Case Title: DeRolph v. State

Citation: 2001-Ohio-1343

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-09-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as DeRolph v. State, 93 Ohio St.3d 309, 2001-Ohio-1343] 
 
 
DEROLPH ET AL., APPELLEES, v. THE STATE OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as DeRolph v. State (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 309.] 
Constitutional law — Education — Schools — School-funding formula adopted by 
General Assembly modified by Supreme Court to meet test for 
constitutionality created in DeRolph I and DeRolph II. 
(No. 99-570 — Submitted June 20, 2001 — Decided September 6, 2001.) 
Common Pleas Court of Perry County, No. 22043. 
DECISION AND ORDER on Exercise of Continuing Jurisdiction. 
 
MOYER, C.J.  Since it was first docketed in this court in 1995, this dispute 
has produced from this court no fewer than three signed majority opinions, a per 
curiam opinion, eleven separate concurrences and dissents, and a number of 
rulings on motions filed by plaintiffs and defendants.  Every justice of the court 
has expressed her and his views regarding the constitutional issue that once again 
is presented for our disposition nearly six years after the court exercised its 
discretionary jurisdiction to review the merits.  The written opinions of the 
justices reflect deeply held beliefs regarding the responsibility of the court as an 
institution and the principles that define the framework by which each justice 
decides issues brought to the court. The informal and formal discussions among 
the justices regarding the jurisdictional and merit issues have been of an intensity 
and duration unmatched by any other case. 
 
The range of the opinions that reflect the decisional process is broad.  For 
instance, some of us believe that the court exceeded its proper role in addressing the 
merits of this case, DeRolph v. State (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 264-283, 677 
N.E.2d 733, 782-795 (“DeRolph I”) (Moyer, C.J., Cook and Lundberg Stratton, JJ., 
dissenting), and thereafter in continuing jurisdiction of this matter,  DeRolph v. State 
(1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 419, 423-424, 678 N.E.2d 886, 889-890 (Lundberg Stratton, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  One of us has characterized the 
“bedrock constitutional challenge” presented by this case as being quite simply the 
“horrible funding inequities that persist between school districts in Ohio due to the 
state’s heavy reliance on local property taxes in formulating the school foundation 
formula.”  DeRolph v. State (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 1, 46, 728 N.E.2d 993, 1028 
(“DeRolph II”) (Pfeifer, J., concurring).  One of us has expressed the belief that the 
court should expressly declare education to be a fundamental right afforded to each 
Ohio child pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution.  
DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 255-257, 677 N.E.2d at 776-777 (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
 
Despite our differences, however, we all agree upon the fundamental 
importance of education to the children and citizens of this state.  Educated, 
informed citizens sustain the vitality of our democratic institutions.  We differ little 
in support of the desired ends so trenchantly recited by Justice Sweeney when he 
observed that our forefathers, in drafting our state Constitution, “carried within them 
a deep-seated belief that liberty and individual opportunity could be preserved only 
by educating Ohio’s citizens,” DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 197, 677 N.E.2d at 736, 
and by Justice Resnick when she so incisively counseled that the goal of funding 
primary and secondary public education should be to assure “a quality education for 
every single child in Ohio regardless of where that child resides” so that every child 
may “enter a structurally safe building, which is staffed with sufficient teachers, and 
contains enough textbooks and equipment so that the child can develop self-esteem 
and intellectual abilities,” DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 260 and 261, 677 N.E.2d at 
779 and 780 (Resnick, J., concurring).  We agree regarding the goals of public 
education; we have vigorously disagreed with respect to whether the legislature or 
the judiciary has the ultimate authority to determine if the goals have been achieved. 
January Term, 2001 
3 
 
The current plan for funding public primary and secondary education 
adopted by the General Assembly and signed by the Governor1  is probably not 
the plan that any one of us would have created were it our responsibility to do so.  
But that is not our burden, and it is not the test we apply in this decision.  None of 
us is completely comfortable with the decision we announce in this opinion.  But 
we have responded to a duty that is intrinsic to our position as justices on the 
highest court of the state.  Drawing upon our own instincts and the wisdom of 
Thomas Jefferson, we have reached the point where, while continuing to hold our 
previously expressed opinions, the greater good requires us to recognize “the 
necessity of sacrificing our opinions sometimes to the opinions of others for the 
sake of harmony.”  16 Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Boyd Ed.1961) 598 (letter to 
Francis Eppes, July 4, 1790). 
 
A climate of legal, financial, and political uncertainty concerning Ohio’s 
school-funding system has prevailed at least since this court accepted jurisdiction 
of the case.  We have concluded that no one is served by continued uncertainty 
and fractious debate.  In that spirit, we have created the consensus that should 
terminate the role of this court in the dispute. 
I 
Controlling Law 
 
Pursuant to the doctrine of the law of the case, the “decision of a reviewing 
court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal questions involved for all 
subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing levels.”  Nolan v. 
Nolan (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 11 OBR 1, 2-3, 462 N.E.2d 410, 412. 
                                                          
 
1. 
Since DeRolph II, the General Assembly has enacted, e.g., 2000 Am.Sub.S.B. No 272, 
which enhances the Classroom Facilities Assistance Program and otherwise addresses school 
facility deficiencies; 2000 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 345, which addresses statutory provisions previously 
characterized as imposing unfunded mandates, and establishes procedures to prevent fiscal 
problems in school districts; 2000 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 94, the biennial budget bill, which prescribes 
formulas for determining the amount of state funds to be distributed to the various school districts; 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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On March 24, 1997 a majority of this court held, as syllabus law: 
 
“Ohio’s elementary and secondary public school financing system violates 
Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution, which mandates a thorough and 
efficient system of common schools throughout the state. The following specific 
provisions are unconstitutional: 
 
“(a) R.C. 133.301, granting borrowing authority to school districts; 
 
“(b) R.C. 3313.483, 3313.487, 3313.488, 3313.489, and 3313.4810, the 
emergency school assistance loan provisions; 
 
“(c) R.C. 3317.01, 3317.02, 3317.022, 3317.023, 3317.024, 3317.04, 
3317.05, 3317.051 and 3317.052, the School Foundation Program; 
 
“(d) R.C. Chapter 3318, the Classroom Facilities Act, to the extent that it 
is underfunded.”  DeRolph v. State (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 677 N.E.2d 733, 
syllabus. 
 
The court admonished the General Assembly to create a new school-
funding system.  Id. at 213, 677 N.E.2d at 747. 
 
In April 1997, this court advised that the General Assembly may well 
retain local property taxes as a funding source for Ohio schools, but that “property 
taxes can no longer be the primary means of providing the finances for a thorough 
and efficient system of schools.”  DeRolph v. State (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 419, 
678 N.E.2d 886, 887.  We also held that debt obligations incurred prior to 
DeRolph I remained valid beyond the date of DeRolph I.  Id. at 420, 678 N.E.2d 
at 887. 
 
In September 1998, we made it clear that only the Thorough and Efficient 
Clause of the Ohio Constitution, and not the Equal Protection Clause, remained at 
issue in this case.  DeRolph v. State (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 1212, 699 N.E.2d 518.  
The court further held that the state would be required to “show by a 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
and 2001 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 1, which establishes a new system of academic standards and testing 
to gauge the success of Ohio students and schools. 
January Term, 2001 
5 
preponderance of the evidence that the constitutional mandates have been 
satisfied” in order to justify dismissal of the proceedings against them.  Id. 
 
A year ago, the majority established further law of this case. The syllabus 
to DeRolph v. State (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 1, 728 N.E.2d 993 (DeRolph II), 
provides: 
 
“1.  ‘[T]he sovereign people made it mandatory upon the General 
Assembly to secure not merely a system of common schools,’ but rather a 
thorough and efficient system of common schools. Miller v. Korns (1923), 107 
Ohio St. 287, 297-298, 140 N.E. 773, 776, approved and followed. 
 
“2.  ‘The attainment of efficiency and thoroughness in that system’ of 
common schools is ‘expressly made a purpose, not local, not municipal, but state-
wide.’ Id., approved and followed. 
 
“3.  A thorough system means that each and every school district has 
enough funds to operate.  An efficient system means one in which each and every 
school district in the state has an ample number of teachers, sound buildings that 
are in compliance with state building and fire codes, and equipment sufficient for 
all students to be afforded an educational opportunity.” 
 
The court in DeRolph II retained continuing jurisdiction to provide 
additional time for the state to further refine the school-funding system.  We 
acknowledged, however, that significant improvements in Ohio’s system of 
common schools had been achieved in the time that elapsed between DeRolph I 
and DeRolph II. 
 
Most recently, we recognized that, in order to decide whether the state’s 
funding system now is constitutional, we must examine Ohio’s statutory school-
funding system as designed by defendants as of June 15, 2001, and determine “the 
likely effects that the legislation enacted in response to [DeRolph II] will 
produce.”  DeRolph v. State (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 1274, 1276, 747 N.E.2d 823, 
824. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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It is the law contained in the syllabi to DeRolph I and DeRolph II and the 
principles established by court entry in the case at bar by which we are required to 
evaluate the constitutionality of the school-funding system now statutorily in 
place. See Thackery v. Helfrich (1931), 123 Ohio St. 334, 336, 175 N.E. 449, 450 
(this court “announces the law only through the syllabi of cases and through per 
curiam opinions”); S.Ct.R.Rep.Op. 1(B) (“The syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion 
states the controlling point or points of law decided in and necessarily arising from 
the facts of the specific case before the Court for adjudication”). 
II 
Adequacy of Funding; Assurance of “Ample Number of Teachers, Sound 
Buildings in Compliance with State Building and Fire Codes, and 
Equipment Sufficient for All Students to be Afforded an Educational 
Opportunity” (DeRolph II, Paragraph Three of the Syllabus) 
A 
Adequacy of Funding—Base Cost Formula 
 
As defined in DeRolph II, a “thorough system means that each and every 
school district has enough funds to operate.”  89 Ohio St.3d 1, 728 N.E.2d 993, 
paragraph three of the syllabus.  To this end, the General Assembly has been 
charged with determining the amount of funding that is adequate to establish a 
“constitutionally required foundation of basic educational opportunity.”  Id. at 47, 
728 N.E.2d at 1029 (Pfeifer, J., concurring).  Unlike the formula determined to be 
problematic by this court in DeRolph II, the General Assembly has offered a new 
funding formula to arrive at the base cost of providing for an adequate education. 
 
Under 2001 H.B. No. 94, the General Assembly recalculated the cost of 
providing an adequate education to be $4,814 per student in fiscal year 2002.  
R.C. 3317.012(A).  This figure is increased by 2.8 percent per year to account for 
rising costs, resulting in a base cost per student of $5,527 in fiscal year 2007.  
R.C. 3317.012(A)(1).  A most significant aspect of H.B. 94 is that the base cost 
January Term, 2001 
7 
amount of $4,814 is funded in the full amount immediately without a phase-in 
period.  Removal of the phase-in period addresses a key concern of DeRolph II 
that the state was “funding below the level that the General Assembly deemed to 
be the base amount for an adequate education,” 89 Ohio St.3d at 18-19, 728 
N.E.2d at 1007, and the statement that the “phase-in aspect of the basic aid 
amount should be reconsidered.”  Id. at 37, 728 N.E.2d at 1021. 
 
The formula adopted by the General Assembly has changed in other 
significant ways.  To determine the base cost of an adequate education, the new 
formula uses the unweighted average cost per student of educating students 
enrolled in selected districts.  Under the new law, this selection began with one 
hundred seventy school districts that, in fiscal year 1999, met at least twenty of 
twenty-seven performance standards 
established 
by 
H.B. 
94. 
 
R.C. 
3317.012(B)(1)(a) through (aa).  Districts in the top and bottom five percent of 
income and property wealth bases are deleted to adjust for anomalies within those 
districts, leaving one hundred twenty-seven model districts. 
 
The H.B. 94 methodology for determining state aid considers the 
following factors:  base cost, the district’s cost of doing business, the districts’ 
average daily membership (“ADM”), property valuation, and the charge-off rate 
of twenty-three mills ($0.023) per dollar of valuation.  The formula is ADM x 
base cost x cost-of-doing-business factor – 0.23 x property valuation = state aid to 
a school district for basic education costs.  R.C. 3317.022. 
 
H.B. 94 adopts a charge-off rate of twenty-three mills per dollar of 
valuation.  R.C. 3317.022.  Additionally, H.B. 94 continues to provide a charge-
off supplement, termed “gap aid,” to account for districts that are not able to fund 
their local share of the base cost amount.  H.B. 94 applies gap aid not only to base 
cost, special education costs, and vocational education costs, but also to 
transportation costs.  R.C. 3317.0216(C)(1).  H.B. 94 also eliminates the phase-in 
of state funding increases.  Greater gap aid addresses the problem of “phantom 
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revenue” by assuring that the state will contribute more funding to districts where 
the tax base does not increase at the same rate as the increase in the base cost 
amount. 
 
As an additional measure to ensure that no district is unable to fund 
programs because of its small local tax base, the General Assembly has enacted 
legislation that requires districts to pay no more than an additional three mills of 
local tax revenue to provide for their share of special education, vocational 
education, and transportation.  R.C. 3317.022(F).  H.B. 94 restructures the manner 
in which the state contributes to such programs. 
 
The state has also reassessed the manner in which it approaches 
transportation costs.  Under H.B. 94, the state’s share of transportation costs is the 
greater of sixty percent or the same percentage that the state pays for the district’s 
base cost.  R.C. 3317.022(B)(2), (D)(3).  According to the state’s experts, this 
greater level of funding will benefit rural, property-poor districts that have greater 
transportation needs. 
 
H.B. 94 further adds six weights to determine the method by which special 
education is funded.  R.C. 3317.013(A) through (F).  In part as a result of the new 
weights, the state projects that state special education funding will increase 18.6 
percent from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2003.  The percentage of the state’s 
share increases automatically once a district’s cost of serving a special education 
student exceeds $30,000 in category six of the special education categories and 
$25,000 for categories two through five.  R.C. 3317.022(C)(3).  The state funds 
one hundred percent of half the costs above the applicable threshold, plus the 
calculated state share percentage of the other half.  R.C. 3317.022(C)(3)(a)(i) and 
(ii). 
B 
Parity Aid 
January Term, 2001 
9 
 
In addition to modifying the base cost formula, the General Assembly has 
also enacted another form of aid termed “parity aid” by the state.  Parity aid 
addresses disparities between wealthier districts and poorer districts and provides 
additional funds to the latter.  As designed by the General Assembly, parity aid is 
intended to give low-wealth districts the opportunity to spend funds on 
discretionary items in the same manner as wealthier districts.  The General 
Assembly determined that in fiscal year 2001, school districts in the seventieth to 
ninetieth percentile in valuation per pupil collected an average of 9.5 mills beyond 
the millage necessary to fund their calculated local share of the base cost amount, 
special education, vocational education, and transportation funding.  R.C. 
3317.0217(C)(2).  With parity aid, eligible districts will receive funding to make 
up the difference between what they can raise on 9.5 mills and what the district at 
the eightieth percentile in income-adjusted wealth can raise ($1,300).  R.C. 
3317.0217(C).  The amount of parity aid distributed, therefore, will vary on a 
district-by-district basis depending upon how far below the eightieth percentile a 
district falls.  Defendants estimate that parity aid will provide an additional $100 
million to eighty percent of school districts in fiscal year 2002 and an additional 
$500 million per year when the program is fully phased in by fiscal year 2006. 
 
Parity aid is designed to address disparities in tax bases even after 
ensuring full funding of the base cost, special and vocational education, and 
transportation costs.  The ability to receive parity aid, however, is not dependent 
upon local effort.  If a district is unable or unwilling to generate additional 
funding, it will still receive parity aid if it falls below the eightieth percentile.  For 
example, the state estimates that New Lexington City School District in Perry 
County would receive an additional $774 per student this year if parity aid were 
fully phased in, for a total $1.4 million per year, and the Cleveland City School 
District would receive an additional $601 per student, for a total of $43,873,307 
per year.  All of the money provided under the parity aid program is paid above 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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the base cost amount and equalizes disparities in the amount needed to address the 
adequacy concerns of DeRolph II. 
 
Additionally, H.B. 94 incorporates a “stabilizing” function to ensure that 
the “state share percentage of base cost and parity aid funding” (defined in R.C. 
3317.012[D][5]) does not vary by more than 2.5 percent between the current year 
and the last year in which a calculated base cost amount took effect, i.e., the 
“update years” (defined in R.C. 3317.012[D][1]).  If the General Assembly 
estimates that the state share percentage will vary by more than 2.5 percent from 
the preceding update year, it must bring the state share back within the allowable 
variance by any means it determines to be necessary.  R.C. 3317.012(D)(4). 
 
Parity aid and gap aid are significant, expansive aspects of the new 
legislation that reflect defendants’ genuine efforts in complying with the rulings 
of this court. 
C 
Facilities 
 
This court in DeRolph II held that an efficient system of common schools 
is one in which school districts throughout the state have “sound buildings that are 
in compliance with state building and fire codes.”  Id., 89 Ohio St.3d 1, 728 
N.E.2d 993, paragraph three of the syllabus.  Plaintiffs argue that many deficient 
school buildings are still in use today.  But in deciding whether the school-
funding system created in the legislation under review is constitutional, we must 
determine only whether, when fully implemented, the legislation enacted in 
response to DeRolph II will likely have the effect of bringing these facilities into 
compliance within a reasonable time.  When determining what is a reasonable 
time, we must realize that construction and renovation are necessarily lengthy and 
complex processes and are not amenable to a one-year or even a five-year 
deadline. 
January Term, 2001 
11 
 
There is a well-documented need for many of Ohio’s school buildings to 
be renovated, repaired, or replaced, or for completely new facilities to be 
constructed, in order to meet the standards established by DeRolph II.  
Construction of this magnitude will necessarily be complex and time-consuming. 
 
The state of Ohio has dedicated a large amount of its budget to 
constructing and repairing school facilities.  Since 1998, the General Assembly 
has allocated nearly $2.7 billion to this effort.  The Ohio School Facilities 
Commission directs this funding to local school districts, and as of May 2001 was 
distributing an average $1.5 million dollars daily—a number that continues to 
grow.  Additionally, the Facilities Commission provides management oversight 
and technical assistance to the local school districts for construction and 
renovation.  Building Our Future, Ohio School Facilities Commission FY 2000 
Annual Report, at 3. 
 
The state has devised multiple interlocking programs that address different 
aspects of the school facilities problem.  For example: 
 
●  Since 1997, the Classroom Facilities Assistance Program has funded 
replacement and renovation projects in seventy-three school districts, expending 
over $1.8 billion in state funding. Building Our Future, at 8. 
 
●  The Exceptional Needs Program provides immediate assistance to 
districts of below average wealth with exceptional needs for classroom facilities.  
R.C. 3318.37. 
 
●  The Expedited Local Partnership Program allows school districts to 
fund repair or construction through local monies before their state funding 
becomes available through the Classroom Facilities Assistance Program.  R.C. 
3318.36.  Once funds from the program become available, the school district 
receives credit for their required local contribution. Eligibility for the program 
was recently expanded by amendment of R.C. 3318.36 by 2000 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 
272. 
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●  The “Big 8” and Accelerated Urban School Building Assistance 
Programs target urban school districts for major renovations and repairs.  1997 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 102, Section 7, 147 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7416; R.C. 3318.38, 
enacted by 2000 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 272;  Building Our Future, at 10.  The Big 8 
Program is authorized to provide up to $120 million in matching funds, and 
includes the larger districts in the state, such as the Akron, Toledo, Dayton, 
Cincinnati, Columbus, and Cleveland city schools.  Building Our Future, at 10.  
As of the end of calendar year 2000, these districts had spent over fifty percent of 
the funds available to them. Id. 
 
●  The Extreme Environmental Contamination Program provides 
assistance for any classroom facility that needs to be replaced or relocated due to 
extreme environmental contamination.  H.B. No. 94, Section 186. 
 
●  The School Building Emergency Assistance Program provides 
assistance to all school districts to reconstruct, repair, or renovate classroom 
facilities damaged by an act of God.  R.C. 3318.351(A)(2). 
 
Significant progress has been made to date.  The Facilities Commission has 
provided facilities funding to three hundred sixty-four school districts.  OSFC: All 
District Summary, Ohio School Facilities Commission.  As of May 2001, the 
commission was administering projects that will provide for over three hundred 
additional buildings, and will complete fifty full building fixes by the end of 2001. 
 
In addition, S.B. 272 requires the state to make a facilities assessment within 
two years of a request by the school district. R.C. 3318.022.  Complete facilities 
assessments will have been performed on four hundred and fifty districts by the end 
of 2001.  These facilities assessments are crucial to determining what needs remain 
to be addressed in terms of repair and construction. 
 
Plaintiffs argue that the state is not doing enough to remedy the facilities 
problem.  First, plaintiffs argue that the state’s timetable for fixing these problems is 
too slow.  As we have observed above, however, to pass constitutional muster the 
January Term, 2001 
13 
state must have in place legislation that will be likely to bring school facilities into 
compliance within a reasonable time. 
 
Plaintiffs also argue that future funding for school facilities remains 
uncertain.  We acknowledge that there is no legislation currently in place that 
guarantees funding for the programs outlined beyond the current biennium.  
However, this concern is inherent in a democracy where public policy is never 
stagnant, and in a state that operates on a biennial budget.  As was noted in DeRolph 
II, the duration of any legislative appropriation is “limited by the prohibition of 
Section 22, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, which prohibits the General 
Assembly from appropriating for more than a two-year period.”  DeRolph II, 89 
Ohio St.3d at 24, 728 N.E.2d at 1011.  Were it necessary to guarantee funding in the 
future, this court would be required to retain jurisdiction in this cause in perpetuity. 
 
Plaintiffs argue that in the current system, local school districts are 
required to contribute to financing of the repair, renovation, and construction of 
school buildings, and that this necessarily violates the strictures set down in 
DeRolph II.  However, nothing in the Ohio Constitution or any of the controlling 
law of this case precludes the state from insisting on joint state-local support of 
primary and secondary schools. 
 
Plaintiffs also argue that the state has not performed a comprehensive survey 
to determine whether school buildings are in compliance with building and fire 
codes.  However, as discussed earlier, S.B. 272 requires the state to make a complete 
assessment within two years upon receiving a request from a local school district.  
R.C. 3318.022.  This method of assessing the schools is reasonable, given the 
practicalities of such a project. 
 
The Ohio School Facilities Commission has developed comprehensive 
guidelines for the design and construction of commission-funded buildings.  
Building Our Future, Ohio School Facilities Commission FY 2000 Annual 
Report, at 7.  Plaintiffs maintain that these guidelines require schools to accept 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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buildings that are inadequate for educational needs.  Specifically, plaintiffs assert 
that the guidelines provide for inadequate numbers of rooms if the twenty-five-to-
one student-teacher ratio is to be maintained.  Inadequacies in School Facilities: A 
Review of the State’s Program, Ohio Coalition for Equity & Adequacy of School 
Funding, at 2.  They note that the twenty-five-to-one ratio dictates the size of the 
room, and that school districts that wish to have a lower student-teacher ratio will 
find themselves forced to add additional rooms at their own expense. 
 
The state’s funding initiative for school districts with a substantial portion 
of families living below the poverty line, Disadvantaged Pupil Impact Aid 
(“DPIA”), has reduction in classroom size as one of its primary goals.  The class-
size-reduction portion of DPIA requires districts to focus their efforts on reducing 
the student-teacher ratio in kindergarten through third grades.  The target student-
teacher ratio for individual districts is calculated through use of a complicated 
index based on the concentration of students in the district living below the 
poverty line.  R.C. 3317.029(E).  Options available to the school districts are not 
limited to reducing the number of students in a classroom taught by a single 
teacher but include the use of teacher’s aides, team teaching, and extending the 
length of the school day or school year.  R.C. 3317.029(F)(3). 
 
The Legislative Office of Education reported in October 2000 that the 
average number of students in kindergarten through third grade in five selected 
districts receiving DPIA varied from eighteen to twenty-four students.  Barriers to 
achieving a reduced student-teacher ratio do exist, including the uncertainty of 
sustained funding of additional teachers and lack of classroom space.  These are 
serious concerns.  However, the commission conducts a ten-year projected 
enrollment analysis prior to beginning design work for a district, and designs 
facilities based on the highest enrollment figure in that ten-year period, or 
enrollment in the third year if enrollment is declining.  If something occurs later 
to change this figure, the commission works with the district to make any 
January Term, 2001 
15 
necessary adjustments.  Currently, more than half of those districts reporting a 
need for more space are working with the Ohio School Facilities Commission to 
resolve the problem.  On balance, we find that the problem of student-teacher 
ratio as it relates to facilities can be improved through state and local 
collaboration within the existing legislative framework, and we do not find that 
the admittedly imperfect current situation is grounds for striking down the 
legislative framework as unconstitutional.  We decline to find that the guidelines 
as promulgated by the Ohio School Facilities Commission result in inadequate 
buildings. 
D 
Adequacy of Funding for Teachers and Supplies 
 
The majority in DeRolph I concluded that the record contained exhaustive 
evidence that “the appellant school districts were starved for funds, lacked 
teachers, buildings, and equipment, and had inferior educational programs, and 
that their pupils were being deprived of educational opportunity.”  DeRolph I, 78 
Ohio St.3d at 205, 677 N.E.2d at 742.  That record demonstrated that some of the 
poorest school districts in the state at that time were forced to ration even basic 
supplies:  “paper, chalk, art supplies, paper clips, and even toilet paper.”  Id. at 
208, 677 N.E.2d at 744.  The evidence revealed instances of schools where 
textbooks were not available to every student, id. at 259, 677 N.E.2d at 778, and 
classes were held under leaking roofs and in former coal bins,  id. at 241, 255, 677 
N.E.2d at 766, 755 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 
The record before us today is very different.  The plaintiffs now assert that 
“educational deprivation” exists because, e.g., within the one hundred twenty-
seven districts used to calculate the base amounts, one district has the “least 
number of teachers allowable to operate a district,” not all high schools offer 
advanced placement classes, some elementary schools lack space for science labs, 
and art and music classes in some districts must share the same room.  These 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
complaints simply do not equate to deprivation of an opportunity to receive a 
basic education. 
 
The second paragraph of the syllabus to DeRolph II, 89 Ohio St.3d 1, 728 
N.E.2d 993, establishes the legal proposition that efficiency and thoroughness in 
Ohio’s system of common schools is a statewide goal rather than a local one.  In 
April 2000, Governor Taft created the Governor’s Commission for Student 
Success, whose members included  parents, educators, community leaders, and 
legislators.  The commission conducted sixteen focus group discussions, polled 
one thousand Ohioans, and met with twenty-eight constituent groups to better 
understand Ohioans’ thoughts and concerns about public education.  In December 
2000, the commission issued its report, entitled “Expecting More:  Higher 
Achievement for Ohio’s Students and Schools.”  The report contained thirty-one 
recommendations to create a statewide system of academic performance 
standards, student and school assessments, and school accountability.  In January 
2001, legislation incorporating recommendations from the report was introduced 
as Senate Bill No. 1.  The bill was enacted and signed into law on June 12, 2001. 
 
In adopting and signing this legislation, the General Assembly and the 
Governor have adopted public policies consistent with the commission’s view 
that, while “the state has a clear and important role in establishing statewide 
academic standards, * * * local flexibility in the design and implementation of 
instructional programs and other services to help children learn” should be 
retained.  In the words of the commission’s report, it “is appropriate for the state 
to say what should be learned in key subjects; it is much less appropriate for the 
state to determine how local schools should teach students to meet these 
standards.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
 
In its report, the commission stated that it “subscribes to a philosophy that 
keeps the state’s interest as narrow as possible and gives flexibility to local school 
boards, administrators and teachers.  But, while flexible, the Commission 
January Term, 2001 
17 
recommendations are oriented toward action: Where students are in danger of 
falling behind or not meeting key state academic standards, the Commission 
expects local schools to act aggressively.  In some cases, we actually require 
action.  The state will provide help—additional resources, technical assistance, 
training and examples of strategies that work—but local educators must be the 
ones who provide the necessary instruction to make sure students reach the 
standards.” 
 
Accordingly, the commission recommended that “schools be expected to 
provide intensive instruction and intervention services to students whose 
diagnostic assessments show they are unlikely to reach the academic standards.  
The nature of these services should be determined locally but could include 
summer school, extended time in school, tutoring assistance or smaller class size.” 
 
This legislative plan just enacted reflects a public policy decision that 
local school districts and boards of education ultimately are responsible for 
managing and allocating their financial resources so as not only to achieve the 
constitutionally mandated, statewide goal of providing all students a basic 
educational opportunity, but to achieve a second goal as well—the goal of helping 
individual students take advantage of that opportunity and thereby receive the 
lifelong benefits of education. 
 
The current statutory system contemplates that the districts of the state 
will themselves determine, at least initially, on a district-by-district basis, how to 
allocate their resources to provide enough teachers and sufficient equipment to 
achieve satisfactory performance results as measured by school district and 
student assessments.  Failure to achieve satisfactory educational results will, 
however, trigger state review and assistance.  The commission has acknowledged 
that districts found to be falling short may need additional funding from the state 
in order to ensure that their schools are able to improve. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
Indeed, the evidence before us demonstrates that Ohio schools are already 
improving.  In school evaluations issued in 2001 pursuant to R.C. 3302.03, thirty-
six districts, including three urban districts, improved their designation from 
“academic emergency” to “academic watch.”  The number of school districts in 
“academic emergency” declined from sixty-nine to thirty-five, a reduction of 
nearly fifty percent.  A fifteen percent increase was realized in the number of 
school districts rising to the status of “continuous improvement” from lower 
designations.  For the first time, all Ohio schools met state standards for science in 
grades nine, ten, and twelve. 
 
Assessments show improvement at the student level as well.  In comparing 
proficiency test results from 2001 to those from 2000, preliminary findings show 
that sixty percent compared to forty-nine percent of fourth graders passed the 
mathematics test, fifty-six percent compared to forty-eight percent passed the 
science test, and sixty-one percent compared to fifty-five percent of sixth graders 
passed the mathematics and science tests.  While not all categories of test results 
show such striking improvements, the overall trend in the 2001 proficiency test 
results is one of improving performance. 
 
The new statutory framework has made positive changes in the base cost 
amount.  The plan also restructures gap aid and introduces parity aid, as described 
above, to assist poor districts.  The plan is designed to ensure that an adequate 
number of teachers and supplies will exist in every district, thereby affording 
every child an opportunity to receive a basic education. 
III 
Avoidance of Primary Reliance on Property Tax 
 
In DeRolph I, this court’s primary concern with the state’s funding system 
was that it relied too heavily on local property taxes to fund a statewide system.  
78 Ohio St.3d at 212, 677 N.E.2d at 747.  The problem this creates, as articulated 
in DeRolph II, is that a system overly reliant on local property taxes will result in 
January Term, 2001 
19 
disparities between districts because the same tax effort in two different districts 
will produce different results.  89 Ohio St.3d at 26, 728 N.E.2d at 1013.  In 
defining overreliance, we stated that local taxes need not be totally abandoned, 
because equality is not constitutionally mandated.  DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 
211, 677 N.E.2d at 746.  Rather than completely rejecting property taxes, the 
majority stated that “property taxes can no longer be the primary means of 
providing the finances for a thorough and efficient system of schools.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  78 Ohio St.3d at 419, 678 N.E.2d at 887.  Thus, some use of local 
property taxes is constitutionally permissible. 
 
Therefore, disparity caused by a school-funding system that rests on the 
dual foundations of state support and local property tax revenues is 
unconstitutional only if the disparity is so dramatic that children in the poorest of 
our school districts are deprived of a basic educational opportunity, and a 
thorough and efficient distribution of funds need only ensure that each Ohio 
school district is financially able to offer an adequate education. 
 
In general, property taxes are less sensitive to economic cycles than are 
taxes based on income or sales.  Property values tend to remain stable over time, 
whereas income and spending are affected by movements in the economy.  
Property taxes, therefore, give school districts a stable and reliable source of local 
revenue through both good and bad economic times.  The problems that arise 
from property taxes, however, are the continuing need for school districts to raise 
revenue through voted local levies that are subject to the limitations of R.C. 
319.301 and the unequal distribution of property wealth throughout the state.  
Districts that have more property wealth generate more local revenue than do 
poorer districts.  Overreliance on property taxes, therefore, has led to disparate 
educational opportunities in these property poor districts.  H.B. 94, however, has 
altered the funding structure to address the concerns of this court through three 
major changes. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
The first method by which the General Assembly has reduced the reliance 
on local property taxes is by altering the charge-off supplement system, known as 
gap aid.  As previously described, gap aid supplements funding in districts that 
cannot produce their local share of the base cost. 
 
Second, H.B. 94 limits any district’s local share of special education, 
vocational education, and transportation to three mills.  R.C. 3317.022(F).  
Limiting the local share of these costs to three mills reduces the amount of local 
revenue a district must generate.  As a consequence, and assuming that the district 
raises more than three mills, the limiting function raises the amount of funds 
available to poorer districts for discretionary spending that the district would not 
have if forced to pay more for its share of these programs.  This, in turn, reduces 
the concern of a district in providing merely an adequate education and allows it 
to focus its spending efforts on providing more than just the basics. 
 
Third, the parity aid program contributes additional funds to poorer 
districts.  It gives those districts the spending power of wealthier districts without 
requiring a district to levy any additional funds at the local level. 
 
Additionally, local contributions for construction of new school facilities 
are no longer contingent upon local property taxes.  S.B. 272 authorizes several 
different options for local funding sources other than a local property tax.  For 
example, to pay their local share required by R.C. 3318.05, districts may now 
apply the proceeds of an existing tax levy for general ongoing improvements or a 
school district income tax.  R.C. 3318.052.  Districts may also apply locally 
donated contributions toward their portion of the basic project cost.  R.C. 
3318.084.  Two or more districts may also enter into an agreement with the 
Treasurer of State to pool bonds to finance their respective projects with the 
facilities commission.  R.C. 3318.085.  Finally, districts may credit as part of their 
local share any bonds issued for classroom facilities within eighteen months 
before being notified that they are eligible for state assistance, so long as the 
January Term, 2001 
21 
facilities supported by the bond measure meet design specifications of the 
facilities commission.  R.C. 3318.01(L); 3318.03; 3318.033; 3318.05; 3318.08. 
 
As we recognized in DeRolph I, no system of school funding could 
address every inequality associated with reliance on local property taxes as a basis 
for school funding.  78 Ohio St.3d at 211, 677 N.E.2d at 746.  While this court 
found in DeRolph II that the system then in place did not meet this court’s prior 
mandate, we recognize that the General Assembly has made significant changes 
to the prior structure in order to reduce reliance on local property taxes.  Through 
changes in gap aid, millage caps, changes in base cost formulation, and the parity 
aid program, for example, the current system established by H.B. 94, when fully 
implemented in accordance with this opinion, will reduce reliance on local 
property taxes to a constitutionally acceptable level by providing substantially 
more state aid to districts less able to generate local revenue. 
IV 
Conclusion and Order 
 
We have thoroughly reviewed the plan now in place and are convinced 
that the defendants are committed to improving primary and secondary education. 
That commitment has operated, and can be expected to further operate, to 
ameliorate the undesirable educational conditions shown in DeRolph I. 
 
In their amicus curiae briefs, both Governor Bob Taft and the current 
majority leadership of the General Assembly have reaffirmed their commitment to 
staying the course of progress we have seen in the period between DeRolph I and 
today.  We believe that the leaders of this General Assembly, Governor Taft, and 
Superintendent Zelman intend to fully implement the school-funding plan for 
which they have so earnestly argued. 
 
Despite the extensive efforts of the defendants to produce a plan that 
meets the requirements announced by this court, changes to the formula are 
required to make the new plan constitutional: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
Base Cost Formula:  H.B. 94 recalculates the cost of providing an adequate 
education to be $4,814 per student in fiscal year 2002.  The base cost formula uses 
one hundred twenty-seven model school districts as a basis for determining base cost 
support.  That number of school districts is achieved by screening out districts in the 
top and bottom five percent of all Ohio districts based on income and property 
wealth from the state’s pool of the one hundred seventy top-performing districts.  
Also included within this number are several districts that did not meet twenty of 
twenty-seven performance standards, but were included regardless because of a 
rounding procedure included within H.B. 94.  R.C. 3317.012(B)(1), last paragraph.  
As the plaintiffs note, rounding and wealth screens include districts that should not 
be considered in the base cost formula and exclude districts that should be 
considered.  Plaintiffs’ arguments and our review of the record convince us that the 
formula must be modified to include the top five percent districts and the lower five 
percent districts, and by considering only those districts that actually meet twenty of 
twenty-seven performance standards without rounding.  We make no determination 
regarding the time in which the state must calculate and implement actual changes in 
the amount of funds distributed to each district pursuant to today’s order, but the 
new calculations must be applied retroactive to July 1, 2001, and to the subsequent 
years designated in R.C. 3317.012. Moreover, in  determining future biennial 
budgets through fiscal year 2007, the rate of millage charged off as the local share of 
base cost funding under divisions (A)(1) and (2) of R.C. 3317.022  may not be 
changed from twenty-three mills, irrespective of the language of  R.C. 
3317.012(D)(4)  suggesting such a methodology. 
 
The H.B. 94 model calculates its base cost amount using spending data for 
FY96, adjusted for inflation, or actual FY99 expenditure data, whichever is lower.  
R.C. 3317.012(B), last paragraph.  The state uses the lower of the two figures to 
compensate for what it terms an “echo effect,” or to adjust for districts that spent 
more than what was actually needed at the base level, due to line-item 
January Term, 2001 
23 
expenditures, other state funding outside of the foundation formula, and local 
enhancement revenues.  The model districts subject to lowering of their base cost 
are those that the state determined to be model districts in 1996.  As the plaintiffs’ 
experts observed, there has been insufficient evidence presented by the state to 
justify lowering the base cost amount to adjust for this supposed echo effect.  
ETPI Report, at 6.  Accordingly, we are persuaded by the plaintiffs that choosing 
the lower of FY96 expenditures or FY99 actual expenditures is unsupported by 
the evidence and should not be used to lower the base cost amount figure. 
 
Parity Aid:  The parity aid program is a salutary attempt to provide poorer 
districts with funds similar to those available to wealthier districts that are used to 
substantially enhance the educational experience of each student.  The plan as 
adopted would fully fund the parity aid program by fiscal year 2006.  We have 
concluded that the parity aid program must be fully funded no later than the 
beginning of fiscal year 2004. 
 
To summarize, we observe that the state has chosen to retain a foundation 
program of funding primary and secondary public education.  We find that, 
having so elected, it must, in order to meet the requirements of DeRolph I and 
DeRolph II, formulate the base cost of providing an adequate education by using 
all school districts meeting twenty of twenty-seven performance standards as set 
forth by the General Assembly in R.C. 3317.012(B)(1)(a) through (aa), without 
adjustments to exclude districts based on wealth screens, without rounding 
adjustments to include additional lower-spending districts, and without use of the 
“echo effect” adjustment, beginning effective July 1, 2001.  In addition, the parity 
aid program established by the General Assembly must be fully funded no later 
than July 1, 2003. 
 
With full implementation of these modifications to the funding plan 
adopted by the General Assembly the plan will meet the test for constitutionality 
created in DeRolph I and DeRolph II.  While the changes will have a fiscal 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
impact, they will not require structural changes to the school foundation program 
set forth in R.C. Chapter 3317. 
 
One final observation is in order.  Historically, the construction and 
maintenance of school facilities have been considered the responsibility of local 
school districts.  By 1989, the General Assembly had begun addressing school  
facilities needs and committing funds to construction and repair of school 
buildings.  We have described previously the substantial commitment of the state 
to the availability of adequate school buildings for every student enrolled in 
public education.  However, the unmet needs are enormous and the time in which 
it is feasible to meet them is lengthy.  We urge the General Assembly to review 
and consider alternative means of funding school buildings and related facilities. 
 
The state is hereby ordered to implement the changes described above.  
Because we have no reason to doubt defendants’ good faith, we have concluded 
that there is no reason to retain jurisdiction of the matter before us.  If the order 
receives less than full compliance, interested parties have remedies available to 
them. 
So ordered. 
 
DOUGLAS, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS and PFEIFER, JJ., separately concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., separately concurs. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., separately concurs. 
 
RESNICK, J., separately dissents. 
 
RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., separately dissent. 
 
COOK, J., separately dissents. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring.  As this case involves principles of great 
importance and may have an enduring influence on the institutions of our state, I 
embrace the high privilege of stating distinctly my opinion on several of the 
January Term, 2001 
25 
difficult matters before us.  Today a new majority decides a case to be known as 
DeRolph III.  In creating this new majority, each member of this majority takes a 
position that substantially deviates from a previously held determination on the 
issues before us.  Our coming to the conclusion we now reach does not mean that 
any one or all of us hold less dear those principles that we have expressed before.  
Because of the inevitable criticism of each of us individually and all of us 
collectively that is sure to follow, I take the time to write separately to 
memorialize a few thoughts. 
History 
 
On March 24, 1997, this court decided DeRolph v. State (1997), 78 Ohio 
St.3d 193, 677 N.E.2d 733 (“DeRolph I”).  In DeRolph I, we held that certain 
provisions of Ohio’s elementary and secondary school-financing system then in 
effect violated Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution, which mandates a 
thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state.  Id. at 
syllabus. 
 
On May 11, 2000, the court decided DeRolph v. State (2000), 89 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 728 N.E.2d 993 (“DeRolph II”).  In DeRolph II, we held that the state’s 
method of funding elementary and secondary schools drafted in response to our 
decision in DeRolph I fell short of providing for a thorough and efficient system 
of public schools throughout this state.  Id. at 35-36, 728 N.E.2d at 1020.  Further, 
we retained continuing jurisdiction over DeRolph II in order to provide the state 
additional time in which to comply with the constitutional requirements set forth 
in Section 2, Article VI.  Id. at 38, 728 N.E.2d at 1022. 
 
Now before us is DeRolph III.  The same issue under consideration in 
DeRolph I and II is again before this court.  That issue is whether the current 
method of funding primary and secondary education in Ohio complies with 
Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution by providing a thorough and 
efficient system of common schools throughout the state.  The Chief Justice has 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
impressively set forth the contents and structure of the legislation now before us.  
I concur in the well-reasoned decision of the majority that with the additional 
initiatives therein ordered, the state will have in place a statutory school-funding 
framework that withstands scrutiny under the Thorough and Efficient Clause of 
the Ohio Constitution as previously interpreted by this court in DeRolph II.  I 
write further for the purpose of detailing several of the numerous issues that I and 
the other members of the court have examined throughout this litigation. 
Separation of Powers 
 
Throughout the DeRolph litigation, we, as a court and individually, have 
been presented with an abundance of concerns.  One of the primary concerns has 
been the doctrine of separation of powers.  “Separation of powers” is a misnomer.  
There is no explicit declaration concerning separation of powers in either the federal 
Constitution or our state Constitution.  Both Constitutions separate government into 
three branches while fusing certain functions and powers of those bodies.  For 
instance, a president’s or governor’s veto protects the executive branch against 
legislative encroachments.  The power of appointment protects the executive branch 
from judicial assault, and executive officers and administrative bodies exercise 
functions that belong to other departments.  In addition, state and federal courts have 
the power to pass on the constitutionality of legislation, and federal judges are 
protected by life tenure.  Further, although the courts do not legislate in the strict 
sense of the word, their decisions may be regarded from a realistic point of view as a 
form of lawmaking.  Finally, the legislative branch controls the purse upon which 
the executive and judicial departments depend.  Mason & Stephenson, American 
Constitutional Law: Introductory Essays and Selected Cases (8 Ed.1987) 76. 
 
The doctrine of separation of powers defines the very character of this 
country’s political system of governance.  Wood, The Creation of the American 
Republic 1776-1787 (1998 Ed.) 151.  As James Madison explained in Federalist 
Paper No. 47, the sharing of powers through a system of checks and balances 
January Term, 2001 
27 
complemented the principle of separation of powers by acting as an additional 
restraint on government.  This blending of powers not only limits government 
itself, it also provides mechanisms by which each branch can defend its place in 
our constitutional system.  The Federalist Papers No. 47 (Madison 1788) (Wills 
Ed.1982), at 243-246.  See, also, Mason & Stephenson, American Constitutional 
Law, supra, at 76.  Thus, the doctrine is viewed as serving a dual purpose.  On 
one hand, it is said that “[t]he doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by 
the convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of 
arbitrary power.”  Myers v. United States (1926), 272 U.S. 52, 293, 47 S.Ct. 21, 
85, 71 L.Ed. 160, 242 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  On the other hand, the principle 
is construed as a facilitator of responsible governance.  “While the Constitution 
diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will 
integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government.”  Youngstown Sheet 
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), 343 U.S. 579, 635, 72 S.Ct. 863, 870, 96 L.Ed. 
1153, 1199 (Jackson, J., concurring).  See, also, Entin, Separation of Powers, The 
Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial Review (1990), 51 Ohio St.L.J. 175.  
Thus, it is clear that the concept of the separation of powers is a political doctrine 
rather than a technical rule of law. 
Meaning of the Separation-of-Powers Doctrine to the DeRolph Litigation 
 
The doctrine of separation of powers has played a paramount role 
throughout our history in ensuring that interbranch conflict never reaches a 
constitutional crisis.  Conflicts between the three branches of government are 
inherent in our political system.  Interbranch conflicts are “natural byproducts of 
the separation of powers principle.”  Hatch, Avoidance of Constitutional Conflicts 
(1987), 48 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 1025, 1027-1028.  Thus, it is inevitable that conflicts will 
arise.  The framers of the federal Constitution foresaw friction between the 
branches of government and sanctioned those conflicts as “the means of keeping 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
each other in their proper places.”  The Federalist Papers No. 51 (Madison 1788) 
(Wills Ed.1982), at 261. 
 
From a practical standpoint, the judicial branch is not the only branch of 
government that engages in constitutional interpretation.  In this respect, the 
DeRolph litigation was sure to spawn conflict between the branches of 
government.  “In the performance of assigned constitutional duties each branch of 
the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of 
its powers by any branch is due great respect from the others.”  United States v. 
Nixon (1974), 418 U.S. 683, 703, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3105, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039, 1061.  
See, also, R.C. 1.47.  Concerning DeRolph, interbranch conflict has existed not 
only between the judicial and legislative branches but also between the judicial 
and executive branches and between the General Assembly and the Governor.  It 
is indeed unfortunate that some persons and segments of the print media have 
chosen to convert the DeRolph litigation into a contest between the General 
Assembly and the court, the court and the Governor, or, more recently, the 
General Assembly and the Governor.  The litigation has not been about which 
branch of government is stronger, which branch would blink first, or which 
branch should be the dominant force.  It is about the proper education and future 
of Ohio’s 1,800,000 public schoolchildren and those generations of children who 
will follow.  Obviously, at some point the questions before each of the branches 
of our government must be resolved—and this must be accomplished while 
preserving the independent role of each branch without the actual or perceived 
subjugation of one branch to another. 
 
That is not to suggest that we, as elected officials, should forgo our duties 
and responsibilities.  All elected officials take an oath of office to uphold the 
Constitution.  Section 7, Article XV, Ohio Constitution.  See, also, Clause 3, 
Article VI, United States Constitution.  Clearly, when a case is properly before the 
court for review and final determination, we as judges are not at liberty to ignore 
January Term, 2001 
29 
our obligations.  “Under the long-standing doctrine of judicial review, it is our 
sworn duty to determine whether the General Assembly has enacted legislation 
that is constitutional.”  DeRolph, 78 Ohio St.3d at 198, 677 N.E.2d at 737, citing 
Marbury v. Madison (1803), 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60.  Deference to the 
corresponding branches of government does not mean abdication.  See United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 704-705, 94 S.Ct. at 3106, 41 L.Ed.2d at 1062 
(“Notwithstanding the deference each branch must accord the others, the ‘judicial 
Power of the United States’ vested in the federal courts by Art. III, [Sec.] 1, of the 
Constitution can no more be shared with the Executive Branch than the Chief 
Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the 
Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto.  Any 
other conclusion would be contrary to the basic concept of separation of powers 
and the checks and balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite government.  
The Federalist [Papers] No. 47, p. 313 [S. Mittell ed. 1938]”).  Thus, the propriety 
of our review of this matter is well established and should no longer be under 
attack.  The judicial branch is the final arbiter in interpreting the Constitution.  
Marbury v. Madison (1803), 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60.  While it is the 
duty of the legislative branch to draft laws, it is the duty of the courts to say what 
the law is.  Id. at 177, 2 L.Ed. at 73. 
 
While deference should be accorded each branch of government, we must 
all remember that the primary rationale behind the separation-of-powers doctrine 
is preservation of the public trust.  The will of the people is of paramount concern, 
and special interests should not be allowed to prevail over public ones.  The 
Federalist Papers No. 51 (Madison 1788) (Wills Ed. 1982), at 264. 
 
The will of the people in regard to public education has been declared by 
the citizens of this state through Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution.  
Miller v. Korns (1923), 107 Ohio St. 287, 297, 140 N.E. 773, 776.  Accordingly, 
respect for separation of powers has led us to scrupulously avoid crafting a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
school-funding remedy in DeRolph I and II.  Out of deference to the General 
Assembly, as well as to the Governor, we have recognized that the scope of our 
review is limited to determining whether the funding method meets the 
educational mandate of the Ohio Constitution.  We have indicated our belief that 
the crafting of a new funding formula is clearly a legislative function.  Thus, we 
have previously declined to instruct the General Assembly regarding the specifics 
of the legislation that it should enact.  DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 212-213, 677 
N.E.2d at 747.  See, also, DeRolph II, 89 Ohio St.3d at 33-38, 728 N.E.2d at 
1019-1022. 
Justice Cook’s Dissent 
 
The dissent of Justice Cook criticizes the majority for “order[ing] the 
General Assembly to make specific changes that are ‘required’ before the current 
funding plan will be constitutional:  adjusting the base cost formula and accelerating 
by two years the full funding of the ‘parity aid program.’  By ordering particular 
legislative action—based on its own concept of what is necessary to guarantee 
educational quality—the majority has made an initial policy determination that the 
judiciary is ill equipped to make and that is characteristic of nonjusticiability.”  With 
all due respect to the dissenter, the majority does no such thing. 
 
In DeRolph I, a majority of this court recognized that a school-financing 
system based on residual budgeting was flawed.  DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 199, 
677 N.E.2d at 738.  See, also, id. at 261, 677 N.E.2d at 780 (Resnick, J., concurring).  
We found that public education was then funded with the residue after other 
mandated government programs had been funded.  Id. at 199, 677 N.E.2d at 738.  
Therefore, we indicated, the base cost of an adequate education as determined by the 
General Assembly had “no real relation to what it actually costs to educate a pupil” 
because, according to one expert, that amount was “ ‘a budgetary residual, which is 
determined as a result of working backwards through the state aid formula after the 
legislature determines the total dollars to be allocated to primary and secondary 
January Term, 2001 
31 
education.’ ”  Id.  We noted in DeRolph I that “[o]ur state Constitution was drafted 
with the importance of education in mind” and that a formula that establishes the 
base cost of an adequate education after determining the total dollars to be allocated 
to primary and secondary education “contravenes the clear wording of our 
Constitution and the framers’ intent.”  Id. at 209, 677 N.E.2d at 745. 
 
In DeRolph II, we commended the Governor and the General Assembly for 
recognizing that “education can no longer be funded as a residual in the state 
budget.”  Id., 89 Ohio St.3d at 36, 728 N.E.2d at 1020.  However, we noted that we 
could not totally discount evidence that residual budgeting methodology remained in 
the funding system under review therein.  Id. at 19-20, 728 N.E.2d at 1008.  Thus, 
we held that the “basic aid formula has structural deficiencies and may not in fact 
reflect the amount required per pupil to provide an adequate education.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at 37, 728 N.E.2d at 1021. 
 
We are again faced with the same concerns, outlined in DeRolph I and II, 
regarding the basic aid amount.  The General Assembly’s determination of the basic 
aid amount has a substantial effect on the entire funding formula.  Thus, the 
computation of the base cost per pupil of an adequate education is, in the words of 
expert witness Dr. Howard B. Fleeter, “a crucial step in defining the funding needs 
of the entire system.” 
 
As indicated by the majority, the formula for determining the base cost of an 
adequate education is based on the average amount spent per pupil in fiscal year 
1999 by “model” school districts.  R.C. 3317.012.  One hundred twenty-seven 
model school districts were used as a basis for calculating the base cost.  The model 
school districts are those school districts that in fiscal year 1999 had met at least 
twenty out of the twenty-seven performance standards established in H.B. 94.  See 
R.C. 3317.012(B)(1)(a) through (aa).2  In order to arrive at the number of model 
                                                          
 
2. 
The twenty-seven performance standards set forth in R.C. 3317.012(B)(1) are: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
32 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
“(a) A ninety per cent or higher graduation rate; 
 
“(b) At least seventy-five per cent of fourth graders proficient on the mathematics test 
prescribed under division (A)(1) of section 3301.0710 of the Revised Code; 
 
“(c) At least seventy-five per cent of fourth graders proficient on the reading test 
prescribed under division (A)(1) of section 3301.0710 of the Revised Code; 
 
“(d) At least seventy-five per cent of fourth graders proficient on the writing test 
prescribed under division (A)(1) of section 3301.0710 of the Revised Code; 
 
“(e) At least seventy-five per cent of fourth graders proficient on the citizenship test 
prescribed under division (A)(1) of section 3301.0710 of the Revised Code; 
 
“(f) At least seventy-five per cent of fourth graders proficient on the science test 
prescribed under division (A)(1) of section 3301.0710 of the Revised Code; 
 
“(g) At least seventy-five per cent of sixth graders proficient on the mathematics test 
prescribed under division (A)(2) of section 3301.0710 of the Revised Code; 
 
“(h) At least seventy-five per cent of sixth graders proficient on the reading test 
prescribed under division (A)(2) of section 3301.0710 of the Revised Code; 
 
“(i) At least seventy-five per cent of sixth graders proficient on the writing test prescribed 
under division (A)(2) of section 3301.0710 of the Revised Code; 
 
“(j) At least seventy-five per cent of sixth graders proficient on the citizenship test 
prescribed under division (A)(2) of section 3301.0710 of the Revised Code; 
 
“(k) At least seventy-five per cent of sixth graders proficient on the science test 
prescribed under division (A)(2) of section 3301.0710 of the Revised Code; 
 
“(l) At least seventy-five per cent of ninth graders proficient on the mathematics test 
prescribed under Section 4 of Am. Sub. S.B. 55 of the 122nd general assembly; 
 
“(m) At least seventy-five per cent of ninth graders proficient on the reading test 
prescribed under Section 4 of Am. Sub. S.B. 55 of the 122nd general assembly; 
 
“(n) At least seventy-five per cent of ninth graders proficient on the writing test 
prescribed under Section 4 of Am. Sub. S.B. 55 of the 122nd general assembly; 
 
“(o) At least seventy-five per cent of ninth graders proficient on the citizenship test 
prescribed under Section 4 of Am. Sub. S.B. 55 of the 122nd general assembly; 
 
“(p) At least seventy-five per cent of ninth graders proficient on the science test 
prescribed under Section 4 of Am. Sub. S.B. 55 of the 122nd general assembly;  
 
“(q) At least eighty-five per cent of tenth graders proficient on the mathematics test 
prescribed under Section 4 of Am. Sub. S.B. 55 of the 122nd general assembly; 
January Term, 2001 
33 
school districts used in the base cost formula, the General Assembly introduced two 
factors into the formula. 
 
R.C. 3317.012(B)(1) contains a rounding provision that permits the 
inclusion of school districts that did not meet at least twenty of the twenty-seven 
academic performance standards.  Thus, seven school districts that had achieved 
only eighteen or nineteen performance measures were included as model districts 
for the purposes of calculating the base cost amount.  The result was a reduction 
in the base cost in the amount of $40 per student for fiscal year 2002.  After 
reviewing this aspect of the school-funding plan, Dr. Fleeter remarked: 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
“(r) At least eighty-five per cent of tenth graders proficient on the reading test prescribed 
under Section 4 of Am. Sub. S.B. 55 of the 122nd general assembly; 
 
“(s) At least eighty-five per cent of tenth graders proficient on the writing test prescribed 
under Section 4 of Am. Sub. S.B. 55 of the 122nd general assembly; 
 
“(t) At least eighty-five per cent of tenth graders proficient on the citizenship test 
prescribed under Section 4 of Am. Sub. S.B. 55 of the 122nd general assembly; 
 
“(u) At least eighty-five per cent of tenth graders proficient on the science test prescribed 
under Section 4 of Am. Sub. S.B. 55 of the 122nd general assembly; 
 
“(v) At least sixty per cent of twelfth graders proficient on the mathematics test 
prescribed under division (A)(3) of section 3301.0710 of the Revised Code; 
 
“(w) At least sixty per cent of twelfth graders proficient on the reading test prescribed 
under division (A)(3) of section 3301.0710 of the Revised Code; 
 
“(x) At least sixty per cent of twelfth graders proficient on the writing test prescribed 
under division (A)(3) of section 3301.0710 of the Revised Code; 
 
“(y) At least sixty per cent of twelfth graders proficient on the citizenship test prescribed 
under division (A)(3) of section 3301.0710 of the Revised Code; 
 
“(z) At least sixty per cent of twelfth graders proficient on the science test prescribed 
under division (A)(3) of section 3301.0710 of the Revised Code; 
 
“(aa) An attendance rate for the year of at least ninety-three per cent as defined in section 
3302.01 of the Revised Code.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
34 
 
“It is difficult to conclude that the addition of these marginally 
unsuccessful districts to the list of successful districts occurred for any reason 
other than the reduction of the total per pupil cost of an adequate education.” 
 
A second factor, income and property wealth screens, was also used in 
determining the model school districts to be included in the base cost foundation 
formula.  The income screen excludes from consideration of the base cost 
calculation those districts that were among the five percent of all districts with the 
highest income and those districts that were among the five percent of all districts 
with the lowest income.  R.C. 3317.012(B)(2).  Likewise, the property wealth 
screen excludes from consideration those districts that were among the five 
percent of all districts with the highest property valuation per pupil and those 
districts that were among the five percent of all districts with the lowest property 
valuation per pupil.  R.C. 3317.012(B)(3).  Previously the funding formula had 
excluded the top and bottom ten percent of all districts.  This change, to a five-
percent wealth screen, allows inclusion of additional successful districts with 
higher wealth.  However, wealth screening still excludes some two-thirds of the 
thirty most effective performing school districts in the state. 
 
In its brief, the state justified the removal of these districts from the 
calculation of the base cost by quoting David Monk, the Dean of the College of 
Education at Pennsylvania State University.  He described Dr. John Augenblick’s 
original recommendation by stating: 
 
“ ‘A 5% exclusion of this kind is a well established practice within the 
field of school finance given the common existence of highly atypical school 
districts in the tails of wealth and income distributions.’ ” 
 
However, we agree with plaintiffs’ argument that the income and property 
wealth screens were implemented “solely to eliminate high wealth districts, since 
no district at the bottom of the wealth spectrum satisfied the 20 out of 27 
performance standards, while most of the districts on the high end of the wealth 
January Term, 2001 
35 
spectrum easily surpassed the 20 of 27 benchmark.”  The result was that, through 
the introduction of wealth screens, the state was able to reduce the basic aid 
amount by $110 per pupil. 
 
The state used a third and, for our purposes, final procedure for calculating 
the base cost amount.  This method is set forth in the last paragraph of R.C. 
3317.012(B) and is referred to as the “echo effect” provision.  For those school 
districts that qualified as model districts in FY99 and that had also met the required 
performance criteria of the statute in effect in FY96, R.C. 3317.012(B) provides that 
the base cost is calculated from the expenditures per pupil for those districts in FY96 
or FY99, whichever year is lower.3  The rationale behind this provision, as stated in 
the statute, was that “the increased state funding may have driven the districts’ 
expenditures beyond the expenditures that were actually needed to maintain their 
educational programs at the level necessary to maintain their ability to meet the 
fiscal year 1999 performance criteria of current division (B)(1) of this section.” 
 
However, as noted by Dr. Fleeter: 
 
“In general, the Echo effect adjustment totally ignores the contribution 
made by local taxes to the base cost amount.  The data show that local revenue 
increases accounted for more of the total dollar increase than that for which State 
aid accounted. * * * 
 
“By assuming that State aid may have caused districts to exceed the 
amount needed to fund an adequate education, the General Assembly also tacitly 
assumes the voters in those districts undertook $112 million in additional tax 
burden unnecessarily.  This assumption has no support in any empirical data.”  
(Emphasis sic.) 
 
With the introduction of an “echo effect” provision, the General Assembly 
reduced the per-pupil basic aid figure by $181. 
                                                          
 
3. 
The 1996 figures were adjusted for inflation. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
36 
 
It is obvious from the foregoing that those provisions discussed above, 
rounding, wealth screens, and “echo effect,” violate the Thorough and Efficient 
Clause set forth in Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution.  Those provisions 
have “no real relation to what it actually costs to educate a pupil.”  DeRolph I, 78 
Ohio St.3d at 199, 677 N.E.2d at 738.  Simply stated, those provisions were inserted 
into HB 94 as residual, cost-based budgeting methods designed to do nothing more 
than lower the basic aid amount to a figure that is palatable to the General Assembly. 
 
This court has the power and the duty to sever those provisions of legislation 
that offend the dictates set forth in our Ohio Constitution.  The General Assembly 
acknowledges this power in stating legislative intent in R.C. 1.50: 
 
“If any provision of a section of the Revised Code or the application thereof 
to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other 
provisions or applications of the section or related sections which can be given effect 
without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions are 
severable.” 
 
The test for determining whether an unconstitutional provision may be 
severable is set forth in Geiger v. Geiger (1927), 117 Ohio St. 451, 466, 160 N.E. 
28, 33: 
 
“ ‘(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable of 
separation so that each may be read and may stand by itself?  (2) Is the 
unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it 
impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause or 
part is stricken out?  (3) Is the insertion of words or terms necessary in order to 
separate the constitutional part from the unconstitutional part, and to give effect to 
the former only?’ ”  Id., quoting State v. Bickford (1914), 28 N.D. 36, 147 N.W. 407, 
paragraph nineteen of the syllabus. 
 
Those offending provisions, the last paragraph of R.C. 3317.012(B)(1) 
(rounding), R.C. 3317.012(B)(2) and (3) (wealth screens), and the last paragraph of 
January Term, 2001 
37 
R.C. 3317.012(B) (echo effect), and the remaining, unoffending sections of HB 94 
may each be read, and each may stand, by itself.  Further, the unconstitutional 
provisions are not so essentially connected with the remainder of HB 94 that by 
eliminating those provisions the enactment will lose its intent.  Therefore, we need 
only excise the constitutionally offensive sections and need not add any other 
language to give effect to its remedial scheme.  Thus modified, the remainder of HB 
94 continues to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly, which is, of 
course, to provide a thorough and efficient system of funding for public education. 
 
Similarly, the majority has also found it necessary to sever that provision of 
the state’s parity aid program requiring a phase-in of the program in full by FY06.  
R.C. 3317.0217(C) and (D).  We have previously voiced our concern regarding the 
General Assembly’s practice of phasing in certain parts of the school-funding 
formula.  DeRolph II, 89 Ohio St.3d at 18-19, 728 N.E.2d at 1007 (phase-in aspect 
of basic aid amount).  In response to the phasing-in of parity aid, Dr. Fleeter noted: 
 
“The fact that Sub. H.B. 94 would phase-in Parity aid in incremental steps 
further undermines the ability of the new program to achieve systematic reform.  
Parity aid amounts to the major element of the legislation intended to address the 
unconstitutional overreliance on the local property tax in Ohio’s school funding 
system.  In this context, Parity aid offers the prospect of alleviating a small part of 
that overreliance initially. ‘Full’ relief would require five years to achieve.” 
 
Without striking the phase-in provision from R.C. 3317.0217(C) and (D), the 
legislation drafted by the General Assembly in response to DeRolph I and II will not 
meet the mandate of a thorough and efficient system set forth in Section 2, Article 
VI of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
Therefore, contrary to Justice Cook’s belief, the majority is not thrusting 
itself into the legislative arena.  Nor is the majority by severing those offending 
portions of HB 94 making public policy determinations reserved for the General 
Assembly.  Our actions are not in disregard of the doctrine of separation of powers 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
38 
or offensive to our constitutional form of government.  We are not imposing our will 
on the General Assembly or the people of this great state.  We are merely 
performing our sworn duty of determining “whether the General Assembly has 
enacted legislation that is constitutional.”  DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 198, 677 
N.E.2d at 737. 
Options 
 
It is important to review what options this court had before it while deciding 
DeRolph III.  As in every case, before finally deciding what decision the court is to 
make, the question that must always be asked is, what will be the next step and the 
step after that? 
A.  Approve the New Legislation 
 
The court could simply approve the legislation and walk away.  Without 
severing those offending portions as ordered in the Chief Justice’s majority opinion, 
this option lacked credibility and was never supported by a court majority. 
B.  Declare the New Legislation Unconstitutional and Do Nothing Else 
 
Assume, as some will forcefully argue, that the funding formula enacted 
by the General Assembly and signed by the Governor fails to pass constitutional 
muster and a majority of the court simply declares it unconstitutional.  This option 
presents at least two problems.  If a majority of the court would say to the General 
Assembly and the Governor, “Try again,” what would that mean?  Merely 
declaring the statutes unconstitutional and returning the matter to the General 
Assembly, without more detailed and specific direction would appear to be an act 
of futility.  Only one member of this court was willing to take this step.  It would 
leave the existing paralysis without treatment. 
 
The second problem could be even more acute.  If the court were to say that 
the legislation is unconstitutional, then, arguably, there would be a return to pre-
existing funding levels.  Such an action would, by the state’s calculations, return to 
January Term, 2001 
39 
the state’s general fund the $1,400,000,0004 appropriated by the General Assembly 
to finance the plan now before us.  These funds would then presumably be 
reallocated to the other state institutions and programs so severely cut to 
accommodate the school-funding plan.  While one or more of us would welcome the 
return of support for higher education, mental health, protection of battered women, 
prison security, payment of wrongfully withheld child support, and other worthwhile 
and needed state responsibilities, the negative practical effect of such an action 
outweighs the benefits. 
 
Each school district in this state presumably already has a budget for at 
least the coming year.  If we were to reject the plan before us, over the course of 
                                                          
 
4. 
It has been widely reported by the Governor and the General Assembly that with the 
enactment of HB 94, an additional $1.4 billion has been budgeted to fund primary and secondary 
education.  However, despite the exuberance of these sources, I am at a loss to confirm their 
calculations, especially when the state’s brief fails to cite such an enormous figure.  At most, the 
state argues in its brief that the current basic aid figure of $4,814 is an increase of twelve percent 
per student in 2001.  Apparently, the state is referring to the increase of $520 between the FY01 
$4,294 figure of HB 650, and the current FY02 figure of $4,814.  Yet, the state fails to credit the 
level at which HB 650 would have funded the FY02 budget, which would have been $4,414.  
Thus, the increase would be only nine percent or $400 per pupil. 
 
In addition, the state fails to reconcile its claims with the fact that it has reduced the 
maximum cost-of-doing-business factor from eighteen percent to 7.5 percent, further eroding the 
enormous gains it purports to fund.  In fact, and by example, Hamilton County under HB 650 
would have received $5,084 per pupil, yet with the reduction in the cost-of-doing-business factor 
under HB 94, Hamilton County will actually receive $5,175.  Thus, after the reduction in the cost-
of-doing-business factor, the $520 base cost increase trumpeted by the state yields a meager $91 
gain for Hamilton County over what it would have received under HB 650.  Other counties face 
similar circumstances. 
 
While this court does not set legislative policy, I do find it curious that in 1995 the 
legislature allowed a maximum cost-of-doing-business factor of 7.5 percent.  Former R.C. 
3317.02(E), 1995 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 117, 146 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1203.  But realizing that cost 
disparities between some counties were as much as thirty-six percent, the legislature, through the 
enactment of HB 215, decided to phase in an increase to a maximum of eighteen percent to offset 
the disparity.  Former R.C. 3317.02(E)(2), 147 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1214.  Yet here we are, but four 
years later, and the legislature has decided to revert to the 7.5 percent maximum.  Moreover, the 
7.5 percent maximum that is reinstated in HB 94 does not assign the same cost-of-doing-business 
factors to the various counties as were assigned prior to HB 650.  In fact, fifty-five of eighty-eight 
counties have been assigned lower cost-of-doing-business factors.  In the words of Dr. Fleeter, one 
of the experts in this case, “One can only conclude that the driving force behind this change is 
either the desire to transfer state aid from urban areas to rural areas or simply the desire to 
seemingly increase the foundation level without paying the full price for doing so.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
40 
the next biennium the Cleveland Municipal School District would lose almost 
$34,000,000.  The Columbus City School District would lose over $33,000,000.  
Toledo City School District would lose $19,679,912.  South-Western City in 
Franklin County would lose over $17,000,000; Lakota Local in Butler County 
almost $13,000,000; Akron City, over $12,000,000; Ohio Valley Local, 
$9,500,000; Hilliard City, $8,700,000; Canton City, $7,384,424.  Lorain City, 
Dayton City, Mason City in Warren County, Pickerington Local in Fairfield 
County, Parma City, Euclid City, and Dublin City would each lose between 
$9,500,000 and $6,700,000. 
 
Benton Carroll Salem Local in Ottawa County would lose over the 
biennium an increase of one hundred ninety-one percent; Wolf Creek Local in 
Washington County, one hundred seventy-seven percent; River View Local in 
Coshocton County, one hundred fifty-three percent; Three Rivers Local in 
Hamilton County, one hundred forty-five percent; College Corner Local in Preble 
County, one hundred thirty-four percent; Edison Local in Jefferson County, one 
hundred fourteen percent; Avon Lake City in Lorain County, one hundred eleven 
percent; and Woodridge Local in Summit County, ninety-seven percent.  The list 
goes on and on, but the increases provided by the plan (and the additional funds to 
be made available by the court’s majority opinion of today) are truly significant.  
Gallia County School District in Gallia County will receive over the two-year 
period an increase from $5,864,774 to $10,686,054, and all of these dollar figures 
and percentages are calculated before the additions that will accrue to each district 
after the majority opinion is fully carried out. 
 
If a majority of the court would say that not enough has yet been done and 
the Governor, the General Assembly, and the court study the matter again for a 
year or two, it is fair to ask, how long would it take, even if there was a new 
acceptable plan, to make up what each district would lose during the 
January Term, 2001 
41 
study/discussion period?  Answering our own question, there is not a court 
majority willing to risk losing what has already been gained. 
 
The option of merely declaring the legislation unconstitutional and 
allowing the General Assembly to enact yet another plan is not viable. 
C.  Special Master or Commission 
 
Appointment of a special master or commission has been discussed.  
There has been little or no support for a single special master.  Appointment of an 
independent five-member blue ribbon commission composed of members with 
specific expertise in law, finance, taxation, educational excellence, and labor 
relations, for the purpose of developing a plan that meets the requirements of both 
DeRolph I and DeRolph II and then submitting it to the court for consideration 
and a possible order to enact it, has been seriously considered and has engendered 
greater support among us.  This idea has failed because, as a former justice of this 
court was fond of saying during my early tenure on the court, “The name of the 
game is four.”  Only three members of the court supported this option.  There 
were never four votes for this approach. 
D.  Contempt 
 
Contempt has been a widely discussed option but, I hasten to forcefully 
and unequivocally state, never within the court itself.  As this is being written, I 
just received a call from a man identifying himself as being from Carroll County.  
His message was the same as various members of the court have received over the 
last four years.  “Don’t cave in to the General Assembly.  Find them in contempt 
and put them in jail.” 
 
While that option has never been seriously discussed among us, let us 
explore that option for the benefit of those who would advocate such a malevolent 
course of action.  Admittedly, if the General Assembly had failed to comply with 
the prior court orders and craft a funding formula that passes constitutional 
muster, this court (like other courts) is vested with the power to enforce its orders.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
42 
But how?  Enforcement of any court order poses concerns.  The judicial branch 
has no concrete powers like the sword (executive) or the purse (legislative) with 
which to carry its judgments into effect.  Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:  
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is (1994), 83 Geo.L.J. 217, 219.  In fact, 
the judicial branch has been referred to as the “least dangerous” branch of 
government.  The Federalist Papers No. 78 (Hamilton 1788) (Wills Ed.1982), at 
393.  Courts do not possess their own army or a police department to enforce their 
orders and judgments.  Instead, as Hamilton observed, the judiciary is dependent 
upon the executive department for the efficacy of its judgments.  Id. at 393-394.  
See, also, Paulsen, 83 Geo.L.J. at 219. 
 
These practical problems of enforcement remain the same, and are, in fact, 
exacerbated because today we live in different times.  We hear from certain 
members of the General Assembly that we can say whatever we want but those 
pronouncements will be ignored.  We hear some members of the General 
Assembly saying that impeachment of one or more justices might be in order and, 
in fact, we have one self-proclaimed constitutional law expert, a professor, 
advocating our impeachment or removal from office and stating that the General 
Assembly has a duty to ignore court orders that he says we have no right to issue, 
notwithstanding that we are doing what we believe the oath means when we 
swear “to support the constitution of the United States and the constitution of this 
state” and “to administer justice without respect to persons.”  R.C. 3.23. 
 
Are we afraid?  No.  We fear not for ourselves but for those who would 
forget their place in our constitutional system of governance and ignore the 
wisdom of our founding fathers.  Are we practical?  Yes.  We recognize that we 
have no army and no police force to send.  We have only our ability to reason, 
persuade, and even plead with the Governor and General Assembly to do what is 
right and best for schoolchildren in Ohio. 
E.  Possible Solutions to Funding Inadequacies 
January Term, 2001 
43 
 
We have been criticized, sometimes by the very same people, both for 
entering the fray at all and for not spelling out exactly “what you want us to do.”  
We recognize this “can’t win” position, but a few comments may now be in order.  
There have now been a legion of challenges in various states to the funding of 
public education.  To date, courts in seventeen states have found their public 
education financing systems to be unconstitutional.  Lundberg, State Courts and 
School Funding: A Fifty-State Analysis (2000), 63 Alb.L.Rev. 1101.  These 
holdings have been based on state constitutional language the same as or similar 
to our own.  What we have done is hardly an aberration. 
 
Certainly Ohio’s schoolchildren are better off today than they were before 
DeRolph I and DeRolph II.  New facilities have been and are being constructed.  
Learning materials, including books, have been updated and replaced.  Student-
teacher ratios have been decreased.  Technology has been introduced and 
improved.  We recognize that more must be done, but the impetus is now at work.  
With the basic plan and the additional provisions spelled out in the majority 
opinion and under the prodding and capable leadership of the Governor, the 
General Assembly, the Ohio Coalition for Equity and Adequacy of School 
Funding, and this court have gone a long way toward rectifying school funding 
inadequacies.  Is the solution perfect?  No.  Is the solution adequate?  I hope so.  
The constitutional mandate is one of adequacy—not equality. 
Other States 
 
It would have been appropriate for the Governor and the General Assembly 
to have drawn on the experiences of other states to solve what, by any fair observer’s 
review, has been a problem in our state for a very long time—inadequate funding of 
public education and decrepit school buildings (a 1996 United States General 
Accounting Office report points out that ninety-five percent of Ohio’s school 
buildings need upgrades and repairs [U.S. GAO Report No.  HEHS-96-148 “School 
Facilities: Profiles of School Condition by State”]).  We hope that the Governor and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
44 
General Assembly will look further at the problem and draw on the experiences of 
such states as Kentucky and Vermont.  In fact, we would do well to study, and 
perhaps emulate, the strategy employed by our sister states of Michigan and 
Minnesota in solving their school-funding inadequacies. 
 
In his recent book, The DeRolph Case: Ohio’s Struggle for a 
Constitutional School Finance System (2001), Professor Richard Lucier, a 
Denison University economics professor, makes the point and specifically details 
the Michigan experience.  Id. at 159-171.  Admittedly, the initiative was bold, the 
medicine distasteful, and political futures uncertain.  But with strong and 
imaginative gubernatorial and legislative bipartisan leadership, Michigan’s 
leaders and its citizens struck a strong blow not only for schoolchildren but also 
themselves.  In doing so, the Michigan plan relieved the heavy burden on 
overtaxed owners of real estate, many of whom were property holders trying to 
reconcile what had become an oppressive burden of trying to do what was right—
support local schools—with what was financially feasible.  But it was not just 
homeowners who benefited.  After all, commercial and industrial real property is 
also taxed, and these business interests also benefited. 
 
In 1993, Governor John Engler and Michigan legislative leaders jointly 
supported a constitutional amendment designed to reduce local property taxes by 
nearly fifty percent and to replace the lost property tax revenue for schools by a 
corresponding state sales tax increase—a method not unfamiliar to Ohio voters.  
Id. at 159.  The amendment was defeated by Michigan voters by a margin of fifty-
five percent to forty-five percent.  Id. at 159-160.  Governor Engler’s proposal 
included a state foundation grant of $4,800 per pupil—in 1993!  Id. at 163.  
Today, some eight years later, our base figure in Ohio is $4,814 for FY02.  
Michigan’s number for FY02 is $6,300.  Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. 388.1620. 
 
In any event, Governor Engler and the members of the General Assembly in 
Michigan were not willing to accept the 1993 defeat.  Id. at 160.  The minority 
January Term, 2001 
45 
leader of the senate, State Senator (and now United States Senator)  Debbie 
Stabenow, a Democrat, introduced legislation that, if approved, would entirely 
eliminate local property taxes as a source of revenue for public education.  The 
legislature did not dilly-dally.  Within twenty-four hours the legislation was 
approved by a vote in the state senate of twenty-nine to five and in the house by a 
vote of sixty-nine to thirty-five.  Id. at 160 and fn. 6.  In August 1993, Governor 
Engler signed the bill, and the massive tax cut, $6.5 billion, became reality.  Id. at 
159.  Suddenly, local property taxes for school funding were reduced to zero.  Id.  
With two-thirds of the funding for primary and secondary education eliminated and 
no provision to replace the lost revenue, decision time was at hand.  Id. 
 
The Michigan General Assembly responded with courage and dispatch.  
Two plans for reform were adopted.  Id. at 163.  The first was a ballot proposal.  It 
proposed a constitutional amendment increasing the state sales tax in an amount 
that would, if approved, provide $10.2 billion in combined state-local revenue 
and, thereby, completely change forever the method by which public education in 
Michigan is financed.  No longer would there have to be an overreliance on local 
real estate taxes to fund the educational system.  The other plan, a statutory plan, 
would automatically take effect if voters rejected the sales tax plan.  That 
legislation, already approved and in place, provided for the replacement of most 
of the local property tax cuts with increased state income taxes if the ballot plan 
failed.  Id. 
 
On March 15, 1994, the voters of Michigan, having had a complete and 
comprehensive program submitted to them, overwhelmingly approved the ballot 
sales tax plan by sixty-nine to thirty-one percent.  Id. at 165.  The referendum was 
on the ballot in a primary election in a nonpresidential year, yet the voter turnout 
was forty-one percent, a substantial response by the Michigan electorate.  Id. at 
165, fn. 23.  With one master stroke, and admirable gubernatorial and legislative 
intestinal fortitude, local property tax revenue funding had been reduced to about 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
46 
twenty percent of the total of school funding with the state’s share and the sales 
tax making up the other eighty percent of the school funding revenue. 
 
Minnesota’s experience in solving its public school financing crisis is also 
worthy of comprehensive review.  However, rather than detail that story, I attach 
as an appendix the well-reasoned and well-presented column by Chris Sheridan, 
associate editor of the Plain Dealer’s editorial pages.  According to the column, 
the average per-pupil spending from the state (Minnesota) for 2001-2002 “will 
amount 
to 
nearly 
$6,900.” 
 
(See 
ftp://ftp.sconet.state.oh.us\opinions/2001/governor.pdf.) 
 
Some members of this court wish that we in Ohio could have gotten 
together on a plan the same as or similar to those enacted in Michigan and 
Minnesota.  We recognize that “hope springs eternal in the human breast.”  
Maybe yet there will be a brave soul or two who will step forward to propose that 
we overhaul the system so that instead of just tweaking what we have, real and 
substantial reform takes place and the systematic overhaul so eloquently called for 
by Justice Sweeney in DeRolph I takes place.  Illustrative of the seriousness of the 
overall problem is the article from the Wall Street Journal of July 18, 2001, which 
is appended hereto.  (See ftp://ftp.sconet.state.oh.us\opinions/2001/wsj.pdf.)  I 
hurt for my hometown, Toledo, and all the many other Ohio communities that 
find themselves in like circumstances.  Unfortunately, what the article depicts is 
the rule—not the exception! 
Conclusion 
 
After reviewing the specific options set forth above and a number of other 
alternatives not listed, we realized that each option was not practical or could not 
attract a majority vote of the court.  Recognizing that it is the primary mission of 
this court to accept cases that properly invoke its jurisdiction under the 
Constitution, read briefs and hear arguments on those cases, decide the cases, and 
then publish opinions to assist the bench, bar, and litigants of this state, a majority 
January Term, 2001 
47 
of the court came to today’s conclusion knowing that a two-two-two-one or a 
three-three-one or any other combination of votes short of a majority of four 
would not be meeting our constitutional obligations. 
 
Certain members of the majority had to forgo their argument on lack of 
jurisdiction.  Other members of the majority had to overcome the feeling that 
what has been presented to the court is nothing more than a massaging of the 
system, that is, the funding legislation before us still looks like, walks like and 
quacks like, and, therefore, is still residual budgeting; that under the plan the 
school facilities problems will not be taken care of during the lifetime of a now 
middle-aged person; that the overreliance on local property taxes for educational 
funding has not really been solved for the long run and that there has not been a 
“complete, systematic overhaul” of the educational funding system for students in 
the K-12 grades called for in DeRolph I.  Id., 78 Ohio St.3d at 212, 677 N.E.2d at 
747.  Finally, one member of the majority had to forgo insisting that in Ohio, 
education is a fundamental right. 
 
Once these chasms had been closed the more obvious problems that could 
not be ignored could be met head on.  Thus, today we hold that to meet the 
constitutional requirements of Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution that 
there be a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state, 
the so-called echo-effect adjustment must be eliminated, the rounding-up 
procedure cannot be used, and the income and property wealth screens must be 
removed when determining the base cost of an adequate education.  In addition, 
the current phase-in aspect of the parity aid program, which is repugnant to a 
thorough and efficient system of public education, is eliminated.  Finally, we urge 
that the Governor and General Assembly look at other ways and means to resolve 
the facilities problems that face almost every school district in our state. 
 
State Senator Jeff Jacobson is widely recognized as the architect of the 
plan now before us.  At a press briefing on Thursday, April 12, 2001, he said, “I 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
48 
think that the court was right in what they did in DeRolph I and II.”  Sunny 
Senators, http://www.capitolgate.com/OH/pressroom/leadstory.asp?id=35.  (or 
see ftp://ftp.sconet.state.oh.us\opinions/2001/senators.pdf.)  More recently, on 
Friday, July 27, 2001, the Senator said, “[I]f you read their decision [DeRolph I 
and DeRolph II], it was a very moderate decision.  It was very wise.  It was not 
the type of decision that would lead by itself to a constitutional crisis and yet 
that’s 
the 
way 
many 
people 
treated 
it.” 
 
Holding 
Out 
Hope, 
http://www.capitolgate.com/OH/pressroom/leadstory.asp?id=109. 
 
(or 
see 
ftp://ftp.sconet.state.oh.us\opinions/2001/hope.pdf.)  Certainly Senator Jacobson 
has never been known as some wild-eyed liberal, and these comments of his, in 
his capacity as a father, a state senator, and a lawyer, should lay to rest the notion 
that the court did something wrong in accepting jurisdiction over a legitimate case 
or controversy with constitutional ramifications.  It is not as if we went out to the 
corner of Broad and High in Columbus and engaged in champerty.  We did not 
ask for the case, but when such a case arrives here it is our sworn obligation to 
resolve it based on the law, the facts, and our own personal oaths with regard to 
interpreting and supporting our Ohio Constitution.  We do not have any 
subcommittee to refer the matter to for purposes of letting it die.  We decide it as 
we must and should. 
 
The new majority finds that, once modified, the legislation will meet the 
required constitutional standard.  That is, the legislation will then not be 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  State ex rel. Dickman v. 
Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59, paragraph 
one of the syllabus. 
 
To some, we will have done too much.  To others, we will have fallen 
woefully short of the ultimate goal.  To those of us in the majority, we will have seen 
our duty and discharged it in a manner consistent with our sworn obligations. 
January Term, 2001 
49 
 
In 1776, when John Adams was traveling to Philadelphia from his home in 
Massachusetts to participate in the major issue of his day—the independence of the 
Colonies—his wife, Abigail Adams, wrote to him.  She said:  “You cannot be, I 
know, nor do I wish to see you, an inactive spectator.  * * *  We have too many high 
sounding words, and too few actions that correspond with them.” McCullough, John 
Adams (2001) 21. 
 
We entered into this enterprise knowing that our actions, whatever we might 
do or not do, would be subject to much commentary, review, and criticism.  We 
could not and would not, however, be inactive spectators uttering high-sounding 
words without corresponding actions. 
 
Accordingly, I concur.  In concurring, I understand that it is the intention of 
the majority that the General Assembly will, within a reasonable period of time, 
make the changes set forth in the majority opinion.  If the General Assembly does 
not comply, any aggrieved party can return to us by reinvoking our jurisdiction.  See 
Harris v. Harris (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 303, 307, 12 O.O.3d 291, 293, 390 N.E.2d 
789, 792.  In that event, a more comprehensive order could very well be entered, and 
we, having gone the extra mile, would seek enforcement of that order through means 
available to the court. 
 
I respectfully concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring.  I concur in Chief Justice Moyer’s majority 
opinion and join the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas.  H.B. 94, fully funded, 
will “smooth out the unconscionable funding inequities that exist between school 
districts in this state.”  DeRolph v. State (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 262, 677 N.E.2d 
733, 780 (Pfeifer, J., concurring).  Although Ohio’s school-funding scheme has thus 
been made constitutional, it is legitimate to observe that the system continues to rely 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
50 
heavily on local property taxes.  That concern could be eased by rethinking the issue 
of funding for school buildings. 
 
The General Assembly has adopted a plan to build new classrooms and 
rehabilitate existing classrooms in this state.  If the Governor and General 
Assembly were to ask Ohio voters to approve an expansion of the state’s debt 
authority for the single purpose of funding one hundred percent of school 
construction and repair, it would be an enormous boost to educational opportunity 
across this state.  It would also serve the collateral purpose of substantially 
reducing the system’s reliance on local property taxes. 
 
Well-built and well-kept school buildings say something to the children who 
are in them now and say something to future generations.  School buildings are 
tangible evidence that we cared, that we saw an opportunity to help our children, and 
that we accepted our responsibility to do so.  The General Assembly has reached for 
and achieved a constitutional system of common schools.  There is room to reach 
higher. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring.  I respectfully concur in the 
judgment of the majority.  I write simply to clarify that I still adhere to my 
position outlined in the dissents in DeRolph I and II, and still believe that the 
“Constitution requires the General Assembly to ‘make such provisions, by 
taxation or otherwise, as * * * will secure a thorough and efficient system of 
common schools throughout the state.’ ” (Emphasis added.)  DeRolph v. State 
(1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 264, 677 N.E.2d 733, 782 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting), 
quoting Section 2, Article VI, Ohio Constitution. 
 
The law, as recently amended by the General Assembly, increases school 
funding by millions of dollars and has dramatically increased funding in many 
areas.  These changes, along with modifications ordered in this majority opinion, 
persuaded two justices from the former majority to find that the school-funding 
January Term, 2001 
51 
plan is constitutional.  Had I continued to dissent, the gridlock in this case would 
have continued to the detriment of all the parties, including most importantly 
Ohio’s schoolchildren.  Thus, my vote to join the majority is not an implicit 
finding that the former plan was unconstitutional, but is rather a pragmatic 
compromise to resolve an impasse that I believe has been divisive for too long 
and for which the alternatives proposed by the dissents are truly unacceptable.  
Therefore, I respectfully concur. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., dissenting.  In its Machiavellian maneuver to 
halt this litigation, the majority gives its seal of approval to a system of public 
education that, even with the judicially legislated adjustments of the majority, 
falls well short of the system required by the Ohio Constitution.  In doing so, a 
majority of this court abandons adherence to the requirements of the Ohio 
Constitution and puts an end to this litigation, even while recognizing that the 
General Assembly’s enactments are unsatisfactory.  It is indeed ironic that one 
thing all the justices (both in the majority and in dissent) of this court agreed on in 
both DeRolph v. State (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 677 N.E.2d 733 (“DeRolph I”), 
and DeRolph v. State (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 1, 728 N.E.2d 993 (“DeRolph II”), 
was that it was the General Assembly’s task, not that of this court, to enact 
school-funding legislation.  Now, a majority of this court has determined that, for 
the sake of expediency, harmony, and consensus, it is acceptable for this court to 
sit as a superlegislature and enact its own version of a constitutionally acceptable 
school-funding plan.  The majority states: 
 
“A climate of legal, financial, and political uncertainty concerning Ohio’s 
school-funding system has prevailed at least since this court accepted jurisdiction 
of the case.  We have concluded that no one is served by continued uncertainty 
and fractious debate.  In that spirit, we have created the consensus that should 
terminate the role of this court in the dispute.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
52 
 
The majority’s creation of this consensus provides an uncertain future for 
the children and citizens of Ohio for two reasons.  The first, of course, is that this 
court has no authority to order the level of spending or impose other specific 
requirements that would make the state’s system of funding education 
constitutional.  The second is that the General Assembly must accept the 
majority’s judicial mandates and enact legislation that complies with this court’s 
order.  Judging by past history, when will that take place? 
 
The defendants have once again resisted as too politically unpopular the 
fundamental changes required to bring our public school system into compliance 
with the Constitution.  Instead, the defendants have merely tweaked the system 
that was rejected by this court in two previous decisions.  They have stamped 
“new and improved” on a system that is neither, and have trumpeted that this 
“revised” system, with a supposed massive infusion of cash provided by the state, 
satisfies the Constitution.  However, it takes much more than money to 
accomplish the systematic overhaul of school funding in Ohio that a majority of 
this court in DeRolph I and DeRolph II recognized was required to bring the 
system into compliance with our Constitution. 
 
Even today’s majority cannot accept the state’s transparent, self-serving, and 
expedient portrayal of its inadequate response without judicially legislating its own 
amendments in order to arrive at a “constitutional” funding system.  The majority 
has acquiesced to the desires of the defendants, and has abandoned all pretense of 
objectivity, ostensibly in the spirit of creating a consensus.  The majority appears to 
be working hand in hand with the legislative branch of government when it quotes 
Thomas Jefferson as support for its decision to impose a compromise in this case for 
“the greater good.”  Jefferson was a wise man, but he was certainly not discussing 
the function of a supreme court when he wrote of “sacrificing our opinions 
sometimes to the opinions of others for the sake of harmony.”  The oath of a 
Supreme Court justice is to “administer justice without respect to persons.”  R.C. 
January Term, 2001 
53 
3.23.  Nowhere in that oath is there any recognition of an overriding necessity of 
harmonious decisions for the sake of getting along with the other branches of 
government or of creating a “consensus” among the members of the court. 
 
The role of the Supreme Court is to act independently from the other two 
branches of government in determining whether the laws as enacted by the General 
Assembly pass constitutional muster.  We are not members of the legislature, where 
compromise is the order of the day and backroom deals are taken for granted.  
Rather, we have taken a sacred oath to support and uphold the Constitution to the 
best of our ability and understanding. 
 
The majority apparently recognizes that the state’s plan is too flawed to meet 
the goals illuminated by two previous decisions of this court.  However, rather than 
giving the state additional time to enact a constitutional system, the majority, “for 
the sake of harmony,” does its own toying with the system, adding its own layer of 
legislation to that enacted by the General Assembly.  The majority’s determination 
that the state must revise its calculations to increase Am.Sub.H.B. No. 94’s basic aid 
amount and must move up the date for the full phase-in of parity aid will cause little 
more than an ineffective addition to an inadequate plan and simply does not make 
the plan constitutionally acceptable. 
 
The majority evaluates the plan not for what the plan actually accomplishes, 
but what it wishes the plan would accomplish, including making its own additions to 
meet that end.  Ignoring the numerous deficiencies along the way, the majority 
places its confidence in a General Assembly that has once again failed to comply 
with the Constitution. 
 
The majority ignores the directives of DeRolph I and DeRolph II, sets the 
bar lower than is justified, and then of course finds that the bar has been cleared.  
Rather than building upon the analyses of previous decisions of this court, as the 
majority purports to do, the majority actually weakens those precedents beyond 
recognition and then proclaims that the watered-down standards allegedly 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
54 
extracted from those decisions have been satisfied.  Somehow, a half-hearted 
response by the state is portrayed as the basis of an acceptable solution.  However, 
the majority imposes its own caveat—the solution is acceptable only after the 
changes ordered by the majority are implemented. 
 
In order to comply, the General Assembly not only must pass legislation to 
reflect the majority’s order, but accordingly must find a source of funding to satisfy 
the majority’s predilection for what a constitutional level of state support for schools 
must be.  The majority innocuously asserts that, due to its belief in the “good faith” 
of the defendants, it expects the General Assembly to comply.  It blandly states that 
if its order “receives less than full compliance, interested parties have remedies 
available to them.”  The possible consequences of a refusal to comply are glossed 
over, and the majority does not specifically say what the available remedies would 
be.  Presumably, if the General Assembly fails to adopt the majority’s judicially 
legislated amendments, the majority is prepared to hold the General Assembly in 
contempt for its failure, or perhaps take even more drastic action.  Since what the 
majority has done is in direct violation of separation of powers, it can do nothing to 
effectively enforce its judicial mandates.  Moreover, the majority abandons 
precedent and enters dangerous territory in ordering that specific legislation must be 
enacted to make the school-funding system constitutional.  School funding is a 
complicated and intricate system.  Any changes to one aspect, while appearing to be 
straightforward, will cause ripple effects and give rise to unintended consequences in 
ways that no justice could possibly anticipate.  That is why the specifics of school 
funding must be devised by the General Assembly and not this court. 
 
Merely raising these concerns illustrates that the majority’s order is ill 
advised.  The majority, rather than limiting itself to highlighting the deficiencies in 
the legislation before us as this court has been careful to do in past cases, now takes 
it upon itself actually to order that specific additional legislation be enacted.  What 
the majority conveniently forgets is that this case has always been centered on 
January Term, 2001 
55 
satisfying the Ohio Constitution.  The majority now turns that consideration on its 
head.  Instead of satisfying the Constitution, the additional legislation must satisfy 
the individual inclinations of four members of this court, and only the majority’s 
preferred legislation, and no other, is acceptable.  Where was this majority when 
DeRolph I and DeRolph II were decided?  If this type of action is legally permissible 
now, why not then?  This case could have been concluded in 1997 by this court 
merely legislating a constitutional system from the bench.  But as we all are aware, 
this court does not legally possess the power to legislate. 
 
What the majority continually fails to appreciate is that our Constitution 
envisions much more than a school system that barely meets the minimum needs of 
its pupils.  Our Constitution envisions a thorough and efficient school system, not a 
system built on backroom deals and political expediency.  When the majority 
proclaims what is essentially a victory for the state in this case, it is actually knelling 
defeat for the students and citizens of Ohio. 
 
The majority has ignored that “ ‘[t]he sovereign people made it mandatory 
upon the General Assembly to secure not merely a system of common schools,’ 
but rather a thorough and efficient system of common schools.” DeRolph II, 89 
Ohio St.3d 1, 728 N.E.2d 993, at paragraph one of the syllabus, quoting Miller v. 
Korns (1923), 107 Ohio St. 287, 297-298, 140 N.E. 773, 776.  In surrender, the 
majority has accepted (and allowed itself to become entangled with) a solution 
that, while politically palatable, leaves a bad taste in the mouths of those of us 
who recognize the state’s revised plan for what it is—a flawed and incomplete 
response to the problems at hand. 
 
In this court’s opinion in DeRolph II, a majority of this court found that 
Ohio’s method of funding public schools continued to violate the Thorough and 
Efficient Clause of the Ohio Constitution.  In DeRolph II, at paragraph three of 
the syllabus, this court defined the meaning of that clause:  “A thorough system 
means that each and every school district has enough funds to operate.  An 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
56 
efficient system means one in which each and every school district in the state has 
an ample number of teachers, sound buildings that are in compliance with state 
building and fire codes, and equipment sufficient for all students to be afforded an 
educational opportunity.”  With today’s decision, this court, while paying lip 
service to those principles, places its imprimatur on a system of education that 
still fails to meet the standards for thoroughness and efficiency mandated by the 
Ohio Constitution. 
 
Perhaps some who have been immersed in this litigation have lost sight of 
where Ohio stands among the fifty states in meeting the problems in its school-
funding system.  Including Ohio, the highest courts of at least sixteen states have 
found that their state’s school-funding system violated the state Constitution.5  In 
addition, several states have had lower courts call into question some or all 
aspects of their school-funding system (see, e.g., lower court orders reviewed in 
Opinion of the Justices [Ala.1993], 624 So.2d 107, and Bismarck Pub. School 
Dist. No. 1 v. State [N.D.1994], 511 N.W.2d 247).  Furthermore, some states, 
including Michigan (see Section 11, Article IX, Michigan Constitution [amended 
March 15, 1994 by “Proposal A”] and 1993 Mich.Pub.Act Nos. 145 and 336 and 
related acts cited in section 6; see, also, Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. 388.1601 et seq., 
M.S.A. § 115.1919[901] et seq.) and Kansas (Finance and Quality Performance 
Act of 1992, 1992 Kansas Session Laws, Ch. 280, Kan.Stat.Ann. 72-6405 et seq.) 
                                                          
 
5. 
See, e.g., Roosevelt Elementary School Dist. v. Bishop (1994), 179 Ariz. 233, 877 P.2d 
806; DuPree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30 (1983), 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90; Serrano v. Priest 
(1976), 18 Cal.3d 728, 135 Cal.Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929; Horton v. Meskill (1977), 172 Conn. 615, 
376 A.2d 359; Rose v. Council for Better Edn. (Ky.1989), 790 S.W.2d 186; McDuffy v. Secy., 
Executive Office of Edn. (1993), 415 Mass. 545, 615 N.E.2d 516; Helena Elementary School Dist. 
No. 1 v. State (1989), 236 Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 684; Claremont School Dist. v. Governor (1997), 
142 N.H. 462, 703 A.2d 1353; Abbott v. Burke (1990), 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359; Tennessee 
Small School Sys. v. McWherter (Tenn.1993), 851 S.W.2d 139; Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. 
Kirby (Tex.1989), 777 S.W.2d 391; Brigham v. State (1997), 166 Vt. 246, 692 A.2d 384; Seattle 
School Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. v. State (1978), 90 Wash.2d 476, 585 P.2d 71; Pauley v. Kelly 
(1979), 162 W.Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859; Washakie Cty. School Dist. One v. Herschler 
(Wyo.1980), 606 P.2d 310. 
January Term, 2001 
57 
have completely revised their school-funding system without a judicial order from 
the state’s highest court to do so.  Thus, Ohio is definitely not alone on the path it 
is pursuing among the states, many of which are facing the same problems we are 
facing. 
 
Furthermore, Ohio is not by any means the only state in which the state’s 
high court has conducted multiple considerations of funding systems that have 
bounced back and forth among lower courts, state legislatures, and the highest 
court.6  In some other states, school funding has been a persistent problem for 
much longer than it has been in this state.  If there is any attitude among those in 
this state that this litigation is best concluded no matter the result, merely for the 
sake of moving the case out of our court system, I point out that in those other 
states, discomfort with facing this issue has not caused their courts to shirk their 
task in the name of expediency. 
I 
DeRolph I and II Highlighted Deficiencies in Previous Enactments That Were 
Inconsistent with a “Thorough and Efficient System of Common Schools” 
                                                          
 
6. 
See, e.g., Roosevelt Elementary School Dist. v. Bishop, supra, 179 Ariz. 233, 877 P.2d 
806; Hull v. Albrecht (1997), 190 Ariz. 520, 950 P.2d 1141; Hull v. Albrecht (1998), 192 Ariz. 34, 
960 P.2d 634; Serrano v. Priest (1971), 5 Cal.3d 584, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241; Serrano v. 
Priest, supra, 18 Cal.3d 728, 135 Cal.Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929; Butt v. State (1992), 4 Cal.4th 668, 
15 Cal.Rptr.2d 480, 842 P.2d 1240; Horton v. Meskill, supra, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359; 
Horton v. Meskill (1982), 187 Conn. 187, 445 A.2d 579; Horton v. Meskill (1985), 195 Conn. 24, 
486 A.2d 1099; Sheff v. O’Neill (1996), 238 Conn. 1, 678 A.2d 1267; Claremont School Dist. v. 
Governor (1993), 138 N.H. 183, 635 A.2d 1375; Claremont School Dist. v. Governor, supra, 142 
N.H. 462, 703 A.2d 1353; Claremont School Dist. v. Governor (1999), 144 N.H. 210, 744 A.2d 
1107; Claremont School Dist. v. Governor (1999), 144 N.H. 590, 761 A.2d 389; Robinson v. 
Cahill (1973), 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273; Robinson v. Cahill (1973), 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65; 
Robinson v. Cahill (1975), 67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 6;  Robinson v. Cahill (1975), 67 N.J. 333, 339 
A.2d 193; Robinson v. Cahill (1976), 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129; Robinson v. Cahill (1976), 70 
N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457; Robinson v. Cahill (1976), 70 N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400; Abbott v. Burke 
(1985), 100 N.J. 269, 495 A.2d 376; Abbott v. Burke, supra, 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359; Abbott v. 
Burke (1994), 136 N.J. 444, 643 A.2d 575; Abbott v. Burke (1997), 149 N.J. 145, 693 A.2d 417; 
Abbott v. Burke (1998), 153 N.J. 480, 710 A.2d 450; Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 
supra, 777 S.W.2d 391; Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby (Tex.1991), 804 S.W.2d 491; 
Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. School Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. (Tex.1992), 826 
S.W.2d 489; Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Meno (Tex.1995), 917 S.W.2d 717. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
58 
 
As stated in DeRolph II, 89 Ohio St.3d at 5, 728 N.E.2d at 997: 
 
“The benchmark of our inquiry remains the Thorough and Efficient 
Clause, as set forth in Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution: 
 
“ ‘The general assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or 
otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a 
thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the State * * *.’ ” 
 
In DeRolph II, 89 Ohio St.3d at 5-6, 728 N.E.2d at 998, this court quoted 
from Justice Francis E. Sweeney, Sr.’s majority opinion in DeRolph I, as follows: 
 
“In DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 212, 677 N.E.2d at 747, this court 
identified four aspects of the school-funding scheme in place at that time that 
contributed ‘to the unworkability of the system and which must be eliminated.’  
Those four aspects were ‘(1) the operation of the School Foundation Program, (2) 
the emphasis of Ohio’s school-funding system on local property tax, (3) the 
requirement of school district borrowing through the spending reserve and 
emergency school assistance loan programs, and (4) the lack of sufficient funding 
in the General Assembly’s biennium budget for the construction and maintenance 
of public school buildings.’ ” 
 
This court’s opinion in DeRolph II reviewed the legislation passed in 
response to DeRolph I and once again determined that the state’s attempts to 
remedy the defects in the system had fallen short.  Near the end of the opinion in 
DeRolph II, 89 Ohio St.3d at 37, 728 N.E.2d at 1021, this court stated: 
 
“The following major areas warrant further attention, study, and 
development by the General Assembly, but are not by any means the only areas 
requiring scrutiny: 
 
“(1) Continued reliance on local property taxes as a primary means to fund 
Ohio’s schools has not been specifically addressed and may in fact be 
compounded by H.B. 283’s phase-out of the inventory tax, which may result in 
even greater reliance on local contributions in the future.  The failure to address 
January Term, 2001 
59 
this problem will make it exceedingly difficult for any system of school funding 
to comply with the Thorough and Efficient Clause, since the inherent inequities 
will remain. 
 
“(2) The basic aid formula has structural deficiencies and may not in fact 
reflect the amount required per pupil to provide an adequate education.  The 
phase-in aspect of the basic aid amount should be reconsidered. 
 
“(3) Continuing attention must be given to the mechanism implemented to 
fund the construction of new school facilities and to repair older, decaying school 
buildings, until the task is complete.  Additionally, requiring local districts to pass 
levies as a prerequisite for obtaining state funding should be reviewed. 
 
“(4) The School Solvency Assistance Fund established by H.B. 412 must 
be reevaluated, so that funds are available and used only in case of extreme 
emergencies and not for unfunded mandates or day-to-day expenses. 
 
“(5) The unfunded mandates in H.B. 412 and S.B. 55, which will 
necessitate either increased reliance on local property taxes or additional 
borrowing from the School Solvency Assistance Fund, must be addressed and 
immediately funded. 
 
“(6) The phenomenon known as phantom revenue has not been eliminated 
and may increase as a consequence of H.B. 650. 
 
“(7) Strict, statewide academic guidelines must be developed and 
rigorously followed throughout all of Ohio’s public school districts.” 
 
These points highlighted only some of the key concerns discussed in 
DeRolph II that stood in the way of a thorough and efficient system.  Tellingly, 
many of those same deficiencies had been pointed out as major problems in this 
court’s opinion in DeRolph I.  These fundamental deficiencies continue to this 
day.  The state’s contention that it has increased the amount of money for K-12 
students at the expense of every other department in the state budget cannot 
obscure the truth of the facts in evidence before us.  Although the majority is 
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swayed by the state’s protestations, actions speak louder than words, and the 
state’s actions fall well short of the mark. 
II 
Perspectives on Recent Developments and on This Court’s Role in This 
Litigation 
 
Before debunking the defendants’ claim that the revised system satisfies 
the Constitution, it is first necessary to put in perspective the recent history of our 
state’s education system.  The history of the system from the beginning of Ohio’s 
statehood was thoroughly discussed in the majority and concurring opinions in 
DeRolph I and DeRolph II and will not be repeated here. 
 
The state has undoubtedly made some grudging progress in addressing a 
few of the problems that have plagued our state’s system of common schools.  
The school-funding system that existed in 1991, when this litigation began in 
Perry County Common Pleas Court, was truly in crisis, as numerous problems all 
contributed to a very poor system that was nowhere near being thorough and 
efficient.  The late 1980s and early 1990s marked the absolute nadir of our 
statewide system of schools in Ohio. 
 
As detailed in DeRolph I, the system under review in that case was so 
disjointed, ineffective, and underfunded that it was a disgrace to the citizens of 
Ohio.  Numerous school buildings in a depressingly large number of districts 
were in deplorable condition.  Particularly in our large city school systems and in 
southeastern Ohio, it was evident that the state had shirked its responsibility to the 
students of the state and had consigned many of them to second-class status.  The 
system was burdened by so many problems that some of the defendants in 
DeRolph I had not at first wanted to appeal the trial court decision that the system 
was unconstitutional. 
 
By the time DeRolph I reached this court, the General Assembly had made 
some unfocused attempts to rectify the most glaring problems. See 78 Ohio St.3d 
January Term, 2001 
61 
at 211, 677 N.E.2d at 746.  After this court’s decision in DeRolph I, the General 
Assembly did make further improvements, some of them fairly substantial, as 
detailed in DeRolph II, which gave some reason for optimism that significant 
improvements might be possible if more time was allotted for the state to devise a 
remedy.  Based on the evidence before us, it is apparent that the system we review 
today is only a minimal improvement. 
 
The overriding question (indeed the only question) that we should be 
answering is whether the system of schools established by the legislation before us is 
a thorough and efficient system.  Now, amazingly, the majority has taken upon itself 
to do its own toying with the system, has picked out the deficiencies it is willing to 
acknowledge, and has declared that with the adjustments it requires the system is 
fixed.  Yet the sum of the details in evidence yields a single conclusion—the system 
we examine today (even as “amended” by the majority) is neither thorough nor 
efficient as constitutionally required. 
III 
A Failure of Resolve—Lack of Significant Basic Reforms Means That No 
Complete Systematic Overhaul Was Accomplished, and the State Has Failed Yet 
Again to Satisfy the Constitutional Mandate 
 
Since DeRolph II was decided, the General Assembly has enacted four 
major pieces of new legislation that are most pertinent to our inquiry.  They are 
2000 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 272 (“S.B. 272”), 2000 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 345 (“S.B. 
345”), 2001 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 94 (“H.B. 94”), and 2001 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 1 
(“S.B. 1”).  In addition, much of the legislation at issue in DeRolph II remains 
relevant, particularly in the areas of school facilities construction and 
maintenance, but also in other areas.  For instance, the state’s school-funding 
formula and its underlying methodology closely resemble the formula before us in 
DeRolph II.  Critical examination of this legislation, in particular of H.B. 94, 
reveals that the most recent reform package assembled by the General Assembly, 
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as further adjusted by the majority, is disappointingly similar to the school-
funding scheme found deficient in DeRolph II. 
A 
Overreliance on Local Property Taxes 
 
This court in both DeRolph I and DeRolph II informed the General 
Assembly in no uncertain terms that the system’s overreliance on local property 
taxes was the single greatest impediment to a thorough and efficient system:  
“The most glaring weakness in the state’s attempts to put in place a thorough and 
efficient system of education is the failure to specifically address the overreliance 
on local property taxes.  If this problem is not rectified, it will be virtually 
impossible for the revised school-funding system to be characterized as thorough 
and efficient.”  DeRolph II, 89 Ohio St.3d at 36, 728 N.E.2d at 1020. 
 
Reiterating another of the majority’s observations from DeRolph II, id. at 
8, 728 N.E.2d at 999-1000:  “The inherent inequities of funding systems that rely 
too much on local property taxes not only are extremely difficult to rectify, but 
also run counter to our Constitution’s explicit requirement for a statewide system 
of public schools.  The valuation of local property has no connection whatsoever 
to the actual education needs of the locality, with the result that a system 
overreliant on local property taxes is by its very nature an arbitrary system that 
can never be totally thorough or efficient.  In a very real sense, this problem 
underlies most of the other deficiencies in Ohio’s school system and is either the 
direct or indirect cause of them.  The majority and all three separate concurring 
opinions in DeRolph I specifically recognized the inadequacies of a system that is 
overreliant on local property taxes.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
 
In both DeRolph I and DeRolph II, this court found that the system was in 
need of a “complete systematic overhaul.”  See DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 212, 
677 N.E.2d at 747; DeRolph II, 89 Ohio St.3d at 17, 728 N.E.2d at 1006.  There 
are two essential aspects of the challenge for a “complete systematic overhaul” 
January Term, 2001 
63 
the court has now twice issued to the state:  the revenue side of the equation and 
the expenditure side.  As to the revenue side, this court has made clear that local 
property taxes can still be a part of the overall revenue system, but they cannot 
continue to be the primary means of funding the system.  DeRolph v. State (1997), 
78 Ohio St.3d 419, 678 N.E.2d 886, 887. 
 
After the decision in DeRolph II was announced, the defendants were 
faced with some basic choices as to how to reduce overreliance on local property 
taxes:  they could either institute major reforms to the property tax system, or they 
could significantly increase the adequacy level of state funding to education, or 
they could undertake some combination of the two approaches. 
 
Perhaps the most disappointing feature of this entire case is that, once 
again, the state has chosen to totally forgo making any reforms to the property tax 
system.  Consequently, as in the previous DeRolph opinions, the state has not 
specifically addressed this overreliance, instead choosing to deal with it in the 
context of revising the expenditure side of the school-funding picture.  In essence, 
the state has claimed throughout that if it modifies the expenditure side enough, it 
has overhauled the system sufficiently to satisfy the Constitution.  The state 
contends that the formula and base funding amount it has established ensure 
adequacy of funding, and that if a local district chooses to fund above the base 
amount of funding ensured by the state, it is free to do so.  The state’s view is that 
disparities in the property tax on the revenue side of funding can be rectified by 
increases in state funding on the expenditure side, so that if adequate per-pupil 
funding is provided by the state, then overreliance on local property taxes melts 
away. 
 
This is so, however, only if the state’s revised plan provides truly adequate 
funding to each school district.  If adequate funding is not provided, then the 
state’s argument that it does not need to specifically address the problems in the 
revenue inequities shatters.  Unfortunately, the amount of funding provided by the 
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state under its revised plan (as modified by this court) is seriously inadequate, and 
the process of establishing the funding amounts was replete with inconsistencies 
and false assumptions. 
 
H.B. 94, the biennial budget bill, is the major piece of legislation that the 
state claims eliminates overreliance on local property taxes.  To that end, H.B. 94 
sets the base cost foundation level at $4,814 in FY02 and at $4,949 in FY03.  R.C. 
3317.012(A).  (Under the statutes at issue in DeRolph II, the base amount was set 
to be $4,414 for FY02 and $4,538 for FY03.  See former R.C. 3317.012[A], 1998 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 650, 147 Ohio Laws, Part III, 5138.)  The majority orders an 
increase in the base funding amount above H.B. 94’s provisions, but the 
majority’s revised amount is simply not enough to make the difference needed to 
truly eliminate overreliance on local property taxes. 
 
It is important to keep in mind a central point about the base funding amount.  
It is simply an amount the state has established to reflect the supposed per-pupil cost 
of a basic education.  The state does not fully fund this amount for each student.  In 
fact, in terms of total funding of the base cost amount, a large percentage is provided 
locally.  For those districts fortunate enough to have the ability to generate a large 
amount of money locally, the state pays very little of the base amount. 
 
H.B. 94 also introduces the concept of “parity aid” to be phased in to provide 
further money to low-wealth districts (R.C. 3317.0217[C]).  The majority orders that 
the phase-in of parity aid be moved up from FY06 to FY04, but, again, the increase 
provided by that amount is not enough to truly make the needed difference.  Under 
H.B. 94’s plan, parity aid, which is approximately $100 million for FY02, is to 
increase about $100 million per year as it is phased in, with it set to be 
approximately $500 million for FY06 when fully phased in.  See R.C. 
3317.0217(C)(1); H.B. No. 94, Section 44, line item 200-525.  The majority’s order 
to move up the date of full phase-in appears to have no effect on funding for FY02 
and FY03, and will therefore have an effect only in FY04 and FY05.  The parity aid 
January Term, 2001 
65 
amount thus becomes approximately $500 million for FY04 (rather than the 
approximately $300 million under H.B. 94) and approximately $500 million for 
FY05 (rather than the approximately $400 million scheduled under H.B. 94).  The 
majority’s ordered adjustment of parity aid thus adds a total of about $300 million 
more to the total funding package than what would have been provided under the 
plan covering FY02 to FY07 as detailed in H.B. 94.  It is not clear what the 
majority’s order in this regard does to equity aid, which was slated to be phased out 
by FY06 as parity aid was phased in under the H.B. 94 plan.  R.C. 3317.0213(A)(7) 
and (B). 
 
H.B. 94 also limits the amounts any district has to pay for special 
education, vocational education, and transportation, so that the state picks up 
more of those costs for some districts (R.C. 3317.022[F]); and expands “gap aid” 
from the state to try to deal with phantom revenue (R.C. 3317.0216[C]).  None of 
these provisions is really directly targeted to reduce overreliance on local property 
taxes—all are actually directed at other deficiencies pointed out in DeRolph II. 
 
This argument that the state had dealt with overreliance simply by 
increasing funding was soundly rejected in DeRolph II, 89 Ohio St.3d at 28, 728 
N.E.2d at 1015:  “The state’s failure to specifically address the school-funding 
system’s overreliance on local property taxes is of paramount concern as we 
evaluate the state’s attempts to craft a thorough and efficient system of funding.  
The state’s argument that it can minimize this problem by addressing the other 
aspects identified in DeRolph I as contributing to the unworkability of the system 
in place at that time, see 78 Ohio St.3d at 212, 677 N.E.2d at 747, is 
unconvincing.  We see no indication that anything significant has been done to 
remove this primary impediment, which was the major factor in the previous 
funding system found unconstitutional in DeRolph I.  No further effort at 
specifically addressing this overreliance on property taxes has been made since 
the voters of the state rejected the one-cent sales tax increase on the May 5, 1998 
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ballot.  The problem of overreliance on local property taxes must be 
independently addressed, and all potential solutions to this problem must be 
explored.  The inequities inherent in a system that relies too heavily on local 
property taxes will remain until this problem is resolved by the General 
Assembly.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
 
Further, this area of concern was the most strongly criticized in both 
DeRolph I and DeRolph II, and again is the overriding weakness of the state’s 
response now.  See DeRolph II, 89 Ohio St.3d at 26-27, 728 N.E.2d at 1013-1014: 
 
“Overreliance on local property taxes was one of the factors that rendered 
the school-funding scheme deficient [in DeRolph I], yet this aspect of the former 
system persists in the state’s current funding plan, wholly unchanged.  The 
system’s dependence on local property taxes has resulted in vast disparities 
among Ohio’s six hundred eleven public school districts due to the differences in 
revenue generated by each.  * * * 
 
“The state would like this court to believe that overreliance on local 
property taxes will dissipate once the new measures are fully phased in, so that 
the only reason a district would have to look to local property taxes would be that 
the district wants to fund beyond adequacy.  Unfortunately, the reality of the 
situation at this time appears to be otherwise.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
 
The state simply has not made the “complete systematic overhaul” of the 
funding system that this court has called for.  This court could not have been 
clearer than in DeRolph II and in DeRolph I that overreliance had to be 
independently addressed.  Yet, once again, it has not been.  While the 
“adjustments” imposed by the majority do increase somewhat the total state 
education spending package above the H.B. 94 level, those adjustments do 
nothing to rectify the inherent disparities. 
B 
A Lack of Adequate Funding 
January Term, 2001 
67 
 
Given that the state has chosen not to reform the property tax system, the 
related question is whether the state has adequately funded the system it has 
chosen to put in place.  It is apparent that the state had no intention of actually 
establishing an adequate amount of state-provided funding, but instead tried to do 
the minimum amount it could, always with an eye to reducing spending whenever 
possible, in order to try to satisfy this court, rather than trying to legitimately 
mount an effort that complied with our Constitution.  The result was a series of 
political bargains that established the state spending amount on education at a 
level the state felt it could get by on without cutting other programs too much and 
without raising significantly more revenue, and that had little, if any, relationship 
to the cost of an adequate education.  The majority partakes of the same 
approach—ordering more funding (but not too much more), according to its own 
opinion of what the state budget can tolerate. 
 
The General Assembly, rather than exploring all potential solutions (see 
DeRolph II, 89 Ohio St.3d at 28, 728 N.E.2d at 1015) as it sought to revamp the 
system after DeRolph II was announced, seems to have operated under a two-
pronged plan.  The first was to delay doing anything meaningful in response to 
DeRolph II until after the November 2000 election, in the hopes that the makeup 
of this court might change so that no response would be necessary.  When the 
makeup of this court did not change, the General Assembly then realized that 
some type of action would be required, and so hastily assembled a perfunctory 
response when it became clear that the problem would not simply go away. 
 
There are essentially two failures in the state’s unsatisfactory response.  
One is that state funding per student under the basic aid formula is inadequate, 
and the other is that state funding for construction and repair of school facilities is 
not only inadequate, but also inefficient.  If the state wants to repeat its argument 
in DeRolph II that it has achieved adequacy in funding (and that overreliance on 
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property taxes has been eliminated thereby), it has to do much more than it has 
done and must fund at a significantly greater level. 
 
There are many forces at work that put revenue pressure on local school 
districts, and the state has not acted to dispel those pressures.  Two immediate 
examples that come to mind are the 1976 H.B. 920 tax-reduction factors, 136 
Ohio Laws, Part II, 3182, discussed in DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 201, 677 
N.E.2d at 739, which prevent a school district from realizing additional revenue 
even though local property increases in valuation, and the inventory tax phase-out 
of 1999 H.B. 283 discussed in DeRolph II, 89 Ohio St.3d at 27-28, 728 N.E.2d at 
993, which reduces local revenue for some districts.  Another area where the state 
has not acted concerns the tax breaks that the state and local governments are 
affording businesses throughout this state.  A July 2001 Wall Street Journal article 
about business tax abatements and their effect on the Toledo Public School 
District points out that Toledo-area businesses complain about the “abysmal 
academic record” of the district, which they claim “hampers efforts to hire well-
trained workers and attract new employers.”  Wall Street Journal (July 18), at A1.  
However, the article details that, ironically, “even as they call for reform, 
companies are receiving hefty breaks from the very taxes that would help pay for 
it.  Since the late 1970s, tens of millions of dollars that would have otherwise 
flowed into Toledo school coffers have instead gone to businesses as tax 
abatements.”  While local business executives defend the abatements as a benefit 
to the community as a whole, there is no doubt that the abatements are a serious 
and sometimes overwhelming burden to local school districts. 
 
The Wall Street Journal article points out that Ohio is not the only state 
where school district revenue is being significantly reduced through tax 
abatements and that “Toledo is hardly alone.”  In other states, too, the problem is 
prevalent: 
January Term, 2001 
69 
 
“[A large corporation] is seeking a two-thirds reduction in the assessed value 
of a big appliance plant in Louisville, Ky., where school officials estimate that the 
resulting loss of tax revenue would be enough to pay the annual salaries of as many 
as 10 teachers.  [Another company] recently sought $1 billion in reduced 
assessments on three San Jose, Calif., properties, although a local school district 
warned of financial havoc, and the company’s bid failed.  Meanwhile, Memphis-
area businesses have now received so many tax abatements that school officials in 
surrounding Shelby County talk of eliminating high school athletics.” 
 
The General Assembly has done little to rectify problems caused by tax 
abatements and related revenue losses.  In a system characterized by inadequate 
funding, local districts have great difficulty in generating additional local money to 
replace the money they have lost.  These considerations help illustrate why, if state 
funding is not adequate, the system cannot be thorough and efficient. 
IV 
The Details of an Inadequate Response 
A 
The Basic Aid Formula 
 
It is evident that, as in DeRolph II, under the legislation we review “[t]he 
basic aid formula has structural deficiencies” and does not “in fact reflect the amount 
required per pupil to provide an adequate education.”  See 89 Ohio St.3d at 37, 728 
N.E.2d at 1021.  Once again, the basic aid formula reflects a series of compromises, 
characterized by giving with one hand and taking away with the other, and not by a 
serious attempt to deal forthrightly with the problems highlighted by this court. 
 
The type of “residual budgeting” identified by this court in DeRolph I was 
blatant.  During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the General Assembly simply 
funded all other departments first, and then funded education with what was left, 
with no regard to what the cost to fund education actually should have been.  See 
DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 261, 677 N.E.2d at 780 (Resnick, J., concurring).  
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70 
The major deficiency of that approach was that no attempt was made to determine 
the cost of, and then to fund, an adequate education.  As we recognized in 
DeRolph II, 89 Ohio St.3d at 19-20, 728 N.E.2d at 1008, this type of overt 
residual budgeting appears to have been eliminated.  Within its recent budgets the 
state has not employed this practice, which was blatantly at odds with the 
Thorough and Efficient Clause of our Constitution. 
 
However, a new variant of the same phenomenon (“cost-based 
budgeting”) appears now to be the dominant factor in the state budget process, in 
which the state determines first how much it wishes to spend on education and 
then backs out from that number to produce a formula that calls for spending that 
amount.  This approach suspiciously resembles residual budgeting and also stands 
in the way of a thorough and efficient system by not placing sufficient priority on 
education in the state budget.  Even more evident in this case than in DeRolph II, 
the “actual cost” was “the deciding factor in selecting the method used to 
determine the base cost of an adequate education.”  See DeRolph II, 89 Ohio 
St.3d at 20, 728 N.E.2d at 1008. 
 
As mentioned above, the state, in H.B. 94, has set the base cost foundation 
level at $4,814 in FY02 and at $4,949 in FY03, an increase of $400 over what it 
had been scheduled to be in FY02 under the former formula, and an even larger 
increase for FY03.  See R.C. 3317.012(A).  To do this, the state used the 
expenditures of one hundred twenty-seven “high-performing districts” as the 
model in its new formula to set the base amount.  See R.C. 3317.012(B).  It is 
obvious that most of those one hundred twenty-seven districts cannot in reality be 
termed successful.  A system built on such a model is inherently flawed.  It 
appears that every time the state adjusted its sample group (for example by 
eliminating the top five percent of districts from consideration by applying 
“wealth screens”), the base amount was lowered, thus making the final result 
more and more suspect. 
January Term, 2001 
71 
 
The overall process engaged in by the state could be interpreted to be 
“residual budgeting,” in that it appears that the state arbitrarily introduced factors 
into its determination of the base amount with the underlying intention of reducing 
the amount as much as it thought it could justify to this court.  The majority appears 
to recognize that the base amount was artificially lowered, and so picks out its own 
solution to that specific problem—modifying the H.B. 94 approach to judicially 
legislate a compromise for the parties. 
 
Another significant concern is that the state reduced the range of the cost-
of-doing-business factor of the formula in H.B. 94 and therefore reduced the 
amount that many school districts otherwise would have received.  See R.C. 
3317.02(N).  This is important because the cost-of-doing-business factor is a 
multiplier that is applied to adjust the base amount to increase funding within the 
formula, and a reduction in the cost-of-doing-business factor can blunt the 
effectiveness of an increase in the base amount for many school districts. 
 
To the state’s credit, H.B. 94’s $400 increase in the base amount for FY02 
over what it would have been under H.B. 650 is meaningful, especially 
considering that the state has eliminated the phase-in criticized in DeRolph II.  
Moreover, the majority has ordered an increase above that amount.  However, the 
majority’s action in this regard underscores the fact that the H.B. 94 amount is 
insufficient.  In addition, it is evident that other adjustments within the overall 
funding scheme (such as the reduction in the range of the cost-of-doing-business 
factor) dilute the effect of the increase in some districts.  Much more must be 
done before the state can prove that the amount it provides under H.B. 94, as 
augmented by the majority, in reality will afford the benefits of a thorough and 
efficient system to each and every student. 
 
H.B. 94’s establishment of the cost of a basic education is predicated on 
methodology devised by Dr. John G. Augenblick, who also devised the 
methodology behind the H.B. 650 system at issue in DeRolph II.  The 
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fundamentals of this approach are detailed in DeRolph II, 89 Ohio St.3d at 17-18, 
728 N.E.2d at 1006-1007, and in many ways the current methodology is similar to 
what was at issue in DeRolph II. 
 
The so-called Augenblick method used in H.B. 94 for establishing basic 
state aid is credible on its face, but below the surface, significant problems lurk.  
Some of those problems are with Augenblick’s methodology itself, and some are 
due to the state’s further manipulation of that methodology.  While the system in 
place in DeRolph II was based on model school districts meeting seventeen of 
eighteen performance standards under the former system of rating schools (see 89 
Ohio St.3d at 17, 728 N.E.2d at 1007), the current H.B. 94 system is based on 
schools that met only twenty of twenty-seven performance standards (and even 
includes some school districts whose scores the state rounded upward to reach the 
twenty-standards level even though those schools did not actually meet that level), 
with many of the top-performing districts eliminated from consideration due to 
the imposition of wealth screens.  See R.C. 3317.012(B).  There is undeniably a 
correlation between a school district’s wealth and its level of student achievement, 
although the state’s overall plan seems to deny that correlation in setting forth 
what the state considers an adequate base amount of funding. 
 
In the year on which data to determine the base amount is based, former R.C. 
3302.03(B)(1) would have required a school district to achieve at least twenty-six of 
the twenty-seven standards to be rated effective, if there had been twenty-seven 
standards.  1999 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 282.  After the wealth screens were applied, only 
ten school districts out of the one hundred twenty-seven that remained in the sample 
would have been rated effective.  As another part of this process, the state used the 
lower of either 1996 spending (with a 2.8 percent per year inflation adjustment) or 
1999 spending for those districts that were model school districts under both current 
and former law, to adjust for an alleged “echo effect.”  See R.C. 3317.012(B), last 
January Term, 2001 
73 
paragraph.  This was a highly questionable practice that further allowed the state to 
lower the base cost formula amount. 
 
The majority, recognizing that the H.B. 94 approach is fraught with 
deficiencies, eliminates some of the less defensible aspects of that plan with the 
stroke of a pen.  However, just because the majority orders that some of the most 
questionable features be removed from the calculations does not change the fact that 
many of the districts that remain in the base amount calculation as approved by the 
majority were not truly model districts.  Of the one hundred twenty-seven model 
districts in the H.B. 94 plan, only 8.5 percent offer all-day, everyday kindergarten 
for all students and less than fifty percent of the districts offer three foreign language 
courses for high school students.  In addition, gifted students are not being 
adequately served in most of these districts, and many of the districts have one or 
more school buildings that have major problems.  The state’s failure to evaluate the 
inputs of these model districts will be discussed later in this opinion.  In failing to 
take inputs into account at any step of the state’s response to the school-funding 
problem, the state has missed an ideal opportunity to construct a constitutional 
system. 
 
The 2.8 percent inflation factor in the base cost foundation formula from 
fiscal year to fiscal year (R.C. 3317.012[A][1]) is unjustified according to evidence 
that school costs rise faster than the general inflation rate.  One study estimates 
inflation for school costs to be more than 3.6 percent per year.  Furthermore, as will 
be discussed below, the unfunded mandates the General Assembly seems intent on 
imposing in much of its legislation tend to increase local costs each year by an even 
greater amount.  This portends that the H.B. 94 plan’s basic aid amounts, even as 
increased by the majority, will be more and more inadequate as we move forward in 
the six-year period covered by H.B. 94. 
 
Appellees claim that, in addition to the base amount being too low, the 
categorical adjustments to the base amount are all underfunded.  It is obvious that 
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74 
a thorough and efficient system should provide adequate funding for categoricals 
such as Disadvantaged Pupil Impact Aid (“DPIA”), special education, vocational 
education, transportation, and gifted education.  However, H.B. 94 actually 
decreases DPIA funding for the biennium it covers.  See H.B. 94, Section 44, line 
item 200-520, $360,149,243; cf. 1999 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 282, Section 4, line item 
200-520, $390,708,953.  That raises questions, when our large city schools have 
so many problems and so many DPIA students reside within the districts that have 
the most trouble meeting state standards.  I agree with appellees that the state 
should undertake a major study to determine more accurately the actual costs of 
educating disadvantaged pupils in both inner cities and poor rural areas.  It is also 
evident that, just as in DeRolph II, most of these categories remain underfunded.  
It is highly suspicious that a recurring consequence of the state’s plan is that 
within each individual aspect of the system, money seems to be shifted away from 
our large city districts that most need it, with the smallest increases in each facet 
of the plan (when there are increases) allocated to the large city districts.  The 
majority’s selective decision to legislate increases in state funding does nothing to 
address the very real problems caused by the underfunding of categoricals. 
 
The state’s claim that it is providing a $1.4 billion increase for the 
biennium covered by H.B. 94 is a fiction.  As Warren G. Russell’s affidavit 
illustrates, the state does three things to arrive at that amount:  (1) replaces money 
eliminated or otherwise reduced within H.B. 94, (2) replaces funds formerly 
provided from state money with federal money, and (3) reallocates funds formerly 
included in the foundation formula that were eliminated or reduced within H.B. 
94.  For example, some of that “increase” is attributable to funds that are merely 
meant to replace local revenue that will be lost through reduction in local taxation 
of public utilities.  Furthermore, it is the state’s method of reallocation that is the 
most questionable.  H.B. 94’s supposed $400 increase in the formula amount for 
FY02 is actually much less than the numbers seem to indicate, given that much of 
January Term, 2001 
75 
that money comes from lowering amounts for categorical spending and moving 
that money into the base amount. 
 
As much as anything, this reallocation indicates the manipulations that are 
inherent in the system before us.  The state claims it is increasing the base amount by 
$400 in FY02.  However, by decreasing the range of the cost-of-doing-business 
factor, by reducing DPIA funding, by allowing unfunded mandates to continue, by 
phasing out the local inventory tax, and by numerous other machinations, the state 
has created numbers that are highly suspect.  The majority’s decision to order an 
increase in the base amount, while augmenting the H.B. 94 figures, does not render 
the state’s numbers any more reliable, only more suspect. 
 
Recognizing that school funding can overwhelm a budget, and that we are 
discussing extremely large amounts of money, I acknowledge that problems in 
our system of schools cannot be quickly corrected.  The problems encountered 
involve enough of the state budget that the task appears to be insurmountable, but 
with insight and time the problems are solvable.  As the evidence in this case 
conclusively indicates, for a variety of reasons the costs of educating our children 
continue to increase well above the general inflation rate.  However, the 
Constitution does not make the Thorough and Efficient Clause conditional.  We 
must never lose sight of the importance of this case on the futures of the children 
of this state, and indeed on the future of the entire state. 
B 
Other Deficiencies 
 
Apart from the overriding flaws of the basic aid formula, there are many 
other deficiencies in the system.  The state has used a Band-Aid approach instead 
of the major surgery that was required to correct these problems. 
1 
School District Borrowing 
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While 2000 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 345 (effective April 10, 2001), the state’s 
response to forced borrowing concerns expressed in DeRolph II, has somewhat 
eased the forced borrowing provisions of prior law, it certainly does not eliminate 
them entirely.  The General Assembly seems to believe that if it does not have 
some type of forced borrowing provision, it will have to give undeserved money 
to poorly administered districts, and the threat of forced borrowing is one of the 
motivations it uses to compel districts to be fiscally prudent.  This is an example 
of the distrust of local school districts the state has repeatedly exhibited in 
enacting legislation to try to remedy school-funding problems.  This distrust was 
also evident in much of the legislation at issue in DeRolph II, especially in the 
mandates heaped upon local districts by 1997 H.B. 412 and 1997 S.B. 55. 
 
All in all, the Solvency Assistance Program Fund remains essentially 
unchanged from what it was in DeRolph II, despite this court’s admonition in that 
case that “[e]xcept in extreme cases, reliance on loans must be eradicated, and 
loans certainly must not be employed as a method to meet school districts’ daily 
operational expenses.”  DeRolph II, 89 Ohio St.3d at 26, 728 N.E.2d at 1013.  So 
long as the state continues to underfund education, forced borrowing will continue 
to be an entrenched component of the system. 
2 
Unfunded Mandates 
 
In DeRolph II, this court pointed out why the problem of unfunded mandates 
came to a head after DeRolph I was decided: 
 
“Both S.B. 55 and H.B. 412 were proceeding through the General Assembly 
at the same time as the proposed sales tax increase.  On February 17, 1998, the Ohio 
Senate approved H.B. 697, which placed the one-cent sales tax increase on the May 
5, 1998 ballot for voter approval.  The one-cent sales tax increase, which appeared 
on the May 5 ballot as Issue 2, was not approved by voters.  Consequently, school 
January Term, 2001 
77 
districts are required to adhere to the bills’ additional requirements and standards of 
accountability, but the anticipated funding must now come from a different source. 
 
“Since these mandates are essentially unfunded, a paramount concern is 
that H.B. 412 and S.B. 55 will impose additional costs on school districts.”  
DeRolph II, 89 Ohio St.3d at 33, 728 N.E.2d at 1018. 
 
The record before us clearly confirms that, as we anticipated in DeRolph 
II, there were large additional costs imposed by these and other unfunded 
mandates.  Id. at 32, 728 N.E.2d at 1018.  Enacted in 2000, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 345 
(see above, under borrowing) is also the state’s response to the concern that 
increased accountability measures have led to too many unfunded mandates.  In 
the accountability portion of S.B. 345, the state has eliminated the budget reserve 
requirement (rainy day fund) (R.C. 5705.29[H], repealed) and has decreased the 
amount a district has to put into both its textbook and instructional materials fund 
(R.C. 3315.17[A]) and its capital and maintenance fund (R.C. 3317.18[A]).  The 
court in DeRolph II ordered the state to “immediately” fund the mandates (see 89 
Ohio St.3d at 37, 728 N.E.2d at 1021).  (This bill was not signed by the Governor 
until January 9, 2001, nearly eight months after DeRolph II was decided.  That is 
quite a long time to be considered immediate.)  But, rather than funding anything, 
including past mandates that had never been funded, the state simply eliminated 
some of the mandates. 
 
Despite the state’s arguments to the contrary, many unfunded mandates, 
both new and old, still exist.  Further, it is predictable that many of the academic 
standards of S.B. 1 will essentially be unfunded mandates at some point for local 
school districts. 
 
It is apparent that, under the state’s current education plan, there may be 
no statewide tax increases, but there will be many tax increases on the local level 
as more and more levies will, of necessity, be on the ballot.  Since the state plan, 
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as “adjusted” by this court, will not provide adequate funding to many local 
districts to cover their costs, more funds will have to be raised locally. 
 
A Legislative Service Commission staff member in the Legislative Budget 
Office estimated that unfunded mandates totaling $515 million per year were 
imposed by the General Assembly in 1997 H.B. 412 and 1997 S.B. 55.  The staff 
member’s report was initially withheld from the General Assembly by the 
Director of the Legislative Service Commission on the grounds that it was of 
questionable quality.  Eventually, a draft of the report was made available to some 
members of the General Assembly, after several requests were made in May 
2001.  This report, required by R.C. 103.141 to be submitted in October 2000, 
was not released in time for the deliberations over S.B. 345 and would certainly 
have been relevant, given that a significant portion of S.B. 345 made adjustments 
to those mandates.  Furthermore, although the draft report was made available to 
members of the General Assembly in the later stages of the discussion regarding 
H.B. 94, it was obviously ignored in the process of enacting that legislation.  The 
state’s failure to address the contents of this report in any of the legislation we 
review and the possible irregularities indicated by the circumstances of failing to 
release the report to all members of the General Assembly in a timely manner 
raise serious questions about the state’s commitment to funding these mandates. 
3 
Phantom Revenue 
 
H.B. 94 takes some steps to reduce phantom revenue by expanding gap aid 
(R.C. 3317.0216) and tries to adjust the formula so that it no longer assumes that 
more local money is raised than actually is realized.  However, it does not do 
enough, and H.B. 94 still does not eliminate all types of phantom revenue. 
 
Phantom revenue remains a serious concern.  As we stated in DeRolph II:  
“Requiring school districts to seek additional tax increases to make up for lost 
revenue is something that should be avoided, especially in view of our holding in 
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79 
DeRolph I, which required overreliance on local property taxes to be eliminated.  
The Achieve, Inc. report quoted one school superintendent who stated, ‘I spend 
every third year running a political campaign, not running my school district.’  
This is not how a thorough and efficient system should function and further serves 
to emphasize why heavy reliance on local property taxes must end.”  89 Ohio 
St.3d at 30-31, 728 N.E.2d at 1016. 
 
Again, since the state does not guarantee adequate funding for many 
districts, local levies beyond twenty-three mills will have to cover the 
deficiencies. 
4 
Development of Statewide Academic Standards 
 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 1, signed by the Governor on June 12, 2001, the 
Education Standards Bill, implements the recommendations of the Governor’s 
Commission for Student Success.  S.B. 1 requires the State Board of Education to 
adopt statewide academic standards for each grade in selected subjects and to 
adopt a model curriculum.  R.C. 3301.079.  S.B. 1 phases out the current 
proficiency tests (R.C. 3301.0712), replaces them with achievement tests (R.C. 
3301.0710), and requires that the new achievement tests be aligned with the 
academic standards and model curricula (R.C. 3301.0710[A]).  S.B. 1 revamps 
the system of school district report cards under new standards to be developed by 
the State Board of Education.  R.C. 3302.02 and 3302.03.  The provisions of this 
bill are so new that its effect remains to be seen.  It directs the State Department 
of Education to set up the details of the plan but does not provide the specifics.  
Since one of the major themes of DeRolph II was that strict academic standards 
must be set and linked to assessment standards, 89 Ohio St.3d at 37, 728 N.E.2d 
at 1021, this bill is a first step in that direction.  However, it is questionable 
whether these measures have been adequately funded in H.B. 94 or elsewhere, 
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raising skepticism that solid standards will be able to be developed and 
thoroughly implemented. 
 
The Achieve, Inc. report quoted in DeRolph II recognized that the lack of 
standards was a significant deficiency in Ohio’s system.  The report pointed out that 
“ ‘[s]trictly speaking, Ohio does not really have statewide academic standards, at 
least as that term is used in most other states.  The absence of standards is 
particularly troublesome * * *.’ ”  (Emphasis added.)  DeRolph II, 89 Ohio St.3d at 
33-34, 728 N.E.2d at 1019. 
 
Putting these statewide standards in place, S.B. 1 (as H.B. 94 did in 
determining the base funding amount) fails to use inputs at any point in the 
process.  Instead, both bills are totally concerned with outputs. 
 
It is prudent to use outputs as a part of determining the formula, but it is 
clear that, at least in some way, inputs should have played a role in the system.  A 
combination of both inputs and outputs would have ameliorated the concerns 
discussed above regarding the fact that many of the one hundred twenty-seven 
districts employed to set the base funding amount in H.B. 94 were not appropriate 
to serve as models.  Inputs have been ignored in the formula, but they should have 
been considered in order to overcome this fundamental problem with the outputs-
only approach. 
 
At a minimum, inputs that should be measured to determine a base amount 
include maximum class sizes; specific curriculum opportunities at all grade levels 
for all students, including advanced placement courses for high school students 
and foreign language opportunities in elementary schools; replacement cycles for 
textbooks; professional development time for all teachers; classroom materials 
and equipment such as computers, televisions, and VCRs; and other necessities 
for a thorough and efficient system. 
 
The Achieve, Inc. report quoted in DeRolph II noted that it was essential that 
all parties work together to fix the funding problem and invest in strengthening the 
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81 
capacity of Ohio’s educators to teach at higher standards.  See 89 Ohio St.3d at 37-
38, 728 N.E.2d at 1022.  The Achieve, Inc. report also proposed that “Ohio must 
mount a substantial, sustained, statewide program to equip its administrators and 
teachers with the skills and support they will need to substantially improve student 
performance.”  Obviously, the authors of the Achieve, Inc. report recognized that 
inputs must play a role in determining adequate funding, as well as in setting 
statewide standards.  Yet H.B. 94 (funding) and S.B. 1 (setting academic standards) 
both totally ignore inputs.  Just as the state failed to undertake any reform on the 
income side to solve the problem of overreliance on property tax, the state also failed 
to incorporate any input standards into S.B. 1 relating to academic accountability.  
However, if inputs are not worked into the accountability process, how can the 
internal efficiency of school districts be compared?  If input standards are ignored, 
then accountability cannot be fairly implemented.  Output goals and standards have 
little meaning if inputs are inconsistent among individual local districts.  If a 
particular district fails to improve in meeting the output standards, the lack of firm 
input standards may be a key reason.  But if inputs are not standardized statewide, 
then the required correlation is lacking.  I see no indication in the record before us, 
or in any of the pertinent legislation including S.B. 1, that any meaningful attempt to 
address the lack of inputs in the system was ever mounted. 
5 
School Construction and Facilities Maintenance 
 
In DeRolph II, this court quoted from the Achieve, Inc. report relative to 
school facilities:  “ ‘[D]espite significant recent investments the challenge remains 
severe.  Although estimates differ on the magnitude of the problem, by all 
accounts too many Ohio children, especially in poor rural and urban districts, 
attend classes in dreadfully sub-standard facilities.  [Emphasis sic.] * * * During 
this decade the state has invested over $1 billion in capital improvement funds for 
schools, more than tripling the investments made over the previous four decades.  
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However, without a reliable inventory of the state’s facilities and a solid cost 
estimate for bringing all Ohio school[s] up to standard, it is impossible to know 
just how much progress has been made.  While the state has at least made a down 
payment on a long deferred problem, this is a major piece of unfinished business 
for Ohio’s policymakers.’  (Emphasis added.)” 89 Ohio St.3d at 22, 728 N.E.2d at 
1010. 
 
This court also remarked in DeRolph II, id. at 24, 728 N.E.2d at 1011-
1012:  “The task at hand is not one to be taken lightly.  One-half of Ohio’s school 
buildings are fifty years old or older.  DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 206, 677 
N.E.2d at 742.  Constructing and maintaining school buildings is an ongoing 
process, and this court recognizes that it would be unreasonable to require the 
General Assembly to remedy overnight what has taken decades of neglect to 
develop, yet there remains an extensive amount of work to be done in order to 
educate Ohio’s students in ‘safe and healthy learning’ environments.  Id. at 208, 
677 N.E.2d at 744.  Continuing funding in this area is of the utmost importance.” 
 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 272 (effective Sept. 14, 2000) is the sole new enactment 
since DeRolph II dealing with school construction and maintenance.  It continues 
on the path that was set out in the statutes at issue in DeRolph II.  Given the 
previous sorry state of neglect and the massive amount of money needed, it may 
be impossible for the state to make great headway on this problem for years to 
come.  However, while the state’s programs have at least corrected the worst 
problems in the worst buildings, they are merely treading water in addressing 
many other facility problems. 
 
The state has still not done a comprehensive statewide study on facilities 
needs and should be faulted for not doing so.  Ohio needs an immediate complete 
facilities assessment for all school buildings, not the watered-down version 
approved by the majority.  The state’s failure to conduct such a comprehensive 
study raises the suspicion that the state fears what the study would reveal.  
January Term, 2001 
83 
Statewide facilities needs, which were found to be $10.2 billion in a 1990 study 
and were estimated to be $16.5 billion in 1997, see DeRolph II, 89 Ohio St.3d at 
20, 728 N.E.2d at 1009, have certainly increased in 2001 beyond those figures, 
which may have been quite conservative, despite the recent influx of state money.  
Although the state is supposedly operating under a twelve-year plan to rebuild 
Ohio’s schools (see DeRolph II, id. at 23, 728 N.E.2d at 1011), it is clear that the 
problems with facilities funding for construction and maintenance will take much 
longer than that to resolve with the methods presently being employed by the 
state. 
 
In addition to simply failing to do enough soon enough, the state’s plan for 
providing the construction money to local districts is marked by inefficiencies, 
bureaucratic red tape, and politics.  As a result, much of the money that 
supposedly is available cannot be used by deserving districts.  Most of the state’s 
building programs rely on the passage of a local levy as a condition for a local 
district to receive state money.  Once again, thoroughness and efficiency are 
conspicuously lacking. 
 
One recent development with significant potential is that the state has 
enhanced its ability to issue bonds to pay part of the state share of the costs of 
local projects.  In DeRolph II, 89 Ohio St.3d at 14, 728 N.E.2d at 1004, this court 
noted that Senate Joint Resolution No. 1 placed on the November 2, 1999 ballot a 
proposal, approved by Ohio voters, to amend the Ohio Constitution “to allow the 
state to issue general obligation bonds to pay for school facilities.”  See, 
principally, Section 2n, Article VIII, Ohio Constitution; see, also, 1997 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 102, Section 8, 147 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7417.  The deposition 
of Randall A. Fischer, executive director of the Ohio School Facilities 
Commission, reveals that these bonds are being issued.  However, it is unclear 
from the record before us how effectively the bonds are being utilized and 
whether the state has fully taken advantage of the opportunities presented by bond 
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issuance.  Our state could benefit greatly if our legislators were able to exercise 
additional vision to put in place plans that would make bonds a more efficacious 
method of paying for school facilities. 
V 
Conclusion 
 
The foregoing discussion of the deficiencies in the state’s “reform” 
package does not mention every inadequacy in the plan and touches only on some 
that could be developed in detail.  It is my intent merely to expose the most 
glaring examples of the many failings within the state’s plan.  It is difficult to 
comprehend how the majority can, for the most part, uphold a plan with so many 
obstacles to thoroughness and efficiency.  Purely political motives seem to be the 
driving force behind the majority’s decision.  As one justice concedes in a 
concurring opinion, she votes with the majority only to facilitate a “pragmatic 
compromise” that will break an impasse she considers unacceptable, even though 
her views on the merits have not changed. 
 
If a majority of this court had found, as I believe we should, that the 
Constitution still has not been satisfied, this court would have had to face the 
extremely difficult issue of what action to take.  Perhaps an unwillingness to 
confront this issue was a further motivation for the majority to generally accept the 
state’s arguments, buttressed by the majority’s decision to modify the legislation by 
judicial fiat to render it slightly less unacceptable, and to rely on the “good faith” of 
the General Assembly to comply with this court’s amendments.  This court has in 
the past resisted the calls of those who asked for a special master, who asked for 
findings of contempt against the Governor and members of the General Assembly, 
who asked that we enjoin funding of schools until a thorough and efficient system is 
devised, and who asked that we ourselves explicitly order funding at a specified 
level.  I continue to adhere to the view that those remedies are not acceptable courses 
of action.  Added to that list of possible remedies, the plaintiffs now urge that we 
January Term, 2001 
85 
should find all of H.B. 94 unconstitutional and therefore reject in toto the state 
biennial budget bill. 
 
Any intrusion by this court into the legislative prerogative is not a step that 
should be taken lightly.  As we stated in DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 213, 677 
N.E.2d at 747, fn. 9:  “[W]e recognize that the proper scope of our review is 
limited to determining whether the current system meets constitutional muster.  
We refuse to encroach upon the clearly legislative function of deciding what the 
new legislation will be.”  See, also, DeRolph II, 89 Ohio St.3d at 12, 728 N.E.2d 
at 1003 (“Our role, as we have declared in past cases, is to decide issues of 
constitutionality—not to legislate”). 
 
The majority, in an effort to terminate this litigation, turns its back on those 
standards, and undertakes to do some legislating of its own, apparently on the theory 
that the end justifies the means.  The majority increases the amount being spent by 
the state on our schools in an effort to placate those who believe that not enough has 
been done. 
 
I have serious objections to this intrusion by a majority of this court into 
the province of the legislature.  The majority’s additions to the legislative plan are 
tantamount to judicial legislation, and represent usurpation by the court of 
legislative power. 
 
The majority cites no precedents for its view that, in uniting to assemble a 
consensus, it has the authority to order the General Assembly to enact specific 
legislation that will make the school-funding system satisfactory to a majority of 
this court.  It is obvious why no precedents are cited—there are none available 
that come anywhere close to justifying the majority’s position.  By going to such 
great lengths to terminate this case, the majority is taking an unprecedented action 
and violating fundamental precepts that should define the role of this court in our 
system of government.  In sitting as a superlegislature in this case, the majority 
abandons its judicial role and appears to view separation of powers as a hollow 
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doctrine that can be easily tossed aside when it is expedient to do so.  One justice 
refers to separation of powers simply as a “political doctrine.” 
 
The majority’s determination to order the General Assembly to enact 
specific legislation will undoubtedly have repercussions beyond those the majority 
intends.  For example, the majority recognizes that its decision may implicate R.C. 
3317.012(D)(4), and specifies that “the rate of millage charged off as the local share 
of base cost funding * * * may not be changed from twenty-three mills, irrespective 
of the language of” that statute.  That is not the only additional section of the 
Revised Code that the majority’s order will affect, but the extent of the majority’s 
decision surely is not fully evident at this time.  This court is not in a position to hold 
hearings, and cannot consult experts on whether possible unforeseen consequences 
lurk in the details of its mandated revisions.  This further illustrates the dangers that 
arise when courts act as if they were legislatures. 
 
“While Ohio, unlike other jurisdictions, does not have a constitutional 
provision specifying the concept of separation of powers, this doctrine is 
implicitly embedded in the entire framework of those sections of the Ohio 
Constitution that define the substance and scope of powers granted to the three 
branches of state government.”  S. Euclid v. Jemison (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 157, 
158-159, 28 OBR 250, 251, 503 N.E.2d 136, 138.  See, also, State v. Harmon 
(1877), 31 Ohio St. 250, 258, 1877 WL 19; State ex rel. Bray v. Russell (2000), 
89 Ohio St.3d 132, 134, 729 N.E.2d 359, 361. 
 
In State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 
Ohio St.3d 451, 475, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1085, this court stated: 
 
“In State v. Hochhausler (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 455, 463, 668 N.E.2d 457, 
465-466, Chief Justice Moyer explained as follows: 
 
“ ‘The principle of separation of powers is embedded in the constitutional 
framework of our state government.  The Ohio Constitution applies the principle 
in defining the nature and scope of powers designated to the three branches of the 
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87 
government.  State v. Warner (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 31, 43-44, 564 N.E.2d 18, 31.  
See State v. Harmon (1877), 31 Ohio St. 250, 258.  It is inherent in our theory of 
government “ ‘that each of the three grand divisions of the government, must be 
protected from the encroachments of the others, so far that its integrity and 
independence may be preserved.  * * *’ ”  S. Euclid v. Jemison (1986), 28 Ohio 
St.3d 157, 159, 28 OBR 250, 252, 503 N.E.2d 136, 138, quoting Fairview v. 
Giffee (1905), 73 Ohio St. 183, 187, 76 N.E. 865, 866.’ “  See, also, Alexander 
Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78 (1788) (Wills Ed.1982) 394 (quoting from 
Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws 181):  “ ‘[T]here is no liberty, if the power of 
judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.’ ” 
 
It is noteworthy that the author of the majority opinion, who today has few 
qualms in ordering the General Assembly to enact specific legislation, stated in 
DeRolph I that “it is not this court’s place to * * * set policy or prioritize the 
allocation of funds to other state programs.  Members of the legislative branch 
represent the collective will of the citizens of Ohio, and the manner in which 
public schools are funded in this state is a fundamental policy decision that is 
within the power of its citizens to change.  Under our system of government, 
decisions such as imposing new taxes, allocating public revenues to competing 
uses, and formulating educational standards are not within the judiciary’s 
authority.”  See 78 Ohio St.3d at 269-270, 677 N.E.2d at 786 (Moyer, C.J., 
dissenting).  See, also, State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 
86 Ohio St.3d at 526, 715 N.E.2d at 1119 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (“I bow to no 
one in my respect for the doctrine of separation of powers”). 
 
Those in the majority in this case who were in the dissent in DeRolph I 
and DeRolph II have now done an about-face.  They expressed the clear view in 
both of those cases that the system was constitutional.  Now that the General 
Assembly has further improved the system, those justices somehow believe that it 
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is only conditionally constitutional with the further changes this court orders the 
General Assembly to make. 
 
One point that cannot be overemphasized is that, were it not for previous 
decisions of this court in this litigation, our system of public schools would still 
be mired in the totally unsatisfactory condition it was in when this litigation began 
in 1991.  We all should remember that it was only due to this lawsuit that residual 
budgeting for education was eliminated and the importance of our schools came 
to the forefront.  If the justices in dissent in DeRolph I and DeRolph II had had 
their way, the unacceptable status quo would have endured. 
 
Furthermore, those justices who were in the majority in DeRolph I and 
DeRolph II and who are now in the majority in this opinion can similarly be 
faulted for also abandoning their previous views for the sake of reaching the all-
important consensus that motivates today’s decision of the court.  Their professed 
fervor for the mandates of the Ohio Constitution, as expressed in the opinions in 
DeRolph I and DeRolph II, obviously has waned to the point that they are willing 
to enter into a political compromise that has little to do with the actual merits of 
this case.  It is most remarkable that one of the justices who joins the majority’s 
decision once expressed the opinion that education is a fundamental constitutional 
right and that, therefore, “[t]he state bears a heavy burden of demonstrating a 
compelling state interest for the wealth-based disparities inherent in Ohio’s 
system of school funding.”  DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 257, 677 N.E.2d at 777 
(Douglas, J., concurring). 
 
That justice also has recognized in the past that it is not this court’s role to 
legislate a constitutionally acceptable response, remarking in his concurring 
opinion in DeRolph II: 
 
“The dissenters [in DeRolph II] can’t have it both ways, and the majority 
opinion, recognizing this dichotomy, strikes a balance by, in specifics, respectfully 
pointing out the constitutional shortcomings of the General Assembly’s remedial 
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89 
efforts while refraining from mandating a particular course of action.  In doing so the 
majority further respects and recognizes that it is the right and prerogative, as well 
as the sworn sacred duty, of the members of the General Assembly to put in place 
the nuts and bolts of our state’s educational system.”  (Emphasis added.)  89 Ohio 
St.3d at 39, 728 N.E.2d at 1023 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 
That justice further observed that specifics and details of the educational 
system must be “debated and decided by the General Assembly rather than this 
court.  Our sole mission is to see to it that the Constitution is honored * * *.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Id. (Douglas, J., concurring.)  It is impossible to reconcile those 
views with the position of the majority today. 
 
In an attempt to detail his motivations for joining the majority’s compromise 
opinion, Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion cleverly uses R.C. 1.50 to justify 
his position that the majority’s decision does not violate the doctrine of separation of 
powers.  In this discourse, he downplays the significance of the concept of 
separation of powers (relegating it to the status of a mere “political doctrine”) and 
overplays the reach of R.C. 1.50 beyond its appropriate scope in a creative attempt to 
rationalize the majority’s decision.  It is interesting that nowhere in the majority 
opinion is R.C. 1.50 cited as validation for its actions. 
 
The majority finds that the state’s employment of certain adjustments in 
determining the base funding amount and the phase-in of parity aid are 
unconstitutional.  An indispensable aspect of severability is that the legislation 
remaining must be constitutional for the severance to be effective.  The mere striking 
of the legislation found offensive would not accomplish the majority’s primary goal, 
which is to increase funding to a level acceptable to the justices who constitute the 
majority.  Therefore a further consequence, wholly inconsistent with R.C. 1.50, 
arises, since the state must pass legislation to give effect to the majority’s 
adjustments to the plan and must fund the increased amounts, or the system 
obviously remains unconstitutional.  This requirement goes beyond the scope of 
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R.C. 1.50 severance and exposes the majority’s actions for what they truly are—
judicial legislation that actually redrafts the substance of the legislation, 
masquerading as acts that supposedly are fully in accord with the separation of 
powers.  By revising the state’s methodology regarding the base amount and altering 
the phase-in period for parity aid, the majority fundamentally disrupts the statutory 
scheme, substituting its own preferences for those of the General Assembly.  See 
Hochhausler, 76 Ohio St.3d at 464, 668 N.E.2d at 466, citing State ex rel. Maurer v. 
Sheward (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 513, 523, 644 N.E.2d 369, 377 (“Prior to severing a 
portion of a statute, we must first determine that the severability will not 
fundamentally disrupt the statutory scheme of which the unconstitutional provision 
is a part”). 
 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas also underscores that the level of 
funding reflected in the basic aid amount is inadequate, even as increased by the 
majority.  He points out that in Michigan, the base foundation amount for 2002 is 
$6,300.  When the base amount set forth in H.B. 94 of $4,814 is augmented by the 
adjustments imposed by the majority, the base amount increases by $331 per pupil 
for FY02, using the numbers set out in the concurring opinion’s view of what the 
majority adds by adjusting the base amount.  This puts Ohio’s base amount at 
$5,145 for FY02.  The stark contrast between this amount and Michigan’s amount of 
$6,300 shows how unrealistically low Ohio’s base amount remains when compared 
to our neighbor to the north, and is compelling support for the proposition that our 
state’s funding system is not yet thorough and efficient, even as augmented by the 
majority. 
 
Finally, Justice Douglas attempts to bolster his position by asserting that if 
this court were simply to hold the state’s plan unconstitutional as enacted, the 
probable result would be a return to preexisting funding levels, thus jeopardizing 
increases in funding (both those of H.B. 94 and those additional increases that will 
result if the General Assembly enacts the legislation ordered by a majority of this 
January Term, 2001 
91 
court) for many districts, and that members of the court are not “willing to risk 
losing what has already been gained.”  This assertion is based on a false premise and 
is therefore erroneous.  There is no reason to believe that, if this court had found the 
funding system unconstitutional, the funding increases in the H.B. 94 plan would 
have been eliminated.  In both DeRolph I and DeRolph II, this court, even though it 
found the systems under review unconstitutional and challenged the state to devise a 
thorough and efficient system, allowed the existing system to remain in place until a 
new system was devised.  That approach is equally feasible in this case.  That some 
individuals and groups (especially many of our state’s lawmakers) are weary of this 
case and may be resistant to further enactments is simply not a sufficient reason to 
discard that option as not viable, when we realize that the educational futures of our 
children are at stake. 
 
While the task facing the state is of such consequence that it is tempting to 
do what the majority has done and simply tell the General Assembly what 
constitutes a thorough and efficient system, that is not the prerogative of the 
judiciary.  Rather, if the system is not thorough and efficient, this court should say 
so and then, as we did in DeRolph I and DeRolph II, give the General Assembly 
additional time to craft a constitutional system based on the momentum that has 
been generated thus far.  Perhaps if more time is given, the General Assembly will 
succeed in achieving a complete and systematic overhaul of the school-funding 
system.  The majority is unable to resist the temptation to legislate an end to this 
case, and so oversteps its role. 
 
A long journey begins with a single step.  Some steps have been taken, but 
now the majority calls a halt to a journey that is nowhere near complete.  In 
DeRolph II, this court held that “ ‘[t]he attainment of efficiency and thoroughness 
in [the] system’ of common schools is ‘expressly made a purpose, not local, not 
municipal, but state-wide.’ ” Id., 89 Ohio St.3d 1, 728 N.E.2d 993, paragraph two 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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of the syllabus, quoting Miller v. Korns (1923), 107 Ohio St. 287, 297-298, 140 
N.E. 773, 776. 
 
Our school system is still not viewed as a statewide system by some.  
Many raise the issue of local control, contending that local control justifies local 
taxation.  The majority is among this group, citing the importance of local control 
in its praise for local property taxes. 
 
It is only recently that the focus on a statewide system, as required by the 
Constitution, has moved to the fore.  Our state Constitution is clear in its 
requirement that the system of public schools is a statewide system.  See Miller v. 
Korns, 107 Ohio St. at 297-298, 140 N.E. at 776.  For many years, this 
requirement was ignored, and problems within individual school districts were 
viewed as distinctly local problems, which had to be solved by local efforts alone. 
 
With statewide standards and statewide testing, we should recognize that 
we have a state system of common schools.  The state bears the ultimate 
responsibility to solve problems (in partnership with the local districts) that have 
been formerly viewed as local.  Recognition of a statewide system of schools 
envisioned by the Constitution may take generations to fully implement.  It is no 
wonder that people with the mindset that local problems are strictly local would 
resist this process.  Those who are reasonably satisfied with the status quo within 
their own school districts fear that solutions to the problems of other local districts 
will be at their expense.  These views must be put aside, and a bipartisan effort 
must continue to ensure that every child in Ohio will receive a thorough and 
efficient education regardless of where he or she resides. 
 
There have been successful bipartisan efforts in the past with less 
importance to the citizens of Ohio.  In the 1980s, Ohio’s Statehouse in Columbus 
had fallen into disrepair.  It was so run down and uncared-for that it spoke poorly 
of the state to everyone who toured or viewed it.  The Governor and the General 
Assembly saw the need and vowed to fix it.  A true bipartisan effort was launched 
January Term, 2001 
93 
to restore the structure.  Through different administrations and sessions of the 
General Assembly, our political leaders stayed the course, despite criticism of the 
cost (approximately $112 million), which ended up being much higher than 
estimated, and of the length of the project, which took six years to complete.  
Every day they saw the urgency of the building’s failings and knew it would be a 
continuing problem unless it was solved the right way.  Years of neglect had to be 
fixed, and cooperation was the common goal.  Many have criticized the amount of 
money spent on the renovation, but the point is that our legislators ignored those 
criticisms and saw the task through to its end. 
 
Our school-funding system can be analogized to this Statehouse 
restoration project, but school funding has a much worthier goal.  While the 
Statehouse is a building that represents our government, in this case we are 
dealing with the futures of our children.  The state leaders who saw the necessity 
of concerted action in renovating the Statehouse have failed to see the necessity of 
bipartisan dedicated action here, to the detriment of all citizens of our state, and 
especially our children, who have no political voice.  The same degree of 
commitment appears to be lacking, and I believe this lack indicates a serious 
failure to put the necessary emphasis on education in our state’s system of 
priorities. 
 
It has been said, “If we refuse to fight for the dignity of truth, we substitute 
expedience for justice.”  This perceptive statement by an unknown author aptly 
explains the majority’s motivation in reaching its decision.  The majority places 
entirely too much importance on political expedience and not nearly enough on 
justice.  Because the majority refuses to recognize that the state’s plan we review at 
this time is clearly insufficient to comply with the requirements of our Constitution, 
even with additional adjustments ordered by this court, I vigorously dissent. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J., dissenting.  Respectfully, I dissent. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
94 
 
The genesis of this case dates back to 1991.  Decades of fiscal neglect and 
poverty prompted student Nathan DeRolph, from property-poor Perry County, to 
challenge the state’s failure to adequately educate its youth.  Today, Nathan is an 
adult.  What have we accomplished in all these years?  Although steps have been 
taken to improve Ohio’s primary and secondary education system, I do not believe 
our job is done.  In my opinion, the current legislation continues to suffer from 
fundamental structural flaws.  As a result, inequities remain and children in the 
poorest districts are still being deprived of an adequate education. 
 
In DeRolph I, we found that Ohio’s elementary and secondary public school 
financing system was unconstitutional under Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio 
Constitution.  In declaring the system unconstitutional, we concluded, “Ohio’s 
public school financing scheme must undergo a complete systematic overhaul.”  
DeRolph v. State (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 212, 677 N.E.2d 733, 747.  We 
reiterated this view in DeRolph II, again declaring the revisions unconstitutional.  
DeRolph v. State (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 1, 37, 728 N.E.2d 993, 1021.  Today, we 
review additional changes that were enacted since our last decision. 
 
The majority takes the unprecedented step of declaring the system 
constitutional, but only after two revisions are made:  (1) adjusting the base cost 
formula and (2) fully funding the parity aid program by fiscal year 2004. 
 
At the outset, I find it incredible that the majority takes it upon itself to make 
unconstitutional legislation constitutional.  This represents quite a departure in 
philosophy from our past opinions, in which we adamantly stated that we would not 
instruct the General Assembly on how to remedy the system.  The majority 
compounds the problem by then taking a hands-off approach in the future.  Rather 
than retain jurisdiction over the matter and help ensure that these changes are made, 
the majority steps aside, relying instead on the “good faith” of the defendants to 
implement these changes.  But what assurances do we truly have that these changes 
and the rest of the current plan will be fully implemented? 
January Term, 2001 
95 
 
Moreover, with the majority declaring the funding plan constitutional (after 
the two  modifications are implemented), at first glance it would appear that giant 
steps have been taken in restructuring the way in which we fund public schools.  
However, upon closer scrutiny, it is evident that the system does not encompass the 
systematic overhaul envisioned and mandated by this court.  The new legislation 
merely tinkers with an existing framework that this court has twice struck down. 
 
Overreliance on property taxes continues to be the predominant root cause 
of the funding system’s constitutional defects.  Although we underscored in our 
prior opinions that property taxes could still be a component of the funding 
structure, we stated that they could not be the “primary” source of funding.  The 
General Assembly has ignored the plain language of our mandate.  Instead, it has 
enacted legislation that, when applied statewide, still uses property taxes as the 
primary means to fund our public school system.  As a result, there continue to 
exist large disparities in per pupil funding due to the uneven distribution in 
taxable property valuation.  This is not the result we intended. 
 
As expressed in the Education Tax Policy Institute (“ETPI”) report, which 
analyzed the new funding changes: 
 
“The piecemeal changes in the legislation do not fit together.  They do not 
overhaul the school funding system.  They do not end the necessity for many 
districts to return to the ballot on a regular basis simply to maintain existing levels 
of service.” 
 
The need to seek additional revenues through local levies is staggering.  In 
1997, there were four hundred forty-seven school issues placed on the ballot.  In 
2000, there were four hundred forty-six.  Moreover, the change in the state’s share 
of total revenue received by school districts is almost imperceptible:  from 42.4 
percent in FY93 to 43.7 percent in FY00.  Even with the current budget, the 
state’s attorney admitted in oral argument that this percentage will remain the 
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96 
same or will be similar under the new plan.  From this, it is easy to see that there 
is no change in the manner in which school revenues are raised. 
 
The majority believes that the General Assembly has solved the problem 
of overreliance on local property taxes through increasing the base cost amount, 
passing parity aid and gap aid legislation, and instituting millage caps.  However, 
rather than change the school-funding structure and create a new system that is 
based on something other than property tax at its core, the General Assembly has 
simply changed how much the state pays for schools.  In doing so, the General 
Assembly has diverted funding from areas such as higher education, mental 
health, mental retardation, and other state agencies and given it to public 
education.  Although this may generate revenue in the short term, it cannot be 
relied upon as a long-term solution to public education financing. 
 
There are other serious flaws inherent in the new legislative plan.  Rather 
than discuss every deficiency, the following represent some examples of the 
glaring inadequacies present in the revised funding plan.  For instance, in theory, 
the idea of subsidizing poorer districts with parity aid to compensate for the lower 
amount of money generated in their districts is a good one.  However, in practice, 
it does not work.  To begin with, as codified, parity aid is to be phased in over a 
period of five years.  R.C. 3317.0217(C)(1).  Even with the court’s current order, 
if parity aid is to be phased in by 2004, it still has a limited immediate effect.  
Furthermore, according to the ETPI report, “[t]he ability of local effort to 
contribute according to ability remains part of the total Parity aid structure.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Thus, the ability to raise sufficient revenue again is intertwined 
with local effort and the ability of each district to generate sufficient income 
based on its property tax values. 
 
Gap aid is also fraught with problems.  What the majority opinion fails to 
mention is that “[i]f a school district wants to levy local taxes to supplement 
parity aid, it can do so only by foregoing all gap aid. Gap aid occurs only at the 
January Term, 2001 
97 
expense of all local option taxes,” according to the EPTI report.  Another problem 
with gap aid is that it still results in phantom revenue.  In DeRolph II, we stated 
that phantom revenue occurs “ ‘when the growing property wealth of a school 
district gives the illusion of a commensurably increasing revenue stream, which, 
in fact, is not realized.’ “  89 Ohio St.3d at 29, 728 N.E.2d at 1015, quoting 
Frederick Church of the Legislative Budget Office.  We found that H.B. 650, the 
predecessor of the new gap aid legislation, resulted in phantom revenue.  Id. at 30, 
728 N.E.2d at 1016.  Since the current gap aid program is similar to that of the 
previously rejected provision in H.B. 650, with the exception of an additional 
transportation component, it too will result in phantom revenue.  R.C. 3317.0216. 
 
The issue of school facilities is another major concern. The state has 
begun to address this monumental problem.  Yet although funds are set aside by 
the state for the current biennium, future funding remains uncertain.  Whether 
funding will be available depends upon the whims of the General Assembly, state 
surpluses, the economy, and receipt of income from the tobacco settlement.  Thus, 
is it questionable whether the Governor’s twelve-year plan will be fully 
implemented.  Furthermore, even if there are sufficient funds available to rectify 
the situation, no study has been conducted to show what the facility needs of 
school districts are and whether they will be adequately addressed within this time 
period.  Finally, many of the school facilities programs still require districts to 
pass levies as a prerequisite for obtaining school funding.  E.g., R.C. 3318.05.  
Once again, the tie-in to local property taxes continues to plague this area of 
school funding as well. 
 
Moreover, the majority fails to discuss the repeal of Ohio’s local tax on 
business inventories.  The repeal of this tax is significant and may indeed result in 
an increased reliance on property tax.  In 1997, according to ETPI, the inventory 
tax generated $474 million in operating revenue, which was then 7.7 percent of 
total local property tax revenues. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Finally, the majority recognizes that there is a problem with the way in 
which the base cost formula has been calculated.  As a quick fix, the majority 
states that the formula should be reworked to include districts from the top and 
bottom five percent. Second, the formula should consider only those districts that 
meet twenty of the twenty-seven performance standards without rounding.  Third, 
the base cost amount should not be lowered to adjust for the supposed echo effect.  
However, even with these changes, the system itself still remains constitutionally 
flawed.  This is so because the state still has not determined what resources are 
necessary so that disadvantaged students can have the same opportunities to 
achieve as more affluent students. 
 
Ohio is certainly not the only state struggling with the issue of school 
funding.  Michigan has taken the challenge head-on and has voluntarily revamped 
its system without court challenges.  1993 Mich.Pub.Act No. 336 and Acts cited 
in Section 6; see, generally, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 388.1601 et seq.  Michigan 
has instituted a new way in which to generate school revenue by increasing its 
statewide sales tax and adding a statewide property tax.  1993 Pub.Acts Nos. 325, 
331.  However, the majority of state battles have been fought in litigation.  As a 
result, Vermont has instituted a statewide property tax to fund education at the 
state support grant level of $5,000 per student, allowing additional voted local 
property taxes subject to an equalization formula so that any property tax rate 
produces the same funds per student in every district.  This funding scheme was 
upheld in Stowe Citizens for Responsible Government v. Vermont (1999), 169 Vt. 
559, 730 A.2d 573.  New Hampshire has likewise enacted a statewide uniform 
education property tax.  However, this property tax was declared unconstitutional 
because the tax phase-in was unequal between districts.  Claremont School Dist. 
v. Governor (1999), 144 N.H. 210, 744 A.2d 1107.  Thus, the battle continues in 
that state. 
January Term, 2001 
99 
 
Apparently, in Ohio the battle is over.  At the end of the day, can we truly 
say that we have been victorious?  Have we done all that we can for Ohio’s 
schoolchildren?  Have we given the children throughout the state the same 
opportunities to learn and to excel?  Can we say that the children in poor, rural, or 
urban areas have been given the same opportunities as their peers who happen to 
be blessed with the good fortune of living in a wealthy district with a high 
property tax base?  In a statewide system of education, it should not matter where 
one lives.  However, under the current funding scheme, less wealthy districts must 
still rely on the good graces of the General Assembly to make up revenue which 
property taxes fail to generate.  Is this truly the legacy we want to leave? 
 
I recognize that inroads have been made and that the system is better today 
than it was in 1991 when this lawsuit was filed.  But we have not done enough.  
The state still has not met its full obligation to educate the Nathan DeRolphs of 
tomorrow.  Inherent inequities remain. By deciding that the current legislation is 
constitutional, after the implementation of two minor modifications, we have 
missed the opportunity to make a genuine commitment to improving public 
schools.  The importance of adequately educating our youth cannot be overstated.  
All aspects of our community life are linked to the quality of the education our 
children receive.  Full development of human potential serves all of society.  Our 
founding fathers recognized the importance of public education and wanted a 
system that served all children, not just the wealthy among us.  As stated by 
David McCullough in his biography of John Adams, who was speaking in the 
words of his time: 
 
“[E]mphatically, [John Adams] urged the widest possible support for 
education.  ‘Laws for the liberal education of youth, especially for the lower 
classes of people, are so extremely wise and useful that to a humane and generous 
mind, no expense for this purpose would be thought extravagant.’ “  McCullough, 
John Adams (2001) 103. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
100 
 
The hallmark of a thorough and efficient form of public education is that it 
works as well for the least advantaged as it does for the most advantaged.  The 
funding system advocated by the majority sadly misses the mark. 
 
Since there have been no fundamental changes to the school-funding 
structure, I would find that the current legislation continues to violate the 
Thorough and Efficient Clause of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
RESNICK, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  It is beyond dispute that providing a thorough and 
efficient system of common schools for the children of the state of Ohio is both a 
noble and necessary endeavor.  But the same Constitution that directs the General 
Assembly to provide such a system also constrains this court’s role within Ohio’s 
governmental framework. 
 
I continue to believe that this cause presents a nonjusticiable political 
question.  The fundamental principle of separation of powers and the related 
doctrine of nonjusticiability prevent this court from deciding what a “thorough 
and efficient” system of public schools requires.  The term “thorough and 
efficient” speaks to the question of educational quality, which is an issue that 
unquestionably involves difficult policy choices and value judgments that courts 
are not in the business of making.  “The political question doctrine excludes from 
judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value 
determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of [the 
legislature] or the confines of the Executive Branch.”  Japan Whaling Assn. v. 
Am. Cetacean Soc. (1986), 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 2866, 92 L.Ed.2d 
166, 178. 
 
In Baker v. Carr (1962), 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, the 
United States Supreme Court identified six characteristics of political questions, 
any one of which may render a controversy nonjusticiable: 
January Term, 2001 
101 
 
“[1] [A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to 
a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without 
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] 
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without 
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or 
[6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 
various departments on one question.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 217, 82 S.Ct. at 
710, 7 L.Ed.2d at 686. 
 
The dissent in DeRolph v. State (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 677 N.E.2d 
733 (“DeRolph I”), offered a compelling explanation why the first two factors cut 
in favor of the conclusion that the Education Clause of the Ohio Constitution 
commits to the General Assembly the power to define what constitutes a 
“thorough and efficient” system of schools.  See id. at 264-283, 677 N.E.2d at 
782-795 (Moyer, C.J., Cook and Lundberg Stratton, JJ., dissenting).  Today’s 
decision underscores the nonjusticiability of the issue by implicating the third 
factor.  The majority opinion is notable for the absence of genuine constitutional 
analysis.  What the opinion sets forth instead are policy determinations “of a kind 
clearly for nonjudicial discretion,” Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. at 710, 7 
L.Ed.2d at 686, thus confirming that the issues involved are nonjusticiable 
political questions. 
 
The majority orders the General Assembly to make specific changes that are 
“required” before the current funding plan will be constitutional: adjusting the base 
cost formula and accelerating by two years the full funding of the “parity aid 
program.”  By ordering particular legislative action—based on its own concept of 
what is necessary to guarantee educational quality—the majority has made an initial 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
102 
policy determination that the judiciary is ill-equipped to make and that is 
characteristic of nonjusticiability.  As the Illinois Supreme Court recognized: 
 
“It would be a transparent conceit to suggest that whatever standards of 
quality courts might develop would actually be derived from the constitution in 
any meaningful sense.  Nor is education a subject within the judiciary’s field of 
expertise, such that a judicial role in giving content to the education guarantee 
might be warranted.  Rather, the question of educational quality is inherently one 
of policy involving philosophical and practical considerations that call for the 
exercise of legislative and administrative discretion.”  Commt. for Educational 
Rights v. Edgar (1996), 174 Ill.2d 1, 28-29, 220 Ill.Dec. 166, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 
1191; cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez (1973), 411 U.S. 1, 43, 93 
S.Ct. 1278, 1302, 36 L.Ed.2d 16, 49 (“the judiciary is well advised to refrain from 
imposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe 
or handicap the continued research and experimentation so vital to finding even 
partial solutions to educational problems and to keeping abreast of ever-changing 
conditions”). 
 
The decisions about how to define educational quality, and the related 
question of how we pay for the pursuit of that ideal, are better left to the 
legislature, which, unlike the judiciary, is a branch of government well suited to 
make such vitally important policy choices.  “In a climate of finite resources, the 
General Assembly, with its function of reaching decisions through compromise 
and consideration of popular opinion, has the greatest legitimacy in making 
budget decisions that require a choice among priorities.”  DeRolph v. State 
(1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 419, 425, 678 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Cook, J., dissenting).  By 
once again choosing to adjudicate a nonjusticiable political question, today’s 
majority continues to tread upon the General Assembly’s legitimate constitutional 
role—thereby thwarting the will of the people of this state as expressed through 
their elected representatives. 
January Term, 2001 
103 
 
Even assuming that this court properly reached the merits in DeRolph I, I 
continue to believe that once this court declared the school-funding system 
unconstitutional, “[t]here remain[ed] nothing more for this, or any other, court to 
do.”  DeRolph, 78 Ohio St.3d at 424, 678 N.E.2d at 890 (Cook, J., dissenting). 
This court’s remand to the trial court, vesting “plenary jurisdiction” to decide the 
constitutional validity of funding statutes that the General Assembly had not yet 
even enacted, violated basic precepts of appellate jurisprudence.  Id. at 424, 678 
N.E.2d at 890 (Cook, J., dissenting).  This court also took the peculiar step of 
eschewing traditional intermediate appellate review, ordering that any decision on 
remand would come directly to this court.  Id. at 421, 678 N.E.2d at 888.  Such 
action led the majority to create a heretofore unknown “hybrid” cause in this 
court—a case that is “not an original action” yet “not a traditional appeal, in 
which the court has a previously established record available for review.”  
DeRolph v. State (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 1274, 1275, 747 N.E.2d 823, 824.  There 
was no sound basis in law for any of these extraordinary acts. 
 
Further, when the majority again held Ohio’s school-funding system 
unconstitutional in DeRolph v. State (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 1, 728 N.E.2d 993 
(“DeRolph II”), I dissented from the majority’s assertion that it could require a 
revision of the General Assembly’s enactments.  Id. at 57, 728 N.E.2d at 1036 
(Cook, J., dissenting).  The majority’s approach in DeRolph II violated basic 
tenets of our democracy.  “Unless the other branches of government are to be 
totally subordinate to the judiciary, we cannot direct the General Assembly in the 
performance of its legislative duties.”  DeRolph, 78 Ohio St.3d at 425, 678 N.E.2d 
at 891 (Cook, J., dissenting). 
 
Today’s decision ordering the General Assembly to adopt specific 
legislation not only continues DeRolph II’s misguided approach, but also goes a 
disconcerting step further.  The majority has either forgotten or deliberately 
chosen to ignore this court’s prior express assurance that it would not order the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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General Assembly to enact specific legislation as part of a remedy: “[I]t might be 
tempting for this court to do its own analysis, for example, determining the level 
of funding per pupil to achieve a thorough and efficient system, and then ordering 
that amount of funding.  * * *  However, * * * [t]hat degree of involvement in 
fashioning a remedy in this case is not, nor should ever be, how we perceive our 
role.  Our role, as we have declared in past cases, is to decide issues of 
constitutionality—not to legislate, as some may believe.”  (Emphasis added.)  
DeRolph II, 89 Ohio St.3d at 12, 728 N.E.2d at 1003. 
 
Finally, I also question the majority’s application of the law-of-the-case 
doctrine here.  Contrary to the majority’s assertion that the law-of-the-case 
doctrine “require[s]” this court to evaluate the constitutionality of the system now 
in place, the doctrine contains significant limitations and exceptions.  It is 
considered to be “a rule of practice rather than a binding rule of substantive law.”  
Nolan v. Nolan (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 11 OBR 1, 3, 462 N.E.2d 410, 413; 
see, also, Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. (1988), 486 U.S. 800, 
817, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2178, 100 L.Ed.2d 811, 831 (“the law-of-the-case doctrine 
‘merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has 
been decided, not a limit to their power,’ “ quoting Messinger v. Anderson [1912], 
225 U.S. 436, 444, 32 S.Ct. 739, 740, 56 L.Ed. 1152, 1156).  The procedural and 
substantive infirmities I have discussed suggest that this is a case to which the 
doctrine should not apply. 
 
The majority quotes Thomas Jefferson for the proposition that it is 
necessary to “sacrific[e] our opinions sometimes to the opinions of others for the 
sake of harmony.”  Willingness to compromise is, of course, an essential quality 
for legislators, who must continually balance competing policy interests as they 
discharge their constitutionally prescribed functions.  Indeed, in the very passage 
quoted by the majority, Jefferson discusses a legislative matter then pending in 
Congress.  16 Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Boyd Ed.1961) 598 (letter to Francis 
January Term, 2001 
105 
Eppes, July 4, 1790).  As a judge, however, I am unwilling to sacrifice what the 
majority correctly describes as my “deeply held beliefs regarding the 
responsibility of the court as an institution.”  I am confident that my unwillingness 
to do so is justified, given that the majority’s compromise—though well 
intentioned—results in an order requiring the General Assembly to enact 
legislation implementing a few judges’ view of appropriate public policy. The 
judicial oath of office requires me to support the Ohio Constitution and to perform 
the duties of a judge—not of a legislator.  See R.C. 3.23. 
 
I have opined from the outset that the Ohio Constitution commits 
budgetary decisions regarding school funding to the mechanisms of democracy.  
Yet this court continues to infringe upon matters that lie within the distinct 
purview of the collective judgment of our elected representatives in the Ohio 
General Assembly. 
 
Because I would dismiss this cause, I respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Nicholas A. Pittner, John F. Birath, Jr., Sue W. 
Yount, Quintin F. Lindsmith and Susan B. Greenberger, for appellees. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Mary Lynn Readey, Roger F. 
Carroll and James G. Tassie, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellants. 
 
Walter & Haverfield, P.L.L., James E. Betts and Frederick W. Whatley, 
for amicus curiae Alliance for Adequate School Funding, in support of appellees. 
 
John P. Concannon, for amicus curiae Cincinnati School District Board of 
Education, in support of appellees. 
 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., and Kimball H. Carey, for amici curiae Buckeye 
Association of School Administrators, Ohio School Boards Association, and Ohio 
Association of School Business Officials, in support of appellees. 
 
Patrick F. Timmins, Jr., for amicus curiae Coalition of Rural and 
Appalachian Schools, in support of appellees. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
106 
 
Louis B. Geneva Co., L.P.A., and M. Jayne H. Geneva, for amici curiae 
Coalition for School Funding Reform, Cleveland Heights-University Heights City 
School District, Lakewood City School District, Shaker Heights City School 
District, and Community Advocates for Public Education, in support of appellees. 
 
Carson, Sowash & Ferrier and Herman A. Carson, for amicus curiae 
Federal Hocking Local School District, in support of appellees. 
 
Hugh Calkins, for amicus curiae Initiatives in Urban Education 
Foundation, in support of appellees. 
 
Courtney M. Wilson, for amicus curiae League of Women Voters of Ohio, 
in support of appellees. 
 
John T. Ryerson and Susan Truitt, for amicus curiae Ohio Association for 
Gifted Children, in support of appellees. 
 
Thomas C. Drabick, Jr., for amicus curiae Ohio Association of Public 
School Employees/AFSCME Local 4, AFL-CIO, in support of appellees. 
 
Christopher Lopez; Kalniz, Iorio & Feldstein Co., L.P.A., Ted Iorio and 
Christine A. Reardon, for amicus curiae Ohio Education Association, in support 
of appellees. 
 
Ulmer & Berne, L.L.P., Donald J. Mooney, Jr., and Yelena Boxer; Schnorf 
& Schnorf Co., L.P.A., and David M. Schnorf, for amicus curiae Ohio Federation 
of Teachers, in support of appellees. 
 
Ben Espy Co., L.P.A., and Ben E. Espy, for amici curiae members of the 
Ohio House of Representatives Jack Ford, Dixie J. Allen, John E. Barnes, Jr., 
Catherine L. Barrett, Joyce Beatty, John Boccieri, Samuel T. Britton, Kenneth A. 
Carano, Mary M. Cirelli, Wayne E. Coates, Dean E. DePiero, L. George Distel, 
Steven L. Driehaus, Teresa Fedor, Bryan Flannery, William J. Hartnett, Peter 
Lawson Jones, Annie L. Key, K. Eileen Krupinski, Anthony Latell, Jr., G. Daniel 
Metelsky, Dale Miller, Ray Miller, Mary Rose Oakar, William L. Ogg, Robert J. 
Otterman, Sylvester Patton, Jr., Jeanine Perry, Chris Redfern, Ronald Rhine, 
January Term, 2001 
107 
Derrick Seaver, Daniel J. Sferra, Shirley A. Smith, Fred Strahorn, Erin Sullivan, 
Joseph P. Sulzer, Barbara Ann Sykes, Charles A. Wilson, Jr., and Claudette 
Woodward, and members of the Ohio Senate Leigh E. Herington, Daniel Brady, 
Gregory L. DiDonato, Ben E. Espy, Eric Fingerhut, Linda J. Furney, Robert F. 
Hagan, Mark Mallory, Rhine McLin, C.J. Prentiss, Timothy J. Ryan, and Michael 
C. Shoemaker, in support of appellees. 
 
Ben Espy Co., L.P.A., and Ben E. Espy, for amicus curiae Ohio Legislative 
Black Caucus, in support of appellees. 
 
Susan G. Tobin, for amicus curiae Ohio Legal Rights Service, in support 
of appellees. 
 
John M. Haseley, for amicus curiae United States Congressman Ted 
Strickland, in support of appellees. 
 
Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff and N. Victor Goodman, for 
amici curiae Richard H. Finan, President of the Ohio Senate, and Larry 
Householder, Speaker of the Ohio House of Representatives, in support of 
appellants. 
 
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chad A. Readler and Mary 
Beth Young, for amicus curiae Ohio Board of Regents, in support of appellants. 
 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., Robert W. Trafford, James D. 
Curphey, Jennifer T. Mills and Constance M. Greaney, for amici curiae Ohio 
Business Roundtable, Ohio Manufacturers’ Association, National Federation of 
Independent Business/Ohio, Ohio Council of Retail Merchants, Ohio Chamber of 
Commerce, and Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, in support of appellants. 
 
John S. Jones, for amicus curiae Ohio Coalition for the Education of 
Children With Disabilities, in support of appellants. 
 
Chester, Willcox & Saxbe and John J. Chester, for amicus curiae Ohio 
Governor Bob Taft, in support of appellants. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
108 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Robert C. Maier, Assistant 
Attorney General, for amicus curiae Tax Commissioner of Ohio, in support of 
appellants. 
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