Case Title: MICHAEL L. MARINARO v. STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0014

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
MICHAEL L. MARINARO v. STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 123163 P.3d 833Case Number: No. S-07-0014Decided: 08/02/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
MICHAEL 
L. MARINARO,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Dion J. 
Custis of Dion J. Custis PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Paul S. Rehurek, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Rehurek.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant 
appeals his conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver.1  The issue presented is whether the 
district court abused its discretion or erred as a matter of law in denying the 
appellant's motion to suppress the evidence found in his car during a traffic 
stop.  We affirm because the 
appellant voluntarily consented to the search of his car.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶2]      At about 1:00 
p.m. on August 29, 2005, a Wyoming Highway Patrol trooper "clocked" an eastbound 
vehicle at 77 m.p.h. in a 75 m.p.h. zone on Interstate 80 in Laramie 
County, Wyoming.  
As the trooper turned around to pursue the vehicle, he saw it pass a 
semi-truck and move into the right lane without signaling the lane change.  The trooper stopped the vehicle and 
informed the appellant, who was the driver and alone in the vehicle, that he had 
been stopped for speeding and for failing to signal a lane change.  In response to a request that he produce 
his driver's license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance, the 
appellant, who exhibited a high level of nervousness, handed the trooper a 
rental agreement, showing that the car had been rented in San Francisco and was to be dropped off at the airport in 
Denver.

 
 
[¶3]      The trooper 
noticed a small cosmetics bag on the front seat and a black overnight bag on the 
back seat.  The trooper asked the 
appellant to accompany him to his patrol car, where he explained to the 
appellant that he was going to write him warning tickets for the two traffic 
violations.  He then asked the 
appellant for permission to ask him some questions while he wrote the tickets, 
to which the appellant consented.  
The two men then engaged in a conversation that lasted about four and 
one-half minutes.  The trooper asked 
the appellant about his travel plans, to which the appellant responded that he 
was driving to Denver to visit friends for a few 
days and then he would drive back to San Francisco.  They also discussed various equipment in 
the patrol car, the appellant's job, and the fact that the trooper's brother 
lived in Denver.

 
 
[¶4]      After issuing the 
warning tickets, the trooper returned the appellant's driver's license and 
rental agreement, and told him he could go and to "have a safe trip."  The appellant then got out of the patrol 
car and began walking back towards his rental car.  The trooper radioed for the assistance 
of a canine unit, and then re-approached the appellant as he reached his 
car.  The trooper asked the 
appellant if he could ask him more questions, to which the appellant 
assented.  The trooper then asked 
the appellant more detailed questions about his travel plans.  The appellant repeated that he was going 
to visit friends in Denver, but this time he told 
the trooper that he would be flying back to San 
Francisco.  The trooper noticed that the appellant 
was tense, his face was sweating, and his hands were shaking.  In response to the trooper's inquiry 
about these signs of nervousness, the appellant explained that they were caused 
by the patrol car's red lights.

 
 
[¶5]      The trooper then 
asked the appellant if there was anything in the car he should know about, such 
as guns, drugs, large amounts of cash, marijuana, methamphetamine, heroin, or 
cocaine.  When the appellant denied 
having any such items, the trooper asked if he could search the car.  The appellant consented and began 
opening the car's doors for the trooper.  
He then offered to, and did, open the trunk.  The trooper observed two medium-sized 
cardboard boxes, taped shut, in the trunk.  
The appellant almost immediately admitted that the boxes contained 
marijuana, and he was arrested.

 
 
[¶6]      After waiving a 
preliminary hearing and being bound over to district court for trial, the 
appellant filed a motion to suppress all evidence stemming from the search of 
the rental car.  At the hearing of 
that motion, the trooper testified to the facts set forth above, and summarized 
as follows the circumstances that made him suspicious of criminal activity on 
the appellant's part: (1) the appellant's abnormal level of nervousness did not 
dissipate as the traffic stop continued; (2) the one-way car rental was 
indicative of someone hauling drugs or other contraband when coupled with a 
return flight home; (3) although the appellant claimed that he had driven 
straight through from San Francisco to Wyoming over the preceding two days, it 
does not take that long to drive straight through to Wyoming; the missing time 
could be accounted for by the delay often experienced by drug couriers who must 
wait a certain amount of time after the car is rented and before the drugs are 
loaded into the car; (4) the appellant's luggage was on the back seat of the car 
and not in the trunk, indicating the possibility that there were drugs in the 
trunk that the appellant did not want to expose to the senses by repeatedly 
opening the trunk to access his luggage; (5) the appellant's story about driving 
to Denver to visit friends when he had just a couple days off work did not make 
sense; and (6) some of the appellant's answers to questions were unresponsive or 
evasive.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      We set forth our 
standard for the review of the denial of a motion to suppress in Campbell v. State, 2004 WY 106, ¶ 9, 97 P.3d 781, 784 (Wyo. 2004):

 
 
            
When this Court reviews a district court's decision on a motion to 
suppress evidence, we do not disturb the district court's findings on factual 
issues unless they are clearly erroneous.  
Meek v. State, 2002 WY 1, ¶ 8, 
37 P.3d 1279, ¶ 8 (Wyo. 2002); McChesney 
v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo. 1999).  The evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the district court's determination because the district court 
conducts the hearing on the motion to suppress and has the opportunity to assess 
the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary 
inferences, deductions, and conclusions.  
Id.  "When the district court has not made 
specific findings of fact, we will uphold its general ruling if the ruling is 
supportable by any reasonable view of the evidence."  Meek, ¶ 8 (quoting Frederick v. State, 981 P.2d 494, 497 
(Wyo. 
1999)).  However, the issue of 
lawwhether an unreasonable search or seizure has occurred in violation of 
constitutional rightsis reviewed de 
novo.  Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 7, 64 P.3d 700, ¶ 7 (Wyo. 2003).  See also Meadows v. State, 2003 WY 37, ¶ 
14, 65 P.3d 33, ¶ 14 (Wyo. 2003); Wilson 
v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 1994).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      We will begin 
this discussion by briefly noting that the appellant has neither preserved for 
appeal, nor has he presented to this Court a "precise, analytically sound 
approach when advancing an argument to independently interpret the state 
constitution," so we will analyze his contentions solely under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  See Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 484 
(Wyo. 
1999).  In that regard, we will 
further note that the United States Supreme Court held in Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100-101, 
125 S. Ct. 1465, 1470, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299 (2005) that, during the course of a legal 
detention of an individual, law enforcement officers may pose questions to that 
person that are unrelated to the underlying purpose of the seizure and that are 
not independently justified by reasonable suspicion.  Following Muehler, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals recently held that suspicionless questioning of a motorist by a law 
enforcement officer during the course of a traffic stop regarding weapons and 
contraband is not a Fourth Amendment violation so long as it does not extend the 
duration of the traffic stop.  
United 
States v. Stewart, 473 F.3d 1265, 1268-69 
(10th Cir. 2007).

 
 
[¶9]      Without much 
further ado, we will simply state that the hearing transcript and the videotape 
of the traffic stop establish quite clearly that (1) the appellant does not 
challenge the validity of the initial traffic stop; (2) the brief questioning in 
the patrol car did not extend the period of detention necessary to write out the 
warning tickets; and (3) the appellant consented to the questioning in the 
patrol car, he consented to the questioning after he exited the patrol car, and 
he consented to the search of his car.

 
 
[¶10]   In examining the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether these consents were voluntary, as we must do 
under O'Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, ¶ 
60, 117 P.3d 401, 418 (Wyo. 2005), we look at such factors as the way the 
requests were phrased by the officer, whether the individual was told he could 
refuse the request, and the presence of other coercive factors.2  Once again, we refer to the hearing 
transcript and the videotape of the traffic stop to point out that:  (1) the entire traffic stop was very 
brief, with the initial traffic detention lasting only about six minutes; (2) 
the trooper's conduct throughout was professional, courteous, and completely 
non-coercive; and (3) all three consents given by the appellantto the initial 
questions, to the subsequent questions, and to the searchwere unhesitant and 
immediate.

 
 
[¶11]   The "coercive factors" present 
during this traffic stop are the same "coercive factors" that are present at 
every traffic stop:  an armed and 
uniformed officer, plus the flashing lights on the patrol car.  If these factors were sufficient to 
invalidate the voluntariness of a consent, no consent would ever be 
voluntary.  Neither can these 
factors, alone, be seen as proving that the person stopped did not feel that he 
was free to go.  In the present 
case, for instance, the appellant knew that he was free to go because the 
trooper had told him he could go.  
His departure was not stopped by the uniform, gun, or flashing 
lights.  It was stopped only by his 
consent to a non-demanding, relatively cordial request by the trooper to ask 
more questions.  A reasonable person 
in the appellant's position at that time would have felt that he could have said 
"no" and proceeded on his way.3

 
 
[¶12]   Our conclusion that the evidence in 
this case was discovered via the voluntary consent of the appellant obviates the 
necessity of determining whether the trooper independently had developed 
sufficient reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to pursue additional 
questioning and eventual search of the car.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶13]   The appellant does not contest the 
validity of the initial traffic stop in this case.  During the brief period it took for the 
trooper to write out the warning tickets, the appellant consented to answering 
the few questions that were put to him about his travel plans.  Subsequently, after he was released to 
return to his car, he voluntarily consented to answering another series of 
questions about those travel plans, and he voluntarily consented to the search 
of his car.

 
 
[¶14]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
appellant appeals from a "Judgment and Sentence of the Court" that was filed on 
November 20, 2006.  The record on 
appeal, however, also contains an "**Amended** Judgment and Sentence of the 
Court" filed on December 8, 2006, and a "**2nd 
Amended** Judgment and Sentence of the Court" filed on February 7, 
2007.  In their briefs, neither 
party mentioned these amended documents, the continued vitality of the original 
judgment and sentence, or the appellant's failure to appeal from the latter 
documents, so we will proceed under the assumption that no issues of mootness, 
appealable order, or jurisdiction exists.  
Nevertheless, in detailing the procedural history of a case, counsel on 
appeal should explain such filings, rather than leaving them to our 
guesswork.

 
 

2When a 
consent to search follows an illegal detention, which was not the case here, we 
also look to the temporal proximity of the illegal detention, any intervening 
circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the officer's unlawful 
conduct.  O'Boyle, ¶ 61, 117 P.3d  at 418; Campbell, ¶ 14, 97 P.3d  at 
785.

 
 

3It must 
be remembered that the subjective intent of the officer is not relevant to this 
inquiry.