Case Title: Rhoten v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 130456

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2013-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
JEFFREY RHOTEN, 
a/k/a JEFFREY RHOTON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     OPINION BY 
v.     Record No. 130456  
 
  JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  October 31, 2013 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 
Harold W. Burgess, Jr., Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether res judicata prohibits 
an individual, determined in a prior proceeding not to be a 
sexually violent predator pursuant to the Civil Commitment of 
Sexually Violent Predators Act, Code §§ 37.2-900 et seq. (SVPA 
or the Act), from being subjected to reevaluation and 
redetermination of his status as a sexually violent predator at 
the conclusion of a subsequent period of reincarceration for 
the same sex offenses. 
Background 
 
On June 15, 1989, Jeffrey Paul Rhoten (Rhoten) was 
convicted in the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County of 
aggravated sexual battery and attempting to commit forcible 
sodomy.  The circuit court sentenced him to twenty years’ 
imprisonment with five years suspended for the sexual battery 
charge and ten years’ imprisonment with ten years suspended for  
the attempted forcible sodomy charge.  He was released from 
custody in 1997 but was reincarcerated almost two years later 
 
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due to parole violations.  Before Rhoten’s next scheduled 
release, the Commonwealth filed a petition to civilly commit 
Rhoten pursuant to the Act.  On April 14, 2005, the circuit 
court found that the Commonwealth had failed to meet its burden 
of proof that Rhoten was a sexually violent predator and 
ordered that Rhoten be released from custody (2005 proceeding).  
The Commonwealth appealed, and this Court dismissed its appeal 
on March 24, 2006. 
In 2008, Rhoten was found guilty of violating his parole 
and was reincarcerated for his 1989 sexual offenses.  Prior to 
his scheduled release from incarceration, pursuant to the Act, 
the Commonwealth filed a second petition on March 25, 2011 to 
civilly commit Rhoten as a sexually violent predator (2011 
petition).  In response, Rhoten filed a motion to dismiss the 
2011 petition, arguing that it was barred by res judicata 
because the circuit court had found that Rhoten was not a 
sexually violent predator in 2005. 
After hearing oral arguments on Rhoten’s motion to dismiss 
on September 30, 2011, the court denied the motion.  Rhoten 
noted his objection on the court order. 
 
Rhoten “waive[d] the formal presentation of the evidence” 
at trial and agreed “[t]hat the [Commonwealth’s] evidence would 
be sufficient to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
[he] is a sexually violent predator, as defined in the Act.”  
 
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Rhoten also stipulated “that the case [was] in a procedural 
posture that [was] ripe and appropriate for adjudication” and 
“[t]hat the [Commonwealth’s] Petition was properly and timely 
filed.” 
The circuit court found that Rhoten was a sexually violent 
predator and ordered that he be committed to the custody of the 
Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services 
after determining that Rhoten did not qualify for conditional 
release.  Rhoten objected to the final order of the circuit 
court because of the court’s failure to grant his res judicata-
based motion to dismiss.  Rhoten appeals, claiming that the 
circuit court erred in failing to find that the Commonwealth’s 
action was barred by res judicata. 
Analysis 
 
Rhoten argues that the circuit court erred in denying his 
motion to dismiss the Commonwealth’s 2011 petition.  Because 
the circuit court found he was not a sexually violent predator 
in the 2005 proceeding and because he has not committed any new 
sexually violent offenses since 1989, Rhoten maintains that the 
2011 petition was barred by res judicata.  Rhoten asserts that 
although he believes Rule 1:6 governs the res judicata issue in 
this case, the Commonwealth’s 2011 petition would be barred 
under former res judicata law as well. 
 
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Initially, the Commonwealth argues that Rhoten waived his 
res judicata argument by stipulating that he is a sexually 
violent predator, that the 2011 petition was “properly and 
timely filed” and that the 2011 petition was “appropriate for 
adjudication.”  On the merits of Rhoten’s appeal, the 
Commonwealth argues that when it filed the 2011 petition, 
Rhoten was serving time in prison for his 1989 sexual offenses, 
and the resulting civil commitment proceeding was to determine 
his status at that time.  It argues Rhoten’s status in 2011 as 
a sexually violent predator could not have been determined in 
the 2005 proceeding.  Additionally, the Commonwealth disagrees 
with Rhoten as to the application of Rule 1:6 to this case 
because the 2005 proceeding was commenced before July 1, 2006. 
 
The question whether res judicata applies so as to bar 
relitigation of a claim is an issue of law this Court reviews 
de novo.  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 285 Va. 537, 548, 
740 S.E.2d 1, 7 (2013).  Before considering the merits, we must 
address the Commonwealth’s contention that Rhoten waived his 
objection to the circuit court’s ruling on his res judicata 
argument.  Rule 5:25 demands that a party object at the time of 
the lower court’s ruling in order to preserve an issue for 
appeal.  This Court has stated that “[t]he purpose of requiring 
timely specific objections is to afford a trial court the 
opportunity to rule intelligently on the issues presented, 
 
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thereby avoiding unnecessary appeals and reversals.”  Chawla v. 
BurgerBusters, Inc., 255 Va. 616, 622, 499 S.E.2d 829, 832 
(1998). 
 
Code § 8.01-384(A) controls the interpretation of Rule 
5:25.  Helms v. Manspile, 277 Va. 1, 7, 671 S.E.2d 127, 130 
(2009).  According to subsection (A), once a party has made the 
court aware of an argument, repeated objections or motions to 
preserve the argument for appeal are unnecessary.  Code § 8.01-
384(A) further provides that “[a]rguments made at trial via 
written pleading, . . . recital of objections in a final order 
[or] oral argument reduced to transcript . . . shall, unless 
expressly withdrawn or waived, be deemed preserved therein for 
assertion on appeal.” 
 
Once a party has preserved an argument for appeal, to 
waive the argument under Code § 8.01-384(A), the party must 
abandon it or show intent to abandon by the party’s conduct.  
Helms, 277 Va. at 6, 671 S.E.2d at 129.  There must be “clear 
and unmistakable proof” of the intent to waive the argument 
before we will find implied waiver.  Chawla, 255 Va. at 623, 
499 S.E.2d at 833. 
 
We have held that a party’s affirmative statement can 
serve as an abandonment of that party’s objection at trial.  
See Graham v. Cook, 278 Va. 233, 248, 682 S.E.2d 535, 543 
(2009) (party’s statement, “I don’t have a problem with that,” 
 
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indicated party no longer objected to admission of testimony).  
However, endorsing a pretrial order as “seen and agreed” after 
having previously filed a memorandum of law and orally argued 
the contrary position does not evince intent to abandon.  
Chawla, 255 Va. at 622, 499 S.E.2d at 832; see also Cashion v. 
Smith, ___ Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2013) (this day decided). 
 
This Court determined in Shelton v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 
121, 128, 645 S.E.2d 914, 917 (2007), that a stipulation did 
not constitute abandonment.  There, the defendant filed a 
motion to dismiss and orally argued that the Commonwealth’s 
petition to civilly commit him under the SVPA should be 
dismissed because his initial score on the applicable risk 
assessment test was incorrect.  Id. at 125, 645 S.E.2d at 915.  
After the circuit court denied his motion, the defendant noted 
his objection on the court’s final order.  Id. at 125, 645 
S.E.2d at 916.  Although he stipulated to receiving a 
qualifying score, he did not stipulate to the score’s accuracy, 
which was the precise issue on appeal.  Id. at 128, 645 S.E.2d 
at 917 (“[T]he evidence at [the defendant’s] trial did not 
affect the merit of his earlier argument or result in an 
effective abandonment of his claim.”). 
 
Rhoten properly preserved the res judicata issue for 
appeal in the present case with his motion to dismiss, his oral 
arguments before the circuit court, his objection to the court 
 
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order denying his motion and his stated objection on the final 
order.  The circuit court had the opportunity to rule 
intelligently on the issue of res judicata after Rhoten made 
the court aware of his argument. 
 
Rhoten’s agreement to stipulations that streamlined the 
trial on the 2011 petition, after his motion to dismiss the 
petition was denied, do not clearly and unmistakably 
demonstrate an intent to abandon his claim of res judicata.  
Therefore, we hold that his stipulations did not affect the 
earlier preservation of his argument and that Rhoten did not 
waive his res judicata argument in the circuit court.  We now 
turn to the merits of this appeal. 
The SVPA ensures that those who have been convicted of 
sexually violent offenses are evaluated before being released 
into society when their period of incarceration is over.  Cf. 
Shivaee v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 112, 120, 613 S.E.2d 570, 574 
(2005) (“[A] State may ‘in certain narrow circumstances 
provide[] for the forcible civil detainment of people who are 
unable to control their behavior and who thereby pose a danger 
to the public health and safety.’”) (quoting Kansas v. 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997)).  To that end, the Act 
charges the Director of the Department of Corrections with 
maintaining a database of prisoners incarcerated for sexually 
violent offenses.  Code § 37.2-903(A).  Every month, the 
 
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Director must review the database to identify prisoners 
incarcerated for sexually violent offenses who are scheduled 
for release in the following ten months.  Code § 37.2-903(B).  
Such prisoners must undergo an initial mental health screening 
to determine whether they “may meet the definition of a 
sexually violent predator” under the Act.  Code §§ 37.2-903(B) 
and (C). 
The Act defines a “sexually violent predator” as “any 
person who (i) has been convicted of a sexually violent offense 
. . . and (ii) because of a mental abnormality or personality 
disorder, finds it difficult to control his predatory behavior, 
which makes him likely to engage in sexually violent acts.”  
Code § 37.2-900.  Those who meet a certain threshold upon 
screening are assessed further by a mental health evaluation.  
Code §§ 37.2-903(E) and -904.  The Commitment Review Committee 
reviews the evaluation and, depending on the results, 
recommends to the Attorney General that the prisoner be 
committed, put in conditional release or not be committed.  
Code §§ 37.2-904(B) and (C).  Information is forwarded to the 
Attorney General to enable the Commonwealth to petition for the 
prisoner’s civil commitment pursuant to the Act if the Attorney 
General so chooses.  Code §§ 37.2-904(C) and -905(A). 
The parties disagree about the appropriate res judicata 
standard to be applied in this case.  However, under either 
 
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standard the result is the same because the 2011 petition was 
not based upon the same transaction as the 2005 proceeding and 
did not require the same evidence. 
 
The current governing law of res judicata in the 
Commonwealth is Rule 1:6.  Raley v. Haider, 286 Va. 164, 170, 
___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2013).  The rule states: 
A party whose claim for relief arising from 
identified conduct, a transaction, or an occurrence, 
is decided on the merits by a final judgment, shall 
be forever barred from prosecuting any second or 
subsequent civil action against the same opposing 
party or parties on any claim or cause of action that 
arises from that same conduct, transaction or 
occurrence . . . . 
Rule 1:6(a).  This rule applies to “judgments entered in civil 
actions commenced after July 1, 2006.”  Rule 1:6(b). 
This Court’s res judicata jurisprudence prior to the 
enactment of Rule 1:6 required four elements before res 
judicata would bar a claim: “(1) identity of the remedies 
sought; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of 
the parties; and (4) identity of the quality of the persons for 
or against whom the claim is made.”  Caperton, 285 Va. at 549, 
740 S.E.2d at 7 (quoting Smith v. Ware, 244 Va. 374, 376, 421 
S.E.2d 444, 445 (1992)).  To establish identity of cause of 
action, a party formerly had to show that the prior and 
subsequent claims required the same evidence.  Davis v. 
Marshall Homes, Inc., 265 Va. 159, 168, 576 S.E.2d 504, 508 
 
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(2003).  By contrast, Rule 1:6 explicitly does not rely on a 
showing of the same evidence or elements to establish res 
judicata.  Rule 1:6(a) (“regardless of the legal elements or 
the evidence upon which any claims in the prior proceeding 
depended”); see also Martin-Bangura v. Commonwealth Dep’t of 
Mental Health, 640 F. Supp. 2d 729, 738 (E.D. Va. 2009) 
(Virginia’s “transactional” test under Rule 1:6 replaced the 
prior “same evidence” test). 
In support of his res judicata argument, Rhoten focuses 
almost exclusively on the fact that he committed no new 
sexually violent offense between the 2005 proceeding and 2011 
petition.  We note that evaluation is triggered under the Act 
by incarceration for a sexually violent offense and impending 
release from incarceration, not by conviction of a new sexually 
violent offense.  See Code § 37.2-903(B) (“Each month, the 
Director shall review the database and identify all such 
prisoners who are scheduled for release from prison within 10 
months.”). 
When the Commonwealth filed its 2011 petition, Rhoten was 
serving time for a sexually violent offense.  See Townes v. 
Commonwealth, 269 Va. 234, 240-41, 609 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2005) (“[A] 
prisoner must be serving an active sentence for a sexually 
violent offense . . . at the time he is identified as being 
subject to the SVPA.”).  To civilly commit Rhoten, the 
 
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Commonwealth had to prove by clear and convincing evidence not 
only that Rhoten has been convicted and incarcerated because of 
a sexually violent offense, but also that he suffers from a 
“mental abnormality or personality disorder” that makes it 
difficult to control his “predatory behavior.”  Code §§ 37.2-
900 and -908(C).  The statutory language necessitates an 
evaluation of the prisoner’s current mental health status.  See 
Code §§ 37.2-900 (“finds it difficult to control . . . which 
makes him likely to engage”) (emphasis added); -908(C) (“The 
court or jury shall determine whether, by clear and convincing 
evidence, the respondent is a sexually violent predator.”) 
(emphasis added).  Regarding both the 2005 proceeding and the 
2011 petition, Rhoten’s mental health evaluations assessed his 
condition and risk of future predatory behavior as of the time 
of evaluation.  See Code § 37.2-907; see also Code § 37.2-
904(B) (“The licensed psychiatrist or licensed clinical 
psychologist shall determine whether the prisoner or defendant 
is a sexually violent predator, as defined in § 37.2-900.”) 
(emphasis added).∗ 
We agree with the Commonwealth that the Act assumes the 
mental health of a sexually violent offender may change over 
                     
∗ Rhoten stipulated that the Commonwealth’s evidence was 
sufficient to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he 
was, at the time of the ruling presently on appeal, a sexually 
violent predator as defined in the Act. 
 
 
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time.  See, e.g., Code §§ 37.2-910(A), (B) and (D) (outlining a 
process for reevaluation after commitment and requiring release 
if a court “finds, based upon the report and other evidence 
provided at the hearing, that the respondent is no longer a 
sexually violent predator”).  As the Commonwealth correctly 
points out, Rhoten’s mental health condition in 2011 could not 
have been litigated in the 2005 proceeding. 
The 2011 petition arose as a result of Rhoten’s impending 
release from custody after a new term of incarceration for a 
sexually violent offense and concerned Rhoten’s mental health 
status in 2011.  The 2011 petition was not dependent upon the 
same evidence as the 2005 proceeding, nor did the 2011 petition 
arise from the same conduct, transaction or occurrence.  
Therefore, application of res judicata is inappropriate.  See 
Rule 1:6; Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. 667, 670-71, 202 S.E.2d 917, 
920-21 (1974) (“A valid, personal judgment on the merits in 
favor of defendant bars relitigation of the same cause of 
action, or any part thereof which could have been litigated, 
between the same parties and their privies.”) (footnote 
omitted).  The 2011 petition was not barred by res judicata. 
Therefore, we hold the circuit court did not err in 
denying Rhoten’s motion to dismiss.  Accordingly, the judgment 
of the circuit court will be affirmed. 
Affirmed.