Case Title: Brown v. Finney

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-11-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Steven A. BROWN v. Leonard S. FINNEY

95-1329                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered November 22, 1996


1.   Workers' compensation -- exclusivity provision mirrors general
     purpose of Workers' Compensation Act -- exclusive-benefits
     provision favors both employer and employee. -- The reason for
     the exclusivity provision in Ark. Code Ann.  11-9-
     105(a)(Repl. 1996) mirrors the general purpose behind the
     Workers' Compensation Act, which was to change the common law
     by shifting the burden of all work-related injuries from
     individual employers and employees to the consuming public
     with the concept of fault being virtually immaterial; in other
     words, the exclusive benefits provision of the workers'
     compensation law favors both the employer and the employee. 

2.   Workers' compensation -- employer has duty to provide safe
     place for employee to work -- duty cannot be delegated. --  
     The duty to provide a safe place to work is that of the
     employer, and it cannot be delegated to an employee.

3.   Workers' compensation -- failure to provide safe place to work
     -- both supervisory and nonsupervisory employees are immune
     from suit for negligence. -- Supervisory as well as
     nonsupervisory employees are immune from suit for negligence
     in failing to provide a safe place to work.

4.   Workers' compensation -- work place defined. -- The work place
     is not static in the sense of being limited to the employer's
     physical premises or actual place of business. 

5.   Workers' compensation -- appellee was performing an assigned
     task when injury to appellant occurred -- employer alone had
     duty to provide safe place to work. -- Where appellant and
     appellee were fellow employees, neither having supervisory
     powers or duties over the other, where appellee had been
     assigned the task of driving the employees to the work sites
     by his supervisors, and where he was in the process of
     transporting the employees between jobs when the accident
     occurred, appellee was acting as an arm of the employer,
     fulfilling its duty to provide a safe work place; the employer
     had elected to provide its part-time employees with
     transportation in a company van both to and from particular
     farm work sites, and in doing so had an obligation to provide
     safe transportation; it was solely the duty of the employer to
     provide its employees with a safe place to work, and such a
     duty could not be delegated to its employees, supervisory or
     otherwise; that duty extended to transportation of the
     employees between work sites.  
     
6.   Workers' compensation -- appellee was immune from suit for
     appellant's injuries -- trial court's judgment affirmed. --
     Appellant's assertion that a nonsupervisory coemployee is a
     "third party" within the meaning of Ark. Code Ann.  11-9-410
     (Repl. 1996), and that he should not be prohibited from
     bringing suit in tort against such a coemployee was meritless
     where appellee was performing the duties of his employer on
     the night in question; as such, he was also immune from suit
     in tort for the injuries sustained by appellant; the judgment
     of the trial court was affirmed.


     Appeal from Sharp Circuit Court; Harold S. Erwin, Judge;
affirmed.
     Blair & Stroud, by:  H. David Blair and Robert D. Stroud, for
appellant.
     Walmsley Law Firm, by:  Tim Weaver, for appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellant Steven A. Brown appeals the judgment of the Sharp
County Circuit Court granting summary judgment to Appellee Leonard
S. Finney Jr. on Appellant's complaint that Appellee was negligent
in his operation of a vehicle that resulted in an accident and
caused injuries to Appellant.  The trial court granted summary
judgment on the basis that Appellant's exclusive remedy was through
a workers' compensation claim against his employer pursuant to Ark.
Code Ann.  11-9-105 (Repl. 1996).  As this appeal involves
statutory interpretation, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup.
Ct. R. 1-2(a)(17).  Appellant's sole point on appeal is that the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment because section 11-
9-105 does not provide the exclusive remedy of a worker injured by
the active negligence of a non-supervisory coemployee. 
     According to the information contained in the abstract,
Appellant and Appellee were part-time employees of ConAgra, working
around ten hours per week catching chickens.  Neither Appellant nor
Appellee had any supervisory duties on the job.  ConAgra provided
its part-time employees with transportation in the company van to
the work site, or farm, where the chickens were located.  For some
time before the accident, ConAgra had delegated to Appellee the job
of driving the part-time employees to the work sites in the company
van.  The part-time employees were not actually required to ride in
the company van, but they were certainly encouraged to do so by
their supervisors.  According to Tim Hicks, the ConAgra supervisor
of both Appellant and Appellee, the employees normally parked their
vehicles at a location in Cave City, Arkansas, and then rode to the
work site together in the company van, normally driven by Appellee. 
In fact, Tim Hicks stated that other than the night of the
accident, he was aware of only one other time when any of the
employees drove their personal vehicles to a work site.  
     On August 18, 1993, Appellee picked up the company van at
ConAgra in Batesville, Arkansas, as was his normal procedure, and
drove to Cave City, Arkansas, to pick up the employees.  For
reasons unclear, two of the employees elected to drive their
personal vehicles to the work site that night.  Apart from
Appellee, the driver of the van, and Appellant, there were four
other young men riding in the van that night.  The employees drove
from Cave City to Dwight Smith's farm and proceeded to catch
chickens on that farm.  When the job was finished at Smith's farm,
the employees left for the next work site.  Along the way, an
accident occurred when the company van, driven by Appellee, went
off the roadway on Highway 58 and overturned.  As a result of the
crash, several of the young men in the van, including Appellant,
were injured, some seriously.  Through ConAgra's investigation of
the accident, there was some indication by the employees who were
riding in the van, along with the two employees in their personal
vehicles, that the van was travelling at a high rate of speed and
that there may have been some racing going on between the vehicles. 
     As a result of the injuries he sustained in the accident,
including a fractured hip, Appellant was awarded workers'
compensation indemnity benefits as well as medical benefits. 
Appellant brought this action against Appellee in circuit court
pursuant to a tort claim that Appellee was negligent in his
operation of the van on the night of the accident.  Specifically,
Appellant's complaint alleged that Appellee was operating the van
at an extremely high rate of speed, and that when he tried to pass
another vehicle, he lost control of the vehicle, which became
airborne, crashed, and overturned.  Appellee answered the complaint
by denying all material allegations and asserting that the circuit
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim, as section 11-9-105
provides an exclusive remedy for work-related injuries.  The trial
court agreed that Appellant's exclusive remedy under the
circumstances was through a workers' compensation claim and granted
Appellee's motion for summary judgment.  Appellant now appeals the
order of summary judgment, asserting that the Workers' Compensation
Act does not prohibit an employee from maintaining an action in
tort against a coemployee for injuries suffered as a result of the
coemployee's negligence.  We affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
     Section 11-9-105(a) provides in part:  
          The rights and remedies granted to an employee
     subject to the provisions of this chapter, on account of
     injury or death, shall be exclusive of all other rights
     and remedies of the employee, his legal representative,
     dependents, next of kin, or anyone otherwise entitled to
     recover damages from the employer, or any principal,
     officer, director, stockholder, or partner acting in his
     capacity as an employer, or prime contractor of the
     employer, on account of the injury or death, and the
     negligent acts of a coemployee shall not be imputed to
     the employer.  [Emphasis added.]

     As this court has previously observed, the reason for the
exclusivity provision in that section mirrors the general purpose
behind our Workers' Compensation Act, which was to change the
common law by shifting the burden of all work-related injuries from
individual employers and employees to the consuming public with the
concept of fault being virtually immaterial.  See Simmons First
Nat'l Bank v. Thompson, 285 Ark. 275,