Case Title: State v. Tactay

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2007-09-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAW LIBRARY

‘#4 oT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *##

 

No. 27271
‘IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Plaintiff-Appellant,

 

ROWENA NAZARENO TACTAY, Defendant-Appellee.

ons

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CR. NO. 04-1-1266)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
(By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, and Duffy, JJ.
‘Acoba, J., dissenting separately)

 

 

‘The plaintiff-appellant State of Hawai'i (hereinafter,
“the prosecution”] appeals from the April 8, 2005 judgment of
conviction and sentence of the circuit court of the first

the Honorable Michae2 A. Town presiding, convicting the
No. 4-1-1266

circuit,
defendant-appellee Rowena Tactay in Criminal (cr.

 

of promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree (Count I), in

violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 712-1243 (Supp.

2002), unlawful use of drug paraphernalia (Count IZ), in

 

+ effective July 3, 1996, the legislature amended HRS § 712-1243 by
adding subsection (3), infxa: Sea’ 1996 Haw. Sess, L. Act 308, $8 4 and 7 at
571-72. Eetective July 1; 2002, the legislature further amended HRS
§ 712-1243 by adding the Underscores language, infra?

(2) A person commits the offense of promoting 2 dangerous
rug in the third degree if the person knowingly possesses any

Gangerous drug in any amounts
(2) Fronoting 8 dangerous drug in the third degree is

clase ¢ felony,
(3). Nobiithstanding any law to the contrary, except for

fence; 706-€22.8(, 200 intra
note 2}, if the. coanlasion of the offense of proncting a cangereus
Grug in’ the third degree under this section involved the
possession of distribution of methamphetamine, the person

 

 

      
 

(continued.
 

+ NOP FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'S REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ++
violation of HRS § 329-0043.5(a) (1993), and promoting a
detrimental drug in the third degree, in violation of HRS

§ 712-1249 (1993) (Count 111), and sentencing her, inter alia, to
a five-year period of probation, pursuant to HRS § 706-622.5
(supp. 2004) .?

 

+1. continued)
convicted shall be sentenced to an indeterminate tere of
imprisonment of five years with s mandatory minimum term of
Imprisonnent, the length of which shall be not less than thirty
Gays and not greater than two-and-a-half years, st the discretion
of the sentencing court. The person convicted shall not be
eligible for parcle during the mandstory period of inprisonment.

 

Sea 2002 Maw. Sess. L. Act 161, $6 8 and 12 at $75. Effective July 1, 2004,
the legislature again anended ARS § 712-1243 by striking subsection (5) in ite
entirery, returning the low to ts 1993 form. See 2004 Hav. Seas. L, Act 4d,
§§ 7 and 33 at 211, 227.

‘Although Act’ 44,

 

ction 7 anended RS § 712-1243, the anendnent dows
not impact the ultinate disposition of Tactay’s sentencing, regardless of
whether Act 44 applies to her case. If Act 44 does apply, subsection (3)
Eupra would be inspplicable tovher sentencing, returning the penalty for a
Miolation of HRS § 712-1243 to a standard class C felony subject to repeat
Gffender sentencing pursuant to HRS § 706-606.5 (Supp. 1995), age inte

note 3. If Aet 4¢ does not apply to her case, subsection (3) continues to
Govern but only dictates the andscory minsmim for a first-time offender: st
Goes not preclude application of HRS § T06-606.5 to the sentencing of s repeat
offender such a Tactay.

 

    

 

 

2 Effective duly 1, 2002, the legislature enacted the predecessor
statute to MRS § 706-622.3 (Supp. 2004) in Act 161, § 3, later codified at HRS
§ 706-622-5 (Supp. 2002), which provided in relevant part?

Sentencing for first-tine drug offenders...
(1) Notwienstending any penalty or sentencing provision
under (HRS ch, 712, pt. 1V (concerning offenses related to drugs
and intoxicating compounds) ], 2 person convicted for the first
Eine for any offense under (WRS ch. 712, pe. IV] tnvolving
possession . . .', not including to distribute or manufacture as
Sefined in {HAs'$} 712-1240 [ (Supp. 1997)], of any dangerous drug
= who is non-violent, as determined by’ the court after
Feviewing the:
(a) Criminal history of the defendants
(b) Factual circumstances of the offense for which the
defendant is being sentences; end
(c) Other information deemed relevant by the court
shail be sentenced in accordance with [paragraph] (2) provided
Ghat the person cose not have s conviction for any violent felony
for five years imediately prece|]ding the date of the coamission
of the offense for wnich the defendant 1s being sentences.
(continved. .

 

 

 

 
 

Mo? FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +**

 

on appeal, the prosecution asserts that the circuit
court illegally sentenced Tactay to probation, inasmuch as, in
Light of an undisputed prior conviction, she was a repeat

offender and, therefore, should have been sentenced pursuant to

HRS § 706-606.5 (Supp. 1999)”

7(., continued)
(2) Berson eligible under (paragraph) (1) shall be
sentenced to probation to underge and conplete a drug treatment

Program.

‘See 2002 Hew. Seas. L. Act 161, $53 and 12 at $72, 575. Effective July 1,
2004, the legislature anended fins § 706-622.5 to read:

Sentencing for first-tine drug offenders...
(1) Notwithstanding [HRS §) 70€-€20(3)  {(@isallowing

probation for repeat offenders}), a ei

Eine for any offense under [ARS che 712, pb, TV) involving

 

Eepincg in tues el Tio-1 240, of sav cancerous dns... is
STigible to be sentenced to probetion uncer {paragraph} (2) if the
Seren meets the following criteria:

(a) The court hae determined that the person is nonviclent aft
Teviewing the person's criminal history, the factual
Eltcunstances of the offense for which the person is being

sneenced, and any other relevant snfornation[.)

 

 

(2) A person eligible under (paragraph) (1) may be sentenced
to probation’to underge and complete a sunstance abuse treatment,
program if the court determines that the person can benefit from

 

EGbetance abuse trestuent and, notwithsta the pers
foule-be subsect to sentencing #5 rebest offender under [HRS
iitest tne subiie.

See 2004 Haw. Sass. L. Act 44, $6 11 and 33 at 214, 227; HRS § 706-€22.5(1)

rnd (2). (Supp. 2004). (Eephases cded.) Section 29 of Act 44, absent from

the Gouified version found at HRS § 706-622.5, reads as follows: “This Act
Goes not affect rights and duties that matured, penalties that were incurred,
Gnd proceedings that were begun, before ite effective date.” Sag 2004 Kaw.
Sess: i. Act 44, § 29 at 227.

 

   

> RS § 706-€06.5 provided in relevant pert:

(2) Notwithstanding [HRS §) 706-669 [ (Supp. 1996) (providing

for parole hearing and procedure therefor)] and any cther law to

the Conteary, any person convicted of . «+ (HRS §) 222-2243.

Sno who bee's prior conviction.» . for’. . . any of the cless C

felony offenses enumerated above [including HRS § 708-836,

Helating te unauthorized control of (a) propelled vehicle,
(continued...)

   

 
 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S IAAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER +

 

For the reasons discussed infra in section III, we hold
that the circuit court erred in sentencing Tactay as a first-tine
drug offender rather than a repeat offender. We therefore vacate
the April 8, 2008 sentence and remand for resentencing as a

repeat offender, pursuant to HRS § 706-606.5 (Supp. 1999).

I. BACKGROUND

On June 30, 2004, Tactay was charged by complaint in
Cr. No. 04-1-1266 with, inter alia, promoting a dangerous drug in
the third degree (Count 1), in violation of HRS § 712-1243 (Supp.
2002), unlawful use of drug paraphernalia (Count II), in
violation of HRS § 329-0043.5(a) (1993), and promotion of a
detrimental drug in the third degree, in violation of HRS
§ 712-1249 (1993), in connection with events that occurred on
June 21, 2004. On November 29, 2004, Tactay pled guilty to all
thr!

 

counts.

3. continued)
shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum period of inprisonnent
without possibility of parole during such period ag follows:

al One prior feleny conviction:

4s)" Were the instant conviction is for a class ¢
Felony offense enunerated above -~ one year, eight
onthe:

i2) Except as in (paragraph) (3) (concerning special terns
for young sdults)}, a person shail not be sentenced to s mandatory
minimum period of inprisonnent under this section unless the
Instant felony offense was committed » +.

 

 

jel | iitnin tive years after a prior felony conviction
where the prior felony conviction was fora class C
Felony offense enumerates above(-]
Effective May 8 and Mey 26, 2006, the legislature amended HRS $ 70€-606.5 in
Eespects annateriel to the present matter. gee 2006 Haw. Seve. L. Act 40,
S51 and Tat 234-37; id. Act 134, §§ 4 and Tat 385-66.

4
0+ Non FOR PUBLICATION I MEST’S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ++
On December 20, 2004, the prosecution filed a motion
requesting the court to impose a term of imprisonment in Count I
based upon Tactay’s status as a repeat offender, pursuant to HRS
§ 706-606.5 (Supp. 1999), see supra note 3. The prosecution's
motion was based on Tactay’s prior conviction on February 28,
2003, in Cr. No. 01-1-1148, of unauthorized control of a
propelled vehicle (UCPV), in violation of HRS § 708-836, and the
fact that, had Tactay been sentenced to the maximum term of
imprisonment for that offense, her term would not yet have
expired at the time of the instant offense.‘
On April 8, 2005, the circuit court conducted a hearing
‘on the motion for repeat offender sentencing. The circuit court
first addressed the question whether the amendments of Act 44,
gee supra notes 1 and 2, applied:
‘The Court: [Defense counsel, w)het do you say.
to [the prosecution]"s excellent argument
(that) penalties .. . are incurred when
you commit the offense, not when they’ re
Imposed at a later cate?
(Oefense): Tsay two things, Judge. The use of the
word “incurred,” as opposed to “imposed,”
wo believe is significant. And T

know the case that [the prosecution] cites
but T would note that that’® & 1902

 

 

 

kod T'.”.”. "honestly [believe] the
Legislative intent is s0 clear, here,
gudge «

The court: Tage

 

But the language dan't clear.

‘The intent, the spirit is clear, but
they put in language which was

+ ractay stipulated to the fact of the prior UCPV conviction and te
the revocation of probetion inposed for thet conviction which resulted from
her Instant conviction. The prosecution requested that any term of
imprisonment resulting from the violation of Tactay's probation be served
Concurrently with ita requested term of imprisonment for the instant
violations

 

 
‘04 NOT FOR FUBLICATION IN MEST’ S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ##¢

Andeed unfortunate. And my obligation

when I became a judge... was not to
inpose my personal sence of morality and
Legality... . it's not about me, it's
about the’ law,

Defense]: But I think the Court can use the
Legislative intent. I'll agree with you
this is pure sausage making. «Bur T

think the Court can, as a principle of
Law, use that legislative intent to
clarify Language that is less than clear.
And we would note that =. . it does use
the word “incurred” rather than “imposed”.

(erosecutionj: While (defense counsel) is correct that the
Qfiginal quotation on that “incurred” versus
ixposed” as from 2 1908 case. - from

1 Uo Vihad cited |. . modern cases as

 

te are talking across 312
jurtadiceione and, most notably, federat
jurisdictions. Penalties incurred, there
Leno ambiguity. This means at the tine
the act 2 committed and one incurs the
penalty upon thenselves(,] makes them
Subject to the penalty.

‘As the Court has noted, this is
about the rule of Law
The court: Exactly.

[Prosecution]: =~ not the rule of man. Tf there ie no
ambiguity in the term, then we do not look to
Gonmittes reports or anything else unless it's
(going to be claimed that it 1s an absurdity not
fou + + make Act #4 retrospective

 

 

 

I think even in intent and spirit
there was no other reason to put [the
savings clause) language there except to
ake 2 cutoff point. Did the Legislature
Intend -. + prospectively for the courts
fo have discretion? Certainly. However,
ONT would say it would be
Undonetitutional for them to say the Cosrt
San choose to have Act 44 apply in one
person's case and Act 161 apply in other
person's case. It has to be the sane lew
for everyone in the sane

circumstances. = = =

The only other thing t would edd,
Your Honor, ie [the defense] has brought
up lot of Heuse committee intent, that
Sort of thing. =

 
 

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Nothing in those House hearings says
that there usa an intent for discretion
Tetreactively, that the Line drawn in the
Tanguage wae meant to be other

 

 

Goirt: . . . I don't hesitate to follow the law.
But in'this case I want you to make &
Fecord, but I’m going to find it's
Giseretsonary.. .- And what convinces
he is reading the legislative history,
Jooking at State v. Avilial, 63 Haw. 503,
350 P.24 78 (1988)}, the word “incurred”
hat certain legislative seanings but T
Bast don't think that’s what ehey
intended -

 

 

 

And to me this ie clearly 2
proceeding under (Avilla, the intent of
Efpeur.” I don't think [the legislature)
vias) that precise and it’s clear to me
thet the legislative intent was to give
Giseretion, be it “imposed,” "incurred."

Ty think there is not’ clear direction
do ‘Act #4 20. do otherwise.

 

 

‘The circuit court then accepted Tactay’s guilty pleas and entered
its judgnent of conviction, sentencing Tactay to five-year terms
of probation for Counts I and II and for the prior uCeV
conviction, based upon its reading of Act 44. The circuit court
ordered the sentences to run concurrently.

on May 3, 2005, the prosecution filed a timely notice

of appeal of the judgment and sentence.*

+ the circuit court sentenced Tactay to 250 days of incarceration on
count 11 with credit for tine sizesdy served.

+ the prosecution's notice of appeal reads in relevant part:

Inlotice is hereby given that the (prosecution) . ... , pursuant
foe. + HRS [6] 641-13(6) (1953... ], and Hawai'd Rules of
dppeliate Procedure, Rule 3, eppeals | .'. from the Judgment,
Giuer of Sentence of Probstion, and Notice of Entry filed ne

fe April 6, 2005. . . + The (prosecution) intends to cont
propricty of the Judgnent, Order of Sentence of Probation, and
Entry, filed on April 8, 2008.

 

 

 

(Some paragraph structure altered.)
+4 Nop FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER #44

1. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Sentencing
“the authority of a trial court to select and

determine the severity of a penalty is normally undisturbed on
review in the absence of an apparent abuse of discretion or
unless applicable statutory or constitutional commands have not
been observed." State v. Aplaca, 96 Hawai'i 17, 22, 25 P.3d
792, 797 (2001) (quoting State v. Jenkins, 93 Hawai'i 87, 100,
997 P.2d 13, 26 (2000).

B. Conclusions Of Law (COLs

“*R COL 4s not binding upon an
eppellate court and ss freciy reviewable
for ite correctness.” AIG Hawait Ing,’
Go, v. Estate of caraang, 74 Haw~ 620,
G26, 851 P28 321, 326 (1993) (quoting
Rafe, Ine! v. Wsikiks Seache
Goa, 7 Haw. 5, 119, 38 P.20 10, 28
{i9h2})." The court ordinarily revie
Cols under the right /wrong standard. Ip
za stage of fiolt, 75 Haw. 226, 232, 657
Pia 1358, 1359 (1993). Thus, °*(a] COL
that is supported by the trial court's
[fingings of fact) and that reflects an
application of the correct rule of law
SER not be overturned." Estate of
Gargang, 74 Haw, at 620-25, 851 Poad at
326 (quoting antec, Inca, 74 Haw. at 119,
839 p.zd at 29). ‘However, a COL that
presents mixed questions of fact and law
Pofeviewed under the clearly erroneous
‘Standard because the court’ s conclusions
fare dependent upon the facts and
circusstances of each ingividusl case.”
dj at 629, 651 p.2d at 326 (quoting

74 haw, 3 115, (839 Pod at
25) (internal quotation marks omitted)

 

 

 

   

 

 

1 76 Hawai'i 172, (280}, 873 P.2d 52, (59)
(isse7-
ee NOP FOR PUBLICATION TS WEST’ § HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **¥

Allstate Ins. Co. vs Ponce, 105 Hawai'i 445, 453, 99 P.3d 96, 104
(2004). (Some brackets and internal citations omitted.) (Some
bracketed material altered.)
c. i sta
The interpretation of @ statute is a question of law
reviewable de nove. State v, Arceo, 84 Hawai'i 1, 10, 928 P.2d
843, 852 (1996).

Furthermore, our statutory construction is guided by
aetablisned rules:

nen construing @ statute, our forenost
Gbligation is to ascertain and give effect
fo the intention of the legislature, which
SS tebe sotained primarily from the
Jenguage contained in the statute itself.
Kad we must read statutory langusge in the
Context of the entire statute and construe
fe'ln's manner consistent with its
Purpose.

When there ss doubt, doubleness of

 

 

Statute, an ambiguity exists.
Th construing an anbiguous statute,
[t]he meaning of the ambiguous words may
be sought by examining the context, with
hich the ambiguocs words, phrases, and
In order to
ings” HRS
Moreover, the courts
Fay resort to extrinsic aids in
Seteraining legislative intent. one
Gvenue is the use of legislative history
‘an interpretive tool,

 

   
   

 

Gray [y. Adnin, Dir, of the Courtl, 64 Kawai'i (236,
{ae, gsi €.2d [580,] 880 [119971] (footnote omitted) .

State v. Koch, 107 Hawai'i 215, 220, 112 P.3d 69, 74 (2005)

(quoting State v. Kaua, 102 Hawai'i 1, 7-8, 72 P.3d 473, 479-80

(2003)). Nevertheless, absent an absurd or unjust result, see
ev. Hausen, 104 Hawai'i 71, 77, 85 P.34 178, 184 (2004),

this court is bound to give effect to the plain meaning of
 

NOP FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ S HANAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *

 

unambiguous statutory language; we may only resort to the use of
legislative history when interpreting an ambiguous statute.

State v. Valdivia, 95 Hawai'i 465, 472, 24 P.3d 661, 668 (2001).

 

IIT. DISCUSSION

* - ly means

The prosecution notes that this court, in State v
Walker, 106 Hawai'i 1, 10, 100 P.3d 595, 604 (2004), concluded
that Act 44 does not apply retroactively and argues, therefore,
that “the relevant issue is when the ‘proceedings’ in this case
began.” It maintains that precedent supports the conclusion that
“proceedings” begin with the initiation of the prosecution
through the issuance of a charging instrument. (Citing State v.
Feliciano, 103 Hawai'i 269, 61 P.3d 1164 (2003); State v. Van den
Berg, 101 Hawai'i 187, 65 P.3d 134 (2003); Avillay Holiday vs
United States, 683 A.2d 61 (D.C. 1996).)

2. Tactay ari hi rocedur:
precedential barriers exist to arenting the
prosecution relief.

a. Procedural barriers
Tactay asserts that the prosecution failed to appeal
the circuit court's resentencing of Tactay in Cr. No. 01-1-1148
(the 2003 UCeV conviction) to probation, which “renders that
Judgment final and unappealable which in turn precludes the
relief [the prosecution) seeks in this appeal as to Cir}. Nlo}.

10
 

NOP FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ HAKAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

04-1-1266," because HRS § 706-629 (1993)? “prohibit(s] [the]

simultaneous dispositions of probation and imprisonment.”

b.
Act 44's amendments
i. Prospective application

Tactay argues that the language of Act 44, section 29,
see supra note 2, is ambiguous, particularly the phrase
wproceedings that were begun.” She insists that “proceedings”
may refer not only to @ criminal prosecution initiated by a
charging instrument, but also “'to a mere procedural step that is
part of a larger action or special proceeding.'” (Quoting
Black's law Dictionary 629 (Sth ed. 1983).) She asserts thet the
alleged onbiguity of “proceedings” justifies @ review of the
legislative history, which, she contends, reflects an intent to
provide greater discretion to the lower courts in sentencing

decisions. She essentially argues that the circuit court, by

 

implication, correctly concluded: (1) that “proceedings” was

ambiguous; (2) that interpreting “proceedings” as including
sentencing proceedings conported with the legislature's intent,
reflected in Act 44, to return greater discretion to the
sentencing court; and (3) that her sentencing proceeding was

excluded from Act 44’s savings clause, insofar as it was

HRs § 706-629 provides in relevant part:

(1). then the disposition of a defendant involves more than one

ceine:

ai the court shall net impose a sentence of probetion and
Tentence of inpelsonnent except as authorized by section
Joeveee 2) (a) {concerning inpriscnnent as 2 condition of
probation.)

 

 

u
#4 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *¥¢
conducted on April 8, 2005, more than nine months after Act 44’s
effective date, thereby allowing the court to sentence her to
probation.

Tactay also asserts that the phrase “penalties that
were incurred” unambiguously refers to a sentence imposed upon
judgment and that, because her sentence was imposed after July 1,
2004, the circuit court therefore properly applied Act 44's
amendments in sentencing her to probation.

ii. Retroactive application
Tactay urges, in the alternative, that even if her

sentencing hearing were part of a unitary criminal prosecution

 

initiated prior to July 1, 2004
retroactive application of Act 44 for her to benefit from its

which would require

amendments -- she challenges this court’s conclusion in Walker,
106 Hawai'i at 10, 100 P.3d at 604, that Act 44 does not apply
retroactively, asserting that precedent requires this court to
apply aneliorative amendments retroactively regardless of the
presence or absence of a savings clause. (Citing Koch
Feliciano; Yan den Berg: Avilla; State v, Von Gelder, 64 Haw.
210, 638 P.2d 319 (1981).)

5B hat.
= Su 7s Cas

In State v. Smith, 103 Hawas's 226, €1 P.3d 408 (2003),
this court analyzed the plain language of HRS § 706-606.5 (Supp.
1999), regarding sentencing for repeat offenders, and HRS

§ 706-622.5 (Supp. 2002), allowing probation for first-time drug
offenders, and held that “in all cases in which HRS § 706-606.5

12
1+ oF FOR PUBLICATION JN WEST’ S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*
is applicable, including those in which a defendant would
otherwise be eligible for probation under HRS § 706-622.5, the
circuit courts must sentence defendants pursuant to the
provisions of HRS § 706-606.5." 103 Hawai'i at 234, 81 P.3d at
414.

The legislature then enacted Act 44 in response to
smith, amending HRS § 706-622.5 to include language expressly
allowing for probation for first-time drug offenders, even those
found by the court to be repeat offenders. See HRS § 706-622.5
(supp. 2004), supra note 2.

In Walker, we reiterated the holding of Smith and
concluded that, “consistent with Act 44, . . . §§ 29 and 33, HRS
§ 706-606.5 trumps HRS § 706-622.5 with respect to all cases
involving ‘rights and duties that matured, penalties that were
incurred, and proceedings that were begun, before [the] effective
date of [Act 44], i.e., July 1, 2004." 106 Hawai'i at 10, 100
P.3d at 604 (brackets in original).

In State v, Beis, No. 27171 (Haw. Aug. 21, 2007), we
held “that the term ‘proceedings,’ as employed in Act 44,

  

section 23, unambiguously means the initiation of a criminal
prosecution against a defendant through a charging instrument and
subsumes within its scope hearings and other procedural events

that arise as a direct result of the initial charging instrument”
land (2) “that a defendant incurs, at the moment he or she conmits
the offense, Liability for the criminal penalty in effect at the
time of the commission of the offense,” and concluded that the

inclusion of the specific savings clause in Act 44, section 29

3
 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAT'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +##

evinced legislative intent that the Act’s provisions apply only
prospectively. eis, slip op. at 28, 34, 41 (emphasis omitted).

Therefore, we reiterate cur conclusion that the
provisions of Act 44, in their entirety, do not apply to any
defendant who committed the charged offense and whose prosecution
was conmenced prior to July 1, 2004, regardless of the date of
the defendant's subsequent conviction or sentence. See Halter,
106 Hawai'i at 9, 100 P.3d at 603; Reis, slip op. at 29, 34, 41.

Accordingly, as required by Walker and Reig, insofar os
the prosecution against Tactay began on June 30, 2004, with the
filing of the complaint, the circuit court was obligated by the
language of Act 44, section 28 to exclude Act 44s anendnents
from its consideration and, instead, to apply the 2002 version of
HRS § 706-622.5 to her case. It therefore erred in sentencing
her according to the 2004 version of HRS § 706-622.5 enacted by
Act 44. Aplaca, 96 Hawai" at 22, 25 P.3d at 797.

Moreover, in line with Smith, 103 Hawai‘ at 234, 62
P.3d at 414, and Walker, 106 Hawai'i at 10, 100 P.3d at 604, and
insofar as Tactay conceded her status as a repeat offender under
HRS § 706-606.5 (Supp. 1999) by conceding the existence of an
applicable prior conviction of unauthorized control of a
propelled vehicle, the circuit court could not sentence her to
probation pursuant to HRS § 706-622.5 (Supp. 2002), the first-
time drug offender statute in effect at the time of the

commission of her offenses. Rather, the circuit court was

4
+ NOP FOR PUBLICATION 18 WEST’ HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **#
required by Smith to apply HRS § 706-606.5 (Supp. 1999) to
sentence her to a mandatory minimum sentence of one year and

eight months.

c. The Prosecution’s Alleced Failure To Appeal The
Ser Tn Cr, NO, 011-1148 Do Bar Remand
Resentencing.

upon remand, the circuit court, in applying HRS
§ 706-606.5 (Supp. 1999) in Cr. No. 04-1-1266, will be obligated
to sentence Tactay to an indeterminate five-year term of
imprisonment with a mandatory minimum of twenty months, see supra
note 3. Although the prosecution's notice of appeal, see suora
note 6, refers to the whole judgnent, which includes all three
sentences for probation running cencurrentiy, the prosecution
nevertheless concedes “it did not appeal the sentence of
probation ordered in Cr. No, 1-1-1148," and, in its opening
brief’s statement of the points of error on appeal, it only
challenges the sentence of probation for Count I. Insofar es the
only count for which the circuit court arguably had no discretion
under HRS § 706-606.5 to impose probation rather than
imprisonment was Count I, this procedural posture by the
prosecution on appeal is not surprising.

Tactay argues, essentially, that @ defendant in her
procedural position -- under three concurrent sentences of
probation, with one sentence overturned on appeal and requiring a
term of imprisonment -- has somehow obtained a “get-out-of-jail-
free” card and has become immune from imprisonment. We need not
address the absurdity of the logical outcone of such an argument,

however, because HRS § 706-629 does not prevent, on remand, the

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imposition of the mandatory minimum term ae required by HRS
§ 706-606.5 (Supp. 1999). The probation imposed for Tactay’s
violation of probation in Cr. No. 01-1-1148, as well as for
Count II, are still subject to correction as illegal sentences by
motion of the prosecution, pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Penal
Procedure Rule 35(a) ("the court may correct an illegal sentence
at any time... ."). Upon such a motion, the circuit court has
broad discretion to ensure that the imposition of a term of
imprisonment in Cr. No, 04-1-1266, sentencing for Count 12, and
any punishment resulting from the revocation of Tactay’s
probation in Cr. No, 0l-1-1148 all comport with the requirenents
of HRS § 706-629.

IV. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, we vacate the April 8, 2005
sentence of the circuit court and remand for resentencing, with
HRS § 106-606.5 (Supp. 1999) being applied to Count 1.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, September 24, 2007.

 

on the briefs:
Daniel H. shinizu,

Deputy Fresecucing Attorney,

for the plaintiff-appellone

State of Howalt .

Phyllis J. Hironaka, Beet mneo
Deputy Public Defender,

for the defendant-apreilee Pus ON ae are
Rowena Nazarene Tactey

Came Duty bo

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