Case Title: Stoner v. Allstate Ins. Co.

Citation: 2007-Ohio-6669

Docket Number: 20061749

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-12-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Stoner v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 Ohio St.3d 1217, 2007-Ohio-6669.] 
 
 
STONER, APPELLEE, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Stoner v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 Ohio St.3d 1217, 2007-Ohio-6669.] 
Appeal dismissed as improvidently accepted. 
(No. 2006-1749 — Submitted October 9, 2007 — Decided December 19, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Morrow County, 
No. 05 CA 16, 2006-Ohio-3998. 
__________________ 
{¶ 1} The cause is dismissed, sua sponte, as having been improvidently 
accepted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, and CUPP, 
JJ., concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents with opinion. 
 
LANZINGER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 2} I respectfully dissent from the court’s order dismissing this case as 
having been improvidently accepted.  In this case, the court of appeals, following 
this court’s decision in Landis v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 339, 
695 N.E.2d 1140, determined that “[u]ninsured/underinsured motorist insurance 
claims are contract claims, and therefore R.C. 1343.03(A) allows prejudgment 
interest for the insured under such provisions.”  Stoner v. Allstate Ins. Co., 05 CA 
0016, 2006-Ohio-3998, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 3} In my view, the four-to-three majority in Landis misconstrued R.C. 
1343.03(A) and (C).  Without question, subsection (C) provides that it pertains to 
a civil action that is “based on tortious conduct,” while subsection (A) provides 
that “when money becomes due and payable upon * * * a contract * * *, the 
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creditor is entitled to interest at the rate per annum determined pursuant to section 
5703.47 of the Revised Code, unless a written contract provides a different rate of 
interest.” 
{¶ 4} In dissent, Justice Cook tellingly pointed out, “[S]upport for 
treating uninsured/underinsured motorist claims under rules of tort rather than 
contract can actually be found in the language of the statute.”  (Emphasis sic.)  
Landis, 82 Ohio St.3d at 345, 695 N.E.2d 1140 (Cook, J., dissenting).  She further 
highlighted that the phrase “civil action based on tortious conduct” is far more 
expansive than the simple phrase “tort action.”  Id.  In my view, Justice Cook’s 
analysis is exacting and correct.  I would therefore hold that R.C. 1343.03(C) 
applies to civil actions based on tortious conduct, and I would overrule Landis on 
that basis. 
{¶ 5} In Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-
5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, this court announced a three-pronged test for overruling 
precedent.  We stated that prior decisions of this court “may be overruled where 
(1) the decision was wrongly decided at that time, or changes in circumstances no 
longer justify continued adherence to the decision, (2) the decision defies practical 
workability, and (3) abandoning the precedent would not create an undue hardship 
for those who have relied upon it.”  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.  In my 
view, Landis meets this high standard. 
{¶ 6} With respect the first prong of the test, Landis determined that R.C. 
1343.03(A) applied to uninsured-motorist (“UM”) claims because such claims are 
contractual in nature.  While the relationship between the parties arises out of 
contract, the nature of the claim does not.  Plainly, it arises out of a civil action 
based on tortious conduct.  The decision in Landis was therefore wrong, and the 
first prong of the Galatis test is met. 
{¶ 7} Next, I contend that the application of Landis defies practical 
workability.  R.C. 1343.03(A) provides that “when money becomes due and 
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3 
payable upon any bond, bill, note, or other instrument of writing * * * , the 
creditor is entitled to interest.”  (Emphasis added.)  Our decision in Landis gave 
trial courts the discretion to determine when interest begins to accrue.  In the case 
before us, the trial court determined the due and payable date for a portion of the 
judgment to be the day of the automobile accident.  Here, the carrier could not 
have known the amount it owed to Stoner pursuant to the UM obligation until the 
claim for injury arising out of tortious conduct had been determined.  This is 
substantially different from a contractual obligation arising out of a note or a bond 
or a sum certain in a written contract.  Thus, the application of R.C. 1343.03(A) to 
this kind of claim is unworkable, as exhibited by the trial court’s effort to award 
interest on parts of the judgment but not the entire award.  This case pointedly 
suggests the impracticability of assessing prejudgment interest on this kind of 
claim. 
{¶ 8} Finally, Landis has not engendered such reliance in litigants that it 
would disrupt the prosecution of claims.  As we stated in Galatis, “there is no 
individual or societal reliance upon Scott-Pontzer outside of the courtroom.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 
1256, ¶ 59.  An award of prejudgment interest, which occurs after a claimant 
receives a final judgment on a claim, does not affect strategy or procedure prior to 
the final judgment.  Overruling Landis, therefore, would not cause “ ‘practical 
real-world dislocations.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 58, quoting Robinson v. Detroit (2000), 462 
Mich. 439, 466, 613 N.W.2d 307. 
{¶ 9} For these reasons, I would overrule our judgment in Landis to the 
extent that it provided for a determination of prejudgment interest to be made in 
this kind of case pursuant to R.C. 1343.03(A) and would submit that they are 
more properly considered pursuant to R.C. 1343.03(C).  Accordingly, I would 
reverse the decision of the Morrow County Court of Appeals, determine that R.C. 
1343.03(C) governs motions for prejudgment interest in UM cases, and remand 
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this matter to the trial court for application of that subsection of the statute to 
these facts. 
__________________ 
Wagner Law Firm, P.L.L., and Jay D. Wagner, for appellee. 
 
Kennedy, Purdy, Hoeffel & Gernert, L.L.C., and Paul E. Hoeffel, for 
appellant. 
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