Case Title: Matter of Parental Rights to ARW

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-85-2

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-03-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matter of Parental Rights to ARW1986 WY 78716 P.2d 353Case Number: C-85-2Decided: 03/25/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF PARENTAL 
RIGHTS TO ARW. RDW, APPELLANT (RESPONDENT),

v.

GJS, APPELLEE 
(PETITIONER). No. C-85-2

Appeal from the District 
Court, ConverseCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

Robert C. 
Wilson, Douglas, for appellant.

Michael J. 
Krampner, Casper, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The district court 
characterized appellant as a "professional, international and unrepentant 
criminal," and in a termination of parental rights proceeding, found that he was 
an unfit person to have custody and control of ARW. From such termination, this 
appeal is brought.

[¶2.]     Appellant states the 
issues as:

"Whether there was 
sufficient evidence before the court to establish by clear and convincing 
evidence that the appellant was unfit to have the care, custody and control of 
his daughter ARW.

"Whether or not the 
appellee was estopped from seeking termination of the appellant's parental 
rights after the parties had voluntarily entered into a guardianship and custody 
agreement.

"Whether or not the 
appellee complied with the mandatory requirements of 14-2-313 and 
14-2-314."

[¶3.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶4.]     Because of the nature 
of the principal issue in this case, a detailed delineation of appellant's 
background is appropriate. Appellant RDW effected a liaison with MKH in 
Lima, Peru, in 1979. At this time MKH was 
an eighteen-year-old high school student living with her parents. Appellant was 
twenty eight years old, twice married, but only once divorced. ARW, born 
November 14, 1980, was the issue of the meretricious relationship between 
appellant and MKH. Appellant had contracted his second marriage in 
Australia in 1975, at which time he 
was a fugitive living under an assumed name. His second wife was also living 
under an assumed name. His profession was that of a drug smuggler, which took 
him to many parts of the world, such as Europe, Southeast 
Asia, Australia, 
South and Central America. It might be more 
accurate to say that he was a semi-professional smuggler in that law enforcement 
people had already laid hands on him several times.

[¶5.]     Appellant's history of 
drug-related charges begins at age seventeen, when he was incarcerated for seven 
months at a federal youth program and remained on probation until he reached the 
age of twenty-one. In 1974 appellant was indicted for conspiracy to smuggle 
approximately 140 lbs. of cocaine into the United States. 
He was released on a $300,000 bond, and after failing to appear the bond was 
forfeited. Appellant left the country and was a fugitive until 1979. He was 
arrested in Lima, 
Peru, on the 1974 
conspiracy indictment, and on October 13, 1979, he was placed on probation for 
five years for a felony bail-jumping charge.

[¶6.]     On October 6, 1980, 
appellant was released from a federal penitentiary to a half-way house to serve 
the remainder of his term. He was allowed to obtain a passport with the 
provision that he could not enter or leave the United States 
without providing a two-week notice to a designated Drug Enforcement 
Administration officer. That appellant was able to obtain a passport seems 
incredible, considering his background.

[¶7.]     MKH died in Mexico City, on August 27, 1982, after she had left 
appellant at their home in Brazil approximately three or four 
days before. The cause of MKH's death was determined to be cocaine poisoning, 
which resulted from balloons containing cocaine bursting in her gastrointestinal 
tract.

[¶8.]     Appellee, MKH's mother, 
was notified at her home in Bogata, Columbia of her daughter's death. Appellee 
traveled from Columbia to Mexico City to claim MKH's remains and to pick up the minor 
child ARW, who had accompanied MKH on the trip from Brazil.

[¶9.]     Appellant went to 
ConverseCounty to attend the 
funeral of MKH. While there he met with appellee. At this time appellant 
admitted to appellee some involvement in the death of MKH. Appellee 
testified:

"He [appellant] came in 
and he said that he thought this was all his fault. I said, `Well, I think it's 
your fault too.' And he said, `Well, I shouldn't have had her do it.' * * * I 
said, `Why did you? Why did you?' And he said, `Because we needed the money. * * 
* For a house payment.'"

[¶10.]  Following the confrontation between 
appellant and appellee, appellant filed a habeas corpus action against appellee 
for return of ARW. After the action was filed on September 16, 1982, appellant 
and appellee entered into a guardianship agreement. This agreement granted 
custody to appellee with restricted visitation for appellant. The guardianship 
was to continue until further order or modification by the 
court.

[¶11.]  Following the signing of the guardianship 
agreement, arrangements were made for appellant to meet appellee in the 
Los Angeles airport to visit with ARW before 
appellee and ARW returned to Columbia. At that time appellant was arrested 
at the airport by federal marshalls. His probation was revoked, and he 
was sentenced to serve five years in the federal 
penitentiary.

[¶12.]  The petition for termination of parental 
rights was heard May 13, 1985. At the hearing, appellant was represented by 
counsel, and appellant testified in opposition to the petition. On August 2, 
1985, the court signed and filed an order terminating appellant's parental 
rights to ARW. In support of the termination order, the court found: 

"5. Respondent [RDW] is 
presently incarcerated at the Federal Prison Camp at Duluth, Minnesota.

"* * * * 
*

"7. Respondent [RDW] is 
an unfit person to have custody and control of [ARW], for the following 
reasons:

"a. Respondent [RDW] has 
spent almost all of his adult life, outside of incarceration, trafficking in 
illegal narcotics and/or as a fugitive from justice, and is a professional, 
international, and unrepentant criminal;

"b. Respondent [RDW], in 
pursuit of illegal drug profits, involved [MKH] in narcotics smuggling, which 
resulted in her death."

[¶13.]  Appellant complains that appellee was 
responsible for his arrest at the Los 
Angeles airport. This may in fact be true, but we fail to 
see how this circumstance in any way adds to or diminishes appellant's parental 
fitness.

I

[¶14.]  In the first issue appellant asks whether 
there was sufficient evidence presented for the trial court to determine that 
appellant was unfit to have the care, custody, and control of ARW. When 
reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence question, we accept the evidence 
presented by the prevailing party as true, giving every favorable inference that 
fairly and reasonably may be drawn therefrom. Lenhart v. Desmond, Wyo., 705 P.2d 338 (1985); and Landmark, Inc. v. Stockmen's Bank&Trust Company, Wyo., 680 P.2d 471 
(1984).

[¶15.]  We have already set forth in detail the 
facts of the case which, needless to say, demonstrate appellant has led a less 
than exemplary life. Since the age of 17, appellant has been involved in a life 
of drug smuggling. His extensive criminal record spans some 18 years. The last 
honest job appellant had before becoming a professional drug smuggler was that 
of a busboy. Appellant was fifteen. Since then, he has smuggled drugs for his 
livelihood. Much of the time appellant has lived in foreign lands under an 
assumed alias as a fugitive from justice.

[¶16.]  Appellant met MKH while he was married to 
someone else. He failed to inform MKH of such fact. He then taught MKH the art 
of using one's body to smuggle drugs, apparently teaching her the various body 
parts conducive to such activity. MKH died as a result, and appellant admitted 
to MKH's parents that her death was his fault.

[¶17.]  But all that is behind appellant now, and 
he claims his life will be different. To demonstrate such change, appellant 
claims he wishes to become a cab driver in southern California. This, he 
claims, makes him a fit parent for ARW.

[¶18.]  In his brief on appeal, appellant advises 
us that he has been released from prison. This fact is not disclosed by the 
record. In any event, we do not attach any significance to the release or future 
release of appellant from prison. If appellant is, in fact, running at large he 
is out of his natural habitat, and we are confident that he will shortly be 
returned to more familiar surroundings.

[¶19.]  Needless to say, we find appellant's 
sudden conversion suspect. It is easy for us to find a plethora of evidence 
sufficient to support the trial court's determination that appellant's parental 
rights should be terminated. In summary, "* * * if [appellant] had any redeeming 
qualities, he managed to keep them fairly well concealed." Matter of Adoption of 
RHA, Wyo., 702 P.2d 1259, 1266 (1985).

II

[¶20.]  Appellant claims appellee should be 
judicially estopped from seeking termination of appellant's parental rights 
since the parties had already entered into a guardianship and custody agreement. 
The only case cited by appellant in support of his estoppel theory is Allen v. 
Allen, Wyo., 550 P.2d 1137 (1976). In that case the 
court recognized the doctrine of judicial estoppel, which bars a party from 
taking inconsistent positions in separate judicial 
proceedings:

"The principle, while 
denominated judicial estoppel, is sometimes referred to as a doctrine which 
estops a party to play fast and loose with the courts or to trifle with judicial 
proceedings. It is an expression of the maxim that one cannot blow hot and cold 
in the same breath. A party will just not be allowed to maintain inconsistent 
positions in judicial proceedings, as here. 31 C.J.S., Estoppel § 117, pp. 
624-625.

"The role of judicial 
estoppel has been accepted in this state. Hatten Realty Co. v. Baylies, 1930, 42 
Wyo. 69, 
89-93, 290 P. 561, 72 A.L.R. 587. It was there held that where a man is 
successful in a position taken in a previous court proceeding, that position 
rises to the position of conclusiveness. It constitutes a solemn and sworn 
acknowledgment of the correctness of plaintiff's claim. Following the same 
reasoning reached in Hatten, it would be highly inequitable for the defendant to 
have a decree in his divorce case holding the property not to be his and at the 
same time be held the owner of an interest in this proceeding. It is that very 
inconsistency that judicial estoppel will not tolerate. Defendant's statements 
in the previous action are the very highest order of evidence against him and 
are entitled to judicial sanctity. He cannot play hanky-panky with the courts of 
this state and thus interfere with the integrity of the judicial system. See 
Parkinson v. California Co., 10 Cir., 1956, 233 F.2d 432, 437-438, for a 
discussion of Hatten." Id., at 1142.

[¶21.]  Judicial estoppel is not applicable here, 
and we find no merit to this issue. Appellant has failed to show how appellee 
has ever taken inconsistent positions in separate judicial proceedings. In the 
guardianship proceedings, appellee alleged, as she does now, that she was the 
proper person to have custody of ARW. A guardian should act in the best interest 
of the child. See, e.g., § 3-2-201, W.S. 1977 (May 1985 Replacement). In 
furtherance of such interest, appellee sought the termination of appellant's 
parental rights.

III

[¶22.]  In his final issue, appellant claims the 
provisions of §§ 14-2-313 and 14-2-314, W.S. 1977, 1985 Cum.Supp., were 
violated. Those statutes read:

"§ 14-2-313. 
Service.

"(a) The petition shall 
be served on the following persons:

"(i) The parent of the 
child;

"(ii) The guardian ad 
litem;

"(iii) The guardian or 
next friend of the parent if the parent is a minor.

"(b) Service of the 
petition on the person required to be served by subsection (a) of this section 
shall be made as provided by the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. If the person 
is a nonresident or his residence is unknown, service may be had by constructive 
service or by publication as provided in the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure.

"§ 14-2-314. Social study 
required; information to be shown, not excluded as 
hearsay.

"Upon the filing of a 
petition by anyone other than an authorized agency as defined by W.S. 
14-2-308(a)(ii)(A), the court shall direct that a social study be made by the 
appropriate county office of public assistance and social services or by any 
authorized agency to aid the court in making a final disposition of the 
petition. The social study shall state the factual information pertaining to the 
allegations in the petition, the social history and the present situation and 
environment of the child and parent. The social study shall not be excluded as 
evidence by reason of hearsay alone. The social study shall be made available to 
any party to the action upon request."

A. Service Upon 
Guardian ad Litem.

[¶23.]  Appellant claims § 14-2-313 was violated 
inasmuch as the guardian ad litem was not served as required. First of all, it 
is important to note that there is no showing that appellant raised this issue 
below. Appellee claims the trial court appointed Thomas W. Barb as guardian ad 
litem for ARW at the pretrial conference. Appellee further claims that her 
counsel sent appellant's counsel an order appointing guardian ad litem to 
approve as to form, and that such order was never returned by appellant's 
counsel. There is no such order in the record. What is in the record is a report 
from Thomas Barb to Judge Taylor regarding ARW, wherein Mr. Barb 
stated:

"I have reviewed the file 
concerning the parental rights of [appellant] and have interviewed [ARW] in an 
effort to inform you of my opinion as to what is and will be best for 
[ARW].

"During our conversation 
it became immediately obvious that this young girl is presently being well taken 
care of and her needs are met. She addresses [appellee's husband and appellee] 
as Grandpa and Grandma and openly admits that she can think of no one else with 
whom she would like to live. [ARW] communicated no recollection of her natural 
father during our conversation.

"[Appellant's] desires 
expressed in his deposition appear to be self centered and without consideration 
or thought given to the requirements of caring for a young girl. His desire to 
be a taxi driver in Los 
Angeles, after release from his present incarceration, 
typifies his nomadic lifestyle prior to his arrest and 
conviction.

"It is my opinion that 
[ARW] belongs with her grandparents. They offer a stable and comfortable 
lifestyle that [appellant] cannot presently, and did not in the past, offer his 
daughter. The best interests of [ARW] will be served by this Court permanently 
placing her with her grandparents.

"Respectfully 
submitted,

"s/ Thomas W. Barb 

Thomas W. Barb 

Attorney at Law 

Guardian ad Litem for 
[ARW]"

[¶24.]  As shown above, Mr. Barb signed the 
report as guardian ad litem for ARW. This report was submitted to the court the 
morning of the trial. In its order terminating appellant's parental rights, the 
court authorized payment of a reasonable fee to the guardian ad 
litem.

[¶25.]  Section 14-2-313 quoted earlier states 
that service of the petition shall be made pursuant to the Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure.

"Jurisdiction of a civil 
suit is ordinarily obtained by the filing of a proper complaint and the issuance 
and service of a summons, Robertson v. State Highway Commission, Wyo., 450 P.2d 1003, 1004; and even if service of notice was insufficient it was waived when 
the defendants proceeded without objection, State ex rel. Sheehan v. District 
Court of Fourth Judicial District, Wyo., 426 P.2d 431, 435; Padlock Ranch v. 
Washakie Needles Irr. Dist., 50 Wyo. 253, 60 P.2d 819, 61 P.2d 410, 412. * * 
*" Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., Wyo., 519 P.2d 972, 977 
(1974).

Furthermore, if 
Mr. Barb was indeed appointed guardian ad litem at the pretrial conference as 
appellee claims, then it is more than likely that Mr. Barb knew of the trial 
since the court set the trial date (May 13, 1985) in its pretrial order. The 
trial was held as scheduled.

[¶26.]  In Matter of Parental Rights of PP, 
Wyo., 648 P.2d 512 (1982), we stated a guardian ad litem should make recommendations to the 
court based upon the best interests of the ward. And while it is best for a 
guardian ad litem to express such recommendations in court where both sides may 
openly participate, filing a report is also acceptable 
practice.

"In representing the 
ward's interests, the guardian ad litem should express to the court that which 
he considers will further such interests. This is often done during a hearing by 
accepting the presentation and argument of the guardian ad litem favorable to 
one side or the other as the guardian ad litem believes is in the best interest 
of the child. Otherwise, the purpose in an appointment of a guardian ad litem 
would be thwarted. If the guardian ad litem were other than an attorney at law, 
his position on behalf of the child could be obtained only through his testimony 
or in some fashion other than actual participation as an attorney in the 
hearing. The position of a guardian ad litem who is also an attorney at law can 
be obtained through such actual participation, i.e., during legal argument, 
cross-examination of witnesses, etc. But it need not be so restricted. The 
position of the guardian ad litem was here presented in the form of a report 
`similar to a social report' in which the guardian ad litem made her 
recommendation." Id., at 517.

[¶27.]  In sum, there is no order appointing a 
guardian ad litem in the record. If no guardian was appointed, no service was 
required. If a guardian ad litem was in fact appointed, as indicated by the 
report filed and fees awarded, appellant should have objected to the allegedly 
insufficient service at trial. No objection was made by the guardian ad litem. 
The purpose of effecting proper service is to give notice. 43 C.J.S. Infants § 
244, p. 637 (1978). It is noted that appellee had custody of ARW from 1982 
through the time of the present action. Therefore, ARW had notice of the 
proceeding since her lawful guardian (appellee) instituted the action. If there 
was defective service, the alleged guardian ad litem waived any objection 
thereto by filing his report the morning of the trial.1 It is further noted that the 
statutes involved, §§ 14-2-308 through 14-2-319, are for the primary benefit of 
the child. We find the child's interests were well represented in this 
case.

B. Social Study 
Pursuant to § 14-2-314, W.S. 1977.

[¶28.]  Appellant claims the mandate of § 
14-2-314, requiring a social study to be made, was not followed since the study 
"was done as an afterthought and not dated until May 10, 1984, three days prior 
to the hearing." Appellant also claims error since he was not contacted when the 
study was made.

[¶29.]  The record shows a social study was made 
by the Converse County Department of Public Assistance and Social Services and 
filed with the court. Appellant has failed to show how this violated § 14-2-314 
in any way.

[¶30.]  Having found no reversible error, the 
judgment terminating appellant's parental rights is 
affirmed.

[¶31.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Cf., DS v. Department of 
Public Assistance and Social Services, Wyo., 607 P.2d 911 (1980), wherein we 
held the failure to serve a guardian ad litem with the notice of appeal was not 
a jurisdictional defect.