Case Title: Brenda Burnett v. State of Arkansas

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 2006-02-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT No. CR 85-44 NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION BRENDA BURNETT Petitioner v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Respondent Opinion Delivered February 2, 2006 PRO SE MOTION TO PROCEED IN CIRCUIT COURT WITH A PETITION TO VACATE OR MODIFY ILLEGAL SENTENCE, PETITION TO PROCEED WITH PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS AND PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS [CIRCUIT COURT OF FAULKNER COUNTY, CR 84-136, CR 84-137] PETITION TO PROCEED WITH PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS DENIED; PETITION TO PROCEED WITH PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS DENIED; MOTION TO PROCEED IN CIRCUIT COURT WITH A PETITION TO VACATE OR MODIFY ILLEGAL SENTENCE MOOT PER CURIAM A jury found Brenda Burnett and her husband Larry Burnett guilty of first degree murder of their thirteen month-old son. She received a sentence of life imprisonment. We affirmed. Burnett v. State, 287 Ark. 158, 697 S.W.2d 95 (1985). Burnett subsequently filed a petition in the trial court for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1. The trial court denied the petition, and Burnett appealed to this court. We affirmed. Burnett v. State, 293 Ark. 300, 737 S.W.2d 631 (1987) (per curiam). Now before us is petitioner Burnett's pro se motion to proceed in circuit court with a petition to vacate or modify an illegal sentence, to proceed with a petition for writ of error coram nobis or to proceed with a petition for writ of habeas corpus.1 With respect to the petition for writ of habeas corpus, the allegations should first be addressed to the trial court in the county in which appellant is incarcerated. That court will be in a position to hold an evidentiary hearing, if it deems necessary, to assess the claims. It is not necessary for a petitioner to seek leave from this court before proceeding with such a petition. Accordingly, the petition to proceed with a petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. The petition for leave to proceed in the trial court with a petition for writ of error coram nobis is necessary because the circuit court can entertain a petition for writ of error coram nobis after a judgment has been affirmed on appeal only after we grant permission. Dansby v. State, 343 Ark. 635, 37 S.W.3d 599 (2001). Petitioner, more than twenty years after she was convicted, asserts that she is entitled to proceed in the trial court based upon our decision in Midgett v. State, 292 Ark. 278, 729 S.W.2d 410 (1987), and the subsequent modification of the definition of first-degree murder by the legislature. In the Midgett decision, we overruled our decision affirming petitioner's direct appeal in Burnett v. State, 287 Ark. 158, 697 S.W.2d 95 (1985), only to the extent that we inferred premeditation sufficient to warrant a conviction of first degree murder. Midgett, 292 Ark. at 287.2 The Arkansas legislature, in response to the Midgett decision, modified the definition of first-degree murder. Acts of 1987 (1st Ex. Sess.), Act 52, § 1. The additional language allows a conviction for first-degree murder if the perpetrator "knowingly causes the death of a person fourteen (14) years of age or younger at the time the murder was committed." Ark. Code Ann. §5-10-102(a)(3) (Repl. 1997). In the instant pleading, petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of premeditation and deliberation required for a conviction of first-degree murder. Petitioner also maintains that she was convicted under the amended language contained in Ark. Code Ann. §5-10-102(a)(3) although the statutory amendment did not come into existence until three years after the date of the offense. Petitioner claims that the amended language amounts to the creation of an "ex post facto law." A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinarily rare remedy, more known for its denial than its approval. Larimore v. State, 341 Ark. 397, 17 S.W.3d 87 (2000). We have held that a writ of error coram nobis was available to address certain errors that are found in one of four categories: insanity at the time of trial, a coerced guilty plea, material evidence withheld by the prosecutor, or a third-party confession to the crime during the time between conviction and appeal. Pitts v. State, 336 Ark. 580, 986 S.W.2d 407 (1999) (per curiam). For the writ to issue following the affirmance of a conviction, the petitioner must show a fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the record. Larimore v. State, 327 Ark. 271, 938 S.W.2d 818 (1997). Coram nobis proceedings are attended by a strong presumption that the judgment of conviction is valid. Penn v. State, 282 Ark. 571, 574, 670 S.W.2d 426, 428, citing Troglin v. State, 257 Ark. 644, 519 S.W.2d 740 (1975). There is no specific time limit for seeking a writ of error coram nobis, but due diligence isrequired in making an application for relief, and in the absence of a valid excuse for delay, the petition will be denied. Echols v. State, ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (January 20, 2005) ("Echols Error Coram Nobis II" or "Echols ECN II"). Due diligence requires that (1) the defendant be unaware of the fact at the time of trial; (2) he could not have, in the exercise of due diligence, presented the fact at trial; or (3) upon discovering the fact, did not delay bringing the petition. Id. A writ of error coram nobis is appropriate only when an issue was not addressed or could not have been addressed at trial because it was somehow hidden or unknown and would have prevented the rendition of the judgment had it been known to the trial court. Echols ECN II, at ___, ___ S.W.3d at ___; Brown v. State, 330 Ark. 627, 955 S.W.2d 901 (1997); Penn, supra. Here, although petitioner could not have known about our decision in Midgett at the time of her trial, we handed down that decision only two years after petitioner's conviction. In 1997, ten years after the Midgett decision, petitioner unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief from the trial court, but she also claims to have contemporaneously pursued relief pursuant to a petition for writ of habeas corpus. She failed to perfect an appeal from the trial court's denial of the habeas petition, and abandoned the matter entirely for another eight years, until now.3 The state urges this court to deny the petition for writ of error coram nobis based on petitioner's lack of due diligence, rather than reaching the merits of the matter. In order to consider the merits of the petition, the arguments set forth must fall under one of the four limited categories enumerated above: insanity at the time of trial, a coerced guilty plea, material evidence withheld by the prosecutor, or a third-party confession. Petitioner's contentions simply do not fit under a cognizable basis for granting this extraordinary remedy. Petitioner has therefore failed to show grounds for reinvesting jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis. Further, we hold that the petitioner failed to act with due diligence in pursuing this type of remedy. We deny the petition to proceed with a petition for writ of error coram nobis. Finally, we turn to petitioner's motion to proceed in circuit court with a petition to vacate or modify an illegal sentence. It is not clear whether the motion was intended to be a separate proceeding as petitioner's only direct reference to it is in the caption. If it was intended as a petition for postconviction relief, it is properly made to the trial court. If it was intended as a general reference to the relief sought, we have already addressed the grounds in the error coram nobis portion of this proceeding. Motion is deemed moot. Petition to proceed with a petition for writ of habeas corpus denied; petition to proceed with a petition for writ of error coram nobis denied; motion to proceed in circuit court with a petition to vacate or modify an illegal sentence moot. 1 For clerical purposes, the instant pleadings were assigned the same docket number as the direct appeal of the judgment. 2 In petitioner's Rule 37.1 appeal, petitioner based her claim, in part, on the Midgett ruling. In affirming the trial court's denial of postconviction relief, we stated that "our decision in Midgett does not provide a basis for postconviction relief for the petitioner." Burnett v. State, 293 Ark. 300, 303, 737 S.W.2d 631 (1987) (per curiam). Instead, we noted that her claim constituted a direct attack on her conviction. Id. 3 It is unclear whether petitioner now claims that her 1997 notice of appeal was filed untimely or whether she was unable to obtain the record on appeal as the impediment to pursuing her appeal regarding the petition for writ of habeas corpus. We acknowledge that a petitioner has the right to appeal a ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief, which includes the dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Scott v. State, 281 Ark. 436, 664 S.W.2d 475 (1984) (per curiam). With that right, however, goes the responsibility to file a timely notice of appeal and tender the record to this court within the time limits set by the rules of procedure. If a petitioner fails to act in accordance with the rules of procedure, the burden is on the petitioner to show good cause for failure to comply with the proper procedure in either instance. See Garner v. State, 293 Ark. 309, 737 S.W.2d 637 (1987) (per curiam). The fact that a petitioner is proceeding pro se in itself does not constitute good cause for the failure to conform to the prevailing rules of procedure. Walker v. State, 283 Ark. 339, 676 S.W.2d 460 (1984) (per curiam); Thompson v. State, 280 Ark. 163, 655 S.W.2d 424 (1983) (per curiam); see alsoSullivan v. State, 301 Ark. 352, 784 S.W.2d 155 (1990) (per curiam). However, since petitioner failed to pursue an appeal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus in 1997, this issue has no bearing on the present matter, except to further act as an indicia of lack of due diligence.