Case Title: State v. Nieves

Citation: 383 Md. 573

Docket Number: 10/04

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
State of Maryland v. Chris Nieves, No. 10, September Term, 2004.
Criminal Law & Procedure:  Search & Seizure — Search Incident to Arrest.  Strip Search
of defendant incident to arrest for several minor traffic violations held unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.  The applicable standard for evaluating strip searches incident to
arrest for minor traffic violations is the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard that the
arrestee was carrying weapons or contraband at the time of the arrest.  An arrestee’s prior
drug history and the fact the he was driving the truck of a missing female does not satisfy
the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 10
September Term, 2004
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
CHRIS NIEVES
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed:   November 15, 2004
This case requires us to consider whether a strip search conducted incident to a lawful
arrest for a minor traffic offense is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  We conclude
that, under the circumstances of this case, the strip search conducted incident to  arrest for
a minor traffic offense was unreasonable, and thus, violative of the Fourth Amendment.
I.  Background
A.  Facts
On January 22, 2002, at approximately 7:45a.m., Officers Jason Ackerman and Jason
Dietz of the Hagerstown Police Department, were on patrol in their vehicle, in the area of
Wakefield Road and West Franklin Street.  They had stopped their vehicle approximately six
feet behind a burgundy Toyota Takoma truck, which was sitting at the intersection stop sign.
While the officers were behind the truck, they noticed that the driver, later identified as Chris
Nieves, was having “some kind of problem around the shifting area.”  The truck then began
to drift back, “as if the clutch was engaged and it wasn’t in gear,” and struck the officers’
vehicle.  Officer Ackerman got out of the patrol car, approached Nieves, and asked Nieves,
the sole occupant of the truck, for a valid driver’s license.  Nieves  responded that he did not
possess a valid driver’s license in any state or any photo identification.  
After the officers reported the accident to police dispatch, they learned that the truck
was registered to a female who had been reported missing by her parents ten days earlier.
In response to their question about his identity, Nieves replied that his name was “Nathan
Nieves” and that his birth date was June 26, 1976.  A subsequent search of police records
failed to identify any person under that name.  During the encounter, Nieves appeared “calm
2
and relaxed” to the officers.
A third police officer, Jason Batistig, arrived at the scene within a matter of minutes,
pursuant to police department policy, in order to investigate the accident involving the police
patrol car.  Officers Batistig and Dietz began to question Nieves about his identity and the
truck’s ownership.  When asked again by the officers for his identity, Nieves supplied the
same birth date but instead gave a different first name, “Chris,” with the same last name.  The
dispatcher ran a search for “Chris Nieves” and found that Nieves’ driving privileges were
suspended and that a state identification card had been issued to him.  When asked how he
came to be in possession of the truck, Nieves responded that “he got it from a guy named
Mike” from West Virginia.  Officer Batistig stated that Nieves was then a little nervous,
fidgety, and evasive during the interrogation. Nieves was placed under arrest for giving false
information to the police and for obstructing a police officer. 
Nieves consented to a pat down, after Officer Ackerman requested permission, to
insure that Nieves did not have weapons, because a crime could have been committed in light
of the fact that a “female was missing.”  During the pat down, Officer Ackerman found a roll
of money totaling $377.00 in Nieves’ pocket.  The officers then searched the truck that
Nieves was driving and found no contraband or weapons.  Officer Batistig thereafter
transported Nieves to the police station.
After Officer Batistig and Nieves arrived at the Hagerstown police station, they  were
met by Lieutenant Richard Johnson, who was investigating the disappearance of Melissa
1
During one of the arrests, Nieves had been taken to a local detention center and the
arresting officers had found money and drugs on Nieves’ person.  Lieutenant Johnson
indicated that “as far as [he could recall],” Nieves had been charged with possession with
intent to distribute as a result of  either one or both of the arrests and had been convicted of
those charges. 
2
Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27 § 287 (a) stated in relevant part:
Except as authorized by this subheading, it is unlawful for any
person:
(a) To possess or administer to another any controlled
dangerous substance. . . . 
Section 287(a) was recodified without substantive change as Md. Code (2002), § 5-601 of
the Criminal Law Article, effective Oct. 1, 2002.
3
Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), Art. 27 § 286(a)(1) and (b)(1)
(continued...)
3
Langdon, the registered owner of the truck Nieves was driving.  Based upon information
provided by Langdon’s parents, Lieutenant Johnson was aware that Langdon’s disappearance
was allegedly linked to drugs.  Lieutenant Johnson immediately recognized Nieves as having
been arrested twice in the year 2000 for drug offenses.1  Although not aware of the $377.00
found on Nieves’ person, Lieutenant Johnson ordered a strip search of Nieves during the
booking procedures based upon “the information regarding the missing person and the prior
history of drugs.”  At the request of Lieutenant Johnson, Detective Schultz conducted the
strip search, which produced two small plastic baggies containing individually wrapped
baggies of cocaine that were protruding from Nieves’ rectum.
B.  Procedural History
On January 22, 2002, Nieves was charged with possession of cocaine,2 possession
with intent to distribute cocaine,3 and five minor traffic violations: Failure to control speed,4
3
(...continued)
provided in relevant part: 
(a) Prohibited conduct. – Except as authorized by this
subheading, it is unlawful for any person:
(1) To . . . possess a controlled dangerous substance in
sufficient 
quantity 
to 
reasonably 
indicate 
under 
all
circumstances an intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense,
a controlled dangerous substance . . . .
* * *
(b) Penalty. – Any person who violates any of the provisions of
subsection (a) of this section with respect to:
(1) A substance classified in Schedules I or II which is a
narcotic drug is guilty of a felony and is subject to imprisonment
for not more than 20 years, or a fine of not more than $25,000,
or both.
Sections 286(a)(1) and (b)(1) were recodified without substantive change as Md. Code
(2002), §§ 5-602 and 5-607 of the Criminal Law Article, effective Oct. 1, 2002. 
Under Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), Art. 27 § 279(b)(4), cocaine
was classified as a Schedule II substance.  Section 279(b)(4) was recodified without
substantive change as Md. Code (2002), § 5-403(b)(3)(iii) and (iv) of the Criminal Law
Article, effective Oct. 1, 2002.
4
Md. Code (1977, 1999 Repl. Vol.), § 21-801(b) of the Transportation Article
provided: 
Driver to control speed. — At all times, the driver of a vehicle
on a highway shall control the speed of the vehicle as necessary
to avoid colliding with any person or any vehicle or other
conveyance that, in compliance with legal requirements and the
duty of all persons to use due care, is on or entering the
highway.
Section 21-801(b) was derived from the former M d. Code (1957, 1976 Supp.), Art. 66½ §
11-801.
5
Md. Code (1977, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), § 16-101(a) of the Transportation
Article provided: 
In general. — An individual may not drive or attempt to drive
a motor vehicle on any highway in this State unless:
(continued...)
4
driving without a valid license,5  negligent driving,6 giving a false name,7 and giving false
5
(...continued)
(1) The individual holds a driver’s license issued under this title.
Section 16-101(a) is derived from the former Md. Code (1957, 1976 Supp.), Art. 66½ § 6-
101. 
6
Md. Code (1977, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.), § 21-901.1(b) of the Transportation
Article provided:  
Negligent driving. — A person is guilty of negligent driving if
he drives a motor vehicle in a careless or imprudent manner that
endangers any property or the life or person of any individual.
Section 21-901.1(b) was derived from the former Md. Code (1957, 1976 Supp.), Art. 66½
§ 11-901. 
7
Md. Code (1977, 1999 Repl. Vol.), § 16.112(e) of the Transportation Article provided:
(e) Giving false name. — A person may not give the name of
another person to any uniformed officer who is attempting to
determine the identity of a driver of a motor vehicle.
Section 16.112(e) was derived from the former Md. Code (1957, 1976 Supp.), Art. 66½ § 6-
112.
8
Md. Code (1977, 1999 Repl. Vol.), § 20-108 of the Transportation Article provided:
A person may not give any information that he knows or has
reason to believe is false in any oral or written report required by
this title.
Section 20-108 was derived from the former Md. Code (1957), Art. 66½ § 10-108.
5
accident report information.8  Nieves was also charged with the common law crimes of
obstructing and hindering a police officer.  Prior to trial, Nieves filed a motion to suppress
the cocaine that was seized during the strip search arguing that the arrest was unlawful and
the strip search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  On May 22, 2002, a
suppression hearing was held on the motion, during which the court heard testimony from
Officers Jason Ackerman, Jason Batistig, and Lieutenant Richard Johnson, and admitted the
stipulated testimony of Detective Schultz.  The officers’ testimony recounted the facts as they
6
have been presented here. 
In an order dated June 7, 2002, the Circuit Court denied Nieves’ motion to suppress
stating that “detaining the defendant under the totality of the circumstances and the
subsequent search were reasonable.”  On October 8, 2002, the case proceeded to a bench trial
in which Nieves was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and the lesser
included offense of possession of cocaine.  Subsequently, Nieves was sentenced to ten years
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  He was also convicted of driving without a
license, negligent driving, and failure to control speed, for which the court imposed monetary
fines.  The court found Nieves not guilty of the charges of obstructing an officer, giving false
information, and giving false accident report information. 
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Nieves argued that the Circuit Court’s
denial of the suppression motion should be reversed because the officers lacked probable
cause to arrest him.  Nieves also  argued that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to strip
search him subsequent to his arrest for a minor traffic offense and that the search was
unconstitutional as violative of the Fourth Amendment.   
The Court of Special Appeals addressed the probable cause issue and found that the
officers lacked probable cause to arrest Nieves for obstructing an officer.  The court found,
however, that the officers did have probable cause to arrest Nieves for the multiple traffic
violations.  Because probable cause existed, the court reasoned, a search incident to the arrest
9
The probable cause issue was not raised on appeal to this Court; therefore, we assume
that probable cause existed for the arrest.  
7
was permissible under the circumstances.9    
The Court of Special Appeals then turned to the question of whether the officers had
reasonable, articulable suspicion to strip search Nieves incident to arrest for minor offenses
and concluded that the strip search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  The
court applied a balancing test by weighing Nieves’ privacy interests against the government
interest in conducting the strip search.  In applying the balancing test, the intermediate
appellate court held that strip searches incident to an arrest for a minor offense should not
occur unless the arresting officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the individual
is presently in possession of weapons or contraband.  The court further reasoned that
conducting a strip search solely on Nieves’ past criminal record would create a per se rule
that would shift the determination of reasonable suspicion from the individual arrestee to a
class or category of offenders.  Additionally, the court noted that it was “far too great a leap
to conclude that any possible narcotics involvement of the missing female ipso facto carried
over to [Nieves] simply because he was the driver of the vehicle.”  Thus, the court concluded
that based upon the totality of the circumstances, the officers lacked reasonable, articulable
suspicion to conduct the strip search and reversed the judgment of the trial court. 
The State filed a  petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court to consider the following
question:
8
Did the Court of Special Appeals err when it determined that the
strip search conducted by the police was unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment? 
We granted the petition and issued the writ of certiorari.  State v. Nieves, 380 Md. 617, 846
A.2d 401 (2004).  We hold that under the circumstances of this case, the strip search was
unreasonable as a search incident to arrest for a minor crime, and therefore, Nieves’ motion
to suppress the evidenced seized from the search should have been granted.  Thus, we affirm
the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
III.  Standard of Review
In reviewing a Circuit Court’s grant or denial of a motion to suppress evidence under
the Fourth Amendment, we ordinarily consider only the information contained in the record
of the suppression hearing and not the trial record. Laney v. State, 379 Md. 522, 533, 842
A.2d 773, 779 (2004); Dashiell v. State, 374 Md. 85, 93, 821 A.2d 372, 376 (2003) (quoting
State v. Collins, 367 Md. 700, 706-07, 790 A.2d 660, 663-64 (2002) (citing Ferris v. State,
355 Md. 356, 368, 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999)).  We view the evidence and all reasonable
inferences drawn from that evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party on the
motion.  Laney, 379 Md. at 533, 842 A.2d at 779; Dashiell, 374 at 93, 821 A.2d at 376-77
(quoting Collins, 367 Md. at 707, 790 A.2d at 664)(citing Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 183,
571 A.2d 1239, 1240 (1990)).  Although we extend great deference to the hearing judge’s
findings of fact and will not disturb them unless clearly erroneous, we review, independently,
the application of the law to those facts to determine if the evidence at issue was obtained in
9
violation of the law and, accordingly, should be suppressed.  Laney, 379 Md. at 533-34, 842
A.2d at 779-80; Dashiell, 374 Md. at 93-94, 821 A.2d at 378 (citing Lancaster v. State, 86
Md. App. 74, 95, 585 A.2d 274, 284 (1991)); State v. Rucker, 374 Md. 199, 207, 821 A.2d
439, 444 (2003). 
IV.  Discussion
The State asserts that the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the strip
search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the search was not supported
by reasonable, articulable suspicion that Nieves was concealing a weapon or contraband on
his person.  In the State’s view, the reasonable suspicion standard for conducting strip
searches incident to arrest requires a minimal level of objective justification and should be
based upon the totality of the circumstances when assessing the reasonableness of the
officer’s basis for conducting the strip search.  According to the State, because Nieves was
driving the truck of a missing person suspected of being involved in drug activity, had failed
to properly identify himself when questioned by the police, and had a criminal history
involving drugs, reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying the strip search in this case had
been created.  Consequently, the State argues, the judgment of the intermediate appellate
court should be reversed.
Nieves’ argument, quite understandably, adheres to the analysis of the Court of
Special Appeals.  He maintains that the test for reasonableness of the officer’s basis for
conducting the strip search involves balancing the privacy interests of the person being
10
searched against the government’s need for conducting the search.  Nieves argues that the
police must have reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a strip search under the search
incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment, when the arrest is for a minor traffic
offense.  Nieves asserts that Lieutenant Johnson did not have reasonable, articulable
suspicion that Nieves was carrying weapons or contraband.  Even considering the totality of
the circumstances, Nieves maintains that Lieutenant Johnson based his decision to order the
strip search solely on Nieves’ prior criminal history and his connection to a missing girl’s
truck.  Those circumstances, according to Nieves, do not amount to reasonable, articulable
suspicion justifying a strip search incident to arrest.  For the reasons stated below, we agree.
A.  Fourth Amendment and Search Incident to Arrest
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable to the
State of Maryland through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees individuals the right to
be secure in “their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1687, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1085
(1961); Laney, 379 Md. at 545, 842 A.2d at 786.  It is axiomatic that the Fourth Amendment
only prohibits those searches and seizures that are unreasonable under the circumstances.
See Carter v. State, 367 Md. 447, 458, 788 A.2d 646, 652 (2002) (citing Gadson v. State, 341
Md. 1, 9, 668 A.2d 22, 26 (1995)), cert denied, 517 U.S. 1203, 116 S.Ct. 1704, 134 L.Ed.2d
803 (1996); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 493, 479 A.2d 903, 907 (1984).  In determining the
11
reasonableness of a search, each case requires a balancing of the government’s need to
conduct the search against the invasion of the individual’s privacy rights.  Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d 447, 481 (1979).  
Furthermore, it is well established that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment absent some recognized exception.  Gamble v. State, 318 Md.
120, 123, 567 A.2d 95, 97 (1989).  A search incident to a lawful arrest is one of the well
delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.  See Carter, 367 Md. at 460-61, 788 A.2d
at 653-54; State v. Evans, 352 Md. 496, 516, 723 A.2d 423, 432-33, cert denied, 528 U.S.
833, 120 S.Ct. 310, 145 L.Ed.2d 77 (1999); Ricks v. State, 322 Md. 183, 188, 586 A.2d 740,
743 (1991) (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685
(1969)).  
The Supreme Court in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d
685 (1969), articulated the bases for a search incident to arrest, those being,  “to remove any
weapons that the [arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his
escape....[or] to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent
its concealment or destruction.”   Id. at 763, 89 S.Ct. at 2040,  23 L.Ed.2d at 694; see also
United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-03,  94 S.Ct. 1234, 1237, 39 L.Ed.2d 771, 775
(1974); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226, 94 S.Ct. 467, 472, 38 L.Ed.2d 427,
435 (1973); Carter, 367 Md. at 460, 788 A.2d at 653. 
Likewise, in United States v. Robinson,   414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427
12
(1973), the Court allowed a full search of the person, including a pat-down of his pockets and
their contents as incident to a lawful arrest.  Id. at 221-24, 94 S.Ct. at 470-71, 38 L.Ed.2d at
433-34.  In Robinson, a police officer suspected the defendant of driving without an
operator’s permit based upon a previous check of the defendant’s operator’s permit four days
earlier.  Id. at 220, 945 S.Ct. at 469-70, 38 L.Ed.2d. at 432.  The defendant was stopped by
the officer, arrested for driving without a valid operator’s permit, and patted down after
getting out of the vehicle.  Id.  During the pat-down, the officer found a cigarette pack in the
defendant’s front coat pocket, which the officer opened and found several vials of heroin.
Id. at 222-23, 94 S.Ct. at 470-71, 38 L.Ed.2d at 434.  The officer then proceeded to search
the defendant’s waist, pants, and remaining pockets.  Id.  Subsequently, the defendant was
convicted for possession of heroin and he appealed challenging the validity of the area of his
person.  Id. at 220, 94 S.Ct. at 469, 38 L.Ed.2d at 432.  
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, explained that the decision of an
arresting officer to search a person incident to a lawful arrest “is necessarily a quick ad hoc
judgment” and that the potential danger that the arrestee is carrying weapons provides “an
adequate basis for treating all custodial arrests alike for purposes of [the] search
justification.”  Id. at 235, 94 S.Ct. at 476-77, 38 L.Ed.2d at 440.   Consequently, the Court
held that police officers are not required to assess the likelihood that the arrestee is carrying
weapons or concealing evidence; rather, the officers may undertake a “full search” of the
arrestee.  Id.  The Court established that a full search incident to arrest can involve “a
13
relatively extensive exploration of the person,” aimed toward locating weapons, or evidence
that could be concealed or destroyed.  Id. at 227, 94 S.Ct. at 473, 38 L.Ed.2d at 436 (quoting
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967)); see also
Carter, 367 Md. at 461, 788 A.2d at 654 (recognizing that the right of an officer to search
a person “follows automatically from the arrest.”) (citing Evans, 352 Md. 496, 508, 723 A.2d
423, 429, cert denied, 528 U.S. 833, 120 S.Ct. 310, 145 L.Ed.2d 77 (1999).  
In United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974), the
Court held that jail administrators could exchange and search the clothes of an individual
who had been arrested and detained.  Id. at 801-02, 94 S.Ct. at 1236, 39 L.Ed.2d at 775. The
Court stated that exchanging and searching the detainee’s clothes for evidence one day after
his arrest was a normal search incident to a custodial arrest and that the delay in the search
was reasonable because the search could have been conducted at the time of the arrest.  Id.
at 805, 94 S.Ct. at 1238, 39 L.Ed.2d at 777.  The Court observed that it is customary to search
an arrestee who is being processed for confinement and that such searches are reasonable.
Id. at 804-05, 94 S.Ct. at 1238, 39 L.Ed.2d at 776.  See also Abel v. United States, 362 U.S.
217, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960) (holding that a search of a suitcase that could have
been made at the arrest scene was allowed at a later time in the detention center).  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not addressed the validity of strip searches
incident to an arrest; in Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65
(1983), the Court explicitly stated that, “[w]e were not addressing in Edwards, and do not
14
discuss here, the circumstances in which a strip search of an arrestee may or may not be
appropriate.”  Id. at 646 n.2, 103 S.Ct. at 2609 n.2, 77 L.Ed.2d at 71 n.2. 
B.  Strip Searches
 The term “strip search” has been defined and used in differing contexts in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.  In general, strip searches involve the removal of the arrestee’s
clothing for inspection of the under clothes and/or body.  See William J. Simonitsch, Visual
Body Cavity Searches Incident to Arrest: Validity Under the Fourth Amendment, 54 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 665, 667 (2000).  Some have defined strip searches to also include a visual
inspection of the genital and anal regions of the body.  Id.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th
Ed. 2004) defines a strip search as “a search of a person conducted after that person’s clothes
have been removed, the purpose usually being to find any contraband the person might be
hiding.”  Likewise, in the instant case, the Hagerstown Police Department procedural rules
(Departmental Rules), define a strip search as “any search of an individual requiring the
removal or rearrangement of some or all clothing to permit the visual inspection of the skin
surfaces of the genital areas, breasts, and/or buttocks.  See Departmental Rules, § 18.11.2.1.
There is a distinction between a strip search and other types of searches, such as body cavity
searches, which could involve visually inspecting the body cavities or physically probing the
body cavities.  Simonitsch, supra, at n.9.  Based upon the record, it appears that a strip search
was conducted rather than a physical body cavity search. 
It is clear that strip searches by their very nature can be degrading and invasive.  See
10
In the instant case, the Departmental Rules also acknowledge the intrusive nature of
strip searches.  They provide: 
This Department recognizes that the use of strip searches....may,
under certain conditions, be necessary to protect the safety of
officers, civilians and other prisoners; to detect and secure
evidence of criminal activity and to safeguard the security,
safety and related interests of this agency’s holding facility.
Recognizing the intrusiveness of these searches on individual
privacy, however, it is the policy of this Department that such
searches shall be conducted only with proper authority and
justification, with due recognition and deference for the human
dignity of those being searched and in accordance with the
(continued...)
15
Wood v. Clemons, 89 F.3d 922, 928 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that “a strip search, by its very
nature, constitutes an extreme intrusion upon personal privacy, as well as an offense to the
dignity of an individual.”); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir.
1983) (noting that “strip searches involving the visual inspection of the anal and genital areas
[are]....demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant,
embarrassing, repulsive, signifying degradation and submission.”); John Does 1-100 v. Boyd,
613 F. Supp. 1514, 1522 (D.Minn. 1985)(commenting that the “experience of disrobing and
exposing one’s self for visual inspection by a stranger clothed with the uniform and authority
of the state, in an enclosed room inside a jail, can only be seen as thoroughly degrading and
frightening.”); Deserly v. Department of Corrections, 995 P.2d 972, 977 (Mont. 2000)
(noting that being strip searched “is an embarrassing and humiliating experience”); Draper
v. Walsh, 790 F.Supp. 1553, 1559 (W.D. Okla. 1991) (stating, “Strip searches can be
described by a number of adjectives, but being dignified is not one of their number ”).10  
10
(...continued)
procedural guidelines for conducting such searches as set forth
in this policy. 
Departmental Rules, Section 18.1.1. 
16
Even though intrusive, however, strip searches have been permitted under the Fourth
Amendment in various settings.  See Bell, 441 U.S. at 523-24, 99 S.Ct. at 1864, 60 L.Ed.2d
at 458-59 (strip search allowed of pretrial detainee in a detention center); United States v.
Dorlouis, 107 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 1997) (strip search in a police van was allowed because the
defendant was suspected of hiding money related to his arrest for drug possession).  
Strip searches commonly have been upheld for two reasons: (1) as a means to
maintain the security of the detention facility; and (2) as a search incident to arrest.  See 3
Wayne LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.3(a) at 108-09 (3d ed. 1996).  Although this Court
has not specifically addressed the issue of strip searches in an institutional setting or as a
search incident to arrest, various courts have done so in the context of a suit brought by the
arrestee for damages for violation of his/her constitutional rights and have delineated various
factors to be assessed. 
In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), the Supreme
Court addressed the permissible scope of searches incident to arrest that occurred in
association with pretrial detention.  Id. at 523, 99 S.Ct. at 1866, 60 L.Ed.2d at 458.  Several
defendants brought a class action suit challenging detention policies requiring pre-trial
detainees to be subjected to a “visual body cavity” search every time the detainee had contact
17
with individuals outside of the institution.  Id.  The Court assessed the reasonableness of
these searches by stating: 
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of
precise definition or mechanical application.  In each case it requires a
balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal
rights that the search entails.  Courts must consider the scope of the particular
intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating
it, and the place in which it is conducted.  
Id. at 559, 99 S.Ct. at 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d at 481.  Because penal institutions face unique
security challenges arising from the possibility of having contraband and weapons brought
into the institution, the Court held that the searches were reasonable and could be conducted
on less than probable cause that the detainee was carrying weapons or contraband.  Id. at 99
S.Ct. at 1884-85, 60 L.Ed.2d at 481-82.  Justice Powell, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, suggested that reasonable suspicion should be the level required to justify the “visual
body cavity” searches that occurred in the case.  Id. at 563, 99 S.Ct. at 1886, 60 L.Ed.2d at
484.   
Since Bell, a number of courts that have examined institutional policies attempting to
prevent detainees from bringing weapons and contraband into the institution and have
required that the strip search be based upon reasonable suspicion that the individual was
carrying weapons or contraband at the time of arrest.  See Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 7 (1 st
Cir. 1997) (holding that there must be reasonable suspicion that the detainee will carry
weapons or contraband into the prison or the detainee is concealing evidence);  Justice v.
Peachtree City, 961 F.2d 188, 193 (11th Cir. 1992) (explaining that the officers must have
18
reasonable suspicion that the detainee is concealing evidence or will bring weapons or drugs
into the prison); Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1255 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting that an
officer could have reasonable suspicion that a detainee is concealing weapons or contraband
if the crime was related to a major felony); Watt v. Richardson Police Dept., 849 F.2d 195,
198 (5th Cir. 1988) (explaining that reasonable suspicion that the defendant was carrying
weapons or contraband did not exist solely based upon the defendant’s criminal history);
Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 800 (2nd Cir. 1986) (holding that the officers lacked reasonable
suspicion to believe that the defendant was concealing contraband because the defendant had
only been arrested for falsely reporting a crime, which did not relate to contraband); Stewart
v. County of Lubbock, 767 F.2d 153, 156-57 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that jail authorities had
no reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was carrying weapons or drugs simply
because he had a prior drug history); Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1271 n.7 (held strip search
of detainees arrested for minor offenses unreasonable because the officers lacked reasonable
suspicion that the detainees were carrying weapons or contraband that could be introduced
into the prison);  Holton v. Mohon, 684 F. Supp. 1407, 1415 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (holding that
strip searches of pretrial detainees must be based upon reasonable suspicion that the
detainees were carrying contraband or weapons).
Reasonable suspicion has been defined as being more than a “mere hunch,’ but is ‘a
less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than
preponderance of the evidence.’”  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673,
11
Although not dispositive in any way regarding the constitutional issue in this case, the
Departmental Rules in the case sub judice address the reasonable suspicion standard in
relation to minor crimes, stating: “Individuals arrested for traffic violations and other minor
offenses of a nonviolent nature shall not be subject to strip searches unless the arresting
officer has articulable, reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual is concealing
contraband or weapons.”  Departmental Rules, Section 18.11.2.5. 
19
675-76, 145 L.Ed.2d 570, 576 (2000); Nathan v. Maryland, 370 Md. 648, 663, 805 A.2d
1086, 1095 (2002). 11  In discussing the concept of reasonable suspicion, the United States
Supreme Court has opined that, “[a]rticulating precisely what ‘reasonable suspicion’ and
‘probable cause’ mean is not possible,” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695, 116 S.
Ct. 1657, 1661, 134 L.Ed.2d 911, 918 (1996), but such terms are “commonsense,
nontechnical conceptions that deal with ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday
life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians act.”  Id.  A determination
of whether reasonable suspicion exists to justify a search is made by looking at the totality
of the circumstances.  In this regard, the Court stated: 
When discussing how reviewing courts should make reasonable-suspicion
determinations, we have said repeatedly that they must look at the ‘totality of
the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a
‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.  This
process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized
training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative
information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’
  
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 749-50, 151 L.Ed.2d 740, 746
(2002); Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99, 104-05, 816 A.2d 901, 904 (2003); Nathan, 370 Md.
at 663, 805 A.2d at 1095 (internal citations omitted).
20
Strip searches of detainees have been permitted when a felony or violent misdemeanor
is the subject of the charge.  See Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 2001)
(“The reasonable suspicion standard may be met simply by the fact that the inmate was
charged with a violent felony.”); Watt, 849 F.2d at 198 (explaining that a strip search is
inherently based upon reasonable suspicion when the detainee is charged with or has a
criminal history of contraband or weapons); Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir.
1984) (recognizing a detainee’s prior arrest record as a factor in determining whether the
officer had reasonable suspicion that the detainee was carrying weapons or contraband);
Dufrin v. Spreen, 712 F.2d 1084, 1087-89 (6th Cir. 1983) (upholding strip search as
reasonable based upon a felony charge that was considered to be a crime of violence.); Smith
v. Montgomery County, 643 F. Supp. 435, 439 (D. Md. 1986) (holding that an officer may
have valid reasonable suspicion that a detainee is carrying drugs or weapons when the
detainee has a prior record involving drugs or weapons or if the person has been arrested for
a felony); but see Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Department, 901 F.2d 702, 714, 716 (9th
Cir. 1990) (holding that the “felony/misdemeanor classification alone indicates little about
the likelihood of the [detainee] concealing drugs, weapons, or contraband...,” however,
“[g]rand theft, a felony...could be considered” as a factor to determine reasonable suspicion
of the detainee concealing weapons or contraband) (emphasis added)).
One of our sister states had occasion to address the appropriateness of a strip search
incident to a felony arrest.  In State v. Jenkins, 842 A.2d 1148 (Conn. App. 2004), an
21
undercover police officer, after having been informed that the defendant was dealing drugs,
arranged to buy heroin from him.  Id. at 1151.  W hen Jenkins approached the officer and
attempted to sell the heroin, the officer placed Jenkins under arrest, conducted a pat down,
and noticed that an object was protruding from Jenkins’ pants.  Id.  The officer pulled down
Jenkins’ pants and underwear and discovered several glass vials of crack and heroin
protruding from Jenkins’ buttocks.  Id.  As a result, Jenkins was charged with possession of
narcotics with the intent to distribute and convicted.  Id.  
The intermediate appellate court of Connecticut, faced with a Fourth Amendment
challenge to the strip search, held that probable cause did exist to arrest and that the strip
search was valid as a search incident to arrest.  Id. at 1154.  The court explained that the
justification for an officer to search incident to a lawful arrest is predicated upon the need to
“disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody as it does on the need to preserve
evidence on his person for later use at trial.”  Id. at 1157.  When the arrest is for a felony
offense, the officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that the
arrestee is carrying weapons or contraband.  Id. at 1156.   The court defined reasonable
suspicion as the officer’s “specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from
the facts in light of his experience.”  Id.  at 1157.  In upholding the search, the court applied
the balancing test articulated in Bell, and explained that the officer had reason to believe that
Jenkins was carrying contraband because the officer was meeting Jenkins presumably to buy
heroin.  Id.  The court also noted that the nature of the offense for which Jenkins was arrested
22
created the suspicion necessary to justify the strip search.  Id.  Based on those factors, the
court found that reasonable suspicion existed to conduct the search of Jenkins; therefore, the
search was reasonable.  Id. at 1158.  
Strip searches conducted of detainees who had been arrested for minor offenses not
associated with weapons or contraband generally have been found wanting, unless the officer
had information that would have led the officer to have reasonable suspicion that the person
was carrying weapons or contraband at the time of arrest.  See Roberts, 239 F.3d at 112
(strip search unreasonable based upon arrest for an “outstanding body attachment,” a
misdemeanor, because there was no evidence that the defendant was carrying weapons or
contraband at the time of arrest); Edwards v. State, 759 N.E.2d 626, 629 (Ind. 2001) (strip
search of arrestee charged with speeding and giving a false name held unconstitutional due
to the absence of  reasonable suspicion that the defendant had weapons or contraband on his
person during the arrest); People v. Kelley, 762 N.Y.S.2d 438, 440 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)
(strip search unreasonable because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion that the
defendant was carrying weapons or contraband at the time of arrest, where the arrest was for
driving without a driver’s license); People v. Jennings, 747 N.Y.S.2d 235, 236 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2002) (strip search conducted incident to an arrest for a routine traffic stop was
unreasonable because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that the defendant was
carrying weapons or contraband at the time of arrest); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 941 (Utah
1994) (strip search of a person arrested for providing false information to an officer held
12
A minority of courts have applied the probable cause standard to determine whether
the officer was reasonable to strip search individuals arrested for minor traffic offenses.  See
Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F.Supp. 486, 491 (E.D.Wis. 1979), affirmed, 620 F.2d 160 (7th Cir.
1980); Burns v. Loranger, 907 F.2d 233, 236 (1st Cir. 1990); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 708
N.E.2d 669, 673 (Mass. 1999); Elk v. Townson, 839 F.Supp. 1047, 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1993);
DiLoreto v. Borough of Oaklyn, 744 F.Supp. 610, 621 (D.N.J. 1990).
13
Wachtler v. County of Herkimer, 35 F.3d 77, 81 (2 nd Cir. 1994)(strip search held
unreasonable after defendant was arrested for speeding because there was no reasonable
suspicion to believe that the defendant was carrying weapons or drugs on his person);
Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393, 395-98 (10th Cir. 1993) (strip search was unreasonable
where the detainee was arrested for speeding and driving without a license—charges that
were unrelated to drugs or weapons); Justice, 961 F.2d at 193(strip search of teenager
(continued...)
23
unreasonable because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that the arrestee was carrying
weapons or contraband on his person); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 507 S.E.2d 661, 664 (Va.
App. 1998) (strip search for minor non-jailable offense held unreasonable when arrest was
for public intoxication and there was no reasonable suspicion that the defendant was carrying
weapons or contraband at the time of arrest).12  
Several courts have also addressed the minor crime distinction in the civil context,
where defendants filed suits against police departments challenging strip search policies for
arrestees.  Those courts held that conducting strip searches of detainees arrested for minor
offenses must be justified by reasonable suspicion that the individual is carrying weapons or
contraband at the time of arrest.  See Swain, 117 F.3d at 9 (holding strip search
unconstitutional based upon arrest for non-felony matter because the type of offense did not
indicate reasonable suspicion that the arrestee was carrying weapons or contraband at the
time of arrest).13  
13
(...continued)
arrested for loitering and truancy must be justified by reasonable suspicion that the teenager
was carrying weapons or contraband at the time of arrest); Masters, 872 F.2d at 1255 (strip
search unreasonable for minor offenses of failure to appear for expired registration plates and
for failure to maintain auto insurance); Walsh v. Franco, 849 F.2d 66, 68-69 (2nd Cir. 1988)
(strip search of person arrested on bench warrant for outstanding parking ticket held
unreasonable because minor offenses do not implicate the need to search for weapons or
contraband on the person); Watt, 849 F.2d at 199 (strip search unreasonable when person was
arrested on outstanding warrant for failure to register his dog); Weber, 804 F.2d at 802 (strip
search of arrestee who was charged with falsely reporting an incident and resisting arrest
violated the Fourth Amendment because the arrest was unrelated to the arrestee having drugs
or weapons in his person); Stewart, 767 F.2d at 156-57 (strip search unconstitutional based
on arrest for minor crimes—public intoxication and bad check writing, without proof that the
officers had reasonable suspicion that the arrestee was carrying weapons or drugs on his
person); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 740-42 (8th Cir. 1985) (strip search of the
defendant, who was arrested for violating animal leash law, was unreasonable because the
arrest was unrelated to drugs or weapons); Giles, 746 F.2d at 617-18 (strip search of detainee
was unreasonable because the minor offense, driving with expired automobile tags, did not
give rise to reasonable suspicion that the detainee was carrying weapons or drugs at the time
of arrest); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 393-94 (10th Cir. 1984) (strip searching detainees
arrested for failing to appear on charges of speeding and violating a license restriction was
held unconstitutional because the charges were unrelated to finding weapons or contraband
in the individual during the arrest); Dufrin, 712 F.2d at 1087; Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1273
(strip search conducted of individual arrested for parking tickets and driving without a
license held unconstitutional because the charges did not implicate a need to search for
weapons or drugs); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir. 1981) (strip search of
person arrested for driving while intoxicated was unreasonable because the arrest was for a
minor offense and was not related to weapons or contraband); Helton v. United States, 191
F.Supp.2d 179, 184-85 (D.D.C. 2002) (strip searching arrestees charged with misdemeanors
or other minor crimes is unreasonable unless reasonable suspicion exists that the arrestee is
carrying weapons or contraband at the time of arrest); Draper, 790 F.Supp. at 1559 (strip
search of a person arrested for public intoxication held unreasonable because the officers
lacked reasonable suspicion that the arrestee was carrying weapons or contraband during the
arrest); Kathriner v. City of Overland, 602 F.Supp. 124, 125 (E.D.Mo. 1984) (strip searches
of individuals charged with a misdemeanor or ordinance violation was unreasonable because
the charges were unrelated to weapons or drugs); Hunt v. Polk County, 551 F.Supp. 339, 344-
45 (S.D.Iowa 1982) (must have reasonable suspicion that a detainee is carrying weapon or
drugs in order to strip search a person arrested for speeding and an outstanding warrant);
(continued...)
24
13
(...continued)
Rankin v. Colman, 476 So.2d 234, 238 (Fla. App. 1985) (strip searches of individuals
arrested for vehicle and traffic offenses are unreasonable because those offenses are unlikely
to yield weapons or evidence of crime).
25
In Edwards v. State,  759 N.E.2d 626 (Ind. 2001), the defendant, Michael Edwards,
was arrested for giving police officers false information after being questioned about his
identity.  Id. at 628.  Subsequent to the arrest, the officers transported Edwards to the police
station, conducted a strip search, and found cocaine protruding from Edwards’ buttocks.  Id.
Edwards was later convicted for possession of cocaine and appealed arguing that the cocaine
was seized illegally.  Id.  
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Indiana held that the search was unreasonable as a
search incident to arrest.  Id. at 630.  The court explained that because the strip search was
incident to an arrest for a minor offense, the search must be justified by reasonable suspicion
that Edwards was carrying weapons or contraband.  Id. at 629-30.  According to the Court,
“[t]here may be misdemeanor charges for which a body search is appropriate because of the
reasonable likelihood of discovery of evidence, but, false informing, without more, is
certainly not such a crime.”  Id. at 629.  Because Edwards had only been arrested for a non-
violent misdemeanor, and the circumstances surrounding Edwards’ arrest did not create the
reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct the search, the court held that the search was
unreasonable.  Id. at 630.  
26
C. Nieves’ Strip Search
In the case sub judice, we are not dealing with a situation where institutional safety
is at issue.  The State has conceded that this case does not involve institutional policies of
strip searching individuals prior to entering prison because the record is devoid of any
evidence that Nieves was confined.  Therefore, in the present case, where the person has been
arrested for a minor traffic offense unrelated to drugs or violence, is a strip search justified,
and what standard should be used to evaluate its reasonableness?  
It is clear that arrestees, such as Nieves, whether or not they face detention, may
conceal weapons and contraband underneath their clothes and on their person, so that the
traditional rationales underlying searches incident to arrest apply.   See Edwards, 415 U.S.
at 805,  94 S.Ct. 1238, 39 L.Ed.2d at 776; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235, 94 S.Ct. at 476, 38
L.Ed.2d at 440;  Jenkins, 842 A.2d at 1151; Edwards v. State, 759 N.E.2d at 630; Jennings,
747 N.Y.S.2d at 236.  Insofar as the standard to evaluate reasonableness, our jurisprudence
is replete with the use of “reasonable, articulable suspicion” to determine the reasonableness
of searches conducted in other contexts.   See Ransome, 373 Md. at 106-07, 816 A.2d at 905
(applying the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard that the arrestee was concealing
weapons or evidence to evaluate the reasonableness of a Terry frisk); Carter v. State, 367
Md. 447, 788 A.2d 646 (2002) (evaluating the search of a lunch bag incident to the
defendant’s arrest using reasonable, articulable suspicion to determine if the defendant was
carrying weapons or evidence of a crime); Nathan, 370 Md. at 664-65, 805 A.2d at 1095-96
27
(assessing the reasonableness of a warrantless search of a vehicle passenger utilizing the
reasonable, articulable suspicion standard); Stokes v. State, 362 Md. 407, 765 A.2d 612
(2001) (requiring reasonable, articulable suspicion that the arrestee had committed a robbery
in order to conduct an investigatory stop and warrantless search).  Accordingly, based upon
our own jurisprudence and utilizing the experience and analyses of many other courts
addressing the reasonableness of strip searches, we hold that the reasonable, articulable
suspicion standard  applies in the strip search incident to arrest context. 
Using this standard, the strip search of Nieves was not reasonable.  The very nature
of the minor traffic violations for which Nieves was apprehended did not create a suspicion
that he was carrying weapons or contraband at the time of arrest.  Rather, during the
suppression hearing, Lieutenant Johnson testified that he ordered a strip search of Nieves for
the following reasons: (1) because of Nieves’ prior drug arrests and (2) because at the time
of his arrest, Nieves was driving the truck of a missing female, who had a history of drug
involvement and was reported missing.  When questioned during the hearing, Lieutenant
Johnson explained that those two were the only justifications for ordering the strip search:
Q:
And what action, if any, did you take at that time?
A:
When they were doing the booking procedures obviously the search and
subsequent fingerprint processing, photographs and so forth I indicated
to them because of his prior drug activity and the knowledge that I had
at that time that he needed to be strip searched.
* * *
Q:
And you gave that order?
28
A:
Yes, I did.
Q: 
Besides the information regarding the missing person and the prior
history of drugs,....was there anything else that you based the order on
or was that it?
A:
No, that was it at the time.
Lieutenant Johnson’s rationale falls short of meeting the reasonable, articulable
suspicion standard.  Prior drug arrests do not necessarily yield reasonable suspicion that an
individual is secreting weapons or drugs on his person at the time of his arrest on a drug
offense, because to allow the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard to be satisfied based
upon a person’s status, rather than an individualized assessment of the circumstances, would
undermine the purpose for requiring officers to justify their reasons for searching a particular
individual.  See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 392-93, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 1420-21, 137
L.Ed.2d 615, 622 (1997) (stating, “[i]f a per se exception were allowed for each category of
criminal investigation that included a considerable [] risk of danger to officers or destruction
of evidence, the knock-and-announce element of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness
requirement would be meaningless”); see also State v. Lee, 374 Md. 275, 308, 821 A.2d 922,
941 (2003).  Also, the fact that the defendant was driving the truck of a missing female
associated with drugs confuses the nature of the inquiry of whether there was reasonable,
articulable suspicion that Nieves was carrying weapons or drugs.  The circumstances
surrounding another person cannot be imputed to the person who is the subject of the search
because the inquiry must be particularized and objectively based upon the person suspected
29
of carrying weapons or contraband.  See Nathan, 370 Md. at 663, 805 A.2d at 1095. 
The State, nevertheless, argues that the Court of Special Appeals’ opinion in Fontaine
v. State, 135 Md. App. 471, 762 A.2d 1027 (2000), is directly applicable.  In Fontaine, the
defendant was arrested for driving on a suspended driver’s license.  Id. at 475, 762 A.2d at
1030.  The arresting officers, who recognized the defendant from a previous encounter for
driving without a license and noticed the defendant making suspicious movements.  Id.  The
intermediate appellate court applied the reasonable suspicion standard and the Wolfish
balancing test to determine that the “officer had at least reasonable suspicion to perform a
strip search incident to [Fontaine’s] arrest.” Id. at 482, 762 A.2d at 1033. Because Fontaine
was fidgeting during the police encounter, attempted to try to place an object in his pants, and
the officer had prior information as to where Fontaine normally concealed contraband, the
court found that the strip search was reasonable.  Id.  Unlike the defendant in Fontaine, the
present record is devoid of additional indicia of suspicious movements and attempts to
conceal weapons or contraband; Nieves had consented to a pat down of his person and he
was described as “calm and relaxed.”  
Under the circumstances of this case, the strip search conducted incident to arrest for
a minor traffic violation was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment.  Although
there may be circumstances in which a strip search may be conducted incident to a lawful
arrest, the strip search of Chris Nieves was not one of them.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED WITH COSTS.