Case Title: KIMSEY v. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
KIMSEY v. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION2002 WY 1539 P.3d 425Case Number: 00-177Decided: 01/30/2002

October Term, A.D. 2001

EDWARD 
GERALD KIMSEY, 

Appellant(Petitioner),

v.

THE 
WYOMING DEPARTMENT

OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 

Appellee(Respondent).

W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b) Certification

 from the District Court of Park 
County:

The 
Honorable H. Hunter Patrick, Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

George 
L. Simonton of Simonton & Simonton, Cody, WY.

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Dennis M. Coll, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
and Mary L. Loos, Assistant Attorney General.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

  

LEHMAN, Chief Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant 
Edward Gerald Kimsey appeals from the Office of Administrative Hear­ing's 
(OAH) order, which upheld the appellee Wyoming Department of Transportation's 
(WYDOT) implied consent suspension of Kimsey's driver's license for a six-month 
period.  

            

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Kimsey 
submits the following issues for our analysis:

1.  Was the Administrative 
Hearing Officer's finding "that there existed probable cause to believe Licensee 
had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a 
public street or highway in this state in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-233(b) 
(1995)" supported by substantial evidence?  
          
              
               
      

2.  Was the Administrative 
Hearing Officer's finding that "Licensee refused to submit to all required 
chemical tests" sup­ported by substantial evidence?  
           
      

3.  Was the Administrative 
Hearing Officer's denial of Motion for New Trial And/Or Relief From Judgment an 
abuse of dis­cretion?  
           
     

FACTS

[¶4]      After a night out 
drinking, Kimsey arrived home in the early morning hours of Febru­ary 27, 
2000, to find a message on his answering machine informing him that his wife had 
been arrested and was being detained at the Cody Law Enforcement Center (Law 
Center).  Kimsey called the Law 
Center to inquire about his wife, and the dis­patcher told him that his wife 
had indeed been arrested and that she would have to spend the night in 
jail.  The dispatcher transferred 
Kimsey's call to Offi­cer Schwindt who advised Kimsey that his wife had been 
arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol, that he could not 
speak to her over the telephone or personally, and that she would not be 
released until later in the day.  
Both the dispatcher and Officer Schwindt believed Kimsey to be 
intoxicated based on their conversations with him on the telephone.  

[¶5]      Just a few 
minutes after this telephone conversation ended, Kimsey showed up at the Law 
Center.  He picked up an in-house 
telephone and waited for several minutes without ever trying to dial a 
number.  When he finally hung up the 
telephone, the dispatcher called him to find out who he was and what he 
wanted.  Kimsey identified himself 
and asked about his wife.  The 
dispatcher asked Officers Melson and Johnson to speak with Kimsey because she 
believed he was intoxicated.  

[¶6]      Officer Johnson 
had exited the building just moments before Kimsey arrived at the Law 
Center.  Upon receiving the request 
from the dispatcher, Officer Johnson returned to the building and noticed a 
Dodge truck that was not there when he left just moments before and was now 
parked in front of the building.  
Officer Johnson ran a registration check on the vehicle and discovered 
that it belonged to Kimsey and his wife.  
Officer Johnson approached Kimsey and asked him if the Dodge truck was 
his.  Kimsey said that it was.  When Officer Johnson asked Kimsey how he 
had gotten to the Law Center, Kimsey told him that he had driven his vehicle and 
added "but I'm O.K."  Officer 
Johnson asked Kimsey if he had been drinking.  Kimsey said that he had been drinking a 
little and again indicated that he was all right to drive.  

[¶7]      Officer Johnson 
proceeded to explain the circumstances surrounding Kimsey's wife's arrest.  Officer Melson arrived and joined the 
conversation.  The dispatcher was 
stationed just a few feet away and overheard the entire exchange.  

[¶8]      During this 
discussion, Officer Johnson noticed that Kimsey's speech was slurred, he was 
unsteady on his feet, and he smelled strongly of alcohol.  When Johnson told Kimsey that he thought 
he was too intoxicated to be driving, Kimsey assured Johnson that he was 
"O.K."  Officer Johnson asked Kimsey 
to perform sobriety tests.  Kimsey 
declined and stated he just wanted to get his wife and they would walk 
home.  When Officer Johnson 
persisted with his request, Kimsey said that he did not drive to the Law 
Center.  Officer Johnson asked how 
his truck got to the Law Center, and Kimsey ini­tially answered that he did 
not know.  He then stated that maybe 
his wife had driven it there.  
Officer Johnson again asked Kimsey to perform sobriety tests, and Kimsey 
again refused.  

[¶9]      Officer Johnson 
informed Kimsey he was under arrest for driving while under the influ­ence 
of alcohol, handcuffed him, and escorted him to the jail.  Officer Johnson read Kimsey the implied 
consent advisement and asked Kimsey to take a breathalyzer test, which Kimsey 
refused.  Kimsey was remanded to the 
custody of the jail.  He was again 
asked to take the test after he had been booked, and again he refused.  The detention officer explained to 
Kimsey that he would not be released until a breathalyzer test read zero and 
placed Kimsey into the intoxication room.  

[¶10]   Kimsey did not reach a zero alcohol 
level until 7:00 p.m., approximately seventeen hours after being arrested.  As Kimsey was being released, he signed 
a document stating that he had initially refused to submit to chemical 
testing.  He claims he did not 
understand that he was signing a refusal to submit to chemical testing form and 
that he did so only so that he could be released from jail.  

[¶11]   The OAH heard the matter and upheld 
the implied consent suspension.  
Kimsey filed a Motion for New Trial and/or Relief from Judgment, which 
the OAH denied.  Kimsey then 
petitioned the district court for review of the OAH's order, and the district 
court certified the case to this court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b).  

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶12]   When the district court certifies 
an administrative agency's decision directly to this court, we review that 
agency decision under the same appellate standards applicable to the reviewing 
court of the first instance.  
Wesaw v. Quality Maintenance, 2001 WY 17, ¶8, 19 P.3d 500, ¶8 
(Wyo. 2001).  Our judicial review is 
limited to those considerations specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) 
(LexisNexis 2001), which provides:

            
To the extent necessary to make a decision and when pre­sented, the 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action.  In making the following determinations, 
the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party 
and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

            
* * *

            
(ii)        Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, find­ings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;

* * 
*

(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.  

[¶13]   In reviewing findings of fact, we 
examine the entire record to determine if there is sub­stantial evidence to 
support an agency's findings.  
Wesaw, ¶9.  If the 
agency's findings are supported by substantial evidence, we cannot properly 
substitute our judgment for that of the agency and must uphold the findings on 
appeal.  Id.  Substantial evidence is relevant 
evi­dence that a reasonable mind might accept in support of the conclusions 
of the agency.  It is more than a 
scintilla of evidence.  Id. 

[¶14]   Conclusions of law made by an 
administrative agency are affirmed only if they are in accord with the law.  Collicott v. State ex rel. Workers' 
Safety & Compensation Div., 2001 WY 35, ¶4, 20 P.3d 1077, ¶4 (Wyo. 
2001).  We do not afford any 
deference to the agency's determi­nation, and we will correct any error made 
by the agency in either interpreting or applying the law.  Id.

DISCUSSION

A.  Probable Cause

[¶15]   Kimsey contends that Officer 
Johnson lacked probable cause to arrest him for driving while under the 
influence because no one saw Kimsey actually driving his vehicle.  WYDOT counters that Officer Johnson had 
reasonable grounds to believe that Kimsey drove his vehicle while intoxicated, 
giving him probable cause to arrest him.  

[¶16]   The party who challenges whether 
the agency's decision was supported by sufficient evidence bears the burden of 
showing that it was not supported by such evidence.  Smith v. State ex rel. Dep't of 
Transp., 11 P.3d 931, 937 (Wyo. 2000).  
A police officer may arrest a person without a warrant if at the time of 
the arrest he possesses probable cause to believe that the person has committed 
a crime.  Jandro v. State, 
781 P.2d 512, 517 (Wyo. 1989).  
Probable cause exists when, given the totality of the circumstances, a 
prudent, reasonable, and cautious police officer is led to believe a crime has 
been committed by the person who is being arrested.  Smith, 11 P.3d  at 937.  Probable cause by definition involves 
probabilities rather than certainties.  
Id.

[¶17]   After analyzing the totality of the 
circumstances that led up to Kimsey's arrest, we hold that Officer Johnson 
possessed adequate probable cause to arrest Kimsey for driving while under the 
influence of alcohol.  It took only 
a few minutes for Kimsey to arrive at the Law Center after he called to inquire 
about the condition of his wife.  
Officer Johnson left the building just before Kimsey arrived, and when he 
returned to speak with Kimsey, he noticed the vehicle in the parking lot.  When Officer Johnson asked Kimsey about 
the truck, Kimsey admitted that it was his and that he had driven it to the Law 
Center, assuring Officer Johnson that he was okay to drive.  Officer Johnson told Kimsey that he 
thought Kimsey was too intoxicated to be driving, and Kimsey again assured 
Officer Johnson that he was all right to drive.  When Officer Johnson asked Kimsey to 
perform some field sobriety tests, Kimsey asked if he could just collect his 
wife and promised to walk home.  
Officer Johnson again requested Kimsey perform sobriety tests, and Kimsey 
replied that he did not drive the vehicle to the Law Center and that he did not 
know how it got there.  Kimsey 
next  gave the expla­nation that 
maybe his wife had driven the vehicle to the Law Center.  

[¶18]   Given the confusing nature of 
Kimsey's statements, along with his slurred speech, insta­bility, and the 
strong odor of alcohol, Officer Johnson concluded that Kimsey was 
intoxicated.  This conclusion, 
coupled with the presence of Kimsey's vehicle in the parking lot, encompass the 
reasonable conclusion that Kimsey was intoxicated and that he had driven his 
vehicle to the Law Center to check on his wife.  

[¶19]   Kimsey asserts to this court that 
when he told Officer Johnson he drove to the Law Center, he meant he had 
received a ride to the Law Center.  
We find it peculiar that Kimsey neither offered this excuse to any of the 
officers on the night he was arrested, nor did he pre­sent any evidence at 
the hearing regarding the identity of the individual he claims gave him the 
ride.  

[¶20]   We hold that the totality of the 
circumstances were adequate to cause a reasonable police officer to believe 
Kimsey had driven while under the influence of alcohol even though no one 
actually saw him driving the vehicle.  
Officer Johnson, therefore, possessed adequate probable cause to arrest 
Kimsey for driving while under the influence of alcohol.

B.  Chemical Tests

[¶21]   Kimsey next contends that the 
hearing examiner's finding that he refused to submit to all required chemical 
tests was not supported by substantial evidence.  He asserts that he did submit to the 
required tests and that the officers on duty that night banded together to 
fabricate their own official story of what transpired.  WYDOT replies that Kimsey initially 
refused to take a breathalyzer test, but did later take several so that the 
officers could determine when Kimsey could be released from jail.  

[¶22]   To support his argument, Kimsey 
claims that the detention officer advised that he had blown approximately a 
.17.  He maintains that this 
evidence corroborates that he did take a test.  He also insists that a .17 reading is 
more consistent with having been tested soon after he got there than after 
spending seventeen hours in jail.  

[¶23]   This court has adopted a bright 
line rule that states once a driver refuses to take a test, any subsequent 
attempt to rescind or cure that refusal is ineffective against the legal 
conse­quences of the initial refusal for the purposes of Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 31-6-102(d) (LexisNexis 
2001).  Farmer v. State, Dep't of 
Transp., 986 P.2d 165, 167-68 (Wyo. 1999).  We reiterated the policy considerations 
behind this bright line rule:

Implied 
consent laws generally have three objectives:  "(1) to discourage individuals from 
driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicants[;] (2) to remove 
the driving privi­leges from those individuals disposed to driving while 
inebri­ated[;] and (3) to provide an efficient means of gathering 
reli­able evidence of intoxication or nonintoxication."  [Department of Licensing v. Lax, 
125 Wash. 2d 818, 888 P.2d 1190, 1193 (1995)] (citing Nowell v. Department of 
Motor Vehicles, 83 Wash. 2d 121, 516 P.2d 205 (1973)).  

Id. at 
167.

[¶24]   The fundamental flaw with Kimsey's 
argument is that he fails to present any evidence to establish that he 
immediately took a breathalyzer test upon request.  It is undisputed that he did ultimately 
take several breathalyzer tests, but it is impossible to tell when Kimsey's 
witnesses might have heard this conversation.  

[¶25]   We are not persuaded by Kimsey's 
attempt to convince us that he complied with this rule by arguing that a .17 
reading lends itself more to a conclusion that he took the test right away.  All that reading showed was that Kimsey 
had a substantial amount of alcohol in his system at the time it was taken.  It has absolutely no value in proving 
the timing of the test or whether Kimsey initially refused to take it.  We hold that the hearing examiner's 
decision was supported by substantial evidence.

C.  Motion for New Trial And/Or Relief From Judgment

[¶26]   Kimsey finally asserts that the 
hearing examiner abused his discretion when he denied Kimsey's Motion for New 
Trial And/Or Relief From Judgment.  
In his argument on this issue, Kimsey claims that newly discovered 
evidence corroborates that he took a breathalyzer test immediately upon being 
arrested.  He maintains that two 
inmates who were incarcerated with his wife heard a conversation between the 
detention officer and Kimsey's wife indicating that her husband had been put in 
jail and that he had blown a .179.  
Kimsey offers affidavits from the two witnesses to this effect.  

[¶27]   The affidavits from these witnesses 
fail to establish when the test result was obtained.  The witnesses were not privy to any 
discussions among Kimsey and the officers, and their statements in no way prove 
that Kimsey did not initially refuse to take a breathalyzer test.   We agree with the hearing 
examiner's observation that the testimony, even if taken as true, "does not 
indicate whether or not the test allegedly taken by [Kimsey] was for the jail's 
internal purposes or whether the test was a test taken pursuant to Wyoming's 
implied consent law."   
Accordingly, we hold that the hearing examiner properly denied Kimsey's 
motion.

[¶28]   Affirmed.