Case Title: State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Henry Cty. Court of Common Pleas

Citation: 2010-Ohio-1533

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-04-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Henry Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Slip Opinion No. 2010-
Ohio-1533.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-1533 
THE STATE EX REL. TOLEDO BLADE COMPANY v. 
HENRY COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Henry Cty. Court of Common 
Pleas, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1533.] 
First Amendment — Fair Trial — Prohibition — Presumptions against prior 
restraint not overcome — Writ granted. 
(No. 2010-0161 — Submitted March 31, 2010 — Decided April 13, 2010.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an original action for a writ of prohibition to prevent a 
common pleas court and its judge from enforcing a gag order prohibiting the 
media from reporting about the trial proceedings in one criminal case until a jury 
is impaneled in a separate criminal case.  Because prohibition is an appropriate 
action to challenge the propriety of the gag order and that order was not supported 
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by sufficient evidence to overcome its presumed unconstitutionality, we grant the 
writ. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} In State v. Jayme Schwenkmeyer and David E. Knepley, Henry 
Cty. C.P. case No. 08-CR-0033, the state of Ohio charged the defendants with 
involuntary manslaughter and child endangering after the death of a child.  
Schwenkmeyer was the child’s mother, and Knepley was Schwenkmeyer’s 
boyfriend.  The cases arose from a joint indictment, but respondent Judge Keith P. 
Muehlfeld of respondent Henry County Court of Common Pleas granted the 
defendants’ motions and ordered that they be tried separately. 
{¶ 3} Judge Muehlfeld originally scheduled Knepley’s jury trial to begin 
on July 20, 2009, with Schwenkmeyer’s jury trial to begin on July 27, 2009.  On 
July 20, Judge Muehlfeld granted Schwenkmeyer’s motion to prohibit print and 
broadcast media from reporting about the trial proceedings in Knepley’s case until 
the jury is impaneled for Schwenkmeyer’s trial, although he permitted members 
of the media to have access to the Knepley trial.  The judge stated in the entry that 
he considered the order necessary to prevent the tainting of the jury pool in the 
second case. 
{¶ 4} Both cases were subsequently rescheduled, and the order of the 
trials was reversed, with Schwenkmeyer’s trial to begin on December 7, 2009, 
and Knepley’s trial to follow a couple months later, on February 8, 2010.  On 
December 2, Knepley moved for an order to, inter alia, “prevent the jury pool in 
his case from being tainted by hearing or reading any published or broadcast 
media report of the State v. Schwenkmeyer trial currently scheduled to begin on 
Monday, December 7, 2009.”  On December 4, in an order consented to by both 
the state and Schwenkmeyer, Judge Muehlfeld issued the following gag order: 
{¶ 5} “Whereas, this Court considers it necessary to issue such an order 
to prevent the tainting of the jury pool in State v. Knepley; * * * 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
{¶ 6} “* * * 
{¶ 7} “IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that members 
of the print and broadcast media shall be permitted access to the trial proceedings 
in Case number 08CR0033, State v. Schwenkmeyer pursuant to Superintendence 
Rule 12, HOWEVER any and all print or broadcast media shall be PROHIBITED 
from the published or broadcast reporting of such trial proceedings until a jury is 
impaneled for the trial in State v. Knepley.” 
{¶ 8} That same day, Judge Muehlfeld telephoned the local newspapers 
and local radio station that had sent representatives to earlier proceedings to 
inform them of the gag order.  The judge did not contact the Toledo Blade. 
{¶ 9} Schwenkmeyer’s trial began on December 7, but Judge Muehlfeld 
declared a mistrial and rescheduled it for February 1, 2010, with Knepley’s trial 
remaining scheduled for February 8.  The mistrial was unrelated to publicity or 
similar concerns.  On December 11, the judge amended his December 4 gag order 
to “permit the print or broadcast media to report that a defense motion for mistrial 
was granted by the Court in the State v. Schwenkmeyer trial on December 10, 
2009,” but reiterated that the gag order remained in effect for Schwekmeyer’s 
rescheduled February 1 trial. 
{¶ 10} In mid-January 2010, relator, The Toledo Blade Co., a newspaper 
publisher, learned of the order, and in a letter e-mailed on January 19, the Blade, 
through counsel, requested that Judge Muehlfeld reconsider his December 4 gag 
order prohibiting the media from reporting on the Schwenkmeyer trial before a 
jury is impaneled in Knepley. 
{¶ 11} On January 26, Judge Muehlfeld held a hearing on the Blade’s 
request for reconsideration at which the Blade and the defendants presented 
argument but no evidence.  Knepley’s counsel asserted that the gag order issued 
by the court upon his motion “was absolutely necessary for [his] client to receive 
a fair trial in his case.”  He added, “This is a small town with a very interesting 
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case,” and if the media were allowed to report on Schwenkmeyer’s trial before a 
jury was impaneled for his trial, “it would taint the jury pool that’s already small.”  
The state and Schwenkmeyer noted that they did not object to the court’s gag 
order, and the state opined that Knepley’s motion was “fairly compelling.” 
{¶ 12} Judge Muehlfeld specified at the hearing that “it is the narrowness 
of that window between these trials, that makes this a truly unique case.”  More 
particularly, the judge concluded that the press and public’s First Amendment 
rights are “derivative in nature” and “abstract,” whereas the defendants’ fair-trial 
rights are “very real interests” that “have a direct impact” upon them.  The judge 
questioned how important the Blade’s interest was in reporting the first trial’s 
proceedings when the Blade did not report about the December 7 trial, and his 
order only briefly delayed its ability to report about the trial. 
{¶ 13} In ratifying the December 4 gag order, the judge made the 
following findings: 
{¶ 14} “The Court finds that there is a substantial probability that the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial in this case will be prejudiced by the publicity that 
the Court’s orders in this case [were] designed to prevent.  The Court further finds 
that no reasonable alternatives can adequately protect the defendant[’]s right to a 
fair trial under the circumstances unique to this case.”  The judge noted that the 
cases had generated “considerable public curiosity * * * and media attention,” 
that voir dire in the first Schwenkmeyer case established that a good portion of the 
population knew about the circumstances of the cases, and that it took the court 
two days and 40 prospective jurors to impanel a jury in the first case.  In addition, 
the judge determined that (1) the option of selecting two juries and sending the 
second jury home until the start of the second trial would not adequately protect 
the second defendant’s right to a fair trial because the court could not adequately 
instruct and control the second jury, (2) a continuance of the second trial was not 
a reasonable alternative because Knepley’s counsel had moved for the gag order 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
when the trials had previously been scheduled two months apart, and (3) a change 
of venue would be too costly and would ignore the defendant’s and the public’s 
right to have the cases tried in the local venue. 
{¶ 15} The next day, on January 27, 2010, the Blade filed this action for a 
writ of prohibition to prevent respondents, the common pleas court and Judge 
Muehlfeld, from restraining it “from speaking or publishing information that [it] 
has lawfully obtained or will lawfully obtain in the course of the criminal 
proceeding.”  On January 28, Judge Muehlfeld issued an order denying the 
Blade’s motion for reconsideration and ratifying the December 4 gag order “for 
the reasons fully stated by the Court from the bench at the conclusion of the 
January 26, 2010 oral argument.”  On that same day, we granted an alternative 
writ on the Blade’s prohibition claim, which stayed the challenged portion of the 
judge’s December 4 and January 28 orders pending our resolution of the case. 
{¶ 16} The parties have submitted evidence and briefs, and this case is 
now before the court for our consideration of the merits.  Various amici curiae 
have also submitted briefs.1 
Legal Analysis 
Request for Oral Argument 
{¶ 17} We deny respondents’ request for oral argument because they do 
not specify any reasons supporting it, and the parties’ briefs are sufficient to 
resolve this case.  See State ex rel. Lorain v. Stewart, 119 Ohio St.3d 222, 2008-
Ohio-4062, 893 N.E.2d 184, ¶ 18; State ex rel. Scioto Downs, Inc. v. Brunner, 123 
Ohio St.3d 24, 2009-Ohio-3761, 913 N.E.2d 967, ¶ 25. 
Prohibition 
                                                 
1.  The motion for admission pro hac vice of Lucy A. Dalglish, Gregg P. Leslie, and Mara E. 
Zimmerman by Monica L. Dias is granted. 
 
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{¶ 18} The Blade requests a writ of prohibition to prevent the common 
pleas court and its judge from enforcing their orders preventing the media from 
reporting on one criminal trial until the impaneling of a jury in a related, second 
criminal trial. 
{¶ 19} “Prohibition is the appropriate action to challenge trial court orders 
restricting public access to pending litigation.”  State ex rel. Plain Dealer 
Publishing Co. v. Geauga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Juv. Div. (2000), 90 Ohio 
St.3d 79, 82, 734 N.E.2d 1214.  More pertinently, “prohibition is the only remedy 
available to nonparties who wish to challenge an order which restricts the rights 
of free speech and press of such nonparties,” including gag orders that prohibit the 
media “from publishing certain information lawfully gathered by them in 
proceedings which are open to the public.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State ex rel. News 
Herald v. Ottawa Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Juv. Div. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 
40, 43-44, 671 N.E.2d 5.  While amicus curiae Ohio Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers argues that prohibition is inappropriate because the media have 
an adequate remedy at law by seeking to intervene and appeal the gag order under 
R.C. 2505.02, this procedure is contrary to the foregoing precedent.  Furthermore, 
the argument is not raised by the parties and will not be considered.  Wellington v. 
Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 143, 2008-Ohio-554, 882 N.E.2d 
420, ¶ 53.  Therefore, the Blade’s prohibition action is the appropriate action to 
challenge Judge Muehlfeld’s order restricting the media from publishing or 
broadcasting reports about the first trial until after the jury in the second trial is 
impaneled. 
Prior Restraints and Criminal Trials 
{¶ 20} “The phrase ‘prior restraint’ * * * is a term of art referring to 
judicial orders or administrative rules that operate to forbid expression before it 
takes place.”  2 Smolla, Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom of Speech (2009) 15-4, 
Section 15:1; Seven Hills v. Aryan Nations (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 304, 307, 667 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
N.E.2d 942; see also Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed.2009) 1314, defining “prior 
restraint” as a “governmental restriction on speech or publication before its actual 
expression.”  The court’s gag order here is a prior restraint because it attempts to 
forbid the media from reporting about the first trial until the jury is impaneled for 
the second trial, and it was issued before either trial had commenced. 
{¶ 21} Although prior restraints are not unconstitutional per se, there is a 
heavy presumption against their constitutional validity.  See FW/PBS, Inc. v. 
Dallas (1990), 493 U.S. 215, 225, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603; Seven Hills, 
76 Ohio St.3d at 307, 667 N.E.2d 942.  This is because “ ‘prior restraints on 
speech and publication are the most serious and least tolerable infringement on 
First Amendment rights.’ ”  Tory v. Cochran (2005), 544 U.S. 734, 738, 125 S.Ct. 
2108, 161 L.Ed.2d 1042.  “Prior restraints are simply repugnant to the basic 
values of an open society” in that they “tend to encourage indiscriminate 
censorship in a way that subsequent punishments do not.”  (Emphasis sic.)  2 
Smolla, Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom of Speech 15:10, Sections 15-14.2-
15.14.3. 
{¶ 22} In the context of court proceedings, the “Free Speech and Free 
Press Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, the 
analogous provisions of Section 11, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, and the 
‘open courts’ provision of Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution create a 
qualified right of public access to court proceedings that have historically been 
open to the public and in which public access plays a significantly positive role.”  
Plain Dealer, 90 Ohio St.3d at 82, 734 N.E.2d 1214, citing In re T.R. (1990), 52 
Ohio St.3d 6, 556 N.E.2d 439, paragraph two of the syllabus.  “Criminal trials 
have historically been open to the public, and public access has always been 
considered essential to the fair and orderly administration of our criminal justice 
system.”  State ex rel. Natl. Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Lake Cty. Court of Common 
Pleas (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 104, 108, 556 N.E.2d 1120, overruled in part on 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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other grounds, State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153, 2008-Ohio-545, 882 N.E.2d 
431, ¶ 10; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Norfolk Cty. Superior Court (1982), 457 U.S. 
596, 605, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248. 
{¶ 23} In criminal proceedings, however, the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution 
secure the criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial.  State ex rel. Vindicator 
Printing Co. v. Watkins (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 129, 138, 609 N.E.2d 551.  
Pervasive, unfair, and prejudicial media coverage of a criminal trial can 
sometimes deprive a criminal defendant of this constitutional right.  Sheppard v. 
Maxwell (1966), 384 U.S. 333, 363, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600. 
{¶ 24} In the seminal case interpreting the interplay between these two 
important constitutional rights, the United States Supreme Court struck down gag 
orders attempting to prevent further publicity about a defendant accused of 
murdering six members of a family in a small Nebraska town.  Nebraska Press 
Assn. v. Stuart (1976), 427 U.S. 539, 570, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683.  There, 
the Supreme Court held that justification for a prior restraint of the media must be 
evidenced by “(a) the nature and extent of pretrial news coverage; (b) whether 
other measures would be likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial 
publicity; and (c) how effectively a restraining order would operate to prevent the 
threatened danger.”  Id. at 562. 
{¶ 25} Notwithstanding respondents’ suggestion that Nebraska Press may 
no longer be viable because of revolutionary changes in the delivery of 
information to the public, e.g., the emergence of the Internet, they cite no case 
that has retreated from the test set forth in that case to evaluate gag orders against 
the media.  Nor have they submitted any evidentiary support for these claims.  
Although it has been fairly noted that “Nebraska Press was decided in 1965 
without the Internet or other firms of mass communication now readily available 
to the public,” nevertheless, “if courts base their constitutional interpretations on 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
the rapidly changing concept of technology, * * * our constitutional rights [would 
be] in the hands of unpredictable technological trends instead of in the hands of 
sound judicial reasoning.”  See Sidman, Gagging Louisiana’s Politicians:  The 
Fifth Circuit Reviews the Constitutionality of Gag Orders Against Trial 
Participants in United States v. Brown (2001), 76 Tul.L.Rev. 233, 244-245.  As 
the Blade mentions, the United States Supreme Court recently observed, “Courts, 
too, are bound by the First Amendment.  We will decline to draw, and then 
redraw, constitutional lines based on the particular media or technology used * * 
*.”  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm. (2010), __ U.S. __, 130 S.Ct. 876, 
891, __ L.Ed.2d __. 
{¶ 26} In State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Kainrad (1976), 
46 Ohio St.2d 349, 75 O.O.2d 435, 348 N.E.2d 695, a case that preceded 
Nebraska Press by a few weeks, we were faced with a factual situation similar to 
that here.  Two defendants had been jointly indicted for aggravated murder, but 
upon request of counsel, separate trials were granted.  Id. at 349.  The trial of one 
of the defendants was in progress when the judge presiding over the second 
defendant’s trial, which had not yet begun, issued an order prohibiting the media 
from publishing any statements made in the first trial concerning the claimed 
participation of the second defendant in any criminal activity.  Id. at 349.  The 
judge expressed concern that the publicity may jeopardize the second defendant’s 
right to an impartial jury.  Id. at 349-350. 
{¶ 27} We set forth the following test for prior restraints in which the 
defendant’s request for a fair trial is asserted as the basis for the order: 
{¶ 28} “An order not to publish cannot be considered unless the 
circumstances are imperative, and it appears clearly in the record that a 
defendant’s right to a fair trial will be jeopardized and that there is no other 
recourse within the power of the court to protect that right or minimize the danger 
to it. 
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{¶ 29} “Before issuing any such order not to publish, it is obligatory upon 
the court to hold a hearing and make a finding that all other measures within the 
power of the court to insure a fair trial have been found unavailing and deficient.”  
Id. at 352. 
{¶ 30} We held, “Where the constitutional right of a criminal defendant to 
a fair trial can be protected by the traditional methods of voir dire, continuances, 
changes of venue, jury instructions or sequestration of the jury, the press and 
public cannot be excluded from a criminal trial or hearing and no order can be 
made which prohibits the publishing of news reports about statements made or 
testimony given during such proceedings until all other measures within the 
power of the court to insure a fair trial have been found to be unavailing or 
deficient.”  Id. at syllabus. 
{¶ 31} Although we decided Kainrad before the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Nebraska Press, we have applied it thereafter.  See Natl. 
Broadcasting Co., 52 Ohio St.3d at 107, 556 N.E.2d 1120.2  And the criteria 
announced in these cases for determining the propriety of a prior restraint are 
consistent. 
{¶ 32} The Blade initially asserts that the foregoing evaluation of criteria 
does not apply to Judge Muehlfeld’s gag order because even though media 
representatives were to be present, the order will prevent the media from 
immediately reporting about the Schwenkmeyer trial and is therefore 
unconstitutional per se.  The Blade cites News Herald, 77 Ohio St.3d at 44, 671 
N.E.2d 5; Craig v. Harney (1947), 331 U.S. 367, 374, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 91 L.Ed.2d 
1546; and Natl. Broadcasting Co., 52 Ohio St.3d at 113, 556 N.E.2d 1120, in 
support of its assertion. 
                                                 
2.  In Natl. Broadcasting Co., 52 Ohio St.3d at 108, 556 N.E.2d 1120, we applied a similar test to 
evaluate orders preventing court personnel, attorneys, and law enforcement from making 
extrajudicial public communications.  See also T.R., 52 Ohio St.3d 6, 556 N.E.2d 439.  This type 
of gag order is not at issue here.  
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
{¶ 33} Nevertheless, this precedent is inapplicable here because the first 
trial that is the subject of Judge Muehlfeld’s gag order has not yet commenced.  
Cf. Craig, 331 U.S. at 368, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 91 L.Ed.2d 1546 (a trial court judge 
held a newspaper publisher and reporter in criminal contempt for newspaper 
articles about what had previously transpired in a forcible entry and detainer); 
Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 567-568, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683, (a trial 
court order entered after an open preliminary hearing, which order purported to 
prevent reporting of certain statements made at the hearing, was unconstitutional); 
Natl. Broadcasting Co., 52 Ohio St.3d at 113, 556 N.E.2d 1120 (“if the jurors’ 
names are revealed in open court, or if relators get them from publicly available 
court records, the judge cannot prevent relators from publishing them by an order 
invoking prior restraint, even if he holds a hearing and makes findings sufficient 
to satisfy Kainrad.”  (Emphasis added)). 
{¶ 34} Therefore, in the absence of the first trial having already 
commenced and the press having access to it, the Nebraska Press and Kainrad 
criteria apply to evaluate the propriety of the gag order issued here.  This 
conclusion comports with the United States Supreme Court’s view that it “has 
frequently denied that First Amendment rights are absolute and has consistently 
rejected the proposition that a prior restraint can never be employed.”  Nebraska 
Press, 427 U.S. at 570, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683. 
Application of Criteria to Gag Order 
{¶ 35} After applying the pertinent criteria to the gag order here, we hold 
that the order is unconstitutional for the reasons that follow. 
{¶ 36} First, the order was not supported by evidence introduced on the 
record at a hearing before the judge.  In Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562, 96 S.Ct. 
2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683, the Supreme Court emphasized that the propriety of the 
prior restraint must be examined based on “the evidence before the trial judge 
when the order was entered.”  “The Nebraska [Press] test must be supported by 
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evidence, not speculation.”  State ex rel. Chillicothe Gazette, Inc. v. Ross Cty. 
Court of Common Pleas (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 24, 25, 2 OBR 570, 442 N.E.2d 
747.  There is no evidence of any evidentiary hearing here that preceded the 
court’s issuance of its December 4, 2009 gag order.  And when Judge Muehlfeld 
reaffirmed it upon the Blade’s request for reconsideration following a hearing on 
January 26, there was no evidence submitted.  In the absence of any properly 
introduced evidence, “ ‘there is no reason for a trial court to * * * [conclude] that 
there will be prejudicial publicity * * * and to presume that such publicity will 
create a * * * threat to the administration of justice * * *.’ ”  Id. at 25, quoting 
State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 457, 468-
469, 75 O.O.2d 511, 351 N.E.2d 127. 
{¶ 37} Second, Judge Muehlfeld’s analysis proceeded from the erroneous 
premise that a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial should be 
accorded priority over the media’s constitutional rights of free speech and press.  
As Justice Black cogently observed more than half a century ago in Bridges v. 
California (1941), 314 U.S. 252, 260, 62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192, “free speech 
and fair trials are two of the most cherished policies of our civilization, and it 
would be a trying task to choose between them.”  “The authors of the Bill of 
Rights did not undertake to assign priorities as between First Amendment and 
Sixth Amendment rights, ranking one as superior to the other.”  Nebraska Press, 
427 U.S. at 561, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683.  “When there is a conflict 
between the First and the Sixth Amendment rights, as in the instant case, the trial 
court is required to act to resolve that conflict by protecting both the First and the 
Sixth Amendment rights when, as here, that can be done in a reasonable and 
lawful way.”  Dayton Newspapers, 46 Ohio St.2d at 464, 75 O.O.2d 511, 351 
N.E.2d 127.  The judge’s refusal to accord equal importance and priority to the 
media’s First Amendment rights was thus plainly erroneous. 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
{¶ 38} Third, Judge Muehlfeld mistakenly ruled that the gag order was 
justified in part because of its limited duration.  As Judge Sotomayor of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed, a “prior restraint 
is not constitutionally inoffensive merely because it is temporary.”  United States 
v. Quattrone (C.A.2, 2005), 402 F.3d 304, 310; Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers 
Trust Co. (C.A. 6, 1996),78 F.3d 219, 221, quoting In re Providence Journal Co. 
(C.A.1, 1986), 820 F.2d 1342, 1351 (“even a temporary restraint on pure speech 
is improper ‘absent the most compelling circumstances’ ”).  “[T]he element of 
time is not unimportant if press coverage is to fulfill its traditional function of 
bringing news to the public promptly.”  Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 561, 96 S.Ct. 
2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683. 
{¶ 39} Fourth, Judge Muehlfeld overstated the prejudicial effect of any 
pretrial publicity.  In his on-the-record findings at the January 26 hearing, he 
merely noted that the cases had generated considerable media attention and that 
his voir dire in the first Schwenkmeyer case had taken two days and 40 
prospective jurors before a jury was impaneled.  “ ‘[P]retrial publicity–even 
pervasive, adverse publicity–does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial.’ ”  State v. 
Coley (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 253, 258, 754 N.E.2d 1129, quoting Nebraska Press, 
427 U.S. at 554, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683.  In effect, in the absence of 
evidence submitted to the court, the judge relied on conclusory, speculative 
assertions to support his finding that publicity of the Schwenkmeyer trial could 
deprive Knepley of a fair trial.  This the judge could not lawfully do.  See Presley 
v. Georgia (2010), __ U.S. __, 130 S.Ct. 721, 725, __ L.Ed.2d __, quoting Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside Cty. (1986), 478 U.S. 1, 
15, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1(“ ‘The First Amendment right of access cannot 
be overcome by the conclusory assertion that publicity might deprive the 
defendant of [the right to a fair trial]’ ”). 
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{¶ 40} Fifth, Judge Muehlfeld did not even specify that all other 
alternatives to assure Knepley a fair trial short of the gag order were unavailing.  
In his January 28 entry reaffirming the gag order and his January 26 on-the-record 
statement of reasons for the ratification of that order, the judge did not even 
mention alternatives like voir dire and jury instructions in the Knepley case or 
sequestration of the Knepley jurors while the Schwenkmeyer trial proceeded.  
Although he has now attempted to remedy this defect with after-the-fact evidence 
introduced in this writ action, this evidence was not introduced at the January 26 
hearing and is not properly before us.  See In re Guardianship of Hollins, 114 
Ohio St.3d 434, 2007-Ohio-4555, 872 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 30; cf. State ex rel. Stoll v. 
Logan Cty. Bd. of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-333, 881 N.E.2d 
1214, ¶ 40. 
{¶ 41} Finally, Judge Muehlfeld dismissed some alternatives for reasons 
that are not supported by evidence or precedent.  The judge rejected a change of 
venue because he considered it too costly and because it would infringe upon the 
defendant’s right to be tried in the county in which the offense is committed.  
There was no evidence submitted at the hearing on the cost of changing venue, 
and even if we were to credit the prosecutor’s and judge’s affidavits filed in this 
writ action about the smaller jury pool in Henry County and the costs involved in 
requiring travel to a distant county, the result would not be altered.  Henry County 
borders Lucas County, a populous county, which would offer a more expansive 
jury pool that would be less likely to be impacted by the pretrial publicity.  We 
have also rejected a similar argument concerning costs of changing venue as a 
reason to justify a prior restraint.  Dayton Newspapers, 46 Ohio St.2d at 466, 75 
O.O.2d 511, 351 N.E.2d 127.  And the common pleas court is authorized to order 
the appropriation of reasonable and necessary expenses to cover any additional 
costs.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Hague v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 123 Ohio 
St.3d 489, 2009-Ohio-6140, 918 N.E.2d 151, ¶ 17.  Nor does Knepley’s 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
constitutional right to be tried by an “impartial jury of the county in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed” under Section 10, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution preclude a change of venue.  R.C. 2901.12(K) and Crim.R. 18(B) 
authorize the court to sua sponte change venue when it appears that a fair and 
impartial trial cannot be held where the action is pending. 
{¶ 42} The judge also rejected the continuance of the Knepley trial based 
solely on the fact that Knepley’s counsel had previously requested the same gag 
order when the trials had been scheduled two months apart.  Again, the judge did 
not rely on any evidence that a continuance might minimize any prejudicial 
pretrial publicity resulting from press reports about the Schwenkmeyer trial.  See 
State v. Warner (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 31, 47, 564 N.E.2d 18 (“In order to 
dissipate the effects of adverse pretrial publicity, the judge may continue the case 
until the threat abates”). 
{¶ 43} For all of these reasons, Judge Muehlfeld’s gag order is patently 
unconstitutional. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 44} Therefore, we grant the writ of prohibition to prevent the common 
pleas court and judge from enforcing the gag order restraining the media in 
general and the Blade in particular from reporting on the Schwenkmeyer trial 
before the jury is impaneled in the Knepley trial. 
Writ granted. 
 
PFEIFER, 
ACTING 
C.J., 
and 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
The late CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS J. MOYER did not participate in the 
decision in this case. 
__________________ 
 
Fritz Byers and Scott Ciolek, for relator. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
 
Rayle, Matthews & Coon and Max E. Rayle; and Ronald J. Kozar, for 
respondents. 
 
Lucy A. Dalglish, Gregg P. Leslie, and Mara E. Zimmerman, urging 
granting of the writ for amicus curiae The Reporters Committee for Freedom of 
the Press. 
 
Michael T. Honohan, Carrie L. Davis, and Angela Barstow, urging 
granting of the writ for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio 
Foundation, Inc. 
 
Stephen P. Hardwick, urging denial of the writ for amicus curiae Ohio 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
Arthur, O’Neil, Mertz, Michel & Brown Co., L.P.A., and Clayton J. 
Crates, urging denial of the writ for amicus curiae, David E. Knepley. 
______________________