Case Title: State v. Riddle

Citation: 

Docket Number: S46170

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2000-08-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  August 10, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
	Petitioner on Review,
	v.
DOUGLAS LEROY RIDDLE,
	Respondent on Review.
(CC 95CR3069FE; CA A93789; SC S46170)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted January 6, 2000.
	Richard D. Wasserman, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for petitioner on review.  With him on the brief
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds,
Solicitor General.
	Walter J. Ledesma, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause for respondent on review.  With him on the brief was David
E. Groom, Public Defender.
	Charles S. Tauman, Portland, filed a brief for amicus curiae
Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Leeson, Justices.**
	GILLETTE, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. 
	*Appeal from Douglas County Circuit Court,
	 William L. Lasswell, Judge.
	 155 Or App 526, 964 P2d 1056 (1998).
    **Kulongoski and Riggs, JJ., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
		GILLETTE, J.
		In this criminal case, we are asked to decide whether a
defendant may prevent an accident reconstruction expert, whom the
defense originally had hired to investigate the accident on which
the criminal charges were based, from testifying for the state
about an opinion that the expert formed while in the defendant's
employ.  We hold that a privilege to prevent such an expert from
testifying altogether cannot be based solely on the fact that the
state offers the expert testimony against the party that
originally employed the expert.  On the specific facts before us,
we affirm the ruling of the trial court that allowed the expert
in this case to testify and reverse the contrary decision of the
Court of Appeals. 
		The relevant facts are as follows:  While defendant was
driving across a bridge on a highway in Douglas County, his
pickup truck crossed the center line and struck an oncoming car. 
The collision killed two of the occupants of the oncoming car;
two others were injured.  Field sobriety tests performed at the
scene, and other physical tests performed later, indicated that
defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the
accident.  Defendant was charged with two counts of manslaughter,
ORS 163.118, one count of driving while intoxicated, ORS 813.010,
and other crimes.
		At defendant's trial, the state in its case-in-chief
called an accident reconstruction expert who testified that, in
his expert opinion, the cause of the accident was that defendant
had taken the turn before the bridge too fast, crossed the center
line, overcorrected, and "spun out of control," causing the side
of his truck to strike the oncoming car.  The defense, in its
case-in-chief, also called an accident reconstruction expert, who
opined that defendant had lost control of his vehicle because the
steering mechanism had become locked.  The state then sought to
introduce the testimony of a third accident reconstruction
expert, Myers, to rebut the testimony of defendant's expert. 
Defendant's lawyer objected to Myers's testimony on the ground
that Myers's opinion was privileged, because the defense
originally had hired Myers to determine the cause of the
accident.   
		The prosecutor acknowledged that he was aware of
Myers's previous connection with the defense and explained that
he had discovered that connection when he attempted to hire
another reconstruction engineer from Myers's firm.  The
prosecutor also explained that he had learned of Myers's theory
of the crash during informal settlement negotiations with
defendant's original lawyer, Bouck, and had contacted Myers at
that time, because Myers's theory seemed to be substantially
similar to that of the state's own accident reconstruction
expert.  Myers, the prosecutor reported, had disclosed his
opinion about the crash after "check[ing] to make sure that it
was not based on any privileged communication, that he didn't
base it on anything that the defendant had said."
		Defendant's lawyer argued that Bouck in fact had
conveyed privileged material to Myers and that Myers "at the very
least [was] tainted by that."  The court then invited the parties
to put on whatever testimony that they wished to present in the
matter, including Bouck's testimony.
		Bouck testified in camera on behalf of defendant.  He
stated that he had retained Myers for consultation purposes -- to
analyze the data and give his opinion about what had caused the
accident.  Bouck stated that he and his investigator had
accompanied Myers to the site of the crash to take measurements
and gather data, that he had discussed a few potential theories
of the crash with Myers, and that he had related to Myers at
least one statement that defendant had made to Bouck.  Bouck
testified that Myers had reported his opinion orally and that
Bouck did not ask for or receive a written report.  On cross-examination, Bouck and the prosecutor engaged in the following
colloquy:
	"Q.	Did [Myers] indicate to you what part if at all
your communication to him of what your client
might have said had played a part in his opinion
as to what occurred? 
	"A.	Not in so many words.  He said basically he's
going to look at this and he's going to tell me
scientifically what his opinion was as to what
happened.
	"Q.	Based on the physical evidence, not on what
someone might have said?
	"A.	Yeah.  He was going to tell me what he -- what his
opinion [was] based on measurements and things he
saw, he was going to tell me, he said good or bad
he was going to let me know what it is."   
		After Bouck testified, the trial court indicated that
neither the fact of Myers's previous employment by defendant nor
any statements that defendant had made to his lawyer or to Myers
were admissible, but that the court was open to persuasion about
the remainder of Myers's testimony.  After hearing the parties'
arguments, the trial court ruled that Myers would be allowed to
testify with some restrictions:  Myers could not mention any
prior connection with the defense, he could not refer to any
statements made by defendant or to information that came from
defendant, and he could not refer to any statements that he had
made to Bouck. 
		Myers testified the next day as part of the state's
rebuttal, limiting his testimony in the manner that the trial
court required.  After Myers testified and the state concluded
its rebuttal, the jury found defendant guilty of two counts of
criminally negligent homicide (lesser-included offenses to the
manslaughter charges), two counts of fourth-degree assault, and
one count of driving while under the influence of intoxicants.
		Defendant appealed, assigning error to the trial
court's decision to permit Myers to testify. (1)  Defendant argued
that Myers's opinion regarding the cause of the crash was
privileged, either under the attorney-client privilege or as
attorney work product.  A majority of the Court of Appeals,
sitting en banc, agreed with defendant that Oregon law "extends
the attorney-client privilege to the opinions of nontestifying
experts who rendered those opinions in anticipation of
litigation" and, therefore, reversed.  State v. Riddle, 155 Or
App 526, 536, 964 P2d 1056, mod on recons, 156 Or App 606, 969
P2d 1032 (1998).  We allowed the state's petition for review.   
		At trial, and in the course of this appeal, defendant
has offered alternative sources for his claim of privilege
respecting Myers's testimony:  OEC 503 (the attorney-client
privilege) and the "work-product" doctrine.  We begin with
defendant's argument regarding the attorney-client privilege,
which the Court of Appeals accepted as a proper ground for
excluding Myers's testimony.  The Court of Appeals' theory in
that regard appears to rest on the notion that OEC 503
incorporates some aspects of the common-law work-product
doctrine, including what that court characterized as the
"majority view" that the opinions of nontestifying experts are
protected by a "work-product" privilege.  Riddle, 155 Or App at
534-35.  The Court of Appeals' majority opined that some variant
of that "majority view" was adopted in a pre-Oregon Evidence Code
case, Brink et ux v. Multnomah County, 224 Or 507, 356 P2d 536
(1960), and that the approach of Brink is "reflected in the plain
language of OEC 503 [and] the legislative commentary on OEC 503." 
Riddle, 155 Or App at 540. 
		Because OEC 503 is the statutory embodiment of the
attorney-client privilege in this state, it is the necessary
starting point for any discussion of the scope of that privilege. 
Accordingly, we turn to OEC 503, beginning with its text and
context.  See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606,
610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (describing methodology).  OEC 503(2)
sets out the attorney-client privilege.  It provides, in part:
	"(2) A client has a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent any other person from
disclosing confidential communications made for the
purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional
legal services to the client:
	"(a) Between the client or the client's
representative and the client's lawyer or a
representative of the lawyer;
	"(b) Between the client's lawyer and the lawyer's
representative[.]"     
OEC 503(1)(b) defines "confidential communication" for purposes
of subsection (2) as 
	"a communication not intended to be disclosed to third
persons other than those to whom disclosure is in
furtherance of the rendition of professional legal
services to the client or those reasonably necessary
for the transmission of the communication." 
OEC 503(1)(e) defines "representative of the lawyer" as "one
employed to assist the lawyer in the rendition of professional
legal services."  
		In this case, there can be no doubt that Myers
qualifies as a "lawyer's representative" for purposes of OEC
503(2).  Bouck employed Myers to assist in developing defendant's
side of the case.  Neither is there any doubt that Myers and
Bouck engaged in confidential communication with one another or
that the purpose of that communication was to "facilitat[e] the
rendition of professional legal services."  The only question
with regard to the application of OEC 503(2) is whether Myers's
testimony contained or consisted of "confidential communications"
within the meaning of the rule. 
		Defendant and the Court of Appeals' majority construe
OEC 503(2) to mean that any testimony by Myers about the subject
that defendant had hired him to investigate falls within the
attorney-client privilege.  Translated into the terminology of
OEC 503(2), the question thus becomes:  Are Myers's opinions and
observations regarding the crash "confidential communications"
within the meaning of OEC 503(2)(a) solely because Myers
developed and communicated them to defendant's lawyer in the
course of his employment by defendant?       
		Referring to the text of OEC 503(2), the answer to that
question is "no."  The approach of the Court of Appeals majority
is to treat the privilege as coextensive with the relationship
between lawyer and expert.  However, the rule protects
communications, not relationships.  The statute does not define
"communication."  We therefore give the word its plain, ordinary
meaning.  See PGE, 317 Or at 611 (words of common usage given
plain, natural, and ordinary meaning, unless special meaning
intended).  A "communication" is an "interchange of thoughts or
opinions."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, 460 (unabridged
ed 1993) (emphasis added).  As that definition makes clear, ideas
and opinions can have an existence separate from the fact that
they are capable of being or even that they are communicated,
i.e., "interchanged."  
		In this case, Myers did communicate to Bouck about his
observations and opinions regarding the crash, and the state
clearly was not entitled, under the rule, to put before the jury,
either directly or indirectly, the fact of those communications. 
Neither would it be permissible to put questions to the expert
that would inform the trier of fact, indirectly, as to what those
communications were.  But the fact of that communication and its
content are distinguishable from Myers's opinions and
observations that were not derived from any communication between
Myers and defendant or Bouck.  OEC 503 extends a privilege to any
such communication, but that is as far as the words of the rule
can reach.  On their face, the words of the rule do not extend to
any opinion that the expert is able to segregate from the
communication.
		Defendant argues that OEC 503(2) is concerned with the
substance of a confidential communication and, therefore,
pertains to the content of Myers's report to Bouck, not just to
the form of that report or the fact that it was made.  Defendant
suggests, moreover, that State v. Keenan/Waller, 307 Or 515, 771
P2d 244 (1989), provides "context" on that point, in that it
contains dicta to the effect that, when disclosure of information
about a communication would amount to disclosure of the substance
of the communication, that information falls within the
privilege.  Defendant's argument misses the point on the present
facts, which involve an opinion that was not based on any
confidential communication.  OEC 503(2) clearly applies to any
confidential communications between Myers and defendant's lawyer. 
However, that does not mean that the substance of Myers's
opinion, which Myers would hold even if he never had reported it
to defendant's lawyer, also necessarily is privileged.  On its
face, OEC 503(2) does not extend so far.
		The Court of Appeals based its different construction
of OEC 503(2) on certain pre-Oregon Evidence Code cases and on a
general pronouncement that Oregon has codified certain aspects of
the work-product doctrine in OEC 503.  Riddle, 155 Or App at 531-32 n 1.  The court noted that the privilege and doctrine have
been treated as interrelated in other jurisdictions (2) and
suggested that the Legislative Commentary to OEC 503 invokes the
work-product doctrine by stating that the privilege applies to
"an expert who is hired to assist in rendering legal advice or to
help in the planning and conduct of litigation, but not one
employed to testify as a witness."  Id., quoting Legislative
Commentary to OEC 503, reprinted in Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Oregon
Evidence, 209-10 (3d ed 1996).  The first point, even if true,
necessarily relies on cases that do not purport to construe OEC
502(3) or to follow this court's statutory construction paradigm. 
They are not controlling.  With respect to the second point, the
Legislative Commentary places certain nontestifying experts into
the category of persons described at OEC 503(1)(e) whose
communications with a lawyer or client are privileged under OEC
503(2).  The Commentary in no way suggests that the nontestifying
experts themselves, or their opinions and analyses that may be
segregated from any such communications, also are insulated by
the privilege.  Neither point relied on by the Court of Appeals
supports that court's "incorporation" theory.
		The Court of Appeals also relied on a number of pre-Oregon Evidence Code cases -- primarily Brink.  However, neither
Brink nor any of the other cases discussed by defendant or the
Court of Appeals supports a construction of OEC 503(2) that
differs from the one that we have suggested.          
		Brink arose out of a county condemnation proceeding. 
The plaintiffs were dissatisfied with the amount fixed as damages
for the taking of their land and filed a complaint against the
county in circuit court.  In the course of the trial, the
plaintiffs called to the stand an appraiser, Kolberg, who had
been employed by the county to evaluate the property in question
but who had not been asked to testify for the county.  The county
objected, on grounds that are not entirely clear from the
opinion, that Kolberg could not be required to testify for the
plaintiffs.  The trial court indicated that it would permit the
plaintiffs to call Kolberg, but that it would not force Kolberg
to give his expert opinion.  On the stand, Kolberg stated that he
had investigated the property and had made a written report of
his findings to the county.  When asked to produce the report,
Kolberg said that he would not produce it unless ordered to do so
by the court.  The plaintiffs then asked Kolberg if he had made
an appraisal, and Kolberg stated that he only had made an
estimate of the damages.  When the plaintiffs asked about the
amount that Kolberg had estimated, the county objected, and the
court asked Kolberg if he would be willing to give his opinion. 
Kolberg testified that he was not, and some discussion followed
as to whether the court already had ruled against the plaintiffs
pursuing that line of questioning.  Ultimately, the court stated
that, in any event, the particular question was objectionable in
form, because a witness cannot give an opinion with respect to
damages.  Brink, 224 Or at 508-14.  The trial court suggested
that there might be some "proper method of approach toward the
adducing of the testimony in this matter" and added that it would
be glad to adjourn to chambers to clarify that point.  Id. at
514.  The plaintiffs indicated that they had no further
questions, and Kolberg was excused.  Subsequently, the jury
returned a verdict that awarded the plaintiffs an amount that was
only slightly higher than the amount that the county originally
had offered.  The plaintiffs appealed, assigning error to the
exclusion of evidence that they had sought to elicit from
Kolberg.  Id. at 508.
  		On appeal, this court held that the trial court's final
ruling -- that Kolberg could not be asked to testify directly as
to the amount of the plaintiffs' damages -- was correct and
adequately explained, and that, after that ruling, the
plaintiffs' failure to make an offer of proof or otherwise to
press for Kolberg's opinion undermined their claim of error.  Id.
at 516.  The court then went on to offer a second justification
for the exclusion of Kolberg's testimony.  After noting that
Kolberg had been employed to evaluate the property by the county
and that he had communicated "in regard to certain data relative
to this problem" with counsel, id. (internal quotation marks
omitted), the court said: 
"A communication made under the circumstances described
by defendant's counsel would fall within the privilege
extended to a client for communications with his
lawyer.  A communication 'by any form of agency
employed or set in motion by the client is within the
privilege.'"
Id. at 516-17 (italics in original; citations omitted; 
underscoring added).  
		Defendant contends that, in view of the facts of this
case, the foregoing statements necessarily reflect the view that
defendant espouses, viz., that an expert's opinion itself is a
confidential communication within the attorney-client privilege,
if that opinion was formed while in a party's employ.  In so
arguing, however, defendant ignores the remainder of the Brink
court's explanation:	   
"But the privilege is not available to the client if
the document which is claimed to be the privileged
communication was prepared by the client's agent in the
regular course of business without reference to an
existing or threatened lawsuit. * * * Plaintiffs
contend that the report sought to be shown in the case
at bar was made under such circumstances.  The record
indicates that the contrary is true. * * * We have,
then, an existing or threatened lawsuit at the time
Kolberg's report was made to defendant or to its
counsel, and the report was made for use in connection
with the litigation.  As we have said, this was
sufficient to bring the report within the privilege."
Id. at 517 (citations omitted; emphasis added).     
		It is clear from the repeated references to the
"document" and "report" in the foregoing paragraph that the Brink
court's comments about privilege were directed at Kolberg's
written report to the county.  That report is an item that would
fall squarely within the privilege under our construction of OEC
503(2), i.e., the report was a communication by Kolberg to the
county and most likely was considered confidential.  Defendant's
suggestion to the contrary notwithstanding, Brink does not hold
that Kolberg's opinion necessarily was privileged, and that case
does not persuade us that Oregon's pre-OEC law regarding the
attorney-client privilege differs in that respect from the
construction of OEC 503(2) that we have proposed. (3)
		We are equally unpersuaded that the other cases cited
by the parties have any relevance, for purposes of this case,
respecting the meaning of OEC 503(2).  For example, defendant
relies on a footnote in State v. Brown, 297 Or 404, 432 n 21, 687 P2d 751 (1984), that suggests that a criminal defendant
may search for a friendly polygraph examiner and then can prevent
the state from offering any evidence or commenting about the
examination if it goes badly.  But that footnote occurs in the
context of a wholly unrelated discussion about a defendant's
state of mind during a polygraph test; it does not address the
issue that is before us.
		We have rejected defendant's and the Court of Appeals'
various theories.  None overcomes our reading of the text of the
rule and its focus on "communication."  Neither is there any
contextual material that bears on the interpretive issue before
us.  We conclude that the meaning of OEC 503(2) is clear at the
first level of interpretation.  If an expert originally worked
for a party and can be deemed to be a representative of that
party's lawyer, then OEC 503(2) extends a privilege to any
confidential information or statements that the lawyer
communicated to the expert, as well as to the fact of and content
of the expert's confidential communications (i.e., written or
oral reports) to either the client or the lawyer.  However, OEC
503(2) does not render the expert per se incompetent to testify
on behalf of another party about segregated information or
opinions that the expert has formed without regard to any
confidential communication. 
				Defendant contends that, even if OEC 503(2) does not
permit him to have Myers's opinion excluded as privileged,
Myers's opinion qualifies as "attorney work product" and should
have been excluded on that ground.  Defendant notes that many
federal cases have recognized that lawyers often must rely on
investigators or other agents in their preparations for trial,
and therefore have extended the doctrine to materials prepared by
such investigators and agents.  For example, defendant quotes
from United States v. Nobles, 422 US 225, 238-39, 95 S Ct 2160,
45 L Ed 2d 141, 154 (1975):
	"At its core, the work-product doctrine shelters
the mental process of the attorney, providing a
privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare
his client's case.  But the doctrine is an intensely
practical one, grounded in the realities of litigation
in our adversary system.  One of those realities is
that attorneys often must rely on the assistance of
investigators and other agents in the compilation of
materials in preparation for trial.  It is therefore
necessary that the doctrine protect material prepared
by agents for the attorney as well as those prepared by
the attorney himself."
Defendant points out, too, that the doctrine has been used in
other jurisdictions not only to preclude discovery of reports and
materials generated by a nontestifying expert in the course of
his or her employment by the opposing party, but to exclude any
use of the expert's conclusions and opinions.  See, e.g., United
States ex rel Edney v. Smith, 425 F Supp 1038 (EDNY 1976), aff'd
556 F2d 556 (2d Cir 1977) (so holding).  
		Although cases from other jurisdictions can be
instructive, they are not binding on this court.  The testimony
at issue is not excludable on the basis of the work-product
doctrine unless such an application of that doctrine is dictated
in some Oregon source of law.  See OEC 402 (all relevant evidence
is admissible except as provided by Oregon Evidence Code, United
States and Oregon Constitutions, or Oregon statutory or
decisional law).  We already have discussed and rejected the
suggestion that some relevant aspect of the work-product doctrine
is incorporated into the Evidence Code as part of OEC 503(2).
		Defendant suggests that another statute, ORS
135.855(1), is relevant.  That statute provides, in part:
	"The following material and information shall not
be subject to discovery under ORS 135.805 to 135.873:
	"(a) Work product, legal research, records,
correspondence, reports or memoranda to the extent that
they contain the opinions, theories or conclusions of
the attorneys, peace officers or their agents in
connection  with the investigation, prosecution or
defense of a criminal action."
(Emphasis added.)  Defendant contends that ORS 135.855(1)(a)
shows that, in Oregon criminal cases, work product includes any
opinion formed by a lawyer's agent (i.e., an expert hired by a
lawyer) in connection with the lawyer's investigation,
prosecution, or defense of the underlying criminal action.  
However, for the reasons that follow, we are not persuaded that
ORS 135.855(1)(a) is proper authority for excluding Myers's trial
testimony in this case.
		The most immediate problem with the statute is that, by
its terms, it pertains only to discovery under ORS 135.805 et
seq.  At least on its face, it does not appear to make any
provision for an evidentiary exclusion.  Amicus Oregon Trial
Lawyers' Association suggests that that apparent limitation
cannot reflect the actual state of the law:  "It would seem
axiomatic," amicus argues, "that if the disclosure of such
'information' were protected from discovery before trial, it
would surely be protected from disclosure at trial."  The
accuracy of that axiom is not self-evident to this court, and
defendant has not offered any concrete demonstration that ORS
131.855(1)(a), which speaks to pretrial matters, also is directed
at protecting work product from disclosure at trial.  To the
contrary, we think that the specific, limited scope of ORS
135.855(1)(a) defeats amicus's argument.  See State v. Hartfield,
290 Or 583, 589, 624 P2d 588 (1981) (holding that scope of
separate paragraph of ORS 135.855(1) extended only to pretrial
discovery).  Although Hartfield dealt with ORS 135.855(1)(c), a
different exemption from pretrial discovery than the one at issue
here, its analysis and the commentary upon which that analysis
relies appear to be applicable equally to ORS 135.855(1)(a).  We
hold that ORS 135.855(1) focuses on pretrial discovery and does
not speak to matters outside of that scope. (4) 
		We turn, next, to the Oregon decisional law, to
determine whether there is separate authority for excluding the
testimony at issue on work-product grounds.  We know of only one
case from this court, Nielsen v. Brown, 232 Or 426, 374 P2d 896
(1962), that discusses that question, and it does not advance
defendant's cause.  
		In Nielsen, the plaintiff in a personal injury action
indicated that she wished to call as a witness a doctor whom the
defendant's lawyer had hired to examine the plaintiff and render
an opinion as to the extent of her injuries.  The defendant moved
to exclude the doctor's testimony on grounds of attorney-client
privilege, protection of attorney work product, and general
unfairness.  This court rejected all three of those theories as a
basis for preventing the doctor from testifying.  
 		The Nielsen court's comments with regard to the
defendant's work-product theory began by describing and quoting
with apparent approval from the leading federal case on attorney
work product, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 US 495, 67 S Ct 385, 91 L Ed
451 (1947).  The court then made a number of comments that
suggest that an expert's work and his or her ultimate opinion
with respect to a problem do not fit comfortably into the concept
of attorney work product.  Nielsen, 232 Or at 435-36 (citing
Grand Lake Drive In, Inc. v. Superior Court, 179 Cal App 2d 122,
129, 3 Cal Rptr 621 (1960)).  Later, the Nielsen court added:
	"We are not required to determine in this case
whether on the trial a party may compel his adversary
to produce the report of an expert employed by the
latter.  The question here is whether the expert can be
called as a witness by the party who did not employ him
and compelled to testify concerning his investigation,
examination, etc., and express his opinion on a
question within his professional knowledge.  Neither
the Hickman case nor any other that we have seen is
authority for the proposition that the information and
knowledge in the mind of the expert must be kept there
and away from the jury on the theory that they are the
work product of the lawyer."
Nielsen, 232 Or at 436-37.
		Defendant points out, correctly, that the Nielsen court
expressly confined its holding to the facts that were before it
and denied any intent to decide what the rule should be with
respect to experts who are hired to investigate an engineering or
other kind of problem.  See id. at 444-45 (limiting holding in
that manner).  That caveat, however, does not diminish the
message that the decision conveys -- that the Nielsen court
disapproved of the notion that the independent thought of an
expert becomes the work product of the attorney who hires the
expert.  More importantly, even if Nielsen cannot be read as
rejecting in all circumstances the idea that the opinion of a
nontestifying expert might be excluded under a work-product
theory, it certainly cannot be held up as authority in favor of
such an exclusion.    
		We conclude that there is no absolute privilege,
arising either out of OEC 503, the work-product doctrine, or this
court's cases, that prevents an expert whom a litigant has
employed to investigate a factual problem from testifying for the
other side as to the expert's thoughts and conclusions that are
segregated from confidential communications. (5)  However, we still
must consider defendant's argument that, under the particular
facts of this case, the trial court incorrectly allowed Myers to
testify regarding his opinion.  Defendant stresses that there is
undisputed evidence in the record that Bouck disclosed to Myers
at least one statement that defendant had made to Bouck, as well
as Bouck's own alternative theories of the case.  Defendant
argues that, when there is evidence that an expert has heard or
received such information, his or her testimony necessarily will
be affected by it, even if the expert denies that the information
affected his or her opinion.  Defendant suggests, in other words,
that when there is any evidence that the expert has been exposed
to confidential communications or attorney work product in the
course of his or her employment by a party, a trial court must
exclude that expert's testimony altogether if the party claims
privilege.
		We do not agree.  Whether an expert's testimony will
refer to, disclose, or be affected by confidential communications
or work product or, instead, can be segregated from both is a
question of fact, albeit a sometimes subtle and delicate one. 
When we are satisfied that a trial court correctly understands
the applicable legal principles, we review the court's
determination in that regard as we would any question of
preliminary fact, i.e., we will uphold the trial court's
determination if there is evidence in the record to support it. 
State v. Carlson, 311 Or 201, 214, 808 P2d 1002 (1991).
		As we explained earlier, there is evidence in the
record in this case that Bouck had related to Myers at least one
statement that defendant had made in confidence and that Bouck
had discussed several potential defense theories with Myers. 
Bouck also testified that Myers had stated that he would make an
independent investigation and that he would base his opinion
solely on the physical evidence in the police records and his own
observations.  Although defendant suggested to the trial court
the possibility that Myers's opinion might contain Bouck's work
product, in that it might be shaped by Bouck's discussion of his
theories, the trial court rejected that as unlikely, in view of
Myers's level of expertise.  The trial court determined and, on
the record before us, there is evidence to support that
determination, that, although Myers had been exposed to
confidential communications or attorney work product, his
testimony could and would be wholly segregated from those
matters.  There was no objection or argument during Myers's
testimony that Myers's actual testimony violated the trial
court's strictures or was derived in any way from anything that
Bouck had told Myers.  The trial court did not err.
		We emphasize the limited nature of our ruling.  We hold
only that, under OEC 503(2)(a), the lawyer/expert relationship
does not automatically disqualify an expert who was retained by
one party from testifying for some other party.  That expert is
disqualified from testifying, however, if his or her opinion
discloses, either directly or indirectly, or is based on, any
confidential communication between the lawyer, the client, and/or
the expert.  If an expert's opinion is so bound up with any such
communication that the expert cannot, in the view of the trial
court, segregate his or her opinion from some part of the
confidential communication, then the expert should not be
permitted to testify.  
		We also emphasize that the trial court has available a
broad range of tools to assure that the privilege is protected. 
In making the preliminary factual determination, for example, a
trial court itself may examine the expert, if doing so will
enhance the court's ability to assure that the opinion is
segregated from any confidential communication.  And, after the
expert is called as a witness, the trial court may use such
familiar devices as orders in limine, cautionary instructions,
and even grants of mistrial, if a party attempts to obtain any
confidential information or communication through the expert's
testimony. 
		The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Court of
Appeals' decision on the facts of this case was erroneous.  It
must be reversed, and the case must be remanded to the Court of
Appeals to consider defendant's other assignment of error.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.

1. 	Defendant also assigned error to the trial court's
exclusion of certain evidence under OEC 403.  The Court of
Appeals did not address that assignment of error, because it
reversed the trial court on the basis of defendant's first
assignment.  

2. 	See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 US 495, 67 S Ct 385,
91 L Ed 451 (1947) (recognizing work-product "privilege" for
memoranda, statements, and mental impressions of attorney that
did not fall within attorney-client privilege).

3. 	In so holding, we acknowledge that the Brink court
initially spoke in terms of a "basis for excluding Kolberg's
testimony."  Brink, 224 Or at 514  (emphasis added).  However, we
are persuaded that, in light of the court's repeated references
to Kolberg's report, that initial reference to "testimony" is not
meaningful.  Nor, we might add, does Brink include any discussion
that would support the Court of Appeals' theory that the
attorney-client privilege incorporates some component of the
work-product doctrine.  In fact, the Brink court expressly
declined to consider whether the work-product rule had any
application to the case.  Id. at 518-19.  

4. 	Defendant also argues that he is entitled to have
Myers's testimony excluded as work product under ORCP 36 B(3),
the civil law parallel to ORS 135.855(1)(a).  We reject that
suggestion, because ORS 135.855(1) is the specific statute
governing this topic.

5. 	We note in passing that the rule that we identify here
is a minority one, although it has the strong endorsement of a
leading expert in the field of evidence.  See Edward J.
Imwinkleried, The Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege
to Non-Testifying Experts:  Reestablishing the Boundaries between
the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Protection, 68
Washington U L Q, 19, 28-30 (1990) (discussing rule).