Case Title: Graham v. Fenno

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1987-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Graham v. Fenno1987 WY 36734 P.2d 983Case Number: 86-308Decided: 04/01/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
Sandra 
J. GRAHAM, f/k/a Sandra Fenno, Appellant (Plaintiff)

 
 
v.

 
 
Thomas 
J. FENNO, Appellee (Defendant)

 
 
John W. 
Davis of Davis, Donnell, Worrall & Bancroft, P.C., for 
Appellant.

 
 
No 
appearance by Appellee. 

 
 
Brown, 
C.J., and Thomas, Cardine, Urbigkit, and Macy, JJ. 

 
 
URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This appeal involves a 
contempt proceeding for nonpayment of child support. The district court which 
granted the parties a divorce in 1971 dismissed this claim for the delinquent 
support payments because it found lack of in personam jurisdiction over the 
defendant.

 
 

[¶2.]     We will 
reverse.

 
 

[¶3.]     The parties, Sandra J. 
Graham (formerly Sandra J. Fenno) and Thomas J. Fenno, were divorced in 
Hot SpringsCounty, Fifth Judicial 
District Court, on November 3, 1971. In that action, Mr. Fenno was personally 
served, accepted service of process, and entered his appearance. He consented to 
the court's jurisdiction and waived notice of the time and place of a 
hearing.

 
 

[¶4.]     The parties entered 
into, and both signed, a stipulation and agreement which was approved and 
confirmed by the trial court's subsequent findings of fact, conclusions of law 
anddecree of divorce. Conforming to the parties' agreement, the decree provided 
in relevant part that Mr. Fenno was required to pay $125.00 per month for each 
of the parties' three children, "until said child for whom said payment is made 
becomes self-supporting, marries, dies or attains the age of twenty-one (21) 
years, whichever first occurs."

 
 

[¶5.]     On April 16, 1986, 
Sandra Graham petitioned the district court for Hot SpringsCounty, Third Judicial District, for an 
order to show cause why Thomas Fenno should not be held in contempt for failure 
to make child-support payments in the amount of $3,750 in violation of the 
court's decree of divorce entered November 3, 1971. The following day, the court 
issued an order to show cause why Mr. Fenno should not be held in contempt for 
failing to make child-support payments as previously ordered by the court. The 
order was served individually on Mr. Fenno in Fort Collins, Colorado by a Larimer County, Colorado 
sheriff's deputy.

 
 

[¶6.]     Mr. Fenno filed a 
motion to dismiss the court's order, claiming lack of jurisdiction over the 
subject matter, lack of jurisdiction over the person, improper venue, 
insufficiency of process, and insufficiency of service of process. The trial 
court held a hearing on the motion, determined that it lacked in personam 
jurisdiction over Mr. Fenno, and dismissed the plaintiff's petition and the 
court's order to show cause.

 
 

[¶7.]     The only issue 
presented by this appeal is whether the district court has in personam 
jurisdiction over Mr. Fenno to decide on the merits whether Mr. Fenno was in 
contempt of court for failing to comply with the court's 1971 divorce decree. We 
hold that the district court has in personam jurisdiction.

 
 

[¶8.]     At the motion hearing, 
counsel for Mr. Fenno argued that under International Shoe Co. v. State of 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 
90 L. Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057 (1945), and Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 98 S. Ct. 1690, 56 L. Ed. 2d 132, reh. 
denied 438 U.S. 908, 98 S. Ct. 3127, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1150 (1978), minimum contacts with the forum state must be established 
and maintained in order for that state to have in personam jurisdiction. The 
federal law pertaining to appellee's position provides:

 
 
"It has 
long been the rule that a valid judgment imposing a personal obligation or duty 
in favor of the plaintiff may be entered only by a court having jurisdictionover 
the person of the defendant. Pennoyer v. 
Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-733, [24 L. Ed. 565] (1878); 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 
U.S., at 316. The existence of 
personal jurisdiction, in turn, depends upon the presence of reasonable notice 
to the defendant that an action has been brought, [citation] and a sufficient 
connection between the defendant and the forumState to make it fair to require defense 
of the action in the forum. * * * *

 
 
"* * * * 
The constitutional standard for determining whether the State may enter a 
binding judgment against appellant * * * * is that set forth in this Court's 
opinion in International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, supra; that a defendant 
'have certain minimum contacts with [the forum State] such that the maintenance 
of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice."' 326 U.S., at 316, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 
[311 U.S. 457,] [85 L. Ed. 278, 61 S. Ct. 339, 132 A.L.R. 1357 (1940)]." Kulko v. 
California Superior Court, 436 U.S.  at 
91-92.

 
 

[¶9.]     The intent of the 
Wyoming legislature is demonstrated by its 
adoption of the California rule, Ch. 178, S.L. of Wyoming 
1977:

 
 
"(a) A 
Wyoming court may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the 
Wyoming or 
United States Constitution.

"(b) 
When the exercise of personal jurisdiction is authorized by this section, 
service may be made outside this state and proved according to the Wyoming Rules 
of Civil Procedure or any order of the court." Section 5-1-107, W.S.1977.

 
 

[¶10.]  Appellee's position is not supported by 
any reliance on federal or state case law.1 If this contempt proceeding were an 
original action, minimum-contact precedent might be applicable. However, because 
the order to show cause stems from a motion in an earlier proceeding, the 
jurisdictional principles enunciated in International Shoe Co. v. State of 
Washington, supra, do not apply. 
They apply only to the district court's jurisdiction in the original divorce 
proceeding. It is not necessary to review that original jurisdiction because Mr. 
Fenno conceded jurisdiction at that time, and does not now assert that the 
district court was without jurisdiction to enter the 1971 divorce 
decree.

 
 

[¶11.]  In Erb v. 
Erb, Wyo., 
573 P.2d 849 (1978), this court discussed the jurisdictional 
status of a contempt action to enforce a support 
obligation:

 
 
"Mrs. 
Moore's motion was filed in the original divorce proceeding, consistent with the 
usual procedure in such cases and it can hardly be said that it was the 
institution of an action. * * * * In Strahan v. 
Strahan, Wyo., 400 P.2d 542 (1965), 
which grew out of a request for citation of a husband for contempt for 
nonpayment of support, the power of the court to consider such matters is 
referred to as a 'continuing jurisdiction.'" 573 P.2d  
at 851.

 
 
We also 
stated:

 
 
"'An 
application to enforce the provisions of a decree in an action for a divorce 
concerning the support of a child is a supplementary proceeding incidental to 
the original suit. The court has a continuing jurisdiction in this respect. * * 
* * A wide variety of remedies is available to a mother to enforce a decree for 
child support. The most common method of enforcement is a contempt proceeding. * 
* * *" 573 P.2d  at 851, quoting 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation § 862, p. 
981.

 
 

[¶12.]  This case really involves the district 
court's power to enforce, byits contempt powers, a decree entered upon proper 
jurisdiction. The law regarding the court's power in this context is 
clear.

 
 

[¶13.]  Initially, we note that a contempt action 
for failure to make support payments pursuant to a divorce decree is an 
appropriate remedy. Hepp v. Hepp, Wyo., 420 P.2d 118 (1966); Erb v. Erb, 
supra; Strahan v. Strahan, Wyo., 
400 P.2d 542 (1965). In its order of dismissal, the trial 
court found that the plaintiff could pursue a proper remedy through the Revised 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), §§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138, W.S.1977. We point 
out, however, that § 20-4-103 states that "the remedies herein provided are in 
addition to and not in substitution for any other remedies." Thus, Wyoming's adoption of 
URESA does not abrogate the plaintiff's right to petition for enforcement or the 
district court's authority to enforce its support orders by using its contempt 
power.

 
 

[¶14.]  It is well-settled law that once a court 
obtains proper jurisdiction, that court retains jurisdiction to modify or 
enforce support obligations provided for in the decree. Strahan v. Strahan, 
supra, 400 P.2d  at 543; Erb v. 
Erb, supra, 573 P.2d  at 851. Mr. 
Fenno cannot call into question the court's in personam jurisdiction, once 
obtained, merely by leaving the jurisdiction. Once jurisdiction attaches, the 
district court's power over his person continues until all matters arising out 
of that litigation are resolved, and jurisdiction is not lost by removal of the 
defendant from the state. Brown v. 
Brown, 183 Colo. 356, 516 P.2d 1129, 1131 (1973); Roberts v. Roberts, 
300 Ky. 454, 189 S.W.2d 691 (1945); 
Brewster v. Brewster, 207 Md. 193, 114 A.2d 53, 56 (1955); 
Genda v. Genda, 11 Ariz.App. 110, 462 P.2d 407 (1969); Karpf v. Karpf, 260 
A.D. 701, 23 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1940).

 
 

[¶15.]  The district court's finding that it 
lacked in personam jurisdiction over Mr. Fenno was 
erroneous.

 
 

[¶16.]  Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1No appellee's brief was filed in this 
court.