Case Title: Adams v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-02-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Adams v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.1999 WY 18975 P.2d 17Case Number: 97-335Decided: 02/25/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

In 
the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of: David ADAMS, Appellant 
(Petitioner),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY 
AND COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee (Respondent).

 

                                

Appeal from the District Court, 
Natrona County, Dan Spangler, J.

 

   
Donald L. Painter, Casper, for Appellant.

    
William U. Hill, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney 
General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for 
Appellee.

 

   
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

  * Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference; retired November 2, 
1998.

 

   
GOLDEN, Justice.

 [¶1]       Appellant David Adams appeals the 
district court's affirmance of a hearing examiner's order denying his claim for 
an additional permanent disability award based upon loss in 
earnings.

 

  [¶2]    We reverse and remand for a 
determination of award.

 

                              
ISSUES

 

   [¶3]   Adams presents the following issue 
for our review:

 

Whether, as a matter of law, Appellant's pre-injury 
wage of $6.25 per hour is comparable to his post-injury earning capacity of 
$5.57 per hour.

 

   [¶4]   Appellee Workers' Compensation 
Division (Division) believes the issue is:

 

An injured worker received worker's compensation 
benefits for his physical impairment but the hearing examiner denied additional 
benefits for vocational disability because the worker is capable of earning a 
wage comparable to his pre-injury wage.

 

Was the hearing examiner's decision supported by 
substantial evidence and in accordance with law?

 

                               
FACTS

 

 [¶5]       Adams suffered a back injury on August 
6, 1995, after which he received certain benefits for medical, hospital and 
other health care related expenses as well as temporary total disability and 
permanent partial physical impairment of 5%. At the time of the injury, Adams 
earned $6.25 per hour as a cook.  
After the injury, Adams was unable to continue as a cook and applied for 
a loss of earnings capacity or vocational award.

 

 [¶6]       The Division referred Adams to Pamela 
Mills, a physical therapist at the Wyoming Performance Center, for a functional 
capacity examination. Adams was examined on November 21, 1996, and found to be 
physically capable of performing work in the sedentary category as defined by 
the U.S. Department of Labor.  The 
Division also referred Adams to Roger Campbell, M.A., of CRA Managed Care, for a 
vocational evaluation.  He reported 
that Adams could perform the functions necessary to obtain jobs such as 
gatekeeper, hotel clerk, or an assembler of small products. Mr. Campbell 
contacted employers in the Casper area and determined that such jobs were 
available and paid an average wage of $5.57 per hour.

 

 [¶7]       The Division denied benefits on the 
basis that the vocational evaluation stated that Adams had no vocational loss 
due to his injury. A hearing was held before the Office of Administrative 
Hearings. The hearing examiner found that Adams' own testimony and that of the 
evaluators indicated that Adams could return to a job as a desk clerk with a 
hotel or motel, which were types of jobs listed in the evaluation as available 
or which would soon be available; that Adams' pre-injury wage was $6.25 per 
hour; and the evaluation showed that the possible post-injury wage was $5.57 per 
hour. Based on this, the hearing examiner concluded that Adams had failed to 
meet his burden of proof that he was unable to return to work at a comparable or 
higher wage and his claim for permanent partial disability was denied.  Adams appealed that denial to the 
district court, which affirmed the administrative action by the hearing 
examiner.  Adams appeals that 
order.

 

                            
DISCUSSION

 

 [¶8]       It is apparent from the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law that the hearing examiner's focus was on determining 
whether Adams was able to return to work. Adams contends, however, that the sole 
issue is whether a post-injury wage that is 89% of one's pre-injury wage is 
"comparable" to the pre-injury wage, and he contends that this presents a 
question of law. He points out that in his particular case the wage difference 
between $6.25 and $5.57 equals $27,765.76 if he were to work until he retires. 
He argues that such a significant amount easily dispels any notion that the two 
wages are comparable. 

 

  [¶9]    At the time of the injury, 
the applicable statute stated:

 

§ 27-14-405. Permanent partial disability; benefits; 
schedule; permanent disfigurement; disputed ratings.

 

            
(a) and (b) Repealed by Laws 1994, ch. 86, § 3.

 

            
(c) Renumbered as (k) by Laws 1994, ch. 86, § 2.

 

            
(d) Repealed by Laws 1994, ch. 86, § 3.

 

            
(e) Renumbered as (m) by Laws 1994, ch. 86, § 2.

 

(f) An injured employee suffering an ascertainable 
loss may apply for a permanent partial impairment award as provided in this 
section.

 

(g) An injured employee's impairment shall be rated 
by a licensed physician using the most recent edition of the American Medical 
Association's guide to the evaluation of permanent impairment. The award shall 
be paid as provided by W.S. 27-14-403 for the number of months determined by 
multiplying the percentage of impairment by forty-four (44) 
months.

 

(h) An injured employee awarded permanent partial 
impairment benefits may apply for a permanent disability award subject to the 
following terms and conditions:

 

(i) 
The injured employee is because of the injury, unable to return to employment 
at a comparable or higher wage than the wage the employee was earning at the 
time of injury;

 

(ii) An application for permanent partial disability 
is filed not before three (3) months after the date of ascertainable loss or 
three (3) months before the last scheduled impairment payment, whichever occurs 
later, but in no event later than one (1) year following the later date; 
and

 

(iii) The employee has actively sought suitable work, 
considering the employee's health, education, training and experience.  (j) The disability award under 
subsection (h) of this section shall be payable monthly in the amount provided 
by W.S. 27-14-403 for the number of months determined by adding the number of 
months computed under this subsection as follows:. . . .

 

 Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405 (Michie 1997) (emphasis added).

 

 [¶10]    
Permanent partial disability is defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-102(a)(xv) (Michie 1997) as:

 

(xv) "Permanent partial disability" means the 
economic loss to an injured employee, measured as provided under W.S. 
27-14-405(j), resulting from a permanent physical impairment; . . 
.

 

The term "comparable or 
higher wage" is not defined in the act.  
The Division contends that the hearing examiner correctly ruled that 
Adams did not meet his burden of proof that a minimal wage reduction of 
sixty-eight cents is not a comparable wage. Adams contends that by showing the 
wages were not equal, equivalent, or similar, he met his burden of 
proof.

 

 [¶11]    
Under our statutory interpretation rules, this Court applies the plain 
meaning of the statute unless found to be ambiguous.  Wright v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Div., 952 P.2d 209, 213 (Wyo. 1998). The plain meaning 
of "comparable" according to the dictionary is "capable of or suitable for 
comparison," and the word "comparison" is defined as "the representing of one 
thing or person as similar to or like another." Merriam Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary 234 (10th ed. 1994). The Division contends that if the legislature 
intended that "comparable" mean "equal" it would have said so; however, our 
review indicates that the legislature has used the term "comparable" in 
seventy-seven different statutes. In one statute, the legislature defines a 
"comparable replacement dwelling" as "functionally equivalent" to a prior 
dwelling, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-7-102(iii)(D) (Michie 1997), and in another 
defines a "comparable business" as "the same lines of insurance, same kinds of 
insurance, similar policy limits, similar types of risk and similar quality of 
business." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-45-104(ii)(H) (Michie 1997).  These examples indicate that the 
legislature has used "comparable" to mean something other than exactly equal; 
however, the use of terms "functionally equivalent" and "similar" are not 
particularly helpful without context. Black's Law Dictionary informs us that 
"comparable accommodations," "comparable sales" and "comparable worth" are legal 
terms that require an analysis to determine whether the subjects in question are 
sufficiently similar to be regarded as substantially equal in order to determine 
a particular rental amount, fair market value, or wage rate for male- and 
female-dominated jobs. Black's Law Dictionary 281-82 (6th ed. 
1990).

 

 [¶12]    
In resolving whether the wages are comparable, Adams showed that the 
pre-injury and post-injury wage figures were not the same, and in doing so, 
there is no question that Adams showed an "economic loss" as required under the 
statute. However, the hearing examiner ruled that Adams did not meet his burden 
of proof. What other evidence would he have shown? On what basis did the 
Division and the hearing examiner decide that $5.57 per hour is comparable to 
$6.25 per hour?

 

 [¶13]    
The Division urges that whether wages are comparable is a factual 
determination and our standard of review is whether the hearing examiner's 
decision is supported by substantial evidence. The New Mexico Supreme Court 
reversed a lower court's determination that this issue presented a question of 
fact in Carpenter v. Arkansas Best Corp., 112 N.M. 1, 810 P.2d 1221 (1991). That 
court stated:

 

The question whether post-injury wages plus benefits 
are or are not comparable to pre-injury wages is a question of law in the 
interpretation of the statute. . . . In the abstract, determining whether 
something is or is not comparable to something else might involve factual 
determinations, but in the case of this statute there are no factual issues that 
need to be resolved. The legislature set no guidelines or criteria for 
determining the issue of comparability.

 

 Id. at 1222. The court then determined 
that because there was nothing in the statute to tell it what kind of factual 
determination was proper, it would hold that comparability is a question of law. 
Id. It further held "that comparable means 'substantially equal' or 'equivalent' 
in light of what we think the statute is trying to accomplish." Id. The court 
decided the statute's purpose was to get the worker as close as possible to the 
pre-injury wage and ruled that a post-injury wage plus disability benefits which 
was 84% of the pre-injury was not comparable. Id. at 1223.

 

 [¶14]    
The New Mexico statute differed from the statute in this case because a 
worker's ability to earn comparable wages was part of the definition of 
"permanent total disability." In this case, the Division advances no argument as 
to the purpose of the statute, and we must assume that its purpose is as 
straightforward as its plain meaning, that is, a worker is entitled to a 
permanent disability award based on his economic loss. In light of that purpose, 
we, too, will hold that "comparable" means "substantially equal" or "equivalent" 
and decide that wages are only "comparable" if the difference between them is 
insignificant. In this case, we decide that a post-injury wage which is 89% of 
pre-injury wage is not a comparable wage in this case primarily because at such 
a low rate of pay, when every cent counts to purchase the essentials for living, 
the difference is significant.

 

 [¶15]    
It is suggested by the Division that the hearing examiner's decision can 
be upheld as a determination that Adams was pretending to experience pain and is 
actually able to accept a position other than those listed in the job evaluation 
report which would pay him at a comparable or higher wage. We agree that if this 
were the hearing examiner's ruling, it would be a factual determination 
requiring our review of whether or not it was supported by substantial evidence. 
The findings of fact and the conclusions of law, however, mention nothing about 
finding that Adams was pretending to experience pain while they do make a 
determination based solely on the availability of jobs close to the pre-injury 
wage. We would also point out that this was not the basis for the Division's 
denial, and the Division did not challenge the validity of Adams' injury at the 
hearing.  Accordingly, the basis for 
the hearing examiner's determination requires that we resolve this appeal as an 
issue on the meaning of "comparable." We cannot speculate about areas of concern 
not discussed in the hearing examiner's decision.

 

 [¶16]    
The order denying a permanent disability award is reversed and remanded 
for a determination and entry of award.

 

   
THOMAS, Justice, dissenting, with whom TAYLOR, Justice, 
Retired, joins.

 [¶17]    
I must respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority of the Court 
in this case. One method of amending a statute is to strike a word or phrase, 
and then insert a different word or phrase. After the majority opinion in this 
case, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h)(i) (Michie 1997) is amended in this 
way:

 

(i) The injured employee is because of the injury, 
unable to return to employment at a comparable an equivalent or substantially 
equal or higher wage than the wage the employee was earning at the time of 
injury[.]

 

Can there be any wonder that 
I believe the majority of the Court is engaged in judicial legislation in this 
case? Even though I might feel some sympathy for the result, I am satisfied that 
the majority approach displays an alarming lack of jurisprudential 
discipline.

 

[¶18]      The majority opinion acknowledges 
that a statute is to be interpreted according to its plain meaning, unless it is 
determined to be ambiguous, but there is no indication in the majority opinion 
of any ambiguity that justifies construction of this statute. We summarized the 
applicable rule of statutory construction in State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div. v. Bergeron, 948 P.2d 1367, 1369 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting City of 
Cheyenne v. Reiman Corp., 869 P.2d 125, 127-28 (Wyo. 
1994)):

 

"For some forty years, this court has espoused and 
followed, frequently, the rule that we do not resort to rules of statutory 
construction and interpretation when the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous. E.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Study, No. 93-45, 1994 WL 2811 
(Wyo. Jan. 7, 1994) [866 P.2d 1288 (Wyo. 1994)]; Wyoming State Tax Comm'n v. BHP 
Petroleum Co., Inc., 856 P.2d 428 (Wyo. 1993); Jackson State Bank v. King, 844 P.2d 1093 (Wyo. 1993); Hasty v. Hasty, 828 P.2d 94 (Wyo. 1992); Phillips v. 
Duro-Last Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834 (Wyo. 1991); Vandehei Developers v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n of Wyoming, 790 P.2d 1282 (Wyo. 1990); Halliburton Co. v. McAdams, 
Roux & Assoc., 773 P.2d 153 (Wyo. 1989); NL Industries, Inc. v. Dill, 769 P.2d 920 (Wyo. 1989); Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. State of Wyoming, Envtl. 
Quality Council, 766 P.2d 537 (Wyo. 1988); Wyoming Ins. Dept. v. Avemco Ins. 
Co., 726 P.2d 507 (Wyo. 1986); Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow Comm., 651 P.2d 778 (Wyo. 1982); State, ex rel. Fawcett v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Albany 
County, 73 Wyo. 69, 273 P.2d 188 (1954). An unequivocal corollary of that rule 
is, if the statute is determined to be plain and unambiguous, the words used are 
to be given their plain and ordinary meaning. BHP Petroleum Co., Inc.; Wyoming 
Game and Fish Comm'n v. Thornock, 851 P.2d 1300 (Wyo. 1993); 
Vandehei."

 

 [¶19]    
"Comparable" is defined in a plain and unambiguous way in WEBSTER'S THIRD 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 461 (1993):

 

1: capable of being compared: a: having enough like 
characteristics or qualities to make comparison appropriate - usu. used with 
with < differing from steel in some of the circumstances . . . but ~ with 
steel in respect of the necessity for a centralized control - Thorstein 
Veblen> b: permitting or inviting comparison often in one or two salient 
points only - usu. used with to  
< hot cornbread baked with squash seeds - an Indian delicacy ~ to 
raisin bread  Willa Cather> 2: suitable for matching, coordinating, or 
contrasting: EQUIVALENT, SIMILAR < samples of subtlety . . . which made most 
of the ~ performances of the season sound clumsy  Irving Kolodin>  syn see LIKE

 

 The use of "to" in the statute suggests 
that the applicable definition is that found in the b part of the first meaning 
assigned. Permitting or inviting comparison clearly contemplates a factual 
approach.

 

[¶20]      The only synonym for "comparable" 
suggested by Webster is "like," which is defined at WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 1310 (1993). "Like" would fit the conclusion 
reached in the majority opinion, but in the discussions of the various synonyms 
for "like" we find the following:

 

COMPARABLE indicates a likeness on one point or a 
limited number of points which permits a limited or casual comparison or 
matching together < the Syrians . . . with Arabian coffee, served thick and 
strong in tiny cups, as a national drink comparable to the Englishman's tea - 
American Guide Series: R.I.> 
COMPARABLE is esp. likely to be used in connection with considerations of merit, 
standing, rank, or power < neither in military nor industrial terms is China 
comparable to the other three great powers - Vera M. 
Dean>

 

 [¶21]    
The word "comparable" is peculiarly inappropriate to articulate 
"substantially equal" or "equivalent." The essence of comparable is found in its 
nuance that suggests the points of comparison will be identified as facts, and 
it is that very essence that makes the issue of comparability one of fact rather 
than one of law. By its holding, the majority opinion robs the word of its 
lexigraphic function. Instead "comparable" now becomes a legal word of art.1 Even the suggestion that wages are 
only "comparable" if the difference between them is  insignificant is of little utility to the 
arbiter, who will inevitably conclude that any departure from equality is 
significant.

 

 [¶22]    
In a sophisticated way, the majority opinion invokes persuasive authority 
to support its holding, but in the process it ignores that cardinal rule of 
statutory construction that words should be afforded their plain and ordinary 
meaning. I agree with the contention of the Division that the legislature 
certainly could, and would, have used the words "substantially equal" or the 
word "equivalent" if that had been what it intended.

 

 [¶23]    
In analyzing what the legislature intended, I must assay a response to 
the rhetorical question, found on page four of the majority slip opinion, "What 
other evidence would he [Adams] have shown?" There is a recognized labor market, 
as demonstrated by this record. A participant in a market is presumed to be a 
reflective, evaluative person interested in maximizing his demands. Obviously, 
not all jobs in the labor market are identical, and the economist assumes that 
an individual will move from one job to another whenever the benefits exceed the 
costs at the margin. Costs and benefits in the market consist of both tangible 
and intangible factors, and are essentially influenced by the demands that are 
significant to the individual. In my opinion, the legislature intended that 
wages would be comparable so long as the differential did not influence the 
reflective, evaluative person interested in maximizing his demands to move from 
one position to another. For example, one might prefer to work for some lesser 
wage as a hotel clerk because the job was less dangerous than, or the working 
conditions were preferable to, those associated with work as a cook. In any 
event, I am satisfied that expert opinion evidence could be obtained to assist 
the finder of fact in making the factual determination as to whether the wages 
of different jobs are comparable.

 

 [¶24]    
While the majority is enamored of the approach taken in New Mexico with 
respect to application of the word "comparable" in cases such as this, it has 
ignored a very salient aspect of the decision of the New Mexico court. 
Carpenter, like Adams, had received an award for permanent partial 
disability.  Carpenter v. Arkansas 
Best Corp., 112 N.M. 22, 810 P.2d 1242, 1243 (1990), rev'd, 112 N.M. 1, 810 P.2d 1221 (1991). The Supreme Court of New Mexico did not compare the pre-injury and 
post-injury wages, as the majority in this case has done. That court 
said:

 

The post-injury wage was $548.07 per week, to which 
must be added the partial disability (75%) benefit of $223.97 per week, for a 
total of $772.04 per week.

 

Carpenter v. Arkansas Best 
Corp., 112 N.M. 1, 810 P.2d 1221, 1223 (1991). While the majority opinion 
reports that Adams received a permanent partial disability benefit of five 
percent, that money is not accounted for in the comparison of pre-injury wages 
with post-injury wages. If it were, the two figures undoubtedly would be more 
comparable, probably falling well within the permissible range of statistical 
deviation.

 

 [¶25]    
Counsel for the Division advises the Court that the Division has adopted 
an interpretive rule defining "comparable wage" as being at least 80% of the 
wages paid for the worker's regular employment at the time of injury, but that 
interpretive rule inevitably must be struck down in light of a rule that, as a 
matter of law, a post-injury wage of 89% is not comparable. The only permissible 
way for the definition to be adjusted now is for the legislature to craft its 
own statute, specifically defining the differential that will be acceptable and 
not trigger the claim for additional benefits for vocational 
disability.

 

 [¶26]    
Until that should occur, however, I am satisfied that the question of a 
comparable wage should be treated as one of fact in each case with the burden of 
proof assigned to the claimant to persuade the finder of fact that the wages are 
not comparable. I do not see that as an insurmountable burden, but it must 
address more than the simple monetary wage for the two different jobs. For those 
reasons, I would affirm the Office of Administrative Hearings in this 
case.

  

 

FOOTNOTES

1 Words 
of art. The vocabulary or terminology of a particular art, science, or 
profession, and especially those expressions which are idiomatic or peculiar to 
it. For example, in law "Taking the Fifth" means that a person is asserting his 
or her Fifth Amendment protection against 
self-incrimination.

  BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1605 (6th ed. 
1990).