Case Title: Inskeep v. Inskeep

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87-224

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Inskeep v. Inskeep1988 WY 56752 P.2d 434Case Number: 87-224Decided: 04/07/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
CLIFFORD BRETT INSKEEP, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

ANDREA RENE INSKEEP, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

David A. 
Hampton, Rock 
Springs, for 
appellant (defendant).

Harley J. 
McKinney of Pickett & McKinney, Rock Springs, for appellee 
(plaintiff).

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     In the course of 
divorce proceedings, appellant served discovery requests upon appellee. Appellee 
did not respond. On the eve of the divorce hearing, appellant filed a motion to 
compel discovery and a motion for continuance. The motions were denied, and 
appellee was granted a divorce with attendant property settlement and child 
custody and support provisions. Upon appeal, appellant presents two issues: (1) 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant's motion to 
compel discovery; and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying appellant's motion for continuance. We affirm.

[¶2.]     The parties married in 
1982 and the union produced two children. In September 1986, the parties 
separated when appellant moved out of the family residence. Appellee filed a 
complaint on September 24, 1986, seeking divorce, custody of the children, child 
support, exclusive occupancy of the parties' residence, and an allocation of the 
marital property and debts. On October 16, 1986, appellant filed an answer and a 
counterclaim requesting custody of the children and an equitable property 
division.

[¶3.]     On December 4, 1986, 
appellee filed a motion for trial setting. An accompanying pretrial memorandum 
asserted an inability of the parties to negotiate a settlement and proposed a 
plan of child custody and support and for division of property and debts. No 
further action of record appears until April 16, 1987, when appellant filed and 
served upon appellee a discovery request designated as "Combined Interrogatories 
and Request for Production." The interrogatories and requests for documents 
primarily concerned marital property, and they were lengthy and exhaustive in 
relation to the rather modest assets of the parties. Appellee did not respond to 
the request for discovery.

[¶4.]     On May 1, 1987, 
appellee again filed a motion for trial setting with an additional attached 
pretrial memorandum with proposals for custody, support and property 
apportionment similar to the earlier memorandum. The district court issued an 
order setting trial for May 22, 1987. For reasons not disclosed in the record, 
trial was not held on that date. On July 13, 1987, appellee filed another motion 
for hearing, and an order from the district court issued on the same date 
[¶4.]          
setting trial for July 29, 1987.

[¶5.]     On July 28, 1987, 
appellant filed a motion to compel discovery and a motion for a continuance. The 
motions had been served on appellee on July 24. The motion for continuance was 
based on appellee's failure to respond to discovery and the fact that appellant 
had taken temporary out-of-state employment precluding his attendance at trial. 
Appellee filed a response to the motions asserting, inter alia, that the 
discovery sought was specious in that the information was well known to 
appellant and that appellant was merely attempting to delay the 
proceedings.

[¶6.]     Trial was held on July 
29, 1987, with appellant not in attendance but represented by counsel. 
Appellant's motions were orally denied just prior to trial. A divorce decree was 
issued and filed on July 30, 1987, granting appellee an absolute divorce, 
providing for joint custody of the children with primary and physical custody 
residing in appellee, and dividing the marital property. A formal order denying 
appellant's pretrial motions was filed on August 10, 1987. This appeal followed. 

[¶7.]     Appellant first 
contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to 
compel discovery pursuant to Rule 37(a)(2), W.R.C.P., which 
provides:

"If a deponent fails to 
answer a question propounded or submitted under Rule 30 or 31, * * * or * * * 
fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or * * * in response 
to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that 
inspection will be permitted * * *, the discovering party may move for an order 
compelling an answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in 
accordance with the request."

Appellant sought 
to compel a response to his combined interrogatories and request for production 
of documents served on appellee in accordance with Rules 33 and 34, 
W.R.C.P.

[¶8.]     We have said that the 
decision whether to require answers to interrogatories lies within the broad 
discretion of the district court. Mauch v. Stanley Structures, Inc., Wyo., 641 P.2d 1247 
(1982), citing 8 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 
2176. Wright and Miller, in further commenting on Rule 33, F.R.C.P., which is 
identical to Rule 33, W.R.C.P., also state:

"Ordinarily the exercise 
of discretion by the trial court will be sustained by the appellate court. Only 
if the trial court abuses its discretion to the prejudice of a party will the 
appellate court interfere." (Footnotes omitted.) 8 Wright and Miller, supra, § 
2176, p. 558.

Similarly, with 
respect to Rule 34, F.R.C.P., also identical to Rule 34 W.R.C.P., "the appellate 
court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the trial court in 
the absence of a showing of prejudicial error from an abuse of discretion." 
(Footnotes omitted.) 8 Wright and Miller, supra, § 2215, p. 
653.

[¶9.]     This court has defined 
abuse of discretion in this manner:

"A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did." Martinez v. State, 
Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 (1980).

[¶10.]  The district court's reasons for denying 
appellant's motion to compel are not disclosed in the record. Nevertheless, 
under the circumstances of this case as revealed in the record, we cannot 
conclude that such denial constituted an abuse of discretion. Appellant's 
discovery request was served upon appellee nearly seven months after 
commencement of this action and over four months after appellee's first motion 
for trial setting. Additionally, under both Rules 33 and 34, W.R.C.P., appellant 
could have sought a motion to compel the discovery thirty days after submission 
of the request. Appellant, however, waited over three months, until the day 
before trial, to file his motion. In the interval, two further motions for trial 
had been filed by appellee, and a trial date had been set 
twice.

[¶11.]  It is also clear, as appellee contends, 
that appellant was seeking, through discovery, information already known to him. 
The extent of the limited marital property was well known to each party and had 
been discussed in settlement negotiations. The proposed property division and 
child custody and support provisions as outlined in appellee's two pretrial 
memoranda, both of which had been served on appellant, were substantially 
similar to the eventual corresponding provisions in the divorce decree. Both 
parties were intimately familiar with the facts and issues of the 
case.

[¶12.]  Given the nature of the requested 
discovery, unquestionably the better practice for appellee would have been 
either to serve objections to the discovery requests pursuant to Rules 33 and 
34, W.R.C.P., or to have sought a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c), 
W.R.C.P., which provides:

"Upon motion by a party * 
* * the court * * * may make any order which justice requires to protect a party 
or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense 
* * *."

Also, under Rule 
37(a)(2), W.R.C.P., when a district court denies a motion to compel discovery, 
it may enter a protective order pursuant to a motion under Rule 26(c). In this 
case, there was no need to grant a protective order because trial was at 
hand.

[¶13.]  Although appellant had a right to 
discovery, the untimely assertion of that right and the ingenuine nature of the 
discovery sought could reasonably lead the trial court to conclude that 
appellant only sought to delay the proceedings. Furthermore, since appellant 
already knew the information sought by discovery, he was not prejudiced by the 
denial of his motion to compel. The district court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying appellant's motion to compel discovery.

[¶14.]  In his second issue, appellant similarly 
argues that the denial of his motion for continuance constituted an abuse of 
discretion. We cannot agree. Appellant's motion for continuance and accompanying 
affidavit of counsel, filed the day before trial, listed two grounds for a 
continuance: that appellee had failed to respond to the discovery request, and 
that appellant would be unavailable to testify at the scheduled hearing because 
he had obtained out-of-state employment. The motion and affidavit stated that 
appellant had recently found temporary employment in California at good wages, that such employment was 
expected to last through August 28, and that appellant would likely lose his job 
if he returned to Wyoming to attend the divorce 
hearing.

[¶15.]  We have consistently held that the 
granting or denying of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court and is considered according to the circumstances unique to the case. 
Shanor v. Engineering, Inc. of Wyoming, 
Wyo., 705 P.2d 858 (1985); Smith v. Smith, 
Wyo., 704 P.2d 1319 (1985). Under § 1-9-102, W.S. 1977, a court may grant a continuance "for 
good cause shown." Alternatively, a continuance may not properly be granted 
based upon the mere whim, request or convenience of counsel, and absent a 
substantial factual or legal reason for doing so. Smith v. Smith, supra; Tomash 
v. Evans, Wyo., 704 P.2d 1296 (1985). We have 
additionally held that a continuance may be denied by the trial court if the 
need for the continuance is caused by the movant. Carlson v. BMW Industrial 
Service, Inc., Wyo., 744 P.2d 1383 
(1987).

[¶16.]  As with the motion to compel, the reasons 
for denying the motion for continuance are not disclosed in the record. We are 
persuaded, however, that, under the circumstances of the case, the district 
court could reasonably conclude that a continuance was not warranted. With 
respect to the failure to respond to discovery, the district court could have 
reasonably determined, as appellee asserted, that the requested discovery was 
specious, unnecessary, untimely, and, in effect, a stalling tactic. Regarding 
appellant's unavailability to attend trial, the district court could observe 
that appellant voluntarily accepted out-of-state employment, thereby creating 
the asserted need for a continuance.

[¶17.]  Appellant was aware that appellee was 
actively attempting to have the matter set for trial. Appellee had filed a 
second motion for setting on May 1, 1987, resulting in a May 22, 1987 hearing 
date. For reasons not revealed in the record, trial was not had on that date. 
Appellee, however, filed a third motion for setting on July 13, 1987, and an 
order was entered on that date setting trial for July 29, 1987. Appellant had 
absented himself from the state, apparently in early July, and appellant's 
counsel then waited until the day before trial to file a motion for continuance. 
Similar circumstances were presented to this court in Eldridge v. Rogers, 40 
Wyo. 89, 275 P. 101 (1929). In that case, counsel for a civil defendant sought a continuance 
on the ground that his client was out of state on business and could not attend 
trial. We upheld the trial court's discretionary denial of a continuance, 
observing that there was no showing that the defendant could not return in time 
for trial, or that he would return in a reasonable time, or that he did not know 
when he left that the case had already been set for trial. The same rationale is 
applicable to the facts of this case. We have also said, in upholding the denial 
of a continuance, that a party's dilatory tactics should not be rewarded. Shanor 
v. Engineering, Inc. of Wyoming, supra. Under the circumstances, we 
find no error in the denial of appellant's motion for 
continuance.

[¶18.]  Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
concurring.

[¶19.]  I concur in the court's 
opinion.

[¶20.]  Further comment is only made to define 
not only as failing in good practice, but as inexcusable to either not answer 
interrogatories or to file an objection or motion for a protective order. The 
spirit of Rule 11, W.R.C.P. in negative fashion should not be so casually 
ignored as is now frequently encountered where the discovery respondent 
anticipates a free ride until enforcement is impressed under Rule 37, W.R.C.P. 
In such cases, the so-called free ride should be accompanied by attorney's fees 
and reasonable expenses under Rule 37(a)(4), W.R.C.P., for real, not figurative, 
compensation as a charged fare for the delays and costs incurred. It is inexcusable to systematically fail 
either to answer or to object to submitted 
interrogatories.

[¶21.]  Similarly objectionable in my opinion is 
any pro-forma submission of written interrogatories, such as in this divorce 
case, where the information should be equally known to each litigant and the 
request is motivated by something other than the acquisition of information for 
trial preparation. In this regard, Rule 11 relief to respondent, who is forced 
to either inanely answer or regularly object, should not be 
ignored.

[¶22.]  To serve the expeditious and inexpensive 
completion of litigation, interrogatories should be thoughtfully prepared and 
promptly controverted or answered. Anything else subverts the delivery of 
justice process.