Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Robert B. Moodie

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2020-04-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
2020 WI 39 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP1781-D 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Robert B. Moodie, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Robert B. Moodie, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MOODIE 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 22, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
   
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 13, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ZIEGLER, J. dissents, joined by ROGGENSACK, C. J. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-petitioner, there were briefs filed by 
Terry E. Johnson and von Briesen & Roper, S.C., Milwaukee.  Oral 
argument by Terry E. Johnson. 
 
For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Thomas Laitsch and Office of Lawyer Regulation, Madison.  Oral 
argument by Thomas Laitsch.  
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 39
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP1781-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Robert B. Moodie, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert B. Moodie, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
APR 22, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   This disciplinary matter comes to the 
court on Attorney Robert B. Moodie's appeal of a report and 
recommendation of Referee James W. Mohr, Jr.  The referee based 
his report in part on Attorney Moodie's stipulation to the two 
counts of misconduct alleged in the Office of Lawyer Regulation's 
(OLR) complaint involving his conversion of fees belonging to his 
law firm to his personal use.  Attorney Moodie reserved his right 
to be heard on the matter of sanctions.  After holding a hearing 
on sanctions and receiving post-hearing briefs, the referee issued 
No. 
2018AP1781-D   
 
2 
 
a report recommending that the court suspend Attorney Moodie's law 
license for a period of six months, and order Attorney Moodie to 
pay the full costs of this proceeding, which total $6,081.63 as of 
January 15, 2020. 
¶2 
When we review a referee's report and recommendation in 
an attorney disciplinary case, we affirm the referee's findings of 
fact unless they are found to be clearly erroneous, but we review 
the referee's conclusions of law on a de novo basis.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 
Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  We determine the appropriate level of 
discipline to impose given the particular facts of each case, 
independent of the referee's recommendation, but benefiting from 
it.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, 
¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶3 
After reviewing this matter and considering Attorney 
Moodie's appeal, we accept the referee's factual findings and legal 
conclusions based on the parties' stipulation.  We agree with the 
referee's 
recommendation 
that 
a 
six-month 
suspension 
is 
appropriate, despite Attorney Moodie's arguments to the contrary.  
We order Attorney Moodie to pay the full costs of this disciplinary 
hearing. 
¶4 
The OLR initiated this disciplinary proceeding with the 
filing of a two-count complaint.  Attorney Moodie filed an answer 
in which he generally admitted the factual allegations of the 
complaint, as well as the two counts of alleged misconduct.  
Attorney Moodie later entered into a stipulation in which he pled 
no contest to the misconduct alleged in the complaint, and agreed 
No. 
2018AP1781-D   
 
3 
 
that the referee could use the allegations of the complaint as an 
adequate factual basis for a determination of misconduct. 
¶5 
The referee's report accepted the parties' stipulation 
and determined that the stipulated facts supported legal 
conclusions that Attorney Moodie had engaged in the two counts of 
misconduct alleged by the OLR.  The referee's factual findings and 
conclusions of law are described in the following paragraphs. 
¶6 
Attorney Moodie was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1982.  He practiced at a law firm in Waukesha, 
Wisconsin for over 30 years.  He has no disciplinary history.   
¶7 
In September 2016, Attorney Moodie suffered a serious 
health event resulting in a lengthy hospitalization.  During 
Attorney Moodie's absence, other members of the firm assumed 
responsibility for his client files, including the management of 
his billing.  While handling Attorney Moodie's files and billing, 
the firm discovered that over an 18-month period, Attorney Moodie 
had converted fees in five client matters for his personal use.  
It is undisputed that in some matters, he received billed fees 
directly from the client and failed to tender them to the firm; in 
others, he collected money directly from the client and then wrote-
off his billable time.  The converted fees totaled $8,665.  Had 
Attorney Moodie not converted these fees, he would have ultimately 
received 55-60 percent of them under the terms of the firm's 
compensation system.  
¶8 
In November 2016, after the firm discovered Attorney 
Moodie's misappropriations, Attorney Moodie consented to the 
redemption of his shares in the firm, ending his employment there.  
No. 
2018AP1781-D   
 
4 
 
As part of the redemption, any claims by the firm against Attorney 
Moodie were settled. 
¶9 
The firm reported Attorney Moodie's conduct to the OLR, 
and the OLR commenced this disciplinary matter.   As noted earlier, 
Attorney Moodie stipulated to the two counts of misconduct alleged 
by the OLR:  
 Count 1:  By converting at least $8,665 in fees belonging 
to his law firm for his own personal use, Attorney Moodie 
violated SCR 20:8.4(c).  That rule provides:  "It is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit 
or 
misrepresentation."   
 Count 2:  By failing to tender and report to his law 
firm fees that he received, and by misrepresenting 
write-offs of billable time to his firm, Attorney Moodie 
breached his fiduciary duty to his firm, and his duty of 
honesty in his professional dealings with the firm, in 
violation of the standard of conduct set forth in In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Shea, 190 Wis. 2d 560, 
527 N.W.2d 314 (1995).  See SCR 20:8.4(f) (providing 
that "[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to 
violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme court 
order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct 
of lawyers.") 
¶10 Referee Mohr held a sanctions hearing.  Attorney Moodie 
testified, and was at a loss to explain his actions.  His household 
was not short of money.  He and his law partners had had 
No. 
2018AP1781-D   
 
5 
 
professional disagreements, but he declined to categorize his 
misappropriations as a form of retribution.  He had health issues 
and gambling issues during the period of his misconduct, but he 
did not cite them as a reason for his misconduct, and he has not 
raised a medical defense in these proceedings.  Attorney Moodie 
also confirmed that, under his firm's compensation system, he would 
have ultimately collected between 55-60 percent of the $8,665 in 
fees that he misappropriated, making his actions, in his words, 
"just wrong and dumb."   
¶11 In post-hearing briefing, the OLR asserted that a one-
year suspension was appropriate, whereas Attorney Moodie argued 
that no more than a 60-day suspension was appropriate. 
¶12 In his report, the referee recommended that the court 
suspend Attorney Moodie's law license for six months.  In making 
this recommendation, the referee discussed various mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances.  On the mitigating side, the referee 
noted that Attorney Moodie had been a member of his law firm for 
over 30 years, without any past disciplinary issues.  The amount 
of the misappropriation was relatively small, and Attorney Moodie 
has repaid it.  He has admitted his misconduct, cooperated with 
the OLR, and expressed sincere remorse.  On the aggravating side, 
the referee noted that Attorney Moodie converted fees over a period 
of 18 months, without any obvious motive.  Considering these 
circumstances together with the range of discipline imposed in 
previous cases involving the misappropriation of firm funds, the 
referee concluded that a six-month suspension was in order. 
No. 
2018AP1781-D   
 
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¶13 On appeal, Attorney Moodie argues that the referee's 
recommended six-month suspension is excessive.  He claims that 
this case is most analogous to In Re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Casey, 174 Wis. 2d 341, 496 N.W.2d 94 (1993), where the 
court imposed a stipulated 60-day suspension on a lawyer who 
misappropriated three client retainers totaling $2,300.  Attorney 
Moodie argues that his case involves a similar amount of clients 
and money, and that he, like the respondent-lawyer in Casey, 
stipulated to the misconduct in question.  Thus, he reasons that 
a 60-day suspension is as appropriate here as it was in Casey.  
Attorney Moodie also argues that his conduct is mitigated by a 
variety of factors, including that it was an inexplicable departure 
from his normal character and from common sense.  This is an 
"unusual and baffling" case, he says, because "there was no cause, 
basis[,] or motivation for the conversions."  Attorney Moodie also 
notes that a six-month suspension will require him to go through 
the reinstatement process, see SCR 22.28(3), which can add as much 
as 18 months on to a suspension period.  Attorney Moodie claims 
that an "effective suspension" of two years "may well be the 
equivalent of revocation" given his age and health issues.   
¶14 The OLR responds that the facts and the law support the 
recommended six-month suspension.  The OLR argues that Attorney 
Moodie engaged in an 18-month period of deceit and dishonesty, and 
he presents no excuse for his behavior.  His reliance on Casey is 
misplaced, the OLR says, because the respondent-lawyer in Casey 
was an inexperienced first-year associate, not a shareholder and 
trusted 30-year member of the firm.  Moreover, the Casey court 
No. 
2018AP1781-D   
 
7 
 
announced that, going forward, the court would sanction a 
misappropriation of firm funds as severely as a misappropriation 
of client funds.  Casey, 174 Wis. 2d at 341-43.  The court has 
held true to its word, the OLR says, as evidenced by such cases as 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Olson, 216 Wis. 2d 483, 574 
N.W.2d 245 (1998) (one-year suspension for lawyer who wrote 
himself unauthorized law firm checks totaling $11,250 from the 
firm's bank account, and then deleted some of them from the firm's 
check register), and In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Schaller, 2006 WI 40, 290 Wis. 2d 65, 713 N.W.2d 105 (two-year 
suspension for lawyer who retained about $4,300 in client funds 
for his own use, failed to report that money on his tax returns, 
and practiced law for three-and-a-half months while his license 
was administratively suspended).  Finally, the OLR acknowledges 
that a six-month suspension would require Attorney Moodie to go 
through the formal reinstatement process——a positive consequence, 
the OLR says, given that Attorney Moodie has no rational 
justification for his behavior.  His inability to explain his own 
actions makes it prudent to require him to prove his moral 
character and fitness for re-licensure. 
¶15 As we view the matter, the OLR has the better of the two 
arguments.  We agree with the OLR that Attorney Moodie's reliance 
on 
Casey——where 
we 
imposed 
a 
60-day 
suspension 
for 
the 
misappropriation of three client retainers totaling $2,300——is 
misplaced.  Our modest 60-day suspension imposed in Casey came 
with an explicit disclaimer:  we issued it "on the basis of 
discipline previously imposed for similar misconduct."  Casey, 174 
No. 
2018AP1781-D   
 
8 
 
Wis. 2d at 341 (emphasis added).  "[L]est attorneys rely on our 
disposition of this proceeding or prior proceedings involving 
similar attorney misconduct," we explicitly directed the State Bar 
to "bring to the attention of its members" the fact that "in the 
future the court will treat an attorney's misappropriation of funds 
belonging to another lawyer, associate or firm in practice with 
that lawyer no differently than it treats misappropriation of funds 
belonging to a lawyer's client," and this behavior "will be 
disciplined severely."  Id. at 341-43.  In other words, we warned 
in Casey that when it comes to modest 60-day suspensions for 
misappropriation of firm funds, that was then, this is now, and 
things have changed.  And so they have:  since Casey, we have 
consistently imposed suspensions of at least six months for 
misappropriations of firm funds.1  The six-month suspension imposed 
here fits comfortably within this caselaw. 
                                                 
1 See In Re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Curran, 180 
Wis. 2d 540, 509 N.W.2d 429 (1994) (imposing two-year suspension); 
In Re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Shea, 190 Wis. 2d 560, 527 
N.W.2d 314 
(1995) 
(imposing 
six-month 
suspension); 
In 
Re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Olson, 216 Wis. 2d 483, 574 
N.W.2d 245 
(1998) 
(imposing 
one-year 
suspension); 
In 
Re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Brown, 
2005 
WI 
49, 
280 
Wis. 2d 44, 695 N.W.2d 295 (imposing 18-month suspension); In Re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Peterson, 2006 WI 41, 290 
Wis. 2d 74, 713 N.W.2d 101 (imposing two-year suspension); In Re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schaller, 2006 WI 40, 290 
Wis. 2d 65, 713 N.W.2d 105 (imposing two-year suspension); In Re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Siderits, 2013 WI 2, 345 
Wis. 2d 89, 824 N.W.2d 812 (imposing one-year suspension); In Re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Koenig, 2015 WI 16, 361 
Wis. 2d 16, 859 N.W.2d 105 (imposing two-year suspension); In Re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hotvedt, 2016 WI 93, 372 
Wis. 2d 68, 888 N.W.2d 393 (imposing 18-month suspension); In Re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Trupke, 2018 WI 43, 381 
Wis. 2d 136, 911 N.W.2d 361 (imposing one-year suspension). 
No. 
2018AP1781-D   
 
9 
 
¶16 We also hold that the fact that we only know what 
Attorney Moodie did (misappropriate firm funds) and how he did it 
(billing improprieties), and have no idea why he did do so, cuts 
against an argument of mitigation.  When it comes to evaluating 
the discipline owed for a lawyer's misconduct, the "why" is often 
as important as the "what" and the "how."  We decline to establish 
a precedent whereby the lack of a rational explanation for a 
lawyer's misconduct serves to mitigate the sanction owed for it.  
A shrug of the shoulders is not a defense. 
¶17 If anything, Attorney Moodie's inability to explain his 
behavior weighs in favor of a six-month suspension, which will 
require him to successfully complete the formal reinstatement 
process in order to regain his Wisconsin law license.  See SCRs 
22.29–22.33.  This process will require Attorney Moodie to fully 
account for his moral lapses and explain how they have been 
addressed to ensure they will not happen again.  See SCR 22.31; 
see also In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arthur, 2005 WI 
40, ¶78, 279 Wis. 2d 583, 694 N.W.2d 910 (lawyer disciplinary 
system aims to prevent unethical lawyers from repeating their 
misconduct).  As for Attorney Moodie's claim that the length of 
the reinstatement process may preclude him from practicing again 
given his age and health, we have made clear that we will not 
"countenance a rule that would soft-pedal the discipline owed to 
attorneys" who commit misconduct "so long as they do so in the 
twilight of their careers."  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Carter, 2014 WI 126, ¶26, 359 Wis. 2d 70, 856 N.W.2d 595.   
No. 
2018AP1781-D   
 
10 
 
¶18 We 
do 
not, 
however, 
impose 
the 
condition 
of 
reinstatement recommended by the referee: 
that in the event Attorney Moodie's law license is 
restored and he resumes practice, it be on the condition 
that for a period of three years following such 
restoration, he practice only as a sole proprietor or as 
an employee, and not as a partner or shareholder in a 
law firm.  
Neither party has voiced support for this condition.   It is 
unclear how requiring Attorney Moodie to practice as a sole 
proprietor, with no collegial oversight, or as an employee would 
deter future misconduct of the type that occurred here.  
Consequently, we decline to impose this recommended condition of 
reinstatement. 
¶19 Because 
Attorney 
Moodie 
has 
already 
made 
full 
restitution to his former firm, no restitution award is sought, 
and none is ordered. 
¶20 Finally, as is our general practice, we impose full costs 
on Attorney Moodie, which total $6,081.63 as of January 15, 2020. 
Neither the OLR nor Attorney Moodie challenges the imposition of 
full costs. 
¶21 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Robert B. Moodie to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of six months, 
effective June 3, 2020. 
¶22 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of 
this order, Robert B. Moodie shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are $6,081.63 as of 
January 15, 2020. 
No. 
2018AP1781-D   
 
11 
 
¶23 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, to the extent that he has 
not already done so, Robert B. Moodie shall comply with the 
provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person whose 
license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended. 
¶24 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions with this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.29(4)(c). 
¶25 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 
 
No.  2018AP1781-D.akz 
 
1 
 
¶26 ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
I 
respectfully dissent because I believe that when it comes to lawyer 
discipline, courts should say what they mean and mean what they 
say, and here the discipline imposed will far exceed that which is 
stated.  While we have consistently said there is no fixed formula 
for determining the "right" amount of lawyer discipline, that 
amounts to lip service because here we abdicate the responsibility 
we have to individualize our determinations when it comes to lawyer 
discipline and should not instead default to a mandatory minimum 
set in another case based upon other facts.  See, e.g., In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Siderits, 2013 WI 2, ¶33, 345 
Wis. 2d 89, 824 N.W.2d 812, (acknowledging that the imposition of 
discipline in attorney disciplinary cases "is not an exact 
science").  Each case is different, we say, and discipline must be 
tailored to each case's unique facts.  See id., ¶¶31-32.  Here, 
the court imposes what it views as a mandatory minimum six-month 
suspension of Attorney Moodie's license even though, in reality, 
a six-month suspension may very well be three or four times that 
amount because of the required reinstatement process.  See SCRs 
22.29-22.33.  In other words, for Attorney Moodie, a six-month 
suspension could be two years and perhaps the equivalent of 
revocation.  Here, that is excessive.  We should decide each case 
independently. 
¶27 The referee concluded that here any suspension must be 
for a minimum period of six months because a previous case stated 
as much and the cases in its wake have gone no lower.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Casey, 174 Wis. 2d 341, 341-42, 
No.  2018AP1781-D.akz 
 
2 
 
496 N.W.2d 94 (1993); see, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Shea, 190 Wis. 2d 560, 572, 527 N.W.2d 314 (1995).  I 
disagree that this court, when essentially acting as the 
"sentencing" decision maker in a lawyer discipline case, is forever 
hamstrung from exercising any discretion.  I disagree that we are 
bound to a mandatory minimum six-month penalty because of other 
fact-dependent cases.  I disagree that we should have judicially 
imposed automatic mandatory minimum penalties for all such cases 
going forward no matter the evidence.  If we so constrain 
ourselves, there is little room for judicial decision making or 
case-specific determinations, and we abdicate our responsibility 
to weigh and consider what is appropriate discipline in each 
individual case.  We should not be so robotically confined.  
¶28 The record below demonstrates that absent this perceived 
constraint, the referee's recommendation would likely have been 
less than six months and definitely not for up to two years.  The 
record makes clear that Attorney Moodie's case was notably 
different than the cases relied upon by the OLR.  For example, 
Attorney Moodie's conduct is less severe than that in Shea.  In 
fact, as the referee noted, there are numerous mitigating 
circumstances present in this case: 
[Attorney Moodie] was the senior partner in a well-
established and well-respected firm, having been a 
member of the firm for over 30 years, he has no prior 
disciplinary record, the amount taken by [Attorney 
Moodie] which should have gone to his partners 
(approximately $3,000 to $3,500) was relatively small 
and has been fully repaid, he and his firm have resolved 
all issues between them[.] 
No.  2018AP1781-D.akz 
 
3 
 
¶29 The referee's findings further reflect that Attorney 
Moodie was forthright and sincere.  The referee noted: 
[Attorney Moodie] has admitted his misconduct, is 
extremely and sincerely remorseful for it, and has fully 
cooperated in the OLR investigation, stipulating to all 
of the relevant facts.   
¶30 In addition, Attorney Moodie apparently had a heart 
attack and resultant health issues that will affect his practice 
of law, may have played a role in the violation at issue, and ought 
to be considered to some degree.  From the record, it appears that 
his conduct is completely out of character and will not occur 
again.  There is virtually no chance Attorney Moodie will work 
with other lawyers in a law firm setting again.  He is not then a 
threat to taking other lawyers' money.  The record also reflects 
that the amounts he converted may have ultimately been due to him.  
The evidence here reveals that unlike some, Attorney Moodie is not 
a threat to the legal profession, clients, or others as his 
practice will be significantly limited because of his health.  A 
suspension less than six months is appropriate in this case, and 
therefore I would suspend Attorney Moodie's license for five months 
and 28 days, which really is six months. 
¶31 This court ties its hands when it claims that Wisconsin 
precedent establishes a six-month suspension floor.  In fact, in 
Casey, this court imposed a 60-day suspension for an attorney who 
misappropriated three client retainers rather than those funds 
going to his partners.  174 Wis. 2d at 342.  Like this case, 
Attorney Casey stipulated to his wrongful conduct and the court 
agreed and suspended him for 60 days.  Id.  The referee in this 
case, however, felt constrained by the fact that this court has 
No.  2018AP1781-D.akz 
 
4 
 
not imposed discipline shorter than six months since Casey.  The 
referee explained how Shea was distinguishable because the amount 
converted in Shea far exceeded that in the case at issue; unlike 
Attorney Moodie, Attorney Shea engaged in misconduct for years; 
and unlike Attorney Moodie, Attorney Shea justified and concealed 
the conversions by misrepresenting facts to the partners of his 
firm.  See, e.g., Shea, 190 Wis. 2d at 561-62, 572. 
¶32 We should not shirk our duty to carefully consider each 
matter independently, taking into account the gravity of Attorney 
Moodie's 
offense, 
its 
nature, 
implications 
on 
the 
legal 
profession, and the need to protect the public.  Reasonable and 
appropriate discipline should be determined on a case-specific 
basis.  What is necessary to protect the public from a part-time, 
limited solo practitioner who works primarily for friends and long-
time clients?  Does Attorney Moodie understand the gravity of his 
behavior and misconduct?  Has he admitted to the wrongdoing, 
stipulated to the facts, cooperated fully, and has since seemingly 
done everything the right way?  The answers to these questions and 
the evidence in this case should impact what is fair and 
appropriate.  The six-month suspension imposed by this court could 
very well be the equivalent of two years and/or a revocation, given 
Attorney Moodie's age and health issues.  Six months is too much; 
I would impose the equivalent of what the court says it is imposing 
as discipline, or five months and 28 days.  
¶33 Just as I recently stated in my dissent to this court's 
order denying Rule Petition 19-10, In the Matter of Amending 
Supreme Court Rules Pertaining to Permanent Revocation of a License 
No.  2018AP1781-D.akz 
 
5 
 
to Practice Law in Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings, we should 
say what we mean and mean what we say.  See S. Ct. Order 19-10 
(issued Dec. 18, 2019) (Ziegler, J., dissenting).  We should not 
be creating false perceptions to both the public and to the lawyer 
seeking to practice law again.  When this court ties its own hands 
by instead of providing individualized consideration for a 
disciplinary matter, setting a mandatory minimum six-month 
suspension (which amounts to far more, perhaps four times that 
length), the court abdicates its responsibility.   
¶34 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
¶35 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 
DRAKE ROGGENSACK joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2018AP1781-D.akz 
 
 
 
1