Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Gordon

Citation: 413 Md. 46

Docket Number: 31ag/09

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2010-03-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Jeffrey Keith Gordon, AG No. 31, September Term
2009.
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS – RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE
A forty-five day suspension is the appropriate sanction in a reciprocal discipline case
involving a Respondent who was publicly reprimanded by the State Bar of Texas as a result
of misrepresentations made to a court in violation of several Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct corresponding to Rules 3.3(a)(1), 3.3(a)(4), and 8.4(c) of the Maryland
Rules of Professional Conduct.  Respondent’s conduct warrants “substantially different
discipline” in Maryland than that which was imposed in Texas, because “exceptional
circumstances,” do exist under Rule 16-773(e).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 31
September Term, 2009
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
v.
JEFFREY KEITH GORDON
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Bell, C.J., Dissents.
Filed: March 16, 2010
1
Jeffrey Keith Gordon graduated in 1990 and was admitted to the Maryland Bar,
but he has never lived nor practiced in Maryland as he was an employee of a federal agency.
Several years later, he moved to Texas, and was admitted to practice there.  When questioned
at oral argument regarding why he was a member of the Maryland Bar, Gordon replied:
In all due respect, I kept my Maryland Bar membership,
[because] it wasn’t that expensive to keep up.  The CLE
requirements are far more significant in Texas, and I mean,
that’s the honest [truth] why I kept it.  I have it on my resume.
2
Pursuant to Rule 5.02 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure (TRDP),
the Chief Disciplinary Counsel for the State Bar of Texas reviews information coming to the
attention of the Texas Commission for Lawyer Discipline and determines whether the
information satisfies just cause to file a complaint against a lawyer barred in Texas.  Once
the Chief Disciplinary Counsel determines just cause exists, a Respondent is given written
notice of the allegations and rule violations complained of.  
Rule 2.15 of the TRDP states that a lawyer facing a complaint of a violation of the
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct may elect to have the complaint heard by
an evidentiary panel, which is appointed by the chair of the Grievance Committee for the
State Bar of Texas, or have the  complaint heard in a district court with or without a jury.  In
this action, Jeffrey Keith Gordon elected to have his complaint heard before an evidentiary
panel, and neither he, nor the Commission for Lawyer Discipline, appealed the panel’s
sanction.
This is a reciprocal discipline action concerning Jeffrey Keith Gordon, (“Gordon” or
“Respondent”), who was admitted to the Bar of this Court on December 18, 1990,1 and to the
State Bar of Texas in 1996.  On May 5, 2009, a Texas Evidentiary Panel for State Bar
District No. 09A3 of the State Bar of Texas2 imposed a Judgment of Public Reprimand
3
Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 3.03(a)(1) (“Candor Toward
the Tribunal”) provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law
to a tribunal;
4
Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 3.03(a)(5) (“Candor Toward
the Tribunal”) provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
* * *
(5) offer or use evidence that the lawyer knows to
be false.
5
Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 8.04(a)(3) (“Misconduct”)
provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not:
* * *
(3) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
6
Rule 16-751(a)(2) provides:
(a) Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action.
* * *
(2) Conviction of crime; reciprocal action.  If authorized by Rule
(continued...)
2
against Gordon after determining that he violated Rules 3.03(a)(1),3 3.03(a)(5),4 and
8.04(a)(3)5 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.  
On August 10, 2009, the Attorney Grievance Commission (“Petitioner” or “Bar
Counsel”), acting pursuant to Rules 16-751(a)(2)6 and 16-773(b),7 filed a Petition for
6(...continued)
16-771(b) or 16-773(b), Bar Counsel may file a Petition for
Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals
without prior approval of the Commission. Bar Counsel
promptly shall notify the Commission of the filing.  The
Commission on review may direct the withdrawal of a petition
that was filed pursuant to this subsection.
7
Rule 16-773(b) provides:
(b) Petition in Court of Appeals. Upon receiving and verifying
information from any source that in another jurisdiction an
attorney has been disciplined or placed on inactive status based
on incapacity, Bar Counsel may file a Petition for Disciplinary
or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule
16-751(a)(2). A certified copy of the disciplinary or remedial
order shall be attached to the Petition, and a copy of the Petition
and order shall be served on the attorney in accordance with
Rule 16-753.
3
Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Gordon to which a certified copy of the State Bar
of Texas’ Judgment of Public Reprimand was attached.  Bar Counsel incorporated by
reference into its Petition the findings of fact of the Texas Evidentiary Panel:
In October 2005, Respondent was representing clients on a breach of contract
claim.  Respondent requested leave to supplement his summary judgment
record and attached what appeared to be an original signature page signed by
Respondent’s client (“the Client”), in the year 2000.  The document was not
the original signature page but instead was one that had been signed by the
Client the night before the 2005 summary judgment hearing.  Whether the
Client had signed the contract in 2000 was a material issue in the litigation.
The tendered signature page was challenged by the opposing party as newly
“manufactured” evidence at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment.
Respondent did not inform the Court at that time that the tendered signature
page had just been signed by the Client.  Respondent thereafter filed pleadings
falsely suggesting that this document was the original signature page.  Six
weeks later, in response to discovery, Respondent and the Client disclosed to
opposing counsel that the Client had signed the signature page at issue on the
8
Rule 3.3(a)(1) (“Candor Toward the Tribunal”) of the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made
to the tribunal by the lawyer.
9
Rule 3.3(a)(4) (“Candor Toward the Tribunal”) of the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
* * *
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer
has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity,
the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.
10
Rule 8.4(c) (“Misconduct”) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct
provides:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
* * *
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
(continued...)
4
eve of the summary judgment hearing and also disclosed the recently found
original signature page from 2000.  But Respondent did not inform the Court
of these facts.  The Court granted Respondent’s Motion for Leave to
Supplement the Record, but denied the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
The case went to trial in 2007, at which time the Client testified during cross-
examination that he had signed the tendered signature page just prior to
Respondent submitting it as evidence in 2005.  When questioned by the Court,
Respondent admitted that the Client had signed the document right before the
summary judgment hearing.
In his petition, Bar Counsel relied upon the Texas Evidentiary Panel’s conclusion that
Gordon violated Rules 3.03(a)(1), 3.03(a)(5), and 8.04(a)(3) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules
of Professional Conduct, which correspond to Rules 3.3(a)(1),8 3.3(a)(4),9 and 8.4(c)10 of the
10(...continued)
misrepresentation;
11
Rule 16-773(e) provides:
(e) Exceptional circumstances. Reciprocal discipline shall not
be ordered if Bar Counsel or the attorney demonstrates by clear
and convincing evidence that:
(1) the procedure was so lacking in notice or
opportunity to be heard as to constitute a
deprivation of due process;
(2) there was such infirmity of proof establishing
the misconduct as to give rise to a clear
conviction that the Court, consistent with its duty,
cannot accept as final the determination of
misconduct;
(3) the imposition of corresponding discipline
would result in grave injustice;
(4) the conduct established does not constitute
misconduct in this State or it warrants
substantially different discipline in this State; or
(5) the reason for inactive status no longer exists.
12
Rule 16-757 provides:
(a) Generally. The hearing of a disciplinary or remedial action
is governed by the rules of evidence and procedure applicable to
a court trial in a civil action tried in a circuit court. Unless
(continued...)
5
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC” or “Rule”).  Bar Counsel requested that
we issue a Show Cause Order.
On August 10, 2009, we issued a Show Cause Order pursuant to Rule 16-773(e).11
Bar Counsel responded, asked that reciprocal discipline not be imposed, and requested that
we order a ninety day suspension, or in the alternative, enter an order designating a judge to
hold a hearing in accordance with Rule 16-757.12  Petitioner’s rationale was that, “[i]n
12(...continued)
extended by the Court of Appeals, the hearing shall be
completed within 120 days after service on the respondent of the
order designating a judge. Before the conclusion of the hearing,
the judge may permit any complainant to testify, subject to
cross-examination, regarding the effect of the alleged
misconduct. A respondent attorney may offer, or the judge may
inquire regarding, evidence otherwise admissible of any
remedial action undertaken relevant to the allegations. Bar
Counsel may respond to any evidence of remedial action.
(b) Burdens of proof. The petitioner has the burden of proving
the averments of the petition by clear and convincing evidence.
A respondent who asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of
mitigation or extenuation has the burden of proving the defense
or matter by a preponderance of the evidence.
(c) Findings and conclusions. The judge shall prepare and file
or dictate into the record a statement of the judge's findings of
fact, including findings as to any evidence regarding remedial
action, and conclusions of law. If dictated into the record, the
statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless the time is
extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed
statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record
no later than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The
clerk shall mail a copy of the statement to each party.
(d) Transcript. The petitioner shall cause a transcript of the
hearing to be prepared and included in the record.
6
Maryland, the submission of false documents and/or assisting a client in the commission of
a fraud warrants more than a reprimand, especially when the lawyer fails to take any
mitigating or remedial action.”
In Gordon’s response to the Show Cause Order, in his Reply, and in subsequent
pleadings, he stated that his misconduct warranted a reciprocal sanction of a public
13
Gordon argued that Bar Counsel should be bound by his earlier
recommendation of a reprimand in a Joint Petition for Reprimand by Consent.  We had
denied the Joint Petition and issued a Show Cause Order.  
14
Rule 16-773(e) provides:
(e) Exceptional circumstances. Reciprocal discipline shall not
be ordered if Bar Counsel or the attorney demonstrates by clear
and convincing evidence that:
(1) the procedure was so lacking in notice or
opportunity to be heard as to constitute a
deprivation of due process;
(2) there was such infirmity of proof establishing
the misconduct as to give rise to a clear
conviction that the Court, consistent with its duty,
cannot accept as final the determination of
misconduct;
(3) the imposition of corresponding discipline
would result in grave injustice;
(4) the conduct established does not constitute
misconduct in this State or it warrants
substantially different discipline in this State; or
(5) the reason for inactive status no longer exists.
7
reprimand.13  He stated that he “accepted full responsibility for [his] actions from the very
beginning of the Texas disciplinary proceeding,” and that he knew his “actions were wrong
and inappropriate and a violation of [his] duties as an officer of the court.”  He argued that
reciprocal discipline must be ordered, because Bar Counsel did not demonstrate, by clear and
convincing evidence, that exceptional circumstances under Rule 16-773(e)14 existed.  He also
argued that while his actions in the Texas summary judgment proceeding were misleading
and constituted professional misconduct, his actions did not constitute fraud, for which the
Texas Bar would have imposed a more significant sanction.  He stated that his disclosure of
15
Gordon also requested that this disciplinary proceeding be dismissed in
exchange for his resignation from the Maryland Bar, because, he argues, a suspension from
the Maryland Bar “will likely result in [his] temporary suspension from the three federal
court districts in which [he is] currently a member.”  We will not entertain Gordon’s
resignation request, because Maryland does not allow attorneys to resign during the
pendency of disciplinary proceedings.  See Rule 16-775(b) (“An attorney may not resign
while the attorney is the subject of a disciplinary investigation, action, or proceeding
involving allegations of professional misconduct.”); see also Attorney Grievance v. Scroggs,
387 Md. 238, 252 n.17, 874 A.2d 985, 994 n.17 (2005) (“[T]he availability to an attorney to
resign during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings does not exist in Maryland.”).
8
the newly re-signed signature page to opposing counsel six weeks after the summary
judgment hearing, was a mitigating and remedial measure.
Gordon also argued that no exceptional circumstances existed because 1) the Texas
Disciplinary procedure was neither lacking in notice or a deprivation of his due process
rights, 2) there was no infirmity of proof during the underlying proceedings establishing
professional misconduct, 3) a reprimand would not result in grave injustice, but a more
severe sanction would result in a grave injustice, 4) the State Bar of Texas treated the matter
seriously and diligently, and Maryland should defer to the Texas Bar’s decision.15
Discussion
In reciprocal discipline cases, pursuant to Rule 16-773(g), we generally treat the
factual findings and conclusions of law from the original jurisdiction as conclusive evidence
of an attorney’s misconduct:
(g) Conclusive effect of adjudication. Except as provided in
subsections (e) (1) and (e) (2) of this Rule, a final adjudication
in a disciplinary or remedial proceeding by another court,
agency, or tribunal that an attorney has been guilty of
professional misconduct or is incapacitated is conclusive
16
Rule 16-773(f) (“Action by Court of Appeals”) states that we “may
immediately impose corresponding discipline,” “may enter an order designating a judge [for
a hearing],” or “may enter any other appropriate order.” (emphasis added):
Upon consideration of the petition and any answer to the order
to show cause, the Court of Appeals may immediately impose
corresponding discipline or inactive status, may enter an order
designating a judge pursuant to Rule 16-752 to hold a hearing in
accordance with Rule 16-757, or may enter any other
appropriate order. The provisions of Rule 16-760 apply to an
(continued...)
9
evidence of that misconduct or incapacity in any proceeding
under this Chapter. The introduction of such evidence does not
preclude the Commission or Bar Counsel from introducing
additional evidence or preclude the attorney from introducing
evidence or otherwise showing cause why no discipline or lesser
discipline should be imposed.
See also Attorney Grievance v. Haas, __ Md. __, __ A.2d __ (2010); Attorney Grievance v.
Whitehead, 390 Md. 663, 669, 890 A.2d 751, 754 (2006).  We address, then, what discipline
to impose—a reprimand consistent with the Texas sanction or a more serious alternative,
because of the existence of “exceptional circumstances” under Rule 16-773(e).
We have often stated the well established principle that in reciprocal discipline cases,
we are prone or inclined, but not required, to impose the same sanction the original
jurisdiction imposed.  See Attorney Grievance v. Whitehead, 390 Md. 663, 671, 890 A.2d
751, 756 (2006); Attorney Grievance v. Weiss, 389 Md. 531, 546, 886 A.2d 606, 615 (2005).
As we explained in Whitehead, 390 Md. at 668, 890 A.2d at 754,  our rules state that we may
impose “corresponding discipline,” not that we shall impose “identical discipline.”  See Rule
16-773(f).16  Our use of the words “inclined,” “prone,” “tend to,” and “often,” explicitly
16(...continued)
order under this section that disbars or suspends an attorney or
that places the attorney on inactive status.
10
indicate our reluctance to adopt a blanket rule of reciprocity, Weiss, 389 Md. at 547, 886
A.2d at 615.  We are required to analyze each case individually and decide whether to
deviate from the original jurisdiction’s sanction.  Id. at 547, 886 A.2d at 615; see also
Attorney Grievance v. Scroggs, 387 Md. 238, 254, 874 A.2d 985, 995 (2005) (“We are
required to assess for ourselves the propriety of the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction
and that recommended by the Commission.”).
We, generally, follow the original jurisdiction’s sanction “when the purpose for the
discipline in the original jurisdiction is congruent with ours.”  Weiss, 389 Md. at 547, 886
A.2d at 615.  Our purpose in attorney discipline cases is the protection of the public, rather
than the punishment of the erring attorney.  Id., citing Attorney Grievance v. Steinberg, 385
Md. 696, 703, 870 A.2d 603, 607 (2005) (other citations omitted).  Nevertheless, we find that
although most jurisdictions have the same purpose as we do, “[w]e have recognized that the
public interest is served when this Court imposes a sanction which demonstrates to members
of the legal profession the type of conduct that will not be tolerated. . . .”  Attorney Grievance
v. Sperling, 380 Md. 180, 191, 844 A.2d 397, 404 (2004) (quotations omitted).  
Obviously, in so demonstrating, we are concerned with what sanction a lawyer in
Maryland could expect in response to similar conduct, were it to have occurred in Maryland.
We have consistently stated that when considering an appropriate sanction in a reciprocal
11
discipline case, we are duty bound to look “not only to the sanction imposed by the other
jurisdiction but to our own cases as well.  The sanction will depend on the unique facts and
circumstances of each case, but with a view toward consistent dispositions for similar
misconduct.”  Weiss, 389 Md. at 548, 886 A.2d at 616, quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n
v. Parsons & Reback, 310 Md. 132, 142, 527 A.2d 325, 330 (1987).  In this regard, and in
an effort to avoid inconsistent sanctions, we need not follow the original jurisdiction’s
sanction when our cases demonstrate that we would apply a different sanction, had the
conduct occurred or the case originated here.  Whitehead, 390 Md. at 673, 890 A.2d at 757.
“[W]e must balance our tendency to follow the original jurisdiction’s sanction under our
reciprocal discipline doctrine, against our prior cases and the sanctions imposed upon
members of this Bar for similar misconduct committed in this jurisdiction, always with a
view towards the protection of the public.”  Weiss, 389 Md. at 546, 886 A.2d at 614.  
All this being said, we acknowledge that there have been cases in which we have
deferred to the sanction of the original jurisdiction, despite the different sanction we may
have imposed had the proceedings originated in this jurisdiction, see Attorney Grievance v.
Ayres-Fountain, 379 Md. 44, 58-59, 838 A.2d 1238, 1246-47 (2003) (imposing identical
three year suspension sanction as Delaware Supreme Court for the lawyer’s knowing
misrepresentations to that court regarding her certifications in annual tax filings even though
the sanction that may have been imposed by this Court would not have been identical had the
conduct occurred in Maryland); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gittens, 346 Md. 316, 327,
697 A.2d 83, 88-89 (1997) (imposing identical indefinite suspension sanction of the District
12
of Columbia Court of Appeals on an attorney who was convicted of theft of client funds from
his escrow account citing that deference should be paid to the District of Columbia court).
We have, nevertheless, also declared that we have become “much less lenient towards
any misconduct involving theft, misappropriation, fraud, or deceit.”  Weiss, 389 Md. at 551,
886 A.2d at 617.  When attorney misconduct has been more serious, and “when the conduct
involved is of such nature that it would not be tolerated from any member of the Bar in this
State if the conduct occurred here,” we have deviated from the original jurisdiction’s sanction
and imposed a more severe sanction.  Id. at 551-52, 886 A.2d at 618, citing Attorney
Grievance v. Dechowitz, 358 Md. 184, 191, 193, 747 A.2d 657, 660-61 (2000) (substituting
disbarment for California’s sanction of suspension, after the attorney was convicted of
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute); Attorney Grievance v. White, 354 Md. 346,
367, 731 A.2d 447, 459 (1999) (imposing disbarment instead of indefinite suspension for
attorney’s false testimony under oath).  See Attorney Grievance v. Beatty, 409 Md. 11, 18,
972 A.2d 840, 843-44 (2009) (imposing indefinite suspension in a reciprocal discipline case
on an attorney convicted of fourth degree stalking in New Jersey in spite of lesser sanction
of three month suspension imposed by the Supreme Court of that state).
In the present case, the prohibited conduct involved Respondent who, while
representing a client in a breach of contract case, submitted what appeared to be the original
signature page of a year 2000 contract, but was, instead, a replacement signature page signed
by his client the night before the 2005 summary judgment hearing.  The existence of the
signature was a material issue in the litigation, and Respondent did not inform the court that
13
the signature page had been signed five years after the fact and during litigation involving
the contract, but rather, filed pleadings falsely suggesting that the page represented the
original.  Six weeks later, Respondent and his client disclosed to opposing counsel during
discovery, but not to the court, that the signature page had been signed on the eve of
summary judgment and also disclosed the original signature page from 2000.  This conduct
is clearly violative of MRPC 3.3(a)(1), 3.3(a)(4), and 8.4(c).
To support the sanction of a reprimand, however, Gordon cites Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Heinze, 293 Md. 193, 442 A.2d 570 (1982), in which F. George Heinze, III, told
his client, another attorney, that he had filed suit in a collection case when, in fact, he had
not.  We concluded that this misrepresentation violated Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4) of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the precursor to Rule 8.4(c), which provided that a
lawyer shall not “[e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation,” and reprimanded Heinze.  Heinze, 293 Md. at 196-97, 442 A.2d at 572.
In so doing, we acknowledged that Heinze’s conduct did not rise to the level of seriousness
as that of the attorneys in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bailey, 286 Md. 630, 408 A.2d
1330 (1979), and Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Levitt, 286 Md. 231, 406 A.2d 1296 (1979),
in which misrepresentations were made to a court.  See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n
v. Stancil, 296 Md. 325, 463 A.2d 789 (1983) (attorney reprimanded for misrepresentations
made to Bar Counsel); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. O’Neill, 285 Md. 52, 400 A.2d 415
(1979) (“Neophyte lawyer” reprimanded for making false statements to a judge, an assistant
state’s attorney, and a probation agent in the same day, but who immediately informed the
17
Rule 8.4(d) (“Misconduct”) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct
provides:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
* * *
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice;
14
judge of his deceit and expressed remorse to Bar Counsel).
Bar Counsel, in support of his requests that we impose “substantially different
discipline in Maryland than that which [Respondent] received in Texas,” because Gordon’s
conduct warranted “substantially different discipline,” in accordance with Rule 16-773(e),
bases his argument upon three Attorney Grievance cases, in which we ordered a period of
suspension, i.e., Attorney Grievance v. Tanko, 408 Md. 404, 969 A.2d 1010 (2009)
(suspending lawyer for sixty days for knowingly filing expungement petitions that were not
ripe), Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rohrback, 323 Md. 79, 591 A.2d 488 (1991)
(suspending lawyer for forty-five days for misrepresenting to a probation officer that his
client was using a false name), and Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Maxwell, 307 Md. 600,
516 A.2d 570 (1986) (suspending lawyer for ninety days for knowingly making a false
notarization and falsely witnessing a deed). 
In Tanko, Louis P. Tanko, Jr., was charged with numerous Rule violations, including
Rules 3.3 and 8.4.  We affirmed a hearing judge’s conclusions that Tanko violated Rules
3.3(a) and 8.4(d)17 when he filed expungement petitions in the District Court for charges he
believed, although negligently and mistakenly, were eligible for expungement in an attempt
18
Rule 4.1 (“Truthfulness in Statements to Others”) of the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct provides:
(a) In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not
knowingly:
(continued...)
15
to have the petitions “slip by” the court and be granted.  Tanko, 408 Md. at 423-26, 969 A.2d
at 1022-23.  Tanko filed the petitions with lines drawn through words indicating that at least
three years had passed since the disposition in the underlying matter, knowing that less than
three years had elapsed.  We held that Tanko’s misleading actions were clearly violative of
the Rules, but because he lacked any prior disciplinary action and his actions were mitigated
by a misunderstanding of the relevant case and statutory law, his violations warranted a sixty
day suspension instead of disbarment.  Id. at 426, 969 A.2d at 1023-24. 
In Rohrback, Maynard R. Rohrback’s client, Lloyd Francis Asbury, was arrested on
several different occasions and charged with DUI and DWI; and on one occasion, he had
given a false name, Lloyd Francis Boland, to one of the arresting officers.  Rohrback, 323
Md. at 83-84, 591 A.2d at 489-90.  Rohrback, though knowing Asbury was misrepresenting
himself as another to a probation officer charged with developing his presentence
investigation, accompanied him to the meeting with the officer.  We stated that Rohrback’s
“mere act of accompanying Asbury as Boland” to a meeting with a probation officer “served
as Rohrback’s confirmation that Boland was the client’s true name,”  id. at 99, 591 A.2d at
497-98, and we held that Rohrback’s actions were tantamount to knowingly assisting in his
client’s fraud, and violative of Rule 4.118 requiring disclosure of material facts to third
18(...continued)
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law
to a third person; or
(2) fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure
is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by a client.
(b) The duties stated in this Rule apply even if compliance
requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule
1.6.
19
Rule 1-102(A)(4) of the Code of Professional Responsibility was the
predecessor to Rule 8.4(c) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, and provided:
A lawyer shall not . . . [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
Rule 1-102(A)(1) of the Code of Professional Responsibility was the predecessor to
Rule 8.4(a) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, and provided:
A lawyer shall not . . . [v]iolate a disciplinary rule.
(continued...)
16
parties.  Although Rohrback had never before committed any professional infractions, we
imposed a forty-five day suspension.  Id. at 101, 591 A.2d at 499.
In Maxwell, Edward Thomas Maxwell, Jr., while representing two individuals charged
with drug trafficking in Florida, delivered a deed to his client’s bail bondsman with the
signature of “Ronald Jaxon,” and a notarization by Maxwell.  In fact, although “Ronald
Jaxon” did not exist, Maxwell knowingly witnessed one of his clients signing the deed as
Jaxon.  Maxwell, 307 Md. at 602, 516 A.2d at 571.  The hearing judge concluded that
Maxwell made misrepresentations and false statements in violation of former Rules 1-
102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(1), and 7-102(A)(5) of the Code of Professional Responsibility.19  In
19(...continued)
Rule 7-102(A)(5) of the Code of Professional Responsibility was the predecessor to
Rule 4.1(a)(1), and provided:
In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not . . .
[k]nowingly make a false statement of law or fact.
17
determining his sanction, we noted that although we could not “condone deliberate
falsification of a solemn document by an experienced attorney,” a ninety day sanction was
appropriate after considering Maxwell’s veteran experience of thirty years, unblemished
disciplinary record, expressed remorse for his actions, and lack of harm resulting from his
conduct.  Id. at 605, 516 A.2d at 572.
Another case addressing issues of misrepresentations made by an attorney to a tribunal
is Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Parsons & Reback, 310 Md. 132, 527 A.2d 325 (1987).
In Parsons, we addressed the appropriate sanction for two lawyers in a reciprocal discipline
case who falsified their client’s signature on a complaint for divorce and caused it to be
notarized and filed in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia, without the consent
or knowledge of their client, after the original complaint had been dismissed.  Despite the
attorneys’ admission of wrongdoing and their expression of remorse, we imposed a ninety
day suspension.  We were mindful that although the misconduct was intended to assist the
client without personal gain, this “serious transgression” did not exempt them from
discipline, and a suspension was necessary “in order to protect the public from misconduct
of this sort.”  Id. at 142-43, 527 A.2d at 330.
In other circumstances in which lawyers have been untruthful to a tribunal, we have
18
imposed suspensions greater than ninety days, as well as disbarment.  See, e.g., Attorney
Grievance v. McClain, 406 Md. 1, 20-21, 956 A.2d 135, 146 (2008) (attorney disbarred for
intentionally dishonest conduct and systematic effort to mislead the court); Attorney
Grievance v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 75-76, 930 A.2d 328, 347-48 (2007) (attorney disbarred
for dishonesty, fraud, and deceit toward a tribunal, in the absence of any mitigating factors);
Attorney Grievance v. Goodman, 381 Md. 480, 483, 499, 850 A.2d 1157, 1159, 1168 (2004)
(attorney disbarred for filing pleadings and signing another attorney’s name without that
attorney’s knowledge or permission); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Myers, 333 Md. 440,
449-50, 635 A.2d 1315, 1320 (1994) (attorney with a history of sanctions for misconduct was
disbarred for intentional, self-serving misrepresentations to a District Court judge regarding
his traffic record); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bailey, 286 Md. 630, 635-36, 408 A.2d
1330, 1333 (1979) (attorney received three year suspension for misrepresentations to a court
regarding funds that were supposedly placed in an escrow account, but Court noted he would
have been disbarred had the evidence shown he intended “to steal or consciously
misappropriate funds”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Levitt, 286 Md. 231, 239-40, 406
A.2d 1296, 1300 (1979) (attorney received one year suspension for knowingly making a false
statement to a judge).
We conclude that because Gordon’s misrepresentations to the court in violation of
Rules 3.3(a)(1), 3.3(a)(4), and 8.4 (c) of the MRPC would warrant “substantially different
discipline” in Maryland, “exceptional circumstances” do exist under Rule 16-773(e).  The
most difficult issue, however, is which of the myriad suspension periods to impose, which,
19
appropriately, generally rests on what mitigation is found.  In this regard, mitigating factors
may include:
absence of a prior disciplinary record; absence of a dishonest or
selfish motive; personal or emotional problems; timely good
faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify  consequences of
misconduct; full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or
cooperative attitude toward proceedings; inexperience in the
practice of law; character or reputation; physical or mental
disability or impairment; delay in disciplinary proceedings;
interim rehabilitation; imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
remorse; and finally, remoteness of prior offenses.
Attorney Grievance v. Sweitzer, 395 Md. 586, 599, 911 A.2d 440, 448 (2006) (citations
omitted).  
In Maxwell, for example, we imposed a ninety day suspension after recognizing as
mitigation that the attorney was remorseful, admitted using lousy judgment, had no prior
record of professional misconduct, and engaged in deceit that was not self serving.  Maxwell,
307 Md. at 603-05, 516 A.2d at 571-72.   In Tanko, we imposed a sixty day suspension for
his misleading, and perhaps, negligent, filing of expungement petitions to mislead the court,
while noting mitigation of Tanko’s lack of prior disciplinary action, and his
misunderstanding of the relevant case and statutory law.  Tanko, 408 Md. at 425-26, 969
A.2d at 1023-24.  In Rohrback, we imposed a forty-five day suspension after concluding that
“the ultimate purpose of the fraud which Rohrback knowingly assisted was to deceive the
District Court in Baltimore City concerning [his client’s] criminal record,” and recognizing
as mitigation that Rohrback did not originally create the deception, did not receive a fee, and
had never before committed professional misconduct in his twenty years of practice.
20
Rohrback, 323 Md. at 101, 591 A.2d at 499.
In this case, Respondent has no disciplinary record from his twenty years of practicing
law, he has accepted full responsibility and expressed remorse for his actions, the
misrepresentation does not appear to be part of a pattern of misconduct, and his actions were
not financially self-serving.  Gordon’s conduct is most akin to that of the attorney in
Rohrback, and we, therefore, hold that Gordon’s misconduct warrants a forty-five day
suspension.
IT IS SO ORDERED.  RESPONDENT
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY
THE 
CLERK 
OF 
THIS 
COURT,
INCLUDING THE COSTS OF ALL
TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO RULE 16-
761 FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY
GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION 
OF
MARYLAND AGAINST JEFFREY KEITH
GORDON.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
 Misc. Docket AG No. 31
September Term, 2009
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v. 
JEFFREY KEITH GORDON
Bell, C.J.
           Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera
JJ.
   Filed: March 16, 2010 
1 Maryland Rule 16-773 provides, in its entirety: 
"(a) Duty of Attorney. An attorney who in another jurisdiction (1) is
disbarred, suspended, or otherwise disciplined, (2) resigns from the bar
while disciplinary or remedial action is threatened or pending in that
jurisdiction, or (3) is placed on inactive status based on incapacity shall
inform Bar Counsel promptly of the discipline, resignation, or inactive
status.
"(b) Petition in Court of Appeals. Upon receiving and verifying information
from any source that in another jurisdiction an attorney has been disciplined
or placed on inactive status based on incapacity, Bar Counsel may file a
Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals
pursuant to Rule 16-751(a)(2). A certified copy of the disciplinary or
remedial order should be attached to the Petition, and a copy of the Petition
and order shall be served on the attorney in accordance with Rule 16-753.
"(c) Show cause order. When a petition and certified copy of a disciplinary
or remedial order have been filed, the Court of Appeals shall order that Bar
Counsel and the attorney, within 15 days from the date of the order, show
cause in writing based upon any of the grounds set forth in section (e) of
this Rule why corresponding discipline or inactive status should not be
imposed.
"(d) Temporary suspension of attorney. When the petition and disciplinary
or remedial order demonstrate that an attorney has been disbarred or is
currently suspended from practice by final order of a court in another
jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals may enter an order, effective
immediately, suspending the attorney from the practice of law, pending
further order of Court. The provisions of Rule 16-760 apply to an order
(continued...)
For the reasons stated in my dissents in Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Weiss, 389 Md.
531, 556-569, 886 A.2d 606, 620-628 (2005) and Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Whitehead,
390 Md. 663, 684-696, 890 A.2d 751, 763-771 (2006), I dissent from the majority’s refusal
to impose reciprocal discipline in this case.   If it were not crystal clear from the majority
opinions in the aforementioned cases, this case unmistakably confirms the accuracy of the
observations I made in each case, that the majority does not ascribe full value or meaning to
Maryland Rule 16-773,1 no longer reading it as requiring that, in a reciprocal discipline case,
1(...continued)
suspending an attorney under this section.
"(e) Exceptional circumstances. Reciprocal discipline shall not be ordered if
Bar Counsel or the attorney demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence
that: 
"(1) the procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to
be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process;
"(2) there was such infirmity of proof establishing the
misconduct as to give rise to a clear conviction that the Court,
consistent with its duty, cannot accept as final the
determination of misconduct;
"(3) the imposition of corresponding discipline would result
in grave injustice;
"(4) the conduct established does not constitute misconduct in
this State or it warrants substantially different discipline in
this State; or
"(5) the reason for inactive status no longer exists.
"(f) Action by Court of Appeals. Upon consideration of the petition and any
answer to the order to show case, the Court of Appeals may immediately
impose corresponding discipline or inactive status, may enter an order
designating a judge pursuant to Rule 16-752 to hold a hearing in accordance
with Rule 16-757, or may enter any other appropriate order. The provisions
of this Rule 16-760 apply to an order under this section that disbars or
suspends an attorney or that places the attorney on inactive status.
"(g) Conclusive effect of adjudication. Except as provided in subsections
(e)(1) and (e)(2) of this Rule, a final adjudication in a disciplinary or
remedial proceeding by another court, agency, or tribunal that an attorney
has been guilty of professional conduct or is incapacitated is conclusive
evidence of that misconduct or incapacity in any proceeding under this
Chapter. The introduction of such evidence does not preclude the
Commission or Bar Counsel from introducing additional evidence or
preclude the attorney from introducing evidence or otherwise showing
cause why no discipline or lesser discipline should be imposed.
"(h) Effect of stay in other jurisdiction. If the other jurisdiction has stayed
the discipline or inactive status, any proceedings under this Rule shall be
deferred until the stay is no longer operative and the discipline or inactive
status becomes effective."
2
the discipline imposed by this Court correspond, or be equivalent, to that imposed by the
3
initiating jurisdiction.  See Blacks Law Dictionary 1384 (9th ed. 2009) (defining
“reciprocal” to mean “directed to each toward the other or others; .... 3. Corresponding;
equivalent ....”); see also Whitehead, 390 Md. at 689, 890 A.2d at 766 (citing Concise Oxford
Dictionary, (9th ed. 1995) (defining "corresponding" to mean “to be analogous or similar;
to agree in amount, position, etc.; to be in harmony or agreement.”)). In Weiss, rejecting the
majority’s conclusion that a result in the originating jurisdiction different from that which
would have been reached in this State sufficed to make the situation exceptional or to justify
substantially different discipline, I offered: “If that is all that is required to demonstrate
exceptional circumstances, then there is no reason for reciprocal discipline; it really is
meaningless.”  389 Md. at 566, 886 A. 2d at 627.   In Whitehead, commenting on, and
analyzing the effect of, the majority’s “single-minded focus upon internal consistency,” 390
Md. at 695, 890 A. 2d at 770, concluding that such consistency “at the same time ... fosters
and even exacerbates the inconsistency, in reciprocal discipline cases, between the sanctions
imposed by this Court and the reciprocal states,” id, I asked rhetorically, “ what ... is the
purpose, then, of Rule 16-773.”  Id.   I further concluded:
“to allow internal consistency to override the Rule itself, again, makes our
reciprocal discipline framework utterly and totally superfluous and
meaningless.”
Id.
Before Weiss, this Court ordinarily would - “[is] prone,” see Attorney Griev. Comm'n
v. Ayres-Fountain, 379 Md. 44, 57, 838 A.2d 1238, 1246 (2003) - , to, and did, impose
corresponding or equivalent sanctions in reciprocal discipline cases, although not required
to do so.  Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Gittens, 346 Md. 316, 325, 697 A.2d 83, 88 (1997).
4
This is because the rule was:
“When the Court considers the appropriate sanction in a case of reciprocal
discipline, we look not only to the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction
but to our own cases as well. The sanction will depend on the unique facts and
circumstances of each case, but with a view toward consistent dispositions for
similar misconduct.”
Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Willcher, 340 Md. 217, 222, 665 A.2d 1059, 1061 (1995)
(quoting Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Parsons, 310 Md. 132, 142, 527 A.2d 325, 330 (1987).
Then, for sanctioning purposes, important factors for the Court to consider were the location
of the attorney's practice, where the misconduct actually occurred, and the seriousness with
which the originating  jurisdiction treats the misconduct. Ayres-Fountain, 379 Md. at 57, 838
A.2d at 1246.   Exemplary of this approach is Ayres-Fountain, supra.   Our application of
these informing factors and our explication of their relevance in that real and concrete factual
setting are instructive on the issue of the proper sanction in this case.  In Ayres-Fountain, we
accepted, as our own, the sanction imposed  on Ayres-Fountain by the Supreme Court of
Delaware, even though we recognized that it likely was not identical to one that this Court
may have imposed had the matter been initiated in Maryland.  Explaining why, we said: 
"the respondent essentially is a Delaware lawyer; that is where she lives and
where she principally practices. More important, the misrepresentations upon
which the petitioner principally relies are misrepresentations made to the
Supreme Court of Delaware, in certifications contained in annual filings that
Court requires to be made in support of its oversight of the administration of
justice in that State. That Court was fully informed of the facts and
circumstances of the respondent's conduct. In addition to the stipulation, which
is quite detailed and explicit, not only as to the violations but with respect to
the respondent's admissions, the court reviewed the Report and
Recommendation of Sanction of the Board of Professional Responsibility.
That Report, which accepted the facts recited in the stipulation, was prepared
only after the Board conducted a hearing to determine the appropriate sanction
5
to recommend. The Board, in addition to discussing the considerations that
were taken into account in fashioning the sanction recommendation,
painstakingly analyzed the cases bearing on the proper sanction and that
formed the basis for the recommendation it made.
"Having been presented with the Report and the recommendation for a three
year suspension, the Supreme Court of Delaware adopted the Report and
accepted the recommendation, but only after it had ‘considered the matter
carefully.’ That it had a firm grasp of the facts and the gravity of the situation
is shown by the court's recitation of the admissions the respondent made,
noting particularly that ‘she falsely represented to the Delaware Supreme
Court, in her Certificates of Compliance filed between 1996 and 2000, that she
had timely paid all federal, state, and local payroll, gross receipts and income
taxes [and] concealed her failure to pay various federal, state and local taxes
from the ODC and its auditor.’  In addition, the court referred to the
aggravating factors to which the parties stipulated, indicating that the sanction
was appropriate ‘in light of their presence.’”
Ayres-Fountain, 379 Md. at 58-59, 838 A.2d at 1246-47.
In this case, Jeffrey Keith Gordon, the respondent, is a Texas attorney, who, although
admitted to the Bar in this State, has never practiced in this State.  The misconduct for which
he was sanctioned by Texas occurred in Texas, during litigation and consisted of a
misrepresentation of a material fact at issue in the litigation and actions taken in furtherance
of that fact prior to his disclosure of the misrepresentation some six weeks after he made it.
 It having been determined that the misconduct was violative of the Texas counterpoint to
the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct requiring candor toward a tribunal and
proscribing “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,” the Texas
Bar, at the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings, reprimanded the respondent.
The majority does not contend that the Bar of Texas takes attorney discipline less
seriously than do we or that the purpose of such discipline in Texas is different from the
6
purpose  - the protection of the public - for which we pursue such discipline. See generally
Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Gordon, __ Md. __, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___ [slip op. 10].  No
matter, the majority, relying on Weiss and Whitehead, id.   at __, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op.
9, 11], declares that sanction insufficient. Id. at __, ___ A.2d at  ___ [slip op. 19]. Noting that
we would impose, in misrepresentation cases initiated in Maryland, a different sanction, id.
at __, ___ A.2d at  ___ [slip op. 14-19], it suspends the respondent for a period of forty-five
days, id. at __, ___ A.2d at  ___ [slip op. 20], presumably concluding that the sanction is
“substantially different” from the reprimand imposed by Texas. Id. at __, ___ A.2d at  ___
[slip op. 19].
In Weiss, noting that our cases, at least up to that time, expressed a preference for
consistency among States when dispensing discipline in reciprocal discipline cases, specially
when there is no divergence in the purpose of the discipline, I lamented that “[the majority’s]
rationale for refusing deference in th[at] case can only be that the [originating court] did not
exact the pound of flesh that we would have done had the matter initiated in this Court, i.e.,
it did not punish the respondent to the extent we think required.”  389 Md. at 564-65, 886
A.2d at 625-26.  Although that is not the proper test, I believe that, as it has done in Weiss
and Whitehead, the majority has applied just that test in this case. 
I dissent.