Case Title: Commonwealth v. Henley

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12951 & SJC 12952

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-08-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12951 
SJC-12952 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DONTE HENLEY (and three companion cases1). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 6, 2020. - August 5, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Reasonable 
suspicion, Investigatory stop, Stop and frisk, Privacy, 
Probable cause.  Search and Seizure, Reasonable suspicion, 
Expectation of privacy, Protective frisk.  Privacy.  
Cellular Telephone.  Probable Cause.  Practice, Criminal, 
Trial of defendants together, Severance, Opening statement, 
Argument by prosecutor, Instructions to jury, Assistance of 
counsel, Motion to suppress, Warrant.  Evidence, Prior 
misconduct, Relevancy and materiality, Expert opinion.  
Witness, Expert. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 2, 2015. 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Mary K. 
Ames, J., and the cases were tried before Peter M. Lauriat, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the cases from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Katherine C. Essington for Donte Henley. 
Jennifer H. O'Brien for Josiah Zachery. 
 
1 The companion cases are against Josiah Zachery. 
2 
 
Benjamin Shorey, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
Matthew Spurlock & David Rangaviz, Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, Jennifer Lynch & Andrew Crocker, of 
California, Oren Nimni, Matthew R. Segal, & Jessie J. Rossman 
for Committee for Public Counsel Services & others. 
 
Alan Butler & Megan Iorio, of the District of Columbia, & 
Caitriona Fitzgerald for Electronic Privacy Information Center. 
 
Martin F. Murphy for Boston Bar Association. 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  On the morning of February 11, 2015, the 
victim, Kenny Lamour, was shot in the head and killed.  The 
defendants, Josiah Zachery and Donte Henley, were tried jointly 
before a jury.  Both defendants were convicted of murder in the 
second degree.  Zachery also was convicted of assault by means 
of a dangerous weapon and carrying a firearm without a license. 
 
The defendants argued their appeals separately but joined 
in each other's arguments.  The defendants argue that (1) the 
motion judge erred in denying their motion to suppress evidence 
obtained during an investigatory stop, a warrantless search of 
Zachery's Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) 
CharlieCard,2 and a search of Zachery's cell phone pursuant to a 
search warrant; (2) the trial judge abused his discretion by 
failing to sever the defendants' trials; (3) the judge erred in 
admitting evidence of prior misconduct that connected Henley to 
 
2 A CharlieCard, issued by the Massachusetts Bay 
Transportation Authority (MBTA), is a reusable card that can be 
loaded with cash value to pay bus and subway fares. 
3 
 
an earlier shooting; (4) the judge erred in allowing a police 
officer to testify that he had known Henley since 2005; (5) the 
judge erred in admitting certain testimony of the Commonwealth's 
gang expert; (6) the prosecutor made improper statements in his 
opening statement and closing argument; (7) the judge erred in 
failing to give Henley's proposed instruction on mistake or 
accident; (8) trial counsel failed to provide effective 
assistance; and (9) the cumulative impact of trial errors 
created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, even if 
individual errors did not. 
We discern no reversible error, and accordingly, we affirm 
the denial of the defendants' motion to suppress and their 
convictions. 
Background.  We summarize the facts that the jury could 
have found, reserving certain facts for the discussion of the 
defendants' arguments.  In addition, we reserve the facts that 
the motion judge found for the discussion of the defendants' 
motion to suppress. 
1.  The shootings.  Henley and the victim worked at a 
nonprofit organization (program) dedicated to providing at-risk 
youth with vocational training and job opportunities.  The 
program often employed its participants to work as part of a 
larger team in the community.  On February 11, 2015, the morning 
after a snowstorm, Henley sent a text message to his program 
4 
 
supervisor to let the supervisor know that he was on his way to 
work.  Henley's supervisor responded, alerting him that the 
victim, "the kid from [Thetford Avenue]," was present, and asked 
Henley to "keep it cool."  Henley was a member of the Franklin 
Hill Giants gang, and the victim was a member of a rival gang, 
the Thetford Avenue Buffalos gang.  Zachery also was a member of 
the Franklin Hill Giants gang but was not involved with the 
program. 
The program transported a group of individuals in a van to 
Centre Street in the Jamaica Plain section of Boston to shovel 
snow that morning.  Henley joined the group late.  The victim 
also was present.  Around this time, Henley began exchanging 
text messages with and calling Zachery. 
Zachery traveled via the MBTA, as evidenced by surveillance 
video footage and records associated with his CharlieCard, to 
the area where Henley and the victim were located.  Zachery shot 
the victim in the head and ran from the scene down Centre 
Street.  As he fled, he fired a shot at Boston police Officer 
William Louberry but did not hit him.  Louberry used his police 
radio to call in a description of Zachery while pursuing him on 
foot.  Louberry described Zachery physically and noted that he 
was dressed in all black clothing with a gray hooded sweatshirt 
over his head and was running with a gun in hand.  Louberry 
5 
 
eventually lost sight of Zachery after he turned onto Aldworth 
Street. 
2.  The investigation.  Shortly after the shot directed at 
Louberry was fired, Boston police Officer Ydritzabel Oller 
observed an individual, later identified as Zachery, walking 
across Centre Street wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt and black 
pants and carrying a shovel.  Oller stopped Zachery and 
conducted a threshold inquiry.  Zachery was not arrested but was 
handcuffed and put in a police cruiser. 
While Zachery was detained in the police cruiser, the 
firearm that later was determined to have been used in the 
murder was recovered on the garage roof of a house near the 
corner of Centre and Aldworth Streets.  The black jacket worn by 
Zachery during the murder was found under the porch of the 
house.  Police also discovered that a shovel was taken from 
outside the same house.  A resident of the house later 
identified the shovel that Zachery was observed carrying as the 
shovel that was taken from outside his house.  Additionally, 
footprints consistent with Zachery's sneakers were found in the 
area surrounding the house. 
Zachery was transported to police headquarters, where he 
was interviewed until he invoked his right to counsel.  After 
the interview ended, Zachery was arrested.  Henley, who was not 
a suspect at the time, also was transported to police 
6 
 
headquarters and interviewed as a witness.  As part of the 
investigation, police seized Zachery's cell phone and obtained a 
search warrant to review its contents.  Police discovered 
multiple text messages and telephone calls between Zachery and 
Henley on the morning of the murder.  Shortly after Henley 
learned from his supervisor that the victim would be present on 
the work crew, he sent Zachery a text message that he might need 
Zachery to "hold [him] down."  Henley sent a text message to 
Zachery stating his location, and Zachery began traveling to 
that location.  Henley told Zachery via text message to "hurry 
up" because he wanted to "punch the kidd up." In the hours 
leading up to the murder, Henley and Zachery continued to 
coordinate a plan.  Henley sent Zachery a text message stating, 
"I'll do I just need my steal," and shortly thereafter, "It's 
like it's me or him and I ain't going."  Zachery responded, 
"fuck him your right."  At 9:29 A.M., Henley sent Zachery a text 
message stating, "So how we gon do it?"  At 9:30 A.M., Zachery 
called Henley.  The call lasted nineteen seconds.  Eventually, 
Henley sent Zachery a text message with a description of the 
victim's clothing and the work crew's exact location.  At 10:20 
A.M., Zachery sent Henley a text message stating, "I see the van 
Cant find yall."  Two brief calls between them followed before 
the victim was shot. 
7 
 
Zachery and Henley were both charged with murder in the 
first degree under theories of premeditation and extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  The judge instructed the jury on murder in 
the first and second degree and the lesser included offense of 
involuntary manslaughter.  The defendants were convicted of 
murder in the second degree. 
Discussion.  1.  Motion to suppress.  Zachery argues that 
the motion judge erred in denying his motion to suppress 
evidence obtained during an investigatory stop, a warrantless 
search of his CharlieCard, and a search of his cell phone 
pursuant to a search warrant.  See Commonwealth v. Jones-
Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431 (2015).  Henley's motion to join 
Zachery's motion to suppress as it related to Zachery's cell 
phone and text messages was allowed.3  We conclude that the judge 
properly denied the defendants' motion to suppress. 
a.  The warrantless searches.  The defendants challenge the 
stop and frisk of Zachary and the search of his CharlieCard 
without a warrant.  "A warrantless search is presumptively 
 
3 The motion judge allowed Henley's motion to join Zachery's 
motion to suppress "out of an abundance of caution and in 
recognition of this rapidly evolving area of law and 
technology."  Although the issue is not before us, we note that 
in Commonwealth v. Delgado-Rivera, 487 Mass. 551, 552 (2021), we 
concluded that the defendant should not have been allowed to 
join his codefendant's motion to suppress where he did not enjoy 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages sent by 
him that were stored on a cell phone belonging to, and possessed 
by, the codefendant. 
8 
 
unreasonable under both the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights, unless it falls within one of the 'few specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions' to the warrant 
requirement."  Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 48 (2011), 
quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971).  
The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving that a warrantless 
search is reasonable.  See Commonwealth v. Adallah, 475 Mass. 
47, 51 (2016).  An evidentiary hearing was held.  "In reviewing 
the denial of a motion to suppress, we defer to the motion judge 
as to the weight and credibility of the evidence.  We accept the 
motion judge's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous and assess the correctness of the judge's legal 
conclusions de novo."  Commonwealth v. Weidman, 485 Mass. 679, 
683 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Bell, 473 Mass. 131, 138 
(2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2467 (2016). 
i.  The evidentiary hearing.  We summarize the facts found 
by the motion judge, supplemented by uncontroverted facts from 
the record.  We note that the motion judge fully credited and 
adopted the testimony of the officers at the hearing on the 
defendants' motion to suppress. 
On the morning of the murder, Henley contacted Zachery by 
cell phone to let him know of the work crew's location.  After 
the victim was shot, the shooter fled the scene.  While fleeing, 
9 
 
he fired once at Louberry.  The officer gave chase, broadcasting 
the route of the chase and a description of the suspect over the 
radio.  The officer described the shooter as a Black male, from 
six feet to six feet, one inch tall; from eighteen to twenty-
four years old; and wearing black pants, a black jacket, and a 
gray hooded sweatshirt, with the hood over his head. 
Minutes after Louberry's radio broadcast, Oller observed a 
young Black male, later identified as Zachery, coming from the 
location where Louberry had reported over the radio that he had 
last seen the shooter.  At that time, Zachery was two blocks 
from the scene of the shooting.  Zachery was wearing a gray 
hooded sweatshirt and black pants and carrying a snow shovel.  
He fit the description given by the other officer just moments 
before, except that he was not wearing a black jacket.  
Additionally, the officer observed that it was a very cold day 
and Zachery was wearing sneakers and low cut socks and was not 
wearing a jacket or gloves. 
The motion judge found that "[Zachery] appeared overly calm 
and seemed to actively avoid looking at or in the direction of 
the officers or the man on the ground"4 and that "he appeared to 
 
4 Immediately after the shooting, police apprehended an 
individual who was seen running on the street near the scene of 
the crime.  Ultimately, this individual was not charged. 
10 
 
act actively disinterested in all of the events around him 
including the saturation of police and cruisers in the area." 
The officer stopped Zachery to conduct a threshold inquiry.  
She asked him from where he was coming, and Zachery said he was 
"shoveling snow for old ladies for free," but he did not respond 
when she asked him why he was not wearing gloves.  He admitted 
to hearing shots but said that he was far away.  Officers 
conducted a patfrisk for weapons and found a cell phone but did 
not seize it at that time.  No weapons were discovered on 
Zachery's person.  The officers did not formally arrest Zachery, 
but he was handcuffed and placed in a police cruiser on Centre 
Street, pending further investigation.  The motion judge found 
that the moment of seizure occurred when Zachery was handcuffed 
and placed in the cruiser. 
While Zachery was in the cruiser parked on Centre Street, 
officers conducted showup identification procedures with four 
witnesses and Louberry.5  The witnesses were brought, one at a 
 
5 A showup identification procedure is a one-on-one 
identification procedure that usually occurs in the immediate 
aftermath of the crime.  See Commonwealth v. Dew, 478 Mass. 304, 
306-307 (2017) (showup identifications generally disfavored but 
often permitted in immediate aftermath of crime to secure prompt 
identification of suspect).  In this case, one at a time, each 
witness was placed into the back seat of a police cruiser and 
given detailed instructions and a witness preparation form.  
After witnesses indicated that they understood the instructions 
and form, they were given a form to sign.  Before the 
identification procedure, each witness gave a description of the 
 
11 
 
time, to see Zachery and the other individual police had 
apprehended.6  No witness positively identified Zachery, and all 
except one indicated that he looked more like the shooter, or 
the individual they had seen running away from the scene of the 
crime with a gun, than the other individual the police had 
detained. 
Louberry, who chased Zachery on foot, also was asked to 
make an identification.  He asserted that the other individual 
police had detained was not the shooter.  He observed that 
Zachery's appearance was consistent with the appearance of the 
shooter.  However, he noted that Zachery was not wearing the 
black jacket the shooter had been wearing.  Louberry later 
viewed the black jacket the police had recovered from the house 
near the corner of Centre and Aldworth Streets and said that it 
could have been the one the shooter was wearing. 
ii.  The stop of Zachery.  Zachery argues that the police 
did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him.  The motion judge 
found, and the parties agree, that Zachery was seized when he 
was handcuffed and detained in the police cruiser even though he 
 
shooter to the police.  Witnesses were then shown two suspects, 
Zachery and one other individual, in person.  We note that the 
motion judge also referred to the identification procedure as a 
"bring back." 
 
6 Zachery challenged the identification procedure before 
trial but has not pursued this issue on appeal. 
12 
 
was not under arrest at the time.  See Commonwealth v. Barros, 
435 Mass. 171, 173-174 (2001) (police seizure in constitutional 
sense occurs when, in view of totality of circumstances, 
reasonable person would have believed he or she was not free to 
leave).  Accordingly, we consider whether Oller had reasonable 
suspicion to justify the stop. 
To justify a police stop under art. 14, "police officers 
must have had 'reasonable suspicion, based on specific and 
articulable facts, that the defendant had committed, was 
committing, or was about to commit a crime.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Evelyn, 485 Mass. 691, 704 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Depina, 456 Mass. 238, 242 (2010).  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 21 (1986).  Reasonable suspicion requires less than probable 
cause to arrest but must be based on more than just a hunch.  
See Commonwealth v. Lyons, 409 Mass. 16, 19 (1990).  The 
standard of reasonable suspicion does not require that an 
officer exclude all possible explanations of the facts and 
circumstances.  See Commonwealth v. Deramo, 436 Mass. 40, 44 
(2002). 
Here, the motion judge found several of these factors 
relevant to the reasonableness of the officers' suspicion.  
Zachery fit the physical description given by Louberry.  With 
the exception of the black jacket, an item that easily could be 
removed, he was wearing the clothing that the officer described.  
13 
 
Additionally, Zachery's demeanor was unusual considering the 
events taking place around him.  His attire also was 
inappropriate given the extreme weather conditions.  The motion 
judge found that his explanation that he was "shoveling snow for 
old ladies for free" was implausible based on his attire.  
Finally, Zachery was observed two blocks from the scene of the 
crime, within five to six minutes of the time the officer had 
reported losing sight of the shooter. 
 
Although, standing alone, any one of these factors might 
not have been sufficient to justify the stop, when viewed as a 
whole, we agree with the motion judge that they gave rise to 
reasonable suspicion.  See Commonwealth v. Watson, 430 Mass. 
725, 729 (2000) ("Seemingly innocent activities taken together 
can give rise to reasonable suspicion justifying a threshold 
inquiry").  See also Commonwealth v. Gomes, 453 Mass. 506, 511 
(2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Thibeau, 384 Mass. 762, 764 
(1981) ("We view the 'facts and inferences underlying the 
officer's suspicion . . . as a whole when assessing the 
reasonableness of his [or her] acts"). 
First, the physical description of the suspect when 
combined with the other circumstances was particular enough to 
support Oller's reasonable suspicion that the defendant had 
committed a crime.  See Commonwealth v. Hilaire, 92 Mass. App. 
Ct. 784, 791 (2018) (standing alone, description of suspects as 
14 
 
three young Black males wearing regular clothes with backpacks 
insufficiently particularized to support reasonable suspicion 
but enhanced by other factors known to police).  The description 
was not so general that it would include a large number of 
people in the area where the stop occurred.  See Depina, 456 
Mass. at 245-246.  Louberry described the suspect's race, 
height, and age, as well as the clothing he was wearing.  See 
Commonwealth v. Staley, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 189, 192 (2020) 
(description of suspect that contained information about facial 
features, skin tone, height, weight, age, and clothing 
sufficiently detailed to establish reasonable suspicion).  
Contrast Commonwealth v. Warren, 475 Mass. 530, 535-536 (2016) 
(general description of suspects as three Black men, two wearing 
dark clothing and one wearing red hooded sweatshirt, lacked 
information about suspect's physical characteristics and was not 
sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion where defendant was 
with only one other person when stopped); Commonwealth v. Mock, 
54 Mass. App. Ct. 276, 279, 282-283 (2002) (no reasonable 
suspicion to stop defendant where judge found that defendant 
only fit general description of suspect as Black male despite 
conflicting testimony about description of suspect). 
 
Next, we consistently have held that geographic and 
temporal proximity are relevant factors in the reasonable 
suspicion analysis.  See Evelyn, 485 Mass. at 704.  "Proximity 
15 
 
is accorded greater probative value in the reasonable suspicion 
calculus when the distance is short and the timing is close."  
Warren, 475 Mass. at 536.  Here, there is no question that 
Zachery's physical and temporal proximity to the crime supported 
reasonable suspicion.  Zachery was stopped while walking on 
Centre Street, only two blocks away from where the shooting had 
occurred.  He was coming from the location Louberry last 
reported seeing the suspect, and only five minutes had passed 
since the officer's radio transmissions.  Compare Evelyn, supra 
at 704-705 (defendant's proximity to crime scene supported 
reasonable suspicion where defendant was found thirteen minutes 
after shooting, one-half mile distant from it).  The facts in 
this case are in stark contrast to those in Warren, where the 
defendant was stopped thirty minutes after the crime occurred 
and it was estimated that the suspects could have traveled on 
foot within a two mile radius of the crime scene, or within 
12.57 square miles, during that period.  See Warren, supra at 
536-537. 
 
Finally, we consider that the circumstances of this crime, 
a shooting that left one victim dead, presented an ongoing risk 
to public safety.  "The gravity of the crime and the present 
danger of the circumstances may be considered in the reasonable 
suspicion calculus."  See Depina, 456 Mass. at 247.  See also 
Evelyn, 486 Mass. at 705 ("circumstances indicated a potential 
16 
 
ongoing risk to public safety and therefore weighed in favor of 
reasonable suspicion"); Commonwealth v. Meneus, 476 Mass. 231, 
239 (2017) ("the fact that the crime under investigation was a 
shooting, with implications for public safety, was relevant but 
not dispositive in determining the reasonableness of the stop").  
In addition to shooting the victim, the shooter also had shot at 
Louberry.  This, along with the fact that the murder was 
actively being investigated, further supported reasonable 
suspicion.  Depina, supra.  See Meneus, supra; Commonwealth v. 
Doocey, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 550, 557 (2002).  Although not 
dispositive, we consider in our reasonable suspicion calculus 
that the shootings, which occurred only minutes before the stop, 
presented an ongoing risk to public safety.  See Meneus, supra. 
 
We conclude that police had reasonable suspicion to justify 
an investigatory stop of the defendant based on a convergence of 
supporting factors, including the physical description detailed 
in the police dispatch, the defendant's physical and temporal 
proximity to the crime, the defendant's suspicious demeanor, and 
the ongoing danger to public safety.  See Commonwealth v. 
Mercado, 422 Mass. 367, 371 (1996). 
 
Having concluded that the stop of the defendant was 
constitutional, we consider whether Oller was permitted to frisk 
the defendant.  "[T]o proceed from a stop to a frisk, the police 
officer must reasonably suspect that the person stopped is armed 
17 
 
and dangerous."  Commonwealth v. Narcisse, 457 Mass. 1, 7 
(2010), quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326-327 
(2009). 
The same factors that supported reasonable suspicion for 
the stop supported the officer's suspicion that Zachery was 
armed and dangerous.  Based on the factors discussed infra, 
officers suspected that Zachery had committed two shootings.  
The officers' suspicion that Zachery was armed and dangerous 
when he was stopped approximately five minutes after the second 
shooting was reasonable.  See Narcisse, 457 Mass. at 9-10 
(suspicions that individual committed crime and was armed and 
dangerous may arise simultaneously). 
 
We also agree with the Commonwealth that Zachery was 
properly detained to facilitate further investigation.  "It is a 
well 'settled principle that a justifiable threshold inquiry 
permits a limited restraint of the individuals involved as long 
as their detention is commensurate with the purpose of the 
stop'" (quotation and alteration omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Sinforoso, 434 Mass. 320, 325 (2001), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 162 (1997).  While Zachery was detained 
in the police cruiser, officers diligently pursued an 
investigation that confirmed many of their suspicions.  During 
this time, officers discovered the footpath leading from where 
the shooter was last seen to a porch where the black jacket was 
18 
 
found and from where the shovel had been taken.  The police also 
conducted identification procedures with witnesses.  Although no 
witness definitively identified Zachery, all but one said 
Zachery looked more like the suspect than the other individual 
police had detained. 
iii.  Warrantless search of the CharlieCard.  Zachery was 
transported from the scene of the crime to police headquarters 
for an interview.7  After the interview, Zachery was placed under 
arrest and his CharlieCard was seized.  Zachary argues that the 
motion judge erred in failing to suppress the data obtained from 
a warrantless search of the defendant's CharlieCard, including 
the location where he boarded an MBTA train and surveillance 
footage from that location.  The Commonwealth counters that the 
actions of police in obtaining Zachery's CharlieCard 
transactions from the MBTA did not constitute a search in the 
constitutional sense and therefore no warrant was required.  The 
Commonwealth also argues that the third-party doctrine applies 
to CharlieCard transactions and that the cell site location 
information (CSLI) exception to the third-party doctrine should 
not be extended. 
 
7 Zachery also moved to suppress statements made during a 
police interview before his arrest, but he did not pursue this 
claim on appeal. 
19 
 
We provide context for the analysis, based on the motion 
judge's findings and uncontroverted testimony from the 
evidentiary hearing, by explaining how a CharlieCard records a 
user's activity and provides this data to the MBTA.  A 
CharlieCard is a plastic stored-value card used to pay for MBTA 
bus and subway fares.  Every card has a unique number, but the 
holder of the card is unknown unless that individual takes steps 
to register the card.  Zachery's card was an "M-7" card, which 
is a reduced fare card issued to students through their schools.  
A user's name is not associated with an M-7 card.  All 
CharlieCards record information each time they are used to pay 
the fare to board a bus, trolley, or train.  Significantly, a 
CharlieCard is used only at a fare vending machine to enter the 
MBTA system, not to disembark from a bus or subway or to 
transfer from one subway line to another. 
The information generated by a CharlieCard is stored for 
fourteen months on a central computer system database owned by 
the MBTA.  The data stored is transactional in nature, with no 
directly personally identifiable information.  It is kept only 
for ridership information and accounting purposes.  The practice 
of the MBTA is to provide this information to law enforcement 
when requested.  This practice is posted on the MBTA website as 
part of its privacy policy.  The location information retrieved 
from the CharlieCard data can then be used to access 
20 
 
surveillance video recordings at bus and subway stations by the 
MBTA police. 
A.  Third-party doctrine.  Before we consider the 
defendants' arguments that Zachery was subjected to a 
warrantless search of his CharlieCard, we take this opportunity 
to observe that the third-party doctrine is not a viable refuge 
for the Commonwealth.  The central tenet of the third-party 
doctrine is that when an individual voluntarily conveys 
information to a third party, for instance a telephone company, 
that individual does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy because he or she knows that the company records 
information for legitimate business purposes and assumes the 
risk that the company may disclose that information to others, 
including the government.  See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
743-744 (1979). 
In Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 245, 251 
(2014), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 and 472 Mass. 448 (2015), we 
concluded that even though CSLI is business information 
belonging to and existing in the records of private cellular 
service providers, it is substantively different from the third-
party information identified by the United States Supreme Court.  
See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-744 (petitioner had no legitimate 
expectation regarding numbers he dialed on telephone because 
numbers were turned over automatically to third-party telephone 
21 
 
company); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-443 (1976) 
(bank depositor had no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
financial information voluntarily conveyed to third-party 
banks).  We reasoned in Augustine that there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in CSLI because, unlike a record of 
telephone numbers, CSLI is not provided knowingly to a third 
party.  Augustine, supra at 250.  Further, CSLI has nothing to 
do with a cell phone user's primary purpose in owning and using 
the cell phone.  See id.  See also Carpenter v. United States, 
138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) ("Given the unique nature of cell 
phone location records, the fact that the information is held by 
a third party does not by itself overcome the user's claim to 
Fourth Amendment protection").  Instead, we noted, CSLI is the 
"location-identifying by-product of the cellular telephone 
technology."  Augustine, supra at 251. 
It similarly is inappropriate to apply the third-party 
doctrine to this case.  The information conveyed to the MBTA 
when an individual pays a fare with his or her CharlieCard is 
far removed from the individual's primary purpose in owning and 
using a CharlieCard -- to pay for public transportation.  See 
Augustine, 467 Mass. at 250.  Unlike a telephone user, who takes 
the affirmative step of providing the telephone company 
information by dialing a number, a CharlieCard user does not 
knowingly transmit data to a third party.  Individuals do not 
22 
 
purchase a CharlieCard with the purpose or expectation of 
sharing information about their location with the MBTA. 
In the digital age, the technology of real-time monitoring 
has become commonplace.  Before electronic monitoring, "law 
enforcement might have pursued a suspect for a brief stretch, 
but doing so 'for any extended period of time was difficult and 
costly and therefore rarely undertaken.'"  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 
at 2217, quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 
(2012).  Today, real-time monitoring can "provide[] an intimate 
window into a person's life, revealing not only his particular 
movements, but through them his 'familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations.'"  Carpenter, 
supra, quoting Jones, supra at 415.  "[I]t is objectively 
reasonable for individuals to expect to be free from sustained 
electronic monitoring of their public movements."  Commonwealth 
v. McCarthy, 484 Mass. 493, 503 (2020).  See Jones, supra at 417 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("[I]t may be necessary to 
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to 
third parties.  This approach is ill suited to the digital age, 
in which people reveal a great deal of information about 
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out 
mundane tasks" [citations omitted]).  Accordingly, we decline to 
"mechanically apply[] the third-party doctrine," and we reject 
23 
 
the doctrine as applied to this case, where the data at issue 
has no connection to the limited purpose for which an individual 
uses a CharlieCard.  Carpenter, supra at 2219. 
B.  The mosaic theory.  The Fourth Amendment and art. 14 
afford protections against unreasonable searches when a search 
or seizure is conducted by or at the direction of the 
government.  See Augustine, 467 Mass. at 240.  "Under both the 
Federal and Massachusetts Constitutions, a search in the 
constitutional sense occurs when the government's conduct 
intrudes on a person's reasonable expectation of privacy."  Id. 
at 241, citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) 
(Harlan, J., concurring).  The defendant bears the burden of 
proving that he or she had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the items seized.  See Commonwealth v. Miller, 475 Mass. 212, 
219 (2016).  The defendant must demonstrate that he had a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the item and that the 
expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable.  Id. at 219-220. 
As we have observed in previous cases, the technological 
developments in surveillance of public space require us to take 
a careful look at society's reasonable expectation of privacy.  
See McCarthy, 484 Mass. at 499.  We are guided by our historical 
understanding of what constitutes an unreasonable search and 
seizure; however, we recognize that technological developments 
24 
 
have placed "'extraordinarily powerful surveillance tool[s]' in 
the hands of police."  Id. at 498, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Almonor, 482 Mass. 35, 46 (2019).  We have acknowledged the 
usefulness of these tools in crime detection while, at the same 
time, cautioning against allowing the "power of technology to 
shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy."  McCarthy, supra, 
quoting Almonor, supra at 41.  In these circumstances, we have 
applied the "mosaic theory."  The mosaic theory requires that we 
consider the governmental action as a whole and evaluate the 
collected data when aggregated.  See McCarthy, supra at 503. 
 
With this in mind, we first consider whether Zachery had a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the data obtained from his 
CharlieCard.  Zachery argues that he had a subjective 
expectation of privacy in being able to move freely about the 
city, akin to cell phone users who use a cell phone to 
communicate with others, without sharing detailed information 
about his or her whereabouts with the government.  See 
Augustine, 467 Mass. at 255 & n.38. 
We are satisfied that the first prong of the analysis is 
met.  In his affidavit, Zachery averred that he "did not know 
that the use of the [CharlieCard] generated a record of [his] 
whereabouts and travel history on the MBTA" and that "he did not 
consent to the police conducting a search of [his] MBTA travel 
history that was connected to the use of the [CharlieCard]."  
25 
 
See Commonwealth v. Mora, 485 Mass. 360, 366 (2020); Augustine, 
467 Mass. at 255 & n.38. 
 
Whether Zachery's expectation of privacy is one that 
society is prepared to recognize is a more difficult question.  
We have recognized that "a privacy interest in the whole of 
one's public movements" exists.  McCarthy, 484 Mass. at 502.  
See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014).  This privacy 
interest can be implicated continually, as when the government 
affixes a location-tracking device to a suspect's vehicle.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rousseau, 465 Mass. 372, 382 (2013).  See also 
Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.  Under the mosaic theory, it also can be 
implicated as a result of data aggregation.  See McCarthy, supra 
503.  Indeed, "[w]hen collected for a long enough period, 'the 
cumulative nature of the information collected implicates a 
privacy interest on the part of the individual who is the target 
of the tracking.'"  Id., quoting Augustine, 467 Mass. at 253.  
See Mora, 485 Mass. at 373 ("our analysis under art. 14 turns on 
whether the surveillance was so targeted and extensive that the 
data it generated, in the aggregate, exposed otherwise 
unknowable details of a person's life"). 
"The mosaic theory requires courts to apply the Fourth 
Amendment search doctrine to government conduct as a collective 
whole rather than in isolated steps."  See Kerr, The Mosaic 
Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 311, 320 
26 
 
(2012).  Under the mosaic theory, while each individual piece of 
information collected may not amount to a search, the 
cumulative, aggregate nature of the data collected may.  See id.  
In McCarthy, 484 Mass. at 506, we adopted the mosaic theory in 
the context of automatic license plate reader cameras.  Although 
we held that four cameras located at the ends of two bridges did 
not reveal information that rose to the level of a search, we 
acknowledged that "[a] detailed account of a person's movements, 
drawn from electronic surveillance, encroaches upon a person's 
reasonable expectation of privacy because the whole reveals far 
more than the sum of the parts."  Id. at 504. 
Here, Zachery argues that the mosaic theory applies to the 
cumulative nature of the information collected from his 
CharlieCard.  While we agree that an extensive record of an 
individual's MBTA activity could constitute a search under the 
mosaic theory, the minimal amount of data obtained in this case 
does not constitute a violation of art. 14 or the Fourth 
Amendment.  Whether the aggregation of data collected by police 
implicates the mosaic theory depends on how much data police 
retrieved and the time period involved.  See Mora, 485 Mass. at 
370.  See also Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852, 858 
(2015).  The MBTA has the ability to retain fourteen months of 
an individual's travel history through the individual's 
CharlieCard.  There is no question that such extensive data, in 
27 
 
certain circumstances, could create a "highly detailed profile."  
Commonwealth v. Connolly, 454 Mass. 808, 834 (2009) (Gants, J., 
concurring), quoting People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 442 
(2009).  From this information, MBTA police also can search for 
and retrieve video footage. 
Here, a Boston police detective contacted an MBTA police 
lieutenant detective by telephone to request the travel history 
and corresponding video footage and still images for Zachery's 
CharlieCard.  To do so, the Boston police detective provided the 
MBTA with Zachery's CharlieCard number.  The detective who made 
the request did not specify what time frame of travel history he 
was interested in or limit the request in any way.  The time 
frame the MBTA police used to check the activity on Zachery's 
CharlieCard is not stated in the record.  On the same day, the 
MBTA police lieutenant detective reported back to the Boston 
police detective that he had recovered some travel history, as 
well as some video footage and still images.  Boston police then 
received information about where the card had been used and 
corresponding video footage that was retrieved based on the time 
period in which the card was used. 
The Boston police detective testified that he received 
travel history, surveillance video footage, and still images 
from two dates -- February 11, 2015, the day of the murder; and 
28 
 
January 26, 20158  -- and that he did not recall if there were 
other dates and times he received.  The detective also testified 
that although he was aware that a printout detailing an 
individual's CharlieCard activity could be generated, he did not 
recall receiving one in this case.  When asked again whether 
Boston police had received a printout of the travel history 
associated with Zachery's CharlieCard, the detective said he did 
not recall. 
 
The motion judge found that police obtained CharlieCard 
activity and coinciding surveillance video footage from January 
26, 2015, and from February 11, 2015, the day of the murder, but 
did not make any findings regarding the MBTA's collection or 
review of the data. 
 
On appeal, Zachery reiterates his argument that he has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the data from his 
CharlieCard where the MBTA retains this data for fourteen 
months.  The Commonwealth counters that the actions by police in 
obtaining Zachery's CharlieCard transactions from the MBTA did 
not constitute a search in the constitutional sense because 
Zachery has failed to establish a privacy interest in a few, 
recent CharlieCard transactions.  Our review of the record 
confirms the motion judge's finding that police obtained 
 
8 There is nothing in the record to explain how MBTA 
officers located data from January 26, 2015. 
29 
 
Zachery's CharlieCard activity and coinciding surveillance video 
footage and still images from January 26 and February 11, 2015.  
Accepting the detective's testimony, as the motion judge did, 
that he did not receive a printout of Zachery's CharlieCard 
activity, there is no indication in the record that MBTA police 
turned over any evidence outside of the data, video recordings, 
and still images from the day of the murder and from January 26, 
2015.  Although the MBTA retains fourteen months of data and 
police made an open-ended request for information relating to 
Zachery's CharlieCard, the record supports the judge's finding 
that police received information from only two days.9 
The data from Zachery's CharlieCard on the day of the 
murder, and the coinciding video footage, revealed his travel 
path to the scene of the crime.  Zachery used his CharlieCard to 
travel from the MBTA station in Jackson Square to the MBTA 
station in Forest Hills within one hour before the shooting.  
Officers received surveillance video recordings from both MBTA 
stations.  Even though Zachery did not use his CharlieCard when 
disembarking from the train at Forest Hills, MBTA police were 
able to locate surveillance video footage of Zachery's exit from 
the train toward the busway wearing black pants, a gray hooded 
sweatshirt, and a black jacket covered by a camouflage jacket on 
 
9 There is nothing in the record to better explain the 
parameters of the request or the response. 
30 
 
the day of the murder.  Surveillance video footage recovered 
from January 26, 2015, shows an individual matching Zachery's 
description wearing a black jacket similar to the jacket 
recovered near the corner of Centre and Aldworth Streets on the 
day of the murder. 
In Augustine, we held that a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in CSLI data relating to his or her cell 
phone that covered a two-week period.  Augustine, 467 Mass. at 
232.  We concluded, however, that there may be some period of 
time for which the Commonwealth could obtain an individual's 
CSLI data without a warrant "because the duration is too brief 
to implicate the person's reasonable privacy interest."  Id. at 
254.  In Estabrook, we adopted a bright-line rule that "the 
Commonwealth may obtain historical CSLI for a period of six 
hours or less relating to an identified person's cellular 
telephone from the cellular service provider without obtaining a 
search warrant, because such a request does not violate the 
31 
 
person's constitutionally protected expectation of privacy."  
Estabrook, 472 Mass. at 858.10,11 
In Mora, 485 Mass. at 370, we analyzed the applicability of 
the mosaic theory in the context of pole cameras.  There, we 
concluded that "the limited pole camera surveillance of [the 
defendants] away from their homes did not collect aggregate data 
about the defendants over an extended period."  Id.  Although 
these pole cameras surveilled twenty-four hours a day, seven 
days a week, they captured the defendants on only a few 
 
10 We noted, however, that this exception applies only to 
"telephone call" CSLI and not "registration" CSLI.  The 
distinction is an important one.  "Telephone call" CSLI 
"indicates the 'approximate physical location . . . of a 
cellular telephone only when a telephone call is made or 
received by that telephone.'"  Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 
Mass. 852, 858 n.12 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Augustine, 
467 Mass. 230, 258-259 (2014) (Gants, J., dissenting), S.C., 470 
Mass. 837 and 472 Mass. 448 (2015).  "By contrast, 
'registration' CSLI 'provides the approximate physical location 
of a cellular telephone every seven seconds unless the telephone 
is "powered off," regardless of whether any telephone call is 
made to or from the telephone.'"  Estabrook, supra, quoting 
Augustine, supra at 259 (Gants, J., dissenting). 
 
11 The court in Estabrook distinguished between the length 
of time for which a person's CSLI is requested and the length of 
time covered by the person's CSLI that the Commonwealth 
ultimately seeks to use as trial evidence.  Estabrook, 472 Mass. 
at 858-859.  We note that the distinction in this case is 
slightly different.  Here, police made an open-ended request to 
the MBTA for data stemming from Zachery's CharlieCard.  
Nonetheless, police were provided only two days of data and the 
Commonwealth received only two days of data.  The salient 
consideration here is not the police's initial open-ended 
request, which could have encompassed fourteen months of data, 
but rather the data that actually was obtained by police and 
then provided to the Commonwealth. 
32 
 
occasions.  Id. at 362, 369.  Pole cameras that targeted the 
defendants' residences for an uninterrupted period of five 
months and two months, however, "were able to uncover the 
defendants' private behaviors, patterns and associations."  Id. 
at 373-374.  Accordingly, we concluded that even though the 
surveillance did not extend inside the defendants' homes, "the 
targeted, long-duration pole camera surveillance . . . provided 
the police with a far richer profile of those defendants' lives 
than would have been possible through human surveillance."  Id. 
at 375.  At the same time, we recognized that "[a] briefer 
period of pole camera use, or one that is not targeted at a 
home, might not implicate the same reasonable expectation of 
privacy."  Id. at 375-376. 
Here, we conclude that the limited extent and use of the 
MBTA data does not implicate the defendant's expectation of 
privacy in the whole of his public movements.  See Estabrook, 
472 Mass. at 858.  See also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 481 Mass. 
710, 726-727, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 247 (2019).  The data 
garnered from a CharlieCard is generated only when an individual 
pays a fare to enter the MBTA system.  Once an individual is 
traveling within the MBTA system, a CharlieCard does not track 
his or her movements.  In addition, as the Commonwealth notes, 
surveillance cameras are present in plain view everywhere a 
CharlieCard transaction can occur.  Zachery did not have a 
33 
 
reasonable expectation in his MBTA travel history for two 
isolated days.  The data that the Commonwealth received from 
those two days was a far cry from the months of uninterrupted 
monitoring in Mora, 485 Mass. at 373-374.  This short time 
period and the limited data generated by Zachery's CharlieCard 
did not constitute an aggregation of data points that revealed 
extensive detail about Zachery's movements, much less a profile 
of his life.  See id. at 375.  See also United States v. 
Hammond, 996 F.3d 374, 389 (7th Cir. 2021), quoting Carpenter, 
138 S. Ct. at 2217 ("the record of [the defendant's] movements 
for a matter of hours on public roads does not provide a 'window 
into [the] person's life, revealing . . . his familial, 
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations' to 
the same, intrusive degree as the collection of historical 
CSLI").  Zachery's CharlieCard generated far less data than 
other types of location tracking, such as global positioning 
system monitoring or CSLI gathered from a cell phone.  Thus, 
under the mosaic theory, the police investigation of Zachery's 
CharlieCard travel history did not constitute a search. 
Because we conclude that the government's use of MBTA data 
did not constitute a search in the constitutional sense, the 
34 
 
Commonwealth's use of the surveillance video footage coinciding 
with the data from Zachery's CharlieCard was lawful.12 
b.  Search of Zachery's cell phone.  Before transporting 
Zachery to police headquarters to be interviewed, police seized 
his cell phone.  A search warrant for Zachery's cell phone 
issued six days after the murder.  Our review of whether a 
search warrant was supported by probable cause is limited to 
review of the four corners of the affidavit.  Commonwealth v. 
Snow, 486 Mass. 582, 586 (2021).  "[W]e give considerable 
deference to a magistrate's determination of probable cause."  
Commonwealth v. Keown, 478 Mass. 232, 238 (2017), cert. denied, 
138 S. Ct. 1038 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Dorelas, 473 
Mass. 496, 501 (2016).  "To establish probable cause, the facts 
contained in the warrant affidavit, and the reasonable 
inferences drawn from them, must be sufficient for the issuing 
judge to conclude that the police seek items related to criminal 
activity and that the items described 'reasonably may be 
expected to be located in the place to be searched at the time 
the warrant issues.'"  Commonwealth v. Perkins, 478 Mass. 97, 
102 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Walker, 438 Mass. 246, 249 
(2002).  "[T]he burden of establishing that evidence is 
 
12 In this kind of case, the better course may be for police 
to obtain a search warrant for the data.  This is especially so 
where they do not appear to be in control of the amount of data 
they receive or the time span covered by the data. 
35 
 
illegally obtained is on the defendant when the search is under 
warrant" (quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Taylor, 383 Mass. 272, 280 (1981).  See Commonwealth v. Forbes, 
85 Mass. App. Ct. 168, 173 (2014). 
Police applied for a search warrant to search Zachery's 
cell phone.13  Zachery argues that the four corners of the 
affidavit in support of the search warrant failed to establish 
probable cause that the cell phone was used before or during the 
commission of a crime and failed to establish a sufficient nexus 
between the alleged criminal activity and the device.  Zachery 
also argues that the warrant lacked particularity.  The 
Commonwealth counters that the warrant was supported by probable 
cause and the search warrant affidavit did not lack 
particularity because it enumerated eight types of evidence 
likely to be found on Zachery's cell phone. 
i.  Probable cause.  Under the Fourth Amendment and art. 
14, "a search warrant may issue only on a showing of probable 
cause."  Commonwealth v. Anthony, 451 Mass. 59, 68 (2008).  "In 
order to establish probable cause to issue a search warrant, the 
affidavit must 'contain enough information for the issuing 
magistrate to determine that the items sought are related to the 
 
13 Zachery does not challenge the motion judge's conclusion 
that his cell phone properly was seized before he formally was 
arrested.  Accordingly, we do not address it. 
36 
 
criminal activity under investigation, and that they may 
reasonably be expected to be located in the place to be 
searched.'"  Connolly, 454 Mass. at 813, quoting Commonwealth v. 
O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 300 (2003).  Probable cause to support the 
issuance of a search warrant does not require definitive proof 
of criminal activity.  See Anthony, supra at 69.  Our review of 
whether probable cause exists for a search warrant to issue 
"begins and ends with the 'four corners of the affidavit.'"  
Commonwealth v. Cavitt, 460 Mass. 617, 626 (2011), quoting 
O'Day, supra at 297. 
Zachery's probable cause argument focuses on an allegedly 
insufficient nexus between his cell phone and the murder.  The 
government must demonstrate a nexus between the alleged crime 
and the device to be searched or seized.  See Commonwealth v. 
White, 475 Mass. 583, 588 (2016).  We have defined a nexus as a 
"substantial basis" for concluding that the item searched or 
seized contains "evidence connected to the crime" under 
investigation (citation omitted).  See Perkins, 478 Mass. at 
104.  The opinions of investigating officers do "not, alone, 
furnish the requisite nexus between the criminal activity and 
the [device] to be searched."  Anthony, 451 Mass. at 72.  See 
Burns v. United States, 235 A.3d 758, 774 (D.C. 2020) (bare 
bones affidavit stating only detective's belief that probable 
cause existed to search cell phones did not establish nexus 
37 
 
between data on cell phones and homicide).  Rather, 
"particularized evidence" is required to create this connection.  
Dorelas, 473 Mass. at 502. 
Search warrants "rely[ing] on the ubiquitous presence of 
cellular telephones and text messaging in daily life, or 
generalities that friends or coventurers often use cellular 
telephones to communicate" are insufficient to establish the 
nexus for a search of such a device.  See Commonwealth v. 
Jordan, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 743, 750 (2017).  Instead, there must 
be "specific, not speculative," evidence linking the device in 
question to the criminal conduct.  Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 
485 Mass. 172, 185 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1111 (2021). 
We are, however, mindful that "[s]earch warrants should not 
be 'subjected to hypercritical analysis' but, rather, should be 
'interpreted in a realistic and commonsense manner.'"  Keown, 
478 Mass. at 238, quoting Anthony, 451 Mass. at 68.  "In dealing 
with probable cause . . . we deal with probabilities.  These are 
not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations 
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal 
technicians, act."  Anthony, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Hason, 387 Mass. 169, 174 (1982).  See generally J.A. Grasso, 
Jr., & C.M. McEvoy, Suppression Matters Under Massachusetts Law 
§ 8-2 (2020 ed.). 
38 
 
Accordingly, "[t]he nexus 'need not be based on direct 
observation' and it 'may be found in the type of crime, the 
nature of the [evidence] sought, and normal inferences as to 
where such evidence may be found.'"  Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 482 
Mass. 538, 546 (2019), quoting White, 475 Mass. at 589.  As with 
other locations searched, the nexus required to establish that a 
cell phone may contain evidence of a crime requires only a "fair 
probability that evidence of such a crime would be found in [the 
cell phone]."  Anthony, 451 Mass. at 72. 
Here, the affidavit in support of the search warrant 
established probable cause and set forth a sufficient nexus 
between Zachery's cell phone and the crimes alleged.  The 
affidavit presented evidence that Zachery murdered the victim 
and shot at an officer and that the murder was part of a 
coordinated effort. 
It was reasonable to infer that Zachery was coordinating 
with a coconspirator to murder the victim for several reasons. 
To begin, there was no apparent instigating event.  Instead, the 
murder appeared to be planned and targeted.  The affidavit 
presented evidence that Zachery traveled to the area of the 
crime with the intent to murder the victim.  There was no 
apparent reason for Zachery, who lived in the Hyde Park section 
of Boston and was supposed to be in school at the time, to be 
near the crime scene.  This suspicion was compounded by the fact 
39 
 
that Zachery provided a false explanation for why he was in the 
area and how he arrived.  Zachery told police that he had been 
traveling throughout Boston by public transportation to help 
people shovel snow.  He claimed that he had a shovel as he 
traveled and that he had been wearing the same clothing all day.  
However, in the hour before the shooting, surveillance video 
footage revealed that Zachery was walking without a shovel and 
wearing several layers of clothing on top of what he was wearing 
when he was arrested.  In the video footage, he was wearing a 
camouflage jacket that appeared to be bulky and have another 
article of clothing underneath it.  That article of clothing was 
black and had a high collar that was visible under the 
camouflage jacket.  The black article of clothing was consistent 
with the black jacket found underneath the stairwell.  Zachery 
also appeared to be wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt under both 
of these layers of clothing. 
Additionally, the affidavit sets out that the only apparent 
motive for the murder was gang rivalry.  The affidavit states 
that Zachery was listed in the Boston police gang database as 
being an active, primary member of the Franklin Hill Giants 
gang.  The victim was listed as being a primary member of the 
Thetford Avenue gang.  Henley, who was part of the same work 
crew as the victim, also was listed as being an active, primary 
member of the Franklin Hill Giants gang.  The two gangs are 
40 
 
known to be rival gangs.  Based on the information that the 
victim and Zachery were in rival gangs, and the fact that there 
was another person in the work crew with the victim who was part 
of the same rival gang as Zachery, police found it to be 
extremely unlikely that Zachery arrived there by coincidence.  
It was far more likely that Zachery was directed to or alerted 
to the work crew location in real time.  The reasonable 
inference that Zachery used his cell phone to coordinate the 
murder follows logically.  This evidence of likely coordination 
was sufficient to establish a nexus between the murder and 
Zachery's cell phone. 
The facts of this case can be distinguished from those in 
White, 475 Mass. at 590, where we concluded that the seizure of 
the defendant's cell phone was not supported by probable cause 
because the nexus requirement was not satisfied.  There, police 
did not have any information on which to base a belief that a 
cell phone was used in the commission of the crime; rather, the 
decision to seize the defendant's cell phone was made because 
officers had reason to believe that the defendant had 
coventurers and owned a cell phone.14  Id.  The facts here are 
far more compelling than the broad assertions made in White, 
 
14 We also note that the issue here, unlike in Commonwealth 
v. White, 475 Mass. 583, 590 (2016), is not whether the seizure 
of the cell phone was proper but rather whether there was 
probable cause to issue a warrant to search the cell phone. 
41 
 
which were supported by only the assumption that cell phones are 
commonly used to communicate.  Compare id. with Snow, 486 Mass. 
at 587-589 (nexus between crime and cell phone where defendant 
called girlfriend after crime, defendant sent threatening text 
messages to victim, and evidence existed that crime had been 
planned ahead of time), and Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 Mass. 
508, 522 (2017) (substantial basis to conclude defendant's text 
messages related to crime where defendant called victim's cell 
phone immediately before shooting, just as he was entering 
victim's apartment building). 
We emphasize that this case presents a highly unusual 
combination of factors:  there was no apparent instigating event 
for the murder; two rival gang members, one of whom was the 
victim, were part of the same work crew at the time of the 
murder; and, finally, another rival gang member of the victim, 
who did not live near the work site or have any plausible reason 
to be there, arrived at the work site at around the time of 
murder.  Based on these factors, it was reasonable for police to 
believe that the murder was planned.  More specifically, the 
fact that Henley, one of Zachery's fellow gang members, was part 
of the same work crew as the victim on the day of the murder 
permitted the inference that Henley may have coordinated the 
murder with Zachery.  This type of coordination is improbable 
without real-time communication through cell phone calls or text 
42 
 
messages.  Accordingly, these facts, combined with police 
experience and expertise, established a sufficient nexus for the 
search warrant. 
ii.  Particularity.  "Under the Fourth Amendment, warrants 
must 'particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.'"  Keown, 478 Mass. at 239.  
Searches of cell phones "must be done with special care and 
satisfy a more narrow and demanding standard" than physical 
searches.  Dorelas, 473 Mass. at 502.  It is not enough to limit 
the search to the virtual contents of an electronic device.  
"[W]hat might have been an appropriate limitation in the 
physical world becomes a limitation without consequence in the 
virtual one."  Id.  Nevertheless, a search of an electronic 
device is proper when officers are clear about what they are 
seeking on the device.  "[A] computer search 'may be as 
extensive as reasonably required to locate the items described 
in the warrant.'"  United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263, 
1270 (10th Cir. 2006), quoting United States v. Wuagneux, 683 
F.2d 1343, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814 
(1983). 
Here, the search warrant application sought eight types of 
evidence:  ownership of the cell phone, contacts with persons at 
the homicide, discussion or knowledge of the homicide, 
familiarity with persons involved in the homicide, familiarity 
43 
 
or contact with locations or items associated with the homicide, 
communications that led Zachery to arrive at the scene of the 
shooting, evidence of gang activity, and discussions of 
firearms.  The application did not, however, specify where on 
the cell phone the evidence might be found.  Indeed, the affiant 
stated that evidence sought could "be found anywhere in the 
entire electronic contents of the phone."  Even though the scope 
of the warrant was broad, it was sufficiently particular in 
these circumstances where officers had no knowledge of where on 
the cell phone evidence might be located, or in what format, but 
specifically identified the type of evidence sought.  See United 
States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 102 (2d Cir. 2017), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018) ("A warrant may be broad, in that 
it authorizes the government to search an identified location or 
object for a wide range of potentially relevant material, 
without violating the particularity requirement"). 
Our conclusion in Dorelas that "[o]fficers must . . . 
conduct the search in a way that avoids searching files of types 
not identified in the warrant," Dorelas, 473 Mass. at 502, 
quoting United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1069 (2002), requires some 
clarification.  Although general or exploratory searches are not 
permitted, requiring a search warrant application to identify 
specific locations or files on a cell phone to be searched 
44 
 
places an unrealistic burden on law enforcement and restricts 
legitimate search objectives, given the storage capacity and 
file structure of most cell phones.  See United States v. Bass, 
785 F.3d 1043, 1050 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 884 
(2015).  In most cases, at the time of the seizure, officers are 
unable to know "where [the] information [is] located in the 
phone or in what format."15  Id. 
Although police specified eight categories of relevant 
evidence for which they were searching, they did not know the 
precise identity or content of the evidence that would be found.  
Compare United States vs. Juarez, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 12-CR-59 
(RRM) (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2013) (warrant "properly cabined the 
discretion of the officers by limiting the search to a specific 
phone for enumerated categories of evidence related to a 
specific crime"), with United States v. Winn, 79 F. Supp. 3d 
904, 919-921 (S.D. Ill. 2015) (warrant describing category of 
data rather than specific items not particular enough where 
police knew precise identity and content of evidence sought).  
Without knowing precisely what evidence existed, police did not 
know, nor could they have known, the precise location within the 
cell phone where the evidence would be found.  In this case, and 
 
15 We have not required digital search protocols in 
Massachusetts.  See Commonwealth v. Martinez, 476 Mass. 410, 422 
n.11 (2017); Commonwealth v. Molina, 476 Mass. 388, 398 (2017). 
45 
 
other cases where the location of evidence on a cell phone is 
unknowable to law enforcement, the Dorelas requirement that 
officers identify file types to be searched in the warrant is 
impractical.16  Accordingly, the warrant properly limited the 
search to enumerated categories of evidence related to the crime 
without limiting where in the electronic contents of the cell 
phone the search would take place.17  See Hedgepath v. 
Commonwealth, 441 S.W.3d 119, 130 (Ky. 2014) ("the warrant did 
not limit the parts of the cell phone that could be searched, or 
the types of files or data that were to be sought, [but] the 
clear thrust of the warrant was for evidence related to the 
physical and sexual assaults committed"). 
 
16 In a case where police know precisely where the evidence 
for which they are searching is stored, the Dorelas requirement 
limiting the parts of the cell phone or types of files on the 
cell phone to be searched stands.  See Winn, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 
919-920. 
 
17 We have yet to address whether the plain view doctrine 
applies to digital searches.  See Snow, 486 Mass. at 595 n.12.  
Here, there is no showing that police came across any of the 
data from Zachery's cell phone inadvertently.  We note, however, 
that in a case where police do come across evidence 
inadvertently, but are within the scope of the search authorized 
by the warrant, the proper course is for police to stop their 
search and apply for another warrant.  See United States v. 
Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 524 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 
1044 (2010) ("We have applied [the plain view doctrine] 
successfully in the context of warrants authorizing the search 
and seizure of non-electronic files, and we see no reason to 
depart from them in the [context] of electronic files" [citation 
omitted]).  But see Dorelas, 473 Mass. at 505 n.16 ("we 
recognize that the application of that doctrine to digital file 
searches may, at times, need to be limited"). 
46 
 
That the warrant failed to require a temporal limit, 
however, raises a different concern in regard to particularity.  
"[T]o be sufficiently particular, a warrant for a cell phone 
search presumptively must contain some temporal limit."  Snow, 
486 Mass. at 594.  When considering a temporal limit on a search 
warrant, "the inquiry can be based on 'the type of crime, the 
nature of the [evidence] sought, and normal inferences' about 
how far back in time the evidence could be found."  Id., quoting 
White, 475 Mass. at 589.  Cf. Hobbs, 482 Mass. at 549 ("defining 
the permissible parameters of time for CSLI searches that are 
justified by probable cause is difficult" and requires "fact-
intensive inquiry" [citation omitted]).  In Snow, we concluded 
that because the feud between the defendant and victim began 
only days before the murder, the facts did not "support a 
reasonable inference that evidence related to the crime could be 
found in the defendant's cell phone data from years, months, or 
even weeks before the murder."  Snow, supra at 595.  In 
contrast, we have recognized that in certain circumstances, such 
as "in an insider trading case where the tenor of the parties' 
relationship is critical to the claim, it could be reasonable to 
look back further in time."  Id. at 594, citing United States v. 
Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp. 3d 287, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
Here, the detective averred that "it is both impractical 
and imprudent to restrict the electronic search by time frame."  
47 
 
This absence of a temporal limit altogether rendered the warrant 
impermissibly broad.  Because a cell phone can store many years 
of data, some temporal restriction is required.  Furthermore, 
there is little need to carry out a search quickly once a cell 
phone is seized.  Police should "err on the side of narrowness" 
in an initial search warrant to protect the privacy interests at 
stake.  Snow, 486 Mass. at 594.  If officers uncover information 
during the initial search that supports probable cause to expand 
the search, they can request a broader warrant.  Id.  
Accordingly, to be sufficiently particular, the warrant should 
have included some temporal limit. 
In determining the permissible temporal parameters for a 
warrant, we first consider that the crime was a gang-related 
murder.  The relationship between the victim and the defendants 
is relevant to the theory of the case that the murder was a 
result of a feud between rival gang members.  Unlike in Snow, 
the record here supports an inference that there was a long-
standing relationship between the defendants and the victim.  
Therefore, a reasonable temporal limit would extend beyond just 
the day of the murder or even the days leading up to the murder.  
In fact, evidence was presented that in December 2014, 
approximately two months before the murder, Henley told his 
mother about safety concerns he had at the program because of a 
member of a rival gang who also worked there.  We can reasonably 
48 
 
infer that evidence relating to the feud between Henley and the 
victim could be found as far back as two months before the 
murder.  Based on the particular facts of this case, a temporal 
limit of two months would have been reasonable.  We emphasize 
that this determination is based on a fact-intensive inquiry and 
"[does] not amount to a general rule as to the temporal scope of 
cell phone searches."  Snow, 486 Mass. at 595. 
In any event, a "defendant is not prejudiced by an 
overbroad warrant if the Commonwealth does not seek to exploit 
the lack of particularity in the warrant."  Snow, 486 Mass. at 
591, citing Holley, 478 Mass. at 525.  See Hobbs, 482 Mass. at 
550-551 (defendant was not prejudiced by overbroad temporal 
limit where Commonwealth only meaningfully used and relied on 
evidence from date of killing).  At trial, the Commonwealth 
introduced only text messages and telephone calls from the 
morning of the murder.  Because we conclude that the requisite 
nexus existed between these text messages and the murder, and 
that the Commonwealth had probable cause to search Zachery's 
text messages from that day, we conclude that Zachery was not 
prejudiced by the lack of temporal limit in the warrant.  "[T]he 
text messages were 'sufficiently limited in content and scope 
such that the Commonwealth did not capitalize on the lack of 
particularity in the warrant.'"  Hobbs, supra at 551, quoting 
Holley, supra. 
49 
 
2.  Failure to sever cases.  Before trial, the judge denied 
Zachery's motion to sever his case from Henley's.  Zachery also 
raised the issue repeatedly at trial.18  Zachery argues that the 
judge abused his discretion in denying his repeated requests for 
severance and eventually for a mistrial.  Matters of severance 
are left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.  See 
Commonwealth v. McAfee, 430 Mass. 483, 485 (1999); Commonwealth 
v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 658 (1982).  We weigh the efficiencies 
of joinder against the rights of the accused.  Moran, supra.  
Failure to sever a trial is only an abuse of discretion when the 
prejudice from a joint trial deprives the defendant of a fair 
trial.  Id. 
Where parties present mutually antagonistic defenses and 
"the acceptance of one party's defense will preclude the 
acquittal of the other," the prejudice requires severance.  
Commonwealth v. DePina, 476 Mass. 614, 628 (2017), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Ramos, 470 Mass. 740, 749 (2015).  The defenses 
must be "irreconcilable and mutually exclusive."  United States 
v. Crawford, 581 F.2d 489, 491 (5th Cir. 1978).  Defenses that 
merely are hostile or inconsistent do not require severance.  
 
18 Henley did not raise this issue at trial.  On appeal, 
Henley "join[ed] in the arguments contained in the brief of his 
codefendant," but did not specifically address the trial judge's 
failure to sever the cases or how the failure to sever affected 
him in particular. 
50 
 
McAfee, 430 Mass. at 486 (defenses were not mutually 
antagonistic where defendant claimed misidentification and 
codefendant claimed diminished culpability because his 
coventurer, whom he did not identify as defendant, was shooter).  
See Commonwealth v. Watson, 487 Mass. 156, 167-169 (2021) 
(severance was not warranted where defendants had inconsistent 
arguments about specific testimony but did not seek to inculpate 
one another); Holley, 478 Mass. at 531-532 (denial of motion to 
sever was proper where evidence against one defendant was 
substantially greater than that against other but neither 
defense rested solely on guilt of other defendant); Commonwealth 
v. Hernandez, 473 Mass. 379, 391-392 (2015) (denial of motion to 
sever was proper where codefendants differed in descriptive 
characteristics they wanted jury to remember about intruders but 
all named third parties as perpetrators, not each other); 
Commonwealth v. Rivera, 464 Mass. 56, 72, cert. denied, 570 U.S. 
907 (2013) (defenses were not mutually antagonistic where one 
defendant presented alibi witness and other claimed he had 
withdrawn from joint venture before murders).  Further, where 
there is sufficient other evidence of guilt, even mutually 
antagonistic and irreconcilable defenses do not justify 
severance.  Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 462 Mass. 827, 838 (2012). 
Zachery argues that his trial should have been severed from 
Henley's trial because he was prejudiced by evidence that Henley 
51 
 
was involved in another shooting using the murder weapon from 
this case.  Zachery also argues that the trial should have been 
severed because his defense at trial that there was insufficient 
evidence to prove he was the shooter was entirely antagonistic 
to Henley's defense of miscommunication.  Neither of these 
arguments justifies severance. 
Regarding Zachery's first argument, whether Zachery was 
prejudiced by evidence that Henley was involved in another 
shooting is not relevant to the issue of severance.  The 
question is not whether a defendant is prejudiced by evidence 
introduced against a codefendant, but, rather, whether the 
codefendants' "defenses are . . . mutually antagonistic (or 
mutually exclusive) and irreconcilable."  Vazquez, 462 Mass. at 
836.  In any event, there was no prejudice to Zachery where the 
judge gave a contemporaneous limiting instruction that this 
evidence "may not be considered for any purpose whatsoever 
against [Zachery]."  Moreover, evidence that Henley was involved 
in another shooting where the murder weapon was used is not 
prejudicial to Zachery where his defense was that he was not the 
shooter in this case. 
Zachery's second argument is equally unavailing.  Zachery's 
defense at trial was that he was not the shooter.  Henley's 
defense was that he asked Zachery to bring him the gun for 
protection but did not intend for Zachery to shoot the victim.  
52 
 
These defenses are merely inconsistent and, at best, hostile.  
See McAfee, 430 Mass. at 486.  The jury could have accepted 
either defense without implicating the other.  See DePina, 476 
Mass. at 628.  Because Zachery did not show that he was unfairly 
prejudiced by a joint trial, the trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion in denying Zachery's motion and requests for 
severance. 
3.  Evidence of prior misconduct.  Henley argues that the 
trial judge erred in admitting evidence, over his objection, of 
prior misconduct that connected Henley to an earlier shooting.19  
The Commonwealth argues that the probative value of the evidence 
of the prior shooting was not outweighed by unfair prejudice 
because it established Henley's access to a firearm and was 
intertwined with the Commonwealth's theory of Henley's 
involvement in the murder as a coconspirator. 
Following a pretrial hearing, the judge ruled that the 
Commonwealth's witnesses could testify that, approximately five 
months before the murder, Henley and another individual20 were 
observed running away from a location where shots were fired.  
 
19 In his brief, Zachery joined in Henley's argument that 
the judge erred in admitting evidence of prior misconduct that 
connected Henley to an earlier shooting but did not argue that 
the alleged error prejudiced him personally. 
 
20 The parties stipulated that the other individual running 
away was not Zachery. 
53 
 
The Commonwealth also presented evidence that the firearm used 
in that incident was the same one used to kill the victim in 
this case.  A judge's decision to allow the admission of such 
evidence is "not disturbed absent palpable error" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 156 (2014). 
"A weapon that could have been used in the course of a 
crime is admissible, in the judge's discretion, even without 
direct proof that the particular weapon was in fact used in the 
commission of the crime."  Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 
116, 122 (2012).  Nevertheless, evidence relevant to showing 
that a defendant has the means to commit a crime will not be 
admitted if its probative value is outweighed by the risk of 
prejudice to the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 
Mass. 228, 249 (2014).  Henley's contention that the evidence is 
not probative because it did not demonstrate that Henley 
possessed or had access to the gun in the earlier incident is 
unavailing.  While the firearm in the earlier incident was, at 
most, tenuously linked to Henley at the time, the fact remains 
that it was the same firearm used to carry out the murder in 
this case.  Henley's presence at the earlier incident where the 
firearm was used established that he may have had access to the 
firearm, even if he did not possess it at the time.  See Holley, 
478 Mass. at 532 (evidence of prior uncharged gun theft relevant 
to show defendant had means of committing crime). 
54 
 
Moreover, the risk of prejudice to Henley was limited where 
the Commonwealth alleged only that Henley was present when the 
misconduct occurred.  While the jurors could have inferred that 
Henley had some association with the firearm used during that 
incident, based on the evidence presented, it was not a 
reasonable inference that Henley fired the gun or had any 
physical involvement in the shooting. 
Finally, any potential risk that the jury would use the 
evidence to impermissibly infer that Henley had bad character or 
a propensity to commit the crime was offset by the judge's 
limiting instruction.  See McGee, 467 Mass. at 158.  Although 
the judge did not give a contemporaneous limiting instruction, 
he included a limiting instruction in his final charge.  The 
judge stated:  "If you find the evidence concerning the prior 
incident credible you may consider that evidence only for a 
limited purpose; that is, on the issue of whether . . . Henley 
had knowledge of or access to that particular weapon.  You may 
not use the evidence to conclude that . . . Henley has a bad 
character or that he has a propensity to commit crimes or that 
he has committed any crime on that earlier date in September of 
2014."  We presume that the jury followed the judge's 
instructions.  See Commonwealth v. Medina, 430 Mass. 800, 803 
(2000). 
55 
 
4.  Officer testimony that he had known Henley since 2005.  
Henley argues that the judge erred in allowing, over his 
objection, an officer's testimony that he recognized Henley as 
part of the work crew at the scene of the crime and had been 
familiar with Henley since 2005.  Henley argues that this 
testimony impermissibly encouraged the jury to infer that the 
officer knew Henley as a result of previous stops or arrests.  
Henley further argues that whether the officer knew Henley and 
for how long he knew Henley had no probative value where the 
prosecutor could have simply asked the officer to identify 
Henley in the court room.  The Commonwealth counters that the 
testimony was admissible because its probative value outweighed 
any undue prejudice. 
We agree that the testimony about the officer's familiarity 
with Henley and the officer's recognition of Henley at the scene 
of the crime was probative evidence, central to the 
Commonwealth's theory that Henley conspired with Zachery to kill 
the victim.  Similarly, the length of time that the officer had 
known Henley was relevant to the strength of his identification.  
See Commonwealth v. Adams, 458 Mass. 766, 771 (2011).  The 
probative value, however, is lessened where Henley does not 
dispute that he was present at the scene of the crime as part of 
the work crew. 
56 
 
There is no question that officer testimony regarding 
familiarity with a defendant can be prejudicial.  Commonwealth 
v. Pleas, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 321, 327 (2000) ("Identification 
testimony from a police officer who is so designated increases 
the potential for inappropriate prejudice to the defendant").  
The question, however, is not whether admission of the officer's 
testimony was prejudicial; "it is rather whether it was unduly 
prejudicial, or more prejudicial than probative."  Commonwealth 
v. Rosa, 468 Mass. 231, 241 (2014).  Here, Henley's claim of 
undue prejudice is premised on the notion that the jury were 
likely to infer from the testimony that Henley had a long 
history of police contact.  Because Henley himself used his gang 
involvement as part of his theory of defense throughout the 
trial, the officer's testimony about his familiarity with Henley 
did not amount to undue prejudice. 
Furthermore, even if we were to conclude that the probative 
value of this evidence did not outweigh the prejudice to Henley, 
there was no prejudicial error because, as stated, Henley's 
defense included his history of gang involvement.  Accordingly, 
the officer's testimony did not contribute substantively to the 
Commonwealth's case and was unlikely to have affected the jury. 
5.  Testimony of the Commonwealth's gang expert.  Henley 
argues that the trial judge improperly admitted portions of the 
57 
 
Commonwealth's expert witness's gang testimony.21,22  
Specifically, Henley contends that certain of the expert 
testimony was inadmissible because it was either unduly 
prejudicial or outside the witness's expertise and that the 
judge's limiting instruction to the jury permitted consideration 
of the gang evidence for too many purposes. 
Zachery raised a timely objection to the expert's testimony 
regarding general gang violence.23  Accordingly, as to that 
claim, we review for prejudicial error and "inquire[] whether 
there is a reasonable possibility that the error might have 
contributed to the jury's verdict."  Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 478 
Mass. 142, 150 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 
8, 23 (1999) (Greaney, J., concurring).  As to Henley's other 
unpreserved claims regarding the gang expert's testimony, our 
review is limited to whether any error created a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 
431 Mass. 609, 612 (2000), S.C., 438 Mass. 325 (2002). 
 
21 The expert, a Boston police detective, provided testimony 
on gangs but did not testify about other issues in the case. 
 
22 Zachery joined in the argument contained in Henley's 
brief that the judge erred in admitting certain testimony from 
the Commonwealth's gang expert.  Zachery did not advance any 
additional arguments regarding the alleged error. 
 
23 Zachery's objection to the expert's testimony regarding 
gang violence was sufficient to preserve the claim for both 
defendants.  See Commonwealth v. Charles, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 595, 
598 n.7 (2003). 
58 
 
"Expert testimony 'is admissible whenever it will aid the 
jury in reaching a decision, even if the expert's opinion 
touches on the ultimate issues that the jury must decide.'"  
Commonwealth v. Evans, 469 Mass. 834, 849 (2014), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Dockham, 405 Mass. 618, 628 (1989).  "Expert 
opinion testimony must rest on a proper basis, else inadmissible 
evidence might enter in the guise of expert opinion."  
Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 466 (2019), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 477 Mass. 658, 667 (2017).  "Proper 
bases include 'facts within the witness's direct personal 
knowledge,' facts already introduced in evidence, or 'unadmitted 
but independently admissible evidence.'"  Wardsworth, supra, 
quoting Barbosa, supra. 
Here, the evidence relating to the rival gangs and both 
defendants' gang membership was relevant to the Commonwealth's 
theory of the case.  The evidence established motive and was 
relevant to the Commonwealth's theory that Zachery and Henley 
conspired together to murder the victim.  We disagree with 
Henley's claim that the Commonwealth's expert was unqualified to 
opine on the meaning of certain phrases in the defendants' text 
messages.  "Expert testimony is useful where speakers engage in 
coded conversation or speak about a subject using specialized 
vocabulary."  Rosa, 468 Mass. at 240.  Although expert testimony 
is not permitted to interpret clear conversations, an expert 
59 
 
opinion as to "street-level jargon" is admissible.  Id. at 240 
n.12.  The expert's extensive history of gang-related police 
work gave him a specialized knowledge and familiarity with 
common gang terminology.  The expert properly testified that to 
"hold somebody down" was an expression of loyalty and to "punch 
somebody up" meant to shoot someone.  Additionally, the expert 
properly testified that a "crash" or "crash test dummy" was 
slang for a younger gang member who may commit violent acts to 
gain status in a gang. 
We conclude, however, that the expert's testimony regarding 
general gang violence was overbroad.  The expert testified 
extensively about the general presence of gangs in Boston, as 
well as prior instances of gang violence in the city.  Although 
the expert's testimony regarding the gangs with which the 
defendants and the victim were affiliated was relevant to 
establish motive and joint venture between Zachery and Henley, 
his more general comments regarding gangs in the Boston area 
went beyond what was probative of the defendants' criminal 
liability.  Such testimony risked "prejudice to the defendant in 
that it [suggested] a propensity to criminality or violence" 
resulting from his gang affiliation.  Commonwealth v. Phim, 462 
Mass. 470, 477 (2012).  Contrast Commonwealth v. Akara, 465 
Mass. 245, 267-269 (2013) (no error where "[t]he prosecutor did 
60 
 
not suggest that the gang or its members had a history of 
violence" and "did not discuss any criminal activity"). 
We disagree with Henley that the circumstances here are 
analogous to Wardsworth, 482 Mass. at 471-472.  In Wardsworth, 
the erroneous admission of the gang expert's opinion that the 
defendant fit the criteria of a gang member constituted 
reversible error.  Id. at 473.  There, the Commonwealth's case 
depended upon the jury believing that the defendant was a member 
of a gang.  Id. at 455.  While we concluded that testimony about 
general gang violence was part of the totality of gang-related 
testimony that "went well beyond that which was probative of the 
facts at issue," we had no need to reach what effect this 
evidence would have had on the jury alone.  Id. at 473. 
The circumstances here are far different.  First, the 
defendants' gang membership is not in dispute and, in fact, it 
is a crucial part of Henley's defense.  Second, unlike in 
Wardsworth, the judge gave an effective limiting instruction 
regarding the jury's use of the expert testimony.  Henley argues 
that this limiting instruction was overbroad.  We disagree. 
The judge's limiting instructions drew a direct connection 
between the alleged gang involvement of the defendants and the 
murder.  Most significantly, the judge effectively instructed 
the jury regarding the limited purpose of the expert's evidence.  
The judge gave this limiting instruction at the start of the 
61 
 
expert's testimony and in the judge's final charge to the jury.  
In the limiting instruction, the judge said that the "so-called 
gang evidence" should be considered for three limited purposes, 
"if [the jury] credit it": 
"first, as evidence of the defendants' state of mind, 
including whether either or both of the defendants had a 
motive to commit the killing of [the victim], and as 
evidence of any hostility or fear that either of the 
defendants held for [the victim] or his group; second, as 
evidence, again if you credit it, of whether there was a 
joint venture or common purpose or plan between the two 
defendants to commit the killing; and third, whether any 
reported gang affiliations may have influenced certain 
decisions or actions by members of the [program].  If you 
conclude that either defendant is affiliated with a gang or 
group that in itself is no proof that either defendant 
committed the crimes with which he is charged in this 
case." 
 
In his final charge to the jury, the judge repeated the 
limited purposes for which the expert gang testimony could be 
considered but did not add the caveat that the evidence should 
be considered for these purposes only "if the jury credit it."  
Henley contends that the judge erred in failing to use this 
language.  Considering the judge's instructions as a whole, we 
disagree. 
At the close of evidence, the judge separately instructed 
the jury on expert witness testimony.  The judge instructed:  
"[Y]ou are to treat the so-called expert witness just as you 
would treat any other witness.  In other words, as with any 
other witness it is completely up to you to decide whether you 
62 
 
accept the testimony of an expert witness including the opinions 
that the witness has given."  Although the gang expert's 
testimony was overbroad, we conclude that any material risk of 
prejudice to the defendants was remedied by the judge's limiting 
instruction at the time the expert testified and the judge's 
final instruction. 
6.  Opening statement and closing argument.  Zachery argues 
that portions of the prosecutor's opening statement and closing 
argument were improper and require a new trial.24  We conclude 
that the prosecutor's statements were within the bounds of 
proper argument. 
First, Zachery argues that, in the prosecutor's opening 
statement, he argued facts not in evidence with respect to the 
footprints found on the porch.  The prosecutor stated, "Through 
the part of the yard that was shoveled and up onto the back 
porch left sneaker prints in the fresh snow on that back porch.  
Sneaker prints of the exact same size, make, model and tread 
pattern of the sneakers . . . Zachery was wearing."  "[A] 
prosecutor in a criminal action may state anything in [his or 
her] opening argument that [he or she] expects to be able to 
prove by evidence."  Commonwealth v. Johnson, 429 Mass. 745, 748 
 
24 Henley joins in the arguments regarding prosecutorial 
misconduct in Zachery's brief but does not make any additional 
arguments relating to this issue in his brief. 
63 
 
(1999), quoting Commonwealth v. Cohen, 412 Mass. 375, 382 
(1992). 
The Commonwealth's expert was not able to individualize the 
sneaker print to Zachery's sneaker.  The expert did, however, 
testify that the print was the same make, model, and size as 
Zachery's sneaker.  While she did not speak to whether the tread 
pattern was identical, this assertion was independently 
supported by an exhibit that showed the matching tread patterns 
side by side. 
Next, Zachery argues that, in his closing argument, the 
prosecutor "made light of the importance of the jurors' 
obligation to be convinced of the defendant's guilt," mocked the 
closing argument of Zachery's attorney and his theory of 
defense, and incorrectly characterized defense counsel's 
argument.  Specifically, Zachery argues that the following 
statement in the prosecutor's closing was improper:  "[Defense 
counsel] hammered on that phrase moral certainty like it's 
suppose[d] to scare you, like it's suppose[d] to scare you out 
of decisions that juries make in trials every day."  As the 
Commonwealth contends, this statement was a response to 
Zachary's counsel's closing argument, which repeatedly mentioned 
moral certainty.  The prosecutor is entitled to respond to the 
defendant's closing argument.  See Commonwealth v. Smith, 404 
Mass. 1, 7 (1989). 
64 
 
Zachery also takes issue with the prosecutor's statement in 
his closing that "[defense counsel] has very honorably 
represented . . . Zachery and done what he could, but his 
argument amounts to let's pretend.  Let's pretend there's no 
evidence.  Let's pretend the content of those text messages 
isn't there.  Let's pretend that the MBTA video doesn't show 
. . . Zachery."  A "prosecutor [is] permitted to comment on the 
defense strategy and tactics," and even to argue "that the 
strategy was intended to confuse."  Commonwealth v. Scesny, 472 
Mass. 185, 202 (2015).  At trial, Zachery's theory of the case 
was that the Commonwealth's identification evidence was 
insufficient.  We agree with the Commonwealth that the 
prosecutor's argument that Zachery's case amounts to "let's 
pretend" was not an improper response to Zachery's argument and 
should be understood as comment on the weakness of Zachery's 
case. 
Finally, Zachery argues that in both his opening statement 
and closing argument, the prosecutor improperly appealed to the 
jury's compassion for the decedent.  First, Zachery argues that 
it was improper for the prosecutor to state in his opening 
statement, "down [the victim] went in the gutter, gasping for 
breath.  Lungs filling up with blood as well, bleeding and 
dying."  Zachery also argues that the prosecutor improperly 
revisited this theme in his closing argument when he stated, 
65 
 
"I'm not going to show you the pictures again of [the victim's] 
body in the gutter, the way he died bleeding into his hoodie, 
lungs filling up with blood.  I'm not going to show you again 
now during my closing the picture of the bullet hole that these 
two men put in [the victim's] head.  No, once is enough seeing 
that stuff unless for any reason you feel like you need to look 
at it again to refresh your memory, it's going to be there.  
While it is improper for a prosecutor to inflame the jury to 
evoke an emotional, rather than intellectual response, "'[w]here 
a charge of murder in the first degree is based on the theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty' . . . the Commonwealth may 
'illustrate the magnitude of the crime' by discussing the 
details of the victim's death."  Commonwealth v. Camacho, 472 
Mass. 587, 607 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran, 
460 Mass. 535, 554 (2011), and Commonwealth v. Torres, 437 Mass. 
460, 465 (2002).  Moreover, if a prosecutor's statement "falls 
into the category of 'enthusiastic rhetoric, strong advocacy, 
and excusable hyperbole,'" it is not grounds for reversal.  
Commonwealth v. Silva, 455 Mass. 503, 515 (2009), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 350 (1998). 
Here, we agree with the Commonwealth that the prosecutor's 
arguments were based in fact and relevant to the issue of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  Although this evidence may have 
been upsetting, it was "inherent in the odious . . . nature of 
66 
 
the crime[] committed."  Barbosa, 477 Mass. at 669-670, quoting 
Johnson, 429 Mass. at 749.  Details regarding how the victim 
died were relevant to the jury's determination as to the manner 
of killing necessary to justify a conviction of murder in the 
first degree.  See Johnson, supra at 748. 
 
Neither defendant objected to any of the alleged 
misstatements at trial.  Even if the prosecutor's statements 
were improper, none of the statements created a substantial risk 
of a miscarriage of justice, given that the Commonwealth's case 
was particularly strong.  Moreover, the judge instructed the 
jury on the limited purpose of opening statements and closing 
arguments.  He instructed that these statements were not 
evidence, that the verdict should not be swayed by sympathy for 
the victim, and that only the evidence presented at trial could 
be used to determine the verdict.  See Commonwealth v. Lopes, 
478 Mass. 593, 607 (2018). 
7.  Henley's proposed instruction on mistake or accident.  
Henley argues that the judge was required to instruct the jury 
that Henley could not be convicted if his participation in the 
crime was the result of "mistake, accident, negligence or other 
innocent reason" because the instruction went to the heart of 
his case.  The Commonwealth asserts that the judge's 
instructions on aiding and abetting, as well as intent, were 
sufficient. 
67 
 
"Where the evidence fairly raises the possibility of 
accident, the defendant is entitled, if he requests, to have the 
judge instruct the jury that the Commonwealth has the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the death was not 
accidental."  Commonwealth v. Jewett, 442 Mass. 356, 370 (2004).  
A judge should not, however, instruct on accident when there is 
no evidence of accident.  See Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 395 
Mass. 568, 578-579 (1985).  Here, Henley was charged under a 
joint venture theory of liability, which required that he 
knowingly participated in the commission of the crime.  In both 
his opening statement and closing argument, Henley argued that 
he did not share an intent to kill the victim but rather had 
sent Zachery a text message to bring him a gun only for 
protection.  He argued that Zachery simply misunderstood his 
message.  Henley argues that an accident or mistake instruction 
should have been given in relation to the "knowingly" element of 
the offense.  Accordingly, we conclude that Henley fairly raised 
the defense of accident at trial.25 
 
25 Zachery would not, however, have been entitled to an 
affirmative defense accident instruction.  "A defendant is 
entitled to an accident instruction in a shooting death 'only 
where there is evidence of an unintentional or accidental 
discharge of a firearm.'"  Commonwealth v. Pina, 481 Mass. 413, 
418 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Millyan, 399 Mass. 171, 182 
(1987). 
68 
 
Even where a defendant was entitled to an accident 
instruction, we have concluded that absence of such an 
instruction is prejudicial only where the jury instructions 
improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lowe, 391 Mass. 97, 110-111, cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 840 (1984) ("if a charge, viewed as a whole, adequately 
informs a jury of the burden of the Commonwealth to establish 
each element of the crime, including the disproof of a so called 
affirmative defense [e.g., self-defense, insanity, alibi, 
accident], there is no error").  See also Commonwealth v. 
Robinson, 382 Mass. 189, 207-208 (1981) (no error where judge 
adequately charged jury as to burden of Commonwealth to 
establish free will of defendant to commit crime without 
shifting burden of proof).  Contrast Commonwealth v. Zezima, 387 
Mass. 748, 756-757 (1982) (prejudicial error where judge's 
failure to instruct on accident could have led jury to shift 
burden of proof from Commonwealth to defendant). 
Here, the judge's charge to the jury was sufficient to 
inform the jury of their "true duty."  Robinson, 382 Mass. at 
208.  Although the judge did not give an explicit instruction on 
mistake or accident, he repeatedly instructed the jury that the 
Commonwealth is required to prove all elements of a charge, 
including intent, beyond a reasonable doubt.  Moreover, the 
judge extensively described intentional conduct to logically 
69 
 
exclude conduct resulting from mistake or accident.  The judge 
stated, "To find . . . Henley guilty of murder there must be 
proof that he intentionally participated in some fashion in 
committing that particular crime and that he had or shared the 
intent required to commit the crime.  It's not enough to show 
that . . . Henley simply was present when the crime was 
committed or that he knew about it in advance." 
"[T]his is a case where the jury charge 'clearly placed the 
burden of proving malice beyond a reasonable doubt on the 
Commonwealth and contained other discussion which, although not 
referring to the burden of proof as to [accident], adequately 
defined [that factor] and established [it] as negating a finding 
of malice.'"  Lowe, 391 Mass. at 112, quoting Reddick v. 
Commonwealth, 381 Mass. 398, 405 (1980). 
8.  Zachery's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Zachary filed a brief pursuant to Commonwealth v. Moffett, 383 
Mass. 201, 208-209 (1981), in which he argued that trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance by failing to call a witness who 
reported seeing a white man running from the crime scene with a 
gun.  The Commonwealth counters that Zachery has not satisfied 
either prong of Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 
(1974), required to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.  
We agree. 
70 
 
To prevail on a claim on ineffective assistance of counsel 
under Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96, the defendant bears the burden 
of proving that (1) "there has been serious incompetency, 
inefficiency, or inattention of counsel -- behavior of counsel 
falling measurably below that which might be expected from an 
ordinary fallible lawyer"; and (2) as a result, the defendant 
was "likely deprived . . . of an otherwise available, 
substantial ground of defence."  "A strategic or tactical 
decision by counsel will not be considered ineffective 
assistance unless the decision was 'manifestly unreasonable' 
when made."  Commonwealth v. Boria, 460 Mass. 249, 252-253 
(2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Watson, 455 Mass. 246, 256 
(2009).  A determination whether to call a witness, although not 
immune from scrutiny, is a tactical decision.  See Commonwealth 
v. Adams, 374 Mass. 722, 728-729 (1978). 
Zachery has failed to satisfy the first prong of Saferian, 
given that the record reflects that counsel explicitly 
considered the possibility of calling the witness at trial.  
While it is unclear why counsel decided not to call the witness, 
this is a tactical decision that does not amount to "serious 
incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention of counsel."  
Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96.  It is unnecessary for us to proceed 
to the second prong of Saferian.  In any event, we note that 
Zachery could not have been deprived of an otherwise available 
71 
 
third-party culprit defense, given that an officer testified 
that a witness described a Caucasian man with the gun. 
9.  Cumulative error analysis.  Finally, the defendants 
argue that the alleged errors cumulatively created a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice.  We disagree.  Given our 
conclusions stated supra, we conclude that there was no 
cumulative error necessitating a new trial. 
 
Conclusion.  For these reasons, we affirm the order denying 
the defendants' motion to suppress and their convictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.