Case Title: PHILIP and FREDDIE WILSON V. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF TETON, a political Subdivision of the State of Wyoming

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-03-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
PHILIP and FREDDIE WILSON V. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF TETON, a political Subdivision of the State of Wyoming2007 WY 42153 P.3d 917Case Number: 05-213Decided: 03/14/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
PHILIP 
and FREDDIE WILSON,

 
 
Appellants

(Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
BOARD OF 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF TETON, a political Subdivision of the 
State of Wyoming,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofTetonCounty

The 
Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Karen 
Budd-Falen and Brandon L. Jensen of Budd-Falen Law Offices, LLC, Cheyenne, WY.  
Argument by Mr. Jensen.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

James L. 
Radda, Deputy Teton County Attorney, Jackson, WY.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      On May 7, 2004, 
Appellants, Phillip and Freddie Wilson (Wilsons), filed a declaratory judgment 
action seeking a declaration from the district court:  (1) That Division 4300 of the Teton 
County Comprehensive Plan and Land Development Regulations (LDR or LDRs) 
(entitled "Open Space Standards"), which requires a developer to set aside open 
space within any proposed residential subdivision development is facially 
unconstitutional (as a taking without compensation) and, hence, unenforceable; 
(2) that Section 4330.D.3., which requires the developer to convey an easement 
for any open space within the residential subdivision development to a qualified 
organization (giving that organization authority to enforce the open space 
restriction), is unconstitutional on its face; (3) that Section 4330.D.3. of the 
LDRs (if not unconstitutional) is ultra 
vires and beyond the powers conferred upon Teton County by law; and (4) that 
Section 49440 of the Teton County LDRs (entitled "Calculation of Affordable 
Housing Standards for Residential Development") is facially unconstitutional (as 
a taking without compensation) and, hence, unenforceable.  In addition, the Wilsons sought a court order enjoining TetonCounty from further enforcing the 
provisions of the disputed LDRs.

 
 
[¶2]      By order entered 
on March 21, 2005, the district court granted Appellee's, Board of County 
Commissioners of the County of Teton (Teton County), motion to dismiss Counts 1, 
2, and 4 pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted).  With 
respect to Count 3, TetonCounty filed a motion for summary judgment 
and on July 18, 2005, the district court entered its order granting that 
motion.  We will affirm the district 
court's orders on the basis that the Wilsons' claims are untimely, and they do not 
currently have standing to make a facial challenge to the constitutionality of 
the Teton County LDRs or to otherwise challenge the orders of the district 
court.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      The Wilsons raise these 
issues:

 
 
            
A.  Whether the United States Supreme Court's standards with 
regard to the conditional granting of a development permit, as set forth in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 
483 U.S. 825 (1987) and Dolan v City of 
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), apply to Teton County's regulations 
conditioning subdivision approval?

            
B.  Whether [Wilsons'] takings 
challenge is ripe for review even though TetonCounty has not been provided an 
opportunity to avoid an "unconstitutional application" of the challenged 
regulations?

            
C.  Whether TetonCounty's subdivision regulations fail to 
substantially relate to a legitimate government interest?

            
D.  Whether Section 4300.D.3 of TetonCounty's subdivision regulations provides 
for an unlawful physical appropriation of property?

            
E.  Whether TetonCounty has express or implied authority to 
require the conveyance of rights to enforce open space restrictions to an 
organization qualified and dedicated to preserving the values intended by the 
open space restrictions?

            
F.  Whether [Wilsons'] claims and allegations are barred by 
the statute of limitations, the doctrine of equitable estoppel, or 
laches?

 
 

Teton 
County offers 
this statement of the issues:

 
 
            
1.  Whether the heightened judicial scrutiny required by Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commissionand Dolan v. City of 
Tigard...applies to Teton County's open space and affordable housing 
regulations, which are legislatively adopted, non-discretionary (formula-based 
or quantitative) land use regulations?

            
2.  Whether the "rough proportionality" and "individualized 
determinations" standards of Dolan 
can ever be challenged facially?

            
3.  Whether a challenge to the facial constitutionality of a 
land use regulation is ever tenable where the very terms of the challenged 
regulation permit those who administer it to avoid an unconstitutional 
application?

            
4.  Whether the Wilsons' taking and substantive due process 
claims are barred by laches?

            
5.  Whether Teton County's open space and affordable housing 
regulations comply with substantive due process?

            
6.  Whether Section 4330.D. results in a physical invasion of 
property under the Takings Clause?

            
7.  Whether Wyo. Stat. § 18-5-201 impliedly authorizes Teton 
County to require the conveyance of rights, in perpetuity, to enforce open space 
restrictions to an organization qualified and dedicated to preserving the values 
intended by the restrictions?

            
8.  Whether the conveyance of such rights in perpetuity 
unlawfully deprives future boards of county commissioners from acting in the 
public good?

            
9.  Whether there is anything about requiring the conveyance of 
rights, in perpetuity, to enforce open space restrictions pursuant to a 
development option that contravenes public policy?

            
10.  Whether the statute of limitations bars the Wilsons' ultra vires 
claims?

            
11.  Whether equitable estoppel bars the Wilsons' ultra vires 
claims?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶4]      The Wilsons filed a complaint 
for declaratory relief on May 7, 2004, seeking to declare portions of the Teton 
County LDRs "unconstitutional, ultra 
vires, and consequently unenforceable."  It is undisputed that the LDRs at issue 
were adopted by TetonCounty on May 9, 1994.  The Wilsons contended that, on the face of the matter, the LDRs 
effected an uncompensated taking of private property (denied Wilsons the economically 
beneficial use of their property or were a physical taking) and, therefore, were 
facially unconstitutional.  The 
Wilsons also 
contended that the LDRs did not "substantially advance a legitimate state 
interest, maintain an essential nexus' with a  legitimate state interest, or bear some 
roughly proportional relationship to the burden on the landowner."  The Wilsons asked the district court to enjoin TetonCounty from "further use, implementation, 
or enforcement" of the LDRs.  One of 
the central complaints voiced by the Wilsons was that, under the LDRs, approval of 
their Hog Island Subdivision (Subdivision) was contingent upon them setting 
aside ten acres of mandatory open space and approximately five acres for 
affordable housing units.

 
 
[¶5]      The Subdivision 
consists of approximately forty acres and is located in TetonCounty 
about eight miles south of Jackson along U.S. Highway 89.  The plat for the Subdivision was 
approved on October 19, 1999.  As 
approved, the Subdivision was split into a thirty-acre parcel for residential 
development and ten acres of mandatory open space.  The thirty residential acres were 
divided into eighteen residential lots.  
Three of the lots were sold as "affordable housing" (value set by 
TetonCounty at $40,000, $50,000, 
and $60,000).  Three of the lots 
were sold as "attainable housing" ($80,000 apiece).  Lot eighteen is reserved for current 
occupation and use by the Wilsons' construction business.  The business enjoys grandfathered status 
at that location.  The Wilsons sold four of the 
remaining lots, and three were gifted to their children.  Four of the lots remained unsold at the 
time the complaint was filed.  At 
the time the instant complaint was filed, the Wilsons purported to be pursuing administrative remedies 
against TetonCounty because of the 
unconstitutional standards that deprived them of the economically beneficial use 
of their property.  If there has 
been any progress with respect to that matter in the interim, it has not been 
reported to this Court.

 
 
[¶6]      Under the LDRs, 
the Wilsons were 
required to devote 25% (10 acres) of the acreage within their subdivision to 
open space.  The Wilsons' open space (which 
they continue to own and from which they may bar the public) is designated as a 
"hay pasture" and "arena area."  Of 
course, it is subject to the limiting easement that requires that it remain a 
hay pasture or some other approved open space use.  It is this limitation on its use that 
the Wilsons 
contend amounts to a "taking" as contemplated by the Takings Clause of the 
United States Constitution.  The 
Wilsons were 
also required to devote 15% of their subdivision to affordable or attainable 
housing and they characterize this as a "taking" as well.

 
 
[¶7]      The Teton County 
LDRs were enacted on May 9, 1994, and constitute a regulatory system which 
purports to protect the health, safety, and general welfare of the citizens of 
TetonCounty.  Specific goals were 
these:

 
 
a.  To 
maintain a sense of place and of community, and a way of life based upon 
TetonCounty's western 
heritage;

 
 
b.  To 
protect TetonCounty's natural and scenic 
resources, including wildlife, as a primary element of community 
character;

 
 
c.  To 
maintain social and economic diversity;

 
 
d.  To 
maintain a balance between visitation and community life; 
and

 
 
e.  To 
preserve the character of some existing neighborhoods and commercial centers and 
to enhance others through redevelopment.

 
 
[¶8]      In addition, the 
Comprehensive Plan and Land Development Regulations set these 
objectives:

 
 
a.  Maintain 
open space in continuous tracts to allow the continuation of agricultural 
options and to protect rural character where appropriate;

 
 
b.  Protect 
key natural resources and features;

 
 
c.  Identify 
and protect critical wildlife habitat and migration 
corridors;

 
 
d.  Protect 
key scenic vistas and scenic areas;

 
 
e.  Establish 
the spatial and functional relationships of structures to a site as the basis 
for regulating development; and

 
 
f.  Facilitate 
the protection of important natural, scenic, and agricultural areas through 
conservation easements to the extent that minimum development may be allowed on 
sensitive parcels to facilitate protection of large parcels. 
[5]

 
 
[¶9]      The Wilsons 
contend that there can be no justifiable need for additional "open space" in 
Teton County because 97% of it is already designated as National Park, National 
Forest, National Elk Refuge wilderness areas, and other public lands.  Moreover, they contend owners are given 
no compensation for the property that is required to be devoted to open 
spaces.  In addition, the open space 
is supervised by an organization "qualified and dedicated" to preserving the 
values intended by the restrictions on open spaces.  With respect to affordable housing, the 
Wilsons contend 
that developers are required to set aside 15% of the lands to be developed as 
affordable housing without there being any specific demonstration of a need for 
it arising from their particular development, nor any compensation for it.  The LDRs, however, state the factual 
basis that TetonCounty relied upon in 
adopting this portion of the LDRs, i.e., that luxury/vacation-home development 
creates a need for affordable and attainable housing that can be set at about 
15% of luxury/vacation-home development.  
The Wilsons contend that this formulaic approach 
deprives them of individualized consideration and that it is not "roughly 
proportional" to any need that their development might have 
created.

 
 
[¶10]   No fact-finding was done by the 
district court, and it is the Wilsons' position that none need be done.  That is, they argue that it is evident 
upon the face of the LDRs that they violate the constitutional principles 
articulated by the Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause.  TetonCounty filed a motion to dismiss with 
respect to Counts 1, 2, and 4 of the complaint and answered with respect to 
Count 3.  Nine documents drawn from 
the LDRs were attached to the motion to dismiss as exhibits.  The Wilsons filed a motion to strike the exhibits 
numbered 3 through 9, as well as a responsive pleading asking that the motion to 
dismiss be denied.  The district 
court denied the Wilsons' motion to strike exhibits 3 through 
9.1  It is only because these exhibits are in 
the record that we are able to even consider, as a general matter, the issues 
raised by the Wilsons in their complaint as well as in this 
appeal.  It would, indeed, be very 
difficult to consider the LDRs' facial constitutionality if we did not see the 
"face" of the LDRs in context.  
Moreover, it is in the consideration of the totality of the LDRs included 
in the record that we find the basis for resolving this appeal short of giving a 
substantive answer to the Wilsons' ultimate question.  The district court granted TetonCounty's motion to dismiss Counts 1, 2, 
and 4 on March 21, 2005.  TetonCounty filed a motion for summary judgment 
with respect to Count 3.  The 
district court granted that motion by order entered on July 18, 2005.  The Wilsons' notice of appeal was filed on August 
17, 2005.  The case was argued 
before the Court on February 15, 2006, and we took the matter under advisement 
on that date.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶11]   We review the district court's 
orders granting dismissal of portions of the complaint and summary judgment with 
respect to others, wherein questions of law were decided, de novo.  Black v. Williams Insulation Co., Inc., 
2006 WY 106, ¶ 7, 141 P.3d 123, 127 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
THE 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

 
 
[¶12]   Below, we set out some of the 
analytical tools that will apply to the disposition of the issues raised in this 
case.  With respect to a district 
court's grant of a motion to dismiss under W.R.C.P. 12 (b)(6) and the granting 
of a motion for summary judgment, we have held:

 
 
When 
reviewing W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, we accept the facts stated in 
the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.  Duncan v. Afton, Inc., 991 P.2d 739, 741-42 
(Wyo.1999).  We will sustain such a 
dismissal when it is certain from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff 
cannot assert any fact which would entitle him to relief.  Id.; see also Robinson v. Pacificorp, 10 P.3d 1133, 1135-36 (Wyo.2000).  However, 
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is converted to a W.R.C.P. 56 motion for 
summary judgment if materials outside the pleadings are considered.  Stalkup v. State Dept. of Envtl. 
Quality, 838 P.2d 705, 709 (Wyo.1992).  
In this instance it is clear the district court considered materials 
outside the pleadings.  Thus, we 
apply the standard of review for summary judgment.  Under this standard we examine the 
record from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion 
and give that party the benefit of all the favorable inferences which may be 
fairly drawn.  Castleberry v. Phelan, 2004 WY 151, 
¶ 8, 101 P.3d 460, 462 (Wyo.2004).  
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  Id.

 
 

Ballinger 
v. Thompson, 2005 
WY 101, ¶ 9, 118 P.3d 429, 433 (Wyo. 2005); also see Askvig v. Wells Fargo Bank Wyoming, 
N.A., 2005 WY 138, ¶ 11, 121 P.3d 783, 787 (Wyo. 2005); Wilson v. Town of Alpine, 2005 WY 57, 
¶ 4, 111 P.3d 290, 291 (Wyo. 2005); and Simon v. Teton Board of Realtors, 4 P.3d 197, 200 (Wyo. 2000).

 
 
[¶13]   Because of the disposition upon 
which we have settled, we will not consider the constitutional challenge 
propounded by the Wilsons.

 
 
DISPOSITVE 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶14]   Before we may reach the heart of 
this controversy, there are several preliminary issues we must address.  This, of course, is premised on the 
principle that we will not address constitutional issues if we are able to 
resolve the case on other grounds.  
State ex rel. Wyoming Department of Revenue v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Company, 2003 WY 54, ¶ 43, 67 P.3d 1176, 1190-91 (Wyo. 2003) 
(and cases cited therein); compare In re 
RM, 2004 WY 162, ¶¶ 8, 30-39, 102 P.3d 868, 871, 877-80 (Wyo. 
2004).

 
 
[¶15]   Of particular importance to these 
considerations is Section 5190, BENEFICIAL USE DETERMINATION, of the TetonCounty plan, which 
provides:

 
 
If after 
the submission and decision on the appropriate application for development 
permits for a plan for development of land, a landowner in the unincorporated 
County is of the opinion that an economically beneficial use of that landowner's 
land has been denied by the application of these Land Development Regulations, 
then the procedures of this Section shall be used prior to seeking relief from 
the courts in order that any denial of economically beneficial use of land may 
be remedied through a nonjudicial forum.

 
 
[¶16]   That section goes on to spell out a 
detailed and expeditious application and hearing procedure.  The "Beneficial use standards" are of 
particular importance:

 
 
C.  Beneficial use standards.  In 
determining if a landowner has been deprived of an economically beneficial use 
of land, the Hearing Officer and Board of County Commissioners shall take into 
account the following factors:

            
1.  Economically viable use.  In 
making the determination of whether the land is provided an economically viable 
use, the Hearing Officer/Board of CountyCommissioners shall first evaluate the 
uses of the land as provided by these Land Development Regulations, and the uses 
of land in relation to the uses provided similarly situated lands.  For the purposes of this Section, 
economically viable use means the opportunity to make a return equivalent to 
that which would have been received from a conservative financial 
investment.  Transitory economic 
issues shall not be relevant to this determination.

            
2.  Diminution in 
value.  The market value of the land, as established by the 
comparable sales approach, prior to adoption of these Land Development 
Regulations which caused the landowner to apply for relief shall be compared to 
the market value of the land, as established by the comparable sales approach, 
with the regulations as applied.  
Market value of the land prior to the adoption of the Land Development 
Regulations shall constitute its highest and best use on March 11, 1991 or the 
date of purchase of the land, whichever is later, and any other land 
value/appraisal information that the 
applicant would like to be considered.  
All appraisals shall be proposed by qualified licensed appraisers, and 
shall follow the best professional practices as established by the 
profession.  A mere diminution in 
market value is not sufficient to support a determination of denial of 
economically beneficial use; the diminution must be so substantial that it 
effectively deprives the landowner of any material use or enjoyment of the land, 
commensurate with any reasonable investment backed expectations, if 
any.

 
 
3.  External costs

 
 
a.  Subsidy.  The amount or 
nature of any subsidy that may be required by Teton County, neighbors, 
purchasers, tenants, or the public at large if the uses allowed under these Land 
Development Regulations are modified.

 
 
b.  Other adverse effects.  Any 
other adverse effects on the County or its residents.

 
 
4.  Current state of the 
law.  The state of the law established by the United States 
Supreme Court, the 10th Circuit Federal Court of Appeals, and the 
Wyoming Supreme Court relevant to these standards.

 
 
If, 
after a hearing, it is determined that the landowner has been deprived of the 
economically beneficial use of land, then the landowner is entitled to 
relief.

 
 
[¶17]   Teton County also points out that 
Section 5160, Variances, provides that landowners may be entitled to relief from 
the LDRs when, "owing to special circumstances or conditions, the literal 
enforcement of the provisions of these Land Development Regulations would result 
in undue and unnecessary hardship."

 
 
[¶18]   Finally, TetonCounty 
contends that a constitutional question might have been avoided had the 
Wilsons applied 
for treatment under Section 49450.C., Payment of in-lieu 
fee.

 
 
[¶19]   The gist of TetonCounty's argument is that, because the Wilsons failed to take 
advantage of these administrative remedies, this Court should decline to 
consider the constitutional challenges.  
That is, if a beneficial use determination were made, a variance granted, 
and/or an appropriate in-lieu fee paid, then the LDRs would not be 
unconstitutional, and that is one of the purposes of those sections of the 
LDRs.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶20]   The Wilsons presented their Hog Island Subdivision 
plan to the County, including a specific election of options under the LDRs 
which allowed for greater dwelling unit density (i.e. more lots on the land), in 
exchange for setting aside a greater amount of open space than was otherwise 
required.  In addition, the LDRs 
required some provision for affordable housing.  The Wilsons' final subdivision plan approved by the 
County in October of 1999, included ten acres of open space and reservation of 
some lots for affordable housing.

 
 
[¶21]   The Wilsons did not appeal the conditions imposed 
on their Subdivision or otherwise contest the validity of the open space or 
affordable housing regulations at that time.  Instead, they took advantage of the 
benefits of the regulations by developing the Subdivision with greater dwelling 
unit density and conveying most of the lots.  The language of the open space easement 
specifically describes the Wilsons' motivations at the time they sought 
approval of their plat that included open space and affordable housing 
conditions.  The easement, which 
identifies the Wilsons as grantor and the Teton County Scenic Preserve Trust as 
grantee, states in pertinent part:

 
 
WHEREAS, 
the Teton County Land Development Regulations permit an increase in development 
potential in exchange for preservation of open space; and

 
 
WHEREAS, 
the Grantor desires to preserve and protect the natural scenic and agricultural 
values of the property and to take advantage of an increase in development 
potential in exchange for doing so; and 

 
 
WHEREAS, 
the Grantor is willing to preserve ten (10) acres of property of open space in 
consideration for the ability to develop an eighteen (18) lot residential 
subdivision on the property.

 
 
NOW, 
THEREFORE, in consideration of the increase in development potential to which 
the Grantor shall be entitled by TetonCounty's Land Development Regulations . . 
. Grantor grants and conveys Grantee an Open Space 
Easement.

 
 
[¶22]   Over a year after the Subdivision 
had been approved, the Wilsons commenced an administrative proceeding 
pursuant to the LDRs contesting the County's conditions on their 
Subdivision.  According to the 
Wilsons, that 
administrative proceeding is still pending.  On May 7, 2004, approximately four and a 
half years after the Subdivision was approved, the Wilsons filed the 
declaratory judgment action at issue here.  
When they filed this action, all but four of the lots in the Subdivision 
had been sold, gifted, or reserved for their business.  In their complaint, the Wilsons argued the land 
use regulations requiring open space and affordable housing were facially 
unconstitutional and they had suffered an unconstitutional taking when the 
County conditioned the approval of their Subdivision upon their compliance with 
those requirements.  The County 
objected to the Wilsons' declaratory judgment action because it 
was filed so long after approval of the Subdivision and challenged it on the 
bases of estoppel, laches, and/or waiver.  
We conclude that these defenses, whether considered singly, or in 
combination, provide an appropriate basis for affirming the district court's 
orders.

 
 

[¶23]   In Pfeiffer 
v. City of La 
Mesa, 137 Cal. Rptr. 804 (Cal.App. 1977), the city conditioned 
the landowners' building permit by requiring them to grant an easement to the 
city and construct a storm drain on their property.  Although the landowners disagreed with 
the condition, they did not undertake any legal action to have it removed or 
declared invalid at that time, but, instead, complied with it "under protest" 
and went forth with their project.  Later, the landowners commenced an 
inverse condemnation action against the city.  The trial court granted the city a 
judgment on the pleadings, and the landowners appealed.  The California court of appeals addressed the 
issue of "whether a landowner can comply with a condition under protest,' 
construct the required improvement, and then maintain an action in inverse 
condemnation to recover his costs."    The court held the 
landowners should have availed themselves of the procedures to challenge the 
conditions before complying with them and was unconvinced by their argument that 
they were compelled to accept the conditions by their economic needs to continue 
with the construction.  The court 
said:  "If every owner who disagrees 
with the conditions of a permit could unilaterally decide to comply with them 
under protest, do the work, and file an action in inverse condemnation on the 
theory of economic coercion, complete chaos would result in the administration 
of this important aspect of municipal affairs."  Id. 
at 806.  "It is fundamental that a 
landowner who accepts a building permit and complies with its conditions waives 
the right to assert the invalidity of the conditions and sue the issuing 
authority for the costs of complying with them."    Id. at 805; see also, County of Imperial v. 
McDougal, 564 P.2d 14, 18 (Cal. 1977); 
Schott v. City of Kingman, 461 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1972).

 
 
[¶24]   More recently, a California court 
of appeals rejected a landowner's belated takings challenge in Serra Canyon Co., Ltd. v. California Coastal 
Comm'n, 120 Cal. App. 4th 663 (Cal.App. 2004).  In 1981, the California Coastal 
Commission granted a landowner a permit to expand his mobile home park on the 
condition the landowner record an irrevocable offer to dedicate certain property 
to the Commission.  The landowner 
subsequently conveyed the property encumbered by the offer to dedicate to Serra, 
and in 2002, the Commission's assignee adopted a resolution to accept the 
offer.  Serra filed a suit seeking 
an injunction preventing acceptance of the offer to dedicate and a declaration 
it would suffer an unconstitutional taking (inverse condemnation) if the offer 
were accepted.  Id. at 
667-69.  The court ruled Serra's 
inverse condemnation claim arrived "20 years too late."  Because Serra's predecessor-in-interest 
had agreed to the condition and accepted the benefit of the permit, Serra was 
bound by the condition and its predecessor's waiver of the right to contest 
it.  The court specifically rejected 
Serra's argument that, by phrasing the issue in constitutional terms, it could 
avoid the requirement that the condition be challenged in a timely manner.  The court stated:  "Once the Commission's permit decision 
becomes final, the affected property owner is estopped from relitigating the 
validity of the decision in a subsequent inverse condemnation action."  Id. 
at 666-670; see also, L.A. Development v. 
City of Sherwood, 977 P.2d 392 (Or.App. 1999).

 
 
[¶25]   Like the Wilsons, the landowner in Serra claimed it had suffered an 
unconstitutional taking under the "exaction" theory as recognized by the United 
States Supreme Court in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825, 
107 S. Ct. 3141, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1987); and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 129 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1994).  The California court 
specifically distinguished the procedural histories of Nollan and the Serra case, as 
follows:

 
 

It 
bears noting that the proper administrative procedures were followed in the case 
Serra relies upon, Nollan 
v. California 
Coastal Comm'n. (1987) 
483 U.S. 825, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677 (Nollan ).  The 
Commission required the Nollans to provide a public easement on their beachfront 
lot in Ventura 
as a condition of allowing them to demolish a tiny bungalow and build a 
decent-sized house.  (Id. 
at pp. 827-828, 107 S. Ct. 3141.)  The Nollans protested and promptly filed 
a petition for a writ of mandate seeking to invalidate the condition.  During the proceedings in superior 
court, the Nollans argued that the easement condition violated the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  The 
inverse condemnation claim was thus preserved for review as the case wound its 
way to the Supreme Court.  (Id. 
at pp. 828-830, 107 S. Ct. 3141.)

 
 

Serra, 120 Cal. App. 4th  at 670. 

 
 
[¶26]   In Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 829 P.2d 226 (Wash.App.Div. 1992), a Washington developer obtained county approval 
for two subdivision developments.  
In accordance with an ordinance designed to protect open space, the 
county conditioned approval of the developments upon reservation of open space 
or payment of a fee in lieu of reserving open space.  Id. 
at 227-29.  The developer elected to 
pay the fee and did not appeal the condition at that time.  Id.  
However, the developer subsequently filed a declaratory judgment 
action claiming the ordinance was unlawful and it was entitled to reimbursement 
of the open space fees.  Id. at 229.  The Washington court of appeals upheld the trial 
court's dismissal of the developer's suit because it had failed to appeal the 
condition after the county had issued final approval of the developments.  Id. at 229-31.  As a separate rationale for the 
dismissal, the court ruled the developer was estopped from bringing its late 
claim for reimbursement of the fees it paid in lieu of providing open space in 
its development plans.  Id. at 
231-32.  The court stated:  "We cannot countenance allowing a 
developer to reap the advantages of final plat approval obtained without 
challenge to the approval conditions, and only bring a challenge to those 
conditions after the municipality has lost any ability to negotiate a solution 
to the problem other than refund of the fee."  Id. 
at 231.

 
 
[¶27]   The reasoning employed by these 
courts is persuasive.  There must be 
a limit on when a landowner can bring a takings action, especially when, as 
here, the landowners did not object to the conditions at the time of approval 
and actually took advantage of the benefit of increased density offered by the 
regulations.  Without a restriction 
on the time for contesting property development conditions, the government would 
be perpetually exposed to unlimited takings challenges.  Thus, we affirm the dismissal of the 
Wilsons' takings 
claims without considering the substance of their constitutional challenges 
because they did not contest the conditions in a timely manner.  

 
 
[¶28]   We note that the Wilsons could still 
maintain a facial challenge to the constitutionality and validity of the LDRs 
with regard to how they may affect land not involved in the approved 
subdivision. However, the record here does not include any showing that the 
Wilsons 
currently have any other property to which the LDRs might apply.  Consequently, they lack the necessary 
standing to challenge the validity of the LDRs.

 
 
[¶29]   We explained the concept of 
standing in the context of declaratory judgment actions in Pedro/Aspen, Ltd. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs 
for Natrona County, 2004 WY 84, 94 P.3d 412 (Wyo. 2004).  "Standing is a legal concept designed to 
determine whether a party is sufficiently affected to insure that the court is 
presented with a justiciable controversy."  
Pedro/Aspen, ¶ 8, 94 P.3d  
at 415, quoting Jolley v. State Loan and 
Inv. Bd., 2002 WY 7, ¶ 6, 38 P.3d 1073, 1076 (Wyo. 2002) (citations 
omitted).  See also, Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, 
¶ 11, 88 P.3d 1050, 1057 (Wyo. 2004).  
The standing requirement generally is not relaxed for actions brought 
under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.  We described the standing requirements 
in declaratory judgment actions in Pedro/Aspen, ¶ 9, 94 P.3d  at 415-16 
as follows:

 
 
1.         
The parties must have existing and genuine, as distinguished from 
theoretical, rights or interests.

 
 
2.         
The controversy must be one upon which the judgment of the court may 
effectively operate, as distinguished from a debate or argument evoking a purely 
political, administrative, philosophical or academic 
conclusion.

 
 
3.         
It must be a controversy the judicial determination of which will have 
the force and effect of a final judgment in law or decree in equity upon the 
rights, status or other legal relationships of one or more of the real parties 
in interest, or, wanting these qualities to be of such great and overriding 
public moment as to constitute the legal equivalent of all of 
them.

 
 
4.         
The proceedings must be genuinely adversary in character and not a mere 
disputation, but advanced with sufficient militancy to engender a thorough 
research and analysis of the major issues.

 
 
The 
fundamental inquiry in determining whether a party has standing is whether he 
has " a tangible interest' in the controversy."  Pedro/Aspen, ¶ 10, 94 P.3d  at 
416.  

 
 
[¶30]   Unquestionably, when the Wilsons applied for 
approval of their subdivision, they had a tangible interest in the validity of 
the LDRs.  Nevertheless, as we 
explained earlier, they relinquished their right to contest the conditions 
imposed on their subdivision under the regulations when they did not challenge 
them.  The Wilsons do not assert in 
their complaint that they have other land subject to the land use regulations 
that they wish to subdivide.  Thus, 
they no longer have a "tangible interest" in the validity of the land use 
regulations.  On the basis of the 
record extant, the Wilsons do not currently have standing to 
present a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the open space or 
affordable housing regulations.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶31]   The Wilsons failed to address their concerns about 
the constitutionality of the LDRs, or the authority of the county commissioners 
to enforce them, in a timely manner.  
Therefore, we conclude that the remedies the Wilsons sought in this 
declaratory judgment action were waived, and they lack standing to pursue their 
claims in this case.  The orders of 
the district court are affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Exhibit 3 is a copy of Teton 
County's "Beneficial Use Determination" regulation; Exhibit 4 is a copy 
of the "Variance" regulation; Exhibit 5 is a copy of the "Community 
Vision" portion of the Teton County Comprehensive Plan; Exhibit 6 is a 
copy of the "Community Character" portion of the plan; Exhibit 7 is a 
copy of the "Natural and Scenic Resources" portion of the plan; Exhibit 8 
is a copy of the chapter of the plan dealing with "Affordable Housing;" and 
Exhibit 9 is the "Residential Affordable Housing Standards" of the 
LDRs.