Case Title: State v. Feliciano. Dissenting Opinion by J. Acoba [pdf].

Citation: 107 Haw. 469

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘T

---000-

STATE OF HAWAT'I, Plaintiff-Appellee,

HAL FELICIANO,

Defendant-Appellant -

ro.
soe

 

No. 26273

E
APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT couRT Ea)z
(CR. NO, 021-1177) e

Lie S-

JOLY 5, 2005

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY,

33.2
AND ACOBA, J., DISSENTING

MOF THE purl
befendant-appellant Hal Feliciano appeals from the

Circuit Court of the First Circuit's judgment of conviction filed

on November 19, 2003, the Honorable Richard K. Perkins presiding.

Feliciano shot his cousin, Alex Stoesser, in the eye with 2 .22

caliber revolver. The circuit court convicted Feliciano on three
counts: (1) attempted murder in the second degree (Hawai'i

Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 705-500, 707-701.5, and 706-656)

[hereinafter, attempted murder in the second degree); (2) place

to keep pistol or revolver (HRS $§ 134-6(c) & (e)) [hereinafter,

place to keep]; and (3) carrying, using or threatening to use a

firearm in the commission of a separate felony (HRS $5 134-6(a) &

gas
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(e)) (hereinafter, use of a firearm]. Feliciano was sentenced as
follows: (1) Life with the possibility of parole and a three-
year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment! for count ones (2)
ten years for count two; and (3) twenty years for count three.
on appeal, Feliciano argues that the circuit court erred by:
(1) violating the Hawai'i Constitution’s double jeopardy clause
when it (a) punished him for conduct by sentencing him to a
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment pursuant to § 706-660.1
and then punishing him a second time for the same conduct with
convictions of use of a firearm and place to keep, and (b)
convicted him of attempted murder, place to keep, and use of a
firearm; and (2) concluding that neither the HRS $ 704-400
defense (entitled "Physical or mental disease, disorder, or
defect excluding penal responsibility”) or self-defense applied.
Wie disagree with Feliciano, and affirm the circuit court’s final
judgment, guilty convictions, and sentences in all respects.
T. BACKGROUND

A. Event

on June 1, 2002, Stoesser (Feliciano’s cousin) went to

belia Feliciano’s (Feliciano’s mother) (hereinafter, Delia’)

! the circuit court sentenced Felicieno to serve a mandatory ainimun
term of imprisonment of three years pursuant to HRS § 706~660.1, entitied
SSentence Sf imprisonment for use of 2 firearm, semiautomatic firearm, or
automatic firearm ina felony.”

   

 

 

+ In the circuit court's findings of fact and conclusions of law,
Feliciano’s mother's name is spelled “Delia.” tn the March 6, 2003
transcript, ner nase is spelled “Delia.”

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house and gave her $600 ($100 was owed to Delia and $500 was a
loan). Feliciano lived at Delia’s house as well. Later that
night Delia claimed that the money Stoesser gave her was missing:
Stoesser (who had been drinking) refused to believe Delia and
began arguing with her? Feliciano asked Stoesser to leave. The
next morning, Stoesser returned to the Feliciano residence.

There was conflicting testimony as to what happened at
this point. Delia testified that Feliciano told her that he
would pay Stoesser the money and that when Stoesser and Feliciano
left in Stoesser’s truck they were going to an ATM to withdraw
money. Feliciano testified that he went with Stoesser to throw
away @ couch and visit Stoesser’s co-worker Graham? (who Stoesser
also suspected of stealing the money), Stoesser testified that
when he arrived at the house that morning Delia asked him to take
Feliciano out of the house because they could not handle him. In

e left

 

any event, later that same morning, Feliciano and stoes:
the Feliciano residence in Stoesser’s truck. Sometime before
noon, Feliciano and Stoesser got into an argument (while in
Stoesser’s truck) and Stoesser referred to Feliciano as a “stupid
mother fucker.” Stoesser saw that Feliciano had a gun and asked
him “Why you bring the gun stupid mother fucker, you wanna shoot
me?" Stoesser eventually stopped the car and told Feliciano to

get out, saying “Get the fuck out stupid. What, you going shoot

* Feliciano did not testify as to Graham's full nane.

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me? What's the problem?” A few moments later, Feliciano shot
Stoesser in his right eye. After shooting Stoesser, Feliciano
walked approximately two-tenths of a mile west of the shooting
until he was disarmed and arrested by police who had been called
by a witness to the shooting. After the police arrested
Feliciano, they brought him to the Pearl City Police Station
where his hands were processed for gunshot residue. Police
officer Chase Inamine testified that while the evidence
specialist was processing Feliciano’s hands Feliciano said, “I
shot with my right.”
B. Eeliciano's History of Mental Illness

In 1979, Feliciano suffered a mental breakdown while he
was stationed in Germany with the United States Air Force.
Feliciano was diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia and was
discharged from the Air Force in 1981 as 100% disabled due to his
mental illness. Feliciano’s mental illness has been
characterized as a delusional belief that he possesses the
supernatural power to control and transform others through the
use of “supernatural devices” that may be invoked by using a
television remote control. Feliciano also believed that he was
one of several people: Hal, Halice, and Opel.‘ After his
discharge from the Air Force, Feliciano received the prescription

drug Risperdal to treat his mental illness; Risperdal is designed

 

+ vopel” is also referred to as “opal” in the court transcripts.

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to control delusions, hallucinations and aggressiveness. During
the months prior to the shooting Feliciano appeared to be taking
less than his prescribed dosage of Risperdal. For sone time
prior to June 2, 2002, Feliciano was smoking marijuana regularly
and using methamphetamine at least once a week.

c. Tek wictions, and Seni

on June 10, 2002, the State of Hawai'i (hereinafter,

prosecution] filed a complaint charging Feliciano with three

counts: (1) attempted murder in the second degree in violation

of HRS §§ 705-500 (1993),° 707-701.5 (1993),* and 706-656 (1993) ;”

SRS § 705-500, entitled “Criminal attempt,” provides in pertinent
part:

(1) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crine
LE the person:

(oy Tncentionally engages in conduct which would
Constitute the crime if the atrencant
Cizcunstances were a8 the person believes then
fo be; oF

() Intentionally engages in conduct which, under
the circunstances s# the person believes them to
be, constitutes a substantial step in » cours
OF conduct intended to culminate in the person's
Commission of the crime

(2) hen causing a particular result is an elenent of

the crime, "a person is guilty of an attempt to commit the
crime if, acting with the state of mind required to
Establish liability with respect to the attendant
Elrcunstances specified in the definition of the crime, the
person intentionally engages in conduct which is 3
Substantial step in a course of conduct intended or known to
cause such a result

 

 

 

 

“uns § 707-701.5, entitied “Murder in the second degree,” provides in
pertinent part: “(1) Except as provided in section 707-701, a person commits
Che offense of murder in the second degree if the person intentionally oF
knowingly causes the death of another person.”

   

* RS § 706-656, entitled “Terms of imprisonment for first and second

degree murder and attenpted first and second degree murder,” provides in
Pertinent part: “(l) Persons convicted of first degree murder or first degree

ECtonpted murder shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility

 

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(2) place to keep in violation of HRS § 134-6(c) and (e} (Supp.

2004);" and (3) use of a firearm in violation of HRS $§ 134-6(a)

 

of parole.”

URS § 706-656 was amended in 1996, but those anendsents were to
subsection two, pertaining to marders which were “especially heinous,
Seiscious, or Gruel:*. Aa this subsection a not applicable in the pre
Gace, we cite to the 1993 version of the statute

 

 

 

+ gag § 134-6 entitled, “Carrying or use of firearm in the commission
of a separate felony) place to Keep firearms; loaded firearms; penalty,”
provides in pertinent part

(a) te shall be unlawful for a person to knowingly
carry én’ the person or have within the person's inmediate
Gontto! or intentionally use of threaten to use a firearm
hile engaged in the commission of 2 separate felony,

Vinether the firearm was Loaded of not, and whether operable
be'not; provided that person shall not be prosecuted under
this subsection where the separate felony 1

 

 

 

(2) A felony offense otherwise defined by this
chapter

(2) The felony offense of reckless endangering in
the first degree under section 707-713;

(3) The felony offense of terroristic threatening in
the first degree under section (707=716(1) (a) 1,
[io7=716(2) th) }y and (707-726 (2) (17 oF

(4) The felony offenses of criminal property damage
Inthe fitst degree under section 708-620 and
Grininal property damage in the second degree
Under section 708-821 and the firearm is the
(nstrunent of means by which the property damage
iS caused.

 

 

 

ic) Except as provided in sections 124-5 and 134-3,
‘sl firearms and ammunition shall be confined to the
possessor’s place of business, residence, or sojourn:
Provided that it shall be lawful to carry unloaded firearms
Ercunscnition or both in an enclosed container from the
place of purchase to the purchaser's place of business,
Pisidencer or sojourn, or between these places upon change
Of place of business, ‘residence, or sojourn, or between
These places and the following: a place of repair; a target
Eunges'a licensed dealer's place of business; sn organized,
icheduled firearms show oF exhsbit; a place of formal hunter
Gf firesrm use training or instruction; or a police station.
Sénclosed container” means 2 rigidly constructed receptacle,
or a commercially sanufactured gun case, or the equivalent
thereot that completely encloses the firearm.

 

 

 

je) Any person violating subsection (2) or (b) shall
be guilty of a class A felony: Any person violating this
bection by carrying of possessing @ loaded firearm oF by
Certying or possessing @ loaded or unloaded pistol oF

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and (e).? The complaint also alleged that, under the attempted
murder in the second degree charge, Feliciano was subject to
sentencing in accordance with HRS § 706-660.1 (1993)"* for use of
a firearm while engaged in the commission of a felony.

on September 10, 2002, the circuit court appointed a

three-menber panel of examiners to determine Feliciano’s fitness

 

revolver without # License issued as provided in section
{$e29"Shall be guilty of class B felony. Any person
yholating this section by carrying or possessing an unloaded
Hitearm, other than a pistol or revelver, shall be guilty of
felony.
Conviction and sentence under subsection (a) or (b)
shall bein adsition to and not in lies of any conviction
land sentence for the separate felony; provided that the
Sentence inposed under subsection (2) or (B) may run
Concurrently of consecutively with the sentence for the
Separate felony.

 

 

 

 

* For statutory text, see footnote 8.

 

% HRS § 706-660.2, entitled “Sentence of imprisonment for use of a
firearm, ‘semiautomatic firearm, or automatic firearm ina felony,” provides in
pertinent part:

 

(2) A person convicted of a felony, where the person
had a firearm in the person’ s possession or threatened its
Use or used the fizear= while engaged in the commission of
tthe felony, whether the firearm was loaded or not, and

Whether operable or net, may in addition to the
Undeterminate term of imprisonment provided for the grade of
offense be sentenced to a mandatory minimus tem of
Geprisonment without possibility of parole or probation the
Yength of which shall’ be as follows:

    

 

  

(a) For murder in the
in the second degree
() For a class A felony
() For a class 8 felony--up to five years,
{a} For a class C felony--up to three years.
‘the sentence ef inpriscnnent for a felony involving the use
of a firearm as provided in this subsection shell not be
Subject to the procedure for determining minimin tern of
[npelsonment preseribes under section 706-663; provided
further that 8 person who is imprisoned in a correctional
Institution as provided in this subsection shall becone
Gubject to the parole procedure as prescribed in section
506-670 only upon the expiration of the term of mandatory
Inprisonment fixed under paragraph (a), (5), (C)y oF (2+

 

\cond degree and attempted murder
up to fifteen years;
‘up to ten years

 

 

and.

    

 

 

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to proceed and the extent of Feliciano’s penal responsibility.
The appointed examiners were Richard Kappenberg, Ph.D. (a
clinical psychologist), David Stein, M.D., Ph.D. (a
psychiatrist), and Terence Wade, Ph.D. (a clinical psychologist).
Reports from all three doctors were admitted into evidence, but
only Dr. Kappenberg and Dr. Stein testified at trial.

on January 2, 2003, Feliciano filed a notice of
intention to rely on a defense of mental disease, disorder or
defect, pursuant to HRS § 704-400 (1993)."" Feliciano’ jury-
waived" trial conmenced on February 27, 2003 and concluded on
March 6, 2003.

Dr. Kappenberg testified that he reviewed Feliciano’s
oahu Community Correctional Center (OCC) records and his records
at Adult Probation (which provide information about past
hospitalizations, police reports and Veterans’ Administration

records) and conducted a one and a half hour examination of

 

RS § 704-400, entitied “Physical or mental al
defect excluding penal Fesponsibility,” provides:

+ disorder, oF

 

(2) A person is not responsible, under this Code, for
conduct if at the time of the conduct as a result, of
physical or mental disease, disorder, or defect the person
Tacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
wrongfulness of the person's conduct or to conform the
person's conduct to the requirenents of law.

 

(2) As used in this chapter, the terms “physical or mental
disease, disorder, or defect” do not include sn abnormality
manifested only by repeated penal oF otherwise anti-social
Conduct

    

© on February 27, 2003 Feliciano waived his right toa jury trial.
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Feliciano at OCCC. Based on the records and his examination, Dr.
Kappenberg opined that Feliciano was suffering from a paranoid
type of schizophrenia and polysubstance dependence at the time of
the alleged offense. Dr. Kappenberg further opined that at the
time of the offense, Feliciano’s cognitive capacity was not
impaired and that he was able to understand the difference
between right and wrong. Dr. Kappenberg based his opinion on
Feliciano’s description of the event (which comported with the
description given by other witnesses) and the fact that Feliciano
specifically indicated that there was no connection between his
beliefs (his supernatural ability to control others with a secret
device) and his behavior that day. When asked about Feliciano’s
behavior when he was arrested by the police, ise., telling the
police to take care of his gun and that he shot with his right
hand, Dr. Kappenberg stated that this showed that Feliciano was
aware of what happened, that he participated, and that he was
oriented and responding to his environment. Dr. -Kappenberg was
also asked about Feliciano’s behavior when he was being
questioned by the police, ists, identifying himself as “opel” and
believing that he was in Germany; Dr. Kappenberg stated that this
showed that Feliciano’s mental functions had decreased

significantly. Dr. Kappenberg opined that this decr

 
 

been caused by the stress of being arrested and pli
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On cross-examination, Dr. Kappenberg was questioned as
to why he did not conduct a further examination of Feliciano
after reading the report about Feliciano’s interview with the
police. Dr. Kappenberg replied that there was no need for a
further examination because there was no apparent connection
between what Feliciano said at his police interview and his
description of Feliciano’s behavior at the time of the alleged
offense. Dr. Kappenberg was further questioned as to whether
Feliciano was taking his medication at the tine of the incidents
he responded that the records were unclear, but that Delia said
that he would sometimes slip in taking his medications and
Feliciano stated that he had not taken his medication for a long
time, but was not clear as to how long this was. Dr. Kappenberg
also testified that he was aware of Feliciano’s history of mental
illness dating back to 1979 and 1980.

Dr. Stein testified that he reviewed Feliciano’ s
records" and examined Feliciano-at OCCC for about an hour; based
on his examination and review of records, Dr. Stein believed that
Feliciano was “psychotic at the time of the offense” and that the
psychosis was “most probably amphetamine-induced psychosis.”

Dr. Stein opined that the defendant’s appreciation of the

 

© De. Stein testified that he reviewed police reports, reports relating
to Feliciano’s service in the Air Foree, and post-discharge information from
the Veterans! Administration, Dr. Stein stated that he did not review the
Ocec records or the other doctors’ reports.

 

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wrongfulness of his conduct was not substantially impaired at the
tine of the alleged offense. Dr. Stein’s opinion was based on:
his examination of Feliciano, where Feliciano told him that it
was wrong to shoot people; Feliciano’s statements to the police
that he used his right hand to shoot Stoesser, demonstrating that
he knew what he had done; and Feliciano’s statement (during Dr.
Stein's examination) that he would not have shot Stoesser if
police officer was standing there, showing that Feliciano knew
that shooting Stoesser was wrong, and also demonstrating that
Feliciano had the ability to control his behavior. Dr. Stein
also testified that he was aware of Feliciano’s long history of
mental illness, anti-psychotic medication use, and substance
abuse.

on November 19, 2003, the circuit court entered its
judgment, guilty convictions, and sentences. The circuit court

convicted and found Feliciano guilty on all three counts and

 

sentenced him as follows: Count 1, life with the possibility of

parole; Count 2, ten years; and Count 3, twenty years. The
circuit court also granted the prosecution’s motion to sentence

Feliciano to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment pursuant to

4 pr. Wade's report similarly concluded that Feliciano suffered from a
mental disorder, bot that Feliciano’ s delusional beliefs wore not connected to
The shooting. Dr. Wade opined that Feliciano had the capacity to appreciate
the wrongfuiness of his conduct and was not substantially impaired by his
hontal disorder at the time of the alleged conduct. Furthernore, Dr. Wade
Btated thet Feliciano believed he wag acting in self-defense.

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HRS § 706-660.1 for Count 1 and accordingly sentenced Feliciano
to a mandatory minimum of three years. Feliciano is currently
incarcerated; he filed a timely appeal.

TI. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Constitutional Questions

“We answer questions of constitutional law by

 

exercising our own independent judgment based on the facts of the

case. . . . Thus, we review questions of constitutional law
under the ‘right/wrong’ standard.” State v. Jenkins, 93 Hawai'i

87, 100, 997 P.2d 13, 26 (2000) (citations, some quotation
signals, and some ellipsis points omitted).

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

We have long held that evidence adduced in

the trial court must be considered in the

Strongest light for the prosecution when

the appellate court passes on the Legal

suiticlency of such evidence to support @

Conviction? the sane standard applies

iether the case wes before a judge or &

Jury, me test on appesi is not whether

Guile {p'estabiisned beyond a reasonable

Sout, But unether there wes substantial

Svidence to support the conclusion of the

there tect.
State x. Batson, 79 Haw. 236, 248, 831 7.24 926, 931,
‘Eeeberetzerattons dented, 79" aw. 625, 634. P28" 1325" (1992)
Yeitations onitted); ee also State v, Silva, 75 Haw. 419,
(est), 864 Pe24 $03, 590 (2993) (estatTons omitted) -
MSSibstantial evidence’ as to every material element of the
offense charged is credible evidence which is of sufficient
Guslity ond probative value fo ensble 2. (person) of
Eeasonabie caution to support a conclusion.” Batson, 73 Haw
ae 2ie-43, 631 Po2d at 981 (estation onitued). dee abso
Silva, 75'kaw. at (432), 864 P.2d at_ 590 (quoting State vy

Fe haw. 197, 203, 840 Pa2d 374, 379 (1993)

 

 

  

 

(2992) ])7 Stats v."Ablaca, 74 Haw. 94; 64-69, 837 F.2d
1298, 1304 (1992) (citations omitted)
in interest of John Doe, Born on January 5.1976, 76 Hawai"t

a8, 92°93, $69 P.24 1308, 1311-12 (1984); 286 also.
Yalatvia, 95 Hawai'i 465," 471, 24 P.3d 661, 667 (2001)

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ee
State v, Martinez, 101 Hawai'i 332, 338-39, 68 P.3d 606, 612-13
(2003) (alterations in original).
IIT. DISCUSSION

A. “suc Prosecution’

1. U.S. and Hawai'i Constitutional prohibitions against
double jeopardy

 

Article 1, section 10 of the Hawai'i Constitution

provides the following protection: “nor shall any person be

 

subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy[.]” The
fifth amendnent to the United States Constitution similarly
provides that “nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in Jeopardy of life or Limb{.]” These
constitutional safeguards are commonly referred to as providing
protection against “double jeopardy.”

In State vi Lessary, 75 Haw. 446, 865 P.2d 150 (1994),

this court pointed out that double jeopardy provides protection

 

in three scenario:

“rt protects against 2 second prosecution
for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it
protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.”
essary, 75 Haw. at 454, 865 P.2d at 154 (quoting North Carolina
ws Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).

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“successive prosecution,” “multiple prosecution,”
and “multiple punishments”

“successive prosecution” cases occur when the defendant
is prosecuted for an offense, then is prosecuted a second time
for the same offense after acquittal or conviction. “Multiple
prosecution” (again “multiple prosecution,” not “multiple
punishments”) cases occur when the defendant is prosecuted for
the same offense at the sane time in two different courts, s.a.,
district court and family court. Both “successive prosecution”
and “multiple prosecution” cases require more than one
prosecution. In contrast, in “multiple punishments” cases, there
Sa a single prosecution after which the defendant is punished
multiple times for the sane offense.”

The Lessary facts presented one of the two “successive
prosecution” scenarios (as distinguished from the “multiple
punishments” scenario) following an alleged criminal episode
(that spanned multiple hours) with his estranged wife as the
victim. Lessary was charged by complaint in district court with
terroristic threatening and kidnapping of his estranged wife
(which was later amended to unlawful imprisonment). Id. at 449,
865 P.2d at 152-53. On the same day, Lessary was charged by
complaint in fanily court with abuse of a family menber. Id, at

% this distinction is important because each situation invokes
diftorent aspects of the double jeopardy clause. As we conclude infra, this
Gifgerence 1s also a justification for different tests for each type of case
(successive prosecution” end "multiple punishments”).

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449, 865 P.2d at 152. Lessary pled “no contest” to the abuse
charge, and was sentenced to five days of incarceration and one
year of probation. Id, at 449-50, 865 P.2d at 152. Lessary
subsequently moved to dismiss the terroristic threatening and
unlawful imprisonment charges on double jeopardy grounds. Id. at
450, 865 P.2d at 152. The motion to dismiss was granted, and the
prosecution appealed. Id. at 450-51, 865 P.2d at 152-53.

3. Possible tests in double jeopardy ca:

 

In our analysis of double jeopardy in this “successive
prosecution” case, this court discussed the three tests that

courts have applied in determining whether offenses are the “same

offense” for double jeopardy purposes:

 

The “same elements” test initially set forth in
Blockburcer v, United States, 264 U.S. 299 (1932): “[t]he
applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the
test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or

only one, is whether each requires proof of a fact which the

 

other does not.” Lessary, 75 Haw. at 452, 865 P.2d at 153

(quoting Blockburger, 264 U.S. at 304) (alteration in original).

 

‘The “same conduct” test set forth in Grady ve

Corbin, 495 U.S. $08, 521 (1990)

 

“the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars any subsequent prosecution in which the government, to

establish an essential element of an offense charged in that

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prosecution, will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for
which the defendant has already been prosecuted." Lessary, 75

Haw, at 457-58, 865 P.2d at 155 (quoting Grady, 495 U.S. at 521).

 

‘The “same episode” test set forth in Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) :
“all offenses ‘that grow out of 2 single criminal act,
occurrence, episode, or transaction’™” are considered to be the
“same offense” for double jeopardy purposes. Lessary, 75 Haw. at
458, 865 P.2d at 155-56 (quoting Ashe, 397 U.S. at 453-54).

4. The Lessary “same conduct” test is used in
Successive prosecution” ca:

 

After discussing each of these tests in the context of
the Lessary “successive prosecution” facts, we rejected the
application of the Blockburaer “same elements” test and the Ashe
“same episode” test. Lessarv, 75 Haw. at 457-59, 865 P.2d at
155-56. With respect to the “sane episode” test, we concluded
that while the double jeopardy clause should protect an
individual from being twice put in jeopardy for a single act, it
should not protect an individual from separate prosecutions for
separate acts. Id. at 458, 865 P.2d at 156. With respect to the
Blockburger “sane elements” test, we concluded that its
protection was inadequate in “successive prosecution” cases
because its focus on the statutory definitions of offenses did

not prevent the government from initiating multiple prosecutions

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against an individual based on a single act as long as the
subsequent prosecutions were for offenses with “different”
elements. Id, at 456-57, 865 P.2d at 155.

We held that the Hawai'i Constitution provides greater
protection against “successive prosecutions” than does the United
States Constitution, and adopted the “same conduct” test in
“successive prosecution” cases:

Although the double jeopardy clause of the United state
Constitution does not bar the prosecution of either the
Unlawful Inprisonment or Terroristic Threatening charges, we
hold that the Hawei't Constitution provides greater
Protection against multiple prosecutions than does the
United States Constitution. “The double jeopardy clause of
the fawai't Constitution prohibits the Stave from pursuing
uitiple prosecutions of en individual for the sane conduct.
Prosecutions are for the same conduct if eny act of the
Gefendant £2 alleged to constitute all or part of the
Conduct elements cf the offenses charged in the respective
prosecutions. Onder the “sane conduct” teat, prosecution of
Efe Unlawful Imprisonment charge is barred while prosecution
of the Terroriatic Threatening charge is allowed,

 

 

 

 

Id. at 462, 865 P.2d at 157.

We take this opportunity to reconfirm that the “same
conduct” test is the proper test to be applied in “successive
prosecution” cases to determin€ whether an offense is the “sane
offense” for double jeopardy purposes under our Hawai'i
constitution.

a. ef Soest nts” Cases

 

Jumila, Brantley, and lesser included offen:
(HRS § 701-109)

 

We most recently addressed the issue of double jeopardy

  

An “multiple punishments” cas

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ee

950 P.2d 1201 (1998), and State v. Brantley, 99 Hawai'i 463, 56
P.3d 1252 (2002).

In Jumila, we held that convictions of both second-
degree murder (HRS § 707-701.5) and use of a firearm in
commission of a felony (HRS § 134-6) were improper under HRS §
01-109 because the second-degree murder charge was an included
offense of the firearm charge. Jumila, 87 Hawai'i at 3, 950 P.2d
at 1203.

In Brantley, a plurality opinion with three justices
concurring separately, we overruled Jumila; we held that a
defendant can be convicted of both use of a firearm in the
commission of a separate felony and the separate felony, despite
the HRS § 701-109 statutory prohibition, where the legislature
Intended to allow convictions for both offenses. Brantley, 99
Hawai'i at 469, 56 P.3d at 1258. While the double jeopardy
constitutional argument was implicated to the extent that the
plurality opinion and concurring opinion of Justice Levinson
acknowledged that HRS § 701-109 must be construed to provide the
minimum protections afforded by the fifth amendment’s double
jeopardy clause, the parties and this court focused on the
statutory interpretation of HRS § 701-109. Id, at 469 n.8, 56
P.3d at 1258 n.8.

‘These cases, however, primarily involved interpretation

of HRS § 701-109 (1993), entitled “Method of prosecution when

18
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OO

conduct establishes an element of more than one offense,” which

provides:

(2) When the sane conduct of @ defendant may
establish en element of more than one offense, the defendant
may be prosecuted for each offense of which such conduct is
Sh element. The defendant nay not, however, be convicted of
ore than one offense if
Ta) "one offense 1a included in the other, as defined
{n subsection (4) of this section; oF

 

Jai" A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in
an offense charged in the indictment or the information. An
Offense is so included whe

(a) “Te fs establishes

Al: the facts required to establis
the offente charged: or

(o) Tt consists of an attempt to commit the offense

Charged or to commit an offense otherwise included
therein; oF

(ce) Teaiffers from the offense charged only in the

Feepect that a less serious injury oF risk of injury
fo'Ehe same person, property, or public interest or a
Gieforent state of mind indicating lesser degree of
Cuipabiiity suffices to establish its commission.

 

 

by proof of the sane or less than
‘the commission of

 

 

 

 

In contrast, in this case, Feliciano bases his clains
of double jeopardy violations on the double jeopardy clause of
the Hawai'i Constitution. We will thus address the issue, for
the first time, of which test we should apply to determine
whether an offense is the “sane offense” under the double
jeopardy clause of the Hawai'i Constitution in multiple
punishments cases.

2. Lessary, Blockburger, and Dixon

In Lesgary, ve explained that we will only extend the
double jeopardy protections of the Hawai'i Constitution if we
find that the protections afforded by the United States

Constitution are inadequate. essary, 75 Haw. at 454, 865 P.2d

19
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Se

at 154. Our analysis must thus begin with the protections
provided under the United States Constitution in the “multiple
punishments” scenario. In Blockburcer, a “multiple punishments”
case, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the double
jeopardy clause protects defendants from receiving multiple
punishments for the same offense, even in a single prosecution,
and created the “same elements” test to implement that
protection. As stated earlier herein, the Blockburger test held
that “where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation
of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to
determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether
each requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”
essary, 75 Haw. at 452, 865 P.2d at 153 (quoting Blockburger,
2864 U.S. at 304). Put simply, in a “multiple punishments” case,
Af each offense has an element that the other does not, then
there is no double jeopardy clause violation. In United States
vs Dixon, 509 U.S, 688 (1993), the Supreme Court vigorously
debated the issue of whether to apply the “same elements” or
“same conduct” tests to “successive prosecution” cases before

overruling Grady and holding that the “same elements” test

 

W616 only one of the tyo crimes has an additional element, then one
crime is 4 lesser snciuded offense of the other. In this situation, the
Prosecution for the lesser included offense is barred by the “sane elenents”
Bese. The double Jeopardy clause protects against multiple punishments
becaise it prevents the state from prosecuting the defendant for both the
breates ond the lesser offenses. See Brantley, 99 Hawai'd at 472, 56 P.3d at
261 (Levinson, J., concurring).

 

20
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a

applies; it appears settled at the federal level that the “same
clenents” test applies in “multiple punishments” cases as well es

in “successive prosecution” cases.

 

the “sane elements” test protects a defendant's
double jeopardy rights and interests in a
‘multiple punishments” case.

‘Again, we have not previously adopted a test for
determining whether an offense is the “same offense” under the
double Jeopardy clause of the Hawai'i Constitution in “multiple

punishments” cases.” Feliciano argues that the “same conduct”

 

tn Skate vs Santiago, 8 Haw. App. 535, $40, 813 P.2d 335, 338
(i9sn), ana SPREE yoGaseta Os wawai's 92, 102, 937" P:2d 993, 943 (Ap.
{1331 and Statecalate Court of Appeals (ICA) ‘concluded that state ¥ tia, 55
1997), [thE Tipe sit P.2d 960, $04 (1973), established @ two-part test for
Now: ttle punishments” cases’ in Hawai'i." The ICA first applied the
Fre Ser Sane elements” test, then determined whether, “the law defining
Bigckburaee OWvenses 1s intended to prevent # substantially different harm or
cae ee eclaao € Haw. App. at Sat, 613 F.2d at, 338 (quoting Bia, S$ Haw. at
quits, SAM, tT capein, €5 Hawai'i at 102, 937 P.2a at 943 (quoting Ela,
2 oat eee ere piza at 284). However, the ‘holding in Pia is very narrow
35,8 bea hot establish the jiawai'i standard for constitutional “multiple
ant Hie cee coses:, See alsa Qunila, 07 Hawal't at 12 n-5, 950 8.24 at 1212
Punishaent cg nalayens, Jovy dissenting) (stating that gantiaga and Casio:
2.3 (Ransl weruled because these cases improperly relied on dicta that did
should be ely address the distinction between multiple punishments and
Successive proseautic

Te 'Pias the defendants were charged with: (1) committing assault
or battery on a teiice officer with the intent to obstruct the officer"
gx battery oF) (aiifally interfering with a police officer while the officer
duties: and (lecuting his duties. Bia, 55 Haw. at 15, 514 F.2d at $82. The
de lovialy Sment had iitele in che way of factual atiegations. Id ?he
gharaing d°cveg guilty to the second offense and then moved to dismiss che
defendants Pie agunle jeopardy grounds. Jd, at 15-16, 514 P.2d at $82-63)
ALrsE count sfon offered to prove that che offenses were based on seperate and
re Preece as the celal court, however, looked only at the information in, the
distincs Gscument and riled that both counts originated in the sane factusl
charg eee that, count two was a lesser included offense of count one:
seaeaee pon ti prad at S63. "Me held that wthe State should have been afforded
Jee 2 re sity to demonstrate that the first count of the information
he opportat Tyclgene separate from that upon which the defendants ples
set eaee the cecond count." Id at 17, Si F.2d at S83-64- This holding is
guilty in ih fangs for: in dicta, we also addressed the defendants’ ergusent
ol that Ha stes a lesser included offense of count one, but we concluded

(continued.

 

   

 

 

 

     

 

   

 

 

 

 

2
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test this court has adopted for “successive prosecution” cases
should apply to his “multiple punishments” case because: (1) it
comports with the common sense notions of double jeopardy
protections; and (2) it prohibits legislative “end-runs” around
his constitutional double jeopardy protections.

We do not believe, however, that it is necessary to
extend the protection of the Lessary “same conduct” test to
‘multiple punishments” cases. First, the rights and interests
protected by the double jeopardy clause, as it applies in
‘multiple punishments” cases, are adequately preserved by the
“same elements” test:

[t]he Fifth Anendeent double Jeopardy guarantee serves
principally asa restraint on courts and prosecutors. The
Vegislsture renaine free under the Double Jeopardy Clause to
define crines and fx puntanments; but once the legislature
has acted courte may not inpose more than one punishment for
the sane offense - ss + Where consecutive sentences are
Imposed at a single criminal trial, the role of the
Constitutional guarantes is limited to assuring that, the
Gourt does not exceed ita legislative authorization by
Smposing meltiple punishnents for the sane offense.

Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S..161, 165 (197).

 

 

 

 

* In other words, the

double jeopardy clause (as applied in “multiple punishments”

 

*
thet, the
'ying on two separate physical acts, not one. Jd
Sear We did not establish a “Hawai's rule” to determine when multiple
punishments are barred by the Hawai'i Constitution's double jeopardy clause,
[iL As sven, Santiago and Caprig are overruled to the extent that these cases
herded that Fis established @ *fawai't rule" applicable to “multiple
punishment” cases because these cases misread Big in reaching this conclusion,

‘cont inved)

 

   

      

 

% when, on the other hand, successive prosecutions are at stake, the
guarantee serves “a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant’ s
Benefir.” 22 U.S, at 165 (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S.
0, 499 STI

 

22
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cases) ensures that the courts cannot punish a defendant beyond
what is authorized by the legislature. As such, the “same
elements” test adequately preserves the protections afforded by
the double jeopardy clause because it focuses on whether the
legislature intended to allow the imposition of multiple
punishments for the commission of a particular act, and ensures
that the courts cannot punish a defendant beyond what was
intended.

Second, in “multiple punishnents” cases, we do not have
the same concerns that caused us to apply the Lessary “sane
conduct” test in “successive prosecution” cases. As we expressed
in Lessary, the dangers in “successive prosecution” cases are as

follows:

Successive prosecutions, however, whether following
acquittals or convictions, raise concerns that extend beyond
merely the possibility of an enhanced sentence(.) The
taderlying one that is Seoply ingrained in at least
the Anglo-Anerican syston of Jurisprudence, is that the
State with ail ite resources and power should not be allowed
ted attempts to convict an individual for an
thereby subjecting hin to gubarrassment,
Gxpense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
fontinuing state of anxiety and insecurity(.] Multipre
prosecutions also give the State an opportunity to reh
Tea"presentation of proof, thus increasing the risk of an
ertonsous conviction for one or more of the offenses
Gharged. Even when a State cen bring sultiple charg
‘against an individual under Blockburgss, a tremendous
fsdditional burden is placed on that defendant if he must
face each of the charges in a separate proceeding.

 

 

  

   

 

 

Lessary, 75 Haw. at 455-56, 865 P.2d at 154-55 (quoting Gradv,
495 U.S. at 518-19) (alterations in original). Third, a

legislative “end-run” around constitutional double jeopardy

23
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eee

protections is not possible so long

 

the legislature acts

within its power to define criminal offenses and to set the

punishment for those convicted of these offenses. See Whalen v
United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980) ("[T]he legislative power

to define offenses and to prescribe the punishments to be imposed
upon those found guilty of them resides wholly with the
congress.) tev. ra, 106 Hawai'i 146, 158, 102 P.3d
1044, 1056 (2004) ("[T]he power to determine appropriate
punishment for criminal acts lies in the legislative branch.”
(Quoting State v, Bernades, 71 Haw. 485, 490, 795 P.2d 842, 845
(1990) .

 

Bexnades, 71 Haw. at 490, 795 P.2d at 045 (stating
further that the “courts cannot interfere unless the punishent
prescribed appears clearly and manifestly to be cruel and
unusual”). In “multiple punishments” cases, the double

Jeopardy clause serves as a constraint on the courts, ensuring
that the court cannot impose punishment upon a defendant that is
greater than what the legislature has authorized. As such, it is
not possible to have a legislative end-run as long as the
legislature is acting within its power.

The dissent disagrees with our analysis, contending
that the “same conduct” test should be applied as Lessary is not
Limited to “successive prosecution” cases, and that Lessary
extended double jeopardy protections against the legislature. We

respectfully disagree. ‘The facts of Lessary, discussed infra,

24
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show successive prosecution for abuse, terroristic threatening,

and unlawful imprisonment, and not a multiple punishments

 

scenario. As clearly stated by Justice Ramil in Jumila, 2
multiple punishments case decided after Lessary:
s[zinere is @ crucial distinction between Lessary and the
present. case =~
thie the press: ia mule a

us He Phrocecutions raise slanificant dangers that are
hot present in multiple punishment situations.
Concerns justify a nore rigorous standard for successive
prosecution cases

gumila, 87 Hawas's at 12, 950 P.2d at 1212 (Ramil, J.,
dissenting) (emphasie added). In addition, the dissent in

Brantley acknowledged that Lessary did pot decide the issue of
whether the “ame conduct” or “same elements” test applies to

multiple punishnents situations:

the question of whether state vs Lesgary, 75 Haw. 446, 865
piseis0 (1398), oF Blockburger v. United States, 284" 0.5.

Boon 32 8: ces 180, 76 E.G 306 (1932), applies to multiple
2ekteheente in a single prosecution has’ not been answered by

Chie court. See Tomomitey v. State, 93 Hawai'i 22, 31.

59s poad 323,582 tapp-2000) tReoba, J. concurring) ("the

Garrese court has net expressly indicated which test applies

Gace the sawal'i Constitution in the multiple punishnents

sizuation.”)

Brantley, 99 Hawai'i at 485, 56 P.3d at-i274 (Acoba, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted) -

‘The dissent’s contention that Lessary extended our
double jeopardy protections against the legislature is belied by
our subsequent decisions in Jumila end Brantley. In Jumila,
discussed infra, we stated that the legislature could, if it

desired, create an exception to the statutory prohibition set

25
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a

forth in HRS § 701-109 against convictions for both an offense
and an offense included therein. Jumlia, 87 Hawai'i at 4-5, 950
P.2d at 1204-05. In Brantley, we found that the legislature
indeed did intend to permit convictions of both HRS § 134-6(a)
and the separate felony (the included offense), and held that a
defendant can be convicted of both offenses. Brantley, 99
Hawai'i at 469, 56 P.3d at 1258.

our jurisprudence on this issue, grounded in the beliet
that the double jeopardy clause is primarily a restriction on the
courts and the prosecution, which allows the legislature (within
the boundaries of the eighth and fourteenth Anendents to the
united States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the
Hawai'i Constitution) to define crimes and fix punishments, is
consistent with the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
court. In addition, with the exception of Indiana cited in the
dissent, we have been unable to locate any other jurisdiction,
state-or federal, whose majority has agréed witi'the dissent’ s
argument; the dissent’s premise (with the exception of Indiana)
has been espoused solely in dissents. See, e.g, Missouri ve
Hunter, 459 0.8. 359, 370 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(stating that the legislature cannot authorize multiple
punishments). Me reject the dissent’s argument as it is contrary

to the double jeopardy jurisprudence of the United States Supreme

26
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Court and this court.” We consequently hold that the double
jeopardy clause does not constrain the legislature from
Antentionally imposing multiple punishments upon a defendant for
separate offenses arising out of the same conduct.

In conclusion, we believe that the protections afforded
by the United States Constitution, as set forth in the

burger “same elements” test, adequately protect against

double jeopardy in “multiple punishnents” cases.

c. Licat. i" “same Elements” Test to

Feliciano

Feliciano asserts that his rights to double jeopardy
protection were violated when he was convicted of and sentenced
for three offenses: (1) attempted murder in the second degree
(HRS § 706-500, 707-701.5, and 706-656), with a sentence of life
imprisonment with the possibility of parole, and a three-year
mandatory minimum term sentence under HRS § 706-660.1); (2) place
to keep pistol (HRS § 134-6(c) and (e)), with a ten-year
sentence; and (3) Use of a*firearm in the commission of a
separate felony (HRS §134-6(a) and (e)), with a twenty-year
sentence. Specifically, Feliciano contends that his
constitutional double jeopardy rights were violated in two ways.
First, he argues that the circuit court's sentence for use of a

% Le we were to adopt the dissent's argument, HRS § 701-109 would be
rendered unconstitutional becouse this statute authorizes the legislature to
Impose multiple punishments for separate offenses arising out of the same
conduct.

   

 

27
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firearm in the commission of a separate felony constituted

multiple punishments for the same offense in two ways

 

between use of a firearm in the commission of a separate felony
and HRS § 706-660.1, and as between using a firearm in the
commission of a separate felony and attempted murder in the
second degree. Second, he argues that the circuit court’s
sentence on place to keep constituted multiple punishments for

the same offense in three way:

 

(a) as between place to keep and
attempted murder in second degree; (b) as between place to keep
and HRS § 706-660.1; and (c) as between place to keep and use of
a firearm in the commission of a separate felony.

Application of the Blockburger “same elements” test to
each violation of double jeopardy alleged by Feliciano reveals
that Feliciano’s constitutional rights have not been violated.

. Use of a Firearm and Second Degree Attempted Murder

‘The elements of murder in the second degree are:

 

(1) causing the death of ancther person? and (2) doing so
intentionally or knowingly. HRS § 707-701.5. The elements of
attempt are: (1) engaging in conduct which would constitute the
crime if the attendant circumstances were as the person believed
them to be; or (2) engaging in conduct which, under the

circumstanc

 

the person believes them to be, constitutes a

substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in

28
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the person’s commission of the crimes and (3) engaging in either
element (1) o (2) intentionally. HRS § 705-500.

use of a firearm has the following elenents:
(1) carrying, having within the person’s immediate control,
using, or threatening to use a firearm; (2) while committing
separate felony; and (3) engaging in elements (1) and (2)
knowingly. HRS § 134-6(a). Use of a firearm requires proof of
fact thet second degree attempted murder does not -- that the
person use a firearm. A person can commit second degree
attempted murder with or without the use of 2 firearm. Attempted
murder requires that the person intended to cause the death of
another person -- an element not present in the use of a firearm.

Each offense has an element which the other does not, and thus is

 

a separate offense for double jeopardy purposes.
Attempted murder is, however, an included offense of
use of a firearm, As we discussed in Jumila, HRS § 701-109
prohibits convictions for both an offense and an offense included
therein. However, in Brantley, 99 Hawai'i at 469, 56 P.3d at
1258, after examination of the legislative history of the use of
a firearm statute (HRS § 134-6(a)), we held that: (1) the
legislature intended to permit convictions of both HRS § 134-6(a)
and the separate felony; and (2) HRS § 134-6(a) was a statutory
exception to the prohibition against convicting for both an

offense and an included offense set forth in HRS § 701-109.

29
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‘therefore, per our holding in Brantley, Feliciano can be
convicted of both attempted murder and of use of a firearm.

2. Place to Keep and Attempted Murder in the Second Degree

The elements of place to keep are: (1) carrying or

possessing a loaded cr unloaded firearm; (2) doing so when the
firearm was not confined in an enclosed containers and (3)
carrying or possessing the unenclosed firearm in a place other
than the person’s place of business, residence, or sojurn or
between specific places (i.e., place of purchase or repair,
target range, police station, etc.). HRS § 134-6(c). Attempted
murder in the second degree and place to keep do not share any
common elements, and thus are separate offenses for double
jeopardy purposes.

3. Place to Keep and Use of a Firearm

Both place to ke

 

p and use of a fir

 

rm require that
the person carry a firearm, However, use of a firearm requires
thatthe person commit a separate felony, an element not required
by place to keep. Place to keep focuses on location (i.e.,
whether the person was at an authorized location or traveling
between authorized locations), an element which is not present in
use of a firearm. Place to keep and use of a firearm are thus

separate offenses for double jeopardy purposes.

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eee

4. Conclusion

Each of the aforementioned offenses (attempted murder
in the second degree, place to keep, and use of a firearm)
contains elements which the ethers do not. Thus, the circuit
court did not violate the Hawai'i Constitution's double jeopardy
clause by convicting Feliciano of attempted murder in the second

degree, place to keep, and use of @ firearm.

D. 2% es im of
mum Term 5 fo nl
ciano Was Als ed tence
r Use of a in amis Ee
ui to
jultiple Punishments.

We previously concluded, aupra, that the circuit court
did not violate Feliciano’s rights under the Hawai'i
Constitution's double Jeopardy clause by convicting Feliciano of
attenpted murder in the second degree, place to keep, and use of
2 firearm. However, Feliciano also contends that his
constitutional double jeopardy rights were violated when the
circuit court imposed a mandatory minimum term sentence pursuant
to HRS § 706-660.1 for attempted murder in the second degree when
Feliciano was also convicted of, and sentenced for, use of a
firearm in the commission of the separate felony of attempted

murder in the second degree. We disagree.

31
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Legislative intent is the proper analysis to apply in
determining whether double jeopardy bars multiple
punishnents.
We previously discussed, supra, the legislature's power
to define criminal offenses and to determine appropriate
punishments for the offenses. We held that the double jeopardy
clause does not constrain the legislature from intentionally
imposing multiple punishments upon a defendant for separate
offenses arising out of the same conduct. The issue we are faced
with in this case is thus whether the legislature intended to
punish Feliciano under both HRS § 134-6(a) and HRS § 706-660.1
for use of @ fizearm in shooting Stoesser.**

2, The legislature clearly intended to punish a defendant

multiple times if the defendant uses a firearm in the
ion of a felony.

 

In 1990, the legislature amended HRS § 134-6 as follows
(bracketed material deleted, new material underlined):

5136-6

ofa felony; [Place] place to Keep Firearns; loaded
fiearas; penalty. (a) 1 shail be unlawful fora person to
Knowingly possess of intentionally use or thresten to use a

care wae shether operable OF

(6) }40) any person violating thia section by
possessing, usin Se threstening touse a turers while

 

% the Blackburger “sane elenente” test applies to offenses only, and
does not apply when comparing 4 mandatory minimum sentence statute and an
Cffense. ‘Ball v. United States, 410 U.S. 856, Sel (1985) ("For purposes of
applying the BlocEouraar test in this setting’ as a me:

congressional intent, ‘punishsent’ must be the equiva:
Conviction and not simply the imposition of sentence.)

 

 

32
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Siass A felon.
990 Haw. Sess. L. Act 195, § 2 at 422 (footnote omitted). In
section 5 of the same bill, the legislature also amended language
in HRS § 706-660.1. 1990 Haw. Sess. L. Act 195, § 2 at 423-24.
While the amendments to the mandatory minimum statute are not
relevant (because they involve semi-automatic firearms) the fact
that the legislature amended HRS § 134-6 in the same bill that
contained the mandatory minimum sentence statute, HRS § 706-
660.1, shows that the legislature was aware of both punishments
and intended to punish a defendant who committed a felony while
using @ firearm multiple times.

b. 1993 legislative histor

In 1993, the legislature amended HRS § 134-6 as follows
(deleted material bracketed; new material underlined):

§ 134-6 (Possession) Carrying oF use of firearm in the

commission of = separate felony; place to keep firearss;

{ended firenras/ penalty. (a) it shall be unlawful for a

person to knowingly (possess) carry on the person or have

a or intentionally use
BMD RESPES Ge a firearm bile engaged in the commission
Cf a separate felony, whether the firearm was loaded oF not,

Gnd whether operable oF not lL
rosecss this 3 where th eats

 

Eien Toe he
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

nstrunent or seans by which the property damsce

iecaused.

1 sha vs 2 knowin
EGitission of 2 felony offense involving the distribution of
fotrtend whether opereble of note

1993 Haw. Sess. L. Act 239, § 1 at 418. The House Judiciary
conmittee stated that this anendnent was to clarify that HRS s
134-6 “was not intended to apply to certain felonies which
atzeady have enhanced penalties for identical conduct. lise.
Stand. Comm. Rep. No, 472, in 1993 House Journal, at 1163. This
amendnent is significant, because while the legislature amended
the statute to exempt certain felonies, it did not exempt the
present situation, where the defendant is convicted of a separate
felony (to which the mandatory minimum is attached) and use of @
firearm.”

c. 1999 legislative history

In 1999, the legislature amended HRS § 134-6 as follows
(new material underlined) :
be guilty SPaveiase A Eelonyy Any Person viousting” chta

Carrying or possessing # loaded or unloaded pistol or
Hevolver without 2 ligense iseved as provided in section

 

    

 

 

1 me Senate Jodiciary Committee also stated that HRS § 134-6(a) “was
not intended to pemit charging of a separate felony for use of a firearm
Ghere the underlying felony involves firearm and is classified as a felony
for thst reason alone.” Sen, Stand. Comm. Rep. No, 1217, in 1993 Senate
Journal, st 1210

‘the Senate Judiciary Committee algo stated that the legislature created
the offense of "use of a firearm” to “recognize and deter the heightened

inted when a firearm is involved in the commission of a felony such

wGen. Stand. Conn. Sap. No. 1217, sn 1993 Senate Journal, at

 

 

 

 

   

34
 

*** FOR PUBLICATION **

ee

134-9 shall be guilty of @ class B felony. Any person
Uisiacing this Section by carrying or possessing en unloaded
firearms other than a pistol of revolver, shall be guilty of
f class C felony.

 

u se oF
si the 2) vided
eet ecu with ee for

‘separate felon

1999 Haw. Sess. L. Act 12, § 1 at 12. The legislature made this
amendnent to clarify the law after this court issued Junila,

where we held that a defendant could not be punished for use of a
firearm and a separate, underlying felony. The Senate Judiciary

Committee stated that:

‘The purpose of this pill ie to clarify that any
conviction of sentence for cézrying or use of a firearm in
the conmiseion of # separate felony

ein any conviction and
Separate felony.

‘Your Committee believes that stronger and more certain

cies bein ate the

 

 

neence for the

 

rent asin uae.

‘Your Committee finds that clarification in
necessary due toe recent Hawaii Supreme Court case,

S1z, 87 Hew. 1 (1996), in whieh the Court held that
tie tfense of carrying of sing # firearm in the commission
Sea felony wes not punisheble as 2 separate offense from
the underlying felony. In gugila, the majority and the
SiSsene agreed that the legisiature could, if desired,
pernit-the conviction and sentencing for both offenses,
Ronover, the najority-and dissent disagreed as to whether
the legislature had done so, The majority found that there
as insufficient legislative history to conclude that the
[2gisiature had intended separate convictions and

Stencing. ‘The dissent disagreed, citing prior case law
Gnd lenguage in committee reperts indicating that carrying
Sr using s firearm in the commission of a felony could be
Charged in addition to the underlying offense,

‘Your Committee agrees with the dissent. Senate
Standing Committee Report No. 1217 (1993 Senate Journal at
{elo} clearly states "(alm offender who uses 2 firearm in
the commisston of # felony can be charged with,
fo 'the underlying offense @ class A felony under section
Tiu-tla] and therefore be subject to enhanced penalty.”
(emphasis added.)

‘At the some time, your Committee recognizes and seeks
to address another shortecning in the law, as pointed out by

 

 

 

 

 

     

  

 

35
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the Juaila dissent. The dissent noted that there waa
Snsuftuese: lati

 

‘sentencing under section 14-6101 and section 106-6601
sentence of isprisonment for-use of a firearm int felony
‘Xout Committee believes that when the application of both

‘SEARSSTE “Based anon the sane underiving felony:

Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 843, in 1993 Senate Journal, at 1296
(Emphases added, third emphasis in original). This legislative
history clearly shows that the legislature intended to punish
defendants multiple times for both the underlying, separate
felony (with a conviction and a mandatory minimum) and with a
conviction for use of a firearm.

We note that our recent decision in State v. Vellina,
106 Hawai'i 441, 106 P.3d 364 (2005), and the recent decision of
the ICA in State v. Coelho, No. 25805 Hawai'i _, __ P.3d _
(iiaw. Apr. 28, 2005), are consistent with, but distinguishable
from, our decision in this case.” In Yelling, the defendant
allegedly stole two firearms from an apartment. Vellina, 106

Hawaii at 445, 106 P.3d at 368. The defendant entered a plea of

 

® our decision today is also consistent with State ¥. Abrosio, 12 Haw.
496, 496657, #24 P.2d 107, 107-108 (1992), where the defendant ples no con
to charges Of kidnaping and possession of 2 firearm in the commission of &
Felony (among other charges) = The trial court imposed ma

of inpriscament for both the kidnaping charge and the pos!
Sh the commission of the felony of kignaping charoe. i

     
  
 

 

at 497, 824 F.2d at
108. we hela that a defendant could be sentenced to a mandatory’ minimun term
Of imprisonment in connection with the kicnaping conviction, but couls not be
Sentenced to a mandatory mininun term of imprisonment for the use of a firearm
Conviction. Ide at 498, 824 P-2d at 108. We based this holding on the fact
that [t]he legislature hes chosen to make the use of = firearm in the

 

 

comission of s felony the basis for enhanced sentencing for that felony, and
{thas also chosen to make such use # separate felony, Sut it clearly hae not
Chosen to inpose euo mandatory minimum sentences for one use of a gun.” Lk.
ar 497-98, 824 F.2d at 108.

 

36
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oe
no contest to the charges against him, which included two counts
of theft in the first degree. Id. at 444, 106 P.3d at 367, The
prosecution requested, and the court granted, mandatory minimum
terms of imprisonment (pursuant to HRS §§ 706-660.1(1) (c) and
706-660.1(3) (c)) as to both of the theft counts. Id, We stated:

Vellina did not possess, use, or threaten the use of a

firears while engeged in Of the felonies of

thet ofc firearm and a senivautonatic firearm. Vellina’ s

thet Sf ¢ firearm gas the entire felony; in other words,

there was no underlying felony that Velline committed while

possessing or using e firearm.

Ida at 447-48, 106 P.3d at 370-71.

     

 

 

In Goetho, the defendant was a felon who was on
probation; one of the terns of the defendant's probation was that
he was not to possess any type of firearm. While executing a
search warrant, police officers recovered a firearm fron the
trunk of the defendant's vehicle. The defendant was convicted of
prohibited possession of a firearm and sentenced to a ten-year
term of imprisonment. The trial court also inposed = mandatory
inimim term of imprisonment for the possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony. Based upon statutory
construction and Hawai'i case lew, the ICA concluded that the
trial court could not convict the defendant for possession of a
firearm and sentence him for a mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment based upon the same possession of a firearm because

the legislature did not intend that the mandatory minimum term be

37
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applied where the entirety of the felonious conduct is the use or
the possession of a firearm.

Vellina and Coelho are thus both distinguishable fron
the present case. In the present case, the mandatory mininun
sentence was attached to a separate (from use of a firearm)
felony -- attenpted murder; in contrast, in Vellina and Coelho,
there was no separate felony and the trial courts improperly
attached the mandatory minimun term of inprisonnent to the use oF
possession of a firearm conviction.”

B. 704-400 pefens ~pefens
1. HRS § 704-400 Defense

Feliciano argues that the circust court erred in
relying on the opinions of Dr. Stein and Dr. Kappenberg because
both doctors failed to conduct a thorough examination of
Feliciano, specifically, Feliciano argues that Or. Kappenberg
and Dr. Stein failed to investigate Feliciano’s health status in
the weeks and nontiié’ Before the shooting and failed to ask
Fellclane questions about critical delusional beliefs. We
disagree.

he record shows that both doctors conducted a thorough
examination of Feliciano, Both doctors testified that they

reviewed Feliciano’s records, including police reports, Veterans’

D the holdings of this court and the ICA are also consistent with the
legislative history of HRS § 706-660.. See supra note

38

 

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
oe

‘Administration records, Adult Probation records, and reports of
past hospitalization. Dr. Kappenberg also testified that he
reviewed Feliciano’s OCC records. Both doctors also conducted
clinical examinations of Feliciano where they spent @ hour to an
hour and a half examining Feliciano. Both doctors testified to
their knowledge of Feliciano’s history of mental illness, Thus,
the record shows that both Dr. Kappenberg and Dr. Stein conducted
a thorough examination of Feliciano.

the record also shows that the doctors investigated
Feliciano’s mental statue during the time before the shooting.
goth doctors testified as to Feliciano’s pattern of taking (or
not taking) his anti-psychotic medication and other drugs. Dr.
Keppenberg also testified that Feliciano told him that he was not
taking his anti-psychotic medication for a while before the
shooting, indicating that Dr. Keppenberg’s examination included
an inquiry into Feliciano’s mental state before the shooting.

Feliciano also argues that both doctors failed to make
inquiries as to critical delusional beliefs; however, this
argument is not persuasive because both doctors testified that
Feliciano’s delusional beliefs had no effect on his actions that
day. br. Kappenberg testified that Feliciano knew the difference
between right and wrong, could give a description of the event
(and that the description comported with the accounts of other

witnesses), and that Feliciano specifically indicated that his

39
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beliefs had no connection to the shooting. Dr. Stein similarly
testified that Feliciano knew that it was wrong to shoot people,
was aware of the event, and vas aware of his participation in
that event. Dr. Stein further testified that Feliciano's
capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
not substantially impaired at the time of the offense. All three
doctors opined that Feliciano’s delusional beliefs were not
connected to the shooting and that Feliciano was not
substantially impaired at the time of the shooting. In summary,
there was substantial evidence to support the circuit court's
conclusion that Feliciano was penally responsible for his conduct
at the time he shot Stoesser.
2. Self-defense

Feliciano also argues that the circuit court's
conclusion of law that “the shooting of Stoesser was not
justifiable under HRS § 703-304 has been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt by the prosecution” is irrelevant because
Feliciano did not raise self-defense.

Self defense is a defense in any prosecution for an
offense. HRS § 703-301(1) (1993); see also State v, Culkin, 97
Hawai'i 203, 215, 35 P.3d 233, 242 (2001). “Self-defense is not
an affirmative defense, and the prosecution has the burden of
disproving it once evidence of justification has been adduced.”

State v. Van Dyke, 101 Hawai'i 377, 386, 69 P.3d 88, 97 (2003)

40
 

*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

(quoting Culkin, 97 Hawai'i at 215, 35 P.3d at 242), Feliciano
was charged with shooting Stoesser in the eye; this conduct
constituted “deadly force.” See HRS § 703-300 (1993) (defining
deadly force as “force which the actor uses with the intent of
causing or which the actor knows to create a substantial risk of
causing death or serious bodily harm”). Such force would be
justified if Feliciano believed that deadly force was necessary
to protect himself against “death, serious bodily injury,
kidnaping, rape or forcible sodeny.” HRS § 703-304 (1993 and

Supp. 2004). Feliciano testified that he acted in self

MRS § 703-204, entitled “Use of force in self-protection,” provides:

(2) Subject to the provisions of this section and of
section 103-308, the use of force upon or toward another
person ie justifiable when the actor believes that such

ep snmeciately necessary for the purpose of protecting
1f against the use of unlawful force by the other

ceasion.

‘Of deadly force is justifiable under this
section If the actor believes that deadly force 1s necessary
fo protect himself against death, serious bodily injury,
Kighapping, rape, of forcible sodomy.

(3) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (4)
and ($) of this section; © person employing protective force
may-estimate the necessity thereof under the circumstunces
bs he believes then to be when the force is used without
Fetreating, surtendering possession, doing any other act
Wich ne has no legal duty to do, of abstaining from any
Taweun action:

(G) The vse of force is not justifiable under this

 

     

  

 

 

(a) To reesst an arrest which the actor knows is
being made by a law enforcement officer,
although the srrest {s unlawful; or
() To resist foree used by the occupier or possessor of
property of by another person on his behalf, were the
Seter knows that the person using the force’ is doing
fo under a claim of right to protect the property,
except that this limitation shall not apply if:
(i) The actor is a public officer acting in the
performance of his duties or a person lawfully
(continued. +.)

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defense. On cross-examination, Feliciano testified that:
(1) Stoesser told him that he had a sawed-off shotgun; (2)
Feliciano thought that Stoesser was going to kill him; (3) when
Feliciano and Stoesser got into an argument before the shooting,
Stoesser hit Feliciano with his baton; and (4) Feliciano shot

Stoesser because he thought that Stoesser was going to shoot him

 

"(scone snved)
assisting him therein or
assisting ina lawful arzi
(4) The actor beleves that such force is necessary
fo protect himself against death or serious
bodily injury.
(5) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under
yotsen Af
te) "rhe actor, with the intent of causing death or
berious bodily injury, provoked the use of force
ageinet himself in the Sane encounter; oF
tb) The actor knows that he cen avoid the necessity
Ge using such force with complete safety by
Yetreating of by surrendering possession of &

 

 

 

 

thing £0 # person asserting a claim of right
thereto of by complying with 2 demand that ne
fEsin fron any action which he has no duty to

   

take, except that?

(i) the actor ie not obliged to retreat trom
his dwelling or place of work, unless he
was the instil aggressor or is assailed
in hia place of work by another person
whose place of work the actor knows it to
bey ang

Lit) Ropublic officer justified in using force
Tn'the performance of his duties, ox a
porson Justified in using force in his
BSsistance or a person Justified in using
force in making an arrest or preventing an
Escape, se not obliged to desist from
sfforts to perform his duty, effect the
Serest, of prevent the escape because of
feeiatance or threatened resistance by or
On behalf of the person against whom the
action is directed.

(6) The justification afforded by this section extends
to the use of confinenant ae protective force only if the
betor takes all reasonable measures to terminate the
Confinement az goon as he knows that ne safely can, unless
the person confines has been arrested on a charge of crine.

 

   

 

42
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with his sawed-off shotgun. Feliciano further testified that he
only shot Stoesser once because he did not want to Kill him, he
only wanted “to neutralize the threat.”29 Peliciane having

raised the issue of self-defense, the circuit court did not err

 

by concluding that the prosecution proved that Feliciano was not
acting in self-defense when he shot Stoesser.

Iv. CONCLUSION

Wwe affirm the circuit court’s November 19, 2003 final

judgment, guilty convictions, and sentences in all respects.

on the briefs: Y
Phyllis J. Hironaka, Grr
Deputy Public Defender
for defendant-appel lent Blac Reavinson

Hal Feliciano

Mark Yuen
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,

for plaintitf-appellee
State of Hawai’ Yom «Rt ry

25 purehermore, on cross-examination, Feliciano’ s counsel questioned
stoonrur an te unether he bad any nartial arts inplenents; Stoesser testified
Stoeaeer 28 Ceachakis (a weapon which consista of a pair of hardwood sticks
Saat eens choin) and a baton. Felicianc's counsel further quest ‘ones
joined bY, = Cohiheher ne had che implementa the day of the shooting snd)
Beoosser a8 0 Mtemvon Feliciano. Moreover, ali three doctors stated that
cee eee ig described his actions as self-defense.

 

3