Case Title: In re Odessa Corp.

Citation: 179 Vt. 640, 2006 VT 35, 898 A.2d 1256

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2006-04-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Odessa Corp. (2004-075); 179 Vt. 640; 898 A.2d 1256

2006 VT 35

[Filed 25-Apr-2006]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2006 VT 35

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2004-075

                             NOVEMBER TERM, 2005


  In re Odessa Corporation           }           APPEALED FROM:
                                     }
                                     }           Liquor Control Board
                                     }  

         In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Odessa Corporation, doing business as Champlain Farms,
  appeals from the Liquor Control Board's order suspending its license for
  seventeen days after finding that one of Odessa's employees sold alcohol to
  a minor.  Odessa raises numerous claims of error.  We affirm.

       ¶  2.  Odessa operates a convenience store in Winooski, Vermont.  In
  August 2003, it was notified that a hearing would be held on whether its
  license should be suspended or revoked based on an allegation that one of
  its employees sold alcohol to a minor.  Approximately three weeks before
  the hearing, Odessa's attorney, William Simendinger, contacted William
  Goggins, the director of the Enforcement Division of the Department of
  Liquor Control, seeking to resolve the pending charge without a hearing. 
  Goggins directed Simendinger, as he had in previous cases, to submit a
  written offer of settlement, which he would present to the Board.  Two days
  before the scheduled hearing, Goggins received a letter from Simendinger
  indicating that Odessa would agree to pay $500 to resolve the charge. 
  Goggins telephoned the Board members and informed them of Odessa's offer. 
  He read the charge from the notice of hearing and summarized Odessa's
  history of prior violations.  All three Board members rejected the
  proposal, indicating that they would settle the case if Odessa agreed to a
  fourteen-day or fifteen-day suspension of its license.  

       ¶  3.  A contested case hearing ensued.  On the day of the hearing,
  Odessa requested a continuance because one of its witnesses, the store
  clerk, failed to appear.  The State opposed Odessa's request, noting that
  Odessa had failed to subpoena the clerk, and the State had several other
  witnesses who had traveled to Montpelier and were prepared to testify.  The
  Board denied Odessa's request, explaining that Odessa was responsible for
  securing its witnesses and the State was prepared and ready to proceed.

       ¶  4.  Odessa then moved to recuse the Board members and dismiss the
  case, asserting that the communications between Goggins and the Board
  regarding Odessa's settlement offer violated due process and the Vermont
  Administrative Procedure Act.  The Board heard evidence and argument on the
  motion.  Goggins described the settlement process, noting that he had
  explained the process to Simendinger in advance without objection.  Goggins
  testified that he did not discuss the investigation, witnesses, evidence,
  or the strength or weakness of the State's case with the Board members. 
   
       ¶  5.  The State offered the settlement letter into evidence and the
  Board admitted it over Odessa's objection.  The Board explained that the
  letter provided the factual basis for Odessa's claim that the Board should
  be recused, and it demonstrated what the communication had been between
  Goggins and the Board with respect to Odessa's offer.  Simendinger
  cross-examined Goggins about his conversations with the Board, inquiring if
  Goggins could remember the conversations verbatim.  Goggins responded that
  he always followed the same procedure in discussing a settlement with the
  Board, but he acknowledged that he could not recall his conversations
  verbatim.  Simendinger then sought to call the Board members as witnesses,
  asserting that Goggins had not adequately testified to the substance of his
  conversations with the Board.  The State objected, arguing that it would be
  "extraordinary and inappropriate" for the Board members to become witnesses
  at a proceeding they were conducting.  The State noted that Goggins had
  testified to the conversations and had been subject to cross-examination. 
  It also explained that Odessa's motion was based on an allegation that the
  Board had received "prejudicial evidence" from Goggins, and no evidence
  supported such an allegation, nor was there any evidence that the
  conversations involved disputed issues of fact as Odessa alleged.  The
  Board denied Odessa's request that the Board members testify, as well as
  Odessa's recusal motion. 

       ¶  6.  The Board then held an evidentiary hearing on the alleged
  violation.  The arresting officer testified that on the evening in
  question, he observed a young woman exiting Odessa's store carrying a large
  quantity of beer.  She looked obviously underage, and the officer spoke
  with her and asked her for identification.  She produced a driver's license
  but eventually admitted to the officer that the identification was false
  and she was underage.  The minor identified the clerk who had sold her the
  alcohol.  The officer spoke to the clerk who informed him that she had sold
  alcohol to the minor "dozens of times," and she had not asked the minor for
  identification before completing the sale.  The officer verified this
  latter statement by looking at an "audit trail," a mechanism used by Odessa
  to track sales.  The minor also testified at the hearing.  She stated that
  she had purchased a large amount of beer that evening at Odessa's store. 
  She stated that she frequently bought beer there.  She admitted showing the
  officer false identification, and she acknowledged that she was underage at
  the time of the sale.  Counsel for the Board later asked if the minor's
  false identification card would be made an exhibit, and the attorney for
  the State replied that it would obtain and submit the identification card. 
  Odessa's counsel objected, asserting that he would want to cross-examine
  the arresting officer, who had been excused, about the identification card. 
  The Board overruled the objection but the identification card was not
  entered into evidence.  In January 2004, the Board issued its order
  suspending Odessa's license for seventeen days based on its finding that
  one of Odessa's clerks had sold "a considerable quantity of beer" to an
  underage individual.  Odessa appealed.

       ¶  7.  On appeal, we presume the reasonableness and validity of a
  determination made within an administrative agency's expertise, and we
  require a clear and convincing showing to overcome the presumption.  In re
  Capital Inv., Inc., 150 Vt. 478, 480,