Case Title: BIG SPRING v BLACKFEET TRIBE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1978-01-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13570 IN THE SUPREMr COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 WILLIAM F.BEO SPRING, S & ' and KATHLEEN R . BIG SPRING,, Plaintiffs and Respondents, THE BLACKFEET TRIBE OF THE BLACKFEET INDIAN RESERVATION, A Corporation, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, Honorable R. D. McPhillips, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Philip E. Roy, Browning, Montana Graybill, Ostrem, Warner and Crotty, Great Falls, Montana Donald Ostrem argued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondents: Frisbee and Moore, Cut Bank, Montana John P. l.1oore argued, Cut Bank, Montana Submitted: October 6, 1977 ~ecided: JAN 1 1 1370 Filed: 'JA I.! 1 . i . 159 M r . Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court: The Blackfeet Tribe of the ~ I B c k f e e t Indian Reservation, appeals from a default judgment of $20,000 damages for l i b e l entered against the Tribe by the District Court, Glacier County. The basis for the l i b e l action was a l e t t e r dated March 18, 1974, allegedly written by Earl Old Person, Chairman of the Blackfeet Tribe, t o William F. Big Spring, Sr. and Kathleen R. Big Spring. The l e t t e r concerned the Big Springs, enrolled members of the Blackfeet Tribe, and it was sent to the Big Springs as well as t o other people outside the reservation. O n March 17, 1976, the Big Springs f i l e d a l i b e l action against the Blackfeet Tribe. The same day, even though the Tribe had not been served with the complaint and summons and had made no appearance, the attorney for Big Springs mailed a request for admissions t o the Tribe's attorney, but did not mail a copy of the summons and complaint. O n March 22, 1976, the sheriff served Earl Old Persons with a copy of the summons and complaint. O n April 2, Big Springs' attorney served the Tribe's attorney with a supplemental request for admissions. The Tribe failed t o appear within 20 days of the date of service. 22 days a f t e r service, on April 13, 1976, the Big springs' attorney f i l e d the original s h e r i f f ' s return on the summons with the clerk of the d i s t r i c t court and then made written request for the clerk t o enter the Tribe's default. Default was entered the same day. Three days a f t e r entry of default, on April 16, and without receiving notice of the default, the Tribe f i l e d a motion t o dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the court lacked juris- diction over the subject matter (the l i b e l action) and personal jurisdiction over the Tribe. The Tribe mailed a copy of i t s motion to dismiss to the Big Springs' attorney. O n April 20, with no notice t o the Tribe, the Big Springs' attorney f i l e d a written motion to s t r i k e the Tribe's motion to dismiss, alleging that the Tribe had no right t o f i l e such a motion or t o appear a f t e r i t s default had been entered. N o authority was cited. O n April 21, the t r i a l court granted t h i s ex-parte motion and immediately proceeded t o hear evidence on the question of l i a b i l i t y and damages. Exhibits were introduced and witnesses were sworn and testified. The court took the matter under advisement. O n April 23, the Tribe f i l e d a motion t o s e t aside the default .and t o quash the summons and dismiss the complaint. The Tribe s e t out several grounds t o s e t aside the default including that (1) service was not made on the proper person, (2) the t r i b a l chairman had no recollection of ever being served, (3) copies of the complaint and summons could not be found, and ( 4 ) the Tribe's attorney had no way of determining the exact day of service because the original summons had not been returned t o the clerk of court u n t i l the day the default was taken. The Tribe again contended the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the Tribe. The Tribe stressed that i t was appearing specially and not generally. Two hearings were held on the Tribe's motion t o s e t aside the default and dismiss the complaint. The f i r s t hearing was the result of a notice sent by the attorney for the Big Springs on April 29 setting the hearing date for May 5. This notice was deficient under Rules 6(d) and 6(e), M.R.Civ.P., which require a notice of a t least eight days i f service is made by mail. Neither the Tribe's attorney nor any of defendants were present a t the hearing. (At a l a t e r hearing the Tribe's attorney sought t o justify h i s absence a t the f i r s t hearing by stating he was i n Chicago a t the time and had called the court a f t e r learning of the hearing date, and the t r i a l court had agreed t o a continuance. The court did not deny this.) The court then proceeded with i t s hearing and received evidence on the question of service of process. Nothing in the record indicates the court ruled on the Tribe's motion t o s e t aside the default, o r that a minute entry or other notice was sent t o the f r i b e ' s attorney informing him of what proceedings had taken place on that day. O n June 2, 1976, the Tribe's attorney sent notice by mail to the Big springs' attorney setting a hearing for June 9 on the Tribe's motion to s e t aside the default. This notice was also deficient under Rules 6(d) and 6(e), M.R.Civ.P., but attorneys for both parties appeared a t the hearing and therefore notice here i s not a t issue. O n the date of the hearing, the attorney for the Big Springs filed a motion to quash the Tribe's motion t o s e t aside the default on the grounds that (1) the Tribe had failed t o appear a t the prior hearings, (2) the Tribe had no right to make any appearances a t t h i s point, and (3) the notice was not accompanied by the motion t o s e t aside or by an affidavit. Both attorneys presented t h e i r arguments t o the court. The District Court judge stated that normally he would s e t aside the default when a motion or pleading was f i l e d "within a reasonable time" a f t e r the 20 day period, such a s t h i s case, but concluded: "* * * but the problem here, of course, is that it [the motion t o s e t aside the default] was s e t for hearing and you failed t o appear and argue the motion." The court then took the motion under advisement. O n June 29, without ruling directly the motion s e t aside the default, the t r i a l court entered i t s findings of fact and conclusions of law and awarded the Big Springs $20,000 in damages against the Tribe. Judgment was entered July 6 and on the same day the Big Springs' attorney sent a copy of the judgment and notice of entry of judgment t o the Tribe. O n July 12, the Tribe moved t o s e t aside the judgment. O n July 21, i n a short order devoid of reasons, the t r i a l court denied the motion t o s e t aside the judgment. The Tribe appeals from the court's rulings failing t o s e t aside the default and failing t o s e t aside the judgment. O n the basis of the t o t a l circumstances surrounding the proceedings i n the District Court we conclude the Tribe was denied a meaningful opportunity to appear and be heard. The District Court proceedings reek of a denial of due process and the default judgment and default must be s e t aside. Rule 5 ( f ) , M.R.Civ.P., states that proof of service "shall be f i l e d within 10 days a f t e r service. Failure t o make of proo-f/service does not affect the validity of the service." The rule, as stated, is unconditional. Here, the attorney for the Big Springs did not return and f i l e the summons with proof of service u n t i l 22 days a f t e r service on Earl Old Person. Although t h i s l a t e return did not affect the validity of the service for jurisdictional purposes, it did make it d i f f i c u l t for the Tribe's attorney t o determine the date of service. Here the summons was returned and f i l e d simultaneously with a motion t o take the Tribe's default. It could well be that the failure to return the summons within the time required by the rule could have contributed to the Tribe's failure t o appear within the 20 days. Lack of an opportunity t o acquire t h i s information, coupled with other circumstances, may be sufficient "good cause" t o s e t aside a default under Rule 55(c), M.R.Civ.P., which s t a t e s i n part: "For good cause shown the court may s e t aside an entry of default * * *.If Henceforth, it shall be the duty of a l l process servers, be it the sheriff or private persons, t o s t r i c t l y comply with Rule 5 ( f ) , M.R.Civ.P. It i s the duty of the process server t o return the summons t o the clerk of court within 10 days a f t e r service, and t h i s duty s h a l l only be excused under circumstances which constitute "good cause". "Good cause" shall r e l a t e only t o the difficulty which the process server has i n f i l i n g the papers with the appropriate clerk of court. The Tribe finds i t s e l f i n a position of not knowing why the District Court overruled i t s motion to s e t aside the default. Not only did the t r i a l court f a i l t o give reasons for denying the motion to s e t aside the default, but no ruling was directed t o the Tribe's motion. The Tribe's motion was only impliedly overruled by the judgment against the Tribe. I n matters of such importance the parties are entitled not only t o a direct ruling from the t r i a l court on the motion, but they are also entitled t o know the reasons for the ruling. In i t s motion the Tribe s e t out substantial grounds why the default should be s e t aside, and since the District Court failed to discuss these grounds, w e cannot uphold the rule that a judgment of the t r i a l court comes to us as presumptively correct. W e adhere to our rule that t h i s Court does not favor d e f a u l t s , but r a t h e r , favors an adjudi- cation on the merits whenever possible. Lindsey v. Keenan, (1946), 118 Mont. 312, 322, 165 P.2d 804. See also: Schwab v. Bullock's Inc., (9th C i r . 1974), 508 F.2d 353,355; 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil $2681, pp. 248-251. It follows naturally t h a t i f the default must be s e t aside so must the judgment. However, there a r e independent reasons why the default judgment must be s e t aside, even i f the default was allowed t o stand. Once the Tribe f i l e d i t s i n i t i a l motion t o dismiss before judgment was entered, it was e n t i t l e d t o n o t i c e of a l l subse- quent proceedings, but it was denied t h i s notice. Rule 55(b)(2), M.R.Civ.P., s t a t e s i n p a r t : "* J c * I f the party against whom judgment by default is sought has appeared i n the action, he (or, i f appearing by representative, h i s representative) s h a l l be served with w r i t t e n notice of the application f o r judgment a t l e a s t three days p r i o r t o the hearing on such applica- tion. 3r * *" Section 93-8505, R.C.M. 1947, a l s o e n t i t l e s a party t o notice of subsequent proceedings a f t e r an "appearance" by t h a t party. This section s t a t e s i n part: " A defendant appears i n an action when he answers, f i l e s H-motion, o r gives the p l a i n t i f f written notice of h i s appearance * * *.Ir (Emphasis added). Two days a f t e r default was entered, but before default judgment was taken, the Tribe f i l e d i t s motion t o dismiss on j u r i s d i c t i o n a l grounds. A motion t o dismiss on the b a s i s of lack of subject matter j u r i s d i c t i o n may be raised a t any time. Rule 12(h)(3), M.R.Civ.P.; .W I"gm' d v. McCloskey & Co.,(Brd C i r . 1965), 342 F.2d 495, 497, c e r t . den. 382 U.S. 823, 86 S.Ct. 52, 15 L ed 2d 68; Rath Packing Co. v. Becker, (9th C i r . 1975), 530 F.2d 1295, 1303. Moreover, t h i s Court has long held a motion attacking the complaint, a s i n the instant case, is sufficient to act as an appearance. Donlan v. Thompson Falls Copper & Milling-Co., (1910), 42 Mont. 257, 112 P. 445. Even though the Tribe denominated its appearance a s a special one, it was still an appearance under any circumstances. Under Rule 12, M.R.Civ.P., there i s no longer a distinction between general and special appearances. Under Rule 12(b) lack of jurisdiction may be asserted either i n the responsive pleading or by motion; Rule 12(g) allows consolidation of Rule 12(b) defenses; and Rule 12(h) (1) requires a party t o raise the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction in h i s i n i t i a l pleading The Tribe complied with each of these rules. Since the Tribe properly appeared, it follows that it was I improper for the t r i a l court t o grant the Big Springs' ex parte motion t o s t r i k e the ~ r i b e ' s motion t o dismiss. Once the Tribe f i l e d its appearance the Big Springs were required t o give notice t o the Tribe of any opposing motion. Rule 5(a), M.R.Civ.P., provides i n part: "* * * Except a s other wise provided i n these rules, every * * * written motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice * * * and similar paper s h a l l be served upon each of the parties. * * *" It is clear the t r i a l court had no procedural authority s t r i k e the Tribe's motion t o dismiss. Once the Tribe had made its appearance by f i l i n g i t s motion t o dismiss, it was the duty of the court to require notice to the Tribe of any opposing motion. Moreover, the District Court had a duty to rule on the Tribe's motion before proceeding t o judgment. Paramount ~ u b l j # Corp. v. Boucher, (1933), 93 Mont. 340, 347, 19 P. 2d 223. Even assuming the District Court ruled against the Tribe on its motion to dismiss and the Tribe did not further plead within the time requirements, the Big Springs s t i l l had the duty t o give a t l e a s t a three day notice t o the Tribe before a hearing could be held on the Big Springs' application to (2) take judgment. Rule 55(b)/, M.R.Civ.P. This, of course, was not done, and the Tribe had no opportunity t o participate a t the hearing where the t r i a l judge heard evidence upon which the judgment was based. These failures t o give proper notice were f a t a l t o the judgment. Under the t o t a l i t y of the circumstances such as exist in t h i s case, we can see no useful punpose i n setting aside the judgment only t o allow the parties to r e l i t i g a t e the question of whether the default should be s e t aside. The entire proceedings were so lacking such a s t o constitute a denial of due process. The t r i a l court has not yet ruled on the issues of juris- diction over the subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the Tribe, and we refrain from deciding these issues. Similarly, the proper t e s t for damages i n a defamation action i s not properly before t h i s Court a t t h i s time. For instructions regarding the correct basis of damages i n a defamation action, however, w e direct the Discrict Court's attention t o N e w York Times Co. v. Sullivan, (1964), 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 1 1 L ed 2d 686, 95 ALR2d 1412; Gertz v. Welch, (1974), 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L ed 2d 789, and related federal cases. W e vacate the default judgment and the default and remand with directions to the District Court t o rule on the Tribe's motion t o dismiss and proceed f u r t h e r under t h e proper r u l e s of c i v i l procedure. . . -. Chief J u s t i c e