Case Title: State v. Tyren E. Black

Citation: 2001 WI 31

Docket Number: 1999AP000230-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 31 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-0230-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Tyren E. Black,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  237 Wis. 2d 694, 616 N.W.2d 922 
 
 
(Ct. App. 2000-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
April 5, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
January 5, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Kremers 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
Dissented: 
BABLITCH, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Chris R. Larsen, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by 
Michael S. Holzman and Rosen and Holzman Ltd., Waukesha, and oral 
argument by Michael S. Holzman. 
 
2001 WI 31 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-0230-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Tyren E. Black,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.  
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This case presents two questions. 
 First, we must decide whether the circuit court conducted an 
appropriate "inquiry" under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b)(1997-98)1 
before accepting Tyren E. Black's (Black) no contest plea to a 
charge of felon in possession of a firearm.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.29(2).  We conclude that the circuit court did so.  
Second, 
we 
must 
determine 
whether 
the 
statement 
in 
the 
complaint——accepted by Black at the plea hearing——that he 
"stated that he handled the pistol" meets the elements of the 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes will 
be to the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated.  
FILED 
 
APR 5, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-0230-CR 
 
 
2 
crime of felon in possession of a firearm.  We conclude that it 
does. 
¶2 
The State charged Black with a two-count criminal 
complaint.  Count one alleged that on December 31, 1997, Black 
knowingly possessed marijuana2 and count two alleged that on 
December 29, 1997, Black, a felon, possessed a firearm in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 939.62.  The Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County, Jeffrey A. Kremers, Judge, accepted Black's no 
contest pleas to both charges and Black was sentenced.  Black 
then moved to withdraw his no contest plea to the second count, 
which the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Timothy G. Dugan, 
Judge, denied.  In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals 
reversed the circuit court's order.   State v. Black, No. 99-
0239-CR, unpublished slip op. at ¶12 (Wis. Ct. App. May 30, 
2000). 
I 
¶3 
The facts are largely undisputed for the purposes of 
this review.  On December 31, 1997, several Milwaukee police 
officers went to 1928 North 34th Street to investigate a 
narcotics complaint.  The officers were admitted to Felicia 
Ferguson's (Ferguson) upper residence and given permission to 
search.  During the search, the officers found six bags of 
marijuana together with a black semi-automatic Ruger pistol 
                     
2 Black does not challenge his no contest plea to the first 
count, marijuana possession with intent to deliver.  
No. 
99-0230-CR 
 
 
3 
between Ferguson's mattress and box spring in her bedroom.  
Black lived in the lower unit and was Ferguson's boyfriend.  
¶4 
Black informed the police that he owned the marijuana. 
 He also stated that he "handled the pistol on Monday [two days 
earlier] in Felicia's bedroom," but that he did not know to whom 
the gun belonged.  On January 2, 1998, the State charged Black 
with possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance 
and possession of a firearm by a felon.  The complaint also 
charged Black with habitual criminality in violation of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.62. 
 
Black 
subsequently 
entered 
into 
plea 
negotiations with the State, wherein the State agreed to dismiss 
the habitual criminality penalty enhancer as to the second count 
in exchange for no contest pleas to both counts.  Black signed 
and filed a completed plea questionnaire listing "felon in 
possession of firearm" as one of the two offenses to which he 
was entering a no contest plea.  In this signed questionnaire, 
Black acknowledged that:  (1) he read the complaint and 
understood "the elements of the offense and their relationship 
to the facts in this case and how the evidence establishes [his] 
guilt;" (2) by pleading guilty he was giving up any possible 
defenses and the right to challenge the sufficiency of the 
complaint; (3) he was giving up his "right to make the State 
prove [him] guilty by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to each 
element of the crime charged"; and (4) if the court allowed a 
plea of no contest, he would be giving up all of the same 
rights, defenses, and motions that he would give up with a plea 
of guilty.  
No. 
99-0230-CR 
 
 
4 
¶5 
On January 26, 1998, prior to Black's plea hearing, 
the circuit court received a letter from Ferguson.  In that 
letter, Ferguson stated that she purchased the semi-automatic 
pistol from someone in her neighborhood on December 29, 1997, 
and further wrote that Black "only touched [the pistol] once 
looking at it after I purchased it.  And at that moment he said 
to me that I didn't need it." 
¶6 
The circuit court held Black's plea hearing on 
February 16, 1998.  There, the court engaged Black in a colloquy 
and found that Black was entering his no contest pleas 
voluntarily and with full knowledge of the nature of the charges 
and the possible penalties.  After so finding, the court asked 
the parties the following: 
THE COURT:  May I use the complaint as a factual basis? 
MS. CORNWALL  [Black's attorney]:  Yes. 
MS. LOEBEL  [Prosecutor]:  Yes. 
THE COURT:  Mr. Black, have you read the complaint? 
MR. BLACK:  Yes. 
THE COURT:  You understand that I'm going to use the facts 
in the complaint as a basis for your plea and sentencing? 
MR. BLACK:  Yes. 
The court then found that a factual basis existed for Black's 
pleas and accepted them.  Black was sentenced to six years on 
the narcotics charge and two years on the felon in possession of 
a firearm charge.  Black subsequently filed a postconviction 
motion seeking to withdraw his no contest plea to the firearm 
charge.  The circuit court rejected Black's motion, finding that 
No. 
99-0230-CR 
 
 
5 
Black agreed and understood that the court could use the 
complaint to establish a factual basis for his plea.  The court 
further asserted that Black's admission that he had "handled" 
the pistol provided an adequate factual basis for the plea.  
¶7 
The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
order, indicating that Ferguson's letter, which stated that 
Black "only touched [the pistol] once" conflicted with the 
complaint, which stated that Black "handled the pistol."  This, 
the court concluded, threw into question whether Black's conduct 
met the elements of the crime of felon in possession of a 
firearm.  See Black, unpublished slip op. at ¶8.  The court of 
appeals then stated that it "cannot conclude, as a matter of 
law, that 'handling' the gun for a brief instance, coupled with 
the instruction to the owner to get rid of it, constitutes 
possession."  Id. at ¶11. 
¶8 
This court then granted the State's petition for 
review. 
II 
¶9 
We review the circuit court's denial of Black's motion 
to withdraw his no contest plea as to the felon in possession 
charge under an erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  
State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶13, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d 
836.  "'[T]his court will find an [erroneous exercise] of 
discretion if the record shows that the trial court failed to 
exercise its discretion, the facts fail to support the trial 
court's decision, or this court finds that the trial court 
applied the wrong legal standard.'"  J.L. Phillips & Assoc. v. 
No. 
99-0230-CR 
 
 
6 
E&H Plastic Corp., 217 Wis. 2d 348, 364-65, 577 N.W.2d 13 (1998) 
(quoting Oostburg State Bank v. United Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 130 
Wis. 2d 4, 11-12, 386 N.W.2d 53 (1986)).  To allow Black to 
withdraw his plea, the circuit court would had to have found 
that he established by clear and convincing evidence that 
failure to allow a withdrawal would result in a manifest 
injustice.  Thomas, 2000 WI 13 at ¶17.  This high standard flows 
from the State's interest in the finality of convictions.  Id. 
at ¶16.  The two questions in this case both involve statutory 
interpretation.  Accordingly, we begin by analyzing the first 
statute at issue, Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b), which requires the 
circuit court to "[m]ake such inquiry as satisfies it that the 
defendant in fact committed the crime charged." 
A 
¶10 Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we 
review de novo.  County of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 
301, 
603 
N.W.2d 541 (1999).  The 
purpose 
of 
statutory 
interpretation is to discern and give effect to the intent of 
the legislature.  Id.  We do so by first looking to the plain 
language of the statute.  Id.  When the statutory language 
clearly and unambiguously sets forth the legislative intent, we 
may not look beyond the language to determine its meaning.  Id. 
at 301-02.  On the other hand, if the statutory language is 
ambiguous or unclear, we may examine the statute's history, 
scope, context, subject matter, and objective in our efforts to 
ascertain the legislative intent.  Id. at 302. 
No. 
99-0230-CR 
 
 
7 
¶11 As noted, Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b) requires a circuit 
court to "[m]ake such inquiry as satisfies it that the defendant 
in fact committed the crime charged."  We have previously 
observed that § 971.08(1)(b) is a codification of Rule 11(f) of 
the 
Federal 
Rules 
of 
Criminal 
Procedure, 
which 
asserts:  
"'[n]otwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the 
court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making 
such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis 
for the plea.'"  Thomas, 2000 WI 13 at ¶19 (citation omitted).  
Although both statutes utilize the word "inquiry," neither 
defines it.  In the "absence of statutory definitions, this 
court construes all words according to their common and approved 
usage, which may be established by dictionary definitions."  
Lake City Corp. v. City of Mequon, 207 Wis. 2d 155, 162, 558 
N.W.2d 100 (1997).  The definition of "inquiry" is "a seeking or 
request for truth, information, or knowledge."  Random House 
Unabridged Dictionary 985 (2d ed. 1993).  Interpreting these 
parallel statutes, we have noted that if a circuit court "fails 
to 
establish 
a 
factual 
basis 
that 
the 
defendant 
admits 
constitutes the offense pleaded to, manifest injustice has 
occurred."  Thomas, 2000 WI 13 at ¶17.  In conducting this 
inquiry into whether there is a factual basis for the offense, 
"the trial court may consider hearsay evidence, such as 
testimony of police officers, the preliminary examination record 
and other records in the case."  Morones v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 
544, 552-53, 213 N.W.2d 31 (1973).  However, "[n]owhere in our 
case law interpreting Rule 11(f) do we require a judge to make a 
No. 
99-0230-CR 
 
 
8 
factual basis determination in one particular manner."  Thomas, 
2000 WI 13 at ¶21.   
¶12 Similarly, we find no authority for the proposition 
that Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b) requires a judge to make a 
factual 
basis 
determination 
in 
one 
particular 
manner 
or 
prohibits a judge from utilizing the complaint for that purpose. 
 Instead, we note that the plain language of the statute merely 
requires the circuit judge to make such inquiry as satisfies 
"it"——meaning the circuit court——"that the defendant in fact 
committed the crime charged."  Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b); see 
also Thomas, 2000 WI 13 at ¶22 (observing that "[t]he phrase, 
'such inquiry,' indicates that a judge may establish the factual 
basis as he or she sees fit, as long as the judge guarantees 
that the defendant is aware of the elements of the crime, and 
the 
defendant's 
conduct 
meets 
those 
elements"). 
 
Under 
§ 971.08(1)(b), the circuit court is not required to satisfy the 
defendant that he or she committed the crime charged.  Indeed, 
the defendant evidenced his or her own satisfaction by entering 
a plea and thereby waiving his or her right to a jury trial. 
¶13 In the present case, the circuit court's questioning 
of Black and his counsel on whether it could use the facts set 
forth in the complaint as a factual basis for the plea——after 
Black responded affirmatively that he read the complaint——
amounted to seeking or requesting the truth, information, or 
knowledge, about whether or not he committed the offenses in 
question.  His counsel  likewise responded that the circuit court 
could use the criminal complaint as a factual basis for the 
No. 
99-0230-CR 
 
 
9 
pleas.  As we have previously ruled, "a factual basis is 
established when counsel stipulate on the record to facts in the 
criminal complaint."  Id. at ¶21. 
¶14 In essence, Black urges us to overturn this rule and 
find that a circuit court cannot find a factual basis for a plea 
in the complaint alone.  We find no law in support of Black's 
position.  To be sure, a circuit court may look beyond the 
complaint to the record in a Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b) factual 
basis inquiry, but Black does not cite any authority that 
requires a circuit court to do so.  We decline to hamstring 
circuit courts by overturning our precedent and ruling that they 
may not find a factual basis for a plea in the complaint.  
Moreover, we decline to rewrite § 971.08(1)(b) as requiring the 
circuit judge to conduct a mini-trial at every plea hearing to 
establish that the defendant committed the crime charged beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  If the facts as set forth in the complaint 
meet the elements of the crime charged, they may form the 
factual basis for a plea.   
¶15 Black counters that the proposal he urges would not 
have burdened the circuit court in the present case.  The 
circuit court, Black argues, would have merely had to ask him "a 
few brief questions," which would have resolved the matter of 
whether he possessed the pistol.  Black's argument, however, 
collapses under scrutiny.  First, it misapprehends the nature of 
a no contest plea.  A no contest plea: 
 
differs from a plea of guilty in its collateral 
effects.  Because a plea of guilty is an unqualified 
No. 
99-0230-CR 
 
 
10
express admission by the defendant it may be used 
against him in a collateral or subsequent civil 
action; but a plea of nolo contendere [no contest] is 
not such an admission against interest and may not be 
used in a subsequent or collateral civil action for 
that purpose. 
Lee v. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 29 Wis. 2d 330, 334, 139 
N.W.2d 61 (1966).  A criminal defendant, by pleading no contest, 
declines to exercise his or her right to put the State to their 
burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but does 
not admit unqualified guilt.  Perhaps the defendant is concerned 
about possible collateral effects; perhaps the defendant does 
not want to make an admission of guilt.  Regardless, when a 
defendant enters a no contest plea, he or she is not required to 
admit his or her guilt to every charge, which is precisely the 
advantage of entering a no contest plea instead of a guilty 
plea.  Accordingly, the circuit court need not ask the defendant 
to admit his or her guilt to every charge.3  Even so, a no 
contest plea is "an implied confession of guilt for the purposes 
of the case to support a judgment of conviction and in that 
respect is equivalent to a plea of guilty."  Id.  Therefore, 
                     
3 The dissent accurately notes that "[t]he fact that Black 
entered a no contest plea rather than a plea of guilty has no 
bearing on the court's responsibilities under § 971.08(1)."  
Dissent at ¶38.  Clearly, in both situations, the circuit court 
must satisfy itself that a factual basis exists for the plea, as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1).  However, asking the 
defendant to admit his guilt to every charge is only one way——
and possibly not an exhaustive way——for the circuit court to 
satisfy itself "that the defendant in fact committed the crime 
charged."  Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1).  In contrast, where the 
defendant has pled no contest, the circuit court would not ask 
the defendant to admit his or her guilt to every charge. 
No. 
99-0230-CR 
 
 
11
Black's no contest plea——coupled with the questionnaire and the 
colloquy——was sufficient to support his conviction of the second 
charge, as long as the facts set forth in the complaint met the 
elements of the offense. 
¶16 Moreover, there is no factual matter that needed to be 
resolved here.  As further delineated below, even though the 
complaint utilizes the verb "handled"  rather than the verb 
 "touched," both could indicate that Black possessed the pistol, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2)(a).  Nonetheless, a factual 
basis for a plea exists if an inculpatory inference can be drawn 
from the complaint or facts admitted to by the defendant even 
though it may conflict with an exculpatory inference elsewhere 
in the record and the defendant later maintains that the 
exculpatory inference is the correct one.  See, e.g., State v. 
Spears, 147 Wis. 2d 429, 435, 433 N.W.2d 595 (Ct. App. 1988); In 
re Guilty Plea Cases, 235 N.W.2d 132, 145 (Mich. 1975).  This is 
the essence of what a defendant waives when he or she enters a 
guilty or no contest plea.  Therefore, the circuit judge 
properly utilized the complaint as a factual basis for the plea, 
thereby making "such inquiry as satisfies [the court] that the 
defendant in fact committed the crime charged."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(b). 
B 
¶17 Black, however, argues that his conduct did not meet 
the elements of the crime charged, felon in possession of a 
firearm.  Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2)(a).  He, as does the court of 
appeals, relies on the language in Ferguson's letter that he 
No. 
99-0230-CR 
 
 
12
"only 
touched 
[the 
pistol] 
once 
looking 
at 
it 
after . . . [Ferguson] purchased it.  And at that moment he said 
to . . . [Ferguson] that . . . [she] didn't need it."4  According 
to Black, this language casts doubt upon whether he possessed 
the firearm as required by § 941.29(2)(a) and, therefore, he 
should be allowed to withdraw his no contest plea. 
¶18 Section 941.29(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes states 
that someone who has been previously convicted of a felony "is 
guilty of a Class E felony if he or she possesses a 
firearm . . . subsequent to the conviction for the felony."  
This crime has two elements:  (1) the defendant has been 
convicted of a felony; and (2) the defendant possessed the 
firearm.  It is undisputed that Black previously has been 
convicted of a felony; thus, the only question for the circuit 
court was whether he possessed the firearm. 
                     
4 We note that the court of appeals' majority opinion 
confused 
Ferguson's 
letter 
with 
the 
presentence 
report.  
According to the court of appeals, the letter states "that Black 
only touched it once to look at it, and told [Ferguson] to get 
rid of it."  State v. Black, No. 99-0230-CR, unpublished slip 
op. at ¶8 (Wis. Ct. App. May 30, 2000).  As the State observed 
in its brief, the phrase that Black "told her to get rid of it" 
was not in Ferguson's letter, but rather in the presentence 
report, which contained Black's version of the facts.  Rather 
than supporting Black's argument, Black's order to Ferguson——
that he "told her to get rid of [the pistol]"——would actually 
bolster the State's position for he was exercising control over 
the firearm.  See id. at ¶29 (Schudson, J., dissenting). 
No. 
99-0230-CR 
 
 
13
¶19 At the outset, we note the absence of any mens rea5 
requirement in this statute.  That is, the statute makes no 
reference to intent and therefore creates a strict liability 
offense.  State v. Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d 654, 664, 594 N.W.2d 780 
(1999); State v. Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d 199, 207, 556 N.W.2d 701 
(1996).  As a result, the State is only required to show that 
the felon "possessed" the firearm with knowledge that it is a 
firearm.  In this context, "possess," according to the legal 
definition, simply "means that the defendant knowingly had 
actual physical control of a firearm."  Wis JI——Criminal 1343 
(1997); see State v. Loukota, 180 Wis. 2d 191, 201, 508 N.W.2d 
896, (Ct. App. 1993) (determining that this definition of 
possession 
was 
appropriately 
given 
and 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.29(2) does not require ownership, just mere possession).  
Furthermore, there are no temporal limitations in this statute. 
 It does not specify what length of time a felon must possess 
the firearm in order to violate the statute.  While to some it 
may seem unduly harsh that a felon who handles a firearm for a 
brief period violates this statute, such a result comports with 
the theory of strict liability.  As we have explained: 
 
The 
basic 
concept 
of 
strict 
liability 
is 
that 
culpability is not an element of the offense and that 
the state is relieved of the burdensome task of 
proving the offender's culpable state of mind. . . . 
 
                     
5 Mens rea is "[t]he state of mind that the prosecution, to 
secure a conviction, must prove that a defendant had when 
committing a crime; criminal intent or recklessness."  Black's 
Law Dictionary 999 (7th ed. 1999). 
No. 
99-0230-CR 
 
 
14
 . . . . 
 
 . . . One of the objectives of the legislature 
in adopting the concept of strict liability in 
statutes designed to control conduct of many people, 
such as operating motor vehicles is to assure the 
quick and efficient prosecution of large numbers of 
violators. 
State v. Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 44, 53-54, 318 N.W.2d 370 (1982).  
The statute at issue here, felon in possession of a firearm, 
applies to all felons and is designed by the legislature to 
control their conduct:  it aims to prevent felons from 
possessing firearms.  Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2).  This is so 
"because the legislature has determined that felons are more 
likely to misuse firearms."  Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d at 210.  We 
have further recognized that this statute is "aimed not at 
punishment but at protecting public safety through firearm 
regulation."  State v. Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d 695, 706-07, 524 
N.W.2d 641 (1994).  With this goal in mind, the legislature 
struck a balance between the possibility of a harsh result to an 
individual felon and the greater good of protecting the public 
from felons with firearms.  We decline to upset this balance by 
rewriting the statute with an intent requirement.  In the 
present case, the complaint stated that Black "handled the 
pistol," which is sufficient to show possession because such an 
action amounts to exercising actual physical control over the 
firearm, even though it may have been only for a brief period of 
time. 
¶20 Black, however, urges us to rewrite the statute by 
arguing that intent is inherent in the concept of possession.  
No. 
99-0230-CR 
 
 
15
In the present case, Black asserts, he only innocently touched 
the pistol.  For support, he turns to the Wisconsin jury 
instructions, which state that "'[p]ossession' means that the 
defendant knowingly had actual physical control of the item."  
Wis JI——Criminal 920 (1997).  From this and the accompanying 
footnotes, Black blurs and mixes the language to argue that in 
order "to possess a firearm under Wis. Stat. § 941.29(b) the 
possessor must have some right or dominion of control over the 
object or an intent to exercise this control over the weapon."  
We reject Black's attempt to insert an intent requirement into 
§ 941.29(b).  The word "knowingly" in the instruction does not 
refer to a degree of culpability; rather it refers to conscious 
possession.  See Wis JI——Criminal 920 n.1; Doscher v. State, 194 
Wis. 67, 69, 214 N.W.2d 359 (1927).  With other common 
possession offenses, such as a narcotics possession offense, the 
defendant may claim that he or she was unaware that a bag of 
white powder that he or she handled contained cocaine rather 
than baking soda.  See United States v. Kottmyer, 961 F.2d 569, 
574 (6th Cir. 1992) (observing that defendant would not have 
been convicted of possession of cocaine because he would have 
possessed pure baking soda).  Here, however, Black does not 
claim that what he handled was not a firearm or that he was 
unaware that it was a firearm.  Rather, the implicit thrust of 
his argument——and Ferguson's letter——is that Black did not touch 
the pistol with malicious intent.  Instead, Black may have only 
No. 
99-0230-CR 
 
 
16
handled the pistol for a brief period and then he may have 
informed Ferguson that she did not need it.6  Felon in possession 
of a firearm, however, precludes him from handling a firearm 
because of his status as a felon.  Under this test, his 
intention in handling the firearm is irrelevant in determining 
whether he violated the statute. 
¶21 That is not to say that in every circumstance where a 
felon handles a firearm he or she will have violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.29(b).  A felon who violates § 941.29(b) may be able to 
assert one of the six privileges enumerated in Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.45 by way of a defense.7  Indeed, Black attempts to raise 
                     
6 We construe the facts favorably to Black only to clarify 
what constitutes possession under the statute, not as a mode of 
analysis that courts should employ where a defendant seeks to 
withdraw his or her plea post-sentencing. 
7 The six privileges under Wis. Stat. § 939.45 in part are: 
(1) When the actor's conduct occurs under circumstances of 
coercion or necessity so as to be privileged under 
§ 939.46 or 939.47; or 
(2) When the actor's conduct is in defense of persons or 
property under any of the circumstances described in 
§ 939.48 or 939.49; or 
(3) When the actor's conduct is in good faith and is an 
apparently authorized and reasonable fulfillment of 
any duties of a public office; or 
(4) When 
the 
actor's 
conduct 
is 
a 
reasonable 
accomplishment of a lawful arrest; or 
(5) . . .  
No. 
99-0230-CR 
 
 
17
§ 939.45(6), which allows a defendant who committed a criminal 
act to claim a defense when his or her "conduct is privileged by 
the statutory or common law of this state."  However, there is 
no statute or case that Black can cite as privileging his 
handling of the pistol contrary to the strict liability offense 
                                                                  
(b) When the actor's conduct is reasonable discipline 
of a child by a person responsible for the child's 
welfare.  Reasonable discipline may involve only such 
force as a reasonable person believes is necessary.  
It is never reasonable discipline to use force which 
is intended to cause great bodily harm or death or 
creates an unreasonable risk of great bodily harm or 
death. 
(6) When for any other reason the actor's conduct is 
privileged by the statutory or common law of this state. 
No. 
99-0230-CR 
 
 
18
created by § 941.29(b).8  As a result, he does not have a 
privilege under § 939.45(6).9 
III 
¶22 In conclusion, because the circuit court could utilize 
the complaint as a factual basis for Black's plea and the facts 
set forth therein that Black "stated that he handled the pistol" 
meet the elements of the offense, we hold that there was no 
erroneous exercise of discretion by the circuit court in denying 
Black's motion to withdraw his plea as to the second count.  We 
therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
                     
8 The dissent correctly notes that the court must satisfy 
itself that the facts that form the basis of the defendant's no 
contest or guilty plea constitute the offense charged or do not 
amount to a defense.  Dissent at ¶30; see Morones v. State, 61 
Wis. 2d 544, 552, 213 N.W.2d 31 (1973).  Therefore, it is not 
the defendant's burden in establishing a privilege on the facts 
that form the basis of the plea at the plea hearing.  But Black 
now seeks to withdraw his plea; accordingly, he bears the burden 
to establish by clear and convincing evidence that failure to 
allow a withdrawal of his plea would result in a manifest 
injustice.  State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶17, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 
605 N.W.2d 836.  Furthermore, there is no authority supporting 
the proposition that handling a firearm amounts to a defense to 
the crime of felon in possession of a firearm. 
9 The dissent further asserts that "[i]t is not difficult to 
imagine a myriad of circumstances that would constitute a 
defense." Dissent at ¶28.  While that certainly is true, none of 
the circumstances that may constitute defense are present in the 
complaint, to which Black pled no contest.  Moreover, none of 
the circumstances that would constitute a defense are in the 
record.  Therefore, although "[t]he court must make an inquiry 
as to whether the defendant's conduct does not amount to a 
defense," the facts, as admitted by the defendant, still must 
give rise to a defense. Dissent at ¶30.  There are no such facts 
admitted by Black here. 
No. 
99-0230-CR 
 
 
19
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No. 99-0230-CR.awb 
 
1 
¶23 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (concurring). I agree with the 
majority that the circuit court conducted an appropriate inquiry 
under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b) in accepting Black's plea.  I 
also agree that Black's statement in the complaint satisfies the 
elements of the crime of felon in possession of a firearm.  
Accordingly, I join in the majority opinion.  I write separately 
because I feel the majority's characterization of the crime of 
felon in possession as a strict liability crime overshadows the 
fact that the crime does indeed require proof of a mental state.  
¶24 Felon in possession of a firearm requires proof of 
possession.  Possession under Wisconsin law requires that the 
"defendant knowingly had the item under his actual physical 
control."  Wis JI——Criminal 920; see also Doscher v. State, 194 
Wis. 67, 69, 214 N.W. 359 (1927).  As the majority notes, the 
"knowingly" requirement means conscious possession.  Majority 
op. at ¶20.   
¶25 What the majority does not clearly explain is that 
knowledge is a mental state required to establish the offense.  
See Wis. Stat. § 939.23(2).  As a crime having a requisite 
mental state, the crime is not a true strict liability offense. 
 See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607-08 n.3 (1994) 
(explaining that "strict liability" is a misnomer where crime 
actually requires proof of knowledge).  While this court has 
used the "strict liability offense" in describing the crime of 
felon in possession of a firearm in the past, these statements 
highlighted the lack of a specific intent or the requirement of 
"culpability or bad purpose" and not the lack of a mental state 
No. 99-0230-CR.awb 
 
2 
in its entirety.  See State v. Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d 654, 664, 594 
N.W.2d 780 (1999).   
 
 
No. 99-0230-CR.wab 
 
1 
 
¶26 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. (dissenting).  I respectfully 
dissent for two reasons.  First, the majority fails to 
recognize, nor follow, well settled law that at a plea inquiry 
the court must determine whether the defendant's conduct does 
not amount to a defense.  Second, in relying solely on one 
sentence in the complaint that the defendant admitted that he 
"handled" the gun, the circuit court failed to determine whether 
the facts constitute the offense of felon in possession of a 
firearm. 
I 
¶27 It is well settled law in this state that the judge, 
at a plea inquiry, must determine whether the facts, if proved, 
"constitute the offense charged and whether the defendant's 
conduct does not amount to a defense."  Edwards v. State, 51 
Wis. 2d 231, 236, 186 N.W.2d 193 (1971) (emphasis added), cited 
with approval in Morones v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 544, 552, 213 
N.W.2d 31 (1973) ("What is required is a sufficient postplea 
inquiry to determine to the court's satisfaction that the facts, 
if proved, 'constitute the offense charged and whether the 
defendant's conduct does not amount to a defense.'"); see also 
Broadie v. State, 68 Wis. 2d 420, 423, 228 N.W.2d 687 (1975).  
The majority does not cite any of the above cases, much less 
overrule them.   
¶28 As pointed out in the majority opinion, there are six 
privileges that, if present, constitute a defense to this 
charge, including coercion, necessity, and defense of persons or 
No. 99-0230-CR.wab 
 
2 
property.  See majority op. at ¶21 (citing Wis. Stat. § 939.45). 
 It is not difficult to imagine a myriad of circumstances that 
would constitute a defense. 
¶29 The circuit court made no inquiry whatsoever.  The 
circuit court, and the majority, rely solely on the following 
sentence in the complaint:  "Defendant further stated that he 
had handled the pistol on Monday in Felicia's bedroom, but he 
doesn't know to who [sic] the gun belonged to."  A simple 
question - "Why did you handle it?" - would have resolved the 
problem of any defenses.  It was not asked. 
¶30 The majority opinion, in its attempt to deal with 
possible defenses, acknowledges that a felon may assert one of 
six privileges to the charge of possession.  Majority op. at 
¶21.  However, then the majority states that there is not a 
statute or a case that Black can cite as privilege, concluding 
that "As a result, he does not have a privilege."  Respectfully, 
this statement appears to be a non sequitur.  I do not 
understand the point the majority is trying to make, but if the 
point is that the defendant bears the burden of establishing a 
privilege, the majority is incorrect.  See Broadie, 68 Wis. 2d 
at 423; Morones, 61 Wis. 2d at 552; Edwards, 51 Wis. 2d at 236. 
 The court must make an inquiry as to whether the defendant's 
conduct does not amount to a defense.  
II 
¶31 The gist of the majority opinion is that "handling" 
amounts to "possession" of a firearm.  I disagree. 
No. 99-0230-CR.wab 
 
3 
¶32 In State v. Bodoh, 226 Wis. 2d 718, 736, 595 N.W.2d 
330 (1999), we unanimously upheld a conviction for the negligent 
handling of a dangerous weapon under Wis. Stat. § 940.24.  In 
defining "handling," we noted that this word may encompass 
different meanings, including "'to operate with the hands; 
manipulate'" or "'[t]o deal with or have responsibility for; 
conduct.'"  Id. at 731 (citation omitted).  In comparison, we 
have held that "possession" requires "some right of dominion or 
control over the thing possessed."  Schwartz v. State, 192 Wis. 
414, 417, 212 N.W. 664 (1927).  Thus, it was error for the court 
to rely on the mere allegation of "handling" in the complaint in 
establishing a factual basis because, by itself, this word may 
encompass conduct that does not rise to the level of dominion or 
control over the thing possessed.  
¶33 Further, 
possession 
requires 
that 
the 
defendant 
knowingly have actual physical control of the item.  Wis 
JICriminal 1343 (2000).  Standing alone, the word "handling" 
does not provide any indication as to whether Black "knowingly" 
possessed the firearm.  Such possession connotes a defendant's 
"conscious" possession.  See Doscher v. State, 194 Wis. 67, 69, 
214 N.W. 359 (1927).  In other words, as to the nature of one's 
conduct, "knowingly" requires that, a person is aware that his 
or her conduct is of that nature.  1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. 
Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 3.5(b) (1986).  Again, 
there is nothing inherent in the word "handling" to show that 
Black was aware that his conduct constituted actual possession 
of the firearm.  The facts could have displayed a momentary 
No. 99-0230-CR.wab 
 
4 
"handling," which may have been too slight or negligible to show 
conscious possession.  
¶34 An inquiry into the facts could have also possibly 
revealed Black's lack of knowledge as to the thing possessed.  
For example, the firearm could have been contained in a package, 
and Black's "handling" could have constituted his unsolicited 
and temporary receipt of the package from Ferguson without his 
knowledge of the contents.  Such facts would not amount to 
conscious possession.  Cf. Kabat v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 224, 229, 
251 N.W.2d 38 (1977) (burnt traces of marijuana in a pipe were 
not sufficient to impute knowledge that the substance contained 
ingredients of marijuana to sustain a conviction of possession 
of a controlled substance). 
¶35 The allegations in the complaint also do not present 
circumstances that are sufficient to support an inference that 
Black exercised control over or intended to possess the firearm, 
i.e., to show constructive possession.  See State v. Allbaugh, 
148 Wis. 2d 807, 812, 436 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting 
Wis JICriminal 920, Comment (1987)).  Mere proximity of Black 
to the firearm is insufficient to support a finding of 
possession of the firearm.  Id.  In this case, despite any 
proximity that Black had to the firearm, the allegations in the 
complaint do not provide any indication of Black's control over 
or intent to posses the firearm.  In fact, the complaint states 
that Black claimed no ownership of the firearm.  For these 
reasons, constructive possession was not shown. 
No. 99-0230-CR.wab 
 
5 
¶36 I recognize that the circuit court's insufficient 
inquiry was in all likelihood the result of an overloaded 
calendar and an effort by a hard-working judge to complete the 
calendar.  However, oversights can occur.  This record cannot 
support the crime charged.   
¶37 Collectively, these factors show a serious flaw in the 
fundamental integrity of the plea because the court failed to 
determine whether the defendant committed the crime charged.  
See State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 
N.W.2d 836.  A manifest injustice resulted for the defendant.  
Withdrawal of Black's plea is necessary to correct the manifest 
injustice.  See State v. Johnson, 207 Wis. 2d 239, 244, 558 
N.W.2d 375 (1997).  As a result, the court of appeals' decision 
should be affirmed, and this case remanded with directions to 
the circuit court to withdraw Black's no contest plea. 
¶38 Finally, 
I disagree 
with 
the majority 
opinion's 
assertion that a circuit court has less of a responsibility to 
establish a factual basis if the defendant pleads no contest.  
The majority does not cite any authority for this proposition, 
and this assertion is in direct contravention of the clear 
language of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1).   This statute specifically 
states that "[b]efore the court accepts a plea of guilty or no 
contest, it shall . . . [m]ake such inquiry as satisfies it that 
the defendant in fact committed the crime charged."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(b) (emphasis added).  The fact that Black entered a 
no contest plea rather than a plea of guilty has no bearing on 
the court's responsibilities under § 971.08(1).  See State v. 
No. 99-0230-CR.wab 
 
6 
Higgs, 230 Wis. 2d 1, 10-11, 601 N.W.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(defendant challenged the factual basis for his no contest plea; 
the court applied the same standards that exist for a challenge 
to a guilty plea).  
¶39 For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. 
¶40 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
 
No. 99-0230-CR.wab 
 
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