Case Title: People v. Chhoun

Citation: 

Docket Number: S084996

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2021-02-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
RUN PETER CHHOUN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S084996 
 
San Bernardino County Superior Court 
FSB08658 
 
 
February 11, 2021 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, Groban, and Kim* concurred. 
 
 
*         Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
1 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
S084996 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
During a home invasion robbery, defendant Run Peter 
Chhoun and fellow gang members killed the entire Nguyen 
family except three-year-old Dennis.  The child was wounded 
and left alone overnight with the bodies of his parents and 
siblings.  Defendant was tried with alleged accomplice Samreth 
Pan.  The court dismissed all charges against Pan at the close of 
the People’s case.  Defendant was convicted of five counts of 
murder, one count of residential burglary, and three counts of 
residential robbery with enhancements for personal use of a 
firearm.1  He was acquitted of the attempted murder of Dennis.  
The jury found true special circumstances of murder during 
burglary and robbery and the murder of multiple victims.2  It 
set the penalty at death.  We affirm the judgment. 
 
1 
Penal Code sections 187, subdivision (a), 459, 211, 
12022.5, subdivision (a).  Although the jury found the personal 
use allegation true for the residential burglary and robbery 
charges, it determined the allegation had not been proven for 
the murder charges.  
2  
Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) and (a)(3).  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless 
otherwise specified. 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Guilt Phase 
 
In the summer of 1995, defendant (nicknamed “Chaka”) 
and Pan (nicknamed “Rusty”) were “shot callers” and “O.G.s”3 in 
the Tiny Rascals Gang (TRG).  Vinh Tran (“Scrappy”) and 
William Evans were junior members.  Although not officially a 
member of the gang, Nhung Tran (“Karol”) “took care of” young 
girls who associated with TRG members.  All five were originally 
charged together.  Because Scrappy and Evans were juveniles, 
however, their cases were later severed, as was the case against 
Karol.4  Evans and Karol testified at trial pursuant to plea 
agreements.5 
 
3  
The term “O.G.,” which stands for “original gangster,” is 
generally used as a term of respect for older or veteran gang 
members.  In Asian gangs, the label is awarded based on 
experience level rather than age.  Even young gang members 
may rise to leadership if they accrue sufficient criminal 
experience.  O.G.s typically advise younger members how to 
plan and carry out crimes, and how to evade detection.  A “shot 
caller” is a respected gang member who plans how a specific 
crime will be committed.  
4  
Although they share the same last name, Vinh (Scrappy) 
and Nhung (Karol) Tran are not related.  To avoid confusion, we 
refer to them as “Scrappy” and “Karol,” as they were 
consistently referred to in the trial court. 
5  
Karol pled guilty to five counts of second degree murder, 
with a sentence of up to 50 years in prison.  Evans pled guilty to 
five counts of first degree murder, with a sentence of 25 years to 
life in prison.  Evans’s plea agreement also encompassed 
charges in a Sacramento case.  (See post, at pp. 6–8.)  In 
exchange for pleading guilty to the Sacramento crimes and 
testifying truthfully in both cases, Evans’s 25-year-to-life 
sentence in the Sacramento case could be served concurrently 
with his sentence for these San Bernardino murders.  
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
3 
1. Elm Street Home Invasion Robbery and Murders 
 
In late July, defendant asked Karol if she knew a good 
place to rob.  Karol described a family in San Bernardino who 
were likely to have cash and jewelry in the house.  She believed 
a husband and wife lived there with a child and grandmother.  
Karol said the family would be a good target because they were 
Vietnamese and, she believed, would not call the police.  
 
Although Karol did not want to be part of the robbery 
because her parents lived nearby, defendant ultimately 
persuaded her to join him.  He also recruited Evans and 
Scrappy, and the crime took place on August 9.  Defendant had 
a Glock nine-millimeter pistol but wanted a second gun.  He 
drove the group to Pan’s house.  He told Pan they were on their 
way to commit a robbery and asked for Pan’s gun.  Pan said he 
did not want to be involved but provided a Glock pistol, which 
defendant handed to Scrappy.   
 
Defendant drove to the target house on Elm Street.  Karol 
was to approach the front door because she knew the residents.  
While she knocked, Scrappy stood behind a bush, armed with 
Pan’s gun.  When Henry Nguyen6 answered the door, Scrappy 
rushed inside, followed by defendant and Evans.  Karol fled to 
defendant’s red Honda, which he had parked outside.  
 
The Nguyens did not understand English, and Scrappy 
was the only robber who spoke Vietnamese.  Defendant gave 
orders that Scrappy translated to the family.  Initially, Henry, 
his wife, Trinh Tran, and their 13-year-old daughter Doan were 
the only family members in the living room.  Scrappy appeared 
 
6  
To avoid confusion, we refer to members of the Nguyen 
family by their first names. 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
4 
with three children from another room:  11-year-old Daniel, 10-
year-old David, and 3-year-old Dennis.  Everyone was ordered 
to get on the floor.  Evans searched the house while Scrappy 
demanded cash.  Henry said they had none, but when defendant 
threatened Dennis with a large knife Henry turned over about 
$2,000.  When Daniel volunteered that he had some money in 
his bedroom, Evans followed him into a hallway.  Evans heard 
a gunshot and returned to the living room, to see Henry lying 
facedown.  Defendant stood less than a foot away holding a gun.  
At defendant’s order, Evans left the house and sat in the car 
with Karol.  Both reported hearing several gunshots from inside 
the house.  Karol estimated the robbers had been in the house 
about 15 minutes before the first shots were fired.  A neighbor 
heard several gunshots and saw a car drive away. 
 
Defendant drove the group to Karol’s house.  In the car, 
defendant remarked, “It must have been the wrong house,” 
because there was no grandmother and the family did not have 
as much money as he had expected.  He said five people had been 
killed.  He handed Scrappy a gun, directing him to unload it.  
Later, he told Karol he had held “the little boy” at knifepoint 
trying to get more money from the mother.  Pan was waiting at 
Karol’s house, and defendant returned his pistol.  Learning of 
the murders, Pan became extremely angry and called the group 
stupid.  Defendant doled out cash to everyone but Pan.  They 
also divided some of the Nguyens’ jewelry.  Defendant told 
everyone to “act like nothing’s happened,” and they spent the 
rest of the evening at a pool hall.  Defendant told other gang 
members he had done some of the shooting at the Elm Street 
house.  He was also overheard saying that “Scrappy went crazy 
and shot a kid.”  
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
5 
 
The next morning, Henry’s sister called the Nguyen home.  
The phone rang for a long time.  Dennis finally answered and 
said, “Mommy’s dead.”  Karol’s mother went to the house and 
heard Dennis crying inside.  He finally opened the door and then 
sat next to his mother’s body.  Henry, Trinh, and David lay dead 
on the living room floor.  Toothpaste had been smeared around 
Trinh’s nostrils, mouth, and eyes, the tube discarded near her 
body.  Another neighbor found Doan and Daniel lying dead in a 
bedroom.  All had been shot repeatedly.  Dennis was holding his 
brother’s head and “just crying, screaming.”  
 
Dennis had been shot in the hand.  Henry was shot in the 
head and neck.  One shot was fired with the gun’s muzzle placed 
directly against his skull.  He was also shot in the chest at close 
range while lying on the floor.  Four superficial cuts on the back 
of his neck had been inflicted by a sharp object, like a knifepoint.  
Trinh was shot once in the thigh and twice in the head, at very 
close range.  Two of her teeth were detached by the force of the 
bullets.  The oldest child, Doan, was shot in the leg, chest, and 
head.  Another bullet pierced a hand that she had held up to 
protect her face.  Daniel was shot in the lower leg and chest.  
David was shot twice in the chest and once in the back of the 
head.  
 
Several nine-millimeter cartridge cases and spent bullets 
were found in the living room.  Trinh’s emptied purse was found 
in the hallway.  A meat cleaver rested atop the stereo cabinet.  
More casings and rounds were recovered near the victims in a 
bedroom.  Fourteen of the fired casings were Winchester, and 
one was S&B brand.  All were fired from the same Glock nine-
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
6 
millimeter pistol.7  No fingerprints matching the gang members 
were found in the house, but a latex glove was discarded in the 
backyard.  
 
Shortly after the crimes, defendant told Jonathan Ibarra 
that he had committed the robbery.  He said five people were 
killed but “somebody fucked up in the house and one got away.”  
He shot that one in the arm.  Ibarra had seen both defendant 
and Pan with nine-millimeter Glock pistols around the time of 
the murders.  Defendant later told a jail inmate that Scrappy 
had squirted toothpaste in a woman’s face during the robbery.  
He said it was poison and ordered the family to “[t]ell him where 
the fuckin’ money is or she’s going to die.”  
2. Sacramento Home Invasion Murders 
 
Defendant and other TRG members were linked to a home 
invasion incident in Sacramento almost two weeks before the 
Elm Street crimes.  Jurors were admonished that the 
Sacramento evidence was admitted for a limited purpose to 
show “a common scheme, motive, or knowledge” bearing upon 
the intent of defendant and Pan to commit the Elm Street 
murders.  
 
Defendant, Pan, Scrappy, and Evans drove to Sacramento 
and met with other TRG members to plan a robbery.  Bunjun 
Chhinkhathork (nicknamed “Puppet”) suggested robbing an 
apartment where the owners sold cigarettes and other items.  
On the evening of July 27, 1995, defendant drove to a park then 
 
7  
After the evidence was presented in the guilt phase, 
another ballistics examination determined one bullet had been 
fired by a different gun, which was also a Glock nine-millimeter.  
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
7 
led Pan and Evans through a fence to the residence.  He told 
Chhinkhathork to stay in the car as the getaway driver.  
 
Quyen Luu and her husband, Hung Dieu Le, operated a 
small store in their home.  Their 17-year-old daughter Amie was 
sitting on the stairs of the building when defendant, Pan, and 
Evans approached.  One pointed a gun at her and gestured for 
her to follow.  Instead, she yelled for her mother to close the door 
and ran upstairs to a neighbor’s apartment, where her brother 
Vincent and sister Mei were visiting.  The Le family was just 
finishing dinner when a robber entered.  He struggled with 
Quyen, shooting her in the leg, then shot Hung and his father, 
Nghiep Thich Le, several times.  The parties stipulated that 47-
year-old Hung died of a gunshot to the chest, and 73-year-old 
Nghiep was killed by a shot to the head.  
 
Evans testified that defendant went into the apartment 
alone.  When the three returned to the car, Chhinkhathork 
drove away.  Defendant said he shot “the lady” because she tried 
to grab him.  He also shot a man who had tried to hit him with 
a chair.  He later joked to Karol about the “stupid guy” who 
thought he could “stop a bullet with a chair.”  After the incident, 
defendant drove Evans and other TRG members back to San 
Bernardino.  They acquired no money in the attack.  
 
None of the survivors could identify the attackers, but all 
said only one man held a gun and did the shooting.  About an 
hour before the robbery, a different man had come to the 
apartment, bought candy, then joined the eventual shooter.  
They drove off together in a Honda Accord with a damaged front 
fender.  The car, registered to Pan’s mother, was recovered with 
live nine-millimeter rounds in the trunk.  All shell casings 
recovered from the apartment had been fired by the same Glock 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
8 
nine-millimeter pistol.  It was a different gun from the one used 
in the Elm Street killings.  
3. Investigation 
 
A detective tried to interview Dennis in the emergency 
room, but the child was too upset to answer questions.  The 
following week, assisted by a child psychologist, police were able 
to obtain a statement.  Dennis said his father answered a knock 
at the door and three men entered.  One put a gun to his father’s 
head and demanded money.  Another took necklaces from 
Dennis and his mother.  Everyone was ordered to “get down.”  
His father was shot in the head, and one of the men also shot 
Dennis in the hand.  The men left by a rear door.  Dennis 
thought the robbers all had black handguns.  They did not wear 
masks.   
 
Shortly after the Elm Street murders, defendant visited 
his girlfriend in Seattle.  Evans and Scrappy joined him.  
Defendant needed to borrow gas money for the drive home and 
produced a jade pendant to be held as collateral.  The necklace 
was later recovered and belonged to Trinh, who had been 
wearing it at the time of the robbery.  
 
Defendant, Evans, and Scrappy left Seattle, stopping in 
Sacramento, where they were arrested.  A Glock nine-millimeter 
shell casing was recovered from defendant’s car and linked to 
the gun used at Elm Street.  Defendant denied involvement in 
those murders.  As to the Sacramento crimes, he admitted 
telling a girl outside the home to “shut up,” but claimed he had 
stayed outside the apartment and ran away when he heard 
gunshots.  Pan told the police a similar story.  
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
9 
4. Expert Testimony 
 
Sergeant Marcus Frank of the Westminster Police 
Department testified as an expert on Southeast Asian gangs.  
He described the gangs as loosely organized, with leadership 
roles given to those with the most criminal experience.  To 
become an O.G. or shot caller, members must have committed 
certain felonies.  Unlike western gangs, Asian gangs do not 
claim a geographic territory and tend to be highly mobile.  TRG 
had over 1,000 members nationwide, with nearly 800 of them in 
California, ranging in age from 11 to 25.  In Southern California, 
about half its members are Vietnamese and half Cambodian.  
Females are limited to supporting roles.  Only the males are 
allowed to hold guns and commit robberies or car thefts.   
 
Home invasion robberies are a hallmark of Asian street 
gangs.  In the late 1970s, Vietnamese gangs in Orange County 
developed the practice, which had previously been rare.  These 
are complex crimes, with specific jobs typically assigned to 
different members.  The gangs frequently target Asian families.  
Because valuable jewelry is a symbol of the family’s wealth and 
community standing, jewelry is often kept at home, where it can 
be easily accessed.  Many in the Southeast Asian community are 
reluctant to cooperate with police.  The gangs understand this 
and know how to intimidate victims to hinder investigations.  
Guns are often used to terrorize victims but, while threats are 
common, it is unusual for home invasion robberies to result in 
murder.  Typically, gang members manipulate the most 
vulnerable victim, assaulting the youngest or the oldest family 
member until someone discloses where money and jewelry are 
kept.  A nonfatal shot may be fired to secure group compliance.  
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
10 
B. Penalty Phase 
1. Aggravating Evidence 
 
In the penalty phase, the prosecution offered more 
evidence about the Sacramento incident along with defendant’s 
additional murders and violent behavior in custody. 
a. Additional Sacramento Evidence 
 
A medical examiner testified based on autopsy reports and 
photographs that 47-year-old Hung Le died from a single 
gunshot to the chest, fired at “apparently distant range.”  He 
would have died quickly.  The second victim, 73-year-old Nghiep 
Le, was shot in the arm and directly in the face, with the bullet 
entering through the upper lip.   
b. Spokane Home Invasion Robbery and Murders 
 
A little over two weeks before the Sacramento murders, 
defendant committed another home invasion robbery with 
murders in Spokane, Washington.  Police interviewed one of the 
survivors, four-and-a-half-year-old Joe Hagan, Jr.  Portions of 
his account were read to the jury.  Joe said that when his mother 
opened the door the robbers entered with a knife and a gun.  
They tied up his parents and pushed them to the floor.  The 
robbers cut both his parents on the face or neck.  Joe heard 
gunshots but was afraid and covered his head with a pillow.  He 
ran to his father and tried to wake him and then held his sister 
on the couch until the next morning, when he went to alert the 
neighbors.  The robbers took jewelry from him and his sister 
before they started hurting his parents.  Shown a photo array, 
Joe immediately pointed to defendant, saying he was positive it 
was the person who had hurt his dad.  Defendant was the larger 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
11 
of the two attackers.  About a year later, Joe identified a 
photograph of Giao Ly as the second robber.8  
 
Spokane police responded around 7:30 the next morning 
to find the bodies of 27-year-old Johnny Hagan, Jr., and 23-year-
old Thi Hong Nga Pham.  Pham’s hands were tied with phone 
cord, and speaker wire was wrapped around her neck.  She was 
shot in the head, face, and chest.  The face and the chest shots 
came from close range.  Pham’s jaw was broken in two places; 
she had also been cut several times in the face and neck.  A 
wedding ring and engagement ring were found inside her 
mouth.  Hagan had also been bound with phone cord and 
speaker wire.  He was shot in the ear, at the base of the skull, 
and through the back of the head.  Two shots were fired from 
only an inch or two away.  Hagan had bruising and a cut across 
the front of his neck.  Officers found a bloody knife on a counter 
and several shell casings from a .45-caliber automatic near the 
bodies.  Giao Ly’s palm print was found on a kitchen cupboard, 
and defendant’s fingerprint was lifted from inside the 
apartment door.  Defendant denied ever being in the residence 
and could not explain why his fingerprint was found there.  
Evans recalled seeing a .45-caliber gun at defendant’s house.  
 
Defendant’s girlfriend, Champa Onkhamdy, testified 
defendant visited her in Portland in early July 1995.  They drove 
to Spokane with Ly, whom she knew as “Sandman,” and 
Kunthea Sar, also known as “Precious.”  The women stayed at 
an apartment while defendant and Ly went out.  The men 
returned with jewelry and cash, which they divided among 
 
8  
When shown the photographic lineups again during trial, 
Joe could not recall which photos he had selected and could no 
longer identify defendant or Ly.  
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
12 
themselves and one or two others.  A police officer testified that 
Onkhamdy reported hearing the men discuss a murder.  She 
disavowed the statement at trial, however, saying the men were 
speaking Cambodian, a language she did not understand.  
Before defendant flew back to San Bernardino, he gave 
Onkhamdy five rings and a bracelet.  Hagan’s mother identified 
one ring as her son’s and the bracelet as her grandson’s.  
c. Drive-by Shootings 
i. Bunlort Bun 
 
On August 6, 1995, defendant and other TRG members 
decided to drive around San Bernardino looking for members of 
the Oriental Boys, a rival street gang.  Defendant gave Evans a 
gun and followed two men in a red Toyota.  The driver, later 
identified as Bunlort Bun, let the passenger out and sped away.  
Defendant gave chase while Pan and Evans took turns shooting 
at the car until it swerved to a stop.  Defendant pulled up next 
to the car.  Seeing Bun slumped over, he told Pan and Evans to 
make sure he was dead.  They said they were out of bullets, so 
defendant handed Pan another ammunition clip.  Pan shot Bun 
three times.  
 
Afterward, either defendant or Pan told Karol that they 
had seen “Bones,” an Oriental Boy gang member who had 
previously shot 25 rounds at the home of Pan’s mother.  
Defendant said they followed Bones and shot him.  At 
defendant’s urging, Karol and others visited the murder scene.  
When they reported back that there were many police cars 
there, defendant cheered and joked that they had “drained a 
whole magazine” into the victim.  The 32 cartridge cases found 
at the scene had been fired from the same two guns used in the 
Elm Street and Sacramento shootings.  
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
13 
 
The passenger who had been in Bun’s car testified that he 
was a member of the Oriental Boys gang, but Bun was not.  A 
different member of the Oriental Boys was known as “Bones.”  
Bun was shot five times, with three fatal wounds to the chest 
and abdomen.  The downward trajectory of the bullets was 
consistent with shots fired into a slumped-over body.  
ii. Miguel Avina Vargas 
 
On August 8, 1995, two days after Bun’s shooting and the 
day before the Elm Street murders, defendant was driving in 
Pomona.  Pan rode in front, with Sar and Diep Tran (also called 
“Giggles”) in the back.  When they saw a man in a white pickup 
truck, defendant made a U-turn, drove at the truck, and pulled 
a gun.  Pan told the women to duck.  Defendant and/or Pan fired 
several shots at the truck until it hit a curb and stopped.  Sar 
later told Karol, “Oh, man, we just shot up a Mexican for 
throwing up [a] sign.”   
 
The truck’s driver left the scene.  The passenger, Miguel 
Avina Vargas, died of massive internal bleeding from a bullet to 
the heart.  Ten cartridge casings were recovered from the area.  
All had been fired from one of the guns used in the Elm Street, 
Sacramento, and Bun shootings.  
d. In-custody Behavior 
 
In May 1996, defendant became angry with a jail deputy 
who denied him “tier time” outside his cell after lights out.  He 
kicked his cell door and yelled for several minutes, threatening 
to kill the deputy and his family.  The conflict continued into the 
night.  When deputies entered his cell in the morning, they 
found defendant armed with a six-inch stainless steel shank.  
Defendant then refused to leave his cell for court.  He poured 
shampoo and toilet water onto the cell floor, urging the deputies 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
14 
to come and get him.  He was forcibly removed in a violent 
altercation.  A second shank was found hidden in the cell, along 
with a piece of braided cord that could be used as a garrote.  
 
In December 1998, shortly before defendant’s trial was to 
begin, he was overheard on a phone call discussing a Karol or 
Carolyn.  He said this person had been in protective custody but 
might be out and he needed to locate her.  He said he had men 
looking for her because “without her, they didn’t have a case” 
against him.   
2. Mitigating Evidence 
 
Defendant presented extensive evidence about his early 
childhood in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge regime, 
atrocities the Khmer Rouge committed against his family and 
others, and expert testimony explaining how these traumatic 
experiences 
may 
have 
affected 
his 
psychological 
and 
neurological development.  Because defendant raises no legal 
issue concerning this evidence, we summarize it only briefly 
here. 
a. Childhood Trauma 
 
Defendant was born in Cambodia in 1972, shortly before 
the Khmer Rouge took over the country.  His father, previously 
a rice farmer, was drafted and fought against the regime.  When 
their village was attacked, the family hid for more than a week 
under a Buddhist temple.  The Khmer Rouge took over the town, 
imprisoned his father, loaded defendant and his brother into a 
wagon at gunpoint, and sent them to a work camp.  Defendant 
was four or five years old and his brother was seven or eight.  
Children in the camp were indoctrinated to reject their parents 
and consider the state their family.  They had no bed or blankets 
and were fed only rice water.  Many died.  Defendant and his 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
15 
brother ran away at least twice but were caught and brutally 
punished upon their return.  They were freed only after the 
Vietnamese ousted the Khmer Rouge.  
 
The family was reunited and decided to leave Cambodia, 
walking for three days and two nights to the Thailand border.  
They passed many corpses and saw an entire family killed by an 
exploding landmine.  In a Thai refugee camp, defendant often 
ran away to hunt or beg for more food.  He showed signs of 
starvation and tuberculosis.  
 
The family immigrated to America in 1981, settling in 
Mobile, Alabama.  Defendant went to a school that was not 
equipped to handle Cambodian refugees and offered no 
language support.  Defendant suffered from poor health and 
often ran away from home, sleeping in a dumpster.  After four 
years, the family moved to California.   
b. Psychological and Neurological Evidence 
 
Trauma expert William Foreman interviewed defendant 
and his family and reviewed school, court, and medical records.  
He did not administer psychological tests because he believed 
defendant 
lacked 
the 
necessary 
English 
and 
reading 
comprehension skills.  Foreman reviewed the history of 
defendant’s early life in detail.  The most important thread was 
his parents’ inability to intervene and protect him.  For example, 
defendant nearly drowned when he was very young and was 
pulled from the water by a villager.  Although he was confused 
and ill afterward, the Khmer Rouge prevented his mother from 
comforting him.  Throughout his childhood, defendant’s actions 
were focused on survival, something typically seen in trauma 
cases.  In the United States, defendant again lacked parental 
care and supervision.  His parents drank heavily, argued 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
16 
violently, and beat the children.  Foreman diagnosed defendant 
with reactive attachment disorder and chronic posttraumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD).  Antisocial personality disorder was 
another possible diagnosis based on defendant’s “sheer degree of 
criminal behavior.”  However, Foreman considered these 
behaviors artifacts of survival strategies developed in 
Cambodia.  Defendant said he regretted murdering the Nguyen 
children but had been unable to react emotionally until long 
after the event.  Foreman concluded defendant’s criminal and 
gang activities were reenactments of his early childhood 
experiences.  
 
Paul Leung, an expert in cross-cultural psychiatry, 
reviewed the details of defendant’s early life and explained that 
even incidents defendant did not remember could have 
significantly affected him.  Malnutrition could have delayed his 
brain development and impaired his learning ability.  Exposure 
to war and violence could have caused long-term anxiety.  There 
were also indications of serious head trauma, which could have 
altered his temperament.  Although defendant satisfied several 
of the criteria, ultimately Leung could not diagnose PTSD 
because defendant was unable to recall specific traumatic 
events.  Nevertheless, his history and behavior were consistent 
with PTSD.  
 
Child psychiatrist William Sack also testified about the 
impact of defendant’s early childhood.  The forced separation 
from his parents prevented him from forming a strong family 
attachment.  He would have felt abandoned and survived by 
self-reliance.  The coping strategies he had learned in Cambodia 
worked against him in the United States.  The lack of support 
from school and family further impaired his development.  He 
found acceptance and trusted friends when he joined a gang.  
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
17 
Sack had participated in a large study assessing PTSD in 
Cambodian refugees.  He discussed defendant’s various 
symptoms and the traumatic experiences that could have 
induced them.  Sack concluded defendant might qualify for a 
PTSD diagnosis only “if you bend the rules a little bit,” because 
defendant did not report the type of recurrent intrusive 
thoughts about trauma that are typically seen.  Instead, Sack 
thought reactive attachment disorder was the best diagnosis.  
Defendant also reported significant substance abuse and 
chronic depression.  
 
A scan of defendant’s brain showed decreased frontal lobe 
functioning, which is frequently seen in traumatic brain 
injuries.  Portions of his brain were asymmetrical, a pattern also 
reported in PTSD patients.  Defendant displayed abnormally 
high activity in the orbital frontal lobe, a finding associated with 
both traumatic brain injury and PTSD.  Defendant’s brain 
abnormalities could have been caused by head injury or 
malnutrition.  These patterns have been associated with poor 
judgment and aggressive impulse control.   
c. Anticipated Custody Conditions and 
Family Testimony 
 
A former correctional counselor described the conditions 
in secure housing units at Pelican Bay State Prison.  If given a 
sentence of life without parole, defendant’s offenses and jail 
record would require him to be placed in a Level 4 prison, like 
Pelican Bay.  He would spend at least four to six years in the 
highly restrictive setting of the prison’s secure housing unit.  
 
In addition to describing his childhood, defendant’s family 
members asked the jury to show mercy in sentencing.  
Onkhamdy testified that defendant had moved with her to 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
18 
Portland in an effort to quit TRG.  He took a job at a deli and 
spent time fishing and cooking.  When he returned to California 
in June 1995, he said he was going to visit his family.  The couple 
had a son born after defendant’s arrest.  Although defendant 
saw the child only once, during a jail visit, he sent the boy 
birthday cards and letters.   
3. Rebuttal 
 
During trial, defendant was housed in the county jail’s 
high security unit.  Deputies conducting a routine search of his 
cell found a handmade handcuff key hidden under the frame of 
his desk.  When tested, the key successfully opened a pair of 
handcuffs.  
 
Craig Rath, a clinical psychologist, disputed the defense 
experts’ findings.  Based on defendant’s speech in recordings, his 
high school grades, and the letters he wrote to his girlfriend and 
others, Rath observed defendant was facile in English.  He could 
have taken many psychological tests that were not given.  Rath 
found the reactive attachment disorder diagnosis questionable 
because there was ample evidence defendant had formed bonds 
with his girlfriend and other gang members.  This bonding 
would be impossible for someone with the disorder.  Rath 
thought a conduct disorder was more likely.  Defendant’s 
continual criminal behavior was inconsistent with PTSD and 
more strongly associated with psychopathy or antisocial 
personality disorder.  Defendant’s traits and behavior were 
consistent with severe psychopathy.  
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
19 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Guilt Phase Issues 
1. Admission of Inflammatory Evidence  
 
Defendant contends the court improperly admitted 
irrelevant evidence about the Sacramento murders and his gang 
membership.  Noting the inflammatory quality of the evidence, 
he contends the errors were so prejudicial as to violate his rights 
to due process and a reliable guilt verdict.  There was no error 
and no constitutional violation. 
a. Other Crimes 
i. Background 
 
Before trial, the prosecution gave notice that it intended 
to present guilt phase evidence of several other homicides in the 
days leading up to the Nguyen murders.  Specifically, the 
prosecution sought to admit evidence of the July 10 home 
invasion robbery and murders in Spokane; the July 27 murders 
in Sacramento; the July 28 execution-style murder of Trang Vu 
(see post, at pp. 56–57); the August 6 drive-by murder of Bun; 
and the August 8 drive-by murder of Vargas.  Defendant and 
Pan each moved to exclude this evidence.  The court granted 
their motions as to most of the crimes, concluding the 
circumstances were too dissimilar from the present charges for 
the evidence to be admissible.  It held an Evidence Code 
section 402 hearing to consider admissibility of the Sacramento 
crimes.  
 
After 
hearing 
from 
several 
witnesses, 
the 
court 
determined the Sacramento evidence was admissible against 
Pan on the issue of knowledge and intent in providing the 
murder weapon.  Although the issue was “more troublesome and 
closer” in defendant’s case, the court concluded the evidence 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
20 
showed premeditation and malice.  The Sacramento crimes 
tended to show defendant entered the Elm Street home with the 
intent to commit a robbery and, in doing so, “he did not hesitate 
to kill individuals when he felt it to be necessary.”  Because the 
evidence was admissible against both defendant and Pan, the 
court also denied a severance motion.  After the court granted 
Pan’s motion for acquittal (see § 1118.1), defendant renewed his 
objections and moved for a mistrial.  The court denied the 
motion, noting that defendant’s conduct in Sacramento tended 
to show his premeditation and intent to kill in the Elm Street 
murders.  Similarities between the crimes also tended to 
establish they were done as part of a common scheme.  
 
During trial, the court instructed extensively on the 
limited ways the jury could use the Sacramento evidence.  Three 
times, before testimony concerning the Sacramento case, the 
court read the following admonition: 
 
“Certain evidence is admitted for a limited purpose.  Such 
evidence is going to be received at this time.  [¶] You are 
instructed that you are not to consider it for any purpose other 
than the limited purpose for which it is admitted.  The fact that 
it is being admitted at this point in the trial has no significance 
as to its relative importance. 
 
“This trial concerns charges by the [P]eople that the 
defendants 
allegedly 
committed 
a 
home-invasion 
robbery/murder which occurred on August 9, 1995, on Elm 
Street in the City of San Bernardino.  [¶] I remind you that the 
defendants have entered pleas of not guilty and it will be up to 
the jury to determine whether or not they are guilty of the 
charges which the People must prove to you beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
21 
 
“The law permits under certain circumstances that 
evidence of similar crimes or criminal acts to those charged in 
this case may be presented to the jury.  This evidence concerns 
an uncharged crime in this trial that occurred in the [C]ity of 
Sacramento on July 27, 1995.  That crime involved a home-
invasion robbery/murder.  [¶] This evidence is being admitted 
for the limited purpose as evidence in the Elm Street crimes of 
premeditation and malice aforethought as required in the crime 
of first degree murder, [and] the necessary intent as required in 
the crimes of murder, robbery, and burglary.  It may be used as 
evidence of a common scheme, motive, or knowledge.  You will 
be completely instructed as to the elements of all crimes charged 
in the Elm Street incident. 
 
“Before you may consider this evidence for any purpose, 
you must be satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the Sacramento crimes took place and that the defendants were 
participants in committing them.  You are not to consider any of 
this limited evidence as proof of a propensity of the defendants 
to commit the crimes charged in the Elm Street offenses and you 
are reminded you may not find either or both of the defendants 
guilty of the Elm Street crimes solely on this evidence, but must 
determine the truth of those charges beyond a reasonable doubt.  
And you may consider this evidence of the Sacramento crimes 
only for the limited purpose for which it is being admitted.  
[¶] Further, you may not and you are not to consider this 
evidence of the Sacramento offenses as corroboration of the 
testimony of any coparticipant that may testify in this trial 
concerning the Elm Street killings.”   
 
A slightly modified version of this admonition, referring to 
a singular defendant instead of “defendants,” was also included 
in instructions before closing argument.  At that time, the court 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
22 
gave further instructions on the limited purposes for which the 
Sacramento evidence could be considered: 
 
“Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing 
that the defendant committed a crime other than that for which 
he is on trial.  [¶] This evidence, if believed, may not be 
considered by you to prove that defendant is a person of bad 
character or that he has a disposition to commit crimes.  It may 
be considered by you only for the limited purpose of determining 
that it tends to show a characteristic method, plan, or scheme in 
the commission of criminal acts similar to the method, plan, or 
scheme used in the commission of the offenses in this case[,] 
which would further tend to show . . . [¶] [t]he existence of the 
intent which is a necessary element of the crime charged; [¶] [or, 
a] motive for the commission of the crime charged[.]  [¶] For the 
limited purpose for which you may consider such evidence, you 
must weight it in the same manner as you do all other evidence 
in this case.”  (See CALJIC No. 2.50.) 
ii. Discussion 
 
Defendant first argues the Sacramento evidence was 
improperly admitted under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 
352.  Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) prohibits 
admission of evidence of a person’s character, including evidence 
of character in the form of specific instances of uncharged 
misconduct, to prove the conduct of that person on a specified 
occasion.  The provision “expressly prohibits the use of an 
uncharged offense if the only theory of relevance is that the 
accused has a propensity (or disposition) to commit the crime 
charged and that this propensity is circumstantial proof that the 
accused behaved accordingly on the occasion of the charged 
offense.”  (People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 316.)  
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
23 
“Subdivision (b) of section 1101 clarifies, however, that this rule 
does not prohibit admission of evidence of uncharged 
misconduct when such evidence is relevant to establish some 
fact other than the person’s character or disposition.”  (People v. 
Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 393 (Ewoldt).)  “If an uncharged 
act is relevant to prove some fact other than propensity,” such 
as the perpetrator’s intent or identity, or the existence of a 
common plan, “the evidence is admissible, subject to a limiting 
instruction upon request.”  (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler 
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 406 (Bryant, Smith and Wheeler).) 
 
“Evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible to prove 
identity, common plan, and intent ‘only if the charged and 
uncharged crimes are sufficiently similar to support a rational 
inference’ on these issues.”  (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 
658, 711 (Edwards).)  The degree of similarity varies depending 
on the purpose for which the evidence is offered.  “The least 
degree of similarity . . . is required in order to prove intent.”  
(Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402.)  For this purpose, “the 
uncharged misconduct must be sufficiently similar to support 
the inference that the defendant ‘ “probably harbor[ed] the same 
intent in each instance.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  A higher degree of similarity 
is required to prove the existence of a common plan:  “[E]vidence 
of uncharged misconduct must demonstrate ‘not merely a 
similarity in the results, but such a concurrence of common 
features that the various acts are naturally to be explained as 
caused by a general plan of which they are the individual 
manifestations.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Finally, although not at issue here,9 
 
9  
The court specifically ruled the Sacramento evidence was 
not admissible to prove identity.  There was ample other 
evidence that defendant was among the attackers in both 
Sacramento and San Bernardino.  The court also instructed that 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
24 
“[t]he greatest degree of similarity is required for evidence of 
uncharged misconduct to be relevant to prove identity.”  
(Ewoldt, at p. 403.)  To establish identity, the uncharged and 
charged crimes “ ‘must be so unusual and distinctive as to be 
like a signature.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
 
Even if evidence of the uncharged conduct is sufficiently 
similar to the charged crimes to be relevant for a nonpropensity 
purpose, the trial court must next determine whether the 
evidence’s probative value is “substantially outweighed by the 
probability that its admission [would] . . . create substantial 
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of 
misleading the jury.”  (Evid. Code, § 352; see Ewoldt, supra, 7 
Cal.4th at p. 404.) 
 
As with other evidentiary rulings, the trial court’s decision 
is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  (Edwards, supra, 57 Cal.4th 
at p. 711.)  “ ‘Under the abuse of discretion standard, “a trial 
court’s ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal . . . is not 
required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an 
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted 
in a manifest miscarriage of justice.”  [Citation.]’ ”  (People v. 
Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1328–1329 (Foster).)  We conclude 
evidence of the Sacramento crimes was properly admitted to 
 
before jurors could even consider the Sacramento evidence as to 
common plan or scheme or state of mind, they had to find by 
preponderating evidence that defendant had participated in 
both attacks.  Naturally, as with all circumstantial evidence, the 
jury could not rely on the Sacramento evidence as proof of guilt 
unless it concluded those relevant facts had been proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  The jury was given CALJIC Nos. 2.01 and 
2.02, which properly explained the use of circumstantial 
evidence. 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
25 
show defendant’s state of mind for the charged offenses.  
Because the court did not abuse its discretion under state law, 
defendant’s constitutional claims also fail.  (People v. Fuiava 
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 670.) 
 
As the trial court observed, the Sacramento murders 
shared numerous common features with the Elm Street attacks 
committed less than two weeks later.  Both sets of murders 
occurred in the evening during home invasion robberies.  Both 
were carried out as gang-related activities.  The targets were 
Asian10 families, known to someone associated with the gang, 
and believed to keep cash or jewelry in the home.  In both cases, 
the person who had provided information on the family waited 
in the car while other gang members entered the home.  
Defendant took two associates inside with him each time:  Pan 
and Evans in Sacramento; Evans and Scrappy in San 
Bernardino.  Defendant was armed with a Glock nine-
millimeter pistol in each robbery.  The incidents unfolded 
similarly, as well.  In each, the robbers inflicted a nonfatal 
wound on one family member while demanding that the others 
produce money and valuables.  When the victims did not comply, 
they were shot repeatedly. 
 
There were some differences between the incidents.  The 
Sacramento crime occurred in an apartment rather than a 
house.  It was witnessed by other family members from an 
upstairs apartment.  Defendant was identified as the only 
robber armed with a handgun.  He left two family members alive 
in Sacramento and obtained no money but left only one survivor 
at Elm Street and acquired cash and jewelry.  These differences 
 
10  
Both were apparently Vietnamese, although Quyen Luu of 
the Le family used a Cantonese interpreter in testifying. 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
26 
do not undermine the probative value of the crimes’ many 
similarities.  If anything, they reveal that defendant and his 
fellow gang members learned from their recent mistakes and 
carried out the Elm Street crimes more effectively.  The botched 
Sacramento crime could explain defendant’s desire to have a 
second gun available at Elm Street.  Defendant also complains 
that the similarities the court found could describe most 
residential robberies.  However, “it was the combination of 
similar factors common to” both crimes that rendered them 
distinctive and made the Sacramento evidence relevant for a 
nonpropensity purpose.  (People v. Rogers (2013) 57 Cal.4th 296, 
328 (Rogers).)  In an Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) 
analysis, “ ‘features of substantial but lesser distinctiveness 
may yield a distinctive combination when considered together.’ ”  
(Rogers, at p. 328.) 
 
“ ‘ “We have long recognized ‘that if a person acts similarly 
in similar situations, he probably harbors the same intent in 
each instance’ . . . .  The inference to be drawn is not that the 
actor is disposed to commit such acts; instead, the inference to 
be drawn is that, in light of the first event, the actor, at the time 
of the second event, must have had the intent attributed to him 
by the prosecution.” ’ ”  (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 
706 (Roldan).)  The Sacramento and Elm Street crimes were 
sufficiently similar to show the same intent in both cases:  to kill 
any or all residents if necessary to successfully complete the 
robbery.  For the same reason, as the trial court observed,  the 
Sacramento evidence tended to show that the Elm Street 
murders were premeditated and deliberate, rather than the 
result of an impulsive or spontaneous reaction.  We have 
frequently upheld the admission of uncharged crime evidence 
relevant to premeditation, deliberation, and intent to kill.  (See, 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
27 
e.g., Rogers, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 328; People v. Soper (2009) 
45 Cal.4th 759, 778 (Soper).)  Similar evidence was also held 
properly admitted to show intent and common design or plan in 
People v. Johnson (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 623.  In Johnson, 
“Both crimes were home-invasion robberies.  The main purpose 
of the crimes was to obtain drugs.  The modus operandi used to 
gain admission into the residences was the same: knocking on 
the front door and forcing entry when the victim opened the 
door.  In both crimes, appellant was assisted by two accomplices 
and was the ‘mastermind.’ ”  (Id. at p. 635.)  Similarly here, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 
Sacramento crimes to show defendant’s state of mind. 
 
As in Johnson, the evidence was also relevant to whether 
defendant acted in accordance with a common design or plan.  
“Evidence of a common design or plan . . . is not used to prove 
the defendant’s intent or identity but rather to prove that the 
defendant engaged in the conduct alleged to constitute the 
charged offense.”  (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 394.)  Here, in 
addition to asserting premeditation and deliberation, the 
prosecution pursued first degree murder charges under a felony-
murder theory.  It had to prove not only that members of the 
Nguyen family were murdered, but also that the murders were 
committed in the course of a robbery or burglary.  Evidence of 
defendant’s conduct 13 days earlier was relevant to show he 
employed the same general plan on both occasions.  Armed with 
a nine-millimeter pistol, defendant and two fellow gang 
members entered the homes of specifically targeted Asian 
families, demanded cash and jewelry, disabled one family 
member with a nonfatal shot, then killed some or all of the 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
28 
victims.11  “ ‘To establish the existence of a common design or 
plan, the common features must indicate the existence of a plan 
rather than a series of similar spontaneous acts, but the plan 
thus revealed need not be distinctive or unusual’; rather it ‘need 
only exist to support the inference that the defendant employed 
that plan in committing the charged offense.’ ”  (Edwards, 
supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 712.)  Accordingly, once the evidence was 
admitted to show defendant’s state of mind, the court could also 
properly instruct on its relevance to show a common plan.12 
 
Defendant protests the Sacramento evidence was not 
relevant to any disputed issue.  He argues intent to kill was clear 
from the manner of the killings, with the victims shot at very 
close range, and that premeditation should not be considered a 
disputed issue because in closing argument the prosecutor 
invited the jury to rely on felony murder as an “easier” path to a 
first degree murder conviction.  Finally, he maintains that no 
one disputed a robbery and burglary had taken place at Elm 
Street.  The only real dispute, according to defendant, was his 
identity as one of the Elm Street attackers.  These arguments 
misapprehend the prosecution’s burden at trial.  As we have 
repeatedly noted, a not guilty plea places in issue all elements 
of the charged crimes.  (See, e.g., Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, 
 
11  
Quyen Luu’s testimony suggests Hung Le’s brother and 
possibly one other person were in the Sacramento apartment 
during the robbery, but it does not appear these individuals 
were shot. 
12  
Separately, defendant asserts that the Sacramento 
evidence was admissible only against Pan, and the court erred 
in refusing to sever his trial from Pan’s.  Because we have 
concluded the evidence was relevant to disputed issues in the 
charges against defendant, however, the premise of this 
argument fails. 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
29 
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 407; People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 
1, 23 (Lindberg); Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 705–706.)  
Defendant did not concede his guilt on any issue, requiring the 
prosecution to prove each element of first degree murder, 
attempted murder, robbery, and burglary, along with the 
enhancements and special circumstances.  “Defendant’s 
assertion that his defense to the . . . charges was bound to focus 
upon identity, and not intent, would not eliminate the 
prosecution’s burden to establish both intent and identity 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 777.)  
Even when other evidence is present, it remains the 
prosecution’s burden to prove premeditation and malice beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  It has the “right to introduce all relevant 
and admissible evidence toward that end.”  (Rogers, supra, 57 
Cal.4th at p. 330.)13 
 
The court also properly exercised its discretion under 
Evidence Code section 352.  (See Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at 
p. 404.)  The Sacramento and Elm Street murders shared 
numerous similarities.  Defendant committed them less than 
two weeks apart.  The Sacramento evidence was highly 
probative of defendant’s mental state in San Bernardino.  (See 
Rogers, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 331.)  Nor was the evidence 
unduly prejudicial.  “As we have repeatedly explained:  ‘ “In 
applying section 352, ‘prejudicial’ is not synonymous with 
‘damaging.’ ” ’  [Citation.]  ‘ “ ‘[A]ll evidence which tends to prove 
 
13  
Defendant’s argument is also at odds with his trial 
strategy.  His lawyer gave no opening statement and offered no 
guilt-phase evidence.  His defense only became fully clear during 
closing arguments, when counsel asserted there was insufficient 
corroboration of the accomplices’ testimony to support a finding 
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
30 
guilt is prejudicial or damaging to the defendant’s case.’ ” ’  
[Citation.]  The ‘prejudice’ which section 352 seeks to avoid is 
that which ‘ “ ‘uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against 
the defendant as an individual and which has very little effect 
on the issues.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 275.)  
The Sacramento crimes were less inflammatory than the 
charged crimes, in that fewer people were killed and none were 
children.  Defendant complains that the volume of testimony 
about the Sacramento crimes was disproportionate to its 
relevance.  He argues the evidence was merely cumulative 
because the nature of the Elm Street shootings showed the 
perpetrator’s intent and the jury did not need to find 
premeditation to convict on first degree murder.  But, as noted, 
the issues of defendant’s intent and actions were not beyond 
dispute, and additional evidence on these subjects was not 
merely cumulative.  (See People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 
399; Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1331.) 
 
Moreover, the extensive limiting instructions the court 
read during testimony and before argument directed the jury 
not to use the other crimes evidence for an improper purpose, 
including bad character.  “We presume the jury followed these 
instructions.”  (Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 26.)  The 
prosecutor’s closing argument reinforced the instructions.  He 
explained at length that the Sacramento evidence was only 
offered to show that defendant acted according to a common 
scheme and with the intent to kill, and could not be used simply 
to show that defendant was a bad person.  
b Gang Membership 
 
Defendant complains of evidence he belonged to a gang.  
The evidence violated neither statutory nor constitutional law. 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
31 
i. Background 
 
Defendant and Pan both moved to exclude evidence of 
gang membership.  The court denied the motion in a written 
order, explaining:  “This uncharged conspiracy, if proven, would 
tend to establish Pan’s involvement in the crime, showing his 
knowledge and intent in furnishing the gun, and it would be of 
some value to the prosecution in establishing the necessary 
specific intent by both defendants to commit the robbery and 
burglary which resulted in the murders and which then may 
tend to prove motive.”  The court cautioned that the gang 
evidence should be limited to that needed to explain the 
relationship between the defendants, Pan’s conduct, and both 
men’s intent and motive.  It concluded the evidence would not 
be unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352 because, 
even without direct evidence, the facts of the case “allude to and 
strongly suggest the existence of a gang” and defendants’ 
relationship to it.   
 
After an in limine hearing, the court allowed Sergeant 
Frank to testify as an expert about the organization of Asian 
gangs, including the Tiny Rascals, as well as their differences 
from other types of gangs, their use of firearms, and their typical 
practice of committing home invasion robberies.  The prosecutor 
was not permitted to ask hypotheticals that would elicit an 
opinion about the Sacramento or Elm Street crimes.  Nor could 
he present evidence about Asian gangs’ attempts to intimidate 
witnesses, unless it later became relevant to explain a witness’s 
attitude or conduct.   
 
Before Sergeant Frank testified, the court gave an 
admonition agreed upon by the parties:  “This witness . . . is 
being called for a specific purpose and a very limited purpose.  
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
32 
The law allows that some evidence occasionally may be admitted 
for limited purposes only, and you will be admonished to 
consider this evidence only for those limited purposes.  This is 
such evidence.  You’re going to hear testimony concerning 
activities which at first may sound strange to you and not 
relevant to the case, but at some subsequent time I will 
admonish you and explain to you why the evidence is relevant, 
if it is, and why it has been admitted and the limited purpose for 
which you may consider it.”  Before closing arguments, the jury 
was instructed:  “Evidence has . . . been introduced that the 
defendants are members of the Tiny Rascals Gang.  Such 
evidence, if believed, was not received and may not be 
considered by you to prove that they are persons of bad 
character or that they have a disposition to commit crimes.”  
ii. Discussion 
 
The People are generally entitled to introduce evidence of 
a defendant’s gang affiliation and activity if it is relevant to the 
charged offense.  (People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 655 
(McKinnon).)  “Evidence of the defendant’s gang affiliation — 
including evidence of the gang’s territory, membership, signs, 
symbols, beliefs and practices, criminal enterprises, rivalries, 
and the like — can help prove identity, motive, modus operandi, 
specific intent, means of applying force or fear, or other issues 
pertinent to guilt of the charged crime.”  (People v. Hernandez 
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1049 (Hernandez).)  Even when it is 
relevant, however, “courts should carefully scrutinize evidence 
of a defendant’s gang membership because such evidence 
‘creates a risk the jury will improperly infer the defendant has 
a criminal disposition and is therefore guilty of the offense 
charged.’ ”  (People v. Melendez (2016) 2 Cal.5th 1, 28–29; see 
People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 193.)  We review the 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
33 
trial court’s ruling for abuse of discretion.  (Melendez, at p. 29; 
People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1194 (Carter).) 
 
Defendant first complains his gang affiliation was not 
relevant to any disputed issue.  As with the Sacramento 
evidence, he contends his intent to kill was indisputable given 
the manner of the shootings.  He also argues, “The motive for 
the crime here, financial gain, was apparent — and not gang 
related.”  However, these characterizations adopt an overly 
narrow view of the disputed issues and the evidence relevant to 
address them. 
 
As noted, a not guilty plea disputes all elements of the 
charged crimes.  (See Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 
Cal.4th at p. 407; Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 23; Roldan, 
supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 705–706.)  Evidence of defendant’s gang 
membership was relevant to show his relationship with the 
accomplices who testified against him, to prove his identity as 
one of the robbers.  (See People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 
859 (Montes).)  It also tended to show his intent to steal and kill 
if necessary.  Sergeant Frank’s testimony helped illuminate 
other evidence about the plan or scheme by which the crimes 
were carried out.  Frank explained that home invasion robberies 
are a signature crime of Asian street gangs like TRG and are 
typically committed against Asian families, such as the 
Nguyens.  The gangs frequently intimidate their victims by 
threatening, harming, or even torturing the most vulnerable 
family members, including children.  This evidence helped 
explain the significance of the nonfatal gunshot wound to 
Dennis’s hand, the small knifepoint cuts to Henry’s neck, and 
the toothpaste smeared on Trinh’s face.  Because home invasion 
robberies are complex crimes, gangs often assign specific roles 
to different gang members.  Frank also explained that Asian 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
34 
gangs particularly value firearms and use them only for 
committing crimes.  This testimony shed light on how the 
robbery was conducted, including why only two guns were taken 
to the house and why so many bullets had been fired from a 
single weapon.  
 
In addition, the evidence showed defendant was a shot 
caller in TRG, which meant he had enough standing in the gang 
to give direction to junior members.  This evidence, combined 
with Frank’s testimony that Asian gangs promote leaders based 
on their criminal experience, was relevant to defendant’s motive 
to rob and his intent to kill while doing so.  Defendant’s 
argument that financial gain was the sole motive for the robbery 
ignores evidence that committing the crimes would have 
enhanced his gang status.  Moreover, defendant’s sole focus on 
the robbery is too narrow.  Intent to kill was a disputed issue for 
the murder charges and special circumstances.  While not itself 
an element of the crimes, motive can illuminate intent.  (See, 
e.g., Carter, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1195.)  “ ‘ “[B]ecause a motive 
is ordinarily the incentive for criminal behavior, its probative 
value generally exceeds its prejudicial effect, and wide latitude 
is permitted in admitting evidence of its existence.” ’ ”  
(McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 655.) 
 
Defendant next argues that even if evidence of his gang 
membership was relevant, the gang expert’s testimony should 
have been excluded because it was overbroad, inflammatory, 
and unduly prejudicial.  He complains that the testimony 
pertained to Asian gangs generally, rather than TRG in 
particular.  But Frank testified in detail about TRG’s history 
and organization.  He also described the age and gender of 
members, the meaning of TRG’s name, and the significance of 
TRG tattoos.  Defendant was free to highlight 
any 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
35 
overgeneralizations on cross-examination and did so at length.  
During defendant’s cross-examination, Frank conceded there 
are many Asian cultures and some differ markedly.  In response 
to Pan’s questioning, Frank also explained that, while many 
Asian gangs are no longer ethnically separated, gangs of 
different ethnicities can have distinct structures.  For example, 
age determines leadership in Korean gangs, whereas experience 
is more important in Vietnamese and Cambodian gangs.  
 
Defendant’s primary objection, however, concerns expert 
testimony about victim intimidation.  Frank testified that Asian 
street gang members had “universally” told him their primary 
compliance tactic was “to go after the children in front of their 
parents.”  He explained, the “younger the child . . . , the more 
coercive they feel that can be with the parents.  And so it’s not 
at all uncommon to start with either the very youngest or the 
very oldest member of the household.”  Frank described three 
incidents:  “We’ve had a two-year-old hung . . . by his ankles out 
of a second story window”; “another case where a one-year-old 
child was picked up and his head repeatedly dunked in the 
toilet”; and a third instance in which “a pan of boiling water . . . 
was poured over a 79-year-old grandmother.”  Defendant argues 
these examples were irrelevant and needlessly inflammatory.  
However, this testimony was relevant to explain the nonfatal 
wounds on the Elm Street victims, as well as the nonfatal 
gunshot wound inflicted upon Quyen Luu in Sacramento.  It 
illuminated the gang’s modus operandi and explained the 
motive for the nonfatal gunshots, knife cuts, and toothpaste 
smeared on Trinh Tran’s face.  Although distressing, the 
examples directly showed the perpetrators’ desire to cause 
distress in pursuit of their aims.  Testimony about them was 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
36 
brief and unelaborated and was not more inflammatory than the 
torture and murders of the Nguyen family. 
 
Nor was the probative value of the gang evidence 
substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice.  “ ‘The 
admission of gang evidence over an Evidence Code section 352 
objection will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court’s 
decision exceeds the bounds of reason.’ ”  (Montes, supra, 58 
Cal.4th at p. 859.)  The court here carefully weighed the 
probative value of the evidence against the potential for undue 
prejudice.  It took steps to minimize the subject areas of expert 
testimony and instructed that the evidence could not be used as 
proof of defendant’s character.  
 
Defendant complains the limiting instructions were 
inadequate because the court never explained what purpose the 
gang evidence could be used for, even though its first 
admonishment said an explanation would later be provided.  If 
defendant believed a more extensive instruction was needed, it 
was his burden to request one.  (See People v. Powell (2018) 6 
Cal.5th 136, 161; Hernandez, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1052.)  
During trial, the court invited counsel to propose instructions on 
the issue.  Indeed, the record suggests that the closing 
instruction on gang evidence was offered by the defense.14  It 
described the prohibited uses of the evidence but refrained, 
possibly for tactical reasons (see Hernandez, at p. 1053), from 
 
14  
The court stated:  “Special instructions have been offered 
by the defense, and one is . . . instruction number 2.50a 
regarding the fact that evidence has been offered concerning the 
fact that the defendants are members of the Tiny Rascal[s] 
Gang, and this should not be used as any consideration by the 
jury that they’re bad persons or of bad character or that they 
have a disposition to commit crime[s].”  
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
37 
spelling out exactly how the evidence could be used.  Having 
proposed the instruction at issue, and raised no objection, 
defendant cannot now complain it was inadequate.  His reliance 
on U.S. v. Jobson (6th Cir. 1996) 102 F.3d 214 is also unavailing.  
Jobson requested a limiting instruction on gang evidence but the 
district court declined to give it, instructing the jury instead that 
the evidence had been admitted for a limited purpose without 
ever saying what the purpose was or that using the evidence as 
proof of bad character or a criminal disposition was prohibited.  
(Id. at p. 222.)  The case is not precedentially binding on this 
court and is factually distinguishable.15 
2. Witness Support Persons  
 
Witness support persons were present in court during 
some testimony.  Defendant complains that the court failed to 
follow required statutory procedures and that this practice 
violated his confrontation and due process rights.  There was no 
prejudicial error. 
a. Background 
 
An employee of the District Attorney’s office accompanied 
Lilah Garcia to the witness stand.16  Garcia was a neighbor who 
found the Nguyens’ bodies and comforted Dennis.  When 
defendant objected in chambers, the prosecutor made an offer of 
proof that Garcia was “terrified to be here,” “very afraid of these 
defendants,” and had asked that a support person sit with her.  
 
15  
Although no error occurred here, an instruction explaining 
the limited purpose for which gang evidence has been admitted, 
such as CALCRIM No. 1403, is generally advisable. 
16  
The same support person had previously joined Mei Le 
and Amie Le during their testimony at an Evidence Code 
section 402 hearing.  
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
38 
Defendant’s attorney requested a hearing on whether the 
support person was requested and necessary.  The court 
accepted the prosecutor’s offer and found that the need for a 
support person had been adequately established.  The employee 
was placed in a seat “substantially behind the witness” and 
ordered to remove a badge showing her association with the 
District Attorney’s office.  The court stated that the jury would 
be given “no indication as to who she is, why she’s there or 
anything else, other than she’s just simply there.”  The next day, 
defense counsel observed that, in addition to accompanying 
Garcia at the witness stand, the person also sat in the front row 
of the audience section during testimony from another 
witness.17  He asked that the court admonish any future support 
persons not to prompt or interfere with the testifying witness.  
(See § 868.5, subd. (b).) 
 
Later in trial, the prosecutor advised the court and counsel 
that Mei Le and Amie Le, the daughters of the Sacramento 
victims, requested a support person during their testimony.  
This time defense counsel requested an admonition not to the 
support person but to the jury, explaining “that she is an 
employee of the D.A.’s office and a witness advocate.”  The court 
stated it would “simply tell the jury that . . . the witness[] has 
requested that there be a person in the courtroom pending her 
testimony to act as liaison support and that this individual is in 
that capacity.”  Defense counsel responded, “Uh-huh,” which 
was apparently understood as assent.  When Mei was called the 
following day, the court stated:  “Ladies and gentlemen, you will 
 
17  
Although counsel did not name the witness, his 
description of her as a Hispanic woman suggests it was Graciela 
Elias, another neighbor who testified immediately after Garcia.  
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
39 
notice that there is a young lady sitting behind the witness.  
[¶] The law allows that a witness under certain circumstances 
can request the presence of someone to merely be there for moral 
support.  That individual is not to in any way confer with, 
attempt to influence, or be involved at all in the testimony.  Just 
the mere presence is allowed and for the assurance that the 
witness may have by that individual being here.  So please 
understand that is why this other person is seated behind the 
witness.”  The admonition was not repeated before Amie’s 
testimony.  
 
Finally, defendant’s counsel objected to the presence of a 
support person during Karol Tran’s testimony.  Shirley Amador, 
the wife of Karol’s attorney Robert Amador, sat inside the 
railing behind the District Attorney’s table.  Counsel argued 
Shirley was a potential witness because she had helped secure 
a reduction in the charges against Karol.  The prosecutor 
disputed this characterization, noting Shirley was not on his 
witness list and the defendants had indicated they would not 
call any witnesses.  He observed that Karol had a right to have 
her attorney present but he was in trial elsewhere.  In his place, 
Shirley was there “just to be moral support” for Karol.  He 
stressed that she was sitting “out in the audience” and not at 
the witness stand.  The court overruled the objection.   
 
During Karol’s cross-examination, defendant’s attorney 
interjected to complain that Shirley was signaling or coaching 
the witness.  Pan’s attorney called for a recess, and both defense 
attorneys conferred with Robert Amador, who had entered the 
courtroom at some point during the testimony.  Pan’s attorney 
then explained that Karol “wasn’t talking to Shirley.  She was 
motioning to Mr. Amador,” her attorney.  One of defendant’s 
attorneys stated he had seen Shirley’s lips moving while looking 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
40 
at the preliminary hearing transcript, which at the time was 
being used to impeach Karol, but “we all believe it was 
inadvertent.”  Defendant’s other attorney added, “And it 
appears in this last exchange that she was not conversing with 
the witness.  The witness was attempting to converse with her 
and she was warning her off.”  The prosecutor suggested it 
would be better to have Shirley sit elsewhere, but the record 
does not indicate whether that happened.  
b. Discussion 
 
Under 
section 868.5, 
subdivision (a), 
prosecuting 
witnesses in a murder case are entitled to the attendance of up 
to two support persons during their preliminary hearing and 
trial testimony.  One person may also accompany the witness at 
the witness stand.  (§ 868.5, subd. (a).)  Section 868.5, 
subdivision (b) requires additional procedures in some 
circumstances.  If the support person is also to be called as a 
witness, the prosecution must present evidence that the support 
person’s attendance is desired and will be helpful to the 
prosecuting witness.  (§ 868.5, subd. (b).)  The judge must also 
“admonish the support person or persons to not prompt, sway, 
or influence the witness in any way.”  (Ibid.) 
 
Defendant contends the court did not follow these required 
procedures because it failed to conduct an evidence-based “need 
assessment” or “give the required admonition” each time a 
support person appeared.  The first argument lacks support in 
the statute.  On its face, section 868.5, subdivision (b) requires 
an assessment of need only when the chosen support person is 
also to be a witness in the case.  That circumstance was not 
present here.  The second argument presents a closer question.  
Although the subdivision is prefaced with the phrase “[i]f the 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
41 
person or persons so chosen are also witnesses,” which would 
seem to limit its application to this specific context, a later 
sentence addressing admonitions provides that “[i]n all cases, 
the judge shall admonish the support person or persons to not 
prompt, sway, or influence the witness in any way.”18  (§ 868.5, 
subd. (b).)  It is unclear whether the admonition requirement is 
intended to apply in all cases or in all cases involving a support 
person who will also be a witness, and the Courts of Appeal have 
reached different conclusions.  (Compare People v. Valenti 
(2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1169–1171 (Valenti) with People 
v. Spence (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 478, 513 (Spence).)  We need 
not decide this question because there is no evidence that a 
support person prompted, swayed, or influenced the witnesses 
in any way.  Accordingly, any error in failing to admonish the 
 
18  
The full text of the subdivision states:  “If the person or 
persons so chosen are also witnesses, the prosecution shall 
present evidence that the person’s attendance is both desired by 
the prosecuting witness for support and will be helpful to the 
prosecuting witness.  Upon that showing, the court shall grant 
the request unless information presented by the defendant or 
noticed by the court establishes that the support person’s 
attendance during the testimony of the prosecuting witness 
would pose a substantial risk of influencing or affecting the 
content of that testimony.  In the case of a juvenile court 
proceeding, the judge shall inform the support person or persons 
that juvenile court proceedings are confidential and may not be 
discussed with anyone not in attendance at the proceedings.  In 
all cases, the judge shall admonish the support person or 
persons to not prompt, sway, or influence the witness in any 
way.  Nothing in this section shall preclude a court from 
exercising its discretion to remove a person from the courtroom 
whom it believes is prompting, swaying, or influencing the 
witness.”  (Pen. Code, § 868.5, subd. (b), italics added.) 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
42 
support persons was harmless.  (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 
Cal.2d 818, 837.) 
 
Despite the lack of statutory support, defendant argues a 
case-specific, evidence-based showing of need for support 
persons is required under the federal Constitution.  He asserts 
the 
procedure 
here 
infringed 
his 
Sixth 
Amendment 
confrontation rights and was not justified by a compelling state 
interest, given that the witnesses were not children or sexual 
abuse victims who would be particularly susceptible to 
psychological harm.  Case law is to the contrary.  (See People v. 
Ybarra (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1077; People v. Adams 
(1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 412, 435–437 (Adams).)  Concerns about 
improper vouching are also unfounded because the mere 
“ ‘presence of a second person at the stand does not require the 
jury to infer that the support person believes and endorses the 
witness’s testimony, so it does not necessarily bolster the 
witness’s testimony.’ ”  (People v. Stevens (2009) 47 Cal.4th 625, 
641, quoting Adams, at p. 437.)  “Absent improper interference 
by the support person, . . . no decision supports the proposition 
that defendant advances here, that the support person’s mere 
presence infringes his due process and confrontation clause 
rights.”  (People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1214 (Myles); 
see Valenti, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 1171; Spence, supra, 
212 Cal.App.4th at p. 514.) 
 
Defendant contends a different result is compelled by 
Maryland v. Craig (1990) 497 U.S. 836 (Craig) and Coy v. Iowa 
(1988) 487 U.S. 1012, but the procedures employed in those 
cases placed significant burdens on confrontation that were not 
present here.  In Coy, a large screen was placed between the 
defendant and the witness stand, blocking the defendant’s view.  
(Coy, at pp. 1014–1015.)  Because this tactic prevented a face-
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
43 
to-face encounter, it violated the confrontation clause.  (Id. at 
pp. 1016–1020.)  In Craig, a child witness was allowed to testify 
by one-way closed-circuit television.  (Craig, at p. 840.)  The 
court held the confrontation clause does not categorically 
prohibit such a procedure, and a witness may testify outside the 
defendant’s presence if the alternative arrangement is justified 
by a compelling state interest and a case-specific finding of need.  
(Id. at pp. 849, 852, 855–856.)  These holdings concerned 
procedures that deny face-to-face confrontation with an accuser, 
a core concern of the confrontation clause.  The use of a support 
person does not do so.  We agree with the Courts of Appeal that 
have concluded the support person procedure does not require 
the same constitutional scrutiny.  (See People v. Andrade (2015) 
238 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1298 (Andrade); People v. Chenault 
(2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1503, 1516 (Chenault); People v. Johns 
(1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 550, 554 (Johns); People v. Lord (1994) 30 
Cal.App.4th 1718, 1722 (Lord); People v. Patten (1992) 9 
Cal.App.4th 1718, 1727.) 
 
Nevertheless, relying on Adams, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th 
412, defendant argues his confrontation rights were infringed 
because the presence of witness support persons interfered with 
the jury’s observation of testifying witnesses’ demeanor.  In 
Craig, the high court described four key components of the 
confrontation right:  “(1) the face-to-face confrontation, (2) the 
oath, (3) the cross-examination, and (4) the jury’s observation of 
the witness’s demeanor.”  (Johns, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 554, citing Craig, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 846.)  The Court of 
Appeal in Adams asserted the use of support persons implicates 
the fourth component, jury observation of witness demeanor, 
because a support person’s presence changes “the dynamics of 
the testimonial experience for the witness” and thus alters the 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
44 
witness’s demeanor.  (Adams, at p. 438.)  Notably, the Adams 
comments were made within a peculiar factual context.  The 
defense claimed the victim had falsely reported a sexual assault 
because she feared the wrath of her abusive father.  The father 
was a trial witness and also appeared as her support person.  
(Id. at pp. 424, 434–435.)  This situation posed an unusual risk 
that the support person’s mere presence might exert improper 
influence on the witness during her testimony.  To the extent 
Adams implied a broader holding, requiring a compelling state 
interest and necessity showing in other contexts, courts have 
disagreed with it.  (See Andrade, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1298; Chenault, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1516; Johns, at 
p. 554; Lord, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1721–1722; see also 
Valenti, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1171–1172; Spence, 
supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at pp. 517–518.)  We do as well.  A 
support person’s mere presence in the courtroom or at the 
witness stand does not infringe the defendant’s due process or 
confrontation rights unless there is evidence of improper 
interference by the support person.  (Myles, supra, 53 Cal.4th at 
p. 1214.) 
 
Aware of our precedent, defendant claims support persons 
“improperly insinuated themselves into the trial” on two 
occasions.  First, he notes that Garcia’s support person stood 
between Garcia and the jury, blocking the jury’s view, and wore 
a badge that disclosed her employment.  Defendant appears to 
challenge the support person’s positioning as a confrontation 
clause violation and her badge as an instance of prosecutorial 
vouching in violation of the due process clause.  We need not 
consider these arguments based on the record here.  Defense 
counsel objected immediately after Garcia was seated and gave 
her name.  Following a chambers conference, the court ordered 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
45 
that the support person be moved to a seat “substantially 
behind” Garcia to ensure the jury’s view would be unimpeded.  
It also ordered that the support person’s employment badge be 
removed.  The badge was not on display when Garcia was 
testifying.  If the badge had been visible when the support 
person entered the courtroom, this indication of employment 
was not an invocation of the office’s prestige or reputation 
implicating vouching concerns.  (See People v. Rodriguez (2020) 
9 Cal.5th 474, 480.)  Indeed, before Mei Le testified, defendant’s 
attorney asked that the jury be told the support person was an 
employee of the District Attorney’s office.  Defendant cannot 
complain of prejudice if a briefly worn badge indicated the 
information he sought revealed. 
 
Defendant also asserts Karol Tran’s support person was 
inappropriately signaling to the witness during her testimony, 
but the record belies this assertion.  Although defense counsel 
originally believed Shirley Amador was communicating with 
Karol, he later clarified that she was not doing so.  Instead, 
“[t]he witness was attempting to converse with her and she was 
warning her off.”  (Italics added.)  Shirley’s lips had been moving 
while she looked at the transcript, but defense counsel assured 
the court that he considered the movement “inadvertent” and 
not an attempt to communicate with Karol.  Defendant thus 
abandoned his objections below, and the record fails to 
demonstrate any improper interference. 
 
Finally, there is no indication of prejudice.  At defendant’s 
request, the court admonished the jury that the law entitles 
witnesses to have someone with them for moral support and that 
support persons may not interfere with the witness’s testimony.  
(See Myles, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1215.)  Although defendant 
now complains that the admonition was not repeated each time 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
46 
a witness used a support person, he did not object on this ground 
below.  Indeed, for tactical reasons, defense counsel may have 
wished to avoid drawing attention to the support person’s 
presence by repeated admonitions.  The court also told the jury 
to decide the case based on the evidence and not be influenced 
by sentiment or sympathy.  (CALJIC No. 1.00.)  To the extent 
defendant now claims this instruction was insufficient, it was 
his burden to propose amended or additional instructions.  He 
did not do so. 
3. Instructional Error Claims 
 
Although he raised no objection below, defendant now 
argues several of the standard guilt phase instructions violated 
his constitutional rights.  As he recognizes, we have rejected 
these claims many times before.  We affirm these holdings. 
a. First Degree Murder Instructions  
 
Defendant first argues the court lacked jurisdiction to try 
him for first degree murder because the information charged 
murder under section 187, which he contends defines only 
second degree malice murder.  He claims his convictions for an 
uncharged crime violated his rights to due process, a jury trial, 
and a fair and reliable capital guilt trial.  (U.S. Const., 6th, 8th 
& 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15–17.)  “Similar 
claims — whether framed in terms of a lack of jurisdiction, 
inadequate notice, erroneous instruction, insufficient proof, or 
the absence of jury unanimity — have been rejected before. . . .  
[O]ur cases have long made clear that an accusatory pleading 
charging malice murder supports conviction of first degree 
murder,” whether on a felony-murder or premeditation theory.  
(People v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 147 (Contreras); see 
People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 474 (Sattiewhite); 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
47 
People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 54 (Friend).)  “Malice 
murder and felony murder are two forms of the single statutory 
offense of murder.  Thus, a charge of murder not specifying the 
degree is sufficient to charge murder in any degree.  The 
information also need not specify the theory of murder on which 
the prosecution relies at trial.”  (Contreras, at p. 147; see People 
v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 369–370 (Hughes); see also 
People v. Witt (1915) 170 Cal. 104, 107–108.) 
 
Nevertheless, defendant argues these principles were 
“completely undermined” by People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 
441, which described section 189 as “a statutory enactment of 
the first degree felony-murder rule in California.”  (Id. at p. 472.)  
This argument fails.  “Because there is only a single statutory 
offense of first degree murder [citation], defendant reasons that 
the relevant statute must be section 189, not section 187, which 
he construes as a definition of second degree murder.  Defendant 
misreads both Dillon and the statutes.  Dillon made it clear that 
section 187 serves both a degree-fixing function and the function 
of establishing the offense of first degree felony murder.  (Dillon, 
at pp. 468, 471.)  It defines second degree murder as well as first 
degree murder.  Section 187 also includes both degrees of 
murder in a more general formulation.  (People v. Witt[, supra,] 
170 Cal. [at p.] 108.)  Thus, an information charging murder in 
the terms of section 187 is ‘sufficient to charge murder in any 
degree.’ ”  (People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1294–1295, 
fn. omitted (Harris).)  We have reaffirmed this rule many times 
following our decision in Dillon (see, e.g., Contreras, supra, 58 
Cal.4th at p. 148; People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 968–969 
(Jones); Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 369–370), and do so 
again. 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
48 
 
Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 (Apprendi) 
does not compel a different result.  As we have previously noted, 
“the Apprendi court expressly declined to address the 
constitutional implications, if any, of omitting sentencing 
factors from accusatory pleadings.  (Apprendi, [at p.] 477, fn. 3 
[noting that no ‘indictment question’ was properly presented or 
actually addressed in the case].)”  (Contreras, supra, 58 Cal.4th 
at p. 148.)  Moreover, because Apprendi and its progeny address 
the right to a jury determination of sentencing facts beyond the 
elements of the charged offenses, the cases “do not create new 
notice requirements for alternative theories of a substantive 
offense such as a theory of first degree murder.”  (People v. Abel 
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 938.)  We continue to hold that the 
traditional California rule, under which a section 187 charge 
“places the defense on notice of, and allows trial and conviction 
on, all degrees and theories of murder,” does not violate 
Apprendi or the Sixth Amendment.  (Contreras, at p. 149.) 
b. Failure to Require Unanimity on First Degree 
Murder Theory  
 
The jury was instructed on the alternative theories of 
premeditation and felony murder.  Defendant now claims the 
court violated his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments by failing to instruct that the jury 
must unanimously agree on a single theory of first degree 
murder in order to convict him.  Again, as defendant 
acknowledges, this claim has been repeatedly rejected.  (See, 
e.g., Jones, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 973; People v. Taylor (2010) 
48 Cal.4th 574, 626; People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 
712 (Nakahara).)  “ ‘[A]s long as each juror is convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty of murder as that 
offense is defined by statute, it need not decide unanimously by 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
49 
which theory he is guilty.’ ”  (Rogers, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 339.)  
Neither the federal Constitution (see Schad v. Arizona (1991) 
501 U.S. 624, 640–642; Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1295–
1296) nor the Apprendi decision (see People v. Tully (2012) 54 
Cal.4th 952, 1023–1024; Nakahara, at pp. 712–713) requires 
otherwise.  We decline to reconsider this settled precedent.  
Further, given the special circumstance findings here, the jury 
necessarily reached unanimous agreement that defendant 
committed first degree felony murder in the course of a robbery 
and burglary.  (See Taylor, at p. 626; Harris, at p. 1296.) 
c. Juror Misconduct Instruction  
 
Although he did not object below, defendant now claims 
the court erred in giving CALJIC former No. 17.41.1, which 
instructed, “The integrity of a trial requires that jurors, at all 
times during their deliberations, conduct themselves as 
required by these instructions.  Accordingly, should it occur that 
any juror refuses to deliberate or expresses an intention to 
disregard the law or to decide the case based on penalty or 
punishment or any other improper basis, it is the obligation of 
the other jurors to immediately advise the Court of the 
situation.”  After defendant’s trial, we exercised our supervisory 
power in People v. Engelman (2002) 28 Cal.4th 436 to disapprove 
the use of this instruction in future criminal trials.  We also 
concluded the instruction does not violate a defendant’s state or 
federal constitutional rights to a jury trial, a unanimous verdict, 
or due process.  (Id. at pp. 439–440.)  Defendant argues the 
concerns addressed in Engelman have greater force in capital 
trials, but we have repeatedly rejected calls to depart from 
Engelman’s constitutional holdings in capital cases.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 591–592 (Johnson); 
People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 157–158; Rogers, supra, 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
50 
57 Cal.4th at pp. 339–340; McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at 
p. 681.) 
 
The 
instruction 
did 
not 
violate 
defendant’s 
constitutional rights and does not require reversal. 
d. CALJIC Instructions Regarding Evaluation of 
Evidence  
 
Defendant also claims a series of pattern instructions 
undermined the state’s burden to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  He first challenges instructions addressing 
the use of circumstantial evidence to prove guilt (CALJIC 
No. 2.01), mental state (CALJIC Nos. 2.02, 8.83.1), and special 
circumstances (CALJIC No. 8.83).  He argues these instructions 
required the jury to accept or draw incriminatory inferences if 
they appeared reasonable.  We will not revisit settled law here.  
(See, e.g., Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 592; Harris, supra, 43 
Cal.4th at p. 1294; Nakahara, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 713–714.)  
We reaffirm that “[t]he circumstantial evidence instructions did 
not permit, induce, or compel jurors to convict defendant or to 
sustain the special circumstance merely because he reasonably 
appeared to have committed the charged crimes.  [Citations.]  
Nor would the jury, when considering the circumstantial 
evidence 
instructions 
alongside 
the 
reasonable 
doubt 
instruction, somehow still have been misled about the requisite 
standard of proof.”  (Contreras, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 161–
162.) 
 
Defendant next objects to a series of instructions on the 
jury’s evaluation of witness testimony and the weight of 
evidence:  CALJIC No. 2.21.1 (discrepancies in witness 
testimony); CALJIC No. 2.21.2 (witnesses willfully false); 
CALJIC No. 2.22 (conflicting testimony); CALJIC No. 2.27 
(sufficiency of single witness); and CALJIC No. 8.20 (finding 
deliberate and premeditated murder).  Defendant argues these 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
51 
instructions diluted the state’s burden of proof because they 
encouraged the jury to decide issues based on which side had the 
stronger evidence.  We have rejected these claims before (see, 
e.g., McKinnon, supra,  52 Cal.4th at pp. 677–678; Friend, 
supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 53; Nakahara, supra, 30 Cal.4th at 
p. 714), and defendant does not persuade us to do otherwise 
here.  “ ‘ “Jurors are not reasonably likely to draw, from bits of 
language in instructions that focus on how particular types of 
evidence are to be assessed and weighed, a conclusion overriding 
the direction, often repeated in voir dire, instruction, and 
argument, that they may convict only if they find the People 
have proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’  ([People v.] 
McKinzie[ (2012)] 54 Cal.4th 1302, 1356–1357.)  No reasonable 
juror would have ‘parsed’ these instructions and believed that 
the People had some lesser burden of proof.”  (Contreras, supra, 
58 Cal.4th at p. 162.)  Nothing in the prosecutor’s closing 
argument calls for a different conclusion. 
 
Finally, defendant contends CALJIC No. 2.51 improperly 
allowed the jury to determine guilt based on the existence of 
motive alone, lessening the state’s burden of proof.  The 
instruction simply provides that motive, while not an element of 
a crime, is a circumstance the jury may consider in determining 
guilt.  We have consistently rejected defendant’s precise claims 
of error (see, e.g., Sattiewhite, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 474; Jones, 
supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 971; People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 
97–98) and now reaffirm those holdings. 
B. Penalty Phase Issues 
1. Admission of Hearsay  
 
Defendant argues the court improperly admitted hearsay 
implicating him in the Spokane murders.  He contends this error 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
52 
violated his rights to due process, confrontation, and a reliable 
penalty verdict.  Any error in admitting the evidence was 
harmless. 
a. Background 
 
During 
the 
prosecutor’s 
questioning, 
defendant’s 
girlfriend Onkhamdy testified that defendant and Giao Ly left 
the Spokane apartment where they were staying and later 
returned with money and jewelry.  As Onkhamdy lay on a couch 
facing away from them, she heard defendant, Ly, and one or two 
other men dividing money.  The prosecutor asked if she heard 
“any conversation among them regarding a murder,” but 
Onkhamdy replied that all of the men were speaking 
Cambodian, a language she did not understand.  Questioned 
further, Onkhamdy denied telling the investigating officers 
something different.  The prosecutor tried to impeach her with 
notes from her police interview, in which she said she “knew 
from the conversation that the subjects had committed a 
murder.”  Defense counsel objected.  He noted that defendant’s 
remarks might be admissible as statements of a party if 
Onkhamdy could testify that defendant had made the 
statement.  But instead three or four people were talking “and 
we don’t know who said what.”  The court overruled the objection 
as premature and allowed the prosecutor to ask if Onkhamdy 
had told detectives she overheard a discussion about murder 
and it made her “nauseous to know what had occurred.”  
Onkhamdy said she told the police she felt ill due to her 
pregnancy and denied saying anything about people discussing 
murder.  
 
The prosecution then called Detective David Dillon, who 
was present during Onkhamdy’s interview.  Dillon testified that 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
53 
Onkhamdy reported hearing defendant and the others 
discussing a murder, though she did not say who had mentioned 
murder or in what language.  The court overruled defendant’s 
hearsay objection and denied his motion for mistrial, concluding 
the evidence was admissible as an adoptive admission.  
b. Discussion 
 
Hearsay is “evidence of a statement that was made other 
than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is 
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.”  (Evid. Code, 
§ 1200, subd. (a).)  Hearsay is inadmissible unless some 
exception to the hearsay rule is satisfied.  (Id., subd. (b).)  “[A] 
trial court has broad discretion to determine whether a party 
has established the foundational requirements for a hearsay 
exception.”  (People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 132.) 
 
The challenged testimony involved two layers of hearsay:  
(1) Onkhamdy’s statement to police; and (2) the underlying 
statement about “murder” in the conversation she described.  
Onkhamdy’s statement was admissible as a prior inconsistent 
statement.  A statement inconsistent with a witness’s trial 
testimony “is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule” (Evid. 
Code, § 1235) so long as the witness either had “an opportunity 
to explain or to deny the statement” while testifying or has not 
been excused from giving further testimony (Evid. Code, § 770, 
subd. (a)).  These requirements were satisfied.  Onkhamdy gave 
inconsistent testimony, and she was given an opportunity to 
explain her prior statement when she did so.  Prior inconsistent 
statements admitted under Evidence Code section 1235 may be 
considered for their truth as well as for impeachment.  (People 
v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 859; People v. Guerra (2006) 37 
Cal.4th 1067, 1144, disapproved on another ground in People v. 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
54 
Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151.)19  Accordingly, Onkhamdy’s 
statement to police was properly admitted without limitation. 
 
Whether the underlying hearsay from the overheard 
conversation was properly allowed is difficult to discern because 
details about the conversation are so vague.  All we know is that 
the topic of murder arose.  Without any information about what 
was said or by whom, it is unclear whether the foundational 
requirements were satisfied for the adoptive admission 
exception.  (See Evid. Code, § 1221.)  However, any error in 
admitting the testimony was clearly harmless.  Strong evidence 
tied defendant to the Spokane murders.  The only survivor, four-
year-old Joe Hagan, unequivocally identified defendant as one 
of the perpetrators shortly after the crime, and defendant’s 
fingerprint was found inside the Hagans’ apartment.  Evans 
recalled seeing a gun at defendant’s house of the same caliber 
used in the shootings.  Both Onkhamdy and Kunthea Sar 
testified that defendant and Ly went out on the night of the 
murders and returned with cash and jewelry, some of which was 
later identified as belonging to the victims.  In contrast to this 
evidence, vague hearsay about defendant’s participation in a 
conversation held in a language the witness did not understand 
 
19  
People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 929, disapproved 
on another ground in People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 
686, footnote 13, suggested that a prior inconsistent statement, 
standing alone, is legally insufficient to establish aggravating 
conduct in the penalty phase of a capital trial.  However, that 
idea was based on a holding in People v. Gould (1960) 54 Cal.2d 
621, 631, that we have since overruled.  (People v. Cuevas (1995) 
12 Cal.4th 252, 257.)  We need not decide whether Montiel’s 
observations have continuing vitality because significant 
evidence beyond Onkhamdy’s statement implicated defendant 
in the Spokane crimes. 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
55 
was unlikely to have influenced the jury’s decision.  Moreover, 
the prosecutor never mentioned the “murder” conversation in 
closing argument.  And there was significant aggravating 
evidence apart from the Spokane crimes, including defendant’s 
involvement in two fatal drive-by shootings.  The jury was also 
entitled to consider the grim facts of the charged offenses and 
the Sacramento murders.  Considering the quantity and quality 
of the aggravating evidence, it is not reasonably possible the 
jury would have reached a different penalty verdict absent any 
asserted error.  (See People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 
472.) 
2. Exclusion of Scrappy’s Inculpatory Statements  
 
Defendant attempted to call “Scrappy” Tran to testify 
about his role in the Elm Street crimes.  On counsel’s advice, 
Scrappy refused to testify.  Defendant then sought to introduce 
out-of-court statements in which Scrappy claimed he had killed 
Trinh and the three Nguyen children.  The court excluded the 
evidence as insufficiently reliable to satisfy the hearsay 
exception for statements against interest.  (Evid. Code, § 1230.)  
Defendant claims error under state and federal law, asserting 
violations of his constitutional rights to present mitigating 
evidence, obtain a fair trial, and have a reliable penalty 
determination.  Although we agree with the trial court that the 
issue is close, we conclude the ruling was an appropriate 
exercise of discretion. 
a. Background 
 
Scrappy was a minor at the time of the Elm Street crimes.  
He pled guilty to 10 counts in exchange for a sentence of 50 years 
to life imprisonment.  A defense investigator interviewed him at 
Folsom State Prison during the guilt phase of defendant’s trial.  
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
56 
The interview was taped, but Scrappy asked for the recorder to 
be turned off before discussing the Elm Street murders.  Scrappy 
then said that after “the man” was shot, “he lost it or went crazy, 
shot the woman, [then] ran into the bedrooms and shot the 
children.”  He gave no further details about the shootings and 
did not indicate that he had been the one to shoot “the man.”  He 
told the investigator he was willing to testify in defendant’s trial 
because he had become a Christian, felt responsible for the 
murders, and did not want defendant to be blamed for them all.  
However, he worried how other inmates would treat him if he 
admitted killing a woman and children.  He also worried that he 
would incur new charges from an unrelated shooting.  
 
A second defense investigator interviewed Scrappy shortly 
before the penalty trial.  Scrappy again declined to be taped.  He 
described the planning and entry into the Nguyen home in a 
manner similar to the guilt phase testimony of Evans and Karol.  
Inside the house, the father argued with defendant, whom the 
investigator called “Peter.”  According to the investigator’s 
notes, Scrappy said:  “The next thing I see is Peter acting weird.  
I hear a shot and Peter is standing over the father looking weird.  
Then I go crazy and start shooting the family.  Quote:  I killed 
the mother and the kids.  I don’t know why.  I just went crazy.  
It’s all fog.”  When pressed for more details, he shook his head 
and repeated, “I was in a fog.”   
 
Scrappy’s appointed counsel advised him not to testify.  
Although Scrappy was serving a very long sentence, his trial 
attorney thought “there might be . . . a glimmer” of hope that he 
could obtain parole in 40 years, and an admission to killing 
children could “doom” his chances.  He was also subject to 
prosecution for an additional uncharged murder.  Fourteen-
year-old Trang Vu’s murder was initially charged against 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
57 
defendant, but the prosecution dismissed it at the close of the 
penalty phase.  Those accusations were not included in 
Scrappy’s plea agreement.  
 
Defendant attempted to introduce Scrappy’s statements 
as declarations against penal interest.  However, the court 
determined the foundation for that exception was not satisfied.  
The court observed Scrappy was “a proven liar” with no 
credibility.  His current assertions were “completely contrary” to 
his previous statements to the police and investigators.  
Although he might have been motivated to clear his conscience 
by telling the truth, he might also have wanted to gain favor 
with fellow gang members by making up a story to exonerate 
their associate “from some very serious acts.”  The court also 
questioned whether the statements were truly against penal 
interest, given that Scrappy had pled guilty to all the murders, 
received a lengthy sentence, and his plea was final.  Considering 
all the circumstances, the court did not find the hearsay 
statements sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted under the 
claimed exception.  
b. Discussion 
 
Evidence Code section 1230 sets out the hearsay exception 
for statements against interest:  “Evidence of a statement by a 
declarant having sufficient knowledge of the subject is not made 
inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable 
as a witness and the statement, when made, was so far contrary 
to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far 
subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability . . . , or 
created such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, 
or social disgrace in the community, that a reasonable man in 
his position would not have made the statement unless he 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
58 
believed it to be true.”  The rationale for the exception “is that ‘a 
person’s interest against being criminally implicated gives 
reasonable assurance of the veracity of his statement made 
against that interest,’ thereby mitigating the dangers usually 
associated with the admission of out-of-court statements.”  
(People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 711 (Grimes).)  To satisfy 
the exception, the proponent “ ‘must show “that the declarant is 
unavailable, that the declaration was against the declarant’s 
penal [or other] interest, and that the declaration was 
sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite its hearsay 
character.” ’ ”  (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 584 (Geier); 
see People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 610–611 (Duarte).)  
We review the trial court’s ruling for abuse of discretion.  (People 
v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 704 (Westerfield); Grimes, at 
p. 711.)  Its decision will not be disturbed on appeal “ ‘except on 
a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, 
capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a 
manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” (People v. Brown (2003) 31 
Cal.4th 518, 534 (Brown); see Geier, at p. 585.) 
 
The parties agree Scrappy became unavailable as a 
witness when he asserted the privilege against self-
incrimination.  (See Evid. Code, § 240, subd. (a)(1).)  But support 
for the hearsay exception’s other two requirements is not so 
clear.  As the trial court observed, it is questionable whether 
Scrappy’s claim to have shot Trinh and the Nguyen children was 
truly against his interests.  “In determining whether a 
statement is truly against interest within the meaning of 
Evidence 
Code 
section 1230, 
and 
hence 
is 
sufficiently 
trustworthy to be admissible, the court may take into account 
not just the words but the circumstances under which they were 
uttered, the possible motivation of the declarant, and the 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
59 
declarant’s relationship to the defendant.”  (People v. Frierson 
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 745 (Frierson).)  Scrappy’s statements 
implicated him in serious criminal activity, and the record 
suggests he personally feared opprobrium from the prison 
community and the public at large for becoming known as a 
child killer.  However, he had already been convicted and was 
serving a lengthy sentence for the same crimes.  Belatedly 
claiming that he was the primary shooter at Elm Street added 
little to his own admission of guilt and could not result in 
additional punishment.  Defendant argues the admission would 
have ruined Scrappy’s chances of obtaining parole, but the only 
evidence that Scrappy would have “a glimmer” of such hope 40 
years later was hearsay that his current counsel repeated 
hearing from his trial counsel.  Similarly, Scrappy was 
purportedly concerned about the effect his statement might 
have on a motion for a new trial, in the event he later decided to 
withdraw his guilty plea.  The court could well conclude these 
potential consequences were too speculative or remote to 
impinge on penal interest for purposes of Evidence Code 
section 1230.  
 
“[E]ven when a hearsay statement runs generally against 
the declarant’s penal interest . . . , the statement may, in light 
of circumstances, lack sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to 
qualify for admission.”  (Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 614.)  
“ ‘The decision whether trustworthiness is present requires the 
court to apply to the peculiar facts of the individual case a broad 
and deep acquaintance with the ways human beings actually 
conduct themselves in the circumstances material under the 
exception.’ ”  (Frierson, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 745.)  The trial 
court here did so, and it did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding the statements were too unreliable to be admitted.   
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
60 
 
Scrappy did not take responsibility for the shootings until 
he was interviewed by defendant’s investigators, years after the 
crimes occurred.  “The significant passage of time is a relevant 
circumstance to be considered when determining a statement’s 
reliability.”  (People v. Masters (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1019, 1057; see 
Frierson, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 745.)  In addition, as the court 
observed, Scrappy was a demonstrated liar, and his current 
account was “completely contrary” to all of his previous 
statements.  In the past, Scrappy had not only denied his own 
responsibility to both the police and investigators, but at one 
point he had falsely claimed Pan was personally involved in the 
shootings.  That assertion was later disproved when evidence 
indisputably showed Pan was nowhere near the crime scene.  
Inconsistent accounts cast doubt on the reliability of a 
declarant’s statements.  (See Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 585.) 
 
Although defendant did not raise the point below, he now 
contends the court should have considered the reliability of 
Scrappy’s account in light of corroborating evidence from the 
trial.  Before announcing its decision, the court remarked that 
appellate case law prohibited it from using trial evidence as 
corroboration of a statement against interest’s truthfulness, 
remarking that it would be impermissible bootstrapping to look 
beyond the circumstances surrounding the declaration’s 
utterance.  It appears the court was referencing the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 
U.S. 805.  There, under its pre-Crawford20 jurisprudence, the 
high court held the confrontation clause requires that “hearsay 
evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of 
reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by 
 
20  
Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36. 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
61 
reference to other evidence at trial.”  (Wright, at p. 822.)  The 
court reasoned that “the use of corroborating evidence . . . would 
permit admission of a presumptively unreliable statement by 
bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial, 
a result” that was at odds with the confrontation clause.  (Id. at 
p. 823.)  Wright was addressing the constitutional requirements 
governing admission of a hearsay statement against a criminal 
defendant, however.  Because defendant was the one seeking to 
introduce a hearsay statement against interest here, there was 
no confrontation issue, and the trial court was free to examine 
all facts bearing upon the statement’s trustworthiness.  (See 
People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 607; Frierson, supra, 53 
Cal.3d at p. 745.)  This was precisely the sort of mistake the 
court could have easily corrected if the issue had been brought 
to its attention.  Nevertheless, defendant said nothing, and 
thereby forfeited the issue on appeal.  (See People v. Romero 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 411.)21 
 
21  
That said, we are not persuaded that the court’s mistake 
led it to abuse its discretion.  Defendant argues Scrappy’s 
account was corroborated by evidence that two guns were used 
in the Elm Street crimes.  Because a shell casing that came from 
a second gun was not available for testing until the close of the 
guilt phase, the evidence initially established that a single gun 
was used in the shootings.  (See ante, fn. 7.)  Scrappy’s statement 
was consistent with the later discovery that one bullet was fired 
from a second gun.  However, this alignment between Scrappy’s 
statement and the ballistics evidence does not necessarily mean 
his assertion that he shot all but one of the victims was truthful.  
It is beyond dispute that Scrappy participated in the crimes.  
Unlike Karol and Evans, he was inside the house with 
defendant the entire time.  He would have known how many 
guns were fired. 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
62 
 
In addition, although admitting to the murder of a mother 
and her children would likely subject a person to “hatred, 
ridicule, or social disgrace” (Evid. Code, § 1230) within the 
general community, certain aspects of Scrappy’s particular 
community meant he could actually benefit from making a false 
confession.  Defendant was a high-ranking gang leader; Scrappy 
a juvenile and relative newcomer to the gang.  Scrappy might 
have believed that taking the blame for a more senior member’s 
crimes, thus helping him evade the death penalty, could 
enhance his position in the gang or help to secure his safety in 
prison.  Because he faced little to no risk of additional penal 
consequences, the possibility of general opprobrium might have 
been worth these potential benefits.  This was the scenario we 
envisioned in Grimes when we observed that “sometimes a 
declarant who makes an inculpatory statement may have a 
substantial incentive to exculpate others.  A member of a 
criminal street gang, for example, may choose to take the fall for 
fellow gang members by making a confession that exculpates 
them.  A trial court in that situation may reasonably conclude 
that the declarant’s incentive to protect his friends renders the 
exculpatory portions of the statement inadmissible.”  (Grimes, 
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 716; see Frierson, at p. 745.)  The court did 
not abuse its discretion in concluding Scrappy’s hearsay 
statements were not sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted as 
statements against interest. 
 
Defendant protests that it was fundamentally unfair for 
the court to permit the prosecutor “to build his entire case on 
the testimony of self-serving co-defendants whose various 
stories changed continuously” but then exclude the statements 
of another codefendant as unreliable.  This objection overlooks 
the most crucial difference between Scrappy’s account and those 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
63 
of Karol and Evans.  Karol and Evans testified in court.  They 
were subject to extensive cross-examination, which allowed the 
jury to evaluate their truthfulness.  Scrappy did not testify.  His 
unavailability for cross-examination is why the court had a duty 
to carefully scrutinize the reliability of his out-of-court 
statements.  “ ‘[A] defendant does not have a constitutional right 
to the admission of unreliable hearsay statements.’ ” (People v. 
Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 269.)  The court’s ruling was 
neither statutory nor constitutional error.  (See Westerfield, 
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 705.) 
3. Instructional Error Claims 
 
Defendant next argues the court should have modified the 
standard penalty-phase instructions to include additional 
concepts and should have refused to give a special instruction 
regarding victim impact.  The instructions given were accurate 
and appropriate under settled law.  There was no error. 
a. Refusal to Modify CALJIC No. 8.85  
 
“CALJIC No. 8.85 instructs the jury regarding the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in section 190.3, 
factors (a) through (k), which the jury must consider in deciding 
the penalty to be imposed on a capital defendant.”  (People v. 
Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1210.)  Defendant argues the 
court erred in refusing several proposed modifications. 
 
First, defendant contends the court erred in refusing to 
instruct the jury that it could consider lingering or residual 
doubt regarding guilt as a mitigating factor in setting penalty.  
As he recognizes, however, “we have frequently and consistently 
rejected claims that the trial court is required to instruct on 
lingering doubt.”  (People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 
254, 325; see People v. Howard (2010) 51 Cal.4th 15, 38.)  The 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
64 
concept is sufficiently covered in CALJIC No. 8.85 and other 
instructions typically given in capital cases.  (People v. Enraca 
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 767; People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 
395, 497 (Panah).) 
 
Next, defendant asserts the court improperly rejected two 
modifications he proposed regarding how the jury should 
consider his age and maturity.  Although he was 22 years old 
when he committed the charged crimes, the defense argued a 
traumatic childhood hindered his cognitive and emotional 
development.  Defendant first sought an instruction that the 
jury could consider his “psychological immaturity” as a 
mitigation factor.  The court did not err in refusing this 
expansion.  We have repeatedly held courts are not required to 
instruct that age is relevant only in mitigation.  (People v. 
Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 257–258; Panah, supra, 35 
Cal.4th at pp. 499–500.)  The instructions as a whole permitted 
the jury to consider both defendant’s age and his psychological 
immaturity as mitigating considerations.  (People v. Booker 
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 194; Burney, at p. 258.)  Defendant’s 
second proposed modification would have related that people 
under age 18 are not eligible for the death penalty or a sentence 
of life without parole.  We upheld the rejection of a similar 
instruction, proposed by a 19-year-old defendant, in Brown, 
supra, 31 Cal.4th 518.  We noted that “ ‘[a]lthough instructions 
pinpointing the theory of the defense might be appropriate, a 
defendant is not entitled to instructions that simply recite facts 
favorable to him.’  (People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 
1159.)  By instructing the jury that those younger than 18 years 
old are legally ineligible for the death penalty, the proffered 
instruction 
highlighted 
a 
single, 
mitigating 
aspect 
of 
defendant’s age — that he had only recently become eligible for 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
65 
the 
ultimate 
penalty 
— 
and 
was 
thus 
improperly 
argumentative.”  (Id. at pp. 564–565.)  Defendant’s proposed 
modification was appropriately refused here for the same 
reason. 
 
Defendant also proposed advising the jury that it could 
consider the fact that his accomplices received more lenient 
sentences.  The court did not err in refusing this request.  “We 
have consistently held that evidence concerning coparticipants’ 
sentences is properly excluded from the penalty phase of a 
capital trial because such evidence is irrelevant.”  (People v. 
Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1104, 1141; see People v. Thomas (2012) 
54 Cal.4th 908, 940.)  “The focus in a penalty phase trial of a 
capital case is on the character and record of the individual 
offender.  The individually negotiated disposition of an 
accomplice is not constitutionally relevant to [a] defendant’s 
penalty determination.”  (People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 
1194, 1249.)  Defendant argues a different rule should apply in 
his case because the jury, having rejected the personal use 
firearm enhancements in the guilt phase, necessarily concluded 
one of his accomplices was the actual shooter.  This logic fails.  
The guilt-phase verdict merely reveals that the jury determined 
the evidence was insufficient to prove which attacker fired the 
fatal shot at any particular victim.  Nothing about the verdict, 
nor the facts of this case, made the accomplices’ sentences 
relevant to the jury’s determination of defendant’s proper 
punishment. 
 
Finally, defendant argues the court should have approved 
his request to supplement CALJIC No. 8.85 with an admonition 
not to decide penalty “by the simple process of counting the 
number of [aggravating and mitigating] circumstances on each 
side.”  The jury was instructed with this same concept in 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
66 
CALJIC No. 8.88, which explained that the “weighing of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a 
mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an 
imaginary scale or the arbitrary assignment of weights to any of 
them.”  Defendant complains that CALJIC No. 8.88 was read 
after closing arguments and was not given with the other 
instructions.  He overlooks the fact that his own counsel 
specifically requested that the court present the instructions in 
the order it did.  There was no error. 
b. Refusal to Modify CALJIC No. 8.88  
 
Defendant asked that CALJIC No. 8.88 be modified to add 
that jurors could return a verdict of life imprisonment without 
parole even if they found that one or more aggravating factors 
outweighed the mitigating factors.  Although the court was 
initially inclined to adopt a version of defendant’s proposal, it 
ultimately decided to give the standard, unmodified instruction.  
Defendant now claims this refusal to modify CALJIC No. 8.88 
was error.  We disagree. 
 
It is settled that CALJIC No. 8.88 accurately describes the 
capital jury’s weighing task and is not unconstitutional.  (People 
v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 816–817.)  Specifically, the 
instruction is not constitutionally flawed “for failing to 
affirmatively allow the jury to impose a life sentence even if the 
aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating ones.”  (People v. 
Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1028.)  Nor is the trial court 
obligated to instruct that the jury cannot return a death 
judgment unless it finds aggravating factors “ ‘outweigh[]’ ” 
mitigating factors.  (Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 498.)  “[T]he 
standard version of CALJIC No. 8.88, read as a whole, 
accurately describes the individualized, normative nature of the 
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67 
sentencing determination, and properly guides the jury’s 
discretion in this regard.”  (Contreras, supra, 58 Cal.4th at 
p. 170.)  Defendant contends his modification was “better” and 
“more accurately stated the law.”  Even if this were true, it 
would not mean instructing the jury with unmodified CALJIC 
No. 8.88 was error.  It was not. 
c. Pinpoint Instruction on Child Victim Impact 
 
At the prosecution’s request, the court instructed the jury 
that it could “consider the impact [of] the defendant’s crime on 
the surviving victim, Dennis Nguyen, . . . as part of the 
circumstances of the crime of which defendant was convicted” 
under section 190.3, factor (a).  Although it is unclear whether 
he raised an objection below, defendant now contends the 
instruction was argumentative because it improperly singled 
out one side’s evidence for specific mention. 
 
We have rejected similar claims (People v. Souza (2012) 54 
Cal.4th 90, 139; People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 358–
359), and do so again.  The jury was entitled to consider as a 
circumstance of defendant’s capital crimes the harm caused to 
the victims’ families.  (§190.3, factor (a); People v. Edwards 
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 833–836.)  Moreover, the jury’s 
consideration of victim impact “need not be based upon specific 
testimony of the victim’s family members describing their 
emotions.”  (People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1017.)  
The prosecutor did not present victim impact evidence, but his 
closing argument asked the jury to consider how defendant’s 
crimes affected Dennis.  The pinpoint instruction appropriately 
informed the jury how it could take this victim impact into 
account.  (See Harris, at p. 358.) 
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68 
4. Constitutionality of Death Penalty Law  
 
Defendant raises a number of familiar challenges to the 
constitutionality of California’s death penalty statute and 
instructions.  While acknowledging that we have previously 
rejected all of these arguments, he presents them again to urge 
reconsideration and preserve the issues for federal review.  We 
decline to reconsider our previous holdings that: 
• The class of offenders eligible for the death penalty is not 
impermissibly broad.  (People v. Potts (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 
1060 (Potts); People v. Reed (2018) 4 Cal.5th 989, 1018.)   
• Section 190.3, factor (a), which permits aggravation based on 
the circumstances of the crime, does not result in arbitrary 
and capricious imposition of the death penalty.  (People v. 
Rhoades (2019) 8 Cal.5th 393, 455 (Rhoades); People v. 
Capers (2019) 7 Cal.5th 989, 1013 (Capers).)  
• California’s death penalty scheme does not violate the federal 
Constitution for failing to require:  written findings (People 
v. Molano (2019) 7 Cal.5th 620, 678 (Molano)); unanimous 
findings as to the existence of aggravating factors or 
unadjudicated criminal activity (Capers, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
p. 1013); or findings beyond a reasonable doubt as to the 
existence of aggravating factors (other than factor (b) or (c) 
evidence), that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating 
factors, or that death is the appropriate penalty (People v. 
Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 213 (Fayed); People v. Krebs 
(2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 350 (Krebs)).  These conclusions are not 
altered by Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, Ring v. Arizona 
(2002) 536 U.S. 584, or Hurst v. Florida (2016) 577 U.S. 92.  
(Rhoades, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 455; Capers, at pp. 1013–
1014.)   
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
69 
• The prosecution has no obligation to bear a burden of proof 
or persuasion because sentencing is “an inherently moral and 
normative function, and not a factual one amenable to burden 
of proof calculations.”  (People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 
402, 489; see People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 954 (Hoyt); 
Capers, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1014–1015.)  Further, “ ‘the 
trial court is not required to explicitly tell the jury that 
neither party bears the burden of proof.’ ”  (Potts, supra, 6 
Cal.5th at p. 1060.)   
• The federal Constitution does not require an instruction that 
life is the presumptive penalty.  (People v. Beck and Cruz 
(2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 670 (Beck and Cruz)); Capers, supra, 7 
Cal.5th at p. 1016.) 
• CALJIC No. 8.88 is not impermissibly flawed because it does 
not require a finding that death is the “appropriate” penalty 
(see People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 853; Beck and Cruz, 
supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 671), or because it does not require a 
life sentence if the jury finds mitigating factors outweigh 
aggravating ones (Capers, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1016; 
Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 594).  The instruction’s use of 
the phrase “so substantial” does not make it overbroad or 
unconstitutionally vague.  (See Beck and Cruz, at p. 671; 
People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 293.)   
•  CALJIC No. 8.85’s use of the words “extreme” and 
“substantial” does not impermissibly constrain the jury’s 
consideration of mitigating circumstances.  (See Molano, 
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 678; People v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 
94.)  The court was not constitutionally required to delete 
inapplicable sentencing factors, identify which factors are 
aggravating or mitigating, or instruct that certain factors are 
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70 
relevant only for mitigation.  (Krebs, supra, 8 Cal.5th at 
p. 351; Potts, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1061.) 
• The federal Constitution does not require intercase 
proportionality review.  (Hoyt, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 955; 
Rhoades, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 455–456.)  
• The death penalty law does not violate equal protection 
because it provides different procedures for capital and 
noncapital defendants.  (Fayed, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 214; 
Rhoades, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 456.)   
• California’s capital sentencing scheme does not violate 
international law or the Eighth Amendment.  (Beck and 
Cruz, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 671; Molano, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
p. 679.) 
C. Restitution Fine  
 
At the time of defendant’s crimes, section 1202.4, 
subdivision (b) required the court to impose a felony restitution 
fine between $200 and $10,000.  Although the fine was 
mandatory, a defendant’s inability to pay could be considered in 
setting the amount.  (§ 1202.4, former subd. (d).)  In considering 
defendant’s plea for a reduced fee, the court observed the 
question was whether to exercise mercy to allow defendant “to 
get whatever benefits he might receive from his income at the 
prison during his stay there.”  It ultimately ordered him to pay 
the maximum fine of $10,000.  Defendant now claims this order 
was an abuse of discretion because it was “based on the fiction” 
that he could receive income while in prison.  
 
These arguments misapprehend the burden of proof.  
Under governing law, it is the defendant who must “bear the 
burden of demonstrating his or her inability to pay.”  (§ 1202.4, 
subd. (d).)  As in other capital cases, defendant “contends his 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
71 
indigence is established by the fact that he was appointed 
counsel and provided funds for expert witnesses and 
investigators, and because he assertedly has no earning 
potential.  However, the fact that he could not afford the cost of 
the defense in a capital case does not establish that he cannot 
pay these fines.”  (People v. Miracle (2018) 6 Cal.5th 318, 356.)  
Defendant “points to no evidence in the record supporting his 
inability to pay, beyond the bare fact of his impending 
incarceration.”  (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 409.)  
The record indicates the trial court was aware of its duty to 
consider defendant’s ability to pay the fine but exercised its 
discretion to impose the maximum amount.  Considering the 
gravity of defendant’s offenses and the losses he inflicted on 
multiple victims (see § 1202.4, subd. (d)), we cannot conclude 
this order was an abuse of discretion.  (See Potts, supra, 6 
Cal.5th at p. 1057.) 
 
Nor is there merit to defendant’s claim that the court 
violated Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466 in imposing the fine 
without jury findings.  Apprendi holds that: “Other than the fact 
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a 
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Id. 
at p. 490.)  The rule can also be implicated when criminal fines 
are imposed.  (Southern Union Co. v. United States (2012) 567 
U.S. 343, 346.)  However, Apprendi does not apply to the setting 
of a fine under section 1202.4.  As we have previously explained, 
this mandatory restitution fine “is properly understood as part 
of the maximum penalty statutorily authorized by a jury’s 
finding that the defendant is guilty of a felony.”  (People v. Wall 
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 1048, 1076.)  In imposing the fine, a court does 
not make any factual finding that increases the range of 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
72 
penalties to which the defendant is exposed.  It simply sets a 
fine within the prescribed statutory range.  (People v. Henriquez 
(2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 47.)  “Its ruling therefore raises no concerns 
under Apprendi.”  (Id. at pp. 47–48.)22 
D. Cumulative Error  
 
Finally, defendant argues errors in his trial were 
cumulatively prejudicial.  We assumed potential errors in the 
court’s failure to admonish support persons each time they 
accompanied a witness and in the admission of hearsay at the 
penalty phase.  We found no reasonable possibility either 
assumed error could have affected the verdict and now conclude 
no cumulative prejudice rendered defendant’s trial unfair.  (See, 
e.g., Potts, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1058.) 
 
 
 
22  
Defendant also argues his obligation to pay the fine should 
be stayed pending the finality of his automatic appeal, but, as 
he recognizes, an appeal to this court “stays the execution of the 
judgment in all cases where a sentence of death has been 
imposed.”  (§ 1243.)  No additional stay is required. 
PEOPLE v. CHHOUN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
73 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
KIM, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________ 
*        Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Chhoun   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted     
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S084996 
Date Filed:  February 11, 2021 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior    
County:  San Bernardino    
Judge:  Bob N. Krug    
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek and Mary K. McComb, State Public Defenders, under appointments by the Supreme 
Court; Denise Anton and Alexander Post, Deputy State Public Defenders, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Joseph P. Lee and Toni R. Johns Estaville, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Alexander Post 
Deputy State Public Defender 
1111 Broadway, 10th Floor 
Oakland, CA 94607-4139 
(510) 267-3300 
 
 
Toni R. Johns Estaville 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 269-6166