Case Title: Thompson v. Amis

Citation: 208 Kan. 658, 493 P.2d 1259

Docket Number: 46,487

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1972-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
208 Kan. 658 (1972)
493 P.2d 1259
LORENE THOMPSON, Appellee  Cross-Appellant,
v.
GEORGE C. AMIS, HENRY J. RIOJAS, THEODORE K. SHARP, as members of the Civil Service Board of Kansas; and GEORGE C. AMIS, HENRY J. RIOJAS, and THEODORE K. SHARP, individually; and WALTER F. KUIKEN, Secretary of the Civil Service Board of Kansas; and WALTER F. KUIKEN, individually; and the DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION of the State of Kansas; and the STATE BOARD OF SOCIAL WELFARE of the State of Kansas Appellants  Cross-Appellees.
No. 46,487

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 22, 1972.
Franklin R. Theis, assistant attorney general, argued the cause, and Woody D. Smith, attorney for the Department of Social Welfare, and Vern Miller, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellants  cross-appellees.
Mary Schowengerdt, of Irwin, Irwin & Schowengerdt, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Robert R. Irwin, of the same firm, was with her on the brief for appellee  cross-appellant.
*659 The opinion of the court was delivered by
FATZER, C.J.:
This appeal stems from a controversy over the discharge of a classified civil service employee.
The question immediately before the court is one of procedure involving jurisdiction. The facts material to the disposition of that question are first presented.
On August 1, 1968, the plaintiff, Lorene Thompson, was promoted to the position of Supervisor of Vocationl Rehabilitation for the Topeka State Hospital, and as of November 30, 1968, she was granted permanent status. On February 17, 1969, she was orally dismissed from her position by the Acting Director of the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation of the State of Kansas. The first written notice of her oral dismissal was given by letter dated February 19, 1969.
The plaintiff gave notice of her intention to appeal her dismissal by a letter dated February 20, 1969, directed to the Chairman of the Civil Service Board of the State of Kansas (the board), requesting a hearing with respect to the dismissal. The board, on March 27, 1969, and again on April 3, 1969, conducted a hearing in the matter. On April 3, 1969, the Board announced its decision which was made a part of its minutes, and reads:
The secretary of the Board directed a letter to the plaintiff reporting its decision. Thereafter, and on April 3, 1970, the plaintiff delivered a letter to the Director of the personnel division requesting that her term of eligibility be extended for a period of one year pursuant to K.S.A. 75-2942 (2). She also filed a motion for rehearing and reconsideration. The Board's decision on that motion was reported in its minutes of May 11, 1970, and reads:
Plaintiff's counsel was informed of the Board's decision by letter *660 dated May 12, 1970. On May 21, 1970, the plaintiff filed two cases in the district court seeking relief from the decisions of the Board  one was a direct appeal; the other was an action in equity.
On June 3, 1970, the Board filed a motion to dismiss the action in equity on the ground it was immune from actions except on its contracts, and that plaintiff's petition failed to allege the purported cause of action was based on contract. The board also filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for the reason the functions of the board were administrative, not judicial in character, and, therefore, not subject to review under K.S.A. 60-2101 (a).
On June 24, 1970, the plaintiff filed a motion for determination of the appropriate remedy  direct appeal, or action in equity.
At the hearing on the motion for the determination of the proper remedy, counsel for all parties agreed that the remedy was an action in equity for relief in the form of mandamus, and that the appeal statute (K.S.A. 60-2101[a]) had no application. The court then ruled:
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in the equity case. The motion was sustained, the court finding that plaintiff was entitled to be restored to her position as Vocational Rehabilitation Supervisor with the State Department of Social Welfare, and that she should be reimbursed for the salary which she had lost because of her wrongful dismissal.
Following a motion for rehearing and a motion by plaintiff for attorney fees, an order of summary judgment was entered on June 30, 1971, placing in the judgment the findings above mentioned, but denying plaintiff attorney fees.
The Board, the Department of Administration, and the Board of Social Welfare, all statutory agencies of the state of Kansas, appealed from the order reinstating the plaintiff to her position of Vocational Rehabilitation Supervisor and reimbursing her for lost *661 salary. The plaintiff cross-appealed from the order denying her attorney fees.
The appellants contend that an appeal pursuant to K.S.A. 60-2101 (a) from the Board's decision of April 3, 1969, was the only procedural remedy available to the appellee.
Before considering this question, we are met with the appellee's contention the appellants took no appeal from the court's order adjudging that the appellee's remedy was by an equitable action and not by appeal under K.S.A. 60-2101 (a), but actually encouraged the district court to make such an order and they are now foreclosed from raising such an issue.
Ordinarily, trial errors in which a party acquiesces or encourages the district court to make cannot be raised on appeal. A party should not be permitted to assume an attitude in this court inconsistent with that taken in the court below. (Brown v. East Side National Bank, 196 Kan. 372, 376, 411 P.2d 605; Potwin State Bank v. Ward, 183 Kan. 475, 327 P.2d 1091, 80 A.L.R.2d 166.) However, the rule above stated does not apply where the question is one of jurisdiction of the subject matter. If the district court had no jurisdiction, then this court has no jurisdiction. In Kowing v. Douglas County Kaw Drainage Dist., 167 Kan. 387, 207 P.2d 457, we held:
This court will raise the jurisdictional question on its own motion. (Materi v. Spurrier, 192 Kan. 291, 387 P.2d 221; Bammes v. Viking Manufacturing Co., 192 Kan. 616, 389 P.2d 828; Hotchkiss v. White, 191 Kan. 534, 538, 382 P.2d 325; Lira v. Billings, 196 Kan. 726, 414 P.2d 13.)
The appellants argue the issue before us is one of jurisdiction. We agree. The district courts are expressly created by the Constitution of the state of Kansas and are given only such jurisdiction as may be provided by the Legislature. (Art. 3, § 6; State v. Jack, 69 Kan. 387, 392, 76 Pac. 911, affirmed 199 U.S. 372, 50 L. Ed. 234, 26 S. Ct. 73; City of McPherson v. State Corporation Commission, 174 Kan. 407, 411, 257 P.2d 123.) If the district court had no appellate jurisdiction over the decision of the Board, then it had equitable jurisdiction to determine whether the Board's acts were illegal, fraudulent, or oppressive. (Gray v. Jenkins, 183 Kan. 251, 326 P.2d *662 319.) If the district court had appellate jurisdiction, then it had no jurisdiction in an independent equitable action to review alleged errors of the Board. (Pelican Transfer & Storage v. Kansas Corporation Commission, 195 Kan. 76, 402 P.2d 762; Neeley v. Board of Trustees, Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement System, 205 Kan. 780, 473 P.2d 72; Neagle v. Brooks, 203 Kan. 323, 454 P.2d 544.) See, also, Northern Natural Gas Company v. Dwyer, 208 Kan. 337, 492 P.2d 147, and Powers v. State Department of Social Welfare 208 Kan. 605, 493 P.2d 590.
The appellee relies heavily on Gray, supra, where we said that the Board acts quasi-judicially, but that no statutory provision for appeal to the courts is made from an order of the State Civil Service Board, either under the Civil Service statutes, or under the code of civil procedure. The Gray case was decided in 1958. Following the decision in that case, the Legislature enacted the new code of civil procedure effective January 1, 1964, which specifically provided for appeals from Administrative Boards exercising quasi-judicial functions. (K.S.A. 60-2101 [a].) Insofar as here pertinent, that statute reads:
It is noted the statute as written includes boards or officers exercising quasi-judicial functions.
In Gawith v. Gage's Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc., 206 Kan. 169, 476 P.2d 966, certain rules were laid down for determining whether an administrative agency performs legislative or judicial functions. We held:
It may be added that quasi-judicial is a term applied to administrative boards or officers empowered to investigate facts, weigh evidence, draw conclusions as a basis for official actions, and exercise discretion of judicial nature.
The Board is empowered by statute to hear appeals of dismissed employees and determine the reasonableness of the dismissal (K.S.A. 75-2949 [2]), and after considering the evidence, it may order reinstatement of the employee and the payment of loss of salary. (K.S.A. 75-2949 [3] [4].) The Board has authority to establish rules (75-2949 [5]); to conduct hearings; to administer oaths and take testimony; to issue subpoenas to compel attendance of witnesses; to take depositions, and to require the production of documents pertinent to any inquiry or investigation authorized by the Civil Service Act (75-2932 [1-4]).
Giving consideration to the various provisions of the Civil Service Act and the plenary power lodged in the Board by the Legislature, we conclude it exercises quasi-judicial functions in the performance of its duties. That being the case, the procedure for appellate review in the district court provided in K.S.A. 60-2101 (a) was exclusive, and the appellee was required to invoke that procedure within thirty days after entry of the Board's order of April 3, 1969, sustaining the action of the appointing authority dismissing her from service.
It follows the district court was without jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of the Board's order in the original action in equity, and it erred in rendering judgment granting the appellee relief.
*664 What has been said renders unnecessary the determination of other questions raised by the parties.
The case is remanded to the district court with directions to dismiss the equity action.
It is so ordered.
PRAGER, J., not participating.
OWSLEY, J., dissenting:
The majority opinion declares that plaintiff's remedy, after her dismissal was sustained by the Civil Service Board, was by appeal and that appeal was an exclusive remedy. This opinion disposes of this case on a procedural point without any concern for the gross injustice resulting therefrom. It is difficult to perceive why the majority of this Court approved this opinion without any effort to consider means of avoiding its harshness and unfairness. Perhaps after my period of infancy on the Court has passed I can develop a callousness in like situations, but I hope this never occurs.
Since a complete statement of the facts was not necessary to the majority opinion, reference thereto was limited. The trial court sustained a motion for summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and in support thereof prepared and filed a "Rationale of the Decision." An extended quote therefrom is necessary to disclose the basis of this dissent:
`1. Follow any statutory requirements, or;
The plaintiff herein, following her dismissal and before the *667 hearing before the Board, employed counsel. Her attorney, in counseling appellee, sought to advise her as to her right to appeal to the district court and as to her right to file an independent action, having in mind at all times the desire of appellee to be re-employed as a counselor within the year she remained eligible for re-employment.
Assuming that her counsel researched the law, and it appears that she did, she would have discovered the ruling of this court in Gray, which held that the dismissal of a civil service employee was a ministeral function and therefor unappealable. Since this was the only case decided by this court involving the Civil Service Board, she was fully justified in relying on it and advising her client to rely on it. In this situation, counsel could with confidence instruct her client to seek re-employment with her department since there was always available if she failed, an independent action to review the Board's decision. Counsel was also undoubtedly aware of our statement in City of Kansas City v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 187 Kan. 701, 360 P.2d 29, where we said:
After the time for appeal had passed, counsel undoubtedly discovered this court by its decisions in Lauber, Goetz, and Neeley initiated doubts as to the precedent established in Gray. Thus, counsel was duped. Possibly this has occurred before when this court has reflected and then corrected its decisions, but we hope not with the fatal consequences that occurred here.
It cannot be denied that the plaintiff lost her remedy as a result of the change in the law made after she had relied on the discarded rule. I do not believe that this court is charged to enforce jealously and blindly a new declaration of the law under circumstances which obviously and glaringly result in a wrong.
The majority opinion in effect overrules the Gray case. Ordinarilly, a new judicial rule operates retroactively and hence governs the instant case. In the occasional situation where there has been substantial reliance on a precedent that a court now finds unsound, an injustice occurs.
*668 I feel that there should be some exceptions to the usual retroactive operation of judicial decisions. The court is justified in this case in finding the rule of procedure declared in the majority opinion to have prospective application only.
I do not propose all deviations from precedence should operate prospectively, but only when retroactive application results in undue hardship upon a party that has justifiably relied on the old rule. The concern should be to not penalize a party for relying on a rule whose liquidation he could not reasonably foresee.
The application of the foregoing is not without support. In Gt. Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932), 77 L. Ed. 360, 53 S. Ct. 145, the Supreme Court of the United States speaking through Justice Cardozo affirmed a ruling of the Supreme Court of Montana that an old precedent should apply to the considered case, but the old precedent would be supplanted henceforth. The court said beginning at page 364:
We have also determined in this state that departure from precedent may be retroactive or prospective. In Carroll v. Kittle, 203 Kan. 841, 457 P.2d 21, we said:
The majority opinion cannot be justified on the grounds that there is no means to avoid the "shabby" treatment given the plaintiff by the defendant in view of what has been said herein.