Case Title: State v. Lickes

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019AP001272-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2021-06-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
2021 WI 60 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP1272-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Jordan Alexander Lickes, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 394 Wis. 2d 161, 949 N.W.2d 623 
PDC No:2020 WI App 59 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 15, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 18, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Green   
 
JUDGE: 
James R. Beer   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, HAGEDORN, and 
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion in which DALLET, J., joined.  
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Catherine E. White and Hurley Burish, S.C., Madison. There 
was an oral argument by Catherine E. White. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by Scott 
E. Rosenow, assistant attorney general; with whom on the brief was 
Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument by 
Scott E. Rosenow.  
 
 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Susan Lund, Sheila 
Sullivan, Julie Leary, Jessie Long and Legal Action of Wisconsin, 
Inc., Milwaukee.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2021 WI 60 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2019AP1272-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2012CF64) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
: 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Jordan Alexander Lickes, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 15, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, 
JJ., joined.  ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion in 
which DALLET, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   Jordan Lickes seeks review 
of the court of appeals decision,1 which reversed the Green County 
Circuit Court's order expunging three of Lickes's convictions.2  
                     
1 State v. Lickes, 2020 WI App 59, 394 Wis. 2d 161, 949 
N.W.2d 623. 
2 The Honorable Judge James R. Beer, Green County Circuit 
Court, presided. 
No. 
2019AP1272-CR 
 
2 
 
Pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 973.015(1m)(a) (2017-18),3 
for individuals 
under the age of 25 at the time of an offense, a court "may order 
at the time of sentencing that [the individual's] record be 
expunged upon successful completion of the sentence[.]"  If the 
individual is placed on probation, § 973.015(1m)(b) provides that 
he "has successfully completed the sentence if . . . [he] has 
satisfied the conditions of probation," among other things. 
¶2 
Lickes raises two principal issues.  First, Lickes 
contends that the phrase "conditions of probation" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.015(1m)(b) does not refer to the conditions set by the 
Department of Corrections (DOC) but only those conditions ordered 
by the sentencing court.  According to Lickes, he did not need to 
satisfy DOC's conditions of probation in order for the circuit 
court to expunge all three of his convictions.  Second, Lickes 
argues that, even if the phrase "conditions of probation" includes 
conditions set by DOC, circuit courts nonetheless have discretion 
to determine that an individual "satisfied [his] conditions of 
probation" despite having violated one or more conditions. 
¶3 
We hold:  (1) the phrase "conditions of probation" in 
Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) means conditions set by both DOC and 
the sentencing court; and (2) the statute does not give circuit 
courts discretionary authority to declare an individual has 
"satisfied 
[his] 
conditions 
of 
probation" 
if 
the 
record 
demonstrates an individual has violated one or more "conditions of 
                     
3 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-
18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2019AP1272-CR 
 
3 
 
probation," including DOC-imposed conditions.  The circuit court 
erred in expunging Lickes's three convictions because he failed to 
satisfy DOC's "conditions of probation" for all three convictions.  
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.4 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
Based on an incident in April 2012, the State charged 
then 19-year-old Lickes with four counts:  (1) fourth-degree sexual 
assault, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.225(3m) (hereinafter 
"Count 1"); (2) sexual intercourse with a child aged 16 or older, 
in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.09 (hereinafter "Count 2"); (3) 
disorderly conduct, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 947.01(1) 
(hereinafter "Count 3"); and (4) exposing genitals or pubic area, 
in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.10(1) (hereinafter "Count 4").5 
¶5 
Lickes pled guilty to Count 2 and no contest to the other 
three counts.  The circuit court sentenced Lickes in January 2014.  
For Counts 1 and 3, the circuit court withheld sentence and placed 
Lickes on probation for 24 months.  For Count 2, the circuit court 
sentenced Lickes to 90 days in county jail with Huber privileges.6  
                     
4 Decrying the "consequences" of the court's decision, the 
dissent advances several policy-laden arguments for affording 
circuit court judges greater discretion to apply a more forgiving 
approach toward expungement.  Such policy choices rest with the 
legislature, not this court, which is limited to saying what the 
law is and not what we may wish it to be. 
5 For Counts 1 and 3, the State originally charged Lickes with 
third-degree sexual assault and child enticement, respectively.  
However, the State later amended the charges as reflected above. 
6 Huber privileges allow individuals to leave county jail for 
certain 
purposes, 
such 
as 
"[w]orking 
at 
employment" 
or 
"[p]erforming community service work."  Wis. Stat. § 303.08. 
No. 
2019AP1272-CR 
 
4 
 
For Count 4, the circuit court imposed and stayed a three-year 
prison sentence——comprising one year of initial confinement and 
two years of extended supervision——and placed Lickes on three years 
of probation. 
¶6 
For convictions under Counts 1, 3, and 4, the circuit 
court imposed approximately ten conditions of probation.  One of 
the conditions required Lickes to "enter into, participate [in], 
and successfully complete sex offender treatment."  The circuit 
court informed Lickes that if he "successfully complete[d] 
probation and all the terms," the circuit court would expunge 
Lickes's convictions on Counts 1, 3, and 4, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.015(1m). 
¶7 
On October 6, 2015, Lickes's probation agent at DOC sent 
a document to the circuit court disclosing that "Mr. Lickes has 
violated his probation multiple times."  In particular, the 
document stated that "Mr. Lickes has had unapproved sexual contact, 
has given his agent false information, and has been terminated 
from Sex Offender Treatment."  The next page of the document 
contained Lickes's signature, along with the statement:  "I hereby 
admit as shown by my signature . . . that I violated the rules and 
conditions of probation as described on the front [of the 
document]."  The document also indicated that, "in lieu of 
probation revocation proceedings being initiated, I hereby accept 
45 days, as shown by my signature, . . . in the Green County Jail."  
The circuit court accepted the agreement between Lickes and DOC, 
ordering Lickes to serve 45 days in jail with Huber privileges. 
No. 
2019AP1272-CR 
 
5 
 
¶8 
On January 23, 2016, Lickes completed his term of 
probation for his convictions under Counts 1 and 3.  On July 8, 
2016, Lickes sent a letter to the circuit court requesting 
expungement for his convictions for Counts 1 and 3, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 973.015.  In September 2016, Lickes's DOC probation 
agent sent the circuit court a form entitled "Verification of 
Satisfaction of Probation Conditions for Expungement" regarding 
Counts 1 and 3.  The form contained conflicting information.  On 
the one hand, Lickes's probation agent checked a box stating that 
"[t]he offender has successfully completed his/her probation."  
However, the probation agent also checked a box stating that "[a]ll 
court ordered conditions have not been met," noting that "Lickes 
is still currently participating in sex offender treatment."  
(Emphasis in original.)  The probation agent also declined to check 
the box stating that "[a]ll court ordered conditions have been 
met." 
¶9 
On January 23, 2017, Lickes completed his term of 
probation for Count 4.  In July 2018, Lickes's probation agent 
sent the circuit court a form entitled "Certification of Discharge 
and Satisfaction of Probation Conditions for Expungement" 
regarding Count 4.  On this form, the probation agent checked the 
box stating that "[t]he offender has successfully completed 
his/her probation" and "[a]ll court ordered conditions have been 
met." 
¶10 In January 2019, the State filed a brief in circuit court 
opposing Lickes's expungement for convictions under Counts 1, 3, 
and 4, arguing that Lickes failed to satisfy his "conditions of 
No. 
2019AP1272-CR 
 
6 
 
probation."  According to the State, Lickes was not entitled to 
expungement because, as evidenced in the October 2015 document, 
Lickes violated his conditions of probation established by DOC.  
The State contended that, per Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m) and this 
court's decision in State v. Ozuna, 2017 WI 64, 376 Wis. 2d 1, 898 
N.W.2d 20, the phrase "conditions of probation" refers to 
conditions set by both DOC and the sentencing court, and the 
circuit court must deny expungement if an individual has violated 
one or more of the conditions——as Lickes had allegedly done.  
Lickes submitted a brief arguing he was entitled to expungement. 
¶11 In March 2019, the circuit court held expungement 
hearings regarding Counts 1 and 3.  The circuit court ordered both 
of Lickes's convictions expunged.  The circuit court found Lickes 
satisfied the sentencing court's conditions of probation, and 
Lickes's violations of the DOC conditions did not prevent 
expungement.  In doing so, the circuit court relied, in part, upon 
the fact that Ozuna was not a unanimous decision and that the 
legislature's "intent" is to not "have so many people having 
criminal records." 
¶12 The 
circuit 
court 
ordered 
supplemental 
briefing 
regarding the conviction for Count 4, held an expungement hearing 
on Count 4 in May 2019, and granted expungement for that 
conviction.  Despite Lickes violating some of DOC's conditions of 
probation, the circuit court determined he was nevertheless 
entitled to expungement because, among other reasons, "[Ozuna] 
does not deal with this situation" and it "declines to expand 
[Ozuna's holding]."  The circuit court acknowledged that "Mr. 
No. 
2019AP1272-CR 
 
7 
 
Lickes did break a rule, but it was not deemed serious by the 
Department [of Corrections], in that they didn't try to revoke 
probation[.]" 
¶13 The State appealed the circuit court's decision.  The 
court of appeals reversed the circuit court's order granting 
expungement of Lickes's convictions for all three counts.  We 
granted Lickes's petition for review. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶14 This case requires us to interpret the expungement 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.015, and its application to undisputed 
facts.  Statutory interpretation and its application are questions 
of law we review "independently, while benefiting from the 
decisions by the court of appeals and circuit court."  State v. 
Stephenson, 2020 WI 92, ¶18, 394 Wis. 2d 703, 951 N.W.2d 819 
(quotations and alterations omitted); see also Ozuna, 376 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶9. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  "Conditions of Probation" in Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) 
¶15 "The Wisconsin statutes empower a circuit court to order 
certain criminal offenses to be expunged from a person's record, 
if the offender was younger than 25 at the time of the commission 
of the offense."  Ozuna, 376 Wis. 2d 1, ¶11.  Specifically, Wis. 
Stat. § 973.015(1m)(a) provides: 
[W]hen a person is under the age of 25 at the time of 
the commission of an offense for which the person has 
been found guilty in a court for violation of a law for 
which the maximum period of imprisonment is 6 years or 
less, the court may order at the time of sentencing that 
the record be expunged upon successful completion of the 
No. 
2019AP1272-CR 
 
8 
 
sentence if the court determines the person will benefit 
and society will not be harmed by this disposition. 
(Emphasis added.)  "Under the statutory scheme, the determination 
of a defendant's eligibility for expungement must be made at the 
time of sentencing."  Ozuna, 376 Wis. 2d 1, ¶11 (citing State v. 
Matasek, 2014 WI 27, ¶45, 353 Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811). 
¶16 "If the circuit court determines that the defendant is 
eligible for expungement under Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(a), 'the 
plain language of the statute indicates that once the defendant 
successfully completes his sentence, he has earned, and is 
automatically entitled to, expungement.'"  Id., ¶12 (quoting State 
v. Hemp, 2014 WI 129, ¶23, 359 Wis. 2d 320, 856 N.W.2d 811).  As 
particularly 
relevant 
to 
this 
case, 
a 
defendant 
must 
"successful[ly] complet[e] . . . [his] sentence" before receiving 
expungement, as mandated by subsection (a).  § 973.015(1m)(a).  
Subsection (b) provides three criteria for a defendant's 
"successful completion of [his] sentence":  "[1] [t]he person has 
not been convicted of a subsequent offense, and if on probation, 
[2] the probation has not been revoked[,] and [3] the probationer 
has satisfied the conditions of probation."  § 973.015(1m)(b).  
"[T]he probationer must meet all three of the statutory criteria" 
in order to be entitled to expungement.  Ozuna, 376 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶13. 
¶17 There is no dispute that Lickes satisfied the first two 
criteria:  he was not convicted of a subsequent offense and his 
probation was not revoked.  Instead, Lickes challenges the scope 
of the third criterion under Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b):  whether 
No. 
2019AP1272-CR 
 
9 
 
he "satisfied [his] conditions of probation."  Lickes contends 
that the phrase "conditions of probation" does not encompass the 
conditions set by DOC but only those conditions ordered by the 
sentencing court.  According to Lickes, he did not need to satisfy 
DOC's conditions of probation in order for the circuit court to 
determine he satisfied the third criterion and then expunge all 
three of his convictions.  We disagree.   
¶18 "[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language of 
the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily 
stop the inquiry.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoted 
source omitted).  In doing so, we give statutory language "its 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning."  Id.  In conducting a 
plain meaning analysis, we also examine "the context in which 
[statutory language] is used; not in isolation but as part of a 
whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related statutes[.]"  Id., ¶46.  "Statutes are closely related 
when they are in the same chapter, reference one another, or use 
similar terms."  State v. Reyes Fuerte, 2017 WI 104, ¶27, 378 
Wis. 2d 504, 904 N.W.2d 773.  The plain text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.015(1m)(b) in relation to closely-related statutes resolves 
the question presented:  under § 973.015(1m)(b), the phrase 
"conditions of probation" refers to the conditions set by both DOC 
and the sentencing court.  Accordingly, in addition to the other 
two criteria, defendants must satisfy all conditions of probation 
established by both DOC and the sentencing court before being 
entitled to expungement. 
No. 
2019AP1272-CR 
 
10 
 
¶19 As a foundational matter, the sentencing court and DOC 
each play a key role in the "imposition of probation," and both 
set conditions of probation.  As instructed by Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.10(1), "[i]mposition of probation shall have the effect of 
placing the defendant in the custody of the department and shall 
subject the defendant to the control of the department under 
conditions set by the court and rules and regulations established 
by the department[.]"  "As a matter of law," therefore, individuals 
are required to "abide . . . with departmental regulations."  
State ex rel. Rodriguez v. DHSS, 133 Wis. 2d 47, 52, 393 N.W.2d 105 
(Ct. App. 1986).  In other words, throughout the duration of 
probation, an individual must comply with conditions and 
regulations imposed by both the sentencing court and DOC.  As this 
court has stated, "[p]robation agents have the authority to 
establish rules of probation that are supplemental to court-
imposed conditions."  State v. Purtell, 2014 WI 101, ¶6 n.7, 358 
Wis. 2d 212, 851 N.W.2d 417. 
¶20 DOC does, therefore, impose "conditions of probation" 
upon individuals.  Closely-related statutes confirm this.  In 
particular, Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(d)4 requires circuit courts to 
determine whether "[t]he probationer has satisfied all rules and 
conditions of probation that were set by the department" before 
modifying or discharging a person from probation. 
¶21 Other statutory provisions beyond Wis. Stat. ch. 973 
support the same conclusion.  For example, under Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.132(2) DOC may require sex offenders to submit to a "lie 
detector test" as part of DOC's "conditions of probation."  In 
No. 
2019AP1272-CR 
 
11 
 
relevant part, the statute reads:  "The department [of corrections] 
may require submission to a lie detector test under this subsection 
as . . . a 
condition 
of 
a 
sex 
offender's 
probation."  
§ 301.132(2).  The same is true for the statute authorizing DOC to 
require convicted sex offenders to use GPS tracking devices as a 
"condition of probation."  Specifically, the statute states:  
"If . . . a person is being placed on probation . . . for 
committing a sex offense . . . , the department may have the person 
tracked using a global positioning system tracking device, or 
passive position system tracking, as a condition of the person's 
probation."  Wis. Stat. § 301.48(2)(d).  Indeed, the statutes 
repeatedly employ the phrase "conditions of probation" to refer to 
conditions set by DOC.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 304.06(1q)(b) 
("This paragraph does not prohibit the department [of corrections] 
from requiring pharmacological treatment using an antiandrogen or 
the chemical equivalent of an antiandrogen as a condition of 
probation."). 
¶22 Recognizing that DOC does have the ability to set 
"conditions of probation," we turn now to the statute before us.  
Under Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b), the phrase "conditions of 
probation" plainly refers to conditions imposed by both DOC and 
the sentencing court.7  Section 973.015(1m)(b) broadly states that, 
in order to be entitled to expungement, a probationer must 
"satisf[y] the conditions of probation."  Importantly, the statute 
                     
7 As a general matter, the parties do not dispute that 
sentencing courts have the ability to impose "conditions of 
probation." 
No. 
2019AP1272-CR 
 
12 
 
does not limit the phrase "conditions of probation" in any way, 
much less restrict it to only court-imposed conditions.  In 
contrast, Wis. Stat. § 973.01(5) specifies that "the court may 
impose conditions upon the term of extended supervision" when 
imposing 
a 
bifurcated 
sentence. 
 
Similarly, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.09(3)(d)3 states that "[t]he court may modify a person's 
period of probation and discharge the person from probation if," 
among other factors, "[t]he probationer has satisfied all 
conditions of probation that were set by the sentencing court." 
¶23 In comparison, Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) contains no 
such modification; it refers broadly to "conditions of probation."  
Had the legislature wanted to limit the phrase solely to those 
conditions set by the sentencing court and thereby exclude 
conditions set by DOC, it could have done so, as it did elsewhere.  
See Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2019 WI 24, 
¶29, 385 Wis. 2d 748, 924 N.W.2d 153 (stating that when the 
legislature uses different statutory phrases, we presume the 
legislature gave the phrases different meanings); Outagamie Cnty. 
v. Town of Greenville, 2000 WI App 65, ¶9, 233 Wis. 2d 566, 608 
N.W.2d 414 ("[I]f a statute contains a given provision, the 
omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a 
related subject is significant in showing" a different meaning)  
(internal quotations and citation omitted).   
¶24 But courts may not add to the text.  It is a fundamental 
maxim of statutory interpretation that we do not "read into [a] 
statute language that the legislature did not put in."  Matasek, 
353 Wis. 2d 601, ¶20 (quoted source omitted); see also Fond du Lac 
No. 
2019AP1272-CR 
 
13 
 
Cnty. v. Town of Rosendale, 149 Wis. 2d 326, 334, 440 N.W.2d 818 
(Ct. App. 1989) ("One of the maxims of statutory construction is 
that courts should not add words to a statute to give it a certain 
meaning.") (citation omitted).  "Under the omitted-case canon of 
statutory interpretation, '[n]othing is to be added to what the 
text states or reasonably implies (casus omissus pro omisso 
habendus est).'"  State ex rel. Lopez-Quintero v. Dittmann, 2019 
WI 58, ¶18, 387 Wis. 2d 50, 928 N.W.2d 480 (quoting Antonin Scalia 
& Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal 
Texts 93 (2012)).  Given that the legislature did not limit the 
phrase 
"conditions 
of 
probation" 
solely 
to 
court-imposed 
conditions or DOC-imposed conditions, we conclude that Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.015(1m)(b) applies to conditions set by both the sentencing 
court and DOC.  Courts may not "elaborate unprovided-for exceptions 
to a text."  Scalia & Garner, supra, at 93. 
¶25 This interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) is 
confirmed by a closely-related statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.10(2), in 
which the legislature likewise employed the phrase "conditions of 
probation."  Section 973.10(2) pertains to probation revocation 
proceedings and reads, in relevant part:  "If a probationer 
violates 
the 
conditions 
of 
probation, 
the 
department 
of 
corrections may initiate a proceeding before the division of 
hearings and appeals in the department of administration."  
§ 973.10(2).  In interpreting this language, Wisconsin courts have 
never held that DOC's statutory right to initiate revocation 
proceedings is solely limited to an individual's violations of the 
sentencing 
court's 
conditions. 
 
To 
the 
contrary, 
"[a] 
No. 
2019AP1272-CR 
 
14 
 
probationer . . . is within the custody of the DOC and similarly 
subject to all of the conditions and rules of supervision, the 
violation of which could be cause for revocation."   State ex rel. 
Rupinski v. Smith, 2007 WI App 4, ¶20, 297 Wis. 2d 749, 728 
N.W.2d 1 (emphasis added). 
¶26 Within the context of Wis. Stat. § 973.10(2), the term 
"conditions of probation" is decidedly broad, encompassing more 
than just conditions set by the sentencing court.  "When the same 
term is used throughout a chapter of the statutes, it is a 
reasonable deduction that . . . the term possess[es] an identical 
meaning each time it appears."  Winebow, Inc. v. Capitol-Husting 
Co., 2018 WI 60, ¶29, 381 Wis. 2d 732, 914 N.W.2d 631 (quoted 
source omitted).  Because the phrase "conditions of probation" in 
§ 973.10(2) encompasses more than just conditions set by the 
No. 
2019AP1272-CR 
 
15 
 
sentencing court, this phrase retains an equally expansive meaning 
in Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b).8 
¶27 In short, DOC may impose conditions of probation upon 
individuals in addition to the conditions imposed by the sentencing 
court. 
 
Unlike 
closely-related 
statutes, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.015(1m)(b) does not limit "conditions of probation" to only 
those ordered by the circuit court.  Accordingly, individuals must 
satisfy conditions of probation imposed by both DOC and the 
sentencing court in order for their records to be expunged under 
§ 973.015(1m)(b). 
B.  Discretion Under Wis. Stat. § 973.015 
¶28 Lickes next argues that, even if the phrase "conditions 
of probation" in Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) includes conditions 
set by both DOC and the sentencing court, circuit courts 
nonetheless have discretion to determine that an individual 
                     
8 Although not controlling our analysis, administrative rules 
promulgated under Wis. Stat. § 973.10(2) confirm our reading of 
the phrase "conditions of probation."  In particular, to effectuate 
the language in § 973.10(2), the Department of Administration's 
Division of Hearings and Appeals ("the Division") enacted rules 
pertaining to the "procedure and practice for correction 
hearings."  In relevant part, the Division requires that, before 
any final revocation hearing of probation, a probationer receive 
notice of "[t]he conduct that the [probationer] is alleged to have 
committed and the rule or condition that the offender is alleged 
to have violated."  Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(1)(b).  The rules 
define "conditions" as any "specific regulations imposed on the 
[probationer] by the court or department [of corrections]."  Wis. 
Admin. Code § HA 2.02(4) (emphasis added).  In practice, when DOC 
initiates revocation proceedings before the Division pursuant to 
§ 973.10(2), it can petition to revoke an individual's probation 
for violating conditions set by either the sentencing court or by 
DOC. 
No. 
2019AP1272-CR 
 
16 
 
"satisfied [his] conditions of probation" even when an individual 
has violated one or more "conditions of probation."  We disagree. 
¶29 In order to "satisf[y] the conditions of probation," an 
individual 
must 
satisfy 
all 
the 
conditions 
of 
probation 
established by both the sentencing court and DOC.  As we already 
explained in Ozuna, in order to successfully complete the sentence, 
"the probationer must meet all three of the statutory criteria, 
including satisfying all the conditions of probation."  Ozuna, 376 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶13; see also Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶22 (noting that 
a defendant must meet "all the conditions of probation").  As Wis. 
Stat. § 973.015(1m)(a) plainly states, an individual's record of 
conviction may be expunged only "upon successful completion of the 
sentence," which requires fully satisfying all three criteria for 
expungement under subsection (b).  Therefore, if a probationer 
does not satisfy all the conditions of probation established by 
both the sentencing court and DOC, he is not entitled to 
expungement of his convictions. 
¶30 Accordingly, when an individual fails to fulfill all the 
conditions of his probation set by the sentencing court and DOC, 
circuit courts do not have discretion to conclude that he 
"satisfied [his] conditions of probation" for purposes of the third 
criterion under Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b).  It is well 
established that § 973.015(1m) affords circuit courts 
the 
discretion to decide whether an individual is entitled to 
expungement only at the time of sentencing.  Matasek, 353 
Wis. 2d 601, ¶6 ("[I]f a circuit court is going to exercise its 
discretion to expunge a record, the discretion must be exercised 
No. 
2019AP1272-CR 
 
17 
 
at the time of the sentencing proceeding."); see also State v. 
Arberry, 2018 WI 7, ¶21, 379 Wis. 2d 254, 905 N.W.2d 832 ("[T]he 
sentencing hearing . . . [is] the only time at which the circuit 
court could exercise its discretion to expunge a record under the 
statute, if it [is] going to do so[.]").  Section 973.015(1m) 
contains no language permitting circuit courts to exercise 
discretion at any other time.  Once the individual completes his 
term of probation, the question for the circuit court becomes 
whether, based upon undisputed facts,9 the individual satisfied 
the three criteria for expungement set forth in § 973.015(1m)(b).  
See § 973.015(1m)(a) ("[T]he court may order at the time of 
sentencing that the record be expunged upon successful completion 
of the sentence[.]").  This is an objective inquiry:  based upon 
undisputed facts, either the individual satisfied all three 
criteria of expungement, including every one of his conditions of 
probation, or he did not——a question of law that appellate courts 
review de novo.  See Ozuna, 376 Wis. 2d 1, ¶9.  Therefore, once an 
individual completes his term of probation, if it is undisputed 
that the individual violated at least one of his conditions of 
probation——as in this very case——circuit courts must deny 
expungement. 
                     
9 As the parties agree, the circuit court may first need to 
conduct factfinding to determine whether an individual violated a 
condition of probation.  See State v. Ozuna, 2017 WI 64, ¶14 n.9, 
376 Wis. 2d 1, 898 N.W.2d 20.  Appellate courts review a circuit 
court's findings of fact under a "clearly erroneous" standard.  
Phelps v. Physicians, Inc. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2009 WI 74, ¶34, 319 
Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 615. 
No. 
2019AP1272-CR 
 
18 
 
C.  Application to Lickes's Case 
¶31 Applying these principles, we conclude the circuit court 
erred in expunging all three of Lickes's convictions.  For Counts 
1 and 3, the sentencing court imposed two years of probation, which 
expired on January 23, 2016; for Count 4, the sentencing court 
imposed three years of probation, which expired on January 23, 
2017.  As the sentencing court informed Lickes at the time of 
sentencing, if he "successfully complete[d] probation and all the 
terms," the circuit court would expunge Lickes's convictions on 
Counts 1, 3, and 4, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m). 
¶32 Because Lickes violated DOC-imposed conditions, he 
failed to satisfy his "conditions of probation" for all three 
convictions, pursuant to the third criterion under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.015(1m)(b).  As Lickes's probation agent notified the 
circuit court on October 6, 2015, "Mr. Lickes has violated his 
probation multiple times."  In particular, the document submitted 
by the probation agent disclosed that "Mr. Lickes has had 
unapproved sexual contact, has given his agent false information, 
and has been terminated from Sex Offender Treatment."  Lickes also 
signed the document, acknowledging that he "admit[s] as shown by 
[his] signature . . . that [he] violated the rules and conditions 
of probation."  (Emphasis added.)  Lickes's violation of his DOC-
imposed conditions occurred before his terms of probation expired 
for all three convictions. 
¶33 Because Lickes admittedly violated his DOC-imposed 
conditions, he failed to "successful[ly] complet[e] . . . [his] 
No. 
2019AP1272-CR 
 
19 
 
sentence," as required by Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(a).10  The 
circuit court did not have discretion to determine otherwise.  As 
the circuit court recognized, "Mr. Lickes did break a rule" imposed 
by DOC.  Consequently, the circuit court erred in granting Lickes's 
expungement for all three convictions.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
                     
10 The circuit court also determined that Lickes satisfied the 
sentencing court's conditions of probation, despite the State's 
contention that Lickes did not satisfy the sentencing court's sex-
offender treatment requirement.  According to Lickes, the circuit 
court did not err when it found that Lickes satisfied the court-
ordered conditions of probation.  We need not resolve this 
question.  As discussed, Lickes violated DOC's conditions of 
probation for all three convictions; therefore, regardless of 
whether Lickes violated the sentencing court's conditions of 
probation, he is still not entitled to expungement under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.015.  See Maryland Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, 
¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15 ("Issues that are not 
dispositive need not be addressed."). 
No.  2019AP1272-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶34 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  When a person is 
placed on probation by a court, that person is subject to a vast 
array of rules.  Imposed both by the sentencing court and a 
Department of Corrections (DOC) agent, these rules set rigid 
contours for a person's life for the duration of the supervision 
period.  They can include everything from the extraordinary to the 
mundane. 
¶35 Indeed, 
the 
DOC's 
standard 
rules 
of 
community 
supervision require that a person meet regularly with the probation 
agent and obtain approval from the agent prior to moving; changing 
employment; leaving the state of Wisconsin; purchasing, trading, 
selling, or operating a motor vehicle; borrowing money; or buying 
anything on credit.1  The standard rules also broadly require that 
a person "[c]omply with any court ordered conditions and/or any 
additional rules established by [their] agent" that are subject to 
change at any time.2 
¶36 Although the conditions of probation may be extensive, 
for many young people convicted of offenses there can be a 
significant reward for complying:  expungement.3  The desire to 
insulate young offenders from the harsh consequences of a criminal 
                     
1 Wis. Dep't of Corrections, Standard Rules of Community 
Supervision, 
https://doc.wi.gov/Pages/AboutDOC/CommunityCorrections/Supervisi
onRules.aspx (last visited June 9, 2021). 
2 Id. 
3 Following 
the 
majority 
opinion, 
I 
use 
the 
term 
"expungement."  Other cases use the term "expunction," but the two 
terms mean the same thing.  State v. Arberry, 2018 WI 7, ¶1 n.2, 
379 Wis. 2d 254, 905 N.W.2d 832. 
No.  2019AP1272-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
record is both sensible and practical.  In addition to the legal 
and financial penalties associated with the conviction itself, a 
criminal conviction carries significant collateral consequences.   
¶37 Such consequences often include increased difficulties 
in obtaining employment, housing, and education.4  The aggregate 
effect of these collateral consequences is that absent mechanisms 
for reducing the impact on young people, a criminal record can 
leave cascading negative ramifications.  Importantly, the lack of 
access to employment is a primary factor leading to recidivism.5   
¶38 Yet the majority opinion places expungement further out 
of reach for those defendants who would benefit most.  Although I 
agree with the majority that expungement requires satisfaction of 
conditions imposed by both the sentencing court and DOC, I part 
ways with the majority when it determines that the circuit court 
has no discretion to order expungement in the face of any rule 
violation, no matter how small.   
¶39 Does the majority's determination mean that if, without 
agent approval, probationers from the border community of 
Marinette, Wisconsin cross to Menominee, Michigan to do grocery 
shopping, that they must be denied expungement?  The majority 
apparently responds, "Yes.  Under the standard rules of probation, 
it is a violation." 
                     
4 See Larry J. Martin, Now the Real Work Begins, 94 Wis. Law. 
9, 9 (Jan. 2021) ("A criminal record can be a life-long barrier, 
presenting obstacles to employment, housing, education, and family 
reunification and often resulting in significant debt.").     
5 Devah Pager, Double Jeopardy:  Race, Crime, and Getting a 
Job, 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 617, 647 (2005). 
No.  2019AP1272-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
¶40 How about the standard rule of buying nothing on credit?  
What happens if the probationer, without agent approval, pays for 
gas with a credit card?  "It's out of our hands," responds the 
majority.  The same apparently holds true if the probationer misses 
a single meeting with the probation agent. 
¶41 Admittedly, the violations here are more significant 
than the above examples, but that matters not.  The majority 
interprets "satisfaction" as an all-or-nothing proposition.  Thus, 
in the majority's view, regardless of the severity of the 
violation, the circuit court has no discretion at all in deciding 
whether to grant or deny expungement.  Majority op., ¶30. 
¶42 With a mere three paragraphs of analysis on the issue, 
see id., ¶¶28-30, the majority jettisons the future lives of 
countless young offenders and their families, who will be harmed 
by this stunted analysis.  And why?  The answer of the majority is 
"the legislature made us do this." 
¶43 Nonsense.  The legislature did no such thing.  The plain 
text of Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) requires that a probationer 
"satisfy" the conditions of probation.  Here, both the DOC and the 
circuit court, entities in the best position to make such a 
finding, determined that Jordan Lickes did so. 
¶44 Rather than embracing those determinations, the majority 
instead embarks upon a misguided and destructive path.  Its 
conclusory determination runs counter to the statutory language, 
has no basis in the case law the majority cites, and thwarts the 
purpose of the expungement statute. 
¶45 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
No.  2019AP1272-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
I  
¶46 The legislature has been engaged in a consistent "effort 
to expand the availability of expungement to include a broader 
category of youthful offenders."  State v. Hemp, 2014 WI 129, ¶20, 
359 Wis. 2d 320, 856 N.W.2d 811.  This legislative effort "offers 
young offenders a fresh start without the burden of a criminal 
record and a second chance at becoming law-abiding and productive 
members of the community."  Id., ¶19.  Today's majority opinion 
subverts the legislative trajectory.   
¶47 I begin by examining the framework for the exercise of 
judicial discretion enacted by the legislature.  This framework 
provides "a means by which trial courts may, in appropriate cases, 
shield youthful offenders from some of the harsh consequences of 
criminal convictions."  State v. Matasek, 2014 WI 27, ¶42, 353 
Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811 (quoting State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, 
¶38, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341). 
¶48 At the sentencing hearing, if certain criteria are 
fulfilled a circuit court may make the determination that a 
defendant will be eligible for expungement upon completion of the 
sentence.  Matasek, 353 Wis. 2d 601, ¶45.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 973.015(1m)(a)1. sets forth four criteria governing when a 
circuit court may deem a defendant eligible for expungement upon 
completion of the sentence:  (1) the person must have been under 
25 when the offense was committed; (2) the maximum period of 
imprisonment for the offense must be six years or less; (3) the 
court must determine that the probationer will benefit and society 
No.  2019AP1272-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
will not be harmed by the disposition; and (4) the person must 
successfully complete the sentence.  § 973.015(1m)(a)1.   
¶49 If defendants are made eligible for expungement by the 
circuit court, they must fulfill the conditions set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) to actually have their conviction expunged:  
(1) the person must not be convicted of a subsequent offense; (2) 
if the person is on probation, it must not be revoked; and (3) the 
person must "satisf[y] the conditions of probation."  It is the 
"satisfaction" condition that is at issue in this case. 
¶50 With this framework as a foundation, the majority 
proceeds to rigidly interpret "satisfaction" in an all-or-nothing 
fashion.  In the majority's view the circuit court has no 
discretion at all in deciding whether to grant or deny expungement.  
Majority op., ¶30.  One would expect a determination of such reach 
to be supported with more than the majority's cursory analysis.  
And it is an analysis that runs counter to the statutory language, 
has no basis in the case law the majority cites, and thwarts the 
purpose of the expungement statute.  I address each in turn.  
II 
¶51 The plain language of the expungement statute does not 
support 
the 
majority's 
conclusion. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 973.015(1m)(b) sets as a prerequisite for expungement that the 
person must "satisf[y] the conditions of probation." 
¶52 I observe initially that the statute uses the word 
"satisfy."  Nowhere does it mention a "violation" of a rule as 
preclusive of receiving expungement.  If the legislature had wanted 
No.  2019AP1272-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
to require perfect compliance with "all" or "every" condition of 
probation, it certainly could have, but it did not. 
¶53 "Satisfy" is ambiguous in the context of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.015.  A recognized dictionary defines the term as follows:  
"[t]o meet or be sufficient for (a requirement)."  Satisfy, The 
American 
Heritage 
Dictionary 
of 
the 
English 
Language, 
https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=satisfy 
(last 
visited June 9, 2021) (emphasis added).   
¶54 In deciding which definition to apply, we are guided by 
the principle that 
"a plain-meaning interpretation cannot 
contravene a textually or contextually manifest statutory 
purpose."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶49, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Indeed, "courts 
will favor an interpretation of statutory language that fulfills 
the statute's purpose."  Wis. Indus. Energy Grp., Inc. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm'n, 2012 WI 89, ¶15, 342 Wis. 2d 576, 819 N.W.2d 240.  
¶55 The definition that makes the most sense is that which 
permits expungement when an offender has "sufficiently" complied 
with the terms of probation.  Such a definition is clearly more 
consistent with the purpose of the expungement statute and the 
legislature's continuing quest to broaden its application.  See 
Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶20; see also State v. Ozuna, 2017 WI 64, 
¶62, 376 Wis. 2d 1, 898 N.W.2d 20 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., 
dissenting) (explaining that a definition of "satisfy" based on 
sufficiency "is more consistent with the purpose of the statute 
than using a definition that would limit expunction to offenders 
with . . . 'perfect' compliance").  In other words, by setting 
No.  2019AP1272-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
forth a "satisfaction" standard, the expungement statute eschews 
the "perfection" standard advanced by the majority. 
¶56 In determining what is "sufficient" to comply with the 
terms of probation, the circuit court must use discretion.  It 
must determine whether a person did enough to "satisfy" the 
conditions of probation.  Such an exercise necessarily requires 
examining the relevant facts, applying a standard of law, and using 
a demonstrated rational process, i.e., the exercise of discretion.  
See State v. Walters, 2004 WI 18, ¶¶13-14, 269 Wis. 2d 142, 675 
N.W.2d 778.   
¶57 The majority's interpretation also violates the maxim 
that we are to avoid interpreting statutes to render absurd or 
unreasonable results.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  Indeed, the 
logical consequence of the majority's analysis and institution of 
a "perfection" standard coupled with its conclusion regarding a 
circuit court's lack of discretion is that a circuit court is 
required to deny expungement if a person violates any condition of 
probation, no matter how small.   
¶58 Looking at the DOC's standard conditions, the absurdity 
of such a proposition is revealed.  Miss a single meeting with 
your agent?  No expungement.  Use a credit card without prior 
approval?  No expungement.  It is certainly unreasonable to 
condition one's future prospects of employment, housing, and 
education on a single missed meeting or use of a credit card to 
pay for gas. 
No.  2019AP1272-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
III 
¶59 The majority's conclusion is also out of step with the 
very case law on which it relies.  For example, the majority relies 
on Ozuna to support a discretionless scheme and the proposition 
that satisfaction of conditions of probation means completion of 
all conditions with no slip-ups.  Majority op., ¶29.  But the Ozuna 
court held no such thing. 
¶60 Rather, in Ozuna the court consistently used language 
indicative of discretion, determining that "a court has no duty to 
expunge a probationer's record if the probationer has not satisfied 
the conditions of probation."  Ozuna, 376 Wis. 2d 1, ¶14 (emphasis 
added).  It even entitled one of the section headings in its 
opinion, "The Court May Deny Expungement if a Probationer Does Not 
Satisfy the Conditions of Probation."  Id. (emphasis added).  Ozuna 
thus does not compel the majority's result. 
¶61 The majority's citation to Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶22, 
is similarly unavailing.  See majority op., ¶29.  In the cited 
paragraph, the Hemp court simply set forth that a probationer must 
satisfy all the conditions of probation to receive expungement.  
Even accepting the court's addition of the word "all" where it 
does not appear in the statutory language, the Hemp court did not 
analyze the term "satisfy" or give any insight whatsoever into its 
meaning. 
IV 
¶62 Finally, bestowing the circuit court with discretion to 
make the determination of whether conditions of probation have 
been satisfied is consistent with the purpose of the expungement 
No.  2019AP1272-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
statute.  The intent of the expungement statute is "to provide a 
break to young offenders who demonstrate the ability to comply 
with the law."  Leitner, 253 Wis. 2d 449, ¶38.  Expungement is a 
powerful tool to improve people's lives and open opportunities 
that would otherwise be closed.  This court has previously noted 
the arc of legislation meant to "expand the availability of 
expungement to include a broader category of youthful offenders."  
Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶20. 
¶63 Yet through its destructive holding, the majority 
forever shuts the door on countless young people who would benefit 
from the fresh start expungement offers.  And for what?  To teach 
them a lesson that they shouldn't miss a meeting?  Such a minimal 
violation surely has nothing to say about a person's risk to 
society. 
¶64 Moreover, the majority's determination could have long-
lasting consequences on the lives of those who commit crimes at a 
young age.  Research consistently demonstrates that the brains of 
adolescents are not fully developed, and that as a result they are 
prone to risky behavior.  See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 
(2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471-72 (2012).  The 
majority ensures that expungement will remain out of reach for 
No.  2019AP1272-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
many of these people and that they will be held back as they 
attempt to change their lives for the better.6 
¶65 As to the specific facts of the instant case, the circuit 
court determined that Lickes satisfied the conditions of his 
probation.  DOC apparently agreed when it submitted the 
"Certification of Discharge and Satisfaction of Probation 
Conditions for Expungement."7  These are the entities that imposed 
conditions on Lickes in the first place, so they are in the best 
position to determine whether the conditions have been satisfied 
and whether Lickes and the public would be well served by 
expungement.   
                     
6 The majority accuses this dissent of basing its conclusions 
on policy rather than the law.  Majority op., ¶3 n.4.  As should 
be clear by now, this criticism is misguided.  The "consequences" 
the majority asks us to ignore are part and parcel of a statutory 
analysis, as confirmed by the very case law upon which the majority 
relies.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶¶46, 49, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (explaining 
that we are to interpret statutes to "avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results" 
and 
that 
"a 
plain-meaning 
interpretation 
cannot 
contravene a textually or contextually manifest statutory 
purpose"). 
Further, the majority admonishes that this court is "limited 
to saying what the law is and not what we may wish it to be."  
Majority op., ¶3 n.4.  This may be a snappy phrase, but it is only 
half true.  To the extent that the majority means it is not the 
role of this court to say what the law should be, such an admonition 
ignores a fundamental role of courts——the development of the common 
law.  Courts for centuries have been declaring just what the law 
should be.  To reduce the court's role to only "saying what the 
law is," and not what the law should be, constitutes a vast and 
misleading oversimplification. 
7 It should also be observed that DOC did not think Lickes's 
violations serious enough to warrant revocation of his probation. 
No.  2019AP1272-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
¶66 It was the circuit court that placed on Lickes the 
condition that he "enter into, participate [in], and successfully 
complete sex offender treatment."  Majority op., ¶6.  And it was 
the circuit court that "examined the relevant facts, applied a 
proper standard of law, used a demonstrated rational process, and 
reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach" to 
conclude that he had done so.  See Walters, 269 Wis. 2d 142, ¶¶13-
14.  I thus determine that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in expunging Lickes's convictions. 
¶67 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶68 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA FRANK 
DALLET joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2019AP1272-CR.awb 
 
 
 
1