Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF JWT: CLT V. SJT and CET

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-04-4

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF JWT: CLT V. SJT and CET2005 WY 4104 P.3d 93Case Number: C-04-4, C-04-5Decided: 01/19/2005
 
 
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 
 

                                                                                                                                   

 
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF JWT:

 
 
CLT,

 
 
Appellant

(Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
SJT and 
CET,

 
 
Appellees

(Petitioners).

 
 
 
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF JWT:

 
 
CLT,

 
 
Appellant

(Respondent),

 
 
v.

SJT and 
CET,

 
 
Appellees

(Petitioners).

 

 
 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
            
F. Scott Peasley of Peasley Law Office, Douglas, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

 
 

            
Nadine 
McLeod, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and STEBNER, D.J. 
Ret.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court; STEBNER, District Judge, Retired, 
filed a dissenting opinion with which KITE, Justice, joined.

 
 
 
 
            
VOIGT, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      These combined 
appeals are from an order denying a motion for temporary custody, an order 
denying a motion to contest an adoption, and an order of adoption.  We reverse and remand because the 
necessary relinquishments of custody, consents to adoption, and affidavit were 
not filed with the petition to adopt.

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      The appellant is 
the biological mother of J.W.T.  
After J.W.T.'s birth, the appellant and J.W.T. lived with the appellant's 
mother in Texas for about sixteen months.  In July 2001, J.W.T. went to live with 
his maternal grandfather in West 
Virginia.  
Over the years, the appellant has executed several untitled documents 
evidencing some intent to transfer J.W.T.'s custody, or to create a 
guardianship, or to allow adoption:

 
 
1.         
November 30, 2000, to the maternal grandfather and his wife (the 
appellees), "temporary partial custody and full power of attorney," reserving 
right to void agreement.

 
 
2.         
July 27, 2001, to the appellees, "custody."

 
 
3.         
July 29, 2001, to the maternal grandmother, "full and legal permanent 
custody" and "permission to adopt . . .."

 
 
4.         
July 31, 2001, to the appellees, "permission to adopt," reserving 
visitation rights.

 
 
[¶3]      On June 10, 2003, 
the appellees filed a petition to adopt J.W.T.  The petition alleged that "the natural 
father of the minor child is unknown."  
The "unknown father" was then served by publication in a newspaper in 
Natrona 
County, Wyoming.  
In the meantime, however, the appellant had filed a response to the 
petition in which she denied that the name of the putative father was 
unknown.  In subsequent proceedings, 
the district court determined that the consent accompanying the petition was 
valid and denied the appellant's motion to contest the 
adoption.

 
 

 
 

[¶4]      Because adoption 
was unknown at common law, courts must strictly construe adoption statutes.  In re Estate of Kirkpatrick, 2003 
WY 125, ¶ 12, 77 P.3d 404, 407 (Wyo. 2003).  And because adoption is purely 
statutory, the proceedings must be conducted in substantial conformity with the 
provisions of the statute.  In re 
Adoption of KJD, 2002 WY 26, ¶ 22, 41 P.3d 522, 527 (Wyo. 2002); 
Matter of Adoption of AMD, 766 P.2d 550, 552 (Wyo. 1988); In 
re Adoption of Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862, 866 (1948).  In relevant part, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-22-109 (LexisNexis 2003) provides, as follows:

 
 
            
(a)       
A written relinquishment of custody of the child to be adopted and 
written consent to adoption shall be filed with the petition to adopt and shall 
be signed by:

 
 
                        
. . .

 
 
(iii)       The mother 
and putative father of the child if the name of the putative father is known; 
or

 
 
(iv)       The mother 
alone if she does not know the name of the putative father, in which case she 
shall sign and file an affidavit so stating and the court shall determine 
whether the putative father has registered under W.S. 1-22-117 and if so, shall 
require notice to be given to the putative father[.]

 
 

[¶5]      These statutory 
requirements simply were not followed, rendering the adoption invalid ab 
initio.  If the name of the 
putative father truly was unknown, mother's affidavit to that effect had to 
accompany her written relinquishment and written consent to adoption.  No such affidavit was filed.  In fact, mother filed a response to the 
petition in which she specifically denied that the name of the putative father 
was unknown.  At that point, the 
district court could not proceed with the adoption without the written 
relinquishment and written consent to adoption signed by the putative father, or 
at least without a determination whether the name of the putative father was, or 
was not, known.1  A relinquishment and consent by the 
mother cannot bind the father.  
Peters v. Campbell, 80 Wyo. 492, 345 P.2d 234, 238 (1959).

 
 

[¶6]      This is not a 
case where mother filed a false affidavit in which she claimed not to know the 
identity of the putative father and the putative father later sought to contest 
the adoption on that basis.  Neither 
is this a case where mother filed a truthful affidavit and the putative father 
later sought to contest service by publication.  In those situations, the correct 
statutory procedures arguably having been followed, the district court might 
have had jurisdiction to proceed with the adoption.  But here, the appropriate documentation 
never having been filed, the district court did not obtain jurisdiction to hear 
the adoption.  JK ex rel. DK v. 
MK, 5 P.3d 782, 788 (Wyo. 2000).  In her response to the petition, the 
appellant was not contesting service of process on the putative father; rather, 
she was bringing to the district court's attention the fact that the necessary 
consents and relinquishments had not been filed.

 
 
[¶7]      The orders of the 
district court are reversed and this case is remanded for dismissal of the 
petition to adopt.

  
STEBNER, 
District Judge, Retired, dissenting, with whom KITE, Justice, 
joins.

 
 
[¶8]      I respectfully 
dissent.  In my view of this case, 
Mother has no standing to assert the arguments she makes on appeal.  I certainly agree with the majority that 
adoption is purely statutory and therefore the proceeding must be conducted in 
substantial conformity with the provisions of the statute.  I likewise agree that parental consent 
for the adoption is jurisdictional.  
Nevertheless, the issue presented does not deprive the district court of 
jurisdiction.  Instead, the issue is 
one of the sufficiency of the notice provided to father.  While the appellees did assert that the 
putative father was unknown in their petition for adoption, they nevertheless 
served "the unknown father of JWT" with notice by publication, in essence 
proceeding as if the putative father's consent were required.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-109(a)(iii).  In her response to the petition, Mother 
denied that the name of the putative father was unknown, but later stated in an 
affidavit that she did not know the putative father's whereabouts.  In instances where the whereabouts of 
the putative father are unknown, the father may be served by publication and may 
default if he fails to answer.  It 
does appear that there may be an issue as to whether the published notice to the 
"unknown father of JWT" was sufficient notice to the putative father.  However, that argument is Father's to 
make.  

 
 
[¶9]      Indeed, it is 
apparent that Mother's arguments are based entirely on the putative father's 
rights and interests.  Clearly the 
provisions of § 1-22-109 requiring either the putative father's consent or an 
affidavit that the mother does not know the name of the putative father are 
intended to protect the putative father's rights.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-109(a)(iii) & 
(iv).  The Arkansas Court of Appeals 
considered a somewhat similar proposition when the grandparents of the child to 
be adopted asserted that the father had not validly consented to the 
adoption.  The court reasoned: "The 
right of natural parents with respect to the care, custody, management and 
companionship of their minor children has been described as a personal 
right."  In re Adoption of B.A.B, 
842 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Ark.App. 1992).  
Therefore, the adoption statutes require the father's consent to protect 
that right.  Id.   The court then concluded that the 
grandparents did not have standing to contest father's consent because "[i]t is 
apparent that the question of a natural father's consent is a matter that is 
personal to him."  Id.  I find this to be a similar case.    

 
 
[¶10]   Mother is attempting to assert 
Father's protections to somehow revoke her own consent to the adoption.  However, the district court found that 
Mother consented to the adoption, and the record supports this conclusion.  Once a parent consents to adoption, she 
cannot revoke that consent except under specific circumstances.  

 
 
Consent 
to adoption and the relinquishment of a child for adoption are irrevocable 
unless obtained by fraud or duress, except that if the court should deny the 
adoption on account of a claim or objection of the putative father of the child, 
the court may also allow the mother of the child to withdraw her consent and 
relinquishment. 

 
 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-22-109(d).  Mother 
never asserted that her consent was obtained by fraud or duress; therefore, she 
cannot revoke her consent.  
Indeed, 
once the validity of mother's consent was established, she became a stranger to 
the proceedings.  Matter of Adoption 
of RHA, 702 P.2d 1259, 1264 (Wyo. 1985).  Additionally, as evidenced by the 
exception provided in the above quoted statute, the 
putative father's consent is considered independent of mother's consent.    If it were otherwise, there 
would be no need for the provision that "the court may also allow the mother of 
the child to withdraw her consent and relinquishment."  Consequently, it is entirely appropriate 
for a district court to consider the validity of Mother's consent without 
considering Father's consent.  In 
this case, Mother's consent was found to be valid, and Mother became a stranger 
to the proceeding.  She therefore 
has no further standing to object to the adoption.  

 
 

[¶11]   However, Mother now seeks 
to revoke her consent by taking advantage of the exception provided by 
§ 1-22-109(d).  She does so by 
asserting objections that Father could possibly make to the adoption 
proceeding.  It does 
appear that some irregularities exist regarding notice to the putative 
father.   Nevertheless, it is 
Father that has standing to object to these irregularities.  Mother cannot now use the arguments that 
Father could possibly make to try to revoke her own valid consent.  See Burdette v. Dietz, 711 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Ark.App. 1986) (mother has no standing to raise lack of proper service 
on natural father); In re Adoption of Trent, 624 P.2d 433, 439 (Kan. 
1981) (one parent's consent is not binding on the other parent, therefore one 
parent has no basis to challenge the other parent's consent).  While the putative father apparently 
knows of these irregularities, as evidenced by his affidavit, he has not 
formally contested the adoption to assert the arguments that Mother makes.  I would, therefore, affirm the district 
court's decision.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

  1Subsequent affidavits from the 
putative father and his mother alleged that the father was known not only to the 
appellant mother, but also that the appellee grandfather knew the father's 
identity from the date of the child's birth.