Case Title: STATE EX REL BARKER v STEVENSVILL

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1974-07-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12351 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 19 74 STATE O F M O N T A N A , ex r e l . DENZIL J. BARKER and BETTY JEAN BARKER, Petitioners and Appellants, -vs - T O W N O F STEVENSVILLE, e t a l . , Respondents, -vs - R O B E R T B . BROWN and FRANCES M. BROWN, e t a l . , P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents, and T O W N O F STEVENSVILLE , P l a i n t i f f and Intervenor and Respondent, -vs - DENZIL J. BARKER and B E T T Y JEAN BARKER, e t a l . , Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Christian, McCurdy, Ingraham and Wold, Polson, Montana Keith W. McCurdy argued, Polson, Montana For Respondents : Murray and Holt, Missoula, Montana Harold L. Holt argued, Missoula, Montana Larry Persson, Hamilton, Montana Robert B. Brown, Stevensville, Montana Submitted: April 24, 1974 Decided : Jub - 2 1 m Filed : J U L . - 2 1974 Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a judgment denying an application for issuance of a writ of mandate. This is a unique case. I t is in some respects moot, never- theless we feel justice requires a study of the matter and the granting of such relief as may be warranted. In July 1971, Denzil and Betty Jean Barker purchased two lots within the city limits of the Town of Stevensville, Montana. Denzil Barker was disabled and confined to a wheelchair. Because of his limited income and disability, Barker signed a contract to purchase what is commonly called a "double-wide" mobile home. Purchase was made through one Kratofil, a dealer in Hamilton, Montana. After completing arrangements for the purchase, Barkers left Montana on July 17, 1971 for California to sell their home there and move their belongings to Montana. Just prior to leaving they arranged to have one Siphers, the real estate agent who sold them the lots, to secure a building permit for them in their absence. Siphers agreed to so as a favor and acted gratuitously. Siphers appeared at the Stevensville town council meeting on July 19, 1971 to request the issuance of a building permit. He presented the council with a color brochure, a lot layout plan, and a floor plan. The council felt it needed more information and appointed Robert GJeber, the Stevensville police chief, to go to Hamilton, view the mobile home and report back to the counsil. tlayor Summers also volunteered to view the home. Neither one reported back to the council. Mayor Summers did view the home in Hamilton. At this point there is a conflict in the testimony. Mayor Summers said he thought the council had authorized him to issue the permit if, in his opinion, the Darker home was similar to a home previously allowed in the town. The council members however deny such authorization and testified they expected Mayor Summers to report back to them with his information. In any event, a f t e r viewing the home, Summers returned t o Stevensville and t o l d Raymond Meadows, t h e town o f f i c i a l who issues building permits, t o issue one t o the Barkers. Meadows s t a r t e d t o f i l l out the permit but lacked information a s t o the number of rooms, baths, etc. and so did not complete it. He t e s t i f i e d t h a t had he had t h a t information he would have issued it a t t h a t time. Further Meadows, a s town building inspector, caused the town's water main and sewer t o be tapped t o accept t h e connections from the Barker home. He t e s t i f i e d t h a t water and sewer taps a r e made a s a p a r t of the normal course of events a f t e r a building permit has been issued; t h a t the town council's authorization of building permits was normally communicated t o him by the mayor and t h i s had been the practice a s long a s he had been i n office. Later on the same day Summers had t o l d Pleadows t o issue the permit, he encountered Siphers on the s t r e e t and t o l d him the permit would issue. Siphers proceeded t o Pleadowst o f f i c e t o get t h e permit but he too lacked the information regarding t h e number of rooms, baths, e t c . , so t h e permit did not issue a t t h a t time, O n August 7, 1971, a t about 1 1 a . m., Summers again t o l d Siphers t h a t the permit had been granted. Siphers, acting upon t h a t information, called K r a t o f i l i n Hamilton and told him the permit had been issued and the home could be moved onto the Barker l o t s . O n August 8 Siphers wrote t o the Barkers informing them t h e permit had been issued. However, the council, Mayor Summers included, went i n t o session on the evening of August 7, 1971 and t e n t a t i v e l y rejected the application. That decision was communicated t o Siphers by Summers o r a l l y on the 8th, a f t e r Siphers had written t o Barkers. Kratofil, unaware of the r e j e c t i o n , moved one-half of t h e home onto the Barker l o t s on the 9th, but due t o high winds w a s unable t o move the second half t h a t day. Later t h a t same day Summers called Kratofil and told him t h a t no permit had issued. Being a t a l o s s , K r a t o f i l consulted counsel and moved the second half of the mobile home a few days l a t e r . O n August 14, 1971, the town council met i n formal session and rejected the application. O n August 1 7 , 3arkers returned from California and early on the 18th f i r s t learned of t h e i r troubles. They immediately gathered Lheir plans, neighbors' a f f i d a v i t s i n support, and affidavits of a building contractor and an a r c h i t e c t and presented them t o the 5tevensville Planning Commission. A t t h a t time the Planning Commission was i n the process of formation and awaiting approval 2rom the county commissioners, hence it had no l e g a l s t a t u s and \+,as advisory only. The Planning Commission did, however, recommend approval. This decision, along with the plans and a f f i d a v i t s , was resubmitted t o the town council. Shortly a f t e r Barkers returned from California two of t h e i r neighbors i n s t i t u t e d s u i t against the Rarlcers seeking an injuntion to compel them t o remove the housing u n i t . The Town of Stevens- v i l l e intervened, appearing against the Barkers, and c i t e d town ordinances which called f o r possible j a i l sentences. O n October 29, 1971, Barkers sought a w r i t of mandate t? compel issuance of the building permit. O n October 30, 1971, the town council sent a l e t t e r t o the Barkers ordering them t o remove the home. (The h0rr.e was removed i n M a y 1972). The two causes were consolidated f o r t r i a l before the d i s t r i c t court, s i t t i n g withouc a jury. Judgment was entered i n favor of the Town of Stevensville and against the Sarkers. They appeal. During o r a l argument before t h i s Court, counsel informed the Court Lhe mobile home had been repossessed but t h a t Earkers s t i l l dwn the l o t s . Ordinarily t h i s would render t h e appeal moot, but we. find other matters j-n t h i s case which we f e e l should be commented upon. W e w i l l not discuss the issues raised by the Barkers. W e fi-lid the issue rai-sed by the record, b r i e f s , and argument i s whether the conduct of the town council and the mayor of Stevensville was s u fundamentally unfair t o the Barkers a s t o require reversal. W e hold t h a t it was. The town council on the basis of the a c t s of t h e mayor and c l e r k should have been estopped from asserting the Barker home would have to be removed from the Town of Stevensville because no building permit had been issued therefore putting the Barkers i n violation of town ordinances. - 4 - y,~/e are aware of he ,peat weight of authority holding t h a t A xunicipal corporation i s not bound by a c t s or statements of i t s dgents o r o f f i c e r s made i n excess of t h e i r authority, even where -3 shird party has r e l i e d thereon t o h i s detriment. See: Anno. 6 .LK2d 960; 3 McQuillin Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., 5 12.126a. Various rationales have been advanced f o r such a r u l e but the most soundly reasoned i s t h a t t o bind the corporation t o a c t s and sutements of i t s agents or o f f i c e r s would have the e f f e c t of ilidking c i t y ordinances and regulations a n u l l i t y every time a luunicipal agent or o f f i c e r led a t h i r d party t o a c t i n contraven- tion of such ordinance regulation. 6 ALR2d 960, 94. This r u l e could be extremely harsh i n i t s application. It i s to snitigate t h i s harshness t h a t some s t a t e s have fashioned a qualification t o t h i s general rule. The I l l i n o i s r u l e a s s t a t e d i n C i t i e s Service O i l Co. v. City of Des Plaines, 21 I11.2d 157, 171 N.E.2d 605, 608, i s : "The general r u l e i s qualified, however, t o enable a party t o invoke the doctrine where h i s action was induced by the conduct of municipal o f f i c e r s , and where i n the absence of such r e l i e f he would suffer a substantial loss and municipality would be permitted t o s t u l t i f y i t s e l f by r e t r a c t i n g what i t s agents had done. 1 1 Application of t h i s qualification has been used sparingly. People ex r e 1 Amer. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago v. Smith, 110 Ill.kpp.2d 354, 249 N.E.2d 232; City of Rockford v. Sallee, 1-29 IIl.App.2d 75, 262 N.E.2d 485. Nonetheless it i s available f o r those exceptional cases where i t s use i s j u s t i f i e d . Emerald Home Builders, Inc. v. Kolton, 11 Ill.App.3rd 888, 298 N.E.2d 275. 2 Municipal Corporation Law, Antieau (1973 Ed.), 5 16A..05, criticizes the general r u l e , saying: he prevailing r u l e i s unjust and should be repudiated or a t l e a s t qualified." In 2 Nunicipal Corporation Law, Antieau (1973 Ed.), S16A.06, a test i s suggested f o r circumstances i n which the doctrine should I I It i s suggested t h a t there should be no general r u l e t h a t estoppel i s not t o be applied i n police power situations. Rather courts should be encouraged t o weigh i n every case the gravity of the i n j u s t i c e t o the c i t i z e n if the doctrine is not applied against the injury to the common weal if the doctrine is applied in that case. Where any danger to the public is slight and. a citizen has made a good faith and sub- stantial change in position in reasonable reliance upon the conduct or representations of municipal officials and agents, several courts have estopped the local government from exercising their 'police power' in a way inconsistent with their prior re- presentations ar actions. II We agree with this approach. In cases of this kind there should be a balancing of the municipal corporation's unwarranted assumption of risk of liability for acts or statements of its agents or employees made in excess of their authority against the harm done to good faith, innocent and unknowledgeable third parties who act in reliance upon those representations. It follows that each case will necessarily have to be judged upon its own unique factual situation. We do not suggest that a municipal corporation will not be able to enforce valid city ordinances when its agents have acted in excess of their authority. However, by the same token, we are not willing to permit the municipal corporation to deny the validity of its agents' actions in all cases. To do so lends itself too readily to situations in which equity and justice would be denied. Applying what has been said heretofore to the instant case, we find that a town official, the mayor, represented to ~arkers' agent that a building permit had issued, when in fact it had not, thereby resulting in a course of action by the Barkers and their agent leading to a substantial loss. We have a situation where application for a building permit was made to the t o ~ m council. The t o ~ m council felt that more information was necessary in order for it to reach a decision. To that end one man was appointed by the council and another volunteered to obtain that information. Neither man ever reported back to the t o ~ m council. Yet at a subsequent meeting, the application was rejected for lack of that information. Such a procedure does not comport with elemental fairness. 'de now have the ~roblern of granting appropriate r e l i e f . 'the huusing unit i s gone and cannot be put back. W e w i l l not go so f a r i3 to give the Barkers c a r t e blanche t o move any housing u n i t of Chcir choice onto t h e i r l o t s , without meeting the terms of the i l ~ p l i c a b l e ordinances. W e do hold however, t h a t upon proper a p p l i - ddcion they a r e e n t i t l e d t o a f a i r review, and i f denied, a written 2xplanation of the reasons within a reasonable time. Costs i n these consolidated cases s h a l l be taxed i n the d i s t r i c t court i n favor of the Barkers and against the Town of ~ r e v e n s v i l l e , including an attorney fee hereby fixed a t the sum ui $750.00. W e Concur : fl \ i . ( b , -4 - , i . - : * m . \ - J - , 4 : - r l d - j S u i - 2 $ ---- -- w e - - - - - ----- Chief J u s t i c e ................................. Justices. N l r . Justice Gene B. Daly specially concurring: I concur with the majority that to prevent unnecessarily harsh results to the common weal in selected cases, where the facts permit, an equitable exception to the rule can be applied. However, once committed to this rationale the Court must proceed to do equity. Here the majority has given the Barkers the right to a fair review upon proper application. I assume this would be be- fore the municipal authorities, in which case this result could have been obtained without the aid of this Court. These people asked for the right to proceed to assemble and occupy a two-wide preconstructed home on their property, not carte blanche authority to move any house onto the property. The housing unit is gone by repossession, but nowhere in the record is it indicated it cannot or will not be replaced. Therefore, the appellants have gained nothing unless equity gives them the relief prayed for. ------------ ------- A/% Justice h . f r . J ~ ~ ~ - : L ~ c e Frank 1. Yaswell specially concurring -in Justice ~aiy's specially concurring opinion< I concur in the foregoing specially concurring opinion of 3r. Justice Dafy. Justice.