Case Title: Mace v. Nocera

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mace v. Nocera2004 WY 154101 P.3d 921Case Number: 04-4Decided: 12/07/2004Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
 
 
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 
 
                                                                                                

MARTHA 
LOU MACE,                                                         

                         
Appellant (Plaintiff)                                       

                                                                                                

                   
v.                                                                          

                                                                                                

MICHAEL 
ARTHUR NOCERA,                                           

                          
Appellee (Defendant) .                               

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Raymond 
D. Macchia, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Robert 
T. Moxley of Gage & Moxley, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 
 
 
 

HILL, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Martha 
Lou Mace (Mother), seeks review of an order of the district court issued upon 
the parties' cross-motions to modify their divorce decree with respect to child 
custody.  In that order, the trial 
court placed the parties' son (Child) in the primary custody of Michael Arthur 
Nocera (Father).  Mother contends 
that the district court failed to afford her procedural due process with respect 
to her motion for a change of judge pursuant to W.R.C.P. 40.1(b), as well as in 
not removing himself as the presiding judge.  She also contends that the trial court 
erred in allowing a custody evaluator, who was not licensed in Wyoming, to testify at 
trial, and in failing to take into account the living environment in Father's 
home.  We will 
affirm.

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      Mother raises 
these issues:

 
 
            
1.  Did Judge Grant err when he failed to give procedural due 
process to [Mother] when [she] filed her motion pursuant to [W.R.C.P.] 
40.1(b)(2) to change the district judge?

 
 
            
2.  Did Judge Grant err in failing to remove himself as the 
presiding judge when [Mother] filed her motion pursuant to [W.R.C.P.] 40.1(b)(2) 
for a disqualification for cause of Judge Grant?

 
 
            
3.  Did Judge Grant err when he allowed a custody evaluator to 
testify at trial when that custody evaluator was not licensed in Wyoming?

 
 
            
4.  Did Judge Grant err when he failed to take into 
consideration the living environment of [Father] when he made his custody 
determination?

 
 
Father 
presents this "counterstatement" of the issues:

 
 
I.          
As a matter of law, may [Mother] legally challenge the testimony of a 
court-appointed expert  and repudiate her stipulation for his appointment  on 
grounds that he has no Wyoming license?

 
 
II.          
As a matter of law, can Judge Grant's comment upon the evidence presented 
in the first day of the trial be regarded as proof of "personal" bias or 
prejudice, sufficient to render a judge unable to act and rule 
impartially?

 
 
III.         
Did Judge Grant abuse his discretion in awarding custody of [Child] to 
his Father  as Judge Kautz previously had done in the Eighth Judicial District 
 because Mother would do her best to deprive Father and [Child] of their 
relationship?

 
 

 
 
[¶3]      The parties were 
married on January 4, 1993.  Child 
was born on October 12, 1992.  On 
April 7, 1994, Mother filed a complaint for divorce.  A Decree of Divorce was entered on May 
13, 1994.  With respect to custody 
of Child, the decree provided:  
"[Mother] and [Father] shall have custody of the parties' minor 
child.  [Mother] shall have the 
primary care, custody and control of the minor child with visitation rights to 
[Father]."

 
 
[¶4]      In October 1994, 
Mother left Wheatland to pursue enhancement of her career, as well as a romantic 
interest.  As a result of that 
change of circumstances, Father sought and was awarded "sole temporary custody" 
of Child.  On October 17, 1994, 
Father filed a petition to permanently modify custody, asking that he be awarded 
primary custody of Child with Mother having visitation.  Mother contested the matter.  After a hearing on Father's petition, 
the district court issued a decision letter that summarized the divorce 
proceedings and the original custody arrangements.  The district court noted that the 
custody arrangements, to which the parties stipulated, operated smoothly so long 
as both parties lived and worked in PlatteCounty.  The district court also noted that 
Father and Mother were involved in domestic violence incidents, but eventually 
both parties dropped those matters.  
At that time Mother resided in Deer Lodge, Montana, with her 
boyfriend, Kenneth Holkan, whom she met while he was incarcerated in Wheatland 
for aggravated assault and battery (Mother worked as a jailer while in 
Wheatland).

 
 
[¶5]      Employing the 
"best interests of the child" standard, the district court noted that neither 
parent had consistently demonstrated good judgment and that each considered 
Child "a prize to be won."  However, 
finding Mother's testimony not to be credible and that Father was the parent 
"most likely to provide the child with stability, security, and an open attitude 
toward the other parent," the court awarded custody to Father and visitation to 
Mother.  Mother sought 
reconsideration of the modification order, which was denied.  When her attorney withdrew from his 
representation of her, she continued her battle pro se.  Eventually, a middle ground was reached 
and another order modifying custody and visitation, again in favor of Father, 
was entered on December 8, 1995.  
The parties reconciled to some degree by 1997, and the district court 
approved a stipulation that provided for "joint custody" of the 
Child.

 
 
[¶6]      On January 19, 
2000, Father filed a petition for change of custody, and on February 10, 2000, 
Mother filed a counter-petition for change of custody.  Mother also sought to have the case 
transferred to the First Judicial District in Cheyenne because all parties resided in LaramieCounty.  Father opposed the transfer.  However, the district court agreed that 
the matter should be transferred to LaramieCounty, and an order to that effect was 
entered on April 20, 2000.

 
 
[¶7]      On August 8, 
2000, the parties entered into a stipulation settling the matter of temporary 
custody pending further hearings, and the district court entered an order 
effectuating that stipulation on August 15, 2000.  Although it is apparent that there were 
additional proceedings below, so far as the record on appeal shows, the next 
significant development in this matter occurred on April 12, 2002, when the 
parties, now including a guardian ad litem, stipulated to a custody evaluation 
to be done by Jorge L. Figueroa, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist practicing in 
Fort Collins, Colorado.2  On December 6, 2002, after Dr. 
Figueroa's report had been made available to all parties, Mother filed a motion 
for an additional custody evaluation.  
Mother contended that she did not "know" Dr. Figueroa was licensed only 
in Colorado, and not Wyoming, and that his report indicated "an unfair bias" 
against her.  Dr. Figueroa reached a 
conclusion that Child should be in the primary custody of Father because his was 
the more stable of the two homes, and Father was the parent most likely to 
encourage Child's relationship with the other parent.  On December 10, 2002, based on Dr. 
Figueroa's report, as well as other materials in the voluminous record of this 
case, Father filed a motion for temporary custody.  In a decision letter filed of record on 
December 31, 2002, the district court declined to order a second custody 
evaluation and set a schedule for a pretrial conference and a 
trial.

 
 
[¶8]      The trial in this 
matter was conducted on three days:  
March 5, 2003, April 16, 2003, and April 30, 2003.  On March 5th, the district 
court heard some brief testimony from Mother, mostly about her contentions that 
she had obtained a "no contact" order from the police to protect her from Father 
because he had been threatening her, harassing her by phone, and stalking 
her.  She also repeated her 
allegations about Father's alcoholism, mental illness, neglect of Child, and 
general bad character.  Rocklon 
Edmonds, a prosecutor for the City of Cheyenne, testified about his handling of 
criminal complaints filed by Mother against Father.  With respect to those complaints, 
prosecution of Father was deferred and he was placed on probation.  Later, a petition to revoke probation 
was filed but was dismissed because Mother was not available to testify at the 
hearing on the motion.  Edmonds also testified 
that he had never issued a "no contact" order for Mother, and against Father, 
except for perhaps an "informal" suggestion to police to tell people quarreling 
in circumstances such as those presented in this case, to stay away from each 
other temporarily.  The district 
court also heard testimony from Dr. Figueroa, the gist of which already has been 
set forth.  Martha Schilling, Ph.D., 
also testified as a witness that day.  
She was called on behalf of Mother.  
Her practice is limited to doing evaluations, including custody 
evaluations.  Her testimony was 
limited to a critique of Dr. Figueroa's report, which she considered lacking in 
some respects.  However, the source 
of some of her concerns was information provided to her by Mother that had not 
been otherwise validated or investigated (nor had much of it been previously 
reported by Mother in other court proceedings).  Mother also called Gina John as a 
witness.  She had been asked to 
treat Child at the Cheyenne Children's Clinic in 2000-2001, at Mother's behest, 
but without Mother first seeking Father's consent.  John related that she did therapy but 
did not do custody evaluations and declined to enter into a therapeutic 
relationship with Child unless both parents fully consented to it and agreed to 
cooperate in the process.  At the 
time, she felt she did not have "permission" from Father, although she conceded 
in cross-examination that she had no reason to believe that Father was opposed 
to the proposed counseling with her.  
She also conceded that she did not have a very good recollection of those 
events and that, because she was no longer employed by the clinic, she did not 
have access to the records created at the time of these events.  In any event, her contact with Child was 
very limited.

 
 
[¶9]      Father called 
Reanne White as a witness.  For a 
time in 1990, the parties lived directly across the street from White.  She and her husband continued to be 
friends with Father even after he moved away (and Mother remained at that 
location, whereas Father lived six or eight blocks away).  She also knew Mother's other children, 
as well as the Child affected by this matter.  Her testimony was principally to the 
effect that Mother bitterly complained about Father's drinking, infidelity, and 
general irresponsibility, but she never saw anything that justified those 
criticisms.  In addition, she 
related that both Father and Child came to visit them almost weekly, and the 
first three or four times he came to visit, the police came to her house.  She testified that she never perceived 
that Father used his visits to "surveil" Mother, nor did he visit more often 
than was the custom between them after a police officer told Father he was to 
have "no contact" with Mother.3  She also praised Father's parenting 
abilities and noted that Mother appeared to have her older children raise the 
younger children, as she worked very long hours.  She testified that she did not see 
Father drink to excess (only a beer or two).  The final business of that day of trial 
was a request by the district court to hear the guardian ad litem's 
recommendations with respect to an interim custody order.  For several years preceding the trial, 
the custody arrangement had been one week with Mother, then one week with 
Father.  The guardian ad litem did 
not recommend an interim order that would alter the existing custody 
arrangement, although she clearly favored awarding custody of Child to 
Father.  Her rejection of the idea 
of an interim order at that point in the proceedings was based upon a concern 
that yet another change in custody would not be good for the child, especially 
if it turned out not to be permanent.  
In his closing remarks, the district court said 
this:

 
 
            
Well, I guess I'm very concerned about Dr. Figueroa's testimony that 
[Child] should have a stable permanent custody situation soon rather than later, 
and in view of his recommendation, and apparently, what would be the guardian ad 
litem's position, that the father should have custody [.]  It's hard to imagine.  It would be a very, very compelling case 
that the mother would have to show for the Court to go against those very strong 
and seemingly well-founded recommendations.

            
Miss Schilling listened to all of Dr. Figueroa's testimony and [had] a 
copy of his report before, and it seems to me that many of the alleged 
deficiencies  that is, deficiencies alleged by her and criticism of Dr. 
Figueroa's evaluation go back to supposed allegations prior to the time these 
parties even met, prior to 1995.

            
Judge Kautz and his finding Mr. Nocera has had custody of [Child] for 
substantial periods of time since the divorce, and this shared custody was 
[stipulated in] 1997.  That is just 
simply inconceivable to me that the mother would have agreed to this believing 
the things she apparently believes about him.  It is just really hard to conceive 
of.

            
Dr. Schilling's critique does not refute any of Dr. Figueroa's 
conclusions.  She only says she 
would have done the evaluation somewhat differently, and the notion that she 
would have relied on [Mother's] purported refutation of the report simply seemed 
unreasonable in the circumstances Dr. Figueroa saw as evidence  as evidence of 
[Mother's] extreme antagonism toward Mr. Nocera and the unreasonableness of her 
demands and the unlikelihood of the validity of her 
perceptions.

  

            
So the 
critique of the evaluated recommendations are really very material to the 
decision.  It just seemed to me 
[Child] is harmed more every day that he is in this back-and-forth thing.  It seems to me almost inherently, at 
this point, unhelpful for him, not in his best interests, but I guess your 
recommendation, at this point, is that [an] interim order still not ought not to 
be done until such time, if there is to be such time, as it would not be 
tentative in any way.

 
 
[¶10]   Counsel for Mother vehemently 
objected to the district court's comments, asserting that they violated her due 
process rights and deprived her of her day in court.  In response to Mother's counsel's 
concern that the court needed to hear all the evidence, the judge 
commented:  "I cannot imagine what 
advantage that might be.  That's 
what I'd like to hear."  The 
district court then continued the trial until the next scheduled date for trial, 
which was to be on April 16, 2003, noting that he would make an interim order at 
that time.

 
 
[¶11]   On April 14, 2003, Mother filed a 
motion to change district judge contending that the presiding judge was "biased 
or prejudiced" against her.  Her 
affidavit was attached to the motion.  
The district court set that motion for hearing on April 16, 2003, and it 
was taken up as the first order of business on that date.  Mother's attorney noted that the 
presiding judge had decided to hear the motion himself, rather than assign it to 
another judge, but did not specifically object to the proceedings on that 
basis.  The presiding judge made 
reference to the applicable rule, W.R.C.P. 40.1(b)(2), which allows for just 
such a circumstance, and noted that the timing of the motion did not afford the 
trial court the opportunity to assign another judge to hear the motion.  The district court declined to hear 
testimony from Mother and relied only on her affidavit, as well as the argument 
of counsel and the guardian ad litem, in deciding the motion.  Mother's counsel objected to that 
procedure but did not articulate a specific factual (offer of proof) or legal 
basis for the objection.  In 
argument, Mother relied on the comments made by the district court at the 
conclusion of the March 5th hearing, as well as a perception that the 
district court did not pay attention to Dr. Schilling (he was reading court 
documents and taking notes during her testimony).  The district court denied any bias or 
prejudice against Mother (though he conceded he may have been a bit impatient at 
times) or that he had prejudged the case.  
The district court then denied the motion for a change of 
judge.

 
 
[¶12]   Father was the first witness to 
testify on April 16th.  He related that he agreed to the 1997 
modification of child custody at Mother's insistence and against the advice of 
his counsel.  The parties then split 
up again shortly thereafter and they had an informal custody arrangement for a 
period of time.  When Mother 
remarried, Father wanted a more formal, structured custody plan in place.  An arrangement acceptable to both 
parties was eventually worked out -- one week with Mother, one week with 
Father.  Suffice it to say, his 
further testimony related the rather difficult history Mother, Father, and Child 
had endured together.   
Mother's current husband, Jake Edward Hardin, testified as to his 
perceptions of the interactions between Mother, Father, and Child during the 
time he had been in the picture.  A 
friend of Mother testified that on one occasion, Father had shown up in an 
inebriated condition at Mother's house while Mother was in Hawaii for temporary 
military duty.  Cheyenne Police 
Officer Bonnie Bristow (formerly Marquart) testified about her investigation of 
Mother's complaints about phone harassment.  A caller ID device showed 50-60 calls 
from Father to Mother in one 24-hour period.  Officer Bristow related that when she 
delivered a ticket/summons to Father, he was "extremely belligerent," but not 
intoxicated and not "scary."  At 
that time, she issued Father a verbal "no-contact" order.  Officer Bristow admitted on 
cross-examination that there was no content to the telephone calls at issue, 
just many calls that were not answered.  
She also stated that she had no further contact with either Mother or 
Father since that episode.  In 
connection with the phone call incident, Officer Bristow testified that she went 
to the Whites' house (they lived across the street from Mother), and told them 
that if Father "was coming over and doing that kind of activity [spying], that 
they should be aware of it, and that it is against the law  to do that, to spy 
on her."

 
 
[¶13]   The third day of the trial was held 
on April 30, 2003.  The main purpose 
of that session was to hear Mother's testimony.  Mother testified that her main concerns 
were Father's "stalking, for one thing; the manipulating of these  the 
principals, teachers."  She added to 
this, "city attorneys, county attorneys, whomever, whoever he spoke with on 
different occasions to do a multitude of things, criminal."  She related that she reconciled with 
Father in 1997 because:  "He said it 
was a package deal, like I had to put up with him in order to have any kind of 
contact with [Child], and that was during that time period that he refused to 
allow me visitation."  She testified 
that Father stalked her "daily."  
She testified to two incidents (her oldest daughter corroborated one of 
these incidents), where Father held a gun on Mother and the children and 
threatened them.  However, these 
incidents were not reported to police and they occurred early in the parties' 
relationship.  Another of Mother's 
central concerns was that if Father had primary custody of Child, he would use 
that time to alienate Child from her.

 
 
[¶14]   At the conclusion of the final day 
of trial, the district court ruled generally in favor of Father, based upon the 
evidence presented by the parties, the relative credibility of the parties, Dr. 
Figueroa's report, and because Father was the parent more likely to foster a 
positive relationship with the other parent.  Since the parties were unable to reach 
an agreement on visitation, the district court entered an order directing that 
Child be placed in the primary custody and control of Father, with Mother to 
have "standard visitation."

 
 

 
 

 
 
[¶15]   W.R.C.P. 40.1(b)(2) 
provides:

Rule 
40.1.  Transfer of trial judge and 
change of judge.

            
.

(b) 
Change of Judge. --

.

            
(2) Disqualification for Cause. -- Whenever the grounds for such 
motion become known, any party may move for a change of district judge on 
the ground that the presiding judge:  
(A) has been engaged as counsel in the action prior to being appointed as 
judge;  (B) is interested in the 
action;  (C) is related by 
consanguinity to a party;  (D) is a 
material witness in the action; or (E) is biased or prejudiced against the 
party or the party's counsel.  
The motion shall be supported by an affidavit or affidavits of any person 
or persons, stating sufficient facts to show the existence of such grounds.  Prior to a hearing on the motion any 
party may file counter-affidavits.  
The motion shall be heard by the presiding judge, or at the 
discretion of the presiding judge by another judge.  If the motion is granted, the presiding 
judge shall immediately call in another judge to try the action.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
[¶16]   Father objected to the motion 
because of timeliness and because of a lack of notice.  The district court sustained those 
objections.  The rule directs that 
such a motion be filed when the grounds for it become known.  We will set out the content of the 
affidavit in full below, but it is clear that the motion was based upon Mother's 
perception of the general demeanor of the trial judge during the March 5, 2003 
hearing, as well as his comments to Mother and her attorney at the conclusion of 
the first day of trial.  
Nonetheless, the motion was not filed until two days before the second 
day of trial and was not served until the day before trial.  The timely filing of such a motion is 
one of substance and not merely of form.  
Barbour v. Barbour, 518 P.2d 12, 13 (Wyo. 1974); and see 
generally, Walker v. Walker, 546 S.E.2d 315, 318 (Ga. 2001) (motion 
untimely where it was not filed within five days of the time a party learned of 
the alleged basis for recusal and showed no good cause for delay); and J. H. 
Cooper, Annotation, Time for Asserting Disqualification of Judge, and Waiver 
of Disqualification, 73 A.L.R.2d 1238, esp. § 10 (1960 and Later Case 
Service 2004).  Given these 
circumstances, it appears the district court would have been justified in 
declining to consider the motion because it was untimely.

 
 
[¶17]   The substance of Mother's affidavit 
in support of her motion for change of judge was this:

 
 
1.  I 
request that Judge Grant remove himself from my case.  During the hearing on March 5, 2003, I 
felt that Judge Grant raised his voice to my attorney.  Judge Grant also attempted to grant 
custody of my ten year old son to his father, Michael Nocera without me being 
allowed to present my side of the case.

 
 
2.  I 
further feel that Judge Grant showed impatience toward my attorney and prejudice 
to me by his words and actions during the hearing.

 
 
3.  During 
the hearing Judge Grant would not allow my attorney to ask further questions of 
a witness who I considered to be a questionable psychologist from Colorado.  When my attorney asked to be allowed to 
further question this witness, Judge Grant raised his voice and informed my 
attorney that the witness was dismissed.

 
 
4.  I 
believe that the Judge was not paying attention to my psychologist witness as I 
believe he was reading and writing on papers during her telephone 
testimony.

 
 
5.  Judge 
Grant asked for the guardian ad litem's recommendation as to the custody of my 
son pending the case being finished, which was without me being allowed to 
present my side of the case.  My 
attorney objected to this, however, I feel that the Judge yelled at her about 
continuing to allow my son to be in a situation that causes him 
harm.

 
 
6.  Judge 
Grant said from the bench that I would have to produce some really good evidence 
to make him change his mind in this case.

 
 
7.  Due 
to the actions and statements of Judge Grant, I believe that he is biased and 
prejudiced regarding my case and has already made up his mind without hearing my 
side of the case.  I strongly 
believe that I will not be granted an impartial hearing.

 
 
[¶18]   We have held that notice and the 
opportunity to be heard are the touchstones of due process of law.  Pecha v. Smith, Keller & 
Associates, 942 P.2d 387, 391 (Wyo. 1997).  The hearing provided must be appropriate 
to the case at hand and contemplates the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful 
time and in a meaningful manner.  
Jones v. Jones, 903 P.2d 545, 548 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Moore v. Board of 
Education, 836 S.W.2d 943, 947 (Mo. Banc 1992)).  The district court held a hearing.  The record reflects that the district 
court declined to hear testimony from Mother's husband, Jake Hardin.  Hardin had not submitted an 
affidavit.  Mother's attorney made 
no offer of proof with respect to what the import of Hardin's testimony would 
be.  Mother was then called to 
testify.  After some discussion, the 
district court declined to hear Mother's testimony on the change of judge issue, 
choosing instead to rely solely on her affidavit.  Mother's counsel objected.  The district court asked for the basis 
for the objection and counsel replied:  
"Just an explanation from her in terms of her in person and why it's 
important to her."  Mother's 
attorney did not make an offer of proof as to what her live testimony might have 
added to the affidavit.  The 
district court noted that he understood it was important to her, and that her 
affidavit was in front of him.  The 
district court also commented with respect to Mother's affidavit:  "Since this sets forth a number of 
subjective conclusions, I don't know how you could count it by 
affidavit."

 
 
[¶19]   After hearing argument from the 
parties, the district court made this ruling:

 
 
            
As I've indicated earlier, there are a couple outstanding features of 
this motion.  First and most 
important, in the view of the Court, is it is a series of conclusionary 
statements based on subjective opinion, so it is not as easy a thing to deal 
with if there were some specific factual problems such as the judge had ex parte 
contact or something of that nature.  
It's based on a perception of one of the litigants.

 
 
            
Going to the point about the Court's expression of concern about 
maintaining the status quo while this litigation grinds on and on, certainly, I 
did express that view, and I think quite properly so.  The key, essential, and really only 
issue in this case is the best interests of the child who has been the object of 
this combat off and on over a period of nine years.

 
 
            
The expert witness who did the stipulated child custody evaluation 
expressed grave concern about the well-being of the child in the status quo of 
50-50 shared custody.  Mrs. 
Schilling testified by way of a critique of Dr. Figueroa's opinion, and Mr. 
Moxley's correct, I was taking notes during the telephone testimony of Dr. 
Schilling, and I was listening, I think quite attentively, to that testimony, 
and the crux of it is that she did not purport to take issue with any of the 
evaluators' conclusions, opinions; rather, she testified that there are some 
items of methodology that she would have differed on.  She would have conducted the evaluation 
in a somewhat different way.

 
 
            
She simply didn't try to refute any of the essential and important 
conclusions or opinions of the stipulated custody evaluator, and it was on the 
basis of that man's testimony that the Court expressed concern, and that 
concern, of course, remained as to a perceived impatience.

 
 
            
I would say there is some impatience on behalf of the Court concerning 
this case.  As I indicated earlier, 
it has gone on now for nine years.  
These parties have been on and off again, one time or another, back 
together, and then apparent  and they stipulate changes in the order.  They continue to 
fight.

 
 
            
Judge Kautz held a trial and did a decision letter with findings.  Those are all in the file.  So any impatience is with the extended 
nature of this litigation while the best interests of the child sort of 
languishes.  It seems to me it's yet 
another case of parental combat not in the interests of the child but regardless 
of the interests of the child.  I 
think the evidence in this case thus far supports that.

 
 
            
My recollection comports with that of Mr. Moxley with respect to the 
termination of the interrogation of the witness.  Those things can  simply cannot be 
allowed to go on endlessly.  At some 
point, somebody cannot have the last word in interrogating the witness.4  I think the rules clearly support the 
authority to control that sort of thing.  
There's no impropriety there.

 
 
            
So as to any impatience shown, specifically to Mrs. Serelson, that of 
course, is not directed to her in any way.  
Mrs. Serelson [has] practiced before this Court for many years.  She's a highly competent attorney, well 
respected, and she's always been accorded commensurate treatment by the Court 
and will be.

 
 
            
She happens to be counsel in a piece of litigation that would try the 
patience of anyone, I believe.  So 
there was no improper premature termination of the examination of the 
witness.

 
 
            
Affiant says the Court was not paying attention to psychologist's 
witness, Miss Schilling; was reading and writing on papers.  Of course, that is critically important 
what she said about Dr. Figueroa's evaluation, and I was taking notes on her 
testimony, and as I say, that testimony was a critique going plainly to some of 
the methodology.

 
 
            
Asking for the guardian ad litem's recommendation on an interim order, 
that consideration of that was very much in the best interests of the 
child.  If I didn't sit on the 
bench, I'd have to produce some really good evidence to make him change his mind 
in this case.  That, of course, is 
not verbatim.  I believe I did 
express the view there would have to be a compelling case to overcome the 
strength of the evidence that the Court had heard so far to that 
point.

 
 
            
Finally, I would say I think it's a bizarre notion that a judge might be 
biased by the facts, by the evidence.  
An oxymoron of sorts, it seems to me.  The other overriding feature of the 
motion in the affidavit that I referred to earlier is the matter of timeliness 
and timing.  Here we are five or six 
weeks from that hearing.  According 
to the rule, when the basis becomes known, this motion will be 
brought.

 
 
            
Well, there's nothing in this affidavit except reference to what occurred 
at that hearing five or six weeks ago.  
So it was certainly not brought when the alleged biases became known, and 
so to grant this motion would interpose yet another delay in this matter, which 
I think would be unconscionable.

 
 
            
So the motion for change of judge is denied.

 
 
[¶20]   After examining the information set 
out above, we conclude that the district court heard the motion for change of 
judge as contemplated by the governing rule, and in a manner appropriate to 
these circumstances.  The district 
court gave the motion substantive consideration, and it did not deprive Mother 
of due process of law.

 
 

 
 
[¶21]   Mother also contends that the trial 
judge was duty bound to recuse himself in these circumstances.  A trial judge need only recuse himself 
if he determines that the facts set out in the affidavit, taken as true, are 
such that they would convince a reasonable man that he harbored a personal as 
opposed to a judicial bias against a party.  See Hopkinson v. State, 679 P.2d 1008, 1032 (Wyo. 1984).  Further, we have 
said:

 
 
We have 
defined bias and prejudice as follows:  
"Prejudice involves a prejudgment or forming of an opinion without 
sufficient knowledge or examination.  
Bias is a leaning of the mind or an inclination toward one person over 
another."  Cline v. Sawyer, 
600 P.2d 725, 729 (Wyo.1979).  The 
fair meaning of any remark made by the trial judge must be interpreted in light 
of the context in which it was made.  
Brown v. State, 816 P.2d 818, 824 
(Wyo.1991).

 
 

Metz v. 
Metz, 2003 
WY 3, ¶ 20, 61 P.3d 383, ¶ 20 (Wyo. 2003); also see Richardson v. Richardson, 868 P.2d 259, 262-63 (Wyo. 1994); and TZ Land & Cattle Company v. 
Condict, 795 P.2d 1204, 1211-12 (Wyo. 1990).

 
 
[¶22]   We conclude that the district court 
did not err in declining to recuse himself in the midst of this 
trial.

 
 

 
 
[¶23]   Mother contends that it was error 
for the district court to admit the testimony of Dr. Figueroa because he was not 
licensed to practice in Wyoming.  
This issue was not directly raised before the trial court.  The parties stipulated to employing Dr. 
Figueroa as the custody evaluator, and there is no suggestion in the record or 
in Mother's brief that he performed that function other than in a fully 
competent manner.

 
 
[¶24]   We note in passing that as a 
general rule, the fact that a mental health professional is not licensed goes at 
most to the weight to be given his testimony, not to its admissibility.  State v. Walker, 649 P.2d 624, 
625 (Or. 1982).  Whether or not a 
mental health professional should be permitted to testify depends upon his 
education, training, and experience.  
Bricker v. State, 565 A.2d 340, 346-47 (Md. 1989).  Here, no question was raised about Dr. 
Figueroa's professional credentials; indeed, the parties stipulated to 
them.

 
 
[¶25]   However, we conclude that neither 
cogent argument nor pertinent authority supports this contention, and we will 
not consider it further.  See 
Odegard v. Odegard, 2003 WY 67, ¶ 29, 69 P.3d 917, ¶ 29 (Wyo. 
2003).

 
 

 
 
[¶26]   Mother contends the district court 
did not consider Father's living environment in making its decision.  In support of this contention, Mother 
points to evidence in the record that Father, while intoxicated, had driven with 
Child in the car, failed to provide proper supervision for the child, was 
"inappropriately angry, curses, yells and alienates the other parent," Dr. 
Figueroa's testimony that Father is not an "ideal parent" and sometimes puts his 
owns needs above the child (drinks beer and smokes cigarettes in front of 
Child), and Father's abusive nature; etc.  
We have detailed much of this information in our statement of the 
facts.  There is nothing in the 
record to suggest that the district court did not consider all of this evidence 
in reaching its decision.  Indeed, 
it is readily apparent that it did.

 
 
[¶27]   The district afforded Mother due 
process of law in considering her motion to change judge.  The district court did not err in 
declining to recuse himself.  The 
district court did not err in considering the evidence elicited from Dr. 
Figueroa.  The district court 
considered all evidence presented at trial in reaching its decision.  The order of the district court 
modifying custody is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

   1Mother's brief 
did not include "a statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for 
review with appropriate references to documents listed in the index of the 
transmitted record."  W.R.A.P. 
7.01(e)(2). 

   2In his report, 
Dr. Figueroa stated that he had 15 years of experience in providing custody 
evaluation to Wyoming and Colorado 
courts.

   3So far as we are 
able to ascertain from the record, this was a verbal directive of "no contact" 
(no specifics provided) and did not emanate from a judicial authority.  The basis for it appeared to be that 
Father continued to visit the Whites even though Mother did not like that.  Mother subsequently moved to a new 
location, and Father and the Whites continued to visit each other on a regular 
basis, just as they had done for many years.

   4The record 
reflects that Dr. Figueroa testified on direct examination for 50 pages in the 
transcript, on cross-examination for 32 pages, was questioned by the guardian ad 
litem for 13 pages, and was on re-direct for 9 pages.  When Mother's attorney asked to 
re-cross, the district court said:  
"No.  We've beat this to 
death."  However, the district court 
then relented somewhat, asking Dr. Figueroa a couple of questions himself.  The district court then permitted 
Mother's attorney some limited re-cross before the witness was excused.  Mother has not presented, either below 
or before this Court, a statement of what additional questions she would have 
asked had she been afforded additional opportunity(ies) to do so.