Case Title: Reed v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 422, 2003

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
JEROME REED,                      
           
Defendant Below- 
Appellant,   
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
     
 
 
     
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
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   No. 422, 2003 
 
   Court Below---Superior Court 
   of the State of Delaware, 
   in and for Sussex County  
   Cr. A. Nos. IS01-02-0120; 0121; 
                          0122; 0125; 0126;  
                          0127; 0128; 0574 
  
 
Submitted:  January 16, 2004 
   Decided:  March 2, 2004 
 
Before BERGER, STEELE and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 2nd day of March 2004, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal and 
the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Jerome Reed, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s August 6, 2003 order denying his motion for postconviction relief 
pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find no merit to the appeal.  
Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 
 
(2) 
In October 2001, Reed was found guilty by a Superior Court jury of 
Robbery in the First Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a 
Felony, Kidnapping in the Second Degree, two counts of Burglary in the Second 
Degree, Felony Theft, Theft From a Senior, and Misdemeanor Criminal Mischief.  
 
 
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Reed was subsequently sentenced as an habitual offender to a total of 66 years 
incarceration at Level V, to be followed by probation.  Reed’s convictions and 
sentences were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.1 
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Reed claims that the Superior Court erred as a matter of 
law, first, by denying his motion for postconviction relief on the basis that he had 
not demonstrated that his counsel provided ineffective assistance and, second, by 
improperly injecting race into its order denying postconviction relief. 
 
(4) 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there 
is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been 
different.2  Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly 
demanding and leads to a “strong presumption that the representation was 
professionally reasonable.”3 
 
(5) 
Our review of the order denying Reed’s motion for postconviction 
relief does not reflect any error of law on the part of the Superior Court.  The 
Superior Court utilized the proper standard in determining whether Reed had 
                                                 
1 Reed v. State, Del. Supr., No. 641, 2001, Steele, J. (June 21, 2002). 
2 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
3 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
 
 
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demonstrated that his counsel provided ineffective assistance and properly 
determined, based upon the evidence in the record, that he had not.  Moreover, the 
Superior Court’s order does not reflect any improper references to race.   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice