Case Title: Dayton Bar Assn. v. Sebree

Citation: 2004-Ohio-6560

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Dayton Bar Assn. v. Sebree, 104 Ohio St.3d 448, 2004-Ohio-6560.] 
 
 
DAYTON BAR ASSOCIATION v. SEBREE. 
[Cite as Dayton Bar Assn. v. Sebree, 104 Ohio St.3d 448, 2004-Ohio-6560.] 
Attorneys at law – Misconduct – Motion for default upon respondent’s failure to 
answer – Evidence offered in support of motion insufficient to support 
findings of misconduct, when – Cause returned to board for further 
proceedings. 
(No. 2004-1060 — Submitted August 17, 2004 — Decided December 15, 2004.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 02-40. 
__________________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Ronald H. Sebree of Dayton, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0063210, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1994.  
On July 3, 2002, we suspended respondent’s license to practice for six months but 
stayed imposition of this sanction on conditions that respondent submit to 
monitoring of his office practices and management skills for one year and pursue 
further training in office management.  Dayton Bar Assn. v. Sebree, 96 Ohio St.3d 
50, 2002-Ohio-2987, 770 N.E.2d 1009. 
{¶ 2} On December 11, 2002, relator, Dayton Bar Association, filed an 
amended complaint charging respondent with violating the Code of Professional 
Responsibility.  Respondent was served with the amended complaint but did not 
answer, and relator filed for default pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(6)(F).  The motion 
was supported by an affidavit1 signed by an attorney investigator. 
                                                 
1.{¶a}  The affidavit states: 
   {¶b} “1.  I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Ohio; 
January Term, 2004 
2 
{¶ 3} Relator filed a second affidavit2 in support of the motion for 
default judgment upon advisement that the first affidavit failed to provide any 
                                                                                                                                     
   {¶c} “2.  I was contacted by the Dayton Bar Association to follow up on the investigation of a 
Deborah Smith against a local attorney, Ronald H. Sebree; 
   {¶d} “3.  A member of the Certified Grievance Committee of the Dayton Bar Association 
initially investigated the matter and subsequently was unable to continue as the Bar’s 
representative; 
   {¶e} “4.  During the course of the investigation, the member talked with Ms. Smith on the 
telephone and met with Mr. Sebree; 
   {¶f} “5.  At the conclusion of the member’s investigation, he determined that Ms. Smith had 
employed Mr. Sebree to end her marriage by dissolution and that he had advised her it would be 
done prior to her new scheduled wedding date in early September; 
   {¶g} “6. Ms. Smith paid Mr. Sebree in advance and signed the Separation Agreement and 
Petition in May of 2001; 
   {¶h} “7.  By July 30, 2001, Mr. Sebree had still not filed the dissolution paperwork with the 
Court and Ms. Smith filed a complaint with the Dayton Bar Association; 
   {¶i} “8.  Ms. Smith eventually found another lawyer to complete her dissolution  
and Mr. 
Sebree refused to refund the payment previously made; 
   {¶j} “9.  I determined during the course of my investigation of Mr. Sebree that he did not have a 
trust account as required by the rules governing lawyer conduct in the State of Ohio; 
   {¶k} “10.  Further, I determined that Mr. Sebree was commingling client funds with his own and 
not properly administering court refunds back to clients; 
   {¶l} “11.  In addition, I determined that Mr. Sebree was not following recent amendments to the 
Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, was not advising clients that he did not carry 
professional malpractice insurance, and not appropriately documenting his files regarding same; 
   {¶m} “12.  It is my opinion that the conduct of Mr. Sebree in this matter violates Disciplinary  
Rule DR9-102(A) and DR9-102(B) and DR1-104.” 
 
2.{¶a}  The second affidavit stated: 
   {¶b} “1.  I am an attorney at law, duly licensed to practice law in the State of Ohio.  * * * 
   {¶c} “2.  I am currently a member of the Certified Grievance Committee of the Dayton Bar 
Association, and have been for a number of years. 
   {¶d} “3.  In my capacity as a member of the Certified Grievance Committee of the Dayton Bar 
Association, I was asked to investigate a complaint by  Sophia Battigaglia against Attorney 
Ronald H. Sebree, Esq.  I received Ms. Battigaglia’s complaint against Attorney Sebree on August 
30, 2002. 
   {¶e} “4.  During the course of my investigation of Ms. Battigaglia’s complaint, I discovered 
that, on July 20, 2001, Ms. Battigaglia saw Attorney Sebree regarding some probate matters; that 
Attorney Sebree accepted a $500.00 retainer from Ms. Battigaglia at that time to handle the 
probate matters; that, after accepting the $500.00 retainer, Attorney Sebree did nothing whatsoever 
regarding the probate matters; and that Ms. Battigaglia was eventually required to hire another 
attorney to handle the probate matters. 
   {¶f} “5.  During the course of my investigation of Ms. Battigaglia’s complaint, I attempted to 
contact Attorney Sebree by letter on three occasions (he had no working telephone number at that 
time), requesting that he contact me regarding the investigation.  Although none of my letters were 
returned to me by the post office, Attorney Sebree did not contact me as I requested and he did not 
respond to my letters in any fashion. 
January Term, 2004 
3 
sworn or certified documentary prima facie evidence with regard to claims in the 
complaint that respondent had mishandled a client’s case. 
{¶ 4} A master commissioner appointed by the Board of Commissioners 
on Grievances and Discipline granted the motion, making findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and a recommendation, all of which the board adopted. 
Sufficiency of Supporting Evidence 
{¶ 5} Gov.Bar R. V(6)(F)(1)(b) requires that a motion for default in a 
disciplinary proceeding be supported by “[s]worn or certified documentary prima 
facie evidence in support of the allegations made.”  In addition, Gov.Bar R. 
V(6)(J) establishes a standard of clear and convincing proof in disciplinary cases 
that proceed to a hearing, including those that result after a case survives a motion 
for default. 
{¶ 6} The case at bar requires us to review a recommendation issued 
pursuant to the grant of a motion for default as authorized by Gov.Bar R. V(6)(F).  
It is similar to two other disciplinary cases recently considered by us: 
Northwestern Bar Assn. v. Lauber, 104 Ohio St.3d 121, 2004-Ohio-6237, 818 
N.E.2d 687 (case No. 2003-2171), and Dayton Bar Assn. v. Parker, 104 Ohio 
St.3d 117, 2004-Ohio-6236, 818 N.E.2d 684 (case No. 2003-2169). 
{¶ 7} In Lauber, we denied the motion for default and remanded the 
cause for further investigation and proceedings because the findings were not 
based on the personal knowledge of any affiant.  Rather, the board found 
misconduct in Lauber based entirely on an investigator’s secondhand and 
conclusory assessment apparently gleaned from conversations with those who had 
                                                                                                                                     
   {¶g} “6.  As a result of my investigation of Ms. Battigaglia’s complaint, I conclude that  
Attorney Sebree violated DR6-101(A)(3) (neglecting a matter entrusted to him), DR7-101(A)(2) 
(failing to carry out a contract of employment entered into with a client for professional services), 
Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) (failure to cooperate  with my investigation), and possibly DR1-102(A)(4) 
(engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).” 
 
January Term, 2004 
4 
filed grievances against the attorney.  We held that a “summary, conclusory, and 
hearsay-filled” affidavit was not “of sufficient weight or probative force to 
constitute the ‘[s]worn or certified documentary prima facie evidence’ that 
Gov.Bar R. V(6)(F)(1)(b) requires to sustain a motion for default.” 
{¶ 8} In Parker, this court indefinitely suspended an attorney from the 
practice of law based on violations of multiple Disciplinary Rules and Gov.Bar R. 
V(4)(G) (requiring an attorney to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation), as 
confirmed by investigator affidavits.  The dissent concluded that those affidavits 
did not adequately support the motion for default judgment under Gov.Bar R. 
V(6)(F)(1)(b), observing that they contained “summary, conclusory assessments 
of misconduct based solely on conversations with the four grievants and [were] 
not based upon personal knowledge.”  Dayton Bar Assn. v. Parker, 104 Ohio 
St.3d 117, 2004-Ohio-6236, 818 N.E.2d 684 (case No. 2003-2169) (Lundberg 
Stratton, J., dissenting).  We note that the attorney in Parker was subject to 
discipline for his violation of Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) independently of any other 
misconduct, see, e.g., Lake Cty. Bar Assn. v. Vala (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 57, 693 
N.E.2d 1083, and that the investigator’s affidavits in that case were based on first-
hand, personal knowledge of the underlying failure to cooperate. 
{¶ 9} We affirm today the principle established in Lauber.  A motion for 
default in a disciplinary proceeding supported only by summary, conclusory, and 
hearsay-filled affidavits is not supported by the prima facie evidence of 
misconduct required by Gov.Bar R. V(6)(F).  Local bar associations appearing as 
relators in disciplinary hearings should therefore provide affidavits executed by 
the grievants themselves in moving for default.  Where the grievant is 
unavailable, an affidavit executed by an investigator may suffice, but the affidavit 
must delineate why the grievant’s sworn statement is unattainable in addition to 
reciting the investigator’s own knowledge of the alleged misconduct. 
Misconduct 
January Term, 2004 
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Smith Grievance 
{¶ 10} We are told by the first investigator’s affidavit that Deborah Smith 
engaged respondent sometime prior to May 2001 to assist her in terminating her 
marriage.  Smith paid respondent a retainer and signed a separation agreement 
and petition.  By July 30, 2001, the petition had not been filed, and Smith filed a 
grievance with relator.  Smith eventually had to find another lawyer, and 
respondent allegedly refused to refund the retainer. 
{¶ 11} From this affidavit, the board found that respondent had refused to 
refund Smith’s retainer and thereby violated DR 9-102(B)(4) (requiring an 
attorney to promptly return client’s property upon request).  We reject this 
finding.  Although relator’s complaint purported to charge a violation of DR 9-
102(B)(4), the complaint did not specify that this misconduct emanated from 
Smith’s grievance or state any factual basis for the charge.  To the contrary, the 
complaint stated that “the Smith complaint lacked sufficient merit to warrant the 
filing of a grievance procedure against Mr. Sebree.”  Respondent was thus not 
sufficiently charged with a violation of DR 9-102(B)(4). 
{¶ 12} The board also relied on this affidavit to find violations of DR 9-
102(A) (requiring an attorney to deposit client funds in separate identifiable bank 
account), 9-102(B)(2) (requiring an attorney to promptly identify client’s property 
upon receipt and put such property in a place of safekeeping), and 9-102(B)(3) 
(requiring an attorney to maintain complete records and appropriately account for 
client’s property).  To substantiate these findings, however, the underlying 
affidavit offers hearsay at best and double hearsay at worst.  All that we know 
from the investigator’s account is what the charged attorney told a previous 
investigator or perhaps what the attorney’s client told the affiant.  We cannot even 
tell which source provided what information.  The affiant’s statements that she 
“determined that Mr. Sebree was commingling client funds with his own” and had 
January Term, 2004 
6 
committed other misconduct are no more than summary conclusions reminiscent 
of those found insufficient in Lauber. 
Battigaglia Grievance 
{¶ 13} According to the second investigator’s affidavit, Sophia Battigaglia 
paid respondent $500 on July 20, 2001, to represent her in some probate matters.  
Respondent took no action on the client’s behalf, and she was eventually required 
to hire another attorney.  The board found that respondent had thereby violated 
DR 6-101(A)(3) (prohibiting an attorney from neglecting a legal matter) and 7-
101(A)(2) (requiring an attorney to carry out a contract of employment). 
{¶ 14} We also reject these findings of misconduct for lack of sufficient 
proof.  Again, information in the affidavit seems to have been gleaned entirely 
from conversations with the grievant.  Because the affiant did not possess 
personal knowledge of the alleged misconduct, his sworn statement is not the 
prima facie evidence required by Gov.Bar R.V(6)(F). 
{¶ 15} The board also found that respondent had violated DR 1-104(A) 
(requiring an attorney to notify clients if the attorney “does not maintain 
professional liability insurance in the amounts of at least one hundred thousand 
dollars per occurrence and three hundred thousand dollars in the aggregate” or if 
the professional liability insurance is terminated).  We reject this finding because 
no evidence establishes that respondent committed this misconduct after July 1, 
2001, the effective date of DR 1-104. 
Disposition 
{¶ 16} Having found that the record before us lacks the reliable 
evidentiary support required to support the charges of misconduct against 
respondent on a motion for default, we return this cause to the board for further 
proceedings and findings consistent with our order, including the submission and 
consideration of evidence that directly establishes the charges of respondent’s 
misconduct. 
January Term, 2004 
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Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Allbery Cross Fogarty and Canice J. Fogarty, for relator. 
______________________