Case Title: State v. Subdiaz-Osorio

Citation: 2014 WI 87

Docket Number: 2010AP003016-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-07-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 87 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP3016-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Nicolas Subdiaz-Osorio, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 345 Wis. 2d 396, 824 N.W.2d 927 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Unpublished)  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 24, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 3, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
Mary K. Wagner 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.) CROOKS, 
J., concurs. (Opinion filed.) ROGGENSACK, 
ZIEGLER, JJ. concur. (Opinion filed.) ZIEGLER, 
ROGGENSACK, GABLEMAN, JJJ. Concur. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents. (Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by John A. Pray and Frank J. Remington Center, University of 
Wisconsin Law School, and oral argument by Lanny Glinberg.  
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Daniel J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
 
2014 WI 87
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2010AP3016-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2009CF149) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Nicolas Subdiaz-Osorio, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 24, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Subdiaz-
Osorio, No. 2010AP3016-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Nov. 15, 2012). 
¶2 
The case involves the increasingly busy intersection 
between Fourth Amendment privacy considerations and the constant 
advancement of electronic technology.  The court must determine 
whether 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
may 
contact 
a 
homicide 
suspect's cell phone provider to obtain the suspect's cell phone 
location information without first securing a court order based 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
2 
 
on probable cause.  The court also must consider whether the 
suspect effectively invoked his right to counsel during an 
interrogation when he asked how he could get an attorney rather 
than affirmatively requesting the presence of counsel. 
¶3 
The homicide here occurred in Kenosha, Wisconsin.  
After fatally stabbing his brother, Nicolas Subdiaz-Osorio 
(Subdiaz-Osorio)1 borrowed his girlfriend's car and fled the 
scene of the crime.  Kenosha police quickly suspected that 
Subdiaz-Osorio, who was in the country illegally, was heading 
for Mexico and carrying the murder weapon.  They marshalled 
their information and, acting through the Wisconsin Department 
of Justice, asked Subdiaz-Osorio's cell phone provider to track 
his cell phone location.  The tracking was successful, and 
Subdiaz-Osorio was arrested on a highway in Arkansas as he 
headed south.  Several Kenosha officers promptly went to 
Arkansas to interrogate the suspect.  Subdiaz-Osorio was 
questioned in Spanish and given his rights in Spanish.  After 
the officers explained the extradition process, Subdiaz-Osorio 
asked how he could get an attorney because he could not afford 
one.  The officers told him that Arkansas would provide him an 
attorney if he needed one but then continued to question him.  
Subdiaz-Osorio later moved to suppress all evidence obtained 
after his arrest on grounds that the search of his cell phone's 
                                                 
1 This opinion refers to Nicolas Subdiaz-Osorio and his 
brother, Marco Antonio Ojeda-Rodriguez, by their full hyphenated 
last names.  For the sake of simplicity, the opinion refers to 
all other witnesses, other than police officers, by their first 
names. 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
3 
 
location information violated his Fourth Amendment rights and 
that he was denied his Fifth Amendment right to counsel.  He 
also alleged violations of his rights under the Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
¶4 
The Kenosha County Circuit Court, Mary K. Wagner, 
Judge, denied Subdiaz-Osorio's motions to suppress the evidence 
obtained after his arrest in Arkansas, accepted his plea to an 
amended charge, and entered a judgment of conviction for first-
degree reckless homicide.  The court of appeals affirmed, 
determining that any error by the circuit court was harmless 
because it was beyond a reasonable doubt that Subdiaz-Osorio 
would have entered the same plea even if the evidence obtained 
after his arrest had been suppressed. 
¶5 
This case presents two issues for review.  First, did 
law enforcement agents violate Subdiaz-Osorio's Fourth Amendment 
rights when they procured his cell phone location information 
without first obtaining a court order2 based on probable cause?  
Second, did Kenosha police officers violate Subdiaz-Osorio's 
Fifth Amendment right to counsel when they continued to 
interview him after he asked how he could get an attorney? 
                                                 
2 A court order that meets the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment may function as a warrant.  State v. Tate, 2014 WI 89, 
¶2 & n.4, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; see also State v. 
Sveum, 2010 WI 92, ¶39, 328 Wis. 2d 369, 787 N.W.2d 317.  
However, when a statute provides procedures for obtaining a 
warrant in a given set of circumstances, law enforcement should 
follow the statute to ensure that a search conducted under the 
circumstances contemplated by the statute does not violate a 
person's Fourth Amendment rights. 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
4 
 
¶6 
The court is deeply divided on these issues as 
evidenced by the number of separate writings. 
¶7 
This opinion is the lead opinion.  It will outline the 
legal conclusions of the writer, including a mandate that the 
decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.  Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley, Justice N. Patrick Crooks, Justice Patience Drake 
Roggensack, Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler, and Justice 
Michael J. Gableman concur solely in the mandate. 
¶8 
The following conclusions are my conclusions. 
¶9 
First, I assume for this case, without deciding the 
issue, that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
their cell phone location data and that when police track a cell 
phone's location, they are conducting a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.  I make these assumptions to avoid delivering a broad 
pronouncement about reasonable expectations of privacy in the 
rapidly developing field of wireless technology.3   
¶10 Second, even though I assume there was a search in 
this case and recognize that police did not have a court order 
when they tracked Subdiaz-Osorio's cell phone location, I 
conclude that police did have probable cause for a warrant and 
                                                 
3 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and Justice N. Patrick Crooks 
believe that tracking a cell phone's location is a search that 
requires a search warrant.  Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson 
shares this view in her dissent. 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
5 
 
that the exigent circumstances of this case created an exception 
to the warrant requirement.4 
¶11 Third, I conclude that Subdiaz-Osorio failed to 
unequivocally invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel when 
he said, "How can I do to get an attorney here because I don't 
have enough to afford for one."  Subdiaz-Osorio asked how he 
could get an attorney, which could lead a reasonable officer to 
wonder whether Subdiaz-Osorio was affirmatively asking for 
counsel to be present during the custodial interrogation or 
simply inquiring about the procedure for how to obtain an 
attorney.  See State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶¶27-33, 252 
Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142.  Moreover, Subdiaz-Osorio asked how 
he could get an attorney immediately after a discussion about 
the extradition process.  The context is important, and the 
interviewing officers could reasonably believe that Subdiaz-
Osorio was asking how to get an attorney for his extradition 
hearing rather than asking for counsel to be present at the 
interrogation.  Therefore, the interviewing officers did not 
violate Subdiaz-Osorio's Fifth Amendment rights 
when they 
                                                 
4 Justice 
Patience 
Drake 
Roggensack, 
Justice 
Annette 
Kingsland Ziegler, and Justice Michael J. Gableman agree that 
the facts of this case qualify for the exigent circumstance 
exception to the warrant requirement. 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
6 
 
continued to question him after he asked about how he could get 
an attorney.5 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶12 In February 2009 Subdiaz-Osorio lived at a trailer 
park in Kenosha with his brother, Marco Antonio Ojeda-Rodriguez 
(Ojeda-Rodriguez).  Two other men, Liborio DeLaCruz-Martinez 
(Liborio) and Damien DeLaCruz-Martinez (Damien), lived with the 
brothers. 
¶13 Subdiaz-Osorio was 27 years old and had been living in 
Kenosha for about two years.  The week before the homicide, 
Subdiaz-Osorio and Ojeda-Rodriguez had argued because their 
employer had laid off Ojeda-Rodriguez but allowed Subdiaz-Osorio 
to keep his job.  Rankled by Ojeda-Rodriguez's bitterness, 
Subdiaz-Osorio threatened to stab Ojeda-Rodriguez.  Liborio 
reported that while they were eating in the kitchen, Subdiaz-
Osorio held up a steak knife and said that if Ojeda-Rodriguez 
kept bothering him about being laid off, Subdiaz-Osorio would 
stab him. 
¶14 The bad blood culminated in the late evening and early 
morning hours of Saturday, February 7 and Sunday, February 8, 
2009.6  Late on February 7, Subdiaz-Osorio and Roberto Gonzales-
                                                 
5 Justice 
N. 
Patrick 
Crooks, 
Justice 
Patience 
Drake 
Roggensack, Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler, and Justice 
Michael J. Gableman agree that there was no Fifth Amendment 
Miranda violation in this case.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966). 
6 Unless otherwise indicated, the events described in this 
section occurred in 2009. 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
7 
 
Carreno (Roberto) had a few beers and called Lanita Mintz 
(Lanita) to come and dance for them.  Lanita knew Subdiaz-Osorio 
and Ojeda-Rodriguez because the three of them had worked 
together for approximately four months.  Subdiaz-Osorio and 
Roberto picked up Lanita and brought her to the trailer around 
10:45 p.m.  The three of them went to Subdiaz-Osorio's bedroom, 
and Lanita changed into lingerie.  Roberto left around 11:20 
p.m.  At some point after that, Ojeda-Rodriguez tried to force 
his way into Subdiaz-Osorio's bedroom while Subdiaz-Osorio tried 
to keep him out.  Ojeda-Rodriguez, a former boxer, was heavier 
than Subdiaz-Osorio and was able to gain entry into the bedroom. 
¶15 When Ojeda-Rodriguez entered, he and Subdiaz-Osorio 
began arguing in Spanish.   Lanita could tell that both Subdiaz-
Osorio and Ojeda-Rodriguez had been drinking, but because she 
speaks little Spanish, she could not understand what they said.  
The argument lasted less than two minutes and ended with Ojeda-
Rodriguez punching Subdiaz-Osorio in the face.  Subdiaz-Osorio 
fell into his dresser, then got up to retrieve two knives from 
his closet.  Lanita later testified that Subdiaz-Osorio had a 
knife in each hand and that he stabbed Ojeda-Rodriguez in the 
chest after Ojeda-Rodriguez said something aggressive in Spanish 
and pounded on his chest.  As Ojeda-Rodriguez continued to pound 
his chest, Subdiaz-Osorio lifted one of the knives and brought 
it down toward Ojeda-Rodriguez's face, cutting him just under 
the left eye.  The blade pierced Ojeda-Rodriguez's left eye 
socket and entered the right hemisphere of his brain.  Ojeda-
Rodriguez fell back into the wall, and Subdiaz-Osorio began 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
8 
 
kicking him in the face and punching him between kicks.  When he 
stopped beating Ojeda-Rodriguez, Subdiaz-Osorio turned to Lanita 
and asked her to push one of his teeth back into place because 
it had probably been dislodged when Ojeda-Rodriguez hit him.  
Lanita refused, and Subdiaz-Osorio turned back to Ojeda-
Rodriguez and punched him two more times.  Lanita pushed 
Subdiaz-Osorio off of Ojeda-Rodriguez and into the doorway. 
¶16 After Subdiaz-Osorio left the room, Liborio and Damien 
arrived and entered the bedroom.  Lanita said that Liborio and 
either Damien or Subdiaz-Osorio carried Ojeda-Rodriguez to 
Ojeda-Rodriguez's bedroom.  As Lanita remembers it, Ojeda-
Rodriguez was moving and speaking when she left, but she did not 
talk with him.  She knew Ojeda-Rodriguez was hurt, but she did 
not think that his wounds were fatal.  Lanita arrived home at 
1:05 a.m. on February 8.  She was the only eyewitness to the 
stabbing.  Although Lanita could recall the event itself, she 
could not recall what happened to Subdiaz-Osorio's two knives. 
¶17 After the stabbing, Subdiaz-Osorio asked Liborio for 
help bandaging Ojeda-Rodriguez, but when Liborio suggested that 
they call the police, Subdiaz-Osorio refused and said that he 
did not want to be arrested.  Subdiaz-Osorio then asked his 
girlfriend, Estella Carreno-Lugo (Estella), to help him take 
care of Ojeda-Rodriguez.  Estella came to Subdiaz-Osorio's 
trailer and helped bandage Ojeda-Rodriguez's wounds and clean 
him up.  She and Subdiaz-Osorio then left the trailer for her 
home.  Despite Estella's efforts, Liborio found Ojeda-Rodriguez 
dead the next morning.  At 9:27 a.m. on February 8, Liborio, 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
9 
 
Damien, and Norma Romero (Norma) reported to the front counter 
of the Kenosha Safety Building that there had been a stabbing. 
¶18 The police found Ojeda-Rodriguez's body battered and 
stabbed with "purple swelling" on his face and eyes and bandages 
on his left cheek and shoulder.  Emergency Medical Services 
personnel confirmed that Ojeda-Rodriguez was dead.  The medical 
examiner noted that there was a fatal stab wound under Ojeda-
Rodriguez's left eye and two stab wounds on Ojeda-Rodriguez's 
left shoulder.  The fatal stab occurred when Subdiaz-Osorio 
thrust the knife into Ojeda-Rodriguez's left eye, causing the 
blade to penetrate Ojeda-Rodriguez's brain three to four inches. 
¶19 Detective David May (Detective May) and Detective 
Gerald Kaiser (Detective Kaiser) became the lead detectives for 
the investigation.  Detective May testified that he learned 
about the incident about 9:30 a.m. on Sunday, February 8.  
Several 
Spanish 
speaking 
officers 
interviewed 
the 
three 
individuals who came to the Safety Building.  Officer Ernan 
DelaRosa arrived at 10:25 a.m. and interviewed Liborio, who said 
that 
Subdiaz-Osorio 
admitted 
that 
he 
had 
stabbed 
Ojeda-
Rodriguez.  Officer Gloria Gonzales arrived at 11:55 a.m. and 
interviewed Norma.  Officer Arturo Gonzalez arrived at 12:06 
p.m. and interviewed Damien. 
¶20 Officer Pablo Torres7 (Officer Torres) spoke with 
Estella around 10 a.m. at her home, and she told him that 
                                                 
7 There is no dispute that Officer Torres speaks Spanish 
fluently. 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
10 
 
Subdiaz-Osorio came to her trailer asking for help because he 
had stabbed Ojeda-Rodriguez.  Estella gave Subdiaz-Osorio's name 
to Officer Torres and told him that she allowed Subdiaz-Osorio 
to borrow her silver Saturn station wagon when he asked for it.  
She also gave Officer Torres Subdiaz-Osorio's cell phone number 
and the license plate number of her car.  Police determined that 
Subdiaz-Osorio had family living in two communities in nearby 
Lake County, Illinois, but witnesses also informed the police 
that Subdiaz-Osorio was in the country illegally, and Estella 
thought that it was possible that Subdiaz-Osorio was on his way 
to Mexico, where he also had family.  Officer Torres continued 
to interview Estella back at the police station until about 12 
p.m.  Following up on the information from Estella, the police 
contacted Subdiaz-Osorio's family in Illinois and determined 
that they had not heard from him.  Officer Torres believed that 
since Subdiaz-Osorio's family in Illinois did not know where he 
was, it was likely he was on his way to Mexico. 
¶21 After 
compiling 
essential 
information 
from 
the 
witnesses, the Kenosha police put a temporary want8 on Subdiaz-
                                                 
8 A temporary want means "that the suspect was alleged to 
have committed a felony and should be apprehended promptly, and 
that there was information sufficient to support an arrest 
warrant, but that no arrest warrant had yet been issued."  State 
v. Collins, 122 Wis. 2d 320, 322 n.1, 363 N.W.2d 229 (Ct. App. 
1984). 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
11 
 
Osorio into the Crime Information Bureau (CIB)9 and National 
Crime Information Center (NCIC).10  CIB is a state system and 
                                                 
9 CIB is part of the Wisconsin Department of Justice's 
Division of Law Enforcement Services.  Crime Information Bureau, 
Wis. 
Dep't 
of 
Justice, 
http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/cib/crime-information-bureau 
(last visited July 14, 2014).  CIB "operates and manages the 
Transaction Information for the Management of Enforcement or 
TIME System."  Time & Technical Unit, Wis. Dep't of Justice, 
http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/cib/time-and-technical-unit 
(last visited July 14, 2014).   
The TIME/NCIC Systems allow for entry of a wanted 
person record even if no warrant has been issued in 
special circumstances.  Agencies that have knowledge 
by police that a felony was committed and who the 
person was that committed the felony but no warrant 
has been issued yet may enter the subject as a wanted 
person in the Temporary Felony category while the 
process for obtaining a felony warrant is pursued.  
The want can be entered into CIB only or CIB and 
NCIC, and the entry remains on file for 48 hours 
before being automatically purged.  As the entry 
remains on the system for such a short amount of time, 
agencies are not allowed to add detainer information 
to such a record. 
TIME System Newsletter Crime Information Bureau, Wis. Dep't of 
Justice, https://wilenet.org/html/cib/news-time/201211.pdf (Nov. 
2012). 
10 NCIC is "an electronic clearinghouse of crime data that 
can be tapped into by virtually every criminal justice agency 
nationwide, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year."  National Crime 
Information Center, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ncic 
(last visited July 14, 2014).  The FBI operates NCIC in 
conjunction with other federal, state, local, and tribal 
criminal justice entities.  Id.  For NCIC,  
A "Temporary Felony Want" may be entered when a law 
enforcement agency has need to take prompt action to 
establish a "want" entry for the apprehension of a 
person 
who 
has 
committed, 
or 
the 
officer 
has 
reasonable grounds to believe has committed, a felony 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
12 
 
NCIC is a national system.  The systems work together by sharing 
information.  To enter information into the CIB and NCIC, the 
police had to demonstrate probable cause.  The Kenosha police 
had probable cause to believe Subdiaz-Osorio committed the 
homicide based on their investigation, and they entered Subdiaz-
Osorio's information into the systems.  Together, the CIB and 
NCIC notified all law enforcement agencies in the country about 
the temporary want for Subdiaz-Osorio. 
¶22 The 
notification 
of 
a 
temporary 
want 
was 
old 
technology.  Kenosha police also wanted to track Subdiaz-
Osorio's cell phone location to find the vehicle in which he was 
travelling.  Sometime after 12 p.m., having heard nothing from 
CIB and NCIC, they contacted the Wisconsin Department of 
Justice, Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI), and asked DCI 
to seek information from Sprint Nextel (Sprint), Subdiaz-
Osorio's cell phone provider.  DCI filled out and submitted a 
"Mandatory Information for Exigent Circumstances Requests" form 
to Sprint.  The description on the form said, "Local law 
                                                                                                                                                             
and 
who 
may 
seek 
refuge 
by 
fleeing 
across 
jurisdictional boundaries and circumstances preclude 
the immediate procurement of a felony warrant.  A 
"Temporary 
Felony 
Want" 
shall 
be 
specifically 
identified as such and subject to verification and 
support by a proper warrant within 48 hours following 
the entry of a temporary want.  The agency originating 
the "Temporary Felony Want" shall be responsible for 
subsequent verification or re-entry of a permanent 
want. 
Privacy Act of 1974; Notice of Modified Systems of Records, 64 
Fed. Reg. 52343-01 (Sept. 28, 1999). 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
13 
 
enforcement homicide suspect.  Believed that suspect will flee 
the state or the country to avoid prosecution.  Suspect has no 
ties to Wisconsin.  Suspect considered armed and dangerous.  
Suspect poses a threat to the public."  DCI requested Subdiaz-
Osorio's subscriber information, his call records with cell site 
information within the past week, his precision location (GPS 
location), and his real-time Pen Register, Trap & Trace.11 
¶23 Subdiaz-Osorio's Sprint Nextel Privacy Policy (Policy) 
contains a "Disclosure of Personal Information" section that 
reads: 
We disclose personal information when we believe 
release is appropriate to comply with the law (e.g., 
legal 
process, 
E911 
information) . . . or 
if 
we 
reasonably 
believe 
that 
an 
emergency 
involving 
immediate danger of death or serious physical injury 
                                                 
11 According to Wis. Stat. § 968.27(13) (2009-10), 
"Pen register" means a device that records or 
decodes electronic or other impulses that identify the 
numbers 
dialed 
or 
otherwise 
transmitted 
on 
the 
telephone line to which the device is attached.  "Pen 
register" does not include any device used by a 
provider 
or 
customer 
of 
a 
wire 
or 
electronic 
communication service for billing, or recording as an 
incident 
to 
billing, 
for 
communications 
services 
provided by the provider or any device used by a 
provider or customer of a wire communication service 
for cost accounting or other like purposes in the 
ordinary course of its business. 
Wis. Stat. § 968.27(13) (2009-10). 
"'Trap and trace device' means a device that captures the 
incoming 
electronic 
or 
other 
impulses 
that 
identify 
the 
originating number of an instrument or device from which a wire 
or electronic communication was transmitted."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.27(15) (2009-10). 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
14 
 
to any person requires disclosure of communications or 
justifies disclosure of records without delay. 
"[P]ersonal information" is "information that is directly 
associated with a person such as his or her name, address, 
telephone number, e-mail address, activities and preferences."  
The 
Policy 
also 
refers 
to 
Customer 
Proprietary 
Network 
Information (CPNI), which is "information Sprint Nextel obtains 
or creates when it provides wireline or mobile wireless 
telecommunications services to a customer."  Under the Policy, 
location information is CPNI and is protected as described in 
the above block quotation.  The Policy informs the subscriber 
that the "network knows the general location of your phone or 
wireless device whenever it is turned on."  It goes on to say in 
a section titled "Presence, Location and Tracking Information" 
that in the event of an emergency, "The law also permits us to 
disclose the call location of a device on our network without a 
user's consent . . . ." 
¶24 In addition to pursuing the cell phone location 
information, the police applied for a search warrant to search 
Subdiaz-Osorio's trailer.  Detective Kaiser later stated that it 
usually takes between two and three hours to draft a search 
warrant and have it signed by a judge.  This case was no 
different.  Kenosha County Circuit Judge Bruce Schroeder issued 
the search warrant for the trailer on February 8 at 2:37 p.m.  
Judge Schroeder happened to be in his car when he was called and 
was able to stop at the police station relatively quickly.  
After obtaining the warrant, the Kenosha police searched the 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
15 
 
trailer around 3 p.m.  The police did not find any knives that 
could have been the murder weapon at the scene of the crime, and 
thus did not know whether Subdiaz-Osorio had the knives with 
him. 
¶25 Sometime during the afternoon, DCI obtained tracking 
information for Subdiaz-Osorio's cell phone without obtaining a 
warrant.  The only information that DCI received from the cell 
phone provider was location information, not conversations or 
other 
data. 
 
After 
obtaining 
Subdiaz-Osorio's 
location 
information, Detective Kaiser called Arkansas police to inform 
them that Subdiaz-Osorio was traveling South on I-55 and that 
the knives used in the murder were never recovered.  Detective 
Kaiser gave the license plate information, the make, and the 
model of the car to an Arkansas patrol officer around 5:43 p.m.  
The Arkansas patrol officer pulled the car over in Luxora, 
Arkansas around 6:11 p.m. and took Subdiaz-Osorio and Roberto, 
who was driving the car, into custody.  On the Sunday night he 
was arrested, Subdiaz-Osorio signed a consent form allowing 
police to obtain trace evidence from him, including DNA and 
fingernail clippings.  The Arkansas police did not interrogate 
him that evening. 
¶26 On Monday, February 9, Detective Kaiser traveled to 
Arkansas with Detective May and Officer Torres.  The Arkansas 
police obtained a search warrant for the car at 2:34 p.m., and 
Detective Kaiser processed the car for evidence. 
¶27 Officer Torres and Detective May interviewed Subdiaz-
Osorio in the Mississippi County Jail in Luxora.  The room was 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
16 
 
well-lit and roughly eight feet by eight feet in size with a 
table separating the suspect from the two officers.  When 
Officer Torres entered the interrogation room, he removed 
Subdiaz-Osorio's handcuffs, and Subdiaz-Osorio accepted a Coke 
at the beginning of the interview.  Subdiaz-Osorio told the 
police that he preferred that the interview be in Spanish, so 
that Officer Torres provided translation assistance.  Officer 
Torres believed that Subdiaz-Osorio understood him "very well," 
and Subdiaz-Osorio never said that he was having trouble 
comprehending Officer Torres's Spanish.  Before speaking with 
Subdiaz-Osorio, Officer Torres informed Subdiaz-Osorio of his 
constitutional rights (Miranda12 warning), and Subdiaz-Osorio 
signed a waiver form titled "Waiver of Constitutional Rights."  
Officer Torres read the form written in Spanish, Subdiaz-Osorio 
read the form himself, and Subdiaz-Osorio signed the form in 
Officer Torres's presence on February 9 at 3:34 p.m. 
¶28 The officers made an audiovisual recording of the 
interview, portions of which were later played in court and 
translated contemporaneously from Spanish into English.  During 
the interview, Subdiaz-Osorio asked if Officer Torres would be 
taking him back to Kenosha, and Officer Torres replied that he 
and Detective May would not be taking Subdiaz-Osorio back.  
Officer Torres explained the extradition process: 
We aren't going to take you back to Kenosha.  What 
happens is that you have to appear in front of a 
judge . . . .  And after you appear in front of a 
                                                 
12 Miranda, 384 U.S. 436. 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
17 
 
judge here in Arkansas then they will find out if 
there 
is 
enough 
reason 
to 
send 
you 
back 
to 
Kenosha, . . . but we are not going to do that right 
now.  We are not going to know that right now . . . . 
Immediately after Officer Torres explained how extradition would 
work in the above quotation, Subdiaz-Osorio asked, "How can I do 
to get an attorney here because I don't have enough to afford 
for 
one." 
 
Officer 
Torres 
responded, 
"If 
you 
need 
an 
attorney . . . by the time you're going to appear in the court, 
the state of Arkansas will get an attorney for you . . . ."  
Then their interview continued.  Subdiaz-Osorio was very 
cooperative throughout the interview, which lasted less than an 
hour.  Although he was cooperative, he did at one point 
contradict Lanita's version of the stabbing when he claimed that 
Ojeda-Rodriguez brought a knife into the bedroom and that he 
disarmed Ojeda-Rodriguez.  After the interview, Officer Torres 
read a form titled "Consent to Search and Seizure," and Subdiaz-
Osorio agreed to give up DNA and trace evidence when he signed 
the form at 4:12 p.m. 
¶29 At no point in the interview in Arkansas did Officer 
Torres or Detective May threaten, coerce, or make any promises 
to 
Subdiaz-Osorio 
to 
get 
him 
to 
sign 
the 
Waiver 
of 
Constitutional Rights or the consent to obtain DNA and trace 
evidence. 
¶30 On February 9, after the police had collected a 
substantial amount of evidence against him, Subdiaz-Osorio was 
charged with first-degree intentional homicide contrary to Wis. 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
18 
 
Stat. 
§§ 940.01(1)(a) 
(2009-10),13 
939.50(3)(a), 
and 
939.63(1)(b). 
¶31 Officer Torres and Detective May interviewed Subdiaz-
Osorio again on February 22, this time at the Kenosha Police 
Department, after Subdiaz-Osorio's return to Wisconsin.  Again, 
the officers read Subdiaz-Osorio the Waiver of Rights form, and 
Subdiaz-Osorio consented and signed it.  Subdiaz-Osorio also 
signed a "Consent to Search" form that allowed the Kenosha 
police to search his trailer.  The Kenosha police applied for 
and obtained another search warrant for the trailer, but they 
did not need the warrant because they had Subdiaz-Osorio's 
consent.  On February 22 Subdiaz-Osorio accompanied Detective 
May, Officer Torres, and other Kenosha police personnel to the 
scene of the stabbing, and Subdiaz-Osorio walked through and 
assisted the officers in the investigation.  Subdiaz-Osorio 
described the incident and again claimed that Ojeda-Rodriguez 
had brought a knife into the bedroom.  The officers told 
Subdiaz-Osorio that his story conflicted with Lanita's account, 
and Subdiaz-Osorio then admitted that he had procured the 
knives. 
¶32 On April 1, 2009, Subdiaz-Osorio filed a pretrial 
motion to suppress all statements and evidence that the police 
                                                 
13 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
19 
 
obtained after his arrest.14  In the suppression motion, Subdiaz-
Osorio argued that the warrantless search of his cell phone's 
location 
data 
violated 
his 
Fourth 
Amendment 
rights, 
and 
therefore all evidence obtained after the arrest should be 
suppressed.  Subdiaz-Osorio also filed a motion challenging the 
sufficiency of the criminal complaint and the bindover, and he 
moved to dismiss the information.15  On May 14, 2009, Subdiaz-
Osorio filed a separate motion to suppress the statements he 
made during the interrogation in Arkansas, on grounds that 
Officer Torres failed to properly inform Subdiaz-Osorio of his 
Miranda rights. 
¶33 On June 26, 2009, Judge Wagner denied Subdiaz-Osorio's 
motion to suppress statements based on the alleged Fourth 
Amendment violation.  Judge Wagner cited United States v. 
Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated sub nom. on other 
grounds, Garner v. United States, 543 U.S. 1100 (2005), for the 
proposition that tracking a phone on a public roadway is not a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment because there is no legitimate 
expectation of privacy on public roadways.  Alternatively, the 
                                                 
14 It is unclear exactly what evidence the police obtained 
after Subdiaz-Osorio's arrest.  However, the State filed a 
"Notice of Intent to Use DNA Evidence at Trial and Summary of 
Expert 
Testimony" 
and 
attached 
Laboratory 
Findings 
that 
contained an analysis of blood stains on Subdiaz-Osorio's shoes 
and pants.  In the DNA analyst's opinion, the blood on Subdiaz-
Osorio's shoes and pants belonged to Ojeda-Rodriguez. 
15 In his motion, Subdiaz-Osorio argued that there was no 
probable cause to suggest he had the requisite intent to kill 
under Wis. Stat. § 940.01(1)(a). 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
20 
 
court determined that there were exigent circumstances because 
an alleged murderer was fleeing and was unpredictable.  The 
court also denied the motion challenging the sufficiency of the 
complaint and bindover and refused to dismiss the case.  
Finally, the circuit court concluded that Officer Torres did not 
fail to properly inform Subdiaz-Osorio or honor his Miranda 
rights: Subdiaz-Osorio's question about an attorney was not a 
request to have an attorney with him during the interview; 
rather, Subdiaz-Osorio was asking about how he could obtain an 
attorney for the extradition hearing. 
¶34 Therefore, Judge Wagner denied all motions to suppress 
evidence.  The State filed an amended information on February 
15, 2010, charging Subdiaz-Osorio with first-degree reckless 
homicide by use of a dangerous weapon contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 940.02(1) and 939.63(1)(b), and Subdiaz-Osorio pled guilty to 
the charge in the amended information.  The circuit court 
accepted the plea and found Subdiaz-Osorio guilty of first-
degree reckless homicide by use of a dangerous weapon.  On June 
28, 2010, the circuit court sentenced Subdiaz-Osorio to 20 years 
of confinement and 15 years of extended supervision. 
¶35 Subdiaz-Osorio appealed the judgment of conviction and 
the 
denial 
of 
his 
suppression 
motion 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.31(10).16  State v. Subdiaz-Osorio, No. 2010AP3016-CR, 
                                                 
16 "An order denying a motion to suppress . . . may be 
reviewed 
upon 
appeal 
from 
a 
final 
judgment 
or 
order 
notwithstanding the fact that the judgment or order was entered 
upon a plea of guilty . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 971.31(10). 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
21 
 
unpublished slip op., ¶2 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2012).  The 
court of appeals assumed without deciding that the circuit court 
should have granted the suppression motion.  Id., ¶3.  However, 
the court determined that any error by the circuit court was 
harmless because it was beyond a reasonable doubt that Subdiaz-
Osorio would have accepted the same plea absent the error.  Id., 
¶12.  The court of appeals rejected Subdiaz-Osorio's argument 
that he could have pursued a self-defense theory if the evidence 
would have been suppressed inasmuch as Subdiaz-Osorio continued 
to assault Ojeda-Rodriguez after stabbing him and did not seek 
medical help.  Id., ¶5.   
¶36 The court also rejected the argument that without 
evidence that he fled to Arkansas, Subdiaz-Osorio could have 
shown that he did not act with utter disregard for life (a 
required element of first-degree reckless homicide).  Id., ¶¶6, 
9.  According to the court of appeals, Subdiaz-Osorio's flight 
from Wisconsin and his false statement to the police about 
Ojeda-Rodriguez bringing one or more knives into his room were 
not especially important evidence in proving that Subdiaz-Osorio 
was acting with utter disregard; thus, the failure to suppress 
that evidence did not significantly impact the State's ability 
to prove that Subdiaz-Osorio acted with utter disregard.  Id., 
¶¶9-11.  Finally, the court of appeals noted that the State had 
a strong eyewitness account of the murder, and Subdiaz-Osorio 
received a significant benefit in pleading to first-degree 
reckless homicide.  Id., ¶12.  Therefore, the court of appeals 
concluded that any error by the circuit court was harmless 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
22 
 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt 
and 
affirmed 
the 
judgment 
of 
conviction.  Id. 
¶37 Subdiaz-Osorio petitioned this court for review, which 
we granted on March 13, 2013. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶38 Whether 
law 
enforcement 
agents 
have 
violated 
a 
suspect's Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights is a question of 
constitutional fact.  State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 189-
91, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998); see State v. Brereton, 2013 WI 17, 
¶17, 345 Wis. 2d 563, 826 N.W.2d 369; State v. Sveum, 2010 WI 
92, ¶16, 328 Wis. 2d 369, 787 N.W.2d 317.  Although the court 
upholds findings of historical fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous, constitutional questions are questions of law that 
this court reviews independently.  Brereton, 345 Wis. 2d 563, 
¶17; Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 189-91.  In addition, the court 
applies a de novo standard of review to "determine whether the 
historical or evidentiary facts establish exigent circumstances" 
to justify a warrantless search.  State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, 
¶26, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29 (citation omitted). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. The Current Privacy Landscape 
¶39 This case involves a brutal killing, but the law 
enforcement effort to apprehend the killer has implications for 
citizens at large.  Thus, I begin my analysis with a general 
discussion of privacy and citizens' concerns about protecting 
personal information in an era when technology is chipping away 
at traditional notions of privacy.   
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
23 
 
¶40 Privacy is a pillar of freedom.  There is great value 
in being able to enter and withdraw from public spaces and 
disclose the details of our thoughts and movements at our 
discretion.  We share pieces of ourselves with loved ones and 
bond over the secrets of our identities.  We perfect ideas 
behind closed doors and reveal them to the public when they are 
ready.  We take comfort in seclusion from the world in moments 
of intimacy.  Privacy is not insignificant; it is not something 
to be taken for granted; and even as it diminishes as our world 
becomes more interconnected and dangerous, privacy must not 
become a legal fiction. 
¶41 It would be difficult to overstate the value of 
privacy: 
Privacy is valuable because it is necessary for the 
proper development of the self, the establishment and 
control of personal identity, and the maintenance of 
individual dignity.  Without privacy, it not only 
becomes harder to form valuable social relationships——
relationships based on exclusivity, intimacy, and the 
sharing of personal information——but also to maintain 
a variety of social roles and identities.  Privacy 
deserves to be protected as a right because we need it 
in order to live rich, fulfilling lives, lives where 
we can simultaneously play the role of friend, 
colleague, parent and citizen without having the 
boundaries 
between 
these 
different 
and 
often 
conflicting identities breached without our consent. 
Stephen E. Henderson, Expectations of Privacy in Social Media, 
31 Miss. C. L. Rev. 227, 233 (2012) (quoting Benjamin Goold, 
Surveillance and the Political Value of Privacy, 1 Amsterdam L. 
Forum 3, 3-4 (2009)).  Thus, privacy serves more than the 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
24 
 
individual; it is an integral component of a well-ordered 
society. 
¶42 The privacy landscape is shifting as we embrace new 
technologies.  Electronic devices afford us great convenience 
and efficiency, but unless our law keeps pace with our 
technology, we will pay for the benefit of our gadgets in the 
currency of privacy.  As we incorporate more of our lives into 
our smartphones and tablets, we are not merely using technology 
as a tool for societal and professional navigation; we are 
digitizing our identities.  Thus, efforts to access the 
information in our electronic devices invade and expose the 
marrow of our individuality. 
¶43 As Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis noted presciently 
well over a century ago, "Recent inventions and business methods 
call attention to the next step which must be taken for the 
protection of the person, and for securing to the individual 
what Judge Cooley calls the right 'to be let alone.'"17  Perhaps 
in this age of technology, that right is not as strong as it 
once was, but it should be our goal to quell its attenuation 
insofar as it is safe and reasonable to do so.  It used to be 
that 
"the 
greatest 
protections 
of 
privacy 
were 
neither 
constitutional nor statutory, but practical."  United States v. 
Jones, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring).  Today, in an environment of rapid technological 
                                                 
17 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to 
Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 195 (1890) (footnote omitted). 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
25 
 
advancement that allows tracking via electronic data, practical 
limitations 
on 
surveillance 
are 
quickly 
dissipating.  
Technology, it seems, has been irreversibly incorporated into 
our modern lives.  The question we face is whether privacy must 
be eviscerated to accommodate innovation. 
¶44 I believe there is room in the law for both, as well 
as security.  Technology brings with it the danger of criminal 
opportunism.  Thus, at times privacy must make room for 
security, for privacy is worth little if it is overshadowed by 
fear.  There will be times at which privacy must yield to 
security in order to thwart crimes, from identity theft to 
terrorism.  The Fourth Amendment often conjures the image of a 
scale on which we balance the needs of law enforcement and the 
rights of individuals.  Technological innovation does not change 
the need for balance, but it makes the act of balancing 
difficult.  It is no small task to afford law enforcement 
officers and government agencies the leeway they need to keep 
citizens safe while ensuring that citizens retain a reasonable 
degree of privacy. 
¶45 The balancing is especially important as citizens pay 
close attention to their privacy rights in the context of 
wireless technology.  As awareness of our dwindling privacy 
increases, 
surveys 
consistently 
reveal 
that 
people 
are 
apprehensive about losing privacy with regard to their personal 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
26 
 
information.18  As cell site location and GPS technology become 
ubiquitous,19 
Americans 
are 
adding 
cell 
phone 
location 
information to the list of concerns.20  This concern makes sense 
                                                 
18 See Vera Bergelson, It's Personal But Is It Mine? Toward 
Property Rights in Personal Information, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 
379, 427-29 (2003) (citing numerous polls in which citizens 
expressed concerns about their privacy and revealed that they 
wanted more legal protection for privacy, especially for 
personal information on the internet).   
19 There are different ways in which cell phone companies, 
and consequently, the government, can track a cell phone.  
Providers can obtain a subscriber's location information using 
global positioning system (GPS) technology or triangulation.  
GPS technology can calculate an accurate location within 20 
meters by "measuring the time it takes for a signal to travel 
the distance between satellites and a cell phone's GPS chip."  
Who Knows Where You've Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use 
of Cellular Phones As Personal Locators, 18 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 
307, 308 (2004) [hereinafter Who Knows Where You've Been?].  To 
locate a phone by triangulation, two or more cell towers that 
receive signals from an active phone compare the phone's signals 
and calculate location based on the difference between the times 
that the signals arrived or the angle of the signals.  Id.  When 
a cell phone provider "pings" a phone pursuant to law 
enforcement's request, the provider enters the phone number in a 
computer program to make the cell phone identify its GPS 
coordinates to the provider.  United States v. Caraballo, 963 F. 
Supp. 2d 341, 350 (D. Vt. 2013). 
20 One commentator noted: 
Not surprisingly, cell phone users regard access 
to their location data as yielding private data about 
their locations.  A research report found that 
seventy-three percent of cell phone users surveyed 
favored "a law that required the police to convince a 
judge that a crime has been committed before obtaining 
[historical] location information from the cell phone 
company." 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
27 
 
as an estimated 335.65 million wireless subscriber connections 
existed in the United States at the end of 2013.21  The court is 
mindful of the pervasiveness of wireless technology and of our 
citizens' 
concern 
for 
their 
privacy 
as 
we 
analyze 
the 
constitutional 
protections 
against 
unreasonable 
government 
intrusions. 
B. Constitutional Protections of Privacy 
 
¶46 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV.22  In the event of a Fourth Amendment 
violation, the usual remedy is suppression of evidence obtained 
                                                                                                                                                             
Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth 
Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 Md. L. Rev. 681, 744 
(2011) (brackets in original) (footnote omitted).  Others have 
similarly posited that "[w]hile society may be willing to accept 
the 
idea 
of 
collecting 
information 
associated 
with 
the 
origination and termination of calls, people are likely to 
reject the prospect of turning every cell phone into a tracking 
device."  Who Knows Where You've Been?, supra note 19, at 316. 
21 Annual 
Wireless 
Industry 
Survey, 
CTIA, 
http://www.ctia.org/your-wireless-life/how-wireless-
works/annual-wireless-industry-survey (last visited July 14, 
2014). 
22 The Wisconsin Constitution's text is almost identical to 
the language in the United States Constitution. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
28 
 
in the search.  State v. Ferguson, 2009 WI 50, ¶21, 317 
Wis. 2d 586, 767 N.W.2d 187.  However, there are several 
exceptions to the warrant requirement.  See State v. Krajewski, 
2002 WI 97, ¶24, 255 Wis. 2d 98, 648 N.W.2d 385 (noting that 
exceptions to the warrant requirement include consent and 
exigent circumstances).  Particularly relevant to this case is 
the exception for exigent circumstances, which this opinion 
discusses below. 
C. Judicial Interpretations of Constitutional Protections of 
Privacy 
¶47 This case requires the court to consider whether the 
tracking of Subdiaz-Osorio's cell phone location was a search 
under the above-quoted constitutional provisions and, if so, 
whether it required a warrant or was subject to one of the well-
delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.  My analysis 
keeps in mind Justice Kennedy's caution that: "The judiciary 
risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment 
implications of emerging technology before its role in society 
                                                                                                                                                             
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 11.  "Historically, we have interpreted 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution in accord 
with 
the 
Supreme 
Court's 
interpretation 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment."  State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶20, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 
752 N.W.2d 748 (citations omitted).  Thus, this opinion will not 
explicitly address the Wisconsin Constitution in the analysis, 
but the analysis will apply to both constitutions. 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
29 
 
has become clear."  City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 
759 (2010) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 
(1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967)).23   
1. Trespassory Searches 
¶48 Recent decisions from both the United States Supreme 
Court and this court have utilized the common law trespass 
theory 
to 
analyze 
whether 
a 
search 
violated 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment.  Case law interpreting the Fourth Amendment "was tied 
to common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 
20th century."  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (citations omitted).  
Recently, the Court has turned again to trespass theory, 
deciding in Jones that government installation of a GPS tracking 
device under a suspect's Jeep without a valid warrant was a 
search because the placement of the device was an impermissible 
physical intrusion.  Id.  Trespass theory would not be 
applicable 
to 
the 
effort 
to 
obtain 
cell 
phone 
location 
information unless one were to deem the cell phone provider's 
                                                 
23 The United States Supreme Court recently issued a 
decision in Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ___, No. 13-132, slip 
op. (June 25, 2014), in which it determined that police must 
obtain a warrant before searching the contents of a cell phone 
in a search incident to an arrest.  Id. at *28.  The Court 
acknowledged that cell phones are capable of containing large 
quantities of private information, including historical location 
information, 
but 
the 
Court's 
decision 
did 
not 
address 
acquisition of contemporaneous cell phone location information 
like the tracking of Subdiaz-Osorio's cell phone in this case.  
See id. at *18 & n.1, 19-20. 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
30 
 
electronic interaction with Subdiaz-Osorio's cell phone as a 
physical trespass.  Such an analysis  would be unnatural.24 
¶49 This court has not had the opportunity to analyze 
whether the tracking of cell phones in complete absence of a 
warrant implicates a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights, but the 
court has decided that valid warrants may permit GPS tracking of 
vehicles.  See Brereton, 345 Wis. 2d 563, ¶3 (installation of 
GPS device did not go beyond scope of warrant); Sveum, 328 
Wis. 2d 369, ¶74 (warrant for GPS tracking was valid and 
execution of warrant was reasonable).  Although those prior 
cases involved tracking facilitated by technology, the present 
case falls under the category of a non-trespassory search and 
does not benefit from an analysis that relies on the trespass 
theory of Fourth Amendment searches. 
¶50 This court's opinion in State v. Tate, 2014 WI 89, 
___Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, discusses the requirements to 
obtain a warrant for cell phone location tracking.25  Tate is 
                                                 
24 See, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 
945, 953 (2012) ("Situations involving merely the transmission 
of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to 
Katz analysis."); Marc McAllister, The Fourth Amendment and New 
Technologies: The Misapplication of Analogical Reasoning, 36 S. 
Ill. U. L.J. 475, 517-18 (2012) (footnote omitted) (stating that 
cell phone tracking "does not require the installation of any 
device; rather, the telephone itself does the work, making the 
Jones majority's trespass rationale inapplicable."). 
25 During the writing of Tate and this opinion, Governor 
Scott Walker signed into law 2013 A.B. 536, which requires law 
enforcement, with some exceptions, to obtain a warrant before 
obtaining cell phone location information.  2013 Wis. Act 375; 
see Wis. Stat. § 968.373 (2013-14).  The new law went into 
effect on April 25, 2014. 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
31 
 
similar to this case in that it does not involve a trespass.  
However, Tate focuses on whether the court order there was valid 
to authorize tracking of the defendant's cell phone location, 
whereas this case involves an assumed non-trespassory search in 
the absence of a court order. 
2. Non-Trespassory Searches 
¶51 The Supreme Court expanded the traditional concept of 
a search in 1967 by extending Fourth Amendment protections to 
circumstances in which technology enabled an invasion of privacy 
without a trespass.  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (determining that regardless of trespass, the Fourth 
Amendment 
protects 
a 
person's 
"reasonable 
expectation 
of 
privacy"); see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953 ("Situations 
involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without 
trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.").  In Katz, the 
government used evidence of the defendant's incriminating phone 
conversations that the FBI secretly recorded with a device 
attached to the outside of a public phone booth.26  Katz, 389 
U.S. at 348.  Because the defendant had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the phone booth, and because the government failed 
                                                 
26 An anachronism in today's wireless world, the phone booth 
calls forth both a sense of irony and nostalgia as it sits 
unassumingly 
at 
the 
center 
of 
modern 
Fourth 
Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
The virtual elimination of telephone booths and payphones 
has made it difficult for a citizen away from home to make a 
telephone call without using a traceable cell phone.  Even at 
home, people today are less reliant on a land line than in the 
past. 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
32 
 
to 
get 
a 
warrant, 
the 
FBI's 
eavesdropping 
violated 
the 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.  Id. at 353-59.   
¶52 Justice Harlan's concurrence set forth a two-part test 
to determine when a non-trespassory search implicates the Fourth 
Amendment: (1) the person must have a subjective expectation of 
privacy; and (2) the expectation of privacy must be "one that 
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'"  Id. at 361 
(Harlan, J., concurring).  As the Supreme Court suggested in 
Jones, Katz offers the proper test to determine whether cell 
phone location tracking receives Fourth Amendment protection.  
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953. 
3. The Cell Phone Policy and the Subjective Expectation of 
Privacy 
¶53 The State contends that Subdiaz-Osorio did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell phone location 
data because his Sprint Policy said that Sprint would disclose 
location information to law enforcement in the event of an 
emergency.  A recent federal case from Vermont offers an 
intriguing analysis of a suspect's subjective expectation of 
privacy based on his cell phone policy.  United States v. 
Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341 (D. Vt. 2013).   
¶54 In Caraballo, the defendant carried out an execution-
style murder when he bound up a woman, shot her in the back of 
the head, and left her body in the woods.  Id. at 343.  The 
victim had been arrested in the past and had told police that 
she was engaged in drug activity with a man named Frank 
Caraballo.  Id.  In her past discussions with police, the victim 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
33 
 
said that she was very afraid of Caraballo because he would kill 
her if he knew she was talking to the police, and he had many 
weapons.  Id.  Given what they knew about the defendant, the 
police decided that they would track his cell phone so that they 
could find and arrest him as quickly as possible.  Id. at 345-
46.  Because time was precious, they did not obtain a warrant.  
Id. 
¶55 Caraballo argued that the warrantless search of his 
cell phone location data violated his Fourth Amendment rights.  
Id. at 342.  The court went through a variety of analyses but 
determined that the defendant did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his cell phone location data because 
his Sprint privacy policy informed him that Sprint may disclose 
personal information in response to emergencies.  Id. at 362-63.  
Hence, the court said, the defendant knew that the police could 
track him because the situation was an emergency.  Id. at 363.  
Although the facts of Caraballo and the cell phone policy there 
are similar to the present case, I choose to decide this case on 
different grounds because total reliance on Subdiaz-Osorio's 
Policy to decide this case would be problematic. 
¶56 First, the Policy in this case is confusing and 
difficult to interpret.  It consists of nine pages that include 
piecemeal definitions and vague terminology.  For example, the 
Policy creates confusion by defining the term "CPNI" at several 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
34 
 
different points with varying degrees of specificity.27  The 
definition of CPNI is important because it includes location 
information, but because the full definition is spread out over 
several pages, references to CPNI are difficult to understand.   
¶57 The Policy is also unclear about what information 
Sprint will disclose in the event of an emergency.  For example, 
in a paragraph titled "Protection of Sprint Nextel and Others,"28 
the Policy says that Sprint discloses personal information (of 
which CPNI is a "special category") if Sprint "reasonably 
believe[s] that an emergency involving immediate danger of death 
or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure of 
communications or justifies disclosure of records without 
delay."  (Emphasis added.)  The "communications" language 
suggests that Sprint will disclose only information related to 
communications——like phone calls——and there is no attempt to 
define the "records" that Sprint will disclose. 
                                                 
27 The Policy defines CPNI on pages one and two of the 
Policy: "CPNI is information Sprint Nextel obtains or creates 
when it provides wireline or mobile wireless telecommunications 
services to a customer.  CPNI includes the types of services 
purchased, how the services are used, and the billing detail for 
those services." 
On page four, the Policy says CPNI "is information about 
your phone usage, which is a special category of personal 
information." 
Page seven adds to the definition by stating that "Location 
information derived from providing our voice service . . . is 
CPNI . . . ." 
28 The title of this paragraph suggests that the disclosure 
disclaimer is to protect Sprint, not the customer. 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
35 
 
¶58 The Policy later says in a section titled "Presence, 
Location and Tracking Information" that "[l]ocation information 
derived from providing our voice service, in addition to being 
covered by this Policy, is CPNI and is protected as described 
above."  Thus, the full definition of CPNI does not come until 
after the section that discusses disclosure of CPNI.  Moreover, 
it is difficult to see how the customer's CPNI is "protected as 
described 
above" 
as 
the 
paragraph 
above 
enumerates 
only 
circumstances in which information will be disclosed.  The 
"Presence, Location and Tracking Information" section goes on to 
say that Sprint may disclose "call location" information, but 
the term "call location," like the phrase "disclosure of 
communications," misleadingly implies that only location data 
obtained from a phone call may be disclosed.  It is possible 
that a customer would read this Policy and understand that his 
cell phone may be tracked at all times, but that is not the only 
possible reading. 
¶59 In sum, I am reluctant to say that a person loses his 
reasonable expectation of privacy based on an opaque contract.  
The Fourth Amendment is complicated enough without introducing 
contract interpretation into the calculus. 
¶60 Second, even if the Policy clearly provided that 
Sprint may disclose location information to law enforcement in 
an emergency, that language merely governs the conduct of 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
36 
 
Sprint.29  It does not necessarily follow that law enforcement 
may lawfully seek and obtain the information without a court 
order 
or 
without 
satisfying 
the 
exigent 
circumstances 
exception.30  Thus, a customer might still reasonably assume that 
the cell phone company will disclose information only when 
presented with a valid court order.   
¶61 Third, although it is likely that all cell phone 
policies contain language similar to the Sprint Policy in this 
case, law enforcement may not know what any given individual's 
cell phone policy actually says.  It is untenable to contend 
                                                 
29 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.375(15) permits Sprint and other 
wireless services providers to disclose customer information 
without a subpoena or warrant if: 
The provider of electronic communication or remote 
computing service believes in good faith that an 
emergency involving the danger of death or serious 
physical 
injury 
to 
any 
person 
exists 
and 
that 
disclosure of the information is required to prevent 
the death or injury or to mitigate the injury. 
Wis. Stat. § 968.375(15)(b).  Section 968.375 took effect on May 
28, 2010.  The Federal Stored Communications Act also permits a 
similar disclosure.  18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4) (2006) (provider may 
disclose information "to a governmental entity, if the provider, 
in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of 
death or serious physical injury to any person requires 
disclosure 
without 
delay 
of 
information 
relating 
to 
the 
emergency").  However, statutes granting cell phone companies 
authority to disclose information do not necessarily grant law 
enforcement authority to conduct the search for that information 
without a court order. 
30 See United States v. Takai, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1323 
(D. Utah 2013) (probable cause and exigent circumstances 
justified detective's application for cell phone pinging under 
18 U.S.C. § 2702). 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
37 
 
that a search under the Fourth Amendment depends on the specific 
language 
in 
an 
individual's 
cell 
phone 
policy——that 
law 
enforcement 
may 
track 
a 
cell 
phone 
without 
a 
warrant, 
understanding that if the policy does not alert the suspect that 
he may be tracked, the search will violate the Fourth Amendment.   
¶62 Fourth, the language in Sprint's Policy mirrors the 
language in the exigent circumstance exception to the warrant 
requirement.  One example of this exception requires law 
enforcement to show probable cause and a reasonable belief that 
there is "a threat to safety of a suspect or others."  State v. 
Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶¶19, 25, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621.  
The Policy says that Sprint discloses information "if we 
reasonably believe that an emergency involving immediate danger 
of death or serious physical injury to any person requires 
disclosure."  Thus, both the exigent circumstances exception and 
the Policy contemplate the government obtaining location data 
where someone's safety is in jeopardy.  However, the exigent 
circumstances exception contains the additional requirement of 
probable cause.  I believe it is more appropriate to interpret 
the Policy as permitting the wireless services provider to 
disclose information in exigent circumstances rather than saying 
that the clause nullifies a customer's reasonable subjective 
expectation of privacy. 
¶63 Fifth, interpreting the cell phone policy to eliminate 
a customer's reasonable subjective expectation of privacy 
invites law enforcement to be complacent in its requests for 
tracking.  The Caraballo court noted that Sprint processes 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
38 
 
thousands of emergency requests each year, and it is Sprint's 
practice 
not 
to 
second-guess 
law 
enforcement's 
emergency 
requests.  Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 349.  If law 
enforcement agents say that there is an emergency, wireless 
providers apparently give up the location information almost 
without exception.  The deference to law enforcement's tracking 
requests is not inherently wrong, but requiring police to have 
probable cause and an exigent circumstance before requesting 
location data, if they do not have a warrant, diminishes the 
potential for abuse. 
¶64 Finally, I believe it prudent to heed the cautionary 
advice of the Supreme Court when it comes to determining whether 
a policy can render an expectation of privacy unreasonable.  See 
Quon, 560 U.S. at 759.  In Quon, the Ontario Police Department 
(OPD) in California distributed to various officers pagers that 
could send and receive text messages.  Id. at 750-51.  OPD 
explicitly informed the officers that messages on the pagers 
were not private and that the officers should have no 
expectation of privacy when sending texts on the pagers.  Id. at 
758.  When Police Sergeant Jeff Quon (Quon) challenged the OPD's 
decision to look at his sexually explicit text messages, 
claiming a Fourth Amendment violation, the Court decided not to 
determine whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the texts.  Id. at 752-53, 760 ("A broad holding concerning 
employees' 
privacy 
expectations 
vis–à-vis 
employer-provided 
technological equipment might have implications for future cases 
that cannot be predicted.  It is preferable to dispose of this 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
39 
 
case on narrower grounds.").  The Court then assumed Quon had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and decided that the special-
needs-of-the-workplace 
exception 
applied 
to 
allow 
the 
warrantless search.  Id. at 760-61.  Because I can avoid a broad 
pronouncement regarding reasonable expectations of privacy by 
analyzing this case under the exigent circumstances exception, I 
need not decide whether Subdiaz-Osorio's cell phone Policy 
nullified his subjective reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his cell phone location information. 
4. The Objective Reasonableness of the Expectation of Privacy in 
Cell Phone Location Information 
¶65 Despite its apparent simplicity, the Katz test's 
second prong——whether society is prepared to recognize an 
expectation of privacy as reasonable——has been the subject of 
much confusion, debate, and analysis, and it is far from an easy 
touchstone to apply.31  See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 
U.S. 35, 46-49 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (disagreeing 
with the majority about whether respondents had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their trash); Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735, 747 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with 
the majority and suggesting that people have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers that they dial).   
                                                 
31 See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment 
Protection, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 503, 504-05 (2007) (criticizing the 
numerous, inconsistent tests to determine what society accepts 
as a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
40 
 
¶66 Although it is difficult to apply, the interpretation 
of what society is prepared to recognize as a "reasonable 
expectation of privacy" is an important part of the analysis 
under Katz.  See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989).  
In Riley, the Court considered whether police surveillance of a 
greenhouse from a helicopter 400 feet in the air was a search 
that required a warrant.  Id. at 447-48.  A plurality of the 
Court said that because anyone could have flown a helicopter and 
observed the top of the greenhouse without violating the law, it 
was not reasonable for the respondent to expect privacy when he 
left the top of the greenhouse partially open.  Id. at 450-51.  
Justice O'Connor's concurrence tempered Riley's plurality by 
emphasizing that the search was not permissible simply because 
the helicopter complied with FAA regulations or because any 
citizen could have conducted the same search.  Id. at 454-55 
(O'Connor, J., concurring).  Instead, Justice O'Connor suggested 
that "consistent with Katz, we must ask whether the helicopter 
was in the public airways at an altitude at which members of the 
public travel with sufficient regularity" to determine if the 
search was "one that society is prepared to recognize as 
'reasonable.'"  Id. at 454 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361). 
¶67 In 
accordance 
with 
Justice 
O'Connor's 
Riley 
concurrence, 
the 
Court 
later 
determined 
that 
it 
was 
presumptively unreasonable for the government to use technology 
that was not in general public use to conduct a warrantless 
search that would normally require a physical intrusion of the 
home subject to the search.  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
41 
 
27, 40 (2001).  In Kyllo, the government's use of thermal 
imaging to determine whether the defendant's house contained 
high-intensity lamps used to grow marijuana constituted a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 29, 40.  The Court concluded 
that because the government used a thermal imaging device not in 
general public use to see details inside a house that would 
normally 
require 
a 
physical 
intrusion, 
the 
warrantless 
surveillance was an improper search.  Id. at 40.  Kyllo 
demonstrates that surveillance aided by technology can rise to 
the level of an impermissible search even absent a physical 
intrusion. 
¶68 Because 
the 
concept 
of 
an 
objective 
reasonable 
expectation of privacy is elusive, this opinion makes no 
definitive pronouncement as to whether society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable an expectation of privacy in cell phone 
location data.  Given the widespread apprehension of government 
intrusion in citizens' electronic personal information, we 
cannot say that an expectation of privacy in cell phone location 
data is unreasonable even if it were true that the public is 
generally aware that cell phone tracking is possible.  On the 
other hand, cell phone location tracking might be better 
understood and more prevalent than, say, thermal imaging.  I 
need not decide the issue of an objective reasonable expectation 
of privacy on these facts to decide this case. 
D. Exigent Circumstances 
¶69 Irrespective of whether Subdiaz-Osorio had both a 
subjective and objective reasonable expectation of privacy in 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
42 
 
his cell phone location data, and irrespective of whether 
obtaining that data was a search without a warrant under the 
Fourth Amendment, I conclude that the tracking of Subdiaz-
Osorio's 
cell 
phone 
location 
fell 
within 
the 
exigent 
circumstances 
exception 
to 
the 
warrant 
requirement.  
Consequently, the search did not violate Subdiaz-Osorio's Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
¶70 Seeking and obtaining the defendant's cell phone 
location information is assumed to be a search in this opinion 
because of the privacy implications.  Under the exigent 
circumstances exception,32 a warrantless search does not violate 
a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights if: (1) the government can 
show that there is probable cause to believe that "evidence of a 
crime will be found"; and (2) there are exigent circumstances.  
Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 280, ¶¶17, 21 (citations omitted).  To 
establish probable cause for a search, the government must show 
that there is a "'fair probability' that contraband or evidence 
of a crime will be found in a particular place."  Id., ¶21 
(citation omitted). 
¶71 The probable cause standard also has been employed 
when there is "probable cause to believe that the evidence 
sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction for a 
particular offense."  State v. Henderson, 2001 WI 97, ¶19, 245 
                                                 
32 When the exigent circumstances exception applies, a 
citizen's privacy right "must give way to the compelling public 
interest in effective law enforcement."  State v. Robinson, 2010 
WI 80, ¶24, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463 (citations omitted). 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
43 
 
Wis. 2d 345, 629 N.W.2d 613 (quoting Dalia v. United States, 441 
U.S. 238, 255 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967).  This formulation 
may be a more suitable fit for searches of cell phone location 
information when the primary goal of the search is to obtain 
information to apprehend the suspect.33  "In regard to probable 
cause, the supreme court has stated that [the Court] deal[s] 
with probabilities.  These are not technical; they are the 
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, [must] act."  
State v. Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d 201, 215, 589 N.W.2d 387 (1999) 
(quoting State v. Wisumierski, 106 Wis. 2d 722, 739, 317 
N.W.2d 484 (1982)) (brackets in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
¶72 The court determines whether there was probable cause 
by an objective standard and asks whether the police acted 
reasonably.34  State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶26, 327 Wis. 2d 
302, 786 N.W.2d 463.  "The core requirement of probable cause 
                                                 
33 The new statute requiring a warrant to track cell phone 
location information requires "probable cause to believe the 
criminal activity has been, is, or will be in progress and that 
identifying or tracking the communications device will yield 
information relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation."  
Wis. Stat. § 968.373(3)(e) (2013-14). 
34 "In both an arrest warrant and a search warrant context, 
probable cause eschews technicality and legalisms in favor of a 
'flexible, 
common-sense 
measure 
of 
the 
plausibility 
of 
particular conclusions about human behavior.'"  State v. Kiper, 
193 Wis. 2d 69, 83, 532 N.W.2d 698 (1995) (quoting State v. 
Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 989, 471 N.W.2d 24 (1991)). 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
44 
 
serves to 'safeguard the privacy and security of individuals 
against arbitrary invasions by government officials.'"  State v. 
Kiper, 193 Wis. 2d 69, 81, 532 N.W.2d 698 (1995) (emphasis 
added) (quoting State v. DeSmidt, 155 Wis. 2d 119, 130, 454 
N.W.2d 780 (1990)).   
¶73 Exigent circumstances exist if, "measured against the 
time needed to obtain a warrant," and under the facts known at 
the time, it was objectively reasonable for law enforcement to 
conduct a warrantless search when: (1) law enforcement was 
engaged in a "hot pursuit"; (2) there was a threat to the safety 
of either the suspect or someone else; (3) there was a risk of 
destruction of evidence; or (4) the suspect was likely to flee.  
Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 280, ¶¶24-25 (citing State v. Smith, 131 
Wis. 2d 220, 229, 388 N.W.2d 601 (1986)).  The objective exigent 
circumstances test asks "whether a police officer, under the 
facts as they were known at the time, would reasonably believe 
that delay in procuring a search warrant would gravely endanger 
life, risk destruction of evidence, or greatly enhance the 
likelihood of the suspect's escape."  Id., ¶24 (citing Smith, 
131 Wis. 2d at 230).  The State has the burden to prove that 
exigent circumstances justified the search.  Ferguson, 317 
Wis. 2d 586, ¶20. 
¶74 Kenosha police had probable cause to conduct a search 
because there was a "fair probability" that evidence of the 
stabbing would be found at the location of Subdiaz-Osorio's cell 
phone.  Eyewitnesses had informed the police that Subdiaz-Osorio 
had fatally stabbed his brother less than 24 hours before the 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
45 
 
search and that he had admitted to the stabbing.  Subdiaz-Osorio 
was now missing but known to have borrowed an automobile.  The 
murder weapon had not been found.  Subdiaz-Osorio's cell phone 
had not been located.  There was a fair probability that if 
Subdiaz-Osorio had his phone, evidence would be found at that 
location. 
¶75 Of course, the police wanted to apprehend Subdiaz-
Osorio because of the accumulated evidence they had against him, 
but the police also had a hope and expectation that Subdiaz-
Osorio's apprehension would yield additional evidence of the 
crime.  This evidence included the defendant's clothing if he 
was wearing any of the same clothing he wore at the time of the 
stabbing, the murder weapon if he had not discarded his knives, 
and his cell phone if he made calls to additional people to whom 
he made admissions.  The defendant himself could yield DNA 
evidence and could make inculpatory statements when questioned.  
Any person accompanying Subdiaz-Osorio would likely have heard 
incriminating admissions.  For instance, the driver of the 
vehicle, Roberto, would surely be asked why he was driving 
Subdiaz-Osorio south.  Where were they going and why were they 
going there?  Did they avoid major highways at any point during 
the trip to avoid detection?  If so, why? 
¶76 Given that they had probable cause to track Subdiaz-
Osorio's cell phone, the Kenosha police arguably had their pick 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
46 
 
of three exigent circumstances.35  There was a threat to safety, 
risk of destruction of evidence, and a likelihood that Subdiaz-
Osorio would flee.36  The threat to safety and risk of 
destruction of evidence stem in part from the fact that no 
murder weapon was ever recovered after Subdiaz-Osorio killed his 
brother.  It was important to find Subdiaz-Osorio quickly to 
prevent him from destroying or disposing of his knives and 
clothes. 
¶77 Moreover, it would be difficult to say that a 
potentially armed individual who recently committed a homicide 
did not create a threat to safety.  Subdiaz-Osorio argues that 
stabbing his brother did not automatically support the inference 
that he was dangerous to others, but police do not have to have 
conclusive proof that a suspect is likely to harm someone in 
                                                 
35 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.373(8)(a)2. (2013-14) provides an 
exception to the warrant requirement based on exigency if "[a]n 
emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury 
to any person exists and identifying or tracking the location of 
the communications device is relevant to preventing the death or 
injury or to mitigating the injury." 
36 "Hot pursuit" is not at issue in this case because a "hot 
pursuit" occurs "where there is an immediate or continuous 
pursuit of [a suspect] from the scene of a crime."  State v. 
Richter, 2000 WI 58, ¶32, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29 
(brackets in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The pursuit of Subdiaz-Osorio was not immediate 
or continuous. 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
47 
 
order to satisfy the exigent circumstances exception.  Richter, 
235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶40.37   
¶78 Richter demonstrates that reasonableness is at the 
center of the exigent circumstances analysis, and in the present 
case, it was reasonable for the Kenosha police to believe that a 
potentially armed homicide suspect created an exigent threat to 
the safety of others.  See id. ("[P]ursuit of a suspect known to 
be armed and dangerous would establish exigent circumstances 
implicating a threat to physical safety.").  Though it is not 
necessarily required, the police had evidence that Subdiaz-
Osorio was armed and dangerous because he had just committed a 
homicide, and it was likely that he still had the murder weapon.  
In fact, Subdiaz-Osorio told Liborio that he did not want to be 
arrested, which could lead a reasonable law enforcement officer 
to infer Subdiaz-Osorio might become violent if confronted.  The 
Kenosha police had no way of knowing how desperate Subdiaz-
Osorio might become to avoid apprehension, or to obtain money or 
                                                 
37 Richter involved a situation in which an eyewitness told 
police that a burglar fled from her trailer and went into a 
trailer across the street.  Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶1.  This 
court determined that even though there was no information to 
suggest that the burglar was armed or had violent tendencies, 
the officer could reasonably believe that there was a threat to 
safety and could conduct a warrantless search of the trailer 
based on exigent circumstances.  Id., ¶¶40-41.  A requirement 
that law enforcement "have affirmative evidence of the presence 
of firearms or known violent tendencies on the part of the 
suspect before acting to protect the safety of others is 
arbitrary and unrealistic and unreasonably handicaps the officer 
in the performance of one of his core responsibilities."  Id., 
¶40. 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
48 
 
shelter to facilitate escape.  They did know that this was an 
individual who was dangerous enough to stab someone in the head, 
and they could reasonably believe that the delay in getting a 
warrant would seriously endanger life.  Therefore, it was proper 
for them to conduct a warrantless search to find Subdiaz-Osorio 
as quickly as possible. 
¶79 In addition, the police reasonably could have believed 
that the likelihood that Subdiaz-Osorio would flee created an 
exigent circumstance.  The exigent circumstance exception for a 
fleeing suspect exists if getting a warrant would "greatly 
enhance the likelihood of the suspect's escape."  Hughes, 233 
Wis. 2d 280, ¶24 (citation omitted).  Subdiaz-Osorio was in the 
country illegally, had just committed a grisly murder, and the 
police determined that his family in Illinois had not heard from 
him.  The police knew that he was from Mexico and had family 
there.38  They knew that he had borrowed his girlfriend's car and 
had warned Liborio that he did not want to be arrested.  
Therefore, there was a strong inference that he would try to 
                                                 
38 This case calls to mind the situation in State v. Ndina, 
2009 WI 21, ¶¶99-102, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 (Prosser, 
J., concurring), in which the defendant booked a flight back to 
his home country of Albania after stabbing a relative in the 
neck.  An arrest warrant was obtained, and authorities tried to 
act quickly before the defendant could fly back to Albania.  
Even though he spoke almost no English, Ndina evaded capture in 
the United States and was not apprehended in Albania until 
several months later.  Id., ¶¶101-02.  The warrant in Ndina was 
for an arrest, not a search, but that case illustrates how 
precious time can be when authorities are trying to capture a 
fleeing suspect. 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
49 
 
flee, and time was of the essence to find him before he left the 
country.   
¶80 It is not clear from the record exactly when Subdiaz-
Osorio left Kenosha.  Clearly, it was before 10 a.m. on February 
8, 2009, because the police began to interview Estella by 10 
a.m.  It was probably before 9:27 a.m. because three of Subdiaz-
Osorio's acquaintances went to the Kenosha Safety Building at 
9:27 a.m.  Kenosha County borders the State of Illinois so that 
Subdiaz-Osorio would likely have been in Illinois in less than 
15 minutes after he left Estella.  He probably would have been 
able to be in Chicago in less than an hour and a half.  Chicago 
provides multiple forms of transportation out of the area 
besides automobile——airplanes, trains, buses.  Chicago also 
provided the opportunity to buy or rent a different vehicle and 
buy a different cell phone, perhaps a prepaid cell phone.  All 
this is predicated on Subdiaz-Osorio traveling south rather than 
north or west.  The police could only speculate as to his plans 
or his route. 
¶81 By the time he was arrested at 6:11 p.m. on February 
8, Subdiaz-Osorio was in Arkansas, which meant that he had 
traveled a significant distance since he left that morning.  The 
police could not have known what method of transportation he 
would use as he attempted to escape or how quickly he would be 
able to leave the country if that were his goal.  Because time 
was crucial to apprehend a fleeing suspect, the Kenosha police 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
50 
 
acted properly in the face of exigent circumstances and could 
not delay to secure an additional warrant.39 
E. Constitutional Protections Against Self-Incrimination 
¶82 In addition to his Fourth Amendment claims, Subdiaz-
Osorio argues that Kenosha police violated his Fifth Amendment 
rights when they continued to question him after he asked about 
how he could get an attorney.  I conclude that Subdiaz-Osorio's 
question about obtaining an attorney was equivocal, and Officer 
Torres did not violate Subdiaz-Osorio's Fifth Amendment rights 
by continuing to question him.   
¶83 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
reads in part: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of 
life, 
liberty, 
or 
property, 
without 
due 
process 
of 
law . . . ."40  U.S. Const. amend. V.  The Fifth Amendment is the 
source of the so-called Miranda warnings, which advise a 
                                                 
39 The events in this case occurred on February 7 and 8, 
2009, in Kenosha.  The events in Tate occurred on June 9, 2009, 
in Milwaukee.  This case represents the earliest reported case 
of cell phone location tracking in Wisconsin. 
40 Similar to the United States Constitution, the Wisconsin 
Constitution provides, "No person may be held to answer for a 
criminal offense without due process of law, and no person for 
the same offense may be put twice in jeopardy of punishment, nor 
may be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself or herself."  Wis. Const. art I, § 8(1).  The Wisconsin 
Constitution has been interpreted to offer the same protection 
as the United States Constitution's Fifth Amendment when it 
comes to invoking the right to counsel in a custodial 
interrogation.  State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶¶41-42, 252 
Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142. 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
51 
 
defendant that he has a right to an attorney, as a means to 
safeguard his right to remain silent.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966). 
¶84 Having been advised of his right to an attorney and 
his right to remain silent, a suspect in custody must clearly 
invoke those rights.  "[A]fter a knowing and voluntary waiver of 
the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue 
questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an 
attorney."  Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994).  
"If a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous 
or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the 
circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might 
be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require 
the cessation of questioning."  Jennings, 252 Wis. 2d 228, ¶29 
(quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 459).  The suspect "must articulate 
his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a 
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand 
the statement to be a request for an attorney."  Id., ¶30 
(quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 459). 
¶85 In Davis, the Supreme Court determined that when the 
suspect said, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer," it was not an 
unequivocal request for counsel.  Davis, 512 U.S. at 462.  This 
court 
followed 
Davis 
in 
Jennings 
and 
decided 
that 
the 
defendant's statement, "I think maybe I need to talk to a 
lawyer," was not clear enough to invoke the right to counsel, 
and the interrogating officers did not have to cease questioning 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
52 
 
or attempt to clarify what the suspect meant.  Jennings, 252 
Wis. 2d 228, ¶44. 
¶86 In the present case, Subdiaz-Osorio said, "How can I 
do to get an attorney here because I don't have enough to afford 
for one."  The interview took place in Spanish (so that what we 
have before us is a translation at the suppression hearing), but 
it appears as though Subdiaz-Osorio was asking about the process 
of obtaining an attorney rather than asking for counsel to be 
present during the interview. 
¶87 The context in which Subdiaz-Osorio's question arose 
is important and a vital element in the totality of the 
circumstances. 
 
Officer 
Torres 
had 
just 
explained 
the 
extradition process to Subdiaz-Osorio and told him that he would 
have to appear before a judge in Arkansas before a decision on 
whether he would return to Wisconsin.  It was reasonable for 
Officer Torres to assume Subdiaz-Osorio was asking about how he 
could get an attorney for his extradition hearing, especially 
since Subdiaz-Osorio continued to answer questions and remained 
cooperative for the rest of the interview.  In addition, prior 
to sitting down for the interview, Subdiaz-Osorio signed a 
waiver of rights form, which Officer Torres had read to him in 
Spanish.  Our case law is clear that it is not enough for a 
suspect to say something that the interviewer might interpret as 
an invocation of the right to counsel.  Id., ¶29.  The 
invocation of that right must be unequivocal.  In this case it 
was not. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
No. 
  2010AP3016-CR 
 
53 
 
¶88 Although the court is divided on the rationale for an 
affirmance, the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶89 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the dissent that the tracking of a cell phone constitutes a 
search in the context of the Fourth Amendment and that the 
warrantless 
search 
here 
was 
not 
justified 
by 
exigent 
circumstances.  Dissent, parts I-V.  Likewise, I agree that 
Subdiaz-Osorio's statement was sufficient to invoke his right to 
counsel.  Dissent, part VI. 
¶90 However, I part ways with the dissent because, like 
the court of appeals, I conclude that the circuit court's errors 
in denying the defendant's suppression motion were harmless.  
There is no reasonable probability that the circuit court's 
failure to grant the suppression motion contributed to the 
conviction.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur in the mandate 
of the lead opinion. 
I 
¶91 The facts in this case are for the most part 
uncontested.  After a night of drinking the defendant, Subdiaz-
Osorio, and his brother, Ojeda-Rodriguez, got into an argument 
in front of a guest, Mintz, at their trailer.  The argument 
escalated and after his brother punched him, the defendant 
retrieved a knife and stabbed his brother in the eye.  Then, 
after the brother fell down, the defendant began kicking and 
punching him in the face.  After Mintz pushed Subdiaz-Osorio 
away from his brother, Subdiaz-Osorio left the room.   
¶92 Subdiaz-Osorio asked his roommate, Martinez, for help 
bandaging Ojeda-Rodriguez.  Martinez wanted to call the police, 
but Subdiaz-Osorio refused and threatened to stab Martinez if he 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
did.  Martinez telephoned Carreno-Lugo asking for assistance 
taking care of Ojeda-Rodriguez.  Upon arriving she bandaged him, 
then she and the defendant went back to her trailer and went to 
bed.  The next morning Martinez found the brother dead.  After 
telling the defendant that his brother was dead and that 
Martinez was calling the police, Subdiaz-Osorio left. 
¶93 Police 
arrived 
and 
found 
Ojeda-Rodriguez's 
badly 
beaten body.  When they interviewed Carreno-Lugo, she told them 
that the defendant asked for help because he had stabbed his 
brother.  He spent the night at her trailer, and after learning 
his brother was dead, he told her that he had to leave.  
Careeno-Lugo allowed the defendant to take her car.  She told 
police 
that 
he 
had 
family 
in 
Illinois 
and 
Mexico 
and 
acknowledged that he might be headed to Mexico. 
¶94 After tracking his cell phone, the police located 
Subdaiz-Osorio in Arkansas.  They took trace evidence from him, 
including DNA.  The next day, after officers read the defendant 
his Miranda1 rights, he signed a waiver of rights form and agreed 
to speak without an attorney present.  During the interview, the 
defendant asked if he would be taken back to Kenosha.  The 
officer informed him that he would first have to appear before a 
judge in Arkansas who would make that determination.  At that 
point the defendant asked "How can I do [sic] to get an attorney 
here because I don't have enough to afford one?"  The officer 
told him that Arkansas would appoint him a lawyer for the 
hearing, and continued the interview.  At one point during the 
                                                 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
interview, the defendant gave a version of the stabbing, 
indicating that his brother brought the knife into the room.   
¶95 A few weeks later, after the defendant was read his 
Miranda rights again and signed another waiver of rights form, 
Subdiaz-Osorio recounted the events of the evening, again 
indicating that his brother brought the knife.  When the officer 
interviewing the defendant told him that his version of the 
events conflicted with Mintz's version, the defendant admitted 
that he had retrieved the knife.   
¶96 Subdiaz-Osorio 
was 
charged 
with 
first-degree 
intentional homicide.  After his suppression motion was denied, 
Subdiaz-Osorio accepted a plea bargain and pled to a reduced 
charge of first-degree reckless homicide by use of a deadly 
weapon.  Subdiaz-Osorio now argues that the circuit court erred 
in failing to suppress the DNA evidence, the location of his 
apprehension, and his statement in the interview that his 
brother brought the knife into the room.  
II 
¶97 In assessing whether a trial error is harmless, we 
focus on the effect of the error on the jury's verdict.  State 
v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶29, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485.  We 
have described the test as "whether it appears beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute 
to the verdict obtained."  Id. (quoting State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 
93, ¶44, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189, quoting in turn Neder 
v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1999)).  To make that 
determination, "a court must be able to conclude 'beyond a 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the 
defendant guilty absent the error.'"  Id. (quoting Harvey, 254 
Wis. 2d 442, ¶48 n.14).  
¶98 However, in a guilty plea situation following the 
denial of a motion to suppress, the test for harmless error on 
appeal is whether there is a reasonable probability that the 
erroneous admission of the disputed evidence contributed to the 
conviction.  State v. Semrau, 2000 WI App 54, ¶21, 233 Wis. 2d 
508, 608 N.W.2d 376; State v. Sturgeon, 231 Wis. 2d 487, 503-04, 
605 N.W.2d 589 (Ct. App. 1999).  As part of this inquiry, the 
court considers:  
(1) the relative strength and weakness of the State's 
case and the defendant's case; (2) the persuasiveness 
of the evidence in dispute; (3) the reasons, if any, 
expressed by the defendant for choosing to plead 
guilty; (4) the benefits obtained by the defendant in 
exchange for the plea; and (5) the thoroughness of the 
plea colloquy.   
Semrau, 233 Wis. 2d 508, ¶22. 
¶99 As an initial matter, neither the court of appeals nor 
the State addressed Subdiaz-Osorio's arguments relating to the 
DNA evidence.  It is unclear if he previously raised this as 
evidence he wanted suppressed.  In any event, the DNA evidence 
is not necessary to link him to the crime scene.  Subdiaz-Osorio 
admitted to stabbing his brother and that his asserted defenses 
were that he acted in self-defense and did not act with utter 
disregard for human life.  Thus, I conclude it is not reasonably 
probable that this evidence contributed to the conviction.  
¶100 The second piece of evidence Subdiaz-Osorio believes 
should have been suppressed was the fact that he was located in 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
Arkansas.  This court has previously determined that evidence of 
flight has probative value as it tends to show consciousness of 
guilt.  Wangerin v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 427, 437, 243 N.W.2d 448 
(1976).  In this case, however, even without the evidence that 
the defendant was found in Arkansas, there was strong evidence 
against him, including an eyewitness to the stabbing, and other 
witnesses he spoke with after seeking help.  See State v. 
Quiroz, 2009 WI App 120, ¶28, 320 Wis. 2d 706, 772 N.W.2d 710 
(admission of flight evidence harmless error where evidence of 
guilt was overwhelming).   
¶101 To the extent that Subdiaz-Osorio's arrest location 
indicates flight, it was cumulative of other evidence.  As the 
State asserts, the statements from Carreno-Lugo that Subdiaz-
Osorio took her car and was possibly going to Mexico or 
Illinois, together with his absence from his home, could have 
independently established that he fled.   
¶102 It is also notable that Subdiaz-Osorio received a 
reduced charge in exchange for his guilty plea.  The charge of 
intentional homicide, which is a class A felony with a maximum 
sentence 
of 
life 
imprisonment, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 
946.01(a), 
939.50(3)(a), was reduced to a charge of reckless homicide, 
which is a class B felony with a maximum sentence of 65 years 
imprisonment, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 940.02(1), 
939.50(3)(b), 
939.63(1)(b). 
¶103 Because Subdiaz-Osorio accepted a reduced plea, in the 
face of strong evidence against him, including eyewitness 
testimony and his own confession, I conclude it is not 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
reasonably probable that the circuit court's failure to suppress 
the location information contributed to the conviction.  
¶104 I turn next to the third piece of evidence Subdiaz-
Osorio sought to suppress: his initial statement to officers 
that his brother brought the knife into the room.  The harmless 
error analysis also applies here.  State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 
2d 331, 368-370, 588 N.W.2d 606 (1999) (concluding that the 
admission of evidence obtained in violation of Miranda was 
harmless error); State v. Harris, 199 Wis. 2d 227, 263, 544 
N.W.2d 545 (1996) (determining that it was harmless error for 
the court to admit the fruits of a Miranda violation); State v. 
Rockette, 2005 WI App 205, ¶33, 287 Wis. 2d 257, 704 N.W.2d 382 
(determining that regardless of whether a Miranda violation 
occurred, the error was harmless as the defendant would still 
have accepted the State's plea deal). 
¶105 As with the DNA evidence and the location evidence, 
the denial of Subdiaz-Osorio's suppression motion with respect 
to his statement about his brother bringing the knife to the 
room is also harmless error.  As discussed above, the State had 
a strong case against Subdiaz-Osorio, there was an eyewitness 
who could testify about who brought the knives, and Subdiaz-
Osorio confessed.  In exchange for his guilty plea, he received 
a reduced charge.  Accordingly, I conclude that it is not 
reasonably probable that the circuit court's failure to suppress 
Subdiaz-Osorio's statements contributed to the conviction. 
¶106 In sum, although I determine that the circuit court 
erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress, I conclude 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
that the circuit court's errors were harmless.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully concur in the mandate of the lead opinion. 
 
 
 
2010AP3016-CR.npc 
 
1 
 
 
¶107 N. 
PATRICK 
CROOKS, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
In 
the 
consolidated cases of Riley v. California and United States v. 
Wurie, the United States Supreme Court recently recognized that 
"[m]odern cell phones are not just another technological 
convenience.  With all they contain and all they may reveal, 
they hold for many Americans 'the privacies of life.'"1  By 
generally requiring a warrant before a cell phone search 
following an arrest, the Supreme Court unanimously took a 
definitive approach, which it stated in simple terms: "Our 
answer to the question of what police must do before searching a 
cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—
get a warrant."2 
¶108 Our decision in State v. Carroll,3 a cell phone case, 
is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Riley/Wurie.  In Carroll, we held that an officer was not 
justified in searching through images stored on a suspect's cell 
phone absent a warrant.4  We reasoned that the images stored on 
the cell phone were "not in immediate danger of disappearing 
before [the officer] could obtain a warrant."5  Like Riley/Wurie, 
                                                 
1 Riley v. California, Nos. 13-132, 13-212, slip op., at *20 
(U.S. June 25, 2014) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616, 630 (1886)).  I will refer to the two consolidated cases as 
Riley/Wurie. 
2 Id. 
3 State v. Carroll, 2010 WI 8, 322 Wis. 2d 299, 778 N.W.2d 
1. 
4 See id., ¶33. 
5 Id. 
2010AP3016-CR.npc 
 
2 
 
our decision in Carroll demonstrates a definitive approach, 
requiring a warrant to search the contents of a cell phone. 
¶109 The holdings of the United States Supreme Court in the 
Riley/Wurie cases and of this court in Carroll lead me to the 
conclusion that, absent case-specific exceptions, such as an 
emergency, a warrant is required for the search of a cell 
phone's location.  Therefore, I cannot join the lead opinion.  I 
write 
separately 
to 
express 
my 
concern 
with 
the 
broad 
pronouncements of the lead opinion, especially given that Fourth 
Amendment cell phone jurisprudence, cell phone technology, and 
related legislation are all rapidly evolving.  However, for the 
reasons explained below, I would apply a good faith exception 
consistent with the rationale of State v. Eason6 and would 
decline to apply the exclusionary rule here.  I agree that the 
location evidence obtained from Subdiaz-Osorio's cell phone 
provider should not be suppressed.  In addition, I agree that 
Subdiaz-Osorio did not unequivocally invoke his right to 
counsel.  Therefore, I respectfully concur with the mandate of 
the lead opinion. 
I. 
 
¶110 The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
                                                 
6 State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 
625. 
2010AP3016-CR.npc 
 
3 
 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.7 
¶111 "As the text makes clear, 'the ultimate touchstone of 
the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.'"8  The United States 
Supreme Court has also "determined that '[w]here a search is 
undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of 
criminal wrongdoing, . . . reasonableness generally requires the 
obtaining of a judicial warrant.'"9 
¶112 In general, law enforcement should be required to 
obtain a warrant to search the contents of a cell phone incident 
to arrest and to obtain location information from a cell phone 
provider.10  In addressing the facts of the Wurie case, for 
example, 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
held 
that 
law 
enforcement was required to obtain a warrant to search a cell 
phone for information as to the location of the arrestee's 
                                                 
7 U.S. Const. amend IV. In similar language, the Wisconsin 
Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 11. 
8 Riley v. California, Nos. 13-132, 13-212, slip op. at *6 
(U.S. June 25, 2014) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 
398, 403 (2006)). 
9 Id. (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 
646, 653 (1995)). 
10 See id.; see also Carroll, 322 Wis. 2d 299. 
2010AP3016-CR.npc 
 
4 
 
apartment.11  I see a definite connection between the location 
information obtained in Wurie and the location information 
obtained in this case.  As the United States Supreme Court 
explained,   
Data on a cell phone can also reveal where a person 
has been. Historic location information is a standard 
feature on many smart phones and can reconstruct 
someone's specific movements down to the minute, not 
only 
around 
town 
but 
also 
within 
a 
particular 
building.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. __, __ 
(2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (slip op., at 3) 
("GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive 
record of a person's public movements that reflects a 
wealth of detail about her familial, political, 
professional, religious and sexual associations.").12 
The United States Supreme Court recognized that there is a 
balancing of interests required when determining whether there 
should be a definitive rule or some exceptions permitted: 
Absent more precise guidance from the founding era, we 
generally determine whether to exempt a given type of 
search from the warrant requirement "by assessing, on 
the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an 
individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to 
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests." Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 
295, 300 (1999).13 
¶113 Therefore, I would hold that law enforcement should 
obtain 
a 
warrant 
before 
obtaining 
cell 
phone 
location 
information from providers.   
                                                 
11 Riley v. California, Nos. 13-132, 13-212, slip op. at *5, 
9 (U.S. June 25, 2014).  
12 Id. at *19. 
13 Id. at *9. 
2010AP3016-CR.npc 
 
5 
 
¶114 I am persuaded that the definitive approach of 
requiring a warrant for cell phone searches and cell phone 
location data is appropriate.  I recognize that before the 
Riley/Wurie decisions, other jurisdictions that have considered 
cases involving cell phone location data have come to differing 
conclusions concerning a warrant requirement.14   
¶115 Furthermore, 
a 
general 
warrant 
requirement 
is 
preferable considering the rapid evolution of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence and related legislation in the area of cell phone 
                                                 
14 See Adam Koppel, Note, Warranting A Warrant: Fourth 
Amendment Concerns Raised by Law Enforcement's Warrantless Use 
of GPS and Cellular Phone Tracking, 64 U. Miami L. Rev. 1061, 
1079 (2010).  Compare In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the 
Release of Prospective Cell Site Info., 407 F. Supp. 2d 134, 135 
(D.D.C. 2006) (holding that the government must demonstrate 
probable cause in order to obtain cell site tracking information 
due to Fourth Amendment privacy concerns), and In re Application 
of the U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen 
Register & a Trap & Trace Device, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 295 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding same), and In re Application of U.S. 
for an Order Authorizing Installation & Use of a Pen Register & 
a Caller Identification Sys. on Tel. Nos. (Sealed), 402 F. Supp. 
2d 597, 598 (D. Md. 2005) (holding same), and In re Application 
for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location 
Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 757 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding same), 
with In re U.S. for an Order, 433 F. Supp. 2d 804, 806 (S.D. 
Tex. 2006) (holding that probable cause was not required for 
cell site location information), and In re Application of U.S. 
For an Order, 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 680 (W.D. La. 2006) (holding 
same), and In re Application of U.S. for an Order for 
Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 
460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding same), and In 
re Application of U.S. for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomms. 
Records & Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace, 
405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding same). 
  
2010AP3016-CR.npc 
 
6 
 
and 
other 
location 
tracking 
technology.15 
 
Justice 
Alito 
recognized this very principle when he concurred in part and 
concurred in the judgment in Riley/Wurie, where he stated: 
In light of these developments, it would be very 
unfortunate if privacy protection in the 21st century 
were left primarily to the federal courts using the 
blunt 
instrument 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment. 
Legislatures, elected by the people, are in a better 
position than we are to assess and respond to the 
changes that have already occurred and those that 
almost certainly will take place in the future.16 
 
¶116 It is noteworthy that the Wisconsin Legislature has 
quite recently enacted17 Wis. Stat. § 968.373, which generally 
requires law enforcement to obtain a warrant before "track[ing] 
the location of a communications device."18  This statute, 
however, 
provides 
an 
exception 
to 
the 
general 
warrant 
                                                 
15 In addition to Riley, the United States Supreme Court has 
also recently considered questions arising under the Fourth 
Amendment as they relate to location tracking technology.  
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) 
(holding that a GPS device placed on an automobile to record the 
vehicle's location constituted a search under the Fourth 
Amendment).  
16 Riley v. California, Nos. 13-132, 13-212, slip op. at *22 
(U.S. June 25, 2014). 
17 At the time the police obtained the location information 
at issue here, our case law was not clear as to the need for a 
warrant, nor were the statutes clear as to the procedures 
necessary to obtain a warrant, as those procedures are spelled 
out in the recently enacted provision (Wis. Stat. § 968.373(2)).  
See Dissent, ¶ ___ n.32; State v. Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶___ n.33, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
18 Wis. Stat. § 968.373(2) (2011-12) (Effective April 25, 
2014). 
2010AP3016-CR.npc 
 
7 
 
requirement if "[t]he customer or subscriber provides consent 
for the action" or if "[a]n emergency involving the danger of 
death or serious physical injury to any person exists and 
identifying or tracking the location of the communications 
device is relevant to preventing the death or injury or to 
mitigating the injury."19  Furthermore, Wis. Stat. §968.373(8)(b) 
provides guidance to cell phone providers faced with law 
enforcement requests for location data absent a warrant.20  In 
the fast developing area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and 
emerging 
technology, 
I 
would 
generally 
require 
that 
law 
enforcement obtain a warrant to obtain cell phone location data. 
¶117 There is no indication that law enforcement lacked the 
necessary time to obtain a warrant to access Subdiaz-Osorio's 
cell phone location through information disclosed by his cell 
phone provider.  Furthermore, nothing suggests that a delay in 
obtaining a warrant would have hindered law enforcement efforts.  
Based on the record in this case, law enforcement could have and 
                                                 
19 Wis. Stat. § 968.373(8)(a). 
20 Wis. Stat. § 968.373(8)(b) (instructing providers to 
disclose information to law enforcement in situations where 
customers have provided consent or when the provider has a good 
faith belief that such information is necessary to prevent death 
or serious injury). 
2010AP3016-CR.npc 
 
8 
 
should have obtained a warrant in time to access the requested 
cell phone location data and apprehend the defendant.21 
II 
¶118 Despite my view that usually law enforcement must 
obtain a warrant before obtaining a cell phone location, I would 
not exclude the location evidence in this case even though law 
enforcement did not first obtain a warrant.  However, I do not 
agree with the lead opinion's conclusion that the warrantless 
search was justified on the grounds of probable cause and 
exigent circumstances.  Instead, I would apply a good faith 
exception in this case to conclude that Subdiaz-Osorio's Fourth 
Amendment rights were not violated. 
¶119 As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit stated:  
[W]e now hold that evidence is not to be suppressed 
under the exclusionary rule where it is discovered by 
officers in the course of actions that are taken in 
good faith and in the reasonable, though mistaken, 
belief that they are authorized. We do so because the 
exclusionary rule exists to deter willful or flagrant 
actions by police, not reasonable, good-faith ones. 
Where the reason for the rule ceases, its application 
must cease also.22 
 
                                                 
21 I agree with Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent that 
there was sufficient time and information for the police to get 
a warrant. 
22 United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 
1980). 
 
2010AP3016-CR.npc 
 
9 
 
¶120 The United States Supreme Court in United States v. 
Leon23 recognized the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule in the context of a search based on a subsequently 
invalidated warrant.  However, as a treatise writer has 
recognized, Leon's sweeping language supports the extension of 
the good faith exception beyond the warrant situation to non-
warrant cases where a police officer's conduct is objectively 
reasonable: 
Although the holding in both Sheppard and Leon is 
limited to with-warrant cases, the possibility that 
these decisions will serve as stepping stones to a 
more comprehensive good faith exception to the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule cannot be discounted. 
Certainly the author of those two decisions, Justice 
White, was prepared to go farther, as he clearly 
indicated prior to and contemporaneously with the 
rulings in those two cases, and some current members 
of the Court may be equally prepared to take such a 
step. If they are, much of the reasoning in Leon will 
offer support for such an extension of that case 
beyond 
the 
with-warrant 
situation. 
Particularly 
noteworthy is the Leon majority's broad assertion that 
whenever the police officer's conduct was objectively 
reasonable the deterrence function of the exclusionary 
rule is not served and that "when law enforcement 
officers have acted in objective good faith or their 
transgressions have been minor, the magnitude of the 
benefit conferred on such guilty defendants offends 
basic concepts of the criminal justice system."24  
                                                 
23 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 (1984). 
24 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.3(f), at 128 
(5th ed. 2012) (citations omitted).  See also Wesley MacNeil 
Oliver, Toward A Better Categorical Balance of the Costs and 
Benefits of the Exclusionary Rule, 9 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 201, 
270-71 (2005) (advocating a broader application of the good 
faith exception to cases involving serious crimes wherein the 
police officers involved reasonably believed probable cause 
existed for the search or seizure) 
2010AP3016-CR.npc 
 
10 
 
 
¶121 The good faith exception does not contravene the 
purpose of the exclusionary rule.  “When there has been an 
unlawful search, a common judicial remedy for the constitutional 
error is exclusion."25  Specifically, "[t]he exclusionary rule 
bars evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure from a 
criminal proceeding against the victim of the constitutional 
violation."26  That the exclusionary rule is a judicially created 
remedy, not a right, is significant; "its application is 
restricted to cases where its remedial objectives will best be 
served."27  
¶122 Thus, a court considering whether to apply the 
exclusionary rule must bear in mind the primary purpose of the 
rule: deterring police misconduct.28   "[M]arginal deterrence is 
not enough to justify exclusion; 'the benefits of deterrence 
must outweigh the costs.'"29  In employing this type of 
cost/benefit analysis to the facts of a particular case, a court 
should recognize the "substantial social costs exacted by the 
                                                 
25 State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ¶15, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 
N.W.2d 97. 
26 State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶46, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 
N.W.2d 517 (citing Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987)). 
27 Dearborn, 327 Wis. 2d 252, ¶35 (citing Herring v. United 
States, 555 U.S. 135, 129 S.Ct 695, 700 (2009)). 
28 Id., ¶41 (citing Krull, 480 U.S. at 347). 
29 Id., ¶35 (citing Herring, 129 S.Ct at 700). 
2010AP3016-CR.npc 
 
11 
 
exclusionary rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights 
. . . ."30  The social costs of deterrence are particularly high 
where "law enforcement officers have acted in objective good 
faith or their transgressions have been minor" because “the 
magnitude of the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants 
offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system.”31   
¶123 The exclusionary rule is based on a desire to deter 
law enforcement from violating the constitutional right of a 
citizen to be free from illegal searches and seizures.  "Where 
the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, 
the deterrence rationale loses much of its force."32  On that 
basis, we have refused to apply the exclusionary rule where it 
would otherwise apply where officers proceeded consistent with 
"law that was controlling at the time of the search,"33 and where 
police reasonably relied on a subsequently invalidated search 
warrant.34  We stated specifically, "[T]he laudable purpose of the 
exclusionary rule——deterring police from making illegal searches 
                                                 
30 Id. at 907. 
31 Id. at 907-908. 
32 State v. Gums, 69 Wis.2d 513, 517, 230 N.W.2d 813 (1975) 
(quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447) (1979).   
33 State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶3, 231 Wis.2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 
517. 
34 Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶2. 
2010AP3016-CR.npc 
 
12 
 
and 
seizures——would 
not 
be 
furthered 
by 
applying 
the 
exclusionary rule."35   
¶124 That is a guiding principle in the application of the 
exclusionary rule.  We have, consistent with the United States 
Supreme Court, stressed that "just because a Fourth Amendment 
violation has occurred does not mean the exclusionary rule 
applies. . . . The application of the exclusionary rule should 
focus on its efficacy in deterring future Fourth Amendment 
violations.  Moreover . . . 'the benefits of deterrence must 
outweigh the costs.'"36  Citing to Eason, Dearborn made clear 
that in those circumstances where "the exclusionary rule cannot 
deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity, . . . it 
should not apply . . . ."37  Many courts have endorsed this 
approach and have declined to apply the exclusionary rule in a 
rigid manner where law enforcement acted reasonably.38 
                                                 
35 Id. 
36 Dearborn, 327 Wis. 2d 252, ¶35 (citations omitted) 
(citing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 129 S.Ct 695, 
700 (2009). 
37 Id., ¶37. 
38 See State v. Coats, 797 P.2d 693, 696 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1990) 
(discussing 
Ariz. 
Rev. 
Stat. 
§ 
13-3925, 
Arizona's 
statutory good-faith exception); Toland v. State, 688 S.W.2d 718 
(Ark. 1985); Matter of M.R.D., 482 N.E.2d 306, 310 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1985); State v. Sweeney, 701 S.W.2d 420, 426 (Mo. 1985); 
State v. Welch, 342 S.E.2d 789, 795 (N.C. 1986); State v. 
Gronlund, 356 N.W.2d 144, 146-47 (N.D. 1984); McCary v. 
Commonwealth, 321 S.E.2d 637, 644 (Va. 1984). 
2010AP3016-CR.npc 
 
13 
 
¶125 I agree with that approach, and, based on the record 
here,  this case falls within the category of cases to which the 
exclusionary rule should not apply because no deterrent purpose 
would be served by requiring the exclusion of the cell phone 
location evidence at issue.  
¶126 Here police were investigating a murder, and, after 
pursuing 
other 
investigative 
leads, 
police 
contacted 
the 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Justice, 
Division 
of 
Criminal 
Investigation 
(DCI), 
and 
asked 
DCI 
to 
request 
location 
information 
from 
Subdiaz-Osorio's 
cell 
phone 
provider.  
Proceeding according to the requirements of the cell phone 
provider, and pursuant to the terms of its user agreement, DCI 
filled out and submitted to the cell phone provider a "Mandatory 
Information for Exigent Circumstances Requests" form.  There is 
no evidence or allegation of police misconduct in this case.   
¶127 What occurred here is certainly similar to what we 
required in structuring the good faith exception:  
We hold that where police officers act in objectively 
reasonable reliance upon the warrant, which had been 
issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, a good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. We 
further hold that in order for a good faith exception 
to apply, the burden is upon the State to show that 
the process used in obtaining the search warrant 
included a significant investigation and a review by 
either a police officer trained and knowledgeable in 
the requirements of probable cause and reasonable 
suspicion, or a knowledgeable government attorney. We 
also hold that this process is required by Article I, 
Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, in addition 
to those protections afforded by the good faith 
2010AP3016-CR.npc 
 
14 
 
exception as recognized by the United States Supreme 
Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).39 
Parallel to our reasoning in Eason, there was a "significant 
investigation" underway into the murder of Subdiaz-Osorio's 
brother, including multiple interviews with witnesses and a 
search warrant executed at his home.  Furthermore, as part of 
the investigation, law enforcement consulted with the Department 
of 
Justice, 
an 
outside 
entity 
certainly 
"trained 
and 
knowledgeable" in these matters, whose staff then requested the 
cell phone location data.  These steps were of a similar nature 
to the steps outlined in Eason.    
¶128 Searches involving cell phone data represent a rapidly 
evolving area of law where it is appropriate to recognize law 
enforcement's good faith efforts to conduct investigations 
consistent with constitutional restrictions.  There is no 
allegation that there was clearly established law that police 
disregarded in the course of the investigation in this case.  
The actions of the police here show that the officers were 
acting in good faith, and, therefore, a good faith exception to 
the warrant requirement is appropriate here.  
¶129 For the reasons stated, I respectfully concur with the 
mandate of the lead opinion but write separately. 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶74. 
 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶130 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring).   I agree 
with the lead opinion's conclusions that law enforcement acted 
reasonably 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
due 
to 
exigent 
circumstances and that Subdiaz-Osorio failed to unequivocally 
invoke his right to counsel.  I write in concurrence, however, 
because I cannot endorse the lead opinion's discussion of 
whether a search occurred.1   
¶131 The lead opinion says that it does not decide whether 
law enforcement's activities constituted a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.2  It does so in order "to avoid 
delivering a broad pronouncement about reasonable expectations 
of 
privacy 
in 
the 
rapidly 
developing 
field 
of 
wireless 
technology."3  While I wholeheartedly agree with the principles 
of judicial restraint the lead opinion espouses, I write 
separately because I believe the lead opinion has "elaborat[ed] 
too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging 
technology before its role in society has become clear."4  City 
of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010).    
¶132 Specifically, while the lead opinion purports to 
assume 
without 
deciding 
"that 
people 
have 
a 
reasonable 
                                                 
1 Lead op., ¶¶48-68.   
2 Id., ¶¶9, 64, 68.   
3 Id., ¶9. 
4 As an example of the changing landscape, I note that on 
April 23, 2014, 2013 Wis. Act 375 was enacted as Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.373 and now governs "tracking the location of a cellular 
telephone."   
No.  2010AP3016-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
expectation of privacy in their cell phone location data and 
that when police track a cell phone's location, they are 
conducting a search under the Fourth Amendment," it nonetheless 
applies Katz's two-part test for determining whether a search 
occurred.5  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) 
(Harlan, J., concurring).  In doing so, it seems to decide 
several points of law that are unrelated to its conclusion, 
which is grounded in the exigent circumstances exception to the 
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.  Were I writing for the 
majority of the court, I would write more narrowly, avoiding the 
conclusions above and also those mentioned below.  
¶133 First, the lead opinion concludes that the Subdiaz-
Osorio's Sprint policy suffers from multiple legal shortcomings.  
After noting "piecemeal definitions and vague terminology" in 
that contract, it concludes that "[i]t is possible that a 
customer would read th[e] Policy and understand that his cell 
phone may be tracked at all times, but that is not the only 
possible reading."6  Whether a contract is capable of more than 
one reasonable interpretation, and is therefore ambiguous, is a 
question of law that may have important legal ramifications.7  I 
                                                 
5 Lead op., ¶¶9, 51-68.   
6 Id., ¶56, 58.  
7 Most commonly, if a statute is ambiguous, meaning "it is 
capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons 
in two or more senses," we may turn to extrinsic sources, such 
as legislative history, to aid in our interpretation of a 
statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶¶47, 50, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  In the 
context of contract interpretation, the ambiguous term may be 
construed against its drafter.  Folkman v. Quamme, 2003 WI 116, 
¶20, 264 Wis. 2d 617, 665 N.W.2d 857. 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
would therefore refrain from interpreting the contract when 
doing so is unnecessary to our holding.  
¶134 The lead opinion further states that even if the cell 
phone contract were clear, "[i]t does not necessarily follow 
that 
law 
enforcement 
may 
lawfully 
seek 
and 
obtain 
the 
information without a court order or without satisfying the 
exigent circumstances exception."8  It concludes that "a customer 
might still reasonably assume that the cell phone company will 
disclose information only when presented with a valid court 
order."9   
¶135 This pronouncement calls into serious question the 
ability of a defendant's voluntary disclosure of information to 
shape the defendant's expectation of privacy, and therefore 
questions the continued viability of the third party disclosure 
doctrine itself, under which a defendant "typically retains no 
. . . constitutional reasonable expectation 
of privacy in 
information conveyed to a third party."  ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records, 
6 (3d ed. 2013).  This is a developing issue that I believe is 
better evaluated in a decision that requires us to address third 
party disclosures.  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 
957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("it may be necessary to 
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to 
third parties"). 
                                                 
8 Lead op., ¶60. 
9 Id. 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
¶136 Finally, the lead opinion notes that law enforcement 
will not know, in each instance, whether a suspect's cell phone 
contract contains language similar to the Sprint contract in the 
present case.10  It then expresses concern that law enforcement 
will "track a cell phone without a warrant, understanding that 
if the policy does not alert the suspect that he may be tracked, 
the search will violate the Fourth Amendment."11  This will, in 
turn, "invite[] law enforcement to be complacent in its requests 
for tracking," according to the lead opinion.12  As distasteful 
as that idea may be, I would not evaluate cell phone contract 
rationales that do not drive our decision. 
¶137 In sum, while the lead opinion "believe[s] it prudent 
to heed the cautionary advice of the Supreme Court" and to 
decide the case on the narrowest grounds possible, its wide-
ranging discussion fails to implement that directive.13  Instead, 
its decision all but forecloses argument "that a search under 
the Fourth Amendment depends on the specific language in an 
individual's 
cell 
phone 
policy" 
or 
that 
the 
defendant's 
disclosure 
of 
information 
to 
a 
third 
party 
shapes 
his 
expectation of privacy.14  Because I do not wish to decide 
whether a search occurred in this case, or any of the issues 
                                                 
10 Id., ¶61. 
11 Id. 
12 Id., ¶63.  
13 Id., ¶64. 
14 Id., ¶60-61. 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
that are unnecessary to that inquiry, I do not join the lead 
opinion, and respectfully concur in its mandate.    
¶138 I 
am 
authorized 
to 
state 
that 
Justice 
ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this concurrence. 
 
 
 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶139 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
Justice Roggensack's concurrence, but write separately to 
address the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in 
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).  
Riley addressed whether a warrantless search of the contents of 
a suspect's cell by police was constitutionally permissible, id. 
at 2477, while in the case at issue, Subdiaz-Osorio objects to 
the disclosure of location data by his cell phone service 
provider.  See Lead op., ¶2.  The location of a cell phone and 
the contents contained therein may or may not be subject to the 
same constitutional analysis.  At this point, the parties have 
not had a reasonable opportunity to brief or argue that point, 
or address the import of Riley on the case at issue.  Especially 
considering the recent U.S. Supreme Court precedent, I agree 
with Justice Roggensack, and I would decide this case on the 
narrowest possible grounds. 
¶140 The Riley decision explicitly stated that it was not 
addressing "the question whether the collection or inspection of 
aggregated digital information amounts to a search under other 
circumstances."  134 S. Ct. at 2489 n.1.  The Court further 
clarified that "[o]ur holding, of course, is not that the 
information on a cell phone is immune from search; it is instead 
that 
a 
warrant 
is 
generally 
required 
before 
such 
a 
search . . . ."  Id. at 2493 (emphasis added).  The Riley 
decision acknowledged that "[i]f the police are truly confronted 
with a now or never situation,——for example, circumstances 
suggesting that a defendant's phone will be the target of an 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
imminent remote-wipe attempt——they may be able to rely on 
exigent circumstances to search the phone immediately."  Id. at 
2487 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
¶141 In further limiting its holding to the facts of the 
case, the Riley court also stated: 
Moreover, even though the search incident to 
arrest exception does not apply to cell phones, other 
case-specific 
exceptions 
may 
still 
justify 
a 
warrantless search of a particular phone.  One well-
recognized exception applies when the exigencies of 
the situation make the needs of law enforcement so 
compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively 
reasonable 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
Such 
exigencies could include the need to prevent the 
imminent destruction of evidence in individual cases, 
to pursue a fleeing suspect, and to assist persons who 
are seriously injured or are threatened with imminent 
injury.  . . .  
In light of the availability of the exigent 
circumstances exception, there is no reason to believe 
that law enforcement officers will not be able to 
address some of the more extreme hypotheticals that 
have been suggested: a suspect texting an accomplice 
who, it is feared, is preparing to detonate a bomb, or 
a child abductor who may have information about the 
child's location on his cell phone. The defendants 
here recognize——indeed, they stress——that such fact-
specific threats may justify a warrantless search of 
cell phone data.  The critical point is that, unlike 
the search incident to arrest exception, the exigent 
circumstances exception requires a court to examine 
whether an emergency justified a warrantless search in 
each particular case. 
Id. at 2494 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
¶142 Thus, the Supreme Court in Riley did not necessarily 
address the specific question presented in the case at issue, 
presumably because that question was not squarely presented by 
the facts of Riley.  I conclude that, given these uncertainties, 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
we should exercise restraint and cabin our analysis to the facts 
of this case. 
¶143 We have received no briefing or argument on the 
broader privacy questions that are addressed in the lead opinion 
or in Riley.  As a practical matter, the issue of what actions 
law enforcement needs to take when seeking cell phone location 
information has also been addressed by the legislature.  See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 968.373 and 968.375(3)(c) (2013-14).1  The 
technological implications of a broader approach are vast and 
difficult to predict, and we are generally obliged to decide our 
cases on the "narrowest possible grounds."  Barland v. Eau 
Claire Cnty., 216 Wis. 2d 560, 566 n.2, 575 N.W.2d 691 (1998); 
see also State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶23, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 
786 N.W.2d 463.  As a result, I join Justice Roggensack's 
concurrence. 
¶144 For the foregoing reasons I respectfully concur. 
¶145 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence. 
 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 968.373 and 968.375(3)(c) were enacted 
after the commencement of the case at issue and so are not 
directly applicable.  Our inability to consider the new statutes 
in this case is an additional argument in favor of a narrow 
approach. 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶146 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  "Advances 
in technology offer great benefits to society in many areas.  At 
the same time, they can pose significant risks to individual 
privacy rights."1  The proliferation of cell phones and their 
location tracking capabilities exemplify the risks to privacy 
rights posed by technological advancement. 
¶147 The criminal cases State v. Tate2 and State v. Subdiaz-
Osorio3 
raise 
the 
question 
whether 
individuals 
have 
a 
constitutional right of privacy in their cell phone location 
data.  In other words, do the United States4 and Wisconsin 
Constitutions5 permit law enforcement to access a person's cell 
phone location data without a warrant?  
                                                 
1 State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 631-32 (N.J. 2013). 
2 State 
v. 
Tate, 
2014 
WI 
89, 
___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 
___ 
N.W.2d ___. 
3 State v. Subdiaz-Osorio, 2014 WI 87, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___. 
4 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
5 Article 1, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides:   
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶148 Cell phones are a "pervasive and insistent part of 
daily life . . . ."6  The vast majority of Americans own cell 
phones; the Pew Research Center has reported that, as of May 
2013, 91% of American adults have a cell phone and 56% have a 
smartphone.7  Cell phones are literally and figuratively attached 
to their users' persons, such that "the proverbial visitor from 
Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human 
anatomy."8  Unlike land-line phones, people generally carry cell 
phones with them at all times——at home, in the car, at work, and 
at play.      
¶149 Cell phones can thus serve as powerful tracking 
devices 
that 
can 
pinpoint 
our 
movements 
with 
remarkable 
accuracy.  They can isolate in time and place our presence at 
shops, 
doctors' 
offices, 
religious 
services, 
Alcoholics 
Anonymous meetings, AIDS treatment centers, abortion clinics, 
political events, theaters, bookstores, and restaurants, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
the place to be searched and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
6 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014). 
7 Earls, 70 A.3d at 638. 
8 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484.  The Riley Court additionally 
noted that "nearly three-quarters of smart phone users report 
being within five feet of their phones most of the time, with 
12% admitting that they even use their phones in the shower."  
Id. at 2490. 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
identify with whom the user of the cell phone associates.9  
Cellular service providers have records of the geographic 
location of almost every American at almost every moment of the 
day and night.10  Accessing this information reveals intimate 
details about a person and intrudes on the constitutional right 
of association.  The United States Supreme Court characterizes 
location 
data 
as 
"qualitatively 
different" 
from 
physical 
records, noting that location data can "reconstruct someone's 
specific movements down to the minute, not only around town but 
also within a particular building."11  The more precise the 
tracking, the greater the privacy concerns.  
¶150 Cell phone location data can also be a formidable 
instrument in fighting crime.  In both Tate and Subdiaz-Osorio, 
the law enforcement officers were performing their important 
public safety duties by investigating violent crimes.  Both 
criminal suspects were apprehended in relatively short order 
through law enforcement use of cell phone location data.   
¶151 The officers in Tate and Subdiaz-Osorio had to deal 
with the thorny issues raised by seeking access to individuals' 
                                                 
9 See Earls, 70 A.3d at 632.  See also Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 
2489 ("Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a 
qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an 
arrestee's person. . . . [Cell phones] could just as easily be 
called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape 
recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or 
newspapers."). 
10 See Noam Cohen, It's Tracking Your Every Move and You May 
Not Even Know, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 2011, at A1. 
11 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 (citing United States v. Jones, 
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
cell phone location data.  Law enforcement is the first word in 
interpreting constitutional requirements; the courts are the 
last.   
¶152 It is this court's responsibility to evaluate a 
potential search "by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to 
which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the 
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests."  Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 
U.S. 295, 300 (1999).   
¶153 This court owes it to law enforcement, lawyers, 
litigants, circuit courts, the court of appeals, and the public 
at large to provide clarity about when a search has occurred 
regarding cell phone location data and what procedures must be 
undertaken 
by 
the 
government 
to 
render 
such 
searches 
constitutional.12  A clear set of rules will protect privacy 
interests and also give guidance to individuals evaluating these 
interests.     
¶154 Rather 
than 
dance 
around 
the 
issue 
of 
whether 
government access to cell phone location data in the instant 
cases is a search within the meaning of the Constitutions, I 
propose that the court address it head-on.  Government access to 
cell phone location data raises novel legal questions of great 
importance for the privacy rights of the public in an emerging 
                                                 
12 "[W]e promote clarity in the law of search and seizure 
and provide straightforward guidelines to governmental officers 
who must apply our holdings."  State v. Williams, 2012 WI 59, 
¶25, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460. 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
area of technology——exactly the type of questions appropriate 
for resolution pursuant to this court's law-developing function.   
¶155 I conclude that government access to cell phone 
location data in the instant cases, which involves invasive 
surveillance of an individual's movements, is a search within 
the meaning of the Constitutions.13  To read the Constitutions 
more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the cell phone 
has come to play in private communications, to paraphrase the 
United States Supreme Court in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 352 (1967).14    
¶156 People do not buy cell phones to have them serve as 
government tracking devices.  They do not expect the government 
to track them by using location information the government gets 
from cell phones.15  People have a subjective expectation of 
privacy in cell phone location data that society is prepared to 
                                                 
13 Justices Ann Walsh Bradley and N. Patrick Crooks agree 
with this conclusion. 
14 "To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the 
vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private 
communication."  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 
(1967). 
15 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 
2599917, at *9 (11th Cir. 2014) ("[I]t is unlikely that cell 
phone customers are aware that their cell phone providers 
collect and store historical location information.") (quoting In 
re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of 
Elec. Commc'n Serv. To Disclose Records to Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 
317 (3d Cir. 2010)); Earls, 70 A. 3d at 632. 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
recognize as reasonable.  Thus, absent a warrant, such a search 
is per se unreasonable.16 
¶157 If the State does not have a warrant, the State can 
access cell phone location data only if the State can 
demonstrate one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.  In both Tate and Subdiaz-Osorio, law enforcement 
officers could have accessed cell phone location data with a 
properly authorized warrant that complied with existing relevant 
statutes.17  They did not.  
¶158 I address the balance between privacy interests and 
law enforcement interests as presented by Tate and Subdiaz-
Osorio.18  These two cases address substantially similar issues 
regarding government access to cell phone location data but pose 
distinct fact patterns.   
¶159 Neither 
the 
Tate 
majority 
opinion 
nor 
Justice 
Prosser's lead opinion in Subdiaz-Osorio decides whether the 
government access in question constituted a search within the 
meaning of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.  Both 
opinions assume that a search occurred.   
¶160 Despite the insistence of the Tate majority opinion 
and Justice Prosser's lead opinion in Subdiaz-Osorio that they 
                                                 
16 State v. Sanders, 2008 WI 85, ¶27, 311 Wis. 2d 257, 752 
N.W.2d 713; State v. Payano-Roman, 2006 WI 47, ¶30, 290 
Wis. 2d 380, 714 N.W.2d 548. 
17 I refer to the court order issued in Tate as a "warrant," 
as does the Tate majority opinion.  The applicable statute 
refers to a court issuing a "subpoena" requiring the production 
of documents.  Wis. Stat. § 968.135.   
18 "Privacy comes at a cost."  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493. 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
merely assume, without deciding, that the government access was 
a search in each case,19 both opinions address the search issue 
as they elaborate on cases and principles underlying their 
assumption that a search occurred.   
¶161 The Tate majority opinion and Justice Prosser's lead 
opinion in Subdiaz-Osorio refer to and draw guidance from the 
same Wisconsin and United States Supreme Court cases, including 
the recently mandated Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ___, 134 S. 
Ct. 2473 (2014).20   
¶162 The Tate majority opinion and Justice Prosser's lead 
opinion announce principles of law that overlap and to an extent 
                                                 
19 Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶2, 26; Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice 
Prosser's lead op., ¶¶9, 70 (Prosser, J., lead op.).  But see 
Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶132 (accusing 
Justice Prosser's lead opinion of not merely assuming the issue 
of the reasonable expectation of privacy but in effect deciding 
the issue). 
20 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (cited in Tate, 2014 WI 89, 
¶20 n.11; in Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Prosser's lead op., ¶47 
n.23); Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (cited in Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶19-
21; in Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Prosser's lead op., ¶¶51-52, 65-
66; in Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶132); 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (cited in Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶17-
25; in Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Prosser's lead op., ¶¶43, 48, 51; 
in Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶135; State 
v. Brereton, 2013 WI 17, 345 Wis. 2d 563, 826 N.W.2d 369 (cited 
in Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶16-18, 40; in Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice 
Prosser's lead op., ¶¶38, 49; State v. Sveum, 2010 WI 92, 328 
Wis. 2d 369, 787 N.W.2d 317 (cited in Tate,  ¶¶14, 23, 28, 30, 
40-43; in Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Prosser's lead op., ¶49). 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
conflict with each other.21  The two opinions, as well as the 
separate writings in Subdiaz-Osorio of Justices Ann Walsh 
Bradley, N. Patrick Crooks, and Patience Drake Roggensack, must 
thus be read together carefully to understand the court's 
position on the constitutionality of law enforcement access to a 
person's cell phone location data.22   
 
¶163 To address the overlapping issues raised by these two 
cases, I organize my dissenting opinions as follows.  Each 
heading number corresponds to the relevant subdivision of each 
dissent. 
¶164 In my dissent in Tate, I address the following main 
points:  
Part I. The police access to the defendant's cell phone 
location data, an issue in both Tate and Subdiaz-Osorio, 
was a search within the meaning of the Constitutions.23 
                                                 
21 See Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Roggensack's concurrence, 
¶¶131-132 (criticizing Justice Prosser's lead opinion for 
"elaborate[ing] too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications 
of emerging technology before its role in society has become 
clear"); Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Prosser's lead op., ¶50 (noting 
that Tate shares similarities with Subdiaz-Osorio even though it 
is ultimately decided on other issues). 
22 In footnotes 23 through 30, I consolidate and summarize 
the position of each opinion in Tate and Subdiaz-Osorio 
regarding particular topics. 
23 For discussions of whether a search existed, see: 
Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶26: Assumes, without deciding, that 
there was a search.   
Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Prosser's lead op., ¶9: Assumes, 
without deciding, that there was a search but hints 
strongly that a search existed.   
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
Part II. The search existed as a trespass.24 
Part III. The search existed as an invasion of an 
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. 
A. The subjective expectation of privacy was not 
undermined by: 
1. The cell phone contract;25 or 
                                                                                                                                                             
Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Bradley's concurrence, ¶89; Justice 
Crooks' concurrence, ¶116: Determine that there was a 
search.  
Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶¶131-
137: 
Criticizes 
Justice 
Prosser's 
lead 
opinion 
for 
elaborating too fully on right to privacy in cell phone 
location data. 
Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Ziegler's concurrence, ¶139-143: 
Joining Justice Roggensack's concurrence, and requesting 
additional briefing on whether a search existed. 
Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶61 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting): Yes, 
access to cell phone location data is a search.  See also 
Subdiaz-Osorio, Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶155. 
24 For discussions of whether a trespass existed, see: 
Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶18-20: Discusses trespass but refers to 
the search only as "nontrespassory." 
Subdiaz-Osorio, 
Justice 
Prosser's 
lead 
op., 
¶¶48-50: 
Trespass analysis would be "unnatural."  
Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶101-102 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting): 
State does not disclose how information was obtained; 
appears to be a trespass.  See also Subdiaz-Osorio, Chief 
Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶168. 
25 For discussions of whether the cell phone contract 
created consent to access the cell phone location data, see: 
Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶22: Defendant might consent through 
purchase of cell phone. 
Subdiaz-Osorio, 
Justice 
Prosser's 
lead 
op., 
¶¶53-63: 
Consent through cell phone purchase contract was invalid.  
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
2. The third-party doctrine.26 
B. Society recognizes a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in cell phone location data.27 
                                                                                                                                                             
Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶¶133-
135: Questions Justice Prosser's lead opinion regarding 
contract.     
Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶116-121 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting): 
Adhesion 
contract 
will 
not 
be 
enforced 
to 
waive 
constitutional rights.  See also Subdiaz-Osorio, Chief 
Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶168. 
26 For discussions of the impact of third-party doctrine, 
see: 
Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶24-25: Third-party doctrine may need 
reevaluation. 
Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶134-135: 
Questions whether expectation of privacy exists in third-
party records.  
Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶122-135, (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting): 
Third-party doctrine in inapplicable to cell phone location 
data. 
27 For 
discussions 
of 
whether 
society 
recognizes 
a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, see: 
Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶2, 16-25: Expectation of privacy may be 
lower for cell phone location, especially in a public area; 
expectation of privacy was dependent on the cell phone's 
location in a home. 
Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Prosser's lead op., ¶¶65-68: Public 
expects privacy in cell phone location data and worries 
about invasion of privacy.   
Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶¶134-
135: Questions whether expectation of privacy exists in 
third-party records.  
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
Part IV. Wisconsin Stat. § 968.135, the statute setting 
forth the requirements for a subpoena of documents, should 
have been followed——it was not in either Tate or in 
Subdiaz-Osorio.28 
¶165 In my dissent in Subdiaz-Osorio, I address two main 
points:  
Part V. The State failed to meet its burden to demonstrate 
the existence of exigent circumstances;29 and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶136-149 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting): 
Case law, public policy, and Wisconsin legislation point to 
society recognizing reasonable expectation of privacy in 
cell phone location data.  See also Subdiaz-Osorio, Chief 
Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶168. 
28 For discussions of the warrant requirement, see: 
Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶33-50: Warrant did not comply with Wis. 
Stat. § 968.135, subpoena for third-party information.  
Non-statutory 
warrant 
met 
constitutional 
requirements.  
Non-statutory warrants met "spirit" of warrant statutes.   
Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Prosser's lead op., ¶5 n.2: No 
warrant at issue, but warrants must meet Fourth Amendment 
and statutory requirements.   
Subdiaz-Osorio, 
Justice 
Bradley's 
concurrence, 
¶89: 
A 
warrant was needed and the State's warrant failed to comply 
in either case. 
Subdiaz-Osorio, 
Justice 
Crooks' 
concurrence, 
¶118: 
A 
warrant was needed but the good-faith exception applied. 
Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶150-163 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting): 
State fails to comply with statutory warrant requirements.  
Warrant was invalid.  See also Subdiaz-Osorio, Chief 
Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶168. 
29 For discussions of exigent circumstances, see: 
Tate: Exigent circumstances not at issue. 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
Part VI. The defendant invoked his Miranda right to an 
attorney at his interrogation.30 
¶166 My discussion in Parts I-IV of my Tate dissent is 
relevant to Subdiaz-Osorio, and I incorporate Parts I-IV of my 
Tate dissent into my Subdiaz-Osorio dissent without repeating 
                                                                                                                                                             
Subdiaz-Osorio, 
Justice 
Prosser's 
lead 
op., 
¶¶69-81: 
Exigent circumstances exception to warrant requirement was 
satisfied.   
Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Bradley's concurrence, ¶89: there 
were no exigent circumstances. 
Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Crooks' concurrence, ¶118: there 
were no exigent circumstances. 
Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶130: Law 
enforcement acted reasonably under the Fourth Amendment due 
to exigent circumstances. 
Subdiaz-Osorio, Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶169-
208: State fails to meet its burden to show exigent 
circumstances.   
30 For discussions of the Miranda right to an attorney, see: 
Tate: Miranda rights not at issue. 
Subdiaz-Osorio, 
Justice 
Prosser's 
lead 
op., 
¶¶82-87: 
Defendant failed to invoke unequivocally right to an 
attorney. 
Subdiaz-Osorio, 
Justice 
Bradley's 
concurrence, 
¶89: 
Defendant successfully invoked Miranda right.  
Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Crooks' concurrence, ¶109; Justice 
Roggensack's concurrence, ¶130: Defendant failed to invoke 
unequivocally right to an attorney. 
Subdiaz-Osorio, Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶¶209-
219: A reasonable person would understand Subdiaz-Osorio to 
have invoked his Miranda right. 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
them in full.  Parts V and VI address issues found only in my 
Subdiaz-Osorio dissent.31 
¶167 Accordingly, I dissent in both cases. 
I-IV 
¶168 Parts I-IV of my dissent in Tate constitute Parts I-IV 
of this dissent.  In other words, I incorporate by reference 
Parts I-IV of the Tate dissent.  See Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶52-163 
(Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
V 
¶169 Law enforcement did not obtain a warrant for the 
defendant's 
cell 
phone 
location 
data 
in 
Subdiaz-Osorio.  
Warrantless searches are "per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
                                                 
31 The two cases raise numerous additional issues that I do 
not address, including the applicability of federal statutes, 
the good-faith exception, and the proper standard for reviewing 
and remedying an illegal search of cell phone location data. 
Justice Crooks' concurrence in Subdiaz-Osorio asserts that 
an 
illegal 
warrantless 
search 
occurred, 
Justice 
Crooks' 
concurrence, ¶¶125-128, but that the good-faith exception 
applies, and that the evidence should not have been excluded.  
As I explain in Parts I-IV, our state's case law already set 
forth the need for a warrant and the statutes provide procedures 
for obtaining a warrant.  These rules of law existed at the time 
that the officers initiated the search in the instant cases.   
I am unconvinced that the usual harmless-error analysis is 
the proper approach in Tate and Subdiaz-Osorio.  See Subdiaz-
Osorio, 
Justice 
Bradley's 
concurrence, 
¶¶97-105 
(applying 
harmless-error analysis in Subdiaz-Osorio).  When illegally 
obtained cell phone location data forms the entire basis for the 
apprehension and arrest of the defendant, rather than evidence 
of the crime, the usual harmless-error analysis appears to be a 
poor fit. 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
Amendment . . . ."32 of the United States Constitution and under 
the Wisconsin Constitution.   
¶170 The government bears the burden of proving by clear 
and convincing evidence that a warrantless search falls within 
one of the narrowly delineated exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.33  One such exception is exigent circumstances.   
¶171 By definition, exigent circumstances justifying an 
exception to the warrant requirement must be exceptional; the 
circumstances must generate a sense of urgency.  Furthermore, 
the particular warrantless search must be justified by weighing 
"the urgency of the officer's need to [search] against the time 
needed to obtain a warrant."  State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, ¶28, 
235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29.   
¶172 In order to show that an urgent situation existed and 
that there was no time to secure a warrant, "[t]he officer must 
be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken 
with rational inferences from those facts," constitute grounds 
to believe an emergency existed and there was a need to act.34  
Each case must be decided on its facts, not on a court's 
acceptance of overgeneralizations.35   
                                                 
32 Sanders, 311 Wis. 2d 257, ¶27. 
33 Payano-Roman, 290 Wis. 2d 380, ¶30; State v. Kieffer, 217 
Wis. 2d 531, 541, 577 N.W.2d 352 (1998).   
34 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 6.6(a), at 599 
(5th ed. 2013) (citation and quotations omitted). 
35 Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561 
(2013) (citing Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 (1997) 
(blanket rules cannot be used to justify a lack of a warrant)). 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
¶173 The State failed to demonstrate that any of the three 
purported circumstances advanced by Justice Prosser's lead 
opinion——threat to safety, risk of destruction of evidence, and 
increased likelihood of flight36——existed with sufficient urgency 
to justify the privacy violation in the instant case.  To get 
around the State's paucity of evidence in the record to support 
urgency, Justice Prosser's lead opinion engages in the type of 
overgeneralizations condemned by Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 
___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561 (2013).   
¶174 In most criminal investigations, at least one of these 
three purported circumstances exist.  If the mere allegation of 
one of these circumstances is sufficient to demonstrate exigent 
circumstances, 
an 
officer 
could 
simply 
presume 
exigent 
circumstances in most cases.  Justice Prosser's lead opinion's 
holding allows the exigent circumstances exception to swallow 
the warrant requirement in the present case.  
¶175 In addition to its failure to show urgency, the State 
also failed to show that there was not sufficient time to get a 
warrant under the circumstances.   
¶176 Because the State failed to meet its burden to prove 
exigent circumstances, I dissent.  Justice Bradley and Justice 
Crooks agree that in the instant case, the State failed to 
demonstrate exigent circumstances to justify an exception to the 
warrant requirement.37  
                                                 
36 Lead op., ¶76. 
37 See Justice Bradley's concurrence, ¶89; Justice Crooks' 
concurrence, ¶118. 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
A 
¶177 In the instant case, the State entered no evidence 
that alleged exigencies posed the urgent threat necessary to 
justify the warrantless search in question.  
¶178 Justice Prosser's lead opinion relies on three exigent 
circumstances: 
(1) 
"a 
threat 
to 
safety"; 
(2) 
"risk 
of 
destruction of evidence"; and (3) "a likelihood that [the 
defendant] would flee."  Lead op., ¶76.  
¶179 First, Justice Prosser's lead opinion states that 
because the murder weapon (a knife) was not recovered, "a 
potentially armed individual who recently committed a homicide" 
created a "threat to safety."  Lead op., ¶77.   
¶180 I agree that a threat to safety exists when an armed 
and dangerous suspect is at large, but not every suspect 
believed 
to 
be 
armed 
and 
dangerous 
poses 
an 
exigent 
circumstance.   
¶181 State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 
N.W.2d 29, is instructive.  In Richter, the court held that an 
imminent threat to safety existed when an officer knew that one 
home had been burglarized, had evidence that the suspect had 
fled to a second home, observed signs of forced entry into that 
home, and saw that there were people sleeping inside the second 
home 
at 
the 
time 
the 
intruder 
entered. 
 
Richter, 
235 
Wis. 2d 524, ¶41.  This combination of factors "creat[ed] a 
situation fraught with potential for physical harm if something 
was not immediately done to apprehend the suspect."  Richter, 
235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶41 (emphasis added).   
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
¶182 Conversely, in the instant case, there was no such 
immediate threat.  The police could identify only a generalized 
threat that exists any time a suspect is believed to be armed 
and is sought on suspicion of having committed a violent 
offense.  If exigent circumstances exist any time a suspect is 
armed and is under suspicion of having committed a violent 
offense, exigent circumstances would exist in most criminal 
investigations and the warrant requirement would be rendered a 
nullity.   
¶183 Justice Prosser's lead opinion bases its determination 
that a "threat to safety" existed here on pure speculation and 
conjecture, repeatedly citing information that the police "had 
no way of knowing."  Lead op., ¶78.  The police had no way of 
knowing or even inferring, as Justice Prosser's lead opinion 
supposes, 
"that 
[the 
defendant] 
might 
become 
violent 
if 
confronted," or "how desperate [the defendant] might become to 
avoid apprehension."  Id.   
¶184 Second, Justice Prosser's lead opinion asserts that 
there was a "risk of destruction of evidence."  Lead op., ¶76.  
For this proposition, Justice Prosser's lead opinion offers no 
reasonable or articulable facts, because none were offered by 
the State.  Nothing in the record demonstrates an imminent 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
threat of destruction of evidence.38  Unlike other cases in our 
jurisprudence, there were no signs of evidence being destroyed,39 
or particular facts to support an officer's suspicion of the 
destruction of evidence.40   
¶185 Third, Justice Prosser's lead opinion asserts that 
there was "a likelihood that [the defendant] would flee."  Lead 
op., ¶76.  The defendant was no longer at the scene.  The police 
knew the following: the suspect had already fled; the suspect 
had family in Mexico; and the suspect had told a friend that he 
did not want to be arrested.   
¶186 Criminal suspects are often no longer at the scene of 
a crime when law enforcement officers arrive.  Criminal suspects 
often have family and friends in places other than the place of 
the crime.  Criminal suspects can usually access various forms 
of transportation.  Criminal suspects rarely intend to be 
arrested.   
                                                 
38 See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1559 ("[I]n some circumstances 
law enforcement officers may conduct a search without a warrant 
to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.") (emphasis 
added); id. at 1569 (Roberts, C.J., concurring, joined by 
Breyer, J. & Alito, J.) ("[The exigent circumstances exception] 
applies when there is a compelling need to prevent the imminent 
destruction of important evidence, and there is no time to 
obtain a warrant.") (emphasis added). 
39 See, e.g., State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶26, 233 
Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621; State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶31, 
327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463 (in which such signs appeared). 
40 See 
State 
v. 
Meyer, 
216 
Wis. 2d 729, 
751-53, 
576 
N.W.2d 260 (1998) ("[P]articular facts must be shown in each 
case to support an officer's reasonable suspicion that exigent 
circumstances exist."). 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
19 
 
¶187 If these facts alone are enough to justify exigent 
circumstances, 
then 
the 
rule 
that 
the 
State 
must 
show 
"particular facts" to meet its burden is rendered a nullity.   
¶188 Beyond the sparse facts I have stated, the State makes 
no showing of the delay that would have occurred had the police 
pursued a warrant.  Nor does the State make any showing that a 
delay, had it existed, would have had any impact on the 
defendant's flight.  The State thus failed to show that getting 
a warrant would "greatly enhance the likelihood of the suspect's 
escape."41 
¶189 Instead, using 20/20 hindsight, the lead opinion 
relies upon the defendant's travel time and location upon arrest 
to justify its assertion that there was an increased risk of 
flight.42  Justice Prosser's lead opinion speculates about where 
the defendant went and how he could have moved after he began 
driving.43  Justice Prosser wonders where the defendant could 
have gone, listing in great detail the transportation options 
available in Chicago, then noting that the defendant could have 
gone elsewhere as well.44 
¶190 Justice Prosser's lead opinion admits that "the police 
could only speculate as to [the defendant's] plans or his 
route".  Lead op., ¶80.  Justice Prosser's lead opinion then 
                                                 
41 Lead op., ¶79 (citing Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 280, ¶24) 
(emphasis added). 
42 Id., ¶¶80-81 
43 Id., ¶80.   
44 Id.   
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
20 
 
speculates about what the police might have speculated——a 
tenuous chain of reasoning with no basis in fact.   
¶191 Thus, 
Justice 
Prosser's 
lead 
opinion 
bases 
its 
determination that there was a greatly enhanced flight risk upon 
speculation about speculation, creating its own narrative and 
ignoring the glaring failure of the State to offer one iota of 
evidence that increased flight risk existed at all. 
B 
¶192 Even if we accept that there was some urgent threat 
created by the defendant's apparent flight with the murder 
weapon, the State can meet its burden to establish the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement only when 
"there is compelling need for official action and no time to 
secure a warrant."45   
¶193 All warrants necessarily require some amount of time 
to secure, but the inquiry for exigent circumstances is whether 
the State can demonstrate specific, articulable facts showing 
that the warrant process would "significantly increase" the 
delay before the officers can act.46  
¶194 Justice Prosser's lead opinion lays out in careful 
detail the timeline of the events leading up to the defendant's 
arrest, yet it is missing any evidence about the existence of or 
length of a delay that would have been caused by obtaining a 
                                                 
45 McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1559 (citing Michigan v. Tyler, 
436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)); id. at 1570 (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring, joined by Breyer, J. & Alito, J.) (same). 
46 Id. at 1561. 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
21 
 
warrant or any evidence that such a delay would have adversely 
affected law enforcement's ability to act to apprehend the 
suspect. 
¶195 Nothing in the record tells us why the officers, who 
had obtained a warrant for a search of the defendant's 
residence, could not have obtained a warrant for the defendant's 
cell phone location data.  In other words, there is no reason, 
based on the record before us, to suppose that it was 
impracticable for the officers to obtain a search warrant for 
the defendant's cell phone location data as well.47    
¶196 The United States Supreme Court has recently informed 
us once again of the burden of proof the State must meet to 
fulfill the exigent circumstances exception to a warrant.  
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, is instructive.   
¶197 In McNeely, the State of Missouri urged that the 
dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream created a per se 
exigent circumstance that created an exception to the warrant 
requirement for a blood draw.  The Court held that such a rule 
would be contrary to the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis 
that it has employed in the past and would potentially relieve 
the state of any burden to show the actual delay created by 
securing a warrant: 
In those drunk-driving investigations where police 
officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a 
blood sample can be drawn without significantly 
undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth 
Amendment mandates that they do so.  See McDonald v. 
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456, 69 S. Ct. 191, 93 
                                                 
47 Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970). 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
22 
 
L.Ed. 153 (1948) ("We cannot . . . excuse the absence 
of a search warrant without a showing by those who 
seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that 
the exigencies of the situation made [the search] 
imperative"). 
 . . . . 
Consider, for example, a situation in which the 
warrant process will not significantly increase the 
delay before the blood test is conducted because an 
officer can take steps to secure a warrant while the 
suspect is being transported to a medical facility by 
another officer. In such a circumstance, there would 
be no plausible justification for an exception to the 
warrant requirement. 
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561.   
¶198 Thus, the burden on the State in the present case was 
to show that the situation made the warrantless search in 
question "imperative" and that securing a warrant "significantly 
increases" the delay before the officers can take action. 
¶199 In the instant case, the record does not include any 
testimony or evidence demonstrating 
• at 
what 
time 
the 
police 
decided 
to 
seek 
the 
defendant's cell phone location data; 
• the estimated amount of time needed to obtain a 
warrant for the data and the duration of any delay; or 
• the timeline for obtaining the data absent a warrant, 
i.e., at what time the law enforcement officer's 
request was made to the Department of Justice to 
obtain the cell phone location data; at what time the 
Department made the request of the cell phone service 
provider; at what time the cell phone service provider 
received the Department's request; at what time the 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
23 
 
cell phone service provider processed the request; and 
at what time the information was transmitted to 
Arkansas law enforcement. 
¶200 Rather than a clear timeline of the events that 
demonstrates the need for a warrantless search, the record 
reveals only the barest of facts.  Sometime between 10 a.m. and 
12 p.m., while interviewing the defendant's girlfriend, the 
Kenosha 
police 
received 
the 
information 
regarding 
the 
defendant's departure in a car.  The police stated that their 
interviews, which finished around 12 p.m., established probable 
cause to send the temporary "want" to CIB/NCIC "within an hour 
and a half of obtaining information from the witnesses."   
¶201 The record reflects that some time transpired between 
the time that the "want" was executed with CIB/NCIC and the time 
that the request for cell phone location data was made to the 
Wisconsin Department of Justice, which then requested the data 
from Sprint, the cell phone service provider.  The State was not 
able to pinpoint the relevant times: 
[PROSECUTOR]: 
Prior 
to 
contacting 
the 
state 
of 
Wisconsin agents for assistance, had you received any 
hits or any feedback or any communication back from 
CIB or NCIC? 
[OFFICER]: No. 
[PROESCUTOR]: And you indicate that at a point in time 
then that you contacted state agents to assist in your 
investigation to locate the defendant? 
[OFFICER]: Yes. 
[PROESCUTOR]: Do you recall what time that occurred? 
[OFFICER]: I don't know the specific time.  It was 
probably sometime after 12:00 in the afternoon. 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
24 
 
On cross-examination, defense counsel was not able to get the 
officer to pinpoint the approximate time frame for the various 
events:  
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And it was after you had received 
information from [four witnesses] that you put in the 
information for the Temporary Felony Worksheet, the 
document submitted to CIB/NCIC? 
[OFFICER]: I had not spoken with [one witness] before 
that was entered.  I don't know exactly when the 
temporary want was entered because, like I said, I 
didn't do that.  But it was after we had gathered 
enough information to establish probable cause for 
[the defendant].   
¶202 After CIB/NCIC did not respond with any hits, the 
Kenosha police requested the defendant's location data "sometime 
after 12:00 p.m."  The police received the data from state law 
enforcement "sometime in the afternoon."  The information was 
not transmitted to Arkansas until 5:37 p.m.   
¶203 The record does not show that any additional wait time 
would have resulted from obtaining a warrant.  The record does 
not show that the time to secure a warrant would have made any 
demonstrable difference in the time it took to obtain the cell 
phone location data.   
¶204 On 
the 
contrary, 
the 
law 
enforcement 
officers' 
testimony reveals the efficiency and speed of the existing 
system to approve warrants.  When the police in the instant case 
sought to obtain a search warrant for the defendant's residence, 
it took a mere ten to fifteen minutes after the affidavit was 
completed for a judge to arrive.  Within half an hour of the 
judge's arrival, the search warrant was approved.  From the time 
the police began working on the affidavit for a search warrant 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
25 
 
for the defendant's residence until the warrant was approved, a 
maximum of an hour and a half had elapsed.   
¶205 On this record, the State cannot meet its burden to 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
time 
to 
secure 
a 
warrant 
would 
significantly delay, or indeed, delay at all, the disclosure of 
the defendant's cell phone location data or the apprehension of 
the defendant. 
¶206 In sum, the State failed to carry its burden of proof.  
Through conjecture and speculation, the lead opinion fills in 
the many blanks of key facts missing from the record.   
¶207 The lead opinion's exigent circumstances exception 
swallows the rule of the warrant requirement.  According to 
Justice 
Prosser's 
lead 
opinion's 
reasoning, 
almost 
every 
criminal investigation presents exigent circumstances.   
¶208 I decline to undercut the warrant requirement or 
ignore the heavy burden placed on the State to prove the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.   
VI 
¶209 I turn at last to the issue of the defendant's 
invocation of his right to counsel.  The key holding of Miranda 
v. Arizona48 was straightforward: "If [an] individual states that 
he [or she] wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease 
until an attorney is present."49  
                                                 
48 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
49 Miranda, 834 U.S. at 474. 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
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¶210 Justice Prosser's lead opinion requires a suspect to 
make an "unequivocal invocation" of the right to counsel.  This 
test stems from Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994).  
¶211 The Davis "unequivocal" or "unambiguous" invocation 
test has been heavily criticized on a number of grounds, 
including that the "unequivocal" test invites equivocation on 
the part of courts——identical statements appear "unequivocal" to 
one court but "equivocal" to another.50  In applying the 
"unequivocal 
invocation" 
test, 
courts 
have 
"rejected 
as 
ambiguous an array of statements whose meaning might otherwise 
be thought plain."51 
                                                 
50 Compare United States v. Martin, 664 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 
2011) (invocation was unequivocal when defendant said "I'd 
rather talk to an attorney first before I do that") with 
Delashmit v. State, 991 So. 2d 1215 (Miss. 2008) (invocation was 
equivocal when defendant said "I prefer a lawyer").  Compare 
also Wood v. Ercole, 644 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2011) (invocation was 
unequivocal when defendant said "I think I should get a lawyer") 
with Commonwealth v. Morganti, 917 N.E.2d 191 (Mass. 2009) 
(invocation was equivocal when defendant said he was "thinking I 
might need a lawyer and want to talk to him before talking to 
you"). 
51 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 410-11 & n.9 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  Justice Sotomayor cites a variety 
of cases in the context of invocations of the Miranda right to 
remain 
silent 
in 
which 
courts 
have 
applied 
the 
test 
subjectively. 
As Marcy Strauss notes in her empirical overview of cases 
regarding the application of the "unequivocal invocation" rule, 
courts apply their own subjective spin to a purportedly 
objective test: 
[T]he evidence suggests gross inconsistencies in the 
approaches of the courts.  Some courts deem seemingly 
clear demands as ambiguous.  Yet in other cases, 
virtually identical language is treated differently in 
ways inexplicable by the context.  It is drastically 
unfair that a suspect in one jurisdiction who says, "I 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
27 
 
¶212 Davis 
requires 
a 
court 
to 
make 
an 
objectively 
reasonable analysis of the circumstances to determine whether an 
individual's request for a lawyer is unequivocal.  The defendant 
need evince only "a certain and present desire to consult with 
counsel" to invoke the right.  United States v. Hunter, 708 F.3d  
938, 942 (7th Cir. 2013).  Courts are required "to evaluate a 
defendant's request as ordinary people would understand it, and 
to give a broad, rather than a narrow, interpretation to a 
defendant's request for counsel."  Hunter, 708 F.3d at 942 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).52   
                                                                                                                                                             
think I would like to talk to my attorney," can be 
ignored, 
while 
a 
similar 
statement 
in 
another 
jurisdiction is treated as invoking Edwards.  It makes 
no logical sense whatsoever that the police may 
continue questioning a suspect who says, "Can I call 
my lawyer?" in one station house, while in another one 
the comment, "Can I have my lawyer present when [I 
tell you my story]?" is deemed an invocation of rights 
requiring 
the 
cessation 
of 
questions. 
 
Such 
contradictory results are not only unfair, they are 
pernicious. 
Marcy Strauss, Understanding Davis v. United States, 40 Loy. 
L.A. L. Rev. 1011, 1061-62 (2007) (footnotes and citations 
omitted). 
52 "Although 
a 
suspect 
need 
not 
speak 
with 
the 
discrimination of an Oxford don, he must articulate his desire 
to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable 
police officer in the circumstances would understand the 
statement to be a request for an attorney."  Davis, 512 U.S. at 
459 (citations & internal quotation marks omitted). 
In United States v. Hunter, 708 F.3d 938 (7th Cir. 2013), 
the court held that the defendant's asking "Can you call my 
attorney?" while giving the officer the name of the attorney 
constituted an unequivocal invocation of the right to an 
attorney. 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
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¶213 In the instant case, the defendant said, "How can I do 
to get an attorney here because I don't have enough to afford 
for one" (emphasis added).    
¶214 An 
ordinary 
reasonable 
person, 
looking 
at 
the 
defendant's statement, would understand the defendant to be 
making a request for a lawyer.  The defendant is saying he 
cannot afford an attorney and wants to know how to get an 
attorney at that place and time. 
¶215 Justice Prosser's lead opinion ignores the broad 
interpretation of the defendant's words.  Instead, Justice 
Prosser's lead opinion gives them a narrow interpretation, 
squinting hard at the record, searching for ambiguity or 
equivocation where a reasonable person would find none.  Lead 
op., ¶¶86-87.   
¶216 Justice 
Prosser's 
lead 
opinion 
focuses 
on 
the 
discussion of extradition to twist the defendant's request for a 
lawyer into a request for counsel at the extradition hearing.  
Lead op., ¶86-87.  Justice Prosser's lead opinion claims that 
the officer had "just explained the extradition process to [the 
defendant]," which made it reasonable for the officer to infer 
that "here" meant "at the extradition hearing."  Lead op., ¶87. 
¶217 Here is what happened:  The officer interrogating the 
defendant described the extradition hearing ("What happens is 
that you have to appear in front of a judge here in Arkansas 
then they will find out if there is enough reason to send you 
back to Kenosha").  But then, the officer added, "But we are not 
going to do that right now.  We are not going to know that right 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
29 
 
now" (emphasis added).53  The officer made clear that the 
extradition hearing was no longer the subject of conversation.   
¶218 It is not objectively reasonable to assume that the 
defendant used the word "here" to mean anything other than its 
generally understood definition.  The word "here" is generally 
intended to mean "in or at this place or time."  A reasonable 
person would not understand "here" to mean "at some later point 
in time."  What was happening "here"?  The interrogation.  To a 
reasonable person, the defendant is saying that he wants a 
lawyer and wants a lawyer at the interrogation.    
 
¶219 Justice Prosser's lead opinion requires the defendant 
to speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don54 and to use an 
"exact formula" or "magic words"55 to invoke the right to 
counsel.  That's not the law. 
* * * * 
                                                 
53 The relevant portion of the interrogation was transcribed 
by the circuit court as follows: 
[POLICE OFFICER]:  We aren't going to take you back to 
Kenosha.  What happens is that you have to appear in 
front of a judge . . . . And after you appear in front 
of a judge here in Arkansas then they will find out if 
there 
is 
enough 
reason 
to 
send 
you 
back 
to 
Kenosha, . . . but we are not going to do that right 
now.  We are not going to know that right now . . . . 
[DEFENDANT]:  How can I do to get an attorney here 
because I don't have enough to afford for one. 
54 Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. 
55 United States v. Lee, 413 F.3d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 2005) 
("[T]here is no exact formula or magic words for an accused to 
invoke his [or her] right."). 
No.  2010AP3016-CR.ssa 
 
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¶220 In sum, for the reasons stated, I conclude that in the 
instant 
case 
the 
State 
failed 
to 
meet 
its 
burden 
of 
demonstrating the existence of exigent circumstances.  I further 
conclude that Subdiaz-Osorio invoked his Miranda right to an 
attorney at his interrogation. 
¶221 For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in my 
dissent in Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶52-165 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
dissenting), I dissent. 
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