Case Title: MSAD 6 Board of Directors v. Town of Frye Island

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020 ME 45

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2020-04-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 45 
Docket: 
Cum-19-194 
Argued: 
December 4, 2019 
Decided: 
April 14, 2020 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.* 
 
 
MSAD 6 BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
 
v. 
 
TOWN OF FRYE ISLAND et al. 
 
 
HUMPHREY, J. 
[¶1]  The Town of Frye Island appeals from a judgment of the Superior 
Court (Cumberland County, Warren, J.) determining that Frye Island may not 
withdraw from Maine School Administrative District 6 (MSAD 6) in the absence 
of legislation specifically authorizing Frye Island to invoke the statutory 
withdrawal process laid out in 20-A M.R.S. § 1466 (2018).  We affirm the 
judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  For nearly twenty years, Frye Island has endeavored to withdraw 
from MSAD 6.  This is the latest chapter in that long saga. 
                                         
*  Although Justice Alexander participated in the appeal, he retired before this opinion was 
certified. 
 
2 
[¶3]  The relevant facts are not in dispute and are drawn from Frye 
Island’s uncontroverted statement of material facts and the trial court record.  
See Lee v. Town of Denmark, 2019 ME 54, ¶ 2, 206 A.3d 907.  In addition, many 
of the salient facts underlying this dispute and the intersection of those facts 
with the enactment of relevant legislation are chronicled in Town of Frye Island 
v. State, 2008 ME 27, ¶¶ 2-6, 940 A.2d 1065 (Frye Island I). 
[¶4]  Frye Island is a seasonal summer community that shuts down from 
November through April each year.  Id. ¶ 2.  Although Frye Island is a member 
of MSAD 6, no school-aged children live on Frye Island during the school year 
and no residents of Frye Island have ever attended schools in the district.  Id.  
 
[¶5]  Until 1997, Frye Island was part of the Town of Standish.  That year, 
Frye Island sought secession from Standish, and the residents of Frye Island 
reached an agreement with Standish whereby Standish would remain neutral 
with respect to legislation allowing Frye Island to secede, provided that, among 
other things, Frye Island would remain part of MSAD 6 and continue to 
contribute to its support.  Frye Island and Standish memorialized their 
agreement in a Memorandum of Understanding, dated April 11, 1997, which 
provided that Standish’s neutrality was “contingent upon three conditions,” 
 
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one of which was that “Frye Island . . . remain part of [the] Standish education 
entity, to include responsibilities for MSAD #6 on a pro-rated basis.”   
[¶6]  That same year, the Legislature enacted the bill of secession, “An Act 
to Allow the Separation of Frye Island from the Town of Standish,” as private 
and special legislation.  See P. & S. L. 1997, ch. 41.  The secession law provided 
that, in the event that Frye Island’s voters approved secession, Frye Island 
“remains in [MSAD 6] or its successor and pays its proportional share of costs, 
unless or until such time as it withdraws from the school administrative district 
in accordance with applicable state law.”  Id. § A-8.  A majority of Frye Island’s 
voters favored secession, and Frye Island effectively seceded from Standish on 
July 1, 1998.  Id. § A-3.   
[¶7]  In the months following secession, Frye Island adopted a charter, 
effective January 1, 1999, creating and defining its municipal government.  
See Charter of the Town of Frye Island (1999).  The charter tracked the 
secession law’s language, stating that Frye Island would remain in MSAD 6 and 
pay its share of costs “unless or until such time as it withdraws from [MSAD 6] 
in accordance with applicable state law.”  Id. art. IV, § 1.   
[¶8]  The following year, the residents of Frye Island voted unanimously 
to withdraw from MSAD 6.  The Legislature responded by enacting, as 
 
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emergency legislation, “An Act to Clarify the Act of Separation of Frye Island 
from the Town of Standish,” P. & S. L. 2001, ch. 8, referred to as L.D. 500.  
Significant to this appeal, L.D. 500 (1) reiterated the agreement, reflected in the 
Memorandum of Understanding, that Frye Island would remain in MSAD 6 and 
pay its proportional share of costs, (2) amended the secession law by deleting 
the words “unless or until such time as it withdraws from [MSAD 6] in 
accordance with applicable state law,” id. § 1, and (3) added the following 
provision: 
Authorization required.  Notwithstanding any withdrawal 
proceedings initiated or completed pursuant to the Maine Revised 
Statutes, Title 20-A, section 1405 prior to the effective date of this 
section, or any subsequent action taken by the Town of Frye Island, 
the Town of Frye Island is a part of and may not withdraw from 
School Administrative District 6 or its successor unless such 
withdrawal is first authorized by further amendment to this chapter. 
 
Id. § 2 (emphasis added). 
 
[¶9]  In 2009, the Legislature created a new statutory process for 
municipalities to withdraw from school districts.1  See P.L. 2009, ch. 580, § 9, 
                                         
1  On a previous appeal to us, Frye Island challenged both L.D. 500 and a general public law, P.L. 
2005, ch. 2, § D-69, also known as L.D. 1.  Town of Frye Island v. State, 2008 ME 27, ¶ 1, 940 A.2d 1065 
(Frye Island I).  In 2004, the Legislature created a new formula for allocating the cost of education 
among municipalities based on the percentage of students from each municipality attending the 
district’s schools.  Id. ¶ 7.  Under this statutory formula, Frye Island would not have been required to 
make any contribution to MSAD 6.  Id.  L.D. 1 addressed this by exempting MSAD 6 from the generally 
applicable cost allocation formula.  Id. ¶ 8. 
 
5 
codified at 20-A M.R.S. § 1466 (2018).  Years later, in 2017, Frye Island 
residents voted in favor of filing a petition for Frye Island’s withdrawal from 
MSAD 6 pursuant to section 1466.  Then, in February 2018, Frye Island 
amended its charter, which now reads, in relevant part, 
Preamble to Article IV.  This article addresses the circumstances 
of Frye Island’s students.  It is impractical to send those students to 
the school district of which Frye Island is currently a member, 
School Administrative District 6 (SAD 06), based on SAD 06’s 
distance and location compared to more geographically feasible 
school districts.  Frye Island shall consider its best options with 
respect to its prospective students and its taxpayers, while 
acknowledging its commitment to public education in Maine.  
Therefore, Article IV clarifies, to the extent there is any debate, that 
this Charter repeals P. & S.L. 2001, ch. 8 (L.D. 500) under the 
authority granted to Frye Island by the Maine Constitution and the 
general laws of Maine. 
 
Section 1. General.  Frye Island remains a member of SAD 06 or 
its successor and pays it proportional share of costs, unless and 
until it withdraws from the school administrative district in 
accordance with the withdrawal procedures codified in Maine 
Revised Statutes, Title 20-A, section 1466, or other general laws of 
Maine.  In the event that the Town of Frye Island is required to 
operate its own school system, the Voters shall provide, by Charter 
amendment or revision and/or ordinance, for the administration 
of such a system. 
 
                                         
Frye Island sought a declaratory judgment that both L.D. 500 and L.D. 1 violated various 
provisions of the Maine and United States Constitutions.  Id. ¶ 9.  The Superior Court (Delahanty, J.) 
rejected Frye Island’s constitutional challenges, found that L.D. 500 and L.D. 1 were constitutional, 
and entered judgment in favor of the State and MSAD 6.  Town of Frye Island v. State, No. CV-05-712, 
2007 Me. Super. LEXIS 124, at *15 (June 28, 2007).  On appeal, we dismissed Frye Island’s 
constitutional challenges to L.D. 500 as moot and affirmed the court’s decision rejecting Frye Island’s 
constitutional challenges to L.D. 1.  Frye Island I, 2008 ME 27, ¶¶ 11-12, 17, 940 A.2d 1065. 
 
6 
(Emphasis added.)   
 
 
[¶10]  On January 5, 2018, MSAD 6 filed a complaint against Frye Island, 
seeking a declaratory judgment that Frye Island’s effort to withdraw from 
MSAD 6 was unlawful.  In response, Frye Island acknowledged that it sought to 
withdraw from MSAD 6, but denied that its effort to withdraw was unlawful 
and counterclaimed seeking declaratory relief.2  MSAD 6 answered Frye 
Island’s counterclaim and moved to dismiss Count 3, which alleged that the 
secession law was unconstitutional.  In the midst of all this, two individual 
residents of Frye Island—Jim Hodge and Ed Rogers3—filed a joint motion 
seeking to “intervene or be joined . . . as residents and taxpayers of Frye Island 
to enforce and protect the same constitutional rights asserted by Frye Island 
under the Maine and United States Constitutions.”  See M.R. Civ. P. 24(a), (b).  
 
[¶11]  On June 26, 2018, the court granted MSAD 6’s motion to dismiss 
Count 3 of Frye Island’s counterclaim except as to Frye Island’s claim that the 
                                         
2  Counts 1 and 2 of Frye Island’s counterclaim alleged that L.D. 500 was legislatively repealed by 
operation of law or by implication, respectively, upon the enactment of 20-A M.R.S. § 1466 (2018).  
Count 3 alleged that the secession law was unconstitutional and in violation of the Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses of the United States and Maine Constitutions, the special legislation and 
emergency legislation clauses of the Maine Constitution, the right of Frye Island to petition the 
government under the Maine Constitution, the right to equal taxation under the Maine Constitution, 
and the contracts clause of the Maine Constitution.   
3  A third resident, Betsy Gleysteen, initially joined with Hodge and Rogers to intervene, but later 
voluntarily dismissed herself from the case and is not a party to this appeal.   
 
7 
secession law violated the special legislation clause of the Maine Constitution.  
See Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 13.  The court also granted the individual residents’ 
motion for permissive intervention on the town’s remaining claims.4  See M.R. 
Civ. P. 24(b).   
 
[¶12]  Initially, Frye Island moved for summary judgment on Count 1 of 
its counterclaim and on both counts of MSAD 6’s complaint.  Hodge and Rogers 
filed an independent complaint, alleging the same constitutional violations that 
had previously been alleged by Frye Island in Count 3 of its counterclaim prior 
to the court’s dismissal, and MSAD 6 moved to dismiss the intervenors’ 
complaint.   
 
[¶13]  On October 5, 2018, MSAD 6 filed a cross-motion for summary 
judgment on both counts of its complaint and on Count 1 of the Town’s 
counterclaim, and a motion for summary judgment on the remaining two 
counts alleged in Frye Island’s counterclaim.  Rounding things out, Frye Island 
(along with Hodge and Rogers) filed a reply in support of its motion for 
summary judgment on Count 1 of the Town’s complaint, an opposition to MSAD 
6’s cross-motion for summary judgment on Count 1 of its complaint, an 
                                         
4  The court denied the individual residents’ motion to intervene as to Frye Island’s dismissed 
claims, but without prejudice to their right to file a separate action, indicating that if they did so, they 
could move to consolidate that action with the pending case.   
 
8 
opposition to MSAD 6’s motion for summary judgment on Counts 2 and 3 of its 
complaint, and a cross-motion for summary judgment on Counts 2 and 3 of its 
complaint.   
[¶14]  On April 30, 2019, the court entered a final judgment (1) denying 
Frye Island’s motion for summary judgment and its cross-motion for summary 
judgment; (2) granting MSAD 6’s motion for summary judgment on both counts 
of its complaint and on all counts in Frye Island’s counterclaim; and (3) granting 
MSAD 6’s request for a declaratory judgment that Frye Island is not authorized 
to withdraw from MSAD 6 in the absence of legislation specifically authorizing 
it to invoke the withdrawal process.  Frye Island timely filed a notice of appeal 
on May 17, 2019.  See M.R. App. P. 2B(c).   
[¶15]  On May 20, 2019, the court entered an order dismissing Hodge and 
Rogers’s independent complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted.  See M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Hodge and Rogers timely 
filed a notice of appeal on June 7, 2019.  See M.R. App. P. 2B(c).  On June 27, 
2019, the appeals were consolidated.   
 
9 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶16]  The relevant facts are undisputed, and “we review the summary 
judgment de novo for errors of law in the court’s interpretation of the relevant 
legal concepts.”  Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd., 2019 ME 45, ¶ 7, 206 A.3d 283. 
A. 
Express Repeal of L.D. 500 
 
[¶17]  Frye Island argues that the 2018 amendment to its Charter 
expressly repealed L.D. 500 by operation of law, see 30-A M.R.S. § 2107 (2018),5 
because the amendment was a valid exercise of its home rule authority, see Me. 
Const., art. VIII, pt. 2, § 1.   
 
[¶18]  The home rule provision of Maine’s Constitution grants 
municipalities “the power to alter and amend their charters on all matters, not 
prohibited by Constitution or general law, which are local and municipal in 
character.”  Me. Const. art. VIII, pt. 2, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 
[¶19]  Contrary to Frye Island’s contention, the question of its ability to 
withdraw from MSAD 6 is not purely “local and municipal in character.”  The 
structure and language of Maine’s Constitution foreclose this argument.  See Me. 
Const. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1.  The Maine Constitution commits the general power to 
                                         
5  Title 30-A M.R.S. § 2107 (2018) provides, “[p]rivate and special laws applying to a municipality 
remain in effect until repealed or amended by a charter revision, adoption, modification or 
amendment under this chapter.” 
 
10 
promote education to the Legislature, and specifically authorizes the 
Legislature to require municipalities “to make suitable provision, at their own 
expense, for the support and maintenance of public schools.”  Id.  The makeup 
of regional school units—and any attempt to withdraw from a regional school 
unit—implicates public school funding, an issue falling squarely within the 
Legislature’s purview.  See Frye Island I, 2008 ME 27, ¶¶ 15-17, 940 A.2d 1065; 
School Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. Comm’r, Dep’t of Educ., 659 A.2d 854, 857 (Me. 1995). 
Because Frye Island’s withdrawal would implicate the financing of public 
education in MSAD 6, it affects not only Frye Island, but also MSAD 6, Standish, 
and the other towns within the district—Buxton, Hollis, and Limington.   
 
[¶20]  Frye Island points to the possibility that “a future withdrawal 
agreement . . . may ultimately provide for Frye Island to make substantial yearly 
payments to MSAD 6, thereby having zero impact on other [towns’] financial 
contributions.” (Emphasis added).  However, the opposite is also possible—a 
future withdrawal agreement might not require Frye Island to make such 
payments, which would affect the financial contributions of the other 
municipalities in the district.  Guarding against the latter possibility, the 
Legislature enacted L.D. 500—requiring that Frye Island receive authorization 
from the Legislature before withdrawing from MSAD 6—as an exercise of its 
 
11 
constitutional power to “enforce the municipal obligation to support public 
education.”  School Admin. Dist. No. 1, 659 A.2d at 857.   
 
[¶21]  Although we cannot predict the outcome of any hypothetical future 
negotiations between Frye Island and MSAD 6, the fact that the financial 
commitments of other municipalities within MSAD 6 could be affected by the 
withdrawal is a strong indicator that the question of Frye Island’s withdrawal 
is not solely “local and municipal in character.”  Me. Const. art. VIII, pt. 2, § 1.  
Therefore, the 2018 Charter amendment purporting to repeal L.D. 500 was 
outside the scope of Frye Island’s home rule authority. 
 
[¶22]  Additionally, as 30-A M.R.S. § 3001 (2018) makes clear, a 
municipality may not exercise any power or function the Legislature has 
“denied either expressly or by clear implication.”6  L.D. 500 expressly denies 
Frye Island the ability to withdraw from MSAD 6 without first seeking and 
obtaining authorization from the Legislature; Frye Island cannot do an end-run 
around a validly enacted private and special law by purporting to repeal it 
through a charter amendment.7   
                                         
6  Moreover, 30-A M.R.S. § 3001 (2018) refers to the power of municipalities to adopt, amend, or 
repeal “ordinances or bylaws.”  The municipal action here involves a charter amendment, not an 
ordinance or bylaw. 
7  On this point, Frye Island misreads our holding in City of Lewiston v. Lewiston Educ. Dirs., 503 
A.2d 210 (Me. 1985).  There, the City of Lewiston originally had a legislative charter that was created 
by a private and special law.  Id. at 211.  Sometime later, Lewiston adopted a new charter pursuant 
 
12 
 
[¶23]  “[W]here the Legislature enacts a comprehensive scheme of 
statewide regulation, it denies by clear implication the right of municipalities 
to legislate in the regulated area.”  City of Lewiston v. Lewiston Educ. Dirs., 503 
A.2d 210, 212 (Me. 1985).  The Legislature is responsible for “enact[ing] the 
laws that are necessary to assure that all school administrative units make 
suitable provisions for the support and maintenance of the public schools.”  
20-A M.R.S. § 2(1) (2018); see also Me. Const. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1.  
[¶24]  We have previously recognized “the plenary authority of the 
Legislature in the control of the public school system of this state.”  City of 
Lewiston, 503 A.2d at 213 (quotation marks omitted); see also Frye Island I, 
2008 ME 27, ¶ 15,  940 A.2d 1065 (observing that “in our constitutional scheme, 
                                         
to Maine’s constitutional and statutory home rule provisions.  Id.  We held that the adoption of that 
new charter triggered the repeal of the legislative charter under the predecessor statute to 30-A 
M.R.S. § 2107 (2018).  Id. at 212.  The repeal of the legislative charter and adoption of the municipal 
charter had two consequences: “First, the sources of authority for provisions in the new charter are 
confined to the ‘home rule’ amendment and the implementing statutes,” and “[s]econd, the power of 
the charter to override the general laws of the State is extinguished when it ceases to exist as a result 
of a special act of the Legislature.”  Id.  We did not hold, as Frye Island contends, that “any private and 
special law that applies to a single municipality remains in effect only until a municipality’s charter 
is adopted.”  We recognized that Lewiston was entitled to adopt a municipal charter under its home 
rule authority; however, we held that the charter provision at issue, which dealt with approval of 
school department labor contracts, could not be justified as an exercise of Lewiston’s home rule 
authority because, by enacting a comprehensive statutory scheme, the Legislature denied by clear 
implication the authority of municipalities to regulate the process for approval of school department 
labor contracts.  Id. at 212-14.  Thus, in City of Lewiston, we analyzed the charter provision at issue 
under the same home rule framework that we use to analyze the charter amendment at issue here.  
Id.  As we did in City of Lewiston, we conclude that the charter amendment was not a valid exercise of 
the municipality’s home rule authority.  Therefore, it did not repeal L.D. 500.  Cf. id. at 214. 
 
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the Legislature is granted broad authority to legislate in the area of public 
education” and discussing the relevant constitutional and statutory 
provisions).  “It is within the power of the legislature to divide or join towns 
into school-districts as it pleases.”  Beckett v. Roderick, 251 A.2d 427, 433 
(Me. 1969) (alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted).  Put simply, 
“[e]ducation is a state matter.”  City of Lewiston, 503 A.2d at 213. 
 
[¶25]  The court committed no legal error in concluding that the charter 
amendment was not a valid exercise of home rule authority and that the charter 
amendment did not repeal L.D. 500 by operation of law.  See id. at 212-14 
(concluding that the city’s charter provision yielded to the Legislature’s 
authority to enact statutes governing public education).   
B. 
Implied Repeal of L.D. 500 
[¶26]  Frye Island further argues that L.D. 500 was implicitly repealed by 
the Legislature’s enactment of the statutory withdrawal process in section 
1466, which provides that “the residents of a municipality that has been a 
member of a regional school unit for at least 30 months may petition to 
withdraw from the regional school unit in accordance with this subsection.” 
Frye Island contends that the broad language in section 1466, which seemingly 
 
14 
applies to all such municipalities, evinces a legislative intent to repeal L.D. 500 
by implication.   
 
[¶27]  Repeal of legislation by implication is disfavored, and we do not 
apply the concept of implicit repeal in doubtful cases.  See Lewiston Firefighters 
Ass'n v. City of Lewiston, 354 A.2d 154, 159 (Me. 1976).  Implicit repeal may be 
found when a later statute encompasses the entire subject matter of an earlier 
one, or when a later statute is inconsistent with or repugnant to an earlier one.  
Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Liberty, 2004 ME 36, ¶ 9, 845 A.2d 1183.  Implicit repeal will 
not be found if the statutes can be read in harmony with one another.  Id. 
 
[¶28]  L.D. 500 and section 1466 are not inherently inconsistent and can, 
without much difficulty, be read harmoniously.  Under L.D. 500, “the Town of 
Frye Island . . . may not withdraw from [MSAD 6] or its successor unless such 
withdrawal is first authorized by further amendment to this chapter.”  Section 
1466, enacted after L.D. 500, lays out the general procedure that must be 
followed when a municipality seeks to withdraw from a regional school unit or 
school administrative district.  Nothing in L.D. 500 absolutely prohibits Frye 
Island from pursuing the statutory withdrawal procedure laid out in section 
1466.  L.D. 500 simply requires that Frye Island first seek authorization from 
the Legislature in the form of an amendment to that chapter. 
 
15 
[¶29]  It is of no consequence that section 1466 was enacted after L.D. 
500.  City of Lewiston, 503 A.2d at 212 n.2 (observing that “special legislative 
acts . . . control over general laws enacted before or after the special law” 
(emphasis added)).  And, even if the two statutes were inconsistent, the general 
provisions of section 1466 would yield to the more specific provisions of L.D. 
500.  Houlton Water Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2016 ME 168, ¶ 21, 150 A.3d 1284 
(“As a familiar principle of statutory construction, specific statutes prevail over 
general ones when the two are inconsistent.”).   
[¶30]  We conclude that the court committed no error of law in 
determining that L.D. 500 was not implicitly repealed by the Legislature’s 
enactment of section 1466.   
C. 
Special Legislation Clause 
 
[¶31]  Frye Island also argues that L.D. 500 violates the Maine 
Constitution’s special legislation clause.  See Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 13.  “When 
the material facts are not in dispute, we review de novo the trial court’s 
interpretation and application of the relevant statutes and legal concepts.”  
Remmes v. Mark Travel Corp., 2015 ME 63, ¶ 19, 116 A.3d 466. 
 
[¶32]  The special legislation clause provides that “[t]he Legislature shall 
from time to time, provide, as far as practicable, by general laws, for all matters 
 
16 
usually appertaining to special or private legislation.”  Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, 
§ 13.  The special legislation clause “is violated when special legislation is 
enacted when a general law could have been made applicable.”  Fitanides v. City 
of Saco, 2004 ME 32, ¶ 11, 843 A.2d 8 (citation omitted).  However, we have 
recognized that, in general, “[i]t is appropriate for the legislature rather than 
the court to make the policy decision regarding what is practicable in a given 
situation.”8  Brann v. State, 424 A.2d 699, 704 (Me. 1981).  Legislative acts are 
presumed constitutional.  Id. at 705. 
 
[¶33]  L.D. 500 is an amendment to a previously enacted private and 
special law—the secession law—that allowed Frye Island to secede from 
Standish.  See P. & S. L. 1997, ch. 41.  Therefore, it follows that the Legislature 
would choose to amend that statute and withdraw the authority it granted 
through private and special legislation.9  Given the presumption that legislative 
                                         
8  We have found violations of the special legislation clause in cases where special legislation 
attempted to exempt an individual from generally applicable requirements of the law.  See Brann v. 
State, 424 A.2d 699, 704 (Me. 1981) (citing cases).  The special legislation at issue here applies to a 
municipality, not an individual. 
9  By way of comparison, Frye Island argues that the Legislature’s enactment of L.D. 1 as a general 
public law is “proof that general legislation is both practicable and preferable in these 
circumstances.”  See Frye Island I, 2008 ME 27, ¶ 8, 940 A.2d 1065.  However, unlike L.D. 500, L.D. 1 
was an amendment to a general public law.  Id.   
 
17 
acts are constitutional, Frye Island must offer more than mere speculation that 
it would have been practicable to enact L.D. 500 as a general public law.   
 
[¶34]  We conclude that the trial court committed no legal error in 
determining that L.D. 500 does not violate the special legislation clause. 
D. 
Constitutional Arguments 
 
[¶35]  Frye Island argues that the court erred in dismissing its claims 
arising under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States 
and Maine Constitutions.  See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1; Me. Const. art. I, § 6-A.  
Hodge and Rogers, the intervenors in this case, similarly argue that the court 
erred in dismissing their complaint, which alleged the same constitutional 
violations, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  See M.R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).   
 
[¶36]  “We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo and examine 
the complaint in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff] to determine whether 
the[] complaint sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that 
would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief on some legal theory.”  Dubois v. Town of 
Arundel, 2019 ME 21, ¶ 8, 202 A.3d 524.  The rights guaranteed by article I, 
section 6-A of the Maine Constitution are coextensive with those guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  See In re 
 
18 
Adoption of Riahleigh M., 2019 ME 24, ¶ 28, 202 A.3d 1174; Doe v. Williams, 
2013 ME 24, ¶ 61, 61 A.3d 718; Frye Island I, 2008 ME 27, ¶ 14, 940 A.2d 1065. 
 
1. 
Frye Island’s Claims 
 
[¶37]  “The traditional principle throughout the United States has been 
that municipalities and other local governmental corporate entities and their 
officers lack capacity to mount constitutional challenges to acts of the State and 
State legislation.”  City of New York v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 286, 289-90 (1995).  The 
United States Supreme Court has long applied this rule.  “Being but creatures of 
the State, municipal corporations have no standing to invoke the contract 
clause or the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution in 
opposition to the will of their creator.”  Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 441 
(1939); see also Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 363-64 (2009).  We 
have also previously applied this principle.  In South Portland v. State, 476 A.2d 
690, 699 (Me. 1984), we held that a municipality, “being merely an arm of the 
State, has no basis in the United States Constitution for suing the State.”10 
                                         
10  The last time Frye Island raised constitutional challenges to L.D. 500, we stated in dicta that 
“[i]t is questionable whether the Town itself has protectible rights under the due process, equal 
protection, and contract clauses because the Town of Frye Island is a creature of the State.”  Frye 
Island I, 2008 ME 27, ¶ 11 n.3, 940 A.2d 1065.  We declined to address the issue directly because the 
individual plaintiffs in that case had a clear right to assert the constitutional claims.  Id. 
 
 
19 
[¶38]  “In the absence of state constitutional provisions safeguarding it 
to them,” such as Maine’s home rule provision, “municipalities have no inherent 
right of self government which is beyond the legislative control of the State.”  
Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923).  As discussed above, L.D. 500 
does not infringe on Frye Island’s home rule authority.  Therefore, Frye Island 
cannot sustain a challenge to L.D. 500 under the Equal Protection or Due 
Process Clause of the United States Constitution or the Maine Constitution.  
 
[¶39]  The court did not err in dismissing Frye Island’s constitutional 
claims against MSAD 6 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.   
 
2. 
Hodge’s and Rogers’s Claims 
 
[¶40]  Hodge and Rogers argue that the court erred in dismissing their 
complaint because they sufficiently alleged an equal protection violation.11   
 
[¶41]  “The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause prohibits 
any state from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws, and requires, generally, that persons similarly situated 
                                         
11  Hodge and Rogers also argue that the court erred in concluding that they cannot assert an equal 
protection violation on behalf of Frye Island when it is treated differently from similarly situated 
municipalities.  Hodge and Rogers cannot raise an equal protection challenge to L.D. 500 on behalf of 
Frye Island because Frye Island could not do so in its own right.  See, e.g., Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. 
Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 363-64 (2009); Frye Island I, 2008 ME 27, ¶ 11 n.3, 940 A.2d 1065; South Portland 
v. State, 476 A.2d 690, 696, 699 (Me. 1984).  Therefore, we do not address this argument further. 
 
20 
be treated alike.  Article I, section 6-A of the Maine Constitution includes similar 
requirements.”  Doe v. Williams, 2013 ME 24, ¶ 53, 61 A.3d 718 (alteration 
omitted) (quotation marks omitted).  In equal protection cases, “[i]f the 
government action does not implicate either a fundamental right or a suspect 
class, different treatment accorded to similarly situated persons need only be 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”12  Id. ¶ 54 (quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
[¶42]  Under this standard of review, government action “bears a strong 
presumption of validity.”  Anderson v. Town of Durham, 2006 ME 39, ¶ 29, 895 
A.2d 944.  “As a general rule, legislatures are presumed to have acted within 
their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in 
some inequality.”  Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (quotation marks 
omitted).  The party challenging the government action must show “that there 
exists no fairly conceivable set of facts that could ground a rational relationship 
between the challenged classification and the government’s legitimate goals.”  
Williams, 2013 ME 24, ¶ 54, 61 A.3d 718 (quotation marks omitted). 
                                         
12  On the other hand, when government action implicates a fundamental right or involves a 
“suspect classification,” like race or ethnicity, a heightened level of review is appropriate.  See, e.g., 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
(1938).  This principle of equal protection jurisprudence is rooted in the idea “that any official action 
that treats a person differently on account of his race or ethnic origin is inherently suspect.”  See 
Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 570 U.S. 297, 310 (2013) (quotation marks omitted).   
 
21 
 
[¶43]  Hodge and Rogers do not allege that L.D. 500 discriminates on the 
basis of a “suspect classification,” such as race.13  They allege only that they, as 
residents of Frye Island, are being treated differently than similarly situated 
taxpayers in other municipalities in that district.  As the trial court observed, 
the situation giving rise to Hodge’s and Rogers’s equal protection claim is not 
much different than that of people who own second homes in Maine and pay 
property taxes on those homes, but do not send their children to schools in the 
district where their second homes are located.  Nor is their situation all that 
different from that of homeowners who have no school-aged children—or no 
children at all—yet nevertheless pay property taxes. 
 
[¶44]  Hodge and Rogers attempt to distinguish their situation by arguing 
that unlike residents in other municipalities, they are prohibited from availing 
themselves of the school district withdrawal process laid out in section 1466.  
Their argument is flawed. Neither they nor any other Frye Island resident is 
                                         
13  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (“[A]ll racial classifications imposed by 
government must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.  This means that such 
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling 
governmental interests.” (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted)); Anderson v. Town of Durham, 
2006 ME 39, ¶ 29, 895 A.2d 944 (“If government action that is challenged on equal protection 
grounds infringes on a fundamental constitutional right, or involves an inherently suspect 
classification such as race, it is subject to analysis under the strict scrutiny standard.  Strict scrutiny 
requires that the challenged action be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental 
interest.” (citation omitted)). 
 
22 
categorically prohibited from petitioning for withdrawal from MSAD 6 under 
section 1466.  They are merely required to take the additional step of obtaining 
authorization from the Legislature, in the form of an amendment to L.D. 500, 
before withdrawal.  See P. & S. L. 2001, ch. 8, § 2.  Further, even if we assume 
without deciding that Hodge and Rogers sufficiently alleged that, based on this 
“additional step,” they are being treated differently than similarly situated 
taxpayers in other municipalities in MSAD 6, their equal protection argument 
fails. 
 
[¶45]  On these facts, because L.D. 500 does not implicate either a 
fundamental right or a suspect class, our review is limited to determining 
whether it is “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”  Williams, 2013 
ME 24, ¶ 54, 61 A.3d 718 (quotation marks omitted).  We conclude that L.D. 500 
is rationally related to the legitimate state interest of financing public education 
because it is concerned with a potential shortfall in MSAD 6’s budget should 
Frye Island withdraw from MSAD 6.  Cf. Frye Island I, 2008 ME 27, ¶ 17, 940 
A.2d 1065 (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a statute exempting 
MSAD 6 from a statutory cost-sharing formula because not exempting MSAD 6 
could cause a shortfall in the district’s budget).  As discussed above, the 
possibility that a future withdrawal agreement might provide for Frye Island to 
 
23 
make substantial yearly payments to MSAD 6 does not foreclose the possibility 
of an agreement that does not require such payments—a situation that could 
create a shortfall in MSAD 6’s budget or require the other municipalities in the 
school unit to increase their contributions.  L.D. 500 guards against the latter 
possibility by requiring Frye Island—uniquely situated in MSAD 6 because of 
its status as a summer community—to obtain authorization from the 
Legislature before attempting to withdraw under section 1466.  See P. & S. L. 
2001, ch. 8, § 2.  
 
[¶46]  Therefore, the court did not err in dismissing Hodge and Rogers’s 
equal protection claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.   
 
[¶47]  Hodge and Rogers also argue that a substantive due process 
violation was sufficiently alleged, and that the court erred in failing to apply a 
strict scrutiny analysis14 to their claim because “LD 500 infringes upon [their] 
fundamental rights to vote and petition the government.”   
 
[¶48]  Substantive due process turns on whether the challenged 
government action implicates a fundamental right.  Williams, 2013 ME 24, ¶ 65, 
                                         
14  See supra n.13. 
 
24 
61 A.3d 718.  If it does not, the action will be upheld if it is “reasonably related 
to a legitimate state interest.”  Id. ¶ 66. 
 
[¶49]  No fundamental right is implicated here.  To the extent Hodge and 
Rogers argue that their right to vote on and petition for withdrawal from MSAD 
6 is implicated, this argument is unavailing.  Hodge and Rogers, in their capacity 
as residents of Frye Island, along with the other residents of Frye Island, remain 
free to petition the Legislature for approval to pursue statutory withdrawal 
under section 1466, to petition the Legislature to amend or repeal L.D. 500, and 
to petition the Executive Branch to support a repeal of L.D. 500.   
[¶50]  Moreover, there is no requirement under the Maine Constitution 
that the formation of school districts be submitted to a popular vote.  
See McGary v. Barrows, 163 A.2d 747, 754 (Me. 1960).  The Legislature may 
create school districts by statute “without referendum to the people in the 
municipalities within the proposed district.”  Town of North Berwick v. State Bd. 
of Educ., 227 A.2d 462, 468 (Me. 1967). 
 
[¶51]  Because no fundamental right is implicated and L.D. 500 is 
reasonably related to the legitimate state interest of financing public education, 
cf. Frye Island I, 2008 ME 27, ¶ 17, 940 A.2d 1065, we conclude that the court 
 
25 
committed no legal error in determining that Hodge and Rogers failed to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted and dismissing their complaint.   
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eric J. Wycoff, Esq, Catherine R. Connors, Esq., and Sara A. Murphy, Esq. (orally), 
Pierce Atwood LLP, Portland, for Appellants Town of Frye Island, Jim Hodge, 
and Ed Rogers 
 
Agnieszka A. Dixon, Esq. (orally), Melissa A. Hewey, Esq., and Richard A. 
Spencer, Esq., Drummond Woodsum, Portland, for Appellee Board of Directors 
of Maine School Administrative District 6 
 
 
Cumberland County Superior Court docket numbers CV-2018-8 and CV-2018-420 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY