Case Title: State ex rel. Am. Legion Post 25 v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm.

Citation: 2008-Ohio-1261

Docket Number: 20062263

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Am. Legion Post 25 v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 117 Ohio St.3d 441, 2008-
Ohio-1261.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. AMERICAN LEGION POST 25, APPELLEE, v. OHIO CIVIL 
RIGHTS COMMISSION ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Am. Legion Post 25 v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 117 Ohio 
St.3d 441, 2008-Ohio-1261.] 
Mandamus — R.C. 4112.04 — Ohio Civil Rights Commission has clear legal duty 
to issue a subpoena at a respondent’s request during a preliminary 
investigation of an administrative complaint — Adm.Code 4112-3-13(B), 
which authorizes issuance of a subpoena by the Ohio Civil Rights 
Commission only after a complaint is filed, is invalid because it conflicts 
with R.C. 4112.04(B). 
(No. 2006-2263 — Submitted October 17, 2007 — Decided March 26, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Fayette County,  
No. CA2006-01-006, 171 Ohio App.3d 476, 2006-Ohio-5509. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. 
R.C. 4112.04(B) creates a clear legal duty for the Ohio Civil Rights 
Commission to issue a subpoena at a respondent’s request during a 
preliminary investigation of an administrative complaint. 
2. 
The administrative rule that authorizes issuance of a subpoena by the Ohio 
Civil Rights Commission only after a complaint is filed – Ohio Adm.Code 
4112-3-13(B) – is invalid because it conflicts with R.C. 4112.04(B). 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} This discretionary appeal presents the question of whether R.C. 
4112.04(B), the Ohio Civil Rights Commission’s subpoena statute, creates a duty 
for the commission to issue subpoenas at the request of a party charged with a 
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discriminatory practice at any stage of its administrative proceedings.  We hold 
that the clear language of the statute mandates the commission to issue subpoenas 
at the party’s request. 
I.  Case Background 
{¶ 2} Carol Van Slyke filed a complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights 
Commission against her former employer, the American Legion Post 25 (“the 
Legion”), claiming that its executive director had sexually harassed her.  Van 
Slyke alleged that she was fired in retaliation for complaining about the 
harassment. 
{¶ 3} When contacted by the commission, the Legion explained that it 
had fired Van Slyke shortly after receiving an anonymous letter that she was a 
felony offender. 
{¶ 4} During the investigation, the Legion requested, by letter from its 
attorney, that a subpoena be issued on its behalf compelling Van Slyke’s parole 
officer to meet with its representatives.  In addition, the Legion requested that the 
parole officer provide all documents pertaining to Carol Van Slyke’s sentence in 
Arizona, the transfer of her case to Ohio, and all documents pertaining to her 
parole or probation along with the dates and length of her supervision. 
{¶ 5} The commission did not issue the subpoena as requested.  The 
commission did, however, during the investigatory phase, issue a subpoena on its 
own behalf to the parole officer, who provided the commission with requested 
information.  The Legion was not permitted to review that information.  The 
commission issued a determination that it was probable that the Legion had 
engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice under R.C. 4112.02 and scheduled 
the case for conciliation.  Ultimately, after attempts at conciliation failed, the 
commission issued a complaint against the Legion. 
{¶ 6} When the commission did not issue the requested subpoena, the 
Legion filed a complaint in the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas that 
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3 
sought a writ of mandamus to compel the commission to issue the requested 
subpoena to the parole officer.  The commission filed a motion to dismiss the 
complaint, arguing that the Legion had no clear legal right to the subpoena, the 
commission had no clear legal duty to issue the subpoena, and the Legion had an 
adequate remedy at law.  The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and denied 
the writ. 
{¶ 7} On appeal, the Twelfth District Court of Appeals reversed and held 
that the Legion was entitled to a writ of mandamus.  The appellate court stated 
that the commission’s argument that it had the right to issue a subpoena on its 
own behalf during an investigation, but not on the behalf of the party who had 
been charged with a discriminatory practice, ran counter to the plain language of 
R.C. 4112.04(B)(3)(b):  “Upon written application by a respondent, the 
commission shall issue subpoenas in its name to the same extent and subject to 
the same limitations as subpoenas issued by the commission.”  Furthermore, the 
court held that by refusing to issue the subpoena requested by the Legion, the 
commission failed to engage in a “completed attempt” to eliminate the 
discriminatory practice by conference, conciliation, or persuasion before it issued 
a complaint and thus lost jurisdiction to issue the complaint against the Legion. 
{¶ 8} We accepted this discretionary appeal on the commission’s two 
propositions of law.  The first deals with the interplay between the statute, R.C. 
4112.04(B), and the administrative rules, Ohio Adm.Code 4112-3-12(A) and 
4112-3-13(B), that authorize the commission to issue subpoenas. The commission 
asserts that the two are complementary and that it is authorized to issue a 
subpoena on the behalf of a party before it only after a formal complaint has been 
issued.  The second proposition of law suggests that the commission properly 
engaged in conciliation and thereby retained jurisdiction over Van Slyke’s claim 
of discriminatory conduct even though it did not issue the subpoena requested by 
the Legion. 
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II.  Analysis 
{¶ 9} Before we discuss the merits of the commission’s claims, it is 
important to review the steps involved when the commission receives a claim of 
discriminatory treatment.  The process has three steps.  Upon receipt of a 
complaint alleging discriminatory conduct, such as harassment, the commission is 
authorized to investigate the allegations.  R.C. 4112.05(B)(2).  In the first step, the 
preliminary investigation, the commission’s function is to discover evidence to 
determine if it is probable that an unlawful discriminatory practice has occurred.  
Id.  If the commission finds that it is probable that a discriminatory practice has 
occurred, then the second phase begins. R.C. 4112.05(B)(4).  During this phase, 
the commission must try to eliminate the discriminatory practice through 
“informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.”  R.C. 
4112.05(B)(4).  Both the preliminary investigation and attempts at conciliation 
must be completed within a specified time frame.  R.C. 4112.05(B)(3)(a) and 
4112.05(B)(7).  If attempts at conciliation fail, a formal complaint is entered, with 
notice of the allegations and an opportunity for a hearing for the party charged 
with the civil-rights violation.  R.C. 4112.05(B)(5).  During this third and final 
phase, the attorney general represents the commission and prosecutes the charge 
of discrimination.  R.C. 4112.05(B)(5) through (7). 
A.  The Right to Mandamus 
{¶ 10} We are asked to decide whether the commission is entitled to deny 
a respondent’s written request for a subpoena when the request is made during the 
preliminary investigation.  If the commission may deny such a request, the Legion 
was not entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling the issuance of a subpoena on 
its behalf during the preliminary investigation. 
{¶ 11} A writ of mandamus is “a writ, issued in the name of the state to an 
inferior tribunal, a corporation, board, or person, commanding the performance of 
an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty.”  R.C. 2731.01.  For a writ of 
January Term, 2008 
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mandamus to issue, the relator must demonstrate “ ‘(1) that he has a clear legal 
right to the relief prayed for, (2) that respondents are under a clear legal duty to 
perform the acts, and (3) that relator has no plain and adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of the law.’ ”  State ex rel. Westbrook v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. 
(1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 215, 215, 17 OBR 449, 478 N.E.2d 799, quoting State ex 
rel. Harris v. Rhodes (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 41, 42, 8 O.O.3d 36, 374 N.E.2d 641. 
{¶ 12} The Legion argues that R.C. 4112.04(B)(3)(b) confers on it a clear 
legal right to request that the commission issue a subpoena during the preliminary 
investigation.  R.C. 4112.04(B)(3)(b) provides that “[u]pon written application by 
a respondent, the commission shall issue subpoenas in its name to the same extent 
and subject to the same limitations as subpoenas issued by the commission.”  The 
Legion contends that the subpoena must be issued because the plain language of 
the statute places the commission and a party before it on equal footing when it 
comes to subpoena power  
{¶ 13} The commission responds that because the preliminary-
investigation phase of the administrative proceedings is designed to determine 
whether it is probable that discrimination has taken place, not to prove a charge, it 
is not obligated to issue a subpoena on behalf of the party before it while the 
investigation is ongoing.  The commission cites its own administrative rule, Ohio 
Adm.Code 4112-3-13(B),1 which requires a respondent to include the “case 
caption and complaint number” in all requests for a subpoena.  Because there is 
                                                 
1. 
{¶ a} The full text of Ohio Adm.Code 4112-3-13(B) states: 
 
{¶ b} “Issuance of subpoena at the request of respondent. Subpoenas shall be issued upon 
receipt of a written request from a respondent or respondent's representative which identifies the 
case caption and complaint number and contains the name and address of the person to be served. 
Subpoena requests for the production of documents must specify the documents to be produced. 
Subpoenas issued at the request of a respondent shall contain the name and address of the 
respondent and shall state that they were issued at the respondent's request. Subpoenas issued on 
behalf of a respondent shall be sent to the respondent and served by the respondent, consistent 
with the ‘Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.’ ” 
 
 
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no complaint number assigned until the investigation and conciliation phases have 
ended, the commission contends that its rule does not permit a party before the 
commission to ask for a subpoena until a formal complaint has issued. 
{¶ 14} Administrative rules are designed to accomplish the ends sought 
by the legislation enacted by the General Assembly.  Carroll v. Dept. of Adm. 
Servs., 10 Ohio App.3d 108, 110, 10 OBR 132, 460 N.E.2d 704.  Therefore, 
“[r]ules promulgated by administrative agencies are valid and enforceable unless 
unreasonable or in conflict with statutory enactments covering the same subject 
matter.”  State ex rel. Curry v. Indus. Comm. (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 268, 269, 12 
O.O.3d 271, 389 N.E.2d 1126.  The commission is authorized to adopt rules to 
implement the provisions of R.C. Chapter 4112.  However, an administrative rule 
may not add to or subtract from a legislative enactment.  Cent. Ohio Joint 
Vocational School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs. (1986), 21 Ohio 
St.3d 5, 10, 21 OBR 269, 487 N.E.2d 288.  If it does, the rule clearly conflicts 
with the statute, and the rule is invalid.  Id. 
{¶ 15} In this case, the administrative rule adds to the legislative 
enactment by requiring a party before the commission to wait for the complaint 
phase of the proceedings before it can request that a subpoena be issued.  The 
rule’s limitation on the timing of requesting a subpoena, which makes a party 
before the commission wait until an investigation has ended, conciliation has 
stalled, and a formal complaint has been issued, is the extra step that conflicts 
with the statute, which expressly allows for subpoenas to be issued on behalf of a 
party before the commission “to the same extent and subject to the same 
limitations” as those issued on behalf of the commission. The rule improperly 
adds to the statute, thus creating a clear conflict, and must fail. 
{¶ 16} The Legion thus had a clear legal right to request that the 
commission issue a subpoena during the preliminary investigation.  The first 
requirement for granting a writ of mandamus has been met. 
January Term, 2008 
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{¶ 17} Because the commission is entitled to issue subpoenas on its own 
behalf during the preliminary investigation of a party, that party is also entitled to 
have the commission issue subpoenas on its behalf during the investigation.  R.C. 
4112.04 requires the commission to issue subpoenas in a party’s name “to the 
same extent and subject to the same limitations” as those issued in the 
commission’s name.  No limitation on when the subpoena should be issued 
appears in the statute.  Furthermore, R.C. 4112.04(B)(3)(b) clearly imposes this 
duty upon the commission, as is apparent from the phrase “the commission shall 
issue subpoenas.”  (Emphasis added.)  Use of the word “shall” defeats the 
commission’s argument that it may deny a party the right to obtain a subpoena 
until a later time. Accordingly, the commission has a clear legal duty to issue a 
subpoena upon the request of a party being investigated.  The second requirement 
for granting a writ of mandamus has been met. 
{¶ 18} The third requirement for granting a writ of mandamus, no plain 
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, has also been met.  The 
Legion argues that because a substantial portion of the commission’s case is 
gathered during the preliminary investigation and conciliation, any delay until the 
investigation has concluded, or until it may request reconsideration of a probable 
cause determination, makes the remedy inadequate.  "[M]andamus is not 
appropriate if there is a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."  
State ex rel. Beane v. Dayton, 112 Ohio St.3d 553, 2007-Ohio-811, 862 N.E.2d 
97, ¶ 31; see R.C. 2731.05.  To be adequate, the alternate remedy must be 
complete, beneficial, and speedy.  State ex rel. Dreamer v. Mason, 115 Ohio St.3d 
190, 2007-Ohio-4789, 874 N.E.2d 510, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 19} The question is whether the remedy is adequate under the 
circumstances. State ex rel. Butler v. Demis (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 123, 124, 20 
O.O.3d 121, 420 N.E.2d 116.  But see State ex rel. Toledo Metro Fed. Credit 
Union v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 529, 678 N.E.2d 1396. 
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{¶ 20} The commission’s proposed remedies would have the Legion 
request reconsideration of the probable cause determination or have the Legion 
resolve the underlying claim through conciliation or settlement.  But these 
avenues do not provide the Legion with a complete or adequate remedy. Here, a 
third party possesses the information, and the statute expressly gives the 
respondent the right to obtain information from a third party at the same time as 
the commission does.  The Legion has the right to have the commission issue 
subpoenas to obtain information in possession of a third party before the 
conciliation phase begins.  Under these unique circumstances, we conclude that 
the Legion does not have an adequate remedy at law. 
B.  Conciliation 
{¶ 21} The second proposition of law relates to whether the commission 
properly engaged in conciliation under R.C. 4112.05(B)(4), after it had refused to 
issue the subpoena requested by the Legion.  The court of appeals held that the 
“commission failed to engage in ‘a completed * * * attempt * * * to eliminate 
unlawful discriminatory practices by conference, conciliation or persuasion,’ and, 
therefore, the commission lacked jurisdiction to issue a complaint against 
appellant.”  171 Ohio App.3d 476, 2006-Ohio-5509, 871 N.E.2d 1198, ¶ 65, 
quoting State ex rel. Republic Steel Corp. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (1975), 44 
Ohio St.2d 178, 73 O.O.2d 478, 339 N.E.2d 658, syllabus. 
{¶ 22} Because the two parties were not on equal footing during the 
conciliation phase, we cannot say whether the commission failed to engage in an 
attempt at conciliation.  The Legion did not have the advantage of the information 
it sought to gather from a third party by subpoena, although the commission did 
have that information.  Therefore, we cannot conclude, as did the appellate court, 
that the commission has lost jurisdiction. 
III. Conclusion 
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{¶ 23} R.C. 4112.04(B) creates a clear legal duty for the Ohio Civil 
Rights Commission to issue a subpoena at a party’s request during a preliminary 
investigation of an administrative complaint.  Furthermore, the administrative rule 
that authorizes issuance of a subpoena by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission only 
after a complaint is issued – Ohio Adm.Code 4112-3-13(B) – is invalid because it 
conflicts with R.C. 4112.04(B).  Therefore, we affirm the granting of a writ of 
mandamus, and we remand this cause to the commission for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Kiger & Kiger Lawyers and James A. Kiger; and Mary E. King, for appellee. 
Marc Dann, Attorney General, William P. Marshall, Solicitor General, Elise 
Porter, Deputy Solicitor, Michael Stokes, Assistant Solicitor, and Stephanie 
Bostos Demers and Lori Anthony, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellants. 
Gittes & Schulte and Frederick M. Gittes; and Fortney & Klingshirn and Neil 
E. Klingshirn, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Employment Lawyers 
Association. 
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