Case Title: FirstCal Indus. 2 Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision

Citation: 2010-Ohio-1921

Docket Number: 20091505

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-05-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
FirstCal Indus. 2 Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2010-
Ohio-1921.] 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-1921 
FIRSTCAL INDUSTRIAL 2 ACQUISITIONS, L.L.C., APPELLANT, v. FRANKLIN 
COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as FirstCal Indus. 2 Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1921.] 
Taxation — Bulk sale — Allocation of lump-sum sales price to various parcels — 
Burden of proof is on party challenging use of the property’s allocated 
sale price for valuation — Decision affirmed. 
(No. 2009-1505 — Submitted March 31, 2010 — Decided May 6, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, Nos. 2006-B-1789, 2006-B-1790,  
2006-B-1791, and 2006-B-1792. 
__________________ 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals 
(“BTA”) that found the value of four parcels of real property.1  Appellant, 
FirstCal Industrial 2 Acquisitions, L.L.C., part of a real estate investment trust, 
                                                 
1.  One of the parcels is split into taxable and tax-abated portions but constitutes a single parcel.  
See FirstCal Indus. 2 Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (July 28, 2009), BTA 
Nos. 2006-B-1789, 2006-B-1790, 2006-B-1791, 2006-B-1792, 2009 WL 2360912, *7, fn. 3. 
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challenges the BTA’s determination, which adopted the Franklin County Board of 
Revision’s (“BOR”) allocation of the bulk-sale price that FirstCal reported on its 
conveyance-fee statement.  FirstCal contends that the BTA’s decision is 
unreasonable and unlawful because the allocation performed by the BOR lacks a 
reasonable factual basis and because the BOR and the BTA improperly placed the 
burden of refuting the validity of that allocation on FirstCal.  We disagree and 
therefore affirm. 
Relevant Background 
{¶ 2} On March 24, 2006, the South-Western City Schools Board of 
Education and the Hilliard City Schools Board of Education (collectively, the 
“school boards”) filed five valuation complaints concerning five separate parcels 
that were listed on a conveyance-fee statement filed by FirstCal Industrial 2 
Acquisition, L.L.C. as grantee.  The school boards contended that the value 
assigned to the parcels for tax year 2005 should be proportionately increased in 
light of the October 2005 bulk sale of the parcels. 
{¶ 3} On the conveyance-fee statement, FirstCal reported a bulk-sale 
price of $34,336,121 relating to the properties transferred that were located in 
Franklin County.  That price, according to the fee statement, pertained to six listed 
parcels.  The BTA made a specific finding that in spite of “some duplications 
and/or errors in listing parcel numbers” on the deed and the fee statement, the sale 
involved the five parcels challenged by the boards of education in their valuation 
complaints.  FirstCal Indus. 2 Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 
Revision (July 28, 2009), BTA Nos. 2006-B-1789, 2006-B-1790,  2006-B-1791, 
and 2006-B-1792, 2006 WL 2360912, *7, fn. 3.  FirstCal did not contest that 
finding in this court. 2   
                                                 
2.  At the BOR , FirstCal asserted that the valuation complaints were jurisdictionally defective 
because multiple parcels that were located in different taxing districts were referenced on the same 
complaint.  The BTA resolved this issue against FirstCal, and on appeal, FirstCal does not contest 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
{¶ 4} Because the sale price reported on the conveyance-fee statement 
exceeded the aggregate value of the parcels as determined by the auditor, the 
school boards sought an allocated increase in value of the parcels at issue.3  In 
their valuation complaints, the school boards computed a new value for each 
parcel by (1) determining each parcel’s percentage of the aggregate value 
assessed as to all parcels by the auditor and then (2) applying that percentage to 
the $34,336,121 sale price. 
{¶ 5} A hearing was held before the BOR on July 18, 2006.  FirstCal 
presented the testimony of William McVeigh, a property-tax manager first for the 
seller, Duke Realty Ohio, and later for  FirstCal.  McVeigh was engaged to 
analyze the property tax aspects of the sale for both buyers and sellers.  He 
testified that he had personal knowledge of “how things were negotiated and why 
things were negotiated.” 
{¶ 6} The bulk sale involved 72 industrial warehouse buildings in Ohio 
that were transferred as part of the sale, and the buildings were located in various 
counties, including Cuyahoga, Hamilton, and Franklin.  Some vacant parcels were 
also transferred as part of the deal.  Motivation for the sale lay in the seller’s 
decision to broadly divest Ohio industrial properties. 
{¶ 7} The deal was negotiated as one price.  Later, FirstCal allocated the 
sale price to each county based on its own considerations.  FirstCal’s goal was to 
liquidate the properties within 12 months.  The seller was merely cutting its 
losses. 
                                                                                                                                     
the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunals below.  FirstCal Indus., 2009 WL 2360912, *3.  We 
do not discern any jurisdictional issue, given that the school boards filed separate complaints for 
each parcel at issue. 
 
3.  The aggregate value assigned to all the parcels by the auditor was approximately $22,350,000 
rather than the $34,336,121 sale price reported on the conveyance-fee statement.   
 
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{¶ 8} Because real estate investment trusts were involved, no unitary 
allocation had to be performed for federal tax purposes.  The county-by-county 
allocations reported on conveyance-fee statements were not separately negotiated 
aspects of sale price. 
{¶ 9} McVeigh stated generally that the arm’s-length character of some 
real estate sales between real estate investment trusts can be questioned because 
of the special motivations that the parties have in arriving at a sale price, such as 
portfolio balancing to adhere to Securities and Exchange Commission 
requirements.  But McVeigh did not assert that this case fell into that category.4  
Moreover, McVeigh testified that some types of bulk-sale prices and allocations 
pertain to property value more than others do – but he did not testify that the type 
of allocation among the counties in this case was unrelated to property value. 
{¶ 10} One of the five complaints that the school boards originally filed 
was dismissed because the case was settled.  The parties in that case stipulated 
that the value was the sale price paid to FirstCal when it resold the property in 
March 2006.  The school boards allege – and FirstCal does not dispute – that the 
sale price in that case was $3,200,000.  That amount is lower than the $3,329,400 
that would have been allocated to the property pursuant to the school boards’ 
proposal,5 but it is significantly higher than the value originally assigned by the 
auditor, $2,400,028. 
                                                 
4. We have acknowledged that the typical motivation of the seller and the buyer constitutes an 
element in determining whether a transaction constitutes an arm’s-length sale.  See AEI Net Lease 
Income & Growth Fund v. Erie Cty. Bd. of Revision, 119 Ohio St.3d 563, 2008-Ohio-5203, 895 
N.E.2d 830, ¶ 25.  But FirstCal does not contest the arm’s-length character of the sale. 
 
5.  The school boards assert that the difference between the dollar amount that the school boards’ 
complaint would have allocated to that property ($3,329,400) and the actual selling price 
($3,200,000) was further allocated among the four remaining properties in the present case.  
FirstCal does not contest this assertion, and the amounts found by the BOR appear to be consistent 
with it. 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
{¶ 11} The BOR decided to use the reported aggregate sale price and 
adopted the proposed allocations for the four remaining properties.  FirstCal 
appealed to the BTA, where the school boards sought discovery of documentation 
relating to the bulk sale.  When FirstCal failed to comply and produced a 
purported purchase agreement but not the other documents requested, it was 
sanctioned. 
{¶ 12} At the BTA hearing, FirstCal relied on exhibits that included a 
deed, the alleged purchase agreement,6 and the conveyance-fee statement.  There 
was no testimony at the BTA hearing. 
{¶ 13} In its decision, the BTA discussed the case law and extracted the 
principle that the “price garnered through a bulk sale is evidence which may be 
used to value realty sold.”  FirstCal, 2009 WL 2360912, *6.  The BTA then 
imposed the burden of proof on FirstCal as the appellant and as the opponent of 
using the sale price.  Because FirstCal did not discharge that burden, the BTA 
affirmed the BOR’s valuation in accordance with the allocated sale price.  Id. 
Analysis 
{¶ 14} R.C. 5713.03 states that the auditor “shall consider the sale price of 
[any] tract, lot, or parcel to be the true value for taxation purposes” if the sale was 
“an  arm’s length sale” that occurred “within a reasonable length of time, either 
before or after the tax lien date.”   This case involves a bulk sale of real properties 
located throughout Ohio that occurred in October 2005, about ten months after the 
tax lien date at issue.7  FirstCal, as purchaser in the bulk-sale transaction, reported 
an allocated portion of the total bulk-sale price as the sale price of those parcels 
that were located in Franklin County. 
                                                 
6.  The school boards renew their objection to the authenticity of the document, but none of the 
specific content of that document appears to be material to the arguments raised by the parties.  In 
any event, resolving the case in the school boards’ favor renders the issue moot. 
7.  The purchase agreement proffered by FirstCal indicates that the bulk sale included properties 
outside Ohio as well.  That fact is not material to our decision of the case. 
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{¶ 15} The use of the sale price in this case involved a two-step analysis.  
First, the school boards urged that the aggregate sale price reported on the 
conveyance-fee statement constituted the aggregate value of the Franklin County 
parcels to which it pertained.  Next, the school boards suggested – and the BOR 
adopted – an allocation of the aggregate Franklin County sale price to the 
individual Franklin County parcels. 
{¶ 16} When a single parcel is the subject of a recent, arm’s-length sale, 
the sale price “ ‘shall be “the true value for taxation purposes.” ’ ”  Cummins 
Property Servs., L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 117 Ohio St.3d 516, 
2008-Ohio-1473, 885 N.E.2d 222, ¶ 13, quoting Berea City School Dist. Bd. of 
Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 106 Ohio St.3d 269, 2005-Ohio-4979, 834 
N.E.2d 782, ¶ 13, quoting R.C. 5713.03.  We have also stated, however, that the 
bulk sale differs from the situation in which a single parcel is the subject of a sale 
because the issue of proper allocation stands between the stated sale price and its 
character as reflecting the value of any one particular parcel.  See generally St. 
Bernard Self-Storage, L.L.C. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision, 115 Ohio St.3d 
365, 2007-Ohio-5249, 875 N.E.2d 85, ¶ 15 (in a bulk-sale case, a “question arises 
beyond the basic pronouncement of Berea:  whether the proffered allocation of 
bulk sale price to the particular parcel of real property is ‘proper,’ which is the 
same as asking whether the amount allocated reflects the true value of the parcel 
for tax purposes”). 
{¶ 17} In the bulk-sale situation, two overarching principles control our 
decisions.  We articulated those principles in two successive iterations of the same 
underlying case.  In Conalco, Inc. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Revision (1977), 50 Ohio 
St.2d 129, 4 O.O.3d 309, 363 N.E.2d 722, paragraph two of the syllabus, we 
emphasized the importance of the sale price in the bulk-sale context, stating that 
“the best evidence of ‘true value in money’ is the proper allocation of the lump-
sum purchase price and not an appraisal ignoring the contemporaneous sale.” 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 18} After Conalco had returned to the BTA twice and the BTA had 
concluded that a probative allocation of the price could not be obtained, the court 
held that the BTA “is not required, in every instance, and in all events, to accept 
as the true value in money of real property, an allocation of a portion of a lump-
sum purchase price paid for a group of assets which included the property in 
question.”  Consol. Aluminum Corp. [formerly Conalco] v. Monroe Cty.  Bd. of 
Revision (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 410, 414, 20 O.O.3d 357, 423 N.E.2d 75.  Indeed, 
when the BTA “finds [that] a proper allocation of the lump-sum purchase price to 
the property in question is not possible,” the BTA “may consider all of the 
evidence which is before it in determining the true value in money of the 
property.”  Id. at 415. 
{¶ 19} FirstCal avers that the school boards had the burden of showing the 
propriety of allocation at both levels. 
{¶ 20} As noted, the present case presents two allocations of a total sale 
price.  First, FirstCal as purchaser allocated a portion of the overall bulk-sale price 
to Franklin County in order to report that amount on the conveyance-fee 
statement.  Second, the BOR allocated the Franklin County amount to the 
individual Franklin County parcels.  We will address the propriety of each 
allocation in turn. 
FirstCal had the burden to show that its allocation  
of total sale price to Franklin County did not reflect the  
aggregate true value of the parcels in the county. 
{¶ 21} When real property is sold, the new owner will record its deed in 
order to secure its title to the property against other claimants.  But a prerequisite 
to recording is the endorsement of the deed by the county auditor.  And before the 
deed may be endorsed, R.C. 319.202 “requires the new owner to submit a real 
property conveyance fee statement to the auditor declaring the value of the real 
property,” after which the auditor must, pursuant to R.C. 319.20, “transfer the 
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parcel into the new owner’s name on the tax list.”  HIN, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. 
Bd. of Revision, 124 Ohio St.3d 481, 2010-Ohio-687, 923 N.E.2d 1144, ¶ 23. 
{¶ 22} In this case, FirstCal acceded to the ownership of the parcels at 
issue by virtue of the October 2005 sale and, as new owner, submitted the 
conveyance-fee statement setting forth the aggregate the sale price, as allocated 
by FirstCal itself, for the Franklin County properties.  Because the BOR and the 
auditor increased the value of the parcels through an allocation of the aggregate 
sale price that FirstCal reported, and because the BOR and auditor did so in 
response to the school boards’ claims, FirstCal demands that the county officials 
or the school boards shoulder the burden of proving the propriety of the amount of 
sale price that FirstCal itself allocated to Franklin County.  We disagree. 
{¶ 23} We have held that the “initial burden on a party presenting 
evidence of a sale is not a heavy one, where the sale on its face appears to be 
recent and at arm’s length.”  Cummins Property Servs., 117 Ohio St.3d 516, 2008-
Ohio-1473, 885 N.E.2d 222, ¶ 41.  Indeed, our cases acknowledge that the school 
board, as the proponent of using a sale price to value real property, typically 
makes a prima facie case when it presents a recent conveyance-fee statement 
along with a deed to evidence the sale and the price.  Olentangy Local Schools 
Bd. of Edn. v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Revision, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2010-Ohio-1040, 
__ N.E.2d __, ¶ 14, citing Worthington City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. 
Bd. of Revision, 124 Ohio St.3d 27, 2009-Ohio-5932, 918 N.E.2d 972, ¶ 28. 
{¶ 24} Moreover, the basic documentation of a sale invokes a “rebuttable 
presumption” that “the sale has met all the requirements that characterize true 
value.”  Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision 
(1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 325, 327, 677 N.E.2d 1197. 
{¶ 25} Accordingly, the burden lay on FirstCal in this case, as the 
opponent of using the reported sale price, to demonstrate why it did not properly 
reflect the aggregate true value of the parcels.  FirstCal, as purchaser of the 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
property, performed the allocation to Franklin County in the first instance, and 
FirstCal possesses the information necessary to demonstrate its proper 
relationship to the value of the Franklin County parcels. 
{¶ 26} Citing St. Bernard Self Storage, 115 Ohio St.3d 365, 2007-Ohio-
5249, 875 N.E.2d 85, is unavailing.  In St. Bernard Self Storage, a real estate 
contract for the purchase of a self-storage facility recited that about half the 
contract price should be viewed as purchasing the goodwill of the established self-
storage business.  Id. at ¶ 5.  The BTA rejected the allocation and viewed the 
entire sale price (minus a minor deduction attributable to personal property) as the 
value of the real estate.  Id. at ¶ 11.  In affirming, we held that the recitation of the 
allocation on the face of the contract did not raise a presumption in favor of 
abiding by it.  Id. at ¶ 21.  Rather, the owner, as proponent of the allocation, bore 
the burden of demonstrating the propriety of the allocation.  Id. at ¶ 25.  It failed 
to do so. 
{¶ 27} In St. Bernard Self Storage, the owner and proponent of the 
allocation of the sale price had to show “corroborating indicia” in support of the 
allocation.  Id., 115 Ohio St.3d 365, 2007-Ohio-5249, 875 N.E.2d 85, ¶ 17.  But 
must the school boards in the present case likewise demonstrate the propriety of 
the allocation that was made on the conveyance-fee statement itself?  We answer 
the question in the negative because the allocation of the sale price on the 
Franklin County conveyance-fee statement was performed by the opponent of 
using the allocated sale price, FirstCal, as purchaser of the parcels within the 
county. 
{¶ 28} We have stated that an important purpose of the statutory scheme 
is “to provide the auditor the necessary information to determine the true value of 
property based on a property sale in accordance with R.C. 5713.03.”  HIN, L.L.C., 
124 Ohio St.3d 481, 2010-Ohio-687, 923 N.E.2d 1144, ¶ 23.  If the allocation that 
FirstCal itself reported does not properly reflect the aggregate value of the 
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parcels, it is FirstCal’s burden to show that it does not.  Indeed, FirstCal is in the 
unique position of knowing how the allocation was made and is best able to 
access the pertinent documentation. 
{¶ 29} Although FirstCal presented testimony on the subject to the BOR, 
neither the BOR nor the BTA found that the testimony specifically impugned the 
validity of relying on the aggregate sale price reported on the conveyance-fee 
statement.  In that regard, the BOR and the BTA, as finders of fact, did not 
contravene any legal principle.  Nor did they abuse their discretion in evaluating 
the credibility of the evidence and determining the weight to accord to it.  See 
Meijer Stores Ltd. Partnership v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 122 Ohio St.3d 
447, 2009-Ohio-3479, 912 N.E.2d 560, ¶ 17 (court “ ‘ “will not reverse the BTA’s 
determination on credibility of witnesses and weight given to their testimony 
unless we find an abuse of * * * discretion, ’ ” quoting Strongsville Bd. of Edn. v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 112 Ohio St.3d 309, 2007-Ohio-6, 859 N.E.2d 
540, ¶ 15, quoting Natl. Church Residence v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Revision (1995), 
73 Ohio St.3d 379, 398, 653 N.E.2d 240). 
The pro rata allocation of the aggregate sale price based upon 
each parcel’s proportionate share of the auditor’s original assessment 
was a reasonable method of determining the value of the individual parcels. 
{¶ 30} FirstCal also asserts that the BOR and the BTA lacked any 
evidentiary basis for allocating the aggregate sale price for the Franklin County 
parcels to the individual parcels.  As discussed in the fact section, the allocation 
assigned to each parcel a share of the aggregate Franklin County sale price in 
proportion to that parcel’s percentage of the aggregate amount of value that the 
auditor determined for all the parcels, plus an additional increment because the 
parcel that was subject to a second sale sold for somewhat less than the amount 
assigned to it.  FirstCal characterizes this allocation as a “desk appraisal 
allocation” performed by the school boards’ attorneys and asserts that it gives “no 
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
consideration for the age differences, locational differences etc. of the dissimilar 
properties.”  We disagree.  
{¶ 31} The BOR and the BTA allocated in accordance with the relative 
value of the parcels to their aggregate value in accordance with the auditor’s 
original assessments.  In St. Bernard Self Storage, 115 Ohio St.3d 365, 2007-
Ohio-5249, 875 N.E.2d 85, we spoke of the need for “corroborating indicia” to 
support an allocated sale price.  Id., ¶ 17.  The method used in this case presents 
those indicia.  The auditor’s valuation presumptively accounted for the “age 
differences” and the “locational differences” of the Franklin County parcels.  See 
Colonial Village, Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, 123 Ohio St.3d 268, 
2009-Ohio-4975, 915 N.E.2d 1196, ¶ 31 (the auditor’s valuation constitutes 
“default valuation,” the validity of which need not be separately proved).  
Although not rising to the level of a presumptively correct valuation, pursuant to 
Colonial Village, the auditor’s initial determination of value for a given tax year 
possesses an increment of prima-facie probative force, and the percentages 
derived from those valuations are “corroborating” in the absence of better 
evidence.  As a result, the proportion of each parcel’s assigned value to the 
aggregate value of the parcels possesses the same increment of prima facie 
probative force.  FirstCal was free at the BOR and the BTA to rebut that probative 
force by presenting its own contrary evidence. It did not do so. 
The pro rata allocation of the aggregate sale price based on the 
auditor’s original assessment was not unlawful. 
{¶ 32} FirstCal also maintains that the allocation of aggregate value by the 
BOR and the BTA violates the legal precepts of our case law.  Specifically, 
FirstCal maintains that the only situation in which the law permits a formulaic 
allocation of a bulk-sale price is where the properties are fundamentally 
“identical” units, as in Pingue v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (1999), 87 Ohio 
St.3d 62, 63, 717 N.E. 2d 293.  We disagree. Contrary to FirstCal’s suggestion, 
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we have never confronted the situation presented in this case, i.e., a percentage 
allocation based on the auditor’s original assessments.  In Corporate Exchange 
Bldgs. IV & V, L.P. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 297, 
695 N.E.2d 743, the owner sought to reduce the value assigned to two office-
building parcels by allocating the bulk purchase price for both parcels in 
accordance with the relative square footage of rentable office space contained by 
the respective buildings.  Id. at 299.  In affirming the BTA’s refusal to adopt that 
allocation, we concluded that the BTA could reasonably and lawfully have found 
that the owner had “failed to produce sufficient competent and probative evidence 
to meet its burden of proof.”  Id. at 300.  Nothing in that pronouncement 
precludes, as a matter of law, an allocation based on the relative value of parcels 
pursuant to the auditor’s original assessments. 
{¶ 33} FirstCal’s argument is anomalous in this regard.  On one hand, 
FirstCal embraces the auditor’s original valuations as the most probative evidence 
of value, but FirstCal then disclaims the valuations’ significance as to the relative 
value of the parcels to one another.  Indeed, the sale of the one parcel tends to 
support, not refute, the validity of the BOR’s allocation because the parcel fetched 
a sale price almost $800,000 greater than the auditor’s original valuation while 
falling only $129,500 short of the allocated figure that the school boards had 
suggested for the parcel.  Plainly, the BOR’s allocation constituted a more 
accurate determination of value than the auditor’s original valuation.  Moreover, 
the BOR’s decision to allocate the $129,500 among the other parcels could 
reasonably be construed as a means of correcting any inaccuracy in the 
percentages based on the auditor’s original valuation. 
{¶ 34} As for Elsag-Bailey, Inc. v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Revision (1996), 74 
Ohio St.3d 647, 660 N.E.2d 1184, and Consol. Aluminum Corp., 66 Ohio St.2d 
410, 20 O.O.3d 357, 423 N.E.2d 75, both involved extensive testimony and 
appraisal evidence that ultimately led to the rejection of the proffered allocation of 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
a bulk-sale price.  Neither case stands for the proposition that the proponent of 
allocating an aggregate sale price based on percentages derived from the auditor’s 
original assessments must present additional evidence to support the propriety of 
the allocation. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 35} For all the foregoing reasons, the BTA acted reasonably and 
lawfully when it adopted the bulk-sale price as allocated by the BOR.  We 
therefore affirm the decision of the BTA. 
Decision affirmed. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., 
concur. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
Wayne E. Petkovic, for appellant. 
 
Rich & Gillis Law Group, L.L.C., and Mark H. Gillis, for appellees 
Hilliard City School District Board of Education and South-Western City School 
District Board of Education. 
______________________