Case Title: State v. Wharf

Citation: 1999-Ohio-112

Docket Number: 19981925

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-09-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Wharf , 86 Ohio St.3d 375, 1999-Ohio-112.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. WHARF, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Wharf (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 375.] 
Criminal law — Robbery — Deadly weapon element of R.C. 2911.02(A)(1) does 
not require the mens rea of recklessness — It is not necessary to prove a 
specific mental state regarding the deadly weapon element of the offense of 
robbery to establish a violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(1). 
1. 
The deadly weapon element of R.C. 2911.02(A)(1), to wit, “[h]ave a deadly 
weapon on or about the offender’s person or under the offender’s control[,]” 
does not require the mens rea of recklessness. 
2. 
To establish a violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(1), it is not necessary to prove a 
specific mental state regarding the deadly weapon element of the offense of 
robbery. 
(No. 98-1925 — Submitted April 20, 1999 — Decided September 8, 1999.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Warren County, No. CA97-08-087. 
 
On November 12, 1996, appellant, Stephen M. Wharf, was driving an Isuzu 
Trooper (“Isuzu”) that he had stolen from an automobile dealership in Louisville, 
Kentucky.  Appellant drove the Isuzu into a SuperAmerica gas station in Clermont 
County, Ohio, filled the vehicle’s gas tank with gasoline, and drove away from the 
gas station without paying.  Trooper Matt Evans of the Ohio State Highway Patrol 
proceeded, in a police vehicle, to follow the Isuzu shortly after appellant exited the 
gas station.  After receiving a radio dispatch regarding the theft of gasoline from 
the SuperAmerica, Evans activated his “pursuit lights,” signaling appellant to pull 
over.  At that point, the Isuzu accelerated rapidly and appellant led Evans on a 
high-speed chase with speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour and spanning three 
counties.  During the chase, Evans noticed appellant reaching in the backseat of the 
Isuzu for “something.”  That something turned out to be a .22 caliber rifle. 
 
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Evans’s high-speed pursuit of appellant lasted approximately twenty minutes 
and also involved law enforcement personnel from several localities.  The pursuit 
ended when law enforcement officers placed “stop sticks” across the roadway and 
were able to disable the Isuzu by deflating its tires.  Evans testified that when he 
approached the Isuzu to make the arrest, appellant was pointing a rifle at him 
through the vehicle’s passenger side window.  As a result, Evans fired his weapon 
at appellant, striking appellant in the head.  After appellant dropped his rifle, he 
was removed from the Isuzu and placed under arrest. 
 
Appellant was indicted for, among other things, aggravated robbery in 
violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1).  The trial court amended the indictment to 
robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(1).  During trial, appellant proposed a jury 
instruction to the trial court regarding the deadly weapon element of R.C. 
2911.02(A)(1).  The elements of robbery set forth in R.C. 2911.02(A)(1) are that 
“[n]o person, in attempting or committing a theft offense or in fleeing immediately 
after the attempt or offense, shall * * * [h]ave a deadly weapon on or about the 
offender’s person or under the offender’s control.”  Appellant requested an 
instruction that, before the jury could find appellant guilty of robbery, they must 
find that appellant acted recklessly in having a deadly weapon on or about his 
person.  The trial court declined to give the proposed jury instruction. 
 
Appellant was convicted of committing robbery.  On appeal, appellant 
claimed that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that “recklessly” was 
the requisite mental state for the deadly weapon element of robbery in R.C. 
2911.02(A)(1).  The Warren County Court of Appeals disagreed.  In affirming the 
trial court’s judgment, the court of appeals held that no mental condition or actual 
use of a deadly weapon is required pursuant to the statute.  Thereafter, the court of 
appeals determined its judgment to be in conflict with the judgments of the courts 
of appeals in State v. Anthony (Sept. 30, 1994), Lake App. No. 93-L-096, 
 
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unreported, 1994 WL 587882; State v. Gulley (June 17, 1992), Summit App. No. 
15137, unreported, 1992 WL 140006; State v. Steel (Oct. 21, 1997), Defiance App. 
No. 4-96-29, unreported, 1997 WL 661108; and State v. Westbrook (Sept. 23, 
1992), Licking App. No. 92-CA-2, unreported, 1992 WL 307874.  Accordingly, 
the court of appeals entered an order certifying a conflict.  This cause is now 
before this court upon our determination that a conflict exists. 
__________________ 
 
Tim Oliver, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, and Andrew L. Sievers, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Allen & Crossley, L.P.A., and Paige A. Crossley, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  The question certified by the court of appeals is “whether R.C. 
2901.21(B) requires the particular robbery element, codified in R.C. 
2911.02(A)(1), ‘[h]ave a deadly weapon on or about the offender’s person or under 
the offender’s control,’ to be committed with the mens rea of recklessness.”  In 
other words, the issue presented for our determination is whether robbery, as 
defined by R.C. 2911.02(A)(1), requires that, in order to prove the deadly weapon 
element of the offense, it is necessary that the defendant had recklessness as a state 
of mind. 
 
R.C. 2901.21 provides in relevant part: 
 
“(A) Except as provided in division (B) of this section, a person is not guilty 
of an offense unless * * * : 
 
“ * * * 
 
“(2) He has the requisite degree of culpability for each element as to which a 
culpable mental state is specified by the section defining the offense. 
 
“(B) When the section defining an offense does not specify any degree of 
culpability, and plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict criminal liability for the 
 
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conduct described in such section, then culpability is not required for a person to 
be guilty of the offense.  When the section neither specifies culpability nor plainly 
indicates a purpose to impose strict liability, recklessness is sufficient culpability to 
commit the offense.” 
 
As previously mentioned, the offense of robbery is defined in R.C. 2911.02.  
Appellant was convicted of violating R.C. 2911.02(A)(1), which provides: 
 
“No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense or in fleeing 
immediately after the attempt or offense, shall * * * [h]ave a deadly weapon on or 
about the offender’s person or under the offender’s control.” 
 
The parties agree that there is no mental state for culpability specified in 
R.C. 2911.02(A)(1).  Because R.C. 2911.02(A)(1) is silent as to the necessary 
mental state of the offender, the certified question before us can be resolved by 
determining whether this statute plainly indicates an intent on the part of the 
General Assembly to impose strict criminal liability. 
 
Appellant contends that the deadly weapon element set forth in R.C. 
2911.02(A)(1) does not plainly indicate that robbery was intended to be a strict 
liability offense.  In contrast, appellee argues that while the predicate offense to 
robbery, i.e., theft, requires a mental state of knowingly,1 no separate mens rea 
requirement should be read into the deadly weapon element of the offense of 
robbery.  Appellee contends that possession alone of a deadly weapon is sufficient 
to find an offender in violation of the robbery statute. 
 
Our reading of the statute leads us to conclude that the General Assembly 
intended that a theft offense, committed while an offender was in possession or 
control of a deadly weapon, is robbery and no intent beyond that required for the 
theft offense must be proven.  According to the statutory language, possession of a 
deadly weapon is all that is required to elevate a theft offense to robbery.  See State 
v. Merriweather (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 57, 59, 18 O.O.3d 259, 260-261, 413 
 
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N.E.2d 790, 791.2  In fact, R.C. 2911.02(A)(1) provides that the offender need not 
have actual physical possession of the weapon but only that it be “under [his or 
her] control.”  See State v. Brown (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 349, 351, 588 N.E.2d 113, 
114 (citing Chimel v. California [1969], 395 U.S. 752, 762-763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 
2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694, construing the phrase as meaning “the area from within 
which [the offender] might gain possession of a weapon * * * “).  Furthermore, one 
need not have the weapon in one’s possession or under one’s control while 
committing or attempting to commit a theft offense.  A violation of R.C. 
2911.02(A)(1) will also be found if the offender has a deadly weapon on or about 
his person, or under his control, while fleeing after such offense or attempt.  Thus, 
no use, display, or brandishing of a weapon, or intent to do any of the 
aforementioned acts, is necessary according to the plain language of the statute.  
Had the legislature so intended, it certainly could have required a level of conduct 
more severe than it did in order to show a violation of the statute.  Thus, by 
employing language making mere possession or control of a deadly weapon, as 
opposed to actual use or intent to use, a violation, it is clear to us that the General 
Assembly intended that R.C. 2911.02(A)(1) be a strict liability offense. 
 
Furthermore, the 1973 Legislative Service Commission Comment to 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511 clearly indicates that the legislature, in defining the offenses 
of robbery and aggravated robbery, intended to punish the potential for harm to 
persons as well as actual harm.  See Committee Comment to Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
511, R.C. 2911.01 and 2911.02.  In this regard, we find the rationale of State v. 
Edwards (1976), 50 Ohio App.2d 63, 4 O.O.3d 44, 361 N.E.2d 1083, compelling.  
At issue in Edwards was the deadly weapon element of former R.C. 
2911.01(A)(1), which contained essentially the same statutory language at issue 
here.3  The Montgomery County Court of Appeals construed the statutory language 
of former R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), as well as the legislative comments, and held that 
 
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“[a] person who commits a theft offense is guilty of aggravated robbery, * * * if at 
the time he has possession or control of a deadly weapon, even though he does not 
display, use or intend to use such weapon.”  Id. at syllabus.  The Edwards court 
noted that “[t]he thrust and philosophy of [Am.Sub.] H.B. [No.] 511 is to remove 
the potential for harm that exists while one is committing a theft offense.  The anti-
social act is the theft offense, committed while armed with a weapon.  Merely 
having the weapon is the potentially dangerous factual condition warranting the 
more severe penalty.  As to the weapon, no mental condition or actual use is 
necessary or required under the statute.”  (Emphasis in original.)  Id. at 66-67, 4 
O.O.3d at 46, 361 N.E.2d at 1086.  We find the reasoning in Edwards to be 
persuasive. 
 
We are mindful of the appellate court decisions, cited supra, holding that 
“recklessness” is the mental state necessary to prove the deadly weapon element of 
R.C. 2911.02(A)(1).  However, for the following reasons, we find the reasoning 
behind those decisions not persuasive. 
 
The Summit County Court of Appeals in Gulley, the Lake County Court of 
Appeals in Anthony, and the Licking County Court of Appeals in Westbrook based 
their decisions largely on the case of State v. Crawford (1983), 10 Ohio App.3d 
207, 10 OBR 280, 461 N.E.2d 312.  As appellee points out, reliance on Crawford 
in resolving the issue at hand is misplaced.  Crawford involved former R.C. 
2911.01(A)(2), aggravated robbery, which provided in pertinent part that “[n]o 
person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, * * * or in fleeing immediately 
after such attempt or offense, shall * * * [i]nflict, or attempt to inflict serious 
physical harm on another.”  (Emphasis added.)  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511, 134 Ohio 
Laws, Part II, 1866, 1922.  In Crawford, the Hamilton County Court of Appeals 
held “recklessness [to] be the standard which the prosecution must meet in 
proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant inflicted, or attempted to 
 
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inflict, serious physical harm on another.”  Crawford, 10 Ohio App.3d 207, 10 
OBR 280, 461 N.E.2d 312, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the physical harm element of former R.C. 2911.01(A)(2) and the 
deadly weapon element of R.C. 2911.02(A)(1) are not analogous provisions and 
cannot be compared in deciding the question, herein, certified to us for 
determination. 
 
The Defiance County Court of Appeals did not rely on Crawford in reaching 
its decision in the Steel case.  That court instead cited State v. Merriweather 
(1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 57, 18 O.O.3d 259, 413 N.E.2d 790, and State v. McSwain 
(1992), 79 Ohio App.3d 600, 607 N.E.2d 929, for the proposition that recklessness 
was the mental state necessary to prove the deadly weapon element of R.C. 
2911.02(A)(1).  We respectfully disagree.  We find, instead, that Merriweather 
stands for the proposition that “robbery under [former] R.C. 2911.02 [was] not a 
lesser-included offense of the crime of aggravated robbery under [former] R.C. 
2911.01(A)(1).”  Merriweather, 64 Ohio St.2d 57, 18 O.O.3d 259, 413 N.E.2d 790, 
syllabus.  In fact, the court in Merriweather stated, in dictum, that “as long as the 
accused merely possesses a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance during the 
commission of a theft[,]” the accused could be convicted of aggravated robbery 
pursuant to former R.C. 2911.01(A)(1).  Id. at 59, 18 O.O.3d at 261, 413 N.E.2d at 
791.  Conversely, McSwain did involve the “physical harm” element of former 
R.C. 2911.01(A)(2) and, thus, in resolving the issue in McSwain, the Cuyahoga 
County Court of Appeals placed proper reliance on Crawford.  However, we have 
already noted that the premise that Crawford and the physical harm element of 
former R.C. 2911.01(A)(2) are analogous is not well taken. 
 
It is apparent that this case bears out precisely the potential type of harm the 
General Assembly sought to prevent when it enacted R.C. 2911.02(A)(1).  
Appellant committed a relatively minor theft offense.  However, in attempting to 
 
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elude law enforcement officials, the severity of appellant’s unlawful actions and 
the risk of harm quickly escalated due, in large measure, to a deadly weapon being 
readily accessible to appellant.  This was not a case of neglect, innocent mistake, or 
pure accident on the part of appellant.  This was a situation where the potential for 
violence was greatly enhanced because appellant, in fleeing after committing a 
theft offense, had in his possession a firearm. 
 
By making offenders like appellant strictly accountable for this type of 
conduct, the General Assembly clearly had in mind the laudable goal of protecting 
law enforcement officers, but also members of the general public from any 
potential increased risks of harm.  It is axiomatic that an effective means of 
achieving that goal would be the reduction of criminal activity involving the use of 
firearms.  Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the negative and hold 
that the deadly weapon element of R.C. 2911.02(A)(1), to wit, “[h]ave a deadly 
weapon on or about the offender’s person or under the offender’s control[,]” does 
not require the mens rea of recklessness.  In order to prove a violation of R.C. 
2911.02(A)(1), no specific mental state is necessary regarding the deadly weapon 
element of the offense of robbery.  The judgment of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
“Theft” is defined in R.C. 2913.02(A), which provides in part that “[n]o 
person, with purpose to deprive the owner of property or services, shall knowingly 
obtain or exert control over either the property or services in any of the following 
ways:  (1) Without the consent of the owner or person authorized to give consent.” 
 
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2. 
While Merriweather dealt with former R.C. 2911.01, defining “aggravated 
robbery,” the statutory language setting forth the deadly weapon element therein is 
essentially identical to the statutory language regarding the deadly weapon element 
of R.C. 2911.02(A)(1) at issue here.  See infra. 
3. 
Former R.C. 2911.01(A) set forth the elements of aggravated robbery and 
provided in pertinent part that “[n]o person, in attempting or committing a theft 
offense * * * or in fleeing immediately after such attempt or offense, shall * * * (1) 
[h]ave a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance on or about his person or under his 
control.”  See Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511, 134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1866, 1922.