Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Frazier

Citation: 2006-Ohio-4481

Docket Number: 20060124

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-09-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Frazier, 110 Ohio St.3d 288, 2006-Ohio-4481.] 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. FRAZIER. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Frazier, 110 Ohio St.3d 288, 2006-Ohio-4481.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Multiple violations of the Disciplinary Rules — 
Disbarment. 
(No. 2006-0124 – Submitted May 9, 2006 — Decided September 13, 2006.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 03-069. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Arthur Ray Frazier of Strongsville, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0063635, was admitted to the Ohio bar in 1994. 
{¶ 2} On July 3, 2002, we indefinitely suspended respondent’s license to 
practice law for professional misconduct involving his personal use of entrusted 
client funds.  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Frazier, 96 Ohio St.3d 46, 2002-Ohio-2994, 
770 N.E.2d 1006.  On March 3, 2003, we found respondent in contempt for his 
failure to file an affidavit verifying compliance with Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E) and our 
order requiring him (1) to notify all clients, opposing counsel, and co-counsel of 
his indefinite suspension by certified mail and (2) to return all client files and 
refund all unearned fees.  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Frazier, 98 Ohio St.3d 1469, 
2003-Ohio-916, 784 N.E.2d 704.  Respondent’s license remains under indefinite 
suspension. 
{¶ 3} On June 23, 2005, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged 
respondent in an amended complaint with 15 additional counts of professional 
misconduct, the 11th and 13th of which relator later dismissed.  Respondent 
admitted most of the facts alleged in the complaint and that he had violated some 
Disciplinary Rules.  A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
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Discipline heard the cause on October 27, 2005, and made findings of misconduct 
and a recommendation, which the board adopted. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 4} Count I charged respondent with failing to maintain a client trust 
account.  The remaining 12 counts charged that respondent had failed to properly 
represent numerous clients prior to his indefinite suspension and had continued to 
represent two clients after the suspension.  In finding many of the alleged 
Disciplinary Rule violations, the panel and board noted that respondent’s 
misconduct bore a marked resemblance to his earlier transgressions inasmuch as 
he continued to use clients’ funds as his own, neglected their cases, and did not 
return unearned fees.  Also, respondent had received the original complaint in 
2003 but did not file an answer to it for over one year. 
Count I – Client Trust Account 
{¶ 5} Respondent admitted that at no time during the underlying events 
did he deposit entrusted client funds into a separate, identifiable, interest-bearing 
bank account as required by DR 9-102(A) and in accordance with R.C. 4705.09.  
The board thus found respondent in violation of DR 9-102(A). 
Count II - Tracy 
{¶ 6} In January 2002, Tina Tracy retained respondent to appeal her 
son’s criminal conviction and to file a motion for his judicial release.  Tracy paid 
respondent $5,000, apparently through a nonlawyer who regularly referred 
potential clients to respondent and retained a percentage of the legal fees they 
paid.1  Respondent did nothing in this client’s case before his indefinite 
suspension took effect on July 3, 2002. 
{¶ 7} Tracy asked respondent to return the $5,000 fee.  In May 2002, 
respondent arranged for Tracy’s receipt of a $1,400 cashier’s check and a money 
                                                 
1. Relator did not charge that respondent had impermissibly shared fees with a nonlawyer in 
violation of DR 3-102(A). 
January Term, 2006 
3 
order for $800.  The name of a previous payee had been obscured on the money 
order and was replaced with Tracy’s name.  Although respondent insisted that the 
money order was valid, it has not been cashed.  Respondent returned another 
$2,800 on January 17, 2003, after the Tracy grievance was filed. 
{¶ 8} The board found that in failing to properly represent Tracy, 
respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(6) (prohibiting conduct that adversely 
reflects on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law), 2-106 (prohibiting a lawyer from 
charging or collecting a clearly excessive fee), 2-110(A)(3) (requiring the return 
of unearned fees), 6-101(A)(3) (prohibiting the neglect of an entrusted legal 
matter), 7-101(A)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer from intentionally failing to seek a 
client’s lawful objectives), 7-101(A)(2) (prohibiting a lawyer from intentionally 
failing to carry out a contract of professional employment), 9-102(A) (requiring a 
lawyer to deposit all client funds, other than advances for costs and expenses, in a 
separate, identifiable trust account), and 9-102(B)(4) (requiring a lawyer to 
promptly pay or deliver funds to which the client is entitled).  Apparently because 
respondent delayed in answering relator’s initial complaint, the board also found a 
violation of Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) (requiring a lawyer to cooperate in disciplinary 
proceedings). 
Count III – Finney 
{¶ 9} In February 2002, Karen Finney borrowed $5,000 to pay 
respondent to represent her son, Alan Vincent, who at the time was under 
investigation by police in Michigan.  Respondent accepted this fee without 
informing Finney that he was not licensed to practice law in Michigan.  In April 
2002, after Vincent’s arrest, respondent attempted to appear at Vincent’s 
arraignment in Michigan, but because he was not licensed in that state, the court 
did not permit respondent to speak on his client’s behalf.  Then, the court set bond 
and a preliminary-examination date without Vincent’s having any representation 
by counsel. 
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{¶ 10} After the April 17 preliminary examination, which respondent did 
not attend, Finney called respondent to fire him, and respondent agreed to return 
unearned fees by April 22.  As of the panel hearing, respondent had not returned 
any part of Finney’s fee. 
{¶ 11} The board found that in failing to properly represent Vincent, 
respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(5) (prohibiting conduct 
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6), 2-106, 2-
110(A)(3), 3-101(B) (prohibiting a lawyer from practicing law in violation of the 
professional regulations of a jurisdiction), 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(2), 7-101(A)(3) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from intentionally causing a client prejudice or damage), 9-
102(A), and 9-102(B)(4). 
Count IV - Hellinger 
{¶ 12} In May 2002, Dale Hellinger paid respondent $3,500, apparently 
through respondent’s nonlawyer associate, to defend Hellinger against felony 
criminal charges.  On May 20, 2002, respondent missed an arraignment, requiring 
Hellinger to enter his plea of not guilty, without the benefit of counsel.  A change-
of-plea and sentencing hearing was then scheduled in Hellinger’s case for July 10, 
2002.  Although respondent’s indefinite suspension had taken effect by that time, 
respondent did not notify his client as required, return the client’s file, or return 
unearned fees. 
{¶ 13} On February 2, 2005, respondent finally wrote to Hellinger, 
explaining that he had been unable to represent him because of his license 
suspension.  Respondent also promised to try to make restitution and offered to 
refund $1,000 of the $3,500 fee.  As of the panel hearing, however, respondent 
had repaid nothing. 
{¶ 14} The board found that in failing to properly represent Hellinger, 
respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), 2-110(A)(3), 6-101(A)(3), 
January Term, 2006 
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7-101(A)(1), 7-101(A)(2), 7-101(A)(3), 9-102(A), and 9-102(B)(4), and Gov.Bar 
R. V(8)(E) (requiring a suspended attorney to notify all clients, return files, and 
refund unearned fees). 
Count V - Wolfe 
{¶ 15} Reverend Barry Wolfe retained respondent to defend him against 
allegations of inappropriate behavior.  Faced with disciplinary proceedings within 
his church and possible criminal charges, Reverend Wolfe paid respondent $3,000 
in March 2001 and later paid an additional $2,000. 
{¶ 16} In January 2002, respondent attended only one day of the church’s 
two-day disciplinary hearing regarding Wolfe and provided Wolfe legal advice 
consistent with church rules that prevented him from speaking on Wolfe’s behalf.  
After his July 2002 suspension, respondent failed to immediately advise Wolfe 
that he could no longer represent him.  On September 26, 2005, shortly before the 
panel hearing, respondent finally wrote to Wolfe, told him of the suspension, and 
offered to return $2,000 in unearned fees.  As of the panel hearing, respondent 
had repaid Wolfe nothing. 
{¶ 17} The board found that in failing to properly represent Wolfe, 
respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(6), 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(1), 7-101 (A)(2), 
7-101(A)(3), 9-102(A), and 9-102(B)(4). 
Count VI - Slay 
{¶ 18} In October 2001, Robby Slay paid respondent $5,000, apparently 
again through respondent’s nonlawyer associate, to defend Slay against criminal 
charges.  Respondent appeared at a civil-protection-order hearing and a pretrial on 
Slay’s behalf. 
{¶ 19} After his indefinite suspension took effect, respondent did not 
notify Slay as required, nor did he return the client’s file or unearned fees.  On 
September 26, 2005, respondent wrote to Slay, disclosed the suspension of his 
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license, and offered to refund $500 in unearned fees.  As of the hearing date, 
respondent had not repaid Slay. 
{¶ 20} The board found that in failing to properly represent Slay, 
respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), 2-110(A)(3), 7-101(A)(1), 
7-101(A)(2), 7-101(A)(3), 9-102(A), and 9-102(B)(4), and Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E). 
Count VII - Long 
{¶ 21} In February 2002, Larry Long retained respondent to obtain an 
early release from prison for his brother.  Long paid respondent $5,000, again 
through respondent’s nonlawyer associate.  Respondent performed no legal 
services. 
{¶ 22} Respondent did not immediately notify Long of his indefinite 
suspension as required.  Finally, on September 26, 2005, respondent wrote to 
Long, disclosed his suspension, and offered to repay the $5,000 fee if he could 
find a way.  As of the panel hearing, respondent had paid Long nothing. 
{¶ 23} The board found that in failing to properly represent Long, 
respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(6), 2-106, 2-110(A)(3), 7-101(A)(1), 7-
101(A)(2), 7-101(A)(3), 9-102(A), and 9-102(B)(4), and Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E). 
Count VIII - Buchholz 
{¶ 24} In May 2002, Donald Buchholz, a truck driver, retained respondent 
to defend him against a citation for a speeding ticket and a seat-belt violation.  
Buchholz paid respondent $1,500 through respondent’s nonlawyer associate.  
Buchholz was scheduled for two court dates in June 2002.  Respondent did not 
attend either hearing. 
{¶ 25} Respondent did not immediately advise Buchholz of his July 2002 
suspension from practice as required, nor did he return Buchholz’s file or fees.  At 
some point, respondent advised Buchholz that he had assigned his case to other 
counsel, a decision respondent made without first consulting his client.  
January Term, 2006 
7 
Respondent claimed to have paid the successor counsel $1,000, but he had no idea 
whether that attorney completed the representation. 
{¶ 26} On September 26, 2005, respondent wrote to Buchholz, offering to 
refund $500 of his fee.  As of the panel hearing, respondent had paid Buchholz 
nothing.  On December 22, 2003, however, the Clients’ Security Fund of Ohio 
awarded Buchholz $1,200 on his claim against respondent. 
{¶ 27} The board found that in failing to properly represent Buchholz, 
respondent had violated DR l-102(A)(6), 2-106, 2-110(A)(3), 6-101(A)(3), 7-
101(A)(1), 7-101(A)(2), 9-102(A), and 9-102(B)(4), and Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E). 
Count IX - Ligon 
{¶ 28} In June 2002, Reverend James Ligon paid respondent $500 to 
resolve discrepancies in Ligon’s credit report.  Respondent prepared and sent a 
letter for this purpose, but he sent it to the wrong address.  The letter was of no 
help to Ligon, and respondent performed no other services for his client. 
{¶ 29} On February 2, 2005, respondent by letter advised Reverend Ligon 
of his suspension and offered to return Ligon’s $500 by March 15, 2005.  As of 
the panel hearing, respondent had refunded only $250 of the $500 fee. 
{¶ 30} The board found that in failing to properly represent Ligon, 
respondent had violated DR 2-110(A)(3), 9-102(A), and 9-102(B)(4), and 
Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E). 
Count X - Simerka 
{¶ 31} In 2001, Deborah Simerka retained respondent to represent her in a 
personal-injury case.  Respondent accepted the case on a contingent-fee basis 
without committing the agreement to writing.  Respondent filed suit on Simerka’s 
behalf, and the court scheduled an arbitration hearing for August 30, 2002. 
{¶ 32} Because of his July 2002 suspension, respondent transferred the 
case, apparently without consulting his client, to another attorney, who agreed to 
represent Simerka during the arbitration.  The arbitration panel awarded Simerka 
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$7,800 while she was represented by the successor counsel.  On October 3, 2002, 
however, three months after his suspension, respondent filed a notice of appeal on 
Simerka’s behalf.  In filing the appeal, respondent swore in an affidavit that he 
was Simerka’s counsel.  Moreover, on January 7, 2003, respondent authorized 
opposing counsel to sign a notice of dismissal for him, again representing that he 
was still Simerka’s counsel. 
{¶ 33} The board found that in failing to properly represent Simerka, 
respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), 3-101(B), and 7-102(A)(5) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of law or fact), 
and Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E). 
Count XII - Uchitel 
{¶ 34} In September 2001, Robert Uchitel retained respondent to defend 
him against possible charges that he had violated probation.  Uchitel paid 
respondent $4,500. 
{¶ 35} As part of his client’s defense, respondent arranged for Uchitel to 
be administered a polygraph test by a private company.  The test produced a 
report showing results favorable to Uchitel.  Respondent received this report but 
never used it for his client’s benefit. 
{¶ 36} Sometime later, Uchitel’s probation officer reported to the 
common pleas court that Uchitel was in violation of his probation, and the court 
scheduled a hearing.  Respondent failed to attend.  At a rescheduled hearing in 
March 2002, the court found that Uchitel had violated his probation and ordered 
Uchitel back to prison for nine months. 
{¶ 37} In February 2005, respondent finally wrote to Uchitel, advising 
him of his suspended license and offering to refund $1,000 of Uchitel’s money.  
As of the panel hearing, respondent had paid his client nothing. 
{¶ 38} The board found that in failing to properly represent Uchitel, 
respondent had violated DR 9-102(A), and 9-102(B)(4), and Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E). 
January Term, 2006 
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Count XIV - Magrum 
{¶ 39} In June 2002, Scott Magrum retained respondent to defend him 
against criminal charges filed in Sandusky County.  Magrum paid respondent 
$1,500.  A hearing was held in Magrum’s case on July 3, 2002, the day 
respondent’s suspension took effect.  Respondent went to the hearing and told 
Magrum of his suspension but did nothing to assure that his client was otherwise 
adequately represented.  Fortunately, the prosecution asked at the hearing for 
dismissal of the criminal charges. 
{¶ 40} On September 26, 2005, respondent wrote to Magrum and offered 
to return $700 of his fee.  As of the panel hearing date, respondent had refunded 
nothing. 
{¶ 41} The board found that in failing to properly represent Magrum, 
respondent had violated DR 2-110(A)(3), 9-102(A), and 9-102(B)(4), and 
Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E). 
Count XV – Thomas 
{¶ 42} On February 17, 2005, respondent executed a general power of 
attorney that authorized him to act on behalf of Kamita Thomas, providing that he 
did not perform acts constituting the practice of law.  Despite his July 2002 
suspension from practice, respondent prepared a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition 
for Thomas.  He selected the form of debt relief that he considered to be in her 
best interest, included various schedules and financial statements, and filed the 
petition for Thomas on February 22, 2005.  On March 4, 2005, respondent filed 
other supporting documents that he had prepared for the Thomas bankruptcy 
proceeding.  Respondent did not charge Thomas for his services. 
{¶ 43} On March 8, 2005, the bankruptcy judge held a hearing requiring 
respondent to appear and show cause.  The court confronted respondent about the 
fact of his suspension and the actions that he had taken on Thomas’s behalf.  
Respondent conceded that he had advised Thomas as to which form of bankruptcy 
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she should file, prepared the necessary papers, and filed them in court, acts that 
the bankruptcy judge found to be the practice or law.  At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the bankruptcy court dismissed Thomas’s bankruptcy petition. 
{¶ 44} The board found that in representing Thomas following the 
suspension of his license to practice, respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(6) and 
3-101(B). 
Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 45} Having found that respondent violated the foregoing duties to the 
public, the legal profession, his clients, and the legal system, the panel and board 
considered the mitigating and aggravating factors of respondent’s case before 
recommending a sanction.  See Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations 
Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  Respondent 
submitted as a mitigating factor that he suffered from a mental disability as 
defined by BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g). 
{¶ 46} Respondent was diagnosed with “adjustment disorder with mixed 
anxiety and depressed mood” around the time that he entered into a contract with 
the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program to help him cope with his symptoms.  
According to his psychologist, respondent’s symptoms began after the previous 
charges of professional misconduct were filed against him, and treatment ended in 
early 2005.  The psychologist further reported that respondent’s anxiety and 
depressed mood did not contribute to or cause the misconduct at issue in this case. 
Because BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g)(ii) requires this causal connection, the 
board did not attribute mitigating effect to respondent’s condition. 
{¶ 47} As to other mitigation, the board observed that respondent had 
expressed sincere regret for his wrongdoing and the harm he caused his clients.  
He testified that at the time of his prior suspension, he had undertaken too many 
January Term, 2006 
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cases, had tried to do too many things for too many people, and was overwhelmed 
by his practice. 
{¶ 48} The aggravating factors of respondent’s case, however, far 
outweighed the evidence of mitigating factors.  The board found that respondent 
has a significant history of professional misconduct; committed multiple offenses 
with a discernible pattern; failed to cooperate in the disciplinary process, 
including failing to reimburse the Client Security Fund for claims paid for his 
misconduct; inordinately delayed the disciplinary proceedings; and inflicted 
serious harm on numerous clients.  See BGCD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a), (c), (d), (e), 
and (h).  In addition, respondent did not comply with the additional continuing 
legal education requirements imposed by Gov.Bar R. X(3)(G) on attorneys 
suspended from practice for a definite or indefinite period.  Respondent also made 
little or no restitution to most of the affected clients.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(i).  Finally, the board found that respondent had knowingly engaged in 
the practice of law while his license was under suspension. 
{¶ 49} Relator 
advocated 
respondent’s 
permanent 
disbarment.  
Respondent asked that he receive another indefinite suspension. 
{¶ 50} Adopting the panel’s report, the board recommended respondent’s 
permanent disbarment.  Respondent, who is no longer represented by counsel, 
objects to the board’s recommendation. 
Review 
{¶ 51} Respondent does not contest that he violated the foregoing 
Disciplinary Rules and Rules for the Government of the Bar.  He instead urges us 
to impose a second indefinite suspension of his license, citing his mental 
disability as a mitigating factor and his promise to reform.  Neither consideration 
warrants lenience.  We thus adopt the board’s 84 findings of misconduct and also 
hold that permanent disbarment is the appropriate sanction. 
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{¶ 52} BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g)(ii) affords mitigating effect when a 
mental disability has contributed to cause professional misconduct.  The 
mitigating effect emanates from the fact that the disability diminished the 
lawyer’s capacity to adhere to ethical standards.  Here, however, respondent’s 
psychologist reported that respondent had no such incapacity when he engaged in 
misconduct — his depressed mood developed after his misconduct because he 
faced the prospect of disciplinary censure.  This natural reaction does nothing to 
relieve respondent’s culpability and, therefore, is not mitigating.  Accord 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Allison, 98 Ohio St.3d 322, 2003-Ohio-776, 784 N.E.2d 
695, ¶ 12 (absent evidence that depression contributed to cause misconduct, 
treatment for depression is insufficient to warrant a lesser sanction than 
disbarment). 
{¶ 53} Moreover, we take nothing from respondent’s assurances that he 
has learned from his mistakes and will do better if given another chance.  
Respondent has routinely taken clients’ money and done little if any work in 
return, even continuing to mislead clients while disciplinary proceedings were 
pending against him.  Respondent has not produced records to account for any 
services that he did provide these clients, which may mean that he 
misappropriated as much as $36,000.  Respondent has also repeatedly failed to 
make promised restitution, and he refused to comply with our order suspending 
his license.  Finally, respondent’s misconduct involved most of the aggravating 
factors specified in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1), and he did not credibly establish 
one mitigating factor in his defense. 
{¶ 54} As relator argues, “[t]he normal penalty for continuing to practice 
law while under suspension is disbarment.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Mbakpuo, 98 
Ohio St.3d 177, 2002-Ohio-7087, 781 N.E.2d 208, ¶ 13; Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Allison, 98 Ohio St.3d 322, 2003-Ohio-776, 784 N.E.2d 695, ¶ 12.  Moreover, 
accepting legal fees and then failing to carry out the contract for employment is 
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tantamount to theft of client funds and is also cause for disbarment, particularly 
when coupled with neglect, a history of misconduct, and other disciplinary 
infractions.  Columbus Bar Assn. v. Moushey, 104 Ohio St.3d 427, 2004-Ohio-
6897, 819 N.E.2d 1112, ¶ 16.  The absence of any circumstances to militate 
against disbarment further supports disbarment in this case. 
{¶ 55} Respondent is therefore permanently disbarred from the practice of 
law in Ohio.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Brian E. Shinn, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Arthur Ray Frazier, pro se. 
______________________