Case Title: State v. Scott

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2016AP002017-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2018-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 WI 74 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP2017-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Andre L. Scott, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 20, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 14, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Kremers 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs filed and an 
oral argument by Colleen D. Ball, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Luke N. Berg, deputy solicitor general, with whom on the brief 
were Brad D. Schimel, attorney general, and Ryan J. Walsh, chief 
deputy solicitor general.  There was an oral argument by Luke N. 
Berg, deputy solicitor general. 
 
 
2018 WI 74
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP2017-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2009CF136) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Andre L. Scott, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 20, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
County.  Reversed and remanded. 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   This is an appeal from an 
order of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Jeffrey A. 
Kremers, Judge.  The circuit court ordered Andre Scott, the 
defendant, to be involuntarily medicated to competency for 
purposes of participating in postconviction proceedings after 
the circuit court found that he was not competent to proceed 
with his postconviction motion for relief and was not competent 
to refuse medication and treatment. 
No. 
2016AP2017-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The defendant petitioned this court to bypass the 
court of appeals1 and decide his appeal of the circuit court 
order requiring involuntary medication.2  This court granted the 
petition, bypassing the court of appeals.   
¶3 
We reverse the order of the circuit court and remand 
the cause to the circuit court for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
¶4 
The facts underlying the circuit court order that the 
defendant be involuntarily medicated to competency for purposes 
of assisting with his postconviction proceedings are simple and 
undisputed.  
¶5 
Several years after being convicted of battery, 
disorderly conduct, and kidnapping, the defendant, Andre Scott, 
sought to pursue postconviction relief.  Having concerns about 
the 
defendant's 
ability 
to 
assist 
with 
postconviction 
proceedings, 
defendant's 
counsel 
asked 
for 
a 
competency 
evaluation.   
¶6 
In response to defense counsel's request, the circuit 
court held a hearing on the defendant's competency.  After 
taking testimony, the circuit court ordered the defendant to be 
involuntarily 
medicated 
to 
competency 
for 
purposes 
of 
participating in postconviction proceedings.   
                                                 
1 See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.60 (2015-16). 
2 The circuit court stayed its involuntary medication order 
for 30 days so that the defendant could seek appellate relief.   
No. 
2016AP2017-CR   
 
3 
 
¶7 
The State initially defended the circuit court's 
involuntary medication order.  Thereafter, the State argued that 
the involuntary medication order should be vacated because it 
was premature.  The State acknowledged that the circuit court 
had failed to follow the procedure this court set forth in State 
v. Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d 111, 523 N.W.2d 727 (1994), for how 
to resolve competency issues at the postconviction stage of 
criminal proceedings.   
¶8 
We conclude, as the State urges, that because the 
circuit court did not follow the mandatory procedure set forth 
in Debra A.E., the circuit court's order that the defendant be 
involuntarily medicated to competency for purposes of assisting 
with postconviction proceedings was issued prematurely and is 
invalid.   
¶9 
Accordingly, we reverse the order of the circuit court 
and remand the cause to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.    
¶10 The instant case presents us with four questions: 
1. 
May a circuit court require a non-dangerous but 
incompetent defendant to be involuntarily treated to 
competency 
in 
the 
context 
of 
postconviction 
proceedings, and if so, is Wis. Stat. § 971.14(4)(b) 
(2015-16)3 unconstitutional on its face because it does 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP2017-CR   
 
4 
 
not comport with the requirements announced in Sell v. 
United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003)? 
2. 
Is a circuit court order finding the defendant 
incompetent to proceed and requiring the defendant to 
be involuntarily treated to competency a final order 
for purposes of appellate review? 
3. 
Did the court of appeals erroneously exercise its 
discretion when it denied a motion for relief pending 
appeal without explaining its reasoning? 
4. 
Should involuntary medication or treatment orders be 
automatically stayed pending appeal?   
¶11 We answer the questions presented as follows: 
1. 
Before a circuit court can require a non-dangerous but 
incompetent defendant to be involuntarily treated to 
competency 
in 
the 
context 
of 
postconviction 
proceedings, 
the 
circuit 
court 
must 
follow 
the 
procedure this court established in State v. Debra 
A.E., 188 Wis. 2d 111, 523 N.W.2d 727 (1994).  If 
Debra A.E. is applied properly, an order finding the 
defendant incompetent to seek postconviction relief 
ordinarily will not need to include an order for 
involuntary 
medication 
or 
treatment 
to 
restore 
competency.  The circuit court erred in the instant 
case 
by 
failing 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
procedures 
established in Debra A.E.  
2. 
The proceeding to determine whether a defendant is 
competent 
is 
separate 
and 
distinct 
from 
the 
No. 
2016AP2017-CR   
 
5 
 
defendant's underlying criminal proceeding.  Thus, an 
order that the defendant is not competent to proceed 
(and in the instant case, that the defendant should be 
medicated and treated to competency) is a final order 
issued in a special proceeding for purposes of appeal.4  
3. 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion when it denied the defendant's motion for 
relief pending appeal without explaining its reasoning 
for its discretionary denial decision.   
4. 
Involuntary medication orders are subject to an 
automatic stay pending appeal, which can be lifted 
upon a successful motion by the State. 
¶12 Because we reverse the circuit court order on the 
ground that the circuit court did not comply with Debra A.E., we 
need not address the effect of Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 
166 
(2003), 
on 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.14(4)(b).  We adhere to the doctrine of constitutional 
                                                 
4 Both the State and the defendant agree that that an 
involuntary 
medication 
order 
is 
immediately 
appealable.  
However, the parties propose alternative paths the court may 
take to hold that an involuntary medication order is immediately 
appealable.  The defendant argues that an involuntary medication 
order is a final order that is appealable as a matter of right 
under Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).  The State argues that appeals 
from 
involuntary 
medication 
orders 
should 
be 
taken 
as 
interlocutory appeals.  For the reasons set forth in this 
opinion, we agree with the defendant. 
No. 
2016AP2017-CR   
 
6 
 
avoidance:  A court ordinarily resolves a case on available non-
constitutional grounds.5    
I 
¶13 The facts, for purposes of this review, are simple and 
undisputed.  In 2009, the defendant, Andre Scott, was convicted 
of battery, disorderly conduct, and kidnapping.  
¶14 In 2015, the defendant's counsel expressed concerns 
about the defendant's ability to assist with the postconviction 
proceedings and to make decisions committed by law to the 
defendant to a reasonable degree of rational understanding.  
Defense counsel asked for a competency evaluation of the 
defendant, and  the circuit court granted the request.   
¶15 During 
the 
competency 
evaluation, 
the 
evaluator 
testified that he did not consider the defendant dangerous or 
threatening; that although the defendant is not competent to 
proceed, the defendant's symptoms are treatable; that the 
defendant refused medication because he lacked insight into his 
illness and his need for treatment; and that it was likely that 
the defendant's competence to proceed could be restored with 
psychotropic treatment.   
¶16 Defense counsel explained that the defendant was never 
found to be dangerous to himself or anyone else; that the 
                                                 
5 "This court does not normally decide constitutional 
questions if the case can be resolved on other grounds."  Adams 
Outdoor Advert., Ltd. v. City of Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶91, 294 
Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803 (quoting Labor & Farm Party v. 
Elections Bd., 117 Wis. 2d 351, 354, 344 N.W.2d 177 (1984)). 
No. 
2016AP2017-CR   
 
7 
 
defendant did not want an involuntary medication order; and that 
the defendant likely would not have pursued an appeal if a 
medication order were required.     
¶17 Nevertheless, the circuit court issued an order 
directing involuntary treatment after concluding that the 
defendant was not competent to proceed with his motion for 
postconviction relief and not competent to refuse medication and 
treatment.  However, the circuit court stayed its involuntary 
medication order for 30 days so that the defendant could pursue 
appellate relief.    
¶18 The defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal the 
circuit court order.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.50.  The court of 
appeals denied the defendant's petition for leave to appeal and 
lifted the circuit court's stay of the involuntary medication 
order.   
¶19 The defendant then appealed the involuntary medication 
order as an appeal as a matter of right, Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1), 
and filed an emergency motion to stay the medication order 
pending appeal.  The court of appeals denied the stay of the 
medication order but allowed the direct appeal to proceed.  The 
court of appeals did not explain why it denied the defendant's 
motion to stay the medication order.  As a result, the 
Department of Health Services began medicating the defendant. 
¶20 The circuit court concluded that the defendant was 
competent to proceed after approximately seven months of 
treatment, and he is no longer subject to the involuntary 
medication order.  However, the circuit court warned the 
No. 
2016AP2017-CR   
 
8 
 
defendant that it could order him to submit to treatment again 
if he stops taking his medication and becomes incompetent.  
II 
¶21 First, 
we 
address 
the 
circuit 
court 
order 
for 
involuntary medication and treatment of the defendant.  We 
conclude that the circuit court erred by failing to follow the 
mandatory procedure this court established in Debra A.E. for a 
circuit court to require a non-dangerous but incompetent 
defendant to be involuntarily treated to competency in the 
context of postconviction proceedings.  
¶22 Under Debra A.E., the circuit court order that the 
defendant is incompetent for purposes of appeal need not have 
included 
an 
order 
for 
treatment 
to 
restore 
competency.  
Ordinarily, the defendant is not needed to assist counsel in 
some or all issues involved in postconviction proceedings.  
Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d at 130.   
¶23 Indeed, the court noted in Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d at 
130, that instances in which a defendant may be involuntarily 
medicated to competency for purposes of appeal will be rare.  
The record in the instant case does not support the conclusion 
that the instant case is one of those rare instances in which 
the defendant may be involuntarily medicated to competency for 
purposes of appeal.    
¶24 Debra A.E. fashioned a mandatory process for managing 
postconviction relief of allegedly incompetent defendants.  The 
process is designed to balance the interests of incompetent 
defendants in meaningful postconviction relief and the interest 
No. 
2016AP2017-CR   
 
9 
 
of the public in expediting postconviction relief and reaching a 
final determination of the merits.  Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d at 
119, 129-35.  Furthermore, the Debra A.E. court concluded that 
if this process were followed, a court order for treatment to 
restore competency will ordinarily be unnecessary because 
"[m]eaningful postconviction relief can be provided even though 
a defendant is incompetent."6 
¶25 The process established by Debra A.E. is as follows: 
• As soon as there is a good faith doubt about the 
defendant's competency to seek postconviction relief, 
defense counsel should promptly advise the appropriate 
court of this doubt (on the record) and move for a 
ruling on competency.7 
• The court shall honor defense counsel's request when 
there is reason to doubt a defendant's competency.8 
• To determine competency, the court may order an 
examination and hold a hearing.9 
• The 
test 
for 
competency 
during 
postconviction 
proceedings is whether the defendant "is unable to 
assist counsel or to make decisions committed by law 
                                                 
6 State v. Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d 111, 130, 523 N.W.2d 727 
(1994). 
7 Id. at 131. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 131-32. 
No. 
2016AP2017-CR   
 
10 
 
to the defendant with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding."10 
• When the issues in a postconviction proceeding rest on 
the record in the circuit court and involve no risk to 
the defendant, defense counsel can proceed with 
postconviction relief on a defendant's behalf even if 
the defendant is incompetent.11 
• When the issues in a postconviction proceeding involve 
some risk to the defendant, these issues require the 
defendant's decision-making because whether to file an 
appeal and the objectives to pursue are decisions 
committed by law to the defendant.12   
• If the defendant's assistance is needed for decision-
making 
and 
the 
defendant 
is 
likely 
to 
attain 
competency in the near future, a circuit court may 
grant a continuance or an enlargement of time for 
filing 
the 
necessary 
notices 
or 
motions 
for 
postconviction relief or may appoint a guardian to 
make the decisions that the law requires the defendant 
to make.13  If the defendant's assistance is needed to 
develop a factual foundation and the defendant is not 
                                                 
10 Id. at 126. 
11 Id. at 130. 
12 Id. at 126, 133-34. 
13 Id. at 135. 
No. 
2016AP2017-CR   
 
11 
 
likely to attain competency in the near future, these 
issues can be raised at a later proceeding in a 
§ 974.06 motion if the defendant regains competency.14  
¶26 Because the procedure mandated by this court in Debra 
A.E. was not followed in the instant case, we conclude, as did 
the State, that the involuntary medication order was issued 
prematurely and is invalid.  Specifically, the circuit court 
acted prematurely by ordering that the defendant be medicated to 
competency without determining whether and to what extent 
postconviction 
proceedings 
could 
continue 
despite 
the 
defendant's incompetency.  As we explained in Debra A.E., 
"[m]eaningful postconviction relief can be provided even though 
a defendant is incompetent[,]" and the process through which 
circuit courts and counsel manage the postconviction relief of 
incompetent defendants will not ordinarily need to include a 
court order for treatment to restore competency.  Debra A.E., 
188 Wis. 2d at 129-30.15 
III 
                                                 
14 Id. at 135. 
15 Because we reverse the circuit court order on the ground 
that the circuit court did not adhere to the procedures set 
forth in Debra A.E., we need not address the effect of Sell v. 
United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), on the constitutionality of 
Wis. Stat. § 971.14(4)(b).  As we stated previously, a court 
avoids a decision regarding the constitutionality of a statute 
when the court can decide the case on non-constitutional 
grounds.  Adams Outdoor Advert., Ltd. v. City of Madison, 2006 
WI 104, ¶91, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803 (quoting Labor & 
Farm 
Party 
v. 
Elections 
Bd., 
117 
Wis. 2d 351, 
354, 
344 
N.W.2d 177 (1984)). 
No. 
2016AP2017-CR   
 
12 
 
¶27 The second issue we address is whether the circuit 
court order finding the defendant incompetent to proceed and 
requiring 
the 
defendant 
to 
be 
involuntarily 
treated 
to 
competency is a final order for purposes of appellate review.   
¶28 The status of an order as a final order for purposes 
of appeal is a question of law that this court decides 
independently of the circuit court or court of appeals but 
benefitting from their analyses.16 
¶29 The 
State 
argues 
that 
appeals 
from 
involuntary 
medication orders should be taken as interlocutory appeals.  The 
defendant argues that these appeals should be brought as a 
matter of right under Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1) as an appeal of a 
final order of a special proceeding.17  For the following 
reasons, we agree with the defendant. 
¶30 A final circuit court order is appealable as of right. 
Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).18  A final circuit court order is defined 
in Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1) as "a judgment, order or disposition 
                                                 
16 Admiral Ins. Co. v. Paper Converting Mach. Co., 2012 WI 
30, ¶22, 339 Wis. 2d 291, 811 N.W.2d 351. 
17 The defendant and the State agree that the court should 
rule 
that 
involuntary 
medication 
orders 
are 
immediately 
appealable.  They point out that, as a practical matter, if an 
order that the defendant be treated to competency is not 
immediately reviewable, the order is effectively unreviewable 
because the defendant will have already been forced to undergo 
involuntary medication or treatment while the appeal proceeds. 
18 A non-final circuit court order is not appealable as of 
right but only on leave of the court of appeals.  Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.50.   
No. 
2016AP2017-CR   
 
13 
 
that disposes of the entire matter in litigation as to one or 
more of the parties . . . ."  
¶31 The order of the circuit court in the competency 
proceeding at issue disposed of the entire matter in litigation 
between the parties, namely the question of the defendant's 
competency to assist with postconviction proceedings and the 
defendant's competency to refuse medication or treatment.  An 
appeal of an involuntary medication order is best classified as 
a final order from a special proceeding.   
¶32 In Voss v. Stoll, 141 Wis. 267, 124 N.W. 89 (1910), we 
explained that "[t]he test to be applied in determining the 
nature of any judicial remedy, as regards whether it is a 
special proceeding, is whether it is a mere proceeding in an 
action, or one independently thereof or merely connected 
therewith."  Voss, 141 Wis. at 271 (emphasis added).   
¶33 The 
competency 
proceeding 
is 
not 
part 
of 
the 
defendant's underlying criminal proceeding; it is "merely 
connected" to it.  The competency proceeding resolves an issue 
separate 
and 
distinct 
from 
the 
issues 
presented 
in 
the 
defendant's underlying criminal proceeding.  Thus, while the 
criminal proceeding and the competency proceeding are "related"19 
or "connected"20 to one another, the competency proceeding is 
properly "treated as being commenced independently of any other 
                                                 
19 Ernst v. The Steamer "Brooklyn", 24 Wis. 616, 617 (1869).  
20 Voss v. Stoll, 141 Wis. 267, 271, 124 N.W. 89 (1910); 
Witter v. Lyon, 34 Wis. 564, 574 (1874). 
No. 
2016AP2017-CR   
 
14 
 
action or proceeding."  State v. Alger, 2015 WI 3, ¶76, 360 
Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346. 
¶34 Thus, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
order 
determining 
incompetency and, in the instant case, mandating involuntary 
medication or treatment to restore competency is a final order 
issued in a special proceeding and is appealable as of right 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).21  
IV 
¶35 The third issue relates to the court of appeals' 
denying the defendant's motion for a stay of the involuntary 
medication order pending appeal.22   
                                                 
21 Concluding that involuntary medication orders are final 
orders from special proceedings does not contradict our holding 
in State v. Alger, 2015 WI 3, 360 Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346.  
The Alger case involved petitions to discharge involuntary 
commitments under Chapter 980.  The Alger court held that those 
petitions did not commence "actions" or "special proceedings" 
because those petitions were continuations of the initial 
underlying commitment proceeding.  Alger, 360 Wis. 2d 193, ¶26.  
The Alger decision did not overrule Voss v. Stoll, 141 Wis. 267, 
124 N.W. 89 (1910); in fact, Alger partially relied on Voss.  
Alger, 360 Wis. 2d 193, ¶¶29, 76.   
In the instant case, the competency proceeding is not a 
continuation of the defendant's underlying criminal case.  
Indeed, 
the 
defendant's 
postconviction 
proceedings 
were 
suspended during the pendency of the competency proceeding.  The 
competency proceeding in the instant case, unlike the discharge 
petitions in Alger, resolved an issue separate and distinct from 
the 
issues 
presented 
in 
the 
defendant's 
postconviction 
proceedings. 
22 See Wis. Stat. § 808.07, § (Rule) 809.12 (enabling the 
court of appeals to grant relief from a circuit court order 
pending appeal).   
No. 
2016AP2017-CR   
 
15 
 
¶36 In determining whether to grant relief pending appeal, 
the court of appeals exercises its discretion.  An appellate 
court reviews a circuit court's order on a motion for stay for 
an erroneous exercise of discretion.  Weber v. White, 2004 WI 
63, ¶18, 272 Wis. 2d 121, 681 N.W.2d 137.   
¶37 In the instant case, the court of appeals did not 
explain its reasons for exercising its discretion to deny the 
defendant's motion for a stay of the involuntary medication 
order pending appeal. 
¶38 Our jurisprudence governing the proper exercise of 
circuit court discretion is instructive in determining whether 
the court of appeals must explain the reasons underlying its 
discretionary decision-making.  The case law is clear that a 
circuit court's discretionary decision "is not the equivalent of 
unfettered decision-making."23  When a circuit court exercises 
its discretion, it must explain on the record its reasons for 
its discretionary decision "to ensure the soundness of its own 
decision making and to facilitate judicial review."24 
¶39 The circuit court's explanation on the record of its 
exercise of discretion must demonstrate that the circuit court 
examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, 
and used a rational process to arrive at a conclusion that a 
                                                 
23 Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 
(1981); see also Klinger v. Oneida Cty., 149 Wis. 2d 838, 846, 
440 N.W.2d 348 (1989). 
24 Klinger, 149 Wis. 2d 838, 847, 440 N.W.2d 348 (1989). 
No. 
2016AP2017-CR   
 
16 
 
reasonable judge would make.25  If a circuit court fails to 
explain its exercise of discretion on the record, it has 
erroneously exercised its discretion.26   
¶40 The parties have not offered any case (and we have 
found none) that requires the court of appeals to explain the 
reasons underlying its discretionary decisions.  However, the 
justification that this court has relied upon to require a 
circuit court to explain its discretionary decision-making 
applies equally to the court of appeals.  The court of appeals 
should explain its discretionary decision-making to ensure the 
soundness of that decision-making and to facilitate judicial 
review. 
¶41 We therefore conclude that the court of appeals' 
failure to explain its exercise of discretion in the instant 
case is an erroneous exercise of discretion. 
V 
¶42 Before concluding, we address the fourth and final 
issue:  whether involuntary medication orders should be stayed 
automatically pending appeal as suggested by Scott. 
¶43 Pursuant to Article VII, Section 3 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, this court has superintending authority "that is 
indefinite 
in 
character, 
unsupplied 
with 
means 
and 
                                                 
25 Weber v. White, 2004 WI 63, ¶18, 272 Wis. 2d 121, 681 
N.W.2d 137. 
26 State ex rel. Johnson v. Williams, 114 Wis. 2d 354, 356-
57, 338 N.W.2d 320 (1983). 
No. 
2016AP2017-CR   
 
17 
 
instrumentalities, and limited only by the necessities of 
justice."  Arneson v. Jezwinski, 206 Wis. 2d 217, 225, 556 
N.W.2d 721 (1996).  Pursuant to that authority, we hereby order 
that involuntary medication orders are subject to an automatic 
stay pending appeal.   
¶44 The 
reasoning 
for 
our 
decision 
is 
simple——if 
involuntary medication orders are not automatically stayed 
pending appeal, the defendant's "significant" constitutionally 
protected 
"liberty 
interest" 
in 
"avoiding 
the 
unwanted 
administration of antipsychotic drugs" is rendered a nullity.  
Sell, 539 U.S. at 177 (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 
210, 221 (1990)).    
¶45 The State shall have the opportunity to move to lift 
the stay, and the merits of the State's motion shall be governed 
by the legal standard set forth in State v. Gudenschwager, 191 
Wis. 2d 431, 529 N.W.2d 225 (1995), as modified by the instant 
opinion. 
¶46 In Gudenschwager, we explained that a stay pending 
appeal is appropriate where the moving party: 
(1) makes a strong showing that it is likely to 
succeed on the merits of the appeal; 
(2) shows that, unless a stay is granted, it will 
suffer irreparable injury; 
(3) shows that no substantial harm will come to other 
interested parties; and 
(4) shows that a stay will do no harm to the public 
interest. 
No. 
2016AP2017-CR   
 
18 
 
Gudenschwager, 191 Wis. 2d at 440.  However, because involuntary 
medication orders are automatically stayed pending appeal, these 
factors must be slightly modified to accurately explain what the 
State must show in its motion to lift the stay. 
¶47 On a motion to lift an automatic stay pending appeal 
of an involuntary medication order, the State must: 
(1) make a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on 
the merits of the appeal; 
(2) show that the defendant will not suffer irreparable 
harm if the stay is lifted; 
(3) show that no substantial harm will come to other 
interested parties if the stay is lifted; and 
(4) show that lifting the stay will do no harm to the 
public interest. 
¶48 Whether to grant the State's motion is a discretionary 
decision, and as we explained above, the court of appeals must 
explain its discretionary decision to grant or deny the State's 
motion. 
VI 
¶49 Because the procedure mandated by this court in Debra 
A.E. was not followed in the instant case, we conclude, as did 
the State, that the involuntary medication order was issued 
prematurely and is invalid.  We reverse the order of the circuit 
court and remand the cause to the circuit court for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
¶50 By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is 
reversed and the cause remanded. 
No. 
2016AP2017-CR   
 
 
 
1