Case Title: In Re Estate of Mueseler

Citation: 188 Kan. 407, 362 P.2d 653

Docket Number: 42,291

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1961-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
188 Kan. 407 (1961)
362 P.2d 653
In the Matter of the Estate of Frank Mueseler, Deceased.
KARL H. MUESELER, Appellant,
v.
JOHNNIE WENGER, Executor, LUTHERAN CHILDREN'S FRIEND SOCIETY, THE LUTHERAN HOUR, and THE CHURCH EXTENSION FUND, KANSAS DISTRICT LUTHERAN CHURCH, MISSOURI SYNOD, Appellees.
No. 42,291

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 10, 1961.
Richard W. Shaw of Hiawatha argued the cause, and Lewis E. Helvern of Hiawatha was with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Clarence J. Moore of Horton argued the cause, and Roy V. Nelson of Hiawatha was with him on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
JACKSON, J.:
Frank Mueseler, now deceased, was in his life time a farmer in Brown county. Upon his death in December, 1957, his will was probated in the probate court of Brown county having been admitted to probate on January 24, 1958, and on the same date the executor named in the will was appointed. The three Lutheran church societies were the only named beneficiaries under the will.
Karl H. Mueseler is the only child and sole heir of the above named testator. Karl made no objection to the will until the executor had sold the real estate then owned by the testator, paid the debts and otherwise administered the estate. The executor then filed his petition for final settlement in which he named the above church societies as legatees and devisees. At this time Karl filed his "objections, exceptions and defenses" to the executor's petition.
The chief "objection" contained in the above pleading and the *408 only one concerned in the present appeal was stated in part as follows:
*409 The pleading continued by alleging the recording of the deed to the eighty acres, just referred to, and further alleging that Karl made payments to his father from time to time beginning in April, 1955 and ending in March, 1957. The payments totaled $11,703.94. It was also alleged that the wife and mother died on February 2, 1957, and that the land conveyed to Karl by his father was then free of any inchoate claim of the mother based upon the fact that she had not signed the deed to Karl. It was further alleged that because of the confidential relations existing between Karl and his father, he relied upon his father to keep his promises and leave the father's estate to him; that without the knowledge of Karl, the father made the present probated will leaving his estate to others; that Karl not knowing of the new will of his father continued to make payments to him under the above alleged agreement. Karl then alleged in effect that the beneficiaries under the probated will should take nothing and that he should, as beneficiary under the alleged contract and as sole heir of his father, be declared to be the sole owner of the estate.
Karl later filed his petition to transfer the hearing of the above matters to the district court. The district court took jurisdiction of the hearing and after a full hearing denied the claims of Karl and ordered that the estate should be distributed as provided in the will and the report of the executor. Karl has appealed to this court from the decree of the district court.
In discussing the questions presented to this court, we shall for the sake of brevity continue to refer to the appellant by this first name. We shall also observe in the beginning that, as we read the record, the learned trial judge decided the question of Karl's rights to the estate principally upon one question. The district court decided that Karl had not proved that there was in fact any oral contract to leave the father's estate to Karl.
We would first point out that under the decisions of this court the trial court was under a duty to find that the contract had been pleaded and proved by clear and satisfactory proof and also that the party asserting the contract had complied with the contract and should in equity and good conscience be entitled to possess the fruits of such contract.
In the case of Jones v. Davis, 165 Kan. 626, 631, 197 P.2d 932, plaintiff attempted to set up an oral contract under which plaintiff claimed an interest in real estate of a decedent. At page 631 of the *410 opinion, the court set out the rule applicable to the trial court in passing upon such contracts as follows:
Of course, the facts of the case of Jones v. Davis, supra, differed from the particular facts in this case, but we believe the rule as to the amount of proof of the oral contract applied with equal force to this case. The Jones case has been cited with approval in the following recent cases: In re Estate of Spark, 168 Kan. 270, 212 P.2d 369; In re Estate of Boller, 173 Kan. 30, 244 P.2d 678; Texas Co. v. Sloan, 175 Kan. 735, 267 P.2d 919; and Pattimore v. Davis, 180 Kan. 534, 305 P.2d 835.
We now turn to the abstract to study the proof offered by Karl as to the existence of the alleged oral contract. Karl's wife testified that the father wanted to quit farming and move to town and needed money to buy a place in town; that the father approached his son about the latter buying an eighty acre tract. The father wanted $18,000 maximum and his attorney talked of $15,000 as did Karl.
*411 The wife's testimony as shown in the abstract continues:
After the first of the year, the father talked to his son, Karl, again about buying the land.
"Q. And did he say anything to Karl at that time?
..............
"A. Well, I guess so.
"Q. You guess so, do you know so?
"A. I know so.
"Q. About when was that?
"A. Probably about the first of the year in '56."
A neighboring farmer testified that the father approached him about buying the eighty  that the witness asked if Karl did not want the place, and that later the father returned and said Karl was going to buy it. "It is better that way, Karl is going to get it all anyhow."
Karl then testified in his own behalf. He identified the deed for the eighty acres and the checks given to his father for payment. He related that he went to the office of his father's attorney where the deed was made out. There was no writing besides the deed. The record of Karl's testimony continues:
*412 "Q. You mean the payments, I mean interest?
"A. After the first payment?
"Q. Yes.
"A. Well, he went to Powhattan.
"Q. What did Mr. Nelson say to you?
"A. Well, when he was making up this agreement?
"A. He would disinherit me if I antagonized him.
"Q. Did he say anything else?
"A. Yes.
"Q. When was that?
"A. Yes."
A nephew of the father, who was also a neighboring farmer, testified about two conversations with the father. In the first, he had complimented his uncle on the fact that he understood he was intending to leave his estate to his son Karl. In the second conversation, the witness told of criticizing his uncle because the witness had heard that his Uncle Frank had changed his will and was leaving his estate to strangers. The witness testified:
It may be observed that Karl testified he did not know his father had disinherited him until the father's will was probated. But he *413 testified as shown above that his father's attorney warned him that if he antagonized his father, the father would do so. This might well indicate that the attorney did not understand that there was any contract binding upon the father to leave his estate to the son.
We think that upon the above evidence the trial court can not be said to have erred in holding that the alleged oral contract was not clearly proved. In fact, a careful examination will show that nowhere was there shown any definite promise on the part of the father. True, at the time the deed for the eighty acres was given to the son, the son was the ultimate legatee and devisee of his father's estate, but there is shown to have been no promise on the part of the father not to change the will. The father's attorney warned the son about antagonizing the father, and yet the son quibbled over paying the father money for his living expenses. Perhaps, the son was too much like his father in wanting to get a good bargain. While we are inclined to sympathize with the son under all of the facts, we can not say that the trial court erred in holding the father was not shown to have contracted away his right to change his will.
Other matters are discussed in the briefs, but none which would help the appellant. The judgment appealed from must be affirmed and it is so ordered.