Case Title: In re T.M.L.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 232A20

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2021-04-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-55 
No. 232A20 
Filed 23 April 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: T.M.L. and A.R.L. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from orders entered on 7 
February 2020 by Judge Larry Leake in District Court, Mitchell County.1 This matter 
was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 19 March 2021 but determined 
on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North 
Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Hockaday & Hockaday, P.A., by Daniel M. Hockaday, for petitioner-appellee 
Mitchell County Department of Social Services. 
 
Michelle FormyDuval Lynch for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Wendy C. Sotolongo, Parent Defender, by Annick Lenoir-Peek, Deputy Parent 
Defender, for respondent-appellant father. 
 
 
BERGER, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondent-father appeals from orders terminating his parental rights in the 
minor children “Troy” and “Ava.”2 The children’s mother died during the course of the 
underlying juvenile proceedings and is not a party to this appeal. Based on our review 
                                            
1 Although the termination orders indicate they were filed in Yancey County, the 
entirety of the record otherwise confirms Mitchell County to be their county of origin. 
2 We use pseudonyms to protect the juveniles’ privacy. 
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of the record and respondent-father’s arguments, we hold the trial court properly 
considered respondent-father’s progress up to the time of the termination hearing 
before concluding that he willfully failed to make reasonable progress to correct the 
conditions that led to the children’s removal from the home. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(2) (2019). We further hold the trial court did not err by failing to consider 
whether poverty was the “sole reason” for respondent-father’s failure to correct the 
conditions which led to removal. See id. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s orders. 
I. 
Facts and Procedural History 
¶ 2 
 
Petitioner Mitchell County Department of Social Services (DSS) obtained 
nonsecure custody of the children on September 14, 2017, and filed juvenile petitions 
alleging that the children were neglected and dependent juveniles. The trial court 
adjudicated the children to be neglected and dependent juveniles on January 11, 
2018. The trial court found that the mother and respondent-father had a history of 
substance abuse and domestic violence which had previously resulted in the children 
being removed from the home and placed in DSS custody. At the time the petitions 
were filed, the mother had removed the children from their DSS-approved safety 
placement with their maternal grandmother. When DSS later found the mother with 
the children at a medical clinic, she was in a disoriented condition and had multiple 
syringes and empty pill bottles in her possession. 
¶ 3 
 
In its initial adjudication and disposition order entered on January 11, 2018, 
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the trial court ordered respondent-father to develop a case plan with DSS and delayed 
any visitation by respondent-father with the children “pending the signing of his DSS 
case plan and random clean drug screens.” Respondent-father did not sign his DSS 
case plan until July 18, 2018. The case plan required him to address issues of 
substance abuse, domestic violence, parenting skills, and housing and employment 
stability. 
¶ 4 
 
On November 20, 2019, DSS filed petitions to terminate respondent-father’s 
parental rights in Troy and Ava on the ground that he had willfully left them in an 
out-of-home placement for a period of at least twelve months without making 
reasonable progress to correct the conditions which led to their removal on September 
14, 2017. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). Respondent-father failed to file an answer to 
the TPR petitions within the period prescribed by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1107 (2019). The 
trial court held a hearing on the petitions on January 3, 2020, and entered orders 
terminating respondent-father’s parental rights in the children on February 7, 2020. 
Respondent-father gave timely notice of appeal to this Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 
7B-1001(a1)(1) (2019).  
II. 
Adjudication Under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) 
¶ 5 
 
Respondent-father now claims the trial court erred in adjudicating grounds for 
the termination of his parental rights for his willful failure to make reasonable 
progress under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). As a general matter, we review a trial 
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court’s adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109 
to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, 
cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support 
the conclusions of law, with the trial court’s conclusions of 
law being subject to de novo review on appeal. Findings of 
fact not challenged by respondent are deemed supported by 
competent evidence and are binding on appeal. Moreover, 
we review only those findings necessary to support the trial 
court’s determination that grounds existed to terminate 
respondent’s parental rights. 
In re M.A., 374 N.C. 865, 869, 844 S.E.2d 916, 920 (2020) (cleaned up).  
¶ 6 
 
The statute at issue authorizes the trial court to terminate parental rights if 
the respondent-parent “has willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement 
outside the home for more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the 
court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting 
those conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). 
It further provides that “[n]o parental rights, however, shall be terminated for the 
sole reason that the parents are unable to care for the juvenile on account of their 
poverty.” Id.   
A. Respondent-father’s progress as of the termination hearing date 
¶ 7 
 
Respondent-father first claims the trial court erred by “fail[ing] to consider 
evidence of [his] progress through the date of [the] hearing” in determining whether 
he had made reasonable progress in correcting the conditions which led to the 
children’s removal from the home. “While the trial court was correct in making 
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findings of fact about [his] lack of progress in the year prior to the filing of the petition 
to terminate parental rights,” respondent-father contends the trial court “cannot 
discount the progress he made from August 2019 through the date of the hearing” on 
January 3, 2020. 
¶ 8 
 
“[A]n adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) requires that a child be left 
in foster care or placement outside the home pursuant to a court order for more than 
a year at the time the petition to terminate parental rights is filed.” In re J.S., 374 
N.C. 811, 815, 845 S.E.2d 66, 71 (2020) (cleaned up). However, the reasonableness of 
the parent’s progress “is evaluated for the duration leading up to the hearing on the 
motion or petition to terminate parental rights.” Id. (quoting In re A.C.F., 176 N.C. 
App. 520, 528, 626 S.E.2d 729, 735 (2006)). 
¶ 9 
 
The trial court’s findings of fact3 refute respondent-father’s assertion that the 
court failed to consider his progress up to the date of the termination hearing.  Among 
the trial court’s findings in support of its adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) 
are the following:  
[B]y the time the respondent father signed his DSS case 
plan in July, 2018 his housing was inadequate for the 
[children] and had no running water; the respondent father 
has made no progress in the [c]ourt’s judgment to remedy 
that problem; the respondent father testified he could now 
remedy the housing problem by either renting a home from 
$500–$600 per month or saving money for the purchase of 
                                            
3 The trial court’s orders are identical in all respects pertinent to respondent-father’s 
arguments on appeal. 
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a $60,000 home; the [c]ourt finds that approach by the 
respondent father . . . does not provide any credible evidence 
to support he has any meaningful chance of securing 
suitable housing for the juvenile[s]; as for employment, the 
respondent father has testified he has worked “most of the 
time” while not in prison; however, the most recent 
employment he described began in November, 2019 at 35–
40 hours per week is inconsistent with his other testimony 
in which he acknowledged “no, I had not been employed by 
someone all the time”; . . . the [c]ourt finds the respondent 
father has not obtained and maintained the necessary 
employment as required by the DSS case plan; . . . the 
respondent father testified he has participated in Triple P 
Parenting 
[classes] 
although 
he 
has 
provided 
no 
documentation regarding the same; . . . the respondent 
father has testified he has called approximately 50 times to 
DSS to express his concerns about the juvenile[s] and gain 
information regarding the case; the [c]ourt finds that 
testimony not credible; . . . that DSS workers have regularly 
and consistently reached out to the respondent father to let 
him know about the juvenile[s]; that the respondent 
father’s contact with . . . DSS . . . or efforts to comply with 
the DSS case plan has been essentially nonexistent; that the 
respondent father continues to reside in his residence in 
Cleveland County with his girlfriend; [and] the same still 
has no running water . . . .  
(Emphases added.) The suggestion that the trial court failed to consider respondent-
father’s circumstances as of the termination hearing has no merit. 
¶ 10 
 
Respondent-father also accuses the trial court of “discrediting any progress 
[he] made . . . in the six months leading up to the termination hearing.” Although 
respondent-father makes no reference to the trial court’s actual discussion of the 
issue—whether in open court at the termination hearing or in its written order—our 
own review of the record confirms the trial court’s mistaken view of the time period 
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pertinent to an adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).  
¶ 11 
 
After hearing the parties’ evidence and closing arguments, the trial court 
announced as follows:   
The [c]ourt finds and accepts that it is charged by law with 
evaluating whether the Respondent-Father has made 
reasonable effort to accomplish the plan goals and to 
eliminate those barriers or matters which led to the 
children being taken into the custody of [DSS] in that 12-
month time period between November 21, 2018, and 
November 20 of 2019, the time of the filing of this action. 
The [c]ourt has heard evidence, events both before . . . 
November 21, 2018, and after November 20, 2019, and 
makes findings relative to those events, only as they might 
shed light on the events and significance of what occurred 
in the year preceding the filing of the termination petition 
by [DSS]. 
¶ 12 
 
The trial court included similar language in its written orders as part of finding 
of fact 10: 
[I]n evaluating whether the respondent father has made 
reasonable efforts to accomplish the plan goals and to 
eliminate the reasons the juvenile[s] came into DSS 
custody, the [c]ourt has focused on the barriers that led to 
the [children] being placed in DSS custody and that 12 
month time period between 11/21/18 and 11/20/19 (when 
the TPR Petition[s] w[ere] filed); the [c]ourt has also heard 
evidence as to events, both before and after those dates, 
and made findings as to those events as may shed light on 
the events and significance [sic] in the year previous to the 
TPR Petition[s] being filed by Mitchell [County] DSS . . . .  
By focusing on respondent-father’s progress during the twelve-month period that 
preceded the filing of the TPR petitions, rather the entirety of his progress up to the 
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date of the termination hearing, the trial court applied an incorrect standard in 
adjudicating the existence of grounds for terminating respondent-father’s parental 
rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). See In re J.S., 374 N.C. at 815, 845 S.E.2d at 
71 (requiring consideration of parent’s progress “up to the hearing on the motion or 
petition to terminate parental rights” (quoting In re A.C.F., 176 N.C. App. at 528, 626 
S.E.2d at 735)). 
¶ 13 
 
Our conclusion that the trial court erred does not end our inquiry. “An 
appellant must not only show error; he must show that the error was prejudicial.” 
Rudd v. Am. Fid. & Cas. Co., 202 N.C. 779, 782, 164 S.E. 345, 347 (1932). Moreover, 
this Court has long held that “a correct decision of the lower court will not be 
disturbed because the court gave a wrong or insufficient reason therefor.” Temple v. 
Temple, 246 N.C. 334, 336, 98 S.E.2d 314, 315 (1957). 
¶ 14 
 
The record shows the trial court mistakenly believed that N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(2) required it to assess respondent-father’s progress during the twelve-month 
period between November 2018 and November 2019. However, the trial court also 
made findings of fact that account for respondent-father’s progress up to the date of 
the termination hearing—albeit only in order to “shed light on the events and 
significance of what occurred in the year preceding the filing of the termination 
petition[s].” Regardless of the trial court’s purpose in making these findings, they are 
sufficient to permit a determination of the existence of grounds for terminating 
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respondent-father’s parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) because they 
reflect the totality of respondent-father’s progress in correcting the conditions which 
led to the children’s removal from the home up to the date of the termination hearing. 
See In re J.S., 374 N.C. at 815, 845 S.E.2d at 71. 
¶ 15 
 
This Court reviews de novo the issue of whether a trial court’s adjudicatory 
findings of fact support its conclusion of law that grounds existed to terminate 
parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a). In re M.A., 374 N.C. at 869, 844 
S.E.2d at 920. “Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and 
freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the [trial court].” In re C.V.D.C., 374 
N.C. 525, 530, 843 S.E.2d 202, 205 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Appeal 
of Greens of Pine Glen Ltd. P’ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)). 
¶ 16 
 
Here, conclusion of law 3 states as follows: 
[R]espondent father has willfully left the [children] in 
foster care or placement outside the home for a period of 
more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction 
of the [c]ourt that reasonable progress under the 
circumstances has been made in correcting those 
conditions which led to the removal of the [children] as 
prescribed by [N.C.G.S. §] 7B-1111(a)(2).   
¶ 17 
 
Reviewing this issue de novo, we hold the trial court’s findings of fact support 
a conclusion that respondent-father had willfully failed to make reasonable progress 
at the time of the termination hearing to correct the conditions which led to the 
children’s removal from the home. 
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¶ 18 
 
At the time of the January 3, 2020 hearing, respondent-father had been 
provided more than twenty-seven months to correct the conditions which led to the 
children’s removal from the home. In his brief, respondent-father provides the 
following description of his DSS case plan signed on July 18, 2018: 
The plan required him to take parenting classes due to his 
limited parenting experiences. Because of [his] prior 
substance use, he was expected to complete a CCA 
(Comprehensive 
Clinical 
Assessment) 
and 
follow 
recommendations, as well as comply with requests for drug 
screens from DSS. [He] was to obtain a steady job to 
support himself and the children as well as housing 
appropriate for himself and the children. He would address 
any 
domestic 
violence 
concerns 
and 
follow 
recommendations from the CCA and attend the Batterers 
Intervention Program (“BIP”).  
¶ 19 
 
As found by the trial court, respondent-father failed to comply with the 
domestic violence component of his case plan by completing BIP. Respondent-father 
acknowledged he was dismissed from BIP for nonattendance in late 2018. Although 
he purported to have signed up for the program a second time in mid-November 2019, 
he testified he had completed just one-third of the required classes and would need 
“[t]hree or four months” of additional regular attendance in order to complete the 
program. 
¶ 20 
 
Respondent-father argues that his failure to complete the BIP “matters only if 
he had not addressed the cause of the domestic violence concerns” arising from his 
history of domestic violence with the children’s mother, which included a 2017 
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conviction for assault on a female against her. This argument has no merit. The trial 
court was empowered to require respondent-father to obtain treatment for domestic 
violence as a condition of his case plan. See In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 845, 788 S.E.2d 
162, 168 (2016) (“Subdivision 7B-904(d1)(3) authorizes the trial court to order that a 
parent ‘[t]ake appropriate steps to remedy conditions in the home that led to or 
contributed to the juvenile’s adjudication or to the court’s decision to remove custody 
of the juvenile from the parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker.’ ” (alteration in 
original) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 7B-904(d1)(3) (2015))). Moreover, respondent-father’s 
failure to complete the services prescribed by his case plan is probative of his lack of 
reasonable progress. See In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 844, 788 S.E.2d at 168 (holding 
“the Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that respondent’s failure to comply with 
these [case plan] requirements could not justify the termination of her parental 
rights” pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2)). 
¶ 21 
 
Respondent-father’s observation that he and the children’s mother “were no 
longer together” at the time of the termination hearing is undoubtedly true, given the 
mother’s death in 2017. However, the death of the children’s mother did not absolve 
respondent-father of obtaining the treatment prescribed by his case plan to address 
his domestic violence history. See generally In re J.S., 374 N.C. at 815–16, 845 S.E.2d 
at 71 (requiring only “a nexus between the components of the court-approved case 
plan with which the respondent failed to comply and the conditions which led to the 
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child’s removal from the parental home” in order for noncompliance to support 
termination under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (cleaned up) (quoting In re B.O.A., 372 
N.C. 372, 385, 831 S.E.2d 305, 314 (2019))). Nor was respondent-father relieved of 
complying with his case plan by the fact that DSS offered no evidence of additional 
acts of domestic violence between respondent-father and his current girlfriend. See 
id.  
¶ 22 
 
The trial court also found respondent-father had “made no progress” to “obtain 
housing appropriate for himself and the children” as required by his case plan. The 
evidence showed respondent-father and his girlfriend had resided since 2018 in a 350-
square-foot structure without bedrooms or plumbing—which DSS and the trial court 
had found to be inadequate.  
¶ 23 
 
As for stable employment, the trial court found respondent-father reported 
having full-time employment with a construction company since mid-November 2019,  
a period of less than two months at the time of the hearing. Respondent-father 
characterized his previous employment as “fairly steady” and involving “home 
improvements and side jobs.” However, he acknowledged having been convicted of 
possession of a stolen firearm in March 2019, which resulted in the revocation of his 
probation for his 2017 conviction for assault on a female and five months of 
incarceration from March to July 2019. In addition, the trial court found he “has not 
obtained and maintained the necessary employment as required by the DSS case 
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plan” because respondent-father admitted to lacking stable employment before DSS 
filed the petitions to terminate his parental rights and provided no documentation of 
his employment or income.  
¶ 24 
 
Respondent-father suggests his failure to maintain stable employment “was an 
important factor only if his lack of employment flowed from or led to his substance 
abuse.” To the contrary, as explained in his case plan, stable employment was 
important in order to allow respondent-father “to be able to support himself and the 
children.”   
¶ 25 
 
Regarding the substance abuse component of his case plan, the trial court 
found respondent-father obtained a CCA on August 12, 2019, but did so 
“unbeknownst to DSS” and “after DSS was relieved” of reunification efforts. Although 
the DSS social worker received a copy of the CCA at the termination hearing,4 she 
testified she had not previously seen the document, and respondent-father had 
provided 
no 
documentation 
indicating 
his 
compliance 
with 
the 
CCA’s 
recommendations as required by his case plan. Respondent-father did not claim to 
have complied with the CCA’s recommendations during his testimony at the 
termination hearing.    
¶ 26 
 
The trial court found respondent-father tested positive for marijuana at a drug 
                                            
4 The CCA was not admitted into evidence at the termination hearing, and no witness 
described its contents. 
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screen performed on a court date in October 2018 and refused additional drug screens 
requested by DSS in October and November 2018, after which the trial court relieved 
DSS of reunification efforts. The trial court also found respondent-father refused a 
drug screen requested by DSS in December 2018, advising the social worker that “he 
did not have the financial means to comply.”  
¶ 27 
 
Respondent-father does not contest these findings and in fact “stipulate[s] that 
he tested positive for marijuana when tested twice in court and admitted he would 
have tested positive a third time.”5 He instead implies that his continued drug use 
while the children were in DSS custody is insignificant because “he was not caring 
for the children at the time.” Respondent-father likewise downplays his refusal to 
submit to DSS’s drug screens, citing the fact that he was on criminal probation 
throughout the course of the juvenile proceedings and submitting to drug screens was 
a requirement of his probation. Respondent-father contends DSS presented no 
evidence contradicting his testimony “that his drug test results with probation were 
negative as supported by the fact that he was not violated for using drugs while on 
probation.”  
¶ 28 
 
We offer no comment concerning the relevance of respondent-father’s success 
in satisfying the requirements of his probation as proof of his progress in addressing 
                                            
5 During his testimony at the termination hearing, respondent-father admitted he 
attended previous court hearings while drunk. 
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the issue of substance abuse while simultaneously stipulating to using marijuana and 
to submitting to multiple positive drug screens during the same period. The trial 
court could reasonably construe respondent-father’s positive drug screens and refusal 
of requested screens as noncompliance with this component of his case plan. 
Moreover, it appears respondent-father never submitted the negative drug screens 
required to be allowed visitation with the children as provided in the initial 
adjudication and disposition order.  
¶ 29 
 
As for the parenting skills portion of his case plan, respondent-father appears 
to take issue with the trial court’s finding that he “testified he has participated in 
Triple P Parenting [classes] although he has provided no documentation regarding 
the same.” One DSS social worker acknowledged having “been given a copy of a 
certificate for a Triple P online parenting course with today’s date” on the day of the 
hearing, indicating respondent-father’s completion of the course. However, the 
transcript does not reflect that either DSS or respondent-father tendered this 
document to the trial court as evidence. We assume arguendo that, consistent with 
the testimony from the termination hearing, respondent-father had not completed 
any parenting classes at the time DSS filed its TPR petitions in November 2019 but 
had recently completed an online parenting course at the time of the termination 
hearing. Accordingly, we disregard the trial court’s finding to the contrary for 
purposes of our review. See In re S.D., 374 N.C. 67, 83, 839 S.E.2d 315, 328 (2020).   
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¶ 30 
 
The trial court found that “[t]he failure of the respondent father to comply with 
the DSS case plan[ ] and eliminate the reasons the [children] came into DSS custody 
demonstrates his failure to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions 
leading to the removal of the [children] from his home.” We have held that “parental 
compliance with a judicially adopted case plan is relevant in determining whether 
grounds for termination exist pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2)” provided that 
“the objectives sought to be achieved by the case plan provision in question address 
issues that contributed to causing the problematic circumstances that led to the 
juvenile’s removal from the parental home.” In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. at 384, 831 S.E.2d 
at 313–14.  
¶ 31 
 
Here, respondent-father’s failure to meaningfully engage with the case plan 
objectives related to substance abuse, domestic violence, and suitable housing, 
despite being given more than twenty-seven months to do so, supports the trial court’s 
conclusion that he willfully failed to make reasonable progress under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(2). Respondent-father’s claim that he had “addressed the areas of concern 
listed in his case plan, even if the trial court did not approve of the exact manner or 
timeliness with which he did so” is not borne out by the record or by the trial court’s 
uncontested findings.  
¶ 32 
 
Although the record shows respondent-father made some last-minute attempts 
to comply with the case plan by the time of the termination hearing—including 
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completing a CCA, completing an online parenting course, obtaining full-time 
employment, and reenrolling in domestic violence treatment—he still had not 
completed domestic violence treatment or addressed his substance abuse issues, and 
he remained in housing unsuitable for the children. Respondent-father’s partial 
steps—undertaken after DSS had filed petitions to terminate his parental rights and 
two years or more after the children’s removal from the home—are insufficient to 
constitute reasonable progress under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).6 See e.g., In re I.G.C., 
373 N.C. 201, 206, 835 S.E.2d 432, 435 (2019) (affirming adjudication under N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1111(a)(2) when the “respondent-mother waited too long to begin working on 
her case plan and that, as a result, she had not made reasonable progress toward 
correcting the conditions that led to the children’s removal by the time of the 
termination hearing”). 
                                            
6 Respondent-father asserts he “was not required to have fully complied with his case 
plan by the time of the termination hearing” in order to meet the “reasonable progress” 
standard in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). As a statement of general principle, this is true. See In 
re B.O.A., 372 N.C. at 385, 831 S.E.2d at 314 (cautioning that “a trial judge should refrain 
from finding that a parent has failed to make reasonable progress in correcting those 
conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile simply because of his or her failure to fully 
satisfy all elements of the case plan goals” (cleaned up) (quoting In re J.S.L., 177 N.C. App. 
151, 163, 628 S.E.2d 387, 394 (2006))). However, the parent’s progress must be “reasonable” 
under the circumstances, including the amount of time the parent has enjoyed to correct the 
conditions at issue. See In re J.S., 374 N.C. at 815, 845 S.E.2d at 71 (2020) (“A respondent’s 
prolonged inability to improve [his or] her situation, despite some efforts in that direction, 
will support a finding of willfulness regardless of [his or] her good intentions, and will support 
a finding of lack of progress sufficient to warrant termination of parental rights . . . .” (cleaned 
up) (quoting In re J.W., 173 N.C. App. 450, 465–66, 619 S.E.2d 534, 545 (2005))). 
 
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B. The poverty exception in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) 
¶ 33 
 
Respondent-father also challenges the trial court’s adjudication on the ground 
that the court “failed to consider whether poverty was a factor in his inability to 
complete his case plan.” He bases his argument on the qualifying language that 
appears at the conclusion of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2): “No parental rights, however, 
shall be terminated for the sole reason that the parents are unable to care for the 
juvenile on account of their poverty.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (2019). 
¶ 34 
 
However, respondent-father did not file an answer to the TPR petitions, and 
so he did not assert poverty or any other potential defense to the grounds for 
termination alleged under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). See generally N.C.G.S. § 7B-1107 
(2019) (authorizing the trial court upon a parent’s failure to file a responsive pleading 
to “issue an order terminating all parental and custodial rights of that parent with 
respect to the juvenile; provided the court shall order a hearing . . . on [the facts 
alleged in] the petition or motion”). Nor did respondent-father raise the issue of 
poverty to the trial court during the termination hearing as a potential basis to avoid 
termination of his parental rights.  
¶ 35 
 
“Failure to raise an affirmative defense in the pleadings generally results in a 
waiver thereof.” Robinson v. Powell, 348 N.C. 562, 566, 500 S.E.2d 714, 717 (1998); 
see also N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 8(c) (2019). However, we have not previously classified 
a parent’s poverty as an affirmative defense and decline to do so here. 
IN RE T.M.L. AND A.R.L. 
2021-NCSC-55 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 36 
 
The precise nature of respondent-father’s argument is unclear. A portion of his 
brief may be fairly read as asserting that an adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(2) requires a finding by the trial court to the effect that poverty is not the 
cause of the parent’s failure to correct the conditions which led to the children’s 
removal. In fact, respondent-father “challenges the trial court’s failure to make a 
required statutory finding.” In support of this argument, respondent-father quotes 
the poverty exception in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) and asserts that “[t]he trial court’s 
failure to address this factor at all requires this Court to reverse the termination 
order[s].” Elsewhere, however, respondent-father appears to contend the trial court 
failed to make findings evincing that it considered the evidence in light of the 
statutory language barring termination of parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(2) based solely on the parent’s inability to care for the children on account of 
the parent’s poverty .  
¶ 37 
 
To the extent respondent-father argues that N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) requires 
an affirmative finding by the trial court that poverty is not the sole reason of a 
parent’s inability to care for a child as an element or “factor” of the adjudication, we 
find no merit to his argument.  
¶ 38 
 
Subsection (a)(2) begins by defining one of the eleven grounds authorized by 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 for terminating parental rights: 
The parent has willfully left the juvenile in foster care or 
placement outside the home for more than 12 months 
IN RE T.M.L. AND A.R.L. 
2021-NCSC-55 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
without showing to the satisfaction of the court that 
reasonable progress under the circumstances has been 
made in correcting those conditions which led to the 
removal of the juvenile. 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). It concludes with the following qualifier: “No parental 
rights, however, shall be terminated for the sole reason that the parents are unable 
to care for the juvenile on account of their poverty.” Id.  
¶ 39 
 
The poverty exception in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) does not define the 
“elements” of this statutory ground for terminating parental rights. The exception 
instead establishes what is not a willful failure to make reasonable progress under 
the circumstances for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). Therefore, to the extent 
respondent-father “challenges the trial court’s failure to make a required statutory 
finding” about poverty or its effect on his ability to care for the children, his argument 
is overruled.  
¶ 40 
 
To the extent respondent-father instead complains that the trial court’s 
findings fail to reflect its consideration of the poverty exception in N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(2), we conclude his argument is without merit.  
¶ 41 
 
Because the statutory poverty exception does not create an affirmative element 
or factor required to support an adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), the trial 
court has no obligation to make specific findings on the issue in the absence of 
evidence tending to show that poverty is the sole reason for a parent’s inability to 
care for the child.  
IN RE T.M.L. AND A.R.L. 
2021-NCSC-55 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 42 
 
A review of the transcript from the termination hearing shows respondent-
father did not claim and the trial court heard no evidence that poverty was the “sole 
reason” respondent-father failed to correct the conditions which led to the children’s 
removal from the home. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). Respondent-father did not purport 
to provide an accounting of his income and expenses during the period between 
September 2017 and January 20207, nor did he testify he was financially unable to 
care for his children or comply with his case plan. His counsel likewise made no 
mention of poverty in his motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the evidence or in his 
closing argument to the trial court.  
¶ 43 
 
Respondent-father contends the trial court should have considered whether 
poverty was “a factor” or “an issue that affected [his] ability to remedy the conditions 
causing the children’s removal” or “may have interfered with [his] ability to” do so. 
None of these formulations are consistent with the statutory standard. We conclude 
the trial court’s findings accurately reflect the evidence of respondent-father’s 
circumstances and fully support the trial court’s determination that his lack of 
progress was willful. Compare In re N.K., 375 N.C. 805, 816, 851 S.E.2d 321, 330 
(2020) (“Although the record contains evidence tending to show that respondent-
mother had experienced financial difficulties, a careful analysis of the record shows 
                                            
7 Respondent-father stated he was currently earning $400 to $450 per week at the job 
he had obtained in mid-November 2019. He described his previous employment as “fairly 
steady” but did not provide specific information about his earnings.   
IN RE T.M.L. AND A.R.L. 
2021-NCSC-55 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
that respondent-mother’s inability to care for [the child] did not stem solely from her 
poverty.”), with In re S.D., 243 N.C. App. 65, 73, 776 S.E.2d 862, 867 (2015) (“The 
only other factor which could support the trial court’s conclusion [that respondent 
failed to make reasonable progress] was respondent’s meager income, but again, 
poverty alone cannot be a basis for termination of parental rights.”). 
III. 
Conclusion   
¶ 44 
 
The trial court’s findings of fact support its conclusion that grounds exist for 
the termination of respondent-father’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(2). Respondent-father does not contest the trial court’s conclusion under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) that termination of his parental rights was in the children’s 
best interests. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019). Accordingly, we affirm the trial 
court’s orders. 
AFFIRMED.