Case Title: In re D.P.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S267429

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2023-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re D.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. 
 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF  
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
T.P., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S267429 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Five 
B301135 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
19CCJP00973B 
 
 
January 19, 2023 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, Groban, 
Jenkins, and Cantil-Sakauye* concurred.   
 
 
* 
Retired Chief Justice of California, assigned by the Chief 
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution. 
1 
In re D.P. 
S267429 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
In 2019, T.P. (Father) and Y.G. (Mother) brought their 
infant son, D.P., to the hospital because they were concerned 
about excessive crying.  A chest X-ray revealed that D.P. had a 
single healing rib fracture that the parents could not explain.  In 
response, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and 
Family Services (the Department) filed a dependency petition 
claiming that D.P. and his five-year-old sister, B.P., were at risk 
of neglect.  After reviewing the evidence, the juvenile court 
dismissed all but one of the counts brought by the Department.  
The court found that it had jurisdiction over D.P. under Welfare 
and Institutions Code former section 300, subdivision (b)(1), 
finding that “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial 
risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, 
as a result of the failure or inability of the child’s parent or 
guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child . . . .”  (All 
undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 
Institutions Code; § 300 was amended, effective January 1, 
2023, to include changes nonsubstantive to the issues here 
(Stats. 2022, ch. 832, § 1); unless otherwise indicated, we quote 
and analyze the 2023 version.) 
D.P.’s parents challenged this jurisdictional finding on 
appeal.  While the appeal was pending, the juvenile court 
terminated its jurisdiction, finding that the parents had 
complied with their case plan and D.P. was no longer at risk.  In 
response, the Court of Appeal dismissed the parents’ case, 
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
reasoning that because the juvenile court’s jurisdiction had 
terminated, the case was moot.  We granted Father’s petition for 
review. 
We conclude that Father’s appeal is moot because Father, 
though asserting that the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding 
is stigmatizing, has not demonstrated a specific legal or 
practical consequence that would be avoided upon reversal of 
the jurisdictional findings.  We further hold that the Court of 
Appeal has discretion to review Father’s case even though it is 
moot.  The Court of Appeal erred in reasoning that “[t]he party 
seeking such discretionary review . . . must demonstrate the 
specific legal or practical negative consequences that will result 
from the jurisdictional findings they seek to reverse.”  (In re D.P. 
(Feb. 10, 2021, B301135) [nonpub. opn.].)  We reverse the Court 
of Appeal’s judgment dismissing the appeal and remand for the 
court to reconsider Father’s argument for discretionary review. 
I. 
In 2019, Father and Mother brought two-month-old D.P. 
to the hospital because he had been crying more than usual and 
seemed to have difficulty breathing.  A chest X-ray revealed that 
D.P. had pneumonia as well as a single healing rib fracture that 
the parents, surprised by the latter finding, could not explain.  
A nurse practitioner who treated D.P. and performed a skeletal 
survey found no evidence of any other trauma or injuries to his 
body.  The Department received a report alleging that D.P. was 
a victim of physical abuse and stating that his five-year-old 
sister B.P. might also be at risk.  Following treatment for the rib 
fracture and for unrelated pneumonia and flu, D.P. was released 
to his parents.  At that time, he was gaining weight and seemed 
happy.   
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
Father and Mother are immigrants from Vietnam and 
China, respectively.  Their household includes D.P. and B.P., as 
well as the children’s maternal grandparents.  The family has 
no prior child welfare history or criminal history.  A social 
worker who interviewed B.P. found that she appeared healthy 
and well groomed, and B.P. stated that she felt happy and safe 
at home.  The parents were cooperative with social workers and 
participated in various pre-disposition services including 
parenting classes and individual counseling.  Nonetheless, 
because the timing of D.P.’s rib fracture meant that it must have 
occurred sometime after his birth while he was in the care of his 
parents, and because his parents could not offer a satisfactory 
explanation for the injury, the Department filed a petition 
alleging that D.P. was subject to “deliberate, unreasonable, and 
neglectful acts” at the hands of his parents, which placed him 
and his sister “at risk of serious physical harm, damage, danger, 
and physical abuse.”  The Department claimed the children were 
at risk of neglect and sought to have them removed from their 
parents’ care. 
In the juvenile court, the Department presented testimony 
from Dr. Karen Imagawa, an expert in forensics and suspected 
child abuse.  Dr. Imagawa explained that the type of rib fracture 
D.P. suffered is uncommon in healthy infants and has a “high 
degree of specificity for non-accidental/inflicted trauma.”  
Because a healthy infant’s ribcage is pliable, sustaining this 
type of injury would require significant compression or blunt 
force trauma.  The parents introduced expert testimony from Dr. 
Thomas Grogan, a pediatric orthopedic surgeon and expert in 
child abuse forensics.  Dr. Grogan explained that rib fractures 
like the one D.P. suffered are typically caused by compressive 
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
force.  If a fist or object had been used to strike D.P., causing 
blunt force trauma, Dr. Grogan stated he would have expected 
to see multiple broken ribs and potentially some external marks 
or bruising.  Because D.P. only had a fracture to one rib, Dr. 
Grogan believed the injury could be the result of someone, even 
D.P.’s five-year-old sister, picking him up incorrectly and 
applying too much pressure to his chest.  However, Dr. Grogan 
could not rule out the possibility that the injury was the result 
of an intentional act.  Both experts agreed that in the absence of 
any bruising, a caregiver would have no way of knowing that a 
child had a broken rib.   
At the jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court dismissed 
the portions of the petition relating to D.P.’s sister because they 
were not supported by sufficient evidence.  With respect to D.P., 
the juvenile court sustained a modified version of the former 
section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (section 300(b)(1)) count, which 
had alleged that “deliberate, unreasonable, and neglectful acts 
on the part of [D.P.’s] mother and father endanger the child’s 
physical health, safety and well-being, create a detrimental 
home environment and place the child . . . at risk of serious 
physical harm, damage, danger and physical abuse.”   
By its terms, current section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A) 
applies where “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial 
risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, 
as a result of . . . [¶] . . . the failure or inability of the child’s 
parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child.”  
A related provision, section 355.1, subdivision (a), provides:  
“Where the court finds, based upon competent professional 
evidence, that an injury . . . sustained by a minor is of a nature 
as would ordinarily not be sustained except as the result of the 
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
unreasonable or neglectful acts or omissions of either parent, . . . 
that finding shall be prima facie evidence that the minor is a 
person described by subdivision . . . (b) . . . of Section 300.”   
In light of the expert testimony and the force required to 
cause D.P.’s injury, the juvenile court concluded the injury was 
of a sort that would generally not be sustained barring some 
neglect or harm to the child, and it thus found a prima facie case 
under section 355.1.  This finding “ ‘shift[ed] to the parents the 
obligation of raising an issue as to the actual cause of the 
injury.’ ”  (In re D.P. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 898, 903, italics 
omitted; see Evid. Code, § 604.) 
The juvenile court explained:  “What I have is an 
unanswered explanation as to how this fracture occur[red] . . . , 
but I don’t lay [it] at the parents’ feet because I don’t think they 
affirmatively through a deliberate act or some act on their part 
or omission on their part caused the injury.  And it may, in fact, 
be that while the child is in the care of the maternal 
grandmother or some other event occurred that was outside of 
their view that this compression force was applied.”  Further, 
the court said that “I think this is — at its most — a possible 
neglectful act in the way this compression fracture occurred.”  
But in light of the section 355.1 presumption, the juvenile court 
sustained the section 300(b)(1) count, though it struck the words 
“deliberate” and “unreasonable” because those words are 
“beyond what the evidence shows.”  With the count so modified, 
the court found that D.P.’s injury “would ordinarily not occur 
[except] as the result[] of neglectful acts by the child’s mother 
and father . . . [and s]uch . . . neglectful acts on the part of the 
child’s mother and father endanger the child’s physical health, 
safety and well-being, create a detrimental home environment 
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
and place the child . . . at risk of serious physical harm, damage, 
danger and physical abuse.”   
The court ordered D.P. to remain released to the parents 
under the Department’s informal supervision under former 
section 360, subdivision (b) for a period of six months.  The court 
noted that the parents had already completed family 
preservation services; they each completed over five months of 
weekly individual counseling, and according to their therapists, 
both parents demonstrated a good ability to parent their 
children.  Both parents also attended parenting education 
programming.   
D.P.’s parents promptly appealed the juvenile court’s 
jurisdictional ruling.  Mother challenged the basis for the 
juvenile court’s section 300(b)(1) finding, claiming that the 
elements of failure to protect and causation had not been 
established.  Father argued that the juvenile court had erred in 
applying the section 355.1 presumption and that no substantial 
evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that D.P. faced a 
substantial risk of harm in the future.  While the appeal was 
pending, the parents fully complied with their case plan.  The 
Department did not bring the case back before the juvenile 
court, and the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction before 
the completion of the appeal.  In the Court of Appeal, the 
Department initially took the position that it did not oppose 
reversal of the jurisdictional finding in light of the parents’ 
successful completion of informal supervision.  But after the 
Court of Appeal asked for supplemental briefing on the issue of 
mootness, the Department took the view that the appeal is moot 
and should be dismissed because reversal of the jurisdictional 
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
finding could provide no practical or effective relief to the 
parents. 
The Court of Appeal agreed the case is moot, and it also 
declined to exercise discretionary review on the ground that the 
parents “have failed to identify a specific legal or practical 
negative consequence resulting from the jurisdictional finding.”  
Presiding 
Justice 
Rubin 
dissented, 
arguing 
that 
the 
jurisdictional finding was not supported by substantial evidence 
and “creates potentially serious challenges for the parents in 
their efforts to provide for their family and actively participate 
in their child’s upbringing.”  We granted review. 
II. 
A court is tasked with the duty “ ‘to decide actual 
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and 
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract 
propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which 
cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.’ ”  
(Consolidated etc. Corp. v. United A. etc. Workers (1946) 27 
Cal.2d 859, 863 (Consolidated).)  A case becomes moot when 
events “ ‘render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide 
the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief.’ ”  
(Ibid.)  For relief to be “effective,” two requirements must be 
met.  First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm.  
Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being 
rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.  (See id. at p. 865.) 
This rule applies in the dependency context.  (In re N.S. 
(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60 [“the critical factor in considering 
whether a dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate 
court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible 
error”].)  A reviewing court must “ ‘decide on a case-by-case basis 
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter 
make a case moot and whether [its] decision would affect the 
outcome in a subsequent proceeding.’ ”  (In re Anna S. (2010) 180 
Cal.App.4th 1489, 1498.)  We review de novo the Court of 
Appeal’s determination that this case is moot.  (Robinson v. U-
Haul Co. of California (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 304, 319.) 
The Courts of Appeal have held that when a juvenile 
court’s finding forms the basis for an order that continues to 
impact a parent’s rights — for instance, by restricting visitation 
or custody — that jurisdictional finding remains subject to 
challenge, even if the juvenile court has terminated its 
jurisdiction.  (See, e.g., In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 
1544, 1548 [father could challenge jurisdictional finding after 
jurisdiction terminated because finding was the basis of order 
restricting his visitation and custody rights]; In re J.K. (2009) 
174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1431–1432 [father could challenge 
jurisdictional finding after jurisdiction terminated because 
finding was the basis of order stripping father of custody and 
imposing a stay-away order that remained in effect]; In re A.R. 
(2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 733, 740 [termination of jurisdiction did 
not moot appeal where father’s contact with child was “severely 
restricted as a direct result of the jurisdictional and 
dispositional findings and orders”].)  Because reversal of the 
jurisdictional finding calls into question the validity of orders 
based on the finding, review of the jurisdictional finding can 
grant the parent effective relief.   
Where, as here, the juvenile court terminates its 
jurisdiction without issuing any order that continues to impact 
the parents, the question of whether an appeal can grant the 
parents effective relief becomes more difficult.  In such cases, 
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
the Courts of Appeal have applied different standards regarding 
the showing a parent must make in order to maintain a 
challenge to a juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding after 
jurisdiction has terminated. 
Some decisions hold that a parent must identify a “legal 
[]or practical consequence” arising from a dependency court’s 
jurisdictional findings to avoid mootness.  (In re I.A. (2011) 201 
Cal.App.4th 1484, 1493; see In re N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 61 [mother’s challenge to jurisdictional finding was moot 
because the finding was not the basis of any adverse orders 
against her].)  By contrast, at least one decision has held that 
the possibility that a jurisdictional finding will have negative 
consequences for the parent — for instance, by impacting future 
dependency proceedings — is enough to avoid mootness.  (In re 
Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 716 [termination of 
juvenile court’s jurisdiction did not moot appeal because the 
finding that father placed children at risk of physical and 
emotional harm could have negative consequences for father in 
future family law or dependency proceedings].) 
As noted, a case is not moot where a court can provide the 
plaintiff with “effect[ive] relief.”  (Consolidated, supra, 27 Cal.2d 
at p. 863.)  In this context, relief is effective when it “can have a 
practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal 
status.”  (In re I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1490.)  It 
follows that, to show a need for effective relief, the plaintiff must 
first demonstrate that he or she has suffered from a change in 
legal status.  Although a jurisdictional finding that a parent 
engaged in abuse or neglect of a child is generally stigmatizing, 
complaining of “stigma” alone is insufficient to sustain an 
appeal.  The stigma must be paired with some effect on the 
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
plaintiff’s legal status that is capable of being redressed by a 
favorable court decision.  (Cf. Humphries v. County of Los 
Angeles (9th Cir. 2009) 554 F.3d 1170, 1185, as amended (Jan. 
30, 2009), revd. and remanded sub nom. on other grounds by Los 
Angeles County v. Humphries (2010) 562 U.S. 29 [for purposes 
of the due process clause, a protected liberty interest is 
implicated when the “stigma from governmental action” is 
coupled with the “alteration or extinguishment of ‘a right or 
status previously recognized by state law’ ”].)  For example, a 
case is not moot where a jurisdictional finding affects parental 
custody rights (In re J.K., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1431–
1432), curtails a parent’s contact with his or her child (In re A.R., 
supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 740), or “has resulted in 
[dispositional] orders which continue to adversely affect” a 
parent  (In re Joshua C., supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 1548).  We 
express no view on whether stigma alone may be sufficient to 
avoid mootness in other contexts, including a criminal appeal, 
or whether a reviewing court’s decision not to reach the merits 
of the appeal of a jurisdictional finding could ever implicate a 
parent’s due process rights.  
We disapprove In re Daisy H., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 
to the extent it held, contrary to today’s opinion, that speculative 
future harm is sufficient to avoid mootness. 
In the Court of Appeal, Father sought not only to have 
jurisdiction terminated but also to have the juvenile court’s 
jurisdictional finding reversed as unsupported by the evidence.  
Although jurisdiction has been terminated, Father contends 
that the appeal is not moot because the jurisdictional finding is 
stigmatizing and has resulted or will result in his inclusion in 
California’s Child Abuse Central Index (CACI) (Pen. Code, 
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
§ 11170), which carries several legal consequences.  As noted, 
stigma alone is not enough to avoid mootness, so the question is 
whether Father’s concern about inclusion in the CACI amounts 
to a tangible legal or practical consequence of the jurisdictional 
finding that would be remedied by a favorable decision on 
appeal.  We conclude it does not and thus his appeal is moot. 
Specifically, Father contends that the juvenile court’s 
jurisdictional finding could estop him from challenging his 
inclusion in the CACI.  California’s Child Abuse and Neglect 
Reporting Act (CANRA; Pen. Code, § 11164 et seq.) requires that 
several state agencies, including the Department, forward 
substantiated reports of child abuse or neglect to California’s 
Department of Justice (DOJ) for inclusion in the CACI.  (Id., 
§ 11169, subd. (a).)  CANRA sorts reports of child abuse and 
neglect into three categories:  unfounded, inconclusive, and 
substantiated.  (Pen. Code, § 11165.12.)  A report is unfounded 
when it “is determined by the investigator who conducted the 
investigation to be false, to be inherently improbable, to involve 
an accidental injury, or not to constitute child abuse or neglect.”  
(Id., subd. (a).)  A report is inconclusive when the investigator 
determines it was “not . . . unfounded, but the findings are 
inconclusive and there is insufficient evidence to determine 
whether child abuse or neglect . . . has occurred.”  (Id., subd. (c).)  
A report is substantiated if it “is determined by the investigator 
who conducted the investigation to constitute child abuse or 
neglect.”  (Id., subd. (b).) 
When an agency forwards a substantiated report, the 
agency must provide written notice to the person whose conduct 
was reported to the CACI.  (Pen. Code, § 11169, subd. (c).)  
Persons listed in the CACI are generally entitled to challenge 
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
the basis for their inclusion at a hearing before the reporting 
agency.  (Id., § 11169, subd. (d).)  This is an important 
protection; according to amicus curiae ACLU of Southern 
California, roughly 30 percent of CACI reports are removed 
after a grievance hearing is held.  However, if “a court of 
competent jurisdiction has determined that suspected child 
abuse or neglect has occurred,” the hearing request “shall be 
denied.”  (Id., § 11169, subd. (e).) 
Inclusion in the CACI carries several consequences for 
parents.  A CACI check is required for “any prospective foster 
parent, or adoptive parent, or any person 18 years of age or older 
residing in their household.”  (Health & Saf. Code, § 1522.1, 
subd. (b).)  California law also requires state agencies to search 
the CACI before granting a number of rights and benefits, 
including licensing to care for children in a day care center (id., 
§ 1596.877, subd. (b)) and employment in child care (id., 
§ 1522.1, subd. (a)).  Even if an agency or employer is not legally 
required to check the CACI, it may do so as a matter of internal 
policy.  CACI information is available to a variety of entities, 
including law enforcement entities investigating a case of 
known or suspected child abuse (Pen. Code, § 11170, 
subd. (b)(3)), a court appointed special advocate program 
conducting a background investigation for employment or 
volunteer candidates (id., subd. (b)(5)), an investigative agency, 
probation officer, or court investigator responsible for placing 
children or assessing the possible placement of children (id., 
subd. (b)(7)), a government agency conducting a background 
investigation of an applicant seeking employment as a peace 
officer (id., subd. (b)(9)), a county child welfare agency or 
delegated county adoption agency conducting a background 
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
investigation of an applicant seeking employment or volunteer 
status who will have direct contact with children at risk of abuse 
or neglect (id., subd. (b)(10)), and out-of-state agencies making 
foster care or adoptive decisions (id., subd. (e)(1)).  These 
agencies and employers are not barred from hiring or granting 
a license to an applicant listed in the CACI, but they may be 
hesitant to do so.  A CACI search may also occur if there are 
allegations of child abuse or neglect; the Department’s 
investigation in this case involved making a CACI search for all 
adults living in D.P.’s household, including parents and 
grandparents.  (See Sen et al., Inadequate Protection: 
Examining the Due Process Rights of Individuals in Child Abuse 
and Neglect Registries (2020) 77 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 857, 869.)  
Moreover, because the information included in the CACI is 
available to a wide variety of state agencies, employers, and law 
enforcement, it may be stigmatizing to the person listed. 
In this case, however, Father has not shown that the 
general neglect allegation against him was reported for 
inclusion in the CACI, nor has he shown that this type of 
allegation is reportable.  These two layers of uncertainty render 
Father’s CACI claim too speculative to survive a mootness 
challenge.   
First, Father does not assert that he has actually been 
reported for inclusion in the CACI.  He notes that the record is 
silent on this point and argues that where the record is silent, a 
Court of Appeal will ordinarily presume an official duty has been 
regularly performed.  (See Evid. Code, § 664.)  We are 
unpersuaded that Father has been or will be reported to the 
CACI.  When the Department forwards a substantiated report, 
it must provide written notice to the person whose conduct was 
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
reported to the CACI.  (Pen. Code, § 11169, subd. (c).)  Father 
does not claim he has received any such notice, and the 
Department has submitted a sworn declaration confirming that 
the allegation was not reported.  Moreover, we note that persons 
who are concerned they may be listed on the CACI can inquire 
by sending a notarized and signed letter to the DOJ.  (Id., 
§ 11170, subd. (f)(1).)  Father has not submitted any 
documentation from the DOJ establishing that he is listed in the 
CACI.  On these facts, we find that Father has not shown he was 
reported to the CACI based on his conduct toward D.P. 
Father next makes two related arguments that his 
potential inclusion in CACI is sufficient to avoid mootness.  He 
argues that he will be reported to the CACI in the near future 
because the juvenile court’s findings require the Department to 
forward the report for inclusion in the CACI.  And he asserts 
that the allegations against him could subsequently be 
forwarded for inclusion in the CACI, at which point the juvenile 
court’s finding against him would estop him from challenging 
his inclusion in the CACI.  (See Pen. Code, § 11169, subd. (e) [if 
“a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that suspected 
child abuse or neglect has occurred,” the hearing request “shall 
be denied”].) 
These possibilities are too speculative for purposes of 
avoiding mootness.  The record reveals that in the course of 
investigating the report against Father, the Department made 
two allegations.  The first is the original report of physical abuse 
or “ ‘unlawful corporal punishment or injury’ ” as defined in 
Penal Code section 11165.4.  The Department deemed this 
report inconclusive.  Because the report was not substantiated, 
the Department was not required to forward the report to the 
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
DOJ for inclusion in the CACI, and there is no indication that 
the Department ever did or will forward this report.  Second, 
during its investigation, the Department added an allegation of 
“ ‘[g]eneral neglect’ ” as defined in Penal Code former 
section 11165.2, subdivision (b).  This allegation was deemed 
substantiated.  However, the Department has submitted a 
sworn declaration by the investigator of D.P.’s case stating that 
the allegation was not forwarded to the DOJ pursuant to 
Department policy.   
Further, we note that CANRA distinguishes between 
cases of “general” and “severe” neglect.  “ ‘Severe neglect’ ” is 
defined as “the negligent failure . . . to protect the child from 
severe malnutrition or medically diagnosed nonorganic failure 
to thrive,” or “willfully caus[ing] or permit[ing] the person or 
health of the child to be placed in a situation such that their 
person or health is endangered.”  (Pen. Code, § 11165.2, 
subd. (a).)  “ ‘General neglect’ means the negligent failure of a 
person having the care or custody of a child to provide adequate 
food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or supervision where no 
physical injury to the child has occurred but the child is at 
substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness.”  
(Id., subd. (b).)  Only reports of “child abuse or severe neglect” — 
not “general neglect” — must be forwarded to the CACI.  (Id., 
§ 11169, subd. (a).)  The Department claims it cannot forward 
the allegation against Father to the DOJ because allegations of 
general neglect are not eligible for inclusion in the CACI.  In 
response, Father says the allegations against him do not 
squarely fit within the category of general neglect because 
general neglect lies only “where no physical injury to the child 
has occurred” (id., § 11165.2, subd. (b)) and there is no dispute 
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
D.P. was physically injured.  But the alleged conduct is also a 
poor fit for “severe neglect.”  There is no allegation that D.P.’s 
parents negligently failed to protect him “from severe 
malnutrition or medically diagnosed nonorganic failure to 
thrive,” or that they “willfully caused or permitted the person or 
health of the child to be placed in a situation such that their 
person or health is endangered.”  (Id., subd. (a).) 
Moreover, although “statements by counsel [at oral 
argument] are not evidence and do not amount to an admission 
or stipulation of fact” (Zolly v. City of Oakland (2022) 13 Cal.5th 
780, 796), we note that when asked at oral argument whether 
the Department intended to report Father for inclusion in the 
CACI, counsel for the Department said, “We don’t want to report 
these parents.  We did not report these parents.  And we’re not 
going to unless this court orders us to.”  The fact that the statute 
does not require allegations of conduct short of “severe neglect” 
to be forwarded to the CACI, together with the Department’s 
policy not to forward such allegations and the Department’s 
representations to this court that it will not do so, renders 
Father’s claim too speculative to avoid mootness. 
In sum, Father has not shown that he was included in the 
CACI or that he will be reported in the future based on the 
allegations at issue here.  And even if the Department 
attempted to report him, Father has not shown that the 
allegations against him are reportable.  In light of these layers 
of uncertainty, we find Father’s CACI claim too speculative to 
demonstrate a specific legal consequence that a favorable 
judgment could redress.  Since the other legal or practical 
consequences identified by Father are also too speculative, we 
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
agree with the Court of Appeal that Father’s challenge to the 
juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding is moot.   
III. 
Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their 
“inherent discretion” to reach the merits of the dispute.  (Konig 
v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 743, 745, 
fn. 3.)  As a rule, courts will generally exercise their discretion 
to review a moot case when “the case presents an issue of broad 
public interest that is likely to recur,” “when there may be a 
recurrence of the controversy between the parties,” or “when a 
material question remains for the court’s determination.”  
(Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion v. City of 
Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 473, 479–80; see 
Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 524, fn. 1 
[exercising discretion to decide an otherwise moot case 
concerning “important issues that are capable of repetition 
yet . . . evad[ing] review”].)  
In the dependency context, the Courts of Appeal have 
reached differing conclusions on when discretionary review of 
moot cases may be warranted outside the circumstances noted 
above.  Some have taken a broad view of their discretion to reach 
the merits of a moot appeal.  (See, e.g., In re Nathan E. (2021) 
61 Cal.App.5th 114, 121 [“Although mother’s argument appears 
to assume that there will be future dependency proceedings and 
offers no other specific harm that sustained jurisdictional and 
dispositional findings may bring her, we nevertheless exercise 
our discretion to consider her appeal on the merits”]; In re 
Madison S. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 308, 329 [“a reviewing court 
[has] the discretion to consider the adequacy of additional 
jurisdictional grounds if it so desires”]; In re Anthony G. (2011) 
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
194 Cal.App.4th 1060, 1065 [“We are not persuaded that we 
should refrain from addressing the merits of [parent’s] appeal” 
of a terminated jurisdictional finding]; In re C.C. (2009) 
172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1489 [court found parent’s claim that a 
jurisdictional order would create “the possibility of prejudice in 
subsequent family law proceedings” as “highly speculative,” but 
nonetheless chose to proceed to the merits “in an abundance of 
caution”].) 
Other courts have cited specific factors when considering 
whether to reach the merits of a moot case.  In In re Drake M., 
the court found discretionary review to be appropriate “when the 
[jurisdictional] finding (1) serves as the basis for dispositional 
orders that are also challenged on appeal [citation]; (2) could be 
prejudicial to the appellant or could potentially impact the 
current or future dependency proceedings [citations]; or (3) 
‘could have other consequences for [the appellant], beyond 
jurisdiction.’ ”  (In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 762–
763.)  However, where a jurisdictional finding “serves as the 
basis for dispositional orders that are also challenged on appeal” 
(id. at p. 762), the appeal is not moot.  We disapprove In re Drake 
M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 754 to the extent it suggests that 
such a finding is insufficient to avoid mootness and supports 
only discretionary review.   
Other courts have declined to exercise their discretion to 
reach the merits of a moot case where the parent has not 
identified “specific legal or practical consequence[s] from [the 
juvenile court’s jurisdictional] finding, either within or outside 
the dependency proceedings.”  (In re I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 1493; see In re David B. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 633, 654 
[“decid[ing] an otherwise moot appeal . . . is appropriate only if 
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
a ruling on the merits will affect future proceedings between the 
parties or will have some precedential consequence in future 
litigation generally”].)   
The Court of Appeal here concluded that discretionary 
review is only appropriate when the parent has “demonstrate[d] 
specific legal or practical negative consequences that will result 
from the jurisdictional findings they seek to reverse.”  This was 
error.  Whether or not a parent has demonstrated a specific legal 
or practical consequence that would be avoided upon reversal of 
the jurisdictional findings is what determines whether the case 
is moot or not moot.  It is not what determines whether a court 
has discretion to decide the merits of a moot case.  To be clear, 
when a parent has demonstrated a specific legal or practical 
consequence that will be averted upon reversal, the case is not 
moot, and merits review is required.  When a parent has not 
made such a showing, the case is moot, but the court has 
discretion to decide the merits nevertheless. 
We note that the availability of such discretion is 
particularly important in the dependency context, as several 
features common to dependency proceedings tend to render 
parents’ appeals moot.  For example, the principle that 
“[d]ependency jurisdiction attaches to a child, not to his or her 
parent” (In re D.M., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 638), means 
that “ ‘[a]s long as there is one unassailable jurisdictional 
finding, it is immaterial that another might be inappropriate’ ” 
(In re D.P., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 902).  Thus, where 
jurisdictional findings have been made as to both parents but 
only one parent brings a challenge, the appeal may be rendered 
moot.  (See, e.g., In re D.M., at pp. 638–639.)  The same is true 
where there are multiple findings against one parent; the 
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
validity of one finding may render moot the parent’s attempt to 
challenge the others.  (See, e.g., In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 
Cal.App.4th 438, 451; In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 
873, 875.) 
Further, even where all findings against both parents are 
challenged, the speed with which dependency cases are resolved 
will often render appeals moot.  A key feature of juvenile court 
is expeditious resolution of pending cases.  (See In re T.G. (2015) 
242 Cal.App.4th 976, 986 [it is the “ ‘intent of the Legislature . . . 
that the dependency process proceed with deliberate speed and 
without undue delay’ ”].)  The juvenile court system is designed 
to 
“not 
disrupt 
the 
family 
unnecessarily 
or 
intrude 
inappropriately into family life . . . .”  (§ 300, subd. (j).) 
Also, unlike other court proceedings in which “the 
contested issues normally involve historical facts (what 
precisely occurred, and where and when), . . . in a dependency 
proceeding the issues normally involve evaluations of the 
parents’ present willingness and ability to provide appropriate 
care for the child and the existence and suitability of alternative 
placements.”  (In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal. 4th 901, 915.)  The 
juvenile court’s analysis in this regard may consider myriad 
factors, including a parent’s new job, completion of required 
coursework, changes in housing status, addiction treatment, or 
even the status of the parents’ relationship.  To account for these 
potential developments, juvenile courts conduct “ ‘recurrent 
reviews of the status of parent and child.’ ”  (In re Ryan K. (2012) 
207 Cal.App.4th 591, 597.)  Appellate review, by contrast, 
proceeds more slowly.  Whereas juvenile courts must 
continuously update their information and may alter orders in 
response to changing facts, an appeal from a juvenile court order 
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
may often take up to 18 months — “a considerable time in the 
life of a young child.”  (In re Tiffany Y. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 
298, 304.)  In this span, a dependency case may have “moved 
from possible reunification to possible termination” of parental 
rights (ibid.), and the statutory scheme permits a juvenile court 
to adjust its determinations while an appeal of a prior order is 
pending (In re Ryan K., at p. 597; Code Civ. Proc., § 917.7).  
Appellate dispositions may lose their practical efficacy because 
“when an appellate court reverses a prior order of the [juvenile] 
court on a record that may be ancient history to a dependent 
child, the [juvenile] court must implement the final appellate 
directive in view of the family’s current circumstances and any 
developments in the dependency proceedings that may have 
occurred during the pendency of the appeal.”  (In re Anna S., 
supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1501.) 
In sum, these features of dependency proceedings may 
make appeals particularly prone to mootness problems.  (See In 
re Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 330 [discussing this 
problem].)  Parents may appeal an order that is later changed, 
or jurisdiction over the child may terminate before an appeal is 
finally resolved, as in this case. 
Because dismissal of an appeal for mootness operates as 
an affirmance of the underlying judgment or order (In re Jasmon 
O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 413), such dismissals may “ ‘ha[ve] the 
undesirable result of insulating erroneous or arbitrary rulings 
from review’ ” (In re Marquis H. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 718, 
724).  This can pose issues not only for the parents subject to 
such findings, but also for state agencies that rely on such 
findings in the course of their duties, including child protective 
agencies, the State Department of Social Services, child support 
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
agencies, 
and 
school 
district 
officials. 
 
(See 
§ 827, 
subd. (a)(1)(G)–(J) [discussing which agencies can access 
juvenile court findings].)  It is in this context that Courts of 
Appeal have understandably opted to exercise their inherent 
discretion to decide certain challenges to juvenile court 
jurisdictional 
findings, 
notwithstanding 
mootness. 
 
In 
exercising that discretion, courts have properly considered a 
variety of factors, including but not limited to the ones we now 
discuss. 
Courts may consider whether the challenged jurisdictional 
finding “could be prejudicial to the appellant or could potentially 
impact the current or future dependency proceedings,” or 
“ ‘could have other consequences for [the appellant], beyond 
jurisdiction.’ ”  (In re Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 762–763; see also In re Nathan E., supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 121; In re C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1489.)  A prior 
jurisdictional finding can be considered by the Department in 
determining whether to file a dependency petition or by a 
juvenile court in subsequent dependency proceedings.  (See, e.g., 
In re Jeanette R. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1338, 1340 [petition 
alleged parents were unfit in part because mother had a history 
of neglect as indicated by previous dependency proceedings]; 
Francisco G. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 600 
[affirming juvenile court’s determination that reunification was 
not in child’s best interests, in part because parents had 
previously had their parental rights as to three siblings 
terminated due to drug abuse and domestic violence].)  
Jurisdictional findings may also impact the child’s placement 
(see, e.g., In re Christopher M. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1310, 
1317) or subsequent family law proceedings (see, e.g., In re 
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
Daisy H., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 716 [jurisdictional 
findings “could have severe and unfair consequences . . . in 
future family law or dependency proceedings”]).  In such 
circumstances, ensuring the validity of findings on appeal may 
be particularly important. 
The exercise of discretionary review may also be informed 
by whether the jurisdictional finding is based on particularly 
pernicious or stigmatizing conduct.  (See, e.g., In re M.W. (2015) 
238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452 [electing to conduct merits review 
because findings that Mother “exposed her children to a 
substantial risk of physical and sexual abuse are pernicious”]; 
In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 237 [similar].)  Though 
stigma alone will not sustain an appeal, a court may consider 
the nature of the allegations against the parent when deciding 
whether discretionary review is proper.  The more egregious the 
findings against the parent, the greater the parent’s interest in 
challenging such findings. 
A court may also consider why the appeal became moot.  
Where a case is moot because one parent appealed and not the 
other, but the findings against the parent who has appealed are 
based on more serious conduct, it may serve the interest of 
justice to review the parent’s appeal.  The same may be true 
where a parent does not challenge all jurisdictional findings, but 
only one finding involving particularly severe conduct.  
Moreover, where, as here, the case becomes moot due to prompt 
compliance by parents with their case plan, discretionary review 
may be especially appropriate.  After all, if D.P.’s parents had 
not completed their supervision requirements in a timely 
fashion, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction might have continued 
during the pendency of Father’s appeal, and no mootness 
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
24 
concern would have arisen.  It would perversely incentivize 
noncompliance if mootness doctrine resulted in the availability 
of appeals from jurisdictional findings only for parents who are 
less compliant or for whom the court has issued additional 
orders.  (See, e.g., In re Joshua C., supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1548; In re A.R., supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 740; cf. People 
v. DeLong (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482, 492 [declining to hold 
moot criminal appeal in which defendant promptly complied 
with drug treatment program and probation conditions in part 
because doing so would create a discrepancy regarding appeal 
rights based on compliance].)  Principles of fairness may thus 
favor discretionary review of cases rendered moot by the prompt 
compliance or otherwise laudable behavior of the parent 
challenging the jurisdictional finding on appeal. 
The factors above are not exhaustive, and no single factor 
is necessarily dispositive of whether a court should exercise 
discretionary review of a moot appeal.  Ultimately, in deciding 
whether to exercise its discretion, a court should be guided by 
the overarching goals of the dependency system:  “to provide 
maximum safety and protection for children” with a “focus” on 
“the preservation of the family as well as the safety, protection, 
and physical and emotional well-being of the child.”  (§ 300.2, 
subd. (a); see In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1228 [“The 
overarching goal of dependency proceedings is to safeguard the 
welfare of California’s children.  [Citation.]  ‘Family 
preservation . . . is the first priority when child dependency 
proceedings are commenced.’ ”].)  Given the short timeframes 
associated with dependency cases and the potentially 
significant, if sometimes uncertain, consequences that may flow 
from jurisdictional findings, consideration of the overarching 
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
25 
purposes of the dependency system may counsel in favor of 
reviewing a parent’s appeal despite its mootness.  A reviewing 
court must decide on a case-by-case basis whether it is 
appropriate to exercise discretionary review to reach the merits 
of a moot appeal, keeping in mind the broad principles and 
nonexhaustive factors discussed above. 
Here the Court of Appeal concluded, contrary to today’s 
opinion, that it had discretion to consider a moot appeal only if 
Father 
presented 
specific 
legal 
or 
practical 
negative 
consequences.  We reverse the judgment of dismissal and 
remand to the Court of Appeal to reconsider Father’s argument 
that discretionary review is warranted in light of the principles 
and factors discussed above.  On remand, the Court of Appeal 
may allow Father to introduce additional evidence in support of 
discretionary review if appropriate.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 909 
[appellate court may take additional evidence “for the purpose 
of making factual determinations or for any other purpose in the 
interests of justice”]; In re Salvador M. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 
1415, 1421 [augmenting record to include additional report from 
county agency regarding dependency petition because the report 
related to mootness].) 
 
In re D.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
26 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.* 
 
* 
Retired Chief Justice of California, assigned by the Chief 
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  In re D.P. 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 2/10/21 – 2d Dist. 
Div. 5 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S267429 
Date Filed:  January 19, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  Craig S. Barnes 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Megan Turkat-Schirn, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Rita Himes for Legal Services for Prisoners with Children, Los Angeles 
Dependency Lawyers Inc., East Bay Family Defenders and East Bay 
Community Law Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Aditi Fruitwala, Minouche Kandel; Elizabeth Gill; and David Loy for 
American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, American Civil 
Liberties Union of Northern California and American Civil Liberties 
Union of San Diego and Imperial Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Emily Berger; Keiter Appellate Law and Mitchell Keiter for Los 
Angeles Dependency Lawyers, Law Office of Emily Berger and 
 
 
Thirteen Appellate Dependency Attorneys as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Mary C. Wickham and Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim 
Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal 
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Laura E. Hirahara for California State Association of Counties as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Lounsbery Law Office and Tate Lounsbery as Amicus Curiae.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Megan Turkat-Schirn 
Attorney at Law 
269 South Beverly Drive, #193 
Beverly Hills, CA 90212 
(310) 279-0003 
 
William D. Thetford 
Principal Deputy County Counsel 
500 West Temple Street, Suite 648 
Los Angeles, CA 90012 
(213) 808-8780