Case Title: Ruiz v. City of North Las Vegas

Citation: 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 20

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2011-05-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
4127 Nev., Advance Opinion 2D
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

      
       
 
   
 
   
    
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
    

LAZARIO RUIZ, No. 54762
Appellant,

mS FILED
CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS,
Respondent. NAY 192011

   

Appeal from a district court order dismissing a petition to
vacate an arbitration decision and confirming the decision. Righth Judicial
District Court, Clark County; Jennifer Togliatti, Judge.
Reversed and remanded,

Law Office of Daniel Marks and Adam Levine and Daniel Marks, Las
Vegas,
for Appellant.

Nicholas G. Vaskov, Acting City Attorney, L. Steven Demaree, Chief
Deputy City Attorney, and Chris Davis, Deputy City Attorney, North Las
Vegas,

for Respondent.

   

BEFORE DOUGLAS, C.J., PICKERING and HARDESTY, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:

In this appeal, we address whether an individual peace officer,
rather than the union to which he belongs and which pursued arbitration
on his behalf, may seek judicial relief from the binding arbitration decision
that ensued. While we recognize that the peace officer was not a “party” to

N-14089

 
the arbitration proceeding able to challenge the decision under Nevada’
arbitration laws and that a union generally cannot assign its collectively
bargained-for rights to challenge an arbitration decision to an individual
officer, we conclude that NRS 289.120, which allows an aggrieved peace
officer to seek judicial relief for violations of the Peace Officer Bill of
Rights, confers standing in such a circumstance. As we also conclude that
the peace officer here met the prerequisites for proceeding under NRS
289.120 by grieving the alleged violations internally and under the

collective bargaining agreement, we reverse the district court's order

 

dismissing the officer's petition to vacate the arbitrator's decision.
FACTS

Appellant Lazario Ruiz was employed by respondent, the City
of North Las Vegas (the City), as a police officer with the North Las Vegas
Police Department (NLVPD), Ruiz was a member of the North Las Vegas
Police Officers Association (the Union), a police officers’ union with which
the City had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Under the CBA, the
City and the Union agreed to abide by a series of internal grievance
procedures in the event that a Union member was terminated from his or
her employment. The CBA first required the aggrieved employee to
present a written complaint to the Union Grievance Committee. If the
Committee determined that a genuine grievance existed, then the Union
was required to present the written complaint to the employee's
Department Chief, at which point the Department Chief had ten days to
respond. If the Union found the Department Chiefs response to be

unacceptable, the Union was then required to submit the grievance to the
City Manager. If the Union and the City Manager were unable to reach a
mutually satisfactory settlement of the grievance, the CBA provided that

 

 
“the Union (but not the Union member] shall have the right” to submit the
matter to binding arbitration,

While off duty, Officer Ruiz, witnessed an altercation between
his brother and his brother's business partner. During NLVPD's response
to what it believed may have been a robbery, Officer Ruiz was interviewed
by a superior officer concerning the altercation. Officer Ruiz was then
directed to report to NLVPD headquarters, where a further interview w:
conducted. Without his knowledge or consent, Officer Ruiz’s second
observed by one of NLVPD's Internal Affairs officers.

Based upon what it perceived to be a lack of truthfulness in

 

interview ws

 

Officer Ruiz’s interview statements and unprofessional conduct on his part,
NLYPD terminated Ruiz’s employment. Following Ruiz's termination, and
pursuant to the CBA, the Union filed a grievance on his behalf with the
City. ‘The grievance was based largely on alleged violations of the Peace
Officer Bill of Rights, codified at NRS 289.010-.120, which requires a police
officer's employer to abide by certain procedural safeguards when
conducting an internal investigation. In particular, the grievance stated
the following:

The specific grounds for Officer Ruiz’s and the [Union's]
collective grievance is based on the due process violation
Officer Ruiz suffered during the Department's investigation of

\For example, NRS 289.060(1) mandates that “not later than 48
hours before any interrogation or hearing is held relating to an
investigation,” the peace officer’s employer must “provide written notice to

  

the peace officer” of the interrogation or hearing. Similarly, NRS
289.060(8)(c) requires an interrogating officer to “[l]imit the scope of the
questions during the interrogation or hearing to the alleged misconduct of
the peace officer.” The Union's grievance alleged that NLVPD had violated
these two requirements.

 

 
an alleged robbery ....During such an investigation, it is
believed that the Department effectively violated his rights
guaranteed to him under the [Peace] Officer Bill of Rights—
specifically NRS sections—289.057, 289.060, and 289.080.

‘The Union's grievance went on to assert several specific violations of Ruiz’s

 

rights resulting from his questioning about the alleged robbery, concluding
with the following statement:

[The (Union} believes that the rights of Officer Ruiz have been
violated and the severe discipline imposed should be stricken.
Further, it is the [Union's] belief and assertion that such
information gained in violation of NRS Chapter 289, will be
barred from admission in any subsequent judicial or
arbitration hearing as it is prejudicial to Officer Ruiz and
prohibited under NRS 289.085.?

‘The City denied Ruiz’s grievance, concluding, with respect to
the alleged Peace Officer Rights violations, that Ruiz’s “allegations of
procedural misconduct [did not] have merit.” In light of the City’s denial of
Ruiz’s grievance, the Union submitted the matter to arbitration pursuant
to the CBA. Although the overarching premise of the Union's argument to
the arbitrator was that Ruiz had been terminated without just cause, the

Union also filed a motion in limine, seeking to exclud

 

ements made by
Ruiz that were allegedly obtained in violation of his Peace Officer Rights.
Without ruling definitively on the Union's motion in limine,
the arbitrator entertained the substance of both parties’ arguments, which
included evidence that the Union had sought to exclude. After the hearing,
the arbitrator concluded that NLVPD had just cause to terminate Ruiz,

2NRS 289.085 requires courts and arbitrators to exclude evidence
obtained in violation of the Peace Officer Bill of Rights in specific
circumstances.

 

 
ome

 

Not reaching the merits of all of Ruiz’s arguments as to the Peace Officer
Bill of Rights, the arbitrator determined that NLVPD had not commenced
an official internal investigation of Ruiz at the time he made his
statements and, consequently, any rights that Ruiz had under the Peace
Officer Bill of Rights were not triggered.

‘The Union then assigned to Ruiz its right to challenge the

 

arbitration decision, and Ruiz individually petitioned the district court to
vacate the arbitration decision and to remand the matter for a new
arbitration proceeding. Subsequently, the City filed a motion to dismis
arguing that Ruiz lacked standing to file the petition because he was a
nonparty to the arbitration proceeding. The district court agreed and
granted the City’s motion, further concluding that the right to challenge
the arbitration decision was not assignable and that Ruiz had not met the
prerequisites to sue under the Peace Officer Bill of Rights. This appeal
followed.
DISCUSSION

On appeal, Ruiz presents three arguments as to why he had
standing to individually petition the district court to vacate the arbitration
decision: (1) under Nevada's Uniform Arbitration Act, he was a “party” to
the arbitration proceeding capable of challenging the arbitration decision
in district court; (2) the Union effectively assigned to him its rights under
the CBA to pursue further dispute resolution; and (3) NRS 289.120
statutorily confers standing on aggrieved peace officers to seek judicial
relief from Peace Officer Bill of Rights violations.

'Ruiz. also contends that NRS 288.140(2) permits him to seek judicial
relief separate and apart from any relief that might be available to him
continued on next page...

 
conn Be

 

Because the CBA’s express language limited arbitration rights
to the Union, we conclude that Ruiz was not a “party” to the arbitration
proceeding for purposes of appealing the arbitration decision pursuant to
Nevada’s Uniform Arbitration Act. We also conclude that the Union's

assignment of its rights to Ruiz was ineffective, as the CBA did not

 

expressly permit such assignments and because otherwise permitting such
ignments could have the effect of materially increasing the City's

 

bargained-for obligations under the CBA. However, we conclude that Ruiz
had standing under NRS 289.120 to seek relief in district court. Since NRS
289.120 confers standing upon an aggrieved peace officer, we then address
the district court's determination that Ruiz failed to meet the statute's
prerequisites to judicial review, and we conclude that the district court
viewed those prerequisites too narrowly.
Standard of review

Whether standing exists is a question of law subject to our de
novo review. See Delaware Valley Surgical v. Johnson & Johnson, 523
F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2008); Mid-Hudson Catskill Ministry _v. Fine
Host, 418 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir. 2005); Citizens for Cold Springs v. City of

~ continued

through the Union's CBA. We conclude that this argument lacks merit, as
it is belied by the plain language of the statute. NRS 288.140(2) permits a
government employee who has chosen not to become a union member to act
on his or her own behalf in pursuing an employment-based grievance. The
statute does not permit a union member to seek judicial relief in the event
that he or she is unsatisfied with the outcome of CBA-negotiated grievance
procedures.

 
Reno, 125 Nev. __, __, 218 P.3d 847, 850-51 (2009) (applying de novo
review in deciding upon whom a statute conferred standing).

Ruiz’s first argument is based on his interpretation of a
provision in the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), which provides that,
“{ulpon motion to the court by a party to an arbitral proceeding, the court
shall vacate an award made in the arbitral proceeding if: [one of several
grounds is applicable}.”*| NRS 38.241 (emphasis added), In short, Ruiz
argues that because the Union pursued the grievance and subsequent
arbitration on his behalf, he should be deemed a “party” to the proceedings
capable of challenging the decision in district court under the UAA. For
the following reasons, we reject Ruiz’s argument.

The issue of whether an individual employee has standing as a
“party” to challenge a decision made in an arbitration proceeding between
his union and his employer has never been addressed by this court. While
we often look to other jurisdictions for guidance in such situations, the
need to do so here is of particular importance: “In applying and construing
[the UAA], consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity
of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.”
NRS 38.248 (emphasis added); see also Karcher Firestopping v. Meadow
Valley Contr., 125 Nev. 111, 113-16, 204 P.3d 1262, 1263-65 (2009) (looking
to other jurisdictions’ interpretations of a UAA provision when interpreting
an analogous provision in Nevada’s UAA).

“In 2001, Nevada adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000,
codified in NRS 38.206-.248, See NRS 38.206; 2001 Nev. Stat., ch. 280, § 1,
at 1274,

 

 
 

Generally, other jurisdictions that have adopted the UAA have
held that an individual employee does not have standing as a “party” to
challenge an arbitration decision rendered in a proceeding between the
employee's union and his or her employer. See, e.g., Risen v, State, Dept,
of Public Welfare, 352 N.W.24 731, 736 (Minn, 1984); Stahulak v. City of
Chicago, 703 N.E.2d 44, 46 (Ill. 1998); Miller v. Board of Regents of Higher
Edue,, 541 N.E.2d 989, 992-93 (Mass, 1989).

We find the analysis of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Eisen

to be particularly instructive. In Eisen, the court addressed the exact

 

question before this court: “whether [an individual employee] was a ‘party’
to the arbitration hearing for purposes of appeal under the Uniform
Arbitration Act,” as enacted in Minnesota, 352 N.W.2d at 733. The court
first recognized that Minnesota's UAA failed to define “party” for purposes
of grievance appeals. Id, at 734, As such, it then looked to the CBA to
determine whether the individual employee could be considered a “party.”
Id, at 734-35. Determining that an individual employee was not a “party”
under the CBA, the court stated the following:

‘The agreement, by express terms, permitted the union, not the
employee, to invoke the arbitration provisions of the
agreement. The only parties named in the agreement under
the arbitration provision were the union and the state
negotiator, who, respectively, represent the employee and the
employer in hearings before arbitrators selected by both
parties.

 

Id, The court concluded that “unless the collective bargaining agreement
provides otherwise, an individual employee may not appeal an unfavorable
award where the union expressly determines not to appeal.” Id, at 736.
Such is the case here. Neither Nevada's UAA nor the CBA
between the Union and the City defines “party” to include individual Union
members. In fact, the CBA specifically states that “[tJhis Agreement is,

8

 
made... by and between the City... and the [Union].” Moreover, the
“Grievance and Arbitration Procedure” set forth in the CBA clearly
provides that the Union is the “party” responsible for filing a grievance and
pursuing arbitration.»

Because the CBA expressly states that the Union is
responsible for pursuing an employee's grievance up to and including
arbitration, we conclude that Ruiz was not a “party” to the arbitration
proceeding. Our conclusion also comports with the restrictive view this
court has taken in previous cases in which we have been asked to stretch
the boundaries of the term “party.” See, e.g, Valley Bank of Nevada v.
Ginsburg, 110 Nev. 440, 446, 874 P.2d 729, 734 (1994) (“This court has
consistently taken a restrictive view of those persons or entities that have
standing to appeal as parties.”); Garaventa Co. v, Dist. Court, 61 Nev. 350,
358-54, 128 P.2d 266, 267-68 (1942) (holding that a corporation did not
have standing to appeal an adverse judgment because it was not a named
party in the underlying lawsuit). Consequently, we conclude that the
district court correctly determined that Ruiz lacked standing under NRS
38.241 as a “party” to the arbitration proceeding.®

"The CBA states that “[t]he Union recognizes its responsibility as
bargaining agent and agrees to fairly represent all employees in the
bargaining unit.”

“Although an employee generally will not be considered a “party” to
an arbitration proceeding capable of challenging the arbitrator's decision in
court, we note that such an aggrieved employee is not wholly without
recourse. If the employee can demonstrate that the union has violated its
duty of fair representation in handling the employee's grievance, the
employee may have a cause of action against his or her union. Rosequist v,
IntLAssin of Firefighters, 118 Nev. 444, 448-49, 49 P.3d 651, 653-54 (2002)
(holding that a union member seeking to challenge whether his union

continued on next page...

 
omen

 

‘The Union could not assign its rights to Ruiz
Ruiz next contends that the Union ai

 

jigned to him its rights

 

under the CBA to further pursue his grievance and that, included within
the assigned rights was the ability to challenge the arbitration decision in
district court, It is undisputed that the Union attempted to

 

ign its
rights to Ruiz, The district court, however, concluded that the rights were

not assignable, because to permit such

 

ssignments would violate public

  

 

policy, As explained below, wo agree with the district court's rationale,
because enabling the assignment of certain CBA rights would undermine
the entire purpose for union representation and collective bargaining.

As a general matter, collective bargaining agreements are
contractual by nature. 20 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 55:3
(4th ed. 2001). A union, acting under the authority conferred upon it by all
its members, enters into a contract with the members’ employer in which
both union and employer agree to abide by certain rules and procedures.
Indeed, the CBA at issue here expressly states what is obviously necessary
in this three-way relationship: “[t]he Union recognizes its responsibility as
bargaining agent and agrees to fairly represent all employees in the
bargaining unit.” See NRS 288.160(2) (granting status of “exclusive
bargaining agent” to any union that represents a majority of the employees
in a particular bargaining unit—eg., nonsupervisory peace officers
employed by the City of North Las Vegas).

--continued
fulfilled its duty of fair representation must file a claim with Nevada's

Employee-Management Relations Board), abrogated on other grounds by
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Thorpe, 123 Nev. 565, 170 P.8d 989 (2007).

10

 
 

Given the contractual relationship that a CBA creates between
the union and the employer, the assignability of the union's rights is
appropriately analyzed under traditional principles of contract law. While
wre freely assignable in the
absence of language to the contrary, an assignment that has the effect of

we recognize the general rule that contracts

 

increasing the nonassigning party's obligations or risks under the contract
is prohibited. HD Supply Facilities Maint. v. Bymoen, 125 Nev. 200, 204,
210 P.3d 183, 186 (2009) (“[T]he basic policy in the law of contractual
assignments [is to] honor{] an obligor's choice to contract with only the
original obligee, thereby ensuring that the obligor is not compelled to
perform more than his or her original obligation.”); Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 317(2)(a) (1979) (A contractual right can be assigned
unless... the substitution of a right of the assignee for the right of the
assignor would materially change the duty of the obligor, or materially
increase the burden or risk imposed on him by his contract . . ..”)

With this in mind, we conclude that the Union could not assign
to its members the right to challenge an arbitration decision. Nothing in
the CBA permits the Union to do so, and assigning to its members the
right to seek judicial relief would impose an additional burden on the City,
potentially requiring it to expend additional time, money, and resources on
litigating an arbitration decision that it had thought would be binding. We
conclude that an assignment by the Union of the right to appeal an
arbitration decision would materially increase the City’s obligations under
the CBA. Thus, unless a CBA expressly permits assignment of rights to a
union member, we conclude that such an assignment is invalid. See
Dillman v. Town of Hooksett, 898 A.2d 505, 508 (N.H. 2006) (recognizing
that allowing unions to assign their litigation rights under a CBA would
undermine the purposes behind collective bargaining laws and thereby

u

 
 

violate public policy by potentially requiring the employer to deal directly
with numerous individuals—as opposed to their exclusive representative—
with varying merit to their complaints, subjecting the employer to greater
demand on its public resources than contemplated during negotiations and
allowing the union to avoid liability to its members),
Ruiz has standing under NRS 289.120 to seek judicial relief

Ruiz’s final argument is that the Peace Officer Bill of Rights
statutorily grants individual peace officers standing to challenge an
arbitration decision that determines whether violations of those rights
occurred. Specifically, he points to NRS 289.120, which governs judicial
relief regarding Peace Officer Rights violations:

Any peace officer aggrieved by an action of the employer of the
peace officer in violation of [the Peace Officer Bill of Rights]
may, after exhausting any applicable internal grievance
procedures, grievance procedures negotiated pursuant to
[collective bargaining] and other administrative remedies,
apply to the district court for judicial relief. If the court
determines that the employer has violated a provision of this
chapter, the court shall order appropriate injunctive or other
extraordinary relief to prevent the further occurrence of the
violation and the taking of any reprisal or retaliatory action by
the employer against the peace officer.

Ruiz contends that NRS 289.120 grants him standing to
individually challenge the arbitration decision because the decision upheld
his termination that was based upon information allegedly obtained in
violation of his Peace Officer Rights. We agree. Assuming that Ruiz
“exhausted” any applicable internal or CBA-negotiated grievance
procedures, NRS 289.120’s plain language grants Ruiz the right to
challenge the arbitration decision in district court.

‘The City contends, however, that Ruiz has not exhausted the

CBA-negotiated grievance procedures. Based on the fact that the only

12

 
om

 

question presented to the arbitrator was whether Ruiz had been
terminated without just cause, the City maintains that any ancillary
questions that might form the basis for this main question were not
sufficiently “grieved” through each of the CBA's grievance steps. In
granting the City’s motion to dismiss Ruiz’s petition, the district court

 

agreed with the City’s rationale, “reject{ing] Ruiz’s assertion that the fact
that his firing was grieved de facto encompassed all of his grievable issues,
including alleged violations of NRS Chapter 289.”

We disagree with the district court’s conclusion that a
grievance that generically alleges an employee's wrongful termination
cannot also encompass specific grievable issues related to the employee's
Peace Officer Rights. In its initial grievance, the Union alleged four
specific violations of Ruiz's Peace Officer Rights, the most notable of which
was the allegation that Ruiz was not provided with any notice that he was
going to be questioned about the alleged robbery.” Upon submitting the

grievance to the arbitrator, the Union again made clear that improper

‘The Union's grievance expressly alleged that NLVPD had violated
NRS 289.060(1)’s requirement that an officer be given 48 hours’ notice
prior to being interrogated:

Failure to provide Officer Ruiz at least 48 hours notice prior to
questioning by any fellow law enforcement official in regards to
any complaint or allegation that Officer Ruiz was engaged in
activities which could result in punitive action (e.g. an internal
complaint of Unprofessional Conduct) as, according to the
Department's own internal documents, Officer Ruiz was not
considered a suspect at the time of the contact or initial
interview[.]

13

 
reliance on information obtained in violation of Ruiz’s rights contributed to
NLVPD's decision to terminate Ruiz’s employment. At both stages in the

grievance proce

 

, the Union’s argument rested upon the alleged Peace
Officer Bill of Rights violations, We reject the City’s argument that Ruiz
did not grieve these particular issues simply because NLVPD and the
arbitrator failed to give them ample consideration throughout the
grievance process,

Moreover, we note that an aggrieved peace officer would rarely,
if ever, have occasion to complain that his or her rights were violated when
such violation did not result in some sort of significant discipline. In many
cases, if the rights violation never leads to further disciplinary action, the
peace officer would have little motivation to request that his or her union
seek arbitration. Most CBAs have a screening process to prevent
grievances with no risk of disciplinary action from reaching the arbitration
stage.® With this in mind, we consider it unlikely that a Peace Officer Bill
of Rights violation, grieved in the abstract, would reach the arbitration
stage on its own. Accordingly, we conclude that Ruiz has exhausted the
applicable internal grievance procedures required by NRS 289.120 and

"See Alan Miles Ruben, How Arbitration Works 198-202 (6th ed.
2003) (explaining that an effective collective bargaining agreement will
have in place preliminary procedures to dispose of inconsequential
grievances well before they reach the arbitration stage), The CBA at issue
in this case provides a similar procedure: Step 1 of the “Grievance
Procedure” requires the Union Grievance Committee to review an
employee's complaint, and only “{iJf it is determined by the Union
Grievance Committee that a grievance does exist” shall the Union then
proceed to Step 2 and present the grievance to the employee's Department
Chief,

 

 
that he therefore has standing to challenge the arbitration decision in
district court.?

°The City also contends that NRS 289.120 only permits the district
‘court to grant prospective relief—i.e,, to enjoin a peace officer's employer
from engaging in future rights violations. Construing the statute in such a
manner, however, would produce an absurd result. California Commercial
vy. Amedeo Vegas I, 119 Nev. 143, 145, 67 P.3d 828, 330 (2003) [W]e are
not empowered to construe the statute beyond its plain meaning, unless
the law as stated would yield an absurd result”)

‘The issues raised in this case provide an apt example: Ruiz was
terminated from his job pursuant to an arbitration decision that was
based, in part, on evidence allegedly obtained through prohibited
interrogations. Enjoining his employer from wrongfully interrogating him
in the future provides him with no relief under the statute. If Ruiz’s
allegations are true, he has already been improperly interrogated, has been
terminated, and must deal with his tarnished record when looking for new
employment.

Simply put, the Peace Officer Bill of Rights represents the Nevada
Legislature's recognition that peace officers, because of the important role
they play in maintaining public safety, deserve additional protections that
are unavailable to other public employees. See Hearing on A.B. 458 Before
the Assembly Judiciary Comm., 62d Leg. (Nev., Apr. 12, 1983) (discussing
whether peace officers, because of the "position of trust that they hold.”
should instead be “held to a higher standard than the average citizen”
rather than receive additional procedural rights); Hearing on A.B. 458
Before the Assembly Judiciary Comm., 62d Leg. (Nev., May 11, 1983)
(questioning why peace officers deserve rights that are not afforded to
other state employees); see also Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An
Impediment to Police Accountability? An Analysis of Statutory Law
Enforcement Officers’ Bills of Rights, 14 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 185, 185-87
(2005) (discussing the public-policy considerations behind granting peace
officers additional protections that "(no other group of public employees
enjoys").

When our Legislature enacts statutes purporting to grant a group of
people certain rights, we will construe the statutes in a manner consistent
with the enforceability of those rights. See Torrealba v. Kesmetis, 124
Nev. 95, 101, 178 P.3d 716, 721 (2008) (“[I]t is the duty of this court, when

continued on next page...

 

 

 
om

 

We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court and
remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent
with the provisions of NRS 289.120.

Hardesty

=. continued

possible, to interpret provisions within a common statutory scheme
harmoniously with one another in accordance with the general purpose of
those statutes and to avoid unreasonable or absurd results, thereby giving
effect to the Legislature's intent.” (internal quotations omitted).
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court is not limited to granting
prospective relief under NRS 289.120.

16