Case Title: Thomas v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 000408

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2000-11-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
ANTOINE LAMONT THOMAS 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 000408 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
November 3, 2000 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in denying a criminal defendant’s motion that he be permitted to 
waive his right to counsel and to represent himself at trial. 
BACKGROUND 
On March 1, 1999, the grand jury of the City of Richmond 
returned indictments against Antoine Lamont Thomas charging him 
with grand larceny, Code § 18.2-95, and statutory burglary, Code 
§ 18.2-91.  The charges arose from the breaking of a window and 
taking of consumer goods valued at over $600 from a downtown 
Richmond store on August 25, 1998. 
The Circuit Court of the City of Richmond (the trial court) 
appointed counsel to represent Thomas on April 26, 1999, and she 
undertook discovery on his behalf.  For reasons not fully 
disclosed in the record, the trial date was continued four times 
over the course of three months, during which time Thomas 
continued to be represented by his court-appointed counsel. 
On July 22, 1999, Thomas and his counsel appeared in the 
trial court.  When the clerk called the case and asked counsel 
whether she was prepared, she responded, “I believe my client 
had a motion.”  The trial court asked Thomas whether he had a 
motion to make and Thomas replied: 
 
Yes, Your Honor, sir.  If the Court will allow I 
would like to represent myself on the charge[s] of 
grand larceny and burglary.  I believe I am well 
educated with those two charges and elements which 
consist of them so if you don’t mind just those two. 
 
By “just those two,” Thomas meant that he did not wish to 
represent himself in a probation revocation proceeding that 
would follow his trial if he were convicted.1  The trial court 
asked Thomas whether he had ever previously represented himself.  
Thomas replied, “Yes I have.  Not on these exact charges but I 
have represented myself.”  The trial court then asked whether 
Thomas understood the elements of the offenses with which he was 
charged.  Thomas replied: 
For . . . statutory burglary the breaking and 
entering in the night time as well as the intent.  As 
far as the grand larceny, the actual taking [of] the 
stuff.  That pretty much sums it up. 
 
The trial court asked Thomas whether he had an 
understanding of the rules of evidence.  In response, Thomas 
said that he understood that grand larceny required proof that 
the value of the goods was at least $200.  The trial court then 
asked specifically whether Thomas understood the rules of 
                     
1Thomas was represented by different appointed counsel for 
the revocation hearing. 
 
2
hearsay, and Thomas said that he did.  When the trial court 
asked whether he had any formal legal training, Thomas stated 
that he had “studied these charges for the last seven months.” 
When asked whether he had made any request with which his 
counsel had not complied, Thomas indicated that he was not 
satisfied with counsel’s response to his request for further 
discovery.  In reply to the trial court’s inquiry on this 
matter, Thomas’ counsel indicated that she had shared with 
Thomas the forensic reports obtained through discovery.  She had 
not complied, however, with Thomas’ request that she ask the 
Commonwealth to disclose the identity of its witnesses.  She 
explained to him that the Commonwealth was not required to make 
such disclosure.  Thomas stated that he wanted the Commonwealth 
to disclose the criminal backgrounds of all its witnesses.  The 
trial court explained, however, that the Commonwealth could not 
be compelled to reveal that information, unless it was 
exculpatory. 
The trial court then asked Thomas’ counsel whether she felt 
capable of representing Thomas at trial.  Counsel responded, “I 
don’t have a problem trying this case. . . .  I have every 
confidence I could try this case to the utmost of my ability and 
zealously represent Mr. Thomas.”  The trial court asked whether 
Thomas had requested that any witnesses be called on his behalf.  
Counsel replied that he had, but that she had interviewed them 
 
3
and had concluded that “they are not viable witnesses.”  Thomas 
conceded that he had discussed the potential witnesses with his 
counsel and indicated that he would not be able to call any of 
his witnesses that day.  Nonetheless, Thomas stated that he was 
“prepared to move on myself.” 
The trial court denied Thomas’ motion to represent himself, 
stating that burglary and larceny “are serious charges.  They 
have elements – which you have recited some of those but they’re 
technical offenses.  I think you need counsel to help with 
that.” 
Trial then commenced with Thomas represented by his 
appointed counsel.  Thomas pled not guilty to both charges and, 
the Commonwealth and the trial court concurring, waived his 
right to a jury trial.  The witnesses were excluded on motion of 
Thomas’ counsel. 
The Commonwealth presented evidence from the storeowner, a 
police detective, and a forensic expert.  The evidence showed 
that Thomas’ fingerprints were found on the store’s window 
display.  An eyewitness testified that he heard the window break 
and saw Thomas walking away from the store with a bag of 
merchandise late at night.  Thomas testified on his own behalf 
and denied taking the merchandise from the display window.  At 
the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court, finding there 
was no evidence that Thomas had entered the store, acquitted him 
 
4
of burglary but convicted him of grand larceny, sentencing him 
to three years’ imprisonment with two years suspended. 
Thomas filed a petition for appeal in the Court of Appeals 
asserting issues related to the denial of his motion to 
represent himself and sufficiency of the evidence to prove grand 
larceny.  By unpublished order, the Court of Appeals refused 
Thomas’ petition for appeal.  With respect to the denial of his 
motion to represent himself, the Court of Appeals found that the 
record supported a finding that Thomas “had not knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel.”  
Thomas v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1880-99-2 (February 2, 2000). 
Thomas filed a petition for appeal in this Court, assigning 
error to the Court of Appeals’ failure to award him an appeal on 
both issues raised in his petition to that Court.  By order 
dated June 12, 2000, we awarded Thomas an appeal limited to the 
issue whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to 
represent himself. 
DISCUSSION 
In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975), the 
United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of the right to assistance of counsel also provides a 
criminal defendant with a constitutional right to represent 
himself without counsel if he voluntarily and intelligently 
 
5
elects to do so.2  “Because an exercise of the right of self-
representation necessarily entails a waiver of the right to 
counsel—a defendant obviously cannot enjoy both rights at trial—
the exercise of the right of self-representation must be 
evaluated by using many of the same criteria that are applied to 
determine whether a defendant has waived the right to counsel.”  
United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 558 (4th Cir. 2000).  
In Frazier-El, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit detailed the requirements for a valid assertion of the 
right of self-representation:  the defendant’s motion must be 
timely, clear, and unequivocal, and the defendant’s decision 
must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made.3  Id.
                     
2Although the right to counsel, and consequently the right 
to serve as one’s own counsel, is not explicitly set out in the 
Constitution of Virginia, we have held that it is nonetheless a 
fundamental right guaranteed to an accused by the Bill of Rights 
of the Constitution of Virginia.  See Fitzgerald v. Smyth, 194 
Va. 681, 690, 74 S.E.2d 810, 815 (1953). 
 
3Because the issue is governed by the application of the 
Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the states in this regard by 
Faretta, federal precedent is pertinent.  We recognize that the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adds a 
further requirement that the trial court must also determine 
that the motion is “not for the purposes of delay.”  See, e.g., 
United States v. Schaff, 948 F.2d 501, 503 (9th Cir. 1991).  The 
Fourth Circuit has not yet ruled on this point, and, because the 
record here establishes that Thomas was not seeking a 
continuance or to otherwise delay his trial, we need not 
consider at this time whether this requirement should apply to 
Faretta motions in the courts of Virginia. 
 
6
The Commonwealth concedes that Thomas’ request to represent 
himself was clear and unequivocal.  Indeed, the record 
establishes that Thomas made his request in unambiguous and 
precise terms, being cautious to waive his right to counsel only 
for the present criminal proceeding and not for the probation 
revocation proceeding that might follow.  Similarly, nothing in 
the record suggests that Thomas’ motion was not voluntary.  The 
Commonwealth asserts, however, that Thomas’ motion was not 
timely.  We agree that this is the dispositive issue in this 
case. 
When the motion is timely, the trial court has no 
discretion to deny a defendant his right to represent himself, 
if the trial court is satisfied that the requirements of Faretta 
have been met.  United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321, 1324 
(4th Cir. 1979).  Once meaningful trial proceedings have 
commenced, however, the decision to permit the exercise of the 
right of self-representation lies within the trial court’s sound 
discretion.  Bassett v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 844, 857-58, 284 
S.E.2d 844, 853 (1981); accord Lawrence, 605 F.2d at 1325. 
“When ‘meaningful trial proceedings have commenced’ will, 
of course, vary from case to case.”  Lawrence, 605 F.2d at 1325.  
The federal courts which have examined the issue universally 
agree that an assertion of the right of self-representation, 
even as late as the morning of trial, is timely as a matter of 
 
7
law if it precedes the seating of the jury.  Compare, e.g., 
Armant v. Marquez, 772 F.2d 552, 555-56 (9th Cir. 1985); Chapman 
v. United States, 553 F.2d 886, 895 (5th Cir. 1977); United 
States v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 16 (2nd Cir. 1965).  But see 
Lawrence, 605 F.2d at 1325 (motion made after jury had been 
selected but not yet sworn was untimely where delay in seating 
jury was attributable to defendant).  In the present case, 
Thomas had not been called upon to enter pleas to the two 
charges, he had not yet been required to elect between a jury 
trial and a bench trial, and the witnesses had not yet been 
separated.  Accordingly, despite the Commonwealth assertion that 
“the trial had begun when Thomas finally requested to defend 
himself,” the record does not establish that “meaningful trial 
proceedings” had occurred when Thomas made his motion.  
Accordingly, we hold that Thomas’ request was timely. 
On brief and during oral argument of this appeal, the 
Commonwealth urged this Court to depart from the standard 
adopted in Bassett in favor of a per se rule that any Faretta 
motion made the day of trial would be untimely, whether or not 
meaningful trial proceedings have commenced.  See Russell v. 
State, 383 N.E.2d 309, 314 (Ind. 1978).  We decline to adopt 
such a rule.  The majority view among both state and federal 
jurisdictions which have considered the issue, consonant with 
that expressed in Bassett and reiterated here, is that the 
 
8
timeliness of a Faretta motion made on the verge of trial must 
be determined by the facts of the individual case.  See, e.g., 
People v. Mogul, 812 P.2d 705, 708-09 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1991)(rejecting per se rule). 
When a Faretta motion is timely made, “the trial judge has 
the duty to determine whether such a waiver is voluntarily and 
intelligently made, ‘and it would be fitting and appropriate for 
that determination to appear on the record.’ ”  Church v. 
Commonwealth, 230 Va. 208, 215, 335 S.E.2d 823, 827 
(1985)(quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938)).  
Since the right to represent oneself is constitutional, on 
appeal a defendant need not show prejudice resulting from the 
denial of his demand, Bittaker v. Enomoto, 587 F.2d 400, 402-03 
(9th Cir. 1978), and the trial court’s factual findings are 
reviewed for clear error.  United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 
1195, 1200 (9th Cir. 1984)(en banc); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. 
at 835. 
Although the Court of Appeals apparently interpreted the 
trial court’s stated reasons for denying Thomas’ motion as 
comporting with Faretta, the trial court made no express finding 
that Thomas’ waiver of counsel was not knowingly and 
intelligently made.  Rather, the trial court’s stated reasons 
for denying the request to proceed pro se was that Thomas was 
facing “serious charges” that were “technical offenses” and for 
 
9
which he would need the assistance of counsel in presenting a 
defense. 
In light of these stated reasons, it would appear that the 
trial court was not considering whether Thomas’ waiver was 
intelligently made but, rather, was concerned with the dangers 
and disadvantages of self-representation in the absence of 
adequate legal knowledge.  While this concern on the part of the 
trial court is understandable, a defendant’s “technical legal 
knowledge . . . [is] not relevant to an assessment of his 
knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.”  Faretta, 422 
U.S. at 836.  Indeed, “although [a defendant] may conduct his 
own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be 
honored” so long as it is knowingly and intelligently made.  Id. 
at 834. 
The Commonwealth contends that despite the lack of an 
express finding by the trial court that Thomas’ request to 
represent himself was not knowingly and intelligently made, the 
record nonetheless supports the Court of Appeal’s finding that 
such a basis existed for denying the request.  We disagree. 
Although Thomas expressed only a rudimentary understanding 
of criminal discovery and the rules of evidence, his basic grasp 
of the nature of the offenses with which he was charged was 
accurate.  In his colloquy with the trial court, Thomas was 
literate, competent, and thoughtful in responding to the trial 
 
10
court’s questions and showed respect for the trial court’s 
authority.  Moreover, Thomas appeared to have recognized that 
there were limits to his abilities, since he expressly asserted 
that he did not desire to represent himself in the probation 
revocation hearing that would follow a conviction on the 
criminal charges.  Thomas was clearly cognizant of the potential 
hazards of representing himself and of the limitations he faced 
in presenting his case, but was nonetheless willing to proceed. 
Whatever legitimate misgivings the trial court may have had 
about the difficulty Thomas would face in representing himself, 
his constitutional right to waive the assistance of counsel 
takes precedence when the choice to exercise that right is 
knowingly and intelligently made.  The record in this case 
supports the conclusion that Thomas exercised that choice within 
that standard.  Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred 
in not permitting Thomas to represent himself and the Court of 
Appeals erred in denying an appeal of that judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, Thomas’ conviction will be reversed, and 
the case remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to 
remand the same to the trial court for a new trial on the charge 
of grand larceny if the Commonwealth be so advised. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
11