Case Title: Welch v. Jones

Citation: 470 So. 2d 1103

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1985-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
470 So. 2d 1103 (1985)
James C. WELCH
v.
Robert D. JONES and Shirley Jones.
83-193.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 22, 1985.
Rehearing Denied May 10, 1985.
*1104 Ronald G. Davenport and J. Pelham Ferrell of Ferrell, Davenport & McKoon, Phenix City, for appellant.
C. Neal Pope and Paul D. Hermann of Pope, Hermann & Kellogg, Atlanta, Ga., and Sam E. Loftin, Phenix City, for appellees.
Stephen J. Pettit, Birmingham, for amicus curiae Alabama Defense Lawyers Association.
PER CURIAM.
Appellees' application for rehearing is granted. The original opinion is withdrawn, and the following opinion is substituted therefor.
This is an appeal from a judgment in two consolidated actions. Damages were recovered in each because of injuries suffered by Robert D. Jones from a fall while at work in the employ of James C. Welch Construction Company, a corporation. Mrs. Jone's action was for the loss of her husband's consortium.
The Joneses brought actions against United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company (USF & G), the workmen's compensation carrier; James C. Welch, president and owner of the corporate employer; and Swede Cornelius, the job superintendent. The counts charged the defendants with undertaking duties to make safety inspections and thereafter negligently failing to discover and correct or warn of the hazard that caused Mr. Jones's fall.
The claim against USF & G was dismissed on its motion for summary judgment. The remaining defendant denied negligence and alleged contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and statutory immunity from suit. After denial of numerous pretrial defense motions, the cases were tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Robert D. Jones in the amount of $800,000.00, and awarded Mrs. Jones $100,000.00. The trial court entered judgments on the verdicts and denied timely motions for J.N.O.V., a new trial, and remittiturs.
Defendant James C. Welch appeals from the final judgments and the denial of his post-trial motions.
Robert Jones was working as a carpenter for James C. Welch Construction Company on a project near Phenix City, Alabama, at the Chattahoochee Valley Community College on June 17, 1980, when he fell through an unbarricaded temporary sheet metal floor over an elevator shaft. He suffered fractures of a tibia, a vertebra, and a heel bone.
On appeal, Welch argues that Jones failed to prove Welch's assumption and breach of any duty to Jones with regard to his safety in the work place. A review of the trial transcript, however, reveals direct evidence to the contrary:
Transcript, pages 46-51.
Transcript, pages 104-107.
Transcript, pages 223-248.
Transcript, pages 249-270.
Transcript, pages 288-89.
Transcript, page 345.
Transcript, pages 372-397.
Transcript, pages 403-431.
Transcript, pages 437-441.
As the foregoing testimony plainly shows, Welch routinely received notification from USF & G's loss control representative of safety defects on Welch Construction Company jobs, which reports were sent specifically to Welch himself and not simply to the company. Welch frequently visited his jobsites and either directed that safety defects be cured at the time of his inspections or sent a memo to the job superintendent setting requirements regarding the defects that he had noted on his tour of the jobsite. Webb, of USF & G, testified that he dealt personally with Welch as the safety director for Welch Construction Company. Workers testified to the frequency of Welch's visits to the jobsites and the fact that Welch would go everywhere on a site during his inspections. Welch worked with the job superintendent, Cornelius, on the safety aspects of the CVCC project, but also dealt directly with the workmen when he noted an immediate safety violation. Welch himself testified as to his direct involvement in the safety of his employees on his jobs and that his job superintendents were designated as safety directors in architects' contracts because that was "what they expect to hear and this is what they accept." Further, testified Mr. Welch, his involvement with safety is common to all of his jobs.
We reemphasize that it is neither Mr. Welch's general superintendence over the CVCC construction project nor his overall role with regard to the jobsite that imposes upon him an individual duty of due care with respect to the safety of the instant plaintiff.
*1111 Fireman's Fund American Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 394 So. 2d 334, 347 (Ala.1980) (special concurring opinion of Jones, J.).
The record of the trial is replete with evidence that Welch, the third-party defendant pursuant to § 25-5-11, Code 1975, personally assumed the duty with regard to the plaintiff's safety at the very point where the accident in question occurred and that his breach of that duty proximately resulted in the plaintiff's injuries.
Finding no error in the trial judge's failure to grant the defendant's motion for directed verdict, we affirm the judgment appealed from.
APPLICATION FOR REHEARING GRANTED; ORIGINAL OPINION WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and FAULKNER, JONES, SHORES, BEATTY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
MADDOX and EMBRY, JJ., dissent.
MADDOX, Justice (Dissenting).
I concur in the result reached by the Court on original deliverance. Consequently, I would not grant rehearing; therefore, I respectfully dissent.
EMBRY, Justice (dissenting):
Swede Cornelius was the employer's superintendent on the jobsite and the corporate employee responsible for safety on that site. He was so designated at the preconstruction conference and in the contract documents. He controlled the day-to-day operations and reported to James C. Welch about twice each week. Cornelius was supervising his crew and overseeing subcontractors on the day of the accident.
James C. Welch is president and owner of James C. Welch Construction Company, Jones's employer. He visited the jobsite in question once or twice each week to coordinate with his superintendent and routinely received carbon copies of loss control reports from USF & G's safety inspectors.
He caused them to be forwarded to the respective responsible job superintendents, including Cornelius at this job, for action. If he happened upon an unsafe condition on a site, he called it to the attention of the superintendent, but his duties did not include responsibility for safety. Furthermore, he was not on the site on the day of the accident.
The dispositive issue in this appeal is: Did the trial court erroneously deny Welch's motion for a directed verdict for failure to show the existence of an actionable duty of care? I would answer this query in the affirmative and reverse and render.
Under the evidence in this case, Jones did not satisfy his burden to prove, with specificity, any duty of Welch owed to Jones, or assumed by Welch, and a breach of it out of which Jones's claim for recovery arose. See Clements v. Webster, 425 So. 2d 1058 (Ala.1982).
For the reasons stated, I would reverse the judgments below and here enter judgment in behalf of James C. Welch.
On Application for Second Rehearing
PER CURIAM.
This Court's original opinion reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for a new trial. On appellees' application for rehearing, the original opinion was withdrawn and the judgment was affirmed. On appellant's subsequent application for rehearing, his counsel, in a respectful and professional manner, earnestly insist that this Court, in affirming the judgment, addressed only the propriety of the "directed verdict" issue (the only issue addressed in the original opinion) and omitted any reference to the remaining issues presented for appellate review. We acknowledge that, because the decision of this Court on rehearing addressed the single issue of the propriety of denying the motion for directed verdict, which was the basis of the reversal in the original decision, it might appear that the Court did not consider the remaining issues.
*1112 This is not the case, and we have again studied the original briefs and after a painstaking review of the evidence of record and the cited authorities relative to each of the issues presented, we remain of the opinion that the judgment appealed from is due to be affirmed. One issue, howeverwhether the trial court erred in not ordering a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidenceis deserving of our treatment.
In the instant case, appellant's newly discovered evidence is the alleged testimony of a co-worker of Robert Jones who spontaneously contacted appellant's counsel after trial. Concededly, the co-worker's testimony might tend to support appellant's defense of contributory negligence. But, for appellant to prevail on his motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence, he must show that the evidence at issue:
Eastwood Lands, Inc. v. Walter Carlos Anderton, Inc., 412 So. 2d 247, 249 (Ala. 1982); Forest Investment Corporation v. Commercial Credit Corporation, 271 Ala. 8, 12, 122 So. 2d 131, 135 (1960).
Appellant undisputedly meets the first prerequisitethat the evidence must have been discovered since trial. Appellees do not argue that appellant discovered this witness and his testimony before or during trial. Appellees, however, do argue that appellant fails the second prerequisite that the evidence could not have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence before trial. According to appellees, if appellant had exercised due diligence in pretrial discovery, he would have discovered this witness and his testimony. The trial judge apparently agreed with appellees that appellant did not exercise due diligence, because he denied appellant's motion for a new trial.
The applicable standard of review is stated in Gilmer v. Salter, 285 Ala. 671, 676, 235 So. 2d 813, 817 (1970):
Although we agree that the issue of appellant's due diligence is a valid and close factual one, it is for this very reason that we cannot hold that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the appellant failed to exercise due diligence in locating this witness and securing his testimony. Having failed to meet the prerequisites for the granting of a new trial upon newly discovered evidence, appellant is not entitled to the requested relief. We consider the affirmance previously entered in this case to be proper.
OPINION EXTENDED; APPLICATION FOR REHEARING OVERRULED.
TORBERT, C.J., and FAULKNER, JONES, ALMON, SHORES, BEATTY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
MADDOX and EMBRY, JJ., dissent.