Case Title: State v. Carrick

Citation: 2012-Ohio-608

Docket Number: 2011-0230

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Carrick, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-608.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-608 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. CARRICK, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Carrick, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-608.] 
R.C. 2917.11(A)(2) is not unconstitutionally void for vagueness. 
(No. 2011-0230—Submitted November 1, 2011—Decided February 22, 2012.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Wayne County, 
No. 09CA0077, 2010-Ohio-6451. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Jason Carrick, hosted a Halloween party on October 31, 
2009, in a building he owned outside the city limits of Wooster. 
{¶ 2} That evening, beginning around 8:00 p.m. and continuing into the 
early morning hours of November 1, neighbors Sonia Golgosky and Joshua 
Klenz, who each live approximately a quarter of a mile from Carrick’s property, 
were disturbed by very loud music coming from Carrick’s property.  Golgosky 
testified that she had been able to hear the bass of the music in her home with the 
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windows closed.  She also stated that the music had been so loud that she could 
clearly hear the words to the music when she stepped out on her deck. 
{¶ 3} Klenz, who lives 100 to 200 feet away from Golgosky, testified 
that he had heard the repeated booms of a loud bass in his home and that the 
sound had come from Carrick’s property.  He stated that the noise caused the 
windows on his house to vibrate.  Klenz testified that he had been able to hear the 
music clearly enough to identify the song that was playing when he stepped 
outside his house. 
{¶ 4} Golgosky and Klenz were upset because the music prevented them 
and their young children from sleeping.  Therefore, each called the sheriff’s office 
multiple times after 11:00 p.m. to complain about the music.  They each testified 
that the music had stopped a few times but then started back up again at a loud 
level and did not end until the early morning hours of November 1. 
{¶ 5} Juan McCloud, an off-duty Wooster police officer, testified that he 
was at his home inside Wooster city limits that evening when he heard the 
repeated thumping of a bass.  McCloud called a colleague, Sergeant Conwill, to 
ask him to determine the source of the noise.  Conwill notified McCloud that 
several complaints had already been made, that the music was coming from 
outside the city limits, and that deputies had been dispatched to the area.  
McCloud then called the dispatcher, who advised him that deputies were on the 
scene.  Approximately ten minutes later, the music stopped, only to start up again 
five minutes later.  McCloud called dispatch again and was informed that deputies 
would again be sent to the property. 
{¶ 6} Deputy Daniel Vaughn of the Wayne County Sheriff’s Office was 
the first officer to respond to the noise complaints.  He testified that he had 
notified Carrick of the complaints and had given him a verbal warning.  While the 
officer was at Carrick’s property, the noise level was reduced, but the music was 
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still playing.  Vaughn informed Carrick that if he had to return, he would issue a 
citation. 
{¶ 7} Vaughn stated that the noise level had increased soon after he left 
the property.  He talked with one of the complainants, Golgosky, at her residence, 
and while he was taking Golgosky’s written statement, Klenz came over and also 
provided a written statement.  Vaughn heard the music emanating from Carrick’s 
property during the 25 minutes that he was at Golgosky’s home taking these 
statements. 
{¶ 8} After the statements were completed, Vaughn and three other 
deputies returned to Carrick’s property.  At that time, Vaughn issued a minor-
misdemeanor citation to Carrick for disorderly conduct.  He again cautioned him, 
and the noise level was reduced.  Carrick was also told that if the deputies had to 
return, he would be arrested. 
{¶ 9} Vaughn testified that he had returned a third time to Carrick’s 
property after receiving a complaint at approximately 1:30 a.m.  As he 
approached the property, he could hear the bass of the music.  Vaughn placed 
Carrick under arrest for disorderly conduct. 
{¶ 10} Carrick was charged with and convicted of disorderly conduct in 
violation of R.C. 2917.11(A)(2).  He appealed to the Ninth District Court of 
Appeals.  The court of appeals held that R.C. 2917.11(A)(2) was not 
unconstitutionally vague.  State v. Carrick, 9th Dist. No. 09CA0077, 2010-Ohio-
6451, ¶ 15. 
{¶ 11} Thereafter, the court of appeals found its judgment in this case to 
be in conflict with the judgment of the Fourth District Court of Appeals in State v. 
Compher, 4th Dist. Nos. 1174 and 1175, 1985 WL 17456 (Dec. 9, 1985), and 
certified the record to this court for review.  We recognized that a conflict exists 
on the issue “[w]hether the ‘making unreasonable noise’ provision of [R.C.] 
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2917.11(A)(2) is unconstitutionally void for vagueness.”  State v. Carrick, 128 
Ohio St.3d 1443, 2011-Ohio-1618, 944 N.E.2d 693. 
{¶ 12} At issue is whether R.C. 2917.11(A)(2) provides sufficient notice 
for a person of ordinary intelligence to understand what he or she is required to do 
under the law.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that R.C. 2917.11(A)(2) 
does provide sufficient notice and thus is not void for vagueness.  Therefore, 
Carrick’s due-process rights were not violated and we affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
II.  Analysis 
{¶ 13} R.C. 2917.11(A)(2) states, “No person shall recklessly cause 
inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to another by * * * [m]aking unreasonable 
noise * * *.” 
{¶ 14} Carrick claims that R.C. 2917.11(A)(2) is unconstitutionally void 
for vagueness.  “Under the vagueness doctrine, statutes which do not fairly inform 
a person of what is prohibited will be found unconstitutional as violative of due 
process.”  State v. Reeder, 18 Ohio St.3d 25, 26, 479 N.E.2d 280 (1985), citing 
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926); 
Columbus v. Thompson, 25 Ohio St.2d 26, 266 N.E.2d 571 (1971).  However, 
“’[i]mpossible standards of specificity are not required. * * * The test is whether 
the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct 
when measured by common understanding and practices.’ ”  Id., quoting Jordan 
v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231-232, 71 S.Ct. 703, 95 L.Ed. 886 (1951). 
{¶ 15} Carrick argued to the lower courts that the statute was 
unconstitutional on its face and as-applied.  However, it is not clear from his brief 
whether he is asserting both arguments to this court.  A facial challenge requires 
that “the challenging party * * * show that the statute is vague ‘not in the sense 
that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but 
comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of 
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conduct is specified at all.’ ”  State v. Anderson, 57 Ohio St.3d 168, 171, 566 
N.E.2d 1224 (1991), quoting Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S.Ct. 
1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971).  Stated another way, “the challenger must show that 
upon examining the statute, an individual of ordinary intelligence would not 
understand what he is required to do under the law.”  Id.  Therefore, Carrick 
“must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statute was so unclear that he 
could not reasonably understand that it prohibited the acts in which he engaged.”  
Id., citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 
(1954), 25 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Criminal Law, Section 8, at 106 (1981). 
{¶ 16} “In an as-applied challenge, the challenger ‘contends that 
application of the statute in the particular context in which he has acted, or in 
which he proposes to act, [is] unconstitutional.’ ”  State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 
507, 2007-Ohio-606, 861 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 17, quoting Ada v. Guam Soc. of 
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 113 S.Ct. 633, 121 L.Ed.2d 564 
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Thus, an as-applied challenge focuses on the 
particular application of the statute. 
{¶ 17} R.C. 2917.11(A)(2) withstands both avenues of attack. 
{¶ 18} Guidance in resolving this issue is found in Columbus v. Kim, 118 
Ohio St.3d 93, 2008-Ohio-1817, 886 N.E.2d 217, which the Ninth District relied 
upon in this case.  In Kim, Rebecca Kim was charged with harboring an 
unreasonably loud or disturbing animal in violation of Columbus City Code 
2327.14.  Id., ¶ 3.  That code section states that  "[n]o person shall keep or harbor 
any animal which howls, barks, or emits audible sounds that are unreasonably 
loud or disturbing and which are of such character, intensity and duration as to 
disturb the peace and quiet of the neighborhood or to be detrimental to life and 
health of any individual.”  Id., ¶ 6. 
{¶ 19} Kim argued that the ordinance was void for vagueness.  Id., ¶ 1.  
However, we did not agree “that Columbus City Code 2327.14 provides ‘no 
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standard of conduct * * * at all.’ ”  Id., ¶ 9, quoting Anderson, 57 Ohio St.3d at 
171, 566 N.E.2d 1224.  Instead, we concluded that  
Columbus City Code 2327.14 is not unconstitutionally vague, 
because it sets forth sufficient standards to place a person of 
ordinary intelligence on notice of what conduct the ordinance 
prohibits.  The ordinance incorporates an objective standard by 
prohibiting only those noises that are “unreasonably loud or 
disturbing.”  The ordinance provides specific factors to be 
considered to gauge the level of the disturbance, namely, the 
“character, intensity and duration” of the disturbance.  Further, we 
recognize that “there are limitations in the English language with 
respect to being both specific and manageably brief, and it seems 
to us that although the prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on 
finding fault at any cost, they are set out in terms that the ordinary 
person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently 
understand and comply with.” 
Id., ¶ 9, quoting United States Civ. Serv. Comm. v. Natl. Assn. of Letter Carriers, 
AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 578-579, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973). 
{¶ 20} We find the analysis in Kim to be applicable here.  Contrary to the 
appellate court’s analysis in the conflict case, Compher, and Carrick’s assertions 
in this case, the statute at issue here does provide adequate qualifying language to 
prevent the statute from being unconstitutionally vague.  R.C. 2917.11(A)(2) sets 
forth sufficient standards to place a person of ordinary intelligence on notice of 
what conduct the statute prohibits.  It incorporates an objective standard by 
prohibiting only noise that is “unreasonable.”  This objective standard undermines 
Carrick’s assertion that R.C. 2917.11(A)(2) permits hypersensitive persons to 
impose criminal liability on others. Further, it enumerates specific factors—
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“inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to another”—with which to judge the level 
of the disturbance. 
{¶ 21} Additionally, the statute requires a culpable mental state of 
recklessness.  Therefore, in order to violate R.C. 2917.11(A)(2), a person must act 
“with heedless indifference to the consequences,” in “perversely disregard[ing] a 
known risk that his conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a 
certain nature.”  R.C. 2901.22(C). 
{¶ 22} The record contains sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to 
conclude that the loud bass music emanating from Carrick’s Halloween party was 
loud enough to constitute “unreasonable noise” that “inconvenience[d], 
annoy[ed], or alarm[ed] * * * another * * *.”  R.C. 2917.11(A)(2).  More 
specifically, Golgosky, Klenz and McCloud were inconvenienced and annoyed by 
the loud bass music.  A person of ordinary intelligence would understand that 
R.C. 2917.11(A)(2) proscribes playing music at a late hour at such a volume that 
it keeps the neighbors from sleeping, causes windows to vibrate on a house a 
quarter mile away, and prompts numerous calls of complaint to authorities.  
Moreover, prior to citing Carrick, law-enforcement officers visited the property to 
advise Carrick that the music was so loud that it was generating complaints from 
his neighbors, and they warned him to lower the volume.  Carrick has failed to 
establish “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statute was so unclear that he could 
not reasonably understand that it prohibited the acts in which he engaged.” 
Anderson, 57 Ohio St.3d at 171, 566 N.E.2d 1224. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 23} Accordingly, we conclude that R.C. 2971.11(A)(2) is neither 
unconstitutionally vague on its face nor as applied to Carrick.  We answer the 
certified question in the negative and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, 
and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Daniel R. Lutz, Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney, and Latecia E. 
Wiles, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Clarke W. Owens, for appellant. 
______________________