Case Title: State v. Miles

Citation: 206 Kan. 748, 481 P.2d 1020

Docket Number: 46,037

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1971-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
206 Kan. 748 (1971)
481 P.2d 1020
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
ALFRED C. MILES, Appellant.
No. 46,037

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 6, 1971.
Frank D. Covell, of Anderson, Covell, Hensel and Vincent, of Mission, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
Mark L. Bennett, Jr., Assistant County Attorney, argued the cause, and Vern Miller, Attorney General, and James W. Bouska, County Attorney, were with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
The defendant, Alfred C. Miles, was found guilty of possession of a pistol after having previously been convicted of a felony as that offense is described by K.S.A. 21-2611.
The defendant has appealed.
All of the issues raised by appellant are bottomed on the contention that firearms taken from an automobile which he was occupying were the subject of illegal search and seizure and therefore improperly admitted as evidence.
Preliminary to the trial a motion to suppress was filed, which read in part:
Accompanying the motion to suppress was appellant's affidavit in support thereof, which stated in part:
At the hearing on the motion to suppress the facts were developed.
The chief of police of the city of Lenexa, Johnson County, Kansas testified in substance that while on duty on the 1st day of June, 1969, he had occasion to be dispatched to the scene of a possible car fire and upon arriving at that location fund the appellant seated in the passenger side of an old model Buick automobile bearing Oklahoma license tags. At that time he asked if the car had been on fire and appellant replied in the negative. He then asked appellant to get into his car to talk as it was extremely hot outside and that the air conditioner was on his patrol car. As he walked past the Buick and back to his automobile he had observed some type of pressurized can with a five or six foot length of rubber hose attached to it and a large metal bar approximately four feet in length on the back floorboard of the car. These items could be used as burglary tools. He asked the appellant where the owner of the automobile was and appellant replied that he had gone down the highway to get some water for the over-heated car.
At this time the appellant was not under arrest. After viewing the items on the floorboard of the automobile he asked the appellant if he could look through the automobile. The appellant replied "go right ahead." The officer then proceeded to search the front portion of the vehicle with the assistance of an off-duty officer who had stopped at the scene. The search revealed a large ring of keys under the right side of the front seat. Nothing was found of a suspicious nature in the passenger portion of the automobile other than the bar and pressurized can. The officer proceeded to the rear of the Buick and asked permission to search the trunk. The appellant replied, "Go ahead."
Upon opening the trunk of the automobile the officer first observed two shot guns and a rifle lying on the floor of the trunk. Next he saw a Coors beer box which closer examination revealed contained numerous hand guns of some type wrapped in newspaper. Under the left rear fender well he found a money bag from an *750 Oklahoma bank which contained a fully loaded snub nosed .38 caliber pistol.
The testimony of the officer given at the preliminary hearing was also introduced. At that hearing the appellant did his own cross-examining. We quote in part:
"Q: Did you ask me for my identification?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: Did you open it? Do you know?
"A: Yes.
"Q: You say I was not under arrest?
"Q: I was being detained, right?
"Q: Then you did detain me, right?
"A: (Pause) Figuratively speaking, no.
"A: (Pause)
..............
"Q: Now you went and searched the car?
"A: Me and another officer.
"Q: You and another officer?
"A: Yes sir.
"Q: Had I at that time violated any laws?
"A: No sir.
"A: With your permission.
"Q: You asked me, is that correct?
"A: With your permission I searched the car.
..............
After the hearing on the motion to suppress the trial court ruled:
Appellant's contention that the search was unlawful and that there was error in not suppressing the evidence has no merit. We must agree with the conclusion of the trial court that "there is uncontroverted evidence that the defendant gave permission to the officer to conduct the search."
The case of Wren v. United States, 352 F.2d 617, United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, cert. den., 384 U.S. 944, 16 L. Ed. 2d 542, 86 S. Ct. 1469, cited by the appellant, set out the rules for determining whether consent to search has been given. It was there stated:
There is no evidence to support a claim of any duress or coercion.
The appellant's next contention reads:
The question of cause to search a car was not an issue in the case. The officer saw equipment in the back seat which made him suspicious. He asked and received permission to make the search. A search may always be made if free and voluntary consent is given. (Pekar v. United States, 315 F.2d 319.)
It might also be suggested that the uncontroverted evidence of consent left no question of fact to be determined. It left purely a question of law.
The judgment is affirmed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.