Case Title: Bell v. Jackson

Citation: 530 So. 2d 42

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1988-07-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
530 So. 2d 42 (1988)
Richard BELL
v.
Virginia G. JACKSON.
87-462.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 22, 1988.
Mitchell A. Spears, Montevallo, for appellant.
Clarence T. Hellums, Jr., Centreville, for appellee.
MADDOX, Justice.
This is a land dispute. The plaintiff, Virginia Jackson, filed an action to quiet title in the Circuit Court of Bibb County on October 2, 1986. The defendant, Richard Bell, denied the averments of the complaint, both in his individual capacity and in his representative capacity for the estate of his grandfather, Richard Anderson. The trial judge held an ore tenus hearing and viewed the land. He then rendered a judgment *43 quieting title in Jackson. Bell appealed.
The case was basically tried as a boundary line dispute. The issue was whether a certain barbed wire fence was the boundary line between the Bell and Jackson properties. The disputed parcel of land is approximately 3.34 acres of undeveloped pastureland in Bibb County. Jackson contended that the land was enclosed by a fence and was recognized as her property. On this appeal, Bell raises five issues.
First, Bell contends that in her complaint, Jackson failed to describe the land in question with the certainty required by Ala.Code 1975, § 6-6-541:
We find from the record that an appendix was attached to the complaint; that appendix contained the following description:
"PARCEL 3
"JACKSON PROPERTY BY ADVERSE POSSESSION OR ACQUIESCENCE
We hold that this metes and bounds description of the property, attached as an appendix to the complaint, fulfilled the requirements of § 6-6-541.
Second, Bell contends that the trial judge impermissibly shifted the burden of proof in this action to him. We disagree.
Stansell v. Tharp, 245 Ala. 270, 273, 16 So. 2d 857, 858-59 (1944).
We hold that the trial judge did not shift the burden of proof in this case. No presumption attends any party's designation of the boundary line, and the question *44 of where the true boundary lies is one for the trial judge.
Mardis v. Nichols, 393 So. 2d 976, 978 (Ala. 1981), quoting Salter v. Cobb, 264 Ala. 609, 88 So. 2d 845 (1956).
Bell's third through fifth arguments all relate in some way to the proof presented in this case. Our rule of review in cases such as this one is well settled.
When evidence is presented ore tenus in a boundary line dispute, the trial court's judgment establishing the boundary is presumed correct and need only be supported by credible evidence. Hodge v. Snider, 495 So. 2d 539, 540 (Ala.1986). The ore tenus rule, which on appeal accords a presumption of correctness to a trial court's findings, is particularly strong in boundary line disputes and adverse possession cases, and the presumption is further enhanced if the trial court personally views the property in dispute. Wallace v. Putman, 495 So. 2d 1072, 1075 (Ala.1986).
In the case at bar the trial judge heard ore tenus evidence and viewed the property. Therefore, if there is credible evidence in the record to support his judgment establishing the boundary, his judgment is due to be affirmed.
The trial judge issued a written order in which he recited facts from the case that supported his judgment. We have examined the record and we find his statements regarding the evidence to be supported. We also find the following credible evidence from the record that supports the trial judge's decision: A survey, made by a duly licensed surveyor, showing the boundaries of the land in dispute; testimony from witnesses that the fence was the boundary between the two parcels of land, that the fence had existed in its present location for over 30 years, and that the fence divided land that is very different in nature, one side being thick woods and the other cleared pastureland; and testimony from the man that maintained the land that the fence had been maintained by Jackson's predecessor in interest for 50 years and had been considered the property of Jackson's predecessor, that he had picked up pecans on the land with permission of Jackson's predecessor for over 50 years, that he had fished in a pond on the land with permission of Jackson's predecessors, that he had cleared brush on the land for seven years, and that he had planted and cultivated soybeans and other crops on the land. Another witness testified that she had lived on the land and was familiar with it, that the fence had been considered the boundary line between the parcels since at least 1930, and that the land had been used for grazing cattle and growing crops by Jackson's predecessors in interest until they transferred the land to Jackson.
Based on this evidence, the judgment of the trial court is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and ALMON, BEATTY and HOUSTON, JJ., concur.