Case Title: Ex parte Davian Rashaud Cooper. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1080364

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2009-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:6/26/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1080364
____________________
Ex parte Davian Rashaud Cooper
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Davian Rashaud Cooper
v.
State of Alabama)
(Houston Circuit Court, CC-06-1409; CC-06-1410; CC-06-1411;
and CC-06-1412;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-07-0498)
STUART, Justice.
1080364
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1
2
On July 27, 2006, Davian Rashaud Cooper was arrested and
charged 
with 
several 
counts 
of 
first-degree 
robbery,
violations of § 13A-8-41, Ala. Code 1975.  That same day,
after he had been advised of his Miranda  rights and had
1
acknowledged and signed a waiver-of-rights form, Cooper made
two statements to law-enforcement officers.  An initial-
appearance hearing was conducted, and on July 28, 2006, an
attorney was appointed to represent Cooper.  On August 1,
2006, Cooper made a third statement to law-enforcement
officers and admitted his participation in the charged
offenses.  On October 21, 2006, Cooper was indicted for four
counts of first-degree robbery.
Before his trial, Cooper moved to suppress the statement
he made on August 1.  He argued that that statement was made
while he was represented by counsel, that counsel was not
present when he made the statement, and that "there was no
waiver of the right to counsel" before he made the statement.
The trial court denied Cooper's motion to suppress and
admitted the August 1 statement at trial.  Cooper was
1080364
3
convicted of four counts of first-degree robbery and was
sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment for each conviction.
Cooper appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, arguing
that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence his
August 1 statement.  Specifically, he contended that because
an attorney had been appointed to represent him when he made
the August 1 statement, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
had attached and his right to have counsel present while he
was interviewed was violated.  Cooper conceded before the
Court of Criminal Appeals that the Alabama Supreme Court had
already rejected the same argument in Ex parte Stewart, 853
So. 2d 901 (Ala. 2002).  In an unpublished memorandum, the
Court of Criminal Appeals, recognizing that that court was
bound by the decision of this Court, affirmed Cooper's
convictions, holding that the trial court had not erred in
admitting Cooper's August 1 statement at trial.  Cooper v.
State (No. CR-07-0498, September 19, 2008), ___ So. 3d ___
(Ala. Crim. App. 2008)(table). 
Cooper petitioned this Court for certiorari review, and
we granted the writ to address the sole question whether in
light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
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4
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Texas, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct.
2578 (2008), this Court must overrule Ex parte Stewart, supra.
In Ex parte Stewart, this Court addressed whether a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at the
initial appearance.  Stewart was charged with first-degree
robbery.  The district court conducted an initial appearance,
pursuant to Rule 4.4, Ala. R. Crim. P., and appointed counsel
from the public defender's office to represent Stewart.
Stewart, unable to post bail, remained in jail.  Before his
preliminary hearing, two police officers interviewed Stewart.
The officers informed Stewart of his Miranda rights and
Stewart signed a waiver of his Miranda rights.  During the
interview, Stewart confessed to committing the robbery.
Before his trial, Stewart moved to suppress his confession on
the ground that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was
violated because, although counsel had been appointed to
represent him, he was questioned without counsel being
present. 
 
Arguing 
that 
the 
initial 
appearance 
began
adversarial proceedings against him, Stewart maintained that
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at that time and
that counsel should have been present at the interview.  The
1080364
5
trial court denied his motion.  The Court of Criminal Appeals,
in an unpublished memorandum, affirmed the trial court's
judgment, holding that Stewart's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel had not attached at the initial appearance and,
consequently, that his Sixth Amendment rights were not
violated when law-enforcement officers questioned him without
counsel present after counsel had been appointed to represent
him.  Stewart v. State (No. CR-00-2136, February 22, 2002),
854 So. 2d 1217 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002)(table).  
Stewart then petitioned this Court, and we granted
certiorari review to consider whether a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches at an initial hearing.
This Court recognized the holding of the United States Supreme
Court in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), that the
right to counsel did not attach before the "initiation of
adversary criminal proceedings" and that, even when the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attached, it did not protect the
defendant at all postattachment proceedings, unless the
proceeding constituted a "critical stage."  We further
recognized that at an initial appearance, conducted pursuant
to Rule 4.4, Ala. R. Crim. P., the court informed the
1080364
6
defendant of the charges against him or her and of the
defendant's right to representation by counsel, right to
remain silent, and right to a preliminary hearing.  We held
that the right to counsel did not attach at the initial
appearance, stating:
"The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches
only after the commencement of adverse judicial
criminal proceedings against the defendant.  Because
an initial appearance is an informational proceeding
designed to protect the rights of the accused and
does 
not 
constitute 
a 
'critical' 
pretrial
proceeding, the right to counsel does not attach at
that time."
Ex parte Stewart, 853 So. 2d at 905. 
In Rothgery, the United States Supreme Court considered
whether a defendant's right to counsel attached at a
proceeding before a magistrate conducted pursuant to the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 14.06(a).  At this proceeding
a probable-cause determination is made, bail is set, and a
defendant is informed of the accusation against him or her.
The United States Supreme Court held that a defendant's right
to counsel attached at this initial appearance, stating:
"Attachment occurs when the government has used the
judicial machinery to signal a commitment to
prosecute ....  Once attachment occurs, the accused
at least is entitled to the presence of appointed
counsel 
during 
any 
'critical 
stage' 
of 
the
1080364
7
postattachment proceedings; what makes a stage
critical is what shows the need for counsel's
presence. ...
"....
"... 
[A] 
criminal 
defendant's 
initial 
appearance
before a judicial officer, where he learns the
charge against him and his liberty is subject to
restriction, marks the start of adversary judicial
proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel."
___ U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 2591-92.  With this holding, the
United States Supreme Court unequivocally defined the point at
which a defendant's right to counsel attaches in criminal
proceedings.
  
In light of the fact that in Alabama the defendant is
informed of the charges against him or her and the conditions
of release are determined at an initial appearance, see Rule
4.4, Ala. R. Crim. P., we must overrule Ex parte Stewart to
the extent that it states that a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel does not attach at the initial appearance.
In accordance with Rothgery, we hold that a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches at the initial appearance.
However, as the United States Supreme Court recognized in
Rothgery, in practice Alabama is consistent with the
principles set forth in Rothgery with regard to "when" the
1080364
8
defendant must be informed of his or her right to either
retained or appointed counsel.  In Rothgery, the United States
Supreme Court held that "counsel must be appointed within a
reasonable time after attachment to allow for adequate
representation at any critical stage before trial, as well as
at trial itself."   ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 2591.  Rule
4.4(a)(3), Ala. R. Crim. P., specifically provides that the
judge or magistrate presiding over the initial appearance must
inform the defendant of his or her right to retained or
appointed counsel.  During or after the initial appearance, if
a defendant establishes that he or she is indigent and unable
to obtain counsel, the procedure in Alabama  is for the court
to appoint counsel to represent the defendant.  Thus, in
practice, Alabama has been acting in accordance with the
principles set forth in Rothgery.
Moreover, our holdings in Ex parte Stewart that a
defendant's initial appearance conducted pursuant to Rule 4.4,
Ala. R. Crim. P., is not a critical stage in the proceedings
against the defendant and that a defendant is not entitled to
the assistance of counsel at the initial appearance do not
conflict with Rothgery and remain the law in this State.  See
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9
Rothgery, ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 2591 (noting that "the
attachment question (whether formal judicial proceedings have
begun)" is distinct from "the 'critical stage' question
(whether counsel must be present at postattachment proceedings
unless the right to assistance is validly waived)").
In this case, Cooper's right to counsel with regard to
the robbery offenses attached at the initial appearance.  See
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991)(holding that
"[t]he Sixth Amendment right [to counsel] ... is offense
specific" and the attachment of the right to counsel applies
only to the offenses upon which a prosecution has commenced).
See also Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167-68 (2001).
Moreover, the police interrogation of Cooper on August 1 was
a "critical stage" in the criminal prosecution of the robbery
offenses, and Cooper, absent a valid waiver, had the right to
have counsel present at the interrogation regarding those
offenses. 
 
See 
Brewer 
v. 
Williams, 
430 
U.S. 
307
(1977)(holding, absent a valid waiver, a defendant's right to
counsel was violated where judicial proceedings had been
initiated and counsel was not present when a confession was
obtained).
1080364
10
While this Court was conducting its examination of the
record in this case, the United States Supreme Court issued a
decision in Montejo v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2079
(2009).  The facts in Montejo are similar to the facts in this
case.  Counsel was appointed for Montejo at his preliminary
hearing, at which he was informed that he was being charged
with first-degree murder.  The police, unaware that counsel
had been appointed for Montejo, approached Montejo, who was in
confinement, and requested that he accompany them to locate
the murder weapon.  The police read Montejo his Miranda
rights, and he agreed to go with them.  During the excursion,
Montejo wrote an inculpatory letter of apology to the victim's
widow.  At trial Montejo argued that the letter should be
suppressed because the police had initiated the interrogation
after his right to counsel had attached.  See Michigan v.
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986)(holding that "if police
initiate interrogation after a defendant's assertion, at an
arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel,
any waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that
police-initiated interrogation is invalid").   The letter was
admitted at trial, and Montejo was convicted.  The Louisiana
1080364
11
Supreme Court affirmed Montejo's conviction, rejecting his
argument that under the Jackson rule the letter should have
been suppressed.  Louisiana v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238 (La.
2008).  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
review and overruled Jackson.  Specifically, the United States
Supreme Court rejected the Jackson Court's conclusion that a
defendant's request for counsel at an arraignment was an
invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at every
subsequent critical stage in the prosecution and held that "it
would be completely unjustified to presume that a defendant's
consent to police-initiated interrogation was involuntary or
coerced simply because [the defendant] had previously been
appointed a lawyer." Montejo, ___ U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at
2088.  The United States Supreme Court held that after the
right to counsel has attached, "a defendant who does not want
to speak to the police without counsel present need only say
as much when he is first approached and given the Miranda
warnings."  Montejo, ___ U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2089.
Thus, a court must no longer presume a waiver of a right to
counsel executed after the right to counsel has attached is
invalid.  A defendant must invoke his or her right to counsel,
1080364
12
even if the right to counsel has attached and counsel has been
appointed, and law-enforcement officers must have ignored that
invocation to warrant consideration of the issue whether the
defendant's waiver of his or her right to counsel is invalid.
In Montejo, the United States Supreme Court recognized
that its holding in that case "changed the legal landscape"
and that remand of the case was proper to determine whether
Montejo had made a clear assertion of his right to counsel
when the officers approached him for questioning after his
right 
to 
counsel 
had 
attached. 
Like the decision in Montejo,
our decision to overrule Ex parte Stewart has changed the
legal landscape.  Because of the limited scope of our
certiorari review, see Ex parte Franklin, 502 So. 2d 828 (Ala.
1987)(recognizing that this court can address only those
issues that are pleaded in the petition as grounds for
certiorari review), we cannot reach the merits of the issue
whether Cooper validly waived his right to have counsel
present during the August 1 interrogation and, consequently,
whether the trial court properly admitted into evidence
Cooper's August 1 statement.  We, therefore, remand this case
to the Court of Criminal Appeals for such a determination.  
1080364
13
The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is
reversed, and this case is remanded for proceedings consistent
with this opinion. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Woodall, Smith, Bolin, and Parker, JJ., concur.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, J., concur in the rationale in
part and concur in the result.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.
Shaw, J., recuses himself.*
_________________
*Justice Shaw was a member of the Court of Criminal
Appeals when that court considered this case.
1080364
14
LYONS, Justice (concurring in the rationale in part and
concurring in the result).
I concur in the main opinion except to the extent it
discusses the continued efficacy of Ex parte Stewart, 853 So.
2d 901 (Ala. 2002).  The main opinion states that this Court's
holdings in Ex parte Stewart, that an initial appearance is
not a critical stage in the criminal proceedings and that a
defendant is not entitled to the assistance of counsel at the
initial appearance, ___ So. 3d at ___, remain the law in this
State.  As to that discussion I concur only in the result
reached in this case, lest I be understood as retreating from
the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Ex parte
Stewart.  See Ex parte Stewart, 853 So. 2d at 905 (Lyons, J.,
dissenting) ("If Stewart's initial appearance had gone no
further [than merely being informed of his constitutional
rights], I would agree with the main opinion that an attorney
would be unnecessary to protect Stewart at his initial
appearance where it does not appear that the prosecutor was
present. However, in this case something more than advice as
to constitutional rights transpired at the appearance.
Stewart's initial appearance before the district court was the
1080364
15
first proceeding in which Stewart could challenge the amount
of bail set in his case. The State, in its brief, failed to
accord any significance to this fact, and the main opinion
dismisses this fact in one paragraph.").
Cobb, C.J., concurs.