Case Title: ADDAKAI v. WITT

Citation: 

Docket Number: 00-29

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-09-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
ADDAKAI v. WITT2001 WY 8531 P.3d 70Case Number: 00-29Decided: 09/11/2001

April Term, A.D. 2001

 

 

 

SUSIE 
and ELROY ADDAKAI,                   

husband 
and wife, 

Appellants(Plaintiffs),

 

v.

WILLIAM 
and DEBRA WITT,

husband 
and wife, 

Appellees(Defendants).

 

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County:

The 
Honorable Jere A. Ryckman, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants:

William 
L. Combs of Combs Law Office, Evanston, WY.  

 Representing 
Appellees:

Daniel 
T. Massey of Harrison and Massey L.L.C., Rawlins, WY.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL and KITE, JJ.

 

LEHMAN, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1]      Appellants 
Addakais became interested in buying a thoroughbred mare from appel­lees 
Witts and, after providing a down payment, requested an opportunity to ride the 
horse while it was still on the Witts' premises.  While on a test ride, Mrs. Addakai was 
thrown from the horse and sustained injury.  The Addakais sued alleging, inter 
alia, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, strict liability, and 
conversion (the down payment was not re­turned).  The district court granted the Witts 
partial summary judgment on the strict liability issue, and a jury found in 
favor of the Witts on the remaining counts.  The Addakais appeal claiming misleading 
jury instructions and irregularities in the special verdict form.  Finding that the instructions were a 
proper reflection of the law and that the Addakais failed to prop­erly 
reserve the special verdict form issue for appeal, we 
affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Appellants 
Addakais articulate two issues:

 

[1]  Whether appellants should receive a new 
trial on their neg­ligence claims due to the misleading, confusing and 
prejudicial jury instruction under the Landowner Liability 
Act.

 

[2]  Whether appellants should receive a new 
trial on their neg­ligence claims due to irregularities surrounding the 
special ver­dict form which deprived appellants of a fair and impartial 
jury, and resulted in a verdict contrary to the weight of the 
evidence.

 

Appellees 
Witts expand a bit on the same general theme in their statement of the 
issues:

 

[1]  Was the jury instruction relative to 
landowner liability an accurate statement of the law and 
relevant[?]

 

[2]  Can appellants now object to a verdict 
form when they did not object to the verdict form at 
trial[?]

 

[3]  Did the verdict form cause the jury to 
reach a verdict con­trary to the weight of the 
evidence[?]

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      The horse at the 
center of this controversy is a thoroughbred bay mare named Cindy Mist.  Cindy Mist was purchased by a third 
party shortly after she retired from racing at Vernal, Utah, and then sold to a 
gentleman by the name of Bill Haines.  
Mr. Haines, 85 years of age at the time, retrained Cindy Mist using a 
snaffle bit, although he and a female ac­quaintance frequently rode the 
horse using nothing but a hackamore.  
A hackamore, also known as a bosal, is a rigid oval, usually made from 
braided rawhide, fitting around the horse's nose.  There is no bit in the horse's mouth, 
and commands are given by applying pressure to the horse's nose and 
jaw.

 

[¶4]      In early 1994, 
Dr. Clayton Van Balen purchased Cindy Mist from Bill Haines.  Dr. Van Balen never observed the horse 
behaving in any other than the most gentle fashion, and his affidavit to that 
effect was read into the trial transcript.  
Appellee Bill Witt had ridden virtually his entire life, but Mrs. Witt 
was just learning to ride.  One of 
those riders with whom Cindy Mist was so gentle, according to Dr. Van Balen's 
affidavit, was Mrs. Witt.

 

[¶5]      While working at 
the Jim Bridger Power Plant near Rock Springs, the Addakais were on the lookout 
for a horse to purchase and were referred for that purpose to the Witts by a 
veterinarian.  After two preliminary 
viewings of Cindy Mist, the Addakais agreed to purchase the animal for $1,000, 
giving the Witts a $500 down payment and planning to take the horse back to 
their home in Arizona at the conclusion of their job.  

 

[¶6]      On May 12, 1995, 
the Addakais called Mr. Witt to inquire about coming by for a "test ride" of 
Cindy Mist.   When the Addakais 
arrived at the corrals, Cindy Mist was fitted with a western saddle and a 
hackamore.  Mrs. Addakai had ridden 
quarter horses and mustangs since childhood but had no experience with 
thoroughbreds.  She was used to 
riding with a snaffle bit, which consists of a jointed metal bar that passes 
through the horse's mouth and is more likely to command the horse's 
attention.  Everyone was aware that 
the mare was in season (estrous), but she was ridden by Mr. Witt without 
incident.  Mr. Addakai then rode 
Cindy Mist out of the corral area and up over a hill onto some property 
maintained by the Bureau of Land Management.  Nothing in the horse's demeanor alarmed 
the Addakais.   Mr. Addakai did 
feel that the horse was a bit "hyper," but did not feel a need to communicate 
that concern to his wife, telling her rather that the horse was fine.  Mrs. Addakai relied upon her husband's 
judgment and "figured this horse is pretty good and he says, gentle horse, so 
that's why I sat on it."  

 

[¶7]      Mr. Witt and Mr. 
Addakai watched Mrs. Addakai ride out over the same hill that Mr. Addakai had 
traversed moments before, but the two men then went with Bill Haines to look at 
a horse trailer Mr. Addakai was interested in buying.  The men then heard Mrs. Addakai 
"hollering," and observed her hanging on for dear life while the horse moved at 
a trot back towards the corral.  The 
reins were flopping at the sides of Cindy Mist's head, and Mrs. Addakai had a 
hold on the saddle horn with both hands.  
The horse eventually broke into a lope but then did a quick 90 degree 
turn at the corral, throwing Mrs. Addakai, who then ex­perienced a violent 
collision with a horse trailer that was parked in front of the corral.  Mr. Witt immediately summoned an 
ambulance.  Though not 
life-threatening, Mrs. Addakai's injuries, including broken ribs, a back injury, 
and head lacerations requiring 100 stitches, were sufficient to warrant her 
hospitalization for the next three days.  

 

[¶8]      Throughout the 
following three months, the Witts tried repeatedly to contact the Addakais 
without success.  Eventually the 
Witts could no longer afford to maintain Cindy Mist and sold her to Shawn 
McWilliams.  Mr. McWilliams felt 
that Cindy Mist was a gentle horse and allowed his son, who had been severely 
injured in a horse accident two years ear­lier, to ride her.  

 

[¶9]      Eventually, the 
Addakais filed suit against the Witts, alleging that Mrs. Addakai was suffering 
from post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), had become timorous around animals, 
and was facing the prospect of spinal fusion surgery.  A physician who evaluated Mrs. Addakai 
after her return to Arizona noted that it is a cultural trait of the Navajo 
Tribe, of which both the Addakais are native, to minimize pain and 
discomfort.  A defense expert, 
however, cast doubt upon the PTSD diagnosis and testified that Mrs. Addakai did 
not seem to put much effort into some of the tests he administered.  

 

[¶10]   The Addakais alleged six causes of 
action against the Witts:  1) 
negligent misrepresenta­tion of a dangerous animal as gentle; 2) negligence 
for having failed to take proper precautions to protect Mrs. Addakai during her 
test ride; 3) strict liability for know­ingly maintaining an animal with 
knowledge of its dangerous propensities; 4) conversion predicated upon the 
Witts' refusal to return the $500 down payment; 5) unjust enrichment by virtue 
of the retained down payment; and 6) negligent infliction of emotional distress 
for failure to use ordinary and reasonable care when inviting the Addakais to 
test ride Cindy Mist.  Alleging that 
the Witts' actions were willful, wanton, reckless, and done with "callous 
disregard for the appellants' rights and safety," the Addakais also sought 
exemplary dam­ages.  

 

[¶11]   The Witts set up defenses 
predicated on the Recreation Safety Act (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-1-121 through -123 
(Michie 1997)) and the so-called Wyoming Landowner Liability Act (Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 34-19-101 through -106 (LexisNexis 2001)).  Initially, the district court gave 
partial summary judgment to the Witts on the negligence and strict liability 
counts.  After enlisting the aid of 
an additional expert, however, the Addakais were permitted to amend their 
complaint, realleging negligence and adding a negligent infliction of 
emo­tional distress count with specific respect to Mr. Addakai, but dropping 
the strict liability allegations.  

 

[¶12]   Trial was had before a six-person 
jury from January 26 through 30, 1999.  
The Addakais had submitted jury instructions and a special verdict form 
during the period of time when their negligence claim had been temporarily 
eliminated by the district court's partial summary judgment.  This omission created an awkward moment 
during the instructions con­ference, but was resolved when the Addakais 
agreed to allow the district court to reformulate the special verdict form.  

 

[¶13]   The jury found in favor of the 
Witts on all counts.  From the 
judgment entered upon that verdict and the district court's refusal to grant a 
new trial, the Addakais timely prose­cuted this 
appeal.

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶14]   It is the duty of the district 
court to provide instructions to a jury which clearly ex­press the law in a 
manner sufficient to allow the jury to apply the correct law to the facts as 
they have determined them.  Baier 
v. State, 891 P.2d 754, 756 (Wyo. 1995).  A shortfall in those instructions which 
either misleads or confuses the jury will presage an injustice to the parties 
and require remand for a new trial.  
Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 960 (Wyo. 
1990).

 

[¶15]   It does not follow, however, that 
this court will impress a de novo review of jury instruc­tions as we 
do with most questions of law.  
Rather, it is incumbent upon the party al­leging mistaken 
instructions to demonstrate error.  
Vasquez by and through Vasquez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 913 P.2d 441, 443 (Wyo. 1996).  Prejudicial 
error is never presumed.  
McWilliams v. Wilhelm by and through Wilhelm, 893 P.2d 1147, 1148 
(Wyo. 1995).  The party alleging 
error must show that the instructions had a tendency to confuse or mislead the 
jury before this court will consider reversal.  Bigley v. Craven, 769 P.2d 892, 
895 (Wyo. 1989).  Our review of 
allegedly errant jury instructions proceeds in light of the instructions as a 
whole rather than singling out particular instructions in a piecemeal 
fashion.  Ellison v. State, 3 P.3d 845, 849 (Wyo. 2000).

 

[¶16]   Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 49, the 
submission of a particular form of special verdict is com­mitted to the 
sound discretion of the trial court.  
Turcq v. Shanahan, 950 P.2d 47, 53 (Wyo. 1997).  It follows that reversal may only be 
predicated upon an abuse of that discre­tion.  A party alleging error in a special 
verdict form must be vigilant.  
Failure to object to a special verdict form will not be considered on 
appeal if the complaining party failed to object or present their own 
alternative at trial.  Duffy v. 
Brown, 708 P.2d 433, 439 (Wyo. 1985).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶17]   The Addakais believe they were 
deprived of a fair trial by confusing and misleading jury instructions.  Pointing to our holding in Clarke v. 
Beckwith, 858 P.2d 293, 296 (Wyo. 1993), the Addakais assert that an 
occupier owes a duty to those who come upon the property to maintain those 
premises in a reasonably safe condition.  
They argue that when the Witts placed their horse trailer in proximity to 
Cindy Mist's corral, an inherently dangerous situa­tion was created, setting 
the stage for Mrs. Addakai's injuries.

 

[¶18]   In fact, the Addakais acknowledge 
that Instruction No. 39, as given to the jury by the trial court, properly 
expressed the duty of a landowner or occupier.  The existence of such a duty was further 
buttressed by Instruction No. 37 which covered the duty of a possessor of land 
who invites the public onto that property for business purposes.  However, the salutary effect of those 
instructions upon the Addakais' case was, according to their argument, 
ne­gated by Instruction No. 36, which read as follows:

 

            
A possessor of land owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for 
entry or use by others for recreational pur­poses, or to give any warning of 
a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity on such premises to persons 
entering for recreational purposes.  

 

[¶19]   The Addakais agree that the 
foregoing instruction is an accurate statement of the Land­owner Liability 
Act as expressed at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-19-103 (LexisNexis 2001).1  They argue, however, that confusion was 
engendered by the district court's failure to remind the jury that Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 34-19-106(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2001) imposes a duty of ordi­nary care 
upon landowners, regardless of the aforementioned recreational use 
exception.  Furthermore, the 
Addakais insist that "recreational purpose," as defined by § 34-19-101(a)(iii), 
specifically excludes equine activities from the liability exemption otherwise 
provided by the Landowner Liability Act.

 

[¶20]   It is true that the Recreation 
Safety Act specifically addresses equine activities while the Landowner 
Liability Act does not.  However, 
the definition of "recreational purpose" at § 34-19-101(a)(iii) is 
open-ended, employing the phraseology of "includ[ing], but . . . not limited to" 
before described numerous activities not including equine activities.  We cannot agree with the Addakais that 
this language evinces a legislative intent to exclude equine ac­tivities 
from the "recreational purpose" provisions of the Landowner Liability 
Act.

 

[¶21]   When ruling upon the Addakais' 
motion for a new trial, the district court candidly agreed that there is tension 
between instructions given pursuant to the Landowner Liability Act and those 
given according to the Recreation Safety Act:

 

[T]his 
Court, I think, gave all but one of [the Addakais' prof­fered] instructions, 
and I think I gave most of the [Witts' prof­fered] instructions in this 
case, and when you read the general instructions on land owners' duties and 
possessors of land and then try to read together the specific statutes on 
horseback riding and land owner liability and recreation acts, they don't read 
well together . . . .

 

[¶22]   There can be no dispute that the 
Addakais and Witts were each entitled to have the jury instructed upon their 
respective theories of the case.  
Rittierodt v. State Farm Ins. Co., 3 P.3d 841, 843 (Wyo. 
2000).  That the parties were so 
entitled is not to say that the district court had license to utter confusing 
and contradictory instructions.  
However, an appellate court may not fix a myopic gaze upon one 
instruction to the exclusion of the others and the cumulative impact of the 
jury's charge.  Some forty-odd 
instructions were given to the jury in this case, and we must consider that 
charge as a whole.  Betts v.  Crawford, 965 P.2d 680, 686 (Wyo. 
1998).

 

[¶23]   It was the Addakais' theory of the 
case that Cindy Mist was in season (estrous), not used to a hackamore or bosal 
(as opposed to a snaffle bit), should have been ridden within the confines of 
her corral, and should not have been blocked from reentering that corral by a 
negligently placed horse trailer.  
We believe that the instructions, taken as a whole, im­pressed upon 
the Witts a duty of ordinary care with respect to the manner in which the horse 
was presented to the Addakais for their "test" ride.  This can readily be perceived when 
reviewing Instruction No. 39:

 

            
An occupier of premises must act as a reasonable man in maintaining his 
property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, 
including the likelihood of injury to another, the seriousness of the injury, 
and the burden of avoid­ing the risk.  

 

[¶24]   A careful review of the entire 
charge given to the jury in this case leaves this court with the firm impression 
that "the charge present[ed] a comprehensive, balanced and funda­mentally 
accurate statement of the governing law to the jury."  Betts 
v. Crawford, 
965 P.2d  at 686 (quoting State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co v. Shrader, 
882 P.2d 813, 832 (Wyo. 1994)).

 

[¶25]   Had it been the inclination of the 
jury to find in favor of the Addakais, it could have done so.  We cannot say that the statement of the 
Landowner Liability Act at Instruction No. 36 made any greater impression upon 
the jury than the earlier instructions covering the Rec­reation Safety Act, 
including the admonition that one who engages in a sport or recreational 
activity, including equine activities, assumes the risk inherent in such 
activities.  

 

[¶26]   It is not insignificant that the 
issue of negligence was presented to a jury.  Partial sum­mary judgment had 
earlier been granted on that issue, but the district court eventually 
re­lented, indulging the Addakais by allowing them to present an amended 
complaint and des­ignate an additional expert witness.  In close cases we have expressed a 
preference for al­lowing jurors to decide just what is or is not a risk 
inherent to a particular recreational activ­ity:

 

To 
say that inherent risks are assumed by sports participants "as a matter of law" 
is of little solace to [plaintiffs] when the ques­tion remains: what risks 
in a sport are inherent, obvious, or nec­essary to its participation, a 
question that ordinarily must be re­solved by the 
jury.

 

Halpern 
v. Wheeldon, 
890 P.2d 562, 566 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Dillworth 
v. Gambardella, 
970 F.2d 1113, 1119 (2nd Cir. 1992)).  The district court allowed the jury to 
decide what risks inhere to horseback riding, and the jury made its 
decision.

 

[¶27]   Counsel's affidavit submitted in 
support of the Addakais' motion for a new trial is also instructive with respect 
to the issue of the form of the special verdict.  In that affidavit counsel indicates that 
it was not until he returned to his home in Evanston that he began to have 
concerns about the form of the special verdict.  The trial had been held in Green 
River.  This is an accurate 
reflection of the confusion engendered at the instructions conference by the 
lack of a special verdict form with respect to negligence.  Counsel had, in fact, agreed to leave 
the precise language of the verdict form to the district court.  

 

[¶28]   Timely objection to a verdict 
considered to be inconsistent or irregular is essential to preservation of such 
an issue on appeal:

 

[W]e 
do not think it harsh or unreasonable to require a litigant, when an opportunity 
is afforded during the trial, timely to bring a matter such as here to the 
attention of the trial court in order that it might be corrected, and failing in 
this that he shall not be heard here to complain.

 

Crown 
Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 
638 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Wyo. 1982) (quoting DeWitty 
v. Decker, 
383 P.2d 734, 739-40 (Wyo. 1963)).  
Not having properly pre­served the issue below, the Addakais are 
foreclosed from raising the matter on appeal.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶29]   We are not unsympathetic to the 
travails of the Addakais.  Such 
concerns cannot, how­ever, gainsay the full and fair opportunity which the 
Addakais enjoyed when they were able to present their case to a jury of their 
peers.  If changes are to be made in 
the Landowner Liability Act, such activity is committed to the legislature.  It was, however, the Recreation Safety 
Act which presaged an unfavorable verdict for the Addakais.  The district court is hereby affirmed in 
all respects.

FOOTNOTES

1                       
§ 34-19-103.  Limitations 
on landowner's liability.

 

(a)        
Except as specifically recognized by or provided in W.S. 34-19-105, an 
owner of land who either directly or indirectly invites or permits without 
charge any person to use the land for recreational purposes or a lessee of state 
lands does not thereby:

 

(i)  Extend any assurance that the premises 
are safe for any purpose;

 

(ii)  Confer upon the person using the land 
the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is 
owed;

 

(iii)  Assume responsibility for or incur 
liability for any injury to person or property caused by an act of omission of 
the person using the land.