Case Title: Tokashiki v. Freitas

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAW LIBRARY

*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

No. 26635

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

JACQUELYN K. TOKASHIKI, also known as Jackie Tokashiki,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

in his capacity as Chief of Police,

GEORGE FREITAS,
county of Kaua'i, COUNTY OF KAUA'I, a political subdivision
of the State of Hawai'i, Defendants-Appellees,

  

 

and

JOHN DOES 1-10, JANE DOES 1-10, DOE CORPORATIONS 1=10, py
DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10, DOE ENTITIES 1-10 AND Dog | |S
GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 1-10, Defendants =

APPEAL FROM THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT oS

(CIV. No. 02-1-0086) 2

 

(By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.)
Plaintiff-Appellant Jacquelyn K. Tokashiki, also known

as Jackie Tokashiki, appeals from the Circuit Court of the Fifth

Cireuit’s June 8, 2004 final judgment.! Tokashiki contends that

the cireuit court erred in granting summary judgment to
Defendants-Appellees George Freitas, in his capacity as Chief of
Police of the County of Kaua'i, and the County of Kaua'i.

Based on the following, we agree with Tokashiki and

vacate the circuit court's June 8, 2004 final judgment and remand

this case for trial.

) The Honoreble George M. Masucks presided over this matter

oats
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Backsround?

on February 1, 1980, Tokashiki was first employed as
the Private Secretary for the Chief of Police of Kaua'i County,
the Deputy Chief, and the Police Commission (the Commission), a
position exempt from the civil service rules and regulations.
Freitas was appointed Chief of Police of Kaua'i County in 1995.

In July and August 2001, Kaua'i Police Department
Lieutenant Alvin Seto and Inspector Mel Morris submitted to
Tokashiki, in her capacity as the Secretary for the Commission,
written complaints against Freitas. Tokashiki processed the
complaints and distributed them to Dede Wilhelm, the Chair of the
Commission (hereinafter, Wilhelm or Chair Wilhelm], as well as
the other Commissioners and Hartwell Blake, the county attorney
and the attorney for the Commission. Tokashiki scheduled a
special Commission meeting for August 10, 2001 to discuss the
matter, At Wilhelm’s request, Tokashiki then: (1) prepared a
memo regarding the procedures to be followed by the Commission in
handling the complaints; (2) contacted the Honolulu Police

Department (HPD) to inquire if John Ko, one of HPD's

£ Because the circuit court did not make any findings of fact, the
following facts were taken mainly fron the Stipulation By and Between
Plaintif? and Defendants George Freites and County of Kaa and Tokashiki’s
Declaration in her Cross Motion. Toksshiki’s declaration, which was attached
to her crosa-motion for sunnary judgment, was “nade on personal knowledge,”
Hawal't Rules of Civil Proceduze (HRCP) Rule S6(e), and showed “affirmatively
That [Tokeshiki was] competent to testify to the matters stated therein.” Ide

   

 

 

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investigators, could assist in the investigation: (3) prepared
draft letters to Freitas, Kaua'i County Mayor Kusaka, and
chairman Leong of the Honolulu Police Commission to inform then
of the complaints; (4) requested that Mayor Kusaka attend the
August 10, 2001 meeting? and (5) researched the “leave with or
without pay” issue. Tokashiki also explained to Wilhelm how
internal complaints were handled, as Wilhelm had never before
dealt with such complaints.

Prior to the August 10, 2001 meeting, Commissioner
Norman Holt visited Tokashiki’s office and suggested that, since
he had an investigative background as a police officer, he could

investigate one of the charges against Freitas

 

namely, that he
had driven hie girlfriend in his police vehicle ~~ which would
allow Ko to focus on the other more serious charges against
Freitas, Tokashiki told Holt that it would probably expedite the
investigation, but that Holt would have to clear it with Wilhelm,
the other Conmiseioners, and the county attorney.

Prior to the Auguet 10 meeting, Tokashiki also talked
to Blake over the phone, explaining to him the complaints filed
against Freitas. Since Tokashiki maintained all the internal
investigation files in her office, Blake requested that she
provide him with a copy of the file on Officer Nelson Gabriel,

who was charged with sexual assault of his stepdaughter.
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Lieutenant Seto had accused Freitas of hindering the police
Anvestigation of that charge.

Tokashiki participated in the August 10, 2001 meeting,
answering both procedural questions as well as questions about
the complaints. At the meeting, the Commission decided to accept
and investigate the complaints filed by Seto and Morris and place
Freitas on leave with pay. The Commission instructed Tokashiki
to send all the necessary letters, and to instruct Deputy Chief
Wilfred Ihu that he was appointed Acting Chief in Freitas’
absence.

on August 13, 2001, Tokashiki informed Freitas that he
had a meeting at the Mayor's Office, at which time he was
fornally informed that the Commission placed him on leave with
pay for 120 days, effective August 13, 2001, pending the
investigation of the charges against him. At the meeting, the
Commission gave Freitas a written directive, drafted by
Tokashiki, requiring him to surrender his gun, badge,
identification, pager, cellular phone, vehicle, and office keys.
Freitas was also inetructed not to go onto police premises and
not to talk to others about the investigation.

One week later, on August 20, 2001, Freitas went to the
police station where Tokashiki was working alone. After opening
and closing drawers in his office, Freitas asked Tokashiki about

his gun. Tokashiki, knowing that Freitas had not turned in his
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gun and equipment as ordered by the Conmission and that the
loaded gun was sitting in an unlocked drawer in an unlocked
office, had earlier removed the gun and equipment and, with the
help of a police officer, disengaged the gun and placed the items
in Freitas’ office safe. Because she was concerned for her
safety, Tokashiki told Freitas that she did not know the location
of his gun. After Freitas left, Tokashiki immediately called
Wilhelm, who instructed her to write @ memorandum to Blake about
the incident ae well as Freitas’ refusal to turn over his badge,
gun, and identification, and that he continued to call and go to
the police station contrary to the Commission's written
directive, Wilhelm also requested Tokashiki to make travel
arrangements for Ko, as well as prepare a list of questions for
him to ask witnesses.

At a follow-up Commission meeting on August 24, 2001,
Blake gave Tokashiki copies of two letters he had received from
Freitas, dated August 22 and 23, 2001. The August 22, 2001
letter stated, in pertinent part:

[T]he Police Commission/Chief's Secretary seens confortable
in publicly and repeatedly slurring my reputation. Iam
guare of the fact that sone person(s) searched my office and
Fenoved property... The facts are as follows:

 

fon August 20th, at about $:30 P.M., I entered ay
office to retrieve some personal itens. I was with an
Officer.” The Police Comission/chiet’ s Secretary was
Still at work. I aiscovered ny duty wespon was
Rissing from ay private office, 1 asked The Police
Consission/Chiet's Secretary 1f she knew what happened
fo'the weapon or where it was, She replied twice that
she had no information. On Aagust 2ist, after talking
fo several command and supervisory officers, I was

 

   

 

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told the Comnission/Chief’s Secretary had possession
Of the weapon, one of my badges and other pieces of
Squipment. Ihave been unable to determine who
Guthorized this search and seizure of property.

 

 

1 am concerned with these continued violations of sy rights
and my Secretary's vocal bi Especially troubling 2
the Tact that she has access to ana control of documents
which may Be relevant to this investigation. Your office
heeds co teke innediate steps to ensure thet any relevant
SScunents or evidence sre preserved before there is any
further opportunity for tampering or destruction.

 

Please be advised that I am reserving ay right and option to
Initiate « complaint with the Police Conmission concerning
this satter and other reported improprietics by the
Connission/Chief’s Secretary and other directly involved

personnel,

 

 

 

The August 23, 2001 letter state:

ath os a
Toitistad sqainst-na. Tt is clear, for exanple, that she
Rid'sone role in searching my office and removing and
Storing itens. When questioned, she vas untruthful
Concerning hes relas ‘Ihave received warnings from several

persons that she hag been an active participant in the
Eollection of infomation that could poasibly be used

doeinst ne

‘The Police Conmission/Chiet’s Secretary is privy to
Confidential information which is discussed during the
Felice Commission's Executive sessions. I must assume itens
Of discussion during upcoming executive sessions will
Gnclvde confidential information relative to this on-going
investigation. It ie in my best interest and that of the
County’ that ‘the Police Comnission/Chief's secretary be
Gncluded from having aceess to any of this information.

 

    

 

Z anticipate your prompt consideration and appropriate

(emphases added.). foth letters were signed by Freitas.
Blake then advised Tokashiki that she should not attend
the Comission meetings where the pending complaints against
Freitas were discussed. Tokashiki agreed, but prepared a written
response to Freitas’ two letters, dated August 27, 2001, which,
inter alia, explained that she removed Freitas’ gun for safety

‘
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reasons and requested a temporary restraining order against
Freitas to ensure that he comply with the Commission’ s
directives. Tokashiki also attached various letters and
evaluations from Freitas describing her loyalty and dedication.

In October or Noveber 2001, in response to Ko's
complaints that no one was volunteering to be interviewed for the
snvestigation, Acting Chief Thu instructed Tokashiki to assist Ko
in scheduling interviews and to encourage employees to give
statements to Ko.

In Novenber 2001, at Ko’s requ

 

, Tokashiki gave a
statement to Ko in his investigation of the hindering prosecution
charge against Freitas. Because she maintained the internal
investigation file at issue, Tokashiki was a key witness in the
investigation.

on January 7, 2002, Freitas returned to service as
Chief of Police of the County of Kaua'i and innediately
reassigned Tokashiki to @ position as secretary in the
Administrative and Technical Services Bureau of the Kaue'i Police
Department. ‘The reassignnent did not involve a diminution in pay
ox benefits.

on January 16, 2002, Tokashiki attempted to explain to
Freitas her role in the actions of the Commission. when
questioned about this conversation during his deposition, Freitas
testified that, although he could not recall whether he told
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Tokashiki at that time, someone at the county attorney's office
had told him that Tokashiki “screamed the loudest whenever
[Freitas] showed up [at the police station]” while he was on
Leave during the investigation.

In a letter dated April 26, 2002, Freitas notified
Tokashiki that her enployment was to be terminated effective May
31, 2002.
B. Procedural tistory

on May 14, 2002, Tokashiki filed a Verified Complaint
for Declaratory Relief and Injunctive Relief and Damages alleging
that Freitas and the County wrongfully terminated her in
violation of various civil service rules and regulations and
Hawai" Revised Statutes (HRS) § 378-62 (Supp. 2002), Hawasi’s

Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (hereinafter, HWPA].? The basis

> the HWER provides:

§ 378-62 Discharge of, threats to, or discrimination
‘against eaployee for reporting violations of law. An
esployer shalt not discharge, threaten, or otherwise
Giscriminate against en employee regarding the employee’ ¢
Compensation, cerns, conditions, location, oF privileges of
fe=ployment because:

(2) The employee, or # person acting on behalf of
the enployes, reports or is about to report to
the exployer, or reports or is about to report
toa public body, verbally or in writing,
violation or a suspected violation of:

(A) Alaw, fole, ordinance, or regulation,
Adopted pursuant to law of this state, =
Political subdivision of this state, oF
the United States; oF

B) Acontract executed by the State, a
political subdivision of the State, or the
United states,

unless the employee knows that the report is

felse: or

   

   

 

 

 

 

(continued...)
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for Tokashiki’s whistleblower claim was that she was terminated
for “participating” in an investigation against Freitas.

on February 25, 2003, Freitas filed a motion for
partial summary judgment on all counts of the complaint, except
the whistleblower claim (hereinafter, First MPSJ]. The County
filed its joinder in Freitas’ motion on March 3, 2002. Tokashiki
filed a memorandum in opposition to Freitas’ First MPSJ on
March 21, 2003. On June 17, 2003, the circuit court filed its
order granting Freitas’ First MPSJ, which Tokashiki did not
appeal.

on March 25, 2003, Freitas filed a second motion for
partial summary judgment on the whistleblower claim (hereinafter,
Second MPS). The County filed its joinder on March 28, 2003.
Tokashiki filed her memorandum in opposition to Freitas’ Second
mesg on May 20, 2003, and on August 26, 2003, Tokashiki filed her
cross-motion for partial summary Judgment as to liability on her
whistleblower claim (hereinafter, Cross Motion].

on October 21, 2003, the circuit court heard Freitas’
Second MPSJ and Tokashiki’s Cross Motion. The circuit court
classified Tokashiki’s conduct as ministerial and secretarial,
and thus, not “participation” in an investigation such that her

*(, . continued)
2) An employes is requested by 2 public body to

porticipate in an investigation, bearing, oF

Eiguiry held by that public body, er a court
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conduct constituted protected activity. The circuit court
further found that Tokashiki failed to offer any evidence to

prove that Freitas had any knowledge of any other conduct that
may have been protected. On March 2, 2004, the circuit court

filed:

 

(1) its order granting the County's joinder in Freitas’

First MPSJ and Second MPSJ; (2) its order denying Tokashiki’s

Cross Motion; and (3) its order granting Freitas’ Second MesJ.
During the period fron February 18, 2004 to

February 24, 2004, in Tokashiki’s concurrent federal lawsuit

against Freitas in the United States District Court for the

District of Hawai'i, Tokashiki took the depositions of forner

 

Kaua'i County Police Assistant Chief Melvin Morris, former Kaua’
County Police Deputy Chief Paul Hurley, Kaua'i County Police

Councilman Maurice “Joe” Munechika, as well as present and former

 

Commissioners. Chair Wilhelm testified that the Commissioners
considered the charge against Freitas of hindering prosecution,
but Blake, the county attorney, advised them to “Lay low on this
and cool it” because if they decided against Freitas and were
sued, the county would not pay their expenses. Holt testified
that the Commissioners believed Freitas’ failure to comply with
the directives of the Commission was insubordination and they
discussed disciplining or tezminating Freitas, but Blake again
advised then that if they did and Freitas sued them, the county

would not pay their expenses. Morris testified that Tokashiki’s
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role as the Conmission’s secretary was a substantial and
motivating factor of Freitas’ decision to remove and terminate
Tokashiki.

on March 12, 2004, Tokashiki filed a motion to
reconsider the order granting Freitas’ Second MPSJ and a motion
to reconsider the order denying her Cross Motion, asserting that
“the recently secured depositions of the Commissioners, Morris,
Hurley and Munechika support her contentions that her activities
with the Commission was [sic] substantial and there is a material
issue of fact on whether these activities were a substantial or
motivating factor in Freitas’ decision to remove and terminate
her.” On April 5, 2004, Freitas filed his memorandum in
opposition to both of Tokashiki’s motions for reconsideration, in
which the County joined.

on April 22, 2004, the circuit court heard Tokashiki's
motions and found that the depositions were not newly discovered

evidence under HRCP Rule 59 inasmuch as:

 

(1) Tokashiki had prior
knowledge of the subjects upon which the Commissioners would
testify and the potential value of those testimonies: and (2)
Tokashiki had an adequate opportunity to take such depositions,
but failed to do so before the trial court ruled on the Second
NPSJ and Cross Motion. The trial court therefore denied
Tokashiki’s motions for reconsideration on the ground that

Tokashiki failed to satisfy her burden to establish a procedural

a
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basis to bring the motions. On June 8, 2004, judgment was
entered in favor of Freitas and the County and against Tokashiki
on all claims asserted in the complaint. This timely appeal
followed.

TI. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary Judament

 

lie review the circuit court's grant or denial of summary

judgment de noxo.

Haug, 94 Hawari 213, 221, 11 8-341, 9 (2000). The

Standard for granting « motion for summary judgment is

settled:
[Slunmary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings,
Gepositions, answers to interrogatories, and
Sdnissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
Aaterio: fact and thatthe moving party 4 entitled to
Jusmnent as a matter of law. A fact is material if
Broot of that fact would have the effect of
Establishing or refueing one of the essential elements
Sf a couse of action oF defense asserted by the
Parties. “the evidence must be viewes in the light
Rost favorable to the non-noving party. Tn other
Nords, we must view sll of the evidence and the
Unferences drawn therefrom in the Light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion.

Ad, (citations and Internal quotation marks omitted)

  

 

 

        

 

Coon v, City and County of Honolulu, 98 Hawai'i 233, 244-45, 47
P.3d 348, 359-60 (2002) (alteration in original).
B. Motion For Reconsideration

“the trial court’s ruling on a motion for
reconsideration is reviewed under the abuse of discretion
standard.” Ass’n of Apartment Owners of Wailea Elua v. Wailea
Resort Cou, Ltd., 100 Hawai'i 97, 110, 58 P.3d 608, 621 (2002)
(citation omitted). "An abuse of discretion occurs where the

trial court has clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or

2
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disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the
substantial detriment of 2 party litigant.” Gold v. Harrison, 88
Hawai'i 94, 100, 962 P.2d 353, 359 (1998) (quoting State ex rel.
Bronster v. United States Steel Corp., 82 Hawai"i 32, 54, 919
P.2d 294, 316 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As this court has often stated, “the purpose of =
notion for reconsideration is £0 allow the parties to
present new evidence and/or arguments that could not have
Been presented during the eaflier edjudicated motion.”
Reconsideration ie not a device to relitigate old nates
to raise arguments or evidence that could and should
been brought during the eariier proceeding

 

 

 

Sousaris v. Miller, 92 Hawai'i $05, 513, 993 P.2d 539, 547 (2000)
(internal brackets and citations omitted).
III, DISCUSSION

As points of error, Tokashiki assert:

 

(2) that the
ciroult court erred in finding that there were no genuine issues
of material fact as to whether Tokashiki’s removal and
termination violated the HAPA inasmuch as Tokashiki's acts were
Yprotected conduct” under HRS § 378-62(2) and Freitas had
knowledge about such protected activities; and (2) that the
circuit court erred in denying Tokashiki’s motions for
reconsideration as to the granting of Freitas’ Second MPSJ and
denial of her Cross Motion. Freitas counters: (1) that the
cirevit court correctly found that there was no genuine issue of
material fact regarding the Second MPSJ and that Tokashiki failed
to articulate any justification for ruling in her favor on her

cross Motion

 

(2) that the circuit court did not err in denying

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Tokashiki’s motions for reconsideration because Tokashiki had not
satisfied the procedural threshold requirements to bring such
motions; and (3) that even if the untimely deposition testimony
that Tokashiki submitted were considered by this court, Tokashiki
would still fail to prevail on her claims because the purported
“evidence” does not create a genuine issue of material fact to
warrant going to trial.

To prevail under the HWPA, Tokashiki must first
establish that she engaged in “protected conduct” as that concept
is delineated in the HPA, Tokashiki must then prove that
Freitas renoved and terminated her “because” she engaged in the
protected conducts in other words, Tokashiki must prove that a
causal connection existed between the alleged retaliation and the
protected conduct. Crosby v. State, 76 Hawai'i 332, 342, 876

P.2d 1300, 1310 (1994), Tok

 

niki has the burden of showing that

 

her protected conduct was a “substantial or motivating factor” in
the decision to terminate her employment. Id. “Once the
employee shows that the employer's disapproval of (the protected
conduct) played a role in the employer's action against hin or
her, the employer can defend affirmatively by showing that the
termination would have occurred regardless of the protected

activity.” Id. (internal brackets, quotations marks, and

citations omitted).
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A. The Circuit Court erred as a Matter of Law in Ruling That
5 = Ei a ¢ =

Tokashiki asserts that she engaged in protected conduct
because she “participat(ed] in the Commission's investigation of
Freitas[.]” Tokashiki concludes that she therefore was “an
employee (who was] requested by a public body to participate in
an investigation, hearing, or inquiry held by that public body”
under HRS § 378-62(2). Given Tokashiki’s extensive involvement
with the Commission during the initial inguiry and the formal
investigation, we agree.

Freitas asserts that Tokashiki’s participation in the
Anvestigation as the Commission's secretary does not constitute
“participation” under the HNPA. Specifically, Freitas contends
that “(t]he performance of . . . routine administrative and
ministerial duties, which are all part of (Tokashiki’s] regular
job duties, cannot be considered ‘participation’ in an
investigation[.]” Freitas, however, fails to point to any
authority to support the proposition that “routine administrative
and ministerial duties” or “regular job duties” do not constitute
protected activity, and as this court noted in Crosby, “the HWPA
is @ remedial statute. As such, the HWPA should be construed
liberally to accomplish the purpose for which it was enacted.”
Crosby, 76 Hawai'i at 341-42, 876 P.2d at 1309-10 (citations

omitted).

as
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Nevertheless, assuming, without deciding, that
Tokashiki’s “ministerial” participation was not protected conduct
under the HWPA, Tokashiki points to various other acts that are
more than “ministerial,” including researching and writing
memoranda, preparing questions for the investigator, and
discussing the investigation with the Commissioners,
investigator, and the county attorney. Freitas counters that
Tokashiki''s conduct that occurred before the investigation began
=~ including her research and advice in initiating the
investigation as well as her meeting with Commissioner Holt
regarding the investigation prior to the formal commencement of
the investigation -- is not protected conduct inasmuch as there
can be no participation in an investigation prior to the
commencement of the investigation. The HMPA, however, also
protects an “employee [who] is requested by a public body to
participate in an. . . inguixy held by that public body[.1”
(Emphasis added.). Although the HWPA does not define the term
“inquiry,” the HWPA should be construed liberally to accomplis!

its purpose, See Crosby, 76 Hawai'i at 342, 876 P.2d at 1310.

 

Accordingly, Tokashiki’s research, advice, and other involvement
prior to initiation of the formal investigation would appear to
constitute participation in an “inguiry.”

Assuming, arquendo, that Tokashiki’s involvement prior

to the commencement of the formal investigation does not

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constitute participation in an “inguiry” under the HPA,
Tokashiki, nevertheless, points to four instances of non~
ministerial conduct that occurred after the initiation of the
formal investigation: (1) after Freitas confronted Tokashiki
regarding the whereabouts of his gun on August 20, 2001,
Tokashiki called Chair Wilhelm and Blake, who both told her to
write a memorandum concerning the insubordination of Freitas in
(a) his refusal to surrender his badge, gun, and identification
card ané (b) his conduct in continuing to call and go to the
police station and speak to employees about the complaint and
investigation contrary to the Conmission’s written directives (2)
at the request of Chair Wilhelm, Tokashiki prepared questions for
Ko to ask witnesses in his investigation into the charges against
Freitas; (3) Acting Chief Thu instructed Tokashiki to assist Ko
by scheduling appointments for interviews for the investigation
and encouraging employees to give statements to Ko in response to
Ko's complaints that no one was volunteering to be interviewed:
and (4) Tokashiki provided testimony regarding the hindering
prosecution charge against Freitas. We agree with Tokashiki:
these acts amount to more than “ministerial” participation in an
ongoing investigation and constitute “protected conduct.” The
next question, therefore, is whether Freitas terminated Tokashiki

because of such protected conduct.

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B. The Circuit Court Erved in Granting Summary Judgment

‘Inasmuch as Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist as to
Whether Freitas Reassicned and Terminated Tokashiki Because
efter Protected Conduct.

Freitas asserts that Tokashiki was reassigned and
terminated because the “environment of trust had been eroded”

betw

 

n himself and Tokashiki, Freitas points to several
incidents that he alleges led him to his decision to renove and
terminate Tokashiki: (1) Tokashiki, in response to Freitas’
stated intent to bring his girlfriend to Kaus‘ to live with him
while he was going through @ divorce with his wife, told Freitas
that he should put her in @ hotel in Honolulu. Freitas
admonished Tokashiki that she was “stepping over the line”; (2)
after Freitas’ girlfriend moved to Kaua'i, Tokashiki made
comments to him about hers (3) Freitas and the head of the
Department's custodians both though that Tokashiki seemed
“increasingly upset and angry"; (4) In June or July 2002,
Tokashiki told Freitas about a job opening at Wilcox Hospital and
suggested that Freitas apply because he had served as Chief for
five years, which was the period of tine he had initially stated
he wanted to serve; and (5) Tokashiki got upset over the
construction of the new police station. Tokashiki asserts thet,
notwithstanding the foregoing, genuine issues of material fact
exist as to whether her protected conduct was a substantial or

motivating factor in her removal and termination. Freitas

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counters that Tokashiki cannot prove that Freitas knew of
‘Tokashiki’s protected conduct and, therefore, cannot prove that
such activities were substantially motivating factors for her
termination.

In response, Tokashiki first points to Freitas’
August 23, 2001 letter to assert that Freitas knew of Tokashiki's
protected activities, In this letter, Freitas states that
Tokashiki “may be more than a neutral observer in the

 

tigation process that has been initiated against (him).
Freitas further describes Tokashiki as “an active participant in
the collection of information that could possibly be used against

{him).” Freitas contend:

 

however, that the letter only
idlustrates that he had “concerns that (Tokashiki] was improperly
attempting to influence the investigation and acting outside the
scope of her duties” and that such improprieties did not qualify
as protected conduct. While Ninth Circuit precedent suggests
that conduct constituting @ serious breach of trust is not
protected conduct, see O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co.,
79 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that employee’s conduct in
stealing sensitive personnel docunents was @ “serious breach of
trust” and was thus not protected conduct), this letter, at the
very least, raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Freitas indeed knew about Tokashiki’s more-than-ministerial

involvement with the investigation initiated against him, and

»
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whether this knowledge was 2 substantial or motivating factor in
Freitas’ decision to reassign and terminate Tokashiki.

Although Tokashiki does not set forth any specific
evidence that Freitas knew she testified in the investigation or
that she assisted Ko by setting up interviews and drafting
questions, Tokashiki does point to Freitas’ deposition testimony
in which he testified that he knew Tokashiki complained to the
county attorney's office whenever he showed up at the police
station after he had been directed not to by the Commission.‘ In
discussing the January 16, 2002 conversation between Tokashiki
and Freitas, Tokashiki’s attorney asked Freitas, “Do you recall
making the statement to [Tokashiki] to the effect that from what
you had heard in the county attorney's office, she was the
loudest in screaming harassment?” Freitas responded: “I think
at some point one of the county attorneys did tell me that
[Tokashiki} screamed the loudest whenever I showed up [at the
police station].” This evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to Tokashiki, is probative of Freitas’ knowledge of
Tokashiki's protected conduct -- namely, that at Chair Wilhelm’ s
request, she reported Freitas’ insubordination in disobeying the

Conmission’s directives. Thus, there exists 2 genuine issue of

 

+ this deposition, taken on May 6, 2003, was not taken in conjunction
with Tokeshikive federal! lquouit and is ‘therefore not one of the depositions
Bt Leave in Tokashiki"s motion for reconsideration.

 

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material fact as to whether this knowledge was a substantial or
motivating factor in Freitas’ decision to terminate Tokashiki.

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has held that “in sone
cases, causation can be inferred from timing alone where an
adverse employment action follows on the heels of protected
activity.” Villiarimo v, Aloha Island Air, Inc., 261 F.3d 1054,
1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson
Consumer Prods. Inc., 212 F.3d 493, $07 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting
that causation can be inferred from timing alone)); Miller vw.
Fairchild Indus., 885 F.2d 498, 505 (9th Cir, 1989) (stating that
prima facie case of causation was established when discharges
occurred forty-two and fifty-nine days after protected conduct);
Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating
that sufficient evidence existed where adverse actions occurred
less than three months after complaint filed, two weeks after
charge first investigated, and less than two months after the
investigation ended) .

Here, Freitas reassigned Tokashiki the day he returned
from his leave and terminated her employment approximately four
months later. This court, in Crosby, held that the reassignment
of Crosby to a different project within the department affected a
“condition” of employment under the HWPA and therefore
constituted retaliation. Crosby, 76 Hawai'i at 341, 879 P.2d at

1309. Accordingly, Freitas’ reassignment of Tokashiki to the

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benefits, would also constitute retaliation under the HWPA.*

Jacquelyn K. Tokashiki, DrerePleLerr ner

aso known as Jackie
Tokashiks

 

John Koneii,
Brian Y. Hiyane, and ae
Natanabe Ing Kawashima

Tkonei}i) for defendant Yen. anoten
tppeliee George Freitas,

Phe capecity as Chief

of Policer County of Keue't

 

use we hold that the cicuit court erred in granting sunmary
vor of Freitas, we need not reach the Lesue of Tekashiki's
sconeideraticn.

 

Rotions for

 

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