Case Title: THOMAS CHANDLER V COUNTY OF MUSKEGON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 118811

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2002-10-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________ 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chie f Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED OCTOBER 22, 2002  
THOMAS CHANDLER,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 118811  
COUNTY OF MUSKEGON,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
PER CURIAM  
The issue raised in this appeal is whether the motor  
vehicle exception to governmental immunity applies where an  
injury occurred while the vehicle was parked in a maintenance  
facility for the purpose of cleaning and was not being  
operated as a motor vehicle.  We hold that the injury did not  
result from the negligent “operation” of the vehicle within  
the meaning of the motor vehicle exception, codified at MCL  
691.1405.  Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of  
Appeals.  
 
I  
On May 21, 1996, plaintiff Chandler and several other  
persons, who were performing community service under a  
district court order, were assigned to clean Muskegon Area  
Transit System (MATS) buses and trolleys at a MATS bus barn.  
Frederick Smith, a Muskegon County employee, was supervising  
the workers’ cleaning of the interiors of the vehicles.  Smith  
drove one of the buses into the barn, turned off the engine,  
and started to exit through the open bus doors.  As he was  
doing so, however, the bus doors closed on his neck,  
apparently because he had neglected to release the hydraulic  
air pressure valve.  
The plaintiff had been waiting to clean the bus when he  
saw the incident. He attempted to pry open the doors and to  
hold them until someone came to reach through the bus window  
and release the air valve.  Plaintiff injured his shoulder in  
the process and brought this action against the county.  
II  
Defendant 
moved 
for 
summary 
disposition 
under  
MCR  2.116(C)(7) and (10), asserting that there was no genuine  
issue regarding any material fact and that the claim was  
barred by governmental immunity under MCL 691.1407(1).1  It  
1  
Except as otherwise provided in this act, a 
governmental agency is immune from tort liability 
if the governmental agency is engaged in the  
2  
 
 
 
contended that the case was not within the motor vehicle  
exception to governmental immunity of MCL 619.14052 because  
the bus was not in motion and not being used to transport  
passengers at the time of plaintiff’s injury.  Thus, the  
injury did not arise out of “operation” of the bus.  
The circuit court granted defendant’s motion for summary  
disposition, concluding:  
[The] activity of cleaning seats in the bus 
does not constitute the “operation” of the bus. 
The bus was not being used or employed to clean 
anything.  The bus was not being used or employed 
as an instrument to produce any desired work, nor 
was it being used or employed to produce any 
desired effect of cleanliness.  
The circuit court also said that the cleaning of the bus was  
a form of maintenance and that the governmental immunity  
statute 
refers 
only 
to negligent “operation,” not to 
negligent  
“operation or maintenance.” Plaintiff appealed.  
exercise or discharge of a governmental function.  
2  
Governmental agencies shall be liable for 
bodily injury and property damage resulting from 
the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or 
employee of the governmental agency, of a motor 
vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner, 
as 
defined 
in 
[the 
Motor 
Vehicle 
Code] 
sections 257.1 to 257.923 . . . .  
3  
III  
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Court of Appeals reversed.3  The Court discussed a  
number of cases from 
Michigan4 
and 
elsewhere5 and extracted the  
principle that a vehicle is in operation “as long as it is  
being used or employed in some specific function or to produce  
some desired work or effect.”  The Court found the facts of  
this case to come within this exception, explaining:  
Here, bus 440 was being used in a specific 
function or to produce some desired effect when 
Smith operated the hydraulic doors as a means of 
egress, and in anticipation of the workers entering 
the bus.  Surely, if a bus driver driving a regular 
county route failed to release the air pressure and 
an exiting passenger was caught in the doors and 
injured as a result, as in Sonnenberg, supra, there 
would be no question regarding the application of 
the motor vehicle exception. 
The negligent 
operation of the hydraulic doors would satisfy the 
statutory condition that the plaintiff suffer  
“bodily injury . . . resulting from the negligent  
operation by any . . . employee of the governmental 
agency, of a motor vehicle.” MCL 691.1405.  
Defendant’s argument that because the bus was 
purchased to transport passengers but had been 
parked for cleaning at the time of the incident, it 
was not in a state of being at work, or in the 
active exercise of some function, or employed to  
3  Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued February 23, 
2001 (Docket No. 220435).  
4  Orlowski v Jackson State Prison, 36 Mich App 113; 193 
NW2d 206 (1971), Wells v Dep’t of Corrections, 79 Mich App 
166; 261 NW2d 245 (1977), Nolan v Bronson, 185 Mich App 163; 
460 NW2d 284 (1990), Kuzinski v Boretti, 182 Mich App 177; 451  
NW2d 859 (1989), and North v Kolomyjec, 199 Mich App 724; 502  
NW2d 765 (1993).  
5 Sonnenberg v Erie Metro Transit Auth, 137 Pa Cmmw 533,  
536-537; 586 A2d 1026 (1991), and Swartz v Hilltown Twp  
Volunteer Fire Co, 721 A2d 817 (Pa Cmmw, 1998).  
5  
 
  
produce some desired work or effect, must fail. 
The statute does not require that the motor vehicle 
be involved in any particular activity, only that 
the injury result from the negligent operation of 
the motor vehicle.  Thus, we fail to see why the 
exception, which would otherwise be applicable to a 
door-closing injury, should become inapplicable 
simply because the bus was not on an established 
route.  Also irrelevant is the fact the ultimate  
object was to clean the bus. The doors of the bus  
were still being operated for the purpose of 
exiting the bus (the desired work or effect), an 
integral part of the use of the bus.  Similarly, 
had Smith backed bus 440 into plaintiff, causing 
him injury, presumably all would agree that the 
exception would still be applicable, although the 
bus had been removed from its regular route to be 
cleaned.  An employee’s negligent operation would 
still be involved. [Slip op at 10-11 (emphasis in 
original).]  
The defendant has filed an application for leave to  
appeal to this Court.  
IV  
This appeal involves a decision on a motion for summary  
disposition. The issue presented is one of statutory  
construction.  Both are questions that we review de novo.  
Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456, 461; 628 NW2d 515 (2001);  
Brown v Michigan Health Care Corp, 463 Mich 368, 374; 617 NW2d  
301 (2000).  When interpreting statutory language, our  
obligation is to ascertain the legislative intent that may  
reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the  
statute. Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare System, 465 Mich 53,  
60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001).  
6  
 
 
  
V  
The Legislature has not defined “operation” for the  
purpose of MCL 691.1405.  Where a nontechnical undefined word  
is used in a statute, the Legislature has directed that the  
term should be “construed and understood according to the  
common and approved usage of the language . . . .”  MCL 8.3a,  
see also Stanton v Battle Creek, 466 Mich 611; 647 NW2d 508  
(2002).  As might be expected, in undertaking to give meaning  
to words this Court has often consulted dictionaries. Horace  
v City of Pontiac, 456 Mich 744, 756; 575 NW2d 762 (1998).  
The Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997) defines  
“operation” as “an act or instance, process, or manner of  
functioning or operating.”  We conclude, in accordance with  
this 
definition 
and 
in accordance with the narrow 
construction  
given to the exceptions to governmental immunity,6 that the  
language “operation of a motor vehicle” means that the motor  
vehicle is being operated as a motor vehicle.7  
6 Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 
618; 363 NW2d 641 (1984); Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463 
Mich 143, 158-159; 615 NW2d 702 (2000).  
7  That it is appropriate to give “operation” a narrower 
scope than the more expansive definition utilized by the Court 
of Appeals or the dissent is reinforced by the fact that the 
Legislature itself, when legislating in the transportation 
area, uses the word “operation” in a fashion that mirrors the 
common definition cited above.  For example, in the automobile 
no-fault act the Legislature effectively adhered to a more 
limited definition of “operation.”  In MCL 550.3105 
the  
Legislature made benefits payable for injuries arising out of  
7  
 
Accordingly, 
aware 
that 
we 
are 
considering 
the 
dictionary  
the “ownership, operation, maintenance or use” of a motor 
vehicle.
 The obvious import of this listing is that the 
Legislature clearly intended that ”operation” was distinct 
from ownership, maintenance, and use.  
Similarly this construction of the term “operation” is 
consistent with the use of this term in the automobile owners’  
liability act. That act states:  
The owner of a motor vehicle is liable for an  
injury caused by the negligent operation of the  
motor vehicle whether the negligence consists of a 
violation of a statute of this state or the  
ordinary care standard required by common law.  The  
owner is not liable unless the motor vehicle is  
being driven with his or her express or implied 
consent or knowledge.  [MCL 257.401(1) (emphasis 
added).]  
This language makes apparent that the “operation of a motor 
vehicle” refers to activities that are directly associated 
with the driving of a motor vehicle.  
Moreover, MCL 257.625, prohibiting operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, 
applies to “operating” in the sense of driving the vehicle. 
People v Wood, 450 Mich 399, 404-405; 538 NW2d 351 (1995) 
(Once a person using a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle has 
put the vehicle in motion, or in a position posing significant 
risk of causing a collision, such a person continues to 
operate it until the vehicle is returned to a position posing 
no such risk.).  
Further, 
this 
Court 
has 
resolved 
other 
disputes 
concerning the word “operation” in a fashion harmonious with 
the instant case.  In the context of a dispute about insurance  
coverage, in Pacific Employers Ins Co v Michigan Mut Ins Co, 
452 Mich 218, 226; 549 NW2d 872 (1996), we contrasted the term 
“use” with the narrower term “operation”:  
“Use” is defined more broadly than the mere 
carrying of persons and, while it encompasses the 
“operation” of the bus, it may also include a range 
of activity unrelated to actual driving.  
8  
definition of the word “operation,” as well as construing a  
governmental immunity statute, which we must construe  
narrowly, we conclude that the “operation of a motor vehicle”  
encompasses activities that are directly associated with the  
driving of a motor vehicle.  
In light of this, we reject the Court of Appeals and the  
dissent’s approach because their construction of “operation”  
would construe the term so broadly that it could apply to  
virtually any situation imaginable in which a motor vehicle is  
involved regardless of the nature of its involvement.  
Therefore, we reject this construction as inconsistent with  
the principles of interpretation stated above.  
VI  
In the context of a motor vehicle, the common usage of  
the term “operation” refers to the ordinary use of the vehicle  
as a motor vehicle, namely, driving the vehicle. 
In this  
case, the injury to plaintiff did not arise from the negligent  
operation of the bus as a motor vehicle.  The plaintiff was  
not injured incident to the vehicle’s operation as a motor  
vehicle.
 Rather, the vehicle was parked in a maintenance  
facility for the purpose of maintenance and was not at the  
time being operated as a motor vehicle.  
VII  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of  
9  
 
 
 
 
Appeals and reinstate the summary disposition in favor of the  
defendant entered by the circuit court.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and  
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.  
10  
___________________________________ 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
THOMAS CHANDLER,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 118811  
COUNTY OF MUSKEGON,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
I respectfully dissent.  
The 
majority 
today 
restricts the  
motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity to instances  
involving the "actual driving of a motor vehicle."8
 I  
disagree.  
Operating a motor vehicle requires the performance of  
functions some of which are distinct from the act of driving.  
At a minimum, the Court should include within its reading of  
the statutory exception those functions that are distinct  
from, but necessary to and inherent in, driving a motor  
vehicle.  I would hold that the opening and closing of bus  
8Slip op at 7.  
 
 
doors to permit the driver to leave the bus is one such  
activity.
 Therefore, I would affirm the Court of Appeals  
decision that the motor vehicle exception applies to the  
factual occurrences alleged by plaintiff.  
THE OPERATION OF THE DOORS OF THE BUS IN THIS CASE WAS  
INHERENT IN AND NECESSARY TO DRIVING THE BUS  
Although it is true that the motor vehicle exception to  
governmental immunity must be narrowly construed,9 the  
majority's reading of the term "operation" is unnecessarily  
and inappropriately narrow.  
The 
statute 
in 
question makes a governmental agency, 
such  
as defendant, liable for its negligent operation of a motor  
vehicle it owns.10  In writing it, the Legislature did not  
define the term "operation."  Confronted with providing a  
definition, our Court of Appeals in Orlowski v Jackson State  
Prison11 adopted the interpretation of "negligent operation"  
accepted by most other jurisdictions. As a consequence, for  
over thirty years Michigan courts have followed the rule that  
"'negligent operation' may occur even though the vehicle is  
standing still as long as it is being used or employed in some  
9  Stanton v Battle Creek, 237 Mich App 366; 603 NW2d 285 
(1999), aff’d 466 Mich 611 (2002).  
10 MCL 691.1405.  
11  36 Mich App 113; 193 NW2d 206 (1971).  
2  
 
specific 
function 
or to produce some desired work or 
effect."12  
This Court did not grant leave to appeal in Orlowski or its  
progeny to overturn that precedent. However, today, without  
the benefit of full briefing or oral argument, the majority  
announced a new rule redefining "negligent operation" to mean  
"negligent driving." It does this despite the fact that the  
long line of Court of Appeals cases discussed in the thorough  
Court of Appeals opinion militates against peremptory action  
by this Court.  
Today's 
redefinition 
of 
"negligent 
operation" 
is  
particularly inappropriate as applied to this case.  Here,  
plaintiff alleged that he was injured as a consequence of the  
negligent operation 
of 
the 
hydraulic 
doors on defendant's bus.  
His injury occurred after the driver had parked the bus and  
shut off the engine.  In order to get out of the bus, the  
driver had to open the doors.  Without contest, the doors were  
an integral part of the bus.  Their operation was inherent in  
and necessary to the operation of the bus.  
Consider the majority's definition of "operation" in a  
hypothetical case involving the same bus.  Assume that a  
passenger was injured because of negligent operation of the  
hydraulic doors while the bus was stopped.  The bus was not  
being "operated" as the majority defines the term, because it  
12 Id. at 116, citing Diggins v Theroux, 314 Mass 735; 51 
NE2d 425 (1943).  
3  
 
 
was not being "driven." 
Would the injury be barred by  
governmental immunity?  If so, what wording in the statute  
evidences a legislative intent to define the term so narrowly?  
If not, why should the fact that in this case the plaintiff  
was not a passenger affect the definition of "operation?"  
Recall that the statute does not require that the motor  
vehicle be involved in any particular activity. Recall also  
that the statute does not include words such as "upon a  
highway."  
Assume 
a 
second 
hypothetical case involving the same 
bus,  
in which the bus was stopped on a hill, its engine off.  
Through the driver's negligent setting of the brakes, it began  
to roll, injuring a pedestrian. Would governmental immunity  
apply?  Could the Legislature have intended that someone thus  
injured by the bus would not be entitled to bring suit against  
defendant merely because the bus was not being driven?  
DECISIONS FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS FIND OPERATION OF MEANS  
OF EGRESS FROM A BUS CONSTITUTES OPERATION OF THE BUS  
Other jurisdictions interpreting statutes similar to  
Michigan's have held that functions involving entry or  
departure from a bus are part of the operation of a motor  
vehicle.
 In Groves v Dayton Pub Sch,13 the Ohio Court of  
Appeals held that a bus driver's negligence in helping a  
13 132 Ohio App 3d 566; 725 NE2d 734 (1999).  
4  
 
  
 
  
handicapped student get out of a bus involved the "operation  
of a motor vehicle."14  
14  Id. at 569.  The Groves court interpreted the Ohio 
governmental immunity statute, Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2744.02, 
which contains language similar to Michigan's statute:  
We start by noting that R.C. § 2744.02(A)(1) 
does indeed provide broad immunity to political 
subdivisions. It states as follows:  
For 
the 
purposes 
of 
this 
chapter, 
the  
functions of political subdivisions are hereby 
classified 
as 
governmental 
functions 
and  
proprietary functions. Except as provided in  
division 
(B) 
of 
this 
section, 
a 
political 
subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil 
action for injury, death, or loss to person or 
property allegedly caused by any act or omission of 
the political subdivision or an employee of the 
political 
subdivision 
in 
connection 
with 
a  
governmental or proprietary function.  
R.C. § 2744.02(B) contains five exceptions to  
the 
sovereign 
immunity 
given 
to 
political 
subdivisions by R.C. § 2744.02(A)(1). Only one is 
pertinent to the present appeal, and it provides as 
follows:  
. . . [A] political subdivision is liable in 
damages in a civil action for injury, death, or 
loss to person or property allegedly caused by an 
act or omission of the political subdivision or of 
any of its employees in connection with a  
governmental or proprietary function, as follows:  
* * *  
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this 
division, political  subdivisions are liable for  
injury, death, or loss to person or property caused 
by the negligent operation of any motor vehicle by 
their employees upon the public roads when the 
employees are engaged within the scope of their 
employment and authority.  
(continued...)  
5  
 
In Groves, the plaintiff suffered a hand injury when the  
bus driver failed to secure the plaintiff in her wheelchair  
before helping her get off the bus.  The defendant claimed  
that the bus driver's actions could not constitute "negligent  
operation of [a] motor vehicle" for the purpose of the Ohio  
exception to governmental immunity.  
The Groves Court did not agree. It concluded:  
R.C. Chapter 2744 contains no definition of 
the term "operation of any motor vehicle."  We find  
the term capable of encompassing more than the mere 
act of driving the vehicle involved.  Neither of  
the parties to this appeal refer us to any 
authority construing the term in question with 
regard to a driver assisting a disabled passenger, 
and our research in Ohio law has failed to reveal  
any cases on point.  
* * *  
Here, Groves was a passenger on a school bus 
equipped 
to 
transport 
children 
confined 
to  
wheelchairs, which suggests to us that it was  
equipped with a ramp with which to lift and lower 
the students in their wheelchairs as they boarded 
and disembarked from the bus. In addition, Dayton 
Public 
Schools 
had 
established 
rules 
and  
regulations pertaining to the safe boarding, 
transportation, and disembarking of handicapped 
students that required bus drivers to, inter alia,  
14 (...continued) 
R.C. § 2744.02(B)(1) goes on to provide three 
exceptions which reinstate immunity where the motor 
vehicle being operated is a patrol car, fire truck, 
or emergency medical vehicle responding to an 
emergency call, none of which are applicable to the 
present case. Thus, our first inquiry must be 
whether Dayton Public Schools' bus driver's conduct 
falls within the ambit of "operating a motor 
vehicle on the public roads within the scope of his 
employment." [Id. at 568-569.]  
6  
 
 
secure 
passengers 
in 
their 
wheelchairs 
when  
assisting them on or off the school bus. Thus, it 
can reasonably be inferred that doing so was part 
of the bus driver's duties and an integral part of 
his operation of the school bus.  Furthermore, we 
do not exclude the possibility that the driver's 
operation of the ramp itself would be considered 
operation 
of 
the 
motor 
vehicle 
under 
the  
circumstances of this case. [Id. at 569-570.]  
Similarly, in Sonnenberg v Erie Metro Transit Auth,15 the  
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that operating a bus'  
doors was integral to operating the bus.  In that case, the  
doors unexpectedly closed on the plaintiff while she was  
getting out of the bus, injuring her. The issue was whether  
the operation of the doors could be "operation" of a motor  
vehicle under the Pennsylvania statute.16  
The Sonnenberg Court held:  
The movement of parts of a vehicle, or an 
attachment 
to 
a 
vehicle, 
is 
sufficient 
to  
constitute "operation."  Moreover, the bus driver's 
closing of the bus doors is an act normally related 
to the "operation" of a bus. . . . We must  
15  137 Pa Cmmw 533; 586 A2d 1026 (1991).  
16  The relevant statute, 42 Pa Consol Stat § 8542, 
provided:  
(b) Acts which may impose liability-
-
-The  
following acts by a local agency or any of its 
employees may result in the imposition of liability 
on a local agency:  
(1) Vehicle liability.-
-
-The operation of any 
motor vehicle in the possession or control of the 
local agency.  As used in this paragraph, "motor 
vehicle" means any vehicle which is self propelled 
and any attachment thereto, including vehicles 
operated by rail, through water or in the air.  
7  
  
conclude, therefore, that (the defendant)'s bus was 
in 
"operation" 
when 
the 
bus 
door 
struck  
Sonnenberg . . . ." [Id. at 537.]  
Groves 
and 
Sonnenberg 
use 
different 
approaches. 
 
However,  
both recognize that the functioning of an apparatus that  
permits people to enter or depart from a bus should be  
considered the "operation" of the vehicle itself.  
CONCLUSION  
For the reasons stated, I would hold that the stationary  
bus was still in operation if, as alleged, the driver operated  
the hydraulic doors as a means of egress, thereby injuring  
plaintiff.  Not only was any operation of the hydraulic doors  
an operation of the vehicle, it was inherent in and necessary  
to driving the vehicle. 
Therefore, I would affirm the  
decision of the Court of Appeals.  
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
8  
___________________________________ 
  
 
THOMAS CHANDLER,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 118811  
COUNTY OF MUSKEGON,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
The 
majority today restricts the  
motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity to instances  
involving the "actual driving of a motor vehicle."17 
I  
disagree.  
Operating a motor vehicle requires the performance of  
functions some of which are distinct from the act of driving.  
At a minimum, the Court should include within its reading of  
the statutory exception those functions that are distinct  
from, but necessary to and inherent in, driving a motor  
vehicle.  I would hold that the opening and closing of bus  
17Slip op at 7.  
9  
 
 
doors to permit the driver to leave the bus is one such  
activity.
 Therefore, I would affirm the Court of Appeals  
decision that the motor vehicle exception applies to the  
factual occurrences alleged by plaintiff.  
THE OPERATION OF THE DOORS OF THE BUS IN THIS CASE WAS  
INHERENT IN AND NECESSARY TO DRIVING THE BUS  
Although it is true that the motor vehicle exception to  
governmental immunity must be narrowly construed,18 the  
majority's reading of the term "operation" is unnecessarily  
and inappropriately narrow.  
The 
statute 
in 
question makes a governmental agency, 
such  
as defendant, liable for its negligent operation of a motor  
vehicle it owns.19  In writing it, the Legislature did not  
define the term "operation."  Confronted with providing a  
definition, our Court of Appeals in Orlowski v Jackson State  
Prison20 adopted the interpretation of "negligent operation"  
accepted by most other jurisdictions. As a consequence, for  
over thirty years Michigan courts have followed the rule that  
"'negligent operation' may occur even though the vehicle is  
standing still as long as it is being used or employed in some  
18 Stanton v Battle Creek, 237 Mich App 366; 603 NW2d 285 
(1999), aff’d 466 Mich 611 (2002).  
19 MCL 691.1405.  
20  36 Mich App 113; 193 NW2d 206 (1971).  
10  
 
specific 
function 
or to produce some desired work or 
effect."21  
This Court did not grant leave to appeal in Orlowski or its  
progeny to overturn that precedent. However, today, without  
the benefit of full briefing or oral argument, the majority  
announced a new rule redefining "negligent operation" to mean  
"negligent driving." It does this despite the fact that the  
long line of Court of Appeals cases discussed in the thorough  
Court of Appeals opinion militates against peremptory action  
by this Court.  
Today's 
redefinition 
of 
"negligent 
operation" 
is  
particularly inappropriate as applied to this case.  Here,  
plaintiff alleged that he was injured as a consequence of the  
negligent operation 
of 
the 
hydraulic 
doors on defendant's bus.  
His injury occurred after the driver had parked the bus and  
shut off the engine.  In order to get out of the bus, the  
driver had to open the doors.  Without contest, the doors were  
an integral part of the bus.  Their operation was inherent in  
and necessary to the operation of the bus.  
Consider the majority's definition of "operation" in a  
hypothetical case involving the same bus.  Assume that a  
passenger was injured because of negligent operation of the  
hydraulic doors while the bus was stopped.  The bus was not  
being "operated" as the majority defines the term, because it  
21 Id. at 116, citing Diggins v Theroux, 314 Mass 735; 51 
NE2d 425 (1943).  
11  
 
 
was not being "driven." 
Would the injury be barred by  
governmental immunity?  If so, what wording in the statute  
evidences a legislative intent to define the term so narrowly?  
If not, why should the fact that in this case the plaintiff  
was not a passenger affect the definition of "operation?"  
Recall that the statute does not require that the motor  
vehicle be involved in any particular activity. Recall also  
that the statute does not include words such as "upon a  
highway."  
Assume 
a 
second 
hypothetical case involving the same 
bus,  
in which the bus was stopped on a hill, its engine off.  
Through the driver's negligent setting of the brakes, it began  
to roll, injuring a pedestrian. Would governmental immunity  
apply?  Could the Legislature have intended that someone thus  
injured by the bus would not be entitled to bring suit against  
defendant merely because the bus was not being driven?  
DECISIONS FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS FIND OPERATION OF MEANS  
OF EGRESS FROM A BUS CONSTITUTES OPERATION OF THE BUS  
Other jurisdictions interpreting statutes similar to  
Michigan's have held that functions involving entry or  
departure from a bus are part of the operation of a motor  
vehicle.
 In Groves v Dayton Pub Sch,22 the Ohio Court of  
Appeals held that a bus driver's negligence in helping a  
22 132 Ohio App 3d 566; 725 NE2d 734 (1999).  
12  
 
  
 
  
handicapped student get out of a bus involved the "operation  
of a motor vehicle."23  
23  Id. at 569.  The Groves court interpreted the Ohio 
governmental immunity statute, Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2744.02, 
which contains language similar to Michigan's statute:  
We start by noting that R.C. § 2744.02(A)(1) 
does indeed provide broad immunity to political 
subdivisions. It states as follows:  
For 
the 
purposes 
of 
this 
chapter, 
the  
functions of political subdivisions are hereby 
classified 
as 
governmental 
functions 
and  
proprietary functions. Except as provided in  
division 
(B) 
of 
this 
section, 
a 
political 
subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil 
action for injury, death, or loss to person or 
property allegedly caused by any act or omission of 
the political subdivision or an employee of the 
political 
subdivision 
in 
connection 
with 
a  
governmental or proprietary function.  
R.C. § 2744.02(B) contains five exceptions to  
the 
sovereign 
immunity 
given 
to 
political 
subdivisions by R.C. § 2744.02(A)(1). Only one is 
pertinent to the present appeal, and it provides as 
follows:  
. . . [A] political subdivision is liable in 
damages in a civil action for injury, death, or 
loss to person or property allegedly caused by an 
act or omission of the political subdivision or of 
any of its employees in connection with a  
governmental or proprietary function, as follows:  
* * *  
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this 
division, political  subdivisions are liable for  
injury, death, or loss to person or property caused 
by the negligent operation of any motor vehicle by 
their employees upon the public roads when the 
employees are engaged within the scope of their 
employment and authority.  
(continued...)  
13  
 
In Groves, the plaintiff suffered a hand injury when the  
bus driver failed to secure the plaintiff in her wheelchair  
before helping her get off the bus.  The defendant claimed  
that the bus driver's actions could not constitute "negligent  
operation of [a] motor vehicle" for the purpose of the Ohio  
exception to governmental immunity.  
The Groves Court did not agree. It concluded:  
R.C. Chapter 2744 contains no definition of 
the term "operation of any motor vehicle."  We find  
the term capable of encompassing more than the mere 
act of driving the vehicle involved.  Neither of  
the parties to this appeal refer us to any 
authority construing the term in question with 
regard to a driver assisting a disabled passenger, 
and our research in Ohio law has failed to reveal  
any cases on point.  
* * *  
Here, Groves was a passenger on a school bus 
equipped 
to 
transport 
children 
confined 
to  
wheelchairs, which suggests to us that it was  
equipped with a ramp with which to lift and lower 
the students in their wheelchairs as they boarded 
and disembarked from the bus. In addition, Dayton 
Public 
Schools 
had 
established 
rules 
and  
regulations pertaining to the safe boarding, 
transportation, and disembarking of handicapped 
students that required bus drivers to, inter alia,  
23 (...continued) 
R.C. § 2744.02(B)(1) goes on to provide three 
exceptions which reinstate immunity where the motor 
vehicle being operated is a patrol car, fire truck, 
or emergency medical vehicle responding to an 
emergency call, none of which are applicable to the 
present case. Thus, our first inquiry must be 
whether Dayton Public Schools' bus driver's conduct 
falls within the ambit of "operating a motor 
vehicle on the public roads within the scope of his 
employment." [Id. at 568-569.]  
14  
 
 
secure 
passengers 
in 
their 
wheelchairs 
when  
assisting them on or off the school bus. Thus, it 
can reasonably be inferred that doing so was part 
of the bus driver's duties and an integral part of 
his operation of the school bus.  Furthermore, we 
do not exclude the possibility that the driver's 
operation of the ramp itself would be considered 
operation 
of 
the 
motor 
vehicle 
under 
the  
circumstances of this case. [Id. at 569-570.]  
Similarly, in Sonnenberg v Erie Metro Transit Auth,24 the  
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that operating a bus'  
doors was integral to operating the bus.  In that case, the  
doors unexpectedly closed on the plaintiff while she was  
getting out of the bus, injuring her. The issue was whether  
the operation of the doors could be "operation" of a motor  
vehicle under the Pennsylvania statute.25  
The Sonnenberg Court held:  
The movement of parts of a vehicle, or an 
attachment 
to 
a 
vehicle, 
is 
sufficient 
to  
constitute "operation."  Moreover, the bus driver's 
closing of the bus doors is an act normally related 
to the "operation" of a bus. . . . We must  
24  137 Pa Cmmw 533; 586 A2d 1026 (1991).  
25  The relevant statute, 42 Pa Consol Stat § 8542, 
provided:  
(b) Acts which may impose liability-
-
-The  
following acts by a local agency or any of its 
employees may result in the imposition of liability 
on a local agency:  
(1) Vehicle liability.-
-
-The operation of any 
motor vehicle in the possession or control of the 
local agency.  As used in this paragraph, "motor 
vehicle" means any vehicle which is self propelled 
and any attachment thereto, including vehicles 
operated by rail, through water or in the air.  
15  
  
conclude, therefore, that (the defendant)'s bus was 
in 
"operation" 
when 
the 
bus 
door 
struck  
Sonnenberg . . . ." [Id. at 537.]  
Groves 
and 
Sonnenberg 
use 
different 
approaches. 
 
However,  
both recognize that the functioning of an apparatus that  
permits people to enter or depart from a bus should be  
considered the "operation" of the vehicle itself.  
CONCLUSION  
For the reasons stated, I would hold that the stationary  
bus was still in operation if, as alleged, the driver operated  
the hydraulic doors as a means of egress, thereby injuring  
plaintiff.  Not only was any operation of the hydraulic doors  
an operation of the vehicle, it was inherent in and necessary  
to driving the vehicle. 
Therefore, I would affirm the  
decision of the Court of Appeals.  
16