Case Title: McDonald v. Linick

Citation: 265 P.2d 676, 58 N.M. 65

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1954-01-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
265 P.2d 676 (1954) 58 N.M. 65 McDONALD v. LINICK et al. No. 5699. Supreme Court of New Mexico. January 7, 1954. Smith & Smith, Clovis, for appellants. Rowley, Breen & Bowen, Tucumcari, for appellee. LUJAN, Justice. This is an appeal by the defendants from a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in an action for damages growing out of a collision between two automobiles. The plaintiff's agent, W.G. McDonald, was driving a 1950 Chrysler sedan in a southeasterly direction on a detour from U.S. Highway 66, which is located approximately 13 miles east from Tucumcari, New Mexico, and according to his evidence he was driving at the rate of 40 to 45 miles per hour and well on his right-hand side of the road at the time of the collision. The car, a 1951 Studebaker, driven by the defendant, James David Linick, was proceeding northwesterly towards Tucumcari. The collision occurred on May 31, 1951, at about 10 o'clock at night. The Studebaker car was being driven on its right side of the road prior to meeting the car driven by plaintiff's agent, but just before it reached a point opposite the car driven by plaintiff's agent, the driver of the Studebaker car drove the same to his left-hand side of the center of the road and into the plaintiff's car. The road at that place was 25 to 30 feet wide. After the impact, the plaintiff's car was stopped almost immediately and found resting entirely to its right of the center of the road. The Studebaker car proceeded on past the point of impact for a distance of from 150 to 200 feet before it stopped. The complaint alleged, among other things: The defendants, in addition to a general denial, pleaded defensively contributory *677 negligence and alleged by way of cross-action against the plaintiffs for damages to defendants' automobile, negligent acts of plaintiff's agent, and that the same were the proximate causes of the collision and resulting damages. The specific allegations of negligence were: (1) travelling at a high and excessive rate of speed, and (2) driving on the wrong side of the road. At the conclusion of the trial the court made the following findings of fact: We deem it unnecessary to review the evidence; suffice it to say that we have carefully examined the record and are satisfied that the findings made by the court are sustained by sufficient evidence of a substantial nature and will not be disturbed by us. The sole assignment of error is as follows: The defendants stress the fact that plaintiff's agent was operating his car at between 55 and 60 miles per hour prior to the time he entered the detour from U.S. Highway 66, notwithstanding cautionary signs along the highway warning motorists of said detour, and at between 40 and 45 miles per hour at the time of the collision. From these facts he concludes that plaintiff's agent was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, and contends that such negligence contributed proximately to the collision from which their injuries resulted. Chapter 3, Session Laws of 1943, provides: It is said in Berry on Automobiles (7th Ed.), Section 2.477, that: And in Blashfield, Ency. of Automobile Law, Vol. 1, part 2, p. 725, § 787, the author says: In the instant case, it was not the speed of plaintiff's car that was the proximate cause of the accident, but the position of the defendants' car on that side of the road where it did not belong. There was no danger at all, regardless of the speed of plaintiff's car, until defendant, James David Linick, suddenly turned to the left-hand side of the road. If the above defendant had been on his own side of the road, no trouble would have occurred as the road was wide enough for two cars to pass each other. In order to bar recovery, there not only must be negligence on plaintiff's part but causal relationship as well between that negligence and the injuries complained of. Williams v. Haas, 52 N.M. 9, 189 P.2d 632. Granted, as must be, the right of plaintiff's agent to drive the car on the highway, there is no evidence whatever of any causal relationship between the mere speed at which the agent was travelling and the collision. Before plaintiff's agent could be held guilty of contributory negligence, as a matter of law, it must conclusively appear that such negligence contributed in some way or in some degree to the accident and injuries for which he seeks relief. See, Mayfield v. Crowdus, 38 N.M. 471, 35 P.2d 291; White v. Montoya, 46 N.M. 241, 126 P.2d 471; Williams v. Haas, supra; and Schoen v. Schroeder, 53 N.M. 1, 200 P.2d 1021. Therefore, under the facts and circumstances here present, the questions of negligence of the defendant, James David Linick, and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff's agent, as well as the important question of proximate cause, were all for the court, sitting without a jury to determine in the light of all the facts, circumstances and presumptions presented by the evidence. See, Greenfield v. Bruskas, 41 N.M. 346, 68 P.2d 921, and Turrietta v. Wyche, 54 N.M. 5, 212 P.2d 1041, 15 A.L.R.2d 407. The court did not err in refusing to find the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence. The judgment should be affirmed, and it is so ordered. McGHEE, C. J., and SADLER, COMPTON and SEYMOUR, JJ., concur.