Case Title: Zei v. Md. Transit Admin.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 62/12

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2013-05-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Anthony Zei v. Maryland Transit Administration, Case No. 62, September Term 2012,
Opinion by Adkins, J.
DISABILITY LAW - EMPLOYMENT QUALIFICATION STANDARDS -
TRANSPORTATION LAW - FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY
REGULATIONS: The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, and specifically 49 C.F.R.
§ 391.41(b)(4) governing drivers who suffer from cardiovascular disease, are properly
imposed qualification standards under the Americans with Disabilities Act because the
regulations satisfy the “job-related” and “business necessity” requirements as a matter of law,
and furthermore, a State is entitled to adopt and apply these federally-created qualification
standards to state-run transportation.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 24-C-05-011647
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 62
September Term, 2012
ANTHONY ZEI
v.
MARYLAND TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION
Bell, C.J.
                    Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
McDonald,
JJ.
Opinion by Adkins, J.
Filed:   May 20, 2013
In this case, we are asked to determine whether the State of Maryland complied with
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) when it adopted and applied a federally-
created safety regulation governing the physical qualifications of drivers of commercial
motor vehicles.  Specifically, the United States Department of Transportation (“DOT”) has
determined that an individual is not qualified to drive a commercial motor vehicle if that
individual currently suffers from certain cardiovascular diseases.  The State of Maryland
followed the lead of the federal government and adopted the same standard for bus operators
employed by the Maryland Transit Administration (“MTA”).  We are tasked with
determining whether MTA violated the ADA by firing Anthony Zei, a bus operator who
failed to meet this standard.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Under the collective bargaining agreement between the MTA and Zei’s labor
union—the Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1300—every bus driver must obtain a
medical certification verifying that he is physically fit to operate a bus.  This certification
must be renewed every two years.  If the Union disagrees with the findings of the medical
certification, the Union may select a doctor of its choice to perform a second evaluation.  If
the original doctor and the Union’s doctor cannot reach a consensus on the certification of
the driver, then both doctors will “jointly select a third doctor to review the case” and this
third doctor’s “decision shall be final and binding on both parties.” 
Zei began his employment as a bus driver for the MTA in 1991.   By all accounts, Zei
was “a very good bus driver.”  On December 3, 2004, Zei underwent a “workability
evaluation” performed by Dr. Hench for the purpose of obtaining his necessary medical
2
certification to operate a bus.  During the evaluation, Dr. Hench discovered that Zei had
previously been diagnosed with dilated cardiomyopathy, and that Zei had “been symptomatic
over the past year with shortness of breath and fatigue.”  Dr. Hench reported that Zei’s
cardiomyopathy disqualified him from the position of bus driver “based upon the Medical
Guidelines of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration . . . because of his increased
risk of sudden death.”
In January 2005, Zei consulted his own cardiologist, Dr. Gottlieb, who had been
treating him since 2003.  Dr. Gottlieb instructed Zei to undergo a radiology study.  Based
upon the results of that study, Dr. Gottlieb concluded that Zei did not have “symptomatic
heart failure” and that “Zei has medical clearance to return to work with no restrictions.”
Dr. Gottlieb and Dr. Hench could not come to an agreement, however, and the two
doctors agreed to refer the case to a third doctor—Dr. Hartenbaum—whose determination
would become final.  Dr. Hartenbaum “determined that Zei was not qualified to drive under
the ‘medical criteria’ set forth in the Cardiovascular Guidelines.”  As a result, on September
1, 2005, the MTA discharged Zei from its employment.
In December 2005, Zei brought this action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
alleging that the MTA had violated his rights under 29 U.S.C. § 504—commonly known as
the Rehabilitation Act.  The case went to trial, and a jury found the MTA guilty of
discrimination and awarded Zei $200,000.  In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special
Appeals reversed, holding that Zei’s failure to satisfy the federally-created qualification
standard for drivers of commercial motor vehicles rendered him unqualified for the position
1Although Zei’s claim was brought under the Rehabilitation Act, that Act provides:
The standards used to determine whether this section has
been violated in a complaint alleging employment discrimination
under this section shall be the standards applied under title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12111 et seq.)
and the provisions of sections 501 through 504, and 510, of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12201–12204
and 12210), as such sections relate to employment.
29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (2006).  Therefore, this opinion will discuss and apply the standards
governing discrimination under the ADA.
3
of MTA bus driver as a matter of law.
On September 21, 2012, this Court granted a writ of certiorari, Zei v. Maryland
Transit Administration, 428 Md. 543, 52 A.3d 978 (2012), to answer the following question:
Did the Court of Special Appeals err by holding that
Zei’s inability, because of a heart condition, to meet the DOT
standards (which the MTA applies voluntarily rather than under
compulsion of federal law), render him unqualified as a matter
of law for an MTA bus operator position?
We shall hold that the MTA’s use of the federal regulation was a properly imposed
“qualification standard” under the ADA, and therefore, Zei cannot succeed on his ADA
claim.1
DISCUSSION
In 1990, Congress passed the ADA “to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”  42
U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006).  In relevant part, the Act provided that “[n]o covered entity
shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of
4
such individual in regard to . . . discharge of employees, . . . and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.”  Id. § 12112(a), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. II
2008).  “To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must
demonstrate (1) that [he] is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that [he] is qualified
with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) that [he] was discriminated against
because of [his] disability.”  Tate v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 268 F.3d 989, 992 (10th Cir.
2001) (alterations in original) (citation and quotation marks omitted).  At issue in this appeal,
is the second prong—whether Zei was a qualified individual.
The ADA defined a “qualified individual” as “an individual with a disability who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires.”  42 U.S.C. § 12111(8), amended
by 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. II 2008).  To determine whether an individual is qualified
for the position, the ADA allows an employer to impose “qualification standards . . . that
screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with a
disability,” so long as the standards are “shown to be job-related and consistent with business
necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation . .
. .”  42 U.S.C. § 12113(a); see also Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 568, 119
S. Ct. 2162, 2170 (1999).  Thus, if an individual fails to meet a properly imposed
qualification standard, then that individual is not a “qualified individual” for purposes of the
ADA and cannot maintain a discrimination claim.  Tate, 268 F.3d at 993.
In this case, the MTA applied a federally-created job qualification standard contained
5
in the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (“FMCSRs”), which set forth the physical
qualifications for drivers of commercial motor vehicles.  Specifically, the FMCSRs contain
a regulation governing the qualification of drivers suffering from cardiovascular disease,
stating: “A person is physically qualified to drive a commercial motor vehicle if that person
. . . [h]as no current clinical diagnosis of myocardial infarction, angina pectoris, coronary
insufficiency, thrombosis, or any other cardiovascular disease of a variety known to be
accompanied by syncope, dyspnea, collapse, or congestive cardiac failure.”  49 C.F.R. §
391.41(b)(4); see also 35 Fed. Reg. 6458, 6463 (Apr. 22, 1970) (as amended by 35 Fed. Reg.
17418, 17420 (Nov. 13, 1970)).  It is this qualification standard which the MTA applied, and
Zei failed to meet.
In examining whether the MTA properly applied this qualification standard, we must
resolve how the federally-created qualification standard of drivers suffering from
cardiovascular disease interacts with the ADA, which allows employers to use qualification
standards only if they are “shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity,
and such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation . . . .”  42
U.S.C. § 12113(a).  This inquiry, therefore, is three-fold.  First, are the requirements of 49
C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(4) “job-related” and of “business necessity?”  Second, does the
exemption of state governments from complying with the FMCSRs, found in 49 C.F.R. §
390.3(f)(2), but followed by the State’s voluntary adoption of the same standard, change the
answer to the first question?  Third, could the MTA have adopted a reasonable
accommodation?
2In light of 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e) there is no need to determine whether the ADA
preempts the FMCSRs.  In this context, the ADA and accompanying regulations explicitly
accommodate and defer to other federal laws.
6
FMCSRs as “Job-Related” and “Business Necessity”
Fundamentally, the parties disagree over whether the ADA’s requirements of being
“job-related” and of “business necessity” must be shown in an individualized assessment of
Zei, or whether Zei’s heart condition, per se, renders him unqualified.  Central to this debate
are two additional regulations: (1) 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e)—enacted by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission—which provides a complete defense to an ADA
claim: “It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under [the ADA] that a challenged
action is required or necessitated by another Federal law or regulation;”2 and (2) 49 C.F.R.
§ 390.3(f)(2)—enacted by the Federal Highway Administration (“FHA”)—which exempts
state transportation agencies from complying with the FMCSRs: “the [FMCSRs] do not
apply to . . . Transportation performed by the Federal government, a State, or any political
subdivision of a State, or an agency established under a compact between States that has been
approved by the Congress of the United States.”
Zei acknowledges that, in light of the defense in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e), if the
FMCSRs apply to the State, then the MTA will have a full defense against any discrimination
action under the ADA as a matter of law.  See, e.g., Albertson’s, 527 U.S. at 570, 119 S. Ct.
at 2171 (holding that an employer has not violated the ADA if they have an “unconditional
obligation to follow the [FMCSRs]”).  Yet, Zei argues, the FMCSRs do not apply in this case
7
because the State is not required by federal law to follow them, but rather voluntarily adopted
the standards found in the regulations.  Zei contends that the complete defense found in 29
C.F.R. § 1630.15(e) was created “solely on the need to relieve employers of the burden of
complying with conflicting federal laws.”
To support this assertion, Zei relies on the legislative history of the ADA which
reflects congressional recognition “that a person with a disability applying for or currently
holding a job subject to [FMCSRs] must be able to satisfy any physical qualification standard
that is job related and consistent with business necessity in order to be considered a qualified
individual with a disability under title I of this legislation.”  H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2,
at 57 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 339.  Nevertheless, Zei argues, Congress
questioned whether the FMCSRs were consistent with the ADA and therefore instructed that
“the Secretary of Transportation will undertake a thorough review of [the FMCSRs] to
ascertain whether the standards conform with current knowledge about the capabilities of
persons with disabilities” and to “make any necessary changes within the two year period to
bring such regulations into compliance with the law.”  Id.  Thus, Zei concludes: “An
employer who has voluntarily adopted the DOT Standards does not face the conflicting
federal obligations which serve as the sole justification for deeming the DOT Standards a
complete defense in the mandatory-adoption scenario. . . .  Congress certainly did not
envision that courts would ‘limit application of the ADA as a matter of law’ when there was
no need to do so.”
In Zei’s opinion, when an employer voluntarily adopts the regulations, the FMCSRs
8
“are merely a factor for a jury to consider in determining whether an ADA violation has
occurred.”  See Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007); Cleary v.
Fed. Express Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 930 (E.D. Wis. 2004); Millage v. City of Sioux City, 258
F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Iowa 2003); Tinjum v. Atl. Richfield Co., 34 P.3d 855 (Wash. Ct. App.
2001).  Therefore, argues Zei, MTA is required to conduct an individualized assessment to
determine whether the FMCSRs are “job-related” and of “business necessity” as applied to
Zei.  See Adkins v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 667, 683 (5th Cir. 2011).
To the contrary, MTA argues that the FMCSRs constitute qualification standards that
as a matter of law satisfy the “job-related” and “business necessity” requirements of the
ADA.  See Tate, 268 F.3d 989; Bay v. Cassens Transp. Co., 212 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2000);
Prado v. Cont’l Air Transp. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1304 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Campbell v. Fed.
Express Corp., 918 F. Supp. 912 (D. Md. 1996).  MTA argues that these cases treat the
“failure to satisfy the DOT safety regulations as a disqualification from employment as a
matter of law,” and therefore, “Zei is . . . mistaken in arguing that MTA was required to
conduct an ‘individualized assessment’ to determine whether . . . he could ‘safely perform
the duties’ of an MTA bus driver.”
Furthermore, relying on the history and purpose of the FMCSRs, MTA argues that it
is irrelevant whether it was required by law to follow the regulations or whether it
voluntarily adopted them.  According to the MTA, the exemption of state governments from
following the FMCSRs contained in 49 C.F.R. § 390.3(f)(2) was based solely on federalism
concerns—about the division of responsibilities between the federal and state
3The FMCSRs were initially enacted in 1937, in response to the Motor Carrier Act of
1935.  57 Fed. Reg. 37392, 37392 (Aug. 18, 1992).  At that time, the regulations were under the
control of the Interstate Commerce Commission.  59 Fed. Reg. 1366, 1366 (Jan. 10, 1994).  The
FMCSRs have since been amended multiple times.  59 Fed. Reg. 60319, 60319 (Nov. 23, 1994).  
The Department of Transportation was created in 1967, at which time it took over control of the
FMCSRs.  59 Fed. Reg. at 1366.  The authority was then vested in the Federal Highway
(continued...)
9
governments—not a desire to relieve the states of safely conducting their transportation
operations.  Thus, MTA argues, the “reliance on federalism concerns in creating the state
exemption, and encouragement of states to adopt the safety regulations, demonstrates that
DOT did not intend to differentiate between vehicles operated by public and private motor
carriers.”
To resolve this debate, and determine whether the FMCSRs satisfy the “job-related”
and “business necessity” requirements of the ADA as a matter of law, we will trace the
development of the cardiovascular disease qualification standard contained in the FMCSRs
and the legislative history of the ADA.  Then, we will also examine the development of the
state government exemption from the FMCSRs and Congress’s subsequent legislative
enactments to determine whether MTA’s alleged “voluntary” adoption of the FMCSRs
affects our holding.
Legislative History of the ADA and Cardiovascular Disease Standard
The FMCSR setting forth the qualification of drivers suffering from cardiovascular
disease—49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(4)—was originally enacted in 1970.  At that time, the FHA
deemed it necessary to completely revise the “qualifications of drivers of commercial motor
vehicles engaged in interstate or foreign commerce.”3  34 Fed. Reg. 9080, 9080 (June 7,
3(...continued)
Administration, id., and today the FMCSRs fall under the control of the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration, Pub. L. No. 106–159, § 101, 113 Stat 1748, 1750 (1999) (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 113)—both of which are agencies within the Department of
Transportation.
4In the FHA’s view, “it cannot reasonably be denied that adherence to improved driver
qualification rules will play a vital part in the overall effort to improve motor vehicle safety” and
“that the public interest in motor vehicle safety requires . . . insuring that drivers of modern,
more complex vehicles can safely withstand the increased physical and mental demands that
their occupation now imposes.”  35 Fed. Reg. 6458, 6458 (Apr. 22, 1970).
10
1969).  Explaining its purpose in making the revision, the FHA explained that “[a]ccident
experience in recent years has demonstrated that . . . the good health of drivers are
increasingly important factors in accident prevention[, and therefore, it is] necessary that
criteria for determining whether individuals are qualified to drive commercial motor vehicles
be upgraded.”4  Id. at 9081.  Thus, the FHA sought to “substantially tighten the existing
regulations by including guidelines for evaluation of persons in high-risk medical
categories.”  Id.
In creating these guidelines for “high-risk medical categories,” the FHA for the first
time established qualifications for drivers of commercial motor vehicles who suffer from
cardiovascular disease.  Specifically, the revised FMCSRs provided that a driver is not
qualified if he has a “current clinical diagnosis of myocardial infarction, angina pectoris,
coronary insufficiency, thrombosis, or any other cardiovascular disease of a variety known
to be accompanied by syncope, dyspnea, collapse, or congestive cardiac failure.”  49 C.F.R.
§ 391.41(b)(4); see also 35 Fed. Reg. at 6463 (as amended by 35 Fed. Reg. at 17420).
When Congress subsequently enacted the ADA, it was well aware of the FMCSRs and
11
its potential to disqualify individuals with disabilities.  Yet, Congress did not abolish the
FMCSRs.  Instead, evident from examining the legislative history of the ADA, Congress
viewed the FMCSRs as qualification standards that would satisfy the “job-related” and
“business necessity” requirements of the ADA:
With respect to covered entities subject to rules
promulgated by the Department of Transportation regarding
physical qualifications for drivers of certain classifications of
motor vehicles, it is the Committee’s intent that a person with a
disability applying for or currently holding a job subject to these
standards must be able to satisfy any physical qualification
standard that is job related and consistent with business
necessity in order to be considered a qualified individual with
a disability under title I of this legislation.
In light of this legislation, the Committee expects that
within two years from the date of enactment (the effective date
of title I of this legislation), the Secretary of Transportation
will undertake a thorough review of these regulations to
ascertain whether the standards conform with current knowledge
about the capabilities of persons with disabilities and currently
available technological aids and devices and whether such
regulations are valid under this Act.  The Committee expects
that the agency will make any necessary changes within the two
year period to bring such regulations into compliance with
the law.  (Emphasis added).
H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 57 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 339.
Indeed, because Congress fully understood that the FMCSRs would continue to exist as
qualification standards under the ADA, Congress specifically instructed the Secretary of
Transportation to perform a complete review of the FMCSRs and “bring such regulations
into compliance with the law.”  In other words, to resolve any potential conflict between the
requirements of a qualification standard under the ADA and the existing FMCSRs, Congress
5In its review of Part 391, the FHA “determined that all requirements pertaining to the
written examination and record of violations are unnecessary.”  59 Fed. Reg. at 1367.  In the
final rule, FHA eliminated the regulations related to a written examination, but decided to keep
the regulations related to the record of violations.  59 Fed. Reg. at 60319–20.
12
required the Secretary of Transportation to make sure that all existing FMCSRs were “job-
related” and of “business necessity.”
By 1992, the FHA had completed an entire review of the FMCSRs “to identify and
eliminate any unnecessary regulatory burdens.”  57 Fed. Reg. 37392, 37392 (Aug. 18, 1992).
The FHA did not stop there.  Taking a step further, the FHA determined it was necessary “to
reconsider the underlying basis for all safety rules and to identify a performance-oriented
regulatory structure that would enhance safety while minimizing the burdens placed on
industry.”  Id.  This review was “a comprehensive multi-year effort to re-create a body of
safety rules and regulations that are (1) understandable, (2) enforceable, (3) capable of being
implemented by industry, and above all, (4) consistent with highway safety.”  59 Fed. Reg.
1366, 1366 (Jan. 10, 1994).  The review focused on “the basic question[] of . . . what is
essential to improve motor carrier safety” and sought to “eliminate requirements not needed
to carry out the regulatory program.”  Id. at 1367.  In this process, the FHA specifically
“reviewed the regulations in part 391” and decided to retain the cardiovascular disease
qualification standard in 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(4).5
Our examination of the development of the FMCSRs and the ADA, tells us that both
Congress and the Department of Transportation view the qualification standard of drivers
suffering from cardiovascular disease as “job-related” and of “business necessity.”  As we
13
learned, the regulation was created out of a recognition that “the good health of drivers” was
an important factor in reducing the number of accidents and that the FMCSRs needed to be
“substantially tighten[ed],” specifically regarding drivers “in high-risk medical categories.”
34 Fed. Reg. at 9081.  The legislative history divulges that Congress was aware of this
qualification standard when adopting the ADA and specifically instructed the Secretary of
Transportation to review the regulation for its compliance with the requirements of the
ADA—i.e. for being “job-related” and of “business necessity.”  The Secretary of
Transportation performed such a review, “eliminat[ing all] requirements not needed to carry
out the regulatory program,” and decided to retain the cardiovascular disease standard.    59
Fed. Reg. at 1367.  Based on this careful, multi-step, review of the regulations by the DOT,
we hold as a matter of law that 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(4) satisfies the “job-related” and
“business necessity” requirements of the ADA.
The Exemption of State-Run Transportation from the FMCSRs
The question becomes then, whether MTA’s alleged “voluntary” adoption of the
FMCSRs changes this holding.  In this regard, Zei cites 49 C.F.R. § 390.3(f)(2), which
exempts state transportation from complying with the FMCSRs.  Therefore, we will examine
the creation of this exemption and any relevant subsequent acts of Congress to determine
whether Congress sought to exempt states from the safety concerns of the FMCSRs,
including the qualification of drivers suffering from cardiovascular disease in 49 C.F.R. §
391.41(b)(4).
After the cardiovascular disease standard was enacted, Congress continued to focus
6Furthermore, Congress declared that any “regulations pertaining to commercial motor
vehicle safety which the Secretary issued before [this Act] shall, for purposes of this title, be
deemed to be regulations issued by the Secretary under this section.”  Pub. L. No. 98-554, §
206(e), 98 Stat. 2832, 2834–35 (1984).
14
on improving the safety of commercial motor vehicles and the qualifications of the drivers.
Congress passed the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 “to promote the safe operation of
commercial motor vehicles . . . and to assure increased compliance with . . . the commercial
motor vehicle safety and health . . . regulations . . . .”  Pub. L. No. 98-554, § 202, 98 Stat.
2832, 2832 (1984) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 31131).  Congress found that (1) “it
is in the public interest to enhance commercial motor vehicle safety and thereby to reduce
highway fatalities, injuries, and property damage;” (2) “uniform commercial motor vehicle
safety measures . . . would reduce the number of fatalities and injuries;” and (3) “interested
State governments can provide valuable assistance to the Federal Government in
assuring that commercial motor vehicle operations are conducted safely and healthfully.”
Id. § 203(1)–(4), 98 Stat. at 2832 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 31131) (emphasis
added).
To that end, Congress directed the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations to
ensure that “the physical condition of operators of commercial motor vehicles is adequate to
enable them to operate such vehicles safely.”  Id. § 206(a)(3), 98 Stat. at 2834 (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 31136).6  Under this command, the Secretary proposed to add a new
section of general applicability—Section 390.3—to “assist the general public and the motor
carrier industry in determining when, and in which circumstances, the FMCSR[s] apply.”
15
52 Fed. Reg. 26278, 26282 (July 13, 1987).  Under the proposed rule-making of this new
section, the FHA decided to exempt motor vehicles operated by the federal and state
governments from the requirements of the FMCSRs.  Id.  Nevertheless, the FHA stated that,
“[i]t is expected that governmental entities will comply with the FMCSR[s] to the greatest
extent possible,” and that “the [FHA] has encouraged their compliance with the FMCSR[s].”
Id.  The FHA then sought comment on this proposed exemption, as well as, “what additional
steps the [FHA] might take to foster compliance with the regulations by governments.”  Id.
Under the final rule, the FHA retained the exemption for state governments, but
reiterated its desire that states comply with the FMCSRs  regardless:
Motor vehicles operated by agencies of the Federal or the
various State governments and/or their political subdivisions, in
furtherance of their governmental or civic duties, have been
administratively exempted from the safety regulations.
However, the [FHA] has encouraged their compliance with the
FMCSRs.
53 Fed. Reg. 18042, 18049 (May 19, 1988).  The FHA explained that its decision to exempt
state governments was driven largely by a Presidential Executive Order detailing
“Federalism” concerns: “The purpose of the Executive Order is to restore the division of
governmental responsibilities between the national government and the states.  Federal action
limiting the policy-making discretion of the states should be taken only where constitutional
authority for the action is clear and certain . . . .”  Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
The FHA stated that it decided to exempt state governments “[i]n light of these [federalism]
considerations” and that “[t]his action is consistent with the Executive Order.”  Id.
16
Nevertheless, in reiterating its desire that state governments follow these regulations, the
FHA explained that if the transportation of state governments fell below an acceptable level
of safety, the FHA would step in and regulate it: “The [FHA] will periodically review the
safety performance of these operations.  If it appears that these operations, or a segment of
them, pose an unacceptable risk to public safety, the [FHA] will propose appropriate,
necessary safety measures to improve these operations.”  Id.
Congress then created a state grant program called the Motor Carrier Safety
Assistance Program.  The goal of the program “is to ensure that the Secretary [of
Transportation], States, local government agencies, and other political jurisdictions work in
partnership to establish programs to improve motor carrier, commercial motor vehicle, and
driver safety.”  49 U.S.C. § 31102(b)(1).  The program seeks to accomplish this goal by
having state governments “adopt[] and enforc[e] effective motor carrier, commercial motor
vehicle, and driver safety regulations and practices consistent with Federal requirements.”
Id. § 31102(b)(1)(C).  Providing a financial incentive to the states, the program specifically
conditions the granting of funds on twenty-five requirements that must be met by the state
government—one of which is “adopting and enforcing State safety laws and regulations that
are compatible with the FMCSRs (49 CFR parts 390–397).”  49 C.F.R. § 350.201(a).  In
other words, although 49 C.F.R. § 390.3(f)(2) exempts state governments from complying
with the FMCSRs, if a State wishes to receive federal grant money under the Motor Carrier
Safety Assistance Program, the State must comply with the FMCSRs by adopting
7Explaining the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program, federal regulations make clear
that state governments will ultimately have to comply with the FMCSRs if they wish to receive
federal grant money:
The MCSAP is a Federal grant program that provides
financial assistance to States to reduce the number and severity of
accidents and hazardous materials incidents involving commercial
motor vehicles (CMV).  The goal of the MCSAP is to reduce
CMV–involved accidents, fatalities, and injuries through
consistent, uniform, and effective CMV safety programs. . . .  The
MCSAP also sets forth the conditions for participation by States
and local jurisdictions and promotes the adoption and uniform
enforcement of safety rules, regulations, and standards compatible
with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) . . .
for both interstate and intrastate motor carriers and drivers.
49 C.F.R. § 350.101.
17
“compatible” state regulations.7
Maryland did just that.  See Md. Code (1977, 2009 Repl. Vol.), § 25-111(f)(2)(ii) of
the Transportation Article (“Any rule or regulation adopted pursuant to this subsection shall
. . . [d]uplicate or be consistent with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations contained
in 49 C.F.R., Parts 390 through 399); COMAR 11.17.03.01 (requiring drivers of both
interstate and intrastate commercial motor vehicles to “meet the physical qualifications of
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations contained in 49 CFR 390-392”); 11.21.01.02
(“The federal motor carrier safety regulations contained in 49 CFR 40, 382, 383, 387, 390-
393, 395-399, and 1572, as amended, are incorporated by reference . . . .”).  The Motor
Vehicle Administration, in explaining why it adopted the FMCSRs at the direction of the
General Assembly, stated: “This will improve public safety and integrate Maryland intrastate
motor carrier safety regulations with those promulgated by the Federal Highway
18
Administration for interstate operations.”  21 Md. Reg. 1411, 1411 (Aug. 5, 1994).  The
Motor Vehicle Administration continued: “this action will bring State and local government
commercial motor vehicle operators under the requirements of these regulations, and achieve
compatibility with certain other federal motor carrier safety regulations.”  Id.
Reviewing the development of the state government exemption and subsequent grant
program reveals a clear federal policy to induce states to adopt and apply the FMCSRs in
setting qualification standards for its drivers of commercial motor vehicles.  Although the
FHA originally exempted state governments from the FMCSRs out of federalism concerns,
the Supreme Court has long “held that a perceived Tenth Amendment limitation on
congressional regulation of state affairs [does] not concomitantly limit the range of
conditions legitimately placed on federal grants.”  South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210,
107 S. Ct. 2793, 2797 (1987).  In other words, Congress’s power to condition federal grant
money allows it to achieve indirectly objectives which it may not have been able to
accomplish through direct regulation.
That is precisely what happened in this case.  Congress sought to ensure that state
governments would follow the FMCSRs, and created a grant program that conditioned the
receiving of federal money on the State explicitly adopting 49 C.F.R. parts 390–397—which
includes the qualification standard of drivers suffering from cardiovascular disease.  See 49
C.F.R. § 350.201(a).  Maryland followed the wishes of Congress and adopted state laws
8All of the out-of-state cases which Zei relies on—for the proposition that MTA was
required to conduct an individualized assessment of Zei and thus judgement as a matter of law is
inappropriate—fail to consider this combination of the legislative history of the ADA with the
federalism concerns explaining the development of the FMCSRs and the Motor Carrier Safety
Assistance Program.  Therefore, we find these cases unpersuasive.
9Zei also relies on 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e) which provides “a defense to a charge of
discrimination under [the ADA] that a challenged action is required or necessitated by another
Federal law or regulation.”  In this regard, Zei’s argument is slightly misplaced.  While MTA has
applied a federally-created safety standard, MTA has not argued that it is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law because it was required by federal law to fire Zei.  Rather, MTA argues that it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the federally-created safety standard satisfies the
“job-related” and “business necessity” requirements of the ADA.  In this regard, MTA is not
simply relying on the existence of another federal law, but rather, it argues that the federally-
created qualification standard satisfies the ADA.
19
incorporating the FMCSRs and applying them to state-run transportation.8  In other words,
Congress—well aware that 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(4) satisfies the “job-related” and “business
necessity” requirements of the ADA but that the states were exempt from requiring such a
qualification standard—created direct financial incentives for states to act in accordance with
49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(4).
When the grant program is taken in combination with the FHA’s repeated desire “that
governmental entities will comply with the FMCSR[s],” and that it “has encouraged their
compliance with the FMCSR[s],” 52 Fed. Reg. at 26282, we see a clear federal policy that
state governments, although exempted, should adopt and implement the qualification
standards of the FMCSRs.  Under such circumstances, we hold, as a matter of law, that 49
C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(4) satisfies the “job-related” and “business necessity” requirements of the
ADA, and that Maryland may adopt, and the MTA may rightfully apply, this qualification
standard.9
20
Reasonable Accommodation
The only remaining inquiry to determine whether the MTA may properly apply this
qualification standard is whether “performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable
accommodation.”  42 U.S.C. § 12113.  In arguing that a reasonable accommodation could
have been made in this case, Zei explains that one definition for a reasonable accommodation
includes an “appropriate adjustment or modifications of . . . policies.”  42 U.S.C. §
12111(9)(B).  In other words, Zei asserts “that MTA could have reasonably accommodated
Zei by modifying its policy relating to DOT Standards and adopting a[n] alternative, less
discriminatory criterion.”
Relying on Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 1995), the MTA responds that Zei’s
“undeniable medical condition precludes a finding that he is able to perform the essential
functions of operating an MTA bus with or without reasonable accommodation.”  In Myers,
the Fourth Circuit held that a bus driver for Frederick County who suffered from chronic
heart disease could not satisfy the essential functions of a bus driver which “is to operate his
motor vehicle in a timely, responsible fashion . . . in a way that does not threaten the safety
of his passengers or of other motorists.”  Id. at 282.  The Fourth Circuit reasoned that no
reasonable accommodation could be made because “the County cannot reasonably be
expected to alter the . . . specifications of [the bus driver’s] particular post.”  50 F.3d at 282
n.2.  The Fourth Circuit explained: “Such standard types of accommodation would be
ineffectual in remedying the basic disparities between [the bus driver’s] medical condition
and the legitimate physical criteria for employment as a bus driver.  The sole change in
10As the Tenth Circuit explained the DOT’s expertise in this area:
Nevertheless, the views of an agency such as DOT implementing a
regulatory scheme designed to ensure the safety of our nation’s
highways “‘constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment’” to which employers may properly resort for guidance. 
We hesitate to second guess a legitimate business judgment on the
part of DOT and its covered employers as to the necessary
qualifications of CMV operators.
Tate v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 268 F.3d 989, 994–95 (10th Cir. 2001) (alterations in original)
(citations omitted).
21
circumstances that would enable [the bus driver] to operate public vehicles safely would be
a reversal of his medical condition.”  Id.
We agree with the MTA.  The ADA requires only reasonable accommodations, not
unreasonable ones.  Id. at 283.  As we have reviewed, Congress, the DOT, Maryland’s
General Assembly, and Maryland’s Motor Vehicle Administration view the FMCSRs as
essential to the safety of our highways and crucial in reducing the number of accidents
involving commercial motor vehicles.10  The regulations governing the physical
qualifications of drivers are both “job-related” and of “business necessity.”  We agree with
the Fourth Circuit, therefore, that it would not be reasonable to force the MTA to lower its
standards regarding minimal qualifications for commercial motor vehicle drivers.  Id. at 282
n.2.  Such an accommodation would do nothing to remedy the deficiency between Zei’s
medical condition and the MTA’s legitimate standards to qualify for employment as a bus
driver.  Id.
CONCLUSION
22
We hold, that as a matter of law, the MTA’s use of the federally-created qualification
standard in 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(4) governing drivers suffering from cardiovascular disease
satisfied the ADA’s requirements of being “job-related” and of “business necessity,” and that
“performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation.”  42 U.S.C. § 12113.
Because Zei failed to meet this properly imposed qualification standard, he is not a “qualified
individual” under the ADA.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED; COSTS IN THIS
COURT TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.