Case Title: Menasha Corp. v. Crawford

Citation: 

Docket Number: S47076

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2001-08-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed: August 16, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of the Compensation of
Garrett W. Crawford, Claimant.
MENASHA CORPORATION
and LUMBERMANS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY,
	Respondents on Review,
		v.
GARRETT W. CRAWFORD,
	Petitioner on Review.
(WCB 98-03327; CA A105040; SC S47076)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted November 8, 2000.
	Mike Stebbins, of Stebbins & Coffey, North Bend, argued the
cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.
	Jerald P. Keene, of Reinisch, Mackenzie, Healey, Wilson &
Clark, P.C., Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for
respondents on review.
	David L. Runner, Lead Appellate Counsel, Salem, filed the
brief for amici curiae SAIF Corporation, Pape Group, Inc., and
Timber Products Company.
	G. Duff Bloom, of Cole, Cary, Wing & Bloom, P.C., Eugene,
filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers
Association.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs, Justices.**
	GILLETTE, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The order
of the Workers' Compensation Board is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the Workers' Compensation Board for further
proceedings.
	*Judicial review from the Workers' Compensation Board. 164 Or App 174, 988 P2d 451 (1999).
    **Van Hoomissen, J., retired on December 30, 2000, and did
not participate in the decision of this case; Kulongoski, J.,
resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision
of this case; De Muniz, J., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
	GILLETTE, J.
	The issue in this workers' compensation case is whether
claimant is entitled to receive nearly two years' worth of
temporary total disability (TTD) benefits, based on a physician's
after-the-fact certification that claimant had been disabled for
that period.  An administrative law judge (ALJ) and the Workers'
Compensation Board (Board) held that claimant was entitled to
temporary compensation for the period in question.  The Court of
Appeals reversed.  Menasha Corp. v. Crawford, 164 Or App 174, 988
P2d 451 (1999).  We allowed claimant's petition for review and
now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
	The facts are undisputed.  On October 11, 1995,
claimant reported to his employer that he had suffered an injury
to his lower back.  The next day, claimant saw Dr. Davis, who
confirmed the back injury and released claimant to light work. 
Eight days later, Davis released claimant to regular work.  In
the meantime, employer fired claimant.  On October 27, 1995,
employer's insurer denied claimant's claim for compensation. 
	Claimant appealed the denial of his claim.  On January
16, 1997, an ALJ reversed the denial.  On July 15, 1997, the
Board affirmed the ALJ's decision.  Neither employer nor
employer's insurer (collectively "employer") sought further
review, and the merits of that adjudication are not before us. 
As the case comes to us, claimant is a worker who has had a valid
claim for an on-the-job injury to his back, which claim was in
accepted status after July 15, 1997.
	Claimant was referred to and began treating with
another physician, Dr. Bert, on December 13, 1995.  On September
30, 1997, Bert performed surgery on claimant's back.  On December
1, 1997, after an inquiry by claimant's lawyer, Bert certified
retroactively that claimant had been unable to work for the
period from October 20, 1995 (the date that Davis released
claimant for regular work), until September 30, 1997 (the date of
surgery).
	On January 27, 1998, Bert released claimant for light
work.  On February 4, 1998, two physicians retained by employer
concluded that claimant's back condition was "medically
stationary." (1)  Bert concurred.
	On March 9, 1998, employer's insurer closed the claim
and awarded TTD benefits from September 30, 1997 (the date of
surgery), until February 4, 1998 (the date on which claimant was
determined to be medically stationary).  A later modification
added the period from October 12, 1995 (the date of injury),
until October 20, 1995 (the date that Davis released claimant for
regular work).  Claimant was not awarded benefits for the nearly
two-year gap between October 20, 1995, and September 30, 1997.  
	Claimant challenged the award, seeking compensation for
the period from October 20, 1995, until September 30, 1997.  An
ALJ concluded that, although ORS 656.262(4)(g) (2) restricts
retroactive awards of TTD during the period of time in which the
claim is open, a TTD award for the period from October 20, 1995,
until September 30, 1997, nonetheless was appropriate.  The ALJ
explained:
		"The payment of temporary disability 'pursuant to
ORS 656.268,'" as provided in [former] ORS
656.262(4)(f) [1995], concerns the payment of temporary
disability during the carrier's processing of open
claims to closure.  Thus, ORS 262.268 refers to
procedural temporary disability benefits which may
accrue prior to claim closure.  ORS 656.268 does not
set forth the requirements for substantive entitlement
to temporary disability; those requirements are set
forth in ORS 656.210 and 656.212.  Kenneth P. Bundy, 48
Van Natta 2501, 2503 (1996).
		"Here, inasmuch as claimant's claim has been
closed, the issue is claimant's substantive right to
temporary disability benefits.  A claimant's
substantive entitlement to temporary disability
benefits, which is set forth in ORS 656.210 and
656.212, is determined on claim closure and is proven
by a preponderance of the evidence in the entire record
showing that the claimant was disabled due to the
compensable injury before being declared medically
stationary.  * * *  Neither ORS 656.210 nor ORS 656.212
contains any language which limits a worker's
substantive entitlement to temporary disability to only
those periods for which there is contemporaneous
authorization by the attending physician.  Bundy,
supra.  Therefore, claimant need not show
contemporaneous authorization of time loss to be
entitled to those substantive benefits."[ (3)]
(Citations omitted; emphasis in original.)
		As noted, the ALJ relied on the Board's earlier
decision in Bundy.  In that decision, the Board had held that ORS
656.262(4)(g) applies only to "procedural" obligations.  That was
true, the Board stated, for two reasons:  First, the verbs in ORS
656.262(4)(g) are in the present tense, implying that the statute
applies only when the claim is open.  Second, when the
legislature added what is now ORS 656.262(4)(g), it did not
revise ORS 656.210 and ORS 656.212, the statutes that authorize
TTD and temporary partial disability compensation (TPD),
respectively.  Neither of those statutes specifically limits TPD
and TTD only to those periods for which a physician has issued a
contemporaneous authorization.  As a result, the Board held in
Bundy that ORS 656.262(4)(g) does not apply to a claim at
closure.  48 Van Natta 2501, 2503 (1996).  
		On review in the present case, the Board affirmed,
again asserting (as it had in Bundy) that a claimant's
"substantive" entitlement to temporary disability benefits is
determined when the claim is closed.  Citing its earlier decision
in Bundy, the Board concluded that a worker substantively is
entitled to temporary disability benefits for those periods
during which the worker is able to prove that he or she was
unable to work as a result of a compensable injury and that
substantive entitlement to such benefits is not contingent on
contemporaneous authorization of time loss by the attending
physician.  Garret W. Crawford, 51 Van Natta 1 (1999).  One
member of the Board concurred specially, opining that the
substantive/procedural distinction on which Bundy depended was
eliminated when the legislature enacted former ORS 656.262(4)(f)
(1995) and former ORS 656.268(3)(d) (1995), (4) and that the statute
required a physician to authorize any award of temporary
disability.  The member declined to dissent, however, because the
Board's decision in Bundy still was the law.  Id. at 2.
		Shortly after the Board issued its Crawford decision,
the Court of Appeals, in an en banc decision, reversed Bundy. 
Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Bundy, 159 Or App 44, 978 P2d 385 (1999). (5) 
In Bundy, the Court of Appeals described the issue as "whether
ORS 656.262(4)(g) applies to only procedural obligations to pay
temporary disability while a claim is open, or whether it also
applies to the substantive entitlement to benefits at claim
closure."  159 Or App at 49.
		We examine the Court of Appeals' decision in Bundy at
length, because it squarely presents the legal issue that we
address in the present case.  A majority of the full Court of
Appeals concluded that ORS 656.262(4)(g) does not permit a
physician to make an award of temporary compensation retroactive
for more than 14 days.  The majority rejected the Board's
conclusion that ORS 656.262(4)(g) applies only to pending
"procedural" claims:  "On its face, ORS 656.262(4)(g) is not
limited to benefits that are due and payable during the time that
the claim is open."  Bundy, 159 Or App at 50.  In the majority's
view, the fact that "the verbs in the statute are in the present
tense does not negate the possibility that the statute also
applies to awards of time loss [i.e., temporary disability] made
at claim closure."  Id. (footnote omitted).  In addition, "the
reference to ORS 656.268 in both sentences [of ORS 656.262(4)(g)]
is a reference to a statute that addresses the process of claim
closure."  Id.  The Court of Appeals majority ultimately
concluded that ORS 656.262(4)(g) is ambiguous and proceeded to
examine the legislative history of the statute.  See PGE v.
Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143
(1993) (establishing that paradigm of statutory interpretation). 
From that review, the majority concluded that ORS 656.262(4)(g)
prevents a physician from authorizing retroactive benefits more
than 14 days into the past.  159 Or App at 50-54.
		Judge Wollheim, joined by Judges De Muniz and
Armstrong, dissented.  The dissent noted that the
substantive/procedural distinction on which the Board relied was
not found in the workers' compensation statute but, rather,
existed in the Court of Appeals' case law.  Specifically, the
dissent argued that
	"[s]ubstantive time loss is the temporary total
disability award, which the injured worker is entitled
to receive at the time of closure by virtue of proof
that the injured worker experienced a period of
temporary total disability before claim closure."
159 Or App at 55 (Wollheim, J., dissenting).  Conversely,
	"[a]n injured worker's procedural entitlement to time
loss is the temporary total disability benefits that
the employer or insurer is obligated to pay on an open
claim by virtue of the procedures of claim processing
before the injured worker becomes medically
stationary."
Id. 
		The dissent in Bundy maintained that ORS 656.262(4)(g)
concerns only open claims and procedural benefits, i.e., "when
payment must be made, when payment is not due and payable, and
when payment may be unilaterally suspended."  Bundy, 159 Or App
at 57 (Wollheim, J., dissenting).  The dissent then asserted that
ORS 656.268, which is cross-referenced in ORS 656.262(4)(g), is a
procedural statute that describes the process for awarding
temporary benefits on a claim at the time of closure.  Id. at 57-58.  According to the dissent:
		"The first sentence of [ORS 656.262](4)(g) is
expressly limited to temporary disability benefits not
due and payable 'pursuant to ORS 656.268.'  That
statute is only a procedural statute.  Because
temporary disability benefits suspended under the first
sentence of subsection (4)(g) are, by definition, being
paid pursuant to ORS 656.268, this sentence is limited
to the procedural entitlement to temporary disability
benefits.  The second sentence of subsection (4)(g)
expressly refers to an attending physicians's
authorization of temporary disability benefits 'under
ORS 656.268.'  The explicit reference to ORS 656.268
limits the application of this sentence of (4)(g) to
the procedural entitlement of temporary benefits while
the claim is open.  * * *  Thus, like the first
sentence, the second sentence of subsection (4)(g) is
also limited to the procedural entitlement to temporary
disability benefits."
Id. at 60-61 (citation omitted; emphasis in original).  The
dissent concluded, without reaching the legislative history, that
ORS 656.262(4)(g) does not establish any temporal limit on the
temporary compensation that might be paid when a claim is closed. 
Id. at 56-63.
	On employer's petition for judicial review in the
present case, the Court of Appeals reversed the Board's decision
and remanded for reconsideration in light of Bundy.  Menasha
Corp. v. Crawford, 164 Or App 174, 988 P2d 451 (1999).  We
allowed claimant's petition for review.
	The issue before us turns on the meaning of ORS
656.262(4)(g) and is a question of the legislature's intent.  As
did the Court of Appeals, we examine the text and context of the
statute to determine that intent.  PGE, 317 Or at 610.  If the
legislature's intent is clear from the text and context, further
inquiry is unnecessary.  Id. at 611.  For convenience, we again
set out ORS 656.262(4)(g):
		"Temporary disability compensation is not due and
payable pursuant to ORS 656.268 after the worker's
attending physician ceases to authorize temporary
disability or for any period of time not authorized by
the attending physician.  No authorization of temporary
disability compensation by the attending physician
under ORS 656.268 shall be effective to retroactively
authorize the payment of temporary disability more than
14 days prior to its issuance."
		The authorization of the attending physician triggers
the duty to pay temporary disability benefits.  Subsection (4)(a)
of ORS 656.262, provides:
		"The first installment of temporary disability
compensation shall be paid no later than the 14th day
after the subject employer has notice or knowledge of
the claim, if the attending physician authorizes the
payment of temporary disability compensation."     
(Emphasis added.)  Subsection (4)(d) of the same statute
provides:
		"Temporary disability compensation is not due and
payable for any period of time for which the insurer or
self-insured employer has requested from the worker's
attending physician verification of the worker's
inability to work resulting from the claimed injury or
disease and the physician cannot verify the worker's
inability to work, unless the worker has been unable to
receive treatment for reasons beyond the worker's
control."
		Viewed in light of subsections (4)(a) and (4)(d), the
first sentence of subsection (4)(g) is clear.  It describes two
additional sets of circumstances in which temporary disability
compensation is not due and payable:  (1) after the claimant's
attending physician ceases to authorize such compensation; and
(2) for any other period of time "not authorized by the attending
physician." 
		The first sentence leaves open this question:  Should a
worker receive TTD when an attending physician belatedly
concludes that the worker is temporarily totally disabled?  The
second sentence of subsection (4)(g) answers that question:  The
attending physician's authorization of temporary total disability
payments can be retroactive for up to 14 days -- but no more.
		The foregoing statutes state the positive law basis for
awarding TTD.  TTD benefits are not due and payable if the claim
does not meet the qualifying statutory criteria.
		ORS 656.268, the statute twice cross-referenced in ORS
656.262(4)(g), sets out the procedures for terminating TTD
benefits.  That statute provides, in part:
		"(4) Temporary total disability benefits shall
continue until whichever of the following events first
occurs:
		"(a) The worker returns to regular or modified
employment;
		"(b) The attending physician advises the worker
and documents in writing that the worker is released to
return to regular employment;
		"(c) The attending physician advises the worker
and documents in writing that the worker is released to
return to modified employment, such employment is
offered in writing to the worker and the worker fails
to begin such employment; or
		"(d) Any other event that causes temporary
disability benefits to be lawfully suspended, withheld
or terminated under ORS 656.262(4) or other provisions
of this chapter."
		As did the dissent in Bundy, claimant here argues that
the text of ORS 656.262(4)(g) applies only to open claims, not to
circumstances in which a claim is being closed and an award is
being finalized.  As our examination of that statute in context
demonstrates, however, the text and context of ORS 656.262(4)(g)
do not permit such an interpretation:  Neither ORS 656.262(4)(g)
nor any other statute that provides context for ORS 656.262(4)(g)
makes a distinction between a pending claim and a claim at the
time of closing respecting retroactive compensation. (6)
		The workers' compensation statutes provide for TTD in
ORS 656.210 (7) and for TPD in ORS 656.212. (8)  To be payable, such
compensation must have both a physician's initial and continuing
authorization.  "The first installment of temporary disability
compensation shall be paid * * * if the attending physician (9)
authorizes the payment of temporary disability compensation." 
ORS 656.262(4)(a).  An attending physician may authorize payment
of disability benefits and payment may continue only for the
period of time authorized by those sections.  ORS 656.262(4)(h). 
An employer may suspend payment of TTD or TPD at the end of the
period until the attending physician reauthorizes the temporary
disability.  ORS 656.262(4)(h).  Such compensation is not due and
payable for any period for which the attending physician cannot
verify the worker's inability to work, if the insurer or self-insured employer has requested verification of that inability. 
ORS 656.262(4)(d).  Further, if the insurer or self-insured
employer has requested, but has not received, some form of
verification from the attending physician, that physician's
services are not compensable until the physician submits such
verification.  ORS 656.262(4)(f).  
		ORS 656.262(4)(g) applies in conjunction with ORS
656.268, the statute that determines a claimant's entitlement to
claim closure as well as the claimant's entitlement to TTD. 
Consistent with the first sentence of ORS 656.262(4)(g), ORS
656.268 provides that TTD continues until the attending physician
advises the claimant and documents in writing that the claimant
is released to return to regular employment.  ORS 656.268(4)(b). 
In addition, that same subsection provides that TTD shall
continue until "[a]ny other event that causes temporary
disability benefits to be lawfully suspended, withheld or
terminated under ORS 656.262(4) * * *."  ORS 656.268(4)(d)
(emphasis added).
		In sum, the statement in ORS 656.262(4)(g) that "[n]o
authorization * * * shall be effective * * * retroactively * * *
more than 14 days" establishes that the legislature did not
intend to permit physicians to certify retroactive temporary
compensation for a period greater than 14 days.  Context does not
alter that fact:  No related statutory provision states that ORS
656.262(4)(g) applies only to certain kinds of claims but not to
others, or that the statute applies to claims while they are
pending but not to claims at the time of their closure.  The
statutory text viewed in context is unambiguous.  We need not
examine legislative history to determine the legislature's
intent.  PGE, 317 Or at 611.
		Application of the statute to this case is
straightforward.  On October 20, 1995, Davis released claimant
for regular work.  Under ORS 656.262(4)(g), temporary disability
benefits no longer were due and payable to him, because the
"attending physician cease[d] to authorize temporary disability." 
Later, Bert retroactively certified claimant as fully disabled
from October 20, 1995, but Bert's later certification is, as we
have shown, subject to the clearly worded limitation in the
second sentence in ORS 656.262(4)(g).  The Court of Appeals thus
properly remanded the case to the Board to recalculate claimant's
award of TTD benefits.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
order of the Workers' Compensation Board is reversed, and the
case is remanded to the Workers' Compensation Board for further
proceedings.



1. 	"Medically stationary," as defined in ORS 656.005(17),
means that "no further material improvement would reasonably be
expected from medical treatment, or the passage of time."

2. 	The statute that was in effect at the commencement of
this case, ORS 656.262(4)(f) (1995), was renumbered in 1997 as
ORS 656.262(4)(g), but was not otherwise changed.  ORS
656.262(4)(g) provides: 
		"Temporary disability compensation is not due and
payable pursuant to ORS 656.268 after the worker's
attending physician ceases to authorize temporary
disability or for any period of time not authorized by
the attending physician.  No authorization of temporary
disability compensation by the attending physician
under ORS 656.268 shall be effective to retroactively
authorize the payment of temporary disability more than
14 days prior to its issuance."
Unless otherwise noted, all statutory citations refer to the
current version of the Oregon Revised Statutes.

3. 	"Time loss," as used herein by the ALJ, the Board, and
the Court of Appeals, is a shorthand for temporary disability
compensation under ORS 656.210 and ORS 656.212.

4. 	In 1999, former ORS 656.268(3)(d) (1995), was
renumbered as ORS 656.268(4)(d), but was otherwise unchanged.

5. 	This court accepted review in Bundy, 329 Or 318, 994
P2d 122 (1999), but later dismissed review as improvidently
allowed, 329 Or 503, 991 P2d 1058 (1999).  The order of dismissal
did not disclose the reasons for the court's decision to dismiss.

6. 	The Bundy dissent purported to find such a distinction,
based on the difference in wording between ORS 656.262(4)(g)
("not due and payable") and ORS 656.268(4)(d) ("suspended,
withheld, or terminated").  The two statutes are harmonizable,
however, when one recognizes that benefits are "terminated" when
they no longer are due and payable.

7. 	ORS 656.210(1) states:
		"When the total disability is only temporary, the
worker shall receive during the period of that total
disability compensation equal to 66-2/3 percent of
wages, but not more than 100 percent of the average
weekly wage nor less than the amount of 90 percent of
wages a week or the amount of $50 a week, whichever
amount is lesser.  Notwithstanding the limitation
imposed by this subsection, an injured worker who is
not otherwise eligible to receive an increase in
benefits for the fiscal year in which compensation is
paid shall have the benefits increased each fiscal year
by the percentage which the applicable average weekly
wage has increased since the previous fiscal year."
ORS 656.210(2)-(4) further defines the methods of calculating
temporary total disability benefits.

8. 	ORS 656.212 states:
		"When the disability is or becomes partial only
and is temporary in character:
		"(1) No disability payment is recoverable for
temporary disability suffered during the first three
calendar days after the worker leaves work or loses
wages as a result of the compensable injury.  If the
worker leaves work or loses wages on the day of the
injury due to the injury, that day shall be considered
the first day of the three-day period.
		"(2) The payment of temporary total disability
pursuant to ORS 656.210 shall cease and the worker
shall receive for an aggregate period not exceeding two
years that portion of the payments provided for
temporary total disability which the loss of wages
bears to the wage used to calculate temporary total
disability pursuant to ORS 656.210."

9. 	An attending physician generally is a licensed
physician who primarily is responsible for treating a worker's
compensable injury for the earlier of 30 days from the date of
first visit on the initial claim or 12 visits.  ORS
656.005(12)(b)(B); see also ORS 656.245(5) (authorizing certain
nurse practitioners and physician assistants who practice in
rural areas to authorize payment of temporary disability
compensation for 30 days from date of first visit on claim).