Case Title: Com. v. Perez

Citation: 381 Pa. Super. 149, 553 A.2d 79

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1988-12-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
381 Pa. Superior Ct. 149 (1988) 553 A.2d 79 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Erinaldo PEREZ, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted July 5, 1988. Filed December 27, 1988. Reargument Denied February 14, 1989. *150 Michael S. Gingerich, Lewistown, for appellant. Andrew B. Kramer, Assistant District Attorney, Harrisburg, for Com., appellee. Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and WATKINS, JJ. BROSKY, Judge: This is a consolidated appeal from an order denying relief from a PCHA petition filed regarding charges at three different docket numbers. Appellant pled guilty to various drug charges among them were two conspiracy charges, one to distribute marijuana and another to distribute cocaine. Appellant alleges, among other things, that it was error to sentence him on both conspiracy charges as under 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(c) he was guilty of only one conspiracy. We agree and reverse the order appealed from to the extent it affirms sentences on both conspiracy charges. Section 903(c) of the Crimes Code states: In Commonwealth v. Lore, 338 Pa.Super. 42, 487 A.2d 841 (1984), a panel of this Court expounded upon this section of the Code saying: The opinion of the trial court with regard to this issue focused mostly on the double jeopardy challenge which appellant raised along with the section 903(c) challenge. The trial court states: The reference to the Blockburger test might be useful to an inquiry of whether there has been a prima facie commission of separate offenses, yet its utility in determining whether there was more than one conspiracy must be questioned. The trial court's statement itself is rather conclusory as to whether there were two separate agreements to engage in the selling of the contraband. The court, in essence, simply concluded: *153 However, a review of the record casts doubt as to whether this would in fact have been proven, especially when the criminal complaint itself appears to insufficiently allege separate conspiracies: The acts committed by the accused were: The second paragraph mirrors the above with the exception of the specification of cocaine as the controlled substance and the specification of a few different participants than the first, all of which, upon review of the Affidavit of probable cause, appear to have been connected with the Walters and not with the appellant. Nothing in the complaint tends to establish separate conspiracies to distribute cocaine and marijuana or tends to disprove that a single conspiratorial relationship existed from which both marijuana and cocaine were distributed to the Walters in Pennsylvania. The Affidavit of probable cause referred to in the complaint, despite having 151 paragraphs and being over 30 pages in length, is further barren of these allegations and instead tends to support appellant's position. The lone paragraph of that document relevant to appellant's distribution of drugs reads: The rest of the affidavit details the Walters' dealings with various other individuals. Appellant is depicted as doing no more than supplying, along with the other three Miami residents, cocaine and marijuana to the Walters, who in turn dealt the drugs to others. Quite incongruously, the Walters' involvement with others, particularly the Walters' sale of drugs to others, is used by the Commonwealth, and alluded to by the trial court, to attempt to show separate conspiracies by appellant. Undoubtedly, many separate offenses were committed during the course of the conspiratorial relationship. However, under our law this does not automatically lead to a determiniation that there was more than one conspiracy or conspiratorial relationship. One receives the impression that had an individual called the appellant and ordered five different types of drugs from him which the appellant then agreed to sell, the Commonwealth would argue that there were five conspiracies committed. We do not read section 903(c) in that manner. Our own review of the record leads us to conclude that nothing presented by the Commonwealth tends to establish two separate conspiracies but rather instead tends to establish a single conspiratorial relationship from which two contraband substances were distributed to the Walters in Pennsylvania. Under Lore and Section 903(c) we would conclude that only one sentence is authorized under the facts alleged. We note that although appellant was sentenced to a maximum period of incarceration consistent with the maximum allowable, the minimum period was less than that statutorily authorized. Because our review of the record *155 makes it difficult to determine whether the sentencing court would impose the same sentence for a single conspiracy as that imposed for one of the two conspiracies, we will vacate the sentence imposed on both and remand for imposition of sentence on a single conspiracy count. See, Commonwealth v. Ford, 315 Pa.Super. 281, 461 A.2d 1281 (1983). The order appealed from is reversed to the extent it denies the relief of vacating the conspiracy sentences. The order is affirmed in all other respects. Remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion.[1] ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is hereby ordered and adjudged by this Court that the PCHA Orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County are affirmed in part, reversed in part and cases are remanded for resentencing. [1] We do not reach the other issues raised by appellant, which deal with withdrawal of the guilty plea, because appellant has requested relief in the alternative, either withdrawal of the plea or vacation of one of the conspiracy sentences. However, our decision today should not be construed to prejudice appellant's right to appeal this issue after a valid sentence is imposed by the trial court.