Case Title: Great Atlantic Tea v. Imbr

Citation: 346 Md. 573

Docket Number: 33/96

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1997-07-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No.  33
  September Term, 1996
___________________________________
THE GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA
COMPANY, INC., et al.
v.
ETHEL A. IMBRAGUGLIO, et al.
___________________________________
Bell,  C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Raker
    Wilner
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Karwacki, J.
___________________________________
      Filed: July 28, 1997          
        
      Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references in this opinion will
1
be to the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act.  Maryland Code (1991 Repl. Vol., 1996
Supp.), §§ 9-101 through 9-1201 of the Labor and Employment Article.
Under Maryland Code (1991 Repl. Vol., 1996 Supp.), § 9-509 of
the Labor and Employment Article,  colloquially dubbed the
1
"exclusivity provisions" of Maryland's Workers' Compensation Act
("Workers' Compensation Act" or "the Act"), employers are immune,
save for two exceptions, from suit by their employees for work-
related injuries.  Injured employees' sole recourse against their
employers is ordinarily under the benefit provisions of the
Workers' Compensation Act.  Petitioners, the Great Atlantic and
Pacific Tea Company, Inc. ("A&P") and Super Fresh Markets of
Maryland, Inc. ("Super Fresh") have raised several issues in the
instant case.  A&P asks whether § 9-509 of the Act bars an injured
employee from maintaining an action in tort against a workers'
compensation insurer for injuring the employee by negligently
maintaining real property that the insurer owns.  We shall hold
that § 9-509 does not bar such a suit.  We shall also hold that the
record does not conclusively establish as a matter of law that
Super Fresh was the statutory employer of the injured employee and
therefore immune from suit.  For the reasons articulated below, we
shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
I.
       See § 9-681 of the Act, which delineates workers' compensation death
2
benefits of wholly dependent survivors.
-2-
The undisputed facts are as follows.  On April 21, 1992,
Salvatore Imbraguglio, Respondent's husband, fell approximately
fifteen to twenty feet while attempting to position some boxes in
a warehouse with the assistance of a fellow employee and a "pallet
jack."  Mr. Imbraguglio died two days later from his injuries.  At
the time of the accident, the decedent was working as a forklift
operator for Supermarket Distribution Services, Inc. ("SDS"), a
corporate entity distinct from, but wholly owned subsidiary of,
A&P.  The accident occurred in a warehouse owned by A&P, but
managed by employees of Super Fresh, another corporate entity
distinct from, but wholly owned subsidiary of, A&P.  The record
reveals that in Maryland, Super Fresh operates supermarkets on
A&P's behalf, while SDS provides warehousing and distribution
services for those markets.  A&P is self-insured for workers'
compensation purposes and is also the workers' compensation insurer
for both SDS and Super Fresh.
As the result of the accident, Respondent filed a Dependant's
claim with Maryland's Workers' Compensation Commission ("the
Commission").  Following a hearing, the Commission concluded that
Salvatore Imbraguglio sustained an injury arising out of and in the
course of his employment that ultimately resulted in his death.
Respondent, as the wholly dependent widow of the decedent,   was
2
awarded weekly death benefits of $355, and funeral expenses of
       Section 9-722 of the Act provides in relevant part:
3
"§ 9-722. Claim settlement.
(a) In general. — Subject to approval by the Commission
under subsection (b) of this section, after a claim has
been filed by a covered employee or the dependents of a
covered employee, the covered employee or dependent may
enter into an agreement for the final compromise and
settlement of any current or future claim under this title
with:
* * *
(2) the insurer of the employer;
* * *"
-3-
$2,500, payable by the employer, SDS.  Shortly thereafter, SDS and
Respondent settled the claim for a lump sum amount.  A&P, as the
workers' compensation insurer for SDS, paid all workers'
compensation benefits, including the settlement amount.3
Respondent then brought the action below in the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City.  In her original and Amended Complaint,
Respondent alleged premises liability on the part of A&P and joint
liability on the part of A&P and Super Fresh for failing to provide
proper supervision of the activities at the warehouse where her
husband was killed.
In a Motion for Summary Judgment, A&P maintained that
Respondent's sole remedy was under the workers' compensation
statute.  A&P insisted that it was immune from suit by virtue of
its status as the workers' compensation insurer for SDS and Super
Fresh.  Seeking the same immunity from suit, Super Fresh claimed
that it was Salvatore Imbraguglio's statutory employer.  After
-4-
hearing argument on the issue, the circuit court granted summary
judgment in favor of A&P and Super Fresh, concluding that they,
along with SDS, were the decedent's consolidated employers and
therefore entitled to tort immunity under the exclusivity
provisions of the Act.
Respondent filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals.  The intermediate appellate court reversed the judgment of
the circuit court and concluded that A&P's coincidental status as
SDS and Super Fresh's workers' compensation insurer did not
necessarily shield it from suit.  Imbraguglio v. Great Atlantic Tea
Co., 108 Md. App. 151, 671 A.2d 72 (1996).  The court instead held
that 
"A&P's immunity is limited to the extent that
it was functioning as SDS's insurer and to the
extent it may have negligently performed
duties it had undertaken pursuant to the
insurance contract.  In the absence of these
agreements in the record, we cannot conclude
that the circuit court was legally correct
when it found A&P to be immune from suit."
Imbraguglio, 108 Md. App. at 163, 671 A.2d at 78.  The court also
concluded that a sufficient material factual dispute existed to
preclude a finding, as a matter of law, that Salvatore Imbraguglio
was the statutory employee of Super Fresh.  We issued a writ of
certiorari to consider A&P's claim of immunity and the contention
that Super Fresh served as Salvatore Imbraguglio's legal employer.
II.
-5-
At the outset, we observe that summary judgment may be granted
only when there is no dispute as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Maryland
Rule 2-501(a);  Bowen v. Smith, 342 Md. 449, 454, 677 A.2d 81, 83
(1996); White v. Friel, 210 Md. 274, 285, 123 A.2d 303, 308 (1956).
In that regard, our review of the case sub judice is identical to
that undertaken by the Court of Special Appeals.  
III.
a.
The first issue raised by A&P is a question of law.  Our
review is therefore expansive.  A&P primarily contends that as the
workers' compensation insurer for SDS and Super Fresh, it is immune
from suit to the same extent that SDS, as the employer, is immune
from employee suits stemming from work related injuries and death.
The Workers’ Compensation Act provides in pertinent part under § 9-
509:
"Exclusivity of compensation.
 
(a) Employers. — Except as otherwise
provided in this title, the liability of an
employer under this title is exclusive.
(b) Covered employees and dependents. —
Except as otherwise provided in this title,
the compensation provided under this title to
a covered employee or the dependents of a
covered employee is in place of any right of
action against any person.
-6-
(c) 
Exception 
— 
Failure 
to 
secure
compensation. — (1) If an employer fails to
secure compensation in accordance with this
title, a covered employee who has sustained an
accidental 
personal 
injury, 
compensable
hernia, or occupational disease or, in case of
death, the personal representative of the
covered employee may:
  (i) bring a claim for compensation
under this title; or
  (ii) bring an action for damages.
* * *
(d) Same — Deliberate act. — If a covered
employee is injured or killed as the result of
the deliberate intent of the employer to
injure or kill the covered employee, the
covered employee or, in the case of death, the
surviving spouse, child, or dependent of the
covered employee may:
(1) bring a claim for compensation under
this title; or
(2) bring an action for damages against
the employee."  (Emphasis added in part (a),
supra).
Section 9-509 vindicates an essential and basic tenet of workers'
compensation law — limited employer liability.  In exchange,
injured employees are provided the prospect of swift and sure
compensation, without regard to fault, under other provisions of
the Act.  First struck in 1914, that beneficial social contract
continues unabated.  See Polomksi v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore, 344 Md. 70, 76-77, 684 A.2d 1338, 1340-41 (1996); DeBusk
       See 2A Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 71.10 (1996)
4
("It should never be forgotten that the distortions of our old-fashioned fault
concepts that have been thought advisable for reasons of social policy are
exclusively limited to providing an assured recovery for the injured person; they
have never gone on — once the injured person was made whole — to change the rules
on how the ultimate burden was borne. . . .  [I]t is elementary that if a stranger's
negligence was the cause of injury to claimant in the course of employment, the
stranger should not be in any degree absolved of his normal obligation to pay
damages for such an injury.").
       The Subsequent Injury Fund is a device to limit further, under certain
5
circumstances, an employer and insurer's liability for injuries subsequent to an
permanent impairment that substantially increases the effect of the previous injury.
See §§ 9-801 to 9-808.
       Injured employees of employers who fail to secure workers' compensation
6
insurance in accordance with § 9-402 may generally recover workers' compensation
benefits from the Uninsured Employers' Fund.  See  § 9-1002.
-7-
v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 342 Md. 432, 437-38, 677 A.2d 73, 75-76
(1996).
The Act, however, neither excuses third-parties from their own
negligence nor limits their liability.   Section 9-901 allows
4
injured employees, or their personal representatives either to (1)
file a claim for benefits under the workers' compensation title; or
(2) bring a third-party action against the person or persons
responsible for the injury or death.  If the employee or their
personal representative enforces the compensation remedy under the
Act, § 9-902 permits the self-insured employer, the insurer, the
Subsequent Injury Fund,  or the Uninsured Employers' Fund  to bring
5
6
an action for damages against the negligent third-party responsible
for the injury or death of the employee.  If the self-insured
employer, the insurer, the Subsequent Injury Fund, or the Uninsured
Employers' Fund fails to do so within two months after an award by
the Workers' Compensation Commission, the injured employee or their
       Section 9-902 provides in relevant part
7
"§ 9-902.  Action against third party after award or
payment of compensation.
(a) Action by self-insured employer, insurer, or fund. —
If a claim is filed and compensation is awarded or paid
under this title, a self-insured employer, an insurer,
the Subsequent Injury Fund, or the Uninsured Employers'
Fund may bring an action for damages against the third
party who is liable for the injury or death of the covered
employee.
(b) Recovery of damages exceeding compensation and other
payments. — If the self-insured employer, insurer,
Subsequent Injury Fund, or Uninsured Employers' Fund
recovers damages exceeding the amount of compensation paid
or awarded and the amount of payments for medical
services, funeral expenses, or any other purpose under
Subtitle 6 of this title, the self-insured employer,
insurer, Subsequent Injury Fund, or Uninsured Employers'
Fund shall:
(1) deduct from the excess amount its costs and
expenses for the action; and
(2) pay the balance of the excess amount to the
covered employee or, in case of death, the dependents of
the covered employee.
(c) Action by covered employee or dependents. — If the
self-insured employer, insurer, Subsequent Injury Fund, or
Uninsured Employers' Fund does not bring an action against
the third party within 2 months after the Commission makes
an award, the covered employee or, in case of death, the
dependents of the covered employee may bring an action for
damages against the third party."
-8-
personal representative may then proceed against a negligent third-
party, notwithstanding the payment of workers' compensation
benefits.7
Although the Act expressly preserves a right of action against
third-party tortfeasors, identifying an entity as such has been the
subject of considerable dispute.  A&P, in its role as the workers'
compensation insurer, seeks to cloak itself with the limited
liability expressly provided for employers by § 9-509 of the Act.
b.
       See Ch. 8, § 2 of the Acts of 1991.
8
-9-
 Flood v. Merchants Ins. Co., 230 Md. 373, 187 A.2d 320
(1963), upon which A&P heavily relies, first addressed the issue of
insurer immunity for acts of its own negligence.  In Flood, this
Court rejected a workers' compensation claimant's argument that his
employer's workers' compensation insurer was amenable to suit for
allegedly failing to select competent physicians in evaluating and
treating his work-related injuries.  Our predecessors reasoned that
former Md. Code (1957), Art. 101, § 58 evidenced an intent by the
Legislature to identify the workers' compensation insurer with the
employer.  The Court relied upon provisions in former Art. 101, §
58, now codified in relevant part and with minor and unrelated
changes at §§ 9-901 and 9-902 of the Act,  which "provide[d] if it
8
is necessary for the employer or insurance company to pay benefits
to an employee for injuries sustained which are due to a third
party's negligence, the self-insured employer, `insurance company,
association or the State Accident Fund,' may enforce for their own
benefit the third party's liability."  Flood, 230 Md. at 377, 187
A.2d at 322.  Acknowledging that Maryland's Workers' Compensation
Act allows third-party actions against "person[s] other than the
employer," the Court concluded that "the employer and the insurer
[are] one and the same as far as the exclusivity of the remedy is
concerned" and for that reason, the complainant could not maintain
an independent action against the workers' compensation insurer for
-10-
"alleged malpractice of the physicians recommended by it to the
[complainant]."  Id. at 378, 187 A.2d at 323.  
Although not dispositive, the Court's decision was influenced
in part by a notion advanced by the United States District Court
for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Washington in
Schulz v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 125 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Wash.
N.D. 1954).  In Schulz, the federal district court was faced with
the application of Idaho law.  The crux of the court's opinion was
that although the Supreme Court of Idaho sanctioned third-party
actions against negligent physicians under Idaho's Workers'
Compensation Act, it did not allow third-party actions against the
workers' compensation insurer.  The Schulz court concluded that to
do so would run contrary to the subrogation provisions of the act,
leaving both the employer and the insurer subrogated to no one
other than themselves.  Schulz, 125 F. Supp. at 415 (citing Hancock
v. Halliday, 65 Idaho 645, 150 P.2d 137 (1944)).
Three years later, the Federal District Court for the District
of Maryland applied Flood in a case involving not medical
malpractice, but allegations that the workers' compensation insurer
negligently performed a safety inspection at the insured's
workplace, thereby causing the employee's injuries.  In rejecting
the claim on exclusivity grounds, the federal district court
observed:
"On its facts, Flood thus holds that when an
insurer is performing the duty of an insured
       Obviously, if the negligence of a workers' compensation insurer injures
9
an employee of its insured outside the employment context, a direct action
unencumbered by the Workers' Compensation Act would certainly lie.
-11-
employer imposed on him by Article 101, it
obtains the employer's immunity to suit for
tort liability.  In this case the duty which
the 
insurer 
is 
charged 
with 
performing
negligently is not a duty imposed on the
employer by Article 101, but it is a duty
which is imposed on the employer at common
law.  An employer has the duty to provide a
reasonably safe place to work, and this
includes the duty to make inspections and to
take safety measures in fulfillment of that
obligation.  See Long Co. v. State Accident
Fund, 156 Md. 639, 144 A. 775 (1929). . . . If
it be held, as it was in Flood, that an
insurer is immune from tort liability when it
performs a duty imposed on the employer by the
Workmens' Compensation Act, no discernable
reason is apparent why it should not also be
immune when performing a duty imposed on the
employer at common law, just as the employer
is immune when performing either class of
duties."
Donohue v. Maryland Casualty Co., 363 F. Supp. 588, 591 (D. Md.
1965), aff'd, 363 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1966); see also Young v.
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 303 Md. 182, 492 A.2d 1270
(1985).
Taken to its logical extreme, Flood, as urged by A&P, stands
for the proposition that an employee can never maintain an action
sounding in tort against his employer's workers' compensation
carrier for alleged acts of negligence that result in a work-
related injury.   We disagree.  The holding in Flood was not so
9
broad.  
-12-
A&P seizes upon dicta in Flood where this Court stated that
"[c]onsidering the employer and the insurer to be one and the same
as far as the exclusiveness of the remedy is concerned, the
[c]laimant is precluded from maintaining his action under this
section."  230 Md. at 378, 187 A.2d at 323.   The holding, however,
was limited to malpractice actions in which a carrier-recommended
physician's negligence allegedly aggravated an employee's injury.
Further, the services undertaken by the insurer in both Flood
and Donohue which allegedly resulted in the employee's injuries
were duties imposed upon the employer by, respectively, either the
       For example, § 9-660 of the Act provides in relevant part:
10
"§ 9-660. Provision of medical services and treatment.
(a) In general. — In addition to the compensation provided
under this subtitle, if a covered employee has suffered an
accidental personal injury, compensable hernia, or
occupational disease the employer or its insurer promptly
shall provide to the covered employee, as the Commission
may require:
(1)
medical, surgical, or other attendance or
treatment;
(2)
hospital and nursing services;
(3)
medicine;
(4)
crutches and other apparatus; and
(5)
artificial arms, feet, hands, and legs and
other prosthetic appliances.
(b) Duration. — The employer or its insurer shall provide
the medical services and treatment required under
subsection (a) of this section for the period required by
the nature of the accidental personal injury, compensable
hernia or occupational disease." (Emphasis added).
* * *
At the time of the Flood decision, these provisions were located at Md. Code (1957),
Art. 101, § 37 and were recodified and amended by Ch. 8, § 2 of the Acts of 1991.
       Under the common law, an employer owed an employee the duty to provide a
11
reasonably safe workplace.  M.A. Long Co. v. State Accident Fund, 156 Md. 639, 650,
144 A. 775 (1929).  First statutorily mandated by Ch. 44, § 1 of the Acts of 1955
at Md. Code (1951, 1957 Cum. Supp.), Art. 89, § 17, that duty is currently codified
and amended as Md. Code (1991 Repl. Vol., 1996 Supp.), § 5-104 of the Labor and
Employment Article.
-13-
Workers' Compensation Act  or the common law.  The carrier, as an
10
11
integral part of the workers' compensation system and as part of
the insurance contract, merely assisted the employer in the
fulfillment of those duties.
In the case sub judice, A&P is charged with negligence in its
capacity as a property owner, not as a workers' compensation
insurer or for any acts it undertook pursuant to that role.  For
that reason alone, Flood and Donohue are inapposite.
-14-
In Young v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., supra, (which
was in part a medical malpractice action against the insurer) we
recognized, without adopting, Professor Larson's recommended
solution to the "problem" of carrier liability.  He suggests that
"`[A] distinction should be drawn between the
carrier's function of payment for benefits and
services, on the one hand, and, on the other,
any function it assumes in the way of direct
or physical performance of services related to
the act.  For negligent performance of the
latter it should be liable in tort as a
`person other than the employer' [as those
words are used in § 9-901 of the Act]."
Young, 303 Md. at 195, 492 A.2d at 1276 (citing 2A Arthur Larson,
THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 72.97 (1996)).  Under Professor
Larson's view, "it is virtually impossible to cause physical injury
by writing a check.  It is very possible to cause physical injury
by administering medical treatment to a patient or by making a
safety inspection."  Larson, supra, § 72.97.  As we have indicated,
A&P's alleged negligence has nothing whatsoever to do with its
coincidental status as Mr. Imbraguglio's employer's workers'
compensation insurer.
As in Young, we need not accept or reject Professor Larson's
suggested approach to carrier liability.  Nor are we inclined, at
this juncture, to adopt the approach taken by the federal district
court in Donohue.  Neither is applicable here.  As the intermediate
appellate court pointed out, "the instant case is no different than
any other case presenting similar circumstances," i.e., — a land
-15-
owner who injures a business invitee through an alleged act of
negligence.
Under A&P's view, if an employee furthering his employer's
business, visits the place of business of his employer's insurance
carrier and is injured through an act of the insurer's negligence,
vicarious or otherwise, the former cannot maintain an action in
tort against the insurance company simply because the latter was
ultimately financially responsible for the workers' compensation
claim filed by the injured employee.  To "underscore[] the folly of
the Court of Special Appeals' rule" to the contrary, A&P points out
that a judgment in favor of the employee would leave the insurer
subrogated only to itself.  
A&P's contention is not entirely correct.  If the workers'
compensation insurer is vicariously liable, it is entitled to
indemnification from its negligent employee(s).  Chilcote v. Von
Der Ahe Van Lines, 300 Md. 106, 121, 476 A.2d 204, 212 (1984)
(citing Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mutual Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 233 Md. 205, 215-16, 196 A.2d 76, 81 (1963)).
Further, any recovery by an injured employee after receiving
workers' compensation benefits is subject to § 9-902 of the Act.
Subsection (e) of § 9-902 provides:
"(e) Distribution of damages. — If the covered
employee or the dependents of the covered
employee recover damages, the covered employee
or dependents:
-16-
(1) first, may deduct the costs and
expenses of the covered employee or dependents
in the action;
(2) next shall reimburse the self-insured
employer, insurer, Subsequent Injury Fund, or
Uninsured Employers' Fund for:
(i) the compensation already paid or
awarded; and
(ii) any amounts paid for medical
services, funeral expenses, or any other
purpose under Subtitle 6 of this title; and
(3) finally, may keep the balance of the
damages recovered."
Under § 9-902(e), a successful judgment against the insurer simply
means that the insurer is entitled to offset any judgment entered
against it for amounts already paid pursuant to its obligation as
the workers' compensation insurer.  
In sum, a workers' compensation self-insurer cannot use its
status as such to shield itself from the normal obligations
attendant upon those acts unrelated to its role as a workers'
compensation insurer.  If A&P wishes to assume multiple identities,
it must concomitantly shoulder the risks independently associated
with those identities.
IV.
For both their parts, Super Fresh and A&P claim that the
circuit court correctly determined that, as a matter of law, they
were the decedent's "consolidated" or "dual" employers, thereby
-17-
barring Mrs. Imbraguglio's suit under the exclusivity provisions of
§ 9-509 of the Act.  Super Fresh also independently asserts that it
was the decedent's statutory employer within the meaning of § 9-508
of the Act — an assertion we take up in part V., infra.
Ordinarily, 
the 
existence 
of 
the 
employer/employee
relationship is a question reserved for the fact finder.  Mackell
v. Zayre Corp., 293 Md. 221, 230, 443 A.2d 98, 103 (1982).  When,
however, the existence of the relationship is undisputed, or the
evidence on the issue is uncontroverted, unless conflicting
inferences can be drawn from that evidence, the trial court is
entitled to treat the matter as a question of law.  Whitehead v.
Safety Steel Products, 304 Md. 67, 76, 497 A.2d 803, 808 (1985).
In the present case, however, we cannot conclude that the record is
sufficient to warrant the trial court's conclusion on summary
judgment that the decedent was simultaneously an employee of SDS,
Super Fresh, and A&P.
In Whitehead, supra, a worker employed by a temporary services
agency was injured while working for Safeway Steel Products
("Safeway"), a company to which he was assigned.  After receiving
workers' compensation benefits from the agency, he brought a 
negligence action against Safeway.  Significantly, Whitehead
conceded that "all control of specific tasks while he was at
Safeway belonged entirely to Safeway."  Whitehead, 304 Md. at 76,
497 A.2d at 808. 
-18-
In considering the matter, we surveyed our prior decisions and
concluded 
that 
the 
determination 
of 
the 
employer/employee
relationship is properly based on five factors.  They include "(1)
the power to select and hire the employee, (2) the payment of
wages, (3) the power to discharge, (4) the power to control the
employee's conduct, and (5) whether the work is part of the regular
business of the employer." 304 Md. at 77-78, 497 A.2d at 808-09
(citing Mackell v. Zayre Corp., 293 Md. 221, 230, 443 A.2d 98, 103
(1982)); see also Keitz v. National Paving and Contracting Co., 214
Md. 479, 491, 134 A.2d 296, 301 (1957).  Of these five, control is
paramount and, in most cases, decisive.  304 Md. at 78, 497 A.2d at
809 (and cases cited).  After noting that Safeway "instructed
Whitehead on the tasks to be performed, supervised his work, [] was
free to assign him to any other duties that warranted attention,"
and contributed to Whitehead's workers' compensation insurance
premium, we concluded that the trial court properly granted
judgment n.o.v in favor of Safeway, because as a matter of law,
Whitehead was both an employee of Safeway and of his temporary
services agency.  See Mackell, supra, 293 Md. at 229, 443 A.2d at
102 (worker may simultaneously be employee of two employers).
That an employee can concurrently serve two employers is not
a novel concept in Maryland law.  Indeed, our predecessors
considered the issue over sixty years ago in Saf-T-Cab Service,
Inc. v. Terry, 167 Md. 46, 172 A. 608 (1934).  In Saf-T-Cab, Terry,
     
  The State Industrial Accident Commission preceded the Workers'
12
Compensation Commission, but served the same function.  See Ch. 800, § 1 of the Acts
of 1914 as amended by Ch. 884, § 1 of the Acts of 1957; see also Polomski v. Mayor
and City Council of Baltimore, 344 Md. 70, 76 n.5, 684 A.2d 1338, 1341 n.5 (1996).
-19-
a taxicab driver, suffered injuries while operating his cab in
Baltimore City.  Although the Motor Cab Company, Inc. owned the
taxicab that Terry was driving when he was injured, the Saf-T-Cab
Service, Inc. concerned itself with the cab’s operation.  
In considering Terry's claim for workers’ compensation
benefits, the State Industrial Accident Commission,  concluded that
12
for the purposes of his claim, Terry was solely the employee of the
Motor Cab Company, Inc.  Terry appealed that decision to the
Superior Court of Baltimore City.  The insurer for Saf-T-Cab, on
behalf of itself and its insured, moved to have the appeal
dismissed and a verdict directed in its favor in accordance with
the Commission's order.  The court denied that request and a jury
subsequently concluded that Terry was also an employee of Saf-T-
Cab.  Saf-T-Cab and its insurer appealed seeking review of the
circuit court’s refusal to grant them a directed verdict.
After considering, inter alia, the lower court's refusal to
grant Saf-T-Cab's motion, the Court noted that
"[t]he record attributes no corporate purpose
to either corporation except the prosecution
of the taxicab enterprise in which the
claimant was employed by the executive to whom
the management of both corporations was
committed.  It was testified by that official,
and by the claimant, that the employment under
consideration was on behalf of the Saf-T-Cab
Service, Inc., while there were entries on the
-20-
records of the Motor Cab Company indicating
that 
it 
was [Terry's] 
employer. 
 
Both
corporations were functioning at the time of
the claimant's employment and injury, and were
depositing in the same bank account the
proceeds of the transportation business to
which his service contributed.  Under [these]
circumstances, we think the trial court was
right in declining to rule as a matter of law
that the Saf-T-Cab Service, Inc. was not an
employer of [Terry] . . ."
167 Md. at 49, 172 A. at 609 (emphasis added).
In the instant case, the parties agree that the decedent
worked for SDS in a warehouse managed by Super Fresh and owned by
A&P.  It is also undisputed that SDS and Super Fresh are corporate
subsidiaries of A&P, over which A&P exercises some measure of
control.  There, the agreement ends.
A&P and Super Fresh trumpet our holding in Whitehead, supra,
to assert that, inasmuch as Mrs. Imbraguglio's complaint alleged
some measure of control over the decedent's workplace by the
Petitioners, a fortiori, the decedent was an employee of those who
exercised that control.  Petitioners confuse control of the
workplace with control of the worker.
Unlike the employee in Whitehead, there is no concession from
Mrs. Imbraguglio that her husband was in any way controlled by
either A&P or Super Fresh, or under their direct managerial
authority as was the workers' compensation claimant in Saf-T-Cab
(and even then, the trial judge deferred to the jury).  There is no
evidence from which the trial court could have concluded, as a
       We observed in Whitehead that "the trial court should take great pains to
13
ensure that conflicting inferences are not possible on the presented evidence."
Because of the increasing complexity of the employer/employee relationship, we
believe that in multi-party cases, the employer/employee relationship will most
often be a question of fact, not of law.  Whitehead v. Safeway Steel Products, 304
Md. 67, 76, 407 A.2d 803, 808 (1985).
-21-
matter of law, that (1) A&P or Super Fresh possessed the power to
select and hire the decedent, or that (2) someone other than SDS
paid his wages, (3) had the power to discharge him, or (4) had the
power to control his conduct.  See Whitehead, 304 Md. at 77-78, 497
A.2d at 808.  At best, the record evidence cuts both ways.
Notwithstanding Petitioners' assertions to the contrary, Mrs.
Imbraguglio's Amended Complaint merely alleges that A&P, as owner
of the subject premises, owed her husband a duty of care to
maintain the premises in a safe condition, and that by failing to
do so, caused his death.  Super Fresh's complicity in the accident
is alleged to have resulted from its encouraging employees of SDS
to engage in "unsafe practices" along with A&P.  There are no
direct allegations or permissible inferences to the effect that A&P
or Super Fresh maintained the necessary control over the decedent
which is the hallmark of the employer/employee relationship.   
13
Issues of control aside, A&P individually asserts that as the
parent corporation, it should enjoy the same immunity as its
subsidiary, SDS, under § 9-509 of the Act.  The United States
District Court for the District of Maryland considered this issue
in McClelland v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 735 F. Supp. 172 (D.
Md. 1990), aff'd, 929 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1991).  McClelland was a
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worker at K-S, a corporate subsidiary of the Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company ("Goodyear").  Precluded from seeking damages for his
occupational injuries against K-S in tort, McClelland brought suit
against Goodyear for allegedly providing certain toxic tire-
manufacturing chemicals without regard to the health of the K-S
employees.
In addressing, inter alia, the applicability of the
exclusivity provisions of our Workers' Compensation Act, the
federal district court concluded that
"where as here, the particular practices
causing the plaintiff's injury are said to be
so dominated and controlled by the corporate
parent that the actual employer is a mere
captive of that parent (as was conceded by the
plaintiff in the filing cited ante), then it
would frustrate the purposes of the workers'
compensation law, i.e., to give both employee
and employers a sure, yet simple and exclusive
source 
of 
compensation 
for 
occupational
diseases, if the Court were to disregard the
actuality of corporate control over the
allegedly injurious practices and hold that
the corporate parent was not an employer for
workers' compensation purposes."
McClelland, 735 F. Supp. at 175.  Unfortunately, the only Maryland
authority the federal court relied upon was Dolan v. Kent Research
& Mfg., 63 Md. App. 55, 491 A.2d 1226 (1985), cert. denied, 304 Md.
298, 498 A.2d 1185 (1985) — a case, we note, which reversed a trial
court for failing to apply the employer/employee relationship test
announced in Mackell and Whitehead, supra.  As the intermediate
appellate court pointed out, "employer immunity . . . depends upon
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the existence of an employer/employee relationship, i.e., that a
company so controls the claimant as to be his employer."  Dolan, 63
Md. App. at 65, 491 A.2d at 1231.  The federal court failed to
undertake an analysis of the relationship between the injured
employee and his employer's parent corporation.  In that regard,
the authoritative value of McClelland is suspect.
Significantly, the federal court ignored the separate legal
identities Goodyear and K-S possessed in the eyes of the law.  The
suggestion that "the particular practices causing the plaintiff's
injury are said to be so dominated and controlled by the corporate
parent that the actual employer" is a captive of the parent,
primarily defines the relationship between the parent and the
subsidiary, not between the parent and the injured employee.
As the trial court in the instant case acknowledged, companies
establish distinct corporate subsidiaries for a variety of reasons.
Among those reasons are tax advantages, organizational preferences,
and, of course, limitation of liability.  In any other context, A&P
would assert its legal individuality and seek to shield itself from
liability for the negligent acts of its subsidiaries.  Yet
ironically, it is that very distinctness that A&P now seeks to
disavow.  See Larson, supra, at § 72.40 (parent corporations
vulnerable to the argument that having deliberately set up
corporate separateness for its own purposes should not be heard to
disavow that separateness when advantageous to do so); Annotation,
-24-
Workers' Compensation Immunity as Extending to One Owning
Controlling Interest in Employer Corporation, 30 A.L.R. 4th 948
(and cases collected therein).
To be sure, we are not suggesting parent corporations are
invariably precluded from enjoying tort immunity from suits by
injured employees of their subsidiaries.  Immunity will flow to the
parent to the extent that it functions as the injured employee's
employer under the test articulated in Mackell, Whitehead, and
Saf-T-Cab, supra.  Otherwise, the parent is liable to the same
extent as any other third-party for its own negligent acts causing
injury to the employee of another.
It must be emphasized, however, that the amenability of a
parent corporation to an action in tort in no way establishes
liability on the parent's part.  Like any tort action, the
plaintiff must still establish all elements of a claim against the
parent.  See 1 Fletcher CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 43.80
(1990 & 1996 Cum. Supp.)(and cases cited therein).
V.
As alluded to in Part IV., supra, Super Fresh alone seeks
"statutory employer" status under § 9-508 of the Act.  Section 9-
508 holds principal contractors (or statutory employers) absolutely
liable for the payment of workers' compensation benefits to injured
employees of subcontractors.  Para v. Richards Group of Washington,
     
  Md. Code (1957, 1985 Repl. Vol., 1990 Cum. Supp.), Art. 101, § 62 was
14
transferred to § 9-508 of the Labor and Employment Article with revisions by Ch. 8
of the Acts of 1991.
-25-
Ltd., 339 Md. 241, 253-54, 661 A.2d 737, 744 (1995); Lathrom v.
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 309 Md. 445, 448, 524 A.2d 1228, 1229
(1987).  This ensures that employers who would otherwise evade
their responsibility for carrying workers' compensation insurance
by subdividing their operations through contract are precluded from
doing so.  Roland v. Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc., 221 Md. 11, 19, 155
A.2d 691, 696 (1959).  In exchange for guaranteed compensation,
injured employees of subcontractors are ordinarily barred from
suing the principal contractor in tort, the latter being entitled
to the protection of the exclusivity provisions of § 9-509.  Para,
supra, 339 Md. at 253-54, 661 A.2d at 744; State v. Benjamin F.
Bennet Bldg. Co., 154 Md. 159, 163, 140 A. 52, 53-54 (1928). 
In order for a contractor to be considered the statutory
employer of another contractor's employee, § 9-508 of the Act, like
its predecessor, former Md. Code (1957, 1985 Repl. Vol., 1990 Cum.
Supp.), Art. 101, § 62,  requires two contracts:
14
"one between the principal contractor and a
third party whereby it is agreed that the
principal contractor will execute certain work
for the third party, and another between the
principal 
contractor 
and 
a 
person 
as
subcontractor whereby the subcontractor agrees
to do the whole or part of such work for the
principal contractor."
-26-
339 Md. at 249, 661 A.2d at 742 (quoting Honaker v. W.C. & A.N.
Miller Dev. Co., 278 Md. 453, 460, 365 A.2d 287, 291 (1976)).
In this context, Super Fresh asserts that the record conclusively
establishes that as the principal contractor, it entered into an
agreement with A&P to manage A&P's supermarket operations in the
State of Maryland.  As a necessary and vital part of that
obligation, Super Fresh, in turn, subcontracted with SDS to provide
warehousing and supply services for those supermarkets.  Therefore,
the argument goes, Super Fresh is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law as the statutory employer of the decedent.  
Respondent, although conceding the existence of a business
association among A&P, SDS, and Super Fresh, disputes the
conclusion 
that 
Super 
Fresh 
and 
SDS 
share 
the
principal/subcontractor relationship.  Viewing the evidence and all
reasonable inferences therefrom in Respondent's favor, as we must,
Dobbins v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n., 338 Md. 341, 345,
658 A.2d 674, 676 (1995), we cannot hold that as a matter of law
Super Fresh and SDS share such a relationship.
To its Motion for Summary judgment, Super Fresh appended the
sworn affidavit of one Mary Ellen Offer, Vice President, Assistant
Corporate Secretary, and Senior Counsel for A&P.  In her affidavit,
Offer attested, in relevant part, that based upon her personal
knowledge, "[SDS] and Super Fresh . . . have a contractual
relationship: [SDS] provides warehousing and distribution services
-27-
to Super Fresh[.]"  Offer also attested that "Super Fresh . . . and
[A&P] have a contractual relationship:  Super Fresh . . . operates
the retail supermarket operations of [A&P]."   In her Answer,
Respondent alleged, without a supporting affidavit or other
evidence, that Super Fresh failed to show the existence of the
requisite contractual relationship.
Super Fresh is quick to point out that under Md. Rule 2-501(b)
"[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is
supported by an affidavit or other statement
under oath, an opposing party who desires to
controvert any fact contained in it may not
rest 
solely 
on 
the 
allegations 
in 
the
pleadings, but shall support the response by
an affidavit or other written statement under
oath. "
Because, Super Fresh argues, Respondent failed to support properly
her response to its Motion for Summary Judgment "by an affidavit or
other written statement under oath," she "conceded the truth of
[Petitioners'] affidavit."  Respondent counters by pointing out
that Offer's statement would not have been admissible into
evidence, and we agree.
Maryland Rule 2-501(c) requires that "an affidavit supporting
. . . a motion for summary judgment shall be made upon personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matter stated in the affidavit."  In
other words, an affiant must attest to personal knowledge of the
facts asserted and a basis for that knowledge.  A.J. Decoster Co.
-28-
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 333 Md. 245, 263, 634 A.2d 1330,
1339 (1994).  See also Wyand v. Patterson Agency, Inc., 266 Md.
456, 458, 295 A.2d 773, 774 (1972)("If a grant of summary judgment
is to be affirmed, there must be adherence to the controlling Rules
of Procedure.").
Even assuming (and we will not) that Offer is competent to
testify in her capacity as Vice President, Assistant Corporate
Secretary, and Senior Counsel for A&P regarding a contractual
relationship between A&P and Super Fresh, her affidavit contains no
assertion or recitation of facts that her official duties gave her
reason to have personal knowledge of a contract, much less a
principal/subcontractor relationship, between Super Fresh and SDS
or that she otherwise has authority to speak for parties other than
her immediate employer, A&P.  Her bald assertions are insufficient
to sustain a motion for summary judgment.  See A.J. Decoster Co.,
supra.  Thus, Respondent's failure to controvert a defective
affidavit has no legal consequence and certainly cannot form the
basis of a summary judgment against her.
Super Fresh also insists that because Respondent acknowledged
in her pleadings below and continues to acknowledge that there is
"a distribution system" among SDS, Super Fresh, and A&P she has, in
effect, conceded the existence of a contractual relationship
between the parties.  The existence of a "distribution system,"
while evidence of a business relationship among A&P, Super Fresh,
-29-
and SDS, by no means conclusively establishes the necessary
principal/subcontractor relationship between Super Fresh and SDS.
We have previously defined a subcontract as "a contract with
a person who owes labor or services under another contract, to
perform some or all of the services or labor due."  Para, supra,
339 Md. at 249, 661 A.2d 742.  The record lacks conclusive evidence
concerning the substance of the contractual obligations, if any,
between SDS and Super Fresh, and any concomitant obligations to
A&P.  Simply because three entities do business with each other
does not render any two of them principal and subcontractor.  As
Respondent points out, it can be reasonably inferred that Super
Fresh enters into multiple buy/sell agreements with SDS to restock
its stores.  The "distribution system" conceded by Respondent is
insufficient for us to conclude, as a matter of law, that Super
Fresh and SDS share the principal/subcontractor relationship.
Since the existence of that relationship is material to whether
Respondent can maintain her suit against Super Fresh and is still
in dispute, Super Fresh was not entitled to summary judgment on the
ground that it served as the decedent's statutory employer.  See
White v. Friel, supra, 210 Md. at 285, 123 A.2d at 308.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED.  CASE REMANDED TO
THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR BALTIMORE CITY FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION.  COSTS IN THIS COURT AND
-30-
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE
PAID BY THE PETITIONER.