Case Title: STATE v FARNES

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13107 I N THE SUPKEME C O U R T OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1976 THE STATE OF M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - E V E L Y N FARNES , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable C. B. Sande, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: John Id. Adams, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser, :Billings, Montana Submitted without o r a l argument Submitted: October 22, 1976 . , Dee id ed : G'IL 2. , ! j i 6 Filed : I- , y/j: Hon. L.C. Gulbrandson, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g i n place of M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T , Harrison, delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant Evelyn Farnes appeals from a judgment of conviction f o r t h e c r i m e of t h e f t , t r i e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , i n and f o r t h e County of Yellowstone. O n February 8 , 1975, one B i l l Stumpf a r r i v e d a t t h e Public Auction Market i n B i l l i n g s , Montana, with a number of o t h e r people, i n a cream-colored Oldsmobile, towing a horse t r a i l e r . A n unbranded s o r r e l mare w a s unloaded from t h e t r a i l e r , and was delivered by Stumpf t o an employee of t h e Market a t approximately 12:30 a.m., t e l l i n g t h e employee t o run t h e horse through "loose" a t t h e sale t h a t day. Horses which a r e run through "loose" a r e normally s o l d a s canning horses, whereas horses which a r e ridden through t h e s a l e s r i n g a r e normally s o l d a s pleasure o r working horses. Stumpf d i d not c l a i m any ownership of t h e animal, but consigned t h e mare i n t h e name of one Ray Tanner. After t h e sale, a t about 5:15 p.m., February 8 , 1975, a purported b i l l of s a l e t o t h e animal signed by one E a r l West t o Ray Tanner was d e l i v e r e d t o t h e Auction Market by t h e defendant Evelyn Farnes. The employee receiving t h e b i l l of s a l e t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e defendant introduced h e r s e l f a s Ray Tanner's wife, and when t o l d t h a t payment would be delayed u n t i l t h e following Monday waote t h e name of Karla Reichert on t h e back of t h e b i l l of s a l e and t o l d t h e employee t o make payment t o her f r i e n d Reichert. The employee receiving t h e b i l l of s a l e from t h e defendant t e s t i f i e d over objection t h a t approximately 30 minutes e a r l i e r he had received a phone c a l l from a person i n q u i r i n g what he needed f o r t h e horse, and t h e employee answered t h a t a b i l l of s a l e would be required, and t h e c a l l e r responded t h a t a b i l l of sale would be delivered f o r t h e horse. The l o c a l brand inspector t e s t i f i e d t h a t he photographed t h e mare on February 8 , 1975, because he knew t h e mare w a s on her way t o a dog food f a c t o r y i n South Dakota and t h a t p r i o r t o t h e sale he put a s t o p on t h e check f o r t h e s a l e of t h e horse, and t h a t a t t h e s a l e he s a w t h e defendant, i n t h e company of B i l l Stumpf, Buzz Feeley, and Karla Reichert, The l o c a l inspector/detective t e s t i f i e d t h a t on February 1 0 , 197 5, he commenced an i n v e s t i g a t i o n regarding t h e s a l e of t h e horse, l e a r n i n g t h a t Karla Reichert w a s t h e daughter of t h e defendant and t h e g i r l f r i e n d of B i l l Stumpf. H e f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t he w a s unable t o l o c a t e anyone by t h e name of Ray Tanner o r E a r l West, t h e persons named on t h e b i l l of s a l e d e l i v e r e d by t h e defendant. O n approximately February 25, 1975, D r . Thomas Morledge reported a s o r r e l mare a s missing from h i s winter pasture, and from photographs he had taken and t h e photograph taken on February 8 a t t h e Auction Market, t h e horse w a s i d e n t i f i e d as t h e one delivered by B i l l Sturnpf. The defendant t e s t i f i e d a s follows: t h a t on February 7 , 1975, a t approximately 11:30 p.m. she and "Buzz" Feeley w e r e drinking i n a B i l l i n g s bar when a man asked Feeley t o help him haul a horse t o t h e Auction Market. Feeley agreed, and t h e defendant drove her v e h i c l e , acc0mpanied.b~ Feeley and B i l l y Stumpf, t o t h e North Yard where they picked up F e e l e y ' s horse trailer. They then followed a dark pickup t r u c k t o a p a s t u r e near A l k a l i Creek where both v e h i c l e s stopped and t h e man i n t h e pickup g o t out, crawled through a fence, and walked up t o a horse, p u t t i n g a h a l t e r on t h e horse, then leading it through a g a t e , and put it i n t h e horse t r a i l e r . She f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t while "Buzz" and B i l l y Stumpf were o u t s i d e of her c a r , t h e s t r a n g e r came by t h e d r i v e r ' s window of t h e c a r and handed her t h e b i l l of s a l e , saying, "You w i l l need t h i s t o sell t h e horse." The defendant then drove her v e h i c l e , p u l l i n g t h e loaded horse t r a i l e r , back t o t h e auction yards where B i l l y Stumpf unloaded t h e horse and took it i n t o t h e Market. She f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t she never saw t h e s t r a n g e r again, t h a t she d i d not c a l l t h e Auction Market o r have a c a l l placed f o r her, b u t only delivered. t h e b i l l of s a l e on t h e afternoon of February 8 t o t h e Market because she assumed t h a t they would need it, t h a t she d i d not introduce h e r s e l f a s Ray Tanner's wife, t h a t she wrote her daughter's name on t h e back of t h e b i l l of s a l e so she could hold t h e check u n t i l t h e s t r a n g e r paid them $15.00 which she claimed he had promised i n exchange f o r hauling t h e horse t o market. Karla Reichert, t h e defendant's daughter, t e s t i f i e d she knew nothing about t h e t r a n s a c t i o n o r t h e b i l l of s a l e , and t h a t her mother had never asked her t o pick up t h e check a t t h e Market. B i l l y Stumpfls testimony was corroborative of t h e defendant's except he s t a t e d t h a t he w a s not o u t of t h e c a r a t Alkali Creek, while M r s . Farnes s t a t e d t h a t he w a s when t h e stranger handed her t h e b i l l of s a l e . The appeal presents t h e following issues: 1. W a s t h e evidence s u f f i c i e n t t o support t h e conviction? 2. Did t h e d i s t r i c t court e r r i n refusing t o give defendant's offered i n s t r u c t i o n s number 7 and 8? M r s . Farnes w a s charged and convicted of t h e offense of t h e f t as defined i n s e c t i o n 94-6-302(1) which reads a s follows: " ( 1 ) A person commits t h e offense of t h e f t when he purposely o r knowingly obtains o r e x e r t s unauthorized c o n t r o l over property of t h e owner, and: (a) has t h e purpose of depriving t h e owner of t h e property; o r (b) purposely o r knowingly uses, conceals, o r abandons t h e property i n such manner a s t o deprive t h e owner of t h e property; o r ( c ) uses, conceals, o r abandons t h e property knowing such use, concealment o r abandonment probably w i l l deprive t h e owner of t h e property. " The t e r m "knowingly" is defined i n s e c t i o n "A person a c t s knowingly with respect t o conduct o r t o a circumstance described by a s t a t u t e defining an offense when he i s aware of h i s conduct o r t h a t t h e circum- stance e x i s t s . When knowledge of t h e existence of a p a r t i c u l a r f a c t i s an - - - . - - - element of an offense, such knowledqe i s established i f a Derson i s aware of a L ~ ~ high p r o b a b i l i t y of its existence. Equivalent t e r m s such a s 'knowinq' o r 'with knowledge ' have t h e same meaning. " (Emphasis supplied) "Purposely" i s defined i n s e c t i o n 94-2-101 (53) which reads i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "A person acts purposely with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense if it is his conscious object to engage in the conduct or to cause that result. * * *" The testimony presented at trial constituted direct evidence of every element of the crime of theft except intent. As in State v. Cooper, 158 Mont. 102, 489 P.2d 99 (1971) the element of intent may be, and generally is, demonstrated by circumstantial evidence. Citing State v. Madden, 128 Mont. 408, 276 P,2d 974 (1954) the Court stated: "The element of felonious intent in every contested criminal case must necessarily be determined from facts and circumstances of the particular case--this for the reason that criminal intent, being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct or positive proof and therefore must usually be inferred from the facts testified to by witnesses and the circumstances as developed by the evidence * * * "The question of intent is a question for the jury." The rules that govern the weight and sufficiency of circumstantial evidence are set out in the leading Montana case of State v. Cor, 144 Mont. 323, 396 P.2d 86 (1964) at page 326: "Circumstantial evidence is not always inferior in quality nor is it necessarily relegated to a 'second class status' in the consideration to be given to it. The very fact that it is circumstantial is not a sufficient allegation to justify a reversal of the judgment for such evidence may be, and frequently is, most convincing and satisfactory. In any criminal case. evidence that is material, relevant and' competent will be admitted, 'nothing more and nothing less'. The test is whether the facts and circumstances are of such a quality and quantity as to legally justify a jury in determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If such be the case, then the court should not, indeed cannot, set a s i d e t h e solemn f i n d i n g s of t h e trier of f a c t s . " (Emphasis supplied) I t is a well-established p r i n c i p l e of law t h a t i n a criminal prosecution, t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of evidence t o prove t h e main f a c t of g u i l t o r any evidentiary f a c t looking t h e r e t o i s a matter p e c u l i a r l y within t h e province of t h e jury. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h i s c o u r t has s t a t e d t h a t : "The jury being t h e s o l e judge of t h e weight t o be given t o t h e testimony, t h e c o u r t should n o t t e l l them what p a r t i c u l a r weight t o give t o any p o r t i o n of t h e testimony." S t a t e v. G l e i m , 17 Mont. 17, 29, 4 1 P. 998 (1895). The r u l e i s t h a t i f s u b s t a n t i a l evidence is found t o support t h e v e r d i c t , then it w i l l stand. S t a t e v. White, 146 Mont. 226, 229, 405 P.2d 761 (1965). The c o u r t i n S t a t e v. Stoddard, 147 Mont, 402, 408, 412 P.2d 827 (1966), s t a t e d : F i r s t w e should note t h a t t h i s c o u r t is not a trier of f a c t * * * I n view of t h e presumption of innocence a t t h e t r i a l , t h e jury must have been i n s t r u c t e d t o t h a t e f f e c t , b u t on appeal a f t e r conviction t h e r u l e changes. Then, i f t h e record shows any s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e judgment, t h e presumption is i n favor of such judgment." p. 408. I n S t a t e v. Medicine Bull, Jr., 152 Mont. 34, 445 P.2d 916 (1968), t h e c o u r t held t h a t t h e jury is f r e e t o consider a l l t h e evidence presented and t o pick and choose which of t h e witnesses they wish t o b e l i e v e . That i f s u f f i c i e n t testimony w a s introduced t o j u s t i f y t h e j u r y ' s finding, then t h e i r conclusion would not be d i s t u r b e d unless t h e r e w a s a c l e a r misunderstanding by t h e jury o r a misrepresentation made t o t h e jury. The a p p e l l a n t i s g u i l t y of t h e crime of t h e f t .in t h i s case i f she was aware t h a t t h e horse was s t o l e n o r i f she was aware of a high p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e horse - was stolen. Under t h e weakest i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e f a c t s presented by t h e s t a t e , t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l evidence from which t h e jury could f i n d t h a t t h e defendant w a s aware of a high p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e horse w a s stolen. W e f i n d t h a t t h e evidence is s u f f i c i e n t t o support t h e conviction. Defendant's second a l l e g a t i o n of e r r o r would be grounds f o r r e v e r s a l of t h e conviction i f t h e exclusion of defendant's proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s 7 and 8 w a s erroneous and defendant was prejudiced by such exclusion. Defendant's proposed i n s t r u c t i o n number 7 reads as follows: "You are i n s t r u c t e d t h a t a defendant may not be convicted on conjectures, however shrewd, on suspicions, however j u s t i f i e d , on p r o b a b i l i t i e s , however strong, but only upon evidence which e s t a b l i s h e s g u i l t beyond reasonable doubt; t h a t i s upon proof such a s t o l o g i c a l l y compel t h e conviction t h a t t h e charge i s t r u e . " Defendant's proposed i n s t r u c t i o n number 8 reads as follows: "You are i n s t r u c t e d t h a t proof of i l l e g a l a s p o r t a t i o n is necessary t o prove t h e crime of t h e f t . By i l l e g a l a s p o r t a t i o n i s meant t h e i l l e g a l taking of t h e animal. Therefore i f you find t h a t t h e r e is no proof beyond a reasonable doubt, t h a t t h e defendant knowingly p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e i l l e g a l a s p o r t a t i o n of t h e animal o r proof beyond a reasonable doubt t h a t she knew t h e animal had been s t o l e n when she presented t h e b i l l of s a l e t o t h e stockyards, she i s e n t i t l e d t o an a c q u i t t a l . " I t i s an established p r i n c i p l e of law i n Montana t h a t when examining jury i n s t r u c t i o n s on appeal t o 'determine if prejudice has occurred by erroneous admission or erroneous exclusion of a jury instruction, all instructions must be read as a whole. State v. Bosch, 125 Mont. 566, 242 P.2d 477. Where jury instructions as a whole correctly state the law prejudice is not created because of a refusal of a proposed instruction. State v. Lukus, 149 Mont. 45, 423 P.2d 49. Here the jury was instructed as to each of the elements of the crime of theft, as to circumstantial evidence, and as to the standard of proof necessary to convict. Defendant's proposed instruction number 7 is often given but here the same subject matter was covered in given instructions. Objection to defendant's proposed instruction number 8 was made on the grounds that it was an incomplete statement of law. Here proof of asportation was not essential to conviction and the jury was instructed as to the element of "control" necessary to convict. Upon examining all instructions given we find that the jury was properly instructed and defendant was not prejudiced through the court's failure to give defendant's proposed instructions number 7 and number 8. The appellant further interjected the issue of the admissibility of the telephone call made to the Market approximately one-half hour before the defendant arrived with the bill of sale. The caller was told that a bill of sale would be required before the proceeds of the .sale could be paid. Evidence of the contents of the call did constitute hearsay, but was admissible as an exception to the rule, the call being made as an integral part of an overall criminal transaction. ~ t a e e v. McCracken, 93 Mont. 269, 18 P.2d 302 (1933). The judgment of conviction i - District We concur: Justices J