Case Title: State v. Pitts

Citation: 174 Vt. 21, 800 A.2d 481

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2002-05-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Pitts (2000-399); 174 Vt. 21; 800 A.2d 481

[Filed 17-May-2002]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                No. 2000-399


State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit
Sequoya Pitts
                                                 November Term, 2001 


Edward J. Cashman, J.

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant Attorney 
  General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Robert Appel, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate Attorney, 
  Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.


PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson, JJ., and Corsones, D.J., 
          Specially Assigned


       AMESTOY, C.J.   Defendant appeals a jury conviction in Chittenden
  District Court for  accessory to aggravated assault in violation of 13
  V.S.A. §§ 3 and 1024.  Defendant argues that  (1)  the jury instructions on
  accomplice liability failed to require the jury to find that she shared in
  the  principal's intent; and (2) defendant had no notice of the State's
  intention to charge her for  accomplice liability and where a defendant is
  not charged as an accomplice, she cannot be convicted  as one.  We affirm. 

       Defendant was charged with aggravated assault on Kristina Prior, in
  violation of 13 V.S.A. §  1024(a)(1), after an altercation on April 12,
  1999, which left Ms. Prior with a laceration to her face 

 

  requiring fifteen stitches and leaving permanent scars.  Defendant was
  acquitted of  principal liability  for the aggravated assault but was
  convicted as an accomplice.  

       On the evening of April 11, 1999, defendant and her friend Natalie
  Wright decided to go out.  Ms. Wright had never been to Vermont and had
  come to visit defendant.  At a friend's house,  defendant and Ms. Wright
  wrote a rap song.  Later, the group headed to a bar and dance club in 
  Burlington.  Also at the bar was Ms. Prior, who was engaged to the father
  of defendant's child,  accompanied by her friends.  The two groups did not
  interact, save for a brief exchange between  defendant and Ms. Prior.  

       Ms. Prior and her friends left the bar and, on their way back to Ms.
  Prior's King Street  residence, stopped at a pizzeria.  The defendant was
  standing outside of the pizzeria with Ms. Wright  and others.  Ms. Prior
  and her friends began to leave the pizzeria to head home and walked past 
  defendant and Ms. Wright.  Defendant followed Ms. Prior and pushed her.  An
  altercation ensued,  and Ms. Wright joined the fight.  Defendant and Ms.
  Wright took turns fighting Ms. Prior until Ms.  Prior felt a sudden burn on
  her check, which she later realized was a laceration to her face.  Ms.
  Prior  did not see who had cut her.  The police arrived at the scene and
  took defendant into custody.   The  police recovered a box cutter and found
  the three-page handwritten rap song in defendant's pocket. 

       Defendant was charged with aggravated assault, in violation of 13
  V.S.A. § 1024(a)(1), and  simple assault, in violation of 13 V.S.A. §
  1023(a)(1).   The State proceeded under two theories at  trial: that
  defendant was the principal in the aggravated assault, or in the
  alternative, that defendant  aided in the commission of the felony of
  aggravated assault.  See 13 V.S.A. § 3 (person who aids in  felony will be
  punished as principal).  Defendant conceded simple assault at trial.  The
  jury acquitted  defendant as the principal but convicted her of accessory
  to aggravated assault. 

 

       On appeal, defendant raises two arguments: (1) that the trial court
  erred in its instructions to  the jury on accomplice liability because the
  instructions allowed the jury to convict defendant under  the theory of
  accomplice liability without finding that she shared the principal's
  intent, as required  by State v. Bacon, 163 Vt. 279, 289,