Case Title: Hill v. City of Burlington

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1990-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 89-384


                                             Supreme Court
Robert Hill, Richard Trombley,
Alfred Beaudoin, Jerry Bushell               On Appeal from
                                             Chittenden Superior Court
     v.
                                             December Term, 1990
City of Burlington


Alden T. Bryan, J.

Geoffrey W. Crawford of O'Neill and Crawford, Burlington, Mitchell L. Pearl
   of Langrock Sperry Parker & Wool, Middlebury, and Stephen A. Unsworth of
   Hill & Unsworth, Essex Junction, for plaintiffs-appellants

Joseph E. McNeil and William F. Ellis of McNeil & Murray, Burlington, for
   defendant-appellee


PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     JOHNSON, J.   Plaintiffs appeal a ruling by the Superior Court that
they are not entitled to be compensated for disability leave (FN1) benefits
accumulated before they were mandatorily retired for disability by their
employer, the City of Burlington.  They claim that the Superior Court
misinterpreted their employment contract with the City and, in so doing,
unconstitutionally deprived them of vested property rights.  We affirm.
     Plaintiffs worked for the Burlington Fire Department in non-union,
supervisory positions.  Each became disabled after many years of service.
Each remained employed and received disability benefits for at least a year
before being notified of his mandatory retirement.  At retirement, each of
the plaintiffs had accumulated thousands of hours of disability leave for
which he was not compensated.  Benefits for disability leave were equal to
full pay, whereas benefits under the retirement system were less.
     The contract is comprised of the Burlington City Code (Code) and the
City of Burlington Personnel Policy (Policy).  No express language exists
requiring compensation for accumulated disability leave to a disabled
employee who is being mandatorily retired. Plaintiffs derive their claim
from the general sections on disability leave and from isolated references
to unused disability leave that appear in other sections of the contract.
     The scheme for disability leave is set forth in Article III of the Code
(Disability Leave) and in sections 6 (Leave) and 11 (Employee Benefits) of
the Policy.  Together they permit an employee who has suffered a disability
attributable to employment to receive disability benefits for not more than
twelve months. Code, Art. III, { 24-79(a); Policy { 6G.  Disability leave
for accident or illness not attributable to employment is accrued according
to length of service and "shall be accumulated."  Code, Art. III, { 24-
79(b)(4); see Policy { 6F(2) (sick leave "may be accrued in an unlimited
amount").
     Plaintiffs rely on Policy { 11B(4), which provides that employees may
use accumulated disability leave based on length of service at the
expiration of a twelve-month work-related disability leave.  The issue here
is whether Policy { 11B(4) applies when the City has exercised its right, as
it has done in the case of the plaintiffs, to mandatorily retire an employee
who is "suffering from a total and permanent disability."  Code, Art. II
(Retirement), { 24-23(a).  An employee so retired is entitled to disability
retirement benefits until attaining normal retirement age, when regular
retirement benefits become payable.  Id.
     Section 24-77 of Code Article III on Disability Leave, entitled
"Regulations not to modify rights under retirement system," provides:
          Nothing in this article shall be deemed to modify
          or restrict any of the rights of the city or of
          the employee as such may be set forth in the city
          retirement system regulations, nor shall any
          disability leave or disability benefit payment be
          continued beyond an employee's date of retirement
          for age or disability.

On its face, this section sets forth an unqualified rule that, upon
retirement, disability leave and disability benefits cease.
     Plaintiffs argue that this interpretation renders meaningless their
contractual rights to accumulate and use disability leave based on length of
service.  They would have us interpret { 24-77 narrowly, as merely
prohibiting payment of sick leave and disability retirement benefits at the
same time.  They argue that other references in the contract indicate an
intent to compensate employees for accumulated disability leave in the event
of mandatory retirement for disability.
     We address each of these arguments in turn.  First, plaintiffs' right
to accumulate and use disability leave is not rendered meaningless by
reading { 24-77 to terminate those rights when an employee becomes totally
and permanently disabled.  The City cannot exercise its right to terminate
an employee for disability absent a determination by the city board of
medical examiners that the employee is suffering from a total and permanent
disability.  Code, Art. II, { 24-23.  Whether a disability is total and
permanent does not depend on the length of time an employee has been sick,
but rather on whether the employee "is able for the foreseeable future to
perform the employment duties he was assigned at the time [h]e became so
disabled."  Code, Art. II, { 24-23(b).  For example, an employee with a non-
permanent work-related disability lasting thirteen months could use his one-
year disability leave under { 6G and a month of accumulated disability leave
under { 6F.  Thus, an employee can use accumulated disability leave as long
as he will be able to resume his employment duties in the foreseeable
future.
     Second, it is true that { 24-77 prohibits double benefits, but read in
conjunction with { 24-23(a), (FN2) the section also expressly allows the City to
change the status of a totally and permanently disabled  employee to one of
retiree, notwithstanding the disability leave policy set forth in { 24-79.
Therefore, an employee's right to accumulated disability leave is available
only as long as an individual remains employed.
     Third, isolated references to unused disability leave in other parts of
the contract do not, standing alone, support plaintiffs' position.  The
references appear as exclusions to the computation of disability retirement
benefits, earned compensation, and length of service. (FN3) Plaintiffs argue
that these references would not have been made unless payment was
contemplated.  It is unclear why these references exist; perhaps they
related to a somewhat different benefit scheme under negotiation and were
inadvertently retained; perhaps they were inserted in the event that a
system of lump sum payments was subsequently adopted. (FN4) Whatever the
explanation, it is only by implication that they could be said to create the
rights plaintiffs claim.  We hold that a vague implication of rights cannot
prevail over the clear and express provisions of { 24-23(a) and { 24-77.
See 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts { 564 at 298 (1960)("[a]n implication
that would otherwise be reasonable should not be made when the contrary is
indicated in clear and express words").
     Finally, the Policy explicitly provides that, within certain carefully
drawn limitations, employees shall receive compensation for unused vacation
leave upon termination.  The disability leave sections, which are
contiguous, contain no similar language.  Because of the omission, we
conclude that compensation for sick leave at termination was not
contemplated.  See Grenafege v. Department of Employment Security, 134 Vt.
288, 290,