Case Title: Vicars v. First Virginia Bank

Citation: 

Docket Number: 941447

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1995-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
DELORES B. VICARS, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 941447 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
                                        June 9, 1995 
FIRST VIRGINIA BANK- 
MOUNTAIN EMPIRE, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WISE COUNTY 
 
J. Robert Stump, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether general language in a 
deed was sufficient to convey mineral interests in a tract of 
land which was not specifically identified in the deed. 
 
This controversy arose when Dennis Barnette, trading as 
Kodiak Mining Company (Kodiak), removed coal from a 71.75-acre 
tract of land in Wise County.  Kodiak paid First Virginia Bank-
Mountain Empire (the Bank) $189,799.59 in production royalties 
based on the Bank's claim that it owned the mineral interests 
in the tract.  The Bank's ownership claim was disputed by the 
appellants, Delores B. Vicars, June B. Belcher, Mickey B. 
Hicks, John D. Baker, Jr., and Eva A. Baker (the Baker family). 
 The Baker family maintained that the Bank had only a one-half 
interest in the tract's mineral rights and that they owned the 
other one-half interest.  The Baker family filed suit against 
Kodiak and the Bank, alleging that the coal was removed without 
the Baker family's permission and seeking damages for 
intentional trespass and waste.
1
                     
    
1The Baker family originally sought an injunction to stop the 
mining of the coal but, on learning that the mining had 
terminated, the request for an injunction was withdrawn.  The 
trial court then granted the Baker family's motion to transfer 
the case to the law side of the court. 
 
 
 
 
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Prior to trial, Kodiak and the Bank filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment on the issue of damages.  The trial 
court granted the motion, holding that the Baker family 
consented to the mining of the coal and agreed to the royalty 
rate paid by Kodiak mining.  Based on this holding, the Baker 
family's potential damages were limited to damages based on 
their claimed ownership interest only:  fifty percent of the 
royalties paid by Kodiak mining for the removal of the coal 
from the disputed tract, calculated to be $94,899.79. 
 
The case proceeded to trial on the issue of the parties' 
ownership interests in the 71.75-acre tract.  The trial court, 
citing Amos v. Coffey, 228 Va. 88, 320 S.E.2d 335 (1984), 
concluded that a 1923 deed from J.L. Litz and his wife (J.L.), 
the Baker family's predecessor in title, to A.Z. Litz (A.Z.), a 
predecessor in title to the Bank, conveyed J.L.'s interest in 
the 71.75-acre tract to A.Z.  Therefore, the trial court held 
that the Baker family had no interest in the mineral rights of 
the tract and was not entitled to any damages stemming from the 
removal of coal from that tract.  The Baker family appealed, 
assigning error to the trial court's decisions on both the 
ownership and damages issues.  We consider these assignments in 
order. 
 
I. 
 
The ownership rights at issue initially depend on the 
construction of the 1923 deed.  The Bank claims that the trial 
 
 
 
 
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court correctly held that this deed conveyed the mineral 
interests of J.L. in the 71.75-acre tract to A.Z. and, as 
successor in title to A.Z., the Bank now owns those interests. 
 The Baker family asserts that the 1923 deed did not convey any 
interests in the 71.75-acre tract but that J.L. retained those 
interests until he died intestate in 1940.  The Bank's interest 
in the mineral rights in the tract, the Baker family contends, 
did not arise until 1948, when J.L.'s daughter and sole 
surviving heir, Mabel Litz Baker, and her husband executed a 
deed conveying a one-half undivided interest in the mineral 
rights of the 71.75-acre tract to A.Z. Litz, Jr. 
 
In construing deeds, the intent of the grantor should be 
ascertained through the words used in the conveyance, where 
possible.  Trailsend Land Co. v. Virginia Holding Corp., 228 
Va. 319, 325-26, 321 S.E.2d 667, 670 (1984).  The trial court 
held that the 1923 deed was not ambiguous and neither party 
contends otherwise.  Where the terms of a deed are not 
ambiguous, we "look no further than the four corners of the 
instrument under review."  Id. at 325, 321 S.E.2d at 670.  
Therefore, we confine our review to the provisions of the 1923 
deed. 
 
The 1923 deed stated, in pertinent part, that J.L. 
conveyed "all of those certain tracts pieces or parcels of land 
lying and being situate in the county of Wise, Virginia, and 
more particularly bound and described as follows."  This 
 
 
 
 
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language was followed by seven paragraphs, each of which 
described certain tracts of land by deed book reference and 
acreage.  The referenced deeds were those used to convey the 
property to a predecessor in title, Milburn Gilliam.  The 
disputed 71.75-acre tract was not among those tracts listed and 
described in the deed. The seventh paragraph of the deed, in 
addition to describing a parcel of land conveyed to Gilliam by 
W.J. Ireson and his wife, contained the following language: 
 
all the descriptions in the above given references 
are made a part and embodied as a part of this 
conveyance, and the intention of this deed is to 
convey all the rights, title and interest acquire[d] 
by [J.L.] from the wife and heirs of Milburn 
Gilliam's estate. 
 
 
The Bank argues that the general language in the seventh 
paragraph referring to the conveyance of all the rights, title, 
and interest acquired from Gilliam included J.L.'s mineral 
rights in the 71.75-acre tract even though that tract was not 
specifically described or mentioned in the deed.  This 
construction of the deed's language, the Bank contends, is 
supported by the decision in Amos v. Coffey, 228 Va. at 94, 320 
S.E.2d at 338. 
 
The deed in Amos conveyed specific parcels, identified by 
metes and bounds descriptions, "in or near the Town of Gretna" 
in Pittsylvania County.  Id. at 90, 320 S.E.2d at 336.  After 
specifically identifying the parcels in Gretna, the deed 
provided: 
 
 
It is the intention of the parties of the first 
part to convey to the party of the second part all 
 
 
 
 
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the real estate which they now own in Pittsylvania 
County, Virginia, including but not restricted to the 
lands described above. 
 
Id. 
 
 
We held that the deed not only conveyed the identified 
parcels, but also conveyed the grantors' one-twelfth undivided 
interest in a farm located near Gretna, even though the farm 
was not specifically identified in the deed.  The transfer of 
this property was accomplished by the general words of 
conveyance contained in the deed.  Id. at 94, 320 S.E.2d at 
338. 
 
Amos, however, is inapposite because there are significant 
differences between the intention and conveyance language in 
the two deeds.  Not only does the Amos deed recite the 
intention of the grantors to convey "all" interests in land in 
Pittsylvania County, it unequivocally expands the conveyance to 
property beyond that specifically described in the deed.  No 
analogous language is found in the deed at issue here. 
 
A second and equally significant difference between Amos 
and the instant case is found in the language of conveyance.  
The Amos deed conveyed parcels located "in or near" Gretna.  In 
Amos, the Court found that the property identified by the metes 
and bounds descriptions exhausted the class of property to be 
conveyed "in" Gretna.  The general language in the deed 
identified a second class of property to be conveyed "near" 
Gretna.  The grantors' interest in the farm in Pittsylvania 
 
 
 
 
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County located "near" Gretna was part of the second class of 
property conveyed.  Id. at 94, 320 S.E.2d at 338. 
 
In the instant case, there is only one class of property 
involved:  "all of those certain tracts § of land lying § in 
the county of Wise, Virginia, and more particularly bound and 
described as follows" (emphasis added).  The identification of 
the 11 specific tracts of land exhausted the class of tracts 
"in the county of Wise, Virginia and more particularly bound 
and described," as the Bank notes.  However, unlike Amos, in 
which two classes of property were involved, the 1923 deed in 
this case does not identify any other class of property through 
which the mineral rights in the disputed tract could have been 
conveyed. 
 
Furthermore, the phrase "all the rights, title and 
interest acquire[d] § from the wife and heirs of Milburn 
Gilliam's estate" does not describe the physical property 
conveyed but rather involves the nature of the ownership 
rights, or estate, conveyed.  J.L. could convey mineral rights 
only, not a fee simple interest. 
 
Considering the language used, we conclude that J.L. did 
not convey his interest in the 71.75-acre tract to A.Z. by the 
1923 deed.  The grantor's intention, as reflected in the 1923 
deed, was to convey all his interest acquired from the wife and 
heirs of Gilliam's estate in those tracts in Wise County which 
were specifically described in the deed.  Accordingly, the 
 
 
 
 
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Bank's interest in the mineral rights of the 71.75-acre tract 
is limited to the one-half undivided interest acquired by its 
predecessors in title through the 1948 deed from Mabel Litz 
Baker. 
 
 
II. 
 
The Baker family also assigns error to the trial court's 
action in granting the Bank's motion for partial summary 
judgment limiting damages to one-half of the mining royalties 
paid by Kodiak.  The Baker family contends that "material facts 
were in dispute concerning the issue of trespass or waste 
damage."  We disagree. 
 
As the basis for granting the motion for partial summary 
judgment, the trial court relied on a January 6, 1992 letter 
from the Baker family's attorney to the Bank's attorney.
2  That 
letter stated, in part, "my clients do not wish to impede the 
mining on the tract while these title questions are being 
reviewed."  Kodiak received a copy of this letter. 
 
The Baker family states on brief that they agreed that 
they "would not stop efforts to strip mine the tract," but 
qualified that agreement by limiting it to "a short time while 
counsel for the Bank provided proof that the Baker family did 
 
    
2This correspondence was attached to the Baker family's 
response to the Bank's request for admissions.  These responses 
were before the trial court for determination of the motion for 
partial summary judgment. 
 
 
 
 
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not own a one-half interest in the subject mineral tract."  
This limitation, however, is not contained or reflected in the 
January 6, 1992 letter, and subsequent correspondence between 
counsel for the Bank and the Baker family contained no 
reference to, or indication of, any change in the position 
taken in the letter regarding the mining operation.  The focus 
of the entire correspondence concerned the title dispute.  
Furthermore, the Baker family does not claim that they told the 
Bank or Kodiak that they had changed their position and wanted 
the mining operations terminated. 
 
We agree with the trial court that the statement in the 
January 6, 1992 letter, as a matter of law, constituted consent 
by the Baker family to the mining operations.  It is axiomatic 
that a party cannot collect damages based on theories of waste 
or trespass when the party consented to the very actions 
alleged to constitute trespass or waste.  See, e.g., Cooper v. 
Horn, 248 Va. 417, 423, 448 S.E.2d 403, 406 (1994)("trespass is 
an unauthorized entry"); Chosar Corp. v. Owens, 235 Va. 660, 
664, 370 S.E.2d 305, 308 (1988)(mining without consent of all 
co-tenants constituted waste).  Accordingly, any dispute in 
material facts relating to the issue of trespass or waste 
damages was irrelevant. 
 
For the reasons stated, we will reverse the trial court's 
judgment denying the Baker family's claim to an undivided one-
half interest in the minerals and mineral rights on the 71.75-
 
 
 
 
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acre tract, affirm the judgment with respect to the damage 
issue, and enter final judgment. 
                                            Affirmed in part,
                                            reversed in part,
 
and final judgment.