Case Title: State v. Everette

Citation: 2011-Ohio-2856

Docket Number: 20101325

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Everette, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-2856.] 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-2856 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. EVERETTE, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Everette, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-2856.] 
Postconviction relief — Definition of transcript — The written transcript 
constitutes the “transcript” under App.R. 9 and R.C. 2953.21(A)(2) when 
both a videotape recording and written transcript of proceedings are 
available — Judgment reversed and cause remanded. 
(No. 2010-1325 — Submitted April 5, 2011 — Decided June 16, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 23585,  
2010-Ohio-2832. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
For purposes of determining when the 180-day time period for filing a 
postconviction relief petition shall accrue, only the certified, written 
transcript constitutes a “transcript” under App.R. 9 and R.C. 
2953.21(A)(2) when both a videotape recording and the written form of 
the proceedings are available. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we decide whether a videotape recording of the trial 
court proceedings filed in the court of appeals constitutes a “transcript” pursuant 
to App.R. 9(A) and R.C. 2953.21(A)(2) so as to trigger the 180-day time 
requirement for filing a petition for postconviction relief under the statute.  For 
the reasons stated below, we hold that for purposes of determining when the 180-
day time period for filing a postconviction relief petition shall accrue, only the 
certified, written transcript constitutes a “transcript” under App.R. 9 and R.C. 
2953.21(A)(2) when both a videotape recording and the written form of the 
proceedings are available.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and remand to the court of appeals for consideration of appellant’s second 
assignment of error. 
Relevant Background 
{¶ 2} In June 2008, a jury found Thomas E. Everette Jr., appellant, guilty 
of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and grand theft of a motor vehicle, all 
with firearm specifications.  The trial court found him guilty of having a weapon 
under disability and sentenced him to life imprisonment with the possibility of 
parole after 28 years. 
{¶ 3} Everette appealed his conviction on July 16, 2008.  That same day, 
Everette’s trial counsel requested preparation of the trial transcript.  On August 1, 
2008, Everette’s appellate counsel filed a praecipe in the appellate court, 
requesting a transcript of a suppression hearing.  On August 26, 2008, six 
videotapes—including videotapes of the trial, the hearing on Everette’s motion to 
suppress, and the sentencing hearing—were filed.  A summary of the docket was 
filed two days later.  That same day, the clerk of courts issued its App.R. 11(B) 
notification that the appellate record was complete and that the transcript of 
proceedings had been filed on August 26, 2008.  Written transcripts of the 
suppression hearing and the trial were filed on October 15, 2008. 
January Term, 2011 
3 
 
{¶ 4} On April 8, 2009, Everette submitted a petition for postconviction 
relief, claiming that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing 
to call a detective as a witness, failing to gather and present telephone records at 
trial, and failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct.  Everette supported his 
petition with his own unsworn statement and indicated that he needed the 
transcripts to further support his claims. 
{¶ 5} On April 20, 2009, the state, appellee, moved to dismiss Everette’s 
petition as untimely because it had been filed more than 180 days after the filing 
of the transcript of proceedings (the videotapes) in violation of R.C. 2953.21 
(“petition of postconviction relief”) and 2953.23 (“time for filing petition; 
appeals”).  Alternatively, the state argued that Everette had not shown that there 
were substantive grounds for relief, and therefore that his petition should be 
summarily denied. 
{¶ 6} Everette opposed the motion, arguing that his 180-day time 
limitation did not begin until October 15, 2008, when the written transcripts were 
filed.  Consequently, he argued, his petition was due on April 13, 2009, not 
February 23, 2009, as the state asserted, and was timely. 
{¶ 7} The trial court dismissed Everette’s petition, holding that it was 
untimely under R.C. 2953.21(A)(2) because Everette had not established that this 
filing met any of the exceptional circumstances listed in R.C. 2953.23(A) that 
excuse untimely filings and because he had “not shown the existence of 
substantive grounds for relief, which would render his petition subject to 
dismissal without a hearing, even if timely.”  Everette appealed to the Second 
District Court of Appeals, which was also hearing his direct appeal. 
{¶ 8} The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of 
Everette’s petition for postconviction relief.  State v. Everette, Montgomery App. 
No. 23585, 2010-Ohio-2832, ¶ 39.  In overruling Everette’s assignments of error, 
the Second District held that the videotaped recordings that were filed on August 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
26, 2008, constituted the transcript of proceedings.  Id. at ¶ 33.  Consequently, the 
180-day time period for filing Everette’s petition for postconviction relief began 
on August 26, 2008, and expired on February 23, 2009.  Id. at ¶ 26. 
{¶ 9} Everette appealed to this court for discretionary review, which this 
court granted, 126 Ohio St.3d 1597, 2010-Ohio-4928, 935 N.E.2d 44, to clarify 
what constitutes a “trial transcript” for purposes of filing a petition for 
postconviction relief pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(A)(2).  We hold that in cases in 
which a videotape recording of the proceedings and a written form of the trial 
court proceedings is certified by a reporter, only the certified, written transcript of 
the trial court proceedings constitutes a “transcript” under App.R. 9 for purposes 
of calculating the 180-day period in which an appellant may timely file a petition 
for postconviction relief in accordance with R.C. 2953.21. 
Analysis 
R.C. 2953.21 and App.R. 9 Provide Little Guidance as to the Definitions of  
“Trial Transcript” or “Transcript of Proceedings” 
{¶ 10} R.C. 2953.21(A)(2) sets forth the time by which a petition for 
postconviction relief must be filed.  That statute provides: 
{¶ 11} “Except as otherwise provided in section 2953.23 of the Revised 
Code, a petition under division (A)(1) of this section shall be filed no later than 
one hundred eighty days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the 
court of appeals in the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction or adjudication 
or, if the direct appeal involves a sentence of death, the date on which the trial 
transcript is filed in the supreme court.” 
{¶ 12} Although R.C. 2953.21 does not define “trial transcript,” App.R. 
9(A), which governs the record on appeal, is instructive: 
{¶ 13} “The original papers and exhibits thereto filed in the trial court, the 
transcript of proceedings, if any, including exhibits, and a certified copy of the 
docket and journal entries prepared by the clerk of the trial court shall constitute 
January Term, 2011 
5 
 
the record on appeal in all cases.  A videotape recording of the proceedings 
constitutes the transcript of proceedings other than hereinafter provided, and, for 
purposes of filing, need not be transcribed into written form.  Proceedings 
recorded by means other than videotape must be transcribed into written form.  
When the written form is certified by the reporter in accordance with App.R. 
9(B), such written form shall then constitute the transcript of proceedings.  When 
the transcript of proceedings is in the videotape medium, counsel shall type or 
print those portions of such transcript necessary for the court to determine the 
questions presented, certify their accuracy, and append such copy of the portions 
of the transcripts to their briefs. 
{¶ 14} “In all capital cases the trial proceedings shall include a written 
transcript of the record made during the trial by stenographic means.” 
{¶ 15} Although App.R. 9(A) is helpful in determining what constitutes a 
“trial transcript” or a “transcript of proceedings,” in and of itself, the rule does not 
provide sufficient clarity to resolve this issue.  Thus, our analysis does not end 
here. 
In the Absence of a Statutory Definition, “Trial Transcript” and “Transcript of 
Proceedings” Should be Given Their Usual, Normal, and Customary Meanings 
{¶ 16} The legislature has not defined “trial transcript.”  See State v. 
Hollingsworth, 118 Ohio St.3d 1204, 2008-Ohio-1967, 886 N.E.2d 863, ¶ 2 
(Moyer, C.J., concurring in decision to dismiss the cause as having been 
improvidently accepted).  However, we are not left without guidance.  The 
General Assembly has directed that words not defined by statute “shall be * * * 
construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.”  R.C. 1.42.  In 
accordance with that statutory mandate, we have held repeatedly that “[i]n the 
absence of a specific statutory definition, words used in a statute must be 
interpreted in their usual, normal, or customary meaning.”  State ex rel. Brenders 
v. Hall (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 632, 634, 646 N.E.2d 822; State ex rel. Cassels v. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 220, 631 N.E.2d 
150. 
{¶ 17} In accordance with the directive of R.C. 1.42, we proceed to define 
“trial transcript” and “transcript of proceedings” by giving them their usual, 
normal, and customary meaning. 
Common Usage of “Trial Transcript” and “Transcript of Proceedings” 
{¶ 18} Black’s Law Dictionary defines “transcript” as “[a] handwritten, 
printed, or typed copy of testimony given orally; esp., the official record of 
proceedings in a trial or hearing, as taken down by a court reporter.”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary (9th Ed.2009) 1636.  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
defines “transcript” as “a written or printed copy”; “a usu. typewritten copy of 
dictated or recorded matter”; “an official or legal and often published copy or 
engrossment of a decree, testimony, or proceedings.”  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary (1986) 2426. 
{¶ 19} Black’s Law Dictionary defines “transcript of proceedings” as “[a] 
compilation of all documents relating to a bond issue, typically including the 
notices, affidavits of notices, a bond resolution (or bond ordinance), official 
statement, trust indenture and loan agreements, and minutes of meetings of all 
authorizing bodies.”  Black’s Law Dictionary at 1636. 
{¶ 20} Based on these definitions of “transcript” and “transcript of 
proceedings,” we hold that a “transcript” or “transcript of proceedings” must be in 
written, typed, or printed form. 
{¶ 21} Our holding is consistent with the usual, normal, and customary 
meanings of the words and also in harmony with the proposed amendments to 
App.R. 9.  According to the Staff Note for the July 1, 2011 amendment to App.R. 
9, “[t]he amendments * * * are designed to strike a balance between the trial 
court’s autonomy in determining how to record proceedings in the trial court and 
the appellate court’s preference for official transcripts in lieu of video recordings 
January Term, 2011 
7 
 
transcribed by counsel or counsel’s assistants.  Under App. R. 9(A), trial courts 
may choose to record proceedings through the use of a stenographic/shorthand 
reporter, an audio-recording device, and/or a video-recording device, except in 
capital cases, in which a stenographic/shorthand reporter is required.  Regardless 
of the method of recording the proceedings, a transcript is required for the record 
on appeal; a videotaped recording of the trial court proceedings is no longer 
adequate.”  (Emphasis added). 
{¶ 22} As referenced in the Staff Note, appellate courts prefer written 
transcripts, because portions of the proceedings are required to be referenced on 
appeal.  While modern technology has advanced how proceedings before a trial 
court may be recorded and documented, the written, typed, or printed version 
remains the ideal way of referencing the record on appeal.  In fact, in many 
courtrooms, proceedings are recorded by audio or video devices rather than by 
stenographic reporters.  Despite these technological advances, a written document 
with page numbers is much easier to reference than a transcript in another 
medium, such as a videotape or audio recording, and avoids subjective 
interpretation of the words uttered by witnesses.  In addition, a written transcript 
provides all parties and the courts with an objective source from which all 
concerned can refer to the same information. 
Parties’ Interpretation of “Trial Transcript” and “Transcript of the 
Proceedings” 
{¶ 23} The state argues that we need look no further than App.R. 9(A) to 
reach a determination: “A videotape recording of the proceedings constitutes the 
transcript of proceedings other than hereinafter provided, and, for purposes of 
filing, need not be transcribed into written form.”  The state contends that because 
videotape proceedings are the transcript of the proceedings, we need not look 
beyond this single sentence to resolve this issue. 
{¶ 24} We are not persuaded. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
{¶ 25} The state’s myopic focus on a single sentence in App.R. 9(A) 
ignores the other language in the rule and is contrary to a tenet of statutory 
interpretation: “A guiding principle of statutory interpretation is that the statute 
must be construed as a whole and each of its parts must be given effect so that 
they are compatible with each other and related enactments.”  Brookwood 
Presbyterian Church v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., 127 Ohio St.3d 469, 2010-Ohio-5710, 
940 N.E.2d 1256, ¶ 26, citing  Humphrys v. Winous Co. (1956), 165 Ohio St. 45, 
49, 59 O.O. 65, 133 N.E.2d 780 (Brown, C.J., dissenting). 
{¶ 26} Everette correctly argues that App.R. 9(A), looked at as a whole, 
identifies a certified, written transcript as the transcript of proceedings when one 
is filed.  The second sentence of App.R. 9(A) provides that a “videotape recording 
of the proceedings constitutes the transcript of proceedings other than hereinafter 
provided, and, for purposes of filing, need not be transcribed into written form.”  
(Emphasis added.)  The phrase “other than hereinafter provided” is instructive 
generally because it signals that there is an exception that follows later in the rule. 
{¶ 27} Significantly, the rule later states: “When the written form is 
certified by the reporter in accordance with App.R. 9(B), such written form shall 
then constitute the transcript of proceedings.”  (Emphasis added.)  Thus, although 
it is true that a videotape recording of the proceedings constitutes the transcript of 
the proceedings when a written transcript is not provided, pursuant to this 
exception, when a written transcript is certified by the reporter, it constitutes the 
“transcript of proceedings” under App.R. 9(A).  We thus hold that whenever a 
written transcript is certified by the reporter in accordance with App.R. 9(A), the 
written transcript shall constitute the trial “transcript” or “transcript of 
proceedings” for purposes of calculating the time by which to file a petition for 
postconviction relief.  A videotape recording constitutes the trial transcript or 
transcript of proceedings only when there is no written transcript certified by the 
reporter. 
January Term, 2011 
9 
 
{¶ 28} To hold otherwise would render the exception in the rule 
meaningless.  Under the state’s view, whenever a videotape recording of the 
proceedings is filed, the clock for purposes of appeal would begin to run.  That 
would mean that the 180-day time limit does not accrue until the videotape 
recording is filed even if a certified, written transcript is filed first.  That result is 
not only contrary to the language of App.R. 9(A), but defies logic. 
Application to this Case 
{¶ 29} Here, the videotapes were filed first on August 26, 2008.  The 
certified, written transcripts were filed on October 15, 2008.  Under our holding, 
the clock for calculating the timeliness of Everette’s petition did not begin to run 
until October 15, when the certified, written transcripts were filed.  Thus, Everette 
had 180 days from October 15, 2008, to file his petition for postconviction relief 
pursuant to R.C. 2953.21.  Because Everette filed it within this 180-day time 
period, his petition for postconviction relief was timely. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 30} In cases in which a videotape recording of the proceedings and a 
written form of the proceedings is certified by a reporter, only the certified, 
written transcript of the trial court proceedings constitutes a trial transcript or 
transcript of proceedings under App.R. 9 so as to start the clock for the 180-day 
period to file a petition for postconviction relief in accordance with R.C. 2953.21.  
Therefore, the 180-day period to file a petition for postconviction relief does not 
begin to run until the certified, written transcript of the proceedings is filed.  
Because the trial court and court of appeals erred in holding that the petition for 
postconviction relief was untimely, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and remand to the court of appeals for consideration of appellant’s second 
assignment or error. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 31} I respectfully dissent. 
{¶ 32} The statute that relates to timely filing states, “Except as otherwise 
provided in section 2953.23 of the Revised Code, a petition under division (A)(1) 
of this section shall be filed no later than one hundred eighty days after the date 
on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal of 
the judgment of conviction or adjudication or, if the direct appeal involves a 
sentence of death, the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the supreme 
court.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2953.21(A)(2).  In either situation, it is the trial 
transcript’s filing in the appellate court that begins the running of the 180-day 
time frame. 
{¶ 33} Although the Supreme Court Rules of Practice do not discuss the 
meaning of a trial transcript, App.R. 9(A) does: 
{¶ 34} “The original papers and exhibits thereto filed in the trial court, the 
transcript of proceedings, if any, including exhibits, and a certified copy of the 
docket and journal entries prepared by the clerk of the trial court shall constitute 
the record on appeal in all cases.  A videotape recording of the proceedings 
constitutes the transcript of proceedings other than hereinafter provided, and, for 
purposes of filing, need not be transcribed into written form.  Proceedings 
recorded by means other than videotape must be transcribed into written form.  
When the written form is certified by the reporter in accordance with App.R. 
9(B), such written form shall then constitute the transcript of proceedings.  When 
the transcript of proceedings is in the videotape medium, counsel shall type or 
print those portions of such transcript necessary for the court to determine the 
January Term, 2011 
11 
 
questions presented, certify their accuracy, and append such copy of the portions 
of the transcripts to their briefs. 
{¶ 35} “In all capital cases the trial proceedings shall include a written 
transcript of the record made during the trial by stenographic means.” (Emphasis 
added.) 
{¶ 36} Thus, the “transcript of proceedings if any” constitutes part of the 
record on appeal. A videotape recording of the proceedings is the transcript and, 
unlike proceedings recorded by other means, need not be transcribed into written 
form for filing. Capital cases must have a written transcript of the record made by 
stenographic means. The language of App.R. 9(A) specifies that videotaped 
proceedings are different and need not be transcribed for purposes of filing. 
{¶ 37} Although the majority wishes to adopt language of the proposed 
rule that would make videotape recordings no longer adequate as transcripts for 
purposes of appeal, those rule amendments have not yet been adopted.  When 
App.R. 9 is looked at in its entirety, in its current form, the state’s position is 
correct.  On August 26, 2008, six videotapes—including videotapes of the trial, 
the hearing on Everette’s motion to suppress, and the sentencing hearing—were 
filed. Consequently, the 180 days to file his petition for postconviction relief 
began that day and expired on February 23, 2009.  I would affirm the judgment of 
the court of appeals in dismissing this appeal as untimely. 
 
O’DONNELL and CUPP, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Andrew T. French, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Jeremy J. Masters, Assistant 
Public Defender, for appellant. 
______________________