Case Title: O'Donald v. McConnell, M.D.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 33, 2004

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-08-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RICHARD W. O'DONALD and  
§ 
JERRI O'DONALD, husband and 
§ 
wife, 
 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 33, 2004     
 
Plaintiffs Below, 
§ 
 
Appellants, 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
EDWARD J. McCONNELL, M.D., § 
C. A. No. 00C-12-236 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted: July 21, 2004 
 
 
Decided: 
August 19, 2004
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 19th day of August 2004, it appears to the Court that: 
 
 
(1) 
Appellant Richard O’Donald, the plaintiff below in a medical 
malpractice case, appeals the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment 
for the defendant below-appellee, Dr. Edward McConnell.  Because 
O’Donald failed to provide expert causation evidence to meet an essential 
element of his case, the Superior Court correctly granted summary judgment 
in favor of the defendant physician.  
 
(2) 
Mr. O’Donald (who was a non-smoker) first complained of a 
cough to his family physician, Dr. McConnell, during an April 28, 1998 
 
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office visit.  Between April 1998 and January 2000, O’Donald was seen and 
treated two additional times in the office.  He claims that he telephoned Dr. 
McConnell’s office to complain of a persistent cough on two or three 
occasions.  In January 2000, Dr. McConnell again examined O’Donald and 
noted a significant worsening of his condition.  Dr. McConnell ordered a 
chest x-ray, which revealed multiple nodules throughout both of his lungs, 
which later were identified as a rare, inoperable, alveolar cancer.  O’Donald 
was treated by oncologist Dr. Kenneth Algazy, whom the plaintiff later 
intended to use as an expert witness in his malpractice case. 
(3) 
O’Donald alleges that Dr. McConnell should have ordered a 
chest x-ray after his initial April 1998 office visit, and, that if a chest x-ray 
had been taken, it would have led to an earlier diagnoses of his cancer, and 
thereby increased his chances of survival.    
 
(4) 
This lawsuit, filed on December 28, 2000, has a tortuous 
procedural history that includes missed deadlines, motions to compel and to 
dismiss, and a stay pursuant to 18 Del. C. § 4218 because the defendant’s 
insurer became insolvent during the pendency of the action.  Of significance 
here is the defendant’s second motion to dismiss, to which plaintiff did not 
respond before the scheduled hearing date.  Nor did plaintiff's counsel 
appear at an office conference to discuss that motion.  At that conference, 
 
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the Superior Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, but granted 
monetary sanctions against the plaintiff.  The Court also granted the 
defendant's motion to exclude Dr. Algazy's testimony with respect to the 
standard of care and proximate cause because of the plaintiff's failure to 
provide discovery.1  The plaintiff did not appeal the order excluding Dr. 
Algazy's testimony and imposing the sanctions.   
(5) 
On December 30, 2003, the defendant filed a second summary 
judgment motion, based on the plaintiff's failure to identify a "proximate 
cause" expert.  The Superior Court granted the defendant’s motion, and this 
appeal (on that issue only) followed. 
(6) 
This Court reviews a trial court’s grant of summary judgment 
de novo.2  Summary judgment is to be granted only when there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.3  Where the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of 
                                          
 
1 Order, April 3, 2003.  The trial judge ordered $200 in attorney's fees to be paid to 
defense counsel for preparation of the motion, because of the plaintiff’s prior failure to 
answer interrogatories or provide expert discovery. 
 
2 Kaufman v. C.L. McCabe & Sons, Inc., 603 A. 2d 831, 833 (Del. 1992). 
 
3 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Burkhart v. Davies, 602 A. 2d 56, 59 (Del. 1991). 
 
 
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proof but has not made a sufficient showing on an essential element of his 
case, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.4 
(7) 
To establish liability for medical negligence, plaintiff must 
present expert medical testimony on the physician's deviation from the 
standard of care and “as to the causation of the alleged personal injury or 
death.”5  Without expert medical testimony as to a breach of the standard of 
care and causation, the plaintiff cannot prevail.6 
 
 (8) 
O’Donald’s claim of error on appeal is that his injury 
“obviously resulted from the breach of the standard of care,” and that, 
although Dr. Algazy was precluded from testifying about a proximate 
causation by order of the trial court, causation would be established—even 
without medical testimony about causation—by Dr. Algazy's testimony 
about the nature of the plaintiff's injury.  The appellant asserts that 
“[c]ertainly, in this day and age, and state of knowledge, in a circumstance 
such as this it would be indisputable, that a failure to timely diagnose lung 
                                          
 
4 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 
 
5 18 Del. C. § 6853. 
 
6 Burkhart v. Davies, 602 A.2d 56; 18 Del. C. § 6853. 
 
 
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cancer is, itself a cause of diminished life expectancy.”7  This argument 
ignores the purpose of expert medical testimony, as recognized by the 
General Assembly, which is that, subject to the exceptions listed in the 
statute, the proximate cause of injuries that are claimed to be attributable to 
medical negligence are not within the common knowledge of a layperson.8  
 
(9) 
Appellant’s argument that causation is “obvious” and 
“indisputable” fails to satisfy the statutory requirement of proof in a medical 
negligence case.  Where the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of 
proof and has failed to make a sufficient evidentiary showing on an essential 
element of his case, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.  For that reason, summary judgment was properly granted in the 
defendant's favor. 
                                          
 
7 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 15.  O’Donald did not raise or argue the theory of “loss of 
chance,” also known as reduced chance of survival.  (See Shively v. Klein, 551 A.2d 41 
(Del. 1988); Edwards v. Family Practice Assocs., 798 A.2d 1059 (Del. Super. Ct. 2002)).  
Even under a “loss of chance” theory, however, O’Donald would have been required to 
provide testimony that the alleged failure to diagnose was at least a “substantial cause” of 
his loss of chance at survival. (Shively, supra).  Because Dr. Algazy’s testimony on 
causation was barred, O'Donald could not have met this burden, either. 
 
8 Money v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Disease Compensation Trust Fund, 596 A.2d 1372 
(Del. 1991). 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
                        
 
 
 
 
   Justice