Case Title: Taylor v. State

Citation: 294 So. 2d 648

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1974-05-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
294 So. 2d 648 (1974)
Joseph TAYLOR, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 44343.

Supreme Court of Florida.
May 15, 1974.
*649 Joseph A. Varon, Sp. Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
McCAIN, Justice.
The defendant, Joseph Taylor, was tried by a jury and found guilty of murder in the first degree. The jury subsequently returned a recommendation of mercy, but the trial judge imposed a sentence of death in the electric chair. The defendant thereupon appealed to this Court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, F.S.A.
The evidence presented at trial established that the defendant, in the company of two other males, entered a "package store" owned and operated by Larry Phillips and his 72 year old father, the decedent, Max Phillips. The defendant, with pistol in hand, jumped over the counter after ordering an employee and a customer to lie face-down on the floor. During an ensuing struggle between the defendant and Max Phillips, Larry Phillips drew a pistol from beneath the counter and shot the defendant in the abdomen. While Taylor was on the floor, Larry Phillips fired four more times into the body of the defendant.
Larry Phillips testified that he heard a shot strike the bottles on the shelf near him as he attempted to activate a silent alarm in the rear of the store. Other shots were fired, three of which struck and killed Max Phillips. The fatal shot was shown to have entered the body of the decedent on a downward trajectory. The pistol used by Phillips was shown to have not fired the bullets which killed the decedent. The weapon carried by the defendant, Taylor, was never located, nor was the murder weapon found. The defendant was later arrested after he was admitted for treatment at a near-by hospital.
At the commencement of the trial, an eighteen year old, female juror was selected. After the jury was sworn, a short recess was taken, at which time a reporter for the Fort Lauderdale News approached this young juror and requested an interview while she was in technical charge of the bailiff. The juror refused to even give her name because of the admonition earlier given by the trial judge. The reporter claimed that she had gotten permission from the judge during the recess to interview this juror if the case was not discussed. It was not until the judge came down the corridor and assured the juror that it would be permissible to answer some questions that the juror talked with the reporter. She then gave a few summary answers to general questions about her background and a photograph was taken. Subsequently an article appeared, headlined: "1st Teen Juror Draws Murder Trial." As to this incident, the appellant raises as error the trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial where:
Immediately after the jury returned its recommendation as to the sentence, the trial judge imposed the sentence stating:
*650 As to the immediacy of the imposition of sentence, appellant questions whether:
As to the first alleged error, appellant contends that Florida Statutes, Section 918.07 (1971) F.S.A., precludes the trial judge or any other person from contacting a juror except by leave of court given in open court with the defendant or his counsel present.
This statute specifically provides that:
However, this statute must be read in conjunction with other statutes, specifically: Fla. Stat. §§ 59.041 and 924.33 (1971), F.S.A. These statutes provide that no judgment may be overturned nor a new trial ordered where the error complained of did not injuriously affect the substantial rights of the appellant.
The "harmless error" statutes would apply if it could be determined from a reading of the record that the contact had no prejudicial effect on the juror. See Slinsky v. State, 232 So. 2d 451 (Fla.App. 1970). But unlike the Slinsky case, here, the trial judge held a hearing to determine the effect, if any, the contact with the reporter and the judge had upon the juror's determination. It is clear from her testimony that she had not discussed the case with the reporter or anyone else; had received only permission to talk with the reporter from the judge, with the added admonition not to discuss the case with her; had not read the article; and in fact testified that it had not affected her decision in any way.
"BY MR. HAND:
Appellant argues that Deans v. State, 180 So. 2d 178 (Fla.App. 1965) is controlling. In Deans, a prosecution witness, a policeman, gave a traffic ticket to one of the jurors and a subsequent conversation ensued between the judge and the juror concerning the effect of her receiving the traffic ticket. A new trial was ordered on the ground that even though there were no improper motives involved, lofty purposes are not sufficient to eliminate the prejudice which flowed from such actions. The same prejudice was the turning point in Lowdermilk v. State, 186 So. 2d 816 (Fla. App. 1966). However, in this case we find no such prejudice flowing from the conversation nor does the appellant demonstrate any which could be considered a denial of due process or equal protection.
As to this point we are bound by the "harmless error" statutes which state:
The trial judge was therefore correct in denying the motion for mistrial upon the showing of the absence of a specific fundamental or prejudicial error. See Perry v. State, 146 Fla. 187, 200 So. 525 (1941); Evers v. State, 280 So. 2d 30 (Fla.App. 1973).
As to appellant's second point, dealing with the rejection of the jury's recommendation of mercy and the immediate imposition of the death sentence, we must look to the language and intent of Florida Statutes Section 921.141, F.S.A., as amended by Chapter 72-724, Laws of Florida (1972). The pertinent part of that statute reads:
We are not unmindful that the trial judge heard all the evidence offered during the trial and that at the second hearing no additional evidence was advanced in aggravation, nor in mitigation. However, his immediate rejection of the jury's recommendation upon its return to the courtroom does not comport with the intent of the legislation.
From our reading of the record it appears that the trial judge in his haste to impose sentence may not have properly considered the mitigating circumstances enumerated by the statute and found in the record.
*652 The statute provides:
The record discloses that the appellant has no prior history of criminal activity. At the instant of firing the fatal shots, the appellant was on the floor with five .38 caliber bullets in his body, two of which are still in his body being lodged in close proximity to his spine. And finally, the fatal bullet entered the body of the deceased in a downward trajectory, which at least raises the possibility that the appellant had not fired the shot. This is additionally supported by the fact that no witness saw who in fact fired the fatal shot.
All of this taken together could have substantially impaired the rationality of appellant to the point where the jury, believing his complicity, nevertheless rejected the idea of the imposition of the ultimate penalty. We find no objection to the jury's determination.
Therefore, the order imposing the sentence of death be and the same is hereby reversed with directions to impose a sentence of life imprisonment in accordance with law and the recommendation of the jury.
Accordingly, this cause is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, C.J., ERVIN and BOYD, JJ., and HENDRY, District Court Judge, concur.
ROBERTS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
ROBERTS, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I concur in that part of the judgment which affirms the finding of guilt but I respectfully dissent from that part whereby this Court reduces the sentence from death to life imprisonment. Like the trial judge I find no mitigating circumstances in the record.