Case Title: Forest County v. Wesley S. Goode

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP003592

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1998-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-3592 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Forest County, a political subdivision of the 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Intervenor, 
 
v. 
Wesley S. Goode,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  215 Wis. 2d 217, 572 N.W.2d 131 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-PUBLISHED) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 1, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
May 28, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Forest 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert A. Kennedy 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there 
were briefs by John F. Hovel, Susan A. Philpott and Kravit & 
Gass, S.C., of counsel, Mark C. Darnieder of Darnieder, West & 
Davis, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by John F. Hovel. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued 
by Michael J. Gableman, assistant Forest County corporation 
counsel, with whom on the brief was Fred W. Kawalski, Forest 
 
County corporation counsel. 
 
 
For the intervenor the cause was argued by 
Maryann Sumi, assistant attorney general with whom on the brief 
was Lorraine C. Stoltzfus, assistant attorney general and James 
E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No.  96-3592 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-3592  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Forest County, a political subdivision of 
the State of Wisconsin, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
Intervenor 
 
 
v. 
 
Wesley S. Goode, 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 1, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
JANINE P. GESKE, J.   In this case we are asked to 
determine whether a circuit court retains equitable power to 
deny injunctive relief after a zoning ordinance violation has 
been proven.  Forest County instituted enforcement proceedings 
under Wis. Stat. § 59.69(1) against Wesley S. Goode for 
noncompliance with a zoning ordinance.  The County requested 
assessment of forfeitures and an injunctive order compelling 
Goode to relocate his house to comply with a 50-foot setback 
requirement of Forest County Zoning Ordinance § 5.03.10.  The 
Circuit Court for Forest County, Robert A. Kennedy, Judge, 
denied the County's request for an injunction but imposed a 
No.  96-3592 
 
2 
forfeiture against Goode.  The County appealed from both orders 
of the circuit court. 
¶2 
In a split decision,1 the court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court's order denying injunctive relief after holding 
that Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11) (1995-96)2 does not give a circuit 
court equitable power to deny injunctive relief after a zoning 
ordinance violation has been proven.  Next, the court of appeals 
unanimously reversed the circuit court's calculation of the 
forfeiture amount.  Goode seeks review only of the court of 
appeals' reversal of the order denying injunctive relief. 
¶3 
We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11) gives the 
county or an owner of real estate within the district affected 
by the zoning regulation the option of asking a circuit court 
sitting in equity for injunctive relief as a remedy for a zoning 
ordinance violation.  However, we also conclude that the 
legislature 
did 
not 
intend 
to 
eliminate 
the 
traditional 
equitable powers of the court through § 59.69(11).  Accordingly, 
we hold that when a circuit court is asked to grant injunctive 
relief for a proven zoning ordinance violation, § 59.69(11) does 
not eliminate the circuit court's equitable power to deny 
injunctive relief in a particular case.  In this case, the 
circuit court erroneously failed to take sufficient evidence and 
failed to weigh the proper equitable considerations.  We 
                     
1 Forest County v. Goode, 215 Wis. 2d 217, 572 N.W.2d 131 
(Ct. App. 1997).    
2 All future statutory references will be to the 1995-96 
volume unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  96-3592 
 
3 
therefore affirm the court of appeals' decision reversing the 
order 
of 
the 
circuit 
court 
and 
remanding 
for 
further 
proceedings. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶4 
Goode owns two adjoining lakefront lots on Ground 
Hemlock Lake in Forest County.  In 1993 he decided to tear down 
an existing structure on one of the lots, and construct a new 
residence on the entire property.  In June of 1993, Dawn 
Schmidt, the Forest County zoning administrator, met with Goode 
at the property and together they roughly measured and staked a 
distance of 50 feet from the ordinary high water mark (OHWM), as 
required by Forest County Zoning Ordinance § 5.03.10.  Goode 
obtained a building permit to construct the new house 50 feet 
from the OHWM of Ground Hemlock Lake.3 
¶5 
Goode hired Dan Stampfl to assist in constructing the 
new residence.  Stampfl retained Flannery Trucking to perform 
the excavation work.  Prior to excavation, Stampfl and Flannery 
observed the stakes Goode placed on the property after making 
                     
3 The County issued Goode the permit pursuant to FOREST 
COUNTY, WI ORDINANCE § 5.03.10 which states in part: 
A reduced setback from the waterline may be permitted 
by the zoning administrator where there are at least 
five main buildings within 500 feet of the proposed 
site that are built to less than the required setback. 
 In such cases, the setback shall be the average of 
the nearest main building on each side of the proposed 
site except that in no case shall the setback be less 
than 50 feet. 
 
No.  96-3592 
 
4 
his own measurements.  After the excavation but prior to pouring 
the concrete footings and cement walls, Stampfl remeasured and 
restaked the property.  In March of 1994, a citizen contacted 
Schmidt to report that there might be a problem with the setback 
at Goode's property.  Schmidt returned to the residence in May 
of 1994 and measured the distance from the house to the OHWM.  
She learned that the distance from the northern corner of the 
home to the OHWM was only 35 feet rather than the required 50 
feet.  On May 19, 1994, Schmidt advised Goode by letter that the 
location 
of 
his 
residence 
violated 
the 
50-foot 
setback 
requirement of ordinance § 5.03.10.  Goode responded that the 
violation was unintentional and requested to meet with the 
zoning committee.  Goode requested a variance for the property, 
which 
the 
committee 
denied. 
 
The 
County 
initiated 
this 
enforcement action, requesting forfeitures and an injunction 
requiring Goode to comply with the setback requirements. 
¶6 
Following a trial in September of 1996, the circuit 
court denied the County's request for injunctive relief, finding 
that Goode's violation was unintentional, the cost to move the 
house would be very high, and no property owners in the area 
would be harmed by allowing the house to remain where it was.4  
                     
4 In making its findings, the circuit court stated: 
No.  96-3592 
 
5 
The circuit court imposed a forfeiture against Goode at a per 
diem rate of $35, for a total of $8,540, plus $814.58 in court 
costs.  The circuit court calculated the forfeiture using 244 
days, the number of days from the notice of the violation (the 
May 19, 1994, letter from the county zoning administrator) until 
the County filed the complaint (January 18, 1995).  The County 
appealed.  
¶7 
The court of appeals, with Judge Hoover dissenting, 
reversed and remanded.  The court of appeals concluded that the 
plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11) "does not . . . create a 
discretionary standard for the trial court to follow in 
determining whether injunctive relief is warranted."  Forest 
County, 215 Wis. 2d at 223.  On that basis, the court of appeals 
held that it was an improper exercise of the circuit court's 
discretion to deny the County's request for an injunction 
requiring compliance with the 50 foot setback requirement.  See 
id. at 226.5  The court of appeals reasoned that "the legislative 
                                                                  
"Well, what are the competing interests?  One of the 
interests is the desire of the county to have it's [sic] 
ordinance complied with.  But there's no property owners harmed 
in that area.  At least none have come forward. . . . There's no 
indication of anybody on that lake being against this particular 
defendant in this case.  So the only thing we have is the fact 
that the ordinance is not complied with."  Record transcript at 
109.  
5 Although the court of appeals majority couches its 
conclusion in terms  of "an improper exercise of discretion," 
what it really held is that the circuit court has no equitable 
power to deny injunctive relief under Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11), 
once a violation is proven and such relief is requested.  Thus, 
the court of appeals concluded that the circuit court made an 
error of law, and not an erroneous exercise of discretion.  
No.  96-3592 
 
6 
decision to allow municipalities to pursue injunctive relief to 
effectuate compliance with the ordinance implies entitlement to 
the relief sought upon meeting the burden of proof."  Id. at 
227.  Hence, the court of appeals concluded that the County was 
entitled to injunctive relief.  
¶8 
In the court of appeals' view, a circuit court's 
refusal to grant injunctive relief under Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11) 
would judicially usurp the legislative function.  Specifically, 
denial of injunctive relief would, according to the court of 
appeals, nullify the decision of the body legislatively vested 
with the authority to make variance determinations.  See id. at 
227.  In addition, the court of appeals reasoned that a refusal 
to grant injunctive relief here would infringe upon the public's 
right to have zoning ordinances enforced, would increase the 
dangerous cumulative effects of zoning violations, and would 
allow persons to "purchase" zoning variances by allowing 
forfeitures as a remedy in some cases.  See id. at 228-29.  
¶9 
The court of appeals then turned to the County’s claim 
that the circuit court erred in calculating the forfeitures.  
Forest County's Ordinance § 20.05.1 states:  "Any person who 
violates this ordinance shall be subject to a fine up to 
$200.00, plus costs of prosecution . . . Each day the violation 
continues shall be considered a separate offense."  Relying upon 
Village of Sister Bay v. Hockers, 106 Wis. 2d 474, 317 N.W.2d 
505 (Ct. App. 1982), the court of appeals determined that 
Goode's forfeiture should not be based upon 244 days, but upon 
No.  96-3592 
 
7 
the 861 days between the filing of the complaint until the time 
of trial.  See Forest County, 215 Wis. 2d at 229-230. 
¶10 Accordingly, the court of appeals remanded the case to 
the circuit court for a determination, in its discretion, of the 
per diem forfeiture to be imposed for the period of 861 days.  
See id. at 230.  Goode seeks review only of the court of 
appeals' 
reversal 
of 
the 
circuit 
court's 
order 
denying 
injunctive relief.  We granted the State's request to intervene 
in this review. 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
¶11 The County brought this enforcement action under Wis. 
Stat. § 59.69(11).  That section reads: 
 
PROCEDURE FOR ENFORCEMENT OF COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCE. 
 The board shall prescribe rules, regulations and 
administrative 
procedures, 
and 
provide 
such 
administrative personnel as it considers necessary for 
the enforcement of this section, and all ordinances 
enacted 
in 
pursuance 
thereof. 
 
The 
rules 
and 
regulations and the districts, setback building lines 
and regulations authorized by this section, shall be 
prescribed by ordinances which shall be declared to be 
for the purpose of promoting the public health, safety 
and general welfare.  The ordinances shall be enforced 
by appropriate forfeitures.  Compliance with such 
ordinances may also be enforced by injunctional order 
at the suit of the county or an owner of real estate 
within the district 
affected by 
the 
regulation.  
(Emphasis added).   
Whether the circuit court has equitable power to deny injunctive 
relief once a zoning ordinance violation is proven under § 
59.69(11) is a question of statutory interpretation.  Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law we review independently, 
benefiting from the analysis of the circuit court and the court 
No.  96-3592 
 
8 
of appeals.  See Aiello v. Village of Pleasant Prairie, 206 
Wis. 2d 68, 70, 556 N.W.2d 697 (1996); Town of Clearfield v. 
Cushman, 
150 
Wis. 2d 
10, 
19, 
440 
N.W.2d 
777 
(1989).  
Ascertaining legislative intent is the goal of statutory 
interpretation.  See State v. Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d 397, 406, 
565 N.W.2d 506 (1997).  We begin with the plain language of the 
statute itself.  See id.  We do not look beyond the plain 
language of the statute to ascertain its meaning if the 
legislative intent is clear.  See id.   
I. 
¶12 The pertinent part of the statute we are asked to 
interpret reads: “The (county zoning) ordinances shall be 
enforced by appropriate forfeitures.  Compliance with such 
ordinances may also be enforced by injunctional order instituted 
at the suit of the county or an owner of real estate within the 
district 
affected 
by 
the 
regulation.” 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 59.69(11)(emphasis added).  This section uses the terms 
“shall” and “may” in close proximity to one another.  Goode 
argues that the legislative intent is plainly demonstrated when 
the legislature chose to use the mandatory term “shall” in 
providing for forfeitures, and in choosing the directory term 
“may” when providing for injunctive relief.  Use of the word 
“may,” 
according 
to 
Goode, 
preserves 
a 
circuit 
court’s 
traditional equitable discretion to decide in a particular case 
whether and what manner of injunctive relief is warranted. 
¶13 Goode relies on Swatek v. County of Dane, 192 Wis. 2d 
47, 59, 531 N.W.2d 45 (1995), where this court concluded that 
No.  96-3592 
 
9 
"when the words 'shall' and 'may' are used in the same section 
of a statute, one can infer that the legislature was aware of 
the different denotations and intended the words to have their 
precise meanings."  Additionally, Goode points to Wauwatosa v. 
Milwaukee County, 22 Wis. 2d 184, 191, 125 N.W.2d 386 (1963), 
where we characterized "may” as permissive and “shall” as 
mandatory unless a different construction is required by the 
statute to carry out the clear intent of the legislature. 
¶14 The State contends that the statute plainly does not 
give 
circuit 
courts 
discretion 
over 
whether 
to 
require 
compliance with zoning ordinances.  The State endorses the court 
of appeals’ view that the only discretion provided by the 
statute is vested in the county or affected property owners.  In 
the alternative, the State contends that the statute is 
ambiguous, and thus the State turns to rules of statutory 
construction. 
¶15 If a statute is capable of being understood in two or 
more different senses by reasonably well-informed people, it is 
ambiguous.  See Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d at 406.  A statute is not 
rendered ambiguous merely because the parties disagree as to its 
meaning.  See id. 
¶16 In this case, the court of appeals undertook a plain 
meaning analysis of the statute, and concluded that the only 
discretion permitted by the statute is that of the county or 
resident to decide whether to seek injunctive relief.  See 
Forest County, 215 Wis. 2d at 223.  Thus, the County and the 
State read the subject of the phrases "shall be enforced by 
No.  96-3592 
 
10
appropriate 
forfeitures" 
and 
"may 
also 
be 
enforced 
by 
injunctional order" to be, in both cases, the county or resident 
bringing the enforcement action.  We agree with this reading of 
the statute. 
¶17 Next, the County and the State assert that because 
zoning ordinance violations are to be enforced by a statutory 
injunction rather than a common law remedy, the circuit court's 
traditional equitable power to consider denying the injunction 
is eliminated.  The court of appeals agreed, concluding that 
nothing in the statute created a discretionary standard for the 
circuit court to follow in determining whether injunctive relief 
is warranted.  See id. at 223. 
¶18 We conclude that the statute is silent as to whether 
the legislature intended to eliminate the circuit court's 
traditional equitable power in deciding whether to grant 
injunctive relief.  This silence renders the statute ambiguous, 
because well-informed persons reasonably could read the statute 
as placing no restriction on the circuit court's traditional 
equitable powers.  Other well-informed persons reasonably could 
read the statute as requiring the circuit court, once a zoning 
ordinance violation is proven, to issue an injunction.  Because 
the statute is ambiguous, we may look to the scope, history, 
context, subject matter, and object of the statute in order to 
ascertain the legislative intent.  See Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d at 
406. 
II. 
No.  96-3592 
 
11
¶19 The State contends that the context and subject matter 
of the statute demonstrate a legislative intent to eliminate the 
equitable power of the circuit court to deny an injunction when 
a zoning ordinance violation is proven.  The State invokes the 
statutory construction rule that statutes are read in pari 
materia, or in other words, that statutes relating to the same 
subject matter are read together.  The State urges us to read 
Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11) in conjunction with statutes concerning 
the procedure for obtaining zoning ordinance variances, Wis. 
Stat. 
§§  59.694(7) 
and 
59.692(4)(b). 
 
By 
reading 
those 
provisions together, the State contends we will discern a 
legislative intent to eliminate the circuit court's equitable 
power: 
 
59.692.  Zoning of shorelands on navigable waters. 
(4)(b) Variances and appeals regarding shorelands 
within a county are for the board of adjustment for 
that county under s. 59.694, and the procedures of 
that section apply.6 
 
59.694. County zoning, adjustment board. 
(7) Powers of board.  The board of adjustment shall 
have all of the following powers: 
. . . 
(b) To hear and decide special exception to the terms 
of the ordinance upon which the board is required to 
pass under such ordinance. 
(c) To 
authorize 
upon 
appeal 
in 
specific 
cases 
variance from the terms of the ordinance that will not 
be contrary to the public interest, where, owing to 
special conditions, a literal enforcement of the 
provisions of the ordinance will result in unnecessary 
                     
6 This section, Wis. Stat. § 59.692, was enacted in 1965 as 
Wis. Stat. § 59.971, Stats.  See 1965 Laws of Wisconsin ch. 614.  
No.  96-3592 
 
12
hardship, and so that the spirit of the ordinance 
shall be observed and substantial justice done.7 
 
¶20 Reading those statutory sections together, the State 
then invokes the rule of construction that when a general 
statute and a specific statute are compared, the specific 
statute takes precedence.  See Milwaukee v. Kilgore, 193 Wis. 2d 
168, 185, 532 N.W.2d 690 (1995).  The State and the County view 
Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11) to be a general statutory provision and 
the statutory variance provisions as “a bit more specific.”  
Accordingly, the State and County contend that the more specific 
variance provisions take precedence over the general zoning 
ordinance enforcement statute. The State and County argue that 
the legislature could not have intended that a circuit court 
possess the equitable power to nullify the variance procedures.  
¶21 There is a certain tension between the variance and 
the ordinance enforcement provisions.  If a property owner is 
denied a variance for his or her noncomplying property, and the 
county brings an enforcement action which results in forfeitures 
                     
7 This section Wis. Stat. § 59.694, was enacted in 1927 as 
Wis. Stat. § 59.98, Stats.  See 1927 Laws of Wisconsin ch. 408. 
 The language of this section has remained the same.   
No.  96-3592 
 
13
but no injunctive relief, the property owner could remain in 
indefinite non-compliance.8 
¶22 While 
we 
recognize 
this 
tension 
between 
the 
enforcement provisions of Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11) and the 
variance 
procedures 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 59.692(4)(b) 
and 
59.694(7)(b) and (c), we do not view § 59.69(11) as canceling 
the other sections.  Both the section providing authority to 
consider requests for variances, § 59.69(4), and the zoning 
ordinance enforcement provision at issue here, § 59.69(11), were 
passed by the same legislature as part of the 1927 Laws of 
Wisconsin.  This is a clear indication that the legislature 
intended the two remedies for zoning ordinance violation to co-
exist.  Nothing in the legislative history for those two 
provisions 
demonstrates 
an 
intent 
of 
the 
legislature 
to 
eliminate the traditional equitable powers of the trial court in 
deciding whether to order injunctive relief after a zoning 
ordinance violation is proven. 
¶23 In addition, when the legislature enacted  Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.692(4)(b) in 1965, specifically providing that variances 
                     
8 We note that whether the property owner may later take 
steps to achieve compliance could be affected by the size of the 
forfeiture imposed.  None of the parties dispute that together, 
the enforcement statute and Forest County Zoning Ordinance 
§ 20.05.1 give the circuit court discretion in setting the 
amount of the forfeiture up to a maximum of $200.00 per day.  
See also, State v. Spielvogel & Sons Excavating, Inc., 193 
Wis. 2d 464, 478, 535 N.W.2d 28 (Ct. App. 1995) ("A trial court 
has a wide range of discretion in fixing the amounts of 
forfeitures . . . (for) violations based on the facts of the 
individual case."). 
No.  96-3592 
 
14
from shoreland zoning requirements are reviewed by county boards 
of adjustment, we can presume that the legislature was aware of 
both the ordinance enforcement mechanism and the general zoning 
variance appeal procedures it had put in place almost 40 years 
earlier. 
¶24 The 
State 
correctly 
asserts 
that 
the 
writ 
of 
certiorari is the sole method of review for denial of a 
variance.  See Wis. Stat. § 59.694(10). The zoning ordinance 
enforcement statute, Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11), does not create an 
alternate means of review for a variance denial, nor can it 
result in granting a variance.  Rather, § 59.69(11) is an 
enforcement mechanism available when a property owner does not 
comply with the zoning ordinance. 
¶25 Our reading of the zoning statutes reveals that there 
is no prescribed sequence to instituting a proceeding under 
either the variance request and appeal procedure or the 
ordinance enforcement mechanism.  A county or an owner of real 
estate in the district affected by the regulation need not wait 
for a property owner to seek a variance, or appeal denial of a 
variance, before the county or resident can seek enforcement 
under Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11).  Similarly, if a property owner 
seeks but is denied a variance, neither the county nor district 
property owners are required to enforce compliance.  If and when 
the county or a district property owner chooses to pursue an 
enforcement action remains at their discretion.  Significantly, 
the board of adjustment, which has responsibility to consider 
variance requests, see Wis. Stat. § 59.694, has no authority 
No.  96-3592 
 
15
under Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11) to enforce an ordinance violation. 
 The fact that the two statutory procedures co-exist does not 
mean that the court's equitable power to grant or deny 
injunctive relief will eviscerate the variance appeal procedure. 
¶26 Moreover, certiorari review of a board of adjustment's 
decision to grant or deny a variance reviews the propriety of 
the board's action.  The board's action focuses on protection of 
the land and the purpose of the zoning ordinance.  The board of 
adjustment has no equitable power.  The board only reviews 
whether the applicant met his or her burden to establish that, 
in the absence of a variance, he or she will have no reasonable 
use of the land.  See State v. Kenosha County Board of 
Adjustment, 1998 WL 265097, 577 N.W.2d 813 (1998). 
TRADITIONAL EQUITABLE POWER 
¶27 This case focuses on the scope of the circuit court's 
authority once the plaintiff has proven a prima facie case of 
zoning ordinance violation.  None of the parties contend that 
the County has failed to prove a prima facie case here.  The 
only issue in dispute is whether, by enacting Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.69(11), the legislature intended to eliminate the circuit 
court's equitable power to deny an injunction if appropriate 
under the circumstances.  Most 
of 
the 
cases 
cited 
by 
the 
parties, and discussed below, address what is necessary to make 
a prima facie case for statutory injunctive relief, rather than 
addressing whether the circuit court retains equitable power to 
deny the injunction.  
No.  96-3592 
 
16
¶28 Goode argues that the legislature did not intend to 
eliminate the traditional equitable power of the circuit court 
when it enacted Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11).  Because the legislature 
is presumed to act with knowledge of existing law,  Goode asks 
us to consider the case law in effect at the time § 59.69(11) 
was enacted.  See Town of Madison v. City of Madison, 269 Wis. 
609, 614, 70 N.W.2d 249 (1955) (declaring that statutes are to 
be construed in harmony with existing law, and as part of a 
general and uniform system of jurisprudence). 
¶29 We begin our analysis of this issue by looking at an 
early case describing the traditional equitable power of the 
trial court relative to common law injunctions.  See Gimbel 
Bros. v. Milwaukee Boston Store, 161 Wis. 489, 154 N.W. 998 
(1915). 
 
While the power to issue mandatory9 injunctions is 
vested in courts of equity, it is a power which is 
sparingly used.  High, on Injunctions, § 2.  The 
granting 
of 
an 
injunction 
rests 
in 
the 
sound 
discretion of the court.  The power itself being 
great, a high degree of judgment is required in order 
to use it wisely and never to abuse it. . . . Equity 
should not be successfully invoked merely to inflict 
injury or damage on the defendant without securing any 
substantial 
right 
or 
benefit 
to 
the 
plaintiff 
(citations omitted). 
                     
9 The term “mandatory” in this quotation goes to the nature 
of the injunctive order, and not to the court’s power to grant 
the order. See 4 Ziegler, Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and 
Planning, § 45.02[1][a] (4th ed. Supp. 1997): "An injunction is 
an equitable remedy which a court can use to compel compliance 
with an ordinance (an injunction mandatory in form) or to 
restrain a threatened or existing violation (an injunction 
prohibitory in form)."   
No.  96-3592 
 
17
Gimbel Bros., 161 Wis. at 496. 
¶30 Typically, when a party seeks injunctive relief, the 
circuit court exercises its discretion in deciding whether to 
grant injunctive relief, and if so, in what form.  See Webster 
v. Dane Corp., 9 Wis. 2d 437, 440, 101 N.W.2d 616 (1960).  
Injunctive relief is not ordered as a matter of course, but 
instead rests on the sound discretion of the court, to be used 
in accordance with well-settled equitable principles and in 
light of all the facts and circumstances of the case.  See 
McKinnon v. Benedict, 38 Wis. 2d 607, 616, 157 N.W.2d 665 
(1968); see also, Christie v. Lueth, 265 Wis. 326, 334, 61 
N.W.2d 338 (1953); Maitland v. Twin City Aviation Corp., 254 
Wis. 541, 549, 37 N.W.2d 74 (1949). 
¶31 We now turn to more recent case law discussing 
statutory injunctions.  All three parties here rely upon the 
County of Columbia v. Bylewski, 94 Wis. 2d 153, 288 N.W.2d 129 
(1980), but for different assertions.  The State and County 
assert Bylewski demonstrates that for purposes of zoning 
ordinance enforcement, the court must grant an injunction at the 
plaintiff’s request.  Goode asserts Bylewski reinforces the 
traditional view that injunctive relief is left to the equitable 
discretion of the court. 
¶32 The suit in Bylewski arose when a property owner 
purchased land with a nonconforming structure, a mobile home, on 
it.  When the property owner took down the nonconforming 
structure and replaced it with a newer version, the county sued 
in the county court under the small claims procedures statute.  
No.  96-3592 
 
18
The county sought a forfeiture for violation of a zoning 
ordinance prohibiting structures like the mobile home from use 
in a recreation district.  After the trial, the county court 
concluded 
that 
the 
landowner’s 
mobile 
home 
violated 
the 
ordinance, and that the landowner had constructed his garage 
without a permit.  The county court then ordered the landowner 
to remove his mobile home and garage from the property.  See 
Bylewski, 96 Wis. 2d at 159-60.  The landowner appealed.  Only 
one issue addressed in Bylewski is significant to the case 
before us. 
¶33 Bylewski 
asserted 
that 
the 
county 
court 
lacked 
authority under the small claims procedures to recover a 
forfeiture for a zoning ordinance violation and to issue an 
injunctive order to enforce compliance.  This court held that 
the county court lacked authority to issue any injunctional 
relief under the small claims statute.  See id. at 167.  The 
Bylewski court recognized that Wis. Stat. § 59.97(11), the 
predecessor 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 59.69(11), 
allowed 
both 
the 
imposition of forfeitures as well as the enforcement of zoning 
ordinances by injunctive orders.  See id. at 162.  The Bylewski 
court distinguished between a suit for forfeitures and a suit 
for injunctive relief, because the latter "is an action in 
equity."  Id.10  (Emphasis added).  In the absence of a specific 
                     
10 The statute at issue in Columbia County v. Bylewski, 94 
Wis. 2d 153, 288 N.W.2d 129 (1980), Wis. Stat. § 59.97(11), 
provided: 
No.  96-3592 
 
19
enabling statute, the county court was not authorized to grant 
injunctive relief.  See id. at 163-166. 
¶34 En route to reaching that conclusion, the Bylewski 
court emphatically distinguished between two forms of relief for 
noncompliance with a zoning ordinance.  "[A]n action to recover 
a forfeiture and a suit seeking injunctional relief are 
fundamentally different in nature."  Id. at 167.  First, the 
court observed that to recover forfeitures, the proponent need 
only introduce the ordinance and prove its violation by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  In contrast, the court observed 
that:  
 
[A] suit for an injunctional order is addressed to the 
discretion of the court and requires that there be a 
balancing of the competing equities and interests 
involved.  "The true inquiry in determining [whether 
to 
grant 
injunctional 
relief 
prohibiting 
the 
continuation of an unlawful use or the issuance of an 
order for the removal of a nonconforming building or 
structure] is whether the building or structure is 
legally usable (or modifiable and legally usable) and 
is intended to be used for a main or accessory use 
which is permitted by the applicable ordinance or by-
law."  Town of Sterling v. Poulin, 2 Mass. App. 562, 
316 N.E.2d 737, 739 (1974);  See also:  82 Am. Jur. 
2d, Zoning and Planning, sec. 252 at 787 (1976).  
"However, where it has been clear that the offending 
building or structure could not be utilized for any 
purpose permitted in the pertinent zoning district, 
relief has been extended to include an order for the 
removal of the building or structure."  Id. at 739. 
                                                                  
PROCEDURE FOR ENFORCEMENT OF COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCE. . . . 
Such ordinances shall be enforced by appropriate fines and 
penalties.  Compliance with such ordinances may also be enforced 
by injunctional order at the suit of such county or the owner or 
owners of real estate within the district affected by such 
regulation.  
No.  96-3592 
 
20
 
Id. 
¶35 Goode argues that the first two sentences of this 
discussion in Bylewski support the circuit court's traditional 
power to balance the equities in reaching its decision on 
injunctive relief.  The County and the State argue, and the 
court of appeals agreed, that the discussion in Bylewski most 
relevant to this case is its description of the "true inquiry" 
test of whether an injunction should be orderedan inquiry which 
merely involves a determination of whether the building is 
legally usable or modifiable and legally useable. 
¶36 The court of appeals in this case concluded that 
because Goode's property can be modified to a legal use, an 
injunctive order was proper. See Forest County, 215 Wis. 2d at 
226.  Bylewski does not support that reasoning, however.  First, 
whether 
the 
offending 
structure 
is 
legally 
useable, 
or 
modifiable and legally useable, is not an ultimate test.  
However, such an inquiry may well be a factor that a court, 
sitting in equity, may consider in its balancing of the 
equities. 
¶37 Second, we do not read the statement in Bylewski that 
“relief has been extended” to include injunctive relief to 
denote a situation where the court is prohibited from exercising 
its discretion or has been legislatively required to order 
No.  96-3592 
 
21
injunctive relief.  That statement instead supports Goode's 
argument that Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11) does not eliminate the 
traditional equitable power of the circuit court. 
¶38 We acknowledge that on occasion, the legislature has 
imposed upon the circuit court an affirmative duty to grant 
injunctive relief.  The State points to another enforcement 
statute to support its argument that the legislature has enacted 
statutes that eliminate a circuit court's equitable power to 
deny an injunction.  See Pure Milk Prod. Coop. v. National 
Farmers Organ., 90 Wis. 2d 781, 280 N.W.2d 691 (1979). 
¶39 The language of the 1975 statute in Pure Milk, Wis. 
Stat. § 185.43(2), however, differs from the statutory language 
at issue here: 
[a]ny person, with actual or constructive notice that 
a contract [authorized by sec. 185.41, Stats.] exists, 
who induces or attempts to induce any member to breach 
or repudiate his contract with the association, or who 
in any manner aids a breach of such contract, is 
liable to the aggrieved party for damages caused by 
such interference.  The association is also entitled 
to an injunction to prevent any interference or 
further interference with the contract. 
 
90 Wis. 2d at 789 (emphasis added).  The same distinction can be 
made for an earlier version of that statute: 
Where any contract exists between an association and a 
member, any person who, with knowledge or notice of 
the existence of the contract, induces or attempts to 
induce or aids in the breach thereof by any means, 
shall be liable to the aggrieved party for damages on 
account of such interference with said contract and 
No.  96-3592 
 
22
shall also be subject to an injunction to prevent the 
interference or further interference therewith.  
 
Neillsville Shipping Ass'n. v. Lastofka, 225 Wis. 350, 353-54, 
274 
N.W.2d 
280 
(1937) 
(quoting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 185.08(6)(1937))(emphasis added).  The Neillsville court read 
the statute as denying the circuit court's equitable power to 
refuse an injunction.  See 225 Wis. at 354.  Essentially, proof 
of the statutory violation mandated liability for damages and 
injunctive relief.  The Neillsville court did not engage in any 
discussion 
of 
legislative 
intent 
to 
eliminate 
a 
court's 
traditional equitable powers, but apparently relied on a plain 
language analysis. 
¶40 Similarly, the Pure Milk court did not discuss 
legislative intent.  Instead that court relied on the plain 
language of the statute before it, "is entitled," and on the 
conclusion of the Neillsville court that a trial court had no 
No.  96-3592 
 
23
discretion under such a statute.  See Pure Milk, 90 Wis. 2d at 
789-90.11 
¶41 The State points to two other decisions, where, it 
asserts, the circuit court's equitable powers have been limited 
by statute.  According to the State's brief, this court 
concluded 
that 
"[s]tatutory 
compliance 
is 
required, 
and 
discretion is available to the court not to permit continuing 
violations, but only to fashion relief to the parties injured as 
a result of the statutory violations."  State's brief at 35, 
citing State v. Excel Management Services, 111 Wis. 2d 479, 490, 
331 N.W.2d 312 (1983).  We do not read our opinion in Excel 
Management to find a statutory erasure of the traditional 
equitable power of the court. 
                     
11 All three parties in this case raise a separation of 
powers question.  The State and County contend that if we read 
Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11) not to restrict the traditional equitable 
power of the circuit court, those courts can usurp the 
legislative intent 
behind 
the zoning 
variance 
procedures.  
Conversely, Goode argues that if we read the enforcement statute 
to eliminate the circuit court's traditional equitable power, we 
will be permitting the legislature to infringe on powers 
traditionally 
reserved 
to 
the 
judiciary. 
 
Although 
the 
enforcement statute at issue in Pure Milk Prod. Coop. v. 
National Farmers Organ., 90 Wis. 2d 781, 280 N.W.2d 691 (1979), 
expressly limited the circuit court's equitable power, none of 
the parties in that case raised a separation of powers question. 
   We need not take up a separation of powers analysis here, 
because we read the statute to reflect a legislative intent that 
the circuit court continue to exercise its traditional equitable 
power in deciding, once a zoning ordinance violation is proven, 
whether to grant injunctive relief. 
No.  96-3592 
 
24
¶42 We recognized that the consumer protection statute at 
issue 
in 
Excel 
Management 
gave 
the 
circuit 
court 
broad 
authorization to grant relief, including injunctive relief.  See 
111 Wis. 2d at 498.  We then endorsed the United State Supreme 
Court's description of equitable jurisdiction: 
the comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction 
is not to be denied or limited in the absence of a 
clear and valid legislative command.  Unless a statute 
in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable 
inference, 
restricts 
the 
court's 
jurisdiction 
in 
equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be 
recognized and applied. 
 
Excel Management, 111 Wis. 2d at 490 (citing Porter v. Warner 
Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946)).  More to the point, we stated in 
Excel Management that "[b]ecause the statutes here involved 
contain no limitation on the trial court's exercise of its 
equity jurisdiction, we conclude that the trial court has the 
full scope of equitable remedies available to it to fashion 
relief for the parties injured as the result of the acts and 
practices involved in this action."  Id. at 490.  We decline to 
read Excel Management as supporting a conclusion that the 
circuit court's equitable power has been eliminated. 
¶43 The State also derives a rule from State v. Fonk's 
Mobile Home Park & Sales, Inc., 117 Wis. 2d 94, 343 N.W.2d 820 
(Ct. App. 1983) that in certain instances, once a statutory 
violation has been proved, the circuit court must issue an 
injunction and common law equitable principles do not apply.  
No.  96-3592 
 
25
Fonk is not that restrictive.  The court of appeals held in that 
case that the statutory injunction could be granted if the 
plaintiff only proved a past violation of an unfair trade 
practices statute.  Proving the elements of the statutory 
violation meant that one of the common law requirements for 
injunctive relief, the threat of future harm, need not be 
established.  See id. at 101.  The Fonk decision never discussed 
a restriction on the circuit court's equitable power to deny an 
injunction once the petitioner has met his or her burden of 
proof.12  
PUBLIC POLICY 
¶44 As part of our effort to discern the legislative 
intent relating to the circuit court's equitable power under 
this statute, we look to the object or purpose of the statute.  
"The purpose of state shoreland zoning standards is to 'further 
                     
12 The unfair trade practices statute invoked in State v. 
Fonk's Mobile Home Park & Sales, Inc., 117 Wis. 2d 94, 343 
N.W.2d 820 (Ct. App. 1983), provided: 
The department may commence an action in circuit court 
in the name of the state to restrain by temporary or 
permanent injunction the violation of any order issued 
under this section.  The court may in its discretion, 
prior to entry of final judgment make such orders or 
judgments as may be necessary to restore to any person 
any pecuniary loss suffered because of the acts or 
practices involved in the action, provided proof 
thereof is submitted to the satisfaction of the court. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 100.20(6). 
No.  96-3592 
 
26
the maintenance of safe and healthful conditions; prevent and 
control water pollution; protect spawning grounds, fish and 
aquatic life; control building sites, placement of structure and 
land uses and reserve shore cover and natural beauty.'"  Kenosha 
County, 1998 WL 265097 at *4.  "The basic purpose of a shoreland 
zoning ordinance 'is to protect navigable waters and the public 
rights therein from the degradation and deterioration which 
results from uncontrolled use and development of shorelands.'"  
Id. at *4, quoting Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 10 
201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). 
¶45 Both parties agree  that an absurd or unreasonable 
result must be avoided.  See Lake City Corp. v. City of Mequon, 
207 Wis. 2d 155, 162, 558 N.W.2d 100 (1997).  The County argues 
that to allow a single property owner to enforce a zoning 
provision through mandatory injunctive relief is nothing more 
than providing a remedy co-existent with the citizen's right to 
expect compliance with zoning ordinances.  The State argues that 
allowing the judiciary to nullify a statutory variance process 
is absurd and unreasonable.  The State contends that because the 
public has an important interest in shoreland zoning, it would 
be unreasonable to conclude that the legislature intended the 
circuit court to retain equitable power to deny, in its 
discretion, injunctive relief in the case of zoning ordinance 
violations. 
No.  96-3592 
 
27
¶46 Goode contends that the court of appeals decision 
would lead to absurd or unreasonable results, but for a 
different reason.  Goode argues that because a single property 
owner may institute enforcement proceedings under § 59.69(11), 
this single property owner could also require that an offending 
structure be moved no matter what the equities involved. 
¶47 We note that "self-help through the use of injunctions 
by private litigants has become an important element of zoning 
enforcement."13  Even so, we conclude that to construe the 
enforcement 
statute 
as 
eliminating 
the 
circuit 
court's 
traditional equitable power could lead to unjust results.  For 
instance, a resident of the district affected by the zoning 
regulation could request, and necessarily obtain, an injunction 
compelling conformance with the ordinance.  This is so even if 
                     
13 Kenneth H. Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning, 
§ 29.01, 683 (4th ed. 1997).  Young comments on the evolution of 
zoning enforcement: 
While 
zoning 
regulations, 
like 
other 
regulations 
enacted pursuant to the police power, are enacted with 
the expectation that the burden of enforcement will 
rest with the municipality, the enabling acts of a 
substantial number of states authorize a taxpayer or 
other private person to institute an action to enjoin 
a violation of the zoning regulations.  Provisions of 
this kind recognize not only the fact that landowners 
have a singular stake in the enforcement of land-use 
controls, 
but 
that 
the 
likelihood 
of 
vigorous 
enforcement is not always great.  It is common 
knowledge that when zoning is commenced in many 
communities 
no 
adequate 
provision 
is 
made 
for 
enforcement.  Frequently, enforcement is committed to 
a building inspector who is already understaffed for 
the task of enforcing the building code.  When zoning 
enforcement is committed to his office he is unable to 
give it more than desultory attention.  
No.  96-3592 
 
28
the violation was extremely minor and the issuance of an 
injunction would be inequitable. 
¶48 In 
one 
case 
of 
private 
enforcement, 
plaintiff 
neighbors of a cement plant waited over three years after the 
plant operator had received a permit to build his plant before 
commencing their zoning ordinance enforcement action.  See Diehl 
v. Dunn, 13 Wis. 2d 280, 108 N.W.2d 509 (1961).  If the Diehl 
trial court had lacked equitable power, the defendant would have 
had to dismantle his entire plant with no consideration of the 
equities.  Instead, this court upheld the trial court's denial 
of an injunction, stating, "Injunction is an equitable remedy, 
and a court in accordance with ancient doctrines and established 
decisions will lend its aid only to the vigilant, active, and 
faithful."  13 Wis. 2d at 286. 
¶49 The State asserts that the public interests at stake 
in zoning obviate equitable considerations that might lead to a 
denial of injunctive relief.  The State cites Bouchard v. 
Zetley, 196 Wis. 635, 647, 220 N.W. 229 (1928), as an instance 
where the court rejected the defendants' suggestion that money 
damages 
would 
have 
been 
adequate, 
instead 
of 
the 
harsh 
injunctive relief imposed.  In disagreeing with the defendants' 
proposal, the court stated: "The public is interested in the 
enforcement of the zoning ordinances, as well as the owners of 
property specially affected.  Such public rights should not be 
compromised by private parties."  Id. 
¶50 Our decision today in no way endorses the "purchase" 
of variances.  We only reaffirm the Bouchard court's statement 
No.  96-3592 
 
29
about the nature of zoning ordinance enforcement proceedings.  
"Under the circumstances we think the court, sitting in equity, 
exercised a wise discretion."  Id. at 646. We conclude that the 
circuit court's equitable power to use that discretion has not 
been eliminated.  
¶51 Contrary to the State's prediction, our conclusion 
will not result in dire consequences for zoning enforcement 
actions.  Nor will it frustrate the purpose of shoreland zoning 
in particular. 
¶52 "[P]revention rather than punishment is the keynote of 
most zoning administration."  Kenneth H. Young, Anderson's 
American Law of Zoning, § 29.01 (4th ed. 1997).  When a circuit 
court exercises its equitable discretionary power, there are 
checks in place to oversee the proper use of that discretion.  
The erroneous exercise of discretion standard is available for 
appellate court review. Mercury Records Productions, Inc. v. 
Economic Consultants, Inc., 91 Wis. 2d 482, 500, 283 N.W.2d 613 
(1979).  In addition, the amount of the potential forfeiture 
awarded under the local ordinance, and the potential for jail 
time if the forfeiture is not paid, may deter zoning ordinance 
violations in the first place, or may serve at a later point to 
force the property owner to bring the property into compliance. 
 Additional preventive measures exist in many counties to ensure 
that shoreland is protected, including the grant or denial of 
building permits and licenses, and the approval or disapproval 
of development plans. 
No.  96-3592 
 
30
¶53 Allowing the circuit court to balance the equities 
when an injunction is requested under Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11) 
will not render “meaningless the entire line of case law 
regarding the standard of unnecessary hardship which must be met 
in order for a variance applicant to be properly granted a 
variance.”  State's brief at 7.  Instead, the circuit court, 
sitting in equity, should weigh heavily the factors considered 
by boards of adjustment in determining unnecessary hardship, see 
Wis. Stat. § 59.694(7)(c), as well as traditional equitable 
considerations.14  Equitable defenses, such as laches, estoppel,15 
                     
14 One treatise has collected cases demonstrating the trial 
court's exercise of equitable discretion in deciding whether, 
and in what form, to grant injunctive relief for zoning 
ordinance violations: 
A decree compelling the removal of an offending 
building will not be issued where the building (1) can 
be put to a conforming use; (2) where the violations 
are 
insignificant; 
(3) 
where 
the 
violation 
has 
resulted 
from 
an 
erroneous 
but 
reasonable 
interpretation of the ordinance, and the plaintiff who 
is 
seeking 
the 
mandatory 
injunction 
could 
have 
appealed from the issuance of the permit pursuant to 
which the building was erected, but failed to do so; 
and 
(4) 
where 
the 
entire 
circumstances, 
viewed 
together, present compelling reasons why equity should 
refuse plaintiff's request for an injunction.' 
 
4 Ziegler, Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning, 
§ 45.02, 45-22 (4th ed.) (citations and footnotes omitted). 
 
15 Our conclusion that traditional equitable considerations 
should be balanced by the circuit court recognizes our decision 
in Jelinski v. Eggers, 34 Wis. 2d 85, 93, 148 N.W.2d 750 (1967), 
where we concluded that a building permit granted no vested 
right to an unlawful use, and therefore defendant's assertion of 
estoppel was unsuccessful to avoid compliance.  
No.  96-3592 
 
31
or unclean hands16 should also be weighed in appropriate cases.  
See, e.g., Ramaker v. Cities Service Oil Co., 27 Wis. 2d 143, 
153, 133 N.W.2d 789 (1965) (recognizing that there may be 
situations where laches or estoppel would justify a court of 
equity in denying an injunction at the suit of private parties). 
 See, also, Hargreaves v. Skrbina, 662 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Colo. 
1983) (upholding trial 
court's consideration 
of 
equitable 
principle of relative hardships in setback violation case, where 
encroachment was done in good faith pursuant to a permit, and 
compliance would cost $150,000 with little corresponding benefit 
to the plaintiff or the public); Grand Haven Township v. 
Brummel, 274 N.W.2d 814, 816-17 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (finding 
an erroneous exercise of discretion in ordering relocation of 
homes where property owner received building permits, spent 
$100,000 and acted in good faith throughout the transaction); 
and other cases cited in Anderson's American Law of Zoning, 
§ 29.03-.16. 
¶54 We agree with the County that where a public entity is 
authorized to seek a statutory injunction enforcing a zoning 
ordinance, under Bylewski the plaintiff does not have to show 
irreparable injury in order to obtain the injunction.  Bylewski, 
94 Wis. 2d at 163-64.  A circuit court is one guardian of the 
                     
16 It appears that the city's knowledge of the need for a 
permit prior to construction of a concrete channel contrary to 
DNR regulations, was a factor in the court of appeals' 
determination not to include costs of removal in the equitable 
balancing analysis.  See City of Oak Creek v. DNR, 185 Wis. 2d 
424, 451, 518 N.W.2d 276 (Ct. App. 1994). 
No.  96-3592 
 
32
protected shoreland, and should not deny injunctive relief 
lightly when a zoning ordinance violation is proven.  That 
judicial responsibility, however, does not foreclose the use of 
equitable power to determine, based on the particular facts 
before the court, whether, and in what form, to grant injunctive 
relief. 
¶55 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11), the zoning 
ordinance 
enforcement 
statute, 
does 
not 
eliminate 
the 
traditional equitable power of circuit court.  Therefore it was 
within the power of the circuit court to deny the County's 
request for injunctive relief. 
¶56 The County and the State then assert that the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion by denying an 
injunction.  We agree that in this case, the circuit court 
failed to consider and sufficiently weigh all the proper factors 
prior to entry of its order.  In announcing its decision, the 
circuit court explained that although the County possessed an 
interest in having compliance with the ordinance, no property 
owner in the area had come forward to complain, Mr. Goode had 
acted in good faith, and based upon its own experience, the 
court believed it would be expensive to put the house into 
compliance.  We conclude that the court did not take sufficient 
evidence before reaching its decision and did not adequately 
address the interest of the public at large in obtaining full 
compliance with the ordinance.  The court never explored the 
possibility of a more limited injunction which might have been 
No.  96-3592 
 
33
less cumbersome for Mr. Goode, but yet would have adequately 
protected the public interest. 
¶57 In 
deciding 
whether 
to 
deny 
a 
request 
for 
an 
injunction based upon a shoreland zoning ordinance violation, 
the circuit court should take evidence and weigh any applicable 
equitable considerations including the substantial interest of 
the citizens of Wisconsin in the vigilant protection of the 
state's shorelands, the extent of the violation, the good faith 
of other parties, any available equitable defenses such as 
laches, estoppel or unclean hands, the degree of hardship 
compliance will create, and the role, if any, the government 
played in contributing to the violation.  This list is not meant 
to be exhaustive but only to illustrate the importance of the 
circuit court's consideration of the substantial public interest 
in enforcing its shoreland zoning ordinances. 
¶58 Once a violation is established, a circuit court 
should grant the injunction except, in those rare cases, when it 
concludes, after examining the totality of the circumstances, 
there are compelling equitable reasons why the court should deny 
the request for an injunction.  As the State pointed out at oral 
argument, the circuit court also possesses equitable power to 
fashion an injunction that does justice.  If the court is 
inclined to deny an injunction, it should first explore 
alternatives to the requested full injunction to determine 
whether 
a 
more 
equitably 
crafted 
injunction 
might 
be 
appropriate. 
No.  96-3592 
 
34
¶59 We conclude that the circuit court erroneously failed 
to take sufficient evidence in this case and failed to 
sufficiently 
weigh 
the 
equitable 
considerations 
we 
have 
described.  We therefore affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals reversing the order of the circuit court and remanding 
for a new hearing consistent with this opinion. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
96-3592.awb 
 
1 
¶60 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (Concurring).   I agree with the 
majority's discussion determining that Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11) 
does not eliminate the traditional equitable powers of the 
circuit courts.  However, I write separately to caution those 
same circuit courts to consider in the exercise of their power 
the very real prospect that by merely anteing up the amount of a 
fine imposed, individual landowners may, by circumstance or 
design, 
effectively 
"purchase" 
a 
variance 
for 
their 
nonconforming lakefront homes.  In such instances, the general 
welfare of the public is derogated in favor of the individual 
homeowner and zoning boards are left powerless to fulfill their 
charge to protect Wisconsin's environment and the public 
welfare. 
¶61 A court must consider in the exercise of its equitable 
powers not only the rights of individual landowners, but the 
rights of the public.  I echo the concern voiced by the majority 
opinion in the court of appeals that "courts, under the mantle 
of balancing the equities, can permit defendants to violate 
statutes with [relative] impunity.  One should not be permitted 
at the trial court's discretion to purchase through forfeitures 
a variance from a zoning code."  See Forest County v. Goode, 215 
Wis. 2d 217, 228-29, 572 N.W.2d 131 (Ct. App. 1997). 
 
96-3592.awb 
 
1