Case Title: USAA Casualty Ins. Co. v. Carr

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2020-01-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE 
§ 
COMPANY, 
§ 
 
§ No. 273, 2019 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§  
 
Appellant, 
§ Court Below: Superior Court 
 
§ of the State of Delaware  
 
v. 
§  
 
§ C.A. No. K18C-05-050  
TRINITY CARR,  
§ 
 
§   
 
Defendant Below, 
§  
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
Submitted: November 20, 2019 
Decided: 
January 29, 2020 
 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and TRAYNOR, Justices; 
SLIGHTS, Vice Chancellor,* constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Delaware. REVERSED and 
REMANDED.  
 
Jeffrey A. Young, Esquire, Young & McNelis, Dover, Delaware, Counsel for 
Appellant. 
Benjamin C. Wetzel, III, Esquire, Wetzel & Associates, P.A., Wilmington, 
Delaware, Counsel for Appellee.  
 
 
 
 
* Sitting by designation under Del. Const. art. IV § 12. 
2 
 
TRAYNOR, Justice: 
 
USAA Casualty Insurance Company (“USAA”) sought a declaratory 
judgment in the Superior Court that it was not obligated to defend, indemnify, or 
provide insurance coverage for claims made in two lawsuits against Trinity Carr, the 
daughter of a USAA homeowner’s-insurance policyholder.  The plaintiffs in the 
underlying lawsuits sought money damages from Carr and others for personal 
injuries and wrongful death suffered by Amy Joyner-Francis in a physical 
altercation—described in both complaints as a “brutal, senseless, forseeable [sic] 
and preventable attack”—between Joyner-Francis and Carr and her friends.1  USAA 
argued below, as it does here, that the incident—whether it be labeled an altercation, 
an attack, or otherwise—was not an “accident” and therefore not a covered 
occurrence under the policy and that, even if it were, the purported liability is 
excluded from coverage.  The Superior Court disagreed and entered summary 
judgment in favor of Carr.2  USAA appealed. 
 
We agree with USAA’s interpretation of the relevant policy provisions and 
therefore reverse the Superior Court’s judgment.  To label an intentional assault, as 
the parties agree occurred here, an accident is to disregard the ordinary, everyday 
meaning of “accident.”  We thus hold that whether an assault is an “accident” is 
                                          
 
1 App. to Opening Br. at A50, A71 (hereinafter “A____”). 
2 USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Carr, 2019 WL 2461708 (Del. Super. Ct. June 12, 2019) (hereinafter 
“Opinion Below”). 
3 
 
determined by the intent of the insured, and not by the viewpoint of the victim.  
Further, even though Carr may not have intended to cause Francis’s death, she 
certainly intended to cause injury to her.  Therefore, the provision that excludes 
coverage for intended injuries “even if the resulting injury . . . is of a different, kind, 
quality[,] or degree”—here, death—would bar coverage in any event. 
I.  FACTS 
In April 2016, non-party Amy Joyner-Francis suffered sudden cardiac death3 
after she was assaulted by Defendant/Appellee Trinity Carr in their high school 
bathroom.  Joyner-Francis’s autopsy revealed that she had a “large atrial septal 
defect and pulmonary hypertension,”4 which, in addition to the emotional and 
physical stress from the fight, caused her heart failure.  This Court has already 
analyzed the facts and video evidence related to Carr’s criminal proceedings, finding 
that the assault, which consisted mostly of “awkward punches . . . grappling[,] and 
kicking” on the floor, was a contributing cause of Joyner-Francis’s death, though her 
death was a result outside the risk of which Carr should have been aware within the 
meaning of 11 Del C. § 263.5   
                                          
 
3 “Sudden cardiac death is a sudden, unexpected death caused by a change in heart rhythm.”  Heart 
Disease 
and 
Sudden 
Cardiac 
Death, 
WEBMD, 
https://www.webmd.com/heart-
disease/guide/sudden-cardiac-death#1 (last visited Jan. 17, 2020). 
4 Cannon v. State, 181 A.3d 615, 619 (Del. 2018).  “An atrial septal defect is a birth defect of the 
heart in which there is a hole in the wall (septum) that divides the upper chambers (atria) of the 
heart.”  Facts about Atrial Septal Defect, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/heartdefects/atrialseptaldefect.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2020).  
5 Cannon, 181 A.3d at 625. 
4 
 
After Carr’s criminal prosecution, two civil lawsuits were filed in Superior 
Court by Joyner-Francis’s estate and by her parents.  Carr demanded a defense and 
indemnification from Plaintiff/Appellant USAA, which has a homeowner’s 
insurance policy (“Policy”) covering Carr’s mother and potentially Carr as a resident 
relative.6  In response, USAA sought a declaratory judgment that it did not have to 
cover Carr’s litigation defense or indemnify her losses under the Policy.  After 
discovery, USAA moved for summary judgment, which Carr opposed.  The Superior 
Court denied USAA’s motion, took Carr’s opposition to the summary judgment 
motion as a cross-motion for summary judgment, and granted that cross-motion.  
USAA appeals that decision to us. 
The Policy provides for defense and indemnification “[i]f a claim is made or 
a suit is brought against any insured for damages because of bodily injury or property 
damage caused by an ‘occurrence’ to which this coverage applies” (“Coverage 
Clause”).7  “Occurrence” is defined in the policy as “an accident, including 
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful 
conditions, which results . . . in . . . bodily injury; or property damage.”8  The Policy 
also includes an exclusion of coverage for bodily injury “which is reasonably 
expected or intended by an insured even if the resulting bodily injury . . . is of a 
                                          
 
6 Opening Br. at 1. 
7 A111 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
8 A88 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
5 
 
different kind, quality[,] or degree than initially expected or intended” (“Exclusion 
Clause”).9 
On appeal, USAA argues that the Policy does not cover Carr’s litigation 
defense or litigation liabilities because Joyner-Francis’s bodily injury—death—was 
not caused by an “accident,” as required for coverage under the Coverage Clause.  
Alternatively, it argues that, even if Joyner-Francis’s death was caused by an 
“accident,” coverage is not available due to the Exclusion Clause.  Because we agree 
with USAA that Joyner-Francis’s death was not caused by an accident, and even if 
were, it would be excluded under the Exclusion Clause, we reverse the Superior 
Court’s judgment. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law and subject to 
de novo review.10  “[T]he language of an insurance contract is always construed most 
strongly against the insurance company which has drafted it.”11  But “if the language 
                                          
 
9 A112 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
10 Hudson v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 569 A.2d 1168, 1170 (Del. 1990).   
11 Steigler v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398, 400 (Del. 1978). 
6 
 
of an insurance contract is clear and unambiguous[,] a Delaware court will not 
destroy or twist the words under the guise of construing them.”12   
A. 
The Policy does not cover Carr for her role in Joyner-Francis’s 
death because the death was not caused by an “accident.” 
The Policy’s Coverage Clause provides for insurance coverage where “bodily 
injury . . . [is] caused by an [accident].”13  The parties’ dispute concerns the meaning 
of the word “accident,” although they agree that the meaning incorporates some form 
of unforeseeability.14  The central questions are “what must be unforeseeable?” and 
“to whom?” 
This Court most recently grappled with, but did not decide, that question in 
Hudson v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.15  The issue in that case was whether a driver’s 
automobile insurance policy covered injuries sustained by the victim when the driver 
intentionally drove his car into a telephone pole with the intent to injure the victim.  
The insurance company argued that the injury was not caused by an accident because 
it was intentionally inflicted by the driver, and, therefore, the insurer did not need to 
indemnify the driver for the costs of the injuries.  The victim responded that “[a] 
majority of states have held that whether an assault constitutes an ‘accident’ within 
                                          
 
12 Hallowell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 A.2d 925, 926 (Del. 1982).   
13 A111 (internal quotation marks omitted).  As established above, and undisputed by the parties, 
the Coverage Clause uses the word “occurrence,” which is defined as an “accident.”   
14 Opening Br. at 11 (citing Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, which defines “accident” using the 
word “unforeseen”); Answering Br. at 6 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines “accident” 
using the words “not expected”).  
15 569 A.2d 1168. 
7 
 
the limits of coverage must be determined from the standpoint of the injured party 
rather than the insured”—and from the victim’s standpoint, the injury is an accident 
because it was unforeseen and unexpected.16  Although we noted that many of the 
cases cited by the victim were inapposite because they “arose from bodily injuries 
intentionally caused by the employees of the insured rather than the insured himself” 
and that “at least five jurisdictions have adopted the view that whether injuries were 
‘caused by accident’ must be determined from the standpoint of the insured,” we did 
not decide the case on the basis of whose perspective controls.17  Instead, we decided 
the case on public policy grounds, holding that “Delaware’s enactment of motor 
vehicle financial responsibility laws,” which require owners of motor vehicles to 
have insurance, showed a “fundamental purpose” of “protect[ing] and 
compensate[ing] all persons injured in automobile accidents.”18  We therefore ruled 
against the insurer. 
Our trial courts, however, have attempted to answer the question of whether 
the insured’s or the injured person’s perspective defines whether an event is an 
accident in the context of homeowners’ insurance.  In State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. 
v. Hackendorn,19 a case involving a victim who was shot by someone intending to 
                                          
 
16 Id. at 1170. 
17 Id. at 1170–1171. 
18 Id. (emphasis added). 
19 605 A.2d 3, 7 (Del. Super. Ct. 1991). 
8 
 
shoot someone else, the insurer made an argument similar to the one made by the 
insurer in Hudson—namely, that because the injury was the result of an intentional 
act, the insurance policy did not provide for a legal defense and indemnification of 
legal liabilities.  The Superior Court noted the lack of Delaware decisions grappling 
with whether “accidents” are defined by the insured’s or the injured person’s 
perspective in the context of homeowners’ insurance.  Because the court saw the 
perspective issue as unsettled under Delaware law, it found that the word “accident” 
was ambiguous.20  And because ambiguities in insurance contracts are construed 
against the insurer, the Hackendorn court read “accident” from the perspective of 
the injured rathered than the insured; it therefore ruled against the insurer.21  In 
Camac v. Hall, the Superior Court followed the Hackendorn interpretation, 
concluding that the insurer must cover the litigation defense and liabilities arising 
from the insured’s punching of a victim in a bar bathroom, because “[i]t is not usual 
or expected to be struck at such a time.”22   
Here, the arguments are substantially the same as the ones made in Hudson, 
Hackendorn, and Camac.  Accordingly, the Superior Court hewed closely to the 
reasoning in those cases, and determined that there was a “similar ambiguity in this 
case with regard to whether the incident in the restroom . . . qualifies as an 
                                          
 
20 Id. at 8. 
21 Id. 
22 698 A.2d 394, 396 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996). 
9 
 
accident.”23  Then, because ambiguities in insurance contracts are construed against 
the insurer, the court ruled for Carr and found the Coverage Clause applied. 
On appeal, USAA disputes, as it did below, that whether an incident is an 
accident must be determined from the insured’s standpoint rather than the victim’s.  
According to USAA, because Carr intended for the fight, which unexpectedly 
caused Joyner-Francis’s death, to happen, the fight was not an accident.  Carr, on the 
other hand, argues that whether an incident is an “accident” must be determined from 
the perspective of the victim—that is, if the victim did not expect or foresee the 
incident and injury, it is an accident from the victim’s perspective.  According to 
Carr, Joyner-Francis did not expect or foresee her death, so her death must be an 
accident that is covered by the Policy.  But Carr’s argument is actually about the 
extent of the injury—death, as opposed to minor bruising.  The Coverage Clause 
provides that the bodily injury—in this case, Joyner-Francis’s death—must be 
caused by an accident, not that the nature or extent of the injury itself must be an 
accident.24  Thus, even from Joyner-Francis’s viewpoint, the question is whether the 
                                          
 
23 Opinion Below, 2019 WL 2461708 at *4.  As we understand the Superior Court’s analysis, the 
ambiguity had two sources. First, the policy failed to stipulate whether the existence of an accident 
should be determined from the point of view of the insured or the injured person.  Second, the 
court also noted that, even if the existence of an accident were to be determined from Carr’s 
perspective,  the answer would be “complicated”—because even though Carr clearly intended to 
harm Joyner-Francis, Joyner-Francis’s death was just as unexpected to Carr as it was to Joyner-
Francis. 
24 The language of the Coverage Clause clearly provides that the accident causes the bodily injury, 
and not that the extent of the injury is the accident.  A111 (covering claims brought because of 
10 
 
events that caused her death were accidental, not whether the death itself was an 
accident.   
We therefore hold, contrary to the Superior Court holdings in Hackendorn and 
Camac, that whether an incident is an “accident” in the context of homeowners’ 
insurance policies must be determined from the viewpoint of the insured.  To hold 
otherwise would be to distort the ordinary meaning of the word “accident”25 and 
subvert the “well-established common law principle that an insured should not be 
allowed to profit, by way of indemnity, from the consequences of his own 
wrongdoing”26 in a context where no announced Delaware public policy applies.27  
Joyner-Francis’s death was caused by a combination of her medical conditions and 
the “emotional and physical stress from the assault.”28  The medical conditions 
themselves were not incidents, accidental or otherwise—they were preexisting 
conditions.  And the assault was not an “accident”—as we noted in Cannon, video 
                                          
 
“bodily injury . . . caused by an occurrence,” with “occurrence” being defined as an “accident”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
25 Regardless of the dictionary used, the definition of “accident” always includes some element of 
unforesseeability, lack of intention, or lack of expectation.  See, e.g., accident, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/accident (last visited Jan. 21, 2020) (“an 
unforeseen and unplanned event or circumstance”); accident, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/accident (last visited Jan. 21, 2020) 
(“something that happens unexpectedly and unintentionally”); ACCIDENT, Black’s Law 
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“[a]n unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence; something that 
does not occur in the usual course of events or that could not be reasonably anticipated; any 
unwanted or harmful event occurring suddenly, as a collision, spill, fall, or the like, irrespective of 
cause or blame”). 
26 Hudson, 569 A.2d at 1170. 
27 We do not disturb the holding in Hudson, which dealt with automobile insurance. 
28 Cannon, 181 A.3d at 619. 
11 
 
evidence showed Carr “bragging that [she and her friends] intended to ‘get’ [Joyner-
Francis],”29 and USAA points out that Carr was the aggressor in the fight.30  Because, 
from Carr’s perspective, the fight that caused Joyner-Francis’s death was not an 
accident, the Policy does not provide coverage for her litigation expenses or legal 
liabilities.   
B. 
Even if Joyner-Francis’s death was caused by an “accident,” 
coverage is excluded under the Exclusion Clause. 
Separately, the Policy’s Exclusion Clause provides USAA relief even if the 
Coverage Clause does not.  The Exclusion Clause provides that the Coverage Clause 
does not apply to bodily injury “which is reasonably expected or intended by any 
insured even if the resulting bodily injury . . . is of a different kind, quality[,] or 
degree than initially expected or intended.”31   
The Superior Court found this language to be “ambiguous at best, and utterly 
confusing at worst.”32  As a result, it construed the provision against the drafter, 
USAA, and held that USAA had not carried its burden to prove the clause applied.33  
But ambiguity requires that there be two different reasonable interpretations of the 
text in question;34 the Superior Court’s interpretation of the Exclusion Clause renders 
                                          
 
29 Id. at 618. 
30 Opening Br. 5. 
31 A112. 
32 Opinion Below, 2019 WL 2461708, at *7. 
33 Id. 
34 Hallowell, 443 A.2d at 926 (“[A]n ambiguity exists when the language in a contract permits two 
or more reasonable interpretations.”). 
12 
 
the clause entirely inoperative,35 which cannot have been a reasonable expectation 
of the parties.36  “A textually permissible interpretation that furthers rather than 
obstructs that [contract’s] purpose should be favored.”37  Thus, “[c]ontracts are to be 
interpreted in a way that does not render any provisions ‘illusory or meaningless.’”38  
Here, although the Exclusion Clause might have been drafted more clearly, the intent 
of the Clause is clear:  USAA sought to exclude coverage where the insured intended 
to cause bodily injury, even if the resulting injury was more or less serious or of a 
different kind than intended.   Even the court below acknowledged that such a 
meaning was probably what USAA intended to convey by its language.39   
And when given this meaning, the Exclusion Clause clearly excludes 
coverage in this case.  Carr intended some bodily injury; she initiated the assault on 
Joyner-Francis by “slam[ing]” Joyner-Francis to the ground, yanking her by her hair, 
and “striking her—[albeit] by and large ineffectually—with loosely-balled fists 
                                          
 
35 The court went so far as to conclude that the Exclusion Clause contained a “logical 
impossibility” because “the bodily injury or property damage for which the exclusion purports to 
exclude coverage appears to be one and the same with the ‘resulting’ bodily injury or property 
damage, but the exclusionary language attempts to draw a distinction between the two.” Opinion 
Below, 2019 WL 2461708, at *7.  As set forth above, we do not read it that way. 
36 We have held that an insurance contract should be read to accord with the reasonable 
expectations of the purchaser so far as the language will permit.  State Farm v. Johnson, 320 A.2d 
345, 347 (Del. 1974) (quoting Cooper v. Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co., 237 A.2d 870, 873 (N.J. 1968)).  
And we assume that parties do not expect that the clauses they draft will be surplusage. 
37 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 
63. 
38 In re Verizon Ins. Coverage Appeals, 2019 WL 5616263, at *6 (Del. Oct. 31, 2019). 
39 Opinion Below, 2019 WL 2461708, at *4 (“The insurer may have intended to state that coverage 
is excluded where the insured reasonably expects or intends some injury or damage, even if the 
injury or damage that actually results is neither expected nor intended.”) (emphasis in the original). 
13 
 
before pulling her again by her hair.”40  That intention alone triggers the Exclusion 
Clause.  That the resulting injury was not initially expected or intended is irrelevant; 
indeed, just such a situation is exactly what the Exclusion Clause is meant to exclude.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the Superior Court’s order granting 
summary judgment in Carr’s favor and REMAND for entry of judgment consistent 
with this Opinion. 
 
                                          
 
40 Cannon, 181 A.3d at 618.