Case Title: Commonwealth v. Foster

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11596

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-04-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11596 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  STEPHEN FOSTER. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     November 7, 2014. - April 15, 2015. 
 
Present: Gants, C.J., Cordy, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Robbery.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Probable Cause.  Search 
and Seizure, Probable cause, Warrant, Affidavit.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, Motion to suppress, Warrant, 
Affidavit, Duplicative convictions. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 11, 2009. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Renee P. 
Dupuis, J., and the cases were tried before Robert J. Kane, J. 
 
 
 
Dana Alan Curhan for the defendant. 
 
Sebastian Jose Pacheco, Assistant District Attorney (David 
B. Mark, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  In December, 2009, the defendant was indicted on 
charges of murder in the first degree, armed robbery, receiving 
stolen property, and carrying a firearm without a license, in the 
shooting death of Hegazy Sayed.  In May, 2012, the defendant 
filed a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search 
 
 
2 
warrant from his room in a "sober house."  After an evidentiary 
hearing that took place in eight nonconsecutive days over the 
course of one year, the motion was denied, and the case proceeded 
to trial before a different judge of the Superior Court.  The 
defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty was 
denied.  Before submitting the case to the jury, the judge 
dismissed the charges of carrying a firearm without a license and 
of receiving stolen property.  A Superior Court jury found the 
defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of 
deliberate premeditation and felony-murder, and also found the 
defendant guilty of armed robbery.  The armed robbery conviction 
was dismissed subject to being reviewed for sentencing if the 
murder conviction were reversed on appeal. 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the motion judge erred 
in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from his 
residence pursuant to a search warrant, and all other evidence 
seized as a result of that initial search, because there was no 
probable cause that he was the perpetrator, and also because, 
even if there were evidence of his involvement in the robbery and 
killing, no nexus was established to show that evidence of the 
crimes would be found in his room.  The defendant also requests 
that we exercise our authority to provide relief pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Although the defendant concedes that the 
 
 
3 
evidence was sufficient to support his convictions, he argues 
that a reduction in the verdict would be more consonant with 
justice.  We affirm the convictions,1 and discern no reason to 
reduce the verdict of murder to a lesser degree of guilt or to 
grant a new trial. 
Background.  We summarize the facts the jury could have 
found, reserving certain facts for later discussion. 
1.  The shooting.  At approximately 9:55 P.M. on October 25, 
2009, Rosemary Alicea and Veronica Ponte stopped to purchase 
cigarettes at a convenience store and gasoline station in 
Taunton, where Alicea was a frequent customer.  The attendant, 
the victim, came over to their vehicle, which was stopped near 
the front door.  As was his usual practice, he assisted Alicea 
with purchases of items inside the store, while she remained in 
her vehicle.2  Alicea requested two packages of a specific brand 
of cigarette, and the victim returned with only one package, 
                     
1 The predicate offense for the felony-murder was the armed 
robbery.  The judge dismissed the armed robbery conviction as 
duplicative, subject to reinstatement if the felony-murder 
conviction were reversed.  Because the defendant was convicted of 
murder on theories of premeditation and felony-murder, the 
conviction of armed robbery should not have been dismissed.  See 
Commonwealth v. Brum, 441 Mass. 199, 200 n.1 (2004) ("where, as 
here, the conviction of murder is based on a theory in addition 
to the theory of felony-murder, the conviction of the underlying 
felony stands").  See part 2 of the discussion section, infra. 
 
2 The victim usually carried a large amount of cash with him 
when while he was working.  He kept a stack of bills folded in 
half in his pocket. 
 
 
4 
stating that it was the last one in the store. 
A few minutes later, Neusa Marques, another regular customer 
at the convenience store, drove into the parking lot and stopped 
near the pumps.  She saw a man wearing neon orange pants and a 
black sweater standing in the doorway to the store; he was 
standing with his back to the entrance, holding his arms straight 
out in front of him and appeared to have something in his hands.  
Marques did not see the regular attendant, who usually came out 
of the store and over to the pumps to assist customers.  She 
thought immediately that something was wrong.  She drove over the 
sidewalk rather than out the driveway, to get away from the 
parking lot as quickly as she could, and then "sped home" to her 
mother's house, which was about two or three minutes' drive from 
the convenience store. 
Shortly after Marques left, two other regular customers, 
Kyle Swensen and Jared Kimball, drove into the convenience store 
parking lot.  After they had been waiting at the pumps for the 
attendant for about ten minutes, Swensen went into the store and 
found the victim, whom he recognized, on the floor behind the 
counter; his eyes were open, his face was covered in blood, and 
he was lying in a pool of blood.  He appeared to be dead.  
Swensen ran outside and telephoned 911, and then he and Kimball 
went back inside.  They both thought that the victim was dead.  
 
 
5 
While Swensen and Kimball were waiting for emergency personnel, 
several other cars pulled into the parking lot.  A young woman 
who had arrived went into the store, took the victim's pulse, and 
walked out. 
Emergency medical personnel arrived within minutes and began 
treating the victim.  He was not breathing but he had a faint 
pulse.  They transported the victim to the hospital, where he was 
pronounced dead.  An autopsy established that he died as a result 
of gunshot wounds to the right side of his head and to his face. 
2.  The investigation.  Police officers investigating the 
shooting used a police dog to search a swampy, wooded area behind 
the convenience store.  At approximately 3 A.M. on October 26, 
2009, five hours after the shooting, police found a number of 
items in the wooded area that appeared related to the shooting.  
These included a pair of white, size eleven Nike sneakers, one of 
which was stuck in some mud; a pair of nylon pants that were 
orange on the inside and blue on the outside; a green camouflage 
rifle bag; a firearm lock and instructions, a set of keys, and a 
container for the lock; a single .22 caliber bullet; and a 
Winchester Wildcat .22 caliber rifle.  There was also a loaded 
magazine containing live ammunition in one of the pants pockets.  
Police found a spent shell casing inside the store and a live 
round on the ground immediately outside the store.  Later testing 
 
 
6 
showed that the spent shell casing probably had been fired from 
the Winchester rifle, the weapon that had been used to kill the 
victim.3  The weapon had been stolen from a Taunton home on 
October 19 or 22, 2009.4 
The owner of the convenience store was contacted, examined 
the store, and determined that $1,041 was missing.  He provided 
police with copies of the store's surveillance videotapes; the 
tapes showed a suspect entering the store holding a long object, 
and then running from the store, apparently moments after the 
shooting.  Police were unable to obtain an image of the suspect's 
face due to the poor quality of the recording and the angle of 
the camera; they were able to determine that the suspect was a 
male wearing light-colored shoes and a dark sweatshirt or similar 
top of a dark color. 
Approximately one hour after the shooting, at 11:07 P.M., 
emergency medical technicians (EMTs) -- one of whom had treated 
                     
3 To fire the Winchester Wildcat .22 caliber rifle requires 
that the rifle be loaded manually with a magazine containing 
cartridges.  A cartridge is seated in the chamber by manually 
sliding the bolt forward, pushing a round into the chamber.  At 
that point, if the safety is off and the trigger is depressed, a 
single shot will fire.  The weapon will not fire again until the 
manual bolt action is repeated. 
 
4 Four days before the shooting, a Taunton resident had 
reported to police that on October 19, 2009, a Winchester rifle, 
rifle bag, and firearm lock and container, with a key and 
instructions, had been taken from his home while he was away.  
Some rare coins, a silver ingot, and some jewelry also were 
taken. 
 
 
7 
the victim earlier that evening -- responded to a call from a 
rooming house on Broadway Avenue in Taunton.  There they 
encountered the defendant, sitting on the front stairs waiting 
for them.  Although the EMTs could see no obvious injuries, the 
defendant reported that he had been assaulted and had been hit on 
the side and back of his head.  The defendant climbed into the 
back of the ambulance without assistance, and was transported to 
the hospital, which was approximately 200 feet from the rooming 
house.  En route, the defendant told the EMTs that two men "beat 
him up" and that they had forced him to touch a gun.  The EMTs 
asked the defendant if he had lost consciousness during the 
assault, and he replied that he had not been "knocked out" and 
had not lost consciousness at any point.  The EMTs saw no signs 
of injury, trauma, or abrasions.5  After they completed the 
transport to the hospital, one of the EMTs telephoned police. 
The defendant told an emergency room doctor that he had been 
assaulted and hit in the head, and that he had lost consciousness 
and had been "out cold."  The doctor observed no signs of trauma 
or injury, but ordered a computerized tomography (CAT) scan of 
the defendant's brain.  The CAT scan showed no injury. 
Police arrived at the hospital and spoke with the defendant.  
                     
5 As a precautionary measure, the defendant was later 
discharged from the hospital with aftercare instructions for a 
closed-head injury. 
 
 
8 
He told them that, at approximately 8:30 P.M. that evening, he 
had been outside his house smoking when two men approached him.  
They asked him if he wanted to purchase a gun, and he asked to 
see it.  One of the men handed him a camouflage duffle bag; he 
took the gun out of the bag and examined it.  The gun looked like 
it was a BB gun and one of the metal parts was rusting.  When the 
defendant told the men that he did not want to purchase the gun, 
they punched him in the side of the head, knocking him to the 
ground, and kicked him.  They removed his white, size eleven Nike 
sneakers and blue nylon parachute pants, ripped his shirt, took 
the items of clothing, and left him in the bushes.  In his 
statement to police at the hospital, the defendant described one 
of the men as between five feet, eight inches and five feet, 
eleven inches tall, and either Hispanic or African-American.  He 
was wearing a camouflage jacket and dark pants.  The second man 
was Caucasian, and shorter and heavier than the other.  One of 
the men called the other man "Ray."  The defendant thought he 
would be able to identify both men.  He lost consciousness and 
was very cold when he woke up.  He attempted to telephone his 
girl friend for help; when she did not answer, he called 911 for 
emergency medical help. 
The officers suspected that the defendant had been involved 
in the shooting at the convenience store.  In the early morning 
 
 
9 
hours of October 26, 2009, they had his hands and clothing tested 
for gunshot residue; the test results were negative.  Later that 
day, police obtained a warrant to search the defendant's room in 
the boarding house.  Under the defendant's mattress, they found 
jewelry, and the silver ingot and coins that had been reported 
stolen during the two break-ins at the house in Taunton on 
October 19 and 22, 2009. 
Police subsequently learned that, at a few minutes after 
10 P.M. on the night of the shooting, the defendant had gone to a 
pharmacy where he was a well-known customer.  The pharmacy was 
very near the convenience store.  Another customer and a clerk 
working at the pharmacy noticed that the defendant was not 
wearing shoes and that his socks were muddy.  The defendant 
purchased a pair of slippers; when he paid for the purchase, he 
appeared to be holding a large amount of money. 
Discussion.  1.  Whether there was probable cause to issue a 
search warrant.  The defendant claims that the evidence proffered 
in the search warrant affidavit was insufficient to establish 
probable cause that he had committed the robbery or the shooting, 
or that evidence related to those crimes would be found in his 
room.  He argues that, at most, police had a "hunch" that he 
might have known something about the shooting, or have had some 
involvement in it, but that they lacked probable cause to believe 
 
 
10 
the defendant was the shooter.  He argues also that, even if 
there were probable cause to believe he had been involved in the 
shooting, officers had no reason to think that any evidence 
related to the shooting would be found in his room, in what he 
described as a "sober house," where he contends that residents' 
activities were closely monitored. 
Under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, a search warrant may issue only upon a showing of 
probable cause.  See Commonwealth v. Valerio, 449 Mass. 562, 566 
(2007).  A determination whether there was probable cause to 
issue a search warrant is restricted to an examination of the 
information within the four corners of the affidavit in support 
of the warrant, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom.  See Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297-298 
(2003).  Where the location to be searched is a residence, 
probable cause exists only if there is specific information in 
the search warrant affidavit to show a "sufficient nexus" between 
the criminal activity and the residence.  Commonwealth v. 
Escalera, 462 Mass. 636, 642 (2012).  In order to satisfy the 
"nexus" requirement, "the affidavit 'must provide a substantial 
basis for concluding that evidence connected to the crime will be 
found on the specified premises.'"  Commonwealth v. Tapia, 463 
 
 
11 
Mass. 721, 726 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 
710, 712 (2000).  "Strong reason to suspect is not adequate."  
Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 370 (1985).  Because a 
determination of probable cause is a conclusion of law, we review 
a search warrant affidavit de novo.  Commonwealth v. Long, 454 
Mass. 542, 554-555 (2009). 
We do not agree that the warrant affidavit here was 
insufficient to establish probable cause.  "In dealing with 
probable cause, . . . as the very name implies, we deal with 
probabilities.  These are not technical; they are the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and 
prudent men, not legal technicians, act."  Commonwealth v. Kaupp, 
453 Mass. 102, 111-112 (2009), quoting Draper v. United States, 
358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959), quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 
U.S. 160, 175 (1949).  The affidavit, written by a Taunton police 
detective, recites the events of the shooting and notes the 
items, including the rifle, green bag, white size eleven Nike 
sneakers, nylon pants, and the money recovered from the swampy 
area behind the convenience store.  It details the defendant's 
statement to police, while he was being treated at the hospital 
for the purported assault, concerning the rifle in a green bag 
that he had handled after being shown it by the two assailants, 
and the white size eleven Nike sneakers, "parachute pants," and 
 
 
12 
other items of clothing the defendant reported had been stolen 
from him.   The defendant's improbable story concerning the very 
items that police found near the scene of the shooting, his 
telephone call to be transported to a hospital that was only a 
very brief walk from his house, his inconsistent claims 
concerning his loss of consciousness coupled with his apparent 
lack of injury, and his inconsistent statements to police, as set 
forth in the affidavit in support of the warrant, provided 
probable cause that the defendant had been involved in the 
shooting. 
In support of his argument that it is "questionable" whether 
evidence related to the offenses at issue could have been brought 
into his rooming house, given "the supervision and peer 
monitoring that takes place in such residences," the defendant 
relies on the description of the "sober housing model" in 
Massachusetts Sober Housing Corp. v. Automatic Sprinkler Appeals 
Bd., 66 Mass. App. Ct. 701, 702 (2006).  The defendant does not 
explain how that description, of a single-family dwelling owned 
by the Massachusetts Sober Housing Corporation in another town, 
Oxford, relates to what police witnesses described as the 
"rooming house" where the defendant was living at the time of the 
shooting.  The warrant affidavit describes the building as a 
"three story dwelling consisting of several apartments" with a 
 
 
13 
"common area allowing entrance to all apartments" from the front 
door.  The building has a large sign, approximately three feet by 
three feet, labeling it "Bristol Lodging Sober House."  The 
defendant's apartment is noted as "apartment 4" on the first 
floor, "facing the side door" as one enters the front door. 
Assuming that the building is a "sober house," nothing in 
the record describes its model of operation or any restrictions 
placed on its residents.  Moreover, even if the Oxford sober 
housing model were applicable to the defendant's living 
situation, nothing in the description of the operation of such 
houses, or of the requirements that they be "democratically 
operated," and "financially self-supporting," see id., and that 
residents who use drugs or alcohol must be evicted, warrants an 
inference that a resident of such a house would be unable to keep 
items such as cash, clothing, ammunition, and weapons, the types 
of evidence sought here, in his room.  Nor does the defendant's 
alternate argument that he only had been living in the building 
for a few weeks negate the inference that the defendant could 
have brought such evidence into his room.  In particular, the 
warrant specifically included "bloody clothing."  Because police 
knew that the defendant had been at his house after the shooting, 
he could have had the victim's blood on his clothes, his person, 
or any item he had with him at the scene and wore back to the 
 
 
14 
apartment.  Although distinctive items of clothing and shoes had 
been found earlier near the scene, other items, such as the socks 
the defendant was seen wearing, without shoes, at the pharmacy 
immediately after the robbery, were not found in the swamp behind 
the convenience store. 
2.  Dismissal of armed robbery conviction.  The judge stated 
that he dismissed the conviction of armed robbery because he 
believed he was required to do so given that the armed robbery 
was the predicate felony underlying the conviction of felony-
murder; he stated also that the armed robbery conviction was 
subject to reinstatement if the conviction of felony-murder were 
reversed.  Because the defendant was convicted of murder in the 
first degree on theories of both premeditation and felony-murder, 
the armed robbery conviction should not have been dismissed. 
"The felony-murder rule 'imposes criminal liability for 
homicide on all participants in a certain common criminal 
enterprise if a death occurred in the course of that 
enterprise.'"  Commonwealth v. Hanright, 466 Mass. 303, 307, 
(2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 502 
(1982).  The felony-murder rule substitutes the intent to commit 
an inherently dangerous felony, punishable by imprisonment for 
life, for the "malice aforethought" required for murder; the rule 
is one of "constructive malice."  See Commonwealth v. Judge, 420 
 
 
15 
Mass. 433, 438-439 (1995), citing Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 
Mass. 644, 651 (1982), quoting Commonwealth v. Matchett, supra.  
To be liable for felony-murder, a defendant need only possess the 
intent necessary for the underlying felony.  Commonwealth v. 
Hanright, supra. 
Where a defendant is convicted of murder in the first degree 
on a theory of felony-murder alone, and where the only felony 
apart from the homicide is the predicate felony, the predicate 
felony merges with the homicide.  In such a circumstance, the 
conviction of the predicate felony is duplicative as a lesser 
included offense of the homicide, and must be dismissed.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gunter, 427 Mass. 259, 271-273 (1998).  See also, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Benitez, 464 Mass. 686, 697 (2013); 
Commonwealth v. Stokes, 460 Mass. 311, 316 & n.11 (2011); 
Commonwealth v. Bell, 460 Mass. 294, 299-300 (2011). 
By contrast, where, as here, a defendant is convicted of 
murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder, and also 
is convicted of murder in the first degree on another theory, and 
where we affirm the convictions on both theories, the conviction 
of the predicate felony is not duplicative, and the felony 
conviction stands.  See Commonwealth v. Bizanowicz, 459 Mass. 
400, 402 (2011), citing Commonwealth v. Felder, 455 Mass. 359, 
370-371 (2009); Commonwealth v. Brum, 441 Mass. 199, 200 n.1, 
 
 
16 
(2004). 
3.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Although he 
concedes that the evidence was sufficient to support a verdict of 
murder in the first degree, the defendant nonetheless requests 
that we exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
reduce the verdict, arguing that a verdict of a lesser degree of 
guilt would be more consonant with justice.  In support of this 
argument, the defendant points to a rare autoimmune disorder from 
which he suffers that causes extensive nerve damage.  The 
defendant's condition was diagnosed in February, 2008, and 
resulted in him being hospitalized for six months, three of them 
in an induced coma, followed by eight months in a rehabilitation 
facility where he had to relearn how to walk.  The defendant 
contends, and the record appears to support, that this condition 
is ongoing and, as a result, he continues to suffer pain and 
numbness and has difficulty walking.  The defendant points also 
to a mental health condition that resulted in his commitment to a 
mental hospital for six months while he was awaiting trial, and 
to a childhood history of severe abuse and neglect by alcoholic 
parents and stepparents.  Relying on Commonwealth v. Rolon, 438 
Mass. 808, 821 (2003), the defendant maintains that this 
combination of "physical and mental impairments" suggests that he 
may not have been "fully functional," and may not have acted with 
 
 
17 
malice at the time of the killing. 
The defendant was committed to Bridgewater State Hospital 
pending trial after he made statements indicating that he 
intended to kill himself, and that he had been gathering the 
means by which he intended to do so.  After evaluation, he was 
found to be suffering from severe depression, which his treatment 
providers believed would be ameliorated by individual and group 
therapy to provide him with better coping mechanisms in the face 
of stressful circumstances.  Contrary to the defendant's 
contention that this admission raises "at least some reason to 
question" his mental state at the time of the killing, the 
defendant's medical evaluations state that he was suffering from 
situational depression due to his personal circumstances while 
incarcerated pending trial.  The evaluations indicate that the 
defendant was, understandably, concerned about the possible 
sentence of life imprisonment he faced, and saddened by his 
inability to visit with his three year old son; the defendant 
stated that during earlier incarcerations he had been able to 
visit regularly with relatives, and missed that contact while 
awaiting his murder trial.  These evaluations suggest a rational 
response to the defendant's circumstances, see Commonwealth v. 
Goudreau, 442 Mass. 341, 349-352 (2004), rather than the 
psychotic thought processes and illogical thinking the defendant 
 
 
18 
points to in Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 Mass. 672, 682 (1980).  
"Even an entirely rational defendant would be depressed, and 
might be suicidal, during a murder trial where the proof against 
him is substantial, and where he is facing life imprisonment with 
no possibility of parole."  Commonwealth v. Laurore, 437 Mass. 
65, 70B72, 79 (2002).  See Commonwealth v. Russin, 420 Mass. 309, 
316, 318 (1995).  In any event, the defendant's mental state in 
response to his incarceration does not bear on his mental state 
at the time of the killing.  The defendant did not claim 
diminished capacity at trial, nor does he argue that counsel was 
ineffective for having failed to do so. 
In addition, and notwithstanding the defendant's contention, 
the "thrust of the evidence" does not support a determination 
that a lesser degree of guilt would be more appropriate.  
Contrast Commonwealth v. Cadwell, 374 Mass. 308, 318-319 (1978), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 366 Mass. 805, 808 (1975).  The 
defendant concedes that the evidence was sufficient to support 
the verdict of murder in the first degree, and we conclude that 
the verdict is consonant with justice.  The evidence supports the 
conclusion that, armed with a loaded rifle, the defendant went to 
the convenience store intending to rob it, and that he twice, 
deliberately and intentionally, shot the unarmed victim from the 
doorway of the store, within eight seconds of arriving, before 
 
 
19 
fleeing with a little more than $1,000 in cash.  He then 
concocted a far-fetched story of two unknown assailants to 
explain how clothing, ammunition, and a firearm used in the 
robbery, which could be connected to him, came to be discarded in 
the woods near the scene of the crime.  Nothing in the evidence 
suggests that the killing was the result of a "senseless brawl," 
Commonwealth v. Colleran, 452 Mass. 417, 431 (2008), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Ransom, 358 Mass. 580, 583 (1971), "sudden . . . 
combat," or a "minor controversy" that "explode[d] into" a 
killing, Commonwealth v. Colleran, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Baker, 346 Mass. 107, 110, 119 (1963); that the victim was the 
first aggressor, Commonwealth v. Colleran, supra at 431-432, 
citing Commonwealth v. Baker, supra at 118; or provides any other 
indication of circumstances supporting spontaneity rather than 
premeditation, Commonwealth v. Williams, 364 Mass. 145, 151 
(1973).  See Commonwealth v. Colleran, supra, and cases cited. 
Having carefully reviewed the entire record pursuant to our 
duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we discern no reason to reduce 
the verdict of murder in the first degree or to order a new 
trial. 
Conclusion.  The conviction of murder in the first degree is 
affirmed.  Because the defendant was convicted of murder on 
theories of both premeditation and felony-murder, and because we 
 
 
20 
affirm on both theories, the conviction of armed robbery was not 
duplicative, and should not have been dismissed.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bizanowicz, supra at 402, citing Commonwealth v. 
Felder, supra at 370-371.  The judge's order dismissing that 
conviction is vacated, and the conviction is reinstated; we 
remand to the Superior Court for sentencing on the reinstated 
conviction.  See Commonwealth v. Wood, 469 Mass. 266, 269, 294 
(2014). 
So ordered.