Case Title: Leopold v. Ace Doran Hauling & Rigging Co.

Citation: 2013-Ohio-3107

Docket Number: 2012-0438

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Leopold v. Ace Doran Hauling & Rigging Co., Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-3107.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-3107 
LEOPOLD ET AL., APPELLEES, v. ACE DORAN HAULING & RIGGING COMPANY 
ET AL., APPELLEES; LAURENCE, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Leopold v. Ace Doran Hauling & Rigging Co.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-3107.] 
Evidence—Physician-patient 
privilege—R.C. 
2317.02(B)(1)—Exception 
to 
privilege in R.C. 2317.02(B)(1)(a)(iii)—Statement to hospital personnel in 
previous case involving same accident admissible in subsequent case filed 
by different party—Physician may testify or be compelled to testify only as 
to communication that related causally or historically to physical or 
mental injuries relevant in the other civil action. 
(No. 2012-0438—Submitted February 5, 2013—Decided July 18, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 97277, 
 2012-Ohio-497. 
____________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. R.C. 2317.02(B)(1) establishes the physician-patient testimonial privilege and 
prohibits a physician from testifying about a communication made to the 
physician by a patient. 
2. The General Assembly has carved out exceptions to the physician-patient 
privilege in certain instances and a physician may testify or be compelled 
to do so in any civil action if any type of civil action or claim under R.C. 
Chapter 4123 is filed by the patient. 
3. When the physician-patient privilege described in R.C. 2317.02(B)(1) does not 
apply as provided in R.C. 2317.02(B)(1)(a)(iii), a physician may testify or 
be compelled to do so only as to a communication that related causally or 
historically to physical or mental injuries relevant in the other civil action. 
____________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} Danielle Laurence appeals from a judgment of the Eighth District 
Court of Appeals affirming a decision of the trial court denying her request for a 
protective order seeking to prohibit Stephen Stillwagon and Ace Doran Hauling & 
Rigging Company from using statements she made to emergency room personnel 
that she had produced in a prior lawsuit she filed against Stillwagon and Ace 
Doran arising out of the same accident.  The appellate court held that Laurence 
waived the physician-patient privilege by filing a personal injury action seeking 
recovery for her injuries and therefore the trial court correctly denied her request 
for a protective order. 
{¶ 2} In this circumstance, we need not reach the waiver issue to resolve 
this case.  Pursuant to the statute establishing the physician-patient privilege, at 
least two separate provisions apply and specify that the statements made by 
Laurence are no longer privileged.  For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of 
the appellate court. 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 3} On March 6, 2008, a multivehicle accident occurred on Interstate 
90 in Cleveland, Ohio.  Among the vehicles involved were a tractor-trailer driven 
by Stephen Stillwagon transporting goods for Ace Doran and two cars, one driven 
by Laurence and one driven by Todd Leopold.  Emergency medical personnel 
transported Laurence to MetroHealth Medical Center for treatment as a result of 
the accident.  At that time she told emergency room personnel that she had hit a 
car in front of her and then was hit from behind by a semi and pushed into a 
concrete wall. 
{¶ 4} In November 2008, Laurence sued Stillwagon and Ace Doran, 
seeking recovery for personal injuries she suffered in the accident.  In discovery, 
she produced her medical records, which defense counsel used when they deposed 
her; after that deposition, she voluntarily dismissed her case. 
{¶ 5} In October 2009, Todd Leopold and his wife, Linda, sued 
Stillwagon, Ace Doran, and Ace Doran Brokerage Company, seeking recovery 
for injuries sustained in the same accident.  They dismissed the brokerage 
company and amended their complaint to add Laurence, asserting that her 
negligence had caused the accident.  Laurence then cross-claimed against 
Stillwagon and Ace Doran for contribution or indemnification, claiming that 
Stillwagon had caused the collision.  Stillwagon and Ace Doran thereafter cross-
claimed against her for indemnification or contribution, contending that she 
caused the accident. 
{¶ 6} On April 29, 2011, Laurence moved for a protective order, seeking 
to preclude counsel from using the medical records she produced in her 2008 
lawsuit.  She claimed that the physician-patient privilege protected her medical 
records from disclosure and that her prior waiver of the privilege applied only to 
her 2008 lawsuit.  The court denied her motion, and she appealed.  The appellate 
court affirmed the denial, concluding that “Laurence’s decision to file a claim of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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personal injury against [Stillwagon and Ace Doran], which was based upon the 
same accident that underlies the basis for the claims and defenses posed by the 
parties herein, served to waive her physician-patient privilege with respect to that 
accident pursuant to R.C. 2371.02(B).”  Leopold v. Ace Doran Hauling & Rigging 
Co., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97277, 2012-Ohio-497, at ¶ 15. 
{¶ 7} We accepted Laurence’s discretionary appeal, in which she claims 
that a patient’s production of medical records in discovery in a civil action does 
not waive the physician-patient privilege for all subsequent litigation.  She asserts 
that the trial and appellate courts have created a judicial waiver of the statutory 
physician-patient privilege and maintains that Ohio citizens have a constitutional 
and statutory right to have Ohio courts enforce the physician-patient privilege.  
She further relies on Hageman v. Southwest Gen. Heatlth Ctr., 119 Ohio St.3d 
185, 2008-Ohio-3343, 893 N.E.2d 153, ¶ 17, for the proposition that “when the 
cloak of confidentiality that applies to medical records is waived for the purposes 
of litigation, the waiver is limited to that case.” 
{¶ 8} The Leopolds concur.  They contend that Laurence’s emergency 
room records are inadmissible because her medical condition is not at issue in this 
case, and they maintain that she preserved the privilege by voluntarily dismissing 
her 2008 lawsuit, thereby preventing disclosure of her records to the public.  They 
urge us to follow Hageman and hold that the privilege is not waived when a 
medical condition is not at issue in a subsequent civil action, the medical records 
have not been made public, and a timely objection has been raised. 
{¶ 9} Stillwagon and Ace Doran claim that Laurence waived the 
physician-patient privilege because she voluntarily produced her medical records 
in related litigation she filed against them, and upon dismissal, she neither 
requested that her testimony be sealed nor insisted that the medical records be 
destroyed or returned to her.  They acknowledge that the purpose of the 
physician-patient privilege is to protect the privacy of the patient, but that purpose 
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
is not served when a litigant has previously disclosed medical information 
protected by the privilege in separate litigation involving the same defendants.  
They distinguish Hageman because it concerned the liability of an attorney for the 
unauthorized disclosure to a third party of medical information obtained through 
litigation that arose from a different and unrelated set of circumstances, while this 
case concerns the same accident and involves the same parties originally sued by 
Laurence. 
{¶ 10} Accordingly, the issue presented in this appeal is whether the 
physician-patient privilege protects medical records that a patient has previously 
disclosed in discovery to some of the same parties in previous litigation arising 
from the same accident. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 11} R.C. 2317.02 provides: 
 
The following persons shall not testify in certain respects: 
* * * 
(B)(1) A physician * * * concerning a communication 
made to the physician * * * by a patient in that relation or the 
physician’s * * * advice to a patient, except as otherwise provided 
in this division, division (B)(2), and division (B)(3) of this section, 
and except that, if the patient is deemed by section 2151.421 of the 
Revised Code to have waived any testimonial privilege under this 
division, the physician may be compelled to testify on the same 
subject. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 12} At issue in this case is a legislatively created exception to this 
privilege contained in R.C. 2317.02(B)(1)(a)(iii), which is further restricted by 
R.C. 2317.02(B)(3)(a). 
{¶ 13} R.C. 2317.02(B)(1)(a)(iii) provides: 
 
The testimonial privilege established under this division 
does not apply, and a physician * * * may testify or may be 
compelled to testify, in any of the following circumstances: 
(a) In any civil action, * * * or in connection with a claim 
under Chapter 4123. of the Revised Code, under any of the 
following circumstances: 
* * * 
(iii) If a medical claim [or] * * * any other type of civil 
action, or a claim under Chapter 4123. of the Revised Code is filed 
by the patient * * *. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 14} This exception is all-inclusive as to the type of civil action that 
may be filed by the patient and does not contain any exclusion for or limitation of 
indemnification or contribution claims.  In this matter, Laurence filed a type of 
civil action in the instant litigation—one for indemnification or contribution—
against Stillwagon and Ace Doran.  Hence, because Laurence filed a cross-claim, 
the elements of the exception contained in R.C. 2317.02(B)(1)(a)(iii) are satisfied, 
with the result that the testimonial privilege does not apply and a physician may 
testify or may be compelled to testify to the communications. 
{¶ 15} The limitation at issue is contained in R.C. 2317.02(B)(3)(a): 
 
January Term, 2013 
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If the testimonial privilege described in division (B)(1) of 
this section does not apply as provided in division (B)(1)(a)(iii) of 
this section, a physician * * * may be compelled to testify or to 
submit to discovery under the Rules of Civil Procedure only as to a 
communication made to the physician * * * by the patient in 
question in that relation, or the physician’s * * * advice to the 
patient in question, that related causally or historically to physical 
or mental injuries that are relevant to issues in the * * * other civil 
action. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 16} This subsection applies because the elements are satisfied by the 
facts as demonstrated in this case.  The original statement made by Laurence to 
emergency room personnel in the case she filed and later voluntarily dismissed 
relates causally and historically to injuries that are relevant to issues in her cross-
claim because that statement is her own version of how the accident occurred.  
Since the statute provides that a physician may testify or be compelled to testify to 
communications that relate causally or historically to physical or mental injuries 
relevant to issues in the other civil action, her statement is not protected by the 
privilege. 
{¶ 17} Thus, pursuant to R.C. 2317.02(B)(3)(a) a physician may be 
compelled to testify or submit to discovery only as to a communication made by 
the patient that related causally or historically to physical or mental injuries 
relevant to issues in the other civil action.  Laurence’s statement related both 
causally and historically to how the accident occurred and consequently to the 
injuries and damages that could be awarded as a result of it.  Thus, the privilege 
does not apply. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Conclusion 
{¶ 18} R.C. 2317.02(B)(1) establishes the physician-patient testimonial 
privilege and prohibits a physician from testifying about a communication made 
to the physician by a patient.  The General Assembly has carved out exceptions to 
this privilege in certain instances and a physician may testify or be compelled to 
do so in any civil action if any type of civil action or claim under R.C. Chapter 
4123 is filed by the patient.  When the physician-patient privilege described in 
R.C. 2317.02(B)(1) does not apply as provided in R.C. 2317.02(B)(1)(a)(iii), a 
physician may testify or be compelled to do so only as to a communication that 
related causally or historically to physical or mental injuries relevant in the other 
civil action. 
{¶ 19} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY and FRENCH, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, LANZINGER, and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 20} I respectfully dissent and would reverse the judgment of the court 
of appeals.  I would apply Hageman v. Southwest Gen. Health Ctr., 119 Ohio 
St.3d 185, 2008-Ohio-3343, 893 N.E.2d 153,  to reaffirm that “waiver of medical 
confidentiality for litigation purposes is limited to the specific case for which the 
records are sought * * *.”  Id. at ¶ 20.  The medical records in this case are 
protected by the physician- patient privilege, for although Laurence filed a cross-
claim in this case, the cross-claim did not place Laurence’s medical condition at 
issue. 
Hageman v. Southwest Gen. Health Ctr. 
{¶ 21} In Hageman, we affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals that 
reversed the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of an attorney who 
January Term, 2013 
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had disclosed an opposing party’s medical records without authorization.  We 
held that “[a]n attorney may be liable to an opposing party for the unauthorized 
disclosure of that party's medical information that was obtained through 
litigation.”  Id. at syllabus. 
{¶ 22} The attorney, who represented the wife in a divorce and custody 
proceeding, obtained the husband’s medical records from his psychiatrist pursuant 
to a waiver.  Later, the attorney gave a copy of those records to the prosecutor for 
use in a criminal proceeding against the husband. Writing for a plurality of the 
court, Chief Justice Moyer first set forth the basic policy of confidentiality 
established in Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 86 Ohio St.3d 395, 715 N.E.2d 518 
(1999).  He observed, “If the right to confidentiality is to mean anything, an 
individual must be able to direct the disclosure of his or her own private 
information.”  Hageman at ¶ 13.  In rejecting the same expansive waiver for 
medical records that the appellees now urge in this case, Chief Justice Moyer 
stated that “there is neither a legal justification for nor a practical benefit to the 
proposition that a waiver for a specific, limited purpose is a waiver for another 
purpose.”  Id. at ¶ 14. He explained that “[c]reating an expansive waiver would be 
inconsistent with the generally recognized confidentiality provisions in Ohio and 
federal law.”  Id. at ¶ 15.  Although the husband admitted that he had made his 
health an issue in the divorce action by filing a cross-claim seeking custody of his 
minor child, the waiver of the medical privilege was limited to that case and was 
not effective in the second. 
{¶ 23} The majority opinion in the instant case does not take a position on 
the application of Hageman, although it sets forth the parties’ arguments with 
respect to this earlier case.  I believe that the reasoning expressed in Hageman 
should apply here as well for the protection of the confidentiality of medical 
records.  Laurence originally waived her privilege in a separate action that was 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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eventually dismissed.  She did not file this second case.  She filed only a cross-
claim for indemnification. 
{¶ 24} The filing of a cross-claim in an indemnification action is not “any 
other type of civil action” that provides an exception to the physician-patient 
privilege within the meaning of R.C. 2317.02(B)(1)(a)(iii).  When read in context, 
that section relates to claims in which the patient has placed her medical condition 
at issue and states that the testimonial privilege will not apply if:  
 
a medical claim, dental claim, chiropractic claim, or optometric 
claim, as defined in section 2305.113 of the Revised Code, an 
action for wrongful death, any other type of civil action, or a claim 
under Chapter 4123. of the Revised Code is filed by the patient, the 
personal representative of the estate of the patient if deceased, or 
the patient's guardian or other legal representative. 
  
{¶ 25} In Hageman, although the vote on the ultimate issue was split, all 
justices agreed that the husband had waived his physician-patient privilege when 
he filed a counterclaim that placed his medical condition at issue.  See id. at ¶ 14 
(Moyer, C.J., joined by Pfeifer and Lanzinger, JJ.); ¶ 23 (Cupp, J., concurring in 
syllabus and judgment only, joined by O’Connor, J.); and ¶ 32 (O’Donnell, J., 
dissenting, joined by Lundberg Stratton, J.).  That counterclaim is properly seen 
as an “other type of civil action” within the meaning of the statute.  But I now 
respectfully disagree that the phrase “any other type of civil action” was meant to 
extend to every type of claim, particularly a claim such as the cross-claim in this 
case, which  does not relate to a personal injury or other health issue but merely to 
indemnification or contribution. 
{¶ 26} Laurence’s medical condition is not at issue.  Her medical records 
are protected by R.C. 2317.02(B)(1), and the privilege was not waived in this 
January Term, 2013 
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pending lawsuit.  She is entitled to a protective order, and on these grounds, I 
dissent. 
PFEIFER, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
 
Smith Marshall L.L.P., and Philip J. Weaver, for appellees Todd L. 
Leopold and Linda Leopold. 
 
Ritter, Robinson, McCready & James, Ltd., and Shannon J. George; and 
Bruce S. Goldstein Co., L.P.A., and Bruce S. Goldstein, for appellant. 
 
Reminger Co., L.P.A., and Brian D. Sullivan, Kenneth P. Abbarno, and 
Martin T. Galvin, for appellees Stephen L. Stillwagon, Ace Doran Rigging & 
Hauling Company, and Ace Doran Brokerage Company. 
________________________