Case Title: State v. McConville

Citation: 2010-Ohio-958

Docket Number: 20090893

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. McConville, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-958.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-958 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. MCCONVILLE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. McConville, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-958.] 
Criminal law — Sexual-offender registration — R.C. 2950.11(F)(2) — Suspension 
of community-notification requirements — Effective date. 
(No. 2009-0893 — Submitted January 13, 2010 — Decided March 18, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County, No. 08CA009444,  
182 Ohio App.3d 99, 2009-Ohio-1713. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The community-notification provisions of R.C. 2950.11(F)(2) apply to defendants 
who are notified of their sexual-offender status after January 1, 2008, the 
effective date of the amendment of that section by 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 
10. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
{¶ 1} We are asked to decide whether the community-notification 
provisions of R.C. 2950.11(F)(2) apply to defendants who are notified of their 
sexual-offender status after the effective date of the amendment of that section by 
2007 Senate Bill 10, or whether R.C. 2950.11(F)(2) applies only to sexual 
offenders whose status was determined under the legislation in effect prior to that 
effective date.  Because we conclude that R.C. 2950.11(F)(2) applies to 
defendants who are notified of their sexual-offender status after the January 1, 
2008, effective date of the amendment of that section by Senate Bill 10, we affirm 
the judgment of the court of appeals. 
I 
{¶ 2} Appellee, Stephen James McConville, pleaded guilty in July 2008 
to rape and gross sexual imposition.  At sentencing, appellee was notified that he 
would be classified as a tier III sexual offender pursuant to the Adam Walsh Act, 
R.C. 2950.01 et seq.  The trial court detailed appellee’s registration and reporting 
duties pertaining to the tier III classification, but the court conducted a second 
hearing for further review of the community-notification requirement.  After 
reconvening for a hearing with respect to the community-notification requirement, 
the trial court suspended the requirement.  In making this decision, the trial court 
considered statutory factors in conjunction with the appellee’s history and 
character.  The trial court determined that appellee was “unlikely to commit a 
sexually oriented offense in the future, and that suspending the community 
notification requirements of R.C. 2950.11(F)(1) [was] in the interest of justice.” 
{¶ 3} The appellate court affirmed.  We accepted review under our 
discretionary jurisdiction.  122 Ohio St.3d 1501, 2009-Ohio-4233, 912 N.E.2d 
106. 
II 
{¶ 4} The statute central to this matter is R.C. 2950.11, the revised 
community-notification provision of Ohio’s Sex Offender Registration and 
January Term, 2010 
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Notification Law contained in Senate Bill 10.  2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10, eff. 
June 30, 2007.  Senate Bill 10 made revisions necessary to conform Ohio’s 
sexual-offender laws to the federal Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act 
of 2006.  Senate Bill 10, Title.  This matter arises from appellee’s notification of 
his sexual-offender classification under the provisions of Senate Bill 10, most of 
which, including the amendment to R.C. 2950.11, became effective January 1, 
2008.1  The parties do not dispute that appellee is required by statute to be 
designated as a tier III sexual offender and that, in addition to the registration and 
reporting requirements imposed on appellee, the community-notification 
provisions detailed in R.C. 2950.11(A) apply unless the exception in R.C. 
2950.11(F)(2) applies.  R.C. 2950.01(G)(1)(a) and 2950.11(F)(1).  Community 
notification involves the “release of information about sex offenders and child-
victim offenders to public agencies and the general public [to] further the 
governmental interests of public safety and public scrutiny of the criminal, 
juvenile, and mental health systems.”  R.C. 2950.02(A)(6).  To advance the policy 
of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Law, a victim of a sexually 
oriented offense or a child-victim-oriented offense is entitled to notification that 
the offender who committed the act against the victim has registered and to 
notification of the offender’s address.  R.C. 2950.10. 
{¶ 5} Rather, the dispute here is whether R.C. 2950.11(F)(2) applies to a 
defendant who is notified of his or her sexual-offender status after the effective 
date of the amendment of that section by Senate Bill 10.  That section vests the 
trial court with the authority and discretion to determine whether the community-
                                                 
1.  The R.C. 2950.11(F)(2) community-notification issue may also arise in a reclassification 
context: if a sexual offender was not subject to community notification when his status was 
determined under pre–Senate Bill 10 legislation but is automatically reclassified under Senate Bill 
10 into a status that does require community notification, R.C. 2950.11(F)(2) may be implicated.  
However, a reclassification situation of this type is not presented in this case and, accordingly, we 
express no opinion as to the operation of R.C. 2950.11(F)(2) in this regard.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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notification requirement would apply to a particular offender.  R.C. 2950.11(F)(2) 
provides: 
{¶ 6} “The notification provisions of this section do not apply to a 
person described in division (F)(1)(a), (b), or (c) of this section if a court finds at a 
hearing after considering the factors described in this division that the person 
would not be subject to the notification provisions of this section that were in the 
version of this section that existed immediately prior to the effective date of this 
amendment.” 
{¶ 7} The remainder of the statute details the 11 factors the trial court 
must consider to determine whether the sexual offender would have been subject 
to community notification under prior law.  R.C. 2950.11(F)(2)(a) through (k). 
{¶ 8} This appeal presents a matter of statutory interpretation.  As a 
general rule, the words and phrases of a statute will be read in context and 
construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.  R.C. 1.42.  
Moreover, there is no need for this court to apply the rules of statutory 
interpretation when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and 
conveys a clear and definite meaning.  Meeks v. Papadopulos (1980), 62 Ohio 
St.2d 187, 190, 16 O.O.3d 212, 404 N.E.2d 159, citing Sears v. Weimer (1944), 
143 Ohio St. 312, 28 O.O. 270, 55 N.E.2d 413, paragraph five of the syllabus.  In 
such an instance, the provisions of the statute are applied, rather than interpreted.  
State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Allen Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 24, 
27, 512 N.E.2d 332.  It is with these precepts in mind that we review this matter. 
III 
{¶ 9} The state’s argument is that R.C. 2950.11(F)(2) gives the trial 
court the discretion to suspend the community-notification requirement in 
consideration of the statute’s listed factors only when the sexual offender’s status 
was previously determined under the law in effect prior to Senate Bill 10.  Thus, 
according to the state, appellee may be relieved of the R.C 2950.11(F) 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
community-notification requirement only by the terms of R.C. 2950.11(H), since 
appellee had not been classified prior to January 1, 2008.  R.C. 2950.11(H) allows 
a sexual offender who has been subject to the registration and reporting 
requirements for 20 years to request removal of the originally imposed 
community-notification requirement.  The state further asserts that since appellee 
has not been subject to the registration, reporting, and community-notification 
requirements for 20 years, he is not qualified under R.C. 2950.11(H) for 
suspension of community notification and that the trial court erred when it failed 
to impose that requirement. 
{¶ 10} We find that the language of R.C. 2950.11(F) is unambiguous.  
Accordingly, the state’s argument is not persuasive.  The language used in the 
statue pertains to those sexual offenders whose status is determined after the 
effective date of R.C. 2950.11 as amended by Senate Bill 10.  The provision is 
written in the present tense, referring to a “hearing” at which a judge “finds” 
certain facts.  The 11 factors of R.C. 2950.11(F)(2) are similarly written in the 
present tense, indicating an evaluation presently taking place, and not one that has 
already occurred.  In contrast to the state’s position, the language of the statue 
does not indicate that it applies only to those sexual offenders whose status had 
been previously determined under the provisions of former R.C. Chapter 2950.  
As a result, we decline to interpret the state when no interpretation is required.  
State ex rel. Celebrezze, 32 Ohio St.3d at 27, 512 N.E.2d 332; Meeks, 62 Ohio 
St.2d at 190, 16 O.O.3d 212, 404 N.E.2d 159; R.C. 1.42. 
{¶ 11} Moreover, the language used in R.C. 2950.11(F) demonstrates that 
in some circumstances, the legislature intended the trial court to have discretion 
regarding the application of the community-notification requirement to a sexual 
offender subject to the provisions of Senate Bill 10.  The current version of R.C. 
2950.11(F)(2) specifically provides that its notification provisions do not apply if 
“the person would not be subject to the notification provisions of this section that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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were in the version of this section that existed immediately prior to the effective 
date of this amendment.”  As implied by the current language, former R.C. 
2950.11(F) did not require community notification in all cases.  Former R.C. 
2950.11(F)(2), 2006 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 206.  In other words, under the former law, 
in the instances where community notification was not required, the legislature 
granted the trial court discretion to determine whether to impose it in each 
individual instance. 
{¶ 12} The revisions to R.C. 2950.11(F) made through Senate Bill 10 
specifically refer to and incorporate the former community-notification 
provisions.  By so doing, the legislature expressed its will to continue the policy 
of providing discretion to the sentencing judge in these circumstances, albeit with 
additional guidance in the form of the factors now contained at R.C. 
2950.11(F)(2)(a) through (k).  Notably, ten of these eleven factors were also 
present in former R.C. 2950.09(B)(3) to aid the court in determining whether an 
offender was a sexual predator.  Thus, current R.C. 2950.11(F)(2) generally 
reflects a continuation of that prior discretion and authority that the court had in 
determining when community notification best serves the interests of justice. 
{¶ 13} Finally, we conclude that R.C. 2950.11(H) is not relevant to 
community-notification determinations under R.C. 2950.11(F).  R.C. 2950.11(H) 
provides a manner in which to remove the community-notification requirement as 
it pertains to an offender who is currently under a community-notification 
sanction.  This language contrasts distinctly with that used in R.C. 2950.11(F)(2), 
which details the manner in which the community-notification requirement is 
initially determined with respect to a defendant who is notified of his or her 
sexual-offender status under the provisions of Senate Bill 10.  Further, there is no 
indication that these two divisions are to be read in conjunction with each other, 
and there are no internal cross-references.  In fact, like the community-
notification requirement of R.C. 2950.11(F)(2), the current form of R.C. 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
2950.11(H) is also a continuation of its prior version.  See former R.C 
2950.11(H), 2006 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 260.  In sum, R.C. 2950.11(H) deals with an 
issue completely separate from that which R.C. 2950.11(F) addresses and does 
not apply to determinations regarding the application of the community-
notification requirement after the effective date of R.C. 2950.11 as amended by 
Senate Bill 10. 
IV 
{¶ 14} Based on the foregoing, we hold that the community-notification 
provisions of R.C. 2950.11(F)(2) apply to defendants who are notified of their 
sexual-offender status after January 1, 2008, the effective date of the amendment 
of that section by Senate Bill 10.  Accordingly, the judgment of the court of 
appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Dennis P. Will, Lorain County Prosecuting Attorney, and Billie Jo 
Belcher, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
John M. Prusak, for appellee. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and  Claire R. Cahoon, Assistant 
Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Public Defender. 
______________________