Case Title: Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.1986 WY 108718 P.2d 890Case Number: 85-166Decided: 05/01/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming

                    
Floyd 
Allen JONES and Norene Jones, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

                    

v.

CHEVRON U.S.A., INC., Appellee (Defendant), 
James Bennion; William Jones; Jeff Trampis and Does 1 through 5 
(Defendants).

Appeal from District 
Court, UintaCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

Richard H. 
Honaker (argued) Rock Springs, and Jack A. Rose, 
Anaheim, California, for 
appellants, Robert W. Tiedeken of Terry W. Mackey, P.C., Cheyenne, filed an amicus 
curiae brief on behalf of the Wyoming Trial Lawyers 
Association.

Mark W. Gifford 
of Brown, Drew, Apostolos, Massey & Sullivan, Casper, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
a summary judgment granted Chevron U.S.A., Inc. in a suit brought by appellant 
Floyd Jones for electrocution injuries he suffered while painting a transformer 
platform owned by Chevron. There are several interrelated issues which demand 
our attention. At the outset, we must decide whether an owner of a work site has 
a duty to protect an employee of an independent contractor from hazards of the 
work site which are incidental to the very work the contractor is hired to 
perform. If we find that the owner owes such a duty, we must determine whether 
it runs to an employee who is harmed by obvious man-made hazards. Finally, we 
must decide whether an owner can be vicariously liable to his contractor's 
employee for the contractor's negligent acts. This last issue involves the 
application of the special-risk doctrine of §§ 416 and 427 of the Restatement, 
Second, Torts. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

FACTS

[¶2.]     On September 8, 1978, 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. entered into a general 
service contract with Automation & Electronics, Inc. in which Automation 
agreed to

"[f]urnish labor, 
materials and equipment as needed to perform work as instructed by Chevron 
representatives."

The parties 
agreed that Automation would "perform the work as an independent contractor and 
not as an employee of [Chevron]." The contract also provided with respect to 
safety:

"Contractor agrees, while 
on [Chevron's] premises or vessels, to observe such safety rules as [Chevron] 
shall prescribe as necessary for the protection of personnel and property * * 
*."

[¶3.]     In September 1980, 
pursuant to the 1978 general service contract, Chevron hired Automation to 
construct power lines running to some of Chevron's oil and gas wells near 
Evanston. 
Chevron provided the specifications for all the power line components and 
employed a surveyor who staked the locations for the power poles. Automation 
crews erected the power poles, installed insulators and other hardware, and 
strung the lines. The lines were then energized.

[¶4.]     Appellant Floyd Jones 
had joined Automation as an apprentice electrician in August of 1980 and worked 
at the Chevron project since its inception in early September. He was a member 
of foreman William Jones' work crew. On October 10, 1980, appellant was 
instructed by his foreman to paint the metal portions of an H frame which the 
crew had completed in early October and which had been energized on October 3rd. 
The H frame consisted of two wooden power poles which were set about twenty feet 
apart and connected by a horizontal platform. The platform was a wooden deck 
supported by metal braces affixed about halfway up the poles. Two transformers 
rested on the platform and were wired to the main power lines which ran 
horizontally across the tops of the poles.

[¶5.]     After appellant painted 
the metal under the platform, he climbed onto the platform to complete the job. 
Electricity arced from the transformers to appellant, coursed through his body 
and knocked him from the platform. He sustained serious 
injuries.

[¶6.]     Appellant filed a 
complaint in the district court naming as defendants Automation & 
Electronics, Inc., Chevron U.S.A., Inc., his supervisors, 
several unnamed fellow employees, and several unnamed employees of Chevron. 
Automation was dismissed from the suit because of the bar of the Worker's 
Compensation Act. Chevron moved for summary judgment.

[¶7.]     The affidavits and 
depositions in support of and in opposition to summary judgment disclose several 
disputes of fact. First, while it is clear that appellant's foreman and fellow 
crew members were present when appellant was ordered to paint the H frame, there 
is a dispute as to whether a Chevron engineer was on the scene. Appellant stated 
in his affidavit that he received instructions to paint the H frame right after 
he interrupted a conversation between his foreman and a Chevron engineer named 
either Bob or R.G. But, Chevron's lead project engineer, R.L. "Bob" Kiyoi, 
stated in his affidavit:

"To the best of my 
recollection, I was not at the job site at the time of Floyd Jones' 
injury."

Appellant's 
foreman testified in his deposition that he did not remember any Chevron 
personnel being present.

[¶8.]     There is also some 
dispute over what was said. In his deposition, appellant's foreman testified 
that he told the crew "to go up the poles and paint as far as they could reach." 
He also recalled telling them to paint the part they could not reach "out of the 
bucket truck." But in his affidavit appellant indicated that the instructions 
were less specific and led him to believe that he could safely paint the entire 
platform without the bucket truck. He claims that he asked his foreman, within 
the hearing of the Chevron engineer, whether the H frame was "ready for [them] 
to go up." According to appellant, his foreman told him it was ready, and 
another foreman told him "everything is clear." He assumed from his 
conversations with his foreman and the silence of the Chevron engineer that the 
power was off.

[¶9.]     There is little dispute 
in the summary judgment materials about the procedure for de-energizing the 
power lines. Automation could de-energize lines only after obtaining permission 
from Chevron. Appellant's supervisor did not request a shutdown before he 
ordered the painting to proceed because it would have taken about an hour to get 
permission from Chevron's well operators.

[¶10.]  Based on the affidavits, depositions and 
other summary judgment materials before it, the district court found that 
Chevron owed appellant no direct duty of reasonable care. The court 
held:

a. that, as a matter of 
law, owners "are not obligated to protect employees of an independent contractor 
* * * from hazards which are incidental to or a part of the very work the 
independent contractor was hired to perform";

b. that an owner's duty 
to discover and warn his invitees of dangers on the premises does not extend to 
employees of an independent contractor who suffer physical harm "caused by a 
special danger encountered * * * while engaged in the performance of inherently 
dangerous work";

c. that appellant's 
employer was an independent contractor;

d. that, as a matter of 
fact, the dangers of the transformer tower were obvious to appellant. Therefore, 
the obvious-danger rule barred his recovery as a matter of law; 
and

e. that Chevron could not 
be vicariously liable for Automation's negligence because Automation was 
Chevron's independent contractor not its employee; that the special-risk 
doctrine of § 416 of the Restatement, Second, Torts, which prevents an owner 
from delegating its duty of care to an independent contractor under some 
circumstances, did not apply because, according to the court, the doctrine had 
not "been adopted or approved by the Wyoming Supreme Court [and] is not the law 
of Wyoming * * *."

SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT

"When reviewing a summary 
judgment on appeal, our duty is the same as that of the district court in that 
we have before us the same material and must follow the same standards. The 
party moving for summary judgment has the burden of proving there exists no 
genuine issue of material fact and that [he] is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. We look at the record from the viewpoint most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion, giving him every favorable inference which may be drawn 
from facts in the affidavits, depositions, and other material properly submitted 
in the record." (Citations omitted.) Noonan v. Texaco, Inc., Wyo., 713 P.2d 160, 162 
(1986).

DUTY OF OWNER TO 
INVITEE

[¶11.]  An owner may be liable to a worker who is 
injured on the owner's premises under either of two theories. First, the owner 
may be responsible for the negligence of the worker's employer under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior. Second,

"quite apart from any 
question of vicarious responsibility, the employer may be liable for any 
negligence of his own in connection with the work to be done. * * So far as he 
in fact gives directions for the work, furnishes equipment for it, or retains 
control over any part of it, he is required to exercise reasonable care for the 
protection of others * * *. If the work is done on the employer's own land, he 
will be required to exercise reasonable care to prevent activities or conditions 
which are dangerous to those outside of it, or to those who enter it as 
invitees. In all of these cases, he is liable for his personal negligence, 
rather than that of the contractor." (Footnotes omitted.) W. Keeton, Prosser and 
Keeton on Torts § 71 at 510-511 (1984). See also Ruhs v. Pacific Power & 
Light, 671 F.2d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir. 1982) (applying Wyoming 
law).

Appellant claims 
that Chevron is liable under both theories in the case at bar. We will first 
analyze his claim that Chevron was directly responsible for his 
injuries.

[¶12.]  Appellant argues that he was an invitee 
and that Chevron, therefore, owed a duty to protect him from the dangerous 
condition of its premises and the dangerous acts and omissions of its employees. 
He alleges that Chevron's premises were unsafe because Chevron made it difficult 
for Automation to shut the power off while work went forward on the power lines 
and that Chevron was negligent when its engineer at the scene of the accident 
neither warned appellant that the power was on nor ordered that the line be 
de-energized.

[¶13.]  Chevron counters that the direct duty of 
an owner to an invitee does not extend to an employee of an independent 
contractor who is injured by a hazard that is part of the very work the 
independent contractor was hired to perform.1 If Chevron is correct, then the 
district court properly granted summary judgment as a matter of law. The duty 
running from the defendant to the plaintiff in a negligence case 
is

"entirely a question of 
law, to be determined by reference to the body of statutes, rules, principles 
and precedents which make up the law; and it must be determined only by the 
court." W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 37 at 236 (1984). See also 
Caterpillar Tractor Company v. Donahue, Wyo., 
674 P.2d 1276, 1280 (1983).

But if there was 
a duty running from Chevron to appellant, as a matter of law, then summary 
judgment was proper only if one of the other negligence elements - breach of 
duty, proximate cause, or damages - was missing from appellant's 
case.

[¶14.]  As a general rule,

"[a]n independent 
contractor's employee who goes on the owner's premises is an invitee to whom the 
owner may be liable for injury caused by an unsafe condition of the premises." 
Ruhs v. Pacific Power & Light, supra, 671 F.2d  at 1272 (applying Wyoming 
law); Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power and Light Company, 96 Wn.2d 274, 635 P.2d 426, 430 (1981); 26 Am.Jur.2d Electricity, Gas, and Steam § 64 at 
269.

[¶15.]  But there is an exception to this duty. 
An owner is not obligated to protect the employees of an independent contractor 
from hazards which are incidental to, or part of, the very work the contractor 
was hired to perform. Holdaway v. Gustanson, 546 F. Supp. 231, 233 (D.Wyo. 
1982), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Holdaway v. Amoco Production Company, 
751 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1984); Wolczak v. National Electric Products 
Corporation, 66 N.J. Super. 64, 168 A.2d 412, 417 (1961); 41 Am.Jur.2d 
Independent Contractors § 27 at 784.2 

[¶16.]  This exception was developed to protect 
owners from suits by contractors who presumably assumed the risks associated 
with the work they undertook on the owner's premises. Wolczak v. National 
Electric Products Corporation, supra, 168 A.2d  at 417. But the 
assumption-of-risk rationale does not apply very well when a contractor's 
employee, rather than the contractor, is injured. Unless he is willing to lose 
his job, the employee is often forced to work under whatever contract his 
employer makes with the owner. He does not voluntarily assume the risks of the 
job site. See W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, supra, § 68 at 
490.

[¶17.]  The owner's lack of control over the job 
site is a better reason for the exception. An owner usually hires an independent 
contractor because of the contractor's expertise in the type of work involved. 
In order to do the job, the contractor is generally given control over the 
hazards incidental to the work. The owner should be permitted to assume 
that

"the worker, or his 
superiors, are possessed of sufficient skill to recognize the degree of danger 
involved and to adjust their methods of work accordingly." Wolczak v. National 
Electric Products Corporation, supra, 168 A.2d  at 417.

[¶18.]  Because the exception is based on the 
owner's delegation of control to the contractor, it should not apply when the 
owner maintains control over the hazard that causes the harm. For example, 
suppose a power company hires an electrical contractor to repair hardware on the 
company's poles but the contractor is not expected to replace the poles. The 
power company has a duty "commensurate with the control retained" to provide 
safe poles for the contractor's employees. Conover v. Northern States Power 
Company, Minn., 313 N.W.2d 397, 407 (1981). If, on the 
other hand, the contractor is hired to either replace defective poles or install 
new ones, then the power company has no duty to the contractor's employees to 
protect them from dangerous poles as long as the contractor controls the 
installation process. Paul v. Staten Island Edison Corporation, 2 A.D.2d 311, 
155 N.Y.S.2d 427, 439 (1956).

[¶19.]  The link between control and owner 
liability is codified in § 414 of the Restatement, Second, Torts which 
states:

"One who entrusts work to 
an independent contractor, but who retains control of any part of the work, is 
subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the employer 
owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to 
exercise his control with reasonable care."

[¶20.]  An owner does not have to retain a great 
deal of control over the work to be liable for an employee's harm under § 414. 
In fact, comment (a) to § 414 indicates that the owner can be liable even if he 
gives up enough control to make the contractor an "independent contractor" under 
vicarious liability analysis.3 

"To determine whether the 
nature and extent of the control present is sufficient to impose liability, both 
the contractual provisions and the actual exercise of control are relevant. If 
the employer reserves and exercises only the right to inspect the construction 
work to see that the contract specifications are met while the independent 
contractor controls how and when the work is to be done, there is probably not 
sufficient retained control to subject it to liability. Similarly, if the 
employer retains only [the right to require that the contractor observe safety 
rules and practices] but assumes no affirmative duties and never directs the 
method of performance, there is insufficient control or supervision to render it 
liable.

"On the other hand, if 
the employer retains the right to direct the manner of the independent 
contractor's performance, or assumes affirmative duties with respect to safety, 
the employer has retained sufficient control to be held liable if he exercises 
that control negligently." (Citations omitted and emphasis added.) Moloso v. 
State, Alaska, 
644 P.2d 205, 211-212, 29 A.L.R.4th 1165 (1982).

[¶21.]  The district court granted summary 
judgment to Chevron because appellant was injured while performing the very work 
the independent contractor, Automation, was hired to perform. Factually, the 
court's conclusion cannot be faulted. Even when the summary judgment materials 
are read in a light most favorable to appellant, it is clear that he engaged in 
the very work that Automation was hired to perform when he painted the H frame. 
Nevertheless, we must reverse. As a matter of law, the exception applied by the 
district court must be tempered by the theory of retained control. We hold that 
an owner of a work site who retains the right to direct the manner of an 
independent contractor's performance or assumes affirmative duties with respect 
to safety owes a duty of reasonable care to an employee of the independent 
contractor even if the employee is injured doing the very work the contractor 
was hired to perform.

[¶22.]  Although the safety provisions of the 
Chevron-Automation contract may not have given Chevron enough control to create 
a duty of reasonable care, Chevron's actual control over the energizing of the 
power lines was sufficient to create a duty as a matter of law.4 Appellant's foreman explained in 
his deposition that Automation had developed a working agreement with Chevron 
which prevented Automation crews from de-energizing lines without Chevron's 
permission. If one of Automation's foremen decided that a line had to be 
de-energized, he would contact Chevron's office to obtain permission. If a 
secondary line was involved, a line that did not power important oil well 
operations, Chevron required permission just so its employees would know which 
secondary lines were usable. With primary lines, however, Chevron might actually 
deny permission to de-energize so that its operations would not be interrupted. 
On at least one occasion Chevron refused to allow de-energization of a primary 
line. Chevron's chief engineer made it clear to appellant's foreman that Chevron 
did not want the primary lines de-energized unless it was absolutely necessary 
because those lines were needed to keep wells operating.

[¶23.]  Appellant's foreman stated in his 
deposition that the line which injured appellant was a secondary line with a 
primary load which he treated as a primary line. It is possible that Chevron 
would have denied permission to de-energize the line if the foreman had 
requested permission. And it would have taken at least an hour to obtain 
permission even if granted. Under these circumstances, appellant's foreman 
decided not to request de-energization prior to appellant's 
injury.

[¶24.]  Chevron's control over de-energization of 
primary lines could have contributed to appellant's injury even though 
appellant's foreman never requested de-energization. If Chevron had not 
discouraged de-energization of the primary lines, if it had made permission 
easier to obtain, and if it had permitted de-energization whenever requested by 
Automation - vesting the decision to de-energize and thus control in Automation 
- then appellant's foreman might have de-energized and the injury might have 
been avoided. Chevron retained enough real control to raise a duty of reasonable 
care. Whether Chevron breached that duty and whether its breach caused the 
injury are additional questions whose answers might absolve Chevron of 
liability. But Chevron was not entitled to summary judgment on the duty 
issue.

BREACH OF 
DUTY

[¶25.]  Because Chevron owed appellant a duty of 
due care as a matter of law, Chevron was entitled to summary judgment only if 
the affidavits and depositions establish that one of the other elements from 
appellant's negligence case is missing. In its summary judgment order the court 
stated:

"There is evidence that 
Chevron had control over decisions whether to de-energize the line. However, 
Automation & Electronics made the decision not to ask Chevron to de-energize 
the line, so Chevron knew nothing of it."

In other words, 
the court held that there was no issue of material fact involving the "breach of 
duty" element because Chevron did not know that Automation was painting the H 
frame while it was energized. We disagree for two reasons.

[¶26.]  First, there was conflicting evidence in 
the summary judgment materials with respect to the engineer's presence 
immediately before the accident and with respect to what occurred at that time. 
How that conflict is resolved and what reasonable inferences can be drawn from 
the situation is a matter for the jury unless the evidence is such that 
reasonable minds could not differ as to its effect. It is possible that 
Chevron's chief engineer, Bob Kiyoi, was present at the accident scene. It is 
also possible that Mr. Kiyoi knew the line was energized and that appellant was 
preparing to paint the platform. If these facts are proven at trial, then the 
jury might find that Chevron breached its duty of care when its agent, Mr. 
Kiyoi, failed to exercise his authority by shutting down the line or warning 
appellant of the danger. Of course, Automation's failure to request shutdown, 
appellant's own awareness of the danger, and appellant's failure to ask whether 
the line was energized, could reduce the level of fault, if any, attributable to 
Chevron. But that is a comparative negligence question that must be left to the 
jury.

[¶27.]  Second, if no Chevron employees were at 
the scene of the accident, Chevron may have nevertheless breached its duty of 
care by adopting de-energization procedures which deterred appellant's 
supervisor from requesting that the power be shut off. Then the jury will have 
to decide whether the procedures were reasonable under the circumstances and to 
what extent the procedures caused the harm. As we said in Bancroft v. Jagusch, Wyo., 611 P.2d 819, 821 
(1980),

"[s]ummary judgments are 
not proper in negligence actions when the question is whether or not the 
defendant's actions violate the required duty. [That] is a question of 
fact."

OBVIOUS-DANGER 
RULE

[¶28.]  The trial court did not base its holding 
of "no duty" entirely on the rules discussed above. The court held in the 
alternative that the obvious-danger rule negated Chevron's duty of reasonable 
care to appellant. Under the obvious-danger rule, an owner of property has no 
duty to his invitees "to correct an obvious and known danger resulting from 
natural causes." O'Donnell v. City of Casper, Wyo., 696 P.2d 1278, 1282 (1985); 
see also Note, The Obvious Danger Rule - A Qualified Adoption of Secondary 
Assumption of Risk Analysis, 21 Land & Water L.Rev. 251 (1986). But the 
obvious-danger rule does not apply when a dangerous condition is created by the 
owner or his servants. O'Donnell v. City of Casper, supra, at 1283.5 In this case, neither party 
contends that the transformer was dangerous from natural causes. It was 
dangerous, if at all, because of the way it was designed, constructed, 
maintained, or operated. Even if the danger was perfectly obvious to appellant, 
it is the function of the jury, under the comparative negligence statute, to 
compare his negligence with that of Chevron. O'Donnell v. City of Casper, supra, 696 P.2d  at 
1284. Chevron should not have been granted summary judgment as a matter of law 
based on the obvious-danger rule.

VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF AN 
OWNER

[¶29.]  Although we have concluded that Chevron's 
direct duty to appellant precluded summary judgment, we must still discuss 
Chevron's potential vicarious liability because it could have a very real effect 
on Chevron's liability after remand. See Conover v. Northern States Power 
Company, supra, 313 N.W.2d  at 403. For example, if the jury concludes that 35 
percent of the fault is chargeable to Chevron, 25 percent to Automation, and 40 
percent to appellant, then appellant can recover from Chevron under comparative 
negligence only if Automation's fault is imputed to Chevron. Chevron would then 
be 60 percent at fault compared to appellant's 40 percent. See § 1-1-109, W.S. 
1977; Board of CountyCommissioners of County of Campbell v. Ridenour, Wyo., 623 P.2d 1174 
(1981).

[¶30.]  Although appellant claims that Chevron 
retained some control over the electrical lines, he concedes that Automation was 
an independent contractor rather than a Chevron employee. 
Generally,

"the employer of an 
independent contractor is not responsible for the contractor's inadequate acts 
unless the employer did not use due care in selecting the contractor." Cline v. 
Sawyer, Wyo., 
618 P.2d 144, 148 (1980). See also Restatement, Second, Torts § 
409.

But many 
exceptions to this rule have been recognized which prevent an owner from 
delegating his duty of care to an independent contractor.

[¶31.]  Both appellant and the Wyoming Trial 
Lawyers Association, who submitted an amicus brief, argue that Chevron should be 
vicariously liable to appellant for Automation's negligence because the 
electrical work contracted to Automation was inherently dangerous. They urge us 
to adopt §§ 416 and 427 of the Restatement, Second, Torts which simply restate 
the time-honored rule that an owner cannot delegate to an independent contractor 
the duty to protect others from "inherently dangerous" activities conducted on 
the owner's land. See W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 71 at 512 (1984). 
Section 416 states:

"Work Dangerous in Absence of Special 
Precautions.

"One who employs an 
independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely 
to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless 
special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused 
to them by the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take 
such precautions, even though the employer has provided for such precautions in 
the contract or otherwise."

Similarly, § 427 
states:

"Negligence as to Danger Inherent in the 
Work. 

"One who employs an 
independent contractor to do work involving a special danger to others which the 
employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or normal to the work, or 
which he contemplates or has reason to contemplate when making the contract, is 
subject to liability for physical harm caused to such others by the contractor's 
failure to take reasonable precautions against such 
danger."

[¶32.]  Many courts have applied the "inherently 
dangerous" exception, as synthesized in §§ 416 and 427, when bystanders 
unconnected with the work are the "others" who are injured. But most 
jurisdictions that have decided the issue have refused to apply the exception 
when an employee of the contractor is the injured party. Tauscher v. Puget Sound 
Power & Light Company, supra, 635 P.2d 426, 429 and n. 2. There are several 
good reasons for this view. First, if a bystander is injured by the negligence 
of a financially irresponsible contractor, the owner may be the bystander's only 
source of recompense. The bystander is a totally innocent third party having no 
involvement in the work; and, if it is inherently dangerous and likely to cause 
harm, the owner undertaking the work should be responsible for the harm. The 
employee, on the other hand, is covered by worker's compensation even if the 
contractor is insolvent. The owner should not have to pay for injuries caused by 
the contractor when the worker's compensation system already covers those 
injuries. Sloan v. Atlantic Richfield Company, Alaska, 552 P.2d 157, 160-161 (1976). The 
owner "has in a sense already assumed financial responsibility for the injuries" 
because the independent contractor passes along his worker's compensation costs 
to the owner. Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power & Light Company, supra, at 430; 
Eutsler v. United 
States, 376 F.2d 634, 636 (10th Cir. 
1967).

[¶33.]  Second, under worker's compensation, an 
employer is released from tort liability for his employee's job-related 
injuries. If we held an owner vicariously liable for injuries to the 
contractor's employees, then the owner would be subject to greater liability 
than if he employed his own workers to do the job. Owners might be encouraged to 
use their own inexperienced employees instead of experienced independent 
contractors who specialize in hazardous work. Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power 
& Light Company, supra, at 430-431.

[¶34.]  Finally, if the owner maintains control 
over the work and exercises that control negligently, he can be directly liable 
to the employee for his own negligence. Rather than imposing vicarious liability 
in these cases, it is better to hold the contractor and the owner directly 
responsible for their own fault. The contractor will pay via worker's 
compensation and the owner through the tort system. Conover v. Northern States 
Power Company, supra, 313 N.W.2d  at 405.

[¶35.]  We agree with the district court that §§ 
416 and 427 of the Restatement, Second, Torts do not apply when an employee of a 
contractor is the plaintiff. The court properly granted summary judgment against 
appellant on his claim that Chevron was vicariously liable for the negligent 
acts of Automation.

THE DISSENTING 
OPINIONS

[¶36.]  Justice Urbigkit states that under the 
theory of retained control, which we outlined earlier in this opinion, 
"ownership and control become synonymous." He argues that

"[c]reation of the rule 
of control in the fashion implemented in this case creates the duty, since the 
owner will always have the opportunity to tell the expert how the expert should 
conduct his business."

We disagree. An 
owner does not "always" have the opportunity to tell the expert how to do the 
job. The owner may, by contract, totally rely upon the contractor to perform the 
work with whatever safety precautions the contractor chooses. If, in addition, 
the owner does not assume affirmative duties with respect to safety while the 
contract is performed, then, under our holding, the owner has effectively 
relinquished control. We look to the contract and the parties' actions during 
the period of performance to determine whether control has been retained. The 
owner's hypothetical opportunity to retain control before he executes or 
performs the contract is irrelevant.

[¶37.]  In the case at bar, for example, there is 
no question that Chevron effectively relinquished control over the secondary 
lines when it adopted a policy of automatically approving any request by the 
contractor to de-energize. Chevron had no duty of care running to appellant 
regarding the secondary lines and, if he had been injured on a secondary line, 
Chevron would have been entitled to summary judgment. The fact that Chevron had 
the opportunity to retain control over de-energization of the secondary lines 
does not mean that Chevron actually retained such control.

[¶38.]  Justice Urbigkit states that he is 
"concerned that the homeowner will assume liability for the electricians who 
work on the home without turning off the electricity." Under our holding this 
concern is easily allayed. The homeowner must retain the right to direct the 
electrician's work or assume affirmative duties with respect to safety before he 
owes a duty to the electrician to protect him from hazards incidental to the 
work. Few homeowners would tell the expert electrician how to do his job and few 
would assume affirmative safety duties. The typical electrician would not even 
ask the homeowner whether he could turn off the electricity. Both parties would 
assume that the contractor has the right to turn off the power if he thinks it 
is necessary. If the parties did not agree on the control aspect of their 
service contract, a court would undoubtedly imply reasonable terms on that 
subject. A complete relinquishment of control would be implied because it is the 
reasonable and likely intent of the parties. The homeowner would not retain 
sufficient control to create a duty of care with respect to the very work the 
electrician was hired to perform.

[¶39.]  In the case at bar, Chevron owed 
appellant a duty of care with respect to the primary lines because Chevron, in a 
very real sense, retained control over them. In both dissents it is argued that 
Chevron did not have control over the de-energization of the primary lines 
because Automation simply had to make a request before they would be 
de-energized. Justice Urbigkit asks: "How can you make a request easier than a 
request, since in either case you only have to ask?" The short answer is that 
Chevron did not treat all requests equally. As noted above, Chevron 
automatically approved all requests for de-energization of secondary lines. 
These requests were a mere formality intended to tell Chevron which lines were 
de-energized. This request requirement did not give Chevron real control. But 
the requests for primary line de-energization were not mere formalities. Chevron 
discouraged such requests, took its time processing them (time which the 
contractor's employees might remain idle), and at times denied them. This is the 
kind of real control which implies corresponding 
responsibilities.

[¶40.]  Of course, it may be that Chevron 
exercised its control over de-energization in a perfectly reasonable manner by 
establishing a proper policy and following it. But that is a decision for the 
jury which in negligence cases must usually decide whether the standard of care 
has been breached. Our holding does not create absolute liability as Justice 
Urbigkit claims. It resolves only the duty issue. Breach of duty, causation and 
damages are issues which remain to be adjudicated. The rule of retained control 
merely ensures that the duty to protect another's safety falls on the person who 
has the power to do something about it.

CONCLUSION

[¶41.]  Chevron owed a direct duty of reasonable 
care to appellant even though he was injured by a hazard incidental to the very 
work Automation was hired to perform. The duty arose because Chevron retained 
control over a safety matter - the de-energization of the power line. Chevron's 
duty to appellant was not limited by the obvious-danger rule because the hazards 
were man-made. A dispute of fact existed over whether Chevron breached its duty 
of care to appellant. Summary judgment could not be based on that issue. The 
only issue properly disposed of by the district court on summary judgment 
involved Chevron's vicarious liability for Automation's negligence. The district 
court correctly held as a matter of law that §§ 416 and 427 of the Restatement, 
Second, Torts do not apply in Wyoming when the injured plaintiff is an 
employee of the contractor.

[¶42.]  Affirmed in part and reversed in 
part.

FOOTNOTES

1 Chevron relies heavily 
on our recent decision in Noonan v. Texaco, Inc., Wyo., 713 P.2d 160 
(1986). According to Chevron, Noonan stands for the proposition that there is no 
duty running from an owner to the employee of an independent contractor who is 
injured while doing the job for which his employer, the contractor, was hired. 
Noonan, in fact, is not so broad. We simply applied the unremarkable rule of law 
that ordinarily an owner is not liable under the theory of respondeat superior 
for the negligence of his independent contractors. See Restatement, Second, 
Torts § 409. The Noonan case does not control when direct negligence of the 
owner, rather than respondeat superior is involved. Nor does it identify the 
exceptions to the basic rule of vicarious liability.

2 The New York courts have 
formulated an explicit version of this exception which can be applied in many 
cases, including the case at bar: An owner has no duty to either furnish a safe 
place to work or to give warning of danger

"(a) where the structure 
is defective and the workman is employed for the specific purpose of correcting 
or repairing the defect, * * * [or] (b) * * * where the work is in the 
construction of the place, as in the case of a lineman who is injured because of 
a polesetter's negligence in setting a new pole in soft marshy ground, both of 
them being fellow servants engaged as part of the same gang in the operation of 
erecting a series of new poles and wires." Paul v. Staten Island Edison 
Corporation, 2 A.D.2d 311, 155 N.Y.S.2d 427, 439 (1956).

The problem with 
the New York 
exception is that it only seems to apply to new construction or the repair of 
the actual defect which ultimately causes the worker's injury. We prefer the 
general formulation of the exception which the trial court extracted from 
Holdaway v. Gustanson, 546 F. Supp. 231, 233 (D.Wyo. 1982) and which we repeated 
in the text above.

3 Restatement, Second, 
Torts § 414 comment (a) states:

"If the employer of an 
independent contractor retains control over the operative detail of doing any 
part of the work, he is subject to liability for the negligence of the employees 
of the contractor engaged therein, under the rules of that part of the law of 
Agency which deals with the relation of master and servant [respondeat 
superior]. The employer may, however, retain a control less than that which is 
necessary to subject him to liability as master. He may retain only the power to 
direct the order in which the work shall be done, or to forbid its being done in 
a manner likely to be dangerous to himself or others. Such a supervisory control 
may not subject him to liability under the principles of Agency, but he may be 
liable under the rule stated in this Section unless he exercises his supervisory 
control with reasonable care so as to prevent the work which he has ordered to 
be done from causing injury to others."

4 We have analyzed the 
summary judgment materials in a light most favorable to appellant, the party 
opposing the motion. Noonan v. Texaco, Inc., supra, 713 P.2d  at 162. Our 
conclusion that Chevron had sufficient control over the power lines may not be 
borne out when the conflicts in the depositions and affidavits are resolved at 
trial.

5 In O'Donnell v. City of 
Casper, Wyo., 696 P.2d 1278 (1985), we stated that the obvious-danger rule, as 
broadly formulated in Sherman v. Platte County, Wyo., 642 P.2d 787 (1982), did 
not survive the enactment of comparative negligence. We overruled the cases 
cited in Sherman v. Platte County, one of which was McKee v. Pacific Power and 
Light Company, Wyo., 417 P.2d 426 (1966). In McKee we had applied the 
obvious-danger rule to harm caused by electric wires, a man-made hazard. 417 P.2d  at 427.

BROWN, Justice, concurring in 
part; dissenting in part, in which URBIGKIT, J., joins.

[¶43.]  I agree with the majority opinion's 
holding that:

"* * * [A]n owner of a 
work site who retains the right to direct the manner of an independent 
contractor's performance or assumes affirmative duties with respect to safety 
owes a duty of reasonable care to an employee of the independent contractor even 
if the employee is injured doing the very work the contractor was hired to 
perform."

[¶44.]  I cannot agree, however, with the 
majority's application of the law in this case with regard to 
Chevron.

[¶45.]  We recently recognized that an owner may 
may retain control over certain safety aspects of an independent contractor's 
performance without destroying the independent contractor relationship in Noonan 
v. Texaco, Wyo., 713 P.2d 160 (1986).1 There we found that even though the 
owner retained the right to require the individual contractor to use safe 
equipment, material and supplies, such was insufficient to destroy the 
individual contractor status. Moreover, we encouraged such a 
practice:

"* * * We think an owner 
who undertakes to see that an independent contractor operate in a safe manner 
ought not be penalized. The reservation of a right to require safe equipment, 
material, and supplies to be used by the contractor is not without justification 
or reason. The owner has a vital interest in assuring himself that his well will 
be drilled efficiently, in a good workmanlike manner, at a reasonable cost, and 
that the final result is as good as possible. Good, safe equipment is a 
substantial factor in insuring that performance. But, a simple reservation of a 
right to inspect and secure that benefit does not cause the contractor to become 
the owner's employee, for the owner has not taken over the details of safety 
with respect to the contractor's employees.

"The contractor still 
accepts and reviews applications for employment, determines who to hire, 
presumably knows which potential employees have accident records and their past 
employment history. The contractor-employer is responsible for safety training 
of his employees and for training them in the performance of their work. He 
provides safety equipment and manuals and retains the right to discipline or 
even discharge them for unsafe practices. The details of safety being in control 
of the contractor rather than Texaco, it is apparent to us that Texaco's 
minimal, and we feel necessary, involvement in safety did not result in the 
contractor becoming Texaco's employee so that Texaco became liable to appellant 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior." Id., at 167.

[¶46.]  When reviewing a summary judgment on 
appeal, this court sits in the same position as the district court, using the 
same material and following the same standards. A party moving for summary 
judgment has the burden of proving the nonexistence of a genuine issue of 
material fact. A material fact is one which, if proved, would have the effect of 
establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense 
asserted by the parties. Upon review of a summary judgment, we view the record 
from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Noonan 
v. Texaco, supra; Garner v. Hickman, Wyo., 709 P.2d 407 (1985); Dudley v. East Ridge 
Development Company, Wyo., 694 P.2d 113 
(1985).

[¶47.]  In the present case the following facts 
are undisputed. Automation and Electronics, Inc. (Automation) was an individual 
contractor for Chevron hired to erect power lines. If Automation wished to have 
the power turned off, it made such request to Chevron. On the day of the 
accident, appellant was assigned to paint the metal supports of the H-Frame 
structure, which were located below the platform upon which the transformers 
sit. Appellant was not told to go on the platform, or paint any area which would 
require him to get on the platform. While painting, appellant crawled onto the 
platform and was injured when electricity arced through his body. Automation did 
not request a power shutdown before appellant proceeded with his task of 
painting the H-Frame supports. In my opinion, this is the crucial deciding fact 
in this case. As a matter of law, Chevron cannot be held liable for appellant's 
injuries when absolutely no request was made for a power shutdown, and Chevron 
did not know that appellant would get upon the platform. Whatever negligence 
there may be in the case, there simply is none that can be attributable to 
Chevron.

[¶48.]  I agree with the majority's assessment of 
the law. There are circumstances under which an owner may be held liable for his 
negligence if he retains control over the work to be done. But in this case, 
such principles are misapplied. The procedure for a power shutdown was well 
established. To have the power turned off, Automation had to make such request 
from Chevron, and in this case, there simply was no request 
made.

[¶49.]  Automation is in the business of 
electrical construction and it presumably possesses expertise in that field. 
Automation is presumed to understand the nature and inherent dangers of 
electricity. Insofar as Chevron is concerned, it matters not what appellant was 
told to do by his employer, Chevron had no control over appellant or the manner 
in which he performed his duties other than general safety 
considerations.

[¶50.]  Appellant argues that Chevron, as owner 
of the premises, had a duty to provide safe working conditions on its premises 
for employees of individual contractors. Abeyta v. Hensley, Wyo., 595 P.2d 71 (1979); and 41 Am.Jur.2d 
Independent Contractors § 27 (1968). I agree with that abstract principle, but 
there is no showing that Chevron failed to do just that. Again, Automation 
failed to request that Chevron de-energize the power line. Simply having a power 
line on one's property is not negligent in and of itself.

[¶51.]  In McKee v. Pacific Power and Light 
Company, Wyo., 
417 P.2d 426 (1966), we upheld a directed verdict for the defendant power 
company when the plaintiff electrician was injured by a power line while working 
on a cable for a television company. The plaintiff contended, among other 
things, that the power company was negligent because it did not de-energize the 
line while the plaintiff was working on the television cable. Although the case 
was decided before the adoption of comparative negligence and its application to 
this case is limited, this court found it significant that neither the plaintiff 
nor his employer ever requested that the power be shut off. As to the liability 
of the owner, we stated: "In Wyoming, it is a settled rule that the owner 
of facilities is not an insurer of the safety of his invitees." Id., at 
429.

[¶52.]  Having found no genuine issues of 
material fact, and there being no evidence that Chevron violated any duty, I 
would affirm the summary judgment in all respects.

1 I realize the Noonan 
case involved an injury caused by an instrumentality owned by the independent 
contractor, not the owner as here. Nevertheless, the language as to the owner 
retaining limited control over the safety aspects of the individual contractor's 
performance is applicable here.

FOOTNOTES

URBIGKIT, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part.

[¶53.]  I concur with the special concurrence and 
dissent of Justice Brown, and would add additionally. 

[¶54.]  Although I might have joined in the 
dissent of Justice Rose in Noonan v. Texaco, Inc., Wyo., 713 P.2d 160 (1986), 
had I been serving as a member of the court at that time, it would seem from the 
present opinion of this court that Noonan lasted only these few 
months.

[¶55.]  However, my concern arises not from the 
effect on Noonan by this decision, but that we now go much further than was even 
claimed as proper in the Noonan dissent.

[¶56.]  This court cannot separate the present 
facts from the legal principle discussed. In result it would seem that a special 
area of near absolute liability devolves upon owners who employ experts to 
provide services in activities where carelessness invokes a particular risk of 
injury, such as electrical transmission companies or any other of the dangerous 
occupations which could even include the most dangerous of all locations, our 
personal home, where more accidents do occur.

[¶57.]  This concern is not idly raised, since 
the court accepts neither Holdaway v. Gustanson, 546 F. Supp. 231 (D.C.Wyo. 
1982), rev'd sub nom Holdaway v. Amoco Production Co., 751 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 
1984), nor the second case derived from the Circuit Court, Holdaway v. Amoco 
Production Company, supra, itself, by rejecting the exception rule for employees 
of an independent contractor as creating a duty to protect for hazards which are 
incidental to or part of the very work which the contractor was hired to 
perform.

[¶58.]  I am concerned that the homeowner will 
assume liability for the electricians who work on the home without turning off 
the electricity, and each and every other occupational responsbility which 
invokes danger if carelessly pursued by the personnel of the independent 
contractor which have been selected for job expertise.

[¶59.]  Seriously questioned is the rationale of 
the contention that justification for nonliability arises from lack of control. 
Creation of the rule of control in the fashion implemented in this case creates 
the duty, since the owner will always have the opportunity to tell the expert 
how the expert should conduct his business. Consequently, ownership and control 
become synonymous. As owner, some control over the jobsite exists by the fact of 
ownership.

[¶60.]  By the court's own example in this case, 
a utility company would be responsible for injury to an independent-contractor 
employee, unless power was disconnected, even though a major societal adversity 
would result to the third-party user from the lack of electricity. The nature of 
the functioning economy does not always afford opportunity to disconnect 
service.

[¶61.]  To otherwise define the result is to say 
that the decision in this case is determined by the way the rule is stated by 
the court. Obviously, an owner can always have the electricity turned off in 
order to have services performed. When an expert is employed, the necessity to 
disconnect should properly be in its hands and at its request. In this case, the 
tower painting operation did not invoke any unusual risk if approached with the 
expected realization that all electricity like dynamite, wild animals, motor 
vehicles, and construction operation, etc., can invoke an opportunity for injury 
if not approached with the expected care. Actually, Jones could have safely 
climbed up on the transformer platform itself if the extreme degree of care had 
been utilized for adequate grounding and adjacency determinations (two feet, as 
described by the testimony in the record).

[¶62.]  Every square inch of each transformer 
platform is not necessarily dangerous, which is demonstrable by the fact that 
transformers are changed and electric utilities serviced, sometimes in very 
adverse climatic conditions.

[¶63.]  The court, by the present opinion, has 
effectively promulgated a rule for owner absolute liability, even when experts 
are employed specifically to perform the necessary work. This decision is not 
supported by case authority. Although the majority cite Wolczak v. National 
Electric Products Corporation, 66 N.J. Super. 64, 168 A.2d 412 (1961), the 
present result in this case is directly contrary to that authority. 

"The duty to provide a 
reasonably safe place in which to work is relative to the nature of the invited 
endeavor and does not entail the elimination of potential operational hazards 
which are obvious and visible to the invitee upon ordinary observation. 
[Citations.] This is especially so when the invitee is an experienced laborer 
hired either to correct the very danger present or to perform his tasks amidst 
the visible hazards. The landowner may assume that the worker, or his superiors, 
are possessed of sufficient skill to recognize the degree of danger involved and 
to adjust their methods of work accordingly. Thus the unimpaired line of 
holdings to the effect that the duty to provide a reasonably safe working place 
for employees of an independent contractor does not relate to known hazards 
which are part of or incidental to the very work the contractor was hired to 
perform. [Citations.]

"It is significant to 
note that each of the aforementioned decisions is explainable in terms of the 
equation, in Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 48-50, 155 A.2d 90 (1959), of assumption of risk in its primary sense and lack of duty or 
failure to breach the duty owed. These doctrines, traceable to the law of 
master-servant, constitute a shorthand description of that species of 
occupational risk which, because of its obvious nature, its intimate relation to 
the task being performed, and the presumed expertise of the person encountering 
it, was formerly non-remediable if injury resulted and is now compensable solely 
through the medium of workmen's compensation laws. * * * The extension of this 
concept to the realm of the employer-independent contractor tort relationship is 
amply warranted by the obvious reliance of the employer on the skills of one 
hired to perform a task generally unrelated to the employer's own work." 168 A.2d  at 417-418.

[¶64.]  Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, 
Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90, 82 A.L.R.2d 1208 (1959), a case considered by 
this court in its opinion, affords a thoughtful and philosophic review of the 
basic theories and premises of the legal issues involved.

[¶65.]  An obfuscation now occurs by creating a 
new principle of delegated control. In this case, Automation was contracted to 
build an electrical transmission system which included painting the required 
towers. Such painting, which was not completed by the time of initiation of use, 
was being done thereafter in an operation in the proximity of an activated 
electrical system. Although the painting activity then remained as a part of the 
original construction requirement, it will likely be hereafter repeated by other 
contractors as maintenance during the life of usage if the oil field has a 
sufficiently extended life. Then, or hereafter, carelessness is always dangerous 
in electrical service work, as in many other occupations. Care and knowledge by 
the employed expert is the expectancy of the bargain whereby the contractor is 
employed. It is clear from the present record that no reason existed for Jones 
to climb on the platform.

[¶66.]  Holdaway v. Gustanson, supra, which the 
court previously approved in Noonan as stating the proper rule despite reversal 
by the Circuit Court, stated:

"Futhermore, Amoco is not 
obligated to protect the employees of CWS from hazards which are incidental or 
part of the very work which CWS was hired to perform. Vecchio [v. 
AnHeuser-Busch, 328 F.2d 714, 718 (2d Cir. 1964).] The activity which led to the 
injury was conducted by CWS and the danger arises out of the activity itself. In 
such a situation, the responsibility is that of CWS and not Amoco." 546 F. Supp. 
at 233.

[¶67.]  That principle, in itself, was not 
reversed by the Circuit Court which in Holdaway v. Amoco Production Company, 
supra, stated:

"* * * Regardless of 
whether the contract purports to make CWS an independent contractor, however, it 
will not protect Amoco if it may be inferred from facts and circumstances 
revealed by the evidence that the real relationship between Amoco and CWS was 
that of master and servant." 751 F.2d  at 1130.

[¶68.]  Control and supervision, not control 
alone as presumed from ownership, is the test for liability without regard for 
the exception rule quoted in Holdaway v. Gustanson of the expert employed to 
perform the work from which the dangerous exposure arises. McKee v. Pacific 
Power & Light Co., Wyo., 417 P.2d 426 (1966); Parsons v. Amerada 
Hess Corp., 422 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1970); Texaco, Inc. v. Pruitt, 396 F.2d 237 
(10th Cir. 1968). See also Sherman v. Platte County, Wyo., 642 P.2d 787 (1982); Bluejacket v. Carney, Wyo., 
550 P.2d 494 (1976); LeGrande v. Misner, 
Wyo., 490 P.2d 1252 (1971); and Watts v. 
Holmes, Wyo., 386 P.2d 718 
(1963).

[¶69.]  Factually, what is announced by the court 
in this case as its decision is that Chevron, in the absence of any request, 
should have made it easier for Automation to have requested that the operation 
of the oil field be shut down to avoid danger to a careless employee who might 
be climbing on a transformer platform, so that the tower and support underneath 
could be painted. How can you make a request easier than a request, since in 
either case you only have to ask?

[¶70.]  Despite this writer's disafinity for 
disposition of negligence actions by summary-judgment decision, it is submitted 
that the decision of the trial court in this case was appropriate and well 
justified.

[¶71.]  In reversal of the trial court, we now 
create a new rule with nefarious and indeterminate implications. It would seem 
that this court sets the law adrift somewhere between the Sargasso Sea1 and Matagorda County, Texas. Compare this writer's dissenting 
opinion in DeJulio v. Foster, 715 P.2d 182 (1986), with On the Docket, "There is 
more to the mess in U.S. courtrooms than greedy attorneys 
and vindictive juries. Consider . . ." Greene, The hanging judges of business, 
Forbes, April 7, 1986, at 62, 64, wherein Matagorda County, Texas, is described 
as, "Where plaintiffs rule," as the article attributes proportionate judicial 
responsibility to the present litigious status of our 
society.

FOOTNOTES

1 See Albernaz v. 
United States, 450 U.S. 333, 101 S. Ct. 1137, 67 L. Ed. 2d 275 (1981), and State v. Carter, Wyo., 714 P.2d 1217, 1222 n. 2 (1986), 
Urbigkit, J., dissenting.