Case Title: Pipher v. Parsell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 215, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KRISTYN PIPHER, 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 215, 2006 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   Court Below—Superior Court 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for Kent County 
JOHNATHAN PARSELL,1 
 
§   C.A. No. 04C-05-024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  April 4, 2007 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  June 19, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS, 
Justices, and NOBLE, Vice Chancellor2 (constituting the Court en Banc). 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and 
REMANDED. 
 
 
Kevin M. Howard, Esquire, Young, Malmberg & Howard, Dover, 
Delaware, for appellant. 
 
Philip T. Edwards, Esquire (argued) and Roger D. Landon, Esquire, 
Murphy, Spadaro & Landon, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee, Johnathan 
Parsell. 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
                                          
 
1 Johnathan Parsell is the only defendant who is the subject of this appeal.  This Court 
corrected the caption of the proceeding sua sponte.   
2 Sitting by designation pursuant to Del. Const. art. IV, § 12 and Supr. Ct. R. 2 and 4. 
 
2
 
The plaintiff-appellant, Kristyn Pipher (“Pipher”), appeals from the 
Superior Court’s judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant-
appellee, Johnathan Parsell (“Parsell”).  Pipher argues that the Superior 
Court erred when it ruled that, as a matter of law, Parsell was not negligent.  
We agree and hold that the issue of Parsell’s negligence should have been 
submitted to the jury.   
Facts 
 
On March 20, 2002, around 6 p.m., Pipher, Parsell and Johnene Beisel 
(“Beisel”), also a defendant,3 were traveling south on Delaware Route 1 near 
Lewes, Delaware, in Parsell’s pickup truck.  All three were sitting on the 
front seat.  Parsell was driving, Pipher was sitting in the middle, and Beisel 
was in the passenger seat next to the door.  They were all sixteen-years-old 
at the time.   
As they were traveling at 55 mph, Beisel unexpectedly “grabbed the 
steering wheel causing the truck to veer off onto the shoulder of the road.”  
Parsell testified that Beisel’s conduct caused him both shock and surprise.  
Although Beisel’s conduct prompted him to be on his guard, Parsell further 
testified that he did not expect Beisel to grab the wheel again.  Nevertheless, 
                                          
 
3 Pipher was awarded $70,150.00 in damages against Beisel.  However, Beisel was not 
located before, during, or after trial.  
 
 
3
his recognition of how serious Beisel’s conduct was, shows he was aware 
that he now had someone in his car who had engaged in dangerous behavior. 
Parsell testified that he did nothing in response to Beisel’s initial 
action.  Approximately thirty seconds later, Beisel again yanked the steering 
wheel, causing Parsell’s truck to leave the roadway, slide down an 
embankment and strike a tree.  Pipher was injured as a result of the collision.  
 
Pipher’s testimony at trial was for the most part consistent with 
Parsell’s testimony.  Pipher recalled that the three occupants in the vehicle 
were talking back and forth and that the mood was light as they drove south 
on Route 1.  She also testified that after Beisel yanked the steering wheel for 
the first time, Parsell was able to regain control of the truck.  According to 
Pipher, despite the dangerous nature of the conduct, Parsell and Beisel just 
laughed about it like it was a joke.  Pipher testified she felt that Beisel 
grabbed the steering wheel a second time because Parsell “laughed it off” 
the first time.    
At trial, Parsell acknowledged that he could have taken different steps 
to try to prevent Beisel from grabbing the steering wheel a second time.  
First, Parsell acknowledged, he could have admonished Beisel not to touch 
the steering wheel again.  Second, he acknowledged that he could have 
pulled over to the side of the road and required Beisel to get into the back 
 
4
seat.  Third, Parsell acknowledged that he could have warned Beisel that he 
would put her out of the vehicle.   
 
The trial judge concluded that, as a matter of law, Parsell had no duty 
to do anything after Beisel yanked the wheel the first time because it would 
be reasonable for the driver to assume that it would not happen again.  The 
trial judge also ruled that (1) there was no negligence in failing to discharge 
the dangerous passenger and (2) that failing to admonish the dangerous 
passenger was not negligence and could not be considered a proximate cause 
of Pipher’s injuries.   
Standard of Review 
 
In order to establish a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish that 
“defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care; defendant breached that duty; and 
defendant’s breach was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury.”4  The 
defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the plaintiff fails to 
establish a prima facie case of negligence, or under no reasonable view of 
the evidence could a jury find in favor of the plaintiff.5  Disputed issues of 
foreseeability and proximate cause involve factual determinations that must 
be submitted to a jury.   
                                          
 
4 New Haverford P’ship v. Stroot, 772 A.2d 792, 798 (Del. 2001). 
5 Eustice v. Rupert, 460 A.2d 507, 509 (Del. 1983).  
 
5
“To be held liable in negligence, a defendant must have been under a 
legal obligation—a duty—to protect the plaintiff from the risk of harm 
which caused his injuries.”6  This Court has recognized that “whether a duty 
exists is entirely a question of law, to be determined by reference to the body 
of statutes, rules, principles and precedents which make up the law; and it 
must be determined by the court.”7  If no duty exists, "a trial court is 
authorized to grant judgment as a matter of law."8  On appeal, questions of 
law are reviewed de novo.   
Duty of Driver 
A "driver owes a duty of care to her [or his] passengers because it is 
foreseeable that they may be injured if, through inattention or otherwise, the 
driver involves the car she [or he] is operating in a collision."9  Almost forty-
five years ago, this Court held that a minor who operates a motor vehicle on 
the highways of Delaware will be held to the same standard of care and 
“must accord his [or her] own passengers the same diligence and protection 
which is required of an adult motorist under similar circumstances.”10  The 
following year, this Court recognized an important correlative principle:  
                                          
 
6 Fritz v. Yeager, 790 A.2d 469, 471 (Del. 2002).   
7 Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
8 Id. (citing Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 50). 
9 Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222, 235 (Del. Ch. 1990). 
10 Wagner v. Shanks, 194 A.2d 701, 708 (Del. 1963). 
 
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“One riding as a passenger in a motor vehicle . . . has the right to assume 
that the driver will exercise reasonable care and caution and is under no duty 
to supervise the driving . . . in the absence of knowledge that the driver is 
unfit or incompetent to drive.”11   
Pipher argues that after Beisel grabbed the steering wheel initially, 
Parsell was on notice that a dangerous situation could reoccur in the truck.  
Pipher further argues that once Parsell had notice of a possibly dangerous 
situation, he had a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect his passengers 
from that harm.  Finally, Pipher concludes that Parsell was negligent when 
he kept driving without attempting to remove, or at least address, that risk.   
 
In a similar case, the Supreme Court of Vermont held a driver was 
liable for damages resulting from the passenger seizing the driver’s arm.12  
In that case, a drunken passenger known for being a “playful fellow,” and 
having previously attempted to shake hands with the driver of the vehicle 
over the course of fifteen minutes, then seized the arm of the driver, causing 
the vehicle to collide with a farm wagon.  The Vermont Court held that the 
knowledge the passenger was “a playful fellow” and had in the course of the 
ride “persisted in trying to shake hands” with the driver “should have 
forecast the peril of an accident to an operator of reasonable prudence and 
                                          
 
11 Clayton v. Dartozewiski, 198 A.2d 692, 695 (Del. 1964).   
12 Bessette v. Humiston, 157 A.2d 468 (Vt. 1960). 
 
7
vigilance.”13  In such cases, the driver is expected to make a reasonable 
attempt to prevent the passenger from taking such actions again.   
 
In general, where the actions of a passenger that cause an accident are 
not foreseeable, there is no negligence attributable to the driver.14  But, when 
actions of a passenger that interfere with the driver’s safe operation of the 
motor vehicle are foreseeable, the failure to prevent such conduct may be a 
breach of the driver’s duty to either other passengers or to the public.15  
Under the circumstances of this case, a reasonable jury could find that 
Parsell breached his duty to protect Pipher from Beisel by preventing Beisel 
from grabbing the steering wheel a second time.   
Conclusion 
The issue of Parsell’s alleged breach of duty to Pipher, the 
forseeability of Beisel’s repeat conduct, and the proximate cause of Pipher’s 
injuries were all factual determinations that should have been submitted to 
the jury.16  Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court, that was 
entered as a matter of law, is reversed.  This matter is remanded for further 
proceedings in accordance with this opinion.   
                                          
 
13 Id. at 470.  Compare Brown v. Mobley, 488 S.E.2d 710 (Ga. App. 1997) (no evidence 
that eventual conduct of intoxicated passenger should have been anticipated). 
14 See, e.g., Robinson v. Butler, 33 N.W.2d 821 (Minn. 1948). 
15 Wagner v. Shanks, 194 A.2d 701 (Del. 1963); Bessette v. Humiston, 157 A.2d 468 (Vt. 
1960).  See also Linde v. Emmick, 61 P.2d 338 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1936). 
16 Duphilly v. Delaware Elec. Coop., Inc., 662 A.2d 821, 830 (Del. 1995).