Case Title: Citizens for Equitable and Responsible Government v. County of Hawai'i; County Clerk. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by J. Nakayama with whom C.J. Moon joins. [pdf]. S.Ct. Order of Correction, filed 07/28/2005 [pdf]. S.Ct. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part in Motion for Reconsideration, filed 09/22/2005 [pdf]. Dissenting Opinion by J. Nakayama, with whom C. J.Moon, joins [pdf].

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Wi Goren”
***FOR PUBLICATION***

eee

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

‘o0o--~

ee

CITIZENS FOR EQUITABLE AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT,

‘a Hawai'i nonprofit corporation; BRENDA J. FORD:
STANLEY A. BOREN; FLOYD H. LUNDQUIST; MARLENE E. LUNDQUIST;
RONALD C. PHILLIPS, Plaintiffs-Appellants
and
BEVERLY BYOUK and SANDRA W. SCARR, Plaintiffs~Appellees
vs.

COUNTY OF HAWAI'I; COUNTY CLERK, COUNTY OF HAWAI'I; LLOYD

VAN DE CAR, CHAIRMAN, COUNTY OF HAWAI'I 2001
REAPPORTIONMENT COMMISSION, Defendants-Appellees

a

No. 25614

   

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
(crv. NO. 01-1-0092)

EVAL VRAON
aad

JULY 22, 2005

Shez Hs 22 1" soo

LEVINSON, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.7
WITH NAKAYAMA, 'J., CONCURRING SEPARATELY AND
DISSENTING, WITH WHOM MOON, C.J., JOINS
QPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.
We hold that (1) the phrase “equal resident
populations” in section 3-17(f) (4) of the Charter of the County
of Hawaii (the Charter) excludes nonresident college students and

nonresident military personnel and their dependents from the
***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

population base for purposes of r

 

pportioning county council
districts of the County of Hawai'i, (2) a total deviation in
excess of 108 in an electoral reapportionment plan presents a
prima facie case of discrimination in violation of the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution, (3) a
rational government policy will justify a total deviation that
slightly exceeds the 108 threshold, and (4) assuming, in
excluding nonresident student's and nonresident military personnel
and their dependents from the population base, the plan of the
County of Hawaii 2001 Reapportionment Commission (the Commission)
resulted in a total deviation of 10.89%, such a deviation in this
unigue instance (a) was minimal, (b) apparently included the
Commission's consideration of other valid criteria under section
3-17 of the Charter, (c) resulted from the commission's intent to
achieve inclusiveness and equal representation, and (d) was,
therefore, constitutional.
1

Pursuant to the Charter, Defendant-Appellee County of
Hawas‘i initiated a reapportionment of its county council
Gistricts in 2001. The Conmission was appdinted and confirmed in
accordance witha provision in the Charter requiring that in
1991, and every tenth year thereafter, a commission be

established to determine the boundaries of council districts, and
***FOR PUBLICATION***

ee

to file a reapportionment plan by December 31 of those years.? A

 

1 section 3-27 of the Charter under which the Commission acted
states as follows

(a) There shall be 2 county reapportionnent
commission which shall establish the boundaries of the
council districts,

tb). The initial ceapportionsent commission shall
consist of seven meabera, two of whom shall be residents of
the combined judicial districts of North and South ilo, one
fron the judicial district of Puna, one from the judicial
Glsteict of Rau, one from the combined judicial districts of
North and South Kona, one from the combined judicial
Ulstrices of North and South Kohala, and one from the
Sosicisi district of Hanaksa. The monbers shall be
Appointed by the mayor and confirmed by the council in the
manner prescribed in section 13-4.

(G)" ach subsequent. reapportionsent commission shall
consist of nine menbers,” One member shall be @ resident of

fach council district az established by the previous
SCepportionsent comission. The meabers shall be appointed
by the mayor end confirmed by the council in the manner
Prescribed in section 13-4.

‘a ard ey seat
eanpostionneat years. The reapportionment commission shall be
ERSSUREER"Ond confirmed by March 1 of the reapportionment. year,
ahd shall file a reapportionment plan with the county clerk by
Becenber 31 of the reapportionment year.

fe) The county clerk shall furnish all necessary
technical and secretarial services for the reapportionsent
Ecanission, The council shall appropriate necessary funds
fo enable the commission to carry out its duties.

TE) The reapportionment commission shall be guided by
tthe following criteria in establishing the Boundaries of the
Council districts:

(2) wo district shall be dram to unduly favor
Dr penalise a person of political factions

(2) Yneetar as possible, districts should be
Gontiquoss snd compact,

(3) Bistelet Lines shall, where possible,
follow permanent and easily recognizable
featuress

(©) Districts shal have approximately equal

Hels ution -
(g)_ The district Boundaries a established by the
reapportionment commission shall be in effect at the first
Fegularly scheduled council election following the filing of
the plan and for any subsequent councii election. The
Gistrict boundaries in effect prior to the filing of the
Feapportscnment plan shall rensin in effect during the
Guration of the term of all councilmesbers elected or
appointed to represent such districts until the expiration
OF the fu1l tezm ef such councilneabers, including any,
Glection held £0 Fill an unexpired term under section 3-4

 

 

 

 

 

 

Charter of the County of Hawaii § 3-17 (1990) (emphases added) .

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series of public meetings and hearings was held throughout
Hawai'i County, during which private speakers argued that the
Commission was using the wrong population base and should exclude
therefrom nonresident college students and nonresident military
personnel and their dependents. The Commission adopted a
reapportionment plan (the Conmission’s plan) and filed it as
required with the County Clerk. The Commission’s plan provided
for a total resident population base that included nonresident
college students and nonresident military personnel and their
dependents.

Subsequent to the filing of the Commission’s plan,
Plaintiffs-Appellants Citizens for Equitable and Responsible
Government, Brenda J. Ford, Stanley A. Boren, Floyd H. Lundquist,
Marlene £. Lundquist, Ronald C. Phillips, (collectively,
Appellants) and Plaintiffs-Appellees Beverly Byouk and Sandra W.
Scarr filed a Complaint and First Amended Complaint against
County of Hawai'i and other Defendants~Appellees, the County
Clerk, Hawai'i County and Llyod Van De Car, Chairman of the
Commission (collectively, County Appellees) in the third circuit
court (the court)? requesting, inter alia, a declaratory ruling
that the Conmission’s plan was invalid.

Appellants moved for partial summary judgment on the
ground the Commission used the wrong population base and that,

therefore, the Conmission’s plan was unconstitutional because its

 

2 me Honorable RLki May Amano presided.

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ee

total deviation from the ideal mean exceeded 10%. Appellants
appended to their motion for sunmary judgment a letter dated
october 25, 1989, written by Christopher J. Yuen (Yuen), the
attorney representing the Comission during the drafting of the
reapportionnent plan, for the proposition that the Commission was

advised to use the same population base as used by the State

 

Reapportionment Commission. On June 20, 2002, County Appell

 

filed an affidavit by Yuen to rebut Appellants’ proposition.
Appellants moved to strike the affidavit.

Following a hearing, the court denied Appellants’
motion and sua sponte granted partial summary judgment in favor
of County Appellees. The court did not issue findings of fact or
conclusions of law, but in its July 19, 2002 order stated, inter

alia, as follows:

‘The [elourt finds that the adoption by the. . -
commission of 2 resident population base which did not
Guclude non-resident military personnel and their dependents
Gna aid net exclude non-resident university students in the
2002 council redistricting plan was proper.

‘he (clourt algo finds that there was no
unconstitutional deviation in the population count in the
County council districts ee set foreh in the 2001 council
Fedistricting plan adopted by the. . . Commission.

 

 

 

 

Following the court’s ruling, the parties agreed to withdraw all
remaining counts so that final judgment could be entered in the

case.” The court entered final judgment in favor of County

 

> the effect of the parties’ stipulation to amend the first anended
complaint and for entry of judgeent, was “to withdraw [Appellanta’]
Gilegatlons that the. . + Comission failed to use a ‘rational or objective
nethedology’s . . and wrongfully submerged communities of interest into larger
Gisericts Gut not [Appellants’| allegations as to the population base that the
oe Commission used.

 

 
 

*#*FOR PUBLICATION*

Appellees and against Appellants on January 24, 2003. Appellants
filed their notice of appeal on January 31, 2003.
11
©n appeal, Appellants maintain that the court erred in
(1) refusing to strike the affidavit of the Commission's counsel,
(2) concluding that the Commission could include nonresident

university students and nonresident military personnel and their

 

dependents in the population base, (3) deciding that the total
deviation between county council districts in the redistricting
plan did not exceed constitutional limits, and (4) ruling that
the redistricting plan is valid. They request an order
(2) invalidating the Commission's plan, (2) appointing a master
to prepare a new redistricting plan using the correct population
base, and (3) granting such other appropriate relief.

qr.

“unlike other appellate matters, in reviewing summary
judgment decisions[,] an appellate court steps into the shoes of
the trial court and applies the same legal standard as the trial
court applied. Beamer v. Nishiki, 66 Haw. 572, $77, 670 P.2d
1264, 1270 (1983). “Summary judgment is appropriate if the
pleadings, depositions, and answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Pac, Int’
Serv. Com, v. Hurip, 76 Hawai'i 209, 213, 873 P.2d 88, 92
***FOR PUBLICATION***
eee
(1994). A trial courts conclusions of law are reviewed de nove

under the right/wrong standard. Fulimoto v. Au, 95 Hawai'i 116,
137, 19 P.3d 669, 720 (2001). Under this standard, the trial
court’s conclusions of law are not binding upon the appellate
court and are freely reviewable for its correctness. Id.

w.

As to point (1), the court did not rule on Appellants’
request to strike an affidavit of the Commission's attorney.
Appellants assert that the affidavit of the Commission's attorney
iis not part of the Commission’s records and contains the opinion
land recollection of the attorney ten years after-the-fact.

County Appellees maintain that they offered the affidavit of the
Conmission’s attorney to clarify that the letter in Appellants’
motion stated only that there was a difference in reapportionment
between using residents, 2s opposed to registered voters, in
determining the population base and that the affidavit was not
introduced to reflect the intent of the charter commission.‘
Inasmuch as the affidavit was not offered with respect to the
intent of the charter commission and is not necessary to our
interpretation of the phrase “resident populations,” see infra,

we do not address Appellants’ point (1).

 

yuen's affidavit states that “in drafting the charter language
‘Gistricte should have ‘approximately equal resident
Eoquires by applicable constitutional provision’ the intent was
‘of equality only be as constitutionally mandated.” (Emphasis
0 the charter commission's "intent” merely confirms
‘riteria in charter section 3-17(E)-

      
  
  

>
 

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v

‘The primary issue on appeal, Appellants’ point (2), is
whether nonresident college students and nonresident military
personnel and their dependents should be excluded from the
population base of Hawai'i County’s reapportionment of city
council districts. The Charter mandates that “[dJistricts shall
have approximately equal resident populations as required by
applicable constitutional provisions [,]” Charter § 3-17(f) (4)
(emphasis added), see supra note 1, but fails to define the
phrase “resident populations.”

Appellants first argue that “resident populations”
should be interpreted in the sane manner as that term is applied
in the apportionment of state representative districts, that is,
by using a permanent resident population base. Appellants refer
to an amendment made to Article IV of the Constitution of the
State of Hawaii in 1992, when voters statewide voted to use a
“permanent resident” population base for apportioning legislative
districts. The amendment mandated that only residents having
their domiciliary in the State of Hawai'i may be counted in the
population base for the purpose of reapportioning legislative
districts. Article IV of the Constitution of the State of Hawaii
states in relevant part as follows:

he total number of menbers of
each house of the state legislature being respportioned
fanong the four basic island unite namely: (1) the island of
Mawais, (2) the islands of Maui, Lanai, Molokas and
hoolawe, (2) the island of Oahu and sll other islands not
specifically enumerated, and (4) the selands of Kauai and

Nithau, using the total number of permenent residents in

8

  

  

 

 

 
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***
es

‘gach of the basic island unita end computed by the method
fhow as the method of equal proportions; except that no
barie istend unit shall receive less then one menber in each
house.

 

Haw. Const. art. IV, § 4 (amended 1992) (emphasis added).
However, the amendment to Article IV only applies to state
legislative redistricting, not county council redistricting.

‘The Commission interpreted the Charter phrase “resident
populations” to encompass all persons who “reside within the
county” as reflected in the federal census and, accordingly, did
not exclude nonresident university students and nonresident
military personnel and their dependents in the population base
for the reapportionment plans. County Appellees argue that the
Commission's interpretation of the phrase was a discretionary
act, and, thus, under Kawamoto v, Okata, 75 Haw. 463, 868 P.2d
1183 (1994), the actions of the Commission should be accepted
unless an abuse of discretion is shown.

whe interpretation of the charter is similar to the
interpretation of a statute.” Maui County Council v. Thompson,
84 Hawai'i 105, 106, 929 P.2d 1355, 1356 (1996). when
interpreting a statute,

four foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to
fhe intention of the legisiature(,] which is to be obtained
primarily from the language contained in the statute itself.
Gnd where the lanouage of the statute is plain and

 

and-obvious “meaning.
‘Id. (quoting State v, Baron, 80 Hawai'i 107, 113, 905 P.2d 613,
619 (1995) (emphasis added). In this regard, a common definition

of “resident” is
 

*¥*FOR PUBLICATION*

 

Lalny person who occupies # dwelling within the State, has

preseot intent to remain within the State for 2 period of
By

establishing an ongoing physical presence within the state

together with indicia that his presence within the State is

Black's Law Dictionary 1309 (6th ed. 1990) (emphases added). See
Inte Irving, 13 Haw. 22, 24 (1900) ("{T]he primary significance

 

of the word ‘residence’ as used in the constitution is the sane
as domicil{e] -- a word which means the place where a man
establishes his abode, makes the seat of his property, and
exercises his civil and political rights.” (Quoting Chase v,
Miller, 41 Pa. 403, 420 (Pa. 1862))). This definition of
“resident” would exclude any person who did not exhibit a present
intent to remain within Hawai'i County for more than a transitory
period.

Generally, college students from outside Hawai'i County
who lack a present intent to remain in the county for a period of
time beyond their date of graduation would not be considered
residents. Their presence in Hawai'i County is primarily for
educational purposes, which is “transitory in nature.” Likewise,
ordinarily the transitory nature of military personnel from
outside Hawai'i County is apparent. Normally, military personnel
and their dependents are temporarily stationed in the county by
the United States military. Military personnel may have little
say in deciding the location of their assignment. As a result,
generally speaking, members of the military are in Hawai" County

involuntarily, as opposed to persons who choose to live in the

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oy
county. See Carpenter v, Hammond, 667 P.2d 1204, 1211 (Alaska
1983) (recognizing the “involuntary nature of the military
member’ s assignment to (a) state”).

‘he Charter employs the phrase “resident populations”
which indicates that the drafters of the Charter intended to
Limit the population base to residents of Hawai'i County. Those
who live in the county temporarily for educational purposes or
those who live in the county involuntarily because ordered to do
s0 would seemingly lack a present intent to remain in the county,
rendering their stay “transitory in nature.”* Logically, the
drafters of the Charter would not have modified the word
“population” by the adjective “resident” or, on the other hand,
would have employed the phrase “total population” had they
intended to include nonresident college students and nonresident
military personnel and their dependents in the population base.

Accordingly, we hold that the phrase “resident
populations” found in the Charter excludes nonresident university
students and nonresident military personnel and their dependents
from the population base of the county council reapportionment
plan. The court, therefore, was wrong to conclude that the

Commission’s inclusion of these nonresidents was proper.‘

 

5 opetously, @ person who otherwise ostensibly falls within such
categories but establishes 4 present intent to remain in the county and
Gthibics indicia that his or her presence is something other than nerely
Elansitory may establish resident status. See Black's Lav Dictionary st 1309.

Inasmuch as we determine the phrase “resident populations” to be
plain and unasbiguous, We need not examine the 1990 charter commission’ s
(continued...)

 

 

 

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vr.

While we must interpret the term “resident
populations,” we note that no dispute is raised by the parties as
to whether the persons designated as residents or nonresidents
were properly denominated as such. Appellants note that “in
2001, State officials had access to an improved database and
software program and had the ability to collect data that enabled
state officials to identify and locate nonresident students,
nonresident military personnel and nonresident military
dependents with reasonable accuracy.” (Emphases omitted.) Thus,
argue Appellants, *{i)t was also possible to identify these sane
individuals for the purpose of establishing county council seats
for the County of Hawaii County Council.”

County Appellees do not deny the availability of such
technology nor challenge its feasibility. In fact, they
apparently relied on the State’s database and computer program to
support their motion for partial summary judgment. In an
affidavit attached as “Exhibit D" to County Appellees’ motion for
partial summary judgment, David J. Rosenbrock, data processing

coordinator for the State of Hawai'i Office of Elections, stated

 

*..continued)
records to ascertain the county electors’ intent in adopting the phrase. In
any event, Appellants maintain that aside from evidence that the charter
Commission “clearly rejected the use of ‘registered voters’ ass base because
thet provision wae already under [legal] ateack{s] . «+ {t]he rest of the
charter Commission's records 1 silent.” County Appellees do not cite to the
charter connission's records to support the Comission’ s interpretation.
Wence, ‘there is no instructive “legislative” history concerning the term
“resident populations.”

 

     

 

2
 

***FOR PUBLICATION***

that “his office provided population data to the County of Hawaii
Reapportionment Commission," derived from “the federal censu:
the United States Military and from the University of Hawaii at
Hilo.” Attached ae “Exhibit 1” to the affidavit were three
charts showing (1) total population with no extractions,
(2) total population with nonresident students and nonresident
military personnel extracted, and (3) total population with
nonresident students, nonresident military personnel and their
dependents extracted. The third chart expressed a deviation of
10.8938. The difference in population bases between the first
chart, showing a total population of 148,677, and the third
chart, showing a total population minus nonresidents of 147,806,
confirms Appellants’ calculation in their opening brief that
using information from the Conmission’s computer database, 871
“nonresidents . . . should have been excluded from the population
base.” County Appellees do not raise any objection to this.

vit.

We observe further that the exclusion of identifiable
nonresidents from the population base is consistent with the
rules for determining “residency” for election purposes under
Hawaii's state election law, Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS)
chapter 11, HRS chapter 11 governs “all elections, primary,
special primary, general, special general, special, or county.”
HRS § 11-3 (1993) (emphasis added). Pursuant to HRS § 11-11

(1993), the “county clerk shall be responsible for voter

33
 

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registration in the respective counties and the keeping of the
general register and precinct lists within the county.” HRS §
11-13 (1993) provides seven rules for determining a person's

‘The statute

 

“residency” for voter registration purpos
references students as well as military personnel as follows:

(S) A person does not gain of lose @ residence solely by
Teuson of the person's presence or absence while

smbloved in the service of the United States ox of
Shis Siete, or ubile-a-seodent of an Inetieution of
Leamning, or while tpt in an Institution or asylum,
or uhile confined ina prisons
(6) No nanber of the armed forces of the United states,
"or the member’ s dependent is
ste solely by reason of being
ote)

   

 

 

      

HRS § 11-13. The Commission, by relying on “the census-counted
population,” included persons in the population base “solely by
reason of the person's presence” in Hawai'i County “while
employed in the service” or “while a student of an institution of

rning[.]” This counting of students and military personnel

 

and their dependents based on mere presence alone conflicted with
the statutorily mandated process for determining who may register
to vote among the counties, The plain reading of “resident
populations” avoids the anomalous result of counting nonresidents
in the reapportionment plan when those nonresidents, pursuant to
HRS § 11-13, cannot register to vote.
vin.
A
In line with our holding, the Commission should have

excluded the said nonresidents from the redistricting population
base. However, Appellants do not argue that the use of the wrong

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population base alone invalidates the Commission's plan, but,
rather, that the use of the wrong population base created an
unconstitutional deviation. ven if Appellants had argued that
the plan was void for being based on the wrong population, we
observe that the language of Charter section 3-17(f) (4) would
bring us back to the constitutional question. Section 3-17(f) (4)
states that “[d]ietricts shall have approximately equal resident
populations aa required by applicable constitutional provisions.”
(Emphases added.) Thus, assuming Appellants’ calculations,
infra, are correct, we address Appellants’ argument in points (3)
and (4) that when nonresident military personnel, their
dependents, and university students are excluded from the
population base, “deviations emerge in the (rjedistricting [pian
that exceed constitutional limits.” We do not believe that that

is the case, however.

 

‘The United States Supreme Court has held that the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution requires that
electoral representation “be apportioned on a population basis.”
Reynolds v, Sims, 377 U.S. $33, 568 (1964).’ This requirement
means “that a [s]tate [must] make an honest and good faith effort
to construct districts . . . as nearly of equal population as is

practicable.” Kawamoto, 75 Haw. at 470, 868 P.2d at 1187

7 Revnolds is the “seminel decision in defining the ‘one man, one
vote’ doctrine|.1” Calderon ¥. os Anssles, 461 P.2d 49, 491 (Cal. 1971).

 

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(quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577 (emphases added)). The Court
recognized, however, that “(mathematical exactness or precision
ig hardly a workable constitutional requirement.” Reynolds, 377
U.S, at 533. See Kawamoto, 75 Haw. at 474, 868 P.2d at 1189.

Accordingly, it adopted a flexible, “case-by-case” approach to

 

sessing redistricting plans, providing “general considerations”

a follows:

 

A [a}tate may legitimately desire to maintain the intearity
‘Various political subdir
ings legislative: Svalia

Sonsiderations may underiie such sins. Tndiseriminate
Sistricting, without say regard for

yrnay be Tittle more
than an_open invitation to partiean gerrymandering. Single-
Renber districts may be the rule in one [s]tate, while
‘another. [s)tate might desire to achieve sone flexibility by
Creating multinenper or flotersal districts. whatever the

 

with respect to the apportionment of seats in
Sither of Both of the two houses of @ bicaneral state
Tegislature.

 

Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 576-79 (emphases added). See Swann v
Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1967) (reversing a decision
upholding a reapportionment plan where the state failed to
present, and the district court failed to articulate, “acceptable
reasons for the variations” of 308 among senate districts and 408
among house districts).

The “general principle of population equality . . .

applies to state and local elections{

 

Abate vy. Mundt, 403

16
‘***FOR PUBLICATION**

 

U.S. 182, 185 (1971). The Supr

 

e Court has intimated that
“slightly greater percentage deviations may be tolerable for
local government apportionment schenes” and that “particular

circumstance:

 

and needs of a local community as a whole may
sonetines justify departures fron strict equality.” Id. Sea ide
at 196-88 (upholding a county reapportionment plan with a total
deviation of 11.98 and districts that exactly correspond to the
county’® five towns “based on the long tradition of overlapping
functions and dual personnel” in the county government and “on
the fact that the plan. . . [did] not contain a built-in bias

tending to favor particular political interests or geographic

   

  

 

      

 

areas”).
In view of these considerations, . . .
tions from mathematical equality anong st
Slative districts are insufficient to make out @ prima
facie case of invidious discrimination under the Fourteenth
Amendment so a8 to require justification by the Stai
(Suprene Court] decisions have established, a
matter, thet an apportionnent plan with a maximum copulation
a Aeplen with Tar
therefote aust be justified by the Teizate
Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-43 (1983) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). See Kawamoto, 75 Haw. at 474, 668
P.2d at 1189.

At issue in Brown was a liyoming reapportionment plan
that allocated one of sixty-four seats in the state’s house of
representatives to a county with a deviation of 608 below the
mean. Id, at 837, 843. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld

the plan on the following bases: (1) it was “undisputed” that

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Wyoming's policy of ensuring that each county had one
representative was “free from any taint of arbitrariness or
discrimination”; (2) “population equality [was] the sole other
criterion used”; and (3) “there [was] no built-in bias tending to
favor particular political interests or geographic areas.” Id.
at 943-44, ‘The Brown majority approved of the Wyoming plan as
Yan unusually strong example of an apportionment plan the

population variations of which [were] entirely the result of the

 

consistent and nondiscriminatory application of a legitimate
state policy.”" Id, at 844. Thus, the “ultimate inquiry” is to
determine “whether the legislature’s plan may reasonably be said
to advance a rational state policy and, if so, whether the
population disparities among the districts that have resulted
from the pursuit of this plan exceed constitutional limits.” Id.
at 843 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted)

(emphasis added) .

 

* the Brown majority noted that the appellants “Limited their
challenge to the alleged dilution of their voting power resulting fron the one
representative given co” the subject county and, therefore, the issue Mas "not
ihether 8 16) average deviation and an 898 maximum deviation’. - . (wae]
Constitutionally permissible.” 462 U.S. at 846. Hence, the Brown majority
believed it was "not required to decide whether Myoming’e nondiscriminstory
Adherence to county boundaries justifie(a} the population deviations,” dda,
Walch is the second prong of the two-part “ultinate inquiry” -~ whether the
Population disparities anong the districts exceed constitutional Limits,

 

 

 

 

However, Justice Brennan, authoring the dissenting opinion in Brown, in which
three justices joined, agreed that “Wyoming’ s long-standing policy of using

 

Counties as the basic unite of representation [was] @ rational one,” but
maintained that the deviations in wyoming’ plan, "even if Justified by state
policy, [were not} within the constitutionally tolerable range of sizes” ide
at 853 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmn,
33.4,

 

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Ix.
x,

‘The Commission's plan divides Hawai‘ County into nine
districts. Using the “resident population” base (excluding
nonresident military personnel, their dependents, and university
students) of 147,806, propounded by Appellants, the ideal mean is
16,423 (147,806 divided by nine). According to Appellants’
briefs and the record, the difference between the ideal mean and
the actual “resident population” of each district represents that
district's “deviation,” which is translated into a deviation
percentage. The difference between the district with the
resident population that exceeded the ideal mean by the greatest
percentage and the district with the resident population that
fell below the ideal mean by the greatest percentage constitutes
the redistricting plan's “total deviation.” According to
Appellants’ calculations, the resident population of District 2
was 6.20% below the ideal mean (the latter category) and the
resident population of District 8 was 4.698 above the ideal mean
(the former category), thereby resulting in a total deviation of

10.898. County Appellees do not concede that there is such a

 

* tn their opening brief, Appellants list the nine “Land Districts”
fas “North Hilo, South Hilo, Fonz, Kau, South Kona, North Kona, South Kohala,
North Hohala, and Hamakua.” “They calculate the differences between total
Population and total population less nonresidents as follows: “il in North
Rito, -610 in south Wilo, -20 in Puna, 6 in Kau, ~6 in South Kona, -5 in
North Kona, ~5 in South Kohala, and no change in’ North Kohala and Hamakua

Appellants also contend that “the ‘permanent residents’ population
base for stat legislative districts on the island 12 147,806 persons.
and the ‘resident populations’ base for county council districts on the island
is udsle77. . . , a difference of 871 persons.” (Emphases in original-)

(Continued...)

 

 

 

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deviation, maintaining that “[a]ny deviation is the result of the
artificial construct of the Appellants in determining that the
numbers they believe should have been used are the only correct
numbers, when it was clearly within the discretion of the
[Clonmission to use the numbers which it did use.” However, as
stated supra, to support their motion for partial summary
judgment, County Appellees submitted the Rosenbrock affidavit,
which arrives at the same 10.898 figure as the total deviation
when nonresident students and nonresident military and their
dependents are excluded from the total population.

B.

Using Appellants’ deviation figure for our analysis, a
total deviation of 10.898 exceeds the Supreme Court’s threshold
and, therefore, creates a prima facie case of discrimination in
violation of the equal protection clause. The Supreme Court of
Arkansas has addressed a county plan with a total deviation
similar to the deviation of the Conmission’s plan here. In Riley

%(..continued)

they argue that “e71 Ss a statistically significant number in this case
because most of these individuals reside in'a single council district.

In contrast, County Appellees point out the following:

For [D]istrict 8, the .2668 above 58 Le equivalent to about
47 persons. For’ (D]istrict 2, the difference of .€07% above
58 ig equivalent to 100 persons. Thus, even if Appellant:
population base were accepted az the only required base, the
Presumption of constitutionality could be achieved by
Shifting this small number of persons ~~ less than 200
Persons in a population of over 147,000.

 

"Using County Appellees’ “total” population base, the deviation
betwoen District 6, with the lowest population, and District 9, with the
highest population, 1s 8.628.

 

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w.Baxter County Election, 843 S.W.2d 831, 832-33 (Ark. 1992),

all parties stipulated that the Baxter County redistricting plan

 

varied among the districts by 10.1498. In assessing whether a
“rational policy to justify a variance over 108” existed, id. at
833, the Arkansas Supreme Court acknowledged the “systematic
approach” taken by the election commission. The commission had
divided “the total population” of Baxter County by eleven, the
number of districts to be apportioned.

“The districts with population already closest to that
number were kept the same, and the others were slightly modified,
taking geography into account, to reach parity.” Id. At the
hearing before the trial court, a commission member testified
that “the overriding principle” followed by the commission in
redistricting “was equal representation.” Id. The Arkansas
Supreme Court concluded that the conmission’s “systematic
approach . . . reveal{ed) a rational policy of redistricting in
Baxter County” and that “the 10.149 variance [was] only slightly
over the acceptable 108 variation.” Id. Thus, it was held that
the trial court did not err in finding that the commission
overcame the prima facie case of discrimination, Id.

Similarly here, the 10.89% total deviation of the
Conmission’s plan is “only slightly over the acceptable 10%
variation.” Id, It is true, as Appellants posit, that the

Commission did not address the deviation question because it was

 

working from the “total” as opposed to “resident” population

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base, which presented only an 8.624 deviation. However, we
cannot say that no rational basis underlay the 10.89% deviation
because, akin to the approach exemplified by the commission
member's testimony in Riley, the Commission in the instant case,
by using “total” population, evidenced an intent to achieve
inclusiveness and equal representation. Cf, Calderon v. Los
Angeles, 461 P.2d 489, 493 (Cal. 1971) ("adherence to a
population standard, rather than one based on registered voters,
is more likely to guarantee that those who cannot or do not cast
a ballot may still have some voice in government.” (Emphasis
added.))-

For at the second meeting of the Commission, Hawai'i
County Councilmember Julie Jacobson testified in favor of “using
the population as the basis for the districting,” stating that,

each human being has needs for the governsent serves [sic]

and it doesn’t matter if you're one day old, if you're 99

years old, if you vote or don't vote, or any other of those

Yariables .  . each pereon needs tobe considered and T

think especialy with the complexity of infrastructure

issues, that we deal with, that’s why it’s importent.
Commissioner Mark Van Pernis then made a motion to “include all
people”: “[A]11 the people that the census counted is included
because, whether they vote or not, or whether they’re young or
old, or military or not, they all use county services, they all
pay taxes in some form or shape and they all need

representations.” The motion was put to a vote and carried,

 

evidencing that the Commission was motivated by inclusiveness as

‘opposed to a discriminatory purpose.

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Importantly, the Charter required the Commission to
consider three additional factors in redistricting. In addition
to the “approximately equal resident populations” requirement at
issue here, Charter section 3-17(f) required the Commission to
consider the following criteria:

(2) Mo district shall be dram to unduly favor or penalize
2 person oF political factions

(2) Insofar as possible, districts should be contiguous
‘and compact)

(3) District Lines shall, where possible, follow permanent
and easily recognizable features; « . «

These considerations governed the Conmission’s determination.
The statements supra at the second meeting of the Commission
evidenced the Commission’s commitment against favoring or
penalizing a person or political faction in consonance with
charter Section 3-17(f) (1).

Ultimately, the deviation stenming from a “pure
population” standard resulted from the Commission's commitment to
fan inclusive model rather a discriminatory one. Appellants do
not contend that the Commission failed to consider other
redistricting criteria under the Charter or that such criteria
would not support slightly greater deviation than the 108 prima
facie threshold. It should be noted that related objections were
apparently waived when Appellants stipulated to withdraw the
claims that the Commission failed to use a “rational or objective
methodology” and “wrongfully submerged communities of interest

into larger districts,” see supra note 3, thereby abandoning any

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claim that the Commission incorrectly applied the other three
criteria in Charter section 3-17(£).

Finally, we observe that Appellants do not argue, nor
point to evidence in the record, that the Commission did not
“make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts

+ + of equal population as is practicable[,]” Reynolds, 377
U.S. at 577, that the plan has “‘a built-in bias tending to favor
particular political interests or geographic areas(,]'” Brown,
462 U.S. at 844 (quoting Abate, 403 U.S. at 187), or that the
Commission's redistricting process was “taint(ed]” with
“arbitrariness,” id. at 843. What remains is Appellants’
conclusory statement that the “Commission’s records do not
reflect any evidence that justifies the [Clommission’s action to
adopt a [redistricting [p]lan that has deviations that exceed
the ideal mean by more than 108.” Therefore, on the foregoing

bases and under the specific circumstances of this case, we held

 

that, ultimately, the court did not err in concluding that “there
was no unconstitutional deviation in the population count in the
county council districts as set forth in the 2001 council
redistricting plan adopted by the . . . Commission.”
x.

Based on the foregoing, the Conmission’s erroneous
inclusion of nonresident students and military personnel and
their dependents in the population base for reapportionnent of

Hawai'i County council districts did not ultimately result in an

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unconstitutional deviation under its reapportionment plan.
Although we do not agree with the court that the Commission’s
population base was correct, we affirm the court's decision
upholding the Commission’s plan because the plan complies with
the mandate of Charter section 3-17(f) (4) that the districts be
comprised of “approximately equal resident populations as
required by applicable constitutional provisions.” (Emphi
added.) See Hawaii Provider's Network, Inc, v. AIG Hawaii Ins.

 

Cox, 105 Hawai's 362, 368 n.14, 98 P.3d 233, 239 n.14 (2004)
(llhere the decision below is correct it must be affirmed by
the appellate court though the lower tribunal gave the wrong
reason for its action.” (Quoting Agsalud vs Lee, 66 Haw. 425,
430, 664 P.2d 734, 738 (1963).))7 Boe vs Havas Relation:
Bd, 87 Hawai's 191, 197, 953 P.24 569, 575 (1998) ("Where the
circuit court’s decision is correct, its conclusion will not be
Gisturbed on the ground that it gave the wrong reason for its
ruling.” (Quotation marks and citation omitted.)). Accordingly,

the court's January 24, 2003 final judgment is affirmed.

on the briefs: ‘ 0

Michael J. Nateukawa for

for plaintiffs-appellants. borne C

fetricia K. o'Toole,
Beputy Corporation Counsed, Coot dutty dre
County of aval for
Getendantsrappeiiees.

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