Case Title: Doris Brownley v. Robert Doar

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-02-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 5  
Doris Brownley et al.,
            Appellants, 
        v. 
Robert Doar, &c., 
            Respondent, 
et al., 
            Defendants.
Scott A. Rosenberg, for appellants.
Oren Zeve, for respondent.
Community Service Society of New York et al., amici
curiae.
GRAFFEO, J.:
In New York, eligible individuals with dependent
children may receive public assistance for housing costs for up
to 60 months under the Family Assistance program (FA), which is
jointly funded by the state and federal governments.  Social
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Services Law § 350 specifies that aid provided under the FA
program must be "adequate" to provide the family with a home (see
Jiggetts v Grinker, 75 NY2d 411, 421 [1990]).  Upon the
expiration of the 60-month benefit period, a family may enroll in
the Safety Net Assistance program (SNA), which is funded solely
by the State, has no restriction on the period of eligibility and
does not limit benefits to persons with children.  The issue in
this case is whether the adequacy requirement of Social Services
Law § 350 applies to the SNA program.  We hold that it does not.
I
Before the 20th century, destitute individuals and
families often sought housing in institutional "almshouses." 
Eventually, societal views changed, prompting New York to adopt
the Child Welfare Act of 1915 (L 1915, ch 228).  It authorized
County Boards of Child Welfare to give monetary allowances to
widowed mothers with children under the age of 16 "in order that
such children may be suitably cared for in their homes" rather
than in institutional settings (Jiggetts v Grinker, 75 NY2d at
420).  In the midst of the Great Depression, this program was
expanded to extend housing assistance to eligible indigent
individuals and families with minor children (rather than only
widows) and was referred to as the "Home Relief" program (L 1929,
ch 565).  As before, its purpose was to allow impoverished
persons to remain in homes instead of institutional settings (see
L 1929, ch 565, § 77; Bond, Social Welfare Legislation, 1946
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Legis Ann at 284-287).
In 1935, Congress passed the Social Security Act and
established the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program as a joint federal-state system to provide support to
needy families.  Under the AFDC program, states determined the
level of public assistance needed by parents and their children,
and the federal government reimbursed 50% of those costs.  New
York enacted its companion Aid to Dependent Children (ADC)
program in compliance with AFDC, containing two main components 
-- (1) basic grants for food and other necessities, and       
(2) shelter grants.
In developing the ADC program in New York, the
Legislature specified the dollar amounts of monthly assistance
payable to recipients of basic grants, but directed that the
amount for shelter allowances be set administratively to reflect
local rent levels in the various regions of the State (Social
Services Law § 131-a [1]; 18 NYCRR 352.3).  The former Department
of Social Services therefore promulgated regulations that set
forth the maximum shelter allowances based on the district or
region where recipients lived.  Those assistance levels were
subject to the requirement in former Public Welfare Law § 181 (4)
that "[a]llowances shall be adequate to enable the mother or
relative to bring up the child or children properly, having
regard for the physical, mental and moral well-being of such
child or children" (L 1937, ch 15, at 26).  In addition to the
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creation of the ADC program, the Legislature continued Home
Relief as a separate program, which was not supported with
federal money.
In 1940, the Public Welfare Law was renamed as the
Social Welfare Law (L 1940, ch 619, § 2).  The language in former
Public Welfare Law § 181 (4) requiring that ADC allowances be
"adequate" was recodified in Social Welfare Law § 350 (1) (a) and
it has remained substantively unchanged through today (see Social
Services Law § 350 [1] [a]).
This Court considered claims asserting a right to
"adequate" ADC shelter allowances under Social Services Law § 350
in Jiggetts v Grinker (75 NY2d 411 [1990]).  The plaintiffs were
ADC recipients residing in New York City whose actual shelter
costs exceeded the maximum payable to them pursuant to 1988
schedules prepared by the New York Department of Social Services. 
Social Services Law § 350 (1) (a) provided that:
"Allowances shall be adequate to enable the
father, mother or other relative to bring up
the child properly, having regard for the
physical, mental and moral well-being of such
child, in accordance with the provisions of
section one hundred thirty-one-a of this
chapter and other applicable provisions of
law.  Allowances shall provide for the
support, maintenance and needs of one or both
parents if in need, and in the home."
Noting that New York "has a long history of protecting
children in the home" (75 NY2d at 420), we concluded that the
adequacy requirement of section 350 imposed a statutory duty on
the Commissioner of the New York Department of Social Services to
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1  After the trial, Supreme Court held that the State's 1988
shelter allowances were inadequate, created an interim relief
schedule and ordered the Commissioner to develop and submit a
proposed schedule of shelter allowances for New York City
participants in the AFDC program.  The Appellate Division
affirmed (see Jiggetts v Dowling, 261 AD2d 144 [1st Dept 1999])
and the State's motion for leave to appeal was dismissed (94 NY2d
796 [1999]).  
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establish ADC shelter allowances that bore a reasonable relation
to the cost of housing in New York City (see id. at 421).  To
achieve that objective, the case was remitted for a trial to
determine whether the ADC shelter allowances established by the
Department of Social Services were adequate to meet the housing
needs of poor families residing in New York City.1
During the course of the Jiggetts litigation, Congress
substantially reformed the federal-state AFDC program, enacting
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 (Pub L 104-193, 42 USC § 601 et seq., as added by 110
US Stat 2105 [1996]), which was intended to "promot[e] the
fundamental values of work, responsibility, and family" (Pub L
104-193, Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing
HR 3734, 32 Wkly Compilation Presidential Docs 1487 [Aug 26,
1996], reprinted in 1996 US Code Cong & Admin News, at 2891). 
This legislation replaced AFDC with a new program -- the
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program (42 USC §§
601 et seq.).  TANF restricted the receipt of public assistance
to a maximum of 60 months during a recipient's lifetime,
regardless of subsequent need (see 42 USC § 608 [a] [7] [A]).  
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The following year, New York complied with this
congressional mandate and substituted its ADC program with a
Family Assistance (FA) program for families with dependent minor
children (see L 1997, ch 436, pt B; Social Services Law §§ 343 et
seq.).  In furtherance of the State's policy aim of continuing
support to families and individuals after expiration of the
federal 60-month benefit period, the New York Legislature enacted
a separate and distinct, state-funded Safety Net Assistance (SNA)
program (see Social Services Law §§ 157 et seq.).  SNA replaced
the Home Relief component and was made available to all needy
individuals, not just families with children (see generally
Matter of Rodriguez v Wing, 94 NY2d 192, 195-196 [1999]).  Under
SNA, an individual or family may apply to a local public
assistance agency to receive continued benefits after FA
eligibility ends.  Pursuant to Social Services Law § 159 (1),
"[s]afety net assistance shall be provided in amounts determined
in accordance with article five and, where applicable, section
one hundred seventeen" of the Social Services Law.  As currently
set forth in regulations promulgated by defendant Commissioner of
the New York Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (OTDA)
(the successor agency to the Department of Social Service), the
amount of the shelter allowance established under SNA is
identical to the aid provided by the FA program (see 18 NYCRR
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2 In addition to a shelter allowance, SNA also includes a
basic grant, a home energy allowance, a supplemental home energy
allowance and a fuel allowance if heat is not included in rent
(see Temporary Assistance Source Book, at 2-4, http://
www.otda.state.ny.us/main/ta/TASB.pdf [New York State Office of
Temporary & Disability Assistance, Dec. 28, 2007, accessed Jan.
20, 2009]).
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352.3).2  Thus, when a person transitions from FA into SNA, the
level of shelter assistance does not change.
In 2002, State Supreme Court entered a judgment in the
Jiggetts litigation and the shelter allowance schedule for FA was
adjusted upward by the State in accordance with the court's
order.  After entry of the judgment, families that received
benefits under SNA moved to intervene in the Jiggetts action,
alleging that Social Services Law § 350 (1) required that SNA
shelter allowances be based on the same adequacy standard that
applies to FA benefits.  Supreme Court granted the motions to
intervene and permitted plaintiffs' landlords to join the action
as additional defendants.  The court concluded that families with
minor children were entitled to SNA shelter allowances at the
same level that corresponded to FA benefits (see Jiggetts v
Dowling, 196 Misc 2d 678 [Sup Ct, NY County, 2003]).  The court
therefore issued a preliminary injunction requiring the
Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services
to pay increased shelter allowances under the SNA program for New
York City housing. 
In separate litigation, the Appellate Division, Second
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Department, determined that recipients of SNA shelter allowances
did not have standing to challenge the adequacy of the housing
allowance schedules or the benefits they received (see McVay v
Wing, 303 AD2d 727 [2d Dept 2003], lv dismissed 100 NY2d 577
[2003]; Shubrick v Wing, 303 AD2d 744 [2d Dept 2003], lv
dismissed 100 NY2d 577 [2003]).  Two years later, the Appellate
Division, First Department, reversed Supreme Court's order in
Jiggetts, agreeing with the McVay court that intervention was
improper because the plaintiffs' benefits were provided by the
SNA program, whereas the plaintiffs in the Jiggetts action
received assistance under the AFDC/FA programs (see Jiggetts v
Dowling, 21 AD3d 178 [1st Dept 2005], lv dismissed 6 NY3d 807
[2006]).  The First Department suggested that plaintiffs raise
the issue regarding the applicability of the section 350 adequacy
requirement to the SNA program in their own lawsuit.  Hence, the
case now before us was commenced.
II
Plaintiffs Doris Brownley and Janee Nelson are
residents of New York City who have dependent children and
receive benefits from the SNA program.  They allege that the
payments they obtain from SNA are less than the amount of their
actual rents and that the stipends are inadequate to meet their
housing needs.  As a result, their landlords have commenced
nonpayment proceedings against them.  Plaintiffs brought this
action on behalf of themselves and all families with children in
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3 Although there is a supplemental housing allowance program
in New York City called the Family Eviction Prevention Supplement
(FEPS) that provides money in addition to SNA assistance,
plaintiffs are not eligible to participate in that program. 
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New York City who receive SNA benefits and who are threatened
with eviction because of the alleged inadequacy of SNA
allowances.3  They seek monetary and injunctive relief that would
prevent plaintiffs from being evicted from their homes. 
According to the complaint, current SNA shelter allowances
violate both section 350 of the Social Services Law and article
XVII of the State Constitution.
The Commissioner of OTDA moved to dismiss the statutory
cause of action, arguing that plaintiffs lacked standing to raise
the adequacy claim because section 350 is not pertinent to the
SNA program.  Supreme Court denied the motion and granted
plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction, concluding that
the adequacy requirement of section 350 applied to the SNA
benefits under Social Services Law § 159 because that statute
incorporates the provisions of article five of the Social
Services Law and section 350 is included in article five.  In
another case, the Second Department subsequently reaffirmed its
holding that only FA recipients, and not SNA enrollees, have
standing to challenge the adequacy of shelter allowances under
Social Services Law § 350 (see Hedgepeth v Wing, 29 AD3d 632 [2d
Dept 2006]), so Supreme Court dismissed this action.  The
Appellate Division affirmed, holding that section 350's adequacy
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requirement does not encompass the SNA program (44 AD3d 313
[2007]).  We granted leave to appeal (10 NY3d 848 [2008]) and now
agree with that conclusion.
III
Plaintiffs contend that the adequacy requirement
applies to the SNA program because Social Services Law § 159
provides that SNA benefits must be calculated in accordance with
the provisions of article five of the Social Services Law, of
which section 350 is a part.  In our view, this argument fails to
account for the fundamental differences between the FA and SNA
programs (see generally Matter of Robert J., 2 NY3d 339, 345
[2004]).  Family Assistance is part of the Aid to Dependent
Children program delineated in title 10 of article five of the
Social Services Law and is "the primary program in the State for
ensuring the welfare of needy children" (Jiggetts v Grinker, 75
NY2d at 420).  As the program's name emphasizes, the purpose of
ADC/FA is "to enable the father, mother or other relative" to
raise a needy "child properly, having regard for the physical,
mental and moral well-being of such child" (Social Services Law 
§ 350 [1] [a]).  In light of this focus on providing a sufficient
upbringing to children of impoverished individuals, we have
recognized that it was "reasonable" for the Legislature to codify
a heightened "adequacy" standard in section 350 in order to
promote "special protection to ensure the health and well-being
of children in a program that is dedicated to protecting the
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welfare of children deprived of parental support" (Jiggetts, 75
NY2d at 420).
In contrast, Safety Net Assistance appears in title
three of article five, entitled "Home Relief."  It places no
restriction on how long a person is eligible to receive SNA
benefits and applies more broadly as it "is not contingent upon
the presence of children in the household and it is not
specifically designed to deal with their needs" (id.). 
Consequently, we impliedly recognized in Jiggetts that the
"special protection" of section 350's adequacy requirement should
not apply outside the context of ADC/Family Assistance (id.). 
Indeed, neither section 159, nor any other provision in title
three of the Social Services Law, clearly indicates that the
Legislature intended to incorporate the adequacy requirement to
the SNA program.  Moreover, acceptance of plaintiffs' argument
would allow individuals with children in SNA to invoke the
adequacy standard but preclude persons without children from
doing so -- a conclusion that finds no support in the
construction of Social Services Law article five or its
legislative history.
This issue was addressed by the courts before the 1997
statutory amendments that created the FA and SNA programs.  Under
the preexisting legislative scheme, it had been determined that
section 350 did not apply to the Home Relief program (which was
the predecessor to SNA) (see Matter of Gautam v Perales, 179 AD2d
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509, 511 [1st Dept 1992], lv denied 80 NY2d 758 [1992]; Deleo v
Kaladjian, 215 AD2d 520, 521 [2d Dept 1995]).  Presumably, the
Legislature was aware of those interpretations of the Social
Services Law and could have adopted a provision parallel to
section 350 if it intended to transport the FA adequacy standard
into SNA when section 159 was amended in 1997 (see Matter of
Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc. v Greenburg, 70 NY2d 151, 157
[1987]).  Hence, the failure to include an adequacy requirement
in section 159 or a direct statutory reference to section 350
indicates that the Legislature did not impose that special
protection on the SNA program, which is the conclusion reached in
cases decided after the enactment of the 1997 amendments (see
McVay v Wing, 303 AD2d 727 [2d Dept 2003], lv dismissed 100 NY2d
577 [2003]; Shubrick v Wing, 303 AD2d 744 [2d Dept 2003], lv
dismissed 100 NY2d 577 [2003]; Hedgepeth v Wing, 29 AD3d 632  
[2d Dept 2006]; Brownley v Doar, 44 AD3d 313 [1st Dept 2007]).
Policy considerations also support the Commissioner's
determination that the section 350 adequacy standard is not a
component of SNA.  As previously noted, one of the primary
changes effected by the 1996 federal amendments that eliminated
the AFDC program and created the TANF program was the 60-month
restriction on the receipt of federal welfare assistance.  The
objective of this limitation was to provide a basic standard of
living for a finite time period to provide an incentive to
individuals to obtain an education or job training that would
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allow them to become gainfully employed and eliminate or reduce
their reliance on government assistance (see generally Pub L 104-
193, Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing HR
3734, 32 Wkly Compilation Presidential Docs 1487 [Aug. 26, 1996],
reprinted in 1996 US Code Cong & Admin News, at 2891).  If
plaintiffs here were to prevail, SNA payments would be subjected
to an adequacy standard without any temporal or monetary ceiling,
contrary to the federal purposes that TANF was intended to
promote (see Notice of Adoption of Rev 18 NYCRR parts 352 & 381,
effective Nov. 1, 2003, Rev Reg Impact Statement, at 8).
We are also mindful that New York decided that it is in
the State's best interest to support its needy residents after
federal public assistance benefits are discontinued and therefore
voluntarily undertook to supplement the TANF and FA programs with
Safety Net Assistance.  In order to provide SNA support to the
largest number of indigent individuals for the longest period of
time, the Legislature entrusted the Commissioner of ODTA with the
duty to promulgate schedules of SNA grants based on the funding
resources available to the agency, together with other relevant
considerations.  In reaching these determinations, it was the
burden of the legislative and executive branches of government to
weigh "the intractable economic, social and even philosophical
problems presented by public welfare assistance programs" (Matter
of Barie v Lavine, 40 NY2d 565, 569 [1976]).  We therefore hold
that the adequacy standard set forth in Social Services Law § 350
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is not a component of the SNA program.
IV
Plaintiffs alternatively maintain that article XVII of
the State Constitution mandates that their SNA allowances be
increased consistent with an adequacy requirement.  This
constitutional provision specifies that the "aid, care and
support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by
the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and
by such means, as the legislature may from time to time
determine" (NY Const, art XVII, § 1).  Article XVII "was intended
to serve two functions:  First, it was felt to be necessary to
sustain from constitutional attack the social welfare programs []
created by the State . . . and, second, it was intended as an
expression of the existence of a positive duty upon the State to
aid the needy" (Tucker v Toia, 43 NY2d 1, 7 [1977]).
Article XVII, however, was not intended to "mandate
that public assistance must be granted on an individual basis in
every instance" or "command[] that, in carrying out the
constitutional duty to provide aid, care and support of the
needy, the State must always meet in full measure all the
legitimate needs of each recipient" (Matter of Bernstein v Toia,
43 NY2d 437, 448-449 [1977]).  Thus, there is no right to a
constitutionally prescribed minimum shelter allowance since it is
the prerogative of the Legislature to "determine who is 'needy'
and allocate the public dollar accordingly" (Matter of Aliessa v
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Novello, 96 NY2d 418, 428 [2001]).  We have explained that if
"the over-all consequence of the method of distribution of aid to
the needy adopted initially by the Legislature, and subsequently
by the department charged with executing the social services
program, is reasonably expected to be in furtherance of the
optimum utilization of public assistance funds, there has been no
violation of the constitutional command" unless a group of needy
persons has been impermissibly excluded from eligibility for
benefits (Matter of Bernstein v Toia, 43 NY2d at 449).  No such
transgression has occurred here because plaintiffs have not
demonstrated that the Legislature acted unreasonably in designing
the SNA program or that the State has wrongfully excluded a class
of needy individuals from the program (compare Matter of Lee v
Smith, 43 NY2d 453 [1977]).  Plaintiffs therefore have not met
their burden of establishing that the SNA shelter allowances
violate article XVII of the State Constitution.  
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division,
insofar as appealed from, should be affirmed, without costs.
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Order, insofar as appealed from, affirmed, without costs. 
Opinion by Judge Graffeo.  Judges Ciparick, Read, Smith, Pigott
and Jones concur.  Chief Judge Lippman took no part.
Decided February 17, 2009