Case Title: People v. Jackson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 91464

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-11-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 91464-Agenda 6-May 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								LAMONT JACKSON, Appellant.
Opinion filed November 21, 2002.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	In this case, we consider for the first time whether, in a
criminal bench trial, the State may present evidence relating to a
witness' polygraph examination "for a limited purpose" if that
purpose has not been established prior to the admission of the
evidence. We hold that it cannot.
	Defendant, Lamont Jackson, was indicted in the circuit court
of Cook County on several charges, including first degree murder
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3) (West 1992)) and attempted
armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/8-4, 18-2 (West 1992)). During
defendant's bench trial, the State elicited polygraph testimony
from one of its witnesses. Over defense counsel's objection, the
trial court admitted the evidence "for a limited purpose" despite
the absence of a legally valid purpose at that time.
	The trial court subsequently found defendant guilty of first
degree murder and attempted armed robbery. Defendant appealed,
and the appellate court held that although it was error to admit the
polygraph evidence, the error was harmless because the evidence
had been considered by the trial court "for a limited purpose." 321
Ill. App. 3d 498, 505-06.
	We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill.
2d R. 315) and now reverse and remand the cause for a new trial
based on the improper admission of the polygraph evidence.

BACKGROUND
	Defendant and Jessie Williford were indicted on several
charges, including first degree murder and attempted armed
robbery, related to the July 13, 1996, death of a female shopper at
Tops and Bottoms, a retail clothing store in Chicago. Williford
initially denied any involvement in the crime, but after being
confronted with the results of his polygraph test, he confessed in
a court-reported statement, naming defendant as the shooter. In
December 1998, Williford entered a guilty plea and was sentenced
to concurrent prison terms of 25 years for the murder and 4 years
for the attempted armed robbery.
	In his court-reported statement to police, Williford claimed
that he was driving with defendant on July 13, 1996, when
defendant showed him a black semiautomatic pistol in his
waistband. Williford then suggested robbing a store to get some
money, and defendant agreed. The two men discussed their
respective roles in the robbery: defendant would pull out the gun
and yell "stick up" while Williford got the money from the cash
register and gave it to defendant.
	According to Williford, the men then drove to Trak Auto,
where Williford remained in the car while defendant made some
purchases. After defendant returned to the car, the two men
decided to rob Tops and Bottoms, a retail clothing store. At some
point after entering the store, defendant looked toward the back
and raised his pistol. Williford, who was standing in another aisle,
looked and saw a man near the back of the store. Williford then
ducked and heard shots being fired behind him from defendant's
position. When the shooting stopped, Williford ran to his
grandmother's house.
	Williford's statement concluded with averments that he had
been treated well by the police and the assistant State's Attorney
and that he had no complaints. In addition, he stated that he was
not threatened or promised anything in exchange for his statement.
Finally, Williford indicated that he was not under the influence of
drugs or alcohol at the time and that the facts provided in the
statement were true.
	As for defendant, he initially denied any involvement in the
crime. Later, he gave the police an inculpatory statement that was
generally consistent with Williford's statement, but named
Williford as the shooter.
	Defendant subsequently waived his right to a jury trial. At
defendant's bench trial, the State called Williford as a witness. On
direct examination, Williford denied making any deals with the
State's Attorney's office in exchange for his testimony. He then
gave testimony contradicting his prior inculpatory statement to
police, insisting that neither he nor defendant had been in Tops
and Bottoms on the day of the homicide and denying any
involvement in a plan to rob the store. In response to this
testimony, the State asked Williford whether he had taken a
polygraph test and been told by the examiner that he was a "liar"
just prior to making his inculpatory statement.
	Defendant's counsel objected, arguing that Williford's
polygraph examination was immaterial to defendant's case. The
State countered that while polygraph evidence was inadmissible
against defendant, it was admissible to show the "course of
conduct" leading to Williford's prior inculpatory statement to the
police. The trial court admitted the evidence, stating that it would
be considered "for a limited purpose."
	The State continued to question Williford about the polygraph
test, and Williford indicated that after he had been confronted with
the negative polygraph results, he admitted his involvement in the
crime and implicated defendant as the shooter. He also
acknowledged that he had changed his story "plenty of times." In
addition, Williford claimed that he gave his statement "for his
safety" and that he was suffering from severe heroin withdrawal
and the police had promised to free him and not pursue first degree
murder charges if he implicated defendant.
	Defendant testified in his own defense, specifically denying
any involvement in the attempted armed robbery and homicide at
Tops and Bottoms or even being in the store that day. He
maintained that he gave an inculpatory statement only after he had
received a number of improper threats from the police and the
assistant State's Attorney. According to defendant, these threats
included charging him with first degree murder based on
Williford's statement to the police and barring him from ever
seeing his children again unless he implicated himself in the crime
and named Williford as the shooter.
	The State also presented testimony from a detective who had
interviewed both defendant and Williford, as well as the assistant
State's Attorneys who had taken the inculpatory statements from
the two men. Each of these witnesses denied using any threats,
false promises, or other improper inducements to obtain
statements from either defendant or Williford. They also denied
advising defendant to protect himself by admitting his
involvement in the robbery and naming Williford as the shooter.
Furthermore, they maintained that the two men were treated well
and never complained about their well-being or treatment while in
police custody.
	After considering the testimony of the witnesses and the
arguments of the parties, the trial judge found defendant guilty of
first degree murder and attempted armed robbery, sentencing him
to 50 years in prison for the murder and 15 years in prison for the
attempted armed robbery. Defendant's post-trial motions were
denied, and he appealed.
	The appellate court found that although the trial court erred by
admitting evidence of Williford's polygraph examination, the error
was harmless because Williford subsequently testified that his
confession was " 'for his safety' " and based on false promises by
the police. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 505. The court believed that because
the State could have offered the polygraph evidence to refute
Williford's claims of improper police conduct the error was one of
timing, not substance. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 506. In addition, the
appellate court excused the error because the trial court stated that
it was considering the polygraph evidence "for a limited purpose,"
and judges are presumed to use evidence only for the stated
purpose. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 506. Finally, the appellate court
rejected defendant's arguments concerning the propriety of his
sentencing hearing. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 507. This court
subsequently allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177
Ill. 2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS
	Defendant argues that the admission of evidence concerning
the polygraph test conducted prior to Williford's confession was
reversible error because it violated the general rule barring
polygraph evidence. He asserts that, although he failed to include
this issue in his post-trial motion, this court should address it
under the doctrine of plain error because it affected his substantial
rights. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).
	 The State counters that plain error is a narrow exception to
the general rule of waiver and should be applied only where the
evidence is closely balanced or where the error has deprived
defendant of a fair trial. People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 100
(1992). The State asserts that neither condition is met here because
the evidence of defendant's guilt was not closely balanced and the
alleged error was not serious enough to have resulted in an unfair
trial.
	In People v. Gard, 158 Ill. 2d 191, 204-05 (1994), we
addressed for the first time the applicability of the plain error
doctrine when evidence relating to the polygraph examination of
a witness other than the defendant is admitted in a criminal trial.
During the defendant's trial, both the State and the defense in
Gard made numerous references to the witnesses' polygraph
examinations.
	In our discussion of plain error, we focused on the inherent
unreliability of polygraph testing. Gard, 158 Ill. 2d  at 204-05.
Noting that the scientific reliability of the evidence was not
dependent on the test subject, we concluded that the general rule
precluding the admission of a criminal defendant's polygraph test
applied equally to polygraph evidence obtained from a witness in
a criminal trial. Gard, 158 Ill. 2d  at 204. Our opinion explicitly
acknowledged the lack of closely balanced evidence in the case,
but still found plain error due to our strong concern for protecting
and preserving the integrity and reputation of the judicial system.
Gard, 158 Ill. 2d  at 205. Thus, we held that "the admission of
evidence of polygraph testing of witnesses at defendant's trial
constituted plain error because it was error compromising the
integrity and tarnishing the reputation of the judicial process
itself." Gard, 158 Ill. 2d  at 205.
	 Our rationale in Gard was largely premised on our prior
decision in People v. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d 225 (1981). In Baynes, this
court held that evidence relating to the polygraph testing of a
criminal defendant was inadmissible because it did not have
sufficient indicia of reliability. Consequently, the prejudicial
effects of admitting the evidence substantially outweighed its
probative value. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d  at 244. Moreover, the
admission of polygraph evidence constituted "an unwarranted
intrusion" into the trier of fact's role in determining the credibility
of the witnesses. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d  at 244.
	Based on these considerations, we concluded that the
admission of the defendant's polygraph evidence rose to the level
of plain error because it "impinge[d] upon the integrity of our
judicial system." Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d  at 244. We reached this
conclusion despite a stipulation by the defendant that the test
results would be admissible, reasoning that a mere stipulation
cannot reduce the danger that admitting scientifically unreliable
tests would undermine the judicial process. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d  at
233-34.
	In the instant case, the State attempts to distinguish our prior
analyses, asserting that any error that may have occurred did not
adversely affect the judicial process. It fails, however, to offer any
explanation for this conclusion, and we are unable to conceive of
any justification for it in light of our reasoning in Gard and
Baynes.
	The State next claims that Gard is factually distinguishable
because the jury in that case was permitted to consider the
polygraph evidence for any purpose, while here a trial judge
considered it only "for a limited purpose." As the appellate court
noted, "[i]n a bench trial if the court has admitted evidence for a
limited purpose the court is presumed to only have considered it
for that purpose." 321 Ill. App. 3d at 506, citing People v. Avery,
227 Ill. App. 3d 382, 392 (1991). In reviewing the State's
argument, we must consider the possible distinctions both between
a jury and a judge serving as the fact finder and the use of
polygraph evidence for general versus "limited" purposes. We turn
first to the question of how the identity of the fact finder impacts
our analysis.
	As in Gard, our overriding concern in this case is the
preservation of the integrity of the judicial process. See Gard, 158 Ill. 2d  at 205. We have long recognized that, generally, the
admission of polygraph evidence unjustifiably intrudes on the trier
of fact's ability to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. Baynes,
88 Ill. 2d  at 244. The identity of the trier of fact in any specific
case cannot imbue inherently unreliable polygraph evidence with
reliability or lessen the damage to the integrity and reputation of
the judicial process caused by admitting scientifically unreliable
evidence. See Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d  at 239-40. The same principles
control regardless of whether the trier of fact is a panel of
competent jurors or an experienced trial judge. People v.
Yarbrough, 93 Ill. 2d 421, 426-27 (1982). Thus, we reject the
State's argument that this case is distinguishable from Gard and
Baynes because here the trier of fact was a trial judge, not a jury.
	As for the State's argument that the evidence was properly
considered "for a limited purpose," we initially note that the trial
court did not clearly define this "limited purpose." From our
review of the record, we conclude that the judge intended to
consider the evidence as part of the "course of conduct" leading to
Williford's inculpatory statement to the police. Based on that
limited purpose, we address the State's argument that the evidence
was properly admitted.
	The State cites People v. Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d 486 (1998), in
support of its contention that the polygraph evidence was properly
admitted to establish the sequence of events leading to Williford's
inculpatory statement because he claimed his statement was
procured by the use of threats and false promises from the police
and the assistant State's Attorney. For the reasons that follow, we
believe the State's reliance on Jefferson is misplaced.
	In Jefferson, this court affirmed the trial court's admission of
rebuttal evidence showing that the defendant confessed after
agreeing to undergo a polygraph examination the next day.
Notably, prior to the admission of the polygraph evidence, the
defendant in Jefferson claimed at trial that she confessed because
the police had promised her that if she gave a statement she would
be released from custody to see her child, whom she had been told
had only hours to live. We held that the defendant's claim of
police misconduct opened the door to the introduction of the
polygraph agreement for the limited purpose of establishing an
alternative explanation for the defendant's confession. Jefferson,
184 Ill. 2d  at 495. If the State's polygraph evidence had not been
allowed, the trier of fact would have been misled by the
defendant's prior testimony concerning the circumstances
preceding her confession. Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d  at 496.
	In contrast, the polygraph evidence in the instant case was
presented during the State's direct examination of Williford, prior
to his claim of police coercion. At the time the evidence was
admitted, it served no proper legal purpose. The appellate court
incorrectly reasoned that the trial court in this case must be
presumed to have considered the evidence for a proper limited
purpose. Where, as here, there is no legally proper purpose at the
time the evidence is admitted, we will not afford the trial court that
presumption. For this reason, we cannot agree with the appellate
court's conclusion that the introduction of polygraph evidence
before the witness has opened the door to its admission was
merely a harmless timing error. See 321 Ill. App. 3d at 506.
	In Jefferson, the State used the polygraph evidence as a shield
against the defendant's allegation of police misconduct. Here, the
State attempted to use the evidence affirmatively as a sword to
advance its own case. Moreover, the State's premature
introduction of the polygraph evidence may have actually
compelled Williford to justify his prior actions by claiming
coercion in his subsequent testimony. We did not approve the
offensive use of polygraph evidence in Jefferson, and we will not
now allow the State to create a straw man only to knock him
down, all within its own case in chief.
	The dissent criticizes this decision, asserting that in a new trial
the same evidence will be admitted, only in a different order.
While this may be true,
		"let it be again remembered that delays and little
inconveniences in the forms of justice are the price that all
free nations must pay for their liberty in more substantial
matters; that these inroads upon this sacred bulwark of the
nation are fundamentally opposite to the spirit of our
constitution; and that, though begun in trifles, the
precedent may gradually increase and spread to the utter
disuse of juries in questions of the most momentous
concern." 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *350.
See also Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614-15, 90 L. Ed. 350, 355-56, 66 S. Ct. 402, 406 (1946). Moreover, "[a]ll law
is technical if viewed solely from concern for punishing crime
without heeding the mode by which it is accomplished."
Bollenbach, 326 U.S.  at 614-15, 90 L. Ed.  at 355, 66 S. Ct.  at 406.
	Here, requiring the State to offer some legally valid
foundation prior to admitting inherently unreliable and prejudicial
evidence seems but a small intrusion on judicial expediency in
light of this court's long-standing general bar on polygraph
evidence. Surely, the integrity and reputation of the judicial
process merits such minimal protection. While formal
requirements may often be scorned because they do not serve the
ends of expediency, this court must apply a longer view. Neder v.
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 40, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35, 66, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1848 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part, joined by Souter and Ginsburg, JJ.).
	While in this case the State had the good fortune to obtain
subsequent testimony from Williford that may have justified the
introduction of the polygraph evidence to refute his claim of
coercion under our rationale in Jefferson, in many other cases, the
State will not be so fortunate. It would be unwise to allow the
State to procure otherwise inadmissible and potentially damaging
polygraph evidence in the speculative hope that a witness will later
justify its admission. If the justification does not materialize, then
the admission of the unreliable evidence has done irreparable
damage to both the individual defendant's case and the integrity of
the entire judicial process.
	If the State wishes to admit polygraph testimony to flesh out
the circumstances surrounding a confession, it may attempt to do
so only in the limited circumstances outlined in Jefferson. We will
not condone the anticipatory introduction of polygraph evidence
by the State.
	As for the dissent's claim that the polygraph evidence was
merely elicited to show Williford's state of mind at the time he
made his confession, the State itself never tendered that
explanation to the trial court, insisting instead only that the
evidence was offered to show the witness' "course of conduct."
Thus, we need not address the merits of the dissent's proffered
speculation.
	Accordingly, we conclude there was no proper "limited
purpose" for the trial court's admission of the State's polygraph
evidence in this case. In light of our holding on this issue, we need
not and do not reach the merits of defendant's other argument on
appeal.

CONCLUSION
	We hold that it is plain error to admit polygraph evidence in
a criminal trial in anticipation of evidence potentially justifying its
admission as an alternative explanation for an inculpatory
statement. This is true regardless of whether the case is tried
before a judge or a jury.
	In light of our disposition of this case, we need not reach the
merits of defendant's other argument on appeal, claiming that the
admission of multiple victim impact statements at his sentencing
hearing violated his due process rights.
	The judgments of the appellate court and the trial court are
therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment reversed;
cause remanded.



	JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting:


	Like the appellate court, I believe that the premature
admission of evidence relating to Williford's polygraph
examination was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I therefore
respectfully dissent.
	Plain error is a limited and narrow exception to the general
waiver rule, to be invoked only where the evidence is closely
balanced or the alleged error is so substantial that it deprived the
defendant of a fair trial. People v. Kuntu, 196 Ill. 2d 105, 128
(2001). The second prong of the plain error exception is to be
invoked only where the alleged error is so serious that its
consideration is necessary to preserve the integrity and reputation
of the judicial process. Kuntu, 196 Ill. 2d  at 128. Here, the
evidence of defendant's guilt was not closely balanced. Thus, the
plain error doctrine applies only if the premature admission of
evidence relating to Williford's polygraph examination threatens
the integrity and reputation of the judicial process. As the
majority's own analysis demonstrates, however, the integrity and
reputation of the judicial process is not the least bit at risk in this
case. 
	First, the majority concedes that, under Jefferson, the State
could have solicited evidence relating to Williford's polygraph
examination to rebut Williford's subsequent claim of police
coercion. Slip op. at 9. According to the majority, then, the
"integrity of the entire judicial process" (slip op. at 9) is at risk
because, in an isolated case, the trial court entertained perfectly
admissible evidence a little bit too soon. Stated differently, the
majority is convinced that the evidentiary error that occurred in
this case is of such magnitude as to threaten "the integrity of the
entire judicial process." Slip op. at 8. Yet the majority's remedy is
to remand this cause for a new trial at which the exact same
evidence will come in, only in a slightly different order. Surely, if
the judicial system's integrity is as fragile as the majority suggests,
something more than mere formalism is called for.
	Second, and more importantly, the majority's concern for the
judicial system's integrity is based not upon what happened in this
case but upon what would happen if the facts of this case were
exactly the opposite of what they are. As the majority explains:
			"While in this case the State had the good fortune to
obtain subsequent testimony from Williford that may have
justified the introduction of the polygraph evidence to
refute his claim of coercion under our rationale in
Jefferson, in many other cases, the State will not be so
fortunate. It would be unwise to allow the State to procure
otherwise inadmissible and potentially damaging
polygraph evidence in the speculative hope that a witness
will later justify its admission. If the justification does not
materialize, then the admission of the unreliable evidence
has done irreparable damage to both the individual
defendant's case and the integrity of the entire judicial
process." Slip op. at 9.
Thus, according to the majority, "irreparable damage to both the
individual defendant's case and the integrity of the entire judicial
process" occurs only when a justification for the"otherwise
inadmissible and potentially damaging polygraph evidence" does
not materialize. This may or may not be true. But what is
undeniable is the fact that, in this case, the necessary justification
did materialize. Consequently, under the majority's own analysis,
no harm was done to either this defendant's case or the integrity
of the entire judicial process, and no plain error occurred.
	The bottom line is that the error that occurred in this case was
harmless. It is well established that, in a bench trial, the judge is
presumed to consider evidence only for its proper purpose. People
v. Lewis, 30 Ill. 2d 617, 622 (1964). Under Jefferson, the State
may properly introduce evidence relating to a polygraph
examination to rebut a witness' claim that his or her statement was
the product of coercion. Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d  at 496. Here, the
State introduced evidence relating to Williford's polygraph
examination before any claim of coercion was made. While the
trial court should have sustained defense counsel's objection at
that point, the fact remains that Williford shortly thereafter
asserted that his statement was coerced. At this point, the evidence
relating to Williford's polygraph examination became perfectly
admissible. Thus, any error that the trial court committed in
admitting the evidence in the first instance was at worst harmless
and at best cured entirely.
	As for the majority's concern that "the State's premature
introduction of the polygraph evidence may have actually
compelled Williford to justify his prior actions by claiming
coercion in his subsequent testimony" (slip op. at 8), I have two
responses. First, absolutely nothing in the record supports the
majority's conjecture. Second, and more importantly, the
majority's conjecture is logically untenable. The majority
apparently believes that, had the State not asked Williford about
his polygraph results, Williford might never have mentioned the
coercion that led to his signed and sworn confession. What the
majority's theory overlooks, however, is that Williford had just
testified that the signed and sworn confession that landed him 25
years in prison was a complete fabrication. Surely, the majority
cannot believe that, had the State not asked Williford about his
polygraph results, Williford's testimony would have concluded
without either side inquiring as to why Williford not only gave a
false confession but also pleaded guilty and accepted 25 years in
prison on the basis of that confession. Of course those questions
would have been asked, and of course Williford's claim of
coercion would have come out at that time.
	As a final matter, I wish to note that, while the majority talks
a great deal about "the inherent unreliability of polygraph testing"
(slip op. at 5), "sufficient indicia of reliability" (slip op at 5), and
"scientifically unreliable tests" (slip op. at 6), none of these
concerns are implicated in this case. This is because the State
never introduced the results of Williford's polygraph examination.
Indeed, after reading the majority opinion, one would think that
the State not only introduced those results but also argued that they
constitute scientific proof that Williford lied during his polygraph
examination. In fact, the only thing that the State introduced was
Williford's understanding of his polygraph results, and it did so
only as evidence of Williford's state of mind at the time he gave
his inculpatory statement. As with all state of mind evidence, the
purpose of this testimony was to show what the witness believed
at a certain relevant time, not whether that belief was in fact true.
That the State was interested in eliciting evidence only of
Williford's state of mind is demonstrated by the fact that, from the
record, we have no idea (1) what Williford was asked during his
polygraph examination, (2) whether Williford in fact failed his
polygraph examination, or (3) whether Williford even took a
polygraph examination. All we know is that, at the time he
confessed, Williford believed he had just failed a polygraph
examination. Whether or not this evidence is admissible, its
reliability has nothing to do with a polygraph's scientific integrity.
	For these reasons, I dissent.
	JUSTICE GARMAN joins in this dissent.