Case Title: Berry v. Hinds County

Citation: 344 So. 2d 146

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1977-03-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
344 So. 2d 146 (1977) Judy BERRY and Donald A. Berry v. HINDS COUNTY, Mississippi. No. 49135. Supreme Court of Mississippi. March 30, 1977. *147 Young, Scanlon & Sessums, Pat H. Scanlon, Brad Sessums, Jackson, for appellants. Watkins & Eager, Thomas H. Watkins, John M. Putnam, Jackson, for appellee. Before PATTERSON, ROBERTSON and BROOM, JJ. ROBERTSON, Justice: This suit involves the doctrine of governmental immunity of a county from suit. Suit was brought by Judy and Donald A. Berry against Hinds County, Mississippi, in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by them when their automobile crashed into a collapsed bridge which spanned a large ditch on Longino Road in Hinds County. The accident happened about 6:30 p.m. on November 22, 1970, as the plaintiffs with their children were riding in the family automobile. A general demurrer was sustained to the declaration, and the plaintiffs declining to plead further, the judgment was made final and the declaration dismissed. On appeal, the Berrys contend that the doctrine of governmental immunity should be abolished that there is no valid reason for continuing this outmoded and antiquated doctrine. The appellants further contend that this doctrine of sovereign or governmental immunity was created by the courts and therefore should be abolished by them. Appellants cite Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education, 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973), as their most persuasive authority. In a very lengthy opinion, by a four-to-three vote, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reached this conclusion: This broad and all-encompassing ruling was made in spite of the fact that the suit was only brought against the Philadelphia Board of Public Education for injuries suffered by William Ayala, Jr. when his arm was caught in a shredding machine in the upholstery class of the Carrol School in the City of Philadelphia. The appendix to the opinion in Ayala lists eighteen states (including the District of Columbia) which have judicially abrogated the doctrine of governmental immunity. Pennsylvania, of course, should be added to the list, and, also, Alabama, which abrogated the doctrine as to counties (by a five-to-four vote) in Lorence v. Hospital Board of Morgan County, 294 Ala. 614, 320 So. 2d 631 (1975). This makes a total of twenty states. Seven states are listed as having statutorily abrogated the doctrine. One hundred years ago in the landmark case of Brabham v. Board of Supervisors of Hinds County, 54 Miss. 363 (1877), this Court stated its views on the doctrine of governmental immunity: Over the years since Brabham, Mississippi has steadfastly adhered to this fundamental doctrine. Owens v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 264 So. 2d 892 (Miss. 1972); Lowndes County, District 5 v. Mississippi State Highway Commission, 220 So. 2d 349 (Miss. 1969); Board of Education of Forrest County v. Sigler, 208 So. 2d 890 (Miss. 1968); Board of Supervisors of Lee County v. Payne, 175 Miss. 12, 166 So. 332 (1936); Simpson County v. Kelly, 175 Miss. 596, 166 So. 532 (1936); Federal Land Bank v. Leflore County, Mississippi, 170 Miss. 1, 153 So. 882 (1934); McNulty v. Vickery, 126 Miss. 341, 88 So. 718 (1921); City of Grenada v. Grenada County, 115 Miss. 831, 76 So. 682 (1917). In Monaco v. State of Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 54 S. Ct. 745, 78 L. Ed. 1282 (1933), the Supreme Court of the United States said: In Board of Supervisors of Lee County v. Payne, 175 Miss. 12, 166 So. 332 (1936), this Court pointed out that counties and municipalities of the state are not on the same plane and that there are some fundamental differences between them. In Payne, we said: While it might be true that this doctrine was first enunciated by the English courts, still it came to this country as a part of the Common Law and early in the history of the United States was adopted as a sound and reasonable concept of the law. The Legislature long ago began the process of chipping away at this doctrine of governmental immunity in appropriate areas. In 1914, the Legislature passed an act which provided: It is apparent from even a cursory reading of these statutes that the legislature felt it necessary to carefully limit and circumscribe the approval of such claims. Even then in order for there to be no misunderstanding, the legislature said: In 1972, the legislature provided for suits against counties or school districts operating school busses. Mississippi Code Annotated section 37-41-37 (Supp. 1976), provides in part: Again the Legislature thought it necessary to limit and circumscribe recovery and to provide for funds out of which such claims could be paid. In Section 37-41-39 the Legislature provided for counties and school districts to pay into an "accident contingent fund" to be set up in the state treasury. *150 In Section 37-41-41 (Supp. 1976), the Legislature placed a limit of $10,000 on each such claim for one person, and $50,000 for any one accident. A limitation of $1,000 per claimant per accident was placed on a claim for property damage, and $550 on a claim for hospital, medical and doctor bills per person per accident. In 1973, the Legislature provided for the purchase of liability insurance by counties: Our Federal courts have not seen fit to abolish the doctrine of governmental immunity by judicial fiat. They exercised the proper judicial self-restraint and waited for Congress to act. In 1946, Congress (representing all the people) enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2671-2680). This law has spawned prolific and, at times it seems, unlimited litigation. Appellants contend that they were authorized to bring suit and did bring suit under the provisions of Mississippi Code Annotated § 11-45-17 (1972), which provides: Long ago, we held, in State Highway Commission v. Gully, 167 Miss. 631, 145 So. 351 (1933): Of course, the courts, as well as the legislature, have the undoubted right to abrogate the doctrine of governmental immunity. We are of the opinion, however, that the legislature is in a better position to limit and restrict claims that can be asserted and to provide the ways and means for the paying of such claims (either by taxation or appropriation), if it should see fit to do so. Therefore, we decline to abolish the doctrine of governmental immunity at this time by judicial decision. The trial court was correct in sustaining a general demurrer to the declaration. The judgment of the circuit court is, therefore, affirmed. This case was considered by a conference of the Judges en banc. AFFIRMED. All Justices concur.