Case Title: Scurry v. State

Citation: 489 So. 2d 25

Docket Number: 67589

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1986-06-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
489 So. 2d 25 (1986)
Willie SCURRY, Jr., Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 67589.

Supreme Court of Florida.
June 5, 1986.
*27 Office of the Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, and Terry P. Lewis, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
We have for review Scurry v. State, 472 So. 2d 779 (1st DCA 1985), in which the district court certified the following as a question of great public importance:
Id. at 782. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution.
The essential facts, as recounted in the district court's opinion, are as follows:
Id. at 780-781. The district court affirmed the trial court's sentence, finding only four, six and thirteen invalid, and concluding that the reliance on three impermissible reasons constituted only harmless error.
Petitioner argues that the district court did not go far enough in that none of the reasons the trial court set forth are clear and convincing reasons to depart from the recommended guidelines sentence. We agree. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(11) seeks to discourage unwarranted departures from the sentencing guidelines. Albritton v. State, 476 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1985). Neither reasons prohibited by the guidelines themselves, nor factors already taken into account in calculating the guidelines score, nor an inherent component of the crime in question can ever be used to justify departure from the guidelines. State v. Mischler, 488 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1986). The facts supporting the reasons for departure must be credible and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The "appellate court's function in a sentencing guidelines case is ... to review the reasons given to support departure and determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding those reasons `clear and convincing.'" Id., at 525.
Reason one, even if we were to find it clear and convincing, is not proved. There is insufficient evidence in the record *29 that family members actually witnessed the shooting, although they were nearby.
Reason two, evincing a flagrant disregard for the safety of others, does constitute a clear and convincing reason for departure. However, even if the defendant fired the shot into the victim while he was standing in his doorway, it is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a flagrant disregard for the safety of others.
Reason three reflects the trial court's disagreement with the jury's verdict of second-degree murder rather than first, as it goes to premeditation. It is therefore violative of rule 3.701(d)(11)'s proscription against factors relating to the offense for which convictions were not obtained.
Reason five, that the victim lived and suffered for more than thirty hours before dying would imply that a defendant should make sure he does a thorough job and effects death as soon as possible in order to be sentenced within the guidelines. We find no logic here. Moreover, victim injury is a factor already taken into account by the guidelines.
Reason seven, use of a rifle, is likewise not clear and convincing. Any other weapon, including bare hands, could be just as easily listed and justify guidelines departure in all cases of victim injury.
Reason eight, that the defendant had been drinking prior to committing the crime, is especially puzzling. Voluntary intoxication is a defense to the specific intent crime of first-degree murder. Gardner v. State, 480 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 1985). It is an abuse of discretion to take what could cause a jury to find a defendant guilty of a lesser offense than that charged and use it to aggravate him.
Reason nine, that the defendant had twice been on probation is a factor already included in reaching the guidelines sentence and is not a proper reason for departure. Albritton.
Reason ten, that a lesser sentence is not commensurate with the seriousness of the crime, flies in the face of the rationale for the guidelines. In effect this reason reflects a trial judge's disagreement with the Sentencing Guidelines Commission and is not a sufficient reason for departure.
Reason eleven, deterrence of others in the particular "portion of Monticello" where the crime occurred is invalid. See Santiago v. State, 478 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1985).
Reason twelve, that the Parole and Probation officer who prepared the PSI recommended sentencing outside the guidelines, is no reason at all. It is to be presumed that if his recommendations were based on specific reasons those reasons were included in the list elsewhere.
All of the trial court's reasons having been found invalid, we quash the decision under review and direct the district court to vacate the sentence and remand to the trial court for resentencing.[*]
It is so ordered.
BOYD, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON, McDONALD, EHRLICH, SHAW and BARKETT, JJ., concur.
[*]  The certified question is inapplicable in this case, but is answered in Albritton.