Case Title: Gill Mortuary v. Sutoris, Inc.

Citation: 207 Kan. 557, 485 P.2d 1377

Docket Number: 46,029

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1971-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
207 Kan. 557 (1971)
485 P.2d 1377
GILL MORTUARY (MILLIE E. GILL, Appellant,
v.
SUTORIS, INC., and PAUL E. SUTORIS, Appellees.
No. 46,029

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 12, 1971.
Orlin L. Wagner, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Michael D. Wilson, of Wichita, was with him on the brief for the appellant.
Richard T. Foster, of McDonald, Tinker, Skaer, Quinn and Herrington, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARMAN, C.:
The action in district court was one to compel specific performance of two leases of billboard space on each side of a business building or, in the alternative, for damages for failure to perform.
Trial was to the court. At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence the court sustained defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal. Plaintiff appeals from that order.
The matters at issue can best be understood by reciting the findings made by the trial court:
Recapitulating the more significant events chronologically, the five year term leases between appellant Millie E. Gill and the initial lessor or building owner by their terms became effective January 1, 1963, and February 3, 1963; the lessor entered into a contract of sale for the building with appellees on December 6, 1966, and conveyed title to the building to the latter by warranty deed March 16, 1967; appellant removed her signs from the building either in March or April, 1967, and appellees thereafter constructed the carwash enterprise on the entire block in question; on February 8, 1968, appellant exercised its claimed option to renew the leases, and on February 19, 1968, appellees declared the leases terminated.
Based on its findings the trial court made the following conclusions:
The court thereupon entered judgment against appellant.
In urging reversal appellant treats the trial court's action as though it amounted to entry of summary judgment rather than an order sustaining a motion for involuntary dismissal. She argues the court erroneously failed to construe the evidence strictly against appellees and liberally in favor of appellant. No such rule prevails where trial is to the court. In the oft-cited case of Mackey-Woodard, Inc. v. Citizens State Bank, 197 Kan. 536, 419 P.2d 847, we held:
Actually appellant does not in any of her contentions question the existence of substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings. Hence if those findings justify any of the several conclusions of law adverse to appellant, and the judgment rendered thereon, appellant cannot prevail.
Among other matters, the trial court concluded the two leases had by their own terms expired prior to any attempt by appellant to exercise the renewal option and therefore the attempt was ineffective (Concl. No. 3).
Each lease contained a provision it could be renewed for an additional period of five years at the option of the lessee, such option to be exercised in writing at least ninety days prior to the expiration of the lease. Appellant argues she did in fact timely exercise the option to renew. She bases this argument on her contention the leases were suspended for a period of time while the old building was being razed and the new structure was being built, and that the leases did not expire until July 1, 1969. Upon *562 what legal premise the leases remained viable until that date is not made clear. Appellant has conceded throughout that the terms of the leases are clear and unambiguous. In finding No. 17 the trial court specifically found there was no mutual understanding or agreement, written or oral, between the parties for any modification or suspension of the terms of the leases so as to have extended them or prevented their expiration on December 31, 1967, and February 2, 1968. Mutuality is required in order to amend the terms of a contract and one party cannot unilaterally change its terms (Guy Pine, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 201 Kan. 371, 376, 440 P.2d 595; Fast v. Kahan, 206 Kan. 682, 481 P.2d 958). Hence the purported exercise of the options to renew made on February 8, 1968, came too late.
Appellant complains the trial court actually made an oral finding from the bench at the conclusion of her evidence to the effect the leases were still in their base period. These comments were made in connection with the court's discussion of the February 19, 1968, termination by appellees to indicate that in any event following a sale of the building after the leases had been in operation for a period of thirty-six months (which situation existed) the appellees could rightfully terminate. Beyond this, however, where inconsistency exists, express written findings of fact formally made and entered as the judgment of the court must prevail over informal oral remarks previously made from the bench (see cases cited in 2B Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, rules ed., 1970 Pocket Part, § 1128, note 93, p. 199).
Appellant stresses the fact that appellees in their contract for the purchase of the building acknowledged the existence of and agreed to honor the signboard leases. This fact, however, does not advance appellant's cause inasmuch as appellees have done nothing in violation of the leases. Even their final termination of the leases, assuming they were still in effect, was specifically authorized by a clause in the leases and would be operative despite any extension or renewal clause in them (see Batchelor's Building Maintenance Service, Inc. v. Douglas Avenue Corp. Inc., 205 Kan. 149, 468 P.2d 189, in which a termination by notice clause in a contract for janitorial service for a building was held to take precedence over a clause providing that one year's contract rights would be guaranteed in event the building owner sold the building).
Appellant's argument essentially is that appellees cannot avoid *563 their contractual duty simply because they do not wish to have the billboard displays re-erected, which, as indicated, disregards plain provisions in the leases as to termination dates and the right to cancel upon sale after thirty-six months' operation.
We have considered other matters raised by appellant, including the exclusion of an exhibit offered by her to show removal and relocation costs of the signs, but find nothing to warrant disturbing the judgment and it is affirmed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.