Case Title: In re D.J.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 528A20

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2021-09-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-105 
No. 528A20 
Filed 24 September 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: D.J. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 18 
September 2020 by Judge Beverly Scarlett in District Court, Orange County. This 
matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 19 August 2021 but 
determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 
the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Stephenson & Fleming, LLP, by Deana K. Fleming, for petitioner-appellee 
Orange County Department of Social Services. 
 
Michelle FormyDuval Lynch for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Wendy C. Sotolongo, Parent Defender, by J. Lee Gilliam, Assistant Parent 
Defender, for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
 
BARRINGER, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondent appeals the trial court’s order which terminated her parental 
rights to her minor child, D.J. (Daniel).1 The trial court found that grounds existed to 
terminate respondent’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2) 
and that termination was in Daniel’s best interests. Respondent has not challenged 
on appeal the trial court’s conclusion that the grounds for termination pursuant to 
                                            
1 A pseudonym is used to protect the identity of the minor child and for ease of reading. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2) existed or that termination was in Daniel’s best 
interests. Instead, respondent argues that the trial court erred by denying her 
counsel’s motion to continue the termination hearing and that the trial court failed 
to comply with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Since we 
conclude that respondent has failed to show prejudice from the trial court’s denial of 
the motion to continue and, further, since we conclude that the trial court has now 
sufficiently complied with the ICWA as it pertains to Daniel, we reject respondent’s 
arguments and affirm the trial court’s termination-of-parental-rights order. 
I. 
Background 
¶ 2 
 
Petitioner Orange County Department of Social Services (DSS or OCDSS) first 
became involved with respondent and Daniel on 30 January 2019 when it received a 
Child Protective Services (CPS) report that respondent appeared to be impaired while 
visiting a children’s museum with Daniel. A DSS social worker responded to the scene 
where respondent acted disorganized and agitated, swayed back and forth while 
standing, and had difficulty maintaining a linear conversation. When respondent 
could not identify an alternative caretaker for Daniel, the social worker attempted to 
locate a temporary safety provider. Respondent became agitated and uncooperative 
and fled from DSS and law enforcement with Daniel. DSS and law enforcement 
attempted unsuccessfully to locate respondent and Daniel in the vicinity of the 
children’s museum. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 3 
 
The next day, on 31 January 2019, DSS filed a petition alleging that Daniel 
was a neglected and dependent juvenile. In addition to recounting the incident at the 
children’s museum, the petition alleged that respondent had a prior CPS report 
involving Daniel in Randolph County and another in Forsyth County. DSS was also 
granted nonsecure custody of Daniel. Respondent and Daniel were eventually located 
at a nearby apartment complex. 
¶ 4 
 
On 7 March 2019, DSS filed an amended petition, adding allegations regarding 
prior CPS reports involving respondent and Daniel in Guilford County and Durham 
County and respondent’s history of substance abuse and mental health issues. After 
a hearing on the amended petition on 21 March 2019, the trial court entered an order 
adjudicating Daniel as a neglected and dependent juvenile on 30 April 2019. The trial 
court’s order also incorporated by reference the court report prepared by DSS in which 
it stated that respondent “has reported American Indian heritage and letters have 
been mailed to the identified tribes.” 
¶ 5 
 
DSS filed a motion in the cause to terminate respondent’s parental rights on 
26 February 2020. In the motion, DSS alleged two grounds for termination: neglect 
and willful failure to make reasonable progress in correcting the conditions that led 
to Daniel’s removal. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(2) (2019). 
¶ 6 
 
The termination motion was called for a hearing on 6 August 2020. 
Immediately before the termination hearing, the trial court heard a motion to 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
continue that had been filed by respondent’s counsel to secure the testimony of a 
witness who worked at Lincoln Community Health Center. Respondent’s counsel 
recounted his attempts to secure the witness’s testimony and indicated that “[his] 
understanding in talking with the Lincoln Community [Health] Center was that they 
would not let [the witness] come [testify].” The trial court denied the motion to 
continue but ruled that the witness could testify by phone or Webex and afforded 
respondent’s counsel the opportunity to contact the witness during an impending 
thirty-minute recess to determine if she would testify via telephone or Webex. 
Respondent’s counsel then made an offer of proof as follows: 
I’d just like to make an offer of proof on this that [the 
witness] has had contact and ha[s] been involved with 
[r]espondent[-m]other since, I think, about May of last 
year, that [r]espondent[-m]other gets several services at 
Lincoln Community [Health] Center including I think 
there’s a substance abuse treatment. There’s a psychiatrist 
and maybe another—a therapist involved also. 
 
[The witness] is sort of a—what she calls a bridge 
counselor, that she’s able to connect these services, so she’s 
aware of these services. Also she sees [respondent-mother], 
my understanding is, once or twice a month. I don’t know 
exactly how it was going through COVID. I think it might 
have been [by] telephone[ ], but [respondent-mother] called 
in regularly to her and also attended the, you know, 
Lincoln Community [Health] Center. 
 
So I just think in terms of the information she could 
offer in court, it would be extremely valuable. 
Counsel for DSS in response clarified that there is no dispute that respondent gets 
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some services at Lincoln Community Health Center and that DSS had contact with 
Lincoln Community Health Center and received some information from them. 
Counsel for DSS then had a case social worker inform the trial court of her contact 
with the witness and her attempts to obtain records from the witness which were 
ultimately unsuccessful. Finally, DSS’s counsel raised that Lincoln Community 
Health Center was in Durham but that respondent indicated she was traveling from 
her home in Mount Airy. The trial court subsequently took a scheduled recess. 
¶ 7 
 
After the recess, respondent’s counsel informed the trial court that he was 
unable to get in contact with the witness despite calling her and leaving her 
voicemails. The termination hearing then proceeded. Approximately twenty-five 
minutes later, respondent’s counsel received a response from the witness indicating 
that her employer would not allow her to testify. After DSS concluded its presentation 
of evidence for the adjudicatory phase of the termination hearing, respondent’s 
counsel renewed the motion to continue. The trial court again denied the motion. 
¶ 8 
 
After the termination hearing, the trial court entered an order terminating 
respondent’s parental rights in Daniel. The trial court found that grounds existed to 
terminate respondent’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2) 
and that termination was in Daniel’s best interests. The order was amended on 18 
September 2020, with the trial court reaching the same conclusions in the amended 
order. Respondent appealed. 
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II. 
Motion to Continue 
¶ 9 
 
Respondent contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion to 
continue. Respondent submits that she was prejudiced by her inability to examine 
the witness who worked at the Lincoln Community Health Center during the 
termination hearing. 
¶ 10 
 
“Ordinarily, a motion to continue is addressed to the discretion of the trial 
court, and absent a gross abuse of that discretion, the trial court’s ruling is not subject 
to review.” In re A.L.S., 374 N.C. 515, 516–17 (2020) (quoting State v. Walls, 342 N.C. 
1, 24 (1995)). “Abuse of discretion results where the [trial] court’s ruling is manifestly 
unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a 
reasoned decision.” Id. at 517 (quoting State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285 (1988)). 
 
In reviewing for an abuse of discretion, we are 
guided by the Juvenile Code, which provides that 
continuances that extend beyond 90 days after the initial 
petition 
shall 
be 
granted 
only 
in 
extraordinary 
circumstances 
when 
necessary 
for 
the 
proper 
administration of justice. Furthermore, continuances are 
not favored and the party seeking a continuance has the 
burden of showing sufficient grounds for it. The chief 
consideration 
is 
whether 
granting 
or 
denying 
a 
continuance will further substantial justice. 
In re J.E., 377 N.C. 285, 2021-NCSC-47, ¶ 15 (cleaned up). 
¶ 11 
 
“If, however, the motion [to continue] is based on a right guaranteed by the 
Federal and State Constitutions, the motion presents a question of law[,] and the 
order of the [trial] court is reviewable.” In re A.L.S., 374 N.C. at 517 (quoting State v. 
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Baldwin, 276 N.C. 690, 698 (1970)). However, when “[the respondent] did not assert 
in the trial court that a continuance was necessary to protect a constitutional right,” 
this Court does not review the trial court’s denial of a motion to continue on 
constitutional grounds. In re A.L.S., 374 N.C. at 517; see also In re J.E., ¶ 14. Instead, 
the respondent is held to “ha[ve] waived any argument that the denial of the motion 
to continue violated his [or her] constitutional rights.” In re J.E., ¶ 14 (citing In re 
S.M., 375 N.C. 673, 679 (2020)); see also In re A.L.S., 374 N.C. at 517. 
¶ 12 
 
“Moreover, ‘[r]egardless of whether the motion raises a constitutional issue or 
not, a denial of a motion to continue is only grounds for a new trial when [the 
respondent] shows both that the denial was erroneous, and that he [or she] suffered 
prejudice as a result of the error.’ ” In re A.L.S., 374 N.C. at 517 (first alteration in 
original) (quoting Walls, 342 N.C. at 24–25); see also State v. Phillip, 261 N.C. 263, 
266–67 (1964) (“Regardless of whether the defendant bases his appeal upon an error 
of law or an abuse of discretion, it is elementary that to entitle him to a new trial he 
must show not only error but prejudicial error.”). 
¶ 13 
 
In this matter, respondent’s counsel did not raise a constitutional argument 
before the trial court. Thus, while respondent appears to suggest that the trial court’s 
denial of the motion to continue was constitutional error, respondent has waived any 
argument to this effect. Respondent has also failed to show prejudice. While 
respondent made an offer of proof concerning the witness’s testimony, the offer of 
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proof is vague. See In re A.L.S., 374 N.C. at 518 (upholding the denial of a motion to 
continue when “respondent-mother’s counsel offered only a vague description of the 
[witness]’s expected testimony”). The offer of proof provided that the witness has had 
contact and been involved with respondent since May of the prior year, saw 
respondent once or twice a month, and connected respondent to services at Lincoln 
Community Health Center. However, it does not say what the witness’s testimony 
would be. There was also no dispute that respondent received some services at 
Lincoln Health Community Center. 
¶ 14 
 
Since continuances are not favored, motions to continue “ought not to be 
granted unless the reasons therefor are fully established.” State v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 
497, 501 (1948) (citing Commonwealth v. Millen, 289 Mass. 441, 463 (1935)). Based 
on the record before us, respondent’s offer of proof fails to demonstrate the 
significance of the witness’s potential testimony and any prejudice arising from the 
trial court’s denial of her motion to continue. See In re H.A.J., 377 N.C. 43, 2021-
NCSC-26, ¶ 13; Phillip, 261 N.C. at 267 (“[A] mere intangible hope that something 
helpful to a litigant may possibly turn up affords no sufficient basis for delaying a 
trial to a later term.” (quoting Gibson, 229 N.C. at 502)). Therefore, we reject 
respondent’s assignment of error. 
III. 
Indian Child Welfare Act 
¶ 15 
 
Respondent additionally argues that the trial court failed to comply with its 
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obligations under the ICWA when it had reason to know Daniel had Indian heritage. 
DSS and the guardian ad litem concede that the record fails to establish that the trial 
court complied with the ICWA notice requirements prior to the termination hearing, 
but DSS has supplemented the record on appeal with post-termination-of-parental-
rights-hearing orders, exhibits, and related materials that DSS contends are salient 
to the ICWA issues on appeal. 
¶ 16 
 
We have previously addressed the sufficiency of post-termination-of-parental-
rights notices and hearings to address compliance with the ICWA in In re E.J.B., 375 
N.C. 95 (2020). In that matter, two tribes responded to the notices and indicated that 
the juveniles “were not ‘Indian children’ as defined in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4),” but one 
tribe—the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians tribe—did not respond to the 
notice. Id. at 106. This Court “conclude[d] that the post termination notice sent to the 
Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians tribe did not cure the trial court’s failure to 
comply with the [ICWA] prior to terminating respondent-father’s parental rights,” 
id., because the trial court had failed to ensure that DSS used due diligence when 
contacting the tribes, id. (citing 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(b)(1) (2019)). “If a tribe fails to 
respond, the trial court must seek assistance from the Bureau of Indian Affairs prior 
to making its own independent determination.” Id. (citing 25 C.F.R. § 23.105(c) 
(2019)). 
¶ 17 
 
The ICWA provides as follows: 
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If you do not have accurate contact information for a Tribe, 
or the Tribe contacted fails to respond to written inquiries, 
you should seek assistance in contacting the Indian Tribe 
from the [Bureau of Indian Affairs] local or regional office 
or the [Bureau of Indian Affairs]’s Central Office in 
Washington, DC (see www.bia.gov). 
 
25 C.F.R. § 23.105(c) (2020). In In re E.J.B., we thus reversed and remanded to the 
trial court to issue an order requiring that proper notice be sent to the Keetoowah 
Band of Cherokee Indians tribe despite the trial court’s post-termination-hearing 
conclusion that the ICWA did not apply. In re E.J.B., 375 N.C. at 106. Further, we 
instructed the trial court as follows: 
If the Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians tribe indicates 
that the children are not Indian children pursuant to the 
[ICWA], the trial court shall reaffirm the order terminating 
respondent-father’s parental rights. In the event that the 
Keetoowah Band of Cherokee tribe indicates that the 
children are Indian children pursuant to the [ICWA], the 
trial court shall proceed in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the [ICWA]. 
 
Id. 
¶ 18 
 
In this matter, the trial court also exercised jurisdiction to conduct post-
termination-of-parental-rights review and hearings. However, in contrast to In re 
E.J.B., the trial court ensured compliance with 25 C.F.R. § 23.105(c) and DSS’s due 
diligence before concluding that the ICWA did not apply. The trial court, after hearing 
the evidence, found and concluded as follows: 
14. Respondent[-]mother previously reported to OCDSS 
potential Native American Heritage, specifically the 
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Cherokee and Iroquois (Haudenosaunee) Tribes. 
 
15. In 2019, OCDSS initially sent ICWA notices to the 
Easter[n] Band of Cherokee Indians and notification to 
state-recognized tribes, Haliwa Saponi Indian Tribe and 
Sappony Indian Tribe. Non-membership letters were 
received from these tribes. 
 
16. After the case was transferred from the foster care 
unit to the adoption unit of OCDSS, the agency became 
aware that notices previously provided to the above-
mentioned tribes did not comport with ICWA requirements 
for notification of the Native American Heritage identified 
by [r]espondent[-]mother. 
 
17. In January 2021, OCDSS mailed additional Tribal 
Notification Letters, including Consent to Explore 
American Indian Heritage, and copies of the Juvenile 
Petition, by Certified Mail Return Receipt Requested to the 
nine tribes identified as “Iroquis” . . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
18. In January 2021, OCDSS mailed additional Tribal 
Notification Letters, including Consent to Explore 
American Indian Heritage, and copies of the Juvenile 
Petition, by Certified Mail Return Receipt Requested to the 
three tribes identified as “Cherokee” . . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
19. In response to the Tribal Notification Letters and 
accompanying documents set forth above, letters of the 
juvenile’s non-eligibility status have been received from 
eight of the nine tribes identified as “Iroquis” . . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
20. Despite confirmation of receipt of the Tribal 
Notification Letters and accompanying documents, the 
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Onondaga Nation (NY) has not responded to the inquiry. 
On March 11, 2021, the assigned social worker called the 
Onondaga Nation (NY) to follow up on the notification sent 
and left a voice mail message. 
 
21. On March 11, 2021, [OCDSS] sent a letter to the 
Indian Child Welfare Services, Bureau of Indian Affairs 
Regional Office, Attention Gloria York, 545 Marriot Drive, 
Suite 700, Nashville, TN, 37214 requesting assistance to 
determine tribal membership eligibility of the juvenile 
regarding the identified tribes who have not responded 
within the fifteen-day time frame. 
 
. . . . 
 
23. On April 7, 2021, the United States Department of the 
Interior Bureau of Indian Affairs issued a Response to 
ICWA Child Custody Notification/Request for Indian 
Ancestry to the assigned OCDSS social worker . . . . A copy 
of the letter was admitted into evidence and is hereby 
incorporated by reference. 
 
24. The Bureau of Indian Affairs specified in relevant part 
as follows: 
 
a. The BIA acknowledges that you have notified the 
family’s identified Tribe(s) Tuscarora, Tonawanda, 
Mohawk, 
Seneca, 
Oneida, 
EBCI, 
Cayugo, 
Onondaga, and Keetoowah based on your inquiry 
with the family according to 25 U.S.C. § 1912. 
 
b. You 
have 
identified 
that 
Onondaga 
and 
Keetoowah have not responded. At this point, you 
have done due diligence and completed your ICWA 
responsibilities. 
 
25. On May 20, 2021, the assigned social worker received 
an email from the Cherokee Nation (OK) confirming the 
juvenile’s non-eligibility status. A copy of which was 
admitted into evidence, and hereby incorporated by 
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reference. 
 
26. On April 26, 2021, the United Keeto[o]wah Band of 
Cherokee (OK) issued a letter of the juvenile’s non-
eligibility status. A copy of which was admitted into 
evidence, and hereby incorporated by reference. 
 
27. In response to the Tribal Notification Letters and 
accompanying documents set forth above, letters or written 
correspondence of the juvenile’s non-eligibility status have 
been received from the three tribes identified as 
“Cherokee” . . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
28. While OCDSS has not received a letter regarding the 
juvenile’s eligibility status with the Onondaga, the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs determined that OCDSS conducted due 
diligence and completed responsibilities under the Indian 
Child Welfare Act. 
 
29. In accordance with 25 U.S.C. § 1912, OCDSS complied 
with notification requirements to determine whether the 
juvenile was a member or eligible for membership in . . . a 
federally recognized Indian Tribe. 
 
30. The [c]ourt has sufficient, credible evidence to 
determine that the juvenile is not an Indian Child as 
defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act. 
 
. . . . 
 
HAVING MADE THE PRECEDING FINDINGS, THE 
COURT CONCLUDES AS FOLLOWS: 
 
1. 
This [c]ourt has jurisdiction, both personal and 
subject matter, and all parties have been properly served 
and are properly before the [c]ourt. 
 
2. 
OCDSS has complied with ICWA notification 
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requirements as set forth herein. 
 
3. 
The juvenile is not an Indian Child as defined by 
25 U.S.C. § 1912. 
 
4. 
The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) does not apply 
to the juvenile and subsequent custody or adoption 
proceedings. 
 
¶ 19 
 
As reflected in the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law by the trial 
court, the trial court ensured that DSS used due diligence in contacting and working 
with the tribes. Response letters were received from all tribes but one, and all 
response letters received indicated that Daniel was not eligible for membership in the 
respective tribe. For the one tribe that did not provide a response letter, DSS complied 
with 25 C.F.R. § 23.105(c). DSS contacted the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs determined that DSS “ha[d] done [its] due diligence and 
ha[d] completed [its] ICWA responsibilities.” The trial court also concluded that “[t]he 
juvenile is not an Indian Child as defined by 25 U.S.C. § 1912.” Given the foregoing, 
we hold that the trial court has now sufficiently complied with the requirements of 
the ICWA as it pertains to Daniel and cured its prior noncompliance. 
¶ 20 
 
To the extent respondent argues that the trial court’s prior noncompliance with 
the ICWA deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to enter orders addressing the 
custody of Daniel, this argument fails. Respondent has not contended, and the record 
does not support that an Indian tribe has exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1911(a). Exclusive jurisdiction is only vested in an Indian tribe for a “child custody 
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proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the 
reservation of such tribe” or “[w]here an Indian child is a ward of a tribal court.” 25 
U.S.C § 1911(a). Further, after ensuring DSS’s due diligence in its compliance with 
the notice requirements of 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a), albeit post-termination, the trial court 
concluded that Daniel is not an Indian child. Thus, we need not address whether and 
what remedy exists for noncompliance with 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) in a child-custody 
proceeding involving an Indian child as defined by 25 U.S.C. § 1912. In this matter, 
any error by the trial court on account of its belated compliance with the ICWA is not 
prejudicial. Therefore, we affirm the termination order. 
IV. 
Conclusion 
¶ 21 
 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we reject respondent’s arguments on appeal 
concerning the termination order. Respondent has failed to show prejudice as to the 
trial court’s denial of her motion to continue, and the trial court has now complied 
with the ICWA. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s termination order. 
AFFIRMED.