Case Title: Commonwealth v. Carson C.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13107

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-01-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13107 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CARSON C., a juvenile. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     September 10, 2021. - January 31, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Delinquent Child.  Incompetent Person, Criminal charges.  
Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, 
Arraignment, Competency to stand trial.  Juvenile Court, 
Delinquent child.  Due Process of Law, Juvenile delinquency 
proceeding, Competency to stand trial.  Expungement. 
 
 
 
 
Complaints received and sworn to in the Worcester County 
Division of the Juvenile Court Department on March 21 and 29, 
2019. 
 
 
Entry of judgments of dismissal was ordered by Anthony J. 
Marotta, J., and a petition for expungement was heard by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Taylor Henley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the juvenile. 
 
Donna-Marie Haran, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Timothy J. Cruz, District Attorney, & Patricia Reilly, 
Assistant District Attorney, for District Attorney for the 
Plymouth District, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
2 
 
 
Cristina F. Freitas, Debbie F. Freitas, & Joshua M. 
Daniels, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  In this case, we are asked to decide whether a 
Juvenile Court judge abused his discretion under G. L. c. 123, 
§ 15 (a), or violated a juvenile's rights to due process, in 
denying the juvenile's motion to continue his arraignment for a 
competency evaluation.  We also consider whether, after the 
juvenile was found incompetent to stand trial and the same judge 
dismissed all charges approximately four months after the 
arraignment, the judge abused his discretion in denying the 
juvenile's petition for expungement pursuant to G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100K (a) (5).  Discerning no error in either decision, we 
affirm the denials of the motion to continue and the petition 
for expungement.1 
 
1.  Background.  The relevant facts are undisputed.  In 
June of 2018, the juvenile, then twelve years old and in the 
custody of the Department of Children and Families (DCF), was 
living at a residential program in Barre for children who have 
developmental difficulties or mental illness, are on the autism 
spectrum, or have a history of trauma or abuse.  On June 21, 
2018, while riding in a school van, the juvenile allegedly 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the 
district attorney for the Plymouth district. 
3 
 
struck the driver with his sandal multiple times before jumping 
out of the van and creating a disturbance on a busy road.  On 
March 10, 2019, when the juvenile was thirteen years old and 
still living at the residential program in Barre, he allegedly 
discharged a fire extinguisher several times in a staff 
conference room and sprayed the legs and feet of two staff 
members. 
 
As a result of these incidents, two complaints issued 
against the juvenile in March of 2019.  The first charged him 
with (1) assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, 
G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b); (2) disorderly conduct, G. L. c. 272, 
§ 53; and (3) disturbing the peace, G. L. c. 272, § 53.  The 
second charged the juvenile with two counts of assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 272, § 15A (b), 
and two counts of vandalism, G. L. c. 266, § 126A. 
 
On April 1, 2019, the juvenile appeared in the Juvenile 
Court for arraignment in both cases.  Prior to arraignment, he 
filed a motion to continue so that he could undergo a competency 
evaluation, and he also filed a motion to dismiss.  The juvenile 
argued that arraigning him despite his inability to understand 
the proceedings against him would deprive him of his rights to 
due process under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution and under art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  He asserted that the judge 
4 
 
had discretion to order a prearraignment competency evaluation 
pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a). 
 
At a hearing on the motion to continue, defense counsel 
expressed concerns about the juvenile's competency due to his 
age and "his having some difficulty in our conversations."  
Counsel also informed the judge that several staff members at 
the group home also thought that a competency evaluation would 
be a "good idea," because they shared her concerns about the 
juvenile's ability "to understand what's going on."  The 
Commonwealth orally opposed the motion; it maintained that 
incompetency "doesn't preclude an arraignment going forward" and 
that competency "can be evaluated after the arraignment." 
 
The judge conducted colloquies first with the director of 
the group home and then with the juvenile.  The judge asked the 
juvenile about his family and his school, and the juvenile 
responded appropriately, giving answers that contained 
essentially the same factual information that the director had 
provided about where his family was then living, where he and 
his family had lived before he was placed in the group home, his 
grade in school, and his favorite subject.  The judge also asked 
the juvenile about the role of a judge.  The juvenile responded 
that he did not know what a judge does or what a judge's robe 
means.  The judge subsequently denied both the motion to 
continue and the motion to dismiss, arraigned the juvenile on 
5 
 
all charges, and ordered him released on personal recognizance 
with conditions.  The juvenile remained in the custody of DCF 
and was returned to the group home. 
 
Several months later, the juvenile was evaluated by a 
forensic psychologist who had been retained by the juvenile's 
attorney.  Following this evaluation, which concluded that the 
juvenile was incompetent to stand trial and was unlikely to 
become competent within the foreseeable future, the Commonwealth 
moved to dismiss the charges.  On August 30, 2019, the judge who 
had arraigned the juvenile entered findings of incompetency in 
both matters and dismissed all pending charges. 
 
On the same day that the charges were dismissed, the 
juvenile moved for reconsideration of the denial of his motion 
to continue, and also filed a petition for expungement.  The 
juvenile argued that the judge had erred in proceeding with the 
arraignment prior to a competency evaluation, and that this 
error was grounds for expungement under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100K (a) (5).2  After a nonevidentiary hearing, the judge 
denied the motion for reconsideration and the petition for 
 
2 The juvenile argued that he was eligible for expungement 
because the judge's denial of his motion to continue constituted 
a "demonstrable error[] by [a] court employee[]."  G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100K (a) (5).  Because of the decision we reach, we need not 
address the question whether legal error by a judge qualifies as 
"demonstrable error[] by [a] court employee[]." 
6 
 
expungement.  The juvenile appealed, and we transferred the 
matter to this court on our own motion.3 
 
2.  Discussion.  The juvenile argues that the judge erred 
in denying the motion for a continuance and then conducting the 
arraignment.  The juvenile contends that the judge should have 
exercised the discretion afforded him under G. L. c. 123, 
§ 15 (a), to order a competency evaluation prior to arraignment, 
and that arraigning him notwithstanding his "manifest" 
incompetency, and without any articulable safety or security 
concerns, violated due process.  Before turning to the specifics 
of the juvenile's circumstances, we examine the statutory 
provisions governing competency evaluations and the related due 
process considerations. 
 
a.  Evaluation of competency under G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a). 
General Laws c. 123, § 15 (a), provides: 
"Whenever a court of competent jurisdiction doubts whether 
a defendant in a criminal case is competent to stand 
trial . . . , it may at any stage of the proceedings after 
the return of an indictment or the issuance of a criminal 
complaint against the defendant, order an examination of 
such defendant to be conducted by one or more qualified 
physicians or one or more qualified psychologists." 
 
 
3 Prior to filing this appeal, the juvenile filed a petition 
in the county court for extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3.  The single justice concluded that the juvenile had 
an adequate remedy in the ordinary appellate process and denied 
the petition. 
7 
 
That a competency evaluation may be ordered "at any stage" of 
the proceedings has been broadly construed, consistent with the 
plain language.  See Commonwealth v. Conaghan, 433 Mass. 105, 
110 (2000) (allowing order of examination for competency more 
than four years after defendant had pleaded guilty).  To avoid 
undue delay in proceedings in which competency is disputed, 
G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a), further provides that, "[w]henever 
practicable, examinations shall be conducted at the court house 
or place of detention where the person is being held." 
 
A judge's authority to order an evaluation under G. L. 
c. 123, § 15 (a), is discretionary; the provision states that a 
judge "may" order an evaluation if the judge becomes concerned 
about a defendant's competency but does not mandate such action.  
"While it may be useful for a judge to hear opinions from 
medical experts, the determination [of competency] is ultimately 
a legal, not a medical, judgment."  Commonwealth v. Jones, 479 
Mass. 1, 14 (2018).  A judge therefore has the discretion to 
determine whether examination by a medical professional is 
warranted under the circumstances. 
 
Where a defendant -- adult or juvenile -- moves to continue 
arraignment for an evaluation pursuant to G. L. c. 123, 
§ 15 (a), a judge may allow the motion, or instead may choose 
independently to assess the defendant's competency prior to 
ruling on the motion.  This assessment must satisfy the judge 
8 
 
that the defendant has sufficient mental capacity to participate 
in the arraignment.  See Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden 
Superior Court, 442 Mass. 228, 246 (2004) ("Proceedings in which 
a defendant cannot participate meaningfully may not be allowed 
to proceed"); Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 454, 
454 (1967).  If, after such an assessment, any doubt remains 
about the defendant's ability to participate, the judge may 
allow the motion to continue for a competency evaluation, or 
otherwise must conduct a balancing test, see discussion, infra, 
to determine whether due process permits the arraignment to go 
forward despite the defendant's potential incompetency. 
 
"[A]rraignment is the judicial system's formal mechanism 
for providing the constitutionally prescribed description of 
criminal charges."  Commonwealth v. Dixon, 458 Mass. 446, 456 
(2010).  Among other things, arraignment ensures that defendant 
receives fair notice of charges against him or her, a 
fundamental component of due process.  See, e.g., Rogers v. 
Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 459 (2001) (notice is one of "core due 
process concepts").  Rule 7 (b) of the Massachusetts Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, as appearing in 461 Mass. 1501 (2012), for 
instance, directs a judge at arraignment to (1) "read the 
charges to the defendant in open court," (2) "enter the 
defendant's plea to the charges," (3) "inform the defendant of 
all warnings and advisories required by law," and (4) "determine 
9 
 
the conditions of the defendant's release, if any."  Because 
arraignment is a limited proceeding, the inquiry into competency 
at arraignment need not be as comprehensive as an evaluation of 
competency to stand trial.  Cf. Matter of a Juvenile, 485 Mass. 
831, 835 (2020) ("The trial is the pivotal truth-seeking event, 
so the capacity of the defendant or juvenile to communicate and 
assist counsel at that stage in the proceedings is a cornerstone 
of due process"); Commonwealth v. Torres, 441 Mass. 499, 504 
(2004) ("the limited and fact-specific nature of the inquiry at 
a bail hearing renders some procedural protections unnecessary 
as a matter of due process").  For purposes of arraignment, a 
defendant must have the ability to understand the general 
concept that a criminal case has been initiated against him or 
her; the roles of the prosecutor, defense counsel, and judge; 
the nature of the specific charges the defendant is facing; and 
any conditions of release imposed.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 7; 
State v. Cadorette, 2003 VT 13, ¶¶ 4-5. 
 
In a case involving a juvenile, a more searching inquiry 
into competency prior to arraignment may be justified.  Due to 
age and immaturity alone, a juvenile may lack the ability to 
"understand legal jargon, the legal process, the charges against 
him [or her], and the weight of legal decisions."  Berryessa & 
Reeves, The Perceptions of Juvenile Judges Regarding Adolescent 
Development in Evaluating Juvenile Competency, 110 J. Crim. L. & 
10 
 
Criminology 551, 560 (2020).  Age aside, studies suggest that 
"[u]pwards of [seventy] percent of justice-involved youth have 
at least one diagnosable mental illness, nearly half have a 
substance use disorder, and at least [seventy-five] percent have 
experienced traumatic victimization."  Feye, Keator, Phillippi, 
& Irons, Caring for Youth with Behavioral Health Needs in the 
Juvenile Justice System:  Improving Knowledge and Skills of the 
Professionals Who Supervise Them, National Center for Youth 
Opportunity and Justice, at 2 (Jan. 2020), https://ncyoj 
.policyresearchinc.org/img/resources/CaringforYouthwith 
BehavioralHealthNeedsinJJ-946799.pdf [https://perma.cc/BM8N-
GHCE].  Thus, a judge faced with a potentially incompetent 
juvenile might well benefit from the opinion of a medical expert 
in assessing the juvenile's competency prior to arraignment. 
 
Finally, as the principal aim of our juvenile justice 
system is rehabilitation, a judge should err on the side of 
caution in deciding whether to exercise judicial discretion 
under G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a), with respect to a juvenile.  See 
Commonwealth v. Magnus M., 461 Mass. 459, 461 (2012).  The 
Legislature has mandated that "the care, custody and discipline 
of the children brought before the court shall approximate as 
nearly as possible that which they should receive from their 
parents, and that, as far as practicable, they shall be treated, 
not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement 
11 
 
and guidance."  G. L. c. 119, § 53.  Ordering a prearraignment 
competency evaluation by a medical professional may, in certain 
circumstances, align most with the over-all mission of the 
Juvenile Court. 
 
b.  Due process considerations.  Due process under both the 
Fourteenth Amendment and art. 12 prohibits the "trial, 
conviction, or sentencing of a person charged with a criminal 
offence while he [or she] is legally incompetent."  Commonwealth 
v. Hill, 375 Mass. 50, 51-52 (1978), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Vailes, 360 Mass. 522, 524 (1971).  Where there exists a 
"'substantial question of possible doubt'" as to a defendant's 
competency, a "judge must, on his [or her] own initiative, 
conduct a full hearing on the issue."  Hill, supra at 54, 
quoting Rhay v. White, 385 F.2d 883, 886 (9th Cir. 1967).  The 
judge's determination rests on "whether [the person] has 
sufficient present ability to consult with his [or her] lawyer 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and 
whether [the person] has a rational as well as factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him [or her]."  Vailes, 
supra, quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). 
 
This standard safeguards both the accuracy and fairness of 
criminal trials.  A defendant must be "sufficiently coherent to 
provide his [or her] counsel with information necessary or 
relevant to constructing a defense.  Otherwise, [for example,] 
12 
 
if only the defendant knew of exonerating circumstances, he [or 
she] might be erroneously convicted."  Incompetency to Stand 
Trial, 81 Harv. L. Rev. at 457.  A defendant also must have 
"some awareness of the significance of the proceeding and some 
ability to understand the charges against him [or her], the 
defenses available . . . and the basic elements of a criminal 
trial."  Id. at 458.  Without this capacity, a defendant would 
be unable to exercise control over important decisions such as 
how to plead and whether to dismiss an attorney with whom the 
defendant is dissatisfied.  See id. 
 
A finding of incompetency, however, "does not require the 
cessation of all pretrial proceedings" (emphasis added).  
Abbott A. v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 24, 27 (2010).  See Jackson 
v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 740-741 (1972); Torres, 441 Mass. 
at 502.  Due process is a "'flexible' concept that 'calls for 
such procedural protections as the particular situation 
demands.'"  Torres, supra, quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 334 (1976).  In this vein, we have held that it is not a 
per se violation of due process to proceed with a bail hearing 
pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 57, in a case where a defendant has 
been found incompetent to stand trial.  See Torres, supra 
at 507.  Likewise, due process permits "a hearing under [G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A,] to determine an incompetent person's 
13 
 
dangerousness, regardless [of] whether the person is an adult 
defendant or a juvenile."  Abbott A., supra at 33. 
 
In reaching these determinations, we balanced "the private 
interest that will be affected by the pretrial proceeding, the 
Commonwealth's interest in the outcome of the proceeding, and 
the risk that the [individual]'s incompetency during the 
proceeding will erroneously deprive [the individual] of his [or 
her] liberty."  Abbott A., 458 Mass. at 28.  We observed that, 
both at bail hearings and dangerousness hearings, a defendant's 
or juvenile's interest at stake -- "freedom from restraint 
pending trial" -- is "significant."  See id. at 28, 30 
(dangerousness); Torres, 441 Mass. at 503 (bail).  We concluded, 
however, that "in each of these cases, the alternative of 
staying the proceedings until the defendant or juvenile regained 
competency would have thwarted the strong governmental interest 
in assuring the defendant's appearance for trial or in 
protecting the public from the danger posed by the defendant."  
Matter of a Juvenile, 485 Mass. at 836. 
 
With respect to the risk of erroneous deprivation of a 
defendant's or a juvenile's liberty interests, "we [have] 
distinguished between two types of error:  factual and 
strategic."  Matter of a Juvenile, 485 Mass. at 837.  The risk 
of factual error at a bail hearing, for example, is the risk 
that a defendant's incompetency "will result in . . . bail being 
14 
 
set at a meaningfully higher level than it would be if he [or 
she] were competent," Torres, 441 Mass. at 503-504, while the 
risk of factual error at a dangerousness hearing is "the risk 
that a judge will erroneously determine that no conditions of 
release will reasonably assure the safety of any other person or 
the community."  Abbott A., 458 Mass. at 31.  Because of the 
procedural protections provided at these types of hearings, the 
risk of factual error at either hearing is not "so substantial 
as to violate due process."  Id. at 31-32.  See Torres, supra at 
504-505. 
 
The risk of strategic error "is greatest at trial," where a 
defendant faces the consequential decision of whether to proceed 
with a trial rather than plead guilty -- a decision that "may 
substantially affect the severity of a defendant's sentence on 
conviction."  Abbott A., 458 Mass. at 29.  At bail and 
dangerousness hearings, the risk of strategic error is 
comparatively low, "because the defendant's or juvenile's 
interests are clear (to obtain his [or her] release on 
conditions and avoid a finding of dangerousness), the hearing 
cannot be waived (because the Commonwealth bears the burden of 
proving dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence), and the 
defendant or juvenile almost never testifies."  Matter of a 
Juvenile, 485 Mass. at 838, quoting Abbott A., supra at 33. 
15 
 
 
While due process does not require the cessation of bail 
and dangerousness hearings postarraignment where a defendant is 
incompetent, Abbott A., 458 Mass. at 27, we have yet to address 
a key question at issue here:  whether due process permits the 
arraignment of an incompetent defendant or juvenile.  At the 
outset, we note that an individual's interests at stake at 
arraignment differ categorically from the interests at stake at 
a bail hearing or a dangerousness hearing.  At both of those 
stages, criminal or delinquency proceedings already have begun, 
and the individual already has an established criminal record.  
Arraignment, by contrast, is the initiation of criminal or 
delinquency proceedings.  Arraignment creates an entry on a 
juvenile's court activity record information (CARI) record and 
on an adult defendant's criminal offender record information 
report.  See Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 572 
(2013). 
 
As we have recognized, "the creation of a CARI record may 
adversely affect a juvenile," Humberto H., 466 Mass. at 573, 
regardless of the outcome of the proceeding, for many years and 
potentially throughout the child's life.  See Commonwealth v. 
Preston P., 483 Mass. 759, 769 (2020) ("stigma and [detrimental] 
collateral consequences associated with a delinquency 
adjudication . . . attach[] when the initial charges [are] 
brought"); Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 816 (2013) 
16 
 
("avoidance of attaching the stigma of a criminal to the child 
is of great importance" [citation omitted]).  Although a CARI is 
not a public record, it is "accessible to the justices and 
probation officers of the courts, to the police commissioner for 
the city of Boston, to all chiefs of police and city marshals, 
and to such departments of the state and local governments as 
the commissioner [of probation] may determine."  G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100.  Thus, "[a] juvenile delinquency record -- even just an 
arraignment -- can . . . be used to enhance future sentencing or 
affect charging or probation decisions."  Commonwealth v. 
Manolo M., 486 Mass. 678, 686 (2021). 
 
Considering the ramifications of criminal and delinquency 
records, the interests of a defendant or juvenile in avoiding 
arraignment are significant.4  The stakes may be viewed as akin 
 
 
4 In addition to its impact on any subsequent court 
proceedings, a juvenile record may lead to "difficulty accessing 
educational services, obtaining employment, serving in the 
military, and finding and maintaining housing."  Coleman, 
Expunging Juvenile Records:  Misconceptions, Collateral 
Consequences, and Emerging Practices, United States Department 
of Justice, Juvenile Justice Bulletin, at 1 (Dec. 2020).  See 
Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC v. Chief Justice of the Trial 
Court, 483 Mass. 80, 96 (2019) (noting long-term consequences of 
criminal record on access to employment and housing).  Some 
colleges and universities deny financial aid to students with 
juvenile records, while others deny admission.  See Radice, The 
Juvenile Record Myth, 106 Geo. L.J. 365, 387 (2018).  To 
minimize the harmful consequences of criminal and delinquency 
records, the Legislature has enacted several statutes that allow 
pretrial diversion prior to arraignment.  The purpose of these 
statutes is to "allow the individual to participate as a 
productive member of society, without incurring the serious 
17 
 
to those at a transfer hearing under G. L. c. 119, § 72A, where 
the court has discretion to discharge a defendant and end the 
prosecution altogether.  See Matter of a Juvenile, 485 Mass. 
at 838.  If a case is dismissed prearraignment due to a 
defendant's incompetency, the case leaves no trace.  But if an 
incompetent defendant is arraigned, and the case is dismissed 
postarraignment, the record remains, as do the collateral 
consequences. 
 
We are cognizant, also, that while the individual interests 
at stake at arraignment invariably are strong, the strength of 
the government's interest will vary from case to case.  In some 
cases, the defendant or juvenile may be a flight risk or pose a 
threat to public safety.  A judge can address these concerns 
without arraigning the individual by imposing prearraignment 
conditions of release during the pendency of the competency 
proceeding.  See Commonwealth v. Newberry, 483 Mass. 186, 198 
(2019).  Occasionally, however, the concerns are so serious that 
the individual must be detained pretrial or, if released, 
 
collateral consequences (and concomitant difficulty in 
productive participation) that may arise from a criminal 
record."  Commonwealth v. Newberry, 483 Mass. 186, 196 (2019).  
In particular, the Legislature explicitly has stated that a 
juvenile eligible for pretrial diversion under G. L. c. 119, 
§ 54A (b), "shall not be arraigned and an entry shall not be 
made into the criminal offender record information system" 
(emphasis added). 
18 
 
released on bail.5  In such circumstances, the government may 
have a strong interest in immediate arraignment so that a bail 
hearing or dangerousness hearing can be held.  See Abbott A., 
458 Mass. at 30; Torres, 441 Mass. at 503.  By contrast, where 
an individual presents no safety or flight concerns, the 
government's interest in arraignment prior to a competency 
hearing may be minimal.6 
 
5 We do not agree with the Commonwealth's assertion that its 
interest in arraigning the juvenile stemmed from the need to 
"create an accurate record of what has transpired" so as 
ultimately to "bring the juvenile to trial."  Regardless of 
whether an incompetent juvenile is arraigned, the Commonwealth 
cannot "try the [juvenile] and bring the offender to justice 
until the [juvenile] bec[omes] competent," see Matter of a 
Juvenile, 485 Mass. at 839, if the juvenile ever does attain 
competency.  Where an individual is not likely to become 
competent in the reasonably foreseeable future, maintaining an 
open criminal proceeding violates that individual's due process 
rights.  See Sharris v. Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 586, 593 (2018). 
 
 
6 As the amicus Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers points out, pretrial detention is rarely 
requested in cases in the Juvenile Court.  In the 2020 fiscal 
year, for example, of the more than 7,000 applications for 
criminal complaints filed in the Juvenile Court, the 
Commonwealth sought pretrial detention under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58A, in less than three percent.  Compare Trial Court, 
Department of Research and Planning, Applications for Delinquent 
Complaint (2020), https://public.tableau.com/app/profile 
/drap4687/viz/MassachusettsTrialCourtApplicationsforDelinquent 
Complaint/SummaryCaseInitiation, with Trial Court, Department of 
Research and Planning, Dangerousness Hearings (2020), 
https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/drap4687/viz 
/MassachusettsTrialCourtDangerousnessHearings/MainDashboard.  
And fewer than ten percent of the complaints led to detention 
for any reason, including bail and probation violations.  See 
Department of Youth Services (DYS), Annual Report:  Fiscal Year 
2020, at 4, https://www.mass.gov/doc/dys-annual-report-fy-
2020/download [https://perma.cc/G64Q-9JDR] (reporting 765 youths 
19 
 
 
In sum, to determine whether arraignment of an incompetent 
defendant would violate due process, the key question to be 
resolved is whether the defendant's interests in avoiding 
arraignment while incompetent outweigh the Commonwealth's 
interests in having the defendant arraigned.  Where safety and 
flight concerns cannot be mitigated by the imposition of 
prearraignment conditions of release, arraignment of an 
incompetent defendant or juvenile may be justified, 
notwithstanding the strong individual interests implicated.  
Where safety concerns and the risk of flight are low, and the 
defendant or juvenile has no prior criminal record, the calculus 
might be different, given the individual's interests in avoiding 
the consequences of a criminal record or CARI. 
 
c.  Application.  At the time of his arraignment, the 
juvenile had not been evaluated for competency to stand trial by 
a court or a clinician.  Rather, the juvenile's attorney raised 
the issue of competency at the outset of the arraignment 
proceeding, where she asserted that she had concerns about the 
juvenile's "ability to understand what's going on." 
 
As discussed, once advised of these concerns, the judge had 
an obligation to assess the juvenile's competency prior to 
 
were admitted to DYS in fiscal year 2020).  Thus, the balancing 
of individual and government interests in a case involving a 
juvenile often will favor the juvenile. 
20 
 
moving forward with the arraignment, or else to order an 
evaluation of the juvenile's competency by "one or more 
qualified physicians or . . . qualified psychologist."  See 
G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a).  The judge chose the former course and 
evaluated the juvenile's competency by conducting colloquies 
with the director of the juvenile's group home and the juvenile.  
These colloquies implicitly satisfied the judge that the 
juvenile was competent. 
 
The director of the group home informed the judge that the 
juvenile was in seventh grade but could not say whether that was 
the appropriate grade level for him, as he attended school at a 
different location.  She also explained that the juvenile was 
receiving therapy for emotional issues.  She did not mention any 
difficulties the juvenile might have had with intellectual 
functioning; prior to the colloquy, however, the juvenile's 
attorney told the judge that staff members at the group home 
believed that the juvenile should be evaluated for competency. 
 
In response to the judge's questions, the juvenile said 
that he was thirteen; that his family was living in Roanoke, 
Virginia, where he had visited them; and that he previously had 
lived with his family in Lynn.  The judge then asked the 
juvenile, "Do you know what my job is?" and "Do you know what 
this means when I wear this [robe]?"  The juvenile responded, 
respectively, "Not really" and "No."  When the judge asked the 
21 
 
juvenile, "What do you think I do?" the juvenile answered, "I 
don't know."  The juvenile then told the judge that he was in 
seventh grade and that he liked math and science.  When the 
judge asked what kind of math the juvenile did in school, the 
juvenile said, "just division." 
 
We review a judge's determination of competency for abuse 
of discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Hung Tan Vo, 427 Mass. 464, 
468-469 (1998).  In doing so, "we must give weight to the 
judge's opportunity to observe the defendant's demeanor."  
Commonwealth v. Russin, 420 Mass. 309, 317 (1995).  See 
Commonwealth v. Goldman, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 699, 708 (1981) (in 
deciding whether to conduct competency hearing, "weight must be 
afforded to the trial judge's first-hand opportunity to observe 
the defendant throughout the trial").  That a defendant's 
statements are responsive to the circumstances supports a 
judge's finding of competency.  See Commonwealth v. DeMinico, 
408 Mass. 230, 236 (1990), quoting Hill, 375 Mass. at 58 
("defendant's demeanor at trial and response[s] to questioning 
by the judge . . . [are] relevant to a decision on the merits of 
the competency issue"). 
 
In the circumstances here, we cannot say that the judge 
abused his discretion in implicitly concluding that the juvenile 
was competent and denying the motion to continue the 
arraignment.  On the record before the judge at the time of the 
22 
 
arraignment, the juvenile demonstrated that he could recount 
information about his life accurately and could answer questions 
appropriately.  Although the juvenile lacked knowledge about the 
role of a judge and was not asked about the nature of the 
charges or the roles of the attorneys, the juvenile did not 
demonstrate any gross intellectual deficits during the colloquy 
that suggested that he was incompetent. 
 
The conclusion that there was no abuse of discretion in 
finding the juvenile competent forecloses the juvenile's due 
process claims.  Our jurisprudence makes clear that a judge must 
engage in a due process balancing test prior to conducting a 
pretrial proceeding only if the defendant or juvenile is legally 
incompetent.  See Matter of a Juvenile, 485 Mass. at 834; 
Abbott A., 458 Mass. at 26; Torres, 441 Mass. at 500.  As the 
judge in this case determined that the juvenile was not 
incompetent, no due process balancing was required.  Because 
there was no violation of due process, the juvenile was not 
eligible for expungement under G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a) (5), and 
thus there was no abuse of discretion in the denial of the 
juvenile's petition for expungement. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The orders denying the motion for a 
continuance and denying the petition for expungement are 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.