Case Title: HARVEY v. CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 101332

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
HARVEY v. CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY  HARVEY v. CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY 2005 OK 20 111 P.3d 239 Case Number: 101332 Decided: 03/29/2005 As Corrected: April 15, 2005 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA RALPH L. HARVEY, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. THE CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY, a political subdivision of the State of Oklahoma; THE OKLAHOMA CITY URBAN RENEWAL AUTHORITY; and THE OKLAHOMA CITY REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Defendants/Appellees. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY, HONORABLE DANIEL L. OWENS, DISTRICT JUDGE ¶0 Plaintiff challenges the defendants' use of tax increment financing to redevelop the Skirvin Hotel in downtown Oklahoma City. The trial court dismissed the petition with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff appealed. Having retained the appeal, we affirm. JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED. Stanley M. Ward, Woodrow K. Glass, and Scott F. Brockman, Norman, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant, Ralph L. Harvey. William R. Burkett, Municipal Counselor, Daniel T. Brummit and Kenneth D. Jordan, Assistant Municipal Counselors, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee, City of Oklahoma City. Leslie V. Batchelor, James Dan Batchelor, and Emily K. Pomeroy, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants/Appellees, Oklahoma City Urban Renewal Authority and Oklahoma City Redevelopment Authority. COLBERT, J. ¶1 The City of Oklahoma City (City), together with the Oklahoma City Urban Renewal Authority and the Oklahoma City Redevelopment Authority, desire to redevelop the Skirvin Hotel in downtown Oklahoma City. On May 7, 2004, the City adopted a Resolution "approving in principle a funding plan for the Skirvin Hotel Project." In this Resolution, the City noted the Skirvin Hotel, which closed its door for business in 1988, is "one of the most historic buildings in Oklahoma City [and] should not be abandoned and demolished, but instead salvaged and restored to some productive use." The redevelopment would be paid for in part by public funding as authorized by Article 10, § 6C of the Oklahoma Constitution ¶2 Plaintiff's assertions of error fall into three categories. First, he contends the City's plan violates Article 10, § 26 of the Oklahoma Constitution because it incurs long term debt without the assent of 3/5 of the voters of Oklahoma City and without a determination that the new debt, combined with existing debt, does not exceed 5% of the valuation of all taxable property in Oklahoma City. PART 1 The Skirvin Hotel Project Does Not Violate Article 10, Section 26 of the Oklahoma Constitution. ¶3 Tax increment financing (TIF financing) is a method through which the portion of ad valorem taxes in excess of a base assessed value may be dedicated to finance costs of approved project plans. TIF financing is authorized by Okla. Const. art. 10, § 6C and ¶4 In City of Guymon, the city created a tax increment district pursuant to the Local Development Act, ¶5 In this case, as in City of Guymon and In re Application of ODFA, the City amended its Ordinance to change the language from "shall be apportioned . . . for a period not to exceed 25 years" to "may be apportioned" and made other relevant changes to bring the TIF financing into compliance with Oklahoma City Urban Renewal Authority (and with In re Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, PART 2 The Skirvin Hotel Project Does Not Violate Article 10, Section 6C of the Oklahoma Constitution or Section 852(1) and (2) of the Local Development Act. ¶6 In his response to defendants' motion to dismiss, plaintiff added a new argument - that the Skirvin Hotel Project violates Article 10, § 6C because the Skirvin Hotel is not in a blighted area and also violates § 852(1) and (2) of the Local Development Act because development of the Skirvin Hotel "would have occurred anyway." ¶7 Paragraph C of § 6C requires that the development or redevelopment areas be determined by the governing body to be "unproductive, undeveloped, underdeveloped or blighted." Similarly, Section 852(1) and (2) of the Local Development Act express the intent of the Legislature that the Act be used in cases "where investment, development and economic growth is difficult, but is possible if the provisions of this act are available" and that the Act not be used in areas "where investment, development and economic growth would have occurred anyway." ¶8 However, the Local Development Act specifically declares that "historic preservation, reinvestment or enterprise areas as defined under this act are unproductive, undeveloped, underdeveloped or blighted pursuant to Article 10, § 6C." 62 O.S. 2001 § 851 (emphasis added). The Act defines "enterprise area" as "any area within a designated state or federal enterprise zone." 62 O.S. 2001 § 853(5). Since the area involved in this case is undeniably within a state-designated enterprise zone, it is by definition "unproductive, undeveloped, underdeveloped or blighted" for the purpose of TIF financing and therefore automatically qualifies under the Local Development Development Act. Thus, the Skirvin Hotel Project does not violate Article 10, § 6C of the Oklahoma Constitution or § 852(1) and (2) of the Local Development Act as alleged by plaintiff. PART 3 The Trial Court Did Not Commit Reversible Error in Declining to Treat Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as a Motion for Summary Judgment. ¶9 Plaintiff attached the following documents to his Petition: (1) City's Resolution dated May 7, 2004, and (2) Skirvin Hotel Funding Plan. Defendants attached the following documents to their motion to dismiss: (1) Order Granting Summary Judgment in City of Oklahoma City v. Means, Oklahoma County District Court, No. CJ-2000-9252 (September 18, 2001); (2) City Ordinance No. 21,431 dated February 22, 2000; (3) Downtown/MAPS Economic Development Plan dated July 17, 2001; (4) Amended Downtown/MAPS Economic Development Plan dated June, 2004; (5) City Ordinance No. 21,472 dated April 17, 2000; (6) City Ordinance No. 22,498 dated July 23, 2004; and (7) City Resolution dated August 11, 2004. ¶10 Plaintiff argues that defendants' attachments required the trial court to treat defendants' motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment and to permit plaintiff to conduct discovery. According to plaintiff, he needed to conduct discovery to determine "whether this is a case where investment, development and economic growth is difficult, but possible with the use of TIF funds . . . whether investment, development and economic growth would have occurred in the area anyway . . . [and] whether no economically productive property presently exists within the increment area." ¶11 As discussed in Part II of this opinion, the resolution of this case does not turn on the factual questions plaintiff has stated. Rather, since the area involved in this case is within a state-designated enterprise zone, it is by definition "unproductive, undeveloped, underdeveloped or blighted" for the purpose of TIF financing and therefore automatically qualifies under the Local Development Act. No amount of discovery would have affected the resolution of this case. ¶12 Even if the trial court should have treated the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, such failure does not constitute reversible error. It is well settled that a correct judgment will not be disturbed on review, even when the trial court applied an incorrect theory or reasoning in arriving at its conclusion; an unsuccessful party cannot complain of trial court's error when he would not have been entitled to succeed anyway. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State ex rel. Wildlife Conservation Comm'n, 1983 OK 14, 659 P.2d 930, 934 n. 10. JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED. WATT, C.J., WINCHESTER, V.C.J., LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, KAUGER, EDMONDSON, TAYLOR and COLBERT, JJ., concur. OPALA, J., not participating. FOOT