Case Title: Tirado v. Bd. of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies & Bonds

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11818

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-07-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11818 
 
ALFREDO TIRADO  vs.  BOARD OF APPEAL ON MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY 
POLICIES AND BONDS (and two consolidated cases1). 
 
 
 
Norfolk.  Worcester.  Suffolk.     May 5, 2015. - July 28, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds.  
Motor Vehicle, License to operate.  License.  Registrar of 
Motor Vehicles, Revocation of license to operate.  Carrier, 
License.  Practice, Criminal, Conviction, Admission to 
sufficient facts to warrant finding, Continuance without a 
finding. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
January 3, 2013. 
 
 
The case was heard by Kenneth J. Fishman, J., on a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
February 28, 2013. 
 
 
The case was heard by Robert B. Gordon, J., on a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
                     
 
1 John J. Kelly vs. Registrar of Motor Vehicles & another; 
and Scott Channing vs. Registrar of Motor Vehicles & another. 
 
2 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
March 28, 2013. 
 
 
The case was heard by Judith Fabricant, J., on a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
After consolidation of the cases in the Appeals Court, the 
Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct 
appellate review. 
 
 
David R. Marks, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendants. 
 
Dana Alan Curhan for Scott Channing. 
 
Ryan E. Alekman, for Alfredo Tirado, was present but did 
not argue. 
 
Cornelius J. Madera, III, for John J. Kelly, was present 
but did not argue. 
 
William A. Quade, for United States Department of 
Transportation Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  In these consolidated appeals, we are asked to 
determine if a defendant's admission to sufficient facts to 
warrant a finding of guilty and a judge's continuance of the 
case without a finding (CWOF) constitute a "conviction" as that 
term is defined in G. L. c. 90F, § 1,2 governing the licensure of 
commercial drivers.  Judges in the Superior Court determined 
that it did not and vacated the decisions of the Board of Appeal 
on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds (board) upholding 
the suspension of the commercial drivers' licenses (CDLs) at 
issue by the registrar of motor vehicles (registrar).  The board 
                     
 
2 "Conviction," as defined in G. L. c. 90F, § 1, includes "a 
determination that a person has violated or failed to comply 
with the law in a court of original jurisdiction." 
 
3 
 
and the registrar appealed.  The Appeals Court consolidated the 
three appeals, and we granted the parties' joint application for 
direct appellate review.  As we explain, we vacate the decisions 
of the Superior Court and enter judgment in favor of the board.3 
 
1.  Background.  The facts are undisputed.  The specific 
details of each of the three appeals are not material to 
answering the question before us.  Rather, it is enough to say 
that each plaintiff was licensed as a commercial driver and at 
some time was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor.  Each plaintiff 
subsequently admitted to sufficient facts to warrant a finding 
of guilty, and the judge accepting each admission continued the 
case without a finding of guilty.  Consequently, the registrar, 
after determining that the admission and CWOF were a 
"conviction" as defined in G. L. c. 90F, § 1, suspended the CDL 
of each plaintiff pursuant to G. L. c. 90F, § 9 -- in two cases, 
for life because the new offense was a subsequent offense. 
 
Each plaintiff appealed the decision of the registrar to 
the board.  The board, after a hearing, affirmed each decision 
of the registrar.  Each plaintiff then sought judicial review of 
the board's decision under G. L. c. 30A, § 14.  Judges of the 
                     
 
3 We acknowledge the letter submitted by the United States 
Department of Transportation Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration in lieu of an amicus brief. 
 
4 
 
Superior Court determined that a CWOF is not a conviction as 
that term is used in G. L. c. 90F and vacated the board's 
decision in each case. 
 
2.  Statutory framework.  a.  The 1986 act.  General Laws 
c. 90F is the Legislature's adoption of the Federal Commercial 
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, Title XII of Pub. L. No. 99-
570, codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 31301 et seq. (1986 act).  Enacted 
to address public concern over the substantial social and 
economic losses associated with accidents involving large trucks 
and buses, the purpose of the 1986 act was to improve the safety 
of commercial motor vehicle operations.  52 Fed. Reg. 20,574, 
20,575 (1987).  Congress identified two major issues it sought 
to address:  (1) the practice by commercial drivers of obtaining 
licenses from multiple States, which facilitated the avoidance 
of consequences of license suspensions and revocations, and (2) 
a lack of uniformity or vitality in licensing procedures, 
qualifications, and evaluations among the States.  Id. at 
20,576. 
 
To ensure uniformity in the application of the 1986 act 
among the several States, it requires Federal highway funds be 
withheld from a particular State if that State fails to comply 
substantially with a number of stated requirements.  49 U.S.C. 
§§ 31311(a), 31314 (2012).  One of these requirements involves 
the consequences of operating while under the influence of 
5 
 
alcohol (OUI).  States are required to suspend the CDLs of those 
convicted of OUI or who refuse to be tested on suspicion of OUI.  
In the case of a first conviction or refusal, the suspension is 
for one year.  49 C.F.R. § 383.51 (Table 1) (2013).  A second 
conviction or refusal results in a lifetime disqualification or 
revocation.  Id. 
 
"Conviction" is defined very broadly in the Federal 
regulations to include not only an "adjudication of guilt" but 
also a determination by an appropriate authority, judicial or 
administrative, that "a person has violated or failed to comply 
with the law."  49 C.F.R. § 383.5 (2013), added by 53 Fed. Reg. 
39,044, 39,051 (1998).  Under this definition of "conviction," a 
person "referred to a remedial program as a substitute for the 
imposition of a penalty, fine, or other sanction" would be 
subject to a CDL suspension.  53 Fed. Reg. at 39,047. 
 
b.  The antimasking amendment.  Despite these efforts, 
Congress in 1999 determined that safety on the roads could be 
improved further.  It enacted the Motor Carrier Safety 
Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-159, 113 Stat. 1748 
(1999 act).  The 1999 act increased the range of offenses that 
could disqualify a person from maintaining a CDL.  For example, 
before 1999 only convictions of operating commercial vehicles 
while under the influence of alcohol resulted in 
disqualification.  See 100 Stat. 3207-177 to 3207-178.  Under 
6 
 
the 1999 act, convictions of operating noncommercial motor 
vehicles under the influence of alcohol are now included.  See 
113 Stat. 1759.  Additionally, States are explicitly forbidden 
from disguising or masking the recording of convictions for such 
offenses.  49 U.S.C. § 31311(a)(19) (2012).  The corresponding 
regulations state that the "State must not mask, defer 
imposition of judgment, or allow an individual to enter into a 
diversion program that would prevent a . . . conviction" from 
appearing in the national database.  49 C.F.R. § 384.226 (2013), 
added by 67 Fed. Reg. 49,742, 49,762 (2002) and amended by 76 
Fed. Reg. 26,895 (2011).  In promulgating this regulation, the 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) explained 
that the antimasking provision was "intended to prohibit States 
not only from masking convictions, but also from using diversion 
programs or any other disposition that would defer the listing 
of a guilty verdict on a CDL driver's record. . . .  The FMCSA 
urges State Executive Branch agencies to work with the State 
Judicial Branch to eliminate the practice of masking.  This 
practice allows unsafe drivers to continue to pose a risk to 
other motorists by allowing their continued operation on the 
nation's highways."  67 Fed. Reg. at 49,749-49,750. 
 
c.  State adoption.  The Legislature first adopted the 1986 
act in 1990 and codified it as G. L. c. 90F.  St. 1990, c. 246, 
§ 2.  In response to Congress's 1999 efforts, the Legislature 
7 
 
further amended c. 90F in 2006.  St. 2006, c. 119, §§ 2-7.  The 
2006 amendment included the new antimasking provision and 
specifically referenced 49 C.F.R. § 384.226.  St. 2006, c. 119, 
§ 19.  Additionally, regulations promulgated by the registrar 
specifically incorporate all the provisions of 49 C.F.R. Part 
383.  540 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.06(9) (1999). 
 
3.  Standard of review.  The issue raised in this case is 
one of statutory interpretation -- whether an admission to 
sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty and CWOF is a 
determination that a person "has violated or failed to comply 
with the law" within the meaning of "conviction" as that term 
appears in G. L. c. 90F, § 1.  This question does not involve 
any gaps in the statute to which the board needs to apply its 
specialized knowledge relating to motor vehicles and driving 
rules to give the statute meaning.  The interpretive question 
here is purely legal and we review it de novo because "[t]he 
duty of statutory interpretation rests ultimately with the 
courts."  Souza v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 462 Mass. 227, 
229-230 (2012), and cases cited. 
 
4.  Discussion.  We arrive then at the heart of the 
question in the case before us.  The board4 argues that the 
                     
 
4 For the purpose of clarity in the remainder of this 
opinion, we refer to the board and registrar collectively as the 
board. 
 
8 
 
plaintiffs' admissions to sufficient facts to warrant a finding 
of guilty and CWOFs are convictions for the purposes of c. 90F.  
Relying primarily on our decision in Souza, supra at 235, the 
Superior Court reasoned that an admission to sufficient facts 
and CWOF were not a "determination that a person has violated or 
failed to comply with the law."  G. L. c. 90F, § 1. 
 
In Souza, we considered whether an admission to sufficient 
facts and CWOF were a "conviction" for the purposes of G. L. 
c. 90, § 24 (1) (f) (1).  Souza, 462 Mass. at 227-228.  Under 
the terms of the version of that statute at issue in Souza, "a 
person shall be deemed to have been convicted if he pleaded 
guilty or nolo contendere or was found or adjudged guilty by a 
court of competent jurisdiction, whether or not he was placed on 
probation without sentence or under a suspended sentence or the 
case was placed on file . . . ."  G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (d).  
There the board argued that, although an admission to sufficient 
facts was not explicitly included in the definition of 
"convicted" in § 24 (1) (d), the statute's purpose of increasing 
the penalties of repeat drunk driving required a liberal reading 
of the statutory language.  See Souza, supra at 231.  We 
rejected this argument and stated that the failure of the 
definition of "convicted" to include an admission to sufficient 
facts was fatal to the board's argument when the Legislature had 
9 
 
included that specific term elsewhere in the same statute.  Id. 
at 232. 
 
The plaintiffs note that after our decision in Souza, the 
Legislature amended G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (d), to include an 
admission to sufficient facts within the definition of 
"convicted."  St. 2012, c. 139, § 98.  They urge that a similar 
result should follow in this case.  While we agree that 
legislative action specifically including an admission to 
sufficient facts in the definition of "conviction" in G. L. 
c. 90F would definitively settle the question before us, the 
reasoning in Souza when applied to the statute here leads us to 
the opposite conclusion from that of Souza because the 
definition of conviction in G. L. c. 90F, § 1, is broader than 
in G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (d).  Under G. L. c. 90F, § 1, the 
definition of "conviction" encompasses an admission to 
sufficient facts and CWOF. 
 
An "admission to sufficient facts" means an admission to 
facts sufficient to warrant a finding of guilty.  Commonwealth 
v. Duquette, 386 Mass. 834, 838 (1982).  "An admission to 
sufficient facts is very much like an Alford plea or a plea of 
nolo contendere, in that the defendant does not explicitly admit 
guilt."  Reporters' Notes to Rule 12, Mass. Ann. Laws Court 
Rules, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 1490 (LexisNexis 2014).  
The plaintiffs argued -- and the Superior Court agreed -- that 
10 
 
an admission to sufficient facts is not "a determination that a 
person has violated or failed to comply with the law" because 
the defendant admitting the facts is not admitting his guilt.  
G. L. c.  90F, § 1. 
 
The plaintiffs further contend that no judicial 
determination takes place at all because the disposition of a 
CWOF merely continues the case to a future date.  Successful 
fulfilment of the probationary conditions during the pendency of 
the continuance results in the dismissal of the complaint or 
indictment.  Commonwealth v. Pyles, 423 Mass. 717, 722-723 
(1996).  Violation of the probationary conditions of a CWOF does 
not result in the automatic imposition of the stayed sentence 
but instead "may ripen into an adjudication of guilt and 
imposition of sentence" (emphasis added).  Commonwealth v. 
Villalobos, 437 Mass. 797, 801 (2002).  The fact that a criminal 
defendant avoids either admitting his or her guilt or having a 
court adjudicate his or her guilt under this practice is the 
linchpin to the plaintiffs' argument that no determination that 
a person has violated or failed to comply with the law has 
occurred. 
 
We do not think the issue of admission or adjudication of 
the guilt of a defendant is dispositive of the question whether 
a determination has been made that a person has violated or 
failed to comply with the law.  Such an argument acknowledges 
11 
 
only the form of the end result of the practice without regard 
for its operation and purpose.  The mutual benefits of a 
pretrial disposition of charges are well known and do not need 
to be repeated here.  See Duquette, 386 Mass. at 843.  The 
procedure by which a court allows the case against a defendant 
to be continued without a finding of guilty necessarily requires 
that the defendant admit to sufficient facts to warrant such a 
finding -- that is to say, the facts that would demonstrate that 
he or she had violated or failed to comply with the law. 
 
An admission to sufficient facts to warrant a finding of 
guilty "triggers the same safeguards required when a defendant 
offers to plead guilty."  Commonwealth v. Lewis, 399 Mass. 761, 
763 (1987).  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (a) (2), (a) (3), as 
appearing in 470 Mass. 1501 (2015).  "The judge shall conduct a 
hearing to determine the voluntariness of a plea or admission 
and the factual basis of the charge" (emphasis added).  Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 12 (c) (5), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1511 (2004).  The 
rule further describes the procedures to be followed for a plea 
or admission to sufficient facts.  Commentators and the 
established practice in the District Court indicate that a judge 
would not and should not accept an admission to sufficient facts 
unless that admission had a factual basis to support a finding 
of guilt of the crime charged.  See E.B. Cypher, Criminal 
Practice and Procedure § 24:76 (4th ed. 2014).  Indeed, it is 
12 
 
illogical to conclude that a defendant could receive the 
disposition of a CWOF without first admitting to sufficient 
facts that satisfied the judge that he or she was guilty.  See 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 28 (b), 378 Mass. 898 (1979).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Norrell, 423 Mass. 725, 727 n.5 (1996). 
 
The reason an admission to sufficient facts triggers the 
same safeguards as a guilty plea is that a violation of the 
conditions of a CWOF may result in the immediate adjudication of 
guilt and imposition of sentence without requiring the 
Commonwealth to offer any further evidence of the underlying 
offense.  See Commonwealth v. Tim T., 437 Mass. 592, 596-597 
(2002).  See also Commonwealth v. Mahadeo, 397 Mass. 314, 316 
(1986).  If a judge can enter a finding of guilty and impose 
sentence without taking any further evidence of the underlying 
offense after a violation of the conditions of a CWOF, it 
follows that an implicit determination has been made that the 
defendant "has violated or failed to comply with the law."  We 
therefore conclude that a CWOF falls within the definition of 
"conviction," as that term is used in G. L. c. 90F, § 1. 
 
Our analysis is bolstered by the statutory scheme itself.  
The Legislature, in enacting c. 90F, required that it be 
"liberally construed to promote the public health, safety and 
welfare" and emphasized that "[t]o the extent that the 
provisions of this chapter conflict with the general operator 
13 
 
licensing provisions of [G. L. c. 90, which was the chapter at 
issue in Souza], this chapter prevails" (emphasis added).  St. 
1990, c. 246, § 1.  The Legislature is clearly acting within its 
powers when it defines a general term beyond its ordinary 
meaning for use in a particular piece of legislation.  See 
Kerins v. Lima, 425 Mass. 108, 114-115 (1997).  The definition 
of "conviction" at issue here compels the result we reach.  See 
G. L. c. 90F, § 1 ("As used in this chapter . . .").  Finally, 
the specific reference in G. L. c. 90F, § 13, to 49 C.F.R. 
§ 384.226 and the complete incorporation of 49 C.F.R. Part 383 
by 540 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.06(9) (1999) clearly demonstrate the 
intent of the Legislature to fully comply with the Federal 
framework and its interpretations, which would arrive at the 
same conclusion we have here today. 
 
5.  Conclusion.  For the reasons stated, we hold that an 
admission to sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty and 
the continuance of the case without a finding of guilty is a 
"conviction" as that term is defined in G. L. c. 90F, § 1.  
Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Superior Court in 
each case and enter judgment for the board. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.