Case Title: In Re Marriage of Neiswinger

Citation: 477 N.E.2d 257

Docket Number: 485S175

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1985-04-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
477 N.E.2d 257 (1985)
In re the MARRIAGE OF Charlotte E. NEISWINGER, and Carl E. Neiswinger. and the Matter of Direct Contempt of Witness Robert Meyer, Petitioner.
No. 485S175.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
April 30, 1985.
J.J. Paul, III, Indianapolis, for petitioner-appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
*258 HUNTER, Justice.
This case is before us on petition for transfer from the Court of Appeals. We grant transfer. The judgment and opinion of the Court of Appeals are vacated.
Petitioner Robert Meyer was called as a witness in a hearing concerning the dissolution of the Neiswingers' marriage. Several photographs were entered as exhibits and Meyer testified repeatedly that he had taken them. Apparently, however, he was not the photographer but had been present when the photographs were taken. A rebuttal witness testified that Meyer had lied and that she had taken the photographs. The trial court believed the petitioner had lied under oath. Meyer's reasons for the apparent lie are not relevant here, and his truthfulness is not in issue.
One week after the dissolution hearing, Charlotte Neiswinger petitioned the court to find Meyer in direct contempt of court for having testified falsely about the photographs. The court granted the petition and, in Meyer's absence and without notice or hearing, summarily found him guilty of direct contempt. The court sentenced Meyer to ninety days in jail.
Meyer's motion to reconsider was denied. However, the court granted, in part only, his motion to correct error, noting the court's failure to provide a statement describing Meyer's allegedly contemptuous acts. Ind. Code § 34-4-7-7 (Burns 1984 Supp.) (direct contempt). Meyer received a stay pending his appeal to the Court of Appeals whose opinion is published as In Re the Marriage of Neiswinger, (1984, First District) Ind. App., 467 N.E.2d 43 (vacated).
The Court of Appeals incorrectly decided that Meyer's alleged conduct constituted direct contempt but it correctly reversed the conviction on the basis that Meyer had been denied due process of law. The Court of Appeals stated that this denial of due process could be remedied by the procedure for indirect contempt citations. It ordered that an impartial, special judge be appointed for further proceedings.
Before proceeding with this opinion, we will provide the relevant Indiana statutes. Indiana's direct contempt and indirect contempt statutes provide in pertinent part as follows:
Ind. Code § 34-4-7-1 (Burns 1973 Ed.) (emphasis added).
Ind. Code § 34-4-7-2 (Burns 1973 Ed.) (emphasis added).
Ind. Code § 34-4-7-7 (Burns 1984 Supp.).
Ind. Code § 34-4-7-4 (Burns 1984 Ed.) (emphasis added).
Ind. Code § 34-4-7-8 (Burns 1984 Ed.) (emphasis added).
We agree with the Court of Appeals in this: Meyer was denied due process of law and his conviction for direct contempt should be and is hereby reversed. However, we make no suggestions or comments regarding any future proceedings. See e.g. Brennan v. State, (1961) 242 Ind. 79, 173 N.E.2d 312; Grimm v. State, (1959) 240 Ind. 125, 162 N.E.2d 454; LaGrange v. State, (1958) 238 Ind. 689, 153 N.E.2d 593.
We have granted transfer because the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Meyer's conduct constituted direct contempt was erroneous. We hold that giving false testimony in the manner done here, the falsity of which could not be known but only inferred by reference to later testimony and which, unlike, for example, a refusal to testify, apparently caused no disturbance or disruption or palpable offense to the proceedings does not warrant a summary conviction and, therefore, is not a direct contempt. In Re Oliver, (1948) 333 U.S. 257, 68 S. Ct. 499, 92 L. Ed. 682; Brennan v. State, (1961) 242 Ind. 79, 173 N.E.2d 312; Grimm v. State, (1959) 240 Ind. 125, 162 N.E.2d 454; LaGrange v. State, (1958) 238 Ind. 689, 153 N.E.2d 593; Boggs v. State, (1979) 179 Ind. App. 607, 386 N.E.2d 992; Garlin v. State, (1975) 163 Ind. App. 570, 325 N.E.2d 515; People v. Randall, (1980) 89 Ill. App.3d 406, 44 Ill.Dec. 651, 411 N.E.2d 1017. Although the Court of Appeals correctly cited Oliver and Brennan in holding that Meyer was denied due process of law, it did not discuss these cases insofar as they refuted Young v. State, 198 Ind. 629, 154 N.E. 478.
In Oliver, the petitioner was convicted of contempt after testifying in camera before a "one-man grand jury." His testimony was inconsistent with that of an earlier witness, and the judge/juror summarily convicted him on the basis of that inconsistency. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction. Two justices dissented not on the merits.
The Supreme Court discussed the distinction between direct and indirect contempt, and the action available to a trial court in each case. It concluded that Oliver had been denied due process when the trial court convicted him summarily for lying in the proceedings. The Court wrote:
In Re Oliver, (1948) 333 U.S.  at 274-276, 68 S. Ct.  at 508-509, 92 L. Ed.  at 694-95 (emphasis added).
In light of this passage, and especially the last sentence thereof, we disagree with the Court of Appeals' citation of Oliver for the proposition that, the fact that "the court chose to believe [the rebuttal witness] over Meyer is a valid basis for bringing a direct contempt charge." In Re Marriage Of Neiswinger, 467 N.E.2d  at 45. Oliver does not stand for this proposition, nor does our case of Brennan v. State, (1961) 242 Ind. 79, 173 N.E.2d 312, mean that "the fact that the falsity of Meyer's testimony was not apparent until [the rebuttal witness] took the witness stand is of no consequence... ." In Re Marriage Of Neiswinger, 467 N.E.2d  at 45. In Brennan, an attorney was convicted of direct contempt for having told his witness, outside the hearing of the court, to lie about his fee. This Court embraced the statement from Oliver that direct contempt is conduct the contemptuous nature of which is personally known and observed by the court and not made known by the testimony of others. Brennan v. State, 173 N.E.2d  at 313. This Court wrote: "There is no showing in this case that immediate punishment was necessary to maintain order in the court and a respect for its authority. Such an element being totally absent, there is a failure of proof of direct contempt." Id.
The Court of Appeals in this case stated, "Lying on the witness stand is no less an impediment to court proceedings than refusing to testify; the administration of justice is equally hindered." In Re Marriage *262 Of Neiswinger, (1984) 467 N.E.2d  at 45. We believe Oliver and Brennan instruct otherwise. Refusal to testify, for example, may indeed disturb proceedings in a way that conduct such as Meyer's obviously did not. "The right to be heard in open court before one is condemned is too valuable to be whittled away under the guise of `demoralization of the court's authority.'" In Re Oliver, (1948) 92 L. Ed.  at 697. Other courts have stated that the extra court time spent ferreting out the truth after a witness has lied is not sufficiently disruptive to warrant summary action. Hicks v. Stigler, (1982) Iowa App., 323 N.W.2d 262, citing State v. Meese, (1930) 200 Wis. 454, 229 N.W. 31.
In this case summary punishment was not necessary to maintain order in the court and a respect for its authority. As the Court of Appeals wrote:
In Re Marriage Of Neiswinger, (1984) 467 N.E.2d  at 45-46. Because the Court of Appeals believed that Meyer's alleged contempt was direct in nature but that he was entitled to process beyond that provided statutorily for direct contempt, it fashioned a procedure whereby the indirect contempt statute would apply to a direct contempt. We believe that if Meyer had committed direct contempt, summary action in compliance with Ind. Code § 34-4-7-7 (Burns 1984 Supp.) would have been appropriate. His alleged contempt did not pose a sufficient threat to the order of the court to warrant summary action; therefore he did not commit direct contempt, and therefore he was denied due process of law when he was convicted without notice or an opportunity to be heard, or the procedural rights guaranteed one charged with indirect contempt.
For all the foregoing reasons, transfer is granted, the judgment and opinion of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and Meyer's conviction for direct contempt is reversed.
GIVAN, C.J., and DeBRULER, PRENTICE and PIVARNIK, JJ., concur.