Case Title: BOWERS WELDING AND HOTSHOT, INC., MARVIN BOWERS AND CHARLOTTE BOWERS v. MICHAEL D. BROMLEY, EMMA L. BROMLEY, CLYDE E. DICKERSON, LINDA H. DICKERSON, AND ZENDA M. THOMAS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-05-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
BOWERS WELDING AND HOTSHOT, INC., MARVIN BOWERS AND CHARLOTTE BOWERS v. MICHAEL D. BROMLEY, EMMA L. BROMLEY, CLYDE E. DICKERSON, LINDA H. DICKERSON, AND ZENDA M. THOMAS1985 WY 62699 P.2d 299Case Number: 84-227Decided: 05/10/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
BOWERS WELDING AND 
HOTSHOT, INC., MARVIN BOWERS AND CHARLOTTE BOWERS, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), 

v. 

MICHAEL D. BROMLEY, EMMA 
L. BROMLEY, CLYDE E. DICKERSON, LINDA H. DICKERSON, AND ZENDA M. 
THOMAS, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, SubletteCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

 
 
Clifford J. 
Neilson, Casper, 
for 
appellants.

Gerald R. Mason, 
Mason & Twitchell, Pinedale, for 
appellees.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The present appeal 
involves the enforcement of certain restrictive covenants in a subdivision. 
Appellees, owners of lots in the subdivision, sought to enjoin appellants Marvin 
and Charlotte Bowers from conducting commercial activities on appellants' lot in 
violation of certain restrictive covenants, requiring the land in the 
subdivision be used "for residential purposes only." The district court found 
generally for the appellees, ordering appellants to cease conducting commercial 
activities on the property, finding appellants' actions constituted a nuisance, 
and awarding appellees attorney's fees.

[¶2.]     Appellants raise the 
following issues for our review:

"1. Whether the District 
Court erred in finding that the Restrictive Covenants recorded May 1, 1973, 
applied to the Defendants' property.

"2. Whether the 
activities of the Defendants conducted on their property were sufficiently 
intentional, unreasonable, unwarranted, and unlawful as to constitute a nuisance 
as defined by this Honorable Court.

"3. Whether the District 
Court was justified, based upon the evidence presented, to award attorney fees 
and costs to the Plaintiffs."

[¶3.]     We will affirm the 
district court's finding that appellants violated the restrictive covenants and 
that their activities constituted a nuisance, but modify the judgment by 
deleting attorney's fees.

[¶4.]     On March 18, 1983, the 
appellees, plaintiffs below, filed this action seeking to enjoin appellants, 
defendants below, from conducting further commercial activities on Lot 14 of the Green River Subdivision. Appellants denied 
violating any restrictive covenants, alleging the covenants at issue did not 
apply to their lot since they were omitted from the first set of restrictive 
covenants filed by the subdivision's developer, Fear Ranches, Inc. Appellants 
cross-claimed against developer Fear Ranches, but the cross-claim was dismissed 
upon motion by Fear Ranches. 

[¶5.]     The evidence presented 
at trial indicated that appellants were conducting commercial activities upon 
their land in the subdivision. A large metal building and several large metal 
tanks were constructed on appellants' property for use in their business. Large 
oil field trucks were dispatched from the property; drill pipe was loaded, 
unloaded and stored; and drilling rigs were also stacked and stored. Appellees 
complained of the noise generated by the truck traffic, as well as the 
unsightliness of the above activities in the rural residential 
neighborhood.

[¶6.]     After trial on the 
merits, the district court found for appellees and ordered Lot 14 be brought into conformity with the restrictive 
covenants, holding:

"3. Lot 14 in the Green River Subdivision is subject to the 
original covenants and restrictions on file in the office of the Sublette County 
Clerk and there has been no waiver of those restrictions.

"4. The defendants had 
actual and constructive notice of the covenants.

"5. The defendants have 
violated and are continuing to violate the covenants * * *. (The remainder of 
paragraph 5 is set out infra pertinent to our discussion of 
nuisance.)

* * * * * 
*

"6. The foregoing actions 
of the defendants are a violation of the covenants in that the covenants require 
that Lot 14 be used for residential purposes 
only and all of the above actions are done in furtherance of a commercial 
business enterprise.

"7. The defendants are 
now failing and have since 1981 failed to maintain Lot 14 in a neat and orderly 
manner by depositing upon and using Lot 14 as described in paragraph 5 
hereof.

"8. The defendants are 
maintaining a private nuisance on Lot 14 as 
that term is defined in the covenants and independently of the 
covenants.

* * * * * 
*

"NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

"1. The defendants are 
hereby prohibited and permanently and prospectively enjoined from conducting any 
further welding, repair or hot shot business from or on Lot 14 * * 
*.

* * * * * 
*

"2. The defendants are 
hereby mandatorily enjoined and ordered to abate the nuisance, to put Lot 14 in a neat and orderly condition * * 
*.

* * * * * 
*

"3. Lot 14 of Green River 
Subdivision, Sublette 
County, Wyoming, is 
henceforth to be used for residential purposes only and is to be maintained in a 
neat and orderly fashion.

"4. The 60' X 100' 
building erected on Lot 14 by the defendants is commercial by its very nature 
and appearance but the Court does not order it to be removed at this time and 
will allow the individual defendants a reasonable time to demonstrate that the 
building can be used in conjunction with their personal residence as an 
appurtenant structure, but it must be used only by the individual defendants 
(the corporation has no residential purposes) and it must be used for 
residential purposes only."

I

[¶7.]     In their first issue, 
appellants raise the question of whether the district court erred in finding 
that the restrictive covenants recorded May 1, 1973, applied to appellants' 
property. To determine this issue, examination must be made of the facts and 
circumstances attendant upon appellants' purchase of the 
property.

[¶8.]     In March of 1973, Fear 
Ranches, Inc. executed a plat of the Green River Subdivision constituting some 
160 acres divided into 14 lots. The plat was recorded on April 4, 1973, and 
specifically provided "that the subdivision is subject to covenants and 
restriction of record."1 

[¶9.]     On April 1, 1973, 
appellant Marvin Bowers paid $500 as a down payment toward the purchase of 
Lot 14. On May 15, 1973, appellants and Fear 
Ranches, Inc., made an agreement for warranty deed. This document was recorded 
on June 22, 1973, and specifically made the sale "SUBJECT TO covenants for governing Green 
River Subdivisions filed for record in the Office of the CountyClerk, 
Sublette County, Wyoming." (Emphasis in 
original.)

[¶10.]  On April 23, 1973, Fear Ranches, Inc., 
executed restrictive covenants governing the Green River Subdivision. These 
covenants specifically stated:

"WHEREAS, the undersigned 
wishes to place certain restrictions on the tracts in all of said GREEN RIVER 
SUBDIVISIONS being situated within Sections 20 and 29, Township 29 North, 
Range 111 West of the 6th Principal Meridian, Sublette County, Wyoming, for the 
benefit and protection of the undersigned and those purchasing said tracts; 
and

"WHEREAS, the undersigned 
desires that this instrument shall define the restrictions upon said tracts and 
shall be later incorporated by reference in the deeds and contracts to persons 
purchasing said tracts with said 
restrictions thereby intended to apply to each tract and to run with the 
land through subsequent transactions;

"NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW ALL 
MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that all tracts in 
the GREEN RIVER SUBDIVISION, above described, are subject to the following listed 
restrictions, to-wit:

"1. Said land shall be 
used for residential purposes only. Commercial, public or illegal purposes in 
the use of such lands or residences is hereby barred.

"2. It shall be the duty 
of lot owners to keep their lots neat and orderly and free from odor producing 
refuse and the governing committee shall have the power to declare a nuisance if 
lots are not so kept. If the lot owner does not remove such nuisance upon ten 
(10) days' notice, then the governing committee shall have the authority to 
abate said nuisance at the lot owner's expense.

* * * * * 
*

"4. Lot Thirteen (13) of 
the Green River Subdivision is specifically excluded from the commercial 
provision of Paragraph 1, in that it can continue to be used for gravel pit; all 
other provisions hereof still pertain to said Lot Thirteen (13)." (Emphasis 
added.)

These covenants 
were recorded on May 1, 1973.

[¶11.]  On June 21, 1973, certain "Revised 
Restrictive Covenants for Governing Green River Subdivisions" were recorded. 
This document is identical to the first set of restrictive covenants recorded, 
except it also includes Section 32. Herein lies the problem in this case. 
Appellants assert that since the first restrictive covenants recorded excluded 
Section 32 wherein Lots 13 and 14 and a portion of Lot 12 are located, the 
covenants do not apply to their property, Lot 
14. However, a close examination of the facts reveals that such is not the 
case.

[¶12.]  When the revised restrictive covenants 
were recorded on June 21, 1973, Fear Ranches, Inc., was still the record owner 
of all the lots in the subdivision. Furthermore, when appellants' agreement for 
warranty deed was recorded on June 22, 1973, the complete revised restrictive 
covenants had already been filed. Therefore, appellants are held to have 
constructive, if not actual, notice of the covenants. Furthermore, the first set 
of restrictive covenants referred to the gravel pit in Lot 13, also a part of Section 32, so a reasonable person 
would have been placed on notice that the restrictive covenants were applicable 
to Lots 23, 13, and 14. We agree with the trial court when it stated at the 
close of the trial: 

"Well, of course, this 
case started when a mistake was made over at a lawyer's office, they didn't put 
Section 32 on the covenants. But interestingly enough they put - they talked 
about another lot, another tract; 13, for instance, in those original covenants, 
the tract having to do with the gravel pit which was in Section 32. It would 
have been obvious to anyone who made a reasonable inquiry that Section 32 was 
included, but more than that Section 32 was in fact a part of the Green River 
Subdivision which was in fact mentioned when a plat was filed as early as April 
of 1973 which defined the Green River Subdivision, and the covenants are 
applicable to the Green River Subdivision.

"The Court finds that the 
original covenants are applicable to this case and apply to the Green River 
Subdivision and all of the property therein including Section 32. So, the 
covenants are applicable. There's been no waiver.

"The Court further finds 
that the defendants had actual notice of the restrictive covenants. They also 
had constructive notice."

[¶13.]  In Crozier v. Malone, Wyo., 366 P.2d 125 
(1961), we held the purchasers of three lots in a tract of land had notice of a 
restrictive covenant prohibiting trailers as residences when such covenant was 
recorded a mere one minute prior to the recording of the purchasers' deeds. 
Therein we stated:

"The answer to 
defendants' second question is found in § 34-21, W.S. 1957 [now § 34-1-121, W.S. 
1977], which provides that an instrument touching any interest in lands, made 
and recorded, shall be notice to subsequent purchasers from the time of delivery 
of the instrument to the register of deeds. It follows that a subsequent 
purchaser for value has constructive notice of any burden upon title from the 
date of recordation." Id. at 127.

[¶14.]  Sometime between June 8, 1973, and 
October 1, 1973, Frank Fear of the Fear Ranches, Inc., had a conversation with 
appellant Marvin Bowers regarding the covenants, although no one seems to recall 
exactly what was said.

"The notice of 
restrictions sufficient to charge a purchaser may be actual notice or notice of 
facts sufficient to put him on inquiry. For instance, the notice sufficient to 
charge a purchaser of a lot in a subdivision with knowledge of restrictions 
imposed in deeds to other lots as part of a general plan, but inadvertently or 
otherwise omitted from the deeds in his chain of title, may be actual or 
constructive, including notice of facts which ought to have put him on inquiry, 
such as the uniform appearance of the area in which the lot is located. * * 
*

"If the purchaser has 
actual notice of an agreement containing restrictions, it is not material that 
the agreement is not of record. At least, where it does not appear that the 
agreement was of record, the purchaser with actual notice has been held bound by 
the restrictions. Even notice of a parol agreement binds the purchaser to comply 
with the restrictions." 20 Am.Jur.2d, Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, 
§§ 307-308, pp. 871-872 (1965).

[¶15.]  A common way in which to uphold 
restrictive covenants is to find a general plan or scheme for the development of 
a tract of land. To determine this, we must look to the restrictive covenants 
and construe them to effectuate the intent of the parties. Dawson v. Meike, Wyo., 
508 P.2d 15 (1973).

"The fundamental rule in 
construing restrictive covenants is that the intention of the parties as shown 
by the covenant governs. Such intention is determined by a `fair interpretation 
of the grant or reserve creating the easement,' and a servitude over one parcel 
of land for the benefit of another can be established only when that appears to 
have been the intention of the grantor.

"In the determination of 
the intention of the parties, the entire context of the covenant is to be 
considered. In construing the words of the covenant, the court is not limited to 
dictionary definitions, but the meaning of words used is governed by the 
intention of the parties, to be determined upon the same rules of evidence as 
other questions of intention. * * *" 20 Am.Jur.2d, Covenants, Conditions, and 
Restrictions § 186, p. 753 (1965).

[¶16.]  Frank Fear testified it was certainly the 
intent of the developers to include Section 32, as well as all the lots in the 
Green River Subdivision in the restrictive covenants. Indeed, the first set of 
restrictive covenants recites that "the undersigned wishes to place certain 
restrictions on the tracts in all of said 
GREEN RIVER SUBDIVISIONS," and "KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that all tracts * * * are subject to the 
following listed restrictions." (Emphasis added; capitalized words in 
original).

[¶17.]  We find there was a clear intent on the 
part of the developer to create a general plan or scheme and subsequently hold 
all the owners of lots within the subdivision subject to the restrictive 
covenants. Once a general building plan or scheme is found, it is enforceable on 
all the lots in a subdivision even though the restrictive covenants are not 
expressly placed in every conveyance, provided a party has actual or 
constructive notice of the covenants. 7 Thompson on Real Property § 3163, p. 125 
(1962).

"Though the most complete 
way of creating a neighborhood plan or scheme is by reciprocal covenants in all 
deeds for the common benefit of all grantees, such a scheme is effectually 
created where the common grantor maps and plans into lots a tract of land, and 
offers to sell and does sell the lots under an oral representation that all lots 
will be conveyed subject to like covenants, for the common benefit of all 
subsequent grantees, and in such case purchasers with notice or knowledge are 
bound by the covenants. * * *" 7 Thompson on Real Property § 3159, p. 102 
(1962).

"As a general rule, the 
omission of a restrictive covenant contemplated by a general plan of development 
of a subdivision, through inadvertence or otherwise, in a conveyance of one of 
the lots by the subdivider, does not prevent enforcement of the restriction 
against the immediate grantee of such lot, or his successor in title, if either 
took with notice of the restriction or knowledge of the general plan. * * *" 20 
Am.Jur.2d, Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, § 177, p. 740 
(1965).

See also Harris v. Roraback, 137 Mich. 292, 100 N.W. 391 
(1904); 20 Am.Jur.2d, Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, § 169, p. 729, § 
299, pp. 863-864 (1965); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 1364 (1949).

[¶18.]  In Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496, 60 A.L.R. 1212 (1925), the defendants/owners of a lot in a tract of 
land developed under a general building scheme were held to be bound by the 
"residential purposes only" restrictive covenants in deeds to the other lots in 
the tract, even though no such restrictions appeared in their deed. The 
defendants wished to construct a service station on their lot in a clearly 
residential neighborhood. The developers had placed restrictions in some deeds 
to tract owners, but not in others. The court held the defendants bound by the 
restrictive covenants even though not included in their deed, nor their 
predecessors. The court stated:

"* * * If the owner of 
two or more lots, so situated as to bear the relation, sells one with 
restrictions of benefit to the land retained, the servitude becomes mutual, and, 
during the period of restraint, the owner of the lot or lots retained can do 
nothing forbidden to the owner of the lot sold. For want of a better descriptive 
term this is styled a reciprocal negative easement. It runs with the land sold 
by virtue of express fastening and abides with the land retained until loosened 
by expiration of its period of service or by events working its destruction. It 
is not personal to owners, but operative upon use of the land by any owner 
having actual or constructive notice thereof. It is an easement passing its 
benefits and carrying its obligations to all purchasers of land, subject to its 
affirmative or negative mandates. It originates for mutual benefit and exists 
with vigor sufficient to work its ends. It must start with a common 
owner.

* * * * * 
*

"* * * Considering the 
character of use made of all the lots open to a view of [the defendant] when he 
purchased, we think, he was put thereby to inquiry, beyond asking his grantor, 
whether there were restrictions. * * *" Id. at 497-498.

Accord, Hisey v. Eastminster Presbyterian 
Church, 130 Mo. App. 566, 109 S.W. 60 (1908), wherein a lot owner in a 
residential tract was enjoined from erecting a church even though his deed 
contained no such restrictions. The court found the owner purchased his lot 
subject to an equity or negative easement created by the restrictive covenants 
found in the deeds to other lot owners. See also Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 780 (1962); 
and Godley v. Weisman, 133 Minn. 1, 157 N.W. 711 
(1916).

[¶19.]  In Hein v. Lee, Wyo., 
549 P.2d 286 (1976), a defendant operated a sawmill in a subdivision in 
violation of a "residence only" restrictive covenant. The defendant's position 
was that he had no actual notice of the covenants, but evidence indicated the 
defendant had been informed of the covenants by the developer. We held the 
defendant was bound by the restrictive covenants since he had actual notice of 
them and upheld the enjoining of his operation of the 
sawmill.

"Appellant also contends 
that the covenants were not lawfully imposed with respect to his properties. The 
trial court correctly held that they were binding upon the appellant's lands 
since it found, based upon the evidence in the record that the appellant had 
actual notice of these covenants. [Citations.] The record also demonstrates [the 
developer's] intent to adopt a general scheme for development by imposition of 
the restrictive covenants. Neither the fact that they do not appear in his deed 
nor the fact that they were not properly placed on public record relieves the 
appellant of their burden because he had actual notice. [Citations.]" Id. at 
292.

[¶20.]  More recently, this court upheld a 
restrictive covenant allowing only one single-family dwelling within a 
subdivision in Dice v. Central Natrona 
County Improvement and Service District, Wyo., 684 P.2d 815 (1984). And we 
upheld a restrictive covenant requiring lots within a subdivision be used for 
"residential purposes only," enjoining the construction of a shop/garage in Sutherland v. Bock, Wyo., 688 P.2d 157 
(1984).

[¶21.]  At a minimum, we find appellants in the 
present case had constructive, if not actual, notice of the restrictive 
covenants pertaining to their lot. The first set of restrictive covenants 
referred to the gravel pit in Lot 13 as being 
an exception to the "residence only" restriction. As stated earlier, Lot 13 is 
in Section 32 where appellants' Lot 14 is also 
located. So, a reasonable person would have been put on notice that the 
restrictive covenants applied to Lot 14 as well 
as "all tracts in the GREEN RIVER SUBDIVISION." Such is clearly the intent of 
the developer.

[¶22.]  Furthermore, when appellants recorded 
their agreement for warranty deed, the revised restrictive covenants listing 
their property had already been recorded. The covenants were discussed with 
appellant Marvin Bowers by the developer. Therefore, we think there was ample 
testimony for the trial court to conclude that appellants had notice of the 
restrictive covenants and that they applied to appellants' 
property.

II

[¶23.]  Appellants' second issue raises the 
question of whether their activities were such as to constitute a nuisance. As 
indicated earlier, the trial court found that appellants' activities were a 
nuisance and enjoined any further commercial activity on appellants' 
property:

"The Court finds, 
further, that there is a nuisance on that property in question. There is no 
doubt in the Court's mind whatsoever that the covenants are applicable, even as 
a part of the deal, part of the total deal with reference to the purchase, the 
defendants were required to get title insurance. They got title insurance and 
the title insurance said that the property [was] subject to the restrictive 
covenants.2 The agreement for warranty deed 
said that they were and the deed said they were. Both deeds, both the partial 
deed in October of '73 and the final warranty deed.

"The Court enjoins the 
use of the property for other than residential purposes permanently. The Court 
abates the nuisance as of now."

[¶24.]  Since we have already held the 
restrictive covenants applicable to appellants' property, it is not imperative 
that we address this issue at length. But to answer the issue, we find the trial 
court was correct in holding appellants' activities constituted a 
nuisance.

[¶25.]  We have defined nuisance as being "a 
class of wrongs which arises from an unreasonable, unwarranted, or unlawful use 
by a person of his own property, working an obstruction or injury to the right 
of another." Lore v. Town of Douglas, Wyo., 
355 P.2d 367, 370 (1960), quoting City of 
Phoenix v. Johnson, 51 Ariz. 115, 75 P.2d 30, 34 (1938). See also, 66 
C.J.S. Nuisances § 1, p. 727 (1950).

[¶26.]  In Hein v. Lee, supra, discussed above, the 
trial court enjoined the defendants from operating a sawmill on their lot in a 
subdivision as violative of the restrictive covenants. The court also found the 
activity to constitute a nuisance. We upheld such finding and 
stated:

"* * * Absent a 
controlling statute or ordinance, and none appears here, it is within the 
province of the trial judge to balance equities and to decide whether an 
injunction should or should not issue with respect to an alleged nuisance. Hillmer v. McConnell Brothers, 
Wyo., 414 P.2d 972 (1966). Our examination of this record persuades us that the trial court 
properly applied the balancing test adopted by this court in Schorck v. Epperson, 74 Wyo. 286, 287 P.2d 467 (1955), in reaching its determination that an injunction should 
issue.

"The record also 
demonstrates that the district court was aware of and applied the proper test 
which considers the effect which the operation of the sawmill would have on 
ordinary and reasonable persons, that is, on persons of ordinary health, normal 
or average sensibilities, and ordinary tastes and habits and mode of living. Erickson v. Hudson, 70 Wyo. 317, 249 P.2d 523 (1952). * * * The district court's conclusion that under the facts and 
circumstances shown by this record the operation of appellant's sawmill was a 
nuisance per accidens is consistent with similar cases from other jurisdictions, 
and we hold that this decision is supported by the evidence of record and 
binding upon this Court. Erickson v. 
Hudson, supra." Id., at 291-292, 249 P.2d 523.

[¶27.]  In this case, the trial judge had 
personal knowledge of the subdivision and had visited the site on several 
occasions. He heard the testimony of the appellees, who were owners of other 
lots in the subdivision, to the effect that they had moved to this rural 
residential neighborhood to enjoy a quiet atmosphere in an attractive setting. 
The truck traffic in and around appellants' property was disturbing to 
appellees. The heavy steel tanks, storage of pipe, stacking and storing drilling 
rigs, storing numerous pieces of pipe, sheet metal and scrap iron for 
appellants' welding business were all annoying and unattractive to appellees. 
Indeed, the trial court found the appellants were conducting the following 
activities on their property:

"a) They are and have 
been since 1981 conducting a welding, repair and hot shot business on Lot 
14;

"b) The individual 
defendants since 1982 have erected and have been renting a 60' X 100' commercial 
building and have rented equipment to the corporate defendant for business 
purposes on Lot 14;

"c) They are and have 
been since 1982 dispatching or directing truck traffic from Lot 
14;

"d) They are and have 
been since 1981 loading, unloading and storing drill pipe on Lot 
14;

"e) They are and have 
been since 1982 stacking and storing drilling rigs on Lot 
14;

"f) They are and have 
been since 1981 storing and using in the welding business numerous pieces of 
pipe, sheet metal, and scrap iron on Lot 14;

"g) They did in 1981, and 
indicated they would again if given opportunity, construct and fabricate large 
water tanks on Lot 14;

"h) They are and have 
been since 1981 using numerous employees on Lot 14, parking employee vehicles on 
Lot 14, and dispatching employees to various job sites from Lot 14; 
and

"i) They are and have 
since 1981 parked upon and used on the property numerous commercial vehicles 
including trucks, trailers, forklifts, and welding 
equipment."

[¶28.]  We find ample evidence upon which the 
trial court could find a nuisance. Appellees have a right to be protected from 
such activity in obvious derogation and obstruction to them as property 
owners.

III

[¶29.]  Appellants' final issue asks whether the 
district court "was justified, based upon the evidence presented, to award 
attorney fees and costs to the Plaintiffs [appellees]." It is generally 
recognized that attorney's fees are not recoverable in the absence of express 
statutory authorization or contractual obligation. United States of America v. Redland, 
Wyo., 695 P.2d 1031 (1985); and Kvenild 
v. Taylor, Wyo., 594 P.2d 972 (1979). See also, Comment, "Attorney's Fees in 
Public Interest Litigation," 16 Land & Water Law Review, p. 727 (1981). 
Appellees have cited no justification to be awarded attorney's fees. In the 
present case we find no statutory authority nor contractual liability upon which 
to award attorney's fees.

[¶30.]  The judgment of the trial court is 
affirmed insofar as it found the restrictive covenants were applicable to 
appellants' property and the operation of commercial activities upon appellants' 
property constituted a nuisance. The trial court's judgment is modified by 
deleting the award of attorney's fees to appellees.

1 Appellants also claim 
the plat map and the first set of restrictive covenants were improperly 
notarized in violation of § 34-50, W.S. 1957, which was in effect at the time of 
acknowledgment but has since been repealed. We find no merit to this claim of 
error. The documents were endorsed by a notary public under official seal and 
dated in compliance with § 34-1-113, W.S. 1977.

2 Apparently the title 
insurance examiner had little problem finding appellants' property was subject 
to restrictive covenants, a further indication that the trial court was correct 
in its finding.

ROONEY, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶31.]  I agree with the majority opinion with 
reference to its holding on the issues pertaining to nuisance and attorney fees. 
I do not agree with all of that said in the majority opinion relative to the 
restrictive covenants issue. And I believe the court need not have addressed 
such issue inasmuch as the case could have been disposed of on the nuisance 
issue.

[¶32.]  Accordingly, there is no useful purpose 
in detailing my concern over that which I consider to be dicta. The principal 
fault of the holding of the majority opinion relative to restrictive covenants 
is its effect upon title searches. Under it, a record title search, by a 
purchaser of appellants' property, for example, will not determine title status. 
It will not reflect the property to be subject to the restrictive covenants. It 
will show that when the property was conveyed to appellants on May 15, 1973, 
there was no record of a restrictive covenant on it. The plat of the land to 
which it is a part reflected that it was subject to covenants and restrictions 
of record. Of record was only the 
first set of restrictive covenants, which did not apply to appellants' 
property.1 A title search, then, could 
properly certify the property as not burdened by the covenants. Under the 
majority opinion, however, the title searcher would be faced with deciding the 
intent of the seller as to the existence or nonexistence of the covenants (not 
as to the meaning of covenants acknowledged to exist) - an impossible task as a 
general rule.

[¶33.]  In this respect, the majority opinion 
confuses the existence of constructive notice of that which is of record (a true 
constructive notice) with notice of existing uses or activities from which a 
duty to inquire may result. At the time of purchase by appellants, there were no 
such uses or activities, but if there were such creating a duty in this 
instance, the resulting inquiry would simply have determined no use restriction 
on appellants' property at the time of purchase - regardless of the seller's 
intention. The seller is not a party to this lawsuit.

[¶34.]  I do not mean to say that, as between 
appellants and the seller, an understanding or agreement could not be enforced 
regardless of prior recordation of evidence of such. The principal purpose of 
recordation is to give notice to those subsequently interested parties. Connolly v. Des Moines & Central Iowa 
Railway Company, 246 Iowa 874, 68 N.W.2d 320 (1955); Cheyenne National Bank v. Citizens Savings 
Bank, Wyo., 391 P.2d 933 (1964). But it is not essential to the validity of 
an agreement between the parties to the instrument. Martin v. Commercial National Bank of Macon, 
Georgia, 245 U.S. 513, 38 S. Ct. 176, 62 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1918); Godwin v. Gerling, 362 Mo. 19, 239 S.W.2d 352, 40 A.L.R.2d 1250 (1951); Amana Society v. Colony Inn, Inc., Iowa, 
315 N.W.2d 101 (1982). One may rely on the recorded title to real property in 
absence of actual knowledge of the title in fact or of facts sufficient to put 
him on inquiry concerning the same. Williams v. Jackson, 107 U.S. 478, 2 S. Ct. 814, 27 L. Ed. 529 (1883); Federal 
Land Bank of Spokane v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 54 Idaho 161, 29 P.2d 1009 (1934). There is no evidence whatsoever in the record that appellants had 
actual knowledge of any restrictive covenants placed upon their property as of 
the time of purchase.2 And, as indicated supra, any 
inquiry as a result of facts which would have put them on notice of such 
covenants would have resulted in a determination that there were no covenants as 
of the time of purchase.

[¶35.]  The amended restrictive covenants were 
not only of no potency as far as appellants were concerned because they were 
imposed subsequent to purchase by appellants, but they were adopted only by Fear 
Ranches, Inc. and not by the other owners of property in the subdivision 
(including appellants) at the time of adoption. Hein v. Lee, Wyo., 549 P.2d 286 
(1976).

[¶36.]  I would reverse the holding of the 
district court relative to the restrictive covenants and attorney fees issues 
and would affirm its holding relative to the nuisance issue, remanding the case 
for the purpose of entering a judgment enjoining appellants from any 
unreasonable, unlawful or unwarranted use of their property which works an 
obstruction or injury to the reasonable use by others of their property, 
specifically enjoining the use of appellants' property for storing, keeping or 
maintaining drilling rigs, pipes, scrap material or other items of an unsightly 
nature, and specifically enjoining the use of appellants' property for 
dispatching or directing truck traffic or for any activity creating an 
unreasonably loud noise.

1 The majority opinion 
places reliance on the language of such covenants which recites the restrictions 
to apply to "the tracts in all of 
said GREEN RIVER SUBDIVISIONS" (emphasis added), without consideration of such 
in context; i.e., the quoted language continues "being situated within Sections 
20 and 29." Appellants' property is in Green River Subdivision but is not in 
Section 20 or 29. It is in Section 32, and the covenants are plain in that they 
do not pertain to Section 32.

2 Appellants purchased the 
property from Fear Ranches, Inc. and negotiated the purchase with Frank Fear, an 
officer of the corporation. Frank Fear testified that he vaguely remembered 
talking to appellant Marvin Bowers subsequent to the sale about the restrictive 
covenants and that he was not, at the time, concerned about haying machinery and 
welding activities by appellants on the property. Marvin Bowers testified that 
he did not know of the covenants when he executed the contract for deed, and 
that Frank Fear subsequently told him that it "really doesn't pertain to" him. 
He testified that during the negotiations for purchase of the property, the 
restrictive covenants were never discussed, and as far as he knew "there was 
[sic] no restrictive covenants."