Case Title: State v. Hayes Johnson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1997AP001360-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2000-02-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
2000 WI 12 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Hayes Johnson,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  223 Wis. 2d 85, 588 N.W.2d 330 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 18, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
November 4, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Diane S. Sykes 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BABLITCH, J. joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating: SYKES, J. did not participate. 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petition the cause 
was argued by Lara M. Herman, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by 
Russell D. Bohach and Brennan & Collins, Madison and oral 
argument by Russell D. Bohach. 
 
2000 WI 12 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 97-1360-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Hayes Johnson,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   The State of Wisconsin petitions 
this court for review of a published decision of the court of 
appeals, State v. Hayes Johnson, 223 Wis. 2d 85, 588 N.W.2d 330 
(Ct. App. 1998), which reversed an order denying the defendant’s 
motion for postconviction relief.  The case presents two issues: 
 (1) 
whether 
the 
defendant 
has 
established 
a 
realistic 
likelihood of prosecutorial vindictiveness, which would give 
rise to a presumption of vindictiveness; and (2) whether the 
defendant has established actual prosecutorial vindictiveness.   
¶2 
The defendant, Hayes Johnson, was initially tried 
before a jury on a single count of first-degree sexual assault. 
 The jury was unable to reach a verdict, and the trial court 
declared a mistrial.  Before retrial, the prosecutor filed an 
FILED 
 
FEB 18, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Acting Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
2 
amended information charging the defendant with two counts of 
first-degree sexual assault and one count of burglary, based on 
the same course of conduct as the initial charge.  The 
prosecutor offered to withdraw the new charges in exchange for 
the defendant’s guilty plea to a single count of first-degree 
sexual assault.  The defendant rejected the plea offer and moved 
to dismiss on the ground that the filing of additional charges 
gave rise to a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness.  The 
trial court denied the motion, holding that no presumption of 
vindictiveness arose from the addition of charges after the 
mistrial and that there was no other evidence of vindictiveness. 
  
¶3 
On retrial, the jury found the defendant guilty of 
both counts of sexual assault, but found him not guilty of the 
burglary charge.  In a postconviction motion, the defendant 
renewed his prosecutorial vindictiveness claim.  The trial court 
again denied the motion, and the defendant appealed.   
¶4 
The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the 
institutional 
bias 
against 
retrials, 
together 
with 
the 
prosecutor’s addition of new charges and offer to withdraw them 
if the defendant would plead guilty, was sufficient to trigger 
the presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness.   
¶5 
On review, we hold that the defendant did not 
establish a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness in this case 
and that a presumption of vindictiveness therefore does not 
apply.  We also determine that the defendant has failed to 
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
3 
establish actual vindictiveness.  We therefore reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
I. 
¶6 
The relevant facts are as follows.  In October 1994 
the defendant was arrested after his girlfriend’s five-year-old 
daughter complained that he had sexually assaulted her.  At the 
preliminary hearing on October 24, 1994, the victim testified 
that the assault occurred when the defendant entered her bedroom 
and laid her body on top of his.  She stated that during the 
assault he touched her vagina with his hand and with his penis. 
  
¶7 
The State filed an information charging the defendant 
with one count of first-degree sexual assault of a child in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(1991-92).1  The defendant 
rejected the State’s offer to reduce the charge to second-degree 
sexual assault in exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea.  The 
case proceeded to trial in the Circuit Court of Milwaukee 
County, Judge Diane S. Sykes, on October 31, 1995.  On November 
3, 1995, the jury stated that they were unable to reach a 
verdict in the case, and the trial court ordered a mistrial.  
Neither party objected to the mistrial order. 
¶8 
At a hearing on November 6, 1995, the defense attorney 
indicated that the prosecutor intended to file an amended 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes refer 
to the 1991-92 volumes unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
4 
information.  The trial court set the case for retrial on 
December 4, 1995. 
¶9 
On November 14, 1995, the prosecutor filed an amended 
information charging the defendant with two counts of first-
degree sexual assault of a child in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(1) (one count based on the defendant’s touching of the 
victim’s vagina with his finger, the other count based on the 
defendant’s touching the victim with his penis), and one count 
of burglary in violation of Wis. Stat. § 943.10(1)(f) (based on 
the defendant’s entry into the victim’s bedroom with intent to 
commit a felony).  In a motion accompanying the amended 
information, the prosecutor explained that under the facts of 
the case the defendant could properly be prosecuted for these 
three charges, and that the jury should have the opportunity to 
consider all of the appropriate charges relating to the course 
of conduct.   
¶10 On November 28, 1995, the defendant filed a motion to 
dismiss the amended information, alleging in part that the 
prosecutor’s filing of additional charges after the mistrial 
gave rise to a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness 
because a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness existed under 
the circumstances of the case.   
¶11 On December 4, 1995, the prosecutor wrote a letter to 
the defendant offering to withdraw the amended information in 
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
5 
exchange for the defendant’s agreement to plead guilty to a 
single count of first-degree sexual assault.2  The letter stated: 
 
Dear Mr. Wasserman: 
 
I’m writing to you regarding State v. Hayes Johnson, 
case number F94-3955. 
 
Attached please find the State’s Brief in Opposition 
to 
the 
Defense 
Motion 
to 
Dismiss 
the 
Amended 
Information and a copy of the letter of transmittal to 
the Court.   
 
I also summarize herein our discussion of Saturday, 
December 2, 1995, regarding a possible resolution of 
this matter.  As you know, your client is currently 
charged with: 
 
 
Two counts of First Degree Sexual Assault of a 
Child 
 
 
One count of Burglary. 
 
He faces 90 years in prison; if your client wishes to 
reduce his exposure, the State makes the following 
offer: 
 
 
Plead guilty to only one count of First Degree 
Sexual Assault of a Child; the State will withdraw the 
Amended Information, thereby dismissing the second 
count of First Degree Sexual Assault of a Child and 
the Burglary and recommend a Presentence Report; the 
State is willing to advise the Court that the State 
does not recommend the imposition of maximum sentence 
and to leave the sentence to the Court; you are free 
to 
argue 
for 
whatever 
sentence 
you 
feel 
is 
appropriate, including placement in a counselling 
program.  Further, I will recommend that the sentence 
run concurrent to your client’s probation revocation 
time. 
 
                     
2  This letter, which the court of appeals quoted in 
its decision, see Johnson, 223 Wis. 2d at 88, was entered 
into the record before this court.   
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
6 
It is my hope that these very young children, only 5 
and 7, can be spared additional Court intrusions in 
their young lives.  That is why I am willing to offer 
to dismiss charges constituting 50 years of prison 
exposure, to recommend that the Court not impose the 
maximum sentence, to recommend concurrent time, to 
leave sentencing to the Court and you are free to make 
whatever recommendation you feel is appropriate.  If 
we cannot reach a resolution that spares these young 
children 
from 
the 
trauma 
of 
another 
round 
of 
testifying, and if the defendant is convicted of some 
or all of the charges, it is the State’s intention to 
affirmatively and strongly recommend the imposition of 
a very lengthy prison sentence which will keep the 
defendant in prison for many decades.   
 
I have no objection to your client entering his plea 
as an Alford plea, denying his guilt but accepting the 
State’s offer to cut his losses. 
 
If your client wants to take advantage of the 
opportunity to be out of prison in a relatively short 
period of time, this offer is, in my judgment, his 
best bet to accomplishes [sic] that objective. 
 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
[signed] 
Gale G. Shelton 
¶12 That same day, the trial court denied the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss.  The court relied on the case law of other 
jurisdictions 
holding 
that 
there 
is 
no 
presumption 
of 
prosecutorial vindictiveness when additional charges are filed 
after a mistrial caused by a hung jury.  The court explained 
that the hung jury and mistrial put the parties back in the 
position they were in before the trial began.  Because the 
prosecutor would clearly have had the discretion to file these 
charges 
before 
the 
trial, 
there 
was 
no 
presumption 
of 
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
7 
vindictiveness raised by filing them after the mistrial.  
Finding no other evidence of prosecutorial vindictiveness, the 
court denied the motion.   
¶13 The defendant rejected the state’s plea offer, and the 
case proceeded to retrial.  On December 7, 1995, the jury found 
the defendant guilty of both counts of first-degree sexual 
assault, but not guilty of burglary.   
¶14 The defendant was subsequently sentenced to 20 years 
in prison on each count of sexual assault, to be served 
consecutively.  In a motion for postconviction relief, the 
defendant renewed his claim that the amended information should 
have been dismissed because of prosecutorial vindictiveness.  
The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant appealed. 
¶15 The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s order 
denying postconviction relief and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.  The court concluded that the defendant had 
established both (1) that he had exercised a protected right, 
his right to a jury trial; and (2) that there was a realistic 
likelihood that the prosecutor had added new charges to punish 
him for exercising this right.  Johnson, 223 Wis. 2d at 94.  
Specifically, the court determined that the institutional bias 
against retrials and the prosecutor’s offer to withdraw the 
amended 
information 
in 
exchange 
for 
a 
guilty 
plea 
were 
sufficient 
to 
trigger 
a 
presumption 
of 
prosecutorial 
vindictiveness.  Id. at 95.  The State petitioned for review of 
this decision of the court of appeals. 
II. 
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
8 
¶16 In reviewing a prosecutorial vindictiveness claim, we 
are mindful of the fact that a prosecutor has great discretion 
in charging decisions and is generally answerable for those 
decisions to the people of the state and not the courts.  State 
v. Karpinski, 92 Wis. 2d 599, 607-08, 285 N.W.2d 729 (1979).  We 
review a prosecutor’s charging decisions under an erroneous 
exercise of discretion standard.  Id. at 609. 
¶17 In order to decide whether a prosecutor’s decision to 
bring 
additional 
charges 
constituted 
prosecutorial 
vindictiveness in violation of the defendant’s due process 
rights, we first must determine whether a realistic likelihood 
of vindictiveness exists; if indeed it does exist, then a 
rebuttable presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness applies. 
 If we conclude that no presumption of vindictiveness applies, 
we next must determine whether the defendant has established 
actual prosecutorial vindictiveness.   
¶18 The 
legal 
principles 
surrounding 
prosecutorial 
vindictiveness claims present questions of law that we review de 
novo.  United States v. Contreras, 108 F.3d 1255, 1262 (10th 
Cir. 1997).  However, we review the lower court’s finding of 
fact 
regarding 
whether 
the 
defendant 
established 
actual 
vindictiveness under the clearly erroneous standard.  Id. at 
1262. 
A. 
¶19 There is a dearth of Wisconsin precedent to guide our 
analysis.  Wisconsin courts have examined claims of judicial 
vindictiveness in sentencing after appeal and reconviction.  See 
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
9 
State v. Stubbendick, 110 Wis. 2d 693, 329 N.W.2d 399 (1983) and 
State v. Tarwid, 147 Wis. 2d 95, 433 N.W.2d 255 (Ct. App. 1988). 
 The court of appeals has considered a claim of prosecutorial 
vindictiveness in a prosecutor’s filing of an additional charge 
after a defendant’s successful appeal.  State v. Edwardsen, 146 
Wis. 2d 198, 430 N.W.2d 604 (Ct. App. 1988).  However, no 
previous Wisconsin case has examined a claim of vindictiveness 
arising before a defendant’s successful appeal.  We begin our 
analysis by examining the United States Supreme Court cases that 
established the legal doctrine of prosecutorial vindictiveness. 
¶20 The 
legal 
principles 
surrounding 
prosecutorial 
vindictiveness developed in a series of United States Supreme 
Court cases recognizing the basic principle that it is a 
violation of due process when the state retaliates against a 
person “for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional 
right.”  United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982).   
¶21 The Court first recognized this principle in the 
context of a judge’s imposition of an increased sentence after a 
new trial, in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).  
The Court held that when a judge imposes an increased sentence 
after a defendant obtains a new trial upon appeal, the judge 
must set forth in the record affirmative reasons “based upon 
objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the 
part of the defendant.”  Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726.  In effect, 
Pearce “applied a presumption of vindictiveness, which may be 
overcome only by objective information in the record justifying 
the increased sentence.”  Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 374. 
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
10
¶22 The Court extended Pearce’s reasoning to prosecutorial 
actions that result in increased punishment after a new trial in 
 Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).  The defendant in 
Blackledge was convicted of a misdemeanor assault charge in a 
bench trial before the district court.  Id. at 22.  After his 
conviction in district court, the defendant filed a notice of 
appeal requesting a new trial in superior court, which was his 
absolute right under North Carolina law.  Id.  Before the new 
trial, the prosecutor obtained a new grand jury indictment 
replacing the misdemeanor assault charge with a felony assault 
charge.  Id. at 23.  The defendant was convicted of the felony 
charge.  Id. 
¶23 In considering whether the defendant’s due process 
rights were violated, the Court noted that “the Due Process 
Clause is not offended by all possibilities of increased 
punishment upon retrial after appeal, but only by those that 
pose a realistic likelihood of ‘vindictiveness.’”  Id. at 27.  A 
realistic likelihood of vindictiveness existed in the case 
because the prosecutor had the means to discourage appeals by 
“upping the ante” against the defendant with a more serious 
charge.  Id. at 27-28.  Although there was no evidence of actual 
malice or bad faith on the part of the prosecutor, the 
apprehension of a retaliatory motive could not be allowed to 
deter the defendant’s statutory right to appeal.  Id. at 28.  
The Court did note that “[t]his would clearly be a different 
case” if the State had established that the new charge was based 
on new events and could not have been brought in the original 
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
11
proceeding.  Id. at 29 n.7.  However, under the circumstances of 
the case, it was constitutionally impermissible for the State to 
bring the more serious charge in response to the defendant’s 
appeal.  Id. at 28-29. 
¶24 The Court declined to extend the principles of Pearce 
and Blackledge to a prosecutor’s pretrial filing of increased 
charges in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1977).  The 
prosecutor in Bordenkircher carried out an explicit threat to 
file more serious charges against the defendant if the defendant 
refused 
to 
plead 
guilty 
to 
a 
less 
serious 
offense.  
Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 358-59.  The Court held that the 
prosecutor’s conduct did not violate the defendant’s due process 
rights.  Id. at 365.   
¶25 The Court explained that both Pearce and Blackledge 
involved “the State’s unilateral imposition of a penalty upon a 
defendant who had chosen to exercise a legal right to attack his 
original convictiona situation ‘very different from the give-
and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining between the 
prosecution and defense, which arguably possess relatively equal 
bargaining power.’”  Id. at 362, quoting Parker v. North 
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).  The due process violation at 
issue in Pearce and Blackledge “lay not in the possibility that 
a defendant might be deterred from the exercise of a legal 
right, . . .  but rather in the danger that the State might be 
retaliating against the accused for lawfully attacking his 
conviction.”  Id. at 363 (citations omitted).  No similar 
element of retaliation against a defendant existed in the plea 
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
12
bargain context “so long as the accused is free to accept or 
reject the prosecution’s offer.”  Id.   
¶26 In reaching this conclusion, the Court was mindful of 
the prosecutor’s great discretion in charging decisions.  As 
long as probable cause supports the charged offenses: 
 
[T]he decision whether or not to prosecute, and what 
charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally 
rests 
entirely 
in 
[the 
prosecutor’s] 
discretion . . . .  To hold that the prosecutor’s 
desire to induce a guilty plea is an ‘unjustifiable 
standard,’ which, like race or religion, may play no 
part in his charging decision, would contradict the 
very premises that underlie the concept of plea 
bargaining itself.”  Id. at 364-65. 
Therefore, the Court held that no rigid constitutional rule of 
prosecutorial vindictiveness applied.  Id. at 365.   
¶27 The Court again declined to recognize a presumption of 
vindictiveness in the pretrial context in United States v. 
Goodwin.  The defendant in Goodwin was charged with several 
misdemeanor and petty offenses based on his conduct during a 
traffic stop by a United States Park Policeman and was arraigned 
before a United States Magistrate.  Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 370.  
After initiating plea negotiations with the prosecutor, the 
defendant decided to reject a guilty plea and requested a jury 
trial in district court.  Id. at 371.  The case was transferred 
to the district court, and an Assistant United States Attorney 
[AUSA] assumed the role of prosecutor.  Id.  The new prosecutor 
obtained an indictment charging the defendant with one felony 
and three related misdemeanors, and the defendant was convicted 
of the felony and one misdemeanor.  Id.  The defendant moved to 
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
13
set aside his conviction on the ground that the filing of the 
felony charge gave rise to an impermissible appearance of 
retaliation.  Id.   
¶28 In considering the defendant’s argument, the Court 
noted that “[t]he imposition of punishment is the very purpose 
of virtually all criminal proceedings.”  Id. at 372.  Thus, a 
punitive 
motivation 
alone 
cannot 
distinguish 
justifiable 
governmental response to criminal conduct from impermissible 
governmental response to non-criminal, protected activity.  Id. 
at 372-73.  The presumption of vindictiveness is therefore 
limited 
to 
“cases 
in 
which 
a 
reasonable 
likelihood 
of 
vindictiveness exists.”  Id. at 373.  
¶29 The 
Court 
further 
explained 
that 
an 
inflexible 
presumption of vindictiveness must be viewed with particular 
caution in the pretrial setting.  Id. at 381.  The prosecutor’s 
initial charging decision “may not reflect the extent to which 
an individual is legitimately subject to prosecution,” and 
before trial, the prosecutor must remain free to exercise his or 
her broad discretion to determine which charges properly reflect 
society’s interests.  Id. at 382.   
¶30 The Court then examined the nature of the right 
asserted by the defendant.  After initiating plea negotiations, 
the defendant asserted his right to a jury trial.  Id.  Under 
Bordenkircher, “the mere fact that a defendant refuses to plead 
guilty and forces 
the government 
to 
prove 
its case is 
insufficient to warrant a presumption that subsequent changes in 
the charging decision are unjustified.”  Id. at 382-83.  The 
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
14
Court also pointed out that the case would not involve a 
duplicative expenditure of resources or ask the prosecutor “‘to 
do over what it thought it had already done correctly.’”  Id. at 
383 (citation omitted).   
¶31 Finally, the court explained that “[p]erhaps most 
importantly, the institutional bias against the retrial of a 
decided question that supported the decisions in Pearce and 
Blackledge simply has no counterpart in this case.”   Id. at 
383.  In sum, although a defendant in an appropriate case might 
prove that a prosecutor’s charging decision was motivated by 
actual vindictiveness, “a mere opportunity for vindictiveness is 
insufficient to justify the imposition of a prophylactic rule.” 
 Id. at 384. 
¶32 Thus, the United States Supreme Court has set forth a 
prophylactic rule that a presumption of vindictiveness arises 
when a prosecutor files more serious charges against a defendant 
after the defendant appeals his conviction and wins a new trial. 
 However, the Court has not extended this presumption to the 
pretrial context. 
B. 
¶33 We now must apply these legal principles to the facts 
of this case.  We begin by considering the defendant’s argument 
that a presumption of vindictiveness has arisen in his case.  
The 
defendant 
acknowledges 
that 
he 
bears 
the 
burden 
of 
establishing that under the circumstances of his case a 
realistic likelihood of vindictiveness exists, giving rise to a 
presumption of vindictiveness.  Br. of Def.-Appellant at 12.    
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
15
¶34 The relevant circumstances are as follows.  The 
defendant’s first trial on a single count of first-degree sexual 
assault ended in a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a 
verdict.  The prosecutor subsequently amended the information by 
adding two new charges against the defendant:  a second count of 
first-degree sexual assault of a child, and a count of burglary. 
 In the December 4, 1995 letter, the prosecutor offered to 
withdraw the amended information and thereby dismiss the 
additional charges in exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea 
to the single count of first-degree sexual assault.  The 
defendant declined the offer and was convicted of the two counts 
of first-degree sexual assault.   
¶35 As noted, United States Supreme Court cases have 
applied a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness to the 
filing of increased charges after a successful appeal, but have 
not extended this presumption to the pretrial context.  The 
Court has never considered a vindictiveness claim in the 
mistrial context.   
¶36 Courts in other jurisdictions have pointed out that a 
mistrial does not fall clearly into either the pretrial or the 
post-trial category.  See, e.g., United States v. Mays, 738 F.2d 
1188, 1190 (11th Cir. 1984).  In cases like the one before us, 
the 
Seventh 
Circuit 
has 
observed 
that 
“[c]ourts 
have 
consistently held that no realistic likelihood of vindictiveness 
is found when a jury is deadlocked and both parties agree that a 
declaration of mistrial is a necessity.”  United States v. 
Whaley, 830 F.2d 1469, 1479-80 (7th Cir. 1987), abrogated in 
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
16
part on other grounds by United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221 
(7th Cir. 1990).3  Many state courts are in agreement.4  These 
courts generally reason that no appearance of vindictiveness is 
created when a prosecutor adds charges after a mistrial caused 
by a hung jury, because the defendant has exercised no protected 
right against which the prosecutor might retaliate.  Mays, 738 
F.2d at 1190 (“Mays did not pursue any right such as would 
instigate retaliatory action on the part of the prosecution.  
Thus, the additional charges cannot be characterized as having 
arisen from any exercise of a protected right.”).  See also 
                     
3 See also Contreras, 108 F.3d at 1263-64 (10th Cir. 1997); 
United States v. Fiel, 35 F.3d 997, 1007-08 (4th Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Khan, 787 F.2d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1986); United 
States v. Ruppel, 724 F.2d 507, 507 (5th Cir. 1984); United 
States v. Thurnhuber, 572 F.2d 1307, 1310 (9th Cir. 1977); Mays, 
738 F.2d at 1190.  See also United States v. Marrapese, 826 F.2d 
145, 149 (1st Cir. 1987)(expressing doubt that a presumption of 
vindictiveness could apply to added charges after a mistrial 
caused by a hung jury and holding that in any case the 
prosecutor’s 
explanation 
rebutted 
any 
likelihood 
of 
vindictiveness); Wayne R. LaFave and Jerold H. Israel, Criminal 
Procedure § 13.7 at 84 n.29.1 (Supp. 1991)(noting that there is 
a dispute as to whether a presumption applies “in cases which 
are not entirely in a pretrial setting but in which there was 
not a conviction and appeal”). 
4 State v. Wilkins, 534 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 1988); Griffin 
v. State, 464 S.E.2d 371, 376 (Ga. 1995); Harris v. State, 481 
N.E.2d 382, 385-86 (Ind. 1985); Woods v. State, 775 S.W.2d 552, 
555-56 (Mo. 1989)(deciding in a review for plain error that the 
filing of more serious charge after a mistrial did not raise a 
recognizable presumption of vindictiveness); State v. Person, 
781 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989); Woodson v. State, 
777 S.W.2d 525, 529 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).  But see Twiggs v. 
Superior Court, 667 P.2d 1165, 1173 (Cal. 1983)(concluding that 
a strong presumption of vindictiveness was warranted by the 
filing of an amended information after a mistrial caused by a 
hung jury).  
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
17
Khan, 787 F.2d at 33 (“Defendant did nothing here that was 
likely to inspire the wrath of the prosecutor.”); Whaley, 830 
F.2d at 1479 (“Appellant Whaley took no action; he exercised no 
statutory or constitutional right, and cannot now claim that he 
was penalized for exercising such a right.”); Marrapese, 826 
F.2d at 149 (“[I]t is unlikely any retaliatory animus flowed 
from the first trial’s ending in a mistrial; after all, the 
mistrial was due to a hung jury, not to any legal challenge by 
Marrapese.”). 
¶37 The defendant concedes that the weight of authority 
holds 
that 
no 
presumption 
of 
vindictiveness 
arises 
when 
additional charges are brought after a mistrial caused by a hung 
jury.  He argues, however, that a presumption of vindictiveness 
may arise when a prosecutor files additional charges after a 
mistrial caused by a hung jury if the defendant establishes a 
realistic likelihood of vindictiveness under the circumstances 
of the case.  He contends that a realistic likelihood of 
vindictiveness exists in his case because a defendant after a 
mistrial caused by a hung jury is in the same position as a 
defendant on remand after reversal of his conviction of appeal. 
 He also contends that, like a defendant who has successfully 
challenged his conviction by exercising the right to appeal, he 
seeks a second trial based upon the assertion of a protected 
legal rightthe right to a jury trial.   
¶38 Like the great majority of federal courts, we find 
this reasoning unpersuasive.  The presumption of vindictiveness 
that arose after the defendant’s successful appeal in Blackledge 
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
18
does not arise after a mistrial caused by a hung jury, because 
after a mistrial there is no realistic likelihood that the state 
is retaliating against the defendant’s protected right to 
appeal.  Subsequent to Blackledge, the United States Supreme 
Court’s prosecutorial vindictiveness decisions “have all been 
rooted in a relatively simple proposition:  one may not be 
punished for the exercise of a protected right.”  Mays, 738 F.2d 
at 1190 (citing Ruppel, 724 F.2d at 508)(emphasis in original). 
 In this case, there is no realistic likelihood that the 
defendant was being punished for exercising a protected right, 
because the defendant did not bring about the need for a retrial 
by exercising a protected right.  The retrial was necessary 
because of the jury’s inability to reach a verdict, not because 
of the exercise of any right by the defendant.5  Mays, 738 F.2d 
                     
5 This is why all of the cases relied upon by the dissent, 
except for Twiggs, are distinguishable.  Those cases involved 
mistrials granted upon the defendant's motion, to preserve fair 
trial rights.  See In re Bower, 700 P.2d 1269, 1276 (Cal. 1985) 
(noting that the defendant was granted a mistrial "which was 
necessary to insure the fairness of the proceedings against 
him"); Murphy v. State, 453 N.E.2d 219, 223 (Ind. 1983) (noting 
that a mistrial was declared upon the defendant's motion because 
of the prosecutor's use of improper identification procedures 
tainted the trial); United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407, 409, 
416 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting that a mistrial was declared upon 
the defendant's motion because of ineffective assistance of 
counsel and declining to distinguish between attacks on the 
fairness of criminal proceedings before and after trial); United 
States v. D'Alo, 486 F.Supp. 954, 959 (D.R.I. 1980) ("The very 
same concern evident in the Supreme Court cases . . . exists in 
this case; the defendant is in effect being penalized for moving 
for a mistrial.").   
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
19
at 1190; Khan, 787 F.2d at 33; Whaley, 830 F.2d at 1479; 
Marrapese, 826 F.2d at 149. 
¶39 The defendant argues that he did cause the retrial by 
exercising a protected rightthe right to a jury trial.  He 
contends that a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness was 
created by the prosecutor’s efforts to persuade him to plead 
guilty and forego this right.  We agree with the federal circuit 
courts that have consistently rejected this reasoning.   
¶40 In United States v. Khan, the jury in the defendant’s 
first trial on drug charges was unable to reach a verdict on any 
of the charges against him.  Khan, 787 F.2d at 30.  After the 
mistrial, the AUSA attempted to persuade the defendant to plead 
guilty to a single lesser charge instead of proceeding to 
retrial.  Id.  The AUSA specifically warned the defendant that a 
superseding indictment might be filed before the second trial.  
Id.  The defendant rejected the plea offer, and the AUSA filed a 
superseding indictment containing additional charges.  Id.  The 
defendant then expressed interest in pleading to a lesser 
charge, but the AUSA rejected this offer.  Id.  At the second 
trial, the defendant was convicted on most of the counts.  Id.  
The defendant challenged his convictions on the grounds that the 
filing of additional charges after the defendant rejected a plea 
                                                                  
The only case the dissent cites that actually recognized a 
realistic likelihood of vindictiveness when increased charges 
were brought after a mistrial that resulted from a hung jury, 
rather than the defendant's exercise of a protected right, is 
Twiggs, 667 P.2d at 1170. 
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
20
offer gave rise to an unrebutted presumption of prosecutorial 
vindictiveness.  Id. at 30-31.   
¶41 The court rejected the defendant’s claim, reasoning 
that:  
 
It was not the defendant’s request for a trial that 
precipitated the possible duplication of resources and 
raised the spectre of the prosecution avenging the 
defendant’s rightful exercise of a constitutional 
right.  The root cause of these troubles was the 
jury’s inability to agree on a verdict  . . . .  But 
the government did not object to a mistrial.  . . .  
It is difficult to see how this would prompt a 
prosecutor to act vindictively towards a defendant; 
all agreed that the action taken by the Court was 
necessary under the circumstances.  United States v. 
Thurnhuber, 572 F.2d 1307, 1310 (9th Cir. 1977).  
Defendant did nothing here that was likely to inspire 
the wrath of the prosecutor. 
Id. at 32-33.  As to the defendant’s argument that his rejection 
of a guilty plea might have sparked a vindictive response, the 
court thought that it was “unrealistic to assume that the 
government’s probable response to a defendant’s choice to 
exercise his fundamental right to a trial would be to seek to 
penalize and deter, Goodwin, 458 U.S. at 381, 102 S.Ct. at 2492, 
even if that choice follows on the heels of a mistrial.”  Id. at 
33. 
¶42 The Tenth Circuit followed this reasoning in United 
States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 1997).  In that 
case, the jury at the defendant’s first trial was unable to 
reach a verdict on charges of conspiracy to distribute marijuana 
and money laundering.  Id. at 1216.  Before retrial, and after 
the defendant rejected several plea offers, the United States 
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
21
filed a superseding indictment increasing the charges against 
the defendant.  Id. at 1220 and n.5.  The court rejected the 
defendant’s claim that the increased charges should have been 
dismissed because of prosecutorial vindictiveness.  Id. at 1220. 
 Citing Khan, the court explained that under Bordenkircher, “‘in 
the “give-and-take” of plea bargaining there is no element of 
retaliation so long as a defendant remains free to accept or 
reject the offer.’”  Id. at 1120 n.5 (citing Khan, 787 F.2d at 
31). 
¶43 We determine that the same reasoning applies to the 
defendant’s case and conclude that the fact that the prosecutor 
filed the additional charges during plea negotiations does not 
create a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness.  As the federal 
courts have noted, Bordenkircher confirmed the legitimacy of 
plea bargaining and found no element of retaliation in the give-
and-take of plea negotiations.  Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363. 
 The government’s interest in persuading the defendant to enter 
a guilty plea therefore does not justify a presumption of 
vindictiveness before trial.  Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384.  We find 
no reason that a different rule should apply after a mistrial 
caused by a hung jury.  Accord Morales, 108 F.3d at 1220 n.5; 
Khan, 787 F.2d at 33; Mays, 738 F.2d at 1190. 
¶44 The 
defendant 
makes 
one 
additional 
argument 
in 
attempting to establish that a presumption of vindictiveness 
should apply in this case.  He contends that the “lack of any 
legitimate reasons” for filing the additional charges supports a 
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
22
presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness.  Def.-Appellant’s 
Br. at 18.  
¶45 This argument misinterprets the law.  As the defendant 
acknowledges earlier in his brief, Def.-Appellant’s Br. at 12, 
the burden is on the defendant to establish a realistic 
likelihood of vindictiveness giving rise to a presumption of 
vindictiveness.  Once a presumption of vindictiveness is 
established, the prosecutor may rebut it with an explanation of 
the objective circumstances that led the prosecutor to bring the 
additional charges.  Marrapese, 826 F.2d at 149; Crozier v. 
Wyoming, 882 P.2d 1230, 1234 (Wyo. 1994); see also Stubbendick, 
110 Wis. 2d at 698-99 (explaining that a trial judge may 
overcome the presumption of vindictiveness that is created when 
a defendant receives an increased sentence after a new trial by 
stating sufficient objective reasons for the sentence in the 
record).  Because the defendant has failed to establish that a 
realistic likelihood of vindictiveness exists in his case, the 
burden has not yet shifted to the prosecutor to rebut a 
presumption of vindictiveness. 
¶46 In conclusion, we reject the defendant’s argument that 
a presumption of vindictiveness arose under the circumstances of 
this case.  
C. 
¶47 Our conclusion that a presumption of vindictiveness 
does not exist in this case does not end our inquiry into 
whether 
prosecutorial 
vindictiveness 
has 
violated 
the 
defendant’s due process rights.  As Goodwin notes, even when a 
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
23
presumption of vindictiveness does not apply, a defendant may 
still establish that the prosecutor’s decision to add charges 
was actually motivated by a desire to retaliate against the 
defendant “for doing something that the law plainly allowed him 
to do.”  Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384; see also Stubbendick, 110 
Wis. 2d at 699 (“Where a sentencing or resentencing record 
exhibits actual vindictiveness, that too would constitute an 
abuse of discretion.”).  To establish actual vindictiveness, 
“there must be objective evidence that a prosecutor acted in 
order to punish the defendant for standing on his legal rights.” 
 Whaley, 830 F.2d at 1479 (citing Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 380-81). 
 We reiterate that the lower court’s finding of fact regarding 
whether the defendant established actual vindictiveness is 
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.  Contreras, 108 
F.3d at 1262.   
¶48 At the trial court, the defendant relied only on his 
argument that a presumption of vindictiveness applied because of 
the increased charges.  However, the trial court specifically 
determined that there was no evidence of vindictiveness in the 
absence of a presumption.  In his brief to the court of appeals, 
the defendant argued that the facts of the case suggested actual 
vindictiveness, but the court of appeals did not need to address 
that issue because it applied a presumption of vindictiveness.  
Before 
this 
court, 
the 
defendant 
argues 
that 
the 
same 
circumstances that support a presumption of vindictivenessthe 
“lack of any legitimate reasons” for the new charges and the 
December 1995 letteralso establish actual vindictiveness.  
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
24
¶49 We conclude that the trial court’s determination that 
the defendant failed to produce evidence establishing actual 
vindictiveness was not clearly erroneous.  Almost all of the 
circumstances 
that 
the 
defendant 
claims 
establish 
actual 
vindictiveness 
essentially 
amount to 
allegations 
that the 
prosecutor failed to point to new information that led her to 
file the additional charges.  For instance, the defendant points 
out that there was sufficient evidence to support the two 
separate sexual assault charges from the outset of the case, and 
that the prosecutor has not argued that additional or new 
information led her to file the additional charges.  He also 
notes that the same prosecutor handled both trials, and that he 
did not commit any new crimes or other conduct that would affect 
the prosecutor’s charging decision.   
¶50 We are not persuaded that these factors establish 
actual vindictiveness.  At the time of filing the amended 
information, the prosecutor explained that she believed that the 
jury should have the opportunity to hear all of the appropriate 
charges arising out of the course of conduct.  In addition, in 
her brief in response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss the 
amended 
information, 
the 
prosecutor 
expressly 
denied 
any 
retaliatory motive and further explained that:  
 
[T]he State has reassessed it[s] presentation of the 
evidence, taking into account the additional witnesses 
developed between the mistrial and now and the 
development of the case during the first jury trial. 
 . . . It is the State’s view that the jury should 
hear the three charges in the Amended Information and 
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
25
that they most accurately fit the evidence presented 
on behalf of the State. 
Prosecutors have great discretion in charging decisions and are 
specifically authorized to proceed under any or all statutory 
provisions that apply to a particular course of conduct.  
Karpinski, 92 Wis. 2d at 607-08 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 939.65).  
We conclude that the prosecutor’s belief that sufficient 
evidence exists to support a conviction of a new charge provides 
justification for the decision to file additional charges.6  
Crozier, 882 P.2d at 1233.  See also Penley v. State, 506 N.E.2d 
806, 811 (Ind. 1987)(holding that a prosecutor’s desire to 
increase the chances of conviction by adding a burglary charge 
before the defendant’s third trial on a rape charge was 
“perfectly 
permissible” and 
within 
the 
prosecutor’s 
broad 
discretion).  
¶51 The last piece of evidence on which the defendant 
relies to establish vindictiveness is the prosecutor’s December 
1995 letter offering to withdraw the amended information in 
exchange for a guilty plea to the original charge.  Although the 
letter does suggest that the prosecutor was strongly motivated 
to persuade the defendant to plead guilty to the original 
                     
6  The trial court rejected the defendant’s argument that 
there was no testimony at the preliminary hearing to establish 
that the defendant lacked consent to enter the victim’s bedroom. 
 The defendant was ultimately acquitted of the burglary charge. 
 We note that if there were a case in which a defendant 
established that a prosecutor erroneously exercised his or her 
discretion in deciding to bring a charge, such evidence would 
likely be relevant to the question of whether the addition of 
charges was motivated by actual prosecutorial vindictiveness. 
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
26
charge, it is not evidence of prosecutorial vindictiveness.  As 
previously discussed, Bordenkircher rejected the argument that a 
prosecutor’s attempt to persuade a defendant to plead guilty by 
filing increased charges before trial constitutes prosecutorial 
vindictiveness.  Filing additional charges in an attempt to 
obtain a guilty plea does no more than “present[] the defendant 
with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing 
charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution,” and 
does not violate the Due Process Clause.  Bordenkircher, 434 
U.S. at 365.   
¶52 Furthermore, 
the 
letter 
itself 
suggests 
a 
non-
vindictive reason for the prosecutor’s strong motivation to 
obtain a plea.  In the letter, the prosecutor explains that she 
hopes that the defendant will plead guilty to spare the victim 
and her young sister from “additional Court intrusions in their 
young lives” 
and 
“from 
the 
trauma 
of another 
round of 
testifying.”   
¶53 The prosecutor’s desire to spare the victim and her 
sister from testifying at a second trial is supported by 
research documenting that testifying against abusers has many 
adverse effects on children.  See Julie A. Anderson, The Sixth 
Amendment:  Protecting Defendants’ Rights at the Expense of 
Child Victims, 30 J. Marshall L. Rev. 767, 777-79 (1997); L. 
Christine Brannon, The Trauma of Testifying in Court for Child 
Victims 
of 
Sexual 
Assault 
v. 
the 
Accused’s 
Right 
to 
Confrontation, 18 Law & Psychol. Rev. 439 (1994).  The negative 
emotional consequences of such experiences for children include 
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
27
feelings of shame, guilt, and betrayal.  Anderson at 779; 
Brannon at 442-43.  Testifying in court may also cause the child 
to reexperience feelings of helplessness and powerlessness.  
Brannon at 442.  Studies show that having to testify more than 
once is especially traumatic.  Anderson at 777 n.61.  The number 
of times a child must repeat the story of his or her abuse is 
one of the strongest predictors of trauma.  Brannon at 441-42.  
Thus, there is evidence that the prosecutor’s concern for the 
child victim and witness was well founded. 
¶54 In addition, the prosecutor’s desire to spare the 
children from another round of testimony was also in conformity 
with her statutory duty to child victims and witnesses.  In 
cases involving child victims and witnesses, the Wisconsin 
legislature has imposed on prosecutors the duty to “take 
appropriate action to . . . minimize the length of time the 
child must endure the stress of his or her involvement in the 
proceeding.”  Wis. Stat. § 971.105.  In this case, if the 
prosecutor had been able to persuade the defendant to plead 
guilty, she would have eliminated the need for the child victim 
and witness to endure the harmful effects of testifying at the 
second trial.   
¶55 The defendant argues that the desire to prevent the 
children from testifying is not a legitimate prosecutorial 
motivation, 
because 
it 
shows 
that 
the 
decision 
to 
file 
additional charges was motivated by a desire to persuade the 
defendant to plead guilty.  Def.-Appellant’s Br. at 28.  
However, as we have repeatedly explained, “[t]o hold that the 
No. 
97-1360-CR 
 
 
28
prosecutor’s desire to induce a guilty plea is an ‘unjustifiable 
standard,’ 
which . . . may 
play 
no 
part 
in 
his 
charging 
decision, would contradict the very premises that underlie the 
concept of plea bargaining itself.”  Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 
364-65.  The prosecutor’s desire to obtain a guilty plea 
therefore does not establish prosecutorial vindictiveness. 
¶56 In conclusion, we determine that the trial court’s 
decision that the defendant failed to produce objective evidence 
establishing his claim of actual prosecutorial vindictiveness 
was not clearly erroneous. 
III. 
¶57 Having applied the relevant legal principles to the 
facts of this case, we hold that the defendant has failed to 
establish a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness or 
actual prosecutorial vindictiveness.  We therefore reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
¶58 Diane S. Sykes, J. did not participate.   
 
 
No. 97-1360.ssa 
 
1 
¶59 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
When a defendant demonstrates, following a mistrial, that a 
prosecutor has added a more serious charge or has brought 
additional charges based on the same course of conduct as the 
initial charge, I conclude that the defendant has established a 
realistic likelihood that the prosecutor acted vindictively. 
¶60 Accordingly I conclude that the burden is on the 
prosecutor in the present case to rebut this finding of a 
realistic likelihood of vindictiveness.  The State must explain 
what objective circumstances led the prosecutor to bring the new 
charges.  The prosecutor must explain his or her actions so that 
a “reasonable person would [not] think that there existed a 
realistic likelihood of vindictiveness.”  See Wayne R. LaFave 
and Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 13.7(c) at 106 (2nd 
ed. 1999) (quoting United States v. Andrews, 663 F.2d 449 (6th 
Cir. 1980)).7 
¶61 In the present case, the second count of sexual 
assault and the burglary charge were added after the mistrial.  
These charges related to the same conduct for which the first 
sexual assault charge was brought.  The State does not contest 
the defendant’s contention that the prosecutor did not learn 
                     
7 In United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 455-456 (6th 
Cir. 1980) (en banc), the government increased the charges after 
the defendants' pre-trial bail motion.  The court stated, “[W]e 
think that only objective, 
on-the-record explanations can 
suffice 
to 
rebut 
a 
finding 
of 
realistic 
likelihood 
of 
vindictiveness.”  Andrews, 633 F.2d at 456. 
No. 97-1360.ssa 
 
2 
anything new about this case after the prosecutor filed the one-
count information on which the first trial was based. 
¶62 The majority opinion errs by equating the situation 
presented by this case with a pre-trial scenario in which the 
prosecutor is properly afforded great latitude in deciding what 
charges to bring.  The majority opinion states, “[W]e find no 
reason that a different rule should apply after a mistrial 
caused by a hung jury.”  Majority op. at ¶ 43.  A case in which 
no mistrial occurred is different from one in which a mistrial 
is declared.  Saying the two are the same does not make them the 
same. 
¶63 The majority’s analysis does not properly account for 
what the U.S. Supreme Court has termed an “institutional bias” 
against re-trying cases.  United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 
368, 377 (1982).  While the present case resulted in a mistrial 
and not a conviction, the “institutional bias” recognized in 
Goodwin also applies in this case.8  In both a new trial after an 
                     
8 The Goodwin analysis is instructive: 
In contrast, once a trial begins — and certainly by 
the time a conviction has been obtained — it is much 
more likely that the State has discovered and assessed 
all of the information against an accused and has made 
a determination, on the basis of that information, of 
the extent to which he should be prosecuted.  Thus, a 
change in the charging decision made after an initial 
trial 
is 
completed 
is 
much 
more 
likely 
to 
be 
improperly motivated than is a pretrial decision. 
 
United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 381 (1982); see 
also State v. Edwardsen, 146 Wis. 2d 198, 203, 430 N.W.2d 604 
(Ct. App. 1988), stating:  
No. 97-1360.ssa 
 
3 
appeal and a new trial after a mistrial, a defendant’s exercise 
of the protected right to trial forces a prosecutor to expend 
additional resources to re-try a case. 
¶64 The 
majority 
opinion 
refers 
to 
several 
cases 
consistent with its holding.  The rule I endorse also has 
support in other courts.  In Twiggs v. Superior Ct. of San 
Francisco, 667 P.2d 1165 (Cal. 1983), the defendant endured a 
trial and a mistrial due to a hung jury and was, upon remand, 
offered a "plea bargain" by the prosecution.  The defendant 
refused the offer and demanded a jury trial.  The prosecutor 
added charges based on the defendant’s prior felony convictions, 
which the prosecutor had known about before the first trial.  
The California Supreme Court said these circumstances "strongly 
suggest that the prosecutor unilaterally imposed a penalty in 
response to the defendant's insistence on facing a jury 
retrial . . . ."  Twiggs, 667 P.2d at 1171.9  See also In re 
                                                                  
 
Institutional 
dislike 
of 
retrials 
— rather 
than 
legitimate concerns for the public welfare — might 
subconsciously 
motivate 
a 
vindictive 
judicial 
or 
prosecutorial response to a defendant's exercise of 
his right to obtain a retrial of a decided question.  
 
9 The California Supreme Court explained: 
The same considerations that led the [U.S. Supreme]  
court to condemn such prosecutorial conduct in the 
context of a postconviction appeal are applicable when 
the defendant asserts his right to a retrial after a 
mistrial.  As a prosecutor would have a considerable 
stake in discouraging appeals requiring trials de 
novo, so too would the prosecution in a case such as 
this have a great interest in discouraging defendant's 
assertion 
of 
a 
retrial, 
particularly 
since 
the 
No. 97-1360.ssa 
 
4 
Bower, 700 P.2d 1269 (Cal. 1985) (presumption of vindictiveness 
attached when the defendant was charged with a more severe crime 
after a mistrial); Murphy v. State, 453 N.E.2d 219, 227 (Ind. 
1983) (same); United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407, 413-16 
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (same); United States v. D'Alo, 486 F. Supp. 
954, 959-60 (D.R.I. 1980) (same).  Although all of these cases 
except Twiggs involved the situation where the mistrial was 
granted on the defendant’s motion, their applicability to this 
case is not diminished.  In any mistrial situation there is a 
realistic likelihood that the prosecutor is adding charges to 
punish the defendant for exercising his or her protected right 
to proceed with a second trial. 
¶65 I agree with the court of appeals that the cause be 
remanded to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing.  The 
                                                                  
prosecution was unable to obtain a conviction in the 
first trial. Here, the defendant has endured a trial 
and a mistrial due to a hung jury, and when he asserts 
his right to a jury retrial rather than plead guilty 
and accept a prison term, he is faced with the 
possibility of greater punishment than he could have 
received if the prosecution had secured a conviction, 
apparently as a result of pursuing his right to be 
tried by a jury on retrial.  Such a situation calls 
for invoking the prophylactic rule enunciated in Perry 
to protect against both the possibility that defendant 
will be deterred from exercising a legal right, as 
well as the danger that the state might be retaliating 
against the defendant for maintaining his innocence 
and facing a retrial. 
 
Twiggs v. Superior Ct. of San Francisco, 667 P.2d 1165, 
1170 (Cal. 1983). 
 
No. 97-1360.ssa 
 
5 
circuit court should determine whether the prosecutor has met 
its burden to rebut the finding of a realistic likelihood of 
vindictiveness. 
¶66 For the reasons stated, I dissent. 
¶67 I am authorized to state that JUSTICE WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH joins this dissent.