Case Title: Commonwealth v. Norman

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12744

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-03-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12744 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ERIC NORMAN. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     November 7, 2019. - March 17, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Global Positioning System Device.  Constitutional Law, Search 
and seizure, Privacy.  Search and Seizure, Expectation of 
privacy.  Privacy.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 11, 2015. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Kenneth 
J. Fishman, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Budd, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the case was reported by her to 
the Appeals Court.  The Supreme Judicial Court granted an 
application for direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Jamie Michael Charles, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Matthew Spurlock, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for the defendant. 
 
Katharine Naples-Mitchell, for Charles Hamilton Houston 
Institute for Race and Justice at Harvard Law School, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
2 
 
 
 
Matthew R. Segal & Jessie J. Rossman, for American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts, amicus curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  This case concerns the admissibility of 
location data gleaned from a global positioning system (GPS) 
device imposed on a defendant as a pretrial condition of 
release.  We are called upon to confront a question not present 
in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 481 Mass. 710, cert. denied, 140 S. 
Ct. 247 (2019).  There, we determined that imposition of GPS 
monitoring on a probationer was a search but that, given the 
diminished privacy expectations of a probationer, the 
intrusiveness of such monitoring was outweighed by the 
legitimate governmental interests served by the use of GPS 
monitoring to further the goals of probation.  Id. at 720. 
 
Here, we must determine whether the initial imposition of 
the GPS device as a condition of pretrial release violated the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or art. 14 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and, if not, whether 
police access to the GPS data for the purposes of a new criminal 
investigation violated the Federal or State Constitutions.  In 
the circumstances here, we conclude that the initial imposition 
of the GPS device violated art. 14.1 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs of the Charles Hamilton 
Houston Institute for Race and Justice at Harvard Law School and 
the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts. 
3 
 
 
1.  Background.  In July 2015, the defendant was charged in 
the Boston Municipal Court with possession of a class B 
substance with the intent to distribute, as a subsequent 
offense, and motor vehicle violations.  Among other conditions 
of release, he was ordered to stay out of the city of Boston and 
to wear a GPS monitoring device.2 
He was required to sign a form that stated, 
"You are hereby placed on GPS by this Court. . . .  
Coordinates and other data related to your physical 
location while on GPS are recorded and may be shared with 
the court, probation, parole, attorneys and law 
enforcement.  Data generated by GPS equipment assigned to 
you is not private and confidential.  It is your 
responsibility to remain in contact with probation at all 
times while under GPS supervision unless expressly 
authorized." 
 
The form also included the following statement: 
 
"I have read and understood the above conditions of GPS 
supervision and I agree to observe them.  I understand that 
if I violate any such condition, it may result in my being 
brought before the court, my arrest, revocation of 
probation, the entry of a guilty finding or delinquency 
adjudication (if not already entered), the imposition or 
execution of sentence and modification of my supervision." 
 
                     
 
2 The record does not indicate the judge's reasons for 
imposing the condition of GPS monitoring, and the audio 
recording of the proceeding in the Boston Municipal Court has 
been destroyed.  We conclude, however, that a remand to 
determine the reasons underlying the decision to impose 
conditions of pretrial release more than four years ago would 
not be fruitful.  At this point, any useful evidence likely 
would be documentary, so we are in as good a position as a 
motion judge to evaluate the evidence.  See Commonwealth v. 
Cousin, 478 Mass. 608, 615 (2018). 
4 
 
 
 
On the evening of August 10, 2015, a home invasion and 
armed robbery occurred at a home in Medford; the robbers were 
described as two African-American men.  Police initially did not 
have any information linking the defendant to the crimes.  
Medford police contacted the probation service's electronic 
monitoring program (ELMO) and inquired whether any individuals 
under GPS supervision had been present at the time and location 
of the crimes.  The police did not obtain a search warrant or 
court order for the GPS location data.  ELMO used stored GPS 
data to identify the defendant as being present at the scene of 
the crime.  The GPS data also indicated that the defendant went 
to an address in Everett shortly before and shortly after the 
time of the home invasion.  Police then obtained a search 
warrant for the Everett location, where they discovered 
additional inculpatory information.  One of the victims of the 
home invasion also was presented with a photographic array that 
included the defendant's photograph; the victim indicated that 
he was "almost positive" that the defendant was one of the 
robbers.  The defendant was arrested and indicted on charges of, 
inter alia, armed robbery while masked.3 
                     
 
3 The defendant also was indicted on charges of armed home 
invasion, armed burglary, armed assault in a dwelling, and 
larceny from a building. 
5 
 
 
 
The defendant moved to suppress the GPS location data and 
its fruits, arguing that police acquisition of the data violated 
his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and art. 14.  The judge found that 
the defendant had consented to the imposition of the GPS device 
and the use of the GPS location data only for the purposes of 
enforcing conditions of release, and not for general law 
enforcement purposes.  The judge therefore determined that the 
police were not permitted to obtain the GPS location data 
without probable cause.  Because nothing linked the defendant to 
the crimes before police obtained the GPS location data, the 
judge concluded that the search was not supported by probable 
cause and granted the motion to suppress. 
 
The Commonwealth sought leave to pursue an interlocutory 
appeal in the county court, and a single justice allowed the 
appeal to proceed in the Appeals Court.  We subsequently allowed 
the Commonwealth's petition for direct appellate review.  We 
affirm the judge's determination, on different grounds.  See 
Commonwealth v. Cotto, 471 Mass. 97, 118 (2015), citing 
Commonwealth v. Va Meng Joe, 425 Mass. 99, 102 (1997). 
 
2.  Discussion.  "In reviewing a motion to suppress, 'we 
accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear 
error,' but 'review independently the motion judge's application 
of constitutional principles to the facts found.'"  Commonwealth 
6 
 
 
v. Moore, 473 Mass. 481, 484 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Franklin, 456 Mass. 818, 820 (2010). 
 
The defendant argues that the judge's decision may be 
affirmed on either of two grounds:  the initial imposition of 
the GPS device was an unconstitutional search; or even if we 
were to determine that this pretrial condition of release was 
constitutional, the use of the GPS data for an unrelated 
criminal investigation was unconstitutional.  We agree that, if 
either of these related actions is unconstitutional, the GPS 
data must be suppressed.  See Johnson, 481 Mass. at 715 ("we 
must analyze the constitutionality of both the initial 
imposition of GPS monitoring for the purposes of probation and 
the police's subsequent review of the historical GPS location 
data for investigatory purposes"). 
 
We conclude that the initial imposition of GPS monitoring 
in this case was not based on valid government interests and 
thus was unreasonable and unconstitutional under art. 14.  
Accordingly, we need not reach the question whether, had the 
initial imposition been constitutional, police use of the data 
for a criminal investigation would have been permissible. 
 
a.  Imposition of GPS monitoring as a search.  "[A] search 
in the constitutional sense occurs when the government's conduct 
intrudes on a person's reasonable expectation of privacy."  
Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 241-242 (2014), citing 
7 
 
 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring), and Commonwealth v. Montanez, 410 Mass. 290, 301 
(1991).  This expectation must be "an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy . . . that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable."  Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 454 
Mass. 685, 688 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Blood, 400 Mass. 
61, 68 (1987). 
 
Under the Federal and Massachusetts Constitutions, 
"individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
whole of their physical movements."  See Carpenter v. United 
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018), citing United States v. 
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring), and 
Jones, supra at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  See also 
Johnson, 481 Mass. at 716-717, citing Augustine, 467 Mass. at 
253, and Commonwealth v. Rousseau, 465 Mass. 372, 382 (2013) 
(same under art. 14).  GPS monitoring "continuously track[s]" an 
individual's "precise location," thereby "giv[ing] probation 
officers and police 'access to a category of information 
otherwise unknowable.'"  Johnson, supra at 717, quoting 
Carpenter, supra at 2217-2218.  "The nature and extent of this 
GPS location data yields a 'treasure trove of very detailed and 
extensive information about the individual's "comings and 
goings"' for law enforcement."  Johnson, supra, quoting 
Augustine, supra at 251. 
8 
 
 
 
In Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306 (2015), "the 
United States Supreme Court held that a search under the Fourth 
Amendment occurs when the government 'attaches a device to a 
person's body, without consent, for the purpose of tracking that 
individual's movements.'"  Johnson, 481 Mass. at 718, quoting 
Grady, supra at 309.  Subsequently, we held that imposing GPS 
monitoring as a condition of probation is a search under art. 
14.  See Johnson, supra, citing Commonwealth v. Feliz, 481 Mass. 
689, 690-691 (2019).  This is so even though probationers have a 
"diminished expectation of privacy relative to the general 
population."  See Feliz, supra at 700, citing United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119-120 (2001). 
 
The reasonable expectation of privacy of a defendant 
pretrial, such as the defendant here, is greater than that of a 
probationer.  See Commonwealth v. Silva, 471 Mass. 610, 617 
(2015), citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979), and 
United States v. Cohen, 796 F.2d 20, 23-24 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 854 (1986) ("pretrial detainee enjoys at least 
as many constitutional rights as a convicted prisoner and 
perhaps more").  See also United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 
873-874 (9th Cir. 2006) ("privacy and liberty interests" of 
individual on pretrial release are "far greater than a 
probationer's").  Given the greater expectation of privacy of a 
defendant pretrial, the implication is clear.  The imposition of 
9 
 
 
GPS monitoring as a condition of pretrial release is a search 
under art. 14. 
 
Although consent can justify a warrantless search, "the 
Commonwealth bears the burden of proof that consent was freely 
and voluntarily given, meaning it was unfettered by coercion, 
express or implied" (quotations and citations omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Buckley, 478 Mass. 861, 875 (2018).  We have 
held that the signing of a contract of probation that includes 
GPS monitoring is not sufficient to establish consent because 
the "coercive quality of the circumstance in which a defendant 
seeks to avoid incarceration by obtaining probation on certain 
conditions makes principles of voluntary waiver and consent 
generally inapplicable."  See Feliz, 481 Mass. at 702, quoting 
Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 402 Mass. 789, 791 n.3 (1988). 
 
Here, the only evidence of consent is the fact that the 
defendant signed the form.  If he had not, the consequence 
presumably would have been pretrial detention.  Therefore, the 
form "does not change our constitutional analysis."  See Feliz, 
481 Mass. at 701-702, citing Guiney v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 
411 Mass. 328, 341 (1991), O'Connor v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 
408 Mass. 324, 329 (1990), and United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 
10 
 
 
605, 609 (9th Cir. 2016).  The Commonwealth has not met its 
burden of showing free and voluntary consent.4 
 
b.  Interest balancing.  "The Fourth Amendment and art. 14 
prohibit 'unreasonable' searches and seizures."  Moore, 473 
Mass. at 484, citing Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 472 Mass. 767, 
775-776 (2015).  Warrantless searches are "'presumptively 
unreasonable' and, therefore, presumptively unconstitutional."  
Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 583, 588 (2016), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Craan, 469 Mass. 24, 28 (2014).  See Katz, 389 
U.S. at 357 ("searches conducted outside the judicial process, 
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment -- subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions" 
[footnotes omitted]).  The Commonwealth has the burden of 
showing that any warrantless search "falls within a narrow class 
of permissible exceptions to the warrant requirement."  
Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 481 Mass. 641, 655 (2019), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Abdallah, 475 Mass. 47, 51 (2016).  "We 
determine whether a search is reasonable by 'balanc[ing] the 
intrusiveness of the police activities at issue against any 
legitimate governmental interests that these activities serve.'"  
                     
 
4 There are some situations, however, where a pretrial 
condition of release would be justified by free and voluntary 
consent. 
11 
 
 
Moore, supra, citing Rodriguez, supra at 776.  When a search, 
such as GPS monitoring, is conducted as a pretrial condition of 
release, the only legitimate justifications for doing so are 
those authorized by statute; courts do not have inherent 
authority to impose pretrial conditions of release.  See 
Commonwealth v. Preston P., 483 Mass. 759, 763 (2020). 
 
i.  Legitimate governmental interests.  The monitoring 
requirement at issue was imposed at arraignment as a condition 
of release.  Therefore, the condition must be permissible under 
G. L. c. 276, § 58, the applicable bail statute.  General Laws 
c. 276, § 58, provides, in part: 
"A justice . . . shall, when a person is held under arrest 
or committed either with or without a warrant for an 
offense other than an offense punishable by death, or, upon 
the motion of the commonwealth, for an offense enumerated 
in [G. L. c. 276, § 58A,] or for any offense on which a 
warrant of arrest has been issued by the superior court, 
hold a hearing in which the defendant and his counsel, if 
any, may participate and inquire into the case and shall 
admit such person to bail on his personal recognizance 
without surety unless said justice . . . determines, in the 
exercise of his [or her] discretion, that such a release 
will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person 
before the court" (emphasis added). 
 
Thus, the goal and purpose of G. L. c. 276, § 58, are clear:  to 
permit pretrial release while ensuring that a defendant appears 
in court.  See Commonwealth v. Vieira, 483 Mass. 417, 420 
(2019), citing Brangan v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 691, 692, 699 
(2017), and Commonwealth v. King, 429 Mass. 169, 174 (1999) 
12 
 
 
("The purpose of bail is to assure the appearance of the accused 
in court"). 
 
General Laws c. 276, § 58, contains three references to 
conditions of release.  The first reference states explicitly 
that conditions of release may be used to ensure a defendant's 
return to court: 
"Except in cases where the person is determined to pose a 
danger to the safety of any other person or the community 
under [G. L. c. 276, § 58A], bail shall be set in an amount 
no higher than what would reasonably assure the appearance 
of the person before the court after taking into account 
the person's financial resources; provided, however, that a 
higher than affordable bail may be set if neither 
alternative nonfinancial conditions nor a bail amount which 
the person could likely afford would adequately assure the 
person's appearance before the court" (emphasis added). 
 
G. L. c. 276, § 58, first par. 
 
The second reference states that if the judge setting bail 
"determines it to be necessary, the defendant may be ordered to 
abide by specified restrictions on personal associations or 
conduct including, but not limited to, avoiding all contact with 
an alleged victim of the crime and any potential witness or 
witnesses who may testify concerning the offense, as a condition 
of release."  G. L. c. 276, § 58, first par.  This language 
clearly contemplates that limits may be placed on a defendant's 
contact with an alleged victim, as well as with other witnesses, 
presumably for the purpose of "preserving the integrity of the 
judicial process."  Josh J. v. Commonwealth, 478 Mass. 716, 721 
13 
 
 
(2018), quoting Paquette v. Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 121, 131 
(2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150 (2004). 
 
The third reference to conditions of release in G. L. 
c. 276, § 58, allows conditions of release to be imposed in 
certain crimes involving domestic abuse "in order to 
ensure . . . the safety of the alleged victim, any other 
individual or the community."  See G. L. c. 276, § 58, third 
par.  This provision is inapplicable here because the defendant 
was not charged with a crime involving domestic abuse. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the permissible goals of G. L. 
c. 276, § 58, include generally preventing or deterring criminal 
conduct.  The statute's second reference to conditions of 
release may permit a broader range of conditions, arguably 
including conditions aimed at dangerousness or deterrence.  See 
G. L. c. 276, § 58, first par. ("defendant may be ordered to 
abide by specified restrictions on personal associations or 
conduct including, but not limited to, avoiding all contact 
with" victim and witnesses).  The Legislature, however, clearly 
has indicated an intent to address deterrence and dangerousness 
in other statutory provisions.  See Paquette, 440 Mass. at 130, 
citing Boston Water & Sewer Comm'n v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 
408 Mass. 572, 578 (1990) ("If the Legislature had intended to 
utilize bail revocation under the third paragraph of G. L. 
c. 276, § 58, as a broad preventive detention scheme with a 
14 
 
 
focus on dangerousness, then the promulgation of G. L. c. 276, 
§§ 58A and 58B, would have been duplicative and unnecessary").  
See also Brangan, 477 Mass. at 706 (dangerousness would have 
been relevant "if the Commonwealth had sought to detain [the 
defendant] under [G. L. c. 276,] § 58A"). 
 
General Laws c. 276, § 58A, states, "[t]he [C]ommonwealth 
may move, based on dangerousness, for an order of pretrial 
detention or release on conditions for a felony offense that has 
as an element of the offense the use, attempted use[,] 
threatened use[, or a substantial risk] of physical force").  
Three other statutory provisions allow conditions of release to 
be imposed for reasons of safety in cases involving domestic 
abuse.  See G. L. c. 276, § 42A; G. L. c. 276, § 57, second 
par.; G. L. c. 276, § 58, third par.  By contrast, the provision 
of G. L. c. 276, § 58, in question here does not contain the 
words "safety," "dangerousness," "deterrence," or any similar 
language.  Therefore, we conclude that the Legislature did not 
intend this provision to address dangerousness or deterrence of 
future crimes. 
 
Thus, the only permissible goals of pretrial conditions of 
release in the defendant's case were ensuring the defendant's 
return to court and his presence at trial, and safeguarding the 
integrity of the judicial process by protecting witnesses from 
intimidation and other forms of influence.  There is no 
15 
 
 
indication on this record that GPS monitoring would have 
increased the likelihood of the defendant returning to court.  
Although the general specter of government tracking could 
provide an additional incentive to appear in court on specified 
dates, the causal link in this case is too attenuated and 
speculative to justify GPS monitoring.  See Feliz, 481 Mass. 
at 709 (Commonwealth failed to show that GPS monitoring would 
effectuate desired result).  Additionally, the exclusionary zone 
of the city of Boston, which could be viewed as tied to the use 
of GPS monitoring to assure the defendant was not present in 
Boston, clearly did not advance the goal of ensuring the 
defendant's return to the Boston Municipal Court; indeed, the 
docket clearly states that an exception would apply to any court 
appearances in Boston. 
 
Further, there is no indication in the record that the 
conditions of release were intended to insulate any particular 
victims or civilian witnesses, who, given the nature of the 
crimes charged, likely did not exist. 
 
ii.  Intrusion.  We turn to the degree of intrusion on the 
defendant's privacy.  See Johnson, 481 Mass. at 715.  When a 
judge orders GPS tracking, a "modern-day 'scarlet letter'" is 
physically tethered to the individual, reminding the public that 
the person has been charged with or convicted of a crime.  
Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 815-816 (2013), 
16 
 
 
quoting Commonwealth v. Cory, 454 Mass. 559, 570 n.18 (2009).  
See Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 458 Mass. 11, 22 (2010) ("ankle 
bracelet . . . may . . . expos[e] the [individual] to 
persecution or ostracism"); Commonwealth v. Raposo, 453 Mass. 
739, 740 (2009) (describing "ankle bracelet, which is 
permanently attached to the probationer"). 
 
If a GPS monitoring device loses connection with either the 
cellular network or the satellite network, or if the device's 
battery runs low, "alerts" from ELMO are issued.  Feliz, 481 
Mass. at 694-695, 695 n.9 (noting daily average that "thirty-
four percent of the total individuals monitored" generate 
alert).  The individual may have to leave his or her location in 
search of a signal, or may be required to travel to a location 
where the device can be charged.  See id. at 695.  These 
frequent interruptions can endanger an individual's livelihood.  
See id. at 704 (noting that GPS may require individual "to leave 
his [or her] job and walk around outside during work hours, 
risking potential economic consequences, including loss of 
employment").  In addition, despite an individual's best efforts 
to comply with the strictures of GPS monitoring, connectivity 
issues can lead to the issuance of arrest warrants, see id. 
at 695, thereby subjecting the individual to the indignity and 
dangers of an arrest.  See Commonwealth v. Charros, 443 Mass. 
752, 761, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 870 (2005) ("seizure produced 
17 
 
 
all the indignity of an arrest in full view of the public").  
Lastly, GPS monitoring can place an especially great burden on 
homeless individuals.  See Commonwealth v. Canadyan, 458 Mass. 
574, 575, 578-579 (2010) (noting "undisputed evidence that 
homeless shelters" could not provide electrical outlets 
necessary to charge GPS units). 
 
iii.  Balancing.  For a warrantless search to be 
permissible under art. 14, the legitimate governmental interests 
must outweigh the level of intrusion.  See Moore, 473 Mass. 
at 484, citing Rodriguez, 472 Mass. at 776.  Because the GPS 
monitoring at issue here did not serve the purposes of the 
statutory scheme, the monitoring did not further any legitimate 
governmental interests.  Therefore, the search was clearly 
impermissible.  We caution that even where GPS monitoring does 
serve legitimate government interests, reasonableness is not 
assured; the interests must be sufficient to outweigh the severe 
intrusion at stake. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order allowing motion to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  suppress affirmed.