Case Title: County Commissioners v. Carroll Craft

Citation: 384 Md. 23

Docket Number: 21/04

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
In the Circuit Court for Carroll County
Case No. C-2003-38589
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 21
September Term, 2004
______________________________________
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF 
CARROLL COUNTY, MARYLAND
v.
CARROLL CRAFT RETAIL, INC.
T/A LOVE CRAFT
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
______________________________________
Filed:    December 3, 2004
We granted certiorari in this case on our own initiative, prior to any definitive ruling
by the Court of Special Appeals, in order to examine whether certain provisions in the
Carroll County zoning law dealing with adult entertainment businesses are unconstitutionally
vague and ambiguous.  As is often the case when, on our own initiative, we opt to review a
case still pending in the Court of Special Appeals, we had before us, when we granted the
writ, only the appellant’s brief that had been filed in that court.  After considering the
subsequently filed appellee’s brief, reviewing the record, and questioning counsel at oral
argument, it has become plain that there is no appeal properly before us.  We therefore have
no choice but to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. 
This case has become a procedural nightmare, one that certainly was not apparent
from the appellant’s brief filed in the Court of Special Appeals.  In order to identify what is,
and is not, properly before us, we need to recount the procedural history in some detail,
which, unfortunately, will make this Opinion more than a little tedious. 
BACKGROUND
Subject to specified siting requirements – i.e., minimum distances from certain
enumerated structures or uses – the Carroll County Code permits an “adult entertainment
business” in an IG General Industrial Zone, but in no other zone.  See § 223-125E.  The term
“adult entertainment business” is defined in § 223-2 of the Code as an “adult movie theater”
or an “adult store.”  The business at issue here is clearly not an adult movie theater but is
alleged to be an adult store.  
-2-
The term “adult store” is defined in § 223-2 as a business establishment that offers for
sale or rental “any printed, recorded, photographed, filmed or otherwise viewable material,
or any sexually oriented paraphernalia, if a substantial portion of the stock or trade is
characterized by an emphasis on matters depicting, describing or relating to sexual
activities.”  (Emphasis added).  Section 223-2 defines “substantial portion,” for purposes of
that definition, as:
A.   At least 20% of the stock in the establishment or on display
consists of matters or houses devices depicting, describing or
relating to sexual activities; or
B.  At least 20% of the usable floor area is used for the display
or storage of matters or devices depicting, describing or relating
to sexual activities.”  (Emphasis added).
The term “usable floor area” is not defined in the ordinance.
On or about December 1, 2002, Carroll Craft Retail, Inc., trading as Love Craft,
opened a retail store in a building owned by Drs. Jogendra and Kirpal Singh, from which it
sold sexually oriented paraphernalia and other items.  The store was located in a General
Business zone.  On December 13, the acting zoning administrator, apparently believing that
the operation constituted an adult store that was not permitted in a General Business zone,
issued a violation notice to the Singhs and Love Craft.  When the Singhs and Love Craft
neither appealed the violation notice to the county board of appeals nor ceased or modified
the operation, the county, on December 20, 2002, filed suit in the District Court of Maryland
for Carroll County against them, claiming that they were operating or permitting the
1 Although the District Court does not have general equitable powers, Maryland
Code, § 4-401(8) of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article gives it exclusive original jurisdiction
over a petition filed by a county or municipality for the enforcement of local zoning (and
certain other) codes for which equitable relief is provided.  Section 223-195 of the Carroll
County Code, dealing with the enforcement of the zoning laws, permits the county
commissioners to seek injunctive relief to compel compliance.
2 In filing their counter-claim, appellees evidently overlooked the fact that the
District Court has no jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment.  See Maryland Code, §
4-402(c) of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article (“The District Court does not have jurisdiction to
render a declaratory judgment.”); also Maryland Code, § 3-403(a) of the Cts. & Jud. Proc.
Article (“Except for the District Court, a court of record within its jurisdiction may
declare rights, status, and other legal relations . . . .”) (Emphasis added).  The District
Court informed Love Craft at the January 27, 2003 evidentiary hearing that it did not
think it had jurisdiction to issue declaratory relief and made a handwritten notation on the
pleading that the counter-claim was dismissed.  We are unable to find any docket entry
confirming that notation.  If the counter-claim was not separately dismissed, it was
(continued...)
-3-
operation of an adult store in a B-G General Business zone, where an adult store is not
permitted.  The county sought both temporary and permanent injunctive relief to restrain the
continued operation of the store.1  In an answer and counter-claim, the defendants averred
that the business was not an adult store because “a substantial portion of its stock or trade is
not characterized by an emphasis on matters depicting, describing or relating to sexual
activities” and that, in any event, because the term “substantial portion,” as used in the
ordinance, was vague, ambiguous, and overly broad, the ordinance unconstitutionally chilled
the exercise of freedom of speech and was therefore invalid.  In furtherance of their attack
on the ordinance, the defendants, in their counter-claim, asked for a declaratory judgment
that the ordinance was in violation of Articles 24 and 40 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.2
2(...continued)
effectively resolved by the ultimate judgment entered by the District Court.
-4-
After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court, on February 11, 2003, filed an opinion
and order in which it found persuasive uncontradicted testimony by a county zoning inspector
that between 50% and 60% “of the establishment” was being used for purposes prohibited
in a general business zone and that the property was therefore being unlawfully used as an
adult store.  Upon that finding, it entered a permanent injunction restraining the three
defendants – the Singhs and Love Craft – from operating the adult store.  On February 19,
within 10 days, the defendants filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment.   That same
day, the county, believing that the defendants had failed to bring their operation into
conformance with the zoning requirement, filed a petition for contempt.  
At a hearing on April 14, the court denied the motion to alter or amend the judgment.
In an Opinion and Order filed on April 25, the court denied the contempt petition with
respect to the Singhs, finding that the injunction did not require them to file a breach of lease
action in order to evict their tenant. As to Love Craft, the court concluded that more than
20% of the of the usable floor area was being used for the display or storage of matters or
devices depicting, describing or related to sexual activities, that the operation was therefore
in violation of the injunction, but that Love Craft had made some effort to bring its operation
in compliance with the zoning requirement.  Instead of entering a finding of contempt,
therefore, the court gave Love Craft 14 days in which to bring the operation into full
3 There were two departures from the declaratory relief improperly sought in the
District Court, one of which injected more than a little confusion.  The counter-claim in
the District Court asked for a declaration that “the Carroll County Adult Entertainment
Law” was in violation of Articles 24 and 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The complaint for
declaratory relief filed in the Circuit Court asked “[t]hat this Court issue a declaration that
the Hagerstown Adult Bookstore Law is in violation of Article 40 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights.”  (Emphasis added).  No complaint was made with respect to the
Federal Constitution.  Giving counsel the benefit of the doubt in light of the allegations in
the Complaint, we assume that the intended reference in the prayer for relief was to the
Carroll County Adult Bookstore Law.  Although the Declaratory Judgment Act, Maryland
Code, § 3-409(c) of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article, permits a party to obtain a declaratory
judgment “notwithstanding a concurrent common-law, equitable, or extraordinary legal
remedy,” we have made clear on a number of occasions that “[a]s a general rule, courts
will not entertain a declaratory judgment action if there is pending, at the time of the
commencement of the action for declaratory relief, another action or proceeding
involving the same parties and in which the identical issues that are involved in the
declaratory action may be adjudicated.”  See Waicker v. Colbert, 347 Md. 108, 113, 699
A.2d 426, 428 (1997) and cases cited therein.  Given the pendency of the appeal from the
District Court raising precisely the same issues as the declaratory judgment action, the
declaratory judgment action was unnecessary and inappropriate.
-5-
compliance.  
On May 9, 2003, Love Craft filed an appeal to the Circuit Court for Carroll County,
and on May 30, 2003, it filed a separate complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief which,
with some exceptions, was  a copy of the complaint previously filed in the District Court.3
The appeal seeking de novo review of the District Court judgment and the complaint for
declaratory and injunctive relief were founded on the same premise but were separate actions
and were properly treated as such; the appeal was docketed as Case No. 06-C-03-03859, and
the complaint was docketed as Case No. 06-C-03-038720.  The county filed a motion for
summary judgment and an accompanying memorandum in the declaratory judgment action,
4 Although the Singhs did not appeal the District Court judgment, the case in the
Circuit Court was docketed as County Commissioners v. Jogendra Singh, et al., probably
because the record transmitted by the District Court showed the Singhs as the lead
defendants.  The county did not oppose the motion to dismiss the Singhs from the Circuit
Court case.
-6-
in which it argued that the ordinance was Constitutional, but the county did not seek any
affirmative declaratory judgment to that effect.
At a hearing held on August 4, 2003, the court (1) on motion of the county, formally
consolidated the two cases and identified the appeal from the District Court (03859) as the
lead case; (2) dismissed the Singhs as parties;4 and (3) reserved ruling on the county’s motion
for summary judgment.  On August 8, the court filed a memorandum opinion in which it
concluded that the ordinance – in particular the term “usable space” – was unconstitutionally
vague.  In an accompanying order, it struck “any previous rulings or injunctions prohibiting
Love Craft from operating their store” and determined that Love Craft “is not subject to any
fines for not obeying the previous injunction.”  Although the order does not expressly reverse
the District Court judgment, that is certainly its effect, and we shall treat it as achieving that
result.  The memorandum makes clear that the matter upon which the court acted was the
appeal from that judgment and not the declaratory judgment case. 
It is at this point that the more important procedural glitches begin to appear.  The
Circuit Court order was docketed August 11, 2003.  On August 29, the county noted an
appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  That court docketed the appeal as No. 1376, Sept.
Term 2003.  Both parties, at least initially, understood that the appeal was solely from the
-7-
order dissolving the District Court injunction and not from any ruling made in the declaratory
judgment action which was, as yet, formally unresolved in the Circuit Court.  The pre-hearing
information reports filed by both the county and Love Craft with the Court of Special
Appeals describe the Circuit Court action as an appeal from the District Court.  Love Craft’s
report describes the judgment as “Reversing District Court Order.”  
On September 9, 2003, Love Craft filed a motion in the Circuit Court to dismiss or
strike the appeal, contending that (1) as the action in the Circuit Court was an appeal from
the District Court, no appeal lay to the Court of Special Appeals from the judgment of the
Circuit Court, and (2) to the extent the county was appealing from the refusal of the Circuit
Court to hold Love Craft in contempt, no appeal lay from such an order.  On September 18,
Love Craft filed an identical motion in the Court of Special Appeals.  The county, apparently
confused as to (1) the nature and effect of a consolidation of two independent actions, (2) the
fact that, even when entertaining a de novo appeal from the District Court, the Circuit Court
nonetheless exercises appellate, not original, jurisdiction, and (3) the actual basis of Love
Craft’s motions, averred in response that, because the declaratory judgment action was still
pending in the Circuit Court, no final judgment had been entered in that court, that the
county’s appeal was from the dissolution of the District Court injunction, and that, under §
12-303 of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article, an interlocutory appeal was permissible from such
an order.  Alternatively, the county argued that, in entertaining a de novo appeal from the
District Court, the Circuit Court exercised original, not appellate jurisdiction, and that the
5 Cases do not lose their separate status merely because they are consolidated for
processing and trial.  A judgment entered in one case, if otherwise final, does not lose its
status as a final judgment because judgment has not been rendered in another case with
which it had been consolidated.  The judgment becomes appealable, as a final judgment,
when it is properly entered.  See Yarema v. Exxon Corp., 305 Md. 219, 236, 503 A.2d
239, 248 (1986); Unnamed Atty. v. Attorney Griev. Comm’n, 303 Md. 473, 484, 494 A.2d
940, 945 (1985); Coppage v. Resolute Insur. Co., 264 Md. 261, 263-64, 285 A.2d 626,
628 (1972).  The appeal from the judgment entered in the District Court appeal was from
a final judgment entered in that case.  It was not an interlocutory appeal under § 12-303 of
the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article from the dissolution of the injunction.  Love Craft’s point
was that, because the Circuit Court was, itself, acting as an appellate court, no further
appeal of right was permissible from its judgment.  See Maryland Code, § 12-302(a) of
the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article.  That is a matter we shall discuss further.  The county’s
alternative argument, that the judgment also resolved the declaratory judgment action
finds no support in the record.
-8-
judgment entered in the District Court appeal constituted a judgment as well in the
declaratory judgment action, over which the Circuit Court had also exercised original, not
appellate, jurisdiction. On either of these alternative bases, it claimed, the judgment was
appealable under Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article, § 12-301.5
On October 9, 2003, the Circuit Court granted the motion to dismiss filed in that court
and struck the notice of appeal.  Love Craft immediately informed the Court of Special
Appeals that the appeal had been dismissed in the Circuit Court, and, on October 16, 2003,
it sent a copy of the Circuit Court’s order to that effect to the Court of Special Appeals.
Presumably upon that information, the appellate court took no immediate action on the
motion filed with it but apparently assumed, at that point, that the appeal had already been
dismissed.  
Although, for reasons we shall describe, the Circuit Court had no authority to strike
-9-
the notice of appeal on the grounds presented by Love Craft, the county never filed an appeal
from that order, as it clearly had a right to do.  See Sullivan v. Insurance Comm’r, 291 Md.
277, 284, 434 A.2d 1024, 1028 (1981).  Accordingly, after 30 days, that order became final.
The county’s appeal to the Court of Special Appeals had effectively, even if improperly, been
dismissed, and the record was never transmitted to the appellate court in accordance with the
Rules and normal procedure.  It remained in the Circuit Court.  
As noted, on July 24, 2003 – prior to the consolidation of the two cases – the county
had filed a motion for summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action (038270).  On
October 15, 2003, the county got around to filing an answer to the complaint in that action.
Love Craft then moved to strike the county’s answer or, in the alternative, to dismiss the
action, which it had filed, as moot.  The motion was based on the assertion that the issues
raised in the declaratory judgment action had been resolved by the judgment entered in the
District Court appeal and that, with the dismissal of the appeal in that case to the Court of
Special Appeals and the failure of the county to appeal from the order of dismissal, the
judgment was final.  On December 18, 2003, the Circuit Court granted that motion, struck
the county’s answer to the complaint, and dismissed the action as moot.  On January 15,
2004, the county noted an appeal from that order.  That appeal was docketed in the Court of
Special Appeals as No. 2561, Sept. Term, 2003.
On January 13, 2004, prior to the noting of that second appeal, the Court of Special
Appeals finally acted on the motion to dismiss Appeal No. 1376 that had been filed on
6 With exceptions not relevant here, Maryland Rule 2-321(a) requires a party to file
an answer to an original complaint within 30 days after service.  The clerk of the court
entered an order giving the county 60 days after service to file an answer.  Service was
made on June 5, 2003.  Under the Rule, an answer was due July 7, the Monday following
(continued...)
-10-
September 18, 2003 and that was then moot because the appeal had already been stricken by
the Circuit Court.  Apparently in some doubt as to whether the appeal had, in fact, been
stricken, the court denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice to the appellee raising the
issue again in its brief.  Love Craft responded with a motion to strike that order, in which it
(1) iterated its argument that, because the Circuit Court judgment was entered in an appeal
from the District Court, the Court of Special Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the
county’s appeal from that judgment, and (2) again asserted that the appeal had already been
dismissed by the Circuit Court and that, as no appeal had been taken from that order, it was
final and unreviewable.  The county answered the motion with the same arguments it had
made in response to the motion to dismiss.  On March 18, 2004, the Court of Special Appeals
denied the motion to strike the January 13 order, thus leaving the already-dismissed appeal
facially alive.
This already-confusing state of affairs got worse when the county’s appeal from the
dismissal of the declaratory judgment action was docketed as No. 2561, Sept. Term, 2004
in the Court of Special Appeals.  As noted, that action had been filed by Love Craft, not the
county, and it was dismissed on Love Craft’s motion immediately upon the striking of the
county’s belated and untimely answer to the complaint.6  Nonetheless, the declaratory
6(...continued)
the thirtieth day; under the order, an answer was due August 4.  As noted, the answer was
not filed until October 15, 2003.  Nonetheless, as Love Craft did not seek to strike the
answer on the ground of untimeliness, that issue is now moot.
-11-
judgment action was within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, and,
subject to other defenses, any final judgment entered in such an action would be appealable
to the Court of Special Appeals.  Complicating the matter even further,  Love Craft, on
February 23, 2004, filed a petition in the Circuit Court, in the District Court appeal case
(038589), for attorney’s fees based on its victory in that appeal. The petition, brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, sought $19,953 in fees and expenses.  On May 11, 2004, the
court granted the motion and entered judgment against the county for the $19,953 requested.
On May 21, 2004, the county noted an appeal from that judgment.  That appeal was docketed
by the Court of Special Appeals as No. 643, Sept. Term, 2004.  
Thus it was that the Court of Special Appeals had before it (1) Appeal No. 1376,
which had been erroneously but nonetheless effectively dismissed by the Circuit Court but
which the Court of Special Appeals considered as still pending, (2) Appeal No. 2561, from
the dismissal of the declaratory judgment action, and (3) Appeal No. 643, from the judgment
for attorney’s fees entered in the District Court appeal case.  On May 14, 2004, unaware of
the appeals in Nos. 2561 and 643 and unaware as well of the unappealed Circuit Court order
dismissing No. 1376, this Court granted certiorari to the Court of Special Appeals in Appeal
No. 1376, which we docketed as No. 21, Sept. Term, 2004.  That is the case now before us.
-12-
That triggered action by the Court of Special Appeals in Nos. 2561 and 643. On June
24, 2004, the Court of Special Appeals entered an order in those appeals stating that it
appeared from the docket entries that those appeals emanated from judgments of the Circuit
Court rendered in the exercise of that court’s appellate jurisdiction and directing the parties
to show cause why those appeals should not be transferred to this Court pursuant to Cts. &
Jud. Proc. Article, § 12-302(a) and Maryland Rule 8-132.  The county, in response, urged
that both appeals be transferred to this Court, and consolidated with Case No. 21 pending
before this Court.  In No. 2561, the county continued to argue that, because the Circuit Court
order entered in the District Court appeal did not also resolve the declaratory judgment
action, it was not a final judgment under Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article, § 12-301 but could be, and
was, immediately appealed under § 12-303.  The county did not mention the dismissal of that
appeal by the Circuit Court.  In Appeal No. 643 – the judgment for attorney’s fees –  the
county averred that the Circuit Court was acting in its original jurisdiction, that the judgment
was therefore appealable, but that the appeal should be transferred and consolidated with
Case No. 21.
Love Craft, of course, took a different position.  In both cases, it argued that, because
that case “arose out of and/or was consolidated with” with the District Court appeal, the
Court of Special Appeals had no jurisdiction over it and therefore no authority to transfer it
to this Court.  It urged further that, as no petition for certiorari had been filed, the county had
waived its right to review in this Court.  Unimpressed with Love Craft’s argument, the Court
7 We have treated an order of the Court of Special Appeals transferring a case to us
pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-132 as a petition for certiorari, but, because the order, quite
properly and understandably, does not usually give any reasons why we should accept the
case and therefore does not comply with the normal requirements for a petition for
certiorari under Maryland Rule 8-303(b), we require the appellant/petitioner to
supplement the order with a petition that does comply with the Rule.  Rule 8-302, which
prescribes the time for filing a petition for certiorari, does not specifically address the
time for supplementing a transfer order with a compliant petition.  In these cases, the
Clerk of this Court directed the county to file any supplement by October 14, 2004.
-13-
of Special Appeals, on August 17, 2004, transferred Nos. 2561 and 643 to this Court.  In
response to that order, the county, on October 13, 2004 filed petitions for certiorari in the
two cases.7  In Petition No. 324, applicable to the declaratory judgment action (Appeal No.
2561), the county stated the Question Presented as whether the Circuit Court erred as a matter
of law in failing to allow the county “to defend its Zoning Ordinance in the declaratory ruling
action and in summarily finding the [county] ordinance unconstitutional based on vagueness
and ambiguity[.]”  In Petition No. 325, applicable to the judgment for attorney’s fees in the
District Court appeal, the Question Presented is whether the Circuit Court “ha[d] authority
to award attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 where no federal claim was raised by
any party[.]”  Those petitions have not been granted and, indeed, had not even been filed
when this case was argued on October 5, 2004.
DISCUSSION
As is evident from our discussion of the procedural history, this case is laced with
erroneous rulings, assumptions, and arguments.  It also suffers from a serious, and
8 At the hearing conducted on August 4, 2003, the court noted that, because the
county had not yet filed an answer to the complaint for declaratory judgment, it was
unable to act on the motion for summary judgment the county had filed in that case.
-14-
determinative, procedural lapse on the part of the county – the failure to note an appeal from
the erroneous dismissal of its appeal in Appeal No. 1376. 
As we have indicated in n. 5 above, the District Court appeal and the complaint for
declaratory relief were separate actions in the Circuit Court, and they did not lose their status
as separate actions simply because they were consolidated.  It is clear from the record, it was
clear to the parties, and it was clear to the Circuit Court that the judgment entered by the
Circuit Court on August 11, 2003 pertained only to the District Court appeal and not to the
declaratory judgment action, which remained pending and unresolved in the Circuit Court. 8
That judgment, although it could have been more clearly expressed, was effectively a
reversal of the District Court judgment, and it became a final judgment in that case when
docketed.
Maryland Code, § 12-301 of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article, provides that “[e]xcept as
provided in § 12-302 of this subtitle, a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a
civil or criminal case by a circuit court.”  Section 12-301 further provides that the right of
appeal exists “from a final judgment entered by a court in the exercise of original, special,
limited, statutory jurisdiction, unless in a particular case the right of appeal is expressly
denied by law.”  (Emphasis added).  Section 12-302 enumerates certain exceptions to
appealability under § 12-301.  The first of those exceptions, stated in § 12-302(a), is, in
-15-
relevant part, that “[u]nless a right to appeal is expressly granted by law, § 12-301 does not
permit an appeal from a final judgment of a court entered or made in the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction in reviewing the decision of the District Court.”   We know of no express right
of appeal otherwise given to the county to appeal from a judgment of a Circuit Court
reversing a District Court judgment entered in a zoning enforcement action.  Further
appellate review of a judgment entered by a Circuit Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction to review judgments of the District Court is provided only by §§ 12-305 and 12-
307(2).  Section 12-305 provides:
The Court of Appeals shall require by writ of certiorari that a
decision be certified to it for review and determination in any
case in which a circuit court has rendered a final judgment on
appeal from the District Court . . . upon petition . . . that:
(1) Review is necessary to secure uniformity of decision,
as where the same statute has been construed differently by two
or more judges; or
(2) There are other special circumstances rendering it
desirable and in the public interest that the decision be reviewed.
(Emphasis added).  Section 12-307(2) supplements § 12-305 by conferring jurisdiction on
this Court “to review a case or proceeding decided by a circuit court, in accordance with §
12-305 of this subtitle.”
In State v. Anderson, 320 Md. 17, 26, 575 A.2d 1227, 1231 (1990), we construed
these provisions and made clear that §§ 12-305 and 12-307(2) 
are the only provisions of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article expressly authorizing further review of circuit court final
judgments rendered in cases on appeal from the District Court,
and they provide that there shall be discretionary review by the
9 Indeed, the Circuit Court could only have been exercising appellate jurisdiction,
as it had no original jurisdiction over the case.  As noted above, § 4-401(8) of the Cts. &
Jud. Proc. Article confers on the District Court “exclusive original civil jurisdiction” over
a petition by a county to enforce a zoning code for which equitable relief is provided. 
The county’s enforcement action in this case could not have been brought in the Circuit
Court initially.
-16-
Court of Appeals and not an appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals.
In conformance with that holding, we determined that, as no appeal from such a
judgment lay to the Court of Special Appeals, this Court had no authority to review the
Circuit Court judgment under a writ of certiorari issued to the Court of Special Appeals, and,
accordingly, notwithstanding that this Court had issued such a writ in that case, the appeal
had to be dismissed.  Id., 575 A.2d at 1231.  
In light of Anderson, which followed a similar pronouncement in State v. Jefferson,
319 Md. 674, 678 n.1, 574 A.2d 918, 919 n.1 (1990), it is clear that the county had no right
to appeal the judgment entered in the District Court appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.
It does not matter that the case was tried de novo in the Circuit Court.  That does not alter the
fact that the Circuit Court was exercising appellate, rather than original, jurisdiction.9  What
the county should have done was to file a petition for certiorari with this Court in
conformance with Maryland Rules 8-302 and 8-303.  It did not do so.
That does not end the matter, however.  Traditionally, if an action, including an
appeal, was filed in a court that had no authority to hear it, the normal response was for the
court to dismiss the action or appeal.  By Rule, however, this Court has softened that
-17-
approach, at least in certain settings, by allowing the court in which the action or appeal has
been improperly filed to transfer it to a court in which it could properly have been filed.
Maryland Rule 2-327(a) provides that, if an action within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the District Court is filed in a Circuit Court, the Circuit Court may, in lieu of dismissing
the action for want of jurisdiction, transfer it to the District Court so that it may proceed in
the proper court.  
We have conferred that authority as well on the two appellate courts through
Maryland Rule 8-132, with even greater emphasis, as, instead of leaving the transfer
discretionary, as we did in Rule 2-327(a), we made the transfer mandatory.  It is not
infrequent that an appeal is filed with this Court that, absent the issuance of a writ of
certiorari, can be heard only in the Court of Special Appeals, or, as in this case, that an
appeal is filed with the Court of Special Appeals that can be heard only, if at all, by this
Court.  To achieve the same beneficent policy reflected in Rule 2-327(a), Rule 8-132
provides that, if either appellate court determines that an appellant has improperly noted an
appeal to it but may be entitled to appeal to another court exercising appellate jurisdiction,
the court “shall not dismiss the appeal but shall instead transfer the action to the court
apparently having jurisdiction, upon the payment of costs provided in the order transferring
the action.”  (Emphasis added).  As noted, §§ 12-305 and 12-307(2) confer jurisdiction on
this Court to review the judgment of a Circuit Court entered in an appeal from the District
Court.  In response to the motion to dismiss Appeal No. 1376, therefore, the Court of Special
-18-
Appeals should have denied the motion and immediately transferred the case to this Court.
Had it done so, the Clerk of this Court, in due course, would have treated the transfer as a
petition for certiorari and given the county time to supplement the petition.  Presumably, as
we have already, on our own initiative, declared that the substantive issue raised in the case
was worthy of our consideration, we would have granted such a supplemental petition, and
this case could have proceeded in an appropriate fashion.
The “fly in the ointment” was the striking of the notice of appeal by the Circuit Court.
That was wholly improper.  Maryland Rule 8-203 permits a Circuit Court to strike a notice
of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, but only for certain enumerated reasons: (1) if the
appeal was not filed within the time prescribed by Rules 8-202 or 8-204 – i.e., if the appeal
was untimely; (2) if the Circuit Court clerk has prepared the record pursuant to Rule 8-413
and the appellant has failed to pay for it; (3) if the appellant has failed to deposit with the
clerk the filing fee required by Rule 8-201(b); or (4) if by reason of any other neglect on the
part of the appellant the record has not been transmitted to the Court of Special Appeals
within the time prescribed by Rule 8-412.  
These reasons are both entirely collateral to the merits of the appeal and as objectively
determinable by the Circuit Court as they are by the Court of Special Appeals.  This Court
has not permitted a Circuit Court to preclude review of its own decision by striking an appeal
because it believes that the appellate court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal or that the
appellant is not entitled to take the appeal, or for any other reason that goes, directly or
10 The Circuit Court’s action was particularly inappropriate in this case, as it was
based principally on the assertion that the Court of Special Appeals had no jurisdiction to
hear the appeal.  As we have observed, in that situation, the Court of Special Appeals
would have been required by Rule 8-132 to transfer the appeal to this Court, which did
have jurisdiction, rather than to dismiss the appeal.  The Circuit Court thus arrogated to
itself a power that not even the Court of Special Appeals had.
-19-
indirectly, to the merits of the appeal.  If an appeal is subject to dismissal for any reason other
than the four articulated in Rule 8-203, it is the appellate court that must order the dismissal.
The order of the Circuit Court striking the notice of appeal was unauthorized, erroneous, and
itself appealable.10
The problem, of course, is that the county failed to appeal that order, and we need to
consider the effect of that omission.  In Sullivan, supra, 434 A.2d 1024, we had before us a
somewhat similar, but nonetheless distinguishable, situation.  In an administrative
proceeding, the Insurance Commissioner had apparently approved the termination of
Sullivan’s agency agreement with an insurance company, and Sullivan filed an action for
judicial review.  The Circuit Court affirmed the administrative decision, and Sullivan filed
a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  When it became clear that, due to a delay
by the court reporter in preparing the transcript, the record could not be transmitted to the
appellate court within the time allowed, Sullivan sought an extension.  The Court of Special
Appeals denied the extension because the request itself was untimely.  Without notice to
Sullivan, the Circuit Court, informed by its clerk that the record had not been timely
transmitted, entered an order prepared by the clerk striking the notice of appeal.  Being
-20-
unaware of that order, Sullivan did not appeal it but petitioned this Court for certiorari to
review the merits of the case.  We granted the petition but, upon becoming aware of the
procedural setting, limited our review to the procedural issues, including whether the
dismissal of the appeal by the Circuit Court was reviewable in the absence of an appeal from
that order.
The predecessor to Rule 8-203 that was in effect at the time did not require the Circuit
Court to notify the parties before striking an appeal, which is presumably why Sullivan was
not notified of the court’s intended action.  We concluded that, in the absence of an appeal
from the order striking the appeal, the merits of that dismissal were not before the appellate
court, but that, in the absence of notice, the order was void on due process grounds and could
be collaterally attacked.  Sullivan, supra, 291 Md. at 282, 287, 434 A.2d at 1027, 1030.  We
held (1) that the order striking the appeal was itself an appealable judgment (Id. at 284, 434
A.2d at 1028); (2) that the Circuit Court had no authority to strike the appeal except upon the
grounds allowed in the Rule (Id., 434 A.2d at 1028); (3) that the appeal was stricken on the
ground that the record had not been timely transmitted due to some neglect or omission on
Sullivan’s part, which amounted to a determination that the fault was that of Sullivan and not
the court reporter (Id. at 287, 434 A.2d at 1030); and (4) that the making of such a
determination without notice to Sullivan amounted to “a denial of due process which voids
the order striking the entry of appeal” (Id. at 287, 434 A.2d at 1030).  Because we regarded
the Circuit Court order as void, the appeal was still effectively pending before the Court of
-21-
Special Appeals when we granted certiorari.  Id. at 288, 434 A.2d at 1030.
This case is different.  Rule 8-203, redrafted in light of Sullivan, requires that notice
be given to the parties before an appeal is stricken by the Circuit Court.  Notice was given
to the county, and the county responded.  There was no due process violation, and, although
the Circuit Court’s order was unauthorized and erroneous, it was not void and therefore not
subject to collateral attack. A judicial decree or judgment made by a court lacking
jurisdiction to enter it is void.  Fooks’ Executors v. Ghingher, 172 Md. 612, 619, 192 A. 782,
785 (1937).  The term “jurisdiction” can have different meanings, however, depending upon
the context in which it is used.   It can refer to either “i) the power of a court to render a valid
decree, [or] ii) the propriety of granting the relief sought.” First Federated Comm. Tr. v.
Comm’r, 272 Md. 329, 334, 322 A.2d 539, 543 (1974) (quoting Moore v. McAllister, 216
Md. 497, 507, 141 A.2d 176, 182 (1958)).  It is only when the court lacks the first kind of
jurisdiction which, in Pulley v. State, 287 Md. 406, 417, 412 A.2d 1244, 1250 (1980), this
Court termed “fundamental jurisdiction” that its judgment is void.  First Federated, supra,
272 Md. at 334, 322 A.2d at 543.   As this Court recently reiterated in Carey v. Chessie
Computer, 369 Md. 741, 802 A.2d 1060 (2002), “fundamental jurisdiction” refers to “ ‘ the
power to act with regard to a subject matter which “is conferred by the sovereign authority
which organizes the court, and is to be sought for in the general nature of its powers, or in
authority specially conferred.” ’ ” Id. at 756, 802 A.2d at 1069 (quoting Pulley, supra, 287
Md. at 416, 412 A.2d at 1249 (quoting Cooper v. Reynolds’ Lessee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308,
-22-
316, 19 L. Ed. 931, 932 (1870)).  It is the power that the law confers on a court to render
judgments over a class of cases, within which a particular case may fall.  First Federated,
supra, 272 Md. at 335, 322 A.2d at 543. 
Thus, the main inquiry in determining “fundamental jurisdiction” is whether or not
the court in question had general authority over the class of cases to which the case in
question belongs.  As previously stated, Maryland Rule 8-203 confers upon the Circuit Court
the power to strike notices of appeal, but limits the exercise of that power to certain
circumstances.  Although the court erred in the manner in which it exercised its power, it
acted within its general authority to strike notices of appeal when it issued its ruling.  In
Pulley, supra, 287 Md. at 417, 412 A.2d at 1250, this Court made clear that a court still
retains its “fundamental jurisdiction” though its ability to exercise that power may be
“interrupted” or circumscribed by statute or Maryland Rule.  Indeed, this Court has
repeatedly declined to hold void court or agency decisions that exceeded statutory limits but
fell within the basic or fundamental jurisdiction of the court or agency.  See, e.g., Carey,
supra, 369 Md. 741, 802 A.2d 1060; Board of License Comm. v. Corridor, 361 Md. 403, 761
A.2d 916 (2000); Parks v. State, 287 Md. 11, 410 A.2d 597 (1980); Block v. State, 286 Md.
266, 407 A.2d 320 (1979). 
The fact that the Circuit Court issued its dismissal order after the county had noted its
appeal to the Court of Special Appeals is of no consequence.  Once the appeal was pending,
the Circuit Court was certainly prohibited from exercising its jurisdiction in a way that would
-23-
affect the subject matter of the appeal or appellate proceeding.  See Jackson v. State, 358 Md.
612, 620, 751 A.2d 473, 477 (2000); see also Pulley, supra, 287 Md. at 417, 412 A.2d at
1250.  Any ruling to that effect, however, was reversible on appeal, not void for lack of
jurisdiction.  Id.  Accord Folk v. State, 142 Md. App. 590, 598, 791 A.2d 152, 157 (2002).
If the county desired to challenge the Circuit Court’s order . . . it was required to note an
appeal.  When it failed to do so within the 30 days allowed, the order became final; the
appeal was dismissed.  Thus, when we issued a writ of certiorari on May 14, 2004 in Appeal
No. 1376, that appeal was no longer pending in the Court of Special Appeals.  There is
nothing for us to review.
WRIT OF CERTIORARI
DISMISSED, WITH COSTS,
AS HAVING BEEN
IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED.