Case Title: Chatham Foot Specialist, P.C. v. Health Care Service Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 99067

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 99067-Agenda 15-March 2005.
CHATHAM FOOT SPECIALISTS, P.C., Appellant, 
v. HEALTH 
CARE SERVICE CORPORATION, d/b/a Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois, Appellee.
Opinion filed September 22, 2005.
 
JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, Chatham Foot Specialists, P.C., filed a breach 
of contract action to recover fees against defendant, Health Care Service 
Corporation, d/b/a Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois (Blue Cross). The circuit 
court of Cook County granted Blue Cross' motion for summary judgment on the 
basis that plaintiff's failure to register as a professional service corporation 
with the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation (the Department), 
pursuant to section 12 of the Professional Service Corporation Act (Act) (805 
ILCS 10/12 (West 2000)), rendered plaintiff's contract with Blue Cross void and 
precluded plaintiff from maintaining an action to recover fees under any legal 
theory. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. No. 
1-03-3425 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). For the reasons that 
follow, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND
The facts underlying this appeal are undisputed. Plaintiff 
is an Illinois professional service corporation whose purpose is to deliver 
podiatric services to its patients. During the time period relevant to this 
litigation, Dr. Mitchell M. Rosner, a licensed podiatrist, is, and has been, 
plaintiff's sole shareholder, officer and director. Plaintiff also has in its 
employment a number of additional podiatrists, who are all properly licensed to 
practice podiatry.
On June 1, 2000, plaintiff entered into a contractual 
agreement with defendant, Blue Cross. Blue Cross is in the business of providing 
health insurance. Under the June 2000 agreement, plaintiff contracted with Blue 
Cross to deliver podiatric services as a participating provider under Blue 
Cross' insurance plans. Blue Cross, in turn, agreed to timely pay to plaintiff 
fees for podiatric services provided by plaintiff to patients insured by Blue 
Cross. At the time plaintiff executed the agreement with Blue Cross, plaintiff 
was properly organized under the Act and was in good standing with the Secretary 
of State. However, plaintiff did not possess a current certificate of 
registration issued by the Department.
On November 26, 2001, Blue Cross unilaterally cancelled 
the agreement with plaintiff, effective December 25, 2001. On December 27, 2001, 
plaintiff filed a four-count complaint against Blue Cross, seeking to recover 
payments under the June 2000 agreement for podiatric services rendered to 
patients insured by Blue Cross. In count I, plaintiff alleged that Blue Cross 
breached the June 2000 agreement because Blue Cross failed to pay its bills due 
plaintiff on a timely basis. Count II of plaintiff's complaint alleged that Blue 
Cross engaged in fraud, in that Blue Cross intentionally misrepresented that it 
would pay claims for treatment of its insureds by plaintiff, causing plaintiff 
monetary damages. In count III of the complaint, plaintiff alleged that Blue 
Cross committed unfair and deceptive acts in violation of the Consumer Fraud and 
Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/2 (West 2000)). Finally, count IV 
of plaintiff's complaint alleged that Blue Cross violated section 155 of the 
Illinois Insurance Code by delaying and failing to pay its claims (215 ILCS 
5/155 (West 2000)).
On March 5, 2002, Blue Cross filed in the circuit court a 
motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2000)). Blue Cross 
alleged that, based upon the fact that plaintiff did not possess a current 
certificate of registration issued by the Department, plaintiff had "not 
complied with the mandatory licensing provisions of the Illinois Medical 
Practice Act and Medical Corporation Act and, therefore, under established case 
law, [plaintiff] is barred from maintaining an action to recover fees for 
medical services under any legal theory."
In response, plaintiff did not deny that it had failed to 
maintain a current certificate of registration with the Department. However, 
plaintiff asserted that its lack of compliance with the registration requirement 
neither violated public policy nor harmed the public welfare. According to 
plaintiff, neither the Medical Practice Act nor the Medical Corporation Act 
governed plaintiff and its practitioners. Because plaintiff is a professional 
service corporation incorporated for the purpose of delivering podiatric 
services and not medical services, plaintiff contended that only the statutory 
licensing requirements contained in the Podiatric Medical Practice Act of 1987 
(225 ILCS 100/1 et seq. (West 2000)), and the administrative 
requirements contained in the Act (805 ILCS 10/1 et seq. (West 2000)) 
applied to plaintiff and its podiatrists.
Plaintiff noted that each podiatrist in its employ 
maintained a valid license to practice podiatry in Illinois, and that it 
therefore complied with the licensing requirements under the Podiatric Medical 
Practice Act. With respect to the administrative requirements set forth in the 
Act, plaintiff argued that because the Act's "certificate of registration is 
just an administrative mechanism to confirm that an incorporated practitioner 
holds a valid Illinois professional license," its lack of registration did not 
bar it from maintaining an action against Blue Cross.
On October 30, 2002, the circuit court denied Blue Cross' 
motion to dismiss without prejudice. Although the court granted plaintiff leave 
to file an amended complaint, plaintiff did not avail itself of this 
opportunity. Blue Cross thereafter filed a motion to reconsider. The circuit 
court denied this motion on December 16, 2002.
On April 16, 2003, Blue Cross filed in the circuit court a 
motion for summary judgment, pursuant to section 2-1005 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2000)). In its summary judgment motion, Blue 
Cross repeated the argument that it had unsuccessfully advanced in its prior 
motion to dismiss. Blue Cross asserted that it was entitled to judgment on 
plaintiff's complaint as a matter of law because plaintiff failed to obtain a 
certificate of registration from the Department pursuant to section 12 of the 
Act (805 ILCS 10/12 (West 2000)) and, therefore, was barred from maintaining an 
action to recover fees for medical services under any legal theory. In addition, 
Blue Cross argued, because plaintiff lacked a certificate of registration, it 
was engaged in the unlicensed practice of medicine, an absolute bar to any right 
of recovery. In its motion, Blue Cross noted that plaintiff had admitted that it 
did not possess a certificate of registration from the Department at the time it 
entered into the June 2000 agreement, but that plaintiff did obtain a 
certificate of registration in September 2002.
In response, plaintiff reiterated the argument it had 
advanced in opposition to Blue Cross' earlier motion to dismiss. Plaintiff 
argued that its lack of compliance with the certificate of registration 
requirement neither violated public policy nor harmed the public welfare. 
Plaintiff noted that each podiatrist in its employ maintained a valid license to 
practice podiatry in Illinois, that it therefore complied with the licensing 
requirements under the Podiatric Medical Practice Act, and that its lack of 
registration as a professional service corporation did not bar it from 
maintaining an action against Blue Cross.
On July 17, 2003, the circuit court granted Blue Cross' 
motion for summary judgment with respect to counts III and IV of plaintiff's 
complaint, wherein plaintiff asserted that Blue Cross violated provisions of the 
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, as well as the Insurance 
Code. However, the circuit court entered and continued Blue Cross' motion for 
summary judgment with respect to the dual claims that Blue Cross breached the 
June 2000 contract and engaged in fraud, allegations contained in counts I and 
II of plaintiff's complaint. The circuit court granted plaintiff leave to file a 
motion to supplement the record to submit and address any new evidence.
In its motion to supplement the record, plaintiff argued 
that a professional service corporation offends neither public policy nor the 
public welfare by performing services without a current certificate of 
registration. Plaintiff noted that section 12.1 of the Act addresses the 
operation of a professional corporation with a lapsed certificate of 
registration. 805 ILCS 10/12.1 (West 2000)). Plaintiff observed that the only 
sanction imposed based upon a lapsed certificate is that the Department may 
require that the corporation pay a renewal fee. Plaintiff asserted that nothing 
in section 12.1 bars a professional service corporation from maintaining an 
action to recover its fees, even if the corporation lacks a current certificate 
of registration. In addition, according to plaintiff, when it renewed its 
registration certificate in September 2002, the Department waived payment of any 
additional fees. This, according to plaintiff, further supported its position 
that the failure to maintain a current certificate of registration with the 
Department did not impinge upon the public safety.
In its supplemental pleading, plaintiff also introduced 
statistics generated by the Department that only 38% of active professional 
corporations and 50% of active medical corporations in Illinois possess a 
current certificate of registration issued by the Department. Plaintiff argued 
that such a widespread lack of compliance bolstered its claim that the 
legislature never intended the Act's certificate of registration requirement to 
be the vehicle for expressing public policy or protecting the public welfare. 
Plaintiff asserted that if the registration requirement had been intended to 
protect the public, the legislature would have provided a criminal penalty for 
noncompliance with this requirement.
In addition, plaintiff introduced a flyer created by Blue 
Cross which stated that Blue Cross' participating provider network encompasses 
over 80% of all Illinois physicians. Plaintiff surmised that, given that 50% of 
the medical corporations in Illinois do not have a current certificate of 
registration, this means that a great number of medical corporations in the Blue 
Cross network do not have current certificates of registration with the 
Department. Yet, plaintiff argued, it could be assumed that Blue Cross 
nevertheless paid these unregistered providers, while refusing to pay plaintiff.
On October 14, 2003, the circuit court entered a written 
memorandum opinion and order, granting Blue Cross summary judgment on the 
remainder of the counts in plaintiff's complaint. The circuit court held:
"[T]his court agrees with [Blue Cross'] analysis of the 
applicable case law regarding the purpose of the Illinois Medical Practice Act, 
Medical Corporation Act, Illinois Podiatric Medical Practice Act and the 
Professional Service Corporation Act, i.e., that the legislative intent 
behind the various licensing requirements is for the protection of the public. 
[Plaintiff's] failure to obtain an appropriate certificate of registration from 
the Department of Professional Regulation affects the public welfare. The court 
notes that each individual doctor could have contracted with [Blue Cross] and 
that those contracts would have been valid. Further, this court reviewed the 
supplemental evidence provided by the plaintiff in conjunction with its motion 
to supplement the record. This court finds that said supplemental evidence 
failed to show that plaintiff did in fact have the requisite certificate of 
registration. Although the result here is harsh, the court's analysis of the law 
and facts requires its finding that [plaintiff's] failure to maintain its 
registration precludes [plaintiff] from enforcing its contract with [Blue 
Cross]."
Accordingly, the circuit court granted Blue Cross' motion 
for summary judgment in its entirety.
On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of 
the circuit court. The appellate court held that the Podiatric Medical Practice 
Act of 1987 provides that a corporation having a purpose of practicing podiatry 
is required to be organized under the Act. In turn, the Act requires such a 
corporation to obtain a certificate of registration from the Department. The 
appellate court, quoting Ransburg v. Haase, 224 Ill. App. 3d 681, 
684-85 (1992), observed that it is the general rule that courts will not enforce 
contracts involving a party " 'who does not have a license called for by 
legislation that expressly prohibits the carrying on of the particular activity 
without a license where the legislation was enacted for the protection of the 
public.' "
Finding that the terms "license" and "certificate of 
registration" are used interchangeably in the Act (see 805 ILCS 10/3.3 (West 
2000)), the appellate court stressed that, in instances where the licensing 
requirements are intended to protect the public, contracts violating statutes 
governing the licensing of professionals have been held to injure the public 
welfare and, thus, to be unenforceable under any legal theory. Citing to 
Tovar v. Paxton Community Memorial Hospital, 29 Ill. App. 3d 218, 220 
(1975), the appellate court observed that it has been held that failure to 
comply with the licensing provisions of the Medical Practice Act precludes a 
party from maintaining an action for fees or services as a physician or surgeon. 
Quoting from Tovar, 29 Ill. App. 3d at 220, the appellate court 
concluded that because " '[t]he purpose of the statutes establishing a licensing 
requirement is not to generate revenue, but rather to protect the public by 
assuring them of adequately trained practitioners,' " it followed that " 'a 
person who practices medicine without obtaining the required license cannot 
maintain an action for his promised compensation.' " Accordingly, the appellate 
court held, the rule set forth in Tovar had similar application to the 
instant matter.
The appellate court also rejected plaintiff's argument 
that its failure to obtain a certificate of registration from the Department 
should be excused by the valid license to practice podiatry held by Dr. Rosner, 
plaintiff's sole shareholder, officer and director. The appellate court held 
that an essentially identical argument was rejected in Kaplan v. Tabb 
Associates, Inc., 276 Ill. App. 3d 320, 325 (1995), where an architectural 
firm lacked the requisite license but the sole owner of the corporation was a 
licensed architect.
Finally, the appellate court rejected plaintiff's further 
argument, premised on Joseph P. Storto, P.C. v. Becker, 341 Ill. App. 
3d 337 (2003), that its failure to obtain a certificate of registration did not 
implicate public welfare concerns and, therefore, did not render its contract 
with defendant void. The appellate court held that, contrary to plaintiff's 
assertions, the lack of criminal penalties for a violation of the registration 
requirement contained in the Act is not dispositive here because, unlike the 
registration provisions found in our Rule 721 that apply to attorneys and was at 
issue in Storto, the statutory language of the Podiatric Medical 
Practice Act explicitly establishes the public safety implications of the 
licensing requirement for the practice of podiatric medicine. Accordingly, the 
appellate court held that "plaintiff's failure to obtain the requisite 
certificate of registration renders its contract with defendant void and 
precludes it from maintaining an action to recover fees under any theory."
This court granted plaintiff's petition for leave to 
appeal pursuant to our Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315). We also granted leave to 
the Illinois Podiatric Medical Association, the Illinois Chiropractic Society, 
and the Chicago Dental Society to file amicus curiae briefs in this 
matter.

ANALYSIS
A motion for summary judgment is properly granted when the 
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file establish that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and, therefore, the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2000); 
Land v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 421 
(2002). In ruling upon a motion for summary judgment, a court has a duty to 
construe the evidence strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the 
nonmovant. Travelers Insurance Co. v. Eljer Manufacturing, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 278, 292 (2001). Although summary judgment is an efficient and useful 
aid in the expeditious disposition of a lawsuit, "summary judgment is a drastic 
measure and should only be granted if the movant's right to judgment is clear 
and free from doubt." Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 
154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992). In appeals from summary judgment rulings, our review 
is de novo. Travelers Insurance Co., 197 Ill. 2d  at 292.
In the instant cause, the circuit court, pursuant to 
section 2-1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2000)), 
granted Blue Cross' motion for summary judgment. The circuit court held that 
because plaintiff failed to obtain from the Department a certificate of 
registration pursuant to section 12 of the Act, plaintiff endangered the public 
safety and, therefore, plaintiff was precluded from enforcing against Blue Cross 
any contracts with respect to its provision of podiatric services. Accordingly, 
at issue in this appeal is whether plaintiff's lack of a current certificate of 
registration issued by the Department pursuant to section 12 of the Act means 
that plaintiff is providing podiatric services without a license, thereby 
rendering the June 2000 contract with Blue Cross void.
Plaintiff contends that the appellate court erred in 
affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to Blue Cross. According 
to plaintiff, the appellate court improperly equated a professional service 
corporation's failure to register pursuant to section 12 of the Act with the 
unlicensed practice of podiatry. Plaintiff asserts, contrary to the holding of 
the appellate court, that the Act's certificate of registration requirement is 
not a regulatory provision enacted to protect public safety. Rather, it is an 
administrative provision which not only allows individual professionals to form 
a corporation through which they may provide their services to the public, but 
also functions as a means to raise revenue for the state.
According to plaintiff, the appellate court arrived at its 
holding by improperly reading provisions of the Podiatric Medical Practice Act 
(225 ILCS 100/1 (West 2000)) into the Act. Plaintiff observes that the Podiatric 
Medical Practice Act contains specific licensing requirements and explicitly 
states that its provisions are intended to protect the public health and 
welfare. Plaintiff emphasizes that at all times relevant to this litigation it 
has been in compliance with the licensing requirements of the Podiatric Medical 
Practice Act, and argues that the certificate of registration requirement 
imposed on corporations by the Professional Service Corporation Act is unrelated 
to licensing. Plaintiff contends that because it is in compliance with all 
licensing requirements, the appellate court erred in finding that its contract 
with Blue Cross was unenforceable as against public policy.
In addition, plaintiff asserts, the only other appellate 
court decisions to interpret the scope of the Act's certificate of registration 
requirement rejected the analysis and conclusion arrived at by the appellate 
court below, and found that the Act's registration requirement is not intended 
to protect the public health, safety and welfare. See Riggs v. Woman to 
Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 351 Ill. App. 3d 268 (2004); 
Brockett v. Davis, 325 Ill. App. 3d 727 (2001). Plaintiff concludes that 
there is a distinct difference between requiring an individual to obtain a 
license to practice a profession, which does affect the public welfare, and 
requiring a medical professional corporation to maintain a certificate of 
registration, which does not.
In support of the position taken by plaintiff in the 
instant cause, the Illinois Podiatric Medical Association (Podiatric 
Association) has filed a brief as amicus curiae, contending that the 
appellate court's decision is contrary to the plain language of the relevant 
statutes. According to the Podiatric Association, the Act, unlike the Podiatric 
Medical Practice Act, is not meant to protect public health, safety and welfare. 
To the contrary, the only stated legislative intent in the Act is merely to 
allow individuals who are already licensed under other statutes-such as the 
Podiatric Medical Practice Act-to operate in corporate form. See 805 ILCS 10/2 
(West 2000). The Podiatric Association maintains that the purpose of 
professionals operating in corporate form, pursuant to the provisions of the 
Act, is to obtain the protection of limited liability, as well as garner certain 
tax benefits. The Podiatric Association asserts that the lower courts in this 
case erred by mistakenly reading into the Act provisions from an entirely 
different statute-the Podiatric Medical Practice Act-which was expressly 
intended to protect public health and safety.
In addition, the Chicago Dental Society (Society) has 
filed an amicus brief with this court in support of plaintiff's 
position. In its submission, the Society argues that the effect of the appellate 
court's decision below is to void all contracts executed by professional service 
corporations which are unregistered pursuant to section 12 of the Act. The 
Society stresses that podiatrists are not the only health-care professionals who 
organize as professional service corporations and which have participating 
provider agreements with insurers. According to the Society, the decisions of 
the lower courts which determined these agreements to be void not only leave 
unregistered professional service corporations with numerous patients who now do 
not have insurance, but also permits the insurers to reap a substantial 
windfall.
The Society further argues that the appellate court below 
erred in holding that the Act was intended to protect the public welfare because 
the court relied upon cases invalidating contracts executed by medical providers 
who did not obtain a license to practice. Clearly, a health-care provider who 
does not have a license to practice cannot enter into a valid fee agreement with 
patients. The Society argues that in this case, however, it is merely the 
professional service corporation which failed to obtain an administrative 
certificate of registration under the Act, and issues of licensing are not 
involved.
In response, Blue Cross asserts that the legislature has 
crafted a "statutory scheme" intended to protect the public safety, and the 
certificate of registration requirement is an integral part of this mechanism. 
Blue Cross observes that the Podiatric Medical Practice Act explicitly states 
that the practice of podiatric medicine affects the public health, safety and 
welfare, and is subject to regulation and control in the public interest. In 
addition, Blue Cross notes, the Podiatric Medical Practice Act also provides 
that any corporation that wishes to offer podiatric services to the public must 
be organized under the Act. Thus, Blue Cross argues, the Podiatric Medical 
Practice Act specifically incorporates the requirement for a certificate of 
registration imposed by the Act. Blue Cross therefore concludes that because the 
stated purpose of the Podiatric Medical Practice Act is to protect the public, 
the certificate of registration requirement also necessarily serves this 
purpose.
Blue Cross further asserts that, even if the Podiatric 
Medical Practice Act did not incorporate the Act into its legislative scheme, it 
is apparent that the Act's certificate requirement, standing alone, is also 
intended to safeguard the public. According to Blue Cross, "the requirement to 
obtain a certificate is the mechanism by which a professional service 
corporation is subjected to the jurisdiction of the Department," and a 
corporation that does not apply for a certificate thereby evades the 
Department's regulatory powers. Blue Cross argues that because the legislature 
vested the Department with oversight responsibilities to protect the public from 
receiving services from unlicensed individuals, the requirement that a 
professional service corporation obtain a certificate of registration from the 
Department protects public safety. We reject each of the arguments advanced by 
Blue Cross.
It is well settled that "courts will not aid a plaintiff 
who bases his cause of action on an illegal act." King v. First Capital 
Financial Services Corp., 215 Ill. 2d 1, 35 (2005). More specifically, 
"courts will not enforce a contract involving a party who does not have a 
license called for by legislation that expressly prohibits the carrying on of 
the particular activity without a license where the legislation was enacted for 
the protection of the public, not as a revenue measure." Ransburg v. Haase, 
224 Ill. App. 3d 681, 684-85 (1992); see generally Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts §181 (1981) (if a party is prohibited from performing an act because 
the party fails to comply with a licensing requirement, "a promise in 
consideration of his doing that act or of his promise to do it is unenforceable 
on grounds of public policy if (a) the requirement has a regulatory purpose, and 
(b) the interest in the enforcement of the promise is clearly outweighed by the 
public policy behind the requirement"). Accordingly, a "contract made by an 
unlicensed individual calling for his personal services *** is unenforceable."
Pascal P. Paddock, Inc. v. Glennon, 32 Ill. 2d 51, 54 (1964); 
Ransburg, 224 Ill. App. 3d at 685 ("a person practicing a profession 
without a license cannot recover fees for services rendered").
On numerous occasions, Illinois courts have held that 
where a licensing requirement has been enacted not to generate revenue, but 
rather to safeguard the public by assuring them of adequately trained 
practitioners, the unlicensed party may not recover fees for services or 
otherwise enforce a contract. See, e.g., Lozoff v. Shore Heights, 
Ltd., 66 Ill. 2d 398 (1977) (attorney licensed in Wisconsin but not 
licensed in Illinois and who represented clients in Illinois with respect to an 
out-of-court matter was barred from recovering fees); Douthart v. Congdon, 
197 Ill. 349 (1902) (unlicensed grain broker was denied recovery on contract 
because he lacked a broker's license); Kaplan v. Tabb Associates, 276 
Ill. App. 3d 320 (1995) (building contract was void where the defendant 
architectural corporation was not licensed in Illinois); Tovar v. Paxton 
Community Memorial Hospital, 29 Ill. App. 3d 218 (1975) (physician not 
licensed in Illinois could not enforce employment contract with hospital).
Accordingly, in the instant appeal, our inquiry is whether 
the Act's certificate of registration requirement is an administrative mechanism 
by which professionals may provide their services in the corporate form, or 
whether it is a regulatory provision intended to protect the health, safety and 
welfare of the public. The answer to this question, in turn, determines whether 
plaintiff's June 2000 contract with Blue Cross is enforceable. This is a 
question of statutory construction.
It is well settled that the primary objective of this 
court when construing the meaning of a statute is to ascertain and give effect 
to the intent of the legislature. In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d 364, 
372 (2005). In determining legislative intent, our inquiry begins with an 
examination of the plain language of the statute, which is the most reliable 
indication of the legislature's objectives in enacting a particular law. In 
re D.F., 208 Ill. 2d 223, 229 (2003). A keystone principle of statutory 
construction is to view all provisions of a statutory enactment as a whole. 
Accordingly, words and phrases should not be construed in isolation, but must be 
interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute. Michigan 
Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503 (2000). In 
construing a statute, we presume that the General Assembly, in its enactment of 
legislation, did not intend absurdity, inconvenience or injustice. People ex 
rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d 264, 508 (2003).
The practice of podiatry in this state is governed by the 
Podiatric Medical Practice Act (225 ILCS 100/1 et seq. (West 2000)).(1) "Podiatric medicine" or "podiatry" is defined by 
the Act as "the diagnosis, medical, physical, or surgical treatment of the 
ailments of the human foot with the exception of administration of general 
anesthetics and the amputation of the human foot." 225 ILCS 100/5(D) (West 
2000). In section 1 of the Act, the General Assembly set forth a declaration of 
public policy with respect to the practice of podiatric medicine:
"The practice of podiatric medicine in the State of 
Illinois is declared to affect the public health, safety and welfare and to be 
subject to regulation and control in the public interest. It is further declared 
to be a matter of public interest and concern that podiatric physicians and the 
practice of podiatric medicine as defined in this Act, merit and receive the 
confidence of the public, that only qualified persons be authorized to practice 
podiatric medicine in the State of Illinois and that no person shall practice 
podiatric medicine without a valid existing license to do so. This Act shall be 
liberally construed to best carry out these subjects and purposes." 225 ILCS 
100/1 (West 2000).
Thus, the plain language of section 1 of the Podiatric 
Medical Practice Act provides that because the practice of podiatry affects the 
"public health, safety and welfare," only "qualified persons" shall be 
authorized to practice podiatry, and that no person shall practice podiatry 
without a "valid existing license" to do so.
Section 10 of the Podiatric Medical Practice Act provides 
that a person shall be "qualified" for licensure as a podiatric physician
"(A) who has applied for licensure on forms prepared and 
furnished by the Department;
(B) who is at least 21 years of age;
(C) who is of good moral character. In determining moral 
character under this Section, the Department may take into consideration any 
felony conviction of the applicant, but such a conviction shall not operate as a 
bar to licensure;
(D) who is a graduate of an approved college of podiatric 
medicine and has attained the academic degree of doctor of podiatric medicine (D.P.M.);
(E) who has successfully completed an examination 
authorized by the Department[(2)]; and
(F) who has successfully completed a minimum of one year 
postgraduate training as defined in Section 5 of this Act.[(3)] 
The postgraduate training requirement shall be effective July 1, 1992." 225 ILCS 
100/10 (West 2000).
Accordingly, under the plain language of this section of 
the Podiatric Medical Practice Act, in order to be qualified to be licensed to 
practice podiatric medicine, an individual must satisfy each of the enumerated 
criteria.
If an individual does not meet all the criteria set forth 
in the Podiatric Medical Practice Act, that applicant will not be licensed to 
practice podiatry in this state. Section 11.5 of the Podiatric Medical Practice 
Act forbids the unlicensed practice of podiatry, and provides that
"[a]ny person who practices, offers to practice, attempts 
to practice, or holds oneself out to practice podiatry without being licensed 
under this Act shall, in addition to any other penalty provided by law, pay a 
civil penalty to the Department in an amount not to exceed $5,000 for each 
offense as determined by the Department. The civil penalty shall be assessed by 
the Department after a hearing is held in accordance with the provisions set 
forth in this Act regarding the provision of a hearing for the discipline of a 
licensee." 225 ILCS 100/11.5(a) (West 2000).
The General Assembly allows the practice of podiatry by 
individuals who have formed a corporation, as long as certain requirements are 
satisfied. Section 22 of the Podiatric Medical Practice Act provides that:
"No license shall be issued by the Department to any 
corporation (i) that has a stated purpose that includes podiatry, or (ii) that 
practices or holds itself out as available to practice podiatry unless it is 
organized under the Professional Service Corporation Act." (Emphasis 
added.) 225 ILCS 100/22 (West 2000).
Accordingly, we turn to a review of the relevant 
provisions of the Act. By enacting the Act, the legislature provided for the 
organization of a particular class of business corporation. In section 4 of the 
Act, the General Assembly indicated that there is a close parallel between the 
attributes of a traditional corporation and those of a professional corporation:
"The 'Business Corporation Act of 1983' *** shall be 
applicable to professional corporations organized under this Act, and they shall 
enjoy the powers and privileges and be subject to the duties, restrictions, and 
liabilities of other corporations, except where inconsistent with the letter and 
purpose of this Act." 805 ILCS 10/4 (West 2000).
In section 2 of the Act, the legislature set forth the 
following stated intent:
"It is the legislative intent to provide for the 
incorporation of an individual or group of individuals to render the same 
professional service or related professional services to the public for which 
such individuals are required by law to be licensed or to obtain other legal 
authorization, while preserving the established professional aspects of the 
personal relationship between the professional person and those he serves 
professionally." 805 ILCS 10/2 (West 2000).
Thus, in enacting the Act, the General Assembly intended 
to allow one or more individuals, each of whom is "licensed" to perform the same 
professional or related professional services, to form a "professional service 
corporation" through which they may render these same professional services to 
the public.
In turn, the term "professional service corporation" is 
defined in section 3.4 of the Act:
"a corporation organized under this Act solely for the 
purpose of rendering one category of professional service or related 
professional services and which has as its shareholders, directors, officers, 
agents and employees (other than ancillary personnel) only individuals who are 
duly licensed by this State *** to render that particular category of 
professional service or related professional services ***." 805 ILCS 10/3.4(a) 
(West 2000).
The Act defines the term "license" to include "a license, 
certificate of registration or any other evidence of the satisfaction of the 
requirements of this State *** for the practice of a professional service." 805 
ILCS 10/3.3 (West 2000). "Professional service" is defined in the Act as "any 
personal service which requires as a condition precedent to the rendering 
thereof the obtaining of a license from a State agency." 805 ILCS 10/3.5 (West 
2000). In section 7 of the Act, the legislature further provides that
"No corporation organized and incorporated under this Act 
may render professional services, except through its officers, employees and 
agents who are duly licensed *** to render such professional services within 
this State." 805 ILCS 10/7 (West 2000).
Section 12 of the Act sets forth the requirement for a 
certificate of registration, as well as the procedures for obtaining the 
certificate, the fee for the certificate, certificate renewal procedures, and a 
posting requirement:
"No corporation shall open, operate or maintain an 
establishment for any of the purposes for which a corporation may be organized 
under this Act without a certificate of registration from the regulating 
authority authorized by law to license individuals to engage in the profession 
or related professions concerned. Application for such registration shall be 
made in writing, and shall contain the name and address of the corporation, and 
such other information as may be required by the regulating authority. Upon 
receipt of such application, the regulating authority, or some administrative 
agency of government designated by it, shall make an investigation of the 
corporation. *** If such authority finds that the incorporators, officers, 
directors and shareholders are each licensed pursuant to the laws of Illinois to 
engage in the particular profession *** and if no disciplinary action is pending 
before it against any of them, and if it appears that the corporation will be 
conducted in compliance with the law and the regulations and rules of the 
regulating authority, such authority, shall issue, upon payment of a 
registration fee of $50, a certificate of registration.
Upon written application of the holder, the regulating 
authority which originally issued the certificate of registration shall renew 
the certificate if it finds that the corporation has complied with its 
regulations and the provisions of this Act.
The fee for the renewal of a certificate of registration 
shall be calculated at the rate of $40 per year.
The certificate of registration shall be conspicuously 
posted upon the premises to which it is applicable, and the professional 
corporation shall have only those offices which are designated by street address 
in the articles of incorporation, or as changed by amendment of such articles. 
No certificate of registration shall be assignable." 805 ILCS 10/12 (West 2000).
In section 12.1 of the Act, the legislature addresses 
situations in which a professional service corporation allows its certificate of 
registration to lapse. Although this section refers to certificates that have 
lapsed as a result of the professional service corporation paying fees to the 
Department with a check returned for insufficient funds, we nevertheless find 
its provisions relevant. Section 12.1 states that if
"the corporation whose certificate of registration has 
lapsed continues to practice as a corporation without paying the renewal fee and 
the $50 fee required under this Section, an additional fee of $100 shall be 
imposed for practicing without a current license. The Department shall notify 
the corporation whose certificate of registration has lapsed, within 30 days 
after the discovery by the Department that such corporation is operating without 
a current certificate, that the corporation is operating without a certificate, 
and of the amount due to the Department which shall include the lapsed renewal 
fee and all other fees required by this Section. If after the expiration of 30 
days from the date of such notification, the corporation whose certificate has 
lapsed seeks a current certificate, it shall thereafter apply to the Department 
for reinstatement of the certificate and pay all fees due to the Department. The 
Department may establish a fee for the processing of an application for 
reinstatement of a certificate which allows the Department to pay all costs and 
expenses incident to the processing of this application. The Director may waive 
the fees due under this Section in individual cases where he finds that in the 
particular case such fees would be unreasonable or unnecessarily burdensome." 
805 ILCS 10/12.1 (West 2000).
Furthermore, section 13 of the Act provides that the 
regulating authority which issued the certificate of registration may suspend or 
revoke it for several reasons, one of which is "[t]he revocation or suspension 
of the license to practice the profession of any officer, director, shareholder 
or employee not promptly removed or discharged by the corporation." 805 ILCS 
10/13 (West 2000). Finally, in section 14 of the Act, the legislature sets forth 
the procedures for renewing a certificate of registration. The corporation shall 
file with "the appropriate regulating authority a certificate giving the name 
and residence address of all shareholders as of the last day of the month 
preceding such filing, and certifying that all such shareholders are duly 
licensed to render the same professional services or related professional 
services as those for which the corporation was organized." 805 ILCS 10/14 (West 
2000).
Upon reviewing the relevant provisions of the Podiatric 
Medical Practice Act and the Act, we agree with plaintiff that the requirement 
imposed by section 12 of the Act on professional service corporations to obtain 
a certificate of registration was not enacted as a regulatory measure to protect 
the public health, safety and welfare. We hold that the appellate court erred in 
concluding that the terms "license" and "certificate of registration" are 
synonymous, as nothing in the relevant statutory provisions supports the 
appellate court's interpretation that a "license" and a "certificate of 
registration" are functionally equivalent. We believe that the correct 
interpretation of the scope and purpose of the Act's certificate of registration 
requirement was set forth in Riggs v. Woman to Woman, Obstetrics & 
Gynecology, P.C., 351 Ill. App. 3d 268 (2004), a case that was decided 
subsequent to the filing of the appellate court's unpublished order in the 
matter at bar.
Riggs addressed the issue of whether the 
plaintiff, a physician, was bound by a covenant not to compete with the 
defendant, a professional service corporation, on the basis that the defendant's 
failure to obtain a certificate of registration from the Department pursuant to 
section 12 of the Act rendered the employment agreement void ab initio. 
The trial court ruled in the plaintiff's favor, finding that the Act was 
intended to regulate the practice of medicine and protect the public health and 
safety. Accordingly, the trial court held that because the defendant had failed 
to obtain a certificate of registration in compliance with the Act, the 
defendant was therefore not authorized to practice medicine, and the agreement 
between the parties was against public policy and void ab initio. 
However, finding that there was substantial ground for difference of opinion 
with respect to its legal conclusion, and that an immediate appeal could 
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, the trial court 
certified two questions for review to the appellate court, pursuant to our Rule 
308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308): whether the Act's certificate of registration 
requirement for medical corporations is intended to protect the public's health, 
safety or welfare; and whether the defendant's failure to comply with the Act's 
certificate of registration requirement rendered the employment agreement void
ab initio. The appellate court answered both questions in the negative.
First, the Riggs court held that there was 
nothing in the Act that supported the conclusion of the trial court that the 
General Assembly enacted the Act for the protection of the public. The Riggs 
court found that "[i]t is clear, based on a reading of the entire Act, that the 
function of the Act is primarily permissive, allowing professionals, who would 
otherwise not be entitled to enjoy the benefits of incorporating, to establish 
corporate entities for their professional practices." Riggs, 351 Ill. 
App. 3d at 272.
In support of this conclusion, the court in Riggs 
explained:
"It is generally recognized that professional service 
corporation legislation, similar to the Act, arose 'out of the desire of 
professional groups to realize the tax benefits open to employees under the 
qualified pension, profit-sharing, and annuity plan provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code.' J. Rydstrom, Practice by Attorneys & Physicians as Corporate 
Entities or Associations Under Professional Service Corporation Statutes, 4 
A.L.R. 3d 383, 385 (1965); see also 18 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations §37 
(2003). In addition to providing certain tax breaks, incorporation under the Act 
reduces potential civil liability. See 805 ILCS 10/8 (West 2002). Clearly, the 
intent of the legislature here is not to advance the public welfare but to allow 
professionals to incorporate in order to enjoy certain tax benefits and to 
reduce their potential civil liability." Riggs, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 
272.
Further, the Riggs court rejected the plaintiff's 
argument that the defendant's lack of a certificate of registration under the 
Act to practice as a professional service corporation equated with the lack of a 
license to practice medicine. The court in Riggs emphasized that there 
is a clear difference between these two concepts, because "those statutes 
requiring licenses to practice a profession are necessary for the public safety 
because they have been enacted to provide assurance of adequately trained 
professionals." In contrast, "[a] violation of the Act does not necessarily mean 
that the doctors lack the requisite medical skills to practice medicine." 
Riggs, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 273. Thus, the Riggs court concluded 
that because nothing in the plain language of the Act signifies that it was 
enacted for the benefit of the health, safety and welfare of the public, the 
defendant's failure to comply with the Act's registration requirement did not 
render the employment agreement void ab initio.
We adopt the analysis of the Act set forth by the court in 
the Riggs decision. Accordingly, we reject the argument advanced by 
Blue Cross, based upon the appellate court's holding below, that when the Act 
and the Podiatric Medical Practice Act are read in concert, it is evident that a 
"license" and a "certificate of registration" are functionally equivalent. Blue 
Cross premises this argument upon the General Assembly's statement of 
legislative intent that the Podiatric Medical Practice Act was enacted to 
protect the "public health, safety and welfare." 225 ILCS 100/1 (West 2000). 
According to Blue Cross, the legislature's intent that the certificate of 
registration requirement found in the Act is for the protection of the public is 
evinced by section 22 of the Podiatric Medical Practice Act, which allows the 
practice of podiatry by professional service corporations, and mandates that:
"No license shall be issued by the Department to any 
corporation (i) that has a stated purpose that includes podiatry, or (ii) that 
practices or holds itself out as available to practice podiatry unless it is 
organized under the Professional Service Corporation Act." 225 ILCS 100/22 (West 
2000).
Blue Cross argues that the reference to a corporate 
"license" in this section of the Podiatric Medical Practice Act refers to the 
Act's "certificate of registration" requirement. Blue Cross reasons that because 
the Podiatric Medical Practice Act was enacted to protect the public, and 
because section 22 of that Act incorporates the Act by reference, this leads to 
the conclusion that the Act's certificate of registration requirement was 
similarly intended to protect the public. We disagree.
Comparison of the statutory prerequisites for a 
certificate of registration under the Act with those to obtain a license under 
the Podiatric Medical Practice Act reveals that a corporate certificate of 
registration and a license to practice podiatry are not functionally equivalent. 
To obtain a license to practice podiatry, the Podiatric Medical Practice Act 
requires that an individual must be at least 21 years of age, of good moral 
character, and a graduate of an approved podiatric medical school. 225 ILCS 
100/10 (West 2000). The individual must also have obtained a doctorate in 
podiatric medicine, passed an examination authorized by the Department, and 
finished at least one year of postgraduate training besides completing the 
application and paying a $400 fee. 225 ILCS 100/10, 18 (West 2000). In sum, in 
order to obtain a "license" to practice podiatry, the Podiatric Medical Practice 
Act requires the applicant to prove competency in that profession.
In contrast, a professional service corporation may obtain 
a "certificate of registration" under the Act simply by completing an 
application and paying a $50 registration fee. 805 ILCS 10/12 (West 2000). The 
Act imposes no requirement that any separate professional training be completed, 
nor that any separate professional examination be conducted. The Act does 
require, however, that the individuals seeking to organize as a professional 
service corporation be licensed, stating that "[n]o corporation shall open, 
operate or maintain an establishment for any of the purposes for which a 
corporation may be organized under this Act without a certificate of 
registration from the regulating authority authorized by law to license 
individuals to engage in the profession." (Emphases added.) 805 ILCS 10/12 
(West 2000). In other words, the Act provides that an individual or group of 
individuals, who are currently "licensed as individuals to engage in the 
profession," may form a professional service corporation through which they may 
provide their services to the public. There is no need for the legislature to 
require that the individuals forming the professional service corporation be 
licensed as a prerequisite to that corporation obtaining a certificate 
of registration unless a license and a certificate of registration are two 
separate concepts which serve two distinct purposes. For example, an individual 
who is unlicensed to practice a profession in an individual capacity does not 
become "licensed" simply by virtue of being part of a professional service 
corporation that holds a current certificate of registration issued by the 
Department. Conversely, a duly licensed professional does not become 
"unlicensed" simply because that individual provides services through an 
unregistered professional service corporation.
In further support of its argument that the terms 
"license" and "certificate of registration" are functionally equivalent, Blue 
Cross points to section 3.3 of the Act (805 ILCS 10/3.3 (West 2000)), which 
defines the term "license" to include a "certificate of registration." Although 
Blue Cross is correct that the Act includes a "certificate of registration" 
within the definition of a "license," its argument that the two terms are 
interchangeable is belied when the entire context of the definition is examined. 
Section 3.3 of the Act defines "license" as "a license, certificate of 
registration or any other evidence" that establishes "the satisfaction of the 
requirements of this State *** for the practice of a professional 
service." (Emphasis added.) 805 ILCS 10/3.3 (West 2000). Thus, pursuant to the 
plain language of section 3.3, anything deemed evidence of satisfying the state 
requirements to lawfully practice a profession falls within the 
definition of a "license." It logically follows, therefore, that anything called 
a "certificate of registration" which does not demonstrate the 
satisfaction of state requirements to practice a profession is not a "license" 
under the Act.
The fundamental distinction between an individual's 
"license" to practice a profession and a professional service corporation's 
"certificate of registration" granted by the Department is underscored in 
several additional sections of the Act. For example, section 2 of the Act 
contains the legislature's intent that the Act is to provide for the 
"incorporation of an individual or group of individuals to render the same 
professional service or related professional services to the public for 
which such individuals are required by law to be licensed or to obtain other 
legal authorization." (Emphasis added.) 805 ILCS 10/2 (West 2000). This 
language reveals that the General Assembly intended to allow an individual or a 
group of individuals who obtain a certificate of registration to deliver, as a 
corporation, the services for which each individual has been 
licensed to practice.
Similarly, the difference between a "license" and a 
"certificate of registration" is reflected in section 3.4 of the Act, which 
defines a "professional service corporation" as an organization wherein its 
shareholders, directors, officers, agents and employees must be "duly 
licensed by this State *** to render that particular category of 
professional service or related professional services." (Emphasis added.) 805 
ILCS 10/3.4(a) (West 2000). This distinction is also underscored in the Act's 
definition of "professional service" as any personal service which requires as a 
condition precedent "the obtaining of a license from a State agency." 
(Emphasis added.) 805 ILCS 10/3.5 (West 2000). The Act also mandates that no 
professional service corporation may render professional services "except 
through its officers, employees and agents who are duly licensed *** to 
render such professional services within this State." (Emphasis added.) 805 ILCS 
10/7 (West 2000).
In addition, the distinction between a license and a 
certificate of registration is highlighted in section 13 of the Act, which 
provides that a certificate of registration may be suspended or revoked upon "[t]he 
revocation or suspension of the license to practice the profession of 
any officer, director, shareholder or employee not promptly removed or 
discharged by the corporation." (Emphasis added.) 805 ILCS 10/13 (West 2000). 
Finally, in renewing the certificate of registration, the corporation shall 
certify, inter alia, that all shareholders "are duly licensed 
to render the same professional services or related professional services as 
those for which the corporation was organized." (Emphasis added.) 805 ILCS 10/14 
(West 2000).
Upon review of the above-cited statutory provisions, it is 
clear that the individuals who form the professional service 
corporation must be licensed to practice the profession. As stated, for 
podiatrists, the licensing requirements are set forth in the Podiatric Medical 
Practice Act. Accordingly, the licensing provisions of the Podiatric Medical 
Practice Act are regulatory and protect the public welfare by assuring the 
public of adequately trained professionals. In the matter before us, it is 
uncontradicted that all of the podiatrists in the employ of plaintiff were in 
compliance with the licensing requirements of the Podiatric Medical Practice 
Act.
In contrast to the Podiatric Medical Practice Act, the 
provisions of the Act do not assure professionalism and competence in the 
practice of podiatry. Rather, the Act provisions underscore that the 
professional service corporation is simply the vehicle by which the General 
Assembly allows licensed individuals to practice their profession in the 
corporate form, and thereby reap the benefits of incorporation. We agree with
Riggs that the function of the Act is "primarily permissive, allowing 
professionals, who would otherwise not be entitled to enjoy the benefits of 
incorporating, to establish corporate entities for their professional 
practices." Riggs, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 272. Incorporation allows not 
only limited liability-which shields the corporation's shareholders from 
personal liability for the torts of the other officers, directors, shareholders 
and employees-but also offers various tax benefits. Riggs, 351 Ill. 
App. 3d at 272.
Although the Podiatric Medical Practice Act incorporates 
the Act by reference, we reject Blue Cross' argument that this means that the 
requirements set forth in the Act were intended to protect the public. If this 
argument is extended to its logical conclusion, it would mean that not only is 
the Act's certificate of registration requirement intended to protect the 
public, but so too are the Act's other administrative requirements, such as 
those for electing a board of directors, for specifying the number and types of 
officers that a professional service corporation may have, for limiting the 
abbreviations a professional service corporation may use in its name and for 
registering an assumed name. 810 ILCS 10/9, 10, 12 (West 2000). None of these 
requirements implicate public safety. We will not interpret a statute so as to 
achieve an absurd result. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d  at 280 (in construing a 
statute, we presume that the General Assembly, in its enactment of legislation, 
did not intend absurdity, inconvenience or injustice).
In addition, Blue Cross further argues that the 
requirement that a professional service corporation obtain a certificate of 
registration from the Department is for the protection of the public health, 
safety and welfare because the Department was created solely for the protection 
of the public. In support of this argument, defendant relies upon provisions in 
the Civil Administrative Code which created the Department and which reflect the 
legislature's intent:
"The practice of the regulated professions, trades and 
occupations in Illinois is hereby declared to affect the public health, safety, 
and welfare of the People of the State and in the public interest is subject to 
regulation and control by the Department of Professional Regulation." 20 ILCS 
2105/2105-10 (West 2000).
Thus, defendant asserts, the appellate court below 
properly held that the certificate requirement is for the protection of the 
public welfare, and not merely a revenue-generating mechanism. We disagree. 
Giving the Department administrative oversight of the Act's certification 
requirement does not mean that the legislature intended for the Act to protect 
the public. We agree with the court in Riggs that the Act "assigns only 
minor, administrative functions to the [Department], whose tasks are more 
ministerial than regulatory." Riggs, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 272.
Indeed, the court in Riggs correctly noted there 
are no civil or criminal penalties contained within the Act for noncompliance 
with the certificate of registration requirement, and that such penalties would 
indicate that the provision was enacted because it had a significant impact on 
the public welfare. Riggs, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 272. The Riggs 
court also correctly observed that the only enforcement authority provided to 
the Department under the Act is the Department's ability to revoke a certificate 
of registration (805 ILCS 10/13 (West 2000)), or to collect an additional $100 
fee when a professional service corporation's certificate of registration lapses 
and it continues to practice without a current certificate. 805 ILCS 10/12.1 
(West 2000). This fee, however, is not mandatory and may be waived by the 
Director of the Department if its imposition would be "unreasonable or 
unnecessarily burdensome." 805 ILCS 10/12.1 (West 2000). Notably, in the matter 
before us, the Department did not pursue any action against plaintiff as a 
result of its failure to maintain a current certificate of registration. In 
fact, the record reflects that when plaintiff renewed its certificate of 
registration in September 2002, the Department waived payment of any additional 
fees. In addition, nowhere in the Act did the legislature suggest that contracts 
with an otherwise valid professional service corporation should be voided 
because the corporation did not maintain a current certificate of registration. 
We conclude that the Department's limited administrative power to enforce the 
Act is yet another indication that the Act's certification of registration 
requirement was not intended to protect the public.
In sum, viewing, as we must, the provisions of the Act as 
a whole (Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 504), we hold 
that the term "certificate of registration" as used in the Act is not 
functionally equivalent to a license to practice a profession, and that there is 
nothing in the Act to indicate that the requirement of a professional service 
corporation to maintain a current certificate of registration was enacted to 
protect the public safety. We believe that if the General Assembly had intended 
for the provisions of the Act to protect the public welfare, the legislature 
would have said so, just as it has explicitly stated in the Podiatric Medical 
Practice Act that the licensing requirements for podiatrists are meant to ensure 
the public health, safety and welfare. In the instant matter, there is no 
dispute that the podiatrists were duly licensed to practice podiatry in 
accordance with the Podiatric Medical Practice Act. Therefore, it was error for 
the lower courts to hold that plaintiff's June 2000 contract with Blue Cross 
requiring Blue Cross to reimburse plaintiff for fees charged for podiatric 
services to Blue Cross' insureds was unenforceable as against public policy. The 
goal of protecting the public was not implicated by the facts in the instant 
cause.
Our holding in the matter before us is further supported 
by, and consistent with, our recent decision in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. 
Sperry, 214 Ill. 2d 371 (2005), which addressed facts analogous to those in 
the case at bar. In that case, we addressed the issue of whether a judgment 
obtained by a duly licensed attorney who worked for a law firm that had failed 
to register as a professional service corporation with this court, as required 
by our Rule 721(c) (166 Ill. 2d R. 721(c)), was null and void ab initio. 
We held that the lower courts in that case had erred by holding that a duly 
licensed attorney who was a member of a law firm that lacked a Rule 721(c) 
registration had, solely by virtue of the unregistered nature of the firm, 
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
In Ford Motor, we explained that there is a
"fundamental difference between an unlicensed individual 
representing a party in legal proceedings or performing activities traditionally 
considered to be the 'practice of law' and duly licensed attorneys who happen to 
belong to a law firm that has not filed its registration and paid its fees 
pursuant to Rule 721(c). The material inquiry in assessing whether there has 
been an unauthorized practice of law is whether the individual who acts on 
behalf of a client is duly licensed by this court, as it is only individuals-and 
not corporations-who are granted the privilege to practice law." Ford Motor, 
214 Ill. 2d  at 387.
We also observed in Ford Motor that the public 
faced a risk of harm from unlicensed individuals engaging in the practice of 
law, and that an unregistered law firm did not pose a risk of harm to the 
public, but, rather, harmed itself. We noted that "[b]y failing to register, the 
law firm loses its right to invoke the corporate protections of limited 
liability that are set forth in Rule 721." Ford Motor, 214 Ill. 2d  at 
388. We stated that this reality underscored "that the registration requirement 
in Rule 721(c) was not enacted to safeguard the public welfare, but to benefit 
those law firms seeking the tax and limited liability advantages of 
incorporation." Ford Motor, 214 Ill. 2d  at 388. Accordingly, we held 
that "duly licensed attorneys who practice with a law firm that lacks Rule 
721(c) registration do not, by virtue of the unregistered nature of the law 
firm, engage in the unauthorized practice of law." Ford Motor, 214 Ill. 2d  at 390. Therefore, we concluded that it was error for the lower courts to 
hold that the award of attorney fees for the legal services rendered by the 
licensed attorney was null and void. As stated, we hold that this same reasoning 
is applicable in the matter at bar.
As a final matter, we briefly dispense with Blue Cross' 
argument that the appellate court's holding below that the Act's certificate of 
registration requirement is for the protection of the public is consistent with 
"Illinois' well established policy of ensuring that lay people are not 
controlling or influencing professional services." Citing to our decision in 
Carter-Shields v. Alton Health Institute, 201 Ill. 2d 441, 445 (2002), Blue 
Cross observes that the corporate practice of medicine doctrine prevents persons 
or entities that are not licensed by this state from providing physician or 
other medical services, or from excessively influencing the delivery of those 
services. Therefore, Blue Cross argues, if an entity such as plaintiff has not 
complied with the Act's certificate of registration requirement before offering 
professional services to the public, that entity has avoided requirements that 
were enacted to protect the public from the concerns that underlie the 
prohibition of the corporate practice of medicine, i.e., that "the 
Department [must] determine[ ] that lay people did not own or control the 
corporate enterprise that was providing podiatric services and that none of the 
owners had disciplinary proceedings pending against them."
We reject Blue Cross' assertion that the corporate 
practice of medicine doctrine has application to this case. First, the appellate 
court below did not mention this doctrine, or Carter-Shields, the case 
relied upon by Blue Cross. The undisputed evidence shows that Dr. Mitchell 
Rosner, who has always been the sole officer, director and shareholder of 
plaintiff, as well as all other podiatric physicians employed by plaintiff, have 
been duly licensed podiatrists. Plaintiff was never owned or operated by a 
layperson. Thus, there is no danger of "lay control over professional judgment 
and the division of a physician's loyalties which underpin the prohibition 
against the corporate practice of medicine." Carter-Shields, 201 Ill. 2d  at 461. These concerns cannot apply to a validly incorporated professional 
corporation like plaintiff that is owned and operated by licensed medical 
professionals. Riggs, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 277. Because these dangers do 
not, and cannot, exist under the facts presented here, both the corporate 
practice of medicine doctrine and our decision in Carter-Shields are 
inapposite to the instant cause. We agree with the court in Riggs that 
"Carter-Shields is 'miles removed from the situation at issue in the 
present case,' " which involves a professional service corporation's failure to 
obtain a certificate of registration under the Act. Riggs, 351 Ill. 
App. 3d at 277.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the circuit 
and appellate courts are reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit 
court.



Judgments reversed;
cause remanded.
 
1.   1There appears to have been confusion in the lower 
courts with respect to which licensing statute governed plaintiff. Because 
plaintiff is a professional service corporation formed for the purpose of 
delivering podiatric services to its patients, the provisions of the Podiatric 
Medical Practice Act apply. 
2.   2Section 9 of the Podiatric Medical Practice Act states 
that the "Department shall authorize examinations of applicants as podiatric 
physicians," and that the "examination of applicants shall be of a character to 
give a fair test of the qualifications of the applicant to practice podiatric 
medicine." 225 ILCS 100/9 (West 2000).
3.  3Section 
5(G) of the Act defines "[p]ostgraduate training" as a "minimum one year 
postdoctoral structured and supervised educational experience approved by the 
Council on Podiatric Medical Education of the American Podiatric Medical 
Association which includes residencies and preceptorships." 225 ILCS 100/5(G) 
(West 2000).