Case Title: State ex rel. Frank W. Schaefer, Inc. v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 1998-Ohio-324

Docket Number: 19960816

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1998-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE EX REL. FRANK W. SCHAEFER, INC., APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Frank W. Schaefer, Inc. v. Indus. Comm. (1998), ___ Ohio 
St.3d ___.] 
Workers’ compensation — Claim for compensation for asbestos-related death 
allowed — Former employer disputes that decedent’s last injurious 
exposure occurred during his employment, offers newly discovered evidence 
on issue of last injurious exposure, and asks that Industrial Commission 
reopen the death claim pursuant to its continuing jurisdiction under R.C. 
4123.52 — Industrial Commission does not abuse its discretion in refusing 
to reopen the death claim, when. 
(No. 96-816 — Submitted October 12, 1998 — Decided December 30, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 94APD12-1809. 
 
It is undisputed that between 1934 and 1961, Donald G. Preston was heavily 
exposed to asbestos in the course of his employment.  From 1951 through 1961, 
Preston worked for Plibrico Sales & Service, a company succeeded by appellant 
Frank W. Schaefer, Inc. (“FWS”).  For approximately the next twenty years, 
Preston was self-employed, doing residential general repair and maintenance. 
 
In 1989, Preston died of mesothelioma — an asbestos-induced cancer.  His 
widow, appellee-claimant herein, filed a death claim with appellee Industrial 
Commission of Ohio.  A district hearing officer allowed the death claim against 
FWS.  FWS appealed, questioning the conclusion — inherent in the death-claim 
allowance against it — that decedent’s last injurious exposure to asbestos had 
been in FWS’s employ. 
 
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FWS does not dispute that at some point during the administrative appeals, 
it was informed that decedent had kept records with regard to his subsequent self-
employment.  FWS did not request those records at that time. 
 
The district hearing officer’s order was administratively affirmed.  FWS 
retained new legal counsel and appealed to the Franklin County Common Pleas 
Court pursuant to R.C. 4123.512.  During discovery, FWS, for the first time, 
requested production of decedent’s business records.  Widow-claimant promptly 
forwarded those records.  FWS does not dispute that those records — which 
covered decedent’s approximately twenty years of self-employment — contained 
only one reference to asbestos.  That entry, dated August 17, 1962, stated that on 
that date, decedent had replaced one piece of asbestos siding for which he charged 
$16. 
 
It is undisputed that on September 28, 1993, FWS voluntarily dismissed its 
common pleas appeal.  Three days later, it filed a motion with the commission 
requesting that the agency “initiate new proceedings and set this claim for hearing 
on the issue of last injurious exposure and the appropriate employer to be charged 
with this claim.”  That motion was denied on September 12, 1994, since: 
 
“There has been no allegation that a fraud has been committed, nor a 
clerical error or mistake resulting in prejudice to the claimant or the employer.  
Left for consideration under Section 4123.52 is a determination of whether or not 
new or changed circumstances or conditions have occurred since the final order on 
the widow-claimant’s application for death benefits.  The Staff Hearing Officer 
finds that there are no new or changed circumstances or conditions, and no new 
evidence which with due diligence could have been discovered prior to the final 
order. 
 
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“The employer maintains that it should be permitted to reopen the question 
of correct employer.  This is based solely on the existence of hand-written 
business records kept by Donald Preston, deceased.  The employer’s position is 
that those business records indicate that he worked with asbestos products after 
leaving the employ of Frank W. Shaeffer [sic] Company.  Therefore, employer 
states that it was not the last employer with whom the deceased worked where he 
was exposed to asbestos.  Therefore, employer states, it should be relieved of 
responsibility for this claim.  However, a careful reviewing of transcripts of the 
District Hearing Officer’s Hearing on 6/14/94 and the Staff Hearing Officer[‘]s on 
9/12/94 clearly shows that evidence was available. 
 
“According to Mr. Gene Robinson, Controller and Personnel Officer for 
Frank W. Shaeffer [sic], who testified at both hearings, the widow-claimant 
testified that there were business records available.  Employer’s counsel at that 
time commented on the fact that such records did in fact exist.  (District Hearing 
Officer transcript 6/14/94 Pages 5-6, Staff Hearing Officer transcript 9/12/94, 
Pages 7-8.) 
 
“Therefore, the evidence employer now seeks to rely on was available at 
least as early as the Regional Board of Review hearing on 5/7/91.  Claimant’s 
counsel stated at hearing that the evidence was not requested from the widow-
claimant by anyone until much later, after the employer had engaged new counsel.  
When it was requested[,] it was supplied to the employer. 
 
“Since the evidence was available, and the fact that it was available was 
know[n] to the controller of the company and to claimant’s then counsel, there are 
no new facts, circumstances, or conditions, or evidence which could not with 
reasonable diligence have been discovered prior to the final order.  Therefore, the 
 
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employer’s appeal is denied.  The Staff Hearing Officer has no jurisdiction to 
disturb the existing order.” 
 
FWS immediately refiled its appeal with the common pleas court.  It also 
filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
alleging that the commission abused its discretion in refusing to reopen the case.  
The appeals court disagreed and denied the writ.  This cause is now before this 
court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co., L.P.A., David C. Korte, C. Michelle 
Depew and Mary M. Biagioli, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and William J. McDonald, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
 
Samuels & Northrop Co., L.P.A., and Joseph M. Reidy, for appellee 
claimant. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  The payment of compensation for asbestos-related death lies 
with the employer at which claimant experienced his/her “last injurious exposure.”  
R.C. 4123.68(Y).  FWS does not dispute that decedent was exposed to asbestos 
during his employment with FWS.  It does, however, dispute that it was claimant’s 
last injurious exposure.  As such, FWS seeks to force the commission to reopen 
the death claim pursuant to the continuing jurisdiction provisions of R.C. 4123.52.  
FWS’s position is unpersuasive. 
 
R.C. 4123.52 relevantly provides: 
 
“The jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission * * * over each case is 
continuing, and the commission may make such modification or change with 
 
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respect to former findings or orders with respect thereto, as, in its opinion is 
justified.” 
 
Continuing jurisdiction, however, is not unlimited.  State ex rel. B&C 
Machine Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 538, 605 N.E.2d 372.  It can 
be invoked only in certain enumerated situations, one of which is new and 
changed circumstances.  State ex rel. Cuyahoga Hts. Bd. of Edn. v. Johnston 
(1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 132, 12 O.O.3d 128, 388 N.E.2d 1383.  A derivative of this 
requirement is set forth in former Industrial Commission Resolution No. R93-9-
1(B), now Resolution No. R94-1-6(2), which listed the following among the 
permissible grounds for exercising continuing jurisdiction: 
 
“There exists newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not 
have been discovered and filed by the appellant prior to the date of the hearing 
held under Section 4123.511(D) [of the Revised Code].  Newly discovered 
evidence shall be relevant to the issue on appeal but shall not be merely 
corroborative of evidence which was submitted prior to the date of hearing held 
under Section 4123.511(D).” 
 
FWS asserts that decedent’s business records are newly discovered evidence 
which could not have been discovered by due diligence.  We disagree. 
 
FWS does not dispute that it knew during the course of administrative 
proceedings that decedent kept self-employment records and that it did not request 
those records.  Due diligence, at a minimum, required FWS to ask for the records.  
FWS responds that it did not request the records during administrative 
proceedings because widow-claimant “misrepresented” the records, stating that 
they were simply financial records.  This defense fails.  First, widow-claimant did 
not misrepresent the nature of the records.  They were primarily financial records.  
Again, there was only minimal reference to anything regarding asbestos.  Second, 
 
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even if it had been a misrepresentation, it was FWS’s decision to accept widow-
claimant’s description, rather than secure the records and see for itself.  FWS’s 
inaction, under these facts, precludes an assertion of undiscoverability and due 
diligence. 
 
FWS also alludes to former Industrial Commission Resolution No. R93-9-
1(C), which authorized continuing jurisdiction when substantial injustice would 
otherwise result.  This suggestion also lacks merit.  The singular reference to an 
asbestos encounter in the twenty years or so after claimant left FWS seems grossly 
inadequate to support a conclusion that decedent’s last injurious exposure 
occurred during this period of self-employment.  Therefore, there is nothing 
substantially unjust about leaving decedent’s case closed and allowing continued 
assessment against the employer at which decedent had his most recent significant 
exposure to asbestos. 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.