Case Title: State v. Reese

Citation: 2005-Ohio-3806

Docket Number: 20040285

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Reese, 106 Ohio St.3d 65, 2005-Ohio-3806.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. REESE, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Reese, 106 Ohio St.3d 65, 2005-Ohio-3806.] 
Criminal law — R.C. 2945.05 — “Opportunity to consult with counsel,” 
construed — Record need not show actual consultation with counsel in 
order to establish compliance — Only opportunity to consult need be 
shown — Appointment of counsel for pro se defendant not mandatory. 
(No. 2004-0285 — Submitted February 2, 2005 — Decided August 10, 2005.) 
APPEAL from the Trumbull County Court of Appeals,  
No. 2002-T-0068, 2004-Ohio-341. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. 
Strict compliance with R.C. 2945.05 is accomplished by establishing that 
a pro se defendant had an opportunity to consult with counsel at any time 
prior to waiving his right to a jury trial, but actual consultation need not 
occur. 
2. 
Appointment of counsel for a pro se defendant is not mandatory under 
R.C. 2945.05. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶1} 
We are asked to consider whether strict compliance with R.C. 
2945.05 requires a trial court to impose counsel upon a pro se defendant who has 
already waived his right to counsel and wishes to further waive his right to a jury 
trial.  For the following reasons, we find that strict compliance with R.C. 2945.05 
is accomplished by establishing that a pro se defendant had an opportunity to 
consult with counsel at any time prior to waiving his right to a jury trial, but that 
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actual consultation need not occur, and that appointment of counsel for a pro se 
defendant is not mandatory under the statute. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶2} 
On September 19, 2001, Thomas J. Reese, defendant-appellee, was 
indicted on two counts of felonious assault, two counts of attempted murder, one 
count of criminal damaging, and one count of aggravated menacing.  After almost 
five months and seven pretrial hearings during which Reese was represented by 
attorney Anthony V. Consoldane of the State Public Defender’s Office, Reese 
waived his right to appointed counsel in writing.  Consoldane was then appointed 
by the trial judge as standby counsel. 
{¶3} 
At issue in this case is Reese’s attempt to waive his right to a jury 
trial.  When Reese first stated that he wanted to waive a jury, he expressed his 
desire to be tried instead by a three-judge panel.  The trial judge explained to 
Reese on at least two occasions that he was not entitled to a three-judge panel, but 
rather only a single judge should he choose to waive a jury trial.  The trial judge 
was eventually satisfied that Reese understood the options available to him and 
ultimately permitted Reese to waive his right to a jury trial.  The waiver was 
incorporated in a judgment entry, filed March 19, 2002, and signed by Reese pro 
se.  After trial, the trial judge convicted Reese on all counts in the indictment. 
{¶4} 
On appeal, aided by different counsel, Reese argued that the trial 
court failed to strictly comply with R.C. 2945.05 in accepting his jury trial waiver 
and therefore was without jurisdiction to conduct a bench trial.  The Trumbull 
County Court of Appeals agreed and reversed his conviction.  The court held that 
strict compliance with R.C. 2945.05 requires that “the record must demonstrate 
that a pro se defendant was given the opportunity to consult with an attorney prior 
to waiver of a jury trial.”  The court concluded that “[b]ecause the record has 
failed to give any indication that appellant’s standby counsel was present or that 
appellant was given the opportunity to consult with an attorney immediately prior 
January Term, 2005 
3 
to his waiver of jury trial, the state has not met its burden.”  The court went on to 
clarify that its ruling “does not require that a pro se defendant must consult with 
counsel” but rather that “the state must affirmatively demonstrate from the record 
that the pro se defendant had the opportunity to consult with counsel.”  (Emphases 
sic.) 
{¶5} 
We now review that decision pursuant to our acceptance of the 
state’s discretionary appeal. 
Analysis 
{¶6} 
R.C. 2945.05 states: 
{¶7} 
“In all criminal cases pending in courts of record in this state, the 
defendant may waive a trial by jury and be tried by the court without a jury.  Such 
waiver by a defendant, shall be in writing, signed by the defendant, and filed in 
said cause and made a part of the record thereof.  * * *  
{¶8} 
“Such waiver of trial by jury must be made in open court after the 
defendant has been arraigned and has had opportunity to consult with counsel.  
Such waiver may be withdrawn by the defendant at any time before the 
commencement of the trial.” 
{¶9} 
We have examined R.C. 2945.05 on numerous occasions and 
determined that the statute is clear and unambiguous and requires strict 
compliance.  State v. Pless (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 333, 658 N.E.2d 766; State v. 
Tate (1979), 59 Ohio St.2d 50, 13 O.O.3d 36, 391 N.E.2d 738.  “In the absence of 
strict compliance with R.C. 2945.05, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to try the 
defendant without a jury.”  Pless at 337, 658 N.E.2d 766. 
{¶10} The appellate court began its analysis by noting that the statute 
“fails to carve out any exception for a defendant [who] is representing himself.  
To the contrary, this language requires that the trial court give all defendants, 
regardless of their pro se status, the opportunity to consult with counsel.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  We agree that the statute obviously makes no distinction between 
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pro se defendants and those represented by counsel.  We also agree that, 
accordingly, the language of the statute requires that all defendants have the 
opportunity to consult with counsel.  We differ with the appellate court, however, 
in the next step of its analysis. 
{¶11} The appellate court went on to find that the trial court was not in 
strict compliance with R.C. 2945.05 because Reese was not “given the 
opportunity to consult with an attorney immediately prior to his waiver of jury 
trial.”  (Emphasis added.)  The appellate court improperly created the requirement 
that the “opportunity to consult with counsel” occur immediately before the 
waiver.  The statute contains no such temporal restriction.  Indeed, the reference 
to timing in the statute requires only that the waiver be made after arraignment 
and after the opportunity to consult with counsel.  That opportunity could 
therefore theoretically arise at any time before the waiver. 
{¶12} It follows that the appellate court’s statement that “[a] careful 
examination of the record before us fails to demonstrate that appellant was given 
an opportunity to consult with counsel prior to his jury trial waiver” is incorrect.  
The appellate court held that the statute had been violated because the record did 
not affirmatively demonstrate whether Consoldane was present or had the 
opportunity to consult with Reese immediately before Reese’s waiver on March 
19, 2002.  But the proper query is whether Reese had the opportunity to consult 
with Consoldane at any time after his arraignment.  The record does supply us 
with that information. 
{¶13} The record reflects that Consoldane represented Reese for nearly 
five months between his September 25, 2001 arraignment and the February 12, 
2002 pretrial hearing when Reese orally waived his right to appointed counsel.  
During that period, Consoldane appeared at seven pretrial hearings with Reese.  
The record also reflects that Consoldane visited Reese in jail on at least two 
occasions: before the October 2, 2001 pretrial hearing and before the January 15, 
January Term, 2005 
5 
2002 pretrial hearing.  Finally, Consoldane was appointed by the trial court to be 
available to Reese throughout the proceedings as standby counsel and appeared 
with Reese during at least one additional pretrial hearing before Reese’s waiver of 
a jury trial was accepted by the trial court.  At that February 26, 2002 hearing, in 
Reese’s presence, Consoldane stated on the record that he did not think Reese 
should waive his right to a jury trial.  Given all of the foregoing facts, we find that 
Reese was given an opportunity to consult with counsel in accordance with R.C. 
2945.05. 
{¶14} Having decided that the clear and unambiguous language of R.C. 
2945.05 requires an opportunity for consultation for pro se defendants and that 
Reese was afforded that opportunity, we next turn to the state’s argument that the 
statute as applied to pro se defendants unconstitutionally infringes upon a 
defendant’s right to self-representation.  We hold that it does not. 
{¶15} The United States Supreme Court recognized a criminal 
defendant’s right to self-representation under the Sixth Amendment in Faretta v. 
California (1975), 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562.  Pertinent to this 
case, the Supreme Court stated: 
{¶16} “The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that 
counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an 
aid to a willing defendant—not an organ of the State interposed between an 
unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally.  To thrust counsel 
upon the accused, against his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the 
Amendment.  In such a case, counsel is not an assistant, but a master; and the 
right to make a defense is stripped of the personal character upon which the 
Amendment insists. * * *  An unwanted counsel ‘represents’ the defendant only 
through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction.  Unless the accused has 
acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented is not the defense 
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guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense.”  
Id. at 820-821, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562. 
{¶17} We do not believe that R.C. 2945.05 flies in the face of Faretta.  
Ensuring the opportunity to consult with counsel does not force counsel upon an 
unwilling pro se defendant, but rather gives the defendant a chance to seek advice 
before waiving a fundamental right.  As the appellate court stated below, its ruling 
“does not require that a pro se defendant must consult with counsel.  Instead, our 
ruling is that the state must affirmatively demonstrate from the record that the pro 
se defendant had the opportunity to consult with counsel.”  (Emphasis sic.)  We 
find this distinction valid. 
{¶18} The final question is what is required of a trial court faced with a 
pro se defendant who wishes to waive his right to a jury trial pursuant to R.C. 
2945.05.  As the statute does not distinguish between pro se defendants and those 
represented by counsel, we have only the plain language of the statute for 
guidance.  Again, because the statute does not require that consultation actually 
take place, but rather merely the opportunity for consultation, the record need not 
necessarily contain an actual discussion between an attorney and defendant, nor a 
discussion between attorney and judge regarding a discussion between attorney 
and defendant.  It is advisable, however, that the opportunity to consult be 
demonstrated on the record.  This is a very fact-specific inquiry. 
{¶19} In this case, the record reflects multiple pretrial hearings at which 
Consoldane was present and also contains references to counsel’s visits with 
Reese in jail.  But where such facts are not present, opportunity may be 
established from the record by other means.  In such cases, it is advisable for the 
trial judge to query on the record whether defendant has had the opportunity to 
consult with an attorney.  If a defendant has not had the chance to hire and meet 
with counsel, or to have counsel appointed for him, or has waived counsel at an 
earlier stage, the trial judge would do well to offer to appoint counsel before the 
January Term, 2005 
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waiver is made.  The trial judge should not, however, actually appoint counsel to 
represent defendant contrary to the defendant’s expressed desire to represent 
himself, in light of Faretta.  In such a case, appointing standby counsel would be 
a viable alternative.  Standby counsel does not act in a representational capacity 
for the defendant and thus would not violate Faretta even if the defendant did not 
want standby counsel.  In either event, once the offer has been made by the trial 
judge, the defendant cannot later say that he did not have an opportunity to 
consult with counsel. 
{¶20} Based on all of the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the 
appellate court and reinstate Reese’s convictions and sentence. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL and 
LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecuting Attorney, and LuWayne 
Annos, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Maridee L. Costanzo, for appellee. 
______________________