Case Title: Carr v. Kidd

Citation: 

Docket Number: 000475

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2001-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
LESLIE G. CARR, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 000475   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
January 12, 2001 
ROBERT C. KIDD, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
William F. Rutherford, Judge 
 
 
 
This appeal arises from a judgment entered in a suit to 
determine the riparian rights of neighboring landowners.  The 
primary issue is whether the trial court erred in confirming the 
report of a commissioner in chancery, which recommended an 
apportionment of riparian rights based on an approximated 
historic shoreline existing prior to manmade development of the 
perimeter of the parties' properties. 
 
The suit initially involved a riparian rights dispute 
between Robert C. Kidd and Marjorie B. Kidd (collectively, the 
Kidds), and their immediate neighbors to the northwest, Mark S. 
Crowley and Lori Crowley (collectively, the Crowleys).  The lots 
owned by the Kidds and Mark Crowley1 respectively are situated 
along a cove of Tanner's Creek, a tributary of the Lafayette 
River in the City of Norfolk.  The Kidds sought to build a pier 
out into the cove from their lot, to which the Crowleys 
                     
 
1Mark Crowley is the sole owner of the Crowley lot.  His 
wife Lori was named as a party at the request of Mr. Crowley 
objected.  The Kidds commissioned a riparian surveyor, Robert L. 
Taliaferro, to perform a riparian survey of their lot (the 
Taliaferro survey) to help resolve the dispute.  The Taliaferro 
survey indicated that the Kidds were within their riparian 
rights to build the proposed pier, and that the existing pier 
used by the Crowleys encroached on the Kidds' riparian rights. 
 
Thereafter, the Kidds filed a bill of complaint against the 
Crowleys requesting a determination of the parties' respective 
riparian rights and asserting a cause of action against the 
Crowleys for trespass based on the location of the existing 
pier.2  After the suit was filed, the Crowleys commissioned their 
own riparian surveyor, Robert M. Kennedy, to perform a survey 
(the Kennedy survey) of the Crowley and Kidd lots.  The 
delineation of riparian rights in the Kennedy survey was nearly 
identical to that in the Taliaferro survey.3
 
In light of the similarity between the two surveys, the 
Kidds and the Crowleys reached a tentative settlement that would 
have required the Crowleys to remove the existing pier but would 
have ensured that each party had sufficient riparian rights to 
                                                                  
based on her interest in the property by reason of her marriage 
to Mr. Crowley. 
 
2The Kidds later filed an amended bill of complaint naming 
additional parties with a potential interest in the disputed 
riparian rights.  These additional parties are not involved in 
this appeal. 
 
2
construct a pier.  The Crowleys' neighbors to the northeast, 
Leslie G. Carr and Janice N. Kohl (collectively, the Carrs), 
learned of the impending settlement and intervened in the suit 
on the ground that the proposed settlement interfered with the 
Carrs' riparian rights.  The Carrs further alleged that the 
Kennedy survey incorrectly drew riparian lines across a portion 
of the Carrs' property, thereby converting a substantial portion 
of allegedly non-riparian property into a riparian zone 
belonging to Mr. Crowley. 
 
Following the Carrs' intervention, the trial court referred 
the matter to a commissioner in chancery, Philip R. Trapani, Jr.  
At a hearing before the commissioner, the Kidds and the Crowleys 
stipulated to the results of the Kennedy survey.  The Carrs 
argued that the Kennedy survey was incorrect, and they requested 
a different allocation of the parties' riparian rights. 
 
After the hearing, the commissioner filed a report in which 
he recommended that the parties' riparian rights be allocated 
based on the Kennedy survey.  The trial court confirmed the 
commissioner's report and entered a final order allocating the 
parties' riparian rights in accordance with the Kennedy survey. 
 
The record shows that the lots currently owned by the 
parties were part of a residential subdivision that originally 
                                                                  
 
3Attached to this opinion is a diagram adapted from the 
Kennedy survey depicting the properties and their respective 
 
3
was platted and recorded in 1903.  The lots now owned by the 
Carrs (the Carr property) were purchased by their original owner 
in 1904 from the subdivision developer.4  The source deed for the 
Carr property makes reference to the original subdivision plat 
of 1903 (original subdivision plat).  The lot now owned by Mr. 
Crowley (the Crowley property) was purchased by its original 
owner from the developer in 1910.  The source deed for the 
Crowley property references a revised subdivision plat recorded 
in 1908 (revised subdivision plat).  The source deed for the 
Crowley property is also the source deed for the lot now owned 
by the Kidds (the Kidd property), which was part of a larger lot 
originally purchased from the developer in 1910 by one of the 
Kidds' predecessors in title.5
 
In 1939, a concrete bulkhead was constructed along the 
northwestern edge of the Carr property.  In addition to the 
bulkhead, an area of "riprap"6 was placed along the northeastern 
edge and corner of the Carr property.  Samples of sand and 
potash taken from the Kidd property were admitted into evidence 
                                                                  
riparian allocations. 
 
4The Carr property consists of two adjacent lots.  For ease 
of reference, we will refer to the two lots collectively as "the 
Carr property." 
 
5The larger lot had been subdivided before the Kidds 
purchased their property in 1994. 
 
6The Kidds' expert testified that "riprap" is "[g]enerally 
stone and concrete and debris of that nature . . . use[d] as 
backfill and to prevent any more erosion." 
 
4
at the commissioner's hearing as proof that "fill material" had 
been placed behind the bulkhead on the Carr property. 
 
The parties stipulated that the applicable rule for 
apportioning riparian rights is the rule set forth in Groner v. 
Foster, 94 Va. 650, 27 S.E. 493 (1897).  There, the Court 
stated: 
 
A just rule of division is to measure the length of the 
shore and ascertain the portion thereof to which each 
riparian proprietor is entitled; next measure the length of 
the line of navigability, and give to each proprietor the 
same proportion of it that he is entitled to of the shore 
line; and then draw straight lines from the points of 
division so marked for each proprietor on the line of 
navigability to the extremities of his lines on the shore.  
Each proprietor will be entitled to the portion of the line 
of navigability thus apportioned to him, and also to the 
portion of the flats, or land under the water, within the 
lines so drawn from the extremities of his portion of the 
said line to the extremities of his part of the shore. 
 
Id. at 652-53, 27 S.E. at 494.  Our decision in Groner further 
indicates that the "shore line" for purposes of applying the 
above rule is what today is referred to as the mean low water 
(MLW) line.  94 Va. at 656-58, 27 S.E. at 496. 
 
The parties agreed on the proper methodology for measuring 
a current MLW line for the purpose of apportioning riparian 
rights under Groner, and they did not dispute that the Kennedy 
survey shows the correct current MLW line.  The parties also did 
not dispute that the Kennedy survey shows the correct "edge of 
water" line in 1939, as taken from a 1939 harbor chart prepared 
by the United States Army Corps of Engineers Water Department, 
 
5
and that this line is nearly identical to the current MLW line.  
The parties disagreed, however, whether the current MLW line, or 
a historic MLW line existing about the time the lots originally 
were platted and recorded, should be used in making the 
calculation under Groner. 
 
The parties further disagreed on the proper location of a 
historic MLW line.  The Kidds and the Crowleys argued that the 
correct MLW line for making the Groner apportionment is a 
historic MLW line "unaffected by man," namely, a MLW line that 
existed prior to any manmade development affecting the perimeter 
of the properties.  In determining this historic MLW line in 
their separate surveys, both Kennedy and Taliaferro relied on 
the revised subdivision plat.  Although a MLW line is not 
expressly designated on the revised subdivision plat or the 
original subdivision plat, Taliaferro and Kennedy both concluded 
that the MLW line of 1908 could be approximated from the 
information appearing on the revised subdivision plat.  
Taliaferro testified that this MLW line was an unmarked dotted 
line on the revised subdivision plat that roughly follows the 
"straight-line"7 rear lot boundary lines of the properties, and 
that he used this dotted line in making his calculation under 
the Groner rule.  Kennedy did not use this dotted line in making 
 
6
his calculation pursuant to Groner but instead used the 
"straight-line" rear lot boundary lines of the properties, as 
shown on the revised subdivision plat, which closely resembled 
the historic MLW line identified by Taliaferro.  Kennedy used 
these rear lot boundary lines based on his determination that 
they were precise and clearly determined, and were "basically a 
mathematical tie line" along the actual MLW line of 1908. 
 
The approximate MLW line of 1908, as determined by both the 
Kennedy and the Taliaferro surveys, is located substantially 
inland of the current MLW line.  An apportionment of the 
parties' riparian rights under the current MLW line would yield 
different results from an apportionment under the approximate 
MLW line of 1908.  This disparity would result because the 
property dimensions set forth in the source deeds and 
subdivision plats do not extend to the current MLW line, with 
the exception of the northeastern corner of the Carr property.  
Thus, based on the dimensions indicated in the deeds and the 
subdivision plats alone, there is currently an additional 
portion of land between the rear property line of all the 
parties' lots as originally platted and deeded and the current 
MLW line. 
                                                                  
 
7We use the term "straight-line" to describe the fixed lines 
as designated by the original subdivision surveyor and shown on 
the revised subdivision plat and the Kennedy survey. 
 
7
 
The parties agreed that if the Groner rule were applied 
using the current MLW line, the pie-shaped configuration of the 
Crowley property would result in its side lot lines converging 
before reaching the current MLW line.  Also, using this method, 
the side lot lines extending from the Kidd property would nearly 
converge.  Therefore, use of the current MLW line in applying 
the Groner rule would leave the Crowleys with no riparian rights 
and the Kidds with substantially reduced rights. 
 
By contrast, the Kennedy survey depicts that in 1908 no 
additional portion of land existed between the approximate MLW 
line of 1908 and the back line of the parties' properties as 
platted and deeded.  Since that approximate MLW line was farther 
inland than the current MLW line, all the parties would have 
substantial riparian rights if the calculation under Groner were 
made using the MLW line of 1908. 
 
The Kidds and the Crowleys produced testimony from their 
expert witnesses that the additional portion of land shown on 
their surveys exists today because manmade development of the 
perimeter of the parties' properties has moved the MLW line 
seaward since the lots originally were platted and recorded.  
The Kidds and the Crowleys argued that this movement was caused 
by the placement of the concrete bulkhead and "riprap" on the 
Carr property, as well as the placement of fill materials along 
the perimeter of all three properties. 
 
8
 
The Carrs disagreed with this argument and asserted before 
the commissioner that the Kidds and the Crowleys improperly 
relied on the "straight-line" rear lot boundary lines of the 
revised subdivision plat to approximate the MLW line of 1908.  
John F. Hill, Jr., a surveyor who qualified as an expert 
witness, testified that the MLW line of the parties' properties 
is essentially the same today as when the lots originally were 
platted and recorded.  Based on this testimony, the Carrs 
contended that the current MLW line is the proper line for 
purposes of making the calculation under Groner. 
 
Hill based his opinion on a comparison of a "proposed" 1903 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers harbor chart, a 1939 harbor chart 
prepared by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Water Department, 
and the original subdivision plat.  While Hill conceded in his 
testimony that there had been some movement of the MLW line over 
the years, he contended that this movement was only "partially 
caused by development."  Hill did not prepare a survey that 
supported his opinion. 
 
The Carrs also argued that the language in their source 
deed extended their side lot lines to a MLW line that was 
virtually the same in 1904 as it is currently.  They relied on 
the language of their source deed stating that the property was 
conveyed "with all riparian rights on that branch of Tanner's 
Creek bounding them on the North and West."  Thus, the Carrs 
 
9
argued that the courses and distances set forth in the deed 
descriptions merely approximated the true rear boundary of their 
property, which is the MLW line of Tanner's Creek.  The Carrs 
contended that by comparison, the source deed for the Kidd and 
the Crowley properties did not contain express grants of 
riparian rights or indicate that the properties were bounded by 
Tanner's Creek. 
 
In his report, the commissioner concluded that a historic 
MLW line "unaffected by man" is the appropriate MLW line for 
making the Groner apportionment.  The commissioner determined 
that the "straight-line" rear lot boundary lines shown on the 
revised subdivision plat, and depicted on the Kennedy survey, 
best approximated such a MLW line, and that the Kennedy survey's 
apportionment of riparian rights under the approximated MLW line 
of 1908 should be adopted.  In reaching these conclusions, the 
commissioner found that Kennedy used a more appropriate 
methodology that was based on known points, which are fixed and 
are capable of recertification at any time. 
 
The commissioner was not persuaded by Hill's methodology, 
observing that testimony from Kennedy and Taliaferro established 
that the 1903 proposed harbor chart used by Hill was prepared to 
show navigable water, not land boundaries.  Further, Hill 
conceded on cross-examination that his analysis of the case 
relied on whether he had accurately located the Carr house on 
 
10
the 1903 proposed harbor chart.  The commissioner noted, first, 
that Taliaferro testified that the structure identified by Hill 
was not the Carrs' house but an upstream structure, and second, 
that Kennedy testified that the house simply was shown on the 
plat as a general reference point.  Moreover, while the 
commissioner found that Taliaferro and Kennedy had very candid 
demeanors, the commissioner stated that he was left with the 
impression that Hill did not believe his own testimony but 
merely was crafting the best argument for his clients, the 
Carrs. 
 
The commissioner concluded that there was no merit in the 
Carrs' argument that the Kidds and Mr. Crowley lacked riparian 
rights based on the language of the parties' deeds.  The 
commissioner noted that the 1904 source deed for the Carr 
property describes the property by referring to the lot lines of 
the original subdivision plat, and refers to the Carr property's 
dimensions as 150 feet wide by 125 feet deep, fronting on 
Luxembourg Avenue to the west. 
 
The commissioner observed that the language of this source 
deed states that the Carr property includes "all riparian 
rights" extending into Tanner's Creek from the southwest corner 
of the property by a line of North 16 degrees West "as shown by 
a dotted line of the plat above referred to."  The commissioner 
concluded that this deed language designates this riparian line 
 
11
to run from the platted pin placed 125 feet from Luxembourg 
Avenue at the southwest corner of the Carr property.  The 
commissioner stated that this conclusion is evident from the 
original subdivision plat, which shows dotted lines extending 
out from the corners of the three properties of the parties, and 
described these dotted lines as "strikingly similar in 
orientation to the riparian lines on the Kennedy survey." 
 
The commissioner noted that although the current deeds for 
the Kidd and the Crowley properties have quitclaim provisions 
regarding the properties' respective riparian rights, no 
riparian rights have been severed by deed from these properties.  
The commissioner finally concluded that an apportionment based 
on the Kennedy survey better meets "plain principles of justice" 
because such an apportionment gives all the property owners in 
this case rights to the shore and the flats directly in front of 
their properties.  The trial court entered a final order 
apportioning the parties' riparian rights in accordance with the 
commissioner's recommendations. 
 
We consider the Carrs' assignments of error on appeal under 
an established standard of review.  A trial court's order 
approving a commissioner's report will be affirmed unless it is 
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.  Chesapeake 
Builders, Inc. v. Lee, 254 Va. 294, 299, 492 S.E.2d 141, 144 
(1997); Firebaugh v. Hanback, 247 Va. 519, 525, 443 S.E.2d 134, 
 
12
137 (1994).  We accord "great weight" to the factual findings of 
the commissioner that have been confirmed by the trial court 
and, thus, it is not our role to assess either the credibility 
of the witnesses or the probative value to be given to their 
testimony.  Cooper v. Cooper, 249 Va. 511, 518, 457 S.E.2d 88, 
92 (1995). 
 
On appeal, the Carrs first argue that the commissioner's 
use of the approximate MLW line of 1908, rather than the current 
MLW line, violated the Groner rule.  They contend that the 
commissioner improperly assumed that the historic MLW line had 
changed because the Carrs' predecessors in title had placed fill 
materials and a bulkhead on the property. 
 
The Carrs also assert that since their bulkhead lawfully 
was constructed in 1939 inland of the then existing MLW line, 
the commissioner erred in making his calculations under the 
Groner rule based on the approximate MLW line of 1908.  They 
contend that the Kennedy survey adopted by the commissioner is 
further contrary to the Groner rule because the survey allocates 
within Mr. Crowley's riparian zone 639 square feet of the Carrs' 
"dry" land.  We disagree with the Carrs' arguments. 
 
In addressing these arguments, we first observe that the 
law governing the allocation of riparian rights is clear.  A 
riparian owner has a right to the water frontage that belongs by 
nature to his land.  This right includes, among other things, 
 
13
the right to the soil under the water between his land and the 
navigable line of the watercourse.  The riparian owner may erect 
on this soil wharves, piers, or bulkheads for his own use, or 
for public use, subject to such rules as the General Assembly 
may impose for the public's protection.  Langley v. Meredith, 
237 Va. 55, 62, 376 S.E.2d 519, 523 (1989); Cordovana v. Vipond, 
198 Va. 353, 357, 94 S.E.2d 295, 298 (1956); Groner, 94 Va. at 
651, 27 S.E. at 494.  The enjoyment of this right is limited by 
statute such that exercise of the right shall not result in an 
obstruction of navigation or in injury to another's private 
rights.  See Code § 62.1-164. 
 
In conformance with these principles, a riparian owner is 
entitled to have the extent of his rights on the line of 
navigability of the water course determined and marked, along 
with his proper share of the flats, or land under the water, and 
those boundaries defined.  Langley, 237 Va. at 62, 376 S.E.2d at 
523; Groner, 94 Va. at 651-52, 27 S.E. at 494.  The prime object 
of this apportionment "should be to give each proprietor of the 
shore, and as directly in his front as practicable, a parcel of 
land under the water of a width at its outer end upon the line 
of navigability proportioned to that which it has at the inner 
or shore end."  Langley, 237 Va. at 62, 376 S.E.2d at 523 
(quoting Groner, 94 Va. at 652, 27 S.E. at 494). 
 
14
 
Frequent incidences of shore curvature prevent 
apportionment of riparian rights under a fixed rule extending 
out to the line of navigability the divisional lines between the 
owners' properties in the same direction that these lines reach 
the shore.  Langley, 237 Va. at 62, 376 S.E.2d at 523; Groner, 
94 Va. at 652, 27 S.E. at 494.  If the shore line or the line of 
navigability curves, or the divisional property lines approach 
the shore at different angles, projection of these lines in the 
same direction out to the line of navigability would necessarily 
and unjustly cause an encroachment on the riparian rights of the 
several adjoining waterfront owners, and deprive one or more of 
those owners of all access to the navigable part of the 
watercourse.  Langley, 237 Va. at 62-63, 376 S.E.2d at 523; 
Groner, 94 Va. at 652, 27 S.E. at 494.  To account for these 
potential problems, we articulated the rule in Groner, which we 
set forth above. 
 
As these principles governing riparian rights make clear, a 
riparian owner's rights are limited by the water frontage 
belonging by nature to his land.  Langley, 237 Va. at 62, 376 
S.E.2d at 523; Cordovana, 198 Va. at 357, 94 S.E.2d at 298; 
Groner, 94 Va. at 651, 27 S.E. at 494.  Thus, a riparian owner 
gains the benefit of any accretion8 of his property from gradual 
                     
 
8"Accretion" is a broad term referring generally to any 
change in land that is caused by the force of water and that 
 
15
and imperceptible changes caused by natural forces.  Steelman v. 
Field, 142 Va. 383, 387, 128 S.E. 558, 559 (1925).  However, a 
riparian owner may not, by means of lawful development of his 
land, enlarge his riparian rights and advance the division line 
between his riparian zone and the riparian zone of other 
property owners, or otherwise restrict the riparian rights of 
such other property owners.  Lambert's Point Co. v. Norfolk and 
W. Ry. Co., 113 Va. 270, 274, 74 S.E. 156, 158 (1912); see 
Shepheard v. Boggs, 198 Va. 299, 305, 94 S.E.2d 300, 304 (1956). 
 
This rule articulated in Lambert's Point is particularly 
instructive here.  The parties in that case sought an 
apportionment of riparian rights under circumstances in which 
the shoreline of their adjoining properties was irregular and 
curved.  113 Va. at 271, 74 S.E. at 157.  On the waterfront of a 
portion of its land, one party lawfully had "filled in" land and 
built wharves, and sought to have its riparian rights determined 
in accordance with the altered shoreline resulting from the 
"filled in" land.  113 Va. at 273-74, 74 S.E. at 158.  The 
commissioner in chancery to whom the suit was referred 
apportioned the parties' riparian rights by determining the MLW 
line "as if the filling in had not been done."  113 Va. at 274, 
74 S.E. at 158. 
                                                                  
involves an addition to land.  Lynda Lee Butler & Margit 
Livingston, Virginia Tidal and Coastal Law § 3.4, at 62-63 
 
16
 
We approved the methodology of the commissioner and his 
conclusion that an owner's riparian rights cannot be increased 
by that owner's lawful development of its shoreline.  Id.  We 
quoted with approval the commissioner's explanation that under a 
contrary view, "it would lie in the power of one riparian owner, 
by its own voluntary act, which could not be prevented by the 
adjoining owner, to increase its riparian rights, and encroach 
upon the riparian rights of the other adjoining owner to any 
extent."  Id.  Thus, when a property's perimeter has been 
developed, thereby altering the property's shoreline, an 
apportionment of riparian rights under the Groner rule requires 
that those rights be determined as if the perimeter 
improvements, including the placement of fill materials, had not 
been made.  Id.
 
In the present case, the commissioner accepted the 
testimony of Kennedy and Taliaferro that the Carrs' shoreline 
had been altered due to the manmade development of the perimeter 
of the property.  Both experts testified that there were fill 
materials behind the bulkhead and the riprap on the Carrs' 
property.  Taliaferro stated that these fill materials created 
"an enormous increase in land" behind the bulkhead on the Carr 
property, and he identified the fill materials as including 
                                                                  
(1988). 
 
17
heavy grain sands, rock, stone, and fly ash, which are materials 
"not natural to that area." 
 
In addition, the bulkhead on the Carr property was 
constructed about 38 feet seaward of the 125-foot southern lot 
line terminus designated in the Carrs' source deed.  Taliaferro 
concluded that the portion of the Carr property extending to the 
water beyond its 125-foot southern side lot line consisted 
entirely of fill materials. 
 
Kennedy also testified that the difference between the 
current shoreline of all the parties' properties and their 
shoreline shown on the revised subdivision plat of 1908 is 
largely the result of manmade development.  In addition, Hill, 
the Carrs' expert, conceded on cross-examination that the Carrs' 
shoreline had moved to some degree partly based on the manmade 
development of the property.  Based on this evidence of manmade 
development, we conclude that the commissioner properly 
disregarded the current MLW line for purposes of making his 
apportionment under the Groner rule. 
 
We next conclude that the evidence supports the 
commissioner's use of the approximate MLW line of 1908, as 
reflected by the "straight-line" rear lot boundary lines shown 
on the Kennedy survey.  This methodology is supported by the 
expert testimony of Kennedy and Taliaferro.  The approach also 
is consistent with Code § 28.2-1202 which provides, in material 
 
18
part, that the boundaries of tracts of land lying on the bays, 
rivers, creeks, and shores within the jurisdiction of the 
Commonwealth, and the rights and privileges of the owners of 
such lands, generally extend to the mean low-water mark "but no 
farther."  Id.
 
Kennedy testified that he approximated the MLW line of 1908 
after examining both the original and the revised subdivision 
plats.  He stated that he identified this approximate MLW line 
based on his 16-year expertise in preparing hydrographic and 
riparian surveys, and that he followed proper surveying 
procedures for determining riparian rights, including 
disregarding changes in property boundaries caused by manmade 
development.  Taliaferro confirmed that Kennedy used proper 
surveying procedures, and identified an approximate MLW line of 
1908 that closely resembled the course of the historic MLW line 
identified by Kennedy. 
 
We find no merit in the Carrs' assertion that the method of 
locating this historic MLW line violated the requirement of 
Swanenburg v. Bland, 240 Va. 408, 413, 397 S.E.2d 859, 862 
(1990), that a surveyor's conclusion regarding the location of a 
property line rest on a factual basis.  In Swanenburg, we 
reversed a judgment that was based on a surveyor's opinion 
regarding the location of a MLW line because his testimony was 
not supported by any probative evidence.  Id.  In contrast, the 
 
19
historic MLW line adopted by the commissioner in the present 
case was supported by evidence that this MLW line could be 
approximated based on the shoreline as shown on the original and 
revised subdivision plats. 
 
We next consider the Carrs' contention that the trial court 
erred in adopting the commissioner's conclusion that the 
southern lot line of their property did not extend to "existing 
mean low water."  The Carrs' objection to the commissioner's 
conclusion is based on their assertion that they own a 
triangular-shaped piece of about 639 square feet of land that 
they would lose to Mr. Crowley under the commissioner's 
recommended allocation of riparian rights.  The Carrs note that 
their property was conveyed pursuant to the original 1904 
subdivision plat, and that their deed description did not 
provide for a rear property line but stated only that Tanner's 
Creek bounded the rear of the property.  They contend that this 
natural boundary description takes precedence over measurements 
in the deed, such as the description of the property as "running 
between [125-foot] parallel lines." 
 
We conclude that the commissioner's finding is not plainly 
wrong and is supported by evidence in the record, including the 
testimony of Leslie Carr.  Carr admitted on cross-examination 
that the survey he obtained when he purchased the property 
showed that the disputed triangle of land lying to the southwest 
 
20
of his bulkhead was outside his platted lot lines.  Moreover, 
the Kennedy survey adopted by the commissioner placed that 
triangle of land within the riparian zone for the Crowley 
property based on Kennedy's location of the approximate MLW line 
of 1908 along the rear lot lines fixed in the revised 
subdivision plat.  Thus, the commissioner properly accepted the 
conclusion of Kennedy and Taliaferro that the Carr property did 
not include the disputed triangle of land. 
 
The Carrs next argue that the trial court erred in 
affirming the commissioner's determination that the language of 
the source deed for the Kidd and Crowley properties did not 
"estop" the Kidds and the Crowleys from asserting riparian 
rights.  The Carrs note that the source deed for both properties 
did not contain an express grant of riparian rights and did not 
state that the rear boundary lines of those properties was 
Tanner's Creek.  The Carrs also contend that the commissioner 
failed to address adequately the issues raised by the quitclaim 
provisions in the deeds of the Kidd and the Crowley properties.  
We disagree with the Carrs' arguments. 
 
Although the source deed for the Kidd and Crowley 
properties did not contain an express grant of riparian rights, 
the deed describes the boundaries of those lots in part by 
reference to the revised subdivision plat, which depicts the 
properties as having a rear waterfront boundary.  Moreover, the 
 
21
source deed for the Kidd and Crowley properties did not have a 
quitclaim provision.  The record before us shows that a 
quitclaim provision appeared in the chain of title for the Kidd 
property in 1993, and in the chain of title for the Crowley 
property in 1985. 
 
A riparian owner has the right to water frontage belonging 
by nature to his land, unless that right has been clearly and 
manifestly retained by the grantor in language appearing on the 
face of the deed.  Irby v. Roberts, 256 Va. 324, 330, 504 S.E.2d 
841, 844 (1998); Thurston v. City of Portsmouth, 205 Va. 909, 
913, 140 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1965).  Here, the chain of title to 
both the Kidd and the Crowley properties shows no such retention 
or severance of riparian rights.  Thus, the commissioner 
properly concluded that the language of the Kidd and the Crowley 
deeds did not preclude them from asserting riparian rights in 
their waterfront properties.9
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court's 
judgment. 
Affirmed. 
                     
 
9We have considered the remaining arguments advanced by the 
Carrs in support of their assignments of error and conclude that 
those arguments have no merit.  
 
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