Case Title: Kelley v. Wilson

Citation: 2004-Ohio-4883

Docket Number: 20040557

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-09-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Kelley v. Wilson, 103 Ohio St.3d 201, 2004-Ohio-4883.] 
 
 
KELLEY, APPELLANT, v.  WILSON, WARDEN, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Kelley v. Wilson, 103 Ohio St.3d 201, 2004-Ohio-4883.] 
Habeas corpus — Writ denied, when. 
(No. 2004-0557 — Submitted July 20, 2004 — Decided September 29, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Richland County, No. 04CA12. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} On April 4, 1991, a three-judge panel of the Cuyahoga County 
Court of Common Pleas held a hearing at which appellant, Shawn P. Kelley, 
entered a guilty plea to two counts of aggravated murder with death-penalty 
specifications and one count of aggravated robbery.  The trial court heard a 
prosecutor’s statement of facts, but it did not determine on the record whether 
Kelley was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated murder or of a lesser 
offense.  The trial court stated that it would enter Kelley’s pleas of guilty to the 
charges and then proceeded to sentence him. 
{¶ 2} On April 30, 1991, the trial court issued a journal entry accepting 
Kelley’s guilty plea and sentencing him to an aggregate term of life imprisonment 
with parole eligibility after 20 years. 
{¶ 3} On February 11, 2004, Kelley filed a petition in the Court of 
Appeals for Richland County for a writ of habeas corpus to compel his prison 
warden, Julius Wilson, to release him from confinement. Kelley claimed 
entitlement to the writ based on State v. Parker, 95 Ohio St.3d 524, 2002-Ohio-
2833, 769 N.E.2d 846, and State v. Green (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 100, 689 N.E.2d 
556.  Kelley claimed that he never waived his right to a jury trial.  Kelley further 
claimed that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him because the court 
heard no testimony, failed to determine the appropriateness of the charges, and 
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did not journalize any finding of guilt.  According to Kelley, he was consequently 
entitled to release from custody under the speedy-trial provisions of R.C. 2945.71 
because he had not been convicted and sentenced within the statutory time limit. 
{¶ 4} On February 25, 2004, the court of appeals dismissed the petition. 
{¶ 5} On appeal, Kelley asserts that the court of appeals erred in 
dismissing his habeas corpus petition.  For the following reasons, Kelley’s 
assertions lack merit. 
{¶ 6} First, Parker, 95 Ohio St.3d 524, 2002-Ohio-2833, 769 N.E.2d 
846, is inapplicable.  In Parker, at the syllabus, we held that “[a] defendant 
charged with a crime punishable by death who has waived his right to trial by jury 
must, pursuant to R.C. 2945.06 and Crim.R. 11(C)(3), have his case heard and 
decided by a three-judge panel even if the state agrees that it will not seek the 
death penalty.”  Parker does not address Kelley’s claim that he never waived his 
right to a jury trial. 
{¶ 7} Second, Kelley’s jury-trial-waiver claim is not cognizable in 
habeas corpus.  State ex rel. Larkins v. Aurelius (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 112, 113, 
702 N.E.2d 79 (“A claimed violation of R.C. 2945.05 is not the proper subject for 
an extraordinary writ”); State v. Pless (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 333, 658 N.E.2d 766, 
paragraph two of the syllabus (“The failure to comply with R.C. 2945.05 may be 
remedied only in a direct appeal from a criminal conviction”). 
{¶ 8} Third, we recently rejected a habeas corpus petitioner’s reliance on 
Parker and held that “[t]he failure of a court to convene a three-judge panel, as 
required by R.C. 2945.06, does not constitute a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction 
that renders the trial court’s judgment void ab initio and subject to collateral 
attack in habeas corpus.  It constitutes an error in the court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction that must be raised on direct appeal.” Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 
81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, syllabus.  And as noted previously, 
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Kelley’s trial court did properly convene a three-judge panel to accept his guilty 
plea. 
{¶ 9} Fourth, Kelley’s claim under Green, 81 Ohio St.3d 100, 689 
N.E.2d 556, does not warrant extraordinary relief in habeas corpus.  In Green, 81 
Ohio St.3d at 104-105, 689 N.E.2d 556, we held that trial courts must follow 
certain procedural requirements when a defendant pleads guilty to aggravated 
murder in a capital case: 
{¶ 10} “As there is no conflict in the procedural requirements of Crim.R. 
11 and R.C. 2945.06, we hold that when a defendant pleads guilty to aggravated 
murder in a capital case, a three-judge panel is required to examine witnesses and 
to hear any other evidence properly presented by the prosecution in order to make 
a Crim.R. 11 determination as to the guilt of the defendant.  Following the 
presentation of evidence, pursuant to R.C. 2945.06, a three-judge panel must 
unanimously determine whether the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
of aggravated murder or of a lesser offense.  This finding of guilt must be 
properly journalized to constitute a valid conviction.” 
{¶ 11} In Green, 81 Ohio St.3d at 105, 689 N.E.2d 556, we reversed the 
sentence and remanded the cause for a new trial because the three-judge panel had 
not followed these requirements.  We noted that “there has been no valid 
conviction and Green’s sentence is therefore void.”  Id.  It appears that, like the 
three-judge panel in Green, Kelley’s three-judge panel failed to follow these 
requirements.  We have consistently held that “ ‘[w]hen a court’s judgment is 
void because the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, habeas corpus is 
generally an appropriate remedy despite the availability of appeal.’ ”  Davis v. 
Wolfe (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 549, 552, 751 N.E.2d 1051, quoting Rash v. 
Anderson (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 349, 350, 686 N.E.2d 505. 
{¶ 12} Nevertheless, as we recently emphasized in Pratts, 102 Ohio St.3d 
81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 21, an error that results in a remand to the 
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trial court rather than a dismissal is an error in the exercise of jurisdiction for 
which there is an adequate remedy by way of direct appeal: 
{¶ 13} “Had the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the 
death-penalty case, there could have been no remand.  For in the absence of 
subject-matter jurisdiction, a court lacks the authority to do anything but 
announce its lack of jurisdiction and dismiss.” 
{¶ 14} Therefore, despite our language in Green that the specified errors 
rendered the sentence “void,” the judgment was voidable and properly challenged 
on direct appeal.  Consequently, any error by Kelley’s three-judge panel was an 
error in the exercise of its jurisdiction that is not cognizable in habeas corpus. 
{¶ 15} Fifth, Kelley’s speedy-trial claim cannot be remedied in habeas 
corpus.  Elersic v. Wilson, 101 Ohio St.3d 417, 2004-Ohio-1501, 805 N.E.2d 
1127, ¶ 3. 
{¶ 16} Finally, Kelley waived the additional claims he raises in this 
appeal by not raising them in the court of appeals.  Brown v. Leonard (1999), 86 
Ohio St.3d 593, 716 N.E.2d 183. 
{¶ 17} Based on the foregoing, because Kelley’s claims are not 
cognizable in habeas corpus and should have been raised on direct appeal, we 
affirm the judgment dismissing his habeas corpus petition. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
 Shawn P. Kelley, pro se. 
__________________