Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Paul W. Humphrey

Citation: 2012 WI 32

Docket Number: 2006AP002842-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2012-03-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2012 WI 32 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP2842-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Paul W. Humphrey, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Paul W. Humphrey, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HUMPHREY 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 30, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 10, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
PROSSER, J. concurs in part and dissents in part 
(Opinion filed).    
 
DISSENTED: 
   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ZIEGLER and GABLEMAN, J.J. did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs filed by 
Lester A. Pines and Cullen, Weston, Pines & Bach LLP, Madison 
and oral argument by Lester A. Pines. 
 
For the Office of Lawyer Regulation, there was a brief 
filed by William F. Bedker and oral argument by William F. 
Bedker.  
 
 
 
2012 WI 32
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2006AP2842-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Paul W. Humphrey, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Paul W. Humphrey, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 30, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Paul W. Humphrey appeals a 
report and recommendation filed by Referee Russell Hanson, 
recommending 
a 
public 
reprimand 
based 
on 
the 
referee's 
conclusion 
that 
Attorney 
Humphrey 
committed 
professional 
misconduct in his handling of a criminal prosecution.  For the 
reasons stated herein, we conclude that Attorney Humphrey's 
misconduct warrants a 30-day suspension of his license to 
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
2 
 
practice law in Wisconsin along with the imposition of the full 
costs of this proceeding. 
¶2 
Attorney Humphrey was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1989.  He has no prior attorney disciplinary 
history before this court.   
¶3 
On November 17, 2006, the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
(OLR) filed a complaint against Attorney Humphrey alleging three 
counts of professional misconduct relating to the criminal 
prosecution of Adam Raisbeck.   
¶4 
This disciplinary matter has been pending a long time 
and the parties, the referee, and the public are entitled to 
know why.  Defense counsel in the Raisbeck matter, Attorney 
Joseph Sommers, was also charged with professional misconduct in 
connection 
with 
that 
case. 
 
Each 
disciplinary 
case 
was 
considered separately on its own record, briefs, and arguments.  
However, both attorneys asserted the conduct of the other 
affected their own actions.  We deemed it prudent to hold this 
case in abeyance until the Sommers matter was ready for a 
decision.  We did not anticipate the procedural complications 
that would develop in the Sommers case or the difficulty we 
would face in determining the appropriate sanction for each 
lawyer's respective misconduct.1  These are difficult cases 
stemming from a difficult prosecution, but our decision today 
reflects most careful consideration. 
                                                 
1 The disciplinary proceeding against Attorney Sommers is 
being resolved in a separate opinion also issued today.  See In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Joseph L. Sommers, 2012 WI 
33 (Case No. 2006AP2851-D). 
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
3 
 
¶5 
The factual background relating to the underlying 
criminal prosecution will be discussed only insofar as it is 
relevant to this particular disciplinary proceeding.  On 
September 1, 2001, Adam Raisbeck, then age 17, was involved in a 
one-car rollover accident that occurred in the Town of Medina.  
One passenger was killed and another passenger was injured.  
Dane 
County sheriff's deputies investigating the accident 
conducted an accident reconstruction, photographed the scene, 
and interviewed witnesses. 
¶6 
In December 2001 Raisbeck was charged with one count 
of homicide by negligent operation of a motor vehicle and one 
misdemeanor charge in connection with the injuries sustained by 
the second passenger.  Attorney Humphrey, who is an assistant 
district attorney with the Dane County District Attorney's 
office, was assigned to prosecute the case.  Raisbeck retained 
Attorney Joseph Sommers as his defense counsel.  Raisbeck was 
later acquitted. 
¶7 
At two preliminary hearings on January 28, 2002, and 
February 15, 2002, Attorney Sommers sought to formally subpoena 
the photographs of the accident scene.  The subpoena was 
quashed, as premature, because it is the policy of the district 
attorney's office to provide such information only after 
arraignment.  At the February 15, 2002 preliminary hearing, 
Attorney Humphrey argued that the evidence indicated Raisbeck 
was driving about 88 miles per hour, some 33 miles per hour over 
the posted speed limit.  The defense challenged that assumption, 
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
4 
 
citing discrepancies in the physical evidence.  Probable cause 
was found and Raisbeck was bound over for trial.   
¶8 
On or about February 11, 2002, Attorney Humphrey sent 
his set of 8 by 10 inch accident scene photographs to an 
accident 
reconstruction 
specialist, 
Robert 
Krenz, 
for 
professional analysis.  Mr. Krenz apparently kept this set of 
pictures until about April 24, 2002. 
¶9 
On March 12, 2002, Raisbeck was formally arraigned. 
Attorney Sommers then filed a five-page discovery demand 
requesting, among other items, "copies of all books, papers, 
documents, photographs, and tangible objects related to this 
case" and "a written summary of all oral statements of the 
defendant which the State plans to use in the course of the 
trial and the names of witnesses to the defendant's oral 
statements." 
¶10 On March 13, 2002, Attorney Humphrey sent 84 pages of 
discovery materials to Sommers in response to the discovery 
request.  These materials did not include the accident scene 
photographs.  Sommers had asserted he told Attorney Humphrey he 
wanted to see these photographs numerous times.  Attorney 
Humphrey has maintained that these requests were informal, such 
as while walking down the hall at the courthouse, and that he 
did not remember them or did not consider them official 
requests.  Attorney Humphrey has asserted that Sommers stated he 
specifically wanted to see Attorney Humphrey's working set of 
photos, as opposed to a general set of photographs.  Attorney 
Humphrey asserts the usual procedure for defense counsel to 
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
5 
 
obtain a set of crime scene photographs is for the defense 
attorney to write a letter to the district attorney requesting 
authorization for the sheriff's department, as the custodian of 
the negatives, to release a set of photographs to the defense.  
Attorney Humphrey asserts that Sommers was aware of this 
procedure. 
¶11 On or about April 25, 2002, Attorney Humphrey wrote a 
letter to Sommers regarding the accident scene photographs.  In 
that letter he indicated that if Sommers would stipulate to 
their foundation, Attorney Humphrey could give him a set of 
photographs.  He advised Sommers that, alternatively, Sommers 
could obtain copies of the photographs directly from the Dane 
County Sheriff's Department.  Sommers asserted this letter was 
sent one day after a verbal exchange where Attorney Humphrey 
promised Sommers that Sommers could see Attorney Humphrey's set 
of photographs, and then apparently told Sommers that the photos 
were still with the accident reconstruction expert.   
¶12 On May 2, 2002, Attorney Humphrey wrote a letter to 
Sommers 
providing 
specific 
information 
and 
specific 
authorization 
for 
Sommers 
to 
obtain 
accident 
photographs 
directly from the Dane County Sheriff's Department. 
¶13 On May 10, 2002, Sommers wrote to the Dane County 
Sheriff's records department formally requesting a set of 
accident scene photographs and including the requisite fee. 
¶14 On the morning of the final pretrial conference on 
May 21, 2002, Sommers asked Attorney Humphrey why he had not yet 
received the photographs.  Sommers said that his defense expert 
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
6 
 
needed the photographs to conduct the defense's own accident 
reconstruction.  Sommers apparently received his set of 5 by 7 
inch photographs later that same day.  The size of the 
photographs requested by Sommers is relevant because the parties 
later realized that certain relevant markings were visible on 
the 8 by 10 inch photographs but were not visible on the smaller 
5 by 7 inch photographs.  There is no indication either attorney 
knew in advance that the size of the photograph would affect 
whether the markings were visible on the photographs. 
¶15 On May 22, 2002, Attorney Humphrey filed a motion to 
compel discovery of the defense expert's report.  This motion 
included Attorney Humphrey's affidavit which stated in paragraph 
8: "[O]ver two months ago, the State provided over 84 pages of 
discovery materials, made the photographs available to the 
defendant, and provided the scale diagram." (Emphasis added.) 
¶16 On May 31, 2002, Sommers wrote to the presiding judge 
in the Raisbeck matter, the Honorable Paul Higginbotham, and 
asserted that paragraph 8 of the Humphrey affidavit was "a bald-
faced lie."  Sommers' letter provided a summary of his 
communications with Attorney Humphrey regarding his efforts to 
obtain the photographs.  The bottom line, according to Sommers, 
was that Attorney Humphrey knew Sommers had not received copies 
of the photographs until May 21, 2002. 
¶17 At the June 7, 2002, hearing on the motion to compel 
discovery, Attorney Humphrey stated on the record that the 
photos "were made available to Mr. Sommers way back in March 
actually."  The trial court asked Attorney Humphrey how he 
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
7 
 
responded to Sommers' assertion that Sommers did not truly have 
access to the photos in March.  Attorney Humphrey replied: "He 
had access to the photographs back in April, on April 25 if you 
want to come in and look at them, or if he wanted to stipulate 
to chain, he could have taken them out of my office at any 
time."  Attorney Humphrey suggested that Sommers was planning a 
"trial by ambush" by failing to timely produce an expert report. 
¶18 Sommers vehemently maintained that Attorney Humphrey 
did not make the photographs available to him, stating: "That is 
just a bald-face lie.  He submitted a false affidavit.  Your 
Honor, that is a big thing." 
¶19 Attorney Humphrey's position has been that Sommers 
could have submitted a written request for authorization to see 
the accident scene photographs at any time after Raisbeck's 
arraignment, but that he opted not to do so until May 10, 2002.  
Attorney Humphrey maintains Sommers was fully aware of the 
typical protocol for obtaining accident scene photos.  Attorney 
Humphrey includes in his submissions a form letter that is often 
used by defense counsel to make such requests.   
¶20 In the context of the hearing on the motion to compel, 
Judge Higginbotham stated to Attorney Humphrey: "I think you did 
fabricate in your affidavit when you stated that these photos 
were made available to Mr. Sommers way back when.  . . .  [T]hen 
to come in here and to claim ambush by Mr. Sommers is totally 
disingenuous.  It's not true at all." 
¶21 Attorney Humphrey later wrote to Judge Higginbotham in 
an effort to clarify his position, describing paragraph 8 of the 
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
8 
 
challenged affidavit as "sloppy draftsmanship."  He maintained, 
however, that the typical procedure in such cases is for defense 
counsel 
to 
send 
a 
letter 
to 
the 
prosecutor 
requesting 
authorization to obtain the photographs from the sheriff's 
department. 
¶22 Sommers moved to dismiss the criminal prosecution on 
the ground of prosecutorial misconduct.  At the hearing on this 
motion, Judge Higginbotham commented, with respect to the 
affidavit: "I specifically find it has nothing to do with proper 
draftsmanship.  That you [Attorney Humphrey] clearly misled the 
court on that issue." 
¶23 However, 
in 
this 
disciplinary 
appeal, 
Attorney 
Humphrey claims that the referee's report fails to note the 
district attorney later asked the trial court to rescind this 
statement.  He contends that the trial court agreed.2   
¶24 In the first count of the disciplinary complaint the 
OLR alleges that, by averring in an affidavit that he had made 
the photographs available "over two months ago," Attorney 
Humphrey engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, or 
                                                 
2 There is no evidence in the record before us as to whether 
the circuit court revisited its findings to conclude that 
Attorney Humphrey's statements were exaggerations rather than 
intentional misrepresentations, and we conclude that this would 
not alter our ultimate conclusion here. 
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
9 
 
misrepresentation in violation of former SCR 20:8.4(c)3 (Count 
One).  
¶25 The remaining counts in the OLR disciplinary complaint 
also relate to the trial preparations in the Raisbeck matter.  
On June 12, 2002, Attorney Humphrey gave Sommers a synopsis of 
his expert's accident reconstruction report.  At some date prior 
to August 15, 2002, Attorney Humphrey and his expert met to 
discuss this report.  On August 15, 2002, Attorney Humphrey and 
the expert apparently exchanged e-mails addressing a summary of 
the expert's anticipated trial testimony. 
¶26 Meanwhile, Sommers and his defense expert reviewed the 
5 by 7 inch photographs he received from the sheriff's 
department.  None of these photographs showed a close-up of the 
tire markings.  Sommers argued that without such a close-up view 
of the tire markings it was impossible to evaluate the State's 
assertion that the tire markings were "critical speed scuffs" 
rather than "brake-induced skid marks."  Again, the defense 
considered the tire markings highly relevant evidence for 
                                                 
3 Effective July 1, 2007, substantial changes were made to 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys, SCR Chapter 20.  See S. Ct. Order 04-07, 2007 WI 4, 
293 Wis. 2d xv, 726 N.W.2d Ct.R-45 (eff. July 1, 2007); and 
S. Ct. 
Order 
06-04, 
2007 
WI 
48, 
297 
Wis. 2d xv, 
730 
N.W.2d Ct.R.-29 (eff. July 1, 2007).  Because the conduct 
underlying this case arose prior to July 1, 2007, unless 
otherwise indicated, all references to the Chapter 20 of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules will be to those in effect prior 
to July 1, 2007. 
SCR 20:8.4(c) stated it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation; . . . ." 
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
10 
 
assessing the speed of Raisbeck's vehicle when taking the curve 
in the road before the accident occurred.  
¶27 Sommers argued the State expert's opinion that the 
tire markings were "speed scuffs" was vital to the State 
expert's conclusion that Raisbeck was driving 88 miles per hour 
at the time of the accident.  Sommers did not see markings on 
his set of photographs and thus moved to dismiss the prosecution 
on the ground that the State had failed to preserve critical 
tire marking evidence. 
¶28 At the August 22, 2002 hearing on this motion Sommers 
subpoenaed sheriff's deputies together with their copies of the 
accident scene photographs.  Deputy Sewell appeared at the 
hearing.  He testified that he had brought his set of accident 
scene photographs to court for a previous court hearing, but no 
longer had the photographs in his possession and did not know 
where they were.  A discussion among counsel and the court 
ensued.  The court asked Attorney Humphrey if he had the 
photographs.  Attorney Humphrey's response to the court's 
inquiry forms the basis for the second disciplinary count 
alleged against him.  Attorney Humphrey responded:  "I have two 
photos.  I don't know if these are the ones he wants.  They are 
the 
photos 
of 
black 
marks 
on 
the 
roadway." 
 
Sommers 
characterized Attorney Humphrey's response and the State's 
failure to produce a full set of photographs at the hearing as 
"underhanded."  Judge Higginbotham responded to Sommers that: 
"Nobody has said that Mr. Humphrey had [the photographs]."  
However, the OLR complaint alleges that at the time of this 
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
11 
 
exchange, Attorney Humphrey knew he in fact had, in his office, 
a complete set of 8 by 10 inch accident scene photos but did not 
disclose this fact to the trial court.  Judge Higginbotham asked 
Attorney Humphrey:  "Now, Mr. Humphrey, do you know where the 
photos are?"  Attorney Humphrey replied: "No, I do not."  
Attorney Humphrey has maintained he thought the trial court was 
inquiring specifically about the location of the set of 
photographs originally in the possession of Deputy Sewell.   
¶29 The court ultimately used the two 8 by 10 inch photos 
that Attorney Humphrey had with him in the courtroom as well as 
Sommers' 5 by 7 inch set of photographs.  The motion to dismiss 
was denied. 
¶30 With respect to this exchange, the OLR complaint 
alleges that, by failing to disclose he knew where the photos 
were during the August 22, 2002 hearing, Attorney Humphrey 
knowingly made a false statement of material fact to a tribunal 
in violation of SCR 20:3.3(a)(1),4 and engaged in conduct 
involving dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation in violation 
of SCR 20:8.4(c) (Count Two). 
¶31 The third count of the OLR complaint involves the 
timing of disclosure of a witness statement to Attorney Sommers.  
When the sheriff's deputies first investigated the accident, 
Kevin McCoy, an acquaintance of Raisbeck, told investigators 
that he had seen Raisbeck's passengers the night before the 
                                                 
4 SCR 
20:3.3(a)(1) provided that a lawyer shall not 
knowingly "make a false statement of fact or law to a 
tribunal; . . . ." 
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
12 
 
accident but that he did not know where they went after that.  
This innocuous statement was included in the discovery responses 
sent to Sommers.   
¶32 On September 18, 2002, Attorney Humphrey advised 
Sommers he intended to call McCoy as a witness at trial but 
noted that he did not have an address for him.  On October 15, 
2003, Attorney Humphrey sent Sommers a witness list that 
included McCoy's name together with his address.   
¶33 On or about October 21, 2003, Attorney Humphrey and 
Detective Greiber of the Dane County Sheriff's Department met 
with McCoy in preparation for trial.  At the time of this 
meeting, the Raisbeck trial was scheduled to commence on 
October 27, 2003.  Detective Greiber later prepared a memorandum 
dated October 27, 2003, that summarized the meeting.  At the 
meeting, McCoy apparently stated he had spoken to Raisbeck in 
the spring following the accident, and that Raisbeck had said he 
was feeling sad about the accident, that he admitted to McCoy it 
was foggy and he was driving too fast, that he could not see the 
sign, and he drove off the road.  This statement was significant 
because 
Raisbeck, 
who 
was 
injured 
in 
the 
accident, 
had 
previously stated he had no recollection of the accident. 
¶34 On October 23, 2003, the trial was postponed until 
January 20, 2004.  On November 12, 2003, Attorney Humphrey 
sought a bench warrant identifying McCoy as a material witness 
who "has already not appeared on one subpoena and is unlikely to 
appear on a subpoena in the future."  A bench warrant directing 
McCoy's arrest was issued the same day.  On December 11, 2003, 
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
13 
 
Sommers wrote the court asking how McCoy could be deemed a 
"material witness" given his innocuous statement on September 1, 
2001.   
¶35 On January 7, 2004, Attorney Humphrey disclosed 
McCoy's October 21, 2003 statements to Sommers via a cover 
letter stating that "[w]hile it is not discoverable, I thought I 
would send these notes [along] anyway."  At the time this letter 
was sent, trial was scheduled to commence on January 20, 2004. 
¶36 The OLR complaint alleges that by failing to turn over 
to the defense until January 7, 2004, an October 21, 2003 
witness 
statement 
containing 
incriminating 
declarations, 
Attorney Humphrey did, in pretrial procedure, fail to make a 
reasonably diligent effort to comply with a valid discovery 
request by an opposing party in violation of SCR 20:3.4(d)5 
(Count Three). 
¶37 Attorney Humphrey defends the timing of his disclosure 
of the witness statement.  He claims that he initially viewed 
the statement as privileged work product because the statement 
was not exculpatory, and only later realized that as a statement 
of a party defendant it should be disclosed.   
¶38 With respect to the timing, he asserts that everyone 
involved assumed the trial would be delayed again because 
Sommers had filed an interlocutory appeal that had stayed the 
                                                 
5 SCR 20:3.4(d) stated a lawyer shall not "in pretrial 
procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make 
reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper 
discovery request by an opposing party; . . . ." 
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
14 
 
trial court proceeding.  Moreover, the parties involved were all 
aware that the defense expert was going to be unavailable in 
January.  Attorney Humphrey notes that the trial did not in fact 
occur until April 18, 2005, some 15 months after he disclosed 
the McCoy witness statement to Sommers.   
¶39 The OLR sought summary judgment on Count Three of the 
complaint based on the fact that in his answer, Attorney 
Humphrey admitted the facts alleged in the OLR complaint with 
respect to Count Three.  On June 25, 2007, the referee granted 
the OLR's motion for summary judgment on Count Three, stating: 
"[t]he respondent having admitted all factual allegations of 
Count 3, it, therefore, appears that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact."     
¶40 Attorney 
Humphrey 
sought 
reconsideration 
of 
this 
ruling, emphasizing he did not admit the inferences that the OLR 
wanted the trier of fact to draw from the factual allegations——
namely, that he failed to disclose the witness statement until 
13 days before trial.  Moreover, he argues that the summary 
judgment ruling precluded him from presenting any affirmative 
defenses to the charge.   
¶41 The evidentiary hearing in this disciplinary matter 
was conducted on July 10 and 11, 2007.  The referee denied 
Attorney Humphrey's motion for reconsideration of the summary 
judgment order at this hearing but permitted Attorney Humphrey 
to make an offer of proof that the Raisbeck trial did not occur 
until 15 months after the witness statement was disclosed.   
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
15 
 
¶42 On August 2, 2007, the referee issued his report and 
recommendation.  With respect to Count One, the referee agreed 
that Attorney Humphrey's affidavit "misled the court" and 
concluded that Attorney Humphrey violated SCR 20:8.4(c).   
¶43 With respect to Count Two, the referee was not 
persuaded by Attorney Humphrey's claim that he misunderstood 
which set of accident scene photographs the court meant when the 
court asked if Attorney Humphrey had a set of photographs.  The 
referee concluded that Attorney Humphrey knowingly made a false 
statement 
of 
fact 
to 
a 
tribunal 
in 
violation 
of 
SCR 20:3.3(a)(1), and engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation 
in 
violation 
of 
SCR 20:8.4(c).   
¶44 Finally, with respect to Count Three, the referee 
recited the factual allegations in the complaint and reiterated 
his granting of summary judgment to the OLR on this charge.   
¶45 On appeal Attorney Humphrey challenges the referee's 
findings 
and 
conclusions 
and 
provides 
context 
for 
the 
allegations against him.6  He explains the usual protocol 
regarding 
production of accident photographs, noting that 
Sommers did not follow the usual procedure of submitting a 
                                                 
6 Oral argument in this matter was conducted on April 10, 
2008.  On July 30, 2008, this court issued an order holding this 
matter in abeyance until further order of the court.  On 
December 14, 2009, Attorney Humphrey filed a very brief motion 
seeking "additional oral argument in the matter" on the ground 
that the composition of the court had changed since the court 
last considered the matter.  The motion was held in abeyance and 
is hereby denied. 
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
16 
 
request letter to the district attorney immediately after 
arraignment.  Attorney Humphrey explains that Sommers had 
specifically 
emphasized 
that 
he 
wanted 
to 
see 
Attorney 
Humphrey's copies of the photographs, which had been sent to the 
State's accident reconstruction specialist.  He explains that 
around April 24, 2002, Attorney Humphrey told Sommers he could 
come to Attorney Humphrey's office to see the photos.  At this 
meeting he realized the expert witness had not yet returned 
them.  Attorney Humphrey then wrote Sommers letters on April 25, 
2002, and May 2, 2002, providing details as to how Sommers could 
obtain a set of photographs directly from the sheriff's 
department. 
¶46 With respect to the affidavit forming the basis for 
Count One of the complaint, Attorney Humphrey defends his use of 
the term "available" in the affidavit where he stated that he 
made the photographs "available" to Sommers some two months 
prior to the date of his motion to compel.  He reiterates 
Sommers could have pursued other strategies to obtain the 
accident 
scene 
photographs 
directly 
from 
the 
sheriff's 
department.   
¶47 With respect to Count Two, Attorney Humphrey also 
maintains that during the in-court discussions about the 
location of the accident scene photographs, Attorney Humphrey 
thought they were specifically talking about the location of 
Deputy Sewell's missing set of photographs because Sommers had 
stated that he did not trust the district attorney's office and 
that is why he subpoenaed Sewell and his photographs.   
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
17 
 
¶48 With respect to Count Three, Attorney Humphrey also 
emphasizes that the parties knew in October, when the McCoy 
witness statement was taken, that the trial would be postponed 
because the court of appeals had stayed the trial court case by 
order dated October 22, 2003, and Sommers had advised the court 
that his expert would be unavailable in January because of a 
vacation.  He notes again the trial did not in fact occur until 
15 months following disclosure of the witness statement. 
¶49 We review a referee's findings of fact subject to the 
clearly erroneous standard.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against 
Eisenberg, 
2004 
WI 
14, 
¶5, 
269 
Wis. 2d 43, 
675 
N.W.2d 747.  We review the referee's conclusions of law de novo.  
Id.  Pursuant to our obligation to supervise and regulate the 
practice of law in this state, we determine the appropriate 
level of discipline independent of the referee's recommendation.  
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, 
¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶50 The referee made the following findings of fact with 
respect to Count One:   
• It appears that tire marks were not visible on the 5 by 7 
inch photographs that Sommers obtained from the sheriff's 
department but were visible on the 8 by 10 inch photographs 
Attorney 
Humphrey 
gave 
to 
his 
accident 
reconstruction 
specialist. 
• The Dane County Sheriff's Department at various times 
stated there were 33, 45, 46, and 50 photographs. 
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
18 
 
• It was reasonable for Sommers to be certain he had seen 
all photographs. 
• On May 2, 2002, Attorney Humphrey sent a letter to 
defense counsel which stated, in part: 
At your recent request for your own copies of all the 
photos, I contacted the Court Officer of the DSCO.  
Here's what you need to do. 
• It is clear from the record that the court wanted to be 
sure discovery had been timely produced.  Trial was then 
scheduled for late June. 
• On May 22, 2002, Attorney Humphrey filed an affidavit 
with the court that stated in relevant part that photos had been 
made "available" to the defense for over two months. 
• On June 7, 2002, Judge Higginbotham stated to Attorney 
Humphrey: 
Mr. Humphrey, I've not been happy with your 
conduct either.  I agree with Mr. Sommers and that the 
situation with [Raisbeck] should never have gone that 
way.  But, secondly, I think you did fabricate in your 
affidavit when you stated that these photos were made 
available to Mr. Sommers way back when.  That's not 
true.  Even based on these letters it's clear to me 
that 
those 
photos 
were 
never 
made 
actually 
available. . . .  
• After being told that he had "fabricated" and was 
"totally disingenuous" Attorney Humphrey's response to the court 
was tepid at best.   
¶51 The referee further notes that on April 7, 2003, the 
court stated: "I specifically find it has nothing to do with 
proper draftsmanship.  That [Attorney Humphrey] clearly misled 
the court on that issue."  The referee adds that "any reasonable 
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
19 
 
interpretation of the facts [shows] that for whatever reason 
[Attorney Humphrey] deliberately misled the court."   
¶52 On this appeal, Attorney Humphrey takes issue with 
several of the referee's findings of fact and the inferences 
drawn therefrom.  For example, the referee comments on confusion 
regarding the number of accident scene photographs.  Attorney 
Humphrey points out, however, that as of the May 2, 2002 
hearing, there was no confusion about the number of accident 
scene photographs.  He contends the confusion over the number of 
photographs did not arise until the hearing on August 22, 2002.   
¶53 Attorney 
Humphrey 
also 
challenges 
the 
referee's 
finding that Attorney Humphrey's response to the court's 
statements about the veracity of his affidavit was "tepid."  
Attorney Humphrey responds that he consistently stated on the 
record that his statements were "true."  He defends his response 
in the trial court, describing the colloquy that occurred 
immediately after the court made these statements to Attorney 
Humphrey.  There, the trial court strongly chastised Sommers for 
interrupting him and contradicting the court.  Attorney Humphrey 
asserts that given the timing and tenor of the court's remarks 
to counsel, he "would have been ill-advised to have said 
anything in response to Judge Higginbotham's statement about 
him."  He explains that, instead, he filed a motion asking the 
court to withdraw his conclusion and states the court agreed to 
do so.  Attorney Humphrey also suggests the referee failed to 
correctly analyze the requirements necessary to sustain a claim 
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
20 
 
for 
misrepresentation. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Marks, 2003 WI 114, ¶50, 265 Wis. 2d 1, 665 N.W.2d 836.   
¶54 First, we conclude the referee's factual findings with 
respect to Count One are not clearly erroneous, with one 
exception.  We conclude the record evidence before the court 
supports Attorney Humphrey's assertion that he has consistently 
maintained his affidavit was correct.  As such, the court does 
not agree with the referee's finding that Attorney Humphrey 
tacitly "conceded" the statements in his affidavit violated the 
rules.  However, the other factual findings regarding Count One 
are supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous. 
¶55 Ultimately, the referee was required to make a 
credibility determination as to whether Attorney Humphrey knew 
or should have known his statement that he made the photographs 
"available" to Sommers was a fair and accurate representation of 
matters.  Although there may be technical merit to Attorney 
Humphrey's claim the photos were theoretically available to 
Sommers by other means, we agree with the referee's conclusion 
that Sommers did not have the accident scene photos when 
Attorney Humphrey filed his motion to compel and Attorney 
Humphrey knew it.  We are not persuaded by Attorney Humphrey's 
assertion that the referee was required to analyze each element 
of a misrepresentation claim in order to find misconduct here.  
It is unnecessary to prove the tort of misrepresentation in 
order to establish by clear and convincing evidence that an 
attorney has violated a rule of professional conduct proscribing 
attorney 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
21 
 
misrepresentation.  See Marks, 265 Wis. 2d 1, ¶50; In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schalow, 131 Wis. 2d 1, 12-13, 
388 N.W.2d 176 (1986). 
¶56 The record indicates both the trial court in the 
Raisbeck matter and the referee in this disciplinary proceeding 
were firmly of the opinion that Attorney Humphrey's statement 
that the photographs had been "available" to the defense for 
months constituted misrepresentation within the meaning of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys.  We defer to the 
referee's credibility determinations and we accept the referee's 
conclusion that Attorney Humphrey violated SCRs 20:8.4(c) and 
20:3.3(a)(1) with respect to paragraph 8 of his affidavit. 
¶57 The second count of the OLR complaint alleges that, by 
failing to disclose he knew where the photos were during the 
August 22, 2002 hearing, Attorney Humphrey knowingly made a 
false statement of material fact to a tribunal and engaged in 
conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation.  
¶58 Attorney Humphrey has maintained he thought the trial 
court was inquiring specifically about the location of the set 
of photographs originally in the possession of Deputy Sewell.  
This, again, called for a credibility determination.  The 
referee concluded Attorney Humphrey knew or should have known 
that the trial court was inquiring generally about an 8 by 10 
inch set of photographs at this hearing.  Again, we decline to 
challenge the referee's credibility determination, and we accept 
the referee's conclusion that by claiming he had no knowledge of 
the whereabouts of the set of photographs in response to the 
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
22 
 
trial court's inquiry, Attorney Humphrey knowingly made a false 
statement of material fact to a tribunal in violation of 
SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) and engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, 
deceit, or misrepresentation in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). 
¶59 Count Three of the OLR complaint alleges that, by 
failing to turn over to the defense until January 7, 2004, an 
October 21, 2003 witness statement of Kevin McCoy containing 
incriminating declarations, Attorney Humphrey did, in pretrial 
procedure, fail to make a reasonably diligent effort to comply 
with a valid discovery request by an opposing party. 
¶60 As noted, the referee granted the OLR's motion for 
summary judgment on this claim concluding that Attorney Humphrey 
admitted the factual allegations in the complaint.  Thus, we 
must consider whether the admitted factual elements of the 
complaint, alone, support the legal conclusion that Attorney 
Humphrey violated SCR 20:3.4(d) by failing to disclose a witness 
statement completed on October 21, 2003, until January 7, 2004.  
We hold that it was error for the referee to grant summary 
judgment on this count.  
¶61 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.23 requires the State to turn 
over such a statement within a "reasonable time before trial."  
Attorney Humphrey asserts "[i]t is axiomatic that when an 
assistant district attorney complies with Wis. Stat. § 971.23 he 
cannot have violated SCR 20:3.4(d) which states:  'A lawyer 
shall 
not . . . in 
pretrial 
procedure, . . . fail 
to 
make 
reasonably diligent efforts to comply with a legally proper 
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
23 
 
discovery request.'"  He notes he had over 500 assigned cases at 
the time of the belated disclosure.   
¶62 We do not condone the length of time it took Attorney 
Humphrey to disclose an important witness statement to defense 
counsel in this case, particularly in view of the manner in 
which this prosecution was handled.  However, we must conclude 
that the disciplinary complaint, alone, is not an adequate 
factual basis to support the conclusion that Attorney Humphrey 
violated SCR 20:3.4(d).  The facts set forth in the complaint do 
not allege when the actual trial occurred, nor do they recite 
whether there was any harm to the Raisbeck defense occasioned by 
the delay.  It is apparent from submissions this court has 
received from Sommers and remarks made by the referee that there 
is considerably more to the story with respect to this witness 
statement.  However, this information cannot form the basis of 
our ruling because this matter was decided on summary judgment.7  
This court will not make factual findings that the referee could 
have made but did not.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Wood, 122 Wis. 2d 610, 615-16, 363 N.W.2d 220 (1985); 
see also In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Swartwout, 116 
                                                 
7 In the narrative portion of his report, the referee 
mentions that the trial court later sanctioned the State by 
prohibiting the State from calling McCoy as a witness in the 
Raisbeck trial.  The referee also mentions that Attorney 
Humphrey was removed as a prosecutor in the Raisbeck matter 
allegedly because of his conduct with respect to Count Three. 
These peripheral findings are not technically part of the record 
in 
this 
disciplinary 
matter 
because 
Attorney 
Humphrey 
successfully moved to strike this testimony based on the 
referee's decision to grant summary judgment.   
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
24 
 
Wis. 2d 380, 383, 342 N.W.2d 406 (1984) (court will not conduct 
de 
novo 
review 
of 
record 
or 
independently 
make 
factual 
findings).  Taking, as we must, the undisputed facts viewed in 
the light most favorable to Attorney Humphrey, we must conclude 
that the admissions to the facts alleged in the complaint alone 
do not establish a violation SCR 20:3.4(d).  We decline to 
remand this matter, and we dismiss this charge. 
¶63 We now turn to the appropriate discipline in this 
matter.  The referee stated he found making a recommendation 
with respect to the appropriate discipline in this matter 
difficult.  He acknowledged Attorney Humphrey's previously 
excellent record, but stated, "the fact that he may have been 
driven to them by over work or his apparent intense dislike of 
his opponent is no excuse" and concluded "the least I can 
recommend is a public reprimand."   
¶64 The record reflects the OLR considered several cases 
in recommending its proposed sanction of a public reprimand.  
See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Teasdale, 2005 
WI 12, 278 Wis. 2d 76, 692 N.W.2d 244 (failure to respond to a 
discovery request); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Johann, 216 Wis. 2d 118, 574 N.W.2d 218 (1998) (failing to 
appear for deposition); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Brey, 171 Wis. 2d 65, 490 N.W.2d 15 (1992) (60-day suspension).  
We have reviewed these and other cases and conclude that under 
the facts presented here, a public reprimand is insufficient to 
achieve the objectives of attorney discipline.   
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
25 
 
¶65 We agree with the referee's implicit observation that 
the acrimonious relationship between opposing counsel was likely 
a contributing factor in Attorney Humphrey's conduct.  However, 
the law invests prosecutors with awesome discretionary powers, 
particularly over the nature of the charge and the decision 
whether to prosecute.  See, e.g., 9 Christine M. Wiseman & 
Michael Tobin, Criminal Practice & Procedure § 6:1 (Wisconsin 
Practice Series, 2d ed. 2011).  A prosecutor is not a mere 
advocate for a particular side in a case.  Id.  The prosecutor 
thus serves as "the trustee of the public's law enforcement 
conscience." Thompson v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 325, 332, 212 
N.W.2d 109 (1973).  Thus, prosecutors must be ever mindful that 
they wield significant authority and must carefully guard 
against the temptation to let personal considerations interfere 
with their obligation to seek justice.   
¶66 We consider Attorney Humphrey's ethical violations 
sufficiently serious to warrant a suspension of his license to 
practice law.  The question, then, is the appropriate length of 
that suspension.  Typically, this court has adhered to a policy 
of imposing a minimum license suspension of 60 days.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Osicka, 2009 WI 38, ¶38, 317 
Wis. 2d 135, 765 N.W.2d 775; In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Grady, 188 Wis. 2d 98, 108-09, 523 N.W.2d 564 (1994). 
¶67 We have concluded that we will deviate from our usual 
policy of requiring a minimum suspension of 60 days, and we 
hereby impose a 30-day suspension on Attorney Humphrey's license 
to practice law in Wisconsin.  As we stated in the Sommers case, 
No. 
2006AP2842-D   
 
26 
 
2012 WI 33 (No. 2006AP2851-D), this is an unusual case that 
calls for an unusual result. 
¶68 We also order that Attorney Humphrey shall bear the 
full costs of this proceeding which total $16,242.59 as of 
April 11, 2008. 
¶69 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Paul W. Humphrey to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 30 days, 
effective May 7, 2012. 
¶70 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Paul W. Humphrey shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
¶71 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Paul W. Humphrey shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding.  If the costs 
are not paid within the time specified and Paul W. Humphrey has 
not entered into a payment plan approved by the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation, then the Office of Lawyer Regulation is authorized 
to move this court for a further suspension of the license of 
Paul W. Humphrey to practice law in Wisconsin. 
¶72 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, 
J.J., did not participate. 
 
No.  2006AP2842-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶73 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
lawyer discipline system, including the work of the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation (OLR), the Preliminary Review Committee, the 
referees, and this court, like any system, has its strengths and 
also its opportunities for improvement.  Reasonable people can 
and do disagree about the virtues, the snags, and the changes 
needed.1  
¶74 But I am disappointed when a justice of this court 
unfairly and wrongly undermines the lawyer discipline system, a 
decision of this court, and the actions of the justices joining 
the per curiam opinion with unwarranted, unfounded accusations. 
I 
therefore 
write 
in 
response 
to 
Justice 
Prosser's 
concurrence/dissent.     
¶75 The concurrence/dissent charges that the "handling of 
[the Humphrey] case has been so irregular that it is unfair to 
the attorney and seriously undermines confidence in the lawyer 
regulation system, especially the actions of this court."  See 
concurrence/dissent, ¶¶132, 159.2   
¶76 The concurrence/dissent does not and cannot back up 
this harsh charge.    
                                                 
1 Indeed the court and the Board of Administrative Oversight 
have often examined and reexamined aspects of the lawyer 
discipline system to improve it.  The chair of the Board of 
Administrative Oversight, at my request, appointed a committee 
that reviewed OLR procedures and has offered suggestions for 
improvement. 
2 "[T]he procedures followed in this case, especially the 
long delay in this court, are so irregular that they undermine 
confidence 
in 
the 
lawyer 
regulation 
system."  
Concurrence/dissent, ¶159.   
No.  2006AP2842-D.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶77 In spite of the storm and fury and nasty insinuations 
about 
the 
court's 
actions, 
it 
turns 
out 
that 
the 
concurrence/dissent disagrees only with the imposition of a 30-
day suspension.  The concurrence/dissent joins the opinion of 
the court in concluding that Attorney Humphrey violated the 
Rules of Professional Conduct twice, by misrepresentations to 
the trial court.     
¶78 The referee explicitly found that Attorney Humphrey 
deliberately misrepresented matters to the trial court:  "[A]ny 
reasonable interpretation of the facts [shows] that for whatever 
reason [Attorney Humphrey] deliberately misled the court."3  And 
the 
court 
today 
(including 
Justice 
Prosser) 
affirms 
the 
referee's findings.   
¶79 While attempting to retry the case and downplay the 
two counts against Attorney Humphrey, labeling them "semantic 
disputes,"4 the concurrence/dissent acknowledges being "not 
prepared to assert" that the referee's finding that Attorney 
Humphrey deliberately misled the trial court is "clearly 
erroneous."5 
¶80 The concurrence/dissent thus takes issue with the per 
curiam opinion only in preferring to impose a public reprimand 
rather than a 30-day suspension and in seeking to reduce the 
costs imposed on Attorney Humphrey.  
                                                 
3 Per curiam, ¶51.  See also per curiam, ¶58. 
4 Concurrence/dissent, ¶143.  See also concurrence/dissent, 
¶¶144-154. 
5 Concurrence/dissent, ¶154. 
No.  2006AP2842-D.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶81 When you read the concurrence/dissent and discard the 
hyperbole, inappropriate inferences, and emotional appeal, the 
writing amounts to "nothing more than a disagreement among 
justices about whether an attorney should receive a public 
reprimand or a relatively brief suspension,"6 an issue that the 
concurrence/dissent writes is worthy of "little" discussion.7  
¶82 With the essence of the concurrence/dissent clearly 
stated, I turn to inventory the purported "irregularities."    
I 
¶83 The 
purported 
"irregularities" 
recounted 
in 
the 
concurrence/dissent are as follows: 
(A) The time elapsing between the beginning of the OLR 
proceeding and the imposition of discipline (the release of this 
decision);   
(B) The failure to keep the Humphrey and Sommers discipline 
cases separate;  
(C) The change in the membership in the court during the 
pendency of the Humphrey discipline case;   
(D) The dismissal of the third count while not accepting 
the lower discipline (public reprimand) recommended by the 
referee; and  
(E) The failure of the per curiam opinion to pursue a 
defense that Attorney Humphrey claimed but did not prove.8 
¶84 I will address each in turn. 
                                                 
6 Concurrence/dissent, ¶132. 
7 Id. 
8 Concurrence/dissent, ¶156. 
No.  2006AP2842-D.ssa 
 
4 
 
A 
¶85 The concurrence/dissent describes the time elapsing 
between the beginning of the OLR proceeding and the imposition 
of discipline as "unseemly."9   
¶86 An abbreviated time line of the four steps in the 
disciplinary proceedings in the Humphrey and Sommers cases shows 
that the bulk of the time that has elapsed in the Humphrey case 
between the challenged conduct and the final decision by this 
court has been at this court.10  So what happened here?     
                                                 
9 Concurrence/dissent, ¶141. 
10 Here is an abbreviated time line: 
(1) The Incident 
9/1/01:      Adam Raisbeck's car rolls over. 
4/21/05:     Adam Raisbeck trial; he is acquitted.* 
(2) OLR Proceedings 
11/16/06:    OLR files Humphrey complaint.** 
11/17/06:    OLR files Sommers complaint.  
(3) Referee Proceedings 
8/3/07:  Humphrey referee files report and recommendation 
with Supreme Court. 
10/16/09: Sommers referee files report and recommendation 
with Supreme Court. 
(4) Supreme Court Proceedings 
4/10/08:  Humphrey oral argument before Supreme Court. 
7/30/08: Supreme Court order holding the Humphrey case in 
abeyance.  
11/3/10: Sommers oral argument before Supreme Court.  
No.  2006AP2842-D.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶87 The two discipline cases, Humphrey and Sommers, have 
their genesis in the same criminal prosecution in which Attorney 
Humphrey was the prosecutor and Attorney Sommers was the defense 
counsel.  It was clear from the very beginning that the conduct 
of each attorney affected the conduct of the other.  It was 
reasonable that the discipline imposed in the two cases should, 
at some point, be considered by this court in tandem.11   
¶88 Thus, on July 30, 2008, soon after the Humphrey oral 
argument in this court, the court, on its own motion, issued a 
written order holding Attorney Humphrey's case in abeyance, 
anticipating that the Sommers case would be here soon for oral 
argument.12  No justice dissented from this order.  Justice 
Prosser belatedly objects today, some three and one-half years 
later.13    
                                                                                                                                                             
3/30/12: Sommers and Humphrey decisions released by Supreme 
Court. 
*Ordinarily OLR does not investigate or file a complaint 
during the pendency of a court proceeding during which the 
incident arises.   
**Our goal has been that in most cases a complaint be filed 
within one year after the investigation begins.  We are not 
there yet.  The time, however, of the OLR proceedings in the 
present case does not account for the bulk of the time that has 
elapsed in this disciplinary proceeding. 
11 Per curiam, ¶4.  Neither the majority nor I use the 
Referee's Findings and Recommendations of Discipline in the 
Sommers case or the record in the Sommers case in deciding the 
Humphrey case.  
12 Per curiam, ¶45 n.6. 
13 Concurrence/dissent, ¶139. 
No.  2006AP2842-D.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶89 Holding the Humphrey matter for the Sommers matter was 
the sound, sensible thing to do at the time.  No one anticipated 
that the Sommers case would take three years before it came here 
for oral argument.  Nothing irregular or sinister here.  Nothing 
to undermine confidence in the lawyer regulation system, 
including the actions of this court.  
¶90 Since the Sommers case came to this court with oral 
argument on November 3, 2010, it has taken about 16 months for 
this court to release the Sommers and Humphrey decisions.  This 
is too long.  Decisions in non-discipline cases in which oral 
argument was held in November 2010, as was the Sommers case, 
were released before the end of July 2011.14  We do not have time 
lines for preparing, circulating, and releasing decisions in 
discipline cases (as we do for decisions in non-discipline 
cases).  We should.  I shall continue to urge the court to set 
reasonable time lines for all matters that come to this court.     
B 
¶91 The concurrence/dissent asserts that the court should 
have 
separated 
the 
Sommers 
and 
Humphrey 
cases, 
but 
the 
concurrence/dissent does not tell the full story.  The cases 
were in fact handled separately, even in this court.   
¶92 Each case had its own OLR complaint; its own files and 
records; its own referee (as a result of Sommers' request for 
substitution); its own report by its own referee; its own set of 
briefs in this court; and its own oral argument here.  The court 
                                                 
14 Decisions in non-discipline cases in which oral argument 
was held between September 1, 2010, and April 30, 2011, were 
released before the end of July 2011. 
No.  2006AP2842-D.ssa 
 
7 
 
deliberated on each case separately.  Separate opinions were 
written and considered in each case, but then the court stepped 
back to assess the discipline to be imposed on each lawyer.15    
¶93 Although the concurrence/dissent forcefully argues 
that the two cases be kept separate, as they were, it 
simultaneously suggests that Attorney Sommers' request that a 
new referee be substituted for the Humphrey referee who was 
originally assigned as referee to the Sommers case was irregular 
and worked to Humphrey's disadvantage.16    
¶94 A lawyer has the right to ask that the named referee 
be substituted.  See SCR 22.13(4).  This right has been 
exercised in other cases.  Nothing irregular about a substitute 
referee here.   
¶95 Indeed the court granted Attorney Sommers' request 
that the referee in the Humphrey case not be the referee in the 
Sommers case, in part so that the two cases would be separate. 
C 
¶96 The concurrence/dissent recounts at length the change 
in the membership of the court while the Humphrey case has been 
pending.  It is viewed as an "irregularity."  That a justice 
retires, resigns, is defeated in election, dies, or recuses 
himself or herself while a case is pending is not unusual or 
                                                 
15 Per curiam, ¶4. 
16 Concurrence/dissent, ¶136. 
The disciplinary proceeding against Attorney Sommers is 
being resolved in a separate opinion released today.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sommers, 2012 WI 33, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. 
No.  2006AP2842-D.ssa 
 
8 
 
irregular.17  Only justices who participate in a case from its 
beginning ordinarily participate in the case through the end.  A 
justice who declines to participate in a case cannot be forced 
to participate.   
¶97 That only five justices participate in a matter before 
this court is not an everyday occurrence, but it is not an 
irregularity.  A five-justice decision, with two justices not 
participating after being given the opportunity to do so, is 
valid. 
¶98 Nothing irregular or sinister here.  Nothing unfair to 
Humphrey or Sommers.  Nothing to undermine confidence in the 
lawyer regulation system, including the actions of this court.   
¶99 On December 14, 2009, Attorney Humphrey requested re-
argument in this court, urging that the case should be reargued 
because of the change in the composition of the court.18  Almost 
immediately thereafter, on January 12, 2010, the court entered a 
written order, unanimously holding Humphrey's motion for re-
argument in abeyance.  No justice dissented from this order.     
¶100 Nevertheless, with the benefit of hindsight, the 
concurrence/dissent asserts that the court should have granted 
Attorney Humphrey's motion for reargument.19  Yet, noticeably, 
the concurrence/dissent does not request reargument even today.20   
                                                 
17 Concurrence/dissent, ¶¶137-138. 
18 Per curiam, ¶45 n.6. 
19 Concurrence/dissent, ¶140. 
20 Per curiam, ¶45 n.6. 
No.  2006AP2842-D.ssa 
 
9 
 
D 
¶101 The concurrence/dissent records, as an "irregularity," 
that the per curiam opinion dismisses the third count of the 
complaint against Humphrey while imposing discipline in excess 
of that which the referee recommended.21   
¶102 The 
concurrence/dissent 
asserts 
that 
it 
is 
a 
"spectacle" that the per curiam opinion fails to accept the 
referee's recommendation to discipline Attorney Humphrey with a 
public reprimand while dismissing count three.22   
¶103 The third count implicates Attorney Humphrey in not 
timely providing information he was required to give Attorney 
Sommers.23   
¶104 What the concurrence/dissent does not reveal is that 
count three was dismissed on a procedural ground even though the 
count appears to have potential merit.  Moreover, the remaining 
two counts of misrepresentation are more than sufficient to 
support a 30-day suspension.   
¶105 The per curiam opinion dismisses the third count on 
the ground that the referee erred in granting summary judgment 
on this count without holding an evidentiary hearing.  The court 
could have remanded the third court to the referee to hold an 
evidentiary hearing to determine the merits of this count.  A 
remand causes delay and would have increased the costs incurred 
by Attorney Humphrey.   
                                                 
21 Concurrence/dissent, ¶141.  See per curiam, ¶¶59-62. 
22 Concurrence/dissent, ¶141. 
23 See per curiam, ¶¶31-44, 48, 59-62.  
No.  2006AP2842-D.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶106 Instead, the court exercised its discretion to dismiss 
the count.  The per curiam opinion does not, however, condone 
the time it took Attorney Humphrey to disclose an important 
witness statement to Attorney Sommers.24  
¶107 Dismissal of count three appears to be advantageous to 
Attorney Humphrey. 
¶108 Dismissal of a count happens with some frequency in 
lawyer discipline cases.  The referee and the court are doing 
their respective jobs in carefully checking that the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation proves each count.  Nothing irregular or 
sinister here.  Nothing unfair to Humphrey.  Nothing to 
undermine confidence in the lawyer regulation system, including 
the actions of this court.      
¶109 The 
court 
considers 
carefully 
a 
referee's 
recommendation 
about 
discipline 
but 
modifies 
a 
referee's 
recommendation as too light or too harsh with some frequency.  
Both the referee and court are doing their respective jobs:  The 
referee is to recommend; the court is to decide. 
¶110 The 
referee 
acknowledged 
that 
"making 
a 
proper 
recommendation in this case [is] difficult."25  The referee 
recorded favorable comments about Attorney Humphrey and his 
career and then concluded that Attorney Humphrey violated the 
Rules of Professional Conduct and that his conduct before the 
referee suggested "a deliberate attempt not to cooperate in an 
                                                 
24 Per curiam, ¶62. 
25 Referee's Findings of Fact and Recommendation at 8.  See 
also per curiam, ¶63. 
No.  2006AP2842-D.ssa 
 
11 
 
effort to find the truth.  It must be noted that absolutely no 
contrition was expressed by [Attorney Humphrey].  With all this 
in mind the least I [the referee] can recommend is a public 
reprimand."26 
¶111 Many referees oversee the numerous discipline cases.  
The court's careful review of each referee's recommendation for 
discipline 
and 
the 
court's 
careful 
exercise 
of 
its 
responsibility to impose discipline can bring consistency in 
discipline from one lawyer discipline case to another.  No 
"spectacle" here. 
E 
¶112 The concurrence/dissent criticizes the court for not 
pursuing a defense that Attorney Humphrey claimed, namely that 
the trial court rescinded the statement that attorney Humphrey 
clearly misled the trial court.27  There is no documentary 
evidence showing a change by the trial court.  At Attorney 
Humphrey's deposition he said, "[W]hen he [the trial judge] sort 
of backtracked, later on and he took it back, he made——you know, 
says 
disparaging 
things." 
 
It 
was 
Attorney 
Humphrey's 
obligation, not the referee's or this court's, to pursue 
Humphrey's assertions in his defense and produce evidence to 
support the defense.28  Nothing irregular or sinister here.  
Nothing unfair to Humphrey.  Nothing to undermine confidence in 
                                                 
26 Referee's Findings of Fact and Recommendation at 9. 
27 Concurrence/dissent, ¶156. 
28 Per curiam, ¶23 n.2. 
No.  2006AP2842-D.ssa 
 
12 
 
the lawyer regulation system, including the actions of this 
court. 
¶113 In sum, the charge of such "irregularities" that the 
procedure used and decision are "unfair to attorney [Humphrey] 
and 
seriously 
undermine[] 
the 
confidence 
in 
the 
lawyer 
regulation system, especially the actions of this court" is not 
proven.  None of the purported irregularities holds up under 
scrutiny.  
¶114 Instead, 
the 
concurrence/dissent 
expresses 
one 
justice's opinion about Attorney Humphrey's credibility and the 
facts.  It expresses frustration that, as a matter of law, the 
concurrence/dissent must defer to the referee's assessment of 
Humphrey's credibility and findings of fact, although the 
concurrence/dissent nevertheless attempts to retry credibility.29   
¶115 It turns out that the concurrence/dissent amounts to 
"nothing more than a disagreement among justices about whether 
an attorney should receive a public reprimand or a relatively 
brief suspension,"30 an issue that the concurrence/dissent writes 
is worthy of "little" discussion.31  
¶116 I turn to the issue of discipline. 
II 
                                                 
29 The referee heard the testimony, saw the witnesses, and 
gauged their credibility.  A reviewing court must defer to the 
factual findings and the credibility determination of the trier 
of facts because the trier is in a better position than is a 
reviewing court to determine the facts and weigh the credibility 
of a witness.   
30 Concurrence/dissent, ¶132. 
31 Id. 
No.  2006AP2842-D.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶117 The 30-day suspension is "unprecedented," proclaims 
the concurrence/dissent.32   
¶118 A 30-day suspension is "unprecedented" only in the 
sense that in recent years, unlike in years past, the minimum 
suspension the court ordinarily imposes is 60 days.  In the 
present case the court, like the referee, struggled mightily on 
the question of discipline.  The court decided a public 
reprimand was too light and a 60-day suspension too severe.  The 
court's imposing an "unprecedented" 30-day suspension probably 
has worked in Attorney Humphrey's favor. 
¶119 In spite of the storm and fury and nasty insinuations 
about the court's actions, when all is said and done, it turns 
out that the concurrence/dissent disagrees merely with the 
imposition of a 30-day suspension.  Yet, at the same time the 
concurrence/dissent concludes that the decision whether to 
impose a public reprimand or a suspension is an issue worthy of 
"little" discussion.33       
¶120 Here 
again, 
I 
must 
disagree 
with 
the 
concurrence/dissent.  I think the discipline to be imposed is 
worthy of a lot of discussion and very careful thought.  The 
nature of the discipline has significant consequences.  There is 
a big difference to the disciplined attorney, to the public, to 
                                                 
32 Concurrence/dissent, ¶141. 
33 Id., ¶132. 
No.  2006AP2842-D.ssa 
 
14 
 
the bench, and to the bar between a public reprimand and a 
suspension of any length.34   
¶121 The court is concerned about the effect of discipline 
cases on the litigants involved, on the bar, on the bench, on 
the public, and on the public's trust and confidence in the 
legal and judicial system.  For these reasons, the court 
struggles to impose what it views as the appropriate discipline 
in each case and tries especially hard to reach unanimous 
decisions in discipline cases. 
¶122 The concurrence/dissent inveighs against imposing full 
costs of the proceeding against Attorney Humphrey.35  The court 
carefully considers costs in each case and is fully cognizant of 
the effect of the imposition of all or a portion of the costs on 
the attorney charged or on all the attorneys of the state who 
foot the bill for the lawyer discipline system.36  The 
concurrence/dissent protests about costs but does not say what 
costs it would impose. 
¶123 What discipline should the court impose on a lawyer 
who violates the Rules of Professional Conduct in representing 
the State in a criminal case?     
                                                 
34 See SCR 22.26.  A lawyer's activities are severely 
curtailed on a suspension.  A lawyer who is suspended has to 
notify clients and courts of the suspension and make all 
arrangements for the temporary or permanent closing or winding 
up of the attorney's practice.   
35 Concurrence/dissent, ¶142. 
36 See SCR 22.24 (governing costs).  See Justice Prosser's 
concurrence/dissent and my concurrence discussing imposition of 
costs in discipline cases in In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Konnor, 2005 WI 37, 279 Wis. 2d 284, 694 N.W.2d 376. 
No.  2006AP2842-D.ssa 
 
15 
 
¶124 The case:  Adam Raisbeck, a 17-year-old driver, was in 
a single-car roll-over accident.  One passenger was killed.  
Another was injured.  No drugs or alcohol were involved.  In 
essence, the legal question was whether Adam Raisbeck would be 
held criminally liable for driving too fast.           
¶125 Attorney Humphrey is a long-time experienced assistant 
district 
attorney. 
 
What 
explains 
his 
conduct? 
 
The 
concurrence/dissent ruminates, "it is difficult . . . to imagine 
what would have motivated an experienced prosecutor to promptly 
turn over 84 pages of discovery material to the defendant but 
later insist to a circuit judge that he also turned over or 
actually supplied accident scene photographs in March when he 
obviously did not."37    
¶126 The referee in the Humphrey discipline proceeding 
answers: 
 
"Sommers 
and 
Humphrey 
apparently 
had 
a 
prior 
unpleasant history and it appears that Humphrey determined not 
to be any more cooperative with Sommers than absolutely 
necessary."38  Attorney Humphrey "may have been driven . . . by 
over work or his apparent intense dislike of his opponent."39   
¶127 The justices have struggled mightily, perhaps too 
mightily, and for far too long, to decide the merits of the 
charge and the appropriate discipline.  The discipline had to 
                                                 
37 Concurrence/dissent, ¶152. 
38 Referee's Findings of Fact and Recommendation, Finding of 
Fact 3. 
39 Referee's Findings of Fact and Recommendation at 8.  See 
also per curiam, ¶63. 
No.  2006AP2842-D.ssa 
 
16 
 
fit the offense, considering the attorney's conduct and the 
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and considering the 
effect on the bar, the bench, and the public, and trying to 
ensure fair, effective judicial and legal proceedings that 
produce fair, just results.     
¶128 Each lawyer discipline case, including the Humphrey 
and Sommers matters, presents a sad and difficult story about 
lawyers and clients.  The Office of Lawyer Regulation, the 
Preliminary Review Committee, the referees, and the court 
understand this and take their respective roles very seriously——
as they should.  
¶129 The lawyer discipline system, like any system, has its 
strong and weak spots, and aspects of the system can be 
commended and criticized.  The handling of any particular case, 
including the Humphrey case, is also subject to both approbation 
and disapproval.    
¶130 There is no question that the case took too long.  But 
the 
handling 
of 
the 
Humphrey 
discipline 
case 
was 
not 
"irregular," in the sense that the concurrence/dissent claims, 
so as to be "unfair to the Attorney [Humphrey] and seriously 
undermine the confidence in the lawyer regulation system, 
especially the actions of this court."  No such charge should be 
made in the present case to attack the integrity of the lawyer 
regulation system or the justices joining the per curiam 
opinion.        
¶131 For the reasons set forth, I join the per curiam and 
write separately. 
No.  2006AP2842-D.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
¶132 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting 
in part).  I respectfully dissent from the level of discipline 
imposed by the court.  If this case involved nothing more than a 
disagreement among justices about whether an attorney should 
receive a public reprimand or a relatively brief suspension, 
there would be little to discuss.  But the case involves much 
more.  In my view, the handling of this case has been so 
irregular that it is unfair to the attorney and seriously 
undermines 
confidence 
in 
the 
lawyer 
regulation 
system, 
especially the actions of this court. 
¶133 The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) filed three 
counts of professional misconduct against Attorney Paul W. 
Humphrey in November 2006.  The three counts all relate to 
Attorney Humphrey's conduct as a Dane County Assistant District 
Attorney in the State's prosecution of Adam Raisbeck for a 
traffic homicide.  The three counts read as follows: 
 
1. 
By averring in an affidavit filed with Judge 
[Paul] Higginbotham on May 22, 2002, "That over two 
months 
ago, 
the 
State . . . made 
the 
photographs 
available to the defendant" and by continuing to 
maintain 
that 
factual 
position 
before 
Judge 
Higginbotham during a hearing held on June 7, 2002, 
when in fact he knew that he had informed the defense 
how to obtain the accident scene photographs less than 
one month prior, and that the defense did not actually 
have the photographs as of the morning prior to May 
22, 
2002, 
Humphrey engaged in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, in 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). 
 
2. 
By indicating to Judge Higginbotham during a 
hearing held on August 22, 2002, that he did not know 
where the State's accident scene photos were, and by 
failing 
to 
affirmatively 
disclose 
information 
No.  2006AP2842-D.dtp 
 
2 
 
concerning the location of the State's photos, when in 
fact he possessed a complete set of the photos at the 
time of the hearing, Humphrey knowingly made a false 
statement of fact to a tribunal in violation of SCR 
20:3.3(a)(1), 
and 
engaged 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, in 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). 
 
3. 
By failing to turn over to the defense until 
January 
7, 
2004, 
an 
October 
21, 
2003, 
witness 
statement concerning incriminating declarations that 
the defendant allegedly made to Witness [Kevin] McCoy 
following the accident, despite having been served on 
March 12, 2002, with a valid defense discovery request 
for "a written summary of all oral statements of the 
defendant which the State plans to use in the course 
of the trial and the names of witnesses to the 
defendant's 
oral 
statements," 
Humphrey 
did, 
in 
pretrial procedure, fail to make a reasonably diligent 
effort to comply with a legally proper discovery 
request by an opposing party, in violation of SCR 
20:3.4(d). 
¶134 At 
first, 
the 
prosecution 
of 
Attorney 
Humphrey 
proceeded normally.  Referee Russell Hanson was appointed to 
hear the case.  Referee Hanson entered summary judgment on Count 
Three on June 25, 2007.  He denied Humphrey's motion for 
reconsideration on July 10, then heard two days of evidence.  He 
issued his decision on August 2, 2007 (less than a year after 
the case was filed), finding that OLR had met its burden on all 
three counts and recommending that Attorney Humphrey receive a 
public reprimand.  This was the same level of discipline sought 
by the OLR. 
¶135 Humphrey appealed, and this court heard oral argument 
in his case on April 10, 2008. 
¶136 These facts tell only part of the story.  Attorney 
Humphrey's case has been linked to matters involving Attorney 
Joseph Sommers from the beginning of the Raisbeck prosecution, 
No.  2006AP2842-D.dtp 
 
3 
 
including OLR's subsequent disciplinary proceedings against 
Attorney Sommers.  In virtually every respect, this linkage has 
worked to Attorney Humphrey's detriment.  Attorney Sommers 
testified against Attorney Humphrey at Humphrey's evidentiary 
hearing, and then, after Referee Hanson issued a decision in the 
Humphrey matter, Attorney Sommers succeeded in removing Referee 
Hanson from Sommers' own case. 
¶137 When Attorney Humphrey's case was argued on April 10, 
2008, Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler did not participate.  
She did not participate because Attorney Sommers had been a 
candidate for the supreme court against Justice Ziegler in 2007.  
Justice Ziegler apparently decided that if she should not sit in 
the Sommers case, she should not sit in the Humphrey case 
either.  This reduced the size of Humphrey's court from seven to 
six. 
¶138 Justice Louis Butler did sit in the Humphrey case, but 
when this court decided to hold the release of any decision on 
Attorney Humphrey until reaching a decision on Attorney Sommers, 
it effectively knocked the departing Justice Butler off the case 
and reduced the size of the court to five. 
¶139 The decision to hold Attorney Humphrey's case in 
abeyance had another unfortunate effect: Attorney Humphrey was 
left twisting in the wind for three and one-half years while 
this court struggled to resolve the intractable Sommers matter. 
¶140 Attorney Humphrey played no part in this delay.  He 
simply paid the price for it.  The court should have separated 
the two cases and granted Humphrey's motion for reargument. 
No.  2006AP2842-D.dtp 
 
4 
 
¶141 Beyond the unseemly delay and its adverse effect on 
Attorney Humphrey, this court has created the spectacle of 
invalidating one of the three counts against Attorney Humphrey 
but nonetheless increasing his discipline from a proposed public 
reprimand to an unprecedented 30-day suspension (in a case not 
involving reciprocal discipline).  See SCR 22.22(3).   
¶142 In addition, Attorney Humphrey is required to pay the 
full costs of the prosecution against him, including OLR's costs 
in this appeal, even though OLR did not seek increased 
discipline on appeal and even though OLR lost one of its three 
counts.  The result in this court will send a chilling message 
to attorneys in discipline cases who may wish to defend their 
position on appeal. 
¶143 But there is more.  The two remaining counts, 1 and 2, 
involve semantic disputes about what Attorney Humphrey meant 
when he made certain representations to the circuit court. 
¶144 There is no dispute that Attorney Sommers sought 
accident scene photographs from the State in the Raisbeck case.  
His subpoena for these photographs was quashed by the circuit 
court on grounds that "discovery" of the photographs before the 
arraignment was premature.  After the arraignment, the defense 
was entitled to see the photographs and to acquire its own set. 
¶145 It does not follow, however, that the State was 
required to give the defense its own set of 8 by 10 photographs.  
The referee made no such finding and the majority opinion does 
not assert that that is a requirement of the law. 
No.  2006AP2842-D.dtp 
 
5 
 
¶146 This case would be simple if Attorney Humphrey somehow 
prevented Attorney Sommers from seeing or acquiring a complete 
set of accident scene photographs, but that is not the issue. 
¶147 The facts supporting Count 1 are set out in ¶¶7-22 of 
the majority opinion.  On April 25, 2002, Attorney Humphrey sent 
a letter to Attorney Sommers that said: 
 
You had requested the photographs taken in this 
case.  As I mentioned, I had loaned them out for a 
Crash Reconstruction analyst to look at in the course 
of their investigation.  There are several ways for 
you to access the photographs.  If you are willing to 
stipulate to their foundation, and agree to return 
them within a reasonable time, I can send them to you.  
If you want your own copies, you are welcome to 
contact the [DCSO] [Dane County Sheriff's Office] and 
order them.  They will then print them up and have a 
bill ready for you to pay when they are picked up.  If 
you just want to look at them, then call me up and set 
up a time to come in to my office and look at them.  I 
will have them available at the front desk. 
¶148 On May 2 Humphrey sent Sommers a second letter that 
said: 
 
At your recent request for your own copies of all 
the photos, I contacted the Court Officer of the DCSO.  
Here's what you need to do.  Call Lt. Baglama 
at . . . and request the photos.  You will need the 
Agency Case Number which is 01-53163.  They will 
apparently make the copies and have them ready to pick 
up upon payment of the invoice. 
¶149 Both of these letters allude to the established 
procedure for a defendant to obtain his own set of case-related 
photographs 
after 
arraignment. 
 
The 
majority 
opinion 
acknowledges Attorney Humphrey's reliance on this procedure: 
Attorney Humphrey asserts the usual procedure for 
defense counsel to obtain a set of crime scene 
photographs is for the defense attorney to write a 
letter 
to 
the 
district 
attorney 
requesting 
No.  2006AP2842-D.dtp 
 
6 
 
authorization for the sheriff's department, as the 
custodian of the negatives, to release a set of 
photographs to the defense. 
 
. . . .  
Attorney Humphrey maintains Sommers was fully aware of 
the typical protocol for obtaining accident scene 
photos.  Attorney Humphrey includes in his submissions 
a form letter that is often used by defense counsel to 
make such requests. 
Majority op., ¶¶10, 19. 
¶150 Attorney Humphrey filed an affidavit with the circuit 
court on May 22, 2002, which stated in part: "That over two 
months ago, the State provided over 84 pages of discovery 
materials, made the photographs available to the defendant, and 
provided the scale diagram."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶151 The circuit court and the referee both read the phrase 
"made the photographs available to the defendant" as meaning 
that the State gave the defendant the photographs, which 
Humphrey 
did 
not 
do. 
 
They 
rejected 
an 
alternative 
interpretation of the phrase, that a set of photographs was 
accessible to the defendant after the arraignment in March, if 
and when Attorney Sommers sought the photographs by utilizing 
the established protocol. 
¶152 It is difficult for this writer to imagine what would 
have motivated an experienced prosecutor to promptly turn over 
84 pages of discovery material to the defendant but later insist 
to a circuit judge that he also turned over or actually supplied 
accident scene photographs in March when he obviously did not.  
It is much easier to accept that Attorney Humphrey's statements 
No.  2006AP2842-D.dtp 
 
7 
 
were meant to convey a different proposition.  Of course, the 
referee decided otherwise.   
¶153 The court is constrained by a very rigorous standard 
of review with respect to the facts found by a referee in an 
attorney discipline case.  I wrote about this standard several 
years ago: 
I respect and appreciate the work of the court's 
appointed referees in the Lawyer Regulation System.  
Their findings of fact are entitled to great deference 
and should not be disturbed unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  For the court to adopt a different 
standard of review would plunge us into a fact-finding 
role to which we are not well suited. 
Because it is important to honor the standard of 
review, I concur in the decision of the court.  I 
write separately, however, to emphasize that if I had 
a free hand, I would decide the case differently.   
OLR v. Paget, 2003 WI 26, ¶¶19-20, 260 Wis. 2d 604, 660 
N.W.2d 255 (Prosser, J., concurring). 
¶154 I concur here as well, with deep reservations, because 
I am not prepared to assert that the referee's "facts" are 
clearly erroneous. 
¶155 It should be noted, however, that other attorneys in 
the district attorney's office supported Attorney Humphrey's 
explanation and position.  For example, then-Deputy District 
Attorney Judy Schwaemle testified at Humphrey's hearing that "it 
is the policy of the Dane County DA's office . . . to make 
photographs available to defense counsel immediately after 
arraignment."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶156 The majority could have removed my reservations about 
Count One and eviscerated Attorney Humphrey in the process by 
No.  2006AP2842-D.dtp 
 
8 
 
demolishing his contention "that the referee's report fails to 
note the district attorney later asked the trial court to 
rescind this statement [that Attorney Humphrey 'clearly misled 
the court on that issue']" and, more important, that "the trial 
court agreed."  See majority op., ¶23.  If the circuit court 
actually 
changed 
its 
evaluation 
of 
Attorney 
Humphrey's 
representations, the validity of Count One would be undermined.  
The majority appears determined not to pursue such a tough 
question. 
¶157 The reservations I have about Count One also apply to 
Count Two.  Why would Attorney Humphrey assert, suggest, or 
imply that he did not have a set of accident scene photographs 
in his office when he had previously admitted otherwise in 
writing (see ¶147, supra), when he brought two photos with him 
to court, and when he had already been severely criticized by 
the circuit court over his handling of the photographs?  I don't 
think he did.  More plausible to the writer is that Attorney 
Humphrey was speaking about Deputy Sewell's set of accident 
scene photographs, not his own set.  Again, the referee decided 
otherwise. 
¶158 The majority is not only comfortable with these 
determinations, 
but 
also 
willing 
to 
create 
unprecedented 
discipline to deal with them. 
¶159 I believe a suspension of Attorney Humphrey is 
unwarranted and unfair and that the procedures followed in this 
case, especially the long delay in this court, are so irregular 
that they undermine confidence in the lawyer regulation system.  
No.  2006AP2842-D.dtp 
 
9 
 
Thus, with respect to the sanction, I respectfully but strongly 
dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  2006AP2842-D.dtp 
 
 
 
1