Case Title: State ex rel. Druggan v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 1999-Ohio-335

Docket Number: 19962395

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-06-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Druggan v. Indus. Comm., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 1999-Ohio-335.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. DRUGGAN, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE, v. INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLEE; KINNEAR DIVISION, HARSCO CORPORATION, 
APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Druggan v. Indus. Comm. (1999), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Workers’ compensation — Industrial Commission does not abuse its discretion in 
ordering claimant to submit to a medical examination on the issue of 
ongoing transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation treatment, when. 
(No. 96-2395 — Submitted March 9, 1999 — Decided June 23, 1999.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 
95APD08-1023. 
 
In 1986, appellant-claimant, Harold W. Druggan,  injured his low back in 
the course of and arising from his employment with appellee Kinnear Division, 
Harsco Corporation.  In 1992, Harsco, as a self-insured employer, authorized 
treatment by a transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation (“TENS”) unit.  The 
next year, claimant was found to be permanently and totally disabled.  Harsco 
challenged that decision in mandamus.  See State ex rel. Kinnear Div., Harsco 
Corp. v. Indus. Comm. (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 258, 673 N.E.2d 1290, hereinafter 
referred to as “Harsco I.” 
 
Sometime in 1994, Harsco questioned the continuing appropriateness of 
TENS treatment.  This inquiry was based on (1) an article in the New England 
Journal of Medicine1 that questioned the value of TENS units, and (2) what Harsco 
considered to be nonresponsive answers from claimant’s attending physician on 
continued TENS use. 
 
After protracted administrative proceedings, a staff hearing officer for 
appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio ruled on May 17, 1995 that Harsco had 
the right to examine claimant on the issue of continued necessity for TENS 
 
 
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treatment.  The order did not indicate whether the matter was to be reset for 
hearing after the medical examination took place.  Claimant responded with a 
complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, challenging 
Harsco’s right to an examination.  Harsco filed a cross-complaint, challenging the 
commission’s right to limit the exam to the necessity for TENS.  The court denied 
both writs, and the parties have appealed and cross-appealed to this court as of 
right. 
 
Before the completion of briefing in this case, we decided Harsco I.  In that 
case, we ordered the commission to vacate the award of benefits for permanent 
total disability, after finding that the commission had ignored certain vocational 
evidence and had not addressed the issue of claimant’s retirement. 
__________________ 
 
Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. Jaffy, 
for appellant and cross-appellee. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Michael A. Vanderhorst, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. 
 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur and Karl J. Sutter, for appellee and cross-
appellant. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  One question is before us:  Did the commission abuse its 
discretion in ordering claimant to submit to a medical examination on the issue of 
ongoing TENS treatment?  Upon review, we find that it did not. 
 
R.C. 4123.651(A) states: 
 
“The employer of a claimant who is injured or disabled in the course of his 
employment may require, without the approval of the administrator or the 
industrial commission, that the claimant be examined by a physician of the 
employer’s choice one time upon any issue asserted by the employee or a 
 
 
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physician of the employee’s choice or which is to be considered by the 
commission.  Any further requests for medical examination shall be made by the 
commission which shall consider and rule on the request.” 
 
Former Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-09(B)(3) also provided: 
 
“The bureau, board or commission may, at any point in the processing of an 
application for benefits, require the employee to submit to a physical examination 
* * *.”  (Emphasis added.)  1986-1987 Ohio Monthly Record 915; see current 
Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-09(A)(4) (substantively the same). 
 
These provisions present a formidable obstacle to any successful allegation 
of an abuse of discretion by the commission — an obstacle that claimant does not 
overcome. 
 
Claimant initially decries the examination as inappropriate, since Harsco had 
previously authorized the TENS unit.  Authorization of treatment, however, does 
not confer a right to treatment forever.  Treatments can lose their effectiveness 
over time, and some treatment can actually be dangerous if prolonged.  Oversight 
is, therefore, crucial and supports Harsco’s present inquiry.  Harsco’s 1992 TENS 
authorization should not preclude inquiry in 1994, particularly given the supporting 
evidence Harsco submitted. 
 
Claimant also argues that the May 17, 1995 staff hearing officer’s failure to 
order a post-exam hearing equates to an implicit decision to permit further TENS 
use, negating the need for an exam.  This logic fails.  A presumption of regularity 
accompanies commission orders.  State ex rel. Rouch v. Eagle Tool & Machine Co. 
(1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 197, 26 OBR 289, 498 N.E.2d 464.  Therefore, it must be 
assumed that the commission would not have ordered the examination unless it 
questioned the need for continued treatment. 
 
Claimant next asserts that his permanent total disability forecloses any 
further evaluation.  However, permanent total disability does not immunize 
 
 
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claimant from further examination.  State ex rel. Smothers v. Mihm (1994), 69 
Ohio St.3d 566, 634 N.E.2d 1017, on which claimant relies, says only that a 
permanent total disability claimant cannot be re-examined on permanent total 
disability absent new and changed circumstances.  It did not prohibit a first-time 
examination on an issue unrelated to permanent total disability. 
 
Claimant last maintains that examination was inappropriate because it was 
going to exceed the scope of determining the need for TENS.  This is pure 
speculation, since claimant never attended the exam.  Moreover, it assumes 
Harsco’s disregard of a specific staff hearing officer order limiting the exam to 
TENS use.  Claimant’s fears, therefore, are baseless. 
 
For all of these reasons, we affirm the court of appeals’ judgment and find 
that the commission did not abuse its discretion in ordering an exam. 
 
Turning to Harsco’s cross-appeal, Harsco opposes the commission’s 
decision to limit the examination to TENS use only.  However, the May 17, 1995 
hearing transcript reveals that Harsco specifically agreed to that limitation.  
Therefore, as the court of appeals observed, Harsco “cannot complain that the 
order was too narrowly drafted.” 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1. 
Deyo, Walsh, Martin, Schoenfeld & Ramamurthy, A Controlled Trial of 
Transcutaneous Electrical Nerve Stimulation (TENS) and Exercise for Chronic 
Low Back Pain (1990), 322 New England J. of Medicine 1627.