Case Title: Tavern League of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Palm

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020AP001742

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2021-04-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
2021 WI 33 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP1742 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Tavern League of Wisconsin, Inc., Sawyer County 
Tavern League, Inc. and Flambeau Forest Inn LLC, 
          Plaintiffs, 
     v. 
Andrea Palm and Wisconsin Department of Health 
Services, 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners, 
Julia Lyons, 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
THE MIX UP, INC (D/B/A, MIKI JO'S MIX UP), Liz 
Sieben, Pro-Life Wisconsin Education Task Force, 
Inc., Pro-Life Wisconsin, Inc. and Dan Miller, 
          Intervenors-Plaintiffs-Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 14, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 17, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sawyer   
 
JUDGE: 
James C. Babler   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., announced the mandate of the Court, and 
delivered an opinion, in which ZIEGLER and REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, JJ., joined. HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion. 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
DALLET and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
defendants-respondents-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Colin A. Hector, Hannah S. Jurss, and Thomas C. 
Bellavai, assistant attorneys general; with whom on the brief 
was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument 
by Colin Hector. 
 
 
2 
 
For 
the 
intervenors-plaintiffs-appellants, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Misha Tseytlin, Kevin M. LeRoy, and Troutman 
Pepper Hamilton Sanders LLP, Chicago, Illinois. Also on the 
briefs were Andrew M. Bath and Thomas More Society, Chicago, 
Illinois; as well as Erick Kaardal and Mohrman, Kaardal & 
Erickson, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota. There was an oral 
argument by Misha Tseytlin. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Lucas T. Vebber, 
Corydon J. Fish, and Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, Inc. 
 
 
 
2021 WI 33 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2020AP1742 
(L.C. No. 
2020CV128) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Tavern League of Wisconsin, Inc., Sawyer County 
Tavern League, Inc. and Flambeau Forest Inn 
LLC, 
 
          Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Andrea Palm and Wisconsin Department of Health 
Services, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
Julia Lyons, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
THE MIX UP, INC (D/B/A, MIKI JO'S MIX UP),  
Liz Sieben, Pro-Life Wisconsin Education Task 
Force, Inc., Pro-Life Wisconsin, Inc. and Dan 
Miller, 
 
          Intervenors-Plaintiffs-Appellants. 
FILED 
 
APR 14, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., announced the mandate of the Court, and 
delivered an opinion, in which ZIEGLER and REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, JJ., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion.  
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
DALLET and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
No. 
2020AP1742   
 
2 
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   The Department of 
Health Services (DHS) Secretary-designee, Andrea Palm, issued 
Emergency Order 3 on October 6, 2020, as a response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  Emergency Order 3 limited the size of indoor 
public gatherings either to 25 percent of a facility's permitted 
capacity or, if no general capacity limit was prescribed, to 10 
people.   
¶2 
We 
conclude 
that 
Emergency 
Order 
3 
meets 
the 
definition of a rule, as we recently explained in Wisconsin 
Legislature v. Palm, 2020 WI 42, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 
900.  Therefore, Emergency Order 3 should have been promulgated 
according to rulemaking procedures set forth in Wis. Stat. 
ch. 227.  Because it was not, Emergency Order 3 was not validly 
enacted and was unenforceable.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
On October 6, 2020, as her second response to COVID-19 
cases in Wisconsin, Palm issued Emergency Order 3.  Emergency 
Order 3 limited the number of people who could be present at 
indoor, public gatherings.   
¶4 
A "public gathering" was defined as "an indoor event, 
convening, or collection of individuals, whether planned or 
spontaneous, that is open to the public and brings together 
people who are not part of the same household in a single room."  
Places open to the public were "[r]ooms within a business 
location, store, or facility that allow members of the public to 
enter" or "[t]icketed events where tickets are available for 
No. 
2020AP1742   
 
3 
 
free or for purchase by any individual or by any individual 
within a specific class of people."  Finally, places not open to 
the public included "[o]ffice spaces, manufacturing plant[s], 
and other facilities that are accessible only by employees or 
other authorized personnel," "[i]nvitation-only events that 
exclude uninvited guests" and "[p]rivate residences.  Except, a 
[private] residence is considered open to the public during an 
event that allows entrance to any individual; such public 
gatherings are limited to 10 people." 
¶5 
Emergency Order 3 stated in part: 
2. 
Public gatherings limited. 
a. Public gatherings are limited to no more than 
25% of the total occupancy limits for the room 
or building, as established by the local 
municipality. 
b. For indoor spaces without an occupancy limit 
for the room or building that is established 
by the local municipality, such as a private 
residence, public gatherings are limited to no 
more than 10 people. 
The order listed entities who were exempt from its public 
gathering limits:  childcare settings, schools and universities, 
health care and human services operations, Tribal nations, 
governmental and public infrastructure operations (including 
food distributors), places of religious worship, political 
rallies, and other gatherings protected by the First Amendment.  
Emergency Order 3 was enforceable by civil forfeiture, and it 
was to be effective until November 6, 2020.1  
                                                 
1 In her November 10, 2020 affidavit, Palm said that she had 
prepared Emergency Order 4, which similarly restricted public 
No. 
2020AP1742   
 
4 
 
¶6 
One week after DHS issued Emergency Order 3, the 
Tavern League of Wisconsin, Inc., the Sawyer County Tavern 
League, Inc., and the Flambeau Forest Inn, LLC (collectively the 
"Tavern League plaintiffs") initiated this lawsuit in Sawyer 
County circuit court.  The Tavern League plaintiffs alleged that 
Emergency 
Order 
3 
was 
"a 
general 
order 
of 
general 
application . . . in other words, it is a rule."  The Tavern 
League plaintiffs further alleged that DHS did not undertake 
proper rulemaking procedures under ch. 227 and as required by 
our decision in Palm.  The Tavern League plaintiffs sought a 
declaration that Emergency Order 3 was unlawful and a temporary 
injunction barring its enforcement.   
¶7 
The circuit court, the Honorable John M. Yackel 
originally presiding, granted the Tavern League plaintiffs' 
motion for an ex parte temporary injunction.  Judge Yackel did 
not provide reasoning for his decision.  The Mix Up, Inc., Liz 
Sieben, Pro-Life Wisconsin Education Task Force, Inc., Pro-Life 
Wisconsin, Inc., and Dan Miller moved to intervene (the 
intervenors-plaintiffs collectively "The Mix Up") and moved for 
a temporary injunction.   
¶8 
The Tavern League plaintiffs and DHS each moved for 
judicial 
substitution 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.58(1) 
(2019-20).2  The circuit court, the Honorable James C. Babler now 
                                                                                                                                                             
gatherings.  She said that Emergency Order 4 would be issued 
immediately were we to reverse the court of appeals decision.   
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2020AP1742   
 
5 
 
presiding, granted The Mix Up's motion to intervene but vacated 
Judge Yackel's ex parte order and denied The Mix Up's motion for 
temporary injunctive relief.   
¶9 
The circuit court held that neither the Tavern League 
plaintiffs nor the Mix Up had a reasonable probability of 
success on the merits, one factor courts consider in determining 
whether a movant is entitled to a temporary injunction.3  The 
circuit court reasoned that "this matter . . . [is] not as 
clear-cut as either side would like to make it."   
¶10 The circuit court noted that in Palm, we did not 
address the school closure portion of Emergency Order 28.  See 
Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶3 n.6 ("This decision does not apply to 
Section 4.a. of Emergency Order 28," which listed school 
closings).  DHS alleged that its authority to limit indoor 
public gatherings was based in the same statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.02(3), which lists schools as well as churches, and "other 
places" that the department may close.  The circuit court 
further held that enjoining Emergency Order 3 would disrupt the 
status quo and there was no proof that the plaintiffs were 
harmed by the order because they offered no proof that they were 
                                                 
3 "A circuit court may issue a temporary injunction 
if:  '(1) the movant is likely to suffer irreparable harm if a 
temporary injunction is not issued; (2) the movant has no other 
adequate remedy at law; (3) a temporary injunction is necessary 
to preserve the status quo; and (4) the movant has a reasonable 
probability of success on the merits.'"  Serv. Empl. Int'l 
Union, Local 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶93, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 
N.W.2d 35 (quoting Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n v. Milwaukee 
Cnty., 2016 WI App 56, ¶20, 370 Wis. 2d 644, 833 N.W.2d 154). 
No. 
2020AP1742   
 
6 
 
in compliance with it.  Accordingly, the circuit court denied 
injunctive relief.  
¶11 The Mix Up moved for leave to appeal the circuit 
court's decision.  After the court of appeals granted The Mix 
Up's petition for leave to appeal, DHS petitioned for bypass.  
We denied that petition, and the case remained with the court of 
appeals.   
¶12 The court of appeals summarily reversed the circuit 
court.  Tavern League v. Palm, No. 2020AP1742, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2020).  The court of appeals held 
that "under our supreme court's holding in Palm, Emergency Order 
#3 is invalid and unenforceable, as a matter of law."  Id. at 3.  
It therefore held that The Mix Up had "a reasonable probability—
in fact, an apparent certainty——of success on the merits" and 
was entitled to an injunction.  DHS petitioned for review, which 
we granted.  The question we determine on review is whether 
Emergency Order 3 is a rule.  First, however, we determine 
whether to dismiss this appeal as moot.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶13 Whether an issue is moot is a question of law that we 
review independently.  Portage Cnty. v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶10 
386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509.  Additionally, whether 
Emergency Order 3 was a rule is a question of law that we review 
independently.  Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶14; see also Journal 
Times v. City of Racine Bd. of Police & Fire Comm'rs, 2015 WI 
56, ¶42, 362 Wis. 2d 577, 866 N.W.2d 563 (noting that the 
No. 
2020AP1742   
 
7 
 
interpretation of our prior cases is a question of law reviewed 
independently).  
B.  Mootness 
¶14 The Mix Up urges us to dismiss the review that we 
granted to DHS because the issues are now moot.  The Mix Up 
argues that, because Emergency Order 3 expired on November 6, 
2020, there is not a live controversy.   
¶15 "An issue is moot when its resolution will have no 
practical effect on the underlying controversy."  J.W.K., 386 
Wis. 2d 672, ¶11.  Ordinarily, we refrain from deciding moot 
issues.  Id., ¶12.  However, we have exceptions to that general 
rule such as:  "(1) the issues are of great public importance; 
(2) the constitutionality of a statute is involved; (3) the 
situation arises so often a definitive decision is essential to 
guide the trial courts; (4) the issue is likely to arise again 
and should be resolved by the court to avoid uncertainty; or 
(5) the issue is capable and likely of repetition and yet evades 
review."  Id. (quoted sources and internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
¶16 The Mix Up is correct that the issue in this case is 
moot; Emergency Order 3 expired on November 6, 2020.  However, 
we conclude that this case satisfies several of our mootness 
exceptions set forth above, one of which we address below.  We 
begin by noting that "[t]he dispute in this case involves 
whether the Secretary-designee of DHS issued an order in 
violation of the laws of Wisconsin."  See Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 
¶11.  Similar to Emergency Order 28, Emergency Order 3 impacts 
No. 
2020AP1742   
 
8 
 
every person in Wisconsin, in one way or another, and it is open 
to all who come into Wisconsin during its operation.  It charts 
a course that the Secretary-designee will repeat with future 
orders.4  Accordingly, it is important to confirm, once again, 
that Emergency Order 3 is beyond the power that the legislature 
delegated to the Secretary-designee.  This satisfies the great 
public importance mootness exception.  Accordingly, we decline 
to dismiss our review; instead, we turn to the merits. 
C.  Parameters of a Rule 
¶17 Rulemaking 
"ensure[s] 
that . . . controlling, 
subjective judgment asserted by one unelected official" is not 
imposed by agencies through the abandonment of rulemaking 
procedures.  Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶28; NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon 
Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969) (explaining that rulemaking 
provisions in the law "assure fairness and mature consideration 
of rules of general application").  Accordingly, agencies must 
comport with rulemaking procedures set forth in ch. 227 when the 
agency's proffered directive meets the definition of a "rule."   
¶18 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.10(1) is the initial focus of 
our review.  It provides:  "Each agency shall promulgate as a 
rule each statement of general policy and each interpretation of 
a statute which it specifically adopts to govern its enforcement 
or administration of that statute."  In Palm, we were asked to 
interpret 
whether 
Emergency 
Order 
28 
met 
that 
statutory 
definition.  We concluded that it did because Emergency Order 28 
                                                 
4 See note 1 supra.   
No. 
2020AP1742   
 
9 
 
was "a general order of general application."  Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 
497, ¶42.   
¶19 We further explained that agency action that exhibits 
all of the following criteria meets the definition of a 
rule:  "'(1) a regulation, standard, statement of policy or 
general order; (2) of general application; (3) having the effect 
of law; (4) issued by an agency; (5) to implement, interpret or 
make specific legislation enforced or administered by such 
agency.'"  Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶22 (quoting Citizens for 
Sensible Zoning, Inc. v. DNR, 90 Wis. 2d 804, 814, 280 N.W.2d 
702 (1979)); see also Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13) (defining "rule").   
¶20 As we concluded in Palm, an order issued by an agency 
is a general order of general application if "the class of 
people regulated . . . 'is described in general terms and new 
members can be added to the class.'"  Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶22 
(quoting Citizens for Sensible Zoning, 90 Wis. 2d at 816).  The 
inquiry focuses on the class of people regulated by the agency, 
not on the factual context in which the agency action arose.  
Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶23.  To that end, "to be of general 
application, a rule need not apply to all persons within the 
state" as long as the class to whom the rule applies is 
described in general terms and members can be added to the 
class.  See Citizens for Sensible Zoning, 90 Wis. 2d at 815-16.  
For example, in Palm, Emergency Order 28 was a rule because it 
"regulate[d] all persons in Wisconsin at the time it was issued 
and it regulate[d] all who [would] come into Wisconsin in the 
future."  Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶24; see also Citizens for 
No. 
2020AP1742   
 
10 
 
Sensible Zoning, 90 Wis. 2d at 814 (concluding that a flood 
plain ordinance that was limited to certain portions of a 
certain county was nevertheless a rule because although the 
applicable class was limited, it was open and new members could 
be added).   
¶21 Appellate courts have held that a general order of 
general application could "have the 'effect of law' where 
criminal or civil sanctions can result [from] a violation; where 
licensure can be denied; and where the interest of individuals 
in a class can be legally affected through enforcement of the 
agency action."  Cholvin v. DHFS, 2008 WI App 127, ¶26, 313 
Wis. 2d 749, 758 N.W.2d 118 (collecting cases).  Palm, Citizens 
for Sensible Zoning and Cholvin illustrate the wide array of 
agency conduct that could affect an individual group member's 
legal interests.   
¶22 In Palm, Emergency Order 28 provided that it was 
enforceable by criminal sanction; clearly, it had the effect of 
law.  Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶36.  Similarly, in Citizens for 
Sensible Zoning, the rule had the effect of law because it was 
"'of the same effect as if adopted by the county.'"  Citizens 
for Sensible Zoning, 90 Wis. 2d at 816 (quoting Wis. Stat. 
§ 87.30 
(1973-74)). 
 
Lastly, 
in 
Cholvin, 
the 
written 
instructions that the Department of Health and Family Services 
utilized had the effect of law because the instructions could be 
used to deny certain Medicaid benefits.  Cholvin, 313 Wis. 2d 
749, ¶29.  These cases and those cited in Cholvin demonstrate 
that a myriad of different agency actions could affect one's 
No. 
2020AP1742   
 
11 
 
legal interests and that an action having the effect of law is 
not limited to criminal sanctions.  
¶23 In order to constitute a rule, the directive must be 
that of an agency.  Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶22.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 227.01(1) defines an "[a]gency" as "a board, commission, 
committee, department or officer in the state government, except 
the governor, a district attorney or military or judicial 
officer."  Boards, commissions, committees and departments are 
defined generally in Wis. Stat. § 15.01 and other statutes 
define which entity meets those descriptions as relevant to that 
section or chapter.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 250.01(2) (defining 
the "department" for purposes of chapters 250-257 as "the 
department of health services").  If a general order of general 
application is issued by one of these entities, it satisfies the 
fourth definitional criterion of a rule.   
¶24 Finally, when a general order of general application 
implements, 
interprets 
or 
makes 
specific 
legislation 
or 
regulates how a statute will be administered or enforced moving 
forward 
that 
general 
order 
meets 
the 
fifth 
definitional 
criterion of a rule.5  See Citizens for Sensible Zoning, 90 
Wis. 2d at 816 ("[T]he DNR issued the ordinance to implement 
                                                 
5 To "implement" is to "carry out" or "accomplish" and 
"especially:  to give practical effect to and ensure actual 
fulfillment by concrete measures."  Implement, Merriam-Webster 
Third Int'l Dictionary 1134 (1986).  See State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶54, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110 (utilizing the American Heritage Dictionary to 
glean the common meaning of the word "refuse").  
No. 
2020AP1742   
 
12 
 
sec. 87.30, which it administers."); see also Wisconsin Elec. 
Power Co. v. DNR, 93 Wis. 2d 222, 235, 287 N.W.2d 113 ("[T]he 
DNR issued the permits containing the chlorine limitations to 
implement sec. 147.02, Stats.").  Similarly, emergency rules 
guide the administration and enforcement of a statute under an 
agency's purview when a threat to the "public peace, health, 
safety, or welfare necessitates" expediency.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.24(1).  Therefore, under most circumstances, when an 
agency action makes specific a statute for which the agency has 
rulemaking 
authority 
that 
action 
will 
satisfy 
the 
fifth 
criterion of a rule. 
¶25 Furthermore, when an agency, in order to enforce or 
administer 
a 
statute 
in 
its 
purview, 
adopts 
its 
own 
understanding of that statute, it generally has interpreted the 
statute 
thereby 
satisfying 
the 
"interpret" 
criterion 
of 
rulemaking.  See Wis. Stat. § 227.10(1); see also Frankenthal v. 
Wis. Real Est. Brokers' Bd., 3 Wis. 2d 249, 253, 89 N.W.2d 825 
(1958) (concluding that "mimeographed instructions for renewal 
of real-estate broker's licenses" was a rule of the real estate 
brokers' board).  In addition, where a statute's mandate is not 
clear and unambiguous, an agency will need to interpret the 
statute in order to take action permitted by the statute.  See 
Lamar Cent. Outdoor Co., Inc. v. Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 
2019 WI 109, ¶38, 389 Wis. 2d 486, 936 N.W.2d 573 (concluding 
that the statute at issue did not "plainly and unambiguously" 
compel the agency's interpretation of the statute and therefore 
No. 
2020AP1742   
 
13 
 
rulemaking was required).  In such instances, the fifth 
definitional criterion of a rule is also satisfied. 
D.  Emergency Order 3 
¶26 Having set out the definitional criteria used to 
evaluate when an agency action constitutes a rule, we apply them 
to determine whether Emergency Order 3 is a rule.  The court of 
appeals concluded that Emergency Order 3 was a rule because it 
was issued by DHS purportedly pursuant to its authority under 
Wis. Stat. § 252.02(3), it imposed statewide restrictions on 
public gatherings and it made subjective policy decisions 
regarding which entities were subject to its mandate and which 
entities were exempt.  Because Emergency Order 3 was not 
promulgated as a rule the court of appeals concluded that it was 
invalid and unenforceable.  We agree.  On its face, Emergency 
Order 3 meets the definition of a rule and DHS was required to 
comply with rulemaking procedures in ch. 227.  
¶27 However, despite our decision in Palm and the court of 
appeals' conclusion that this case fell squarely within Palm, 
DHS argues that Emergency Order 3 is not a rule under Palm's 
rubric.  DHS contends that Emergency Order 3 was not a rule 
because it issued Emergency Order 3 under Wis. Stat. § 252.02(3)6 
rather than the more general statutory subsections discussed at 
length in Palm, namely §§ 252.02(4) and (6).7  DHS supports its 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 252.02(3) states that "The department 
may close schools and forbid public gatherings in schools, 
churches, and other places to control outbreaks and epidemics." 
7 In relevant part, Wis. Stat. § 252.02(4) states that 
"[T]he department may promulgate and enforce rules or issue 
No. 
2020AP1742   
 
14 
 
argument by noting that we did not discuss the scope of 
subsection (3) and that we upheld the school closure provision 
of 
Emergency 
Order 
28, 
which 
was 
based 
on 
§ 252.02(3).  
Additionally, DHS argues that § 252.02(3) "confer[s] well-
delineated statutory power" and therefore does not require 
rulemaking to enforce.8 
¶28 This argument reads Palm too narrowly and misses 
Palm's overarching holding.  As a preliminary matter, we note 
that Palm did not bless DHS's order that closed schools.  Palm 
simply said that its holding "[did] not apply to Section 4.a. of 
Emergency Order 28," which was limited to school closures.  
Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶3 n.6.  Palm was very specific in regard 
to the portion of Emergency Order 28 to which it did not apply.  
It employed a subsection of Emergency Order 28, not a subsection 
of Wis. Stat. § 252.02.  It did not exempt all orders issued 
under § 252.02(3) from the definition of a rule.  Stated 
otherwise, whether DHS issued Emergency Order 3 under a 
different statutory subsection than those Palm focused on is of 
                                                                                                                                                             
orders . . . for the control and suppression of communicable 
diseases . . . ."  Similarly, subsection (6) provides that "The 
department may authorize and implement all emergency measures 
necessary to control communicable diseases."  § 252.02(6). 
8 DHS also argues that rulemaking is not needed when an 
agency enforces or administers a statute that plainly authorizes 
the agency to act.  According to DHS, rulemaking is necessary 
only when an agency "fills in the gaps" of a general statute 
with forward looking policy.  This argument appears to be a 
reformulation of the fifth criterion of the rule definition set 
forth above and does not obviate the requirement that DHS 
proceed by rulemaking.   
No. 
2020AP1742   
 
15 
 
no import if DHS's action meets the definition of a rule.  
Accordingly, we examine Emergency Order 3 based on whether it 
satisfies the five definitional criteria of a rule, which were 
explained in detail in Palm. 
¶29 Emergency Order 3 is a general order generally 
applied, and therefore, it meets the facial definition of a rule 
under Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13), explained further in Palm.  We 
set out at length in Palm that when a general order of general 
application satisfies the five rule definitional criteria, it is 
a rule for purposes of ch. 227.  We now review those criteria in 
light of Emergency Order 3.  
¶30 First, and as with Emergency Order 28, Emergency Order 
3 is a general order of general application satisfying the first 
and second definitional criteria of a rule.  An agency action is 
a general order of general application if the class to whom it 
applies is described in general terms and new members can be 
added to the class.  See Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶¶22-24.  By its 
own terms, Emergency Order 3 defined a public gathering broadly 
as any "indoor event, convening, or collection of individuals, 
whether planned or spontaneous, that is open to the public and 
brings together people who are not part of the same household in 
a single room."  "[O]pen to the public" is defined just as 
expansively 
and 
"include[d], 
but 
[was] 
not 
limited 
to: . . . [r]ooms within a business location, store, or facility 
that allow members of the public to enter."  Public gathering 
also includes "[t]icketed events" where persons could obtain 
tickets for free or purchase tickets.  This broad and general 
No. 
2020AP1742   
 
16 
 
description of the class to whom Emergency Order 3 applied 
regulated a vast array of entities and people.   
¶31 In addition to describing the class to which Emergency 
Order 3 applied in general terms, the class it created was an 
open class.  New entities and new members could be added for 
public gatherings.  Just as people who were not regulated by 
Emergency Order 28 one day "could have been regulated the next" 
if they moved into Wisconsin, new entities could have opened 
during Emergency Order 3 and new persons could have come into 
Wisconsin.  If they met the order's broad requirements, all 
attendance for all people would have been regulated.  See Palm, 
391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶24; see also Citizens for Sensible Zoning, 90 
Wis. 2d at 815.9   
¶32 In 
regard 
to 
the 
third 
definitional 
criterion, 
Emergency Order 3 had the effect of law.  Section 6 of Emergency 
Order 3 stated that the "order [was] enforceable by civil 
forfeiture."  Similar to Palm, DHS cited Wis. Stat. § 252.25 as 
the statutory basis for its imposition of civil forfeitures on 
those who would violate Emergency Order 3.  See Palm, 391 
Wis. 2d 497, ¶¶36-40.  As Cholvin made clear, agency action that 
can be enforced by civil forfeiture has the effect of law.  
                                                 
9 It is true that Emergency Order 3 contained certain 
enumerated 
exceptions 
to 
its 
definitions. 
 
However, 
the 
exceptions did not make the class description less general nor 
did the exceptions close the class in any way.  See Citizens for 
Sensible Zoning, Inc. v. DNR, 90 Wis. 2d 804, 814, 280 N.W.2d 
702 (1979) (noting that the class was limited to persons who had 
a legal interest in the land regulated by the ordinance but that 
new people could enter that narrow class). 
No. 
2020AP1742   
 
17 
 
Additionally, Emergency Order 3 was issued by DHS, which 
satisfies the fourth definitional criterion of being "issued by 
an agency."   
¶33 Finally, Emergency Order 3 both implemented and 
interpreted Wis. Stat. § 252.02(3)'s grant of authority to 
"forbid 
public 
gatherings . . . to 
control 
outbreaks 
and 
epidemics" thereby satisfying the fifth definitional criterion.10  
To implement is to carry out, and without some sort of 
implementing mechanism, the "forbid public gatherings" portion 
of § 252.02(3) would not be carried out.  Moreover, by way of 
its implementation, DHS interpreted the statute.  First, "public 
gatherings" is not defined in the surrounding statutes and 
therefore, DHS must have interpreted § 252.02(3) to come to its 
definition.  Moreover, DHS interpreted what it means to "forbid 
public gatherings."  Its interpretation is that "forbid" means 
to "limit" numerically.  Whether this interpretation is legally 
correct is not relevant because it is nonetheless DHS's 
interpretation.  See Lamar Central, 389 Wis. 2d 486, ¶29 n.16.  
By both implementing and interpreting § 252.02(3)'s grant of 
authority, DHS satisfied the fifth definitional criterion of a 
rule.  Accordingly, Emergency Order 3 satisfied all five 
                                                 
10 We note that DHS's indication that it would continue to 
issue similar orders depending on the outcome of this case poses 
the question of whether the expiration date of Emergency Order 3 
was a date certain.  See Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm, 2020 WI 
42, 391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶27, 942 N.W.2d 900 (rejecting the argument 
that Emergency Order 28 was a time limited order because the 
"Gating Criteria" of Emergency Order 31 extended the effect of 
Emergency Order 28 beyond its purported expiration). 
No. 
2020AP1742   
 
18 
 
criteria that define a rule and, because it was not promulgated 
through rulemaking procedures, it was not valid or enforceable.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶34 We 
conclude 
that 
Emergency 
Order 
3 
meets 
the 
definition of a rule, as we recently explained in Palm, 391 
Wis. 2d 497.  Therefore, Emergency Order 3 should have been 
promulgated according to rulemaking procedures set forth in Wis. 
Stat. ch. 227.  Because it was not, Emergency Order 3 was not 
validly enacted and was unenforceable.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals.11 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
                                                 
11 This case presents as the review of the grant of a 
temporary restraining order by the court of appeals in an 
interlocutory appeal.  We do not address temporary restraining 
order standards because our decision herein is a declaration 
that permanently enjoins Executive Order 3, a rule made without 
engaging in rulemaking.   
No.  2020AP1742.bh 
 
1 
 
¶35 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring).  Last term, this 
court struck down an order issued by Department of Health 
Services Secretary-designee Andrea Palm that purported, in part, 
to close or limit capacity at various public places throughout 
Wisconsin.  Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm, 2020 WI 42, 391 
Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900.  We held, among other things, that 
a statewide order limiting public gatherings met the statutory 
definition of an administrative rule and must be promulgated as 
such.  Id., ¶¶3, 7, 42, 58. 
¶36 Some details have changed, but this case arises 
because Palm issued another order doing exactly what this court 
said she may not do:  limit public gatherings by statewide order 
without promulgating a rule.  Palm hopes to achieve a different 
outcome this time by seizing on some of the vulnerabilities in 
last term's decision.  To be sure, the court's rationale in Palm 
was, in some respects, incomplete.  My objections to the court's 
legal analysis were no secret.  See id., ¶¶165-263 (Hagedorn, 
J., dissenting).  But creative efforts to engineer a different 
result from an indistinguishable set of facts would, in my view, 
be a departure from basic principles of judicial decision-
making. 
¶37 The reach and nature of stare decisis——a Latin phrase 
that means "to stand by things decided"——is the subject of much 
debate.1  But if stare decisis is to have any import at all in 
our legal system, it surely must apply when a court has told a 
                                                 
1 Stare decisis, Black's Law Dictionary 1696 (11th ed. 
2019). 
No.  2020AP1742.bh 
 
2 
 
specific party that certain conduct is unlawful, and that party 
does the very same thing again under the same circumstances.  
That is what we have here.  No further clarification of our 
opinion in Palm is needed; its application is plain.  We held 
that Palm's statewide order limiting public gatherings (along 
with a number of other restrictions) meets the statutory 
definition of a rule, and must be promulgated as a rule to have 
legal effect.  Respect for this court and its authority compels 
me to stand by that decision today. 
¶38 Under 
different 
circumstances, 
we 
may 
need 
to 
reconsider some of our conclusions in Palm.  However, we have 
not been asked to reexamine Palm here, nor is doing so necessary 
to decide this case.  For these reasons, while I cannot join the 
Chief Justice's opinion further extending the reasoning of Palm, 
I respectfully concur in the court's mandate. 
No.  2020AP1742.awb 
 
1 
 
¶39 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  At a time when 
public health experts are imploring pandemic-weary Wisconsinites 
to stay vigilant, a faulty statutory analysis once again leads 
this court to undermine public health measures. 
¶40 This time, the statute at issue is Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.02(3), which states that the Department of Health Services 
(DHS) has the authority to "close schools and forbid public 
gatherings in schools, churches, and other places to control 
outbreaks and epidemics."  The court attempts to justify its 
result by relying on stare decisis and statutory interpretation, 
but both rationales fall flat.  
¶41 Stare decisis simply does not apply.  The Palm1 
decision, on which the mandate of this court hinges, did not 
decide the question now before us and did not even attempt to 
interpret § 252.02(3).  With no analysis, there is no decision 
for us to follow.  And even if Palm constituted precedent for 
interpretation of this statute, it falls within the well-
recognized exceptions to according precedential adherence——the 
Palm decision is both unsound in principle and unworkable in 
practice.       
¶42 The lead opinion's2 statutory interpretation fares no 
better.  Trying to get around the plain language of the statute, 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin 
Legislature 
v. 
Palm, 
2020 
WI 
42, 
391 
Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900. 
2 I refer to Chief Justice Roggensack's opinion as the "lead 
opinion" because the opinion has not been joined by a majority 
of the court.  Although Justice Hagedorn concurs in the mandate, 
he does not join the lead opinion's reasoning.  See Justice 
Hagedorn's concurrence, ¶38. 
No.  2020AP1742.awb 
 
2 
 
it engages in a hocus-pocus interpretation and the plain meaning 
of the statute somehow seems to vanish.  In its place there 
appears an interpretation of the statute, which according to the 
lead opinion, means the opposite of what it says.  In place of 
the plain language of the statute that gives DHS the authority 
to forbid public gatherings, the lead opinion interprets the 
statute as not giving DHS that authority.  Instead, it contrives 
a roadblock that is not part of the statute, and forces DHS to 
go through a cumbersome rulemaking procedure. 
¶43 Contrary to the lead opinion, I conclude that the 
plain language of Wis. Stat. § 252.02(3) provides DHS with the 
authority to forbid public gatherings without going through 
rulemaking.  Contrary to the concurrence, I further conclude 
that Palm does not require otherwise. 
¶44 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶45 As has been well established at this point, we are in 
the midst of a worldwide pandemic, the likes of which few have 
                                                                                                                                                             
The only reference to "lead opinions" in our Internal 
Operating Procedures states that if during the process of 
circulating and revising opinions, "the opinion originally 
circulated as the majority opinion does not garner the vote of a 
majority of the court, it shall be referred to in separate 
writings as the 'lead opinion' unless a separate writing garners 
the vote of a majority of the court."  Wis. S. Ct. IOP III.G.4 
(Sept. 12, 2019).   
Lest the public mistakenly believe that a lead opinion 
constitutes precedential authority, it does not.  For further 
discussion of our procedure regarding lead opinions, see Koss 
Corp. v. Park Bank, 2019 WI 7, ¶76 n.1, 385 Wis. 2d 261, 922 
N.W.2d 20 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., concurring). 
No.  2020AP1742.awb 
 
3 
 
ever seen.  In response, both state and local governments have 
issued various public health orders in an attempt to curb the 
spread of COVID-19. 
¶46 At issue in this case is Emergency Order 3, an order 
issued by DHS Secretary-Designee Andrea Palm.  As set forth by 
the lead opinion, this order was issued on October 6, 2020, and 
"limited the number of people who could be present at indoor, 
public gatherings."  Lead op., ¶3.  
¶47 What the lead opinion does not mention is the 
conditions that led to the issuance of Emergency Order 3.  The 
Order details how "Wisconsin is now a COVID-19 hotspot[,]" home 
to "rapidly accelerat[ing]" spread and a strain on hospital 
capacity.  It declares: 
Wisconsin must use all its tools, including keeping 
people physically apart and wearing face coverings, to 
slow this dangerous spike.  The consequences of 
failing to act could be devastating and deadly.  
Because 
of 
the 
time 
period 
between 
infection, 
diagnosis, and the development of serious symptoms, 
hospitalizations and deaths lag behind case counts.  
Wisconsin is now experiencing increases in both of 
these serious indicators because of the steep rise in 
cases of COVID-19 over the past month. 
¶48 Accordingly, 
Emergency 
Order 
3 
limits 
public 
gatherings in two ways.  First, "[p]ublic gatherings are limited 
to no more than 25% of the total occupancy limits for the room 
or building, as established by the local municipality."  Second, 
"[f]or indoor spaces without an occupancy limit for the room or 
building that is established by the local municipality, such as 
a private residence, public gatherings are limited to no more 
than 10 people." 
No.  2020AP1742.awb 
 
4 
 
¶49 A "public gathering" for purposes of this order is 
defined as "an indoor event, convening, or collection of 
individuals, whether planned or spontaneous, that is open to the 
public and brings together people who are not part of the same 
household in a single room."  The order specifies that places 
that are open to the public include, but are not limited to:  
(1) "Rooms within a business location, store, or facility that 
allow members of the public to enter"; and (2) "Ticketed events 
where tickets are available for free or for purchase by any 
individual or by any individual within a specific class of 
people." 
¶50 For contrast, the order also identifies places that 
are not open to the public, and as a result are not included 
within the definition of a public gathering and thus are not 
subject to the order's limitations.  These include:  (1) "Office 
spaces, manufacturing plant[s], and other facilities that are 
accessible only by employees or other authorized personnel"; (2) 
"Invitation-only events that exclude uninvited guests"; and (3) 
"Private residences.  Except, a residence is considered open to 
the public during an event that allows entrance to any 
individual; such public gatherings are limited to 10 people." 
¶51 The Tavern League and others filed suit, seeking an 
injunction against the enforcement of Emergency Order 3 on the 
basis 
that 
the 
order 
constitutes 
an 
unpromulgated 
rule 
impermissible under Wis. Stat. ch. 227 and Wisconsin Legislature 
v. Palm, 2020 WI 42, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900.  The Mix 
Up and others later intervened. 
No.  2020AP1742.awb 
 
5 
 
¶52 After the circuit court initially granted an ex parte 
temporary injunction, a later assigned3 circuit court judge 
subsequently vacated that injunction and denied The Mix Up's 
motion for a temporary injunction.  Lead op., ¶¶7-8.  The 
circuit court reasoned that "it is not clear that plaintiffs 
have a reasonable probability of success on the merits, 
especially when I look at Footnote 21" of Palm.   
¶53 Additionally, 
the 
circuit 
court 
determined 
"that 
there's no showing that a temporary injunction is necessary to 
preserve the status quo.  There is nothing in the affidavits to 
show that any of the plaintiffs have complied with the order; 
that complying with the order has somehow harmed them."  
Finally, the circuit court concluded:  
[T]here's no showing of irreparable harm.  If I had a 
showing for the last 40 days that businesses were 
going out because they were complying with the order, 
that would be a showing of irreparable harm.  I merely 
have the theoretical issue that if they were to 
comply, they would suffer harm. 
¶54 The Mix Up appealed, and the court of appeals 
reversed.  Over Judge Stark's dissent, a majority of the court 
of appeals concluded that "under our supreme court's holding in 
Palm, Emergency Order #3 is invalid and unenforceable, as a 
matter of law."   Tavern League of Wis., Inc. v. Palm, No. 
2020AP1742, unpublished slip op. at 3 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 
2020). 
¶55 This court's mandate now affirms the court of appeals, 
with the lead opinion determining that the plain language of the 
                                                 
3 See Wis. Stat. § 801.58(1). 
No.  2020AP1742.awb 
 
6 
 
statute does not control and that "Emergency Order 3 meets the 
definition of a rule" as explained in last year's Palm decision.  
Lead op., ¶2.  Thus, in the lead opinion's view, "Emergency 
Order 3 should have been promulgated according to rulemaking 
procedures set forth in Wis. Stat. ch. 227.  Because it was not, 
Emergency 
Order 
3 
was 
not 
validly 
enacted 
and 
was 
unenforceable."  Id.   
¶56 Justice Hagedorn's concurrence arrives at the same 
destination, but takes a different route.  It does not join the 
lead opinion, but instead concludes that the Palm court decided 
the issue we consider today and that the doctrine of stare 
decisis dictates that the court of appeals be affirmed.  Justice 
Hagedorn's concurrence, ¶¶37-38. 
II 
¶57 I begin with a discussion of stare decisis because 
this court's mandate rests upon the application of that 
principle.  Although not subscribing to the lead opinion's 
statutory analysis, Justice Hagedorn's concurrence would affirm 
the court of appeals, but only on the basis of stare decisis.  
Justice 
Hagedorn's 
concurrence, 
¶37. 
 
However, 
a 
close 
examination of Palm reveals that the doctrine is inapplicable in 
this case. 
¶58 Stare decisis refers to the principle that requires 
courts to "stand by things decided."  State v. Harrell, 
199 Wis. 2d 654, 667, 546 N.W.2d 115 (1996) (Abrahamson, J., 
concurring).  The doctrine is fundamental to the rule of law.  
No.  2020AP1742.awb 
 
7 
 
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emp.'s Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, 
¶94, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257. 
¶59 But for stare decisis to dictate the outcome of the 
present case, the previous case relied upon must have actually 
decided the issue we now examine.  Palm did not do so. 
¶60 In Palm, a majority of the court struck down the DHS 
secretary-designee's initial "safer at home" order (Order #28) 
on the basis that the order was a rule that should have gone 
through rulemaking procedures.  Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶3.  
Secretary-designee Palm claimed that authority to issue Order 
#28 could be found in Wis. Stat. § 252.02(3), (4) and (6).4   
                                                 
4 These subsections of Wis. Stat. § 252.02 provide in full: 
(3) The department may close schools and forbid public 
gatherings in schools, churches, and other places to 
control outbreaks and epidemics. 
(4) Except as provided in ss. 93.07(24)(e) and 97.59, 
the department may promulgate and enforce rules or 
issue orders for guarding against the introduction of 
any communicable disease into the state, for the 
control and suppression of communicable diseases, for 
the quarantine and disinfection of persons, localities 
and things infected or suspected of being infected by 
a communicable disease and for the sanitary care of 
jails, state prisons, mental health institutions, 
schools, and public buildings and connected premises.  
Any rule or order may be made applicable to the whole 
or any specified part of the state, or to any vessel 
or other conveyance.  The department may issue orders 
for any city, village or county by service upon the 
local health officer.  Rules that are promulgated and 
orders that are issued under this subsection supersede 
conflicting 
or 
less 
stringent 
local 
regulations, 
orders or ordinances. 
 . . .  
No.  2020AP1742.awb 
 
8 
 
¶61 The majority in Palm stated we "do not define the 
precise scope of DHS authority under Wis. Stat. § 252.02(3), 
(4), and (6) because clearly Order 28 went too far."  Id., ¶55.  
It 
did, 
however, 
explicitly 
reject 
Palm's 
reliance 
on 
subsections (4) and (6).  With regard to subsec. (4), the 
majority determined:   
Order 28 goes far beyond what is authorized in Wis. 
Stat. § 252.02(4).  For example, Order 28 exceeds the 
§ 252.02(4) authority to quarantine those infected or 
suspected 
of 
being 
infected. 
 
Instead, 
Palm 
quarantines '[a]ll individuals present within the 
State of Wisconsin' by ordering them 'to stay at home 
or at their place of residence' with exceptions she 
deems appropriate.   
Id., ¶49.  Similarly, the majority did not accept Palm's 
argument that Order #28 was authorized by subsec. (6), observing 
the subsection's non-specific nature and concluding:   "If Wis. 
Stat. § 252.02(6) were the sole factual foundation for criminal 
charges, 
no 
criminal 
prosecution 
could 
result 
because 
§ 252.02(6) does not have the specificity required for fair 
notice of the conduct required or prohibited.  Stated otherwise, 
it has no definable standards for required or prohibited 
conduct."  Id., ¶47.   
¶62 The Palm majority opinion did not contain any analysis 
whatsoever of Wis. Stat. § 252.02(3), which is the statute at 
issue here.  However, it left two clues hidden in footnotes that 
inform our understanding of that subsection.  The two clues are 
actually the same clue, as the Palm majority twice repeated the 
                                                                                                                                                             
(6) The department may authorize and implement all 
emergency measures necessary to control communicable 
diseases. 
No.  2020AP1742.awb 
 
9 
 
following delineated exception to its holding:  "This decision 
does not apply to Section 4. a. of Emergency Order 28."  Id., 
¶¶3 n.6, 58 n.21. 
¶63 So what is section 4.a. of Emergency Order 28, which 
the Palm majority left in place?  This provision closed all 
public and private K-12 schools for the remainder of the 2019-
2020 school year.5  The question then arises, why was this 
section of Order #28 spared from the Palm majority's sword, 
while the rest of the order was slashed? 
¶64 The Palm majority provides no explanation for the 
exception set forth in footnotes 6 and 21, but a look to Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 252.02(3) 
provides 
a 
probable 
rationale. 
 
That 
subsection states:  "The department may close schools and forbid 
public gatherings in schools, churches, and other places to 
control outbreaks and epidemics."  The plain language of the 
statute provides that DHS may issue orders closing schools.  
Full stop.  No interpretation is necessary, and thus no 
rulemaking is necessary for DHS to close schools.  The Palm 
majority 
implicitly 
recognized 
this 
by 
the 
inclusion 
of 
footnotes 6 and 21. 
                                                 
5 In full, section 4.a. of Order #28 provides: 
Public and private K-12 schools shall remain closed 
for pupil instruction and extracurricular activities 
for the remainder of the 2019-2020 school year.  
Schools may continue to facilitate distance learning 
or virtual learning.  Schools may continue to be used 
for 
Essential 
Government 
Functions 
and 
food 
distribution. 
 
This 
section 
does 
not 
apply 
to 
facilities operated by the Wisconsin Department of 
Corrections. 
No.  2020AP1742.awb 
 
10 
 
¶65 The lead opinion attempts to explain footnotes 6 and 
21 in Palm, but its feeble "explanation" really doesn't say 
anything.  See lead op., ¶28.  It states:  "Palm was very 
specific in regard to the portion of Emergency Order 28 to which 
it did not apply.  It employed a subsection of Emergency Order 
28, not a subsection of Wis. Stat. § 252.02.  It did not exempt 
all orders issued under § 252.02(3) from the definition of a 
rule."  Id.  But this non-explanation has no explanatory power 
at all——it doesn't even attempt to explain why Palm carved out 
the exception for closing schools, which is essential to the 
determination of this case. 
¶66 Far from deciding that the subject order would be 
impermissible under § 252.02(3), Palm contained no analysis at 
all of that subsection, and even hints that no rulemaking is 
necessary to implement its clear provisions.  The phrase in 
subsec. 
(3) 
at 
issue 
here, 
"forbid 
public 
gatherings 
in . . . other places," is similarly clear.6  See infra, ¶¶77-79. 
¶67 In order for stare decisis to apply, the "thing" at 
issue must have actually been decided.  Palm did not decide 
anything with regard to § 252.02(3).  Where there is no analysis 
at all, what precedent was created for us to follow?  I 
therefore determine that stare decisis does not dictate the 
result of this case. 
                                                 
6 See Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶232 n.19 (Hagedorn, J., 
dissenting) ("To the extent section 4.a. should be treated 
differently due to the explicit authority granted to DHS to 
close schools in Wis. Stat. § 252.02(3), that same logic would 
seem to apply to the other provisions in Order 28 that have the 
same statutory support."). 
No.  2020AP1742.awb 
 
11 
 
III 
¶68 Even assuming that Palm decided the issue now before 
the court (it did not), stare decisis still would not dictate 
the result because last term's Palm decision is unsound in 
principle and unworkable in practice.  In considering whether to 
overturn a prior case, we consider "whether the prior decision 
is unsound in principle, whether it is unworkable in practice, 
and whether reliance interests are implicated."  Johnson 
Controls, Inc., 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶99. 
¶69 Palm is unsound in principle.  It engages in a flawed 
statutory interpretation that sweeps with a broad brush where 
nuance is required.  As Justice Hagedorn's dissent in Palm 
recognized, the decision "is not grounded in the law."  Palm, 
391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶259 (Hagedorn, J., dissenting).  It twisted 
the language of Wis. Stat. § 252.02 and completely ignored the 
long-standing, broad powers the Legislature granted to DHS.  
Id., ¶132 (Dallet, J., dissenting).  Similarly, its conclusions 
regarding § 252.02 are advisory and undeveloped, and undermine 
DHS's ability to apply and enforce the statute in accordance 
with the authority it has been given.  Id., ¶160 (Dallet, J., 
dissenting), ¶232 (Hagedorn, J., dissenting).7   
                                                 
7 Further underscoring that Palm is unsound in principle is 
its potential impact on scores of statutes and prior cases.  The 
Palm decision largely rests on a premise not briefed or argued 
by any party, namely the proposition that "an executive branch 
order may only carry criminal penalties for any violation if the 
elements of a crime are first promulgated as a rule or otherwise 
defined in the statutes."  Id., ¶253 (Hagedorn, J., dissenting). 
No.  2020AP1742.awb 
 
12 
 
¶70 Further, the Palm majority opinion is unsound in 
principle because it "morphs [rulemaking] into subjecting 
executive branch enforcement of enacted laws to a legislative 
veto," a conclusion "that turns our constitutional structure on 
its very head."  Id., ¶218 (Hagedorn, dissenting).  And for 
what?  To "do[] the Legislature's bidding in the midst of a 
pandemic" and in so doing allow the Legislature "to avoid 
political fallout."  Id., ¶162 (Dallet, J., dissenting). 
¶71 It is also unworkable in practice.  The rulemaking 
process mandated by Palm is overly cumbersome in the event of a 
fast-moving emergency.  By design, the process includes repeated 
checks, public input, and imposed waiting periods.  Id., ¶228 
(Hagedorn, J., dissenting).  Even if an emergency rule in a best 
case scenario could transpire in 12 days, as suggested by the 
Legislature during oral argument in Palm, "[t]welve days is far 
too long in a real emergency.  Epidemics don't always give you a 
two-week heads up on their next move."  Id., ¶230 (Hagedorn, J., 
dissenting).  The emergency rules process is thus a poor fit for 
a fluid situation requiring a real-time and flexible response. 
                                                                                                                                                             
This "dramatic holding" could call into question a lengthy 
list of laws.  Id., ¶255 (Hagedorn, J., dissenting).  Indeed, 
"[o]ur statutes include numerous instances where violating an 
agency's order can result in criminal penalties."  Id.  "If an 
enactment of this sort is unlawful, then all of these statutes 
would presumably be unconstitutional.  The same may be true for 
analogous statutes authorizing civil penalties."  Id.  Beyond 
the plethora of statutes, Palm portends to overrule "our cases 
[that] have long supported the notion that, at least in concept, 
criminal 
penalties 
for 
violating 
a 
lawful 
order 
are 
permissible."  Id., ¶258 n.24 (Hagedorn, J., dissenting).  The 
Palm majority's rationale would thus require a different result 
in an untold number of cases.  Id. 
No.  2020AP1742.awb 
 
13 
 
¶72 It makes no sense to cling to Palm in the name of 
stare decisis when it is unsound in principle and unworkable in 
practice.  Such "precedent" destabilizes rather than advances 
the rule of law.  We are therefore not required to adhere to 
decisions that are objectively wrong.  See Progressive N. Ins. 
Co. v. Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, ¶45, 281 Wis. 2d 300, 697 
N.W.2d 417; 
Wenke 
v. 
Gehl 
Co., 
2004 
WI 
103, 
¶21, 
274 
Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405.  Accordingly, I would decide this 
case 
based 
on 
the 
clear 
statutory 
text 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 252.02(3), to which I turn next. 
IV 
¶73 Agencies have the authority to promulgate rules, but 
they need not promulgate a rule to accomplish every task.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2)(a) ("Each agency may promulgate rules 
interpreting 
the 
provisions 
of 
any 
statute 
enforced 
or 
administered by the agency, if the agency considers it necessary 
to effectuate the purpose of the statute . . . .") (emphasis 
added).   
¶74 As defined by statute, a "rule" is "a regulation, 
standard, statement of policy, or general order of general 
application that has the force of law and that is issued by an 
agency to implement, interpret, or make specific legislation 
enforced or administered by the agency or to govern the 
organization 
or 
procedure 
of 
the 
agency." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.01(13).  When an agency acts within those powers that are 
expressly conferred by statute, the agency simply "effectuates 
No.  2020AP1742.awb 
 
14 
 
the will of the legislature."  Brown Cnty. v. DHSS, 103 
Wis. 2d 37, 43, 307 N.W.2d 247 (1981). 
¶75 Thus, if a statute is unambiguous, i.e. if no 
interpretation is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
statute, then no rulemaking is required.  See Schoolway Transp. 
Co. v. Div. of Motor Vehicles, DOT, 72 Wis. 2d 223, 235-36, 240 
N.W.2d 403 (1976); Lamar Cent. Outdoor, LLC v. Div. of Hearings 
& Appeals, 2019 WI 109, ¶24, 389 Wis. 2d 486, 936 N.W.2d 573.  
The duty of the agency is to "administer the statute according 
to its plain terms."  Schoolway Transp. Co., 72 Wis. 2d at 236. 
¶76 The lead opinion, however, does not engage with the 
unambiguous language of Wis. Stat. § 252.02(3).  It acknowledges 
that "where a statute's mandate is not clear and unambiguous, an 
agency will need to interpret the statute in order to take 
action permitted by the statute," lead op., ¶25, but it does not 
cite the converse:  that where a statute is clear and 
unambiguous, no rulemaking is required.  The logical starting 
point is an analysis of the plain language of § 252.02(3) to 
determine if there is ambiguity, but the lead opinion simply 
doesn't do that analysis. 
¶77 Wisconsin Stat. § 252.02(3) provides that DHS may 
"forbid public gatherings in schools, churches, and other places 
to control outbreaks and epidemics."  As relevant here, the 
plain language allows DHS to forbid "public gatherings" in 
"other places" that are not schools or churches.  Emergency 
Order 3 forbids "public gatherings" in "other places" that are 
not schools or churches.  The plain language of the statute is 
No.  2020AP1742.awb 
 
15 
 
unambiguous.  By issuing Emergency Order 3, DHS is simply 
executing the clear words of the statute.  No interpretation 
necessary.   
¶78 The 
lead 
opinion 
attempts 
to 
set 
out 
how 
DHS 
"interpreted" § 252.02(3) in Emergency Order 3, making Order 3 a 
rule.  See lead op., ¶33.  In the lead opinion's view, DHS 
"interpreted" the term "public gathering" because it is not 
defined in the statute, and it "interpreted" "forbid" to mean 
"'limit' numerically."  Id.  But how are these "interpretations" 
any different from following the plain language of the statute?  
Although Emergency Order 3 provides a definition of "public 
gathering," that definition does not deviate from the common and 
ordinary meaning of the term.  Similarly, "forbid" has a common 
and ordinary meaning.  DHS just applied those common and 
ordinary meanings, no interpretation necessary. 
¶79 Because no interpretation is necessary, no rulemaking 
is necessary.  Accordingly, I determine that Emergency Order 3 
is not a rule.  It is authorized by the plain language of 
§ 252.02(3) 
and 
DHS 
need 
not 
go 
through 
the 
cumbersome 
rulemaking process to do what the statute plainly allows. 
¶80 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶81 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA FRANK 
DALLET and Justice JILL J. KAROFSKY join this dissent. 
No.  2020AP1742.awb 
 
 
 
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