Case Title: State v. Maave

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
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wo, 28082

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'

Hd 91 SAW S802

 

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Plaintiff-Appellee,

ae

ROMAN MAAVE, Defendant-Appellant,
and

IMELDA KWAN, Defendant.

 

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(cR. NO, 01-1-1887)

(By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.)

 

Defendant-appellant Roman Maave (Naave) appeals from
the March 18, 2002 judgment of the circuit court of the first
circuit, the Honorable Kazen $.8. Ahn presiding, convicting Maave
of and sentencing him for promoting a dangerous drug in the
second degree, in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS)
§ 712-1242(1) (e) (1993)! (Counts T and 11).

on appeal, Maave argues that: (1) the circuit court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the proceeding because
(a) the complaint failed to charge him as an accomplice and was
therefore insufficient, and (b) the evidence adduced at the
preliminary hearing did not establish probable cause to commit
the case for trial: (2) the circuit court plainly erred in
instructing the jury, inasmuch as the jury instructions
(a) failed to specity that Maave’s Liability as an accomplice was

predicated upon the jury's determination that Maave’s principal

+ RS § 722-1242(1) (c) provides: “A person commits the offense of
promoting » dangerous drug in the second degree if the person knowingly =
{e]istributes any dangerous drug in any ancunt.”

 

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had committed the offenses for which Maave was derivatively
Liable, (b) failed to provide the jury with a legal definition of
the term “intention” when instructing them on the requisite state
of mind to establish accomplice liability, (c) did not specify
the requisite state of mind to establish each “element” of
accomplice liability, and (d) instructed the jury that Maave
could be convicted as a principal absent any evidence that he
committed the charged offenses in that capacity? (3) the circuit
court plainly erred in permitting a prosecution witness to
testify to events recorded on a videotape subsequently shown to
the jury, inasmuch as the witness’s testimony (a) was
inadmissible “opinion” evidence, (b) violated the “best evidence”
rule, and (c) was unfairly prejudicial; (4) substantial evidence

did not support Maave's convictions; and (5) the circuit court

 

abused its discretion in denying Maave’s motion for mistrial
because (a) the testimony of a prosecution witness referenced
inadmissible evidence, (b) the prosecutor's cross-examination of
Maave purposefully elicited excluded evidence of prior conduct,
and (c) the prosecutor engaged in multiple instances of
prosecutorial misconduct.

upon carefully reviewing the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to
the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we hold that:
(1) the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the
proceeding because (a) Maave need not have been charged as an
accomplice for the complaint to be sufficient, see State v,
Eukusaku, 85 Hawai'i 462, 486, 946 P.2d 32, 56 (1997), and
(b) whether the district court abused its discretion in

committing the cage to circuit court was moot in light of Maave’s
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valid convictions, see In re Does, 102 Hawai'i 75, 78, 73 P.3d
29, 32 (2003); (2) the circuit court did not plainly err in
instructing the jury, inasmuch as (a) the accomplice liability
instruction should have informed the jury that it was required to
find that Kwan had committed the offenses for which Maave was
derivatively liable, see ukusaku, 85 Hawai'i at 488, 946 P.2d at
56; State v. Vip, 92 Hawai'i 98, 113, 987 P.2d 996, 1011 (App.

 

1999), but the error was not plain because the evidence that Kwan
was Naave’s principal was overwhelming and uncontroverted, see
Johnson vs United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469-470 (1997), (b) the
circuit court did not plainly err in failing to define the term
“intent” in the accomplice ability instruction, as the ordinary
understanding of the term, in the context of the instruction at
issue, did not differ substantially from the statutory definition
of “intent,” see HRS § 702-206(1) (1993), such that omitting the
statutory definition from the jury's instructions could not have

affected their deliberations,”

 

 

jard, we note that the following proposed instruction
was withdrawn by mtual agreement:

(COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 22

[A person acts intentionally with respect to his
‘conduct hhen it is his conscious ebject to engage in
conduct.

person acts intentionally ith respect to attendant
circunctances when he ie avare of the existence of such
Circunstances or believes of hopes that they exist.

‘Siperson acts intentionally ith respect to a result
of nis conduct when it is his conscious object to cause such
Secsuie.

such

 

   

Tt should further be noted that defense counsel’s discussion of
accomplice Lisbility during closing arguments crystalized, rather than
Cbfuscated, the correct meaning of “intent” as used in the jury's
Snstructions. As defense counsel noted

 

 

Now, the law in this case =~ and the Judge has gone

over the law and you have a copy of it, and as the state has

SUeietes, ‘that Mee Maave was not the principal. He was not
(cent sned.
 

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see, 2.94, Grieco v. People, 19 P.3d 1, 9-10 (Colo. 2001) (en
banc); State v, Sinclair, 500 A.2d 539, 543-544 (Conn. 1985);

 

7 sscontinued)
‘the person who actually sold the drugs. He was not the
Person who distributed drugs, the State is going under an

jccomplice liability theory

What is accomplice Liability? The Court tolé you that
ere presence at the scene of an offense or knowledge that
an offense is being committed is not enough. That's tru

Gost because Ne. Msave ie there in Chinatown standing next

to Imelda Kwan, that's not enough. Just because he knew

that she was selling drugs, that’s not enough. There has to
be more: “And, nenbers of the Jury, accomplice Liability has
to be proof beyond a reasonable dove.

What the State has to show you is that Roman planned
or participated in the comission of the offense. - . with
thei intent! te promote of facilitace the offense, ‘He would

fan accomplice in that case. What are the inportant words

Roce? “Plane or participates.” “And in this caver che

charge is distribution.

Is there any evidence of 2 plan? Did anybody hear
anything about conepirscy? Dia anybody hear anything about
a conversation between Mr. Maave and Me. fwan that he was
Planning distribution of the drugs? Is there any evidence
Sea plan? None whatscever, Soy guess what? No plan.

How about participation? Now, the participation has
to be in distribution, because that’s what the offense is,
distribution of droge.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bo" you'have any evidence that Mr. Naave sold any
druge? Noy none. Did he ever talk to the police officers?
No." Did he ever hand the police officers anything? No.

How sbout transfer? Oia ne ever nave Ris hands on
those drugs? Old he] ever give those drugs to the police
officer? Did any of the officers testify that he had the
Gruge in his nande? Noy ho transfer.

Prescribe, that's simple. Nobody was prescribing, no
one’s a doctor here, no one’s writing prescription:

Did'ne give anything to the police officers? No. Did
he deliver the drug to the police officers, did he have his
hands on those druge? No.

Was it Me. Maave on that videotape placing the drugs
down onthe ground for the officer to come and get it? Nas
itr. Maave leaving the Grugs for the police officer? No,
Lt wag Me. Ran.

Was it Mr. Maave bartering with these police officers
‘as they cane down and nade eye-contact with "= at least,
Fenenber?... ., Tt was Ne. Kwan, not ME. Maave. So who
ade the bertering or exchenge? All of this was Ms. Kwan,
hot Mr. Maeve. Did he offer or agree to do the sane with
any of ‘these people? No

Participation and distribution? to. Mere presence at
the scene of an offense or knowledge that ‘en offense 12
being committed is not encugh without the planning and the
Participation, and the proof of that beyond a reascnable
oust.

 

 

 
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(c) the court did not err in identifying the state of mind
component requisite to accomplice liability, see State v, Soares,
72 Haw. 278, 262, 815 P.2d 428, 430 (1991); and (d) while the
principal liability instructions were unwarranted by the

evidence, cf, State v. Haanic, 94 Hawai'i 405, 407, 16 P.3d 246,

248 (2001); State v. Timoteo, 87 Hawai'i 108, 117, 952 P.2d 865,
874 (1997); State v. Palisbo, 93 Hawai'i 344, 355, 3 P.3d 510,

521 (App. 2000), the court’s error was not plain because the
conceptual basis for Maave’s liability was never disputed;

(3) the circuit court did not err in permitting a prosecution
witness to testify to events recorded on a videotape subsequently
shown to the jury, inasmuch as (a) the testimony was based on the
witness’s contemporaneous observation of the recorded events and
was therefore admissible es a lay witness's opinion, see Hawai'i
Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 701 (1993); State v. Jenkins, 93
Hawas't 87, 105, 997 P.2d 13, 31 (2000); (b) the “best evidence”
rule was not applicable because the testimony was not admitted to
prove the videctape’s contents, see HRE Rule 1002 & cmt. (1993),
and (c) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
balancing the testimony’s probative value and prejudicial effect,
see HRE Rule 403 (1993); State v. Haili, 103 Hawai'i 89, 101, 79
P.3d 1263, 1275 (2003); (4) substantial evidence supported
Maave's convictions, see State v. Martinez, 101 Hawai'i 332, 338-
339, 68 P.3d 606, 612-613 (2003); and (5) the circuit court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Maave’s motion for mistrial,
inasmuch as the incidents Maave complains of were either not
prosecutorial misconduct or were otherwise harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, see State v. Hauge, 103 Hawai'i 38, 47, 79 P.3d
131, 140 (2003); State v, Cordeiro, 99 Hawai'i 390, 425-426, 56
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P.3d 692, 727-728 (2002); State v. Klinge, 92 Hawai'i 577, 592-
593, 994 P.2d $09, 524-525 (2000); State v. Loa, 63 Hawai'i 335,
353, 926 P.2d 1258, 1276 (1996); State v, Kahinu, 53 Haw. 536,
548-550, 498 P.2d 635, 643-644 (1972). Therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment from which the
appeal is taken is affirmed.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, August 16, 2005.

on the briefs:
James S. Gifford,

Deputy Public Defender,

for the defendant-appeilant SecBlernem

Roman Maave

 

Dona Fudo, Di ON ane
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,

for the plaintiff-appellee

State of Hawai'i

Gorn. Dud tr