Case Title: State v. Bennington

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2011-10-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 98,656 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
WILLIAM BENNINGTON, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1. 
A statement given to a bank in order to document the theft of a financial card and 
to seek an account credit for unauthorized usage of the card is nontestimonial, and 
admission of the statement into evidence does not violate the Confrontation Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied in Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), even though the 
declarant is unavailable for cross-examination.  
 
2. 
 
A statement given to a sexual assault nurse examiner is testimonial when the 
statement is made in the presence of a law enforcement officer who asks questions, the 
declarant is reporting past events, there is not an ongoing public safety or medical 
emergency, and the statement is given in a formal setting.  
 
3. 
 
A statement given to a sexual assault nurse examiner is testimonial when the 
statement is made in answer to questions asked by the sexual assault nurse examiner 
while completing a questionnaire provided by the Kansas Department of Health and 
 
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Environment as part of a sexual assault evidence collection kit approved by the Kansas 
Bureau of Investigation pursuant to K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 65-448, where there is not an 
ongoing emergency or other circumstances to suggest the statement is nontestimonial.  
 
4. 
 
Violation of the Confrontation Clause is subject to analysis under the federal 
harmless error rule. To declare a federal constitutional error harmless under Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967), an appellate court must 
be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the trial's outcome in 
light of the entire record, i.e., there was no reasonable possibility that the error affected 
the verdict. The party benefiting from the error bears the burden of showing that the error 
was harmless. Where there are multiple crimes charged and the evidence as to each 
charge differs, an appellate court must proceed by applying the Chapman federal 
harmless error standard to each alleged crime. 
 
5. 
 
A contemporaneous objection must be made to all evidentiary claims, including 
those alleging prosecutorial misconduct, to preserve the issue for appellate review. 
 
6. 
 
 
Under the circumstances of this case, the prosecutor did not commit prosecutorial 
misconduct during the State's closing argument when stating, "[T]hat's what he did." In 
context, the prosecutor was reviewing the elements and distinguishing the charged crime 
from a lesser included offense and was not making a statement of the prosecutor's 
personal opinion regarding the defendant's guilt. 
 
 
 
 
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7. 
 
Under the circumstances of this case, the prosecutor did not commit prosecutorial 
misconduct during the State's closing argument when telling the jury the deceased victim 
could not say "that the man who did this to her [is] sitting right here," but his DNA can. 
The prosecutor was not expressing a personal opinion of the defendant's guilt but was 
communicating to the jury that the DNA evidence proved the defendant was the person 
who committed the offenses. 
 
8. 
 
Under the circumstances of this case, the prosecutor's remarks during the rebuttal 
portion of the State's closing argument regarding the deceased victim's inability to be at 
the trial were not outside the latitude allowed a prosecutor during argument because the 
remarks were appropriate rebuttal to the defense argument that the State's evidence was 
second-hand. 
 
9. 
 
Use of prior convictions in a criminal defendant's criminal history score to 
enhance the defendant's sentence without requiring the history to be included in the 
complaint and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt does not violate the 
defendant's constitutional rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 
2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). 
 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished decision filed April 10, 2009. 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; CLARK V. OWENS II, judge. Opinion filed October 28, 2011. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
Judgment of the district court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
 
 
 
 
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Rachel L. Pickering, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs 
for appellant. 
David Lowden, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant 
district attorney, Nola Tedesco Foulston, district attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were on the 
brief for appellee. 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
LUCKERT, J.:  William Bennington appeals his convictions and sentences, raising 
three issues. First, he argues his right to confront his accuser was violated when the trial 
court admitted into evidence testimony of a bank employee and a sexual assault nurse 
examiner (SANE) regarding statements made to them by the victim, who died before the 
trial. Bennington also argues his convictions must be reversed because the prosecutor 
committed misconduct by violating an order in limine and by making improper 
comments during closing argument. Finally, he argues his sentences must be reversed 
because the court erred by imposing increased sentences based on a criminal history that 
was not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
We reject most of Bennington's arguments, but we find merit in his argument that 
the victim's statements to the SANE, which were made in the presence of a law 
enforcement officer who asked questions and reported past events rather than information 
regarding an ongoing public safety or medical emergency, were testimonial and should 
not have been admitted. Applying the federal constitutional harmless error standard to 
determine if this error requires reversal of Bennington's convictions, we affirm some of 
Bennington's convictions—aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, aggravated 
kidnapping, rape, and two counts of criminal use of a financial card—but reverse his 
convictions on two aggravated criminal sodomy counts because we determine there is a 
reasonable possibility the error impacted the verdicts on those charges.  
 
 
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In the fall of 2003, V.B., a 77-year-old female, was sexually attacked and robbed 
in her home. Bennington was identified through a photo taken at an automated teller 
machine (ATM) when V.B.'s financial card was used after the aggravated burglary; the 
financial card had been stolen during the robbery, and V.B. had been forced to provide 
her personal identification number (PIN). When DNA evidence found at the scene of the 
crime matched Bennington's profile, he was charged with aggravated burglary, in 
violation of K.S.A. 21-3716; aggravated robbery, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3427; 
aggravated kidnapping, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3421; rape, in violation of K.S.A. 21-
3502(a)(1)(A); two counts of aggravated criminal sodomy, in violation of K.S.A. 21-
3506(a)(3)(A); and two misdemeanor counts of criminal use of a financial card, in 
violation of K.S.A. 21-3729(a)(1).  
 
V.B. had a stroke and died before Bennington's jury trial, but she had related the 
events of the incident in some detail to her niece, to a SANE at the hospital, and, more 
generally, on a claim form submitted to her bank in reporting the unauthorized use of her 
financial card. Through a pretrial "Motion to Exclude Testimony of V.B.," Bennington 
sought to exclude evidence of any statements made by V.B.; his objections were based on 
his confrontation rights articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 148 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004). The trial court 
denied the motion.  
 
A jury found Bennington guilty of all charges. He moved unsuccessfully for 
judgment of acquittal and a new trial on the basis of the purportedly erroneous admission 
of V.B.'s statements. At sentencing, Bennington received consecutive sentences on all 
counts, totaling 1,812 months' incarceration.  
 
 
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On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals determined V.B.'s statement to her bank 
was nontestimonial and its admission was not error. The Court of Appeals did not resolve 
the question of whether the statements to the SANE were testimonial, holding that even if 
the admission was erroneous, any error was harmless. The Court of Appeals rejected 
Bennington's arguments regarding prosecutorial misconduct and sentencing error, 
ultimately affirming all convictions and sentences. State v. Bennington, No. 98,656, 2009 
WL 981683 (Kan. App. 2009) (unpublished opinion).  
 
 
This court granted Bennington's petition for review and has jurisdiction pursuant 
to K.S.A. 22-3602(e) (petition for review) and K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (same).  
 
More facts and details of the Court of Appeals' decision will be provided as 
necessary to the analysis. 
 
CONFRONTATION RIGHTS 
 
Because V.B. died before the trial, she was unavailable to testify. Her statements 
to her bank and to the SANE—the only statements that are discussed in the petition for 
review and are before us—were clearly hearsay. Bennington had no opportunity to cross-
examine V.B. regarding the statements. Consequently, Bennington argues his 
confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution were 
violated. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
Bennington's arguments are subject to a de novo standard of review because he 
challenges the legal basis of the trial court's admission of evidence under the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. 
Dukes, 290 Kan. 485, 487, 231 P.3d 558 (2010) (de novo standard applies to review of 
 
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legal basis of admission of evidence); State v. Appleby, 289 Kan. 1017, 1054-55, 221 
P.3d 525 (2009) (same); State v. Henderson, 284 Kan. 267, 276, 160 P.3d 776 (2007) (de 
novo standard applies to determination of whether the right of confrontation has been 
violated). 
These same arguments are raised in State v. Miller, No. 99,232, this day decided. 
Consequently, we include our discussion of the general legal principles in both opinions.  
 
General Legal Principles 
 
The Confrontation Clause provides:  "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. 
amend. VI. That guarantee applies to criminal defendants in both federal and state 
prosecutions. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 
(1965) (Sixth Amendment applicable to states through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
Similarly, a criminal defendant in Kansas has the right to "meet the witnesses face to 
face." Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 10. 
 
In a landmark decision, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, the United States Supreme Court 
significantly revised the rules related to an analysis of whether the admission of hearsay 
statements violates the Confrontation Clause. Specifically, Crawford held a witness' 
testimonial statements against a defendant are inadmissible unless the witness appears at 
trial or, if the witness is unavailable to testify at trial, the defendant had a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination. If the statements are nontestimonial, the 
Confrontation Clause guarantees are not implicated. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68; see 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531, 174 L. Ed. 2d 314 
(2009); Appleby, 289 Kan. at 1055; State v. Brown, 285 Kan. 261, 285, 173 P.3d 612 
(2007); State v. Davis, 283 Kan. 569, 575, 158 P.3d 317 (2007). Consequently, post-
Crawford, the threshold question in any Confrontation Clause analysis is whether the 
 
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hearsay statement at issue is testimonial in nature. Appleby, 289 Kan. at 1055; Brown, 
285 Kan. at 285.  
 
Crawford did not explicitly define the term "testimonial." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
68 ("We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 
'testimonial.'"). But the Supreme Court did state that "[w]hatever else the term covers, it 
applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or 
at a former trial; and to police interrogations." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68; see Davis, 547 
U.S. at 822 (in context of law enforcement interrogations, statements are nontestimonial 
when made under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable law enforcement assistance to meet an ongoing emergency). 
 
Crawford, Davis, and the case consolidated with Davis for decision, Hammon v. 
Indiana, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2006), dealt with statements 
made to law enforcement officers soon after a criminal incident. In Crawford, Sylvia 
Crawford was interviewed by law enforcement officers after her husband stabbed a man 
who had allegedly attempted to rape her; Sylvia was in custody at the time. The Supreme 
Court concluded Sylvia's statements were testimonial and should not have been admitted 
in her husband's trial after she asserted her spousal privilege. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 65-
68. In reaching this holding the Crawford Court noted:  "An accuser who makes a formal 
statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a 
casual remark to an acquaintance does not." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.  
 
This broad guidance was clarified in Davis where the Court explained:  
"Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under 
circumstances objectively indicating that the [interrogation's] primary purpose . . . is to 
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency," but they "are testimonial when 
the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that 
the primary purpose is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later 
 
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criminal prosecution." Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. Thus, a recording of a 911 call describing 
an ongoing domestic disturbance was nontestimonial in Davis, where the victim's 
"elicited statements were necessary to be able to resolve [the ongoing] emergency," and 
the statements were not formal. Davis, 547 U.S. at 827.  
 
On the other hand, the statements at issue in Hammon were testimonial, where the 
victim was interviewed after the domestic disturbance in a room separate from her 
assailant and "deliberately recounted, in response to police questioning," the past events. 
Davis, 547 U.S. at 830. Because at the time of the interrogation any emergency had 
ceased, "[o]bjectively viewed, the primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose of the 
interrogation was to investigate a possible crime." Davis, 547 U.S. at 830. 
 
 
Based principally on the decisions in Crawford, Davis, and Hammon, in Brown, 
285 Kan. 261, this court established four factors to be considered in determining when 
evidence is testimonial. While the Brown test remains a useful iteration of some of the 
considerations found in the Supreme Court's decisions, the Court provided further 
clarification in four subsequent cases:  Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. ___, 131 S. 
Ct. 2705, 180 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2011); Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S.____, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 
179 L. Ed. 2d 93 (2011); Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2527; and Giles v. California, 554 
U.S. 353, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 171 L. Ed. 2d 488 (2008). As further discussed, in Bullcoming, 
Melendez-Diaz, and Giles, the Court indicated that statements made to medical 
professionals during the course of receiving medical treatment and statements made as 
part of most business records are nontestimonial.  
 
In the earliest of these cases, Giles, the Court noted:  "[O]nly testimonial 
statements are excluded by the Confrontation Clause. Statements to friends and neighbors 
about abuse and intimidation and statements to physicians in the course of receiving 
treatment would be excluded, if at all, only by hearsay rules." (Emphasis added.) Giles, 
554 U.S. at 376. 
 
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Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz discussed the nontestimonial nature of most 
business records, which would include medical records. The Court held there were 
exceptions to this general rule, however. The specific question in Melendez-Diaz, was 
whether the defendant' right to confrontation was violated by the admission of an 
affidavit of a forensic lab analyst who had tested material seized by law enforcement 
officers and determined the material was cocaine. In holding the affidavit was 
testimonial, the Court rejected the argument that the affidavit was nontestimonial because 
it was a business record of the laboratory. The Court noted that "[d]ocuments kept in the 
regular course of business may ordinarily be admitted at trial despite their hearsay 
status," except "if the regularly conducted business activity is the production of evidence 
for use at trial." Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538.  
 
 
Following the decision in Melendez-Diaz, the Court in Bullcoming considered 
whether a blood-alcohol concentration report and an officer's certification of the test 
results were testimonial. The Court reiterated the general rule that business records are 
nontestimonial but noted the exception for records produced as evidence for trial. 
Because of the exception, the Court concluded the analyst who prepared the report and 
the officer who completed the certification had to be subject to cross-examination 
because the documents were prepared in anticipation of prosecution. Bullcoming, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2717.  
 
The discussions in Giles, Melendez-Diaz, and Bullcoming suggest a general rule 
that statements made to health care professionals during the course of treatment and 
recorded in medical records and statements in other business records would generally not 
be testimonial because the purpose of such statements is not to produce evidence for use 
at trial. This point is reiterated in Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, which makes numerous points 
relevant to our inquiry.  
 
 
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In Bryant, law enforcement officers responded to a gas station parking lot. A 
mortally wounded gunshot victim had driven himself to the lot from his home where he 
had been shot. On questioning by the officers, the victim asked for medical attention and 
identified his shooter and the location of his shooting. Reviewing the decisions in 
Crawford, Davis, and Hammon, the Court explained the nature of testimonial statements, 
stating:   
 
"[T]he most important instances in which the Clause restricts the introduction of out-of-
court statements are those in which state actors are involved in a formal, out-of-court 
interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence for trial. [Citation omitted.] Even where 
such an interrogation is conducted with all good faith, introduction of the resulting 
statements at trial can be unfair to the accused if they are untested by cross-examination. 
Whether formal or informal, out-of-court statements can evade the basic objective of the 
Confrontation Clause, which is to prevent the accused from being deprived of the 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant about statements taken for use at trial. When, 
as in Davis, the primary purpose of an interrogation is to respond to an 'ongoing 
emergency,' its purpose is not to create a record for trial and thus is not within the scope 
of the Clause. But there may be other circumstances, aside from ongoing emergencies, 
when a statement is not procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court 
substitute for trial testimony. In making the primary purpose determination, standard 
rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant. Where 
no such primary purpose exists, the admissibility of a statement is the concern of state 
and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause." (Emphasis added.) Bryant, 
131 S. Ct. at 1155. 
 
Despite the reference to "state actors," the Court, as it had in Davis, included a 
footnote referring to the possibility of statements being testimonial if made to someone 
other than a law enforcement officer. The Bryant Court noted that the Davis Court had 
determined 911 operators "'may at least be agents of law enforcement when they conduct 
interrogations of 911 callers,' and therefore 'consider[ed] their acts to be acts of the police' 
for purposes of the opinion." (Emphasis added.) Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155 n.3 (quoting 
Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 n.2); see Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1169 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The 
 
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identity of an interrogator, and the content and tenor of his questions," can illuminate the 
primary purpose of the interrogation.). Because the victim in Bryant had spoken directly 
to State actors, i.e., law enforcement officers, the Bryant Court noted it did not need to 
further address that issue. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155 n.3. 
 
But the circumstances of the case required "additional clarification with regard to 
what Davis meant by 'the primary purpose' of the interrogation is 'to enable police 
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.'" Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156 (quoting Davis, 
547 U.S. at 822). As part of this clarification, the Bryant Court provided guidance on how 
to determine the primary purpose of an interrogation, explaining the determination 
requires "[a]n objective analysis of the circumstances of an encounter and the statements 
and actions of the parties." Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156. Some relevant factors listed by the 
Court were whether the encounter occurs "at or near the scene of the crime versus at a 
police station" or "during an ongoing emergency or afterwards." Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 
1156. The Court emphasized the circumstances that determine the primary purpose of an 
interview "are clearly matters of objective fact." Because the focus is on objective facts, 
"the relevant inquiry is not the subjective or actual purpose of the individuals involved in 
a particular encounter, but rather the purpose that reasonable participants would have had, 
as ascertained from the individuals' statements and actions and the circumstances in 
which the encounter occurred." Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156. 
 
The most important objective fact, according to the Bryant Court, is whether there 
was an "'ongoing emergency'" at the time the statements were made to law enforcement 
officers. If the focus was on an emergency, the Court reasoned, the participants were 
focused on "'end[ing] a threatening situation'" rather than "'prov[ing] past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.'" Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157 (quoting 
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 832). The Bryant Court explained the rationale for the distinction 
by stating: "Implicit in Davis is the idea that because the prospect of fabrication in 
statements given for the primary purpose of resolving that emergency is presumably 
 
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significantly diminished, the Confrontation Clause does not require such statements to be 
subject to the crucible of cross-examination." Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157.  
 
The Court reasoned this rule was similar to the recognition of reliability inherent 
in the excited utterance exception to hearsay. In a footnote, the Court observed there were 
other hearsay exceptions which "similarly rest on the belief that certain statements are, by 
their nature, made for a purpose other than use in a prosecution and therefore should not 
be barred by hearsay prohibitions." Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157 n.9. As relevant to 
Bennington's argument in this case, the Court cited the Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) 
relating to a hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment and also cited the following authorities:  
 
"Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. ___, ___,129 S.Ct., at 2539-2540 ('Business 
and public records are generally admissible absent confrontation not because they qualify 
under an exception to the hearsay rules, but because—having been created for the 
administration of an entity's affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving 
some fact at trial—they are not testimonial'); Giles v. California, 554 U.S., at 376, 128 
S.Ct. 2678 (noting in the context of domestic violence that '[s]tatements to friends and 
neighbors about abuse and intimidation and statements to physicians in the course of 
receiving treatment would be excluded, if at all, only by hearsay rules'); Crawford, 541 
U.S., at 56, 124 S.Ct. 1354 ('Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by 
their nature were not testimonial—for example, business records or statements in 
furtherance of a conspiracy.')." Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157 n.9. 
 
With those general principles stated, the Bryant Court turned to the specifics of the 
"highly context-dependent inquiry" of whether there was an ongoing emergency when 
officers encountered the shooting victim in the parking lot. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158. 
One circumstance evaluated by the Court was whether there was a continuing threat. The 
Court observed that Davis and Hammon involved domestic abuse situations in which the 
perpetrator was known and was not likely to be a threat to the general public or law 
 
14 
 
enforcement. Crawford, the Court noted, related to a resolved situation; Sylvia 
Crawford's husband was the alleged aggressor and was under arrest. In contrast, in 
Bryant, it was not known if the perpetrator was a threat to the general public, the victim, 
the officers, or emergency personnel. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1154, 1158-59, 1163-65. 
 
Another consideration, according to the Court, is the type of weapon used in the 
commission of the crime. The Court found it significant that a gun had been used in 
Bryant as distinguished from a knife in Crawford and fists and hands in Davis and 
Hammon. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158-59.  
 
Additionally, the Bryant Court determined the Michigan Supreme Court's failure 
to appreciate the "context-dependant nature of our Davis decision" led it to erroneously 
conclude the medical condition of a declarant is irrelevant. The Court stated:  "The 
medical condition of the victim is important to the primary purpose inquiry to the extent 
that it sheds light on the ability of the victim to have any purpose at all in responding to 
police questions and on the likelihood that any purpose formed would necessarily be a 
testimonial one." Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1159. Applying that conclusion to the facts of the 
case before it, the Bryant Court noted the victim was in pain, was struggling to breathe, 
and was repeatedly asking when medical personnel would arrive. These circumstances 
weighed in favor of an objective conclusion that the primary purpose of the statements 
was not to aid in the future prosecution for the crime. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1165. 
 
The Bryant Court then noted that while the existence of an ongoing emergency is 
an important factor in determining the primary purpose of a statement, there are other 
factors, including the formality of the encounter that must also be considered. The Court 
stated:  
 
"Formality is not the sole touchstone of our primary purpose inquiry because, although 
formality suggests the absence of an emergency and therefore an increased likelihood that 
 
15 
 
the purpose of the interrogation is to 'establish or prove past events potentially relevant to 
later criminal prosecution,' [citation omitted,] informality does not necessarily indicate 
the presence of an emergency or the lack of testimonial intent. [Citation omitted.]" 
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160.  
 
The Court noted the circumstances of Bryant—statements made in an exposed, public 
area, prior to the arrival of emergency medical services, and made in a disorganized 
fashion—distinguished the statements from those made under the formal setting of a 
stationhouse interrogation as in Crawford. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160. The Court did not 
discuss or distinguish the circumstances of Hammon, where the statements were made at 
the scene of the crime—the home of the victim and her assailant. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 
819-20. 
 
Next, the Bryant Court noted that "[i]n addition to the circumstances in which an 
encounter occurs, the statements and actions of both the declarant and interrogators 
provide objective evidence of the primary purpose of the interrogation." Bryant, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1160. The Court stated this combined approach ameliorates problems that could 
arise from looking solely to one participant, specifically the problem of "mixed motives," 
which both an interrogator and a declarant are likely to have. For example, the desire of 
the victim to have the threat to her and other potential victims cease "does not necessarily 
mean that the victim wants or envisions prosecution of the assailant." Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 
at 1161. The Court cautioned the consideration of statements and actions should not 
transform the inquiry into a subjective evaluation, stating:  "The inquiry is still objective 
because it focuses on the understanding and purpose of a reasonable victim in the 
circumstances of the actual victim—circumstances that prominently include the victim's 
physical state." Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1161-62. In this regard the victim's medical 
condition and the nature of the officer's questions were significant. The Court observed 
the questions asked by the officers in Bryant—"'what had happened, who had shot him, 
and where the shooting occurred,' [citation omitted]"—were the type of questions 
 
16 
 
necessary to allow the officers to assess the danger to themselves, the victim, and the 
public. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1166.  
 
The Court also reiterated a point made in Davis:  What starts as an emergency may 
transition to a nonemergency, in which case some statements might be admissible while 
others are not. The Court explained: 
 
"As we recognized in Davis, 'a conversation which begins as an interrogation to 
determine the need for emergency assistance' can 'evolve into testimonial statements.' 
[Citation omitted.] This evolution may occur if, for example, a declarant provides police 
with information that makes clear that what appeared to be an emergency is not or is no 
longer an emergency or that what appeared to be a public threat is actually a private 
dispute. It could also occur if a perpetrator is disarmed, surrenders, is apprehended, or, as 
in Davis, flees with little prospect of posing a threat to the public. Trial courts can 
determine in the first instance when any transition from nontestimonial to testimonial 
occurs, and exclude 'the portions of any statement that have become testimonial, as they 
do, for example, with unduly prejudicial portions of otherwise admissible evidence.'" 
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1159-60 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 828, 829). 
 
Ultimately, under the particular facts in Bryant, the Court concluded the 
"circumstances of the encounter as well as the statements and actions of [the victim] and 
the police objectively indicate that the 'primary purpose of the interrogation' was 'to 
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.'" Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1166-67 
(quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). Consequently, the victim's "identification and 
description of the shooter and the location of the shooting were not testimonial hearsay," 
the Court concluded. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1167. 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
V.B.'s Statement to Bank 
 
Turning to the specifics of Bennington's appeal, this "highly context-dependent 
inquiry" requires us to conduct an objective analysis of the circumstances of V.B.'s 
statement to her bank and to the SANE, considering such factors as whether the 
interrogator was a State actor or agent, whether there was an ongoing emergency, 
whether the encounter was formal, and whether the statements and actions of both V.B. 
and the interrogator reflect a prosecutorial purpose.  
 
We first consider whether the trial court erred in denying Bennington's motion to 
exclude from evidence a written statement submitted by V.B. to her bank. In denying the 
motion, the trial court stated on the record that the statement 
 
"was certainly not submitted for purposes of assisting law enforcement officers in 
gathering information to apprehend the culprit in the case, but rather was for the banking 
purposes, to notify the bank of the improper withdrawal of funds from [V.B.'s] account so 
that [the Bank] could properly credit her account, [so the Bank] could handle it for a 
business transaction. . . . [T]he purpose of it was not testimonial in nature."  
 
 
At trial, over defense counsel's objection, the security director for the bank 
testified regarding V.B.'s written statement. The security director testified the Wichita 
Police Department notified the bank that V.B.'s financial card might have been used 
without her permission. Two days later, V.B. went into the bank and signed a form 
indicating her card was stolen and she was "forced to give the PIN number." The bank's 
security director testified that "two withdrawals were successfully made," totaling $500. 
V.B.'s statement was made on a standard form issued by the bank and was maintained in 
the ordinary course of the bank's business. Based on these facts, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court's ruling that the statement was nontestimonial. State v. 
Bennington, No. 98,656, 2009 WL 981683, at *7 (Kan. App. 2009) (unpublished 
opinion).  
 
18 
 
 
In his petition for review, Bennington argues, unconvincingly, that the written 
statement was testimonial primarily because, according to the bank's security director, the 
bank sent a copy of the signed form to law enforcement. However, whether law 
enforcement had access to the statement, while a factor, is not determinative of whether 
the statement was testimonial. Rather, the focus is whether the statement was made for 
the primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony, and, here, 
there is no indication that was a primary, or even a secondary, purpose of the statement. 
There is no indication V.B. was aware the statement would be shared with law 
enforcement officers, especially in light of the fact V.B. had already given the same 
information to investigating officers. Instead, V.B. made the statement in order to 
document with her bank that her financial card had been stolen and to seek credit of 
amounts withdrawn through unauthorized usage. In turn, the bank needed the document 
for its internal processing. Other significant circumstances are that the statement was 
made on a bank form, was given to a non-State actor, and was a part of the records 
created in the usual course of the bank's business. As such, the statement was of the type 
referred to in Bryant as one which by its nature was "made for a purpose other than use in 
a prosecution." Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157 n.9; see K.S.A. 60-460(m) (business records 
hearsay exception).  
 
Consequently, we agree with the conclusion of the trial court and the Court of 
Appeals that V.B.'s written statement to the bank was nontestimonial.  
 
 
Statements to the SANE 
 
The other Crawford issue relates to the testimony of the SANE regarding V.B.'s 
statements in the hospital emergency room, where V.B. was taken by ambulance after 
law enforcement officers arrived at the scene. Bennington made a continuing 
Confrontation Clause objection at the outset of the SANE's testimony to any statements 
 
19 
 
made by V.B. to the SANE. Some additional facts are necessary to understand the 
context of the statements.  
 
The SANE explained on direct examination that before conducting a physical 
examination, she took a "history from the patient, an account of what happened to" her. 
The SANE then completed a head-to-toe assessment, a detailed genitalia exam, and then 
collected forensic evidence. 
 
In testimony that sets this case apart from a situation where statements are made 
solely to a health care professional, the SANE explained a law enforcement officer was 
present during V.B.'s "history." While the SANE asked for a narrative statement, asking 
V.B. to explain what had happened, the officer also asked V.B. a few specific questions. 
The SANE wrote down V.B.'s statements, which incorporated her responses to all 
questions. The SANE's notes were recorded in the medical chart; in those notes, one 
cannot make a distinction between the statements to the SANE and the statements to the 
officer. 
 
After the history had been obtained, V.B. was moved to a different location where 
the second step, a sexual assault assessment, was conducted, which entailed a head-to-toe 
examination and a detailed examination of V.B.'s genitalia. Bennington did not object 
during the SANE's testimony regarding physical findings or to the admission of 
photographs taken by the SANE during the physical examination. The standing objection 
made to the SANE's testimony also did not cover any physical findings or the 
photographs, as these observations were made by the SANE who was confronted by 
Bennington before the jury. See K.S.A. 60-404 (contemporaneous objection statute); 
State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, Syl. ¶ 5, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011) (party cannot object to 
the introduction of evidence on one ground at trial and then assert another ground on 
appeal); State v. Dukes, 290 Kan. 485, 487-88, 231 P.3d 558 (2010) (same); State v. 
 
20 
 
King, 288 Kan. 333, 341-42, 346-48, 204 P.3d 585 (2009) (timely and specific objection 
preserves issues related to admission of evidence for appeal).   
 
During this portion of the examination, the SANE completed a Kansas Bureau of 
Investigation (KBI) sexual assault evidence kit in compliance with the procedures 
established by the KBI and the Kansas Department of Health and Environment pursuant 
to K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 65-448. One form within this kit was an anatomical drawing of the 
external female genitalia. The SANE recorded her observations of physical injuries on 
this form. Defense counsel specifically stated there were no objections to the admission 
of this form as an exhibit.  
 
Another form in the KBI kit was a questionnaire, which listed questions asking 
about the nature of the assault, the specific time of the assault, the name of the 
perpetrator, and a description of the perpetrator. The victim was also asked whether the 
victim had other sexual relations in the last 72 hours. The SANE explained the last 
question was helpful when analyzing the import of forensic evidence.  
 
Regarding the information supplied by V.B. in response to these questions, the 
SANE testified that V.B. "reported penetration in all three areas, the genital, anal and 
oral." Bennington did not state a separate objection to testimony regarding V.B.'s 
statements as recorded on this form.  
 
 
State's Focus Misplaced 
 
The State argues V.B.'s statements were nontestimonial because they were made 
to the SANE as a medical professional, not as a government official, and they were made 
to provide the SANE with information for treatment purposes, not for prosecution. The 
State also argues that the interview was not subject to any of the formalities and 
procedures otherwise associated with testimonial hearsay.  
 
21 
 
 
These arguments might be valid in other circumstances where a SANE assesses 
the medical condition of a sexual assault victim and provides treatment. For example, in 
light of the circumstances presented in State v. Miller, No. 99,232, this day decided, slip 
op. at 55, we held that the statements of a 4-year-old victim to a SANE were 
nontestimonial because the primary purpose of the questions and statements were 
medical treatment, not prosecution. That context-dependent conclusion was based on the 
circumstances of the child victim complaining of discomfort, the victim's mother 
deciding to seek medical treatment independent of a request by law enforcement officers 
for an examination, and the SANE providing medical treatment. The same conclusion is 
suggested by some of the circumstances in this case, primarily the facts that V.B. was 
taken by ambulance to the hospital and sought and received medical treatment. This case, 
however, presents the circumstances of the statements being given either (1) to a law 
enforcement officer and a SANE or (2) in response to questions prepared by the KBI that 
were asked by the SANE. These factors dictate the outcome of the issue in this case. 
 
In Miller, slip op. at 36-38, we cite case law from other jurisdictions on the issue 
of whether statements to a SANE are testimonial. We will not repeat that discussion here 
but note that in synthesizing those decisions we concluded "if a law enforcement officer 
participates in the questioning, there is a strong trend toward finding the victim's 
statements testimonial." Miller, slip op. at 38. We agree with the decisions reaching this 
result, at least under the circumstances of this case. We further note that these holdings 
are consistent with our decision in State v. Henderson, 284 Kan. 267, 160 P.3d 776 
(2007). In that case, a child victim was primarily interviewed by a state-employed social 
worker, who was gathering information for potential action related to child protection 
services. However, a law enforcement officer "sat in on the interview, and participated in 
asking several clarifying questions of [the victim]." Henderson, 284 Kan. at 289. This 
participation, along with the officer's continuous involvement in the process and other 
aspects of the investigation from the start, was an "important" consideration leading to 
 
22 
 
our holding that the victim's statements were testimonial. See Henderson, 284 Kan. at 
289-90.  
 
In this case, the presence of the law enforcement officer during the initial taking of 
a history from V.B. blurs the "primary purpose" of the interview. Obviously, one purpose 
of the interview was for medical purposes; the SANE testified the first step of an 
examination is to "obtain information on exactly what happened to [the victim], so then 
in turn you can assess for [the] types of injuries that may have been sustained." Yet, the 
presence of an officer is not necessary for medical purposes.  
 
Rather, the officer was listening to V.B.'s account of past events, with an eye 
toward gathering information relevant to prosecution. The officer, who asked questions, 
gathered this information in a formal setting at a time when there was no indication of an 
ongoing public safety or law enforcement emergency; the perpetrator had fled hours 
before the interview. In this regard, the situation was much like that in Hammon v. 
Indiana, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2006), where the law 
enforcement emergency had been resolved and the victim was being asked to recount 
past facts. The fact the officer interjected questions makes it apparent from an objective 
viewpoint that the information was also being sought for potential use in a subsequent 
prosecution.  
 
The fact these statements were also heard by a SANE does not alter the objective 
circumstances that suggest a primary purpose was prosecution, even if there was a dual 
purpose of assessment for medical purposes. In Miller, slip op. at 46, we concluded that 
an analysis of the testimonial nature of statements must at times be analyzed question by 
question because the purpose of the interview may transition. In this case, we are unable 
to make such fine distinctions because the SANE's narrative of V.B.'s statements does not 
distinguish between information given in response to a question asked by the officer or 
by the SANE.  
 
23 
 
 
Consequently, because the interview was conducted in concert with the officer 
who asked questions, V.B. was asked about past events, there was not an ongoing public 
safety or medical emergency, and the statement was given in a formal setting, we hold 
the admission of the SANE's testimony about the statements made in the presence of a 
law enforcement officer violated Bennington's confrontation rights. 
 
V.B. made other statements outside the presence of the officer, however, during 
the second stage of the SANE's interview of V.B. As previously discussed, it was during 
this second stage that the SANE completed the KBI's questionnaire.  
 
The Court of Appeals separately discussed the two phases of the statements and 
determined Bennington's objection to the admission of V.B.'s second-stage statements 
had not been preserved. The Court of Appeals explained: 
 
"Finally, when [the SANE] related this aspect of her work, there was no objection to her 
testimony; the vague 'continuing objection' asserted at the outset of [the SANE's] 
testimony during step one in the process cannot be construed as applicable to the later 
and attenuated step two testimony without at least a reminder to the court of the general 
applicability of the prior 'continuing' objection. See In re C.E.M., No. 96,914, 
unpublished opinion filed March 2, 2007, rev. denied 284 Kan. 945 (2007) [,slip op. at 6] 
(vague continuing objection deemed inapplicable to attenuated testimony without 
reminder of continuing applicability); [see also] State v. Torrez, 280 Kan. 309, 319, 121 
P.3d 429 (2005) (a timely and specific objection is necessary to preserve an issue for 
appeal). The dispute on appeal focuses upon what the victim told [the SANE] during the 
step one 'history.' The distinction between evidence resulting from step one and that 
resulting from step two is critical to our analysis." State v. Bennington, No. 98,656, 2009 
WL 981683, at *2 (Kan. App. 2009) (unpublished opinion). 
 
Despite this explanation by the Court of Appeals, the source of its insistence that a 
continuing objection needed to be renewed because V.B. made these second-stage 
 
24 
 
statements in a different location and different phase of the examination is unclear. Until 
the Court of Appeals' decision, no one had attached legal significance to the stages of the 
examination. Although we also think the stages are legally significant, we fail to see why 
a continuing objection to all statements of V.B. on confrontation grounds, reasserted 
during the SANE's testimony, did not sufficiently preserve an objection to all statements 
of V.B., regardless of whether made in the initial history portion of the examination or in 
response to questions on the KBI form. Consequently, we conclude Bennington 
preserved the issue of whether all V.B.'s statements, including the stage-two statements, 
were admissible.  
 
Nevertheless, we agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that there is legal 
significance to the fact these stage-two statements were given in response to questions 
through which the KBI sought information significant to the investigation and later 
prosecution of a crime. Even though the questions were verbally posed by the SANE, the 
source was the KBI and the questions asked who, when, where, and other specifics 
relating to the elements of potential crimes. These circumstances indicate the primary 
purpose of the interrogation was to seek information for later prosecution of crimes. 
Significantly, K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 65-448 states, in part: 
 
 
"(a) Upon the request of any law enforcement officer and with the written consent 
of the reported victim, or upon the request of the victim, any physician, a licensed 
physician assistant, who has been specially trained in performing sexual assault evidence 
collection, or a registered professional nurse, who has been specially trained in 
performing sexual assault evidence collection, on call or on duty at a medical care facility 
of this state, as defined by subsection (h) of K.S.A. 65-425, and amendments thereto, 
shall examine persons who may be victims of sexual offenses . . . using Kansas bureau of 
investigation sexual assault evidence collection kits or similar kits approved by the 
Kansas bureau of investigation, for the purposes of gathering evidence of any such crime. 
If an examination has taken place solely upon the request of the victim, the medical care 
facility shall not notify any law enforcement agency without the written consent of the 
victim, unless otherwise required by law. . . . The department of health and environment, 
 
25 
 
in cooperation with the Kansas bureau of investigation, shall establish procedures for 
gathering evidence pursuant to this section." (Emphasis added.)  
 
In this case, the record does not establish whether a law enforcement officer 
requested the examination or whether V.B. consented to the release of the information to 
law enforcement. Nevertheless, because the SANE was complying with the protocol 
established pursuant to K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 65-448 and was seeking information in 
addition to the history that she said she used for diagnostic purposes, her actions reflect 
that the primary purpose of posing the questions was to gather information for 
prosecution. Because the record on appeal is silent regarding whether V.B. consented to 
the information being provided to law enforcement, we decline to project the impact the 
consent would have had on V.B.'s intent and actions. Even without the consent, from an 
objective standpoint, a patient would understand questions that ask for a description of 
the perpetrator and similar information did not need to be asked for purposes of medical 
treatment. Rather, under the circumstances of this case, V.B. was reporting past events 
that were not related to an ongoing public safety emergency or to her need for medical 
treatment. 
 
 
Moreover, when a SANE—even one who is a non-State actor—follows the 
procedures for gathering evidence pursuant to K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 65-448 and asks 
questions prepared by the KBI, the SANE acts as an agent of law enforcement. See 
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1151 n.3, 179 L. Ed. 2d 93 (2011) 
(noting non-State actors may be considered agents for purposes of analysis of whether 
statements are testimonial); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823 n. 2, 126 S. Ct. 
2266, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2006) (same). Again, under some circumstances, there may be a 
transition to nontestimonial statements. But there is no indication of any such 
circumstances in this case. 
 
 
26 
 
 
As a result, we conclude that V.B.'s statements were testimonial under the 
circumstances of this case where an officer was present and asked questions of V.B. in 
stage one and the KBI prepared questions that the SANE asked during stage two of V.B.'s 
statements.  
 
 
Harmless Error 
 
 
Having found error, we must next consider whether the error was harmless error. 
"Violation of the Confrontation Clause is subject to analysis under the federal harmless 
error rule." State v. Nguyen, 281 Kan. 702, Syl. ¶ 6, 133 P.3d 1259 (2006). To declare a 
federal constitutional error harmless under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 
824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967), an appellate court must be persuaded beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error did not affect the trial's outcome in light of the entire record, i.e., 
there was no reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict. The prosecution—
the party benefiting from the error—bears the burden of showing that the error was 
harmless. State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 6, 256 P.3d 801 (2011). Where, as here, 
there are multiple counts and the evidence as to each count differs, an appellate court 
must proceed by applying the Chapman federal harmless error standard to each count. 
See Paige v. United States, 25 A.3d 74, 82 (D.C. 2011). 
 
 
As we apply this test to the trial evidence, we conclude there was overwhelming 
evidence that Bennington was the perpetrator and V.B.'s statements to the SANE did not 
impact that identification in any significant way. (Her response to the KBI questions 
regarding identity was "unknown," and her physical description was too vague to lead to 
identification.) Rather, DNA evidence implicated Bennington in the sex crimes, and the 
ATM photograph identified him as the person using V.B.'s financial card. 
 
 
Additionally, the SANE's testimony played little, if any, role in proving the State's 
case regarding the aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery. V.B.'s statement to the 
 
27 
 
bank established the card was taken when someone broke into her house and she was 
forced to provide her PIN. She also reported the card was used on two occasions to 
withdraw money from her bank account without her consent. The first officer on the 
scene found that V.B.'s phone line had been torn or cut, papers and credit cards were 
scattered, and drawers were opened. Other officers found a window had been forced 
open. V.B.'s niece testified V.B. told her the man broke into her house, pointed a gun at 
her head, took her financial cards, forced her to give him her bank PIN, and took all of 
her good jewelry. This was the primary evidence used to prove the charges of aggravated 
burglary, aggravated robbery, and criminal use of a financial card. We are convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no reasonable possibility the SANE's testimony 
regarding V.B.'s statements affected the verdicts on these charges.   
 
 
Regarding the charges of aggravated kidnapping and rape, V.B.'s history 
statements to the SANE were cumulative of other evidence admitted at trial. V.B.'s next 
door neighbor testified there was a loud banging on his door. He found V.B., naked from 
the waist down, her hands bound behind her back, and her mouth gagged. He could tell 
her legs had also been bound because he could see the indentations and bluish 
discoloration cause by restricted circulation.   
 
 
Then, V.B.'s niece testified: 
 
"She told me that she was awakened in the night with a gun to her head, and she 
said I just prayed all the time, and that a man was in her house. He had on a stocking hat 
and she said she couldn't really see his face very well. And he tried to rape her vaginally, 
and then he turned her over and tried to insert his penis in her rectum, and he also tried to 
put it in her mouth or did. And then he tied her hands and feet all up behind her." 
 
 
In addition, there was physical evidence, including injuries observed by V.B.'s 
neighbor and V.B.'s niece, who reported her aunt was sore and uncomfortable for more 
than a week to the point to being unable to tolerate a bath. More significant were the 
 
28 
 
SANE's observations of V.B.'s injuries and physical findings substantiating the charges of 
aggravated kidnapping and rape. The SANE observed marks on V.B.'s face, arms, back, 
legs, and ankles, which she described to the jury. These injuries were also documented 
with photographs, which allowed the jury to observe ligature markings corresponding to 
the neighbor's descriptions. The photographs also documented other abrasions and 
bruises on V.B.'s forearms, elbows, ankles, and back.  
 
 
Also, the SANE documented injuries to the external female genitalia by making 
notations on a diagram. She testified in detail regarding her observations, describing the 
injuries and explaining their significance to the jury. She first described tears to the skin 
of the labia minora, which she opined were caused by blunt or direct force. There was 
also bruising around the urethra opening and a 1-centimeter tear in that area. Similarly, 
the vaginal opening was marked with a tear and bruising. Explaining this injury, the 
SANE reported that such an injury results from blunt force, such as when "[a]n object is 
directly impacting that skin tissue" and is "generally" consistent with penile or attempted 
penile insertion. The SANE explained the examination did not include looking into V.B.'s 
cervix because "it was just too painful for her."  
 
 
These physical observations and opinions, when combined with the niece's 
description of what happened to V.B. and the neighbor's description of the binding and 
gagging, provided strong evidence of aggravated kidnapping and rape. See K.S.A. 21-
3420 (defining kidnapping as "taking or confining of any person, accomplished by force, 
threat or deception, with the intent to hold such person" for a criminal purpose); K.S.A. 
21-3421 (defining aggravated kidnapping is kidnapping as defined in K.S.A. 21-3420 
when "bodily harm is inflicted upon the person kidnapped"); K.S.A. 21-3502(a)(1)(4) 
(defining rape as sexual intercourse without consent; victim overcome by force or fear); 
State v. Borthwick, 255 Kan. 899, 914, 880 P.2d 1261 (1994) ("Penetration is an element 
of rape, but any penetration, however slight, is sufficient. To establish this element, actual 
penetration of the vagina or rupturing of the hymen is not required; penetration of the 
 
29 
 
vulva or labia is sufficient.").Without the SANE's testimony there is strong evidence that 
V.B. was confined, was threatened with a gun, suffered bodily injury, and experienced 
penetration of the labia. In light of this evidence, we are convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that there is no reasonable possibility the admission of V.B.'s statements to the 
SANE affected the jury's verdict regarding aggravated kidnapping and rape.  
 
 
We cannot reach the same conclusion with regard to the two counts of aggravated 
criminal sodomy, however. The State in one of these counts alleged Bennington engaged 
in oral copulation or oral contact of the male genitalia with V.B. and in the other count 
alleged anal copulation. K.S.A. 21-3501(2) defines "sodomy" to mean "oral contact or 
oral penetration of the female genitalia or oral contact of the male genitalia; anal 
penetration, however slight, of a male or female by any body part or object; or oral or 
anal copulation or sexual intercourse between a person and an animal."  
 
Without V.B.'s statements to the SANE, there was not clear evidence of any 
conduct that would meet this definition. As quoted above, V.B.'s niece testified that V.B. 
said the man "turned her over and tried to insert his penis in her rectum, and he also tried 
to put it in her mouth or did." The prosecutor followed with some additional questions: 
 
"Q:  And you said that he tried to put it in her mouth. What did you understand from that? 
"A:  Putting his penis in her mouth. 
. . . . 
"Q:  My question is, do you remember whether she said he did put it in or he just tried to 
put it in? 
"A:  I'm not absolutely—I think she—she said he tried to put it in my mouth." 
 
Arguably, one could infer oral contact with the male genitalia from the niece's 
testimony that V.B. said the man tried to put his penis in V.B.'s mouth. But the evidence 
is not clear and direct. Similarly, without V.B.'s statements to the SANE describing anal 
penetration, there is no direct evidence substantiating anything more than an attempted 
 
30 
 
anal sodomy. Granted, the niece's report of anal contact was substantiated by physical 
evidence—the SANE's observations of tears and bruising around the anal opening. In 
fact, the SANE testified, "I've noted the whole entire area is swollen." But this 
description was phrased in terms of the "opening," and while it vaguely suggests 
penetration, it does not clearly establish anal penetration. We cannot say beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted Bennington of the two counts of 
aggravated criminal sodomy without the SANE's testimony regarding V.B.'s statements 
of the attack.  
 
 
Consequently, we declare the admission of V.B.'s testimonial hearsay statements 
to the law enforcement officer and the SANE harmless with regard to Bennington's 
convictions of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, two counts of fraudulent use of a 
financial card, aggravated kidnapping, and rape, but we find reversible error as to the two 
aggravated criminal sodomy convictions. We, therefore, reverse Bennington's convictions 
on the two aggravated criminal sodomy counts and vacate those sentences.   
 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
 
Next, Bennington argues his trial was prejudiced by prosecutorial misconduct. 
Specifically, he contends the State violated the trial court's ruling on Bennington's motion 
in limine, which prohibited the mention of Bennington's "prior criminal record." He also 
contends that, during closing argument, the prosecutor committed misconduct by making 
comments that improperly voiced the prosecutor's opinion of Bennington's guilt and 
improperly appealed to the jury's sympathy for the victim. The Court of Appeals found 
no merit to Bennington's contentions, and we agree with that holding. See Bennington, 
2009 WL 981683, at *7-10.  
 
 
 
 
31 
 
Order in Limine—Preservation of Issue 
 
Before trial, Bennington filed a motion in limine in which he sought to prohibit, 
inter alia, any reference to his past criminal conduct, including whether he "has ever been 
arrested for a crime, spent any time in a prison or jail, or has ever been on probation or 
parole." Bennington challenges testimony which referenced his being in custody in 
Yakima, Washington, when law enforcement from Kansas contacted him. He focuses on 
the direct examination of Detective Scott Wiswell who testified that after DNA evidence 
obtained from V.B.'s bed sheet connected Bennington to the crimes, the detective 
obtained an arrest warrant for Bennington in the state of Washington. The warrant was 
executed. Based on that warrant, Bennington was arrested and confined at the Yakima 
police station, where Detective Wiswell was able to interview Bennington. The detective 
testified that Bennington was in custody during the interview. Bennington contends that 
the prosecutor violated the order in limine by eliciting testimony about his being in 
custody. 
 
Bennington acknowledges he failed to object at trial to any of the detective's 
testimony or the prosecutor's questions. Under K.S.A. 60-404, we have established that "a 
contemporaneous objection must be made to all evidentiary claims—including those 
alleging prosecutorial misconduct—to preserve the issue for appellate review." State v. 
Shadden, 290 Kan. 803, 835, 235 P.3d 436 (2010); see State v. King, 288 Kan. 333, 349, 
204 P.3d 585 (2009) (noting that K.S.A. 60-404 "dictates that evidentiary errors shall not 
be reviewed on appeal unless a party has lodged a timely and specific objection to the 
alleged error at trial"); cf. State v. Inkelaar, No. 101,987, filed October 21, 2011, slip op. 
at 17 (prosecutorial misconduct argument preserved by evidentiary objection that 
prosecutor's questions lacked legal or factual basis). Therefore, the issue alleging 
prosecutorial misconduct involving the improper elicitation of testimony is not properly 
before this court.  
 
 
32 
 
 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals correctly determined the prosecutor did not 
improperly elicit the detective's testimony because Bennington's confinement was based 
on the arrest warrant for the current crime, rather than any prior offense. See Bennington, 
2009 WL 981683, at *8. 
 
Closing Argument 
 
Bennington raises two contentions regarding the prosecutor's closing argument: 
(1) The prosecutor improperly injected his personal opinion into the closing argument, 
and (2) the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jury's sympathy for the victim.  
 
Bennington did not object to the challenged remarks during the State's closing 
argument, but a contemporaneous objection is not required to preserve a prosecutorial 
misconduct claim based on remarks made during voir dire, opening statements, or closing 
arguments, which are not evidence. See State v. Stone, 291 Kan. 13, 17, 237 P.3d 1229 
(2010); King, 288 Kan. at 349. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
 
Appellate review of an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct involving improper 
comments to the jury during closing argument requires a two-step analysis. First, the 
appellate court decides whether the comments were outside the wide latitude that the 
prosecutor is allowed in discussing the evidence. Second, if misconduct is found, the 
appellate court must determine whether the improper comments prejudiced the jury 
against the defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial. State v. Huerta-Alvarez, 291 
Kan. 247, 261, 243 P.3d 326 (2010); State v. McReynolds, 288 Kan. 318, 323, 202 P.3d 
658 (2009). 
 
 
 
33 
 
 
First Remark 
 
Bennington's first objection is to the following remark during the prosecutor's 
main portion of his closing argument:  "I want to stand here right now and ask you, don't 
find him guilty of attempted rape. Find him guilty of rape. That's what he did." 
Bennington contends the prosecutor improperly voiced his personal opinion regarding 
Bennington's guilt. See State v. Corbett, 281 Kan. 294, 315, 130 P.3d 1179 (2006) 
("Prosecutors must not state a personal opinion regarding the ultimate guilt or innocence 
of the defendant.").  
 
Viewed in isolation, "That's what he did," sounds like a personal opinion. But 
when placed in context, this statement is not outside the wide latitude allowed attorneys 
during argument. The statement was made during the prosecutor's explanation of the 
elements of attempted rape. The prosecutor stated: 
 
"[Instruction] 11 is attempted rape. It's the lesser included offense of rape. 
Bottom line is, when [V.B.] tells [her niece] he tried, this is kind of, frankly, a fall back. 
If you're not convinced that there was actual penetration, if you're not maybe sure what 
all that business about injury to the interior part of [V.B.'s] genitals means, if you're not—
if you don't know, just not sure what to think of all that, then at the very least he 
[Bennington] was trying. Clearly there was penetration, no question of that. But if all else 
fails, there's an attempted rape here, at least based on what [V.B.] told [her niece]. 
"I want to stand here right now and ask you, don't find him guilty of attempted 
rape. Find him guilty of rape. That's what he did." (Emphasis added.)  
 
Before making this remark, the prosecutor had also gone through the elements of 
rape and discussed the requirement of "penetration, however slight." A review of the 
entire statement shows that the prosecutor was accurately describing the evidence and 
relating it to the elements of attempted rape versus rape, and the statement, "That's what 
he did," was relating the facts to those elements. A prosecutor has wide latitude to craft 
 
34 
 
arguments that include reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Stone, 291 
Kan. at 19; See State v. Scaife, 286 Kan. 614, 623-24, 186 P.3d 755 (2008). Bennington's 
argument fails on the first step of the prosecutorial misconduct analysis—the prosecutor's 
remark did not exceed the wide latitude afforded to the prosecution to argue inferences 
from the evidence presented. 
 
 
Second Remark 
 
Bennington next argues the prosecutor improperly injected his personal opinion 
about Bennington's guilt a second time by making the following remark during the main 
portion of his closing argument: 
 
"I know I've kind of blown through this pretty quick, but you know what am I 
going to say, folks. At the end of the day we have—we live in a world today where we 
have the benefit of technology, DNA here tells us what [V.B.] could not tell her nurse, 
what she could not tell her niece that the man who did this to her sitting right here, Mr. 
Bennington that it's his DNA on that bed sheet." (Emphasis added.)  
 
The State argues this remark was not a personal opinion offered by the prosecutor 
but was a statement meant to communicate to the jury that the DNA evidence proved 
Bennington was the person who committed the offenses. We agree. Again, during closing 
argument, the prosecutor may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence but may not 
comment upon facts outside the evidence. See King, 288 Kan. at 351. The evidence 
presented at trial supported the prosecutor's remark that the DNA linked Bennington to 
the crime scene. Cf. State v. Stano, 284 Kan. 126, 153, 159 P.3d 931 (2007) (prosecutor's 
closing-argument comment that there was 10 times as much of defendant's DNA on 
baseball cap found near crime scene than there was of anyone else's DNA was a fair 
construction of evidence at trial). 
 
 
35 
 
The remark was not outside the wide latitude allowed to the prosecutor in 
discussing the evidence. 
 
 
Third Set of Remarks 
 
Bennington's final argument involves the following remarks made during the 
rebuttal portion of the prosecutor's closing argument:  "The victim's not here to show, to 
tell you her side of the story, and so we have to rely on hearsay"; and "Use your common 
sense, please, and remember what the DNA is doing for us here. It's speaking for [V.B.]. 
It's telling us who committed these crimes." Bennington argues these comments 
improperly appealed to the jury's sympathy for the deceased victim.  
 
"'Prosecutors are not allowed to make statements that inflame the passions or 
prejudices of the jury or distract the jury from its duty to make decisions based on the 
evidence and the controlling law.' [Citations omitted.]" State v. Magallanez, 290 Kan. 
906, 915, 235 P.3d 460 (2010); see State v. Henry, 273 Kan. 608, 621, 44 P.3d 466 
(2002) (prosecutor's comment urging jury to think about Mother's Day, how victim's 
mother felt inflamed passion, prejudice of jury); but see State v. Cravatt, 267 Kan. 314, 
336, 979 P.2d 679 (1999) (prosecutor's comment that jury should not let defendant get 
away with killing 21-year-old victim not improper; State asking "jury to seriously 
consider the nature of the defendant's act toward the victim"). Here, the Court of Appeals 
found the prosecutor's remarks were not an attempt to create sympathy but were an 
attempt to support the State's case, despite its inability to present testimony from the 
victim. Bennington, 2009 WL 981683, at *9. We reach the same conclusion.  
 
Further, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded the prosecutor's remarks were 
acceptable rebuttal to defense counsel's attack on the State's evidence. Bennington, 2009 
WL 981683, at *9; cf. State v. McKinney, 272 Kan. 331, 347, 33 P.3d 234 (2001), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Davis, 283 Kan. 569, 158 P.3d 317 (2007) (in 
 
36 
 
determining if remarks are within latitude allowed in closing argument, appellate court 
may consider whether "questionable remarks made by a prosecuting attorney are 
provoked and made in response to previous arguments or statements of defense 
counsel"). In defense counsel's closing argument, he directly attacked the State's case on 
the basis of the "second-hand" information upon which it relied. For example, defense 
counsel made the following remark: 
 
"Ladies and gentlemen, I would just simply submit to you that this case is not as 
easy as what the State wants you to make it out to be. The fact that [V.B.] is no longer 
with us certainly makes the case a lot more difficult. You don't get to hear from her. You 
don't get to see her demeanor as she testifies. You don't get to see how she holds up under 
cross-examination. You're expected just to take the word of other people that have talked 
to her and then find this man guilty."  
 
In response, the prosecutor reminded the jury the DNA "spoke," even though the 
victim could not, and linked Bennington to the scene. It was appropriate for the 
prosecutor to urge the jury to consider the physical evidence, even if the jury were to 
"ignore" the hearsay evidence. Further, as the State argues in its appellate brief, the 
prosecutor's DNA remark could also have referred to the fact the DNA evidence could 
identify the perpetrator even though V.B. was not available to do so.  
 
In summary, the three remarks during closing argument were not improper and 
were within the wide latitude allowed during argument. Hence, we need not address the 
second step of the prosecutorial misconduct analysis. The Court of Appeals correctly 
concluded there was no prosecutorial misconduct during Bennington's trial. Bennington, 
2009 WL 981683, at *10.  
 
 
 
37 
 
IVORY ISSUE 
 
In Bennington's final argument on appeal, he argues the use of his prior 
convictions in his criminal history score to enhance his sentences without requiring the 
history to be included in the complaint and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt 
violated his constitutional rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 
2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). Bennington acknowledges that this court has previously 
rejected this argument. See, e.g., State v. Riojas, 288 Kan. 379, 388, 204 P.3d 578 (2009); 
State v. Fewell, 286 Kan. 370, 394-96, 184 P.3d 903 (2008); State v. Storey, 286 Kan. 7, 
Syl. ¶ 4, 179 P.3d 1137 (2008); State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44, 46-48, 41 P.3d 781 (2002). 
This court continues to hold that the use of prior convictions for sentencing enhancement 
is constitutional; thus, the Court of Appeals correctly found no merit to Bennington's 
contention. Bennington, 2009 WL 981683, at *10.  
 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. Judgment of the district court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
and remanded.