Case Title: JT v. KD

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0002

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-09-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
JT v. KD2008 WY 104192 P.3d 969Case Number: No. S-08-0002Decided: 09/03/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 

JT,Appellant(Petitioner),v.KD,Appellee(Respondent).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSheridanCounty

The 
Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Rex 
O. Arney and Vincent P. Schutte of Brown, Drew & Massey, Sheridan, Wyoming.  

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Greg 
L. Goddard of Goddard, Wages & Vogel, Buffalo, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      After various 
agreements and orders concerning custody, JT (Mother) filed a petition to modify 
custody in which she sought primary custody of the parties' minor child.  The district court awarded primary 
custody to KD (Father).  Mother 
appeals claiming the district court abused its discretion when it awarded Father 
primary custody.  She claims the 
decision is not supported by sufficient evidence or in the child's best 
interests.   

 
 
[¶2]      We affirm.     

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶3]  The issue for our determination is 
whether the district court abused its discretion when it awarded Father primary 
custody of the minor child.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]  The proceedings in district court were 
not reported or transcribed.  The 
following facts were taken from the district court's decision letter.  

 
 
[¶5]  The parties are the biological parents 
of a child born on August 2, 2001.  
At the time the child was born, the parties were unmarried and resided in 
Sheridan, Wyoming.  
Approximately one year after the child's birth, problems began to develop 
between the parties.  In February of 
2003, they separated and Father moved to California with the child.  

 
 
[¶6]  On March 27, 2003, Mother filed a 
petition in district court in Sheridan to declare paternity and for custody 
and child support.  Father filed a 
special appearance and moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the 
California 
courts had jurisdiction over the issues presented.  After consulting with the California court, the Wyoming district court entered an order 
denying Father's motion to dismiss.   

 
 
[¶7]  In June 2003, Father submitted to the 
jurisdiction of the Wyoming court for the 
limited purpose of enforcing a joint stipulation entered into by the parties and 
filed in Wyoming.  
The stipulation provided for joint legal and physical custody with the 
parents sharing physical custody by transferring the child back and forth 
between Father in California and Mother in 
Wyoming every 
two months until he reached kindergarten age. The district court subsequently 
entered an order regarding paternity, custody and visitation which substantially 
adopted the terms of the stipulation.  
The parties shared custody of the child according to this arrangement for 
the next three years.

 
 
[¶8]  In January of 2007, Mother filed a 
petition for modification of the order in which she sought primary custody on 
the ground that the child would be starting kindergarten in the fall and the 
shared custody arrangement would no longer be feasible.  Father answered the petition and 
counterclaimed for primary custody.  
On July 10, 2007, the district court convened a trial on the custody 
issue.

 
 
[¶9]  Following the trial, the district court 
issued a decision letter.  Among its 
other factual findings, the court found: 

 
 

-          
Mother 
was raised in and has primarily lived in Sheridan and has extended family, including her 
mother and two brothers, and friends in the area;

 
 

-          
Father 
was primarily raised in Brentwood, California and has extended family, including 
parents, siblings, nearly 70 cousins and another son in the 
area;

 
 

-          
Mother 
has worked as a cook at a bar and grill, served in the Wyoming National Guard, 
worked for MDU as a meter reader and is currently employed by the United States 
Post Office as a full time permanent employee working 7 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. Monday 
through Saturday;

 
 

-          
Father 
works for the family water well service business;

 
 

-          
Mother 
lives with another man who shares the responsibility of caring for the 
child;

 
 

-          
Father 
benefits from the support of his extended family for child care 
support;

 
 

-          
During 
the parties' relationship, Mother and her mother were involved in an altercation 
in which Mother was physically injured and alcohol abuse was 
involved;

 
 

-          
At 
some point, Mother went to California.  She led Father to believe that she 
wanted to reconcile and was going to move to California. In California, the parties entered into a lease 
agreement for a residence, shopped for furniture and visited a lawyer.  Mother signed a "judgment  uniform 
parentage" form which set forth the parties' joint custody and shared parenting 
plan and stipulated that California was the child's home state and they intended 
to become residents of California and attend counseling together;  

 
 

-          
Mother 
admits she purposefully misled Father in order to get the child back to 
Wyoming.  She admits she coerced Father to return 
to Sheridan under the guise of packing their 
belongings and moving to California, although 
she never intended to move to California;

 
 

-          
Upon 
arriving in Sheridan, Mother absconded with the child and 
hid from Father for nearly a month.  
Neither she nor her family would tell Father where the child 
was;

 
 

-          
Father 
returned to California after his attempts to find the 
child were unsuccessful.

 
 
[¶10]  Based upon these and its other findings 
and the applicable law, the district court concluded that it was in the best 
interests of the child that primary custody be placed with Father, subject to 
reasonable visitation by Mother. 

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶11]  In reviewing an order modifying custody 
we will not interfere with the trial court's decision absent a procedural error 
or a clear abuse of discretion.  Morris v. Morris, 2007 WY 174, ¶ 5, 170 P.3d 86, 88 (Wyo. 2007).  The 
ultimate issue in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion is 
whether the court reasonably could have concluded as it did.  Id.  In the context of alleged abuse of 
discretion, we in essence evaluate whether the evidence presented was sufficient 
to support the district court's decision.  
Id.  

 
 
[¶12]  The trial proceedings in this case were 
not recorded or transcribed. Although the parties did not request findings of 
fact pursuant to W.R.C.P. 52(a),1 the district court's decision 
letter contains detailed findings.  
In the absence of anything to refute them, we will sustain the district 
court's findings and assume that the evidence presented was sufficient to 
support them.  Wilson v. LucerneCanal and Power Co., 2003 WY 126, ¶ 8, 
77 P.3d 412, 416 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶13]  Mother contends the district court 
abused its discretion because the evidence was not sufficient to support the 
conclusion that awarding primary custody to Father was in the child's best 
interests.  She asserts that neither 
the district court's decision letter nor its order applied the factors 
enumerated in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a) (LexisNexis 2007) for determining 
the best interests of the child in a custody dispute.  She also argues that the district court 
improperly based its decision on her past mistakes, and failed to take into 
account other significant factors, such as Father's absence from the child's 
life for nine months.  She faults 
the district court for not explaining more fully its reasoning and for deciding 
in one sentence what is for her and the child a life-altering decision.  

 
 
[¶14]  Father asserts there was no abuse of 
discretion and the district court adequately stated its reasoning in its eight 
page decision letter.  He argues the 
district court properly considered the factors enumerated in § 20-2-201(a), 
including "other factors [it] deem[ed] necessary and relevant."  Father claims witness credibility was 
one such factor the district court properly considered. 

 
 
[¶15]  We begin our discussion by reiterating 
that neither party requested specific findings pursuant to W.R.C.P. 52(a).2  We have said that a party who fails to 
request findings of fact prior to trial cannot complain later of the absence of 
formal findings, including the absence of findings addressing the factors 
enumerated in § 20-2-201(a).  Stonham v. Widiastuti, 2003 WY 157, ¶ 
21, 79 P.3d 1188, 1195-96 (Wyo. 2003); Resor v. Resor, 987 P.2d 146, 148 
(Wyo. 
1999).  While we encourage district 
courts to spell out the reasons for their conclusions, they are not required to 
do so unless a Rule 52 request is made.  
Stonham, ¶ 16, 79 P.3d  at 
1193-94.  Because she did not 
request specific findings, Mother cannot be heard to complain on appeal that the 
district court did not adequately address the statutory factors or more fully 
explain its reasoning for concluding that the child's best interests would be 
served by awarding primary custody to Father.   

 
 
[¶16]  We consider next Mother's contention 
that the evidence was not sufficient for the district court to reasonably 
conclude as it did.  The district 
court found that both parties had extended family where they lived and that 
Father specifically benefited from their support with child care.  The district court further found that 
sometime toward the end of the parties' relationship, Mother and her mother had 
an altercation that involved alcohol abuse and resulted in physical injury to 
Mother.  The district court found, 
and apparently Mother admitted, that when she went to California she purposely misled Father as to her 
intentions and coerced him into returning to Sheridan for the purpose of absconding with the 
child.  The district court found 
that, once back in Wyoming, Mother remained secreted with the 
child for a month during which time Father was unable to find them.  Given the lack of any record of the 
trial proceedings, we assume there was evidence to support these findings.     

 
 
[¶17]  In addition to these findings, the 
district court emphasized that witness credibility and demeanor played an 
important role in its ruling.  The 
district court found Father to be more credible than Mother based upon the 
evidence that Mother:  toward the 
end of the relationship in 2003, arrived home apparently intoxicated and 
bleeding after an altercation with her mother; went to Minnesota to visit her 
brother, leaving Father to take the child to California; intentionally misled 
Father to believe she wanted to reconcile in order to take the child back to 
Wyoming; signed a legal form representing to the California legal system that 
she intended to reside in California when she had no intention of doing so; 
purposefully hid from Father after returning to Wyoming; and claimed that she 
was compelled to agree to the alternating two month arrangement in order to get 
Father to return the child to Wyoming when, in fact, she signed the agreement 
with the aid of counsel without asserting duress or any opposition to the 
agreement.  We give considerable 
deference to a district court's findings concerning witness credibility because 
it is in the best position to assess the witnesses and weigh their 
testimony.  Humphrey v. Humphrey, 2007 WY 72, ¶ 7, 
157 P.3d 451, 453 (Wyo. 2007).  We 
conclude the evidence was sufficient for the district court to reasonably 
conclude as it did.  

 
 
[¶18] 
Addressing Mother's complaint that the district court did not apply the factors 
enumerated in § 20-2-201(a) in determining the child's best interests, we note 
that the court quoted the factors in its decision letter and so there is no 
question that it was aware of what it was statutorily required to consider in 
making a custody decision.  Although 
the district court did not specifically state which of its findings of fact 
applied to which statutory factor, it is clear from its findings that the court 
considered the statutory factors.  
The court's findings concerning the proximity of extended family to each 
party, for example, reflect that it considered § 20-2-201(a)(ii), the ability of 
each parent to provide adequate care for the child including arranging for the 
child's care by others as needed.   
The court's findings concerning Mother's alcohol abuse, altercation with 
her mother, deceit in getting the child back to Wyoming and hiding the child 
from Father reflect that the court considered § 20-2-201(a)(iii), the relative 
competence and fitness of each parent.  
The court's findings concerning Mother's actions in California and when 
she and the child returned to Wyoming also reflect that the court considered § 
2-2-201(a)(vii), the ability and willingness of each parent to allow the other 
to provide care without intrusion and to respect the other parent's rights.  We find no support for Mother's claim 
that the district court did not consider the statutory 
factors.

  

[¶19]  Mother's claim that the district court 
improperly based its decision on her past mistakes is also without merit.  Section 20-2-201 required the district 
court to order the disposition that appeared in the best interests of the 
child.  Mother's actions and 
behaviors were directly relevant to that determination.  Given that the child was only five and a 
half years old at the time Mother filed her petition for modification and that 
all of the past mistakes the district court considered were made during the 
child's lifetime, it would have been improper for the district court not to 
consider them in determining the best interests of the 
child.

 
 
[¶20]  Finally, the district court issued an 
eight page decision letter containing detailed findings of fact, a thorough 
discussion of the applicable law and a separate discussion of the importance 
witness credibility played in its decision.  Although its ultimate ruling was set 
forth in one sentence, it is clear from the decision letter in its entirety that 
the district court carefully and thoughtfully considered the evidence, the law 
and the best interests of the child in awarding primary custody to Father.  We find no abuse of 
discretion.

 
 
[¶21]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1W.R.C.P. 
52(a) provides in pertinent part:

 
 
     (a)  General and special findings by court.  
Upon the trial of questions of fact by the court, . . . , it shall not be 
necessary for the court to state its findings, except generally for the 
plaintiff or defendant, unless one of the parties requests it before the 
introduction of any evidence, with the view of excepting to the decision of the 
court upon the questions of law involved in the trial, in which case the court 
shall state in writing its special findings of fact separately from its 
conclusions of law; provided, that without such request the court may make such 
special findings of fact and conclusions of law as it deems proper and if the 
same are preserved in the record either by stenographic report or by the court's 
written memorandum, the same may be considered on appeal.   

 
 

2Despite the 
absence of a request, the district court issued an eight page decision letter 
containing four pages of factual findings, two pages of law, two paragraphs 
specifically addressing witness credibility and one page setting forth its 
ruling.