Case Title: Kipp v. Brown

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87-193

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-03-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Kipp v. Brown1988 WY 36750 P.2d 1338Case Number: 87-193Decided: 03/11/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
PAUL E. KIPP, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

FRANKLIN E. BROWN, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Petition for review from 
the District Court, TetonCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

Paul E. Kipp, pro se.

Andrew L. 
Breffeilh, Jackson, for appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The only matter to be 
addressed in this case is our discipline of the appeal process by the 
enforcement of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. We find that the 
hazards of a litigant eschewing the services of an attorney and opting to 
represent himself are illustrated once again. The failure of the appellant to 
meet the requirements of Rule 5.01, W.R.A.P., in a number of respects, is so 
egregious that we must invoke the sanction of affirmance provided in Rule 1.02, 
W.R.A.P., without addressing any of the contentions of the appellant. The 
judgment of the district court is affirmed.

[¶2.]     Franklin E. Brown, the 
appellee in this proceeding, filed a complaint against Paul E. Kipp, the 
appellant, seeking the recovery of possession of a parcel of real property 
located in Teton County, 
Wyoming. The complaint alleged that 
Brown was the record owner in fee of the described property; that Kipp had 
trespassed on the premises for more than two years; and that, without the 
consent of Brown, Kipp had placed several fixtures, improvements and personalty 
on the property. First, in a response letter and, subsequently, in an answer to 
Brown's complaint, Kipp admitted his presence on the property, the addition of 
the various fixtures and improvements and the placing of personalty on the 
property. Kipp contended that his presence on the property as "site manager" not 
only was authorized but was, in fact, "ordered" by certain unidentified 
"offshore trust managers or trustees" holding mineral interests in the 
property.

[¶3.]     By interrogatories and 
a request for production of documents, Brown made a number of unsuccessful 
requests for specific information from Kipp with respect to the litigation. 
Brown then filed a motion to compel discovery. In response to that motion, the 
district court ordered that Kipp "fully and completely answer the 
Interrogatories served on him," and to "respond to the Request for Production of 
Documents served on him * * *." The court, in addition, ordered Kipp to pay $150 
to Brown for costs of the litigation. The order provided that Kipp's failure to 
comply would result in judgment against him.

[¶4.]     Responding to this 
order, Kipp filed "Answers to: `Motions to Compel Discovery'" in which he 
continued to deny his ability to answer the interrogatories and requested the 
court "to take judicial notice that defendant [Kipp] has already `made a good 
faith effort', to provide the information requested by plaintiffs [sic] 
attorney, and cannot provide information he is not privy to." Kipp also filed a 
"Motion to Rescind Orders, Motion to Deny Costs, Motion to Deny Judgement [sic] 
and Costs:." In that motion, Kipp stated, among other 
things:

"1: Defendant 
respectfully demands this court to, `rescind its order', of May 29, 1987, on 
grounds of the Court [sic] has no jurisdiction over defendant under 
constitutional law, rights, privileges and immunities, as retained by defendant 
as citizen voter of Teton County, State of Wyoming, or by authority of the 1872 
Mining Act, federally, and by Supreme Court of the United States and their 
mining decisions and amendments thereto.

* * * * * 
*

"3: Defendant should not 
be `ordered' or forced to subject himself to payment of an enforced, `illegal 
sum of money as a fine', because said defendant asserted his constitutional 
rights, and his answers truthfully, to this Court, in previously filed motions 
or answers to Plaintiffs [sic] requests."

Kipp produced 
nothing further in the nature of answers to interrogatories or documents as the 
order had required him to do.

[¶5.]     The trial court then 
determined that Kipp had failed to comply with its order concerning discovery, 
and it entered judgment against Kipp pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(C), W.R.C.P. The 
judgment which was entered granted a writ of possession of the property to Brown 
and "permanently enjoined and restrained" Kipp "from entering, occupying, 
possessing, or trespassing upon" the land in question "without the express 
permission of [Brown]." After the entry of this judgment, Kipp filed a "Motion 
to Stay Execution of Judgement [sic]: Notice of Appeal from Judgement [sic] of 
this Court, to Wyo. Supreme Court:" in which Kipp also alleged defamation, 
claimed compliance with the order of the court regarding discovery and asserted 
the failure of the trial court to afford him his constitutional right. At all 
times, in the trial court, and in connection with this appeal, Kipp has chosen 
to represent himself.

[¶6.]     In what is denominated 
"Appeal from District Court, TetonCounty: Honorable Robert B. Ranck, 
Judge:," apparently intended as his brief, Kipp makes this statement of 
issues:

"(A) This case # 6861, in 
appellant[']s belief and by cited authorit[i]es in law, by recordations 
submitted, should never have come to court action, nor should appellant have 
been forced by district court to submit the same to supreme court for review and 
decision. The issues are straightforward, Clark Wheeldon purchased real 
property, and upon selling the same to plaintiff appellee, Franklin E. Brown, 
(See , Exhibit (A): Retained certain mineral rights, as recorded: (See: , 
Exhibit (A): which right he has exercised by the exploration, examination, 
drillings for depths, computation of amounts of gravels in tonnage, and now the 
potential sale of the same (gravels): (See: : Exhibits").: As permitted by law 
and by contractual agreement upon sale of property to Franklin E. Brown, the 
plaintiff appelle[e] herein."

In the Brief of 
Appellee, this statement of issues appears:

"I. Whether appellant has 
framed a cogent issue for Supreme Court review.

"II. Whether the District 
Court clearly abused its discretion to enter judgment against the appellant, for 
failure to comply with the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure."

[¶7.]     Rule 5.01, W.R.A.P., 
provides:

"The brief of the 
appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order here 
indicated:

"(1) A table of contents, 
with page references, and a table of cases (alphabetically arranged), statutes 
and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where 
they are cited;

"(2) A statement of the 
issues presented for review;

"(3) A statement of the 
case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the 
course of proceedings; and its disposition in the court below. There shall 
follow a statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review, 
with appropriate page references to the record;

"(4) An argument. The 
argument may be preceded by a summary. The argument shall contain the 
contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the 
reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the 
record relied on;

"(5) A short conclusion 
stating the precise relief sought;

"(6) All briefs shall be 
signed by counsel submitting the briefs."1

[¶8.]     The document filed by 
Kipp fails to comply with Rule 5.01, W.R.A.P., in a number of respects. First, 
Kipp's document contains no table of authorities, and the only references in the 
text of his brief to any authorities are some amorphous citations to 16 
Am.Jur.2d in the title on Constitutional Law. We adopt for the purpose of our 
rule the following definition of "authorities:"

"Citation to statutes, 
precedents, judicial decisions, and text-books of the law, made on the argument 
of questions of law or the trial of causes before a court, in support of the 
legal positions contended for, or adduced to fortify the opinion of a court or 
of a text writer upon any question." Black's Law Dictionary at 121 (5th ed. 
1979).

Secondly, we 
cannot discern from the "statement of issues," which we have recited above, just 
what Kipp believes the issues to be which might be addressed in this case. 
Finally, Kipp's "argument," unsupported by meaningful authority as noted, is 
neither cogent nor comprehensible.

[¶9.]     This court consistently 
has refused to consider positions which are not supported by cogent argument or 
pertinent authority. Hance v. Straatsma, 
Wyo., 721 P.2d 575 (1986); Freeman v. Lusk, Wyo., 717 P.2d 331 
(1986); Capshaw v. State, Wyo., 714 P.2d 349 (1986). In the presentation 
of an appeal to our court, it is inadequate simply to allude to an issue or 
identify only a potential issue. The appellant must make some attempt to relate 
the applicable law to the facts. Hance v. Straatsma, supra; Elder v. Jones, 
Wyo., 608 P.2d 654 (1980). We have noted that Rule 5.01, W.R.A.P., does not contemplate a 
prolix and rambling narrative such as that found in Kipp's brief. Walker v. Karpan, Wyo., 
726 P.2d 82 (1986).

[¶10.]  We are reluctant to affirm a decision 
against a pro se party, such as Kipp, when the party has failed to comply with 
the procedural requirements of the rules of civil or appellate procedure. On the 
other hand, it is not the function of this court to frame an appellant's 
argument or draw his issues for him. Hance v. Straatsma, supra; Freeman v. Lusk, 
supra; Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., Wyo., 699 P.2d 277 (1985). Consequently, we 
must affirm the decision in this case because there is nothing in Kipp's brief 
even akin to cogent argument or appropriate authority upon which to consider any 
contention, far less upon which to base a decision in his favor. See Boehm v. 
Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, Wyo., 748 P.2d 704 (1987); Trout v. Wyoming Oil & Gas 
Conservation Commission, Wyo., 721 P.2d 1047 
(1986).

[¶11.]  The judgment of the district court is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Rule 5.01, W.R.A.P., was 
amended effective October 20, 1987, after the filing of the briefs in this case. 
The amendment is not material in this instance. We quote the rule as it existed 
at the time the briefs were filed.