Case Title: Swett v. Bradbury

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed: April 24, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

MICHAEL SWETT;
DAVID FIDANQUE;
and the AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION OF OREGON, INC.,
	Respondents on Review,
	v.
BILL BRADBURY,
Secretary of State;
and the STATE OF OREGON,
	Petitioners on Review,
	and
VIRGINIA MARKELL;
LAURENCE PERRY;
and SUSAN REMMERS,
	Respondents.
(CC 98-C-20484; CA A107552 (Control),
A107799; SC S48116)

	On petition for attorney fees of respondents on review filed
May 3, 2002.
	Thomas M. Christ, of Cosgrave Vergeer Kester LLP, Portland,
filed the petition for attorney fees for respondents on review.
	Philip Schradle, Special Counsel to the Attorney General,
Salem, filed the objection to petition for attorney fees for
petitioners on review.  With him on the objection were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor
General.
	Paul B. Gamson, of Smith, Gamson, Diamond & Olney, Portland,
filed objections to the petition for attorney fees for
respondents.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.*
	GILLETTE, J. 
	Respondents on review are awarded $21,992.50 as reasonable
attorney fees on review.
    *Leeson, J., resigned January 31, 2003, and did not
participate in the decision of this petition for attorney fees.
	GILLETTE, J.							
	This application for an award of attorney fees on
review arises out of a successful challenge to the
constitutionality of Ballot Measure 62 (1998). (1)  See Swett v.
Bradbury, 333 Or 597, 43 P3d 1094 (2002) (declaring measure
unconstitutional because it violated separate-vote requirement of
Oregon Constitution).  Respondents on review, plaintiffs below
(plaintiffs), the successful challengers of the measure, seek an
award of attorney fees from the state and from respondents
(intervenors below) for plaintiffs' efforts in securing that
outcome in this court.  For the reasons that follow, we allow
their petition against the state. (2)
	Ordinarily, a court awards attorney fees to a litigant
only if a statute or contract authorizes such an award.  See,
e.g., Samuel v. Frohnmayer, 308 Or 362, 366, 779 P2d 1028 (1990)
(stating principle).  Plaintiffs do not claim a right to attorney
fees under either of those sources of law.  Instead, plaintiffs
assert that they are entitled to an award of attorney fees under
the rationale for such awards described in Deras v. Myers, 272 Or
47, 66-67, 535 P2d 541 (1975), and most recently explained by
this court in Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 287-88, 959 P2d
49 (1998).  See also Lehman v. Bradbury, 334 Or 579, 583, 54 P3d
591 (2002) (applying Armatta criteria for such awards).  Under
that rationale, a "court of equity" has inherent power to award
attorney fees to a prevailing litigant in appropriate
circumstances.  Armatta, 327 Or at 287, quoting Deras, 272 Or at
65-66.
	Plaintiffs seek an award of attorney fees totaling
$21,992.50, which represents 80 hours of time devoted to their
successful effort in the case.  Plaintiffs assert that such an
award is justified because they "successfully defended 'the
integrity of the amendment and initiative process,' an
achievement that benefitted all Oregonians."  (Quoting Armatta,
327 Or at 289.)  Defendants (collectively, "the state") object,
arguing that (1) plaintiffs vindicated private, not public,
interests in challenging Measure 62; (2) the theory under which
this court has made such awards does not support such awards; and
(3) the relief that plaintiffs requested in this case was legal,
not equitable, and therefore does not support an award of
attorney fees under this court's precedents.
	This court in Armatta presented the following overview
of the history of the court's exercise of its inherent, equitable
power to award attorney fees:
	"Since issuing its decision in Deras, this court
has not allowed another attorney fee award under the
principles set out in that case.  In denying such
requests, the court has clarified that there are a
number of prerequisites that must be fulfilled before
such an award is appropriate.  First, the proceeding
must be one in equity.  See, e.g., Dennehy v. Dept. of
Rev., 308 Or 423, 428, 781 P2d 346 (1989) (denying
attorney fees, in part, because the action was not one
in equity); Cook v. Employment Division, 293 Or 398,
401, 649 P2d 594 (1982) (same).  Second, the party
requesting attorney fees must be the prevailing party. 
See Gugler v. Baker Co. Ed. Serv. Dist. (Gugler III), 
305 Or 570, 574, 754 P2d 903 (1988) (denying fees
because the plaintiffs had not prevailed in their
action) * * *.  Finally, in filing the action, the
party requesting attorney fees must have been seeking
to 'vindicat[e] an important constitutional right
applying to all citizens without any gain peculiar to
himself,' Dennehy v. City of Gresham, 314 Or [600, 602,
841 P2d 633 (1992)], as opposed to vindicating
'individualized and different interests,' Vannatta [v.
Keisling, 324 Or 514, 549, 931 P2d 770 (1997)], or 'any
pecuniary or other special interest of his own aside
from that shared with the public at large.'  Dennehy v.
Dept. of Rev., 308 Or at 427."
327 Or at 287.  After the foregoing recital, this court held that
the Armatta plaintiffs were entitled to an award of attorney fees
because, in filing their action, they
	"primarily sought to enforce the provisions of the
Oregon Constitution that relate to amendment and
revision of that document, and ultimately prevailed on
their claim that [Ballot] Measure 40 [1996] was not
passed in compliance with the separate-vote requirement
of Article XVII, section 1."
Id. at 289.  With that background in mind, we turn to the issues
raised by the present petition.
	We note at the outset that the state does not contest
three aspects of plaintiffs' petition for an award of attorney
fees.  Plaintiffs were the prevailing party, and the state does
not challenge either the reasonableness of the amount of time
expended by counsel for plaintiffs or the hourly rate charged.  
	The state does assert, however, that this court should
deny the petition for attorney fees for three other reasons. 
First, the state asserts that, in seeking to have Measure 62
invalidated, plaintiffs were acting in their own interests, and
not in the interests of the public at large.  For example, the
state asserts that one plaintiff, Swett, alleged that he is a
public employee who favored one part of the measure, but not
others.  We are not persuaded.  We cannot discern how that fact
makes Swett any different from any other citizen who voted for or
against the measure.  Nothing in our jurisprudence suggests that
holding a point of view respecting the measure in question is
disqualifying.  Indeed, if caring about the outcome of the vote
is to be a disqualifying criterion, then virtually all future
plaintiffs would be disqualified from receiving attorney fees
unless they can aver that they really do not care about the
outcome.
	The state argues that plaintiff Fidanque and plaintiff
American Civil Liberties Union of Oregon (ACLU), of which
Fidanque is executive director, had a special interest in that
they did not wish to see the ACLU burdened with certain
requirements of the measure.  Again, we fail to see how that
makes Fidanque and the ACLU different from any other citizen who
had an interest in the measure and in what he or it would have
been required to do if the measure had been adopted properly.  In
addition -- and this point is important as to all three
plaintiffs -- plaintiffs' position respecting the measure itself
is not the point.  What is the point is that plaintiffs seek to
vindicate the Oregon Constitution's limitations on the amendment
or revision of that document.  See Armatta, 327 Or at 289 (making
similar point respecting prevailing parties in that case).
	The state relies on Vannatta, 324 Or at 548-49, as
supporting a contrary conclusion.  That case involved a challenge
to Ballot Measure 9 (1994), a measure that provided for mandatory
contribution limits in state political campaigns and voluntary
expenditure limits by candidates, and contained other provisions
relating to political contributions and expenditures.  Plaintiffs
there successfully challenged certain parts of the measure on the
ground that those parts violated the right to free expression
guaranteed by Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution. 
However, this court declined to award them attorney fees,
explaining:
	"Deras was a case in which the petitioner was
attempting only to vindicate interests of the public at
large.  By contrast, some of the petitioners, both
individual and institutional, who have brought the
present proceeding are not so disinterested.  Their
victory may benefit many members of the public at
large, but that is true of virtually any case involving
the right to speak, write, or print freely on any
subject whatever.  The overall benefit to the public is
only an ancillary result in this case.  Petitioners
such as the political action committee and the
potential political candidate have individualized, and
different, interests that they seek to vindicate."
Id. at 548-49.  The foregoing statement demonstrates the
distinction between Vannatta and the present petition.  Here, the
individual plaintiffs primarily vindicated a public interest,
rather than their own.
	In summary, we do not deem any of these plaintiffs to
be disqualified from receiving an award of attorney fees on the
ground that the dominant characteristic of their case was that
they were vindicating a private interest of their own, rather
than vindicating an interest of the public generally.  The
state's contrary argument on that ground is not well taken.
	The state next argues that this court's decision in
Armatta to award attorney fees, and the approach that it
represents, is an ill-advised policy choice, one that the court
should have left to the legislature.  The state's argument
disregards the fact that this court and others that grew out of
the Anglo-American legal tradition have exercised such an
inherent power to award attorney fees for a very long time.  We
nonetheless assume, as the state appears to assume, that the
legislature may decide that it has a role to play in this area,
notwithstanding this court's inherent equitable powers.  However,
we are not persuaded that it was inappropriate in Deras to
consider using those powers in that case, and we are not
persuaded that this court should reconsider wholly and abandon
its case law since Deras in that respect.  The state is at
liberty to take its policy argument to the political branches of
government and, if those branches are receptive, we shall examine
their choices respectfully.  For now, however, we adhere to our
decisions in Deras and Armatta. 
	Finally, the state argues that plaintiffs in this case
are disqualified from receiving an award of attorney fees because
it is a prerequisite to such an award that the relief sought by
the prevailing parties be equitable in nature, while the relief
that plaintiffs sought here -- a declaration that Measure 62
violated the separate-vote requirement of the Oregon Constitution
-- was legal in nature.
	The state is correct that this court has stated that,
to qualify for an award of attorney fees, parties in the position
of plaintiffs here must seek some form of equitable relief.  See
Armatta, 327 Or at 287; Dennehy v. Dept. of Rev., 308 Or at 427-28; Cook v. Employment Division, 293 Or at 401 (all so
indicating).  It also is true that declaratory judgment
proceedings can be legal or equitable in nature, depending on the
prayer for relief.  Ken Leahy Construction, Inc. v. Cascade
General, Inc., 329 Or 566, 571, 994 P2d 112 (1999).  Finally, it
is true that plaintiffs here sought only a declaration of their
rights, and did not request specifically any purely "equitable"
form of relief.  However, for the reasons that follow, we now
conclude that this court's reliance on that criterion in prior
cases was dicta in some, overstated in others, and should not be
followed here.
	As noted, this court specifically has adverted to the
requirement that a party seeking an award of attorney fees must
have sought equitable relief in at least three cases:  Armatta,
Dennehy v. Dept. of Rev., and Cook.  However, an examination of
those cases reveals that none actually depended on that criterion
for its disposition.  In Armatta, for example, this court merely
repeated the criterion from earlier cases (Dennehy v. Dept. of
Rev. and Cook), without separately assessing it.  (The plaintiffs
in Armatta specifically sought the equitable remedy of injunction
so there was no need to reexamine the criterion.  Id. at 288.)
		Dennehy v. Dept. of Rev. was a tax case in which the
plaintiff sought an award of attorney fees because he had
challenged successfully a practice of the Oregon Department of
Revenue by which that department "rounded up" tax assessments on
individual parcels of real property.  Id. at 425.  After first
determining that the plaintiff did not qualify for an award under
a statute on which he relied, this court then turned to the issue
whether it should exercise its inherent equitable power to make
an award.  The court compared the position of the Dennehy
plaintiff with that of the plaintiff in Deras and concluded:
	"The present case, by contrast, involves a personal
pecuniary interest of the plaintiff (albeit a very
small one), i.e., it is an action at law in which
plaintiff sought a declaration of his rights and the
return of money.  No injunctive or other equitable
relief was sought or granted.  Furthermore, the action
was brought in a court that has been granted limited
and circumscribed authority to award attorney fees in
certain cases."
Dennehy, 308 Or at 428 (citing Cook and Samuel).  Two aspects of
the foregoing statement are important:  First, the court again
did not independently assess the "proceeding in equity"
criterion; it simply cited Cook for the proposition.  Second, the
court identified another ground for its decision that was
independent and complete:  The plaintiff was vindicating a
personal financial interest of his own.  That latter criterion
was sufficient; the discussion of the additional requirement that
the proceeding be one in equity was a dictum.
	Cook was a case involving a petition for an award of
attorney fees arising out of the petitioner's successful
challenge of a Court of Appeals decision that itself had been
concerned with criteria for the award of fees under a statute,
ORS 183.495.  Cook, 293 Or at 400.  The court first determined in
summary fashion that the petitioner did not qualify for an award
of attorney fees under the statute.  Id.  The petitioner also
argued, however, that the court should award attorney fees
because he had acted as a "private attorney general" and had
secured an outcome that would benefit many other litigants.  The
court responded to that argument as follows:
		"In support of his [alternative] claim for
attorney fees for acting as a 'private attorney
general,' petitioner cites no authority whatsoever.  We
are aware of none.  Perhaps petitioner relies upon our
decisions to award attorney fees in Deras v. Myers, 272
Or 47, 535 P2d 541 (1975), and Gilbert v. Hoisting &
Port. Engrs., 237 Or 130, 384 P2d 136, 390 P2d 320,
cert den 376 US 963 (1964).  In those cases we allowed
awards of attorney fees based upon the inherent power
of a court of equity.  In this matter we did not sit in
equity."
Cook, 293 Or at 400-01 (emphasis added).
		Cook is the only case that we have found in which it
may be said that the court actually relied on the "proceeding in
equity" criterion to justify its action in denying an award of
attorney fees.  The case is not helpful analytically, however,
because the petitioner had not even made the argument that the
court first identified and then rejected.  Nonetheless, the court
made the statement.  An examination of the cases on which the
Cook court relied helps explain why it was made.
		Gilbert was a case brought against a union by some of
its members in which the plaintiffs sought (and received)
equitable relief -- an injunction.  The trial court also awarded
attorney fees to the plaintiffs.  On appeal, the union objected
to the award of attorney fees on the ground that no statute
authorized such an award.  This court overruled that objection,
stating:
	"The authority of a court of equity to award attorneys'
fees is not derived solely from the statutes.  Equity
may under some circumstances as a part of its inherent
equitable powers award attorneys' fees."
Gilbert, 237 Or at 137 (emphasis added).
		The successful plaintiffs in Gilbert also sought a
further award of attorney fees for successfully defending against
the union's appeal.  In a separate opinion devoted strictly to
that issue, i.e., attorney fees on appeal, this court explained:
		"In Adair v. McAtee, 236 Or 391, 385 P2d 621, 338
P2d 748 [(1964)], recently decided, we held that
'attorney's fees will not be allowed upon appeal in the
absence of a statute so providing or in the absence of
any express agreement that the prevailing party is
entitled to attorney's fees on appeal.'  We were not
there concerned with the right to attorney's fees where
the allowance of such fees is regarded as an essential
ingredient in the equitable interest sought to be
protected, as it is in the present case.
		"In Gilbert et al. v. Hoisting & Portable
Engineers, Local Union No. 701, * * * we affirmed an
allowance of attorneys' fees for services rendered in
the lower court.  There * * * we noted that 'Equity may
under some circumstances as a part of its inherent
equitable powers award attorneys' fees.'  It is not
necessary, therefore, to look to a state or an
agreement between the parties (as in Adair v. McAtee,
supra) to sustain plaintiffs' motion in this case."
Gilbert, 237 Or at 140-41 (internal citation omitted).
		In Deras, the plaintiff specifically sought both an
injunction and an award of attorney fees.  He acknowledged the
"American rule" that courts will not award attorney fees in the
absence of an authorizing statute or contract, but "correctly
point[ed] out that courts of equity have the inherent power to
award attorney's fees."  Deras, 272 Or at 65-66 (emphasis added). 
This court stated:
	"This power frequently has been exercised in cases
where the plaintiff brings suit in a representative
capacity and succeeds in protecting the rights of
others as much as his own.  We recognized this
equitable exception to the general rule in Gilbert v.
Hoisting & Port. Engrs., * * * a substantially similar
case to the one at hand."
Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
		Given the foregoing reliance of the Gilbert and Deras
courts on the fact that those cases were proceedings in equity,
the Cook court's reference to "the inherent power of a court of
equity" is understandable.  But that reference also is not
specific as to how, and to what extent, an equity court's
inherent power must have been invoked, or exercised, on the
merits of a case, to make the power available to award attorney
fees.  This case squarely presents that question.
		Aided by our nearly 30 years of experience in analyzing
Deras-type claims, we now conclude that the "proceeding in
equity" criterion is of limited utility in determining whether to
award an attorney fee and is of no utility at all if it is read
to require a specific prayer for, or the actual award of,
equitable relief.  We reach that conclusion for several reasons. 
First, the criterion specifically was established in Cook, a case
in which this court did not have the benefit of advocacy
concerning the criterion.  Second, Cook was a case that could
(and probably should) have been decided the same way on another
criterion, viz., the lack of statutory authorization for an
award, when the plaintiff's theory on the merits relied on a
statute.  Third, the criterion has not been utilized
dispositively since Cook.  Fourth, and most important, the
criterion imposes a pointless pleading requirement, as we shall
explain below.
		As noted, this case on the merits involved a
declaratory judgment proceeding and, in such proceedings, a court
has the power to grant equitable remedies where appropriate.  Ken
Leahy Construction, 329 Or at 571.  Although it is true that
plaintiffs in the case on the merits confined their prayer to a
request for a declaration of their rights, they could have sought
an injunction as well.  They did not so do because it would have
been pointless.  As the state itself acknowledges, equitable
relief -- such as an injunction against enforcement of Measure 62
-- was not necessary, because this court and the lower courts
would assume that the responsible state officials would honor the
court's declaration without the necessity of an accompanying
injunction.  See Burke v. Children's Services Division, 288 Or
533, 548, 607 P2d 141 (1980) (concluding that declaratory relief
need not include injunction, because court assumed responsible
state agencies would comply with law as determined by court).  It
thus would be an odd triumph of form over substance to sustain
the state's argument here, thereby requiring future litigants
formalistically to allege that the state as a defendant in a
similar declaratory judgment proceeding will not obey a trial
court's declaration of the applicable law to qualify for an award
of attorney fees.  We hold that it is sufficient under these
circumstances that the plaintiffs invoked the court's declaratory
judgment powers.
		For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the state's
objections are not well taken.  
		Plaintiffs, respondents on review, are awarded
$21,992.50 as reasonable attorney fees on review. 



1. 	Measure 62 added ten new sections to the Oregon
Constitution.  Among other things, it required recipients of
political contributions of $500 or more to disclose those and
subsequent contributions to the Secretary of State; it required
chief petitioners on all statewide initiative petitions or
referenda to disclose all contributions received or expenditures
made in support of those petitions or referenda to the Secretary
of State; and it required entities receiving contributions or
making expenditures for the purpose of influencing the collection
of signatures on statewide initiative or referendum petitions to
file a statement of organization with the Secretary of State,
form a petition political committee, and disclose contributions
and expenditures to the Secretary of State.

2. 	Respondents are not liable for attorney fees in these
circumstances.  See Lehman v. Bradbury, 334 Or 579, 583-86, 54
P3d 591 (2002) (explaining principle).  Their objection to the
petition is sustained.