Case Title: Lewis v. Bowers

Citation: 392 S.W.2d 819

Docket Number: 

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1965-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
392 S.W.2d 819 (1965) William Eugene LEWIS, Appellant, v. M.C. BOWERS et al., Appellees. Supreme Court of Tennessee. July 12, 1965. Hampton & Hampton, Elizabethton, for William Eugene Lewis. Dugger, Dugger & Cole, Street, Banks, Merryman & Musick, Allen, Nelson & Bowers, Hallie K. Riner, Charles Crockett, David F. Tucker, Jr., Elizabethton, Green & Green, Johnson City, for M.C. Bowers and others. DYER, Justice. Appellant, William Euguene Lewis (hereinafter referred to as complainant), brought suit against the Appellees, M.C. Bowers, et als (hereinafter referred to as defendants), alleging ownership as a tenant in common of a one-half (1/2) undivided interest in certain real property conveyed to defendants by complainant's grandmother Addie Thomas Lewis, and others. To the bill, defendants filed demurrers which the Chancellor sustained, treating them as one demurrer representing all the numerous *820 defendants. Complainant seasonably perfected his appeal, and the case is here now on demurrer. The ultimate issue for determination is, what interest, if any, complainant has in the realty. For reasons discussed infra, we hold that he possesses no interest whatever therein. At this point, the rather complicated and involved factual and historical background of this controversy should be set out. To facilitate this endeavor, we are attaching as an appendix to this opinion a chart of the family tree of W.S. Thomas, the testator, under whose will the land in controversy passed. Less than ten days before his death on April 12, 1885, W.S. Thomas, hereinafter referred to as the testator, executed his last will and testament. The relevant portions thereof to this lawsuit are the fifth clause and the codicil, which read as follows: Jane Thomas, the testator's widow, dissented from the will. John D. Thomas, one of the testator's three sons, was in effect disinherited under the will and accordingly took no interest in the land here in controversy. Shortly after the testator's death, his son Andrew died intestate, leaving his widow Amanda and one son W.H. Thomas. Complainant's father, W. Fred Lewis, died in 1942, and complainant's grandmother Addie (the testator's only daughter) died on January 18, 1963. In 1891 E.E. Hunter filed suit against Jane Thomas and other interested parties under the will to: (a) obtain the court's approval to sell the realty devised under the testator's will to the Co-operative Town Company (hereafter referred to as Co-op), and (b) obtain an adjudication of what interest the various parties possessed in the land. A decree was rendered on November 18, 1891 which, inter alia, confirmed the proposed sale. Then in 1892 complainant's grandfather (Steven Lewis) and E.E. Hunter filed an original bill in the nature of a bill of review making defendants thereto: Co-op, Jane Thomas, Amanda Thomas, W.H. Thomas, Henderson F. Thomas and Addie Thomas Lewis, all of whom had been parties to the original suit. Also made a party-defendant to the 1892 suit was W. Fred Lewis (complainant's father), who had not been a party to the initial suit. The court held that the *821 1892 bill could be maintained as a bill of review against all the named defendants save W. Fred Lewis and as an original bill as to him. The Chancery Court in 1892 reversed the 1891 decree in two particulars not germane here. The second decree was in all things affirmed by this Court, and thus it merits scrutiny here. The following excerpt is particularly relevant: Some two months after the rendition of the 1892 decree, an indenture was entered into between the Clerk and Master of the Chancery Court (to whom the title had been delivered in escrow) and Co-op whereby the title passed to the latter subject to a lien for the unpaid purchase money. At this point of time, Henderson and Addie were still apparently in their minority. Thus, their shares of the funds were to be "invested in a Judicious manner", as prescribed by the 1892 decree. *822 Subsequently Co-op became insolvent and Watauga Land Company succeeded to its interest. Since Henderson and Addie at this point had not yet received their share of the proceeds of the sale to Co-op, they petitioned the court for permission to "buy in" for the amount due them under their liens. The court acted favorably upon this petition, and in June, 1897 the land was conveyed by Watauga to E.E. Hunter "to be held by him in trust for said Henderson F. Thomas and Ada Lewis under same terms and conditions as provided by said last will and testament of said W.S. Thomas." (Per the deed emphasis supplied.) Thus, although a break in the chain of title apparently occurred, the 1892 decree, which construed the testator's last will and testament, is nonetheless controlling here. This because the conveyance from Watauga to E.E. Hunter was made in trust for Henderson F. Thomas and Addie Thomas Lewis "under same terms and conditions as provided by * * * will * * * of * * * W.S. Thomas." The emphasized portions of the 1892 decree abovequoted find particular relevance here. That decree, inter alia, held that: (1) the minors W.H. Thomas and W. Fred Lewis took and had no interest under the will in the property devised thereunder; (2) the widow of Andrew (Amanda) was entitled to dower; and (3) Andrew's son (W.H. Thomas) succeeded to his father's interest (subject to Amanda's dower rights) by inheritance, and not by purchase. In the fifth clause to his will, the testator made an absolute devise of the realty to his three children after the estate for widow hood to Jane Thomas terminated. In his codicil however, this devise was modified, giving his three children trust estates, the legal title going to his executor E.E. Hunter. What was the testator's purpose in creating the trust? In his own words, it was as follows: ("A)nd this I do as a protection to my said children two of them being of tender years." It has long been the rule in this jurisdiction that a trustee takes only such quantity of interest as the purpose of the trust requires. Smith v. Metcalf, 38 Tenn. (1 Head) 64 (1858); Williamson v. Wickersham, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 52 (1866); Park v. Cheek, 44 Tenn. (4 Cold.) 20 (1867) and First American National Bank v. Cole, 211 Tenn. 213, 364 S.W.2d 875 (1963). Particularly persuasive here is the Cole decision, supra, involving a trust set up by the testatrix for her two daughters. The trust instrument provided that the trustee should pay over one-half of each daughter's share on the date of such daughter's twenty-fifth birthday, with the remainder being payable upon her thirtieth birthday. The testatrix's death came some twenty years subsequent to the execution of the trust instrument, by which time both daughters has attained age thirty. Under these facts, this Court held that the trust had ceased, saying: Just as the purpose of the Cole trust was to protect the two daughters of the testatrix during their years of inexperience and immaturity, so too did the trust here have a like purpose. Indeed, such purpose was expressly declared in the codicil where, after revoking the absolute device, the testator said: "(A)nd this I do as a protection to my said children two of them being of tender years. * * *" *823 Equally relevant here is the Cheek decision, supra, which held that a trustee in whom a legal title is vested takes such an interest therein as the purposes of the trust require, and that as soon as the trust is satisfied the legal estate will vest in the person entitled thereto. In the case at bar, the record is silent on the existence of any duty placed upon the trustee Hunter during this century. Nor does it appear that subsequent to his death, another trustee was appointed. Under these facts, since Addie Thomas Lewis had long since reached her majority, we must assume that the purpose of the trust, i.e., the protection of the minor children, had been satisfied. Thus the legal title vested in Addie upon satisfaction of the trust and accordingly she in fact possessed the power to convey the fee simple to defendants and their predecessors in title. Such a result is in keeping with the 1892 Chancery Court decree (affirmed by this Court) which held as aforesaid that complainant's father, W. Fred Lewis, took and had no interest under the will in the lands devised thereby. Numerous other grounds were alleged in the demurrer below, but due to the disposition of the above issue we find it unnecessary to consider same. Concerning costs, we have previously held that since the taxation thereof is discretionary with the lower courts, we are unable to review their action except under very extraordinary circumstances. State ex rel. Wilson v. Bush, 141 Tenn. 229, 235, 208 S.W. 607 (1918). Thus, since costs of court are a discretionary matter for the court that tries the case to determine and reviewable here only for manifest abuse, it follows that we are not in a position in this case to consider the matter, there being no manifest abuse of discretion below. See T.C.A. 20-1621. Merely because this cause was brought under the pauper's oath does not render this an extraordinary matter. Accordingly we affirm the action of the Chancellor in all respects and assess appellant costs as below assessed.