Case Title: ROBERT H. HICKS and PRONGHORN PUBLISHING, INC. a Wyoming corporation, individually and ex rel., BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE SCENIC PRESERVE TRUST V. FRED L. DOWD and LINDA S. DOWD; and the BOARD OF JOHNSON COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-2

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
ROBERT H. HICKS and PRONGHORN PUBLISHING, INC. a Wyoming corporation, individually and ex rel., BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE SCENIC PRESERVE TRUST V. FRED L. DOWD and LINDA S. DOWD; and the BOARD OF JOHNSON COUNTY COMMISSIONERS2007 WY 74157 P.3d 914Case Number: 06-2Decided: 05/09/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
ROBERT H. HICKS 
and PRONGHORN PUBLISHING, INC. a Wyoming corporation, individually and ex rel., 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE SCENIC PRESERVE TRUST,

 
 
Appellants

(Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
FRED L. DOWD and 
LINDA S. DOWD; and the BOARD OF JOHNSON COUNTYCOMMISSIONERS,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 
 

Appeal from the DistrictCourtofJohnsonCounty

The Honorable 
John C. Brackley, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Dennis M. Kirven of Kirven and 
Kirven, P.C., Buffalo, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing Appellees Fred L. and 
Linda S. Dowd:

Tom C. Toner of Yonkee & Toner, 
LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing Appellee Board of 
JohnsonCounty 
Commissioners:

          
Greg L. Goddard, Deputy County Attorney, Buffalo, Wyoming.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, 
HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

HILL, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]    The members of the Board of 
County Commissioners of JohnsonCounty (the Board) serve as the trustees 
of the Scenic Preserve Trust of Johnson County.  On August 6, 2002, the Board acted to 
terminate a conservation easement held by the Scenic Preserve Trust.  On July 14, 2003, Appellants Robert H. 
Hicks and Pronghorn Publishing, Inc. (Appellants) filed a "Complaint for 
Declaratory Judgment, Mandamus Relief, Breach of Fiduciary Duties and 
Constructive Trust."  Appellants' 
complaint challenged the Board's August 6, 2002, actions.  In resolving this dispute, the district 
court first found that there was no violation of Wyoming's open meetings law.  Later, concluding that it lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction, the district court dismissed the remainder of Appellants' 
claims.  The district court ruled 
that the claims were barred because Appellants did not file a timely petition 
for review of the Board's action, pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.  We will affirm, but for reasons other 
than those used by the district court.  
We conclude that Appellants lack standing to maintain an action to 
enforce the Scenic Preserve Trust.

 
 

 
 
[¶2]    Appellants present these six 
issues for our review:

 
 

A.               
Must 
plaintiffs exhaust all administrative remedies prior to challenging JohnsonCounty's authority to extinguish a 
conservation easement granted to the county?

B.               
Does a 
violation of the public meeting law void the attempted extinguishment and 
conveyance of the conservation easement and one acre of property to 
Dowd?

C.              
Does 
Wyoming 
charitable trust law prohibit the extinguishment of a conservation easement 
without prior judicial approval?

D.              
Did the 
trustees of the scenic preserve trust breach their fiduciary duties as a matter 
of law by attempting to extinguish and convey trust land to 
Dowd?

E.               
Should 
the district court have imposed a constructive trust on the lands under the 
conservation easement on behalf of the public?

F.               
Is the 
transfer of public property to a private person without compensation a violation 
of the Wyoming Constitution, Article 3, Section 36 or Article 26, Section 6? 

 
 
[¶3]    In their brief, Appellees 
Fred and Linda Dowd raise a number of issues, including the following issue, 
which we find dispositive:

 
 
Does Hicks have standing as a 
beneficiary of a charitable trust to challenge the Board of County 
Commissioners' action terminating the conservation 
easement?

 
 
[¶4]    In their reply brief, 
Appellants present this argument:

 
 
Plaintiffs have standing to present 
matters of substantial public interest and importance.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶5]    The case arises from a 
conservation easement on Meadowood Ranch in JohnsonCounty.  The conservation easement was 
established in 1993.  At that time, 
Meadowood Ranch,1 which contains approximately 1,043 
acres, was owned by the Lowham Limited Partnership, the predecessor in interest 
to Appellees Fred and Linda Dowd (the Dowds).  In 1993, Paul Lowham, one of the 
principals of the Lowham Limited Partnership, approached the Board of County 
Commissioners of JohnsonCounty (the Board) about placing a 
conservation easement on Meadowood Ranch.

 
 
[¶6]    On December 21, 1993, the 
Board of County Commissioners of JohnsonCounty (the Board) adopted Resolution No. 
145, which was entitled "Scenic Resources Resolution."  The resolution established the "Scenic 
Preserve Trust" and provided:

 
 

Johnson County contains many areas with specific 
qualities that should be preserved in as close to their natural state or their 
current state as possible.  Such 
qualities are known as scenic resources.  
Scenic resources encompass all attributes of the landscape from which 
visually defined values arise including but not limited to topography, rock 
outcrops, vegetation, lakes and streams, panoramic view, and 
wildlife.

. . . .

In the interest of protecting the 
public health, safety and welfare; in the interest of protecting Johnson 
County's priceless environmental quality and scenic beauty; in the interest of 
maintaining and enriching the human environment for both residents and visitors 
to Johnson County; and in the interest of maintaining and enhancing Johnson 
County's economy, of which the tourism section is prominent, the Board of County 
Commissioners believes it advisable to establish a scenic preservation 
trust.

 
 
Section 4:  Establishment of Scenic Preserve 
Trust.

The Board of County Commissioners 
hereby establishes the Scenic Preserve Trust of Johnson County, Wyoming 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Trust") as the entity in which real Trust 
Property Rights are vested and maintained according to this 
resolution.

 
 
Section 5:  Purpose.  

The Trust shall be the repository 
for Trust Property Rights for Johnson County, 
Wyoming, for the purpose of preserving and 
enhancing the scenic resources of JohnsonCounty.  

. . . .

 
 
Section 6:  Board of 
Trustees.

The Trust shall be governed by a 
Board of Trustees. The members of the Board of Trustees shall be the members of 
the Board of County Commissioners of JohnsonCounty.

 
 
Section 7:  Acquisition of Interests in Real 
Property.

a.       The Trust 
may acquire by purchase, gift, devise or bequest title to, or any interest in, 
or rights in real property, including land and water, that will cause the 
County's scenic resources to be preserved in accord with the purposes of this 
resolution.  (All such rights herein 
referred to as "Trust Property Rights").

b.       The Trust 
Property Rights which constitute the assets of the Trust may be fee simple title 
to such property, scenic easements in such property, development rights of such 
property, or such other less-than-fee interests in such property as are 
consistent with the purposes of this resolution. 

 
 
Resolution 145 became effective on 
the date of its adoption, December 21, 1993.

 
 
[¶7]    On December 29, 1993, the 
Lowham Limited Partnership executed a "Deed of Conservation Easement and Quit 
Claim Deed."  The deed transferred 
to the Board a one-acre tract of Meadowood Ranch, as well as a conservation 
easement over the ranch.  The 
conservation easement was intended to "preserve and protect in perpetuity the 
natural, agricultural, ecological, wildlife habitat, open space, scenic and 
aesthetic features and values of the Ranch."  The grantors expressed their intent that 
the conservation easement be maintained in perpetuity unless "unforeseeable 
circumstances" made the continuation of the conservation easement 
impossible.  The conservation 
easement prohibited the "removal of minerals, hydrocarbons, and other materials 
on or below the surface of the land."  
On April 15, 1997, the Board quitclaimed the one-acre parcel of Meadowood 
Ranch to the Scenic Preserve Trust of Johnson County, "subject to any easements 
or rights-of-way that have been legally acquired."

 
 
[¶8]    On February 1, 1999, the 
Lowham Limited Partnership sold Meadowood Ranch to the Dowds.  The Dowds took the property subject to 
the conservation easement.  In 2001, 
coal bed methane development was contemplated by a company that owns mineral 
interests underlying Meadowood Ranch.  
As a result, in June of 2002, the Dowds requested that the Board 
terminate the conservation easement.  
The Dowds asserted that coal bed methane development was unpreventable, 
unanticipated, and inconsistent with the terms of the conservation 
easement.  The Dowds proposed that 
the conservation easement could be extinguished if the Board sold them the 
one-acre parcel and the conservation easement. 

 
 
[¶9]    On August 6, 2002, the Board, 
at a regularly scheduled meeting, took action to extinguish the conservation 
easement on Meadowood Ranch.  First, 
the Board adopted Resolution No. 257.  
The resolution authorized the Board to execute a quitclaim deed that 
would transfer the one-acre parcel and conservation easement to the Dowds.  The resolution referred to coal bed 
methane development on Meadowood Ranch, noting that such development was 
inconsistent with the purposes of the conservation easement.  Next, the Board executed a "Quitclaim 
Deed," which transferred to the Dowds the one-acre tract and the conservation 
easement over Meadowood Ranch.  The 
deed stated that the conservation easement over Meadowood Ranch was 
"extinguished and terminated."  As 
part of the transfer, the Dowds agreed to "indemnify and hold harmless the Board 
and the County."  As far as the 
record shows, there was no W.R.A.P. 12 Petition for Review of any of the actions 
taken by the Board on August 6, 2002.

 
 
[¶10]  Appellant Robert Hicks is a resident of 
JohnsonCounty.  In addition to owning lands in 
JohnsonCounty, Mr. Hicks owns Pronghorn Publishing, which 
publishes the Buffalo Bulletin, a newspaper of general circulation throughout 
JohnsonCounty.  A reporter from the Buffalo Bulletin 
attended the Board meeting held on August 6, 2002.  Public notice of the meeting was 
published in the Buffalo Bulletin on August 22, 2002.

 
 

[¶11]  Approximately ten months later, 
Appellants began this litigation.  
On June 3, 2003, Appellants filed a notice of governmental claim.  On July 14, 2003, Appellants filed a 
"Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Mandamus Relief, Breach of Fiduciary Duties 
and Constructive Trust."

 
 
[¶12]  In the complaint, Appellants first 
alleged that the actions taken by the Board on August 6, 2002, violated the 
Wyoming Public Meetings Act, rendering the Quitclaim Deed void.  Second, Appellants sought a writ of 
mandamus to require the Board to rescind the Quitclaim Deed, as a "violation of 
the Board's fiduciary duties and in violation of the terms of the conservation 
easement."  Appellants alleged that 
the Conservation Easement could not be extinguished until it was judicially 
determined that unforeseeable circumstances made the continuation of the 
easement impossible.  Third, 
Appellants claimed that the Board members had breached their fiduciary duties as 
trustees of the Scenic Preserve trust by failing to transfer trust property in 
exchange for property of at least equal market value.  Appellants sought a declaration that the 
quitclaim deed is null and void.  
Appellants also sought a judgment in favor of the Scenic Preserve 
Trust.  In the alternative, 
Appellants requested that a constructive trust be imposed on Meadowood Ranch, to 
compensate for extinguishment of the conservation easement.

 
 
[¶13]  The Board and the Dowds answered the 
complaint.  Both answers asserted 
that Appellants lacked standing to pursue this litigation.  Later, the Dowds filed a motion for 
summary judgment.  Appellants 
opposed the Dowds' motion for summary judgment and filed their own motion for 
summary judgment.  In opposing 
Appellants' motion for summary judgment, the Dowds provided briefing to support 
their assertion that Appellants lack standing to enforce the terms of the Scenic 
Preserve Trust.  In response, 
Appellants contended that their standing should be recognized because this 
matter involves issues of substantial public interest and 
importance.

 
 
[¶14]  On April 12, 2004, the district court 
denied the motions for summary judgment.  
In its "Order Denying Motions for Summary Judgment," the district court 
made a number of findings.  First, 
the district court found that the conservation easement was transferred to a 
charitable trust, the Scenic Preserve Trust of Johnson County.  Second, citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 4-10-103, the district court found that "the conservation easement was 
granted and accepted for the benefit of Wyoming citizens, so a Johnson County 
resident, including Mr. Hicks, is a beneficiary and has standing."  Next, the district court found that, 
under Title 4 of the Wyoming Statutes, the district courts "have exclusive 
jurisdiction concerning administration of charitable trusts and under Wyoming 
Administrative Procedures Act appeal is not required before requesting the Court 
to adjudicate controversies concerning charitable trusts."  In addition, the district court found 
that there was no violation of the open meetings law.  (Although the district court's order was 
styled as an order denying summary judgment, this resolved this claim.)  Finally, the district court found that 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-110 (LexisNexis 2005)2 "recognizes that the Wyoming 
Attorney General has a right to act as a beneficiary with respect to charitable 
trusts."  The district court ordered 
the parties to notify the Wyoming Attorney General's Office of the action, to 
afford the Attorney General an opportunity to intervene in this 
action.

 
 
[¶15]  The Attorney General was notified of the 
action.  On May 3, 2004, the 
Attorney General responded to the notice, writing that the

 
 
Attorney 
General's Office does not need to intervene in this matter.  The issues are squarely before the Court 
and the interests of the public, as the beneficiaries of the conservation 
easement at issue here, are being represented by arguments of counsel on all 
sides.

 
 

The 
Attorney General has 
not participated in this appeal.  The case was set for 
trial.

 
 
[¶16]  Before trial, however, the Dowds filed a 
motion to dismiss the remaining claims for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  The Dowds argued that 
because Appellants were claiming to be aggrieved or adversely affected by the 
Board's actions of August 6, 2002, Appellants' remedy was to file a petition for 
review of agency action pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.  Because Appellants did not file a 
petition pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12, the Dowds contended that the remaining three 
causes of action (writ of mandamus, breach of fiduciary duties, and constructive 
trust) should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  After a telephonic hearing, the district 
court, reversing its earlier decision, dismissed the remaining claims for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction.  In 
its order, the district court adopted the Dowds' argument and ruled that the 
remaining claims were barred because Appellants did not file a W.R.A.P. 12 
petition for review of agency action.  
This timely appeal followed.

 
 

 
 
[¶17]  Although the district court dismissed 
this action due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to failure to file a 
W.R.A.P. 12 petition for review, we believe this case is more properly resolved 
on a different, but equally important, jurisdictional ground.  We conclude that Appellants lack 
standing to enforce the Scenic Preserve Trust.

 
 
[¶18]  We find it appropriate to decide this 
matter on standing grounds for a number of reasons.  Standing is a "jurisprudential rule of 
jurisdictional magnitude."  Jolley v. State Loan and Inv. Bd., 2002 
WY 7, ¶ 6, 38 P.3d 1073, 1076 (Wyo. 2002); see also Washakie County School Dist. No. One v. 
Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 316 (Wyo. 1980) ("Standing is a jurisdictional 
issue.")  It is axiomatic that the 
existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that can be raised 
at any time.  Granite Springs Retreat Ass'n, Inc. v. 
Manning, 2006 WY 60, ¶ 5, 133 P.3d 1005, 1009-10 (Wyo. 2006); Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. 
Blury-Losolla, 952 P.2d 1117, 1119-20 (Wyo. 1998).  In addition, the standing issue was 
considered in the district court, and the Dowds and the Appellants have provided 
appellate briefing on the issue.  
Under the circumstances, we believe it appropriate to resolve this matter 
on this ground.

 
 
[¶19]  The district court found that the Scenic 
Preserve Trust is a charitable trust.  
Charitable trusts are recognized in Wyoming, both in case law and statute.  See Town of Cody 
v. Buffalo Bill Memorial Ass'n, 196 P.2d 369, 
377, 64 Wyo. 468 (Wyo. 1948).  Wyoming's Uniform Trust Code includes the 
following provision regarding charitable trusts:

 
 
Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 4-10-406. Charitable 
purposes; enforcement.

(a)  A charitable trust 
may be created for the relief of poverty, the advancement of education or 
religion, the promotion of health, governmental or municipal purposes, or other 
purposes the achievement of which is beneficial to the 
community.

 
 
[¶20]  In their brief, Appellants do not 
challenge the district court finding that the Scenic Preserve Trust is a 
charitable trust.  Instead, they 
agree that the Scenic Preservation Trust is a charitable trust, whether under 
common law principles or under current statutory law.  Given the district court's unchallenged 
finding, we must agree that the Scenic Preserve Trust is a charitable 
trust.

 
 
[¶21]  We also conclude that Appellants' action 
is one to enforce the Scenic Preserve Trust.  Appellants' claims are based on (1) the 
Board's alleged violations of the terms of the Scenic Preserve Trust itself, 
and/or (2) the Board's alleged violations of the terms of the conservation 
easement held by the Scenic Preserve Trust.  Implicit in Appellants' claims is that 
the Scenic Preserve Trust is bound by the terms of the conservation easement.3  SeeTown of Cody v. Buffalo Bill Memorial Ass'n, 196 P.2d 369, 377, 64 Wyo. 
468 (Wyo. 
1948) ("Grants made to a charitable corporation may, of course, be of various 
kinds.  They may be absolute or, on 
the other hand, proper terms, conditions and directions may be annexed 
thereto.  In the latter case, the 
terms, conditions and directions annexed must be carried out.")  We conclude that this is an action 
seeking to enforce the Scenic Preserve Trust.

 
 
Standing to enforce a charitable 
trust

 
 
[¶22]  After our review of the common law and 
Wyoming's 
Uniform Trust Code, we are compelled to disagree with the district court on its 
ruling that Appellants have standing.  
A statement of the common law rule regarding the enforcement of 
charitable trusts is found in § 391 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, which 
provides:

 
 
Who Can Enforce a Charitable 
Trust.

A suit 
can be maintained for the enforcement of a charitable trust by the Attorney 
General or other public officer, or by a co-trustee, or by a person who has a 
special interest in the enforcement of the charitable trust, but not by persons 
who have no special interest or by the settlor or his heirs, personal 
representatives or next of kin.

 
 
[¶23]  See also Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 
28, Cmt. C; IVA William F. Fratcher, Scott on Trusts, § 364 (4th ed.1989) ("A 
charitable trust is enforceable at the suit of the Attorney General, and 
ordinarily is not enforceable at the suit of any individual beneficiary, 
although in the case of some charitable trusts there may be beneficiaries having 
such a special interest in the performance of the trust as to entitle them to 
maintain a suit to enforce it."); Scott 
on Trusts at § 391.

 
 
[¶24]  With regard to persons holding a special 
interest, the Restatement provision includes this comment:

 
 

c.  Person having a 
special interest.  As has been stated, a 
trust is not a charitable trust where the beneficiaries are limited to definite 
persons.  The mere fact that a person is a possible 
beneficiary is not sufficient to entitle him to maintain a suit for the 
enforcement of a charitable trust.  
A charitable trust may, however, be created whereby a particular person 
is entitled to receive a benefit under the trust. Thus, a charitable trust may 
be created for the benefit of the minister for the time being of a particular 
church. See §§ 371, 375.  In such a 
case a minister of the church can maintain a suit against the trustee for the 
enforcement of the trust.  So also, 
where a charitable trust is created for the relief of poverty or the promotion 
of education, it may be provided that particular persons shall be entitled to a 
preference in receiving benefits under the trust.  See §§ 370, 375.  In such a case any such person can 
maintain a suit against the trustees for the enforcement of the trust.  So also, a charitable trust may be 
created by the terms of which a particular corporation is entitled to a benefit 
under the trust.  Thus, a charitable 
trust may be created by the terms of which the trustees are under a duty to pay 
the income to a particular incorporated church.  In such a case the church corporation 
can maintain a suit against the trustees for the enforcement of the trust.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
[¶25]  The rationale behind the common law rule 
is found in a leading treatise:

 
 
The persons affected by such trusts 
are usually some or all of the members of a large and shifting class of the 
public.  If any member of this class 
who deemed himself qualified might begin suit, the trustee might be subjected to 
unnecessary litigation. Often no given individual can prove that he will 
necessarily benefit from the charity.  
All may be prospective or possible beneficiaries, but no one can be said 
to be a certain recipient of aid.  
In ultimate analysis it is the public at large which benefits, and not 
merely the individuals directly assisted.  
Thus, there is some reason for vesting in a single authority the 
discretion and power to enforce such trusts, rather than in leaving the matter 
to the numerous, changing, and uncertain members of the group to be 
aided.

 
 
Ronald Chester, George Gleason 
Bogert & George Taylor Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 411, at 
13 (3d ed. 2005); see also State ex rel. Nixon v. Hutcherson, 96 S.W.3d 81, 84 (Mo. 2003).  In other words, "It is well established 
that persons are not entitled to sue if their only benefit from enforcement of 
the trust is that shared by other members of the public.  The community's interest in the 
enforcement of a charitable trust must be vindicated by the attorney 
general."  Mitchellville Cmty. Ctr., Inc. v. Vos (In re 
Clement Trust), 679 N.W.2d 31, 37 (Iowa 2004).

 
 

[¶26]  Recently, the common law standing rule 
has expanded.  "[A]s public 
attention to laxity in the enforcement by the Attorney General increases, courts 
have begun to expand standing to enforce charitable trusts" to others.  Chester, et al., The Law of Trusts and 
Trustees, § 411, at 2.  Generally, that power has been extended 
to individuals with a fiduciary interest (trustees, former and subsequent 
trustees, or subtrustees); to specially interested beneficiaries; and to the 
settlors and their successors.  
Id., at § 412  415; see 
also Forest Guardians v. 
Powell, 24 P.3d 803, 808 (N.M.App. 2001).

 
 
[¶27]  With these common law principles in mind, 
we turn to Wyoming's Uniform Trust Code.4  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-106 ("The 
common law of trusts and principles of equity supplement this act, except to the 
extent modified by this act or another statute of this state.")  With regard to who may act as 
beneficiary of charitable trusts, Wyoming's Uniform Trust Code 
provides:

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 4-10-406. Charitable purposes; 
enforcement.

. . . .

(c)  The settlor of a 
charitable trust, among others, may maintain a proceeding to enforce the 
trust.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 4-10-110.  Others treated as qualified 
beneficiaries.

. . . .

(d)  The attorney general 
of this state may exercise the rights of a qualified beneficiary with respect to 
a charitable trust having its principal place of administration in this state by 
notifying the trustee by written notice.

 
 
[¶28]  Reading Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-110(d) and 
§ 4-10-406(c) (LexisNexis 2005) in pari 
materia, and keeping in mind that the Uniform Trust Code is supplemented by 
the common law of trusts, we conclude that, in Wyoming, a charitable trust may 
be enforced by a settlor, the attorney general, or a qualified beneficiary of 
the trust.

 
 
[¶29]  Because none of the Appellants is a 
settlor of the Scenic Preserve Trust or the attorney general, the only question 
is whether or not Appellants are qualified beneficiaries.  In its ruling that Appellants had 
standing, the district court found that Appellants were beneficiaries.  It wrote:

 
 
[U]nder current Wyoming law, W.S. § 
4-10-103, a beneficiary would include any person or corporation that has a 
present or future beneficial interest in the trust; the conservation easement 
was granted and accepted for the benefit of Wyoming citizens, so a Johnson 
County resident, including Mr. Hicks, is a beneficiary and has 
standing.

 
 
[¶30]  However, § 4-10-110(d) refers to 
"qualified beneficiaries," not simply "beneficiaries."  Indeed, the Uniform Trust Code draws a 
distinction between the two types of beneficiaries, defining the terms in this 
fashion:

 
 
(ii)  "Beneficiary" means 
a person that:

(A)  Has a present or 
future beneficial interest in a trust, vested or contingent;  or

(B)  In a capacity other 
than that of trustee, holds a power of appointment over trust 
property.

. . . .

(xv)  "Qualified 
beneficiary" means a beneficiary who is currently entitled to distributions of 
income or principal from the trust or has a vested remainder interest in the 
residuary of the trust which is not subject to divestment;

 
 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-103(a) 
(LexisNexis 2005).

 
 
[¶31]  While Appellants may meet the definition 
of "beneficiary," Appellants do not meet the definition of "qualified 
beneficiary," a term analogous to the common law concept of "special 
interest."  Appellants' only benefit 
from enforcement of the trust is that shared by other members of the 
public.  Therefore, we hold that 
Appellants lack standing to enforce the terms of the Scenic Preserve 
Trust.

 
 
The Attorney General's role in this 
case

 
 
[¶32]  The parties also take different positions 
with respect to the Attorney General's declination to become involved in this 
suit.  Appellants contend that the 
Attorney General's approach means that they, Appellants, have the green light to 
pursue this litigation.  For their 
part, the Dowds contend that "[o]nce the Attorney General declined to 
participate, for whatever reason, the case should have been over because Hicks 
does not have standing, and standing cannot be conferred by consent of 
anyone."

 
 
[¶33]  We take a third, more pragmatic, approach 
to the Attorney General's non-participation.  At the time the Attorney General 
declined to participate, the district court had already ruled that Appellants 
had standing to pursue this action.  
While we do not agree with that ruling, at the time, it was the law of 
this case.  Given the district 
court's ruling, it was understandable that the Attorney General would allow 
well-represented private litigants to pursue this litigation.  However, there is nothing indicating 
that the Attorney General formally authorized Appellants to pursue this 
litigation on his behalf.  At the same time, given our 
holding that Appellants do not have standing, the Attorney General has the 
opportunity to reassess his position.

 
 
Matters of great public interest and 
importance

 
 
[¶34]  In their reply brief, Appellants again 
argue that their standing should be recognized under "the great public interest 
and importance doctrine," which acts as an exception to the standing 
requirement.  We discussed that 
doctrine at length in Jolley, where 
we wrote:

 
 
The doctrine of great public 
interest or importance should be applied cautiously:

 
 
The question of great public 
importance rests with this court, Kellner 
v. District Court In and For City and County of Denver, 127 Colo. 320, 256 P.2d 887, 888.  This exception must 
be applied with caution and its exercise must be a matter where strict standards 
are applied to avoid the temptation to apply the judge's own beliefs and 
philosophies to a determination of what questions are of great public 
importance.

 
 

Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 578 (Wyo.1974).  We decline to expand the doctrine to 
encompass alleged violations of an agency's rules and regulations that do not 
directly implicate the constitutionality of legislation or an agency's actions 
or inactions.  

 
 

Jolley, ¶ 10, 38 P.3d  at 
1078-79.

 
 
[¶35]  Here, Appellants argue that the Board 
violated Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 365 and/or Wyo. Const. art. 16 § 
6.6  These arguments were neither referenced 
in Appellants' complaint nor meaningfully developed below.  Also, in their appellate brief, 
Appellants devote only slightly more than one page to the constitutional 
arguments.  In that one page, 
Appellants do not establish how article 3 of the Wyoming Constitution applies to 
this matter, given that the article concerns the legislative branch.  Appellants also do not provide much to 
establish that Wyo. Const. art. 16 § 6 would apply to the transactions at 
issue.  In addition, because 
Wyoming's 
Uniform Trust Code and the common law both provide guidance regarding the 
persons who maintain standing to enforce a charitable trust, perhaps the "great 
public interest or importance" exception should be employed with even greater 
caution in this instance.  Given all 
these circumstances, and employing the requisite level of caution, we conclude 
that this is not a matter of great public interest and 
importance.

 
 
Public meetings 
law

 
 
[¶36]  Finally, we briefly address Appellants' 
claim that the Board's actions violated the Public Meetings Law, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 16-4-403 (LexisNexis 2005).7  We will assume, arguendo, that Appellants have standing 
to pursue this issue.  Appellants' 
theory is that the Scenic Preserve Trust is a subagency of the Board, meaning 
that separate notice was required for any meetings of the Scenic Preserve 
Trust.  However, Appellants provide 
no authority to support their position.  
We have long recognized that "a trust is a fudiciary relationship in 
which one person is the holder of the title to property subject to an equitable 
obligation to keep or use the property for the benefit of another."  Scotti's Drive In Restaurants, Inc. v. Mile 
High--Dart In Corp., 526 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Wyo. 1974).  We cannot agree that the Board was 
required to hold, and provide notice of, a separate meeting, when the members 
intended to act in their role as trustees of the Scenic Preserve Trust.  To agree with such an argument would 
place technicalities and form over substance.  The bottom line here is that the Board 
took its actions at a regularly scheduled public meeting, and we, therefore, 
must agree with the district court that no violation of the public meetings law 
occurred.

 
 
[¶37]  For the reasons stated above, the 
district court's decision is affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The Ranch is 
now known as C Bar B Ranch.  For the 
sake of simplicity, we will refer to the property as Meadowood 
Ranch.

 
 

2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
4-10-110.  Others treated as 
qualified beneficiaries.

            
. . . .

            
(d)  The attorney general of this state may exercise the rights 
of a qualified beneficiary with respect to a charitable trust having its 
principal place of administration in this state by notifying the trustee by 
written notice.

 
 

3Wyoming law now includes the 
"Uniform Conservation Easement Act," which became effective July 1, 2005.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-201 et seq.  That act includes the following 
provision.

 
 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
34-1-203.  Judicial action; 
modification; termination.

(a) An 
action affecting a conservation easement may be brought 
by:

            
(i) An owner of an interest in the real property burdened by the 
conservation easement;

            
(ii) A holder of the conservation easement;

            
(iii)  A person having third-party rights of enforcement, as 
named in the instrument creating the conservation 
easement.

 
 

4The Uniform 
Trust Code, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-101 et. seq., became effective July 1, 2003, 
just 13 days before Appellants commenced this action.  The Uniform Trust Code "applies to all 
judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2003."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-1103(a)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2005).

 
 

5Wyo. Const. art. 3 § 36. 
Prohibited appropriations.

            
No appropriation shall be made for charitable, industrial, educational or 
benevolent purposes to any person, corporation or community not under the 
absolute control of the state, nor to any denominational or sectarian 
institution or association.

 
 

6Wyo. Const. art. 16 § 6. Loan 
of credit;  donations 
prohibited;  works of internal 
improvement

            
Neither the state nor any county, city, township, town, school district, 
or any other political subdivision, shall loan or give its credit or make 
donations to or in aid of any individual, association or corporation, except for 
necessary support of the poor, nor subscribe to or become the owner of the 
capital stock of any association or corporation, except that funds of public 
employee retirement systems and the permanent funds of the state of Wyoming may 
be invested in such stock under conditions the legislature prescribes.  The state shall not engage in any work 
of internal improvement unless authorized by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the 
people.

 
 

7Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 16-4-403.  Meetings to be 
open; participation by public; minutes.

(a)  All 
meetings of the governing body of an agency are public meetings, open to the 
public at all times, except as otherwise provided.  No action of a governing body of an 
agency shall be taken except during a public meeting following notice of the 
meeting in accordance with this act.  
Action taken at a meeting not in conformity with this act is null and 
void and not merely voidable.