Case Title: R. SEAN HITE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0066

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-12-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
R. SEAN HITE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 199172 P.3d 737Case Number: S-07-0066Decided: 12/14/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
R. 
SEAN HITE,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMINGAppellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Tina N. 
Kerin, Appellate Counsel; David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel, 
Wyoming Public 
Defender Program

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Timothy J. Forwood, 
Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Sean Hite entered 
into a written plea agreement in which he pleaded guilty to felony battery, 
third offense, against his wife (hereinafter referred to as "Wife").  As part of his sentence, he was ordered 
to pay $5,400 in restitution.  Hite 
appeals the restitution portion of his Judgment and Sentence.  This Court finds the sentencing court 
exceeded its legal authority in ordering the instant restitution, and 
consequently we reverse and remand for entry of an amended judgment and sentence 
consistent with this opinion.  

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      The issue on 
appeal is whether "a restitution award for spousal support exceeds the trial 
court's statutory authority and making such an award with no supporting evidence 
is an abuse of discretion."

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Hite and Wife 
became embroiled in an argument.  
According to the "Affidavit of Probable Cause," at some point during the 
argument Hite grabbed Wife's left arm, from which Wife was able to dislodge 
herself by biting him.  Hite then 
grabbed Wife by the throat.  Hite 
released his grip on her throat when Wife told her son to call the Sheriff's 
office.  The deputy sheriff who 
authored the Affidavit testified he saw some red marks on Wife's neck and her 
left arm and arrested Hite for battery/domestic violence.  

 
 
[¶4]      Hite entered into 
a written plea agreement whereby, in addition to agreeing to plead guilty to the 
negotiated charge, he agreed to pay restitution as deemed appropriate by the 
sentencing court.  The district 
court also advised Hite at the change of plea hearing that he would be required 
to pay restitution if appropriate.  
A  Presentence Investigation 
Report (PSI) was prepared wherein it was related that Wife stated to the person 
preparing the report she was not injured as a result of the offense and she was 
not requesting restitution.  Wife 
also stated she had received over $5,000 from Division of Victim Services of the 
Wyoming Attorney General's Office.  

 
 
[¶5]      Although Wife did 
not seek any restitution, the PSI identified restitution in the amount of 
$5,400.  According to the PSI: 
"[t]he Wyoming Office of the Attorney General, Division of Victim Services has 
paid the victim in this case, [Wife], a total of $5,400.00 for six months of 
loss of support at the rate of $900.00 per month.  The Division of Victim Services requests 
full restitution in this matter." 

 
 
[¶6]      During the 
sentencing hearing, Hite's attorney agreed that Victim Services paid Wife 
$5,400.  He argued that he did not 
understand why Victim Services provided any money to Wife when Wife suffered no 
serious injury from Hite's criminal acts.  
In other words, he argued there was no legal basis for awarding 
restitution since there was no evidence the payments from Victim Services were 
related to Hite's criminal offense.  

 
 
[¶7]      The State 
suggested a new hearing be held if Hite was disputing restitution.  The sentencing court asked Hite's 
attorney if he was objecting to the restitution recommendation, and the attorney 
replied only that he did not think Hite had the means to pay the restitution 
amount.  Without expressly ruling on 
the ability-to-pay objection posed by Hite's attorney, the sentencing court 
moved on and asked if there was any reason why it should not pronounce 
sentence.  Hite's attorney replied 
there was not. 

 
 
[¶8]      In pronouncing 
its sentence, the sentencing court discussed the argument that there was no 
legal authority for the payment but rejected it, stating:

 
 
I'm just 
having a hard time logically concluding that money that went to support his wife 
and family that he shouldn't have to repay that.  I mean, A, I presume she needed money; 
B, she allowed the application [to Victim Services], or accessed the application 
for it; C, it went to the benefit of his family.  

 
 
The 
sentencing court included payment of $5,400 restitution as part of Hite's 
sentence.1

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Waiver

 
 
[¶9]      We begin our 
discussion with the State's argument that Hite has waived any objection to the 
restitution portion of his sentence.  
The State is correct that, although pertinent matters were discussed, 
proper objections were not raised below. The facts are similar to those in Chippewa v. State, 2006 WY 11, 126 P.3d 129 (Wyo. 2006), in which this Court stated:

 
 
This 
Court has held that, when a defendant knowingly and voluntarily agrees in a plea 
agreement to pay restitution, and then fails to object at sentencing to the 
restitution amount, he waives his right to challenge on appeal the factual basis 
of the restitution award.  Meerscheidt v.State, 931 P.2d 220, 
225-26 (Wyo.1997); see also Penner v. 
State, 2003 WY 143, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 1045, 1047-48 (Wyo.2003); Merkison v. State, 996 P.2d 1138, 1141 
(Wyo.2000).  In this case, there is 
no doubt Chippewa voluntarily agreed to pay restitution as part of his plea 
agreement with the State.  The 
record reveals that, contrary to his contention on appeal, Chippewa did not 
cogently object to the requested restitution amount during his sentencing 
hearing.  Although Chippewa briefly 
expressed uncertainty as to whether certain specified items qualified as 
restitution, he presented no specific argument challenging the appropriateness 
of those items.  Instead, Chippewa 
simply argued that he had no ability to pay restitution, regardless of the 
amount.  The amount of restitution, 
therefore, was never properly placed before the district court at 
sentencing.  Under the 
circumstances, we hold that Chippewa waived his right to challenge in this 
appeal the factual basis supporting the district court's restitution 
award.

 
 

Id., ¶ 7, 
126 P.3d  at 131 (footnote 
omitted).  

 
 
[¶10]   A challenge to the legal authority 
of a sentencing court to impose restitution, however, is a different 
matter.  It is essentially an 
allegation that an illegal sentence has been imposed:

 
 
The 
distinction between whether a defendant is making a factual challenge to an 
order of restitution or whether he is challenging the authority of the trial 
court to make a particular award of restitution is an important one.  Challenges to the factual basis of an 
award of restitution can be waived in certain circumstances by the defendant's 
voluntary actions, such as entering into a plea agreement, and then failing to 
make any objection at sentencing, as occurred in Meerscheidt.   See also Aldridge v. State, 956 P.2d 341, 343 
(Wyo.1998).  Outside the context of 
a plea agreement, the failure to object to a factual determination in the 
awarding of restitution results in an appellate review for plain error.  See Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 857 
(Wyo.1998).  In contrast, a 
challenge by a defendant to the authority of a trial court to make a particular 
award of restitution is reviewed on appeal under a de novo statutory interpretation 
standard whether or not the defendant objected or entered into a plea 
agreement.  Meerscheidt, 931 P.2d  at 223-224, 
226-227.  While not explicit in our 
decision in Meerscheidt, the reason 
for conducting a de novo review under 
such circumstances is that a court has only that authority to act which is 
conferred by the subject statute.  
Aldridge, 956 P.2d  at 
343.  ("The trial court's exercise 
of discretion in ordering restitution does not spring from any inherent 
authority.  Rather that exercise, 
like our review, is circumscribed by the statutes empowering the trial court to 
order restitution.") (citation omitted); see also Horn v. State, 556 P.2d 925, 927 
(Wyo.1976) ("[A] penal statute cannot be extended by implication or construction 
to persons or things not expressly brought within its terms, nor to cases not 
within the letter of the statute....").  
An order of restitution by a trial court which exceeds the authority 
granted by the statutes governing restitution would be void, and a void order 
may be challenged at any time.  People v. Evans, 122 Ill.App.3d 733, 78 
Ill.Dec. 50, 461 N.E.2d 634, 639 (1984); see also State ex rel. TRL by Avery v. RLP, 772 P.2d 1054, 1057 (Wyo.1989).  

 
 

Merkison 
v. State, 996 P.2d 1138, 1141-42 (Wyo. 2000) (emphasis omitted); Bush v. State, 2003 WY 156, ¶ 9, 79 P.3d 1178, 1182-83 (Wyo. 2003).  We 
will address the legality of the sentence despite the lack of proper 
objection.

 
 
Restitution

 
 
[¶11]   The legal authority of a sentencing 
court to impose restitution is solely a creature of statute.  Lee v. State, 2 P.3d 517, 527 (Wyo. 
2000); Barnes v. State, 670 P.2d 302, 
303-04 (Wyo. 
1983).  At issue in this appeal is 
whether the district court had the statutory authority to order the restitution 
payment of $5,400.  As with all 
questions of law, we review the district court's legal decision in this matter 
de novo.  Coleman v. State, 2005 WY 69, ¶ 11, 115 P.3d 411, 413 (Wyo. 2005).  

 
 
[¶12]   We first note that the sentencing 
court did not specify a "victim."  
The Judgment and Sentence merely orders Hite to pay $5,400 to the clerk 
of court.  The lack of identity of a 
"victim," however, has not been raised as an issue on appeal.  As the appeal is presented, therefore, 
we will not address the issue except to note the Judgment and Sentence violates 
W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(2)(H).  

 
 
[¶13]   Regardless of whom the victim is, a 
sentencing court only has statutory authority to "fix a reasonable amount as 
restitution owed to each victim for actual pecuniary damage resulting from the 
defendant's criminal activity." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-103(b) (LexisNexis 
2007).  "Pecuniary damages" are 
defined by statute as "all damages which a victim could recover against the 
defendant in a civil action arising out of the same facts or event, including 
damages for wrongful death.  It does 
not include punitive damages and damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish and 
loss of consortium[.]"  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-9-101(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2007).   

 
 
[¶14]   The only information in the record 
is that restitution was ordered for payments made to the victim for "loss of 
support."  Without further 
specificity, it is impossible to tell if "loss of support" fits the statutory 
definition of "pecuniary damage."  
"Support" is a generic term with many meanings.  Probably most significantly for our 
purposes, "support" generally means to assist or help.  That still leaves the field wide 
open.  The parties suggest the 
payments were possibly for child support or spousal support.  Even if these types of support qualify 
as pecuniary damages, which we doubt, these suggestions are only speculative and 
not sustained by anything in the record.2  We are left, therefore, without an 
adequate evidentiary basis to uphold the order of 
restitution.

 
 
[¶15]   It is the responsibility of the 
State to prove a victim's legal entitlement to restitution.  Hampton v. State, 2006 WY 103, ¶ 11, 141 P.3d 101, 105 (Wyo. 2006); Renfro v. 
State, 785 P.2d 491, 493-94 (Wyo.1990).  The State failed to satisfy its burden 
at sentencing.  Its failure leaves 
us with no choice but to reverse the restitution portion of the Judgment and 
Sentence.  Penner, ¶ 12, 78 P.3d  at 1049 ("The 
State is not entitled to a second opportunity to prove restitution"); Coleman, ¶ 15, 115 P.3d  at 415; Van Riper v. State, 999 P.2d 646, 648 
(Wyo. 2000).

  

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶16]   "Loss of support" without further 
definition does not meet the requirements of the statutory mandate that 
restitution be ordered only for "pecuniary damages."  We reverse and remand for entry of an 
amended judgment and sentence consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
sentencing court did make an express finding that Hite had the ability to 
pay.  That finding is not at 
issue.

 
 

2Hite's 
family and employment status as reflected in the record actually belie such 
suppositions.