Case Title: Cooley v. State

Citation: 391 So. 2d 614

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1980-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
391 So. 2d 614 (1980) Chester Lee COOLEY v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 51807. Supreme Court of Mississippi. August 27, 1980. As Modified On Denial of Rehearing December 17, 1980. *615 J. Ronald Parrish, Laurel, for appellant. A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by Billy L. Gore, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. EN BANC. SMITH, Presiding Justice, for the Court: Chester Lee Cooley was indicted for the murder of Charles Earl Moore. He was tried on that charge in the Circuit Court of Jones County. Although it appears from the record that the great weight of the overall evidence supported the State's theory that the homicide was murder, the jury returned a verdict finding Cooley guilty of manslaughter, and he was sentenced to serve a term of 17 years in the Department of Corrections. From that conviction, he appeals. According to the undisputed testimony, including the testimony of Cooley, 18 or 20 *616 people, one of whom was Cooley, had gathered in the home of one of Cooley's relatives at about 7:00 in the evening and were indulging in drinking intoxicating liquor and gambling. Prior to that, Cooley testified: These festivities at his brother's house had then continued throughout the evening and were still in progress at about midnight when a dispute arose as to who had contributed toward the purchase of (and therefore was entitled to drink from) a bottle of whiskey. Although firmly disputed by several witnesses present, Cooley testified that Moore cursed him and members of his family and said that he would kill Cooley and all of "the (vulgarity deleted) Cooleys." Cooley claimed that he saw the "print" of a "small gun" in Moore's pocket and said he knew Moore to be a violent man and had trouble with him on a former occasion. Cooley does not suggest that Moore did anything at all toward carrying out his alleged threat. However, according to Cooley, in order to "defend" himself and his family, he left the house where Moore was and went out to his automobile where he procured a shotgun. Cooley said: He loaded the gun and reentered the house carrying the loaded gun. Cooley admitted that when he came back in with the shotgun "people were scattering every which way." According to eyewitnesses, Cooley then pointed the gun at Moore and shot him at fairly close range, inflicting a terrible wound and causing death. Cooley's version at his trial was that he loaded the gun and returned to the house in order to use it against Moore in defense of himself and his family and that as he went into the room where Moore was that Moore "snatched" the gun. He (Cooley) held on to it and pulled back, and that this caused the gun to cock and his finger to fire it. He said: This version was disputed, as stated, by eyewitnesses who testified that Cooley had deliberately aimed at Moore and shot him. Aside from Cooley's statement that he had earlier in the evening observed the print of the gun on Moore, there is no evidence that Moore had such a weapon, none was found on him afterward, and not even Cooley testified that Moore had made any overt move to draw or use the weapon or to attack him (or any of "the Cooleys") in any way, except by the vulgar, insulting words which allegedly had been spoken before Cooley left the house to get his shotgun. It was admitted that it was the threatening and insulting language allegedly used by Moore that sent Cooley to his automobile where he obtained the gun and shell with which the homicide was committed. This Court has held that: The jury's verdict finding Cooley guilty of manslaughter had the effect of acquitting Cooley of murder, and makes the conclusion inescapable that the jury found the killing to have been the result of resentment and anger on Cooley's part at the insults and threats of Moore which had caused him to leave the house, go for his gun and shells and return with a loaded gun, since there is no evidence that Moore made any attempt whatever to shoot or attack Cooley. This Court has held that one who engages in a fight or quarrel, leaves the scene, arms himself with a deadly weapon, and returns to renew the quarrel, forfeits his right to claim self-defense where the weapon is used to slay the person with whom he has quarreled before, where there is no overt act on the part of the latter capable of engendering a reasonable belief in the mind of the killer that he is in imminent danger of suffering grave bodily injury or death at his hands. When Cooley with whom Moore had quarreled, left, armed himself and returned to the room where Moore was with a loaded shotgun which he intended to use on Moore, if necessary, and if Moore, seeing him, seized the shotgun in an effort to protect himself from being shot by Cooley, and in so doing it went off, killing him, Cooley was guilty of manslaughter. Under the circumstances the right of self-defense lay with Moore, not with Cooley, who was not under attack, even if Moore had been as Cooley said, the author of the original wordy quarrel, following which Cooley left the house and obtained his weapon. Cooley attempted to explain having the gun and shells in his car at a nighttime function (gambling and drinking) by saying that he and his brother had intended to go squirrel hunting. But when pictures of the body, showing the wound, were exhibited to him, Cooley admitted that it was not such a wound as would have been made by bird shot or squirrel shot but to him it gave the appearance of a buckshot wound. Thus confronted, Cooley said he had reached into the glove compartment of his car and had not known what type load he was getting. The pictures also gave support to the State's theory that four or five feet separated the gun muzzle and the victim, and tended to contradict Cooley's contention that Moore had pulled the gun almost against himself at the time it was fired. The admission of the photographs was a matter within the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge and no prejudice is shown to have resulted therefrom. The pictures were relevant and had substantial probative value. Their admission was not an abuse of discretion and there is no merit in this assignment. Herring v. State, 374 So. 2d 784 (Miss. 1979). There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in the admission of the photographs. To place the question raised by this point in proper perspective, and to appreciate what significance it had, if any, in Cooley's manslaughter conviction, reference to the above statement of the facts and circumstances of the case is necessary. After the State had rested, Cooley took the stand as a witness in his own behalf. It is argued that Cooley's testimony in chief, as previously set out, showed that the shooting had been an accident. Among other things, Cooley said that within an hour or two after killing Moore he had surrendered himself to the officers as being the person who had committed the act. Upon completion of Cooley's testimony in chief, on cross-examination the District Attorney had Cooley demonstrate how the gun could have fired in the manner described by Cooley. The record reflects that this demonstration showed that the gun could only have been fired under the circumstances related by Cooley with the cooperation of Cooley's thumb on the hammer and his finger on the trigger. If every word of Cooley's testimony is accepted at face value, the shooting of Moore by Cooley was neither a justifiable nor an excusable homicide under the law. Cross-examination is the only effective means for exposing fabricated and perjured testimony. This may be done not only by proof of inconsistent statements, but also by developing facts tending to show the intrinsic improbability of the truth of the testimony. As said in Bradley v. Jago, 594 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir.1979): "The fact that the defendant did not offer the exculpatory explanation when he had an earlier opportunity to do so is evidence which the jury is entitled to hear, and from which it may draw reasonable inferences." Here, Cooley testified that he had surrendered to the authorities after killing Moore. Failure to assert at that time that the killing had been an accident is so highly improbable as to be incredible. It was not error for the District Attorney to develop in this manner on cross-examination the intrinsic improbability of Cooley's story as tending to show that it was a last minute fabrication. There was an objection by counsel and a motion for a mistrial based upon an assertion that the question had prejudiced Cooley by calling attention to his exercise of his Miranda right to remain silent. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). *619 Appellant devotes 18 typewritten lines in his brief to this point (Point 2), citing only one case, Miranda v. Arizona, supra. However, the State's brief collates the cases in which similar points have been considered. We think that of these cases those in which reversible error has been predicated on references to pretrial silence have been distinguished on the facts. The questions confronting the Court are: (a) Did the cross-examination of Cooley as to the absence of pretrial statements that the shooting had been accidental violate his Miranda pretrial right to remain silent? (b) If so, can it be said that the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt? To answer these questions, a review of the facts is necessary. (1) There was no request for a jury instruction that the matter was to be considered for impeachment only; (2) A motion for a new trial was filed but not upon this ground; (3) Cooley's guilt was beyond question; (4) Cooley took advantage of the incident to bolster his own testimony by putting on a relative to testify that Cooley had told him that the shooting had been an accident. Since the decision of Miranda by the United States Supreme Court, subsequent decisions of that Court have relaxed considerably the strict application of the rules therein established, particularly in the area of the use for impeachment purposes of matter obtained in violation of Miranda guidelines, where a defendant takes the stand to testify in his own defense. There is no evidence or suggestion of custodial, official or other pretrial interrogation of Cooley. It is clear from questions and Cooley's answers that he was at liberty on bail during several months preceding trial. Of paramount importance, the overall evidence, including Cooley's own testimony, required a verdict of criminal homicide, either murder or manslaughter. There is no rational theory from the evidence or want of evidence capable of supporting a finding that the killing of Moore by Cooley was justifiable or excusable under the law. It must be borne in mind that nowhere in the record is there evidence that the victim at any time made any overt move to carry out the alleged threats against Cooley or any member of his family. There is no testimony from anyone that the victim ever attacked, attempted to attack, drew or attempted to draw, a weapon of any kind. No gun or any weapon was ever produced by the victim, even according to Cooley's testimony. The only evidence that the victim possessed a gun at all appears in Cooley's testimony to the effect that he had observed the "print" of the gun through Moore's clothing before he left the house for the purpose of obtaining the shotgun. Whether through compassion, or from some unidentifiable reason, the jury acquitted Cooley of murder by convicting him of manslaughter. When Cooley took the stand and testified he submitted himself to cross-examination for the purposes of impeachment. In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S. Ct. 643, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1971), Harris was indicted for the sale of heroin. A statement, in violation of Miranda, was taken from Harris while he was in custody. The Court excluded this statement on the prosecution's case in chief. Harris' testimony at the trial was inconsistent with the statement which he had made to police and the trial court admitted it in rebuttal for the purpose of impeaching Harris' credibility of the witness. The jury was instructed to consider it in passing upon Harris' credibility but not upon the guilt issue. The United States Supreme Court considered a similar question in Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S. Ct. 1215, 43 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1975). A statement, taken from Hass in violation of Miranda, was excluded in the prosecution's case in chief. Hass then testified as a witness in his own defense as to his innocence. The inculpatory statement was admitted in rebuttal for the purposes of impeachment. The United States Supreme Court said: This Court, in following the rulings of the United States Supreme Court in Harris and Hass, supra, has since dealt with the question in Murphy v. State, 336 So. 2d 213 (Miss. 1976), and Day v. State, 382 So. 2d 1071 (Miss. 1980). *621 In Murphy this Court said: See also Simmons v. State, 358 So. 2d 1324 (Miss. 1978). In Day v. State, supra, this Court approved the interrogation of Day as to an alleged statement admittedly taken in violation of his Miranda right to the presence of an attorney during questioning and the use of the testimony of the officers in impeachment. In Murphy, supra, this Court held that under the circumstances the accused is entitled to an instruction that such statements may not be used as proof of guilt but may be considered only in passing on the defendant's credibility as a witness, if requested by him. In the case now before the Court, the only request made by Cooley was for a mistrial. No request was made by Cooley that the jury be instructed as in the Murphy and Day cases, supra. When Cooley took the stand and told his story, it was proper cross-examination to test its truth by developing facts and circumstances tending to show that it was untrue and was a last minute fabrication. It was not a violation of Miranda to inquire of Cooley, who had testified that he surrendered to the officers within an hour or two after the shooting, whether he had told the officers that he had shot Moore accidentally. The inquiry was directed toward showing the unlikelihood that Cooley, who had just killed a man, and was surrendering to the officers as the killer, failed to state the exculpatory fact that the killing had been an accident. In Bradley v. Jago, 594 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir.1979), the Court had this to say with reference to such a situation: When Cooley came back into the house where Moore was, with his shotgun, loaded with buckshot, someone yelled "there comes Chester with a gun" and "everyone scattered ever which way." Under these circumstances, Cooley advanced on Moore and, Cooley says, Moore grabbed the gun. At that time, the right of self-defense lay with Moore, not Cooley, and if, as Cooley said, Moore "grabbed" the gun, he was justified in doing so in self-defense. *622 We hold that there was no reasonable or tenable theory arising out of the evidence or from the want of evidence capable of supporting a finding that the homicide was excusable or justifiable. On the whole record, the evidence strongly supports the prosecution's theory that the homicide was murder. The jury, however, in finding Cooley guilty of manslaughter acquitted him of murder and, since no other explanation appears from the record, apparently accepted Cooley's statement and found him guilty of the lesser offense of manslaughter. On the evidence this was all Cooley could possibly have been entitled to. We hold that the cross-examination of Cooley under the circumstances was proper for the purpose of exposing the intrinsic improbability of his account of the shooting and tended to show that his version was a recent fabrication rather than the truth. It was permissible under the rule laid down by the United States Supreme Court in the cases of Harris v. New York, and Oregon v. Hass, supra, and followed by this Court in Murphy v. State and Day v. State, supra, and did not constitute a violation of Cooley's rights under Miranda. This Court dealt with the question in May v. State, 211 So. 2d 845 (Miss. 1968). In May this Court said: Moreover, since the evidence established Cooley's guilt of murder or manslaughter beyond question, and the jury acquitted him of murder and convicted him of the lesser offense, there having been no basis in the evidence for acquittal, if the incident now complained of was error, it was without prejudice and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. *623 Rule 11 of the Mississippi Supreme Court Rules provides: Even in a case where a violation is demonstrated to have actually occurred, nevertheless, it will be considered harmless error if the whole record demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that it was without any substantial prejudicial effect under all of the facts and circumstances of the case. United States v. Whitaker, 592 F.2d 826 (5th Cir.1979). In United States v. Dixon, 593 F.2d 626 (5th Cir.1979), the Court said: In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976), the United States Supreme Court, although finding a prejudicial error in that case, stated: In the case at bar the State affirmatively asserts, and we agree, that, if the incident constituted error it was plainly harmless and non-prejudicial beyond a reasonable doubt. The conviction appealed from will be affirmed. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., ROBERTSON, P.J., and SUGG, WALKER, BROOM, LEE, BOWLING and COFER, JJ., concur. WALKER, J., and ROBERTSON, P.J., specially concur. WALKER, Justice, specially concurring: I concur with Justice Smith, but feel it necessary to emphasize certain facts and law for so doing. Chester Lee Cooley was indicted for murder but convicted of manslaughter. His defense was that the shotgun held by him accidentally discharged when the deceased "snatched" the gun. However, the evidence for the State was that the killing was intentional and unnecessary. After shooting the deceased, Cooley fled the scene, but about two hours later turned himself in to the Laurel Police Department and then he and his lawyer and the Laurel Police went to the sheriff's office. It was not contended or even suggested by the defendant that he was given the Miranda warnings that he had a "right to remain silent, etc." During the course of the trial, the following colloquy between Cooley and the prosecuting attorney occurred during cross-examination: The appellant contends that the trial court erred in declining to grant a mistrial because of the cross-examination of Cooley by the district attorney as to the absence of any pretrial assertions that the shooting had been accidental. According to my interpretation of the case law on this subject applicable to the facts presented by this record, there was nothing impermissible about the district attorney's cross-examining Cooley as to whether he had ever told anyone prior to trial that the shooting had been an accident. If Cooley had been properly Mirandaed at the time of arrest, the cross-examination would have been impermissible but the fact is Cooley was not Mirandaed. In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976), the United States Supreme Court in settling conflicts between the various federal circuit courts addressed the issue of "whether a state prosecutor may seek to impeach a defendant's exculpatory story, told for the first time at trial, by cross-examining the defendant about his failure to have told the story after receiving Miranda warnings at the time of his arrest." 426 U.S. at 611, 96 S. Ct. at 2241, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 94. The Court quoted with approval the following language from United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 95 S. Ct. 2133, 45 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1975): In conclusion it held: As stated by Justice Smith in the majority opinion, "When Cooley took the stand and told his story, it was proper cross-examination to test its truth by developing facts and circumstances tending to show that it was untrue and was a last minute fabrication. It was not a violation of Miranda to inquire of Cooley, who had testified that he surrendered to the officers within an hour or two after the shooting, whether he had told the officers that he had shot Moore accidentally. The inquiry was directed toward showing the unlikelihood that Cooley, who had just killed a man, and was surrendering to the officers as the killer, failed to state the exculpatory fact that the killing had been an accident." In Bradley v. Jago, 594 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir.1979), the Court had this to say with reference to such a situation: I see no compelling reason for this Court to impose greater restrictions on a district attorney's right to cross-examine an accused, who takes the stand to testify, than has been done by the Federal courts. The rule as now pronounced is strict enough and is in accordance with the Constitution. It should not be made any more strict in this State. If Cooley had been advised of his right to remain silent by the officers or his own attorney, then I would agree that he could not be cross-examined about his earlier silence but that was not the case. Cooley did not receive any such warning or advice from the officers or his attorney so far as this record shows. The conviction and sentence should be affirmed. ROBERTSON, P.J., and LEE, J., join this specially concurring opinion. On Petition for Rehearing, the contention is again made that permitting cross-examination of Cooley violated his right to remain silent and requires reversal. The facts were stated and the matter was dealt with at length in the original opinion. However, since the opinion in the case sub judice was written, the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 100 S. Ct. 2124, 65 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1980), has become available. In Jenkins, the United States Supreme Court, in dealing with a contention similar to that raised here, said: The issue in Jenkins was succinctly articulated by the Court in the following language: In Jenkins, the Court, citing and quoting from Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 46 S. Ct. 566, 70 L. Ed. 1054 (1926), said: The decision in the case sub judice is clearly in accord with the decision of this Court in May v. State, 211 So. 2d 845 (Miss. 1968) and of the United States Supreme Court in Jenkins v. Anderson, supra. We find no merit in the petition for rehearing and the same is, accordingly, overruled. All Justices concur.