Case Title: State v. Foster

Citation: 296 Or. 174, 674 P.2d 587

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1983-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
674 P.2d 587 (1983)
296 Or. 174
STATE of Oregon, Respondent On Review,
v.
Kenneth FOSTER, Petitioner On Review.
No. 81-333C; CA A22845; SC 29601.

Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.
Argued and Submitted November 2, 1983.
Decided December 20, 1983.
*588 Marilyn C. McManus, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for petitioner on review. With her on the petition and brief was Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, Salem.
Stephen F. Peifer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review. With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and William F. Gary, Sol. Gen., Salem.
JONES, Justice.
Defendant was convicted of felony murder, first degree kidnapping and criminal conspiracy. The facts of the alleged homicide are set forth in the companion case of State v. Snider, ___ Or. ___, 674 P.2d 585 (decided this date). Defendant appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed per curiam, stating:
The first issue we address in this case is whether defense counsel adequately protected his client's record in objecting to evidence of a condition in a plea agreement[1] that the state's witness would take and pass a polygraph examination. The Court of Appeals said that the record was not adequately protected. We respectfully disagree. The following took place during pre-trial conference:
Up to this point in the pre-trial colloquy, the defendant had requested the court to allow cross-examination about the fact that the witness had an agreement with the prosecution for a reduced charge and had moved to exclude any reference to a polygraph examination. Everyone, the prosecutor, the defense counsel and the trial judge, agreed the results of the polygraph would be inadmissible. The judge made no other specific ruling.
Later on in the pre-trial hearing, prior to opening statements, the following took place:
At this stage of the pre-trial proceeding, the court was still tentative and had made no ruling defendant can claim as error.
After defendant's cross-examination of Terry Walker and a noon recess, the following occurred:
We deem this to be an appropriate offer of proof of the agreement for the record and not as an offer to have the agreement received as an exhibit to go to the jury. At this point, defense counsel has made an adequate offer of proof under OEC 103(1)(b), which provides:
Even though these proceedings were held some three months prior to the effective date of the Oregon Evidence Code, the rule adopted evoked no change in the law in respect to an offer of proof.[2] The court's ruling at that point was definite and defense counsel was required to do no more. Of course, after hearing further testimony during the trial, the judge could change his or her mind and indicate to counsel the contested evidence question would be reopened, but unless that is done counsel should be entitled to rely on the court's ruling. On cross-examination of Terry Walker, if defendant's counsel had tried to impeach the witness for bias by showing the culpable witness had made a "deal" with the state for his testimony, the polygraph condition of the plea agreement would have been received.
Over 20 years ago, in Nielsen v. Brown, 232 Or. 426, 430, 374 P.2d 896 (1962), this court said: "It is to be observed at the outset that the procedure of attempting to `suppress' the testimony of a witness in advance of his being called to the stand is not one to be commended."
*592 In today's trial arena, often the opposite is true. The pre-trial motion to limit evidence, commonly called a "motion in limine,"[3] provides a legal procedure to flush out problems to be encountered during the trial, before a jury is contaminated with the evidence. An objection to evidence, with a motion to tell the jury to disregard it, is a poor alternative. The old cliche, "you can't unring a bell," still applies.
In this case, if the judge had not made a pre-trial ruling, the trial scenario would probably have unfolded as follows:
The reasons for seeking pre-trial rulings are, among others, to obtain guidance on how to conduct voir dire and opening statements and, more importantly, to prevent the jury from hearing a trial scenario such as the one above. If counsel must wait to make an objection and receive a ruling in front of the jury, the client could be prejudiced even though the ruling was in the client's favor. With famous legal rhetoric, Justice Cardozo addressed this problem in Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104, 54 S. Ct. 22, 25, 78 L. Ed. 196 (1933), when he referred to the procedure of a judge telling a jury it may accept part of a statement but must reject other portions of it: "The reverberating clang of those accusatory words would drown all weaker sounds. It is for ordinary minds, not for psychoanalysts, that our rules of evidence are framed."
We are not suggesting that a trial judge must make a commitment when confronted with a motion to limit evidence. This should be left to the discretion of the trial judge. Most evidence rulings, probably 90 percent, are routinely conducted during trial. However, sometimes the better practice is to conduct motions to limit evidence before trial, such as sorting out which prior convictions under OEC 609 will be admitted or excluded. We agree with the statement by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals:
In the case at bar, defense counsel did not have to walk barefoot through any more legal coals to protect his client's record. He made a sufficient offer of proof of what would happen in the trial to permit the court to rule intelligently on the propriety *593 of the offered evidence, he asked for a final ruling and, although the trial judge was not obligated to do so, the judge gave a final ruling. There was no need for any further procedure to preserve the assignment of error.
The second issue we address is whether it would have been error for the trial judge to allow into evidence the plea agreement conditions. The answer is "yes," and the error would be prejudicial. State v. Snider, supra.
The Court of Appeals is reversed.
[1]  The relevant portions of the plea agreement are as follows:

"1. Defendant will give a complete statement regarding everything he knows concerning the kidnapping/death of Andrew Norwest.
"2. Defendant will testify at all trials of all persons charged as a result of this incident.
"3. Defendant will take a polygraph examination as to the truthfulness of his statement to the police and as to his testimony at trial (see agreement attached).
"4. If defendant performs 1, 2 and 3 and is truthful the State will accept a plea to Manslaughter in the First Degree and agree:
a) to make no recommendations as to length of time but will inform Court as to facts.
b) State will recommend defendant not be sentenced to an enhanced penalty 161.610."
[2]  * * In making an offer of proof it is requisite that counsel should be distinct and clear. The tender should embody the specific fact or facts in such connection and in such terms as to be apprehended and ruled upon in the intended sense by the trial judge and be examined and applied in the appellate court in the proper light to test the accuracy of the ruling, if adverse. * * *" Booth-Kelly Lumber Co. v. Williams, 95 Or. 476, 483, 188 P. 213 (1920).
[3]  Judge Tanzer criticized the label in State v. Mills, 39 Or. App. 85, 87 n. 1, 591 P.2d 396 (1979):

"We note an inexplicable but epidemic tendency to attempt to dignify such motions by resort to Latin. Such English phrases as preliminary motion and motion to limit evidence are not only more specifically descriptive than the Latin phrase motion in limine, but are also understandable. Res est moderata qualitate materiae suae, non dignitate tituli." (Original emphasis.)