Case Title: Nevins Drug Co. v. Bunch

Citation: 63 So. 2d 329

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1953-02-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
63 So. 2d 329 (1953)
NEVINS DRUG CO., Inc.
v.
BUNCH et al.

Supreme Court of Florida, Division A.
February 24, 1953.
McCune, Hiaasen & Kelley, Berryhill, Leaird & Tedder, Fort Lauderdale, and Weldon G. Starry, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Joseph A. Varon and Judson Samuels, Hollywood, for appellees.
MATHEWS, Justice.
This was a suit in equity to relieve a tenant, or lessee, from a forfeiture, after the conclusion of a statutory proceeding for eviction because of nonpayment of rent. The eviction proceedings were brought under Chapter 83 F.S.A., and particularly, Section 83.20(2), which authorizes the statutory proceeding "after any default in the payment of rent pursuant to the agreement under which such premises are held". The proceedings are simple and the only question was whether or not the defendant was holding over without permission of his landlord after default in the payment of the rent.
A trial was demanded and had before a jury. Final judgment was issued pursuant to the verdict of the jury; motion for new trial was made, which was denied on the 17th day of November, 1952. The proceedings were instituted on the 30th day of October, 1952.
On November 18, 1952 the appellant, hereinafter referred to as the lessee, filed *330 its complaint in equity seeking relief from a forfeiture. It is admitted by the pleadings that the lessee conducted a drug business and the same was a going concern; that the Christmas Season was approaching and that the merchandise and other equipment of the lessee had a value of approximately $100,000; the location was a valuable one for such a place of business; the lessee was in possession of the premises under a written lease, the terms of which are not material at this time, except as construed by the parties; the rental was fixed at $1,375 per month. On the 23rd of October, 1952 the lessor served notice upon the lessee that it was in default in the payment of rent and demanded payment thereof.
The lessee was tenant of another piece of property which is not involved in this action but reference thereto is necessary in order to make clear some of the allegations of the bill of complaint. The complaint alleged in part as follows:
In the answer filed by the landlord it states specifically, among other things:
The landlord further pleaded the final judgment obtained by it in the summary proceeding in the county court hereinabove mentioned, praying for possession of the store, alleging as grounds for forfeiture "the failure of the defendant to pay the October rent."
Before writ of possession under the distress warrant was served, the appellant (lessee) filed his bill of complaint and obtained a temporary injunction seeking to enjoin the execution of the writ of possession and for other relief, and tendered to the Clerk of the Circuit Court sufficient monies to make the landlord whole.
*331 On the 18th day of November, 1952, the Chancellor made an order enjoining and restraining the execution of the distress writ and put the lessee in possession of the property. On December 19, 1952 the Chancellor entered a final decree in which he set aside and vacated the order granting the temporary injunction and dismissed the bill of complaint, with prejudice, and because the plaintiff was not entitled to the equitable relief prayed for. This appeal is prosecuted from that final decree.
Subsequent to the final decree and notice of appeal the tenant filed its petition for a constitutional writ to maintain the status quo and to enjoin the sheriff from executing the writ of possession. The writ was granted.
In the case of Rader v. Prather, 100 Fla. 591, 130 So. 15, 16, this Court had before it a suit in equity to relieve a tenant from a forfeiture because of his failure to pay the rent at the required time. The Court said:
The positive allegations of the bill of complaint and the denials and admissions of the answer become important in this case. It is alleged in the complaint and admitted in the answer that the tenant did call the landlord, acknowledged receipt of the notice, and stated that he would personally deliver the rentals, whereupon the landlord stated that a check would be all right; that said checks were delivered to the landlord on the 27th day of October, 1952, were accepted by the landlord and presented to the bank at approximately 11:30 a.m. on the 28th day of October, 1952, and someone in the bank refused payment of the checks, affixing thereto a slip marked "Not Sufficient Funds". In the answer the landlord did not specifically admit that he told the tenant to deliver a check in payment for the rent in lieu of cash, and neither did he deny this specific allegation. The Rule, 31 F.S.A. Rules of Equity, rule 34, provides as follows:
The only testimony in the record pertinent to the issue here involved was with *332 reference to the check mentioned together with the bank record of deposits and withdrawals. The bank record discloses the following deposits, withdrawals and balances, beginning October 27, 1952 and ending at the close of business on October 31, 1952:
It is, therefore, apparent that at the time the check was presented about 11:30 a.m. on October 28, 1952 until the close of business on October 31, 1952, there were more than ample funds on deposit in the bank with which to pay this check. It may be true that the bank was under no legal liability to make payment of the check to the payee and that its liability was to the payer. Be that as it may, the landlord admits that the lessee called him upon receipt of notice of default, offered to deliver the money for the rent personally, did deliver a check in the correct amount, which was accepted by the landlord and presented by him to the bank for payment, under the circumstances above set forth. The landlord did not deny the positive allegation that he had requested a check in lieu of cash.
The facts shown by the positive allegations of the complaint, the admissions of the answer and the documentary proof, were sufficient to give the appellant a standing in a court of equity to relieve him from a forfeiture of his estate because of the failure to pay rent at the time required and specified in the terms of his lease; unless there are other facts and circumstances not disclosed by the record.
In its final decree the Court recites that the matter was heard upon final hearing as presented by the pleadings of all interested parties and "all witnesses having appeared with their respective counsel at said final hearing and their testimony taken and considered by the court". The record failed to disclose that the testimony was except as hereinabove indicated. The Rules provide for directions in making up the transcript of the record to be filed by the plaintiff. The Rules, 30 F.S.A. Rules of Supreme Court, rule 11(b), work both ways and also provides:
It is insisted by the appellee that the summary judgment in the distress proceedings in the county court was final and conclusive and that the proceeding in equity to to relieve against a forfeiture was too late and precluded by the judgment in the county court. This question was directly raised in the case of Rader v. Prather, supra, and was decided adversely to this contention.
The action in the county court was a summary action. The County Court has no inherent power to relieve a tenant from forfeiture of his estate because of the failure to pay rent. Only those issues mentioned in the statute could be litigated in that proceeding. In the case of Rader v. Prather, supra, this Court said:
The cause should be and is hereby reversed for further proceedings.
HOBSON, C.J., and TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.