Case Title: Didato v. Strehler

Citation: 

Docket Number: 003030

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2001-11-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
MIMI DIDATO 
 
v.  Record No. 003030 
 
PAUL M. STREHLER, M.D., ET AL. 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
 
 
 
November 2, 2001 
GARY DIDATO 
 
v.  Record No. 003031 
 
PAUL M. STREHLER, M.D., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Melvin R. Hughes, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In these consolidated appeals from judgments sustaining 
the defendants' demurrers in medical negligence actions, we 
consider whether the plaintiffs' motions for judgment alleged  
viable causes of action based upon negligence, the assumption 
of a duty, and the creation of a special relationship. 
I. 
 
Mimi Didato and her husband, Gary Didato, filed separate 
amended motions for judgment against Paul M. Strehler, M.D., 
and Chippenham Pediatric & Adolescent Medicine, P.C. 
(Chippenham Pediatric).  Mimi Didato and Gary Didato, to whom 
we will refer jointly as the plaintiffs, alleged in their 
separate motions for judgment that the defendants breached 
certain duties owed to them.  The defendants filed demurrers 
to the amended motions for judgment and asserted that the 
plaintiffs failed to allege viable causes of action against 
them. 
 
The circuit court sustained the demurrers.  The circuit 
court concluded that:  the plaintiffs failed to allege that 
they were patients of the defendants and, therefore, the 
defendants owed no duty to the plaintiffs; a special 
relationship did not exist between the plaintiffs and the 
defendants and, therefore, the defendants owed no duty to the 
plaintiffs under that theory of recovery; and the defendants 
did not assume a duty owed to the plaintiffs. 
 
The circuit court entered judgments in favor of the 
defendants.  We awarded the plaintiffs appeals from the 
judgments, and we consolidated their cases. 
II. 
A. 
 
A demurrer "admits the truth of all material facts that 
are properly pleaded, facts which are impliedly alleged, and 
facts which may be fairly and justly inferred from alleged 
facts."  Cox Cable Hampton Roads, Inc. v. City of Norfolk, 242 
Va. 394, 397, 410 S.E.2d 652, 653 (1991).  Thus, we will state 
the relevant facts, contained in the plaintiffs' amended 
motions for judgment, which are necessary for our resolution 
of these appeals. 
 
2
 
Strehler is a physician licensed to practice medicine in 
this Commonwealth, and he is engaged in the practice of 
pediatrics.  Chippenham Pediatric is a professional 
corporation registered to do business in this Commonwealth and 
provides pediatric services.  Strehler is an officer and 
employee of Chippenham Pediatric.  The Didatos are the parents 
of three children:  Matthew, born on January 21, 1993; 
Gabrielle, born on September 28, 1994; and Nicholas, born on 
May 12, 1998. 
 
In 1993, the plaintiffs "presented to Dr. Strehler and 
Chippenham Pediatric and requested that they provide their 
family including themselves and their infant son Matthew all 
health care [that] a family should receive from a pediatrician 
and a professional corporation engaged in providing health 
care services relating to the practice of pediatrics."  
Pursuant to this request, "Dr. Strehler and Chippenham 
Pediatric agreed to provide the Didato family all health care 
[that] members of a family should receive from a pediatrician 
and a professional corporation engaged in providing health 
care services relating to the practice of pediatrics."  The 
relationship between the Didato family and the defendants 
"continued without interruption until 1997," when the 
plaintiffs moved from Virginia to Connecticut. 
 
3
 
According to the plaintiffs, thalassemia and sickle cell 
disease are inherited diseases of the blood known as 
hemoglobinopathies.  "Thalassemia is a form of anemia (red 
blood cell deficiency).  Hemoglobin is the oxygen-carrying 
component of the red blood cells.  It is made of two different 
kinds of proteins, called alpha and beta globins.  If the body 
doesn't produce both of these two proteins, the red blood 
cells do not form properly and do not carry sufficient oxygen.  
The result is anemia that begins in early childhood and 
persists throughout life.  There are a number of varieties of 
thalassemia.  If the body does not produce beta globins, the 
resultant disease is called beta thalassemia." 
 
The plaintiffs stated in the amended motions for judgment 
that "[s]ickle cell disease (also referred to as 'sickle cell 
anemia') is caused by the presence of an abnormal type of 
hemoglobin called 'sickle hemoglobin' in red blood cells.  The 
presence of sickle hemoglobin causes red blood cells to change 
from their usual biconcave disc shape to a crescent or sickle 
shape.  The abnormal hemoglobin makes the red blood cells 
unable to carry oxygen and the abnormal shape can also cause 
the red blood cells to clog small blood vessels forming clots 
and preventing some organs and tissue from receiving 
sufficient oxygen.  When this occurs, red blood cells are 
damaged and destroyed producing anemia and the victim of 
 
4
sickle cell disease will experience episodes of severe pain 
and sustain damage to organs and tissue." 
 
Continuing, the plaintiffs stated that "[s]ome of the 
various clinical manifestations of sickle cell disease include 
painful swelling of the hands and feet caused by ischemic 
necrosis of the small bones, illnesses accompanied by fever, 
hypoxia and acidosis, infarction of bone marrow, splenic 
infarcts, splenic enlargement leading to circulatory collapse, 
pulmonary infarction, strokes, ischemic damage to heart, 
liver, kidneys and eyes and priapism (painful penile 
erections)." 
 
According to the plaintiffs, "[v]ictims of sickle cell 
disease are susceptible to meningitis, sepsis and other 
serious infections and a high risk for a lethal, rapid 
decrease in hemoglobin level (aplastic episode). . . .  By 
mid-childhood most victims of sickle cell disease are 
underweight and have an enlarged heart.  Puberty is frequently 
delayed.  Throughout life, the victim of sickle cell disease 
will suffer a barrage of medical crises and can expect to 
experience pain in varying levels of intensity on a daily 
basis. . . .  The life expectancy of sickle cell disease 
victims is dramatically reduced as a consequence of the 
disease and its sequelae." 
 
5
 
The plaintiffs also pled that "[b]oth thalassemia and 
sickle cell disease are autosomal recessive disorders.  This 
means these disorders only occur when both parents carry the 
gene for the disorder.  If both parents are carriers of the 
abnormal gene responsible for producing the disorder, there is 
a 25 per cent possibility that a child of the parents will 
have the disorder.  A person who carries the gene for 
thalassemia has the 'thalassemia trait.'  A person who carries 
the gene for sickle cell disease has the 'sickle cell trait.' 
. . . If one parent is a carrier of the beta thalassemia trait 
and the other parent is a carrier of sickle cell trait, there 
is a 25 per cent possibility that a child of the parents will 
be born with a type of sickle cell disease known as sickle 
beta thalassemia."  Continuing, the plaintiffs stated that 
"[o]ne form of sickle beta thalassemia disease is called 
sickle beta O thalassemia.  This is the most severe form of 
sickle beta thalassemia." 
 
"The beta thalassemia trait is found primarily in persons 
of Mediterranean, African or Southeast Asian origin. . . .  
[Mr.] Didato is of Sicilian descent and is therefore a person 
of Mediterranean origin. . . .  The sickle cell trait is found 
primarily in persons of African, Caribbean, Latin American, 
Southeast Asian, Middle Eastern or Mediterranean origin. . . .  
Mrs. Didato's mother is Dominican and her father is of Spanish 
 
6
and Portuguese descent and Mrs. Didato is therefore a person 
of Caribbean, Latin American and Mediterranean origin." 
 
The plaintiffs stated in their amended motions that "[b]y 
the 1970's, technology to screen infants for sickle cell trait 
and disease and thalassemia trait and disease was 
available. . . .  By 1979, a number of pediatricians were 
advocating screening of newborns for sickle cell trait and 
disease and thalassemia trait and disease to help accomplish 
two objectives:  provision of optimum medical care of patients 
with the disease and the prevention of the disease through 
genetic counseling." 
 
According to the plaintiffs, "[p]urposes of genetic 
counseling include making persons such as the parents of [a] 
newborn who tested positive for sickle cell or thalassemia 
trait aware of the risk of parenting a child with thalassemia 
or sickle cell disease, the availability of further genetic 
testing for the parents and the various alternatives for 
disease prevention.  The information made available to parents 
through genetic counseling and follow-up activities 
recommended by genetic counseling would include the 25 per 
cent risk of future offspring with sickle cell disease if both 
parents were carriers of sickle cell trait or one parent was a 
carrier of sickle cell trait and the other a carrier of 
thalassemia trait.  In such parents, the options made known to 
 
7
the parents through genetic counseling and its follow-up 
activities would include preventing the birth of a child with 
sickle cell disease by termination of any unplanned pregnancy 
when prenatal diagnosis revealed the fetus was positive for 
sickle cell disease or thalassemia or avoiding all pregnancies 
by birth control." 
 
The plaintiffs alleged that in 1987, representatives of 
certain medical specialties, including pediatricians, reached 
a consensus that "[g]ood medical practice dictated that 
screening for sickle cell disease and thalassemia should be 
provided to all newborns as a result of ordinary care and that 
state law should require provision of such services[; i]f the 
screening demonstrated that the newborn did not suffer from 
the disease and therefore required no specialized medical care 
but was a carrier, information about the newborn's carrier 
state should be furnished to the parents of the newborn[; t]he 
information provided to the parents should explain that 
although the newborn's carrier state is not a disease, there 
may be implications for other family members, and, depending 
on results of family studies, future children may be at risk 
for a clinically significant hemoglobinopathy[; and a] 
referral source for family testing and genetic counseling 
should be clearly identified for the parents." 
 
8
 
The plaintiffs further stated that "[p]rior to 1994, 
Virginia and most other states had initiated a newborn 
screening program for hemoglobinopathies."  Continuing, the 
plaintiffs alleged that in 1994, Code § 32.1-65 "provided that 
each infant born in the Commonwealth would be subject to a 
screening test for sickle cell diseases unless the infant's 
parent or guardian objected on religious grounds."  The 
plaintiffs also alleged that before September 28, 1994, 
"pediatricians in Virginia and elsewhere in the United States 
had determined that [a] pediatrician who [was] caring for a 
newborn and [was] aware that the newborn carries the sickle 
cell trait [was] in the best position to alert the parents" of 
a newborn of their child's status as a carrier and to 
communicate certain information to the parents. 
 
Strehler and Chippenham Pediatric became aware that Mr. 
Didato and his son Matthew carried the thalassemia trait 
before the birth of Gabrielle on September 28, 1994.  "At the 
time of the birth of Gabrielle on September 28, 1994, Dr. 
Strehler and Chippenham Pediatric agreed to become the 
pediatrician and pediatric practice entity responsible for 
providing Gabrielle and her family including [Mr.] and Mrs. 
Didato all health care [that] Gabrielle and her family should 
receive from a pediatrician and a professional corporation 
 
9
engaged in providing health care services relating to the 
practice of pediatrics." 
 
The plaintiffs alleged that "[a]t the time of the birth 
of Gabrielle on September 28, 1994, Dr. Strehler and 
Chippenham Pediatric knew that blood would be drawn for 
Gabrielle and screened for the presence of 
hemoglobinopathies."  These defendants "knew that the results 
of the newborn screening of Gabrielle for the presence of 
hemoglobinopathies would be reported to [them]."  The 
defendants also knew that the plaintiffs expected the 
defendants to communicate to the plaintiffs any information 
and facts of clinical significance concerning the results of 
the newborn screening of Gabrielle. 
 
In October 1994, the defendants were notified in writing 
that a newborn screening test of Gabrielle indicated 
"HEMOGLOBIN PATTERN = PROBABLE FAS."  The defendants also knew 
that "FAS" meant fetal adult sickle hemoglobin.  When the 
defendants were notified of these results, Strehler knew that 
the newborn screening of Gabrielle's blood indicated that she 
was a carrier of the sickle cell trait.  Strehler and 
Chippenham Pediatric were notified and knew that Mr. Didato 
was a carrier of the thalassemia trait.  The defendants also 
knew "that it was very possible that [the plaintiffs] would 
conceive together other children in the future."  The 
 
10
defendants "knew that any child born to [the plaintiffs] in 
the future had a 25 per cent risk of suffering from sickle 
cell beta thalassemia." 
 
After Gabrielle's birth, Mrs. Didato, "acting on her 
behalf and on behalf of Gabrielle and [Mr.] Didato, asked an 
employee of Chippenham Pediatric about the results of the 
newborn screening of Gabrielle and was informed by an employee 
acting in the scope of the employee's employment by Chippenham 
Pediatric and authorized to speak on behalf of Chippenham 
Pediatric that since Mrs. Didato had not been informed about 
any abnormality by Dr. Strehler or Chippenham Pediatric, it 
meant the newborn screening was normal." 
 
The plaintiffs reasonably relied upon the representation 
of Chippenham Pediatric that Gabrielle's newborn screening 
results were normal.  The plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendants knew that the plaintiffs would rely upon these 
representations. 
 
On May 12, 1998, Mrs. Didato gave birth to Nicholas, who 
was subsequently diagnosed as suffering from sickle cell beta 
O thalassemia.  The plaintiffs learned for the first time, 
after Nicholas' birth, that Gabrielle was a carrier of the 
sickle cell trait.  Had the defendants informed the plaintiffs 
that Gabrielle was a carrier of the sickle cell trait, the 
plaintiffs would not have conceived any additional children 
 
11
thereby avoiding the risk of having a child born with sickle 
cell beta thalassemia. 
III. 
A. 
 
Plaintiffs argue that they pled sufficient facts to 
support a cause of action for negligence against the 
defendants and that contrary to the circuit court's ruling, a 
physician-patient relationship existed between the plaintiffs 
and the defendants.  The defendants respond that the 
plaintiffs were not patients of Strehler or Chippenham 
Pediatric within the meaning of Code § 8.01-581.1 and, 
therefore, they did not owe any duties to the plaintiffs.  
Hence, the defendants contend that the plaintiffs failed to 
plead a cause of action against them.  We disagree with the 
defendants. 
 
Code § 8.01-581.1, which is a part of the Virginia 
Medical Malpractice Act, states in relevant part: 
 
" 'Health care' means any act, or treatment 
performed or furnished, or which should have been 
performed or furnished, by any health care provider 
for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the 
patient's medical diagnosis, care, treatment or 
confinement. 
 
" 'Health care provider' means (i) a person, 
corporation, facility or institution licensed by 
this Commonwealth to provide health care or 
professional services as a physician or hospital 
. . . [or] (ii) a professional corporation . . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
12
 
 
" 'Malpractice' means any tort based on health 
care or professional services rendered, or which 
should have been rendered, by a health care 
provider, to a patient. 
 
" 'Patient' means any natural person who 
receives or should have received health care from a 
licensed health care provider except those persons 
who are given health care in an emergency situation 
which exempts the health care provider from 
liability for his emergency services in accordance 
with § 8.01-225." 
 
 
There is no dispute that the defendants are health care 
providers within the meaning of the Medical Malpractice Act.  
The only dispute is whether the plaintiffs are patients within 
the meaning of the Act. 
 
The plaintiffs pled in their amended motions for judgment 
that they requested the defendants to provide all health care 
that a family should receive from a pediatrician and a 
professional corporation engaged in providing health care 
services relating to the practice of pediatrics.  The 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants agreed to provide the 
Didato family with the requested services.  Code § 8.01-581.1 
defines a patient as "any natural person who receives or 
should have received health care from a licensed health care 
provider."  Applying the definitions in Code § 8.01-581.1, we 
hold that the plaintiffs pled sufficient facts which, if 
proven at a trial, would establish the existence of a 
 
13
physician-patient relationship between the plaintiffs and the 
defendants. 
 
Additionally, we observe that "[a] physician's duty 
arises only upon the creation of a physician-patient 
relationship; that relationship springs from a consensual 
transaction, a contract, express or implied, general or 
special . . . and a patient is entitled to damages resulting 
from a breach of a physician's duty."  Lyons v. Grether, 218 
Va. 630, 633, 239 S.E.2d 103, 105 (1977) (citations omitted); 
accord Prosise v. Foster, 261 Va. 417, 421, 544 S.E.2d 331, 
332 (2001).  The facts pled in the plaintiffs' motions, if 
proven at trial, would permit a jury to find that a physician-
patient relationship existed between the plaintiffs and the 
defendants. 
 
The defendants, relying upon Gray v. INOVA Health Care 
Services, 257 Va. 597, 514 S.E.2d 355 (1999), contend that as 
a matter of law, they owed no duties to the plaintiffs.  We 
disagree.  Our decision in Gray is simply not pertinent here. 
 
In Gray, we considered "whether a parent who witnesses 
the effects of a negligent tort committed upon a child in the 
presence of the parent has a cause of action in tort against 
the tortfeasor for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
and its symptomatic effects."  Id. at 598, 514 S.E.2d at 355-
56.  Holly Gray alleged in her motion for judgment that her 
 
14
three-year-old daughter was admitted to a hospital owned and 
operated by INOVA Health Care Services.  According to her 
motion, health care providers negligently administered the 
drug Fentanyl to Mrs. Gray's daughter during a procedure to 
test her for meningitis.  The daughter experienced a 
convulsion, stopped breathing, and her face turned blue.  Mrs. 
Gray, who was "standing next to her daughter . . . observed 
the condition of her daughter [and Gray] experienced extreme 
fright and shock, temporarily blacked out, fell to the floor, 
and became physically sick and vomited."  Id., 514 S.E.2d at 
356. 
 
We reviewed the allegations contained in Gray's motion 
for judgment, and we held that INOVA owed no duty to Mrs. Gray 
because she was not the patient upon whom medical tests were 
performed.  Id. at 599, 514 S.E.2d at 356.  Unlike the 
pleadings in Gray, the plaintiffs' motions for judgment filed 
in the present cases contain allegations that defendants 
Strehler and Chippenham Pediatric "agreed to provide the 
Didato family all health care [that] members of a family 
should receive from a pediatrician and a professional 
corporation engaged in providing health care services relating 
to the practice of pediatrics." 
 
Moreover, we have stated that a "plaintiff who seeks to 
establish actionable negligence must plead the existence of a 
 
15
legal duty, violation of that duty, and proximate causation 
which results in injury."  Delk v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare 
Corp., 259 Va. 125, 132, 523 S.E.2d 826, 830 (2000).  The 
plaintiffs pled that in 1987, a consensus was reached among 
representatives of the concerned medical specialties, 
including pediatricians, that "[g]ood medical practice 
dictated that screening for sickle cell disease and 
thalassemia should be provided to all newborns," that the 
results of such tests should be communicated to the parents of 
the child and that "[a] referral source for family testing and 
genetic counseling should be clearly identified for the 
parents."  Assuming that the plaintiffs can establish at a 
trial that the standard of care in this Commonwealth required 
that a reasonably prudent pediatrician discharge these duties, 
that the defendants failed to do so, and that their failure 
was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries, then the 
plaintiffs would establish prima facie cases of negligence. 
B. 
 
The plaintiffs contend that their amended motions for 
judgment contain cognizable causes of action against the 
defendants because the plaintiffs pled that "the defendants 
assumed a duty to exercise reasonable care in the 
communication of information [to them,] even if no duty had 
existed prior to this undertaking."  Thus, the plaintiffs 
 
16
contend that the circuit court erred in sustaining the 
defendants' demurrers.  Responding, the defendants state that 
they cannot assume a duty to a non-patient to comply with the 
standard of care set forth in [Code] § 8.01-581.20, which 
states in relevant part: 
 
"A.  In any proceeding before a medical 
malpractice review panel or in any action against a 
physician . . . or other health care provider to 
recover damages alleged to have been caused by 
medical malpractice where the acts or omissions so 
complained of are alleged to have occurred in this 
Commonwealth, the standard of care by which the acts 
or omissions are to be judged shall be that degree 
of skill and diligence practiced by a reasonably 
prudent practitioner in the field of practice or 
specialty in this Commonwealth and the testimony of 
an expert witness, otherwise qualified, as to such 
standard of care, shall be admitted; provided, 
however, that the standard of care in the locality 
or in similar localities in which the alleged act or 
omission occurred shall be applied if any party 
shall prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the health care services and health care facilities 
available in the locality and the customary 
practices in such locality or similar localities 
give rise to a standard of care which is more 
appropriate than a statewide standard. . . . 
 
"B.  In any action for damages resulting from 
medical malpractice, any issue as to the standard of 
care to be applied shall be determined by the jury, 
or the court trying the case without a jury." 
 
We disagree with the defendants' contentions. 
 
As the plaintiffs correctly point out, and the defendants 
do not dispute, we have cited with approval the legal 
principle that "[i]t is ancient learning that one who assumes 
to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject 
 
17
to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all."  Nolde 
Bros. v. Wray, 221 Va. 25, 28, 266 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1980) 
(quoting Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (N.Y. 1922)); 
accord Ring v. Poelman, 240  Va. 323, 326, 397 S.E.2d 824, 826 
(1990); Cofield v. Nuckles, 239 Va. 186, 192, 387 S.E.2d 493, 
496 (1990).  We also observe that this common law principle is 
embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323: 
"One who undertakes, gratuitously or for 
consideration, to render services to another which 
he should recognize as necessary for the protection 
of the other's person or things, is subject to 
liability to the other for physical harm resulting 
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to 
perform his undertaking, if 
 
"(a) his failure to exercise such care 
increases the risk of such harm, or  
 
"(b) the harm is suffered because of the 
other's reliance upon the undertaking." 
 
 
Even if the plaintiffs are unable to establish with 
evidence at trial that the standard of care required that a 
reasonably prudent pediatrician communicate certain 
information to them, the plaintiffs pled sufficient facts 
which, if proven at trial, would permit the finder of fact to 
conclude that the defendants assumed the duty to convey to the 
plaintiffs the correct results of their daughter's test, which 
indicated that she carried the sickle cell trait. 
 
The defendants' contention that they could not assume a 
duty to a non-patient to comply with the standard of care in 
Code § 8.01-581.20 is without merit.  We find no language in 
 
18
Code § 8.01-581.20 which vitiates the common law rule that one 
who assumes a duty must discharge that duty with reasonable 
care. 
C. 
 
The plaintiffs contend that "[u]nder certain 
circumstances . . . a physician will owe a duty to a person 
who is not a patient if there is a special relationship 
between the person and the physician."  Continuing, the 
plaintiffs contend that a special relationship existed between 
them and the defendants which imposed certain duties upon the 
defendants, including the duty to warn the plaintiffs that 
there was "a mathematically certain risk of 25% that any 
future child of the Didatos would suffer from sickle cell beta 
O thalassemia."  The plaintiffs rely upon the following 
decisions to support their contentions:  Thompson v. Skate 
America, Inc., 261 Va. 121, 540 S.E.2d 123 (2001); Delk, 259 
Va. 125, 523 S.E.2d 826; A.H. v. Rockingham Publishing Co., 
255 Va. 216, 495 S.E.2d 482 (1998); and Burdette v. Marks, 244 
Va. 309, 421 S.E.2d 419 (1992).  We disagree with the 
plaintiffs' contentions. 
 
We have held that generally a person does not have a duty 
to protect another from the conduct of third persons.  Delk, 
259 Va. at 132, 523 S.E.2d at 830; Burdette, 244 Va. at 311, 
421 S.E.2d at 420; Marshall v. Winston, 239 Va. 315, 318, 389 
 
19
S.E.2d 902, 904 (1990).  However, we stated that this general 
rule does not apply when a special relationship exists between 
a defendant and a plaintiff which gives rise to a right to 
protection to the plaintiff or between the defendant and third 
persons which imposes a duty upon the defendant to control the 
third person's conduct.  Thompson, 261 Va. at 129, 540 S.E.2d 
at 127; Delk, 259 Va. at 132, 523 S.E.2d at 830-31; A.H., 255 
Va. at 220, 495 S.E.2d at 485; Burdette, 244 Va. at 312, 421 
S.E.2d at 420; Dudley v. Offender Aid & Restoration, 241 Va. 
270, 276, 401 S.E.2d 878, 881 (1991); Fox v. Custis, 236 Va. 
69, 74, 372 S.E.2d 373, 375 (1988); Klingbeil Management Group 
Co. v. Vito, 233 Va. 445, 447-48, 357 S.E.2d 200, 201 (1987).  
We hold that the plaintiffs failed to plead cognizable causes 
of action within the ambit of our jurisprudence governing 
special relationships as discussed in Thompson v. Skate 
America, Delk v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., A.H. v. 
Rockingham Publishing Co., Burdette v. Marks, and Nasser v. 
Parker, 249 Va. 172, 455 S.E.2d 502 (1995), because those 
relationships give rise to a duty of protection from criminal 
acts committed by third parties.  The legal principles 
articulated and applied in these cases have no application 
here. 
IV. 
 
20
 
Accordingly, we will affirm that portion of the circuit  
court's judgments that sustained the defendants' demurrers on 
the basis that the plaintiffs failed to plead causes of action 
that gave rise to a special relationship between the 
plaintiffs and the defendants.  We will reverse the remaining 
portions of the circuit court's judgments, and we will remand 
these cases for further proceedings on the plaintiffs' claims 
of negligence and assumption of duties. 
Record No. 003030 – Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
and remanded. 
 
Record No. 003031 – Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
and remanded. 
 
21