Case Title: Commonwealth v. Roman

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13140

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13140 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DEVIN ROMAN. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     November 1, 2021. - February 3, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Plea, Sentence.  Superior Court.  
Constitutional Law, Plea, Equal protection of laws, 
Sentence. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 15, 2016. 
 
 
A motion to withdraw guilty pleas, filed on January 29, 
2020, was heard by Douglas H. Wilkins, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Andrew P. Power for the defendant. 
 
Lee Baker, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  At the heart of this case are the different 
procedural protections afforded Superior Court criminal 
defendants -- as compared to District Court and Boston Municipal 
2 
 
Court criminal defendants, as well as juveniles in the Juvenile 
Court -- when those defendants tender guilty pleas without 
agreeing with the Commonwealth on a sentence.1  When there is 
such an unagreed plea, both the defendant and the Commonwealth 
may provide their own recommendations with respect to sentencing 
to a judge.  In these circumstances in the Superior Court, 
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (c) (4) (A), as appearing in 
470 Mass. 1501 (2015) (rule 12 [c] [4] [A]), a defendant tenders 
a "Commonwealth-capped plea":  the defendant has a statutory 
right to withdraw the guilty plea if the trial judge would 
impose a sentence that exceeds the Commonwealth's 
recommendation.  In contrast, in these circumstances in the 
District Court, a defendant tenders a "defendant-capped plea":  
the defendant has a statutory right to withdraw the guilty plea 
 
1 For ease of reference, we refer throughout to District 
Court defendants as the class in comparison to Superior Court 
defendants; we note, however, that our analysis extends to 
Boston Municipal Court defendants.  We further note that 
juveniles in the Juvenile Court likewise have a statutory right 
to defendant-capped pleas, although we do not discuss juveniles 
as a class comparable to the defendant's class.  The Legislature 
initially established defendant-capped pleas in the District 
Courts and only a few years later "expanded the [statutory] 
right to tender defendant-capped pleas to include the entire 
Juvenile Court Department."  Charbonneau v. Presiding Justice of 
the Holyoke Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 473 Mass. 515, 521 
(2016).  In his brief, the defendant does not discuss the 
Juvenile Court, presumably because there is more that 
distinguishes his class from the class of juveniles than simply 
the court in which they were charged. 
3 
 
if the trial judge would impose a sentence that exceeds the 
defendant's own recommendation. 
 
The defendant, Devin Roman, was charged, pleaded guilty, 
and was sentenced in the Superior Court.  He seeks to withdraw 
his plea on the basis of a facial challenge to this procedural 
scheme, which is laid out in G. L. c. 278, § 18,2 and rule 12 (c) 
(4) (A).3  The defendant argues that denying Superior Court 
 
2 General Laws c. 278, § 18, states in relevant part: 
 
"A defendant who is before the Boston municipal court or a 
district court or a district court sitting in a juvenile 
session or a juvenile court on a criminal offense within 
the court's final jurisdiction shall plead not guilty or 
guilty, or with the consent of the court, nolo contendere.  
Such plea of guilty shall be submitted by the defendant and 
acted upon by the court; provided, however, that a 
defendant with whom the commonwealth cannot reach agreement 
for a recommended disposition shall be allowed to tender a 
plea of guilty together with a request for a specific 
disposition. . . .  If such a plea, with an agreed upon 
recommendation or with a dispositional request by the 
defendant, is tendered, the court shall inform the 
defendant that it will not impose a disposition that 
exceeds the terms of the agreed upon recommendation or the 
dispositional request by the defendant, whichever is 
applicable, without giving the defendant the right to 
withdraw the plea." 
 
3 Rule 12 (c) (4) (A) states: 
 
"The judge shall give both parties the opportunity to 
recommend a sentence to the judge.  In the District Court, 
the judge shall inform the defendant that the disposition 
imposed will not exceed the terms of the defendant's 
request without first giving the defendant the right to 
withdraw the plea.  In the Superior Court, the judge shall 
inform the defendant that the disposition imposed will not 
exceed the terms of the prosecutor's recommendation without 
first giving the defendant the right to withdraw the plea.  
4 
 
defendants the statutory right to a defendant-capped plea 
violates equal protection principles under both the Federal and 
State Constitutions.  We disagree, and we therefore affirm. 
 
Background.  In April 2016, the defendant was indicted on 
eight charges:  two counts of armed assault with intent to 
murder; two counts of assault by means of a dangerous weapon; 
one count of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon; 
one count of illegal possession of a firearm; one count of 
removal or mutilation of serial or identification numbers of 
firearms during the commission of a felony; and one count of 
unlawful possession of a loaded firearm.  All charges stemmed 
from an incident on March 19, 2016, during which the defendant 
targeted and then repeatedly shot at three unarmed individuals, 
injuring one of them. 
The defendant was arraigned in the Superior Court in May 
2016, and he pleaded not guilty to all charges.  In February 
2017, the defendant appeared before a judge of the Superior 
Court (sentencing judge) to change his pleas.  With counsel 
present -- and after a colloquy with the sentencing judge, 
during which the judge verified the defendant's capacity to make 
 
At any time prior to accepting the plea or admission, the 
judge may continue the hearing on the judge's own motion to 
ensure that the judge has been provided with, and has had 
an opportunity to consider, all of the facts pertinent to a 
determination of a just disposition in the case." 
5 
 
a voluntary and intelligent plea -- the defendant tendered 
guilty pleas for all charges.  The Commonwealth and the 
defendant had not reached an agreement with respect to 
sentencing recommendations.  Accordingly, pursuant to rule 12 
(c) (4) (A), the sentencing judge informed the defendant of his 
statutory right to a Commonwealth-capped plea:  "I will not 
impose a sentence any longer or more severe than what the 
prosecutor's recommending unless I tell you first and let you 
withdraw your guilty plea, if you want to." 
The Commonwealth recommended a series of mostly concurrent 
sentences, the longest of which was from fourteen to fifteen 
years in State prison,4 while the defendant sought a sentence of 
from seven to nine years.5  The sentencing judge opted for a 
disposition that would impose a series of mostly concurrent 
sentences, the longest of which was from ten to twelve years in 
State prison. 
 
4 The Commonwealth recommended from fourteen to fifteen 
years in State prison for the two counts of assault with intent 
to murder; from four to five years in State prison for the two 
counts of assault with a dangerous weapon; from nine to ten 
years in State prison for the count of assault and battery with 
a dangerous weapon; from four to five years for illegal 
possession of a firearm; and from four to five years for the 
removal of a firearm serial number -- all to run concurrently; 
and two and a half years in a house of correction for the 
unlawful possession of a loaded firearm charge, to run from and 
after the illegal possession of a firearm charge. 
 
5 Defense counsel did not break down her recommendation 
charge by charge during the change of plea hearing. 
6 
 
In January 2020, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw 
his guilty pleas pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as 
appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001) (rule 30 [b]).  In September 
2020, the defendant filed, and a different Superior Court judge 
(motion judge) granted, a motion to admit evidence of racial 
disparities in the Massachusetts criminal justice system.6  The 
defendant argued before the Superior Court judge, as he does on 
appeal, that he should be able to withdraw his plea because 
"[r]ule 12 (c) (4) (A) violates . . . equal protection 
guarantees by withholding the right to a defendant-capped plea 
from Superior Court defendants only."  In November 2020, after a 
hearing, the motion judge denied the defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea.  The defendant filed a notice of 
appeal, and we granted his application for direct appellate 
review. 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  "A motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea is treated as a motion for a new trial pursuant to 
[rule] 30 (b)."  Commonwealth v. Resende, 475 Mass. 1, 12 
(2016).  The defendant's argument focuses not on the 
particularities or adequacy of his plea but rather on the 
overarching procedural scheme under which it was tendered.  
 
6 By this time, the sentencing judge had retired, so this 
motion and all subsequent motions were before the same motion 
judge in the Superior Court. 
7 
 
Specifically, the defendant has raised a constitutional 
challenge to this scheme.  When evaluating a trial judge's 
ruling on such a challenge, we "make an independent 
determination as to the correctness of the judge's application 
of constitutional principles to the facts as found" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 487 Mass. 370, 374 (2021). 
2.  Constitutional claims.  In particular, the defendant 
argues that G. L. c. 278, § 18, together with Mass. R. Crim. P. 
12 (rule 12), as amended, 482 Mass. 1501 (2019), discriminate 
against Superior Court criminal defendants in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
cognate provisions of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  
Together, G. L. c. 278, § 18, and rule 12 confer a right to 
defendant-capped pleas to defendants in the District Court.  See 
Charbonneau v. Presiding Justice of the Holyoke Div. of the 
Dist. Court Dep't, 473 Mass. 515, 518 (2016).  The defendant 
contends that the denial of this statutory right to Superior 
Court defendants constitutes a violation of equal protection 
principles.  However, because there is a rational basis for this 
distinction between defendants in the Superior Court and those 
in the District Court, we disagree. 
a.  Defendant-capped and Commonwealth-capped pleas.  A 
defendant may tender a guilty plea either having struck a 
bargain with the Commonwealth or not having done so.  See G. L. 
8 
 
c. 278, § 18; Mass. R. Crim. P. 12.  Where a defendant has 
entered into an agreement with the Commonwealth, such an 
agreement may include a sentence recommendation acceptable to 
both parties.  Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (b) (5) (A).  Defendants may 
withdraw their guilty pleas and choose instead to proceed to 
trial if a judge would impose a sentence that exceeds an agreed-
upon recommendation.  Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (c) (4) (B). 
At issue here is what happens when defendants plead guilty 
without an agreed-upon recommendation -- specifically in what 
circumstances may such defendants withdraw their guilty pleas in 
light of the sentences subsequently imposed upon them.  In these 
situations -- where the Commonwealth and defendants have offered 
opposing sentence recommendations -- defendants in the District 
Court have a statutory right to withdraw their pleas if their 
sentences would exceed their own recommendations (i.e., they 
tender defendant-capped pleas), see G. L. c. 278, § 18; Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 12 (c) (4) (A), while defendants in the Superior Court 
have a statutory right to withdraw their pleas only if their 
sentences would exceed the Commonwealth's recommendations (i.e., 
they tender Commonwealth-capped pleas), Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (c) 
(4) (A).  See Charbonneau, 473 Mass. at 518-519 ("The statute, 
complemented by the rule, defines the two essential elements of 
a defendant-capped plea:  [1] the defendant shall tender a 
guilty plea; and [2] on the tender of the plea, the judge shall 
9 
 
inform the defendant of his or her unconditional right to 
withdraw the plea if the proposed disposition exceeds . . . that 
requested by the defendant").  See also Commonwealth v. 
Rodriguez, 461 Mass. 256, 258 n.4 (2012) ("The procedure set 
forth in G. L. c. 278, § 18, applies in the District Court, the 
Boston Municipal Court, the Juvenile Court, and a District Court 
sitting in a juvenile session, but not in the Superior Court"). 
b.  Constitutional standards of review.  The defendant 
argues that this procedural scheme, in which certain criminal 
defendants have a statutory right to defendant-capped pleas and 
others do not, is on its face violative of equal protection as 
guaranteed by both the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution and cognate provisions of the Declaration of Rights 
of the Massachusetts Constitution.  Our "review of an equal 
protection claim under the Massachusetts Constitution is 
generally the same as the review of a Federal equal protection 
claim, . . . although we have recognized that the Massachusetts 
Constitution is, if anything, more protective of individual 
liberty and equality than the Federal Constitution" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Freeman, 472 Mass. 503, 505 n.5 
(2015). 
We assess constitutional claims such as this one along "a 
continuum of constitutional vulnerability determined at every 
point by the competing values involved" (citations omitted).  
10 
 
Chelsea Collaborative, Inc. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 
480 Mass. 27, 36 n.22 (2018).  For equal protection claims, 
"[w]here a statute either burdens the exercise of a fundamental 
right protected by our State Constitution, or discriminates on 
the basis of a suspect classification, the statute is subject to 
strict judicial scrutiny. . . .  All other statutes . . . are 
subject to a rational basis level of judicial scrutiny" 
(citations omitted).  Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. 
Connector Auth., 459 Mass. 655, 668-669 (2011), S.C., 461 Mass. 
232 (2012).  Under strict scrutiny, a State action "must be 
narrowly tailored to further a legitimate and compelling 
governmental interest and must be the least restrictive means 
available to vindicate that interest," id. at 669, while under 
rational basis a State action "will be upheld as long as it is 
rationally related to the furtherance of a legitimate [S]tate 
interest" (citations omitted).  Doe No. 1 v. Secretary of Educ., 
479 Mass. 375, 393 (2018). 
c.  Strict scrutiny.  The defendant urges us to apply 
strict scrutiny here.  As defined supra, we apply strict 
scrutiny "[w]here a statute either burdens the exercise of a 
fundamental right . . . or discriminates on the basis of a 
suspect classification."  Finch, 459 Mass. at 668-669.  Because 
the procedural scheme of G. L. c. 278, § 18, and rule 12 (c) (4) 
11 
 
(A) neither burdens the exercise of a fundamental right nor 
implicates a suspect class,7 we decline to apply strict scrutiny. 
"A fundamental right is one that is deeply rooted in this 
Nation's history and tradition . . . and implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would 
exist if [it] were sacrificed" (quotations and citations 
omitted).  Gillespie v. Northampton, 460 Mass. 148, 153 (2011).  
 
7 The defendant does not expressly claim that his class 
constitutes a suspect class for purposes of equal protection 
analysis, although the Commonwealth addresses the issue in turn 
in its brief.  We conclude that no suspect class is implicated 
here. 
 
We have held that classifications based on "sex, race, 
color, creed, or national origin," as enumerated in art. 106 of 
the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, are inherently 
suspect.  See, e.g., Doe v. Acton-Boxborough Regional Sch. 
Dist., 468 Mass. 64, 76 (2014); Finch, 459 Mass. at 662-663.  
However, this list is not exclusive.  "If a class is not 
addressed by art. 106 it does not follow that strict scrutiny is 
inappropriate but merely that there is no express constitutional 
mandate that such scrutiny be applied."  Finch, supra at 662-
663. 
 
The defendant has been treated differently in the instant 
case by virtue of where he was charged.  Whether a defendant is 
charged in the Superior Court or the District Court generally is 
determined by the severity of the alleged offense.  Compare 
G. L. c. 212, § 6 (Superior Court has original jurisdiction over 
all criminal offenses), with G. L. c. 218, § 26 (District Court 
has original jurisdiction, concurrent with Superior Court, over 
only subset of typically lesser offenses).  The class of 
Superior Court defendants so created clearly does not run afoul 
of the enumerated protections in art. 106.  It also does not 
represent a nonenumerated suspect class.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Fernandes, 487 Mass. 770, 777 (2021) ("juveniles who have been 
charged with murder are not a suspect class" [alterations and 
citation omitted]). 
12 
 
There is no doubt that there is a fundamental right "to be free 
from physical restraint," Commonwealth v. Knapp, 441 Mass. 157, 
164 (2004), and that this right is implicated here:  on 
tendering a guilty plea, Superior Court defendants face a 
potentially significant amount of time of incarceration.  
However, strict scrutiny applies only where State action 
"'significantly interfere[s] with' the fundamental right at 
issue," Doe No. 1, 479 Mass. at 392, quoting Zablocki v. 
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978), not simply where State action 
involves a fundamental right.  There is no such interference 
here. 
Our decision in Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 487 Mass. 770 
(2021), is instructive.  In that case, this court concluded that 
no "direct infringement [on fundamental rights] arises solely 
from the fact of being tried in the Superior Court rather than 
in a different court."  Id. at 777.  The defendant in Fernandes 
challenged a statute that required a subset of juveniles, aged 
fourteen to sixteen, be tried in the Superior Court rather than 
in the Juvenile Court.  Id. at 776-777.  As is the case for 
adult criminal defendants who are tried in the Superior Court 
rather than in the District Court, these juveniles were required 
to be tried in the Superior Court due to the seriousness of 
their alleged offenses.  Id. at 776 (statute "provided that 
charges of murder in the first or second degree" against 
13 
 
fourteen to sixteen year olds be brought in Superior Court).  
And as there are differences between the District Court and the 
Superior Court, see infra, so too are there differences between 
the Juvenile Court and the Superior Court.  Indeed, "[t]he 
differences between being tried in the Superior Court and in the 
Juvenile Court are considerable" and are perhaps greater than 
those between being tried in the Superior Court and in the other 
Trial Court departments.  Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 
808, 827 (2012) (Lenk, J., concurring) (Juvenile Court "is not a 
punitive scheme strictly akin to the adult criminal justice 
system" [citation omitted]).  Even so, we reasoned that this 
scheme did not interfere with defendants' fundamental rights 
because "[d]ue process protections . . . and the right to a fair 
trial apply in both" courts.  Fernandes, supra at 777. 
In addition, "[a] defendant has no right to insist that the 
prosecutor participate in plea bargaining," Commonwealth v. 
Smith, 384 Mass. 519, 522 (1981), nor does a defendant have a 
"constitutional right to have [a] plea accepted" (citation 
omitted), Commonwealth v. Ramos-Cabrera, 486 Mass. 364, 366 
(2020).  Thus, even if this procedural scheme were to affect 
defendants' or the Commonwealth's decision-making about pleas in 
14 
 
any court, it would still not interfere with any fundamental 
right.8 
d.  Rational basis.  Accordingly, we apply a rational basis 
level of judicial scrutiny to the defendant's equal protection 
claims.9  "For equal protection challenges, the rational basis 
 
8 It follows that there is no constitutional right to a 
defendant-capped plea, although the defendant emphasizes in his 
brief that this court concluded in Charbonneau, 473 Mass. at 
522, that "a defendant's right to tender a defendant-capped plea 
at trial is an essential part of the fairness calculus in the 
guilty plea process."  The defendant seems to argue that it is 
by denying him -- and defendants like him -- this so-called 
essential procedural safeguard that rule 12 (c) (4) (A) 
"unjustly burdens Superior Court defendants' exercise of 
fundamental rights."  However, the defendant's argument is based 
on a misreading of our reasoning in Charbonneau.  The sentence 
that the defendant quotes repeatedly is remarking upon "a 
defendant's right to tender a defendant-capped plea at trial" 
(emphasis added).  Id.  The sentence that follows describes a 
case "also involv[ing] the tender of a defendant-capped plea on 
the day of trial" (emphasis added).  Id.  The following 
paragraph begins:  "[W]e note briefly our rejection of the 
justice's additional argument that judicial discretion to accept 
or deny a defendant-capped plea . . . encompasses the authority 
to truncate the time in which defendants may tender such pleas" 
(emphasis added).  Id.  What we deemed essential to the fairness 
calculus in Charbonneau was not the existence of a right to a 
defendant-capped plea, but rather -- where there was already the 
right to tender a defendant-capped plea -- the ability to tender 
such a plea at any time before trial. 
 
9 The defendant notes that disparities in sentencing between 
white defendants and Black and Latinx defendants in the Superior 
Court drive the disparities in sentencing between white 
defendants and Black and Latinx defendants across the 
Massachusetts criminal justice system.  See Bishop, Hopkins, 
Obiofuma, & Owusu, Criminal Justice Policy Program, Harvard Law 
School, Racial Disparities in the Massachusetts Criminal System, 
at 1 (Sep. 2020).  The reasons for these disparities are 
complex, as explained in the report cited supra.  Nothing in the 
report, or the record in the instant case, however, suggests 
15 
 
test requires that 'an impartial lawmaker could logically 
believe that the classification would serve a legitimate public 
purpose that transcends the harm to the members of the 
disadvantaged class.'"  Goodridge v. Department of Pub. Health, 
440 Mass. 309, 330 (2003), quoting English v. New England Med. 
Ctr., 405 Mass. 423, 428 (1989).  Because we conclude that this 
requirement is met, we hold that the procedural scheme under 
which Superior Court defendants are statutorily entitled to 
Commonwealth-capped pleas -- unlike those defendants in the 
District Court who are statutorily entitled to defendant-capped 
pleas -- is not in violation of equal protection principles. 
The defendant seems to argue there can be no rational basis 
for the distinction between Superior Court defendants and other 
criminal defendants because G. L. c. 278, § 18, indicates an 
"expansive" Legislative intent to extend the statutory right to 
defendant-capped pleas to all criminal defendants.  This 
argument misses the historical motivations that gave rise to the 
defendant-capped plea of G. L. c. 278, § 18.  Indeed, this 
historical background provides not only a rebuttal to the 
defendant's argument about legislative intent but also a 
compelling reason in itself for the distinction between Superior 
Court defendants and District Court defendants. 
 
that such disparities arise from the plea procedures at issue 
here. 
16 
 
Prior to 1994, there was a two-tier criminal trial de novo 
system in the District Court.  Under this system, a criminal 
defendant in the District Court had "the [statutory] right to a 
jury waived bench trial which, if a verdict did not result in 
acquittal, could be appealed to a de novo jury trial with a 
different judge in a different session."  Malone, Abolition of 
the District Court Trial De Novo System:  One Year Later, 39 
Boston B.J. 13 (Mar.-Apr. 1995).  "In effect, this was a risk-
free opportunity to put the Commonwealth to its proof of the 
crime charged."  Charbonneau, 473 Mass. at 520.  When the 
Legislature abolished the de novo system, it created the 
defendant-capped plea to offset that loss for District Court 
defendants.  Id.  Moreover, when the two-tier system was 
abolished, there was a serious "worry that the end of de novo 
would result in an avalanche of jury trials," as defendants 
would no longer be able to take their chances first with a bench 
trial -- which could result in acquittal -- while maintaining 
their right to a jury trial.  Keough, Order in the Courts, 
CommonWealth Mag. (Jan. 1, 2000).  Beyond preserving the balance 
between the Commonwealth and District Court defendants, 
defendant-capped pleas -- by providing risk-free opportunities 
for defendants to tender guilty pleas -- helped address this 
17 
 
case-flow management concern.10  Defendant-capped pleas 
represented the Legislature's solution to problems that involved 
only District Court defendants and thus were intended only to be 
extended to District Court defendants. 
Even without this historical background, an impartial 
lawmaker might reasonably decide to extend this procedural 
safeguard (i.e., defendant-capped pleas) specifically to 
defendants in the District Court.  The defendant correctly 
points out that "Superior Court defendants typically receive 
greater procedural protections."  For example, Superior Court 
defendants are charged via indictment, while District Court 
defendants are charged via complaint, G. L. c. 263, § 4, and 
District Court defendants are tried by a six-person jury, G. L. 
c. 218, § 26A, while defendants in the Superior Court are tried 
by a twelve-person jury, see G. L. c. 234A, § 68; Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 20, 378 Mass. 889 (1979).  It is quite sensible to confer the 
 
10 In the years following the abolition of the de novo 
system, evidence supported the proposition that defendant-capped 
pleas were a vital case-flow management tool.  See, e.g., 
Malone, Abolition of the District Court Trial De Novo System:  
One Year Later, 39 Boston B.J. 13 (Mar.-Apr. 1995) ("At a 
minimum, however, the first year of the one trial system has 
resulted in some progress toward eliminating the backlog of 
District Court criminal cases"); Keough, Order in the Courts, 
CommonWealth Mag. (Jan. 1, 2000) ("In one study of [D]istrict 
[C]ourt cases [after the elimination of the two-tier system], 
[thirty-seven] percent were cleared at arraignment, by dismissal 
or plea, and another [fifty-one] percent at the pretrial 
hearing"). 
18 
 
right to defendant-capped pleas to defendants in those Trial 
Court departments that do not offer the same procedural 
protections as are provided in the Superior Court.  The 
Legislature reasonably may seek to achieve a balance between the 
Commonwealth and defendants across the Trial Court departments, 
albeit by different means. 
There are other reasons lawmakers affirmatively might 
choose not to extend the practice of defendant-capped pleas to 
the Superior Court.  For one, lawmakers may choose to bolster 
prosecutorial discretion in the Superior Court due to the level 
of severity of the offenses typically prosecuted there.  The 
maximum sentences are much higher in the Superior Court, see 
G. L. c. 218, § 26; District Court defendants cannot be 
sentenced to State prison, see G. L. c. 218, § 27; and those 
District Court defendants who are incarcerated are eligible for 
parole after only one-half of their term has elapsed, see 120 
Code Mass. Regs. § 200.02(1) (2017).  As the Superior Court 
judge noted in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his 
plea: 
"[G]iving some significance to prosecutorial 
recommendations during sentencing after acceptance of a 
guilty plea is a legitimate purpose.  That policy may be 
most significant in the Superior Court, which handles the 
most serious cases . . . .  In the other courts, . . . 
there is less room for differences in sentencing 
recommendations, lower potential consequences in 
incarceration lengths and, accordingly, less potential for 
19 
 
seriously undermining prosecutorial authority and 
discretion." 
That is, a lawmaker rationally may choose to create different 
dispositional processes, with varying degrees of deference for 
different parties' discretion, based on the severity of the 
underlying offense.  Cf. G. L. c. 218, § 35A ("show cause" 
hearings); Eagle-Tribune Publ. Co. v. Clerk-Magistrate of the 
Lawrence Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 448 Mass. 647, 650 
(2007) ("the implicit purpose of the § 35A hearings is to enable 
the clerk-magistrate to screen a variety of minor criminal or 
potentially criminal matters out of the criminal justice system" 
[alterations and citation omitted]). 
Moreover, as a sheer practical matter, a lawmaker might 
sensibly wish to afford a Superior Court prosecutor a greater 
degree of control over the plea process as compared to his or 
her counterparts in the District Court.11  Indeed, prosecutions 
in the Superior Court, as opposed to the District Court, 
generally are more complex.  For example, Superior Court 
 
11 It is also sensible to place correspondingly less of the 
plea process within the defendant's discretion in the Superior 
Court, where it is more likely victims would otherwise have to 
give deeply emotional and profoundly upsetting victim impact 
statements more than once (i.e., at a plea hearing and at a jury 
trial, once a plea is withdrawn).  See G. L. c. 258B, § 3 (p) 
(victims have statutory right "to be heard through an oral and 
written victim impact statement at sentencing or the disposition 
of the case against the defendant about the effects of the crime 
on the victim"). 
20 
 
criminal trials are likely to involve more forensic evidence, 
more expert witnesses, and more complex evidentiary issues than 
prosecutions in other Trial Court departments.  Preparation for 
a criminal trial in the Superior Court includes balancing 
complex scheduling issues with the effort to present a case of 
narrative richness in an orderly manner.  Often, motions in 
limine or motions to sever are heard weeks or months before 
trial.  Perhaps exacerbating the difference in complexity of the 
prosecutions, cases in the District Court typically are 
prosecuted horizontally, while cases in the Superior Court are 
prosecuted vertically.  That is, a different prosecutor often 
handles the case on each respective date in the District Court, 
while a single prosecutor is responsible for the entire 
prosecution in the Superior Court.  Allowing a defendant the 
statutory right to tender a plea at any time in the judicial 
process -- including on the trial date -- once the defendant 
sees the Commonwealth's case meticulously prepared, is a benefit 
available under rule 12.  But allowing a defendant in the 
Superior Court the ability to enter a defendant-capped plea at 
any time, whether on a motion to suppress date, a Daubert-
Lanigan12 hearing date, or on a trial date, has implications much 
 
12 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 
(1993) (Federal rule for admissibility of expert testimony); 
Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15 (1994) (Massachusetts rule 
for admissibility of expert testimony). 
21 
 
different from those arising when such a plea is offered in the 
District Court.13 
 
Conclusion.  In short, defendants are afforded different 
procedural protections in different Trial Court departments for 
a host of reasons rationally related to legitimate purposes 
within the purview of the Legislature.  Because the procedural 
scheme of G. L. c. 278, § 18, and Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 survives 
rational basis scrutiny, we uphold the scheme and affirm the 
motion judge's denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw his 
guilty pleas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
13 In addition to such a scheme being sensible, it also is 
wholly permissible for the Legislature to create a system that 
gives particular weight to prosecutorial discretion in the 
Superior Court.  The procedural scheme at issue here "flows 
from, and is encompassed within, the Legislature's broad 
authority to classify criminal conduct, to establish criminal 
penalties, and to adopt rules of criminal practice and 
procedure."  Commonwealth v. Pyles, 423 Mass. 717, 722 (1996).  
Although "a statute impermissibly allocating a power held by 
only one branch to another violates art. 30" of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, "[w]ithin these 
constitutional confines, prosecutors enjoy considerable 
discretion."  Commonwealth v. Ehiabhi, 478 Mass. 154, 160 
(2017).  With Commonwealth-capped pleas, the Commonwealth is not 
imposing sentences but rather advocating for a potential maximum 
sentence.  This practice is in keeping with other exercises of 
prosecutorial discretion -- such as choosing to "charge a 
defendant under multiple enhancement statutes" or "selecting 
charges from among multiple applicable subsections" -- that we 
already have held to be constitutional.  Id.