Case Title: Bosley v. Shepherd

Citation: 

Docket Number: 002735

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2001-11-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
ROBERT BOSLEY, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 002735   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
November 2, 2001 
MICHAEL A. SHEPHERD, et al. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
A. Bonwill Shockley, Judge 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider issues arising from the trial 
of a personal injury action brought by a worker against the 
general contractor of a construction project, one of the general 
contractor's employees, and a steel erection subcontractor. 
 
Michael A. Shepherd was injured in November 1996 while 
using a boom crane to deposit gypsum sheathing (sheetrock) into 
a second-floor opening of a building under construction at the 
Dam Neck Naval Installation in Virginia Beach.  The United 
States Navy, owner of the construction project, entered into a 
contract with W.B. Meredith, II, Inc. (Meredith), which provided 
for Meredith’s services as general contractor of the project.  
Meredith contracted with various subcontractors to provide 
certain construction services, including Virginia-Carolina 
Steel, Inc., to perform the steel fabrication and erection 
portion of the general contract.  Virginia-Carolina Steel, in 
turn, contracted with Atlantic Welding & Fabricating, Inc. 
(Atlantic Welding) to provide the steel erection work for the 
project. 
Additionally, Meredith contracted with Wenger Tile and 
Plastering Co., Inc. (Wenger) for the drywall installation 
portion of the general contract.  Wenger contracted with Gypsum 
Management & Supply, trading as Tidewater Interior Products 
(TIP), a drywall company and supplier of sheetrock, to supply 
sheetrock for the construction project.  TIP employed Shepherd 
to transport the sheetrock to the construction site and to 
operate TIP’s boom crane, which was used to place the sheetrock 
at specific locations at the site. 
 
Upon arrival at the construction site, Shepherd’s co-
worker, Christopher Scott Hewitt, contacted Wenger's project 
superintendent, Jonathan McGowan, Jr., and Wenger's foreman, 
Darrell Ashley, to receive instructions concerning “offloading” 
the sheetrock.  Hewitt, McGowan, and Ashley conferred with 
Meredith’s construction superintendent and co-defendant, Robert 
J. Bosley, to determine the proper locations at which to place 
the sheetrock. 
Shepherd used a TIP truck to deliver the loads of sheetrock 
to the project site.  At the site, he used a hydraulic boom 
crane, mounted on top of the truck, to lift and place several 
bundles of sheetrock, called “hacks,” onto the first and second 
floors of the open structure.  At the direction of McGowan and 
 
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Ashley, Shepherd later moved his boom crane to the southeast 
corner of the structure to place additional hacks in a different 
location on the second floor. 
 
Shepherd’s ability to maneuver the crane's boom arm inside 
the second-floor opening was restricted by a horizontal steel 
girt.  The steel girt was a hollow square beam that was placed 
on brackets several feet above the floor across the top of the 
opening of the second deck of the structure.  The brackets were 
attached to the vertical steel columns of the structure.  The 
girt was about 29 feet long and weighed about 1700 pounds.  The 
distance between the girt and the ground was about 20 feet. 
 
In order to move the sheetrock hacks to the designated 
second-floor location, it was necessary for Shepherd to insert 
and retract the boom arm in between the girt and the second 
floor.  When performing this maneuver, Shepherd had a clearance 
space of between three and four inches from the top of the boom 
arm to the bottom of the steel girt. 
 
On Shepherd’s first attempt to maneuver the boom arm into 
this opening, he successfully unloaded two hacks of sheetrock.  
On Shepherd’s second attempt, he deposited two more hacks.  As 
the boom arm retracted, it made contact with the steel girt. 
 
Hewitt observed that the steel girt was "teetering" on top 
of the boom arm between six and seven inches off the girt’s 
brackets.  Hewitt shouted to Shepherd to alert him to the 
 
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dangerous situation.  As Shepherd attempted to jump out of the 
crane operator’s chair, the girt slid down the crane's arm and 
struck him, causing him serious injuries. 
 
Shepherd filed a motion for judgment in the trial court 
against Meredith, Bosley, and Atlantic Welding, alleging that he 
was seriously injured as a result of the defendants’ negligence.  
Shepherd alleged, among other things, that the defendants were 
negligent in failing to secure the girt adequately to its 
brackets, and in failing to warn all others on the construction 
site that the girt was not properly secured. 
 
At trial, Hewitt and McGowan testified that Bosley was told 
that some sheetrock hacks would be placed on the second floor at 
the southeast corner of the structure.  Hewitt stated that 
Bosley gave Hewitt permission to remove the safety cable at the 
southeast opening on the second floor to prevent the cable from 
obstructing the path of the boom arm. 
 
Shepherd also presented evidence that the steel girt in 
question was not "tack welded" or otherwise secured to its 
brackets.  A tack weld is a temporary weld used by steel 
erection workers to hold a girt in place until it is properly 
aligned with other girts throughout the structure.  Once all the 
girts are properly aligned, they are secured with permanent 
welds. 
 
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Manuel Seoane, a safety investigator for the Navy, 
testified that his inspection of the girt struck by the boom 
arm, and the bracket on which the girt was placed, revealed no 
evidence of any welding.  Seoane concluded that the girt fell 
because it had not been “tacked into position and secured.”  
Seoane also stated that Peter G. Godfrey, a foreman for Atlantic 
Welding, admitted that the girt that struck Shepherd had not 
been tack welded.  However, Godfrey testified that when he made 
this statement, he was referring to permanent welding, not tack 
welding. 
 
Shepherd presented the expert testimony of Frank Burg, an 
occupational safety and health consultant.  The defendants filed 
a motion in limine, requesting that Burg be prohibited from 
testifying that the defendants violated the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA).  29 U.S.C. §§ 651 through 700 
(1994).  The defendants argued, among other things, that "Burg 
has not identified any specific code, regulation or standard of 
any type that addresses the erection and placement of steel 
girts of the type that injured [Shepherd]."  The trial court 
denied the defendants’ motion. 
 
Burg testified that the defendants violated 29 U.S.C. 
§ 654, OSHA’s “general duty” clause, which he stated requires an 
employer to keep the workplace free from recognized hazards that 
could cause death or serious physical harm.  Burg also stated 
 
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that he considers an OSHA violation to have occurred whenever 
someone is seriously injured on a job, unless the injury was 
caused by employee misconduct or an "act of God." 
 
Burg concluded that Shepherd's accident could have been 
prevented if the defendants either had secured the girt or had 
blocked access to the area beneath the girt.  Burg testified 
that Meredith, as the general contractor, had the responsibility 
under OSHA to ensure that the staging and coordination of work 
on the job site was performed in accordance with applicable 
safety standards.  Burg stated that OSHA required the defendants 
to analyze safety hazards and to implement and follow a work 
safety program.  Burg opined that if there had been an adequate 
safety program in place and if sufficient inspections had been 
made, the accident would not have occurred. 
 
During the defendants' case, Bosley testified that he did 
not instruct Hewitt, McGowan, or Ashley to deposit sheetrock at 
the southeast corner of the second floor, and that he did not 
authorize the removal of any safety cables at that location.  
Bosley further stated that he thought that the girt in question 
was secured properly by a weld. 
 
The defendants also presented evidence that the girt was 
tack welded to its brackets.  Frankie L. Brock, an ironworker 
for Atlantic Welding, testified that he personally tack welded 
 
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the steel girt, and that he was “positive” that he secured the 
girt in this manner at both ends. 
 
In addition, the defendants presented testimony from 
experts in the steel erection and welding industries.  These 
experts included Richard Leland, a registered civil engineer, 
Brock, and Edwin W. Shelton, owner and president of Virginia 
Steel.  These experts testified that photographs taken of the 
girt immediately after the accident revealed burn marks and 
other indications of tack welding. 
 
The jury returned a verdict for Shepherd against Bosley and 
Meredith and awarded damages in the amount of $325,000.  The 
jury also returned a verdict in favor of Atlantic Welding.  The 
trial court denied the motion of Bosley and Meredith to set 
aside the verdict and entered final judgment in accordance with 
the verdict.  Bosley and Meredith appealed from this judgment. 
 
On appeal, Bosley and Meredith (collectively, the 
defendants) argue that Shepherd was the statutory employee of 
Meredith under the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act), 
Code §§ 65.2-100 through -1310 and, thus, was barred from 
bringing a common law negligence action against the defendants.  
They contend that Shepherd was engaged in an act of 
construction, rather than of delivery of materials, at the time 
he was injured because he was required to use “specialized” 
equipment at different locations on the job site to deposit the 
 
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sheetrock.  The defendants assert that Shepherd’s use of a boom 
crane distinguishes the present case from our decisions that 
have held that the mere delivery of construction materials to a 
job site does not constitute part of a general contractor’s 
trade, business, or occupation.  We disagree with the 
defendants’ arguments. 
 
The exclusivity provision of the Act, which is found in 
Code § 65.2-307, limits the rights and remedies of an employee 
to those provided in the Act when he and his employer have 
accepted the provisions of the Act for payment of compensation 
for accidental injury or death.  Fowler v. Int'l Cleaning Serv., 
Inc., 260 Va. 421, 425, 537 S.E.2d 312, 313 (2000); Stone v. 
Door-Man Mfg. Co., 260 Va. 406, 412, 537 S.E.2d 305, 307 (2000).  
However, the exclusivity provision does not bar a common law 
action for an employee’s injury or death against an “other 
party,” as construed under the Act.  Code § 65.2-309; Fowler, 
260 Va. at 425, 537 S.E.2d at 314; Stone, 260 Va. at 412, 537 
S.E.2d at 307-08; Stewart v. Bass Constr. Co., 223 Va. 363, 365-
66, 288 S.E.2d 489, 490 (1982). 
 
The issue whether a particular person or entity is the 
statutory employer of an injured employee is a jurisdictional 
matter presenting a mixed question of law and fact that must be 
determined under the facts of each case.  See Fowler, 260 Va. at 
425, 537 S.E.2d at 314; Stone, 260 Va. at 413, 537 S.E.2d at 
 
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308; Cooke v. Skyline Swannanoa, Inc., 226 Va. 154, 156, 307 
S.E.2d 246, 247 (1983).  Since the facts before us regarding 
this issue are not in dispute, we examine whether the trial 
court correctly applied the law to those facts.  See Fowler, 260 
Va. at 425, 537 S.E.2d at 314; Stone, 260 Va. at 413, 537 S.E.2d 
at 308; Cinnamon v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 238 Va. 471, 474, 
384 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1989). 
 
A general contractor is the statutory employer of a 
subcontractor’s injured employee if the employee is engaged in 
the trade, business, or occupation of the general contractor at 
the time of his injury.  Yancey v. JTE Constructors, Inc., 252 
Va. 42, 44, 471 S.E.2d 473, 474 (1996); Sykes v. Stone & Webster 
Eng’g Corp., 186 Va. 116, 121-22, 41 S.E.2d 469, 472 (1947).  
However, when an injured employee reaches an employer in the 
ascending hierarchy of contractors whose trade, business, or 
occupation does not include the work being performed by the 
injured employee, that employer is not the statutory employer of 
the injured employee.  Yancey, 252 Va. at 44, 471 S.E.2d at 474; 
Sykes, 186 Va. at 121-22, 41 S.E.2d at 472. 
 
We have held repeatedly that a subcontractor’s employee who 
merely delivers materials to a job site is not engaged in the 
trade, business, or occupation of the general contractor.  
Yancey, 252 Va. at 44, 471 S.E.2d at 474-75; Hipp v. Sadler 
Materials Corp., 211 Va. 710, 711, 180 S.E.2d 501, 501-02 
 
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(1971); Burroughs v. Walmont, Inc., 210 Va. 98, 100, 168 S.E.2d 
107, 108 (1969); see Peck v. Safway Steel Prods., Inc., 262 Va. 
522, 526, 551 S.E.2d 328, 329-30 (2001).  In contrast, when an 
injured employee’s duties extend beyond delivery of materials to 
the job site, and the employee performs an act that is an 
essential part of the work of the general contractor, the 
injured employee has engaged in the trade, business, or 
occupation of the general contractor.  See Peck, 262 Va. at 528, 
551 S.E.2d at 330; Bosher v. Jamerson, 207 Va. 539, 542-43, 151 
S.E.2d 375, 377 (1966). 
 
The present case is controlled by our decisions in Yancey, 
Hipp, and Burroughs.  In all three cases, we held that the 
injured employees were not engaged in the general contractors' 
trade, business, or occupation because their activities at the 
respective job sites constituted final acts of delivery, not 
acts of construction.  In Yancey, the injured employee’s final 
act of delivery included the inspection and patching of concrete 
panels delivered to the job site.  252 Va. at 45, 471 S.E.2d at 
475.  In Hipp, the injured employee was a mere delivery person 
because he poured concrete where directed by another 
subcontractor, but did not engage in spreading or finishing the 
concrete after it was poured.  211 Va. at 711, 180 S.E.2d at 
502. 
 
10
 
Our decision in Burroughs was based on facts remarkably 
similar to those presented here.  The plaintiff in Burroughs was 
an employee of a trucking company hired to deliver sheetrock to 
a construction site and to stack specific quantities of the 
material in certain rooms of various houses under construction.  
The plaintiff was injured while manually carrying some pieces of 
sheetrock up a stairway in one of the houses.  210 Va. at 99, 
168 S.E.2d at 108.  We concluded that the plaintiff’s act of 
stacking the sheetrock in the several rooms constituted a final 
act of delivery, not an act of construction.  Thus, we held that 
the plaintiff was not engaged in the general contractor’s trade, 
business, or occupation, and that the general contractor was an 
“other party” subject to being sued by the plaintiff in a common 
law negligence action.  Id. at 100, 168 S.E.2d at 108-09. 
 
Like the plaintiff in Burroughs, Shepherd was injured while 
placing sheetrock at a construction site in locations specified 
by the general contractor and its employees.  The nature of the 
work that Shepherd performed is not altered by the fact that he 
used a crane to place the materials at the required locations.  
His actions remained ones of delivery, not of construction, 
because when he used the crane to place sheetrock at the 
specified locations, he did not engage in any other action 
regarding the sheetrock to further the work of the general 
contractor.  Therefore, we hold that the trial court correctly 
 
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concluded that Meredith was not Shepherd’s statutory employer 
but was an “other party” subject to being sued by Shepherd in 
this common law negligence action. 
 
We disagree with the defendants’ argument that because the 
Navy is the owner of the Dam Neck project, a different result is 
required under Roberts v. City of Alexandria, 246 Va. 17, 431 
S.E.2d 275 (1993).  In Roberts, we held that a governmental 
owner’s trade, business, or occupation is determined by 
examining the duties that the owner is authorized or required 
under law to perform.  Id. at 19-20, 431 S.E.2d at 276-77. 
 
We first observe that once Shepherd reached Meredith in the 
ascending hierarchy of contractors, and established that he was 
not performing work at the time of the accident that was part of 
Meredith's trade, business, or occupation, Shepherd conclusively 
proved that Meredith was not his statutory employer.  See 
Yancey, 252 Va. at 44, 471 S.E.2d at 474; Cinnamon, 238 Va. at 
475 n.1, 384 S.E.2d at 619 n.1; Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc. 
v. McReynolds, 216 Va. 897, 901-02, 224 S.E.2d 323, 326 (1976); 
Sykes, 186 Va. at 122-23, 41 S.E.2d at 472.  Thus, the owner of 
the project, who was above Meredith in the ascending hierarchy, 
likewise was not Shepherd's statutory employer.  However, even 
if we assume, without deciding, that the Navy's trade, business, 
or occupation is relevant to an analysis of Meredith's status as 
an "other party" under the Act, we reach the same result. 
 
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Under the United States Code, the Navy is authorized to 
conduct various activities including the construction, 
maintenance, and repair of buildings and structures.  10 U.S.C. 
§ 5013(b)(12)(1994).  However, under the Act, the mere delivery 
of materials to a job site is not an act of construction 
constituting the trade, business, or occupation of either a 
general contractor or an owner of a construction project. See 
Yancey, 252 Va. at 44, 471 S.E.2d at 474-75; Hipp, 211 Va. at 
711, 180 S.E.2d at 501-02; Burroughs, 210 Va. at 100, 168 S.E.2d 
at 108.  Thus, although the Navy is authorized by law to engage 
in construction activities, and may sometimes engage in the 
delivery of materials to a job site, this fact does not alter 
the relationship of a mere delivery person under the Act to the 
general contractor of a construction project.  Nor does that 
fact make the mere delivery person the statutory employee of the 
Navy for purposes of the Act.1
 
The defendants next argue that the trial court erred in 
allowing Burg to testify that the defendants violated certain 
general provisions of OSHA when Burg was unable to identify a 
violation of any specific OSHA standard relating to the 
placement and erection of steel in a construction project.  
                     
 
1The Navy’s authorization for “supplying” under 10 U.S.C. 
§ 5013(b)(3) does not enlarge the scope of 10 U.S.C. 
§ 5013(b)(12), which is a separate provision addressing a 
different subject. 
 
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Thus, the defendants assert that Burg’s testimony improperly 
implied that the defendants were negligent simply because an 
accident had occurred on the construction site. 
 
In response, Shepherd argues that Burg’s testimony was 
properly admitted to allow the jury to determine whether and how 
the defendants violated the provisions of OSHA.  Shepherd 
asserts that the jury was not required to accept Burg’s 
testimony, which was offered to assist the jury in understanding 
applicable safety standards.  We disagree with Shepherd's 
arguments. 
 
We will set forth below the OSHA provisions that formed the 
basis of Burg's testimony.  OSHA's "general duty" clause, 29 
U.S.C. § 654 (1994), provides in relevant part: 
(a) Each employer – 
 
(1) shall furnish to each of his employees 
employment and a place of employment which are free 
from recognized hazards that are causing or are 
likely to cause death or serious physical harm to 
his employees; 
 
(2) shall comply with occupational safety and health 
standards promulgated under this chapter. 
 
 
The second OSHA provision at issue, 29 C.F.R. § 1926.16 
(2000), states in relevant part: 
 
In no case shall the prime contractor be relieved of 
overall responsibility for compliance with the 
requirements of this part for all work to be 
performed under the contract. . . . With respect to 
subcontracted work, the prime contractor and any 
 
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subcontractor or subcontractors shall be deemed to 
have joint responsibility. 
 
 
The third provision at issue, 29 C.F.R. § 1926.21(b)(2000), 
states in relevant part: 
(1) The employer should avail himself of the safety 
and health training programs the Secretary provides. 
 
(2) The employer shall instruct each employee in the 
recognition and avoidance of unsafe conditions and 
the regulations applicable to his work environment 
to control or eliminate any hazards or other 
exposure to illness or injury. 
 
 
Based on the record before us, we conclude that the trial 
court erred in allowing Burg to testify that the defendants 
violated these general provisions of OSHA.  Burg’s testimony 
that the defendants violated the above provisions was based on 
Meredith’s role as general contractor and its overall duty to 
keep the workplace free from recognized hazards that could cause 
death or serious physical harm to employees.  Burg stated that, 
under OSHA, a general contractor has "specific indelible [sic] 
responsibilities to make sure that there is [a] safety program, 
that there are safety rules, and that things don’t happen such 
as happened in this case.”  Burg testified that Meredith's 
safety measures were inadequate "[b]ecause of the facts of the 
accident."  As stated above, he also explained that, in his 
opinion, an OSHA violation is committed when an accident causing 
serious injury occurs, and the accident was not caused by 
employee misconduct or an “act of God.” 
 
15
 
The jury was permitted to consider this testimony although 
there was no evidence that the defendants violated any specific 
duty imposed by OSHA relating to the construction activities 
that gave rise to this accident.  In fact, Shepherd conceded at 
oral argument in this appeal that OSHA does not contain any such 
specific provisions that were violated by the defendants.  In 
addition, the record lacks any evidence that the defendants were 
required by OSHA to take the actions concerning the girt, and 
the area beneath the girt, that Burg indicated would have 
prevented the accident. 
 
In the absence of any such specific requirements imposed by 
OSHA, Burg was permitted to testify, in essence, that the 
defendants violated OSHA because a serious accident occurred on 
the job site, and their safety programs and inspections failed 
to prevent the accident.  Such testimony was analogous to 
suggesting that the defendants were negligent merely because an 
accident had occurred.  Thus, this portion of Burg’s testimony 
violated the longstanding principle that negligence cannot be 
presumed from the mere happening of an accident.  See Gossett v. 
Jackson, 249 Va. 549, 552, 457 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1995); Parham v. 
Albert, 244 Va. 73, 76, 418 S.E.2d 866, 868 (1992)(quoting 
Lawrence v. Snyder, 229 Va. 139, 142, 326 S.E.2d 690, 692 
(1985)); Sneed v. Sneed, 219 Va. 15, 17, 244 S.E.2d 754, 755 
(1978).  Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in 
 
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permitting Burg to testify that the defendants violated the 
above OSHA provisions.2
 
For these reasons, we will affirm in part, and reverse in 
part, the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for a new 
trial consistent with the principles expressed in this opinion.3
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       and remanded.
                     
 
2 We need not determine whether Shepherd was within the 
class of persons that OSHA was intended to protect.  Even if 
Shepherd was within this class of persons, his evidence failed 
to show that the defendants violated any requirements imposed by 
OSHA.  See Halterman v. Radisson Hotel Corp., 259 Va. 171, 177, 
523 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2000). 
 
 
3Based on the above holdings and our remand of this case for 
a new trial, we do not address the defendants’ remaining 
assignments of error.  
 
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