Case Title: People v. Scott

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84678

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1999-04-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
People v. Scott  (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket No. 84678-Agenda
11-September 1998.
Opinion filed April 15,
1999.
JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the
court:
The sole issue for consideration by this court is whether
a written waiver alone validly waives a defendant's right to a jury trial.
We hold that it does not.
Defendant executed a written jury waiver in his attorney's
office, which was later filed outside of defendant's presence.
Thereafter, on the day of trial and in defendant's presence, the following exchange occurred between
his attorney and the trial
judge:
Section 103-6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963
(Code) provides that a bench trial may be held if the right to trial by
jury is "understandingly waived by defendant in open court." (Emphasis added.) 725
ILCS 5/103-6 (West 1992). Section 115-1
of the Code further provides that a waiver of jury trial should be in writing. 725 ILCS 5/115-1 (West
1992). Reading these
provisions together, this court recently held that failure to file a written jury waiver does not require
reversal "so long as the
defendant's waiver was made understandingly in accordance with section 103-6 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure." (Emphasis
added.) People v. Tooles, 177 Ill. 2d 462, 468 (1997). Thus, a defendant validly waives
his right to a jury trial only if made (1)
understandingly; and (2) in open court. 725 ILCS 5/103-6 (West 1992).
We have never found a valid jury waiver where the
defendant was not present in open court when a jury waiver, written or
otherwise, was at least discussed. The State, however, argues that the references on the day of trial
to proceeding with a bench
trial constituted an acknowledgment of the waiver in open court. In People v. Frey, 103 Ill. 2d 327, 332 (1984), this court held
that an accused typically speaks and acts through his attorney, and a jury waiver is valid when "made
by defense counsel in
defendant's presence where defendant gave no indication of any objection to the court hearing the
case." Frey, 103 Ill. 2d  at 332.
However, the court also specifically noted that the defendant in Frey "was present at
some point prior to trial when the jury
waiver was discussed." Frey, 103 Ill. 2d  at 333. In the instant case, it is undisputed that
defendant was never present in open
court when a jury waiver was discussed.
Additionally, the written jury waiver here stated that
defendant had "until the last Thursday of December, 1994 to revoke this
waiver of jury trial." This language creates an inference that the jury waiver was irrevocable after the
last Thursday of December
1994. Thus, rather than find defendant's silence to be "acquiescence," as the court did in
Frey, we find defendant's silence here
may have been due to his belief that it was too late to revoke his jury waiver. Therefore, we cannot
presume defendant's silence
constituted a waiver in open court.
Finally, the significance of the references to proceeding
with a bench trial is not as great as the State suggests. The references
arose in a dialogue between defendant's attorney and the trial judge concerning a motion to dismiss.
The trial judge had not ruled
on the motion to dismiss as of the date of trial, and defendant's attorney agreed to allow the State two
weeks to present a written
response. From this context, it is clear that defendant's attorney, when stating he would proceed with
a bench trial, was merely
indicating that despite the pending motion to dismiss, defendant was ready to proceed. Consequently,
the statement was not
meant as an affirmative waiver, but instead as an indication to the court that defendant would proceed
with trial despite the
pending motion. Thus, the defendant never acknowledged the written jury waiver in open court,
either affirmatively or through
his silence.
For the reasons stated, we hold that defendant did not
validly waive his right to a jury trial in open court. Accordingly, the
judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the circuit court of Wayne County and
remanding the cause for further
proceedings (293 Ill. App. 3d 241) is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment
affirmed.
JUSTICE MILLER, specially concurring:
I concur. I agree with the majority's conclusion that the
circumstances in the present case fail to show that the defendant validly
waived his right to a jury trial. Notably, the jury waiver signed by the defendant stated that it could
not be revoked after a
specified date. Thus, the defendant's subsequent silence in open court, when both defense counsel and
the trial judge referred to
the impending proceeding as a bench trial, might not have represented acquiescence in the waiver,
and instead could have simply
been the product of the defendant's mistaken belief that he could no longer change his mind and
demand a jury trial. Under these
circumstances, I agree with the majority that the defendant did not validly waive his right to a jury
trial and that a new trial is
therefore warranted.
A different result would be required if the defendant's jury
waiver had not contained a deadline for its revocation and if the
defendant had later, in open court, remained silent when the waiver was mentioned. In that event, the
defendant's silence could
properly be construed as acquiescence. See People v. Frey, 103 Ill. 2d 327 (1984).
Finally, unlike Justice Bilandic and Chief
Justice Freeman, I do not believe that the majority abandons the totality-of-the-circumstances test,
as applied in Frey and other
cases, in assessing the validity of the present defendant's jury waiver.
JUSTICE BILANDIC, also specially
concurring:
I join in the majority's holding that defendant's jury waiver
was not valid and a new trial is warranted. The majority correctly
concludes that section 103-6 requires, at a minimum, that the defendant be present in open court
when the jury waiver is
discussed. Although adoption of this rule requires a new trial in this case, I believe that, in the long
run, this rule will reduce the
litigation of jury waiver issues in the reviewing courts and the number of reversals necessitated by
invalid waivers.
In arguing for reversal of the appellate court, the State
urges us to find that, based on the circumstances of this case, defendant
knowingly and understandingly waived his right to a trial by jury. The State cannot avoid section
103-6's explicit requirement
that the defendant waive a jury "in open court." The State therefore asserts that the trial judge's
mention of a "bench trial" in
defendant's presence was sufficient to constitute defendant's waiver of a jury "in open court," when
considered in light of the
other circumstances present in this case. In essence, the State asks us to define the "in open court"
requirement so broadly that it
may be gleaned from any number of circumstances. The problem with the State's approach is that it
gives no clear guidance to
the trial courts on this matter. Exactly what is required in any given case to comply with section
103-6 is not defined. Without a
clear requirement for the trial courts, however, reviewing courts would be faced with numerous
assertions of invalid waivers. In
contrast, the simple requirement which the majority has adopted here-that the defendant, at a
minimum, be present in open court
when the jury waiver is discussed-provides the trial courts with a clearly defined minimum standard
for this situation. That
requirement was not satisfied in this case, and a new trial is therefore warranted. In light of the
majority's holding, however, I
trust that this situation will not arise with any frequency in the future and judicial economy will, in
the end, be served. This court
has previously acknowledged the efficacy of a clear rule on this issue:
" 'It takes but a few moments of a trial judge's time
to directly elicit from a defendant a response indicating that he understands
that he is entitled to a jury trial, that he understands what a jury trial is, and whether or not he wishes
to be tried by a jury or by
the court without a jury. This simple procedure incorporated in the record will reduce the countless
contentions raised in the
reviewing courts about jury waivers.' " People v. Chitwood, 67 Ill. 2d 443,
448-49 (1977), quoting People v. Bell, 104 Ill. App.
2d 479, 482 (1969).
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
I dissent.
The majority holds that a written waiver alone
does not waive a defendant's right to a jury trial. Slip op. at 1. I certainly agree
with that statement as a general legal principle; the proposition is quite established. See,
e.g., People v. Stokes, 281 Ill. App. 3d
972, 978 (1996); People v. Steiger, 208 Ill. App. 3d 979, 982 (1991); People v.
Lewis, 89 Ill. App. 3d 840, 844 (1980).
However, it cannot be the holding in this case because it does not fit the facts herein
presented. The State expressly contends:
The majority
opinion overlooks the totality of the circumstances in this case. A defendant waives the right to a jury
trial only if
made understandingly in open court. 725 ILCS 5/103-6 (West 1992). "That determination cannot rest
on any precise formula
and necessarily turns on the facts and circumstances of each particular case." People v.
Frey, 103 Ill. 2d 327, 332 (1984) (and
cases cited therein).
In this case, defendant: (1) signed a clear and detailed
written jury waiver (293 Ill. App. 3d at 243-44), and (2) was in court and
failed to object when his defense counsel indicated that he was prepared to proceed with a bench trial.
"Recognizing that the
accused typically speaks and acts through his attorney, we have given effect to jury waivers made by
defense counsel in
defendant's presence where defendant gave no indication of any objection to the court hearing the
case." Frey, 103 Ill. 2d  at 332
(collecting cases); accord People v. Smith, 106 Ill. 2d 327, 334 (1985). Courts have
held that a defense counsel's single
affirmative statement either that defendant waives a jury (e.g., People v.
Murrell, 60 Ill. 2d 287, 290 (1975); People v. Sailor, 43 Ill. 2d 256, 260 (1969)) or requests a bench trial (e.g., People v. Pozdoll,
230 Ill. App. 3d 887, 892 (1992); People v. Tucker,
183 Ill. App. 3d 333, 334-35 (1989); People v. Burton, 121 Ill. App. 3d 182, 183-84
(1984)) constituted a valid jury waiver since
defendant was in the courtroom and failed to object. Frey, 103 Ill. 2d  at
332.
Also, the record shows that defendant is not
unsophisticated or uneducated. Defendant was 53 years old at the time of his arrest.
He had completed two years of high school and had taken GED classes. He had police training and
for two years was a deputy
for the emergency services and disaster agency in Wayne County. Further, defendant had two
previous DUI convictions. This fact
indicates that he has some knowledge of the justice system generally and of this type of case
particularly. Thus, based on the facts
and circumstances of this case, I believe that defendant's jury waiver was knowingly and
understandingly made.
Whether a defendant understandingly waived a jury trial
is best determined based on all of the unique circumstances of that
particular case. Courts have long required a totality-of-the-circumstances test (e.g.,
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 278, 87 L. Ed. 268, 274, 63 S. Ct. 236, 241 (1942)), which was codified in section 103-6
of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963. 725 ILCS Ann. 5/103-6, Committee Comments-1963, at 197 (Smith-Hurd 1992)
("This paragraph codifies
*** the case decisions"). Justice Bilandic's special concurrence correctly describes the majority
opinion as adopting a new
interpretation of section 103-6, which replaces the totality-of-the-circumstances test.
In this case, I would hold that defendant understandingly
waived a jury trial, and I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
Accordingly, I dissent.