Case Title: Williams v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC13-1472

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2017-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-1472 
____________ 
 
RONNIE KEITH WILLIAMS, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[June 29, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Ronnie Keith Williams appeals an order of the circuit court denying his 
motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed 
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  We have jurisdiction.  See 
art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons explained below, we affirm the 
postconviction court’s order denying all claims, with the exception of the 
ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel claim, which we do not address 
because Williams is entitled to a new penalty phase in light of Hurst v. State 
(Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, No. 16-998, 2017 WL 635999 
(U.S. May 22, 2017), and Mosley v. State (Mosley), 209 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. 2016). 
 
 
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Williams was initially convicted and sentenced to death for the first-degree 
murder of Lisa Dyke.  See Williams v. State (Williams I), 792 So. 2d 1207, 1207 
(Fla. 2001).1  However, we reversed the conviction on direct appeal due to the trial 
court’s error in substituting an alternate juror on the panel after the jury began its 
guilt-phase deliberations.  Id.  Williams was retried and again convicted of the 
first-degree murder of Dyke.  See Williams v. State (Williams II), 967 So. 2d 735, 
741 (Fla. 2007).  The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of ten to two.  
Id. at 746.  The trial court followed the recommendation and sentenced Williams to 
death.  Id.  In our opinion affirming the conviction and sentence after the retrial, 
we described the facts of the murder: 
On Tuesday, January 26, 1993, at approximately 8:30 a.m., a 
call was made to 911 from a woman who identified herself as Lisa 
Dyke.  Dyke stated that she had been stabbed in her heart and back, 
and she was more than seven months pregnant.  When the operator 
inquired of Dyke as to who stabbed her, she responded with a name 
that sounded to the operator like “Rodney.”  Dyke then informed the 
operator that her attacker was a black male and, although she did not 
know his last name, she could provide a phone number from which 
that information could be obtained.  Dyke provided the phone number 
and stated that it belonged to the girlfriend of the man who had 
stabbed her. 
When Dyke opened her door for the police, Officer Brian 
Gillespie observed an eighteen-year-old black female who was nude, 
                                          
 
 
1.  In that decision, Williams was referred to as Ronald Keith Williams.  
However, in subsequent cases, Williams has been, and will continue to be, referred 
to as Ronnie Keith Williams. 
 
 
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bloody, and wet, “as if she tried to take a shower.”  Dyke was holding 
clothing in front of herself in an attempt to cover her nudity.  
According to Gillespie, Dyke was upset and beginning to lose 
consciousness.  Gillespie observed stab wounds on Dyke’s upper torso 
and back and noticed that there was blood “pretty much everywhere.”  
As she lay on the couch, Dyke stated repeatedly to Gillespie that she 
did not want to die.  While the paramedics were treating Dyke, 
Gillespie asked who had stabbed her.  Through the oxygen mask that 
covered Dyke’s face, and over the sounds of numerous police and 
paramedic radios, Gillespie heard Dyke say the name “Rodney.”  
When Gillespie asked Dyke who Rodney was, Dyke replied, “Ruth’s 
sister’s boyfriend.”  Dyke gave Gillespie the telephone number of 
“Ruth’s sister.”  Dyke then made the unsolicited statement to 
Gillespie, “He raped me.”  Soon after, the paramedics transported 
Dyke to the hospital.  Hospital personnel were unable to perform a 
rape examination or collect evidentiary samples for analysis before 
Dyke was rushed into surgery. 
While processing the crime scene, Detective Bob Cerat noticed 
that there were no signs of forced entry into the apartment.  In the 
bedroom, Cerat discovered a knife that was stained with the same 
reddish substance that appeared throughout the apartment. . . .  
Detective Anthony Lewis determined that Ruth Lawrence 
rented the apartment where the stabbing had occurred.  He met with 
Ruth, and she stated that Lisa Dyke had been babysitting Ruth’s nine-
month-old son in the apartment.  Dyke had been living with Ruth for 
approximately two weeks.  Dyke was connected with Ruth because 
Dyke was dating Ruth’s brother, Julius, and Julius was the father of 
Dyke’s unborn baby.  The detective discovered that Ruth’s sister was 
named Stefanie Lawrence, and the name of Stefanie’s boyfriend was 
Ronnie Williams.  At the time of the attack, Stefanie and Ronnie had 
been dating for approximately six months.  Stefanie lived with her 
father and Julius, and her telephone number was the number that Dyke 
provided to police and the 911 operator to identify her attacker.  Ruth 
testified at trial that when she left the apartment that morning to go to 
school, there was no blood in the apartment where Dyke was found, 
and Williams had never before bled in her apartment. 
Subsequent investigation revealed that on the night before the 
crime, Ruth had participated in a three-way telephone call with 
Stefanie and Williams . . . .  Dyke was listening to the conversation on 
another extension in Ruth’s apartment.  During that call, Ruth 
 
 
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prompted Stefanie to break her relationship with Williams, and 
Stefanie proceeded to do so during the phone conversation.  Stefanie 
then advised Williams that he was not to return to Ruth’s apartment 
again.  According to Stefanie, Williams was upset, and he repeatedly 
stated that they could resolve the problem.  After the call ended, 
Stefanie did not speak to Williams again, but he paged her four or five 
times that night.  Stefanie did not respond to the pages, and the last 
page from Williams was around midnight. 
Stefanie Lawrence agreed to assist the police in locating where 
Williams lived.  Officer David Jones went to the house identified by 
Stefanie and encountered Williams’s sister, Clinita Lawrence, who 
informed Officer Jones that she had transported Williams to a mental 
health crisis facility earlier that day when she noticed that he was 
acting bizarrely.  Officer Jones proceeded to the crisis center and 
located Williams.  Officer Jones observed that Williams had several 
fresh bandages on both of his hands.  Williams was transported to the 
police station, and Officer Jones advised him of his Miranda rights. 
When Dyke regained consciousness after her surgery, she wrote 
a note to a nurse indicating a desire to speak to the authorities. 
Detective Daniel James spoke to Dyke in the intensive care unit.  
Dyke agreed to respond to Detective James’s questions by nodding 
her head for “yes” and moving her head from side-to-side for “no” 
because she was unable to speak with the tubes which had been placed 
in her mouth.  Detective James produced a photographic lineup of six 
individuals and asked Dyke if she recognized the person who attacked 
her.  Dyke tapped on the photo of Ronnie Williams with her finger. 
At the police station, Williams admitted to Officer Jones that he 
knew Dyke, but stated that he had not been in Ruth’s apartment at the 
time Dyke was stabbed.  With regard to the bandages on his hands, 
Williams stated that he had cut his fingers on a knife as he was 
washing dishes.  He mentioned that he was having problems with his 
girlfriend, and that Dyke had been “kind of the go-between person.”  
When Williams was informed that Dyke had identified him as the 
person who stabbed her, Williams requested an attorney, and the 
interview was terminated.  At that time, Williams was arrested for the 
attack on Dyke. 
On January 28, 1993, when Detective James returned to check 
on Dyke’s condition and to photograph her wounds, he realized that 
some of the wounds appeared to be bite marks.  James photographed 
bite marks on Dyke’s chest, arm, breast, and the back of her shoulder. 
 
 
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Dyke also indicated a bite mark in her groin area, but James was 
unable to photograph that area because Dyke was again taken into 
surgery to deliver her baby by cesarean section.  Dyke died on 
February 14, 1993, nineteen days after the stabbing. 
At trial, forensic pathologist Ronald Wright noted that Dyke 
had sustained six stab wounds in her back, some of which penetrated 
her lungs, which caused bleeding into the chest cavity and collapse of 
the lungs.  Further, one stab wound had penetrated Dyke’s sternum 
and was at least four inches deep.  Wright opined that the original stab 
wound would have been deeper, but it was impossible to determine 
the exact depth because Dyke’s wounds had been healing for nineteen 
days before her death.  The doctor noted that Dyke had defensive 
wounds on her hands and bite marks on her body.  Dr. Wright 
ultimately concluded that the cause of Dyke’s death was multiple stab 
wounds which, over a period of nineteen days, produced a fatally high 
level of toxicity in Dyke’s body.  Dr. Wright further reviewed the 
photos of the cuts on Williams’s hands, and concluded that the cuts 
were consistent with slippage—a phenomenon that occurs when a 
person hits a hard surface (such as a sternum) with a hiltless knife 
(such as that which was recovered from the apartment), and the hand 
slides down the knife, producing a cut on the hand of the person 
holding it. 
Fingerprint analyst Fred Boyd testified that a fingerprint found 
in a reddish substance that was located on the bathroom door of 
Ruth’s apartment matched the known print of Williams’s left ring 
finger.  DNA testing on blood samples taken from two pieces of 
clothing collected from the apartment generated DNA profiles that 
matched the profile of Williams at four genetic locations.  According 
to a DNA analysis expert, the frequency of occurrence of finding the 
same profile in two unrelated individuals who matched at four of 
these points would be one in 120 million African-Americans.  Finally, 
forensic dentist Richard Souviron compared the photographs of the 
bite mark on Dyke’s breast with dental casts made from the mouth of 
Williams and concluded with reasonable certainty that the bite on 
Dyke’s breast was made by Williams. 
 
 
 
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Id. at 741-44 (footnotes omitted).  The jury found Williams guilty of first-degree 
murder and indicated in an interrogatory verdict that its finding was based on both 
premeditated and felony murder theories.  Id. at 744. 
 
In sentencing Williams to death, the trial court found that four aggravating 
circumstances were proven beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) Williams was 
previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence (the 
second-degree murder of Gaynel Jeffrey in 1984 and an indecent assault upon a 
nine-year-old girl in 1982) (great weight); (2) the murder was committed while 
Williams was engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight 
after committing or attempting to commit a sexual battery (great weight); (3) the 
murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) (great weight); and 
(4) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner 
without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP) (moderate weight).  Id. 
at 744-46.  The trial court found that two statutory mitigating circumstances were 
present: (1) Williams was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the 
time of the crime (little weight); and (2) the capacity of Williams to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law 
was substantially impaired (little weight).  Id.  The trial court also found five 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances and accorded each slight weight: 
(1) while housed in the Broward County Jail, Williams was a model 
prisoner; (2) while housed in the Broward County Jail, Williams 
 
 
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attended religious services; (3) Williams had a deprived childhood 
because he did not know his father, he lost his mother at an early age, 
he was raised in poverty by his sister, he did not start school until 
adolescence, and he had difficulty finding work after his two prior 
criminal convictions; (4) Williams is a loving person who never 
fought with his relatives, and was a good brother to his sister; and (5) 
Williams was slight in stature and was frequently beat up and robbed 
of his bus money on his way to school. 
Id. at 746 & n.10. 
Williams raised twenty issues on direct appeal.  He argued that the trial 
court: (1) abused its discretion when it admitted out-of-court statements made by 
Dyke; (2) improperly departed from a position of neutrality; (3) abused its 
discretion when it allowed the jury to have access to a transcript of the 911 call that 
was prepared by the State; (4) abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of 
Dyke’s pregnancy; (5) erred when it submitted a felony murder case with sexual 
battery or attempted sexual battery as the underlying felony to the jury and when it 
instructed the jury on the aggravating circumstance that the murder occurred 
during a sexual battery or an attempted sexual battery; (6) committed fundamental 
error by submitting a felony murder charge to the jury that was contrary to the 
statute governing felony murder, which requires that the death occur during the 
commission of the underlying felony; (7) erred when it submitted a premeditated 
murder case to the jury; (8) erred when it permitted the State to proceed on a 
theory of felony murder where the indictment gave no indication of the theory; 
(9) constructively and improperly amended the indictment when it instructed the 
 
 
- 8 - 
jury on felony murder; (10) committed fundamental error when it failed to instruct 
the jury that the presumption of innocence applied to the charge of felony murder; 
(11) erred when it failed to instruct that a conviction on the theory of the murder 
must be unanimous; (12) erroneously failed to instruct the jury that it must 
determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances 
outweighed the mitigating circumstances found before it could recommend death; 
(13)(a) erroneously instructed the jury that it was required to determine whether 
sufficient mitigating circumstances existed that outweighed the aggravating 
circumstances, and (b) the instruction that the jury is to consider mitigation only if 
it is “reasonably convinced” of its existence is unconstitutional; (14) failed to make 
the proper findings for imposition of the death penalty; (15) erred when it used 
Williams’s conviction for indecent assault to support the prior violent felony 
aggravating circumstance; (16) erred when it found HAC as an aggravating 
circumstance; and (17) erred when it found CCP as an aggravating circumstance.  
Williams also asserted that (18) the death sentence is disproportionate; (19) 
imposition of the death penalty in Williams’s case violates Ring v. Arizona, 536 
U.S. 584 (2002); and (20) Florida’s capital sentencing structure fails to narrow the 
category of death-eligible individuals as mandated by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238 (1972).  Williams II, 967 So. 2d at 747-67. 
 
 
- 9 - 
We agreed with Williams that competent, substantial evidence did not exist 
to support the finding of CCP and struck this aggravating circumstance.  Id. at 765.  
However, we concluded there was no reasonable probability that the finding of 
CCP affected the sentence imposed and determined that the error was harmless.  
Id.  All other challenges were rejected, and we affirmed the conviction and 
sentence of death.  Id. at 748-67.  In 2008, the United States Supreme Court denied 
certiorari review.  Williams v. Florida, 552 U.S. 1283 (2008). 
In 2009, Williams filed a motion for postconviction relief, raising fourteen 
claims.  Several of the claims were subsequently amended and a fifteenth claim 
was added.  The claims were: (1) section 119.19, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 3.852 are unconstitutional facially and as applied; (2) the 
one-year time limit for seeking postconviction relief in a capital case is 
unconstitutional; (3) Williams received ineffective assistance of counsel during his 
first trial and, although he was granted a new trial in Williams I, he was prejudiced 
because the pretrial rulings became the law of the case, and more than ten years 
passed between the indictment and the retrial; (4) rule 4-3.5(d)(4) of the Rules 
Regulating the Florida Bar unconstitutionally precluded Williams from fully 
investigating possible juror misconduct, and retrial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to move for a change of venue; (5) retrial counsel was ineffective during the 
guilt phase; (6) newly discovered evidence renders the forensic science used to 
 
 
- 10 - 
convict Williams unreliable and invalid; (7) Williams is ineligible to be executed 
because he is intellectually disabled, and retrial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to raise intellectual disability as a bar to execution; (8) Williams was denied access 
to a competent mental health expert as required by Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 
(1985); (9) retrial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase; (10) improper 
comments and misstatements of the law by the prosecutor deprived Williams of a 
fair trial; (11) Williams is innocent of first-degree murder because his mental state 
prevented him from forming the intent to commit premeditated murder; he is 
innocent of felony murder because there was insufficient evidence to support the 
underlying sexual battery; the instructions provided to the jury on the aggravating 
circumstances were inapplicable and unconstitutionally vague; and the mitigation 
evidence available renders the death sentence disproportionate; (12) an American 
Bar Association report demonstrates that Florida’s death penalty system is 
unconstitutional; (13) cumulative error; (14) Florida’s lethal injection protocol is 
unconstitutional on its face and as applied; and (15) the State committed violations 
of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  After a case management conference, 
the postconviction court granted Williams an evidentiary hearing on portions of 
claims 7, 8, and 9.  The remainder of the claims were held in abeyance pending 
completion of the evidentiary hearing. 
 
 
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During the evidentiary hearing, Williams presented multiple witnesses, 
including Dr. Mark Tassé, a university professor who also conducts intellectual 
disability evaluations; Dr. George Woods, Jr., a psychiatrist; and Dr. Thomas 
Oakland, a psychologist.  The only witness presented by the State was Dr. Gregory 
Prichard, a clinical psychologist.  In May 2013, the postconviction court entered a 
comprehensive order denying all claims.  This appeal follows. 
ANALYSIS 
Public Records 
Williams alleges that section 27.7081, Florida Statutes (2008),2 and Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852 are unconstitutional both facially and as applied 
because they prevent access to public records to which he is otherwise entitled 
under article I, section 24, of the Florida Constitution.  We disagree. 
We have previously rejected similar facial constitutional challenges that 
assert section 27.7081 and rule 3.852 impermissibly restrict a capital defendant’s 
right to access public records.  See, e.g., Lambrix v. State, 124 So. 3d 890, 895 n.2 
(Fla. 2013); Wyatt v. State, 71 So. 3d 86, 110-11 (Fla. 2011).  Therefore, 
Williams’s facial challenge is without merit. 
                                          
 
 
2.  Although Williams referred to section 119.19 in his postconviction 
motion, effective October 1, 2005, section 119.19 was renumbered as section 
27.7081.  See ch. 2005-251, § 39, Laws of Fla. 
 
 
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Williams’s as-applied challenge also fails.  During the postconviction 
proceedings, Williams filed voluminous public records requests with multiple state 
and local agencies.  On appeal, he focuses on the delay by the Florida Department 
of Corrections (DOC) in providing some records and the destruction of other 
records under a DOC retention policy. 
 
In denying this portion of Williams’s public records challenge, the 
postconviction court concluded that (1) Williams received all existing DOC 
records to which he was entitled; (2) the DOC did not intentionally withhold the 
records from Williams’s prior indecent assault and second-degree murder 
convictions; and (3) the retention policy, which led to the destruction of those 
records, was reasonable.  The postconviction court also noted that collateral 
counsel’s request for additional time to review the provided records and prepare 
supplemental demands for additional records was granted, and Williams was twice 
granted leave to amend his postconviction motion.  Given that the postconviction 
court allowed Williams to amend his motion on more than one occasion and to 
seek production of additional records, we fail to see how Williams was harmed or 
how his constitutional rights were violated due to any delays by the DOC. 
 
With regard to the requests for records of Williams’s prior incarceration for 
the 1984 murder of Gaynel Jeffrey and his probationary period for the 1982 
indecent assault, the record reflects counsel for the DOC reported that a diligent 
 
 
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search had been conducted, and it was more likely than not the records were 
destroyed in accordance with the DOC’s long-established retention schedules.  The 
postconviction court concluded that the DOC did not willfully destroy the records 
of Williams’s prior incarceration and probationary periods.  The court noted the 
records related to short periods of time while Williams was on probation and while 
he was incarcerated at Hendry Correctional Institution, and some of the records 
were over twenty-five years old.  The court found that the DOC retention policy 
“was reasonable at the time and reasonable now.” 
Williams nonetheless contends that the postconviction court’s ruling 
constitutes an abuse of discretion.  According to Williams, the DOC should have 
produced the records from the second-degree murder conviction during Williams’s 
initial trial for Dyke’s murder, when those records were still in existence, and the 
failure to do so constitutes a Brady violation.  We disagree.  To establish a Brady 
violation, a defendant must show “(1) that favorable evidence—either exculpatory 
or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) 
because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.”  Doorbal v. 
State, 983 So. 2d 464, 480 (Fla. 2008).  Williams has not identified what 
information these records contained or how the information was material or 
exculpatory.  He therefore cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the failure 
to obtain the records.  Williams asserts that “[t]he records from the prior periods of 
 
 
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incarceration may provide information in mitigation of the death sentence.” 
(emphasis added).  However, this purely speculative assertion fails to establish a 
Brady violation.  Further, Williams has failed to demonstrate how the records 
retention policy of the DOC is unreasonable or violated his right of access to 
public records.  We therefore affirm the denial of Williams’s as-applied 
constitutional challenge to section 27.7081 and rule 3.852. 
Ineffective Assistance of Initial Trial Counsel 
 
Williams contends that the postconviction court erred when it summarily 
denied his claim that the failure of the trial court to provide him with competent 
counsel during his first trial for Dyke’s murder constituted an incurable violation 
of due process.  He asserts that the trial court and the prosecutor knew or should 
have known that Williams’s initial court-appointed counsel was incompetent 
because of his erratic behavior and lack of preparedness.  According to Williams, 
he was prejudiced during his 2004 retrial due to the passage of time because 
records were destroyed, witnesses died, and memories faded.  This claim is without 
merit. 
Where trial counsel is found to be ineffective under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the traditional remedy is that the defendant 
obtains a new guilt or penalty phase.  See, e.g., State v. Fitzpatrick, 118 So. 3d 737, 
741, 770 (Fla. 2013) (affirming postconviction order granting a new trial where 
 
 
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counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase); Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567, 574 
(Fla. 1996) (vacating death sentence and remanding for a new penalty phase where 
counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase).  Williams’s initial conviction 
was reversed on grounds that the trial court erred when it substituted an alternate 
juror onto the jury panel to replace an original juror who was unable to proceed 
after guilt-phase deliberations commenced.  Williams I, 792 So. 2d at 1207.  
Having been granted a new trial, Williams already received the relief to which he 
would have been entitled had initial trial counsel been found ineffective.  Just over 
eleven years elapsed between Dyke’s murder in 1993 and the commencement of 
the retrial in 2004.  However, part of this delay was the result of Williams’s 
successful appeal of his initial conviction.  The cases relied upon by Williams do 
not support the contention that if counsel is deficient, the State is forever barred 
from seeking the death penalty. 
In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), the United States Supreme 
Court identified four factors that are relevant in making a determination as to 
whether a defendant’s due process right to a speedy trial is violated: (1) the length 
of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s invocation of the right 
to speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.  Here, the postconviction court 
applied these four factors and noted that initial trial counsel sought numerous 
continuances prior to the first trial.  With regard to Williams’s claim that beneficial 
 
 
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records were lost or destroyed due to initial trial counsel’s ineffectiveness and the 
delay caused by it, the postconviction court found that the prejudice asserted was 
speculative because Williams failed to identify with specificity the records or 
information contained therein which could not be located prior to the 2004 retrial.  
Williams’s allegations of prejudice are too speculative to justify a conclusion that 
his due process rights were violated.  To the extent Williams asserts the trial court 
should have intervened and removed his initial trial counsel, any error in failing to 
do so was cured by Williams’s receipt of a new trial.  Although one of Williams’s 
witnesses from the initial trial died before the retrial, her prior testimony was read 
into the record, and Williams suffered no prejudice.  We therefore affirm the 
summary denial of this claim. 
Conflict of Interest 
 
Williams asserts that a conflict of interest occurred, described as follows: 
Dr. Brannon testified at the behest of Willams’s 1996 defense attorney 
. . . to establish that [counsel] was sufficiently stable to try Williams’s 
capital case.  This alone presented conflict between the client and his 
lawyer.  At that point, their interests were adverse, although no one 
informed Williams of that fact.  The prosecutor was present at the 
1996 hearing regarding [counsel’s] mental illness and stay at a mental 
hospital, yet the State presented no objection to Williams being tried 
by [counsel].  Eight years later, the same prosecutor hired Dr. 
Brannon as a confidential and consulting mental health expert to assist 
the State in the penalty phase.  The fact that Dr. Brannon readily 
accepted the role demonstrates the prior conflict that served to 
prejudice Williams. 
 
 
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In support of this claim, Williams relies on Walton v. State, 847 So. 2d 438 
(Fla. 2003), and Sanders v. State, 707 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1998), but in neither case 
was a conflict of interest established under similar circumstances.  In Walton, we 
concluded it was error to permit a doctor who previously assisted in the preparation 
of a codefendant’s defense strategy to testify on behalf of the State during the 
defendant’s postconviction evidentiary hearing.  847 So. 2d at 445-46.  In Sanders, 
we concluded the trial court erred in permitting a doctor who had previously been 
in possession of numerous documents and received communications about the 
defendant to testify on behalf of the State during the penalty phase.  707 So. 2d at 
668-69.  However, Williams never asserted that Dr. Brannon previously worked 
for him or was in possession of materials related to his case.  The relationship that 
existed was between Dr. Brannon and initial trial counsel, not Dr. Brannon and 
Williams.  Because Williams has not established a direct conflict of interest 
between himself and Dr. Brannon, this claim is without merit. 
Intellectual Disability 
 
 
Williams asserts that the postconviction court erred when it denied his claim 
that he is intellectually disabled and therefore ineligible to be executed under the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304 (2002).  We have explained: 
“Florida law includes a three-prong test for intellectual 
disability as a bar to imposition of the death penalty.”  Snelgrove v. 
 
 
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State, 107 So. 3d 242, 252 (Fla. 2012).  A defendant must establish 
intellectual disability by demonstrating the following three factors: 
(1) significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning; 
(2) concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) manifestation of 
the condition before age eighteen.  See Hurst v. State, 147 So. 3d 435, 
441 (Fla. 2014) rev’d, Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016); 
§ 921.137(1), Fla. Stat.  The defendant has the burden to prove that he 
is intellectually disabled by clear and convincing evidence.  Franqui v. 
State, 59 So. 3d 82, 92 (Fla. 2011); § 921.137(4), Fla. Stat.  If the 
defendant fails to prove any one of these components, the defendant 
will not be found to be intellectually disabled.  Nixon v. State, 2 So. 
3d 137, 142 (Fla. 2009).  In reviewing intellectual disability 
determinations, this Court has employed the standard of whether 
competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 
determination. 
Salazar v. State, 188 So. 3d 799, 811-12 (Fla. 2016).  We will not reweigh the 
evidence or second-guess the findings of the lower court with regard to the 
credibility of witnesses.  Snelgrove v. State, 107 So. 3d 242, 252 (Fla. 2012). 
 
The postconviction court carefully considered and evaluated, under the 
applicable law at the time,3 each of the three prongs of the intellectual disability 
                                          
 
 
3.  After the postconviction court entered its order holding that Williams 
failed to establish he is intellectually disabled, the United States Supreme Court 
issued Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014), which clarified that the 
standard error of measurement must be considered in determining whether an 
individual has met the “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning” 
prong of the determination.  Because the postconviction court concluded that 
Williams failed to meet all three prongs of the intellectual disability standard, and 
we conclude that competent, substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusion 
that Williams failed to establish the second prong of the standard, Hall does not 
alter the outcome of this case.  To remand this claim for reconsideration in light of 
Hall would not change the fact that Williams failed to establish the second and 
third prongs of the intellectual disability standard and is therefore not entitled to 
relief.  Further, it would disregard the significant effort by the postconviction court 
 
 
- 19 - 
standard.  The court concluded Williams failed to establish that he met any of the 
three prongs by clear and convincing evidence.  In this analysis, we focus on the 
second prong and conclude the postconviction court’s finding that Williams failed 
to demonstrate that he suffers from concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior is 
supported by competent, substantial evidence.  Therefore, Williams is not entitled 
to relief.  See Salazar, 188 So. 3d at 812 (“If the defendant fails to prove any one of 
these components, the defendant will not be found to be intellectually disabled.”). 
The term “adaptive behavior,” as used in section 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. 
(2013), “means the effectiveness or degree with which an individual meets the 
standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected of his or her 
age, cultural group, and community.”  To demonstrate deficits in adaptive 
behavior, a defendant must show significant limitations in adaptive functioning in 
at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, 
social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional 
academics, leisure, and work.  See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3.  In evaluating 
adaptive deficits, 
the trial court does not weigh a defendant’s strengths against his 
limitations in determining whether a deficit in adaptive behavior 
exists.  Rather, after it considers “the findings of experts and all other 
evidence,” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.203(e), it determines whether a 
                                          
 
in evaluating and weighing the extensive evidence presented with regard to this 
claim. 
 
 
- 20 - 
defendant has a deficit in adaptive behavior by examining evidence of 
a defendant’s limitations, as well as evidence that may rebut those 
limitations. 
 
Dufour v. State, 69 So. 3d 235, 250 (Fla. 2011). 
As a threshold matter, Williams asserts that the postconviction court abused 
its discretion in allowing Dr. Gregory Prichard to testify during the evidentiary 
hearing as an expert in the field of intellectual disability.  Williams contends that 
Dr. Prichard was not qualified to render an opinion regarding intellectual disability 
because: (1) his degree is a Doctorate of Psychology (Psy.D.), which requires less 
research than a Doctorate of Philosophy (Ph.D.); (2) he is not affiliated with a 
university; and (3) he does not conduct research and has never published an article 
in a peer-reviewed journal.  The determination of the qualifications of a witness to 
express an expert opinion falls within the discretion of the postconviction court, 
and that decision will not be reversed absent clear error.  See Floyd v. State, 913 
So. 2d 564, 575 (Fla. 2005). 
 
The testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing established that 
Dr. Prichard has been a licensed clinical psychologist in Florida since 1996, with a 
subspecialty in forensic psychology and a specialization in assessing for 
intellectual disability.  He conducts an average of two or three intellectual 
disability assessments per week, and has conducted at least two thousand 
intellectual disability assessments over the course of his career.  At least a few 
 
 
- 21 - 
hundred of those assessments were done in capital cases.  Dr. Prichard is a member 
of the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, the 
Florida Psychological Association, and the American Psychological Association.  
He has been deemed an expert many times in courts throughout Florida, and no 
court has ever refused to allow Dr. Prichard to render an expert opinion in the field 
of psychology on the issue of intellectual disability. 
Section 90.702, Florida Statutes (2012), provides that a witness may be 
qualified as an expert based on knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.  
Research, university affiliation, and publication are not prerequisites to 
qualification as an expert.  Based upon Dr. Prichard’s specialized knowledge and 
extensive experience in evaluating individuals for intellectual disability, we 
conclude that the postconviction court acted well within its discretion in qualifying 
Dr. Prichard as an expert in the field of psychology and intellectual disability. 
As to the merits of Williams’s claim, Dr. Mark Tassé, a psychology 
professor specializing in intellectual disability, testified during the evidentiary 
hearing that there are multiple standardized tests for assessing adaptive behavior.  
One such test is the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System (ABAS).  The ABAS 
assesses ten skill areas: communication, community use, functional academics, 
home living, health and safety, leisure, self-care, self-direction, social, and work.  
These skill areas are incorporated into three domains: the conceptual domain, the 
 
 
- 22 - 
social domain, and the practical domain.  The scores taken from the three domains 
are then used to determine the total score. 
The ABAS was developed by Dr. Thomas Oakland, another expert retained 
by Williams.  Dr. Oakland administered the ABAS to Williams.  However, when 
asked about the validity of ABAS testing on individuals in the prison setting, Dr. 
Oakland stated: 
Well, one must realize that Mr. Williams is incarcerated in a 
setting that provides considerable confinement . . . .  [There] are very 
few things that he is allowed to decide to do on his own.  Which 
makes the assessment of adaptive behavior irrelevant.  It’s silly.  
Down right [sic] silly to try to acquire adaptive behavior information 
on persons who are incarcerated under those conditions. 
Dr. Oakland further explained that because people within a prison setting are 
highly restricted as to the behaviors they can display, “we are not going to get an 
accurate assessment of adaptive behavior by . . . acquiring information on prison 
related behaviors.”  Drs. Tassé, Woods, and Prichard all agreed that the ABAS is 
not especially useful in assessing the adaptive behavior of a person who has been 
incarcerated for an extended period of time. 
Williams’s self-reported responses on the ABAS indicated that he was 
deficient in nine out of the ten skill areas.  In those nine skill areas, Williams 
received the lowest possible score.  When asked about the meaning of the results, 
Dr. Oakland said, “Well, it tells me that [Williams’s] display of adaptive behavior 
in a prison setting is very, very restricted.  But we know that.  So it merely 
 
 
- 23 - 
confirms the fact statistically and through measurement of behaviors that we 
recognize prevail in a prison setting.”  Essentially, Dr. Oakland’s opinion was that 
the results of Williams’s ABAS were not an accurate assessment of his adaptive 
functioning. 
Dr. Prichard also disputed the validity of Williams’s ABAS results.  
Williams indicated on the ABAS that he is not capable of ordering his own meal at 
a restaurant, finding a restroom in a public place, or looking both ways before 
crossing a street.  According to Dr. Prichard, the extremely low scores Williams 
received on the ABAS would place him in the moderate-to-severe range of 
intellectual disability, which comprises the lowest fifteen percent of all 
intellectually disabled individuals.  Dr. Prichard testified that a person with 
adaptive functioning so low as to not be able to find a restroom in a public place 
may have to be institutionalized. 
Further, Dr. Prichard concluded that Williams’s self-reported data was not 
reliable in light of his history.  Williams held various jobs, including in the dietary 
department of a hospital, and at restaurants and grocery stores.  Williams also 
obtained a driver license and informed Dr. Prichard that he would sometimes walk 
to work or take the bus.  Although Williams indicated on the ABAS that he could 
not provide the correct amount of money for a purchase under ten dollars, he was 
able to successfully multiply 809 by 47 and subtract $5.70 from $62.00 during an 
 
 
- 24 - 
administration of the Wide Range Achievement Test.  He also informed Dr. 
Prichard that he managed his own money.  Williams stated that he maintained a 
savings account and would deposit money in the bank, while keeping some for 
himself.  Moreover, Williams obtained his General Educational Development 
(GED) diploma.  Dr. Prichard testified that he has not encountered an intellectually 
disabled person who can pass even a single section of the GED test, let alone the 
entire examination. 
Dr. Oakland also administered the ABAS to Williams’s half-sisters, Clinita 
and Althamease, who provided data regarding Williams’s adaptive behavior prior 
to the age of eighteen.  Under Florida law, however, adaptive deficits must be 
current.  See Hodges v. State, 55 So. 3d 515, 534 (Fla. 2010).  Thus, the 
information provided by Clinita and Althamease is insufficient to satisfy the 
second prong of the intellectual disability test because it does not address 
Williams’s current adaptive behavior.  See Phillips v. State, 984 So. 2d 503, 511 
(Fla. 2008).  Further, Dr. Oakland acknowledged on cross-examination that the 
information provided by Althamease, who is seven years younger than Williams, 
was based on observations she made over thirty years ago when she was only nine 
or ten years old, and therefore her ABAS results may have been even more limited 
in their meaning. 
 
 
- 25 - 
Even assuming the relevancy of the ABAS results provided by Clinita and 
Althamease, the validity of the results was disputed by Dr. Prichard.  He testified 
that family members often give information that is not objective and not useful 
because they are motivated by their love for the individual and a desire for a 
particular outcome.  On the ABAS completed by Clinita, she scored Williams as 
deficient in nearly every skill area assessed and placed Williams’s functioning at 
the age of a five- to seven-year-old.  These results indicated that Williams basically 
had no independent skills in those areas.  Dr. Prichard again noted that some 
individuals with such extreme adaptive deficits have to be institutionalized. 
Dr. Prichard found that the scores Clinita gave on the ABAS were 
completely inconsistent with the testimony she had given during the two trials.   
During Williams’s first trial for Dyke’s murder, Clinita testified that after her and 
Williams’s mother died in childbirth, she and her younger half-siblings were 
homeless and living in an abandoned car, and it was Williams who took care of the 
other children while she worked.  Clinita testified that Williams “became the 
person . . . who had to help me strengthen . . . he went from the person who was 
the youngest to the person who then became the oldest.”  During the retrial, Clinita 
testified that Williams helped her sell bottles and cans to supplement the family 
income.  According to Clinita, Williams did whatever he could to help, including 
searching for food and raising the other children.  Based on these inconsistencies 
 
 
- 26 - 
and what Dr. Prichard knew about Williams, he concluded that the information 
Clinita provided on the ABAS was “exaggerated to the point of being absurd.”  Dr. 
Prichard concluded that, because valid data was not provided, the results were 
likewise invalid. 
Dr. Prichard also analyzed Williams’s ability to think abstractly and 
rationalize his actions and their consequences.  He found that Williams’s conduct 
during and after the Jeffrey murder reflected planning and forethought, which is 
normally beyond the capabilities of an intellectually disabled person.  Williams 
entered the Jeffrey house while everyone was asleep, stabbed Gaynel Jeffrey to 
death, used her mother’s vehicle to dispose of the body at a construction site, and 
then returned the vehicle to the house.  According to Dr. Prichard, such actions 
demonstrate that Williams recognized his situation and took steps to cover his 
actions.   
Further, although most intellectually disabled people think in concrete terms, 
when questioned about the Jeffrey murder, Williams told police that he killed 
Gaynel Jeffrey in self-defense.  After the Dyke murder, Williams explained the 
cuts on his fingers by claiming he cut himself while washing dishes.  According to 
Dr. Prichard, Williams’s ability to know what type of information the police were 
seeking and then fabricate explanations to cover up the truth constitute abstract 
 
 
- 27 - 
thinking that is usually beyond the capabilities of a person who is intellectually 
disabled. 
The postconviction court found Williams’s ABAS results were insufficient 
to support his allegation that he suffers from deficits in adaptive functioning.  
Because Dr. Oakland concluded Williams’s ABAS scores merely confirmed the 
fact that his adaptive behavior in prison was extremely restricted, which he said 
renders “the assessment of adaptive behavior irrelevant” and “silly,” the 
postconviction court declined to “attach more meaning to the ABAS score . . . than 
[Williams’s] own expert did.”  The postconviction court also agreed with Dr. 
Prichard that Williams’s history of employment, driving, managing his money, and 
obtaining a GED diploma all contradicted the ABAS scores and rebutted his 
allegations of deficits in adaptive behavior. 
Competent, substantial evidence supports the postconviction court’s ruling 
that Williams does not suffer from deficits in adaptive functioning.  Dr. Prichard 
explained why Williams’s scores on the ABAS were not credible.  Williams 
himself described behaviors to Dr. Prichard that were inconsistent with his 
responses on the ABAS, such as managing money, taking the bus, shopping for 
groceries, and purchasing household items and clothing for himself.  Each of these 
abilities directly rebuts Williams’s indication on the ABAS that he cannot find a 
restroom in a public place or provide the correct amount of money for a purchase 
 
 
- 28 - 
under ten dollars.  The record further reflects that Williams worked as a cook, a 
sandwich maker, and a server in restaurants, which rebuts Williams’s report on the 
ABAS that he is not capable of ordering his own meal at a restaurant.  Williams 
had a driver license and walked to work, both of which rebut his self-report on the 
ABAS that he is not capable of looking both ways before crossing a street. 
Further, Williams’s efforts to conceal his involvement and culpability in the 
murders of Gaynel Jeffrey and Lisa Dyke also contradict his claim of deficient 
adaptive functioning.  See Phillips, 984 So. 2d at 512 (concluding that the 
defendant’s ability to plan and cover-up the murder was inconsistent with a finding 
of deficient adaptive functioning).  Moreover, the fact that Williams successfully 
obtained his GED diploma supports the conclusion that he does not suffer from 
adaptive deficits.  See Dufour, 69 So. 3d at 250. 
We recently reiterated that “[i]f the defendant fails to prove any one of the[] 
components [delineated in section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes], the defendant will 
not be found to be intellectually disabled.”  Salazar, 188 So. 3d at 812.  Because 
competent, substantial evidence supports the postconviction court’s conclusion that 
Williams failed to establish the second prong of the intellectual disability standard, 
we affirm the determination that Williams does not qualify as intellectually 
disabled under Florida law. 
 
 
- 29 - 
Hurst 
During the pendency of Williams’s appeal from the denial of his motion for 
postconviction relief, the United States Supreme Court issued Hurst v. Florida, in 
which it held that Florida’s former capital sentencing scheme was unconstitutional 
because “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact 
necessary to impose a sentence of death.”  136 S. Ct. at 619.  On remand in Hurst, 
we held that 
before the trial judge may consider imposing a sentence of death, the 
jury in a capital case must unanimously and expressly find all the 
aggravating factors that were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 
unanimously find that the aggravating factors are sufficient to impose 
death, unanimously find that the aggravating factors outweigh the 
mitigating circumstances, and unanimously recommend a sentence of 
death. 
202 So. 3d at 57.  In Mosley, we concluded that Hurst applies retroactively to those 
defendants whose sentences became final after the Supreme Court decided Ring.  
209 So. 3d at 1283.  In light of the non-unanimous jury recommendation to impose 
a sentence of death, it cannot be said that the failure to require a unanimous verdict 
here was harmless.  See, e.g., Hodges v. State, 213 So. 3d 863, 881 (Fla. 2017). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the postconviction court’s order 
denying Williams postconviction relief, with the exception of the ineffective 
assistance of penalty phase counsel claim, which we do not address.  However, 
 
 
- 30 - 
pursuant to Hurst and Mosley, we vacate Williams’s sentence of death and remand 
for a new penalty phase. 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
LAWSON, J., concurs specially with an opinion. 
CANADY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LAWSON, J., concurring specially. 
 
See Okafor v. State, 42 Fla. L. Weekly S639, S641, 2017 WL 2481266, at 
*6 (Fla. June 8, 2017) (Lawson, J., concurring specially). 
CANADY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur with the majority that Williams is not entitled to relief from his 
conviction on his constitutional challenges to section 27.7081, Florida Statutes 
(2008), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852, his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel at his first trial in 1996, his claim of a conflict of interest with 
Dr. Brannon, or his intellectual disability claim.  But I dissent from the decision to 
vacate Williams’s death sentence and remand for a new penalty phase.  I would 
also reject Williams’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty 
phase of his 2004 retrial.  Therefore, I would affirm the denial of postconviction 
relief.   
 
 
- 31 - 
First, I would conclude that there was no error under Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. 
Ct. 616 (2016).  I adhere to my view that Hurst v. Florida only requires that the 
jury find the existence of an aggravating circumstance that renders a defendant 
eligible for a death sentence.  See Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 77 (Fla. 2016) 
(Canady, J., dissenting) (noting “the Hurst v. Florida Court’s repeated 
identification of Florida’s failure to require a jury finding of an aggravator as the 
flaw that renders Florida’s death penalty law unconstitutional”), cert. denied, No. 
16-998, 2017 WL 635999 (U.S. May 22, 2017); see also Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. 
Ct. at 624 (“Florida’s sentencing scheme, which required the judge alone to find 
the existence of an aggravating circumstance, is therefore unconstitutional.”).  But 
here, because Williams had twice previously been convicted of violent felonies 
(the second-degree murder of Gaynel Jeffrey in 1984 and an indecent assault upon 
a nine-year-old girl in 1982), it was not even necessary for the jury to make a 
unanimous finding regarding the existence of an aggravating circumstance.  This 
Court has recently reaffirmed that it will follow the Supreme Court’s precedent 
creating “one narrow exception to the Sixth Amendment requirement that a jury 
must find any fact that increases the maximum sentence: the fact of a prior 
conviction, as established in Almendarez-Torres[ v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 
(1998)].”  Jackson v. State, 213 So. 3d 754, 787 (Fla. 2017) (citing Ring v. 
 
 
- 32 - 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 597 n.4 (2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 
489-90 (2000)).  Thus, I would conclude that no Hurst v. Florida error occurred. 
Second, I adhere to my view that Hurst v. Florida should not be given 
retroactive application.  See Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 1285-91 (Fla. 2016) 
(Canady, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Even if Hurst v. Florida 
error were present in this case, I would deny Williams relief.   
Finally, I would conclude that the postconviction court did not err in denying 
Williams’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the 
penalty phase of his retrial.   
For these reasons, I would affirm the denial of postconviction relief.   
POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County,  
Eileen M. O’Connor, Senior Judge - Case No. 061993CF003005A88810 
 
Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Nicole M. Noël, Assistant 
Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Marta Jaszczolt, Staff Attorney, Capital 
Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Leslie T. Campbell, 
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee