Case Title: Oregon v. Haji

Citation: 

Docket Number: S066254

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2020-05-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
384	
May 7, 2020	
No. 16
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
HANAD ALI HAJI,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 16CR02527) (CA A162905) (SC S066254)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted May 7, 2019.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense 
Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for 
petitioner on review.
Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, 
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on 
review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney 
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Walters, Chief Justice, and Balmer, Nakamoto, 
Flynn, Duncan, and Nelson, Justices, and Landau, Senior 
Justice pro tempore.**
NAKAMOTO, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of 
the circuit court are affirmed.
Duncan, J., dissented and filed an opinion in which 
Walters, C. J., joined.
______________
	
**  On appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Thomas Michael Ryan, 
Judge (judgment), Bronson D. James, Judge (amendment), 293 Or App 202, 426 
P3d 680 (2018).
	
**  Garrett, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
385
Case Summary: Defendant was charged with seven offenses after twice 
entering the victim’s apartment on the same day and committing various crimes. 
After determining that the indictment could be challenged by demurrer because 
the statutory basis for joining those offenses was not expressly alleged, the state 
obtained leave from the circuit court to amend the indictment by adding allega­
tions specifying the statutory basis for joinder, without adding factual allega­
tions about the crimes. Defendant was convicted of some of the charges, and the 
Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: (1) ORS 132.560 does not require a grand jury 
to allege the statutory basis for joinder of multiple charges in an indictment; (2) 
Article VII (Amended), section 5(6), of the Oregon Constitution permits a district 
attorney to amend an indictment that is defective in form; a defect “in form” is 
a matter that is not essential to show that a crime has been committed; and (3) 
the additional allegations were “in form,” and so the circuit court did not err in 
permitting the district attorney to amend the indictment.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court 
are affirmed.
386	
State v. Haji
	
NAKAMOTO, J.
	
After a grand jury issued an indictment charging 
defendant with multiple offenses, the district attorney 
determined that the indictment could be challenged by 
demurrer because the basis for joining those offenses was 
not expressly alleged. Instead of seeking another indictment 
from the grand jury, the district attorney obtained leave 
from the trial court to amend the indictment by adding alle­
gations specifying the statutory basis for joinder, without 
adding factual allegations about the crimes. Defendant was 
convicted on some of the charges at trial, and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed. State v. Haji, 293 Or App 202, 207, 426 
P3d 680 (2018).
	
The question on review is whether a district attor­
ney may add allegations specifying the statutory basis for 
joinder of multiple offenses to an indictment instead of 
resubmitting the case to a grand jury. We conclude that nei­
ther the statute permitting joinder of multiple offenses in a 
single indictment nor Article VII (Amended), section 5(6), of 
the Oregon Constitution precludes a district attorney, with 
approval of the trial court, from amending an indictment 
to add allegations specifying the statutory basis for joinder 
of multiple offenses. We affirm the decision of the Court of 
Appeals, based in part on different reasoning, and affirm 
the judgment of the circuit court.
I.  BACKGROUND
	
As background, the state’s theory of the case was 
that defendant twice entered the apartment where the vic­
tim lived, committing crimes. The first time he entered the 
apartment, defendant took a tablet computer and threat­
ened the victim with a gun and then a kitchen knife, which 
he took when he left. Several hours after the first incident, 
the victim returned and found defendant inside the apart­
ment again. The victim called the police, who soon found 
and arrested defendant, still in possession of his firearm.
	
The salient facts are procedural. The state charged 
defendant with seven offenses in a single indictment 
returned by a grand jury: one count of first-degree robbery 
and one count of first-degree robbery with a firearm, ORS 
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
387
164.415; two counts of first-degree burglary with a firearm, 
ORS 164.225; one count of unlawful use of a weapon and 
one count of unlawful use of a weapon with a firearm, ORS 
166.220; and one count of felon in possession of a firearm, 
ORS 166.270. The indictment stated that the charged con­
duct occurred “on or about January 14, 2016” and described 
each offense in the language of the applicable criminal stat­
utes. The indictment did not expressly state any statutory 
basis for joinder of the counts. Nothing on the face of the 
indictment linked any of the counts specifically to either the 
first or the second entry into the victim’s apartment or, for 
that matter, indicated that the charges stemmed from two 
incidents.
	
Not long after that, the Court of Appeals held in 
State v. Poston, 277 Or App 137, 144, 370 P3d 904 (2016), 
adh’d to on recons, 285 Or App 750, 399 P3d 488, rev den, 
361 Or 886 (2017), that a charging instrument is required 
to allege “the basis for the joinder of the crimes that are 
charged in it.” Anticipating a demurrer by defendant, the 
state moved for leave to amend the indictment to comply 
with the holding in Poston. Specifically, the state sought to 
add to each count an identical allegation stating two of the 
three permissible statutory bases for joinder:
	
“This count constitutes part of a common scheme or plan 
based on two or more acts or transactions with the other 
counts of this indictment. This count is of the same and 
similar character as the conduct alleged in the other counts 
of this indictment. This count is connected together by two 
or more acts or transactions with the other counts of this 
indictment.”
(Emphases added.) See ORS 132.560(1)(b)(A), (C) (permitting 
joinder of offenses “[o]f the same or similar character” or 

“[b]ased on two or more acts or transactions connected 
together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan”).
	
The state contended that those were amendments of 
“form” and, therefore, authorized by Article VII (Amended), 
section 5(6). That provision states that a “district attorney 
may file an amended indictment or information whenever, 
by ruling of the court, an indictment or information is held 
to be defective in form.” Defendant filed a written objection 
388	
State v. Haji
to the state’s motion, asserting that the district attorney 
could not add the allegations stating the statutory bases for 
joinder without resubmission of the case to the grand jury, 
because such amendments would be of substance rather 
than “form.”
	
At the hearing on the state’s motion, the trial court 
granted defendant leave to file a demurrer to bring the case 
into the correct legal posture, instructed the state to file a 
short factual background of the charged conduct, which the 
state did, so that the court could determine the nature of 
the evidence as to each count, and took the matter under 
advisement. Accordingly, defendant filed a demurrer, assert­
ing that the indictment on its face failed to meet the joinder 
requirements of ORS 132.560(1)(b) and should be dismissed 
under Poston. Ultimately, the trial court granted the state’s 
motion for leave to amend the indictment and, consequently, 
denied defendant’s demurrer.
	
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of one 
count of first-degree burglary with a firearm, unlawful use 
of a weapon with a firearm, and felon in possession of a fire­
arm. The jury acquitted him of the remaining four counts.
	
Defendant appealed and, as relevant here, assigned 
error to “the trial court’s allowance of the state’s motion 
to amend the indictment and its consequent denial of his 
demurrer.” Haji, 293 Or App at 205. The Court of Appeals 
upheld the trial court’s rulings. Id. at 207.
	
In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals 
focused on “whether the omission of th[e] allegations [stat­
ing the statutory basis for joinder] from the original indict­
ment was a defect of ‘form’ within the meaning of Article VII
(Amended), section 5(6).” Haji, 293 Or App at 205-06. It 
resolved that question by turning to three considerations 
that this court had articulated in State v. Wimber, 315 Or 
103, 843 P2d 424 (1992), to determine whether additional 
allegations limiting the date range of some of the charged 
crimes were amendments of “form” for purposes of Article VII
(Amended), section 5(6):
	
“(1)  Did the amendment alter the essential nature of 
the indictment against defendant, alter the availability to 
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
389
him of defenses or evidence, or add a theory, element, or 
crime? * 
* 
*
	
“(2)  Did the amendment prejudice defendant’s rights to 
notice of the charges against him and to protection against 
double jeopardy? * 
* 
*
	
“(3)  Was the amendment itself sufficiently definite and 
certain?”
Haji, 293 Or App at 206 (quoting Wimber, 315 Or at 114-15).
	
Analyzing the considerations from Wimber, the 
Court of Appeals concluded that the joinder allegations that 
the district attorney had added to the indictment were mat­
ters of “form” and, thus, constitutionally permissible. Haji, 
293 Or App at 206-07. First, the court determined that the 
amendments did not alter the “ 
‘essential’ nature” of the 
indictment; the amendments only “demonstrate[d] that the 
charges met the statutory procedural standard for being 
tried as part of a single case,” and they neither changed 
the defenses available to defendant, altered the charges 
in a way that would affect the availability of evidence, nor 
added a new theory, element, or crime. Id. As to the second 
consideration, the court concluded that the amendments did 
not prejudice defendant’s right to notice or implicate dou­
ble jeopardy. Id. at 207. Finally, the Court of Appeals deter­
mined that the amendments, by tracking the wording of the 
joinder statute, were “sufficiently clear and definite” under 
Poston to properly allege the basis for joinder. Id.
	
The Court of Appeals also concluded that, because 
the amended indictment comported with Poston, the trial 
court’s denial of defendant’s demurrer was proper. Id. We 
allowed defendant’s petition for review to address whether 
the trial court erred in allowing the district attorney to 
amend the indictment to add allegations specifying the stat­
utory bases for joinder of multiple felony charges.
II.  ANALYSIS
	
Under ORS 132.560(1), an indictment generally must 
charge only one offense, but the state may charge a defen­
dant with multiple offenses in a single indictment when the 
offenses “are alleged to have been committed by the same 
person or persons” and those offenses are “[o]f the same or 
390	
State v. Haji
similar character”; “[b]ased on the same act or transaction”; 
or “[b]ased on two or more acts or transactions connected 
together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.” 
We recently confirmed the Court of Appeals’ conclusion in 
Poston: An indictment charging a defendant with multiple 
offenses must contain the basis for joinder of multiple offenses 
under ORS 132.560(1)(b). State v. Warren, 364 Or 105, 127, 
430 P3d 1036 (2018). As we explained in Warren, “it usually is 
sufficient for the state to allege the basis for joinder by using 
the language of the joinder statute.” 364 Or at 120 (citing 
State v. Huennekens, 245 Or 150, 154, 420 P2d 384 (1966)).
	
On review, defendant contends (1) that ORS 132.560 
and Article VII (Amended), section 5(6), of the Oregon 
Constitution require a grand jury—and only a grand 
jury, not a district attorney—to find evidence supporting 
an allegation that a statutory basis for joinder exists and 

(2) that an indictment that omits that allegation is deficient 
in substance. The state responds that the trial court had 
the authority to allow the district attorney to make the 
amendment, because the grand jury does not have exclusive 
responsibility under the statute or the Oregon Constitution 
to allege the statutory basis for joinder.1
	
We start our analysis with the role of the grand 
jury under the joinder statute, because we first attempt to 
resolve cases on subconstitutional grounds when they are 
available. State v. Conger, 319 Or 484, 490, 878 P2d 1089 
(1994). After concluding that ORS 132.560 does not require 
a grand jury—and only a grand jury—to allege the statu­
tory basis for joinder of multiple charges in an indictment, 
we address whether Article VII (Amended), section 5(6), con­
tains that requirement and conclude that it does not.
A.  Role of the Grand Jury Under ORS 132.560
	
Although defendant relies almost exclusively on his 
constitutional argument, defendant implies that the joinder 
	
1  The state adds that, in any event, the trial court did not commit revers­
ible error for either of two reasons: The original indictment sufficiently alleged a 
proper basis for joinder or, alternatively, if the indictment was facially deficient, 
defendant failed to establish actual prejudice as a result. Because of our resolu­
tion of the case on the state’s primary argument, we need not reach the state’s 
backup arguments.
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
391
statute itself requires a grand jury to find and allege the 
statutory basis for joinder of multiple offenses in the indict­
ment. We agree with the state that ORS 132.560 does not 
require a grand jury to find and allege the statutory basis 
for joinder.
	
We start our construction of the statute with its 
text. State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-73, 206 P3d 1042 
(2009) (stating that we examine a statute’s text and con­
text, together with helpful legislative history). The statute 
contains four subsections. In the first subsection, the law 
states, and provides exceptions to, the general rule that a 
charging instrument must charge one offense:
	
“A charging instrument must charge but one offense, 
and in one form only, except that:
	
“(a)  Where the offense may be committed by the use of 
different means, the charging instrument may allege the 
means in the alternative.
	
“(b)  Two or more offenses may be charged in the same 
charging instrument in a separate count for each offense if 
the offenses charged are alleged to have been committed by 
the same person or persons and are:
	
“(A)  Of the same or similar character;
	
“(B)  Based on the same act or transaction; or
	
“(C)  Based on two or more acts or transactions con­
nected together or constituting parts of a common scheme 
or plan.”
ORS 132.560(1).
	
In the second subsection, the statute permits a 
court to consolidate two or more charging instruments 
upon the court’s determination that they meet the joinder 
requirements of ORS 132.560(1)(b): “If two or more charging 
instruments are found in circumstances described in sub­
section (1)(b) of this section, the court may order them to be 
consolidated.” ORS 132.560(2).
	
The third subsection permits a court to remedy prej­
udice caused by joinder of offenses under ORS 132.560(1):
	
“If it appears, upon motion, that the state or defendant 
is substantially prejudiced by a joinder of offenses under 
392	
State v. Haji
subsection (1) or (2) of this section, the court may order an 
election or separate trials of counts or provide whatever 
other relief justice requires.”
ORS 132.560(3). Finally, the statute defines “charging 
instrument”:
	
“As used in this section, ‘charging instrument’ means 
any written instrument sufficient under the law to charge 
a person with an offense, and shall include, but not be lim­
ited to, grand jury indictments, informations, complaints 
and uniform traffic, game or boating complaints.”
ORS 132.560(4).
	
The statute’s text does not support defendant’s view 
that a grand jury must allege the statutory basis for joinder 
of multiple charges. First, no part of the statute expressly 
requires a grand jury to find and allege one or more of the 
grounds listed in ORS 132.560(1)(b) for joining multiple 
charges in a single charging instrument. Indeed, the term 
“grand jury” appears only in the definition of “charging 
instrument” in subsection (4), which includes “grand jury 
indictments” as well as charging instruments that do not 
involve grand juries at all. ORS 132.560(4). Moreover, while 
subsection (4) appears to describe the kinds of charging 
instruments subject to the joinder provisions in subsec­
tions (1) through (3), nothing specifies who must determine 
whether the allegations in the charging instrument support 
joinder.
	
Second, the text of ORS 132.560(2) undercuts defen­
dant’s view that the grand jury has the sole responsibility 
to find and allege the statutory basis for joinder of multi­
ple charges. Subsection (2) permits a court to order two or 
more charging instruments to be consolidated—without 
resubmission of the combined charges to a grand jury in 
the case of a felony indictment—when they “are found in 
circumstances described in subsection (1)(b),” that is, when 
the charging instruments show grounds for joinder of the 
charges for trial in a single case, as described in subsec­
tion (1)(b). The inclusion of that provision in the same stat­
ute that lists grounds for joinder suggests that the legisla­
ture did not imbue grand juries with exclusive authority to 
determine whether multiple charges should be included in a 
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
393
single indictment.2 Based on the text alone, we do not under­
stand ORS 132.560 to give the grand jury the sole authority 
to find and allege the statutory basis for joinder of multiple 
charges in an indictment. See State v. McNally, 361 Or 314, 
328, 392 P3d 721 (2017) (“It is axiomatic that this court does 
not insert words into a statute that the legislature chose not 
to include.”).
	
And when the statutory text is viewed in the con­
text of other statutes within ORS chapter 132, the potential 
for reading ORS 132.560 to require a grand jury to find and 
allege the statutory basis for joinder does not improve.3 A 
grand jury is defined in ORS chapter 132, which is devoted 
to grand juries and accusatory instruments, as “a body of 
seven persons drawn from the jurors in attendance upon 
the circuit court at a particular jury service term, having 
the qualifications prescribed by ORS 10.030 and sworn to 
inquire of crimes committed or triable within the county 
from which they are selected.” ORS 132.010. The description 
of the grand jury’s duties and procedures is primarily con­
tained within ORS 132.310 to 132.430. Notably, the joinder 
statute is not within that range of statutes, and none of those 
statutes ascribes to the grand jury the sole power to deter­
mine whether grounds justifying joinder of multiple charges 
in an indictment exist. Rather, overall, the grand jury’s role 
and duties as described in ORS chapter 132 appears focused 
on investigating whether the state may charge someone 
with crimes.4
	
2  In State v. Boyd, this court suggested that to avoid the risk of “forfeiting 
the opportunity to prosecute again” by virtue of a criminal defendant’s double 
jeopardy defense, a prosecutor who is forced to make a difficult choice about 
whether charges are sufficiently interrelated for joinder should “obtain separate 
indictments and then make a timely pretrial motion to consolidate the charges 
for trial.” 271 Or 558, 567-68, 533 P2d 795 (1975) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).
	
3  Neither party presents legislative history concerning the enactment of ORS 
132.560.
	
4  See, e.g., ORS 132.310 (the grand jury “shall retire into a private room and 
may inquire into crimes committed or triable in the county and present them 
to the court, either by presentment or indictment”); ORS 132.380 (the grand 
jury “may indict a person for a crime when it believes the person guilty thereof, 
whether such person has been held to answer for such crime or not”); ORS 
132.320(1) (in the “investigation of a charge for the purpose of indictment, the 
grand jury shall receive no other evidence than such as might be given on the 
trial of the person charged with the crime in question,” subject to exceptions for 
394	
State v. Haji
	
Other statutes in ORS chapter 132 concern the 
district attorney’s role with respect to the grand jury and 
indictments, and those do not address whether the grand 
jury alone decides and alleges grounds that render it proce­
durally proper for the state to include multiple charges in a 
single indictment under ORS 132.560(1). Pursuant to ORS 
132.330, the district attorney “may submit an indictment to 
the grand jury in any case when the district attorney has 
good reason to believe that a crime has been committed 
which is triable within the county.” And “when required by 
the grand jury,” the district attorney “must prepare indict­
ments or presentments for it and attend its sittings to advise 
it in relation to its duties or to examine witnesses in its pres­
ence.” ORS 132.340. Neither statute addresses whether the 
grand jury’s duties require it to consider whether joinder of 
crimes in one indictment is proper.
	
Finally, the statute that sets out the required con­
tents of a grand jury indictment, ORS 132.550, suggests 
that specification of the statutory basis for joinder of mul­
tiple counts is not necessarily submitted to the grand jury. 
That statute provides:
	
“The indictment shall contain substantially the 
following:
	
“(1)  The name of the circuit court in which it is filed;
	
“(2)  The title of the action;
	
“(3)  A statement that the grand jury accuses the defen­
dant or defendants of the designated offense or offenses;
	
“(4)  A separate accusation or count addressed to each 
offense charged, if there be more than one;
	
“(5)  A statement in each count that the offense charged 
therein was committed in a designated county;
	
“(6)  A statement in each count that the offense charged 
therein was committed on, or on or about, a designated 
date, or during a designated period of time;
written reports and testimony in certain types of cases); ORS 132.370(1) (pro­
cedures for when “the grand jury is in doubt whether the facts, as shown by the 
evidence before it, constitute a crime in law or whether the same has ceased to be 
punishable by reason of lapse of time or a former acquittal or conviction”).
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
395
	
“(7)  A statement of the acts constituting the offense in 
ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in 
such manner as to enable a person of common understand­
ing to know what is intended;
	
“(8)  The dates of all grand jury proceedings related to 
the offense or offenses charged;
	
“(9)  The signatures of the foreman and of the district 
attorney; and
	
“(10)  The date the indictment is filed with the clerk of 
the court.”
Thus, ORS 132.550 requires that an indictment establish 
that the grand jury accuses the defendant of designated 
offenses, describe the acts constituting the offenses, and 
describe where and when the offenses were committed. The 
statutory basis for joinder of multiple charges is not listed as 
part of the required contents of an indictment issued by the 
grand jury, even though the statute itself anticipates that 
more than one offense might be charged in the indictment. 
See ORS 132.550(3) - (6), (8).
	
In sum, although ORS 132.560(1)(b) does require 
that an indictment establish a statutorily permissible basis 
for joinder of multiple offenses, we reject the argument that 
the joinder statute implicitly designates the grand jury as 
the actor required to make that determination. That conclu­
sion takes us to defendant’s more substantial constitutional 
argument.
B.  Role of the Grand Jury Under Article VII (Amended), 
section 5, of the Oregon Constitution
	
For his constitutional argument, defendant relies 
on Article VII (Amended), section 5(6). As relevant here, 
Article VII (Amended), section 5, provides:
	
“(2)  A grand jury shall consist of seven jurors chosen 
by lot from the whole number of jurors in attendance at the 
court, five of whom must concur to find an indictment.
	
“(3)  Except as provided in subsections (4) and (5) of 
this section, a person shall be charged in a circuit court 
with the commission of any crime punishable as a felony 
only on indictment by a grand jury.
396	
State v. Haji
	
“* 
* 
* 
* 
*
	
“(6)  An information shall be substantially in the form 
provided by law for an indictment. The district attorney 
may file an amended indictment or information whenever, 
by ruling of the court, an indictment or information is held 
to be defective in form.”
(Emphasis added.)
	
Defendant contends that the district attorney’s 
amendment of the indictment in this case was impermis­
sible under Article VII (Amended), section 5(6). He main­
tains that the indictment was defective in substance and, 
therefore, not “defective in form.” The state argues that 
the amendment addressed a defect in form, and it disputes 
that any part of Article VII (Amended), section 5, assigns to 
grand juries the sole responsibility to find and plead allega­
tions supporting the joinder of multiple offenses in a single 
indictment.
1.  Reinke and Wimber
	
To clarify the analytical approach we take, we first 
address two precedents from this court that figure prom­
inently in the parties’ arguments. The state initially con­
tends that, in State v. Reinke, 354 Or 98, 309 P3d 1059, adh’d 
to as modified on recons, 354 Or 570, 316 P3d 286 (2013), this 
court already definitively construed Article VII (Amended), 
section 5, and that Reinke resolves the case in its favor by 
precluding defendant’s argument. We disagree that Reinke 
is dispositive.
	
Reinke involved the defendant’s enhanced sentence 
as a dangerous offender. The applicable statutes required 
the district attorney to give the defendant timely written 
notice of sentence enhancement facts but did “not require 
those facts to be found by the grand jury and pleaded in 
the indictment.” Reinke, 354 Or at 102 (citation omitted). 
We described the issue on review as “whether the Oregon 
Constitution requires that the facts necessary to impose a 
dangerous offender sentence be found by the grand jury and 
pleaded in the indictment.” Id. at 100.
	
The state bases its argument on the court’s state­
ment in Reinke that Article VII (Amended), section 5, 
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
397
“requires the grand jury to find and plead only the elements 
of the crime as defined by the legislature.” 354 Or at 112 
(emphasis added). The state submits that this court con­
cluded that the grand jury’s role is limited to finding and 
pleading elements of crimes, which does not extend to deter­
mining the statutory basis for joining crimes in a single 
indictment.
	
But in arguing that a grand jury was required 
to have found and alleged the statutory facts required for 
imposing an enhanced dangerous offender sentence, the 
defendant in Reinke relied on Article VII (Amended), section 
5(3)—not section 5(6), on which defendant relies. Section 5(3) 
provides that “a person shall be charged in a circuit court 
with the commission of any crime punishable as a felony 
only on indictment by a grand jury.” The defendant in Reinke 
argued that the phrase “any crime punishable as a felony” 
in section 5(3) included both the elements of the underlying 
crime and “any fact that authorizes an enhanced sentence 
for that crime[.]” 354 Or at 106. Thus, Reinke was a case con­
struing the term “crime” in Article VII (Amended), section 
5(3), even though this court broadly couched its conclusion 
as pertaining to “Article VII (Amended), section 5.” 
5
	
We acknowledge, as the state’s argument reflects, 
that the opinion in Reinke can be read as a conclusion about 
the extent of the grand jury’s role with respect to indict­
ments generally. We are reluctant, though, to rely solely on 
Reinke when the court in that case was presented with, and 
resolved, arguments concerning the meaning of Article VII 
(Amended), section 5(3), that defendant here does not make. 
As we later discuss, that case provides context for our con­
struction of Article VII (Amended), section 5(6). But Reinke 
is not, by itself, dispositive in this case.
	
5  In full, the court concluded as follows:
	
“Considering the text, context, and legislative history of Article VII 
(Amended), section 5, we conclude that section 5 requires the grand jury to 
find and plead only the elements of the crime as defined by the legislature. 
Article VII (Amended), section 5, does not contemplate, as a matter of state 
constitutional law, a ‘crime’ that differs from the conventional crime that the 
legislature has defined.”
Reinke, 354 Or at 112-13.
398	
State v. Haji
	
The second precedent we address is Wimber, with 
its multifactor test. As we previously recounted, the Court 
of Appeals relied on that test to conclude that an omission of 
statutory joinder allegations was a defect in form and that 
therefore the district attorney’s amendment was proper. 
Haji, 293 Or App at 206-07. On review, the parties dispute 
how to apply the Wimber test. Defendant argues that the test 
should only apply to amendments relating to a single-count 
indictment, or that, if Wimber supplies the controlling test, 
then the Court of Appeals incorrectly decided that the orig­
inal indictment in this case was defective merely in form. 
The state argues that the Wimber test does control and that 
the Court of Appeals properly applied it in this case. We do 
not share either party’s perspective and conclude that the 
test set out in Wimber does not apply to or control the out­
come of the issue presented in this case.
	
In Wimber, the grand jury indictment alleged that 
all 12 crimes occurred between certain dates in 1984 and 
1989. 315 Or at 105. At the beginning of trial, the defendant 
contended that the charges were time-barred. Id. at 106. 
The state and the defendant disputed whether a six-year or 
a three-year limitation period applied to the crimes (three 
counts of first-degree sodomy, three counts of first-degree 
rape, and six counts of first-degree sexual abuse). Id. at 

105-06. The trial court amended the indictment so that three 
of the sexual abuse counts fell within the three-year limita­
tion period that the defendant argued applied, and the other 
three sexual abuse counts fell outside that limitation period. 
Id. at 107. In other words, the trial court reduced the date 
range applicable to each of the sexual abuse counts. The jury 
then convicted the defendant on all three amended charges 
within the three-year limitation period, and the trial court 
entered a judgment of conviction on those charges. Id. at 
108.
	
On review, this court applied a multifactor test 
that it derived from two earlier cases and determined that 
the trial court had made “a permissible amendment as to 
a defect in the form of the indictment.” 315 Or at 114-15. 
In making that determination, this court examined the 
time period during which all the charged crimes had been 
committed, as found by the grand jury, and the trial court’s 
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
399
narrowing of that period for the sexual abuse counts. It 
appears that an integral part of this court’s determination 
that the amendment did not alter the essential nature of the 
indictment, id. at 114, was its conclusion that “[t]ime is not 
an essential element of the offenses charged in the indict­
ment at issue,” id. at 110. Importantly, this court’s test in 
Wimber was focused on changes to the allegations concern­
ing the crimes charged, as found by the grand jury.
	
Here, by contrast, the district attorney’s amend­
ment did not change a fact about the crimes that the grand 
jury had already found. Instead, the amendment added a 
component, articulating the statutory basis for joinder of 
the charges that needed to appear on the face of the indict­
ment as a matter of law for notice purposes, pretrial, so that 
defendant and the trial court could understand whether 
joinder was proper. See Warren, 364 Or at 120 (explain­
ing that notice is “necessary for the defendant to make an 
informed decision about whether to demur to the indictment 
on the ground that the allegations are insufficient to sup­
port joinder and, later, to make an informed decision about 
whether to move to sever on the ground that the evidence 
is insufficient to support joinder” and “for the trial court to 
make informed rulings on such demurrers and motions”). 
The Wimber test, therefore, does not apply in situations such 
as this one.
	
Although we revisit both Reinke and Wimber in our 
contextual analysis of Article VII (Amended), section 5(6), 
neither case supplies a ready-made resolution of the issue 
presented. Accordingly, we undertake an analysis of Article 
VII (Amended), section 5(6), to determine whether the dis­
trict attorney was barred from amending the indictment in 
this case by adding joinder allegations.
2.  Applicable interpretive principles
	
The genesis of Article VII (Amended), section 5(6), 
affects the interpretive principles that we apply in constru­
ing it. The people enacted the current version of Article 
VII (Amended), section 5, in 1974 upon legislative referral 
to Oregon voters. SJR 1 (1973) (referring the measure); Or 
Laws 1975, p 6 (recording passage at the November 1974 
election). The original version of section 5 was created 
400	
State v. Haji
through the initiative process in 1910, when voters approved 
a new Article VII. Or Laws 1911, pp 7-8 (recording passage 
at the November 1910 election). Article VII (Amended), sec­
tion 5(6), imports the key phrase at issue in this case—the 
“district attorney may file an amended indictment when­
ever an indictment [is] * 
* 
* defective in form”—from the 
1910 version of section 5, which in turn was taken from the 
1908 amendment of Article VII (Original), section 18, of the 
Oregon Constitution. Or Laws 1909, p 12 (recording passage 
at the June 1908 election).6
	
When amended constitutional provisions are adopted 
by voters, we attempt to “discern the intent of the voters” by 
examining the text of the provision itself and its context. 
Roseburg School Dist. v. City of Roseburg, 316 Or 374, 378, 
851 P2d 595 (1993). We may “examine the historical con­
text” of the amendment’s adoption “for possible evidence of 
a settled understanding” of its terms. Couey v. Atkins, 357 
Or 460, 492-93, 355 P3d 866 (2015). As a corollary to that 
rule, when the disputed text of an amended constitutional 
provision consists of text reincorporated from a prior version 
of the constitutional provision, this court will examine the 
enactment of that prior version in our effort to determine the 
meaning of the amended provision. AAA Oregon/Idaho Auto 
Source v. Dept. of Rev., 363 Or 411, 417-18, 423 P3d 71 (2018). 
As we later discuss, defendant places significant weight on 
what voters intended in 1908 when they first adopted the 
disputed phrase as part of the Oregon Constitution.
	
In Ecumenical Ministries v. Oregon State Lottery 
Comm., 318 Or 551, 559 n 7, 871 P3d 106 (1994), this court 
emphasized that we must use caution before ending a textual 
analysis of a constitutional amendment without considering 
its history. More recently, we clarified in Couey that, when 
we construe constitutional amendments adopted by voters, 
we will “consider the measure’s history, should it appear 
useful to our analysis, without necessarily establishing the 
	
6  We note that the relevant constitutional provision was amended on one 
additional occasion between 1910 and 1974. In 1958, the voters approved an 
amendment that authorized the legislature to enact laws permitting the calling 
of a special grand jury. Or Laws 1959, p 6 (recording passage at the November 
1958 election); Official Voters’ Pamphlet, General Election, Nov 4, 1958, 26. That 
amendment does not inform our analysis, and we do not discuss it further.
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
401
existence of multiple reasonable constructions of the provi­
sion at issue.” 357 Or at 490 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). As a result, there is now little practical 
distinction between our methodology for interpreting orig­
inal constitutional provisions and provisions later adopted 
by voters. Id. That history includes “sources of information 
that were available to the voters at the time the measure 
was adopted and that disclose the public’s understanding 
of the measure.” AAA Oregon/Idaho Auto Source, 363 Or at 
418 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 
State v. MacBale, 353 Or 789, 804, 305 P3d 107 (2013) (exam­
ining “a more complete look at the circumstances surround­
ing the creation of Article I, section 10” to help determine 
which types of court proceedings the framers would have 
considered to be properly closed to the public). With those 
principles to guide us, we turn to conduct that analysis.
3.  Text and context
	
We begin with the text and context of Article VII 
(Amended), section 5(6). For convenience, we repeat that sec­
tion 5(6) provides:
	
“An information shall be substantially in the form pro­
vided by law for an indictment. The district attorney may 
file an amended indictment or information whenever, by rul­
ing of the court, an indictment or information is held to be 
defective in form.”
(Emphasis added.)
	
At the outset, several observations can be made 
from the text of Article VII (Amended), section 5(6). First, 
Oregon voters in 1974 would have understood from the plain 
meaning of the text that situations would arise in which an 
indictment would need to be amended and that some of those 
amendments could be accomplished by the district attorney 
simply filing an amended indictment instead of presenting 
the case to the grand jury again. Second, the text does not 
address multiple-count indictments and does not assign, at 
least expressly, the responsibility of determining the basis 
for joinder to the grand jury. And third, the text does not 
define a defect “in form” that would permit a district attor­
ney to file an amended indictment.
402	
State v. Haji
	
Those same observations apply to the text of Article 
VII (Original), section 18, which first included the phrase 
“held to be defective in form.” As amended in 1908, Article 
VII (Original), section 18, provided:
	
“The Legislative Assembly shall so provide that the 
most competent of the permanent citizens of the county 
shall be chosen for jurors; and out of the whole number in 
attendance at the court, seven shall be chosen by lot as 
grand jurors, five of whom must concur to find an indict­
ment. No person shall be charged in any circuit court with 
the commission of any crime or misdemeanor defined or 
made punishable by any of the laws of this State, except 
upon indictment found by a grand jury. Provided, however, 
that any district attorney may file an amended indictment 
whenever an indictment has, by a ruling of the court, been 
held to be defective in form.”
(Emphasis in original.)
	
Because Article VII (Amended), section 5(6), expressly 
permits a district attorney to amend an indictment, the par­
ties focus their arguments on what it means for an indict­
ment “to be defective in form” and whether that phrase 
encompasses an amendment to allege the statutory bases 
supporting joinder of multiple offenses.7 Although the par­
ties largely disagree on the proper approach to the analysis 
and on their conclusions, they do agree that defects “in 
form” are to be distinguished from defects in the substance 
of an indictment. We concur with that starting point in the 
analysis.
	
In analyzing the meaning of the text, “words of 
common usage that are not defined” typically are to be given 
	
7  The dissent adds that the trial court erred by allowing the district attorney’s 
amendment and disallowing defendant’s demurrer, because the dissent views the 
indictment as so ambiguous that it failed to give defendant enough information 
about the crimes being charged. See, e.g., 366 Or at 421, (Duncan, J., dissenting). 
But, as noted in the statement of facts, the grand jury found historical facts as 
to each of the charges alleged in the indictment, and defendant’s demurrer was 
based solely on the failure of the indictment to contain allegations identifying the 
statutory basis for joinder—not its failure to give defendant notice of the nature 
of the charges against him. Specifically, defendant contended that the indictment 
failed to meet the joinder requirements on its face because it failed “to allege that 
the charged offenses are either (1) of the same or similar character, (2) based on 
the same act or transaction, (3) or based on two or more acts or transactions con­
nected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.”
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
403
their “plain, natural, and ordinary meaning.” Ecumenical 
Ministries, 318 Or at 560. But when the words used in a 
constitutional provision enacted by initiative or referen­
dum “have a well-defined legal meaning, we will give the 
words that meaning in construing the provision.” Ester v. 
City of Monmouth, 322 Or 1, 9, 903 P2d 344 (1995); see also 
King v. City of Portland, 2 Or 146, 154-55 (1865) (“If, when 
our Constitution was made, certain words or sentences had 
obtained a certain signification or force, either by common 
usage or legal decision, it must be presumed, if found in 
that instrument that they bear that established meaning, 
unless plainly from the context or other provision, a differ­
ent meaning is certainly intended.”).
	
Here, the 1974 voters approved Article VII (Amended), 
section 5(6), with the term “defective in form,” a legal term 
of art taken from Article VII (Original), section 18 (1908). 
When voters approved section 18 in 1908, the term “form” 
appeared in multiple places in the then most recent com­
pilation of the Oregon Criminal Code to describe a type of 
defect in an indictment. For example, section 1372 provided 
that if “the indictment were dismissed upon a demurrer to 
its form or substance,” it was not deemed a former acquittal. 
The Codes and Statutes of Oregon, title XVIII, ch IX, § 1372 
(Bellinger & Cotton 1901). The term also appeared in the 
next section, which described what was deemed a former 
acquittal: “When, however, the defendant was acquitted on 
the merits, he is deemed acquitted of the same crime, not­
withstanding a defect in form or substance in the indict­
ment on which he was acquitted.” Id. § 1373. Section 1315 of 
the same code stated: “No indictment is insufficient, nor can 
the trial, judgment, or other proceedings thereon be affected 
by reason of a defect or imperfection in matter of form which 
does not tend to the prejudice of the substantial rights of 
the defendant upon the merits.” When the drafters chose to 
allow amendments to indictments determined to be “defec­
tive in form” in Article VII (Original), section 18, they used a 
phrase that the statutes pertaining to indictments had con­
tained since 1864. See Code of Criminal Procedure, ch VIII, 
§ 81, p 455 (1864), codified in General Laws of Oregon, Crim 
Code, ch VIII, § 81, p 351 (Deady & Lane 1843-1872) (pro­
viding that an indictment is not insufficient “by reason of a 
404	
State v. Haji
defect or imperfection in matter of form”). Those statutory 
references support our conclusion that the term “form” as 
used in Article VII (Amended), section 5(6), is a legal term 
of art.
	
We give legal terms of art their established legal 
meanings. See, e.g., DCBS v. Muliro, 359 Or 736, 746, 380 
P3d 270 (2016) (noting rule in the context of statutory inter­
pretation). Contemporary legal dictionaries from the period 
demonstrate that, in 1908, a defect “in form” in an indict­
ment had a legal meaning that stood in contrast to a defect 
in substance.
	
The 1897 edition of Bouvier’s Law Dictionary defines 
a “defect” as “[t]he want of something required by law.” John 
Bouvier, 1 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 528 (1897). Under the 
definition of “form,” Bouvier’s explains that “[f]orm is usu­
ally put in contradistinction to substance.” Bouvier’s at 831. 
Thus, the “difference between matter of form and matter of 
substance * 
* 
* is that if the matter pleaded be in itself insuf­
ficient, without reference to the manner of pleading it, the 
defect is substantial; but that if the fault is in the manner of 
alleging it, the defect is formal[.]” Id. (emphasis in original).8
	
Bouvier’s goes on to provide examples of the differ­
ence between substance and form: Omission from a pleading 
of “the performance of a condition precedent, when such con­
dition exists,” for example, would be a defect of substance. 
Bouvier’s at 831. However, “duplicity [and other examples] 
are only faults in form[.]” Id. (emphasis added). That exam­
ple of duplicity as a defect in form is particularly relevant 
in this case. Defining “duplicity” in the context of pleading, 
Bouvier’s explained that it included the faulty “joinder of two 
	
8  Another legal dictionary from that era offers a similar distinction between 
form and substance. The entry for “form” provides that:
	
“A distinction is often made between matters of form and matters of sub­
stance, particularly in the interpretation of statutes allowing amendment or 
waiver of formal defects in pleadings and other proceedings. With respect to 
pleadings, the distinction is, that, where the matter pleaded is in itself insuf­
ficient, without reference to the manner of pleading it, the defect is substan­
tial; but, where the fault is in the manner of pleading, the defect is merely 
formal[.]”
Benjamin Vaughan Abbott, 1 Dictionary of Terms and Phrases Used in American 
or English Jurisprudence 517 (1879).
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
405
or more distinct offences in one count of an indictment * 
**.” 
Id. at 626.9 Thus, at the turn of the twentieth century, the 
exception in Article VII (Original), section 18, for amend­
ments by a district attorney to address defects “in form” 
suggests that it encompassed indictments that improperly 
contained two offenses.
	
Oregon law also distinguished between indictments 
defective “in form” and “in substance.” That dichotomy is 
consistent with this court’s interpretation of Article VII 
(Original), section 18, in a case decided not long after its 
1908 enactment. This court’s interpretation of Article VII 
(Original), section 18, in State v. Moyer, 76 Or 396, 149 P 84
(1915), provides helpful context. See Stranahan v. Fred 
Meyer, Inc., 331 Or 38, 61, 11 P3d 228 (2000) (stating that 
contextual analysis includes relevant case law interpreting 
the constitutional amendment at issue); Coultas v. City of 
Sutherlin, 318 Or 584, 589-90, 871 P2d 465 (1994) (exam­
ining earlier case law construing initiated constitutional 
amendment in question).
	
In Moyer, this court stated that “amendment of the 
indictment in matters of substance is unauthorized” and 
noted “a well-recognized distinction between matters that 
are purely matters of form and matters that go to the sub­
stance of the indictment.” 76 Or at 398-99. In analyzing 
Article VII (Original), section 18, the court discussed the 
difference between matters of substance and matters of form 
and explained that “formal matters” are “not essential to the 
charge and merely clerical errors, such as where the defen­
dant cannot be misled to his prejudice by the amendment.” 
76 Or at 399 (emphasis added). The court also quoted trea­
tises to explain the distinction. It concluded that “[m]atters 
that are necessary to be proved as alleged are material to 
the indictment,” and it quoted volume 1 of the Encyclopædia 
of Pleading and Practice to support that proposition:
“* 
* 
* the power of amendment extends to formal matters 
which are not essential to the charge, and mere cleri­
cal errors, etc., where the defendant cannot be misled or 
	
9  Thus, as used in this case, the term “duplicity” is a legal term of art that 
is unrelated to the term’s current implication of “deception” and “bad faith.” 
Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 703 (unabridged ed 2002).
406	
State v. Haji
prejudiced; but, on the other hand, any omission or mis­
statement which prevents an indictment or information 
from showing on its face that an offense has been commit­
ted, or from showing what offense is intended to charge, is 
a defect in matter of substance which cannot be cured by 
amendment * 
* 
*.”
76 Or at 400 (emphasis added). Thus, Moyer distinguished 
amendments of substance from those of form in terms of 
whether the defect in an indictment concerned what is nec­
essary “to be proved as alleged” or to show that “an offense 
has been committed.” Id.
	
Over 75 years later, this court construed Article VII 
(Amended), section 5(6), in Wimber, describing its decision 
as one following the holding in Moyer. First, the court noted 
that, although Moyer was decided in 1915, well before the 
adoption of Article VII (Amended), section 5, in 1974, the 
constitutional provision at issue there, Article VII (Original), 
section 18, contained nearly identical wording. 315 Or at 113 
n  19. The court in Wimber then explained that, “[c]onsis­
tent with the holding” in Moyer, its analysis would address 
whether the court’s amendment of the indictment to modify 
allegations concerning the timing of the criminal conduct 
was permissible under Article VII (Amended), section 5(6), 
based on a multifactor test. Id. at 114-15.
	
That test was derived directly from statements in 
Moyer, compare Wimber, 315 Or at 114-15, with Moyer, 76 
Or at 399-400, and the constitutional purposes of an indict­
ment by grand jury. Those purposes are threefold and focus 
on adequate identification of the charged offense:
	
“ 
‘(1) to inform the accused of the nature and charac­
ter of the criminal offense with which he is charged with 
sufficient particularity to enable him to make his defense, 
(2) to identify the offense so as to enable the accused to 
avail himself of his conviction or acquittal thereof in the 
event that he should be prosecuted further for the same 
cause, and (3) to inform the court of the facts charged so 
that it may determine whether or not they are sufficient to 
support a conviction.’ 
”
Wimber, 315 Or at 115 (quoting State v. Smith, 182 Or 497, 
500-01, 188 P2d 998 (1948)).
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
407
	
Thus, in both Moyer and Wimber, this court previ­
ously addressed the meaning of Article VII (Original), sec­
tion 18, and Article VII (Amended), section 5(6). The empha­
sis in both cases, as this court summed up in Wimber, was 
that “[a] matter that is essential to show that an offense has 
been committed is a matter of substance.” 315 Or at 114.
	
And in State v. Pachmayr, 344 Or 482, 185 P3d 1103 
(2008), this court more recently revisited the issue of what an 
indictment defective in “form” is for purposes of Article VII 
(Amended), section 5(6). After noting that section 5(6) was 
substantially similar to Article VII (Original), section 18,
the court reviewed statutes in effect at the turn of the twen­
tieth century and the definition of “form” in Black’s Law 
Dictionary. Pachmayr, 344 Or at 488 (citing Black’s Law 
Dictionary 510 (1st ed 1891). As a result, and as we conclude 
in this case, the court concluded that the term “form” was 
used in the same sense as in those contemporaneous stat­
utes and that Article VII (Original), section 18,
“prohibited the district attorney from amending an indict­
ment that was insufficient to charge the crime—an indict­
ment that was defective in substance—in order to make it 
sufficient, but allowed the district attorney to correct other 
defects—defects in form.”
Pachmayr, 344 Or at 488. The court noted that that under­
standing of indictments defective in form was consistent 
with Moyer and Wimber. Id. at 488-89. The court also quoted 
with approval the conclusion in Wimber that defects in mat­
ters of substance are those “essential to show that an offense 
has been committed.” Id. at 489.
	
The court in Pachmayr went on to apply the Wimber 
test to determine whether the district attorney permissibly 
amended the indictment at the close of the state’s case-in-
chief. The indictment contained three counts of second-
degree assault, which all specified that the defendant had 
used “an automobile” as his weapon. Id. at 484. In two of 
those counts, the allegation stated that the defendant had 
committed the crime by means of a “dangerous weapon”; 
in Count 2, instead of “dangerous weapon,” the indictment 
said “deadly weapon.” Id. The trial court permitted the 
state to change “deadly” to “dangerous” in Count 2, and the 
408	
State v. Haji
defendant was convicted on all three second-degree assault 
charges. Id. at 485. This court concluded that the amend­
ment (1) did not alter the indictment’s essential nature; 
(2) did not prejudice the defendant’s right to notice of the 
charges against him to protect against double jeopardy; 
and (3) did not prejudice the defendant by depriving him of 
a defense. Id. at 494. In so holding, the court emphasized 
that it was satisfied that “the grand jury, not the prose­
cutor, determined the charge to be brought and found the 
facts on which the charge was based,” which maintained 
the grand jury’s role. Id. at 495. Thus, Pachmayr is fully 
consistent with our conclusions about what it means for 
an indictment to be defective in form and when the test 
in Wimber should be used to analyze whether the district 
attorney could amend an indictment.
	
Reinke also sheds some light on our understanding 
of Article VII (Amended), section 5(6), because the court in 
Reinke construed another part of section 5 that was enacted 
by the people at the same time in 1974. The defendant in 
Reinke, who was convicted of second-degree kidnapping, con­
tended that it was necessary for the grand jury to find and 
allege additional facts specified in ORS 161.725(1)(b) that 
would subject him to an enhanced sentence as a danger­
ous offender, because those were “elements” of the offense. 
Reinke, 354 Or at 100. This court considered “whether sen­
tence enhancement facts are elements of an offense that, 
as a matter of state constitutional law, the grand jury must 
find and the indictment must allege.” Id. at 101. The court 
explained the defendant’s argument as follows:
	
“Article VII (Amended), section 5, requires the state 
to proceed by an indictment or an information if it wishes 
to charge a ‘crime punishable as a felony.’ As we under­
stand it, defendant’s argument under that section turns 
on the proposition that the constitutional phrase ‘a crime 
punishable as a felony’ refers not only to the elements of 
the underlying crime but also to any fact that authorizes 
an enhanced sentence for that crime; that is, he views the 
word ‘crime’ as referring to both the elements of the offense 
and any sentence enhancement fact that the prosecutor 
invokes as a basis for seeking a greater sentence.”
Id. at 106 (quoting Or Const, Article VII (Amended), § 5(3)).
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
409
	
This court noted that, in 1908, “the people voted to 
amend Article VII (Original), section 18, and made a grand 
jury indictment mandatory for both crimes and misdemean­
ors.” Reinke, 354 Or at 108. The court then explained that a 
“crime” in that section and in Article VII (Amended), section 5,
referred to prohibited acts that constituted an offense; thus, 
this court had held that Article VII (Amended), section 5 
(1929), “required only that the grand jury determine that 
there is probable cause to find the elements of the ‘con­
ventional charge.’ 
” Reinke, 354 Or at 109 (quoting State v. 
Hicks, 213 Or 619, 641, 325 P2d 794 (1958)). Importantly for 
purposes of this case, this court in Reinke understood that 
a “crime” for purposes of Article VII (Amended), section 5, 
does not differ “from the conventional crime that the legisla­
ture has defined.” 354 Or at 113.
	
To summarize, that case law supports three propo­
sitions: First, a well-recognized dichotomy of long standing 
in Oregon law between indictments defective in substance 
and in form illuminates the meaning of the phrase “defec­
tive in form.” Second, defects in indictments as to matters 
that are essential to show that a crime has been commit­
ted are defects in substance; those that are not essential to 
show that a crime has been committed are defects “in form.” 
And, third, to show that a crime has been committed, it is 
essential for a grand jury indictment to include the facts 
supporting the elements of the crime, that is, “the conven­
tional crime that the legislature has defined.”10 Reinke, 354 
Or at 113.
	
We disagree with the dissent’s view that our recent 
decision in Warren, read in combination with Moyer, leads to 
the conclusion that the amendment in this case is an allega­
tion of substance that required the grand jury to issue a new 
indictment. Quoting Moyer, 76 Or at 400, the dissent states 
	
10  The dissent suggests that the grand jury must make other factual deter­
minations beyond the facts supporting the elements of the crime and that those 
factual determinations are also essential to show that a crime has been commit­
ted. The dissent proffers examples, such as the location of the crime, a fact that 
establishes that venue is proper, and the date of the crime, a fact needed to estab­
lish that the prosecution was commenced within the limitation period permitted 
for the crime. See 366 Or at 441 (Duncan, J., dissenting). We express no opinion 
on that view.
410	
State v. Haji
that a matter is substantive for purposes of Article VII, sec­
tion 5(6) if it “must be proved as alleged.” 366 Or at 430-31 
(Duncan, J., dissenting). And, because we held in Warren, 
364 Or at 122, that an indictment must allege the basis for 
joining charges, the dissent argues that the amendment in 
this case—the statutory basis for joining the charges—was 
an amendment of substance. 366 Or at 449 (Duncan, J., 
dissenting).
	
At its heart, the dissent’s view is inconsistent with 
Moyer (and Wimber and Pachmayr). The statutory basis for 
joinder added to an indictment is not a matter that is essen­
tial to the charge—that is, a substantive change—because 
it is not necessary to show that an offense has been commit­
ted. Though this court held in Warren that a multi-count 
indictment must contain the basis for joinder to properly 
bring multiple counts in one indictment, Warren was a case 
about whether Oregon’s joinder statute required the basis 
for joinder of multiple charges to be in an indictment—not 
whether, for purposes of Article VII, section 5(6), the statu­
tory basis for joinder is “essential to the charge,” Moyer, 76 
Or at 399, that is, essential to show that a crime has been 
committed.
	
There is a difference between components that must 
be included in an indictment because of statutory require­
ments and components that must be included for consti­
tutionally based reasons. That difference undermines the 
logic of the dissent’s reliance on Warren for what the Oregon 
Constitution requires in Article VII (Amended), section 5(6).
	
If the dissent were correct that the statutes con­
cerning requirements for indictments control what this 
court must understand as matters of form or substance in 
an indictment for purposes of Article VII (Amended), sec­
tion 5(6), then everything (or substantially everything) 
listed in ORS 132.550 would be essential to be set out in a 
grand jury indictment such that a subsequent amendment 
to fix any failure would be an amendment of substance.11 
But we need look no further than Wimber for a counter-
example. By statute, an indictment requires “a statement in 
	
11  ORS 132.550 provides that an indictment must contain “substantially” the 
elements that it lists.
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
411
each count that the offense charged therein was committed 
on, or on or about, a designated date, or during a designated 
period of time.” ORS 132.550(6). However, as this court held 
in Wimber, time is not a material element of most offenses, 
so an amendment shortening the time range in the indict­
ment to comply with the statute of limitations is a permis­
sible amendment. 315 Or at 110, 115. The court explained 
in Wimber that “the constitutional purposes of requiring an 
indictment by grand jury” were met because “[n]o new or 
different theory, element, or crime” was added. Id. at 115. 
See also State v. Long, 320 Or 361, 366, 368-69, 885 P2d 
696 (1994) (time not a material element; thus, trial court 
could correct error in indictment and instruct jury on the 
end date for the timeframe during which the crime allegedly 
occurred, even though the end date in the indictment was 
before the date of the incident).
	
Rather, the text and context of Article VII (Amended), 
section 5(6), point to the following essential distinction: If 
the failure of the indictment to include an allegation on the 
statutory basis for joinder of multiple crimes is a matter 
that is essential to show that a crime has been committed, 
then the defect is one of substance that cannot be remedied 
by the district attorney. But if the statutory basis for join­
der of multiple crimes in the indictment is not essential to 
show that a crime has been committed, then a failure to 
include it presents a defect in form that can be corrected by 
the district attorney’s amendment. The history of the pro­
vision in both Article VII (Original), section 18, and Article 
VII (Amended), section 5(6), supports the latter reading.
4.  Historical analysis
	
Under our constitutional jurisprudence, the histor­
ical analysis of an amended constitutional provision exam­
ines “sources of information that were available to the vot­
ers at the time the measure was adopted and that disclose 
the public’s understanding of the measure.” Ecumenical 
Ministries, 318 Or at 560 n 8. Examples of relevant sources 
include “materials that are included in the Voters’ Pamphlet, 
such as the ballot title, the explanatory statement, and the 
legislative argument in support.” Shilo Inn v. Multnomah 
412	
State v. Haji
County, 333 Or 101, 130, 36 P3d 954 (2001), adh’d to as mod­
ified on recons, 334 Or 11, 45 P3d 107 (2002).
	
We first examine the 1908 amendment of Article VII 
(Original), section 18, which arose after legislative changes 
permitted district attorneys to charge crimes by informa­
tion rather than by grand jury indictment. In 1899, the leg­
islature acted pursuant to Article VII (Original), section 18, 
to authorize criminal prosecutions based on the filing of a 
district attorney’s information. Or Laws 1899, §§ 1-3, p 99. 
The legislature also authorized the district attorney to file 
an information to correct any defect in an indictment. Or 
Laws 1899, § 6, p 100. In the period between 1899 and 1908, 
it appears that district attorneys charged even the most 
serious felonies by information. See, e.g., State v. Blodgett, 
50 Or 329, 331, 92 P 820 (1907) (“The defendant by informa­
tion of the district attorney was charged with the crime of 
murder in the first degree[.]”).
	
The 1908 Voter’s Pamphlet reflects that the refer­
ral of the constitutional amendment that first introduced 
the phrase at issue in this case was a response to the wide-
ranging powers that district attorneys had been granted. 
The sole argument related to the proposed amendment 
was submitted by eleven individuals, including Charles H. 
Carey and Ben Selling. Official Voters’ Pamphlet, General 
Election, June 1, 1908, 116. That argument, in favor of the 
amendment, was a resounding call to voters to control the 
unchecked powers of district attorneys to charge crimes. It 
began:
	
“Under the present law, any district attorney can file 
an information against a man for any crime, from murder 
down. The accused is not entitled of right to any prelimi­
nary hearing and the first he knows of the matter may be 
his arrest. He may never be tried at all, the information or 
indictment may be dismissed, and yet his record is black­
ened. It may be that it is not intended from the start that 
he ever should be tried, but the information is issued to 
serve some political purpose, private revenge or the scheme 
of a ring hostile to the victim. It is un-American. It is too 
much like the despotism of Russia and it is too much power 
to be vested in the hands of any one man. The whole history 
of Anglo-Saxon institutions is a battle against this very 
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
413
thing: the power of one man to brand another with crime 
and lodge him in prison.”
Voters’ Pamphlet at 116.
	
The 1908 Voters’ Pamphlet leads with the question 
that was printed on the official ballot. It states:
	
“For constitutional amendment providing for the choos­
ing of jurors and grand jurors, and that no person can 
be charged in the Circuit Courts with the commission of 
a crime or misdemeanor except upon indictment found 
by a grand jury, except when a court holds an indictment 
to be defective, the District Attorney may file an amended 
indictment.”
Voters’ Pamphlet at 114 (emphasis added). Notably, that 
question posed to voters mentioned that amending an 
indictment would be possible, but it does not include the 
pivotal words “in form” after the word defective. That omis­
sion is consonant with the primary focus of the amendment: 
to enshrine in the constitution the role of grand juries in 
finding a factual basis for charging crimes to prevent the 
dangers of the “present arbitrary power lodged in one man.” 
Voters’ Pamphlet at 117.
	
The voters approved the 1908 amendment. That 
amendment withdrew the legislature’s authority to abolish 
grand juries, re-established that a criminal prosecution may 
only commence upon grand jury indictment, and limited the 
extent of a district attorney’s ability to amend indictments 
to matters of form. Or Const, Art VII (Original), § 18 (1908); 
see Or Laws 1909, p 12.
	
As earlier noted, voters in 1974 approved virtually 
identical language concerning the district attorney’s abil­
ity to amend an indictment. Measure 3 was the legislative 
referral to voters of the proposed constitutional amendment 
to Article VII (Amended), section 5. The ballot title in the 
1974 Voters’ Pamphlet read as follows:
“REVISES CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
FOR GRAND JURIES—Purpose: This measure amends 
Oregon Constitution to provide that a grand jury indict­
ment is not necessary for a felony prosecution if a person 
has been charged and a magistrate finds at a preliminary 
414	
State v. Haji
hearing that there is probable cause to believe that the per­
son in fact committed a felony. The amendment does not 
eliminate a citizen’s right to jury trial, but only deals with 
the method by which a person is charged with a crime.”
Official Voters’ Pamphlet, General Election, November 5, 
1974, 16.
	
Voters were told that the proposed amendment 
gave the district attorney three charging options in felony 
cases and allowed the district attorney to proceed by infor­
mation for all misdemeanors. In felony cases, the district 
attorney could (1) seek a grand jury indictment, (2) proceed 
without an indictment if the person charged with a felony 
had a preliminary hearing before a magistrate that estab­
lished that there was probable cause to believe a felony had 
been committed, or (3) proceed by information if the per­
son waived the preliminary hearing. Voters’ Pamphlet at 
13. The explanation of the amendment stated that the pur­
pose of the restrictions on the district attorney’s charging 
options was to “make certain * 
* 
* that some disinterested 
judicial officer (the magistrate) has determined that prob­
able cause exists[.]” Id. The same statement assured voters 
that the “proposal will substantially streamline the section 
but would make no substantive changes other than those 
described above.” Id.
	
Voters also were presented with arguments for and 
against the amendment. The argument in favor stated that 
the proposal would “promote efficiency and fairness” in the 
criminal justice system by “speed[ing] up the system where 
necessary and yet retain[ing] the grand jury for use in ques­
tionable cases and in its traditional role of investigating 
crime.” Voters’ Pamphlet at 14. That argument points to the 
time-consuming process in Multnomah County of taking 
nearly 200 cases per month to the grand jury. Id. The argu­
ment in opposition responded that the proposal was a “half-
way measure [that] should be rejected to await full reform,” 
which it identified as completely abolishing the grand jury. 
Voters’ Pamphlet at 15. Nothing in those materials indicates 
that the continuing distinction between allowing amend­
ments by a district attorney as to matters of form, but not 
on matters of substance, was highlighted for, or was of sig­
nificance to, voters in 1974.
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
415
	
From the explanation of the amendment and argu­
ments both in favor and in opposition to the proposal, vot­
ers in 1974 would have understood that the primary goal 
of the proposed amendment was to facilitate moving cases 
through the criminal justice system, but with appropriate 
checks on the district attorney’s charging decisions. Given 
the ballot title, which advised voters that the amendment 
(1) made a grand jury indictment unnecessary for a felony 
prosecution if “a magistrate finds at a preliminary hearing 
that there is probable cause to believe that the person in fact 
committed a felony” and (2) “deals with the method by which 
a person is charged with a crime,” voters were assured that 
even with allowing alternatives to the grand jury system of 
charging individuals, a neutral party—a magistrate during 
a preliminary hearing—ensured protection for individuals 
being charged with a crime. Voters’ Pamphlet at 16.
	
That history of the 1908 and 1974 amendments sup­
ports the conclusion that voters approved of a neutral party 
reviewing the factual basis for charging serious crimes, 
instead of vesting all discretion for those charging decisions 
in the district attorney. That history is consistent with our 
analysis of the text and context of Article VII (Amended), 
section 5(6), which indicates that matters essential to show 
that a crime has been committed are matters of substance 
committed to the grand jury’s review.12
	
But defendant focuses on the 1908 history and 
urges a different conclusion: In light of pre-1908 caselaw, at 
a time when Oregon law required single-count indictments, 
the voters in 1908 who authorized a district attorney to file 
an amended indictment when it is “defective in form” would 
have understood that allegations required to charge more 
than one offense in a single indictment were matters of 
“substance.”
	
12  The dissent characterizes the purpose of the 1908 amendment in broad 
terms: “to protect the role of grand juries in the initiation of criminal prosecu­
tions and to limit the role of district attorneys.” 366 Or at 440 (Duncan, J., dis­
senting). But couching the purpose of the amendment at that level of generality 
moves too far away from what voters were told about the amendment and its 
historical context—the preceding legislative changes permitting district attor­
neys to charge even serious felonies without grand juries—for us to accept the 
dissent’s extrapolation from it.
416	
State v. Haji
	
Defendant bases his conclusion on cases from that 
era that, he argues, considered a demurrer on the basis of 
duplicity—charging multiple crimes—to be an error in sub­
stance. See State v. Clark, 46 Or 140, 80 P 101 (1905); State 
v. Hinkle, 33 Or 93, 54 P 155 (1898); State of Oregon v. Carr, 
6 Or 133 (1876). Building on that reading of Clark, Hinkle, 
and Carr, defendant argues that voters in 1908 would not 
have viewed a failure to include joinder allegations as a sim­
ple defect “in form” as provided in Article VII (Original), sec­
tion 18. The state responds that those cases are consistent 
with the proposition that the Oregon Constitution assigns 
to the grand jury the responsibility to find and allege facts 
constituting the crime charged but provide no support for 
defendant’s argument that the grand jury is charged to find 
and allege a statutory ground for joinder of multiple crimes 
in one indictment. We agree with the state.
	
Two of the cases, Clark and Carr, illustrate the 
undisputed proposition that indictments at the time were 
required to charge but one crime and were subject to 
demurrer for failure to comply with that requirement, but 
the decisions do not characterize such a failure as either 
a defect in substance or in form. Both involved one-count 
indictments. In Clark, the defendants were convicted of lar­
ceny after unsuccessfully challenging the indictment on the 
ground that more than one crime was charged. 46 Or at 
141. This court concluded that the indictment alleged a sin­
gle crime, because it alleged that the defendants had stolen 
horses belonging to two victims at the same time and place. 

Id. at 142. In Carr, the defendant successfully challenged 
an indictment in the trial court, and the state appealed. 
This court held that the indictment, which alleged that 
the defendant had committed a gambling crime by various 
means (dealing, playing, and carrying on a game of faro for 
money), stated only one offense and that the trial court had 
erred in sustaining the defendant’s demurrer. Carr, 6 Or at 

134-35. This court reversed and remanded the case to the 
trial court. Id. at 137.
	
Unlike in Clark and Carr, this court in Hinkle con­
cluded that the indictment was defective by charging more 
than one crime. 33 Or at 96-97. But, as in Clark and Carr, the 
decision in Hinkle did not address the dichotomy of defects 
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
417
in substance and in form in indictments. The court reversed 
the judgment of conviction because the indictment charged 
two offenses and because the trial court committed revers­
ible error in an evidentiary ruling. Id. at 98. In his opening 
brief, defendant draws from the disposition in Hinkle the 
conclusion that this court “considered such a defect not a 
mere matter of form.” (Emphasis in original.) Without fur­
ther elaboration from defendant, we understand his conten­
tion to be that, because an indictment that is found defective 
on the ground of duplicity would lead to a consequential dis­
position on appeal, reversal of the judgment of conviction, 
this court must have viewed the defect as one of substance 
rather than form. On at least two fronts, defendant’s posi­
tion faces difficulties.
	
First, there is equivocation. Defendant appears to 
equate a defect “in substance” with one that results in a 
serious or consequential disposition. That is, a defect in sub­
stance is a substantial or significant defect (and, thus, con­
comitantly, a defect “in form” is one that results in a minor 
consequence). In other contexts, one involving ordinary par­
lance, for example, a problem of substance may be under­
stood as one of substantial or significant import. But that is 
not the proper understanding in this context, which involves 
the text of a constitutional provision—“defective in form”—
that is a legal term of art. Applying our interpretive prec­
edents, we have already noted that, voters in 1908 would 
have understood that an indictment “defective in form” in 
Article VII (Original), section 18, refers to one that is defec­
tive as to matters that are not essential to show that a crime 
has been committed.
	
Second, defendant’s suggestion that a multicount 
indictment is substantively defective because of the seri­
ousness of such an error also is undercut by the fact that a 
defendant could waive an objection to the indictment on the 
ground of duplicity by failing to properly raise it.13 In 1908, 
the demurrer statute provided that
	
13  Defendant briefly acknowledges that, in 1908, demurring to an indictment 
on the ground that it alleged multiple crimes was a waivable objection but asserts 
that “[h]olding that an objection has been waived * 
* 
* is much different than rel­
egating the defect to be one of mere form.” 
418	
State v. Haji
	
“[t]he defendant may demur to the indictment when it 
appears upon the face thereof either,—
	
“1.  That the grand jury by which it was found had no 
legal authority to inquire into the crime charged because 
the same is not triable within the county;
	
“2.  That it does not substantially conform to the 
requirements of chapter VIII of title XVIII of this code;
	
“3.  That more than one crime is charged in the 
indictment;
	
“4.  That the facts stated do not constitute a crime;
	
“5.  That the indictment contains any matter which, if 
true, would constitute a legal justification or excuse of the 
crime charged, or other legal bar to the action.”
The Codes and Statutes of Oregon, title XVIII, ch IX, § 1357 
(Bellinger & Cotton 1901) (emphasis added). The bases for 
demurrer under section 1357 were divided into two cate­
gories. A defendant could attack an indictment under sub­
sections 1 and 4—the grand jury lacked authority to act or 
the facts alleged did not constitute a crime—at any point 
during the proceedings. State of Oregon v. Bruce, 5 Or 68, 
71 (1873). But the other bases were waivable: A defendant 
could challenge an indictment under subsections 2, 3, and 
5—including on the basis that more than one crime was 
charged—only through a demurrer, and if he or she failed 
to do so, that basis was waived. State v. Jarvis, 18 Or 360, 
362, 23 P 251 (1890); Bruce, 5 Or at 71. Thus, a conviction 
could withstand appeal, even if the indictment had charged 
multiple crimes, if the defendant failed to timely demur on 
the ground of duplicity. See, e.g., State v. Lee, 33 Or 506, 56 
P 415 (1899).14
	
14  In Lee, the state alleged in the indictment that the defendant had forcibly 
engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim and also alleged the elements of 
statutory rape, including that the defendant was over 16 years old and the vic­
tim was a child under 16 years old. 33 Or at 507. The defendant failed to demur 
before trial and was convicted. Id. at 507, 510. The defendant then appealed his 
conviction by arguing that the indictment charged only statutory rape, which the 
state had failed to prove, and that the allegation of forcible sexual intercourse 
was merely a legal conclusion related to the statutory rape offense. Id. at 507-08. 
The state argued that the indictment was duplicitous, that the state “had the 
right to adopt either theory of the case,” and that it had elected to proceed upon 
the common-law, forcible rape charge at trial. Id. at 508. This court concluded 
that the indictment had charged both common-law rape and statutory rape. Id. at 
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
419
	
The dissent uses Clark and Carr for a different pur­
pose. The dissent contends that those cases illustrate that, 
in 1908, an indictment had to include factual allegations 
demonstrating the proper connection between the defen­
dant’s multiple acts so that those acts could be joined in a 
single indictment. See 366 Or at 445, 446 (Duncan, J., dis­
senting). The dissent further concludes that the voters in 
1908 would have viewed a failure to include an allegation 
of the statutory basis for joinder as a defect in substance 
rather than “in form,” because case law indicated that the 
grand jury was responsible for determining the number of 
acts that could be charged in a single indictment. 366 Or at 
447 (Duncan, J., dissenting).
	
The dissent correctly points out that, in those cases, 
this court looked to the indictment for the acts the defendant 
was accused of committing. But the court’s examination in 
those cases illustrates that whether multiple crimes were 
alleged and joined in an indictment—lawfully or unlaw­
fully—was a question of law. The legal question depended 
in part on the historical facts as alleged in the grand jury’s 
indictment, but this court was evaluating whether the alle­
gations should be understood to charge more than one crime 
as a legal matter. Although the grand jury found probable 
cause as to historical facts, it is difficult to move from that to 
the conclusion that a voter in 1908 would have understood 
that the grand jury had to allege the statutory or legal basis 
for joining multiple counts in one indictment, when such 
joinder was prohibited at the time.15
III.  CONCLUSION
	
In sum, considering the text, context, and histori­
cal analysis together, we reject defendant’s contention that 
the omission of statutory bases for joinder of multiple crimes 
510. Implicitly accepting the state’s argument, the court also held that, because 
the defendant had waived a duplicity objection, the allegations supporting stat­
utory rape—the ages of the defendant and the victim—could be stricken from 
the indictment “as surplusage, without affecting the conviction.” Id. Given the 
sufficiency of the evidence of common-law rape, this court affirmed the judgment. 
Id. at 512.
	
15  Twenty-five years later, in 1933, the legislature passed House Bill 277, 
which allowed for multicount indictments when several charges arose from the 
same act or transaction. Or Laws 1933, ch 40, § 1.
420	
State v. Haji
categorically requires the district attorney to resubmit the 
case to a grand jury. In this case, the district attorney added 
only statutory bases for joinder of multiple crimes, which 
were consistent with the allegations of facts in the original 
indictment, not additional historical facts essential to show 
that a crime had been committed. Accordingly, the defect in 
the indictment was one of form, and the trial court correctly 
permitted the district attorney to amend the indictment. We 
also affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, albeit based 
on different reasoning.
	
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judg­
ment of the circuit court are affirmed.
	
DUNCAN, J., dissenting.
	
At the outset it is important to identify the points 
on which the majority and the dissent agree. First, we agree 
that the grand jury plays an important protective role in 
criminal cases. Second, we agree that the grand jury is 
responsible for making all findings of historical fact regard­
ing the conduct upon which a charge is based. That is, the 
grand jury is responsible for determining, among other 
things, what act or omission the defendant committed that 
justifies each charge in an indictment. Third, and relatedly, 
we agree that the district attorney cannot amend an indict­
ment to add any allegations of historical fact.
	
In this case, the grand jury indicted defendant for 
multiple crimes but did not allege any bases for joining the 
charges. Over defendant’s objection, the trial court granted 
the district attorney’s motion to amend the indictment to 
include joinder allegations. The majority affirms the trial 
court’s ruling because, in its view, the amendment did not 
add any allegations of historical fact to the indictment. I dis­
agree because I conclude that the joinder allegations added 
by the district attorney are allegations of historical fact. 
I write separately to explain why, if a grand jury charges 
a defendant with multiple crimes in a single indictment, 
it must find and allege facts that justify the joinder of the 
charges, and, if it does not, the indictment is defective in 
substance and cannot be corrected by an amendment by the 
district attorney.
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
421
	
As I will explain, this case presents a constitutional 
question. Article VII (Amended), section 5(6), of the Oregon 
Constitution provides that a district attorney may amend 
an indictment only to correct a defect “in form.” A district 
attorney may not amend an indictment to correct a defect in 
substance. State v. Moyer, 76 Or 396, 399, 149 P 84 (1915). 
When determining whether an indictment was defective in 
substance when it was issued, this court considers whether 
the indictment was sufficient to serve its constitutional 
purposes. State v. Wimber, 315 Or 103, 114-15, 843 P2d 424 
(1992); State v. Pachmayr, 344 Or 482, 490-93, 185 P3d 1103 
(2008). One of the constitutional purposes of an indictment 
is to ensure that the defendant is tried based on the facts 
found by the grand jury. Moyer, 76 Or at 401; Pachmayr, 
344 Or at 495. Another is to provide the defendant with 
notice of the nature and character of the crime charged with 
sufficient particularity so that the defendant can prepare 
and present an informed response. Wimber, 315 Or at 115; 
Pachmayr, 344 Or at 490. In this case, the indictment, as 
issued by the grand jury, was not sufficient to serve either of 
those purposes.
	
Because the indictment did not allege the basis 
for joinder, it was unclear whether the charges were based 
on the same act, different acts during a single incident, or 
different acts during multiple incidents. Simply put, it was 
unclear what acts the grand jury had based the charges on. 
As a result, the indictment was too ambiguous to ensure 
that the act that the grand jury had relied on when autho­
rizing each charge would be the same act that the district 
attorney would rely on when seeking a conviction on that 
charge. It also was too ambiguous to provide defendant with 
adequate notice of what acts he was being prosecuted for 
committing.
	
That the indictment was too ambiguous to serve its 
constitutional purposes is illustrated by the fact that even 
the district attorney could not tell what acts the grand jury 
had based the charges on. Before trial, the district attorney 
asserted that the charges were based on acts committed during 
two incidents, but at trial he asserted that they were based on 
acts committed during a single incident. The district attorney’s 
422	
State v. Haji
changing positions show that, as a result of the failure to allege 
the basis for joinder, the indictment was too ambiguous to bind 
the state to the facts found by the grand jury and too ambigu­
ous to provide adequate notice to defendant.
	
The ambiguity was a substantive defect and, as 
such, it could not be fixed by a district attorney’s amend­
ment. That conclusion makes sense because allowing the 
district attorney to determine, for example, whether two 
charges were based on the same act or different acts would 
put the district attorney in the position of determining which 
act or acts the charges were based on, thereby supplanting 
the grand jury’s fact findings about the acts underlying the 
charges.
	
The conclusion that the grand jury must find and 
allege facts sufficient to support the joinder of charges is 
also supported by the legislative history of Article VII 
(Amended), section 5(6). The constitutional limit on a dis­
trict attorney’s authority to amend an indictment, which is 
now in Article VII (Amended), section 5(6), dates back to 
1908 and was intended to protect the role of the grand jury. 
Consequently, it is helpful to understand what the grand 
jury’s role was at that time. On that point, the then-existing 
statutes and case law are instructive. They establish that, 
contrary to the state’s argument in this case, the grand jury’s 
role was not limited to finding facts relating to the elements 
of the charged crime. Of importance to this case, the grand 
jury’s role included finding facts relating to the number of 
crimes that could be charged in a single indictment. Again, 
that makes sense. Whether charges can be joined depends 
on the relationship between the acts on which the charges 
are based. Because the grand jury is the entity that deter­
mines what acts a defendant committed, the grand jury is 
in the best position—and perhaps the exclusive position—to 
determine whether the acts underlying multiple charges are 
related in a way that justifies joinder.
I.  FACTS
	
In order to understand the effects of the failure to 
allege the basis for joinder in this case, it is necessary to 
describe the procedural history of the case in some detail. 
As mentioned, a grand jury indicted defendant for multiple 
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
423
crimes. The indictment is the only record of the grand jury’s 
factual findings. Grand juries meet in private, ORS 132.310, 
and, although a district attorney can be present for the pre­
sentation of evidence to a grand jury, no one, not even a dis­
trict attorney, can be present for a grand jury’s deliberations 
and voting, ORS 132.090(4).
	
The indictment charged defendant with seven 
counts: two counts of first-degree robbery (one with a deadly 
weapon, Count 1, and one with a dangerous weapon, Count 
2); two counts of unlawful use of a weapon (one with a knife, 
Count 3, and one with a gun, Count 4); two counts of first-
degree burglary (one with the intent to commit theft, Count 
5, and one with the intent to commit menacing, Count 6); 
and one count of felon in possession of a firearm (Count 7). 
Each count alleged the same crime commission date. The 
robbery counts specified the same victim, RM, and the bur­
glary counts specified the same apartment address. It was 
not clear from the indictment whether the seven counts 
were based on a single incident or separate incidents. If the 
counts were based on separate incidents, it was not clear 
which counts were based on which incident. In addition, for 
two of the pairs of counts (the robbery pair and the burglary 
pair) it was not clear whether each count in the pair was 
based on the same act or separate acts.
	
As a general rule, an indictment “must charge but 
one offense, and in one form only.” ORS 132.560(1). But, 
there are exceptions to that general rule. An indictment 
may charge more than one offense if the offenses are “[o]f 

the same or similar character,” “[b]ased on the same act 
or transaction,” or “[b]ased on two or more acts or transac­
tions connected together or constituting parts of a common 
scheme or plan.” ORS 132.560(1)(b)(A) - (C).
	
After the grand jury issued the indictment in this 
case, the Court of Appeals decided State v. Poston, 277 Or 
App 137, 144-45, 370 P3d 904 (2016), adh’d to on recons, 
285 Or App 750, 399 P3d 488, rev den, 361 Or 886 (2017), 
in which it held that, if an indictment charges a defendant 
with multiple crimes, it must allege the basis for joining the 
charges. Because the indictment in this case did not comply 
with that requirement, the district attorney filed a motion 
424	
State v. Haji
to amend the indictment to include bases for joining the 
charges.
	
As mentioned, under Article VII (Amended), section 
5(6), a district attorney may amend an indictment only to 
correct a defect “in form.” Pachmayr, 344 Or at 486. A district 
attorney may not amend an indictment to correct a defect 
“in substance.” Moyer, 76 Or at 398 (holding that amend­
ments as to matters “of substance” are “unauthorized”).
	
In his motion to amend, the district attorney 
asserted that the failure to allege the basis for joining the 
charges was a defect in form. He proposed that the indict­
ment be amended to add the following paragraph to each 
count:
	
“This count constitutes part of a common scheme or 
plan based on two or more acts or transactions with the 
other counts of this indictment. This count is of the same or 
similar character as the conduct alleged in the other counts 
of this indictment. This count is connected together by two 
or more acts or transactions with the other counts of this 
indictment.”
Thus, the district attorney sought to amend the indictment 
to allege two of the three statutory bases for joinder for 
each count. Specifically, he sought to amend the indictment 
to allege that the counts were “based on two or more acts 
or transactions” that were “connected together” and “part 
of a common scheme or plan,” ORS 132.560(1)(b)(C), and 
that they were “of the same and similar character,” ORS 
132.560(1)(b)(A). The proposed amendment did not allege 
that the counts were “based on the same act or transaction.” 
ORS 132.560(1)(b)(B).
	
The district attorney argued that the amendment 
was not substantive because it did not “alter the elements 
of the charged crimes.” He asserted that, “for purposes of 
Article VII (Amended), section 5, any part of the indictment 
other than an element of a charged crime is non-substantive.”
	
Defendant objected to the proposed amendment, 
arguing that the failure to allege the basis for joinder was 
a defect in substance. He also argued that allowing the 
amendment would prejudice him because, among other 
things, it would affect what evidence the state could offer 
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
425
against him. As an example, he pointed out that it would 
enable the state to offer evidence to support the allegation 
in the proposed amendment that the crimes were part of a 
common scheme or plan.
	
The trial court held a hearing on the state’s motion, 
during which the district attorney stated that the crimes 
charged in the indictment were based on two incidents that 
occurred on the same day, one in which defendant entered 
an apartment with a gun and took a tablet computer and a 
later one in which defendant entered the same apartment 
and took a knife:
	
“Your Honor, we have a series of acts that occurred on 
a single day. [Defendant] came to a particular residence 
where our victim used to live with an acquaintance of 
[defendant’s] who had just moved out.
	
“He had a firearm with him and there was some dis­
cussion at the door with the victim about letting him come 
in, letting [defendant] come into the apartment. The victim 
ultimately was unable to keep [defendant] out.
	
“Upon entry into the apartment * 
* 
* [defendant] showed 
the victim that he had a loaded firearm and took several 
things from the apartment, to include a tablet computer or 
an iPad-type of device from one of the bedrooms.
	
“He then wound up leaving. Then later in the afternoon 
came back and again was seen by the victim. He came back 
into the apartment. On that second return, he took a knife 
out of the kitchen, I recall. So there’s a second incident 
there.
	
“* 
* 
* 
* 
*
	
“We have two acts or transactions that occur through­
out the course of the day. And I would argue that there’s 
sort of a common scheme or plan throughout the course of 
this to not only show up at the apartment, but to do so with a 
firearm, to take the property, and then to come back and do 
so again.”
(Emphasis added.)
	
Defendant argued against the amendment, assert­
ing that the grand jury had to find the facts to justify join­
der of the charges.
426	
State v. Haji
	
Observing that one consideration relevant to 
whether an amendment is substantive is whether it affects 
the evidence that may be admitted at trial, the trial court 
asked defendant whether, if some counts were tried sepa­
rately from others, the evidence would be the same in each 
trial. Defendant answered that, in a trial based on one inci­
dent, evidence of the other incident would not necessarily be 
admissible.
	
At the close of the hearing, the trial court granted 
defendant leave to file a demurrer and asked the state to file 
a “factual summary.” The parties submitted those filings. 
The state’s factual summary was a written statement by the 
district attorney. It was similar to the oral statement that 
the district attorney had made to the court during the motion 
hearing in that it reported that defendant had entered RM’s 
apartment twice, the first time around 9:30 a.m. and the 
second time around 4:00 p.m. But it differed from the oral 
statement in that it did not mention a knife at all. Instead, 
it reported that defendant had pulled out a gun in front of 
RM during the second incident.1
	
After receiving the parties’ post-hearing filings, 
the trial court issued an order granting the state’s motion 
to amend and, thereby, implicitly disallowed defendant’s 
demurrer. The case proceeded to a jury trial in front of a 
different judge than the one who had heard and ruled on the 
motion to amend.
	
At trial, the state changed its position regarding 
when the crimes occurred. Instead of asserting that the 
crimes occurred during two different incidents, as it had 
before trial, it asserted that all the crimes occurred during 
one incident. In keeping with that position, RM testified 
	
1  In the factual summary, the district attorney stated that a police officer 
had spoken to RM on the date at issue. RM told the officer that defendant had 
come to his apartment around 9:30 a.m. and RM had let him in. RM then called 
his roommate, YR, who said that she wanted defendant to leave. RM asked defen­
dant to leave, but defendant refused. Defendant pulled out a gun in front of RM 
and told RM that he would kill him. Defendant went into YR’s room and took a 
tablet computer. RM demanded the tablet back, but defendant denied having it 
and left. Later that day, around 4:00 p.m., RM came home to find defendant in 
the apartment. Defendant again pulled out a gun in front of RM but left when RM 
called 911.
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
427
that, on the morning of the day at issue, defendant pushed 
his way into the apartment, threatened him with a gun, and 
took property, including a knife, which he used to threaten 
RM before leaving the apartment.2
	
Although the state’s trial position was that defen­
dant had committed all the charged crimes during his first 
entry into the apartment, the state presented evidence about 
defendant’s second entry, including that defendant refused 
to leave the apartment that afternoon until RM threatened 
to call the police.
	
The jury did not accept all of RM’s testimony. It 
found defendant not guilty of both counts of first-degree rob­
bery (one with a deadly weapon, Count 1, and one with a 
dangerous weapon, Count 2), one count of unlawful use of 
a weapon (a knife, Count 3), and one count of first-degree 
burglary (with the intent to commit theft, Count 5). It found 
him guilty of one count each of unlawful use of a weapon (a 
gun, Count 4), first-degree burglary (with the intent to com­
mit menacing, Count 6), and felon in possession of a firearm 
(Count 7).
	
Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court 
had erred in allowing the state to amend the indictment. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed. It did so before this court 
decided State v. Warren, 364 Or 105, 127, 430 P3d 1036 
(2018), in which we held, as the Court of Appeals had in 
Poston, that an indictment must allege the basis for join­
der. In Warren, we explained that, “for more than one hun­
dred years, Oregon law has limited the number of offenses 
that can be charged in a single charging instrument and 
has required that charging instruments allege facts suffi­
cient to demonstrate compliance with those limits.” 364 Or 
at 114 (emphasis added). Notably, we described the required 
allegations as factual allegations. The issue in this case is 
whether the failure to allege those facts in this case was a 
defect in form, which could be corrected by the district attor­
ney. For the reasons that follow, I conclude that it was not.
	
2  In its description of the case, the majority describes the state’s trial theory. 
But that was not the state’s only theory, and it was not the theory it presented to 
the trial court when arguing in support of its motion to amend the indictment, 
which was that defendant committed the crimes during two incidents.
428	
State v. Haji
III.  ANALYSIS
	
I base my conclusion on two analyses: (1) an analysis 
of this court’s cases involving the constitutional limitation 
on a district attorney’s authority to amend an indictment 
and (2) a historical analysis of the limitation. I begin with 
the case law.
A.  Case Law Analysis
	
This court has previously interpreted the con­
stitutional limitation on a district attorney’s authority to 
amend a grand jury indictment, and its cases doing so—
including Moyer, Wimber, and Pachmayr—are instructive. 
As explained below, they establish that, when the state pro­
ceeds against a defendant on an indictment, it is the grand 
jury’s role to determine the facts underlying the charges. 
Relatedly, they also establish that a defendant has a right 
to be tried based on the facts found by the grand jury. A dis­
trict attorney cannot amend an indictment based on what 
the district attorney thinks the grand jury found or would 
have found.
	
Moyer makes that clear. In Moyer, a grand jury 
indicted the defendant for arson, which, as relevant here, 
was defined by statute as the willful and malicious burn­
ing of the property of another. The indictment alleged that 
the defendant “did * 
* 
* wrongfully, unlawfully, feloniously, 
willfully and maliciously * 
* 
* set fire to and burn a stable, 
to wit, the Jordan Valley Livery Stable.” 76 Or at 396. The 
defendant demurred to the indictment, asserting that it was 
insufficient because it did not allege that the stable was the 
property of another. The trial court agreed and sustained 
the demurrer. But the court allowed the district attorney to 
amend the indictment to allege that the stable was the prop­
erty of another. The defendant was convicted and appealed. 
On appeal, this court held that the amendment violated 
the constitutional limitation on amendments by a district 
attorney. Id. at 401. It stated that a defendant “is entitled 
to be tried upon an indictment found by a grand jury who 
act under oath,” id. at 398, and that a district attorney “can­
not amend [an indictment] as to charge the crime which it 
is supposed [the grand jury] intended,” id. at 401 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). As the facts of Moyer illustrate, 
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
429
that is true regardless of how likely it is that the grand jury 
found, or would have found, the fact at issue.
	
In its subsequent cases involving amendments to 
indictments, this court has continued to focus on whether 
the indictment, as issued by the grand jury, reflected that 
the grand jury found the facts upon which the defendant 
was tried. In Wimber, this court held that an amendment 
was permissible because, among other things, it did not 
“alter the availability * 
* 
* of defenses or evidence, or add 
new or different theory, element, or crime.” 315 Or at 114. 
“To the contrary, the indictment returned by the grand jury 
was narrowed.” Id. at 115.
	
Similarly, in Pachmayr, this court approved an 
amendment that deleted surplusage from an indictment. 
344 Or at 495. This court explained that it was not making 
assumptions “about what the grand jury ‘actually’ intended 
to charge[.]” Id. Instead, it was relying on the original 
indictment, which, it concluded, “contained the allegations 
necessary to charge” the defendant with the crime for which 
he was tried. Id. Accordingly, this court stated that it was 
“satisfied that * 
* 
* the grand jury, not the prosecutor, deter­
mined the charge to be brought and found the facts on which 
the charge was based.” Id.; see also State v. Long, 320 Or 
361, 370, 885 P2d 696 (1994) (holding that a trial court’s 
correction of a typographical error did not enable the state 
to try the defendant on facts other than those found by the 
grand jury).
	
Moyer, Wimber, and Pachmayr show that, when 
determining whether an indictment was defective in form, 
this court has focused on the constitutional purposes of an 
indictment, one of which is to ensure that a defendant is 
tried based on the facts found by the grand jury. Moyer, 76 
Or at 401; Pachmayr, 344 Or at 495. If an indictment fails to 
serve that purpose, it is defective in substance. Moyer, 76 Or 
at 401.
	
Another constitutional purpose of an indictment 
is to provide notice of the crime charged. Wimber, 315 Or 
at 115; Pachmayr, 344 Or at 490. As this court stated in 
Wimber, an indictment must inform the defendant “ 
‘of the 
nature and character of the criminal offense with which 
430	
State v. Haji
he is charged with sufficient particularity to enable him to 
make his defense[.]’ 
” 315 Or at 115 (quoting State v. Smith, 
182 Or 497, 500-01, 188 P2d 998 (1948)); 315 Or at 109-10 
(citing Smith, 182 Or at 502, for the proposition that, when 
a statute describes an offense in generic terms, a state­
ment of particular circumstances may be necessary). If an 
indictment does not provide such notice, it is defective in 
substance.
	
In Wimber, when determining whether an amend­
ment to an indictment was permissible, this court asked 
itself three questions:
	
“(1)  Did the amendment alter the essential nature of 
the indictment against defendant, alter the availability to 
him of defenses or evidence, or add a theory, element, or 
crime? * 
* 
*
	
“(2)  Did the amendment prejudice defendant’s right to 
notice of the charges against him and to protection against 
double jeopardy? * 
* 
*
	
“(3)  Was the amendment itself sufficiently definite and 
certain?”
315 Or at 114-15. Thus, Wimber reflects that a grand jury 
indictment binds the state; a district attorney may not 
amend an indictment in a way that alters the available evi­
dence or defenses or adds a theory, element, or crime. It also 
reflects that an indictment must provide notice of the nature 
and character of the crime charged so that the defendant is 
not prejudiced in his ability to make a defense or his ability 
to protect against double jeopardy. Finally, it reflects that, 
if an amendment is made, it must be sufficiently definite 
and certain, so that it does not prevent the indictment from 
binding the state or providing adequate notice.
	
In Wimber, this court answered the three questions 
and held that the amendment, which shortened the time 
period alleged, was permissible. As mentioned, this court 
concluded that the amendment did not enable the state to try 
the defendant on facts other than those found by the grand 
jury, noting that the amendment did not alter the availabil­
ity of defenses or evidence or add a new or different theory, 
element, or crime. Id. at 114. This court also concluded that 
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
431
the amendment did not prejudice the defendant’s right to 
notice of the nature and character of the charges against 
him or his right to protection against double jeopardy. Id. at 
115. And, finally, this court concluded that the amendment 
was sufficiently definite and certain. Id.
	
This court followed Moyer and Wimber in Pachmayr, 
its most recent case involving the amendment of an indict­
ment. This court again focused on whether the indictment, 
as issued by the grand jury, was sufficient to serve its con­
stitutional purposes. Applying the first two questions that it 
had set out in Wimber, this court concluded that the amend­
ment was permissible because it did not alter or add to the 
facts found by the grand jury, 344 Or at 493, and because it 
did not prejudice the defendant’s right to notice of the alle­
gations against him, id. at 494. (In Pachmayr, this court did 
not need to apply the third question, regarding whether the 
amendment was sufficiently definite and certain, because 
the amendment in the case deleted surplusage.)3
	
To summarize, Moyer, Wimber, and Pachmayr show 
that, when determining whether an indictment is defec­
tive in substance, this court considers whether the indict­
ment is sufficient to serve its constitutional purposes, which 
include ensuring that the defendant is tried based on the 
facts found by the grand jury and providing adequate notice 
to the defendant. If an indictment is not sufficient to serve 
	
3  In Pachmayr, the defendant drove a car across a highway median and into 
another car, injuring three other persons, and a grand jury indicted defendant for 
three counts of second-degree assault. Two of the counts alleged that the defen­
dant had caused the injuries using a “dangerous weapon,” but one of them alleged 
that he had caused the injuries using a “deadly weapon.” All the counts identified 
the weapon as “an automobile.” At trial, after the state’s case-in-chief, the defen­
dant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the count that alleged that he had 
caused the injuries with a “deadly weapon,” arguing that a car is not a “deadly 
weapon” as defined by the applicable statute. The state acknowledged that a car 
is not a “deadly weapon” and moved to amend the indictment to replace “deadly 
weapon” with “dangerous weapon.” The trial court allowed the amendment and, 
on review, this court affirmed, reasoning that, “although the original indictment 
did not use the phrase ‘dangerous weapon,’ it contained all of the allegations that 
were necessary to make out a charge under that theory: that defendant drove a 
car, and did so under circumstances that made it capable of causing death or seri­
ous physical injury.” 344 Or at 492. For support, the court cited cases holding that 
surplusage does not render an indictment insufficient. Id. at 493 (citing State v. 
Humphreys, 43 Or 44, 48, 70 P 824 (1902), and State v. Horne, 20 Or 485, 486, 26 
P 665 (1891)).
432	
State v. Haji
its constitutional purposes, then it is defective in substance 
and the defect cannot be cured by an amendment. Relatedly, 
a district attorney cannot make a substantive amendment, 
which includes an amendment that alters the available evi­
dence or adds a new theory.
	
Applying Moyer, Wimber, and Pachmayr to this case 
leads to the conclusion that, as issued by the grand jury, the 
indictment against defendant was defective in substance. 
As described above, the indictment charged defendant with 
multiple crimes, but did not allege the basis for joining the 
charges in a single indictment. Because of that omission, 
the indictment was ambiguous. It was not clear whether the 
charges were based on a single act, different acts in a sin­
gle incident, or different acts in separate incidents. Because 
of that ambiguity, the indictment was insufficient to serve 
its constitutional purposes; it failed to ensure that defen­
dant was tried upon the facts found by the grand jury, and it 
failed to provide adequate notice to defendant of the charges 
against him. The burglary counts illustrate the problem.
	
The indictment charged defendant with two counts 
of first-degree burglary. Both counts alleged that defendant 
entered and remained unlawfully in an apartment with the 
intent to commit a crime. One count alleged that defendant 
intended to commit theft, Count 5, and the other alleged 
that defendant intended to commit menacing, Count 6. The 
indictment did not indicate whether the charges were based 
on the same act or separate acts. As a result, it was not clear 
whether the grand jury had found that defendant entered 
and remained unlawfully two times, with a different intent 
each time, or that defendant entered and remained unlaw­
fully one time, but with two different intents. As mentioned, 
even the district attorney could not tell what the grand jury 
had found. The state took different positions on the issue 
over the course of the trial court proceedings. Before trial, 
the state took the position that the charges were based on 
two incidents, one in the morning and one in the afternoon. 
At trial, however, the state changed its position and asserted 
that the charges were based only on the morning incident.
	
The state’s changing versions of events throughout 
the course of the trial proceedings show that the indictment 
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
433
was defective in substance; it did not provide adequate 
notice of the facts on which the grand jury based the charges 
and, as a result, it failed to ensure that defendant was tried 
based on those facts. Unlike Pachmayr, this is not a case 
where this court can be “satisfied that the grand jury * 
* 
* 
found the facts” on which the defendant was tried. 344 Or at 
495. Indeed, given the multiple versions of events the state 
presented throughout the proceedings in the trial court, it 
is impossible to draw any reasonable conclusions about what 
evidence was presented to the grand jury and what facts it 
found.
	
In addition, because the indictment was ambigu­
ous, it failed to provide defendant with adequate notice “ 
‘of 
the nature and character’ 
” of the crimes charged “ 
‘with suf­
ficient particularity to enable him to make his defense[.]’ 
” 
Wimber, 315 Or at 115 (quoting Smith, 182 Or at 500-01). 
Here, defendant was left to guess what acts the grand jury 
had based the charges on and what theory (or theories) the 
state would pursue. See Warren, 364 Or at 121 n 6 (noting 
that the failure to allege the basis for joinder can impair a 
defendant’s ability to make a defense because it can put the 
defendant in the position of having “to guess as to whether 
charges are based on the same or separate incidents”). In 
addition, because it was not clear what acts the charges 
were based on, the indictment did not provide defendant 
with the information he was entitled to have in order to pro­
tect against the admission of irrelevant or unfairly preju­
dicial evidence of other acts.4 It also failed to provide him 
with the information he was entitled to in order to protect 
against improper joinder. Warren, 364 Or at 121-22 (explain­
ing that allegations of the basis for joining charges is nec­
essary so that the defendant can make “an informed choice 
about whether to demur to the indictment on the ground 
that the allegations are insufficient to support joinder and, 
later, to make an informed decision about whether to move 
	
4  A hypothetical illustrates the problem: If a grand jury finds that a defen­
dant committed multiple crimes during a single incident but issues an indict­
ment that fails to allege the basis for joinder, the defendant will not have the 
information he needs to prevent the state from proceeding on a theory that the 
crimes were committed in multiple incidents, as the district attorney did in this 
case when he amended the indictment, which created a basis for the admission of 
evidence of both incidents.
434	
State v. Haji
to sever on the ground that the evidence is insufficient to 
support joinder”).
	
Looking at the amendment itself also leads to the 
conclusion that the amendment was impermissible. The 
amendment added allegations to the indictment about the 
relationship between the charged crimes. It alleged, among 
other things, that the counts were based on two or more 
acts or transactions. As such, the amendment introduced a 

theory—specifically, that defendant had committed the 
crimes during two different incidents—which the indict­
ment did not reflect and which, given the varying versions 
of events, may not have been the theory on which the grand 
jury based the charges.5 The amendment was significant 
because it provided a basis for the state to introduce evi­
dence of both incidents. In doing so, it reduced the defen­
dant’s ability to exclude potentially prejudicial evidence.
	
Finally, looking to general propositions regarding 
the differences between matters of substance and matters 
of form also leads to the conclusion that the indictment’s 
failure to allege the basis for joinder of the charges was not 
a mere defect in form. In Moyer, this court stated that a mat­
ter that must be “proved as alleged” is a matter of substance. 
	
5  The majority asserts that the joinder allegations added by the district 
attorney did not add any “factual allegations about the crimes.” 366 Or at 386. 
I disagree. Joinder allegations are factual allegations about the charged crimes. 
In order for the grand jury to issue an indictment that charges two offenses, the 
conduct underlying each charge must be related in a way that justifies joinder. 
How the conduct is related (if at all) is a factual question. Is the first charge based 
on the very same act as the second one or were there two separate acts? If there 
were two separate acts, were they related by a common scheme or plan? Those are 
factual questions. When alleged in an indictment, the answers to those questions 
are allegations of historical fact about the charged crimes.
	
Even more importantly, when, as here, it is not clear from the indictment 
whether two charges were based on the same act or different acts and the district 
attorney amends the indictment to allege that they are based on different acts, 
the district attorney is selecting which acts the charges are based on. In Moyer, 
this court held that a district attorney could not amend an indictment to add a 
factual allegation regarding an element, so a district attorney should not be able 
to amend an indictment in a way that can add a criminal act.
	
The majority refers to the joinder allegations as “allegations specifying the 
statutory basis for joinder.” E.g.¸ 366 Or at 386, 399, 411, 419 (emphasis added). 
The permissible bases for joinder are specified by statute, but that does not mean 
that an allegation of a basis for joinder is not an allegation of historical fact. 
Elements of a crime are specified by statute, and allegations of elements are alle­
gations of historical fact.
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
435
76 Or at 400 (citing 22 Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure 
439 (William Mack ed 1906)). The basis for joinder is such a 
matter. If the state joins two or more charges, it must prove 
the basis for joinder in order to obtain convictions on both 
charges. If the state does not present such evidence, the state 
can proceed on only one of the charges. State v. Fitzgerald, 
267 Or 266, 273, 516 P2d 1280 (1973) (holding that, where 
the state failed to prove at trial that the two charged crimes 
were part of the same transaction as alleged, the trial court 
erred in denying defendant’s motion to have the state elect 
between the two crimes). Thus, the basis for joinder is a mat­
ter that must “be proved as alleged.” Moyer, 76 Or at 400. 
For that additional reason, it is a matter of substance.
	
To summarize, I conclude that, under this court’s 
caselaw, the indictment’s failure to allege the basis for join­
der in this case was not a mere defect in form for three inde­
pendent reasons. First, as a result of the failure to allege the 
basis for joinder, the indictment was too ambiguous to serve 
its constitutional purposes. It was not sufficient to ensure 
that defendant would be tried for the acts that the grand 
jury relied on when it approved the prosecution, and it was 
not sufficient to provide defendant with the notice to which 
he was entitled to prepare and present his case. Second, 
the amendment itself was impermissible because it added 
a theory and altered the evidence that could be admitted. 
Third, the failure to allege the basis for joinder was a sub­
stantive defect because the bases for joinder must be proved 
as alleged.
	
Concluding that the grand jury must find and allege 
facts that justify the joinder of charges makes practical 
sense. Whether charges can be joined depends on the rela­
tionship between the acts on which the charges are based. 
Because the grand jury is the entity that determines what 
acts a defendant engaged in, it is in the best position—and 
perhaps the exclusive position—to determine whether the 
acts underlying multiple charges are related in a way that 
justifies joinder. This case illustrates that point. The district 
attorney could not tell what acts the charges were based on 
and, therefore, he was not in a position to make allegations 
about how the acts were related. When the district attor­
ney amended the indictment, he did so based on his own 
436	
State v. Haji
beliefs about what acts defendant had committed (beliefs 
that changed over the course of the case). In doing so, he 
supplanted the grand jury’s findings regarding the defen­
dant’s acts with his own. That was impermissible.6
	
In concluding that the indictment’s failure to allege 
the basis for joinder was a defect in form, the majority relies 
on language in Moyer. 366 Or at 405. But Moyer states that 
“any omission” that prevents an indictment from “showing 
what offense [it] is intended to charge is a defect in matter of 
substance which cannot be cured by amendment,” 76 Or at 
400 (internal quotation omitted), and, here, the ambiguity 
resulting from the failure to allege the basis for joinder was 
such an omission because it prevented the indictment from 
showing what acts the charges were based on. In addition, 
Moyer states that “the power of amendment extends to for­
mal matters which are not essential to the charge and mere 
clerical errors, etc., where the defendant cannot be misled 
or prejudiced,” id. (internal quotation omitted), but here, 
the amendment was prejudicial because it introduced a new 
theory, which may not have been the theory relied on by the 
grand jury.
B.  Historical Analysis
	
An examination of intent underlying the constitu­
tional limitation on a district attorney’s authority to amend 
an indictment also leads to the conclusion that the grand 
jury must find and allege facts sufficient to justify the join­
der of charges. Currently, that limitation is in Article VII 
(Amended), section 5(6), which provides:
	
“An information shall be substantially in the form pro­
vided by law for an indictment. The district attorney may 
file an amended indictment or information whenever, by rul­
ing of the court, an indictment or information is held to be 
defective in form.”
	
6  I note that, if the district attorney did not want to resubmit the case to the 
grand jury to make and allege the findings necessary to join the charges, the dis­
trict attorney could have proceeded by filing a district attorney’s information and 
submitting the case for a preliminary hearing. During the hearing, the magis­
trate would serve as a neutral factfinder, responsible for making the fact findings 
regarding what acts the defendant committed and how they were related, if at 
all.
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
437
(Emphasis added.) As explained below, the limitation was 
added to the constitution as part of an amendment in 1908, 
and it has remained in the constitution unchanged since 
then. The amendment was the result of an initiative petition 
approved by the voters. Consequently, when interpreting the 
amendment, our goal is to ascertain the intent of voters who 
approved it. AAA Oregon/Idaho Auto Source v. Dept. of Rev., 
363 Or 411, 417-18, 423 P3d 71 (2018) (stating that, when 
interpreting the text of a constitutional provision imported 
from a previous version of the provision, this court’s task 
is to determine the intent underlying the previous version); 
Roseburg School Dist. v. City of Roseburg, 316 Or 374, 378, 
851 P2d 595 (1993) (“In interpreting a constitutional provi­
sion adopted through the initiative process, our task is to 
discern the intent of the voters.”). It is their understanding 
of the different roles of grand juries and district attorneys 
that matters.
1.  Pre-1908 constitutional and statutory provisions gov­
erning grand juries and indictments
	
It is useful to begin with a review of the history 
of the state constitutional and statutory provisions gov­
erning grand juries and indictments. When the Oregon 
Constitution was ratified in 1857, it contained a provision, 
Article VII (Original), section 18, that stated:
	
“The Legislative Assembly shall so provide that the 
most competent of the permanent citizens of the county 
shall be chosen for jurors; and out of the whole number in 
attendance at the court, seven shall be chosen by lot as 
grand jurors, five of whom must concur to find an indict­
ment: But the Legislative Assembly may modify or abolish 
grand juries.”
	
In addition to that constitutional provision, the 
state had criminal procedure statutes that governed the ini­
tiation of criminal prosecutions. The statutes were first cod­
ified in 1866 in the Deady Code. Under the codified statutes, 
the only way a person could be charged with a crime in a 
state district or circuit court was by grand jury indictment. 
General Laws of Oregon, Crim Code, ch I, § 5, p 442 (Deady 
1845-1864). In addition, the statutes established require­
ments for, and limitations on, grand juries and indictments. 
438	
State v. Haji
Among other things, the statutes established grand juries’ 
authority and responsibilities. Id. at Crim Code, ch  VI, 

pp 449-51 (powers and duties of grand jury). They also spec­
ified the information that an indictment had to contain and 
provided that, if an indictment did not contain that informa­
tion, a defendant could demur to it, which would result in a 
judgment in the defendant’s favor on the indictment, and the 
charge could only be brought if a new grand jury indictment 
was issued. Id. at Crim Code, ch VII, pp 451-52 (finding and 
presentation of the indictment); Id. at Crim Code, ch VIII, 
pp 453-57 (required content and form of indictments); Id. at 
Crim Code, ch XI, pp 461-63 (demurrers); Id. at Crim Code, 
ch X, pp 460-61 (resubmission to grand jury required after 
successful demurrer or motion to set aside indictment).
	
In 1899, the legislature established an additional 
method for charging a person with a crime; it enacted 
statutes that provided that a person could be charged by 
a district attorney’s information. Or Laws 1899, §§  1-7, 

pp 99-100; The Codes and Statutes of Oregon, title XVIII, 
ch IV, §§ 1258-1264 (Bellinger & Cotton 1901). Thereafter, 
district attorney informations were used to charge even the 
most serious crimes. See, e.g., State v. Blodgett, 50 Or 329, 
331, 92 P 820 (1907) (“The defendant by information of the 
district attorney was charged with the crime of murder in 
the first degree * 
* 
*.”).
	
The use of district attorney informations gave rise 
to concerns about potential abuses of power. Motivated by 
those concerns, citizens filed an initiative petition to amend 
Article VII, section 18, to require grand jury indictments in 
all criminal prosecutions. The initiative was submitted to 
the voters in the June 1908 general election, and the pro­
posed amendment to Article VII, section 18, was set out in 
the Official Voter’s Pamphlet as follows:
	
“Section 18.  The Legislative Assembly shall so pro­
vide that the most competent of the permanent citizens of 
the county shall be chosen for jurors; and out of the whole 
number in attendance at the court, seven shall be chosen 
by lot as grand jurors, five of whom must concur to find 
an indictment. No person shall be charged in any Circuit 
Court with the commission of any crime or misdemeanor 
defined or made punishable by any of the laws of this State, 
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
439
except upon indictment found by a grand jury. Provided, 
however, that any District Attorney may file an amended 
indictment whenever an indictment has, by ruling of the 
court, been held to be defective in form.”
Official Voters’ Pamphlet, General Election, June 1, 1908, 
115 (emphasis in original). As is apparent from its text, the 
purpose of the amendment was to establish, as a constitu­
tional requirement, that no person could be prosecuted for 
a violation of the state’s criminal laws unless a grand jury 
approved the prosecution through an indictment.
	
The proponents of the amendment believed that the 
then-current statutes, which authorized district attorneys 
to charge crimes through informations, vested too much 
power in a single government official and that the power 
could be abused for personal or political reasons. They urged 
voters to approve the amendment in order to guarantee 
that citizens, as grand jurors, played a gatekeeping role in 
the administration of the state’s criminal laws. In the only 
Voters’ Pamphlet statement concerning the amendment, the 
proponents explained:
	
“Under the present law, any district attorney can file 
an information against a man for any crime, from murder 
down. The accused is not entitled of right to any prelimi­
nary hearing and the first he knows of the matter may be 
his arrest. He may never be tried at all, the information or 
indictment may be dismissed, and yet his record is black­
ened. It may be that it is not intended from the start that 
he ever should be tried, but the information is issued to 
serve some political purpose, private revenge or the scheme 
of a ring hostile to the victim. It is un-American. It is too 
much like the despotism of Russia and it is too much power 
to be vested in the hands of any one man. The whole history 
of Anglo-Saxon institutions is a battle against this very 
thing: the power of one man to brand another with crime 
and lodge him in prison. It is a return to the Star Chamber 
decrees of Charles I and the time was when Englishmen 
and Americans thought no time or money thrown away 
which protected every citizen from arbitrary arrest and 
arbitrary arraignment and trial at the will of a single man. 
In England the same jealousy exists today, and no man can 
be brought to trial save on an indictment by a grand jury. 
The fathers of our country were careful to write that into 
440	
State v. Haji
the United States Constitution, but it is not yet an article of 
the State Constitution. The time has come when it should 
be there, for the time will inevitably come when wealth and 
great interests will seek to shut the mouth of every man 
who is against them; and if we may judge the future by the 
past, the powerful interests are apt to control the political 
offices, including the district attorney.
	
“The only argument urged against this amendment is 
that the present plan is cheaper. If the citizens of Oregon 
prefer a few dollars to a great fundamental principle of 
personal liberty, then they certainly do not deserve their 
liberties and they might as well be left open to the whims, 
vengeance, mistakes or political intrigues of any district 
attorney. The citizens of this country will make a great 
mistake if they let go that part of the administration of the 
law which belongs to them through the grand jury and the 
petty jury, and we repeat that this present arbitrary power 
lodged in one man is un-American and dangerous.”
Voters’ Pamphlet at 116-17. Thus, the clear purpose of the 
amendment was to protect the role of grand juries in the 
initiation of criminal prosecutions and to limit the role of 
district attorneys. The voters approved the amendment. See 
Or Laws 1909, p 12 (recording approval). Their approval 
reflects their determination that, as a matter of state con­
stitutional law, grand juries were to be responsible for ini­
tiating prosecutions and that they were to do so through 
indictments.7
	
Because the voters who approved the amendment 
sought to protect the role of grand juries and to require 
indictments, the statutes that governed grand juries and 
indictments at the time shed light on what the voters 
	
7  In 1910, the voters approved another initiative, which replaced Article 
VII (Original), section 18, but did not alter the text at issue in this case, which 
became part of Article VII (Amended), section 5(6). See Oregon Laws 1911, pp 7-8 
(recording approval). In 1974, the voters approved a legislative referral, which 
amended Article VII (Amended), but that amendment did not alter the text at 
issue either. It authorized charging a person with a felony through a preliminary 
hearing before a magistrate. SJR 1 (1973) (referring the measure); Or Laws 1975, 
p 6 (recording approval). As mentioned, because the text at issue has remained 
the same since it was first added to the constitution by the voters in 1908, our 
goal is to ascertain the intent of those voters. 366 Or at 436-37 (Duncan, J., dis­
senting) (citing AAA Oregon/Idaho Auto Source, 363 Or at 417-18, and Roseburg 
School Dist., 316 Or at 378).
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
441
would have understood the role of the grand jury to be, 
including what determinations the grand jury—as opposed 
to the district attorney—was to make. See Pachmayr, 344 
Or at 486 (looking to the statutes in effect in 1908 when 
determining the meaning of “defective in form” in Article 
VII (Amended), section 5(6)). As explained below, the then-
existing criminal procedure statutes required grand juries 
to make certain factual findings in order to perform their 
gatekeeping role; in addition, the statutes required that 
the grand juries’ indictments reflect those findings. Those 
findings included findings about the defendant’s conduct, 
which were relevant to the elements of the charged crime. 
But, they were not limited to those findings. They also 
included findings about the time and location of the per­
son’s conduct, which were relevant to whether the grand 
jury could issue an indictment, given the applicable statute 
of limitations and the grand jury’s jurisdiction. And, they 
included findings about whether the person’s conduct con­
stituted one crime or more than one crime; if it constituted 
more than one crime, the grand jury had to issue separate 
indictments for each crime.
	
Regarding a person’s conduct, the statutes autho­
rized a grand jury “to inquire of crimes committed or triable 
within the county from which [it was] selected.” The Codes 
and Statutes of Oregon, title XVIII, ch V, § 1265 (Bellinger 
& Cotton 1901). If a grand jury determined what conduct 
the person had engaged in, but was unsure whether that 
conduct constituted a crime, the grand jury could make a 
“presentment of the facts” to the court and ask the court 
to instruct it on the law. Id. at § 1279. Grand jurors were 
to issue an indictment when “all the evidence before them, 
taken together, [was] such as in their judgment would, if 
unexplained or uncontradicted, warrant a conviction by the 
trial jury.” Id. at §  1284. The indictment had to contain, 
among other things, “[a] statement of the acts constituting 
the offense in ordinary and concise language, without repe­
tition, and in such manner as to enable a person of common 
understanding to know what [was] intended.” Id. at § 1303. 
In addition, in order for an indictment to be sufficient, “the 
act or omission charged as the crime [had to be] clearly and 
distinctly set forth.” Id. at § 1314.
442	
State v. Haji
	
Regarding the time the crime was committed, the 
statutes provided that, although the indictment usually did 
not need to allege the precise time the crime was committed, 
it did need to allege that the crime was committed within 
the applicable statute of limitations. Specifically, § 1309 of 
those statutes provided:
	
“The precise time at which the crime was committed 
need not be stated in the indictment, but it may be alleged 
to have been committed at any time before the finding 
thereof, and within the time in which an action may be 
commenced therefor, except where time is a material ingre­
dient in the crime.”
The statutes also provided that a grand jury could make 
a presentment of facts to the court and request that the 
court instruct them on the law, so that they could deter­
mine whether the conduct “had ceased to be punishable 
by reason of lapse of time.” Id. at § 1279. If a grand jury 
issued an indictment, the indictment had to reflect that “the 
crime was committed at some time prior to the finding of 
the indictment, and within the time limited by law for the 
commencement of an action therefor.” Id. at § 1314.
	
Regarding the location of the crime, the statutes 
provided that a grand jury had authority “to inquire of 
crimes committed or triable within the county from which 
they [were] selected.” Id. at § 1265 (defining jurisdiction of 
grand jury); id. at §  1277 (providing that grand jury has 
the power to “inquire into all crimes committed or triable in 
the county”); see also id. at § 1271 (requiring grand jurors 
to take an oath to inquire into crimes “committed or tri­
able within this county”). The statutes also provided that, 
to be sufficient, an indictment had to reflect that “the crime 
was committed within the jurisdiction of the court, except 
where, as provided by law, the act, though done without the 
county in which the court is held, is triable therein.” Id. at 
§ 1314.
	
Finally, the statutes provided that an indictment 
could not charge more than one crime. Specifically, § 1308 
stated, “The indictment must charge by one crime, and in 
one form only; except that where the crime may be com­
mitted by use of different means the indictment may allege 
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
443
the means in the alternative.” Accordingly, the statutes 
required that an indictment include “a statement of the acts 
constituting the offense,” id. at § 1303, and referred to “the 
offense” or “the crime” in the singular, e.g., id. at §§ 1309, 
1314.
	
Together, the statutes governing grand juries and 
indictments show that the grand jury was the entity respon­
sible for making findings about what acts a person had com­
mitted, when and where the person had committed the acts, 
and how the acts were related, specifically, whether the acts 
constituted one or more crimes. That the grand jury was 
responsible for those findings was consistent with its gate­
keeping role because the determinations protected against 
improper prosecutions. They protected against prosecutions 
that were not supported by sufficient evidence, that were 
time-barred, that could not be brought in the county where 
the grand jury was seated, and that violated the limit on the 
number of charges that could be litigated together.
	
In addition, the criminal procedure statutes pro­
vided a mechanism through which a defendant could stop 
a prosecution if an indictment did not reflect that the 
grand jury had made the findings necessary to issue a 
proper indictment. That mechanism was a demurrer. Id. at 

§ 1355 - 1365. The grounds for a demurrer were set out in 
§ 1357, which provided:
	
“The defendant may demur to the indictment when it 
appears upon the face thereof either,—
	
“1.  That the grand jury by which it was found had not 
legal authority to inquire into the crime charged because 
the same is not triable within the county;
	
“2.  That it does not substantially conform to the 
requirements of chapter VIII of title XVIII of this code;
	
“3.  That more than one crime is charged in the 
indictment;
	
“4.  That the facts stated do not constitute a crime;
	
“5.  That the indictment contains any matter which, if 
true, would constitute a legal justification or excuse of the 
crime charged, or other legal bar to the action.”
444	
State v. Haji
Thus, a defendant could demur to an indictment for several 
reasons, including that the indictment did not substantially 
comply with the statutes governing the form and contents 
of an indictment, one of which provided that an indictment 
could charge only one crime. If a defendant demurred to an 
indictment, the trial court was required to “give judgment, 
either allowing or disallowing [the demurrer]” and to enter an 
entry in the journal “to that effect.” Id. at § 1360. If the court 
allowed the demurrer, “the judgment [was] final upon the 
indictment,” unless the court determined “that the objection 
on which the demurrer [had been] allowed may be avoided in 
a new indictment” and directed “the case to be resubmitted 
to the same or another grand jury.” Id. at § 1361.
	
Of particular relevance here, a defendant could 
demur to an indictment on the ground that it did not comply 
with the statutory limit on the number of charges that could 
be brought. Stated differently, a defendant could demur to an 
indictment on the ground that it improperly joined charges. 
If the defendant was correct, then the trial court had to 
allow the demurrer and enter a judgment on the indict­
ment in the defendant’s favor. Then, if the court determined 
that the defect could be avoided in a new indictment, the 
court could direct that the case be resubmitted to the same 
or another grand jury. All of that is significant because it 
indicates that the grand jury was the entity responsible for 
making the findings relevant to the number of crimes that 
could be charged in an indictment. In turn, that indicates 
that, in 1908, when the voters amended the constitution 
to protect the role of the grand jury and eliminate district 
attorney informations, they intended that the grand jury—
not the district attorney—would make such findings. And, 
as explained in the following section, the contemporaneous 
case law bears that out.
2.  Pre-1908 cases concerning the limit on the number of 
crimes charged
	
Cases decided before 1908 show that an indictment 
had to reflect that the grand jury had made the determina­
tions necessary to charge the proper number of crimes, which 
at the time was one. That requirement was the basis for a 
rule, repeated in several cases, that, if a statute defining a 
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
445
crime included a disjunctive list of acts that could constitute 
the crime, an indictment alleging more than one of those 
acts had to list the acts in the conjunctive. State of Oregon v. 
Dale, 8 Or 229, 231 (1880); State of Oregon v. Bergman, 6 Or 
341, 344 (1877); State of Oregon v. Carr, 6 Or 133, 134 (1876). 
As this court stated in Carr, “When the statute makes it 
a crime to do this or that, mentioning several things dis­
junctively, the indictment may, as a general rule, embrace 
the whole in a single count, but it must use the conjunctive 
‘and’ where ‘or’ occurs in the statute[.]” 6 Or at 134. In other 
words, an indictment could allege multiple acts, but only if 
the acts were alleged to have been committed as part of a 
single crime. Thus, the indictment had to reflect a determi­
nation that the acts were related in a way that allowed them 
to be joined in a single indictment.
	
State v. Clark, 46 Or 140, 80 P 101 (1905), is illus­
trative. In Clark, a grand jury indicted the defendants for 
first-degree theft and the indictment alleged that the defen­
dants stole one horse belonging to one person and two horses 
belonging to another person. The defendants demurred to 
the indictment on the ground that it charged more than 
one offense, in violation of the statutory limit. The trial 
court disallowed the demurrer and this court affirmed. It 
explained that “the stealing of articles belonging to two or 
more persons at the same time and place constitute[d] but 
one offense, and may so be charged in an indictment,” id. at 
141-42, provided that the indictment alleged that the arti­
cles were taken “at the same time and place,” id. at 142. This 
court held that the indictment in the case “sufficiently com­
plie[d] with the rule, by alleging that the articles belonging 
to the persons named were, as a matter of fact, stolen at 
the same time and place, and by the same act.” Id. (empha­
sis added). Notably, this court explained that alleging that 
the articles were stolen on the same date and in the same 
county would not have been sufficient; the indictment had 
to allege that the horses had been stolen “at one and the 
same time.” Id. Thus, Clark shows that, if an indictment 
alleged multiple acts, it had to include an allegation that 
the acts were related in a way that justified charging them 
in a single indictment; it also shows that that allegation was 
an allegation of historical fact. The nature of that allegation 
446	
State v. Haji
indicates that it was for the grand jury to make; it depended 
on the grand jury’s findings about what the defendants had 
actually done. See Warren, 364 Or at 115 (stating that, “for 
more than one hundred years, Oregon law has limited the 
number of offenses that can be charged in a single charging 
instrument and has required that charging instruments 
allege facts sufficient to demonstrate compliance with those 
limits”) (emphasis added).
	
State v. Fiester, 32 Or 254, 50 P 561 (1897), also 
indicates that whether multiple acts can be charged in a 
single indictment is a matter for the grand jury. In Fiester, 
the defendant was charged with first-degree murder, and 
the indictment alleged that he had committed multiple acts 
against the victim. The acts were alleged in the conjunc­
tive. Specifically, the indictment alleged that defendant “did 
then and there * 
* 
* kill [the victim], by then and there beat­
ing her with his fists, and by choking her, and by pushing 
and dragging her into the water, and holding her under the 
water, whereby she was drowned.” Id. at 255-56. The defen­
dant demurred to the indictment, and the trial court disal­
lowed the demurrer. On appeal, this court affirmed on the 
ground that the grand jury could charge multiple acts in a 
single indictment if the grand jury found, based on the evi­
dence before it, that the acts were part of the charged crime; 
it explained:
“the means [by which the murder was committed] being 
known to the grand jury, it was proper to allege them con­
junctively, for it may have been that, in consequence of the 
alleged beating and choking of the deceased, the defendant 
was enabled to drag her to and hold her under water, until 
life was extinct; and if such were the case, and the facts 
were known to the grand jury, all these acts constituted the 
means by which the deed was accomplished.”
Id. at 259 (emphasis added). That explanation indicates that 
it was the grand jury’s role to determine whether multiple 
acts could be charged together and, if so, to allege them in a 
manner that reflected that it had made that determination.
	
The cases just discussed—which predate the 1908 
amendment and, therefore, provide context for the amend­
ment, Coultas v. City of Sutherlin, 318 Or 584, 589-90, 871 
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
447
P2d 465 (1994) (examining earlier case law construing ini­
tiated constitutional amendment in question)—all concern 
whether multiple acts could be alleged in a single indict­
ment. That is because, at the time, the statutory limit on 
the number of crimes that could be charged in a single 
indictment was one and there were no exceptions to that 
limit. Since then, exceptions have been added to allow for 
joinder of crimes. In 1933, an exception was added to allow 
for the joinder of crimes that were based on “the same act 
or transaction.” Or Laws 1933, ch 40, § 1. Then, in 1989, 
two more exceptions were added, one for joinder of crimes 
that were “[b]ased on two or more acts or transactions con­
nected together or constituting parts of a common scheme 
or plan,” and another for crimes that were “[o]f the same or 
similar character.” Or Laws 1989, ch 842, § 1. Although the 
pre-1908 cases do not address joinder of crimes under those 
exceptions, they establish a basic rule—specifically, that a 
grand jury must make and allege the findings necessary to 
charge the proper number of crimes—that leads to the con­
clusion that a grand jury must make the findings necessary 
to join crimes in a single indictment.
	
Given the criminal procedure statutes and the case 
law that existed in 1908, the voters, who amended the con­
stitution to protect the grand jury’s role and limit the district 
attorney’s role, would have intended that a grand jury—not 
a district attorney—make the determinations necessary to 
show that crimes were properly joined. Consequently, they 
would not have regarded the failure to allege the basis for 
joinder as a “defect in form” that a district attorney could 
fix. Under the criminal procedure statutes in effect at the 
time, if an indictment failed to allege the basis for joining 
multiple acts, the indictment was insufficient and a defen­
dant could demurrer to it. Dale, 8 Or at 231 (stating that if 
an indictment charged a defendant with multiple acts in the 
disjunctive, the indictment was “bad”). If the defendant did, 
the defendant was entitled to a judgment on the indictment. 
See State v. Jarvis, 18 Or 360, 361, 23 P 251 (1890) (stating 
that, if an indictment is “bad” and “if the objection be taken 
by demurrer at the proper time, it must prevail”); State v. 
Hinkle, 33 Or 93, 54 P 155 (1898) (stating that, if a defen­
dant demurred to an indictment on the ground that it did 
448	
State v. Haji
not comply with the statutory limit on the number of crimes 
that could be charged, “the objection to the pleading [was] 
not waived by a plea of not guilty, nor [was] the error cured 
by a judgment of conviction”). The fact that a defendant could 
successfully demur to an indictment on the ground that it 
failed to allege the basis for joining multiple acts further 
indicates that the failure was not a “defect in form.” See The 
Codes and Statutes of Oregon, title XVIII, ch VIII, § 1315 
(Bellinger & Cotton 1901) (providing that no proceeding or 
judgment could be affected by defect in form that did not 
prejudice a defendant’s substantial rights). To the contrary, 
it was a failure related to the required contents of the indict­
ment and, as such, it was a “defect in substance.”8
	
The criminal procedure statutes that existed in 
1908 support that view. They indicate that “form” was used 
to describe the basic structure of a pleading, that is, how the 
required allegations were to be set out. Indeed, the statutes 
included a sample “form of indictment” that could be used 
as a template, as well an appendix with additional sample 
indictments for charging particular crimes. The Codes and 
Statutes of Oregon, title XVIII, ch VIII, § 1304-05 (Bellinger 
& Cotton 1901).9 The statutes allowed for some varia­
tion in form but did not allow for the omission of required 
	
8  In concluding that the failure to allege the basis for joinder is a defect in 
form, the majority relies on the fact that a defendant could waive the right to 
have the allegation in the indictment. The majority cites cases that hold that, if a 
defendant does not demur to an indictment on the ground that it violates the stat­
utory limit on the number of crimes that could be charged, the defendant waives 
that objection. 366 Or at 418. Those cases concern preservation. They do not alter 
the fact that a defendant has a right to have the allegation in an indictment or 
the fact that, if the defendant does demur to the indictment, he or she is entitled 
to a judgment on the indictment in his or her favor.
	
9  Dictionaries of the time, including those cited by the majority, are consis­
tent with view of “form.” For example, Abbott’s definition of “form” provides:
“The shape or structure of a thing, as distinguished from the material of 
which it is composed; mode of arrangement. In law, most frequently an estab­
lished method or practice; a fixed way of proceeding; a formula. A model of 
an instrument; a pleading or other legal proceeding, containing the essential 
requisites so arranged as to be used in accordance with the laws, is frequently 
termed a form; or, where a legal proceeding is pursued in the manner and 
order required by law, it is said to be in proper form.”
Benjamin Vaughan Abbott, 1 Dictionary of Terms and Phrases Used in American 
or English Jurisprudence 516 (1987) (emphasis added). Similarly, Bouvier’s defines 
“form,” in part, as, “[t]he model of an instrument or legal proceeding, containing 
the substance and the principle terms to be used in accordance with the laws.” 
Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020)	
449
allegations. Because an allegation of the basis for joinder is 
required, Carr, 6 Or at 134; Dale, 8 Or at 231; Warren, 364 Or 
105, 121-22, the failure to include such an allegation when 
charging multiple acts or crimes, is not a defect in form.
IV.  CONCLUSION
	
To summarize, I conclude that allegations of the 
basis for joining charges—including those phrased in the 
language of the joinder statute—are factual allegations con­
cerning the charged crimes. For example, an allegation that 
two charged crimes are based on two transactions consti­
tuting parts of a common scheme or plan is an allegation of 
historical fact. It depends on the grand jury’s factual find­
ings about the acts underlying each charge and it is itself a 
factual finding about the relationship between the acts. As 
such, it is within the exclusive fact-finding province of the 
grand jury. Consequently, it is not an allegation that can be 
added to an indictment by a district attorney.
	
Moreover, in this case, the indictment’s failure to 
allege facts sufficient to support the joinder of charges is not 
a defect in “form” for the purposes of Article VII (Amended), 
section 5(6). Whether a defect is a defect in form or a defect 
in substance depends on whether, despite the defect, the 
indictment is sufficient to serve its constitutional purposes. 
Here, as a result of the failure to allege the basis for join­
ing the charges, the indictment was ambiguous. Even the 
district attorney could not tell what acts the charges were 
based on. Consequently, the indictment failed to ensure that 
defendant was tried based on the facts found by the grand 
jury and failed to provide defendant with the notice to which 
he was entitled in order to respond to the charges.
	
Finally, the indictment’s failure to allege the basis 
for joinder is not the type of amendment that fits within 
John Bouvier, 1 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 881 (1897). And, one of the definitions 
of “form” in Black’s is:
“A model or skeleton of an instrument to be used in a judicial proceeding, 
containing the principal necessary matters, the proper technical terms or 
phrases, and whatever else is necessary to make it formally correct, arranged 
in proper order, and capable of being adopted to the circumstances of the spe­
cific case.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 510 (1st ed 1891).
450	
State v. Haji
the district attorney’s constitutionally limited authority to 
amend an indictment. The constitutional limit, first enacted 
in 1908, was intended to protect the role of the grand jury, 
which—at the time the limit was imposed—already included 
finding and alleging facts sufficient to show that the indict­
ment did not allege more crimes than the law permitted 
within a single indictment.
	
For those reasons, I would conclude that the trial 
court erred in allowing the prosecutor to amend the indict­
ment in this case, and I respectfully dissent from the major­
ity’s opinion concluding otherwise.