Case Title: North Dakota v. Corona

Citation: 

Docket Number: 20180077

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 2018-08-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH
DAKOTA 2018 ND 196State of North
Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellantv.Crystal Lynn Corona, Defendant and
AppelleeNo. 20180077Appeal from the District Court of McLean
County, South Central Judicial District, the Honorable
John W. Grinsteiner, Judge.DISMISSED.Opinion of the Court by Tufte, Justice.Ladd
R. Erickson, State's Attorney, Washburn, N.D., for plaintiff and appellant; submitted on
brief.Chad R. McCabe, Bismarck, N.D., for
defendant and appellee.State v. CoronaNo. 20180077Tufte, Justice.[¶1] The State appeals from a district court order denying the State's pretrial
motion to allow the introduction of evidence at a jury trial about Crystal Corona's refusal to
submit to an onsite screening test for intoxication. We conclude the State's appeal is not
authorized by N.D.C.C.
§ 29-28-07(5), and we dismiss the appeal.I[¶2] According to the State, a law enforcement officer stopped a vehicle driven by
Corona on October 19, 2017, after she failed to dim her headlights. The officer thereafter
detected the odor of alcohol emanating from Corona, and she refused to submit to an onsite
screening test for intoxication and a subsequent Intoxilyzer test. The State charged her with
driving under the influence for refusing a chemical test for intoxication.[¶3] The State made a pretrial motion to allow the introduction of evidence about
Corona's refusal to submit to the onsite screening test, arguing a 2017 amendment to N.D.C.C.
§ 39-20-14(3) authorized the admission of evidence of the onsite refusal after
she did not take any additional chemical tests requested by a law enforcement officer. The district
court denied the State's motion, stating it would not allow any evidence to be presented at trial
regarding the refusal of the preliminary breath test.II[¶4] The State appeals from the order denying its pretrial motion, arguing the
district court erred in denying the pretrial motion to allow the admission of evidence at trial about
Corona's refusal to submit to an onsite screening test under a 2017 amendment to N.D.C.C.
§ 39-20-14(3).[¶5] Corona argues the State's
appeal from the denial of the pretrial motion is not authorized by N.D.C.C.
§ 29-28-07(5), which provides:An order granting the
return of property or suppressing evidence, or suppressing a confession or admission, when
accompanied by a statement of the prosecuting attorney asserting that the appeal is not taken for
purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding.
The statement must be filed with the notice of appeal. Corona argues the
State's motion and the court's order were not based upon the "exclusion by virtue of
constitutional law" of illegally obtained evidence under N.D.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3) and this Court's
interpretation and application of N.D.C.C.
§ 29-28-07(5). See City of Fargo v. Cossette, 512 N.W.2d 459 (N.D.
1994); State v. Miller, 512 N.W.2d 469
(N.D. 1994); State v. Counts, 472 N.W.2d 756 (N.D. 1991); State v. Miller,
391 N.W.2d 151 (N.D. 1986).[¶6] The State responds that
Corona's argument "harkens the Court back to its forgone standard for a state appeal by arguing
dated case law from an era when the state's right to appeal was more constricted." The
State claims this Court has announced less restrictive standards for a state appeal and now allows
state appeals from the exclusion of evidence if the state can show the excluded evidence is
critical for the state to prove material facts at trial--such as a horizontal gaze nystagmus test result
in a driving under the influence prosecution in State v. Engelhorn, 2016 ND 167, 883 N.W.2d 852.[¶7] In Miller, 391 N.W.2d   at 152, 155 (footnote omitted), this Court extensively
considered the meaning of N.D.C.C.
§ 29-28-07(5) in the context of dismissing an appeal from an order excluding
evidence as a discovery sanction and said:Although it is possible to
construe "suppressing" as a generic term meaning any form of exclusion of evidence (see Section 1-02-02,
N.D.C.C.), the use of the term in context of the Rules of Criminal Procedure leads us to the
conclusion that the words "[a]n order . . . suppressing evidence" relate to a
decision by a lower court granting a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Rule 12,
N.D.R.Crim.P. . . .. . . .In light of a plain reading of our statute, a
comparison of the statutes which served as a basis for our statute, the case law interpreting those
statutes, and the subsequent amendment of those statutes prior to the adoption of our
statute, we hold that appeals by the State pursuant to Section
29-28-07(5) are limited to appeals from the granting of a motion to suppress
under Rule 12(b)(3), N.D.R.Crim.P., and from
the granting of a motion to return evidence under Rule 41(e), N.D.R.Crim.P. Because the State
attempts to appeal from an exclusion of evidence pursuant to a discovery sanction under Rule 16, N.D.R.Crim.P., the appeal is
dismissed.[¶8] Contrary to the State's claims,
we have found no cases explicitly relaxing, questioning, or overruling the rationale or result in
Miller, 391 N.W.2d   at 152, 155. Rather, the State's argument about this Court's
rejection of a "forgone standard" appears to be premised on the result in Engelhorn, 2016 ND 167, ¶ 11, 883 N.W.2d 852, which
involved the State's appeal from a district court's pretrial order refusing to allow the admission
into evidence of the results of a horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Although this Court may raise an
issue about appealability on its own motion, in Engelhorn there was no issue raised about
appealability by the parties or by this Court, and the jurisdictional issue was not specifically
addressed. In the absence of any caselaw expressly questioning or limiting our decisions
stemming from Miller, 391 N.W.2d   at 152, 155, we decline to hold that Engelhorn has implicitly overruled those
cases. Our reaching a decision on the merits in that case is not persuasive support for a sweeping,
silent change in our jurisprudence for appeals by the State in criminal cases. See
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352 n.2 (1996) (discussing standing and stating the
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held the existence of unaddressed jurisdictional
defects has no precedential effect).[¶9] The State's appeal is not
from an order granting Corona's motion to suppress under N.D.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3), or from an order granting
her motion for the return of evidence under N.D.R.Crim.P. 41(e). Our line of cases stemming
from Miller, 391 N.W.2d   at 152, 155, requires dismissal of the State's appeal.III[¶10] We dismiss the State's appeal.[¶11] Jerod E.
TufteDaniel J. CrothersLisa Fair McEversJon J. JensenGerald W.
VandeWalle, C.J.