Case Title: Columbus Bar Assn. v. Brooks

Citation: 1996-Ohio-457

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-06-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Columbus Bar Association v. Brooks. 
[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Brooks (1996), _____ Ohio St.3d  
____.] 
Attorneys at law -- Misconduct -- One-year suspension with last six 
months stayed on condition -- Failing to promptly pay funds client 
is entitled to receive. 
 
(No. 95-1218--Submitted November 8, 1995--Decided June 5,  
 
  1996.) 
 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 94-87. 
 
Relator, Columbus Bar Association, charged respondent, Walter 
G. Brooks of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0034246, with 
having violated DR 9-102(B)(4) (failing to promptly pay funds client is 
entitled to receive).  A panel of the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”) heard the 
matter on April 6, 1995. 
 
2
 
The 
testimony 
and 
stipulations 
submitted 
to 
the 
panel 
demonstrated that respondent and Lawrence E. Winkfield1 practiced law 
as a professional association, Winkfield & Brooks Co., L.P.A. (“L.P.A.”), 
of which they were the sole owners.  In January 1989, respondent 
entered into a fee agreement with Elbert Thomas to represent him in an 
employment discrimination suit.  The fee agreement signed by 
respondent and Thomas required the payment of a retainer and an 
hourly fee for respondent’s services. The agreement also provided that 
if the claim was settled, respondent would retain one third of the 
settlement amount and would reimburse Thomas any monies previously 
paid under the agreement. 
 
In October 1990, after advancing at least $13,956 in attorney fees 
to the L.P.A., Thomas agreed to a $48,298 settlement of his claim. 
When Thomas went to pick up his settlement check, he noticed that his 
share of the settlement proceeds did not include a reimbursement of the 
previously advanced fees. 
 
3
 
Thomas complained immediately to a secretary at the L.P.A. 
Subsequently, he met with respondent on several occasions to discuss 
the $13,956 deficiency.  In February 1991, respondent acknowledged in 
a letter that Thomas was entitled to the reimbursement of $13,956.  
Respondent paid Thomas $3,000 with checks from the L.P.A. and, 
apparently, promised to make installment payments of $500 per month 
until Thomas had been reimbursed in full. 
 
Respondent sporadically paid Thomas the installments with L.P.A. 
checks until March 1993, when the association dissolved, repaying only 
$6,050 of the $13,956 shortfall.  In October 1993, respondent personally 
agreed with Thomas to pay him installments of $200 per month on the 
remaining debt. By May 1994, however, respondent had made only two 
payments from his own funds, prompting Thomas to file a grievance 
with relator. 
 
4
 
Prior to filing the grievance, Thomas contacted Winkfield 
regarding the outstanding debt for the attorney fees advanced in 1990.  
Winkfield, however, did not reimburse any money to Thomas. 
 
In September 1994, Thomas filed a claim with the Clients’ Security 
Fund for payment of the monies retained by respondent on behalf of the 
L.P.A.  His claim incited respondent to pay him $3,000 in November 
1994, $200 in December 1994, $200 in February 1995, and $200 in 
March 1995.  At the time of the hearing, respondent had paid Thomas a 
total of $10,050 of the $13,956 debt, leaving a balance of $3,906 in 
unreimbursed attorney fees. 
 
Testifying before the panel, respondent acknowledged the 
obligation on the debt.  He explained that there had been no funds 
available to reimburse Thomas in February 1991, when respondent 
realized the miscalculation of Thomas’s share of the settlement 
proceeds.  Respondent further testified that he had informed Winkfield 
of the debt owed Thomas in early 1991.  Winkfield denied this assertion, 
 
5
insisting that he learned of Thomas’s claim for reimbursement only after 
the dissolution of the L.P.A. 
 
The panel found that respondent had violated DR 9-102(B)(4).  In 
recommending an appropriate sanction, the panel noted that 
respondent had not submitted mitigating evidence.  The panel 
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law 
for one year with the entire suspension stayed on the condition that 
respondent and WInkfield reimburse Thomas “approximately $3,000” by 
July 1, 1995. 
 
The board adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law of 
the panel, and, except for the deadlines imposed, agreed with the 
panel’s recommendation.  The board further recommended that the 
costs of the proceedings be taxed to respondent. 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
6
 
Carlile, Patchen & Murphy and Robert B. Barnett, Jr.; and Bruce 
A. Campbell, Columbus Bar Association Counsel, for relator. 
 
Walter G. Brooks, pro se. 
---------------------------------- 
 
MOYER, C.J.  This case demonstrates the importance of DR 9-102 
and the necessity of preserving the identity of funds and property of a 
client.  The rule against commingling a client’s funds with those of his or 
her attorney was established to protect against the danger inherent in all 
cases that such commingling will result in the loss of client money and 
the erosion of public trust in the legal profession. 
 
Thomas paid respondent and Winkfield a retainer fee of $13,956.  
Thomas’s claim was settled for $48,298.  Respondent and Winkfield 
were entitled to receive $2,143.33 from the settlement proceeds, 
providing them with a total fee of $16,099.33.  Instead, they kept 
$15,516 from the settlement proceeds and disbursed $32,782 to 
Thomas, who should have received $46,154.67.  On January 5, 1996, 
 
7
over five years from the date of the settlement, Thomas received a 
check from Winkfield that may or may not be a final payment.2 
 
Respondent asserts that after realizing his inadvertent “mistake” in 
calculating Thomas’s settlement check, he made “a diligent and 
concerted effort to fully reimburse” his client. We find this assertion to 
be, at best, disingenuous.  The actions of respondent regarding the 
repayment of his client’s money seem more a diligent and concerted 
effort to evade his responsibility as an attorney than to settle a debt 
owed to a client. 
 
Initially, Thomas pursued the issue of overpayment for several 
months before respondent finally acknowledged the debt to him in 
February 1991.  Over the next five years, respondent continually stalled 
and evaded his obligation to fully reimburse Thomas the funds he was 
entitled to receive.  The result was that Thomas was denied, and the 
respondent enjoyed, the use of a significant amount of money that 
belonged to Mr. Thomas during that lengthy period. 
 
8
 
Given the length of time involved in the improper retention of the 
client’s funds by respondent, we agree with relator that it would be 
difficult to imagine a more glaring violation of this provision of the Code 
of Professional Responsibility.  Because the misconduct of the 
respondent is of such a serious nature, an actual suspension from the 
practice of law is warranted.  Therefore, respondent is suspended from 
the practice of law in Ohio for one year with the last six months stayed 
upon condition that prior to the stay he provide full restitution plus 
interest at the judgment rate to Thomas.  Any lighter sanction would be 
a message to the bar that a lawyer may wrongfully withhold a significant 
amount of funds owing to a client for an indeterminate amount of time 
and receive little more than an order from this court that the funds must 
be repaid with interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
DOUGLAS, SHAW, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., 
concur. 
 
9
 
STEPHEN R. SHAW, J., of the Third Appellate District, sitting for 
WRIGHT, J. 
 
 
FOOTNOTES: 
 
1  Winkfield was also charged with violating DR 9-102(B)(4).  See 
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Winkfield (1996), ___ Ohio St.3d ___, ___ 
N.E.2d ___. 
 
2  In his supplemental pleading regarding the payment of full 
restitution, Winkfield assures us that he has already completely repaid 
Thomas.  Relator does not dispute this representation; however, 
Thomas was owed $3,906 as of the date of the panel hearing, and, 
since then, Winkfield has offered proof only for his payment of $906 to 
Thomas.  Respondent, however, has offered no proof of any recent 
attempts to satisfy the obligation.