Case Title: Moore v. Moore

Citation: 893 P.2d 1268

Docket Number: S-5175

State: alaska

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Date: 1995-04-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
893 P.2d 1268 (1995) Thomas M. MOORE, Appellant, v. Patricia M. MOORE, Appellee. No. S-5175. Supreme Court of Alaska. April 28, 1995. William T. Ford, Anchorage, for appellant. Karla F. Huntington, Mendel & Huntington, Anchorage, for appellee. Before MOORE, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, MATTHEWS, COMPTON and EASTAUGH, JJ. MATTHEWS, Justice. Thomas Moore appeals a child support award to Patricia Moore, his ex-wife. Patricia and Thomas were married in August 1977. They have two children, Thomas, Jr., born in February 1980, and Rachel, born in February 1984. Patricia sued for divorce in *1269 April 1991. The parties settled all property division issues prior to trial. Thomas is a businessman. Between 1987 and 1990, his adjusted gross income fluctuated between $177,000 and $423,000 per year. Patricia did not work during the last ten years of the marriage, but was attending college at the time of trial, and expected to earn $22,000 per year once she graduated. Patricia requested $2150 in child support. Under Alaska Civil Rule 90.3, a non-custodial parent with two children should pay twenty-seven percent of his adjusted gross income up to $60,000 as child support. Twenty-seven percent of $60,000 is $1350. However, "to the extent that the parent has an adjusted annual income of over $60,000 ... the court may make an additional award only if it is just and proper, taking into account the needs of the children, the standard of living of the children and the extent to which that standard should be reflective of the supporting parent's ability to pay." Alaska R.Civ.P. 90.3(c)(2). The superior court admitted into evidence a financial statement showing Patricia's monthly expenses for herself and the two children to be $3849. The superior court awarded $1750 in child support. The superior court judge stated: Thomas appealed the child support award to this court. We noted that "[c]hild support awards are reviewed for an abuse of discretion and will not be set aside by this court unless a review of the record as a whole leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Moore v. Moore, Mem. Op. & J. No. 0678 at 4 (Alaska, September 8, 1993) (citing Farrell v. Farrell, 819 P.2d 896, 900-01 (Alaska 1991)). We found that the trial court's findings were so cursory that we could not "determine if a mistake ha[d] been made." Id. We remanded the case for "specific findings detailing those additional needs of the children which justify the waiver." Id. On remand, the trial judge made detailed written findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial judge's findings can be summarized as follows: Testimony by the children's parents and guardian ad litem shows that the children enjoyed a somewhat affluent standard of living when their parents were married. Patricia expects to earn an annual salary of $22,000 after graduating from college. Patricia's 1992 income tax return shows that Patricia *1270 earned $5,662 in interest in 1992.[1] Patricia's total expected annual income is $27,662. The average monthly expenses for Patricia and the children are $3,849, including a monthly mortgage payment of $1,802. Dividing these expenses per capita, the average monthly expenses for support of the children are $2,540.39.[2] In accordance with the principles of Rule 90.3, Patricia should use twenty-seven percent of her expected income, or $622.39 per month, to support her children. The difference between $2540.39 and $622.39 is $1918. It is just and proper for Thomas to make up this difference; therefore, an award of $1750 is justified. Thomas again appeals to this court. He argues that the superior court erred by including Patricia's mortgage payments within the family expenses used to calculate child support. Thomas relies on Money v. Money, 852 P.2d 1158 (Alaska 1993). In Money, we rejected the ex-wife's argument that her child support award was too low. Id. at 1165. We noted that the ex-wife included monthly mortgage payments on her residence in the monthly budget she submitted in support of a higher award, even though the property division provided that the ex-husband was required to make the payments. Id. at 1164. Since the property division in this case does not require Thomas to make Patricia's mortgage payments, Money is inapposite. A recent Missouri decision is much more on point. In In re Marriage of Cohen, 884 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Mo. App. 1994), the father challenged the trial court's child support award. The appellate court held that the trial court could properly calculate child support by allocating two-thirds of the mother's monthly mortgage expenses to her two children, id. at 40, a procedure identical to that used by the superior court in this case. The appellate court's ruling allowed the trial court to consider the mortgage payments in its determination of the children's needs and of the amount needed to maintain their previous standard of living. Id. In this case, the superior court specifically found that "[r]emaining in [Patricia's current] home is beneficial to the children and consistent with their lifestyle." Thomas does not argue that this finding is clearly erroneous, and there is no evidence in the record contradicting the finding. Thus, the superior court properly treated Patricia's monthly mortgage expenses as a constituent part of "the standard of living of the children" under Rule 90.3(c)(2). The superior court's findings as a whole cogently take into account the three Rule 90.3(c)(2) factors "the needs of the children, the standard of living of the children and the extent to which that standard should be reflective of the supporting parent's ability to pay." The findings are sufficiently specific. They justify the additional award of child support under Rule 90.3(c)(2). The decision of the superior court is AFFIRMED. [1] Thomas does not contend that this is an inappropriate determination of Patricia's reasonable investment income, even though it is inconsistent with the court's statement before remand that Patricia's capital probably could earn approximately $20,000 to $25,000 a year. [2] Two-thirds of $3,849 is actually $2,566, which is a little more than $2,540.39.