Case Title: MARK WHITE V. KRIS ELECTRIC MANUFACTURING, INC . ; , HON . SHELIA LOWTHER, CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2002-SC-000912-WC

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 2003-11-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
IMPORTANTNOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THERULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION ISNOT TO BE PUBLISHEDAND SHALL NOTBE CITED OR USED AS AUTHORITYINANYOTHER CASE INANYCOURT OF THIS STATE. 'SuprMut eaurf of ~Rieua 2002-SC-0912-W C ~n7 MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING RENDERED : October 23, 2003 uQJJE PUBLISHED MARK WHITE APPELLANT APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS V . 2002-CA-1152-WC WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO . 93-42888 KRIS ELECTRIC MANUFACTURING, INC.; , HON . SHELIA LOWTHER, CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD APPELLEES The claimant's second motion to reopen his pre-December 12, 1996, award was dismissed on the ground that it was filed after December 12, 2000 . He appealed the decision, maintaining that KRS 342.125(1), (3), and (8) should be construed to permit the reopening of his claim although the motion was filed more than four years after December 12, 1996 . The Workers' Compensation Board (Board) and the Court of Appeals have affirmed the dismissal, and we affirm . The claimant was injured in a motor vehicle accident on October 12, 1993 . His subsequent application for workers' compensation benefits named his employer and the Special Fund as defendants . The parties agreed to settle the claim, and an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) approved the agreement on January 11, 1996 . On March 16, 2000, the claimant moved to reopen, alleging that his medical conditions had worsened and that he had become totally occupationally disabled . Attached to the motion were medical reports from Drs . Muckenhausen and King, the claimant's affidavit, and a favorable social security disability determination . The employer maintained, however, that there was no change of disability and that the claimant had failed to comply with the regulation that required him to attach a Form 106 medical release to the motion . On April 13, 2000, the claimant filed a reply, indicating that the pleading would be supplemented with the Form 106 "as soon as possible ." Nonetheless, an arbitrator overruled the motion on April 19, 2000, on the ground that the claimant had failed to make the necessary prima facie showing of increased disability and also had failed to comply with the regulation . The claimant did not petition for reconsideration, but within 14 days of the order he filed a pleading entitled "SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO REOPEN BY PLAINTIFF." A Form 106 was attached to the pleading, but no additional prima facie evidence was submitted . On June 7, 2000, the same arbitrator who had overruled the motion to reopen entered an order which indicated that the claimant had set forth a sufficient prima facie case for reopening and transferred the claim to an ALJ for further proceedings . The employer then petitioned for reconsideration and requested that the June 7 order be vacated on the grounds that the initial finding concerning the lack of a prima facie showing was final and that less than two years had passed since the decision . Responding to the petition, the claimant maintained that his supplemental motion merely completed the technical requirements of the initial motion to reopen and that the arbitrator's decision to grant a reopening was sua sponte . Before any action was taken on the petition for reconsideration, the claim was transferred to an ALJ . Thus, the employer moved to hold the reopening in abeyance pending a decision on its petition for reconsideration and any resulting appeal . On August 29, 2000, after both the petition for reconsideration and the motion to hold the reopening in abeyance were overruled, the employer moved to dismiss the reopening on the ground that the claim was not properly before the ALJ . It asserted that because the initial motion to reopen was overruled and because no petition for reconsideration was filed, the decision was final . Thus, nothing was before the arbitrator when the June 7 order granting reopening was entered, and the order was without legal effect . The claimant maintained, however, that the arbitrator had the authority to correct the previous order sua sponte and asserted that the reopening was proper . Agreeing with the claimant, the ALJ overruled the motion, and the employer appealed . In a decision that was rendered on January 3, 2001, the Board determined that the appeal was taken from a non-final order and dismissed it . The Board noted, however, that the claimant had failed to protect himself from the initial order denying his motion to reopen by filing a petition for reconsideration or an appeal . Thus, it was likely that the reopening was not properly before an ALJ . Following the Board's dismissal of the appeal, the reopening was assigned to a different ALJ who determined that the claimant had made the necessary prima facie case in his initial motion to reopen and that the arbitrator who decided that motion erred by overruling it for a lack of prima facie evidence . Nonetheless, noting that the claimant did not petition for reconsideration or appeal the erroneous finding and did not address the erroneous finding in his supplemental pleading, the ALJ determined that the arbitrator's decision to dismiss the motion became final on May 19, 2000 . For that reason, the employer's petition for reconsideration of the June 7, 2000, order should have been sustained . On that basis, the ALJ granted the petition for reconsideration, set aside the June 7 order, and also set aside the order for further proof taking . On October 17, 2001, the claimant filed a second motion to reopen, again alleging a worsening of condition and increased occupational disability. The motion set forth the procedural history of the initial motion ; explained that the initial motion was not finally decided until after December 12, 2000 ; and maintained, therefore, that it was impossible for him to file a second motion to reopen before December 12, 2000 . Unconvinced by the argument, the ALJ dismissed the motion as untimely under KRS 342.125(8), and the claimant appealed . 342.125(1)(d) . Having failed to convince the Court of Appeals that the December 12, 1996, version of KRS 342.125(8) is unconstitutional, the claimant has abandoned that argument . His sole argument on appeal is that with respect to a claim for a pre- December 12, 1996, injury, the grounds for reopening that are found in KRS 342 .125(1) are equivalent to the exceptions to reopening that are listed in KRS 342 .125(3) . Therefore, the four-year period of limitation that is found in KRS 342 .125(8) does not apply where the reopening of a pre-December 12, 1996, award is sought under KRS When the claimant filed his second motion to reopen, KRS 342.125 provided, in pertinent part, as follows : (1) Upon motion by any party or upon an administrative law judge's own motion, an administrative law judge may reopen and review any award or order on any of the following grounds : (a) Fraud; (b) Newly-discovered evidence which could not have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence ; (c) Mistake ; and (d) Change of disability as shown by objective medical evidence of 4 worsening or improvement of impairment due to a condition caused by the injury since the date of the award or order . (3) Except for reopening solely for determination of the compen- sability of medical expenses, fraud, or conforming the award as set forth in KRS 342 .730(1)(c)2 ., or for reducing a permanent total disability award when an employee returns to work, or seeking temporary total disability benefits during the period of an award, no claim shall be reopened more than four (4) years following the date of the original award or order granting or denying benefits, and no party may file a motion to reopen within one (1) year of any previous motion to reopen by the same party . (8) The time limitation prescribed in this section shall apply to all claims irrespective of when they were incurred, or when the award was entered, or the settlement approved . However, claims decided prior to December 12, 1996, may be reopened within four (4) years of the award or order or within four (4) years of December 12, 1996, whichever is later, provided that the exceptions to reopening established in subsections (1) and (3) of this section shall apply to these claims as well . Although KRS 342 125(8) specifies that claims decided before December 12, 1996, may be reopened for a period of four years thereafter, it also specifies that the "exceptions to reopening established in subsections (1) and (3)" apply to such claims . Yet, only fraud appears in both subsections . The claimant notes that in Meade v . Reedy Coal Co . , Ky ., 13 S.W.3d 619 (2000), the Court did not address whether any of subsection (1)'s "grounds" for reopening, other than fraud, may be considered "exceptions to reopening ." His argument is that by referring to both subsections and by using the word "exceptions," KRS 342 .125(8) implies that with respect to a claim decided before December 12, 1996, the grounds found in subsection (1) are exceptions for which subsection (3) permits reopening at any time . He concludes, therefore, that the reopening of a claim decided before December 12, 1996, under KRS 342 .125(1)(d) is not subject to the four-year period of limitation . We disagree . Under the claimant's interpretation of KRS 342.125(8), the exceptions would entirely negate the provision limiting the time for reopening all claims "irrespective of when they were incurred" and the provision limiting the time for reopening claims decided before December 12, 1996, to within four years of December 12, 1996 . For that reason, we are not persuaded that all of the grounds that are included in subsection (1) are exceptions to the four-year period for reopening . Likewise, we are not persuaded that fraud is the only ground for reopening listed in subsection (1) for which subsection (3) permits reopening at any time . A post-award change of disability may sometimes be an exception to the four-year limitation on reopening, but this only occurs in instances where the recipient of a total disability award returns to work or where a period of temporary total disability occurs within the period of a worker's partial disability award . The claimant's second motion to reopen was filed more than four years after December 12, 1996, and it did not allege a temporary total disability . Under those circumstances, the motion was untimely and was properly dismissed . The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed . All concur . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT : Miller Kent Carter P.O . Box 852 Pikeville, KY 41502 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, KRIS ELECTRIC MANUFACTURING, INC . : Francesca L. Maggard W . Barry Lewis Lewis and Lewis Law Offices 151 East Main Street, Suite 100 P.O . Box 800 Hazard, KY 41702 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUNDS David W . Barr Workers' Compensation Funds 1047 U .S . Hwy . 127 South, Suite 4 Frankfort, KY 40601