Case Title: WORLEY v. WYOMING BOTTLING CO.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
WORLEY v. WYOMING BOTTLING CO.2000 WY 521 P.3d 615Case Number: 98-123Decided: 03/23/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
JERRY M. WORLEY, 
Appellant (Plaintiff), v.WYOMING BOTTLING COMPANY, INC., 
d/b/a COCA-COLA OF CASPER, Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Natrona County, Honorable Dan Spangler, 
Judge.

Jeffrey C. 
Gosman of Gosman Law Offices, Casper, WY, representing 
appellant.Marvin L. Tyler and B. Joan Dodd of Bussart, West, Rossetti, 
Piaia & Tyler, PC, Rock Springs, WY, representing 
appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Retired November 2, 
1998.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1] Jerry 
Worley contends that, after fifteen and a half years of faithful service, he was 
fired by appellee Wyoming Bottling. In turn, he filed suit claiming breach of 
employment contract, promissory estoppel, breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial 
court granted Wyoming Bottling summary judgment on all claims. Because we 
conclude that disputed issues of material fact remain on Worley's claims for 
breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, we reverse and remand.

ISSUES

[¶2] We adopt 
the statement of issues presented by appellee Wyoming Bottling, Inc. d/b/a 
Coca-Cola of Casper (Wyoming Bottling):

A. Did the trial court 
properly rule that the Appellant was an at-will employee at all times while 
employed by the Appellee?

B. Did the trial court 
properly rule that the Appellant failed to establish a cause of action for 
promissory estoppel?

C. Did the trial court 
properly rule that the Appellant failed to establish a cause of action for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing?

D. Was the trial court 
correct in ruling that the Appellant failed to establish a cause of action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress?

FACTS

[¶3] In accord 
with our standard of review, we present the facts in the light most favorable to 
Worley. When hired by Wyoming Bottling in May of 1980, Worley completed an 
employment application which contained an at-will employment disclaimer. Worley 
assumed the position of sales manager for the soft drink distributorship shortly 
after being hired, where he remained until his claimed firing in January of 
1996. During his tenure, Worley established an exemplary work record, using 
three sick days in fifteen and a half years while earning numerous 
commendations, awards, and raises.

[¶4] Also during 
Worley's tenure, Wyoming Bottling issued other at-will disclaimers. In 1991, 
Worley signed a non-compete agreement which included at-will employment 
language. Additionally, Wyoming Bottling issued an employee handbook in 1993 
which contained several at-will employment disclaimers. The legal effect of 
these disclaimers, as well as the one contained in the 1980 application, is at 
issue in this appeal.

[¶5] In 1995, 
due to increased sales goals and termination threats, Worley's work environment 
became stressful. After Worley's supervisor, area manager Herb McDonald, 
resigned, Worley began to question his own job security and spoke with Joe 
DeCora, the company president, about job security. Worley explained to DeCora 
that he was planning to make some major financial commitments, but first wanted 
to ensure that his job was secure. In his deposition, Worley testified that 
DeCora told him to make the financial commitments; that his job was secure; and 
the job would remain available to Worley as long as he wanted it. Following this 
discussion, Worley met for lunch with DeCora and the recently resigned McDonald. 
During lunch, and in McDonald's presence, DeCora's promise of job security was 
restated, as confirmed by McDonald's affidavit. In the same affidavit, McDonald 
asserts that Worley was the only employee left in the Casper office with the 
ability and experience to run the office until McDonald's successor could be 
found. It thus, McDonald explained, would have been difficult for Wyoming 
Bottling, without Worley, to continue normal operations for some 
time.

[¶6] In December 
of 1995, Worley borrowed $18,000 by refinancing his home loan, using the 
proceeds to purchase a new car and new appliances for his home. Before 
finalizing the loan, Worley checked with his direct supervisor, Butch Gibson, to 
verify that his job performance was satisfactory. According to Worley, Gibson 
stated that everything was fine and "to go on about my affairs." In January of 
1996, Wyoming Bottling demoted Worley one position level to route manager. The 
demotion included the loss of use of a company car, loss of use of a company 
credit card, and an $11,000 reduction in annual salary. Since Gibson had told 
him in December his work was fine, Worley was confused about the demotion and 
contacted DeCora. The parties contest what occurred during that conversation. 
Worley claims that DeCora fired him, repeating it three times in the midst of 
profanity, whereas Wyoming Bottling asserts that Worley 
quit.

[¶7] Worley 
filed suit in January of 1997, claiming breach of employment contract, 
promissory estoppel, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court 
granted summary judgment on all claims in favor of Wyoming Bottling. Worley 
timely appealed.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶8] Summary 
judgment is appropriate if the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party, reveals that no genuine issues of material fact exist and the 
prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Terry v. Pioneer 
Press, Inc., 947 P.2d 273, 275 (Wyo. 1997); Davis v. Wyoming Medical Center, 
Inc., 934 P.2d 1246, 1250 (Wyo. 1997); W.R.C.P. 56(c). A fact is material if it 
establishes or refutes an essential element of a claim or defense. Tidwell v. 
HOM, Inc., 896 P.2d 1322, 1324 (Wyo. 1995). In evaluating summary judgment, we 
apply the same standards as the trial court, without affording any deference to 
the trial court's decisions on issues of law. Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of 
Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 216 (Wyo. 1994).

DISCUSSION

Contract 
Claims

[¶9] Wyoming 
recognizes the at-will employment doctrine, which allows either an employee or 
an employer to end the employment relationship at any time for any reason or for 
no reason. Although employment for an indefinite period of time is presumed to 
be at will, that presumption can be overcome by either an implied-in-fact 
contract or an express contract. Davis, 934 P.2d  at 1249; Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 
217. Worley claims Wyoming Bottling's progressive discipline policy created an 
implied-in-fact employment contract. Alternatively, Worley claims that he 
entered into an express oral contract with DeCora.

Implied-in-fact 
Contract

[¶10] When 
parties act in a manner conveying mutual agreement and an intent to promise, an 
implied-in-fact contract may arise. Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 216. The consideration 
for such a contract, in the employment context, consists of the benefit to the 
employer in "an orderly, cooperative and loyal work force." Leithead v. American 
Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1062-63 (Wyo. 1986) (citing Mobil Coal Producing, 
Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 707 (Wyo. 1985)); Garcia v. UniWyo Federal Credit 
Union, 920 P.2d 642, 645 (Wyo. 1996). We examine, under an objective test, 
whether the employer has intended, either by words or conduct, to include job 
security as part of an implied contract. Terry v. Pioneer Press, Inc., 947 P.2d  
at 275; McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 820 P.2d 986, 990 (Wyo. 1991). 
"An employment handbook or personnel policies, letters of employment, 
performance evaluations and an employer's course of dealing may supply terms for 
an implied-in-fact employment contract which requires termination for cause only 
unless it contains a sufficient disclaimer." Bear v. Volunteers of America, 
Wyoming, Inc., 964 P.2d 1245, 1250 (Wyo. 1998); Lincoln v. Wackenhut Corp., 867 P.2d 701, 703 (Wyo. 1994); Sanchez v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., 855 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶11] A valid, 
conspicuous, and unambiguous disclaimer notifying employees of their at-will 
employment status can preclude a progressive discipline policy from forming an 
implied contract. Andrews v. Southwest Wyoming Rehabilitation Center, 974 P.2d 948, 951 (Wyo. 1999); Sanchez, 855 P.2d  at 1258-59. "We determine as a matter of 
law whether or not a disclaimer is conspicuous." Arch of Wyoming, Inc. v. 
Sisneros, 971 P.2d 981, 984 (Wyo. 1999) (citing McDonald v. Mobil Coal 
Producing, Inc., 820 P.2d at 988). In making that determination, we look at, 
inter alia, the disclaimer's prominence and placement. McDonald, 820 P.2d  at 
989; Lincoln, 867 at 703-04.

[¶12] A review 
of Worley's 1980 application reveals that the disclaimer does not occupy a 
paragraph of its own, but rather follows a sentence authorizing the employer to 
investigate statements made in the application, along with notice that 
misrepresentation or omission of facts is cause for dismissal. Wyoming Bottling 
did not prominently locate the disclaimer with either a heading, subheading, or 
any type of border, but blended the disclaimer into the rest of the information 
without bolding, capitalization, or use of other means to separate it from the 
other text. In Sanchez, 855 P.2d  at 1259, we held a similar disclaimer was not 
sufficiently conspicuous. We conclude that the disclaimer language in Worley's 
1980 employment application is ineffective as a matter of 
law.

[¶13] Worley 
presented evidence that Wyoming Bottling's discipline policy, prior to the 
issuance of the later at-will disclaimers, proceeded with progressive steps 
before terminating employees. Viewing this evidence in Worley's favor, such a 
policy may have fettered Wyoming Bottling's right to discharge Worley at any 
time without cause. Genuine issues of fact persist regarding the discipline 
policy, including its terms and its extent, whether the policy was followed by 
Wyoming Bottling, and ultimately whether a contract was 
formed.

[¶14] Wyoming 
Bottling also relies upon additional disclaimers, including those issued in a 
1991 non-compete agreement and a 1993 employee handbook. An employer can use a 
valid disclaimer, such as in an employee handbook, to reinstate an employee's 
at-will employment status. Jewell v. North Big Horn Hosp. Dist., 953 P.2d 135, 
138 (Wyo. 1998). However, if the disclaimer modifies an existing employment 
contract requiring termination for cause, the employer must provide 
consideration to make the disclaimer effective. Brodie v. General Chemical 
Corp., 934 P.2d 1263, 1267-68 (Wyo. 1997). Accordingly, if Worley is able to 
overcome the presumption that his employment was at-will prior to the 1991 and 
1993 disclaimers, then Wyoming Bottling must have provided consideration to 
alter his employment status back to at-will. Brodie, 934 P.2d  at 1265, 
n.1.

[¶15] Wyoming 
Bottling neither argues nor directs our attention to any evidence in the record 
that would establish the requisite consideration. In fact, the only evidence in 
the record on this subject establishes not consideration, but coercion. Worley 
testified in his deposition that he was forced to sign the 1991 non-compete 
agreement under the threat of being fired. In addition, in 1993, Wyoming 
Bottling threatened to withhold $100 from its employees' pay checks if they did 
not sign the at-will disclaimer contained in the employee handbook. With 
material issues of fact to be resolved as to the status of Worley's original 
employment status, and no consideration apparent for the later disclaimers, 
summary judgment was improper on Wyoming Bottling's implied-in-fact contract 
claim.

Express 
Contract

[¶16] Worley 
also claims his employment status was governed by an express oral contract. As 
previously stated, an express contract can overcome the presumption that 
employment for an indefinite period of time is at will. Davis, 934 P.2d  at 1249. 
Parties can declare the terms of an express contract either orally or in 
writing. Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 216. However, absent language that explicitly 
promises job security, an employee merely has a subjective understanding and 
expectation, which does not provide the basis for an employment contract. Bear 
v. Volunteers of America, Wyoming, Inc., 964 P.2d  at 1250-51. "Whether an oral 
contract exists, the terms and conditions of the oral contract and the intent of 
the parties are generally questions of fact." Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 218; Shaw v. 
Smith, 964 P.2d 428, 435 (Wyo. 1998). "Interpretation of the terms of an oral 
contract becomes a question of law only when they are shown without any conflict 
in the evidence." Shaw v. Smith, 964 P.2d  at 435.

[¶17] Worley 
asserts that during a conversation with DeCora, he entered into an express oral 
contract. In his deposition, Worley testified that he grew tired of job 
uncertainty and confronted DeCora with his intent to quit. DeCora responded: 
"Your job is secure. You can have that job for as long as you want it." Wyoming 
Bottling accepted Worley's version of events for summary judgment purposes and, 
therefore, does not contest that DeCora told Worley he had a job as long as he 
wanted it. However, Wyoming Bottling contests whether these statements 
constitute a clear, definite, and mutual agreement.1 Viewing the record in the light 
most favorable to Worley, we conclude issues of fact remain whether a mutual 
agreement existed and whether the parties intended to enter into an express 
contract. Wilder, 868 P.2d at 218-20; Leithead, 721 P.2d  at 
1062-63.

[¶18] 
Nevertheless, Worley must establish that he provided Wyoming Bottling with 
additional consideration to sustain an express oral employment contract altering 
the at-will presumption. Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 218 (holding that employer promise 
of "permanent" employment does not alter the at-will presumption without 
additional consideration supplied by the employee or explicit language in the 
contract of employment stating that termination may only be for cause); Bear v. 
Volunteers of America, Wyoming, Inc., 964 P.2d  at 1250. A generally accepted 
definition of consideration is that a legal detriment has been bargained for and 
exchanged for a promise. Loghry v. Unicover Corp., 927 P.2d 706, 712 (Wyo. 1996) 
(citing Moorcroft State Bank v. Morel, 701 P.2d 1159, 1161-62 (Wyo. 1985)). 
Detriment means giving up something which immediately prior thereto the promisee 
was privileged to keep. Id. In this case, Worley claims, and his deposition 
testimony supports, that he intended to quit if he did not receive a promise of 
job security.2 Although Wyoming Bottling does not 
dispute the facts, it argues that Worley gave nothing up as consideration to 
support the contract because, even after his talk with DeCora, Worley was still 
free to leave at any time. Essentially, their argument is that there was no 
mutuality of obligation or that Worley's consideration was illusory. However, 

The demand for mutuality 
of obligation, although appealing in its symmetry, is simply a species of the 
forbidden inquiry into the adequacy of consideration, an inquiry in which this 
court has, by and large, refused to engage.

[¶19] Pine River 
State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983). Worley testified that 
he agreed to stay on when he was free to leave. There being a question whether 
this consideration was bargained for, we conclude that Worley provided 
sufficient evidence on the issue of consideration to survive summary 
judgment.

[¶20] Assuming 
Worley and Wyoming Bottling entered into an employment contract (either express 
or implied) allowing termination only for cause, a question also remains whether 
Worley was discharged for cause. Wyoming Bottling claims Worley was terminated 
for violating three personnel policies. Worley counters that termination for 
these violations was pretextual since the alleged violations were common, 
ordinary practices, and two fellow employees corroborated his claim. Whether an 
employee has been terminated for cause is generally a question of fact and, 
thus, summary judgment is premature under these disputed facts. See Jewell, 953 P.2d  at 139; Abell v. Dewey, 847 P.2d 36, 41 (Wyo. 1993).

Promissory 
Estoppel

[¶21] Worley 
also presented promissory estoppel as an affirmative claim for relief. Although 
numerous Wyoming cases have discussed promissory estoppel in the employment 
context, this court has yet to find an appropriate case in which to adopt the 
theory. Terry v. Pioneer Press, Inc., 947 P.2d  at 277; Loghry, 927 P.2d at 
710-11; Garcia v. UniWyo Federal Credit Union, 920 P.2d  at 647; see also Bouwens 
v. Centrilift, 974 P.2d 941, 945, 947 (Wyo. 1999) (discussing precedential value 
of McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 789 P.2d 866 (Wyo. 1990) (McDonald 
I), and McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 820 P.2d 986 (Wyo. 1991) 
(McDonald II)). The case before us presents an appropriate fact pattern, and we 
adopt promissory estoppel as a theory of recovery in this context. This probably 
comes as no surprise to the practicing bar, given the number of opinions in 
which promissory estoppel is discussed, yet not embraced.

[¶22] Promissory 
estoppel provides relief for an "injury arising from actions or declarations 
which have been acted on in good faith and which would be inequitable to permit 
a party to retract." Davis v. Davis, 855 P.2d 342, 347-48 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting 
Jankovsky v. Halladay Motors, 482 P.2d 129, 132 (Wyo. 1971)). In the employment 
context, promissory estoppel works to prevent injustice to employees who in good 
faith detrimentally rely upon an employer's actions, in turn binding the 
employer to fulfill a promise to an employee despite the lack of an employment 
contract. Promissory estoppel may be useful when, because of lack of 
consideration, an employee is unable to bring a breach of contract claim. As 
long as a promise is present, promissory estoppel can be used to satisfy the 
consideration element. Terry v. Pioneer Press, Inc., 947 P.2d  at 277 (citing 1 
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Employee Dismissal Law And Practice § 4.39 (3d ed. 
1992)).

[¶23] Promissory 
estoppel is detailed in the Restatement, Second, Contracts § 90(1) (1981), which 
we recently quoted:

A promise which the 
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of 
the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance 
is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The 
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice 
requires.

[¶24] Bouwens v. 
Centrilift, 974 P.2d  at 947; Michie v. Board of Trustees of Carbon County School 
Dist. No. 1, 847 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Wyo. 1993). The required elements of a 
promissory estoppel claim are: the existence of a clear and definite agreement; 
proof that the party urging the doctrine acted to its detriment in reasonable 
reliance on the agreement; and the equities support the enforcement of the 
agreement. Loghry, 927 P.2d  at 710; Michie, 847 P.2d  at 1009. Whether elements 
one and two exist are questions for the finder of fact. Michie, 847 P.2d  at 
1009. Whether element three is satisfied is decided as a matter of law by the 
court. Id.

[¶25] Relying on 
his deposition testimony, Worley asserts that DeCora promised job security by 
telling Worley he could have his job as long as he wanted it in exchange for 
staying when the company needed his services. We agree with Worley that this 
evidence is sufficient, at the summary judgment stage, to establish the 
existence of a promise of job security. Compare Terry v. Pioneer Press, Inc., 
947 P.2d  at 277 ("The distinction between representing that a person will have 
`a job,' as compared to `a permanent job,' is critical and proves fatal to 
Terry's claim.")

[¶26] Along with 
demonstrating the existence of a promise, Worley must also establish "action or 
forbearance of a definite and substantial character" to satisfy element two. 
Loghry, 927 P.2d  at 710. Here, Worley's reliance is demonstrated by his 
procurement of a loan following DeCora's assurance of job security. In fact, 
Worley's deposition testimony establishes that Worley "wasn't [going to buy] 
anything until [he] had job security." We again conclude an issue of material 
fact is presented regarding this element.

[¶27] 
Regardless, a claim for promissory estoppel may fail if a disclaimer, such as 
one in an employee handbook, makes the employee's reliance on the promise 
unreasonable. Bouwens, 974 P.2d  at 947. "Disclaimer provisions are enforceable 
against promissory estoppel claims." Davis v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc., 934 P.2d  at 1252; see Loghry, 927 P.2d  at 711. We have previously stated that an 
employee's reliance on sources unauthorized to grant job security is 
unreasonable. Davis, 934 P.2d  at 1252; Loghry, 927 P.2d  at 
709-11.

[¶28] Worley's 
situation, however, is distinguishable from either Davis or Loghry. Here, for 
example, one of Wyoming Bottling's disclaimers stated, "[w]ords or actions which 
are inconsistent with these rights, by any company employee or representative 
except the president, are not authorized and may not be relied upon." (Emphasis 
added.) Worley claims that DeCora, the company president authorized to provide 
such assurances, made the job security representation. If DeCora did make such a 
promise, then Worley's belief may be considered reasonable, and he arguably 
acted in justifiable reliance on DeCora's promise. The disclaimer, therefore, 
does not defeat Worley's promissory estoppel claim, and we conclude that summary 
judgment was improper.

Covenant of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing

[¶29] Wyoming 
recognizes a limited tort claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing in employment contracts. Loghry, 927 P.2d  at 712; Wilder, 868 P.2d  
at 221; Townsend v. Living Centers Rocky Mountain, Inc., 947 P.2d 1297, 1299 
(Wyo. 1997). Because this cause of action sounds in tort, we employ traditional 
tort principles in our analysis. Fundamentally, this tort requires there be a 
duty and a breach thereof.

[¶30] Our first 
inquiry is whether a duty exists. "[A]lthough a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing is created by law in all cases, it is only in rare and exceptional cases 
that the duty is of such a nature as to give rise to tort liability." Wilder, 
868 P.2d  at 221 (quoting K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1370 (Nev. 
1987)). A duty arises only where a special relationship of trust and reliance 
exists between the employer and the employee seeking recovery. Loghry, 927 P.2d  
at 712; Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 222. Whether a special relationship exists is a 
question of fact, not a question of law, and is to be decided by the trier of 
fact unless reasonable minds could not differ. Jewell v. North Big Horn Hosp. 
Dist., 953 P.2d  at 139. Previous cases indicate some of the sources that may 
give rise to a special relationship include separate consideration, common law, 
statutory rights, or the existence of rights accruing with longevity of service. 
Loghry, 927 P.2d  at 712; Springer v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Wyoming, 944 P.2d 1173, 1178 (Wyo. 1997); Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 221; VanLente v. University of 
Wyoming Research Corp., 975 P.2d 594, 598 (Wyo. 1999).

[¶31] To support 
his claim of a special relationship, Worley relies on separate consideration. We 
begin our analysis by tracing the history of separate consideration in this 
context. The idea of a special relationship of trust and reliance based on 
separate consideration first appeared in Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 221. There, citing 
to Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (Cal.App. 1980), 
this court wrote that "[t]rust and reliance may be found by the existence of 
separate consideration, common law, statutory rights, or rights accruing with 
longevity of service." Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 221. A closer look at Cleary reveals 
that decision did not rely on separate consideration. Instead, the California 
court held "that the longevity of the employee's service [18 years], together 
with the expressed policy [regarding grievances and discharge] of the employer, 
operates as a form of estoppel, precluding any discharge of such an employee by 
the employer without good cause." 168 Cal. Rptr.  at 729.

[¶32] The 
preceding Wilder quote was taken from the following discussion in 
Cleary:

As was concluded by a 
commentator in 26 Stanford Law Review at (see fn. 3), "(t)he existence of 
separate consideration, the common law of the job, and rights accruing through 
longevity are all factors for courts to consider in evaluating whether an 
implied contractual right to job security exists."

[¶33] 168 Cal. Rptr.  at 729. This passage from Cleary contemplates separate consideration 
in support of an implied contract and does not reference the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing.

[¶34] Shifting 
our focus to the quoted law review article, we quote that 
article:

The rule that permanent 
employment arrangements are indefinite and hence unenforceable created serious 
inequities when the clear intent of the parties was to bind the employer. To 
correct this situation the courts recognized an exception to the rule when an 
employee gave extra consideration for the job.

[¶35] J. Peter 
Shapiro & James F. Tune, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 
Stan.L.Rev. 335, 351 (1974).3 This article relied on, inter alia, 
a Minnesota case, Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 266 N.W. 872 (Minn. 1936), 
for this proposition. The Minnesota Supreme Court looks at the following for 
separate consideration:

[A] contract for 
"permanent employment" will be construed to be terminable at the will of either 
party except in compelling circumstances, such as where the employee in effect 
purchases the permanent employment by giving a valuable consideration other than 
his customary daily services or otherwise giving up more than one normally gives 
up when he agrees to take on new employment.

[¶36] Bussard v. 
College of Saint Thomas, Inc., 200 N.W.2d 155, 161 (Minn. 1972); see also Pine 
River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d  at 628-29.

[¶37] This rule 
is essentially the same rule as found in the Wilder discussion concerning 
additional consideration to form an express contract. 868 P.2d  at 218-19. Given 
the genesis of separate consideration from Cleary, we conclude the analysis for 
separate consideration to support a special relationship should be the same as 
that used to determine whether there exists additional consideration necessary 
to support an express contract.

[¶38] In Loghry, 
our only case discussing separate consideration in the context of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, our analysis was consistent with Cleary and the 
sources it relied on. The employee in Loghry contended that the special 
relationship existed by virtue of separate consideration given when she turned 
over files to a vice president (Hilt) of her employer's sister corporation and 
did not inform her supervisor that the supervisor was the object of an 
investigation. In rejecting Loghry's claim, we wrote: "Loghry's assertion that 
she acted when she did not have to does not constitute valid consideration since 
there is no dispute that she was required to turn over company documents at the 
request of a company officer. She does not contend that she gave up an 
obligation to inform her supervisor of Hilt's request. Without a demonstration 
of legal detriment, Loghry does not establish the existence of separate 
consideration." 927 P.2d  at 712. To establish separate consideration, the Loghry 
court thus required something more than merely performing the duties of the 
job.

[¶39] To 
establish his claim of separate consideration, Worley relies on the same 
consideration he claims he provided to form an express employment contract. 
Worley asserts he intended to quit unless he could obtain job security. We have 
previously concluded this additional consideration is sufficient to preclude 
summary judgment on Worley's cause of action based on express contract. We 
conclude it likewise creates a question whether Worley provided separate 
consideration.

[¶40] Besides 
separate consideration, the evidence establishes other facts that could lead to 
a finding of a special relationship. Wyoming Bottling does not dispute that 
fifteen and a half years constitutes long term employment. Both DeCora and 
Gibson knew Worley was relying on DeCora's promise of job security and 
supervisor Gibson's later reassurances that "everything was fine" to make major 
purchases. Moreover, the evidence supports Worley's contention that he did rely 
on these assurances when deciding to refinance his home and make major 
purchases. There was also evidence that Worley was not just an average employee. 
In fact, an argument can be made that he was vital to Wyoming Bottling, 
especially at the time of his conversation with DeCora regarding job security. 
In his affidavit, Worley's former supervisor, McDonald, states that Worley was 
the only employee left in the Casper office with the ability and experience to 
run the office until McDonald's successor could be found. According to McDonald, 
it would have been difficult for Wyoming Bottling, without Worley, to continue 
normal operations for some time. This finds support in Worley's testimony that 
he filled McDonald's position of area manager on numerous occasions when the 
position was vacant. Viewing all this evidence in the light most favorable to 
Worley, we conclude reasonable minds may differ whether Worley established a 
special relationship of trust and reliance between himself and Wyoming Bottling. 
Jewell, 953 P.2d  at 139; compare Sears v. Amoco Production Co., 967 F. Supp. 1222, 1230-31 (D.Wyo. 1997).

[¶41] Having 
concluded that a special relationship of trust and reliance could be found to 
exist based on these facts, the next question is whether Wyoming Bottling 
breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing. A breach of the covenant will 
generally be found only in cases involving egregious conduct that ordinary 
contract principles cannot remedy. In the seminal case of K Mart Corp. v. 
Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1370 (Nev. 1987), the Nevada Supreme Court wrote: "Tort 
remedies are allowed here only because K Mart's conduct goes well beyond the 
bounds of ordinary liability for breach of contract." In essence, the 
determination of whether the implied covenant has been breached is a question of 
whether the employer acted in bad faith.

[¶42] Our 
previous cases have addressed the covenant primarily in the context of longevity 
of service, where we have made it clear that lengthy employment coupled with 
termination is insufficient to establish a breach of the implied covenant. 
Garcia, 920 P.2d  at 646; Jewell v. North Big Horn Hosp. Dist., 953 P.2d  at 139; 
VanLente v. University of Wyoming Research Corp., 975 P.2d  at 598; Terry v. 
Pioneer Press, Inc., 947 P.2d  at 278. Usually, "the special relationship giving 
employees an action on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing stems 
from a long term employment relationship coupled with a discharge calculated to 
avoid employer responsibilities to the employee, e.g., benefits or commissions." 
Garcia, 920 P.2d  at 646 (citing Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Mass. 1977) and K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 
1366-69 (Nev. 1987)); VanLente, 975 P.2d  at 598; Terry v. Pioneer Press, Inc., 
947 P.2d  at 278. 

[¶43] In Wilder, 
we provided examples of the type of conduct that could constitute a breach of 
the implied covenant. 868 P.2d  at 220-22. While, due to the infinite variety of 
human interaction, recovery is by no means limited to these examples, two 
general scenarios have emerged. Wilder first cited Fortune v. National Cash 
Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255-58 (Mass. 1977), where a twenty-five year 
employee was fired to avoid paying bonuses due him on a large sale he had just 
completed. 868 P.2d  at 220-21. The second example found in Wilder was the Nevada 
case of K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d  at 1366, where a nine and a half year 
contract employee was fired, for trivial reasons, six months prior to the time 
his pension was scheduled to fully vest.4 As Wilder teaches, in order to 
establish that the implied covenant has been breached, most commonly the 
employee must have been terminated to avoid payment of commissions or benefits 
already earned, or to avoid payment of benefits scheduled to arise or vest in 
the near future. See also Masso v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 610, 614 (D.Mass. 1995); Coll v. PB Diagnostic Systems, Inc., 50 F.3d 1115, 1125 (1st Cir. 1995); Kelley v. City of Mesa, 873 F. Supp. 320, 329 
(D.Ariz. 1994). But see Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 111 S. Ct. 478, 112 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1990) (holding that ERISA preempts state law wrongful 
discharge claim based on termination to avoid pension fund 
payments).

[¶44] Worley 
argues his firing was calculated to avoid payment of employment benefits, 
including contributions to his retirement account and salary commensurate with 
his length of service. Worley does not contend that he is being denied benefits 
or salary he has already earned. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d  at 1257. Nor does he contend that he was fired shortly before some type 
of benefit was scheduled to accrue or vest. K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d  at 
1366. Instead, Worley relies on Jewell, the only case decided by this court in 
which a claim based on breach of the implied covenant has survived summary 
judgment. Jewell, 953 P.2d  at 139. In Jewell, the employee of thirty years was 
commanding a large salary thanks to her longevity as well as overtime pay. 
"Because of budgetary problems, Jewell's overtime and her requests for a 
scheduled pay raise had caused a conflict between her and Chief Executive 
Officer Kellersberger. . . . Her overtime had also been the subject of 
discussion among Kellersberger's management team which viewed it as excessive 
and unwarranted." 953 P.2d  at 136-37. Thus, the Jewell court concluded that "the 
record establishes that a jury could reasonably decide that Jewell was 
improperly discharged for the purpose of denying her a scheduled pay raise and 
other possible benefits associated with her longevity." 953 P.2d  at 139. In this 
case, there is no material issue of fact regarding whether the covenant has been 
breached because there is simply no evidence that Worley was discharged in order 
to deny benefits. Summary judgment on this cause of action is 
affirmed.

Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress

[¶45] We 
recognize the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress as stated in 
Restatement, Second, Torts § 46(1) (1965): 

[¶46] One who by 
extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe 
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional 
distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily 
harm.

[¶47] Wilder, 
868 P.2d at 223-24; Leithead, 721 P.2d  at 1065. We have acknowledged that 
certain conduct in employment situations may be outrageous enough to provide the 
employee with a basis of recovery. Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1341 (Wyo. 
1997); Leithead, 721 P.2d  at 1066; Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 223-24. However, despite 
an employee's success in showing severe emotional distress as a result of 
termination, recovery may still be unattainable in some cases. "If an employee's 
mental distress is caused solely by his discharge, and if the discharge was 
permitted in his contract, then the employer has a complete defense, even if the 
employer is aware that the discharge will cause emotional distress." Terry v. 
Pioneer Press, Inc., 947 P.2d 273, 278 (Wyo. 1997); see also Leithead, 721 P.2d  
at 1066; Restatement, Second, Torts, § 46, cmt. g. At the crux of this case is 
whether Wyoming Bottling was permitted to terminate 
Worley.

[¶48] To recover 
under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff 
must prove that the defendant acted in an extreme and outrageous manner and that 
the defendant intentionally or recklessly caused the plaintiff severe emotional 
harm. Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d  at 1341 (Wyo. 1997) (citing R.D. v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26, 31 (Wyo. 1994)). Comment d of the Restatement, Second, Torts § 46, 
which we have cited on numerous occasions, attempts to clarify the parameters of 
outrageous behavior. See Hatch v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 930 P.2d 382, 
396 (Wyo. 1997); Spurlock v. Ely, 707 P.2d 188, 192 (Wyo. 1985); Garcia v. 
Lawson, 928 P.2d 1164, 1168 (Wyo. 1996) (Thomas, J., concurring specially); 
Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d  at 1341. We quote from that 
comment:

Extreme and outrageous 
conduct. The cases thus far decided have found liability only where the 
defendant's conduct has been extreme and outrageous. It has not been enough that 
the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or 
that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has 
been characterized by "malice," or a degree of aggravation which would entitle 
the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found 
only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in 
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as 
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case 
is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the 
community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to 
exclaim, "Outrageous!"

[¶49] The 
liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, 
annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. The rough edges of our 
society are still in need of a good deal of filing down, and in the meantime 
plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain 
amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely 
inconsiderate and unkind. There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every 
case where some one's feelings are hurt. There must still be freedom to express 
an unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must be left through which 
irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam.

[¶50] Both the 
court and the jury play a role in assessing the validity of a claim of 
outrageousness.

[¶51] It is for 
the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct 
may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, 
or whether it is necessarily so. Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the 
jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the 
particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to 
result in liability.

[¶52] Kanzler v. 
Renner, 937 P.2d  at 1341 (quoting Restatement, Second, Torts § 46, cmt. h); 
Leithead, 721 P.2d  at 1066.

[¶53] In Wilder, 
868 P.2d  at 223, we considered the allegations of outrageous conduct from two 
points in time: conduct prior to and at the time of termination; and conduct 
following termination. In Worley's case, however, we limit our focus to the 
conduct of Wyoming Bottling prior to and at the time of Worley's 
termination.

[¶54] First, 
there is evidence from the months preceding Worley's termination that helps 
establish the claim of outrageous behavior. Worley advances that during this 
time, despite his stellar work record, Wyoming Bottling harassed him by 
repeatedly threatening to terminate his employment, by demanding impossibly 
large increases in sales, and by withholding a periodic pay raise. In addition, 
Worley and his coworkers were humiliated and vilified for minor infractions. 
Overall, McDonald, Worley's former coworker, described the situation as a 
"living hell."

[¶55] Three days 
prior to his claimed termination, Worley received a letter stating he would be 
demoted to route manager accompanied by an $11,000 cut in pay, the loss of use 
of a company car, and the loss of other perquisites. Worley testified that he 
attempted to discuss his demotion with Gibson, his supervisor, but Gibson told 
him he should just go ahead and quit because he would probably be fired in two 
or three weeks anyway. In addition, Worley asserted that Gibson told 
him:

I will make it so tough 
on you, you would have wished you would have quit. . . . You think your job was 
tough before; its going to be really tough now.

[¶56] Worley 
then asked Gibson if he could call DeCora. Worley testified that Gibson 
responded:

If you call Mr. DeCora, 
he will C then he stopped. And then he says, You can call Mr. DeCora if you want 
to.

[¶57] Worley 
stated that when he telephoned DeCora to talk about his demotion, DeCora told 
him:

You either accept it [the 
demotion] or you're fired. And he said it again, You're fired. You're just 
fired. I'm tired of your goddamn shit anyway, stupid silly ass shit. You're 
fired.

[¶58] DeCora 
also told Worley: "Get your shit and get the hell out of there." When Worley 
finished his call with DeCora, he told Gibson that DeCora had just fired him. It 
was only then that Gibson told him: "That was the ending of the statement that I 
was going to make; that if you called him, he would fire 
you."

[¶59] None of 
these facts, standing alone, convinces us that Wyoming Bottling's conduct was 
outrageous. Indeed, "[t]he workplace is not always a tranquil world where 
civility reigns. Personality conflicts and angst over disciplinary actions can 
be expected." Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat'l Management Co. v. Weathersby, 607 A.2d 8, 16 (Md. 1992). Regardless, we must also examine the context and 
background in which these events took place. Swenson v. Northern Crop Ins., 
Inc., 498 N.W.2d 174, 186 (N.D. 1993); Pavilon v. Kaferly, 561 N.E.2d 1245, 1252 
(Ill.App. 1990).

[¶60] In 
examining context, a number of courts have recognized the employer-employee 
relationship as a significant factor in determining outrageousness. Kentucky 
Fried Chicken Nat'l Management Co. v. Weathersby, 607 A.2d  at 15 (collecting 
cases). "It is only natural that a defendant's position of power over a 
plaintiff may enhance his or her ability to do harm." Id. Comment e to § 46 of 
the Restatement Second also recognizes this reality:

The extreme and 
outrageous character of the conduct may arise from an abuse by the actor of a 
position, or a relation with the other, which gives him actual or apparent 
authority over the other, or power to affect his 
interests.

[¶61] 
Nevertheless, liability does not attach upon the mere existence of an employment 
relationship. On this issue, we are in accord with the Maryland Court of 
Appeals:

We agree that the 
employment relationship is a factor to be considered when analyzing whether an 
employer's behavior was so outrageous that he or she has committed the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. That does not mean, however, that 
this Court wishes to lower the threshold for determining liability whenever the 
parties are employer and employee. The conduct must still reach the same degree 
of outrageousness if an employee is to prove that his or her employer has 
committed this tort; the employment relationship is merely one factor among many 
to use in analyzing individual cases.

Kentucky Fried 
Chicken Nat'l Management Co. v. Weathersby, 607 A.2d  at 
15.

[¶62] In this 
case, Wyoming Bottling's position of power over Worley, especially given 
DeCora's and Gibson's assurances of job security, could be viewed as an 
important factor. Likewise, the fact that Wyoming Bottling knew Worley was 
relying on these assurances in making financial commitments furnishes added 
impetus for Worley's claim. Thus, the previously stated facts (those describing 
Worley's termination and the months prior thereto), although not outrageous in 
and of themselves, are more compelling when considered in the context of the 
unique employment relationship between Worley and Wyoming 
Bottling.

[¶63] We 
acknowledge that this is a close case. However, we are persuaded that, given all 
the facts and circumstances, the cumulative effect of Worley's evidence is 
sufficient such that reasonable minds may differ as to whether the conduct is 
outrageous, precluding summary judgment. See Pavilon v. Kaferly, 561 N.E.2d  at 
1251-52 (cumulative pattern of conduct used to establish outrageousness). 
Nevertheless, we must still address whether Worley has sufficiently established 
the second prong of his claim, emotional distress, in order to preclude summary 
judgment.

[¶64] Comment j 
to Restatement, Second, Torts § 46(1) defines emotional distress 
as

all highly unpleasant 
mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, 
embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea. It is only 
where it is extreme that the liability arises.

[¶65] In 
Leithead, this court noted the employee's emotional distress must go above and 
beyond the normal distress that arises from loss of a job: "The ordinary person 
who is fired from his job might worry about his future and his ability to pay 
his bills. He might also lose sleep over it. But this is the kind of distress 
with which the ordinary person must be expected to cope." Id. at 1067; Wilder, 
868 P.2d  at 223.

[¶66] Our review 
of an emotional distress claim is similar to the determination of whether 
conduct is extreme or outrageous:

It is for the court to 
determine whether on the evidence severe emotional distress can be found; it is 
for the jury to determine whether, on the evidence, it has in fact 
existed.

[¶67] Kanzler v. 
Renner, 937 P.2d  at 1341 (quoting cmt. j, Restatement, Second, Torts § 46)); 
Davis v. Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., 802 P.2d 840, 849 (Wyo. 1990); 
Leithead, 721 P.2d  at 1067.

[¶68] We 
conclude sufficient evidence of emotional distress was presented to preclude 
summary judgment. For approximately one year after his discharge, Worley was 
treated for clinical depression. In an affidavit, Worley's doctor stated that 
Worley's depression was severe, as demonstrated by bouts of crying, abnormal 
emotional upset, and remaining in a vegetative state. The physician further 
stated that Worley's depression was brought about in large part due to the 
manner in which he was terminated. In addition, Worley suffers from 
diverticulitis, which his physician asserted was aggravated by the stress 
arising from his termination, especially the manner in which he was terminated. 
There was sufficient evidence presented to preclude summary judgment on Worley's 
intentional infliction of emotion distress claim.

CONCLUSION

[¶69] Genuine 
issues of material fact exist on Worley's claims for breach of contract, 
promissory estoppel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The 
district court's Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is 
reversed and remanded on these claims. Summary judgment on Worley's claim 
premised on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is 
affirmed.

Footnotes

1 Wyoming 
Bottling also relies on an opinion from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
interpreting Wyoming law, for the proposition that "[v]erbal assurances of a 
term of employment cannot defeat [the at-will] presumption unless accompanied by 
some form of written documentation." Dobbs v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 39 F.3d 1064, 1069 (10th Cir. 1994). However, no Wyoming case has ever announced such a 
requirement. In addition, to the extent that this assertion implicates the 
statute of frauds, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-23-105 (Lexis 1999), we note the alleged 
contract was of an indefinite duration, rendering the statute of frauds 
inapplicable. See Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 218.

2 A similar 
situation was discussed in Wilder, 868 P.2d at 219:

The 
Restatement illustrates the operation of this rule with a hypothetical in which 
an employee is given a pay raise following a job offer from a competitor and a 
new contract of employment is written. The consideration for the new contract is 
provided by the employee refusing the job offer from the 
competitor.

(citation 
omitted).

3 The authors 
of this article divided separate consideration into two categories: (1) benefits 
to the employer and (2) special reliance by the employee. As examples of 
benefits to the employer, the authors provide: (1) surrender of tort claims; (2) 
contributions to the business; (3) job training. As special reliance, the 
authors give the following examples: (1) sale of business, i.e. people who sell 
the business and become employees of the purchasers; (2) changing jobs; (3) 
moving; and (4) reliance induced by recruitment techniques. 26 Stan.L.Rev. 
350-56. We offer no opinion on the efficacy of any of these putative forms of 
consideration.

4 Since its 
decision in Ponsock, the Nevada Supreme Court has greatly limited this tort 
remedy. In Martin v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 899 P.2d 551, 555 (Nev. 1995), that 
court provided the following interpretation of 
Ponsock:

[In 
Ponsock,] this court held that a claim for bad faith discharge would lie in the 
fact-specific instance where a tenured employee who enjoyed a right to continued 
employment was discharged by a large, nationwide employer in bad faith for the 
improper motive of defeating contractual retirement benefits. . . . For this 
cause of action to apply, specific elements must exist. First, there must be an 
enforceable contract. Second, there must be a special relationship between the 
tortfeasor and the tort victim, such as the relationship that exists between an 
insured and insurer, that is, a relationship of trust and special reliance. 
Third, the employer's conduct must go "well beyond the bounds of ordinary 
liability for breach of contract." However, the mere breach of an employment 
contract by a large and powerful employer, or any employer, does not in and of 
itself give rise to tort damages. The reason tort damages are appropriate for 
bad faith discharge is that ordinary contract damages do not adequately 
compensate, nor do they make the victim whole.

(Citations 
omitted.)