Case Title: JOHNSON v. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIV.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
JOHNSON v. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIV.2001 WY 4823 P.3d 32Case Number: 00-236Decided: 05/16/2001

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                          

IN THE 
MATTER OF THE WORKER'S

COMPENSATION 
CLAIM OF DARRELL E.

JOHNSON, 
AN EMPLOYEE OF KERSTEN

TRAILER 
SALES, INC.:

 

DARRELL 
E. JOHNSON,

Appellant(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

STATE OF 
WYOMING ex rel.

WYOMING 
WORKERS' SAFETY

AND 
COMPENSATION DIVISION,

Appellee(Respondent).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Donald L. Painter, Casper, Wyoming  

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald 
L. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and David L. Delicath, Assistant 
Attorney General  

 

 Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

 
            
KITE, Justice.

 [¶1]      Appellant Darrell 
E. Johnson suffered a work related injury in November 1996.  In June of 1999, Mr. Johnson applied for 
permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits, which the Division of Workers' 
Safety and Compensation (Division) denied because he was not actively seeking 
work.  On appeal, the Office of 
Administrative Hearings (OAH) denied benefits because Mr. Johnson failed to 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he had actively pursued work 
and had sustained a loss of earnings due to his work related injury. The 
district court affirmed the OAH decision.  
On the specific facts and evidence presented in this case, we reverse and 
remand for an award of PPD benefits.  

ISSUE

 

[¶2]      This statement of 
the issue is found in Mr. Johnson's brief:

 

1.  Whether 
[Mr. Johnson] is excused from the legal requirement of a job search in order to 
qualify for a permanent partial disability award where any such search would be 
futile.

 

Appellee 
State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division posed 
the issue in the following manner:

 

Was the 
Hearing Examiner's determination that [Mr. Johnson] failed to seek suitable 
employment as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. §27-14-405(h)(iii) arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On November 14, 
1996, a co-worker accidentally dropped a four-pound hammer on Mr. Johnson's 
head.  At the time of the accident, 
Mr. Johnson was standing on a ladder, and the blow caused him to fall to a 
concrete floor some fourteen feet below.  
He suffered injuries to his head, neck, and lower back requiring 
two surgeries on his cervical spine and two surgeries on his lower 
back.

 

[¶4]      Mr. Johnson was 
forty-five years old when the accident occurred and was employed as a welder for 
Kersten Trailer Sales, Inc. earning ten dollars per hour.  He had approximately a ninth grade 
education with a GED and had worked the previous twenty years in the 
construction profession, primarily as a welder and performing heavy labor 
functions. 

 

[¶5]      At the time of 
the PPD hearing, Mr. Johnson was confined to a wheelchair and could walk only 
ten to fifteen feet unassisted.  He 
experienced constant headaches and pain in his right arm, legs, and lower 
back.  He was unable to use his 
right arm and experienced numbness of his left arm.  He had developed a seizure disorder, and 
the hearing examiner personally observed his spasms and tremors.  Mr. Johnson took medication on a daily 
basis for pain and the seizure disorder.  
As a result of back surgery, he had to use a catheter.  Presumably due to the seizure disorder 
and medication, he had been unable to drive for some five months prior to the 
hearing date.  It is uncontested 
that Mr. Johnson's physical impairments are the result of the work 
related accident.

 

[¶6]      Mr. Johnson 
applied for PPD benefits on June 6, 1999.  
A final determination denying the benefits was issued June 18, 1999, 
stating that Mr. Johnson was ineligible due to his failure to actively seek 
work.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-405(h)(iii) (LEXIS 1999).  The 
PPD benefits denial was appealed, and a hearing was held by the OAH on September 
29, 1999.  The evidence 
admitted during the course of the hearing included Mr. Johnson's sworn 
testimony, a letter from Dave Sigurslid, M.D., his treating physician, and a 
second opinion impairment rating report by Victoria M. Vernon, M.D.  In her report, Dr. Vernon concluded 
Mr. Johnson had incurred a twenty-four percent whole person impairment due to 
the work related accident.  On 
October 28, 1999, the OAH issued its decision denying benefits on the grounds 
that Mr. Johnson had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 
he had actively pursued work and, due to his work related injury, had sustained 
a loss of earnings.  Mr. 
Johnson filed a Petition for Review, and the district court ultimately affirmed 
the OAH decision denying benefits.  
This appeal followed.

 

 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 

[¶7]      In a case of this 
nature, our standard of review is well established:

 

            
A claimant for worker's compensation benefits has the burden of proving 
all the essential elements of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence in 
the contested case hearing.  When an 
agency decides that the party charged with the burden of proof has failed to 
meet that burden, the case is reviewed under the "[a]rbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law" language of Wyo. 
Stat.  § 16-3-114(c)(ii) 
(1990).  On appeal the complainant 
. . . has the burden of proving arbitrary administrative 
action.  The agency, as the trier of 
fact, is charged with weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of 
witnesses.  The deference normally 
accorded to the findings of fact by a trial court is extended to the 
administrative agency, and the agency's decision as to the facts will not be 
overturned unless it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence.  Demonstrating evidentiary 
contradictions in the record does not establish the irrationality of the ruling, 
but we do examine conflicting evidence to determine if the agency reasonably 
could have made its finding and order based upon all of the evidence before 
it.  

 

Lunde v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 6 P.3d 1256, 1258-59 (Wyo. 2000) (citations omitted); see also Erdman v. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 5 P.3d 64, 66 (Wyo. 
2000); Pederson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 
939 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo. 1997).

 

[¶8]      In the exercise 
of interpreting statutes:

 

"We read 
the text of the statute and pay attention to its internal structure and the 
functional relation between the parts and the whole.  We make the determination as to meaning, 
that is, whether the statute's meaning is subject to varying 
interpretations.  If we determine 
that the meaning is not subject to varying interpretations, that may end the 
exercise, although we may resort to extrinsic aids of interpretation, such as 
legislative history if available and rules of construction, to confirm the 
determination.  On the other hand, 
if we determine that the meaning is subject to varying interpretations, we must 
resort to available extrinsic aids.  
If an ambiguous statute has been construed by an agency charged with 
administering it, we will accord deference to, but are not bound by, that 
construction.  After all, the final 
construction of an ambiguous statute is a question for the 
court."

 

Hernandez 
v. Laramie County School District No. 1, 8 P.3d 318, 321 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game 
and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Wyo. 1993)).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶9]      Mr. Johnson had 
the burden of proving eligibility for PPD benefits by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  Lunde, 6 P.3d  at 
1258.  When Mr. Johnson was injured, 
the statute at issue required proof as follows:

 

(h) An 
injured employee awarded permanent partial impairment benefits may apply for a 
permanent disability award subject to the following terms and 
conditions:

 

(i) The 
injured employee is because of the injury, unable to return to employment at a 
comparable or higher wage than the wage the employee was earning at the time of 
injury;

 

(ii) An application for permanent 
partial disability is filed not before three (3) months after the date of 
ascertainable loss or three (3) months before the last scheduled impairment 
payment, whichever occurs later, but in no event later than one (1) year 
following the later date;  
and

 

(iii) 
The employee has actively sought suitable work, considering the employee's 
health, education, training and experience.

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h) (LEXIS 1999) (amended 2000).  The OAH decision reflects "there is no 
dispute between the parties that Johnson has satisfied the first two 
requirements in the above quoted statute."  
The only issue for resolution was whether Mr. Johnson had proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he actively sought suitable employment, 
considering his health, education, training, and experience.  The concept of "preponderance of the 
evidence" is defined as "proof which leads the trier of fact to find that the 
existence of the contested fact is more probable than its non-existence."  Scherling v. Kilgore, 599 P.2d 1352, 1359 (Wyo. 1979); see also Ikenberry v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division, 5 P.3d 799, 808-09 (Wyo. 2000).  "The evidence presented is not to be 
liberally construed in a claimant's favor when determining if an injured worker 
has met that burden of proof."  
Ikenberry, 5 P.3d  at 809.

 

[¶10]   Beyond Mr. Johnson's testimony 
regarding his severe physical limitations, which we grant is subjective and 
perhaps less reliable than other forms of evidence, he also submitted a letter 
from his physician, Dr. Sigurslid, who had been actively treating him for over a 
year. That letter, dated April 21, 1999, provides in its entirety as 
follows:

 

To Whom 
It May Concern:

 

RE: 
Darrell Johnson

 

This 
letter is to verify my assessment of Mr. Johnson's capability for 
work.  He has severe chronic neck and back 
problems for which he receives weekly to every two week pain injections and 
takes pain medication.  This occurs 
in the setting of relatively little activity and wheelchair assistance.  When he increases any amount of his 
activity he suffers an increase in his back pain.  Stress also adds to this degree of back 
pain.

 

I cannot 
see where placing Mr. Johnson at any regular job will help his back pain picture 
nor is it likely to remain static.  
It will undoubtedly get worse with enforced sitting, standing or any 
prescribed activity such as a job might indicate at this 
point.

 

I hope 
this letter is of some value to you.  
If you desire further information and with Mr. Johnson's permission I am 
happy to provide it for you.  

 

 (Emphasis added.)

 

[¶11]   The OAH hearing examiner findings 
in relation to this evidence are as follows:

 

Johnson's 
current physician, Dr. Sigurslid, opined that regular employment would 
undoubtedly worsen Johnson's pain and physical condition.  Exhibit 2.  Dr. Sigurslid did not opine that Johnson 
was unable to return to employment at a comparable or higher wage than the wage 
he was earning at the time of injury.

 

These 
findings are internally inconsistent and therefore arbitrary and 
capricious.  Dr. Sigurslid's letter 
clearly relays his medical opinion that any level of "regular" work activity 
would make Mr. Johnson's already extraordinarily limited physical capacity and 
condition worse.  It is arbitrary 
and capricious to somehow extract from this opinion the factual conclusion, 
stated in the double negative, that the doctor did not say Mr. Johnson could not 
return to work for a comparable or higher wage.  Furthermore, as noted above, the OAH 
conceded the requirement of § 27-14-405(h)(i), which is the inability to return 
to employment at a comparable or higher wage than he was earning at the time of 
injury, had been met and was not at issue.  
So this finding has no relevance.  
We conclude the treating physician opined Mr. Johnson could not return to 
work without making his condition worse which supports the inference that the 
claimant could not return to workperiodleastwise for a comparable or higher 
wage.

 

[¶12]   Mr. Johnson's burden was to 
establish that it was more likely than not that he had actively sought suitable 
employment, considering his health, education, training, and experience.  Mr. Johnson acknowledged he did not seek 
work.  His treating physician had 
advised him any type of work would aggravate his already severely debilitated 
condition.  The question we face now 
is whether the written statement by Dr. Sigurslid was sufficient to carry Mr. 
Johnson's burden and shift that burden to the Division.  See Sellers v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 979 P.2d 959, 961 (Wyo. 
1999).

 

 

[¶13]   The circumstances of this case 
raise a peculiar quandary.  Mr. 
Johnson is evidently in a very diminished physical state.  His doctor has advised him against work 
of any kind, and from his testimony, which is consistent with this medical 
opinion, it appears he has not been released to work. On the other hand, 
§ 27-14-405(h)(iii) seems to require evidence of an active job search.  However, at the same time, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-407 (LEXIS 1999)1 precludes a claimant from engaging 
in activities which imperil or retard recovery.  "[W]orkers' compensation benefits will 
not be awarded for the subsequent injury caused by the worker's willful 
disregard for his physical limitations and his doctor's orders."  Fenner v. Trimac Transportation, 
Inc., 554 N.W.2d 485, 490 (S.D. 1996) (State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Division v. Henriksen, 2001 
WY 42, presents an analogous factual circumstance in the context of a claimant's 
application for temporary total disability benefits).  This potential dilemma is resolved by 
the language of § 27-14-405(h)(iii) which qualifies the requirement the employee 
"actively sought suitable work" with the language "considering the employee's 
health."  Pursuant to this analysis, 
we conclude Mr. Johnson met his burden.  

 

[¶14]   The question then arises, upon the 
shifting of the burden, whether the Division adequately demonstrated Mr. Johnson 
did not actively pursue employment considering his health.  The only evidence the Division submitted 
was a second opinion impairment report prepared by Dr. Vernon.  This document reflects that Dr. Vernon 
reviewed Mr. Johnson's medical records and conducted a physical 
examination.  On this information, 
she ultimately concluded Mr. Johnson had incurred a twenty-four percent whole 
body impairment directly related to the workplace accident.  The only statements she made with regard 
to Mr. Johnson's employment capacity are as follows:

 

In light 
of his injury and physical impairments, I do not feel that Mr. Johnson will be 
able to return to his prior line of work which was a heavy duty job 
description.  Mr. Johnson would do 
best should he desire to return to the work force to receive job retraining at 
the sedentary level.  Mr. Johnson 
reports difficulty sitting, standing or walking for prolonged periods of time 
and I feel that it would be in his best interest to perform all activities on an 
as tolerated basis only.  I would 
limit his sitting to no more than 1 hour at a time with positional changes and 
rest breaks as needed.  

 

The OAH 
hearing examiner somehow gleaned from this statement that the doctor did not say 
Mr. Johnson could not return to work for a comparable or higher wage.  Although we grant Dr. Vernon did not 
make such a statement, its omission is not relevant.  As noted above, that fact was not at 
issue.  The reasonable inference to 
be drawn from the Division's doctor's statement was that Mr. Johnson's physical 
capacity would only allow sedentary work on an "as tolerated basis" with the 
flexibility to permit him to sit, stand, and change position on an as-needed 
basis.  This medical opinion, from a 
doctor examining Mr. Johnson for the first time for the purpose of an impairment 
rating, actually tends to support the treating physician's conclusion that 
return to the "regular" workforce would be detrimental to his health.  Dr. Vernon's report, at best, provides 
significant qualifications as to Mr. Johnson's capacity to endure normal 
sedentary work functions without proffering an opinion as to his 
employability.  This limited and 
highly qualified judgment does not override the treating physician's evaluation 
that his patient cannot work without making his condition 
worse.

 

[¶15]   It is correctly noted, in both the 
OAH decision and the district court decision, that vocational evidence is 
lacking in the record.  The Division 
could have developed such evidence to establish Mr. Johnson's vocational 
capacity and to specifically identify jobs he could perform with his impairments 
that would not worsen his physical state.  
It is possible such evidence would have met and overridden Dr. 
Sigurslid's medical opinion of Mr. Johnson's work capacity, or lack 
thereof.  The Division, however, 
did not provide such evidence.  Upon 
our examination of the conflicting evidence, we have determined the OAH could 
not reasonably have made its finding and order based upon all the evidence 
before it.  Lunde, 6 P.3d  at 
1259.

 

[¶16]   Reversed and remanded for an award 
of PPD benefits.

 

FOOTNOTES

  1Section 27-14-407 
provides:

 

            
If an injured employee knowingly engages or persists in an unsanitary or 
injurious practice which tends to imperil or retard his recovery, or if he 
refuses to submit to medical or surgical treatment reasonably essential to 
promote his recovery, he forfeits all right to compensation under this act.  Forfeiture shall be determined by the 
hearing examiner upon application by the division or 
employer.