Case Title: State v. Sprague

Citation: 175 Vt. 123, 2003 VT 20, 824 A.2d 539

Docket Number: 2002-028

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2003-02-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Sprague (2002-028); 175 Vt. 123; 824 A.2d 539

2003 VT 20

[Filed 21-Feb-2003]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2003 VT 20

                                No. 2002-028

  State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

  Jonathan L. Sprague	                         September Term, 2002

  John P. Wesley, J. (Final Order)
  Robert Grussing III, J. (Motion to Suppress)

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant Attorney
    General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, and Victoria Cherney, Appellate
    Attorney, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse (FN1), Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

        
       ¶  1.  SKOGLUND, J.   The questions we address in this appeal are
  whether a reasonable person in defendant's position would have felt free to
  refuse a State trooper's request that he exit his vehicle, and whether a
  police officer may automatically order a driver to exit a vehicle following
  a routine traffic stop. We hold that the record evidence here did not
  support a finding that defendant voluntarily exited his vehicle.  We
  further hold that a police officer must have a reasonable basis to believe
  that the officer's safety, or the safety of others, is at risk or that a
  crime has been committed before ordering a driver out of a stopped vehicle. 
  Finding no basis for the exit order in the circumstances of this case
  involving a routine traffic stop for a speeding violation, we conclude that
  the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress and
  therefore that the judgment must be reversed.

       ¶  2.  The record evidence reveals the following.   On October 3,
  2000, at approximately 3:30 p.m, a State trooper operating a radar device
  on Route 91 in the Town of Rockingham clocked a vehicle traveling at a rate
  of seventy-nine miles per hour.  Nothing in the record suggests that the
  officer observed any indicia of drunk driving, or any other offense or
  traffic violation, other than speeding.  The trooper followed the car in
  his cruiser, activated his blue lights, and parked behind the car after it
  had stopped on the paved shoulder of the highway.  A police videotape of
  the events that followed, which was also transcribed, shows that the
  uniformed officer approached the driver's side of the car and asked the
  driver, "can I see your license and registration, please?"  The driver,
  later identified as defendant, handed these to the officer through the car
  window.  The officer asked defendant several additional questions
  concerning the reason for the stop, and defendant indicated that he was
  running late to pick up his son.  The officer then said, "you mind having a
  seat in my car while I check your license, please?"  Defendant, in
  response, exited the vehicle and started walking with the officer toward
  the police cruiser.
   
       ¶  3.  As they approached the cruiser, the officer asked defendant
  whether he had "any weapons, knives, sharp anything like that in your
  pocket?  Would you mind showing me what you have, quick, before you get in
  my car?"  Defendant thereupon emptied his pockets, revealing a small packet
  which, in response to additional questioning, he acknowledged contained
  marijuana.  Under further questioning, defendant also acknowledged that he
  possessed "a pipe and bag."  The officer proceeded to pat down defendant,
  found a prescription bottle which defendant indicated was for "panic
  attacks," and entered the cruiser with defendant.  Once inside, the officer
  questioned defendant further about his marijuana use, work, and other
  subjects.  At one point, the officer reassured defendant, "you're not going
  to end up in jail; you're going to drive away from here, okay?"   

       ¶  4.  After several minutes, the officer completed writing up the
  ticket, returned defendant's license, and announced, "Okay, this's done and
  over with, Jon."  The officer then indicated that he wanted to "just take a
  quick peek in the car,"and addressed defendant as follows:

         What I'm going to do is just - from this point forward, Jon,
    it behooves you to be a hundred percent honest with me, okay?  I'm
    not going to pull any fast ones with you or anything like that,
    I'm an up-front kind of guy.  Okay?

         What I want to do is take a peek at what you have in the
    vehicle, okay?  And I wouldn't mind going to your house and taking
    a peek there, okay?  Because based on what we've discovered right
    now, is people who smoke dope carry dope with you and they have
    dope at their house; okay?

         Now, I can go the short route, or we can go the long route;
    okay.  It's entirely up to you.  But what I want to do is I just
    want to tell you everything now, okay; so you fully understand
    everything.

         You got a little bit more dope at the house?

       ¶  5.  Defendant, responded, "A tiny bit, not much."  The officer
  reassured defendant that he wasn't looking "to tear your place apart or
  anything like that,"and had defendant sign a consent form for the search of
  his vehicle and home, explaining that "[e]ssentially this is just for your
  protection; okay?" After a search of the car, defendant drove home followed
  by the officer and another trooper.  A search of the home revealed several
  marijuana plants.
   
       ¶  6.  Defendant was charged with possession of two ounces or more
  of marijuana, in violation of 18 V.S.A. § 4230(a)(2).  He moved to suppress
  the evidence, arguing that the searches of his pockets, car and home were
  non-consensual.  In a supplemental memorandum, he argued for suppression on
  the additional ground that any questioning beyond the traffic stop should
  have been preceded by Miranda warnings.  Following a hearing, the court
  issued a written decision, denying the motion.  The court ruled that
  defendant had validly consented to the search of his pockets, car and home,
  and that Miranda warnings were not required because defendant was never in
  custody during the incident.  

       ¶  7.  The public defender later substituted for defendant's retained
  attorney, and filed a new motion to suppress, together with a cover letter
  from successor counsel.  The letter stated that the new motion had been
  filed "to ensure that all issues have been raised and are preserved for
  appeal,"and that the State and defendant had agreed to have the motion
  decided based on the record of the prior hearing, including the testimony
  and videotape previously admitted into evidence.  In the event that the
  court denied the motion, the letter stated that the parties had agreed to a
  conditional plea, under terms previously reviewed by the court.  

       ¶  8.  In addition to the arguments previously raised, the new motion
  asserted that defendant had not freely exited his vehicle, that the
  "request" that he exit constituted a further seizure requiring reasonable
  suspicion of criminal activity under Chapter 1, Article 11 of the Vermont
  Constitution, and that all evidence subsequently seized was tainted by the
  initial illegality and should be suppressed.  In its response, the State
  noted that the court had previously decided all of the issues raised with
  the exception of the question whether defendant had properly exited the
  car, which it characterized as "the only issue now open for review by this
  Court. . . . "  As to this issue, the State asserted that defendant had
  voluntarily consented to leave his vehicle, and that suppression was
  therefore unwarranted.  
   
       ¶  9.  The court later issued a written decision, denying the new
  motion to suppress.  The court observed that the claims relating to the
  propriety of defendant's exit from the vehicle had been waived by his
  failure to raise them in the initial suppression motion.  Nevertheless, the
  court went on to state that it had reviewed the new claims on the merits
  and had concluded that the evidence and law did not support defendant's
  assertion that his decision to exit the vehicle was involuntary, or his
  argument that the officer's request to exit was improper.  This appeal
  followed.

                                     I.

       ¶  10.  Defendant renews on appeal the claims raised below in the
  successive motions to suppress.  The State raises a procedural bar at the
  threshold, however, arguing that the issues relating to defendant's  exit
  from the vehicle were not preserved for review because defendant failed to
  raise them in the first suppression motion.

       ¶  11.  It is well settled that "absent plain error, issues neither
  litigated nor decided below will not be addressed for the first time on
  appeal."  State v. Parker, 155 Vt. 650, 651, 583 A.2d 1275, 1276  (1990)
  (mem.).  The record here, however, shows that the State agreed that
  defendant could raise the issues which it now claims are barred "to ensure
  that all issues have been raised and are preserved for appeal,"
  acknowledged in its opposition to the new motion that the issues remained
  open to review, and addressed the legal and factual merits of the claims. 
  The trial court, moreover, indicated that it had reviewed the arguments,
  and rejected them on the merits, albeit after indicating that they had been
  waived.  Both parties have now fully briefed the issues to this Court, as
  well.
   
       ¶  12.  In these circumstances, we find that the basic purposes
  underlying the preservation rule would not be served by declining to
  address defendant's arguments.  The parties had a full and fair opportunity
  to litigate the issues, the court addressed them on the merits, and the
  record is more than ample for purposes of affording meaningful appellate
  review.  See In re White, 172 Vt. 335, 343, 779 A.2d 1264, 1270-71 (2001)
  ("purpose of the preservation rule is to ensure that the original forum is
  given an opportunity to rule on an issue prior to our review"); State v.
  Wool, 162 Vt. 342, 346,