Case Title: Ex parte Jimmy Walker.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1131448

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2015-08-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:08/28/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2015
_________________________
1131448
_________________________
Ex parte Jimmy Walker
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Jeremy M. Deason
v.
Jimmy Walker et al.)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-13-659)
SHAW, Justice.
Jimmy Walker, a defendant below, petitions this Court for
a writ of mandamus directing the Montgomery Circuit Court to
vacate its order denying his motion for a summary judgment in
1131448
the action commenced by the plaintiff, Jeremy M. Deason, a
former inmate in the custody of the Alabama Department of
Corrections 
("DOC"), 
alleging 
negligence 
and 
wantonness 
and 
to
enter a summary judgment in Walker's favor on the basis of
State-agent immunity.  We grant the petition and issue the
writ.
Facts and Procedural History
While Deason was incarcerated, he participated in a DOC
work-release program and was assigned to an inmate- 
construction detail; Walker, who was employed as a "carpenter
supervisor" with DOC's Correctional Industries Division,
served as Deason's work-release supervisor.  In 2010, Deason
suffered an on-the-job injury when scaffolding he and Walker
were dismantling collapsed.  Before both Deason and Walker's
ascent onto the scaffolding, Walker had performed a visual
inspection of the scaffolding and the "mud plates," which
prevent scaffolding from settling, in order to assess the 
stability of the scaffolding; according to Walker, the
scaffolding appeared secure before Deason started ascending.1
Deason's own testimony confirmed that nothing about the
1
scaffolding appeared unstable before his ascent.
2
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As a result of his injuries, Deason sued, among other
defendants, numerous DOC officials, including Walker, whom
Deason sued only in his individual capacity.  Specifically, as
to Walker, Deason contended that Walker "started climbing the
scaffold on the same side as [Deason] knowing that the
scaffold was not set up properly for workers to climb the same
side at the same time."  During his subsequent deposition
testimony, Deason elaborated, explaining that Walker had
allegedly supervised the initial erection of the scaffolding,
which, according to Walker, was neither anchored to the wall
of the adjacent building nor supported by jacks.  In his
answer to Walker's petition, Deason 
lists 
the alleged tortious
actions of Walker as including: "failing to inspect the
scaffold just before climbing and then climbing an unanchored
scaffold on the same side and just behind ... Deason." 
Deason's answer and brief, at p. 23.
All 
claims 
in 
Deason's 
complaint, 
excepting 
the
negligence 
and 
wantonness 
claims 
against 
Walker, 
were 
disposed
of either by dismissal or by summary judgment.  Walker, too,
sought a summary judgment 
on, 
among other grounds, State-agent
and sovereign-immunity grounds.  Deason opposed Walker's
3
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motion, arguing, essentially, that "because the State can
never be liable for a tort, any time an employee of the State
commits a tort, he is acting beyond his authority."  On August
5, 2014, the trial court entered an order denying  Walker's
summary-judgment motion.  In response, Walker filed the
instant petition seeking a writ of mandamus directing the
trial court to enter a summary judgment in his favor on the
basis of State-agent immunity. 
Standard of Review
"'Mandamus is an extraordinary writ
and will be issued "'only when there is: 
(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner
to the order sought, (2) an imperative duty
upon 
the 
respondent 
to 
perform, 
accompanied
by a refusal to do so, (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy, and (4) properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court.'"  Ex
parte Land, 775 So. 2d 847, 850 (Ala. 2000)
(quoting Ex parte Horton, 711 So. 2d 979,
983 (Ala. 1998)).  When we consider a
mandamus petition, the scope of our review
is to determine whether the trial court
clearly exceeded its discretion.  Ex parte
Tegner, 682 So. 2d 396 (Ala. 1996).'
"State v. Bui, 888 So. 2d 1227, 1229 (Ala. 2004). 
We further note this Court's general rule that we
will not review the denial of a motion for a summary
judgment on a petition for the writ of mandamus
because an adequate remedy exists by way of an
appeal.  Ex parte Par Pharm., Inc., 58 So. 3d 767,
775–76 (Ala. 2010).  However, an exception to that
general rule is 'that the denial of a motion for
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summary judgment grounded on a claim of immunity is
reviewable by petition for writ of mandamus.'  Ex
parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912 (Ala. 2000) (citing
Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d 794 (Ala. 1996))."
Ex parte Thomas, 110 So. 3d 363, 365–66 (Ala. 2012).
In addition,
"[t]his 
Court 
has 
established 
a
'burden-shifting' process when a party raises the
defense of State-agent immunity.  Giambrone v.
Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Ala. 2003).  In
order to claim State-agent immunity, a State agent
bears 
the 
burden 
of 
demonstrating 
that 
the
plaintiff's claims arise from a function that would
entitle the State agent to immunity.  Giambrone, 874
So. 2d at 1052; Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 709
(Ala. 2002).  If the State agent makes such a
showing, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to
show 
that 
the 
State 
agent 
acted 
willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond
his or her authority.  Giambrone, 874 So. 2d at
1052; Wood, 852 So. 2d at 709; Ex parte Davis, 721
So. 2d 685, 689 (Ala. 1998).  'A State agent acts
beyond authority and is therefore not immune when he
or she "fail[s] to discharge duties pursuant to
detailed rules or regulations, such as those stated
on a checklist."'  Giambrone, 874 So. 2d at 1052
(quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala.
2000))."
Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006).
Discussion
In his petition, Walker, citing, among other cases,
Carpenter v. Tillman, 948 So. 2d 536 (Ala. 2006), argues that
he 
is entitled to State-agent immunity because, he 
says,"[t]he
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1131448
law is clear that 'employees of the DOC are entitled to
State-agent immunity when in conducting the activities made
the basis of the action they were exercising "judgment in the
administration" of the DOC.'"  Petition, at 10 (quoting
Carpenter, 948 So. 2d at 538).  According to Walker, at the
time of Deason's injury, Walker, among other things, "was
supervising personnel on a work squad and exercising
discretion in performing his duties as a supervisor." 
Therefore, Walker argues that he is immune from suit pursuant
to Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000).   We
2
agree.
Alabama law governing actions against State agents is
well settled:
"'State-agent 
immunity 
protects 
state 
employees,
as agents of the State, in the exercise of their
judgment in executing their work responsibilities.'
Ex parte Hayles, 852 So. 2d 117, 122 (Ala. 2002). In
Cranman, this Court restated the rule governing
State-agent immunity:
"'A State agent shall be immune from
civil liability in his or her personal
capacity when the conduct made the basis of
Cranman was a plurality opinion.  The test set forth in
2
Cranman was subsequently adopted by a majority of the Court in
Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000).
6
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the claim against the agent is based upon
the agent's
"'(1) formulating plans, policies, or
designs; or
"'(2) exercising his or her judgment
in the administration of a department or
agency of government, including, but not
limited to, examples such as:
"'(a) 
making 
administrative
adjudications;
"'(b) allocating resources;
"'(c) negotiating contracts;
"'(d) hiring, firing, transferring,
assigning, or supervising personnel; or
"'(3) discharging duties imposed on a
department or agency by statute, rule, or
regulation, insofar as the statute, rule,
or regulation prescribes the manner for
performing the duties and the State agent
performs the duties in that manner; or
"'(4) exercising judgment in the
enforcement of the criminal laws of the
State, including, but not limited to,
law-enforcement officers' arresting or
attempting to arrest persons; or
"'(5) exercising judgment in the
discharge of duties imposed by statute,
rule, 
or 
regulation 
in 
releasing 
prisoners,
counseling or releasing persons of unsound
mind, or educating students.
"'Notwithstanding anything to the
contrary in the foregoing statement of the
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1131448
rule, a State agent shall not be immune
from civil liability in his or her personal
capacity
"'(1) when the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or the Constitution of
this State, or laws, rules, or regulations
of this State enacted or promulgated for
the purpose of regulating the activities of
a 
governmental 
agency 
require 
otherwise; 
or
"'(2) when the State agent acts
willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in
bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or
under a mistaken interpretation of the
law.'
"792 So. 2d at 405."
Reynolds, 946 So. 2d at 453-54.
As Deason notes, to be entitled to the claimed immunity,
Walker must generally demonstrate that his acts fall within
one of the five categories of conduct set out above.  Once
Walker makes that demonstration, the burden then shifts to
Deason to show that, at the time of Deason's injury, Walker
was "'act[ing] willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad
faith, beyond his ... authority, or under a mistaken
interpretation of the law.'"  Id.  We note that, in his answer
to Walker's petition, Deason argues alternatively that
Walker's actions do not fall within any of the five Cranman
categories and that he exceeded his authority.  The crux of
8
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Deason's argument in opposition to Walker's petition appears
to be that Walker's alleged negligent and/or wanton conduct 
with regard to the inspection and ascent of the scaffolding is
sufficient to abrogate Walker's entitlement to State-agent
immunity.  Deason states: "The requirement of State
constitutional immunity means that an employee is not immune
when he or she commits a tort that does not fit into the
immunities enumerated in the first five paragraphs of the
[Cranman] test."
Walker contends that, at the time of Deason's accident,
he was acting in his discretionary capacity as "carpenter
supervisor" and that his duties included "supervising,
instructing, 
and training inmates in the specifications of 
the
project" and "conducting safety checks to ensure that safe
techniques [were] being utilized with tools, including
scaffolding."  Petition, at 14.  Walker further contends that
his duties and actions in supervising the work site and the
inmates, including Deason, "necessarily involve planning,
directing, supervising, and making discretionary decisions." 
Id.  Thus, Walker appears to contend that his actions fall
within the second category of Cranman.  Further, according to
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Walker's summary-judgment motion, "[t]here is no rule or
regulation of [DOC or its subject entities] relating to
construction or of scaffolding, how it is to be anchored,
climbed, or additional safety equipment that must be used." 
Thus, Walker also contends that there is no evidence
indicating that he acted beyond his authority.  
The supporting evidence Walker submitted indicated that,
in his capacity as "carpenter supervisor," he was generally
responsible for supervising the work of inmates, including
Deason, and for conducting safety inspections at the work
site.  More specifically, the list of general responsibilities
3
on Walker's "Employee Performance Appraisal" lists the job
responsibilities of a "carpenter supervisor" as including the
following:  
"1.  Reviews prints, shop drawings and job
specifications using all applicable building codes
to 
learn 
about 
the 
work 
at 
hand 
and 
find
discrepancies with no valid complaints.
"2.  Visits job sites with inmates following written
and oral instructions to work on projects with
maximum productivity and no valid complaints.
Deason, who possessed carpentry experience, had worked
3
under Walker's supervision for more than a year before the
accident.  
10
1131448
"3.  Reviews purchasing paperwork against all
specifications to confirm materials required and
identify any problems for maximum productivity and
timely completion of assignments.
"4.  Receives and stores materials at the job site,
verifying materials received, storing materials
properly and maintain[ing] property control with no
valid complaints.
"5.  Supervises, instructs and trains inmates in the
use of any specifications available using hand tools
or power tools following all applicable codes in new
construction, remodeling, demolition and all related
work with no valid complaints.
"6.  Completes assignments using inmate labor
following all available specifications, proper
construction techniques, following instructions, or
correcting problems at job sites.
"7.  Troubleshoots all inmate work checking for
quality work, work meeting specifications, proper
construction techniques, following instructions, or
correcting problems at job sites.
"8.  Conducts safety checks to ensure that inmates
use safe techniques as to power tool usage, all
electrical 
devices, 
scaffolding, 
and 
debris
removal."4
According to Walker, other than the foregoing, he has
4
never received anything in writing detailing the duties and
responsibilities of his position.  Testimony from other DOC
personnel confirms that there are no written guidelines or
regulations for a 
carpenter supervisor to follow in performing
his or her duties at a job site, nor are there any written
standards for performing the job in a "safe manner."
11
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The evidence presented in support of Walker's summary-
judgment motion further established that, on the morning of
Deason's injury, Walker began the workday by generally
instructing his crew that a section of scaffolding had to be
taken down.  In response to Walker's instructions, Deason
voluntarily ascended the scaffolding; once Deason had reached
the top tier of the scaffolding, Walker followed Deason up by
ascending the same side of the scaffolding that Deason had
climbed.  When Walker reached approximately its second tier,
the scaffolding began swaying and ultimately toppled,
resulting in Deason's claimed injuries.
Deason's testimony indicated his belief that the work-
release center might have a policy governing required "job
inspections" for security of job sites; however, according to
Deason, to his knowledge, those inspections consist solely of
a work-release officer like Walker "com[ing] to jobs and
mak[ing] sure the inmates [are] doing what they're told [and
are] properly dressed."  Further, DOC has issued no specific
rule or regulation governing either the construction,
anchoring, or ascension of scaffolding or the employment of
12
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fall-protection 
or 
other 
safety 
equipment.  
 
More
5
specifically, the record establishes that DOC does not have
any guidelines regarding the dismantling of scaffolding and,
instead, relies upon the discretion of the carpenter
supervisor as to the performance of such duties.  Walker's
evidentiary submissions further established that, prior to
directing Deason to ascend the scaffolding for dismantling,
Walker performed a visual inspection of its condition.  
Walker contends that, in light of the foregoing facts and
prior decisions of this Court, even assuming that he
negligently performed his duties 
with regard to the inspection
and ascension of the scaffolding, those duties were performed
in the line and scope of his discretionary authority as a
carpenter supervisor.  See Ex parte Randall, 971 So. 2d 652,
664 (Ala. 2007) ("This Court has previously held that poor
judgment or wanton misconduct, an aggravated form of
negligence, does not rise to the level of willfulness and
maliciousness necessary to put the State agent beyond the
immunity recognized in Cranman.  See Giambrone [v. Douglas],
Deason's counsel acknowledged on the record below that
5
Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations did
not apply in this case. 
13
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874 So. 2d [1046] at 1057 [(Ala. 2003),] (holding that
State-agent immunity 'is not abrogated for negligent and
wanton behavior; instead, immunity is withheld only upon a
showing that the State agent acted willfully, maliciously,
fraudulently, 
in 
bad 
faith, 
or 
beyond 
his 
or 
her
authority').").
The undisputed evidence before us establishes that Walker
clearly 
possessed 
discretion 
regarding 
the 
day-to-day
activities on the job site at which Deason was working,
including the delegation of work necessary to complete a
particular project –- such as the dismantling of the 
scaffolding.  In fact, Walker's responsibilities specifically
include 
both 
"[s]upervis[ing]" 
and 
"instruct[ing]" 
in 
order 
to
"[c]omplete[] 
assignments 
using 
inmate 
labor." 
 
Nothing 
before
us indicates that Walker exceeded the scope of his authority
as that authority was defined by his supervisors and by the 
job description.  Ex parte Hayles, 852 So. 2d 117, 122 (Ala.
2002) ("State-agent immunity protects state employees, as
agents of the State, in the exercise of their judgment in
executing their work responsibilities.").  See also Ex parte
Spivey, 846 So. 2d 322, 331 (Ala. 2002) ("A State agent is ...
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immune from civil liability for exercising judgment in
supervising personnel.").
Deason disputes that Walker's inmate work detail
constitutes "personnel" as the term is used in Cranman, and he
also appears to believe that, because supervision of inmates
on work release and, more specifically, the climbing of
scaffolding fail to appear as explicit categories in Cranman,
Walker failed to meet his initial burden of showing that his
actions fall within an activity entitling Walker to immunity
under Cranman.  As Deason correctly notes, however, the list
of conduct enumerated by this Court in Cranman is not
exhaustive.  See, e.g., Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d
201, 206 (Ala. 2003).  
Moreover, the caselaw cited by Deason in support of his
claim that a State agent "has no authority to act for the
state in the commission of a tort," see Elmore v. Fields, 153
Ala. 345, 350, 45 So. 66, 67 (1907), is notably pre-Cranman. 
See also DeStafney v. University of Alabama, 413 So. 2d 391
(Ala. 1981).  As this Court noted in Cranman, in DeStafney,
the Court "adopted a rule of qualified immunity" that 
"partially closed the door that had been opened in Elmore." 
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792 So. 2d at 402. In Cranman, we discussed our prior
decisions, including Elmore, recognizing the difficulties –-
and potential inequities –- associated with applying the
DeStafney rule to certain discretionary functions and, in an
effort to avoid such inconsistent application, restated the 
rule to result in the current rule, as set out above.  792 So.
2d at 405.
Deason further contends that on-site safety is one of
Walker's job responsibilities and that, therefore, ensuring
the security of the scaffolding "was not something he would
have discretion in deciding whether or not to do."  In
addition, Deason argues that there is no immunity for
discharging duties imposed by a statute, rule, or regulation
where the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the manner
for 
performing 
those 
duties 
and 
the 
agent 
performs
accordingly.  However, in both his response in opposition to
Walker's summary-judgment motion and his answer to the
petition, Deason conceded, and the evidence confirmed, that
"[t]here are no written guidelines for a [carpenter]
supervisor to follow in performing their [sic] duties as a
supervisor at a job site," nor are there any "written
16
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standards used by supervisors on job sites to perform their
jobs in a safe manner."  In addition, Deason acknowledged that
"[t]here 
were 
no 
written 
standards, 
guidelines, 
or 
regulations
for ... Walker to follow as a carpentry supervisor, and no
standard used to determine if ... Walker was competent to be
a carpentry supervisor."  More specifically, "'[t]here [are]
no written standards regarding Walker's responsibilities and
results as a carpentry supervisor ... with regard to the
erection or deconstruction of scaffolding."  Here, Walker
undisputably assessed the security of the scaffolding before
he and Deason proceeded to climb it.  The fact that Walker
allegedly performed that duty in a negligent and perfunctory
manner does not in itself deprive Walker of immunity.  See
Randall, supra.
The record establishes that the actions of which Deason
complains amounted to discretionary actions by Walker in 
allocating resources, assigning duties, and choosing the
manner in which to perform his role as a carpenter supervisor
over the job site and the inmates; therefore, the duties
Walker was discharging at the time Deason was injured were
within his authority and required him to exercise judgment in
17
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discharging those duties.  Further, the record is devoid of
any evidence indicating –- and Deason does not establish -–
either that Walker violated any applicable DOC rule or
regulation governing his conduct or that Walker was acting
"willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, [or] in bad faith" in
the exercise of judgment in regard to the scaffolding when
Deason was injured. Therefore, Walker has successfully
demonstrated that he is entitled to State-agent immunity as to
Deason's tort claims.
Conclusion
In consideration of the foregoing, and applying the law
established in Cranman and its progeny to the facts of this
case, we conclude that the Montgomery Circuit Court erred in
denying Walker's 
motion 
for a summary judgment; because Walker
has shown a clear legal right to the relief sought, we issue
the writ and direct that court to vacate its previous denial
and to enter a summary judgment in favor of Walker on Deason's
claims.
18
1131448
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ.,
concur.  
Moore, C.J., and Murdock, J., concur in the result.
19