Case Title: State v. Smith

Citation: 131 Ariz. 29, 638 P.2d 696

Docket Number: 4021-2

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1981-12-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
131 Ariz. 29 (1981) 638 P.2d 696 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Joseph Clarence SMITH, Jr., Appellant. No. 4021-2. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. December 7, 1981. Rehearing Denied January 12, 1982. Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer, III, Crane McClennen, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Stephen M.R. Rempe, Phoenix, for appellant. STRUCKMEYER, Chief Justice. Joseph Clarence Smith, Jr. was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and received the death penalty. He appealed, and we affirmed his convictions but remanded for resentencing in light of our holding in State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 586 P.2d 1253 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 924, 99 S. Ct. 1254, 59 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1979). See State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 231, 243, 599 P.2d 187 (1979). After another aggravation/mitigation hearing, the death penalty was again imposed and this appeal followed. Affirmed. Appellant questions the constitutionality of Arizona's death penalty statute. He asserts that the death penalty statute was improperly modified by this Court in State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 586 P.2d 1253 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 924, 99 S. Ct. 1254, 59 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1979), and that the lower court's subsequent resentencing of him to death: (1) violated the double jeopardy *30 clause of the Fifth Amendment; (2) is illegal in light of Chapter 138, Laws of 1973 § 10; and (3) constitutes an ex post facto application of the law. All of these issues have been resolved adversely to appellant on numerous occasions. We find it unnecessary to reconsider them at this time. See State v. Greenawalt, 128 Ariz. 150, 174, 624 P.2d 828 (1981); State v. Mata, 125 Ariz. 233, 241, 609 P.2d 48, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 938, 101 S. Ct. 338, 66 L. Ed. 2d 161 (1980); State v. Arnett, 125 Ariz. 201, 202, 608 P.2d 778 (1980); State v. Jordan, 126 Ariz. 283, 286, 614 P.2d 825, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 986, 101 S. Ct. 408, 66 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1980); and State v. Watson, supra. No compelling reason has been advanced which would cause us to conclude that we erred in our prior decisions. Appellant also asserts that the imposition of the death penalty was improper because there was evidence sufficient to establish that his capacity "to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, [although] not so impaired as to constitute a defense to the prosecution." See A.R.S. § 13-454(F)(1), now A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1). At the first aggravation/mitigation hearing, appellant presented the testimony of Dr. Faye G. Goldberg and Dr. Jacob Hoogerbeets to establish the existence of the mitigating factor specified in A.R.S. § 13-454(F)(1). At the second aggravation/mitigation hearing, neither the State nor appellant produced additional evidence of the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Both relied upon the evidence introduced at the first hearing. The lower court again found that there was an absence of any mitigating circumstances which would justify a reduction from the death penalty. The court below found three of the aggravating circumstances set forth in A.R.S. § 13-454(E) (now § 13-703(F)) in the murder of Neva Lee, as follows: 2. The Defendant was previously convicted of felonies in the State of Arizona involving the use of violence on another person. *31 As to the murder of Sandy Spencer, the court found the aggravating circumstances set forth in A.R.S. § 13-454(E) (now A.R.S. § 13-703(F)) to be: The court also found there were no mitigating circumstances in both homicides. It explained that it was not relying on the testimony of the State's psychiatrist, Dr. Michael Cleary, but was basing its finding solely on the fact that the evidence presented by appellant did not establish the existence of impaired capacity: In appellant's first appeal we held that "there was sufficient evidence adduced through Dr. Cleary's testimony to support the trial court's determination that the defendant could appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts or could conform his conduct to the requirements of law." State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 231, 242-43, 599 P.2d 187 (1979). Appellant now argues that since this Court, in deciding his first appeal, relied upon Dr. Cleary's testimony to reject his argument that his capacity to conform to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, our conclusion must now be that the lower court erred in finding there was no mitigating circumstance requiring leniency. We disagree. At the outset, it should be pointed out, as we have so many times held, that in reviewing imposition of the death penalty we will conduct an independent examination of the record to determine whether the death penalty was properly imposed. See State v. Britson, 130 Ariz. 380, 636 P.2d 628 (1981). Dr. Jacob B. Hoogerbeets, a physician licensed in the State of Arizona, an associate professor of psychiatry at the University of Arizona Medical School, College of Medicine, and board certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, testified that appellant was able to assist *32 counsel and knew right from wrong. He also testified: Dr. Faye G. Goldberg has a Bachelor's Degree in Psychiatry from Temple University, a Master's Degree from Boston University, and a Doctorate from Harvard, and is currently on the faculty of the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Chicago. She examined appellant ten days before and in response to questioning answered: Dr. Goldberg classified the appellant as a sadistic sexual slayer, stating: She stated that her psychological testwork supported the "possibility" that appellant "is a psychotic personality", "the kind of personality that fluctuates between good reality testing and very poor ego control which results in the explosive kind of episodes." Her answers to questions on cross-examination, among others included the following: Dr. Goldberg further testified: It is apparent that Dr. Hoogerbeets classified appellant more or less as a borderline psychotic person, an emotionally disturbed individual, which drives him to compulsory aberrant actions, and Dr. Goldberg's views were that appellant fitted the profile of a sadistic sexual slayer, that he knew he was doing wrong but that Smith was in a compulsory manner driven to commit a series of acts. We could conclude, if we were compelled to believe the appellant's witnesses, that we would have to say his capacity was sufficiently impaired that he could not conform his conduct to the requirements of law. We are not, however, compelled to do so since the credibility of the expert witnesses is for the trier of fact. State v. Moore, 111 Ariz. 496, 497, 533 P.2d 663 (1975). In conducting our independent examination of the evidence to determine whether the death sentence should have been imposed, we adhere to the same rule. In contrast to the indefinite language of Dr. Hoogerbeets and Dr. Goldberg, extractions from the testimony of Dr. Michael Cleary, a physician certified as a specialist in psychiatry, establishes his unequivocal belief in the appellant's mental stability: We think the lucid, positive testimony of Dr. Cleary plainly outweighs the inexplicit and often equivocal testimony of the appellant's witnesses. We therefore hold that the psychiatric testimony does not convincingly establish that appellant's capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired. We have considered the decision in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 1866, 1870-77, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1981), and find that it has no application to this case. There, without notice to defense counsel, the trial judge ordered a psychiatric examination to determine the defendant's competency to stand trial. During the sentencing phase, the examining psychiatrist testified that the defendant showed no regard for another person's life or property and that he showed no remorse for his crime. The jury found in favor of the death penalty. The United States Supreme Court held that there was a privilege against self-incrimination which applied at the sentencing phase. The Court stated that the availability of the Fifth Amendment privilege turns upon the exposure which it invites, which in that case, because of the potential consequences of the defendant's statements, was the death penalty. Consequently, the state was obliged to observe all constitutional guarantees. That is not the situation here. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 463, 101 S. Ct. at 1873, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359. Prior to the first trial on February 16, 1977, appellant's counsel petitioned the court to appoint two or three impartial medical experts to examine appellant as to his present mental condition, his attorneys then being of the view that appellant was unable to understand the proceedings against him or assist in his defense. Additionally, appellant's attorneys requested the court pursuant to Rule 11.2, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., to appoint an impartial expert to investigate and report on the appellant's mental condition at the time of the alleged offenses. In response to this petition for examination, the court on February 25, 1977 appointed Drs. Michael F. Cleary, Jacob Hoogerbeets and Leonardo Garcia-Bunuel to serve as mental health experts in appellant's case, to examine the mental condition of appellant, report their opinion of the appellant's competency to stand trial, and to further report their opinion as to "[t]he probable mental condition of the defendant at the time he committed the offense." Since the appellant was examined at his own request, the exposure which was invited was a clear waiver of constitutional guarantees. Nor do we find that the psychiatric testimony offered by appellant constitutes a mitigating factor other than those set forth *35 in A.R.S. § 13-454(F) (now A.R.S. § 13-703(G)). He does not contend that he is suffering from a character disorder, such as sociopathy or psychopathy, which prior to our decision in State v. Watson, supra, was not recognized as a mitigating factor. Compare State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 197, 560 P.2d 41 (1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915, 97 S. Ct. 2988, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1101 (1977), with State v. Vickers, 129 Ariz. 506, 633 P.2d 315, 325 (1981). Instead, appellant attempts to establish that he was a borderline psychotic and that his capacity to control his conduct was significantly impaired. As such, our finding on appeal is not that appellant's mental impairment does not constitute a mitigating factor, but that appellant has failed to establish the existence of any mental impairment at all. Since several aggravating factors have been found to be present and no mitigating circumstances sufficient to overcome the aggravating factors, the imposition of the death penalty is proper. Judgment affirmed. HOLOHAN, V.C.J., and HAYS, CAMERON and GORDON, JJ., concur.