Case Title: Graham v. Brown

Citation: 

Docket Number: Som-10-597

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2011-08-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2011 ME  
93 
Docket: 
Som-10-597  
Submitted 
   On Briefs: June 1, 2011  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
August 23, 2011 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, and JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
SARAH GRAHAM 
 
v. 
 
SHYAM BROWN 
 
 
LEVY, J. 
 
[¶1]  Shyam Brown appeals from a default judgment entered in the District 
Court (Skowhegan, Kelly, J.) awarding Sarah Graham $50,000 in compensatory 
damages and $5000 in punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress after an entry of default on the issue of liability and a hearing on the issue 
of damages.  Brown contends that (1) the court abused its discretion in declining to 
set aside the entry of default; (2) the court erred in entering the default judgment 
because the evidence did not support, and the court did not expressly find, each 
element of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (3) the 
damages awarded were excessive and not supported by the evidence.  We affirm 
the judgment. 
 
 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  The following facts, found by the court, are supported by competent 
evidence in the record.  See Degenhardt v. EWE Ltd. P’ship, 2011 ME 23, ¶ 2, 13 
A.3d 790, 792.  
 
[¶3]  Graham and Brown began cohabiting in April 2003.  From April 20041 
until the couple separated in July 2006, Brown committed frequent acts of physical 
and emotional abuse against Graham.  The acts committed included throwing her 
across a room so that she fell on her face and jaw, and nearly fell twelve feet into a 
basement; aggressively pulling Graham out of her truck, causing bruising on her 
arm; striking her hand with a drum stick, injuring her hand when he knew that she 
was studying to become a massage therapist and would need the use of her hands; 
refusing Graham assistance when she developed a uterine infection after an 
abortion, and telling her that she deserved to die; refusing her assistance after she 
had a miscarriage and telling her that she deserved the miscarriage and deserved to 
bleed to death; shoving Graham backwards into a cement step, resulting in injuries 
to her back and spine; on multiple occasions, hitting, slapping, or head-butting 
Graham during arguments; on several occasions, punishing her young son in front 
of her by covering his mouth so that he could not breathe; on several occasions, 
                                               
 
1  The court correctly determined that events occurring before this date would be outside the six-year 
statute of limitations.  See 14 M.R.S. § 752 (2010).   
 
 
 
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emptying onto the driveway potted plants that Brown knew were important to 
Graham; and throwing Graham’s cat against a chimney because it annoyed him. 
[¶4]  In 2005, Graham sought treatment from a psychotherapist for her 
emotional distress.  The therapist diagnosed Graham as suffering from 
post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety disorder, depression, and insomnia, all 
resulting from Brown’s actions.  Although Graham is licensed as a massage 
therapist, her emotional condition has prevented her from engaging in that work 
and she has instead worked for less pay as a retail clerk. 
 
[¶5]  On April 8, 2010, Graham caused Brown to be served in hand with a 
summons and complaint alleging physical, emotional, and mental abuse, and 
seeking compensatory and punitive damages.  Brown did not file an answer.  On 
May 7, the clerk of the court entered a default against Brown.  See M.R. Civ. P. 
55(a).  The court subsequently held a hearing on damages, at which Brown 
appeared and participated without counsel.  See M.R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). 
 
[¶6]  At the outset of the damages hearing, the court explained to Brown that 
the issue of liability had already been determined against him because he did not 
respond to the complaint.2  Brown stated that he did not respond to the complaint 
                                               
 
2 Although the court referred to the entry of default as a “default judgment,” the characterization 
resulted in no prejudice to Brown and is inconsequential to our analysis.  Compare M.R. Civ. P. 55(a) 
(providing for entry of default when “a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has 
failed to plead or otherwise defend”), with M.R. Civ. P. 55(b) (providing procedure for determination of 
damages and for entry of judgment by default). 
 
 
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because he “thought it was absurd” and he was “not good at paperwork.”  Brown 
thought that he would be able to address the complaint at the hearing.  The court 
informed Brown that he could move to set aside the entry of default, but that the 
scheduled hearing would focus on damages.  After receiving testimony from 
Graham, Brown, and two other individuals, the court established a schedule for the 
parties to submit memoranda regarding the calculation of Graham’s damages.  
[¶7]  The court ultimately entered a written judgment with findings that 
Graham suffered damages of $9600 for her past and future therapy expenses and 
$14,000 for her lost income.  Based on these financial losses and the general 
damage resulting from the distress inflicted by Brown, the court awarded Graham 
total compensatory damages of $50,000.   
 
[¶8]  Graham sought $30,000 in punitive damages.  With respect to punitive 
damages, the court found that the “nature and frequency of the acts of abuse and 
domestic violence . . . provide clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Brown’s 
conduct towards Ms. Graham was so outrageous that malice . . . can be implied.”  
The court concluded that Brown’s conduct was egregious, he failed to take 
responsibility for his actions, and he tried to blame Graham for his behavior.  
Because there was no evidence presented regarding Brown’s ability to pay, the 
court limited its award of punitive damages to $5000.  This appeal followed. 
 
 
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II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
 
[¶9]  Brown contends that the court erred in (1) declining to set aside the 
entry of default; (2) entering a default judgment; and (3) determining the amount of 
Graham’s damages. 
A. 
Entry of Default  
 
[¶10]  Because Brown failed to file a motion to set aside the entry of default 
as the court instructed, he did not preserve this issue for appellate review.3  See 
Farley v. Town of Washburn, 1997 ME 218, ¶ 5, 704 A.2d 347, 349.  However, 
even if we treat the issue as having been preserved, the court did not abuse its 
discretion by declining to set aside the entry of default because Brown’s 
justifications for not filing an answer—that he viewed the complaint as “absurd” 
and that he is “not good at paperwork”—do not constitute “good cause” pursuant 
to Rule 55(c).  See M.R. Civ. P. 55(c); Richter v. Ercolini, 2010 ME 38, ¶¶ 15-16, 
994 A.2d 404, 409.   
B. 
Default Judgment 
[¶11]  Contrary to Brown’s contention, the court did not err by holding that 
Brown was liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress and entering a 
default judgment accordingly.  The court properly construed Graham’s complaint 
                                               
 
3  Brown did ultimately file a motion for relief from the entry of default pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 
60(b).  That motion, however, is not part of the record on appeal and we do not address it in considering 
the issues presented. 
 
 
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as one for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).  See Lyman v. Huber, 
2010 ME 139, ¶ 16, 10 A.3d 707, 711.  Because the issue of liability was resolved 
against Brown by the entry of default, he was properly precluded from relitigating 
any of the elements of liability related to the IIED claim, and the court was not 
required to issue findings regarding those elements.  See M.R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).  At 
the hearing, the sole issue before the court was damages.  See Estate of Hoch v. 
Stifel, 2011 ME 24, ¶¶ 17-18, 46, 16 A.3d 137, 145, 152.   
C. 
Compensatory and Punitive Damages 
 
[¶12]  Brown argues that the damages awarded were excessive and not 
supported by the evidence.  Our review of an award of damages is highly 
deferential, and although an award must be supported by some evidence of the 
amount of loss, “damages need not be proved to a mathematical certainty.”  Estate 
of Hoch, 2011 ME 24, ¶ 43, 16 A.3d at 150-51 (quotation marks omitted); 
Palleschi v. Palleschi, 1998 ME 3, ¶ 6, 704 A.2d 383, 385.  “Proof of financial loss 
need not be proffered for a court to award compensatory damages for the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.”  Palleschi, 1998 ME 3, ¶ 6, 704 A.2d 
at 385.  In addition, a “plaintiff need not present evidence of a defendant’s 
financial circumstances for a fact-finder to consider an award of punitive 
damages.”  Estate of Hoch, 2011 ME 24, ¶ 53, 16 A.3d at 153-54. 
 
 
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[¶13]  Here, the court based slightly less than half of the compensatory 
award on actual damages.  The balance of the $50,000 award was for “general 
damage suffered by Ms. Graham.”  Based on competent evidence in the record 
supporting the numerous incidents of abuse and resulting injuries found by the 
court, and the clear and convincing evidence in the record that Brown’s conduct 
was so outrageous that malice can be implied, it is not “plain that there is no 
rational basis upon which the amount of the award may be supported.”  Id. ¶ 43, 16 
A.3d at 151 (quotation marks omitted).  Accordingly, the court did not err in its 
determination of compensatory damages.  
 
[¶14]  Nor was the punitive damages award of $5000 excessive considering 
(1) the reprehensibility of Brown’s acts; (2) the one-to-ten ratio of punitive to 
compensatory damages; and (3) the amount of the punitive damages award 
compared to other punitive damages awards.  See id. ¶¶ 54, 56-60, 16 A.3d at 154; 
Harris v. Soley, 2000 ME 150, ¶ 33 & n.21, 756 A.2d 499, 509 (affirming a 
$1 million punitive damages award that was sixteen times the award of 
compensatory damages for conversion and IIED, and noting jurisdictions allowing 
ratios as high as 100:1); Shrader-Miller v. Miller, 2004 ME 117, ¶¶ 10, 21, 24, 
855 A.2d 1139, 1142, 1145-46 (affirming a $10,000 punitive damages award in a 
7:1 ratio to compensatory damages related to defendants’ malicious actions 
intended to lower the sale value of a property). 
 
 
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The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney for Shyam Brown: 
 
John Alsop, Esq. 
Alsop & Mohlar 
PO Box 189 
Skowhegan, Maine  04976 
 
 
Attorney for Sarah Graham: 
 
Robert E. Sandy, Jr., Esq. 
Sherman & Sandy 
74 Silver Street 
PO Box 499 
Waterville, Maine  04903-0499 
 
 
 
 
Skowhegan District Court docket number CV-2010-136 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY