Case Title: Jitnan v. Oliver

Citation: 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 35

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2011-07-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
127 Nev, Advance Opinion 35
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

BOONSONG JITNAN AND CHANLY No, 53225
THAN,
Appellants,
vs.
RYAN JAY OLIVER, INDIVIDUALLY; FILED
CANICA JAQUES CRUSHER, A
BUSINESS ENTITY UNKNOWN, A
WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF
‘TEREX CORPORATION, A BUSINESS
ENTITY UNKNOWN; TEREX CANICA,
A BUSINESS ENTITY UNKNOWN, A
WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF
‘TEREX CORPORATION, A BUSINESS
ENTITY UNKNOWN; TEREX
SIMPLICITY, A BUSINESS ENTITY
UNKNOWN, A WHOLLY OWNED
SUBSIDIARY OF TEREX
CORPORATION, A BUSINESS ENTITY
UNKNOWN; AND TEREX
CORPORATION, A BUSINESS ENTITY
UNKNOWN,
Respondents.

UL O7 2011

BOONSONG JITNAN AND CHANLY | No. 53340
THAN,
Appellants,

vs.
RYAN JAY OLIVER, INDIVIDUALLY;
CANICA JAQUES CRUSHER, A
BUSINESS ENTITY UNKNOWN, A
WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF
‘TEREX CORPORATION, A BUSINESS
ENTITY UNKNOWN; TEREX CANICA,
‘A BUSINESS ENTITY UNKNOWN, A
WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF
‘TEREX CORPORATION, A BUSINESS
ENTITY UNKNOWN; TEREX
SIMPLICITY, A BUSINESS ENTITY

 

 

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M- AOI6d

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UNKNOWN, A WHOLLY OWNED
SUBSIDIARY OF TEREX
CORPORATION, A BUSINESS ENTITY
UNKNOWN; AND TEREX
CORPORATION, A BUSINESS ENTITY

 

 

Consolidated appeals from a district court judgment and an
order awarding attorney fees and costs. Eighth Judicial District Court,
Clark County; Valorie Vega, Judge.

Affirmed.

Mainor Eglet Cottle and Robert T. Eglet and Lesley B. Miller, Las Vegas,
for Appellants.

Lewis & Roca LLP and Daniel F. Polsenberg, Joel D. Henriod, and
Jaqueline A. Gilbert, Las Vegas; Hall Jaffe & Clayton, LLP, and Steven
Jaffe and Ashlie Surur, Las Vegas,

for Respondents.

BEFORE SAITTA, HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, SAITTA, J.:

In these consolidated appeals, we address whether the district
court abused its discretion in denying a challenge for cause to a
prospective juror. We conclude that it did. We hold that when a

prospective juror expresses a potentially disqualifying opinion or bias and

 

is inconsistent in his or her responses regarding that preconception upon

 

 
further inquiry, the district court must set forth, on the record, the
reasons for its grant or denial of the challenge for cause. We conclude that
the district court erred in failing to do so. We nonetheless affirm the
judgment of the district court because the case was ultimately tried by a
fair and impartial jury.
ACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant Boonsong Jitnan was operating a cab when it was
struck from behind by a vehicle operated by respondent Ryan Jay Oliver.
At the time, Oliver was employed by respondents Canica Jaques Crusher,
Terex Canica, Terex Simplicity, and Terex Corporation (collectively,
Oliver). Boonsong and his wife, appellant Chanly Than (collectively,
Jitnan), instituted a personal injury action against Oliver for injuries
arising out of the accident. Subsequently, the district court granted
partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, determining that
ind

 

Oliver was the sole cause of the accident, that Oliver was negligent,
that there was no comparative negligence on the part of Jitnan, The case
then proceeded to trial on the issue of damages.

At the beginning of trial, the district court asked the panel of
prospective jurors whether any of them had been a party to a lawsuit.
Prospective juror no, 40 responded that he was sued as a result of a car
accident that he caused. The voir dire of prospective juror no. 40
proceeded as follows:

THE COURT: You understand that every
case has its own particular facts?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: Yes.

‘THE COURT: Will you be able to set aside
your own personal situation and listen to the
evidence in this case to make your decision here if
you're selected to serve?

 

 
nee

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: No.

‘THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to come back
to you in a little bit on that, okay?

I told you I was going to come back to
you to explore one of the issues that had come up
about your own personal suit and the motor
vehicle accident that you were involved in in 2005.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. And when I asked you
if you would be able to set that case aside and
determine this case based on the evidence, you
said no. That was what I wanted to explore with
you.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: Okay.

THE COURT: Can you tell me why that [is]?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: Just
between me personally being sued or actually
really the insurance company, and the fact that
Ive also been rear-ended, and obviously not
sued—or sued anybody. I just kind of have an
opinion that there are a lot of frivolous lawsuits in
the State of Nevada and just the advertisements
on TY, et cetera, et cetera. And the fact the one
that I was in when I got sued, the guy waited two
years to even have the lawsuit. Plus he refused
medical care on site. It's just my opinion that a lot,
of lawsuits are frivolous, so I feel pretty strongly
about it. And that would play a part in... me
being on the jury and my decision, so.

‘THE COURT: So you've kind of been in both,
situations—

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: Correct.
Yes.

‘THE COURT: —one where you were at fault
in an accident and one where somebody else was
at fault and involving you in an accident?

 

 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: Correct.

‘THE COURT: Do you think that all suits are
frivolous?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: No.

THE COURT: So whether a suit is frivolous
or not would depend on the evidence and the facts?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: Yes.

THE COURT: So would you be able to keep
an open mind to listen to the facts of this case to
make your decision?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: I want to
say yes but—

‘THE COURT: But what?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: I would say
no. No.

‘THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask you this
then. Do you think maybe half of the cases are
righteous and half are frivolous, or two percent are
righteous and 98 percent are frivolous, or where
would you put yourself?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: I think the
insurance company payls] for medical bills, pay[s]
to fix the car, they lost a couple days of work, took
care of that, and that's all you're entitled to,
period. So nothing more above and beyond that.

THE COURT: Okay. So just the—just the
concrete bills or the—that can—the invoices that
people have, that’s what you would limit them to,
is that what you're saying?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Does plaintifffs’]
counsel wish to ask him any questions on that?

[JITNAN'S COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor.

‘THE COURT: And does defendants counsel?

 
[OLIVER'S COUNSEL): If 1 may, Your
Honor.

Ifyou said you accept the concept that
there are lawsuits that may be legitimate, correct?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: Correct.
Yes.

[OLIVER'S COUNSEL}: And do you—do you
accept the concept that people can be legitimately
hurt in an accident?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: Yes.

[OLIVER'S COUNSEL]: Even in no
circumstances would you have a problem with
pain and suffering awards?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: In no
circumstances?

[OLIVER'S COUNSEL}: In no circumstances
if somebody was legitimately hurt.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: If
somebody was legitimately hurt, obviously it
wasn’t their fault, and for some reason they
couldn't work anymore, then I would say yes. I
mean as far as a cash settlement of some kind, I
would say they're entitled to that.

[OLIVER'S COUNSEL]: Let me—there is a
dispute on these. I don't want to, you know, lead
you down the wrong path.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: Okay.

[OLIVER'S COUNSEL]: We do have a
dispute about the injuries that this accident did
cause, if any—

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: Mm-hmm.

[OLIVER'S COUNSEL]: —and I mean that’s
one of the reasons why we're here,

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: Yes.

 

 
om

[OLIVER'S COUNSEL]: But given the fact
that you do accept that there could be some
lawsuits that are legitimately based, and people
could legitimately be entitled to pain and
suffering, would you be able to at least listen to
the facts of this case to see if it fell within that
arena before you made your decision, and give
both sides the benefit of the doubt?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: Yes, I
would listen to the facts, but I do have a biased
opinion of it, I guess, already.

[SITNAN'S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I have
an officer outside, as far as I know, and I would
ask that he be excused for cause.

[OLIVER'S COUNSEL}: Your Honor, I think
the Court's just giving me an opportunity to ask
some questions.

[OLIVER'S COUNSEL]: You said you've
already got certain thoughts built into your mind
about this case, correct?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: Correct.

[OLIVER'S COUNSEL]: You haven't heard
any evidence in the case, right?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: Correct.
Yes.

[OLIVER'S COUNSEL}: If the evidence that
came into the case was different from what you've
built up in your mind, would you listen and fairly
weigh the facts of the case and give both sides the
benefit of that doubt?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: Yes.

[JITNAN'S COUNSEL}: May I inquire that
[sic]?

 

 
on

‘THE COURT: You may.

[JITNAN'S COUNSEL): And what I was
hearing is, you don't believe in—much in people
coming to court to recover anything more than
medical bills or the time they've missed from
work. Am I pretty accurate in that?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: Yes.

(JIPNAN'S COUNSEL}: All right. And in a
case where as they say they've missed time from
work or the car’s got damage or they have medical
bills, but they want something more, you have a
problem with that something more, wouldn't you?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: Yes.

(JITNAN'S COUNSEL}: And the reason for
that is, we're all different. My dad used to say
that’s why they make strawberry, chocolate and
vanilla ice cream, a flavor for everybody. You
believe that people shouldn't get something for
pain and suffering, isn't that right?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: Yes.

(ITNAN'S COUNSEL]: Okay. Nothing
further.

THE COURT: Anything further, [Jitnan’s
counsel]?

[OLIVER'S COUNSEL): But if somebody
was legitimately hurt and did legitimately suffer
pain, you wouldn't have any problem in those
circumstances?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 40: Yes,

THE COURT: The Court's going to deny the
challenge for cause.

 
Following the district court's denial of the challenge for cause,
Jitnan was provided with an opportunity to question the prospective juror
panel. In so doing, ditnan inquired whether the prospective jurors
believed it was improper for a plaintiff to seek pain and suffering
damages, Juror H, who eventually served on the jury but was just @
prospective juror at the time, responded in the affirmative, stating that

“there is a point you can go beyond ¥

 

son,” and that there is “a tendency
to ask for more than is what I believe is reasonable in some cases.” Also,
Juror H indicated that she was unsure if she could award damay
injured party's spouse, even if she were instructed that the spouse is

toan

 

entitled to receive such damages. Despite these responses, Jitnan did not
challenge Juror H for cause, nor did he exercise a peremptory challenge on
her. But Jitnan did exercise a peremptory challenge on prospective juror
no, 40 and ultimately exhausted all of his peremptory challenges. At that
time, Jitnan did not state, or even suggest, that Juror H was an
unacceptable juror, nor did he inform the district court that he would have
exercised a peremptory challenge to remove Juror H if prospective juror
no, 40 had been dismissed for cause. Likewise, Jitnan did not object to the
seated jury. The jury ultimately awarded Jitnan $47,472 in damages.

Jitnan now appeals.

DISCUSSION
‘The district court abused its discretion in denving the challenge for cause

to prospective juror no. 40

Jitnan argues that the district court abused its discretion in
failing to disqualify prospective juror no. 40 for cause. He asserts that the
voir dire of prospective juror no, 40 revealed a fixed bias or opinion that

prevented him from performing his duties

 

@ a juror. In particular, Jitnan

contends that prospective juror no. 40 we

 

biased against plaintiffs in

 
oH

personal injury cases and stated a predetermined opinion that such
plaintiffs are not entitled to damages for pain and suffering. He therefore
argues that prospective juror no. 40 should have been dismissed for
cause.

A district court's ruling on a challenge for cause involves
factual determinations, and therefore, the district court enjoys “broad
discretion,” as it “is better able to view a prospective juror's demeanor
than a subsequent reviewing court.” Leonard v. State, 117 Nev, 53, 67, 17
P.3d 397, 406 (2001). Among other grounds, a prospective juror may be

challenged for cause for:

(Having formed or expressed an
unqualified opinion or belief as to the merits of the
action, or the main question involved therein ... .
(@) The existence of a state of mind in the
juror evincing enmity against or bias to either
party.
RS 16.050(1).

In determining if a prospective juror should have been

 

removed for cause, the relevant inquiry focuses on whether the “juror's

views

 

‘ould prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties
Weber v.

 

as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath,

Witnan also asserts that (1) the district court erred in failing to
provide the jury with proof of the amount of his workers’ compensation
benefits; and (2) the district court abused its discretion when it required
the jury to begin deliberation after a day of trial, beginning at
approximately 9 p.m., just before a holiday, thereby coercing a prompt
verdict. We have considered these claims and conclude that they are
without merit.

10

 

 
os

 

State, 121 Nev. 554, 680, 119 P.3d 107, 125 (2005) (quoting Leonard, 117
Nev. at 65, 17 P.8d at 405 (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424
(1985))). Broadly speaking, if a prospective juror expresses a preconceived
opinion or bias about the case, that juror should not be removed for cause
if the record as a whole demonstrates that the prospective juror could “lay
aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence
presented in court.” Blake v, State, 121 Nev. 779, 795, 121 P.3d 667, 67
(2005) (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961). But “{dletached
language considered alone is not sufficient to establish that a juror can be
fair when the juror’s declaration as a whole indicates that she could not
state unequivocally that a preconception would not influence her verdict.”
Weber, 121 Nev. at 681, 119 P.3d at 126.

During jury selection, prospective juror no, 40 expressed an
opinion or bias against plaintiffs in personal injury cases because of his
own prior experience with similar lawsuits. When asked whether he could
set these opinions and impressions aside and assess the current case
based on the evidence, prospective juror no. 40 responded that he could
not. The juror went on to explain that he believed “a lot of lawsuits are
frivolous,” and that this would influence his decision. Jitnan then
inquired further, seeking to rehabilitate the prospective juror. While
prospective juror no, 40 retreated somewhat from his opinions, again, he
fell back on his previously stated preconceptions—that many claims
similar to Jitnan’s were illegitimate and that plaintiffs should not be
entitled to damages for pain and suffering. Probably most indicative of
the fact that the prospective juror could not “lay aside his impression or
opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence,” Blake, 121 Nev. at
795, 121 P.3d at 577 (quoting Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723), were prospective

u

 
juror no, 40's answers to the final two questions propounded during voir
dire. In response to ditnan’s question, he answered that plaintiffs should
not receive damages for pain and suffering, but indicated the opposite
when Oliver asked the same question. Indeed, despite prospective juror
no, 40's ever-changing position when questioned by counsel, the record as
a whole demonstrates that the prospective juror had a fixed opinion and
bias toward plaintiffs in personal injury cases and that his preconception
would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a
juror, given the nature of this case, We therefore conclude that the
district court abused its discretion in denying the challenge for cause.

‘We further beliove that the voir dire of prospective juror no. 40
exemplifies a situation where a district court must set forth, on the record,
findings explaining the basis of

 

ruling. The prospective juror in this
case continually gave inconsistent responses—at times he indicated that
he could be fair and impartial, and at others he reiterated his preconceived
opinion and bias, Of course, we are aware that our review of a decision on
a challenge for cause is deferential; however, “[dJeferential review is not
no review” and “does not automatically mandate adherence to [the district

court's] decision.” McDonald v, Western-Southern Life Ins. Co,, 347 F.3d
161, 172 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hess v, Hartford Life & Ace, Ins, Co,, 274

F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 2001). Without an explanation of the reasons or
bases for a district court's decision, meaningful appellate review, even a
deferential one, is hampered because we are left to mere speculation. See,
e.g., Lioce v. Cohen, 124 Nev. 1, 20, 174 P.3d 970, 982 (2008) (specific on-
the-record findings “enable{]] our review of [the district court's] exercise of
discretion”); Rosky v. State, 121 Nev. 184, 191, 111 P.3d 690, 695 (2005)
(requiring findings “facilitate[s} proper appellate review” and fosters

12

 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
 
 
   
  
  
   
  
  

“synergy between the trial and reviewing courts {s0] that appellate courts
can develop a uniform body of precedent” (internal quotation omitted));
Las Vegas Novelty v. Fernandez, 106 Nev. 113, 119, 787 P.2d 772, 776
(1990) (requirement that a district court state reasons for permanent
injunction is “intended primarily to facilitate appellate review"). Indeed,
our statutory scheme embraces the notion that a decision on a challenge
for cause is of a magnitude warranting findings. See NRS 16.060
(Challenges for cause shall be tried by the [district] court,” and “[t]he
juror challenged and any other person may be examined
the trial of the challenge.” (Emphases added,)).

We are cognizant that district courts “rule on cause challenges,
by the minute,” United States v, Martiner-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 310
(2000) (internal quotation omitted), and we do not wish to make light of

a witness on

 

that fact, We do not mean to suggest that a district court must explain the
basis of its decision each time it grants or denies a challenge for cause.
Rather, we hold that when a district court is faced with a situation such as
the one in this case—that is, when a prospective juror expresses a
potentially disqualifying opinion or bias and is then inconsistent in his or
her responses regarding that preconceived opinion or bias—the district
court must set forth, on the record, the reasons for its grant or denial of a
challenge for cause, We believe that this will enable an appellant to
understand the precise basis for the district court's decision, as well as
facilitate informed review in this court. Because the district court failed to
do so here, we conclude that it erred,
ditnan cannot demonstrate prejudicial error requirin,

Jitnan contends that the district court's erroneous denial of
the challenge for cause to prospective juror no. 40 requires reversal. He
argues that because he was required to use a peremptory challenge to cure

13
oe

 
the district court's error, he lost one of his peremptory challenges, which
he asserts was in and of itself prejudicial. Jitnan also contends that the
curative use of his peremptory challenge, in removing prospective juror no.
40, was prejudicial because it prevented him from using a peremptory
challenge on Juror H.

‘The United States Supreme Court has definitively held that
the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause of a prospective juror,
followed by a party's use of a peremptory challenge to remove that juror,
does not deprive the party “of any rule-based or constitutional right” so
long as the jury that sits is impartial, Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 307;
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88-91 (1988). In short, “peremptory
challenges are not of federal constitutional dimension.” Martinez-Salazar,
528 U.S. at 311, We have likewise held that the curative use of a
peremptory challenge does not violate a party's state constitutional rights

unless he or she demonstrates actual prejudice; in other words, he or she

 

must show that a member of the jury was unfair or partial? Blake, 121
Nev. at 796, 121 P.3d at 578; Weber, 121 Nov. at 581, 119 P.8d at 125-26;
Wesley v, State, 112 Nev. 503, 511, 916 P.2d 793, 799 (1996). We

*Jitnan relies on Burch v, Southern Pacific, 32 Nev. 75, 105, 104 P.
225, 229 (1909), in which we suggested, in dictum, that the erroneous
denial of a challenge for cause and the subsequent use of a peremptory
challenge to cure that wrongful denial would amount to reversible error.
While Burch has not been explicitly overruled, it has been abrogated by
our more recent opinions. Blake, 121 Nev. at 796, 121 P.3d at 578; Weber,
121 Nev. at 581, 119 P.3d at 125-26; Wesley v. State, 112 Nev. 508, 511,
916 P.2d 793, 799 (1996); Thompson v, State, 102 Nev. 348, 350, 721 P.2d
1290, 1291 (1986). Also, the statement is dictum and therefore “not
controlling.” Argentena Consol. Mining Co. v. Jolley Urga, 125 Nev. 527,
536, 216 P.3d 779, 785 (2009).

 

 
therefore reject Jitnan’s contention that the loss of one of his peremptory
challenges was, in and of itself, prejudicial, requiring reversal.

Jitnan has also failed to show actual prejudice, Although
Jitnan asserts that Juror H, a biased juror, was forced upon him, the

record revi

 

Is otherwise. Jitnan did not challenge Juror H for cause. He
never stated, or even suggested, that Juror H was an unacceptable juror,
nor did he inform the district court that he would have exercised a
peremptory challenge to remove Juror H if prospective juror no, 40 had

been removed for cause. In fact, Jitnan did not take issue with the jury as

 

seated. As a result, Jitnan cannot demonstrate prejudice requiring
1. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.?
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the record as a whole demonstrates that

rever'

 

prospective juror no. 40 had a preconceived opinion and bias that would
prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror.
We therefore determine that the district court abused its discretion in
denying the challenge for cause. We hold that when a prospective juror
expresses a potentially disqualifying bias or prejudice and is inconsistent
in his or her responses regarding that preconception upon further inquiry,

SJitnan also appealed from the district court's order granting
Oliver's motion for costs and attorney fees. Jitnan, however, makes no
argument regarding the award of costs and fees. As a result, we affirm
the district court's order awarding costs and fees. See Edwards v.
Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 190 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38
(2006) (if an appellant neglects to fulfill his or her “responsibility to
cogently argue, and present relevant authority, in support of his or her]
appellate concerns,” this court will not consider the claims); NRAP
28(a)(8).

 

 
as here, the district court must set forth, on the record, the reasons for its
grant or denial of the challenge for cause. We conclude that the district
court erred in failing to do so, We nonetheless determine that there wa
no prejudicial error requiring reversal because the jury that decided
Jitnan’s case was fair and impartial. We therefore affirm the judgment of
the district court.

 

We concur:

 

‘We note that Oliver originally filed a cross-appeal in this case;
however, the cross-appeal was subsequently dismissed by this court
pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. Despite the dismissal, Oliver, in his
answering brief, asks us to revisit the district court's grant of partial
summary judgment as to his negligence and Jitnan’s lack of comparative
negligence. Oliver, however, has not pursued his appeal from the district
court’s judgment or any of its orders, and therefore, we are without
jurisdiction to entertain these contentions. NRAP 8A(a)-(b); Ford_v.
Showboat Operating Co., 110 Nev. 752, 755-56, 877 P.2d 546, 548-49
(1994),