Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V HEATHER ANNE BEARSS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 115665

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 17, 2001  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 115665  
HEATHER ANNE BEARSS,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
KELLY, J.  
After reversing defendant's conviction for obtaining  
money by false pretenses,1 the Court of Appeals remanded this  
case to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment on  
a cognate offense. We granted leave to consider the  
constitutionality of this remedy. After deliberation, we find  
that the appellate court's directed verdict violates the Due  
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United  
1MCL 750.218; MSA 28.415.  
States Constitution. US Const, Am XIV.  
I  
Defendant Heather Anne Bearss and her friend, Tiffany  
Ruppert, visited Glen's Market and Horizon Video in the  
Petoskey area. The two women selected a substantial quantity  
of merchandise from each store and paid with checks written by  
Ms. Ruppert and drawn against her bank account.  
The next day, Ms. Ruppert reported that the checks had  
been lost or stolen. The police investigated and questioned  
both Ms. Ruppert and defendant. Ms. Ruppert confessed her role  
in the transactions, agreeing to testify against defendant in  
exchange for a plea agreement.  
Defendant was charged with two counts of taking over $100  
by false pretenses. At the jury trial, Ms. Ruppert testified  
that she and defendant mutually had devised the plan to write  
checks for merchandise,  report them as stolen, and then stop  
payment on them. She told the jury that, after they made their  
purchases, they went to defendant's home where defendant's  
boyfriend burned the carbon copies of the checks. According to  
Ms. Ruppert, defendant knew that Ms. Ruppert planned to report  
the checks lost or stolen. She testified that the two women  
wrote the checks in order to obtain merchandise without paying  
for it.  
The court instructed the jury on the elements of false  
pretenses over $100, as well as those of the cognate offense  
2  
of writing three nonsufficient funds checks within ten days.  
MCL 750.131a(2); MSA 28.326(1)(2). The jury found defendant  
guilty of one count of taking by false pretenses over $100.  
Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed her  
conviction, finding insufficient evidence to support a  
conviction of taking by false pretenses. Unpublished opinion  
per curiam, issued July 16, 1999 (Docket No. 209568), pp 2-3.2  
The panel remanded the case to the trial court, instructing it  
to enter a judgment of conviction for writing three  
nonsufficient 
funds 
checks in a ten-day period. The prescribed  
term of imprisonment for this crime is less than that for  
obtaining money by false pretenses.  
Judge Murphy wrote separately. He raised concerns over  
the constitutionality of remanding with instructions to enter  
a judgment of conviction on a cognate offense. The jury, he  
noted, never determined that defendant was guilty of the  
lesser charge. The offense of writing three nonsufficient  
funds checks within a ten-day period has several elements  
differing from those of the false pretenses offense. Judge  
Murphy opined that the Court of Appeals remedy encroached on  
defendant's right not to be convicted except upon proof beyond  
a reasonable doubt of committing the crime charged, citing In  
2The prosecutor did not appeal from the Court of Appeals 
finding that insufficient evidence of taking by false  
pretenses had been presented at trial. Thus, we have no 
occasion to review that ruling today.  
3  
 
 
re Winship, 397 US 358; 90 S Ct 1068; 25 L Ed 2d 368 (1970),  
and People v Goss, 446 Mich 587, 596; 521 NW2d 312 (1994).  
Despite his reservations, Judge Murphy joined his  
colleagues in remanding the case for entry of judgment on the  
cognate offense. He did so because this Court had employed the  
same 
remedy 
in 
several 
cases.3
 
If 
the 
remedy 
is  
unconstitutional, Judge Murphy felt, it is this Court rather  
than the intermediate appellate court that should make that  
decision.4  
We granted leave to determine whether an appellate court  
may instruct a trial court to enter judgment on a cognate  
offense on which a jury did not render a verdict. We find that  
the 
appellate 
court's 
practice 
in 
this 
case 
was 
unconstitutional. 
II 
The crimes of writing three nonsufficient funds checks  
within ten days is a cognate offense of taking by false  
3Judge Murphy cited the following cases where the 
Michigan Supreme Court remanded for entry of conviction on a 
lesser charge: People v Brager, 406 Mich 1004; 280 NW2d 826 
(1979), People v Kamin, 405 Mich 482; 275 NW2d 777 (1979), 
People v Van Wyck, 402 Mich 266; 262 NW2d 638 (1978), and 
People v Thomas, 399 Mich 826; 249 NW2d 867 (1977).  
4A previous panel of the Court of Appeals similarly 
questioned the constitutionality of remanding for entry of 
judgment on a cognate offense. People v Goliday, 153 Mich App 
29, 35-37; 394 NW2d 476 (1986). Like Judge Murphy, the judges 
in Goliday declined to find unconstitutional a practice this 
Court had previously employed. The parties in Goliday did not  
seek leave from this Court to appeal from the ruling.  
4  
pretenses over $100.5 This Court has characterized cognate  
offenses as "allied offenses of the same nature." People v  
Jones, 395 Mich 379, 387; 236 NW2d 461 (1975). A cognate  
offense has some elements in common with the charged offense.  
It also has elements not found in the charged offense. Id.  
By 
contrast, 
all the elements of a necessarily considered  
lesser offense are contained within those of the greater  
offense. Thus, "it is impossible to commit the greater without  
first having committed the lesser." Id., citing 4 Wharton,  
Criminal Law & Procedure, § 1799.  
The elements of taking by false pretenses are:  
(1) a false representation as to an existing 
fact; (2) knowledge by the [accused] of the falsity 
of the representation; (3) use of the false  
representation with an intent to deceive; and (4) 
detrimental reliance on the false representation by 
the victim. [In re People v Jory (Genesee  
Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge), 443 Mich 403, 
412; 505 NW2d 228 (1993).]  
The elements of writing three nonsufficient funds checks  
within ten days, as found in the standard jury instructions,  
are:  The accused (1) wrote three separate checks, drafts, or  
money orders within ten days; (2) did not have sufficient  
funds available in the bank to cover them; (3) knew that he  
did not have sufficient funds available; and (4) when he  
5A cognate offense may or may not carry smaller penalties 
than those of the crime charged. Today's opinion applies to 
all offenses that may be characterized as cognate offenses of 
the offense charged, not merely "lesser cognate offenses."  
5  
 
 
 
wrote or delivered each of the checks, drafts, or money  
orders, intended to defraud or cheat someone. See CJI2d 29.8.  
It is possible to commit the crime of taking by false  
pretenses without writing three nonsufficient funds checks  
within a ten-day period. Hence, the offense of writing  
nonsufficient funds checks is not necessarily included within  
the offense of taking by false pretenses. Both offenses  
involve an intent to defraud someone; therefore they are  
cognate offenses.  
This 
Court 
discussed 
necessarily 
included 
lesser 
offenses  
and cognate lesser offenses in People v Chamblis, 395 Mich  
408; 236 NW2d 473 (1975).6 Chamblis considered whether a trial  
judge may instruct a jury about lesser offenses on its own  
motion. We held that the late addition of a charge of a  
necessarily included lesser offense does not infringe a  
defendant's right to due process. Id. at 417. The ability to  
defend 
against 
the 
prosecutor's charges is not impaired, since  
the accused is required to defend against the same evidence as  
when charged with only the greater offense.  
6In People v Robert Stephens, 416 Mich 252, 260-261; 330 
NW2d 675 (1982), this Court overruled Chamblis in part on 
grounds unrelated to the present case. Specifically, we 
overruled 
Chamblis' 
adoption 
of 
the 
"misdemeanor 
cutoff 
rule," 
which provided that a jury should be instructed on lesser 
included offenses if the evidence supported them.  If the  
charged offense is punishable by incarceration for over two 
years, the rule continued, a court may not instruct on lesser 
included offenses carrying sentences under one year. See 
Chamblis, supra at 429.  
6  
 
 
However, the addition of a cognate offense may require an  
accused to present additional or different defenses to rebut  
the 
evidence 
the 
prosecutor offers on the additional elements.  
Id. at 418. Due process concerns may arise if the judge,  
alone, decides to instruct the jury on a cognate offense.  
Chamblis 
illustrates 
the 
constitutional 
difficulties 
that  
arise when cognate offenses are equated with necessarily  
included lesser offenses. The remedy under consideration in  
this case activates those difficulties. It fails to recognize  
that the prosecutor was obliged to prove different elements in  
order to obtain a conviction of the cognate offense.  
III  
The state may not "deprive any person of life, liberty or  
property, without due process of law . . . ." US Const, Am  
XIV. In serious criminal cases, a trial by jury is guaranteed.  
US Const, Am VI. The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is  
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus, applies to  
the states. Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145, 156; 88 S Ct 1444;  
20 L Ed 2d 491 (1968).  
Together, 
the 
Sixth 
and 
Fourteenth 
Amendments  
"indisputably entitle a criminal defendant to 'a jury  
determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the  
crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.'"  
Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466, ___; 120 S Ct 2348, 2356;  
147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000). In cases where the defendant invokes  
7  
 
the right to a trial by jury, "the jury, not the judge,  
renders the verdict." People v Duncan, 462 Mich 47, 54; 610  
NW2d 551 (2000).7  
The remedy employed by the Court of Appeals in this case  
runs afoul of these constitutional principles. As discussed  
above, cognate offenses contain elements not found in the  
charged offense. When a jury has rendered a verdict on the  
charged offense, it has not necessarily rendered one on a  
cognate offense. It may have left the additional elements of  
the cognate offense unaddressed.  
In the case under consideration, the Court of Appeals  
effectively directed a guilty verdict on the additional  
elements of the cognate offense. A court may not direct a  
verdict of guilty, either in whole or in part. Goss, supra at  
596-597, ns 12 & 13. Although the jury convicted defendant of  
taking by false pretenses, an appellate court may not assume  
that the jury would have found her guilty of an offense  
comprised of different elements.  
For example, the offense of writing nonsufficient funds  
checks within ten days requires a finding that the defendant  
knew sufficient funds were not available in the account. The  
7Duncan found structural error requiring reversal when a 
jury was not instructed regarding any of the elements of the 
crime charged. Id. at 54. When a jury is not informed of  any 
of the elements, it cannot fulfill its function of rendering 
a reliable verdict. Id. at 54-55.  
8  
 
offense of taking by false pretenses does not require this  
element. Did defendant know that the account did not contain  
sufficient funds? Since the jury never ruled on the cognate  
offense, we do not know if it discounted her claim that she  
did not know and favored Ms. Ruppert's testimony that she did.  
The jury easily could have based its verdict on evidence of  
defendant's plan to falsely report the checks as stolen and  
stop payment. The Due Process Clause requires that the trier  
of fact, rather than an appellate court, decide whether  
defendant knew that the account lacked sufficient funds.  
IV  
The constitutional analysis differs when the lesser  
offense is one necessarily included within the greater. See  
Chamblis, supra. Unlike a verdict on a cognate offense, a  
jury's 
verdict 
regarding 
a 
necessarily 
included 
lesser 
offense  
always is encompassed in the verdict on the greater offense.  
Thus, our opinion today does not impede an appellate court  
from remanding for entry of judgment of a necessarily included  
lesser offense. The United States Supreme Court has approved  
the use of this remedy in cases "when a conviction for a  
greater offense is reversed on grounds that affect only the  
greater offense." Rutledge v United States, 517 US 292, 306;  
116 S Ct 1241; 134 L Ed 2d 419 (1996).  
9  
 
V  
In the past, we have remanded for entry of conviction on  
a lesser cognate offense. Five cases in which that occurred  
are People v Billy Stephens, 407 Mich 402; 285 NW2d 664  
(1979), People v Brager, 406 Mich 1004; 280 NW2d 826 (1979),  
People v Kamin, 405 Mich 482; 275 NW2d 777 (1979), People v  
Van Wyck, 402 Mich 266; 262 NW2d 638 (1978), and People v  
Thomas, 399 Mich 826; 249 NW2d 867 (1977).  However, all five  
cases are distinguishable.8  
In each of them, the trial court failed to give a  
requested instruction on a cognate lesser offense. The jury  
returned a guilty verdict on a greater offense for which there  
was sufficient evidence. The appellate court determined that  
the failure to instruct was error, and remanded for entry of  
a conviction on the cognate lesser offense, a remedy that had  
been requested. Given the juries' findings of guilt on the  
greater offenses, the defendants in those cases could not  
argue plausibly that the juries' consideration of the cognate  
lesser offenses would have led to acquittals.  
Conversely, in the instant case, the appellate court's  
remedy cannot fairly be said to have benefited defendant.  
Where, as here, a conviction on the greater offense was  
secured on insufficient evidence, a defendant might argue  
8Because they are distinguishable, we make no comment on 
their continued viability.  
10  
persuasively that the jury might have acquitted on the cognate  
offense, as well.  To permit appellate courts to direct a  
conviction on cognate offenses is to invite violations of the  
right to a jury determination of every element of the crime  
charged. Hence, we find these five cases inapposite.  
Conclusion  
Before today, we have not taken the occasion to address  
the constitutionality of directing convictions on cognate  
offenses 
when 
insufficient evidence of the charged offense had  
been admitted at trial. In light of our analysis, we now  
disavow the practice with rare exceptions. We hold that, if  
an appellate court determines that insufficient evidence was  
presented to support a conviction, it may not direct a  
conviction on a cognate offense on remand unless (1) there was  
sufficient evidence to support a conviction of the lesser  
offense and (2) the appellate court can unequivocally state  
that the jury's verdict must have included a specific finding  
of every element necessary to support a conviction of the  
cognate offense.9  
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part.  
The prosecutor did not appeal from the Court of Appeals  
determination that there is insufficient evidence to support  
9To the extent that People v Chappelle, 114 Mich App 364; 
319 NW2d 584 (1982), conflicts with our holding today, it is 
overruled.  
11  
 
 
 
the jury's verdict on the charge of taking by false pretenses.  
Therefore, we leave that aspect of the opinion intact. We  
vacate the instruction to the trial court to enter a judgment  
of conviction on the lesser cognate offense of writing three  
nonsufficient 
funds 
checks within a ten-day period. The matter  
is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings  
consistent with this opinion.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and  
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with KELLY, J.  
12