Case Title: STATE OF WYOMING ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION V. TED G. SLAYMAKER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-198

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-04-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE OF WYOMING ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION V. TED G. SLAYMAKER2007 WY 65156 P.3d 977Case Number: 06-198Decided: 04/25/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY 
AND COMPENSATION DIVISION,

 
 
Appellant

(Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
TED G. 
SLAYMAKER,

 
 
Appellee

(Petitioner).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLincolnCounty

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Steven 
Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kristi M. Radosevich, Assistant 
Attorney General.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

David M. 
Gosar of Gosar Law Office, Jackson, Wyoming.                   

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Mr. Slaymaker 
injured his back at work, but the Worker's Compensation Division (Division) 
denied benefits because it concluded his injuries were pre-existing.  After a contested case hearing, the 
Office of Administrative Hearings (the OAH) granted benefits for a torn muscle 
and ligament damage in Mr. Slaymaker's lower back, but denied benefits for his 
pre-existing bulging discs, annular 
tears and facet arthropathy.  
The district court reversed the OAH decision, concluding Mr. 
Slaymaker had proven his pre-existing back condition was materially aggravated 
by the work-related accident.    

 
 
[¶2]      On appeal, we 
conclude the record contains uncontroverted evidence that Mr. Slaymaker's 
pre-existing condition was materially aggravated by his work-related injury and 
the OAH's finding to the contrary is not supported by substantial evidence.  Furthermore, the OAH's conclusion that 
Mr. Slaymaker did not meet his burden of proof was arbitrary and capricious.1  Consequently, we affirm the district 
court's decision reversing the OAH's denial of benefits for aggravation of Mr. 
Slaymaker's pre-existing condition.     

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      The Division 
phrases the appellate issue as:

 
 

            
Whether the Office of Administrative Hearing[s'] decision awarding 
benefits for an acute injury but denying benefits for a preexisting injury is 
supported by substantial evidence? 

 
 
Mr. 
Slaymaker generally agrees with the Division's statement of the issue, but also 
adds a second issue:

 
 
Did the 
hearing examiner err as a matter of law when he concluded that Mr. Slaymaker's 
treating physician failed to adequately support his case?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      Mr. Slaymaker 
was employed by Union Telephone Company (Union) 
as a heating and air conditioning technician.  On May 29, 2003, he traveled to a remote 
cell phone tower near Smoot, 
Wyoming to service equipment 
located at the site.  The tower site 
could not be accessed by passenger vehicle, so Mr. Slaymaker used a four-wheel 
all-terrain vehicle (ATV) to travel from the road to the site.  He transported the ATV using a trailer 
pulled behind a pickup truck.  

 
 
[¶5]      Mr. Slaymaker 
completed his work at the site and returned to the pickup truck.  He loaded the ATV on the trailer, 
secured it with tie-down straps and proceeded to drive down the mountain 
road.  As he drove, Mr. Slaymaker 
noticed one of the tie-down straps had broken, allowing the ATV to roll forward 
and lodge between the trailer and the pickup truck.  Mr. Slaymaker attempted to push the ATV, 
which weighed approximately 400 pounds, back on the trailer when it slipped and 
crushed him against the truck.   

 
 
[¶6]      After Mr. 
Slaymaker repositioned and secured the ATV, he called another Union employee and 
told him what had happened.  The 
next day, which was a Friday, Mr. Slaymaker was stiff and suffering from an 
aching back.  He reported the injury 
to his supervisor and filed a worker's compensation claim.  The next Monday, June 1, 2003, Mr. 
Slaymaker drove to Colorado to work at another site.  When he returned home that evening, he 
was in a great deal of pain and his wife had to assist him out of the 
truck.   Mr. Slaymaker sought 
medical treatment for his lower back pain, but the treatment was not successful 
and he has not been able to return to work since June 1, 2003.    

 
 
[¶7]      The Division 
denied Mr. Slaymaker's request for worker's compensation benefits because he 
suffered from a pre-existing condition in his lower back.  Mr. Slaymaker objected to the Division's 
final determination, and a hearing examiner for the OAH conducted a contested 
case hearing.  The hearing examiner 
awarded benefits for treatment  
of  a torn muscle and 
ligament damage in Mr. Slaymaker's lumbar spine, but denied benefits for 
treatment of bulging discs, annular tears and facet arthropathy (a degenerative 
condition), finding those conditions were pre-existing and had not been 
materially aggravated by the May 2003 injury.      

 
 
[¶8]      Mr. Slaymaker 
filed a petition for review of the OAH decision.  The district court reversed the OAH 
decision, ruling the agency's "conclusion that Mr. Slaymaker[] did not meet his 
burden of proving that his preexisting condition was aggravated by work 
conditions was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion and not in 
accordance with the law."  The 
Division appealed to this Court.    

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]      "When 
considering an appeal from a district court's review of agency action, we accord 
no special deference to the district court's conclusions.   Instead, we review the case  as if it had come directly to us from 
the administrative agency.'"  Newman v. State ex. rel Wyo. Workers' Safety 
and Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 7, 49 P.3d 163, 166 (Wyo. 2002) quoting French v. Amax Coal West, 960 P.2d 1023, 
1027 (Wyo. 1998) (citation omitted).

 
 
[¶10]   Upon appeal from a contested case 
hearing where both parties have presented evidence, we apply the substantial 
evidence standard to review the agency's findings of fact.  Robbins v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2003 WY 29, ¶ 18, 64 P.3d 729, 732 (Wyo. 
2003).  Substantial evidence is more 
than a scintilla of evidence.  It 
consists of relevant evidence a reasonable mind might accept in support of the 
agency's conclusions.   
Id.

 
 
[¶11]   When the agency concludes the 
claimant did not meet his burden of proof, we apply the arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review.  Boyce v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2005 WY 9, ¶ 6, 
105 P.3d 451, 454 (Wyo. 2005).  

 
 
Under 
the arbitrary, capricious and abuse of discretion standard, we are charged with 
examining the entire record.  In our 
examination and review of a hearing examiner's determination, we defer to the 
hearing examiner's findings of fact.  
We will examine conflicting and contradictory evidence to see if the 
hearing examiner reasonably could have made its findings based on all the 
evidence before it.  The findings of 
fact may include determinations of witness credibility, as the hearing examiner 
is charged with determining the credibility of the witnesses.  In our review, we will not overturn the 
hearing examiner's determinations regarding witness credibility unless they are 
clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.  

 
 

Brees v. 
Gulley Enters., Inc., 6 P.3d 128, 132 (Wyo. 2000) (citations omitted).   

 
 
[¶12]   An administrative agency's 
conclusions of law are not entitled to the same deference as its factual 
findings.  We review an agency's 
conclusions of law de novo, and 
"[w]e will affirm an agency's legal conclusion only if it is in accordance with 
the law.'"  Diamond B Servs., Inc. v. Rohde, 2005 WY 
130, ¶ 12, 120 P.3d 1031, 1038 (Wyo. 2005), quoting DC Prod. Serv. v. Wyo. Dep't of Employment, 
2002 WY 142, ¶ 7, 54 P.3d 768, 771 (Wyo. 2002).  

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
[¶13]   A worker's compensation claimant 
has the burden of proving all of the essential elements of his claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence.   
Sanchez v. State ex. rel. Wyo. 
Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2006 WY 64, ¶ 7, 134 P.3d 1255, 1257 (Wyo. 
2006).  "This burden includes 
establishing the cause of the condition for which compensation is claimed and 
proving that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment."  Hanks v. City of Casper, 2001 WY 4, ¶ 
6, 16 P.3d 710, 711 (Wyo. 2001).  See also, State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div. v. Espinoza, 924 P.2d 979, 
981 (Wyo. 
1996).  Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 27-14-102(a)(xi)(F) (LexisNexis 2005) of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Act, the definition of a compensable injury "does not include any injury or 
condition preexisting at the time employment begins with the employer against 
whom a claim is made."  Boyce, ¶ 10, 105 P.3d at 454-55;  Lindbloom v. Teton Int'l, 684 P.2d 1388, 
1389 (Wyo. 
1984).  However, "[i]f an employee 
suffers from a preexisting condition, that employee may still recover if his 
employment substantially or materially aggravates that condition."  Boyce, ¶ 10, 105 P.3d  at 455.  1 Larson's Workmen's Compensation 
Law § 12.20, 273-276 explains 
this legal principle in greater detail:  

 
 
Preexisting 
disease or infirmity of the employee does not disqualify a claim under the 
"arising out of employment" requirement if the employment aggravated, 
accelerated, or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce the death or 
disability for which compensation is sought.  

 
 

See 
also, 
Lindbloom, 684 P.2d  at 1389 (holding 
"in Wyoming an 
employer takes the employee as he finds him").   

 
 
[¶14]   In Boyce, we described the proof required 
to show a work-related aggravation of a preexisting 
condition.

 
 
[O]ur 
case law requiring a claimant to show his or her employment "materially or 
substantially aggravated" the preexisting injury does not require expert medical 
testimony specifically using the words "substantial or material."   Rather, what our cases require is 
that the claimant show that work activities, rather than the natural progression 
of the condition, factors associated with ordinary daily living or some other 
non-work related factor, significantly aggravated the preexisting 
condition.  The nexus between work 
activities and the aggravation ordinarily will be shown through expert opinion 
testimony.  That is, expert medical 
testimony ordinarily will be required to establish the link between the 
worsening of the medical condition and the claimant's work activities, rather 
than some other factor.  The 
materiality of the nexus ordinarily will be shown through evidence of the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the employment.  Stated simply, the claimant is required 
to prove by a preponderance of all of the evidence that the work activities were 
a significant factor in the worsening of the preexisting 
condition.

 
 
¶16, 
105 P.3d  at 456.   See also, Salas v. Gen. Chem., 2003 WY 79, ¶ 10, 
71 P.3d 708, 711 (Wyo. 2003).  

 
 
[¶15]   In the case at bar, there is no 
question that Mr. Slaymaker suffered from a pre-existing condition, including 
bulging discs, annular tears and facet arthropathy in his lower back.2  The hearing examiner's findings of fact 
described Mr. Slaymaker's history of low back problems: 

 
 

8.                  
The 
evidence shows that on October 24, 2000, Dr. Noe diagnosed the Claimant as 
suffering from fibromyalgia and possible depression (Exhibit 00027).  The diagnosis of fibromyalgia by its 
very definition is a chronic pain condition.

 
 

9.                  
That 
on November, 30, 2001, the Claimant saw Dr. Noe again complaining of low back 
and mid back pain.  Dr. Noe 
diagnosed him as suffering from low back pain, thoracic pain and probable facet 
syndrome (Exhibit 00024).  

 
 

10.             
In 
January and March of 2002, the Claimant complained of ongoing low back pain and 
underwent lumbar medial branch blocks in order to better discover the cause of 
his pain (Exhibits 000060, 000062).

 
 

11.             
On 
March 29, 2002, the Claimant was referred by Dr. Noe to Dr. Rosenthal.  Under the history section of Dr. 
Rosenthal's report, he indicated that the Claimant's pain is usually most 
pronounced in the evening and tends to be aggravated with coughing, standing and 
lying down.  Dr. Rosenthal indicated 
that the Claimant continued to require the use of oral opiates for his pain 
control.  Dr. Rosenthal discussed 
Claimant's treatment options with him, and it was decided that the Claimant 
would proceed with a medial branch radiofrequency to treat his pain.  Dr. Rosenthal indicated that the average 
duration of pain relief is 6 to 18 months.

 
 

12.             
On 
June 3, 2002, Dr. Rosenthal ordered the Claimant to undergo a Lumbar 
Discogram.  The Diagnostic Imaging 
Report indicated that the Claimant had a herniated disc at L4-5 and facet joint 
arthropathy more specifically [at] L1-L2. (Exhibit 000076) .  . . . IMPRESSION:  (1) These discograms between L3 and S1 
show that the most significant abnormality is the herniated disc at L4-5 from 
midline over to the left, that could irritate the exiting L5 
root.

 
 

13.             
On 
June 24, 2002, the Claimant saw Dr. Berry of the Intermountain Spine Institute for 
evaluation.  Dr. Berry [n]oted that 
the Claimant has had pain and discomfort for the last year and a half after 
working on the job lifting, twisting and bending.  Dr. Berry noted that the Claimant had been through 
a tremendous amount of non-operative treatment.  Dr. Berry also noted that the Claimant was poorly 
conditioned and overweight.  The 
Claimant described his pain as in the low back and then up around L2-3 with 
radiating pain down both legs, worse on the left than on the right.  Dr. Berry ordered a lumbar MRI (Exhibit 
00087).

 
 

14.             
On 
March 17, 2003, the Claimant returned to see Dr. Noe and continued to complain 
of lower back pain.  In his note, 
Dr. Noe indicated that the Claimant's back pain had not changed in location over 
the last month and it was very similar to the back pain he had in the past.  Dr. Noe also noted that the Claimant's 
back pain was managed for a while by Dr. Rosenthal and seemed to improve after 
epidural steroid injections (Exhibit 000024).

 
 
The 
hearing examiner's findings pertaining to Mr. Slaymaker's medical treatment 
after the May 29, 2003, injury were: 

 
 

15.             
On 
June 6, 2003, Dr. Gardner's note indicated that the Claimant has a history of 
back pain for years and that he had had multiple epidurals.    

 
 

16.             
The 
Claimant again saw Dr. Gardner on June 24, 2003.  An MRI scan was ordered which showed 
bulging of the discs at L4-5 and L5-S1 with a small annular tear at L4-5 as well 
as facet arthropathy in the low back.  
. . . Dr. Gardner reviewed the films and stated there was not a surgical 
lesion that he could detect on the MRI scan, certainly Ted is having a lot of 
pain, but I think it is more probable that it is torn muscle and possible 
ligament damage . . . which is something that we cannot help with surgery.  (Exhibit 000088) (emphasis 
omitted).  

 
 

17.             
Dr. 
Gardner stated in a letter to the Claimant's attorney dated December 2, 
2004:

 
 

(A)              
Dr. 
Gardner last saw Claimant in late October of 2002 for treatment of his low back 
pain;

 
 

(B)              
Claimant 
had had low back pain for at least two years and it had gotten progressively 
worse; 

 
 

(C)             
On 
the October 24, 2002 visit, Dr. Gar[d]ner did identify that Claimant had a left 
L4-5 disc protrusion;

 
 

(D)             
The 
Claimant continued to show protrusion of the L4-5 disc as of the date of his 
letter;

 
 

(E)              
Claimant 
had a preexisting condition;

 
 

(F)              
Claimant's 
new subjective pain and injury was directly related to the injury in question of 
May 29, 2003;

 
 

(G)             
Claimant's 
back had previous degenerative changes;

 
 

(H)             
Claimant's 
preexisting changes had been exacerbated by the new injury of May 29, 2003; 

 
 

(I)                 
50% 
of Claimant's back pain was due to preexisting conditions and 50% was due to the 
aggravation injury of May 29, 2003.  
(Exhibit U1-U2).  

 
 
[¶16]   The hearing examiner ruled the 
opinions expressed in Dr. Gardner's letter did not establish Mr. Slaymaker had 
suffered a compensable aggravation of his pre-existing lower back condition in 
the ATV incident.  The agency order 
stated: "Dr. Gardner did not 
say that the Claimant had suffered a material aggravation of his pre-existing 
condition.  Stating one suffers an 
aggravation is not good enough."  
(emphasis in original).  The 
hearing examiner, therefore, concluded treatment of Mr. Slaymaker's acute 
injury, including torn muscle and possible ligament damage, was compensable, but 
treatment for his pre-existing lower back condition, including bulging discs, 
annular tears and facet arthropathy, was not compensable.    

 
 
[¶17]   After reviewing the record in 
accordance with our standard of review, we conclude the hearing examiner's 
findings do not accurately reflect Dr. Gardner's opinions.  In his December 2, 2004, letter to Mr. 
Slaymaker's attorney, Dr. Gardner reviewed Mr. Slaymaker's treatments both 
before and after the ATV accident.  
The doctor stated, before the accident, Mr. Slaymaker  had undergone several treatments for his 
lower back pain and he had a disc protrusion at L4-5.  With regard to Mr. Slaymaker's 
post-accident situation, the doctor stated:

 
 
Approximately 
eight months later Mr. Slaymaker did come back to the office and had indicated 
to us that he was involved in a Workman's Comp injury where he was bringing a 
4-wheeler up from a dirt road onto a truck when one of the tire straps broke and 
the 4-wheeler became lodged between the truck and the trailer.  He had to pull this back up by himself, 
and at that point in time he developed new back pain.  He has continued to be treated in this 
office since June of 2003, his accident actually occurred on May 29, 2003.  He has continued to be treated 
conservatively, without any surgical intervention.  He has not been terribly impressed with 
wanting to proceed with surgery, and I have agreed with this treatment program 
for him.  He has not undergone any 
aggressive surgical means, and unfortunately he has continued with aggravating 
back pain, as well as subjective numbness, tingling, and on occasion weakness of 
his lower extremities.  He does 
continue to show a protrusion of the L4-5 disc.  He could certainly be having discogenic 
pain, although a discogram since the new accident has not been performed to show 
any concordant pain.  I think that 
clearly riding on unpaved, bumpy, dirt roads aggravates his back pain.  My impression is that although he had 
previous pain, he was back performing his job prior to May 29, 2003, with good 
success.

 
 
In 
regards to your questions;  I do 
feel that Mr. Slaymaker, based on his history, has had preexisting conditions, 
but I feel that these were quiescent prior to his May 29, 2003 
accident.  I do feel that his 
new subjective pain and injury is directly related to the injury in question of 
May 29, 2003.  According to Mr. 
Slaymaker's history, this would be a Worker's Compensation injury, although, 
because his back had previous degenerative changes with some obvious treatment 
being required, I would indicate that he did have pre-existing conditions and 
this has now been exacerbated by his new injury of May 29, 
2003.

 
 
In 
regards to your letter indicating the division has determined that Mr. Slaymaker 
did not suffer a back injury, or even a material aggravation or exacerbation of 
a pre-existing condition on May 29, 2003, I do not agree with this 
position.  I do agree that he did 
have some pre-existing condition concerning his low back, but this has clearly 
been aggravated and exacerbated by the events of May 29, 2003.  

 
 
I 
feel at this point he is now almost a year and a half out from the injury in 
question.  He has had good 
conservative care, and he continues to have pain in his low back.  I would agree without any further 
surgical intervention that he is at maximal medical improvement in regards to 
his back.  However, in regard to 
apportionment of any causation, I would have to apportion 50% to pre-existing 
conditions, as well as 50% to the aggravation injury of May 29, 2003.  

 
 
(emphasis 
added).   

 
 
[¶18]   In Boyce, we ruled there are no "magic" 
words which must be uttered by the medical expert in order to justify a finding 
that the claimant suffered a material aggravation of a pre-existing 
condition.  

 
 
            
To prove aggravation of a preexisting injury, a claimant must demonstrate 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the work contributed to a material 
degree to the aggravation of the preexisting condition.  Salas, ¶ 10; Jim's Water Service v. Eayrs, 590 P.2d 1346, 1349 (Wyo.1979);  Claim of Vondra, 448 P.2d 313 
(Wyo. 
1968).  The causal connection 
between the work and the condition is satisfied if the medical expert testifies 
it is more probable than not that the work contributed in a material fashion to 
the aggravation of the injury.   
Id.  Expert medical testimony to the effect 
that the work "contributed to" the injury or that the injury "most likely" or 
"probably" is the product of the workplace suffices.  Id. 
We can find no authority for the proposition that the medical expert must state 
with specificity that the work conditions "materially or substantially" 
aggravated the preexisting condition.  

 
 
¶ 
11, 105 P.3d  at 455.

 
 
[¶19]   Dr. Gardner specifically stated he 
disagreed with the Division's conclusion that the accident did not materially 
aggravate Mr. Slaymaker's pre-existing condition and that his pre-existing 
condition had "clearly been aggravated and exacerbated by the events of May 29, 
2003."  Although the doctor did not 
put together the magic words "material" and "aggravate," the only reasonable 
interpretation of his opinion was that Mr. Slaymaker's pre-existing condition 
was materially aggravated by the ATV incident.  Dr. Gardner was the only medical expert 
to offer an opinion on the causation of Mr. Slaymaker's current back problems 
and there was no evidence to discredit his opinion.  The doctor's statement was clearly 
sufficient to satisfy our standards as expressed in Boyce and the precedent it relied 
upon.  

 
 
[¶20]   We find important similarities 
between this case and Salas.  Salas had a pre-existing right knee 
problem and had undergone medical treatment, including surgery, prior to his 
employment with General Chemical.  
Salas, ¶ 3, 71 P.3d  at 
709.  On the day he started work, a 
four to five hundred pound slab fell from the side of the mine and "rolled" 
Salas to the ground, pinning him down with his right knee bent at an angle.  Id., ¶ 4, 71 P.3d  at 709-10.  He did not immediately notice that his 
right knee was injured, but within a month or two after the accident, he began 
to experience a "new," more severe pain in his knee.  Id., ¶ 5, 71 P.3d  at 710.  He eventually sought medical treatment 
and underwent a second surgery on his right knee.  Id., ¶¶ 6-7, 71 P.3d  at 710.  

 
 
[¶21]   The Division awarded Salas benefits 
for "acute treatment only."  
Id., ¶ 8, 71 P.3d  at 710-11.  After a contested case hearing, the 
hearing examiner awarded benefits for all of his medical treatment, finding the 
May 1999 accident materially aggravated the pre-existing degenerative condition 
in his right knee.  Id.  
The district court reversed, finding that the "greater weight of the 
evidence leans toward disallowing benefits for Salas' preexisting injury."  Id., ¶ 9, 71 P.3d  at 711.  On appeal, we held the hearing examiner 
properly accepted Salas' expert medical testimony that the May 1999 accident 
exacerbated or aggravated his degenerative condition.  Id., ¶ 20, 71 P.3d  at 715-16.  We found substantial evidence to support 
the hearing examiner's decision awarding Salas benefits.  Id., ¶ 23, 71 P.3d  at 716.  See also, Boyce, ¶¶ 22-23, 105 P.3d  at 458 
(reversing OAH denial of benefits for aggravation of a pre-existing condition 
because claimant presented unopposed evidence that her work activities 
aggravated her preexisting condition).  

 
 
[¶22]   As in Salas, the only expert evidence  in this case was Dr. Gardner's opinion 
that Mr. Slaymaker's pre-existing condition was materially aggravated by the 
work accident.  Dr. Gardner was well 
aware of Mr. Slaymaker's medical history, having treated him for low back pain 
prior to the accident.  He was, 
therefore, in a good position to assess whether the work-related accident 
materially aggravated Mr. Slaymaker's pre-existing condition.  Compare Brees, 6 P.3d  at 130 (holding 
physician's testimony was not sufficient to meet the claimant's burden of 
proving a material aggravation of a pre-existing condition because the physician 
was never directly asked whether the claimant's surgery resulted from the 
pre-existing condition or the work activities) with State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div. v. 
Roggenbuck, 938 P.2d  851 (Wyo. 
1997) (upholding award of benefits for aggravation of a pre-existing condition 
because evidence squarely addressed the issue of whether the work-related injury 
materially aggravated the claimant's pre-existing condition).   

 
 
[¶23]   Moreover, other evidence presented 
at the hearing established, without contradiction, that Mr. Slaymaker's physical 
condition deteriorated significantly following the accident.  Prior to May 29, 2003, Mr. Slaymaker was 
suffering from lower back pain and had sought medical treatment for that 
condition.  However, he was able to 
manage his pain sufficiently to continue working fifty hours per week at his 
physically demanding job.  Following 
the ATV accident, he was in severe pain, could no longer work, and needed 
assistance getting out of his truck.    

 
 
[¶24]   Mr. Slaymaker and his wife were the 
only witnesses to testify at the hearing.  
They both testified that his physical abilities and quality of life 
diminished significantly after the accident.  The hearing examiner did not make any 
findings indicating that Mr. Slaymaker and/or his wife were not credible.  See State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & 
Comp. Div. v. Armijo, 2004 WY 116, ¶ 22, 99 P.3d 445, 457 (Wyo. 2004) 
(indicating that claimant's and other witnesses' testimony about the effect of 
claimant's injury was persuasive).  
Thus, their testimony was corroborative of Dr. Gardner's opinion that the 
May 2003 injury materially aggravated his pre-existing lower back condition. 

 
 
[¶25]   The Division directs us to Romero v. Davy McKee Corp., 854 P.2d 59 
(Wyo. 1993) and Lindbloom v. Teton Int'l, 
684 P.2d 1388 (Wyo. 1984), claiming these cases justify a conclusion that 
Mr. Slaymaker's post-accident situation was simply a result of the natural 
progression of the degenerative condition in his lower back.  In Romero, where there were conflicts in 
the medical testimony, we found 
substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's conclusion that the 
claimant's work activities did not materially aggravate his pre-existing wrist 
problems.  Romero, 854 P.2d  at 63-64.  See also, Lindbloom, 684 P.2d  at 1390 (recognizing 
worsening of a pre-existing condition is not a disease "attributable to 
industry").  The principle discussed 
in Romero and Lindbloom does not apply here.  Dr. Gardner's uncontested opinion as 
stated in his letter, rendered with full knowledge of Mr. Slaymaker's medical 
history, was that his pre-existing condition was materially aggravated by the 
accident.  

 
 
[¶26]   The record clearly establishes that 
Mr. Slaymaker suffered a material aggravation of his pre-existing lower back 
condition and the hearing examiner's conclusion to the contrary was not 
supported by substantial evidence.  
In addition, we conclude, to the extent the hearing examiner ruled that 
Mr. Slaymaker failed to meet his burden of proving his pre-existing condition 
was materially aggravated by the May 2003 accident, that ruling was arbitrary 
and capricious.  The district 
court's decision reversing the hearing examiner's order denying Mr. Slaymaker 
benefits for aggravation of his pre-existing lower back condition is 
affirmed.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The hearing 
examiner did not make an express finding that Mr. Slaymaker failed to satisfy 
his burden of proof.  However, the 
district court fairly interpreted the OAH decision as having that effect. 

 
 

2The record 
also contains information about other problems Mr. Slaymaker had with his back, 
including a prior cervical spine injury and surgeries.  The hearing examiner did not base his 
decision to deny benefits on Mr. Slaymaker's other back problems; consequently, 
we will not relate the details of his other problems 
here.