Case Title: Commonwealth v. Scanlon

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13375

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2024-01-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13375 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  BLAKE SCANLON. 
 
 
January 18, 2024. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
District Attorney.  Attorney at Law, Disqualification.  
Constitutional Law, Separation of powers. 
 
 
 
The Commonwealth appeals from a judgment of a single 
justice of this court denying its petition pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3.  We affirm. 
 
 
Background.  In April 2019, a Hampden County grand jury 
indicted the defendant, Blake Scanlon, on one count of murder in 
the first degree, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 1; and one 
count of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, in 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b).  Two years later, in April 
2021, a Hampshire County grand jury indicted Scanlon on one 
count of solicitation to commit witness intimidation and two 
counts of solicitation to commit murder, all in violation of 
G. L. c. 274, § 8.  The victim of one of the counts of 
solicitation to commit murder in the Hampshire County case is 
the prosecutor in the Hampden County case, Matthew Green.  On 
the basis that, through certain of his own actions, Green made 
himself a potential witness at trial, Scanlon filed a motion to 
disqualify him, as well as the whole of the district attorney's 
office for the Hampden district, from prosecuting the Hampden 
2 
 
County indictment, and to instead appoint a special 
prosecutor.1,2 
 
After a hearing, a judge in the Superior Court allowed 
Scanlon's motion to the extent that it sought to disqualify 
Green, but she denied it to the extent that it sought to 
disqualify the entire office of the Hampden district attorney.3  
The Commonwealth thereafter filed a petition pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, arguing that the judge abused her discretion in 
disqualifying Green.  A single justice denied the petition on 
the basis that the disqualification order did not constitute an 
abuse of discretion.  The Commonwealth appeals. 
 
 
Scanlon's motion to disqualify Green stems from Green's 
involvement with Christopher Fiorentino, a so-called jailhouse 
informant, who was incarcerated with Scanlon at the Hampshire 
County house of correction.  Fiorentino told State police 
investigators that Scanlon had made statements and admissions 
about the murder, and that Scanlon had tried to engage 
Fiorentino in a murder-for-hire plot targeting both Green and 
several Commonwealth witnesses.  The Commonwealth and Fiorentino 
entered into an agreement providing that in exchange for 
 
 
1 Pursuant to Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.7, as appearing in 471 
Mass. 1434 (2015): 
 
"A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the 
lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless: 
 
 
"(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
 
 
"(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of 
legal services rendered in the case; or 
 
 
"(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work 
substantial hardship on the client." 
 
 
2 Although the defendant initially appeared to indicate that 
the basis for the disqualification motion was that the 
prosecutor was the victim of one of the counts of solicitation 
to commit murder, he later clarified that this was not the basis 
for the motion. 
 
 
3 The judge subsequently denied the Commonwealth's motion 
for reconsideration, in a written decision after a second 
hearing, and then issued yet another (third) written decision, 
on the Commonwealth's second motion for reconsideration. 
3 
 
Fiorentino's cooperation with the Hampden district attorney's 
office regarding the investigation and prosecution of Scanlon, 
the Commonwealth would take Fiorentino's cooperation into 
consideration in two contexts:  (1) in resolving his pending 
criminal matters within the Hampden district attorney's office; 
and (2) to "assist and inform" the Worcester district attorney's 
office regarding the resolution of his pending probation 
violation in that county.  The agreement was signed by Green. 
 
 
In the course of upholding the cooperation agreement, Green 
appeared in court in Worcester County as least twice to, in 
Green's own words, "advocate[]" for a lower sentence for 
Fiorentino in connection with his probation violation in that 
county.4  Green also advocated on Fiorentino's behalf several 
times when Fiorentino sought modifications of certain conditions 
of release that would apply once he becomes eligible for 
release. 
 
 
These actions are what makes Green a potential witness at 
Scanlon's murder trial.  The Commonwealth has indicated that it 
intends to call Fiorentino as a witness.  If Fiorentino 
testifies in conflict with any of the disclosures made by Green 
regarding the cooperation agreement and Green's role in securing 
lesser penalties for Fiorentino, Green may be called to testify.  
Even if that does not happen -- that is, even if Fiorentino's 
testimony is in line with what Green disclosed -- Scanlon has 
indicated that he intends to deny the conversations with 
Fiorentino and to vigorously cross-examine Fiorentino so as to 
call Fiorentino's credibility into question and show bias in 
favor of the Commonwealth.  Either way, it seems likely that the 
details of Green's involvement in Fiorentino's cooperation with 
the Commonwealth will come to light at trial. 
 
 
Discussion.  Disqualification of counsel is not a measure 
to be taken lightly.  See, e.g., Adoption of Erica, 426 Mass. 
55, 58 (1997).  In considering whether to disqualify counsel, a 
judge "must closely scrutinize the facts before [him or her] to 
determine whether a lawyer's 'continued participation as counsel 
taints the legal system.'"  Smaland Beach Ass'n, Inc. v. Genova, 
 
 
4 In connection with Fiorentino's probation violation in 
Worcester County, the Worcester district attorney's office 
initially requested a longer sentence; Green persuaded them to 
agree to a lower recommendation, which the judge ultimately 
imposed, over the objection of the probation department.  Green 
also agreed to reduce Fiorentino's bail on a pending matter in 
Hampden County. 
4 
 
461 Mass. 214, 224-225 (2012), quoting Borman v. Borman, 378 
Mass. 775, 788 (1979).  See also, e.g., Slade v. Ormsby, 69 
Mass. App. Ct. 542, 546 (2007) (motions to disqualify are, by 
their nature, intensely fact specific, and charges of conflict 
of interest warrant searching review before ordering 
disqualification).  There is no question that the judge did that 
here, that she engaged in the requisite analysis and gave due 
consideration to the facts and circumstances of this case, as 
evidenced by the multiple hearings and her three written 
decisions. 
 
 
Pursuant to Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.7 (a), as appearing in 471 
Mass. 1434 (2015), a lawyer "shall not act as advocate at a 
trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness."  
See note 1, supra.  The Commonwealth argues that the judge erred 
in disqualifying Green on the basis that he is only a 
"potential" witness and not inevitably "likely to be a necessary 
witness."  Moreover, the Commonwealth argues, even if Green were 
a necessary witness, there are other means by which information 
within Green's personal knowledge could be elicited at trial, 
i.e., other witnesses who could testify to the same information 
or certain facts to which the Commonwealth would stipulate, 
obviating the need for some witness testimony.  See Smaland 
Beach Ass'n, Inc., 461 Mass. at 221 ("judges . . . should 
consider whether the information sought from the attorney-
witness can be presented in a different manner"). 
 
 
It is not, however, clear that this is so, and indeed, 
Scanlon argues that there is certain information that is not 
otherwise obtainable if not from Green himself, due in part to 
the degree to which Green inserted himself into Fiorentino's 
cases.  To the extent that the Commonwealth suggests that 
Scanlon is using Green's role as a potential witness to 
"tactical advantage" and "as a weapon to maneuver [opposing 
counsel's] withdrawal," see id., we find no merit to this 
argument.  Although a cooperation agreement between the 
Commonwealth and one of its witnesses, and the revelation of 
such an agreement at trial, is by no means extraordinary, the 
level of Green's involvement with Fiorentino was extensive, and 
Scanlon's concerns are well founded.  The judge, in short, did 
not err in concluding that precluding Scanlon from calling Green 
as a witness was not a viable option in the circumstances. 
 
 
The Commonwealth also argues that the judge's 
disqualification of Green raises separation of powers concerns, 
and violates art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 
because it constitutes improper judicial interference in an 
5 
 
executive branch decision, i.e., the district attorney's 
discretion to choose the prosecutor.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Cheney, 440 Mass. 568, 574 (2003), and cases cited (judicial 
review of decisions within executive discretion of prosecutor 
constitutes "intolerable interference by the judiciary in the 
executive department" and violates art. 30 [citation omitted]).  
The argument is not persuasive.  The judge's decision was not 
baseless -- she did not arbitrarily or with no reason disqualify 
a prosecutor, and she only disqualified Green, not the entire 
office as Scanlon had requested.  Additionally, this is not a 
case of a judicial ruling that bears on whether to prosecute.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rosa, 491 Mass. 369, 372 (2023), and 
cases cited (decision to proceed with prosecution lies 
exclusively with executive branch).  In short, the judge's 
decision does not amount to an "intolerable interference by the 
judiciary" in the executive branch.  This is simply a case where 
a judge made a discretionary decision, based on the particular 
circumstances of the case, to disqualify an attorney who may 
well be a witness at trial. 
 
 
Conclusion.  The single justice did not err or abuse his 
discretion in affirming the trial court judge's decision and in 
denying relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
Lee Baker, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Marissa Elkins for the defendant. 
 
 
5 The judge's decision to allow the motion to disqualify 
Green was based in part on the appearance of impropriety.  Our 
decision is not based on that issue -- and we express no view on 
that issue -- but rather on the level to which Green was engaged 
with Fiorentino's cases and circumstances.