Case Title: McCarthy v. Taylor

Citation: 

Docket Number: 123622

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2019-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Illinois Official Reports 
 
Supreme Court 
 
 
McCarthy v. Taylor, 2019 IL 123622 
 
 
 
Caption in Supreme 
Court: 
 
GERALD S. McCARTHY, Appellee, v. ROZLYN TAYLOR et al. 
(Marvin Gray, Appellant). 
 
 
 
Docket No. 
 
123622 
 
 
 
Filed 
Modified upon 
denial of rehearing 
 
 
June 20, 2019 
 
October 1, 2019 
 
 
 
Decision Under  
Review 
 
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that 
court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. 
Kathleen M. Pantle, Judge, presiding. 
 
 
Judgment 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. 
Counsel on 
Appeal 
Marvin Gray, of Chicago, appellant pro se. 
 
Tanya D. Woods, of Chicago, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Digitally signed 
by Reporter of 
Decisions 
Reason: I attest 
to the accuracy 
and integrity of 
this document 
Date: 2020.11.02 
11:46:11 -06'00'
 
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Justices 
JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with 
opinion. 
Justices Thomas, Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and 
opinion. 
Chief Justice Karmeier concurred in part and dissented in part, with 
opinion. 
Justice Garman concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion. 
Justice Neville took no part in the decision. 
 
 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
In this appeal, we address, as a matter of first impression, whether a court may impose 
sanctions in the form of attorney fees under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137(a) (eff. July 1, 
2013) against a plaintiff to compensate an attorney defending himself against a frivolous cause 
of action. Here, plaintiff and defendant are both experienced licensed attorneys who proceeded 
pro se in the action below.  
¶ 2 
 
Plaintiff, Gerald S. McCarthy, filed a complaint against defendant, Marvin Gray. Plaintiff’s 
complaint was dismissed, and the Cook County circuit court entered an order imposing Rule 
137 sanctions against him, in favor of defendant. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the circuit 
court erred in dismissing his tortious interference claim and issuing Rule 137 sanctions. The 
appellate court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s tortious interference claim and the finding 
that plaintiff violated Rule 137 in filing that frivolous claim, but it reversed the circuit court’s 
finding that defendant was entitled to attorney fees and vacated that award. McCarthy v. 
Abraham Lincoln Reynolds, III, 2006 Declaration of Living Trust, 2018 IL App (1st) 162478.1 
We reverse that part of the appellate court judgment vacating defendant’s attorney fee award 
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The remainder of the appellate 
court’s judgment is affirmed. 
 
¶ 3 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 4 
 
In 2006, Abraham Lincoln Reynolds III created and executed the “A. L. Reynolds III 2006 
Declaration of Living Trust,” naming himself as the trustee. Cherie Coles, the romantic interest 
of Reynolds, was named as successor trustee. Plaintiff was appointed as the second successor 
trustee. The trust granted 10% of the residuary estate to plaintiff, 80% to Coles, and 10% to 
Elaine Lawell. If Coles predeceased Reynolds, however, her 80% share would go to plaintiff, 
and plaintiff’s 10% share “shall [be] extinguished and be given to Reverend Wayne Reynolds, 
Senior.” The schedule of property attached to the trust document included bank accounts, 
 
 
1Plaintiff’s complaint duplicatively named the trust as an entity and trustee Rozlyn Taylor in her 
trustee and individual capacities. As trustee, Taylor held legal title to the property and bore the capacity 
to compromise or contest claims against the trust estate. 760 ILCS 5/4.11 (West 2012); see Campbell 
v. Campbell, 2017 IL App (3d) 160619, ¶ 17 (“In a conventional trust, the trustee holds the legal title 
to the property and the beneficiary holds the equitable title.” (quoting Restatement (Third) of Trusts ¶ 2 
cmt. d (2003))). 
 
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savings bonds, a “1996 Mercury Grand Marquee [sic]” automobile, personal and household 
items, and a condominium apartment located in Chicago. Defendant was Reynolds’s attorney 
who prepared the trust document. 
¶ 5 
 
Coles passed away in 2007. In 2010, Reynolds executed an amendment to the trust 
clarifying and augmenting the power of the trust to include the powers to borrow money on 
behalf of the trust and to pledge and encumber property of the trust. The amendment further 
provided that “the real property owned by [the trust] is encumbered or conveyed by [Reynolds] 
to secure payment” for a “Home Equity Conversion Mortgage” through Wells Fargo Bank. 
¶ 6 
 
Reynolds committed suicide on December 15, 2012. Defendant contacted plaintiff after 
Reynolds’s death and notified him that Reynolds had amended the trust before his death. 
Defendant informed plaintiff that Reynolds came to defendant’s home prior to his suicide and 
presented defendant with an amended trust document he “had made in his own handwriting.” 
The amendments named Rozlyn Taylor as successor trustee. Reynolds and Taylor had become 
intimately involved after Coles’s death. The amendments granted 20% of the residuary estate 
to plaintiff, 70% to Taylor, and 10% to Devon Morris. The schedule of property was amended 
to delete certain bank accounts and savings bonds as “gone” and added new bank and 
individual retirement accounts. The schedule of property also substituted a 1998 Oldsmobile 
for the 1996 Mercury.2 
¶ 7 
 
Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in 2013, in another action that is not the subject of this 
appeal, alleging that Reynolds’s amendment to the trust was invalid. Defendant testified as a 
witness at the trial. The circuit court ruled against plaintiff, finding that Reynolds’s handwritten 
amendment to the trust naming Taylor as the successor trustee was valid. The appellate court 
affirmed. McCarthy v. Taylor, 2014 IL App (1st) 132239. On September 26, 2014, plaintiff 
filed a petition for leave to appeal with this court. We denied leave to appeal. McCarthy v. 
Taylor, No. 118293 (Ill. Nov. 26, 2014).  
¶ 8 
 
On June 9, 2014, plaintiff filed a pro se five-count complaint, the subject of this appeal, 
against Taylor, in her capacity as trustee and individually, and defendant. In relevant part, 
plaintiff presented two counts against defendant: (1) alleging defendant breached his fiduciary 
duty to plaintiff as a beneficiary of the trust and (2) alleging defendant tortiously interfered 
with plaintiff’s share of the trust by making false statements and presenting misleading 
evidence against him in the 2013 case. In response, defendant filed a combined motion to 
dismiss pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-
619.1 (West 2012)). 
¶ 9 
 
On February 27, 2015, the circuit court dismissed plaintiff’s tortious interference claim 
with prejudice pursuant to section 2-619(a)(4) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(4) (West 
2012)) based on the doctrine of res judicata, because plaintiff’s action essentially asked the 
circuit court to relitigate the issues determined in the 2013 case, namely, the veracity of the 
handwritten trust amendment. The court also dismissed plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty 
claim but on the basis of his failure to present a sufficient claim pursuant to section 2-615 of 
 
 
2An inventory filed by the trustee in this action indicates the total value of estate assets together 
with items in the trust that included the value of the condominium ($88,000, subject to a $44,000 
mortgage) to be approximately $105,400, less the mortgage on the condominium, for a value of the 
remaining assets totaling approximately $61,400. 
 
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the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2012)). Plaintiff was granted leave to amend his complaint 
on the breach of fiduciary duty claim. 
¶ 10 
 
On March 27, 2015, plaintiff filed an amended complaint containing one count against 
defendant for breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiff alleged defendant had a duty to act with due 
care in providing plaintiff with services related to the trust. On August 25, 2015, the circuit 
court again dismissed plaintiff’s claim against defendant, stating: 
 
“McCarthy has not alleged any facts which would establish that Gray owed him a 
fiduciary duty. McCarthy has cited no legal authority for the proposition that a trust 
attorney owes a fiduciary duty to the trust’s beneficiaries as a matter of law. Since 
McCarthy and Gray were not otherwise in privity, McCarthy would need to allege facts 
which would show his eligibility for an exception to the rule. However, McCarthy has 
failed to allege facts to support that any contract was entered into for his benefit, or the 
benefit of all the beneficiaries. Since McCarthy has failed to make any more than a 
bare-bones assertion that a fiduciary duty exists, he has not alleged the essential 
elements of his cause of action.” 
¶ 11 
 
Defendant then filed a motion seeking sanctions under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 
(eff. July 1, 2013), including an award for attorney fees and an award for costs, against plaintiff. 
In support of his request for sanctions, defendant alleged that plaintiff made false statements 
in his complaint and that he and plaintiff did not have an attorney-client relationship. Defendant 
requested sanctions in the amount of $11,232.55 as a result of having to defend against 
“plaintiff’s unfounded, fallacious and specious allegations and pleadings.” Defendant later 
amended the sanction expense to $12,106.03 for the time expended in defending against the 
case as of November 13, 2015. 
¶ 12 
 
The circuit court entered an order granting in part and denying in part defendant’s motion 
for Rule 137 sanctions. The court found that plaintiff’s cause of action against defendant for 
tortious interference was frivolous and, therefore, subject to Rule 137 sanctions. The court 
concluded, however, that sanctions were not appropriate for the breach of fiduciary duty claim. 
The circuit court later entered a corrected order clarifying that it found Rule 137 sanctions were 
warranted only for the tortious interference claim. The court entered a sanction award in 
defendant’s favor for $9907.98, including $102.28 in costs for parking and postage fees. 
¶ 13 
 
Plaintiff appealed, contending that the circuit court erred in dismissing his tortious 
interference claim based on res judicata and issuing Rule 137 sanctions. Plaintiff also 
contended that the circuit court erred in awarding fees as a sanction against him in favor of 
defendant. 
¶ 14 
 
The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s tortious interference claim and its 
finding that plaintiff violated Rule 137 in filing that frivolous claim. However, the appellate 
court reversed the circuit court’s finding that defendant was entitled to attorney fees and 
vacated that award on the basis that a pro se attorney is not entitled to receive attorney fees. 
2018 IL App (1st) 162478. We allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 
315 (eff. Apr. 1, 2018). 
 
¶ 15 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 16 
 
Defendant, proceeding pro se, has elected to allow his petition for leave to appeal to stand 
as his brief in this case. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(h) (eff. Apr. 1, 2018). Although plaintiff proceeded 
 
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pro se in the circuit court, he subsequently retained counsel to represent him in the appeal 
process. 
¶ 17 
 
The issue in this appeal is whether a court may impose sanctions in the form of attorney 
fees under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137(a) (eff. July 1, 2013) against a plaintiff to 
compensate an attorney defending himself against a frivolous cause of action. Interpretation of 
the Illinois Supreme Court rules is governed by the same principles as statutory interpretation. 
Lake Environmental, Inc. v. Arnold, 2015 IL 118110, ¶ 12; People v. Santiago, 236 Ill. 2d 417, 
428 (2010). Our goal is to ascertain and give effect to the drafters’ intention. People v. 
Campbell, 224 Ill. 2d 80, 84 (2006). This court begins our interpretation with the language of 
the rule, given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. O’Brien, 197 Ill. 2d 88, 90 (2001). 
When the language of the rule is clear and unambiguous, we will apply the rule as written 
without resort to further aids of statutory construction. O’Brien, 197 Ill. 2d at 90-91. “The 
interpretation of a supreme court rule, like the interpretation of a statute, is a question of law 
that we review de novo.” Santiago, 236 Ill. 2d at 428. “[B]ecause Rule 137 is penal in nature, 
it is narrowly construed.” Lake Environmental, 2015 IL 118110, ¶ 12. 
¶ 18 
 
Rule 137(a) provides, in relevant part: 
“Every pleading, motion or other document of a party represented by an attorney shall 
be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall 
be stated. *** The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that 
he has read the pleading, motion, or other document; that to the best of his knowledge, 
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and 
is warranted by existing law or in a good-faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost 
of litigation. *** If a pleading, motion, or other document is signed in violation of this 
rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person 
who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include 
an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses 
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other document, including a 
reasonable attorney fee.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 137(a) (eff. July 1, 2013). 
¶ 19 
 
The plain language of Rule 137 authorizes a court to impose sanctions against a party or 
counsel for filing a motion or pleading that is not well grounded in fact; that is not supported 
by existing law or lacks a good-faith basis for the modification, reversal, or extension of the 
law; or that is interposed for any improper purpose. It is settled that “[t]he purpose of Rule 137 
is to prevent abuse of the judicial process by penalizing claimants who bring vexatious and 
harassing actions.” Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County of Du Page, 195 Ill. 2d 257, 285-86 
(2001); see also In re Estate of Wernick, 127 Ill. 2d 61, 77 (1989) (noting that the purpose of 
section 2-611 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, ¶ 2-611), the 
predecessor to Rule 137, was to “penalize the litigant who pleads frivolous or false matters, or 
who brings a suit without any basis in the law”). In other words, the clear purpose of Rule 137 
is to prevent the filing of false and frivolous lawsuits. Cult Awareness Network v. Church of 
Scientology International, 177 Ill. 2d 267, 279 (1997). 
¶ 20 
 
Nothing in the plain language of Rule 137(a) precludes imposition of a sanction for filing 
of a frivolous lawsuit in the form of an award of fees in favor of a pro se defendant who is also 
 
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an attorney. The committee comments to Rule 137 also contain no express intended prohibition 
on imposing a sanction against a plaintiff in the form of attorney fees for filing a frivolous 
lawsuit in favor of a party who is a pro se attorney. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 137, Committee Comments 
(adopted June 14, 2013). The parties have not cited any Illinois case, nor has our research 
revealed any Illinois case, where a court has considered whether a monetary sanction for 
violation of Rule 137(a) may include attorney fees for time spent by a pro se litigant who is an 
attorney defending against a plaintiff’s frivolous pleadings. Thus, the issue here is one of first 
impression. 
¶ 21 
 
In this case, the appellate court relied on this court’s decision in Hamer v. Lentz, 132 Ill. 
2d 49 (1989), to conclude that the circuit court did not have authority to grant attorney fees as 
a remedy under Rule 137. In Hamer, this court held that an attorney appearing pro se as the 
plaintiff in an action brought pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (Ill. Rev. 
Stat. 1987, ch. 116, ¶ 201 et seq.) was not entitled to attorney fees. Hamer, 132 Ill. 2d at 63. 
Notably, Hamer involved the fee-shifting provisions of the FOIA rather than sanctions under 
Rule 137.  
¶ 22 
 
In Hamer, we recognized that the purpose of the fee-shifting provision of the Illinois FOIA 
is to ensure its enforcement, and that “is accomplished by removing the burden of legal fees, 
which might deter litigants from pursuing legitimate FOIA actions.” Hamer, 132 Ill. 2d at 61-
62. We explained that the fee-shifting provision was not “intended as either a reward for 
successful plaintiffs or as a punishment against the government” and that “legal fees do not 
present a barrier to a pro se lawyer seeking to obtain information.” Hamer, 132 Ill. 2d at 62. 
We also recognized that one of the goals of the Illinois FOIA fee-shifting provision “is to avoid 
unnecessary litigation by encouraging citizens to seek legal advice before filing suit.” Hamer, 
132 Ill. 2d at 62. Additionally, we also opined that “[t]he most effective way to deter abusive 
fee generation” by unscrupulous lawyers “is to deny fees to lawyers representing themselves.” 
Hamer, 132 Ill. 2d at 62-63. 
¶ 23 
 
The appellate court acknowledged that there was no Illinois case law applying Hamer to a 
Rule 137 motion and that “the purpose of Rule 137 is, in relevant part, to curb the filing of 
frivolous pleadings.” 2018 IL App (1st) 162478, ¶ 29. The appellate court further 
acknowledged that plaintiff’s tortious interference claim “was undoubtedly a frivolous cause 
of action.” 2018 IL App (1st) 162478, ¶ 29. Nevertheless, the appellate court determined that 
pro se attorneys are not entitled to attorney fees under Rule 137. 2018 IL App (1st) 162478, 
¶ 29. 
¶ 24 
 
The appellate court reasoned that Rule 137 is penal in nature and must be strictly construed. 
2018 IL App (1st) 162478, ¶ 29. The appellate court also relied heavily on cases involving fee-
shifting provisions. See Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1991) (holding, two years after 
the Hamer decision, that a pro se attorney was not entitled to recover attorney fees under 42 
U.S.C. § 1988 (1988)); Uptown People’s Law Center v. Department of Corrections, 2014 IL 
App (1st) 130161, ¶ 25 (following Hamer and holding that a private entity whose attorneys 
were salaried employees was not entitled to an award of attorney fees under Illinois FOIA 
because they did not actually incur legal fees); Brazas v. Ramsey, 291 Ill. App. 3d 104, 110 
(1997) (holding that nonlawyer pro se litigants are barred from collecting fees under Illinois 
FOIA); Aronson v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development, 866 F.2d 1, 
5 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that plaintiff, who was attorney acting pro se, was not entitled to 
 
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attorney fees under federal FOIA). Relying on this fee-shifting precedent, the appellate court 
reversed the circuit court’s finding that defendant was entitled to attorney fees under Rule 137 
and vacated that award, holding that a pro se attorney is not entitled to receive attorney fees 
under Rule 137. 2018 IL App (1st) 162478. 
¶ 25 
 
Following the appellate court’s decision in this case, and while this appeal was pending, 
this court issued another decision that relied on the rationale in Hamer. See State ex rel. Schad, 
Diamond & Shedden, P.C. v. My Pillow, Inc., 2018 IL 122487. In My Pillow, this court held a 
law firm that brought a qui tam claim under the Illinois False Claims Act (740 ILCS 175/1 
et seq. (West 2012)), using its own lawyers, was not entitled to an award of attorney fees. My 
Pillow, 2018 IL 122487, ¶ 37. Section 4(d)(2) of the False Claims Act (740 ILCS 175/4(d)(2) 
(West 2012)) contains a fee-shifting provision. In My Pillow, this court acknowledged that 
“Illinois has long followed the ‘American rule’ regarding the award of attorney fees.” My 
Pillow, 2018 IL 122487, ¶ 17. “Under that rule, each party to litigation must normally bear its 
own litigation expenses, regardless of who won,” and “[p]revailing parties are prohibited from 
recovering their attorney fees from the losing party absent express authorization by statute or 
by contract between the parties.” My Pillow, 2018 IL 122487, ¶ 17. 
¶ 26 
 
In My Pillow, we recognized that in Willard v. Bassett, 27 Ill. 37 (1861), our court expressly 
rejected the notion that an attorney who represents himself or herself in a legal proceeding may 
charge a fee for professional services in prosecuting or defending the case. My Pillow, 2018 IL 
122487, ¶ 22. In Willard, the issue concerned whether an attorney, who is the administrator of 
an estate, is entitled to an allowance against the estate for his professional services. The court 
recognized in Willard that the attorney was entitled to reasonable compensation for 
administering the estate but that he was not entitled to an additional fee for legal services 
rendered by him. Willard, 27 Ill. at 38. My Pillow quoted Willard’s rationale: 
“ ‘To allow him to become his own client and charge for professional services in his 
own cause, although in a representative or trust capacity, would be holding out 
inducements for professional men to seek such representative place[s] to increase their 
professional business, which would lead to most pernicious results. This is forbidden 
by every sound principle of professional morality as well as by the policy of the law.’ ” 
My Pillow, 2018 IL 122487, ¶ 22 (quoting Willard, 27 Ill. at 38). 
¶ 27 
 
My Pillow recognized that “our court has continued to adhere to the principle that it is 
contrary to the public policy of Illinois to allow an attorney ‘to become his own client and 
charge for professional services in his own cause.’ ” My Pillow, 2018 IL 122487, ¶ 23 (quoting 
Cheney v. Ricks, 168 Ill. 533, 549 (1897) (following Willard in holding that where one of the 
complainants in a partition suit was an attorney who prosecuted the suit, he was not entitled to 
recover attorney fees)). My Pillow relied on Hamer in determining, “[t]o the extent that a 
lawyer elects to proceed pro se in a case for which the legislature has provided statutory 
authorization for an award of attorney fees, he or she therefore has no attorney fees to claim 
and is not entitled to an award of fees under the statute.” My Pillow, 2018 IL 122487, ¶ 24 
(citing Hamer, 132 Ill. 2d at 62-63). We also recognized that in Kay, 499 U.S. at 437-38, the 
United States Supreme Court reached the same conclusion when applying a federal fee-shifting 
statute. My Pillow, 2018 IL 122487, ¶ 24. We noted in My Pillow that Hamer has been applied 
in other contexts. See, e.g., Kehoe v. Saltarelli, 337 Ill. App. 3d 669, 678 (2003) (pro se 
attorney not entitled to an award of attorney fees in defending against malpractice action); In re 
 
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Marriage of Pitulla, 202 Ill. App. 3d 103, 117-18 (1990) (rule that attorneys appearing pro se 
are not entitled to recover attorney fees cited with approval in dissolution action); In re 
Marriage of Tantiwongse, 371 Ill. App. 3d 1161, 1164 (2007) (law firm not entitled to an 
award of attorney fees for work done by its own lawyers in collecting fees owed to firm by 
client). 
¶ 28 
 
We find that Hamer and its progeny are distinguishable because those cases did not involve 
Rule 137 sanctions to compensate a pro se attorney defending himself against frivolous claims. 
The essential underlying policy of Rule 137 of discouraging frivolous or harassing litigation is 
furthered by imposing sanctions in the form of an award of attorney fees in favor of a pro se 
attorney defending against meritless claims. See Sundance Homes, 195 Ill. 2d at 285-86; In re 
Estate of Wernick, 127 Ill. 2d at 77. Here, defendant did not initiate or otherwise invite the 
frivolous pleadings. Nevertheless, defendant was forced to defend against the frivolous claims 
filed by plaintiff, also an attorney. If the policy of Rule 137 sanctions is to deter frivolous 
pleading and litigation, it would be illogical to deny attorney fees to pro se attorneys defending 
themselves in such matters. 
¶ 29 
 
The policy considerations underlying our decisions in Hamer and My Pillow on fee-shifting 
provisions are not present when a court awards sanctions under Rule 137. Here, sanctions are 
intended as a punishment against the party who abuses the judicial process, not as a reward to 
a successful pro se attorney who is defending against a frivolous lawsuit. The concern 
articulated in Hamer and My Pillow on deterring abusive fee generation by lawyers who initiate 
litigation is not present when sanctions are imposed against a plaintiff who files frivolous 
pleadings. This case does not involve awarding attorney fees to an attorney bringing suit as a 
plaintiff in his own name. Rather, defendant was forced to expend his time defending a 
frivolous lawsuit, as well as pursuing sanctions clearly provided for by Rule 137. 
¶ 30 
 
Other courts addressing this issue have similarly held that a pro se attorney defendant may 
be awarded attorney fees as part of a sanction for efforts in defending against a frivolous 
complaint. See Burke v. Elkin, 51 N.E.3d 1287, 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that, 
“[d]espite the American Rule, *** a party to a civil action may recover attorney fees incurred 
defending against a frivolous action or an action litigated in bad faith” and recognizing that 
Indiana had adopted the majority rule permitting an attorney representing himself to recover 
an award of attorney fees for time and effort spent defending against a frivolous lawsuit); Stiles 
v. Kearney, 277 P.3d 9 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012), review denied, 287 P.3d 11 (Oct. 10, 2012) 
(table) (pro se defendant who is an attorney can receive attorney fees for his effort in defending 
against complaint as part of sanction imposed against plaintiff for violation of rule in filing 
lawsuit); Keaty v. Raspanti, 2003-1080, p. 8 (La. App. Cir. 2/4/04); 866 So. 2d 1045 (“To hold 
that an attorney who must defend himself or herself cannot recover reasonable attorney’s fees, 
including his or her own lost time and expenses in defending himself or herself [against 
frivolous litigation], would frustrate the purpose of the statute [to deter frivolous litigation] and 
possibly reward those who persist in maintaining litigation such as that found in this case.”); 
Friedman v. Backman, 453 So. 2d 938 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (pro se defendant lawyer is 
entitled to attorney fees under statute allowing sanctions against plaintiff for filing frivolous 
pleadings). We find these cases persuasive. 
¶ 31 
 
We reiterate that “[t]he purpose of Rule 137 is to prevent abuse of the judicial process by 
penalizing claimants who bring vexatious and harassing actions.” Sundance Homes, 195 Ill. 
 
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2d at 286. To hold that an attorney cannot recover reasonable attorney fees in defending himself 
against frivolous litigation would clearly frustrate the purpose of Rule 137 and unfairly reward 
those who persist in maintaining frivolous litigation. 
¶ 32 
 
We hold that, under Rule 137, a court is authorized to impose sanctions in the form of 
attorney fees under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137(a) (eff. July 1, 2013) against a plaintiff to 
compensate an attorney defending himself against a frivolous cause of action. Accordingly, we 
reverse that part of the appellate court decision holding to the contrary and remand with 
directions to conduct further proceedings on the issue of the proper amount of Gray’s circuit 
court attorney fee award. That part of the appellate court decision affirming the circuit court’s 
dismissal of plaintiff’s tortious interference claim and finding that plaintiff violated Rule 137 
is affirmed. 
¶ 33 
 
In his prayer for relief on his petition for leave to appeal, defendant also requests that this 
court impose sanctions against plaintiff under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 375 (eff. Feb. 1, 
1994) in the form of damages and the reasonable costs of defending the instant “frivolous” 
appeal. Defendant requests reasonable attorney fees, presumably for plaintiff taking an appeal 
from the trial court’s ruling. Rule 375(b) provides that “[a] reviewing court may impose a 
sanction upon a party or an attorney for a party upon the motion of another party or parties, or 
on the reviewing court’s own initiative where the court deems it appropriate.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 
375(b) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). Nothing in the record indicates that defendant filed any motion with 
the appellate court requesting sanctions against plaintiff for filing a frivolous appeal. 
Nonetheless, we remand this matter to the appellate court for further proceedings on this 
matter. 
 
¶ 34 
 
 
 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶ 35 
 
For the above reasons, we reverse that part of the appellate court judgment vacating Gray’s 
attorney fee award and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
¶ 36 
 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. 
 
¶ 37 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE KARMEIER, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
¶ 38 
 
I agree with Justice Garman’s analysis insofar as she concludes that an award of “attorney 
fees” is inappropriate in this circumstance because there is no attorney-client relationship and 
thus no “attorney fees” have been incurred. I also agree with her assessment of what the 
majority is actually trying to accomplish: “[G]iven that a pro se attorney does not incur legal 
fees, the majority is essentially awarding ‘attorney fees’ to defendant to ‘compensate’ him, not 
for the fees he incurred to obtain legal representation, but for the opportunity costs he chose to 
forgo.” Infra ¶ 64. Without going further, Justice Garman would apparently leave a pro se 
defendant to bear the brunt of a plaintiff’s abusive litigation without recompense and allow the 
plaintiff to benefit from a defendant’s decision to proceed pro se. That outcome seems to me 
inconsistent with the purpose and language of the rule; that is the result the majority is straining 
to avoid. “The purpose of Rule 137 is to prevent abuse of the judicial process by penalizing 
claimants who bring vexatious and harassing actions.” Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County of 
Du Page, 195 Ill. 2d 257, 285-86 (2001); see Ill. S. Ct. R. 137 (eff. July 1, 2013). A pro se 
defendant is no less victimized by a vexatious and harassing action because he is pro se, nor is 
 
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the abusive plaintiff less deserving of sanction. By focusing on the happenstance that this 
defendant is an attorney, and twisting the definition of “attorney fees” to cover the time the 
defendant spent away from his practice, the majority’s holding compensates this defendant and 
penalizes this plaintiff, but it leaves in analytical limbo—or worse—all other pro se defendants 
who are victimized by a plaintiff’s abuse of the judicial process. On the other hand, although 
Justice Garman recognizes that “appropriate sanctions” “may include an order to pay the other 
party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred,” it is not clear that she would 
allow a pro se defendant to be compensated in an amount that reflects the “opportunity *** he 
chose to forgo,” i.e., the loss of livelihood occasioned by the need to respond to a plaintiff’s 
vexatious and harassing action. (Emphases omitted.) Infra ¶ 64. I believe Rule 137 allows for 
that element of compensation.  
¶ 39 
 
Rule 137 uses the phrase “appropriate sanction” broadly. It lists two of the compensatory 
items that an order for sanctions “may include”: defendant’s “reasonable expenses incurred” 
and “attorney fees.” As our appellate court has observed, the words “include” or “including” 
are ordinarily terms of enlargement, rather than restriction, and indicate that items enumerated 
are not meant to be exclusive. Gem Electronics of Monmouth, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 
286 Ill. App. 3d 660, 667 (1997), aff’d, 183 Ill. 2d 470 (1998); Friends for Murray Center Inc. 
v. Department of Human Services, 2014 IL App (5th) 130481, ¶ 22 (“[T]he word ‘including’ 
generally does not connote exclusivity, but is ordinarily interpreted as a term of enlargement.”). 
This court has interpreted the word “include” in the same manner. In People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 
2d 312, 330-31 (2007), this court expounded upon the meaning of the term at some length: 
 
“According to Black’s Law Dictionary, ‘include’ means: 
 
‘To contain as a part of something. The participle including typically 
indicates a partial list . But some drafters use phrases such as including without limitation 
and including but not limited to—which mean the same thing.’ (Emphases in 
original.) Black’s Law Dictionary 777-78 (8th ed. 2004). 
The law dictionary refers the reader to the term ‘namely,’ which means: 
 
‘By name or particular mention; that is to say . The term indicates what is 
to be included by name. By contrast, including implies a partial list and 
indicates that something is not listed.’ (Emphasis in original.) Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1049 (8th ed. 2004). 
 
Similarly, the editor of Black’s Law Dictionary observes in another work that: 
 
‘[I]ncluding is sometimes misused for namely. But it should not be used to 
introduce an exhaustive list, for it implies that the list is only partial. In the 
words of one federal court, “It is hornbook law that the use of the word 
including indicates that the specified list … is illustrative, not exclusive.” Puerto 
Rico Maritime Shipping Auth. v. I.C.C., 645 F.2d 1102, 1112 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 
1981).’ (Emphases in original.) B. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal 
Usage 431 (1995).”  
¶ 40 
 
Clearly, the listing of “reasonable expenses” and “attorney fees” in the rule was not meant 
to be exhaustive. Indeed, if the drafters of the rule had intended only “reasonable expenses” 
and “attorney fees” incurred, the phrase “appropriate sanctions” would be superfluous. When 
 
- 11 - 
 
interpreting supreme court rules, we are guided by the same principles applicable to the 
construction of statutes, and that being the case, we are here obliged to avoid a construction 
that renders a part of the rule superfluous or redundant and instead presume that each part of 
the rule has meaning. See People v. Salem, 2016 IL 118693, ¶¶ 11, 16.  
¶ 41 
 
If the phrase “appropriate sanctions” is to encompass something more than “reasonable 
expenses” and “attorney fees,” and as the point of the rule is to punish the plaintiff by 
compensating the defendant for the costs of defending a frivolous suit, the defendant’s loss of 
income attributable to that defense would reasonably be included within the ambit of 
“appropriate sanctions.” Discretionary imposition of that element of cost upon a plaintiff who 
has initiated and perpetuated abusive litigation, as a means to make an innocent defendant 
whole—be that defendant an attorney, doctor, mechanic, or a practitioner of any other 
vocation—would seem to be a reasonable application of the rule. Interpreting the rule in this 
manner validates the language of the rule and advances its purpose as well. To do otherwise 
would allow an abusive plaintiff to benefit from a defendant’s decision to proceed pro se and 
limit the circuit court’s ability to mete out egalitarian justice to those who may well be without 
the means to hire an attorney.3  
¶ 42 
 
Applying the foregoing principles here, defendant is not entitled to “attorney fees” because, 
as demonstrated by Justice Garman, there was no attorney-client relationship and no attorney 
fees were generated. However, defendant may be entitled to loss of income attributable to the 
time he spent away from his practice defending against this frivolous lawsuit. Those two things 
may be, but are not necessarily, the same.  
¶ 43 
 
I would reverse the judgment of the appellate court and remand this cause to the appellate 
court for consideration of defendant’s request for Illinois Supreme Court Rule 375 (eff. Feb. 
1, 1994) sanctions, directing the appellate court to thereafter remand to the circuit court for a 
redetermination of “appropriate sanctions” consistent with the principles here expressed. 
 
¶ 44 
 
JUSTICE GARMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
¶ 45 
 
The majority concludes, as a matter of first impression, that a court may impose sanctions 
in the form of attorney fees under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137(a) (eff. July 1, 2013) against 
a plaintiff to compensate an attorney defending himself against a frivolous action. For the 
following reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶ 46 
 
First, as this court explained in State ex rel. Schad, Diamond & Shedden, P.C. v. My Pillow, 
Inc., “the real question before us is not what the law should permit but rather what the law, as 
written, does permit.” 2018 IL 122487, ¶ 34. Rule 137 must be “strictly construed when 
determining what persons come within [its] operation.” See id. My Pillow demonstrates: 
“Applying such a construction to section 4(d)(2) of the Act, we see nothing therein to 
suggest that when the General Assembly authorized recovery of ‘reasonable attorneys’ 
fees and costs’ in qui tam actions, it intended to change the established common-law 
 
 
3We should bear in mind that the imposition of Rule 137 sanctions is a matter within the discretion 
of the trial court. Lake Environmental, Inc. v. Arnold, 2015 IL 118110, ¶ 16. In the event a defendant 
decides to retain counsel and the trial court determines that plaintiff’s conduct is not so egregious as to 
warrant the imposition of sanctions, the defendant will be liable for his own attorney fees, which may 
amount to much more than his own loss of income.  
 
- 12 - 
 
rule in Illinois that litigants who choose to represent themselves rather than retain 
counsel incur no compensable attorney fees even if they are themselves lawyers and 
even if they have brought the action on behalf of their own law firm.” Id. 
¶ 47 
 
Here, the majority attributes little value to the fact that, for over 150 years, pro se attorneys 
have not been permitted to obtain attorney fees for their own work.4 See id. ¶ 22. Accordingly, 
if the drafters intended the term “attorney fees”5 to be interpreted more broadly, i.e., to apply 
in the context of Rule 137 sanctions where no attorney-client relationship exists and thus no 
attorney fees have been incurred, 6  the drafters most likely would have made such an 
understanding explicit, either in the plain language of the rule or in a committee comment.  
¶ 48 
 
Second, the majority dismisses the appellate court’s reasoning because it relied upon cases 
involving fee-shifting provisions. The majority also states that the “concern articulated in 
Hamer and My Pillow on deterring abusive fee generation by lawyers who initiate litigation is 
not present.” Supra ¶ 29; see Hamer v. Lentz, 132 Ill. 2d 49 (1989); My Pillow, 2018 IL 122487. 
Interestingly, however, the appellate court based its holding upon other policy reasons: (1) that 
the potential to recover attorney fees enables potential plaintiffs to obtain competent and 
independent counsel and, in a similar vein, an attorney who proceeds pro se is deprived of 
independent judgment; (2) that, in Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 437 n.7 (1991), the United 
States Supreme Court indicated in a footnote that the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship is critical in establishing an objective assessment of meritorious claims; (3) that, 
“as in Hamer, courts consistently have considered the fact that pro se attorneys are not 
burdened by legal fees, such that the fees create a barrier to seeking representation”; and 
(4) that “courts have highlighted that nonattorney pro se litigants are not entitled to fees for the 
time they spend litigating their own cases; therefore, pro se attorneys should not be treated 
differently.” McCarthy v. Abraham Lincoln Reynolds, III, 2006 Declaration of Living Trust, 
2018 IL App (1st) 162478, ¶ 30.  
¶ 49 
 
It is not made clear in the majority opinion how not one of the enumerated policy reasons 
above carry over, in whole or in part, to the Rule 137 context. Also, the majority disregards 
the appellate court’s decision due to a concern—abusive fee generation—to which the 
appellate court attached no weight.  
¶ 50 
 
Third, and in connection with my first concern, Hamer and My Pillow both clearly 
observed that a pro se attorney does not incur legal fees. Hamer, 132 Ill. 2d at 62 (“A lawyer 
representing himself or herself simply does not incur legal fees.”); My Pillow, 2018 IL 122487, 
¶ 31 (“in this case, there was nothing that could fairly be characterized as an attorney-client 
relationship from which an obligation or need to pay an attorney fee might arise”). Courts and 
 
 
4Although attorney fees were awarded to a pro se attorney in a single appellate court case, 
Department of Conservation v. Lawless, 100 Ill. App. 3d 74 (1981), the reasoning is unpersuasive, 
particularly in light of this court’s later decisions in Hamer v. Lentz, 132 Ill. 2d 49 (1989), and My 
Pillow, 2018 IL 122487. 
 
5Black’s Law Dictionary defines “attorney’s fee” as “[t]he charge to a client for services performed 
for the client, such as an hourly fee, a flat fee, or a contingent fee.” Black’s Law Dictionary 154 (10th 
ed. 2014).  
 
6Black’s Law Dictionary defines “pro se” as “[f]or oneself; on one’s own behalf; without a lawyer” 
or as “[o]ne who represents oneself in a court proceeding without the assistance of a lawyer.” Black’s 
Law Dictionary 1416 (10th ed. 2014). 
 
- 13 - 
 
litigants are left with no explanation as to how pro se attorneys incur or become liable to pay 
attorney fees in the Rule 137(a) context but not pursuant to the provisions at issue in Hamer or 
My Pillow. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 137(a) (eff. July 1, 2013) (“reasonable expenses incurred because 
of the filing of the pleading, motion or other document, including a reasonable attorney fee”).  
¶ 51 
 
Fourth, the majority defers to out-of-state case law holding “that a pro se attorney 
defendant may be awarded attorney fees as part of a sanction for efforts in defending against a 
frivolous complaint.” Supra ¶ 30; see Burke v. Elkin, 51 N.E.3d 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016); 
Stiles v. Kearney, 277 P.3d 9 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012); Keaty v. Raspanti, 2003-1080, p. 8 (La. 
App. 4 Cir. 2/4/04); 866 So. 2d 1045; Friedman v. Backman, 453 So. 2d 938 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1984). I do not find these cases persuasive. 
¶ 52 
 
As the majority notes, Burke held that “ ‘a party to a civil action may recover attorney fees 
incurred defending against a frivolous action or an action litigated in bad faith.’ ” Supra ¶ 30 
(quoting Burke, 51 N.E.3d at 1288). For this proposition, Burke cited Ziobron v. Crawford, 
667 N.E.2d 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), another Indiana Court of Appeals decision. Burke, 51 
N.E.3d at 1288-89. Ziobron, in turn, distinguished Kay and another Indiana case on the basis 
that those cases involved attorney fees that were authorized by a fee-shifting statute. 667 
N.E.2d at 207-08. Ziobron noted that it was not aware of another Indiana case pertaining to 
attorney fees sought in the context of a malicious prosecution case. See id. at 208. However, 
the Ziobron court explained its holding: 
“the majority rule permits an attorney representing himself to recover an award of 
attorney’s fees for his time and effort in defending a frivolous lawsuit. Friedman v. 
Backman, 453 So. 2d 938 (Fla.App. 1984); Quick & Reilly, Inc. v. Perlin, 411 So.2d 
978 (Fla.App. 1984). The rationale of this rule is, ‘as the saying goes, “a lawyer’s time 
and advice are his stock in trade.” ’ Friedman, 453 So.2d at 938.” Id. 
¶ 53 
 
In Marion County Election Board v. Bowes, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that a pro se 
attorney was not entitled to recover attorney fees or litigation expenses under the Indiana 
Access to Public Records Act for missed work and other employment opportunities. Marion 
County Election Board v. Bowes, 53 N.E.3d 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Marion reasoned, 
“despite prevailing on the merits, Bowes is not entitled to recover attorney fees as there 
are none to recover. Even if a pro se litigant happens to be a lawyer, no attorney fees 
are earned unless independent counsel is engaged. As the United States Supreme Court 
recognized in Kay, ‘the word “attorney” assumes an agency relationship,’ one that 
cannot exist between an appellant and himself. [Citation.] The Kay Court highlighted 
the point by noting several definitions of the word ‘attorney,’ all of which emphasize 
the agency aspect[.]” Id. at 1207.  
¶ 54 
 
Nonetheless, the pro se attorney in Marion argued in part that he was entitled to attorney 
fees based on the court’s earlier decision in Ziobron. Id. at 1209. Though it did not overrule 
Ziobron, Marion called Ziobron’s reasoning into question by noting that 
“[a]lthough another panel of this Court awarded attorney fees in Ziobron, we first 
disagree with the Ziobron Court’s characterization of Ziobron’s potential compensation 
as ‘attorney’s fees.’ [Citation.] Again, use of the word ‘attorney’ indicates an agency 
relationship between lawyer and client, which did not exist in Ziobron.”Id.  
¶ 55 
 
Moving on, the majority cites Stiles, 277 P.3d 9. There, the Washington Court of Appeals 
relied on its decision in Leen v. Demopolis, 815 P.2d 269 (Wash. App. 1992), which held that 
 
- 14 - 
 
an attorney appearing pro se could recover attorney fees because pro se attorneys must take 
time from their practices to prepare and appear just like any other attorney. Stiles, 277 P.3d at 
16 (citing Leen, 815 P.2d at 277). In Stiles, the Washington Court of Appeals rejected the 
argument that it should instead follow Kay, reasoning that Kay was distinguishable, as it 
involved the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006)). Id.  
¶ 56 
 
As to Keaty, a Louisiana Court of Appeal observed in a footnote that: 
 
“We note that to permit a lawyer to recover his or her fees representing himself or 
herself in a case for article 863 sanctions while not permitting a non-lawyer to recover 
the time and expenses that he or she has incurred while defending a sanctionable 
pleading, may seem unfair. That issue is not before us and is reserved for another day; 
however, we do not read article 863 as prohibiting a non-lawyer from recovering his or 
her lost time and expenses in an article 863 matter.” Keaty, 2003-1080, p. 8 n.6 (La. 
App. 4 Cir. 2/4/04); 866 So. 2d 1045. 
¶ 57 
 
Though dicta, Keaty clearly acknowledged that its holding could be perceived as unjust. 
Keaty also did not explain how its reading of article 863 could be such that a pro se nonlawyer 
could recover attorney fees.  
¶ 58 
 
Finally, the majority cites Friedman, 453 So. 2d 938. Friedman stated that it seemed logical 
to award attorney fees to a pro se attorney because, “as the saying goes, ‘a lawyer’s time and 
advice are his stock and trade.’ ” Id. at 938. 
¶ 59 
 
The clear theme running through these cases is the belief that a pro se attorney should be 
compensated for the time spent being “forced to defend” against a frivolous action. I disagree 
with this line of reasoning for several reasons. 
¶ 60 
 
Most importantly, the majority’s holding impermissibly carves out a special exception for 
attorneys. Hamer observed that other courts, concluding that pro se lawyers in Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 116, ¶ 201 et seq.) cases are not permitted to 
obtain attorney fees, observed that there is “ ‘no good reason for treating pro se lawyers any 
differently than pro se laypersons.’ ” 132 Ill. 2d at 58 (quoting Aronson v. United States 
Department of Housing & Urban Development, 866 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1989)); Falcone v. 
Internal Revenue Service, 714 F.2d 646, 647 (6th Cir. 1983). Although Hamer declined to 
address this consideration, I believe that this matter deserves due consideration, as the majority 
now concludes—for the first time—that a pro se attorney is entitled to attorney fees. See 
Hamer, 132 Ill. 2d at 58-59 (“Whether a nonlawyer pro se litigant may recover attorney fees 
under the Illinois FOIA is a question that is not before us, and we express no opinion on the 
matter.”).  
¶ 61 
 
As Aronson noted: 
 
“Nor are we impressed by the argument that a pro se lawyer should be awarded 
fees because of the time he/she must spend on the case. The inference is that the time 
so spent means the sacrifice of fees he/she would otherwise receive. But a lay pro se 
must also devote time to the case. If such a litigant is a professional person, such as an 
author, engineer, architect, etc. the time expended may also result in loss of income. 
Lawyers are not the only persons whose stock in trade is time and advice.” 866 F.2d at 
5. 
¶ 62 
 
Additionally, Aronson accurately observed that it would be unseemly to treat pro se 
lawyers differently from pro se nonattorneys, because to allow the former but not the latter to 
 
- 15 - 
 
recover fees creates the appearance that courts are “especially solicitous for the economic 
welfare of lawyers.” Id. at 6 (“This is not the type of image that enhances public respect for 
the bar or judiciary.”); see also Frison v. Mathis, 981 A.2d 57, 63 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009) 
(“Requiring that an attorney-client relationship exist before allowing the recovery of attorney 
fees avoids the public perception of unfairness in the legal system.”); Trope v. Katz, 902 P.2d 
259, 262 (Cal. 1995) (otherwise, it “would in effect create two separate classes of pro se 
litigants—those who are attorneys and those who are not—and grant different rights and 
remedies to each”); cf. Lolley v. Campbell, 48 P.3d 1128, 1134 (Cal. 2002) (declining to extend 
Trope where attorney fees were sought by an indigent employee who was represented by the 
labor commissioner). If a plaintiff brings a frivolous suit against a doctor who elects to proceed 
pro se, the doctor would be forgoing the time he could be spending treating sick patients. See 
Trope, 902 P.2d at 267.  
¶ 63 
 
The majority observes that defendant was “forced to defend” and “forced to expend his 
time defending” against the frivolous claim. Supra ¶¶ 28-29. But this characterization holds 
true for a pro se nonattorney defendant as well. In both circumstances, a frivolous action is 
being brought against both types of pro se parties. And both a pro se nonattorney defendant 
and a pro se attorney defendant are exercising the choice to defend against frivolous claims 
pro se and, as a result, are forgoing the opportunity to spend their time otherwise, e.g., 
representing clients, treating patients, etc. Yet, to be eligible for attorney fees, the nonattorney 
is forced to incur a “potential out-of-pocket obligation” by retaining counsel, whereas the 
pro se attorney would not. See Swanson & Setzke, Chtd. v. Henning, 774 P.2d 909, 913 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 1989).  
¶ 64 
 
Because Rule 137 aims to deter frivolous pleading and litigation, the majority concludes 
that “it would be illogical to deny attorney fees to pro se attorneys defending themselves in 
such matters” (supra ¶ 28) and holds that “a court is authorized to impose sanctions in the form 
of attorney fees under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137(a) (eff. July 1, 2013) against a plaintiff 
to compensate an attorney defending himself against a frivolous cause of action” (supra ¶ 32). 
However, Rule 137 provides for “appropriate sanction[s], which may include an order to pay 
the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of 
the pleading, motion or other document, including a reasonable attorney fee.” (Emphases 
added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 137(a) (eff. July 1, 2013). Based on the plain language of the rule, other 
options exist for sanctioning a party who violated the provision. The word “appropriate” 
connotes a sanction that is proper in a given circumstance. Further, if the rule itself provides a 
judge with discretion not to award attorney fees, it is unclear how the denial of attorney fees 
in one circumstance would be illogical or defeat Rule 137’s purpose. Finally, given that a 
pro se attorney does not incur legal fees, the majority is essentially awarding “attorney fees” 
to defendant to “compensate” him, not for the fees he incurred to obtain legal representation, 
but for the opportunity costs he chose to forgo. 
¶ 65 
 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
¶ 66 
 
JUSTICE NEVILLE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.