Case Title: State v. Juergen Huebner

Citation: 2000 WI 59

Docket Number: 1998AP002470-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
2000 WI 59 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-2470-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Juergen Huebner,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  223 Wis. 2d 803, 589 N.W.2d 457 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 20, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
March 1, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Clare L. Fiorenza 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BRADLEY AND SYKES, J.J., join dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there was 
a brief by Sally Day and Law Office of Sally Day, Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Sally Day. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Gregory M. Posner-Weber, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2000 WI 59 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-2470-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Juergen Huebner,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   The issue in this case is whether 
a defendant who did not object to the use of a six-person jury 
at 
his 
misdemeanor 
trial, 
as 
authorized 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 756.096(3)(am), may obtain a new trial in reliance on State v. 
Hansford's holding that § 756.096(3)(am) is unconstitutional.  
We conclude that he may not. 
I 
¶2 
On February 18, 1998, the defendant Juergen Huebner 
was tried and convicted of two misdemeanors in the Circuit Court 
for Milwaukee County, Clare L. Fiorenza, Judge.  The verdict in 
FILED 
 
JUN 20, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-2470-CR 
 
2 
Huebner's case was rendered by a six-person jury, under the 
authority of Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am)(1995-96).1   
¶3 
At the time of Huebner's trial, this court had 
accepted the court of appeals' certification of State v. 
Hansford, No. 97-0885-CR, on the question of whether the six-
person jury authorized by Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) violated 
art. I, § 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Huebner acknowledges 
that although Hansford was pending before this court at the time 
of his trial, he did not object to the use of a six-person jury 
at his trial.   
¶4 
On June 19, 1998, this court released its decision in 
State v. Hansford holding that the six-person jury authorized by 
Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) violated the jury trial guarantee of 
art. I, §  7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  State v. Hansford, 
219 Wis. 2d 226, 243, 580 N.W.2d 171 (1998). 
¶5 
On August 25, 1998, Huebner filed a notice of appeal. 
 Huebner's sole argument on appeal is that even though he did 
not object to the six-person jury at the time of his trial, 
Hansford applies retroactively to invalidate his conviction by a 
                     
1 Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am)(1995-96) provided, "[a] jury 
in misdemeanor cases shall consist of 6 persons."  Section 
756.096 has subsequently been repealed.  Essentially the same 
language has been reenacted as § 756.06(2)(am)(1997-98).  See 
Hansford, 219 Wis.2d at 229 n.2 (citing WI Order 97-2 (S. Ct. 
Order 96-08), 207 Wis. 2d xv). 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 volumes unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
98-2470-CR 
 
3 
six-person jury.  Huebner raises no other challenge to his 
conviction. 
¶6 
In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals 
rejected Huebner's request for a new trial.  State v. Huebner, 
No. 98-2470-CR, unpublished slip. op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 
1998).  The court of appeals concluded that Hansford only 
applies retroactively to cases in which the defendant objected 
to his trial by a six-person jury.  Id. at 3.  The court 
reasoned that although an increased number of jurors provides 
some numerical advantage to a defendant, that advantage did not 
warrant overturning an otherwise error-free trial when the 
defendant never objected to the six-person jury.  Id.  The court 
also 
rejected 
Huebner's 
argument 
that 
he 
had 
received 
ineffective assistance of counsel, because the court found no 
reasonable probability that a twelve-person jury would have 
produced a different outcome in Huebner's case.  Id. at 3 and 
n.2.  
¶7 
This court granted Huebner's petition for review. 
II 
¶8 
Huebner concedes that he made no objection to the use 
of a six-person jury at his trial.  Furthermore, Huebner has 
abandoned any claim that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Instead, Huebner now asserts that his trial counsel's 
assistance was neither incompetent nor deficient.  Nonetheless, 
Huebner claims that this court should grant him a new trial 
under Hansford.   
No. 
98-2470-CR 
 
4 
¶9 
To support this argument, Huebner relies primarily on 
the retroactivity analysis set forth in State v. Koch, 175 Wis. 
2d 684, 499 N.W.2d 152 (1993).  In Koch, this court adopted the 
retroactivity analysis that the United States Supreme Court 
applies to cases on direct appeal.  Under this approach,  
 
'[A] new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions 
is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or 
federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, 
with no exception for cases in which the new rule 
constitutes a "clear break" with the past.' 
Koch, 175 Wis. 2d at 694 (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 
314, 328 (1987)). According to Huebner, this rule means that 
Hansford applies retroactively to his case. 
¶10 The flaw in Huebner's reasoning is that unlike the 
defendants in Koch, Griffith, and Hansford, Huebner made no 
constitutional objection at the trial court level.  It is a 
fundamental principle of appellate review that issues must be 
preserved at the circuit court.  Issues that are not preserved 
at the circuit court, even alleged constitutional errors, 
generally will not be considered on appeal.  State v. Caban, 210 
Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997).  The party who raises 
an issue on appeal bears the burden of showing that the issue 
was raised before the circuit court.  Id. at 604.   
No. 
98-2470-CR 
 
5 
¶11 We have described this rule as the "waiver rule,"2 in 
the sense that issues that are not preserved are deemed waived. 
 See id.; State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 766, 596 N.W.2d 
749 (1999).  The waiver rule is not merely a technicality or a 
rule of convenience; it is an essential principle of the orderly 
administration of justice.  Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, 
501 
U.S. 
868, 
894-95 
(1991) 
(Scalia, 
J., 
concurring)(citing 9 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 2472 at 455 (1971)).  The rule promotes both 
efficiency and fairness, and "go[es] to the heart of the common 
law tradition and the adversary system."  Caban, 210 Wis. 2d at 
604-05; see also Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 766.   
¶12 The waiver rule serves several important objectives.  
Raising issues at the trial court level allows the trial court 
to correct or avoid the alleged error in the first place, 
eliminating the need for appeal.  Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 766. 
 It also gives both parties and the trial judge notice of the 
issue 
and 
a 
fair 
opportunity 
to 
address 
the 
objection.  
Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 766.  Furthermore, the waiver rule 
encourages attorneys to diligently prepare for and conduct 
                     
2 We recognize that labeling this rule the "waiver rule" is 
imprecise.  It might be better to label the rule requiring issue 
preservation as the "forfeiture rule," because it refers to the 
forfeiture of a right by silence rather than the intentional 
relinquishment of a known right.  See United States v. Olano, 
507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993); Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, 
501 
U.S. 
868, 
894-95 
n.2 
(1991) 
(Scalia, 
J., 
concurring).  However, we have often referred to the issue 
preservation rule as the "waiver rule" in the past, and we do so 
here. 
No. 
98-2470-CR 
 
6 
trials.  Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 456 N.W.2d 797 
(1990).  Finally, the rule prevents attorneys from "sandbagging" 
errors, or failing to object to an error for strategic reasons 
and later claiming that the error is grounds for reversal.  
Freytag, 501 U.S. at 895; see also Vollmer, 156 Wis. 2d at 11.  
For all of these reasons, the waiver rule is essential to the 
efficient and fair conduct of our adversary system of justice. 
¶13 Huebner 
does 
not 
attempt 
to 
show 
that 
the 
constitutional issue he raises on appeal was raised below.  He 
concedes that at the trial court level he acquiesced in the 
application of Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) to his case.  
¶14 Instead, Huebner argues that he can circumvent the 
waiver rule because of constitutional considerations.  Although 
the 
waiver 
rule 
is 
an 
important 
principle 
of 
judicial 
administration, it does not apply to all defects in trial court 
proceedings.  Huebner points out that a criminal defendant has 
certain fundamental constitutional rights that may only be 
waived personally and expressly.  State v. Albright, 96 Wis. 2d 
122, 129-30, 291 N.W.2d 487 (1980).  These fundamental rights 
include the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to 
refrain from self-incrimination, and the right to have a trial 
by jury.  Id. at 130 (citations omitted).  Such rights cannot be 
forfeited by mere failure to object.  
¶15 Huebner argues that his right to a twelve-member jury 
falls within this category of rights.  He cites Albright's 
statement that "the decision whether to request a trial by jury" 
is a fundamental, personal right.  See Albright, 96 Wis. 2d at 
No. 
98-2470-CR 
 
7 
130.  Equating the right to a jury of twelve members with the 
right to a trial by jury, Huebner argues that he could not 
forfeit his right to a twelve-member jury in the absence of an 
express, personal waiver. 
¶16 Whether Huebner's waiver of his right to a twelve- 
member jury could only be made expressly and personally is a 
question 
that 
requires 
the 
application 
of 
constitutional 
principles.  We review such questions independently.  State v. 
Reitter, 227 Wis. 2d 213, 223, 595 N.W.2d 646 (1999).   
¶17 As Albright states, the right to a jury trial is a 
fundamental constitutional right that may only be waived 
personally and expressly.  However, Huebner has not lost his 
right to a jury trial.  A trial by six jurors is not equivalent 
to no jury trial at all.  Huebner received an otherwise fair and 
error-free trial by six jurors.   
¶18 Nothing in Hansford suggests that having a six-person 
jury trial is equivalent to having no jury trial at all.  
Hansford did not state that a six-person jury is procedurally 
unfair 
or 
that 
it 
is 
an 
inherently 
invalid 
factfinding 
mechanism.  Hansford only held that a six-person jury trial is 
not consistent with the historical meaning of the right to a 
jury trial under art. I, § 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d at 249.  The court reached this conclusion 
based on a careful examination of the history of the Wisconsin 
Constitution and this court's longstanding interpretation of the 
right to trial by jury in art. I, §§ 5 and 7.  Id. at 242-43.   
No. 
98-2470-CR 
 
8 
¶19 We find nothing in Hansford to support the conclusion 
that the difference between a six-person jury trial and a 
twelve-person jury trial is so fundamental that a six-person 
jury trial, which was conducted without objection under the 
express authority of a statute, is automatically invalid.  
¶20 Our conclusion on this point may appear to conflict 
with State v. Cooley, 105 Wis. 2d 642, 645-46, 315 N.W.2d 369 
(Ct. App. 1981).  See also State v. Wingo, 2000 WI 31, ¶ 16, 233 
Wis. 2d 467, 609 N.W.2d 162 (discussing Cooley).  However, we 
conclude that Cooley does not apply to Huebner's case. 
¶21 The defendant in Cooley was on trial for second-degree 
sexual assault.  Cooley, 105 Wis. 2d at 643.  During the trial, 
one of the jurors announced that she knew the victim's mother, 
who was a witness in the case.  Id. at 644.  The judge examined 
the juror and concluded that the juror was not biased.  Id.  The 
judge therefore denied the defendant's motion to strike the 
juror and grant a mistrial.  Id.  However, the court gave the 
defendant's attorney the option of removing the allegedly biased 
juror and proceeding with an eleven-member jury.  Id.  Faced 
with these options, the defendant's attorney chose to proceed 
with the eleven-member jury.  Id.   
¶22 On appeal, the defendant argued that because he did 
not personally and expressly waive his right to a full jury of 
twelve 
members, 
the 
eleven-member 
jury 
violated 
his 
constitutional right to a jury trial.  Id.  The court of appeals 
agreed and concluded that the procedural safeguards for waiver 
of a trial by jury apply equally to waiver of a full jury of 
No. 
98-2470-CR 
 
9 
twelve members.  Cooley, 105 Wis. 2d at 645-46.  Because the 
defendant did not personally waive his right to a twelve-member 
jury, the court of appeals reversed the defendant's conviction. 
 Id. at 646. 
¶23 Unlike the six-person jury in Huebner's case, the 
eleven-member jury in Cooley was not authorized by any statute. 
 Instead, Cooley involved a statutorily deficient trial to which 
the defendant's attorney agreed in order to avoid an allegedly 
biased juror.   
¶24 We agree with Cooley's holding that when the trial 
court itself has induced a defendant to give up his statutory 
and 
constitutional 
right 
to 
a 
twelve-member 
jury, 
the 
defendant's waiver must be made personally and expressly.  See 
also Wingo, 2000 WI 31 at ¶ 17.  However, we do not think that 
the same procedure must be followed when a statute authorizes a 
jury of fewer than twelve members.  In Huebner's case, a 
recently enacted statute expressly authorized a six-person jury. 
 We conclude that under these limited circumstances, Huebner's 
failure to object to the use of a six-person jury can function 
as a waiver of his constitutional objection. 
¶25 We also reject Huebner's undeveloped argument that his 
trial by a six-person jury violated the procedural due process 
guarantees of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.  As 
Hansford noted, a six-person jury trial is entirely consistent 
with the United States Constitution.  Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d at 
241-42 and n.14 (citing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 
(1970)).  In addition, Hansford's invalidation of Wis. Stat. 
No. 
98-2470-CR 
 
10
§ 756.096(3)(am) was not based on the procedural due process 
guarantee of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Huebner has not 
established that his six-person jury trial provided him with 
insufficient 
due 
process 
under 
the 
federal 
or 
state 
constitutions. 
¶26 We hold that the waiver rule applies to Huebner's 
constitutional objection to the use of a six-person jury at his 
trial.  By failing to raise his objection to the use of a six-
person jury, Huebner forfeited his right to a twelve-person 
jury. 
III 
¶27 Of course, even when the waiver rule applies, this 
court may nevertheless exercise its discretionary power to 
reverse the judgment and grant a new trial in the interests of 
justice.  Huebner urges this court to exercise its discretionary 
power to reverse his conviction and apply Hansford to his case 
retroactively. 
¶28 Appellate courts have the power to consider issues 
raised for the first time on appeal.  See Vollmer, 156 Wis. 2d 
at 13; Caban, 210 Wis. 2d at 609.  Under Wis. Stat. § 751.06, 
this court may exercise its discretion to reverse a circuit 
court judgment (1) whenever it is probable that justice has for 
any reason miscarried, or (2) whenever the real controversy has 
not been fully tried.  
¶29 Huebner argues that we should reverse his conviction 
because his case is analogous to State v. Benzel, in which the 
court of appeals applied a decision of this court retroactively 
No. 
98-2470-CR 
 
11
to reverse a defendant's conviction.  State v. Benzel, 220 Wis. 
2d 588, 583 N.W.2d 434 (Ct. App. 1998).   
¶30 Benzel is not analogous to Huebner's case.  Benzel was 
"convicted of a charge based on a statute that has been found 
constitutionally invalid," the drug tax stamp law.  Benzel, 220 
Wis. 2d at 591.  Thus, Benzel's conviction represented a 
miscarriage of justice; his conviction was based on conduct that 
could not constitutionally be punished.  Id. at 592.  In 
contrast, Huebner does not challenge the statutes under which he 
was convicted.  He asks us to overturn his conviction because of 
a procedural defect to which he did not object at the time of 
trial.  
¶31 We agree with the court of appeals that the procedural 
defect that Huebner complains of does not warrant reversal of 
his conviction.  The use of a six-person jury rather than a 
twelve-person jury did not undermine the fundamental integrity 
of Huebner's trial.  See Huebner, unpublished slip op. at 3 n.1. 
 Rather, "this case concerns the application of a constitutional 
principle that 'does not affect the basic accuracy of the 
factfinding process at trial.'"  Id. (quoting Benzel, 220 Wis. 
2d at 592).  We conclude that the interests of justice do not 
require us to exercise our discretionary power to reverse 
Huebner's conviction. 
¶32 Instead, the interests of justice in this case demand 
adherence to the rule that objections that are not raised at the 
trial court will not be considered on appeal.  This case 
No. 
98-2470-CR 
 
12
demonstrates why the waiver rule is essential to the efficiency 
and fairness of the judicial process.   
¶33 Wisconsin Stat. § 756.096(3)(am), the statute that 
authorized six-person jury trials in misdemeanor cases, was 
enacted on June 7, 1996.  1995 Wis. Act 427.  Thus, the statute 
had been in effect for only 20 months at the time of Huebner's 
trial.  As Hansford explained, the statute directly contradicted 
this court's long-standing interpretation of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  See Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d at 237-241.  Hansford 
and other defendants challenged the constitutionality of the 
statute, and the court of appeals certified the question in 
Hansford to this court on December 11, 1997.  This court 
accepted certification of Hansford certification on January 23, 
1998, approximately one month before Huebner's trial.   
¶34 Under these circumstances, Huebner had a strong basis 
for objecting to the constitutionality of his trial by a six-
person jury under Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am).  If Huebner had 
raised such an objection before his trial, the trial judge 
easily could have decided to empanel a twelve-person jury and 
obviate the risk that the six-person jury's verdict would be 
invalidated on appeal.  Huebner's failure to object deprived the 
trial court of the opportunity to avoid this error.  Proceeding 
on the reasonable assumption that Huebner did not object to the 
use of a six-person jury in his case, the trial court provided 
Huebner with a full, fair, and otherwise error-free trial by a 
six-person jury.   
No. 
98-2470-CR 
 
13
¶35 To invalidate Huebner's trial, and the trials of all 
those other defendants who were convicted by six-person juries 
under the authority of Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) without 
objection, would result in a tremendous waste of judicial 
resources. 
 
Because 
Huebner 
has 
not 
established 
that 
a 
miscarriage of justice has occurred or that the real controversy 
in his case was not tried, we decline to exercise our 
discretionary power to reverse his conviction by a six-person 
jury. 
IV 
¶36 In conclusion, we hold that Huebner forfeited his 
right to a twelve-person jury when he failed to object to the 
use of a six-person jury at his misdemeanor trial.  We also 
decline to exercise our discretionary power to reverse Huebner's 
conviction.  We therefore affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
 
 
98-2470-CR.dtp 
 
1 
¶37 DAVID T. PROSSER, J. (concurring).   In 1996 the 
Wisconsin legislature passed a statute mandating six-person 
juries in misdemeanor cases.  Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) (1995-
96).  In 1998 this court held the statute unconstitutional as a 
violation of art. I, § 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  State 
v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 230, 580 N.W.2d 171 (1998). 
¶38 This case is one of many in which six-person juries 
convicted defendants of crimes before announcement of the 
Hansford decision.  Juergen Huebner seeks to overturn his 
conviction on the grounds that trial by a six-person jury 
deprived him of a fundamental constitutional right.  The 
majority rejects his request, holding that the defendant waived 
his right to a twelve-person jury by failing to make a timely 
objection. 
¶39 I agree with the result here but for different 
reasons.  In my view, the defendant is not entitled to a new 
trial because the statute authorizing six-person juries in 
misdemeanor cases was constitutional at the time his case was 
tried.  The Hansford decision was a serious mistake and should 
be overruled. 
I 
¶40 On July 13, 1787, Congress approved "An Ordinance for 
the Government of the Territory of the United States Northwest 
of the River Ohio."  The "Northwest Ordinance" provided 
principles to govern the territory that evolved into several 
north central states, including Wisconsin.  The Northwest 
Ordinance contained fundamental principles of civil liberty that 
98-2470-CR.dtp 
 
2 
would "forever remain unalterable, unless by common consent."  
Section 13, ¶¶ 1-2. 
¶41 Article II under Section 13 read in part:  "The 
inhabitants of the said territory shall always be entitled to 
the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus, and of the trial by 
jury." 
¶42 In 1836 Congress passed "An Act establishing the 
Territorial Government of Wisconsin."  In Section 12 of the Act, 
Congress provided that the inhabitants of the Territory were 
entitled to the rights, privileges, and advantages contained in 
the Northwest Ordinance. 
¶43 The Wisconsin Constitution was adopted in March 1848, 
two months before Wisconsin officially became a state. The 
original document contained several provisions that are relevant 
to this case.  Article I, § 5 provided for trial by jury:  "The 
right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; and shall extend 
to all cases at law, without regard to the amount in 
controversy; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in 
all cases, in the manner prescribed by law." 
¶44 Article I, § 7 provided for the rights of the accused: 
 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to be heard by himself and counsel; to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him; to meet the witnesses face to face; to have 
compulsory 
process 
to 
compel 
the 
attendance 
of 
witnesses in his behalf; and in prosecutions by 
indictment or information, to a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district wherein 
the offence shall have been committed; which county or 
district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law. 
98-2470-CR.dtp 
 
3 
¶45 Article I, § 8 described presentment or indictment in 
criminal cases:  "No person shall be held to answer for a 
criminal offence, unless on the presentment or indictment of a 
grand jury, except . . . in cases cognizable by justices of the 
peace." 
¶46 These 
sections 
recognized 
different 
levels 
of 
prosecution and offense and different rights depending upon the 
circumstances.  Then as now, art. I, § 7 begins with the phrase, 
"In all criminal prosecutions."  This language is broader than 
the phrase "in prosecutions by indictment or information" 
contained in the same section.  Article I, § 8 suggested that 
"cases cognizable by justices of the peace" need not be 
commenced by "the presentment or indictment of a grand jury," 
presumably because those cases were less serious. 
¶47 Article VII of the new constitution established the 
structure and powers of the Wisconsin judiciary.  Section 2 
provided that the judicial power of the state, both as to 
matters of law and equity, was vested in a supreme court, 
circuit courts, courts of probate, and in justices of the peace. 
 Section 15 described justices of the peace and gave to them 
"such civil and criminal jurisdiction as shall be prescribed by 
law" (emphasis added). 
¶48 Reading these provisions together, we see that the 
1848 constitution ensured the accused "in prosecutions by 
indictment or information" the right to "trial by an impartial 
jury."  It did not, however, require "presentment or indictment" 
in cases cognizable by justices of the peace.  The constitution 
98-2470-CR.dtp 
 
4 
gave the legislature the authority to determine by law what 
cases were cognizable by justices of the peace, and hence what 
cases were not accompanied by presentment or indictment and what 
cases were not guaranteed a jury trial.  Unless one is prepared 
to say that there is no distinction between "all criminal 
prosecutions" and "prosecutions by indictment or information," 
the Wisconsin Constitution did not unequivocally bestow upon all 
criminal defendants the constitutional guarantee of a jury 
trial.  Even as it declared rights, the 1848 constitution 
afforded the legislature the power to modify those rights in 
certain cases. 
II 
¶49 The original constitution not only assigned general 
legislative power to a senate and assembly but also empowered 
the new legislature to change existing law.  Article XIV, § 2 
authorized change in existing statutory law:  "All laws now in 
force in the territory of Wisconsin, which are not repugnant to 
this constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by 
their own limitation, or be altered or repealed by the 
legislature" (emphasis added). 
¶50 Section 13 authorized change in the common law:  "Such 
parts of the common law as are now in force in the territory of 
Wisconsin, not inconsistent with this constitution, shall be and 
continue part of the law of this state until altered or 
suspended by the legislature" (emphasis added). 
¶51 Common law prevails in Wisconsin until changed by 
statute.  Aaby v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 197 Wis. 56, 57, 221 N.W. 
98-2470-CR.dtp 
 
5 
417 (1928).  A rule of common law persistently embraced by text 
writers and the courts of sister states should not be ignored 
"unless a legislative intent to abrogate it has been clearly 
expressed."  Nickel v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 269 Wis. 647, 
649, 70 N.W.2d 205 (1955) (citing Kappers v. Cast Stone Constr. 
Co., 184 Wis. 627, 200 N.W. 376 (1924)).  To abrogate the common 
law, the intent of the legislature must be clearly expressed, 
either in specific language or in such a manner as to leave no 
reasonable doubt of the legislature's purpose.  Sullivan v. 
School Dist. No. 1 Tomah, 179 Wis. 502, 506, 191 N.W. 1020 
(1923).   
¶52 Our decisions unquestionably show great deference to 
the common law, but the common law is not immutable.  The 
legislature may modify or repeal the common law, as long as the 
change does not conflict with the constitution. 
III 
¶53 In 1848 the first Wisconsin legislature engaged three 
people as commissioners to collate and revise all the public 
acts of the state of a general and permanent nature, in force at 
the close of the session.  Revised Statutes of Wisconsin (1849) 
at vii.  The commissioners reported their work to the second 
legislature.  The second legislature eventually approved the 
revisions.  Consequently, a substantial portion of the law 
enacted in 1849 was carried over from the Wisconsin Territory. 
¶54 In 1849 the legislature expressed its intent to have 
six-person juries in certain cases.  Chapter 86 of the Revised 
98-2470-CR.dtp 
 
6 
Statutes of Wisconsin (1849) related to county courts.  Section 
16 of Chapter 86 provided: 
 
If an issue of law be made in the cause, it shall be 
tried by the court; if an issue of fact, it shall on 
demand of either party, as hereinafter provided, be 
tried by a jury to consist of not more than six 
persons; and if no jury be demanded by either party, 
the issue shall be tried by the court. 
 
¶55 Chapter 88 of the Revised Statutes of Wisconsin (1849) 
related to "Justices' Courts," meaning justices of the peace.  
Section 80 of this chapter provided: 
 
In every civil cause brought before a justice of the 
peace, after issue joined, and before the justice 
shall proceed to an examination of the testimony, or 
to inquire into the merits of the cause, either party, 
on first paying to the justice the jury fees in 
advance, which shall be taxed against the losing 
party, may demand that the cause be tried by a jury of 
six men.  
 
¶56 Chapter 89 of the same Revised Statutes related to 
criminal proceedings in Justices' Courts.  Section 10 of this 
chapter provided: 
 
After the joining of issue, and before the court shall 
proceed to an investigation of the merits of the 
cause, unless the accused shall expressly waive his 
right to a trial by jury, the court shall direct the 
sheriff or any constable of the county to make a list 
in writing, of the names of eighteen inhabitants of 
the county qualified to serve as jurors in the courts 
of 
record 
of 
this 
state, 
from 
which 
list 
the 
complainant and accused may each strike out six names. 
Section 11 then provided: 
 
In case the complainant or the accused shall neglect 
to strike out such names, the court shall direct some 
suitable, disinterested person, to strike out the 
names for either or both the parties so neglecting; 
98-2470-CR.dtp 
 
7 
and upon such names being struck out, the justice 
shall issue a venire, directed to the sheriff or any 
constable of the county, requiring him to summon the 
six persons whose names shall remain upon such list, 
to appear before such court at the time and place to 
be named therein, to make a jury for the trial of such 
offence. 
¶57 There can be no mistake about the legislative intent 
in these statutes, which were approved one year after the 
Wisconsin Constitution was adopted and carried over from 
territorial law. 
IV 
¶58 There 
is 
now 
a 
well-established 
methodology for 
interpreting provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution.  "In 
interpreting a constitutional provision, the court turns to 
three sources in determining the provision's meaning:  the plain 
meaning of the words in the context used; the constitutional 
debates and the practices in existence at the time of the 
writing of the constitution; and the earliest interpretation of 
the provision by the legislature as manifested in the first law 
passed following adoption."  Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 
674, 680, 546 N.W.2d 123 (1996); State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 
136-37, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984).  Contemporaneous legislative 
construction of a constitutional provision is entitled to great 
deference.  Payne v. Racine, 217 Wis. 550, 558, 259 N.W. 437 
(1935); State ex rel. Pluntz v. Johnson, 176 Wis. 107, 114-15, 
186 N.W. 729 (1922). 
¶59 In the December 1853 term, the supreme court decided 
Norval v. Rice, 2 Wis. 17, addressing the constitutionality of 
Section 16 of Chapter 86, which provided for a jury of six men 
98-2470-CR.dtp 
 
8 
instead of twelve in county court civil cases.  The court ruled 
that the six-person jury violated art. I, §  5, which provided 
in part:  "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate."  
Id. at 19. 
¶60 The court traced the history of the jury to "before 
the Norman Conquest."  Id. at 20.  It cited Lord Coke, Crabb's 
History of English Law, Blackstone's Commentaries, Professor 
Woodesson's Lectures on the Law of England, Sir Matthew Hale, 
and Chitty's Case Law for the proposition that at common law a 
jury consisted of twelve men.  The court quoted 1 Chitty's C.L. 
505 to this effect:  "The petit jury when sworn, must consist 
precisely of twelve, and is never to be either more or less on 
the trial of the general issue."  Id. at 21.  The court 
concluded: 
 
In our view of the provisions of the Revised Statutes 
concerning County Courts, where they restrict the jury 
to six persons, they conflict with the enjoyment of a 
constitutional 
right, 
secured 
to 
every 
citizen, 
namely, the right of trial by a jury of twelve men; 
and we therefore hold, that when the defendant in the 
court below was denied a trial by a jury consisting of 
twelve men, he was deprived of a right secured to him 
by the Constitution. 
Id. at 23. 
 
¶61 Basing its decision on language in § 5 of art. I, the 
court asserted that, "the trial by jury in a court of record 
which has been enjoyed before the adoption of the Constitution, 
remains inviolate."  Id.  The court thus implied that common law 
notions of the jury  may not be altered by the legislature.  
98-2470-CR.dtp 
 
9 
 
¶62 There are several troublesome elements to the Norval 
decision.  First, although the court discussed juries in the 
Wisconsin Territory, conceding that in justice of the peace 
courts, juries "of six only" were allowed in all cases except 
"actions of forcible entry and detainment,"3 it nonetheless 
attached no significance to the fact that these six-person 
juries existed in the territory before the adoption of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, operated for years under the principles 
of the Northwest Ordinance, and continued as part of state law 
pursuant to art. XIV, § 2 after the constitution was adopted.   
                     
3  
Justice of the peace courts had jurisdiction in 
criminal cases and tried minor crimes pursuant to Chapter 89 of 
the Revised Statutes of Wisconsin (1849).  Section 2 of this 
chapter provided:  "Justices of the peace shall have power to 
hold a court, subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, 
to hear, try and determine all charges for offences arising 
within 
their 
respective 
counties, 
where 
jurisdiction 
is 
conferred upon them by any law of this State." 
 
 
Section 8 of Chapter 89 further provided:  "If the plea of 
the accused be not guilty, and no jury be demanded by him, the 
said court shall proceed to try such issue, and to determine the 
same according to the evidence which may be produced against and 
in behalf of such accused." 
 
 
Section 28 of Chapter 89 named specific minor crimes 
presented before justices of the peace:   
 
No assault, battery or affray, shall be indictable, 
but 
all 
such 
offences 
shall 
be 
prosecuted 
and 
determined in a summary manner, by complaint made 
before a justice of the peace, and on conviction 
thereof, the offender may be punished by fine not less 
than five dollars, nor more than fifty dollars, 
according to the nature of the offense. 
 
98-2470-CR.dtp 
 
10
¶63 Second, the court made no reference to art. XIV, § 13, 
which gives the legislature power to change the common law. It 
disregarded the power of the legislature to change common law 
until it addressed a law it liked, the 1850 act providing for 
the protection of married women, an act that overturned a common 
law rule that "marriage deprived the wife of the right to 
maintain an action in her own name alone, upon contracts made by 
her before marriage."  Id. at 24.  The court recognized that law 
as valid.4  In short, the court not only discounted the practices 
in existence at the time of the writing of the constitution but 
                     
4 In retrospect, it is quite evident that we have changed 
many elements of the common law with respect to juries.  Modern 
juries do not consist of twelve men, contrary to common law.  
Persons 
with 
criminal 
convictions 
are 
not 
automatically 
disqualified as prospective jurors, contrary to common law.  See 
State v. Mendoza, 227 Wis. 2d 838, 851 n.7, 596 N.W.2d 736 
(1999).  In 1859, this court recognized that the legislature 
could change the manner of selecting juries.  Perry v. State, 9 
Wis. 15 (1859).  The court said:   
[W]e think the manner of designating the persons who 
are to act as jurors . . . is clearly within the 
control 
of 
the 
legislature; 
and 
that 
the 
constitutional right of every accused person to a jury 
trial, is not impaired merely because those persons 
have been selected instead of drawn.  Or, in other 
words, we think that in order to preserve the right of 
trial by jury, it is not necessary to preserve any 
particular mode of designating jurors, even though 
such mode may have been in force at the time of the 
adoption of the constitutional provision.  All that 
the right includes, is a fair and impartial jury, not 
the particular mode of designating it.   
9 Wis. at 17-18. 
 
98-2470-CR.dtp 
 
11
also disavowed the earliest interpretation of the constitution 
in the first laws passed following adoption. 
¶64 Third, the court failed to discuss the presumption of 
constitutionality.5  The court simply observed that it was "a 
delicate matter for courts to declare a legislative enactment 
unconstitutional."  Id. at 23.  
V 
 
¶65 In Hansford, this court relied heavily on Norval.  219 
Wis. 2d at 237-39.  It noted that Edward V. Whiton, Chief 
Justice of the three-member supreme court that decided Norval in 
1853, was a delegate at the 1847-48 convention that redrafted 
the Wisconsin Constitution.6  Id. at 239.  Hansford did not 
                     
5 As 
this 
court 
observed 
in 
Association. 
of 
State 
Prosecutors v. Milwaukee County, 199 Wis. 2d 549, 557, 544 
N.W.2d 
888 
(1996), 
"A 
statute 
is 
presumed 
to 
be 
constitutional. . . . When attacking the constitutionality of a 
statute, the contesting party must prove the unconstitutionality 
of the statute beyond a reasonable doubt."  
6 Edward V. Whiton served in the Territorial Legislature.  
In 1839, he was commissioned to compile all the laws passed by 
the legislature at the 1838-39 session.  Statutes of the 
Territory of Wisconsin (1839).  Whiton recorded "An Act 
concerning justices of the peace."  Id. at 319.  Section 2 of 
Article Sixth of the Act reads in part: 
In every action to be brought, by virtue of this act, 
it shall be lawful for either of the parties to the 
suit, or the attorney of either of them, after issue 
joined, (and before the court shall proceed to inquire 
into the merits of the cause,) to demand of said 
court, that said action be tried by a jury of six 
jurors, on first paying to the justice the jury fees 
in advance, which shall be taxed against the losing 
party, and upon such demand, the justice shall direct 
the sheriff or any constable of the county who may be 
present, or if no officer be present, the justice may 
98-2470-CR.dtp 
 
12
mention, however, that five members of the legislature that 
passed the six-person jury billsSenators Warren Chase and 
George W. Lakin and Representatives Paul Crandall, James Fagan, 
and 
James 
D. 
Reymertwere 
also 
members 
of 
the 
1847-48 
convention. 
 
¶66 The Hansford opinion cites Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 
69, 75, 14 N.W. 912 (1883), Jennings v. State, 134 Wis. 307, 
309, 114 N.W. 492 (1908), and State ex rel. Sauk County Dist. 
Attorney v. Gollmar, 32 Wis. 2d 406, 409, 145 N.W.2d 670 (1966), 
for the proposition that a criminal defendant's right to a trial 
by jury as guaranteed by art. I, § 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution "is the right to a jury of 12 persons."  Hansford, 
219 Wis. 2d at 241.  Each of these cases uses Norval, a civil 
case that relied on a different section of the constitution, as 
precedent.  Moreover, Bennett involved a first-degree murder 
felony, not a misdemeanor, so that it is not directly on point. 
 
¶67 Hansford also invoked State v. Lockwood, 43 Wis. 403, 
405 (1877), which observed that:  "The right of trial by 
jury . . . is secured by the constitution, upon a principle of 
public policy, and cannot be waived" (emphasis added).  The 
emphasized language, not quoted in Hansford, is in direct 
contradiction to the holding in this case.  It also directly 
contradicted art. I, § 5, which provided that "a jury trial may 
                                                                  
appoint a suitable person to perform the duties 
required by this section.  
 
Id. at 327. 
98-2470-CR.dtp 
 
13
be waived by the parties in all cases," as well as Chapter 89, 
Section 10 Revised Statutes (1849), which authorized waiver in a 
criminal case. 
 
¶68 This court is not bound by common law principles that 
the legislature was empowered to change and did change.  We are 
not shackled to precedent that is plainly mistaken, particularly 
when that precedent disregards and disrespects a coequal branch 
of government that has clearly and constitutionally expressed 
its intent.  If Norval is viewed as good law, we are likely to 
see additional challenges to Wisconsin statutes providing for 
juries of less than twelve. 
VI 
 
¶69 Wisconsin joined the Union on May 29, 1848, as the 
30th state.  1999-2000 Wisconsin Blue Book at 204.  Twenty-nine 
states preceded Wisconsin.  In several of these states, early 
court decisions interpreted the right of trial by jury to 
require twelve jurors.  Vaughn v. Scade, 30 Mo. 600 (1860); 
Opinion of the Justices, 41 N.H. 550 (1860); Cruger v. Hudson 
River R.R. Co., 2 Kern 190 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1854); Work v. State, 
2 Ohio St. 296, 59 Am. Dec. 671 (1853); State v. Cox, 8 Ark. 436 
(1848). 
 
¶70 In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970), 
however, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right 
to an impartial jury did not explicitly codify a twelve-member 
jury as a constitutional requirement.  The Court said:  "We hold 
that the 12-man panel is not a necessary ingredient of 'trial by 
jury,' and that [Florida's] refusal to impanel more than the six 
98-2470-CR.dtp 
 
14
members provided for by Florida law did not violate petitioner's 
Sixth Amendment rights as applied to the States through the 
Fourteenth." 
¶71 There are now juries of less than twelve in a number 
of the 29 states that preceded Wisconsin into the Union.  See 
Brown v. State, 684 N.E.2d 529 (Ind. App. 1997); Carter v. 
State, 702 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App. 1986); O'Brien v. State, 422 
N.E.2d 1266 (Ind. App. 1981); State ex rel. Columbus v. Boyland, 
391 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1979); Williams v. State, 224 So.2d 406 
(Fla. App. 1969).  These juries have been effected without 
modifying the state constitutions. 
¶72 I freely acknowledge that strong arguments can be made 
in behalf of twelve-member juries.  These arguments may be 
stronger and better than the arguments for six-member juries.  
But public policy was not the issue in Hansford.  The issue in 
Hansford was whether the Wisconsin Constitution deprives the 
Wisconsin legislature of the power to mandate jury trials of six 
persons in misdemeanor casesbeyond a reasonable doubt.  In 
answering this question, our court erred.  I believe this court 
should have upheld the 1996 legislation.   
¶73 As the majority opinion correctly states at ¶ 17:  
"Huebner has not lost his right to a jury trial."  His right to 
a jury trial remained inviolate.  Huebner received a fair trial 
by a constitutional jury in a misdemeanor case.  Consequently, I 
concur in the judgment to affirm his conviction.  
No. 98-2470-CR.ssa 
 
1 
¶74 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).  On 
June 21, 1996, the legislature mandated the use of a six-person 
jury in misdemeanor actions commenced after that date.7  On June 
19, 1998, this court declared the law mandating a six-person 
jury in misdemeanor cases unconstitutional.  State v. Hansford, 
219 Wis. 2d 226, 243, 580 N.W.2d 171 (1998).   
¶75 When this court declares a state law unconstitutional, 
the law is unconstitutional ab initio, that is, the law is null 
from the date it was adopted.8  Thus, the law mandating a six-
                     
7 1995 Wis. Act 427; Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am)(1995-96). 
8 "An unconstitutional act of the Legislature is not a law; 
it confers no rights, it imposes no penalties, it affords no 
protection, and is not operative; and in legal contemplation it 
has no existence."  State ex rel. Kleist v. Donald, 164 Wis. 
545, 552-53, 160 N.W. 1067 (1917) (quoted with approval in 
Hunter v. School Dist. of Gale-Ettrick-Trempealeau, 97 Wis. 2d 
435, 444, 293 N.W.2d 515 (1980)). 
See also Berlowitz v. Roach, 252 Wis. 61, 64, 30 N.W.2d 256 
(1947) (quoting Kleist); State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman, 233 
Wis. 16, 288 N.W. 454, 457 (1939) ("with respect to an 
unconstitutional law . . . the matter stands as if the law had 
not been passed"); John F. Jelke Co. v. Hill, 208 Wis. 650, 661, 
242 N.W. 550 (1932) (an unconstitutional act is not a law); 
Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193, 200, 116 N.W. 885 (1908) (an 
unconstitutional legislative enactment is no law at all).  
Compare Butzlaff v. Van Der Geest & Sons, Inc., 115 Wis. 2d 535, 
538-540, 340 N.W.2d 742 (Ct. App. 1983) (recognizing the Kleist 
rule but holding that private persons should not be held liable 
for acting in good faith pursuant to statutes that are later 
declared unconstitutional). 
No. 98-2470-CR.ssa 
 
2 
person jury in misdemeanor cases was null from the date it was 
enacted and should have no impact on this court's decision in 
the present case.9   
                                                                  
See also Shirley v. Getty Oil Co., 367 So. 2d 1388, 1391 
(Ala. 1979) ("[i]f the act is unconstitutional, it was void from 
the beginning"); Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d 1167, 1174 
(Fla. 1991) ("a penal statute declared unconstitutional is 
inoperative from the time of enactment"); People v. Manuel, 446 
N.E.2d 240, 244-245 (Ill. 1983) ("[w]hen a statute is held 
unconstitutional in its entirety, it is void ab initio"); State 
ex rel. Stenberg v. Murphy, 527 N.W.2d 185, 192 (Neb. 1995) ("an 
unconstitutional 
statute 
is 
a 
nullity, 
void 
from 
its 
enactment"); Reyes v. State, 753 S.W.2d 382, 383 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1988) ("unconstitutional statute is void from inception," 
discussing cases); Fairmont v. Pitrolo Pontiac-Cadillac Co., 308 
S.E.2d 527, 534 (W.Va. 1983) ("when a statute or ordinance is 
declared unconstitutional, it is inoperative, as if it had never 
been passed," citing cases). 
9 Cases have recognized a tension between the principle that 
unconstitutional statutes are void ab initio and the principle 
that challenges to prosecutions under laws later declared 
unconstitutional can be forfeited if a defendant failed to 
assert the challenge at trial.  For discussions of this tension, 
see State v. Thomas, 128 Wis. 2d 93, 97-101, 381 N.W.2d 567 (Ct. 
App. 1985); State ex rel. Skinkis v. Treffert, 90 Wis. 2d 528, 
531-38, 280 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1978).   
No. 98-2470-CR.ssa 
 
3 
¶76 The defendant in this case was arrested on November 
16, 1997, and tried by a six-person jury on February 17 and 18, 
1998, when no statute was "in existence" authorizing a six-
person 
jury. 
 
Therefore, 
the 
present 
case 
cannot 
be 
distinguished from this court's recent decision in State v. 
Wingo10 and the court of appeals' decision in State v. Cooley.11 
                                                                  
Cases attempt to resolve this tension by recognizing that 
facial constitutional challenges to criminal convictions cannot 
be forfeited.  See, e.g., In re F.R.W., 61 Wis. 2d 193, 200, 212 
N.W.2d 
130 
(1973) 
(facial 
challenge 
to 
statute's 
constitutionality was challenge to court's jurisdiction and not 
forfeited when not raised at trial) (quoting State ex rel. 
Comrs. of Public Lands v. Anderson, 56 Wis. 2d 666, 672, 203 
N.W.2d 84, 87 (1973)); State v. Benzel, 220 Wis. 2d 588, 592, 
583 
N.W.2d 
434 
(Ct. 
App. 
1998) 
(court 
cannot 
acquire 
jurisdiction to try a person for an act made criminal only by an 
unconstitutional law, even when defendant had not objected at 
trial on this ground); State v. McCoy, 139 Wis. 2d 291, 295 n.1, 
407 
N.W.2d 
319 
(Ct. 
App. 
1987) 
(a 
challenge 
to 
the 
constitutionality of a statute on grounds of vagueness relates 
to a court's subject matter jurisdiction and is not forfeited by 
failure to raise issue at trial); State v. Olson, 127 Wis. 2d 
412, 418-420, 380 N.W.2d 375 (Ct. App. 1985) (facial challenges 
to statute's constitutionality were jurisdictional and not 
forfeited when not raised at trial). 
A constitutional challenge to the statute mandating six-
person rather than twelve-person juries in misdemeanor cases can 
be viewed as a facial challenge to the statute and thus is not 
forfeited by failure to having objected at trial. 
For 
a 
discussion 
of 
the 
reach 
of 
a 
judgment 
of 
unconstitutionality, 
see 
Laurence 
H. 
Tribe, 
American 
Constitutional Law § 3.3 (2d ed. 1988).  
10 State v. Wingo, 2000 WI 31, 233 Wis. 2d 647, 609 N.W.2d 
162.  
11 State v. Cooley, 105 Wis. 2d 642, 315 N.W.2d 369 (Ct. 
App. 1981). 
No. 98-2470-CR.ssa 
 
4 
¶77 In Wingo the conviction was reversed when a defendant 
was tried and convicted under the six-person jury statute even 
though the defendant did not object to the six-person jury.  In 
Wingo, as in the present case, no statute was in existence at 
the time of trial authorizing a six-person jury.  But in Wingo 
the action was commenced prior to the effective date of the 
unconstitutional statute authorizing a six-person jury, while in 
the present case the six-person jury statute was not "in 
existence" because it was later declared unconstitutional.   
¶78 However, in both Wingo and in the present case, the 
defendant failed to object to the six-person jury at trial.  In 
Wingo we held that the defendant did not waive his right to 
trial by a twelve-person jury and did not forfeit his right to 
address the issue on appeal.  The defendant in this case is in 
the same position as the defendant in Wingo.  Therefore the 
Wingo case governs the present case. 
¶79 In Cooley,12 the other case that is indistinguishable 
from the present case, the defense counsel, not the defendant, 
agreed to proceed with an eleven-person jury.  The court of 
appeals concluded that because the defendant had not personally 
waived the right to a jury of fewer than twelve people, the 
conviction must be reversed.  
¶80 In Wingo and in this case, as in Cooley, no statutory 
authorization existed to try a defendant with a jury of fewer 
                     
12 State v. Cooley, 105 Wis. 2d 642, 315 N.W.2d 369 (Ct. 
App. 1981).  
No. 98-2470-CR.ssa 
 
5 
than twelve people.  None of these defendants agreed personally 
to a trial by a jury of fewer than twelve people.  Thus the 
result in this case, just as in Wingo and Cooley, should be a 
reversal of the defendant's conviction and a remand for a new 
trial.   
II 
¶81 Regardless of whether I choose to rely on the 
principle that the law mandating six-person jury trials in 
misdemeanor cases was void ab initio, I would still dissent from 
the majority's holding that the defendant forfeited his right to 
a twelve-person jury when he did not object to the six-person 
jury at trial. 
¶82 Before I explain my dissent, I want to express my 
agreement with the following principles set forth in the 
majority opinion: 
• The right to a trial by jury in Wisconsin is a 
"fundamental right" that "cannot be forfeited by mere 
failure to object [at trial]."  Majority op. at ¶ 14.13 
• Some constitutional rights may be forfeited on appeal if 
they are not raised at trial; others will not be 
                     
13 See State v. Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d 561, 569-570, 464 
N.W.2d 839 (1991) (defendant must personally and affirmatively 
waive his right to jury trial; mere failure to object does not 
forfeit the right); Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
501 U.S. 868, 895 n.2 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (right to 
trial by jury cannot be forfeited by mere failure to object at 
trial; right to counsel cannot be forfeited by mere failure to 
object at trial). 
No. 98-2470-CR.ssa 
 
6 
forfeited by mere failure to object at trial.14  Majority 
op. at ¶¶ 14-15. 
• The rule of forfeiture is important to the administration 
of the judicial system.  Majority op. at ¶ 14.  United 
States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has noted 
that the rule of forfeiture reflects the principle that a 
trial is "the main event," and not simply a "tryout on 
the road to appellate review."  Freytag v. Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 895 (1991) (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
• This court may exercise its discretion to reach an issue 
that a party has forfeited.  Majority op. at ¶¶ 27-28. 
¶83 In this case the defendant did raise his objection 
before the circuit court, in a motion for post-conviction 
relief.  This procedure gave the circuit court the opportunity 
to consider the issue.  Regardless of this submission to the 
circuit court, I conclude that in Wisconsin the right to a trial 
by a jury of twelve persons cannot be forfeited by a defendant's 
                     
14 As the majority opinion notes, majority op. at ¶ 11, n.2, 
this case presents a question of the "forfeiture rule" rather 
than the "waiver rule."  I agree with the majority opinion that 
Wisconsin opinions tend to use the word "waiver" when the word 
"forfeiture" is more appropriate. 
For the distinction between "waiver" (the intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege) and 
"forfeiture" (the failure to assert timely a right to preserve 
an 
issue 
for 
appellate 
review), 
see, 
e.g., 
Freytag 
v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 895 n.2 (1991) 
(Scalia, J., concurring); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 
731-733 (1993). 
No. 98-2470-CR.ssa 
 
7 
mere failure to object at trial to a lesser number of persons on 
the jury.  My reasoning is as follows: 
• A six-person jury trial in a criminal case is not a 
"trial by jury" as that phrase has been historically 
understood in Wisconsin.  In State v. Hansford, 219 
Wis. 2d 226, 241, 580 N.W.2d 171 (1998), the court 
equated trial by jury to a jury of twelve persons.  
According to Hansford, "a criminal defendant's right to a 
trial by jury as guaranteed by art. I, § 7 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, is the right to a jury of twelve 
persons."15  This court declined in Hansford to adopt the 
U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning "that the twelve-person 
requirement for a jury trial is not 'an indispensable 
component of the Sixth Amendment.'"16  Rather this court 
declared in Hansford that a twelve-person jury is an 
indispensable component of the state constitutional 
guarantee of trial by jury.  Thus the Hansford court 
unanimously declared that the legislatively mandated six-
person jury was unconstitutional.  When a defendant is 
not afforded the right to a jury of twelve people, as 
                     
15 State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 241-42, 580 N.W.2d 
171 (1998). 
16 State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 241-42, 580 N.W.2d 
171 (1998) (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 
(1970)). 
No. 98-2470-CR.ssa 
 
8 
guaranteed by art. I, § 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution, 
the conviction must be reversed.17  
• To waive a trial by jury a defendant must personally 
state in open court on the record, or in writing, that he 
or she waives a jury trial.18  "Neither counsel nor the 
court nor any other entity can act in any way or to any 
degree so as to waive on the defendant's behalf his right 
to trial by jury."19  If a defendant personally fails to 
waive a jury trial, he or she does not forfeit the right 
to raise the issue on appeal.  
• The same rules that apply to waiving a trial by jury 
apply to waiving a trial by a jury of fewer than twelve 
people.20  In other words, a defendant must personally 
state on the record his or her willingness to be tried by 
                     
17 State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 243, 580 N.W.2d 171 
(1998). 
18 Wisconsin Stat. § 972.02 (1997-98) provides: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, 
criminal cases shall be tried by a jury selected as 
prescribed in s. 805.08, unless the defendant waives a 
jury in writing or by statement in open court or under 
s. 967.08(2)(b), on the record, with the approval of 
the court and the consent of the state. 
 
19 State v. Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d 561, 569, 464 N.W.2d 839 
(1991) (defendant must personally and affirmatively waive his 
right to a jury trial). 
20 State v. Cooley, 105 Wis. 2d 642, 645-46, 315 N.W.2d 369 
(Ct. App. 1981). 
No. 98-2470-CR.ssa 
 
9 
a jury of fewer than twelve people.21  In this case the 
defendant did not agree personally on the record to be 
tried by fewer than twelve people.  Thus he did not waive 
his right to a twelve-person jury and he could not 
forfeit the issue on appeal.  
• The size of a jury can affect the fact-finding process.  
Accordingly I conclude that a defendant should not 
forfeit the opportunity to raise the issue on appeal.  In 
declining to adopt Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 
(1970), in the Hansford decision, the court implicitly 
rejected the position in Williams that a jury of twelve 
people is not significantly different than a jury with 
fewer people.  There are good reasons for rejecting this 
position.  See Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 332 
(1980) ("a decline in the jury size leads to less 
accurate factfinding and a greater risk of convicting an 
innocent person") (quoted by State v. Ledger, 175 Wis. 2d 
116, 127, 499 N.W.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1993)); Ballew v. 
Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 234 (1978) ("[s]tatistical studies 
suggest that the risk of convicting an innocent person 
 . . . rises as the size of the jury diminishes.").  
Hansford and these other cases thus contradict the 
majority opinion's assertion that a six-person jury "does 
                     
21 State v. Cooley, 105 Wis. 2d 642, 645-46, 315 N.W.2d 369 
(Ct. App. 1981).  See also State v. Ledger, 175 Wis. 2d 116, 
127-28, 499 N.W.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1993) (permitting a thirteen-
person jury when the defendant personally agreed). 
No. 98-2470-CR.ssa 
 
10
not affect the basic accuracy of the factfinding process 
at trial."  Majority op. at ¶ 31 (internal citations 
omitted). 
• Recent decisions, including State v. Wingo, 2000 WI 31, 
233 Wis. 2d 647, 609 N.W.2d 162, and State v. Cooley, 105 
Wis. 2d 642, 315 N.W.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1991), discussed 
above, support my dissent.  The majority opinion fails in 
its attempt to distinguish State v. Cooley, 105 Wis. 2d 
642, from this case.  The majority opinion posits that 
Cooley was based on the fact that an eleven-person jury 
was not authorized by any statute.  Majority op. at ¶ 23. 
 Nothing in Cooley suggests that the decision rests on 
the lack of statutory authorization for an eleven-person 
jury.22  Rather, relying on decisions of this court,23 the 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
"the 
procedural 
safeguards for waiver of trial by jury apply equally to 
waiver of a full twelve-person jury."24  This court has 
                     
22 See State v. Ledger, 175 Wis. 2d 116, 127-28, 499 N.W.2d 
198 (Ct. App. 1993) (the number of jurors need not be 
established by statute to be constitutional; trial by thirteen 
jurors did not justify reversal of the conviction when the 
defendant personally agreed to that number of jurors). 
23 State ex rel. Sauk County District Attorney v. Gollmar, 
32 Wis. 2d 406, 409, 145 N.W.2d 670 (1966); Krueger v. State, 84 
Wis. 2d 272, 281, 267 N.W.2d 602, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 874 
(1978); State v. Moore, 97 Wis. 2d 669, 671, 294 N.W.2d 551 (Ct. 
App. 1980). 
24 State v. Cooley, 105 Wis. 2d 645-46. 
No. 98-2470-CR.ssa 
 
11
expressed approval of the Cooley decision.25  The majority 
opinion attempts to explain away the Cooley decision by 
stating that when "the trial court itself has induced a 
defendant to give up his statutory and constitutional 
right to a twelve-member jury, the defendant's waiver 
must be made personally and expressly."  Majority op. at 
¶ 24.  In the present case both the Wisconsin legislature 
(by enacting an unconstitutional law) and the circuit 
court (by drawing six-person juries in compliance with 
the unconstitutional law) induced the defendant to give 
up his statutory and constitutional right to a twelve-
person jury.  
¶84 Because a jury in this state is, as a matter of law, 
composed of twelve people in criminal cases, and because the 
right to trial by a twelve-person jury is a right that cannot be 
waived except by a defendant's personal oral or written waiver 
on the record, I conclude that the right to trial by a twelve-
person jury cannot be forfeited by the defendant's mere failure 
to object at trial to a jury of fewer than twelve people. 
¶85 For the reasons stated, I dissent. 
                     
25 See State v. Wingo, 2000 WI 31, ¶ 16, 233 Wis. 2d 647, 
609 
N.W.2d 
162 
(citing 
Cooley 
with 
approval); 
State 
v. 
Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d 561, 569, 464 N.W.2d 839 (1991) (same). 
No. 98-2470-CR.ssa 
 
12
¶86 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and DIANE S. SYKES join this dissent. 
No. 98-2470-CR.ssa 
 
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