Case Title: Ex parte State of Alabama.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1151152

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2016-12-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 12/23/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2016-2017
____________________
1151152
____________________
Ex parte State of Alabama
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Otha Lee Woods
v.
State of Alabama)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CC-13-1482;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-14-0845)
STUART, Justice.
1151152
This Court granted certiorari review to address a
question of first impression for this Court: Whether it is
improper to admit into evidence in a trial de novo in the
circuit court evidence of a defendant's plea of guilty made in
the district court?  We hold that it is not, and we reverse
and remand with directions.
Facts and Procedural History
In the Montgomery District Court, Otha Lee Woods pleaded
guilty to and was convicted of driving under the influence of
alcohol, a violation of § 32-5A-191(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975. 
Woods appealed to the Montgomery Circuit Court for a trial de
novo.
In the circuit court, Timothy Hutton, the law-enforcement
officer who arrested Woods, testified that he stopped Woods's
vehicle at 4:50 p.m., that when he approached Woods he smelled
alcohol emanating from Woods, that Woods failed the field-
sobriety tests Officer Hutton administered, and that at 7:20
p.m. a breath-analyzer test indicated that Woods's blood-
alcohol level was .08.  Before the State rested, the State
moved to admit into evidence the district court's sentencing
order incorporating its judgment, which referenced Woods's
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1151152
guilty plea. The circuit court admitted into evidence over
Woods's objection a redacted version of the sentencing order,
which stated:
"The Defendant appeared with Counsel Julian
McPhillips and entered a plea of guilty to the
charge of Driving Under the Influence and the Court
having ascertained that the Defendant has a full
understanding of what a plea means and its
consequences and that there is a factual basis for
the plea, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED
that the Defendant is found to be guilty as
charged."
(Capitalization in original.) 
Woods testified, stating that at the time of his arrest
he was taking several medications and that he believed the
breath-analyzer machine used for his test was malfunctioning. 
During cross-examination, the prosecutor 
asked Woods if 
he 
had
pleaded guilty to driving under the influence in the district
court.  Woods objected to the question, and the circuit court
overruled his objection.  Woods responded that his counsel had
advised him to plead guilty in the district court.  Woods,
after being asked to read a portion of the district court's
sentencing order, agreed with the prosecutor that the order
stated that he had entered a plea of guilty to the charge of
driving under the influence. 
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1151152
A jury found Woods guilty of driving under the influence.
The circuit court entered a judgment of conviction and 
sentenced Woods to 12 months' imprisonment.  The sentence was 
suspended, and Woods was ordered to serve two years'
supervised probation.  Woods appealed to the Court of Criminal
Appeals.
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the circuit 
court's judgment, holding that the circuit court's admission
of evidence of Woods's plea of guilty made in the district
court "violate[d] well settled principles of law regarding a
trial de novo and that the admission of such evidence [was]
inherently prejudicial."  Woods v. State, [Ms. CR-14-0845,
June 3, 2016] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2016). 
Woods petitioned for certiorari review.
Standard of Review
"'"'"This Court 
reviews 
pure questions of 
law 
in
criminal cases de novo."'"  Ex parte Brown, 11 So.
3d 933, 935 (Ala. 2008)(quoting Ex parte Morrow, 915
So. 2d 539, 541 (Ala. 2004), quoting in turn Ex
parte Key, 890 So. 2d 1056, 1059 (Ala. 2003)).' 
Hiler v. State, 44 So. 3d 543, 546 (Ala. 2009)."
State v. Simmons, 179 So. 3d 249, 250 (Ala. 2014).
Discussion
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1151152
The State contends that the Court of Criminal Appeals
erred in reversing the circuit court's judgment because, it
says, the circuit court did not err in admitting evidence of
Woods's plea of guilty made in the district court.  
In Phillips v. City of Dothan, 534 So. 2d 381 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1988), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
"It is well settled under Alabama law that on
cross examination of the defendant, a defendant's
guilty plea in a lower court, but not the judgment
of the lower court, is admissible in the criminal
trial in circuit court as being in the nature of a
judicial 
confession 
or 
an 
admission 
against
interest,
 when there was no evidence that the plea
[1]
was induced by coercion, threats, or promises or
leniency."
534 So. 2d at 383. 
As the Phillips court noted, this principle is well
settled.  In Booker v. City of Birmingham, 23 Ala. App. 312,
313, 125 So. 603, 604 (1929), the court stated:
"The predicate laid by 
the 
appellee 
showed 
that,
when appellant was arraigned before the recorder, no
coercion in the way of hopes, threats, or promises
was employed. Over objection, appellee was permitted
to prove that appellant was asked by the recorder
whether she wished to plead guilty or not guilty,
and that appellant pleaded guilty. In overruling
appellant's objection, the court did not err. This
evidence was admissible as being in the nature of a
judicial confession."
See Rule 801(d)(2)(A), Ala. R. Evid. 
1
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1151152
Similarly, in Gray v. State, 29 Ala. App. 568, 569, 199 So.
255, 255 (1940), the court stated: "The fact that the
defendant pleaded guilty to the charge before the County Court
was admissible as being in the nature of a judicial
confession."  In Daniel v. State, 41 Ala. App. 405, 134 So. 2d
752 (1961), the court distinguished between the 
admission into
evidence in a trial de novo of the lower court's judgment as
opposed to the admission into evidence of testimony as to the
defendant's guilty plea.  The court held that "the judgment of
the lower court adjudging the defendant guilty is not
admissible in a trial de novo in the circuit court." 41 Ala.
App. at 408, 134 So. 2d at 755.  The court reasoned that,
because a trial de novo was the equivalent of "'a statutory
grant of a new trial,'" id. (quoting Gravely v. Deeds, 185 Va.
662, 664, 40 S.E.2d 175, 176 (1946)), the lower court's
judgment was irrelevant to the proceeding.  However, the court
further recognized that "the statement of the clerk that he
heard the defendant plead guilty in the lower court was
admissible as being in the nature of a judicial confession or
an admission against interest."  41 Ala. App. at 408, 134 So.
2d at 754. 
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1151152
Booker, Gray, and Daniel, which are all cited in
Phillips, harmonize with the principle that "a defendant's
guilty plea in a lower court, but not the judgment of the
lower court, is admissible in the criminal trial in circuit
court as being in the nature of a judicial confession or an
admission against interest." 534 So. 2d at 383. 
In reversing the circuit court's judgment in this case,
the Court of Criminal Appeals overruled Phillips.  In
concluding that the admission into evidence at a trial de novo
in the circuit court of a guilty plea entered in the district
court is erroneous, the Court of Criminal Appeals reasoned
that a trial de novo from the district court, see § 12-12-71,
Ala. Code 1975, "'means that the slate is wiped clean and a
trial in the Circuit Court is had without any consideration
being given to prior proceedings in another court.'"  Woods,
___ So. 3d at ___ (quoting Yarbrough v. City of Birmingham,
353 So. 2d 75, 78 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977)). The court, quoting 
Ex parte Sorsby, 12 So. 3d 139, 146 (Ala. 2007), further
stated that "'review in the circuit court is by trial de novo
without any consideration being given 
to the 
prior 
proceedings
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1151152
in the district court.'" ___ So. 3d at ___.  Based on those
propositions, the Court of Criminal Appeals  concluded:
"The holding in Phillips effectively prevents a
defendant from 'wiping the slate clean' when a
defendant appeals a guilty plea entered in municipal
or district court to the circuit court for a trial
de novo. Instead, a defendant is encumbered by a
guilty plea in the lower court that, once admitted
into evidence, answers the ultimate question posed
to the trier of fact during a trial de novo –-
whether a defendant is guilty of the crime charged."
___ So. 3d at ___.
We disagree; the admission into evidence in a trial de
novo of a defendant's plea of guilty made in the district
court, provided that the plea was voluntary, is not error.  A
trial de novo in the circuit court provides a defendant with
a clean slate with regard to a determination of whether he or
she is guilty of the offense charged.  It is an opportunity to
have the defendant's guilt or innocence determined without
consideration of the outcome, i.e., the judgment, of the
earlier proceeding.  Therefore, because the judgment from the
prior court proceeding, and not the defendant's guilty plea,
answers the ultimate question posed in the trial de novo –-
whether the defendant is guilty of the offense charged -–
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1151152
admission of the  judgment, but not of the guilty plea, is
prohibited at the trial de novo. 
Moreover, a trial de novo does not preclude the admission
of evidence used or developed in earlier proceedings.  A
defendant is not required to enter a plea of guilty in the
district court to obtain a trial de novo in the circuit court. 
Rather, a defendant chooses whether to enter a plea of guilty
in the district court.  The entry of a guilty plea by the
defendant is a voluntary admission and constitutes 
evidence of
culpability.   The defendant's guilty plea does not function
as a conclusive presumption of guilt, and, like any other
piece of evidence, the evidence of a guilty plea can be
challenged.  Indeed, a defendant's decision to enter a guilty
plea in the district court may be based on any number of
considerations.  For example, a defendant could argue that,
even though innocent, he or she  entered a plea of guilty to
avoid the risk of a harsher sentence at trial.  See Phillips,
534 So. 2d at 383.  Because the evidence of a defendant's
guilty plea is merely evidence to be weighed by the trier of
fact against other evidence, the admission of that evidence is
not precluded in a trial de novo.
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1151152
Furthermore, we cannot agree with the Court of Criminal
Appeals that the admission into evidence in a trial de novo 
in the circuit court of a defendant's plea of guilty made in
the district court creates unfair prejudice.  
Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid., states:  "Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice
...."
  "'Unfair prejudice' under Rule 403 has been
defined as something more than simple damage to an
opponent's case. Dealto v. State, 677 So. 2d 1236
(Ala. Crim. App. 1995).  A litigant's case is always
damaged by evidence that is contrary to his or her
contention, but damage caused in that manner does
not rise to the level of 'unfair prejudice' and
cannot alone be cause for exclusion.  Jackson v.
State, 674 So. 2d 1318 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993),
reversed in part on other grounds, 674 So. 2d 1365
(Ala. 1994). 'Prejudice is "unfair" if [it] has "an
undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper
basis."'  Gipson v. Younes, 724 So. 2d 530, 532
(Ala. Civ. App. 1998), quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403
(Advisory Committee Notes 1972). See, also, Rule
403, Ala. R. Evid."
Ex parte Vincent, 770 So. 2d 92, 96 (Ala. 1999).
Although the admission into evidence in a trial de novo
in the circuit court of a defendant's voluntary guilty plea 
in the district court might damage the defendant's case, we
cannot conclude that the admission of such evidence unfairly
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1151152
prejudices the defendant.  When a defendant enters a voluntary
plea of guilty, the defendant acknowledges that he or she
understands that he or she is admitting guilt as to the
offense charged.  As previously stated, a defendant's guilty
plea is evidence of culpability; that evidence may be
challenged and does not answer the ultimate question posed to
the trier of fact –- whether the defendant is guilty of the
offense charged.  Because a defendant voluntarily enters the
plea of guilty and, in so doing, acknowledges the consequences
of such a plea, we cannot conclude that the admission at a
trial de novo in the circuit court of evidence that the
defendant entered a guilty plea in the district court creates
unfair prejudice, i.e., an undue tendency to suggest a
decision based on an improper ground.  Ex parte Vincent, 770
So. 2d at 96.
Thus, although it is error to admit into evidence in a
trial de novo in the circuit court the district court's
judgment, the admission of evidence of a defendant's guilty
plea entered in the district court is not improper.   
Conclusion
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1151152
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded for
that court to address Woods's specific argument, not 
addressed
by that court in light of its overruling of Phillips, that,
based on Phillips and the cases relied upon in Phillips, the
circuit court erred in admitting into evidence the district
court's judgment.
 
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., dissents.
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1151152
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.  I fully agree with what I
consider to be the well reasoned opinion of the Court of
Criminal Appeals, and I incorporate that reasoning herein by
this reference.  Without implying any lesser agreement with
other aspects of that court's opinion, I note my agreement
with that court's understanding of a "de novo" trial and what
it means to "wipe the slate clean" for purposes of such a
trial.  Moreover, I believe that the Court of Criminal Appeals
correctly analyzes the concept of "unfair prejudice" and that
this Court today embraces a new and, I believe, incorrect
understanding of 
that 
concept 
that 
has 
inappropriate
ramifications for both this case and future cases.
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