Case Title: Rissler & McMurry v. Snodgrass

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92-163

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rissler & McMurry v. Snodgrass1993 WY 80854 P.2d 69Case Number: 92-163Decided: 06/09/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
RISSLER & McMURRY, a 
Wyoming Corporation, 

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

George William SNODGRASS, 
Phyllis J. Snodgrass, State of Wyoming Farm Loan Board, Rodney L. Stalkup and 
Laura Stalkup, 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

June 9, 1993. Rehearing 
Denied July 20, 1993.

 

Donald J. 
Rissler of Central Wyoming Law Associates, P.C., Riverton, for 
appellant.

Jeffrey C. 
Gosman, Casper, for appellees Snodgrass and Stalkup.

Mary L. 
Scheible, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee State of Wyo.

Before MACY, 
C.J., THOMAS and GOLDEN, JJ., ROONEY, Ret. J., and LANGDON, Ret. District 
Judge.

ROONEY, Justice 
(Retired).

[¶1]      This appeal is 
from a judgment on a jury verdict in an eminent domain action. The verdict was 
in the amount of $182,034 for 5.45 acres of land taken for a mine haul road 
across pasture land. Appellant lists five issues for our review, one of them is 
worded:

"Whether it was error for 
the Court to fail to further instruct the jury in open Court and on the record 
and whether it was error for the Court to fail to maintain a post deliberation 
instruction for the record in accordance with Wyo. Stat. § 1-11-205 thereby 
preventing appellate review."

Since we do find 
error therein, we must reverse and remand for a new trial, and thus it is 
unnecessary to consider the other four alleged errors.

[¶2]      After the case 
was given to the jury and during the jury deliberations, the jury sent a note to 
the court asking for an additional instruction. The court answered the request 
through a return written message. The same was not done in open court or made a 
matter of the reported record.

Wyo. Stat. § 1-11-209 
(1988) provides:

"After the jurors have 
retired for deliberation, if there be a disagreement between them as to any part 
of the testimony, or if they desire to be informed as to any part of the law 
arising in the case, they may request the officer to conduct them to the court 
where information upon the matter of law shall be given. The court may give its 
recollection as to the testimony on the points in dispute, in the presence of or 
after notice to the parties or their counsel."

[¶3]      In this case, 
after the jury made known its desire to be informed concerning a part of the law 
arising in the case, the requirement of the statute to "conduct them to the 
court where information upon the matter of law shall be given" was not followed. 
Nor was the instruction made part of the record as required by Wyo. Stat. § 
1-11-205(a)(vii) (1988). It provides in pertinent part: "All instructions given 
by the court together with those refused shall be filed as a part of the 
record."

[¶4]      The statutory 
directions and the court rules concerning the manner in which jury trials are to 
be conducted are mandatory and are for the purposes of protecting the 
fundamental rights of the parties, e.g. in this instance: to have only open 
court official contact with the jury by the court and/or counsel after 
submission of the case to the jury, together with the maintenance of a record on 
the instructions given to the jury.

[¶5]      The unusual 
aspect in this case is that the jury contact and subsequent procedure occurred 
with full knowledge of both counsel. Although the substance of the incident is 
not here pertinent, jurymen affidavits made subsequent to the incident and 
acknowledgements of judge and both counsel reflect that the jury requested an 
instruction on whether they could fix their own value, or whether they must 
accept a value fixed by a witness. The return message from the court provided 
such instruction.

[¶6]      If the court's 
instruction had been given to the jury after they had been conducted back before 
the court, and if it had been made a matter of the record, the requirements of 
the statutes and rules would have been met, and there would be no error. 
However, such was not done, and even though an objection was not made thereto 
(in fact, there is indication to the contrary, i.e., that it was done with the 
approval of counsel),1 there was plain error in the 
proceedings.

[¶7]      "Plain errors or 
defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not 
brought to the attention of the court." W.R.A.P. 9.05. To qualify as plain 
error, there must be (1) a clear record of what happened at the hearing, (2) a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law shown to exist, and (3) the facts of the case 
must clearly and obviously transgress such rule. Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051, 
1057 (Wyo. 1981); Westmark v. State, 693 P.2d 220 (Wyo. 1984). We have here a 
clear record of what happened procedurally (part of such clear record is the 
fact that the occurrence was not made a part of the trial record). The 
applicable statute and rule are noted, and they were clearly 
transgressed.

[¶8]      Agreement to the 
procedure by appellant's counsel may be suggested here. Parties to a legal 
contest may stipulate and agree to many aspects thereof, but we cannot give 
approval or effect to such when the agreement is to disregard or circumvent the 
specific requirement of a statute or rule. For extreme examples: We cannot 
accept or approve agreements (1) that the trial shall be before a jury of 50, 
(2) that the taking in eminent domain may be for a purpose not specified by law, 
or (3) that one not qualified as an expert (other than the owner) may testify as 
to value in a condemnation case.

[¶9]      Since plain error 
exists in the procedural aspect, i.e., the jury instruction was given in 
response to the jury inquiry made after the case was submitted to it, the case 
must be remanded for a new trial.

FOOTNOTES

1 The district court judge 
in this case was a learned and experienced judge. He was undoubtedly misled by 
the acquiescence of counsel in this respect.