Case Title: Snead v. SPCA of PA, Aplt (Concurring Opinion)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 2009-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
[J-83A&B-2009] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT LAILA SNEAD, Appellee v. SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellant LAILA SNEAD, Appellee v. SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellant : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 5 EAP 2009 Appeal from the Judgment of Superior Court entered on 7/11/07 at No. 3313 EDA 2005 (reargument denied on 9/13/07) affirming in part, reversing in part and remanding the order entered on 11/21/05 in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Civil Division at No. 2921 March term 2001 No. 6 EAP 2009 Appeal from the Judgment of Superior Court entered on 7/11/07 at No. 355 EDA 2006 (reargument denied on 9/13/07) affirming in part, reversing in part and remanding the judgment entered on 11/30/05 in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Civil Division at No. 2921 March term 2001 ARGUED: October 20, 2009 CONCURRING OPINION MR. JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: December 29, 2009 I agree with the result reached by the majority, but I have reservations about the reasoning, particularly to the degree the opinion suggests that status as a [J-83A&B-2009] - 2 Commonwealth agency and the ability to sue and be sued are mutually exclusive. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 5. The materiality of a general sue-or-be-sued clause to the resolution of immunity claims appears to be a complex issue in both federal and state courts. Compare, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 390 (2d Cir. 2009) (indicating that “[s]ue-and-be-sued clauses ‘have long been recognized as broad waivers of sovereign immunity’” (citation omitted)), with Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 342 (Tex. 2006) (rejecting the proposition that the use of the phrase “sue and be sued” in organic documents is always tantamount to a waiver of immunity and explaining that the term is often used to mean only that an entity has the capacity to sue and be sued in its own name). In my view, such complexity, as well as the wider implications of treating authority to sue and be sued as dispositive,1 merit independent consideration in closer cases. 1 For example, the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission has the statutory authority to sue and be sued, see 36 P.S. §652d; nevertheless, it has maintained that it is entitled to immunity. See, e.g., Farabaugh v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 590 Pa. 46, 55-56, 911 A.2d 1264, 1269-70 (2006) (discussing the Commission’s position); accord Bradley v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 121 Pa. Cmwlth. 51, 55, 550 A.2d 261, 263 (1988) (holding that the Commission is a Commonwealth agency entitled to sovereign immunity).