Case Title: State v. Roosevelt Williams

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1999-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-1821-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Roosevelt Williams,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  214 Wis. 2d 411, 570 N.W.2d 892 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
April 27, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
November 12, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
James Eaton & Maxine A. White 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Prosser, J., (opinion filed) 
 
Dissented: 
Bablitch, J., (opinion filed) 
 
 
Abrahamson, C.J. & Bradley, J., join in dissent. 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and 
oral argument by Melinda Swartz, assistant state public defender. 
 
 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-1821-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Roosevelt Williams,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
APR 27, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
¶1 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.   The State seeks review of a 
court of appeals' decision reversing the judgment of conviction 
of the defendant Roosevelt Williams.  Two issues are presented 
in this case:   
¶2 
The first issue is whether police officers had 
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of 
Roosevelt Williams when, responding to an anonymous tip that 
unidentified individuals were dealing drugs from a vehicle 
parked within view of the tipster, they confirmed the readily 
observable 
information 
offered 
by 
the 
tipster 
without 
independently observing any suspicious activity.  The Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court, Reserve Judge James Eaton presiding, 
answered "yes."  The court of appeals answered "no," holding 
that an anonymous tip containing only readily observable 
information failed to constitute reasonable suspicion in the 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
2 
absence 
of 
independent 
police 
observations 
of 
suspicious 
activity. 
¶3 
The second issue is whether a protective frisk of the 
vehicle following the stop was illegal because police officers 
lacked reasonable suspicion that the defendant might have been 
armed and dangerous.  The circuit court again answered "no."  
The court of appeals did not reach this issue. 
¶4 
We find that under the circumstances of this case that 
the police officers did have reasonable suspicion to conduct an 
investigatory stop of the defendant.  We also find that the 
officers' protective frisk of the defendant and the vehicle was 
not unreasonable.  We reverse the court of appeals and affirm 
the decision of the circuit court and uphold the judgment of 
conviction. 
I 
¶5 
The 
defendant Roosevelt Williams 
was 
stopped on 
November 2, 1995 as he sat with one other person in a vehicle 
parked in an area adjoining an apartment building at 4261 North 
Teutonia in Milwaukee.  Police Officers Johnny Norred and 
Phillip Henschel, responding to a dispatch relaying a report of 
drug activity at that address, approached Williams from the 
front of the vehicle in which Williams was sitting.  As they 
approached, with their weapons drawn, the officers ordered both 
occupants from the vehicle.  The officers made an initial pat-
down of both, found nothing, and then placed both in the back 
seat of their police car.  Officer Norred returned to the 
stopped vehicle and searched the areas which were within the 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
3 
reach of the two occupants for weapons.  He found no weapons, 
but did discover both marijuana and cocaine.  Williams was 
subsequently arrested and charged with knowingly possessing with 
intent to deliver five grams or less of cocaine, a controlled 
substance, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 161.16(2)(b)(1) and 
161.41(1m)(cm)(1).   
¶6 
On November 10, 1995, the defendant moved to suppress 
the evidence seized by the officers as a result of their search 
on the grounds that they did not have a warrant and that the 
circumstances leading to the search provided them with no 
exception to the search warrant requirement. 
¶7 
On January 10, 1995, the circuit court held an 
evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion.  The parties 
stipulated to the reception into evidence of a transcript of a 
November 2, 1996, 9-1-1 telephone call received from an 
anonymous caller.  The transcript is repeated here: 
 
OPERATOR: Milwaukee Emergency Operator Number 62.  How 
may I help you? 
CALLER: 
Yes, I'm calling . . . O.K., I don't want to 
get involved but there's some activity 
that's going in . . . going around in the 
back alley of my house where they're 
selling drugs and everything and I want to 
know who can I call to report so they can 
come around here. 
OPERATOR: Are they outside or is (unintelligible) 
 . . . already . . . dealing from a house 
or what? 
CALLER: 
They're 
in 
the 
van 
and 
they 
giving 
customers, you know, drugs. 
OPERATOR: Do you have a description of the van? 
CALLER: 
Um, hold on, I can get for you. 
OPERATOR: Okay. 
CALLER: 
It's a blue and burgundy Bronco.  Hello? 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
4 
OPERATOR: Okay.  A blue and burgundy? 
CALLER: 
Ah hah.  Bronco.  It's right beside, it's 
right beside my apartment building. 
OPERATOR: Okay.  Is it in the alley or is it . . . it 
CALLER: 
It's right in the driveway.  Beca . . . ah, 
I stay at 4261 North Teutonia. 
OPERATOR: Um hmm. 
CALLER: 
And we have like this big parking lot on the 
side of our apartment. 
OPERATOR: Okay. 
CALLER: 
And 
it 
is 
right 
in 
between 
the . . . um . . . the parking way and the 
alley. 
OPERATOR: So they're in the driveway? 
CALLER: 
Right. It's a dark blue and burgundy. 
OPERATOR: Okay, we'll send someone. 
CALLER: 
Okay.  Thank you. 
OPERATOR: Thank you.  Bye. 
______________________ 
 
¶8 
The officers, in the squad car 73R, did not receive 
the above transcript, but instead responded to the following 
radio dispatch:  
 
OPERATOR: Disrestrict [sic] until further notice. 
OPERATOR2: 
73R. 
SQUAD 73R: 
73R. 
OPERATOR2: 
73R drug dealing complaint, 4261 North 
Teutonia and the alley.  Somebody's dealing 
drugs from a blue and burgundy Ford Bronco 
that's parked in the driveway on the side 
of the building.  Complaint number is 1119. 
SQUAD 73R: 10-4. 
 
______________________ 
 
¶9 
Officer Norred testified that after receiving the 
radio dispatch, approximately four minutes passed before he and 
Officer Henschel arrived in their marked squad car at 4261 North 
Teutonia.  On their initial pass of the location they observed a 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
5 
vehicle closely matching, although not identical, to the 
description of the vehicle provided by their dispatcher.1 
¶10 The officers next drove around the block in order to 
approach the vehicle from the vehicle's front.  At that point, 
the officers observed that the vehicle was a two-door blue and 
burgundy Chevy Blazer without license plates.  Officer Norred 
admitted that he and his partner neither conducted surveillance 
nor observed any drug activity. 
¶11 The officers then left their squad car and approached 
the Blazer.  Officer Norred observed that the defendant's right 
hand was behind the passenger seat, and he testified that the 
defendant's hand was already in place when the officer first 
noticed the defendant's position; that is, Norred did not see 
the defendant make any moves which could be characterized as 
furtive.  Although he did not see a weapon, he testified that he 
was concerned for his safety.  Therefore, he and his partner 
approached the Blazer with their weapons drawn. 
¶12 The officers asked the occupants to exit the vehicle, 
at which point the officers patted them down.  They found no 
weapons 
or 
contraband. 
 
The 
officers 
then 
placed 
both 
individuals into the back seat of their squad car.  
¶13 While Officer Henschel remained in the squad car with 
the two individuals, Officer Norred returned to the Blazer and 
                     
1 Instead of finding a Ford Bronco, as the anonymous caller 
and the dispatcher had indicated, the officers observed a Chevy 
Blazer. Officer Norred testified that the vehicles are similar 
in appearance.  
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
6 
searched the area behind the driver's seat where he earlier had 
noticed the defendant's hand to have been hidden from his view. 
 Norred testified that the purpose of this search was his 
safety.  He stated that the defendant "may have had a gun in his 
hands, and he possibly may have dropped it [behind the seat]."  
On cross-examination Norred explained he needed to search the 
area behind the seat, for his "life depends on it when I have a 
call like thisdrug dealers have been known to carry gunsand 
my life is on the line.  I don't know if he has a weapon there 
or not, and I certainly wouldfelt there was a possibility of 
danger to myself."   
¶14 During this protective search of the vehicle, Officer 
Norred discovered a ball of a green leafy substance which he 
suspected was marijuana.  He also found a small container with 
26 rocks of a white-rock like substance which he suspected was 
cocaine base, and another small bag of marijuana next to the 
passenger seat.  It was at this point that he placed the 
defendant under arrest. 
¶15 At the conclusion of this evidentiary hearing, the 
circuit court denied the defendant's motion to suppress.  The 
court specifically found that the police officers verified the 
readily observable information contained in the anonymous call 
and that the defendant's hand was behind the passenger seat as 
the officers approached the vehicle.  The court ruled that 
together, the two facts sufficiently supported the officers' 
reasonable suspicion for making a stop, and that together, the 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
7 
two facts also made reasonable the officers' protective search 
of the occupants and the Blazer. 
¶16 The defendant pled guilty to the charge in the 
information.  The court found the defendant guilty and ordered a 
judgment of conviction, and later sentenced him to 30 months in 
the state prison system.2  The defendant appealed the order 
denying his motion to suppress. 
¶17 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court, 
holding that the information contained in the 9-1-1 anonymous 
call and independently corroborated by the police officers did 
not reach the requisite level of reasonable suspicion necessary 
for a stop.  State v. Williams, 214 Wis. 2d 412, 570 N.W.2d 892 
(Ct. App. 1997).  The court held that reasonable suspicion under 
the circumstances in this case requires not only that the police 
corroborate anonymous tips with independent observation of the 
details of such calls, 
but 
that 
they must 
also 
either 
corroborate the predictions contained in those tips, see Alabama 
v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), or make independent observations 
of suspicious activities.  Williams, 214 Wis. 2d at 422-424 
(citing United States v. Roberson, 90 F.3d 75 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
We disagree with the court of appeals and now reverse.   
II 
                     
2 Reserve Judge James Eaton presided over the evidentiary 
hearing 
on 
the 
defendant's 
motion 
to 
suppress 
and 
the 
defendant's plea hearing; he also entered a judgment of 
conviction; Judge Maxine A. White presided over the defendant's 
sentencing hearing. 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
8 
¶18 In reviewing a circuit court order suppressing or 
denying the suppression of evidence, this court will uphold a 
circuit court's findings of fact unless they are against the 
great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.  See State 
v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 137, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990).  
However, whether the circuit court's findings of fact pass 
statutory or constitutional muster is a question of law that 
this court reviews de novo.  Id. 
¶19 The threshold issue is whether Officers Norred and 
Henschel had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory 
stop of  Williams.  In executing a valid investigatory stop of 
an individual, a law enforcement officer need only reasonably 
suspect, in light of his or her experience, that some kind of 
criminal activity has taken or is taking place.  Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).  The constitutional standard established 
in Terry was codified by the Wisconsin legislature in Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.243, and in interpreting the scope of the statute, this 
court must review the facts leading to an investigatory stop in 
                     
3 Wis. Stat. § 968.24 provides as follows:   
Temporary questioning without arrest.  After 
having 
identified 
himself 
or 
herself 
as 
a 
law 
enforcement officer, a law enforcement officer may 
stop a person in a public place for a reasonable 
period of time when the officer reasonably suspects 
that such a person is committing, is about to commit 
or has committed a crime, and may demand the name and 
address of the person and an explanation of the 
person's 
conduct. 
 
Such 
detention 
and 
temporary 
questioning shall be conducted in the vicinity where 
the person was stopped. 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
9 
light of Terry and its progeny.  State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 
51, 55, 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996). 
¶20 In determining what facts are sufficient to authorize 
police to stop a person, "the totality of the circumstancesthe 
whole picturemust be taken into account." United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).  Only with a view toward the 
totality of the circumstances are we able to determine the 
reasonableness of an officer’s actions.  Our consideration of 
the reasonableness of an officer's actions has us ask  
 
a common sense question, which strikes a balance 
between the interests of society in solving crime and 
the 
members 
of 
that 
society 
to 
be 
free 
from 
unreasonable intrusions.  The essential question is 
whether the action of the law enforcement officer was 
reasonable under all the facts and circumstances 
present. 
Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 139-40. 
¶21 Further, reasonable suspicion  
 
is dependent upon both the content of information 
possessed by police and its degree of reliability.  
Both factorsquantity and qualityare considered in 
the 'totality of the circumstancesthe whole picture,' 
[citation omitted], that must be taken into account 
when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion. 
 Thus, if a tip has a relatively low degree of 
reliability, more information will be required to 
establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than 
would be required if the tip were more reliable. 
White, 496 U.S. at 330. 
¶22 In the instant case, the anonymous tip reporting drug 
dealing activity is one of the facts that forms the whole 
picture the officers had developed in making an investigatory 
stop of Williams.  We must determine what weight, if any, the 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
10
police could give to that tip in deciding to make their stopit 
is 
a 
determination 
that 
assesses 
the 
quality 
of 
that 
information. 
¶23 In White, the United States Supreme Court for the 
first time considered the weight police could accord an 
anonymous tip when making an investigatory stop.  Specifically, 
the Court confronted the question of whether police officers had 
the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle when the 
entirety of their suspicion was based upon their corroboration 
of innocent activities detailed in an anonymous tip. 
¶24 Police were first informed of allegedly criminal 
activity when they received an anonymous tip that the defendant 
in White would be leaving her apartment at a particular time in 
a brown Plymouth station wagon with the right taillight lens 
broken, that she was driving to a particular motel, and that she 
would be in possession of about an ounce of cocaine carried 
inside a brown attaché case.  Following their receipt of the 
call, officers proceeded to the defendant’s apartment building 
where they identified the Plymouth station wagon as that 
described in the call.  Subsequently, they saw a female get into 
the vehicle and then drive in the most direct course toward the 
motel indicated by the anonymous caller.  Before the defendant 
reached the motel, the officers stopped her.  They asked her to 
step out of her car and to step to its rear, and then explained 
that she was suspected of carrying cocaine in the vehicle.  She 
granted the officers permission to search her vehicle, and when 
they did so, they discovered an attaché case, within which they 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
11
discovered marijuana.  She was then placed under arrest.  The 
defendant moved to suppress the evidence on grounds that the 
initial stop of her car was not premised upon the officers’ 
reasonable suspicion that a crime had been or was about to be 
committed. 
¶25 The Supreme Court disagreed with the defendant.  After 
acknowledging that the police observed no suspicious activity, 
and that they confirmed only some of the innocent details 
included in the anonymous tip, the Court held that the  
information, 
as 
corroborated 
by 
independent 
police 
work, 
nevertheless "exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to 
provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop."  
White, 496 U.S. at 327.   
¶26 Prior to engaging in an analysis of the facts in 
White, the Court noted that in most circumstances, an anonymous 
tip like the one in White, without more, would not "'"warrant a 
man of reasonable caution in the belief" that [a stop] was 
appropriate.'"  Id. at 329 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 
(quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925))).  
This was so, the Court reasoned, because an anonymous tip like 
the one in White would generally fail due to the lack of 
evidence regarding a tipster's “veracity,” “reliability,” and 
“basis of knowledge,” all of which are critical factors in 
making an investigatory stop.  White, 496 U.S. at 328-29.  Where 
these 
critical 
factors 
are 
absent, 
the 
quality 
of 
the 
information within the tip is seriously undermined and therefore 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
12
may not sufficiently provide reasonable suspicion in the absence 
of additional facts. 
 
¶27 However, the Court found that the tip in White, which 
contained predictions of the defendant's future activity, did 
contain these critical factors.  It held that a prediction of 
even innocent activities, contained in an anonymous tip and 
verified by the police, is of sufficient quality that an officer 
can rely solely on the tip as his or her basis for the 
reasonable suspicion needed to make an investigatory stop.  The 
Court reasoned that "because an informant is shown to be right 
about some things, he is probably right about other facts that 
he has alleged, including the claim that the object of the tip 
is engaged in criminal activity."  Id. at 331 (citing Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 (1983)).  "Thus, it is not 
unreasonable to conclude in [White] that the independent 
corroboration by the police of significant aspects of the 
informer's predictions imparted some degree of reliability to 
the other allegations made by the caller."  Id. at 331-332. 
 
¶28 The 
Court 
in 
White 
drew 
a 
distinction 
between 
allegations of future behavior and facts and conditions that 
exist at the time of a tip.  Because the former are not easily 
predicted, stated the Court, the anonymous tip in White was 
reliable 
because the prediction demonstrated 
the caller's 
"inside informationa special familiarity with [defendant's] 
affairs."  White, 496 U.S. at 332.   
 
Because only a small number of people are generally 
privy to an individual's itinerary, it is reasonable 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
13
for police to believe that a person with access to 
such information is likely to have access to reliable 
information 
about 
that 
individual's 
illegal 
activities.  [citation omitted]  When significant 
aspects of the caller's predictions were verified, 
there was reason to believe not only that the caller 
was honest but also that he was well informed, at 
least well enough to justify the stop. 
Id. at 332. 
¶29 In Richardson, we recognized the "special emphasis" 
the Court placed on the police verification of the caller's 
predictions.  Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 142.  We then stated 
our agreement with the Court in White that the verification of 
significant aspects of an anonymous tip "serves to avoid 
investigative stops based on minimal facts that any passerby or 
resident on the street could enunciate."  Id.   
¶30 The anonymous caller in the instant case provided the 
police with no information that could be characterized as a 
prediction of Williams' future behavior.  All the parties agree 
that with respect to the anonymous tip, the police officers did 
no more here than verify information readily observable to the 
tipster.  The defendant argues that because the Court in White 
drew a distinction between predictions of future behavior and 
readily observable information that existed at the time of the 
tip, the failure of the police to verify a prediction here 
renders the entire tip worthless for purposes of establishing 
reasonable suspicion.  This conclusion might also be reached 
under a liberal reading of Richardson which placed special 
significance on the verification of non-readily observable 
information.  We disagree that White and Richardson are to 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
14
preclude officer reliance on all anonymous tips except for those 
which include predictions.  
¶31 The absence of information predicting the future 
behavior of an individual who is the subject of an anonymous tip 
does not necessarily make worthless that anonymous tip.  Despite 
the significance the White Court places in the anonymous 
caller's ability to predict future activities, we do not read 
the decision to require that a tip contain a prediction in order 
to ensure an anonymous caller's "veracity," "reliability," or 
"basis of knowledge."  That is, White established that the 
verification 
of 
an 
anonymous 
caller's 
prediction 
is 
a 
sufficient, not a necessary, element establishing reasonable 
suspicion.  In accordance with this view, the requirement in 
Richardson that non-readily observable significant aspects of an 
anonymous tip must be verified by police before they have 
reasonable suspicion to make a Terry stop is a requirement that 
necessarily applies only to tips which do contain predictions. 
¶32 We agree with a number of courts that "[t]he Court in 
[White] did not depart from its well-established 'totality of 
the circumstances' test; nor did it adopt a categorical rule 
requiring the corroboration of predictive information as a 
precondition to reliance on anonymous tips." United States v. 
Clipper, 973 F.2d 944, 949 (D.C. Cir., 1992); see also United 
States v. Bold, 19 F.3d 99, 104 (2nd Cir. 1994) ("There is 
nothing in White that precludes police from acting on an 
anonymous tip when the information to be corroborated refers to 
present rather than future actions."); United States v. Gibson, 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
15
64 F.3d 617, 623 (11th Cir. 1995)(finding "that White does not 
prevent law enforcement officers from relying and acting on 
anonymous tips when the information to be corroborated does not 
refer 
to 
future 
actions 
but 
instead 
details 
present 
circumstances."). 
¶33 In the limited circumstance where an anonymous tip 
provides the police with information concerning ongoing criminal 
activity that a tipster is observing at the time he or she makes 
the call, the critical factors of "veracity," "reliability," and 
"basis of knowledge" may be established in a manner no less 
certain than they are when a tip contains a prediction of an 
individual's future activity.  A comparison of the emergency 
call detailing  ongoing criminal activity in the present case 
with the anonymous tip containing predictions of an individual's 
future behavior in White demonstrates that the two contain 
information equally rich in quality. 
¶34 A tipster's "basis of knowledge" can be determined by 
answering the following question:  how does the tipster know the 
information that he or she is relaying?  In White, the Court 
arrived at the answer to this question through the inference 
that the tipster must be well-informed about the defendant's 
criminal 
activity 
because 
he 
accurately 
predicted 
the 
defendant's innocent activity.  See White, 496 U.S. at 332.  
Under the circumstances presented to this court, the anonymous 
tipster's "basis of knowledge" is even more certain than that in 
White, for here the caller explicitly tells the 9-1-1 operator 
his or her basis of knowledgethe caller's contemporaneous 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
16
observation of criminal activity taking place outside his or her 
apartment.  When the officers corroborated the innocent details 
of the caller's observation, it was reasonable for them to 
believe that the tipster was positioned to observe the reported 
criminal activity as well. 
¶35 With respect to the "reliability" of the information 
in White, the Court found that police corroboration of the 
information detailing innocent activity gave rise to the 
inference that the call contained information reliable with 
respect to the criminal activity as well.  As strong an 
inference can be made in the instant case.  Here, as in White, 
the 
officers' 
corroboration 
of 
the 
readily 
observable 
information supports a finding that because the tipster was 
correct about the details of those innocent activities, he or 
she is probably correct about the ultimate fact of criminal 
activity.  For purposes of reliability, both the tip in White 
and the tip here contained the same type of informationinnocent 
activities that police corroborated and the ultimate fact of 
criminal activity that could be inferred reliable due to the 
accuracy of innocent activities. 
¶36 A tipster's "veracity" appears to be the key concern 
in assessing an anonymous tip.  The Court in White established 
the tipster's veracity upon its conclusion that the caller had a 
basis of knowledge and was reliable, observing that because the 
anonymous caller was able to predict future events accurately, 
"there was reason to believe . . . that the caller was honest." 
 Id. at 332.  Under the circumstances of the instant case, an 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
17
anonymous caller's use of an emergency telephone system to 
report a current and ongoing crime provides as sufficient a 
reason to believe that the caller is honest as the reason found 
in White.  Neither the tip in White, nor the one found here, 
contains direct evidence of the tipster's honesty.  In both, the 
tipster's honesty must be inferred from the circumstances. 
¶37 The Court in White appears to conclude that one who 
knows another well, knows another intimately enough to know his 
or her daily activities, could be trusted not to be a prankster. 
 It is a point that was highlighted by the court in Roberson, 
the case relied upon heavily by the court of appeals.  Roberson 
was concerned that an individual reporting an ongoing crime, 
like the caller in this case, could be an "anonymous prankster, 
rival, or misinformed individual."  Roberson, 90 F.3d at 81.  
While it is true that the anonymity of a caller is a concern, we 
believe that there is no more likelihood that a completely 
anonymous person will play the prankster than the individual who 
knows the subject of his or her tip quite well. 
¶38 Furthermore, 
the 
test 
of 
a 
citizen-informant's 
reliability is less strict than the test applicable to the 
police-informant.   
 
When faced with information received from a citizen 
informant, 
Wisconsin 
holds 
that 
the 
test 
for 
reliability 
shifts-from 
a 
question 
of 
personal 
reliability to 'observational' reliability.  A citizen 
informant's reliability must be evaluated from the 
nature of his report, his opportunity to hear and see 
the matter reported, and the extent to which it can be 
verified by an independent investigation.   
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
18
State v. Boggess, 110 Wis. 2d 309, 316, 328 N.W.2d 878 (Ct. App. 
1982) (citing State v. Doyle, 96 Wis. 2d 272, 287, 291 N.W.2d 
545, 552 (1980)).  We have quoted with approval that "[a] 
citizen who purports to be a victim of or to have witnessed a 
crime is a reliable informant even though his reliability has 
not theretofore been proved or tested."  Doyle, 96 Wis. 2d at 
287 (quoting State v. Knudson, 51 Wis. 2d 270, 276, 187 N.W.2d 
321 (1971)(quoting People v. Bevins, 85 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1970) 
(emphasis in the original)). 
¶39 We find that an anonymous tip that is, as here, 
supplied by a citizen informant, lacking in predictions but 
describing a crime in progress, can be accorded some weight in 
an officer's consideration of reasonable suspicion. A bar on 
information garnered from an anonymous tip which failed to 
predict future activity that could be independently corroborated 
by the police would bar some of the most helpful and reliable 
information: that which comes from citizens observing crime in 
their own neighborhoods.  These are individuals who are honest, 
reliable, and base their knowledge of criminal activity on their 
observation of that activity.  They may also be, as was evident 
from the call here, individuals who for a variety of reasons may 
not want to identify themselves.   
¶40 The transcript of the anonymous call in the instant 
case supports a finding that this caller was reliable, honest, 
and an eyewitness to the criminal activity.  The caller 
initially misidentified the vehicle as a vanthen, when asked to 
describe the vehicle in greater detail, stated that the vehicle 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
19
was a Ford Bronco.  In fact, the vehicle was a Chevy Blazer.  
This minor mistake strengthens the reliability of the caller's 
observations, for the mistakes suggest that the observation is 
taking place at the time of the call and is not rehearsed.  
Further evidence that the call is not rehearsed but is in fact 
taking place contemporaneous with the observed criminal activity 
is the caller's need to leave the telephone for brief periods in 
order to further observe the activity when the 9-1-1 operator 
asked the caller specific questions.4 
¶41 Further, in assessing whether the officers had the 
requisite reasonable suspicion, we must consider not only the 
tip, but also the circumstances in which the tip was received, 
and with that in mind balance the privacy interest of Williams 
against the need to protect society.  Where the public is placed 
at a substantial riskthe classic example is that of the report 
that an armed person has been seen walking the streetsthe 
balance may favor protection of the public over the privacy 
rights of the individual. 
¶42 For instance, in Clipper, the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court held that where an anonymous tip informs police 
that an individual is carrying a weapon, police officers have 
the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop and perform a frisk 
where the "anonymous informant makes no predictions, but 
                     
4 While the officers did not receive any evidence of the 
caller's reliability, the evidence of that reliability, held by 
the authorities, may be imputed to them.  See State v. Cheers, 
102 Wis. 2d 367, 388-89, 306 N.W.2d 676 (1981)(quoting Schaffer 
v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 673, 676-77, 250 N.W.2d 326 (1977)). 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
20
provides the police with verifiable facts while alerting them to 
an imminent danger that the police cannot ignore except at risk 
to their personal or the public's safety."  Clipper, 973 F.2d at 
949-950.  And in Bold, the second circuit held that "[w]here the 
tip concerns an individual with a gun, the totality-of-the-
circumstances test for determining reasonable suspicion should 
include consideration of the possibility of the possession of a 
gun, and the government's need for a prompt investigation."  
Bold, 19 F.3d at 104. 
¶43 Courts have observed the competing interests involved: 
An officer "who is able to corroborate other information in an 
anonymous tip that another person is in actual possession of a 
gun is faced with an 'unappealing choice.'"  Id. (citing United 
States v. McClinnhan, 660 F.2d 500, 502 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  "He 
must either stop and search the individual, or wait until the 
individual brandishes or uses the gun."  Id.  Under such 
circumstances, 
officers 
may 
constitutionally 
make 
that 
investigatory stop. 
¶44 This unappealing choice police face is not limited to 
cases which involve gun-tips.  In State v. Stuart, 452 S.E.2d 
886 (W. Va. 1994), the West Virginia Supreme Court concluded 
that police had sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop a 
vehicle that matched the description of the vehicle reported by 
an anonymous caller and detailing evidence of drunk driving, 
even though the police did not independently corroborate either 
behavior that appeared suspicious or any predicted activity.  In 
Stuart, in addition to the information contained in the tip 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
21
which could only be characterized as that which is readily 
observable, the police observed nothing else except for the 
innocent activity of the vehicle being driven ten miles per hour 
below the speed limit; this observation, in connection with the 
readily observable information contained in the anonymous call, 
was sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion to stop that 
vehicle. 
¶45 The defendant would distinguish the instant case from 
one involving a tip informing police of a weapons violation or 
of a vehicle that appears to be controlled by an intoxicated 
driver, on the grounds that the latter cases involve situations 
in which the public is potentially placed in danger.  The 
defendant further notes that the court in Clipper, and the court 
of appeals in this case, also draw a distinction between the 
danger posed by a subject reported to have a gun and a subject 
reported to be engaged in drug dealing.  The distinction is one 
of degree only. Drug dealing is a dangerous activity, and we 
have previously recognized that where drugs are involved, guns 
are probably involved as well.  See Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 
144.  It is unreasonable to conclude that drug dealing poses no 
danger to the communityit is not a non-violent crimeand when 
deciding whether to make a stop, the possible danger the subject 
of a tip poses to the community is necessarily one of an 
officer's considerations. 
¶46 Finally, while the issue presented to this court was 
whether an anonymous tip, by itself, could establish probable 
cause to arrest, the issue, and the court of appeals' decision, 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
22
too narrowly presents the scope of the question.  In considering 
the totality of the circumstances known to the officers prior to 
their stop of the defendant, all of the facts known to the 
officers at the time of the stop must be considered. 
¶47 In our review of the circumstances here, taking into 
consideration both the quality and quantity of the information, 
and then balancing the individual's right to privacy against the 
need to protect the public, we find that the police had the 
requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop 
of Williams. 
¶48 First, the police corroborated the following readily 
observable information from the call reporting a crime in 
progress: that the vehicle they observed largely matched the 
description of the vehicle as offered by the anonymous caller.  
As described, the vehicle was at the location stated.  Two 
people were in the vehicle, a fact also in accord with the 
language used by the caller (although the caller did not 
identify the number of individuals involved, his or her use of 
the plural demonstrates that he or she was observing more than 
one person).  That the caller was correct about all of the 
readily observable information increased the likelihood that he 
or she was also correct that the defendant was engaged in drug 
dealing. 
¶49 Second, the police arrived at the scene described by 
the caller within four minutes or so of the call.  The timing of 
their response ensured that the reported information was still 
fresh, increasing the likelihood that the officers would 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
23
confront 
the 
possible 
drug 
dealers 
while 
decreasing 
the 
likelihood that they would mistakenly detain the wrong suspects. 
 See Gibson, 64 F.3d at 623. 
¶50 Third, the officers were not limited to the innocent 
and readily observable information provided by the caller.  In 
addition to the information contained in the tip, the police 
also noted that the vehicle did not have license plates,5 and, 
when approaching the vehicle, the defendant's hand was not in 
view. While the defendant's hand did not disappear from view in 
a furtive manner, the placement of the hand behind the seat 
could only heighten the officers' suspicion that drug activity 
was taking place. 
¶51 The absence of license plates on the vehicle, as well 
as the defendant's hand being hidden from view, might be 
considered innocent activities under any number of scenarios. 
However, we stated in Richardson that 
 
the corroboration by police of innocent details of an 
anonymous 
tip 
may 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances give rise to reasonable suspicion to 
make a stop.  The corroborated actions of the suspect, 
as viewed by police acting on an anonymous tip, need 
not be inherently suspicious or criminal in and of 
themselves.  Rather, the cumulative detail, along with 
 reasonable 
inferences 
and 
deductions 
which 
a 
reasonable 
officer 
could 
glean 
therefrom, 
is 
                     
5 The absence of license plates on the vehicle may or may 
not be an innocent activity, as the record does not disclose 
whether the vehicle was engaged at the time of the encounter, or 
whether it was on a public thoroughfare.  We note that the 
absence of license plates by itself may have been sufficient to 
justify the stop.  See State v. Griffin, 183 Wis. 2d 327, 515 
N.W.2d 535 (Ct. App. 1994). 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
24
sufficient to supply the reasonable suspicion that 
crime is afoot and to justify the stop. 
Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 142.  These two innocent activities, 
coupled with the information the police had when they were 
responding to a drug dealing report, would reasonably contribute 
to the officers' suspicions and their conclusion that a stop for 
the limited purpose of investigation was warranted. 
¶52 The officers had the following facts and information 
before them: an anonymous 9-1-1 phone call from a citizen 
informant 
detailing 
information 
concerning 
his 
or 
her 
contemporaneous observation of illegal drug dealing activity; 
independent corroboration of the readily observable information 
from that anonymous tip; the quick response time in which they 
arrived at the reported scene; their observation that the 
vehicle contained no license plates; and their inability to 
observe the defendant's hand.  Considering the totality of these 
circumstances, 
the 
officers 
had 
the 
requisite 
reasonable 
suspicion to "stop" the defendant. 
III 
¶53 Next, we must determine whether the officers were 
justified in searching the defendant and the vehicle in which 
the defendant was sitting for weapons following the stop.  The 
Court 
in 
Terry 
enunciated 
the 
test 
for 
determining 
the 
constitutionality of a frisk for weapons during an investigatory 
stop.  The Court wrote that "[t]he officer need not be 
absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is 
whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
25
warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in 
danger."  Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.  An officer must have a 
reasonable suspicionless than probable cause, but more than a 
hunchthat someone is armed before frisking that person for 
weapons.  State v. Guy, 172 Wis. 2d 86, 95, 492 N.W.2d 311 
(1992).  An officer's right to make a protective search for 
weapons includes a search of a passenger compartment of an 
automobile during an investigatory stop.  Michigan v. Long, 463 
U.S. 1032 (1983); State v. Moretto, 144 Wis. 2d 171, 423 N.W.2d 
841 (1988).   
¶54 Neither party suggests that the reasonable suspicion 
required for a protective search of the individual requires a 
different calculus than that required for a protective search of 
the vehicle.  The circuit court believed Officer Norred's 
testimony that following the defendant's detainment under the 
Terry stop, he would have been released back to the Blazer.  
Therefore, if the officers were reasonable to believe that the 
defendant could have been armed, they were reasonable to believe 
that the vehicle contained a weapon that could harm them as 
well, and they were then entitled to search the passenger area 
of the vehicle to ensure their safety.  As the Supreme Court 
explained in Long and we quoted with approval in Moretto,  
 
If a suspect is 'dangerous,' he is no less dangerous 
simply because he is not arrested. 
 . . .  
Just as a Terry stop on the street may, despite being 
under the brief control of a police officer, reach 
into his clothing and retrieve a weapon, so might a 
Terry suspect in Long's position break away from 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
26
police 
control 
and 
retrieve 
a 
weapon 
from 
his 
automobile.  In addition, if the suspect is not placed 
under arrest, he will be permitted to reenter his 
automobile, and he will then have access to any 
weapons inside. . . .  In any event, we stress that a 
Terry 
investigation 
. 
. 
. 
involves 
a 
police 
investigation 'at close range,' when the officer 
remains particularly vulnerable in part because a full 
custodial arrest has not been effected, and the 
officer must make a 'quick decision as to how to 
protect himself and others from possible danger. . . 
.' 
Moretto, 144 Wis. 2d at 180 (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1050-52).6 
¶55 The State argues that the officers' search of the 
defendant was reasonable because they were responding to a drug 
dealing complaint, and it is common knowledge that drug 
trafficking 
and 
weapons 
go 
hand-in-hand. 
 
Both 
officers 
testified at the suppression hearing that as they approached the 
vehicle in response to the report of drug activity, they were 
concerned 
about their 
safety.  We 
find 
that 
under the 
circumstances 
a 
"reasonably 
prudent 
officer 
in 
[officers 
                     
6 The United States Supreme Court's holding in Long was 
reaffirmed in Knowles v. Iowa, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 484 
(1998), a case decided subsequent to the oral arguments in the 
instant case.  The Court in Knowles held that police officers 
may not conduct a search of a vehicle incident to a traffic 
citation accompanying a routine traffic stop.  Id. at ___, 119 
S.Ct. at 488.  The Court wouldn't countenance a "search incident 
to citation" exception to the warrant requirement because in a 
routine traffic stop and citation, officers are generally not in 
danger for their safety, and they have no need to preserve 
evidence.  However, the Court continues to recognize that where 
officers have an independent basis to search for weapons and 
protect themselves from danger, they may "conduct a 'Terry 
patdown' of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon 
reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain 
immediate control of a weapon."  Id. (citing Long, 463 U.S. at 
1049). 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
27
Norred's 
and 
Henschel's] 
position 
would 
be 
justified 
in 
believing [their] safety was in danger."  Guy, 172 Wis. 2d at 
96. 
 
One of the reasons this belief would be reasonable is 
that weapons are often 'tools of the trade' for drug 
dealers.  See, e.g., United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 
45, 62 (2d Cir. 1977).  This court has recognized that 
'[t]he violence associated with drug trafficking today 
places law enforcement officers in extreme danger.'  
State v. Williams, 168 Wis. 2d 970, 984, 485 N.W.2d 42 
(1992); see also State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 
144, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990) ('Several cases have found 
that drug dealers and weapons go hand in hand, thus 
warranting a Terry frisk for weapons.') 
Id.  Given the level 
of 
violence 
associated 
with 
drug 
trafficking, the officers could reasonably believe that their 
safety was jeopardized, providing sufficient justification for 
performing a Terry frisk of both the individual and the vehicle 
for the limited purpose of their protection.  
 
¶56 The defendant's objection to this conclusion is that 
the protective search of the vehicle was illegal because Officer 
Norred did not possess the reasonable suspicion that he was 
armed.  In the defendant's view, an officer's belief that a drug 
deal is taking place is insufficient to support a frisk for 
weapons.  He finds support for his position in the decision of 
the Supreme Court in Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997), 
that "while drug investigation frequently does pose special 
risks to officer safety . . . not every drug investigation will 
pose these risks to a substantial degree."  Id. at 393. 
 
¶57 In concluding that Wisconsin could not have a blanket 
exception to the knock and announce rule based upon the inherent 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
28
dangers associated with drug dealing, the Court in Richards 
reasoned that not all drug searches pose special risks to law 
enforcement officers.  However, the examples the Court provided 
as support for this holding are significantly different than the 
situation now before usas when a search was conducted "at a 
time when the only individuals present in a residence have no 
connection with the drug activity and thus will be unlikely to 
threaten officers or destroy evidence."  Id.  Richards is not 
applicable under the facts of this case, for our finding that 
the police had the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct a 
pat-down of the defendant is not premised upon a blanket rule 
allowing officers to do so. 
¶58 There are doubtless circumstances in which a frisk 
under Terry would not be justified following a Terry stop that 
is based upon a report of drug dealing.  This case, however, is 
not one of those circumstances.  Here, the officers first 
approached Williams suspecting him of drug dealing.  As they did 
so, Williams' hand was hidden from the officers' view.  When 
frisked himself, Williams did not have any weapons on his 
person.  Under these circumstances it was not unreasonable for 
Officer Norred to suspect, as he did, that Williams may have had 
a weapon and dropped it on the floor of the Blazer before he 
exited the vehicle.  These circumstances justified Officer 
Norred's limited search of the vehicle for they lead a 
reasonably prudent individual to the conclusion that his or her 
safety is in danger. 
No. 
96-1821-CR 
 
29
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.   
96-1821-CR.dp 
 
1 
¶59 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.    (Concurring).   This case has 
been argued and analyzed as a case involving an investigatory 
stop.  In this context, the principal question is whether 
officers Johnny Norred and Phillip Henschel had reasonable 
suspicion for an investigatory stop while the defendant and 
another person were sitting in the front seat of an automobile 
parked behind an apartment building at 4261 North Teutonia 
Avenue in Milwaukee.  While I join in the mandate and opinion of 
the court, I write this concurrence to help explain my belief 
that the two officers were on very solid footing when they acted 
as they did. 
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
¶60 The court is obliged to take into account the totality 
of the circumstances in determining whether the police had 
sufficient evidence to warrant an investigatory stop.  Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-33 (1983); State v. Richardson, 156 
Wis. 2d 128, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990).  The totality of the 
circumstances includes the direct observations of the two 
officers, the collective information in the police agency, and 
the experience of the officers in evaluating the information 
available. 
¶61 The knowledge of the two officers is combined in 
determining the existence of either reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause.  Moreover, the information possessed by the 
entire police department is imputed to these officers under 
long-standing Wisconsin law.  In State v. Mabra, 61 Wis. 2d 613, 
96-1821-CR.dp 
 
2 
625-26, 213 N.W.2d 545 (1974), the court, speaking through Chief 
Justice Hallows, stated: 
 
Mabra contends the arresting officer must personally 
have in his mind knowledge sufficient to establish 
probable cause for the arrest.  This is an incorrect 
view of the law.  The arresting officer may rely on 
all 
the 
collective 
information 
in 
the 
police 
department. . . .  The police force is considered as a 
unit and where there is police-channel communication 
to the arresting officer and he acts in good faith 
thereon, the arrest is based on probable cause when 
such 
facts 
exist 
within 
the 
police 
department.  
Whiteley v. Warden (1971), 401 U.S. 560, 91 Sup. Ct. 
1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306. 
¶62 These principles were repeated in Desjarlais v. State, 
73 Wis. 2d 480, 491-92, 243 N.W.2d 453 (1976) (citing State v. 
Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 515, 210 N.W.2d 873 (1973)), and State 
v. Shears, 68 Wis. 2d 217, 253, 229 N.W.2d 103 (1975).  "[W]here 
an arresting officer is given information through police 
channels such as roll call, this court's assessment of whether 
the arrest was supported by probable cause is to be made on the 
collective knowledge of the police force."  State v. Cheers, 102 
Wis. 2d 367, 388, 306 N.W.2d 676 (1981) (citing Schaffer v. 
State, 75 Wis. 2d 673, 676-77, 250 N.W.2d 326 (1977), overruled 
on other grounds, State v. Walker, 154 Wis. 2d 158, 453 N.W.2d 
127 (1990)). 
¶63 The collective knowledge rule is not a parochial 
Wisconsin invention.  It is prevalent throughout the United 
States.  For instance, the Minnesota Supreme Court said:  "The 
test in Minnesota under the 'collective knowledge' approach, is 
whether the pooled knowledge of the entire police department is 
96-1821-CR.dp 
 
3 
sufficient to establish probable cause." State v. Eling, 355 
N.W.2d 286, 290 (Minn. 1984) (citing State v. Conaway, 319 
N.W.2d 35, 40 (Minn. 1982)).7 
911 CALLER 
¶64 Against this background, the person who called 911, 
saying that drugs were being sold from a vehicle parked behind 
her apartment building at 4261 North Teutonia Avenue, should not 
be viewed as an anonymous tipster.  The police knew the caller's 
identity or could easily have discovered it because of the 
information provided by 911. 
¶65 Today, the 911 emergency telephone number is familiar 
to most people in Wisconsin.  According to a 1997 audit by the 
Legislative Audit Bureau, "As of May 1997, an estimated 94 
percent of the State's population was receiving 9-1-1 service 
from one of 121 answering points being operated in the 57 
counties that provide 9-1-1 service."  A Best Practices Review: 
 911 Services, State of Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau (July 
1997), at 3.  The audit indicated that 105 of the 121 answering 
points operate an "enhanced 9-1-1 system," which automatically 
identifies and displays the caller's telephone number and 
location.  Id. at 4. 
¶66 There is a statutory framework for the "statewide 
emergency 
services 
number." 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 146.70.  
                     
7  See also United States v. Green, 962 F.2d 938, 942 (9th 
Cir. 1992); Charles v. Smith, 894 F.2d 718, 724 (5th Cir. 1990), 
cert. denied 498 U.S. 957 (1990); United States v. Hoyos, 892 
F.2d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 498 U.S. 825 
(1990). 
96-1821-CR.dp 
 
4 
Subsection (1)(i) of the statute defines "sophisticated system" 
as "a basic system with automatic location identification and 
automatic number identification."  A "sophisticated system" and 
the "enhanced 9-1-1 system" referred to in the audit are 
essentially the same thing. 
¶67 An "enhanced" system normally provides authorities 
with (1) the name of the residence or place of business where 
the incoming call is made, (2) the address of the residence or 
place of business where the incoming call is made, and (3) the 
telephone number of the phone from which the incoming call is 
made.8   
¶68 The 1997 audit states that Milwaukee has had an 
enhanced system since 1989.  A Best Practices Review:  911 
Services, supra, Appendix III at 2.  This is confirmed by news 
reports from Milwaukee newspapers.  "By nearly 8 to 1, voters 
said in a referendum that they wanted [Milwaukee] County to 
establish a 911 system, which automatically records a caller's 
telephone number and address at a central dispatch location, 
even if the caller cannot speak."  911 System Wins Big in County 
Referendum, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL, November 5, 1986, at 3B. 
¶69 In 
a 
later 
article, 
Leverett 
F. 
Baldwin, 
then 
emergency government services director of Milwaukee County, now 
Milwaukee County Sheriff, is quoted as saying that the 911 
                     
8  At present, a cellular phone call will not provide this 
information, so that when a cellular call is received, the 
dispatcher must ask the caller for identification if it is not 
volunteered.  A Best Practices Review:  911 Services, State of 
Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau (July 1997), at 7. 
96-1821-CR.dp 
 
5 
system was expected to eliminate most prank calls because the 
caller's telephone number and address will be recorded and will 
be easy to track down.  Ralph D. Olive, Single Number May Call 
for Help, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL, January 18, 1988, at 3B. 
¶70 In 
fact, 
the 
legislature 
established 
criminal 
penalties for any person who intentionally dials the telephone 
number "911" to report an emergency, "knowing that the fact 
situation which he or she reports does not exist. . . ."  Wis. 
Stat. § 146.70(10).  This penalty provision long predated the 
911 call in this case. 
¶71 Florida has a similar penalty.  In United States v. 
Gibson, 64 F.3d 617, 625 (11th Cir. 1995), the court observed 
that, "The state of Florida provides a significant deterrent 
against reporting false information to its law enforcement 
agencies and officers by making such acts punishable by law.  
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 365.171(16) (West 1995) (false "911" calls); 
Id. § 817.49 (false reports of commission of crimes to law 
enforcement officers).  This deterrent increases the odds that 
an anonymous tip is legitimate."  (Emphasis added). 
¶72 When the police received the 911 call in this case, 
they knew at a minimum the address and phone number of the 
caller, and the call was recorded.  The dispatcher never asked 
for the caller's name, address, or telephone number; rather, the 
dispatcher replied "Um hmm" when the caller disclosed that, "I 
stay at 4261 North Teutonia."  In giving her address, the caller 
confirmed what the dispatcher already knew. 
96-1821-CR.dp 
 
6 
¶73 The dispatcher did ask whether the caller had a 
description of the van, and the caller replied:  "Um, hold on, I 
can get for you."  Then the caller returned and gave a more 
detailed description of the vehicle.  The color of the vehicle, 
the location of the vehicle, and the fact that more than one 
person was in the vehicle were either described or alluded to by 
the caller and later confirmed by the officers.  In addition, 
the caller answered all other questions asked by the dispatcher. 
¶74 The recorded call and its subsequent transcript show 
both the caller's basis of information and the caller's 
reliability.  But the fact that the agency either knew the 
identity of the caller or had the means to discover the caller's 
identity puts the call in a different light.  The caller 
politely asked for police intervention in alleged criminal 
activity she was witnessing.  In effect, the caller was saying: 
 "Come quickly.  As you know, I am at my apartment, and I am 
watching criminal activity out my back window."  Were this 
information false, the police would have been able to follow up 
and confront the caller, demand an explanation, and perhaps 
press criminal charges. 
¶75 In my view, then, this case does not involve an 
anonymous tipster or an anonymous caller.  The essence of 
anonymity is being unknown.  Anonymity and confidentiality are 
cousins, not twins.  A confidential informant is an informant 
whose identity is assiduously withheld.  An anonymous informant 
is an informant whose identity is unknown.  The identity of the 
caller in this case was not unknown.  It has been kept 
96-1821-CR.dp 
 
7 
confidential out of respect to a citizen who came forward to 
report what she saw. 
LOCATION OF THE VEHICLE 
¶76 When the officers arrived at the scene, they were able 
to see the blue and burgundy vehicle from "quite a distance."  
The Chevy Blazer was parked in an alley or in a parking lot 
adjacent to an alley behind a building on Teutonia.  The 
building is located on the west side of Teutonia.  An "empty 
lot-type deal" is located near the building. 
¶77 Strategically, the subject vehicle was not parked on a 
street where it could be easily observed.  It was parked in or 
near an alley, behind a building, where it was partially 
concealed from traffic on Teutonia. 
¶78 In its decision, the court of appeals declared that: 
 
We note, as did the court in Roberson, "that the 
police 
were 
not 
powerless 
to 
act 
on 
the 
non-
predictive, anonymous tip they received.  The officers 
could have set up surveillance of the defendant."  
Indeed, 
particularly 
in 
cases 
of 
drug 
dealing, 
excellent 
police 
work 
consists, 
in 
part, 
of 
surveillance leading 
not 
only to 
solid 
evidence 
against a suspect, but also to additional arrests of 
those the police observe engaging in drug transactions 
with the suspect.   
State v. Williams, 214 Wis. 2d 412, 424, 570 N.W.2d 892 (Ct. 
App. 1997). 
¶79 This advice presupposes that the situation permitted 
surveillance.  The record does not provide evidence that a 
marked squad car could have stopped to watch the vehicle without 
itself being seen.  We know that this case is different from 
96-1821-CR.dp 
 
8 
U.S. v. Roberson, 90 F.3d 75 (3d Cir. 1996), because in Roberson 
the criminal activity was out on the street, not in an alley.  
We also know that the officers here circled around the block 
trying to approach the vehicle without being seen. 
¶80 The officers first saw the Blazer at "quite a 
distance."  Had the occupants seen the squad car at "quite a 
distance," they could have started the car and attempted to 
drive away.  Then the officers would have faced a decision 
whether to stop a moving vehicle.  Cf. State v. Harris, 206 Wis. 
2d 243, 557 N.W.2d 245 (1996). 
ABSENCE OF LICENSE PLATES 
¶81 Officers Norred and Henschel drove north on Teutonia 
Avenue past the building and then turned west on Roosevelt 
Drive.  Eventually, they entered the alley at a point where they 
thought their squad car would be concealed.  They drove through 
the alley, coming up to the front of the Chevy Blazer.  There 
were no license plates on the car. 
¶82 Like 29 other states and the District of Columbia, 
Wisconsin requires two license plates on a car.9  For the last 20 
years, there have been efforts in the Wisconsin legislature to 
move from two license plates to one license plate.  But, 
according to the Legislative Fiscal Bureau, "the major objection 
to the single license plate proposal has been expressed by law 
                     
9  See Wis. Stat. §§ 341.12(1) and 341.15(1).  See also The 
Fast 
Track 
to 
Vehicle 
Services 
Facts, 
A 
Motor 
Vehicle 
Regulations 
and 
Procedures 
Information 
Guide 
(1999 
ed.), 
American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, at 83. 
96-1821-CR.dp 
 
9 
enforcement officials.  They contend that the front license 
plate has value because it allows identification of oncoming and 
parked vehicles."10 
¶83 In this case, there were no plates on the Blazer.  
Under the circumstances, the primary concern of the police 
officers would have been identifying the vehicle, not ticketing 
the driver for a motor vehicle violation.  From the point of 
view of the officers, the suspected drug vehicle had been 
stripped of the standard means of identifying it.  The absence 
of license plates added to the evidence which permitted the 
officers reasonably to conclude in light of their training and 
experience that criminal activity might be afoot.  Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
¶84 In State v. Griffin, 183 Wis. 2d 327, 329, 515 N.W.2d 
535 (Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 520 N.W.2d 88 (1994), cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 950 (1994), the court of appeals held that the 
absence of license plates, and reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from that fact, provide reasonable suspicion sufficient to 
justify an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle.  The absence 
                     
10 Cheryl McIlquham, Issue Paper #864, 1997-99 Budget, 
Single License Plate, Legislative Fiscal Bureau (May 22, 1997), 
at 2. 
In a May 24, 1995, letter to the Legislative Joint 
Committee on Finance, Emil S. Thomas, Deputy Chief of Police, 
Madison Police Department, stated, "Police Officers utilize 
license plates for the basic purpose of identification . . . 
Requiring a front plate significantly improves the chance of an 
officer identifying a suspect leaving the scene of a crime as 
the officer responds to the scene.  It also enhances the odds of 
a citizen witness correctly identifying the plate number." 
96-1821-CR.dp 
 
10
of license plates in this case, as evidenced by the record, 
combined with the court of appeals' holding in Griffin, provides 
further support that the officers had reasonable suspicion to 
make an investigatory stop. 
¶85 Reasonable suspicion is a smaller quantum of evidence 
than probable cause because the temporary seizure of a person in 
an investigatory stop is less than the complete and lasting 
seizure of a person in an arrest.  In my view, the two officers 
had more than reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory 
stop.  Consequently, I concur in the mandate and opinion of the 
court. 
 
 
96-1821-CR.wab 
 
1 
 
¶86 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. (Dissenting).   The majority 
opinion allows any report called in to 911 to trigger a police 
stop and frisk if the anonymous caller describes a vehicle, 
tells how many people are in it, where it is parked, and then 
alleges the unnamed occupants are selling drugs.  The potential 
for mischief-making directed to totally innocent people is 
patent.  Neither the quantity nor the quality of the facts 
relied upon by the police create a reasonable suspicion to 
conduct an investigatory stop under the Fourth Amendment in this 
case.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶87 The facts are few and can be listed briefly.  On 
November 2, 1995, an anonymous 911-caller alleged that drugs 
were being sold from a blue and burgundy vehicle in the driveway 
at the side of an apartment building at a Milwaukee address.  
Officers were quickly dispatched to the address.  The officers 
corroborated the three lone facts supplied by the 911-caller: 1) 
there was a vehicle matching the color and general model in 
caller’s description, 2) at the location provided by the caller, 
and 3) two people were in the vehicle, comporting with the 
caller’s use of the plural “they’re selling drugs.”  The 
officers contemporaneously observed that the vehicle did not 
have a front license plate, and the defendant’s right hand was 
behind the passenger seat.  Guns drawn, the two officers 
approached the vehicle to conduct an investigatory stop. 
¶88 With these facts in mind, our task is to objectively 
assess the reasonableness of the decision by the officers to 
96-1821-CR.wab 
 
2 
conduct an investigatory or Terry11 stop.  A professional law 
enforcement officer may find reasonable suspicion from objective 
facts that appear ordinary to the untrained.  United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 419 (1981).  But I conclude the facts 
alone are in too short of supply to form a legitimate basis for 
an investigatory stop in this case.  The record shows only bits 
and fragments of information. 
¶89 The first fragment of information is supplied by an 
anonymous informant to a 911-operator.  Certain anonymous tips 
describing only innocent details of identification can be 
factored into a reasonable suspicion determination if it can be 
found that the tip is reliable.  State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 
2d 128, 142-43, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990); Alabama v. White, 496 
U.S. 325 (1990).  As explained in Richardson, “the greater the 
amount, specificity and uniqueness of the detail contained in an 
anonymous tip, the more likely it is that the informant has an 
adequate basis of knowledge.”  Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 142.  
The anonymous callers in Richardson and White, however, provided 
far greater detail than the caller in this case.  In White, the 
caller told police the name of the suspect, a specific address 
where she could be found at a specific time, the details of her 
vehicle down to its broken taillight and a detailed description 
of her future itinerary.  Even with these details White was 
characterized as a “close case” by the Supreme Court.  White, 
496 U.S. at 332. 
                     
11 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
96-1821-CR.wab 
 
3 
¶90 In comparison to White and Richardson, the tipster 
here provided little.  The anonymous caller did not provide a 
name or physical description of the occupants.  The caller did 
not state any details with respect to the purchase of drugs.  
The caller did not state how long the suspects had been parked 
in the lot.  The caller did not allege that the defendant was 
armed.  The caller did not allege any facts that indicated that 
violence was in the offing.  The anonymous caller did not 
provide any information other than a general description of a 
vehicle, its location, and that it was occupied by one or more 
individuals.  I agree with Chief Judge Posner, who said: 
 
to 
deem 
the 
tip 
adequately 
corroborated 
by 
circumstances that, as in this case, show nothing more 
than that the tipster had seen the person he was 
reporting would be mere bootstrapping, for the tipster 
could easily be a prankster who seeing a perfectly 
innocent-looking person in the street calls up the 
police and describes the location and appearance of 
the person.  It is different if the details that are 
given by the tipster and that the police corroborate 
before making the stop are details that only someone 
personally acquainted with the suspect would know.  
There is still a chance that the tip is a lie—the 
tipster may be a personal enemy of the person he is 
reporting—but the probability is sufficiently low to 
permit the police to stop the person reported on the 
basis of the tip. 
United States v. DeBerry, 76 F.3d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(internal citations omitted).   
¶91 Corroboration of the spare details provided by the 
anonymous caller in the instant case is mere bootstrapping and 
adds no weight to the “reasonable suspicion” calculation.  This 
type of tip may be a useful lead for police surveillance and 
96-1821-CR.wab 
 
4 
further investigation but to justify a “stop and frisk,” 
additional facts must be established.  White, 496 U.S. at 329 
(for Fourth Amendment purposes, tips “‘completely lacking in 
indicia of reliability . . . require further investigation 
before a forcible stop of a suspect would be authorized . . .’”) 
(citation omitted).  The police investigation of the tip must 
provide additional information to justify moving from being 
merely suspicious of the vehicle and its occupants to having 
reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop. 
¶92 Turning then to the actions by the officers at the 
location, the officers did indeed corroborate the descriptive 
observations provided by the 911-caller.  The officers saw more 
than one person sitting in the described vehicle at the 
described location.  The officers could not know whether these 
were in fact the same people the caller claimed to have seen 
engaging in criminal activity because the caller did not provide 
any physical description whatsoever of the alleged drug dealers. 
  
¶93 The majority opinion resolves this problem by stating 
that the officers arrived promptly at the scene while the 
information from the caller was still fresh, decreasing the 
likelihood of detaining the wrong suspect.  However the 
anonymous 911-tipster did not provide any time frame of when the 
illegal activity was observed, or any descriptive facts which 
would show whether the caller actually saw illegal drugs being 
sold, other activity which a trained law enforcement officer 
96-1821-CR.wab 
 
5 
would associate with illegal activity, or merely suspected 
criminal activity.  
¶94 Next, the officers observed that the driver, Williams, 
had his right hand behind the passenger seat.  The officers did 
not see Williams make any sort of a “furtive” gesture.  The 
officers observed no sudden, guilty or threatening moves.  
Additionally, the officers did not see any weapon and the 
anonymous caller did not allege any weapon to be present or in 
use.  In total, the record presents no facts from which I can 
infer 
circumstances 
placing 
the 
public 
in 
immediate 
and 
substantial risk of danger and requiring swift action by the 
officers.   
¶95 The facts do not suggest that time was of the essence. 
 Nevertheless, the officers did not conduct any surveillance to 
see whether there was any drug activity going on in connection 
with the vehicle or its occupants; they did not observe Williams 
or the other passenger do anything that appeared to be illegal; 
nor did they observe anything else that endangered public safety 
or the safety of the officers.  Thus, the observations by the 
officers at the scene did not add any facts to “establish the 
requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip 
were more reliable.”  White, 496 U.S. at 330.   
¶96 A greater quantity of even innocent facts could have 
supported reasonable suspicion.  See United States v. Sokolow, 
490 U.S. 1 (1989).  In Sokolow, the Supreme Court found 
reasonable suspicion when federal agents knew the defendant paid 
over $2000 cash for two airline tickets from a roll of $20 bills 
96-1821-CR.wab 
 
6 
containing nearly twice that amount of cash; traveled under a 
name that did not match the name under which his telephone 
number was listed; had traveled on a round-trip flight from 
Honolulu to Miami, a source city for illicit drugs; stayed in 
Miami for only 48 hours, even though a round-trip ticket from 
Honolulu to Miami takes 20 hours; appeared nervous; and checked 
none of his luggage.  Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 3-4, 6.  The court 
held that the total impact of this quantity of facts supported 
the agent’s conclusion that criminal action was afoot and an 
investigatory stop was warranted.  In the present case the 
quantity of facts in the record simply falls far short of the 
required mark. 
¶97 Moreover, while an allegation of drug dealing is a 
most serious matter, the majority opinion links the allegation 
to violent criminal action by observing that where drugs are 
involved, guns are probably involved as well.  See Richards v. 
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 (1997) (“[W]hile drug investigation 
frequently does pose special risks to officer safety and the 
preservation of evidence, not every drug investigation will pose 
these risks to a substantial degree.”)  The officers in this 
case, however, did not observe anything resembling drug dealing 
nor did they observe any weapons, nor did the tipster report 
weapons or gunfire.  It was daytime when the officers responded 
to the call.  
¶98 Finally, I agree with the court of appeals’ conclusion 
that although the police testified that the Williams vehicle had 
no front license plate, neither party pursued the issue at the 
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7 
evidentiary hearing and therefore the record on this issue is 
insufficient to serve as an alternative basis on which the 
circuit court may be affirmed.  State v. Williams, 214 Wis. 2d 
412, 414 n.3, 570 N.W.2d 892 (Ct. App. 1997). 
¶99 These facts are insufficient to support a stop and 
frisk.  I respectfully dissent. 
¶100 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and JUSTICE ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent.