Case Title: Toledo v. Tellings

Citation: 2007-Ohio-3724

Docket Number: 20060690

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Toledo v. Tellings, 114 Ohio St.3d 278, 2007-Ohio-3724.] 
 
 
CITY OF TOLEDO, APPELLANT, v. TELLINGS, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Toledo v. Tellings, 114 Ohio St.3d 278, 2007-Ohio-3724.] 
Dogs – State of Ohio and city of Toledo have a legitimate interest in protecting 
citizens from the dangers associated with pit bulls — R.C. 955.22 and 
955.11(A)(4)(a)(iii) and Toledo Municipal Code 505.14 are rationally 
related to government’s interest and are constitutional. 
(No. 2006-0690 – Submitted April 4, 2007 – Decided August 1, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, 
No. L-04-1224, 2006-Ohio-975. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The state of Ohio and the city of Toledo have a legitimate interest in 
protecting citizens from the dangers associated with pit bulls, and 
R.C. 955.11(A)(4)(a)(iii) and 955.22 and Toledo Municipal Code 
505.14 are rationally related to that interest and are constitutional. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, the city of Toledo, appeals from the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals of Lucas County that held R.C. 955.11 and 955.22 and Toledo 
Municipal Code 505.14 unconstitutional.  For the following reasons, we reverse 
the judgment of the court of appeals. 
{¶ 2} Appellee, Paul Tellings, a resident of the city of Toledo, owned 
three dogs identified as pit bulls.  Tellings was charged by the city for violating 
Toledo Municipal Code 505.14(a) and R.C. 955.22.  The Toledo Municipal Code 
limits ownership of vicious dogs, as defined in R.C. 955.11, or dogs commonly 
known as pit bulls or pit bull mixed breeds, to one in each household, and the 
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Ohio Revised Code requires an owner of a pit bull to obtain liability insurance for 
damages, injuries, or death that might be caused by the dog. 
{¶ 3} Tellings challenged the constitutionality of Toledo Municipal Code 
505.14(a) and R.C. 955.22 and 955.11(A)(4)(a)(iii), which includes pit bull in the 
definition of “vicious dog.”  The trial court conducted a hearing on appellee’s 
motion, and several witnesses testified for both parties regarding the traits and 
characteristics of pit bulls.  The court found that as a breed, pit bulls are not more 
dangerous than other breeds but that the evidence supported the city’s claim that 
pit bulls present dangers in an urban setting. 
{¶ 4} The trial court found that property rights are subject to a 
government’s police powers.  The court stated: “The fact that such legislation may 
have an adverse effect on a segment of the dog population not presenting a danger 
to the public does not make the legislation overbroad.  Legislation will only be 
considered overbroad if it is applicable to conduct protecting a fundamental 
constitutional right * * * and this does not include the category of ownership of 
dogs.”  The court found that Tellings’s evidence did not prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Toledo Municipal Code 505.14 was unconstitutional.1   
{¶ 5} In a split decision, the court of appeals reversed the trial court, 
holding that R.C. 955.11 and 955.22 and Toledo Municipal Code 505.14 were 
unconstitutional.  Toledo v. Tellings, Lucas App. L-04-1224, 2006-Ohio-975.  The 
court of appeals held that the three laws violated the right to procedural due 
process, substantive due process, and equal protection, as guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 16, Article I 
of the Ohio Constitution, and were void for vagueness. 
                                                 
1.   The trial court found only Toledo Municipal Code 505.14 unconstitutional, which was the law 
specifically challenged in the caption of Tellings’s motion to dismiss, though he did argue the 
constitutionality of Toledo Municipal Code 505.14 and R.C. 955.11 and 955.22 in the action.  
When reviewing the decision of the trial court, the court of appeals reviewed the constitutionality 
of all three laws.   
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{¶ 6} First, relying on the rationale of State v. Cowan, 103 Ohio St.3d 
144, 2004-Ohio-4777, 814 N.E.2d 846, the court of appeals held that R.C. 955.11 
and 955.22 and Toledo Municipal Code 505.14 were unconstitutional because the 
three laws violated procedural due process.  In Cowan, we held that “R.C. 955.22 
violates the constitutional right to procedural due process insofar as it failed to 
provide dog owners a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the issue of whether 
a dog is ‘vicious’ or ‘dangerous’ as defined in R.C. 955.11(A)(1)(a) and 
(A)(4)(a).”  Id. at syllabus.  In this case, the court of appeals held that because 
Tellings did not “have an opportunity under [R.C. 955.22] to offer evidence that 
his pit bulls were not vicious in order to refute the charges,” Tellings, 2006-Ohio-
975, at ¶ 48, the laws were unconstitutional. 
{¶ 7} The court of appeals also held that the laws violated Tellings’s 
rights to equal protection and substantive due process because, once the trial court 
had determined that the American Pit Bull terrier was not inherently dangerous, 
the laws were not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.  The court of 
appeals stated that the evidence presented at the trial court had disproved the 
presumption that pit bulls are inherently dangerous. 
{¶ 8} Finally, the court of appeals held that the three laws were 
unconstitutional because they were void for vagueness.  The court of appeals 
stated that it was “troubled by the lack of an exact statutory definition of ‘pit 
bull’” and the “highly subjective nature of the identification process.”  Tellings, 
2006-Ohio-975, at ¶ 73. 
{¶ 9} We accepted discretionary review to consider the constitutionality 
of R.C. 955.11 and 955.22 and Toledo Municipal Code 505.14. 
{¶ 10} R.C. 955.11 states: 
{¶ 11} “(A) As used in this section:  
{¶ 12} “* * *  
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{¶ 13} “(4)(a) ‘Vicious dog’ means a dog that, without provocation and 
subject to division (A)(4)(b) of this section, meets any of the following: 
{¶ 14} “(i) Has killed or caused serious injury to any person; 
{¶ 15} “(ii) Has caused injury, other than killing or serious injury, to any 
person, or has killed another dog. 
{¶ 16} “(iii) Belongs to a breed that is commonly known as a pit bull dog. 
The ownership, keeping, or harboring of such a breed of dog shall be prima-facie 
evidence of the ownership, keeping, or harboring of a vicious dog.” 
{¶ 17} R.C. 955.22(A) states: 
{¶ 18} “As used in this section, ‘dangerous dog’ and ‘vicious dog’ have 
the same meanings as in section 955.11 of the Revised Code.” 
{¶ 19} Toledo Municipal Code 505.14(a) states:   
{¶ 20} “(a) No person or organization or corporation shall own, keep, 
harbor or provide sustenance for more than one vicious dog, as defined by Ohio 
R.C. 955.11, or a dog commonly known as a Pit Bull or Pit Bull mixed breed dog, 
regardless of age, in the City of Toledo, with the exception of puppies commonly 
known as Pit Bull or Pit Bull mixed breed for which the owner has filed an 
ownership acknowledgement form in person with the Dog Warden of Lucas 
County, prior to reaching seven (7) days of age. The ownership of these puppies 
must be transferred according to Ohio R.C. 955.11 before they are three (3) 
months of age.  Additionally, this section requires that all vicious dogs, as 
described in the Ohio Revised Code, or dogs commonly known as Pit Bull or Pit 
Bull mixed breed dogs are required, when off the owners' premises, to be securely 
confined as described in Ohio R.C. 955.22 and muzzled.” 
{¶ 21} Our resolution of the issue presented turns on whether the statutes 
and the ordinance in question are valid exercises of police power by the state and 
the city.  If R.C. 955.11 and 955.22 and Toledo Municipal Code 505.14 are 
rationally related to a legitimate interest of the state and the city in the public’s 
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health, safety, morals, or general welfare, they are constitutional.  See Benjamin v. 
Columbus (1957), 167 Ohio St. 103, 4 O.O.2d 113, 146 N.E.2d 854, at paragraph 
five of the syllabus. 
{¶ 22} We begin with the well-established legal principle that “ ‘[t]he 
legislature is the primary judge of the needs of public welfare, and this court will 
not nullify the decision of the legislature except in the case of a clear violation of a 
state or federal constitutional provision.  Williams v. Scudder (1921), 102 Ohio St. 
305, 131 N.E. 481, paragraphs three and four of the syllabus.’ ”  Beagle v. Walden 
(1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 59, 61, 676 N.E.2d 506, quoting Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. 
Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500, 515, 620 N.E.2d 809 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting). 
{¶ 23} The Ohio Constitution provides for the exercise of state and local 
police power in derogation of the right to hold private property.  Section 19, 
Article I of the Ohio Constitution states: “Private property shall ever be held 
inviolate, but subservient to the public welfare.” “As a result of this subordination, 
police power regulations are upheld although they may interfere with the 
enjoyment of liberty or the acquisition, possession and production of private 
property.”  State v. Anderson (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 168, 170, 566 N.E.2d 1224.  
Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution provides:  “Municipalities shall 
have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and 
enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, 
as are not in conflict with general laws.” 
{¶ 24} “Among the regulations which have been upheld as legitimate 
exercises of police power are those regulations addressing the ownership and 
control of dogs.”  Anderson, 57 Ohio St.3d at 170, 566 N.E.2d 1224.  Despite the 
special relationships that exist between many people and their dogs, dogs are 
personal property, and the state or the city has the right to control those that are a 
threat to the safety of the community:  “Although dogs are private property to a 
qualified extent, they are subject to the state police power, and ‘might be 
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destroyed or otherwise dealt with, as in the judgment of the legislature is 
necessary for the protection of its citizens.’ * * *  [L]egislatures have broad police 
power to regulate all dogs so as to protect the public against the nuisance posed by 
a vicious dog.”  Id., citing Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton RR. Co. (1897), 
166 U.S. 698, 17 S.Ct. 693, 41 L.Ed. 1169.   
{¶ 25} The state and the city have a legitimate interest in protecting 
citizens against unsafe conditions caused by pit bulls.  We note that substantial 
reputable evidence was presented at the trial court by both parties:  the parties 
produced 18 witnesses, dozens of exhibits were admitted into evidence, and more 
than 1,000 pages of testimony were taken.  The trial court found that there is little 
evidence that pit bulls are a dangerous breed when trained and adapted in a social 
situation and that there is no evidence that pit bulls bite more frequently than other 
breeds of dogs.  However, the trial court correctly noted that its finding that pit 
bulls are not inherently dangerous does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that 
the laws at issue are unconstitutional.  Rather, the evidence was evaluated to 
determine whether pit bulls were associated with problem circumstances. 
{¶ 26} The trial court cited the substantial evidence supporting its 
conclusion that pit bulls, compared to other breeds, cause a disproportionate 
amount of danger to people.  The chief dog warden of Lucas County testified that 
(1) when pit bulls attack, they are more likely to inflict severe damage to their 
victim than other breeds of dogs, (2) pit bulls have killed more Ohioans than any 
other breed of dog, (3) Toledo police officers fire their weapons in the line of duty 
at pit bulls more often than they fire weapons at people and all other breeds of 
dogs combined and (4) pit bulls are frequently shot during drug raids because pit 
bulls are encountered more frequently in drug raids than any other dog breed.  The 
trial court also found that pit bulls are “found largely in urban settings where there 
are crowded living conditions and a large number of children present,” which 
increases the risk of injury caused by pit bulls. 
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{¶ 27} The evidence presented in the trial court supports the conclusion 
that pit bulls pose a serious danger to the safety of citizens.  The state and the city 
have a legitimate interest in protecting citizens from the danger posed by this 
breed of domestic dogs. 
{¶ 28} The statutes and the city ordinance are rationally related to serve 
the legitimate interests of protecting Ohio and Toledo citizens.  R.C. 
955.11(A)(4)(a)(iii) states that “vicious dog” includes a dog that “[b]elongs to a 
breed that is commonly known as a pit bull dog” and that owning, keeping, or 
harboring a pit bull is prima facie evidence of owning, keeping, or harboring a 
vicious dog.  In view of the unique problems posed by pit bulls in this state, the 
General Assembly requires owners of pit bulls, like owners of vicious dogs, to 
meet certain statutory requirements.  In R.C. 955.22(E), all persons having vicious 
dogs are required to obtain liability insurance, and under R.C. 955.22(F), vicious 
dogs cannot be surgically silenced.  These requirements are rationally related to 
the state’s interest in protecting its citizens from pit bulls and in assuring those 
who are injured by a pit bull that they will be compensated for their injuries. 
{¶ 29} Toledo Municipal Code 505.14 limits ownership to one pit bull per 
person, organization, or corporation, and requires that pit bulls be muzzled when 
not on the owner’s premises.  The limitation and requirement are rationally related 
to the city’s interest in protecting its citizens from harm caused by pit bulls.  In 
addition to the evidence cited above, the chief dog warden testified that an 
encounter with two aggressive dogs is much worse than an encounter with one 
aggressive dog because dogs in a pack are more likely to have increased 
aggressive behavior and act on predatory instincts. 
{¶ 30} The court of appeals found R.C. 955.11 and 955.22 and Toledo 
Municipal Code 505.14 unconstitutional with respect to procedural due process, 
substantive due process, and equal protection, and under the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine.  We disagree. 
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{¶ 31} First, the court of appeals declared that the laws violated procedural 
due process pursuant to State v. Cowan, 103 Ohio St.3d 144, 2004-Ohio-4777, 
814 N.E.2d 846.  In Cowan, a Portage County deputy dog warden determined two 
dogs to be vicious following a complaint that the dogs had attacked a woman.  Id. 
at ¶ 1.  The dogs were determined to be vicious because of the alleged attack, not 
because they were pit bulls.  We held that when a dog is determined to be 
“vicious” under R.C. 955.11(A)(4)(a), procedural due process requires that the 
owner have notice and an opportunity to be heard before the owner is charged 
with a crime.  Id. at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 32} In Cowan, the dogs were determined to be vicious under the first 
two subsections of R.C. 955.11(A)(4)(a) because they had caused injury to a 
person.  Thus, the case concerned the dog warden’s unilateral classification of the 
dogs as vicious.  However, in this case, the “vicious dogs” at issue are those 
classified as pit bulls under the third subsection of R.C. 955.11(A)(4)(a).  Unlike 
the situation in Cowan, the General Assembly has classified pit bulls generally as 
vicious; there is no concern about unilateral administrative decision-making on a 
case-by-case basis.  The clear statutory language alerts all owners of pit bulls that 
failure to abide by the laws related to vicious dogs and pit bulls is a crime.  
Therefore, the laws do not violate the rights of pit bull owners to procedural due 
process. 
{¶ 33} Second, R.C. 955.11 and 955.22 and Toledo Municipal Code 
505.14 are not unconstitutional for violating substantive due process or equal 
protection rights.  Laws limiting rights, other than fundamental rights, are 
constitutional with respect to substantive due process and equal protection if the 
laws are rationally related to a legitimate goal of government.  See State v. 
Thompkins (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 558, 560-561, 664 N.E.2d 926.  As we 
discussed previously when evaluating whether the statutes and ordinance in 
question are valid exercises of state and city police power, R.C. 955.11 and 955.22 
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and Toledo Municipal Code 505.14 are rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest. 
{¶ 34} Finally, the court of appeals erred in holding that R.C. 955.11 and 
955.22 and Toledo Municipal Code 505.14 are void for vagueness.  This court has 
previously held that the term “pit bull” is not unconstitutionally void for 
vagueness.  In State v. Anderson, we stated:  “In sum, we believe that the physical 
and behavioral traits of pit bulls together with the commonly available knowledge 
of dog breeds typically acquired by potential dog owners or otherwise possessed 
by veterinarians or breeders are sufficient to inform a dog owner as to whether he 
owns a dog commonly known as a pit bull dog.”  57 Ohio St.3d 168, 173, 566 
N.E.2d 1224. 
{¶ 35} In conclusion, the state and the city of Toledo possess the 
constitutional authority to exercise police powers that are rationally related to a 
legitimate interest in public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.  Here, 
evidence proves that pit bulls cause more damage than other dogs when they 
attack, cause more fatalities in Ohio than other dogs, and cause Toledo police 
officers to fire their weapons more often than people or other breeds of dogs cause 
them to fire their weapons.  We hold that the state of Ohio and the city of Toledo 
have a legitimate interest in protecting citizens from the dangers associated with 
pit bulls, and that R.C. 955.11(A)(4)(a)(iii) and 955.22 and Toledo Municipal 
Code 505.14 are rationally related to that interest and are constitutional. 
{¶ 36} For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER and CUPP, JJ., 
concur. 
 
O’CONNOR, J., concurs in judgment only. 
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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O’CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 37} I concur in judgment only to emphasize my disapproval of R.C. 
955.11(A)(4)(a)(iii), which identifies pit bulls as vicious animals per se. 
{¶ 38} Breed-specific prohibitions, limitations, and restrictions are 
justified by labeling dogs as “inherently dangerous” by virtue of the particular 
breed’s alleged characteristics. Contrary to that assumption, dangerous animal 
behavior is the function of inherently dangerous dog owners, not inherently 
dangerous dogs. 
{¶ 39} The statistics offered at trial in this case may support a correlation 
between pit bulls and the frequency and severity of injuries they cause to people 
in urban settings, but they do not establish the conclusion that pit bulls must 
necessarily pose a danger.  Indeed, experts in the canine field who rate the 
temperament of different breeds of dogs conclude that pit bulls have a better 
temperament than many other common breeds of dogs used as pets, including the 
miniature poodle and Shih-Tzu.  See Karyn Grey, Breed-Specific Legislation 
Revisited:  Canine Racism or the Answer to Florida’s Dog Control Problems? 
(2003), 27 Nova L.Rev. 415, 436, and fns. 147 and 148. 
{¶ 40} A more thorough analysis of the dynamic would demonstrate that 
the danger posed is the result of some dog owners, including drug dealers, who 
deliberately increase the dog’s aggression and lethality through abuse or other 
specific methods of training.  Other owners simply fail to properly train and 
supervise the animal, thereby creating dangerous behavior by the dog. 
{¶ 41} Almost all domestic animals can cause significant injuries to 
humans, and it is proper to require that all domestic animals be maintained and 
controlled.  Laws to that effect are eminently reasonable for the safety of citizens 
and of the animal.  Because the danger posed by vicious dogs and pit bulls arises 
from the owner’s failure to safely control the animal, rational legislation should 
focus on the owner of the dog rather than the specific breed that is owned. 
January Term, 2007 
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__________________ 
 
John T. Madigan, Toledo Acting Law Director, Adam Loukx, General 
Counsel, and Joseph Howe and Daniel R. Pilrose Jr., Assistant Prosecuting 
Attorneys, for appellant. 
 
Rubin & Zyndorf Associates, P.C., and Sol Zyndorf, for appellee. 
 
Marc Dann, Attorney General, Elise W. Porter, Acting State Solicitor, 
Stephen P. Carney, Senior Deputy Solicitor, Robert J. Krummen, Deputy 
Solicitor, and Daniel W. Fausey and Todd Marti, Assistant State Solicitors, urging 
reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General. 
 
Robert J. Triozzi, Cleveland Law Director, and Victor R. Perez, Chief 
Prosecutor, urging reversal for amicus curiae city of Cleveland. 
 
Debora M. Bresch, urging affirmance for amicus curiae American Society 
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. 
 
Scott J. Saum and Carolyn Chan, urging affirmance for amicus curiae  
American Canine Foundation. 
______________________