Case Title: Johns Hopkins v. Correia

Citation: 405 Md. 509

Docket Number: 49/07

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2008-08-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 49
September Term, 2007
_________________________________________
THE JOHNS HOPKINS HOSPITAL, et al.
v.
JANE E. S. CORREIA, et al.
_________________________________________
       * Raker
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned)
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned)
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired, Specially
Assigned),
                  JJ.
_________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
_________________________________________
Filed:   August 25, 2008
*Raker, J., now retired, participated in the hearing
and conference of this case while an active member
of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the
Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, she also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
We granted the petition for a writ of certiorari in this tort action in order to
review the standard set forth in numerous Maryland cases that owners or operators of
elevators owe their passengers the highest degree of care and diligence practicable
under the circumstances to guard against injury. 
I.
On August 30, 2000, respondent Jane Correia was a passenger in one of the
elevators located in Johns Hopkins Hospital when a mechanical defect caused the
elevator to come to a jarring halt.  Mrs. Correia immediately complained of back pain
and was taken to the hospital’s emergency room.  She eventually was required to have
surgery on her back and hip for the injuries sustained when the elevator malfunctioned.
Almost three years later, Mrs. Correia and her husband filed a complaint in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the owner and operator of the elevator,  Johns
Hopkins Hospital and Johns Hopkins Health Systems Corporation (hereafter
collectively referred to as “Johns Hopkins”).  Also named as a defendant was Schindler
Elevator Com pany, an elevator maintenance company with which Johns Hopkins had
contracted, about two months before the accident, to service and maintain the elevators.
Johns Hopkins did not file a cross-claim against Schindler.  The basic allegation  lodged
against the defendants was that their negligent failure to heed numerous warnings
-2-
regarding the malfunctioning elevator led to Mrs. Correia’s injuries.  Evidence
presented at trial tended to support this allegation, indicating that the defendants were
alerted to the worn condition of certain elevator parts and failed to respond in a diligent
manner.
After the evidentiary portion of the trial, the jury was instructed as follows:
“The owner of a passenger elevator, in this case, Johns Hopkins is
the owner of the passenger elevator, is bound to exercise to the
highest degree . . . care and skill and diligence, practicable under
the circumstances to guard against injury to individuals riding on
these elevators.  This rule of law applies to the owner of the
elevator only.  It does not apply to the service company Schind ler.”
The jury was also advised that “[e]ach defendant is entitled to a separate
consideration.”  The verdict sheet reflected this separate consideration by asking the
jury to consider independently whether Schindler or Johns Hopkins had acted
negligently.
Counsel for Johns Hopkins objected to the jury instruction on the ground that the
higher standard of care should apply only to attendant operated elevators, not to
passenger operated elevators like the one involved in the incident with Mrs. Correia.
He argued that the case relied on by the trial judge to fashion the instruction, O’Neill
& Company v. Crumm itt, 172 Md. 53, 190 A. 763 (1937), was “factually very
distinguishable” because:
“In that case, which was 68 years ago, there was actually a person,
a human being, in the elevator operating the elevator, having the
-3-
elevator go up and down. And the court at that time saw fit to treat
that circumstance as the elevator owner, the elevator operator, was
as a common carrier, and, therefore, posed a duty of the highest
degree of care and skill and diligence practicable under the
circumstances to avoid injury to the person in the elevator. . . .
“The thing that distinguishes that, because this did not have
individual human beings in the elevator operating [it], should be
distinguished from a common carrier case, it’s not applicable on
that basis to an automatic operation of elevators. I think it
highlights, poses more duty on Johns Hopkins than it does on the
elevator expert.
“I look at the evidence in the case, it is clearly shown,
Hopkins, which it was its duty to delegate for legal purposes.
They can certainly obtain other people who are experts to work
on the elevators, and I think that is another basis for objecting
to this instruction, and the reason why this instruction shouldn’t
be given.”
At no point did counsel for Johns Hopkins object to the reasonable care standard
applied to Schindler or request that Schindler be subjected to a higher standard of care.
The Circuit Court decided that the heightened standard of care for elevator owners was
“still good law” and overruled Johns Hopkins’s objections.  The jury determined that
Johns Hopkins was negligent, awarded Mrs. Correia $264,500, and jointly awarded Mr.
and Mrs. Correia $35,500 for loss of consortium.  The jury found that Schindler was not
negligent.
Johns Hopkins appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that, with
respect to the heightened standard of care, previous Maryland cases were
distinguishable and that, even if Maryland case law was not sufficiently
distinguishable, the prior Maryland cases imposing a heightened standard of care
-4-
upon owners and operators of elevators were “outdated” and “no longer approp riate.”
(Appellants’ brief in the Court of Special Appeals at 8-9).  Johns Hopkins argued that
it “should have been held to a standard of reasonable care.”  (Id.  at 13).  The principal
reasons underlying this argument were that “human attendants” hired and trained by
elevator owners to operate elevators are no longer used, that now elevators are
“automatic and . . . operated by the passengers,” and that the owners of modern
buildings, instead of being experts “in the inspection, maintenance, repair, replacement
or safety of elevators,” hire independent contractors “to ensure that the elevators
operated safely and effectively.”  (Id. at 8-10).  Johns Hopkins also raised in the Court
of Special Appeals two evidentiary issues which were not included in the certiorari
petition and, therefore, are not before this Court.
The plaintiffs did not appeal the judgment in favor of Schindler Elevator
Com pany.  Moreover, Johns Hopkins in the Court of Special Appeals raised no issue
about the jury instructions with respect to Schindler or the judgment in favor of
Schindler.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court,
holding that the high standard of care reflected in the jury instruction was supported by
several Court of Appeals decisions.  Johns Hopkins v. Correia, 174 Md.App. 359, 921
A.2d 837 (2007).  The Court of Special Appeals held that there was “no principled
reason why the duty owed to an elevator passenger should be reduced simply because
of technological advances.” Johns Hopkins v. Correia, supra, 174 Md.App. at 378, 921
-5-
1
In light of the facts that no cross-claim was filed against Schindler, that no appeal was taken
from the judgment in favor of Schindler, and that Schindler has not been a party to the appellate
proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals or in this Court, we cannot interpret the second question
in the certiorari petition as presenting an issue concerning the appropriate standard of care owed by
an elevator maintenance company.  Instead, we necessarily construe the second question as
presenting essentially the same issue as the first, namely whether Johns Hopkins as the elevator
owner should owe a heightened standard of care.  In support of its position that an elevator owner
should not owe a heightened standard of care, Johns Hopkins does argue that both the elevator owner
and the maintenance company should owe the same standard of care to elevator passengers, namely
ordinary care.
A.2d at 849.
Johns Hopkins filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, presenting the following
issues:
“a. Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred as a matter of law
when it affirmed the trial court’s decision to instruct the jury that
Johns Hopkins, the elevator owner, owed Mrs. Correia, the elevator
passenger, ‘the highest degree of care and skill and diligence,
practicable under the circumstances to guard against injury’?
“b. Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred as a matter of law
when it applied a different standard of care – a higher standard of
care – to Johns Hopkins, the elevator owner, than to Schindler
Elevator Company . . . the full-service elevator maintenance
company?”
The plaintiffs did not file a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari.  This Court granted
the petition, Johns Hopkins v. Correia, 400 Md. 647, 929 A.2d 889 (2007), and we
shall affirm.1
II.
The principle that elevator owners and operators owe a heightened standard of
care to elevator passengers was explained by Chief Judge Alvey for the Court in Wise
-6-
v. Ackerman, 76 Md. 375, 25 A. 424 (1892), a case involving a defective freight
elevator.  In that case, Chief Judge Alvey distinguished between “an elevator [which]
is erected in a factory or warehouse, and is intended to be used only for the purpose of
carrying and transferring goods and materials,” and a freight elevator which also carries
passengers.  Wise v. Ackerman, supra, 76 Md. at 388-389, 25 A. at 425.  The Court in
Wise explained that, if a person decides to ride on a freight elevator which is intended
to be used only for the purpose of carrying goods, that person “can only require of the
defendant the use of ordinary care, either in the construction or operation of the
machine.”  Wise, 76 Md. at 389, 25 A. at 425.  Chief Judge Alvey, however, then turned
to the situation where employees were authorized to use a freight elevator for
transportation (Wise, ibid.):
“But an elevator is in many respects a dangerous machine, and
though it may be primarily intended only as a freight elevator, yet,
if the employees, in the course of their employment, are authorized
or directed to use the elevator as means of personal transportation,
the employer, controlling the operation of the elevator, is required
to exercise great care and caution both in the construction and
operation of the machine; so as to render it as free from danger as
careful foresight and precaution may reasonably dictate. Nothing
short of this will excuse the defendant . . . .”
The Court of Appeals in Belvedere Building Co. v. Bryan, 103 Md. 514, 64 A.
44 (1906), applied the principles of Wise v. Ackerman, supra, to a passenger elevator
in a hotel.  In Belvedere, a hotel guest was stepping out of an attendant operated
elevator when the elevator abruptly went down, striking the guest on his back and hip
-7-
2
Treadwell v. Whittier, 80 Cal. 574, 22 P. 266 (1889).
3
Vol. 2, Shearman and Redfield on Negligence, § 719A.
and causing him to fall on top of the “rapidly descending or dropping elevator” car.
The owner of the hotel appealed from a judgment in favor of the injured guest, and this
Court affirmed.  One of the issues before the Court was “the degree of care required in
the operation of a passenger elevator,” Belvedere, 103 Md. at 533, 64 A. at 49.  After
discussing and quoting from Wise v. Ackerman, as well as a California case cited in
Wise,2 the Court in Belvedere held (103 Md. at 535, 64 A. at 50, emphasis in original):
“[W]hen an elevator is used, under due authority, as a means of
personal transportation, great care and caution is required, and
nothing less will suffice to protect the operator.  Ordinary care is
not great care, and this case therefore is authority for holding that
where an elevator is used as a means of personal transportation a
higher degree of care than ordinary care is required in its
operation.  Whether the highest degree of care is required in such
case would seem to be the only question left open for consideration
under the language of that decision, and that question will now be
considered.”
The Belvedere opinion went on to hold that the highest degree of care is required,
quoting with approval from a negligence treatise of that time3 (103 Md. at 535, 64 A.
at 50):
“‘For the same reason – a regard for human life – that common
carriers are required to exercise the highest degree of care for the
safety of their passengers, irrespective of any contract of carriage,
a like degree of care is exacted of a landlord in transporting persons
by elevator between the several floors of his building.  He is
therefore bound to use the greatest care, not only in providing, safe
-8-
and suitable cars, appliances, and machinery for control, but also
in managing these means of transportation.’”
The Court in Belvedere continued by quoting with approval numerous other authorities
taking the positions that there “‘is no distinction in law between the duties and
liabilities of a carrier by elevator and one by railroad,’” that there is no situation
“‘where the law demands a higher degree of care than in the construction and operation
of passenger elevators,’” that owners or operators of passenger elevators have the same
“‘legal status’” as “‘a common carrier,’” that the elevator owner or operator “‘is the
bailee, so to speak, of human beings, and has their lives in his custody,’” that “‘no
distinction can be drawn between vertical transportation and horizontal
transportation,’” etc.  Belvedere, 103 Md. at 536-539, 64 A. at 50-51.  The Court then
reiterated (103 Md. at 539-540, 64 A. at 51, emphasis in original):
“The liability of the common carrier is not imposed because he is
a common carrier, but because he is a carrier of passengers,
because as Judge Cooley states it in Cooley on Torts, 2 ed. 768 and
769, ‘there are committed to his charge for the time the lives and
safety of persons of all ages and of all degrees of ability of self-
protection, and as the slightest failure of watchfulness may be
destructive of life or limb, it is reasonable to require of him the
most perfect care of prudent and cautious men as far as human
foresight and care can reasonably go.’  The liability is not imposed
upon the owner or occupant of real property as such, but
irrespective of such ownersh ip and occupancy and because he is
engaged in the undertaking of running an elevator as a means of
personal transportation, which Judge Alvey has said in Wise v.
Ackerman requires a higher degree of care than ordinary care.”
The Belvedere opinion, 103 Md. at 540, 64 A. at 51-52, concluded by quoting
-9-
from Fox v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa. 127, 134-135, 57 A. 356, 358 (1904):
“‘The foundation of the rule for the protection of a passenger is in
the undertaking of the common carrier which is to carry safely; but
another reason for it is, that when the passenger commits himself
to the carrier, he does so in ignorance of the machinery and
appliances (as well as of their defects) used in connection with the
means of transportation, and becomes a passive and helpless
creature in the hands of the transportation company and its agents.
For the same reason, this rule should be extended to those who
operate elevators for carrying passengers from one story of a
building to another.  When they undertake to carry, they undertake
to carry safely.  If it is not their express agreement to do so, it is
surely an implied one, and the condition of a passenger caged in a
suspended car is one not only of utter ignorance of what has been
done or ought to be done for his safety, but of absolute passiveness
and pitiable helplessness when confronted with danger against
which human knowledge, skill, and foresight ought to have
guarded; and the rule has been so extended.’  The view thus
expressed is in accord with our own, and we think it well grounded
both in reason and authority.”
The decision in the next elevator case to come before this Court, Owners’ Realty
Co. v. Richardson, 158 Md. 367, 148 A. 543 (1930), is most significant because the
Court in that case applied the principles of Belvedere to an injury caused by a defective
passenger operated automatic elevator.  The elevator was in an apartment house of six
stories, owned by the defendant.  The plaintiff was standing immediately outside of the
elevator and was attempting to open the elevator door by use of a “knob” for that
purpose, “but . . . she had barely touched the knob when the door slammed back very
rapidly, startling her, and catching her finger between the laths with such force as to
swing her around ,” Owners’ Realty Co. v. Richardson, supra, 158 Md. at 371, 148 A.
-10-
at 545.  There had previously been complaints about the rapid and sudden movements
of the elevator door.  In affirming a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the Court, in an
opinion by Judge Parke, indicated that the heightened standard of care was particularly
applicable to a passenger operated automatic elevator (Richardson, ibid., emphasis
added):
“The defendant was engaged in the carriage of its tenants and
their servants and visitors by means of an automatic elevator, which
was operated by those using it without any assistance, direction, or
supervision by the defendant.  It was an economical method to cast
the burden of its operation upon those having occasion to go to and
from the several apartments of the six storied building, but the
knowledge of the defendant that it would be run by a number of
persons, who would represent a wide range of age, experience,
intelligence, and capacity, cast upon the defendant all the more
care in the selection and maintenance of the mechanical device
which was adopted for this general service.  The rule approved by
this court is that the landlord engaged in transporting passengers by
elevators must exercise great care not only in their operation but
in providing safe and suitable equipment.  It is a rule which has its
sanction in sound public policy, which exacts a high degree of care
where security of person and life is frequently involved, under
circumstances in which the carrier is in control of the movement or
of the equipment  Belvedere Bldg. Co. v. Bryan, 103 Md. 514, 534-
540 . . . .”
Seven years later, the case of O’Neill & Company v. Crumm itt, supra, 172 Md.
53, 190 A. 763, involved an attendant operated passenger elevator in a department
store.  The plaintiff, a passenger in the elevator, desired to exit at the third floor.  When
the elevator reached the third floor, and the doors opened, the elevator was stopped
about four inches above the level of the floor.  As the plaintiff was exiting, the elevator
-11-
dropped suddenly, causing the plaintiff to lose her balance.  Furthermore, when the
plaintiff touched the third floor, she slipped on a greasy substance in such a manner that
her back struck the elevator.  An “inspection, according to the undisputed testim ony,
revealed that the outer elevator door could be opened with the elevator floor
approxim ately four inches above or below the landing floor.”  O’Neill, 172 Md. at 60,
190 A. at 766.  There was also evidence that, “with both doors open, the elevator could
have been caused to drop by manipulation of the operato r.”  Ibid.  
In affirming a jury award in favor of the injured plaintiff, this Court in O’Neill
was emphatic regarding the department store’s standard of care (172 Md. at 61, 190 A.
at 766):
“In Belvedere Building Co. v. Bryan, supra, this Court held that the
owner or operator of a passenger elevator was bound to exercise the
highest degree of care and diligence practicable under the
circumstances, to guard against injuries to persons riding in such
elevator.  In view of that decision the question under consideration
cannot be regarded as an open one in this state.”
Moreover, the Court in O’Neill held that a person’s status as a passenger did not
automatically terminate as soon as the person was outside of the elevator (172 Md. at
61-62, 190 A. at 766):
“Certainly we do not feel that it can be said, as a matter of law, that
appellant, whose duty it was to exercise the highest degree of care
and diligence practical under the circumstances for the safety of
appellee, has fulfilled such duty by permitting its elevator landing,
where it discharged passengers, to be in the condition described by
the plaintiff, for obviously her status as a passenger continued
-12-
while leaving the elevator and until she had been landed safely.”
See also Otis Elevator Co. v. Embert, 198 Md. 585, 599-600, 84 A.2d 876, 882-883
(1951) (reiterating the heightened standard of care owed to passengers by owners or
operators of passenger elevators, although the issue in the case was whether the owner
was entitled to recover, under a third party complaint, from the elevator maintenance
company).
The most recent case in this Court discussing the heightened standard of care
owed by elevator owners was Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace, 308 Md. 432, 520 A.2d
361 (1987).  Flowers was a tort action by a fireman against an apartment building
owner, based on injuries sustained by the fireman when, while responding to a fire in
the apartment building, he fell down an open elevator shaft.  The shaft was open
because, allegedly, the elevator system was defective.  While the issues and the
discussion in the opinion predominantly concerned the so-called “fireman’s rule,” the
plaintiff did raise an argument under the cases dealing with the heightened standard
owed by owners of elevators, and this Court rejected the argument based on those cases.
We held as follows (Flowers, 308 Md. at 452, 520 A.2d at 371):
“In count XV, Flowers asserted that Rock Creek and
Westinghouse owed a duty of care like that of a common carrier
because they provided, maintained, and operated elevators at the
apartment building.  But the higher duty a common carrier owes
extends only to its passengers.  Sheridan v. Balto. & Ohio R. Co.,
101 Md. 50, 57, 60 A. 280 (1905).  See Jackson v. Hines, 137 Md.
621, 626, 113 A. 129 (1921).  The analogous higher duty owed by
an elevator operator is to its passengers.  O’Neill & Company v.
-13-
Crumm itt, 172 Md. 53, 60, 190 A. 763 (1937) (‘the degree of care
due by the owner of a passenger elevator to those who are expressly
or impliedly invited to ride therein is similar to that which a
common carrier owes its passengers’).  Flowers was not a
passenger . . . .”
III.
The cases reviewed above firmly establish, as a Maryland common law
principle, that owners of elevators owe to elevator passengers the highest degree of
care and diligence practicable under the circumstances.  Nevertheless, a “‘common
law rule may, within constitutional constraints, be changed or modified by legislative
enactment or judicial decision where it is found to be a vestige of the past, no longer
suitable to the circumstances of our people,’” Owens v. State, 399 Md. 388, 413, 924
A.2d 1072, 1086 (2007), quoting Jones v. State, 303 Md. 323, 337 n.10, 493 A.2d 1062,
1069 n.10 (1985).  See also, e.g., Price v. State, 405 Md. 10, 23, 949 A.2d 619 (2008)
(A common law rule was modified in light of several recent judicial decisions which
undermined the common law rule); Fox v. Wills, 390 Md. 620, 635, 890 A.2d 726, 735
(2006); Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 614, 861 A.2d 78, 86-87 (2004); Baltimore Sun
v. Baltimore, 359 Md. 653, 662, 755 A.2d 1130, 1135 (2000); Bowden v. Caldor, 350
Md. 4, 27, 710 A.2d 267, 278 (1998); Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 469-470,
601 A.2d 633, 657-658 (1992), and cases there collected.
Johns Hopkins argues that “the continued application of the heightened
standard” of care owed by elevator owners is not justified and “request[s] this Court
[to] reevaluate the equity and utility of its continued application.”  (Petitioners’ Reply
-14-
Brief at 9).  In support of its position, Johns Hopkins advances arguments similar to
those made in the Circuit Court and in the Court of Special Appeals.  Johns Hopkins
argues that “[t]his Court has not . . . examine[d] the heightened standard of care since
O’Neill was decided in 1937,” that there have been “technological advancements . . .
in the elevator industry since 1937,” that elevators now, such as the one involved in this
case, have “no human attendant operating [the] elevator,” whereas “the source of
injury” in prior Maryland cases “was the negligent operation of the elevator by its
human attendant,” that today “the unpredictable element of human error has been
eliminated,” and that the elevator in the case at bar “malfunctioned due to aging and
worn parts” which fell within Schindler’s “responsibility . . . to maintain the elevator.”
(Petitioners’ Opening Brief at 9-13).
While Johns Hopkins “acknowledge[s] that an elevator owner’s duty – whether
under a common carrier standard of liability or a reasonableness standard of care – is
not delegable,” the petitioners contend that a modern elevator owner’s justifiable
reliance on a maintenance company should result in both the owner and the
maintenance company owing the same duty, i.e., ordinary care.  (Id. at 14).  Johns
Hopkins states that “there was no evidence in O’Neill or Belvedere that service or repair
was conducted by an independently contracted elevator expert.”  (Id. at 12-13).  Finally,
Johns Hopkins maintains that different standards of care owed by elevator owners and
maintenance companies serve “only to confuse and mislead the jury.”  (Id. at 26).
Preliminarily, the contention that this Court has not considered the heightened
-15-
standard of care owed by elevator owners since 1937 is not entirely accurate.  It
overlooks the 1987 opinion in Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace, supra, 308 Md. at 452,
520 A.2d at 371, and the 1951 opinion in Otis Elevator Co. v. Embert, supra, 198 Md.
at 599-600, 84 A.2d at 882-883.  In addition, the majority rule in this country is that
owners of elevators or escalators owe a heightened standard of care to their
passengers, and there are numerous recent cases in our sister states reaffirming this
standard.  For a thorough review of cases in other jurisdictions, see Judge Salmon’s
opinion for the Court of Special Appeals in the case at bar.  Johns Hopkins v. Correia,
supra, 174 Md. App. at 365-373, 921 A.2d at 841-845.
While there have been technological changes in elevators over the years, just as
there have been technological changes in common carriers and most other machines,
instruments, equipment, chattels, processes, etc., this in itself furnishes no reason to
change basic legal principles.  Instead, well-established legal principles frequently
apply very well to new technology.  As the Court of Special Appeals pointed out in the
present case, over the last century “motor buses have replaced the stage coach, taxi cabs
have replaced Hanson cabs, and overall transportation and safety technology has
improved exponentially.  Yet the duty owed by the common carrier to its passengers has
remained constant.”  John Hopkins v. Correia, supra, 174 Md. App. at 378, 921 A.2d
at 849.  Furthermore, automatic passenger operated elevators were not invented
subsequent to this Court’s opinions dealing with the heightened standard of care owed
to passengers by elevator owners.  The first automatic passenger operated elevator was
-16-
introduced in 1894.  See George Strakosch, The Vertical Transportation Handbook, at
4 (1998).
Essentially, Johns Hopkins’s position is that the heightened standard of care,
developed in this Court’s earlier opinions, was based upon attendant operated elevators,
and involved negligent operation of the elevators by the human attendants.  Today,
according to Johns Hopkins, elevators are automatic with the passengers operating
them, and the tortious conduct is usually a defect in the elevator itself such as worn
parts.  Furthermore, Johns Hopkins asserts that modern elevators are serviced by expert
independent maintenance companies, whereas the elevator owners serviced the older
attendant operated elevators.  Johns Hopkins submits that these changes warrant a
modification of the common law.  An examination of the previously reviewed Maryland
cases, however, presents an entirely different picture from the one drawn by Johns
Hopkins.  What Johns Hopkins relies upon as new or changed circumstances were fully
considered in this Court’s opinions.  Moreover, the argumen ts made by Johns Hopkins
overlook the principal reason for imposing upon elevator owners the same duty of care
which is imposed on common carriers.
Wise v. Ackerman, supra, 76 Md. 375, 25 A. 424, the first Maryland case setting
forth the heightened standard of care, did not involve negligent operation of the
elevator by an attendant.  Instead, the plaintiff’s injury resulted “from what is alleged
to have been a defective and dangerously constructed elevator,” 76 Md. at 386, 25 A.
at 424.  In fact, the Court’s opinion in Wise describes in detail the various alleged
-17-
defects in the elevator, including parts that were “permitted to . . . remain out of repair,”
76 Md. at 386, 25 A. at 424-425.  Chief Judge Alvey’s opinion for the Court made it
clear that the elevator owner “is required to exercise great care and caution both in the
construction and operation of the machine,” 76 Md. at 389, 25 A. at 425, emphasis
added.
The declaration in Belvedere Building Co. v. Bryan, supra, 103 Md. at 523-525,
64 A. at 45-46, contained two counts, with the first count alleging that “the sudden
dropping and ascent of said elevator . . . was caused by the improper and defective
construction and maintenance of the machinery,” and the second count alleging
negligence by the elevator attendant.  Although the Court affirmed the judgment in
favor of the plaintiff under the second count, this Court’s opinion made it clear that the
elevator owner’s heightened duty of care extended to “‘providing, safe and suitable
cars, appliances, and machinery,’” Belvedere, 103 Md. at 535, 64 A. at 50.
As earlier discussed, the next case, Owners’ Realty Co. v. Richardson, supra, 158
Md. 367, 148 A. 543, is quite significant because it involved defective doors in a
passenger operated automatic elevator located in a six story apartment building.
Moreover, as this Court emphasized in Richardson, 158 Md. at 371, 148 A. at 545, the
fact that the elevator was automatic and passenger operated should “cast upon the
defendant all the more care in the selection and maintenance of the mechanical device
. . . .”  The Court continued (ibid., emphasis added):
“The rule approved by this Court is that the landlord engaged in
-18-
transporting passengers by elevators must exercise great care not
only in their operation but in providing safe and suitable
equipm ent.”
In O’Neill & Company v. Crumm itt, supra, 172 Md. 53, 190 A. 763, there was
evidence of a defect allowing the outer elevator door to open when the elevator was
four inches above or four inches below the proper floor.  There was also evidence of
negligence by the defendant’s employees.  In affirming a judgment for the injured
plaintiff, this Court held that, under settled law, “the owner or operator of a passenger
elevator was bound to exercise the highest degree of care and diligence . . . to guard
against injuries to persons riding in such elevator.”  O’Neill, 172 Md. at 61, 190 A. at
766.  The Court, in this regard, drew no distinction between a defect in the elevator and
the negligence of the elevator attendant.  And, as previously discussed, the most recent
case discussing the heightened duty owed to passengers by elevator owners, Flowers
v. Rock Creek Terrace, supra, 308 Md. at 452, 520 A.2d at 371, involved allegations
of a defective elevator.
It is obvious that this Court’s opinions fail to support Johns Hopkins’s theory that
the heightened standard of care owed to passengers by elevator owners was grounded
upon attendant operated elevators and negligence by the attendants.  The cases involved
both defects in the elevators and the negligence of the elevator owners’ employees.  To
the extent that any of the Maryland cases drew a distinction between attendant operated
elevators and automatic elevators operated by passengers, the latter situation warranted
even “more care” by the elevator owner.  Richardson, 158 Md. at 371, 148 A. at 545.
-19-
Furthermore, there is no support in the prior Maryland cases, or any other authority
cited, for Johns Hopkins’s assertion that elevator owners, at the time most of the
Maryland cases were decided, did not hire independent experts to service or repair
elevators, whereas today elevator owners do hire such independent contractors.
Johns Hopkins intimates that today elevators are safer because “the unpredictable
element of human error has been eliminated.”  Nothing cited by Johns Hopkins,
however, supports this contention.  We note that the United States Consumer Product
Safety Commission NEISS Data Highlights for the Calendar Years 2007 and 2006,
estimates that in the year 2007 there were 19,055 injuries from elevators and other lifts,
and that in the year 2006 there were 20,974 injuries from elevators and other lifts.  The
record in this case gives us no basis for concluding that elevators today are safer than
they were in 1930 or 1937.  
There is no merit in Johns Hopkins’s contention that different standards of care
owed by elevator owners and maintenance companies will confuse the jury.  First, as
earlier noted, supra n.1, no issue regarding a maintenance company’s standard of care
is before us.  Second, if we assume arguendo that the maintenance company owes only
ordinary care, the argument is still not a valid ground for changing Maryland common
law.  There are many situations where tort law recognizes different standards applicable
to different defendants in the same case, and juries routinely deal with such matters.
For example, one or more tort defendants may be entitled to qualified immunity, while
other defendants in the same case may not.  Both a common carrier defendant and non-
-20-
common carrier defendants may be joined in the same case, with different standards
applicable.  Multiple causes of action may call for different standards being applied to
the same factual circumstances.  Many other examples of different standards being
applied in the same case could be listed.  While there may occasionally be jury
confusion, we have confidence that, for the most part, juries are capable of
satisfactorily resolving such cases.  Different standards, applicable to different
categories of defendants, furnish no basis for changing an established common law
principle.
The reason why an elevator owner owes the same heightened standard of care
which common carriers owe is not because of the operational characteristics of
particular types of elevators or the source of the passenger’s tortious injury.  Instead,
the fundamental reason for the heightened standard of care owed by both a common
carrier and an elevator owner is that each “is a carrier of passengers” who “‘are
committed to his charge’” and who rely upon the carrier or elevator owner for their
safety.  Belvedere Building Co. v. Bryan, supra, 103 Md. at 539-540, 64 A. at 51.  The
heightened standard of care is rooted “in sound public policy, which exacts a high
degree of care where [the] security of person[s] . . . is frequently involved,” Owners
Realty Co. v. Richardson, supra, 158 Md. at 371, 148 A. at 545.
Consequently, we decline to change the Maryland common law principle that
owners or operators of elevators owe to their passengers a heightened standard of care.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
-21-
APPEALS AFFIRMED.  COSTS IN THIS
COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS 
TO 
BE 
PAID  
BY 
THE
PETITIONERS.