Case Title: In re DLC Corporation

Citation: 167 Vt. 544, 712 A.2d 389

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1998-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re DLC Corporation  (97-321); 167 Vt. 544; 712 A.2d 389

[Filed 1-May-1998]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            No. 97-321

In re DLC Corporation                        Supreme Court
d/b/a Pour Man's Pub
                                             On Appeal from
                                             Liquor Control Board

                                             March Term, 1998

Daniel J. O'Brien, Chairman, J.

       Lamar Enzor of Abatiell & Valerio, Rutland, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

       William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and William Griffin, Chief
  Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT:  Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       SKOGLUND, J.,  DLC Corporation d/b/a/ Pour Man's Pub appeals an order
  of the Vermont Liquor Control Board, which issued a first and third class
  liquor license to DLC subject to several conditions.  DLC contends that the
  Board exceeded both its constitutional and statutory authority by placing
  those conditions upon DLC's liquor license.  We affirm.

       Laurel Chapman is the sole director and stockholder of DLC, which
  leased a building in Rutland to be used as a bar -- Pour Man's Pub.  The
  building had housed another bar -- June's Corner Bar -- previously, and
  Glenn David Chapman, Ms. Chapman's husband, managed June's Corner Bar for
  several months before DLC leased the premises.  While not formally
  connected with DLC, Mr. Chapman helped develop DLC's business plan, and
  both the husband and wife had spoken of Pour Man's Pub as if it were a
  jointly-held business.  After Pour Man's Pub opened, Mr. Chapman performed
  janitorial services and "odd jobs" for the pub.  In addition, he tended bar
  part-time and arranged promotional events and hired entertainment for the
  pub.

 

       In 1996, DLC applied to the Board for a liquor license, and a hearing
  was held.  At that time, Mr. Chapman had been charged with, but not yet
  convicted of, the crime of conspiracy relating to the delivery of cocaine,
  in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 1404(a).  On May 16, 1996, the Board granted
  DLC a first-class (FN1) and third-class (FN2) liquor license with the 
  following condition:

   It is a specific condition of the continued licensure that Mr. Glenn
   David Chapman NOT be convicted of the crime he is currently
   charged with or any other crime of any type, misdemeanor or
   felony.  In the event a conviction of any crime occurs, these
   licenses shall be subject to immediate review by the Board of
   Liquor Control and treated as . . . new license applications.  The
   Board will then offer the licensee a hearing and make a decision
   whether or not to revoke the conditional license issued this date,
   whether or not to issue a new license, and if so, whether to subject
   and condition such further license.

       In November 1996, a police officer discovered Mr. Chapman smoking
  marijuana and sitting in an automobile owned and licensed by DLC that was
  parked in an alley next to the Pour Man's Pub.  A small amount of marijuana
  was also found on Mr. Chapman.  He was arrested and later pleaded nolo
  contendere and was adjudicated guilty of the misdemeanor crime of
  possession of marijuana.  See 18 V.S.A. § 4230(a).

       Mr. Chapman's pending conspiracy charge was subsequently amended to a
  misdemeanor charge of possession of cocaine.  On January 8, 1997, Mr.
  Chapman pleaded nolo contendere to the amended charge and was adjudicated
  guilty.(FN3)  Upon learning that the condition under which DLC's license was
  granted had been violated, the Board informed DLC that if DLC did not
  request a hearing within five days then DLC's liquor license would be
  revoked.  DLC requested a hearing, and the Board held proceedings on June
  17, 1997.  After the hearing, the

  

  Board issued DLC a first-class and third-class liquor license with the
  following conditions:

   1.   Glenn David Chapman shall have no legal or defacto
   ownership interest in or managerial responsibilities for the DLC
   Corporation, d/b/a Pour Man's Pub; and

   2.   Because of Glenn David Chapman's prior and repeated
   criminal activities, including those criminal activities taking place
   outside of licensed premises, the Board finds it necessary in the
   public interest and considering the public health, safety and
   morals, that in the event Glenn David Chapman were to be found
   on the licensed premises by any competent evidence therefore, this
   Board will issue an emergency closing order by which the liquor
   license issued to the DLC Corporation, d/b/a/ Pour Man's Pub
   will be immediately revoked pending a hearing which shall be
   granted on short notice, at which hearing the Board will determine
   whether once again Glenn David Chapman violated the condition
   under which the license was issued by being physically on the
   premises.  If this Board finds that CHAPMAN was in fact upon
   the premises, the license in the discretion of this Board, will be
   permanently revoked.

  This appeal followed.

       DLC contends that by conditioning its liquor license upon the
  requirement that DLC "absolutely" control Mr. Chapman's access to the
  premises, the Board exceeded its statutory and constitutional authority. 
  First, DLC contends that the second condition is improper because it has
  nothing to do with the fitness of DLC to conduct its business and sell
  liquor.  In addition, DLC contends that the second condition interferes
  with its constitutionally-protected right to run a business.  Finally, DLC
  alleges that DLC cannot lawfully control the movements of Mr. Chapman
  because Mr. Chapman is not a shareholder, owner, or employee of DLC and,
  therefore, the condition is unreasonable and impossible for DLC to enforce.
  We disagree.

       Traditionally, federal and state treatment of intoxicating liquors has
  been markedly different than their treatment of most other items of
  commerce.  This disparity in treatment is directly related to intoxicating
  liquor's "tendency . . . to deprave public morals."  Green Mountain Post
  No. 1 v. Liquor Control Bd., 117 Vt. 405, 409,