Case Title: State ex rel. Brecksville Edn. Assn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd.

Citation: 1996-Ohio-310

Docket Number: 19950576

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Brecksville Edn. Assn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 1996-Ohio-310.] 
The State ex rel. Brecksville Education Association, OEA/NEA, v. State 
Employment Relations Board et al. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Brecksville Edn. Assn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd. 
(1996),      Ohio St.3d     .] 
Public employment -- Teachers -- Collective bargaining -- Section 4(A) 
of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 133 does not deprive State Employment 
Relations Board of jurisdiction to consider petition jointly filed by 
employer and an exclusive representative requesting SERB to 
amend composition of deemed certified bargaining unit. 
 
(No. 95-576 -- Submitted October 10, 1995 -- Decided March 1, 
1996.) 
------------- 
Section 4(A) of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 133 does not deprive the State 
Employment Relations Board of jurisdiction to consider a petition 
jointly filed by an employer and an exclusive bargaining 
representative requesting SERB to amend the composition of a 
deemed certified bargaining unit.  (Ohio Council 8, Am. Fedn. of 
State, Cty. & Mun. Emp., AFL-CIO v. Cincinnati [1994], 69 Ohio 
 
2
St.3d 677, 635 N.E.2d 361, distinguished.) 
------------- 
 
IN MANDAMUS. 
 
Relator, Brecksville Education Association (“BEA”), is the deemed 
certified collective bargaining agent for teachers employed by the 
Brecksville-Broadview Heights Board of Education (“board”).1  No 
challenge to BEA’s exclusive representative status has been made by 
any other employee organization. 
 
The board is an Ohio Public Employer as defined by R.C. 
4117.01(B).  It is also a “body politic and corporate” under R.C. 3313.17 
and R.C. Chapter 4117.  Though the board is formally designated as a 
respondent on the complaint, the board does not oppose, but rather 
supports relator’s position in this case. 
 
Respondent State Employment Relations Board (“SERB”) is an 
agency of the state of Ohio created by R.C. Chapter 4117 and charged 
with the administration of the Ohio Public Employees Collective 
 
3
Bargaining Act (“the Act”). 
 
On January 1, 1985, BEA and the board entered their first contract 
subsequent to passage of the Act.  The contract recognized BEA as the 
exclusive bargaining representative of the unit composed of teachers 
and certain other employees, but specifically excluded substitute 
teachers and tutors.  BEA and the board subsequently entered into a 
series of collective bargaining agreements which continued the 
exclusion of tutors from the bargaining unit. 
 
Following our decisions in State ex rel. Brown v. Milton-Union 
Exempted Village Bd. of Edn. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 21, 531 N.E.2d 
1297, and State ex rel. Tavenner v. Indian Lake Local School Dist. Bd. 
of Edn. (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 88, 578 N.E.2d 464, holding that tutors 
were teachers entitled to compensation under duly adopted teachers’ 
salary schedules, BEA and the board executed a collective bargaining 
agreement effective January 1, 1994, which included small group 
instruction teachers, formerly known as tutors, in the bargaining unit 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
 
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represented by BEA.  A total of ten tutors were affected by this 
modification. 
 
After reaching agreement on the terms of the 1994 contract, BEA 
and the board jointly petitioned SERB to amend the bargaining unit to 
include tutors in accord with the provisions of the collective bargaining 
agreement.  SERB declined jurisdiction, citing Ohio Council 8, Am. 
Fedn. of State, Cty. & Mun. Emp., AFL-CIO v. Cincinnati (1994), 69 
Ohio St.3d 677, 635 N.E.2d 361, and therefore made no determination 
on the merits of the petition.  BEA responded by filing the present action 
requesting this court to grant a writ of mandamus that would compel 
SERB to exercise jurisdiction over the joint petition. 
--- 
 
Cloppert, Portman, Sauter, Latanick & Foley and Mark A. Foley, 
for relator. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Vincent L. 
Lombardo, 
Assistant 
Attorney 
General, 
for 
respondent 
State 
 
5
Employment Relations Board.  
 
Flanagan, Blackie, & Giffels, L.P.A., and William E. Blackie III, for 
respondent Brecksville-Broadview Heights Board of Education. 
 
Lucas, Prendergast, Albright, Gibson & Newman and Robert J. 
Walter, urging issuance of writ for amicus curiae, Ohio Association of 
Public School Employees/AFSCME Local  4, AFL-CIO. 
 
Green, Haines, Sgambati, Murphy & Macala Co., L.P.A., and 
Ronald G. Macala, urging issuance of writ for amici curiae, Westlake 
Education Assn. and Independence Education Assn. 
 
Daniel S. Smith, OEA/NEA Director of Legal Services, urging 
issuance of writ for amici curiae, Ohio Education Assn. and Columbus 
Education Assn. 
 
Kalniz, Iorio & Feldstein Co., L.P.A., and Brenda Meyer, urging 
issuance of writ for amici curiae, Swanton Education Assn. and Sylvania 
Education Assn. 
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6
 
MOYER, C.J. 
The issue presented is whether Section 4(A) of 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 133 deprives the State Employment Relations Board 
of jurisdiction to consider a petition filed jointly by an employer and an 
exclusive bargaining representative that requests an amendment to the 
composition of a deemed certified bargaining unit. 
 
“In order for a writ of mandamus to issue, a relator must 
demonstrate that (1) he or she has a clear legal right to the relief prayed 
for; (2) respondent is under a corresponding legal duty to perform the 
requested act; and (3) relator has no plain and adequate legal remedy.”  
State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 69 
Ohio St.3d 217, 218-219, 631 N.E.2d 150, 152, citing State ex rel. 
Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Internatl. Union, 
Local 333, AFL-CIO, CLC v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1993), 66 Ohio 
St.3d 157, 158, 609 N.E.2d 1266, 1267. 
 
Under R.C. 4117.06(A), SERB has a duty to “decide in each case 
the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining.”  The 
 
7
statute further provides that the SERB appropriateness determination is 
“final and conclusive and not appealable to the court.”  Because there is 
no right of appeal from SERB’s determination that it had no jurisdiction 
to reach the merits of the joint petition for amended certification, BEA 
has no adequate alternative remedy at law.  Mandamus, therefore, is an 
appropriate remedy to correct SERB’s failure to exercise jurisdiction 
when under a statutory duty to do so.  See State ex rel. Coen v. Indus. 
Comm. (1933), 126 Ohio St. 550, 554, 186 N.E. 398, 399. 
 
This court has previously stated that “[t]he purpose of  the Act is to 
minimize public-sector labor conflict and to provide a mechanism for 
resolving disputes when they arise.” State ex rel. Dayton Fraternal 
Order of Police, Lodge No. 44 v. State Emp. Relations Bd.. (1986), 22 
Ohio St. 3d 1, 6, 22 OBR 1, 5, 488 N.E.2d 181, 186.  The policy of 
encouraging cooperation rather than conflict between public employers 
and employees was important enough to the General Assembly that it 
included a subsection of the statute to emphasize the point.  R.C. 
 
8
4117.22 provides:  “Chapter 4117. of the Revised Code shall be 
construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purpose of promoting 
orderly and constructive relationships between all public employers and 
their employees.”  This language represents the express legislative 
intent that produced the statute.  BEA and the board contend that their 
agreement to include the tutors in the bargaining unit was the model 
expression of an orderly and constructive relationship.  Indeed, if not 
prohibited by statute, public employers and public employee bargaining 
agents should be encouraged to do precisely what the board of 
education and the union did here. 
 
Standing alone, the language of R.C. 4117.06 appears to require 
SERB to exercise jurisdiction to rule on relator’s petition.  In Ohio 
Council 8, Am. Fedn. of State, Cty. & Mun. Emp., AFL-CIO v. Cincinnati 
(1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 677, 635 N.E.2d 361, however, we held that 
SERB’s jurisdiction to consider such petitions is limited by the terms of 
Section 4(A) of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 133. 
 
 
9
 
The syllabus of Ohio Council 8 reads: 
 
“Ohio Adm.Code 4117-5-01(F) is in clear conflict with Section 4(A) 
of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 133 (140 Ohio Laws, Part I, 336 337) and is, 
therefore, invalid.  Pursuant to Section 4(A), adjustments or alterations 
to deemed certified collective bargaining units are not permitted until 
challenged by another employee organization.” (Emphasis added.) 
SERB contends that it correctly relied on the syllabus language in 
refusing to accept jurisdiction over the joint petitions. 
 
Ohio Adm. Code 4117-5-01(F) provides: 
 
“For a unit that has not been approved by the board through the 
procedures of division (A) of section 4117.05 or 4117.07 of the Revised 
Code, a petition for unit clarification or amendment of a deemed certified 
unit may be filed only during the period of one hundred twenty days to 
ninety days before the expiration date of the collective bargaining 
agreement, after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, 
or at any other time if the petition is submitted by mutual request of the 
 
10
parties.  Unless the petition for amendment or clarification of such a unit 
is submitted by mutual request, the board will consider clarification or 
amendment only if the petition alleges that the unit contains a 
combination of employees prohibited by division (D) of section 4117.06 
of the Revised Code.” 
 
SERB argues that two aspects of our holding in Ohio Council 8 
support its conclusion that it is without jurisdiction to address the joint 
petition filed in this case.  First, the syllabus of Ohio Council 8 broadly 
states that Ohio Adm.Code 4117-5-01(F) is invalid.  Because the 
invalidation is not expressly limited to those portions of the rule which do 
not involve joint petitions for amended certification, SERB maintains that 
the rule must be considered invalid in its entirety.  Second, the Ohio 
Council 8 syllabus holds that a challenge by another employee 
organization is a necessary prerequisite to adjustments or alterations to 
deemed certified collective bargaining units.  Therefore, argues SERB, 
because the joint petition for amended certification of the collective 
 
11
bargaining unit in this case did not involve a challenge by another 
employee organization, SERB properly refused to exercise jurisdiction.  
SERB has, perhaps understandably, misapplied our holding in Ohio 
Council 8. 
 
The issue of a joint petition for amended certification of a 
bargaining unit was not before the court in Ohio Council 8.  Rather, that 
case involved the conflict between Section 4(A) of the Act and the 
language of Ohio Adm.Code 4117-5-01(F) that authorized unilateral 
employer petitions.  Because we find the distinction between unilateral 
employer petitions and joint petitions to be critical, and because we find 
Ohio Council 8 applicable only to unilateral employer petitions, we 
confine the holding of Ohio Council 8 to those particular facts. 
 
The controlling issue in this case is whether, as SERB contends, 
Section 4(A) of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 133 precludes SERB jurisdiction over 
joint petitions for amended certification of collective bargaining units.  
 
Section 4(A) provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of 
 
12
this act, an employee organization recognized as the exclusive 
representative shall be deemed certified until challenged by another 
employee organization under the provisions of this act and the State 
Employment Relations Board has certified an exclusive representative.”  
140 Ohio Laws, Part I, 336, 337.  The quoted language is the same 
language that provided the foundation for our decision in Ohio Council 
8.  Its application to the two situations, however, is quite different. 
 
First and foremost, we note that the language of Section 4(A) of 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 133 does not expressly protect the composition of the 
bargaining unit.  Section 4(A) provides that the deemed certified unit 
shall remain deemed certified until challenged by another organization.  
It does not exclude, expressly or otherwise, SERB jurisdiction under the 
facts of this case; nor does it preclude the addition of a group of 
employees to an existing bargaining unit where no one opposes the 
action.  In the absence of express statutory direction, and in light of our 
decision in Ohio Council 8, we must determine the intent of the General 
 
13
Assembly and decide whether there is good reason to extend the Ohio 
Council 8 reasoning to the facts of the present case. 
 
In Ohio Council 8 we explained at some length that the Section 
4(A) language explicitly protecting the deemed certified status of the 
employee representative also protected the composition of the 
bargaining unit from unilateral attack by the employer on grounds of 
R.C. 4117.06(D).  Ohio Council 8, 69 Ohio St.3d at 681-682, 635 N.E.2d 
at 364.  The majority opinion observed in language not necessary to the 
disposition of the issue before us that the composition of the bargaining 
unit was intended by the General Assembly to be preserved intact as it 
was on October 6, 1983.  Id. at 682, 635 N.E.2d at 364, citing Univ. of 
Cincinnati, Univ. Hosp. v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1988), 42 Ohio 
App.3d 78, 81, 536 N.E.2d 408, 411.  We do not believe it is either 
necessary or advisable to extend the concept that far. 
 
We find the distinction between unilateral and joint petitions to be 
dispositive for the following reasons:  (1) The language of Section 4(A) 
 
14
does not expressly require that SERB forgo jurisdiction, and we decline 
to read such a requirement into the statute;  (2) Co-operative solutions 
are the express objective of Ohio collective bargaining law. 
 
Though it is reasonable to conclude, as we did in Ohio Council 8, 
that the General Assembly intended to protect preexisting collective 
bargaining relationships from unilateral attack by employers, it does not 
necessarily follow that the General Assembly intended to forever freeze 
the composition of units extant on October 6, 1983. 
 
The grandfather clause of Section 4 of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 133 was 
included in the statute in order to protect existing relationships from 
upheaval due to the passage of the Act.  See Drucker, Collective 
Bargaining Law in Ohio (1993) 199, Section 5.02(D).  There is no 
indication, however, either in our opinions or in the legislative history of 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 133, that the intent of the legislature was slavish 
adherence to the 1983 status quo.  On the contrary, it is clear that 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 133 and R.C. Chapter 4117 were passed in response 
 
15
to a widely perceived need to “bring stability and clarity to an area where 
there had been none,” and to remove public employees from a position 
of “second-class citizenship” by placing them on an equal footing with 
private employees. State ex rel. Dayton Fraternal Order of Police, 
Lodge No. 44 v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1986), 22 Ohio St. 3d 1, 5, 
22 OBR 1, 4, 488 N.E.2d 181, 185.   
 
SERB has offered no evidence that there was any question, prior 
to our decision in Ohio Council 8, regarding SERB’s jurisdiction to 
consider joint petitions for amendment of bargaining units.  Indeed,  
Ohio Adm.Code 4117-5-01 expressly provides for SERB rulings on joint 
petitions, and the principle appears to have been generally accepted 
from the inception of the Act.  See Drucker, Collective Bargaining in 
Ohio, supra, at 235, Section 5.18(B).  Moreover, joint petitions are fully 
consistent with the acknowledged legislative objectives of orderly and 
cooperative resolution of disputes, and with the policy interest of stability 
in labor relationships. 
 
16
 
We agree with BEA and the board that if this court were to find no 
jurisdiction for SERB to consider the joint petition, such holding would 
impose an unworkable and unrealistic requirement that the employee 
unit composition be forever frozen in time unless and until an 
adversarial position is taken by a third-party employee representative; 
that the decision would promote confrontation rather than the 
cooperation encouraged by the statute; and that such a rule would 
present an impediment to the flexibility that complex collective 
bargaining requires.   
 
In construing the statutes of this state, we must presume that just 
and reasonable results are intended by the General Assembly.  R.C. 
1.47; State ex rel. Brown v. Milton-Union Exempted Village Bd. of Edn. 
(1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 531 N.E.2d 1297, 1303; State ex rel. 
Dispatch Printing Co. v. Wells (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 382, 384, 18 OBR 
437, 439, 481 N.E.2d 632, 634.  When a statute with the stated purpose 
of fostering cooperation is interpreted to require conflict without a 
 
17
counterbalancing benefit, such interpretation can only be described as 
unreasonable. 
 
We are confident that the General Assembly did not intend unified 
parties to forgo that course of action which they judge to be desirable 
and efficacious for all concerned, simply because it is not the solution 
agreed upon prior to October 6, 1983, and because no rival organization 
has challenged the exclusive representative.  We therefore hold that 
Section 4(A) of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 133 does not deprive the State 
Employment Relations Board of jurisdiction to consider a petition jointly 
filed by an employer and an exclusive representative requesting SERB 
to amend the composition of a deemed certified bargaining unit. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that BEA and the board are entitled to 
the determination they seek and that SERB is under a duty to provide it.  
The writ of mandamus is therefore granted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Writ granted. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur. 
 
18
 
DOUGLAS and RESNICK, JJ., concur separately in the syllabus and 
judgment. 
 
WRIGHT, J., concurs in the syllabus and judgment. 
 
 
19
FOOTNOTE: 
 
1Also known as a “historical unit,” a deemed certified collective 
bargaining agent is the employee representative who bargained with the 
employer on behalf of public employees in a collective bargaining 
relationship that predated the passage of the Ohio Collective Bargaining 
Act.  Rather than being certified by SERB according to the normal 
certification procedure provided for under the Act, such units were 
“deemed certified” by the grandfather clause of Section 4(A) of 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 133, and are treated as if they had been certified 
normally.  See Drucker, Collective Bargaining Law in Ohio (1993) 199, 
Section 5.02(D).  
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring.     I concur in the syllabus and judgment of the 
majority.  I write separately to make two points wherein I disagree with the 
majority. 
 
The majority states that “* * * the language of Section 4(A) of 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 133 does not expressly protect the composition of the 
 
20
bargaining unit.”  I respectfully disagree.  I believe that Section 4(A) does 
protect the deemed certified unit, including composition, from attack by all but 
another employee organization.  That, in fact, is the real substance of Ohio 
Council 8.  This does not say, however, as the majority clearly points out, that 
the composition of a unit cannot be changed by the joint agreement of the unit 
and the public employer.  Such an agreement is not an attack. 
 
The majority also says, in discussing Am.Sub.S.B. No. 133, that “[t]here 
is no indication * * * that the intent of the legislature was slavish adherence to 
the 1983 status quo.”  While I would not call it “slavish adherence,” I would 
say and I do believe that the intent of the legislature was to codify then existing 
bargaining relationships, so as to maintain the status quo between public 
employers and their employees who at that time had a collective bargaining 
history and, often, a contractual relationship. 
 
With the foregoing exceptions, I concur with the well-reasoned syllabus, 
opinion and judgment of the majority. 
 
RESNICK, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
at