Case Title: Sullivan v. Five Acres Realty Trust

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12934

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-03-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12934 
 
CONSTANCE M. SULLIVAN & another1  vs.  FIVE ACRES REALTY TRUST & 
others.2 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     November 4, 2020. – March 12, 2020. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Real Property, Sale.  Damages, Breach of implied warranty of 
habitability, Consumer protection case.  Consumer 
Protection Act, Trade or commerce, Unfair or deceptive act, 
Damages, Attorney's fees.  Fraud.  Contract, Sale of real 
estate, Misrepresentation.  Practice, Civil, Consumer 
protection case, Directed verdict, Judgment notwithstanding 
verdict, Summary judgment, Attorney's fees, Costs. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
September 5, 2014. 
 
 
A motion for summary judgment was heard by William F. 
Sullivan, J.; the case was tried before Mark A. Hallal, J., and 
posttrial motions were heard by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
 
1 Edward T. Sullivan, Jr. 
 
 
2 Giuseppe Gagliardi, Rosalie Gagliardi, and Maria D. 
Gagliardi, individually and as trustees of the Five Acres Realty 
Trust; and J.F. Contracting Co., Inc. 
2 
 
 
Joel Lewin for the defendants. 
 
Peter B. McGlynn for the plaintiffs. 
 
Deborah Schrieber, for American Society of Trial 
Consultants, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  In 2013, the plaintiffs, Constance M. Sullivan 
and Edward T. Sullivan, Jr., purchased a piece of real property 
in Dover (Dover property) from defendants Giuseppe, Rosalie, and 
Maria Gagliardi,3 as trustees of the Five Acres Realty Trust.4  
The plaintiffs thereafter discovered various defects in the 
Dover property and commenced this action in 2014 against 
Giuseppe, Rosalie, their daughter Maria, Five Acres Realty 
Trust, and J.F. Contracting Co., Inc. (J.F. Contracting), a 
masonry contracting business owned by Giuseppe.5  The plaintiffs 
alleged breach of the implied warranty of habitability, fraud 
and misrepresentation, defective and deficient renovation work, 
and violations of the Massachusetts consumer protection act, 
G. L. c. 93A.  A judge in the Superior Court (motion judge) 
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the fraud 
and misrepresentation and the defective and deficient renovation 
 
 
3 Because the defendants share the same last name, we refer 
to them by their first names. 
 
 
4 The property was owned by the Five Acres Realty Trust, of 
which Giuseppe, Rosalie, and Maria Gagliardi are the trustees 
and beneficiaries. 
 
 
5 The plaintiffs sued the Gagliardis in their individual 
capacities and in their capacities as trustees. 
3 
 
work claims.  After trial, the jury found in favor of the 
plaintiffs on the warranty of habitability and the G. L. c. 93A 
claims, awarding the plaintiffs $250,000 on the warranty of 
habitability claim and $211,153.38 on the c. 93A claim.6 
 
The defendants appeal from the trial judge's denial of 
their motions for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, and for a new trial or to alter or amend the 
damages.  The plaintiffs appeal from the motion judge's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the fraud and 
misrepresentation claim and the from the trial judgeꞌs denial of 
an award of jury consultant fees under G. L. c. 93A.  We 
conclude that the motion for directed verdict or the motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been allowed on 
the G. L. c. 93A and the warranty of habitability claims, the 
motion judge properly granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants on the fraud and misrepresentation claim, and jury 
consultant fees are not recoverable under G. L. c. 93A.  Because 
we vacate the awards of damages on the G. L. c. 93A and warranty 
of habitability claims, we need not reach the arguments related 
to those awards.7 
 
 
6 The jury awarded double damages against Rosalie and 
Giuseppe, individually, on the G. L. c. 93A claim. 
 
 
7 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the American 
Society of Trial Consultants, Inc. 
4 
 
 
Background.  1.  The Gagliardis.  Giuseppe was a licensed 
construction supervisor who owned J.F. Contracting, which he 
started in 1985.  J.F. Contracting performed primarily 
residential construction.  Rosalie managed the books for J.F. 
Contracting and for the apartment rentals she and Giuseppe 
operated. 
 
Rosalie and Giuseppe had a history of purchasing, 
renovating, refinancing, and renting properties.  In 1974, they 
purchased their first property, which during the 1980s and 1990s 
they renovated and converted to a two-family property.  They 
mortgaged the first property and used the proceeds to purchase a 
second property, into which they moved after living at the first 
property for about twelve years.  They have rented out the first 
property since moving from it.  They also renovated and 
converted the second property to a duplex apartment and received 
rental income from it until they sold it to their daughter in 
2004.  In 1988, Rosalie and Giuseppe refinanced the second 
property and used the proceeds to purchase a third property, 
which they renovated and have since rented out.  In 1997, they 
used proceeds obtained from refinancing the second property to 
purchase a commercial property. 
 
In 2002, they purchased the Dover property with proceeds 
from refinancing the first and third properties.  At that point 
they had lived at the second property for about fifteen years.  
5 
 
In 2009, they purchased a property in Weston with proceeds from 
mortgaging the Dover property.  They rented out the Weston 
property for several years, until they eventually moved in after 
selling the Dover property. 
 
2.  Renovation work.  The Dover property was built in 1986.  
Rosalie and Giuseppe, through the trust, were the sixth 
purchasers of the home, in 2002.  Before selling the Dover 
property to the plaintiffs, Rosalie and Giuseppe lived there for 
eleven years.  During that time, Rosalie and Giuseppe completed 
several renovations to the home for which they did not obtain 
building permits or certificates of occupancy.  The work 
included renovating and enlarging the kitchen, transforming a 
screened-in porch into a "Tuscan-style room," and installing a 
brick pizza oven.  Giuseppe completed some of the renovation 
work himself, and contractors completed the other work.  The 
renovation work began in 2006 and took three to four years to 
complete; however, the exact completion date is unknown because 
Rosalie shredded the renovation documents. 
 
3.  Plaintiffs' purchase of Dover property.  Rosalie and 
Giuseppe listed the Dover property for sale in 2011.  In 2012, 
the plaintiffs conducted a preclosing inspection of the Dover 
property, during which Rosalie and Giuseppe showed the 
plaintiffs the renovations to the property.  When showing the 
plaintiffs the work in person, Rosalie and Giuseppe did not 
6 
 
disclose that the renovations never were inspected or approved 
for occupancy. 
 
The plaintiffs purchased the Dover property in 2013, and 
thereafter discovered structural and other deficiencies relating 
to the home, such as that the ceilings in the kitchen and 
Tuscan-style room were in danger of collapsing, and that the 
defendants had never obtained required permits and certificates 
of occupancy for the home.  The plaintiffs were informed that it 
would be more cost effective to raze the Tuscan-style room and 
rebuild it, which could cost approximately $211,000. 
 
4.  Prior proceedings.  After discovering the defects, the 
plaintiffs contacted the Gagliardis' real estate broker to learn 
who performed the renovation work, but Rosalie and Giuseppe 
refused to provide the requested information. 
 
In 2014, the plaintiffs sent the defendants a demand letter 
pursuant to G. L. c. 93A, § 9.  The defendants did not identify 
the individuals who performed the renovation work, and the 
defendants stated in response to the demand letter that they did 
not perform renovations that would affect the home's structural 
integrity, nor did they know of any building code violations.  
The defendants also claimed in their response that a factual and 
legal investigation into the plaintiffs' allegations had been 
undertaken, but they later admitted that they never investigated 
7 
 
the property.  The defendants did not respond with a settlement 
offer. 
 
The plaintiffs thereafter commenced this action, alleging 
breach of the implied warranty of habitability, fraud and 
misrepresentation, defective and deficient renovation work, and 
violations of G. L. c. 93A.  The defendants moved for summary 
judgment on all claims, which the plaintiffs opposed.  The 
motion judge granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants 
on the fraud and misrepresentation claim and the defective and 
deficient renovation work claim. 
 
Following a trial, the jury found in favor of the 
plaintiffs on the implied warranty of habitability and the G. L. 
c. 93A claims.  On both claims the jury awarded damages jointly 
and severally against Giuseppe and Rosalie, individually, and 
Giuseppe, Rosalie, and Maria as trustees of Five Acres Realty 
Trust.  Damages on the implied warranty of habitability claim 
were $250,000, plus statutory and prejudgment interest, and 
damages on the c. 93A claim were $211,153.38, plus statutory and 
prejudgment interest.  The jury also awarded double damages 
against Rosalie and Giuseppe, individually, in the amount of 
$211,153.38, as the jury found that the defendants acted 
willfully and knowingly and that the response to the c. 93A 
demand letter was made in bad faith.  The plaintiffs moved for 
attorney's fees and costs pursuant to G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (4), and 
8 
 
the trial judge awarded $425,727.76 in attorney's fees and 
$35,222.19 in costs, but he denied recovery for costs associated 
with a jury consultant used by the plaintiffs. 
 
The defendants had moved for a directed verdict on both 
claims at the close of the plaintiffs' case and again at the 
close of all the evidence, and the trial judge denied both 
motions.  The defendants also moved for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict on both claims and filed a motion for a new trial 
or, in the alternative, for remittitur or to alter or amend the 
judgment with respect to damages.  The plaintiffs opposed the 
motions and moved to alter or amend the judgment, which the 
defendants opposed.  The trial judge denied all motions.  The 
parties filed timely notices of appeal, and the case now is 
before us on transfer from the Appeals Court on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Motions for directed verdict and judgment 
notwithstanding verdict.  In reviewing a denial of a defendant's 
motion for a directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff.  Miga v. Holyoke, 398 Mass. 343, 348 & n.6 
(1986).  "The verdict will be upheld if it may be determined 
that 'anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, 
any combination of circumstances could be found from which a 
reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the plaintiff.'"  
9 
 
McAvoy v. Shufrin, 401 Mass. 593, 596 (1988), quoting Miga, 
supra at 348. 
 
a.  Chapter 93A.  The defendants argue that the evidence 
was insufficient to establish that the sale of the property took 
place in the course of trade or commerce.  We agree. 
 
General Laws c. 93A, § 2 (a), prohibits unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices "in the conduct of any trade or commerce."  
The statute is intended to apply to individuals acting in a 
business context and is therefore not applicable "where the 
transaction is strictly private in nature, and is in no way 
undertaken in the ordinary course of a trade or business."  
Lantner v. Carson, 374 Mass. 606, 607-608, 611 (1978).  The 
statute does not apply to "strictly private transactions such as 
the isolated sale of a private home."  Begelfer v. Najarian, 381 
Mass. 177, 190 (1980), citing Lantner, supra.  Therefore, the 
threshold issue we must address is whether the defendants were 
acting in a business context.  Factors relevant to whether the 
defendants' participation in the transaction took place in a 
"business context" are the nature of the transaction, the 
character of the parties, the activities engaged in by the 
parties, whether the transaction was motivated by business or 
personal reasons, whether similar transactions have been 
undertaken in the past, and whether the participant played an 
10 
 
active role in the transaction.  Begelfer, supra at 190-191, 
citing Lantner, supra at 611. 
 
Relying on the factors delineated in Begelfer, the 
plaintiffs argue that the defendants were acting in a business 
context.8  The plaintiffs support their argument by relying on 
Rosalie and Giuseppe's practice of acquiring a property, making 
renovations to it, refinancing to acquire additional property, 
and then moving from the property.  They further argue that 
Rosalie and Giuseppe were acting in a business context because 
of their involvement in the construction business and J.F. 
Contracting's connection to the Dover property, in part through 
the property being the company's legal place of business and 
Rosalie's maintenance of the company's books there.  In 
addition, the plaintiffs note that Rosalie maintained the books 
and records for the Gagliardi's real estate holdings at the 
Dover property, and that Rosalie and Giuseppe actively 
participated in the sale, and the plaintiffs surmise that 
Rosalie and Giuseppe sold the Dover property to generate wealth.  
 
 
8 The defendants contend that we should look only to the 
Begelfer factors if "there is evidence that the ownership and 
subsequent sale of a home is part of a business plan to buy and 
resell homes for a profit."  The defendants do not support this 
argument with relevant authorities, and either way, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, Uno 
Restaurants, Inc., 441 Mass. at 382, there was evidence to 
support that the defendants were engaged in a business plan to 
purchase, renovate, and either rent or sell residential 
properties. 
11 
 
The plaintiffs' contention that Rosalie and Giuseppe's purchase, 
leveraging of equity, renovation, and sale of the property -- 
particularly when considering previous similar transactions 
engaged in by Rosalie and Giuseppe -- brings this transaction 
into the "business context" is perhaps their strongest argument, 
but it is ultimately unpersuasive in the circumstances of this 
case. 
 
Despite the above practices, the sale at issue was a 
strictly private transaction and was not subject to c. 93A.  See 
Lantner, 374 Mass. at 607-608, 611.  Applying the Begelfer 
factors to the present circumstances, the nature of the 
transaction was private, the parties were not real estate 
professionals, and the defendants had not engaged in similar 
transactions in the past, arguably except for the sale of a home 
in 2004 to their daughter.  The primary reason the plaintiffs' 
argument is unavailing is because the Dover property was Rosalie 
and Giuseppe's residence for about a decade.  This is in stark 
contrast to "flipping" a house, where a seller purchases a 
property, renovates it, and may incidentally live at the 
property during the period before they are able to sell the 
property, but where it is evident from the circumstances that it 
was not intended as a long term residence. 
 
In addition, the existence of J.F. Contracting vehicles 
being stored on occasion or Rosalie's keeping of the books for 
12 
 
J.F. Contracting and their real estate endeavors at the Dover 
property does not alter our conclusion.  Regardless of the level 
of "business" those actions constituted, they are separate from 
the transaction at issue.  Here, we are dealing with a private 
sale of a home, and even though the sellers engaged in various 
business endeavors somewhat tangentially related to the 
transaction at issue, this sale was private in nature. 
 
In addition, certain actions taken by Rosalie and Giuseppe, 
such as their active participation in the sale process and their 
motivation to sell, were customary when selling a private 
residence and therefore do not factor toward a conclusion that 
they were acting in a business context.  By assisting with the 
listing information and by showing the plaintiffs the Dover 
property, Rosalie and Giuseppe were active participants in the 
transaction, but this level of participation is customary when 
selling one's private residence.  Moreover, although the 
plaintiffs contend that Rosalie and Giuseppe's motivation in 
renovating and selling the Dover property was the same as with 
their other properties, i.e., to generate wealth, in the context 
of selling a residential property that has been lived in for 
about a decade, this factor does not tip the scales toward 
bringing the transaction out of the private realm.  Hoping to 
make a profit by selling a property that one has lived in for 
13 
 
many years, after making renovations or other improvements, is 
simply a typical process that many homeowners undertake. 
 
Because the sale was private in nature, and therefore not 
subject to G. L. c. 93A, the defendants were entitled to a 
directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
 
b.  Implied warranty of habitability.  The defendants argue 
that the trial judge should have allowed their motion for a 
directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the 
implied warranty of habitability claim because the Dover 
property was not a new home and they are not builder-vendors.  
We agree that there was insufficient evidence that the 
defendants were builder-vendors and therefore conclude that the 
defendants' motion for a directed verdict or judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict should have been allowed. 
 
The purpose of the implied warranty of habitability that 
attaches to the sale of new homes by builder-vendors "is to 
protect a purchaser of a new home from latent defects that 
create substantial questions of safety and habitability. . . . 
[A] home that is unsafe because it deviates from fundamental 
aspects of the applicable building codes, or is structurally 
unsound, or fails to keep out the elements because of defects of 
construction, would breach the implied warranty."  Albrecht v. 
Clifford, 436 Mass. 706, 710-711 (2002).  "To establish a breach 
of the implied warranty of habitability a plaintiff [has] to 
14 
 
demonstrate that (1) he [or she] purchased a new house from the 
defendant-builder-vendor; (2) the house contained a latent 
defect; (3) the defect manifested itself only after its 
purchase; (4) the defect was caused by the builder's improper 
design, material, or workmanship; and (5) the defect created a 
substantial question of safety or made the house unfit for human 
habitation."  Id. at 711-712.  At issue in the present case is 
whether the first prong has been met. 
 
The evidence was insufficient to show that the defendants 
were builder-vendors.  Although Massachusetts law does not 
expressly define "builder-vendor," persons considered "builder-
vendors" under our implied warranty of habitability 
jurisprudence have included builders of new residential 
condominium developments and homes.  See Berish v. Bornstein, 
437 Mass. 252, 254-255, 262-263 (2002) (defendant constructed 
condominium development); Albrecht, 436 Mass. at 707-708 
(defendant constructed new single-family home).  In determining 
whether a party is a builder-vendor for purposes of the implied 
warranty of habitability, other jurisdictions have focused on 
whether the house was "built for the purpose of sale to the 
public" (quotation omitted), Mobley v. Copeland, 828 S.W.2d 717, 
728 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992), and relatedly, whether the sale was 
commercial in nature, rather than personal or casual, see 
Mazurek v. Nielsen, 599 P.2d 269, 271 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979); 
15 
 
Mobley, supra at 728-729; Bolkum v. Staab, 133 Vt. 467, 469-470 
(1975); Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wash. 2d 567, 570 (1976).  These 
considerations are in line with the actions of the defendants in 
Berish and Albrecht. 
 
In the present case, it is undisputed that the defendants 
were not involved in the original construction of the house.  In 
support of their position that Rosalie and Giuseppe are builder-
vendors, the plaintiffs point to evidence showing that Giuseppe 
completed some of the renovation work himself.9  Giuseppe also 
hired contractors to complete other portions, such as the 
installation of the kitchen cabinets, installation of a new gas 
line, and demolition of walls.  However, the mere completion of 
renovations to one's private residence does not make him or her 
a builder-vendor.  Moreover, the sale of the Dover property was 
personal in nature.  Rosalie and Giuseppe lived in the Dover 
property for years before beginning renovations and then lived 
in the property for at least a year before listing it for sale.10  
 
 
9 For instance, Giuseppe and his son installed a pizza oven, 
built a chimney in the Tuscan-style room, installed a portion of 
the foundation under the Tuscan-style room, and removed floor 
joists. 
 
 
10 Although not present in the case before us, it may be 
possible for a party to be a builder-vendor even though a newly 
constructed home has been lived in during the time between the 
completion of construction and the sale of the home.  See, e.g., 
Klos, 87 Wash. 2d at 570-571, citing Casavant v. Campopiano, 114 
R.I. 24 (1974), superseded by statute on other grounds ("sale 
 
16 
 
The present circumstances stand in stark contrast to a developer 
building a new home for the express purpose of selling it.  See 
Berish, 437 Mass. at 254-255 (defendant constructed condominium 
development); Albrecht, 436 Mass. at 707-708.  For the foregoing 
reasons, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to show 
that the defendants were builder-vendors, and the defendants 
therefore were entitled to directed verdicts and judgments in 
their favor on the implied warranty of habitability claim.11 
 
2.  Damages.  The defendants next argue that the judgment 
reflects duplication of damages, an unjust windfall for the 
plaintiffs, and manifest injustice.  Further, the defendants 
contend the damages under G. L. c. 93A should be awarded 
jointly, rather than severally.  Because we determined supra 
that the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict should have been granted on the c. 93A and warranty of 
 
must be fairly contemporaneous with completion and not 
interrupted by an intervening tenancy unless the builder-vendor 
created such an intervening tenancy for the primary purpose of 
promoting the sale of the property"); Casavant, supra at 26 
("That there had been an intervening tenancy [between completion 
of construction and sale of home] should not, standing alone, 
deprive the buyer of [implied warranty of habitability] 
protection"). 
 
 
11 Because we determine that the defendants were not 
builder-vendors, and thus the sale of the home was not subject 
to the warranty of habitability, we need not reach the issue 
whether the warranty of habitability extends to the sale of a 
renovated house. 
17 
 
habitability claims, we need not determine these issues, as the 
award of damages on those claims must be vacated. 
 
3.  Fraud and misrepresentation.  The plaintiffs argue that 
the motion judge erred in granting summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants on the plaintiffs' claim of fraud and 
misrepresentation.  We conclude that the motion judge properly 
granted summary judgment on this claim. 
 
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo to determine 
whether there are any genuine issues of material fact.  Federal 
Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Hendricks, 463 Mass. 635, 637 (2012).  In 
doing so, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party.  Id. 
 
"[A] plaintiff alleging a claim for deceit (i.e., fraud) 
must show the defendant (1) made a false representation of 
material fact, (2) with knowledge of its falsity, (3) for the 
purpose of inducing the plaintiff to act on this representation, 
(4) which the plaintiff justifiably relied on as being true, to 
her detriment" (citations omitted).  Greenleaf Arms Realty Trust 
I, LLC v. New Boston Fund, Inc., 81 Mass. App. Ct. 282, 288 
(2012).  "Deception need not be direct to come within reach of 
the law.  Declarations and conduct calculated to mislead and 
which in fact do mislead one who is acting reasonably are enough 
to constitute fraud."  Boston Five Cents Sav. Bank v. Brooks, 
309 Mass. 52, 55 (1941).  In addition, "[f]ragmentary 
18 
 
information may be as misleading . . . as active 
misrepresentation, and half-truths may be as actionable as whole 
lies" (citation omitted).  Kannavos v. Annino, 356 Mass. 42, 43, 
48-49 (1969), and cases cited (intentionally deceptive and 
fraudulent where defendants marketed property as investment 
property due to multifamily use when in fact zoning ordinance 
banned mutlifamily use, and defendants knew purchasers planned 
to use property for apartments but did not disclose zoning 
violations).  Moreover, "where there is reliance on fraudulent 
representations or upon statements and action treated as 
fraudulent, our cases have not barred plaintiffs from recovery 
merely becuase they 'did not use due diligence . . . [when they] 
could readily have ascertained from . . . records' what the true 
facts were.  Id. at 49-50, quoting Yorke v. Taylor, 332 Mass. 
368, 373 (1955). 
 
The plaintiffs argued in their amended complaint that the 
defendants represented that renovations were made to the Dover 
property, but (1) they failed to disclose that they did not 
apply for building permits, nor did the Dover building 
department (department) inspect the renovations or issue a 
certificate of occupancy; (2) they knew or should have known 
that the kitchen renovations did not comply with the 
requirements of the department; and (3) they had a duty to 
disclose the foregoing information to the plaintiffs before the 
19 
 
plaintiffs purchased the property.  In addition, the plaintiffs 
argued in opposition to summary judgment that the during the 
sale process, the defendants highlighted the renovations.  This 
highlighting included stating in the marketing materials that 
the Dover property had a "[m]agnificent young gourmet kitchen," 
and "fantastic Tuscan-style [four] season room with authentic 
brick oven and grill," and that during the preclosing 
inspection, Rosalie and Giuseppe verbally emphasized the 
renovations. 
 
In granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants on 
this claim, the motion judge reasoned that "[s]ilence does not 
constitute a basis for claiming fraud and misrepresentation, 
even where a seller may have knowledge of some weakness in the 
subject of the sale and fails to disclose it" (citations 
omitted).  See Urman v. South Boston Sav. Bank, 424 Mass. 165, 
168 (1997).  The motion judge also noted that the plaintiffs had 
had an inspection of the Dover property before the purchase and 
that they did not take the inspector's advice to check the 
municipal records "to ensure that any necessary permits were 
obtained" for the renovations. 
 
The plaintiffs argue on appeal that the defendants' written 
and oral representations concerning the renovations rose to the 
level of fraud, under the theory that "[f]ragmentary information 
may be as misleading . . . as active misrepresentation, and 
20 
 
half-truths may be as actionable as whole lies" (citation 
omitted).  Kannavos, 356 Mass. at 48. 
 
Although in Kannavos, we held that suggesting that a 
property was suitable for a particular purpose when that purpose 
was prohibited was "intentionally deceptive and fraudulent," in 
the present case the defendants' conduct is closer to "bare 
nondisclosure."  Kannavos, supra at 47, 49.  See Swinton v. 
Whitinsville Sav. Bank, 311 Mass. 677, 677-679 (1942) 
("nonliability for bare nondisclosure" where seller knew house 
had termite infestation at time of sale, which buyer could not 
readily observe upon inspection, but seller did not inform buyer 
of infestation).  Here, the defendants did not make 
representations that were intended to cause the plaintiffs to 
believe something that was untrue.  Cf. Maxwell v. Ratcliffe, 
356 Mass. 560, 562-563 (1969), citing Kannavos, supra at 42, 46-
50 ("Because the question of the dryness of the cellar had been 
raised expressly, there was special obligation on the brokers to 
avoid half truths and to make disclosure at least of any facts 
known to them or with respect to which they had been put on 
notice").  With regard to the lack of permits and faulty work, 
the defendants' actions reflect a failure to reveal, see 
Swinton, supra at 678 ("If this defendant is liable on this 
declaration every seller is liable who fails to disclose any 
nonapparent defect known to him in the subject of the sale which 
21 
 
materially reduces its value and which the buyer fails to 
discover"), rather than "[d]eclarations and conduct calculated 
to mislead."  Boston Five Cents Sav. Bank, 309 Mass. at 55.  
Accordingly, even viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiffs, the defendants were entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law on the claim of fraud and 
misrepresentation. 
 
4.  Jury consultant fees.  The plaintiffs contend that the 
trial judge erred in denying fees and costs associated with 
their jury consultant.  In their motion for attorney's fees and 
costs, the plaintiffs sought to recover $105,000 for jury 
consultant fees.12  The trial judge concluded that the requested 
jury consultant fees were excessive and unreasonable, and that 
awarding such expenses under G. L. c. 93A was unsupported by 
Massachusetts authority.  Although we need not reach the issue, 
given our conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to 
recover under c. 93A, we nevertheless address the matter, as it 
is an important, unresolved issue that has been fully briefed.  
See Ferman v. Sturgis Cleaners, Inc., 481 Mass. 488, 491 n.7 
(2019).  We conclude that jury consultant fees are not 
recoverable under G. L. c. 93A. 
 
 
12 This consisted of a five percent contingent fee of 
$100,000 and $5,000 in costs. 
22 
 
 
General Laws c. 93A, § 9 (4), provides that a prevailing 
plaintiff "shall . . . be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in connection with [the] action."  Our cases have 
clarified the types of costs recoverable under this seemingly 
broad standard, but this case presents us with the novel issue 
whether jury consultant fees are recoverable. 
 
The jury consultant provided the plaintiffs with various 
assistance before and during the trial, including conducting a 
mock voir dire and jury trial and analyzing data obtained during 
those exercises; providing the plaintiffs with a report about 
the jury pool; working with the plaintiffs on voir dire, opening 
statements, and testimony; and being present in court to assist 
with jury selection.  Although, as the plaintiffs argue, a jury 
consultant may provide a service that aids attorneys in 
providing more effective representation, the cost associated 
with such a consultant is dissimilar to the types of costs 
contemplated by the Legislature and previously allowed by our 
courts as recoverable under G. L. c. 93A.  Cf. Yorke Mgt. v. 
Castro, 406 Mass. 17, 19 (1989) (appellate attorney's fees); 
Linthicum v. Archambault, 379 Mass. 381, 389 (1979), overruled 
on other grounds by Knapp Shoes, Inc. v. Sylvania Shoe Mfg. 
Corp., 418 Mass. 737 (1994) (expert witness fee); O'Connor v. 
Brophy, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 909, 909 (2002) (costs associated with 
removal of case).  Unlike the services associated with trial 
23 
 
attorney's fees, appellate attorney's fees, expert witness fees, 
or removal of a case to a different court, a jury consultant 
provides a luxury service.  This luxury service is not one the 
Legislature intended to be recoverable under c. 93A. 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that 
the defendants' motions for a directed verdict or judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict should have been allowed on the 
G. L. c. 93A and warranty of habitability claims.  The award of 
damages to the plaintiffs on the c. 93A claim, including the 
award of attorney's fees and costs, and on the warranty of 
habitability claim are vacated, and judgment shall enter for the 
defendants on those claims.  The judgments are otherwise 
affirmed.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
13 The plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees from 
August 16, 2018, forward and in connection with this appeal is 
denied.