Case Title: Dennis Kocken v. Wisconsin Council 40 AFSCME

Citation: 2007 WI 72

Docket Number: 2005AP002742

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 72 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2742 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Dennis Kocken, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Council 40, AFSCME, AFL-CIO and Brown 
County Mental Health Center Employees, Local 
1901, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 14, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 16, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
Mark A. Warpinski 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and PROSSER, JJ., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-appellants there were briefs (in the 
court of appeals) by Bruce F. Ehlke, Danielle L. Carne, and 
Hawks Quindel Ehlke & Perry, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by 
Bruce F. Ehlke. 
 
For the respondent there was a brief (in the court of 
appeals) by Thomas P. Godar and Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by Thomas P. Godar. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Gregg J. Gunta, Kevin 
P. Reak, John A. Wolfgang, and Gunta & Reak, S.C., Milwaukee, on 
behalf of the Badger State Sheriff’s Association. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by George F. Graf and 
Sandra G. Radtke, Milwaukee, on behalf of the Office and 
Professional Employees International Union, Local 35. 
 
 
2007 WI 72
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
No.  2005AP2742  
(L.C. No. 
2004CV1170) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Dennis Kocken, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Council 40, AFSCME, AFL-CIO and Brown 
County Mental Health Center Employees, Local 
1901, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 14, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Brown 
County, Mark A. Warpinski, Judge.  Reversed and remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This case is before the 
court on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2003-04).1    
¶2 
The circuit court for Brown County, Mark A. Warpinski, 
Judge, granted a permanent injunction to Dennis Kocken, Brown 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
2 
 
County Sheriff, against the defendants, Wisconsin Council 40 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (the District Council) and Local 1901, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO (AFSCME Local 1901) (which represents the Brown County 
employees who provide food service at the Brown County jail).  
The circuit court enjoined the defendants from pursuing any type 
of action before the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission 
or seeking injunctive relief insofar as it would affect Sheriff 
Kocken's ability to hire Aramark Corporation as a food service 
provider at the Brown County jail.  Furthermore, the circuit 
court ordered AFSCME Local 1901 to withdraw its prohibited 
practice complaint filed with the Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Commission with prejudice. 
¶3 
This case arose as a result of Sheriff Kocken's 
proposal to stop using county employees to prepare meals for the 
Brown County jail and instead contract with a private food 
service provider.  The issue presented is whether Sheriff 
Kocken's decision to enter into a contract for the preparation 
of 
meals 
for 
jail 
inmates 
falls 
within 
the 
sheriff's 
constitutional powers, rights, and duties, and is thus not 
subject to legislative limitations, including a collective 
bargaining agreement between Brown County and county employees.2 
                                                 
2 The collective bargaining agreement was entered pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 111.70, the Municipal Employment Relations Act.  
The Municipal Employment Relations Act requires that municipal 
employers bargain collectively with employees and abide by any 
agreement reached.  City of Janesville v. WERC, 193 Wis. 2d 492, 
499, 535 N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1995). 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
3 
 
¶4 
For the reasons set forth, we hold that the Sheriff's 
hiring and firing of personnel to provide food service to the 
county jail is not a time immemorial, principal, and important 
duty that characterizes and distinguishes the office of sheriff, 
and as such, is not within the Sheriff's constitutional powers.  
Rather, the hiring and firing of personnel to provide food 
service to the county jail falls within the "mundane and 
commonplace" "internal management and administrative duties"3 not 
protected by the constitution.  Hiring and firing personnel to 
provide food to inmates is subject to legislative regulation, 
including collective bargaining under Wis. Stat. § 111.70.  The 
circuit court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that 
the contract with Aramark at issue is within the sheriff's 
constitutional prerogative.  This error of law rendered the 
circuit court's judgment an erroneous exercise of discretion. 
¶5 
We therefore reverse the judgment of the circuit court 
and remand the cause to the circuit court to dismiss Sheriff 
Kocken's complaint seeking declaratory relief.  We also vacate 
the permanent injunction.  AFSCME Local 1901 is no longer 
restrained from pursuing its complaint filed with the Wisconsin 
Employment 
Relations 
Commission, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.70, the Municipal Employment Relations Act.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Heitkemper 
v. 
Wirsing, 
194 
Wis. 2d 182, 
193, 
533 
N.W.2d 770 
(1995); 
Manitowoc 
County 
v. 
Local 
986B, 
168 
Wis. 2d 819, 820, 484 N.W.2d 534 (1992). 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
4 
 
I 
 
¶6 
The parties stipulated to the following facts in the 
circuit court: 
 
¶7 
Prior to 2001, food for inmates at the Brown County 
jail was prepared at the jail by five Brown County Sheriff's 
Department employees represented by the Teamsters Union.  Jail 
inmates were also involved in all aspects of the food service. 
¶8 
In 2001 Brown County completed construction of a new 
county jail facility.  A decision was made in 2001 to 
consolidate food preparation for the county mental health 
center, the county work release center, and the county jail in 
the new jail facility, although not all the food for the mental 
health center would be prepared or processed at the jail.  The 
kitchen built in the new jail facility was constructed to have a 
capacity 
that 
would 
accommodate 
this 
consolidated 
food 
preparation plan.      
¶9 
As part of this consolidation plan, a new mental 
health center was to be constructed adjacent to the new jail 
facility, with a tunnel connecting the two buildings to 
facilitate, among other services, the delivery of food from the 
jail to the mental health center.  There were no plans to 
similarly connect the work release center, which would remain 
located at the old county jail, more than five miles from the 
new jail facility.   
¶10 As a result of this consolidation in food services at 
the jail, the employees preparing food at the jail and at the 
mental health center became a single group of county employees 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
5 
 
represented by AFSCME Local 1901.  Certain members of AFSCME 
Local 1901 began preparing food in the jail for jail inmates, 
for the work release center and for the mental health center, 
and other members of AFSCME Local 1901 remained engaged in food 
service activities at the mental health center.  A collective 
bargaining agreement was created between AFSCME Local 1901 and 
Brown County, which governs the wages, hours, and other 
conditions of employment of these employees. 
¶11 The proposed new county mental health center was not 
built, and there is no plan to connect the existing mental 
health center with the new jail. 
¶12 In order to provide food service to the existing 
mental health center and the work release center, two meal 
deliveries are made each day, by truck, from the kitchen in the 
new jail to the mental health center and to the work release 
center.  Dishes are returned from these locations to the jail 
kitchen.   
¶13 Dennis Kocken was elected as the sheriff of Brown 
County in November 2002. 
¶14 Sheriff Kocken proposed that the food preparation at 
the Brown County jail be handled as a combination of inmate 
labor and the services of a private food provider, with the 
private company overseeing the provision of meals for the inmate 
population at the jail and the work release center. 
¶15 Under 
Sheriff 
Kocken's 
plan, 
the 
Brown 
County 
employees represented by AFSCME Local 1901 who prepare food at 
the Brown County jail would no longer work at the jail, unless 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
6 
 
they were independently hired by the private food service 
company.   
¶16 On behalf of these Brown County employees, AFSCME 
Local 1901 demanded that Brown County bargain regarding the 
decision to subcontract the food preparation at the jail.  Brown 
County refused.    
¶17 In June 2004, AFSCME Local 1901 filed a complaint with 
the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission against Brown 
County alleging that the County's refusal to bargain constituted 
a prohibited practice in violation of Wis. Stat. § 111.70(3)(a).4 
¶18 On June 28, 2004, Sheriff Kocken filed a complaint for 
declaratory relief with the circuit court for Brown County 
against the District Council.5  An amended complaint named AFSCME 
Local 1901 as an additional party.  Sheriff Kocken also sought 
injunctive relief. 
¶19 On July 14, 2004, by agreement of the parties, counsel 
for AFSCME Local 1901 requested a stay of proceedings at the 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.70(3)(a) states in relevant part: 
"It 
is 
a 
prohibited 
practice 
for 
a 
municipal 
employer 
individually or in concert with others: . . . 4. To refuse to 
bargain collectively with a representative of a majority of its 
employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit. . . ." 
5 In their answer, the District Council and AFSCME Local 
1901 alleged, among other things, that the preparation of food 
for the jail population was not a constitutional power of the 
sheriff and that Sheriff Kocken had failed to join a necessary 
party 
to 
the 
action, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Employment 
Relations 
Commission, which had primary jurisdiction to hear the complaint 
filed by the Brown County employees at issue. 
   
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
7 
 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, pending the outcome 
of the circuit court litigation. 
¶20 In addition to the stipulated facts, the circuit court 
made the following findings of fact after receiving the parties' 
briefs, supporting affidavits, and testimony in connection with 
the hearing on the preliminary injunction:  
• Idle inmates create more problems for the sheriff's 
staff than inmates who are occupied in some type of 
activity.  Under the present system of meal preparation 
by the mental health center staff, there is less inmate 
activity. 
• Increasing inmate work in meal preparation would improve 
morale because inmates would be occupied in productive 
activity.   
• Aramark, which would offer the contract food service 
under Sheriff Kocken's proposal, would train inmates in 
food service and maintain a log of such training. 
• Meal preparation was formerly a part of the sheriff's 
budget. 
• Savings 
would 
be 
realized 
by 
Sheriff 
Kocken's 
contracting with Aramark, and Sheriff Kocken intended to 
use these savings to fill positions, continue training, 
and replace law enforcement vehicles.   
• The former county executive acknowledged that had the 
then-sheriff refused to go along with the consolidation 
plan in 2001, the County would have been required to 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
8 
 
construct two kitchens, one for the new jail and one for 
the proposed mental health center.   
• Approximately one million dollars were diverted from the 
mental health center construction budget to construct 
the jail kitchen facility.   
¶21 In its decision on the preliminary injunction, the 
circuit court stated that "this record is devoid of any 
suggestion that anyone attempted to enjoin the Sheriff from the 
exercise of his constitutionally vested authority of deciding 
how the meal service was to be provided in 2001.  That decision 
of the Sheriff was accomplished without objection so far as the 
Court is aware from the record that has been provided."6  
                                                 
6 Based on these findings, the circuit court concluded as a 
matter of law that it was within the sheriff's powers, rights, 
and duties to contract with a food service provider for the 
county jail, explaining that "[i]t is clear that the Sheriff in 
the past has determined how he will provide the meals. For 
example, in 2001, the Sheriff agreed to consolidate the food 
services with the food services of the Mental Health Center.  It 
was the Sheriff's prerogative, not obligation to involve himself 
in this joint effort."   
The circuit court stated it was basing its legal conclusion 
of the sheriff's power on the testimony of Ms. Nussbaum, the 
former county executive, reasoning as follows:  "[T]his Court 
relies on the testimony of Brown County's former County 
Executive, Ms. Nancy Nusbaum, who testified that had the Sheriff 
decided not to join in a joint kitchen effort, that it would 
have been the County's responsibility to have two kitchens: one 
for the jail and one for the then anticipated new construction 
of the County's Mental Health Center."   
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
9 
 
¶22 On November 5, 2004, the circuit court granted Sheriff 
Kocken a preliminary injunction, finding a likelihood of success 
on the merits, a likelihood of irreparable harm, and an 
inadequate 
remedy 
at 
law. 
 
The 
defendants 
moved 
for 
reconsideration of the circuit court's decision; the motion was 
denied. 
¶23 On July 8, 2005, the circuit court issued its decision 
granting a permanent injunction, and on October 31, 2005, the 
circuit court entered its final judgment and amended order 
granting Sheriff Kocken a permanent injunction.  The defendants 
appealed this judgment and order. 
II 
 
¶24 A circuit court's decision whether to grant injunctive 
relief is within the sound discretion of the circuit court.7  
                                                                                                                                                             
Ms. Nusbaum's actual testimony, however, does not support 
the circuit court's description of the testimony.  Ms. Nusbaum 
testified that during the discussions of a consolidated kitchen, 
in which the then-sheriff was involved, no one raised the issue 
of the constitutional power of the sheriff.  Furthermore, she 
testified that she would have acceded to the then-sheriff's wish 
to have two kitchens, one in each facility (had he so stated), 
not because she could not tell the sheriff what to do or because 
of any constitutional issues, but because it was her practice to 
seek consensus and not to go forward with a plan if a key player 
opposed it.   
Past 
practice 
is 
not 
relevant 
to 
the 
sheriff's 
constitutional authority.  Dunn County v. WERC, 2006 WI App 120, 
¶16, 293 Wis. 2d 637, 718 N.W.2d 138.    
7 Hoffmann v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 2003 WI 64, ¶10, 262 
Wis. 2d 264, 664 N.W.2d 55. 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
10 
 
"Injunctions, whether temporary or permanent, are not to be 
issued lightly.  The cause must be substantial."8 
 
¶25 This court reviews a circuit court order granting 
injunctive relief to determine whether the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion.9  A circuit court's 
discretionary decision will be sustained if the circuit court 
has examined the relevant facts, applied the proper standard of 
law, and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a 
conclusion that a reasonable court could reach.10  If in 
exercising its discretion a circuit court errs in deciding a 
question of law upon which its exercise of discretion rests, the 
circuit court has erroneously exercised its discretion.11 
 
¶26 In reviewing a circuit court's discretionary decision, 
an appellate court decides questions of law imbedded in the 
circuit court's exercise of discretion, including questions of 
constitutional law, independently of the circuit court but 
benefiting from its analysis.   
 
¶27 In the present case, the determinative question of law 
governing 
Sheriff 
Kocken's 
request 
for 
declaratory 
and 
                                                 
8 Werner v. A. L. Grootemaat & Sons, Inc., 80 Wis. 2d 513, 
520, 259 N.W.2d 310 (1977). 
9 Hoffmann, 262 Wis. 2d 264,  ¶10. 
10 Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 
(1982). 
11 State v. Hutnik, 39 Wis. 2d 754, 763, 159 N.W.2d 733 
(1968) ("If a judge bases the exercise of his discretion upon an 
error of law, his conduct is beyond the limits of discretion."). 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
11 
 
injunctive relief is whether the Sheriff's hiring and firing of 
personnel to provide food service for the county jail is within 
the constitutional powers, rights, and duties of the office of 
sheriff.  If the circuit court erred in deciding this question 
of law, we need not address the other requirements for a 
permanent injunction.12   
 
¶28 The circuit court held that AFSCME Local 1901, if 
allowed to proceed with its complaint before the Wisconsin 
Employment 
Relations 
Commission, 
would 
impinge 
upon 
a 
constitutional power of Sheriff Kocken.  The circuit court 
reasoned as follows:  The operation of the jail is "one of [the] 
obvious constitutional duties" of the office of sheriff; "the 
providing of meals is an essential function of operating a jail 
just as is having a secured facility;" and "once it has been 
determined 
that 
the 
Sheriff's 
actions 
fall 
under 
this 
constitutional umbrella that it is up to the Sheriff to decide 
how those services will be provided." 
                                                 
12 Before 
the 
circuit 
court 
can 
issue 
a 
permanent 
injunction, "a plaintiff must show a sufficient probability that 
future conduct of the defendant will violate a right of and 
injure the plaintiff."  Pure Milk Prods. Coop. v. Nat'l Farmers 
Org., 90 Wis. 2d 781, 800, 280 N.W.2d 691 (1979).  A permanent 
injunction will not be granted unless there is the threat of 
irreparable injury that cannot be compensated with a remedy at 
law.  Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 58 Wis. 2d 299, 305, 
206 N.W.2d 152 (1973).  In other words, "[i]n order to warrant 
an injunction, the injury must be real, serious, material, and 
permanent, or potentially permanent; the right to the injunction 
must be clear; and the reasons for granting it strong and 
weighty."  Hartung v. Milwaukee County, 2 Wis. 2d 269, 281, 86 
N.W.2d 475 (1957) (quoting 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 111c, at 875). 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
12 
 
 
¶29 Because the circuit court determined that it was 
within the constitutional powers, rights, and duties of the 
sheriff to hire the food service provider for the county jail, 
the circuit court concluded that Sheriff Kocken could act 
without interference from the legislature and without limitation 
by a collective bargaining agreement.  Accordingly, the circuit 
court was satisfied that Sheriff Kocken's request for injunctive 
relief was warranted. 
III 
 
¶30 In deciding a question of state constitutional law, we 
turn first to the text of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
 
¶31 The Wisconsin Constitution establishes the office of 
sheriff, provides for the selection and term of the sheriff, 
places restrictions on the sheriff's holding other partisan 
office, and creates requirements for the giving of security.   
 
¶32 Article 
VI, 
section 
4(1)(a) 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution states that "sheriffs . . . shall be chosen by the 
electors of the respective counties once in every 2 years."13  
"When a vacancy occurs in the office of sheriff, the vacancy 
shall be filled by appointment of the governor and the person 
appointed shall serve until his or her successor is elected and 
qualified."14  The constitution further provides that sheriffs 
                                                 
13 The constitution was recently amended to provide for the 
election of sheriffs to four-year terms.  See Wis. Const. Art. 
VI, § 4(1)(b). 
14 Wis. Const. Art. VI, § 4(6).  
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
13 
 
may not hold any other partisan office15 and that sheriffs may be 
required by law to renew their security from time to time and, 
in default of giving such new security, their office shall be 
deemed vacant.16     
 
¶33 The Wisconsin Constitution does not delineate the 
powers, rights, and duties of the office of sheriff.  The case 
law has given meaning to the powers, rights, and duties of the 
office of sheriff protected by the state constitution.    
 
¶34 Acknowledging that "the constitution nowhere defines 
what powers, rights and duties shall attach or belong to the 
office of sheriff," the court, in 1870 in State ex rel. Kennedy 
v. Brunst, 26 Wis. 412, 414 (1870), concluded that the framers 
of the constitution intended the office of sheriff to have 
"those generally recognized legal duties and functions belonging 
to it in this country, and in the territory, when the 
constitution was adopted."17  The court further explained that 
"part and parcel of the duties from time immemorial belonging to 
[the office of sheriff] by law" are constitutionally protected.18   
                                                                                                                                                             
The court concluded that "[t]he office of sheriff, in a 
certain sense, is a constitutional office; that is, the 
constitution provides that sheriffs shall be chosen by the 
electors of the respective counties, once in every two years and 
as often as vacancies shall happen."  State ex rel. Kennedy v. 
Brunst, 26 Wis. 412, 413-14 (1870). 
15 Wis. Const. Art. VI, § 4(3)(a). 
16 Wis. Const. Art. VI, § 4(3)(b). 
17 Brunst, 26 Wis. at 414. 
18 Id. at 413-14; see also Manitowoc County v. Local 986B, 
168 Wis. 2d 819, 824, 484 N.W.2d 534 (1992). 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
14 
 
¶35 The court reasoned that unless these "time immemorial" 
duties were constitutionally protected from interference by 
others, the constitutional provision securing the people the 
right to choose sheriffs would become meaningless.  This 
analysis was set forth in Brunst, 26 Wis. at 414-15, as follows: 
And it seems to us unreasonable to hold, under a 
constitution which carefully provides for the election 
of sheriffs, fixes the term of office, etc., that the 
legislature may detach from the office its duties and 
functions, 
and 
transfer those duties to another 
officer.  In this case it is said that the legislature 
has attempted to take the largest share of the duties 
of sheriff, in point of responsibility and emolument, 
and to commit it to an officer selected by the county 
board of supervisors.  If the legislature can do this, 
why may it not deprive the sheriff of all the duties 
and powers appertaining to his office, and transfer 
them to some officer not chosen by the electors?  It 
would certainly be a very idle provision of the 
constitution, to secure to the electors the right to 
chose their sheriffs, and at the same time leave to 
the legislature the power to detach from the office of 
sheriff all the duties and functions by law belonging 
to that office when the constitution was adopted, and 
commit those duties to some officer not elected by the 
people.  For this would be to secure to the electors 
the right to choose a sheriff in name merely, while 
all the duties and substance of the office might be 
exercised by and belong to an officer appointed by 
some other authority. 
¶36 The Brunst court thus formulated the inquiry into the 
sheriff's constitutional powers, rights, and duties as an 
historical one, examining the nature of the office of sheriff as 
it existed when the constitution was adopted.  In later cases, 
beginning with State ex rel. Milwaukee County v. Buech, 171 Wis. 
474, 
482, 
177 
N.W. 
781 
(1920), 
the 
inquiry 
into 
the 
constitutional prerogatives of the office of sheriff continued 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
15 
 
to focus on the historical attributes of the office, but the 
court limited the constitutional powers, rights, and duties of 
the sheriff to only those "immemorial principal and important 
duties that characterized and distinguished the office."19 
¶37 In Buech, the sheriff challenged the application of 
the civil service law to a deputy as unconstitutional.  The 
Buech court held that the civil service law applied to the 
sheriff's hiring deputies, although "at common law the sheriff 
possessed the power to appoint deputies."  According to the 
Buech court, the power to hire does not give character and 
distinction to the office; it is not a power "peculiar" to the 
office of sheriff. The state constitution does not, in the words 
of the Buech court, "prohibit[] any legislative change in the 
powers, duties, functions, and liabilities of a sheriff as they 
existed at common law."20  
¶38 The court explained in Heitkemper v. Wirsing, 194 
Wis. 2d 182, 189, 533 N.W.2d 770 (1995), that Buech "rejected 
any interpretations of Brunst which tried to include within the 
constitutionally protected functions of the sheriff all powers 
held by the sheriff at the common law.  Rather, the [Brunst] 
court indicated that the test for determining which functions 
were constitutionally protected was more exacting."  The 
Heitkemper 
court 
explained 
that 
"internal 
management 
and 
                                                 
19 State ex rel. Milwaukee County v. Buech, 171 Wis. 474, 
482, 177 N.W. 781 (1920).   
20 Id. 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
16 
 
administrative 
duties," 
while 
important, 
fall 
within 
the 
"mundane 
and 
commonplace" 
duties 
not 
protected 
by 
the 
constitution.21   
¶39 Cases addressing the constitutional dimensions of the 
office 
of 
sheriff 
establish 
the 
following 
criteria 
for 
identifying a sheriff's constitutional powers, rights, and 
duties: certain immemorial, principal, and important duties of 
the sheriff at common law that are peculiar to the office of 
sheriff and that characterize and distinguish the office are 
constitutionally protected from legislative interference.22  
¶40 Nevertheless, the constitution does not prohibit all 
legislative change in the powers, duties, functions, and 
liabilities of a sheriff as they existed at common law.23  
"[I]internal management and administrative duties . . . [that] 
neither gave 'character' nor 'distinction' to the office of 
sheriff . . . fall within the mundane and common administrative 
duties of a sheriff which may be regulated by the legislature."24    
¶41 The court has carefully explained its reasoning for 
allowing legislative change to certain powers, rights, and 
duties of a sheriff as follows:  If the legislature could not 
                                                 
21 Heitkemper, 
194 
Wis. 2d 
at 
193; 
Local 
986B, 
168 
Wis. 2d at 824, 831 ("The legislature may still regulate the 
administrative and executive duties of a sheriff. . . . ").  
22 Buech, 171 Wis. 2d at 482; see also Local 986B, 168 
Wis. 2d at 826-27. 
23 Buech, 171 Wis. at 482.   
24 Heitkemper, 194 Wis. 2d at 193. 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
17 
 
act, "a constitutional amendment would be necessary in order to 
change the duties of sheriffs in the slightest degree, and in 
this respect 'the state would be stretched on a bed of 
Procrustes.'"25   
¶42 In sum, powers, rights, and duties of the office of 
sheriff that are "mundane and commonplace" "internal management 
and administrative" duties, even if they are ever-present 
aspects 
of 
the 
constitutional 
office, 
are 
not 
accorded 
constitutional status.26  To ignore an analysis of whether the 
duty at issue is mundane and commonplace and whether it is an 
internal management and administrative duty is to ignore or 
misread our case law and to risk over-constitutionalizing the 
powers of the office of the sheriff, in contravention of the 
framers' intentions.   
¶43 This traditional constitutional analysis of whether a 
power, right, or duty of the office of sheriff is immemorial and 
distinctive (and constitutionally protected) or mundane and 
commonplace, internal management and administrative (and not 
constitutionally protected) is easily apparent from the cases 
                                                 
25 Buech, 
171 
Wis. at 482 (quoted with approval in 
Heitkemper, 194 Wis. 2d at 190).  As the court later explained 
in 
Local 
986B, 
168 
Wis. 2d at 
824, 
"Procrustes 
was 
a 
mythological bandit known for placing his victims on an iron 
bed, tying them to it, and then making them the right length for 
it by stretching those who were too short and cutting off as 
much as was necessary from those who were too long."  Id. at 826 
n.2. 
26 Local 986B, 168 Wis. 2d 819, 826.  See also Heitkemper, 
194 Wis. 2d at 193. 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
18 
 
and is easy to state.  This traditional constitutional analysis 
is not, however, easy to apply.  Each of the cases coming to the 
court involves an action of the sheriff that is in some way 
related to a recognized constitutional power, right, and duty of 
the office, as in the instant case involving the operation of 
the jail and care of inmates.  Some cases have protected the 
office of sheriff from legislative interference; others have 
not.  
¶44 We begin our analysis of the case law by stating that 
the operation of the jail and the custody and care of jail 
inmates are part and parcel of the duties from time immemorial 
belonging to the office of sheriff and are distinctive to the 
office.  In 1870, the Brunst court stated that "[a]mong those 
duties [of a sheriff], one of the most characteristic and well 
acknowledged was the custody of the common jail and of the 
prisoners therein."27  Case law and the opinions of the attorney 
general have continued to recognize that the operation of the 
jail is a primary duty of the office of sheriff that "gave 
character and distinction to the office" at common law and thus 
is within the constitutional prerogative of the sheriff.28 
¶45 Aspects of the operation of the jail, however, 
including the provision of food for inmates, have been governed 
by statute.  As early as 1881, the court held that the sheriff 
                                                 
27 Brunst, 26 Wis. at 414. 
28 Buech, 171 Wis. at 482; Brunst, 26 Wis. at 414; 68 Op. 
Att'y Gen. 330, 332 (Nov. 7, 1979). 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
19 
 
has an obligation to furnish board for those housed at a jail.  
But the court did not characterize the duty to furnish board as 
a "time immemorial" task.  Rather the court located the 
sheriff's responsibility in the statutory obligations prescribed 
by the legislature.29  The court declared that "[t]he duty of 
furnishing board for persons confined in jail is absolutely 
imposed upon the sheriff by law."30  The applicable "statute 
imposes the absolute duty and responsibility upon that officer 
'to take the charge and custody of the jail of his county and 
the persons therein, and keep them himself, or by his deputy or 
jailer.'"31 
¶46 Today, Wis. Stat. § 302.37 requires the sheriff to 
take 
custody 
of 
inmates 
and 
provide 
them 
with 
adequate 
nourishment.  Wisconsin Stat. § 302.37(1)(a) states in relevant 
part:  
The sheriff or other keeper of a jail shall constantly 
keep it clean and in a healthful condition and pay 
strict attention to the personal cleanliness of the 
prisoners and shall cause the clothing of each 
prisoner to be properly laundered.  The sheriff or 
keeper shall furnish each prisoner with clean water, 
towels and bedding.  The sheriff or keeper shall serve 
each prisoner 3 times daily with enough well-cooked, 
wholesome food.  The county board shall prescribe an 
adequate diet for the prisoners in the county jail. 
                                                 
29 Bell v. Fond du Lac County, 53 Wis. 433, 434, 10 N.W. 522 
(1881). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 433-34. 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
20 
 
¶47 Of course, the simple fact that the legislature 
codified a duty and responsibility of the sheriff, like 
providing food for jail inmates, does not strip sheriffs of any 
constitutional protections they may have regarding this duty.  
Likewise, the simple fact that the task of providing food to 
inmates 
in 
the 
jail 
has 
been 
a 
long-standing 
statutory 
responsibility of the sheriff does not imbue this duty with 
constitutional protections.32 
 
¶48 The dispute between the parties in the instant case 
centers on whether a sheriff's hiring and firing of personnel to 
provide food service to inmates, including Sheriff Kocken's 
contracting with a food service provider for jail inmates at the 
                                                 
32 See Dunn County v. WERC, 2006 WI App 120, ¶9, 293 
Wis. 2d 637, 718 N.W.2d 138.  According to the record, the Brown 
County sheriff and his wife at one time personally handled food 
service in the jail. 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
21 
 
Brown County jail, is within the sheriff's constitutional 
powers, rights, and duties.33   
 
¶49 Sheriff Kocken insists that the circuit court properly 
analyzed the law when it found that the provision of food at the 
jail was within the "time immemorial" duties of the office of 
sheriff.  According to Sheriff Kocken, the case law makes clear 
that the operation of the jail, including the care of the 
inmates of the jail, is a constitutional duty of the office of 
sheriff such that a sheriff is to be afforded full discretion in 
performing this duty.  Sheriff Kocken urges this court to adopt 
the circuit court's reasoning: Provision of food is a central 
aspect of caring for inmates and operating the jail, and 
therefore, the sheriff has sole constitutional responsibility to 
manage and administer this constitutional task, including hiring 
the food service provider. 
                                                 
33 Although 
Sheriff 
Kocken 
states 
the 
issue 
as 
his 
constitutional power to choose a meal delivery system, he 
attempts to justify his ability to select a food service 
provider as part of a broader power than just the provision of 
food.  According to Sheriff Kocken, this decision about the food 
service provider has important ramifications: it may generate 
opportunities for inmate rehabilitation, like training and 
certification; create fiscal savings; and affect other budgetary 
considerations.  These collateral consequences do not, however, 
transform 
our 
inquiry 
into 
whether 
the 
sheriff 
has 
the 
constitutional power to design and implement rehabilitative 
programs at the jail or to reduce expenditures.  The parties 
focus their arguments on the sheriff's duty to provide food, not 
the ramifications of the decision, and so do we.  The question 
presented by the parties and the non-party briefs is a legal 
question of whether the sheriff had the ability to choose a food 
provider for the jail, not whether he made the right choice and 
not whether the sheriff has powers to implement rehabilitative 
programs or make budgetary decisions. 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
22 
 
 
¶50 In contrast, the defendants, the District Council and 
AFSCME Local 1901, contend that the hiring and firing of 
personnel to provide food service for the county jail is not 
within the constitutional prerogatives of the office of sheriff 
and is instead one of the mundane and commonplace internal 
management and administrative tasks that do not give character 
and distinction to the office.  Accordingly, the defendants 
argue that the hiring of a food service provider for the county 
jail can be regulated by the legislature and can be subject to a 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
entered 
pursuant 
to 
the 
Municipal Employee Relations Act.   
¶51 We do not approach the question presented by writing 
on a blank slate.  We gain guidance in the instant case about 
the 
proper 
application 
of 
the 
criteria 
defining 
the 
constitutional and non-constitutional powers, rights, and duties 
of the office of sheriff from prior court decisions that 
addressed the constitutional prerogatives of the office of 
sheriff, as well as from the published opinions of the Wisconsin 
attorney general.34  We first examine cases recognizing the 
constitutionally protected powers, rights, and duties of the 
office of sheriff and then the cases declaring certain powers, 
rights, and duties not constitutionally protected. 
                                                 
34 Attorney 
General 
Opinions, 
whether 
published 
or 
unpublished, are not binding authority on this court.  The court 
may, however, choose to treat them as persuasive authority and 
gain guidance from their analyses.  The Attorney General's 
Office has published numerous opinions, in a period spanning 
over one hundred years, expounding on the constitutional 
prerogatives of the office of sheriff. 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
23 
 
¶52 The operation of a jail and care of the jail inmates 
has been recognized as within the constitutional powers of the 
sheriff, because the operation of the jail gives character and 
distinction to the office of sheriff.  Thus in 1870, the court 
struck down legislation assigning the entire operation of the 
jail to an officer other than the sheriff.  The court declared 
unconstitutional a statute making the Milwaukee house of 
correction the Milwaukee County jail and making the inspector of 
the house of correction, ex officio, the jailer of the county 
with exclusive charge and custody of the jail and all prisoners 
therein.  The court held that the legislature could not take 
from the constitutional office of sheriff a part of the office 
and transfer it to another government officer who was appointed 
in a different manner and held a different tenure than that 
provided for the sheriff by the state constitution.35   
¶53 Furthermore, the attorney general, in an opinion 
published in 1979, opined that because of the constitutional 
nature of the sheriff's authority over the jail, the sheriff 
could order the county clerk to return a set of jail keys to the 
sheriff, even though statutes gave the county board the power to 
construct and maintain the jail and declared that the county 
property shall be held by the clerk in the name of the county.  
The attorney general explained that because the power over the 
jail "is an important attribute of the constitutional office of 
                                                 
35 Brunst, 26 Wis. at 415.  See also Wis. Prof'l Police 
Ass'n v. Dane County, 106 Wis. 2d 303, 313, 316 N.W.2d 656 
(1982) (WPPA I). 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
24 
 
sheriff, the county board cannot constitutionally effect a 
change in the substance of that power by transferring custody of 
the jail to the county clerk or by requiring the sheriff and the 
clerk to share custody of the jail."36   
¶54 Another 
constitutionally 
protected 
power 
and 
prerogative of the office of sheriff recognized by the courts is 
the sheriff's special relationship with the courts.  See Wis. 
Prof'l Police Ass'n v. Dane County, 106 Wis. 2d 303, 305, 316 
N.W.2d 656 (1982) (WPPA I).  This relationship between the 
sheriff and the courts is "peculiar to" and "gives character and 
distinction to" the office of sheriff.  The duties performed by 
the court officer designated by the sheriff are among the 
principal and important duties that characterize the office of 
sheriff, and, therefore, the sheriff may not be restricted as to 
whom he or she appoints to perform the functions.37  The court 
explained that only the sheriff can designate which deputies can 
serve as a court officer.  "'Attendance on the Court' is in the 
same category of powers inherent in the sheriff as is running 
the jail.  Just as . . . the legislature cannot deprive the 
sheriff of control of the jail, neither can the legislature 
                                                 
36 68 Op. Att'y Gen. 330, 332 (Nov. 7, 1979). 
37 These cases focused the inquiry not on the sheriff's 
power of appointment or the sheriff's ability to assign a task 
generally, but rather on the nature of the task assigned in 
order to assess the constitutional nature of the appointment 
power.  WPPA I, 106 Wis. 2d at 312 (it is the "nature of the job 
assigned [to the appointee] rather than the general power of job 
assignment which must be analyzed in light of the sheriff's 
constitutional powers."). 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
25 
 
through a statute authorizing collective bargaining by the 
county board and a union deprive the sheriff of his authority to 
select who among his deputies shall act in his stead in 
attendance on the court."38  The court focused on the "nature of 
the 
job 
assigned 
rather than the general power of job 
assignment."39   
                                                 
38 WPPA I, 106 Wis. 2d at 313.  This case was remanded to 
the circuit court for a determination of the specific duties of 
the "court officer" in question, because they were not clear 
from the record.  If the "court officer" did in fact attend to 
the courts as within the constitutional power of the office of 
sheriff, then only the sheriff could select these officers. 
At common law, the duties of the sheriff were four 
fold.  He was the keeper of the king's peace within 
the county; he was the king's bailiff; he heard and 
determined certain causes of action in his judicial 
capacity; and finally, in his ministerial capacity, he 
executed all process issuing from the king's superior 
courts of justice.  "It is one of the many duties of 
the 
sheriff 
to 
attend 
sessions 
of 
particular 
courts. . . . The responsibility of the sheriff is 
limited to the direction of the court. . . . When the 
sheriff attends the court, he attends as an officer of 
the court. . . . It is the duty of the sheriff to be 
present himself, or through a deputy and provide 
sufficient deputies to carry out the court's orders." 
 
 . . . . 
[A]t common law, the sheriff was an officer of the 
court and obliged to the court's commands.  The 
sheriff remains today subject to the orders of the 
courts.  We conclude that when the sheriff executes an 
arrest warrant issued by the court to bring a prisoner 
before the court the sheriff attends upon the court. 
Wis. Prof'l Police Ass'n/Law Enforcement Employee Relations Div. 
v. Dane County, 149 Wis. 2d 699, 706-07, 439 N.W.2d 625 (Ct. 
App. 1989) (WPPA II) (citations omitted). 
39 WPPA I, 106 Wis. 2d at 312. 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
26 
 
¶55 The sheriff's special relationship with the courts was 
reinforced recently in a 2006 court of appeals decision.  Dunn 
County v. WERC, 2006 WI App 120, ¶¶12-13, 293 Wis. 2d 637, 718 
N.W.2d 138.  The court of appeals held that a collective 
bargaining agreement cannot delegate power to the clerk of 
courts, with priority over the sheriff, in the scheduling, 
directing, and supervising of deputies serving as court security 
officers.  This delegation of power, held the court of appeals, 
interferes 
with the sheriff's constitutional authority in 
attending on the courts.40  "[T]he sheriff cannot be required to 
delegate to another county official the directory or supervisory 
authority over attendance upon the court."41 
¶56 Again dealing with the sheriff's relationship to the 
courts, the court of appeals held in Wisconsin Professional 
Police Ass'n/Law Enforcement Employee Relations Division v. Dane 
County, 149 Wis. 2d 699, 712, 439 N.W.2d 625 (Ct. App. 1989) 
(WPPA II), that the sheriff's duty "to execute court-issued 
arrest warrants to bring before the court a prisoner" was a 
cardinal and traditional responsibility of the sheriff, giving 
character to the office of sheriff.  Accordingly, the court of 
appeals concluded that the sheriff's right to enlist the 
services of the U.S. Marshal for interstate conveyance of 
                                                 
40 Dunn County v. WERC, 2006 WI App 120, ¶¶12-13, 293 
Wis. 2d 637, 718 N.W.2d 138. 
41 Id., ¶14. 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
27 
 
prisoners "may not be limited by a collective bargaining 
agreement."42 
¶57 Two other powers, rights, and duties recognized and 
clearly accepted by the courts as within the constitutional 
prerogative of the office of sheriff are maintaining law and 
order and preserving the peace.43  In a case involving this 
constitutionally protected prerogative of the office of sheriff, 
the court of appeals has concluded that a sheriff has the right 
to create a temporary mutual aid unit consisting of various law 
enforcement officers to address a special emergency, despite the 
objection of a deputy seeking overtime opportunities under the 
collective bargaining agreement.  The court of appeals explained 
in Washington County v. Washington County Deputy Sheriff's 
Ass'n, 192 Wis. 2d 728, 531 N.W.2d 468 (Ct. App. 1995), that 
"[the sheriff's] assignment of municipal officers to patrol duty 
normally assigned to deputies was in the reasonable anticipation 
of a possible emergency situation during Harleyfest and, in this 
case, was a proper exercise of a sheriff's duty to preserve the 
peace . . . ."44  Again, the court focused on the special "nature 
                                                 
42 WPPA II, 149 Wis. 2d at 712. 
43 Local 986B, 168 Wis. 2d at 830; WPPA I, 106 Wis. 2d at 
313; Andreski v. Indus. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 234, 240, 52 N.W.2d 135 
(1952) (a worker's compensation case involving whether the 
sheriff was on business so that his widow was eligible for 
compensation). 
44 Washington County v. Washington County Deputy Sheriff's 
Ass'n, 192 Wis. 2d 728, 741, 531 N.W.2d 468 (Ct. App. 1995) 
(emphasis added). 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
28 
 
of the job assigned rather than the general power of job 
assignment."45 
¶58 In another case involving the same constitutional 
prerogative, Manitowoc County v. Local 986B, 168 Wis. 2d 819, 
484 N.W.2d 534 (1992), the court concluded that a sheriff had 
the constitutional right to assign a specially qualified deputy 
from patrol duty to fill a unique undercover position.46  The 
court explained that "law enforcement and preserving the peace 
were duties which 'gave character and distinction' to the office 
of 
sheriff . . . "47 
and 
"undercover 
detective 
work 
is 
a 
contemporary method of the exercise of the sheriff's historical 
duties of maintaining law and order and preserving the peace."48  
The court emphasized, however, that the "legislature may still 
regulate the administrative and executive duties of a sheriff, 
and the collective bargaining agreement will still control 
wages, hours and conditions of employment."49  The court 
expressly declared that its holding about the undercover agent 
is narrow and limited to the facts of the case.50  Again, the 
                                                 
45 WPPA I, 106 Wis. 2d at 312. 
46 Local 986B, 168 Wis. 2d at 830. 
47 Id. at 828. 
48 Id. at 830. 
49 Id. at 831. 
50 Id. 
 
See 
also 
Heitkemper, 
194 
Wis. 2d at 
192-93 
(interpreting Local 986B narrowly). 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
29 
 
court focused on the special "nature of the job assigned rather 
than the general power of job assignment."51 
¶59 The court of appeals in Dunn County v. WERC, 2006 WI 
App 120, ¶23, 293 Wis. 2d 637, 718 N.W.2d 138, has explained the 
limited applicability of the mutual aid case and the undercover 
agent case.  They involve, wrote the court of appeals, "very 
specific 
assignments, 
not 
day-to-day 
routine 
scheduling 
requirements."52 
¶60 Other cases demonstrate that not all matters related 
to the sheriff's powers, rights, and duties to maintain law and 
order and to preserve the peace are constitutionally protected 
and within the total discretion of the sheriff.  In other words, 
even when a task is related to a sheriff's constitutional 
powers, rights, and duties, like maintaining law and order, the 
sheriff may be subject to legislative regulation in regard to 
performance of that duty.  The court's reasoning has been that 
many tasks for which a sheriff is responsible that relate to the 
office's 
constitutional 
powers, 
rights, 
and 
duties 
are 
nondistinctive, "mundane and commonplace" "internal management 
and administrative" duties of a sheriff.  Such duties do not 
themselves 
take 
on 
constitutional 
dimensions 
and 
can 
be 
regulated by the legislature. 
                                                 
51 WPPA I, 106 Wis. 2d at 312. 
52 Dunn County v. WERC, 2006 WI App 120, ¶23, 293 
Wis. 2d 637, 718 Wis. 2d 138. 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
30 
 
¶61 For example, the constitutional prerogative of the 
office of sheriff to maintain law and order and preserve the 
peace does not encompass the power to appoint or dismiss 
deputies. 
¶62 The appointment and dismissal of deputies are non-
distinctive internal management and administrative tasks, in 
contrast to the constitutional tasks previously described.  
Although at common law the sheriff had the power or authority to 
appoint deputies, the court has held that this power "was not a 
power or authority that gave character and distinction to the 
office."53  Thus in State ex rel. Milwaukee County v. Buech, 171 
Wis. 474, 
177 
N.W. 781 
(1920), 
the 
court 
upheld 
the 
constitutionality of a statute providing for a civil service 
                                                 
53 Buech, 171 Wis. at 482. 
With no disposition to question the doctrine of [State 
ex rel. Kennedy v. Brunst], we do not think it should 
be extended to the extent here urged.  We think it 
should be confined to those immemorial principal and 
important duties that characterized and distinguished 
the office.  While at common law the sheriff possessed 
the power to appoint deputies, it was not a power or 
authority that gave character and distinction to the 
office.  Many other officers as well as sheriffs 
possessed the power.  It was more in the nature of a 
general power possessed by all officers to a more or 
less extent, and was not peculiar to the office of 
sheriff.  It should not be held, in our judgment, that 
the constitution prohibits any legislative change in 
the powers, duties, functions, and liabilities of a 
sheriff as they existed at common law.  If that were 
true, a constitutional amendment would be necessary in 
order to change the duties of sheriffs in the 
slightest degree, and in this respect, "the state 
would be stretched on a bed of Procrustes." 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
31 
 
system that included defining and limiting the sheriff's 
authority to hire and discharge deputies.  The court reaffirmed 
this holding in Heitkemper v. Wirsing, 194 Wis. 2d 182, 533 
N.W.2d 770 (1995), stating that "[w]hile internal management and 
administrative duties such as termination are important, they 
neither gave 'character' nor 'distinction' to the office of 
sheriff.  Rather, these duties, specifically the power to 
dismiss, fall within the mundane and common administrative 
duties of a sheriff which may be regulated by the legislature."54  
¶63 The 
sheriff 
is 
thus 
subject 
to 
civil 
service 
requirements in the hiring and discharging of deputies.55  A 
newly elected or reelected sheriff who wishes to dismiss or not 
to reappoint a previously appointed deputy does not possess the 
constitutional authority to do so.  The sheriff is instead bound 
by the collective bargaining agreement.56  
¶64 The working environment of the sheriff's office may be 
regulated by the legislature or may be subject to collective 
bargaining agreements.  The court has declared: "The legislature 
may still regulate the administrative and executive duties of a 
                                                 
54 Heitkemper, 194 Wis. 2d at 193.   
55 Buech, 171 Wis. at 482; see also Brown County Sheriff's 
Dep't v. Brown County Sheriff's Dep't Non-supervisory Employees 
Ass'n, 194 Wis. 2d 265, 273-74, 533 N.W.2d 766 (1995). 
56 Id. at 269. 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
32 
 
sheriff, and the collective bargaining agreement will still 
control wages, hours and conditions of employment."57  
¶65 Likewise, the attorney general opined that the county 
board may fix the number and the compensation of all deputy 
sheriffs, including honorary deputies, without usurping the 
constitutional powers of the sheriff.58  In another opinion, the 
attorney general explained that the administrative aspects of 
the office of sheriff are not constitutional in nature, 
emphasizing that "the constitution does not prohibit the 
Legislature from exercising any control of the powers, duties, 
functions and liabilities of a sheriff as they existed at common 
law, and it may regulate many such matters, including the 
appointment 
and 
compensation 
of 
his 
deputies 
and 
other 
subordinates."59     
¶66 An analysis of the case law and opinions of the 
attorney general demonstrates that just because the office of 
sheriff has constitutional power over the jail and care of the 
inmates does not mean that every aspect of the operation of the 
jail or every aspect of caring for the inmates falls within the 
sheriff's 
constitutional 
powers. 
 
Although 
the 
sheriff 
traditionally may have been responsible for providing food to 
the inmates under his care, the constitutional inquiry does not 
                                                 
57 Local 986B, 168 Wis. 2d at 831.  See also Dunn County v. 
WERC, 2006 WI App 120, ¶23, 293 Wis. 2d 637, 718 N.W.2d 138.  
58 68 Op. Att'y Gen. 334, 339 (Nov. 8, 1979). 
59 77 Op. Att'y Gen. 94, 96 (Apr. 29, 1988).  See also 68 
Op. Att'y Gen. 334, 339-40 (Nov. 8, 1979). 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
33 
 
focus exclusively on whether the sheriff was responsible for 
food service at common law.60  Rather the focus in the 
constitutional inquiry is on whether the task of hiring and 
firing personnel to provide food to inmates gives distinction 
and character to the office of sheriff or whether the task is a 
mundane and commonplace internal management and administrative 
duty of the office. 
¶67 The present case involves a routine assignment of the 
sheriff's duties related to the operation of the jail and care 
for inmates.  Adhering to case law, we focus on the nature of 
the job assigned, that is, providing food, rather than the 
general power of job assignment.61  The case law and the opinions 
of the attorney general make clear that hiring and firing 
personnel to provide food service, including contracting with a 
food service provider, is more akin to the other employment 
decisions that this court has previously determined to be 
mundane and commonplace internal management and administrative 
duties outside the constitutional powers, rights, and duties of 
the office of sheriff.  Hiring and firing a food service 
provider is at best ancillary to the constitutional powers, 
rights, and duties of the office of sheriff to operate the jail 
                                                 
60 The attorney general opined that there might be a 
constitutional question whether the legislature could deprive 
the sheriff of the privilege of electing to feed the inmates 
himself or by means of the services of his wife and avoided 
answering the question.  40 Op. Att'y Gen. 140, 143 (May 18, 
1951). 
61 WPPA I, 106 Wis. 2d at 312. 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
34 
 
and take care of the jail inmates, much like many employment 
decisions concerning deputies are ancillary to the powers, 
rights, and duties of the office of sheriff to maintain law and 
order and preserve the peace.   The employment decision in the 
instant case is not similar to a sheriff's constitutional 
prerogative to supervise court security officers, enlist the 
services of the U.S. Marshal for interstate conveyance of 
prisoners, and assign a deputy to be a unique undercover agent.   
¶68 Even back when sheriffs, or their wives, single-
handedly prepared the food for jail inmates, the sheriff was not 
known as a butcher, a baker, or a meal-maker.  History makes 
clear that the active preparation and service of food to inmates 
does not have a "time immemorial" nature that gives character 
and distinction to the office of sheriff.62  Not all operations 
of a jail fall within the sheriff's constitutional prerogative; 
each task must be individually analyzed and assessed. 
¶69 Thus, 
just 
as 
the 
legislature 
can 
prescribe 
limitations on the sheriff's power to hire or terminate deputies 
who maintain law and order and preserve the peace, so too can 
the legislature regulate the employment decisions for food 
service workers at the county jail. 
                                                 
62 The provision of food to jail inmates bears little 
distinction from the provision of food to residents of other 
institutions, 
including 
orphanages, 
reform 
schools, 
state 
prisons, mental asylums, and poorhouses.  For discussion of 
these other institutions, see Richard N. Current, The History of 
Wisconsin, Volume II:  The Civil War Era, 1848-1873, 186-88, 
190-91, 515-18 (William Fletcher Thompson ed., State Historical 
Society of Wisconsin 1976). 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
35 
 
¶70 We 
are 
persuaded 
our 
conclusion 
is 
correct 
by 
examining 
the 
consequences 
of 
adopting 
Sheriff 
Kocken's 
position.  If we determined that hiring and firing personnel to 
provide food for the county jail is in fact a constitutional 
power of the office of sheriff merely because it is related to 
the sheriff's constitutional power and duty to operate the jail 
and care for inmates, then all mundane and commonplace internal 
management and administrative aspects of the operation of the 
jail 
and 
care 
of 
the 
inmates 
would 
similarly 
become 
constitutionally protected prerogatives of the sheriff, such 
that any changes the legislature might want to make to mundane 
and commonplace internal management or administrative aspects of 
the operation of the jail and care of inmates might require a 
constitutional amendment.     
¶71 Moreover, our decision today has consequences beyond 
the office of sheriff.  Section 4 of Article VI of the state 
constitution applies not only to sheriffs but also to district 
attorneys and other officers.  A broad characterization of the 
immemorial and distinctive principles and characteristics of the 
office 
of 
sheriff 
could 
be 
similarly 
applied 
to 
other 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
36 
 
constitutional offices, further stretching the state on a bed of 
Procrustes.63   
¶72 In sum, hiring and firing personnel to provide food 
service does not fall within the constitutional powers, rights, 
and duties of the office of sheriff.  Having concluded that the 
selection of a food service provider for the county jail is not 
within the constitutional powers and duties of the office of 
sheriff, we hold that the circuit court erroneously exercised 
its discretion in rendering judgment in favor of Sheriff Kocken.  
The circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in 
granting the permanent injunction when it erred as a matter of 
law 
in 
concluding 
that 
the 
sheriff 
had 
constitutionally 
protected authority to designate a food service provider without 
limitation by a collective bargaining agreement entered pursuant 
to the Municipal Employment Relations Act. 
¶73 Although the constitutional powers and prerogatives of 
the office of sheriff cannot be limited by collective bargaining 
agreements,64 if a function is "not reserved to the sheriff by 
                                                 
63 For instance, in Schultz v. Milwaukee County, 245 
Wis. 111, 
13 
N.W.2d 580 
(1944), 
the 
court 
discussed 
the 
constitutional aspects of the office of coroner and applied the 
standard used for the constitutional prerogatives of the office 
of sheriff established in Brunst.  The court concluded that "the 
holding 
of 
inquests 
was 
not 
such 
a 
distinctive 
and 
characteristic feature of the office of coroner at the time of 
the adoption of the constitution as to deprive the legislature 
of power to create another office and impose the duty to hold 
inquests upon it."  Schultz, 245 Wis. at 121-22. 
64 See Heitkemper, 194 Wis. 2d at 193.  See also WPPA I, 106 
Wis. 2d at 314. 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
37 
 
the Constitution, then the sheriff may be bound by the 
collective bargaining agreement entered into between the county 
and the union by virtue of the Municipal Employment Relations 
Act (MERA) . . . ."65   
 
¶74 We need not comment further on the nature or effect of 
the collective bargaining agreement.  That issue is not before 
the court.  We merely conclude that hiring and firing the 
personnel to provide food for the Brown County jail is not 
within Sheriff Kocken's constitutional authority and may be 
limited by legislation, including the Municipal Employment 
Relations Act. 
¶75 For the reasons set forth, we hold that the Sheriff's 
hiring and firing of personnel to provide food service to the 
county jail is not a "time immemorial," principal, and important 
duty that characterizes and distinguishes the office of sheriff, 
and as such, is not within the Sheriff's constitutional powers.  
                                                 
65 Id. at 315. 
The collective bargaining agreement at issue in the present 
case is an "Agreement Between Brown County and the Brown County 
Mental Health Center Employees Local 1901." 
Although not a named party to the agreement, Sheriff Kocken 
may be bound by it.  As we explained in Brown County Sheriff's 
Department, "[t]he sheriff argues that he should not be bound to 
the 'agreement to arbitrate' because he is not a party to the 
collective bargaining agreement.  However, the legislature has 
provided the county, not the sheriff, with the option of 
adopting § 59.21(8)(b), Stats.  Likewise, the county can clearly 
choose to collectively bargain the terms of employment and 
suspension, demotion, and dismissal of deputy sheriffs."  Brown 
County Sheriff's Dep't, 194 Wis. 2d at 275-76. 
No. 
2005AP2742   
 
38 
 
Rather, the hiring and firing of personnel to provide food 
service to the county jail falls within the "mundane and 
commonplace" "internal management and administrative duties"66 
not protected by the constitution.  Hiring and firing personnel 
to provide food to inmates is subject to legislative regulation, 
including collective bargaining under Wis. Stat. § 111.70.  The 
circuit court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that 
the contract at issue is within the sheriff's constitutional 
prerogative.  This error of law rendered the circuit court's 
judgment an erroneous exercise of discretion. 
¶76 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit 
court and remand the cause to the circuit court to dismiss 
Sheriff Kocken's complaint seeking declaratory relief.  We also 
vacate the permanent injunction.  AFSCME Local 1901 is no longer 
restrained from pursuing its complaint filed with the Wisconsin 
Employment 
Relations 
Commission, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.70, the Municipal Employment Relations Act. 
¶77 By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is 
reversed and the cause remanded.  
 
                                                 
66 Heitkemper, 
194 
Wis. 2d at 
193; 
Local 
986B, 
168 
Wis. 2d at 820. 
No.  2005AP2742.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶78 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J. 
(dissenting).   The 
majority concludes that the provision of food, including the 
power to select a food service provider, does not fall within 
the constitutional powers and duties of the office of sheriff.  
Majority op., ¶¶4, 66.  The majority opinion lacks our 
traditional 
constitutional 
analysis 
that 
is 
necessary 
to 
determine whether feeding the prisoners falls within the 
constitutional powers and duties of the sheriff.  However, when 
undertaken, such analysis demonstrates that the constitutional 
powers and duties of the sheriff include the care and custody of 
prisoners in the county jail, which duty encompasses the duty to 
feed them.  Accordingly, a collective bargaining agreement 
cannot detach from the office of sheriff those constitutional 
duties that the people have elected the sheriff to undertake.  
Because the majority opinion takes away from the office of 
sheriff part of its constitutional power and gives that power to 
those who were not elected by the people, I respectfully 
dissent. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶79 AFSCME Local 1901 (Local 1901), which represents 
county employees, filed a complaint in June 2004 with the 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) against Brown 
County, in regard to the means by which the Brown County 
Sheriff, 
Dennis 
Kocken, 
chose 
to 
provide 
meals 
to 
jail 
prisoners.  The complaint alleged that Brown County had 
committed a prohibited labor practice in violation of Wis. Stat. 
No.  2005AP2742.pdr 
 
2 
 
§ 111.70(3)(a) (2003-04),1 because it refused to bargain with 
Local 1901 on Sheriff Kocken's decision to subcontract the 
provision of meals for jail prisoners.   
¶80 Sheriff Kocken had contracted with a private party, 
Aramark, to provide meals to jail prisoners.  According to 
Sheriff Kocken, his decision was intricately related to many 
aspects of running the jail.  He explained it would save Brown 
County $1,000,000, 
provide food-service training for jail 
prisoners, improve prisoner morale and improve jail safety.  
¶81 Prior to 2001, food for jail prisoners was provided by 
the Brown County Sheriff's Department employees.  They were not 
members of Local 
1901, and they were assisted in meal 
preparation by jail prisoners.  In 2001, in anticipation of 
county construction projects, the Brown County Sheriff decided 
to consolidate food service for the jail with that for the 
County Mental Health Center and the County Work Release Center.  
As a result of this food preparation consolidation, Local 1901 
became the bargaining unit for the food service providers and 
prisoner involvement in food preparation was discontinued.   
¶82 When the anticipated construction, for which the food 
service was consolidated, did not occur, Sheriff Kocken decided 
to employ Aramark to provide prisoner meals because doing so 
would save Brown County $1,000,000, and Aramark would train and 
utilize the services of jail prisoners in food preparation.  The 
prisoners also would receive sentence credit for the hours 
                                                 
1 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version, unless otherwise noted. 
No.  2005AP2742.pdr 
 
3 
 
worked, which would increase prisoner morale and jail safety.  
It is this entire program that Local 1901's complaint affects.     
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶83 This 
case 
involves a question of constitutional 
interpretation that we review independently.  Schilling v. Crime 
Victims Rights Board, 2005 WI 17, ¶12, 278 Wis. 2d 216, 692 
N.W.2d 623.   
B. 
Wisconsin Constitution, Article VI, Section 4 
¶84 The constitutional provisions that relate to sheriffs 
are contained within Article VI, Section 4 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  It provides in relevant part: 
[S]heriffs shall be chosen by the electors of the 
respective counties . . . for the term of 4 years.  
. . .  Sheriffs may not hold any other partisan 
office.  . . .  Sheriffs may be required by law to 
renew their security from time to time, and in default 
of giving such new security their office shall be 
deemed vacant.  . . .  The governor may remove any 
[sheriff] . . . giving to [the sheriff] . . . a copy 
of the charges and an opportunity of being heard.  
. . .  When a vacancy occurs in the office of sheriff, 
the vacancy shall be filled by appointment of the 
governor, and the person appointed shall serve until 
his or her successor is elected and qualified.  
¶85 When we interpret the Wisconsin Constitution, we do so 
to give effect to the "intent of the framers and of the people 
who adopted it."  Schilling, 278 Wis. 2d 216, ¶13 (citations 
omitted).  In so doing under our traditional constitutional 
No.  2005AP2742.pdr 
 
4 
 
analysis,2 we examine three sources:  the plain meaning of the 
words, in context; the practices as they existed at the time the 
constitution was written; and the earliest interpretations of 
the constitutional provision under consideration.  Wis. Citizens 
Concerned for Cranes & Doves v. DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶44, 270 Wis. 
2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612 (citations omitted).   
¶86 The constitutional directives that apply to the office 
of sheriff provide for the election of sheriffs and fix the term 
of office, but they do not describe the constitutional powers 
and duties of that office.  Because of this lack of specificity, 
questions in regard to sheriffs' powers and duties have been 
addressed by Wisconsin courts for more than 100 years.  See 
State ex rel. Kennedy v. Brunst, 26 Wis. 412 (1870).  
¶87 In Brunst, the inspector of the Milwaukee house of 
correction sought a writ to direct the Milwaukee County Sheriff 
to turn over all prisoners confined to the jail.  The inspector 
based his demand on an 1870 statute that named the house of 
correction as the county jail and the inspector as the jailor, 
                                                 
2 The 
majority 
opinion 
claims 
that 
its 
analysis 
is 
"traditional."  Majority op., ¶43.  However, it is only talking 
the talk, not walking the walk.  The majority opinion does not 
analyze and rely on the powers and duties of the sheriff as they 
existed at the time the constitution was ratified or the 
earliest interpretations of the constitutional provision at 
issue, as we did in Wisconsin Citizens Concerned for Cranes & 
Doves v. DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶44, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612; 
State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶10, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 
328; and Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 680, 546 N.W.2d 
123 (1996).  It mentions State ex rel. Kennedy v. Brunst, 26 
Wis. 
412 
(1870), 
the 
earliest 
interpretation 
of 
the 
constitutional powers and duties of the sheriff, but it ignores 
its conclusions, as it does the powers and duties of the sheriff 
at the time the Wisconsin Constitution was ratified.   
No.  2005AP2742.pdr 
 
5 
 
ex officio.  Id. at 413.  The sheriff refused to comply with the 
demand, claiming that the care and custody of the prisoners of 
the jail were "duties from time immemorial belonging to [the 
office of sheriff]."  Id.  We reasoned that the framers of the 
constitution "had reference to the office [of sheriff] with 
those generally recognized legal duties and functions belonging 
to it in this country, and in the territory, when the 
constitution was adopted."  Id. at 414.  Important to our 
decision was the following rationale:   
It would certainly be a very idle provision of the 
constitution, to secure to the electors the right to 
choose their sheriffs, and at the same time leave to 
the legislature the power to detach from the office of 
sheriff all the duties and functions by law belonging 
to that office when the constitution was adopted, and 
commit those duties to some officer not elected by the 
people.  For this would be to secure to the electors 
the right to choose a sheriff in name merely, while 
all the duties and substance of the office might be 
exercised by and belong to an officer appointed by 
some other authority. 
Id. at 414-15.  
¶88 Based on the common law legal duties and functions of 
a sheriff in 1848 when the Wisconsin Constitution was ratified, 
we concluded that it was constitutionally impermissible to grant 
to another the common law functions and duties of the sheriff.  
Id. at 415.  Therefore, the legislature was without power to 
detach from the office of sheriff those powers and duties a 
sheriff held at common law.  Because our decision in Brunst was 
issued only 22 years after the Wisconsin Constitution was 
ratified 
and 
is 
the 
earliest 
interpretation 
of 
the 
constitutional provisions relating to the sheriff, its reasoning 
No.  2005AP2742.pdr 
 
6 
 
is the foundation of all subsequent opinions that have addressed 
the constitutional powers and duties of sheriffs.3  
¶89 Brunst identified the sheriff's constitutional powers 
and duties at the time the constitution was ratified.  They 
include:  (1) having custody and the care of the jail and the 
prisoners therein; (2) preservation of the public peace; (3) 
execution of writs and other service of the courts.  Id. at 413-
14.  Our reasoning in Brunst about the scope of the common law 
powers and duties of a sheriff and how we identified those same 
powers and duties as the constitutional powers and duties of a 
sheriff 
when 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
was 
ratified 
is 
important to understanding the issues presented for our review 
in the case before us.  Our analysis in Brunst is the 
traditional, constitutional analysis that we have continued to 
use for more than 100 years to determine the meaning of a 
constitutional provision.4  Brunst's analysis also is cited in 
the well-respected treatise, Walter H. Anderson, Anderson on 
Sheriffs, Coroners and Constables 37 (Dennis & Co., Inc. 1941), 
which concurs in our analysis.   
¶90 As has been explained in learned treatises that 
examine the office of sheriff, the common law powers and duties 
that the sheriff held also included "the powers necessary for 
                                                 
3 I note that "[t]he position of sheriff is one of great 
antiquity and honor.  He was the deputy of the king in his shire 
and was accountable to no one but the king."  Andreski v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 261 Wis. 234, 239, 52 N.W.2d 135 (1952).    
4 See Dunn County v. WERC, 2006 WI App 120, ¶10, 293 Wis. 2d 
637, 718 N.W.2d 138. 
No.  2005AP2742.pdr 
 
7 
 
their performance."  William L. Murfree, Sr., Law of Sheriffs 
and Other Ministerial Officers 21 (2d ed. 1890).  Accordingly, 
if a sheriff had a particular duty at common law, such as the 
care of the prisoners, he also had all of the powers necessary 
to perform that duty.   
¶91 In State ex rel. Milwaukee County v. Buech, 171 Wis. 
474, 177 N.W. 781 (1920), we again construed the constitutional 
powers and duties of a sheriff.  We addressed the question of 
whether a sheriff's dismissal of a deputy could be regulated by 
the legislature through the civil service laws or whether the 
constitution prohibited that regulation.  Id. at 476.  In our 
review of the question presented, we did not use the terms 
"constitutional duties and functions" as we had in Brunst.  
Instead, we described the sheriff's common law "duties" that 
were constitutionally based as those "immemorial principal and 
important 
duties that characterized and distinguished the 
office."  Id. at 482.  We opined that while at common law the 
sheriff possessed the general power to appoint deputies, such 
power was not "peculiar to the office of sheriff" because many 
other officers also had a general power of appointment.  Id.  
Many other public officers also had the power to fire employees, 
so that firing employees was not a task "peculiar to the office 
of sheriff."  However, we specifically avoided determining 
whether the sheriff had been deprived of a constitutional power 
of appointment of deputies by legislative action because we 
determined that the civil service laws that governed the 
No.  2005AP2742.pdr 
 
8 
 
qualification of deputies were only a reasonable regulation upon 
the sheriff's power.  Id. at 482-83.   
¶92 In Wisconsin Professional Police Ass'n (WPPA) v. 
County of Dane, 106 Wis. 2d 303, 316 N.W.2d 656 (1982) (WPPA I), 
we addressed whether a collective bargaining agreement between 
Dane County and the Teamsters Union Local 695 could limit the 
person whom the sheriff could select as a "court officer" to 
attend upon the courts on behalf of the sheriff.  Id. at 305.  
We concluded that while a collective bargaining agreement 
authorized by the legislature may limit a sheriff's power that 
is purely statutory, "it provides no basis for so limiting the 
powers and duties of the sheriff which are based upon his 
constitutional status."  Id. at 319.   
¶93 We also explained in WPPA I that when analyzing 
whether a particular power is constitutionally grounded, we 
examine "the nature of the job assigned rather than the general 
power of job assignment."  Id. at 312 (emphasis added).  This 
explanation distinguished our WPPA I analysis from that which we 
used in Buech because in Buech we focused on a general power, 
rather than on the assignment of a specific job.  
¶94 In WPPA I, we determined that "'Attendance on the 
Court' is in the same category of powers inherent in the sheriff 
as is running the jail."  Id. at 313.  It is "among the 
principal and important duties which characterized the office of 
sheriff so that the sheriff may not be restricted as to whom he 
appoints."  Id. at 312.  When a power of the sheriff is bottomed 
in 
the 
sheriff's 
constitutional 
authority, 
a 
"collective 
No.  2005AP2742.pdr 
 
9 
 
bargaining by the county board and a union [cannot] deprive the 
sheriff of his authority."  Id. at 313.  
¶95 In Wisconsin Professional Police Ass'n v. Dane County, 
149 Wis. 2d 699, 439 N.W.2d 625 (Ct. App. 1989) (WPPA II), the 
court of appeals addressed another union complaint against a 
sheriff.  In WPPA II, the union claimed that the sheriff had 
violated the collective bargaining agreement with the county by 
contracting with the U.S. Marshal's Service for the interstate 
conveyance of prisoners, rather than assigning a union member to 
the task.  Id. at 702-03.  The sheriff contended that it cost 
less to transport prisoners with the U.S. Marshal's Service than 
it did using bargaining unit members, and because prisoner 
transportation was within his constitutional power to attend 
upon the courts, his choice of how to complete that task could 
not be changed by a collective bargaining agreement.  Id.  
¶96 As it began its analysis, the court of appeals pointed 
out that a court should focus on "the nature of the sheriff's 
duty in light of the sheriff's constitutional powers . . . not 
the way in which the sheriff carries out the duty."  Id. at 701.  
The court explained that one of the sheriff's constitutional 
duties was attending upon the court.  Id. at 707.  The court of 
appeals said that when a sheriff transports a prisoner in 
execution of an arrest warrant issued by the court, he is 
performing part of that constitutional duty.  Id.  Because the 
duty of attending upon the court was a duty that "characterized 
and distinguished the office of sheriff at common law, the 
sheriff 'chooses his own ways and means of performing it.'"  Id. 
No.  2005AP2742.pdr 
 
10 
 
at 710 (citing WPPA I, 106 Wis. 2d at 314 (quoting Andreski v. 
Indus. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 234, 240, 52 N.W.2d 135 (1952)).   
¶97 In Manitowoc County v. Local 986B, 168 Wis. 2d 819, 
484 N.W.2d 534 (1992), Local 986B complained that the sheriff 
had violated a collective bargaining agreement by assigning an 
officer as an undercover drug agent without posting the 
position.  We concluded that the sheriff was operating within 
his constitutional authority to preserve the peace when he made 
the appointment.  Id. at 828.  We explained that keeping the 
peace was one of the "immemorial principal and important duties" 
of the sheriff at common law, but it was not necessary that such 
a duty also be "unique" to the office of sheriff.  Id.  We 
explained that there "is no reason why the constitution should 
protect only those traditional duties which were 'unique' to the 
office of sheriff at common law."  Id. at 829.   
¶98 We said that "[c]itizens of a county have a right to 
elect a sheriff to perform certain traditional duties regardless 
of who else may also have performed them at common law."  Id. at 
824.  This reasoning, bottomed on the right of the electors to 
choose a sheriff who will carry out duties and perform functions 
traditional to the office of sheriff, was the foundation of our 
first interpretation of the constitutional role of the sheriff.  
See Brunst, 26 Wis. at 415 (explaining that it would be a hollow 
constitutional right if the electors could choose a sheriff, but 
could not have him perform his traditional duties and functions, 
as that would be electing a sheriff in name only). 
No.  2005AP2742.pdr 
 
11 
 
¶99 In Washington County v. Washington County Deputy 
Sheriff's Ass'n, 192 Wis. 2d 728, 531 N.W.2d 468 (Ct. App. 
1995), the court of appeals analyzed whether the sheriff had the 
constitutional 
power 
to 
utilize 
non-bargaining 
unit 
law 
enforcement personnel to help maintain law and order in 
anticipation of a public event that the sheriff anticipated 
would draw large numbers of people into Washington County.  The 
court of appeals began by noting that maintaining law and order 
was a historic duty of the sheriff.  Id. at 738.  The court then 
used the same test as it had in WPPA II:  If the nature of the 
job assigned was for the purpose of law enforcement and 
preserving the peace, then the sheriff had the constitutional 
power to choose the "ways and means of performing those duties."  
Id. at 738-39.    
¶100 On June 26, 1995, we decided two cases that addressed 
the issue of the sheriff's constitutional powers:  Heitkemper v. 
Wirsing, 194 Wis. 2d 182, 533 N.W.2d 770 (1995) and Brown County 
Sheriff's Dep't v. Brown County Sheriff's Dep't Non-supervisory 
Employees Ass'n, 194 Wis. 2d 265, 533 N.W.2d 766 (1995).  Both 
cases address firing a deputy who had served in a sheriff's 
department for many years.  Each case specifically pointed out 
that it did not address the sheriff's power to appoint a deputy 
who previously had not been hired by the sheriff.  Heitkemper, 
194 Wis. 2d at 185 (concluding that "the issue in this case is 
not whether a collective bargaining agreement can usurp [the 
sheriff's] power to appoint a deputy"); Brown County, 194 Wis. 
2d at 269 (concluding that the issue is whether the sheriff's 
No.  2005AP2742.pdr 
 
12 
 
constitutional power extends to the "power to dismiss or not to 
reappoint a previously appointed deputy").  It is important to 
note that neither Heitkemper nor Brown County turned on, or 
addressed, the constitutional power of a sheriff to decide how 
to perform tasks undertaken within the scope of one of the 
sheriff's constitutional duties.  Both cases focused only on the 
general power to terminate an employee, a power that did not 
distinguish the office of sheriff at common law.  
¶101 In the most recent appellate decision addressing the 
constitutional powers of a sheriff, Dunn County v. WERC, 2006 WI 
App 120, 293 Wis. 2d 637, 718 N.W.2d 138, the court of appeals 
reviewed several provisions in a collective bargaining agreement 
upon the complaint of the sheriff that the provisions were 
illegal on their face because they violated the constitutional 
powers of the office of sheriff.  Id., ¶3.  In analyzing the 
claims of the sheriff, the court of appeals applied the same 
two-part test we began in WPPA I and the court of appeals 
continued in WPPA II.  It first analyzed whether the duty 
impacted by the collective bargaining provision was one of the 
"immemorial principal and important duties that characterized 
and distinguished the office of sheriff at common law."  Id., 
¶10 (citation omitted).  If it was, then "the sheriff may choose 
the ways and means of performing the duty and [the sheriff's 
choice] cannot be limited by a collective bargaining agreement."  
Id.   
¶102 One of the contract provisions directed who would be a 
court security officer and provided that the sheriff must 
No.  2005AP2742.pdr 
 
13 
 
"delegate" his power to schedule that person to the clerk of 
courts.  Id., ¶3.  In applying the test it had recited, the 
court of appeals first noted that attending upon the court was a 
constitutional duty of the sheriff.  Id., ¶13.  Therefore, the 
sheriff has the constitutional power to choose the "ways and 
means" of performing that duty.  Id.  Citing our decision in 
Manitowoc County, the court of appeals pointed out that "[w]hen 
performing his common law duties, the sheriff 'represents the 
sovereignty of the State and he has no superiors in his 
county.'"  Id., ¶14 (quoting Manitowoc County, 168 Wis. 2d at 
827).  Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that the 
collective bargaining agreement could not affect whom or how the 
sheriff selected the court security officers.  Id., ¶15. 
¶103 When 
all 
the 
above 
cited 
cases 
are 
considered 
together, it becomes apparent there are two types of cases that 
address the constitutional powers and duties of the sheriff:  
(1) those involving the sheriff's choice about how to perform a 
specific task within the ambit of one of the sheriff's 
constitutional duties when another entity is attempting to 
No.  2005AP2742.pdr 
 
14 
 
change the sheriff's choice5 and (2) those dealing with a general 
power possessed by other elected officials, such as the power to 
dismiss a previously appointed employee.6   
¶104 In the case before us, Sheriff Kocken contends that 
the choice of the means by which to feed the prisoners in the 
county jail is embraced within his constitutional power and duty 
to care for and have custody of jail prisoners.  He asserts that 
at common law no other person had the duty to care for and have 
custody of the prisoners.  He explains that his choice of the 
means by which to provide meals to prisoners is interwoven with 
other aspects of running the jail.  For example, the choice 
                                                 
5 See Kennedy, 26 Wis. 412 (1870) (location of jail's 
prisoners is within the sheriff's constitutional duty to provide 
for the care and custody of the jail's prisoners); Wis. Prof'l 
Police Ass'n (WPPA) v. County of Dane, 106 Wis. 2d 303, 316 
N.W.2d 656 (1982) (WPPA I) (sheriff's selection of a court 
officer falls within his constitutional duty to attend upon the 
court); Wis. Prof'l Police Ass'n v. Dane County, 149 Wis. 2d 
699, 439 N.W.2d 625 (Ct. App. 1989) (WPPA II) (task of 
interstate transport of prisoners by U.S. Marshal's Service is 
within the sheriff's constitutional duty to attend upon the 
court); Manitowoc County v. Local 986B, 168 Wis. 2d 819, 484 
N.W.2d 534 (1992) (sheriff's choice of whom to assign as 
undercover 
drug 
agent 
was 
embraced 
within 
the 
sheriff's 
constitutional duty to preserve the peace); and Dunn County, 293 
Wis. 2d 637 (sheriff's choice of whom to assign as court 
security 
officer 
was 
within 
the 
scope 
of 
sheriff's 
constitutional duty to attend upon the court).   
6 See State ex rel. Milwaukee County v. Buech, 171 Wis. 474, 
177 N.W. 781 (1920) (civil service commission could regulate the 
general power to dismiss a deputy); Heitkemper v. Wirsing, 194 
Wis. 2d 182, 533 N.W.2d 770 (1995) (union's contract could 
affect under what conditions a sheriff could dismiss a deputy) 
and Brown County Sheriff's Dep't v. Brown County Sheriff's Dep't 
Non-supervisory Employees Ass'n, 194 Wis. 2d 265, 533 N.W.2d 766 
(1995) (union's contract could affect the conditions under which 
dismissal of a deputy would be sustained). 
No.  2005AP2742.pdr 
 
15 
 
Sheriff Kocken made in how to perform his duty to feed the jail 
prisoners will save the people of Brown County $1,000,000.  It 
will provide training to the prisoners in food preparation; it 
will give sentence credit to participating prisoners, thereby 
moving them out of institutional care more rapidly; and it will 
improve prisoner morale, which impacts jail safety.   
¶105 I agree with Sheriff Kocken's position.  His position 
is consistent with the constitutional analysis we have employed 
since 1870, beginning with our decision in Brunst.  It is beyond 
question that the sheriff has the constitutional power and duty 
to run the jail.  Operation of the jail and the care and custody 
of the prisoners therein have been immemorial principal and 
important duties that have characterized and distinguished the 
office of sheriff since 1848 when the Wisconsin Constitution was 
ratified.  No other person had those duties at common law.  
Brunst, 26 Wis. at 415.  It should be self-evident that no 
sheriff can "care for" a person who is in his custody in a 
locked facility without feeding him.   
¶106 Accordingly, the nature of the job assigned, feeding 
the 
jail 
prisoners, 
falls 
squarely 
within 
the 
sheriff's 
constitutional power to care for the prisoners.  It does so in 
the same way as:  (1) the sheriff's choice to hire the U.S. 
Marshal's Service for interstate transportation of prisoners 
comes within the sheriff's constitutional duty to attend upon 
the courts;7 (2) the sheriff's choice to hire non-bargaining unit 
personnel to help police a large event comes within the 
                                                 
7 WPPA II, 149 Wis. 2d at 701. 
No.  2005AP2742.pdr 
 
16 
 
sheriff's constitutional power to maintain the public peace;8 and 
(3) the sheriff's choosing an undercover drug agent without 
posting the position comes within the sheriff's duty to maintain 
the peace.9 
¶107 The Brown County Sheriff has chosen the "ways and 
means" of feeding the prisoners, and no collective bargaining 
agreement 
can 
deprive 
the 
sheriff 
of 
his 
constitutional 
authority to make this choice.  Manitowoc County, 168 Wis. 2d at 
828-30 
(concluding 
that 
the 
sheriff's 
assignment 
of 
an 
undercover agent without posting the position could not be 
affected by a collective bargaining agreement because the 
assignment was part of the sheriff's constitutional power and 
duty to keep the peace); WPPA I, 106 Wis. 2d at 312-15 
(concluding that when analyzing whether a particular duty is 
constitutionally grounded, we look at the nature of the job 
assigned rather than the general power of job assignment and if 
the nature of the job was within the power and duty of the 
sheriff at common law, the sheriff's choice cannot be affected 
by a collective bargaining agreement); Brunst, 26 Wis. at 414-15 
(concluding 
that 
it 
is 
constitutionally 
impermissible 
to 
separate from the office of sheriff the duties the sheriff held 
at 
common 
law); Dunn County, 293 Wis. 2d 637, ¶¶10-14 
(concluding that the sheriff's power to decide who will be the 
court security officer was within the sheriff's constitutional 
                                                 
8 Washington County v. Washington County Deputy Sheriff's 
Ass'n, 192 Wis. 2d 728, 738-39, 531 N.W.2d 468 (Ct. App. 1995). 
9 Manitowoc County, 168 Wis. 2d at 829. 
No.  2005AP2742.pdr 
 
17 
 
duty to attend upon the court and therefore it could not be 
affected by a collective bargaining agreement); Washington 
County, 192 Wis. 2d at 738-39 (concluding that the sheriff's 
choice of method by which to fulfill his duty to maintain the 
peace at a public event could not be affected by a collective 
bargaining 
agreement); 
WPPA 
II, 
149 
Wis. 
2d 
at 
701-03 
(concluding that the sheriff's decision about using the U.S. 
Marshall's Service for the interstate conveyance of prisoners in 
order to save money for the county was within the sheriff's 
constitutional power to attend upon the courts so that it could 
not be changed by a collective bargaining agreement). 
¶108 The majority opinion is a significant departure from 
precedent both procedurally and substantively.  Procedurally, it 
does not apply the analysis we have utilized for more than 100 
years in addressing the constitutional powers and duties of the 
sheriff.  It merely concludes that the sheriff's choice of how 
to feed the jail prisoners' is simply a hiring and firing of 
personnel.  Majority op., ¶4.  It characterizes the feeding of 
jail prisoners as "mundane and commonplace" and therefore 
outside of the sheriff's constitutional powers and duties.  Id.  
However, that conclusion ignores our precedent.  We have already 
concluded that the constitution preserves to the office of 
sheriff those duties that were traditionally performed by the 
sheriff even if they were not uniquely preformed by the sheriff.  
Manitowoc County, 168 Wis. 2d at 829 (concluding that there "is 
no reason why the constitution should protect only those 
traditional duties which were 'unique' to the office of sheriff 
No.  2005AP2742.pdr 
 
18 
 
at common law").  And even if one were to assume that the task 
under review could be accurately described as "mundane," that 
description does not cause it to be excluded from the 
constitutional duty of the sheriff to "care for" jail prisoners.  
At common law, it was the sheriff who was responsible for 
feeding the jail prisoners. 
¶109 The majority opinion's discarding of our traditional 
constitutional analysis when faced with the question of whether 
a job falls within the constitutional powers and duties of the 
sheriff permits the majority opinion to reach a substantive 
result that is contrary to the constitutional powers and duties 
of the sheriff as explained in multiple cases.  That is, the 
majority opinion ignores our repeated teaching that if the job 
falls within the scope of a constitutional power and duty of the 
sheriff at common law, the sheriff's choice about to how to 
perform that job cannot be regulated by a collective bargaining 
agreement.10   
¶110 The majority opinion removes from the sheriff the 
power to perform certain constitutional duties that the people 
of Wisconsin elected sheriffs to perform.  In so doing, the 
majority 
opinion 
transfers 
portions 
of 
the 
sheriff's 
constitutional power to non-elected union representatives and 
members of the WERC, who are not subject to review by the 
electorate.   
                                                 
10 Manitowoc County, 168 Wis. 2d at 829; WPPA I, 106 Wis. 2d 
at 312; Brunst, 26 Wis. at 415; Dunn County, 293 Wis. 2d 637, 
¶¶10-11; Washington County, 192 Wis. 2d at 738-39; WPPA II, 149 
Wis. 2d at 701. 
No.  2005AP2742.pdr 
 
19 
 
¶111 From our first consideration of the constitutional 
powers of the sheriff, we stressed how important it was not to 
remove from the office of sheriff the duties that the people had 
elected the sheriff to perform.  We explained that were we to do 
so, we would: 
secure to the electors the right to choose a sheriff 
in name merely, while all the duties and substance of 
the office might be exercised by and belong to an 
officer appointed by some other authority. 
Brunst, 26 Wis. at 415.  The majority opinion permits non-
elected persons to direct the sheriff on the ways and means the 
sheriff can employ in fulfilling his constitutional duty to run 
the jail and care for the prisoners.  This impairs the rights of 
the electorate, as well as those of the sheriff. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶112 Therefore, because the majority opinion overturns more 
than 100 years of precedent and in so doing removes from the 
sheriff a duty the people of Wisconsin elected the sheriff to 
perform, I respectfully dissent.  
¶113 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and DAVID T. PROSSER join this dissent. 
 
 
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