Case Title: Mallet v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC19-1038

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2019-10-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC19-1038 
____________ 
 
STEPHEN MALLET, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
October 10, 2019 
 
LAWSON, J. 
 
Stephen Mallet filed a notice to invoke this Court’s discretionary jurisdiction 
stating that the First District Court of Appeal’s decision below “expressly and 
directly conflicts with the decision of another district court of appeal or the Florida 
Supreme Court.”  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. (granting this Court jurisdiction 
to review district court opinions that “expressly and directly” conflict with the 
decision of another district court of appeal or with a decision of the Florida 
Supreme Court on the same question of law).  However, Mallet’s jurisdictional 
brief does not identify a conflict case.  Instead, arguing that the case “may present 
 
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federal issues,” Mallet simply “requests that discretionary review be granted,” 
citing O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). 
Because the Florida Constitution does not authorize this Court to review 
cases that “may present federal issues,” we deny the petition.  Because we have 
received a number of similar briefs recently that identify potential “federal issues” 
but fail to identify any basis for our review, we write to explain why we do not 
have jurisdiction in this case or similar cases. 
BACKGROUND 
Stephen Mallet entered open pleas to two counts of possession of images 
depicting sexual conduct by a child with intent to promote child pornography and 
to 117 counts of possession of child pornography.  Mallet v. State, 270 So. 3d 
1282, 1284 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).  He was sentenced to forty years in prison 
followed by multiple terms of sex offender probation.  Id.  The convictions and 
sentences were per curiam affirmed on direct appeal.  Id. (citing Mallet v. State, 
173 So. 3d 890 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)).  Thereafter, Mallet timely filed a motion for 
postconviction relief, arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely 
reserve the right to appeal the order denying a pre-plea motion to dismiss two of 
the counts.  Id. at 1284-85.  The postconviction court denied Mallet’s motion 
following an evidentiary hearing, ruling that Mallet had failed to demonstrate 
 
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prejudice.  Id. at 1285.  The First District agreed and affirmed the denial on appeal 
in Mallet, 270 So. 3d 1282, the decision that Mallet asks us to review. 
ANALYSIS 
The Florida Supreme Court is “a court of limited jurisdiction,” Baker v. 
State, 878 So. 2d 1236, 1245 (Fla. 2004), with authority to hear only those matters 
specified in Florida’s Constitution.  See art. V, § 3(b), Fla. Const.  There is no 
provision authorizing us to review a district court of appeal decision simply 
because it “may present federal issues.”  See id. 
In O’Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court addressed the doctrine that 
“[b]efore a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner 
must exhaust his remedies in state court.”  526 U.S. at 842.  “The particular 
question posed [in O’Sullivan] is whether a prisoner must seek review in a state 
court of last resort when that court has discretionary control over its docket.”  Id. 
at 843 (emphasis added).1 
O’Sullivan involved an Illinois prisoner, Darren Boerckel, who had been 
convicted of “rape, burglary, and aggravated battery of an 87-year-old woman.”  
                                          
 
1.  The federal exhaustion doctrine does not require state prisoners “to 
invoke extraordinary remedies when those remedies are alternatives to the standard 
[appellate] review process and where the state courts have not provided relief 
through those remedies in the past.”  O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844 (citing 
Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 249-250 (1971)). 
 
 
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Id. at 840.  The convictions and sentences were affirmed by an Illinois intermediate 
appellate court “with one justice dissenting.”  Id.  Boerckel then sought review in 
the Illinois Supreme Court with respect to some, but not all, of the issues decided 
against him by the intermediate appellate court.  Id.  Although the Illinois Supreme 
Court denied review, id. at 841, significantly, the Illinois Supreme Court had 
discretionary jurisdiction to hear the appeal.  Id. at 843 (“A party may petition for 
leave to appeal a decision by the Appellate Court to the Illinois Supreme Court 
(with exceptions that are irrelevant here), but whether ‘such a petition will be 
granted is a matter of sound judicial discretion.’ ” (quoting Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (a))). 
Boerckel then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States 
District Court for the Central District of Illinois, seeking relief as to three claims 
not raised in his petition to the Illinois Supreme Court.  Id. at 841.  Ultimately, the 
United States Supreme Court held that because “Illinois’ established, normal 
appellate review procedure is a two-tiered system” in which “state prisoners have 
‘the right . . . to raise’ their claims through a petition for discretionary review in the 
State’s highest court,” id. at 845 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)), the federal courts 
would not entertain the habeas claims that Boerckel had not included in this 
petition to the Illinois Supreme Court.  Id. at 845-48. 
We fail to see the relevance of O’Sullivan to the question of our jurisdiction 
to review the First District’s opinion in Mallet’s case.  First, of course, our 
 
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jurisdiction is established by the Florida Constitution, not by federal law.  And, 
second, unlike the Illinois Supreme Court, which “has the opportunity to decide 
which cases it will consider on the merits,” id. at 846, we do not.  Art. V, § 3(b), 
Fla. Const. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Mallet’s jurisdictional initial brief fails to identify a jurisdictional 
basis for this Court to consider his case, we deny Mallet’s petition for review. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAGOA, LUCK, and MUÑIZ, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D17-4627 
 
 
(Leon County) 
 
Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Danielle Jorden, Assistant Public Defender, 
Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, and Barbara 
Debelius, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent