Case Title: State v. Dawson

Citation: 2000-Ohio-442

Docket Number: 19991883

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Dawson, 89 Ohio St.3d 1208, 2000-Ohio-442.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. DAWSON, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Dawson (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 1208.] 
Certification of conflict dismissed as improvidently certified due to want of a conflict. 
(No. 99-1883 — Submitted April 25, 2000 — Decided June 7, 2000.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 19179. 
__________________ 
 
Michael T. Callahan, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Christina J. 
Marshall, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Larry D. Dawson, pro se. 
__________________ 
 
The certification of conflict is dismissed, sua sponte, as having been improvidently 
certified; there is a want of a conflict. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs separately. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring.  I concur in the dismissal of this 
case for want of a conflict, and write separately to explain why. 
 
The particular provisions of Crim.R. 33 at issue in this case are: 
 
 
2
 
“(A) A new trial may be granted on the motion of the defendant for any of 
the following causes affecting materially his substantial rights: 
 
“ * * * 
 
“(2) Misconduct of the jury, prosecuting attorney, or the witnesses for the 
state; 
 
“ * * * 
 
“(6) When new evidence material to the defense is discovered which the 
defendant could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the 
trial.  When a motion for a new trial is made upon the ground of newly discovered 
evidence, the defendant must produce at the hearing on the motion, in support 
thereof, the affidavits of the witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be 
given * * *.” 
 
A motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence must be made 
within one hundred twenty days after the end of the proceedings.  Crim.R. 33(B).  
But “[i]f it is made to appear by clear and convincing proof that the defendant was 
unavoidably prevented from the discovery of the evidence upon which he must 
rely, such motion shall be filed within seven days from the order of the court 
finding that the defendant was unavoidably prevented from discovering the 
evidence within the one hundred twenty day period.”  Crim.R. 33(B). 
 
 
3
 
Initially, it appeared that there was a conflict between the Ninth and Second 
Appellate Districts on the procedure for handling delayed motions for new trial.  
The Ninth Appellate District viewed a motion for a new trial as a two-step process, 
where first the defendant submits affidavits supporting his assertion of unavoidable 
delay.  Then, if the trial court finds that the delay was unavoidable, the court issues 
an order finding that a valid basis exists to justify allowing the defendant to file the 
delayed motion for new trial. 
 
However, the Second Appellate District in State v. Wright (1990), 67 Ohio 
App.3d 827, 828, 588 N.E.2d 930, 930-931, addressed a delayed motion for a new 
trial in a single-step procedure, requiring a hearing to establish both that the 
defendant was unavoidably delayed in discovering the evidence and that the newly 
discovered evidence forms a sufficient basis to grant a new trial.  The Second 
Appellate District interpreted Crim.R. 33(B) as requiring a hearing as long as the 
motion was accompanied by affidavits that, on their face, support the assertion that 
the defendant was unavoidably delayed in discovering the evidence. 
 
The Ninth Appellate District petitioned this court to certify a conflict on the 
following question:  “Do Crim.R. 33, 47 and 57(B), and applicable local rules, 
permit a trial court to deny a motion for leave to move for a new trial without a 
hearing, when that motion is premised upon: 
 
 
4
 
“(1) the discovery of new evidence and is made later than one hundred 
twenty days after the verdict is rendered, or 
 
“(2) being unavoidably prevented from filing the motion and is made later 
than fourteen days after the verdict is rendered, 
 
“and affidavits attached to the motion for leave to move for a new trial 
support the assertion that the movant was unavoidably prevented from timely 
discovering the evidence or timely filing a motion for a new trial.” 
 
Later, however, the Second Appellate District in State v. Smith (Mar. 27, 
1998), Miami App. No. 97 CA 46, unreported, 1998 WL 404458, adopted the two-
step process.  “To obtain leave to file a motion for a new trial based on 
prosecutorial or witness misconduct, [the defendant] had to show ‘by clear and 
convincing proof’ that he had been ‘unavoidably prevented’ from filing the motion 
in a timely fashion.  Crim.R. 33(B).  For leave to file a motion for a new trial based 
on newly discovered evidence, [the defendant] needed to show ‘by clear and 
convincing proof’ that he had been ‘unavoidably prevented’ from discovering such 
evidence within that time period.  Crim.R. 33(B).”  Id. 
 
Because the Second Appellate District ultimately adopted the correct two-
step process, I concur that there is no longer a conflict.