Case Title: DOYLE EUGENE GABBERT V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 05-34

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-08-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
DOYLE EUGENE GABBERT V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 108141 P.3d 690Case Number: 05-34Decided: 08/31/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
DOYLE 
EUGENE GABBERT,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofConverseCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Tina N. 
Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Ms. Kerin.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Dee Morgan, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Morgan.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL,* KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 
* Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Doyle Gabbert was 
convicted following a jury trial of one count of aggravated robbery, two counts 
of aggravated assault, four counts of kidnapping, one count of conspiracy to 
deliver a controlled substance, one count of delivery of a controlled substance 
and one count of using a firearm during the commission of felonies 
(kidnapping).  On appeal, Gabbert 
asks this Court to review whether the district court committed reversible error 
in instructing the jury on the kidnapping charges and admitting testimony 
concerning his arrest, whether sufficient evidence was presented to support his 
convictions on two counts of kidnapping, and whether he was deprived of a fair 
trial because of prosecutorial misconduct.  
We reverse the kidnapping convictions because of erroneous jury 
instructions.  Finding no other 
error, we affirm the convictions on all remaining counts.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Gabbert offers 
the following issues for our review:

 
 
I.          
Did fundamental error occur in instructing the 
jury?

 
 
II.          
Was there insufficient evidence to convict [Gabbert] of two counts of 
kidnapping (as to the two children)?

 
 
III.         
Did prosecutorial misconduct occur during [Gabbert's] trial, warranting 
reversal?

 
 
IV.        Did 
the trial court err in admitting irrelevant testimony regarding the arrest of 
[Gabbert]?

 
 
V.        Did 
cumulative error occur, warranting reversal?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On November 9, 
2003, Gabbert fronted fifteen grams of methamphetamine to Michael Hershberger 
(Hershberger) and Serenity Thomas (Thomas), two of the victims in this 
case.  The two had agreed to leave 
Douglas, Wyoming, to sell the drugs for Gabbert and pay 
him $1,500.00 from the proceeds.  
Instead of selling the drugs as agreed, Hershberger and Thomas used some 
of the methamphetamine and gave some away, returning to Douglas with only a few grams.  Anticipating they would incur Gabbert's 
wrath for using the drugs, they told Gabbert upon their return on November 10 
that they were pulled over by police and had thrown the drugs out the car 
window.  Gabbert initially accepted 
their story, although he expressed concern about the lost proceeds.  

 
 
[¶4]      The next day, 
November 11, Hershberger sold some of the remaining methamphetamine to a friend 
he had in common with Gabbert.  
Later that night, Gabbert went to the apartment shared by Hershberger, 
Thomas and Thomas' two young daughters,1 ages 2 and 7, demanding money or 
the return of the drugs.  Gabbert 
pointed a gun at Hershberger's head, then to Thomas' head, and told them he was 
going to kill them and Thomas' daughters if he did not get his $1,500.00 or his 
drugs.  Gabbert then took 
approximately $200.00 from Hershberger's wallet, which was all the money they 
possessed.  Not satisfied with the 
amount recovered, Gabbert again threatened to kill them and the girls if he did 
not get the rest of his money.  

 
 
[¶5]      Around 3:00 a.m., 
Hershberger called his grandmother and asked for money.2  She declined to give him any money.  A few minutes later, Gabbert and 
Hershberger left the apartment.  As 
they were walking through the apartment complex, Hershberger saw an opportunity 
to escape and took off running.  He 
eventually hid in a house a short distance from the apartment complex, where he 
remained until police arrived in the morning.  

 
 
[¶6]      Gabbert angrily 
returned to the apartment.3  Gabbert informed Thomas that Hershberger 
ran away and that it was now on her shoulders to get him his money.  Gabbert demanded his money and 
threatened to kill her and her daughters if she tried to get away or failed to 
come up with the money.  After a 
period of time, Gabbert directed Thomas to use a nearby pay phone to call 
someone who could give her the money to pay him, and forced her to leave the 
children with him until she returned.  
He again told her that if she did not come up with the money, he would 
kill her and the girls. 

 
 
[¶7]      Thomas left the 
apartment and called her mother, who lived in Newcastle, Wyoming, and told her what was happening.  They agreed that Thomas would call back 
in an hour to find out if her mother could get the money.  Gabbert later refused to let Thomas 
leave the apartment to make the follow-up call.  Thomas' mother ultimately contacted the 
police in Newcastle and reported what her daughter had 
told her.  

 
 
[¶8]      When the girls 
woke up in the morning, Thomas informed Gabbert that she and the girls had to go 
to court.  Gabbert agreed Thomas and 
her oldest daughter could leave the apartment for that purpose, but they had to 
return.  Everett VanMeter, Thomas' 
cousin's husband, unexpectedly arrived to give them a ride to court.  Thomas and her two daughters eventually 
left the apartment with VanMeter and were contacted by law enforcement officers 
at the scene. Police later arrested Gabbert inside the apartment and recovered a 
loaded 9mm handgun that had been hidden inside a heating vent.  The handgun matched the description 
given by Thomas and Hershberger of the gun Gabbert used to threaten them and 
Thomas' children. 

 
 
[¶9]      The State charged 
Gabbert with one count of first degree sexual assault in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2005), one count of aggravated robbery in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-401(a)(ii) and (c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005), two 
counts of aggravated assault in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2005), four counts of kidnapping in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-201(a)(ii) and (d) (LexisNexis 2005), two counts of delivery of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine) in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2005), one count of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine) in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1042 (LexisNexis 2005), 
and one count of using a firearm during the commission of felonies in violation 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-101 (LexisNexis 2005).  After a four-day trial, a jury acquitted 
Gabbert on the sexual assault charge and one of the delivery charges but found 
him guilty on the other charges.  
The district court sentenced Gabbert to prison terms of fifteen to twenty 
years on the aggravated robbery, kidnapping and conspiracy convictions and five 
to ten years on the aggravated assault convictions, to run concurrently, and 
fifteen to twenty years for the delivery conviction, to run consecutively to the 
other sentences.4   This appeal 
followed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

Issue I 
 Jury Instructions

 
 
[¶10]   Gabbert first contends the jury 
instructions pertaining to the kidnapping charges were fatally defective because 
they did not correctly state the law.  
Specifically, Gabbert complains that the instructions did not properly 
set forth the elements of kidnapping because they referenced the crime of 
"larceny" instead of "felony larceny" and did not define the crime of felony 
larceny.  He claims that the alleged 
erroneous instructions, when viewed as a whole, misled the jury as to the 
circumstances under which he could have been convicted on the four counts of 
kidnapping.

 
 
[¶11]   Gabbert did not object to the 
challenged instructions at trial and, therefore, our only avenue of review is 
under the doctrine of plain error,5 which demands: (1) the record be 
clear as to the incident alleged as error; (2) Gabbert demonstrate the existence 
of a clear and unequivocal rule of law which was violated in clear and obvious, 
not merely arguable, way; and (3) Gabbert prove the error adversely affected a 
substantial right resulting in material prejudice to him.  Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 12, ¶ 19, 126 P.3d 897, 904 (Wyo. 2006); Reilly v. 
State, 2002 WY 156, ¶ 15, 55 P.3d 1259, 1264-65 (Wyo. 2002).  The plain error criteria apply even when 
constitutional error is alleged, and unless each criterion is satisfied, a claim 
for review under the plain-error doctrine will fail.  Miller v. State, 904 P.2d 344, 348 
(Wyo. 
1995).  The failure to properly 
instruct on an element of a crime can constitute plain error.  Reilly, ¶ 16, 55 P.3d  at 1265.  In Reilly, we 
reiterated:

 
 
Jury 
instructions are designed to inform the jury about the applicable law so that 
the jury may apply that law to its own findings with respect to the material 
facts.  Given this purpose, the test 
whether the jury has been instructed on the necessary elements of the crime 
charged is whether the instruction leaves no doubt as to under what 
circumstances the crime can be found to have been committed.  A failure to give any instruction on an essential element 
of a criminal offense is fundamental error, as is a confusing or misleading 
instruction, requiring reversal of the defendant's 
conviction.

 
 

Reilly, ¶ 16, 
55 P.3d  at 1265 (quoting Miller, 904 
P.2d at 348) (emphasis in original) (quotation marks and internal citations 
omitted).  We 
analyze jury instructions as a whole and do not single out individual 
instructions or parts thereof.  
Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 8, 34 P.3d 271, 274 (Wyo. 2001).  We afford 
trial courts great latitude in instructing juries and will not find reversible 
error as long as the jury instructions correctly state the law, and the 
instructions as a whole sufficiently cover the issues which were presented at 
the trial.  Id.; 
Harris v. State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1126 (Wyo. 
1997).

 
 
[¶12]   In this case, the district court 
instructed the jury in pertinent part as follows on the elements of 
kidnapping:6

 
 
The 
elements of the crime of Kidnapping, as charged in Count [] of this case 
are:

 
 

1.                  
On or 
about the 11th day of November, 
2003,

 
 

2.                  
In 
Converse County, Wyoming,

 
 

3.                  
The 
Defendant, DOYLE GABBERT,

 
 

4.                  
Unlawfully 
confined [name of victim],

5.                  
With the 
intent to facilitate the commission of a crime: larceny.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  Instruction No. 17 defined 
the crime of larceny as "the stealing, taking or carrying away the property of 
another with the intent to deprive the owner or possessor of the property."  

 
 
[¶13]   The section of the kidnapping 
statute under which Gabbert was charged, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-201(a)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2005), provides in relevant part:

 
 

(a)               
A person 
is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully . . . confines another person, with the 
intent to:

 
 
                        
* * * *

 
 

(ii)               
Facilitate 
the commission of a felony[.]

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶14]   It is clear and unequivocal that 
the kidnapping statute required the jury to determine whether Gabbert confined 
Hershberger, Thomas and Thomas' daughters with the intent to facilitate a 
felony.  Because the object crime of 
his felonious intent was larceny, the district court was required to give an 
instruction setting forth the elements of felony larceny.  The larceny instruction given by the 
district court did not differentiate between the crime of misdemeanor larceny 
and the crime of felony larceny.7  The instructions were deficient because 
they required only a finding by the jury that Gabbert intended to commit a 
larceny without a determination as to whether the intended larceny qualified as 
a felony level offense as required by the kidnapping 
statute.

 
 
[¶15]   The record clearly reflects what 
occurred at trial without resort to speculation.  The district court failed to properly 
instruct the jury on an essential element of the kidnapping crime.  This constitutes a transgression of the 
requirement that a trial court instruct the jury on the necessary elements of 
the crime charged.  Reilly, ¶ 20, 55 P.3d  at 1267; Vigil v. State, 859 P.2d 659, 662 
(Wyo. 
1993).  We have no trouble 
concluding the instructional error adversely affected Gabbert's substantial 
rights.  As the accused, Gabbert had 
the right to be convicted based on a finding of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
as to each element of the crime charged.  
Reilly, ¶ 20, 55 P.3d  at 1267; 
Vigil, 859 P.2d  at 662.  The jury did not find the State had 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Gabbert unlawfully confined the victims 
with the intent to facilitate the commission of a felony because the jury was 
not instructed that his intended crime had to be a felony level offense.  Accordingly, we reverse Gabbert's 
kidnapping convictions.

 
 
[¶16]   While not raised by Gabbert, our 
review of the record reveals that his conviction for using a firearm during the 
commission of felonies relied on the kidnapping crimes as the predicate 
felonies.  Having determined that 
Gabbert's convictions on the kidnapping charges must be reversed, his conviction 
on this count likewise must be reversed.

 
 

Issue II 
 Evidentiary Sufficiency

 
 
[¶17]   Gabbert's sufficiency of the 
evidence claim only involves the kidnapping convictions pertaining to the Thomas 
children.  Although we have reversed 
those convictions due to erroneous jury instructions, we must address Gabbert's 
claim because a finding of insufficient evidence on those convictions amounts to 
a judgment of acquittal and prohibits the State, pursuant to the Double Jeopardy 
Clauses of the United 
States and Wyoming Constitutions, from retrying 
Gabbert on those charges.  Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 2147, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1 
(1978); Longstreth v. State, 890 P.2d 551, 552-54 (Wyo. 1995).

 
 
[¶18]   Gabbert's claim concerns 
Instruction No. 27 which defined for the jury the unlawful confinement element 
of the kidnapping charge:

 
 
                                    
A confinement is unlawful if it is accomplished:

 
 
                                                
(i)         
By force, threat or deception; or

 
 
(ii)        
Without the consent of a parent, guardian or other person responsible for 
the general supervision of an individual who is under the age of fourteen or who 
is adjudicated incompetent.

 
 
Citing 
to the principles espoused in Bush v. 
State, 908 P.2d 963, 966 (Wyo. 1995), and its progeny, Gabbert claims that 
Instruction 27 contains alternative theories for satisfying the unlawful 
confinement element and, because the record is unclear as to which alternative 
the jury based its verdict, sufficient evidence must exist on both alternatives 
to sustain his conviction on each count.  
According to Gabbert, insufficient evidence exists to prove he confined 
the girls by force, threats or deception.  
Gabbert does not challenge the adequacy of the evidence on the 
alternative theory.

 
 
[¶19]   Gabbert's argument is not 
well-founded.  As noted above, 
instructions were given setting forth the elements of kidnapping.  Instruction No. 27 simply defines the 
"unlawfully confine[d]" element of the kidnapping crime.  In Miller v. State, 2006 WY 17, ¶¶ 25-26, 
127 P.3d 793, 799-800 (Wyo. 2006), and Doherty v. State, 2006 WY 39, ¶¶ 15-16, 
131 P.3d 963, 968-69 (Wyo. 2006), we held that the rule of Bush does not apply to definitional 
instructions.  The holdings in those 
cases apply equally in the instant case.  
Instruction No. 27 does not change, or add anything to, the elements of 
kidnapping.  There is no need under 
Bush and its progeny for sufficient 
evidence to exist as to both subsections of the challenged definitional 
instruction. 

 
 

Issue 
III  Prosecutorial Misconduct

 
 
[¶20]   Gabbert insists that reversible 
error occurred because of prosecutorial misconduct.  The majority of Gabbert's complaints 
involve the prosecutors' alleged improper questioning of three witnesses.  He also claims the prosecutors 
improperly elicited victim impact testimony from Thomas and misstated the 
evidence during closing argument.

 
 
[¶22]   When reviewing a claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct, the entire record must be considered.  Whether such misconduct is reviewed on 
the basis of harmless error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and W.R.A.P. 9.04, or on the basis 
of plain error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(b) and W.R.A.P. 9.05, our primary focus is whether 
an accused's case has been so seriously prejudiced by the error that a fair 
trial has been denied.  Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 38, 123 P.3d 543, 554 (Wyo. 2005); Lopez v. 
State, 2004 WY 103, ¶ 56, 98 P.3d 143, 157 (Wyo. 2004). This involves a 
determination as to whether, "based on the entire record, a reasonable 
possibility exists that, in the absence of the error, the verdict might have 
been more favorable to the accused."  
Lopez, ¶ 56, 98 P.3d  at 
157.  Gabbert bears the burden of 
establishing prejudicial error.  Butcher, ¶ 39, 123 P.3d  at 
554.

 
 
[¶23]   We have carefully examined 
Gabbert's various prosecutorial misconduct claims and conclude that Gabbert has 
not established reversible error with respect to any of his allegations.  In some instances, Gabbert has totally 
failed to provide this Court with a cogent legal analysis to support his 
claims.  Most glaring is his failure 
to demonstrate, within the context of the record in this case, how the 
prosecutors' alleged improprieties adversely affected his trial.  Gabbert's reliance on catchy phrases and 
bald assertions of prejudice is utterly insufficient to satisfy his burden of 
proving that the outcome of his trial would have been different absent the 
challenged conduct.  Bhutto v. State, 2005 WY 78, ¶ 44, 114 P.3d 1252, 1268 (Wyo. 2005).  
Regardless of Gabbert's failure, we are not convinced from our review of 
the entire record that any of the complained of conduct, even if deemed 
improper, had a deleterious effect on the jury's verdict. 

 
 
 
 

Issue IV 
 Admission of Evidence

 
 
[¶24]   Gabbert claims that reversible 
error occurred when the district court, over his objection, permitted testimony 
concerning the events surrounding his arrest.  At issue is the testimony of several 
officers detailing law enforcement's course of action in responding to and 
investigating the reported crimes.  
Gabbert claims the officers' testimony was unduly prejudicial and 
irrelevant to any fact at issue and should have been excluded under W.R.E. 402 
and 403. 

 
 
[¶25]   Generally, we apply the following 
standard when reviewing a trial court's evidentiary 
ruling:

 
 
Evidentiary 
rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and include 
determinations of the adequacy of foundation and relevancy, competency, 
materiality, and remoteness of the evidence.  This Court will generally accede to the 
trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence unless that court 
clearly abused its discretion.  We 
have described the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the question 
of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice.  Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria;  it means exercising sound judgment with 
regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily 
or capriciously.  In the absence of 
an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's 
determination.  The burden is on the 
defendant to establish such an abuse.

 
 

Brown v. 
State, 2005 
WY 37, ¶ 12, 109 P.3d 52, 56 (Wyo. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted); see also Farmer v. State, 
2005 WY 162, ¶ 8, 124 P.3d 699, 703 (Wyo. 2005); Holloman v. State, 2005 WY 25, ¶ 10, 106 P.3d 879, 883 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶26]   Even if we were to assume, for 
purposes of this appeal, that the district court erred in admitting the 
testimony at issue, Gabbert must prove that the error was prejudicial and 
adversely affected a substantial right.  
Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 12, 
¶ 15, 126 P.3d 897, 903 (Wyo. 2006); see 
also W.R.A.P. 9.04; W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) (any "error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded" by the 
reviewing court).  As previously 
noted, this requires a showing that the outcome of his trial would have been 
more favorable had the error not occurred.  
Once again, Gabbert has failed to demonstrate, within the context of the 
record in this case, how the outcome of his trial would have been more favorable 
absent the complained of testimony.  
This Court requires more substantive analysis than a self-serving 
statement that the case was "hotly" contested and "any error . . . tipped the 
scales unfairly against Mr. Gabbert."  
We decline to make Gabbert's argument for him.

 
 

Issue V 
 Cumulative Error

 
 
[¶27]   Gabbert presents a perfunctory 
declaration that, if the errors complained of "do not warrant reversal standing 
alone, their cumulative effect is such that reversal is necessary in order to 
secure Mr. Gabbert's right to a fair trial."  This single statement is not accompanied 
by cogent argument that has any direct relation to the facts and circumstances 
of this case.  We therefore will not 
consider his claim further.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶28]   We reverse the four kidnapping 
convictions because the district court failed to properly instruct the jury on 
an element of the crime.  Because 
the kidnapping convictions cannot stand, the use-of-firearm conviction must also 
be reversed.  This case is remanded 
for proceedings consistent with this opinion on these charges.  

 
 
[¶29]   After careful review of the record 
we find that none of Gabbert's other issues have merit.  We can find no indication that the 
outcome of the trial on the remaining counts against Gabbert would have been 
more favorable to him absent any of his alleged errors.  Consequently, we affirm those 
convictions.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The children 
were in the bedroom asleep during most of the 
encounter.

  

2Hershberger 
used Gabbert's cellular phone to make the call as there was no phone service in 
the apartment.

 

3Thomas had 
apparently locked only one of the door's locks after Gabbert and Hershberger 
left the apartment.  Gabbert had a 
key to that lock, which allowed him to re-enter the 
apartment.

 
 

4The district 
court did not impose a separate sentence for the use-of-firearm 
conviction.

 
 

5The State 
suggests this Court decline to review the alleged instructional error, claiming 
this error was "invited" by Gabbert's actions below.  We summarily reject this argument.  As this Court made clear in Vigil v. State, 859 P.2d 659, 664 
(Wyo. 1993), 
an instructional error going to an essential element of a crime is necessarily 
prejudicial.  The doctrine of 
invited error" has no application to a claim of such 
error.

 
 

6The 
kidnapping instructions given in this case were identical except for the names 
of the victims.

 
 

7At the time 
of the crimes, larceny was a felony if the value of the property was more than 
$500.00.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-3-402(a) and (c) (LexisNexis 2003).  
In 2004, the felony amount was increased to $1,000.00.  2004 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 126, § 
1.