Case Title: Bankruptcy Authorities v. State

Citation: 592 So. 2d 1042

Docket Number: 1901640

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1992-01-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
592 So. 2d 1042 (1992)
BANKRUPTCY AUTHORITIES, INC., and Samuel W. Kelley
v.
STATE of Alabama ex rel. Jimmy EVANS, Attorney General.
1901640.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 24, 1992.
Michael D. Blalock, Birmingham, for appellants.
James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Dennis M. Wright, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
HOUSTON, Justice.
The sole issue presented in this case is whether the permanent injunction issued by the trial court complies with Rule 65(d)(2), Ala.R.Civ.P. We hold that it does not; therefore, the injunction is dissolved.
The State of Alabama, by and through its attorney general, sued Bankruptcy Authorities, Inc., a company involved in the retail sale of furniture, and its president, Samuel W. Kelley, seeking to temporarily restrain and, ultimately, to permanently enjoin them from engaging in what the state alleged were deceptive trade practices. The state alleged that the company's name, "Bankruptcy Authorities, Inc.," as well as certain advertisements that were being used by the company, were confusing and misleading and that they created the false impression that the company was in some way affiliated with or acting under the auspices of a federal bankruptcy court. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order that stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
While this T.R.O. was in effect, the state moved to hold the defendants in contempt of court for allegedly failing to abide by the terms of the T.R.O. The trial court, after holding a full evidentiary hearing, found the defendants to be in contempt and entered the following order:
Subsequently, the state moved a second time to hold the defendants in contempt for allegedly failing to abide by the temporary restraining order. Before the trial court could rule on the second motion, however, the defendants and the state had entered into the following agreement:
The trial court later denied the state's second contempt motion, stating that the issue raised therein had been rendered moot by the agreement. Ultimately, the trial court issued a permanent injunction, based on the evidence that had previously been presented in connection with the state's first contempt motion. The permanent injunction read, in pertinent part, as follows:
The defendants then filed this appeal.
The defendants contend that the permanent injunction lacks the specificity required by Rule 65(d)(2), which provides:
(Emphasis added.)
Particularly, the defendants argue that the permanent injunction 1) does not give the reasons for its issuance, 2) is not specific in its terms, and 3) does not describe in reasonable detail, without reference to the complaint or other documents, the act or acts restrained.
The state's contention is, in effect, that the specific act or acts restrained can be discerned by looking to the entire record. In other words, the state says that the permanent injunction complies with Rule 65(d)(2) because, it says, the act or acts that were intended to be permanently restrained by the trial court are clearly reflected in the temporary restraining order, the order entered in connection with the state's first contempt motion, and the agreement executed by the defendants and the state in response to the state's second contempt motion.
It is apparent that the permanent injunction does not comply with Rule 65(d)(2). First, there are no specific reasons stated for the issuance of the permanent injunction. Obviously the trial court issued the injunction to restrain what it found to be violations of § 8-19-5(2) and (11), part of Alabama's Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ala.Code 1975, § 8-19-1 et seq.[1] Even so, Rule 65(d)(2) states in mandatory *1045 terms that an injunction must recite the specific reason or reasons for its issuance. See Teleprompter of Mobile, Inc. v. Bayou Cable TV, 428 So. 2d 17 (Ala. 1983). Second, and perhaps more importantly, the permanent injunction issued by the trial court does not describe in reasonable detail, without reference to other parts of the court's file, the act or acts restrained. To the contrary, the injunction does no more than direct the defendants not to violate § 8-19-5(2) and (11). Blanket injunctions against a general violation of state law, such as the injunction issued in this case, do not satisfy the specificity requirements of Rule 65(d)(2). See Miglionico v. Birmingham News Co., 378 So. 2d 677 (Ala.1979); see, also, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Morton, 365 So. 2d 662, 664 (Ala.1978), wherein this Court, quoting Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 94 S. Ct. 713, 38 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1974), stated:
The state's argument that the specifics of the permanent injunction may be filled in by reference to the record of the proceedings below is clearly foreclosed by the Rule's express prohibition against the incorporation by reference of the details that may be set out in other court documents. The trial court can issue a permanent injunction in this case that complies with Rule 65(d)(2) by specifically stating what the defendants cannot do (i.e., that the defendants cannot use the company name "Bankruptcy Authorities, Inc."; that the defendants cannot use the terms "Bankruptcy," "Seized," "Confiscated," or other terms the use of which was found by the trial court to violate the law, in company advertising or on the company's on-site signs). In its present form, however, the permanent injunction creates uncertainty and confusion on the part of the defendants, who face possible future contempt proceedings, because it does not make it clear exactly which act or acts were restrained. Rule 65(d)(2) was designed to prevent such uncertainty and confusion.
For the foregoing reasons, the permanent injunction is hereby dissolved and the case is remanded for the issuance of a permanent injunction that complies with the requirements of Rule 65(d)(2).
INJUNCTION DISSOLVED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, SHORES and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
[1]  Section 8-19-5 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

"The following deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared to be unlawful:
"....
"(2) Causing confusion or misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval or certification of goods or services;
"....
"(11) Making a false or misleading statement of fact concerning the reasons for, existence of or amounts of price reductions."