Case Title: State v. Waylon Picotte

Citation: 2003 WI 42

Docket Number: 2001AP003063-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 42 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-3063-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Waylon Picotte,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 16, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 6, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
William C. Griesbach and Peter J. Naze 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONURRED/DISSENTED: WILCOX, J., concurs in part, dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
CROOKS and SYKES, JJ., join concurrence/dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
SYKES, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and CROOKS, JJ., join dissent. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by John T. 
Wasielewski and Wasielewski & Erickson, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by John T. Wasielewski. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by David 
J. Becker, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2003 WI 42 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.  
 
 
 
No.  01-3063-CR  
(L.C. No. 
99 CF 1096) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Waylon Picotte,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 16, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Circuit Court for 
Brown County, William C. Griesbach and Peter J. Naze, Judges.   
Reversed and remanded. 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This case 
comes before the court on certification by the court of appeals 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.61 (1999-2000).1  The circuit 
court for Brown County, Peter J. Naze, Judge, entered a judgment 
of 
conviction 
for 
first-degree 
reckless 
homicide 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 
1999-2000 
version 
of 
the 
statutes 
unless 
otherwise 
indicated. 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
2 
 
(Wis. Stat. § 940.02), party to a crime, against Waylon Picotte, 
the defendant.  It also entered an order denying the defendant's 
postconviction motions.  
¶2 
The issue presented by this case is whether the 
defendant's conviction for first-degree reckless homicide is 
barred because the victim did not die within a year and a day of 
the infliction of the fatal injuries. 
¶3 
The defendant's postconviction motions asserted that 
his conviction of first-degree reckless homicide was barred 
because it violated the common-law year-and-a-day rule, which 
establishes an irrebuttable presumption that death occurring 
more than one year and one day after an accused's injury-
inflicting act was not caused by the accused. 
¶4 
The circuit court denied the defendant's motions.  The 
circuit court concluded that even if the year-and-a-day rule 
were part of the law of Wisconsin after adoption of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, the legislature eliminated the year-and-
a-day rule by enacting Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2), authorizing a 
prosecution for violation of § 940.02 (proscribing first-degree 
reckless homicide) to be commenced at any time.2 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.74 reads, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
"Time 
limitations 
on 
prosecutions . . . (2) 
Notwithstanding that the time limitation under sub. (1) has 
expired: (a) A prosecution under ss. 940.01, 940.02, or 940.04 
may be commenced at any time."   
Wisconsin has had a criminal statute of limitations since 
1849.  Wis. Stat. ch. 146, § 2 (1849).  A statute of limitations 
has thus always coexisted with the year-and-a-day rule in 
Wisconsin. 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
3 
 
¶5 
We disagree with the circuit court and hold that the 
defendant's conviction in this case is barred by the common-law 
year-and-a-day rule.  In order to reach this conclusion, we must 
address four successive questions of law that this court decides 
independent of the circuit court but benefiting from the circuit 
court's analysis.  The four questions and this court's answers 
to them are as follows: 
1. Is the common-law year-and-a-day rule the law in 
Wisconsin?  We agree with both the State and the 
defendant that the year-and-a-day rule has been the law 
of Wisconsin since statehood, preserved through Article 
XIV, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
2. If the year-and-a-day rule is the law in Wisconsin, does 
this court have the authority to abrogate the rule?  
This court has the authority to develop the common law 
and therefore may abrogate the year-and-a-day rule. 
3. If this court has the authority to abrogate the year-
and-a-day rule, do sufficiently compelling reasons exist 
for this court to do so now?  This court should abrogate 
a common-law rule when the rule becomes unsound.  We 
conclude that the year-and-a-day rule is an archaic rule 
that no longer makes sense.  Accordingly, the court 
abolishes the rule. 
4. Should the abrogation of the year-and-a-day rule apply 
to the defendant in the present case?  The court may 
change 
or 
abrogate 
a 
common-law 
rule 
either 
retroactively or prospectively.  We conclude that purely 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
4 
 
prospective abrogation of the year-and-a-day rule best 
serves the interests of justice.  Thus, prosecutions for 
murder in which the conduct inflicting the death occurs 
after 
the 
date 
of 
this 
decision 
are 
permissible 
regardless of whether the victim dies more than a year 
and a day after the infliction of the fatal injury.  The 
prosecution for first-degree reckless homicide in the 
present case, however, remains subject to the year-and-
a-day rule, and because the fatal injury in the present 
case was inflicted more than a year and a day before the 
death of the victim, the defendant's conviction for 
first-degree reckless homicide is reversed.  
I 
¶6 
The relevant undisputed facts of this case are as 
follows.  Waylon J. Picotte, the defendant, was involved, along 
with another, in a fight outside of a Green Bay bar on September 
26, 1996.  During the fight, John Jackson was struck in the face 
and hit his head on a brick wall.  Jackson suffered brain damage 
that left him in a coma.  The defendant was charged with 
aggravated battery and substantial battery on October 21, 1996.3  
He pled guilty and was sentenced to 15 years in prison.4 
                                                 
3 The substantial battery charge was based upon injuries 
sustained by another person involved in the fight.  Neither of 
the battery charges is at issue in the present case. 
4 The combined sentence for both battery charges was 15 
years. 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
5 
 
¶7 
More than two years later, on June 8, 1999, Jackson 
died from complications arising from the injuries sustained in 
the fight.  The defendant was then charged with first-degree 
reckless 
homicide, 
party 
to 
a 
crime, 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 940.02(1) and 939.05.5  After a jury trial, the 
defendant was convicted and sentenced to 30 years in prison. 
¶8 
The defendant filed postconviction motions asserting, 
among other issues, that his prosecution and conviction for 
first-degree reckless homicide violated the common-law year-and-
a-day rule.6  The circuit court affirmed the conviction and the 
court of appeals certified the issues relating to the year-and-
a-day rule for review by this court.  
II 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.02(1) 
reads: 
"Whoever 
recklessly 
causes the death of another human being under circumstances 
which show utter disregard for human life is guilty of a class B 
felony." 
Wisconsin Stat. § 939.05 reads:  
Parties to crime. (1) Whoever is concerned in the 
commission of a crime is a principal and may be 
charged with and convicted of the commission of the 
crime although the person did not directly commit it 
and although the person who directly committed it has 
not been convicted or has been convicted of some other 
degree of the crime or of some other crime based on 
the same act. 
6 In addition to raising the year-and-a-day common-law rule, 
the defendant argued that the circuit court erred by not 
instructing 
the 
jury 
on 
the 
lesser-included 
offense 
of 
aggravated battery.  He also argued, in the alternative, that he 
deserved a sentence modification.  Because of our holding, we 
need not reach these additional issues. 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
6 
 
¶9 
We address first whether the year-and-a-day rule has 
been the common-law rule in Wisconsin since statehood.  We agree 
with both the State and the defendant that the year-and-a-day 
rule has been the law of Wisconsin since statehood, preserved 
through Article XIV, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶10 Article XIV, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
reads as follows: 
Common law continued in force.  Such parts of the 
common law as are now in force in the territory of 
Wisconsin, not inconsistent with this constitution, 
shall be and continue part of the law of this state 
until altered or suspended by the legislature. 
Decisions of this court make clear that Article XIV, Section 13 
specifically incorporates the common law of England as it 
existed in 1776 into the law of this state.7   
¶11 The year-and-a-day rule is a common-law criminal rule 
of causation that dates back to thirteenth-century England.8  
According to the rule, no homicide is committed unless the 
victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is 
inflicted, for if the victim dies more than one year and a day 
                                                 
7 See, 
e.g., 
State 
v. 
Hobson, 
218 
Wis. 2d 350, 
577 
N.W.2d 825 (1998) (Article XIV, Section 13 preserves the English 
common law in the condition in which it existed at the time of 
the American Revolution until modified or abrogated); Davison v. 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 75 Wis. 2d 190, 248 N.W.2d 433 
(1977) (the common law to which Article XIV, Section 13 applies 
has consistently been defined as the law arising from English 
court decisions rendered prior to the Revolutionary War). 
8 United States v. Jackson, 528 A.2d 1211, 1214 (D.C. 1987); 
State v. Ruesga, 619 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Iowa 2000); People v. 
Stevenson, 331 N.W.2d 143, 145 (Mich. 1982); State v. Vance, 403 
S.E.2d 495, 498 (N.C. 1991). 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
7 
 
from the injury it is "conclusively presumed that the injury did 
not cause the death."9  The year-and-a-day rule was plainly part 
of English common law at the time of the American Revolution,10 
and was therefore the law in Wisconsin at statehood.11   
¶12 The circuit court ruled that while the year-and-a-day 
rule may have been the law in Wisconsin, the legislature 
abrogated 
the 
common-law 
rule 
when 
it 
enacted 
Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2).  We agree with both the State and the 
defendant that the circuit court's ruling is erroneous.  Section 
939.74(2) 
eliminates 
any 
statute 
of 
limitations 
for 
a 
prosecution for first-degree reckless homicide.  It provides 
that a prosecution under § 940.02 "may be commenced at any 
time."  A statute of limitations sets the time within which a 
prosecution must be commenced after the crime is completed.  In 
contrast, the year-and-a-day rule is a substantive principle of 
criminal law defining when a murder has been committed.  "There 
is no question that the year-and-a-day rule has long been 
                                                 
9 Charles E. Torcia, 2 Wharton's Criminal Law § 118, at 151-
52 (15th ed. 1994). 
For an historical analysis of the evolution of the year-
and-a-day rule, see Donald E. Walther, Taming a Phoenix: The 
Year-and-a-Day Rule in Federal Prosecutions for Murder, 59 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1337 (1992). 
10 See, e.g., Jackson, 528 A.2d at 1214. 
11 The rule apparently has never been discussed in Wisconsin 
case law except in a territorial case.  See Mau-zau-mau-ne-kah 
v. United States, 1 Pin. 124 (Wis. 1841).  
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
8 
 
recognized in the common law as substantive legal principle."12  
In adopting § 939.74(2), the legislature did not act to alter or 
suspend the year-and-a-day rule. 
¶13 In fact, legislative history relating to the Wisconsin 
Criminal Code indicates that the year-and-a-day rule has been 
and remains to this day a part of the common law of this state.  
The 1953 revision of the Wisconsin Criminal Code, which never 
went into effect, included the following provision, abolishing 
the year-and-a-day rule.13 
339.15 YEAR AND A 
DAY 
RULE ABOLISHED. 
 
In 
a 
prosecution for homicide the state must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt the causal relation between the 
homicidal act and death, but shall not be required to 
prove that death occurred within a year and a day of 
such act.14 
¶14 The 
very 
fact 
that 
the 
drafters 
included 
this 
provision is strong evidence that the legislature understood the 
                                                 
12 United States v. Chase, 18 F.3d 1166, 1172 (4th Cir. 
1994). 
13 It was agreed that the 1953 version of the criminal code, 
including the provision abolishing the year-and-a-day rule, 
would go into effect in 1955 provided that the 1955 legislature 
voted to enact it.  In the interim, a criminal code advisory 
committee was created to study the code and propose amendments.  
See § 282, ch. 623, Laws of 1953.  One of the changes made by 
the committee was to remove the provision abolishing the year-
and-a-day rule.  The committee eventually created a "wholly new 
bill" that was enacted by the 1995 legislature.  The 1955 act 
repealed the 1953 version of the criminal code.  Thus, when the 
1955 legislature enacted a criminal code, it did not include the 
provision abolishing the year-and-a-day rule.  See William A. 
Platz, The Criminal Code, 1956 Wis. L. Rev. 350, 351-52. 
14 § 393.15, ch. 623, Laws of 1953. 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
9 
 
year-and-a-day rule to be part of the common law of Wisconsin.  
Assistant Attorney General William Platz, one of the architects 
of both the 1953 and the 1955 versions of the criminal code, 
explained the removal of that provision from the code as a 
policy decision to leave the year-and-a-day rule in effect for 
Wisconsin. 
Another section [of the 1953 version of the criminal 
code] deleted by the committee would have abolished 
the rule in homicide cases that death must occur 
within a year and a day from the felonious act of 
causing death.  This was a policy decision by the 
committee and leaves the law as it has been.15 
 
¶15 Thus, we conclude that the year-and-a-day rule was 
incorporated into the laws of Wisconsin by Article XIV, 
Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution and has not been 
altered or suspended by the legislature. 
III 
 
¶16 We next consider whether this court has the authority 
to abrogate the year-and-a-day rule.  The defendant asserts that 
Article XIV, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution permits 
only the legislature to abrogate the common law and that this 
court does not have the authority to abrogate the common-law 
year-and-a-day rule.  We disagree with the defendant.  It is now 
well established that Article XIV, Section 13 did not usurp the 
traditional authority of the judiciary to develop the common law 
in Wisconsin. 
                                                 
15 Platz, supra note 13, at 363 (citations omitted). 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
10 
 
¶17 This court addressed the effect of Article XIV, 
Section 13 on the judiciary's power to develop the common law in 
State v. Esser, 16 Wis. 2d 567, 115 N.W.2d 505 (1962).  Esser 
was an appeal by the State, in which the State argued that the 
trial court had misinstructed the jury when it defined the 
defense of insanity in terms more broad than the common-law 
right-wrong test.  The State argued that the "right—wrong 
definition was part of the common law in force in the territory 
of Wisconsin at the time our constitution was adopted, and the 
constitution [Article XIV, Section 13] prohibits the courts from 
changing it."16 
¶18 The Esser decision rejected the State's construction 
of Article XIV, Section 13.  The Esser court concluded that the 
Wisconsin Constitution vests this court, and other courts of 
this state, with "judicial powers,"17 and that those judicial 
powers include the power to adapt and develop the common law 
through the judicial process.18  In light of this power, the 
                                                 
16 State v. Esser, 16 Wis. 2d 567, 571, 115 N.W.2d 505 
(1962).  This argument is substantially similar to the argument 
raised by the defendant in the present case.  
17 Wis. Const. art. VII, § 2. 
18 The court stated in Esser: 
Just as common law principles and rules have been 
recognized or developed in part through the judicial 
process, so the further adaptation and development of 
them must be part of the judicial power.  The court 
may modify the common law, adopting such of its 
principles as are applicable and rejecting such others 
as are inapplicable. 
Esser, 16 Wis. 2d at 581.   
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
11 
 
Esser decision concluded as follows that Article XIV, Section 13 
cannot be read to bar this court from changing the common law: 
We conclude that the function of sec. 13, art. XIV, 
Wis. Const., was to provide for the continuity of the 
common law into the legal system of the state; 
expressly made subject to legislative change (in as 
drastic degree within the proper scope of legislative 
power as the legislature might see fit) but impliedly 
subject, because of the historical course of the 
development of the common law, to the process of 
continuing evolution under the judicial power.19 
 
¶19 This conclusion does not contravene the plain words of 
the constitutional provision because by definition, common law 
is law subject to continuing judicial development, including 
abrogation.  "[I]nherent in the common law is a dynamic 
principle which allows it to grow and to tailor itself to meet 
changing needs within the doctrine of stare decisis, which, if 
correctly understood, was not static and did not forever prevent 
the courts from reversing themselves or from applying principles 
of the common law to new situations as the need arose."20  Thus, 
properly construed, Article XIV, Section 13 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution does not codify English common law circa 1776, but 
                                                 
19 Esser, 16 Wis. 2d at 584 (citations omitted). 
20 Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 11 n.35, 114 N.W.2d 105 
(1962). 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
12 
 
rather preserves law that by historical understanding is subject 
to continuing evolution under the judicial power.21 
¶20 Decisions of this court since Esser have reaffirmed 
this interpretation of Article XIV, Section 13.22  Perhaps most 
relevant to the case at hand is State v. Hobson, 218 
Wis. 2d 350, 577 N.W.2d 825 (1998), in which this court affirmed 
its authority not only to alter but also to abrogate the common 
law when appropriate. 
¶21 The Hobson decision addressed the viability of the 
common-law right to forcibly resist an unlawful arrest.  After 
determining that the common-law right had been a part of the law 
of Wisconsin by virtue of Article XIV, Section 13 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, the court went on to explain that this 
fact did not prevent the court from abrogating this right.23  
                                                 
21 The defendant asserts that the discussion in Esser 
affirming the power of the judiciary to develop the common law 
is dicta, unnecessary to the holding of the case, and contrary 
to the language of Article XIV, Section 13.  We agree with the 
State, however, that the conclusion reached by the Esser 
decision was essential to the issue in the case.   
22 See, e.g., Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 633, 350 
N.W.2d 108 (1984) ("[A]s a part of our common law heritage, this 
court is free to amend the common law . . . ."); Davison, 75 
Wis. 2d at 201 ("There is now no question that this court 
can . . . change existing common law principles."); Garcia v. 
Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 731, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1970) ("The fact 
a common law rule was in effect when the Wisconsin Constitution 
was adopted does not mean this court is 'bound by the common 
law' and unable to change the law when it no longer meets the 
economic and social needs of society."). 
23 Hobson, 218 Wis. 2d at 370 ("We agree with the State that 
this court may adopt or refuse to adopt such a privilege."). 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
13 
 
Indeed, based upon a thorough assessment of the issue, the court 
in Hobson did in fact abrogate the long-standing common-law 
rule, holding, "Wisconsin has recognized a privilege to forcibly 
resist an unlawful arrest, but based on public policy concerns, 
we hereby abrogate that privilege."24  Hobson thus clearly 
demonstrates that the power to abrogate a common-law rule 
preserved by Article XIV, Section 13 is not limited to the 
legislature, but extends to the judiciary as well. 
 
¶22 The defendant also argues that even if Esser is good 
law, this court may not abrogate the year-and-a-day rule in this 
case because the legislature has specifically refused to adopt 
such a change and thereby expressed a policy decision to 
maintain the rule as good law in Wisconsin.  In light of this 
legislative history, the defendant asserts that abrogation of 
the common-law rule would be an improper exercise of judicial 
power by developing the law in contravention of the legislative 
policy. 
¶23 We disagree with the defendant's assessment of the 
impact legislative history has on this court's authority to 
alter or abrogate the year-and-a-day rule.  We have long 
                                                 
24 Id. at 379-80. 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
14 
 
rejected the doctrine that "legislative consideration coupled 
with inaction [is] indicative of preemption."25 
¶24 In Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 
N.W.2d 618 (1962), this court abandoned the previously held view 
that that legislature's refusal to enact an introduced bill 
amounted to "an expression by the legislature that no change 
should be made."26  The Holytz decision announced that when the 
rule 
in 
question 
is 
a 
common-law 
rule, 
the 
court's 
responsibility for altering or abolishing that rule does not end 
due to legislative indifference or failure to enact a statute to 
the contrary.  This important turning point has since been 
recognized in a number of decisions.27 
¶25 This court's post-Holytz decision, Sorensen v. Jarvis, 
119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984), is particularly on 
point.  In Sorensen, this court abrogated the common-law rule 
barring a third party injured by an intoxicated minor from 
recovering 
damages 
from 
the 
retail 
seller 
who 
sold 
the 
                                                 
25 Garcia, 46 Wis. 2d at 732.  For a discussion of court 
rules of 
statutory 
interpretation 
relating 
to 
legislative 
conduct as a legal fiction, see Jane S. Schachter, The 
Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court 
Statutory Interpretation:  Implications for the Legislative 
History Debate and Beyond, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1998). 
26 Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 37, 115 
N.W.2d 618 (1962) (citing Schwenkoff v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 6 Wis. 2d 44, 47 (1959)). 
27 See, e.g., Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 412, 122 
N.W.2d 193 (1963) (explaining that the court retains power to 
change a court-made rule even though the legislature refused to 
make the change). 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
15 
 
intoxicating beverage to the minor.  The defendant in Sorensen 
asserted that the court was prohibited from changing the common-
law rule because a recent legislative attempt to do so "was 
allowed to die in committee" and by this inaction a declaration 
of the legislative will not to change the common law was 
announced.28  The Sorensen decision rejected this argument, 
concluding, "While in the past we have indicated that nonaction 
by the legislature could be so interpreted we have since stated 
that, even where there has been some evidence, arguably, of the 
legislature's will by its failure to act, we are not foreclosed 
from acting."29 
¶26 Aside from this court's pronouncement in Holytz that 
common law unaltered by legislation remains within the province 
of the judiciary to develop, the decision not to treat a 
legislature's failure to enact a bill overriding the common law 
as indicative of legislative intent is further supported by 
considerations of the legislative process itself.  As the 
Sorensen decision explains, "[N]onpassage of a bill is not 
reliable evidence of legislative intent, for it may have failed" 
for a variety of nonpolicy reasons, such as insufficient time, 
the agenda-setting maneuverings of legislative leadership, the 
efforts of special interests, or lobbying efforts at a committee 
or floor level.30   
                                                 
28 Sorensen, 119 Wis. 2d at 634. 
29 Id. at 634 (citation omitted). 
30 Id. at 634-35. 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
16 
 
¶27 It would be absurd to conclude that every time a bill 
to change the common law was introduced but not passed by the 
legislature, the relevant common law effectively freezes at that 
moment until further action by the legislature.  Indeed, such a 
rule would result in an unwarranted encroachment on the judicial 
powers of the courts by individual legislators empowered with 
their own personal veto over development of the common law of 
Wisconsin. 
¶28 We conclude, therefore, that the fact that the 
legislature declined to abrogate the year-and-a-day rule when it 
revised the criminal code in 1955 does not bar this court from 
doing so.31 
IV 
¶29 Having decided that this court has the authority to 
abrogate the year-and-a-day rule, we must now determine whether 
the time has come to do so.  Common-law rules are meant to 
develop and adapt to new conditions and the progress of 
society.32  In Esser, the court concluded that "whenever an old 
rule is found unsuited to present conditions or unsound, it 
should be set aside."33  In Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 70 
                                                 
31 Nor is Wis. Stat. § 939.10 a prohibition on judicial 
development of common-law criminal rules.  Section 939.10 
provides that "common law rules of criminal law not in conflict 
with the criminal code are preserved."  As the court in Esser 
concluded, preserving common-law rules is distinctly different 
from requiring that common-law rules must be "applied without 
change."  Esser, 16 Wis. 2d at 585. 
32 Esser, 16 Wis. 2d at 582. 
33 Id. (quoting 11 Am. Jur. Common Law § 2 (1937)). 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
17 
 
Wis. 2d 836, 854, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975), the court stated that 
"[i]t is the tradition of common-law courts to reflect the 
spirit of their times and discard legal rules when they serve to 
impede society rather than to advance it."34 
¶30 We agree with the State that new conditions and the 
progress of society have rendered the year-and-a-day rule 
"unsuited to present conditions" and an impediment to society, 
and that the time has come to set it aside. 
¶31 As the State points out, there are three traditional 
justifications for the year-and-a-day rule.  The primary and 
most frequently cited justification is that because of the 
primitive state of medical knowledge in the thirteenth century 
it was not possible to establish causation beyond a reasonable 
doubt when a great deal of time had elapsed between the injury 
to the victim and the victim's death.  Therefore, it was 
presumed that a death that occurred more than one year and one 
day after the assault or injury was due to causes other than the 
criminal conduct.35 
                                                 
34 The majority in Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 70 Wis. 2d 
836, 854, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975), went on to quote from Borgnis v. 
Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209 (1911), as follows:  "[T]he 
conditions and problems surrounding the people, as well as their 
ideals, are constantly changing.  The political or philosophical 
aphorism of one generation is doubted by the next, and entirely 
discarded 
by 
the 
third. 
 
The 
race 
moves 
forward 
constantly . . . ."  Id. at 349.  Although Borgnis dealt with an 
issue of constitutional interpretation, the Antoniewicz court 
found this rationale applicable to changes in the common law.   
35 See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 463 (2001). 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
18 
 
¶32 Second, it has often been said that the rule arose 
from the early function of the jury.  In early English courts, 
jurors decided cases by relying upon their own knowledge of the 
matter at issue, and could not rely upon the testimony of fact 
witnesses or expert witnesses.  Thus, even if expert medical 
testimony had been adequate to establish causation at common 
law, it would not have been admissible.36 
¶33 Third, the rule has occasionally been characterized as 
an attempt to avoid the harsh result of the common law of 
homicides:  Those convicted of homicide in any form, from first-
degree to manslaughter, were subject to the death penalty.37 
¶34 None of these justifications remain persuasive for 
maintaining the year-and-a-day rule in Wisconsin.  Advances in 
medical science that permit causes of death to be identified 
with great certainty have undermined the first justification for 
the year-and-a-day rule.38  Modern rules of evidence giving 
jurors access to expert opinion testimony regarding the cause of 
                                                 
36 See Jackson, 528 A.2d at 1216; Ruesga, 619 N.W.2d at 380; 
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 409 N.E.2d 771, 773 (Mass. 1980); 
Stevenson, 331 N.W.2d at 146; State v. Rogers, 992 S.W.2d 393, 
397 (Tenn. 1999). 
37 See Jackson, 528 A.2d at 1216; Ruesga, 619 N.W.2d at 380; 
Lewis, 409 N.E.2d at 773; Commonwealth v. Ladd, 166 A.2d 501, 
506 (Pa. 1960); State v. Rogers, 992 S.W.2d at 397. 
38 See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. at 463; Jackson, 528 
A.2d at 1216, 1220; Lewis, 409 N.E.2d at 773; Stevenson, 331 
N.W.2d at 146; State v. Sandridge, 365 N.E.2d 898, 899 (Ohio Ct. 
Com. Pleas 1977); State v. Rogers, 992 S.W.2d at 401; 2 Wayne R. 
LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 7.1, at 190 
(1986). 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
19 
 
death 
undermine 
the 
second 
justification 
for 
the 
rule.39  
Finally, since Wisconsin does not have the death penalty, the 
third justification for the rule can have no sway in this state. 
¶35 In addition to the lack of any justification for 
continuing the year-and-a-day rule in modern society, two 
affirmative reasons exist for abolishing the year-and-a-day 
common-law rule.  First, the common-law rule raises the specter 
of a family's being forced to choose between terminating the use 
of a life-support system and allowing an accused to escape a 
murder charge.40  Second, it is unjust to permit an assailant to 
escape punishment because of a convergence of modern medical 
advances and an archaic rule from the thirteenth century.41 
¶36 Moreover, we agree with the State that the abrogation 
of the year-and-a-day rule would not deprive an accused of any 
fundamental right.42 
 The 
burden 
would remain 
"upon the 
prosecution to prove proximate causation——that death flowed from 
the wrongful act of the defendant."43  As one court has observed: 
Of course, abolition of the rule would not relieve the 
prosecution of its duty to prove all of the elements 
of the crime, including proximate causation, beyond a 
                                                 
39 See Sandridge, 365 N.E.2d at 899; State v. Rogers, 992 
S.W.2d at 401. 
40 Jackson, 528 A.2d at 1217 n.14; Stevenson, 331 N.W.2d at 
146.  
41 Ruesga, 619 N.W.2d at 382; State v. Gabehart, 836 P.2d 
102, 105 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998). 
42 Sandridge, 365 N.E.2d at 899. 
43 Id. 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
20 
 
reasonable doubt.  A murder conviction which rests 
upon uncertain medical speculation as to the cause of 
death is not a case which has been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Fears about murder convictions for 
death 5, 10, or even 20 years after the injury are 
therefore unfounded where proximate cause is proven 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt. 
 
If 
such 
proof 
is 
available, the conviction is justified.44 
¶37 In short, we are persuaded that the year-and-a-day 
rule has outlived its various justifications and therefore now 
join the many states that have abrogated the rule.45  
V 
¶38 Having 
abrogated 
the 
year-and-a-day 
rule, 
the 
remaining issue we address is the applicability of this 
abrogation of the common-law rule to the defendant in the case 
at hand.   
¶39 The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that 
this court has the authority to abrogate the year-and-a-day 
common-law rule prospectively or retroactively.  In Northern 
Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 
(1932), Justice Cardozo, writing for a unanimous court, affirmed 
a decision of the Montana Supreme Court to overrule precedent 
purely prospectively——that is, to apply the new rule only to 
future conduct——explaining:  "We think the Federal Constitution 
has no voice upon the subject.  A state in defining the limits 
of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself between 
                                                 
44 Stevenson, 331 N.W.2d at 146. 
45 See Ruesga, 619 S.W.2d at 380 ("The great majority of 
states . . . have 
abrogated 
the 
rule, 
judicially 
or 
legislatively."). 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
21 
 
the principle of forward operation and that of relation 
backward."46 
¶40 More recently, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing 
for a five-justice majority in Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 
(2001), declared that the Tennessee Supreme Court had the 
authority to abrogate the year-and-a-day rule retroactively 
without violating the federal constitution. 
¶41 These decisions make clear that state courts must 
decide for themselves whether to abrogate the common-law year-
and-a-day rule prospectively or retroactively, and so we turn to 
Wisconsin case law for guidance.   
¶42 This court has faced the question of prospective 
versus retroactive overruling of a common-law rule in several 
cases.  The court has stated a number of times that it, like all 
courts, generally adheres to the "Blackstonian doctrine," which 
provides that "a decision to overrule or repudiate an earlier 
decision is retrospective in operation."47  The Blackstonian 
doctrine is based on the jurisprudential theory that "courts 
                                                 
46 In Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 
287 U.S. 358 (1932), the Montana Supreme Court had overruled its 
own 1921 decision, applied the old rule to the case at hand 
arising out of events that occurred while the old rule was in 
existence, and declared that the new rule only governed conduct 
arising thereafter.  The United States Supreme Court declared 
that the state court's wholly prospective overruling of a rule 
of law was constitutional. 
47 Harmann v. Hadley, 128 Wis. 2d 371, 377, 382 N.W.2d 673 
(1986) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 
Wis. 2d 571, 575, 157 N.W.2d 594 (1968)); Laabs v. Tax Comm'n, 
218 Wis. 414, 416-17, 261 N.W. 404 (1935). 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
22 
 
declare but do not make law.  In consequence, when a decision is 
overruled, it does not merely become bad law,——it never was the 
law, and the later pronouncement is regarded as the law from the 
beginning."48 
¶43 The 
court, 
however, 
has 
also 
criticized 
the 
Blackstonian doctrine because it "leads to a strict and 
unyielding adherence to the rule of stare decisis and interferes 
with the progress of the law."49  Furthermore, inequities can 
arise when a court departs from precedent and announces a new 
rule.50  Accordingly, the court has recognized exceptions to the 
Blackstonian doctrine and has employed the technique known as 
prospective overruling, or "sunbursting," to soften or limit the 
impact of a newly announced rule.51 
¶44 In Harmann v. Hadley, 128 Wis. 2d 371, 377, 382 
N.W.2d 673 (1986), we explained that there are no easy-to-follow 
rules or consistent guidelines directing courts on whether or 
                                                 
48 Laabs, 218 Wis. at 416-17.  
49 Id. at 417 (emphasis in original). 
50 Id. 
51 See Harmann, 128 Wis. 2d at 377-78.  
Courts have employed the prospective overruling technique 
for over a century.  Walter V. Schaefer, The Control of 
"Sunbursts": Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 631, 631-33 (1967).   
The word "sunbursting" derives from the name of one of the 
parties in Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 
287 U.S. 358 (1932), in which the Court limited its decision to 
future conduct.  
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
23 
 
how to sunburst a decision.  Courts must make the decision based 
upon the "equities peculiar to a given rule or case."52   
¶45 The decision to overrule a rule of law purely 
prospectively is therefore a "question of policy."53  The most 
common reason for prospective overruling is to protect the 
reliance interests of individuals and institutions that have 
ordered their affairs under the prior legal regime.  Other 
interests, however, are also implicated when a court overrules 
past precedent.54  A free and democratic society requires 
stability in the law, and retroactive changes in the law 
jeopardize the courts' own institutional reliance on announced 
                                                 
52 Harmann, 128 Wis. 2d at 379. 
53 Harmann, 128 Wis. 2d at 378.  See also Thomas E. 
Fairchild, Limitation of New Judge-Made Law to Prospective 
Effect Only: "Prospective Overruling" or "Sunbursting", 51 Marq. 
L. Rev. 254, 254 (1967-68) ("We employ the technique of 
prospective overruling as an exceptional expedient when the 
traditional retroactivity would wreak more havoc in society than 
society's interest in stability will tolerate."); Roger J. 
Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of 
Judicial Responsibility, 28 Hastings L.J. 533, 541-42 (1977) ("A 
court usually will not overrule a precedent even if it is 
convinced that the precedent is unsound, when the hardship 
caused by a retroactive change would not be offset by its 
benefits.  The technique of prospective overruling enables 
courts to solve this dilemma by changing bad law without 
unsettling the reasonable expectations of those who relied on 
it."). 
54 See Laabs, 218 Wis. at 417; Thomas S. Currier, Time and 
Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 Va. L. Rev. 
201, 235-38, 254-55 (1965).  In Dupuis v. General Casualty Co., 
36 Wis. 2d 42, 45-46, 152 N.W.2d 884 (1967), the court said that 
the elements of order, system, predictability, and reliance are 
to be considered in determining whether a compelling judicial 
reason exists for making a court decision purely prospective.    
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
24 
 
law.  Our society also values the efficient administration of 
justice, and applying a new rule retroactively often imposes an 
added burden on the judicial institution.  Moreover, retroactive 
application 
of 
criminal 
responsibility 
may 
be 
viewed 
as 
tarnishing the rule of law and institutional adherence to the 
law, thus tarnishing the "image of justice."55  
¶46 Purely prospective overruling frequently reduces the 
impairment of these interests and mitigates any hardships that 
result from a decision to change the law.  Judge Thomas E. 
Fairchild, then judge of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit and former Wisconsin Supreme Court justice, explains 
that the use of the sunbursting technique relieves some pressure 
against departure from precedent and serves the same social 
interest in stability that is the root of stare decisis.56 
¶47 With respect to criminal cases, Wisconsin courts have 
expressed reservations about retroactive overruling of judge-
made substantive criminal laws, making acts criminal that were 
not considered criminal when they occurred.  In Laabs v. Tax 
Commission, 218 Wis. 414, 417, 261 N.W. 404 (1935), this court 
explained that the Blackstonian presumption of retroactivity 
should be abandoned where a criminal statute "which has received 
a limited construction by earlier decisions, has been so 
expanded in meaning by the later overruling decision as to make 
acts criminal which were not such under earlier decisions, and 
                                                 
55 Currier, supra note 54, at 254-55. 
56 Fairchild, supra note 53, at 254. 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
25 
 
the later decision is sought to be applied to one whose acts 
were committed before the statute was given the enlarged 
construction."57   
¶48 Commentaries uniformly recognize the hardships created 
by retroactive application of judicial decisions expanding 
substantive criminal laws.58  Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor of 
the California Supreme Court (ret.) explained that the problem 
of "retroactive versus prospective application calls for the 
most sensitive balancing of competing claims to justice in the 
area of criminal law."59 
¶49 An argument can be made for retroactive application of 
the new rule to this case.  The defendant here committed a 
criminal act, a battery against another person, ultimately 
resulting in death.  Battery is recognized as criminal conduct 
regardless of the year-and-a-day rule, and the defendant cannot 
claim his conduct was lawful when he inflicted the injury.  
Furthermore, the criminal law accords high value to the 
preservation of individual life, and this defendant violently 
took a life.   
¶50 We conclude, however, that a stronger argument can be 
made for purely prospective application of the new rule in this 
case.  Our legal system accords high value to the rule of law 
                                                 
57 This portion of Laabs has been quoted with approval in 
Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d at 576. 
58 See, e.g., Currier, supra note 54, at 240-41, 252-72; 
Fairchild, supra note 53, at 256. 
59 Traynor, supra note 53, at 548. 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
26 
 
and institutional adherence to the law.  Although overruling the 
year-and-a-day rule does not mark the defendant's conduct in the 
case at hand as criminal for the first time, abrogating the 
year-and-a-day rule nevertheless creates criminal liability for 
a different crime, the crime of first-degree reckless homicide, 
where no such liability previously existed.  By abrogating the 
year-and-a-day rule, we have altered the law after the defendant 
committed the crime.  When the defendant battered the victim in 
this case, he was guilty of the crimes of aggravated battery and 
substantial 
battery, 
but 
not 
of 
violating 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.02(1), which punished a person for recklessly causing the 
death of another human being within one year and one day of the 
conduct that showed utter disregard for human life.   
¶51 In 1996, the defendant in the present case pled guilty 
to 
substantial 
battery 
and 
aggravated 
battery 
for 
his 
altercation with the victim and was sentenced to 15 years in 
prison.  Then, more than two years later, the defendant was 
charged and convicted of first-degree reckless homicide for his 
part in that same altercation.  Under the year-and-a-day rule in 
existence at that time, the State's prosecution was barred.  The 
defendant in the present case was thus assured by the law that 
he was safe from the State's pursuit on a murder charge.   
¶52 The bar on the State's ability to prosecute the 
defendant for murder is removed for the first time today, by 
this court's decision to abrogate the year-and-a-day rule.  
Thus, the decision today, if applied to the defendant, revives 
the State's ability to bring this second prosecution for murder.  
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
27 
 
Judge Learned Hand artfully stated, when describing the problem 
with extending a criminal statute of limitation after it has 
already expired, that "for the state to assure a man that he had 
become safe from its pursuit, and thereafter to withdraw its 
assurance, seems to most of us unfair and dishonest."60   
¶53 As Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor ominously warned, 
permitting retroactive application of expanded criminal laws as 
a general proposition threatens the liberty interests of 
everyone within a free and open society:   
The first among them to be criminally prosecuted may 
be those whose offenses are so close to specified 
crimes as to seem properly punishable.  But each such 
punishment broadens the area of prosecution and the 
number of those who may be caught in it.  No one can 
forget that in our own time, in purportedly civilized 
countries, millions have thus been caught who have 
committed no greater offense than to be themselves.61 
¶54 Abrogating the year-and-a-day rule retroactively and 
thereby expanding the construction of § 940.02(1)——as well as 
all other homicide statutes in Wisconsin——undermines stability 
in the law and tarnishes the image of justice.   
¶55 First, retroactive abrogation of the year-and-a-day 
rule would affect more than just the defendant in this case.  
There is no statute of limitations on a homicide prosecution in 
Wisconsin.62  Consequently, retroactive abrogation of the common-
                                                 
60 Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420, 425-26 (2d Cir. 
1928) (quoted with approval in State v. Haines, 2003 WI 39, ¶11, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___). 
61 Traynor, supra note 53, at 550-51. 
62 See Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(a). 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
28 
 
law rule will put many other individuals who committed similar 
crimes——some decades ago and some who have already served time 
for 
their 
crimes 
and 
been 
released——in 
jeopardy 
of 
new 
prosecutions.63   
¶56 Moreover, 
permitting 
the 
prosecution 
of 
these 
individuals for the same conduct for which they have already 
served time paints our criminal justice system with a brush of 
arbitrariness.  Which of these individuals may actually be 
prosecuted could depend on a variety of arbitrary factors, 
including whether or not evidence has been preserved, the 
availability of resources in a given county to charge the 
accused again, and the age and health of the perpetrator.  
Liberty should not hinge on such chance events.64 
¶57 Consequently, we conclude that the year-and-a-day rule 
should be overruled purely prospectively.  Prosecutions for 
murder in which the conduct inflicting the death occurs after 
the date of this decision are permissible regardless of whether 
the victim dies more than a year and a day after the infliction 
of the fatal injury.  Although the defendant in the present case 
                                                 
63 Nothing in the record indicates how many individuals this 
decision might affect.  A brief case search, however, reveals 
that the issue may be present in another case making its way 
through the Wisconsin court system.  See State v. McKee, 2002 WI 
App 148, ¶21 n.8, 256 Wis. 2d 547, 648 N.W.2d 34.  
64 "It is a fundamental ethical requirement that like cases 
should 
receive 
like 
treatment, 
that 
there 
should 
be 
no 
discrimination between one litigant and another except by 
reference to some relevant differentiating factor. The value of 
equality is at the root of our system of justice."  Currier, 
supra note 54, at 237. 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
29 
 
is not punished for the death of the victim and relatives and 
friends of the victim are not vindicated by our decision today, 
the 
defendant 
does 
not 
go 
unpunished. 
 
The 
defendant's 
conviction 
for aggravated 
battery 
and 
substantial battery 
stands.  His sentence of 15 years imprisonment stands.  Thus, 
important values in our society have been preserved.   
¶58 In addition, we have expanded the construction of a 
statute through abrogation of the common-law year-and-a-day rule 
so that hereafter persons can be convicted of murder even though 
the death of the victim occurs more than a year and a day after 
the act inflicting the injury.   
¶59 We recognize that there are different methods of 
prospective overruling and that one of the most common is to 
apply a change in the law prospectively in all cases except the 
one before the court that has served as the impetus for change.  
The reasons justifying this approach, however, are not present 
in the case at hand. 
¶60 Courts and commentaries alike cite two reasons for 
applying a new rule of law to the parties in the case where the 
rule is announced and prospectively.  The first is that to do 
otherwise would relegate the announced change in law to the 
status of mere dicta.65   
¶61 Wisconsin, 
of course, does 
not always 
recognize 
intentionally answered questions of law in judicial decisions as 
nonbinding dicta.  "It is deemed the doctrine of the cases is 
                                                 
65 Fairchild, supra note 53, at 256. 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
30 
 
that when a court of last resort intentionally takes up, 
discusses, and decides a question germane to, though not 
necessarily decisive of, the controversy, such decision is not a 
dictum but is a judicial act of the court which it will 
thereafter recognize as a binding decision."66  Following this 
doctrine, prior decisions of this court have announced rules to 
be applied purely prospectively.67 
¶62 The second reason is that it is necessary to apply the 
new rule to the party that challenges the old law as a reward to 
encourage others to continue to bring claims to the courts.68  In 
the case at hand, it is the defendant who has raised the claim 
of the application of the common-law rule.  It is hardly a 
reward to the defendant to abrogate the year-and-a-day rule in 
                                                 
66 State v. Kruse, 101 Wis. 2d 387, 392, 305 N.W.2d 85 
(1981) (quoting Chase v. Am. Cartage, 176 Wis. 235, 238, 186 
N.W. 598 (1922)).  Other cases, however, assert the generally 
accepted doctrine that "a statement not addressed to the 
question before the court or necessary for its decision" is 
dictum, Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shannon, 120 Wis. 2d 560, 
565, 356 N.W.2d 175 (1984), and not binding on the court, Reiter 
v. Dyken, 95 Wis. 2d 461, 474, 290 N.W.2d 510 (1980). 
67 See, e.g., Hobson, 218 Wis. 2d 350, 381 (common-law 
defense of resisting an unlawful arrest in the absence of 
unreasonable force abrogated prospectively only; court refused 
to apply abrogation retroactively to Hobson); Sparkman v. State, 
27 Wis. 2d 92, 98, 133 N.W.2d 776 (1965) (on grounds of public 
policy this court adopted rule for prospective application only 
that an indigent is entitled to appointed counsel at or prior to 
a preliminary hearing unless counsel is intelligently waived); 
State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 25 Wis. 2d 177, 179, 130 
N.W.2d 569 (1964) (order taking original jurisdiction stated 
that 
any 
declaration 
of 
invalidity 
of 
the 
statute 
has 
prospective effect only). 
68 Fairchild, supra note 53, at 256. 
No. 
01-3063-CR   
 
31 
 
his case.  Such a decision would uphold his conviction for 
first-degree reckless homicide.   
¶63 Even if it is more accurate to recognize the State as 
bringing the claim in this case by prosecuting the defendant for 
conduct that caused death more than one year and one day later, 
the State does not need the encouragement to press claims that 
other litigants might.  Ordinarily a private party who raises an 
issue is in court for that case only and gains nothing if the 
new rule does not apply to it.  In contrast, the State litigates 
frequently and is a repeat player in criminal cases.  The State 
gains even if the new rule applies only prospectively.  While 
barred from prosecuting the defendant in this case, the State 
gets the benefit of the rule in the future from the ability to 
bring homicide prosecutions unencumbered by this archaic common-
law rule. 
¶64 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the year-
and-a-day 
rule 
should 
be 
overruled 
purely 
prospectively.  
Accordingly we reverse the judgment and order of the circuit 
court and remand the cause to the circuit court to dismiss the 
criminal complaint.  
By the Court.—The judgment and order of the circuit court 
are reversed and the cause remanded. 
 
 
 
No.  01-3063-CR.jpw 
 
1 
 
¶65 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting in 
part).  I agree with the court's determination that the year-
and-a-day rule was, until today, part of Wisconsin law.  I also 
agree that this court has the authority to abrogate such a 
common law rule, and that the year-and-a-day rule is outdated 
and should be abrogated.  However, I must disagree with the 
court's conclusion in Part V of the majority opinion that the 
abrogation of the rule should not be applied to this defendant.  
While I do not dispute the majority's assertion that this court 
may decide whether or not the "new rule" should be applied 
prospectively or retroactively, I take issue with the court's 
apparent disregard for a recent decision by the United States 
Supreme Court on this exact issue.  In Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 
U.S. 451 (2001), the Court held that retroactive application of 
abrogation of the year-and-a-day rule was permissible.  This 
court has typically followed the interpretations of the Supreme 
Court on issues of due process.  Because I see no reason why the 
court should not adopt the Rogers analysis and because I find it 
fair to apply the abrogation of the year-and-a-day rule to this 
defendant, I respectfully dissent. 
¶66 Picotte argues that the Wisconsin Constitution may 
afford defendants greater protection than the United States 
Constitution.  That is certainly true.  However, this court has 
repeatedly held that the due process provisions of the United 
States 
Constitution 
and 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
are 
substantively the same and should be interpreted as such.  State 
v. Hezzie R., 219 Wis. 2d 848, 891, 580 N.W.2d 660 (1998) ("This 
No.  01-3063-CR.jpw 
 
2 
 
court has repeatedly stated that the due process clauses of the 
state and federal constitutions are essentially equivalent and 
are subject to identical interpretation."); State v. Konrath, 
218 Wis. 2d 290, 297 n.9, 577 N.W.2d 601 (1998); Reginald D. v. 
State, 
193 
Wis. 2d 299, 
306-07, 
533 
N.W.2d 181 
(1995).  
Moreover, in previous cases interpreting the interaction of ex 
post facto principles and due process analysis, this court has 
relied upon the guidance of the United States Supreme Court.  
See State v. Kurzawa, 180 Wis. 2d 502, 510-13, 509 N.W.2d 712 
(1994).  In Kurzawa, this court, quoting Marks v. United States, 
430 U.S. 188, 191-92 (1977), held that the ex post facto and due 
process clauses share a common fundamental principle, that being 
"the notion that persons have a right to have fair warning of 
that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties."  
Kurzawa, 180 Wis. 2d  at 510-11.   
¶67 In 2001, the United States Supreme Court in Rogers 
upheld 
a 
Tennessee 
Supreme 
Court 
decision, 
finding 
that 
retroactive application of the abrogation of Tennessee's year-
and-a-day rule did not violate due process.  Rogers, 532 U.S. 
451.  Once again dealing with the interplay of ex post facto and 
due process, the Court stated: 
[W]e conclude that a judicial alteration of a common 
law doctrine of criminal law violates the principle of 
fair warning, and hence must not be given retroactive 
effect, only where it is "unexpected and indefensible 
by reference to the law which had been expressed prior 
to the conduct in issue." 
Id. at 462 (emphasis added).  The Court went on to find that 
abrogation of the year-and-a-day rule was neither unexpected nor 
No.  01-3063-CR.jpw 
 
3 
 
indefensible and thus, retroactive application did not violate 
due process.  Id. at 462, 466-67.   
¶68 In holding that abrogation of the rule could be 
applied retroactively, the Supreme Court noted that the year-
and-a-day rule "is widely viewed as an outdated relic of the 
common law."  Id. at 462.  The Court added that "practically 
every court" that recently examined the rule found that the rule 
had been rendered obsolete and that the original reasons for its 
existence no longer existed.  See id. at 463.  Although the 
Court acknowledged that due process does not require a defendant 
to be aware of the common law in all 50 states, it noted that in 
this case, such information was valuable to the analysis. 
[T]he fact that a vast number of jurisdictions have 
abolished a rule that has so clearly outlived its 
purpose is surely relevant to whether the abolition of 
the rule in a particular case can be said to be 
unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law as 
it then existed. 
Id. at 464.   
¶69 Additionally, the Supreme Court found it important 
that the year-and-a-day rule "had only the most tenuous 
foothold" in Tennessee's criminal law.  Id.  The rule was not 
part of the Tennessee statutory criminal code.  Id.  It had 
never served as the ground for any prosecution for murder in the 
state and had only been mentioned in Tennessee cases three 
times, in dicta.  Id. 
¶70 The Rogers decision provides the exact analysis we 
have been called upon to do in this case.  The cases are 
strikingly similar both factually and legally.  In Rogers, the 
No.  01-3063-CR.jpw 
 
4 
 
defendant was charged with second-degree murder when the man he 
had stabbed 15 months earlier died from complications caused by 
those wounds.  Id. at 454.  Like the defendant here, Rogers 
claimed his murder prosecution violated due process.  The 
Supreme Court rejected these arguments.   
¶71 The majority here asserts several reasons for applying 
the abrogation prospectively, including reliance interests, 
systemic stability, efficient administration, and maintaining an 
untarnished "image of justice."  Majority op., ¶45.  The 
majority 
suggests 
that 
the 
rule 
should 
not 
be 
applied 
retroactively because the defendant would not have been subject 
to liability for murder under the law as it existed at the time 
the defendant beat his victim and that such application of a new 
rule threatens important liberty interests.  Majority op., ¶50.  
However, even the majority acknowledged, as it must, that 
regardless of the year-and-a-day rule, the defendant here cannot 
claim his conduct was lawful when committed.  Majority op., ¶49.   
¶72 The majority's analysis, though, defies the standards 
laid out by the Supreme Court in Rogers and ignores the balance 
already done by that Court.  As noted, this court has long 
followed the precedents of the Supreme Court in this realm of 
the law, and the majority does not distinguish Rogers nor does 
it provide a valid reason for straying from Supreme Court 
precedent in this case.  Under Rogers, the test for the 
appropriateness of retroactive application is whether the change 
in law was "unexpected or indefensible."  Rogers, 532 U.S. at 
No.  01-3063-CR.jpw 
 
5 
 
462.  The reasons for the Court's decision in Rogers apply with 
equal or more force in this case.   
¶73 The majority in this case, like the Rogers Court, 
found that the year-and-a-day rule was clearly outdated.  
Majority op., ¶¶30-37.  Even the defendant here cannot provide a 
good reason for the rule's continued existence.  Next, the Court 
in Rogers noted that the vast majority of jurisdictions had 
already found the year-and-a-day rule obsolete and abrogated it.  
Rogers, 532 U.S. at 462-64.  The Supreme Court found that the 
overwhelming precedents abrogating the rule served fair notice 
to the defendant that the abolition of the rule should be 
anticipated.  Id. at 464, 466-67.  Adding the Rogers decision to 
those many precedents noted by the Court, I submit that the 
defendant in this case is in an even poorer position than Rogers 
to argue that the abolition of the rule was unanticipated. 
¶74 Further, the Supreme Court found important that the 
year-and-a-day rule had but a "tenuous foothold" in the criminal 
law of Tennessee.  In this case, Picotte argues that the rule 
had a stronger hold in Wisconsin law because its protections 
arose through the state constitution.  Whatever the source of 
the rule in Wisconsin, it nonetheless appears that the rule has 
no stronger "foothold" than the Tennessee rule did.  As in 
Tennessee, the rule is not part of the state statutory criminal 
code.  See Rogers, 532 U.S. at 464.  Additionally, the rule had 
only been mentioned in Tennessee cases three times, all in 
dicta.  Id.  Wisconsin has even fewer cases mentioning the rule. 
As noted by the majority, "the rule apparently has never been 
No.  01-3063-CR.jpw 
 
6 
 
discussed in Wisconsin case law except in a territorial case."  
Majority op., ¶11 n.11.69   
¶75 In 
Kurzawa, 
180 
Wis. 2d at 
511, 
this 
court 
acknowledged that the fundamental principle common to both ex 
post facto and due process analyses was "fair warning" of 
conduct that would give rise to criminal penalties.  Under 
Rogers, such fair warning is fulfilled in this case.  I disagree 
with the majority's stated concerns about unforeseen liability 
and appropriately rewarding those who challenge old laws.  See 
majority op., ¶¶50-57, 62-63.  The year-and-a-day rule has been 
overruled in the vast majority of jurisdictions that dealt with 
the issue.  See Rogers, 532 U.S. at 463-64.  The Supreme Court 
upheld abrogation of the rule and the retroactive application of 
the abrogation.  Id. at 466-67.  The rule hung on by a mere 
thread in this state.  Given these factors, this defendant 
should not be able to successfully argue the change in the 
common law rule is unexpected or indefensible.  Finally, the 
defendant's conduct here was not innocent when committed.  
Picotte had warning that the injuries he inflicted could give 
rise to criminal penalties.  He should not be rewarded simply 
because modern science allowed his victim to live more than a 
                                                 
69 In addition to the case noted by the majority, the State 
noted in its brief that the court of appeals also once referred 
to the rule.  In a case similar to the one at hand, the court of 
appeals mentioned that it would not address the "common law's 
ancient year and a day rule" because neither of the parties had 
raised the issue.  State v. McKee, 2002 WI App 148, ¶21 n.8, 256 
Wis. 2d 547, 648 N.W.2d 34 (internal citation omitted).  While 
it did not address the issue, the court of appeals did note that 
the majority of states have abrogated the rule.  Id. 
No.  01-3063-CR.jpw 
 
7 
 
year and a day after he was beaten into a coma. As the Supreme 
Court in Rogers concluded: 
There is, in short, nothing to indicate that the 
[state] court's abolition of the rule in petitioner's 
case represented an exercise of the sort of unfair and 
arbitrary 
judicial action 
against 
which 
the Due 
Process Clause aims to protect.  Far from a marked and 
unpredictable departure from prior precedent, the 
court's decision was a routine exercise of common law 
decisionmaking in which the court brought the law into 
conformity with reason and common sense.  It did so by 
laying to rest an archaic and outdated rule that had 
never been relied upon as a ground of decision in any 
reported [state] case. 
Rogers, 532 U.S. at 466-67. 
¶76 For the foregoing reasons, I would adopt Rogers and 
conclude the abrogation of the year-and-a-day rule should be 
retroactively applied to this defendant.  
¶77 I am authorized to state that Justices N. PATRICK 
CROOKS and DIANE S. SYKES join this dissent.   
 
No.  01-3063-CR.dss 
 
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¶78 DIANE S. SYKES, J.   (dissenting).  I join Justice 
Wilcox's dissent.  I write separately to emphasize certain 
additional concerns about the majority's refusal to apply the 
decision in this case to this defendant. 
¶79 The majority concludes that "the year-and-a-day rule 
has outlived its various justifications" and that Wisconsin will 
"now join the many states that have abrogated the rule."  
Majority op., ¶37.  I agree with this conclusion. 
¶80 The majority also concludes, however, that "now" does 
not actually mean "now" in the usual sense, as in, "in this 
case."70  Instead, "now" actually means "later," because the 
majority has decided to "sunburst" its decision——to abrogate the 
year-and-a-day rule prospectively only.  Majority op., ¶¶38-64.  
I do not agree with this aspect of the majority opinion. 
¶81 The majority identifies and discards as obsolete each 
of the justifications for the common law year-and-a-day rule, 
concluding unequivocally that "[n]one of the[] justifications 
remain persuasive for maintaining the year-and-a-day rule in 
Wisconsin."  Majority op., ¶34.  In addition, as an "affirmative 
reason" for abrogating the year-and-a-day rule, the majority 
holds that "it is unjust to permit an assailant to escape 
punishment because of a convergence of modern medical advances 
and an archaic rule from the thirteenth century."  Majority op., 
¶35. 
                                                 
 
70 The majority acknowledges the Blackstonian rule that 
judicial decisions are generally retrospective in operation.  
Majority op., ¶42. 
  
No.  01-3063-CR.dss 
 
2 
 
¶82 If the year-and-a-day rule is unjustifiable then what 
justifies the majority's application of it in this case?  The 
majority has declared that it is "unjust to permit an assailant 
to escape punishment" because of the year-and-a-day rule, 
majority op., ¶35, yet the majority endorses——indeed, orders——
just such an injustice in this case.  Majority op., ¶64.  
Picotte's conviction is overturned and he escapes responsibility 
for the reckless homicide he committed. 
¶83 The majority notes that "[the] most common reason for 
prospective overruling is to protect the reliance interests of 
individuals and institutions that have ordered their affairs" in 
accordance with the prior legal rule.  Majority op., ¶45.  It 
cannot seriously be suggested that persons who commit violent, 
ultimately fatal assaults "order their affairs" around the year-
and-a-day rule.  The rule does not implicate any institutional 
reliance interests.  Apparently conceding this, the majority 
bases its decision to sunburst the abrogation of the year-and-a-
day rule in large part upon the "image of justice."71  Majority 
op., ¶¶45, 54. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
71 The majority obtains this rationale for prospective 
overruling from a law review article, Thomas S. Currier, Time 
and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 Va. L. 
Rev. 201 (1965).  
  
No.  01-3063-CR.dss 
 
3 
 
¶84 This is an "image of justice":72 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There 
are 
many 
other 
"images 
of 
justice." 
See 
http://members.tripod.com/mdean/justice.html (collecting various 
internet 
links 
to 
images 
of 
the 
goddess 
of 
justice).  
Magnificent "images of justice" adorn our State Capitol, 
courthouses, and other public buildings across the state and 
nation. 
¶85  The "image of justice," however, is not a legal 
principle upon which to base an appellate judicial decision.  As 
far as I can tell, "the image of justice" as a rationale for the 
majority's decision to prospectively abrogate has something to 
do with 1) the "equities" in the case, 2) "policy," and 3) the 
requirement of "stability in the law."  Majority op., ¶¶44-45. 
                                                 
72 See State of Wisconsin Blue Book (2001-2002) at 129-135.  
The mosaic "Justice" is one of four panels of glass mosaic 
works, each one consisting of approximately 100,000 pieces of 
glass tile, in the State Capitol rotunda designed by Kenyon Cox, 
an American painter, draughtsman, and art critic.  Id. 
No.  01-3063-CR.dss 
 
4 
 
¶86  Stability in the law is an argument for adhering to an 
existing rule rather than refusing to apply a newly-declared 
one.  Indeed, the technique of sunbursting enables courts to 
more readily avoid stare decisis and the legal stability that 
adherence to precedent seeks to promote.  Announcing a new legal 
rule is easier when the decision to do so is untethered from any 
obligation 
to 
apply 
it 
in 
the 
case 
before 
the 
court.  
Sunbursting promotes stability in the law only when reliance 
interests are very strong, which is not the case here.73 
¶87  The generalized invocation of "policy" and "equity" 
gives the majority the flexibility to make the decision it wants 
to make, but does not articulate a principled, consistent rule 
of law, as the majority apparently concedes.  Majority op., ¶44 
("[T]here are no easy-to-follow rules or consistent guidelines 
directing courts on whether or how to sunburst a decision.").   
The majority does not identify any equitable or policy factors 
that govern its use of sunbursting in this case.  Such 
standardless appellate decisionmaking undermines rather than 
promotes the rule of law.  See majority op., ¶50 ("Our legal 
system accords high value to the rule of law and institutional 
adherence to the law."). 
¶88 The majority "agree[s] with the State that the 
abrogation of the year-and-a-day rule would not deprive an 
                                                 
 
73 Professor Currier, the author of the law review article 
from which the majority derives the "image of justice" rationale 
for prospective overruling, acknowledges that the criminal law 
"is not an area where people are apt to have acted in reliance 
on perceived law."  Currier, supra note 2, at 254. 
  
No.  01-3063-CR.dss 
 
5 
 
accused of any fundamental right," because the burden remains on 
the prosecution to prove causation beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Majority op., ¶36.  Nevertheless, the majority concludes that 
retroactive abrogation of the year-and-a-day rule creates a 
"hardship" that must be "mitigated" or "softened" by prospective 
overruling.  Majority op., ¶¶43, 46.   
¶89 Picotte 
inflicted 
serious, 
ultimately 
fatal 
head 
injuries on the victim, who was in a coma for over two-and-a-
half years before he died.  Picotte was convicted after a jury 
trial.  The State proved causation (as well as the other 
elements of the crime) beyond a reasonable doubt.  There are no 
claims of any constitutional or statutory violations.74  Under 
these circumstances, I do not see any "hardship" in holding 
                                                 
 
74 Picotte does argue that retroactive abrogation of the 
year-and-a-day rule (that is, applying the abrogation to his 
case) would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the state 
constitution.  See Wis. Const., art. I, § 12 ("No  . . . ex post 
facto law  . . . shall ever be passed.")  The state and federal 
Ex Post Facto Clauses prohibit only ex post facto legislative 
enactments.  See also U.S. Const., art. I, § 9.  In Rogers v. 
Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 456 (2001), a constitutional challenge 
to the Tennessee Supreme Court's retroactive abrogation of the 
year-and-a-day rule was brought under the federal due process 
clause, although the Ex Post Facto Clause "figure[d] prominently 
in [the petitioner's] argument."  The United States Supreme 
Court held that while ex post facto principles are implicated in 
the concept of due process, "[e]xtending the [Ex Post Facto] 
Clause to courts through the rubric of due process . . . would 
circumvent the clear constitutional text.  It also would evince 
too little regard for the important institutional and contextual 
differences between legislating, on the one hand, and common law 
decisionmaking, on the other."  Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 
451, 460 (2001).  The majority does not address the defendant's 
state constitutional argument.  For the reasons discussed in 
Justice 
Wilcox's 
dissent, 
I 
would 
interpret 
the 
state 
constitution consistently with Rogers.   
  
No.  01-3063-CR.dss 
 
6 
 
Picotte criminally responsible for reckless homicide.  This case 
hardly falls within Justice Traynor's "ominous warning" against 
convicting people for committing "no greater offense than to be 
themselves."  Majority op., ¶53.  
¶90 The majority claims that retroactive abrogation of the 
year-and-a-day rule will put "many other individuals who 
committed similar crimes" in jeopardy.  Majority op., ¶55.  
Actually, retroactive abrogation would probably affect very few 
people——by its terms, the rule applied only in the highly 
unusual circumstance of a death occurring more than a year after 
the criminal infliction of injury.  The majority itself notes 
that the year-and-a-day rule is mentioned only once in Wisconsin 
case law, in a territorial case dating from 1841.  Majority op., 
¶11 n.11. 
¶91 The majority also asserts that "the prosecution of 
these individuals for the same conduct for which they have 
already served time paints our criminal justice system with a 
brush of arbitrariness."  Majority op., ¶56.  Again, the 
majority 
is 
referring 
to 
hypothetical 
"prosecutions" 
of 
hypothetical "many other individuals."  More importantly, it is 
not at all uncommon for the criminal justice system to 
prosecute, convict, and sentence a defendant for several 
different crimes arising out of a single incident.  Unless there 
is a double jeopardy bar, the law does not regard this practice 
as unfair or "paint[ed] with a brush of arbitrariness." 
¶92 Ultimately, the 
majority's 
refusal 
to 
apply the 
general rule of retroactivity is itself quite arbitrary, resting 
No.  01-3063-CR.dss 
 
7 
 
only on the majority's sense that it would be somehow unfair to 
Picotte and the hypothetical "many other individuals" who might 
be subject to homicide prosecutions if their victims hereafter 
die of injuries criminally inflicted before the date of this 
decision.  But as Justice Wilcox discusses at greater length in 
his dissent, the United States Supreme Court has held that 
retroactive abrogation of the year-and-a-day rule fully comports 
with due process.  Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001). 
¶93 I agree with Justice Wilcox that the majority's 
retroactivity 
analysis 
is 
inconsistent 
with 
Rogers. 
If 
retroactive abrogation of the year-and-a-day rule does not 
offend due process, then it is not unfair to retroactively 
abrogate the rule in this case and apply that law to Picotte.75  
The majority does not rest its decision on any independent state 
constitutional ground. 
¶94 Thus, in the end, the majority essentially holds that 
the "image of justice" prohibits what the federal and state 
constitutions and the applicable law permit.  This, then, is 
                                                 
 
75  The Supreme Court's decision in Rogers undermines the 
majority's reliance on the Currier law review article that 
advanced the "image of justice" rationale for prospective 
overruling.  Currier stated that "the image of justice quite 
obviously will not tolerate retroactive application of criminal 
responsibility, for the same reason that the [E]x [P]ost [F]acto 
[C]lause will not."  Currier, supra note 2, at 255.  The Supreme 
Court in Rogers declined to import the Ex Post Facto Clause into 
the determination 
of the 
constitutionality 
of 
retroactive 
judicial 
decisionmaking, 
and 
sustained 
the 
retroactive 
abrogation of the common law year-and-a-day rule against a due 
process challenge.  The majority acknowledges as much, majority 
op., ¶40, but does not explain how a judicial act that is 
consistent with the constitution and the laws nevertheless 
impermissibly violates the "image of justice."    
No.  01-3063-CR.dss 
 
8 
 
really just an act of judicial will.  Applying the general rule 
of retroactivity, I would affirm the defendant's conviction for 
reckless homicide.    
¶95 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and N. PATRICK CROOKS join this dissent.   
 
 
No.  01-3063-CR.dss 
 
1