Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Gold

Citation: 2018-Ohio-3238

Docket Number: 2017-1411

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2018-08-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Gold, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-3238.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-3238 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. GOLD. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Gold, Slip Opinion No.  
2018-Ohio-3238.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
including misappropriating client funds, engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, engaging in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice, and engaging in conduct that 
adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law—Two-year 
suspension, with second year stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2017-1411—Submitted January 24, 2018—Decided August 14, 2018.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2016-069. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, John Walter Gold, of Hinckley, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0078414, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2004. 
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{¶ 2} In a complaint certified to the Board of Professional Conduct on 
December 28, 2016, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Gold with multiple 
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  The charges arose from Gold’s 
efforts to collect more than $51,000 in unclaimed funds on behalf of a client.  The 
allegations in the complaint included that Gold misappropriated those funds in 
violation of an agreed court order requiring him to hold them in his client trust 
account, that he engaged in a pattern of dishonesty and misrepresentation to conceal 
his misappropriation, and that he failed to maintain required records regarding his 
client trust account. 
{¶ 3} The parties entered into stipulations in which Gold admitted to some 
misconduct and relator agreed to withdraw the remaining alleged violations.  After 
a hearing, a panel of the board found that Gold engaged in the stipulated misconduct 
and dismissed the remaining allegations.  The panel recommended that Gold be 
suspended from the practice of law for two years with the second year stayed on 
conditions and that upon reinstatement, he be required to serve a one-year period 
of monitored probation.  The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions 
of law, and recommended sanction. 
{¶ 4} Gold objects to the board’s recommended sanction and argues that 
based on his misconduct, the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, and this 
court’s precedent, the appropriate sanction for his misconduct is a two-year 
suspension stayed in its entirety. 
{¶ 5} For the reasons that follow, we adopt the board’s findings of fact and 
misconduct, overrule Gold’s objection, and suspend him from the practice of law 
for two years with the second year stayed on the conditions recommended by the 
board. 
 
 
January Term, 2018 
 
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Misconduct 
{¶ 6} In May 2012, George Daher signed a contingent-fee contract retaining 
Gold to assist him in recovering $51,032.37 from the Ohio Department of 
Commerce’s Division of Unclaimed Funds. 
{¶ 7} In July 2012, Gold filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County Court 
of Common Pleas seeking a declaratory judgment that Daher was entitled to the 
unclaimed funds.  Because the source of the unclaimed funds was an insurance 
claim that preceded Daher’s 2010 discharge of his debts in bankruptcy, Gold 
notified the bankruptcy trustee of the claim.  The trustee filed a motion to intervene 
in the state-court proceeding to represent the bankruptcy estate’s interest.  Before 
the state court ruled on the motion to intervene, it granted partial summary 
judgment to Daher, declaring that he was entitled to make a full claim to the 
unclaimed funds.  The state court later granted the trustee’s motion to intervene. 
{¶ 8} Meanwhile, the trustee also filed an adversarial complaint against 
both Daher and the state of Ohio in the reopened bankruptcy proceeding alleging 
that the funds belonged to the bankruptcy estate.  Gold initially contested the 
complaint, arguing that the state court was the proper forum to determine the 
bankruptcy estate’s interest in the unclaimed funds.  But Gold and the trustee 
eventually signed an agreed order in the bankruptcy court, in which Gold agreed to 
accept $51,032.37 from the state of Ohio, to hold those funds in his client trust 
account until the bankruptcy court determined whether and how much of those 
funds were the property of the bankruptcy estate, and to deliver any funds found to 
be property of the estate to the trustee.  Based on that order, the trustee dismissed 
his adversarial complaint in the bankruptcy court and all of his claims in the state-
court case. 
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{¶ 9} On October 3, 2013, Gold deposited $53,161.72 into his client trust 
account, comprised of $51,161.72 of Daher’s unclaimed funds1 and money from 
another client.  The next day, Gold disbursed $5,000 from that account without 
receiving the bankruptcy court’s approval, misappropriating at least $2,869.03 of 
the unclaimed funds.  During that month, he misappropriated and disbursed 
$8,869.03 of those funds without court approval.  In November and December 
2013, he misappropriated an additional $9,634.41.  In March 2014, Gold gave 
Daher $2,000 of the disputed funds without receiving the court’s approval and 
misappropriated another $6,536 of the funds. 
{¶ 10} As Gold’s misappropriations were occurring, the trustee filed a 
second adversarial complaint in the bankruptcy court, naming Gold and Daher as 
defendants and asking the court to determine the bankruptcy estate’s interest in the 
funds.  Despite having agreed that the bankruptcy court was the proper forum to 
decide that issue, Gold moved the court to close Daher’s bankruptcy case and to 
dismiss the adversarial complaint.  He also argued that the bankruptcy trustee’s 
claims were barred because they were not raised in the state-court proceeding.  And 
contrary to his written contingent-fee contract with Daher, he claimed that he was 
entitled to an hourly calculation of his legal fee.  The court overruled Gold’s 
motions, and it later found in April 2014 that all the funds were the property of the 
bankruptcy estate and ordered Gold to turn them over to the trustee. 
{¶ 11} Gold appealed the bankruptcy court’s judgment to the bankruptcy 
appellate panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.  He 
continued to withdraw additional funds from his client trust account while that 
appeal was pending.  By the end of May 2014, he had misappropriated more than 
$32,000, and by the time the appellate panel affirmed the bankruptcy court’s 
judgment in December 2014, that number had climbed to nearly $49,000. 
                                                 
1 This amount apparently includes interest on the money held by the Division of Unclaimed Funds.  
See Sogg v. Zurz, 121 Ohio St.3d 449, 2009-Ohio-1526, 905 N.E.2d 187; R.C. 169.08(D). 
January Term, 2018 
 
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{¶ 12} In January 2015, Daher and the trustee reached a settlement that 
permitted Daher to receive $18,300 of the disputed funds in exchange for his 
agreement to refrain from any further appeals or litigation.  Gold, who had 
negotiated the agreement on Daher’s behalf, refused to sign it because it did not 
address his attorney fees.  He also misappropriated an additional $250 during that 
month. 
{¶ 13} On February 6, 2015, the bankruptcy court approved the settlement 
and ordered Gold to remit $32,722.37 to the trustee within five days.  That day, 
Gold deposited $8,000 into his client trust account, issued Daher a $6,000 check 
from that account, and gave him approximately $6,000 in cash.  Gold purported to 
keep $6,300 as a discounted fee under the contingent-fee agreement. 
{¶ 14} Because Gold failed to timely remit $32,722.37 to comply with the 
bankruptcy court’s order, the trustee moved the court to hold him in contempt.  In 
response, Gold asserted for the first time that he had more than $49,000 in liens 
over the funds because he had performed more than 240 hours of work on the matter 
at $200 per hour—but at that time, the balance in his client trust account was just 
$50.  On July 21, 2015, the bankruptcy court held that Gold was precluded from 
pursuing his alleged liens because he had failed to timely assert them.  The court 
later denied Gold’s motion to reconsider its decision and ordered him to turn over 
the funds by noon on July 28, but he failed to comply and the trustee again asked 
the court to hold him in contempt.  The court scheduled a hearing and ordered Gold 
to bring “complete documentation establishing the current location of the funds.” 
{¶ 15} Gold filed a Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion for relief from judgment in 
the closed adversarial proceeding in the bankruptcy court.  He also filed a notice of 
dismissal of all claims in the state-court proceeding and a motion to enforce a 
charging lien for attorney fees in that case.  Although Gold appeared at the 
bankruptcy-court contempt hearing, he failed to comply with the court’s order to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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provide documentation regarding the location of the funds and it became apparent 
that he had not maintained adequate records for his client trust account. 
{¶ 16} The trustee then filed a separate motion to hold Gold in contempt, in 
which the trustee requested that the bankruptcy court order an accounting and 
impose sanctions.  Although Gold appeared at the ensuing contempt hearing, he did 
not bring the documents he had been ordered to produce.  The court instructed Gold 
to find a nearby location to print his bank records, but when the hearing resumed, 
he had printed just some of the monthly statements for his client trust account.  The 
court questioned Gold about those statements, but he did not directly answer most 
of the court’s questions.  The court later issued an opinion admonishing Gold and 
ordering the contempt hearing adjourned until a later date. 
{¶ 17} As these events were occurring, Gold filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
case of his own.  After the court in Gold’s personal bankruptcy case ruled in the 
trustee’s favor on several motions filed by the parties, Gold failed to appear at a 
scheduled hearing, and the court dismissed Gold’s personal bankruptcy case based 
on that failure. 
{¶ 18} On November 12, 2015, the bankruptcy court reconvened the 
contempt hearing in Daher’s bankruptcy case.  Later that month, the court issued a 
decision finding Gold in contempt of court and ordering him to pay the trustee’s 
attorney fees.  The court also ordered him to file a written accounting of the funds 
entrusted to him within 14 days and ordered that he was to be fined $50 for each 
additional day of noncompliance.  Gold unsuccessfully attempted to stay the 
proceedings pending the outcome of his appeal to the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Ohio from the contempt order, sought a protective order, 
and invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in filings in the 
bankruptcy court.  He also renewed his motion to enforce a charging lien in the 
state-court case. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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{¶ 19} More than a year after Gold was first ordered to remit $32,722.37 to 
the trustee, he had neither transmitted the funds nor submitted an accounting for 
them.  Consequently, on March 1, 2016, the bankruptcy court ordered Gold to pay 
a $32,722.27 fine, an additional $1,600 for his delay, and the trustee’s attorney fees.  
The court also increased the daily fine for noncompliance to $100.  That same day, 
Gold filed a notice with the bankruptcy court in which he falsely claimed that he 
had already provided the court with a “full accounting.” 
{¶ 20} Gold’s appeal of the bankruptcy court’s contempt ruling to the 
federal district court was unsuccessful.  He then filed a notice of appeal in the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, but Gold and the trustee 
negotiated a settlement of the contempt matter.  The parties in Gold’s disciplinary 
proceeding stipulated (and the board acknowledged) that pursuant to the settlement, 
Gold agreed to pay the trustee $32,722.27, but neither the agreement nor the 
bankruptcy court’s approval of the agreement appears in the record.  As of the date 
of Gold’s disciplinary hearing, he had made an initial lump-sum payment of 
$16,000 and two monthly payments of $2,000 toward his agreed obligation. 
{¶ 21} The parties stipulated and the board found that Gold’s conduct 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) (requiring a lawyer to hold funds belonging to a 
client or third party in a client trust account separate from the lawyer’s own 
property), 1.15(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to maintain a record for each client on 
whose behalf funds are held), 1.15(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to maintain a record 
for the lawyer’s client trust account, setting forth the name of the account, the date, 
amount, and client affected by each credit and debit, and the balance in the account), 
1.15(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to maintain all bank statements, deposit slips, and 
canceled checks, if provided by the bank, for each bank account), 1.15(a)(5) 
(requiring a lawyer to perform and retain a monthly reconciliation of the funds held 
in the lawyer’s client trust account), 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice), and 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in 
conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law).  We agree 
with the board’s findings of fact and misconduct, and consistently with our opinion 
in Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker, 137 Ohio St.3d 35, 2013-Ohio-3998, 997 
N.E.2d 500, ¶ 21, we find that Gold’s misconduct was sufficiently egregious to 
support a finding that he violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h). 
Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 22} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
several relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
{¶ 23} As aggravating factors, the parties stipulated and the board found 
that Gold acted with a dishonest or selfish motive and engaged in multiple offenses.  
See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2) and (4).  Stipulated mitigating factors include the 
absence of prior discipline, a timely and good-faith effort to make restitution to 
Daher, Gold’s cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings once the 
complaint was filed, and his full and free disclosure to the board.  See Gov.Bar R. 
V(13)(C)(1), (3), and (4).  Gold also acknowledged the wrongful nature of the 
conduct, though the board expressed concerns that Gold may not have 
acknowledged that some of his filings were frivolous or were attempts to obstruct 
the bankruptcy proceedings.  The board also accepted the parties’ stipulation that 
Gold suffered from adjustment disorder with disturbance of conduct, depressive 
disorder, anxiety disorder, and a substance-use disorder at all relevant times 
between 2012 and April 2016 and that the circumstances of those disorders satisfied 
the criteria to qualify as a mitigating factor pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7).2 
                                                 
2 Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7) provides that a mental-health disorder qualifies as a mitigating factor 
when all the following factors exist: a diagnosis of a disorder by a qualified health-care professional, 
January Term, 2018 
 
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{¶ 24} In considering the appropriate sanction for Gold’s misconduct, the 
board examined Disciplinary Counsel v. Marshall, 142 Ohio St.3d 1, 2014-Ohio-
4815, 27 N.E.3d 481.  Marshall had agreed to represent a client in a personal-injury 
action pursuant to a contingent-fee contract after the client terminated another 
attorney’s representation.  The client’s former attorney, who had also taken the case 
on a contingent-fee basis, informed Marshall that he intended to assert a lien on any 
settlement proceeds based on his contract or alternatively, on the basis of quantum 
meruit.  Just one month after accepting the representation, Marshall settled the case 
for $150,000. 
{¶ 25} Due to the fee dispute between the two attorneys, the defendants in 
the personal-injury case submitted the settlement check to the court.  At a hearing 
regarding the attorneys’ entitlement to the fees, former counsel argued that his firm 
had completed 95 percent of the work on the case and was entitled to a fee of 
approximately $50,000, but the court continued the hearing before Marshall had the 
opportunity to present her case.  The court ordered Marshall to disburse no more 
than $85,000 to her client and to hold the remaining settlement proceeds in trust 
until the fee dispute was resolved.  Marshall deposited the money into a separate 
trust account that she had established for the client’s benefit and soon disbursed 
more than $63,000 to her client.  But she also violated the court’s order by 
reimbursing her own expenses and accepting $25,000 from the client as a portion 
of her fee. 
                                                 
a determination that the disorder contributed to the respondent’s misconduct, a sustained period of 
successful treatment, and a prognosis from a qualified health-care professional that the attorney will 
be able to return to the competent, ethical practice of law under specified conditions.  The rule also 
provides that a substance-abuse disorder qualifies as a mitigating factor when all the following 
factors exist: a diagnosis of a disorder by a qualified chemical-dependency professional, a 
determination that the disorder contributed to the respondent’s misconduct, a certification of 
successful completion of an approved treatment program, and a prognosis from a qualified 
chemical-dependency professional that the attorney will be able to return to the competent, ethical 
practice of law under specified conditions. 
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{¶ 26} Marshall then engaged in a multipronged effort to avoid the 
enforcement of former counsel’s charging lien, unsuccessfully seeking several 
writs of prohibition, injunctive relief, and an emergency peremptory writ.  She also 
unsuccessfully sought to disqualify the judge presiding over the case.  And before 
the court could resume the fee-dispute hearing, Marshall distributed the remaining 
settlement proceeds—more than $60,000 to her client and more than $25,000 to 
herself.  Marshall compounded her misconduct by failing to produce her client-
trust-account records for the court’s inspection, failing to timely appear for a 
hearing, refusing to answer the judge’s questions, and making false and misleading 
statements to the court.  She was twice held in contempt of court, sought to 
discharge her obligation to her client’s former counsel in bankruptcy, and made 
unfounded allegations of racial and gender bias against the trial judge. 
{¶ 27} The board found that the facts of Gold’s misconduct are very similar 
to those in Marshall.  Both Gold and Marshall held tens of thousands of dollars in 
trust pursuant to court orders pending the judicial resolution of fee or ownership 
disputes.  Each attorney took the funds in violation of the court’s orders, failed to 
comply with court orders to produce required records regarding the funds, and, 
consequently, was held in contempt of court.  There are also common aggravating 
and mitigating factors, including a dishonest or selfish motive, multiple offenses, 
the absence of prior discipline, and full and free disclosure. 
{¶ 28} The board recognized that Gold established the existence of 
additional mitigating factors beyond the two that were also present in Marshall—
including his timely payment of restitution to Daher and his qualifying mental and 
substance-use disorders.  While the board found that the mitigating evidence 
warranted a deviation from the presumptive sanction of disbarment, it rejected 
Gold’s proposed sanction of a fully stayed suspension.  See, e.g., Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Bubna, 116 Ohio St.3d 294, 2007-Ohio-6436, 878 N.E.2d 632, ¶ 27 
(recognizing that although disbarment is the presumptive sanction for 
January Term, 2018 
 
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misappropriation, that sanction may be tempered with sufficient evidence of 
mitigating or extenuating circumstances). 
{¶ 29} Instead, the board recommends that we impose a two-year 
suspension with the second year stayed on conditions, the same sanction imposed 
in Marshall.  Among the recommended conditions are that Gold comply with the 
contract that he has entered into with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program 
(“OLAP”) and comply with any extension of that contract, make full restitution to 
the trustee in Daher’s bankruptcy proceeding, pay all other monetary sanctions 
imposed on him by the bankruptcy court pursuant to its contempt finding against 
him, and commit no further misconduct.  In addition, the board recommends that 
upon reinstatement, Gold be required to serve a one-year period of monitored 
probation focused on a lawyer’s proper use of a client trust account. 
Objection to Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 30} Although Gold acknowledges in his brief that the facts of Marshall 
are “remarkably similar” to the facts of this case, he objects to the board’s 
recommendation that we impose a sanction comparable to the one we imposed in 
that case.  Based on Gold’s perception that his own misconduct is less egregious 
and that the mitigating factors in his case are more compelling than those in 
Marshall’s case, Gold argues that a fully stayed two-year suspension is the 
appropriate sanction for his misconduct.  But we are not convinced that Gold’s 
misconduct is, in fact, less egregious than Marshall’s.  Nor are we persuaded that 
the mitigating factors found by the board or the additional mitigating factors 
advanced by Gold in support of his objection warrant the imposition of a fully 
stayed suspension in this case. 
{¶ 31} Gold attempts to minimize the severity of his own misconduct by 
claiming that he was “forthcoming and honest” with the bankruptcy court while 
noting that Marshall not only made false and misleading statements to a judge but 
also made false or unsupported allegations of racial and gender bias against a judge.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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The record, however, demonstrates that in at least one bankruptcy-court filing, Gold 
falsely claimed that the disputed funds remained in his client trust account—even 
though bank records clearly show that his client-trust-account balance had dropped 
to just $50 by the time of that filing—and that in at least one other bankruptcy-court 
filing, Gold falsely claimed that the disputed funds were in his possession.  The 
record also shows that he failed to comply with the bankruptcy court’s orders to 
bring his complete client-trust-account records to hearings, resisted being placed 
under oath, and was evasive when answering the court’s questions. 
{¶ 32} We acknowledge that Gold answered in the affirmative when the 
bankruptcy-court judge at the August 17, 2015 contempt hearing asked whether he 
had ever removed the disputed funds from his client trust account.  However, the 
transcript from that hearing also shows that on further questioning, Gold claimed 
to have no recollection of when he had removed the money, how many times he 
had made disbursements, or how much of the approximately $51,000 he had 
disbursed.  And although Gold admitted taking more than $10,000, he did not 
respond when the judge asked whether he had withdrawn more than $15,000.  
When the judge then asked whether any of the money remained in his account, the 
transcript shows that there was a “47 second pause” before Gold stated, “I think I 
need an attorney” and the hearing was continued to a later date. 
{¶ 33} On these facts, we cannot find that Gold’s conduct before the 
bankruptcy court was forthcoming and honest.  Nor can we agree with his assertion 
that his misconduct is less egregious than Marshall’s because he did not knowingly 
or recklessly impugn the integrity of a judge with unfounded allegations of bias as 
Marshall did.  Indeed, we find that at least one aspect of Gold’s misconduct is more 
egregious than Marshall’s because, despite Gold’s arguments to the contrary, the 
evidence plainly demonstrates that Gold misappropriated funds from the very client 
he was duty-bound to protect. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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{¶ 34} Gold also argues that the balance of the aggravating and mitigating 
factors in his case weigh more heavily in favor of a fully stayed suspension.  He 
points to the fact that an equal number of aggravating and mitigating factors (four 
each) were present in Marshall while at least five mitigating factors and just two 
aggravating factors are present in this case.  But Gov.Bar R. V(13)(A) recognizes 
that each disciplinary case “involves unique facts and circumstances” and Gov.Bar 
R. V(13)(B) and (C) go on to state that the aggravating and mitigating factors 
enumerated in the rule “may be considered” in recommending a more or less severe 
sanction but “shall not control” the discretion of the board.  Thus, the board’s 
analysis of the aggravating and mitigating factors—and, in turn, our own—have 
never come down to a strict mathematical equation.  On the contrary, these analyses 
have always involved a careful balancing of the relative weight of the relevant 
factors. 
{¶ 35} Here, the board found that Gold has no prior disciplinary record in 
his 13-year legal career, made a timely and good-faith effort to make restitution to 
Daher, made full and free disclosure to the board, exhibited a cooperative attitude 
toward the disciplinary proceedings, and established the existence of qualifying 
mental and substance-use disorders.  Gold’s timely restitution to Daher, however, 
is tempered by the fact that Gold made numerous frivolous filings in multiple courts 
in an effort to conceal his misconduct and to delay making restitution to the trustee 
in Daher’s bankruptcy proceeding. 
{¶ 36} The evidence of Gold’s qualifying mental and substance-use 
disorders is likewise overshadowed by his testimony at his disciplinary hearing, 
during which he  admitted his noncompliance with the five-year OLAP contract he 
had entered into more than 14 months earlier.  Specifically, Gold acknowledged 
that he was not checking in with OLAP as frequently as required, had not found an 
Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) home group, and was not attending AA meetings 
even though his contract required him to attend at least three per week.  His claims 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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that he was “very uncomfortable with AA for a number of reasons” and that he 
hoped to alter the terms of his OLAP contract so that he could spend more time 
with his family do not excuse this failure.  Moreover, his failure to comply with 
that contract raises significant concerns about his ability to abide by the terms of 
other agreements and court orders and, consequently, his ability to practice law in 
a competent, ethical, and professional manner going forward. 
{¶ 37} Gold’s misconduct centers around the misappropriation of client 
funds, for which the presumptive sanction is disbarment, Bubna, 116 Ohio St.3d 
294, 2007-Ohio-6436, 878 N.E.2d 632, at ¶ 27, and a course of conduct involving 
dishonesty, for which we typically impose an actual suspension from the practice 
of law for an appropriate period of time, Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 74 
Ohio St.3d 187, 191, 658 N.E.2d 237 (1995).  We agree that the mitigating factors 
found by the board warrant a deviation from the presumptive sanction of 
disbarment.  However, they are not sufficient to warrant the imposition of a fully 
stayed suspension in this case.  Therefore, we overrule Gold’s objection and adopt 
the board’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended sanction. 
{¶ 38} Accordingly, John Walter Gold is suspended from the practice of 
law in Ohio for two years with the second year stayed on the conditions that he 
comply with his OLAP contract and any extension of that contract, make full 
restitution to the bankruptcy trustee and pay any monetary sanctions imposed by 
the bankruptcy court in conjunction with his contempt, and engage in no further 
misconduct.3  Upon reinstatement to the practice of law, Gold shall serve a one-
year period of monitored probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(21) with a 
                                                 
3 On March 23, 2018, Gold filed a notice of supplemental authority stating that on March 21, 2018, 
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division issued an 
order in case No. 10-17252, In re Daher.  In that order, the bankruptcy court recognized that Gold 
had paid $32,722.37 to the bankruptcy trustee in full settlement of all claims and vacated the two 
judgments of contempt previously issued against Gold.  We deny relator’s motion to strike Gold’s 
supplemental authority, as it was permitted under S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.09(B).  Although we acknowledge 
that those judgments have been vacated, the bankruptcy court’s order does not affect our analysis. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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focus on the proper use of his client trust account.  If Gold fails to comply with a 
condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted and he will serve the full two-year 
suspension.  Costs are taxed to Gold. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, SADLER, FISCHER, 
and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
LISA L. SADLER, J., of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, sitting for 
O’Neill, J. 
_________________ 
Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, Joseph M. Caligiuri, Chief Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel, and Donald M. Scheetz, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for 
relator. 
Zukerman, Daiker & Lear Co., L.P.A, Larry W. Zukerman, S. Michael Lear, 
and Brian A. Murray, for respondent. 
_________________