Case Title: Johnson v. Cintas Corp. No. 2

Citation: 2012 WI 31

Docket Number: 2009AP002549

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2012-03-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
2012 WI 31 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP2549 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
Robert Johnson, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Cintas Corporation No. 2, 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
United Healthcare, 
          Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 331 Wis. 2d 51, 794 N.W. 2d 475 
(Ct. App 2011 – Published) 
PDC No: 2011 WI App 5 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 27, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 1, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
CIRCUIT   
 
COUNTY: 
KENOSHA 
 
JUDGE: 
DAVID M. BASTIANELLI 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J. dissents (Opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J. did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Robert I. DuMez, John V. O’Connor, and O’Connor, DuMez Alia, 
& McTernan, S.C., Kenosha, and oral argument by John V. 
O’Connor. 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief filed by 
Terry E. Johnson, Ahndrea R. Van Den Elzen, and Peterson, 
Johnson, & Murray, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Terry 
E. Johnson. 
 
 
2012 WI 31
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP2549 
(L.C. No. 
2007CV633) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Robert Johnson, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Cintas Corporation No. 2, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
United Healthcare, 
 
          Defendant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 27, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, Johnson v. Cintas 
Corp. No. 2, 2011 WI App 5, 331 Wis. 2d 51, 794 N.W.2d 475, that 
reversed a default judgment entered by the Kenosha County 
Circuit Court1 in favor of Robert Johnson (Johnson) and against 
Cintas Corporation No. 2 (Cintas No. 2).  Because Johnson's 
summons and complaint did not name Cintas No. 2 as a defendant 
                                                 
1 The Honorable David M. Bastianelli presided. 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
2 
 
and instead named Cintas Corporation (Cintas), the parent 
corporation of Cintas No. 2, the court of appeals concluded that 
the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over Cintas No. 
2, and therefore, the default judgment is void.  Accordingly, 
the court of appeals reversed the default judgment and remanded 
the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
¶2 
On appeal to this court, Johnson argues that the 
circuit court had personal jurisdiction over Cintas No. 2 
because, despite not being named in the summons and complaint, 
Cintas No. 2 was served with the summons and complaint and was 
not prejudiced by Johnson's error.  Alternatively, Johnson 
contends that his pleadings ought to be construed as only 
technically defective on the grounds that Cintas No. 2 held 
itself out as Cintas. 
¶3 
We disagree with Johnson on both counts and therefore 
affirm. 
¶4 
We 
conclude 
that 
service 
in 
this 
case 
was 
fundamentally defective because Johnson failed to name Cintas 
No. 2 as a defendant in his summons and complaint, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 801.02(1) and 801.09(1).  Therefore, the circuit 
court lacked personal jurisdiction over Cintas No. 2, regardless 
of whether or not the defect prejudiced Cintas No. 2 and 
regardless of the manner in which Cintas No. 2 held itself out 
to the public or to Johnson specifically.  Because the circuit 
court lacked personal jurisdiction over Cintas No. 2, the 
default judgment entered against Cintas No. 2 is void. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
3 
 
¶5 
On April 12, 2007, Johnson filed a summons and 
complaint against Cintas; United Healthcare; Marvin Crandall 
(Crandall); and XYZ Corporation, a fictitious name designating 
Crandall's automobile liability insurer.2  According to his 
complaint, Johnson was an employee of Cintas and was required to 
use his personal vehicle in the course of his employment.  As a 
result, Johnson alleged, he had automobile liability insurance 
coverage through Cintas.   
¶6 
In his complaint, Johnson alleged that on July 2, 
2006, he was riding as a passenger in his own vehicle driven by 
Crandall with Johnson's permission when Crandall negligently 
operated the vehicle, causing it to collide with another 
vehicle.  Johnson alleged that as a result of the accident, he 
was 
permanently 
injured, 
experienced 
pain 
and 
suffering, 
incurred past and future medical expenses, and had a loss of 
earning capacity. 
¶7 
In addition, Johnson claimed that both he and Crandall 
qualified 
as 
insureds under Cintas's automobile liability 
insurance coverage and consequently were entitled to benefits 
payable by Cintas.  Cintas's refusal to pay any benefits, 
according to Johnson, constituted a breach of contract and bad 
faith. 
                                                 
2 See Wis. Stat. § 807.12 (2007-08) (permitting a plaintiff 
to designate an unknown defendant by a fictitious name until the 
defendant's true name is ascertained). 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
4 
 
¶8 
On April 19, 2007, Johnson served his summons and 
complaint upon the registered agent for Cintas No. 2, a wholly 
owned subsidiary of the named defendant, Cintas.  Unlike Cintas 
No. 2, Cintas is neither registered nor licensed to do business 
in Wisconsin and does not have a registered agent for service of 
process in Wisconsin.  Cintas is a foreign public corporation, 
incorporated under the laws of Washington with a principal place 
of business in Ohio.   
¶9 
Neither Cintas nor Cintas No. 2 answered Johnson's 
complaint.  Accordingly, Johnson's counsel filed an affidavit of 
no answer, and on June 15, 2007, Johnson moved for default 
judgment against Cintas.  Like his summons and complaint, 
Johnson's motion for default judgment was served upon the 
registered agent for Cintas No. 2, not Cintas. 
¶10 On July 2, 2007, Cintas, through its counsel in 
Illinois,3 filed an emergency motion to dismiss Johnson's motion 
for default judgment on the grounds that the circuit court 
lacked personal jurisdiction over Cintas.  Cintas's motion 
explained that Johnson's employer was actually Cintas No. 2, not 
Cintas as Johnson had alleged in his complaint.  Cintas attached 
to its motion various corporate records from the Wisconsin 
Department of Financial Institutions (DFI), showing that Cintas 
is not a registered corporation in Wisconsin.  By contrast, the 
                                                 
3 According to the record before this court, the circuit 
court was later apprised of the fact that Cintas's counsel 
appeared before the court without first seeking pro hac vice 
admission as required by SCR 10.03(4)(b). 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
5 
 
DFI records reveal that Cintas No. 2, incorporated under the 
laws of Nevada with a principal place of business in Ohio, is a 
registered corporation in Wisconsin, as of June 1, 2000.  
Because Johnson failed to serve his summons and complaint upon 
Cintas, Cintas argued that the circuit court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over Cintas and consequently could not enter 
default judgment against Cintas. 
¶11 Alternatively, assuming the circuit court found that 
Cintas was properly served, Cintas maintained that default 
judgment would still be inappropriate because Cintas's failure 
to answer was unintentional and because Cintas had a valid 
defense to Johnson's claims.  Specifically, Cintas alleged that 
the accident that injured Johnson was a result of both Johnson 
and Crandall being intoxicated. 
¶12 Three days later, on July 5, 2007, Johnson filed a 
letter with the circuit court, acknowledging receipt of Cintas's 
emergency motion to dismiss Johnson's motion for default 
judgment and expressing his intention to amend his summons and 
complaint by changing the named defendant from Cintas to Cintas 
No. 2.  Furthermore, relying on this court's decision in Hoesley 
v. La Crosse VFW Chapter, 46 Wis. 2d 501, 175 N.W.2d 214 (1970), 
Johnson submitted that default judgment should still be entered 
against Cintas No. 2 because Cintas No. 2 was the entity served. 
¶13 On July 6, 2007, the circuit court held a hearing on 
Johnson's motion for default judgment, at which only counsel for 
Johnson and counsel for Cintas were present.  Johnson moved to 
orally amend his summons and complaint to name Cintas No. 2 as 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
6 
 
the correct defendant.  The circuit court granted Johnson's 
motion to amend and then immediately granted default judgment in 
favor of Johnson and against Cintas No. 2.  The circuit court 
denied that Cintas No. 2 was entitled to notice of the amended 
summons and complaint.  The court reasoned that the amendment 
did not have the effect of bringing in Cintas No. 2 as a new 
party since Cintas No. 2 was the entity served with the original 
summons and complaint. 
¶14 On July 20, 2007, Cintas No. 2 filed an answer to both 
Johnson's complaint and amended complaint and moved to intervene 
and to set aside the default judgment.  That same date, by 
letter, the circuit court responded to Cintas No. 2, advising 
Cintas No. 2 that it need not intervene because the court 
already determined that it was a party to the action.  The 
circuit court further stated that it would not accept the filing 
of Cintas No. 2's answer because default judgment had already 
been entered.  Still, the court indicated that it would be 
willing to consider a motion for relief from the judgment under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07. 
¶15 Cintas No. 2 heeded the circuit court's suggestion and 
moved to vacate the default judgment under Wis. Stat. § 806.07.  
Specifically, Cintas No. 2 argued that it was entitled to relief 
from the default judgment on the grounds that Cintas No. 2's 
failure 
to 
answer 
was 
due 
to 
excusable 
neglect, 
see 
§ 806.07(1)(a); the judgment was void for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, see § 806.07(1)(d); or, alternatively, notions of 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
7 
 
fairness and justice weigh in favor of granting relief, see 
§ 806.07(1)(h). 
¶16 On September 11, 2007, the circuit court held a 
hearing on Cintas No. 2's motion to vacate the default judgment 
and granted the motion, finding that Cintas No. 2's failure to 
answer was due to mistake or excusable neglect under Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.07(1)(a). 
¶17 Nearly a year later, on August 19, 2008, Johnson filed 
a motion for reconsideration of the circuit court's order 
vacating the default judgment.4  According to Johnson, subsequent 
discovery had revealed that Cintas No. 2 held itself out as 
Cintas.  Thus, Johnson asserted, Cintas No. 2 was not actually 
misled by Johnson's pleadings; rather, Cintas No. 2 misled 
Johnson into referring to his employer as Cintas.  As examples, 
Johnson averred that both his offer of employment and employment 
agreement were prepared by Cintas and that his paycheck was 
administered by Cintas.  In addition, Johnson submitted an 
affidavit by Kenneth Uva, the Vice President and Representation 
Services Advisor of Cintas No. 2's registered agent, explaining 
that 
the 
registered agent immediately forwarded Johnson's 
summons 
and 
complaint 
to 
Cintas 
No. 
2, 
per 
Cintas's 
instructions.  Such evidence, Johnson asserted, demonstrates 
that Cintas No. 2's failure to timely answer was not excusable. 
                                                 
4 Alternatively, Johnson moved for sanctions as a result of 
Cintas No. 2's alleged failure to comply with Johnson's 
discovery requests.   
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
8 
 
¶18 The circuit court agreed with Johnson.  Accordingly, 
on February 10, 2009, the circuit court issued a written 
decision granting Johnson's motion to reconsider the court's 
order vacating the default judgment.  The court determined that 
the facts in this case are akin to those in Hoesley, 46 
Wis. 2d 501, in which the correct defendant was served despite 
being misnamed in the summons and complaint.  Because Cintas No. 
2 was the entity served, the court concluded that "allowing the 
amendment of the pleadings would not be adding a new party to 
this lawsuit."  Furthermore, persuaded by the South Carolina 
Court of Appeals' decision in McCall v. IKON, 611 S.E.2d 315 
(S.C. Ct. App. 2005), the court found that the misnomer in 
Johnson's summons and complaint was "due entirely to the actions 
of [Cintas No. 2] in terms of the business name it choose [sic] 
to operate under in the State of Wisconsin and in relation to 
[Johnson]."  Given those circumstances, the circuit court 
concluded that Cintas No. 2's failure to timely answer was the 
result of its own actions and neglect.  The court therefore 
granted Johnson's motion to reconsider, permitted Johnson to 
amend his pleadings to name Cintas No. 2 as the correct 
defendant, and entered default judgment against Cintas No. 2. 
¶19 Cintas No. 2 appealed, and the court of appeals 
reversed.  Johnson, 331 Wis. 2d 51.  Because Johnson's summons 
and complaint did not name Cintas No. 2 as required by Wis. 
Stat. §§ 801.02(1) and 801.09(1), the court of appeals concluded 
that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over Cintas 
No. 2, irrespective of whether Cintas No. 2 was served with or 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
9 
 
had notice of Johnson's pleadings.  Id., ¶17.  As such, the 
court of appeals held that the default judgment is void.  Id. 
¶20 The court of appeals rejected Johnson's argument that 
he simply misnamed the correct defendant.  Id., ¶14.  Instead, 
the court of appeals determined Johnson named the incorrect 
legal entity.  Id., ¶15.  As a result, the court of appeals 
ruled that the amendment of Johnson's pleadings had the effect 
of bringing a new party into the action, "[r]egardless of how 
Cintas No. 2 held itself to the public."  Id.  Absent service of 
the amended summons and complaint, the court of appeals 
concluded that the circuit court lacked the requisite personal 
jurisdiction to enter a default judgment against Cintas No. 2.  
See id., ¶¶15-17.  The court of appeals therefore reversed the 
default judgment and remanded the cause to the circuit court for 
further proceedings.  Id., ¶17. 
¶21 Johnson petitioned this court for review.  We accepted 
on May 25, 2011. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶22 In this case, the circuit court granted Johnson's 
motion to reconsider the court's order vacating the default 
judgment against Cintas No. 2.  The determination of whether to 
vacate a default judgment is within the circuit court's sound 
discretion. 
 
Ness 
v. 
Digital 
Dial 
Commc'ns, 
Inc., 
227 
Wis. 2d 592, 599, 596 N.W.2d 365 (1999); Dugenske v. Dugenske, 
80 Wis. 2d 64, 68, 257 N.W.2d 865 (1977).  We will not disturb 
the circuit court's discretionary determination to reconsider 
its order vacating the default judgment unless the court 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
10 
 
erroneously exercised its discretion.  See Ness, 227 Wis. 2d at 
599-600.  "A circuit court erroneously exercises its discretion 
if it applies an improper legal standard or makes a decision not 
reasonably supported by the facts of record."  260 N. 12th St., 
LLC v. DOT, 2011 WI 103, ¶38, 338 Wis. 2d 34, 808 N.W.2d 372.  
At the same time, whether a defect in a summons and complaint is 
fundamental such that it deprives the circuit court of personal 
jurisdiction is a question of law that this court reviews 
independently, without deference to the court of appeals or 
circuit court.  See Burnett v. Hill, 207 Wis. 2d 110, 121, 557 
N.W.2d 800 (1997); Bulik v. Arrow Realty, Inc. of Racine, 148 
Wis. 2d 441, 444, 434 N.W.2d 853 (Ct. App. 1988). 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶23 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 801 governs civil procedure as it 
relates to the commencement of an action.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 801.02(1) provides, in relevant part, that "a civil action in 
which a personal judgment is sought is commenced as to any 
defendant when a summons and a complaint naming the person as 
defendant are filed with the court," provided that the defendant 
is served with an authenticated copy of the summons and 
complaint within 90 days after filing.  See also Ness, 227 
Wis. 2d at 
601-02. 
 
A 
Wisconsin 
court 
obtains 
personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant by proper service of a summons 
upon 
the 
defendant. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 801.05, 
801.11.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 801.09 lists the required contents of a 
summons.  Relevant to this case, a summons must contain, inter 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
11 
 
alia, "the names and addresses of the parties to the action, 
plaintiff and defendant."  § 801.09(1). 
¶24 A summons serves two purposes.  First, a summons 
provides notice to the defendant that an action has been 
commenced against the defendant.  Ness, 227 Wis. 2d at 602; Am. 
Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 167 Wis. 2d 524, 
530, 481 N.W.2d 629 (1992); Hoesley, 46 Wis. 2d at 503; Bulik, 
148 Wis. 2d at 444.  Indeed, notice that apprises a party of the 
pendency of an action against it and affords the opportunity to 
present 
objections 
is 
regarded 
as 
"[a]n 
elementary 
and 
fundamental requirement of due process."  Mullane v. Cent. 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).  Second, 
consistent with Wis. Stat. §§ 801.05 and 801.11, a summons 
confers personal jurisdiction on a court over the defendant 
served.  Ness, 227 Wis. 2d at 602; Am. Family, 167 Wis. 2d at 
530; Bulik, 148 Wis. 2d at 444.   
¶25 Given that a defendant's constitutional right to due 
process is at stake, "'Wisconsin requires strict compliance with 
its rules of statutory service, even though the consequences may 
appear to be harsh.'"  Am. Family, 167 Wis. 2d at 531 (quoting 
Mech v. Borowski, 116 Wis. 2d 683, 686, 342 N.W.2d 759 (Ct. App. 
1983)).  In particular, "[t]he service of a summons in a manner 
prescribed by statute is a condition precedent to a valid 
exercise of personal jurisdiction," Danielson v. Brody Seating 
Co., 71 Wis. 2d 424, 429, 238 N.W.2d 531 (1976), as any action 
taken by a court over a defendant not properly served is a 
deprivation 
of 
that 
defendant's 
constitutional 
protection, 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
12 
 
Bulik, 148 Wis. 2d at 446.  Significantly, a defendant's actual 
notice of an action is not alone enough to confer personal 
jurisdiction upon the court; rather, "[s]ervice must be made in 
accordance with the manner prescribed by statute."  Danielson, 
71 Wis. 2d at 430. 
¶26 In keeping with the above rule, our courts have 
recognized a distinction between service that is fundamentally 
defective, such that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant in the first instance, and service that is merely 
technically defective.  See Schaefer v. Riegelman, 2002 WI 18, 
¶25, 250 Wis. 2d 494, 639 N.W.2d 715; Gaddis v. La Crosse 
Prods., Inc., 198 Wis. 2d 396, 401-02, 542 N.W.2d 454 (1996); 
Am. Family, 167 Wis. 2d at 533; Bulik, 148 Wis. 2d at 446; 
Cynthia L. Buchko et al., Wisconsin Civil Procedure Before Trial 
§ 3.60 (3d ed. 2007).  If the defect is fundamental, then the 
court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant, regardless 
of whether or not the defect prejudiced the defendant.  Am. 
Family, 167 Wis. 2d at 533.  If the defect is technical, 
however, then the court has personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant only if the complainant can show that the defect did 
not prejudice the defendant.  Id.  The burden rests on the 
complainant to show that service was not defective or, if 
service was defective, that the defect was merely technical and 
did not prejudice the defendant.  Id.   
¶27 We appreciate that the line between a fundamental 
defect and a technical defect can be a fine one.  Accordingly, 
we look to case law for guidance. 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
13 
 
¶28 In 
American 
Family, 
this 
court 
held 
that 
a 
complainant's failure to comply with the requirements of Wis. 
Stat. § 801.02(1) constitutes a fundamental defect that deprives 
the circuit court of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, 
regardless 
of 
whether 
or 
not 
the 
defect 
prejudiced 
the 
defendant.  167 Wis. 2d at 534; see also Gaddis, 198 Wis. 2d at 
402.  As aforementioned, § 801.02(1) directs that a civil action 
is commenced as to any defendant when a summons and complaint 
naming the person as defendant are filed with the court, 
provided that the defendant is served with an authenticated copy 
of the summons and complaint within 90 days5 after filing.  Thus, 
pursuant 
to 
this 
court's 
holding 
in 
American 
Family, 
a 
fundamental defect occurs when a complainant (a) fails to name 
the defendant in the summons and complaint; (b) fails to file 
with the court the summons and complaint; (c) serves the 
defendant with an unauthenticated copy of the summons and 
complaint; or (d) serves the defendant with an authenticated 
copy of the summons and complaint more than 90 days after 
filing.  See 167 Wis. 2d at 533-34. 
¶29 The instant case implicates the first of the four 
requirements 
identified 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.02(1): 
the 
requirement to name the defendant in the summons and complaint.  
That a complainant must name the defendant in the summons is 
                                                 
5 In 1998, the legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 801.02(1) to 
provide that a complainant has 90 days, instead of 60 days, 
after filing to serve the defendant with an authenticated copy 
of the summons and complaint.  See 1997 Wis. Act 187, §§ 7, 
22(1).  
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
14 
 
echoed by Wis. Stat. § 801.09(1).  As indicated previously, 
§ 801.09(1) provides that the summons "shall contain . . . the 
names and addresses of the parties to the action, plaintiff and 
defendant."   
¶30 In Bulik, the complainant failed to name the defendant 
in the summons as required by Wis. Stat. § 801.09(1).  See 148 
Wis. 2d 441.  Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that 
the summons was fundamentally defective.  Id. at 446.  In that 
case, the plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit after 
allegedly falling in the parking lot of a shopping center, 
outside the entrance to a store operated by Zayre Corporation.  
Id. at 443.  In the body of her complaint, the plaintiff alleged 
that Arrow Realty, Inc. of Racine (Arrow) maintained the grounds 
on which she fell.  Id.  However, the plaintiff's summons and 
complaint named as defendants only "Zayre Corporation, a 
domestic corporation, et al., Defendants."  Id. at 443-44.  The 
plaintiff served her summons and complaint upon one of Arrow's 
principals.  Id. at 444.  Arrow failed to timely answer, and 
consequently, default judgment was entered against it.  Id.   
¶31 Arrow moved to vacate the default judgment, arguing 
that the summons was defective because it did not name Arrow as 
a defendant.  Id.  The circuit court denied Arrow's motion, 
pointing out that Arrow was identified as a defendant in the 
body of the complaint.  Id. 
¶32 Arrow appealed, and the court of appeals reversed.  
Relying on Wis. Stat. § 801.09(1), the court of appeals held 
that "[t]he court has jurisdiction only over the parties named," 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
15 
 
id. at 446; stated otherwise, "not naming a person means that a 
court is without power to do anything with that person regarding 
the case," id. at 447.  In Bulik, because the summons did not 
name Arrow as a defendant, the court of appeals concluded that 
the summons failed to give notice to Arrow that an action had 
been commenced against it and failed to confer personal 
jurisdiction on the circuit court over Arrow.  Id. at 445.  The 
court of appeals so concluded irrespective of the fact that 
Arrow was served with the summons and therefore might have had 
knowledge that it was meant to be a party.  See id. at 446.  As 
the court of appeals explained, the plaintiff's failure to name 
Arrow as a defendant in the summons meant that the circuit court 
lacked power over Arrow "in the first instance," regardless of 
whether or not the defect prejudiced Arrow.  Id.  Because the 
circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over Arrow, the court 
of appeals held that the default judgment was void.  Id. at 443. 
¶33 Conversely, in Hoesley, this court held that the 
plaintiff's summons and complaint properly conferred personal 
jurisdiction on the circuit court over the defendant Thomas 
Rooney Post No. 1530, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United 
States (Thomas Rooney Post No. 1530, VFW), even though the 
summons 
and 
complaint 
mistakenly 
named 
the 
defendant 
as 
"La Crosse VFW Chapter, Thomas Rooney Post."  46 Wis. 2d at 502.  
In other words, this court concluded that the summons and 
complaint were merely technically defective. 
¶34 In that case, the plaintiff filed a personal injury 
lawsuit after allegedly falling on property owned by Thomas 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
16 
 
Rooney Post No. 1530, VFW, a corporation located in La Crosse.  
Id. at 501.  However, the plaintiff's summons and complaint 
incorrectly referred to the defendant as an "association" and 
listed its name as "La Crosse VFW Chapter, Thomas Rooney Post."  
Id. at 502.  The plaintiff served her summons and complaint upon 
the post commander.  Id. at 501.  Thomas Rooney Post No. 1530, 
VFW then moved to dismiss the action for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, arguing that neither the summons nor the complaint 
correctly 
identified 
the 
defendant's 
name 
and 
corporate 
character.  See id. at 501-02.  The circuit court denied the 
motion.  Id. at 502. 
¶35 Thomas Rooney Post No. 1530, VFW appealed, and this 
court affirmed.  The court concluded that a mere misnomer in a 
summons and complaint may be corrected by amendment at any stage 
of the lawsuit, including after a default judgment is entered:  
The 
general 
rule 
is 
that 
if 
the 
misnomer 
or 
misdescription does not leave in doubt the identity of 
the party intended to be sued, or, even where there is 
room for doubt as to identity, if service of process 
is made on the party intended to be sued, the misnomer 
or misdescription may be corrected by amendment at any 
stage of the suit, or even after judgment, and a 
judgment taken by default is enforceable.   
Id. (internal quotations omitted).  The court underscored the 
difference between an amendment that merely corrects the 
defendant's name and one that has the effect of bringing a new 
party into the action: "'[I]f the effect of the amendment is to 
correct the name under which the right party is sued, it will be 
allowed.  However, if it is to bring in a new party, it will be 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
17 
 
refused.'"  Id. at 503 (quoting Ausen v. Moriarty, 268 Wis. 167, 
174, 67 N.W.2d 358 (1954)).  In Hoesley, because an amendment to 
the summons and complaint would have resulted only in correcting 
the right defendant's name to Thomas Rooney Post No. 1530, VFW, 
as opposed to bringing a new party into the action, this court 
held that the circuit court properly denied the defendant's 
motion to dismiss.  Id. at 504. 
¶36 By comparison, in Parks v. West Side Railway Co., 82 
Wis. 219, 52 N.W. 92 (1892), a decision that predated Hoesley by 
nearly a century, this court rejected the defendant's argument 
that the plaintiff's amendment to his summons and complaint had 
the improper effect of discharging one party as defendant and 
substituting another.  In that case, the plaintiff filed a 
complaint, alleging that noise, smoke, steam, and gases emitted 
from an electrical power house constituted a nuisance.  Id. at 
219.  At the time, the power house was owned and operated by the 
West Side Railroad Company.  Id. at 220.  However, the 
plaintiff's summons and complaint named as defendant the West 
Side Railway Company.  See id. at 219.  The facts revealed that 
over a year prior to the commencement of the plaintiff's action, 
the West Side Railway Company conveyed all of its franchises and 
property, including the building at issue, to the West Side 
Railroad Company, a then newly organized corporation.  Id. at 
220.  Only the latter corporation maintained an electrical 
railroad and used the building as a power house; the former 
operated its railway by animal power and used the building as a 
stable for horses.  Id. at 219-20.  Subsequent to the 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
18 
 
conveyance, the West Side Railway Company ceased doing business.  
Id. at 220.  The plaintiff served his summons and complaint upon 
Washington Becker, the president of both companies.  Id.  The 
plaintiff then moved to amend his summons and complaint by 
striking out the "way" in the defendant's name and inserting 
"road" in its place.  Id. at 219.  The circuit court granted the 
motion.  Id. 
¶37 The West Side Railroad Company appealed to this court, 
arguing that the amendment to the summons and complaint did not 
have the legitimate effect of correcting a party's name but 
rather had the improper effect of discharging one party as 
defendant and substituting another.  Id. at 221.  The court 
disagreed, commenting that the defendant's argument "does not 
appeal strongly to a mind which is looking at the substance of 
things, rather than the mere form."  Id.  Had the West Side 
Railway Company never existed, the court reasoned, the amendment 
would have "no doubt" been unobjectionable.  Id. at 221-22.  The 
court determined that the result should be no different when the 
company maintained only a "nominal existence, without property 
or franchises."  Id. at 222.  As far as the court was concerned, 
"the corporation which was operating the electrical power house 
and railroad was sued in th[e] action, with a slight mistake in 
[the] name, which the [circuit] court properly corrected."  Id.   
¶38 Having set forth the applicable law, we turn now to 
the instant case.  Johnson urges us to conclude that the circuit 
court appropriately reconsidered its order vacating the default 
judgment against Cintas No. 2.  Specifically, relying on 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
19 
 
Hoesley, Johnson maintains that he merely misnamed Cintas No. 2 
as Cintas in his summons and complaint, and therefore, his 
pleadings were only technically defective.  He argues that the 
defect did not prejudice Cintas No. 2 because, pursuant to the 
circuit court's finding, Cintas No. 2 was served with the 
summons and complaint.  We disagree.   
¶39 We conclude that the circuit court erred as a matter 
of law when it reconsidered its order vacating the default 
judgment against Cintas No. 2.  Johnson's failure to name Cintas 
No. 2 as a defendant in his summons and complaint, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 801.02(1) and 801.09(1), constituted a fundamental 
defect that deprived the circuit court of personal jurisdiction 
over Cintas No. 2, regardless of whether or not the defect 
prejudiced Cintas No. 2.  Because the circuit court lacked 
personal jurisdiction over Cintas No. 2, the default judgment 
entered against Cintas No. 2 is void.   
¶40 This case is resolved by a straightforward application 
of the above-stated law.  As made clear by both American Family 
and Bulik, a complainant's failure to name a defendant in the 
summons and complaint in accordance with Wis. Stat. §§ 801.02(1) 
and 801.09(1) constitutes a fundamental defect that precludes 
personal jurisdiction over that defendant, regardless of whether 
or not the defect prejudiced the defendant.  See Am. Family, 167 
Wis. 2d at 534; Bulik, 148 Wis. 2d at 446-47.  Here, it is 
undisputed that Johnson named Cintas, not Cintas No. 2, in his 
summons and complaint.  Cintas No. 2, as a wholly owned 
subsidiary 
of 
Cintas, 
is 
a 
legal 
entity 
that 
exists 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
20 
 
independently of Cintas.  See DOR v. River City Refuse Removal, 
Inc., 
2007 
WI 
27, 
¶43, 
299 
Wis. 2d 561, 
729 
N.W.2d 396 
(explaining that this court "treat[s] wholly-owned subsidiaries 
as independent legal entities").  Johnson's failure to name 
Cintas No. 2 in his summons and complaint constituted a 
fundamental defect that precluded the circuit court of personal 
jurisdiction over Cintas No. 2, regardless of whether or not the 
defect prejudiced Cintas No. 2.  For that reason, it is 
irrelevant that Johnson served his summons and complaint upon 
the registered agent for Cintas No. 2 and Cintas No. 2 therefore 
might have had knowledge that it was meant to be a party.6  See 
Bulik, 148 Wis. 2d at 446.  As far as the law is concerned, 
Cintas No. 2 was "a stranger to the court."  See id. at 444. 
                                                 
6 Citing this court's recent decision in Tews v. NHI, LLC, 
2010 WI 137, 330 Wis. 2d 389, 793 N.W.2d 860, the dissent 
submits that "this court has acknowledged that a slight mistake 
in naming a defendant does not necessarily cause that defendant 
any confusion about whether it was the party against which the 
plaintiff intended to file suit."  Dissent, ¶56 n.4.  As the 
dissent acknowledges, Tews was decided in an entirely "different 
context," id., namely, relation-back.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.09(3), an amended pleading that adds a new party after the 
statute of limitations has expired relates back to the date of 
the filing of the original pleading if, inter alia, within the 
applicable limitations period, the added party (a) received such 
notice of the institution of the action that it will not be 
prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits and (b) knew 
or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the 
identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought 
against the added party.  Tews, 330 Wis. 2d 389, ¶72.  Relation-
back is not at issue in the case now before us.  Moreover, as 
recognized by both the text of § 802.09(3) and the Tews decision 
itself, application of the relation-back doctrine presumes that 
the amended pleading had the effect of adding a new party, a 
point which supports our decision today.  See id., ¶¶62, 68, 72. 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
21 
 
¶41 While Johnson relies on Hoesley to support his 
position that his summons and complaint were only technically 
defective, the opposite is true: Hoesley supports our conclusion 
that Johnson's pleadings were fundamentally defective.  Hoesley 
instructs that a misnomer in a summons and complaint constitutes 
a technical defect when an amendment to the pleadings would 
result in merely correcting the name under which the right party 
is sued, as opposed to bringing an entirely new party into the 
action.  See 46 Wis. 2d at 503.  In this case, Johnson amended 
his summons and complaint by changing the named defendant from 
Cintas to Cintas No. 2.  Unlike the single corporation in 
Hoesley, which the plaintiff correctly sued but simply misnamed 
as 
"La Crosse 
VFW 
Chapter, 
Thomas 
Rooney 
Post," 
see 
46 
Wis. 2d at 502, Cintas and Cintas No. 2 are two, distinct legal 
entities, and Johnson mistakenly sued the first instead of the 
second.  Moreover, unlike the railway company in Parks, which, 
by the time the plaintiff commenced his action, had ceased doing 
business and maintained only a nominal existence, see 82 Wis. at 
220, 
Cintas 
was 
and 
continues 
to 
be 
a 
going 
concern.  
Consequently, by changing the named defendant from Cintas to 
Cintas No. 2, Johnson's amendment did not have the effect of 
either correcting the name of the right party that was sued all 
along, as in Hoesley, or correcting a misnomer to reflect the 
only going concern that could be——and unmistakably was intended 
to be——sued, as in Parks.  Rather, Johnson's amendment had the 
effect of substituting the wrong party, Cintas, with another 
existing and entirely new party, Cintas No. 2.  Thus, absent 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
22 
 
proper service of the amended summons and complaint upon Cintas 
No. 2, the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over 
Cintas No. 2.  See Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 12 Wis. 2d 190, 196, 
107 N.W.2d 204 (1961) ("A court cannot acquire jurisdiction of 
an action by amending a process in order to give it such 
jurisdiction."). 
¶42 Johnson does not quarrel with the fact that his 
summons and complaint named the wrong party, Cintas, and that 
the party he intended to sue, Cintas No. 2, is an independent 
legal entity.  Instead, Johnson maintains that when the party 
intended to be sued is the entity served, as Cintas No. 2 was in 
this case, the distinction between a fundamental and technical 
defect should not depend upon the mere "happenstance" of whether 
the misnomer in the summons and complaint corresponds to 
another, existing legal entity.  So long as the right party is 
the entity served, Johnson contends, the purpose of the summons 
is fulfilled.  According to Johnson, this court's decision in 
Ness, 227 Wis. 2d 592, "stands for the proposition that when a 
plaintiff has served the party he or she intended to sue, a 
misnomer is subject to correction, without re-serving the 
defendant, even if the misnomer corresponds to the actual name 
of someone else."   
¶43 While Johnson's argument may seem appealing on the 
surface, it lacks support in the law.  To begin with, as 
articulated by the court of appeals in Bulik, a summons that 
does not name the party intended to be sued fails, as a matter 
of law, to give notice to that party that an action has been 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
23 
 
commenced against it.  See 148 Wis. 2d at 445, 446.  That the 
named party happens to have a name that closely resembles the 
name of the party intended to be sued is simply not enough.  See 
id. at 445 ("[V]ague designation does not give fair notice to 
the specific individual" intended to be sued).  In any event, 
Johnson's argument rests on the false premise that a summons' 
only purpose is to provide notice to the defendant that an 
action has been commenced against it.  As set forth above, a 
summons serves a second and equally significant purpose of 
conferring personal jurisdiction on a court over the defendant 
served.  This court has made clear that "'actual notice alone is 
not enough to confer jurisdiction upon the court.  Service must 
be made in accordance with the manner prescribed by statute.'"  
Am. Family, 167 Wis. 2d at 530 (quoting Danielson, 71 Wis. 2d at 
430).   
¶44 Furthermore, our decision in Ness does not stand for 
the proposition that Johnson suggests.  The sole issue in Ness 
was whether, under Wis. Stat. § 801.14(1) (1995-96), an amended 
summons and complaint that was filed with the court but not 
served upon a defaulting party creates a new 20-day window under 
Wis. Stat. § 812.11 (1995-96) for the defaulting party to answer 
the amended complaint.  See 227 Wis. 2d at 595.  This court 
answered that question in the negative, holding that "a 
defaulting party cannot answer an amended complaint, thereby 
attempting to cure its default, when the party is already in 
default at the time the amended complaint is filed, unless the 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
24 
 
amended complaint relates to a new or additional claim for 
relief."  Id. at 607-08.   
¶45 The facts in Ness were procedurally complex and 
largely immaterial to the case now before us.  For our purposes 
today, it is sufficient to recount the following.  A receiver 
filed a garnishment action against two businesses, U.S. Billing, 
Inc. (U.S. Billing) and Zero Plus Dialing, Inc. (Zero Plus).  
Id. at 597.  U.S. Billing was a corporation based in Texas.  Id.  
However, the receiver's complaint mistakenly named as defendant 
a Wisconsin-based corporation that also bore the name U.S. 
Billing.  See id.  Additionally, the receiver mistakenly served 
the summons and complaint upon the Wisconsin-based U.S. Billing.  
Id.  The receiver served Zero Plus through its in-house counsel.  
Id.  Zero Plus and the Texas-based U.S. Billing happened to 
share the same in-house counsel.  See id. at 604 n.10.  The 
Wisconsin-based U.S. Billing immediately answered the complaint, 
denying any involvement in the underlying events.  Id. at 597.  
Subsequently, the receiver, realizing his mistake, served the 
correct U.S. Billing through its registered agent in Texas.  Id.  
Neither Zero Plus nor the Texas-based U.S. Billing answered the 
complaint.  Id.  After they defaulted, the receiver amended the 
complaint to correctly name as garnishee the Texas-based U.S. 
Billing 
rather 
than 
the 
Wisconsin-based 
U.S. 
Billing 
as 
originally designated.  Id. at 597-98.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.14(1) (1995-96), the receiver did not serve the amended 
complaint upon the Texas-based U.S. Billing.  Id. at 598.  The 
receiver then moved for default judgment against both Zero Plus 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
25 
 
and the Texas-based U.S. Billing for failure to answer the 
original complaint.  Id.  The garnishees did not assert any 
defense to the garnishment action but rather objected to the 
attempted garnishment of funds generated outside of Wisconsin.  
Id.  The circuit court rejected their objection and granted 
default judgment against both Zero Plus and the Texas-based U.S. 
Billing.  Id. 
¶46 The garnishees twice moved to vacate the default 
judgment on the grounds of excusable neglect.  Id. at 598-99.  
They also twice filed a proposed answer to the original 
complaint, alleging that the only amount at issue was the amount 
collected from Wisconsin consumers.  Id.  While the circuit 
court denied their first motion to vacate the default judgment, 
id. at 598, the court granted the second, id. at 599.  As 
articulated by this court, the circuit court "vacated the 
judgment solely on the ground that the original complaint on 
which the default judgment was based was superseded by the 
amended complaint . . . ."  Id. at 599.  Because the garnishees 
filed their proposed answer within 20 days of the filing of the 
amended complaint pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 812.11 (1995-96), the 
circuit court determined that the answer was timely.  Id. 
¶47 The receiver appealed, and the court of appeals 
reversed, 
concluding 
that 
an 
amended 
complaint 
does 
not 
supersede the original complaint in regard to any defaulting 
party, unless the amended complaint presents an additional claim 
for relief.  Id.  The garnishees appealed to this court, and we 
affirmed.  Id. at 595.  Citing the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
26 
 
§ 801.14(1) (1995-96), we agreed with the court of appeals that 
once a defendant defaults, it loses its ability to answer an 
amended complaint unless the amended complaint asserts new or 
additional claims for relief.  Id. at 601.  In so concluding, we 
noted that the receiver's amended complaint did not present new 
or additional claims but rather made "merely a technical 
change."  Id. at 603-04.  In a footnote, we clarified that "the 
amended complaint is to be viewed as a technical change" because 
of the relationship between Zero Plus and the Texas-based U.S. 
Billing, namely, the fact that the two entities had the same in-
house counsel which was served at the outset.  Id. at 604 n.10. 
¶48 Presumably, it is that footnote on which Johnson hangs 
on to argue that his summons and complaint were only technically 
defective.  Johnson submits that "Ness is indistinguishable from 
this case": like the receiver in Ness whose pleadings mistakenly 
named as defendant the Wisconsin-based U.S. Billing instead of 
the Texas-based U.S. Billing, see id. at 597-98, Johnson's 
pleadings mistakenly named as defendant Cintas instead of Cintas 
No. 2.  It follows, according to Johnson, that because we deemed 
the amendment in Ness merely a technical change, then so too 
should we deem Johnson's amendment a mere technical change.  
While we appreciate some of the procedural similarities between 
Ness and the instant case, we do not regard Ness as controlling 
on the issue before us today: whether Johnson's pleadings were 
fundamentally or technically defective.  As our foregoing 
discussion makes apparent, the Ness court never analyzed whether 
the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over the Texas-based 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
27 
 
U.S. Billing as a result of the receiver's failure to name that 
specific corporation in his original garnishment complaint.  
Indeed, the Ness court made a point to state that the Texas-
based 
U.S. Billing 
"did not assert any defense to the 
plaintiff's garnishment action," jurisdictional or otherwise.  
See id. at 598.  Again, the sole issue in Ness was whether, 
under Wis. Stat. § 801.14(1) (1995-96), the receiver's amended 
complaint that was filed with the court but not served upon the 
defaulting garnishees created a new 20-day window under Wis. 
Stat. § 812.11 (1995-96) for the garnishees to answer the 
amended complaint.  See id. at 595.  That being the case, we 
decline to expand Ness in a manner that Johnson suggests and 
thereby effectively override the requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 801.02(1) and 801.09(1) that heretofore, have been strictly 
construed. 
¶49 Finally, Johnson contends that even if we conclude 
that his failure to name Cintas No. 2 constituted a fundamental 
defect, we ought to nevertheless construe his pleadings as only 
technically defective on the grounds that Cintas No. 2 held 
itself out as Cintas.  In support of his argument, Johnson 
points to the circuit court's specific findings that Johnson 
served his summons and complaint upon Cintas No. 2 and that the 
misnomer in the pleadings was "due entirely to the actions of 
[Cintas No. 2] in terms of the business name it choose [sic] to 
operate under in the state of Wisconsin and in relation to 
[Johnson]."  Under such circumstances, Johnson asserts, fairness 
demands that we construe his pleadings as conferring upon the 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
28 
 
circuit court personal jurisdiction over Cintas No. 2.  Again, 
we decline Johnson's invitation for the simple reason that his 
argument is without support in the law.7  While the circuit court 
                                                 
7 In reconsidering its order to vacate the default judgment 
against Cintas No. 2, the circuit court relied in large part 
upon the South Carolina Court of Appeals' decision in McCall v. 
IKON, 611 S.E.2d 315 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005).  In McCall, the South 
Carolina Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff effectively 
served the defendant IKON Office Solutions Technology Services, 
LLC, even though the plaintiff's summons and complaint named as 
defendant "IKON, d/b/a IKON Educational Services," referring to 
a trade name under which the defendant was not registered to do 
business in South Carolina.  Id. at 318-19.  The court reasoned 
that because the defendant held itself out as IKON Education 
Services, 
"it 
would 
be 
wholly 
inequitable 
to 
find 
[the 
plaintiff's] attempts to serve the company under that name 
ineffective."  Id. at 318. 
As the court of appeals in the instant case aptly noted, 
see Johnson v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 2011 WI App 5, ¶14 n.4, 331 
Wis. 2d 51, 794 N.W.2d 475, the South Carolina Court of Appeals' 
decision in McCall is not germane to our decision today because 
the South Carolina courts do not require strict adherence to 
their rules governing service of process.  As the McCall court 
explained, it has "never required exacting compliance with the 
rules to effect service of process."  Id. at 317 (internal 
quotations omitted).  In South Carolina, personal jurisdiction 
turns not on strict compliance with the rules governing service 
of process but rather on whether the plaintiff sufficiently 
complied with the rules and whether the defendant had notice of 
the proceedings.  Id. 
By comparison, as we have already explained, "'Wisconsin 
requires 
strict 
compliance 
with 
its 
rules 
of 
statutory 
service . . . .'"  Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. of 
Am., 167 Wis. 2d 524, 531, 481 N.W.2d 629 (1992) (quoting Mech 
v. Borowski, 116 Wis. 2d 683, 686, 342 N.W.2d 759 (Ct. App. 
1983)).  A complainant's failure to name a defendant in his or 
her summons and complaint constitutes a fundamental defect that 
deprives the court of personal jurisdiction over that defendant, 
regardless 
of 
whether 
or 
not 
the 
defect 
prejudiced 
the 
defendant.  Id. at 534.  "Substantial compliance is not a 
factor."  Id. 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
29 
 
made findings related to the manner in which Cintas No. 2 held 
itself out to the public and to Johnson specifically, the facts 
remain that Johnson named Cintas instead of Cintas No. 2 in his 
summons and complaint, and our courts recognize Cintas No. 2 as 
a 
legal 
entity 
that 
exists 
independently 
of 
its 
parent 
corporation.  Therefore, the court lacked personal jurisdiction 
over Cintas No. 2 in the first instance, irrespective of whether 
Johnson was under the impression that he was suing the right 
entity or whether Johnson served the right entity.  As we have 
explained, Wisconsin requires plaintiffs to strictly comply with 
our rules of statutory service, "'even though the consequences 
may appear to be harsh.'"  Am. Family, 167 Wis. 2d at 531 
(quoting Mech, 116 Wis. 2d at 686).  It is worth mentioning that 
the DFI records, accessible online to the public, unambiguously 
reveal that Cintas is not a registered corporation in Wisconsin.  
In any case, if Johnson remained unsure of which entity to name, 
Cintas or Cintas No. 2, it would have been a simple and routine 
matter to name them both.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶50 We 
conclude 
that 
service 
in 
this 
case 
was 
fundamentally defective because Johnson failed to name Cintas 
No. 2 as a defendant in his summons and complaint, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 801.02(1) and 801.09(1).  Therefore, the circuit 
court lacked personal jurisdiction over Cintas No. 2, regardless 
of whether or not the defect prejudiced Cintas No. 2 and 
regardless of the manner in which Cintas No. 2 held itself out 
to the public or to Johnson specifically.  Because the circuit 
No. 
2009AP2549   
 
30 
 
court lacked personal jurisdiction over Cintas No. 2, the 
default judgment entered against Cintas No. 2 is void. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶51 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No.  2009AP2549.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶52 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  It may be that 
in some instances, there is a "fine line" between fundamental 
and technical defects.  Majority op., ¶27.  However, this case 
falls squarely on the technical side of that line. 
¶53 A straightforward application of the rules set forth 
in Hoesley1 and Parks2 to the facts of this case reveals that the 
summons and complaint contained a mere misnomer——a technical 
defect that does not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction.  
The majority reaches the wrong result by dodging the applicable 
standards 
for 
mere 
misnomers, sidestepping precedent, and 
crafting an unreasonable and unnecessary new rule.  Accordingly, 
I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶54 The majority acknowledges that a mere misnomer in the 
summons and complaint does not deprive the circuit court of 
jurisdiction over the misnamed defendant.  Majority op., ¶¶33-35 
(citing Hoesley v. La Crosse VFW Chapter, 46 Wis. 2d 501, 175 
N.W.2d 214 (1970)).  Nevertheless, the majority barely pauses to 
consider whether the omission of the designation "No. 2" could 
be considered a misnomer.  Rather, it leaps to the conclusion 
that Johnson named the wrong party: "the facts remain that 
Johnson named Cintas instead of Cintas No. 2 in his summons and 
                                                 
1 Hoesley v. La Crosse VFW Chapter, 46 Wis. 2d 501, 175 
N.W.2d 214 (1970). 
2 Parks v. West Side Ry. Co., 82 Wis. 219, 52 N.W. 92 
(1892). 
No.  2009AP2549.awb 
 
2 
 
complaint, and our courts recognize Cintas No. 2 as a legal 
entity 
that 
exists 
independently 
of 
[Cintas] 
its 
parent 
corporation."  Id., ¶49.     
¶55 The majority's dodge results in a new bright-line 
rule:  When a plaintiff misnames a party and the misnomer 
happens to be the correct name of another legal entity, the 
defect is transformed from technical to fundamental.3  See id., 
¶¶40-41.  The majority appears to recognize that its new rule 
does not sit comfortably with Wisconsin case law, including 
Parks v. West Side Railway Co., 82 Wis. 219, 52 N.W. 92 (1892).  
Majority op., ¶41.  Nevertheless, it concludes that, regardless 
of whether Cintas Corporation No. 2 held itself out to its 
employees as "Cintas Corporation," the amendment to correct the 
mistake in the complaint "did not have the effect of [] 
correcting the name of the right party" and instead, had the 
effect of bringing in a new party.   Id., ¶41.   
II 
¶56 A mistake in the intended defendant's name is a 
technical defect, and it does not deprive the court of 
jurisdiction as long as the intended defendant was served and 
                                                 
3 The majority's new rule mirrors the rule proposed by 
Cintas Corporation No. 2 during oral argument: "If there is only 
one entity in the world that could possibly be referred to by 
that misnomer, that is [the] Hoesley [case], and [the summons 
and complaint are] not [fundamentally] defective.  If in fact 
there is another entity . . . , if there is another one just 
like that, it may well be [fundamentally] defective."  
No.  2009AP2549.awb 
 
3 
 
suffered no prejudice as a result of the misnomer.4  In one case, 
for example, the court determined that the plaintiff's mistake 
in naming "Thomas Rooney Post No. 1530, Veterans of Foreign Wars 
of the United States" as "La Crosse VFW Chapter, Thomas Rooney 
Post" was a mere misnomer.  Hoesley, 46 Wis. 2d 501.   
¶57 The Hoesley court explained the "general rule" of 
misnomers as follows: "[I]f the misnomer or misdescription does 
not leave in doubt the identity of the party intended to be 
sued, or, even where there is room for doubt as to identity, if 
service of process is made on the party intended to be sued, 
this misnomer or misdescription may be corrected by amendment at 
any stage of the suit, or even after judgment, and a judgment 
taken by default is enforceable."  Id. at 502.       
¶58 A straightforward application of this standard reveals 
that there was a misnomer in this case.  Here, Johnson served 
the registered agent of his employer, Cintas Corporation No. 2, 
                                                 
4 In a different context, this court has acknowledged that a 
slight mistake in naming a defendant does not necessarily cause 
that defendant any confusion about whether it was the party 
against which the plaintiff intended to file suit.  See Tews v. 
NHI, LLC, 2010 WI 137, ¶¶74-76, 330 Wis. 2d 389, 793 N.W.2d 860.  
In Tews, the plaintiff mistakenly named "WE Energies" and 
"Wisconsin Energy Corporation" rather than "Wisconsin Energy 
Power Company," the correct name of the intended defendant.  
Id., ¶1.  It finally amended its complaint to name Wisconsin 
Energy Power Company, but only after the statute of limitations 
had expired.  Id., ¶20.  The parties presumed that the effect of 
the amendment was to add a new party, and accordingly, the court 
did not address whether the mistake in naming could be 
considered a mere misnomer.  When an amendment adds a new party, 
the intended defendant's statute of limitations defense will be 
defeated 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 802.09(3) 
(the 
relation-back 
statute) if the intended defendant received fair notice of the 
claim within the period of limitations.  Id., ¶2.   
No.  2009AP2549.awb 
 
4 
 
with an authenticated copy of the summons and complaint.  In 
that summons and complaint, Johnson correctly identified the 
address of the defendant.  However, the name on the summons and 
complaint 
read 
"Cintas 
Corporation" 
rather 
than 
"Cintas 
Corporation No. 2."5  The circuit court found no prejudice as a 
result of the misnomer, and it entered default judgment. 
¶59 On its face, the omission of the designation "No. 2" 
appears to be nothing more than a mistake.  Had the complaint 
named "Cintas Corporation No. 3," "Cintas #2 Corporation," or 
even "Sintas Corporation No. 2," there is little doubt that the 
error in naming would be considered a mere misnomer under 
Hoesley.  Accordingly, the question would be whether the 
defendant was prejudiced by that mistake.  
¶60 The wrinkle in this case is that there happens to 
exist a separate corporation with the name "Cintas Corporation."  
For the majority, that fact transforms an otherwise technical 
defect into one that is fundamental.6    
                                                 
5 In full, the summons and complaint named the defendant as 
follows: "CINTAS CORPORATION a domestic corporation 9828 South 
Oakwood Park Drive Franklin, WI 53132."   
6 The majority cites to Bulik v. Arrow Realty, Inc. of 
Racine, 148 Wis. 2d 441, 434 N.W.2d 853 (Ct. App. 1988) and 
American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Royal Insurance Co. of 
America, 167 Wis. 2d 524, 481 N.W.2d 629 (1992), to bolster its 
analysis.  Majority op., ¶40.  Nevertheless, these cases are not 
about misnomers, and accordingly, neither case governs the 
outcome here.  
No.  2009AP2549.awb 
 
5 
 
III 
¶61 The majority's new bright-line rule is contrary to 
precedent.  In addition to contravening Hoesley, as discussed 
above, it is difficult to reconcile the majority's rule with 
Parks, 82 Wis. 219. 
¶62 In that case, there existed two separate corporations: 
West Side Railway Co. and West Side Railroad Co.  Id. at 219-20.  
The plaintiff mistakenly named West Side Railway Co. rather than 
the related West Side Railroad Co.  Id. at 219.  When Parks 
moved to amend the summons and complaint by striking "way" and 
replacing it with "road," West Side Railroad Co. objected.  Id. 
at 221.  It asserted that the amendment was "not a legitimate 
amendment of the name of the party, but the discharge of one 
party as defendant and the substitution of another."  Id.    
¶63 Despite the mistake and the existence of a separate 
corporation bearing the name West Side Railway Co., the Parks 
court refrained from concluding that an amendment to correct the 
name from Railway to Railroad would have the effect of bringing 
                                                                                                                                                             
In Bulik, the defect was the failure to name the defendant 
in the original summons at all.  The plaintiff was injured when 
she fell in the parking lot of a store operated by Zayre 
Corporation.  148 Wis. 2d at 443.  She intended to file suit 
against Zayre and Arrow Realty, the corporation that maintained 
the grounds.  Nevertheless, the summons named only "Zayre 
Corporation, a domestic corporation, et al."  Id. at 443-44.  It 
did not name Arrow.  Id.  Accordingly, there was no "misnomer" 
in Bulik that could be construed as a technical defect.    
Likewise, in American Family, there was no defect in naming 
the defendant.  Rather, the defendant was correctly named in a 
summons and complaint, but the summons and complaint were not 
authenticated as required by statute.  167 Wis. 2d at 527.  
No.  2009AP2549.awb 
 
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in a new party.  Rather, it asserted that "[n]o doubt can be 
entertained that if there had been no corporation bearing the 
name of the West Side Rail'way' Company, the amendment would 
have been unobjectionable."  Id. at 221-22.  It concluded that 
the intended defendant was sued "with a slight mistake in name, 
which the court properly corrected" by amendment.  Id. at 222.    
¶64 The majority attempts to distinguish Parks on the 
ground that West Side Railway Co. maintained only a "nominal 
existence."  Majority op., ¶41.  It is not clear, however, why 
this 
distinction 
would 
make 
any 
difference. 
 
Under 
the 
majority's analysis, "the facts remain that [Parks] named [West 
Side Railway] instead of [West Side Railroad] in his summons and 
complaint, and our courts recognize [West Side Railroad] as a 
legal entity that exists independently of [West Side Railway]."  
See id., ¶49.     
IV 
¶65 Additionally, when the majority's new rule is tested 
against 
analogous 
scenarios, 
it 
creates 
unreasonable 
and 
unnecessary results.  Imagine a plaintiff who, intending to sue 
John Smith Sr., serves him with a summons and complaint that 
mistakenly omits the designation, "Sr."  When considered in 
light of Hoesley, the omission would appear to be nothing more 
than a misnomer.   
¶66 Nevertheless, under the majority's analysis, it would 
appear that John Smith Sr. could successfully claim that the 
misnomer was a fundamental defect merely by opening a telephone 
book and locating a man named "John Smith."  Under the 
No.  2009AP2549.awb 
 
7 
 
majority's analysis, John Smith Sr. could assert that an 
amendment to correct his name had the effect of bringing him in 
as a new party.  
¶67 I expect that the majority would not countenance such 
an unreasonable result.  Perhaps the majority would distinguish 
this scenario on the ground that there is no relationship 
between John Smith Sr. and the John Smith in the telephone book.  
If so, this hypothetical reveals what is truly at stake.   
¶68 Corporate separateness is a shield that protects a 
corporation from the liabilities of separate but related 
entities.  Here, however, the majority transforms the shield of 
corporate separateness into a sword.  Under the majority's 
analysis, a corporation can use the name of a related entity as 
a trade name, induce plaintiffs to name that trade name in the 
summons and complaint, fail to answer the complaint, and then 
escape any consequence for the default by claiming lack of 
jurisdiction.  The law should not sanction such an abuse of the 
principles of corporate separateness and legal process.      
¶69 Ultimately, I conclude that the majority's new rule is 
wholly unnecessary, given that existing law is well equipped to 
handle any confusion or lack of notice that results from a 
misnomer.  If a plaintiff serves but misnames the defendant, the 
plaintiff who made the mistake has the burden to prove that the 
defendant was not prejudiced as a result.  Am. Family Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 167 Wis. 2d 524, 533, 481 
N.W.2d 629 (1992).  If the defendant has truly been confused by 
the misnomer, then the plaintiff will fail to meet its burden on 
No.  2009AP2549.awb 
 
8 
 
prejudice, and the circuit court will conclude that it lacks 
jurisdiction over the defendant.      
¶70 Because the majority dodges the applicable standards 
regarding mere misnomers, sidesteps precedent, and crafts an 
unreasonable and unnecessary new rule, I respectfully dissent. 
¶71 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.   
 
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