Case Title: People v. Hopp

Citation: 

Docket Number: 95574

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2004-02-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 95574-Agenda 18-September 2003.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 							TIFFANY HOPP, Appellee.
Opinion filed February 20, 2004.
	 
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Tiffany Hopp, was found guilty by a jury of conspiracy
to commit first degree murder. The appellate court reversed her conviction
on the ground that the trial court committed plain error when it failed to
give sua sponte a required jury instruction defining first degree murder.
336 Ill. App. 3d 523. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal.
177 Ill. 2d R. 315. We now reverse and affirm defendant's conviction.
BACKGROUND
	In the early morning of December 20, 2000, 16-year-old J.S.
entered the home of James Hopp in Nauvoo and hit James on the head
with a fireplace poker while he slept. James was seriously injured by the
blow but has since recovered. J.S. and another juvenile, M.H., were
arrested near the Hopp residence by a police officer who was responding
to the scene. At the time of the attack, defendant Tiffany Hopp, James'
estranged wife, was in California with the couple's four children, visiting
Tiffany's mother. After defendant returned from California, she went to the
Hancock County sheriff's department to be interviewed about the attack
on her husband. She gave two statements regarding her involvement in the
attack, the second of which was videotaped. She was then arrested and
later charged by information with conspiracy to commit first degree
murder, and with attempted first degree murder and home invasion on a
theory of accountability for the actions of J.S. and M.H.
	J.S. and M.H. testified against defendant at trial. Both testified that
J.S. was defendant's boyfriend. J.S. was 16 years old at the time of the
attack on James, while defendant was 26. Both J.S. and M.H. testified
about numerous conversations they had with defendant in the weeks prior
to the attack. During those conversations the three discussed various plans
to kill James, including using a shotgun, burning down the house, and
cutting James' throat. Defendant criticized these plans. For example, she
opined that a shotgun would make too much noise. The trio also discussed
fabricating alibis by, for example, going to a movie theater in another town,
obtaining tickets, and then slipping out of the theater to go to Nauvoo and
kill James.
	J.S. testified that "[w]e finalized the plan" shortly before defendant
and the children left for California. The final plan was for J.S. and M.H.
to go to the Hopp house early in the morning during the weekend. J.S.
testified that it was decided to use the poker at his suggestion, and that he
had the idea because he "saw it on TV a lot." M.H. testified that his role
was to accompany J.S. to make sure he would go through with it. Both
testified that M.H. was to receive a car for his involvement while
defendant would get custody of the four children, the house, and possibly
proceeds from insurance on James' life.
	The State played defendant's videotaped statement for the jury. In
it she maintained that she discussed killing James with J.S. and M.H. only
so she could talk the boys out of it by pointing out flaws in their plans. She
also claimed she was afraid J.S. would leave her if she told him not to kill
James. Defendant also introduced a letter that J.S. wrote to James after
the attack in which J.S. stated that defendant "didn't plan anything, she
didn't talk me into anything, if anyone deserves her charges it's [M.H.]."
	A police officer who was present when defendant gave both
statements testified that defendant was generally more "accountable" in the
untaped statement. The officer testified that in the untaped statement
defendant admitted that when she sent a message to J.S. via the internet
stating that he had one more day, she meant that he had one more day left
in which to kill James. In the taped statement she claimed that she meant
J.S. had one more day to be without her, but admitted she did not correct
him when she realized he understood it to mean that he had one more day
to kill James. A second officer testified that while he was transporting
defendant to court the day after her arrest she asked him why she was
charged with solicitation to commit murder. Before he could answer,
defendant stated, "We committed a conspiracy to kill [James] but we
didn't do a solicitation to kill [James]." J.S. testified that when he wrote
to James that defendant did not plan anything, the statement was not
accurate. J.S. testified further that defendant did not come up with any of
the ideas about how to kill James.
	The jury was instructed on the elements of conspiracy and the other
two charged crimes. However, neither party tendered a jury instruction
defining first degree murder, the object offense of the conspiracy, and no
such instruction was given. The failure to instruct was not raised in a
posttrial motion. The jury found defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit
first degree murder and not guilty of attempted first degree murder and
home invasion. The court later sentenced defendant to seven years in the
Department of Corrections.
ANALYSIS
	Defendant did not tender a jury instruction defining first degree
murder, nor did she assert in her posttrial motion that it was error to omit
the instruction. On appeal, defendant argued that the court erroneously
failed to give a nonpattern jury instruction she had tendered and that the
court committed plain error when it failed to give an instruction defining
first degree murder sua sponte. The appellate court held that the court did
not err in refusing the nonpattern jury instruction but reversed defendant's
conviction, over a dissent, on the ground that the failure to instruct the jury
on the definition of first degree murder for purposes of the conspiracy
count was plain error. The sole issue before us is whether that failure to
instruct on the definition of first degree murder was plain error.
	Supreme Court Rule 451(a) requires that in a criminal case, if the
court determines the jury should be instructed on a subject, and the Illinois
Pattern Jury Instruction (IPI), Criminal, contains an applicable instruction,
then the IPI instruction "shall" be given unless the court determines it does
not accurately state the law. 177 Ill. 2d R. 451(a); People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 116 (1994). The court in this case gave the IPI instructions for
a charge of conspiracy other than certain drug conspiracies. See Illinois
Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, Nos. 6.03, 6.04 (4th ed. 2000)
(hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th). The committee note to Instruction 6.03
states that the court "must" also give an instruction defining the offense that
is the alleged subject of the conspiracy. IPI Criminal 4th No. 6.03,
Committee Note. The user's guide to IPI Criminal 4th states, "If a
Committee Note indicates to give another instruction, that is a mandatory
requirement." IPI Criminal 4th, User's Guide, at VIII. Thus it was error
for the court to fail to give the IPI instruction defining first degree murder.	
	Supreme Court Rule 366 provides that a party that fails to tender a
jury instruction may not raise the failure to give the instruction on appeal.
155 Ill. 2d R. 366(b)(2)(i). However, Rule 451(c) provides that
"substantial defects [in jury instructions in criminal cases] are not waived
by failure to make timely objections thereto if the interests of justice
require." 177 Ill. 2d R. 451(c).
	Rule 451(c)'s exception to the waiver rule for substantial defects
applies when there is a grave error or when the case is so factually close
that fundamental fairness requires that the jury be properly instructed.
People v. Thurman, 104 Ill. 2d 326, 329-30 (1984); People v.
Huckstead, 91 Ill. 2d 536, 544 (1982). The tests for application of Rule
451(c)'s exception to the waiver rule are "strict tests" that "demonstrate
that the exception to the waiver rule is limited and is applicable only to
serious errors which severely threaten the fundamental fairness of the
defendant's trial." People v. Roberts, 75 Ill. 2d 1, 15 (1979). The
function of jury instructions is to convey to the jurors the law that applies
to the facts so they can reach a correct conclusion. People v. Fuller, 205 Ill. 2d 308, 343 (2002). Thus, the erroneous omission of a jury instruction
rises to the level of plain error only when the omission creates a serious
risk that the jurors incorrectly convicted the defendant because they did
not understand the applicable law, so as to severely threaten the fairness
of the trial. In People v. Ogunsola, we reversed defendant's conviction
because an omitted jury instruction "removed from the jury's consideration
a disputed issue essential to the determination of defendant's guilt or
innocence." People v. Ogunsola, 87 Ill. 2d 216, 223 (1981). The
defendant in Ogunsola was charged with deceptive practices. The jury
was given an IPI instruction that it should find the defendant guilty if the
State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant wrote a check
with the intent to pay the victim while knowing the check would not be
paid. The jury should have been instructed that it also had to find the
defendant intended to defraud the victim, because intent to defraud is an
element of the offense of deceptive practices. We reasoned that intent to
defraud is an essential element because it is possible to possess the
element of knowledge the check will not be paid, on which the jury was
instructed, without possessing intent to defraud. Ogunsola, 87 Ill. 2d  at
221. Because the principal contested issue relevant to defendant's
culpability was whether he intended to defraud, we held that "fundamental
fairness required that the jury be instructed" it had to find intent to defraud.
Ogunsola, 87 Ill. 2d  at 223.
	By contrast, in People v. Underwood, we held that it was not plain
error for the court to fail to give an IPI instruction on the definition of
"reasonable belief." People v. Underwood, 72 Ill. 2d 124, 131 (1978).
The parties in Underwood agreed that the essential issue bearing on the
defendant's guilt was whether he justifiably acted in self-defense when he
stabbed the victim. The court instructed the jury that a person is justified
in the use of force if he "reasonably believes" his conduct is necessary to
defend himself. The defendant failed to tender the IPI instruction that
"reasonably believes" means "the person concerned, acting as a
reasonable man, believes" and the instruction was not given. We reasoned
that, while it would have been plain error to fail to instruct the jury on self-defense, the definitional instruction was not "so basic to the given
instruction on self-defense" that it was plain error for the court to fail to
give it sua sponte. Underwood, 72 Ill. 2d  at 130.
	Before addressing the defendant's argument that the omission in her
case was plain error, we must address the opinion of the appellate court.
As will be explained below, defendant argues that a conviction for
conspiracy to commit first degree murder requires intent that the victim be
killed. The appellate court expressly rejected this premise, but reversed
on other grounds. 336 Ill. App. 3d at 529. If the appellate court's grounds
were sufficient to reverse defendant's conviction, we would affirm its
judgment without reaching defendant's argument. However, for the
following reasons we find the appellate court's grounds insufficient.
	The appellate court declined to follow People v. Carey, rejecting the
dissent's suggestion that Carey is on point. 336 Ill. App. 3d at 528, citing
People v. Carey, 94 Ill. App. 3d 631 (1981). In Carey, defendant was
convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and solicitation to commit
murder. She failed to tender an instruction defining murder, but argued on
appeal that the failure to give such an instruction was plain error. The
Carey court applied Underwood. Carey, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 634, citing
Underwood, 72 Ill. 2d  at 124, 130-31. It found no plain error because
"the definitional instruction omitted was not so basic to the given
instructions on solicitation and conspiracy that under the facts of this case
the failure of the trial court to sua sponte give it resulted in an unfair trial."
Carey, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 637.
	The appellate court sought to distinguish Carey on three grounds.
336 Ill. App. 3d at 528-29. The dissent argued that these grounds were
insufficient. 336 Ill. App. 3d at 532-33 (Holdridge, J., dissenting).
Although we, of course, are not bound by Carey, we note that the result
advocated by the dissent corresponds to our disposition today. See 336
Ill. App. 3d at 533 (Holdridge, J., dissenting).
	We now turn to the appellate court's positive arguments for granting
defendant relief. Without referring to the record to explain how
defendant's trial may have been rendered unfair by the omission of the
instruction defining first degree murder, the appellate court held that the
omission was "a substantial and prejudicial defect." 336 Ill. App. 3d at
529. However, we have never held any such omission to be plain error
without considering the effect that the omission had on defendant's trial.
On the contrary, the result in Underwood demonstrates that omission of
the definition of a term used to instruct the jury on the essential issue in the
case is not necessarily plain error. See Underwood, 72 Ill. 2d  at 130-31.
Furthermore, even an incorrect instruction on an element of the offense is
not necessarily reversible error. People v. Jones, 81 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (1979).
In Jones the jury was erroneously instructed that a mental state other than
intent to kill could support a guilty verdict for attempted murder. The
victim in Jones survived being abducted, robbed, and shot four times. The
defendant did not deny that the shooter intended to kill, but denied
responsibility for the shooting. We upheld his conviction for attempted
murder, holding that the erroneous instruction on the intent element of
attempted murder was harmless where intent to kill was "blatantly evident"
from the evidence. Jones, 81 Ill. 2d  at 10.
	The appellate court appears to have relied on the following language,
which it quoted from our decision in People v. Koshiol:
		" ' "[I]t would seem utterly meaningless to instruct a jury on
attempt to commit a 'specific offense' without defining the
specific offense alleged to have been committed. Such procedure
would leave the jury entirely to its own devices in determining
what specific offense the court was referring to in its
definition of attempt as well as in determining whether the
defendant had taken a substantial step toward its commission."
' " (Emphasis in original.) 336 Ill. App. 3d at 528-29, quoting
People v. Carey, 94 Ill. App. 3d 631, 636, 418 N.E.2d 1119,
1122 (1981), quoting People v. Koshiol, 45 Ill. 2d 573, 579
(1970).
	In Koshiol the defendant poisoned her husband but failed to kill him.
The jury was instructed on attempted murder and on the definition of
murder. The defendant argued that it would only confuse the jury to
instruct on the definition of murder when no one died. We held that it was
not error to give the definitional instruction. Koshiol, 45 Ill. 2d  at 579.
Moreover, in Koshiol the instruction on attempt did not name the object
offense but only spoke of some unnamed "specific offense." It was only
the definition of first degree murder that told the jury what "specific
offense" was allegedly attempted. In this case the instruction on conspiracy
did tell the jury the object offense was first degree murder. Thus Koshiol
is distinguishable. We conclude that the reasoning of the appellate court
fails to show that defendant is entitled to relief.
	We now turn to defendant's argument. Defendant asserts that the
facts in this case reveal that the erroneous omission of an instruction
defining first degree murder rises to the level of plain error. Her argument
relies on two contentions: (1) the jury may have concluded that the State
failed to prove that she intended that James be killed, but (2) the jury may
have convicted her of conspiracy because the omission led it to believe
mistakenly that it could convict based on some mental state short of intent
to kill.
	As explained above, an omitted jury instruction constitutes plain error
only when the omission creates a serious risk that the jurors incorrectly
convicted the defendant because they did not understand the applicable
law, so as to severely threaten the fairness of the trial. This rule does not
require that defendant prove beyond doubt that her trial was unfair
because the omitted instruction misled the jury to convict her. It does
require that she show that the error caused a severe threat to the fairness
of her trial. Ogunsola and Underwood exemplify cases where an omitted
instruction did severely threaten the fairness of a trial and one where it did
not, respectively.
	Before considering whether the omission in this case severely
threatened the fairness of defendant's trial, we must answer two
preliminary questions. First, what would a correct instruction have told the
jury? Second, what was the essential disputed issue in this case?
	The committee note to the IPI instruction defining conspiracy
mandates that if a defendant is charged with conspiracy to commit first
degree murder, Instruction 7.01 defining first degree murder must also be
given. IPI Criminal 4th No. 6.03, Committee Note. The committee note
to the instruction defining first degree murder, Instruction 7.01, further
provides that when the prosecution is for an inchoate offense such as
attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy, paragraphs [2] through [4] of the
instruction are not to be given. IPI Criminal 4th No. 7.01, Committee
Note. The instruction, so truncated, states in relevant part:
			"A person commits the offense of first degree murder when
he kills an individual *** if, in performing the acts which cause
the death,
				[1] he intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that
individual[.]" IPI Criminal 4th No. 7.01.
The committee note further requires, in attempted first degree murder
cases, that paragraph [1] be modified to eliminate the intent to do great
bodily harm and thus require the intent to kill. IPI Criminal 4th No. 7.01,
Committee Note. Defendant argues that this further requirement properly
applies to conspiracy cases as well as attempt. As defendant points out,
we have held that, because a person is not guilty of attempted murder
unless he intended to kill, jury instructions in attempted first degree murder
cases must make clear that proof of nothing less than intent to kill is
required to convict. People v. Harris, 72 Ill. 2d 16, 27 (1978); People
v. Trinkle, 68 Ill. 2d 198, 204 (1977). We reasoned that if a jury were
instructed that the lesser intent to do great bodily harm is sufficient, then
it could find a defendant who intended to seriously hurt the victim but not
kill him guilty of attempted murder when, in law, he would only be guilty
of aggravated battery. Trinkle, 68 Ill. 2d  at 201. Defendant urges that our
reasoning applies to conspiracy as well as attempt. The State agrees.
	We also agree. The elements of the crime of conspiracy are (1)
agreement with another that an offense be committed, (2) intent that the
offense be committed and (3) an act in furtherance of the agreement by the
defendant or a co-conspirator. 720 ILCS 5/8-2(a) (West 2000).
Because murder requires that a victim die, logic requires that an agreement
to commit a crime, absent intent to kill, cannot be conspiracy to commit
any sort of murder. A defendant who agreed with others to beat someone
and who only intended that a beating occur may be guilty of conspiracy of
some sort, but not of conspiracy to commit murder. Thus, jury instructions
in cases of conspiracy to commit first degree murder must make clear that
the State must prove that the defendant intended a killing. We conclude
that, had the jury in this case been properly instructed, it would have been
given a definition of first degree murder that, when combined with the
instructions on conspiracy, would make clear the State must prove
defendant intended that her husband James be killed.
	We note that our decision to follow Trinkle and Harris to conclude
that the jury should have been told expressly that proof of intent to kill is
required to convict a person of conspiracy does not commit us to follow
the disposition of those cases. As the appellate court recognized, those
cases involved an instruction that misstated the law. See 336 Ill. App. 3d
at 527. We find the case at bar, where the jury was not given any
instruction, is clearly distinguishable.
	The second preliminary question concerns the essential disputed issue
in this case. It was undisputed that defendant discussed killing James with
J.S. and M.H. on many occasions, and that she never told them not to kill
James. The disputed issue was what defendant intended, not what she did.
The State argued to the jury that she wanted James dead. Defendant
argued she did not intend that James be killed, but only wanted to talk the
boys out of killing him by finding flaws in their plans. As we have just
explained, conspiracy to commit first degree murder requires intent to kill.
Thus the essential disputed issue was whether defendant intended that
James be killed.
	We now turn to defendant's first point, which is that the jury may
have concluded that the State did not prove that defendant intended that
James be killed. Defendant attempts to support this by pointing out
evidence before the jury that purported to show that she did not intend
that James be killed. However, the evidence on the issue of defendant's
intent was overwhelming. Intent to kill may be proved by the
circumstances. People v. Williams, 165 Ill. 2d 51, 64 (1995). The
undisputed circumstances of this case are that defendant participated in
numerous discussions about killing James and criticized various methods
of killing him. For example, she advised the boys not to use a shotgun
because it would be too loud. She also criticized various ways to establish
an alibi. She never said anything before the attack to indicate that she did
not want the boys to kill James. A reasonable juror could and very likely
would infer intent to kill from these circumstances.
	In her videotaped statement, and at trial through counsel's closing
argument, defendant maintained that in spite of her conduct her intention
was that James not be killed. She explained that she wished to talk the
boys out of killing James by pointing out flaws in their plan. She explained
her failure to do anything more to oppose the idea of killing James by
claiming that she, a 26-year-old woman, was afraid of losing her 16-year-old boyfriend, J.S., if she overtly opposed the idea of murdering the father
of her four children.
	The mere fact that defendant offered an exculpatory explanation for
her conduct is insufficient to show that it is likely that the jury concluded
that the State failed to prove that defendant intended that James be killed.
Of course, it is for the trier of fact to judge defendant's credibility. See
People v. Locascio, 106 Ill. 2d 529, 537 (1985). In this case, it is
apparent the jury did not accept her explanation.
	Defendant also offers the following argument. The jury acquitted her
on the charge of attempted first degree murder on an accountability
theory. When the jury was instructed on attempted murder, it was told that
the elements are (1) defendant, or someone for whose conduct defendant
is legally responsible, performed a substantial step toward killing an
individual and (2) defendant, or someone for whose conduct defendant is
legally responsible, did so with intent to kill an individual. It is undisputed
that J.S. hit James with the poker, which clearly was a substantial step
toward killing James. It is also undisputed that defendant participated in
conversations about killing James. If those conversations supported the
finding of an agreement necessary for defendant's conviction for
conspiracy, they must also support a finding of abetting in planning, which
would make her legally responsible for J.S.'s actions. Thus, defendant
concludes, the only logical explanation for the acquittal on attempted
murder is that the jury thought the State had not proved intent to kill.
	Defendant's argument fails upon consideration of the whole record.
The jury also acquitted on the charge of home invasion on an
accountability theory. The jury was told that the elements of home invasion
are that defendant or one for whose conduct she is legally responsible was
(1) not a peace officer acting in the line of duty who (2) knowingly and
without authority entered the dwelling of another when he (3) knew or had
reason to know that a person was present and (4) intentionally caused
injury to James Hopp, a person within the dwelling place. The undisputed
facts establish all the elements of home invasion as to J.S. However,
defense counsel attacked the notion of legal accountability during closing
argument. One of defense counsel's themes was "I am not my brother's
keeper." Thus defendant's acquittal on the home invasion charge indicates
that the jury decided defendant was not accountable for J.S.'s actions.
Rejection of accountability for J.S.'s actions also explains the acquittal on
the charge of attempted murder. On the other hand, defendant's theory
that the jury thought the State did not prove intent to kill does not explain
the acquittal on home invasion, because intent to kill is not an element of
home invasion. Therefore, the fact the jury in this case acquitted defendant
of attempted murder provides little or no reason to conclude the jury
thought that the State did not prove defendant intended that James be
killed.
	In sum, we conclude that there is inadequate support in the record for
defendant's contention that the jury may have thought that the State did
not prove that defendant intended that James be killed. Her contention
amounts to mere speculation. Speculation about what the jury may have
thought is insufficient to show that the omission of the instruction defining
first degree murder severely threatened the fairness of defendant's trial and
that it was plain error.
	In addition to suggesting that the jury may have concluded that intent
to kill was not proven, defendant contends that the omission of the
instruction defining first degree murder may have misled the jury to think
that it could convict based on some mental state other than intent to kill.
However, there is nothing in the record that indicates that the jury may
have been misled.
	The jury was instructed that it should not convict defendant of
conspiracy unless the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant intended that the offense of first degree murder be committed.
As the dissenting justice below stressed, it is commonly understood that
to murder someone is to kill him. See 336 Ill. App. 3d at 531 (Holdridge,
J., dissenting). Jurors are not required to set aside the observations and
inferences that they would ordinarily make. See IPI Criminal 4th No.
1.01[10] (instructing jurors to consider the evidence in light of "your own
observations and experience in life"). The jurors, knowing that to murder
is to kill, would undoubtedly understand from the instruction given in this
case that the State had to prove that defendant intended that James be
killed. See also People v. Ambrose, 28 Ill. App. 3d 627, 633 (1975)
(holding that, because lay persons have general knowledge of what armed
robbery is, failure to instruct jury on the definition of armed robbery in a
conspiracy case is not reversible error).
	Defendant argues that the jurors may have been misled if they knew
that in Illinois a person can be guilty of first degree murder based on
mental states other than intent to kill, such as intent to do great bodily harm
or intent to commit a forcible felony. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 2000).
Jurors who know this fact about Illinois law might mistakenly infer that
defendant could be guilty of conspiracy to commit first degree murder if
she only intended that James suffer great bodily harm or that he be the
victim of a forcible felony. Defendant urges that we cannot presume that
jurors are ignorant of Illinois law.
	Accepting, arguendo, that the jurors did know that one can commit
first degree murder without intending to kill, we still find little likelihood that
the jury was misled. At no point in the record does anyone suggest to the
jury that intent to kill is not required. Therefore, we must presume that the
jury relied on the commonly understood fact that to murder is to kill
instead of mistakenly inferring that intent to kill is not required.
CONCLUSION
	We conclude that defendant has not shown from the record in this
case that there is any significant likelihood that the jury concluded that the
State did not prove that defendant intended that James be killed. The
evidence on the disputed issue, whether defendant intended that James be
killed, was overwhelming. Defendant has merely speculated that the jury
may have thought that intent to kill was not proved and that it may have
convicted her of conspiracy because the omitted jury instruction on the
definition of first degree murder misled it to think that intent to kill is not
required. However, such speculation is insufficient to show that the
omission severely threatened the fairness of defendant's trial. Therefore,
the omission does not rise to the level of plain error. We reverse the
judgment of the appellate court and affirm the defendant's conviction for
conspiracy to commit first degree murder.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.