Case Title: State v. Dodson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018AP001476-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2022-01-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
2022 WI 5 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP1476-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Octavia W. Dodson, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 394 Wis. 2d 187,949 N.W.2d 879 
(2020 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 26, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 13, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Joseph M. Donald   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined.  
HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion.  REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., 
and ROGGENSACK, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Jorge R. Fragoso, assistant state public defender. There 
was an oral argument by Jorge R. Fragoso. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Donald V. Latorraca, assistant attorney general; with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Donald V. Latorraca. 
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 5 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2018AP1476-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2016CF1316) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Octavia W. Dodson, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
JAN 26, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined.  HAGEDORN, 
J., filed a concurring opinion.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed 
a dissenting opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., 
joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
JILL 
J. 
KAROFSKY, 
J.   Octavia 
W. 
Dodson 
seeks 
resentencing 
for 
his 
second-degree 
intentional 
homicide 
conviction, alleging that the Milwaukee County Circuit Court 
relied on an improper sentencing factor in mentioning his lawful 
gun ownership and conceal-carry (CCW) permit.1  He contends such 
reliance contravenes his rights under the Second Amendment to the 
                                                 
1 The Honorable M. Joseph Donald presided over sentencing. 
No. 
2018AP1476-CR 
 
2 
 
United States Constitution.  The circuit court denied Dodson's 
postconviction motion for resentencing, and the court of appeals 
affirmed that denial.2  We likewise affirm.  Dodson fails to prove 
by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit court actually 
relied on an improper factor.  Accordingly, his sentence stands. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
On March 25, 2016, Dodson shot and killed Deshun T. 
Freeman.  Roughly four minutes before the homicide, Dodson was 
involved in a minor car accident during which an unidentified 
driver——in what Dodson believed to be a Buick3——collided with the 
rear of Dodson's car.  Dodson exited his vehicle and as he walked 
toward the back of his car, the other driver reversed the Buick 
several car-lengths and sped off.  Meanwhile, Dodson unholstered 
his pistol, which he lawfully owned and for which he had a valid 
CCW permit.4 
¶3 
Dodson returned to his car and attempted to follow the 
Buick but lost sight of it.  While searching for the Buick, Dodson 
swapped out his pistol's ten-round magazine for an extended 17-
round magazine.  Soon thereafter Dodson spotted a second Buick 
driven by the victim, Deshun Freeman.  Believing it to be the car 
                                                 
2 State v. Dodson, No. 2018AP1476-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2020) (affirming the postconviction order 
of the Honorable Carolina Stark of the Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court). 
3 This opinion will refer to the striking vehicle as "the 
Buick." 
4 A CCW permit authorizes a qualifying person to carry a 
concealed weapon in Wisconsin, except in enumerated circumstances.  
See generally Wis. Stat. § 175.60 (2019–20). 
No. 
2018AP1476-CR 
 
3 
 
that rear-ended him, Dodson pursued Freeman's vehicle.  When 
Freeman pulled over to the side of the road, Dodson parked his car 
about two car-lengths behind. 
¶4 
According to Dodson, Freeman began "fumbling around" by 
his driver-side door before starting to walk toward Dodson.  At 
that point, Dodson exited his vehicle and stood between the open 
driver-side door and his car.  Dodson told officers that Freeman, 
with his hands either in his pockets or underneath his sweatshirt, 
began running toward Dodson, and shouted an obscenity at him.  
Dodson responded by firing six rounds from his pistol, three of 
which hit and killed Freeman.  After witnessing Freeman's body 
fall to the ground, Dodson fled the scene.  Hours later, Dodson 
surrendered himself to the police.  The investigation revealed 
that Freeman had not been armed and that Freeman's vehicle did not 
match Dodson's description of the Buick from the earlier collision. 
¶5 
The State charged Dodson with second-degree intentional 
homicide, citing unnecessary defensive force as the mitigating 
circumstance.5  The charge included the "use of a dangerous weapon" 
penalty enhancer.6  As the result of plea negotiations, the State 
dismissed the dangerous-weapon penalty enhancer in exchange for 
Dodson's guilty plea to second-degree intentional homicide. 
¶6 
At the sentencing hearing, the circuit court determined 
that despite Dodson being an otherwise "model citizen," the gravity 
                                                 
5 See Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01(2)(b) & 940.05(1) (2015-16).  All 
subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2015-16 
version unless otherwise indicated. 
6 See Wis. Stat. § 939.63(1)(b). 
No. 
2018AP1476-CR 
 
4 
 
and serious nature of the crime warranted 14 years of initial 
confinement followed by six years of extended supervision.  As the 
circuit court explained: 
 
In reviewing this case, I have to say I am completely 
baffled as to why this happened.  And I don't think that 
there is any rational way of trying to explain it.  I 
can tell you this, Mr. Dodson, that in my experience as 
a judge, I have seen over time how individuals when they 
are possessing a firearm, how that in some way changes 
them.  It changes how they view the world.  It changes 
how they react and respond to people.  I know that this 
is only speculation on my part, but I do strongly feel 
that the day that you applied for that concealed carry 
permit and went out and purchased that firearm, and that 
extended magazine, whether your rational beliefs for 
possessing it, whether you felt the need to somehow arm 
yourself and protect yourself from essentially the crime 
that is going on in this community I think on that day 
set in motion this circumstance. 
It is clear to me, Mr. Dodson, that for whatever reason, 
and it appears that it is a distorted, misguided belief 
of the world that somehow Mr. Freeman was a threat that 
required you, in essence, to terminate his life.  Makes 
no sense. 
. . . [I]t is clear to me that you were operating under 
some misguided belief, some distorted view of the world 
that somehow [Deshun] Freeman was a threat to you when 
in reality it was nothing further from the truth. 
 
¶7 
In a postconviction motion, Dodson argued that the 
circuit court's statements demonstrated an improper reliance on 
his gun ownership and CCW permit, in contravention of his Second 
Amendment rights.7  The postconviction court denied the motion, 
                                                 
7 Dodson's postconviction motion also sought to withdraw his 
guilty plea, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  He does not pursue that relief in this appeal. 
No. 
2018AP1476-CR 
 
5 
 
concluding that the challenged statements, in context, were not 
improper.  The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the 
sentencing court's statements demonstrated that Dodson was being 
punished not for exercising his Second Amendment rights but rather 
his "distorted, misguided belief" that he could unlawfully and 
lethally use his gun against the unarmed Freeman.  See State v. 
Dodson, No. 2018AP1476-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶16–18 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Aug. 25, 2020).  We granted Dodson's petition for review. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW 
¶8 
We review a circuit court's sentencing decision for an 
erroneous exercise of discretion.  State v. Dalton, 2018 
WI 85, ¶36, 383 Wis. 2d 147, 914 N.W.2d 120.  A circuit court 
erroneously exercises its sentencing discretion when it "actually 
relies on clearly irrelevant or improper factors."  Id.  
Accordingly, a defendant challenging his or her sentence must prove 
by clear and convincing evidence that:  (1) the challenged factor 
is irrelevant or improper; and (2) the circuit court actually 
relied on that factor.  State v. Pico, 2018 WI 66, ¶48, 382 
Wis. 2d 273, 914 N.W.2d 95. 
¶9 
Under the improper-factor prong, sentencing factors are 
proper when they inform valid sentencing objectives including "the 
protection of the community, punishment of the defendant, 
rehabilitation of the defendant, and deterrence to others."  State 
v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶40, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197; see 
also Wis. Stat. § 973.017(2).  Primary factors informing those 
objectives are the gravity of the offense, the defendant's 
No. 
2018AP1476-CR 
 
6 
 
character, and the need to protect the public.  Gallion, 270 
Wis. 2d 535, ¶44.  Secondary factors include: 
 
(1) Past record of criminal offenses; (2) history of 
undesirable 
behavior 
pattern; 
(3) the 
defendant's 
personality, character and social traits; (4) result of 
presentence investigation; (5) vicious or aggravated 
nature of the crime; (6) degree of the defendant's 
culpability; 
(7) defendant's 
demeanor 
at 
trial; 
(8) defendant's 
age, 
educational 
background 
and 
employment record; (9) defendant's remorse, repentance 
and cooperativeness; (10) defendant's need for close 
rehabilitative control; (11) the rights of the public; 
and (12) the length of pretrial detention. 
 
Id., ¶43, n.11.  Finally, a circuit court may properly entertain 
a "general predisposition[], based upon his or her criminal 
sentencing experience" so long as that predisposition is not "so 
specific or rigid" that it "ignore[s] the particular circumstances 
of the individual offender."  State v. Ogden, 199 Wis. 2d 566, 
573, 544 N.W.2d 574 (1996). 
¶10 Under 
the 
actual-reliance 
prong, 
we 
review 
the 
sentencing transcript as a whole and assess any allegedly improper 
comments within that context.  State v. Williams, 2018 WI 59, ¶52, 
381 Wis. 2d 661, 912 N.W.2d 373.  To prove actual reliance a 
defendant must identify where in the transcript the circuit court 
both gave "explicit attention" to an improper factor and made the 
improper factor a part of the "basis for the sentence."  Id.  
Therefore, a defendant will fall short of proving actual reliance 
if the transcript lacks clear and convincing evidence that the 
factor was the sole cause of a harsher sentence.  Id., ¶¶45-46, 
53.  A defendant will also fail to show actual reliance if a 
No. 
2018AP1476-CR 
 
7 
 
reference to a challenged factor bears "a reasonable nexus" to a 
relevant, proper factor.  Id., ¶53. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶11 Turning from the law to the case before us, Dodson 
isolates two statements that he contends offer clear and convincing 
evidence that the circuit court actually relied on an improper 
factor.  First, Dodson contends that the circuit court improperly 
grafted a negative predisposition against all gun owners onto him 
when it said that it has seen how "possessing a firearm" "changes 
how they view the world" and "react and respond to people."  
Second, Dodson argues that the circuit court improperly relied on 
his gun ownership and CCW permit when it stated that "the day that 
you applied for that concealed carry permit and went out and 
purchased that firearm, and that extended magazine . . . set in 
motion this circumstance." 
¶12 We disagree.  Dodson's arguments ignore critical context 
that, when read alongside the challenged statements, demonstrate 
the circuit court neither exhibited an improper predisposition 
against all gun owners nor actually relied on Dodson's gun 
ownership or CCW permit as part of his sentence.  Our analysis 
begins by providing the full context surrounding the challenged 
statements.  We then assess the challenged statements in their 
proper context under the established law. 
A.  Context 
¶13 The circuit court's challenged statements arise in the 
context of its struggle to reconcile Dodson's clean criminal record 
and the innocuous circumstances leading up to the shooting, with 
No. 
2018AP1476-CR 
 
8 
 
an element of Dodson's second-degree homicide charge:  his use of 
unnecessary defensive force.  See Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2)(b).  That 
is, the circuit court was trying to understand what caused this 
"model citizen" to harbor the unreasonable belief that either he 
"was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm" or the 
lethal "force used was necessary to defend [himself]."  Id.  This 
inquiry into how the particular facts establish an element of the 
offense is a necessary step in assessing the gravity of that 
offense——a 
proper 
sentencing 
factor. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.017(2)(ag); Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶44. 
¶14 The circuit court then leaned on its judicial experience 
to hypothesize about why Dodson used unnecessary defensive force.  
The circuit court explained that in its "experience as a judge," 
it observed a recurring pattern wherein "possessing a firearm" 
changes how some criminal defendants "view the world" and "react 
and respond to people."  From the circuit court's standpoint that 
pattern was apparent here:  Dodson reacted unreasonably to Freeman 
because Dodson was armed with a gun.  That is, absent the gun, 
Dodson would not have used lethal force.  But Dodson did have the 
gun and a "distorted, misguided belief of the world that somehow 
Mr. Freeman was a threat," which as Freeman's murder tragically 
demonstrates, created a danger to the community——another proper 
sentencing consideration.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.017(2)(ad); 
Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶44. 
B.  Predisposition 
¶15 Having established the full context in which the circuit 
court made the challenged statements, we next assess the statements 
No. 
2018AP1476-CR 
 
9 
 
in that context.  Dodson first challenges the circuit court's 
comment about gun possession changing how some criminal defendants 
both "view the world" and "react and respond to people" as an 
improper predisposition against all gun owners or CCW permit 
holders.  Dodson is incorrect.  The transcript read as a whole 
shows that the circuit court properly cabined any "general 
predisposition[]" about "when a certain type of sentence is 
appropriate" both to its "criminal sentencing experience" and to 
the "particular circumstances" of Dodson's criminal conduct.  See 
Ogden, 199 Wis. 2d at 573.  Indeed, nothing in the transcript 
indicates that this predisposition was "so specific or rigid as to 
ignore" Dodson's "distorted, misguided" conduct here, which 
included: 
 Tracking down the first Buick instead of reporting the 
minor collision; 
 Swapping out a regular-capacity magazine for an extended 
17-round magazine when tracking down the first driver, 
indicating that he anticipated a violent confrontation; 
 Failing to either record the license plate or call the 
police when he began following Freeman's vehicle; 
 Exiting his car when Freeman pulled over instead of 
driving away from the confrontation; 
 Firing six rounds at the unarmed Freeman as he 
approached. 
See id.  Accordingly, Dodson fails to meet his burden to prove an 
improper predisposition. 
C.  Actual Reliance 
No. 
2018AP1476-CR 
 
10 
 
¶16 Dodson likewise fails to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the circuit court improperly relied on his Second 
Amendment activities when it speculated that "the day" Dodson 
obtained his gun, extended magazine, and CCW permit "set in motion" 
the homicide.  Assuming without deciding that this statement 
contained an improper factor, the transcript lacks evidence of 
actual reliance in at least two regards.  For one, when read in 
context this statement "bore a reasonable nexus" to relevant and 
proper sentencing factors.  See Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 661, ¶53.  
As explained above, the circuit court made this statement while 
assessing 
both 
the 
offense's 
gravity, 
by 
addressing 
its 
"unnecessary defensive force" element, and the need to protect the 
public from the danger of Dodson's "distorted, misguided" view of 
innocent community members.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.017(2); Gallion, 
270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶44. 
¶17 Second, nothing in the transcript suggests that the 
circuit court increased Dodson's sentence solely because he owned 
a gun or sought permission to carry it concealed.  The circuit 
court acknowledged that its reference to these activities was "only 
speculation" about what caused an otherwise "model citizen" to 
react to Freeman so unreasonably.  Nowhere did the circuit court 
indicate that Dodson received a longer sentence because he 
purchased the gun or applied for the CCW permit or that those 
activities formed the "basis for the sentence."  See Williams, 381 
Wis. 2d 661, ¶52.  Indeed, this transcript stands in stark contrast 
to the one in State v. Dalton that contained statements such as 
"you will be punished for [exercising your constitutional right] 
No. 
2018AP1476-CR 
 
11 
 
today" and "[exercising that right is] going to result in a higher 
sentence for you."  383 Wis. 2d 147, ¶21.  While a sentencing 
transcript need not contain statements as direct as those in Dalton 
to meet the clear-and-convincing threshold, the statements here 
fall short of that mark.  For that reason, we cannot disturb the 
circuit court's wide sentencing discretion.  See Williams, 381 
Wis. 2d 661, ¶¶45-47. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶18 Dodson fails to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that the circuit court actually relied on an improper factor.  
Accordingly, Dodson's sentence stands. 
By the Court.—The court of appeals' decision is affirmed. 
No.  2018AP1476-CR.bh 
 
1 
 
¶19 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring).  I join the majority 
opinion, but write separately to make two points. 
¶20 First, this case turns on how you view the sentencing 
transcript.  I read the transcript the same way the postconviction 
court and court of appeals did.  The circuit court was trying to 
comprehend how Dodson came to have a "distorted, misguided belief 
of the world that somehow Mr. Freeman" posed a deadly threat.  So, 
drawing on a pattern it sometimes observed in criminal defendants 
who previously purchased firearms, the circuit court offered its 
"speculation" about how Dodson developed the criminal mindset that 
precipitated 
an 
inexplicable 
and 
"baffl[ing]" 
homicide.  
Understood in this context, the circuit court was not declaring 
that all gun owners or CCW licensees develop a warped mindset 
toward the world around them.  Rather, the circuit court suggested 
that in its experience, some do, and speculated that perhaps this 
could explain Dodson's actions.  To be sure, the circuit court 
could have been clearer.  But Dodson's contention that the court 
punished him solely for exercising his Second Amendment rights is 
unsupported by the sentencing transcript. 
¶21 Second, as the majority explains, we employ a two-
pronged analysis when reviewing whether a sentencing court relied 
on an improper factor.  We consider:  (1) whether the challenged 
factor was improper, and (2) whether the sentencing court actually 
relied on that factor.  State v. Pico, 2018 WI 66, ¶48, 382 
Wis. 2d 273, 914 N.W.2d 95.  Tracking the analysis in a prior case, 
the majority concludes Dodson did not prove actual reliance——in 
part because the discussion of Dodson's lawful gun possession 
No.  2018AP1476-CR.bh 
 
2 
 
shared a "reasonable nexus" with "relevant and proper sentencing 
factors."  Majority op., ¶16; State v. Williams, 2018 WI 59, ¶53, 
381 Wis. 2d 661, 912 N.W.2d 373.  While the majority's approach 
comports with our prior discussion of the actual reliance prong, 
in my view, the reasonable nexus analysis more properly belongs 
under the improper factor prong. 
¶22 Logically, whether something bears a reasonable nexus to 
permissible sentencing considerations goes not to whether it was 
improperly relied upon, but to whether the consideration was proper 
in the first place.  State v. J.E.B. is a case in point.  161 
Wis. 2d 655, 469 N.W.2d 192 (Ct. App. 1991).  There, the circuit 
court discussed the defendant's tendency to read graphic novels 
containing "descriptions of adults having sexual contact with 
children."  Id. at 659.  Reading the novels, however, was a 
constitutionally protected activity.  Id. at 663.  The court of 
appeals concluded that referencing this protected material was not 
off limits because there was "a reliable showing of a sufficient 
relationship" between the protected activity and the criminal 
conduct.  Id. at 673.  Therefore, even though constitutionally 
protected activity was discussed, it was not improper because it 
was tied to an appropriate and relevant sentencing consideration.  
Federal courts evaluate these types of sentencing challenges under 
this same analytical framework.  See Dawson v. Delaware, 503 
U.S. 159, 166-67 (1992); United States v. Schmidt, 930 F.3d 858, 
862-67 (7th Cir. 2019). 
¶23 In this case, the majority correctly explains that the 
circuit court's discussion of Dodson's gun possession was not about 
No.  2018AP1476-CR.bh 
 
3 
 
all gun owners; it was directly connected to Dodson's criminal 
mindset and bore a reasonable nexus to the gravity of his offense 
and the need to protect the public.  Majority op., ¶16.  While the 
majority thus concludes there was no actual reliance, it would be 
more analytically precise to hold that the reference to Dodson's 
gun 
possession 
did 
not 
constitute 
an 
improper 
factor.  
Nevertheless, I acknowledge our precedent has employed a 
reasonable nexus test under the actual reliance prong and therefore 
join the majority opinion. 
No.  2018AP1476-CR.rgb 
 
 
 
1 
¶24 REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
J. 
 
(dissenting).  
"[H]oplophobia" is the "irrational fear of guns."  Wis. Judicial 
Comm'n v. Woldt, 2021 WI 73, ¶91, 398 Wis. 2d 482, 961 N.W.2d 854 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
concurring/dissenting).  
"Constitutional rights must not give way to hoplophobia."  Mance 
v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 390, 405 (5th Cir. 2018) (Ho, J., dissenting 
from a denial of a rehearing en banc).  In this case, the sentencing 
judge's hoplophobia was on full display——he gave Octavia Dodson a 
particularly harsh sentence because Dodson legally purchased and 
carried a firearm.1  In doing so, the sentencing judge violated 
Dodson's constitutional right to keep and bear arms and deprived 
Dodson of due process of law.   
¶25 The majority ignores the facts in an effort to legitimize 
Dodson's unlawful sentence.  It whitewashes what actually happened 
at the sentencing hearing by downplaying and twisting the 
sentencing judge's remarks.  In its opening paragraph, the majority 
minimizes Dodson's argument as the sentencing judge "relied on an 
improper sentencing factor in mentioning his lawful gun ownership 
and concealed-carry (CCW) permit."2  As the record reflects, the 
sentencing judge imbued his entire sentencing rationale with the 
fact of Dodson's lawful gun ownership and possession, repeatedly 
emphasizing not only how such lawful activity influenced Dodson's 
behavior, but how it "changes" people who exercise their 
                                                 
1 The Honorable M. Joseph Donald, Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court, presided. 
2 Majority op., ¶1 (emphasis added). 
No.  2018AP1476-CR.rgb 
 
 
 
2 
fundamental Second Amendment right——in the sentencing judge's own 
worldview. 
¶26 Instead of crafting an individualized sentence, the 
sentencing judge focused on how lawful firearm possession changes 
people, not on how Dodson unlawfully used his firearm.  The 
sentencing judge reasoned:  (1) when a person buys a gun and begins 
carrying it for self-defense, he is forever changed by the 
experience and starts to see the world as a threat; (2) therefore, 
all gun owners are a danger to society——not just felons who 
unlawfully use firearms; and (3) Dodson should be behind bars for 
a particularly long time because he, like all other gun owners, 
has a "distorted, misguided belief of the world," which causes him 
to perceive non-existent threats. 
¶27 Dodson's punishment was increased "solely" because he 
"availed himself" of a constitutional right.  See State v. 
Williams, 2018 WI 59, ¶22, 381 Wis. 2d 661, 912 N.W.2d 373 (quoting 
Buckner v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 539, 550, 202 N.W.2d 406 (1972)).  
His status as a lawful gun owner was irrelevant, and its 
consideration was improper.  Lawful gun ownership says nothing 
about a person's character or propensity for violence.  Because 
the majority sanctions punishing lawful gun owners for exercising 
the fundamental constitutional right to keep and bear arms, I 
dissent. 
I.  SELF-DEFENSE, GUN OWNERSHIP, & VIRTUOUS CITIZENSHIP 
[L]aw-abiding citizens who arm themselves are exhibiting 
the moral temper appropriate to a free people.  They do 
not regard their lives and safety as a gift from the 
government.  Nor do they think they should wait for the 
No.  2018AP1476-CR.rgb 
 
 
 
3 
government to come along and save them when their lives 
or the lives of other innocent people are threatened. 
Nelson Lund, The Right to Arms and the American Philosophy of 
Freedom, First Principles, Oct. 17, 2016, at 1, 18. 
¶28 Every person has a natural right to defend himself, which 
is protected by both the Second Amendment to the United States 
Constitution as well as Article I, Sections 1 and 25 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  People are born with this right, and the 
government may not infringe it.  See Porter v. State, 2018 WI 79, 
¶52, 382 Wis. 2d 697, 913 N.W.2d 842 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley & 
Kelly, JJ., dissenting).  "[People] should have a right to destroy 
that which threatens [them] with destruction:  for, by the 
fundamental law of nature, man being to be preserved as much as 
possible, when all cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent 
is to be preferred[.]"  John Locke, Second Treatise of Government 
§ 16 (1690).  Indeed, "self defence is nature's eldest law."  John 
Dryden, Absalom and Achitophel, as reprinted in 9 The Works of 
John Dryden, at 217, 231 (1808). 
¶29 Millions of Americans, including hundreds of thousands 
of Wisconsinites, keep and bear arms in exercising their natural 
right 
to 
self-defense. 
 
See 
Christopher 
J. 
Schmidt, 
An 
International Human Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 15 Wm. & Mary 
Bill Rts. J. 983, 994 (2007) ("The Framers believed individual 
self-defense was an inalienable natural right. . . .  The right to 
keep and bear arms was a by-product of the natural right to self-
defense and survival. . . .  Consequently, the right to keep and 
bear arms was also described as a natural right that does not 
belong to the government but to the individual.").  Although Dodson 
No.  2018AP1476-CR.rgb 
 
 
 
4 
admittedly committed a crime by using unnecessary defensive force, 
his lawful gun ownership and possession had no bearing on his 
culpability or character.   
¶30 Wisconsin's concealed carry law reflects a legislative 
recognition that lawfully purchasing and carrying a firearm is 
completely consistent with responsible citizenship.  See generally 
C'Zar Bernstein, Timothy Hsiao & Matt Palumbo, The Moral Right to 
Keep and Bear Firearms, 29 Pub. Aff. Q. 345 (2015).  As the Framers 
understood, "an individual's ability to arm himself against 
threats to his person, property, or . . . the State" is "[t]he 
cornerstone of strength of a republican society[.]"  Schmidt, An 
International Human Right to Keep and Bear Arms, at 994.  As a 
matter of law, law-abiding citizens have a constitutionally-
protected right to possess firearms and the government may not 
punish them for exercising it.   
¶31 Both the United States Constitution and the Wisconsin 
Constitution protect the individual right to keep and bear arms.  
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:  
"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall 
not be infringed."  As particularly relevant in this case, the 
Second Amendment "guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and 
carry weapons in case of confrontation."  District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).  This individual right is 
incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.  
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750, 791 (2010).   
No.  2018AP1476-CR.rgb 
 
 
 
5 
¶32 Article I, Section 25 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
states:  "The people have the right to keep and bear arms for 
security, defense, hunting, recreation or any other lawful 
purpose." 
 
We 
recently 
described 
this 
provision 
as 
"a 
straightforward declaration of an individual right to keep and 
bear arms for any lawful purpose[,]" including "obtaining a license 
to carry concealed weapons."3  Wisconsin Carry, Inc. v. City of 
Madison, 2017 WI 19, ¶¶10–11, 373 Wis. 2d 543, 892 N.W.2d 233.  
Among other lawful purposes, the Framers of Section 25 enumerated 
both "security" and "defense" as functions which animated the 
people's decision to protect the right to keep and bear arms. 
¶33 American citizens have a long history and tradition of 
keeping and bearing arms in case of confrontation.  The right to 
do so antedates the establishment of government at any level.  Both 
our federal and state constitutions preserve this most fundamental 
and natural right from infringement by the government.  Citizens 
may not be punished for lawfully exercising it. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Octavia Dodson & His Crime 
¶34  As acknowledged by the sentencing judge, Dodson was a 
model citizen before committing this crime.4   A hard-working 
employee and a good father, Dodson had no criminal history.5  Like 
                                                 
3 The majority does not address Article I, Section 25 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution even though Dodson raised it.  Dodson's Br. 
at 16. 
4 R. 73:32. 
5 R. 17:9–12; R. 73:32. 
No.  2018AP1476-CR.rgb 
 
 
 
6 
millions of other model citizens, Dodson chose to keep and bear 
arms.  In 2014, he became a concealed carry permit-holder after 
completing all state-mandated training.6  In the sentencing judge's 
personal view, Dodson's decision to purchase and carry a firearm 
somehow impaired his virtue, an opinion utterly antithetical to 
founding 
principles 
underlying 
the 
explicit 
constitutional 
protection afforded the natural right to keep and bear arms.   
¶35 The sentencing judge would have us believe that each day 
Dodson exercised his right to keep and bear arms, he menaced 
society. 
 
For 
the 
sentencing 
judge, 
Dodson's 
lawful, 
constitutionally-protected conduct before the crime overshadowed 
the crime itself.  With no grounding in reality, the sentencing 
judge hypothesized that gun owners possess an increased propensity 
for violence triggered by a purportedly paranoid worldview, 
clouded by misperceptions of non-existent threats.  In applying 
his own "distorted" views of gun owners in this case, the 
sentencing judge impermissibly stereotyped Dodson. 
¶36 In March 2016, Dodson, a Black man, was the victim of a 
hit and run.7  The driver of a Buick rear-ended him and then drove 
away.  Dodson tried to follow the fleeing Buick, but he lost sight 
of it.  Minutes after the collision, Dodson spotted Deshun 
Freeman's Buick, which, contrary to Dodson's belief at the time, 
probably was not the Buick involved in the hit and run.  After 
Dodson followed Freeman's Buick, Freeman pulled over and exited 
                                                 
6 R. 1:4.  The state requires extensive training.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 175.60(4)(a) (2013–14). 
7 R. 1:3 & n.2. 
No.  2018AP1476-CR.rgb 
 
 
 
7 
his vehicle.  As the majority notes, the two men were standing 
only "about two car-lengths" away.8  Freeman moved toward Dodson, 
yelling racial epithets.9  Mistakenly thinking Freeman was armed, 
Dodson shot Freeman multiple times with a handgun, which he was 
lawfully carrying as a concealed carry permit-holder.  Freeman 
died.  A few hours later, Dodson surrendered himself to the police. 
¶37 For apparent dramatic effect, the majority emphasizes 
that Dodson "swapped out his pistol's ten-round magazine for an 
extended 17-round magazine" as he was searching for the Buick.10  
So what?  The sentencing judge did not even mention this irrelevant 
fact, but merely noted Dodson purchased an extended magazine, 
without discussing how Dodson used it.11  The conflation of lawful 
purchase and possession with unlawful use is the central problem 
with the sentencing judge's remarks (and the majority's approval 
of them). 
¶38 No one has suggested the magazine was atypical, much 
less illegal.  To the contrary, such magazines are "fairly 
ordinary" and "popular."  See Miller v. Bonta, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 
2021 WL 2284132 *1 (S.D. Cal.), appeal filed ("Like the Swiss Army 
Knife, the popular AR-15 rifle is a perfect combination of home 
                                                 
8 Majority op., ¶3. 
9 The majority fails to mention Dodson is a Black man and 
merely says Freeman yelled an "obscenity[.]"  Id., ¶4.  The 
majority employs euphemisms.  Understanding why Dodson may have 
perceived a threat——even if one did not, in fact, exist——is 
critical to understanding his actual culpability. 
10 Id., ¶3; see also id., ¶15. 
11 R. 73:30–31. 
No.  2018AP1476-CR.rgb 
 
 
 
8 
defense weapon and homeland defense equipment. . . .  This case is 
not about extraordinary weapons lying at the outer limits of Second 
Amendment protection.  The banned 'assault weapons' are not 
bazookas, howitzers, or machineguns.  Those arms are dangerous and 
solely useful for military purposes.  Instead, the firearms deemed 
'assault weapons' are fairly ordinary, popular, modern rifles.").   
¶39 More fundamentally, even if there were something unusual 
about a 17-round magazine, it would have no bearing on this case.  
Would Dodson be less culpable in the majority's view if he had 
used a ten-round magazine instead?  The majority doesn't say.  
Perhaps it deems a ten-round magazine less scary.  Regardless of 
the majority's feelings toward guns, our constitutions do not 
countenance Wisconsinites being punished more harshly for lawfully 
carrying weapons a judge deems insufficiently mundane.  
¶40 The State charged Dodson with second-degree intentional 
homicide by unnecessary defensive force and sought a penalty 
enhancer for use of a dangerous weapon.  The penalty enhancer 
related to Dodson's use of the firearm, and had nothing to do with 
the extended magazine.  Dodson pled guilty in exchange for the 
State dismissing the penalty enhancer and agreeing to seek a 
"substantial prison term" rather than a specific sentence.12   
¶41 The majority fails to mention the presentence writer 
recommended a sentence of five to nine years of initial confinement 
followed by five to six years of extended supervision——
                                                 
12 R. 70:2–3; see also R. 13:2. 
No.  2018AP1476-CR.rgb 
 
 
 
9 
substantially less than the sentence Dodson received.13  The 
presentence writer noted, "Mr. Dodson expressed sincere remorse 
for his behavior, and was tearful in expressing his desire to go 
back in time."14  The presentence writer emphasized the incident 
happened "[i]n the flash of a second" and seemed to believe Dodson 
was in fear for his life.15 
B.  The Sentencing Hearing 
¶42 At the sentencing hearing, the State expressed grave 
concern about America's gun laws——"critical context"16 also 
noticeably left unmentioned by the majority.  This context informs 
the sentencing judge's remarks.  See United States v. Lemon, 723 
F.2d 922, 931–32 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  In particular, the prosecutor's 
anti-gun sermon influenced the judge's reasoning for the sentence 
he imposed on Dodson.  The State claimed: 
I think that given the way our laws are now, a law-
abiding citizen who's not otherwise prohibited can 
exercise the right to keep and bear [arms] on the Second 
                                                 
13 R. 17:20.  We often refer to the presentence investigation 
for context.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Wren v. Richardson, 2019 WI 
110, ¶4, 389 Wis. 2d 516, 936 N.W.2d 587 ("In early 2006, 15-year-
old Joshua Wren shot and killed a man.  He pled guilty to first-
degree reckless homicide, and in March 2007 was sentenced to 21 
years of initial confinement and nine years of extended 
supervision——considerably more than Wren's counsel suggested and 
longer than was recommended in the presentence investigation 
report (PSI).").  The majority conspicuously omits any summary of 
the PSI. 
14 R. 17:19. 
15 R. 17:19. 
16 The majority accuses Dodson of "ignor[ing] critical 
context[,]" majority op., ¶12, while giving the reader only a 
selective and truncated version of the facts. 
No.  2018AP1476-CR.rgb 
 
 
 
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Amendment and the State can't prohibit the carrying of 
deadly force concealed on one's person because we have 
just decided as a people, that that is not a reasonable 
restriction on the time, place, and manner on the 
exercise of that inalienable right, and that's our law.  
That's where we are as a society.  But the public does 
still have a right to be protected from people who think 
that this is some sort of a game, or that this is not 
real, or that this is a movie or a video.  And that we 
can carry around these pieces of technology, which are 
capable of taking away a human life in a nano second.  
These are semiautomatic weapons.  They are going to fire 
just as fast as a person who can pull the trigger.  In 
[sic] a 17-round capacity is meant for nothing, nothing 
more than killing as quickly and efficiently as one 
possibly can. 
. . . . 
It's just, we just as a society, as a community, we just 
cannot look the other way and chalk this kind of carnage 
up to our CCW laws or our self-defense laws, or our 
castle doctrines, or whatever we have got these days 
that are condoning deadly force.[17] 
The prosecutor's hyperbolic comments stand in contrast to the 
record, nothing in which indicates Dodson considered himself a 
character in a "movie or a video." 
¶43 Betraying his derision for the people's fundamental 
right to keep and bear arms, the prosecutor complained that laws 
protecting the people's exercise of their natural right to self-
defense "condon[e] deadly force."18  Dodson admittedly used 
unnecessary defensive force; therefore, he could not claim self-
defense.  However, he did nothing wrong by lawfully carrying a 
firearm in case of confrontation.  The prosecutor, by attacking 
CCW, self-defense, and the castle doctrine, conflated Dodson's 
                                                 
17 R. 73:18–20. 
18 R. 73:19–20. 
No.  2018AP1476-CR.rgb 
 
 
 
11 
unlawful use of force with his lawful decision to purchase and 
carry a firearm. 
¶44 To "condone" means to "[f]orgive or overlook (an 
offence; freq. a spouse's adultery)" or to "[a]pprove, sanction, 
esp. reluctantly[.]"  Condone, Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 
(6th ed. 2007); see also Condone, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 
2019) ("To voluntarily pardon or overlook (esp. an act of 
adultery).").  It can also mean to "permit the continuance of (as 
vice, gambling)[.]"  Condone, Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 
(2002). 
 
Contrary 
to 
the 
State's 
moralistic 
disparagement of the people's fundamental constitutional rights, 
self-defense serves as a "justification" for an otherwise criminal 
act, not an "excuse."  An act done in self-defense is not merely 
tolerated by the law——it is declared rightful.  Marcia Baron, 
Justifications and Excuses, 2 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 387, 388–90 
(2005).  Compare Justification, Black's Law Dictionary ("A lawful 
or sufficient reason for one's acts or omissions; any fact that 
prevents an act from being wrongful."), with Excuse, Black's Law 
Dictionary ("A defense that arises because the defendant is not 
blameworthy for having acted in a way that would otherwise be 
criminal.  • The following defenses are the traditional excuses:  
duress, 
entrapment, 
infancy, 
insanity, 
and 
involuntary 
intoxication.").  The prosecutor's comments relegated self-defense 
to an excuse, on par with insanity.  See Baron, Justifications and 
Excuses, at 388–89 ("Insanity is an excuse; self-defense is a 
justification.").  By extension, the prosecutor's comments also 
No.  2018AP1476-CR.rgb 
 
 
 
12 
called into question the character of lawful gun owners who 
exercise their right to self-defense. 
¶45 Such a belittling attitude toward fundamental laws by a 
lawyer sworn to uphold them is disconcerting.  The right to keep 
and bear arms may be listed second in the Bill of Rights, but 
"[t]he Second Amendment is neither second class, nor second rate, 
nor second tier."  Mance, 896 F.3d at 396 (Willett, J., dissenting 
from a denial of a rehearing en banc).  The prosecutor's hostility 
toward CCW, self-defense, and the castle doctrine set the tone for 
the rest of the sentencing hearing, conveying a sentiment 
ultimately adopted by the sentencing judge.  At the outset of his 
remarks, the sentencing judge identified relevant sentencing 
factors but then acknowledged the prosecutor's diatribe was 
intended "almost in a sense to demonize the defendant in such a 
way that the Court truly understands what's at stake."19   The 
sentencing judge then moralized about how gun ownership "changes" 
people: 
In reviewing this case, I have to say I am completely 
baffled as to why this happened.  And I don't think that 
there is any rational way of trying to explain it.  I 
can tell you this, Mr. Dodson, that in my experience as 
a judge, I have seen over time how individuals when they 
are possessing a firearm, how that in some way changes 
them.  It changes how they view the world.  It changes 
how they react and respond to people.  I know that this 
is only speculation on my part, but I do strongly feel 
that the day that you applied for that concealed carry 
permit and went out and purchased that firearm, and that 
extended magazine, whether your rational beliefs for 
possessing it, whether you felt the need to somehow arm 
yourself and protect yourself from essentially the crime 
                                                 
19 R. 73:30. 
No.  2018AP1476-CR.rgb 
 
 
 
13 
that is going on in this community I think on that day 
set in motion this circumstance.  
It is clear to me, Mr. Dodson, that for whatever reason, 
and it appears that it is a distorted, misguided belief 
of the world that somehow Mr. Freeman was a threat that 
required you, in essence, to terminate his life.  Makes 
no sense.[20] 
No other portion of the sentencing judge's remarks were as long as 
his speech about the malefactions of lawful gun owners.  Contrary 
to the majority's view, the sentencing judge did much more than 
make an off the cuff remark that could be construed to express a 
bias against gun owners; the judge's remarks bristled with animus 
toward them.   
¶46 The sentencing judge then turned to Dodson's driving 
habits on the night in question, stating "[t]here is that factor, 
too, that I struggle with as to why Mr. Freeman pulled over and 
got out of his car."21   By using the language "factor, too" in 
transitioning away from his criticisms of gun ownership, the 
sentencing judge made clear he considered gun ownership as a factor 
in sentencing Dodson.  Our constitutions prohibit this. 
¶47 The sentencing judge then discussed victim impact 
statements, Dodson's character, accomplishments, and acceptance of 
responsibility, and statements Dodson made to law enforcement that 
were not factually supported.  He reiterated his belief that Dodson 
was "operating under some misguided belief, some distorted view of 
the world that somehow Desh[u]n Freeman was a threat[.]"22  Notably, 
                                                 
20 R. 73:30–31. 
21 R. 73:31 (emphasis added). 
22 R. 73:32 (emphasis added). 
No.  2018AP1476-CR.rgb 
 
 
 
14 
the sentencing judge did not merely say Dodson had a "distorted 
view" that Freeman was a threat——he said Dodson had a "distorted 
view of the world[.]"  This generalized statement strongly 
indicates the sentencing judge inferred character traits from 
Dodson's lawful gun ownership. 
¶48 Given the majority's fast and loose description of the 
sentencing hearing, it is necessary to discuss what the sentencing 
judge did not say.  The sentencing judge's remarks were brief.  
Absent from them is any discussion of why Dodson might have been 
fearful.  In fact, the sentencing judge barely discussed Dodson's 
actions on the night of his crime.  When the sentencing judge did 
so, he focused primarily on Dodson's ostensibly aggressive 
driving.  The sentencing judge said:  "I struggle with as to why 
Mr. Freeman pulled over and got out of his car.  And the only 
rationale that I can surmise, is that there was something about 
how you were operating your vehicle at that time that at least 
attracted his attention to you."23   
¶49 The majority also mistakenly claims the sentencing judge 
"properly cabined" his remarks about gun owners to "some criminal 
defendants[.]"24  In the majority's recasting of the hearing, the 
sentencing judge was not speaking about gun owners generally——just 
violent felons.  The record proves the falsity of the majority's 
reconstruction of the hearing.  The sentencing judge actually said:  
"I have seen over time how individuals when they are possessing a 
firearm, how that in some way changes them.  It changes how they 
                                                 
23 R. 73:31. 
24 Majority op., ¶15. 
No.  2018AP1476-CR.rgb 
 
 
 
15 
view the world."25  The sentencing judge referred to "individuals," 
not "some criminal defendants," and lest there be any doubt about 
what he meant, moments later he also said, "I do strongly feel 
that the day that you applied for that concealed carry permit and 
went out and purchased that firearm . . . set in motion this 
circumstance."26  Of course, when Dodson lawfully purchased a 
firearm, he was a lawful gun owner, not a felon or misdemeanant in 
the criminal justice system.  
¶50 The sentencing judge sentenced Dodson to fourteen years 
of initial confinement followed by six years of extended 
supervision, for a total of twenty years imprisonment.27  In 
announcing the sentence, he mentioned twice that Dodson was forever 
prohibited from possessing a firearm.28  Dodson filed a 
postconviction motion for resentencing, which was heard by a 
different judge.29 
                                                 
25 R. 73:30 (emphasis added). 
26 R. 73:30–31. 
27 R. 73:34. 
28 R. 73:33, 35 ("You are not to own or possess any 
firearms. . . .  One other thing I forgot.  Mr. Dodson, you are a 
convicted felon.  From this time forward you may not own or possess 
a firearm.  If you do so, you can be charged and prosecuted as a 
felon in possession of a firearm."). 
29 The Honorable Carolina Stark, Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court, presided. 
No.  2018AP1476-CR.rgb 
 
 
 
16 
C.  The Postconviction Proceedings & Appeal 
¶51 The 
postconviction 
judge 
denied 
the 
motion.30  
Critically, however, she found the sentencing judge's comments on 
gun ownership were not merely passing remarks but reflected his 
reasons 
for 
imposing 
the 
sentence. 
 
Specifically, 
the 
postconviction judge stated: 
[W]hen I look at them [the comments of the sentencing 
judge] there in the context of what he said, I do think 
that he was relying on [them].  So the reliance prong of 
this analysis I think is satisfied. 
I think he was relying on the things that he said were 
factors or things that he was announcing as part of his 
thought process he was relying on them.[31] 
Nevertheless, the postconviction judge concluded, "the types of 
statements . . . the defendant has raised as evidence of an 
improper sentencing factor . . . are not improper sentencing 
factors when you look at them and look at them in the context of 
what [the sentencing judge] was saying."32  The postconviction 
judge seemed to reason that, while perhaps a person's status as a 
gun owner and permit holder could be an improper factor, as applied 
in this case, they were not.  The majority discards the 
postconviction judge's finding of actual reliance even though we 
generally give such findings some weight——at least when the 
                                                 
30 Dodson's motion also requested plea withdrawal, alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  This appeal, however, concerns 
only his request for resentencing.  See State v. Dodson, No. 
2018AP1476-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶9 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 
2020) (per curiam). 
31 R. 72:25. 
32 R. 72:25. 
No.  2018AP1476-CR.rgb 
 
 
 
17 
postconviction judge is different than the sentencing judge.  See 
State v. Alexander, 2015 WI 6, ¶34, 360 Wis. 2d 292, 858 
N.W.2d 662.   
 
¶52 Dodson appealed.  The court of appeals affirmed.  State 
v. Dodson, No. 2018AP1476-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Aug. 25, 2020) (per curiam).  It assumed "it would be improper to 
punish a defendant for legally exercising his or her right to bear 
arms under the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions."  Id., 
¶13.  It concluded, however, the sentencing judge did not actually 
rely on Dodson's status as a gun owner and concealed carry permit-
holder.  Id., ¶16.  It stated, "the trial court's comments indicate 
that it, like the parties, was trying to make sense of what 
appeared to be a senseless homicide[.]"  Id.  We granted Dodson's 
petition for review. 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶53 Generally, we review a circuit court's sentencing 
determination for an erroneous exercise of discretion.  State v. 
Gayton, 2016 WI 58, ¶19, 370 Wis. 2d 264, 882 N.W.2d 459 (citing 
State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 
N.W.2d 197).  "In exercising discretion, sentencing courts must 
individualize the sentence to the defendant based on the facts of 
the case by identifying the most relevant factors and explaining 
how the sentence imposed furthers the sentencing objectives."  
State v. Harris, 2010 WI 79, ¶29, 326 Wis. 2d 685, 786 N.W.2d 409 
(citing Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶¶39–48).  "Individualized 
sentencing . . . has long been a cornerstone to Wisconsin's 
criminal justice jurisprudence."  Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶48; 
No.  2018AP1476-CR.rgb 
 
 
 
18 
see also In re Judicial Admin. Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 120 
Wis. 2d 198, 202, 353 N.W.2d 793 (1984) (per curiam). 
¶54 A circuit court erroneously exercises its discretion if 
it misapplies the law by relying on a "clearly irrelevant or 
improper factor[]" in determining a sentence.  State v. Pico, 2018 
WI 66, ¶48, 382 Wis. 2d 273, 914 N.W.2d 95 (quoting Harris, 326 
Wis. 2d 685, ¶30); see also State v. Loomis, 2016 WI 68, ¶31, 371 
Wis. 2d 235, 881 N.W.2d 749 (citing McCleary v. State, 49 
Wis. 2d 263, 278, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971)).  Whether a circuit court 
relied on particular statements made at sentencing is a question 
of fact, which the defendant bears the burden of proving by clear 
and convincing evidence.  See Alexander, 360 Wis. 2d 292, ¶17 
(citations omitted).  In this case, the only evidence of reliance 
is a transcript of the sentencing hearing.  Therefore, we 
independently determine whether the sentencing judge relied on his 
statements about guns and gun owners, although we benefit from the 
postconviction judge's findings.  State v. Travis, 2013 WI 38, 
¶48, 347 Wis. 2d 142, 832 N.W.2d 491; Alexander, 360 Wis. 2d 292, 
¶34.   Whether a factor is irrelevant or improper presents a 
question of law we also review independently.  See Loomis, 371 
Wis. 2d 235, ¶29 (citing Jackson v. Buchler, 2010 WI 135, ¶39, 330 
Wis. 2d 279, 793 N.W.2d 826). 
IV.  APPLICATION 
A.  Actual Reliance 
 
¶55 As the postconviction judge recognized, the sentencing 
judge actually relied on Dodson's status as a gun owner and 
concealed carry permit-holder.  Actual reliance is established if 
No.  2018AP1476-CR.rgb 
 
 
 
19 
the sentencing judge gave "explicit attention" to Dodson's status 
such that his status "formed part of the basis for the sentence."  
See Alexander, 360 Wis. 2d 292, ¶25 (quoting State v. Tiepelman, 
2006 WI 66, ¶14, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1; Travis, 347 
Wis. 2d 142, 
¶¶28, 
31). 
 
Dodson's 
exercise 
of 
his 
constitutionally-protected right to keep and bear arms not only 
"formed part of the basis for the sentence," it was central to the 
imposition of a sentence considerably harsher than the PSI writer's 
recommendation. 
¶56 The sentencing judge began his remarks by noting 
relevant and proper factors he was supposed to consider.  Before 
he discussed any of them, however, he suggested that the State's 
argument was intended to "demonize" Dodson to ensure the judge 
understood "what's at stake."33  The sentencing judge did not say 
explicitly what he thought was "at stake;" however, immediately 
following this comment he spoke at length about gun ownership and 
how it "changes" people.  He claimed he "ha[d] seen over time how 
individuals when they are possessing a firearm, how that in some 
way changes them.  It changes how they view the world.  It changes 
how they react and respond to people."34  The judge did not refer 
to Dodson's particular circumstances but instead categorically 
grouped him with gun owners as a whole. 
¶57 The sentencing judge then stated: 
I know that this is only speculation on my part, but I 
do strongly feel that the day that you applied for that 
                                                 
33 R. 73:30. 
34 R. 73:30 (emphasis added). 
No.  2018AP1476-CR.rgb 
 
 
 
20 
concealed carry permit and went out and purchased that 
firearm, and that extended magazine, whether your 
rational beliefs for possessing it, whether you felt the 
need to somehow arm yourself and protect yourself from 
essentially the crime that is going on in this community 
I think on that day set in motion this circumstance.[35] 
This comment reveals the sentencing judge speculated that Dodson's 
lawful decision to keep and bear arms changed his worldview and 
"set in motion" a series of events culminating in his unlawful 
behavior.  Given the temporal proximity of this comment to the 
sentencing judge's statement that gun ownership changes people, 
the judge made clear he stereotyped Dodson by finding him——like 
gun owners generally——forever changed for the worse by carrying a 
gun.  The temporal proximity is dispositive to the analysis the 
majority should have employed; we are, after all, required to view 
sentencing statements in context, not in isolation.  Id., ¶30 
(citing Harris, 326 Wis. 2d 685, ¶45). 
¶58 The sentencing judge solidified his reliance with his 
very next statement.  He claimed this tragedy was likely caused by 
Dodson's "distorted, misguided belief of the world that somehow 
Mr. Freeman was a threat[.]"36  Notably, the sentencing judge made 
a similar comment toward the close of his remarks, after discussing 
other factors everyone agrees he considered.37  Critically, the 
sentencing judge did not claim that Dodson had a "distorted, 
misguided belief" that Freeman was a threat; he claimed that Dodson 
                                                 
35 R. 73:30–31 (emphasis added). 
36 R. 73:31 (emphasis added). 
37 R. 73:32. 
No.  2018AP1476-CR.rgb 
 
 
 
21 
had a "distorted, misguided belief of the world" that caused him 
to wrongly perceive Freeman as a threat.38   
¶59 Although Dodson, by pleading guilty, admitted that he 
acted unreasonably, the sentencing judge did not articulate a 
legitimate basis for finding that Dodson's unreasonable behavior 
stemmed from a paranoid worldview.  This finding was based 
primarily on the sentencing judge's biased——and admittedly 
speculative——opinion that gun owners generally view the world as 
a threat.  Importantly, the judge felt "strongly" about his 
subjective opinions——a point he felt compelled to articulate at 
sentencing.39  In conveying those opinions, the sentencing judge 
paid "explicit attention" to Dodson's status as a gun owner and 
concealed carry permit-holder.  See id., ¶25. 
¶60 Immediately after a lengthy discussion of gun ownership, 
the sentencing judge said, "[t]here is that factor, too, . . . as 
                                                 
38 The majority does not dispute this point.  It says: 
The circuit court explained that in its "experience as 
a judge," it observed a recurring pattern wherein 
"possessing a firearm" changes how some criminal 
defendants "view the world" and "react and respond to 
people."  From the circuit court's standpoint that 
pattern was apparent here:  Dodson reacted unreasonably 
to Freeman because Dodson was armed with a gun.  That 
is, absent the gun, Dodson would not have used lethal 
force.  But Dodson did have the gun and a "distorted, 
misguided belief of the world that somehow Mr. Freeman 
was a threat," which as Freeman's murder tragically 
demonstrates, created a danger to the community——another 
proper sentencing consideration. 
Majority op., ¶14 (citing Wis. Stat. § 973.017(2)(ad)).   
39 R. 73:30. 
No.  2018AP1476-CR.rgb 
 
 
 
22 
to why Mr. Freeman pulled over and got out of his car."40  The use 
of the phrase "factor, too" shows that the immediately preceding 
discussion was more than a passing remark.  The use of that phrase 
indicates Dodson's status as a gun owner and permit holder was a 
factor on at least equal footing with Dodson's debatably 
belligerent driving.  Accordingly, not only did the sentencing 
judge pay explicit attention to Dodson's status as a lawful gun 
owner and concealed carry permit-holder, it "formed part of the 
basis for his sentence."  Id.   
¶61 The prosecutor's comments, which have already been 
discussed in detail, provide further context indicating the 
sentencing judge actually relied on Dodson's constitutionally-
protected status.  See Lemon, 723 F.2d at 931–32.  The sentencing 
judge even acknowledged the prosecutor's argument was intended to 
ensure he understood what was "at stake."41  The full transcript 
of the sentencing hearing confirms the sentencing judge was 
responding to an argument advanced by the prosecutor——and 
generally signaling his agreement. 
¶62 Actual reliance is supported by the length of the gun 
ownership discussion in proportion to the sentencing judge's 
remarks as a whole.  Nothing else was discussed to the same extent.  
The postconviction judge's findings substantiate this analysis.  
See Alexander, 360 Wis. 2d 292, ¶34.  Although she interpreted the 
sentencing judge's remarks differently, the postconviction judge 
                                                 
40 R. 73:31 (emphasis added). 
41 R. 73:30. 
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found the comments actually constituted part of the basis for the 
sentence.42 
¶63 The 
majority 
nevertheless 
declares 
"Dodson . . . fail[ed] to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that the circuit court improperly relied on his Second Amendment 
activities when it speculated that 'the day' Dodson obtained his 
gun, extended magazine, and CCW permit 'set in motion' the 
homicide."43  The majority's argument relies heavily on magic 
words.  Apparently, because the sentencing judge said he was "only 
speculat[ing]" about what caused Dodson to shoot Freeman, his 
remarks are insulated from scrutiny.44  Magic words cannot save an 
unlawful sentence.  See State v. Morgan-Owens, No. 2008AP887-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶33 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2008) (Kessler, 
J., dissenting) ("Although the trial court indicated that the 
pregnancy would 'not enter into this Court's decision-making in 
this case,' I am not convinced that the pregnancy did not 
negatively impact the sentence.  These were not passing references 
to the pregnancy.  On the contrary, the remarks indicate that the 
court was highly focused on the fact that Morgan-Owens became 
pregnant . . . .  The totality of the trial court's comments show 
the court believed that Morgan-Owens intentionally became pregnant 
in order to positively influence the court at sentencing, and that 
it considered the pregnancy in a negative context at sentencing."). 
                                                 
42 R. 72:25. 
43 Majority op., ¶16. 
44 Id., ¶17. 
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24 
¶64   It is not necessary for a sentencing judge to say "you 
will be punished for [exercising your constitutional right] today" 
or "[exercising that right is] going to result in a higher sentence 
for you."45    Although the majority professes it is not requiring 
defendants to identify such an explicit statement, it fails to 
provide any other avenue for meeting the artificially high bar it 
sets in this case.  By effectively requiring a sentencing judge to 
admit wrongdoing, the majority impermissibly raises the burden of 
proof from clear and convincing evidence to beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
B.  Dodson's Gun Ownership:  An Irrelevant & Improper Factor 
¶65 Dodson's status as a gun owner and concealed carry 
permit-holder was both an irrelevant and improper sentencing 
factor.  The sentencing judge increased Dodson's punishment 
because he exercised his constitutional right to keep and bear 
arms.  "To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly 
allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic 
sort[.]"  Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (citing 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 738 (1969) (Black, J., 
concurring/dissenting), overruled by Alabama v. Smith, 490 
U.S. 794 (1989)). 
¶66 Dodson's status was irrelevant because, as already 
explained, no reasonable inference whatsoever about a person's 
propensity for violence or his character in general can be drawn 
from lawful gun ownership.  In Dawson v. Delaware, the United 
                                                 
45 Id. (quoting State v. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, ¶21, 383 
Wis. 2d 147, 914 N.W.2d 120) (modifications in the majority). 
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States Supreme Court held the First and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution prohibited the introduction into 
evidence of a defendant's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood 
because his membership had "no relevance[.]"  503 U.S. 159, 160 
(1992).  Dawson's reasoning applies with particularly strong force 
in this case. 
¶67 David Dawson was prosecuted in a capital case for a 
murder he committed after escaping prison.  Id. at 160–61.  While 
on the run, he broke into a home, killed a woman, and then stole 
her money and car before fleeing.  Id. at 161.  Dawson had 
stipulated that the Aryan Brotherhood was a prison gang that 
"entertains white racist beliefs[.]"  Id. at 165.  The murder 
victim was white.  Id. at 166.  The prosecutor never introduced 
any other evidence about the Aryan Brotherhood.  Accordingly, the 
Court deemed Dawson's membership in that group an irrelevant 
sentencing factor. 
¶68 If there had been evidence associating the Aryan 
Brotherhood with "violent escape attempts" or "murder," the Court 
declared it "would have [had] a much different case."  Id. at 165.  
However, "the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was not tied in any way 
to the murder of Dawson's victim."  Id. at 166.  "[T]he inference 
which the jury was invited to draw in this case tended to prove 
nothing more than the abstract beliefs of the . . . [Aryan 
Brotherhood]."  Id.  The evidence "was employed simply because the 
jury would find these beliefs morally reprehensible."  Id. at 167.  
That violated Dawson's constitutionally-protected associational 
rights.  Id. 
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¶69 Just as Dawson's membership in a hate group was an 
irrelevant sentencing factor, even more so was Dodson's status as 
a lawful gun owner and concealed carry permit-holder in this case.  
The prosecutor introduced no evidence about gun owners at all; he 
merely asserted, in conclusory fashion, that they are dangerous.  
While personal opinions about the desirability of gun ownership 
and possession may diverge greatly among members of the judiciary 
as much as among the citizenry, judges are duty-bound to apply the 
law and not their personal opinions in all cases before them.  In 
upholding the rule of law, judges may punish people for committing 
crimes.  They may not punish people for exercising constitutional 
rights judges may disfavor.   
¶70 United States v. Lemon, a D.C. Circuit case, is also 
instructive.  723 F.2d 922.  At sentencing, the prosecution argued 
the defendant, Edward Lemon, was a member of a "Black Hebrew sect" 
and that "his crime was part of a pattern of crimes committed for 
the benefit of the Black Hebrew community."  Id. at 925.  Despite 
Lemon's denial, the judge relied on the prosecution's assertions.  
Id. at 924, 931–32.  The D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded for 
resentencing.  It held:  "A sentence based to any degree on 
activity or beliefs protected by the first amendment is 
constitutionally invalid."  Id. at 938 (emphasis added).  Even if 
Lemon was a member, "mere membership," the court concluded, "would 
be an impermissible factor in sentencing."  Id. at 940.   
¶71 By analogy, a sentence based on activity protected by 
the 
Second 
Amendment 
is 
also 
constitutionally 
invalid.  
"Consideration of political beliefs, as distinguished from 
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criminal activity, would clearly be impermissible in determining 
defendants' sentences, because it would impair the rights of the 
defendants under the First Amendment, protecting public expression 
of their political beliefs, by words and symbols."  United States 
v. Bangert, 645 F.2d 1297, 1308 (8th Cir. 1981) (citations 
omitted).  While the sentencing judge could obviously consider 
Dodson's use of his gun to kill Freeman, consideration of Dodson's 
lawful ownership and possession of his gun during sentencing was 
clearly impermissible and violated Dodson's rights under the 
Second Amendment.     
¶72 Factoring lawful gun ownership and possession into 
sentencing as a basis for increasing the defendant's punishment 
also implicates due process by assigning negative traits to all 
gun owners.  We have recognized that "certain factors are improper 
for [a] circuit court to consider at sentencing and therefore 
violate a defendant's right to due process:  race or national 
origin, gender, alleged extra-jurisdictional offenses, and the 
defendant's or victim's religion."  Alexander, 360 Wis. 2d 292, 
¶23.  When constitutionally-protected factors such as race or 
religion are considered at sentencing, the chance that the 
defendant is impermissibly stereotyped——and thereby denied an 
individualized sentence——is high.  See Harris, 326 Wis. 2d 685, 
¶101 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., concurring).   
¶73 In this case, the sentencing judge pejoratively 
stereotyped 
all 
gun 
owners, 
thereby 
denying 
Dodson 
an 
individualized sentence while impermissibly punishing him not only 
for his crime but for his constitutionally-protected activity as 
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well.  The sentencing judge's comments on gun ownership invoked 
"general predispositions" grounded in his experience, at the 
expense of the particulars of the case.  See State v. Ogden, 199 
Wis. 2d 566, 573, 544 N.W.2d 574 (1996).  Tellingly, the 
sentencing judge never discussed Dodson's belief that his life was 
in danger, instead pronouncing in conclusory fashion that Dodson 
had a "distorted, misguided belief of the world[,]"46 cultivated 
(in the judge's own worldview) by Dodson's decision to lawfully 
carry a concealed firearm.  Absent from the sentencing judge's 
consideration 
was 
Dodson's 
side 
of 
the  
story——that he, a Black man, was approached by a man yelling racial 
slurs.  In fact, the sentencing judge barely discussed Dodson's 
crime at all, instead impermissibly focusing on Dodson's exercise 
of his constitutionally-protected right to keep and bear arms as 
the predominate basis for the sentence imposed.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶74 The 
majority 
establishes 
a 
dangerous 
precedent, 
sanctioning the State's imposition of enhanced punishment based 
upon a defendant's exercise of a constitutionally-protected right.  
No one challenges the State's prerogative to punish criminals for 
the crimes they commit.  Dodson pled guilty to a serious crime for 
which the law authorizes a penalty.  The constitution, however, 
does not authorize punishment based in whole or in part on the 
defendant's constitutionally-protected conduct, no matter how 
inadvisable the judge may deem it.   
                                                 
46 R. 73:31. 
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¶75 In this case, Dodson's punishment was impermissibly 
increased because he chose to exercise his right to keep and bear 
arms.  Dodson's punishment should have been based solely on his 
unlawful use of a firearm, not his lawful ownership or possession 
of it.  The majority's conflation of the two imperils the Second 
Amendment rights of Wisconsin citizens.  I dissent. 
¶76 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this 
dissent. 
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