Case Title: Alvarez v. Coastal Cmtys. at Ocean Ridge Plantation, Inc

Citation: 

Docket Number: 377A14

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2015-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
NO. COA13-405 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 17 December 2013 
 
 
THOMAS C. WETHERINGTON, 
 
Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Wake County 
No. 11 CVS 3211 
N.C. DEPARTMENT OF CRIME CONTROL & 
PUBLIC SAFETY; NORTH CAROLINA 
HIGHWAY PATROL; 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by Petitioner and Respondent from order entered 14 
December 2012 by Judge Howard E. Manning, Jr. in Superior Court, 
Wake County.  Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 October 2013. 
 
The McGuinness Law Firm, by J. Michael McGuinness, for 
Petitioner. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 
Tamara S. Zmuda, for Respondent. 
 
Richard Hattendorf for the Fraternal Order of Police, 
amicus curiae. 
 
Richard 
C. 
Hendrix 
for 
the 
North 
Carolina 
Troopers 
Association, amicus curiae. 
 
 
McGEE, Judge. 
 
 
Thomas C. Wetherington (“Petitioner”) was employed as a 
trooper 
with 
the 
North 
Carolina 
State 
Highway 
Patrol 
(“Respondent”) on 29 March 2009.  A complaint was filed against 
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Petitioner on 21 May 2009 with the Internal Affairs unit of 
Respondent, alleging that Petitioner had violated Respondent’s 
Truthfulness policy.  Respondent dismissed Petitioner on 4 
August 2009 for violating the Truthfulness policy. 
Petitioner filed a petition for a contested case hearing in 
the Office of Administrative Hearings on 23 October 2009, 
challenging his dismissal.  The administrative law judge (the 
“ALJ”), following a hearing, concluded that the “decision to 
dismiss Petitioner for violations of Respondent’s truthfulness 
policy” was supported by the evidence.  The State Personnel 
Commission (the “SPC”), over a dissent, entered a final decision 
and order adopting the ALJ’s decision on 2 February 2011.  
Petitioner filed a “Petition for Judicial Review and Notice of 
Appeal” on 25 February 2011 from the final decision of the SPC 
in Superior Court, Wake County. 
The superior court reversed the final decision of the SPC 
on 14 December 2012.  The superior court concluded that 
Petitioner’s “unacceptable personal conduct did not rise to the 
level to constitute just cause for dismissal as a matter of 
law.”  The superior court also concluded, as a separate ground, 
that the decision to dismiss Petitioner was arbitrary and 
capricious. 
Petitioner and Respondent appeal. 
-3- 
I. Respondent’s Appeal 
Respondent first argues that the “facts and circumstances 
in this case amount to just cause for the dismissal of 
Petitioner.” 
A. Standard of Review 
 
When this Court reviews appeals from superior court 
reversing the decision of an administrative agency, “our scope 
of review is twofold, and is limited to determining: (1) whether 
the superior court applied the appropriate standard of review 
and, if so, (2) whether the superior court properly applied this 
standard.”  Mayo v. N.C. State Univ., 168 N.C. App. 503, 507, 
608 S.E.2d 116, 120, aff’d per curiam, 360 N.C. 52, 619 S.E.2d 
502 (2005). 
B. Analysis 
 
The superior court may reverse or modify the agency’s 
decision 
if the substantial rights of the petitioners 
may 
have 
been 
prejudiced 
because 
the 
agency’s findings, inferences, conclusions, 
or decisions are: 
 
(1) 
In 
violation 
of 
constitutional 
provisions; 
 
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or 
jurisdiction of the agency; 
 
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure; 
 
(4) Affected by other error of law; 
-4- 
 
(5) 
Unsupported 
by 
substantial 
evidence 
admissible under G.S. 150B-29(a), 150B-30, 
or 150B-31 in view of the entire record as 
submitted; or 
 
(6) Arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-51(b) (2009).1 
In the present case, the superior court concluded that: 
(1) Petitioner’s 
conduct 
“did 
not 
rise 
to 
the 
level 
to 
constitute just cause for dismissal as a matter of law” and 
(2) the decision to dismiss Petitioner was arbitrary and 
capricious. 
The superior court’s first conclusion, on just cause for 
dismissal, refers to an error of law in the SPC’s decision.  
N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(b)(4) (allowing the superior court to reverse 
an agency’s decision on the basis of an error of law).  Where 
“the gravamen of an assigned error is that the agency violated” 
N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(b)(4), the superior court “engages in de novo 
review.”  N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 
N.C. 649, 659, 599 S.E.2d 888, 895 (2004).  Under the de novo 
standard of review, the superior court “consider[s] the matter 
                     
1 The General Assembly amended N.C.G.S. § 150B-51 in 2011 to 
repeal subsections (a) and (a1).  2011 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 398 
§ 27.  The amended statute applies only to “contested cases 
commenced on or after” 1 January 2012.  2011 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 
398 § 63.  The petition for a contested case hearing in this 
case was filed 23 October 2009. 
-5- 
anew[] 
and 
freely 
substitutes 
its 
own 
judgment 
for 
the 
agency’s.”  Id. at 660, 599 S.E.2d at 895 (alterations in 
original). 
In the present case, the superior court stated that whether 
Petitioner’s “conduct constitutes just cause for the discipline 
taken is a question of law and is reviewed de novo.”  As to the 
first prong of our review in Mayo, the superior court applied 
the appropriate de novo standard of review.  We proceed to the 
second prong in Mayo, whether the superior court properly 
applied this standard. 
“Determining whether a public employer had just cause to 
discipline its employee requires two separate inquiries: first, 
whether the employee engaged in the conduct the employer 
alleges, and second, whether the conduct constitutes just cause” 
for the discipline imposed.  Carroll, 358 N.C. at 665, 599 
S.E.2d at 898 (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Just cause, 
like justice itself, is not susceptible of precise definition.  
It is a flexible concept, embodying notions of equity and 
fairness, that can only be determined upon an examination of the 
facts and circumstances of each individual case.”  Id. at 669, 
599 S.E.2d at 900 (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted). 
-6- 
This Court discussed Carroll in Warren v. N.C. Dep’t of 
Crime Control, ___ N.C. App. ___, 726 S.E.2d 920, disc. review 
denied, 366 N.C. 408, 735 S.E.2d 175 (2012).  We concluded in 
Warren “that the best way to accommodate the Supreme Court’s 
flexibility and fairness requirements for just cause is to 
balance the equities after the unacceptable personal conduct 
analysis.”  Id. at ___, 726 S.E.2d at 925. 
Respondent contends that, “based on the balance of equity 
and fairness, and the facts and circumstances of this case, 
including, but not limited to, the importance of truthfulness in 
the [Highway] Patrol, the detailed and prolonged nature of the 
untruth 
and 
Petitioner’s 
pattern 
and 
practice 
of 
being 
untruthful,” there was just cause for dismissal of Petitioner. 
i. Whether Petitioner Engaged in the Conduct Respondent Alleges 
The facts found by the ALJ and adopted by the SPC that are 
relevant to this issue are below:2 
5. On March 29, 2009, Petitioner, while on 
duty, observed a pickup truck pulling a boat 
and made a traffic stop of that truck on US 
70 at approximately 10:00 pm.  During that 
traffic 
stop, 
Petitioner 
discovered 
two 
loaded handguns in the truck and smelled the 
odor of alcohol coming from the interior of 
the truck.  The two male occupants of the 
truck were cooperative and not belligerent.  
                     
2 The record contains only the odd-numbered pages of the ALJ’s 
decision.  However, the complete ALJ decision was in the 
appendix to Respondent’s appellant brief.  Parties are reminded 
to carefully prepare the record. 
-7- 
Petitioner took possession of the handguns.  
At the conclusion of that traffic stop, 
Petitioner proceeded to a stopped car that 
had pulled off to the side of the road a 
short distance in front of the truck and 
boat trailer. 
 
6. 
Petitioner 
testified 
that 
he 
first 
noticed his [trooper] hat missing during his 
approach to the car parked in front of the 
truck.  Petitioner heard a crunch noise in 
the roadway and saw a burgundy eighteen-
wheeler drive by. 
 
7. 
Petitioner 
testified 
that 
after 
the 
conclusion [of] his investigation of the 
stopped 
car, 
he 
looked 
for 
his 
hat.  
Petitioner found the gold acorns from his 
hat in the right hand lane near his patrol 
vehicle. 
 
The 
acorns 
were 
somewhat 
flattened. 
 
. . . . 
 
9. After searching for, but not locating his 
hat, Petitioner contacted Sergeant Oglesby, 
his immediate supervisor, and told him that 
his hat blew off of his head and that he 
could not find it. 
 
. . . . 
 
11. Trooper Rink met Petitioner on the side 
of the road of US 70.  Trooper Rink asked 
Petitioner 
when 
he 
last 
saw 
his 
hat.  
Petitioner said he did not know.  Petitioner 
said 
that 
he 
was 
going 
down 
the 
road . . . and was putting something in his 
seat when he realized he did not have his 
hat.  Petitioner then indicated that he 
turned around and went back to the scene of 
the traffic stops and that is when he found 
the acorns from his hat.  Petitioner was 
very upset and Trooper Rink told Petitioner 
that everybody loses stuff and that if 
Petitioner did not know what happened to his 
-8- 
hat, then he should just tell his Sergeants 
that he didn’t know what happened to it.  
Petitioner replied that it was a little late 
for that because he already had told his 
Sergeant that a truck came by and blew it 
off of his head. 
 
. . . . 
 
13. The testimony of Trooper Rink provides 
substantial evidence that Petitioner did not 
know 
what 
happened 
to 
his 
hat, 
was 
untruthful to Sergeant Oglesby when he said 
it 
blew 
off 
of 
his 
head, 
and 
that 
Petitioner’s untruthfulness was willful. 
 
. . . . 
 
15. The next day, March 30, 2009, Sergeant 
Oglesby and several other members of the 
Patrol looked for Petitioner’s hat. 
 
16. 
Sergeant 
Oglesby 
had 
a 
detailed 
conversation with Petitioner on the side of 
the road regarding how the hat was lost.  
During the conversation, Petitioner remained 
consistent 
with 
his 
first 
statement 
to 
Sergeant Oglesby from the night of March 29, 
2009 as he explained to Sergeant Oglesby 
that a gust of wind blew his hat off of his 
head.  Petitioner continued stating that the 
wind was blowing from the southeast to the 
northwest.  Petitioner said he turned back 
towards the direction of the roadway and saw 
a burgundy eighteen wheeler coming down the 
road so he could not run out in the roadway 
and retrieve his hat.  Petitioner then heard 
a crunch and did not see his hat anymore. 
 
. . . . 
 
18. Petitioner was not truthful to Sergeant 
Oglesby on March 30, 2009, when he explained 
how he lost his hat. 
 
. . . . 
-9- 
 
20. Petitioner testified that, approximately 
three to four days after the loss of the 
hat, he suddenly realized that the hat did 
not blow off of his head, but that he had 
placed the hat on the light bar of his 
Patrol vehicle and it blew off of the light 
bar. 
 
Petitioner 
never 
informed 
any 
supervisors of this sudden realization. 
 
21. Approximately three weeks after the hat 
was lost, Petitioner received a telephone 
call from Melinda Stephens, during which 
Petitioner was informed that her nephew, the 
driver of the truck and boat trailer on 
March 29, 2009, had Petitioner’s hat. 
 
22. Petitioner informed Sergeant Oglesby 
that his hat had been found. 
 
23. 
Petitioner’s 
hat 
subsequently 
was 
returned 
to 
Sergeant 
Oglesby. 
 
When 
returned, the hat was in good condition and 
did not appear to have been run over. 
 
24. 
Due 
to 
the 
inconsistencies 
in 
Petitioner’s statements and the condition of 
the hat, First Sergeant Rock and Sergeant 
Oglesby called Petitioner to come in for a 
meeting.  During the meeting, First Sergeant 
Rock asked Petitioner to clarify that the 
hat blew off of his head that the hat was 
struck by a car.  Petitioner said yes.  
First Sergeant Rock then pulled Petitioner’s 
hat out of the cabinet and told Petitioner 
that his story was not feasible because the 
hat did not appear to have been run over.  
At that point, Petitioner broke down in 
tears and said he wasn’t sure what happened 
to his hat.  He didn’t know if it was on the 
trunk lid of the truck, the boat, or behind 
the light bar, and blew off.  Petitioner 
stated that he told Sergeant Oglesby that 
the hat blew off his head because he 
received 
some 
bad 
counsel 
from 
someone 
regarding what he should say about how the 
-10- 
hat was lost. 
 
25. During his meeting with First Sergeant 
Rock 
and 
Sgt. 
Oglesby, 
Petitioner 
was 
untruthful when he told First Sergeant Rock 
that the hat blew off of his head because by 
Petitioner’s own testimony, three days after 
losing his hat he realized that he placed it 
on his light bar.  However, three weeks 
after the incident, in the meeting with 
First Sergeant Rock and Sergeant Oglesby he 
continued to claim that the hat blew off of 
his head.  It wasn’t until First Sergeant 
Rock 
took 
the 
hat 
out 
and 
questioned 
Petitioner more that Petitioner admitted 
that the hat did not blow off of his head, 
but blew off of the light bar.  Therefore, 
even if Petitioner was confused on March 29, 
2009, as he claims, he still was being 
untruthful to his Sergeants by continuing to 
tell them that the hat blew off of his 
head[.] 
 
. . . . 
 
33. Petitioner’s untruthful statements to 
First Sergeant Rock and Sergeant Oglesby 
were willful and were made to protect 
himself against possible further reprimand 
because 
of 
leaving 
the 
patrol 
vehicle 
without his cover.  (citations omitted). 
 
The superior court concluded that evidence supported the finding 
that Petitioner’s “untruthful conduct fell within the category 
of unacceptable personal conduct under the Administrative Code.”  
Thus, the superior court answered in the affirmative the first 
inquiry in Carroll, whether the employee engaged in the alleged 
conduct.  As to the second inquiry in Carroll (the third inquiry 
-11- 
in Warren), whether the conduct constituted just cause, the 
superior court answered in the negative. 
ii. Determination as to Just Cause 
“Unacceptable 
personal 
conduct 
does 
not 
necessarily 
establish just cause for all types of discipline. . . .  Just 
cause must be determined based ‘upon an examination of the facts 
and circumstances of each individual case.’”  Warren, ___ N.C. 
App. at ___, 726 S.E.2d at 925 (quoting Carroll, 358 N.C. at 
669, 599 S.E.2d at 900). 
In the present case, Petitioner noticed his hat missing 
after a traffic stop.  Petitioner heard a crunch in the roadway 
and saw an eighteen-wheeler drive by.  While searching for his 
hat, Petitioner found the gold acorns from his hat in the right 
hand lane near his patrol vehicle.  The acorns had become 
somewhat flattened.  After searching for his hat, Petitioner 
contacted his immediate supervisor and “told him that his hat 
blew off of his head and that he could not find it.”  The ALJ 
found that Petitioner “was untruthful to Sergeant Oglesby when 
he said it blew off of his head, and that Petitioner’s 
untruthfulness was willful.” 
We review this case using the “commensurate discipline 
approach” described in Warren.  This Court must consider the 
attendant facts and circumstances in accordance with Carroll and 
-12- 
Warren.  After the unacceptable personal conduct analysis, we 
must “balance the equities[.]”  Warren, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 
726 S.E.2d at 925.  “Although there is no bright line test” to 
determine whether an employee’s conduct establishes just cause 
for discipline, “we draw guidance from those prior cases where 
just cause has been found.”  Carroll, 358 N.C. at 675, 599 
S.E.2d at 904. 
Our Supreme Court in Carroll cited cases including, inter 
alia, Kea v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 153 N.C. App. 
595, 570 S.E.2d 919 (2002), aff’d per curiam, 357 N.C. 654, 588 
S.E.2d 467 (2003) (employee violated work rules, disobeyed 
direct order from superior, and made crude and offensive sexual 
advances to a co-worker) and Davis v. N.C. Dep’t of Crime 
Control & Pub. Safety, 151 N.C. App. 513, 565 S.E.2d 716 (2002) 
(highway patrol officer was stopped for speeding and driving 
while intoxicated). 
In 
Carroll, 
our 
Supreme 
Court 
also 
considered 
the 
petitioner’s “extreme emotional stress of knowing that his 
mother, who suffered from Alzheimer’s disease and had recently 
shown signs of congestive heart failure, was being transported 
to the hospital[.]”  Carroll, 358 N.C. at 675, 599 S.E.2d at 
904.  Granting the “influence of the natural bonds of filial 
devotion” on the petitioner’s emotional state and the fact that 
-13- 
others testified they did not take personal offense with 
anything the petitioner did, our Supreme Court concluded that 
the findings do not support a conclusion that the conduct 
amounted to just cause for discipline.  Id. at 675-76, 599 
S.E.2d at 904. 
In balancing the equities of the present case, we consider 
the following facts that the ALJ found and the SPC adopted, in 
addition to the facts already discussed in this opinion.  When 
Petitioner’s superiors confronted him about the inconsistency 
between his answers and the hat’s condition, Petitioner “broke 
down in tears and said he wasn’t sure what happened to his hat.  
He didn’t know if it was on the trunk lid of the [stopped] 
truck, the boat, or behind the light bar, and blew off.” 
Petitioner further stated that “he received some bad 
counsel from someone regarding what he should say about how the 
hat was lost.”  Petitioner indicated he was worried about the 
consequences of conducting a traffic stop without wearing his 
hat, having been reprimanded in the past for failure to wear his 
hat during a traffic stop. 
Respondent contends in its brief that Petitioner “made up 
an elaborate lie full of fabricated details” regarding the 
“specific direction of the wind, the specific color of the truck 
and the noise he heard when the truck ran over his hat.”  
-14- 
However, neither the ALJ nor the SPC made findings indicating 
that the wind, truck’s color, or “crunch noise” were untruthful.  
Rather, the lie or “untruth” lay only in the hat’s location when 
Petitioner misplaced it.  The ALJ found that Petitioner “didn’t 
know if it was on the trunk lid of the truck, the boat, or 
behind the light bar, and blew off.”  The findings do not 
support Respondent’s characterization of Petitioner’s statements 
as an “elaborate lie full of fabricated details[.]” 
The discipline imposed upon Petitioner was dismissal.  As 
the ALJ found, truthfulness “is paramount to the official duties 
of 
a 
law 
enforcement 
officer.” 
 
Respondent’s 
policy 
on 
“Truthfulness” states: 
Members shall be truthful and complete in 
all 
written 
and 
oral 
communications, 
reports, and testimony.  No member shall 
willfully 
report 
any 
inaccurate, 
false, 
improper, or misleading information. 
 
Respondent contends that “[f]rom this point forward, in 
every criminal case in which Petitioner is associated, the 
judicial finding of untruthfulness here and the facts supporting 
that conclusion must be disclosed to the defendant[,]” citing 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 218 (1963) 
(“suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 
material either to guilt or to punishment”). 
-15- 
However, Respondent cites no case to this Court in which 
the State was required to disclose to a criminal defendant 
findings of an officer’s untruthfulness.  Assuming arguendo, 
without deciding, that the State must disclose to future 
criminal defendants the finding of Petitioner’s untruthfulness, 
Respondent’s contention is not entirely accurate.  Respondent 
contends that, after this finding, Petitioner cannot perform the 
essential job duty of testifying “in court in an effort to hold 
the violator accountable for his or her actions.” 
However, Petitioner is not barred from testifying in court.  
Respondent’s argument depends upon at least two assumptions that 
Respondent does not address: (1) that defense counsel will elect 
to impeach Petitioner using the finding; and (2) that defense 
counsel’s impeachment will necessarily influence a jury to the 
point that a jury will disregard the entirety of Petitioner’s 
testimony.  The possibility of impeachment and the possibility 
of the impeachment’s success must both occur in order to 
diminish Petitioner’s performance of the duty to testify 
successfully. 
 
Respondent 
presents 
no 
argument 
that 
the 
likelihood of the two possibilities justifies dismissal. 
Respondent concedes that a trooper is not always the sole 
witness to a violation of the law.  Respondent points to no 
other essential job duties that the finding of untruthfulness 
-16- 
would 
diminish 
or 
impair. 
 
Thus, 
excepting 
the 
above 
possibilities which may diminish Petitioner’s performance of the 
duty to testify successfully, Petitioner can fulfill the duties 
of his office in all other respects, despite the existence of 
this finding. 
The dissenting member of the SPC recited the following 
facts in concluding that Respondent “lacked just cause in this 
particular matter to dismiss Petitioner”: 
(1) 
Petitioner 
had 
just 
conducted 
a 
stressful traffic stop immediately prior to 
the loss of his hat; 
 
(2) 
Petitioner 
did 
not 
attach 
any 
significance, 
nor 
was 
there 
any 
significance, 
to 
a 
hat 
blowing 
off 
a 
Trooper’s head as opposed to his vehicle; 
 
(3) Petitioner found flattened acorns that 
normally are attached to a State Trooper hat 
and surmised that the hat had been crushed; 
and 
 
(4) Petitioner broke down into tears and 
admitted that he didn’t know exactly what 
happened to the hat when his Sergeant 
suggested his story was not feasible. 
 
As the superior court observed in its order, the dissenting 
member of the SPC concluded that “the dismissal of Petitioner 
did not fit the violation and was not necessary to uphold the 
integrity of the truthfulness policy.  In short, the punishment 
did not fit the offense.”  In view of the commensurate 
discipline approach described in Warren and applied in Carroll, 
-17- 
we agree.  Petitioner’s conduct in this case did not rise to the 
level described in Kea and Davis, supra.  Rather, Petitioner’s 
conduct 
and 
the 
existence 
of 
extenuating 
circumstances 
surrounding the conduct make this case comparable to Carroll, in 
which our Supreme Court concluded that the Commission lacked 
just cause to discipline the petitioner. 
The 
superior 
court 
did 
not 
err 
in 
concluding 
that 
Petitioner’s 
conduct 
did 
not 
constitute 
just 
cause 
for 
dismissal.  Because of our conclusion as to this issue, we do 
not address Respondent’s remaining argument. 
II. Petitioner’s Appeal 
 
Petitioner filed a cross appeal as “an alternative basis to 
conclude that there was no just cause for termination[.]”  In 
light of our holding as to the previous issue, we need not 
address an alternative basis to uphold the superior court’s 
order. 
Affirmed. 
Judges BRYANT and STROUD concur.