Case Title: Dietrich v. Dietrich

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2016 ME 130

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2016-08-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2016 ME 130 
Docket: 
Fra-15-506 
Submitted 
On Briefs: June 22, 2016 
Decided: 
August 16, 2016 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
KYLE DIETRICH 
 
v. 
 
HILARY A. DIETRICH 
 
 
JABAR, J. 
[¶1]  Kyle Dietrich appeals from a judgment of the District Court 
(Farmington, Oram, J.) adopting, over his objection, the final order of a Family 
Law Magistrate (Woodman, M.) that granted Hilary Dietrich’s motion to 
modify child support,1 and dismissing with prejudice Kyle’s objection to the 
magistrate’s orders denying his motions for reconsideration and for further 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Because Kyle did not timely object to 
the magistrate’s orders concerning child support, reconsideration, and further 
findings and conclusions, we dismiss his appeal.  See M.R. Civ. P. 118(b). 
                                               
 
1  A family law magistrate may enter a final order “in a contested proceeding when child support 
is the only contested issue.”  4 M.R.S. § 183(1)(D)(4) (2014).  Although 4 M.R.S. § 183(1)(D) was 
recently amended, see P.L. 2015, ch. 296, §§ C-1, D-1 (effective July 1, 2016), the amendment is not 
relevant here.  In this opinion, we refer to the statute that was in effect at the time of the judgment 
at issue.  
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  In 2011, Kyle and Hilary were divorced by an uncontested 
judgment of the District Court (Stanfill, J.) that granted the parties shared 
parental rights and responsibilities of their three minor children and did not 
order either party to pay child support.  Following the parties’ cross-motions 
to modify, the court (Carlson, J.) entered an amended judgment ordering Kyle 
to pay Hilary child support of $177 per week, beginning on June 23, 2012.  
When Hilary again moved to modify child support in 2014, the matter was 
assigned to a magistrate (Woodman, M.), who held a hearing and entered an 
amended judgment and a final child support order on June 30, 2015.  That 
child support order directed Kyle to pay Hilary child support of $305 per 
week beginning retroactively on October 3, 2014, and continuing until the 
parties’ oldest child is no longer entitled to support, at which time the 
payments will be reduced to $264 per week.   
[¶3]  On July 14, 2015, Kyle filed separate motions for reconsideration 
of the amended judgment and for further findings of fact and conclusions of 
law (collectively, Kyle’s post-judgment motions); he also moved for additional 
time to file an appeal, citing the pendency of the post-judgment motions.  The 
magistrate denied Kyle’s post-judgment motions and the motion for an 
 
3 
extension by orders entered on August 4, 2015.  On August 12, 2015, Kyle filed 
in the District Court an objection to the magistrate’s order amending the 
judgment and her orders denying his post-judgment motions pursuant to M.R. 
Civ. P. 118(a).  On September 23, 2015, the court (Oram, J.) entered an order 
adopting the magistrate’s amended judgment and denying Kyle’s objection to 
the judgment as untimely filed.  Kyle filed a notice of appeal on October 13, 
2015.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶4]  The dispositive issue presented by this appeal is whether the 
District Court erred by concluding that Kyle’s objection to the magistrate’s 
orders was not timely filed.  Our review is governed by M.R. Civ. P. 118 and 
other rules of court, which we interpret de novo, looking to the plain language 
of the rules to determine their meaning.  See Town of Poland v. T & M. Mortg. 
Solutions, Inc., 2010 ME 2, ¶ 6, 987 A.2d 524. 
 
[¶5]  Rule 118 reads as follows: 
RULE 118.  FINAL ORDERS OF FAMILY LAW MAGISTRATES; 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
  (a)  Objection and Review.  Any party who wishes to appeal a 
Family Law Magistrate’s final judgment or order shall file an 
objection in the District Court within 21 days of the entry of the 
magistrate’s final judgment or order.  If no objection is filed, the 
parties are deemed to have waived their right to object and to 
 
4 
appeal, and the magistrate’s final judgment or order shall become 
the judgment of the court and have the same effect as any final 
judgment signed by a District Court judge. 
 
  (1)  The objection must specifically state the grounds alleged for 
rejecting or modifying the judgment or order.  If a party fails to 
comply with these requirements, the objection may be dismissed 
with prejudice.  An objection shall not be dismissed solely because 
it is erroneously captioned as a “motion,” “appeal,” “notice of 
appeal” or some other form of pleading. 
 
  (2)  When an objection is filed, a judge shall review the record 
established before the magistrate with or without a hearing and 
may adopt, modify or reject the order, set the matter for further 
hearing before a judge or magistrate or recommit the matter to 
the magistrate with instructions. 
 
  (3)  A magistrate’s final order addressing parental rights and 
responsibilities, residency, and support of minor children or the 
separate support or personal liberty of a person is effective when 
signed and remains in effect until modified or rejected by a judge. 
 
  (4)  Every written final order of a magistrate shall state the 
parties’ right to object to the magistrate’s final order and the 
consequences if the parties fail to object. 
 
  (b)  Appeals.  An appeal from a judgment entered after objection 
to a final judgment or order of a magistrate shall be taken in 
accordance with the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure.  No 
appeal may be taken from a final judgment or order of a 
magistrate as to which no timely objection was filed pursuant to 
subdivision (a). 
 
  (c)  Waiver of Rights.  The parties may waive their right to 
object and request immediate confirmation of a magistrate’s final 
order.  They may also waive their rights to appeal. 
 
 
5 
[¶6]  In Sylvester v. Vitagliano, 2002 ME 141, ¶ 8, 804 A.2d 391, we 
discussed the authority conferred by Rule 118(a)(2)’s predecessor, M.R. 
Fam. Div. III(G)(2)(b) (West 2000), which contained language substantially 
similar to M.R. Civ. P. 118(a)(2), and explained that the rule “gives the District 
Court a wide range of options, everything from rejecting the CMO’s[2] order 
entirely and beginning again with a new hearing to reviewing the order for 
abuse of discretion.”  Pursuant to Rule 118(a)(2), when a party objects to a 
magistrate’s final judgment or order, the District Court is authorized to hold 
hearings and make additional findings, or to review the judgment or order 
and the existing record in an appellate capacity.  The filing of an objection to a 
magistrate’s final judgment or order in the District Court thus establishes the 
potential for that court’s exercise of its authority.   
[¶7]  In order to preserve his right to appeal to us, Kyle was required to 
timely invoke the authority of the District Court by objecting to the 
magistrate’s amended judgment and child support order within twenty-one 
days after their entry on June 30, 2015.  See M.R. Civ. P. 118(a)-(b).  Kyle’s 
objection, filed on August 12, 2015, fell well outside of the twenty-one-day 
window allowed by Rule 118(a).  Kyle maintains, however, that he did not 
                                               
 
2  In 2005, the Family Division of the District Court ceased to employ case management officers 
and began employing family law magistrates in their stead.  See P.L. 2005, ch. 384, § 1 (effective 
Sept. 17, 2005) (codified at 4 M.R.S. § 183 (2005)).  
 
6 
waive his right to appeal by waiting too long to object.  He argues that, by 
timely filing his post-judgment motions,3 he tolled the running of the time for 
filing an objection until the magistrate denied his post-judgment motions on 
August 4, 2015, rendering timely his objection filed on August 12, 2015.  
[¶8]  Maine Rule of Appellate Procedure 2(b)(3) expressly terminates 
the running of the time for filing an appeal from a civil judgment upon the 
timely filing of certain motions, including a motion for reconsideration 
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 59(e), and a motion for further findings of fact 
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b).  In stark contrast to M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3), M.R. 
Civ. P. 118(a) contains no provision terminating the running of the time for 
filing an objection to a magistrate’s final order or judgment upon the timely 
filing of a motion for reconsideration pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 59(e), or for 
further findings of fact pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b).  In fact, the Family 
Division Rules neither expressly authorize a magistrate to act on a motion for 
reconsideration or for additional findings and conclusions, nor toll the 
applicable timeframes upon the filing of such motions.  See M.R. 
Civ. P. 100-125.   
                                               
 
3  Kyle’s motions for reconsideration, filed pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 59(e), and for additional 
findings and conclusions, filed pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), were filed on July 14, 2015, within the 
time prescribed by Rules 52 and 59—i.e., no later than fourteen days after the amended judgment 
and final child support order were entered on June 30, 2015.  See M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), 59(e).  
 
7 
[¶9]  Because Kyle’s post-judgment motions could not have tolled the 
time for filing an objection in the District Court if the magistrate did not have 
authority to entertain the motions, we consider whether a magistrate has 
authority to act on motions made pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b) and 59(e) 
after a magistrate’s final order or judgment and before the District Court acts 
on any objection to the magistrate’s order filed pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 118(a).  
We address this issue in the context of the purpose of the Family Division 
Rules “to provide a system of justice that is responsive to the needs of families 
and the support of their children.”  M.R. Civ. P. 100. 
[¶10]  Except as otherwise specified in the Family Division Rules, the 
other Rules of Civil Procedure apply to family matters governed by the Family 
Division Rules.  Id.  The question here is how Maine Rules of Civil Procedure 
52(b) and 59(e) apply to a final judgment or order of a magistrate, and 
specifically whether motions made pursuant to those rules may be 
entertained by a magistrate, or whether such motions may be ruled upon only 
by the District Court following an objection to the magistrate’s final order or 
judgment.  For two reasons, we conclude that motions filed pursuant to 
Rule 52(b) and Rule 59(e) are not available to parties seeking relief from the 
final order or judgment of a magistrate. 
 
8 
[¶11]  First, proceedings before magistrates differ from other 
proceedings in the District Court in that magistrates are judicial officers of 
limited jurisdiction, 4 M.R.S. § 183(1)(D) (2015), whose “primary objective” is 
“to promptly address the family’s situation to assure that the children’s needs 
are being met,” Jensen v. Jensen, 2015 ME 105, ¶ 13, 121 A.3d 809 (emphasis 
omitted) (quotation marks omitted).  A construction of Rules 52(b) and 59(e) 
allowing post-judgment relief to be granted both by a magistrate, before the 
filing of an objection pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 118, and by the District Court, 
after the filing of an objection, would substantially increase the time to final 
resolution in family matters, thwarting the purpose that magistrates serve. 
[¶12]  Second, and more importantly, Rule 118(a) already provides a 
procedure for a party to seek relief from a final order or judgment of a 
magistrate—by filing of an objection to it in the District Court.  This procedure 
offers an affected party a full opportunity to challenge a magistrate’s final 
judgment or order by giving the District Court the discretion to review the 
judgment or order in an appellate capacity, or to conduct a further hearing 
and engage in additional fact-finding.  To augment the remedy provided in 
Rule 118(a) by permitting a magistrate to act on motions pursuant to M.R. 
Civ. P. 52(b) and 59(e) after entry of the magistrate’s final judgment or order 
 
9 
would place duplicative demands on limited judicial resources and greatly 
delay the entry of a final, appealable judgment.  See Ringuette v. Ringuette, 
594 A.2d 1076, 1077 n.1 (Me. 1991) (recognizing that the filing of a timely 
motion pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 59 suspends the finality of the judgment at 
issue); Gosselin v. Better Homes, Inc., 256 A.2d 629, 633 (Me. 1969) (stating 
that a judgment is deprived of its finality upon the timely filing of a motion 
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b)).  
[¶13]  For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that a Family Law 
Magistrate is not authorized to entertain post-judgment motions pursuant to 
M.R. Civ. P. 52(b)4 and 59(e).  Because Kyle’s post-judgment motions were not 
authorized, they did not toll the time for filing an objection.  We therefore 
agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Kyle’s objection was untimely 
filed.  See M.R. Civ. P. 118(a).  Thus, we dismiss the appeal to us and do not 
reach the substantive issues that Kyle raises in his brief.  See M.R. 
Civ. P. 118(b) (“No appeal may be taken from a final judgment or order of a 
magistrate as to which no timely objection was filed . . . .”). 
The entry is: 
Appeal dismissed.  
                                               
 
4  Although we have previously suggested in dicta that a Rule 52(b) motion might have been 
available to a party seeking relief from a magistrate’s final order, see Wong v. Hawk, 2012 ME 125, 
¶ 18, 55 A.3d 425, this appeal is the first instance in which we have been asked to rule on the issue. 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Brian D. Condon, Esq., Law Office of Brian D. Condon, 
Winthrop, for appellant Kyle Dietrich 
 
Hilary Dietrich, appellee pro se 
 
 
 
Farmington District Court docket number FM-2010-89 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY