Case Title: State v. Samuel

Citation: 521 S.W.2d 374

Docket Number: 58781

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 1975-04-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
521 S.W.2d 374 (1975)
STATE of Missouri, Respondent,
v.
Glenn SAMUEL, Appellant.
No. 58781.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
April 14, 1975.
John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., G. Michael O'Neal, Clarence Thomas, Assist. Attys. General, Jefferson City, for respondent.
*375 Wallace N. Springer, Jr., and Gregory K. Johnson, Springfield, for defendant-appellant.
DONNELLY, Chief Justice.
Appellant, Glenn Samuel, was convicted of manslaughter in the Circuit Court of Douglas County, Missouri, and his punishment was assessed at ten years' imprisonment. Following rendition of judgment and imposition of sentence on January 19, 1973, an appeal was taken to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Springfield District. That court heard the appeal, adopted an opinion reversing and remanding for new trial, and, on August 14, 1974, transferred the cause to this Court, in accordance with the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 83.02, V.A.M.R.; for the purpose of reexamination by this Court of the existing Missouri law regarding the "tacit admission" rule.
In 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence § 638, the "tacit admission" rule is described as follows:
In Missouri, the scope of the rule has been more limited than in many states. The following conditions must be met in Missouri in order to render the rule operative: (1) the statement must be made in the presence and hearing of the accused. State v. Burk, 234 Mo. 574, 137 S.W. 969, 970 (1911); State v. Walker, 78 Mo. 380, 388 (1883); State v. Lovell, 235 Mo. 343, 353, 354, 138 S.W. 523, 525 (1911); State v. Kissinger, 343 Mo. 781, 786, 123 S.W.2d 81, 83 (1938); State v. Dowling, 348 Mo. 589, 598, 599, 154 S.W.2d 749, 755 (1941); State v. Allen, 235 S.W.2d 294 (Mo.1948), and State v. Thomas, 440 S.W.2d 467, 469, 470 (Mo.1969); (2) the statement must be sufficiently direct, as naturally would call for a reply. State v. Mullins, 101 Mo. 514, 518, 14 S.W. 625, 626, 627 (1890); State v. Glahn, 97 Mo. 679, 11 S.W. 260 (1888); State v. Burk, supra; State v. Walker, supra; and State v. Thomas, supra; and (3) the statement must not have been made at a judicial proceeding, or while the accused was in custody or under arrest. State v. Young, 99 Mo. 666, 674, 12 S.W. 879, 881 (1889); State v. Mullins, supra; State v. Dowling, supra; State v. Battles, 357 Mo. 1223, 212 S.W.2d 753 (Mo.1948); State v. Allen, supra, and State v. Phelps, 384 S.W.2d 616, 621 (Mo.1964).
The Court of Appeals' opinion, in questioning the tenability of the tacit admission rule, quotes extensively from the opinion written in Commonwealth v. Dravecz, 424 Pa. 582, 227 A.2d 904, 906, 909 (1967). In Dravecz, the defendant voluntarily appeared at State Police headquarters and submitted himself to questioning by a police officer. The police officer read to defendant a written statement which had been made by one Stockley. Dravecz made no comment at the end of the reading of the statement. At the trial the court permitted the statement to be read to the jury. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania cited our Kissinger case, supra, but decided to abrogate the rule, rather than merely restrict its application, as this Court has done in Missouri. The Court said:
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (n. 37) the Court said: "In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute * * * in the face of accusation."
In Missouri, as noted above, the tacit admission rule has never been applied in a situation where the accused was "under police custodial interrogation." "In those jurisdictions in which the pre-Miranda tacit admission rule was conformable to Miranda * * * of course, no new problem arose by virtue of Miranda." 3 Wigmore, Evidence, § 821, p. 310 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). Missouri is one of "those jurisdictions."
In his supplemental brief filed in this Court after transfer, the Attorney General states:
We agree with the Attorney General, and decline to abrogate the tacit admission rule as it is applied in Missouri.
We turn then to the facts in this case and to the assertion by appellant that the trial court erred in "failing to suppress all evidence of statements allegedly made by deceased * * * tending to incriminate defendant of the charge against him and of defendant's silence in respect thereto * * *."
The assertion relates primarily to testimony given at the trial by Sheriff Troy Hancock. On October 31, 1971, Sheriff Hancock went to the home of Allen Wright where he found Wright lying just inside the doorway entrance. Appellant, Glenn Samuel, was sitting in the kitchen of the home. Sheriff Hancock asked Wright what was wrong but there was no reply. Sheriff Hancock told appellant to remain seated and then left to get Deputy Collins. When he returned, he asked Wright, "Who did it to you?", but there was no reply. Appellant continued to sit in the kitchen. Sheriff Hancock then left to radio for an *377 ambulance and returned to the house. His testimony as to what then transpired is as follows:
The testimony of Sheriff Hancock, supra, shows that the accusation against the appellant, spoken by Allen Wright to the Sheriff, was weak. On cross-examination, the Sheriff testified that the distance between Wright and appellant was approximately 10-11 feet and that "from where Mr. Wright was laying he couldn't see the chair" in which appellant was sitting. Deputy Sheriff Collins testified that he was standing next to Allen Wright, across from Sheriff Hancock, and that from where he was standing he would have to lean back and look around the corner into the kitchen in order to see Glenn Samuel.
In these circumstances, we believe the failure to exclude Sheriff Hancock's testimony as to appellant's "tacit admission" constitutes prejudicial error.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the Circuit Court of Douglas County for new trial.
All concur.