Case Title: Illinois Education Ass'n v. Illinois State Board of Education

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93347

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2003-05-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 93347-Agenda 11-January 2003.
ILLINOIS EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, an Illinois Not For 
Profit Corporation, Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS STATE BOARD
OF EDUCATION, Appellee.
Opinion filed May 22, 2003.
	JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:
	The issue presented in this case is whether the Freedom of
Information Act (Act) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2000)) requires
the Illinois State Board of Education (Board) to disclose material
provided to the Illinois Attorney General (Attorney General)
pertaining to its request for an Attorney General opinion, or
whether such material is protected by the attorney-client privilege.
The Illinois Education Association (IEA) filed this action against
the Board seeking a declaratory judgment, arguing that it was
entitled to certain documents pursuant to the Act. Both parties
filed motions for summary judgment, and the circuit court of
Sangamon County granted the Board's motion and denied the
IEA's motion, finding the material was exempt from disclosure
pursuant to section 7(1)(n) of the Act (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(n) (West
2000)). The IEA appealed, and a divided appellate court affirmed.
327 Ill. App. 3d 326. We granted the IEA's petition for leave to
appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
	Summary judgment is proper where "the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2000); Travelers Insurance
Co. v. Eljer Manufacturing, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 278, 292 (2001). In
appeals from summary judgment rulings, our review is de novo.
Travelers, 197 Ill. 2d  at 292.
	The record in the instant case reveals the following facts. On
July 17, 2000, the IEA made a request under the Act seeking the
disclosure of all materials that the Board had provided to the
Attorney General in the course of requesting Attorney General
opinions on four topics. We note that, for purposes of this appeal,
only the material pertaining to one of the Attorney General
opinions remains at issue.(1)

 That portion of the IEA's request
sought:
		"Any and all materials provided to the Illinois Attorney
General's Office by the Illinois State Board of Education
with regard to its request for an Attorney General's
opinion on the issue of whether the Illinois State Board of
Education and/or the Illinois Teacher Certification Board
has authority to hear cases where an applicant for a
teaching certificate has been found to be more than 30
days delinquent in payment of child support, has failed to
comply with a subpoena or warrant relating to paternity or
child support proceedings and/or has failed to make the
certificate as required by section 10-65 of the Illinois
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 ILCS 100/10-65."
	On July 26, 2000, the Board denied the IEA's request for this
material citing section 7(1)(n) of the Act, which exempts from
disclosure "[c]ommunications between a public body and an
attorney *** representing the public body that would not be
subject to discovery in litigation." 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(n) (West
2000). On July 28, 2000, the IEA appealed to the State
Superintendent of Education and, on August 10, 2000, he affirmed
the denial of the IEA's request. On August 24, 2000, the IEA filed
its complaint against the Board in the circuit court seeking a
declaratory judgment that the IEA was entitled to receive the
requested material from the Board and that the material was not
exempt from disclosure under the Act.
	On October 10, 2000, the Board filed its index to records,
pursuant to the IEA's motion made under section 11(e) of the Act
(5 ILCS 140/11(e) (West 2000)). In the index, the Board stated, in
relevant part, as follows:
			"The requested materials comprise a letter directed to
Attorney General Jim Ryan from Respicio F. Vazquez,
General Counsel to the Illinois State Board of Education.
The letter requests an opinion from the Attorney General
as to whether the Illinois State Board of Education and/or
the Illinois Teacher Certification Board has decision-making authority relative to the determination of
delinquency in child support payments called for in
Section 10-65 of the Illinois Administrative Procedure
Act. The letter contains confidential communication
between the Illinois State Board of Education and its
Chief Legal Advisor."
The index further provided, as required by section 11(e)(ii), that
access to the requested material was denied pursuant to the
exemption set forth in section 7(1)(n) of the Act.
	On October 27, 2000, the IEA filed both a motion for
summary judgment and a motion for in camera inspection of the
documents at issue. Thereafter, on January 8, 2001, the Board filed
its motion for summary judgment, together with the affidavits of
its general counsel, Vazquez, and Michael J. Luke, chief of the
Opinions Division of the Attorney General's office.
	In his affidavit, Vazquez stated, inter alia, that the Board
"regularly requests legal advice from the Office of the Illinois
Attorney General," and that "[n]ot only does the Attorney General
represent [the Board] and its employees when they are named
parties to litigation, [the Board] is also represented by the Illinois
Attorney General on an ongoing basis." Vazquez further averred
that the Board communicates with the Attorney General "with the
general exception [sic] that the communications are privileged as
between attorney and client, and thus will remain confidential,"
and that the Board's requests for the Attorney General opinions
involved herein "were made with the expectation that they would
be maintained in confidence by the Attorney General's Office and
would not be disclosed to any third party or the public."
	Additionally, Vazquez's affidavit stated that while the Board
"is aware that the official opinions issued by the Office of the
Attorney General are eventually published for the public," the
Board "relies upon the fact that the Attorney General's published
opinions do not reveal the substance of any privileged
communications" between the Board and the Attorney General's
office, and that it is the Board's "understanding and expectation
that any communication between the [Board] and the Attorney
General's Office with respect to those opinions remain
confidential pursuant to the attorney-client privilege for public
bodies consulting with their attorney."
	Luke's affidavit stated, inter alia, that "[a]s the State's chief
legal officer, the Attorney General represents State officers and
agencies including the [Board] on an ongoing basis," that the
Board "regularly requests legal advice and opinions" from the
Attorney General, and that it has been "the practice of the Office
of the Attorney General to treat documents relating to pending
requests for Attorney General opinions in confidence." Luke
further averred that the "Office of the Attorney General recognizes
that such communications may be subject to the attorney/client
privilege," and that "[a]lthough Attorney General opinions often
reference the request for an opinion to the extent necessary to
frame the issue to form a cogent opinion, such opinions generally
do not recite the substance of the communication between the
State agency and the Office of the Attorney General."
	Although no report of proceedings is included in the record on
appeal, it appears from the common law record that a hearing on
the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment was held on
February 7, 2001, and that the circuit court thereafter entered its
written order granting judgment in favor of the Board on February
13, 2001. The IEA timely appealed, and the appellate court
majority affirmed, holding that because the Board drafted the
material at issue with the intent that it remain confidential and in
order to obtain legal advice from the State's chief legal officer, the
Attorney General, the exemption set forth in section 7(1)(n) for
communications between a public body and its attorney was
applicable. 327 Ill. App. 3d at 329-31. Justice Cook, in dissent,
argued that the Board has no attorney-client relationship with the
Attorney General in this case that justified its refusal to turn over
the requested material. 327 Ill. App. 3d at 331 (Cook, J.,
dissenting).
	In conducting our analysis, we are guided by the principle
that, under the Freedom of Information Act, public records are
presumed to be open and accessible. Lieber v. Board of Trustees
of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, 407 (1997).
Indeed, the Act's introductory paragraphs clearly set forth this
legislative intent:
			"Pursuant to the fundamental philosophy of the
American constitutional form of government, it is
declared to be the public policy of the State of Illinois that
all persons are entitled to full and complete information
regarding the affairs of government and the official acts
and policies of those who represent them as public
officials and public employees consistent with the terms
of this Act. Such access is necessary to enable the people
to fulfill their duties of discussing public issues fully and
freely, making informed political judgments and
monitoring government to ensure that it is being
conducted in the public interest.
			This Act is not intended to be used to *** disrupt the
duly-undertaken work of any public body independent of
the fulfillment of any of the fore-mentioned rights of the
people to access to information.
			***
			These restraints on information access should be seen
as limited exceptions to the general rule that the people
have a right to know the decisions, policies, procedures,
rules, standards, and other aspects of government activity
that affect the conduct of government and the lives of any
or all of the people. The provisions of this Act shall be
construed to this end." 5 ILCS 140/1 (West 2000).
	Relying upon this clear statement of public policy and
legislative intent, this court has repeatedly held that the exceptions
to disclosure set forth in the Act are to be read narrowly. See
Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d  at 407; American Federation of State, County
& Municipal Employees (AFSCME) v. County of Cook, 136 Ill. 2d 334, 341 (1990); Bowie v. Evanston Community Consolidated
School District No. 65, 128 Ill. 2d 373, 378 (1989). Thus, when a
public body receives a proper request for information, it must
comply with that request unless one of the narrow statutory
exemptions set forth in section 7 of the Act applies. Lieber, 176
Ill. 2d at 407-08; 5 ILCS 140/7 (West 2000); 5 ILCS 140/3 (West
2000) ("Each public body shall make available to any person for
inspection or copying all public records, except as otherwise
provided in Section 7 of this Act").
	"If the public body seeks to invoke one of the exemptions in
section 7 as grounds for refusing disclosure, it is required to give
written notice specifying the particular exemption claimed to
authorize the denial." Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d  at 408; 5 ILCS 140/9(b)
(West 2000). Thereafter, if the party seeking disclosure of
information under the Act challenges the public body's denial in
circuit court, the public body has the burden of proving that the
records in question fall within the exemption it has claimed.
Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d  at 408; 5 ILCS 140/11 (West 2000); see also
Carter v. Meek, 322 Ill. App. 3d 266, 268 (2001). "To meet this
burden and to assist the court in making its determination, the
agency must provide a detailed justification for its claim of
exemption, addressing the requested documents specifically and
in a manner allowing for adequate adversary testing." (Emphasis
in original.) Baudin v. City of Crystal Lake, 192 Ill. App. 3d 530,
537 (1989); accord Cooper v. Department of the Lottery, 266 Ill.
App. 3d 1007, 1012 (1994); Carbondale Convention Center, Inc.
v. City of Carbondale, 245 Ill. App. 3d 474, 477 (1993); Williams
v. Klincar, 237 Ill. App. 3d 569, 572 (1992).
	In the case at bar, the Board denied the IEA's request citing
section 7(1)(n), which provides an exemption for
"[c]ommunications between a public body and an attorney or
auditor representing the public body that would not be subject to
discovery in litigation." 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(n) (West 2000).
Therefore, in order for the Board to prove that the material
requested by the IEA falls within the exemption contained in
section 7(1)(n), the Board was required to establish both that: (1)
the Attorney General was "representing" the Board; and (2) the
communications would not be "subject to discovery in litigation."
	As to the first requirement, this court has consistently held,
under both the 1870 and the 1970 constitutions, that the Attorney
General is the chief legal officer of the state. Environmental
Protection Agency v. Pollution Control Board, 69 Ill. 2d 394, 398
(1977); Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 342 (1915). However, the
question of whether the Attorney General is "representing" a
public body when receiving and fulfilling a request for an Attorney
General opinion appears to be one of first impression. In
Environmental Protection Agency, 69 Ill. 2d  at 399, this court
discussed the Attorney General's role with regard to state
agencies, finding:
			"As the chief legal officer of the State, the Attorney
General has the constitutional duty of acting as legal
adviser to and legal representative of State agencies. He
or she has the prerogative of conducting legal affairs for
the State. The effect of this grant of power to the Attorney
General is that Illinois is served by a centralized legal
advisory system. There are, arguably, at least two reasons
for this centralization. First, private counsel for State
agencies are expensive. *** Second, centralization is
more efficient. Whatever the merits of these arguments, it
remains true that the duties of the Illinois Attorney
General encompass advising and representing State
agencies."
	This court has additionally recognized that, under the Illinois
Constitution, the Attorney General has retained his common law
powers and role as "the sole official advisor of the executive
officers and of all boards, commissions and departments of the
State government, and it is his duty to conduct the law business of
the State, both in and out of the courts." (Emphasis added.)
Fergus, 270 Ill.  at 342; see also Environmental Protection Agency,
69 Ill. 2d  at 399. More specifically, section 4 of the Attorney
General Act (15 ILCS 205/4 (West 2000)) provides that the duties
of the Attorney General include: "To consult with and advise the
governor and other state officers, and give, when requested,
written opinions upon all legal or constitutional questions relating
to the duties of such officers respectively." 15 ILCS 205/4 (West
2000).
	The IEA argues that the Attorney General is not representing
a state agency when it issues an Attorney General opinion, and that
the performance of this duty pursuant to section 4 "is a separate
function from [the Attorney General's] responsibility to
'represent' the State in court or to give private advice." We cannot
agree. Rather, we agree with the Board that section 4 "makes no
distinction between the Attorney General's opinion writing
function and any other of his legal functions," and that nothing in
section 4 suggests that, in issuing written opinions, the Attorney
General acts in any other capacity than "as the legal officer for
state officials." See State ex rel. Caryl v. MacQueen, 182 W. Va.
50, 53, 385 S.E.2d 646, 649 (1989) ("even in situations where the
Attorney General stands as an 'administrator of the law,' he
remains the legal representative of the State and its citizens").
Indeed, an examination of section 4 reveals the interrelationship
of the duties "[t]o consult with and advise *** state officers, and
give, when requested, written opinions," as evidenced by their
placement in a single conjunctive sentence among the 14
subsections enumerating the Attorney General's duties. (Emphases
added.) 15 ILCS 205/4 (West 2000); see Jarvis v. South Oak
Dodge, Inc., 201 Ill. 2d 81, 87 (2002) ("Generally, use of the
conjunctive 'and' between two or more statutory elements
indicates that the legislature intended that all of the elements must
be satisfied in order to comply with the statute").
	Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Attorney
General's opinion writing function is an inherent part of the
Attorney General's duty to represent public bodies such as the
Board. See W. Scott, The Role of Attorney General's Opinions in
Illinois, 67 Nw. U. L. Rev. 643, 643 (1972) ("one of the most
important but least heralded responsibilities of the Illinois
Attorney General is the issuance of written opinions to the various
state officers whom he is empowered and required to advise"); see
also P. Heiser, The Opinion Writing Function of the Attorney
General, 18 Idaho L. Rev. 9, 9 (1982) ("Inherent in the role of
attorneys general as chief legal officers for their states is the
function of rendering legal opinions to various officials,
departments, and agencies of government"). Moreover, the record
herein reveals that the Board, through the filing of its affidavits
and "Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment," presented the circuit court with many of the
same facts and arguments that we have relied upon in deciding this
question. Therefore, we further conclude that the Board provided
the requisite detailed justification for its claim that the Attorney
General was "representing" the Board for purposes of applying the
exemption set forth in section 7(1)(n) of the Act.
	The second requirement for application of the section 7(1)(n)
exemption is that the communication at issue "not be subject to
discovery in litigation," i.e., that the communication falls within
the attorney-client privilege. See 166 Ill. 2d R. 201(b)(2). This
court, in defining the attorney-client privilege, has stated that: (1)
where legal advice of any kind is sought, (2) from a professional
legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications
relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence, (5) by the client,
(6) are permanently protected, (7) from disclosure by himself or
the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived. Fischel &
Kahn, Ltd. v. Van Straaten Gallery, Inc., 189 Ill. 2d 579, 584
(2000); In re Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d 531, 541 (1988); People v.
Adam, 51 Ill. 2d 46, 48 (1972).
	In the case at bar, we agree with the appellate court majority
that the letter at issue, requesting an Attorney General opinion,
was created by Vazquez "to obtain legal advice from the state's
chief legal officer." 327 Ill. App. 3d at 330. However, these facts
alone do not establish that the definition of attorney-client
privilege has been met, because the privilege is based on the
confidential nature of the communication. See People v. Simms,
192 Ill. 2d 348, 381 (2000); see also Dickerson v. Dickerson, 322 Ill. 492, 500 (1926) (one fundamental condition necessary to the
establishment of the privilege is that the communications must
originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed). Indeed,
this court has found that matters intended by a client for disclosure
by the client's attorney to third parties, who are not agents of either
the client or the attorney, are not privileged. Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d  at
542; People v. Werhollick, 45 Ill. 2d 459, 462 (1970).
	Here, the IEA argues that because the Board knew the
Attorney General opinion it had requested would be made public,
and that material submitted to the Attorney General with such
requests may be and often is quoted in the resulting opinions, the
Board had no reasonable expectation that the material would
remain confidential.(2)

 The Board, in turn, cites to Vazquez's
affidavit stating that the letter at issue was drafted with the intent
that it remain confidential and to Luke's affidavit stating that the
office of the Attorney General "treat[s] documents relating to
pending requests for Attorney General opinions in confidence."
However, as we have noted, it was the Board's burden under the
Act to establish that its refusal to release the requested material
fell within the narrow ambit of section 7(1)(n), by providing "a
detailed justification for its claim of exemption, addressing the
requested documents specifically and in a manner allowing for
adequate adversary testing." (Emphasis in original.) Baudin, 192
Ill. App. 3d at 537; see also Cooper, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 1012.
	Pursuant to section 11(f) of the Act, the court "shall conduct
such in camera examination of the requested records as it finds
appropriate to determine if such records or any part thereof may be
withheld under any provision of this Act." 5 ILCS 140/11(f) (West
2000). This section has been interpreted by our appellate court to
mean that the circuit court need not conduct an in camera review
where the public body meets its burden of showing that the
statutory exemption applies by means of affidavits. See Williams,
237 Ill. App. 3d at 572-73; Baudin, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 535, 538.
However, affidavits will not suffice if the public body's claims are
conclusory, merely recite statutory standards, or are too vague or
sweeping. See Williams, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 572-73; Baudin, 192
Ill. App. 3d at 538.
	In the case at bar, we find the affidavits submitted by the
Board to be merely conclusory and thus inadequate to sustain the
Board's burden of proof. The only information of record
pertaining specifically to the confidentiality of the material at issue
comes from the vague affidavits of Vazquez and Luke and from a
conclusory statement in the index to records that Vazquez's letter
"contains confidential communication between the Illinois State
Board of Education and its Chief Legal Advisor." Further, despite
a request by the IEA for in camera review of the material at issue,
there is no indication in the record that the circuit court either
conducted such a review or determined that it was unnecessary.
See 5 ILCS 140/11(e), (f) (West 2000).
	Therefore, given the inadequacy of the Board's affidavits and
the circuit court's failure to conduct an in camera review, we are
compelled to conclude that the court had an insufficient basis to
grant summary judgment for the Board. As such, this cause must
be remanded for the circuit court to conduct further proceedings
to determine whether the material in question is exempt under
section 7(1)(n). See Williams, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 573; Baudin, 192
Ill. App. 3d at 538.
	In remanding, we caution the circuit court that two
considerations must be taken into account. First, as we have noted,
in light of the public policy favoring open and accessible
government documents, the attorney-client exemption set forth in
section 7(1)(n) is to be construed and applied narrowly. This is so
notwithstanding the countervailing policy favoring confidentiality
between attorneys and clients. We agree with Justice Cook's
dissent that "[g]iven the breadth of the language of the [Act]
requiring disclosure, we should be hesitant to read the attorney-client privilege so as to swallow up the duty to disclose." 327 Ill.
App. 3d at 332 (Cook, J., dissenting); see also Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Housing & Redevelopment Authority, 310 Minn.
313, 322-23, 251 N.W.2d 620, 625 (1976) ("public officers and
attorneys [can]not abuse their trust by extending the privilege as
a mere conduit to suppress public observation of the decision-making process").
	Second, and equally as important, under the Act, the burden
is on the public body to demonstrate that the attorney-client
exemption of section 7(1)(n) is applicable. But, in meeting its
burden, the public body may not simply treat the words "attorney-client privilege" or "legal advice" as some talisman, the mere
utterance of which magically casts a spell of secrecy over the
documents at issue. Rather, the public body can meet its burden
only by providing some objective indicia that the exemption is
applicable under the circumstances. Thus, summary judgment
would be appropriate without in camera review if the affidavits
show with reasonable specificity why the documents fall within
the claimed exemption and are sufficient to allow adversarial
testing. See Baudin, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 542. However, we believe
that in camera review by the circuit court is the most effective way
for the public body to objectively demonstrate that the exemption
claimed does, in fact, apply. See Baudin, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 543
(McLaren, J., concurring) ("The trial court should be hesitant in
determining a privilege exists based solely on the affidavits
submitted by the defendant, for without an in camera review there
is no external means to verify the truthfulness of the affidavits").
Such in camera review affords the benefits of an impartial arbiter
without the risks accompanying public disclosure of the
documents. See Baudin, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 543 (McLaren, J.,
concurring).
	Thus, on remand, the circuit court must apply a narrow
construction of section 7(1)(n) in determining those portions of the
material which the Board could reasonably believe were privileged
and confidential communications with its counsel, the Attorney
General, and those portions which state the substance of the
request for an Attorney General opinion and to which no claim of
confidentiality could reasonably apply. The IEA would then be
entitled to disclosure of the letter, following a redaction by the trial
court of any matters that were properly within the attorney-client
privilege. See Carter v. Meek, 322 Ill. App. 3d 266, 269 (2001);
Baudin, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 543.
	In summary, we hold that the attorney-client exemption set
forth in section 7(1)(n) of the Act may apply to material submitted
by a public body requesting an Attorney General opinion.
However, a public body may only invoke this exemption to deny
disclosure of material for which a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality exists. Moreover, under the Act, in order to
establish the requisite detailed justification for its claim of
exemption, the public body must provide the circuit court some
objective indicia by which to determine this issue.
	Accordingly, because the Board failed to establish that the
information requested by the IEA was, as a matter of law, exempt
from disclosure, summary judgment for the Board was
inappropriate. We therefore remand this matter to the circuit court
for an in camera review of the material at issue. If the exemption
claimed applies to any portion of the material, the court must then
redact that portion prior to disclosure of the remainder of the
material to which the exemption does not apply.
	The judgments of the appellate and circuit courts are reversed
and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment reversed;
cause remanded.
 
 
1.      1The Board no longer claimed privilege with respect to materials
associated with two of the opinions after those opinions were released,
and it is uncontroverted that a third set of materials does not exist
because the Board made no request for an Attorney General opinion on
that topic.
2.      2Originally, Attorney General opinions were published in bound
volumes, but now are available electronically over the Internet at the
Attorney General's website. J. McKnight, Finding Illinois Attorney
General Opinions, 86 Ill. B.J. 393 (1998).