Case Title: Noonan v. Texaco, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-01-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Noonan v. Texaco, Inc.1986 WY 9713 P.2d 160Case Number: 84-300Decided: 01/15/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOHN P. NOONAN, JR., AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AND THE 
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF KEVIN V. NOONAN, DECEASED, AND ON BEHALF OF JOHN 
P. NOONAN, JR., ELLEN H. NOONAN, MICHAEL D. NOONAN, AND MARTIN D. NOONAN, 
APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

 
 
v. 

 
 
TEXACO, INC., A DELAWARE 
CORPORATION, JOY MANUFACTURING COMPANY, A PENNSYLVANIA CORPORATION, AND DRESSER 
INDUSTRIES, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

* This opinion was 
originally published on September 6, 1985. The original opinion has been 
withdrawn and substituted with the opinion of this date.

 
 
Appeal from the District Court,SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

P. Richard Meyer of 
Spence, Moriarity & Schuster, Jackson.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

G.G. Greenlee and Robert 
M. Shively of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, for appellee Texaco, 
Inc.

Thomas S. Gorman and 
Glenn Parker of Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, for appellee Joy Mfg. 
Co.

Cameron S. Walker of 
Schwartz, Bon, McCrary & Walker, Casper, for appellee Dresser Industries, 
Inc.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
BROWN, CARDINE, ROSE (Retired) and ROONEY (Retired), 
JJ.

 
 

BROWN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
a summary judgment granted in favor of appellees in a negligence action. Kevin 
Noonan was killed while working on an oil rig. Appellants brought suit against 
Texaco, Inc. (hereinafter Texaco), Joy Manufacturing Company (hereinafter Joy), 
Dresser Industries, Inc. (hereinafter Dresser), Leonard Charles Cruth, Max 
Atwell, Hercules Drilling, Brinkerhoff Drilling Company, Inc., 
Brinkerhoff-Signal, Inc., Petrolane Company, Petrolane Drilling Company, Signal 
Drilling Company, Inc., and Signal Drilling, Inc., for damages incurred in Kevin 
Noonan's death. All defendants answered and denied liability. Appellees Texaco, 
Joy, and Dresser filed motions for summary judgment which were granted by the 
trial court. Subsequent thereto, appellants settled with all the remaining 
defendants, and appellants' complaint against such defendants was dismissed with 
prejudice. From the summary judgment granted in favor of appellees Texaco, Joy, 
and Dresser, this appeal is brought.

 
 

[¶2.]     Appellants raise the 
following issues:

 
 
"I

 
 
"Where a manufacturer 
negligently fails to guard machinery manufactured by it and fails to warn 
against its use without proper guards, is the manufacturer entitled to summary 
judgment because the purchaser/user of the product also failed to provide a 
guard for the machinery?

 
 
"II

 
 
"Where the owner of an 
oil well provided daily supervision over drilling operations and had the power 
to control safety aspects of the work, was it error for the trial court to grant 
summary judgment in favor of the owner where the owner knew that unsafe, 
unguarded rotating machinery was being used at the well site, and failed to warn 
of or correct such dangerous condition?"

 
 

[¶3.]     We will affirm. 

 
 

[¶4.]     The facts show that on 
December 6, 1979, Kevin Noonan was killed while working on an oil rig in the 
employ of Brinkerhoff-Signal. While there were no eyewitnesses to the accident, 
the accident report reveals that Kevin Noonan was using a water hose to wash the 
drilling rig floor when the hose became wrapped around the rotating drill stem, 
also known as a "kelly." The hose also became entangled around Kevin's foot, 
lashing him to the rotating kelly. The rotation of the kelly caused his left leg 
to be severed, resulting in his death. Kevin's body was found with his left leg 
lashed to the kelly bushing and master bushing, which connect the drill stem or 
kelly to the rotary table on the drilling rig floor.

 
 

[¶5.]     When reviewing a 
summary judgment on appeal, our duty is the same as that of the district court 
in that we have before us the same material and must follow the same standards. 
American Legion, Samuel Mares Post No. 8, Department of Wyoming v. Board of County 
Commissioners of the County of Converse, Wyo., 697 P.2d 1040 (1985); and Roth v. First Security Bank of Rock 
Springs, Wyo., 684 P.2d 93 (1984). The party moving for summary 
judgment has the burden of proving there exists no genuine issue of material 
fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Larsen v. 
Roberts, Wyo., 676 P.2d 1046 (1984); and Miller v. Reiman-Wuerth Company, 
Wyo., 598 P.2d 20 (1979). We look at the record from the viewpoint most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion, giving him every favorable inference which may be drawn 
from facts in the affidavits, depositions, and other material properly submitted 
in the record. Reno Livestock Corporation 
v. Sun Oil Company (Delaware), Wyo., 638 P.2d 147 (1981); and Bancroft v. Jagusch, Wyo., 
611 P.2d 819 (1980).

 
 
I

 
 

[¶6.]     Although argumentative, 
appellants' first issue basically makes inquiry as to whether summary judgment 
was proper with regard to appellees Joy and Dresser. Appellants assert that Joy 
manufactured the kelly bushing and Dresser manufactured the master bushing. The 
thrust of appellants' argument is that Joy and Dresser were negligent in not 
designing and manufacturing guards for the kelly bushing and master bushing. 
However, the trial court found such argument untenable since the driller 
Brinkerhoff-Signal had made a conscious decision not to use such guards. In his 
decision letter, the judge noted:

 
 
"As for Joy's and 
Dresser's motions for summary judgment, they are granted for the simple reason 
that regardless of the argument they failed to provide a bushing guard or failed 
to manufacture a safe one or violated some duty in that regard, all as alleged 
by plaintiff, the fact remains, as noted above, that no matter what they would 
have done, Brinkerhoff-Signal would not have used the guard. In short, as both 
Joy and Dresser point out, the failure to provide or manufacture such a guard 
was not the cause of the accident. 
Kopriva v. Union Pac. R. Co., 592 P.2d 711, 713 (Wyo. 1979) 
said:

 
 
"`In Lemos v. Madden, 28 Wyo. 1, 10, 200 P. 791, 
793 (1921) Justice Blume defined the issue as follows:

 
 
"`"The proximate cause of 
an injury is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an 
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result 
would not have occurred."

 
 
"`Later in the case, 28 
Wyo. at 12, 
200 P.  at 794, Justice Blume rejected the notion of "but for" causation and 
stated:

 
 
"`"But if the original 
wrong furnished only the condition or occasion, then it is the remote and not 
the proximate cause, notwithstanding the fact that there would have been no loss 
or injury but for such condition or occasion."

"`See also, Frazier v. Pokorny, Wyo., 349 P.2d 324 (1960); Gilliland v. Rhoads, Wyo., 
539 P.2d 1221 (1975); and 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence, § 378. See 65 C.J.S. 
Negligence § 103:'

 
 
"If the absence of the 
bushing guard contributed to the accident, its absence was the conscious 
decision of Brinkerhoff-Signal not to obtain one or use one if it had been 
available to it."

 
 

[¶7.]     In support of their 
motions for summary judgment, Joy and Dresser filed the affidavit of Max Atwell, 
safety director for Brinkerhoff-Signal, employer of the deceased. He testified 
in his deposition that it was the policy of Brinkerhoff-Signal not to use 
bushing guards because it was the opinion of Brinkerhoff-Signal, as well as the 
drilling industry, that such guards were of questionable use and safety. It is 
clear that Brinkerhoff-Signal made a conscious choice not to use bushing guards, 
and it seems immaterial whether Joy and Dresser manufactured their products with 
or without guards since the guards would not have been utilized on the drilling 
rig. Therefore, appellants have failed to show the existence of a genuine issue 
of material fact; i.e., how Joy and Dresser's negligence, if any, was the 
proximate cause of the accident and resultant death. See, e.g., Thomas v. South Cheyenne Water and Sewer 
District, Wyo., 702 P.2d 1303 (1985); Apperson v. Kay, Wyo., 546 P.2d 995 (1976); LeGrande v. Misner, Wyo., 
490 P.2d 1252 (1971).

 
 

[¶8.]     In opposition to Joy 
and Dresser's motions for summary judgment, appellants filed a "Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motions to Dismiss by Defendants Joy Manufacturing Company and 
Dresser Industries, Inc." It is noted that there were numerous depositions filed 
in the record, but since we view the evidence on a motion for summary judgment 
in the same light as the district court, we need only consider those depositions 
which were before the district court. Appellants asserted that it was negligent 
for Joy and Dresser not to manufacture guards for the kelly bushing, master 
bushing, and rotary table. However, as noted above, appellants failed to show 
how this was the cause of the accident in this case when the driller would not 
have used such guards in any event. Although speculative, it may be surmised 
that if Joy and Dresser had manufactured their products with such guards, 
Brinkerhoff-Signal still would have refused to use them because 
Brinkerhoff-Signal questioned their utility and safety. It must also be noted 
that the water hose in the instant case initially became wrapped around the 
rotating kelly, not the kelly bushing where it eventually wound up. Appellants 
have not claimed it was negligent to leave the kelly 
unguarded.

 
 

[¶9.]     It is further noted 
that the memorandum filed by appellants' counsel in opposition to Joy and 
Dresser's motions for summary judgment is full of categorical assertions of 
ultimate facts. If such categorical assertions, totally unsupported by competent 
evidence, could be used to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the 
procedure would be rendered useless. Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Company, 
Wyo., 527 P.2d 832 (1974); and Clouser v. Spaniol Ford, Inc., 
Wyo., 522 P.2d 1360 (1974).

 
 

[¶10.]  Appellants also assert in their brief 
that "Prior to Kevin Noonan's death, OSHA began citing drilling contractors for 
failing to guard the kelly bushing. Nonetheless, Joy consciously decided not to 
manufacture guards for the equipment or to warn against its use without guards." 
This argument is misleading when viewed in context with all relevant facts. 
While it is true that federal OSHA rules and regulations require kelly bushing 
guards and failure to use such may result in a citation, Wyoming OHSA rules 
specifically exempt the "rotary table, kelly and cathead" from guard 
requirements. Wyoming Occupational Health and 
Safety Rules and Regulations for Oil and Gas Drilling, Ch. 5, § 1(7). 
In a letter addressed to appellants' counsel dated July 1, 1981, Donald D. 
Owsley, Administrator for the Wyoming Occupational Health and Safety Commission, 
revealed that the Wyoming Occupational Health and Safety Rules and Regulations 
"do not require guarding of the rotary table, the kelly bushing, or the kelly. 
In fact, the rules specifically exempt such equipment from guarding." 
Furthermore, the Wyoming OHSA rules and regulations are controlling over federal 
OSHA rules and regulations once the secretary of labor determines that a state 
has promulgated standards comparable to the federal OSHA and has an enforcement 
plan in compliance with Section 18 of the Federal Occupational Safety and Health 
Act of 1970. Therefore, the Wyoming OHSA rules and regulations are controlling 
in this case and the Wyoming OHSA regulations do not require kelly bushings. An 
investigation into the accident was made by the Wyoming Occupational Health and 
Safety Department and such concluded there had been no violations of applicable 
rules and regulations which contributed to the fatality.

 
 

[¶11.]  In any event, it is difficult to find any 
alleged negligence on the part of Joy or Dresser to have been the cause of the 
injuries and death here when the deceased's employer, Brinkerhoff-Signal, chose 
not to use such guards on its drilling rig. It matters not what Joy and Dresser 
did or failed to do regarding bushing guards when their utility and safety were 
in question by the industry as a whole, Wyoming OHSA regulations specifically 
exempted such guards, and Brinkerhoff-Signal refused to use them. Furthermore, 
Joy and Dresser manufactured only component parts which were assembled as part 
of the oil rig by another party. Joy and Dresser had no control over the manner 
in which the drilling rig was constructed nor did they have anything to do with 
a decision concerning the assembly of safety features. We find summary judgment 
was proper with respect to Joy and Dresser.

 
 
II

 
 

[¶12.]  Appellants' second issue basically asks 
whether summary judgment in favor of Texaco was proper. Appellants' wording of 
the issue is argumentative and makes assertions of fact which have never been 
proved.

 
 

[¶13.]  Brinkerhoff-Signal was in the course of 
drilling an oil well for Texaco when the accident occurred. The relationship of 
Brinkerhoff-Signal to Texaco was that of independent contractor. The agreement 
between these two parties is clear evidence of such relationship, which 
specifically provided:

 
 
"17. INDEPENDENT 
CONTRACTOR:

 
 
"17.1 In the performance 
of the work herein contemplated, Contractor is an independent Contractor, with 
the authority to control and direct the performance of the details of the work, 
TEXACO being interested only in the results obtained. But the work contemplated 
herein shall meet the approval of TEXACO and be subject to the general right of 
inspection and supervision herein provided to TEXACO to secure the satisfactory 
completion thereof. The actual performance and superintendence of all work 
hereunder shall be by Contractor, but TEXACO shall be privileged to designate a 
representative or representatives who shall at all times have access to the 
premises for the purpose of observing tests or inspecting the work performed by 
Contractor, in order to judge whether, in TEXACO's judgment, such work is being 
performed by Contractor in accordance with the provisions of this contract and 
the Drilling Bid Contract. Such representative or representatives shall be 
empowered to act for TEXACO in all matters relating to Contractor's performance 
of the work herein undertaken."

 
 

[¶14.]  In Wyoming, the overriding consideration in 
determining whether one is an employee or independent contractor is dependent 
upon whether or not the employer has the right to control the details of the 
work whereby liability is sought to be established. Scott v. Fagan, Wyo., 684 P.2d 805 (1984); Combined Insurance Company of 
America v. Sinclair, Wyo., 584 P.2d 1034 (1978); Brubaker v. Glenrock 
Lodge International Order of Odd Fellows, Wyo., 526 P.2d 52 (1974). The determination of 
such issue is ordinarily one of fact for the trier of fact, but becomes one of 
law when only one reasonable inference can be drawn. Combined Insurance Company of 
  America 
 v. Sinclair, 
supra; and Barnes v. Fernandez, Wyo., 
526 P.2d 983 (1974).

 
 

[¶15.]  While it is true that a contract is not 
conclusive evidence of the status of the relationship between parties, it is a 
strong indication of the intended association. In Combined Insurance Company of America v. 
Sinclair, supra, at p. 1044, this court stated:

 
 
"We should say - perhaps 
in emphasis - that the most telling evidence indicating the intention of the 
parties with respect to the type of association they contemplated is the 
contract of employment itself * * *."

 
 
In Parsons v. Amerada Hess Corporation, 422 F.2d 610, 611 (10th Cir. 1970), the court stated: "While the contract is not 
conclusive evidence of the legal relationship of the parties, it is to be sure 
cogent evidence of it." In this case, Texaco's supervisory role was result 
oriented so as to insure satisfactory performance of the work. Such a role is 
common between owners and independent contractors. Texaco did not retain the 
power to control the activities of the driller, 
Brinkerhoff-Signal.

 
 
"* * * [T]he owner may 
retain a broad general power of supervision and control as to the results of the 
work so as to insure satisfactory performance of the independent contract - 
including the right to inspect, [citation] the right to stop the work, 
[citation] the right to make suggestions or recommendations as to details of the 
work, [citation] the right to prescribe alterations or deviations in the work, 
[citation] - without changing the relationship from that of owner and 
independent contractor or the duties arising from that relationship. * * *" McDonald v. Shell Oil Company, 44 Cal. 2d 785, 285 P.2d 902, 904 (1955).

 
 
See also Peter v. Public Constructors, 368 F.2d 111 (3rd Cir. 1966).

 
 

[¶16.]  In Sword v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 251 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1958), the court found an employee of an independent contractor 
engaged to drill an oil well for Gulf Oil could not hold Gulf liable for 
injuries sustained in a drilling rig accident. The employee was injured when his 
foot and leg got caught in the revolving clutch of the rig which had no guard. 
The court found that Gulf could not be held liable for the injury since its 
relationship to the driller was that of independent contractor and since Gulf 
was only interested in the results of the work. The court 
stated:

 
 
"As has been noted, * * * 
the contract provided that in the performance of the work the contractor was an 
independent contractor with the authority to control and direct the performance 
of the details of the work, and that Gulf was interested only in the results 
obtained. The contract continued: `But the work contemplated herein shall meet 
the approval of Gulf and be subject to the general right of inspection herein 
provided to Gulf to secure the satisfactory completion thereof.' That degree of 
right of supervision and control was clearly reserved for the benefit of Gulf 
itself, in its legitimate concern for the protection of its investment and 
properties and the satisfactory completion of the well. * * * That degree of 
right of supervision and control was not inconsistent with the relationship 
between Gulf and its independent drilling contractor as such, and did not impose 
on Gulf any direct duty to the employees of its independent contractor, in the 
absence of actual control of the operations by Gulf or its employees." 
Id., at 833.

 
 
Accord, Hurst v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 251 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 
1958), reh. denied, 254 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied 358 U.S. 827, 79 S. Ct. 44, 3 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1958).

 
 

[¶17.]  
A case involving similar facts recently arose in Simpson v. Home 
Petroleum Corporation, 770 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1985). In that case, a 
drilling rig crew member brought action against the oil and gas lessee and the 
lessee's drilling consultant for injuries he received in an accident involving 
the kelly. The plaintiff-employee alleged that the lessee (Home Petroleum) was 
responsible for the drilling consultant's (Weems') acts through a master-servant 
relationship. After trial to a jury, the jury found the relationship to be that 
of an independent contractor. On appeal the Fifth Circuit discussed burden of 
proof at length, and upheld the jury verdict finding an independent contractor 
relationship.

 
 
"Home 
offered evidence indicating that Weems acted as an independent contractor, for 
whom Home would not be responsible. It established that Weems billed for his 
services on a monthly basis and, unlike the company men, that Home did not take 
out deductions from his pay-check. It also introduced an expert witness who 
testified that consultants like Weems work independently of rig operators such 
as Home. On cross-examination, however, the expert testified that a drilling 
consultant has somewhat less discretion than a drilling foreman to vary from 
Home's instructions in the well prognosis. All in all, this evidence tends to 
establish an employer/independent contractor relationship between Home and 
Weems.

 
 
* * * * * *

 
 
"Finally, as we have noted, the existence of a 
master-servant relationship is a necessary part of the plaintiff's case when 
recovery is sought on a respondeat superior theory, and in that regard `the 
essential inquiry is whether or not the employer has the contract right to 
control the opposite contracting party in the details of the work to be 
performed.' [Citation.] Such a right to control is a prerequisite of the 
master-servant relationship. Conversely, the absence of such a right of control 
is a prerequisite of an independent contractor relationship. Master-servant and 
independent contractor are thus opposite sides of the same coin; one cannot be 
both at the same time with respect to the same activity; the one necessarily 
negatives the other, each depending on opposite answers to the same right of 
control inquiry. * * *" Id., at 501, 506-507.

 
 

[¶18.]  
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Texaco filed the affidavit 
of Charlie Cruth, employed by Brinkerhoff-Signal, who testified that the daily 
operations of drilling the well for Texaco were left up to Brinkerhoff-Signal. 
The power to hire and fire employees on the rig belonged to 
Brinkerhoff-Signal.

 
 

[¶19.]  
In opposition to Texaco's motion for summary judgment, appellants filed, 
among other things, the affidavit of John Butters, an engineer. Mr. Butters 
claimed the drilling rig in question was in violation of federal OSHA 
regulations regarding the proper safety color codes. However, Mr. Butters did 
not state exactly how the drilling rig parts in apparent violation of the safety 
color codes should have been colored. Such allegation is not totally clear, and 
what we have said previously regarding the applicability of federal OSHA 
regulations is applicable here. Mr. Butters further stated that in his opinion 
the absence of bushing guards was a violation of industry standards. Such 
allegation is not persuasive since we have already noted that the safety and 
benefit of such guards were in controversy within the oil drilling industry.

 
 

[¶20.]  
Appellants also relied upon the affidavit of Raymond F. Tyler, a company 
man from Texaco, who opined that he personally would not allow an oil rig to 
operate without a kelly bushing guard in place. But such seems inconsequential 
since we have already determined that Texaco's relationship with the driller was 
that of an independent contractor, and Texaco exercised no control over the 
performance of the details of the driller's work.

 
 

[¶21.]  
It is claimed that because Texaco retained the right to inspect and 
require safe equipment, material and supplies and to require replacement if 
deemed unsafe, that such destroyed the asserted independent contractor status. 
Paragraph 3.21 of the contract between Texaco and Brinkerhoff-Signal 
provided:

 
 
"3.21 
TEXACO shall have the right from time to time to inspect and examine the 
drilling equipment, material and supplies furnished by Contractor and if found 
inadequate or unsafe for the work required to be done, Contractor shall at once 
replace the article or articles with articles deemed by TEXACO to be adequate 
and safe for such work."

 
 

[¶22.]  
We do not think such a provision destroys the independent contractor 
relationship. We think an owner who undertakes to see that an independent 
contractor operate in a safe manner ought not be penalized. The reservation of a 
right to require safe equipment, material, and supplies to be used by the 
contractor is not without justification or reason. The owner has a vital 
interest in assuring himself that his well will be drilled efficiently, in a 
good workmanlike manner, at a reasonable cost, and that the final result is as 
good as possible. Good, safe equipment is a substantial factor in insuring that 
performance. But, a simple reservation of a right to inspect and secure that 
benefit does not cause the contractor to become the owner's employee, for the 
owner has not taken over the details of safety with respect to the contractor's 
employees.

 
 

[¶23.]  
The contractor still accepts and reviews applications for employment, 
determines who to hire, presumably knows which potential employees have accident 
records and their past employment history. The contractor-employer is 
responsible for safety training of his employees and for training them in the 
performance of their work. He provides safety equipment and manuals and retains 
the right to discipline or even discharge them for unsafe practices. The details 
of safety being in control of the contractor rather than Texaco, it is apparent 
to us that Texaco's minimal, and we feel necessary, involvement in safety did 
not result in the contractor becoming Texaco's employee so that Texaco became 
liable to appellant under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

 
 

[¶24.]  
One authority has stated:

 
 
"It 
is apparent that virtual abrogation of the general doctrine of an employer's 
nonliability for acts of an independent contractor or the latter's servants 
would result if the law were to predicate, under all circumstances, the 
existence of an absolute duty on the employer's part to guard against all 
accidents, probable as well as improbable, that might happen, to the damage of 
third persons, while stipulated work is being performed by an independent 
contractor. If, therefore, recovery is sought on the ground that an employer 
should have adopted certain precautionary measures for the purpose of preventing 
the injury complained of, the action must fail unless the plaintiff can at least 
show that in view of the nature of the work and the conditions under which it 
was to be executed, the defendant should have foreseen that the actual 
catastrophe which occurred was likely to happen if those precautionary measures 
were omitted. * * *" 41 Am.Jur.2d Independent Contractors § 35, p. 795 
(1968).

 
 

[¶25.]  
Indeed, it may be negligent for an owner to fail to provide that an 
independent contractor perform his work in a safe manner:

 
 
"One 
who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should 
recognize as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk 
of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to 
liability for physical harm caused to them by the absence of such precautions if 
the employer

 
 
"(a) 
fails to provide in 
the contract that the contractor shall take such precautions, or

 
 
"(b) 
fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some other manner for the taking 
of such precautions." (Emphasis added.) Restatement (Second) of Torts § 413 
(1965).

 
 

[¶26.]  
We agree with the district court's disposal of Texaco's motion for 
summary judgment wherein it stated:

 
 
"It 
seems obvious to me that Texaco had nothing to do with the accident. Obviously, 
Brinkerhoff-Signal, as the driller, was an independent contractor of Texaco who 
had no control over Brinkerhoff's employees. * * *"

 

[¶27.]  
We find summary judgment was also proper with regard to Texaco in that 
appellants also failed to establish any genuine issue of material fact. We think 
it clear that the relationship between Brinkerhoff-Signal and Texaco was that of 
independent contractor and that appellants failed to support their allegations 
of negligence on the part of Texaco.

 
 

[¶28.]  
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

 
 

THOMAS, C.J., 
specially concurs.

 
 

ROSE, J. 
(Retired), dissents.

 
 

THOMAS, 
Chief Justice, specially concurring.

 
 

[¶29.]  
In the briefs and oral arguments Holdaway v. Gustanson, 546 F. Supp. 231 (D.C. Wyo. 
1982), rev'd sub nom. Holdaway v. Amoco Production Co., 751 F.2d 1129 (10th 
Cir. 1984), was cited to us. As the opinion of the court in this case 
demonstrates, the Honorable Ewing T. Kerr, Senior Judge, United States District Court for the 
District of Wyoming, accurately discerned the law of the State of Wyoming, and applied it in Holdaway v. 
Gustanson, supra. It seems to me appropriate to note that it was he who 
successfully predicted the rule in the State of Wyoming applicable to a contract 
like that involved in this case, and that the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit should not have reversed his decision.

 
 

ROSE, 
Justice, dissenting.1

 
 

 [¶30.] 
I will dissent from that part of the majority opinion which upholds the 
district court's granting of summary judgment to Texaco.

 
 
INTRODUCTION

 
 

[¶31.]  
The majority opinion erroneously affirms the summary-judgment disposition 
of the suit between plaintiffs-appellants and Texaco, Inc. Not only is there - 
at the very least - a question of material fact on the issue of whether 
Brinkerhoff-Signal, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Brinkerhoff) was - in the safety aspects 
of its agreement with Texaco where liability is being asserted - an 
independent contractor or an employee, but it seems clear to me that, as a 
matter of controlling precedential law, Brinkerhoff was a servant of and under 
the detailed control of Texaco which control Texaco, in practice, exercised with 
respect to the safety features of its relationship with contract drillers.

 
 

[¶32.]  
In the first place, it is hard to read the majority opinion and remain 
aware that we are involved in contemplating a summary-judgment question, since a 
plethora of relevant material and competent testimony and contract evidence 
constituting issues of material fact in the safety area, where liability is 
being asserted, is everywhere. Even so, the majority ignore our well-established 
summary-judgment law and affirm the trial court's granting of the summary 
judgment in behalf of Texaco.

 
 
Summary-Judgment Review Standards

 
 

[¶33.]  
In Greaser v. 
Williams, Wyo., 703 P.2d 327, 332 (1985), 
we said:

 
 
"Our 
review of these questions is governed by the fundamental rule that summary 
judgment properly issues only upon the dual findings that no genuine question of 
material fact exists and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Rompf 
v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc., Wyo., 685 P.2d 25 (1984); Matter of Estate of 
Brosius, Wyo., 683 P.2d 663 (1984). To 
determine the propriety of a summary judgment, we must examine the record in the 
light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was entered 
and give to that party the benefit of all inferences which properly can be drawn 
from the available evidence. Rompf v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc., 
supra. If we find that an inquiry into the facts was necessary for the proper 
application of the law, we must overturn the summary judgment. Kimbley v. City of 
Green River, 
Wyo., 642 P.2d 443, 446 
(1982),"

 
 
and:

 
 
"Summary judgment is not available where the parties 
dispute the facts which explain and give meaning to their agreement. Weaver v. Blue 
Cross-Blue Shield of Wyoming, Wyo., 609 P.2d 984, 989 (1980)." 
703 P.2d  at 334.

 
 
Issues of Material Fact Are Present in the Case

 
 

[¶34.]  
In the case at bar, the contract between Texaco and Brinkerhoff provides 
that, in the area 
where safety is a factor, it is Texaco that controls, supervises and makes 
the ultimate decisions and, according to Texaco's field supervisor, it is Texaco 
which possesses the final decision-making power to shut the drilling operation 
down if, in its judgment, Texaco's safety requirements are not being complied 
with. These powers and authorities are exemplified by the contract and the 
conduct of the parties including the field supervisor for Texaco. It is worth 
noting that the retention of these powers and authorities is neither denied by 
the parties nor refuted by the evidence in the case. Paragraph 3.21 of the 
contract provides:

 
 
"3.21 TEXACO shall have the right from time to time to inspect 
and examine the drilling equipment, material and supplies furnished by 
Contractor and if found inadequate or unsafe for the work required to be done, 
Contractor shall at once replace the article or articles with articles deemed by 
TEXACO to be adequate and safe for such work." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶35.]  
The paragraph of the contract between Texaco and Brinkerhoff upon which 
the majority rely to reach their result is:

 
 
"17. 
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR:

 
 
"17.1 In the performance of the work herein contemplated, Contractor 
is an independent Contractor, with the authority to control and direct the 
performance of the details of the work, TEXACO being interested only in the 
results obtained. But the work contemplated herein shall meet the 
approval of TEXACO and be subject to the general right of inspection and 
supervision herein provided to TEXACO to secure the satisfactory completion 
thereof. The actual 
performance and superintendence of all work hereunder shall be by Contractor, 
but TEXACO shall be privileged to designate a representative or representatives 
who shall at all times have access to the premises for the purpose of observing 
tests or inspecting the work performed by Contractor, in order to judge whether, 
in TEXACO's judgment, such work is being performed by Contractor in accordance 
with the provisions of this contract and the Drilling Bid Contract. Such 
representative or representatives shall be empowered to act for TEXACO in all 
matters relating to Contractor's performance of the work herein undertaken." 
(Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶36.]  
It is perfectly clear to me that this independent-contractor provision 
pertains to the drilling requirements - i.e., "the performance of the 
work herein contemplated" and the field representative, under this provision, is 
given access to the premises to inspect the "work [of drilling the well]" so 
that Texaco may be informed, throughout the drilling operation, whether or not 
"such work" is being performed "in accordance with the provisions of this 
contract and the Drilling Bid Contract." This provision therefore contemplates 
that Brinkerhoff will remain an independent contractor in its relations with 
Texaco with respect to the performance of the work contemplated by the drilling 
requirements of the contract and the bid agreement, while reserving to Texaco 
the right to inspect and inquire so as to make certain that the drilling is 
being performed in accord with the agreements of the parties. This was the 
interpretation of the Texas federal court when this self-same provision was 
under consideration in Sword v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 251 F.2d 829 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied 358 U.S. 824, 79 S. Ct. 41, 3 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1958), a case upon which 
the majority place great reliance. The Federal 
District Court for the Western District of Texas said 
in Sword:

 
 
"As 
has been noted * * * the contract provided that in the performance of 
the work the contractor was an independent contractor with the authority to 
control and direct the performance of the details of the work, and that Gulf was 
interested only in the results obtained. The contract continued: `But the work 
contemplated herein shall meet the approval of Gulf and be subject to the 
general right of inspection herein provided to Gulf to secure the satisfactory 
completion thereof.' That degree of right of supervision and control was clearly 
reserved for the benefit of Gulf itself, in its legitimate concern for the 
protection of its investment and properties and the satisfactory completion of 
the well." (Emphasis added.) 251 F.2d  at 833.

 
 
But, 
the Sword case 
does not even consider a contract provision comparable to ¶ 3.21 of the 
Brinkerhoff-Texaco agreement wherein the principal retains control over the 
details of the safety factors of the drilling operation.2 For my part, I 
would be willing to concede that a contract which included the ¶ 17.1 language 
and excluded the 
¶ 3.21 language would compel the same results as those reached in Sword v. Gulf Oil 
Corporation, supra, and its companion case, Hurst v. Gulf Oil 
Corporation, 251 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.), reh. denied 358 U.S. 827, 79 S. Ct. 44, 
3 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1958). In other words, as was said in Hurst:

 
 
"* * 
* In the absence of 
any actual control of the operation, or of any reserved right of control more 
than that deemed necessary to secure the satisfactory completion of the work, 
an employer of an independent contractor owes no duty to the contractor's 
employees to inspect or to supervise the installation or operation of the 
machinery furnished by the contractor." (Emphasis added.) 251 F.2d  at 838.

 
 

[¶37.]  
In the case at bar, there is a "reserved right of control more than that 
deemed necessary to secure the satisfactory completion of the work"; namely, 
such control over the safety features of the work as that expressed in ¶ 
3.21.

 
 

[¶38.]  
With respect 
to the safety of the equipment, the OSHA regulation requirements and the 
parties' safety obligations to each other and third persons - the area with 
which we are concerned in this appeal - Texaco, under ¶ 3.21, retained the right 
to supervise the safety program, demand compliance with OSHA regulations and 
require part and equipment replacement. According to the field supervisor for 
Texaco, this separate reservation of authority permits Texaco to shut down the 
drilling operation if - in Texaco's judgment - its safety requirements are not 
complied with. The presence of these authorities and powers constitutes 
sufficient evidence of a retention of the right to control the details of the 
work in the area of safety - the area where liability in this case is sought to be 
established - so that the ravages of a summary judgment should not have been 
imposed. Holdaway v. 
Amoco Production Company, 751 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1984), discussed 
infra.

 
 

[¶39.]  
Not only does ¶ 3.21 of the agreement contemplate that Texaco will retain 
the right to control the details of the safety features of the drilling 
operation, but further evidence of the intention of the parties in this respect 
is to be found in the testimony of Raymond Tyler, Texaco's field supervisor. He 
explains that, in those instances where he has observed safety violations while 
this and identical contractual arrangements have been in effect, it has been his 
duty to inform the drilling contractor's tool pusher and request that he correct 
the problem - but if the tool pusher did not comply, it was Tyler's duty and 
habit to report the safety infraction to upper Texaco management who would then 
impose Texaco's demands upon the upper management of the drilling contractor. 
Tyler testified that he had been 
instructed to take care of these infractions as soon as possible according to 
these procedures. The field supervisor went on to explain that he had, at 
various times, admonished the contractor about safety infractions. When asked if 
Texaco gave him the power to stop an operation that he found unsafe, he 
testified:

 
 
"A 
Upper management stops them.

 
 
"Q 
All you do is report to upper management?

 
 
"A 
Right.

 
 
"Q 
And upper management of Texaco, if they want to, can stop the work?

 
 
"A 
Yes.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
"Q 
(By Mr. Meyer) You yourself had no power to stop the contractor from proceeding 
with his work if you saw that he was breaking the OSHA regulations? "Mr. 
Greenlee: Asked and answered. He has already answered that question.

 
 
"Q 
(By Mr. Meyer) That's true though, isn't it?

 
 
"A 
That's true.

 
 
"Q 
You had to rely upon the reporting system that Texaco had set up before anything 
could be done to stop the operation; is that true?

 
 
"A 
To a sense.

 
 
"Q 
Tell me why.

 
 
"A 
Within the operation, if I am having these type of problems and I call up and 
recommend, you know - I guess there is kind of a vaguity here of what powerless 
means. See? I mean, as far as me saying shut the rig down.

 
 
"Q 
You can't do it?

 
 
"A I 
don't have that type of authority.

 
 
"Q 
You have the authority to call your boss?

 
 
"A I 
call management, and I say: These are the - this is the situation, and I 
recommend, and then they say yes/no.

 
 
"Q 
They make a decision based upon whatever they want to do?

 
 
"A 
Right."

 
 
Raymond Tyler testified that he would not permit the 
drilling operations to proceed in circumstances where he believed unsafe 
conditions existed. In this connection he said that he believed the 
controversial bushing guards to be an important safety factor and he would not 
permit a rig to operate without them. He testified as follows:

 
 
"Q. 
Would you require that the rig stop operation until the guard could be placed or 
would you permit it to be operated until one could be obtained, under your 
procedures as you understand it?

 
 
"A. 
Are you asking me for a personal - what I personally would do from my own 
viewpoint?

 
 
"Q. 
Yes, sir.

 
 
"A. I wouldn't let them 
operate.

 
 
"Q. 
Because you know now that it would be unsafe - or potentially unsafe to operate 
the rig without a Kelly guard; isn't that true?

 
 
"A. 
Can I explain why?

 
 
"Q. 
Sure.

 
 
"A. 
First of all, there would be no need for me to delay drilling operations because 
there is no Kelly bushing guard. Okay? If the rig starts to move in, there are 
multitudes of things to do, and I would go to the tool pusher and say, you know: 
You don't have a bushing guard, so, therefore, before we pick the Kelly up - and 
there has been many things to do prior to that - I would suggest to him or ask 
him to be sure that there was a Kelly guard on it or a bushing guard.

 
 
"Q. 
Is one of the 
reasons that you would insist that the guard be in place before they could 
operate because of your knowledge that it might be a safety hazard?

 
 
"A. I would say yes.

 
 
"Q. 
The reason that you person - the thing that taught you personally that it was 
unsafe or potentially unsafe to operate a rig without a Kelly bushing guard was 
Kevin Noonan's death?

 
 
"A. 
Yes." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

Tyler 
also testified that it was his responsibility to take care of known safety 
problems "as soon as possible" and that he was supposed to make sure that they 
were corrected.

 
 
THE 
LAW

 
 

[¶40.]  
The irony of the majority opinion is this: It first quotes the 
"independent contractor" paragraph, ¶ 17.1 of the contract - does not even 
acknowledge the existence of ¶ 3.21, which is the paragraph which pertains to 
the aspect of the agreement with respect to which the appellant seeks to hold 
Texaco liable - and then, having quoted an inapplicable provision of the 
contract, proceeds to test it against the right rules of contract law. For 
example, after quoting ¶ 17.1, and having failed to mention ¶ 3.21, the majority 
say:

 
 
"While it is true that a contract is not conclusive 
evidence of the status of the relationship between parties, it is a strong 
indication of the intended association. In Combined Insurance 
Company of America v. Sinclair, [infra at] 1044, this court stated:

 
 
"`We 
should say - perhaps in emphasis - that the most telling evidence indicating the 
intention of the parties with respect to the type of association they 
contemplated is the contract of employment itself * * *.'

 
 
"In 
Parsons v. Amerada 
Hess Corporation, 422 F.2d 610, 611 (10th Cir. 1970), the court stated: 
`While the contract is not conclusive evidence of the legal relationship of the 
parties, it is to be sure cogent evidence of it.'" 584 P.2d  at 1044.

 
 

[¶41.]  
I would be the last to question these rules of law since it was I who 
authored Combined 
Insurance Company of America v. Sinclair, Wyo., 584 P.2d 1034 (1978), but 
the majority abuse their appellate license when they apply the contract rules of 
Combined Insurance and Amerada Hess to a provision of the contract which is 
inapplicable and irrelevant to the issue at hand. The question for decision in 
this case is whether or not there is a material fact presented on the issue of 
whether Texaco retained control of and exercised control over the safety features of 
the contract - not 
the drilling operation features!!

 
 

[¶42.]  
In deciding whether Brinkerhoff was an independent contractor or an 
employee of Texaco in the safety area of their relationship, the test is whether 
or not Texaco retained the right to control the details of the aspect of the 
work which caused plaintiff's injury. As the majority indicate, the law on this 
subject has been carefully reviewed by this court in Combined Insurance Company 
of America v. Sinclair, supra, but - to the great misfortune of the appellant - 
Combined Insurance has been misapplied by the majority in the case at bar. The 
question of whether or not a person is an independent contractor or an employee 
is to be resolved by ascertaining whether or not the employer (or principal) 
has

 
 
"* * 
* the right to 
control [emphasis in original] the details of the work whereby liability is 
sought to be established. [Emphasis added.] Stockwell v. 
Morris, 46 Wyo. 1, 22 P.2d 189." 584 P.2d  at 
1042.

 
 
Thus, in Combined Insurance, we held that the base issue is 
whether the principal retained the right of control over the activity where 
liability is sought to be established, citing Brubaker v. Glenrock 
Lodge Int'l Order of Odd Fellows, Wyo., 526 P.2d 52 (1974); Tyler v. Jensen, 75 
Wyo. 249, 295 P.2d 742 (1956); Fox Park Timber Co. v. 
Baker, 53 Wyo. 467, 84 P.2d 736, 120 A.L.R. 1020 (1938); Stockwell v. Morris, 46 Wyo. 1, 22 P.2d 189 (1933); 
Chatelain v. 
Thackeray, 98 Utah 525, 100 P.2d 191 (1940); and Ludlow v. Industrial Commission, 65 Utah 168, 235 P. 884 (1925). See 
also 41 Am.Jur.2d, Independent Contractors §§ 5 and 7. We held that this issue 
of retained control and right of control in the area where liability is sought 
to be established is ordinarily a question of fact, rather than one of law. We 
said:

 
 
"* * 
* This issue is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury and becomes a 
question of law only when but one reasonable inference can be drawn. Barnes v. Fernandez 
[infra], and Tyler v. Jensen, 75 Wyo. 249, 295 P.2d 742, 749. More 
particularly, the extent to which an [employer] has the `right to control' is 
primarily a jury question. Holly Sugar Corporation v. Perez, 
Wyo., 508 P.2d 595, 598." 584 P.2d  at 1042.

 
 

[¶43.]  
In Barnes v. 
Fernandez, Wyo., 526 P.2d 983, 985 (1974), 
we said:

"The 
determination of whether the relationship of master and servant exists is 
ordinarily one of fact to be determined by the jury and it is only where the 
pertinent facts are not in dispute and but one reasonable inference could be 
drawn that the question becomes one of law for the courts to decide, Tyler v. Jensen, 75 
Wyo. 249, 295 P.2d 742, 749; 57 
C.J.S. Master and Servant § 617, p. 408; and it is only when the conduct of an 
employee is shown clearly to be either within or beyond the scope of his 
employment that such determination can be made as a matter of law. Sun Land & Cattle 
Co. v. Brown, Wyo., 394 P.2d 387, 390."

 
 

[¶44.]  
In Stockgrowers' Bank of Wheatland v. Gray, 24 Wyo. 18, 154 P. 593 (1916), and 
notwithstanding the terms of a contract between the bank and its builder in 
which the parties provided that the builder's status was that of an independent 
contractor, and where it appeared that the bank actually retained control of the 
details of the work over which liability was sought to be established, we 
held:

 
 
"* * 
* [T]he bank did in fact retain control and supervision of the work, any 
negligence resulting in injury would be imputable to the bank." 154 P.  at 
596.

 
 

[¶45.]  
In resolving the question which asks whether Texaco retained the right to 
control the details of the work where liability is sought to be established, we 
must do two things: (1) decide where it is that liability is sought to be 
established, and (2) apply the relevant evidence which is the most favorable to 
the appellant and give it every favorable inference. Combined Insurance 
Company of America v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d  at 1042 n. 2, citing Rissler and McMurry 
Company v. Atlantic Richfield Company, Wyo., 559 P.2d 25 (1977), and Kahler v. Martin, 
Wyo., 570 P.2d 720 (1977).

 
 
Where Is the Liability That Is Sought To Be 
Established?

 
 

[¶46.]  
In May of 1933 this court published Stockwell v. 
Morris, 46 Wyo. 1, 22 P.2d 189, in which the issue was whether a Maytag washing machine salesman was, 
when he had an accident on the highway injuring another, a servant of Maytag 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. It is in this opinion that Justice 
Blume established the rule that right of control is the test and, in 
ascertaining whether this right is present, the courts must direct their 
attention to

 
 
"* * 
* that portion of the employment directly connected with the factor by reason of 
which liability is sought to be established. It would not do, we think, to 
pursue the shadow, leaving the substance out of consideration." 22 P.2d  at 
193.

 
 

[¶47.]  
Justice Blume called up the statement from Tentative Draft No. 5 of the 
Restatement of the Law of Agency, p. 100, as one of the best expressions of the 
rule:

 
 
"`A 
principal employing another to achieve a result but not controlling the details 
of his physical movements is not responsible for incidental negligence while 
such person is conducting the authorized transaction. Thus the principal is not 
responsible for the negligent physical conduct of an attorney, a broker, a 
factor or a rental agent, as such. In their movements and their control of 
physical forces, they are in the relation of independent contractors to the 
principal. It is only when to the relationship of principal and agent there is 
added that right to control physical details as to the manner of performance, 
which is characteristic of the relation of master and servant, that the person 
in whose service the act is done, becomes subject to liability for the physical 
conduct of the actor.'" 22 P.2d  at 194.

 
 

[¶48.]  
In reaching a decision in Stockwell, Justice Blume analyzed the evidence for 
purposes of deciding whether Maytag had retained the right to control the manner 
its agent actually operated the vehicle - and found that no such control was 
retained by the principal - and none could be implied. In arriving at this 
conclusion, this court looked at the contract between Maytag and Morris and 
found no provision for retention of the right to control the manner in which 
Morris operated the vehicle and that the other evidence did not reveal any basis 
from which it could be inferred that Maytag had retained such right of 
control.

 
 

[¶49.]  
In the case at bar, we have no need to rely upon inference to identify 
the area where the issue must be resolved. Paragraph 3.21 of the contract 
between Brinkerhoff and Texaco and the testimony of the Texaco field supervisor 
make clear that, while Brinkerhoff remained an independent contractor as to the 
drilling of the well under ¶ 17.1 and other provisions of the agreement, Texaco 
retained and exercised the right of detailed supervisory control of the safety 
features of the contract which is the area where liability was sought to be 
established in this case.

 
 

[¶50.]  
It is my contention that the majority misidentify the liability area over 
which Texaco retained control and the right to control the details of the work 
relationship. The majority look to the ¶ 17, independent-contractor provision of 
the contract to support the conclusion that Brinkerhoff is an independent 
contractor. Having quoted ¶ 17, "Independent Contractor," the majority say:

 
 
"In 
Parsons v. Amerada 
Hess Corporation, 422 F.2d 610, 611 (10th Cir. 1970), the court stated: 
`While the contract is not conclusive evidence of the legal relationship of the 
parties, it is to be sure cogent evidence of it.' In this case, Texaco's 
supervisory role was result oriented so as to insure satisfactory performance of 
the work. Such a role is common between owners and independent contractors. 
Texaco did not retain the power to control the activities of the driller, 
Brinkerhoff-Signal.

 
 
"`* 
* * [T]he owner may retain a broad general power of supervision and control as 
to the results of the work so as to insure satisfactory performance of the 
independent contract - including the right to inspect, [citation] the right to 
stop the work, [citation] the right to make suggestions or recommendations as to 
details of the work, [citation] the right to prescribe alterations or deviations 
in the work, [citation] - without changing the relationship from that of owner 
and independent contractor or the duties arising from that relationship. * * *' 
McDonald v. Shell 
Oil Company, 44 Cal. 2d 785, 285 P.2d 902, 904 (1955)." 584 P.2d  at 1042.

 
 

[¶51.]  
I would disagree with the majority's application of these and other 
quoted and cited "independent contractor" case holdings, for the reason that 
Texaco, in the case at bar, did retain control and right of control over the safety 
aspects of the drilling operation - these were not the "`broad general 
power[s]'" contemplated by McDonald v. Shell Oil Company, 44 Cal. 2d 785, 285 P.2d 902 (1955); Sword v. 
Gulf Oil Corporation, supra; Hurst v. Gulf Oil Corporation, supra, and the retained 
control does not fall within the classification of "`the right to inspect * * *, 
the right to stop the work * * *, the right to make suggestions or 
recommendations as to the details of the work'" and "`the right to prescribe 
alterations or deviations in the work'" that are contemplated in McDonald v. Shell Oil 
Company. In the case at bar, we are talking about the retention of control 
of the details of the safety features including Texaco's right to shut down 
operation if Brinkerhoff does not comply with them. We are not talking about 
the overall drilling contractual obligations of the parties, and the majority 
opinion does not even attempt to address this compelling and overriding 
question.

 
 

[¶52.]  
It is difficult to contemplate, but nonetheless true, that the majority 
have chosen to completely ignore a case which is, in every relevant aspect, exactly like the 
one at bar, which case was tried before the United States District Court of 
Wyoming, where an independent-contractor relationship was found to exist and the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under a contract and 
facts which are identical with those at bar, there was an issue of fact as to 
whether the driller was a servant or an independent contractor.

 
 

[¶53.]  
In Holdaway 
v. Amoco Production Company, 751 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1984) (the style of 
the case in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals), reversing Holdaway v. 
Gustanson, 546 F. Supp. 231 (D.C.Wyo. 1982), a motorman who was employed by 
the driller, CWS, was injured and sued Amoco, who had contracted for the 
drilling of the well. Plaintiff claimed various acts of negligence, including 
failure to correct safety hazards. Amoco contended that CWS was an independent 
contractor and therefore it had no liability to the contractor's employees. The 
United States District Court for Wyoming granted summary judgment. 
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the case was not one which qualified 
for summary judgment. The court said:

 
 
"The 
essential question in this case is whether CWS was an independent contractor of 
Amoco. This question turns on whether Amoco had in fact retained sufficient 
control over CWS's operations that it could not in law shield itself from 
liability for plaintiff's injury.

"There appears to be some question over whether the 
contract as written reserves such a right to Amoco. Regardless of whether the 
contract purports to make CWS an independent contractor, however, it will not 
protect Amoco if it may be inferred from facts and circumstances revealed by the 
evidence that the real relationship between Amoco and CWS was that of master and 
servant. McReynolds 
v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, 291 P.2d 341, 345 (Okla. 1955); Ulibarri Landscaping Material, Inc. v. Colony Materials 
Inc., 97 N.M. 266, 639 P.2d 75, 78 (1981); see also Stockwell v. Morris, 46 Wyo. 1, 22 P.2d 189 (1933) (issue 
in determining whether master-servant relationship exists is control or right to 
control). The extent to which Amoco actually retained the right to control is 
primarily a question of fact for the jury. Combined Insurance Co. 
of America v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034, 1042 (Wyo. 1978).

 
 
"Deposition evidence in the hearing for summary judgment 
clearly creates an issue of fact on the question of Amoco's control over the 
claimed hazardous situation that resulted in the plaintiff's injury. The 
following excerpt from the deposition of an Amoco employee, which was quoted to 
the judge during the hearing, is sufficient to create a factual question:

 
 
"`Q 
If you should observe on the well site violations of any rules, regulations, or 
laws that you know about, what procedure would you employ, what would you do 
about it?

 
 
"`A 
If it was along the line of safety of somebody working on there, I would tell 
them directly at the time. If there was a matter of safety of someone working on 
there. But if they was doing something unsafe, I'd go through the pusher, and if 
the pusher wasn't there I would talk to the driller on the job at the time.

 
 
"`Q 
What would you do if you observed an unsafe condition on or about the drilling 
rig?

 
 
"`A 
Get it corrected immediately.

 
 
"`Q 
How would you accomplish that?

 
 
"`A 
Just go through the tool pusher, and if he wasn't around, go to the driller.

 
 
"`Q 
You wouldn't shut down operations or anything of that nature, would you? 

 
 
"`A 
We'd shut down operations if it was necessary, yes, until it was corrected.

 
 
"`Q 
You have the authority to shut down operations -

 
 
"`A 
Oh, yeah.'

 
 
"Record, vol 6, at 22. Mr. Bates, the Amoco employee, 
clearly felt he had the right and the responsibility to correct unsafe 
conditions on the CWS drilling rig.

 
 
"The 
court below ruled that the contract did not give Amoco the right to control, but 
ignored the factual question, legitimately raised by the Bates deposition, of 
whether Amoco had in fact retained the right to control notwithstanding the 
contractual language. Plaintiff has carried his burden of showing that a genuine 
issue of fact exists on the question of Amoco's control, and summary judgment on 
this issue was improper.

"The 
decision is reversed and the case is remanded." 751 F.2d  at 1130-1131.

 
 

[¶54.]  
Before concluding, I would observe that, in my opinion, the majority 
erroneously find solace in Simpson v. Home Petroleum Corporation, 770 F.2d 499 
(5th Cir. 1985). Simpson was an appeal from a jury verdict in which the 
appellate court held that - under the facts of the case and, under the 
applicable law pertaining to burden of proof and persuasion - a trial court 
judgment upholding the jury's finding that an independent-contractor 
relationship was present should not be reversed. The issue before the appellate 
court was, therefore, whether the trial court had properly instructed the jury 
upon the parties' burden-of-proof and persuasion obligations as those burdens 
pertained to proving to and persuading the jury on the issue of master-servant 
and/or independent contractor. Therefore, Simpson - a jury-decision appeal - 
does not have anything to do with the case before this court - a 
summary-judgment decision appeal - except that it announces general rules of 
employee-employer and independent-contractor law with which I have no quarrel, 
and the precedential law of this court has no quarrel.

 
 
Based upon these authorities which clearly establish that, 
under the facts of record here, a genuine issue of material fact exists on the 
issue of Texaco's control and right of control over the safety aspects of the 
agreement between Texaco and Brinkerhoff, the summary judgment was erroneously 
granted and I would have reversed the trial court's summary judgment for 
Texaco.

 
 
 
 

1 
Even though I reach the same conclusion here, this opinion simply edits and 
reaffirms my dissenting opinion published in this appeal on September 6, 1985, 
prior to my retirement on November 1, 1985. This new dissent is necessitated by 
the majority's changing of their opinion, which is again revised and republished 
after publishing and circulating a purported final majority opinion to lawyers 
of the State of Wyoming in September of 1985.

 
 

2 In 
fact, in Sword, 
supra, 251 F.2d  at 831, the responsibility for the safety program is 
specifically assigned to the driller. The applicable provisions are:

 
 
"`Contractor shall maintain well control equipment in good 
condition at all times; shall test the blowout preventers at least once each 
tour by closing the rams; and shall test the master gate valve by closing same 
each time the drill pipe is pulled.'"

 
 
"`Contractor shall provide and have available at all times 
for use by Contractor's employees engaged in the performance of the work herein 
undertaken, all safety appliances needed for the maximum protection of 
Contractor's employee's [sic] against injuries.'"