Case Title: Minton v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc.

Citation: 1997-Ohio-356

Docket Number: 19962006

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-10-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
MINTON, EXR., APPELLANT, v. HONDA OF AMERICA MANUFACTURING, INC. ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Minton v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc. (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 62.] 
Torts — State tort claim based upon manufacturer’s failure to equip automobiles 
with air bags is not preempted by former Section 1381 et seq., Title 15, 
U.S.Code and regulations promulgated thereunder. 
A state tort claim based upon a manufacturer’s failure to equip its automobiles 
with air bags is not expressly or impliedly preempted by former Section 
1381 et seq., Title 15, U.S.Code and regulations promulgated thereunder. 
(Nos. 96-2006 and 96-2025 — Submitted June 10, 1997 — Decided October 15, 
1997.) 
 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Montgomery 
County, No. 14949. 
 
On March 14, 1991, Jeffery L. Minton was driving his 1990 Honda Accord 
on Hardin Road in Washington Township, Miami County, Ohio.  A vehicle 
traveling in the opposite direction crossed the center of the road and collided 
virtually head-on with Minton’s automobile.  Although Minton was wearing both 
an automatic shoulder belt and a manual seat belt at the time of the accident, he 
sustained fatal head injuries. 
 
On February 11, 1993, appellant, Mary Ann Minton, as executor1 of the 
estate of Jeffery Minton, filed a survivorship cause of action on behalf of the estate 
of Jeffery and a wrongful death cause of action on behalf of (1) herself as 
surviving spouse, (2) Travis Minton, the eleven-year-old son of Jeffery and Mary 
Ann, (3) the parents of Jeffery, and (4) the other next of kin of Jeffery.  The cause 
of action sounded in products liability and was filed against appellees Honda of 
America Manufacturing, Inc. and others (collectively referred to as “Honda”).  In 
2 
the complaint, appellant alleged, inter alia, that the 1990 Accord driven by Jeffery 
and manufactured by Honda was defectively designed.  Appellant’s complaint was 
based in part on the fact that the driver’s-side restraint system failed to properly 
protect Jeffery during the accident. 
 
Prior to trial, Honda filed a motion in limine.  Honda sought to preclude 
evidence by appellant that the 1990 Accord did not contain an air bag.  In the 
motion, Honda asserted, among other things, that any claim pertaining to the 
absence of an air bag was preempted by federal law. 
 
The trial court granted Honda’s motion in limine.  At trial, appellant 
attempted to demonstrate that the shoulder belt restraint system in the 1990 
Accord was defectively designed.  Appellant was allowed to introduce evidence of 
the belt geometry in a 1987 Honda Civic.  However, appellant was not allowed to 
introduce evidence of subsequent changes made by Honda to its Accords and 
incorporated in 1992 models.  According to appellant, 1992 Accords were safer in 
front-end collisions because the shoulder belt mechanisms in 1992 models had 
been changed and because 1992 Accords contained air bags. 
 
During trial, the following colloquy occurred between the attorneys for the 
parties and the trial court with respect to Honda’s motion in limine and the 
evidence proffered by appellant: 
 
“MR. SHEA [counsel for appellant]:  As Your Honor remembers, we have a 
proffer.  There was a motion in limine filed with the Court prior to trial concerning 
several subjects, one of which was the subject of air bags.  The Plaintiff, in its 
brief to the Court, outlined the law.  At this time, we just want to make our proffer 
of evidence.  The Plaintiff has requested that the testimony be allowed, not only 
because preemption to the air bag as a defect, there are states and there is current 
law that says there’s not preemption, but also for other purposes.  The fact that it is 
3 
an alternative design is not preemptive.  Under the risk benefit, alternative designs 
are permitted, and the fact that the alternative design is one of those which should 
be considered by the Court, we believe that our exhibits should have been 
admitted. 
 
“Additionally, the fact of remedial repair, and this does not only go to the 
air bags, it goes to the location of the B pillar belt geometry which are shown in 
Plaintiff’s exhibits that have been excluded, that the Defendant, in 1992, and in 
subsequent years, located the belt geometry point in the proper location, or at least 
in a much preferred location than it was in the 1990 Honda vehicle which was the 
identical platform of the 1992. 
 
“The Plaintiff requested that it be permitted to show simply that location, 
even if the air bag information were removed because of other concerns that the 
Court had, which we were willing to do. 
 
“The same is true of the exhibits which deal with brochures depicting the B 
pillar placement point, as well as the air bag system, were relevant under the 
claims of the parties. 
 
“Finally, the B pillar placement point as remedy of a defect, we believe that 
the evidence should have been allowed to show that Honda cured the bad, the poor 
placement of the B pillar placement for the belt geometry, and that the exhibits go 
to that point as well to show evidence of cure for the B pillar placement. 
 
“* * * 
 
“MR. BODE [counsel for Honda]:  Your Honor, we would stand on the 
position we took in our initial brief in the motion in limine that the issue of an air 
bag is preempted by Federal law, and that any attempt to compare the 1990 Honda 
Accord with a vehicle that is equipped with, as part of its occupant restraint 
system, an air bag is preempted and a comparison that is not allowed by the law. 
4 
 
“* * * 
 
“THE COURT:  Very well.  The Court has noted both the memoranda 
submitted by Counsel and does not alter its position from its previously announced 
position that the exhibits and the subject matter described will not be included.  
The exhibits, as listed by Counsel for Plaintiff, shall be contained as part of the 
proffer.” 
 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Honda.  Appellant then appealed to 
the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County.  The court of appeals affirmed the 
judgment of the trial court. 
 
The court noted initially that the change in design of the shoulder belt 
restraint system in 1992 Accords was a subsequent remedial measure taken by 
Honda.  In this regard, the court, citing McFarland v. Bruno Mach. Corp. (1994), 
68 Ohio St.3d 305, 626 N.E.2d 659, agreed with appellant that “evidence of 
subsequent remedial measures is admissible to prove design defects in strict 
liability cases.”  Nevertheless, the court concluded that the trial court properly 
excluded any evidence of the occupant restraint system in 1992 Accords.  
Specifically, the court held: 
 
“[We] agree with Honda that the evidence is inadmissible in this instance 
because of the nature of the restraint systems in issue.  Honda utilized an 
automatic seatbelt as its passive restraint system in the 1990 Accord.  However, in 
the 1992 Accord, Honda used an airbag as its passive restraint system.  Therefore, 
pursuant to the relevant federal legislation, Honda was allowed to change the 1992 
shoulder belt restrain[t] to a manual, rather than a passive, restraint system.  In 
other words, the later model year included a shoulder belt restraint system that the 
driver had to pull down and fasten, while the 1990 Accord featured a shoulder belt 
restraint system that automatically engaged when the door was closed.  Thus, the 
5 
shoulder belt systems (manual versus passive) of the two model years are not truly 
comparable. 
 
“At trial, Minton offered to redact the photographs [showing the belt design 
change] to exclude any reference to the airbag system in the 1992 Honda.  In our 
opinion, however, the difference in the two systems would necessarily precipitate 
the introduction of evidence regarding the change from a passive shoulder belt to a 
manually operated shoulder belt, and thus would require the introduction of 
evidence regarding the reason for the design change (i.e., the conversion to airbag 
technology * * *).  Since we have concluded later in this opinion that the failure to 
install airbags is an issue preempted by federal law, we find that evidence of the 
subsequent remedial change in the shoulder belt restraint system is inadmissible 
because it would inevitably lead to the jury’s becoming aware of the fact that 
Honda switched to an airbag passive restraint system, thereby injecting an issue — 
the failure to have used the airbag system in the 1990 model Accord — that was 
preempted by federal law.” 
 
The court of appeals ultimately concluded that appellant’s design defect 
claim based on the failure to install a driver’s-side air bag was not expressly 
preempted by former Section 1381 et seq., Title 15, U.S.Code (now found at 
Section 30101 et seq., Title 49, U.S.Code) and relevant regulations promulgated 
thereunder.  Rather, the court held that appellant’s “no air bag” claim was 
impliedly preempted by federal law.  Thereafter, the court, finding its judgment to 
be in conflict with the judgment of the Eleventh Appellate District in Nelson v. 
Ford Motor Co. (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 158, 670 N.E.2d 307, entered an order 
certifying a conflict, and we determined that a conflict existed (case No. 96-2025).  
Minton v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 1421, 670 N.E.2d 1007.2  
6 
The cause is also before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal 
(case No. 96-2006).  The two appeals have been consolidated. 
__________________ 
 
Shea & Associates, Joseph W. Shea III, Shirley A. Coffey and Andrea T. 
Rosenthal, for appellant. 
 
Reminger & Reminger Co., L.P.A., and Hugh J. Bode; and Eric A. 
Portuguese, for appellees. 
 
Nurenberg, Plevin, Heller & McCarthy Co., L.P.A., Marshall I. Nurenberg, 
Richard C. Alkire and Kathleen J. St. John, urging reversal for amicus curiae, 
Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
The Landskroner Law Firm, Ltd., Jack Landskroner, Lawrence 
Landskroner and Arthur Bryant, urging reversal for amici curiae, Trial Lawyers 
for Public Justice, Public Citizen, Center for Auto Safety, and Consumers for Auto 
Reliability and Safety. 
 
Clark, Perdue, Roberts & Scott, Robert W. Kerpsack and Dale K. Perdue; 
Coben & Associates and Larry E. Coben, urging reversal for amicus curiae, 
Raymond Richard Nelson. 
 
Thompson, Hine & Flory, Elizabeth B. Wright and James W. Wiggin III, 
urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ford Motor Company. 
 
Mayer, Brown & Platt, Kenneth S. Geller, Erika Z. Jones, John J. Sullivan 
and Lily Fu Swenson, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Product Liability 
Advisory Council, Inc. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  The central question presented for our consideration is whether 
the court of appeals erred in concluding that the National Traffic and Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act, former Section 1381 et seq., Title 15, U.S.Code (“Safety Act” 
7 
or “Act”),3 precluded appellant from presenting evidence at trial that the 1990 
Accord was defective for failure by Honda to install a driver’s-side air bag in the 
vehicle.4  For the reasons that follow, we find that appellant should have been 
allowed to present evidence to the jury that the 1990 Accord did not have an air 
bag and that Honda did install air bags in its 1992 Accords.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
I 
 
Based on the belief that “the soaring rate of death and debilitation on the 
Nation’s highways is not inexorable,” S.Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, 
reprinted in 1966 U.S.Code Cong. & Adm.News 2709, Congress, in 1966, enacted 
the Safety Act “to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons 
resulting from traffic accidents.”  Former Section 1381, Title 15, U.S.Code.  See, 
also, Miller, Deflating the Airbag Pre-emption Controversy (1988), 37 Emory L.J. 
897.  The Act directed the Secretary of Transportation to “establish * * * 
appropriate Federal motor vehicle safety standards.”  Former Section 1392(a), 
Title 15.5  “Motor vehicle safety standards” is defined as “minimum standard[s] 
for motor vehicle performance, or motor vehicle equipment performance, which 
[are] practicable, which [meet] the need for motor vehicle safety and which 
[provide] objective criteria.”  Former Section 1391(2). 
 
In accordance with the Safety Act, Section 571.208, Title 49, C.F.R. 
(“standard 208” or “208”) was promulgated6 “to reduce the number of deaths of 
vehicle occupants, and the severity of injuries, by specifying vehicle 
crashworthiness requirements in terms of forces and accelerations measured on 
anthropomorphic dummies in test crashes, and by specifying equipment 
requirements for active and passive restraint systems.”  Section 571.208.S2.  
Standard 208 sets forth occupant restraint system options available to 
8 
manufacturers.  With respect to the vehicle at issue here, appellant does not allege 
that the 1990 Accord failed to meet the requirements of standard 208.  Rather, 
appellant’s products liability claim, grounded upon the theory of strict liability in 
tort, turns on a showing that Honda could have used an allegedly safer shoulder 
belt restraint system in its 1990 Accords and that Honda could have made its 1990 
models safer by equipping them with air bags.  Appellant’s claim also rests on the 
grounds that, by changing the belt geometry in 1990 models and by installing air 
bags in 1992 Accords, Honda undertook remedial measures to correct the 
defective conditions that existed with respect to 1990 Accords. 
 
The Safety Act includes two sections that are particularly relevant to our 
determination of whether the court of appeals erred in determining that appellant 
was properly precluded from presenting evidence of the subsequent measures 
taken by Honda with respect to its Accords.  The Act contains a preemption 
clause, which provided: 
 
“Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this 
title is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority 
either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or 
item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same 
aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical 
to the Federal standard.  Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing 
any State from enforcing any safety standard which is identical to a Federal safety 
standard.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the Federal 
Government or the government of any State or political subdivision thereof from 
establishing a safety requirement applicable to motor vehicles or motor vehicle 
equipment procured for its own use if such requirement imposes a higher standard 
of performance than that required to comply with the otherwise applicable Federal 
9 
standard.”  (Emphasis added.)  Former Section 1392(d), Title 15, U.S.Code (now 
found, substantively unchanged, at Section 30103[b][1], Title 49, U.S.Code). 
 
As a specific exception to the preemption clause, the Safety Act also 
contains a savings clause.  The savings clause stated that “[c]ompliance with any 
Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not 
exempt any person from any liability under common law.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Former Section 1397(k), Title 15, U.S.Code (now found, substantively unchanged, 
at Section 30103[e], Title 49, U.S.Code). 
 
In the case at bar, the court of appeals determined that appellant was 
precluded under the Safety Act from presenting evidence of design changes made 
to the Accords.  Thus, we must determine what effect both the preemption clause 
and the savings clause have on appellant’s claim and, particularly, whether 
appellant should have been allowed to introduce evidence that the 1990 Accord 
did not have an air bag, that the belt geometry was changed in 1992 Accords, and 
that 1992 models contained air bags. 
II 
 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that “the 
Laws of the United States * * * shall be the supreme Law of the Land; * * * any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”  
Clause 2, Article VI, United States Constitution.  Pursuant to the Supremacy 
Clause, Congress possesses the power to preempt state law.  Jenkins v. James B. 
Day & Co. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 541, 544, 634 N.E.2d 998, 1001, citing In re 
Miamisburg Train Derailment Litigation (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 255, 259, 626 
N.E.2d 85, 89.  In addition, “‘[p]re-emption may result not only from action taken 
by Congress itself; a federal agency acting within the scope of its congressionally 
delegated authority may pre-empt state regulation.’”  Id. at 260, 626 N.E.2d at 89, 
10 
quoting Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Fed. Communications Comm. (1986), 476 
U.S. 355, 369, 106 S.Ct. 1890, 1899, 90 L.Ed.2d 369, 382.  See, also, Carpenter v. 
Consol. Rail Corp. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 259, 631 N.E.2d 607.  In English v. Gen. 
Elec. Co. (1990), 496 U.S. 72, 78-79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 2275, 110 L.Ed.2d 65, 74, 
the United States Supreme Court described the three ways that state law can be 
preempted under the Supremacy Clause: 
 
“First, Congress can define explicitly the extent to which its enactments pre-
empt state law.  See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95-98 [103 S.Ct. 
2890, 2898-2900, 77 L.Ed.2d 490, 500-502] (1983).  Pre-emption fundamentally 
is a question of congressional intent, see Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 
U.S. 293, 299 [108 S.Ct. 1145, 1150, 99 L.Ed.2d 316, 325] (1988), and when 
Congress has made its intent known through explicit statutory language, the 
courts’ task is an easy one. 
 
“Second, in the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is pre-
empted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal 
Government to occupy exclusively.  Such an intent may be inferred from a 
‘scheme of federal regulation * * * so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,’ or where an 
Act of Congress ‘touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that 
the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the 
same subject.’  Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 [67 S.Ct. 1146, 
1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447, 1459] (1947).  Although this Court has not hesitated to draw 
an inference of field pre-emption where it is supported by the federal statutory and 
regulatory schemes, it has emphasized: ‘Where * * * the field which Congress is 
said to have pre-empted’ includes areas that have ‘been traditionally occupied by 
the States,’ congressional intent to supersede state laws must be ‘“clear and 
11 
manifest.”’  Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 [97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 
51 L.Ed.2d 604, 614] (1977), quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S., 
at 230 [67 S.Ct. at 1152, 91 L.Ed. at 1459]. 
 
“Finally, state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with 
federal law.  Thus, the Court has found pre-emption where it is impossible for a 
private party to comply with both state and federal requirements, see, e.g., Florida 
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 [83 S.Ct. 1210, 
1217-1218, 10 L.Ed.2d 248, 257] (1963), or where state law ‘stands as an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.’  Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 [61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581, 
587] (1941).  See also Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 747 [101 S.Ct. 2114, 
2129, 68 L.Ed.2d 576, 596] (1981).” 
 
More concisely, federal preemption of state law can occur in essentially 
three instances:  (1) where Congress expressly preempts state law (express 
preemption); (2) where Congress has occupied the entire field (field preemption); 
or (3) where there is an actual conflict between federal and state law (conflict 
preemption).  Field and conflict preemption are both forms of implied preemption.  
See Gade v. Natl. Solid Wastes Mgt. Assn. (1992), 505 U.S. 88, 98, 112 S.Ct. 
2374, 2383, 120 L.Ed.2d 73, 90. 
 
The critical question in any preemption analysis is whether Congress 
intended state law to be superseded by federal law.  In re Miamisburg, 68 Ohio 
St.3d at 260, 626 N.E.2d at 89, citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (1992), 505 
U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617, 120 L.Ed.2d 407, 422.  However, in 
considering issues arising under the Supremacy Clause, courts must start with the 
assumption that the historic police powers of the states are not to be superseded by 
federal law unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.  Id. at 516, 
12 
112 S.Ct. at 2617, 120 L.Ed.2d at 422, citing Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S.Ct. at 
1152, 91 L.Ed. at 1459.  See, also, California Fed. S. & L. Assn. v. Guerra (1987), 
479 U.S. 272, 280-281, 107 S.Ct. 683, 689, 93 L.Ed.2d 613, 623; CSX Transp., 
Inc. v. Easterwood (1993), 507 U.S. 658, 663-664, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 1737, 123 
L.Ed.2d 387, 396 (“In the interest of avoiding unintended encroachment on the 
authority of the States, however, a court interpreting a federal statute pertaining to 
a subject traditionally governed by state law will be reluctant to find pre-
emption.”); and Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr (1996), 518 U.S. ___, ___, 116 S.Ct. 
2240, 2250, 135 L.Ed.2d 700, 715 (“[B]ecause the States are independent 
sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not 
cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.”).  To that end, “[t]he applicable 
preemption provision must be read narrowly ‘in light of the presumption against 
pre-emption of state police power regulations.’”  In re Miamisburg, 68 Ohio St.3d 
at 264, 626 N.E.2d at 92, citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518, 112 S.Ct. at 2618, 120 
L.Ed.2d at 424. 
A 
 
The court of appeals held, and we agree, that the Safety Act did not 
expressly preempt appellant’s products liability claim based upon Honda’s failure 
to install air bags in its 1990 Accords.  The conclusion reached by the court of 
appeals is in accord with the vast majority of federal circuit courts that have 
considered a similar claim.  See Wood v. Gen. Motors Corp. (C.A.1, 1988), 865 
F.2d 395, 402; Kitts v. Gen. Motors Corp. (C.A.10, 1989), 875 F.2d 787; Taylor v. 
Gen. Motors Corp. (C.A.11, 1989), 875 F.2d 816, 825; and Pokorny v. Ford 
Motor Co. (C.A.3, 1990), 902 F.2d 1116, 1121.  But, cf., Harris v. Ford Motor 
Co. (C.A.9, 1997), 110 F.3d 1410, 1415 (concluding that Section 1392[d] 
expressly preempts state law causes of action for failure to install air bags).  
13 
Further, various state Supreme Courts have also determined that the Act does not 
expressly preempt state damage claims based upon a manufacturer’s failure to 
install air bags.  See, e.g., Tebbetts v. Ford Motor Co. (1995), 140 N.H. 203, 665 
A.2d 345; Wilson v. Pleasant (Ind.1995), 660 N.E.2d 327; and Munroe v. Galati 
(Ariz.1997), 938 P.2d 1114. 
 
In the preemption clause, Congress expressed its intent to preempt all 
“safety standards” by a “State or political subdivision of a State” that are 
applicable to the same aspect of performance or item of equipment as the federal 
standard but “not identical to the Federal standard.”  See former Section 1392(d), 
Title 15.  Honda contends that appellant’s air bag claim falls squarely within the 
scope of this clause.  Honda urges that appellant’s air bag claim amounts to a state 
safety “standard” because appellant’s claim “requires manufacturers to install 
airbags, not seat belts, in all vehicles.”  Therefore, according to Honda, appellant’s 
“purported standard is not ‘identical’ to the federal standard, and federal law 
expressly preempts it.” 
 
This court has recognized that, in the appropriate case, state tort claims can 
be within the preemptive reach of a federal statute.  Jenkins, 69 Ohio St.3d at 544, 
634 N.E.2d at 1001, citing In re Miamisburg, 68 Ohio St.3d at 262, 626 N.E.2d at 
91.  See, also, Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 520-523, 112 S.Ct. at 2619-2621, 120 
L.Ed.2d at 425-427 (holding that the phrase “requirement[s] or prohibition[s] * * * 
imposed under State law” in Section 5[b] of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking 
Act of 1969, codified at Section 1334[b], Title 15, U.S.Code, is not limited to 
positive enactments by legislatures and agencies but may also include certain state 
law damage actions); and Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664, 113 S.Ct. at 1737, 123 
L.Ed.2d at 396-397 (finding that “[l]egal duties imposed on railroads by the 
common law fall within the scope of” Section 434, Title 45, U.S.Code preempting 
14 
any state “law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety”).  
However, we do not agree with Honda’s interpretation of the preemption clause.  
We believe that the domain expressly preempted by former Section 1392(d) does 
not include appellant’s air bag claim.  See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517, 112 S.Ct. at 
2618, 120 L.Ed.2d at 423, and Medtronic, 518 U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2250, 135 
L.Ed.2d at 715.  Indeed, given the presumption against preemption, and the fact 
that the preemption clause must be construed narrowly in light of that 
presumption, there is no basis for concluding that Congress intended former 
Section 1392(d) to preempt appellant’s claim. 
 
Notably, former Section 1392(d) “does not expressly mention actions at 
common law or jury verdicts reduced to judgments by the courts.”  Chadwell, 
Automobile Passive Restraint Claims Post-Cipollone:  An End to the Federal 
Preemption Defense (1994), 46 Baylor L.Rev. 141, 156.  If Congress had intended 
in that clause to preclude state tort claims, it could have easily achieved this result.  
See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2251, 135 L.Ed.2d at 717 (“[I]f 
Congress intended to preclude all common-law causes of action, it chose a 
singularly odd word [‘requirement’] with which to do it.  The statute [Section 
360k(a), Title 21, U.S.Code] would have achieved an identical result, for instance, 
if it had precluded any ‘remedy’ under state law relating to medical devices.”).  
See, also, Taylor, 875 F.2d at 824 (“An additional factor militating against a 
finding that the language of the Safety Act expressly preempts appellants’ claims 
is that Congress did not make explicit reference to state common law in the Act’s 
preemption clause as it has in the preemption clauses of many other statutes.  
Congress has long demonstrated an aptitude for expressly barring common law 
actions when it so desires.”). 
15 
 
Thus, we find that the absence of any explicit reference to state tort damage 
actions in the Safety Act’s preemption clause leads to a finding that appellant’s 
claim is not expressly preempted under the Act.7  We agree with one commentator 
who has concluded that “[t]here is no indication that Congress considered a 
common law damages action to fall within the meaning of the term ‘safety 
standard’ as used in the Safety Act’s preemption provision.  On its face, the 
preemption provision by its own terms merely appears to preclude state 
legislatures and other state rule-making bodies from mandating vehicle equipment 
or performance standards not identical to promulgated federal safety standards. 
 
“Beyond the precise words of the preemption provision, this reading is 
appropriate for several other reasons.  First, as dictated by Cipollone, one must 
construe express preemption provisions in light of the presumption against the 
preemption of state police power.  This presumption reinforces the necessity of a 
narrow reading of §1392(d).  Second, the preemption provision allows States and 
their political subdivisions to establish identical safety standards, and even higher 
standards when acquiring vehicles for their own use.  Third, there is no general, 
inherent conflict between federal preemption of state mandated vehicle safety 
standards and the continued vitality of state common law damages actions.  All of 
these considerations indicate that §1392(d) is best read as having superseded only 
positive enactments by state legislatures or administrative agencies that mandate 
particular safety standards with respect to vehicle performance.”  (Footnotes 
omitted.)  Chadwell, supra, 46 Baylor L.Rev. at 176-177. 
 
Accordingly, permitting a state tort law cause of action does not, in and of 
itself, constitute the setting of a “standard” as contemplated in the Safety Act.  
Allowing a state cause of action does not set a standard requiring that Honda must 
include air bags in every vehicle it manufactures and sells. 
16 
 
Moreover, even if we were to assume that the preemptive language of 
former Section 1392(d) is far-reaching enough to encompass state tort damage 
actions, the savings clause nevertheless expressly preserves such claims.  See 
Wilson, supra, 660 N.E.2d 327 (holding that Section 1397[k] should be read to 
preserve state law claims).  See, also, Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518, 112 S.Ct. at 
2618, 120 L.Ed.2d at 424 (noting that a savings clause in the Comprehensive 
Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986 [Section 4406, Title 15, 
U.S.Code] “preserved state-law damages actions based on those products”). 
 
Congress unambiguously expressed its intent in the savings clause not to 
exempt any person from “any liability under common law.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Former Section 1397(k), Title 15.  Honda’s express-preemption arguments, 
however, undercut the clear meaning of this language.  In this regard, Honda’s 
construction of the Safety Act contravenes the long-standing principle that a court 
must, if possible, give effect to every clause and word of a statute.  See United 
States v. Menasche (1955), 348 U.S. 528, 538-539, 75 S.Ct. 513, 520, 99 L.Ed. 
615, 624.  Additionally, an examination of the history of the Safety Act supports 
our rejection of Honda’s express preemption arguments.  The Act’s legislative 
history confirms that the savings clause was intended by Congress to preserve 
state law remedies for injuries occurring as a result of defective automobiles.  
Accord Tebbetts, 140 N.H. at 207, 665 A.2d at 347-348; Wilson, 660 N.E.2d at 
338; Munroe, 938 P.2d at 1117-1118.  See, also, Hernandez-Gomez v. Leonardo 
(1996), 185 Ariz. 509, 513, 917 P.2d 238, 242. 
 
Specifically, the Senate Report states that the “[f]ederal minimum safety 
standards need not be interpreted as restricting State common law standards of 
care.  Compliance with such standards would thus not necessarily shield any 
person from product liability at common law.”  S.Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d 
17 
Sess. 12, reprinted in 1966 U.S.Code Cong. & Adm.News 2709, 2720.  The House 
Committee Report also provides that Congress “intended, and this subsection 
specifically establishes, that compliance with safety standards is not to be a 
defense or otherwise to affect the rights of parties under common law particularly 
those relating to warranty, contract, and tort liability.”  (Emphasis added.)  
H.R.Rep. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1966).  Remarks by members of 
Congress also support the view that, notwithstanding the preemption clause, the 
savings clause was intended to preserve all state tort damage actions.  See, e.g., 
112 Cong.Rec. 20599 (1966) (remark by Senator Magnuson that “[t]he Senate 
conferees accepted the House provision that compliance with Federal standards 
does not exempt any person from common law liability.  This provision makes 
explicit, in the bill, a principle developed in the Senate report.  This provision does 
not prevent any person from introducing in a lawsuit evidence of compliance or 
noncompliance with Federal standards.  No court rules of evidence are intended to 
be altered by this provision.”).  Indeed, nowhere in the Safety Act’s history have 
we uncovered even the slightest hint that the preemption clause was intended to 
foreclose any state common-law duties enforced by damage actions. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the Safety Act should not be construed as 
manifesting an intent by Congress to preempt appellant’s air bag claim.  Therefore, 
we hold that appellant’s claim is not expressly preempted by the Act. 
B 
 
Having concluded that the language of the Safety Act does not expressly 
preempt appellant’s claim, we turn next to the issue of implied preemption.  Honda 
argues that even if the preemption clause in the Act does not expressly extinguish 
appellant’s claim, it impliedly does so.  In support of its position, Honda cites 
numerous courts that have concluded that the Safety Act impliedly preempts 
18 
claims like the one asserted by appellant.  See, e.g., Wood, 865 F.2d 395, and 
Pokorny, 902 F.2d 1116.  We acknowledge that the clear weight of authority, at 
least before the court’s decision in Cipollone and its progeny, supports Honda’s 
position on this matter.  See Wilson, 660 N.E.2d at 330. 
 
Appellant, on the other hand, urges that it is not necessary for us to consider 
whether Congressional intent to preempt a “no air bag” claim may be inferred 
under the principles of implied preemption.  Appellant suggests that, in light of the 
court’s findings in Cipollone, an implied preemption analysis is not required in 
this case. 
 
Cipollone involved state-law claims made by and on behalf of smoker and 
lung cancer victim Rose Cipollone against various cigarette manufacturers.  As 
one of their defenses, the manufacturers in Cipollone asserted that the Federal 
Cigarette Labeling and Advertisement Act, enacted in 1965, and its successor, the 
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Section 1331 et seq., Title 15, 
U.S.Code, protected them from liability based on their conduct after 1965.  The 
court in Cipollone determined that the preemptive scope of both the 1965 Act and 
the 1969 Act was governed entirely by the preemption clauses of each Act.  In 
reaching this conclusion, the court observed: 
 
“When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included 
in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when 
that provision provides a ‘reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to 
state authority,’ Malone v. White Motor Corp. [1978], 435 U.S. [497], 505 [98 
S.Ct. 1185, 1190, 55 L.Ed.2d 443, 451], ‘there is no need to infer congressional 
intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions’ of the legislation.  
California Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282 [107 S.Ct. 
683, 690, 93 L.Ed.2d 613, 624] (1987) (opinion of Marshall, J.).  Such reasoning 
19 
is a variant of the familiar principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius:  
Congress’ enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute 
implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted.  In this case, the other 
provisions of the 1965 and 1969 Acts offer no cause to look beyond § 5 of each 
Act.  Therefore, we need only identify the domain expressly pre-empted by each of 
those sections.  As the 1965 and 1969 provisions differ substantially, we consider 
each in turn.”  Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517, 112 S.Ct. at 2618, 120 L.Ed.2d at 423. 
 
Relying on Cipollone, we have concluded that if the federal legislation at 
issue contains an express preemption clause, there is no need to look beyond the 
text of that clause to determine the preemptive intent of Congress.  See, e.g., In re 
Miamisburg, 68 Ohio St.3d at 260, 626 N.E.2d at 90.  See, also, Jenkins, 69 Ohio 
St.3d at 545, 634 N.E.2d at 1001 (“If a federal statute contains an express 
preemption clause, matters beyond the reach of the express clause are not 
preempted. * * * Since the FHSA [Federal Hazardous Substances Act, Section 
1261 et seq., Title 15, U.S.Code] contains a preemption clause, we examine the 
text of that clause to determine if Congress intended for appellee’s claims to be 
preempted in the context of the FHSA.”). 
 
However, following Cipollone, and subsequent to our decisions in In re 
Miamisburg and its progeny, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick (1995), 514 U.S. 280, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 
385.  In Myrick, the Supreme Court noted that an explicit statement limiting 
Congress’s preemptive intent does not always obviate the need to consider the 
implied preemption.  Specifically, the majority in Myrick concluded that: 
 
“The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute 
‘implies’ — i.e., supports a reasonable inference — that Congress did not intend to 
pre-empt other matters does not mean that the express clause entirely forecloses 
20 
any possibility of implied pre-emption.  Indeed, just two paragraphs after the 
quoted passage in Cipollone, we engaged in a conflict pre-emption analysis of the 
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 79 Stat. 282, as amended, 15 
U.S.C. § 1331 et seq., and found ‘no general, inherent conflict between federal 
pre-emption of state warning requirements and the continued vitality of state 
common-law damages actions.’  505 U.S., at 518 [112 S.Ct. at 2618, 120 L.Ed.2d 
at 424].  Our subsequent decisions have not read Cipollone to obviate the need for 
analysis of an individual statute’s pre-emptive effects.  See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. 
v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 673 [113 S.Ct. 1732, 1742, 123 L.Ed.2d 387, 402], 
n. 12 (1993).  (‘We reject petitioner’s claim of implied “conflict” pre-emption * * 
* on the basis of the preceding analysis’).  At best, Cipollone supports an 
inference that an express pre-emption clause forecloses implied pre-emption; it 
does not establish a rule.”  Myrick, 514 U.S. at 288-289, 115 S.Ct. at 1488, 131 
L.Ed.2d at 393. 
 
Notably, Myrick did not overrule Cipollone.  Rather, it is apparent that 
Myrick sought merely to disapprove of decisions interpreting Cipollone to mean 
that implied preemption can never exist when Congress has included an express 
preemption clause in the legislation in question.  Wilson, 660 N.E.2d at 334. 
 
Thus, given the fact that Myrick did not overrule Cipollone, and applying 
the principles set forth in Cipollone, we agree with appellant that an implied 
preemption analysis is not required in this case.  See Wilson, 660 N.E.2d at 334; 
Tebbetts, 140 N.H. at 207, 665 A.2d at 348; Munroe, 938 P.2d at 1117; and 
Nelson v. Ford Motor Co. (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 158, 162, 670 N.E.2d 307, 
310 (“The express preemption clause, when read together with the savings clause, 
provides a ‘reliable indicium of congressional intent’ to preserve common-law 
causes of action such as appellant’s.”).  However, given the findings in Myrick, we 
21 
cannot tell whether the Supreme Court would necessarily agree that an implied 
preemption analysis is not warranted here.8  Myrick stands for the proposition that 
an implied preemption analysis may be required even where there is an express 
preemption clause.  Unfortunately, Myrick provides little guidance with respect to 
when an implied preemption analysis is actually required.  In this regard, we agree 
with those courts that have attempted to reconcile Cipollone and Myrick and have 
concluded, ultimately, that, given the unsettled state of the law in this area, it is 
better to “take the jurisprudentially safer course and proceed with an implied 
preemption analysis.”  Hernandez-Gomez, 185 Ariz. at 514, 917 P.2d at 243.  See, 
also, Wilson, 660 N.E.2d at 336; and Munroe, 938 P.2d at 1117. 
 
As we noted earlier, implied preemption includes both “field” and “conflict” 
preemption.  Therefore, we begin our analysis of implied preemption with “field” 
preemption. 
1 
 
The area of implied field preemption requires little discussion in light of the 
fact that Honda has conceded that the Safety Act does not occupy the field 
exclusively with respect to appellant’s claim.  Honda has accepted the fact that 
“[t]he Safety Act also contains a general savings clause, which makes clear that 
Congress did not intend to occupy the entire field of automotive safety.”  We agree 
with Honda in this regard.  Additionally, we would also point out that the 
preemption clause in the Safety Act specifically allows states to enforce identical 
standards and even higher standards for vehicles procured for their own use. 
 
Furthermore, it is also apparent that standard 208 does not create a “scheme 
of federal regulation [that] is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress ‘left no room’ for” appellant’s claim.  Guerra, 479 U.S. at 
281, 107 S.Ct. at 689, 93 L.Ed.2d at 623.  The phrase “motor vehicle safety 
22 
standards,” as set forth in former Section 1392(a), Title 15, is defined as 
“minimum standard[s] for motor vehicle performance, or motor vehicle equipment 
performance * * *.”  (Emphasis added.)  Former Section 1391(2).  “Thus, from the 
beginning it is seen that the minimum standards were intended to apply to 
performance characteristics of the vehicle and equipment installed in the vehicle, 
not to what equipment must, or could be, installed.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Hernandez-Gomez, 185 Ariz. at 515, 917 P.2d at 244. 
2 
 
We now move to “conflict” preemption.  Honda urges that appellant’s claim 
is impliedly preempted by federal law because appellant’s claim actually conflicts 
with the federal scheme.  Implied conflict preemption can occur in essentially two 
instances:  (1) where it is impossible to comply with both state and federal 
requirements; or (2) where state law obstructs Congressional objectives.  Myrick, 
514 U.S. at 287, 115 S.Ct. at 1487, 131 L.Ed.2d at 392. 
 
After extensive analysis and reflection, we believe that many of Honda’s 
arguments of implied conflict preemption rest on the same faulty premise as its 
express-preemption argument, namely, that appellant’s claim somehow amounts to 
a state regulatory mechanism.  That being the case, it is not “impossible” for 
Honda to comply with both federal and state law because, as we determined in 
Part IIA, supra, appellant’s claim just does not amount to a state performance 
standard.  Honda’s arguments are not well taken for the additional reason that 
nothing within the Safety Act or standard 208 prevented Honda from including air 
bags in its 1990 Accords to reduce injuries from head-on crashes.  Honda chose to 
use an automatic belt as part of the passive restraint requirement.  Honda could 
have installed a driver’s-side air bag in the 1990 Accord.  Indeed, such an 
installation was not “impossible.”  See Wilson, 660 N.E.2d at 337 (“We do 
23 
acknowledge that in some cases, a common law judgment may be pre-empted due 
to a conflict with a federal law.  However, we conclude that for there to be a 
conflict, state law — statutory, regulatory, or common — would have to mandate a 
passive restraint system prohibited by the federal regulation.  Assuming, 
arguendo, that Indiana common law requires airbags, there would be no conflict 
with Rule 208 because Rule 208 does not prohibit airbags — it only permits some 
other alternatives.”).  (Emphasis sic.) 
 
Specifically, Honda contends, as part of its “conflict preemption” argument, 
that appellant’s claim is impliedly preempted by the Safety Act because, if 
allowed, appellant’s claim would frustrate Congress’s goal of ensuring uniformity 
of automotive safety regulations.  See Wood, 865 F.2d at 412 (“Congress decided 
that once the federal government had promulgated a standard, the states’ usual role 
in setting safety standards was subordinated in the interest of national 
uniformity.”); and Harris, 110 F.3d at 1415 (“The text of [Section] 1392[d] and its 
purpose in the overall structure of the Act — ensuring national uniformity in 
safety standards — clearly pre-empts common law claims.”). 
 
We do not agree.  Rather, we agree with those courts that have soundly 
rejected the position that uniformity is an overriding purpose of the Safety Act.  
See, e.g., Garrett v. Ford Motor Co. (D.Md.1987), 684 F.Supp. 407, 409 (“The 
expressly declared purpose of the Act was to reduce deaths and injuries resulting 
from traffic accidents, 15 U.S.C. § 1381.  Ford contends that Congress’ purpose 
for the Act was to create uniformity in safety standards.  While this was one of 
Congress’ incidental concerns, it was not the primary one.  Congress intended the 
Act to save the lives of automobile passengers through safety standards[,] not the 
dollars of automobile manufacturers through uniformity.”); and Pokorny, 902 F.2d 
at 1122 (“[U]niformity was not Congress’s primary goal in enacting the Safety 
24 
Act. * * * [W]e are unwilling to accept an overly broad notion of pre-emption 
based on uniformity that could have the effect of undercutting Congress’s concern 
for safety.”).  See, also, Wilson, 660 N.E.2d at 338. 
 
While we are aware that Congress was concerned with providing uniform 
safety standards while enacting the Safety Act, see S.Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 
2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1966 U.S.Code Cong. & Adm.News 2709, 2720,9 the 
declared purpose of the Safety Act was “to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and 
injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents.”  Former Section 1381, Title 
15.  See, also,  Section 571.208.S2, Title 49, C.F.R. (“The purpose of this standard 
is to reduce the number of deaths of vehicle occupants, and the severity of injuries 
* * *.”).  Indeed, “[n]ational uniformity of motor vehicle safety standards is at 
most an ancillary goal, subordinate to the primary goal of improved motor vehicle 
safety.”  Harris, 110 F.3d at 1417 (Van Sickle, J., dissenting). 
 
Honda also contends that appellant’s claim would “conflict with and 
undermine” the purposes of the Safety Act and standard 208 because it would 
remove the flexibility and options authorized by federal law.  See Baird v. Gen. 
Motors Corp. (N.D.Ohio 1986), 654 F.Supp. 28, 32 (“An automobile manufacturer 
faced with the prospect of choosing the air bag option, or facing potential 
exposure to compensatory and punitive damages for failing to do so, has but one 
realistic choice.  A court decision that removes the element of choice authorized in 
the occupant crash safety regulations will frustrate the statutory scheme.”).  See, 
also, Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1123; and Taylor, 875 F.2d at 827. 
 
Again, we respectfully disagree.  Like the uniformity element, assuring 
flexibility and choice was not the primary purpose of the Safety Act.  The focus of 
the Act is to reduce deaths and injuries from automobile accidents by requiring 
safer vehicle designs.10  Clearly, imposing liability for failure to install an air bag 
25 
would not defeat the purpose of reducing deaths and injuries due to front-end 
crashes.  Rather, the effect of liability here would be to compensate a plaintiff for 
the injuries allegedly caused by a manufacturer’s choice not to do something 
which, in fact, was specifically allowed under federal law in the first instance.  
Moreover, we fail to see how appellant’s claim could possibly remove the 
elements of flexibility and choice afforded under standard 208, because 
appellant’s claim simply does not force Honda to do anything.  Granted, an award 
of damages subjects a manufacturer to monetary liability, but that liability does not 
impose a legal obligation on the manufacturer to change its product design. 
Hernandez-Gomez, 185 Ariz. at 519, 917 P.2d at 248 (“Imposition of tort liability 
under Plaintiff’s theory does not interfere with Congress’ chosen method because 
it does not establish any performance standard.  Standard 208 sets out minimum 
safety standards that are uniformly applicable to all cars manufactured, whereas 
tort liability operates to encourage behavior but not require it.  Manufacturers may 
weigh the risks and benefits and choose to live with the occasional lawsuit rather 
than change their behavior.”). 
 
Accordingly, we find Honda’s implied-preemption arguments not well 
taken.  Congress did not intend for the Safety Act to occupy the entire field of auto 
safety.  In addition, appellant’s claim does not prevent compliance with standard 
208, nor does it thwart the accomplishment of the full purposes of Congress.  
Myrick, 514 U.S. at 287, 115 S.Ct. at 1487, 131 L.Ed.2d at 392. 
III 
 
Honda also contends that appellant’s “no air bag” claim should be barred 
because during discovery, counsel for appellant stated that he would not raise the 
issue that the 1990 Accord did not contain an air bag.  Apparently, this discussion 
occurred between the parties’ attorneys during the deposition testimony of one of 
26 
appellant’s expert witnesses.  Although Honda set forth portions of the deposition 
in its motion in limine, the deposition itself was apparently never filed with the 
trial court.  Thus, we are unable to verify what actually occurred during the 
deposition.  In any event, we find that appellant did not waive her right to bring 
this claim.  Honda was aware that appellant would attempt to introduce evidence 
at trial of remedial changes made to Honda’s 1992 Accords, which included the 
fact that 1992 models contained air bags.  That is precisely why Honda filed its 
motion in limine.  In addition, the trial court granted Honda’s motion without a 
reason.  Accordingly, from our review of what is now before us, we are compelled 
to find that Honda’s argument is not well taken. 
 
In McFarland v. Bruno Mach. Corp. (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 305, 626 N.E.2d 
659, we held that “Evid.R. 407, which prohibits the introduction of evidence of 
subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence or culpable conduct, is not 
applicable to products liability cases premised upon strict liability in tort.”  Id., 
syllabus.  In McFarland, we set forth the pros and cons of allowing post-
occurrence modifications by a manufacturer into evidence.  In concluding that 
such evidence was admissible in a products liability case premised upon strict 
liability in tort, we reasoned: 
 
“[W]e are aware of the contention by some that the introduction of evidence 
of subsequent remedial measures in a strict products liability case could be highly 
prejudicial to a defendant-manufacturer.  While this contention may have some 
validity, an equally plausible assertion can be made on behalf of an injured 
plaintiff if such evidence is excluded.  Without question, all evidence going to the 
heart of an issue is, to some extent, ‘prejudicial’ to someone.  That is the very 
essence of ‘evidence’ and our adversary system.  Let the jury decide!”  Id., 68 
Ohio St.3d at 312, 626 N.E.2d at 664. 
27 
 
In the case at bar, Honda had the option to install air bags in its 1990 
Accords but chose not to do so.  However, Honda equipped its 1992 Accords with 
air bags.  In addition, Honda changed the location of the shoulder belt attachment 
system in its 1992 models.  Appellant was allowed to show the belt geometry 
makeup in a 1987 Honda Civic but was not permitted to show the location of the 
belt mechanism in 1992 Accords.  According to appellant, both 1990 and 1992 
Accords were the same body type.  Hence, the question that remains in our minds 
is, why did Honda make these changes?  Maybe the question answers itself.  
Clearly, evidence of the alleged remedial changes implemented by Honda directly 
concerns whether alternative designs were feasible and whether the 1990 Accord 
was in fact defective.  Proof that Honda equipped its 1992 Accords with air bags 
and that the shoulder belts in 1992 models were positioned differently than 1990 
Accords would be probative of the quality of 1990 Accords.  The jury was not 
allowed to view these subsequent changes.  “Let the jury decide!”  McFarland, 68 
Ohio St.3d at 312, 626 N.E.2d at 664. 
IV 
 
In conclusion, we hold that a state tort claim based upon a manufacturer’s 
failure to equip its automobiles with air bags is not expressly or impliedly 
preempted by former Section 1381 et seq., Title 15, U.S.Code and regulations 
promulgated thereunder.  In accordance with McFarland, appellant should have 
been allowed to introduce evidence showing the subsequent design changes made 
by Honda to its 1992 Accords. 
 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand 
the cause to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion.  On remand, the trial court should allow the parties to conduct additional 
28 
discovery including, but not limited to, the subsequent changes made by Honda to 
its 1992 Accords. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
We recognize that the historical and common designation of a female 
testamentary personal representative has been “executrix.”  In our continuing 
efforts to make our language gender neutral, we now use the term “executor” in all 
cases involving a testamentary disposition wherein a designated person is named 
and serves as a fiduciary. 
2. 
On appeal to this court, we denied jurisdiction in Nelson v. Ford Motor Co.  
(1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 158, 670 N.E.2d 307.  See (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 1404, 
666 N.E.2d 565. 
3. 
We are mindful that in 1994, the Safety Act was revised and recodified in 
Section 30101 et seq., Title 49, U.S.Code “without substantive change.”  See 
Pub.L. 103-272, Section 1(a), 108 Stat. 745 (1994). 
4. 
The question that has been certified for our review and final determination 
is whether “a ‘no air bag’ claim brought under Ohio’s tort law [is] preempted by 
the National Traffic & Motor Vehicle Safety Act found at 15 U.S.C. § 1381, et 
seq.” 
5. 
The Secretary of Transportation’s general authority to promulgate safety 
standards under the Safety Act has been delegated to the Administrator of the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.  See Section 1.50(a), Title 49, 
C.F.R. 
29 
6. 
For an excellent and thorough historical analysis of Section 571.208, Title 
49, C.F.R., see Chadwell, Automobile Passive Restraint Claims Post-Cipollone:  
An End to the Federal Preemption Defense (1994), 46 Baylor L.Rev. 141, 143-
150. 
7. 
An additional reason for rejecting Honda’s express-preemption argument is 
that Congress did not add any reference to state tort claims in the preemption 
clause when it recodified and amended the Safety Act in 1994.  See 30103(b)(1), 
Title 49, U.S.Code, effective July 5, 1994, which provides that “[w]hen a motor 
vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or a political 
subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to 
the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment 
only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter.”  By 
1994, federal preemption of state law claims with respect to air bags was not a 
novel matter. 
8. 
Our uncertainty whether an implied-preemption analysis is or is not 
warranted in this case is further compounded by the fact that, in Freightliner Corp. 
v. Myrick (1995), 514 U.S. 280, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 385, the court 
determined that it was unnecessary to consider the effects of former Section 
1397(k), Title 15, U.S.Code with respect to the respondents’ claims, because the 
applicable federal safety standard had been suspended by court order.  The court 
noted that “[b]ecause no federal safety standard exists, we need not reach 
respondents’ argument that the term ‘standard’ in 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) pre-empts 
only state statutes and regulations, but not common law.  We also need not address 
respondents’ claim that the savings clause, § 1397(k), does not permit a 
manufacturer to use a federal safety standard to immunize itself from state 
30 
common-law liability.”  Id., 514 U.S. at 287, 115 S.Ct. at 1487, 131 L.Ed.2d at 
392, fn. 3. 
9. 
“The centralized, mass production, high volume character of the motor 
vehicle manufacturing industry in the United States requires that motor vehicle 
safety standards be not only strong and adequately enforced, but that they be 
uniform throughout the country.  At the same time, the committee believes that the 
States should be free to adopt standards identical to the Federal standards, which 
apply only to the first sale of a new vehicle, so that the States may play a 
significant role in the vehicle safety field by applying and enforcing standards 
over the life of the car.  Accordingly, State standards are preempted only if they 
differ from Federal standards applicable to the particular aspect of the vehicle or 
item of vehicle equipment (sec. 104). 
 
“The States are also permitted to set more stringent requirements for 
purposes of their own procurement.  Moreover, the Federal minimum safety 
standards need not be interpreted as restricting State common law standards of 
care.  Compliance with such standards would thus not necessarily shield any 
person from product liability at common law.”  (Emphasis added.)  S.Rep. No. 
1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1966 U.S.Code Cong. & Adm.News 
2709, 2720. 
10. 
We also note that the declared purpose of the present version of the Safety 
Act “is to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries resulting from traffic 
accidents.”  Section 30101, Title 49, U.S.Code.  Indeed, this section does not list 
uniformity or flexibility as additional purposes of the Safety Act. 
 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  Because I believe that state “no air bag” claims 
grounded in tort are impliedly preempted by the National Traffic and Motor 
31 
Vehicle Safety Act, former Section 1381 et seq., Title 15, U.S.Code (“Safety Act”) 
and Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, Section 571.208, Title 49, C.F.R. 
(“FMVSS 208”), I respectfully dissent. 
 
The majority bases its decision on the implied preemption issue on three 
factors: (1) appellant’s state law cause of action does not amount to a state 
performance standard; (2) assuming that state law would penalize Honda for its 
failure to implement an air bag, it would not be “impossible” for Honda to comply 
with both state and federal law because the federal standard does not prohibit 
implementation of air bags; and (3) the primary purpose of the Safety Act is to 
reduce death and injuries resulting from traffic accidents, while national 
uniformity in safety standards is a secondary goal.  These factors, however, do not 
compel the majority’s conclusion. 
 
It is important to an express-preemption analysis whether appellant’s state 
law cause of action amounts to a state performance standard because, if it does 
not, express preemption cannot be found.  That inquiry, however, has little bearing 
on the issue of implied preemption.  In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (1992), 
505 U.S. 504, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407, the court stressed that state 
“‘regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through 
some form of preventive relief.  The obligation to pay compensation can be, 
indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling 
policy.’” Id. at 521, 112 S.Ct. at 2620, 120 L.Ed.2d at 426, quoting San Diego 
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon (1959), 359 U.S. 236, 247, 79 S.Ct. 773, 780, 3 
L.Ed.2d 775, 784.  Accordingly, even if not the definitional equivalent of a safety 
standard, state actions at common law may generate tensions with federal safety 
standards so as to create a conflict, warranting preemption. 
32 
 
In delimiting the reach of implied preemption, the United States Supreme 
Court has stated that “state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts 
with federal law.  Thus, the Court has found pre-emption where it is impossible for 
a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements, * * * or where 
state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.’”  (Emphasis added.)  English v. Gen. Elec. 
Co. (1990), 496 U.S. 72, 79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 2275, 110 L.Ed.2d 65, 74, quoting 
Hines v. Davidowitz (1941), 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581, 587.   
 
I begin my analysis by noting that the rule set out by the Supreme Court on 
implied conflict preemption recognizes two disjunctive bases for preemption.  The 
majority rejects preemption on the first basis, impossibility of compliance, 
determining that, by choosing air bags for all its automobiles, Honda could comply 
with both state and federal law.  The majority rejects the second basis for 
preemption, that allowance of “no air bag” claims stands as an obstacle to 
execution of the full purposes of Congress, by stating that Congress’s primary 
purpose is reduction of traffic accidents, deaths and injuries — a goal that would 
be furthered by state law penalizing manufacturers for failure to implement air 
bags. 
 
The flaw in the majority’s analysis rejecting the second, alternative basis for 
preemption is that the majority itself subverts a goal of Congress in passing the 
Safety Act — uniformity — in favor of what it labels the “overriding” purpose of 
the Act.  Cipollone, however, establishes that a court is to look to the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress embodied in an act, not only to that purpose or 
objective that a court deems overriding.11 
 
In making law, a legislative body necessarily strikes balances in formulating 
a scheme to accomplish its ultimate goal.  Compromises are necessary to reconcile 
33 
legitimate competing interests and to ensure the act’s workability.  Piecemeal 
subversion of an act ultimately weakens it.  In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr (1996), 518 
U.S. ____, ____, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 2251, 135 L.Ed.2d 700, 716, the United States 
Supreme Court recognized that preemption analysis requires courts to look at the 
structure and purpose of the statute as a whole in determining Congress’s purpose 
in enacting legislation.  According to the court, that purpose is revealed “not only 
in the text, but through the reviewing court’s reasoned understanding of the way in 
which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to 
affect business, consumers, and the law.”  Id. 
 
Federal circuit courts considering this issue, before and after Cipollone was 
decided,12 have determined that the Safety Act and regulations promulgated under 
it preempt state “no air bag” claims.  See, e.g., Harris v. Ford Motor Co. (C.A.9, 
1997), 110 F.3d 1410 (express preemption); Montag v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd. 
(C.A.10, 1996), 75 F.3d 1414 (implied preemption); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co. 
(C.A.3, 1990), 902 F.2d 1116 (implied preemption); Taylor v. Gen. Motors Corp. 
(C.A.11, 1989), 875 F.2d 816 (implied preemption); Wood v. Gen. Motors Corp. 
(C.A.1, 1988), 865 F.2d 395 (implied preemption).   While a few state high courts 
have found against preemption, I believe that those courts, like today’s majority, 
misunderstand the purpose of the Act’s savings clause and have failed to discern 
congressional intent from the structure and purpose of the Act as a whole.  See 
Munroe v. Galati (Ariz.1997), 938 P.2d 1114; Wilson v. Pleasant (Ind.1995), 660 
N.E.2d 327; Tebbetts v. Ford Motor Co. (1995), 140 N.H. 203, 665 A.2d 345. 
THE SAVINGS CLAUSE 
 
 Former Section 1397(k) of the Act provided that “[c]ompliance with any 
Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not 
exempt any person from any liability under common law.”  Looking to the 
34 
structure of the Act, it is noteworthy that the savings clause did not form a part of 
the clause devoted to preemption.  Instead, the savings clause was remotely 
located, with four intervening sections separating it from the preemption clause.  
Additionally, the former preemption clause itself contained the exceptions to its 
reach.  It permitted states to enforce safety standards identical to the federal 
standard and to require higher standards for motor vehicle equipment procured for 
its own use.  Former Section 1397(d). 
 
What, then, was the purpose of former Section 1397(k)?  I believe that the 
language used in that clause and its placement in the Act best support a conclusion 
that it was intended to eliminate compliance with federal regulations as a defense 
to unpreempted common-law actions.  As noted by the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Harris, “In the absence of former § 1397(k), manufacturers might 
claim that compliance with all Federal standards satisfies their common law tort 
duties as a matter of law, and that they should not be liable for a design or 
manufacturing defect even when no Federal standard exists.” Id., 110 F.3d at 
1415-1416. 
 
“Exemption” from liability presumes that liability attaches in the first 
instance.  Preemption does not provide an “exemption.”  Instead, it blocks 
application of laws so that liability cannot attach under the preempted law.  See 
Harris, 110 F.3d at 1415.  Had Congress intended to address preemption in the 
savings clause, it easily could have spoken in terms of preemption rather than 
exemption, as it did in former Section 1392(d).  Moreover, had Congress intended 
former Section 1397(k) to limit the preemptive reach of the Act, it could have 
placed the limiting language more appropriately in former Section 1392(d), 
alongside the preemption clause’s express limitations.  Compare CSX Transp., Inc. 
v. Easterwood (1993), 507 U.S. 658, 665, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 1738, 123 L.Ed.2d 387, 
35 
397 (noting that the structure of the Act under consideration “displays 
considerable solicitude for state law in that its express pre-emption clause is both 
prefaced and succeeded by express saving clauses.”). 
 
Courts have consistently rejected the notion that savings clauses like former 
Section 1397(k) preserve “common law actions that would subvert a federal 
statutory or regulatory scheme.” Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1125, citing Internatl. 
Paper Co. v. Ouellette (1987), 479 U.S. 481, 492-494, 107 S.Ct. 805, 811-813, 93 
L.Ed.2d 883, 897-898; see, also, Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile 
Co. (1981), 450 U.S. 311, 101 S.Ct. 1124, 67 L.Ed.2d 258;  Pennsylvania RR. Co. 
v. Puritan Coal Mining Co. (1915), 237 U.S. 121, 129-130, 35 S.Ct. 484, 487, 59 
L.Ed. 867, 872; Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. (1907), 204 
U.S. 426, 446, 27 S.Ct. 350, 357-358, 51 L.Ed. 553, 561.  On the other hand, if we 
interpret the savings clause as eliminating a defense to common-law actions 
outside the Act’s preemptive reach, we preserve the overall consistency of the Act.  
Under former Section 1397(k), liability may still exist under common law for 
claims not in conflict with the Act’s structure and purpose.  For instance, in 
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick (1995), 514 U.S. 280, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 
385, the court allowed a state common-law action in tort premised on a “no 
antilock brake” claim because there was no conflicting federal safety standard in 
effect at the time.  Additionally, former Section 1397(k) evinces a congressional 
intent to allow claims, such as the one tried below, alleging a manufacturing or 
design defect in a safety device sanctioned by the federal regulations.  See Perry v. 
Mercedes Benz of N. Am., Inc. (C.A.5, 1992), 957 F.2d 1257, 1265-1266 (state 
common-law action allowed for injury incurred when air bag failed to deploy). 
NATIONAL UNIFORMITY IS A GOAL OF THE ACT REQUIRING 
 IMPLIED PREEMPTION OF STATE NO AIR BAG CLAIMS 
36 
 
The majority concedes, as it must, that national uniformity of safety 
standards was a congressional goal in enacting the Safety Act.  Nonetheless, the 
majority dismisses this goal as “ancillary” to Congress’s “primary” and 
“overriding” goal of improved vehicle safety. 
 
There is no question that Congress enacted the Safety Act to improve 
vehicle safety.  Both the language of the Act and the legislative history, however, 
demonstrate that Congress considered uniformity of safety standards an essential 
means to that end. 
 
As stated by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Wood, 865 F.2d at 412, 
“[The] division of authority between state and federal government was part of 
Congress's chosen method for implementing the Safety Act.  Congress believed 
that for the federal standards to be effective, they had to be uniform throughout the 
country.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d);  Senate Report, 1966 U.S.Code Cong. & 
Admin.News at 2720 (‘The centralized, mass production, high volume character of 
the motor vehicle manufacturing industry in the United States requires that motor 
vehicle safety standards be not only strong and adequately enforced, but that they 
be uniform throughout the country.’).”  The text of the Act itself establishes this 
point, mandating that “no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any 
authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor 
vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the 
same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not 
identical to the Federal standard.”  Former Section 1392(d). 
 
Additionally, limited flexibility in choosing safety devices was a major 
objective of the Department of Transportation in promulgating FMVSS 208.13  
This is best demonstrated by simply noting that the version of FMVSS 208 under 
consideration permits implementation of two alternative passenger restraint 
37 
mechanisms.  49 Fed.Reg. 28962, 29009-29010 (July 17, 1984).  Providing such 
flexibility to manufacturers is consistent with the Safety Act, which delegates to 
the Secretary of Transportation the authority to establish federal motor vehicle 
safety standards that “shall be practicable, meet the need for motor vehicle safety, 
and be stated in objective terms.”  (Emphasis added.)  Former Section 1392(a), 
Title 15, U.S.Code; see, also, Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1125. 
 
Because uniformity and flexibility are necessary components to the 
continuing vitality of the Act, I would adopt the approach taken by the First 
Circuit in Wood, 865 F.2d at 402, and applied by the majority of federal circuit 
courts — that the Act and FMVSS 208 impliedly preempt state “no air bag” 
claims.  The ultimate reason for arriving at this conclusion was best stated by the 
Wood court in the following passage:  “[W]e are convinced that Congress's 
purposes, as revealed in the Safety Act and in the legislative history, plainly imply 
a preemptive intent.  The instant product liability claim alleging that the absence 
of an air bag rendered the vehicle's design faulty would, if upheld, clearly ‘stand as 
an obstacle’ to the regulatory scheme of the Safety Act.  A state common law 
action sustaining the theory that a vehicle was defective because it lacked an air 
bag would, in effect, create a state safety standard related to the same aspect of 
performance of FMVSS 208 but not identical to FMVSS 208.  Such an action is, 
in our view, impliedly preempted because it would effectively circumvent section 
1392(d)'s prohibition of nonidentical state standards covering the same aspect of 
performance as a federal safety standard.  Allowing a common law action holding 
manufacturers liable for failing to install air bags in motor vehicles would be 
tantamount to establishing a conflicting safety standard that necessarily 
encroaches upon the goal of uniformity specifically set forth by Congress in this 
area.” 
38 
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE REGARDING SEAT 
 BELT DESIGN CHANGE IN 1992 ACCORD 
 
Initially, it is unimportant to the analysis that the trial court orally granted 
Honda’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of implementation of air bags and 
subsequent design changes in the belt restraint system from model year 1990 
Honda Accords to model year 1992 Accords and that there is no record to 
document the basis for that ruling.  Reviewing courts must affirm the trial court's 
judgment if, upon review, any valid grounds are found to support that judgment.  
See Joyce v. Gen. Motors Corp. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 93, 96, 551 N.E.2d 172, 
174.  "[A] reviewing court is not authorized to reverse a correct judgment merely 
because erroneous reasons were assigned as the basis thereof."  Id.; State ex rel. 
Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 222, 
631 N.E.2d 150, 154. 
 
Aside from the rule on subsequent remedial measures (Evid.R. 407), the 
court was required to determine whether the evidence was relevant to the issues 
being tried (Evid.R. 402) and, if relevant, whether that evidence nonetheless 
should be excluded on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time (Evid.R. 
403).  Evid.R. 104(A) establishes that admissibility questions such as Evid.R. 402 
and 403 are for the court to decide.  I believe that the trial court could have 
excluded the evidence solely on the basis of Evid.R. 403. 
 
Having properly determined that a claim premised on the absence of an air 
bag was preempted by federal law, the court was left to determine the relevance of 
a change in seat belt design that was inextricably tied to Honda’s change of 
passive restraint mechanisms from automatic seat belts to air bags.  Because of the 
Safety Act’s preemptive effect, the only theory remaining for Minton was that the 
automatic shoulder belt used in 1990 Accords was defectively designed.  
39 
Excluding “no air bag” claims, it was irrelevant that air bags were available as an 
alternative. 
 
At trial, Minton introduced expert testimony that, had the 1990 Accord 
shoulder belt attachment been moved backwards by approximately seven inches, 
Minton’s injuries could have been minimized.  Minton later unsuccessfully 
attempted to introduce evidence that Honda designed its 1992 Accord shoulder 
belt attachment seven inches to the rear of its position in the 1990 Accord.  As 
noted by the appellate court, the seat belt restraints of the 1990 and 1992 Accord 
were not truly comparable.  The 1990 version was an automatic passive restraint 
mechanism, while the 1992 version was a manual belt, with an air bag acting as 
the passive restraint.  Nevertheless, evidence of Honda’s placement of the 
shoulder belt attachment in 1992 Accords is arguably relevant to demonstrate 
Honda’s design change in the shoulder belt attachment geometry.  Moreover, 
under the authority of McFarland v. Bruno Mach. Corp. (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 
305, 626 N.E.2d 659, Evid.R. 407 does not prohibit introduction of evidence of 
the later change. 
 
As a second step in determining whether the evidence should be admitted,  
however, the court was required to apply Evid.R. 403(A): 
 
“Exclusion mandatory.  Although relevant, evidence is not admissible if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of 
confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury.” 
 
Having noted the limited relevance of the design change, I believe that the 
appellate court noted proper reasons why Evid.R. 403 mandated exclusion of the 
change in the 1992 Accord’s shoulder belt attachment: 
 
“In our opinion, * * * the difference in the two systems [automatic shoulder 
belt versus manual belt with air bag] would necessarily precipitate the introduction 
40 
of evidence regarding the change from a passive shoulder belt to a manually 
operated shoulder belt, and thus would require the introduction of evidence 
regarding the reason for the design change (i.e., the conversion to airbag 
technology, which was a federally mandated option). * * * [W]e find that evidence 
of the subsequent remedial change in the shoulder belt restraint system is 
inadmissible because it would inevitably lead to the jury's becoming aware of the 
fact that Honda switched to an airbag passive restraint system, thereby injecting an 
issue — the failure to have used the airbag system in the 1990 model Accord — 
that was preempted by federal law. 
 
“We note that Minton was permitted to introduce expert testimony 
regarding the alleged design defect in the 1990 seat belt system, including, 
specifically, evidence regarding typical shoulder belt attachments in comparable 
systems of other automobile manufacturers.  Therefore, we conclude that the trial 
court reasonably exercised the discretion inherent in its power to rule upon the 
admissibility of evidence to prevent the interjection of the omitted airbag theory of 
design defect, while not unduly restricting Minton's ability to show, through her 
use of evidence of comparable shoulder belt passive restraint systems in cars 
manufactured by Honda's competitors, that it was feasible to have designed the 
system with an attachment point closer to the driver's shoulder.” 
 
In addition to the opportunity to demonstrate feasible alternative designs of 
comparable passive shoulder belt attachments, Minton also was permitted to 
introduce expert testimony that the upper attachment point of the manual belt on 
an earlier model Honda Civic provided a safer design than the attachment point for 
the automatic shoulder belt on the 1990 Accord. 
 
Accordingly, whatever slight probative value may attach to the difference in 
shoulder belt attachment points between the 1990 and 1992 model Honda Accords 
41 
was substantially outweighed by that evidence’s danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of issues, and misleading of the jury.  Exclusion, therefore, was proper. 
CONCLUSION 
 
In light of the foregoing analysis, I would affirm the judgment of the court 
of appeals. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur in the foregoing 
dissenting opinion. 
FOOTNOTES: 
11. 
Although the court in Cipollone primarily made its determinations of 
congressional intent for purposes of an express-preemption analysis, the court has 
noted the importance of congressional intent in any preemption analysis.  In 
English v. Gen. Elec. Co. (1990), 496 U.S. 72, 79-80, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 2275, 110 
L.Ed.2d 65, 75, fn. 5, the court noted: “By referring to these three categories 
[express preemption, implied field preemption, implied conflict preemption], we 
should not be taken to mean that they are rigidly distinct.  Indeed, field pre-
emption may be understood as a species of conflict pre-emption: A state law that 
falls within a pre-empted field conflicts with Congress’ intent (either express or 
plainly implied) to exclude state regulation.” 
12. 
The majority states its belief that given the express language of the savings 
and preemption clauses, an implied preemption analysis is not required in this 
case.  Nevertheless, the majority states that it addresses the implied preemption 
issue out of caution.  I believe that it is the clear import of United States Supreme 
Court law on supremacy of federal legislation, not mere caution, that mandates an 
implied-preemption analysis. 
 
In Cipollone, the court determined that the preemptive scope of the 
legislation under consideration was governed entirely by the express language of 
42 
the relevant preemption clauses.  505 U.S. at 517, 112 S.Ct. at 2618, 120 L.Ed.2d 
at 423. It is noteworthy, however, that the Cipollone court first determined that the 
other provisions of the relevant legislation offered no cause to look beyond the 
preemption clauses.  Id.  In fact, the court went on to analyze why implied conflict 
preemption did not apply, finding “no general, inherent conflict between federal 
pre-emption of state warning requirements and the continued vitality of state 
common-law damages actions.”  505 U.S. at 518, 112 S.Ct. at 2618, 120 L.Ed.2d  
at 424. 
 
In Freightliner the court went to great lengths to dismiss as meritless the 
proposition that Cipollone obviates the need for implied conflict preemption 
analysis where an act includes an express preemption clause, stating that “[a]t best, 
Cipollone supports an inference that an express pre-emption clause forecloses 
implied pre-emption; it does not establish a rule.”  514 U.S. at 289, 115 S.Ct. at 
1488, 131 L.Ed.2d at 393. 
 
Finally, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr (1996), 518 U.S. ____, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 
135 L.Ed.2d 700, Justice Stevens, writing for a majority of the court, refused to go 
beyond the facts of that case and state that the express preemption clause under 
consideration foreclosed the possibility that any common-law actions would ever 
be preempted.  In so doing, Justice Stevens noted that even upon consideration of 
future cases properly raising specific express preemption issues, “the issue may 
not need to be resolved if the claim would also be preempted under conflict 
preemption analysis.”  Id., 518 U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2259, 135 L.Ed.2d at 726. 
 
The Supreme Court cases are not ambiguous.  The existence of an express 
preemption clause does not excuse a court from determining whether implied 
preemption applies.  While an express preemption clause may support an inference 
43 
foreclosing implied preemption, it never forecloses an implied-preemption 
analysis. 
13. 
The Secretary has exercised his authority to promulgate safety standards by 
delegating that authority to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.  
Sections 1.50 and 501.2, Title 49, C.F.R.