Case Title: Todd Dev. Co., Inc. v. Morgan

Citation: 2008-Ohio-87

Docket Number: 20070041

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-01-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Todd Dev. Co., Inc. v. Morgan, 116 Ohio App.3d 461, 2008-Ohio-87.] 
 
 
TODD DEVELOPMENT CO., INC. ET AL., APPELLEES,  
v. MORGAN ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Todd Dev. Co., Inc. v. Morgan,  
116 Ohio St.3d 461, 2008-Ohio-87.] 
Civil procedure — Civ.R. 56 — Party moving for summary judgment does not 
bear initial burden of negating opposing party’s affirmative defenses. 
(No. 2007-0041– Submitted October 9, 2007 – Decided January 17, 2008.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Warren County, 
No. CA2005-11-124, 2006-Ohio-4825. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A plaintiff or counterclaimant moving for summary judgment does not bear the 
initial burden of addressing the nonmoving party’s affirmative defenses. 
_________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶ 1} The Twelfth District Court of Appeals has certified this case to this 
court for review and final determination pursuant to Section 3(B)(4), Article IV, 
Ohio Constitution and App.R. 25.  The Twelfth District found its judgment to be 
in conflict with the judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals in 
Countrymark Coop., Inc. v. Smith (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 159, 705 N.E.2d 738.  
We determined that a conflict exists and agreed to resolve the following issue:  
“Does a plaintiff or counterclaimant moving for summary judgment granting 
affirmative relief on its own claims bear the initial burden of addressing the non-
moving party’s affirmative defenses in its motion?”  The answer to this question is 
no. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 2} The facts in this case are not relevant to the disposition of the legal 
issue.  Briefly, appellants and appellees dispute whether particular lots, located in 
Warren County, Ohio, are subject to various covenants, including a restriction 
against subdivision.  Appellants are owners of various lots in the neighborhood, 
and appellees, Todd Development Company, Inc. and HDC II, L.L.C., are 
developers that now own certain lots that were part of the original neighborhood. 
{¶ 3} Appellees filed a declaratory judgment action alleging that the 
covenants cannot be enforced against them because appellees’ lots were 
subsequently replatted, resulting in a change of circumstances sufficient to relieve 
appellees of any requirement to honor the covenants.  The appellants filed a 
counterclaim and amended counterclaim, alleging that appellees had violated the 
covenants, including a restriction against subdividing the lots, and had committed 
trespass. 
{¶ 4} Both parties filed motions for summary judgment.  The trial court 
found that the covenants were not ambiguous and should be enforced.  The court 
granted summary judgment in favor of appellants and filed an entry prohibiting 
appellees from violating the subdivision restriction and other covenants.  An 
amended entry included a Civ.R. 54(B) certification. 
{¶ 5} Appellees appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by overruling 
appellees’ motion for summary judgment, by sustaining appellants’ motion for 
summary judgment, and by overruling the appellees’ second motion for summary 
judgment and objections to the decision. 
{¶ 6} The court of appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part the trial 
court’s decision.  The court of appeals held that the subdivision restriction was 
valid, but that a second covenant was invalid in part and could not be enforced 
against appellees.  Todd Dev. Co., Inc. v. Morgan, Warren App. No. 2005-11-124, 
2006-Ohio-4825, ¶ 41. 
January Term, 2008 
3 
{¶ 7} Further, the court of appeals held that the trial court abused its 
discretion by failing to reconsider its interlocutory order after appellees filed their 
second summary judgment motion.  When the trial court filed its original 
summary judgment entry, the court did not include the Civ.R. 54(B) certification 
that there was “no just reason for delay.”  That language was added several 
months after the original decision on summary judgment by separate entry 
modifying that decision.  This modification occurred after the filing of appellees’ 
second motion for summary judgment. 
{¶ 8} Appellees’ second motion argued that the trial court had failed to 
address affirmative defenses and that there was evidence before the trial court that 
raised genuine issues of material fact on the issue of laches.  In granting judgment 
to appellees, the court of appeals held that a party moving for summary judgment 
bears the initial burden of addressing affirmative defenses in a motion for 
summary judgment.  If the moving party fails to meet its burden, the nonmoving 
party has no burden to present evidence on its defenses, and the trial court errs in 
granting summary judgment for the moving party. 
{¶ 9} The court of appeals held that appellants failed to address 
appellees’ affirmative defenses in their motion for summary judgment and reply 
memorandum.  Thus, appellees were not required to raise their affirmative 
defenses in their first motion for summary judgment; when the appellees did raise 
the defense of laches in their second motion for summary judgment and presented 
evidence that raised genuine issues of material fact on that defense, the trial court 
was required to revise its first summary judgment decision.  The court noted that 
an interlocutory order of summary judgment may be reconsidered and revised by 
the trial court at any time before final judgment is entered. 
{¶ 10} Having determined that a conflict exists on the issue of whether a 
party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of addressing in its 
motion the nonmoving party’s affirmative defenses, we now turn to the merits. 
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{¶ 11} Civ.R. 56 defines the standard to be applied when determining 
whether a summary judgment should be granted.1  Civ.R. 56(C) mandates the 
entry of summary judgment if the evidence, properly submitted, shows that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Civ.R. 56(E) states that when a motion for summary 
judgment is properly made and supported, the nonmoving party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings.  Instead, the burden shifts to the 
nonmoving party, and the nonmoving party’s response must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.  If the nonmoving party does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against the 
nonmoving party.  Id. 
{¶ 12} In Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 662 N.E.2d 264, this 
court reviewed the standard for granting summary judgment and held that “the 
moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court of the 
basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record before the trial 
                                                 
1. 
{¶ a} Civ.R. 56 states: 
 
{¶ b} “(A) For party seeking affirmative relief.  A party seeking to recover upon a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part of the claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or declaratory judgment action. * * * 
 
{¶ c} “(B) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part of the claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or declaratory judgment action. * * *  
 
{¶ d} “(C) Motion and proceedings.  * * * Summary judgment shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, 
transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. * * * 
 
{¶ e} “* * * 
 
{¶ f} “(E) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required.  * * *  When a motion 
for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not 
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party's pleadings, but the party's response, by 
affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If the party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against the party.” 
January Term, 2008 
5 
court which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material 
element of the nonmoving party’s claim.”  Id. at 292, 662 N.E.2d 264.  Once the 
moving party satisfies its initial burden, the nonmoving party has the reciprocal 
burden outlined in the last sentence of Civ.R. 56(E).  Id. at 294, 662 N.E.2d 264. 
{¶ 13} The basic standard for summary judgment has been well 
established in Ohio jurisprudence.  The issue in this case is whether the moving 
party’s burden to support its motion for summary judgment includes the burden to 
address the nonmoving party’s affirmative defenses.  The language of Civ.R. 56 
and our case law do not support the proposition that a party moving for summary 
judgment has the burden to prove its case and disprove the opposing party’s case 
as well. 
{¶ 14} We agree with the appellants that there is no requirement in the 
Civil Rules that a moving party must negate the nonmoving party’s every possible 
defense to its motion for summary judgment.  To the contrary, Civ.R. 56(E) states 
that a party opposing summary judgment may not rest upon its pleadings, but must 
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.  If a moving 
party meets the standard for summary judgment required by Civ.R. 56, and a 
nonmoving party fails to respond with evidence of a genuine issue of material 
fact, a court does not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the moving 
party. 
{¶ 15} This holding protects the nonmoving party’s due process rights.  In 
Marshall v. Aaron (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 48, 15 OBR 145, 472 N.E.2d 335, 
syllabus, we stated that “Civ.R. 56 does not authorize courts to enter summary 
judgment in favor of a non-moving party.”  We reached our conclusion in 
Marshall based upon the implications of the language of Civ.R. 56(C) and stated 
that “[w]here no motion has been filed, and necessarily no evidence attached 
thereto, no conclusion, favorable or adverse, is properly available upon which to 
base an order for summary judgment.”  Id. at 50, 15 OBR 145, 472 N.E.2d 335. 
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{¶ 16} There is an exception to this general prohibition:  “ ‘While Civ.R. 
56 does not ordinarily authorize courts to enter summary judgment in favor of a 
non-moving party, * * * an entry of summary judgment against the moving party 
does not prejudice his due process rights where all relevant evidence is before the 
court, no genuine issue as to any material fact exists, and the non-moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ”  State ex rel. J.J. Detweiler Ents., Inc. v. 
Warner, 103 Ohio St.3d 99, 2004-Ohio-4659, 814 N.E.2d 482, ¶ 13, quoting State 
ex rel. Cuyahoga Cty. Hosp. v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp. (1986), 27 Ohio 
St.3d 25, 28, 27 OBR 442, 500 N.E.2d 1370.  Detweiler also quotes State ex rel. 
Lowery v. Cleveland (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 126, 128, 616 N.E.2d 233: “ ‘the 
court’s summary judgment for relator neither prejudiced the city’s procedural 
rights nor denied the city an opportunity to submit evidence.’ ”  Detweiler at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 17} The language quoted in Detweiler conveys the importance of a 
party’s due process rights.  We created an exception to the general rule announced 
in Marshall for factual situations in which the court has all the relevant evidence 
before it and the summary judgment standard is met.  When a party moves for 
summary judgment, the nonmovant has an opportunity to respond, and the court 
has considered all the relevant evidence, the court may enter summary judgment 
against the moving party, despite the nonmoving party’s failure to file its own 
motion for summary judgment.  The reason for this exception is that the parties 
have had an opportunity to submit all evidence to the court, and the parties have 
notice that the court is considering summary judgment.  As a result, neither party’s 
due process rights are violated. 
{¶ 18} In this case, both appellants and appellees have had an opportunity 
to submit evidence to the trial court.  Both parties have had legal notice of the 
moving party’s summary judgment motion.  Appellees had the opportunity in their 
response to appellants’ summary judgment motion to submit evidence showing a 
genuine issue of material fact with respect to their affirmative defenses.  Appellees 
January Term, 2008 
7 
were not required to conclusively demonstrate their case, but to produce only 
enough evidence to show that there remained a genuine issue of material fact.  
Detweiler, 103 Ohio St.3d 99, 2004-Ohio-4659, 814 N.E.2d 482, ¶ 14.  Appellees 
did not do so, and the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in 
favor of appellants. 
{¶ 19} Our decision in this case is in accord with decisions in several other 
states.  The Supreme Court of Indiana stated that, in regard to a response to a 
motion for summary judgment, “[i]t is clear that the burden of pleading and 
proving any affirmative defense is on the defendants.”  Criss v. Bitzegaio 
(Ind.1981), 420 N.E.2d 1221, 1224. 
{¶ 20} A Texas court of appeals expressly stated the “well-established rule 
of Texas summary judgment procedure”:  “ ‘Where the plaintiff moves for 
summary judgment in an action in which the defendant has pleaded an affirmative 
defense, he is entitled to have his summary judgment if he demonstrates by 
evidence that there is no material factual issue upon the elements of his claim, 
unless his opponent comes forward with a showing that there is such a disputed 
fact issue upon the affirmative defense.’ ”  Barrand, Inc. v. Whataburger, Inc. 
(Tex.App.2006), 214 S.W.3d 122, 143, fn. 6, quoting Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe 
Ry. Co. v. McBride (1959), 159 Tex. 442, 454, 322 S.W.2d 492. 
{¶ 21} Finally, our holding is consistent with the public policy in support 
of summary judgment motions.  Civ.R. 1(B) states that the Rules of Civil 
Procedure “shall be construed and applied to effect just results by eliminating 
delay, unnecessary expense and all other impediments to the expeditious 
administration of justice.”  A moving party does not need to offer evidence on 
every defense raised by the nonmoving party.  To impose such a requirement 
would delay the filing of summary judgment motions and increase the expense of 
litigation. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 22} As the United States Supreme Court stated in Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett (1986), 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, in reference to 
the federal Civil Rule for summary judgment, which is similar in relevant respects 
to the Ohio rule:  “The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have for almost 50 years 
authorized motions for summary judgment upon proper showings of the lack of a 
genuine, triable issue of material fact.  Summary judgment procedure is properly 
regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of 
the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and 
inexpensive determination of every action.’ ”  Id., quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. 
{¶ 23} We decline the opportunity to alter the summary judgment 
procedure in Ohio to require a moving party to bear the initial burden of 
addressing and negating the nonmoving party’s affirmative defenses.  Our holding 
today encourages the just and timely disposition of civil actions by requiring a 
nonmoving party to respond to a motion for summary judgment with evidence 
creating a genuine issue of material fact. 
{¶ 24} A plaintiff or counterclaimant moving for summary judgment does 
not bear the initial burden of addressing the nonmoving party’s affirmative 
defenses.  The trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of 
appellants was proper, and the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s 
decision. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would answer the certified question in the 
affirmative and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurring in judgment only. 
January Term, 2008 
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{¶ 25} I would strike reference to Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 
280, 662 N.E.2d 264, as singularly unhelpful to the determination of the instant 
matter.  In Dresher, a plurality of this court held that a moving party has the 
burden to identify those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of an 
issue of fact on a nonmoving party’s claim.  Id. at 292, 662 N.E.2d 264. The 
decision, limited in scope, does not lead to the conclusion that affirmative 
defenses need not be addressed by a plaintiff or counterclaimant filing a summary 
judgment motion. 
{¶ 26} The holding in this case adequately rests upon Civ.R. 56 alone, and 
on that basis, I concur. 
__________________ 
 
Matre & Matre Co., L.P.A., James A. Matre, and Kerrie K. Matre, for 
appellees. 
 
Leppla Associates, Gary J. Leppla, and Eric S. Thompson, for appellants. 
______________________