Case Title: Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., Inc.

Citation: 2003-Ohio-1099

Docket Number: 20020070

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2003-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., Inc., 98 Ohio St.3d 330, 2003-Ohio-1099.] 
 
 
JONES, APPELLANT, v. ACTION COUPLING & EQUIPMENT, INC., APPELLEE; 
[CONRAD], ADMR., BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., Inc., 98 Ohio St.3d 330, 2003-
Ohio-1099.] 
Workers’ compensation — R.C. 4123.65 does not apply to state-fund workers’ 
compensation claims on appeal to a common pleas court under R.C. 
4123.512. 
(Nos. 2002-0070 and 2002-0149 — Submitted January 22, 2003 — Decided 
March 26, 2003.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Holmes County, No. 
01CA013, 2001-Ohio-1958. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
R.C. 4123.65 does not apply to state-fund workers’ compensation claims on 
appeal to a common pleas court under R.C. 4123.512. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J. 
{¶1} 
Appellant, Steven S. Jones, was injured while working for 
appellee, Action Coupling & Equipment, Inc. (“Action Coupling”).  An Industrial 
Commission1 district hearing officer allowed the claim and awarded temporary 
total disability benefits.  Pursuant to R.C. 4123.512, Action Coupling, a state-fund 
employer, appealed from the decision to the common pleas court prompting Jones 
to file a complaint supporting his right to participate in the state fund.  See R.C. 
                                          
 
1. 
The commission and the administrator offer different views as to the applicability of R.C. 
4123.65. Therefore, the commission retained separate counsel and appears as an amicus in this 
case in support of Action Coupling. 
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2 
4123.512(D).  Appellant James Conrad, Administrator of the Bureau of Workers’ 
Compensation (“administrator”), filed an answer acknowledging Jones’s right to 
participate in the fund. 
{¶2} 
A dismissal entry was filed with the court on March 16, 2001, 
stating that “[t]his case is settled and dismissed with prejudice by agreement of 
the parties.”  The entry was signed by the attorneys for Jones, Action Coupling, 
and the administrator.  A written settlement agreement was prepared and 
circulated to the parties.  Jones and his attorney signed the agreement on April 5, 
2001.  However, Action Coupling did not sign the agreement.  Instead, on April 
19, 2001, through new counsel, Action Coupling filed a motion for relief from 
judgment seeking to vacate the March 16 dismissal entry.  Action Coupling 
argued that it was withdrawing its consent to settle pursuant to R.C. 4123.65(C).  
Assuming that R.C. 4123.65 applied, the trial court denied the motion on the 
grounds that Action Coupling’s withdrawal of consent had not been filed within 
30 days as required by division (C) of the statute.  The court then granted Jones’s 
motion to enforce the settlement. 
{¶3} 
The court of appeals reversed, finding that R.C. 4123.65 applied to 
all settlements and that under Division (A), every workers’ compensation 
settlement agreement must be in writing and must be submitted to the 
administrator for approval.  Since the agreement had not been finalized in 
accordance with the statute, the 30-day “cooling off” period had never begun.  
Therefore, the court concluded that Action Coupling was entitled to relief from 
judgment.  However, the court certified its decision as being in conflict with 
Bedinghaus v. Admr., Bur. of Workers’ Comp. (Mar. 16, 2001), Hamilton App. 
No. C-000468, 2001 WL 300734, and Macek v. Damon Baird Excavating & Land 
Improvement Co. (Dec. 21, 1999), Columbiana App. No. 99-CO-6, 1999 WL 
1243297. 
January Term, 2003 
3 
{¶4} 
The cause is now before the court upon the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal and upon our determination that a conflict exists. 
{¶5} 
The certified question is “[w]hether R.C. 4123.65 is applicable to 
state fund claims in which settlement is reached during litigation brought pursuant 
to R.C. 4123.512.”  We answer this question in the negative. Accordingly, the 
judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. 
{¶6} 
R.C. 4123.65 addresses the settlement of workers’ compensation 
claims.  R.C. 4123.65(A) provides: 
{¶7} 
“A state fund employer * * * may file an application with the 
administrator of workers’ compensation for approval of a final settlement of a 
claim under this chapter.  * * *  Every self-insuring employer that enters into a 
final settlement agreement with an employee shall mail * * * a copy of the 
agreement to the administrator and the employee’s representative.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
{¶8} 
R.C. 4123.65(C) provides: 
{¶9} 
“No settlement agreed to under division (A) of this section or 
agreed to by a self-insuring employer and the self-insuring employer’s employee 
shall take effect until thirty days after the administrator approves the settlement 
for state fund employees and employers, or after the self-insuring employer and 
employee sign the final settlement agreement.  During the thirty-day period, the 
employer, employee, or administrator, for state fund settlements, and the 
employer or employee, for self-insuring settlements, may withdraw consent to the 
settlement by an employer providing written notice to the employer’s employee 
and the administrator or by an employee providing written notice to the 
employee’s employer and the administrator, or by the administrator providing 
written notice to the state fund employer and employee.” (Emphasis added.) 
{¶10} In Gibson v. Meadow Gold Dairy (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 201, 724 
N.E.2d 787, we held that the settlement of all workers’ compensation claims 
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involving self-insured employers is subject to the requirements of R.C. 4123.65 
that the settlement agreement must be in writing and is not effective until 30 days 
after signing.  In Gibson, we declined to address the issue that is now before us, 
i.e., whether R.C. 4123.65 applies to all settlements of workers’ compensation 
claims involving state-fund employers.  Nevertheless, we did touch upon it, in 
dicta, when we stated:  “Settlements involving state-fund employers are referred 
to in the statute with different language.  For example, the statute applies to 
‘every’ self-insured settlement, but does not have corresponding language 
encompassing ‘every’ state-fund settlement.”  Id., 88 Ohio St.3d at 203, 724 
N.E.2d 787. 
{¶11} The cases certified as being in conflict with this appeal picked up 
on this distinction, and held that state-fund judicial settlements are not subject to 
R.C. 4123.65.  In Bedinghaus, supra, the court stressed that unlike claims 
involving self-insured employers, which are always subject to the statute, in state-
fund claims the employer, employee, or administrator “ ‘may’ file for settlement 
approval under the statute, but they are not required to do so.  See R.C. 
4123.65(A).” Similarly, in Macek, supra, the court held that R.C. 4123.65 does 
not apply to this type of case, i.e., one involving a state-fund employer.  It further 
explained that “the appeal came under R.C. 4123.512 and was not initiated under 
R.C. 4123.65(A).  Therefore, the ‘cooling off’ period of R.C. 4123.65(C) did not 
apply.” 
{¶12} We believe that the certified cases were correctly decided. When 
the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite 
meaning, we must rely on what the General Assembly has said.  Symmes Twp. Bd. 
of Trustees v. Smyth (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 549, 553, 721 N.E.2d 1057.  Although 
“R.C. 4123.65 is not a model of legislative draftsmanship,” see Gibson, 88 Ohio 
St.3d at 205, 724 N.E.2d 787 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting), the plain wording of the 
statute does not support Action Coupling’s position.  Action Coupling believes 
January Term, 2003 
5 
that an application for settlement must be made to the administrator in every 
workers’ compensation case.  However, to the contrary, the statute clearly states 
that a “state fund employer * * * may file an application” with the administrator.  
The decision to do so is optional.  Thus, not all state-fund claims are covered by 
the statute.  Moreover, R.C. 4123.65(C) does not encompass the settlement of all 
state-fund claims.  Rather, reference is made only to “settlement agreed to under 
division (A) of this section.”  Thus, only those claims arising in an administrative 
setting where an application is filed with the administrator would be subject to the 
requirements of the statute.  Accordingly, we hold that R.C. 4123.65 does not 
apply to state-fund workers’ compensation claims on appeal to a common pleas 
court under R.C. 4123.512.2 
{¶13} Here, the parties entered into a settlement during court litigation 
initiated under R.C. 4123.512.  Under these circumstances, we find that R.C. 
4123.65 does not apply to this action.  The judgment of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the trial court’s judgment ordering that the settlement be enforced is 
reinstated. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’CONNOR, 
JJ., concur. 
 
HARSHA, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
WILLIAM H. HARSHA III, J., of the Fourth Appellate District, sitting for 
COOK, J. 
__________________ 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Gerald H. Waterman, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellant Administrator, Bureau of Workers’ Compensation. 
                                          
 
2. 
Action Coupling and amicus Industrial Commission raise an equal-protection argument 
by asserting that an arbitrary distinction is being made between state-fund employers and self-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
Lonas, McGonegal & Tsangeos and Terrance J. McGonegal, for appellant 
Steven S. Jones. 
 
Rademaker, Matty, McClelland & Greve and Robert C. McClelland, for 
appellee Action Coupling & Equipment. 
 
Lee M. Smith & Associates Co., L.P.A., Elizabeth P. Weeden and Lee M. 
Smith, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Industrial Commission of Ohio. 
__________________ 
                                                                                                                   
insured employers and their employees.  We need not address this argument, as it was not raised 
below.  Gibson v. Meadow Gold Dairy (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 201, 204, 724 N.E.2d 787.