Case Title: Gray v. INOVA Health Care Services

Citation: 

Docket Number: 981387

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1999-04-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 
 
HOLLY GRAY 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 981387 
SENIOR JUSTICE RICHARD H. POFF 
 
 
 
April 16, 1999 
INOVA HEALTH CARE SERVICES 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
F. Bruce Bach, Judge 
 
 
The dispositive issue raised in this appeal is whether a 
parent who witnesses the effects of a negligent tort committed 
upon a child in the presence of the parent has a cause of action 
in tort against the tortfeasor for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress and its symptomatic effects.  We think not, 
and we will affirm the judgment of the trial court sustaining 
the tortfeasor's demurrer. 
 
The motion for judgment alleged that Mrs. Holly Gray's 
three-year old daughter, Kira, was admitted to a hospital owned 
and operated by INOVA Health Care Services (INOVA) to undergo a 
lumbar puncture test for meningitis; that "the health care 
providers . . . negligently administered 160 mg. of the drug 
Fentanyl . . . [which] was ten times the proper dosage;" that 
Kira's "body convulsed, her breathing stopped, and her face 
turned blue;" that when Mrs. Gray, "standing next to her 
daughter . . . observed the condition of her daughter, she 
experienced extreme fright and shock, temporarily blacked out, 
fell to the floor, and became physically sick and vomited;" and 
that she "still suffers from mental anguish and emotional 
trauma." 
 
As her principal assignment of error, Mrs. Gray asserts 
that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer "because 
[her] motion for judgment states a cause of action . . . for 
physical injury directly resulting from the negligent infliction 
of emotional stress."  In the alternative, she contends that her 
motion for judgment "states a cause of action for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, independent of physical impact 
or injury." 
 
The initial, and crucial, question before us is whether the 
tortfeasor, INOVA, owed a duty to Mrs. Gray, a third-party 
bystander.  This Court has consistently held that "[t]here can 
be no actionable negligence unless there is a legal duty, a 
violation of the duty, and a consequent injury."  Chesapeake and 
Potomac Telephone v. Dowdy, 235 Va. 55, 61, 365 S.E.2d 751, 754 
(1988) (quoting Trimyer v. Norfolk Tallow Co., 192 Va. 776, 780, 
66 S.E.2d 441, 443 (1951)). 
Mrs. Gray relies upon our decision in Naccash v. Burger, 
223 Va. 406, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982).  There, this Court 
recognized a parental cause of action for emotional distress 
when blood samples withdrawn from the parents were mishandled, 
blood test results were incorrectly reported as negative, and a 
 
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fetus, born alive, died two years later of Tay-Sachs disease.  
Unlike Mrs. Gray, however, the plaintiffs in Naccash were not 
third-party bystanders.  It was their own blood that was tested 
and mishandled.  Upholding their motion for judgment, this Court 
said: 
Essential to the recognition of a cause of action in 
favor of the Burgers is the existence of a duty owed them. 
Clearly, when the Burgers presented themselves to the 
Cytogenetics Laboratory at Arlington Hospital for Tay-Sachs 
testing, they were owed a duty of reasonable care in the 
handling of the blood withdrawn for the tests; this duty 
encompassed the obligation to provide them with reasonably 
accurate information concerning the condition of their 
unborn child so they could make an informed decision 
regarding abortion. 
 
Id. at 414, 290 S.E.2d at 829. 
 
Mrs. Gray also relies upon Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 197 
S.E.2d 214 (1973).  There, the plaintiff's injuries were 
"sustained . . . as a consequence of fright and shock caused 
when an automobile driven by the defendant . . . crashed into 
the front porch of her home."  Id. at 28, 197 S.E.2d at 215.  
Clearly, the tortfeasor owed the homeowner a duty not to damage 
her property. 
Here, INOVA owed Mrs. Gray no duty.  She was not the 
patient upon whom medical tests were being performed.  Kira was 
the patient undergoing those tests, and it was Kira to whom 
 
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INOVA owed a duty of care.  Any negligence in administering the 
tests was a breach of the duty owed to Kira, not her mother.*  
Because Mrs. Gray had no cause of action against INOVA, we 
will affirm the judgment of the trial court sustaining the 
demurrer to the Motion for Judgment. 
Affirmed. 
                     
* We have held that a tortfeasor whose negligence has caused 
an injury to a child in utero owes a duty to the mother of that 
child.  Specifically, we have said that "an unborn child is a 
part of the mother until birth" and, accordingly, that "injury 
to an unborn child constitutes injury to the mother and that she 
may recover for such medical injury and mental suffering 
associated with a stillbirth."  Modaber v. Kelley, 232 Va. 60, 
66, 348 S.E.2d 233, 236-37 (1986).  See also, Bulala v. Boyd, 
239 Va. 218, 389 S.E.2d 670 (1990); Fairfax Hospital System v. 
McCarty, 244 Va. 28, 419 S.E.2d 621 (1992). 
 
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