Case Title: PROFESSIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES V. SERENA GORDON, ET AL.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018-SC-000363-WC

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 2019-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4){C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION. RENDERED: JUNE 13, 2019 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Supreme Court of Kentucky 2018-SC-000363-WC PROFESSIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES APPELLANT ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS V. NO. 2017-CA-000679-WC WORKERS’COMPENSATION NO. 13-WC-92143 SERENA GORDON; APPELLEES HONORABLE ROLAND CASE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT REVERSING AND REMANDING Under Kentucky workers’ compensation law, one of an Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) primary roles is to make findings of fact. The role of the Workers’ Compensation Board (“the Board”), as well the courts, is to review those findings, not to make independent factual findings. In this case, Professional Financial Services (“PFS”) appeals from the Court of Appeals’ opinion affirming the opinion of the Board which upheld the decision of the ALJ awarding Serena Gordon disability and medical benefits for an injury she sustained when she tripped and fell in the parking lot leaving work one evening. Upon review, we hold that the ALJ’s determination was conclusory and insufficiently factually or legally based, and that the Board improperly filled in the factual blanks in affirming the ALJ’s decision. We therefore reverse and remand to the ALJ to make additional findings of fact and conduct a more complete legal analysis. I. Background. In February 2013, while walking to her parked car from PFS’s office building after work one evening, Gordon realized that she had forgotten her employer-issued iPad in the office. She turned back to retrieve it. As she returned to her car with the iPad, she tripped over a curb in the parking lot and injured her leg. PFS initially agreed that the injury was compensable, but later denied Gordon’s claim after concluding that her injury did not occur on its business premises. The ALJ agreed with PFS in that regard, finding that PFS neither owned the parking lot where the injury occurred, nor directed Gordon where to park.1 Nevertheless, the ALJ concluded that Gordon’s injury occurred during the course and scope of her employment with PFS since her purpose in turning back to the office building was to retrieve her employer-issued iPad so she could work from home. Specifically, the ALJ found that “[t]he act of retrieving the tablet to take same home for use was for the benefit of the employer and not for her personal benefit.” In a two-paragraph analysis of this issue, the . ALJ cited to only one case - from 1918 - for the general rule that workers’ 1 PFS is one of several tenants that lease office space from Fortune Business, Inc. The office complex is quite large, encompassing fifty acres, with eleven different office buildings and over 70 tenants. 2 compensation coverage can extend to injuries occurring outside the boundaries of the employer’s premises. Phil Hollenbach Co. v. Hollenbach, 181 Ky. 262, 204 S.W. 152 (Ky. 1918). PFS filed a petition for reconsideration and for additional findings of fact, which the ALJ summarily denied on grounds that the petition was “nothing more than a re-argument of the issues.” PFS appealed to the Board, challenging the ALJ’s conclusion and asking the Board to remand the claim for additional findings of fact and law by the ALJ to clarify which exception he relied on to award compensation and provide additional analysis as to why that exception applied. The Board, by a 2-1 vote, affirmed the ALJ, finding that Gordon should be compensated based on the “service to the employer” exception to Kentucky’s traditional rule that injuries sustained when workers are coming and going from work are not compensable (the “coming-and-going rule”). The Board opined that “Gordon had veered from the usual process of ‘coming and going’ to return to her office. This brief excursion was in service and of benefit to the employer.” Specifically, the Board found that “Gordon had reached her vehicle when she remembered the forgotten tablet. In our view, she did not resume regular ‘coming and going’ until she had again returned to her vehicle to resume her drive home. She was injured before she again reached her vehicle.” The Board acknowledged that the ALJ failed to specifically cite case law concerning the “service to the employer” exception to the “coming and going” rule, but nevertheless held that the ALJ’s findings of fact and analysis were sufficient to support the conclusion 3 that Gordon had deviated from her usual process of coming and going to retrieve the iPad, a deviation which benefitted PFS. A dissenting Board opinion opined that the case should be remanded for additional analysis on whether Gordon sustained a compensable work-related injury. Specifically, the dissent noted “[t]he ALJ did not perform an appropriate analysis as to whether either the ‘traveling employee’ exception, or the ‘some benefit’ exception, or both are applicable in accordance with the cases cited in the majority opinion. Professional Financial Services requested such analysis, which was denied by the ALJ. ... I would vacate and remand for a complete analysis.” By a 2-1 vote, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Board. In a two- paragraph discussion of the issue, the appellate court observed the distinction drawn in Kentucky workers’ compensation law when a worker is injured traveling to and from work: “[t]ravel is work related if it is for the convenience of the employer and not work-related if it is for the convenience of the employee.” Prof I Fin. Servs. v. Gordon, No. 2017-CA-000679-WC, 2018 WL 2749399, at *2 (Ky. App. June 8, 2018). The appellate court concluded: Here, despite PFS’s argument to the contrary, the ALJ applied controlling Kentucky law to the facts of the case and properly concluded Serena sustained a work-related injury. As the sole arbiter of witness credibility, see Miller v. East Kentucky Beverage/Pepsico, Inc., 951 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Ky. 1997), the ALJ accepted Serena’s testimony that she frequently worked from home using the tablet, a device she also noted could only be utilized for business purposes, and made the following finding based on that substantial evidence: “[Serena’s] act of retrieving the tablet to take same home for use was for the benefit of the employer and not for personal benefit.” Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in awarding 4 Serena benefits for her workplace fall. Id. A dissenting opinion disagreed, stating that the opinions of both the Board and the Court’s majority expanded, and incorrectly applied, Kentucky’s workers’ compensation law. Id., at *2. The dissent pointed out, Had Serena put the iPad in her briefcase when she left her office the first time and then fallen in the parking lot, she would not have been entitled to workers’ compensation because as the Board found, the coming-and-going rule would apply........ While I may agree with the Board and this Court’s majority that her return to her office the second time was in furtherance of her employer’s business, I believe they err in their determination that her return, second trip, from her employer’s place of business to her car is also covered. Once Serena had retrieved her iPad, the errand which benefitted her employer was complete. Id., at *2-3. This appeal followed. II. Standard of Review. “Our standard of review in workers’ compensation claims differs depending on whether we are reviewing questions of law or questions of fact.” Ford Motor Co. v. Jobe, 544 S.W.3d 628, 631 (Ky. 2018). With respect to an ALJ’s decisions on questions of law or an ALJ’s interpretation and application of the law to the facts, our standard of review is de novo. Id. (citation omitted). Regarding factual findings, “[t]he ALJ as fact finder has the sole authority to judge the weight, credibility, substance, and inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). KRS 342.285(2) and KRS 342.290 limit administrative and judicial review of an ALJ’s decision to determining whether the ALJ “acted without or in excess of his powers;” whether the decision “was procured by fraud;” or whether the decision was erroneous as a matter of law. Legal errors would include whether the ALJ 5 misapplied Chapter 342 to the facts; made a clearly erroneous finding of fact; rendered an arbitrary or capricious decision; or committed an abuse of discretion. Id. at 632 (citation omitted). Judicial review of a Board’s decision is governed by KRS 342.290, which reads: The decision of the board shall be subject to review by the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 111 of the Kentucky Constitution and rules adopted by the Supreme Court. The scope of review by the Court of Appeals shall include all matters subject to review by the board and also errors of law arising before the board and made reviewable by the rules of the Supreme Court for review of decisions of an administrative agency. Further, The function of further review of the [Board] in the Court of Appeals is to correct the Board only where the ... Court perceives the Board has overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice. The function of further review in our Court is to address new or novel questions of statutory construction, or to reconsider precedent when such appears necessary, or to review a question of constitutional magnitude. W. Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky. 1992). III. Analysis. At every stage of review in this case, PFS has argued that the ALJ failed to make adequate findings of fact or perform a complete legal analysis in support of its decision that Gordon’s injury was work-related. PFS maintains that the Board engaged in improper fact finding and misconstrued controlling law in applying the “service to the employer” exception since no substantial evidence supports its application to the “coming-and-going” rule under the present facts. Specifically, PFS argues the Board engaged in improper fact finding by stating that Gordon’s detour in service to the employer would have 6 ended when “she had again returned to her vehicle to resume her drive home.” PFS asserts that no evidence exists to support the implication that Gordon had reached her vehicle the first time before turning back; in fact, PFS cites to Gordon’s testimony that she was on the way to her car when she turned back. PFS argues that if the point at which Gordon turned back is determinative as to the time which the “service to the employer” exception applies, it was the prerogative of the ALJ, and not the Board, to make such a finding. We agree. This Court has held that parties to a workers’ compensation action are “entitled to a sufficient explanation by the ALJ of the basis for the decision.” Whittaker v. Rowland, 998 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Ky. 1999). Specifically, “workers’ compensation litigants are entitled to know the evidentiary basis for an ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, and an ALJ’s opinion must summarize the conflicting evidence concerning disputed facts, weigh the evidence to make findings of fact, and determine the legal significance of those findings.” Miller v. Go Hire Emp’t Dev., Inc., 473 S.W.3d 621, 630 (Ky. App. 2015) (citing Arnold v. Toyota Motor Mfg., 375 S.W.3d 56, 61-62 (Ky. 2012)). As noted by the ALJ in this case, a determination of whether an injury occurred within the course and scope of employment is a “fact sensitive analysis.” Here, the Board found that Gordon had “veered from the usual process of ‘coming and going’ to return to her office.” The Board concluded that Gordon’s detour in service to the employer would have ended when “she had again returned to her vehicle to resume her drive home.” However, as PFS points out, the ALJ’s opinion is devoid of any factual findings with respect to 7 Gordon “veering” or “detouring” from her usual “coming and going” and makes no reference to the “service to the employer” exception. The ALJ devotes pages to analyzing whether the parking lot in question was part of PFS’s operating premises, and ultimately holds that it was not, but then perfunctorily concludes in two paragraphs that Gordon’s injury was work-related because she was in the process of retrieving a work-issued iPad to perform work at home when she fell. On review, the Board fills in the blanks and connects the dots from the ALJ’s factual findings to reach the same conclusion, but through a more in depth and complete legal analysis. The ALJ did not make any findings as to exactly when Gordon’s activities became for the “benefit of the employer” and when they ceased. And the ALJ’s reliance on one case for the general rule that workers’ compensation coverage can cover injuries sustained outside an employer’s operating premises is insufficient to resolve the issue at bar, as demonstrated by the analysis in the Board’s majority opinion. While we do not opine whether Gordon’s injury is compensable, we do remand for the ALJ to perform an appropriate analysis and to make a determination supported by the record. IV. Conclusion. We reverse the Court of Appeals’ opinion and remand this case to the ALJ for further findings and analysis. Minton, C.J.; Buckingham, Hughes, Keller, VanMeter, and Wright, JJ., sitting. All concur. Lambert, J., not sitting. 8 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Ian Mathew Godfrey Goodrum & Downs, PLLC COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE SERENA GORDON: Paula Gay Richardson Richardson, Barber & Williamson, PSC COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE HONORABLE ROLAND CASE: Not Represented by Counsel COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD: Michael W. Alvey Office of Workers’ Claims 9