Case Title: Carr v. Wallace

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC93487

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2017-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc 
STATE ex rel. JASON CLAY CARR, 
  ) 
  ) 
Petitioner, 
 
  ) 
  ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
No.  SC93487 
  ) 
IAN WALLACE, SUPERINTENDENT,   ) 
  ) 
Respondent.  
  ) 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN HABEAS CORPUS 
In 1983, Jason Carr was convicted of three counts of capital murder for killing his 
brother, stepmother, and stepsister when he was 16 years old.  He was sentenced to three 
concurrent terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole for 50 years.  His 
sentences were imposed without any consideration of his youth.  Mr. Carr filed a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court.  He contends his sentences violate the Eighth 
Amendment because, following the decision in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), 
juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced to life without parole pursuant to mandatory 
sentencing schemes that preclude consideration of the offender’s youth and attendant 
circumstances.   
Mr. Carr was sentenced under a mandatory sentencing scheme that afforded the 
sentencer no opportunity to consider his age, maturity, limited control over his 
Opinion issued July 11, 2017
2 
environment, the transient characteristics attendant to youth, or his capacity for 
rehabilitation.  As a result, Mr. Carr’s sentences were imposed in direct contravention of 
the foundational principle that imposition of a state’s most severe penalties on juvenile 
offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children. Consequently, Mr. Carr’s 
sentences of life without the possibility of parole for 50 years violate the Eighth 
Amendment.  Mr. Carr must be resentenced so his youth and other attendant circumstances 
surrounding his offense can be taken into consideration to ensure he will not be forced to 
serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  Habeas relief is 
granted. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
Mr. Carr was born in 1968.1  His parents divorced several years later.   Immediately 
following the divorce, Mr. Carr and his brother lived with their paternal grandmother, 
although their mother had legal custody of the two boys.  About a year and a half later, the 
boys began living with their mother, who had remarried.  Due to ongoing physical and 
verbal abuse from their stepfather, the boys later lived with their biological father.  
Mr. Carr’s father was an alcoholic but had stopped drinking when Mr. Carr was 
about five years old and became a devout member of a Jehovah’s Witnesses congregation. 
His father’s religious beliefs seemingly led him to place strict restrictions on Mr. Carr, 
which caused conflict.  For example, when he lived with his father, Mr. Carr was not 
1 Mr. Carr did not provide this Court with a transcript from his criminal trial.  The facts 
herein are, therefore, taken without attribution from State v. Carr, 687 S.W.2d 606 (Mo. 
App. 1985). 
3 
 
allowed to play high school basketball because practice conflicted with the family’s home 
bible study.  He was also not allowed to play video games, watch certain television shows, 
or date a girl who did not attend his father’s place of worship.  Mr. Carr lived with his 
father until he was around 14 years old.   
The boys moved back in with their mother following her second divorce.  Upon 
returning to his mother’s house, Mr. Carr attempted to throw away his Jehovah’s Witnesses 
books and pamphlets.  Citing the expense of the materials, his mother had him store them 
in a closet.  While living with his mother, he was allowed to join the high school basketball 
team and was generally a good student who did not get in serious trouble.  Early in January 
1983, when he was around 16 years old, Mr. Carr received a phone call from his father.  
Following the phone call, Mr. Carr became withdrawn.  He quit the basketball team and 
would not see his friends.  He stayed in his room most of the time, would not talk or eat 
much, and began reading the Jehovah’s Witnesses materials he had kept.  At Mr. Carr’s 
request, his mother took him to live with his father, his stepmother, and stepsister in late 
January 1983. 
Sometime in early March 1983, Mr. Carr called his mother.  He was upset and 
repeatedly told his mother he was “bad” because he wanted to do things that were against 
church rules, such as play basketball, date a girl outside the faith, and drive.  Evidence 
presented at his trial suggested his father made him publicly renounce the girl he wanted 
to date during a worship service.  In addition, his mother testified at trial that Mr. Carr 
“kept saying he was trying to do the right thing but everything he did was bad and he said 
his dad kept telling him he was bad.”  She also testified that he said that the congregation 
4 
 
“kept telling him that he was bad because he wasn’t going by their rules.”  Based on 
Mr. Carr’s demeanor during the phone call, his mother testified she believed he was 
suffering from an ongoing mental disease or defect that would not have allowed him to 
“calmly and coolly reflect on killing someone.”   
On March 14, 1983, Mr. Carr and his father went to a worship service.  During the 
service, his father “rebuked and ridiculed” him for failing to recite a biblical passage.  After 
the service, Mr. Carr stayed at his grandmother’s house.  The following morning, he did 
not attend high school.  Instead, he returned to his father’s house, where he stayed 
throughout the day.   
At approximately 4:15 p.m., his brother and stepsister returned home from school.  
When they entered the house, Mr. Carr shot his brother at close range with a .22 caliber 
rifle, hitting him in the left side of the back of his head and in front of his right ear.  He 
shot his stepsister in her back and in her left eye.  When his stepmother returned home from 
work at around 4:35 p.m., he shot her at close range above the right eye and in the right 
temple.  When Mr. Carr’s father arrived home at approximately 5:10 p.m., Mr. Carr 
attempted to shoot his father, but the rifle did not fire.  When Mr. Carr tried to insert another 
shell into the rifle, his father took the gun from him, seemingly without resistance.  After 
being disarmed, Mr. Carr began crying.  He told his father he “kill[ed] them all,” including 
his brother, even though he loved him.   
At the time of the offenses, Mr. Carr was 16 years old.  He was originally charged 
as a juvenile offender and then certified to be tried as an adult for three counts of capital 
5 
murder under section 565.001.2  At the time, capital murder could be punished by death or 
a life sentence without the possibility of parole for 50 years.  Section 565.008.1.  The state 
did not seek the death penalty.  Therefore, if convicted, the only eligible sentence Mr. Carr 
could receive was life without the possibility of parole for 50 years.    
In December 1983, a jury convicted Mr. Carr of three counts of capital murder. 
Following the jury’s verdict, the trial court sentenced him to three concurrent sentences of 
life imprisonment without the eligibility for parole for 50 years.  Because the state did not 
seek the death penalty, the defense was not required to and did not present any mitigating 
evidence prior to sentencing.  The trial court’s judgment stated that Mr. Carr would be 
scheduled for a parole hearing in March 2031.  The court of appeals affirmed his 
convictions on direct appeal.  Carr, 687 S.W.2d at 613.  Mr. Carr’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel was also denied.  Id. at 611.   
Mr. Carr filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court after the Supreme 
Court of the United States’ decision in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).  In 
Miller, the Supreme Court held that juveniles could not be sentenced to a mandatory 
sentence of life without the possibility of parole in a homicide case without first 
considering whether this punishment was just and appropriate given the juvenile offender’s 
age, development, and the circumstances of the offense.  Id. at 2469.  Mr. Carr argued his 
mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole for 50 years violate the Eighth 
2 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory citations are to RSMo 1978. 
6 
 
Amendment because they were imposed on him for offenses he committed as a juvenile 
without consideration of any of the factors in Miller.   
While Mr. Carr’s habeas petition was pending, the Supreme Court held that Miller’s 
substantive rule must be applied retroactively on collateral review of a juvenile offender’s 
mandatory sentence of life without parole.  Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 
(2016).  This Court then set this case for briefing and oral argument.  
Standard of Review for Habeas Relief 
 
This Court has jurisdiction to “issue and determine original remedial writs.”  Mo. 
Const. art. V., sec. 4.  “Habeas corpus relief is the final judicial inquiry into the validity of 
a criminal conviction and functions to relieve [prisoners] whose convictions violate 
fundamental fairness.”  State ex rel. Clemons v. Larkin, 475 S.W.3d 60, 76 (Mo. banc 
2015).  A prisoner is entitled to habeas corpus relief where he proves that he is “restrained 
of his . . . liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the state or federal government.”  
Id.  Although prisoners are generally required to raise constitutional claims on direct appeal 
or in a post-conviction proceeding, a defendant has cause for failing to raise such claims 
where a new constitutional rule may be applied retroactively on collateral review.  State ex 
rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 401 (Mo. banc 2003).  
 Mr. Carr did not raise his Eighth Amendment claims on direct review or in a post-
conviction proceeding.  Nevertheless, in Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736, the Supreme Court 
held that Miller’s new substantive rule of constitutional law must be applied retroactively 
on collateral review of a juvenile offender’s sentence.  In doing so, the Supreme Court 
explained that a “substantive rule . . . forbids criminal punishment of certain primary 
7 
 
conduct or prohibits a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of 
their status or offense” and can be applied retroactively.  Id. at 732 (internal quotation 
omitted).  It reasoned Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law because 
Miller rendered a mandatory penalty unconstitutional for a class of defendants because of 
their status – “juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth.”  
Id. at 734.  Because Mr. Carr is seeking retroactive application of Miller’s substantive rule 
of constitutional law to the facts and circumstances of this case, Mr. Carr has cause for 
failing to previously raise his constitutional claims.  He may seek habeas corpus relief on 
his claims that his sentences were imposed in violation of the Eighth Amendment pursuant 
to Miller.   
Mr. Carr’s Sentences Violate the Eighth Amendment  
Mr. Carr contends his three concurrent sentences of life without the possibility of 
parole for 50 years violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment because they were mandatory sentences for offenses he committed as a 
juvenile that were imposed without any consideration of his youth and attendant 
circumstances.  To withstand the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment, the punishment for a crime must be proportional to both the offender and the 
offense.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463.   
 
In Miller, the Supreme Court held that mandatory sentencing schemes that require 
juveniles convicted of homicide to receive lifetime incarceration without the possibility of 
parole, regardless of their age, age-related characteristics, and the nature of their crimes, 
violate the Eighth Amendment principle of proportionality.  Id. at 2475.  The Supreme 
8 
Court explained that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of 
sentencing.”  Id. at 2464.   Because juveniles are constitutionally different for purposes of 
sentencing, an “offender’s juvenile status can play a central role in considering a sentence’s 
proportionality.”  Id. at 2466 (internal quotation omitted).  Therefore, “criminal procedure 
laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into account at all [are] flawed.”  Id. (internal 
quotation omitted).   
Sentencers should be given the opportunity to consider the mitigating qualities of a 
defendant’s youth.  Id. at 2467.  A state’s severest penalties cannot be imposed on juveniles 
“as though they were not children.”  Id. at 2466.  A sentencing scheme that makes youth 
and all its attendant circumstances irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence 
“poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.”  Id. at 2469.  By their nature, 
mandatory penalties “preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender’s age and 
the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it.”  Id. at 2467.  Judges and 
juries “must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing 
the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”  Id. at 2475. 
Here, Miller controls because Mr. Carr was sentenced to the harshest penalty other 
than death available under a mandatory sentencing scheme3 without the jury having any 
opportunity to consider the mitigating and attendant circumstances of his youth.  Mr. Carr 
3 At the time of Mr. Carr’s conviction, capital murder was the only crime for which the 
death penalty could be imposed.  The alternative punishment available under the capital 
murder statute was life without the possibility of parole for 50 years, thereby making it the 
second harshest penalty that could be imposed on a homicide offender.  See section 
565.008.   
9 
 
was found guilty of three counts of capital murder under section 565.001.4  He was 
thereafter sentenced under section 565.008.1, which provided: 
Persons convicted of the offense of capital murder shall, if the judge or jury 
so recommends after complying with the provisions of sections 565.006 and 
565.012, be punished by death.  If the judge or jury does not recommend the 
imposition of the death penalty on a finding of guilty of capital murder, the 
convicted person shall be punished by imprisonment by the division of 
corrections during his natural life and shall not be eligible for probation or 
parole until he has served a minimum of fifty years of his sentence.  
 
 
The state did not seek the death penalty against Mr. Carr; therefore, the only penalty 
that could be imposed was life without the possibility of parole for 50 years.  This penalty 
was imposed for each of his three convictions without any consideration of Mr. Carr’s 
youth.  This was done despite section 565.006 requiring a presentence hearing during 
which the jury or judge was to hear “additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and 
aggravation of punishment,” including “[t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct” and “[t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime.”  See 
section 565.012.  In Mr. Carr’s case, no presentence hearing was held because there was 
no other statutorily authorized sentence that could be considered by the judge or jury.5  
Like Miller, the mandatory statutory sentencing scheme in place at the time of Mr. Carr’s 
conviction denied the sentencer the opportunity to consider the attendant characteristics of 
                                              
4 Under section 565.001, “[a]ny person who unlawfully, willfully, knowingly, deliberately, 
and with premeditation kills or causes the killing of another human being is guilty of the 
offense of capital murder.” 
5 Had the death penalty been sought and imposed, this penalty would have been invalidated 
following Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005), which held that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on defendants who commit first 
degree murder at age 17 or younger.  
10 
 
Mr. Carr’s youth before imposing the severe punishment of a life sentence without the 
possibility of parole for 50 years.6   
As the Supreme Court explained, “in imposing a State’s harshest penalties, a 
sentencer misses too much if he treats every child as an adult.”  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.  
A harsh, mandatory sentence for a juvenile “precludes consideration of [a defendant’s] 
chronological age and its hallmark features–among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and 
failure to appreciate risks and consequences.”  Id.    
It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that 
surrounds him–and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no 
matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the 
homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and 
the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him.  Indeed, it ignores 
that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for 
incompetencies associated with youth–for example, his inability to deal with 
police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his 
incapacity to assist his own attorneys.  And finally, this mandatory 
punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the 
circumstances most suggest it. 
 
Id. (internal citation omitted).  
The record in this case reflects that many of these mitigating factors were relevant 
to Mr. Carr at the time he committed the three capital murder offenses.  Yet the jury was 
afforded no opportunity to consider his age, maturity, limited control over his environment, 
the transient characteristics attendant to youth, or his capacity for rehabilitation when 
                                              
6 As previously explained, at the time Mr. Carr committed the offenses, premeditated 
murder was classified as “capital murder” and was punishable by either death or life in 
prison without the possibility of parole for 50 years.  Section 565.001; section 565.008.  In 
1984 – the year following Mr. Carr’s offenses – Missouri repealed its capital murder statute 
and classified premeditated murder as first degree murder punishable by death or life in 
prison without the possibility of parole.  Section 565.020, RSMo 1984.   
11 
assessing whether the punishment of life without the possibility of parole for 50 years 
proportionately punished him as a juvenile offender.  Id. at 2464-68. 
In doing so, the most severe mandatory penalty was imposed on Mr. Carr in direct 
contravention of the foundational principle “that imposition of a State’s most severe 
penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children.”  Id. at 
2466.  Consequently, Mr. Carr’s sentences7 violate the Eighth Amendment because they 
were “imposed without any opportunity for the sentencer to consider whether th[e] 
punishment[s were] just and appropriate in light of [Mr. Carr’s] age, maturity, and other 
factors discussed in Miller.”  State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 238 (Mo. banc 2013).    
Resentencing under Hart 
Because Mr. Carr’s sentences, as imposed, violate the Eighth Amendment, he must 
be resentenced.  Following Miller, this Court outlined the procedure by which juvenile 
offenders must be resentenced in Hart.   
First, the sentencer must consider whether Mr. Carr’s sentences of life without the 
possibility of parole for 50 years are just and appropriate considering his youth, maturity, 
and the other Miller factors.  Id. at 241.  If Mr. Carr elects to have a jury resentence him, 
the jury must be “instructed properly that it may not assess and declare” his punishment 
for capital murder should be life without the possibility of parole for 50 years “unless it is 
7 Although this case involves multiple offenses, Mr. Carr’s three sentences of life without 
the possibility of parole for 50 years were all run concurrently.  This case does not present 
the same stacking or functional equivalent sentences issue presented in Willbanks v. 
Missouri Department of Corrections, SC95395, -- S.W.3d -- (Mo. banc July 11, 2017) or 
State v. Nathan, SC95473, -- S.W.3d -- (Mo. banc July 11, 2017).  
12 
 
persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that this sentence is just and appropriate under all the 
circumstances.”  Id. (internal quotation omitted).  The jury must also be instructed, “before 
it begins its deliberations, that if it is not persuaded that life without parole [for 50 years] 
is a just and appropriate sentence under all the circumstances of the case, additional 
instructions concerning applicable punishments will be given at that time.”  Id. at 242. 
If, after considering all the circumstances, the sentencer finds Mr. Carr qualifies for 
life without the possibility of parole for 50 years, then that is the only authorized statutory 
sentence.  Id.  If, however, the sentencer is not persuaded that this sentence is just and 
appropriate, Mr. Carr cannot receive that sentence.  Instead, the trial court must declare 
section 565.008 void as applied to Mr. Carr on the ground that it does not provide a 
constitutionally valid punishment for his offense.  Id. 
If section 565.008 is void, the trial court must vacate the jury’s verdict finding 
Mr. Carr guilty of capital murder under section 565.001 and enter a new finding that he is 
guilty of murder in the second degree under section 565.004.8  Id.  After the sentencer 
enters the finding that he is guilty of murder in the second degree, the sentencer must 
determine his sentence based on the statutory range applicable to these offenses.  Id. at 243.  
Under section 565.008.2, “[p]ersons convicted of murder in the second degree shall be 
                                              
8 Murder in the second degree under section 565.004 included “[a]ll other kinds of murder 
at common law, not herein declared manslaughter or justifiable or excusable homicide[.]”  
It is a lesser-included offense of capital murder under section 565.001 insofar as it 
“sufficiently test[s] a jury’s belief in the crucial facts for a conviction of capital murder.”  
State v. Baker, 636 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Mo. banc 1982); see also Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 242 
n.8 (similarly holding that if the statute for first degree murder is void as applied to a 
juvenile offender and, therefore, the juvenile cannot be found guilty of first degree murder, 
it is proper to find the juvenile offender guilty of the lesser-included offense). 
13 
punished by imprisonment by the division of corrections for a term of not less than ten 
years.”  If Mr. Carr elects to have a jury resentence him, the jury will be provided with 
additional instructions regarding sentencing for murder in the second degree.  Id.  As this 
Court instructed in Hart, these additional instructions “should not be submitted to the 
sentencer – unless and until the sentencer has deliberated and rejected sentencing [the 
juvenile offender] to [life without the possibility of parole for 50 years] for [capital 
murder].”  Id.  Mr. Carr would then be resentenced for second degree murder within the 
statutorily authorized range of punishments for that offense.  Id. 
Conclusion 
Mr. Carr was sentenced to three concurrent terms of life without the possibility of 
parole for 50 years for three counts of capital murder he committed when he was 16 years 
old.  He was sentenced without the jury or the judge considering the mitigating factors of 
his youth, the attendant characteristics of youth, the circumstances of the offense, or his 
potential for rehabilitation.  Because Mr. Carr’s sentence was imposed without any 
consideration of his youth, his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment.  Mr. Carr must be 
resentenced.  Habeas relief granted.   
___________________________________ 
  PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JUDGE 
Draper, Wilson, Russell and Stith, JJ., concur; 
Fischer, C.J., dissents in separate opinion filed. 
Powell, J., not participating. 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
STATE ex rel. JASON CLAY CARR, 
   ) 
   ) 
Petitioner, 
 
 
   ) 
   ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
   
   ) 
No. SC93487 
   ) 
IAN WALLACE, SUPERINTENDENT,    ) 
   ) 
Respondent.  
 
   ) 
DISSENTING OPINION 
The principal opinion cherry picks a passage out of Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 
2455 (2012), to justify its holding that Carr's three concurrent terms of life in prison without 
the possibility of parole for 50 years violate the Eighth Amendment.  The principal 
opinion's conclusion—that "Miller controls because Mr. Carr was sentenced to the harshest 
penalty other than death available under a mandatory sentencing scheme"—is based on a 
fundamental misreading of Miller.  Indeed, it ignores this Court's unanimous decision in 
State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232 (Mo. banc 2013), to apply Miller only in cases in which a 
juvenile offender was sentenced to a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the 
possibility of parole.  This Court in Hart eloquently explained that Miller stands for the 
proposition that: 
2 
the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in 
prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.  By making 
youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest 
prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate 
punishment. . . . Although we do not foreclose a sentencer's ability to make 
that judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into account how 
children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably 
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison. 
404 S.W.3d at 237–38 (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469) (emphasis added).  "That 
harshest prison sentence" in Miller referred to a mandatory sentence of life in prison 
without the possibility of parole, not three concurrent terms of life in prison without the 
possibility of parole for 50 years.  In the interest of further clarity, the Supreme Court in 
Miller explained its 
individualized sentencing decisions make clear that a judge or jury must have 
the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the 
harshest possible penalty for juveniles.  By requiring that all children 
convicted of homicide receive lifetime incarceration without possibility 
of parole, regardless of their age and age-related characteristics and the 
nature of their crimes, the mandatory-sentencing schemes before us violate 
this principle of proportionality, and so the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel 
and unusual punishment.  
132 S. Ct. at 2475 (emphasis added).  See also id. at 2460, 2466, 2468–69 (cataloging age-
related factors that the sentencer must be allowed to consider before the Eighth Amendment 
will permit a juvenile offender to be sentenced to life without parole) (emphasis added); 
Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 234–35 (stating Miller "holds only that life without parole may not 
be imposed unless the sentencer is given an opportunity to consider the individual facts 
and circumstances that might make such a sentence unjust or disproportionate") (emphasis 
added) (footnote omitted). 
3 
Carr's three concurrent terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole for 
50 years do not run afoul of Miller.  Miller only applies to cases in which a sentencing 
scheme "mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders."  132 
S. Ct. at 2469.  Therefore, Miller does not require vacating Carr's sentences.  Nor are Carr's
sentences inconsistent with this Court's or any of the Supreme Court's current Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Indeed, the principal opinion's holding that Miller applies to 
Carr's sentences is, undoubtedly, not just an extension of Miller, but also calls into question 
whether any mandatory minimum sentence for murder could be imposed on a juvenile 
offender.  Accordingly, I decline to concur with that implication and remain bound by this 
Court's unanimous decision in Hart to apply Miller only to cases involving a mandatory 
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. 
Carr was 16 years old at the time he committed the offenses.  He will become parole 
eligible in 2033, when he is 66 years old.  In fact, on July 3, 2001, the Parole Board 
informed Carr that he would have a parole hearing in March 2031, two years before he 
becomes parole eligible.  Such parole eligibility from the outset of his sentence gave Carr 
a meaningful opportunity to obtain release within his life expectancy. 
___________________________ 
Zel M. Fischer, Chief Justice