Case Title: Sanders v. E. I. Campbell et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2120035

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2013-03-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 03/15/2013 
Notice: T h i s 
o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l 
r e v i s i o n b e f o r e 
p u b l i c a t i o n i n 
t h e advance 
s h e e t s o f 
Southern Reporter. 
R e a d e r s a r e 
r e q u e s t e d t o 
n o t i f y t h e 
Reporter of Decisions, 
Alabama 
A p p e l l a t e 
C o u r t s , 
300 D e x t e r Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 
((334) 
2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f 
any t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n 
o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may be made 
b e f o r e t h e 
o p i n i o n i s 
p r i n t e d i n 
Southern Reporter. 
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS 
OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 
2120035 
Nandean Sanders 
v. 
E.I. Campbell e t a l . 
Appeal from Dallas C i r c u i t Court 
(CV-09-86) 
THOMAS, Judge. 
Nandean Sanders a p p e a l s 
from a judgment o f t h e D a l l a s 
C i r c u i t C o u r t ("the 
t r i a l c o u r t " ) i n 
f a v o r o f E . I . C a m p b e l l , 
A v e r l i n e C a m p b e l l , and J e r r y W i n s t o n Lawrence 
( h e r e i n a f t e r 
2120035 
c o l l e c t i v e l y r e f e r r e d t o as "the d e f e n d a n t s " ) . 
We d i s m i s s the 
a p p e a l as h a v i n g been t a k e n from a n o n f i n a l judgment. 
Sanders and the d e f e n d a n t s a r e the owners of a d j o i n i n g 
p r o p e r t i e s l o c a t e d i n D a l l a s County. 
On May 13, 2009, Sanders 
f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t a s k i n g the 
t r i a l c o u r t f o r d e c l a r a t i v e and 
i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f r e g a r d i n g a d i s p u t e d s t r i p o f p r o p e r t y 
("the 
d i s p u t e d 
p r o p e r t y " ) 
t h a t 
Sanders 
and 
the 
d e f e n d a n t s 
b o t h 
c l a i m e d t o own. 
On 
J u l y 16, 2009, the d e f e n d a n t s 
f i l e d 
an 
answer t o the c o m p l a i n t 
and a c o u n t e r c l a i m a s k i n g the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
t o 
e s t a b l i s h 
the 
boundary 
l i n e 
between 
Sanders's 
p r o p e r t y and the d e f e n d a n t s ' s 
p r o p e r t y , t o o r d e r Sanders t o 
"cease and 
d e s i s t from her encroachment of and 
e f f o r t s 
t o 
c l a i m 
any 
r i g h t , 
t i t l e 
or 
i n t e r e s t 
i n 
[ t h e 
d i s p u t e d ] 
p r o p e r t y , " 
and 
t o 
e n t e r 
a permanent 
i n j u n c t i o n 
e n j o i n i n g 
Sanders from t r e s p a s s i n g on 
the d i s p u t e d p r o p e r t y . 
Sanders 
f i l e d an answer t o the c o u n t e r c l a i m on J u l y 17, 2009. 
A 
t r i a l 
was 
h e l d on May 
10, 
2011, 
a t w h i c h the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t h e a r d 
e v i d e n c e 
ore t e n u s . 
The 
t r i a l 
c o u r t e n t e r e d 
a 
judgment on A p r i l 4, 2012 
("the 
A p r i l 4 judgment"), i n f a v o r 
of the d e f e n d a n t s . 
The 
A p r i l 4 judgment s t a t e d : 
"1. Judgment i s i n f a v o r o f the Defendants, 
E . I . 
C a m p b e l l , 
A v e r l i n e 
Campbell 
and 
J e r r y 
Winston 
2 
2120035 
Lawrence 
and 
a g a i n s t 
t h e 
P l a i n t i f f , 
Na[n]dean 
Sanders, on account o f s t a t u t o r y adverse p o s s e s s i o n . 
Defendants met t h e i r burden and p r o p e r l y 
s a t i s f i e d 
the c o u r t t h a t t h e y a r e c o t e r m i n o u s landowners w i t h 
[ S a n d e r s ] and have h e l d a c t u a l p o s s e s s i o n 
o f t h e 
d i s p u t e d 
s t r i p o f l a n d o p e n l y and e x c l u s i v e l y 
f o r 
more t h a n 10 y e a r s , b e l i e v i n g i t 
t o be t h e a c t u a l 
p r o p e r t y 
l i n e . S t r i c k l a n d v. Markos, 566 So. 2d 229 
( A l a . 1990); K u b i s z y n v. B r a d l e y , 292 A l a . 57, 298 
So. 2d 9 
(1974). 
"2. That d e f e n d a n t s have h e l d t h e l a n d between t h e 
p a r t i e s t h a t i n c l u d e s t h e f l o w e r b e d as t e s t i f i e d and 
p r e s e n t e d i n c o u r t , and t h r e e (3) f e e t beyond such 
p o i n t . S a i d p o i n t s h a l l be t h e p r o p e r l y e s t a b l i s h e d 
p r o p e r t y 
l i n e f o r s a i d p a r t i e s . The d e f e n d a n t s a r e 
a u t h o r i z e d , a t t h e i r expenses, t o have p r e p a r e d a 
boundary s u r v e y t o r e f l e c t such and r e t u r n i t 
t o 
t h i s c o u r t 
w i t h i n 60 days o f the d a t e o f t h i s 
o r d e r 
f o r f u r t h e r o r d e r s . 
"3. I f t h e boundary s u r v e y i s n o t r e t u r n e d t o t h i s 
c o u r t w i t h i n t h e above s a i d 60 days, then t h e c o u r t 
h e r [ e ] b y a p p o i n t s and a u t h o r i z e s Mr. G l e n McCord ... 
as 
t h e s u r v e y o r / l a n d 
e n g i n e e r , 
t o p e r f o r m 
s a i d 
s u r v e y i n t h i s case, the c o s t o f w h i c h w i l l be t a x e d 
e q u a l l y a g a i n s t t h e p a r t i e s . "
1 
1 I t appears t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t r e l i e d on § 35-3-3, 
A l a . 
Code 1975, w h i c h p r o v i d e s : 
"The 
judgment 
s h a l l 
l o c a t e 
and 
d e f i n e t h e 
boundary l i n e s i n v o l v e d by r e f e r e n c e t o well-known  
permanent landmarks, and i f 
i t s h a l l be deemed f o r 
the 
i n t e r e s t o f t h e p a r t i e s , 
a f t e r the e n t r y o f 
judgment, t h e c o u r t may d i r e c t a competent 
s u r v e y o r 
t o e s t a b l i s h a permanent stone o r i r o n landmark i n 
a c c o r d a n c e 
w i t h 
t h e judgment 
from 
w h i c h 
f u t u r e 
s u r v e y s o f t h e l a n d embraced i n t h e judgment 
s h a l l 
be made. Such landmarks s h a l l have d i s t i n c t l y c u t 
o r 
marked 
t h e r e o n 
' j u d i c i a l 
l a n d m a r k . ' The 
s u r v e y o r 
3 
2120035 
Sanders f i l e d what she s t y l e d as a m o t i o n f o r a new 
t r i a l 
p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 9 ( a ) , A l a . R. 
C i v . P., 
on A p r i l 18, 
2012; 
the d e f e n d a n t s f i l e d an o b j e c t i o n . A h e a r i n g was h e l d on June 
11, 2012; 
however, c o u n s e l 
f o r the d e f e n d a n t s was 
u n a b l e t o 
a t t e n d the h e a r i n g . 
The 
t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d an o r d e r on June 
13, 2012, 
i n d i c a t i n g t h a t , a t the h e a r i n g , Sanders had 
o r a l l y 
r e q u e s t e d t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t i n s t r u c t the d e f e n d a n t s t o s t o p 
c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a fence on the d i s p u t e d boundary l i n e and 
t o 
remove 
any 
p a r t s 
of 
the 
fence 
t h a t 
had 
a l r e a d y 
been 
c o n s t r u c t e d . 
In the o r d e r , 
the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t i n s t r u c t e d the 
d e f e n d a n t s t o cease c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the fence and t o remove 
any 
s t r u c t u r e t h e y had caused t o be p l a c e d on the 
d i s p u t e d 
s h a l l make r e p o r t t o the c o u r t , and 
i n h i s 
r e p o r t 
s h a l l 
a c c u r a t e l y d e s c r i b e 
the landmark so 
e r e c t e d 
and d e f i n e i t s l o c a t i o n as n e a r l y as p r a c t i c a b l e . " 
(Emphasis added.) 
W i t h o u t 
a d d r e s s i n g 
the 
m e r i t s 
o f 
t h i s 
a p p e a l , we note t h a t "decrees e s t a b l i s h i n g 
b o u n d a r i e s between 
c o t e r m i n o u s l a n d s must be r e a s o n a b l y 
d e f i n i t e and c e r t a i n i n 
t h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n s and t h a t a s c e r t a i n e d boundary l i n e s must be 
c a p a b l e 
of 
b e i n g 
p h y s i c a l l y i d e n t i f i e d , 
t h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n 
l e a v i n g no room f o r the e x e r c i s e o f d i s c r e t i o n as t o 
t h e i r 
l o c a t i o n . 
Ray 
v. 
R o b i n s o n , 
388 
So. 
2d 
957 
( A l a . 
1980)." 
T i d w e l l v. S t r i c k l e r , 457 
So. 2d 365, 
368 
( A l a . 1984). 
4 
2120035 
p r o p e r t y . 
The 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
a l s o c o n t i n u e d 
the 
h e a r i n g 
on 
Sanders's p u r p o r t e d postjudgment m o t i o n .
2 
On J u l y 19, 2012, 
the 
t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d an o r d e r t h a t 
s t a t e d t h a t Sanders's motion f o r a new 
t r i a l had been d e n i e d 
by o p e r a t i o n o f l a w
3 
and t h a t a l s o a d d r e s s e d 
q u e s t i o n s 
the 
p a r t i e s 
had 
r a i s e d r e g a r d i n g 
the 
f i n a l i t y 
o f t h e 
A p r i l 
4 
judgment, 
s t a t i n g : 
" T h i s [ c ] o u r t i s o f the o p i n i o n t h a t a l l a c t i o n a b l e 
i s s u e s were f u l l y a d j u d i c a t e d by t h i s C o u r t ' s 
o r d e r 
o f 
[ A p r i l 
4 ] , 
2012, 
and 
t h a t 
the 
p r o v i s i o n s 
o f 
p a r a g r a p h s 2 and 
3 p e r t a i n i n g t o a s u r v e y 
o f 
the 
p r o p e r l y 
e s t a b l i s h e d 
boundary 
l i n e 
a r e 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e i n n a t u r e o n l y , and t h e r e f o r e , t h e r e 
b e i n g 
no 
j u s t 
reason 
f o r d e l a y , 
t h i s 
C o u r t 
does 
h e r e b y d i r e c t the e n t r y o f f i n a l judgment i n f a v o r 
o f the d e f e n d a n t s and 
a g a i n s t [ S a n d e r s ] 
i n 
a c c o r d 
w i t h the p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s C o u r t ' s o r d e r o f [ A p r i l 
4 ] , 
2012." 
2On 
June 
13, 
2012, 
the 
d e f e n d a n t s 
f i l e d 
a m o t i o n 
t o 
r e c o n s i d e r the t r i a l c o u r t ' s o r d e r i n s t r u c t i n g them t o remove 
the f e n c e . 
The 
t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d an o r d e r on June 16, 
2012, 
t h a t 
r e a d , 
s i m p l y : 
"motion 
t o 
r e c o n s i d e r 
f i l e d 
by 
[ t h e 
d e f e n d a n t s ] 
i s h e r e b y 
g r a n t e d 
i n p a r t . " 
The 
motion 
and 
subsequent o r d e r are not a t i s s u e i n t h i s 
a p p e a l . 
3 S a n d e r s f i l e d the m o t i o n s t y l e d as a motion f o r a 
new 
t r i a l 
on 
A p r i l 
18, 
2012. 
P u r s u a n t 
t o Rule 
59.1, 
such 
a 
postjudgment m o t i o n would have been d e n i e d by o p e r a t i o n o f law 
on J u l y 17, 2012, 
90 days a f t e r i t was 
f i l e d . 
5 
2120035 
Sanders 
f i l e d an a p p e a l w i t h our supreme c o u r t on August 29, 
2012; t h a t c o u r t then t r a n s f e r r e d the cause t o t h i s 
c o u r t , 
p u r s u a n t t o § 1 2 - 2 - 7 ( 6 ) , A l a . 
Code 1975. 
A l t h o u g h no p a r t y has r a i s e d t h e i s s u e o f t h i s c o u r t ' s 
j u r i s d i c t i o n on a p p e a l , 
" ' " [ j ] u r i s d i c t i o n a l 
m a t t e r s a r e of such magnitude 
t h a t we t a k e n o t i c e o f them a t any time and do so 
even ex mero m o t u . W a l l a c e v. Tee Jays Mfg. Co., 
689 So. 2d 210, 211 ( A l a . 
C i v . App. 1997) ( q u o t i n g 
Nunn v. Baker, 518 So. 2d 711, 712 ( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) ) . The 
t i m e l y 
f i l i n g 
o f 
a 
n o t i c e 
of 
a p p e a l 
i s 
a 
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l 
a c t . W i l l i a m s o n 
v. 
F o u r t h 
Ave. 
 
Supermarket, 
I n c . , 12 
So. 
3d 
1200, 
1202 ( A l a . 
2 
0 
0 
9 ) . " 
Burgess v. B u r g e s s , 
99 So. 3d 1237, 1239 
( A l a . 
C i v . App. 
2012). 
Our supreme c o u r t has s t a t e d : 
"'"'As 
t h i s 
c o u r t has 
s 
a i 
d 
ma ny 
t i mes 
p r e v i o u s l y , 
a 
f i n a l 
judgment 
i s 
n e c e s s a r y 
t o g i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n t o 
t h i s 
c o u r t 
on 
an 
a p p e a l , 
and i t cannot 
be 
w a i v e d 
by 
the 
p a r t i e s 
' 
II 
I 
II 
"'"When 
i t i s 
d e t e r m i n e d 
t h a t an o r d e r a p p e a l e d 
from i s 
not a f i n a l judgment, i t i s t h e 
6 
2120035 
d u t y of the C o u r t t o d i s m i s s 
the 
a p p e a l ex mero motu." 
" ' P o w e l l v. R e p u b l i c N a t ' l L i f e I n s . 
Co., 
293 
A l a . 
101, 
102, 
300 
So. 
2d 
359, 
360 
(1974) ( q u o t i n g McGowin Investment Co. 
v. 
 
J o h n s t o n e , 291 
A l a . 714, 
715, 
287 
So. 
2d 
835, 
836 
(1973)). 
" ' " O r d i n a r i l y , an a p p e a l 
can 
be 
b r o u g h t 
o n l y 
from 
a 
f i n a l 
judgment. 
A l a . 
Code 
1975, 
§ 
12-22-2. 
I f 
a 
case 
i n v o l v e s 
m u l t i p l e 
c l a i m s 
or 
m u l t i p l e 
p a r t i e s , 
an 
o r d e r 
i s g e n e r a l l y 
not 
f i n a l 
u n l e s s 
i t d i s p o s e s 
of 
a l l 
c l a i m s 
as 
t o 
a l l p a r t i e s . 
Rule 
5 4 ( b ) , 
A l a . 
R. 
C i v . 
P. 
However, when an a c t i o n c o n t a i n s 
more than 
one 
c l a i m f o r 
r e l i e f , 
Rule 
54(b) 
a l l o w s 
the 
c o u r t 
t o 
d i r e c t 
the 
e n t r y 
of 
a 
f i n a l 
judgment as t o one or more of the 
c l a i m s , 
i f i t makes the 
e x p r e s s 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
t h a t 
t h e r e 
i s 
no 
j u s t reason f o r d e l a y . " 
"'Grantham v. V a n d e r z y l , 
802 
So. 2d 
1077, 
1079-80 ( A l a . 2001).' 
"North Alabama E l e c . Coop. v. New Hope T e l . Coop., 
7 So. 3d 342, 344-45 ( A l a . 2008). 
"In 
r e f e r e n c e 
t o 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n s 
under 
R u l e 
5 4 ( b ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., 
t h i s C o u r t has s t a t e d t h a t 
"'a Rule 54(b) 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n s h o u l d not be 
e n t e r e d 
i f the i s s u e s i n the c l a i m 
b e i n g 
c e r t i f i e d 
and 
a 
c l a i m 
t h a t 
w i l l 
remain 
p e n d i n g i n the t r i a l c o u r t "'are so c l o s e l y 
i n t e r t w i n e d 
t h a t 
s e p a r a t e 
a d j u d i c a t i o n 
would 
pose 
an 
u n r e a s o n a b l e 
r i s k 
of 
7 
2120035 
i n c o n s i s t e n t 
r e s u l t s . ' " 
C l a r k e - M o b i l e 
 
C o u n t i e s Gas D i s t . v. P r i o r Energy Corp., 
834 
So. 2d 88, 95 
( A l a . 2002) 
( q u o t i n g 
B r a n c h v. S o u t h T r u s t Bank o f Dothan, N.A., 
514 So. 
2d 1373, 1374 ( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) ) . ' 
" S c h l a r b 
v. Lee, 955 So. 2d 418, 419-20 
( A l a . 
2006)." 
H a r l a n Home B u i l d e r s , 
I n c . v. H a y s l i p , 58 So. 3d 102, 
106 
( A l a . 
2010). 
The 
t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s 
judgment 
p u r p o r t s 
t o be a 
f i n a l 
judgment i n 
f a v o r o f 
t h e 
d e f e n d a n t s i n s o f a r as i t e s t a b l i s h e d 
the 
l o c a t i o n o f t h e boundary 
l i n e 
between t h e p a r t i e s ' 
p r o p e r t i e s ; 
however, 
t h e judgment d i d n o t a d d r e s s t h e 
d e f e n d a n t s ' c o u n t e r c l a i m 
f o r 
i n j u n c t i v e 
r e l i e f . 
I t 
i s our 
o p i n i o n t h a t t h e 
b o u n d a r y - l i n e d i s p u t e t h a t has 
been 
r e s o l v e d 
by t h e 
t r i a l c o u r t and the d e f e n d a n t s ' r e q u e s t f o r i n j u n c t i v e 
r e l i e f , 
i . e . , a permanent i n j u n c t i o n e n j o i n i n g Sanders from 
t r e s p a s s i n g on t h e d i s p u t e d 
p r o p e r t y , 
" ' " ' a r e so c l o s e l y 
i n t e r t w i n e d 
t h a t 
s e p a r a t e 
a d j u d i c a t i o n 
would 
pose 
an 
u n r e a s o n a b l e r i s k o f i n c o n s i s t e n t r e s u l t s . ' " ' " 
See 
H a r l a n Home  
B u i l d e r s , 
I n c . , 58 So. 3d a t 106. 
A c c o r d i n g l y , 
because 
Sanders a p p e a l s from a n o n f i n a l judgment, we must d i s m i s s t h e 
a p p e a l f o r l a c k o f s u b j e c t - m a t t e r 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . See Sexton v. 
S e x t o n , 
42 So. 3d 1280, 1282 ( A l a . 
C i v . App. 2010) 
8 
2120035 
( " G e n e r a l l y , an a p p e a l 
w i l l l i e o n l y from a f i n a l judgment, 
and 
i f t h e r e i s n o t a 
f i n a l 
judgment then 
t h i s 
c o u r t i s 
w i t h o u t 
j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear t h e a p p e a l . " ) . 
APPEAL DISMISSED. 
Thompson, P . J . , and P i t t m a n , Moore, and Donaldson, 
J J . , 
concur. 
9