Case Title: State v. Hourdeh

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020 ME 69

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2020-05-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 69 
Docket: 
Cum-19-338 
Submitted 
    On Briefs: April 14, 2020 
Decided: 
May 14, 2020 
 
Panel: 
MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, and CONNORS, JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
SAHAL O. HOURDEH 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
[¶1]  Sahal O. Hourdeh appeals from a judgment of the trial court 
(Cumberland County, Warren, J.) terminating his deferred disposition and 
imposing sentence following his earlier guilty plea to trafficking in prison 
contraband (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 757(1)(B) (2020).  Hourdeh contends that 
the court erred in admitting evidence at the termination hearing that had been 
suppressed in a separate criminal case.  We affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  In January 2018, the State charged Hourdeh by criminal complaint 
with unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 1103(1-A)(A) (2020) (Count 1), and trafficking in prison contraband 
(Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 757(1)(B) (Count 2).  On June 28, 2018, Hourdeh 
 
 
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entered into an agreement with the State, pursuant to which the State 
dismissed Count 1, Hourdeh pleaded guilty to Count 2, and the court 
(J. French, J.) deferred disposition on Count II for twelve months.  See 
17-A M.R.S. §§ 1901-1904 (2020).  The agreement required Hourdeh to, inter 
alia, “refrain from all criminal conduct and violations of federal and state laws.” 
 
[¶3]  In November 2018, a grand jury indicted Hourdeh on new charges 
of unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 1103(1-A)(A), 
and violation of condition of release (Class E), 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(A) (2020).  
He moved to suppress the evidence resulting from a police officer’s search of 
his pocket, which yielded 7.6 grams of crack cocaine.  After hearing, the court 
(Fritzsche, J.) granted the motion and suppressed the evidence on the basis that 
the search was unconstitutional.  In doing so, the court said, “I am not finding 
any deliberate misconduct, any racial motivation, or any evil motive by the 
police officer.  That’s not there whatsoever.”  As a result of the court’s ruling, 
the State dismissed the charges. 
 
[¶4]  In the first case, the State moved to terminate Hourdeh’s deferred 
disposition based on his alleged new criminal conduct.  Hourdeh moved the 
court “to order the continued suppression of all evidence gained as a result of 
the illegal stop and questioning.”  The court (Cashman, J.) heard the motion and 
 
 
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continued the termination hearing for the parties to brief the “very discrete 
issue as to whether the State can rely on evidence that was suppressed . . . in 
moving forward on a motion to terminate the deferred [disposition].”  The court 
subsequently denied Hourdeh’s motion, ruling that the exclusionary rule does 
not apply to a deferred disposition proceeding. 
 
[¶5]  The court (Warren, J.) then held a termination hearing on 
August 6, 2019, at which Hourdeh preserved the issue now on appeal.  The 
court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Hourdeh had violated the 
deferred disposition agreement and imposed the parties’ jointly recommended 
sentence of 145 days’ imprisonment, which Hourdeh had fully served.  Hourdeh 
timely appealed.  See M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶6]  Hourdeh initially argues that the Maine Rules of Unified Criminal 
Procedure, including Rule 41A governing motions to suppress evidence, apply 
to a proceeding to terminate a deferred disposition.  The State agrees, as do we.  
The criminal rules apply “[i]n all criminal proceedings.”  M.R.U. Crim. P. 1(b)(1).  
A deferred disposition is part of an ongoing criminal proceeding because “[f]or 
purposes of a deferred disposition, a person is deemed to have been convicted 
when the court imposes the sentence.”  17-A M.R.S. § 1902(4).  Here, when the 
 
 
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State introduced the suppressed evidence at the termination hearing, Hourdeh 
had not yet been sentenced and so he had not yet been convicted of the charge 
to which he previously pleaded guilty.1  See id.  Section 1902(4) is a necessary 
part of the deferred disposition scheme because one possible result of a 
deferred disposition is that the State dismisses the criminal charge with 
prejudice, which must occur before the defendant is convicted and sentenced.  
See 17-A M.R.S. § 1903(1)-(2). 
 
[¶7]  The operative question in this appeal is not whether the criminal 
rules apply, but rather whether the exclusionary rule barred the State’s use of 
evidence that had been suppressed in a separate case to meet its burden in this 
case of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Hourdeh “inexcusably 
failed to comply with a court-imposed deferment requirement.” 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 1903(3); see State v. Caron, 334 A.2d 495, 499 (Me. 1975) (stating that after 
the Law Court determines whether the criminal rules apply to a proceeding, 
“[t]he further question remains” as to whether the exclusionary rule applies).  
                                         
1  In contrast, a probation revocation hearing, which involves a defendant who has already been 
convicted, “is not a criminal proceeding” to which the Maine Rules of Unified Criminal Procedure 
apply.  State v. Johansen, 2014 ME 132, ¶ 17, 105 A.3d 433; see 17-A M.R.S. § 1802(1) (2020) 
(“A person who has been convicted of a crime may be sentenced to a sentencing alternative . . . that 
includes a period of probation . . . .” (emphasis added)); M.R.U. Crim. P. 1(b). 
 
 
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The trial court answered that question in the negative, a ruling that we review 
de novo.  See State v. Johansen, 2014 ME 132, ¶ 11, 105 A.3d 433. 
 
[¶8]  Although we have not decided this issue in the context of a deferred 
disposition, we have declined to apply the exclusionary rule to a probation 
revocation proceeding, holding that  
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, which acts as 
protection for Fourth Amendment rights, was adequately served 
by the exclusion of the unlawfully seized evidence in the criminal 
prosecution. 
 
 
. . . The exclusionary rule . . . does not apply to probation 
revocation proceedings unless the probationer presents proof of 
widespread police harassment or other proof of a serious due 
process violation. 
 
Id. ¶¶ 17-18 (quotation marks omitted); see Caron, 334 A.2d at 499 & nn.5-6. 
 
[¶9]  Here, the trial court made a factual finding in the separate case that 
there was no “deliberate misconduct, . . . racial motivation, or . . . evil motive by 
the police officer.  That’s not there [in the record] whatsoever.”  Accordingly, 
we are not presented with “proof of widespread police harassment or other 
proof of a serious due process violation.”  Johansen, 2014 ME 132, ¶ 18, 
105 A.3d 433 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
 
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[¶10]  The officer’s conduct did, however, result in a serious 
consequence—the suppression of evidence in the State’s separate criminal 
prosecution and the dismissal of that case.  For that reason, as in Caron, 
[t]here is no need for double application of the exclusionary rule, 
using it first in preventing criminal prosecution of the [defendant] 
and a second time at a . . . revocation hearing.  The deterrent 
purpose of the exclusionary rule is adequately served by the 
exclusion of the unlawfully seized evidence in the criminal 
prosecution. 
 
334 A.2d at 499 n.5 (alterations and quotation marks omitted); see Johansen, 
2014 ME 132, ¶ 17, 105 A.3d 433; State v. Foisy, 384 A.2d 42, 44 (Me. 1978) 
(“We find nothing to justify changing, or departing from, our conclusion in 
Caron that application of an evidence-exclusionary rule in all criminal 
prosecutions is a sufficient police deterrent . . . .” (quotation marks omitted)).
 
[¶11]  Hourdeh correctly notes that there is a difference between the 
probation revocation at issue in Caron and a deferred disposition termination, 
see supra n.1, but it is not an “extreme difference” as he contends.  Although at 
the termination hearing Hourdeh had not yet been convicted, 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 1902(4), neither was he in the position of a defendant who had simply been 
accused of a crime.  Hourdeh had already entered a guilty plea to a Class C 
charge of trafficking in prison contraband.  Had he successfully completed the 
deferred disposition agreement, the contract he entered into called for him to 
 
 
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stand convicted of the Class D crime of unlawful possession of a scheduled drug, 
carrying a stipulated sentence of a $400 fine.2  See State v. Palmer, 2016 ME 120, 
¶ 13, 145 A.3d 561 (“A deferred disposition agreement is a contract between 
the defendant and the State and must be interpreted accordingly.”); Gordon v. 
Cheskin, 2013 ME 113, ¶ 19, 82 A.3d 1221 (“Deferred dispositions allow 
defendants in criminal matters to avoid some of the negative consequences of 
a criminal conviction.  In exchange, however, defendants must openly 
acknowledge and take responsibility for their conduct.”). 
 
[¶12]  Because Hourdeh had admitted guilt and accepted future 
punishment when the State introduced evidence that had been suppressed in a 
separate case, his deferred disposition termination proceeding is sufficiently 
analogous to a probation revocation hearing to make Caron’s reasoning 
applicable.  334 A.2d at 499 & n.5; see Gordon, 2013 ME 113, ¶ 19, 82 A.3d 1221 
(stating that a defendant’s admission of guilt in a deferred disposition case may 
be considered by a court in a later proceeding, even if the underlying charge is 
eventually dismissed); Foisy, 384 A.2d at 44. 
                                         
2  The agreement that Hourdeh signed further provided that “[i]f I am found to have violated any 
of the conditions of this agreement, my plea of guilty will stand on the Class C charge and I will 
proceed by way of an open sentence.” 
 
 
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[¶13]  Our conclusion that the exclusionary rule does not apply in this 
case is fully supported by United States Supreme Court precedent.  That Court 
has explained that the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment “is not a personal constitutional right,” but rather a judicial 
doctrine whose “sole purpose . . . is to deter future Fourth Amendment 
violations.”  Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236-37 (2011) (quotation 
marks omitted); see Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 362-63 
(1998).  The Court has therefore 
limited the rule’s operation to situations in which this purpose is 
thought most efficaciously served.  Where suppression fails to yield 
appreciable deterrence, exclusion is clearly unwarranted. 
 
 
. . . Exclusion exacts a heavy toll on both the judicial system 
and society at large. It almost always requires courts to ignore 
reliable, trustworthy evidence bearing on guilt or innocence. . . . Our 
cases hold that society must swallow this bitter pill when 
necessary, but only as a last resort.  For exclusion to be appropriate, 
the deterrence benefits of suppression must outweigh its heavy 
costs. 
 
Davis, 564 U.S. at 237 (alteration, citations, and quotation marks omitted); see 
also Scott, 524 U.S. at 363 (“[W]e have repeatedly declined to extend the 
exclusionary rule to proceedings other than criminal trials.”), 368 (“We have 
never suggested that the exclusionary rule must apply in every circumstance in 
which it might provide marginal deterrence.”). 
 
 
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[¶14]  Relevant here, “the deterrence benefits of exclusion vary with the 
culpability of the law enforcement conduct at issue.”  Davis, 564 U.S. at 238 
(alteration and quotation marks omitted); see Herring v. United States, 
555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009) (“Our cases establish that . . . suppression is not an 
automatic consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation.  Instead, the 
question turns on the culpability of the police and the potential of exclusion to 
deter wrongful police conduct.”).  Accordingly, “[u]nder [the Court’s] 
exclusionary-rule precedents, [an] acknowledged absence of police culpability 
dooms [an appellant’s] claim [that the rule applies].  Police practices trigger the 
harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield 
meaningful deterrence, and culpable enough to be worth the price paid by the 
justice system.”  Davis, 564 U.S. at 240 (alteration and quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
[¶15]  Here, the trial court found that although the officer conducted an 
unconstitutional search, the search did not result from “any deliberate 
misconduct . . . or any evil motive.”  In that circumstance, suppression beyond 
the directly related criminal case would not serve to “deter future Fourth 
Amendment violations” and is therefore “clearly unwarranted.”  Davis, 564 U.S. 
at 236-37 (alteration and quotation marks omitted).  As in Scott, where the 
 
 
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Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in parole revocation 
hearings, “application of the rule in the criminal trial context already provides 
significant deterrence of unconstitutional searches,” 524 U.S. at 364, and “the 
remote possibility that the subject is [on a form of conditional release] and that 
the evidence may be admitted at a . . . revocation proceeding surely has little, if 
any, effect on the officer’s incentives,”3 id. at 367; see id. at 368 (“[An] officer 
will be deterred from violating Fourth Amendment rights by the application of 
the exclusionary rule to criminal trials.”). 
 
[¶16]  Because the “sole purpose” of the exclusionary rule, Davis, 
564 U.S. at 236, was satisfied by the exclusion of the evidence derived from the 
unlawful search in the dismissed criminal case, the trial court did not err in 
ruling that the suppressed evidence could be considered in the deferred 
disposition termination proceeding. 
 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
3  The Court noted that “even in [the] context” of criminal trials, application of the exclusionary 
rule is “significantly limited.”  Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 n.4 (1998). 
 
 
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Clifford B. Strike, Esq., Strike & Knight, Portland, for appellant Sahal O. Hourdeh 
 
Jonathan Sahrbeck, District Attorney, and Kate E. Marshall, Asst. Dist. Atty., 
Cumberland County District Attorney’s Office, Portland, for appellee State of 
Maine 
 
 
Cumberland County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2017-7056 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY