Case Title: Commonwealth v. McNeal

Citation: 

Docket Number: 101933

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, 
JJ., and Lacy and Koontz, S.JJ. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
 OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 101933 
CHIEF JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUNE 9, 2011 
DAVID ELWOOD McNEAL, SR. 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
David Elwood McNeal, Sr., was convicted in a bench trial in 
the Circuit Court of Augusta County for failing to return rented 
personal property valued at more than $200 within ten days after 
expiration of the rental period in violation of Code § 18.2-118.  
In this appeal, the Commonwealth challenges the Court of 
Appeals' judgment holding that there was insufficient evidence 
as a matter of law to sustain the conviction.  Because the Court 
of Appeals erred in finding that contradictory testimony 
rendered the evidence insufficient to support the conviction, we 
will reverse its judgment. 
MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
At trial, the Commonwealth offered the testimony of one 
witness, Wenda Workman, the store manager of a rental business 
known as "Central Virginia Rental."  When asked whether she 
"encounter[ed]" McNeal "on or about September 18, 2008," she 
responded affirmatively, explaining that McNeal came into the 
store and rented a 10-foot aluminum brake along with an extra 
handle and a stand for a period of one week.  According to 
Workman, the aluminum brake, which is a device used by 
construction contractors to bend aluminum, was valued at 
approximately $2,500. 
Workman testified that McNeal did not return the brake 
after the one-week rental period ended and that she was unable 
"to get ahold of [McNeal]" via mail.  After "a couple of months" 
elapsed, she contacted the Augusta County Sheriff's Office 
regarding McNeal's failure to return the rented equipment.  The 
parties stipulated that a deputy with the sheriff's office would 
testify that he recovered the aluminum brake and extra handle 
from the residence of McNeal's sister on September 19, 2008, and 
returned those items to the rental store.  Workman testified 
that the total rental charge for the time during which McNeal 
had the equipment was $1,518.98, which sum included $300 for the 
replacement of the stand that was not recovered. 
When asked on cross-examination to confirm that the deputy 
returned the brake and handle to the rental store on 
September 19, 2008, Workman testified that "it was in 
September," but that she did not "know the exact date."  Workman 
confirmed again on redirect examination that the equipment had 
not been returned for "two to three months" prior to the 
deputy's recovering part of it.  Workman explained that she did 
not "know [her] dates" at trial because her "papers [were] at 
the store." 
 
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At the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, McNeal moved 
to strike, arguing that "[t]here's nothing here to show criminal 
intent" because the evidence showed that McNeal rented the 
equipment for a week beginning on September 18th and the deputy 
recovered it on September 19th.  The circuit court denied the 
motion to strike, noting that although Workman "testified, 
obviously confused, that September 18 and 19 were the days that 
the tool went out, and [the deputy] brought it in," she 
nevertheless "subsequently testified . . . that [McNeal] had it 
for two or three months."  McNeal offered no evidence. 
Considering all the evidence, the circuit court concluded 
that although Workman "did agree with [the Commonwealth's 
Attorney] that she first encountered Mr. McNeal . . . on 
September the 18th, she testified that the item was gone for two 
or three months."  The circuit court expressly found that the 
"equipment was gone for two or three months on a week's rental, 
and that it was returned on September the 19th."  The circuit 
court thus held that there was "evidence sufficient for a 
finding of guilt" and sentenced McNeal to a three-year term of 
imprisonment, with one year suspended. 
McNeal appealed the circuit court's judgment of conviction 
to the Court of Appeals of Virginia.  A three-judge panel of 
that court reversed the circuit court's judgment and vacated 
McNeal's conviction.  McNeal v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2171-
 
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09-3, slip op. at 4 (July 20, 2010) (unpublished).  The Court of 
Appeals explained that Workman's testimony about McNeal's 
keeping the rented equipment for two to three months and 
incurring a large rental expense "conflicted with the undisputed 
evidence that the items were rented on September 18 and . . . 
returned on September 19."  Id., slip op. at 3.  Viewing these 
facts as " 'equally susceptible to more than one 
interpretation,' " the Court of Appeals concluded that the 
circuit court could not " 'arbitrarily adopt [the] inculpatory 
interpretation,' " id., slip op. at 3-4 (quoting Moody v. 
Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 702, 706, 508 S.E.2d 354, 356 (1998)), 
and that the evidence, therefore, "failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that McNeal did not return the brake within ten 
days of the expiration of the rental agreement."  Id., slip op. 
at 4. 
The Commonwealth now appeals to this Court.  The sole issue 
is whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the 
evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain McNeal's 
conviction under Code § 18.2-118. 
ANALYSIS 
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on 
appeal, our review is guided by well-established principles.  
This Court "must examine the evidence that supports the 
conviction and allow the conviction to stand unless it is 
 
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plainly wrong or without evidence to support it."  Vincent v. 
Commonwealth, 276 Va. 648, 652, 668 S.E.2d 137, 139-40 (2008) 
(citing Code § 8.01-680 and Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 255 Va. 
516, 520, 499 S.E.2d 263, 265 (1998)).  "[W]e review 'the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 
prevailing party in the [trial] court' and 'accord the 
Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible 
from the evidence.' "  Noakes v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 338, 345, 
699 S.E.2d 284, 288 (2010) (second alteration in original) 
(quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 523, 527, 685 S.E.2d 43, 
45 (2009)).  After so viewing the evidence, the question is 
whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."  
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis 
omitted); accord Maxwell v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 437, 442, 657 
S.E.2d 499, 502 (2008).  In sum, "[i]f there is evidence to 
support the conviction, the reviewing court is not permitted to 
substitute its judgment, even if its view of the evidence might 
differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the 
trial."  Commonwealth v. Taylor, 256 Va. 514, 518, 506 S.E.2d 
312, 314 (1998). 
Pursuant to Code § 18.2-118(a), "[w]henever any person is 
in possession or control of any personal property, by virtue of 
or subject to a written lease of such property, . . . and such 
 
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person so in possession or control shall, with intent to 
defraud, . . . fail to return such property to the lessor 
thereof within ten days after expiration of the lease or rental 
period . . . stated in such written lease," that person "shall 
be deemed guilty of the larceny" of the property.1  McNeal 
asserts that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he failed to return the equipment within 
ten days after expiration of the rental period.  Like the Court 
of Appeals, McNeal points to the conflict between Workman's 
testimony that McNeal leased the equipment on September 18, 2008 
for a period of one week but kept the equipment for two to three 
months, and the stipulation that the deputy would testify that 
he recovered the aluminum brake and extra handle on 
September 19, 2008. 
Clearly, the circuit court had before it two, contradictory 
factual accounts: either McNeal failed to return the equipment 
for two or three months or the equipment was recovered one day 
after McNeal first rented it.  As relevant to resolving this 
contradiction, the circuit court also heard Workman's testimony 
that substantial rental charges accrued as a result of McNeal's 
failure to return the equipment within ten days after the one-
                     
1 If such personal property is valued at $200 or more, the 
offense is classified as grand larceny, a felony, Code § 18.2-
95(ii); if it is valued at less than $200, the offense is 
classified as petit larceny, a Class 1 misdemeanor.  Code 
§ 18.2-96(2). 
 
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week rental period expired; Workman's testimony that she spent 
many days, not one, attempting to contact McNeal and recover the 
equipment, and when her attempts proved unsuccessful, she 
contacted the police; and finally, Workman's concession that she 
was uncertain regarding the date on which the equipment was 
rented. 
Upon considering all of Workman's testimony, the circuit 
court credited those parts showing that McNeal rented the 
equipment for a period of one week, that the equipment was not 
returned for several months, and that the equipment was valued 
at more than $200.  Given Workman's admitted confusion about the 
date on which McNeal rented the equipment and the evidence 
supporting her testimony that McNeal failed to return the 
equipment for several months, the circuit court rejected 
Workman's statement that McNeal initially rented the equipment 
on September 18, 2008.  We conclude that the circuit court was 
entitled to consider all the evidence and to resolve the 
conflict in the evidence as it did.  See Williams v. 
Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 195, 677 S.E.2d 280, 283 (2009) (in 
making credibility determinations and factual findings, "the 
trial court [i]s entitled to consider all the evidence"). 
"The fact finder, who has the opportunity to see and hear 
the witnesses, has the sole responsibility to determine their 
credibility, the weight to be given their testimony, and the 
 
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inferences to be drawn from proven facts."  Taylor, 256 Va. at 
518, 506 S.E.2d at 314 (emphasis added); accord Hamilton v. 
Commonwealth, 279 Va. 94, 105, 688 S.E.2d 168, 175 (2010).  That 
responsibility lies with the fact finder because "[t]his 
[C]ourt[,] sitting as an appellate court, and knowing nothing of 
the evidence or of the witness, except as it appears on the 
paper, feels itself very incompetent to decide on the 
credibility of the testimony."  Brown v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. (2 
Leigh) 832, 841 (1830).  Furthermore, a fact finder's 
evaluations of credibility are not limited to choosing between 
competing accounts offered by different witnesses, see, e.g., 
Hamilton, 279 Va. at 105, 688 S.E.2d at 174-75, but often 
include, as in this case, resolving conflicts in a single 
witness' testimony, accepting that part of the testimony it 
deems credible and rejecting the portion it deems incredible.  
See Hopkins v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 280, 293, 337 S.E.2d 264, 
272 (1985). 
In sum, we conclude that a "rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.  The circuit 
court's judgment finding McNeal guilty of violating Code § 18.2-
 
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118 thus was not "plainly wrong or without evidence to support 
it."2  Code § 8.01-680. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals of Virginia and reinstate McNeal's conviction 
for violating Code § 18.2-118. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
                     
2 The specific question whether the evidence was sufficient 
to establish criminal intent is not before us.  Although McNeal 
raised the issue at trial, he did not challenge that aspect of 
the circuit court's judgment on brief either in the Court of 
Appeals or in this Court. 
 
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