Case Title: Weber v. McCoy

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Weber v. McCoy1997 WY 145950 P.2d 548Case Number: 97-132Decided: 12/17/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

JACK B. WEBER, 

Appellant (Plaintiff), 

 

v. 

 

THEODORE N. McCOY, M.D., 

Appellee (Defendant).

 

Appeal 
from The District Court, Laramie County 

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

James A. 
Coulter, Riverton.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

J. Kent 
Rutledge and Lou Piccioni of Lathrop & Rutledge, P.C., 
Cheyenne.

 

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

MACY, Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant Jack 
Weber (the patient) appeals from the summary judgment which the district court 
granted in favor of Appellee Theodore McCoy (the doctor).

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      The patient 
offers the following issues for our review:

 

I. Whether the District Court erred in concluding 
appellee met his initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue 
of material fact, when Dr. Stacy Childs' affidavit in support of summary 
judgment was inadequate, by not providing and stating a standard of reasonable 
medical probability necessary for admissible evidence in a medical malpractice 
action, by using speculative and conclusory language and failing to state the 
standard of care including the substantial risks of this surgery as well as the 
alternative of doing nothing?

 

II. Whether the District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment to Defendant based on that court's interpretation of timing 
prescribed by W.R.C.P. Rule 6(c) and whether it exceeded discretion in denying 
appellant's 6(b) W.R.C.P. motion for enlargement of time for submission of 
opposition affidavits in view of the actual procedural circumstances and cited 
definitive case law?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      The patient filed 
a medical malpractice action on February 13, 1995, alleging that the doctor 
negligently recommended a surgical procedure to deflate a large cyst on the 
patient's left kidney, that the doctor performed the surgery in a negligent 
manner, and that the doctor failed to obtain an informed consent from the 
patient when he did not disclose significant risks of the surgery. The doctor 
denied being negligent in caring for and treating the 
patient.

 

[¶5]      On May 1, 1996, 
during the course of discovery, the patient designated an expert witness. 
Subsequently, however, the patient refused to produce that expert so that the 
doctor could take his deposition. On January 17, 1997, the doctor's attorney 
called the patient's counsel, attempting to make arrangements for getting the 
expert's deposition. During that conversation, the patient's attorney disclosed 
that he had recently learned that his expert witness died on April 5, 1996, 
almost a full month before he designated him as an expert.

 

[¶6]      The doctor filed 
a motion for a summary judgment on January 24, 1997. A brief, along with an 
affidavit from Stacy Childs, M.D., a board-certified urologist, supported the 
motion. The district court notified the parties that it would hear the motion 
during the pretrial conference on February 18, 1997.

 

[¶7]      On the morning of 
February 18, 1997, the patient filed his response to the doctor's summary 
judgment motion along with a motion for more time in which to respond to the 
doctor's motion. The patient did not provide expert medical testimony in his 
opposition materials nor did he file an affidavit with his enlargement-of-time 
motion.

 

[¶8]      On that same 
date, the doctor filed a written response to the patient's opposition materials 
and enlargement-of-time motion. Given the various documents which were filed on 
February 18th, the district court vacated the pretrial conference and hearing on 
the summary judgment motion and rescheduled the hearing for March 13, 1997. On 
March 12, 1997, the patient served supplemental documentation to support his 
opposition to the doctor's summary judgment motion.

 

[¶9]      At the summary 
judgment motion hearing, after the parties had presented their arguments, the 
district court asked the parties to provide additional briefing on the limited 
issue of whether the patient's responsive materials, including the 
enlargement-of-time motion, were timely filed. After receiving and considering 
the briefs, the district court denied the patient's enlargement-of-time motion 
and granted a summary judgment in favor of the doctor. The patient appeals from 
this order.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶10]   A summary judgment is appropriate 
when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and when the prevailing 
party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Kirkwood v. CUNA Mutual Insurance 
Society, 937 P.2d 206, 208 (Wyo. 1997); see also W.R.C.P. 56(c). We examine the 
record from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the 
motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may 
fairly be drawn from the record. Kirkwood, 937 P.2d  at 208. We evaluate 
the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and by using 
the same materials as were employed and used by the lower court. Id. We do not accord any deference to 
the district court's decisions on issues of law. Id. The moving party bears the initial 
burden of establishing a prima facie case for a summary judgment. Mize v. North Big Horn Hospital 
District, 931 P.2d 229, 232 (Wyo. 1997). If the movant carries this burden, 
the opposing party is obligated to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material 
fact does exist. Id.

 

[¶11]   In order to avoid the entry of a 
summary judgment, a plaintiff in a malpractice case "`has the obligation to 
establish (1) the accepted standard of medical care or practice, (2) that the 
doctor's conduct departed from the standard, and (3) that his conduct was the 
legal cause of the injuries suffered.'" Harris v. Grizzle, 625 P.2d 747, 751 
(Wyo. 1981) (quoting Orcutt v. 
Miller, 95 Nev. 408, 595 P.2d 1191, 1193 (1979)). In a malpractice case, the 
plaintiff must establish through expert medical testimony the appropriate 
standard of care and that the doctor breached that standard of care. Id.

 

DISCUSSION

 

A. Sufficiency of the 
Affidavit

 

[¶12]   The patient contends that Dr. 
Childs' affidavit was not sufficient to preclude a showing of a genuine issue of 
material fact because Dr. Childs did not state his opinions in terms of a 
"reasonable medical probability."

 

[¶13]   Wyoming does not require that an 
expert use the magic words "reasonable medical probability" in order for his 
opinion to be considered a competent medical opinion.

 

"The use of the terms `probable' and `possible' as a 
basis for test of qualification or lack of qualification in respect to a medical 
opinion has frequently converted this aspect of a trial into a mere semantic 
ritual or hassle. The courts have come to recognize that the competency of a 
doctor's testimony cannot soundly be permitted to turn on a mechanical rule of 
law as to which of the two terms he has employed. Regardless of which term he 
may have used, if his testimony is such in nature and basis of hypothesis as to 
judicially impress that the opinion expressed represents his professional 
judgment as to the most likely one among the possible causes of the physical 
condition involved, the court is entitled to admit the opinion and leave its 
weight to the jury."

Vassos v. Roussalis, 658 P.2d 1284, 1290-91 (Wyo. 1983) (quoting Norland v. Washington General 
Hospital, 461 F.2d 694, 697 (8th Cir. 1972)).

 

[¶14]   The patient claims that our 
decision in Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe 
Line Co., 767 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1989), supports his argument. After reviewing 
Hashimoto, we conclude that the 
patient's reliance on this case is misplaced. In that case, we addressed an 
issue regarding the appropriate jury instructions for a personal injury case. 
767 P.2d  at 161-67. We held that the instruction should include the term 
"reasonable probability" instead of the term "reasonable certainty" in its 
description of the proper standard under which future damages must be proven. 
767 P.2d  at 165. We did not address the issue of whether an expert must use the 
phrase "reasonable medical probability" before his testimony will be considered. 
We decline to depart from our previous determination that such qualifying 
technical language is not indicative of whether the doctor based his opinion 
upon the requisite degree of certainty.

 

B. Informed Consent

 

[¶15]   The patient complains that Dr. 
Childs' affidavit did not demonstrate that the doctor provided the patient with 
enough information about the surgery to enable him to give an informed 
consent.

 

[¶16]   This Court has previously discussed 
what an affidavit must include to adequately support a summary judgment motion 
on a claim which alleges that informed consent was not obtained. Havens v. Hoffman, 902 P.2d 219 (Wyo. 
1995); Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108 
(Wyo. 1989). In Havens and Roybal, we carefully detailed the 
analysis of the summary judgment process as it pertains to lack of informed 
consent claims. We summarized the applicable rules as 
follows:

 

"Wyoming adheres to the majority position, known as 
the `traditional' or `professional' view, with respect to the required scope of 
disclosure. This standard provides that the physician is required to disclose 
only such risks that a reasonable practitioner of like training would have 
disclosed in the same or similar circumstances. Under this standard, expert 
testimony is required to establish what a reasonable practitioner would disclose 
in the same or similar circumstances.

 

"In order to overcome a motion for summary judgment, 
a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case must also present evidence, usually in 
the form of expert testimony, indicating the departure by a medical practitioner 
from a recognized standard of practice was a proximate cause of her injury. A 
plaintiff establishes proximate cause in an informed consent case by proof that 
proper disclosure would have resulted in a decision against the proposed 
treatment or procedure. . . .

 

"With the foregoing principles in mind, we look to 
the materials in the record to determine if genuine issues of material fact 
exist which would preclude the entry of summary judgment."

 

Havens, 
902 P.2d  at 222 (quoting Roybal, 778 P.2d  at 112-13 (citations & footnote omitted)).

 

[¶17]   In his affidavit, Dr. Childs 
explained that a physician must disclose the usual risks which are associated 
with a particular type of surgery and that bleeding was an additional risk of 
the surgery which was performed on the patient. Dr. Childs also averred that the 
risks which must be disclosed with this type of surgery are those risks which 
were set forth in the informed consent form that the patient signed. By 
referring to Dr. Childs' affidavit, the district court was able to specifically 
determine what risks needed to be disclosed and that the doctor did indeed 
disclose these risks to the patient.

 

C. Timeliness of Opposition 
Documents

 

[¶18]   The patient maintains that the 
district court erred by incorrectly determining that his opposition materials 
were untimely filed pursuant to W.R.C.P. 6(c)(1) and by denying his motion for 
an enlargement of time to respond to the doctor's summary judgment 
motion.

 

[¶19]   W.R.C.P. 56(c) provides: "Unless 
the court otherwise orders, the motion and any response and other papers 
relating thereto shall be served pursuant to Rule 6(c)." W.R.C.P. 6(c)(1) 
provides in pertinent part:

 

[U]nless the court by order permits service at some 
other time, a party affected by the motion shall serve a response, if any, 
together with affidavits, if any, at 
least three days prior to the hearing on the motion or within 20 days after 
service of the motion, whichever is earlier. Unless the court by order 
permits service at some other time, the moving party shall serve a reply, if 
any, at least one day prior to the hearing on the motion or within 15 days after 
service of the response, whichever is earlier. Unless the court otherwise 
orders, any party may serve supplemental memoranda or rebuttal affidavits at 
least one day prior to the hearing on the motion.

 

(Emphasis added.) The 
district court should not receive or consider untimely filed affidavits in 
summary judgment matters. Larsen v. 
Roberts, 676 P.2d 1046, 1047-48 (Wyo. 1984). To condone a practice which 
permits parties to simply ignore the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure would 
defeat the purpose for the rules. 676 P.2d  at 1048.

 

[¶20]   The district court originally set 
the hearing on the summary judgment motion for February 18, 1997. Instead of 
serving his opposing materials in accordance with W.R.C.P. 6, the patient waited 
until February 18, 1997, to file a written opposition to the doctor's summary 
judgment motion and a motion for an enlargement of time to respond. On March 12, 
1997, the day before the rescheduled hearing, the patient filed and served 
additional documents in support of his opposition to the doctor's summary 
judgment motion. He included two affidavits in these documents which purported 
to oppose the summary judgment motion.

 

[¶21]   The patient asserts that, when the 
district court rescheduled the hearing date, the deadlines imposed by W.R.C.P. 
6(c)(1) also changed. The patient misinterprets this rule. An order which 
rescheduled a hearing and was entered after the responsive documents were due 
does not extend the response period. The patient relies on the language in 
W.R.C.P. 6(c)(1) which allows "supplemental memoranda or rebuttal affidavits at 
least one day prior to the hearing." This, of course, assumes that adequate 
opposing materials were timely filed in the first place.

 

[¶22]   With regard to the 
enlargement-of-time motion, we rely upon W.R.C.P. 6(b) which provides in 
pertinent part:

 

(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice 
given thereunder or by order of court an act is required or allowed to be done 
at or within a specified time, the court, or a commissioner thereof, for cause 
shown may at any time in its discretion: (1) with or without motion or notice 
order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of 
the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order; or (2) upon 
motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be 
done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect. . . 
.

 

In denying the patient's 
motion for more time, the district court stated:

 

5. It is undisputed that [the patient's] original 
expert urologist . . . died in April of 1996. Although [the patient] was 
apparently unaware of this fact until January of 1997, [the patient] should have 
known about this much earlier due to [the doctor's] requests for taking the 
deposition of [the expert witness]. Moreover, [the patient] has failed to show 
that he did not have adequate time to retain another expert. Considering all of 
the circumstances in this case, [the patient] has had more than enough time to 
provide responsive materials in opposition to [the doctor's] Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The Court specifically finds that [the patient] has failed to show 
either cause or excusable neglect sufficient to justify enlargement of time for 
filing responsive materials.

 

Because the patient waited 
until the prescribed response period had expired to make his motion, he was 
required to show "excusable neglect." W.R.C.P. 6(b)(2). This Court has defined 
excusable neglect as being that behavior which might be the act of a reasonably 
prudent person under the circumstances. Whitney v. McDonough, 892 P.2d 791, 794 
(Wyo. 1995).

 

[¶23]   The patient maintains that the 
unknown death of an expert should be viewed as "excusable neglect or at least 
compassion allowing a just resolution on the merits and not sanctionable lack of 
diligence." We disagree and echo the district court's findings that the patient 
should have known about the death of his expert much earlier than he did and 
that the patient failed to demonstrate that he did not have sufficient time in 
which to retain another expert. Accordingly, the patient failed to show 
excusable neglect which was sufficient to justify being granted an enlargement 
of time for filing responsive materials.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶24]   After having reviewed Dr. Childs' 
affidavit, we are satisfied that he stated his opinions with the requisite 
degree of certainty and that the affidavit contained sufficient detail to enable 
the district court to determine whether the doctor disclosed the necessary 
information to the patient in order to obtain an informed consent. The district 
court properly relied on the affidavit, and, because the patient did not timely 
provide opposing expert medical testimony, the district court correctly granted 
the summary judgment in favor of the doctor.

 

[¶25]   
Affirmed.