Case Title: Freitas v. Administrative Director of the Courts. Partial Opinion by J. Acoba. Dissenting Opinion by J. Acoba. S.Ct. Opinion, filed 06/16/2004 [pdf], 104 Haw. 483. S.Ct. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, filed 07/20/2004 [pdf], 105 Haw. 130.

Citation: 108 Haw. 31

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
‘***FOR PUBLICATION*#*

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

 

 

000:

 

DARCY C.K. FREITAS, Petitioner-Appellant

 

ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR OF THE COURTS, STATE OF HAMAI"
Respondent -Appellee

 

SSS

No. 25323

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CTRCUIT
(CASE NO. JRO2~0012)

JULY 25, 2005
HOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY LEVINSON, J. AS TO PARTS I-III
(IDENTIFICATION SIGN-IN PROCEDURE) ;
OPINION OF TRE COURT BY ACOBA, J. AS TO PARTS IV-XIV (MERITS);
AND ACOBA, J., DISSENTING AS TO PART 111
LAL OF F THE LevIN
‘The petitioner-appellant Darcy C.K. Freitas appeals
fron the decision of the district court of the first circuit, the
Honorable Fa’ auuga To’ oto’e presiding, affirming the
adninistrative revocation of Freitas’s driver's license by a
hearing officer of the Administrative Driver’s License Revocation
Office (ADLRO). In his supplenental brief, Freitas argues
(2) that he was denied his state and federal constitutional due
process rights to an open ADLRO hearing on remand, (2) that the
hearing officer “ignored all evidence contrary to her
preconceived determination to uphold the ADLRO sign{-Jin
procedure[,]” and (3) that “the hearing officer's findings of

aa
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——

fact are clearly erroneous and her conclusions of law are
contrary to established law(.]""

In this portion of our opinion, we address Freitas’s
contentions that the ADLRO erred in ruling that the sign-in and
identification procedure employed at ADLRO hearings did not
deprive Freitas of his right to a public hearing. We hold that
the hearing officer's decision was correct, inasmuch as the
procedure satisfies the three-part test that this court
articulated in Freitas v. Admin, Dir, of the Courts, State of
Hawai‘i, 104 Hawai'i 483, 489, 92 P.3d 993, 999 (2004)
(hereinafter, “Ereitas 1”).

 

T. BACKGROUND
on July 14, 2004, the ADLRO conducted a hearing on the
question whether the ADLRO’s sign-in identification procedure
impermissibly limited Freitas’s right to a public hearing. At
the hearing, the deputy attorney general, on behalf of the
respondent-appellee Administrative Director of the Courts

(Director), called two witnesses: Lloyd Shimabuku, security

 

 

1 om appeal to this court in the first instance, Freitas argued,
Anter alia, thet the district court erred in impliedly ruling that
Freitas, was not entitled to a nearing on the ADLRO's restrictions on public
Access fo hearings and that public access to his hearing was not hindered,
thereby resulting in no violation of his state and federal constitutional
Fights to's public hearing.

Tn Freitas v. Adnin. Dir. of the Court, State of Maualii, 104
Hawai'i 493, 404, 52 Pad 993, 994 (2008), this court held, aiter alia, that
Nbecause ABLRO hearings are quasi-judicial administrative hearings, due
process requires that the hearings be public, and... . Freitas wag entitled
Eo'a hearing on his objections to the ADLRO sign-in and identification
Procedure Limiting public access to his hearing.” We therefore temporarily
Penanded the present matter to the ADLRO for a hearing on whether the ADLRO' s
Identification and sign-in procedures violated Freitas’s right to a public
hearing. Id. at 484, 92 P.8d at 994. On July 14, 2004, the ADLEO conducted a
hearing, heating officer Jacqueline L.2. Kaneshiro presiding. On July 16,
2004, the nearing officer entered her findings of fact (FOFs), conclusions of
Taw (Cols), and order determining that the AOLRO' s sign-in and identification
procedure did not inperniseibly interfere with Freitas’s right to a public
hearing.

 

 

 

 

      

 

 
 

*FOR PUBLICATION*#*
a
consultant to several Waikiki hotels and deputy chief in the
investigation division of the state department of the attorney
general; and Ronald Sakata, chief adjudicator for the ADLRO. The
Director also submitted into evidence two articles, one entitled
vA Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Evil:
understanding How Good People Are Transformed Into Perpetrators,”
by Phillip G. Zimbardo, Ph.D., in The Social Psychology of Good
wil: Und n
(Arthur Miller ed., 2004), and the second entitled “Identity and
Anonymity: Some Conceptual Distinctions and Issues for
Research,” by Gary T. Marx, in Documenting Individual Identity
(5. Caplan and J. Torpey eds., 2001). Freitas’'s counsel called
four witnesses to testify: Reneau Charlene Ufford Kennedy,

 

Ph.D., psychologist: Patrick McPherson, attorney; Lois Perrin,
Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, Hawas'l; and
Michael Nakamura, retized chief of the Honolulu Police
Department.

Following the h
hearing officer entered twenty-five written supplemental FOFs and

ring, on July 16, 2004, the ADLRO

 

four written supplemental COLs, which stated in relevant part:
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT.

3." The ADLRO instituted this ID procedure as 2
curity measure te prevent unknown menbers of the ge
public from entering the inner-office area.

a1

 

 

5." te 1D procedure provides a reasonable means of
identifying and apprehending those persons who might engage
in undaetul or inappropriate behavior at an adninistrative

 
 

8. the 10 procedure provi
persons seeking entry past the front desk/reception counter,
Theluding those persone who wish to attend hearings, to
engage in unlaful, disruptive, or otherwise ineppropriate

‘vior while within the hearing and inier-office area.
‘3, “This deterrent effect arises cut of the fact that
persons who kriow that their identity has been recorded will
Seneraity be less Likely to engage in unlawful or
Snapproptiete behavior for the simple reason that they know

bel

 
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Sse

they can be held accountablé
‘R person who remains anonymous, on the other hand,

is more Likely to engage in inappropriate behavior if such

person knows that he of ahe might be able to "get away with

[ee Sha nce be hela accountable. This deterrent effect

nates the 1D procedure an effective security measure.

5° Although the ID procedure is not @ perfect
security measure, it is a fundamental first-step in the
ADLAO's security’ measures.

Jo. wr, Sakata, as Chief Adjudicator of the ADLRO,
instituted this 1D procedure based upon his experience and
connon sense understanding of human behavior...»

ity This finding 19 s1s0 supported by the testimony
of ur. Lioya Shimsbuku, 2 former police officer() and
Current Deputy Chief, special agent, at the Hawai's Attorney
General's office, who also serves as the liaison for
Honelend Security... . Mr. Shimabuku, who testified as en
expert on security neasires {without objection), and who ha
fag direct experience with sign-in and identification
Showing requirenents, testified that a sign-in and
{Genet fication requitenent does have 2 deterrent effect upon
a person who might otherwise be inclined to engage in
Snlawfel cr improper behavior, and that auch a requirenent
Serves as a fundanental or basic security measure.

12, “Articles by Stanford University psychology
professor Phillip ¢. Zimbardo, and M.I.T. emeritus sociology
Professor Gary Te Marx, 0 which no objection was made,
Provide further support for this finding, because these
Eteleles support the principle that anonymity makes people
nore Likely to engege in aggressive, evil, destructive, oF
Uniawéel benawsor. =.

33. "this Hearing Officer finds that these two
articles support the view that the ID procedure, by directly
Stripping « person of his or her anonymity, lessens the
{ikelinood thee the identified person will engage in
Unlawful, harmful, or otherwise inappropriate behavior ==
the adainistrative hearing and within the inner-office

 

    

 

 

 

  

"ia. “Me. Partington also elicited testimony from

former police chief Michael Naksnura that the 1D procedure
would have Little benefit to security, This Hearing Officer
Hinds that this testimony woe not particularly persuasive in
Ligne of the testimony of not only ADLRO Chief Adjudicator
Ronald Sakata, but the testimony of security expert Lloyd.
Shinabuka, and since Mr- Nakamura conceded that the ID
procedure could have sone deterrent effect...

SE: “With respect to attorney R, Patrick MoPherson’s
testimony, a8 elicited by Mr. Partington, in which MePherson
acknowledges that no state coure, trial Or appellate level,
Fequires one to show identification and sign{Jin in order to
attend a court proceeding, this Hearing Officer finds this
testimony unrelated to the ADLRO's unique circumstances in
Which, unlike the court butldings, the area to which
Counsel, respondent, and/or other menbers of the public are
Eequesting access, includes undifferentiated access to the
hesring room a2 well ae all other areas of the ADLRO office,
Including private offices of ADLRO employee: :

7 Peet [the ADLRO does not have separate public
and non-public Secess area(s). This distinguishing factor
Between courte and the ADLRO is critical and material in)
Getermining whether the ADLRO"s ID procedure is warranted.

 

 

 

 

 
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37, thie Hearing Officer finds that other security
measures, including a metal detector, x-ray machine and
Conveyor belt, a hand metal-detecting wand, and someone to
Operate these devices, or posting sheriffs or security
guards (arned or unermed) in or sear the hearing room ~
Nould be expensive and beyond the budget capabilities of the
RDLAO. "the uncontradicted testimony of Chief Adjudicator
Sakata setting forth the approximate costs of some of these
eesures, and how the ADLAO's budget would not allow such
eesures to be taken, supports this finding. On the other
hand, the 1D procedure costs virtually nothing)...

jo “Tafacaition, metal detectors, x-ray machines and
hand metal-detecting wands would do nothing to stop a person
Thtent on aecosting ADLRO staff or hearing attendees by
hand, arm, Leg oF foot, nor would cuch devices prevent
Somone from causing a’ vocal of verbal disturbance to the
Saministrative proceeding. The ID procedure, on the other
hand, could potentially deter such inappropriate
Behavior

5. “rurthermore, metal detection devices may be very
intrugive into person's privacy, by requiring people to
take their things out of their pockets, nave their bags x-
Fayed, oF thelr personal bodies searched by hand wand.

2. “In addition, this Hearing Officer finds that even
it such additional security seasures wore in place =~ 0.9.)
a'netal detector, x-ray conveyor belt, and hand wand, oF a
Security guard -- the ID procedure would provide an
Adsitional security Benetit in the form of deterrence(.]
see there is no less intrusive way to achieve this
particular form of deterrence ~~ based upon depriving
Person of her anonymity -- other than to have the ADERO’s 1D
Procedure in effect. Although security cameras, by
Recording the visual image of a person, do renove some level
of anonymity, they still leave person the chance of
Penaining unidentified, Indeed, security cameras, by
Capturing a continuing end visusl image of hearing
Sttendees, may be equally 4f not more intrusive upon a
person's privacy than the 1D procedure.

23." "thie Hearing Officer finds that there ts no 1
Antrusive way to provide the unigue deterrent effect created
by the ADLRO ID procedure other than to maintain the 20
Procedure, No other security measure could fully substitute
for the special and unique deterrent effect brought about by
Fequiring the showing of a picture 1D and sign-in, as it is
the most effective (and simplest) way of eliminating one
anonymity: es

25)" tnie Hearing Officer finds that although the 10
procedure is not perfect =~ e.9., people can sonetines
Sbtsin fake ID's, and sone people will engage in bad
behavior regardiess of being previdentified —- it renains a
Useful and feasonable security Reasure for the ADLRO. And
the 1D procedure is a very easy and simple process for a
prospective attendee to sect. A driver's license, a state
Eib. or other acceptable picture identification is all that
Se necessary. “If one does not already own a driver's
Lcense, 2 state I.0. can be obtained in most cases by
presenting a social security card, a birth certificate, and
Paying s nominal fee. Indeed, « driver's license, state
Tib., oF other acceptable picture identification, is
domething people need for all sorts of everyday activities,
including for example: check cashing, banking, end air

 

 

 

 

 

 

    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
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ee

rave.
24, thie Hearing Officer finds that although the ID
procedure may deprive a person of his or her anonymity
Tigeed thet de precisely why the 10 procedure has an
effective deterrent effect ~~ that is not an especially
Significant intrusion because # person attending the hearing
Would have their face seen by hearing participants in any
Gvent, Furthermore, the ADLRO as a matter of policy does
fot distribute the sign-in 1ist to anyone, except in the
Gvent someone on that List engages in unlawful activity oF
Greates a disturbance,
uv can

 

 

 

 

T.the TD procedure
interest: “namely; enhancing security and
disruptions at ADLRO adninistrative hearings.

2. "this interest in enhancing security and avoiding
disruptions, and the meant employed, is unrelated to the
Gontent of the information to be disclosed in the
saninistrative proceedins

3. there 1a no less restrictive way to fully serve
this important governmental interest in enhancing security
Gnd avoiding disruptions at ADLRO administrative hearings
ind inner-cffice area, other than to continue with the £0
Procedure, Although other measures can add to security a
Neils there 1s no other less intrusive neans of achieving
the unique deterrent effect that arises out of depriving @
person of his or her anonymity. The ADLRO ID procedure is
Eke least intrusive means of achieving this unique deterrent
effect

i, the ADLRO ID procedure 1s therefore fully
warranted, and does not’ impermissibly interfere with =
Tespondent’s right tos public hearing.

 

 

 

 

 

 

IT. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions

[f0Fs} are reviewable under the clearly
erroneous standard to determine if the agency
Seciaion was clearly erroneous in view of
Fellable, probative, and substantial evidence on
the whole record. "Alvarez v. Liberty louse,
Anse, #5 Hawai'i 275, 277, 342 F.2d 938, 542
(T5541; HRS §. 91-1649) (5)

icots) are freely reviewable to determine
kf the agency's decision was in violation of
constitutional or statutory provisions, in
Gnoese of statutory authority or Jurisdiction of
Agency, of affected by other error of law.

2 ‘84 Hawai'i 305, 310, 933 P.2d
HSS, Tata (1997) (cltations onitted) HRS
$8 91-149) (1), (2), and (8).

TA\GoL that prosents mixed questions
of fact and lau is reviewed under ‘the
Glearly erroneous standard because the
Conelusion is dependent upon the facts and
Circumstances of the particclar case.”

GSounty of Honcluiu, 17 Hawai's 168, 172,

 

 

 
 

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ee

983 .24 629, 633 (1994)...
Pool vi iaval4 Labor Relations Board], 67 Hawas's
{iS1,1 197,995 P.2a (308,) 973 [(1998)]

% 130 fawal"t 384, 392-93, 978 F.2d

822, 830-31 (1955)

‘An FOF oF a mixed determination of law and fact is
clearly erroneous when (1) the record lacks substantial
Evidence to support the finding or determination, or (2)
Sespite substantial evidence to support the finding or
Sotermination, the appellate court is left with the definite
nd fire conviction that a alstake hag been made. "Soa
u abe of 5 S394, 399, 988 P.2d
1220, 1235 11998). "we have defined ‘substantial evidence’
25 cfedible evidence which is ef sufficient quality and
probative value to enable @ person of reasonable caution to
Support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting state v, Kotig, 91
Hawei's 319, 328, 984 P.2a 7, 87 (1999)).

In re Wai‘ola 0 Moloka'i, Inc., 103 Hawai'i 401, 421, 63 P.3d 664,
684 (2004) (quoting In re e Perni ical
Hawai'i 97, 118-19, 9 P.3d 408, 430-31 (2000) (some brackets

 

 

   

 

added and some in original).
B. Questions of Constitutional Law

we answer questions of constitutional law ‘by
exercising our own independent judgnent based on the facts
Of the case,"” and, thus, questions of constitutional lew
Gre reviewed on appeal “under the "right/wrong’ standard.”
State v. Jenkins, 99 Hawaii 87, 100, 997 P.2d 13, 26 (2000)
{eltations omitted)

State v, Aplaca, 96 Hawai'i 17, 22, 25 P.3d 792, 797 (2001).

III, DISCUSSION
In his supplemental brief, Freitas argues that the

hearing officer's supplemental FOFs and COLs upholding the

ADLRO’s sign-in and identification procedure are not supported by

 

substantial evidence in the record and are clearly erroneous. We
disagree.

In Exeitas, we invoked 2 three-faceted formalation for
determining whether a limitation on access permissibly furthers
the legitimate need to maintain “order and dignity” in a public
adjudicative proceeding: “(whether] the regulation serve[s) an

important government interest; (whether) the interest [is]
4**FOR PUBLICATION*#*
unrelated to the content of the information to be disclosed in
the proceeding; and [whether] there [is a] no less restrictive
way to meet that goal.” 104 Hawai'i at 489, 92 P.3d at 999
(quoting Brown ¢ Williamson Tobacco Corp, v. Fed, Trade Comm'n,
710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing United states v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968))) (emphasis deleted). We hold
(2) that the ADLRO’s identification and sign-in procedure serves
an important government interest in securing ADLRO hearings,
(2) that the security procedure is unrelated to the content of
the information disclosed at ADLRO hearings, and (3) that there
is no less restrictive way to meet the goal of securing ADLRO
hearings. As such, we hold that the ADLRO’s identification and
sign-in procedure does not impermissibly infringe upon Freitas’s
constitutional right to a public hearing.

At the hearing on the propriety of the ADLRO's
identification and sign-in procedure, the Director adduced
evidence that the “ADLRO instituted (the] 1D procedure as a
security measure to prevent unknown menbers of the general public
from entering the inner-office area.” The Director further
demonstrated that the identification procedure “provides a
deterrent” to people engaging in “unlawful, disruptive, or
otherwise inappropriate behavior while within the hearing and
inner-office area.” The Director elicited testimony from Chief
Adjudicator Sakata that the ADLRO identification procedure was
established to “provide a deterrent to inappropriate behavior.”
The hearing officer found that the identification procedure was a
“fundamental first [step in the ADLRO’s security measures” and
determined that such a finding was supported by the testimony of
the security expert Shimabuku and the two psychology articles
proffered by the Director.
 

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ee
In United States v, Deluca, 137 F.3d 24 (1st Cir.
1998), the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
held that the trial court’s requirement that trial spectators
present identification before entering the courtroom did not
violate the defendants’ rights to a public trial. In Deluca, a
United States Marshall sua sponte established a screening and
identification procedure for each spectator who wished to enter
the courtroom in order to help offset courtroom security risks.
137 F.3d at 32.
[t)n the circumstances presented here{,] we cannot a
that prudent identification procedures’ suitebly foc
Seterting would-be trial spectators who may pose
Gnscceptable risks =~ either to the security of the
Courtroom oF the integrity of the factfinding proc
feed be held in abeyance pending evidence of an ac
Rtteapt to influence or harm @ witness or juror in
Shtrials. Therefore, though we cannot endorse the
Ghilatera2 action by the United States Marshal, we hold that
(OGis act strip avay the substantial deference due the
district court's subsequent jont that the screening
procedures were warranted
at 34-35. The First Circuit further stated that, “in our
view(,] an appellate court should be hesitant to displace a trial
"Ide at 34.

In the present matter, the Director explained that the

 

 

 

     

 

     

 

 

court’s judgment call in such circumstanc

ADLRO’'s identification and sign-in procedure is designed to
advance the substantial government interest of heightening
security for the ADLRO’s hearings and its inner-office area. We
are thus “hesitant to displace [the ADLRO hearing officer]’s
judgment call in [these] circumstances.” Deluca, 137 F.3d at 34.
Similarly, in Williams v, State, 690 N.E.2d 162 (Ind.

1997), the Indiana Supreme Court held that courtroom security
procedures requiring that each person who was unknown to the
officer at the door show identification and sign in did not
amount to “exclusion” of anyone and, thus, did not implicate the

right to public trial.
‘***POR PUBLICATION***

 

‘The security procedures required that each person who was
luntnown to the officer. show identification and sigh in
Neither requirenent actively excludes anyone. The
identification requirenent introduced « minor procedural
hnurdie to gaining admittance to the trisl by desanding the
production of some form of identification, which is an item
Eeadily available to the genersl. public. ‘mn’ sum, this
Simply is not # case of partial of totel closure of the
Protesdings to the public and so the constitutional right to
B poblic trial is not implicated by the procedures as they

 

Williams, 690 N.£.2d at 168-69, Although the Hilliams court held
that there was no constitutional violation, the court went on to
require that trial courts make findings in support of security

measures imposed beyond those customarily permitted.

Even where the measure does not ancunt to a violation of the
constitutional Fights of the defendant, when access to
public proceedings is impeded, even slightly, the right to
be free to walk into court and assess our justice eysten in
Operation comes under threat. Any such restriction must be
Imposed only with proper Justification. Accordingly, we
Eequire under our supervisory powers that the court make a
finding thet specifically supports any measures taken beyond
tihat is customarily permitted that are likely to affect
Untettered access by the press and public to the courtroom.
The finding need not be extensive, but must provide the
Fessons for the action taken, and’ show that both the burdens
and benefits of the action have Deen considered. This
exercise of supervisory powers applies to trials conducted
Sifter the publication of this opinion

The trial court in this case failed to provide such 3
record. + The coure made no findings as to why the
procedures wore warranted,

Because the court did not provide the r
decision to authorize the procedures, and bec
Goes not clearly substantiate the need for these additional
Precautions, the trial court’s condoning of use of the
Identification procedures does not mest the standard we
announce today.” As an abstract proposition, this kind of
Procedure seems likely to produce both a slight burden and a
Slight benefit. The taking of names 1s perhaps intimidacing
for sone, but the practice siso is likely to help contral
Gourtroom behaviors Because it alerts spectators that the
court con identity them, it may discourage some who Bight’
otherwise have disrupted the proceeding in the hope of
Fensining anonymous. Accordingly, when considering this
Sort of procedure, 2 court must weigh the prospective
Benefits to the ofder and security of the courtroom with the
burdens to the defendant, the press, and the public.

 

 

 

 

    

Id. at 169-70 (footnotes omitted). Consonant with the Williams
rationale, this court temporarily remanded the present matter to
the ADLRO for a hearing on Freitas’s objections to the ADRLO's

10
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identification and sign-in procedure, and the hearing officer
entered FOFs and COLs supporting the procedure. Accordingly, the
hearing officer made findings that “specifically support {] any
measures taken beyond what is customarily permitted” in order to
“substantiate the need for these additional precautions{.]”"

In United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 822 (1997), the United states Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district
court's requirement that all persons entering the courtroom
provide identification did not violate the defendants’
constitutional rights. “The [s]ixth [a]mendment right to a
public trial is not absolute and must, on occasion, give way to
other rights, and interests.” Brazel, 102 F.3d at 1155 (quoting
Waller v, Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45 (1984). “[I]f the
identification procedure can be said to have imposed a closure at
all, it was ‘partial,’ as all persons wishing to enter the
courtroom were allowed to do so provided they identified
themselves as required, and the required identification was not
especially arduous.”

We find no violation of the Constitution. The trial

judge Saplenented the identification procedure bases on her

oun observations for more than s week, confirmed by the

Prosecution, that individuals had bech coming into the

Eourtroon and fixing stares on the witnesses and possibly

Government counsel. The court considered the alternative

Proposed by defendants, but reasonably found it infeasible,

She dia not believe thst, while presiding over the trial,

she could assume the responsibsiity co pick out individuals

the might be trying to influence the witnesses or might

Otherwise pose @ threat to trial participants. Given the

Specific problem that had arisen and the lisited nature of

the rensdy adopted, we see no abuse of discretion in whet

was done.

Brazel, 102 F.3d at 1156.7 See also Bell v, Evatt, 72 F.3d 421,

 

 

 

 

 

2 The dissent seeks to distinguieh Deluca, Williams, and Brazel on

tthe basis that they are “cases addressing the sixth anendnent right toe

publie Erigl” and that, “[{]nasmuch as this case concerns s quasi~judicial
(continved.

  

 

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433 (4th Cir. 1995), cert, denied 518 U.S. 1009 (1996) (holding
that trial court’s prevention of ingress and egress to courtroom
during witness testimony did not violate public-trial right where
“trial judge was merely maintaining order in his courtroom and
ensuring a non-disruptive atmosphere” for participants, press,
and public).

In the present matter, the governmental interest at
stake is the security of ADLRO hearings, which is obviously
unrelated to the hearings’ substantive content. In any event,
Freitas does not argue that the ADLRO hearing officer erred in
applying that portion of the three-part formulation outlined in
Exeitas I. 104 Hawai'i at 489, 92 P.3d at 999.

‘The ADLRO identification and sign-in procedure also

satisfies the third prong of the Freitas I formulation, to wit,
goal of

 

that there be no less restrictive way to meet the ALDRO’
securing their hearings. See 104 Hawai'i at 489, 92 P.3d at 999.

The Director adduced substantial evidence that the costs

 

associated with implementing other security procedures ~~ i.e.,

metal detectors, x-ray machines, additional security guards --

 

-continued)

 

 

adninistvative proceeding before the ADLRO, . . . the defendant’s sixth
Amendment right tos public tris) in a criminal prosecution ie not

Smplicated.” Sleseating opiaion at 51-52 (emphases in original]. Meare not
persuaded. As discussed above, the three-faceted formulation for deteraining

hether a limitation on access to a hearing persissibly furthers the
Tegitinate need to maintain "order and dignity” ins public adjudicative
bearing was taken directly from 30 F.2d at
1199. "sae Ereitas I, 204 aval't ot 405, 52 Pio at 999. Broun & Mitlianaon
was cited with approval in Detroit Free Press v Asheroft, 195
Fesupp, 20 937, 945 n.8 (E.0. Mich. 2002), upon whach we expressly relied in
Eieitas I. See Ereitas 1, i0d Hawai'i at d#s~e9, 92 P.34 at 996-99. "Rnd
Betcolt fice Beess, which’ sovoived « quasi-judicial adninistrative deportation
hearing, expressly relied on
His 0.8, 1'ViSe6)7 Sehicn held shat the Tight OF crisinel defenaanes to pubic
lings resides in the Sixth Anendnent’. . - .” Gea Exeitag I, 104
e486, 488, 92 P.3d at 596, 998. Tt is inconceivable to us that
constitutional right to a public hearing in an administrative
driver's license revocstion hearing is broader than a criminal defendant's
Constitutional right toa public trial.

12

 

 
  

  
 

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were not fiscally feasible. further to the foregoing, the
hearing officer found that such additional security measures
would not obviate the efficacy of the ADLRO’s current
identification and sign-in procedure in any event. ‘The security
expert, Shimabuku, testified that the ADLRO’s identification
procedure provided “a separate and beneficial deterrent effect”
to any additional security procedures, Freitas’s contention that
“the ADLRO is part of the Judiciary and[) if the Judiciary can
afford to put metal detectors and deputy sheriffs in the courts,
it can certainly afford to put a metal detector and/or a deputy
sheriff in the ADLRO(,]” is both unsupported and unpersuasive.
Although Freitas further postulates that “Lalnything that
discourages pubic participation in the functioning of government

is intolerable if the interests of the government can be achieved

 

by alternative means,” (emphasis in original), recommendations
contained within the Security Assessment? specifically concluded
that “[aldditional security measures will be costly, create
inconvenience, and increase workload for the receptionist.” The
hearing officer’s conclusion that there is no less restrictive
means of securing ADLRO hearings is supported by substantial
evidence. Consequently, the inquiry into whether the
identification procedure as implemented at ADLRO hearings is the
least restrictive means of achieving the goal of providing
security at hearings has been satisfied.

‘The ADLRO’s identification and sign-in procedure is
reasonably tailored to meet the security needs of ADLRO hearings.

 

> ‘the Supplemental Record on Appeal contains a written Security
Assessment. prepared by the Department of Public Safety for the ADLIO at the
ADLRO's request, which was received by the ADLRO on May 30, 2001.

13
 

‘***FOR PUBLICATION*
Furthermore, the Director satisfied the burden of establishing
the reasonableness of the ADLRO sign-in and identification
procedure. The ADLRO’s procedure in no way, in and of itself,
deprives parties of a public hearing. Therefore, we hold that
the hearing officer's decision upholding the sign-in and
identification procedure at ADLRO hearings is supported by

substantial evidence and that Freitas’s constitutional right to a

 

public hearing was not impermissibly infringed.

A majority of this court has decided that the sign-in
and identification procedure of the Administrative Driver's
License Revocation Office (ADLRO) was valid. Therefore, we turn

to the merits of Freitas’s appeal.

Ww.
We hold that (1) the administrative hearing procedures
of the ADLRO did not violate Freitas’s due process rights and
(2) the district court did not err in failing to reverse the
hearing officer’s decision which was based on prior rulings of
the district court, which, by their very nature, are unpublished
and have no precedential effect. Based on the foregoing, we
affirm the judgment of the District Court of the First Circuit,

uu
 

‘*#*FOR PUBLICATION)

 

Honolulu Division‘ (the court) affirming the decision of the
ADLRO, and thereby sustaining the revocation of Freitas’s

driver’s License.

v.

‘As mentioned in the prior remand, see Ereitas 1, 104
Hawai'i 483, 92 P.3d 993, on January 16, 2002, Freitas was
arrested for driving under the influence of an intoxicating
Liquor (OUI). On January 17, 2002, he was issued a notice of
License revocation for DUI. On January 23, 2002, Frietas’s
driver's license revocation was sustained by @ review officer of
‘the ADLRO. On January 30, 2002, Freitas requested a hearing.

then the hearing began, the hearing officer admitted
into evidence all of the documents that were contained in the
ADLRO case file. The hearing officer denied counsel’s request to
subpoena ADLRO Chief Adjudicator Ronald Sakata to testify about
the identification procedure which required anyone attending an
ADLRO hearing to sign in and produce picture identification. the
hearing officer did not permit @ hearing on this matter.

After raising the above requests, counsel asked the
hearing officer to follow a hearing procedure as set forth ina

written document presented by him.? The hearing officer declined

 

     

 

‘the Honorable Fa‘ auuga Tofeto'o presided over this natte
+ the procedure provided as follows:
‘The arrestee hereby requests that the following

 

 

procedure be followed st this hearing becau:
Adzinistrative revocation schene contemplates, that this
procedure will be followed pursuant to (Mawai's Revised
Statutes] #.R.S. § 2918-38]?
1.""the hearing officer receives into evidence
‘only the sworn statements described in H.R.S. § 2915~
36(a) (2) and (2) and competent evidence of any prior
Aleohol contacts (H-R-S- § 2918-38 (g) and (h)):
(continued...)

 

 

 

  

45
**#FOR PUBLICATION***
—
counsel's offers instead the hearing officer indicated she would
1) allow counsel to raise any issues; 2) start calling witnesses;

then 3) proceed with arguments.

[Counsel]: And if you're not willing to follow that
T wlan to know what procedure is going to be

ing Officer): Well, Lhaven't reviewed the

 

fate a ine an
‘Shen, i7m going to start calling the witness

Mee aguslly, start with the arresting officer(]
[tyhen Twill proceed £0 hear your argunents after that.

   

*(..seontinued)

 

2, _I£ the hearing officer is satisfied that the
three prong test has not been met, the hearing officer
Eescings the revocation and the hearing is over,
Tien.8: $ 2918-38(e) the three prong test is (1)
fessonable suapicion to stop, (2) probable cause to
Believe arrestee DUI, and (3) proof of OUI - (Kernan

SEitew, 1, 30, 856 B.24. 1207, 1222-(1993));
Si xe the heating officer is satisfied that the
three prong test has been met, the bearing officer 20
Hinds and the arrestee is given an opportunity to
Offer evidence to refute any part of the three prong
fest or any prior élcohel contact (Kernan v. Tenska,
SS haw, 1138, 856 P.2d 1207, 1222 (2993177
"d. "12 there 13 any other competent evidence
which has become relevant by virtue of the arrestee!
Uvidence, whether documents in the file, through
Witness, or otherwise, the hearing officer may receive
Buch evidence (H-R.S-8 2918-38(d) (3))7
S. the hearing officer makes findings and
either rescinds of upholds the revocation (H.R.S.
$281-838(d) (6))7
6 Tf the revocation {8 upheld, the hearing
officer makes findings as to any prior alcobel
Contacts and the consequences thereof (H.R.S. $2916~
ao).
Pursuant to H.R.S. § 2516-38(a), the purpose of this hearing
fs Sto Feview the (aduinistrative review) decision,” nok
Conduct s de nave hearing. ‘Thus, the hearing officer has no
power to increase the revocation period set at the
Saninistretive review.

YE the hearing officer is unwilling to follow this
procedure, the hearing officer 1s hereby requested to sti

hat procedure will be followed, which party has the

Bitden of proot, and whether and when the burden of
producing evidence ever shifte in the course of the hearing.

 

 

 

 

 

    

 

 

16
***FOR PUBLICATION*#*

 

 

[Counsel]: _{W)ho has the burden of proof? Does
burden of producing evidence ever shift inthis case? These

 

You may proceed, counsel, with you
to examine the officers or
ae well
lot vour (a4

   

No. haven't had tine to even

(Counsei]: Welt, T ask that you read it. 7 think I'm
required to do that.
{Wearing Officer}: I don’t believe so. I believe the
‘asking now, would you like to examine
‘and put any other issues on the record at

 

 

   

(Smphases added.)
‘The arresting officer, Officer Lorica, then testified
d to him from the

 

that at the time of Freitas’s arrest, she r
driver's implied consent form entitled, “Administrative
Revocation of Driver's License and Motor Vehicle Registration
Form.” This form referred to HRS chapter 286, Part XIV (Supp.
2000) (repealed effective January 1, 2002, and replaced with HRS
chapter 2918, Part III).

‘The Intoxilyzer operator failed to appear to testify.
As a result, the hearing officer excluded an Intoxilyzer test*
result obtained from Freitas. After the test result was
excluded, counsel objected to the ADLRO asserting jurisdiction,

maintaining that a “valid breath or blood test or refusal is a

 

jurisdictional requirement for administrative revocation.”
Counsel also argued that the implied consent form the police read
to Freitas referred to Chapter 286, Part XIV, which had been

repealed, and that the Notice of Administrative Revocation failed

 

‘an intoxilyzer test measures an individual's blood alcohol
concentration by a breath sample. ia8
Hawai 133, 134 1.2, 997 P-2d 95, 60 n-2 (App. 2000)

 

93

   

vv
    

"FOR PUBLICATION:
eee
to explain the distinction between the administrative revocation
and criminal suspension or revocation as required by HRS § 2916-
34(a) (2) (Supp. 2002).

‘The hearing officer sustained the revocation of
Freitas's driver's license pursuant to HRS § 291£-38(e) in
written decision dated March 13, 2002. But, the hearing officer
found that Freitas had not been properly informed “of the
sanctions and consequences of the law as it was in effect on the
day of his arrest{,]” apparently because the implied consent form
referred to a repealed statute. The hearing officer determined
in effect, that the proper remedy was to strike Freitas’s
Intoxilyzer test result. Based on other evidence, the hearing
officer determined that Freitas operated his vehicle while DUI:

1, there existed reasonable suspicion for officer
erica, to For tees tted probable cause Go believe that

[rreicas) operated the vehicle while under the influence of
an intexteant-

 

3 ex we 0! 2) vee
xeault, she tenaindes of tha record pevertheless reflects be

rat of the evident Fr a
Sabicle while under the influence of en intonicant.

Siteitas's] five (5) year driving record preceding
tthe date of arrest (January 17, 2002) shows no alcohol
cntorcenent contact or drog enforcement contact, as defined
Tnaes 9 2928-1

‘Sy Pursuant to HRS § 2916~41{"), the period of
revocation that may be imposed on (Freitas) is a minimun of
three months up toa maximum period of one year.

 

7 HRS § 2918-41 states in relevant part,
(b) The periods of adninistrative revocation with respect to
a License and privilege to operate a vehicle, and sotor vehicle
Zegistration if applicable, that shall be imposed under this part
are as follow

 

 

 

(2) A minimum of three months up to 2 maximum of one year
Tevocetion of license and privilege to operate a
Yenicle, if the respondent's record shows no prior
[lcohe! enforcement contact oF drug enforcenent
Contact guring the five years preceding the date the
notice of administrative revocation was Lrsued.

 

18
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***
‘Therefore, it is the decision of the director, by the
undersigned Hearing Officer, that. (Freitas’s] driver's
License be revoked for a period of thres months, from
February 17, 2002 through and ineluding May 16, 2002.
(Emphasis added.)
The findings in the decision cited to unpublished

district court decisions in other ADLRO cases. Freitas appealed

 

to the court.
on August 13, 2002, the court affirmed the hearing
officer by a written decision.’ A separate judgment filed on the
same day stated that, “[plursuant to the Decision and Order
Affirming Adninistrative Revocation entered herein on August 13,

2002, Administrative Revocation is affirmed.”

vr.
The identification sign-in procedure aside, on appeal,
Freitas essentially argues that the court erred (1) in impliedly
ruling (a) that the administrative hearing procedure did not deny
Freitas his rights to due process of law under the Fifth and
Fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution’ and

 

+ the district court’s August 13, 2002, written decision states:

‘the (pletition for [Judicial [xJeview in this case
ame on for hearing en May 3, 2002. {Counsel}
Sppeared for the Petitioner, who wae fot present.
Respondent did not appear. The (c]ourt considered the
Submissions and arguments of counsel and the records
and {ides herein.

‘The [clourt finde none of the arguments raised by
Counsel sufficient to warrant reversal, and the
[elourt find no reversible ezror In the record.

For these reasons, the Director's decision is

 

[aftirmed) .
the Fifth amenduent states in relevant part that “Inlo person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,

 

(Emphasis adée
‘the Fourteenth Amendments
shall . . . depeive any person of life,

   

es in relevant part that “[nJo state
Liberty or property, without dus
(cont ined,

   

 

19
***FOR PUBLICATION***
Article I, § § of the Hawai'i Constitution" or (b) the mandate of
Chapter 291, Part ITZ, and (2) in failing to reverse the hearing
officer for citing to unpublished district court ADLRO decisions

to justify her decision.

vir.

Review of a decision made by a court upon its review
of an adninistrative decision is a secondary appeal. The
standard of review is one in which this court must determine
whether the court under review was right or wrong in its
decision.” Soderiund v. Admin, Dir. of the Courts, 96 Hawai'i
114, 118, 26 P.3d 1214, 1218 (2001) (internal quotation marks,
citations and brackets omitted) (vacating and remanding the
district court’s amended decision affirming the revocation of
notorist’s driver's license for driving under the influence of
alcohol). HRS § 291E-40 (Supp. 2002)" governs judicial review
by the district court of an administrative revocation of a

driver's license by the Director.”

 

continued)
process of Iau; ner deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the lawe.” (Empaasis added.)

 

article 2, § § of the Hawai'i Constitution states that “(nlo
Person shall be deprived of life, Liberty or property
Tae “nor be denies the equal protection of the laus, nor be denied the
Seioyent of the person's civil rights or be discriminated against
exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex of ancestry.” (Enph

‘che
S added)

 

   

1M HRG § 2918-40 {9 the recoditied version of HRS § 286-260 (1999)
In provision (a), “arrestee” was substituted with “respondent” and “offens
wis substituted with “incident.” Section (a) was added to the new version.

 

1 HRS § 2918-40 states in relevant part as follows:

Oudicial reviews procedure. (a) If the director
sustains the administrative revocation after an
Adninistrative hearing, the respondent . .. may file =
Petition for judicial review within thirty days after the
Easinistrative nearing decision is mailed. The petition
(continued...)

20
‘***POR PUBLICATION**#*

 

vir.
On appeal we review findings of fact under the clearly
erroneous standard . Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Roe, 96
Hawai'i 1, 11, 25 P.3d 60, 70 (2001). Findings of fact are
“clearly erroneous when the record lacks substantial evidence to
support the finding.” Id. (quoting In ve Water Use Permit
Applications, 94 Hawai'i 97, 119, 9 P.3d 409, 431 (2000)).
“ ‘Substantial evidence’ is credible evidence which is of
sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of
reasonable caution to support a conclusion.” Id. (brackets,
internal quotation marks, and citation omitted); see Leslie v.
Estate of Tavares, 91 Hawai'i 394, 399, 984 P.2d 1220, 1225
(1999). Findings of fact are also clearly erroneous when
“despite substantial evidence to support the finding . . . , the
appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction in
reviewing the entire evidence that a mistake has been made.”
Child support Enforcement Agency, 96 Hawai'i at 11, 25 P.3d at
70. “Hawai'i appellate courts review conclusions of law de novo,
under the right/wrong standard.” Leslie, 91 Hawai'i at 399, 984
P.2d at 1225 (citations omitted).

 

(continued)
‘shall be fled with the clerk of the district court in the
Gistrict in which the incident occurred and shall be
accompanied by the required filing fee for civil
‘acetone.

{ci ine sole issues before the court shall be whether
the director
(2) Exceeded constitutional or statutory authority:
(2) Erronesusly interpreted the Laws
(3) Acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner;
(2) Conaitted an abuse of discretiony or
(5) Made determination thet was unsupported by the
evidence in the record.
(d) the court shail not renand the matter back to the
director for further proceedings consistent with its order.

   

2
**#FOR PUBLICATION***

—_—_— se
m%

As mentioned, Freitas asserts that he was deprived of
due process because the clear mandate of HRS chapter 2916 was
violated. His subsidiary points appear to be (1) that the
revocation law, HRS chapter 291£, Part III, does not expressly
set forth a specific procedure to be followed at an
administrative hearing, (2) that in seeming contradiction, “HRS §
2918-38(a) provides [that] . . . the function of the
administrative hearing is to ‘review the (administrative review]
decision,’ but the person arrested for DUI may call witnesses and
offer witnesses,” suggesting it is a de novo hearing, (3) the
plain language of HRS § 291E-37(c} (3) and HRS $ 291E-38(h) does
not authorize receipt of the entire ADLRO file or police report
into evidence, (4) HRS chapter 291E, Part III, requires that
there be a valid chemical test or refusal for the ADLRO to assert
jurisdiction.

‘As to his subsidiary arguments (1) and (2), Freitas
proposed a procedure, which he argued would not offend due
process!” and would reconcile the “apparent conflict” he
perceived between a de novo hearing’ and the hearing officer's
role of administrative review. In Desmond v. Admin, Dir. of the
Courts, 91 Hawai" 212, 219, 982 P.2d 346, 353, (App. 1998)
[nereinafter, Desmond I], rev'd on other arounds, 90 Hawai'i 301,
978 P.2d 739 (1999) (hereinafter, Desmond II], the motorist

 

 

gee gupra note 5. Of course, there 18 nothing to p:
hearing officer trom adopting such s procedure or the legislature from
enacting it.

 

A hearing de noua is defined as follows: “Generally, 2 new
hearing or a hearing fer the second tine, contemplating an entize trial in
Sone manner in which matter Was originally heard and 2 review of previous

 

hearing, [Generally oln [a] hearing "de flovo’ court hears matter as court of
driginsl end net appellate Juriediction.”” Black's Law Dictionary 649 (Sth ed.

1579)
22
‘***FOR PUBLICATION*#*
proposed a hearing procedure almost identical to the procedure
supported by Freitas in this case." The Intermediate Court of
Appeals (ICR) held, however, that the hearing officer “did not
err in following her procedure rather than the procedure proposed
by [the notorist]” and rejected contentions similar to those
raised by Freitas. Id, It was concluded “that the applicable
law does not require the {hJearing [o]fficer to follow the
procedure proposed by Desmond.” Id. at 218, 982 P.24 at 352. On
certiorari, this court affirmed the ICA, except on a matter not
relevant to this issue. See Desmond II, 90 Hawai'i 301, 978 P.2d
738.

 

We observe that procedural due process requires that a
person have an “opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and
in @ meaningful manner." Farmer v, Admin. Dir. of the Courts, 94
Hawas't 232, 238, 11 P.3d 457, 463 (2000). This court has said
that providing @ presuspension revocation hearing “sufficiently
assure(d] reliable results and provide(d] adequate due process.”
Id, at 239, 11 P.3d at 464. Freitas was afforded such a hearing
on March 8, 2002, where witnesses were called and he was

represented by counsel."* The ADLRO program has been examined

aiso

 

™% the counsel representing Freitas in the present
represented the petitioner in the Desmond case.

 

uns § 2918-38 sets forth the requirements of the hearing and

states in relevant pare:

 

(b) the hearing shall be held by the director, as
close to the location where the notice of administrative
Fevocation was issued ss practical,

(c) The respondent may be represented by coun
Af the respondent is under the age of eighteen, mise
‘accompanied by a parent or guardian.

 

   

ai
authority 22
Jai" deninister oaths and affirmations:
ToL aninesitnesees tone tastinanee
a EZ s7

 

23
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***
ee
and found not to violate due process. Kernan, 75 Haw. at 25-32,
256 P.2d at 1219-22; Farmer, 94 Hawai'i at 238, 11 P.3d at 463;
Desmond I, 91 Hawai'i at 220, 982 P.2d at 354. In addition, the

 

hearing officer advised counsel of the procedure that she was
going to follow consistent with the caution that “[ilt is
advisable that, at the conmencenent of the administrative
hearing, the (hlearing (0) fficer inform the parties what
procedure he or she will follow.” Desmond I, 91 Hawai'i at 219,
982 P.2d at 353, In light of the foregoing, we do not believe
reversible error was conmitted and, thus, decline Freitas’s
invitation to overrule Desmond I.

lie observe, however, as previously noted in the facts,
that the hearing officer's procedure consisted of ascertaining
issues raised by Freitas and then proceeding to the calling of
witnesses starting with the arresting officer. In Desmond I, the
ICA pointed out that in Kernan, 75 Haw. at 30, 856 P.2d at 1222,

this court directed that the grounds for revocation must first be

 

§(. .seontinved)
“4 Lesue subpoenes:
SL Regulate the course and conduct of the hearina:
aud.
4. Makea tinal ruling

ig) Zhe respondent's prior alcohol and drug
enforcement contacts shall be entered into evidence.

th) The sworn statenente provided in section 2916-36
shall be admitted into evidence, The director shall
Consider the sworn statements in the absence of the Law
enforcement officer or other person. Upon written notice to
the digector, no later than five days prior to the hearing,
that the respondent wishes to examine = law enforcenent
officer of other person who made s sworn statenent, the
Gkfector, the director shall issue @ suppoena for the
officer or other person to appear at the hearing. Personal
Service upon the law enforcenent officer or other person who
made a sworn statenent shall be made no later than forty~

If the officer or

or other person at

 

 

 
 
 

(Emphasis added.)

24
 

*FOR PUBLICATION***

 

established before the arrestee proceeds with his or her
evidence." 91 Hawai'i at 218, 982 P.2d at 352. Accordingly,
insofar as the hearing officer may have conveyed the suggestion
that Freitas was to “raise [his] issues” at the beginning of the
hearing, it should be made clear that an arrestee cannot be
called on to respond or to “raise any issues” before the initial

burden of proof with respect to revocation is satisfied.

x.

As to Freites’s third argument, HRS $ 2916-37(c) (Supp.
2002) sets forth the matters the administrative officer “shall
consider” in conducting the administrative review. HRS § 291E-
37(c) states in pertinent part that “falny sworn or unsworn
written statement or other written evidence provided by the
respondent [and] . . . [t]he sworn statement of any law
enforcement officer or other person or other evidence or

information required by section 2918-36" shall be considered.

 

th Desmond 1, the ICA, quoting Kernan, sald:

‘he arrestes doesnot _have to present apy evidence
Dati the reviewing officer determines thar sufficient:

aie to prove that: {I} reasonable
Suspicion existed to stop the vehicle: (2) probable
cause existed to believe the arrestee was driving
under the influence; and (3) by a preponderance of the
evidence, the arrestee did in fact drive under the
Influence. Only after these burdens have Deen met
Goes the arrestee carry any burden of contrary proof.

 

 

Kernan establishes that the police have the initial bursen’
‘pinrovina certain {acts before the arrestes bears burden of
Poontrary proof.”

added) .

 

91 Mawas's at 238, 982 P.2d at 352 (empha

HRS § 2918-36 provics

 

tn relevant part:

Documents required to be submitted for adninistrative
zeview; sworn statesents. (a) Whenever = respondent has been
arrested for a violation of section 2918-61 and submits to's
fost that establishes: the respondent’ s alcohol

 

 

(continued...)

25
**#FOR PUBLICATION***

 

In Desmond I, the ICA disagreed with contentions similar to those
The ICA stated that “the [hJearing [0] fficer
(a) all unsworn

raised by Freitas.
must exclude from the record only the following:
statements (except the arrest report) of law enforcenent
officials who do not appear to testify; and (b) all other
evidence that is both irrelevant and prejudicial.” 91 Hawai'i at
220, 982 P.2d at 354, The ICA stated that “[a]n agency should
receive all evidence which is competent, relevant and material,
regardless of its weight, and a refusal to hear such evidence can
constitute a denial of due process.” Id.

Freitas has failed to demonstrate how admitting the
entire ADLRO file and police report contravenes the
administrative revocation statute, and violates due process.
cannot agree with his argument regarding an alleged inconsistency
between HRS § 2918-37(c) (3) and HRS § 291E-38(h)." We note that

We

(continued)
‘concentration was .08 or mores the presence, in the
Fesponaent’s blood or urine, of any drug that is capable of
impairing the respondent's ability to operate a vehicle in
careful and prudent manner; or whenever’ a respondent has
been involved in a collision resulting in injury or death
and a blood or urine test performed pursuant to section
25le"21 establishes that the respondent's alcohol
Concentration was .08 oF more establishes the presence in
‘the respondent's blood or urine of any drug thet is capable
Of impairing the respondent's ability to operate a vehicle
in a'eareful and prudent manner,

 

 

 

 

 

i the arrest report or the report of
the law enforcenent officer who issued the
notice of administrative revocation to the
person involves in a collision resulting sn
injury oF death and the sworn statement of the
arissting law enforcement officer or the officer
bio issued she notice of adinistrative
revocation, stating factal.l

(emphases added.)

 

% Freitas argues that HRS § 2918-37(c) (3), pertaining to docusents
that must be forwarded to the administrative director of the courts upon sn
arrest for OUI, is inconsistent with HRS § 2916-38 (n), mandating that sworn

Statements shail be admitted into evidence. We do not perceive any.
(continued...)

 

26
***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

admission of the ADLRO file and police report may be barred if
irrelevant or prejudicial. Freitas has not provided any evidence
that the admission of the entire record or the police report was

irrelevant or prejudicial.

Furthermore, although the plain language of the statute
states that an “arrest report” shall be considered, legislative
history fails to provide guidance in defining this term. While
the hearing officer was not required by statute to admit the
police report for her review, we cannot say the hearing officer
reversibly erred when she did so. Freitas does not specify which
items received in evidence, including the police report, were

irrelevant or prejudicial.”

xz.
As to his fourth argument, Freitas contends that
to the “distinction

 

because he was not properly informed
between an administrative license revocation and a license

suspension in a criminal DUI case . . . as required by H.R.S.
§ 2916-33(a) (2),” he should be entitled to restoration of his

 

(. .scontinued)
Inconsistency because ERS § 2518-38 does not prohibit the admission of #
police report or the entire ADLAO file. Moreover, the fact that HRS § 291E~
51h) “refers only to sworn statements provided for in HRS § 2916-36 and not
police reports, does not necessarily indicate a legislative intent to prohibit
police reports’ fron adaission into evidence at an adninistrative hearing,
assuming their relevance and non-prejudicial nature. Sea Desmond II, 90
Hawai'i at. 301-02, 978 F.2d at 738-40 (holding that the only evidence

hearing officer sust exclude are (a) unsworn statements and (b) irrelevant end
prejudicial evidence) «

 

= om » 80 Hawas"s 358, 910 P.24 129 (App. 1995),
Serb. denied, 60 Hawali 351, 306-67, 910 P.2d 128, 137-138 (1996), the
Petitioner similarly “objected to ‘sdnitting ali the documents in the file’
But faillea), ‘on appeal, to identify what items in the ‘file’ were
objectionable.” Ig, A in the present case, the hearing officer received
Into evidence ‘all’ of the docunents contained in the case file and made. the
part of the record. Counsel objected. The ICA affirmed the hearing officer's
Gecision. Tt reasoned that “(HAS § 2926-38 (d)(3)] does not otherwise Limit
the discretion of the Director in determining what evidence is relevant. Id.
at 366, 910 P.2d at 137.

 

 

 

 

     

20
 

‘*#*FOR PUBLICATION:

 

driving privileges. In this regard, Frietas asserts that “the
legislature did not intend that the police may forego entirely
the reading of the implied consent law so long as they can
provide a sworn statenent showing that the person was under the
Anfluence[,] applying the subjective test of H.R.S. § 291E~
61(a) (1). In this case, the hearing officer refused to adit
the intoxilyzer results. We believe this is an adequate
safeguard in the situation where the police fail to adequately
notify the defendant of the implied consent law.

Wowhere is it indicated that notice of the implied
consent law was intended to act as a jurisdictional prerequisite
to a License revocation hearing. Rather, notice was required to
inform motorists of the consequences of agreeing or refusing to
consent to a DUI test. See State v. Garcia, 96 Hawai'l 200, 208,
29 P.3d 919, 927 (2001) (Nakayama, J. dissenting, joined by
Ramil, J.) (reiterating the exclusionary rule that remedy for

nt rule was exclusion of intoxilyzer

 

violation of implied con:
test); state v, Wilson, 92 Hawai'i 45, 49, 987 P.2d 268, 272
(1999) (Nakayama, J. dissenting, joined by Ramil, J.) (announcing
exclusionary rule and holding that implied consent law was
intending to protect the rights of the driver “to enable the
driver to knowingly and intelligently consent to or refuse a

 

chemical alcohol test”).

XII,
Finally, Freitas contends that the district court erred
in failing to reverse the hearing officer’s decision because the
hearing officer cited to unpublished district court ADLRO
decisions. See Kena v. Gaddis, 91 Hawai'i 200, 204 n.4, 982 P.2d

28
***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

334, 338 n.4 (1999) (clarifying that “decision and orders issued
in unrelated . . . cases that were not reviewed on appeal and
addressed in published decisions have no precedential value”).
Freitas relies on Chun v. Bd. of Trustees of the Employees’ Ret
Sva., 92 Hawai'i 432, 446, 992 P.2d 127, 142 (2000) (citations
omitted) which stated that, “[a]lthough this jurisdiction has yet

 

expressly to articulate the rule, other jurisdictions have

 

adopted the position that unpublished decisions of trial courts
have no precedential value.”

In opposition, the State argues that regardless of
whether the court cited to unpublished or published trial court
decisions, “the only time reversal of a lower court decision is
warranted is when the legal result or position adopted by the
lower court is found to be erroneous as a matter of law.” Me
agree with thie proposition. Cf, Roe v. Hawai'i Labor Relations
Bd., 87 Hawai‘ 191, 197, 953 P.2d $69, 575 (1998) (holding that
Af upon review the circuit court's decision is correct, the
circuit's court’s decision “will not be disturbed on the ground
that it gave the wrong reason for its ruling”); Delos Reves v.
Kubovama, 76 Hawai'i 137, 140, 870 P.2d 1281, 1284 (1994)
(holding that appellate court may affirm grant of summary
judgment based on any ground appearing in the record, even if
circuit court did not rely on it).
wing officer's decision, it appears

 

In reviewing the h
that the hearing officer cited to a nunber of unpublished
district court decisions. However, inasmuch as the hearing
officer's decision did not involve any reversible error, the
court did not reversibly err when it did not reverse the hearing

officer’s decision.

29
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

XIII.
For the foregoing reasons, the court's August 13, 2002
judgment affirming the administrative revocation of Freitas’s

driver's license, is affirmed.

on the briets: Gm

Earle A. Partington

for petitioner-appellant. iA te

Girard D. Lau, Pecsecse COT seecteey are
Deputy Attorney General,

State of Hawai'i wae
for respondent appellee.

Une riety

30
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

DISSENTING OPINION BY ACOBA, J.
I respectfully dissent as to the partial majority
opinion in Part ITI, upholding the ID procedure of the
Administrative Driver‘s License Revocation Office (ADLRO). The
ID procedure constituted an unconstitutional limitation on
Freitas’s right to a public hearing. ‘The partial opinion in Part
III, sanctioning as it does a sign-in procedure at public

hearings, will have a deleterious and potentially inhibiting

 

effect on the right to attend similar hearings freely and openly
and without needless restriction, but more troubling, it diverts
focus in any particular case from measures actually aimed at
preventing disruptions and ensuring safety. I would hold that
Freitas’s hearing should have been open without the restrictions

imposed by the ADLRO procedure and order that future hearings be

 

80 conducted subject only to security measures previously
identified by the Department of Public Safety (DPS) that are

appropriate.

 

First, in my view, the essential supplemental findings
of the ADLRO hearing officer, including the reference to the
budget capabilities of the ADLRO, see infra page 45, are not
‘supported by substantial evidence. In the absence of substantial

 

evidence, the findings were clearly erroneous and the conclusions
from which they were derived, wrong. Second, assuming arquende
there was substantial evidence, the record gives rise to a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. Third, the
hearing officer did not apply the test adopted in Freitas v
Admin. Dir. of the Courts, State of Hawai'i, 104 Hawai'i 483, 92

P.3d 993 (2004) [hereinafter, Freitas 1], correctly and, thus,

31
***FOR PUBLICATION***
—_—_— sss
committed reversible error in her legal conclusion. On the
grounds set forth herein, a person exercising reasonable caution
would not conclude that the evidence submitted was of sufficient
quality so as to support the conclusion that the ADLRO 1D

procedure prevents disruption of hearings, and is the least

 

restrictive manner of implementing security. Finally, the cas

relied upon by the majority to uphold the ID procedure concern

 

the sixth amendment right to a public trial, and, hence, are
distinguishable and inapplicable.
I.

‘This court previously held inter alia, that “because

ADLRO hearings are quasi-judicial administrative hearings, due
process requires that the hearings be public, and. . . Freitas
was entitled to a hearing on his objections to the ADLRO sign-in
and identification procedure limiting public access to his
hearing.” Freitas I, 104 Hawai'i at 483-64, 92 P.3d at 993-94.
‘Thus, on June 16, 2004, this court remanded this case temporarily
to the ADLRO to afford Freitas @ hearing on his objections to the
ID procedure that limited public access to his hearing. Id. at
484, 92 P.3d at 994. The hearing was held on July 14, 2004 at
‘the ADLRO offices. Following remand, the ADLRO submitted
supplemental conclusions of law and an order on the public
hearing issue.

on behalf of the ADLRO, the deputy attorney general
called to witnesses, Lloyd Shimabuku, security consultant to
several Waikiki hotels and special agent with the state
Department of the Attorney General, and Ronald Sakata, Chief
Adjudicator of the ADLRO. Respondent-Appellee Administrative

Director of the Courts, State of Hawai'i (Director) also

32
***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

submitted tvo articles: “A Situationist Perspective on the

Understanding How Good People are

 

Psychology of Evi:
Transforned Into Perpetrators,” by Phillip G. Zimbardo and
“Identity and Anonymity: Sone Conceptual Distinctions and Issues
for Research," by Gary T. Marx.

Freitas’s counsel called four witnesses, Dr. Reneau
Charlene Ufford Kennedy, psychologist, Mr. R. Patrick McPherson,
attorney, Ms. Lois Perrin, Director of the American Civil
Laberties Union, Hawai"i, and Mr. Michael Nakamura, retired chief
of the Honolulu Police Department.

The Record on Appeal also contains a written security
assessment prepared by the Department of Public Safety (DPS) for
the ADLRO entitled, “Security Assessment, The Judiciary,
Administrative Driver's License Revocation Office, 3875 South

King Street” (the Security Assessment) .

mr.
Pertinent here, Freitas contends in his supplemental
brief that (1) “the hearing officer ignored all evidence contrary
to her preconceived determination to uphold the ADLRO sign-in
procedure”! and (2) the hearing officer’s findings of fact are
clearly erroneous and her conclusions of law are contrary to
established law. To these contentions Appellee essentially
responds that the supplemental findings and conclusions are not

contrary to the evidence or the 1aw.?

 

1 Freitas maintaing that the hearing officer ignored all contrary
evidence because Sakata, the hearing officer's supervisor, implemented the
Security neasure now under scrutiny. Finding no. 10, gupta, confirms that
Sakata implemented the ID procedure.

 

 

2 the Director argues that all of the hearing officer's findings
conclusions are valid and that this court must not review credibility of
(cont inved,

 

3
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***
Any restriction on the right to a public hearing must
comport with the three-part test adopted in Freitas I:
[t}hat the regulation serve an important governmental
Interests that thia interest be unrelated to the content of

the information to be disclosed in the proceeding; and thet
there be no less restrictive may to meet that goal,

104 Hawai'i at 489, 92 P.3d at 999 (quoting Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp, v, Fed, Trade Comm'n, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir.
1983) (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968))) (emphasis omitted). Because Freitas asserts a
constitutional violation, in applying the three-part test, we are

free to exercise our own “independent constitutional judgment
. ka

   

   

based on the facts of the case.”
Use Comm'n, 94 Hawai'i 31, 41, 7 P.3d 1068, 1078 (2000) (internal

quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).

Vv.
‘The hearing officer made twenty-five supplemental
findings and four supplemental conclusions. On appeal we review
findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. Child
Support Enforcement Agency v. Roe, 96 Hawai'i 1, 11, 25 P.3d 60,
70 (2001) (quoting Gump v, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 93 Hawai'i 417,

420, 5 P.3d 407, 410 (2000)). Findings of fact are “clearly

 

 

continued)
witnesses or weight of evidence
597 P24 13, 27 (2000). Assuming its rel
complete abrogation of an appellate court’
Dased on witness testimony.

 

 

citing State v. Jenking, 93 Hawai'i 87, 102,
130; ankLus does not represent a
ight to review findings of fact,

 

 

 

[verdicts based on conflicting evidence will not be set
aside where there 1s substantial evidence to support the
trier of fact's findings. We have defined "substantial
evidence" as "exedible evidence which is of sufficient
quality and probative value to enable a (person) of
Feasonable caution to support # conclusion.”

   

 

 

Ad, at 102-02, 997 P.24 at 26-27 (internal citations omitted)

34
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

erroneous when the record lacks substantial evidence to support
the finding.” Id, (quoting In re Water Use Permit Applications,
94 Hawai"i 97, 119, 9 P.3d 409, 431 (2000)). ‘Substantial
evidence’ is credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and
probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to
support a conclusion.” Id. (brackets, internal quotation marks,
and citation omitted); see Leslie v. Tavares, 91 Hawai'i 394,

399, 984 P.2d 1220, 1225 (1999). Findings of fact are also
clearly erroneous when “despite substantial evidence to support
the finding . . . , the appellate court is left with the definite
and firm conviction in reviewing the entire evidence that a
mistake has been made.” Child Support Enforcement Agency, 96
Hawai'i at 11, 25 P.3d at 70. See Lanai Co. v. Land Use Comm'n,
105 Hawai'i 296, 314, 97 P.3d 372, 390 (2004) (observing a
“definite and firm conviction” that the Land Use Commission “made
a ‘mistake’ in its enforcement of an order). “Hawai'i appellate
courts review conclusions of law de novo, under the right/wrong
standard.” Leslie, 91 Hawai'i at 399, 984 P.2d at 1225

(citations omitted) .

ve
Preliminary, it must be noted that in a letter
regarding ADLRO security renovations, the ADLRO detailed prior

security incidents over the “history of the program."? The

 

+ the Letter Lists the following incident:

 

- one arrestee lunging at hearing officer during
hearing(s)

- One Iife time revocation individual writing, calling

‘J viaiting ADLRO with a series of threatening

Ietters to ADLRO staff and fanilyt)

= [lhree bonb threats, to resulting in police
investigation, one made on the record at hearing[?]

- [Bullet Roles shot through strest front windows on

(Continued...)

 

 

 

35,
‘+**POR PUBLICATION®#*
—_—_SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSsSSssseses
letter also states that ADLRO is concerned that “persons whose
Licenses have been or are in jeopardy of being revoked, in
particular when we do start having drug related cases, will
becone unmanageable and/or violent.”

‘he Security Assessment was specifically prepared by
the DPS for the ADLRO. It precisely addresses the matters of
security at ADLRO meetings. In this docunent the DPS conducted
fan examination of the ADLRO premises at the ADLRO’s request.‘

 

The objective was to determine measures necessary to protect the

health and safety of the employees and community:

in an effort to mest Public Safety's goals of ensuring the
health and safety of exploy
ss

   

a i.
See *ihe recommendations contained in this report are
For the

 

ruse in

(emphases added.) Significantly, the Security Assessment does
not identify the anonymity of members of the public which the
sign-in procedure is designed to counteract as a threat to
security. Indeed, a perusal of the Security Assessment reveals

that DPS did not recommend the current sign-in procedure at all.

 

--continued)
‘Evo occasions (undetermined if 2 direct result of
ADLAO activities) (3)

= [Whumerous instances of persons at front desk or on
the phone with irate and aggressive behavior shown{/]

= [Sleverai Instances of cbvicusly intoxicated persons
at front desk and/or attending hearings!

= One arrestee entering the ADLAO office with a plastic
Grocery bag filled with tools (pick axe, hammer and
Sther unidentifiable objects) on one of several visits
SO'ADLRO.  ADLAO requested that sheriff(s) be on site
af ADLRO'during the scheduled hearing.

 

   

 

 

‘for example, the Security Assessment identified the hearing roons
fas “critical ares.”

‘The critical areas are the Hearing Rooms where Referees meet

ath clieste and their attorneys. The Referees are

Unprotected should elients become angry or violent. The

e1BSee° doors present a serious problen with ensuring the
‘and attorneys health and safety.

 

   

36
***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

The Security Assessment was prepared by the DPS after
interviewing ADLRO employees and surveying the ADLRO building,
hearing rooms, and office and, hence, is substantial evidence of
ADLRO security problems and remedies. Yet the hearing officer

did not reference the Security Assessment in her supplemental

findings.

vi.

 

‘The pertinent supplemental findings are as follows:

3. The ADLRO instituted thie ID procedure as a
security measure to prevent unknown menbers of the general
Public fron entering the inner-office area.

4." ind 10 procedure provides a reascoable neana of
Adentfv4na" and aberehendiog thoee’persens who aghe engage

Gecunlawtul or Theppropriate behavior at an administrative
hearing of within the saner-office ares. (Emphasis added.)
.. The 10 procedure for those
persons seeking entry past the front desk/reception counter,
Eneluding those persone who wish to attend hearings «
Tn) This deterrent effect arises out of the fact ‘that

exsons uo know that theic identity has been recorded wil)
‘Gsgbinoriste Genarior for the simple reason that they know
They can be heid accountable.

 

 

3. Although the 1D procedure 15 not

security measure,
RDLAO's security’ me
Io." Mr. Sakata, as Chief Adjudicator of the ADLRO,

instituted this TD procedure

 

i! ‘aitictes . . . provide further support for this
finding, ‘because these afticles support the principle that
anonymity makes people more likely to engage in aggressive,
evil, destructive, or unlawful behavior...

13. “This Wearing Officer finds that these two

 

14, Mr, Partington also elicited testimony from
former police chief Michael Naksnurs that the ID procedure

would have littie benefit to security. This Hearing Officer

inde that this testimony was not particularly persuasive

‘Light of the testinony of not _only the ADLRO Chief

‘Adiudlcator Ronald Sakata, Put the testimony of security
Elowd shia Tekan
‘***FOR PUBLICATION #*

 

fect...
TS. With respect to attorney R. PatFick McPherson’ s
testinony .". . in which McPherson acknowledges thet no

 

state court, ‘trial or appellate level, requires one to show
identification and signein in order to attend « court,
proceeding, this Searing Officer finds this testimony
Snrelated to the ADLRO's unique circumstances in which,
unlike the court buildings, the area to which counsel,
Fespondent, and/or other sambers of the public are
Fequesting access, includes undifferentiated access to the
hearing room as well as other areas of the ADLAO
office.
26.".".". (t]he ADLRO does not have separate public
and nonspublic' access area. this distinguishing factor is
Efieiealand saterial in determining whether the ADLRO' = ID
procedure is warranted

I), This Hearing Officer finds that other security
measures - including a metal detector, x-ray machine and
Conveyor belt, a hand metal-detecting wand, and someone to
Operate these devices, or posting sheriffs or security

Guards. (armed or unarmed) in or near the hearing room ~
fuss

 

 

 

 

 

 

18." In addition, metal detectors, x-ray machines and
hand netal-detecting wends would do nothing to stop a person
Entent on accosting ADLAO staff or hearing attendees by
hand, army leg oF foot, nor would such devices. prevent
Someone fron causing s\ vocal” or verbal disturbance to the
Scninistrative proceeding. The 1D procedure, on the other
hand, could possibly deter such Inappropriate behavior,

 

20. “th addition, his Hearing Officer finds that even

welty measures wlege a
etal detector, x-ray conveyor belt, end hand wand, oF a
Security guard ~"the 10 procedure would provide an

additional security benefit in the form of deterrence

 

faiticuar fom of deterrence ~ based upon depriving a

erson of hia or her anonumity = other than to have the
Hilda's tp oroceaure in effect. —Althouah security cameras:
ado tenove sone level of anommity, they still leave a

22. “This Hearing Officer finds that there is no 1
intrusive way to provice the unique deterrent effect crested

by the ADLAO 10 procedure than to maintain the ID procedure.

‘eauitina che showing ofa picture 1p and sfanins aa it is,

23. This hearing officer finds that although the ID
procedure is not perfect = e.g.,

 

ip bad behavior
Te renaine a useful and
Eeagonable security measure for the ADLAO. And the
Procedure is a very easy and simple process for =
Brospective attendee to Beet, A driver's iicense, state
TD. or other acceptable picture identification 1s 211 that
is necessary. -; + Indeed, a driver's License, state .D.,
of other sccoptable picture identification, 1s something

   

 

 

38
‘***FOR PUBLICATION##*

 

people need for all sorts of everyday activities, including
for example: check cashing, banking, and air travel.

24, This hearing officer finds that although the 10
procedure may deprive a person of his or her anonymity ~
Tndees that 1s precisely why the 1D procedure has an
effective deterrent effect ~ that is

nificant inte sattending the hear

‘eent furthermore,
= except in the
Svent someone on that Iist engeges in unlowful activity or

creates a disturbanc

(Emphases added.) On the grounds set forth herein, the relevant

    

 

supplemental findings are not supported by substantial evidence.
‘The said findings are considered in sexiatim.

1. Finding no. 3 states that “[t]he ADLRO instituted
this ID procedure as_a security measure . . . .” The record
shows that the ID procedure was introduced by Sakata, based on

his “common sense, experience” that the ID procedure would have a

 

deterrent effect.’ However, as mentioned, the ID procedure is
not identified or recommended by the Security Assessment, supra.
Additionally, at the time the ID procedure was instituted, Sakata
did not even know of the social science articles that were
subsequently introduced at the remand hearing to justify the
Procedure, and as he conceded, the articles had nothing to do

with his decision to institute the procedure.‘ Consequently, the

+ RDLRO chief Adjudicator Ronald Sakata testified:

(Deputy Attorney General): So, in your opinion,
basically renoving a person's anonymity acts as 4 natural
deterrent to wrongful or inappropriate conduct?

Sekata:” I Believe 20, yes:

[Deptuty Attorney General}
view on?

Sakata: Mel, common sense, experience.

And what do you base this

 

(Baphasis added.)
* the relevant testimony reads
2 for Freitas (Counsel)]: Mr. Sakata, when did

these paychology articles?
Within the last couple of weeks

 

 

(continved,

 

39
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***
SSeS
articles not only lack a credible basis for the purpose of the
hearing, sce discussion infra; they are completely irrelevant to

the ADLRO’s decision to implement the ID procedure.

 

2. Finding no. § states that “[t]he ID procedure
provides a reasonable means of identifving and apprehending those
persons who might engage in unlawful or inappropriate behavior
ts that the ID

 

"(Emphasis added.) Finding no, 23 reps
procedure is useful, reasonable, easy and simple.

However, the reasonableness of the procedure is a
question of law, and insofar as it relates to a fact, is not
supported by substantial evidence. Appellee’s own security
expert, Shimabuku, agreed that without training personnel to
recognize “fake” photo ID's, the ID procedure is “relatively
useless.” Sakata testified that ADLRO staff is not trained to

 

“(.-seontinved)
(Counsel): the 2 4 aa

Sa) Toe

 

(emphases added.)

 

tified as follow

 

Director's security expert Shimabuku t

 

{Counsel}: (DJoes it matter if the staff of this
office or anywhere the sign in procedure 1s trained to look
for fake ID's? Would that be an important consideration?

‘Shinabukur Yes, T would think so.

[counsel]: And if somebody cones in with
1D, then the identification and eign in requir
Esther mesningless, isn’t it?

‘Shimabuks
to ses ire ou

   

 

(Emphasis added.)
Sekata testified that the staff had no training in recognizing

 

(Counsell: Now what training is oiven to vour stat
it

 

yout Io
Teentinved.-.)
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

recognize false ID's, and Chief Nakamura testified that such ID's
are “relatively easy” to obtain in Hawai'i.

3. Findings nos. 6, 7, 8 14, and 18 state that the ID
procedure acts as a deterrent. The assertion is presumably
supported by the two articles and the testimony of Sakata and
Shimabuku. However, this determination is not supported by the
articles submitted by Appellees. In light of the ADLRO letter,
the testimony of Chief Nakamura, and the Security Assessment, the
testimony of Sakata and Shimabuku as discussed, did not
constitute substantial evidence to support these findings.

‘a. Although the hearing officer relies heavily upon
the two articles, neither article can be accepted as credible
evidence. In his article, Marx states unequivocally that he
focuses on concepts, not actual behavior.' The author also
admits, with respect to Section B,? that he is simply reporting
justifications for concealment and revelation, not endorsing
these justifications.” As Marx himself will not endorse the

 

Freitas's security expert, retired Chief Nekamura testified as

 

(Counsel): {Jow hard 1s it to get a fake
identification here in Hawait?

Yakanure: Tt's relatively easy based on current
technology with computers.

 

* the relevant statement in Marx's article states

 

Im this article T layout sone of the conceptual landscape
‘and sone research issues. This enphasis is on the cultural

Jevel .. . more than on describing actual behavior.

 

 

(Emphasis added.)
+ Finding 12, infra, quotes exclusively from Section 8
| ection B, “Socially Sanctioned Contexts of Concealment and

Revelation” is composed of Part 1, Rationales in Support of (Full or Partial)
(cont inved.

 

41
‘***FOR PUBLICATION®**

—_—__
validity of the “claimed empirical consequences,” little credence
can be attributed to any findings of fact resting upon this
article.

zimbardo’s article similarly does not constitute
credible evidence relevant to security measures at ADLRO
hearings. This article does not concern security measures at
public hearings but rather, “generic forms of institutional evil,
such as poverty, prejudice or destruction of the environment by
corporate greed.” It therefore is not meaningfully relevant to
the question of public hearing security measures." Further, the
article is seemingly driven by an overt political view, and

cannot be accorded the status of unbiased scientific or social-

 

(.. .continved)
Anonymity and Part 2, Rationales in Support of identifiability. Footnote 4,
in the Introduction to Section B, states as follows:

 

1 make these observations as @ social observer and not as 2
noralist arvagpiticiat (in the sense of subjecting clains to sone
kind of empirical standare), [araue neither that chess

 

nee iat ner
Dacessacily follas. To have a pony in those races require:
Enalyeta beyond the scope of this paper. Here, 1

claimed iustifications at face value and report then.

(Emphases added.)
& Relevant statenents in Zimbardo's article include:

‘This behaviorally-focused definition [of evil] makes an
agent of agency responsible « +” Te excludes «the
Beetder, generic forms of inatitutionel evil, such
poverty; prejudice, or destruction of the environnent by
Egents of corporate greed. Dut it does include corporate
Esponsibility for marketing snd selling products with knows
Giaeare-cavaing, death-dealing properties, such as cigarette
Ronufsecurers, or other drug dealers. It/also extends.

     

 

 

   

re or la fed at zi
Eitieeoitslie meee ro rere Gdbamn
(emphasis added.)

42
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

scientific reports for the purpose of this case." Findings 12
and 13, based on these articles, are similarly unsupported by the
record.

b. Appellee’s contention that the anonymity of members
of the public poses a threat to ADLRO hearings is also
unsupported by the ADLRO’s letter, supra. In that letter listing
prior and anticipated incidents, the ADLRO identified threats to
the physical safety of ADLRO employees. Any threat posed because
of the anonymity of members of the public is absent.

c. The testimony of Chief Nakamura likewise does not
support a finding of deterrence. While this court usually
disinelines review of a hearing officer’s findings based on oral
testimony, finding no. 14 appears to mischaracterize the
testinony of Chief Nakamura, In that finding, the hearing
officer stated that “Mr. Nakamura conceded that the ID procedure
could have some deterrent effect. . . .” (Emphasis added.) To
the contrary, Chief Nakamura’s testimony was that the procedure

was “close to” “useless.” The relevant testimony reads as

 

 

 

follows:
(Deputy Attorney General): Chief Nakamura, you were
saying that signing requirements, sign in and identification
showing requirement would have Little mpact upon security,
fare you Saying that this requirenents has no impact on
Security and is absolutely useless?
Nakamura: “It's not absolutely useless, close to it
[ocputy ‘Attorney General): But it could have some
impact?
Nakamura: If I had to rate that with every option
available, .
% For example, the article states that [t]he ‘war on terrorisn’ can

 

never be won solely by current administration plans to find and destroy
Cerroriats . . "7 "{m)iiitary commanders. - such ae Hitler, Stalin, Mao,
Pol Pot, Idi Amin, and others who history has identified as tyrants for their
complicity in the deaths of untold millions of innocent people. divstory will

= ‘in March, 2002, with dubious
Justification, that resulted in widespread death, injury destruction and
enduring chaos." (Emphasis added.)

 

43
*#*FOR PUBLICATION*#*
_
(emphases added.) Chief Nakamura’s testimony does not support 4
finding that he conceded the ID procedure has a deterrent effect.
Although the hearing officer decided, in finding no. 14, that
Chief Nekamura’s “testimony was not particularly persuasive,” it
would appear evident that the testimony of the former police
chief of Honolulu should have been accorded substantial weight in
the areas of public disruption, violent acts, and security in
public places based on his training, expertise, and experience
and in the absence of any finding that his testimony should be
disregarded in this respect.

d. As mentioned previously, the hearing officer did
not reference the Security Assessment in her supplemental
findings. But, the assessment is substantial evidence of ADLRO
security problens and remedies. Again, a perusal of the Security
Assessment reveals that DPS nade specific recommendations, none
of which included the current sign-in procedure.

In sum, the documentary evidence and oral testimony in
the record do not support a substantial connection between
disruption and deterrence of threats and the current ID
procedure. Although Appellee argues the 1D procedure may
facilitate locating an individual after the fact, ADLRO staff are
not trained to recognize fake Ib's, see supra note 7: hence,
there is no evidence that the ID procedure advances even this
Limited goal.

4. Finding no. 9 states that the ID procedure is “a
fundanental first-step in the ADLRO’s security measures.” There
is no substantial evidence in the record to support @ finding
that the ID procedure is either “fundamental” or a “first-step”
in appropriate security measures. On the other hand, the

Security Assessment precisely enumerates the measures necessary
 

‘***FOR PUBLICATION:
to insure security and thus is substantial evidence of the
“fundamental” and necessary “steps” required.

5. Findings nos. 15 and 16 discuss the unique
circumstances of the ADLRO building. But these findings, unlike
the Security Assessment, are not tailored to the specific safety
requirements of the facility: hence, these findings are not
supported by substantial evidence.

6. Finding no, 17 indicates that other security
measures, “including a metal detector, x-ray machine and conveyor
belt, a hand metal~detecting wand, and someone to operate these
devices or posting sheriffs or security guards (armed or unarmed)
in or near the hearing room - would be expensive and beyond the
budget capabilities of the ADLRO. . . .” Contrary to the partial
majority opinion in Part ITZ, majority opinion at 12-13, other
than Sakata’s bare testimony, nothing was submitted in the record
to support this finding. Moreover, the relevant inguiry on
remand was the application of the Freitas I test, supra.”
Additionally, the record indicates that the ADLRO has, on
occasion, requested and been afforded deputy sheriffs to provide
security, as occurred at this renand hearing.

7. Finding no. 20 states that “[t]here is no other
less intrusive way to achieve this particular form of deterrence
~_based upon depriving 2 person of his or her anonymity - other

than to have the ADLRO’s procedure in effect. Although security

 

cameras . . . do remove some level of anonymity, they still leave
@ person the chance of remaining unidentified. . . .” (Emphases
© the nearing officer disnissed these other measures as “expensive

land beyond the budget capabilities of the ADLRO.” Such fiscal concerns,
however, are an irrelevant consideration in the Eraitas I test, where the
Teoue 12 whether the government's regulation 1s the least restrictive m
achieving its ssserted goal.

2 of

 

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oe
added.) Finding no. 22 essentially restates finding 20.

Findings 20 and 22 must be rejected for two reasons.
First, they state a conclusion of law that the ID procedure is
the least intrusive means. Even if construed as a fact, these
findings are controverted by the recommendations in the Security
Assessment, which are substantial evidence of the means for
ensuring security at ADLAO hearings.

Second, the findings erroneously limit potential
security measures to those that require the public to sign-in and
produce a picture 10, The governmental interest at stake is the
security at agency hearing. Limiting this interest to security
that is based on deprivation of anonymity leads to the
syllogistic conclusion that only deprivation of anonymity can
secure against the threat of anonymity.

It should also be noted that in footnote 6 to finding
22, the hearing officer states that “IDs are required for entry
to circuit court chambers.” The relevant inquiry concerns the
right of public access to a public hearing. Court chambers are
not the equivalent of public hearing rooms. Therefore,
procedures for court chanbers entry do not constitute relevant or
substantial evidence and the reference thus is clearly erroneous.

8. Finding no. 24 states that the intrusion posed by
the ID procedure is insignificant because “a person attending the
hearing would have {his)' face seen by hearing participants in any
event.” Whether an intrusion is insignificant is a question of
law and should not be couched as a finding. In addition, it
would appear plain that being required to sign one’s name on a
roster maintained by a state agency and to produce a picture ID
is not equivalent to merely having one’s face seen by

participants at an ADLRO hearing. Relatedly, the assertion that

46
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ee
the sign-in list is not distributed does not accurately reflect
the record. According to Sakata’s testimony, the sign-in list
remains on the office counter all day and its subsequent custody
is apparently entirely subject to Sakata’s discretion.

‘Thus, the record lacks substantial evidence to support
findings that the current ID procedure (1) advances the
governmental interest of safety at the hearings, (2) deters
security threats at ADLRO hearings, and (3) is the least

restrictive means of achieving security at ADLRO hearings.

vir.

Aside from the erroneous findings, the hearing officer
incorrectly applied the Freitas I test. Thus, her conclusions
were wrong. ‘The four conclusions state:

1. Te 10 procedure
interest: namely, Z
iat ADLAG administrative hearings.

Siang IS interest, . + is unrelated to the content of
‘the information to be disclosed in the administrative
preceeaing.

3. inere is no less restrictive way to fully serve
tenis daportant. governmental interest in enhancing security
and aveiding diaruptions at ADLAO adninistrative hearings
and incoffice area, other than to continue with the 1D
procedure. for measures can aad to security as
fell, shexe is no other less intrusive aeans of achieving
Berson of bis or ber anonymity. The ADLAO ID procedure is
Rittidost introsive means of achieving this unique deterrent
effect.

 

rrvea_an important governmental
Pe

   

 

 

‘The ADLRO TD procedure ie therefore fully
warranted, and does not inpernissibly interfere with a
Tespondent’s Fight to public hearing.
(Emphases added.) Inasmuch as the test in Freitas I answers a
constitutional question of law, the hearing officer's application
of the test must be reviewed de novo, under the right/wrong
standard. See Bank of Hawaii v, Kunimoto, 91 Hawai'i 372, 387,
984 P.2d 1198, 1213 (1999).

a
 

FOR PUBLICATION***

 

viit.

Logically, the first step in the Freitas I analysis is
to identify the ADLRO’s “important governmental interest.” 104
Hawai'i at 489, 92 P.3d at 999, In its letter, see supra, the
ADLRO noted its concern that “persons whose licenses have been or
are in jeopardy of being revoked . . . will become unmanageable
and/or violent.” The hearing officer accepted this concern in
conclusion no. 1 by identifying “enhancing security and avoiding
disruptions at ADLRO administrative hearings” as the “important
governmental interest” to be served by the ID procedure.

‘This would appear to satisfy the first element of the
Ereitas I scrutiny, see v. Mayfield
738 N.E.2d 42, 48 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (determining that
“security at venues that attract a large number of people in a
congested area at the same time” is “an important government
interest”); Klein v. Leis, 795 N.E.2d 633, 640 (ohio 2003)
(concluding that “{e]nsuring public safety is an important
government interest”); In re Rules Adoption, 576 A.2d 274, 281
(1.3. 1990) (holding that “institutional security” at a prison is
an “important government interest”), and Freitas does not dispute

‘that the ADLRO's concern constitutes a valid interest.

m
Under Freitas I, the next inquiry applicable to this
case" is determining whether the ID procedure constitutes the

least “restrictive way to” “enhanc[e] security and avoid{]

M_atthough Freitas argues that “the record ute.
[the] conclusions [of law,]” he does not argue that the
An applying the second Exoitag factor concerning the content of the
information to be disclosed in the proceeding. Therefore, the hearing
officer's ment of that factor need not be addressed

 

 

 

 
‘+**FOR PUBLICATION®#*
interruptions at ADLRO administrative hearings.” 104 Hawai'i at
489, 92 P.3d at 999. As there is no substantial evidence that
the ID procedure advances the governmental interest at stake,
concluding that this procedure is the least restrictive means of
achieving that interest is also untenable. For the reasons set
forth previously, the findings do not support a conclusion based
upon substantial evidence that the 10 procedure in any way

rings.

 

enhances security or prevents disruptions at ADLRO hi
Instead, the record indicates that because ADLRO staff are not
trained to recognize false ID's, the current ID procedure
provides no deterrent. Even if the staff were trained,
substantial evidence did not exist to support a finding that the
Ip procedure would in fact reduce security threats.

At this point, the hearing officer's analysis, as
exhibited in conclusion no. 3, blurred the first and third prongs
of the Freitas I test. Essentially, the hearing officer confused
the “important governmental interest” with the least “restrictive
way to meet” that interest. To reiterate, in conclusion no. 3,
the hearing officer determined

[there is no less restrictive way to fully serve this

Inportant governmental interest ip enhancing security and
ve aeive and
D

Gheoffice area, other than to continue with the

 

 

Procedure, Although other measures can add to security as
weil, ns of

the tniaue deterrent effect that arises out of depriving a
etaon-of his or her anonymity. The ADSO 1D procedure 12
‘Ehg-least intrusive means of achieving this unique deterrent
effect

(Emphases added.) This analysis is flawed for two reasons.

 syTAbtD*2,a,nole: the findings, do enything but address, the crucial
Ascue. they state that the 1D procedure “is g reasonable means" and “provides
a'detercent,”" {finding 5) “Lessanls) the likelihood” and “gay discourage,”
Teinding 13) “could potentially deter,” (finding 16) and would “provide an

‘measure of detersence,” (finding 21)- (Emphases added.) But they

Sornot establish that the 10 procedure is the “reasonable
ean” or “deterrent,” or that such 2 policy is the Jaast restrictive way to
“discourage” and “deter” disruptive behavior at hearings

 

 

 

 

49
 

‘4**FOR PUBLICATION®:
Ba

First, the “unique deterrent effect that arises out of depriving
a person of his or her anonymity” is not the “important
governmental interest” that was asserted by the ADLRO and
identified in conclusion no. 1. In asking whether there is no
less restrictive means to meet the goal, the hearing officer
wrongly redefined the governmental interest as whether “(t}here
is no other less intrusive means of achieving the unique
deterrent effect that arises out of depriving a person of his or
her_anonymity.” (Emphasis added.) The governmental interest at
stake is the security of the agency hearing, not the most
efficacious way of depriving @ person of his or her anonymity.
Second, this “unique deterrent effect” constitutes the
means of achieving the ADLRO’s interest in enhanced security and

in minimizing disruptions at hearings, not the interest itself.

t

 

The conclusion that “(t]he ADLRO ID procedure is the 1
intrusive means of achieving this unique deterrent effect” of
“depriving @ person of his or her anonymity” is factually true.
Requiring persons to present proper and valid identification no
doubt stripe them of their anonymity. But this is not the issue
to be decided.

‘The proper inquiry is whether the ID procedure, i.e,
depriving persons of their anonymity, is the least “restrictive
way to” “enhanc[e] security and avoid{} disruptions at ADLRO

administrative hearings.” The governmental interest at stake is

 

rings. As indicated before, equating

 

the security at agency h
this interest to the deprivation of anonymity leads to the
syllogistic conclusion that only deprivation of anonymity can

secure against the threat of anonymity and results in the hearing

officer’s wrong conclusion.

50
 

‘#**FOR PUBLICATION

 

Based on the reasons enumerated before, the 1D
procedure was not shown to be the least restrictive means of
meeting the governmental interest in “enhancing security and
avoiding disruptions.” On the other hand, credible evidence in
the form of the Security Assessment set forth security measures
previously calculated to the specific situation of the ADLRO.

Appellees introduced no credible evidence balancing the

 

alternatives set forth in the assessment as required under the
Exeitas I test. The hearing officer thus erred in her
application of the Freitas I test.

 

To support its holding that “the ADLRO’s identification
and sign-in procedure does not impermissibly infringe upon
Freitas’s constitutional right to a public hearing(,]” majority
opinion at 8 (enphasis added), the majority relies upon cases
addressing the sixth amendment right to a public trial, se

 

majority opinion at 9-12. In our prior opinion remanding the
case to the ADLRO, however, we distinguished between the sixth
amendment right to a public trial and the right to a public
hearing asserted by Freitas. See Freitas I, 104 Hawaii at 496
n.7, 92 P.3d at 996 n.7 (distinguishing State v. Ortiz, 91 Hawaii
181, 981 P.2d 1127 (1999), because it involved “a criminal
Proceeding subject to the right to a public trial afforded by the
[s]ixth [a}mendnent and [a]rt. VII § 14 of the Hawaii state
Constitution and this case-is an administrative proceeding”).
Inasmuch as this case concerns a quasi-judicial administrative
Proceeding before the ADLRO, Freitas I, 104 Hawai'i at 489, 92
P.3d at 999, and “due process requires that [such] hearings be
public,” id., the defendant's endment right to

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ee
trial in a criminal prosecution is not implicated. To intimate
otherwise, as the partial majority opinion in Part III does, see
majority opinion at 11-12, note 2, would obscure the “automatic
reversal” rule under the sixth amendment applied in criminal
cases, and the balancing test we had adopted in Freitas I to be
applied where the due process clause pertains.'*

Nonetheless, the majority cites to United States v.
Deluca, 137 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 1998), a sixth amendment right to a
public trial case, for the proposition that this court should be
“hesitant to displace the ADLRO hearing officer's judgment call
in these circumstances.” Majority opinion at 9 (quoting Deluca,
137 F.3d at 34) (brackets omitted). In Deluca, the First Circuit
afforded the trial court “substantial deference” in its
“assessment that the screening procedures were warranted,”
observing that such “difficult judgments are matters of courtroom
1 of the climate

 

governance which require a sensitive apprai
surrounding a trial and a prediction as to the potential security
or publicity problems that may arise during the proceedings.” 137
F.3d at 34 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Assuming, arguendo, the applicability of Deluca, it
should be enphasized that the screening procedure used in that
case “was reasonably designed to respond,” id. at 35, to the
concerns specific to the defendants who “either were directly
associated with prior efforts to obstruct fair fact (-] finding

“ty the event that the sixth anendnent right to a public trial was
denied, then such denial would be “considered a ‘structural defect affecting
the framework within which che trial proceeds, ‘rather than simply an erzor in
the trial process itself," State v. Ortiz, 91 Hawai't at 193, 981 24 at,
Tio" (quoting Arizona v. Fulminanta, 499 0-5. 279, 310, 211 8.ce. 1246 (1991))
dnd the cove wedd be “subject o-tautonatic reversal,‘ 1d. (quoting Neder
imiekdstatea’ 527 Ors. rvs Lis's. cts 162), 1633 (1999/1. Thus, ansotar a=
Ehismatterte not a criminal prosecution, the Sixth Anendnent and Article Z,
Section If of the Hawai Constitution do not apply and Freitas Sa not
Guaranteed « Sixth Anendnent public trial in this particular adainistrative
fearing.

 

 

 

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through untruthful trial testimony, or were found to possess the
present means as well as ample inducement . . . to sponsor
similar efforts in the case,” id. In contrast here, the ID
procedure was not shown to be “reasonably designed to respond” to
a specific security threat at ADLRO hearings. As stated
previously, the Security Assessment prepared by DPS for the ADLRO
hearings did not recommend the sign-in procedure and there was no
evidence to support the conclusion that the ID procedure would
prevent disruptions at the hearings. Thus, the hearing officer
is not entitled to the same level of “judgment call” deference
afforded the trial judge in Deluca.

The majority cites to a second right to a public trial
case, Williams v. Indiana, 690 N.E.2d 162 (Ind. 1997), and
asserts that our prior renand for a hearing was “{clonsonant with
the Williams rationale(.J” Majority opinion at 10. williams
requires a court to “provide the reasons for its decision to
authorize the procedures” and to create 2 record “clearly
substantiat [ing] the need for these additional precautions.” 690
N.E.2d at 170. As previously discussed, however, the hearing
officer's findings do not “substantiate the need for,” id. at
170, the ID procedure. Moreover, Williams requires a weighing of
“the prospective benefits to the order and security of the
courtroom with the burdens to the defendant, the press, and the
public.” Id, The hearing officer apparently found in finding
no. 17 that the “budget capabilities of the ADLRO” outweighed the
burdens of the ADLRO’s sign-in and identification procedure. 1
cannot accept, as the majority does, this “fiscal feasib(ility)”
justification, majority opinion at 13, for the implementation of
an ID procedure that, according to the record, including

testimony by Chief Nakamura, is unlikely to yield worthwhile

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security benefits at the ADLRO hearings.

The majority also cites to United States v. Brazel, 102
F.3d 1220 (11th Cir, 1997). But 1ike Deluca, the sign-in
procedure in Brazel was upheld based on the trial judge’s “own
observations for more than a week . . . that individuals had been
coming into the courtroom and fixing stares on the witnesses and
possibly government counsel.” Id, at 1156. Thus, the court
itself had observed a threat that jurors or witnesses might be
improperly influenced. Id, at 1155. No such evidence of a
similar threat was apparent at the ADLRO hearings and, therefore,
I cannot agree with the majority’s assessment that the sign-in
procedure is “reasonably tailored to meet the security needs of
ADLRO hearings.” Majority opinion at 13.

Noreover, the defendants in Brazel “objected that the
identification procedure could have a chilling effect on the
public, because sone people might fear that if they identified
themselves (by name, address, and birth date), a computer check
night be run and they might be suspected of being @ part of the
drug conspiracy.” Id, at 1156. Thus, it was logical that an
identification requirenent would dissuade those with criminal
histories, the very ones likely to be improperly influencing the
jurors and witnesses, from entering the courtroom and interfering
with the court proceeding. ‘The sign-in procedure utilized at the
ADLRO hearings is not supported by similar logic, but stems from
a sweeping conclusion that depriving a person of his or her
anonynity will minimize disruptions at the ADLRO hearings

Whereas the sign-in procedure in Brazel was justified
by the overt instances of intimidation observed by the judge
herself and designed to exclude the sources of the intimidation,

the sign-in procedure here is not similarly justified. Rather,

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it is based upon an amorphous threat to security at the ADLRO
hearings and may exclude not just the sources of a supposed
disruption, but individuals who, as stated in our prior opinion
in this case, are entitled access to quasi-judicial proceedings
in order to ensure that “the liberty and property of the citizen
shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play”
and to maintain “public confidence in the value and soundness of
this important governmental process.” Freitas I, 104 Hawaii at
489, 92 P.3d at 999.

Finally, it should be noted that DeLuca and Braze!
involved case-specific approaches aimed at threats unique to the
immediate proceeding before the trial judges. Therefore, these
cases cannot serve as authority for the ADLRO’s permanent across-

the-board sign-in procedure.

xr.
Under the evidence produced at the remand hearing,
Freitas’s revocation hearing should have been free of the
identification and sign-in procedure. I would order that future
ADLRO hearings be open to the public without the requirement of
ID and sign-in restrictions and that recommendations of the ops

I

as are appropriate be implemented.

55