Case Title: D'Amico v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 130549

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2014-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
PAUL J. D'AMICO 
 
 
 
 
  OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 130549 
JUSTICE ELIZABETH A. McCLANAHAN 
 
 
 
     FEBRUARY 27, 2014 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY 
Robert M.D. Turk, Judge 
 
 
The circuit court found Paul J. D'Amico guilty of 
unreasonably refusing to submit to a breath test in violation 
of Code § 18.2-268.3.  On appeal, D'Amico contends the circuit 
court erroneously admitted into evidence the arresting 
officer's "Declaration and Acknowledgment of Refusal" form 
required by subsections B and C of the statute.  D'Amico also 
challenges the circuit court's denial of his motion to strike 
the Commonwealth's evidence.  We affirm his conviction. 
I.  Background 
 
Deputy A.J. Shrader, Jr., of the Montgomery County 
Sheriff's Office, arrested D'Amico for driving under the 
influence of alcohol (Code § 18.2-266).  At that time, Shrader 
"advise[d] [D'Amico] of Virginia's implied consent law," which 
Shrader read from "the standard card that [he] kept with [him].  
Shrader then transported D'Amico to the Montgomery County 
magistrate's office and left D'Amico with Officer Mike F. 
Nelson of the Christiansburg Police Department to conduct the 
"DUI breath test." 
 
2 
 
Before administering the breath test, Nelson read to 
D'Amico the information contained in the Declaration and 
Acknowledgment of Refusal form (hereinafter the "refusal form") 
as specified in Code § 18.2-268.3(B).1  D'Amico stated in 
response that "he wanted his attorney and if his attorney said 
to take [the breath test], he would."  Nelson then asked 
D'Amico three times to take the test, but D'Amico refused and 
cursed at Nelson.  Afterwards, Shrader returned for D'Amico, 
took him to the magistrate and obtained a summons against him 
                      
 
1 Subsection B of Code § 18.2-268.3 states, in relevant 
part: 
 
 
When a person is arrested for a violation of [§] 18.2-
266 . . . and such person refuses to permit blood or 
breath or both blood and breath samples to be taken for 
testing as required by § 18.2-268.2, the arresting officer 
shall advise the person, from a form provided by the 
Office of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court, 
that (i) a person who operates a motor vehicle upon a 
highway in the Commonwealth is deemed thereby, as a 
condition of such operation, to have consented to have 
samples of his blood and breath taken for chemical tests 
to determine the alcohol or drug content of his blood, 
(ii) a finding of unreasonable refusal to consent may be 
admitted as evidence at a criminal trial, (iii) the 
unreasonable refusal to do so constitutes grounds for the 
revocation of the privilege of operating a motor vehicle 
upon the highways of the Commonwealth, (iv) the criminal 
penalty for unreasonable refusal within 10 years of a 
prior conviction for driving while intoxicated or 
unreasonable refusal is a Class 2 misdemeanor, and (v) the 
criminal penalty for unreasonable refusal within 10 years 
of any two prior convictions for driving while intoxicated 
or unreasonable refusal is a Class 1 misdemeanor. 
 
 
 
3 
on the charge of unreasonably refusing to submit to a breath 
test in violation of Code § 18.2-268.3, first offense.2 
 
In obtaining the summons, Shrader presented to the 
magistrate a refusal form bearing his signature.  The refusal 
form indicated that Shrader, as the arresting officer, had read 
the form to D'Amico, and that D'Amico, "after having th[e] form 
read to him[,] refused to permit the taking of a breath and/or 
blood sample." 
 
At the bench trial on D'Amico's refusal charge, Shrader and 
Nelson testified for the Commonwealth.  Shrader acknowledged 
during his testimony that he could not recall whether he had in 
fact read the refusal form to D'Amico.  D'Amico objected to the 
Commonwealth's motion to admit into evidence the refusal form 
signed by Shrader (hereinafter the "Shrader form").  D'Amico 
argued, inter alia, that the Shrader form was inadmissible 
because the Commonwealth's evidence established that Nelson, 
the breath test operator, and not Shrader, the arresting 
officer, read the refusal form to D'Amico, contrary to the 
terms of Code § 18.2-268.3(B).  Furthermore, D'Amico asserted, 
Shrader wrongfully certified to the magistrate on the Shrader 
form that he read this form to D'Amico, contrary to the terms 
                      
 
2 Pursuant to subsection D of Code § 18.2-268.3, "[a] first 
violation is a civil offense and subsequent violations are 
criminal offenses.  For a first offense the court shall suspend 
the defendant's privilege to drive for a period of one year." 
 
4 
of Code § 18.2-268.3(C).3  In response, the Commonwealth argued 
that the combined actions of Shrader and Nelson were in 
substantial compliance with the procedures set forth in 
subsections B and C of Code § 18.2-268.3, which was all that 
was required under the governing standard provided in Code § 
18.2-268.11.4  The circuit court took D'Amico's objection under 
advisement. 
 
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case, D'Amico 
presented no evidence, but moved to strike the Commonwealth's 
evidence on the same grounds that he opposed the admission of 
the Shrader form.  Absent this form's admission, D'Amico 
argued, the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case 
                      
 
3 Subsection C of Code § 18.2-268.3 states, in relevant 
part: 
 
 
The arresting officer shall, under oath before the 
magistrate, execute the form and certify, (i) that the 
defendant has refused to permit blood or breath or both 
blood and breath samples to be taken for testing; (ii) 
that the officer has read the portion of the form 
described in subsection B to the arrested person; [and] 
(iii) that the arrested person, after having had the 
portion of the form described in subsection B read to him, 
has refused to permit such sample or samples to be taken . 
. . .  Such sworn certification shall constitute probable 
cause for the magistrate to issue a warrant or summons 
charging the person with unreasonable refusal. 
 
 
4 Code § 18.2-268.11 states, in relevant part, that "[t]he 
steps set forth in §§ 18.2-268.2 through 18.2-268.9 relating to 
taking, handling, identifying, and disposing of blood or breath 
samples are procedural and not substantive," and that 
"[s]ubstantial compliance shall be sufficient." 
 
5 
of unreasonable refusal.  The circuit court took the case under 
advisement, deferring its rulings on the admissibility of the 
Shrader form and the motion to strike. 
 
The circuit court subsequently overruled D'Amico's 
objection to the Shrader form and found him guilty as charged, 
based on the testimony of Shrader and Nelson that D'Amico was 
arrested under Code § 18.2-266 and refused to submit to the 
breath test in order to first speak with his attorney. 
 
We granted D'Amico this appeal in which he argues in his 
assignments of error that the circuit court erred by admitting 
the Shrader form and denying his motion to strike. 
II.  Analysis 
 
Central to D'Amico's challenges to the circuit court's 
rulings is his contention that the circuit court erroneously 
construed Code § 18.2-268.3 with regard to the elements of the 
unreasonable refusal offense.  This presents a pure question of 
law subject to de novo review.  Boone v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 
597, 599, 740 S.E.2d 11, 12 (2013); Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 
Va. 187, 223, 738 S.E.2d 847, 868 (2013).  Settled principles 
of statutory construction dictate that "'[w]hen the language of 
a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of 
that language.'"  Osman v. Osman, 285 Va. 384, 389, 737 S.E.2d 
876, 878-79 (2013) (quoting Conyers v. Martial Arts World of 
Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007)).  
 
6 
That is to say, courts are not free to place a construction 
upon a statute that "'amounts to holding that the legislature 
did not intend what it actually has expressed.'"  Paugh v. 
Henrico Area Mental Health & Dev. Servs., 286 Va. 85, 89, 743 
S.E.2d 277, 279 (2013) (quoting Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. P'ship, 
255 Va. 335, 339, 497 S.E.2d 335, 337 (1998)). 
 
Under D'Amico's view of Code § 18.2-268.3, subsections B 
and C of the statute - prescribing the content, reading and 
execution of the refusal form - constitute part of the elements 
of the offense of unreasonable refusal.  Thus, D'Amico contends 
that the Commonwealth was required to prove as part of its 
prima facie case that Shrader, as the arresting officer, read 
the refusal form to D'Amico and observed his "resulting 
refusal," which the Commonwealth's evidence failed to show.  We 
disagree with this reading of Code § 18.2-268.3. 
 
Under Virginia's implied consent law, any person operating 
a vehicle on a Virginia highway is "deemed . . . to have 
consented" to submit to a chemical test that measures his blood 
alcohol and/or drug content if he is arrested for violation of 
Code § 18.2-266, as occurred in this case.  Code § 18.2-268.2.  
Code § 18.2-268.3(A) then sets forth the unreasonable refusal 
offense as follows: 
 
It shall be unlawful for a person who is arrested for 
a violation of § 18.2-266 . . . to unreasonably refuse to 
have samples of his blood or breath or both blood and 
 
7 
breath taken for chemical tests to determine the alcohol 
or drug content of his blood . . . and any person who so 
unreasonably refuses is guilty of a violation of this 
section. 
 
The elements of the offense are plainly stated in subsection A: 
unreasonably refusing to submit to a blood and/or breath test 
after being arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol 
or drugs.  Contrary to D'Amico's urged construction of the 
statute, subsection A does not incorporate the procedural 
requirements set forth in subsections B and C.5  Instead, 
compliance with the subsection B and C procedures is limited to 
establishing probable cause for the issuance of a warrant or 
summons charging a driver with unreasonably refusing to submit 
to the breath or blood test.  Thus, while the requirements in 
subsections B and C indeed provide significant procedural 
safeguards to the accused, they are not elements of the 
unreasonable refusal offense. 
 
Accordingly, the Shrader form was not required in order for 
the Commonwealth to establish a prima facie case of 
unreasonable refusal against D'Amico.  The relevant, undisputed 
evidence was, instead, that D'Amico had been arrested for 
driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Code § 
18.2-266 and refused to submit to a breath test until he had 
                      
5 See supra notes 1 and 3. 
 
8 
spoken with his attorney.  On those undisputed facts, the 
circuit court found D'Amico guilty of the offense.  Those facts 
were sufficient as a matter of law to support that finding.  As 
this Court has previously held, a person's unwillingness to 
take the test without prior consultation with counsel does not 
constitute a reasonable basis for the refusal.  Coleman v. 
Commonwealth, 212 Va. 684, 685, 187 S.E.2d 172, 174 (1972); 
Deaner v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 285, 293, 170 S.E.2d 199, 204 
(1969).  Thus, D'Amico was not prejudiced by the admission of 
the Shrader form, as he contends, and its admission was, at 
most, harmless error.6 
 
For the same reasons, we reject D'Amico's contention that 
the circuit court erred by denying his motion to strike the 
Commonwealth's evidence on the theory that, absent the 
admission of the Shrader form, the Commonwealth failed to prove 
the elements of the unreasonable refusal offense.  As stated 
above, the undisputed evidence in this case was sufficient to 
establish D'Amico's guilt as a matter of law. 
III.  Conclusion 
                      
 
6 Given our holding, we need not address D'Amico's argument 
concerning the applicability of the substantial compliance 
provisions of Code § 18.2-268.11 to Code § 18.2-268.3 in the 
context of the Shrader form's admissibility. 
 
9 
 
We hold the circuit court committed no reversible error in 
admitting the Shrader form and denying D'Amico's motion to 
strike the Commonwealth's evidence.  We will therefore affirm 
the judgment of the circuit court. 
Affirmed.