Case Title: Roalsvik v. Comack

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019 ME 71

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2019-05-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 71 
Docket: 
Yor-18-443 
Submitted 
 
On Briefs: April 24, 2019 
Decided: 
May 14, 2019 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
LISA ROALSVIK 
 
v. 
 
BRETT COMACK 
 
 
HJELM, J. 
[¶1]  Lisa Roalsvik appeals from orders entered in the District Court 
(York, Sutton, J.) denying her motion to modify the parties’ divorce judgment 
and her motion for the court to reconsider that order.  The orders, among other 
things, denied Roalsvik’s request that the parties’ child reside primarily with 
her; allocated final parental decision-making authority regarding the child’s 
education to Brett Comack; and increased Roalsvik’s child support obligation.   
[¶2]  In determining whether to modify parental rights and 
responsibilities established in an existing judgment, “the trial court engages in 
a two-step inquiry: [f]irst, whether since the prior order there has occurred a 
change in circumstances sufficiently substantial in its effect upon the child’s 
best interest to justify a modification; and second, if so, how should the custody 
 
2 
arrangement be modified in furtherance of the child’s best interest.”1  Bulkley v. 
Bulkley, 2013 ME 101, ¶ 11, 82 A.3d 116 (alterations and quotation marks 
omitted); 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1657(1)(A), (2) (2018).  Because at trial Roalsvik bore 
the burden of proof on her motion, see Little v. Wallace, 2016 ME 93, ¶ 13, 142 
A.3d 585, she must demonstrate here that the evidence compelled the court to 
make the findings necessary to grant her motion.  See Handrahan v. Malenko, 
2011 ME 15, ¶ 13, 12 A.3d 79.  Contrary to Roalsvik’s assertion, the record 
evidence did not compel the court to conclude that it would be in the child’s 
best interest to reside primarily with her.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3) (2018).   
[¶3]  Additionally, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
Roalsvik’s motion for reconsideration because the motion comprised a 
reiteration of arguments that she had already presented to the court and 
allegations of events that occurred only after the hearing was held and the 
record was closed.  See M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(5); M.R. Civ. P. 59(e); Shaw v. Shaw, 
2003 ME 153, ¶¶ 7-8, 12, 839 A.2d 714.   
[¶4]  We write only to address two issues that Roalsvik raises on this 
appeal.   
                                         
1  The parties do not dispute that a “substantial change in circumstances” existed—specifically, 
the relocation of each party and their inability or unwillingness to communicate with each other 
effectively.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 1657(2) (2018).  Only the child’s best interest is at issue.  
 
3 
[¶5]  The first issue relates to the recommendation presented by the 
court-appointed guardian ad litem.  The day-long motion hearing included the 
presentation of testimony from the parties and a number of others, including 
the GAL, whose report is also part of the record and whose ultimate 
recommendation to the court was supportive of Roalsvik’s motion.  Near the 
end of Comack’s examination of the GAL, Roalsvik objected to several of 
Comack’s questions that were designed to challenge the GAL’s opinion on 
certain aspects of the case, but the court overruled most of those objections.  
Immediately after the last of those colloquies and as the GAL’s testimony 
concluded, the court explained,  
The Court values the [GAL’s] input, but the Court is not going to just 
do what the [GAL] says.  The Court’s going to make a decision based 
solely on the best interest of the child, using the statutory factors 
that the Court needs to consider.  It’s lovely to have a [GAL] in this 
place.  It’s lovely to have a report.  But I’m not a rubber stamp for 
the [GAL]. 
 
With that said, [the GAL] put an enormous amount of time 
into the report, his testimony.  And I want to know every aspect of 
what he has to say. 
 
Largely from this, Roalsvik asserts that “the court summarily dismissed the 
[GAL’s] report, testimony and recommendations regarding primary residency.”   
[¶6]  For two reasons, Roalsvik’s claim reflects a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the court’s remarks.  First, utterly contrary to Roalsvik’s 
 
4 
view of the way the court treated the GAL’s recommendation, the court’s 
statement constitutes an explicit expression of its intention to take the 
recommendation seriously and a recognition of the value that a GAL’s 
investigation and recommendation can provide to the court in these often 
difficult cases.  Indeed, the court explained that it wanted to know “every 
aspect” of the GAL’s reasoning—an approach illustrated by the court’s rulings 
that overruled Roalsvik’s own objections to a number of Comack’s questions 
that explored the GAL’s opinion.  The court’s order did not specifically refer to 
the GAL’s recommendation, and its ultimate conclusion differed from the GAL’s.  
Nonetheless, particularly given that Comack’s cross-examination of the GAL 
generated testimony that could reasonably be seen to bring several aspects of 
the GAL’s recommendation into question, it cannot be fairly maintained that the 
court improperly ignored or “summarily dismissed” the GAL’s testimony.  
Indeed, the record establishes just the opposite.   
[¶7]  This ties into the second element of the court’s comment quoted 
above, namely, that the court intended to adjudicate the question of where the 
parties’ child should primarily reside “based solely on the best interest of the 
child, using the statutory factors that the Court needs to consider” and not 
based “just” on a “rubber stamp” acceptance of the GAL’s recommendation.  
 
5 
This is an indelibly correct statement of the court’s responsibility to exercise its 
independent judgment based on the record as a whole and within the analytical 
framework established by the Legislature.  Here, the court was presented with 
the testimony of multiple witnesses—including the GAL—and voluminous 
exhibits.  Consistent with what the court told the parties it would do, the court 
stated plainly in its order that its decision was based on that full record and that 
it had considered “each” of the statutory factors that pertain a proper analysis 
of the child’s best interest.  See Vibert v. Dimoulas, 2017 ME 62, ¶ 15, 159 A.3d 
325 (“The judgment of the trial court is entitled to very substantial deference 
because the court is able to appraise all the testimony of the parties and their 
witnesses.” (alteration and quotation marks omitted)); see also In re Caleb M., 
2017 ME 66, ¶ 27, 159 A.3d 345 (“The weight and credibility of the testimony 
and other evidence, including GAL reports, is for the fact-finder’s 
determination.” (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted)). Roalsvik’s 
contention that the court’s analysis was incomplete is without merit. 
[¶8]  The second of Roalsvik’s contentions that warrants comment is her 
assertion that the court erred by denying her motion for reconsideration.  Two 
of the grounds for that motion comprised events that occurred only after the 
hearing was held, and, for that reason, the court did not err by denying the 
 
6 
motion.2  One of those post-hearing developments was the birth of Roalsvik’s 
new child with her new wife several weeks after the hearing, which could affect 
Roalsvik’s child support obligation relating to the parties’ child.  See 19-A M.R.S. 
§ 2006(5)(A) (2018) (stating that a child support obligation is subject to 
adjustment based on the obligor’s legal obligation to support a child in that 
party’s household other than the child who is the subject of the child support 
order).  Although at the motion hearing the court was presented with evidence 
of the expected due date, it would have been premature for the court to adjust 
Roalsvik’s child support obligation pursuant to section 2006(5)(A)—and in fact 
Roalsvik never argued to the court that it should do so, thereby waiving the 
issue, see Homeward Residential, Inc. v. Gregor, 2017 ME 128, ¶ 9, 165 A.3d 357 
(“To preserve an issue for appeal, the party seeking review must first present 
the issue to the trial court in a timely fashion. . . . Otherwise, the issue is deemed 
waived.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted)).  The other post-hearing 
development was that soon after the judgment was issued, Comack changed 
employment, which could affect the calculation of child support if Comack’s 
income also changed as a result.   
                                         
2  As noted above, see supra ¶ 3, the remaining ground for the motion was a restatement of 
arguments Roalsvik had already presented to the court and thus did not constitute a proper basis for 
reconsideration.  See M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(5). 
 
7 
[¶9]  Even though the court properly denied the motion for 
reconsideration, should Roalsvik seek a modification of child support based on 
these changed circumstances, the issue can be addressed promptly, and even 
without a hearing if none is requested or the matter is otherwise uncontested, 
provided that the amount of the proposed child support obligation is not less 
than that set out in the guidelines.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 2009(6) (2018); see also 
Higgins v. Wood, 2018 ME 88, ¶¶ 25-27, 189 A.3d 724.  Additionally, no filing 
fee will be required if the motion is limited to a modification of child support.  
Revised Court Fees Schedule and Document Management Procedures, 
Me. Admin. Order JB-05-26 (as amended by A. 7-18) (effective July 1, 2018); 
M.R. Civ. P. 120.  Consequently, the only issue raised in Roalsvik’s motion that 
might merit the court’s attention can be presented in an efficient manner and 
resolved expeditiously. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
Anthony P. Shusta II, Esq., Law Offices of Anthony P. Shusta II, Madison, for 
appellant Lisa Roalsvik 
 
Keri J. Marshall, Esq., Marshall Law, PLLC, East Kingston, New Hampshire, for 
appellee Brett Comack 
 
 
York District Court docket number FM-2015-170 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY