Case Title: Travelers Ins. Co. v. Palmer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-02-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Palmer1986 WY 45714 P.2d 765Case Number: 85-237Decided: 02/21/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
THE TRAVELERS INSURANCE 
COMPANY, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

 
 
v. 

 
 
TRACY PALMER, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, ParkCounty, John T. Dixon, 
J.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Arnold B. Tschirgi, 
Lander.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Ernest F. Fuller, Jr., of 
Bormuth, Freeman & Fuller, Cody.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J. and 
BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ.

 
 

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This case was received 
by appeal from an order dismissing the complaint with prejudice following the 
failure of counsel for plaintiff to attend a scheduled pretrial 
conference.

 
 

[¶2.]     The facts leading to 
the unhappy event (for plaintiff as appellant) are simple. Plaintiff, as a 
subrogated insurance carrier, sued the customer of a laundromat where a fire had 
occurred, alleging negligent use of the facilities by cleaning oil-soaked 
clothing. After answer, a letter order of the trial court dated August 19, 1985, 
was entered, setting that action, and some 13 other pending contested cases for 
pretrial hearing on September 19, 1985. Defendant filed and served a pretrial 
memorandum required by the Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of 
Wyoming, and 
then appeared at the hearing. Counsel for plaintiff neither filed the memorandum 
nor appeared at the scheduled time, and the action was then dismissed by the 
court with prejudice.

 
 

[¶3.]     Neither before nor 
after the scheduled hearing date had plaintiff's counsel contacted the trial 
court about scheduling problems, or to afford an explanation for nonappearance. 
Since the case comes to this court by direct appeal from the order and judgment 
of dismissal with prejudice, neither the record nor brief afford an explanation 
for any factual reason for counsel to have missed the court 
session.

 
 

[¶4.]     Included in the 
judgment were attorney's fees and costs for pretrial hearing attendance by 
counsel for the defendant. 

 
 

[¶5.]     This court only 
recently said, in speaking to the associated subject of the nonfiling of 
pretrial memoranda, by construction of Rule 41(b)(2), 
W.R.C.P.:

 
 
"* * * Where the court 
determines upon its own motion, as in this case, that dismissal should result, 
the dismissal under this rule may not be with prejudice. The penalty for 
violation of the rule permits only that the case may be dismissed without prejudice. We have said 
that,

 
 
"`* * * The remedy of 
involuntary dismissal * * * rests within the sound discretion of the trial 
court.' Gaudina v. Haberman, 
[Wyo., 644 P.2d 159,] 169-170 [(1982).]" Glatter v. 
American National Bank of Powell, Wyo., 
675 P.2d 642, 644 (1984).

 
 

[¶6.]     In accord, we require 
modification of the present judgment to the extent that dismissal was with 
prejudice.

 
 
 
 

[¶7.]     Rule 901, Uniform Rules 
for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming is applicable, and includes dismissal 
as one remedy.1

 
 

[¶8.]     A proposed change as 
now under discussion affords a suitable policy consideration, and would 
add:

 
 
"While imposition of 
sanctions other than dismissal or striking of pleadings is not required before 
such sanctions are imposed, it is the policy of these rules that dismissal of 
the case or striking of pleadings are remedies of last 
resort."

 
 

[¶9.]     This court recognizes, 
within the confines of the uniform rule for dismissal in this state, 
that:

 
 
"`* * * Involuntary 
dismissal requires a weighing of circumstances and judicial policies.' Gaudina v. Haberman, supra at 169-170. 
See also, Johnson v. Bd. of Comm'rs of 
Laramie Cty., Wyo., 588 P.2d 237 (1978)." Glatter v. American National Bank of 
Powell, supra, 675 P.2d  at 644.

 
 

[¶10.]  The general principle involving requests 
for continuances has applicability to default dismissal orders in the pretrial 
process. In those cases, it has been held that movant, by his motion, must 
forcefully and adequately present any request for continuance for whatever 
reason with appropriate compliances with rules and statutes, as normally 
including affidavits of supporting specific facts. See Pacific Indemnity Company v. Berge, 205 
Kan. 755, 473 P.2d 48 (1970); State v. 
Spurlock, 161 Mont. 388, 506 P.2d 842 (1973); Albuquerque National Bank v. Albuquerque 
Ranch Estates, 99 N.M. 95, 654 P.2d 548 (1982); State v. Rigsbee, 285 N.C. 708, 208 S.E.2d 656 (1974); Sanditen v. Brooks 
Flame-Spray, Inc., Okla., 403 P.2d 471 (1965); Sims v. Sowle, 238 Or. 329, 395 P.2d 133 
(1964).

 
 
"The answer must be found 
in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reason presented 
to the trial judge at the time the request is denied." Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S. Ct. 841, 11 L. Ed. 2d 921, reh. denied 377 U.S. 925, 84 S. Ct. 1218, 12 L. Ed. 2d 217 
(1964).

 
 

[¶11.]  The direct appeal, rather than the motion 
to set aside the order as supported by affidavits, was utilized in Glatter, 
although the appeal was also factually supported by affidavits. We would note 
with approval a discussion of this subject in Annot., 55 A.L.R.3d 303, 309, 
Failure of Party or His Attorney to Appear at Pretrial 
Conference:

 
 
"A threshold question 
which the attorney faces is whether to take an appeal from the trial judge's 
judgment or order, or to attempt relief in the trial court by way of a motion or 
other application for vacation of the order or judgment. * * * Where either 
route is open, in selecting the one to follow the attorney will want to consider 
various factors including the nature of the defense, the time involved, and the 
relative expense. Generally speaking, however, the least expensive and most 
effective procedure is to move in the trial court that the judgment or order be 
vacated, and, if the motion is denied, then to take an appeal 
therefrom."

 
 
See also Annot., 8 
A.L.R.3d 1272, Appealability of Order Setting Aside or Refusing to Set Aside, 
Default Judgment; and Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1255, Opening Default or Default 
Judgment Claimed to Have Been Obtained Because of Attorney's Mistake as to Time 
and Place of Appearance, Trial or Filing of Necessary 
Papers.

 
 

[¶12.]  In the absence of a documented 
explanation for the nonappearance, as derived from a motion addressed to the 
district court to set aside the default as supported by affidavits, or some 
similar process affording evidence of the factual status, there is no basis for 
this court to find an abuse of discretion and consequently to reverse the 
dismissal in favor of some less severe sanction. Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831 
(1980).

 
 

[¶13.]  The case is remanded to the district 
court for entry of an amendatory order reflecting that the dismissal is without 
prejudice, and otherwise the trial court is sustained and the appeal 
denied.

1 Rule 901, Uniform Rules 
for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming reads:

 
 
"The following may be 
imposed for violation of these rules: reprimand, monetary sanctions, contempt, 
striking of briefs or pleadings, dismissal of proceedings, costs, attorney fees, 
or other sanctions."