Case Title: Ex Parte Americold Compressors Co.

Citation: 684 So. 2d 140

Docket Number: 1951188

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1996-10-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
684 So. 2d 140 (1996)
Ex parte AMERICOLD COMPRESSORS COMPANY.
(Re AMERICOLD COMPRESSORS COMPANY v. Nancy STRICKLIN).
1951188.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 18, 1996.
*141 Stephen D. Christie and William Perry Webb of Porterfield, Harper & Mills, P.A., Birmingham, for Petitioner.
Michael A. Stewart, Sr., Cullman, for Respondent.
SHORES, Justice.
We granted the Americold Compressors Company's petition for the writ of certiorari to consider whether the Court of Civil Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's reopening of a 1991 final judgment in a workers' compensation case to allow Nancy Stricklin's 1995 claim for future medical expenses. We reverse and render a judgment for Americold.
In December 1989, Stricklin sued Americold, seeking workers' compensation benefits for permanent partial disability, as well as for past and future medical treatment, based on a work-related injury she had suffered while employed as a spot welder with the company. Following a trial on the merits in January 1991, Circuit Judge Jack C. Riley entered a final judgment, which read as follows:
At the time of this final order, our courts followed Davis v. City of Tuscaloosa, 494 So. 2d 643 (Ala.Civ.App.1986), in regard to future medical expenses. In that case the Court of Civil Appeals held that in cases in which a trial court found that a workers' compensation plaintiff had suffered no permanent disability as the result of the on-the-job injury, he or she was precluded as a matter of law from recovering any future medical benefits. 494 So. 2d  at 645. Thus, Judge Riley's finding that the plaintiff had fully recovered from the original injury and that she could be gainfully employed was a determination that no future medical expenses were due to her.
In April 1995, the Court of Civil Appeals expressly overruled its decision in Davis v. City of Tuscaloosa, in the case of Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. Byrd, 659 So. 2d 672 (Ala.Civ.App.1995), holding that a workers' compensation plaintiff found to have sustained a compensable injury is entitled to future medical benefits, regardless of whether he or she suffers from any permanent disability as the result of the on-the-job accident.
In May 1995, Stricklin filed a "Motion to Enforce Judgment." In it she stated:
Judge Riley, who had originally heard the case on the merits, had retired by that time. Judge H. Frank Brunner held a hearing on the motion and ordered as follows:
The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's holding, under the following reasoning:
Americold Compressors Co. v. Stricklin, 684 So. 2d 139 (Ala.Civ.App.1996).
Americold contends that this holding of the Court of Civil Appeals is in direct conflict with this Court's precedent, because, Americold says, it sanctions a collateral attack on a valid final judgment entered four years earlier and allows a heretofore unsuccessful plaintiff to relitigate an issue previously decided against her. We agree. The trial court had no jurisdiction to disturb a valid judgment that had become final and on which the appeal time had expired long before the substantive case law in regard to future medical expenses in workers' compensation cases changed. The question of jurisdiction was not addressed by the Court of Civil Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court, citing Ex parte Tuscaloosa County, 522 So. 2d 782 (Ala.1988), and Jones v. Pickens County Health Care, 589 So. 2d 754 (Ala. Civ.App.1991).
*144 In Ex parte Tuscaloosa County, the issue before this Court was whether an employee's failure to sue within the statutorily prescribed one-year limitations period for a workers' compensation claim barred his or her right to sue for accrued medical expenses. This Court held that an injured employee's right to sue for accrued medical expenses, as authorized by Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-77, is independent of the employee's right to sue for workers' compensation benefits, and thus that such a claim is not time-barred merely because the injured employee has not sued within the statutorily prescribed period of limitations for a compensation claim. 522 So. 2d  at 783-84. In Jones v. Pickens County Health Care, a workers' compensation case, the Court of Civil Appeals stated that because the trial court had found that Jones had suffered work-related injuries, she was automatically entitled to future medical benefits under § 25-5-77. Future medical expenses are recoverable under § 25-5-77 if they are related to the injury, are "reasonable" and "necessary," and are obtained with the authorization of the employer. 589 So. 2d  at 756. In neither case did this Court or the Court of Civil Appeals sanction the reopening of a valid final judgment.
When Ms. Stricklin sued in December 1989, she was exercising her rights under Ex parte Tuscaloosa County and § 25-5-77 in seeking both workers' compensation benefits and medical expenses. In fact, Judge Riley's order noted that "there may be some outstanding medical bills that should be paid by the defendant." In his final order, Judge Riley found that Ms. Stricklin had suffered no permanent disability as the result of an on-the-job injury. Under this holding, she was precluded, as a matter of law, from recovering any future medical expenses. Davis v. City of Tuscaloosa, 494 So. 2d 643 (Ala.Civ.App.1986), and Hammons v. Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 516 So. 2d 713, 715 (Ala. Civ.App.1987).
Judge Riley's order was final, it was not appealed, and it cannot now be reopened by the filing of a so-called "motion to enforce judgment." Cornelius v. Green, 477 So. 2d 1363 (Ala.1985). The time has long since passed for the filing of a motion to amend the final judgment, pursuant to either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.
The principles of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the finality of judgments prohibit a trial court from disturbing a final judgment. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Atkins, 435 So. 2d 1275 (Ala.1983); State v. Morrison Cafeterias Consolidated, Inc., 487 So. 2d 898 (Ala.1985). In Louisville & N.R.R. v. Atkins this Court held that the doctrine of res judicata would be violated if the law as it evolves were made retroactive to reopen, for another trial, matters that had been laid to rest under theories of liability existing at the time they were tried must not be reopened. 435 So. 2d  at 1279. This Court, in State v. Morrison Cafeterias, citing Farrior v. New England Mortgage Security Co., 92 Ala. 176, 9 So. 532 (1891), stated that where a party has acted upon the law as clearly declared by a judicial decision, that party will be protected even if the decision is thereafter overruled. Matters laid to rest under theories of liability existing at the time the matters were tried must not be reopened. State v. Morrison Cafeterias, supra, 487 So. 2d  at 903. To reopen such matters not only would conflict with settled Alabama law, but also would defeat public policy considerations: "`[t]he quieting of litigation; the public peace and repose; respect for judicial administration of the law, and confidence in its reasonable certainty, stability and consistency.' Bibb v. Bibb, 79 Ala. 437, 444 (1885)." Stallworth v. Hicks, 434 So. 2d 229, 230 (Ala.1983).
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed and a judgment is rendered for Americold.
REVERSED AND JUDGMENT RENDERED.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON, HOUSTON, KENNEDY, COOK, and BUTTS, JJ., concur.