Case Title: Parkside Schools, Inc., v. Bronco Elite Arts & Athletics, LLC. Lease dispute

Citation: 

Docket Number: 32611

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2008-01-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 32611 
 
PARKSIDE SCHOOLS, INC., an Idaho 
corporation,          
                                                       
          Plaintiff-Respondent,                        
                                                       
v.                                                     
                                                       
BRONCO ELITE ARTS & ATHLETICS, 
LLC., an Idaho limited liability company, and 
BRANDON PAINE, an individual,                     
                                                       
          Defendants-Appellants.                               
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Boise, December 2007 Term 
 
2008 Opinion No. 12 
 
Filed:  January 28, 2008 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Ada County.  Hon. Deborah A. Bail, District Judge. 
 
The district court’s order is vacated and remanded for further proceedings. 
 
Perkins Coie, LLP, Boise, for appellants.  Cynthia L. Yee-Wallace argued. 
 
Bill Smith & Associates, PA, Boise, for respondent.  William L. Smith argued. 
 
_____________________ 
 
J. JONES, Justice 
 
Parkside Schools, Inc. filed suit against Bronco Elite Arts & Athletics, LLC, and its 
owner, Brandon Paine, (collectively, Bronco Elite) when a lease dispute arose between the 
parties.  After failing to obtain preliminary injunctive relief, Parkside moved to dismiss.  The 
district court granted the motion without a hearing, ordering each party to bear its own costs and 
attorney fees.  Bronco Elite appealed.  We vacate the district court’s order and remand for further 
proceedings.  
  
I. 
Bronco Elite leased two building spaces to Parkside for operation of a day care facility.  
The parties agreed on a separate lease for each space.  One of the leases stated, “Tenant shall 
have the right to extend the term of the lease for (1) period of 1 year.  The option may be 
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exercised only by giving written notice thereof to Landlord not later than six months prior to the 
expiration of the then expiring term.”  Parkside was required to notify Bronco Elite of its intent 
to exercise the option by January 1, 2005.  The other lease stated, “Tenant shall not have the 
right to extend the term of the Lease for any period of time.”  That lease expired on July 1, 2005. 
Both leases contained a provision requiring the losing party to pay the reasonable attorney fees 
of the prevailing party in any lease-related legal action.  
Parkside failed to exercise its option on the extendable lease.  Around February 29, 2005, 
Bronco Elite delivered two Notice of Lease Expiration letters to Parkside.  The letters informed 
Parkside that both leases were to expire on July 1, 2005.  Bronco Elite then leased the spaces to 
another tenant for a term beginning July 1.   
Parkside filed suit, alleging twelve claims against Bronco Elite.  Bronco Elite answered 
and claimed attorney fees.  Parkside then filed an application for a temporary restraining order 
and preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin Bronco Elite from disrupting its interest in the 
leased space.  The district court denied the injunction, stating Parkside had no basis for 
injunctive relief. 
Parkside’s counsel asked Bronco Elite to stipulate to dismiss the action with each party 
bearing its own costs and legal fees, but Bronco Elite declined, indicating it was considering a 
motion to recover its attorney fees.  Six days later, Parkside filed a motion to dismiss without 
prejudice.  The motion requested that each party bears its own fees and costs.  The motion did 
not indicate on its face whether Parkside desired to present oral argument or to file a brief in 
support.  Parkside did not notice the motion for hearing.  The district court dismissed the action 
without prejudice three days after the motion was served.  The dismissal order provided, “each 
party to bear their own costs and attorney fees.”  Bronco Elite did not file a memorandum of 
costs and fees and or a motion for reconsideration.  Instead, Bronco Elite appealed the dismissal 
to this Court.   
II. 
The question presented is whether the district court abused its discretion by granting the 
motion to dismiss Parkside’s action without compliance with I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3).  
A. 
A trial court’s dismissal under I.R.C.P. 41(a)(2) is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard.  Rohr v. Rohr, 118 Idaho 689, 692-93, 800 P. 2d 85, 88-89 (1990).  In reviewing 
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whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion, this Court considers: (1) whether the 
trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted 
within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise 
of reason.  Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 711, 52 P.3d 848, 856 (2002).   
B. 
The district court’s dismissal order could not have based on I.R.C.P. 41(a)(1) because 
Bronco Elite had answered the complaint and there was no stipulation for dismissal.  The 
dismissal would have been under I.R.C.P. 41(a)(2), which requires all other dismissals to be 
“upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.”  This 
provision “is discretionary with the trial court both as to whether a dismissal should be allowed, 
as well as to the terms and conditions to be imposed, if allowed.”  Rohr, 118 Idaho at 692, 800 
P.2d at 88 (quoting Rohr v. Rohr, 118 Idaho 698, 702, 800 P.2d 94, 98 (Ct. App. 1989)).  “The 
purpose of the court’s discretionary authority under this rule is to insure that the court pays due 
regard to the interests of both the plaintiff and defendant; dismissal of the plaintiff’s action must 
not unfairly jeopardize the defendant’s interests.”  Id.  
It is clear that Parkside failed to comply with applicable provisions of I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3) 
and the district court ignored those provisions, thereby abusing its discretion.  As a result, 
Bronco Elite’s interests, particularly its right to an opportunity to be heard on the question of 
attorney fees, were disregarded.   
I.R.C.P 7(b)(3)(A) provides, “A written motion, other than one which may be heard ex 
parte, and notice of the hearing thereon shall be filed with the court, and served so that it is 
received by the parties no later than fourteen (14) days before the time specified for the hearing.”  
Id.  Thus, Parkside was required to provide Bronco Elite with at least 14 days’ notice of the 
hearing on the motion to dismiss.  It did not do so. 
Parkside was also required to indicate on the face of the motion whether it desired to 
present oral argument or file a brief in support of its motion.  I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(C) states,  
It shall not be necessary to file a brief or memorandum of law in support of a 
motion, but the moving party must indicate upon the face of the motion whether 
the party desires to present oral argument or file a brief within fourteen (14) days 
with the court in support of the motion. 
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Id.  (emphasis added).  Again, it failed to do so.  Parkside’s failure to notice the motion for a 
hearing and to make the required notations on its motion prejudiced Bronco Elite because 
Bronco Elite had no chance to oppose the motion.  And while Bronco Elite gained the end it 
desired—dismissal of the action—it had no opportunity to argue in favor of an award of attorney 
fees.   
The district court compounded these failures by simply overlooking them.  Only three 
days after Parkside’s motion to dismiss was served, the court granted the motion via an order 
apparently prepared by Parkside.  In doing so, the district court exceeded its authority.  I.R.C.P. 
7(b)(3)(D) provides,  
If the moving party does not request oral argument upon the motion, and does not 
file a brief within fourteen (14) days, the court may deny such motion without 
notice if the court deems the motion has no merit.  If argument has been requested 
on any motion, the court may, in its discretion, deny oral argument by counsel by 
written or oral notice to all counsel before the day of the hearing, and the court 
may limit oral argument at any time.   
Id.  The rule provides authority to deny a motion under the specified circumstances.  It does not 
give the court authority to grant a motion, nor does it excuse compliance with I.R.C.P. 
7(b)(3)(A) and (C).  Thus, the district court acted in excess of its authority in granting the 
motion.  We therefore vacate the order.     
III. 
 
Bronco Elite seeks attorney fees on appeal under I.A.R. 41(a).  However, it neither 
submits legal argument in support of its request, nor specifies the statute or contractual provision 
pursuant to which an award of fees would be available.  “As we have long held and oft repeated, 
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 does not provide an independent basis for attorney fees on appeal 
because it is a procedural rule.  Ater v. Idaho Bureau of Occupational Licenses, 144 Idaho 281, 
286, 160 P.3d 438, 443 (2007).  Therefore, fees are denied.1   
 
                                                 
1 Bronco Elite could have also taken more prudent steps to protect its interests below.  It neither filed a 
memorandum of costs and fees nor sought reconsideration of the district court’s order.  The appropriate course of 
action was followed in a somewhat similar case recently decided by this Court – Straub v. Smith, 2007 WL 4209 
361, November 30, 2007.  There, after a case was dismissed with prejudice and without fees, the prevailing 
defendant filed both a memorandum seeking costs and fees as well as a motion for reconsideration.  
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IV. 
We vacate the district court’s order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.   
 
Chief Justice EISMANN, and Justices BURDICK, HORTON and Justice Pro Tem 
KIDWELL CONCUR.  
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