Case Title: Clean Sweep v. Talley

Citation: 

Docket Number: 030058

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2004-01-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
CLEAN SWEEP PROFESSIONAL PARKING 
LOT MAINTENANCE, INC., ET AL. 
 
 
                              OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 030058             JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
January 16, 2004 
FRANK TALLEY, SR. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY 
William H. Ledbetter, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in overruling pleas in bar based upon the exclusivity 
provisions of the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act, Code 
§ 65.2-100 et seq. (“the Act”). 
I. 
Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
In August 1997, Virginia Paving Company (“Virginia 
Paving”) was engaged in the repaving of certain portions of 
Interstate Highway 95 in Spotsylvania County, under a contract 
from the Virginia Department of Transportation (“VDOT”).  The 
contract required Virginia Paving to undertake all aspects of 
the repaving process including milling the existing road 
surface, removing the milled asphalt, sweeping away loose 
debris, and repaving the roadway with fresh asphalt supplied 
by Virginia Paving. 
Because of the size of the project, in addition to 
utilizing its own equipment and workforce, Virginia Paving 
hired subcontractors to assist in certain portions of the 
work.  Virginia Paving hired J. E. Coleman Trucking Company 
(“Coleman Trucking”) to assist Virginia Paving in transporting 
asphalt from Virginia Paving’s plant to the jobsite, loading 
asphalt into the paving machines, and hauling the millings 
from the jobsite back to the plant.  Virginia Paving also 
hired Clean Sweep Professional Parking Lot Maintenance, Inc. 
(“Clean Sweep”) to help Virginia Paving clear the roadway of 
asphalt after it was loosened by the milling machines. 
On August 27, 1997, Frank Talley, Sr. (“Talley”), a truck 
driver employed by Coleman Trucking, loaded fresh asphalt at 
the Virginia Paving plant, delivered it to the jobsite, dumped 
the asphalt into the paving machine, and reloaded the truck 
with asphalt millings.  Before returning to the Virginia 
Paving plant, Talley responded to a call to diagnose a 
disabled Coleman truck that was also at the site.  While 
Talley was underneath the truck, it was struck by one of Clean 
Sweep’s sweeper trucks operated by John J. O’Connor 
(“O’Connor”).  As a result of the accident, Talley sustained 
back injuries. 
Talley sued Clean Sweep and O’Connor, alleging that 
Talley was injured by O’Connor’s negligence and recklessness 
in operating the sweeper truck.  Clean Sweep and O’Connor 
filed pleas in bar stating that the Act is Talley’s sole 
avenue for recovery and precludes any and all other remedies.  
 
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The trial court overruled the pleas in bar.  The jury 
subsequently returned a verdict in favor of Talley in the 
amount of $900,000.  Clean Sweep and O’Connor appeal the trial 
court’s judgment refusing to sustain the pleas in bar. 
II. Analysis 
 
On appeal, Clean Sweep and O’Connor maintain that the 
trial court erred by failing to sustain the pleas in bar.  
They assert that Coleman Trucking and Clean Sweep were both 
subcontractors of Virginia Paving and they were engaged in the 
trade, business, or occupation of Virginia Paving.  Further, 
they maintain that because Coleman Trucking’s employee, 
Talley, was injured by the actions of Clean Sweep’s employee, 
O’Connor, Talley’s exclusive remedy is provided by the Act. 
 
Whether a person is subject to the exclusivity provision 
of the Act presents a mixed question of law and fact that must 
be resolved in light of the facts and circumstances of each 
case.  Burch v. Hechinger Co., 264 Va. 165, 169, 563 S.E.2d 
745, 747 (2002).  We review de novo the trial court’s 
determination that Talley and O’Connor were not statutory 
fellow employees. 
 
The rights and remedies provided in the Act are exclusive 
of all other rights and remedies of an employee or his estate 
at common law or otherwise.  Peck v. Safway Steel Prods., 
Inc., 262 Va. 522, 525, 551 S.E.2d 328, 329 (2001).  The only 
 
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exception to this exclusivity provision is provided in Code 
§ 65.2-309(A) permitting an action to be maintained against an 
“other party.” “[T]o be an ‘other party,’ a defendant must 
have been a stranger to the trade, occupation, or business in 
which the employee was engaged when he was injured.” 262 Va. 
at 525, 551 S.E.2d at 329.  Additionally, we have held: 
[B]ecause he is not a “stranger to the 
employment,” an allegedly negligent employee of 
one contractor, engaged in the same business or 
project of an owner as an injured employee of 
another contractor, is not an “other party” 
amenable to suit . . . 
Evans v. Hook, 239 Va. 127, 131, 387 S.E.2d 777, 779 (1990). 
See also Pfeifer v. Krauss Construction Co., 262 Va. 262, 266-
67, 546 S.E.2d 717, 719 (2001). 
 
Talley does not argue that O’Connor was not a statutory 
employee of the general contractor, Virginia Paving.  On 
appeal, Talley maintains that Talley’s actions on behalf of 
his employer, Coleman Trucking, were not in the trade, 
business, or occupation of Virginia Paving. 
 
The trial court held that Coleman Trucking was engaged 
in “a function which was solely as a supplier or deliverer of 
goods and, of course, to haul off goods.”  Citing Burroughs v. 
Walmont, 210 Va. 98, 168 S.E.2d 107 (1969), the trial court 
concluded that Coleman Trucking’s work consisted of mere 
delivery and hauling and as such, Coleman Trucking was not 
 
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engaged in the trade, business or occupation of Virginia 
Paving.  Consequently, Talley was not a statutory employee of 
Virginia Paving and could not be a statutory fellow employee 
of O’Connor.  We disagree. 
 
In Burroughs, the plaintiff, an employee of a trucking 
company, was injured while carrying plasterboard into one of 
several houses being constructed by the general contractor.  
210 Va. at 99, 168 S.E.2d at 108.  The trucking company had 
agreed to deliver and stack specified quantities of the 
plasterboard in the rooms in the various houses under 
construction.  Id. at 98, 168 S.E.2d at 108.  We held that 
“the stacking of [plasterboard] in the several rooms 
constituted the final act of delivery, not an act of 
construction.”  Id. at 100, 168 S.E.2d at 108.  Consequently, 
the plaintiff was not engaged in the general contractor’s 
trade, business, or occupation, and, therefore, the general 
contractor was an “other party” and subject to being sued.  
Id. at 100, 168 S.E.2d at 109. 
 
Similarly, in Yancey v. JTE Constructors, Inc., 252 Va. 
42, 471 S.E.2d 473 (1996), a general contractor was hired by 
the Virginia Department of Transportation to design and 
install a sound barrier along an interstate highway.  Id. at 
43, 471 S.E.2d at 474.  The general contractor engaged a 
subcontractor merely to design, manufacture, and deliver 
 
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concrete wall panels to the job site.  Id.  The plaintiff, an 
employee of the subcontractor, was injured while he was 
inspecting one of the panels.  Id. at 43, 471 S.E.2d at 474.  
We held that the plaintiff’s inspection and patching 
activities “were the final acts of delivery required by the 
contract” and that the plaintiff was not engaged in the 
general contractor’s trade, business, or occupation.  Id. at 
45, 471 S.E.2d at 475. 
But not all cases that initially appear to be “delivery” 
cases have resulted in a holding that the plaintiff was not 
engaged in the trade, business or occupation of the general 
contractor. In Bosher v. Jamerson, 207 Va. 539, 151 S.E.2d 375 
(1966), we considered a case involving an employee of a 
trucking company who delivered sand to a construction site but 
also participated in the spreading of the sand to create a 
foundation under the direction of the general contractor.  An 
employee of the general contractor was injured by negligence 
of the employee of the trucking company during the sand 
spreading process.  Id. at 540-41, 151 S.E.2d at 376.  In 
applying the exclusivity rule and barring the suit for 
personal injuries, we held that 
at the time of the accident [the driver] was 
performing work on behalf of his employer, [the 
trucking company], that was part of the trade, 
business or occupation of [the general 
contractor].  If [the driver] was performing 
 
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such work, [the trucking company], though an 
independent contractor, is not an “other party” 
against whom [the general contractor’s 
employee’s] right of action is preserved under 
the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and [the 
general contractor’s employee’s] right to 
recover for the injury is limited to the 
compensation provided under the Act. 
Id. at 542, 151 S.E.2d at 377.  See also Floyd v. Mitchell, 
203 Va. 269, 274, 123 S.E.2d 369, 372 (1962). 
 
Smith v. Horn, 232 Va. 302, 351 S.E.2d 14 (1986), 
concerned a suit for personal injuries sustained in a 
collision of three vehicles involving employees of two 
subcontractors of a coal company.  One subcontractor’s vehicle 
was delivering supplies to a mine while another 
subcontractor’s vehicle was hauling coal from a mine to the 
coal company’s processing plant.  Id. at 307, 351 S.E.2d at 
17.  In approving the trial court’s ruling sustaining the plea 
in bar, we held that the coal company’s business 
involved the mining, processing, and sale of 
coal from properties it owned or leased.  [The 
subcontractors] were independent contractors 
engaged to mine coal on land owned or leased by 
[the coal company] and to transport the coal to 
[the coal company’s] preparation plant.  Horn 
and Smith, as employees of these two 
contractors, were performing duties within this 
purpose – Smith hauling supplies to the Carrie 
mine and Horn driving a load of coal from the 
Potter mine to the [coal company’s] plant.  As 
both Smith and Horn were acting within the 
scope of their employment and as both 
contractors were carrying out a part of the 
trade, business, or occupation of [the coal 
company], Smith and Horn were fellow statutory 
 
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employees of [the coal company] and Smith’s 
common-law action against Horn was barred under 
[the exclusivity provision of the Act]. 
Id. at 307, 351 S.E.2d at 17. 
 
In Peck, an employee of a general contractor was killed 
when he fell from scaffolding on which he was working.  262 
Va. at 524, 551 S.E.2d at 328.  The subcontractor, Safway, was 
contracted to supply and install scaffolding for the project 
to repair and replace brick masonry on a 12-story building.  
Id.  In erecting, modifying, and dismantling the scaffolding 
system, Safway provided over 5,000 man-hours of labor.  
Clearly, Safway was engaged in an essential part of the work 
that the general contractor was required to perform under its 
contract.  Id. at 528, 551 S.E.2d at 330.  Accordingly, we 
held that Safway was not merely engaged in a final act of 
delivery, was not a stranger to the general contractor’s work, 
and that Safway’s work was integral to the construction done 
on the building.  Id.  We approved the trial court’s 
sustaining of the plea in bar. 
 
In Burch, the plaintiff was employed as a sales 
representative for a plant wholesaler.  The plaintiff agreed 
to be present after delivery of the plants to assist in the 
display of the retailer and to answer customer’s questions.  
She was injured by the alleged negligence of an employee of 
the retailer and subsequently sued for damages.  264 Va. at 
 
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167-68, 563 S.E.2d at 746.  We rejected the plaintiff’s 
contention that she was involved in mere delivery; rather, her 
participation in the display of plants and providing service 
to the retailer’s customers removed her from the category of 
“other person” because she was then engaged in the business, 
trade, or occupation of the retailer.  Id. at 170-71, 563 
S.E.2d at 748.  We approved the trial court’s sustaining of 
the plea in bar based upon the exclusivity provision of the 
Act.  Id. at 171, 563 S.E.2d at 748. 
 
The case before us is less like Burroughs and Yancey and 
more like Bosher, Floyd, Smith, Burch, and Peck.  Coleman 
Trucking was not simply delivering goods.  To the contrary, 
its duties extended beyond the mere delivery of fresh asphalt 
and were integral to the construction process.  Virginia 
Paving was responsible for milling the surface of the road, 
removing the milled asphalt, sweeping away loose debris, and 
repaving the roadway with fresh asphalt supplied by Virginia 
Paving.  Virginia Paving employed its own equipment and 
workforce to complete these tasks but, because of the 
magnitude of the project, Virginia Paving engaged 
subcontractors to assist in the project.  Coleman Trucking was 
not merely delivering its own independently manufactured 
parts.  Rather, it was hauling asphalt millings to Virginia 
Paving’s plant and delivering the recycled asphalt from the 
 
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plant back to the road project to be used in new paving.  
Clearly, similar to the defendant in Peck, Coleman “was 
engaged in an essential part of the work that [Virginia 
Paving] was required to perform under its contract with 
[VDOT.]”  See 262 Va. at 528, 551 S.E.2d at 330. 
 
Coleman Trucking was not a stranger to the work of 
Virginia Paving, and its employee, Talley, was a statutory 
employee of Virginia Paving.  There is no controversy over 
whether Clean Sweep was engaged in the trade, business, or 
occupation of Virginia Paving.  Consequently, Talley and 
O’Connor were fellow statutory employees of Virginia Paving.  
Talley’s suit is precluded by the exclusivity provision of the 
Act. 
 
Finally, we reject Talley’s claim that his investigation 
of a disabled truck was a “discrete activity” “far removed 
from the construction process Virginia Paving had contracted 
to perform for VDOT.”  We hold that the investigation of the 
disabled truck on the premises of the project was not “far 
removed” or “discrete” such that it removed Talley’s activity 
from the trade, occupation, or business of Virginia Paving.  
See Burch, 264 Va. at 170-71, 563 S.E.2d at 748. 
 
For the reasons stated, we hold that Talley and O’Connor 
are statutory fellow employees for purposes of the exclusivity 
provision of the Virginia Worker’s Compensation Act.  
 
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Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court 
and enter final judgment in favor of Clean Sweep and O’Connor 
sustaining the pleas in bar. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
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