Case Title: In re Ryan B.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97118

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2004-09-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 97118-Agenda 10-May 2004.
In re RYAN B., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, 							
Appellee, v. Ryan B., Appellant).
Opinion filed September 23, 2004. 
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	Respondent, Ryan B., was adjudicated delinquent based upon a
finding that he had committed the offense of sexual exploitation of a
child (720 ILCS 5/11-9.1(a-5) (West 2000)). Respondent was
sentenced to five years' probation, was ordered to register as a sex
offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (Registration
Act) (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2000)), and was ordered to
submit to a DNA blood draw (730 ILCS 5/5-4-3 (West 2000)). The
appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. No.
1-01-2320 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We
granted respondent's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R.
315(a).

BACKGROUND
	Respondent was charged as a delinquent minor for committing
the offense of sexual exploitation of a child. At the time of the offense,
respondent was 14 years old. The parties proceeded with a stipulated
bench trial. The parties stipulated that, if called to testify, the victim,
J.B., would testify that around 3 p.m. on August 19, 2000, respondent
approached her and asked her to lift up her shirt so he could see her
"boobs." At the time, J.B. was eight years old. J.B. knew respondent
from the neighborhood. J.B. did lift up her shirt and expose her
breasts to respondent.
	The parties also stipulated that, if called to testify, Detective
Hollister would testify that respondent was brought to the police
station on August 19, 2000, and signed a waiver of his Miranda
rights. Respondent was questioned about the incident with J.B. and
admitted that he had asked J.B. to lift up her shirt and show him her
"boobs." Respondent said that J.B. lifted her shirt for 5 to 10 seconds
and that he was able to see her nipples when she lifted up her shirt.
Respondent then went home. When Detective Hollister asked
respondent why he asked J.B. to lift up her shirt, respondent said he
had just thought of it and that he asked her because it "turned him
on."
	Based upon the stipulation, the trial court found respondent to be
a delinquent minor. Respondent was placed on probation for five years
and ordered to cooperate with any therapeutic placement to be
determined later. As noted, respondent also was ordered to register as
a sex offender and to submit a blood sample for DNA analysis. The
latter two orders were stayed pending appeal.
	On appeal, respondent argued that he had not been proven
delinquent beyond a reasonable doubt. Respondent claimed that the
State had failed to establish that he had enticed, coerced or persuaded
J.B. to lift her shirt, as required by statute in order to prove sexual
exploitation of a child. Respondent also argued that juvenile sex
offenders are not required to register under the Registration Act.
Finally, respondent maintained that the Registration Act violates
procedural due process because it fails to provide juvenile offenders
the opportunity to be heard on the issue of their continuing danger to
the community before requiring them to register as sex offenders.
	The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.
The appellate court held that a rational trier of fact could have found
that respondent coerced J.B. into lifting her shirt because "[o]ne could
easily conclude that an 8-year-old girl would be intimidated by a 14-year-old boy who asked her to lift her shirt and expose her breasts.
Such intimidation would explain J.B.'s compliance with respondent's
request." The appellate court also held that a rational trier of fact
could have found that respondent persuaded J.B. to lift her shirt. The
appellate court stated that it was logical to conclude that J.B.'s
decision to lift her shirt "was influenced solely by respondent's
solicitation" and that "J.B. would not have lifted her shirt had
respondent not specifically urged her to do so." In response to J.B.'s
argument that merely asking J.B. to lift her shirt did not constitute
persuasion, the appellate court stated that "[b]ecause respondent fails
to identify any other persuasive factor that would have convinced J.B.,
an 8-year-old girl, to lift her shirt and expose her breasts to
respondent, we are left with only one rational conclusion: that J.B.
was persuaded and/or coerced by respondent."
	Citing this court's decision in In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50 (2003),
the appellate court also rejected respondent's claim that juvenile sex
offenders are not required to register under the Registration Act.
Finally, the appellate court rejected respondent's claim that the
Registration Act violates due process, noting that the registration
requirement was not based upon a finding of dangerousness, but upon
an adjudication of delinquency or a conviction for a sex offense.

ANALYSIS
	In this court, respondent again argues that he was not proven
delinquent for sexual exploitation of a child beyond a reasonable
doubt. In addition, respondent reasserts his claim that the Registration
Act violates his right to procedural due process. Respondent also asks
this court to reconsider its decision in In re J.W.
	The statute at issue in this case provides that:
			"A person commits sexual exploitation of a child who
knowingly entices, coerces, or persuades a child to remove
the child's clothing for the purpose of sexual arousal or
gratification of the person or the child, or both." 720 ILCS
5/11-9.1(a-5) (West 2000).
The dispute in this case concerns whether respondent's actions
constituted enticing, coercing or persuading as set forth in the statute.
Because respondent's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
against him does not question the credibility of the witnesses, but
instead questions whether the uncontested facts were sufficient to
prove the elements of sexual exploitation of a child, our review is de
novo. People v. Smith, 191 Ill. 2d 408, 411 (2000). The State must
prove the elements of the substantive offense charged in a delinquency
petition beyond a reasonable doubt. In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 336
(1995).
	Respondent maintains that the stipulated testimony showed only
that he "asked" J.B. to lift her shirt and that she did so. Respondent
denies that "asking" amounts to "coercing," "enticing" or
"persuading" as set forth in the statute. The State, however, maintains
that respondent's actions qualify as enticing or persuading. The State
argues that asking is one way to persuade or entice another person to
do something, particularly where the victim is an 8-year-old girl and
the respondent is a 14-year-old boy.
	In order to determine whether asking constitutes coercing,
enticing or persuading, we must look to the language of the statute.
The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give
effect to the legislature's intent. Caveney v. Bower, 207 Ill. 2d 82, 87-88 (2003). The best indication of the legislature's intent is the
statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Caveney,
207 Ill. 2d  at 88. In the absence of a statutory definition indicating
legislative intent, an undefined word must be given its ordinary and
popularly understood meaning. In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 496
(2002).
	Because the sexual exploitation of a child statute does not define
the terms "entice," "coerce" or "persuade," we must look to the
ordinary and popularly understood meaning of those terms. As the
appellate court observed, Webster's Third New International
Dictionary defines "entice" as "to draw on by arousing hope or
desire." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 757 (1993).
"Coerce" is defined as "to restrain, control, or dominate, nullifying
individual will or desire (as by force, power, violence, or
intimidation)." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 439
(1993). "Persuade" is defined as "to induce by argument, entreaty, or
expostulation into some mental position (as a determination, decision,
conclusion, belief) *** to use persuasion upon: plead with: URGE."
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1687 (1993).
	Based upon the foregoing definitions, respondent argues that
there was no evidence that he caused J.B. to lift her shirt by arousing
her hope and desire, that he restrained, controlled or intimidated J.B.
into lifting up her shirt, or that he pleaded with or urged J.B. to lift her
shirt. The stipulated testimony established only that respondent
"asked" J.B. to lift her shirt and that she did so. Respondent notes that
Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "ask" as "put
a question to: inquire of" and to "make a request of." Webster's Third
New International Dictionary 128 (1993). Respondent contends that
the appellate court erred in holding that because J.B. complied with
respondent's request, it follows that she was coerced or persuaded
into doing so. Respondent claims that the appellate court erroneously
rendered the plain language of the statue meaningless by inferring that
"ask" has the same meaning as "persuade" or "coerce."
	The State concedes that respondent did not "coerce" J.B. to lift
her shirt, as that word implies a measure of force. Nonetheless, the
State argues that it is obvious that respondent enticed or persuaded
J.B. to expose her breasts because she responded by complying with
respondent's request. The State maintains that there is no evidence
that J.B.'s exposure of her breasts was an independent act unsolicited
by respondent.
	Upon review, we agree with respondent that the State failed to
prove him guilty of sexual exploitation of a child beyond a reasonable
doubt. In order to commit the offense of sexual exploitation of a child,
an offender must coerce, entice or persuade the child to remove her
clothing. Giving the statutory terms "coerce," "persuade," and
"entice" their plain and ordinary meanings, it is clear that asking does
not rise to the level of coercing, persuading or enticing. The stipulated
testimony in this case established only that respondent asked J.B. to
lift her shirt and that she complied. As respondent argues, coercing,
persuading or enticing requires something more than making a single
request of another. For example, had the stipulated testimony shown
that respondent repeatedly requested, badgered or begged J.B. to lift
her shirt, or explicitly or implicitly threatened J.B. into lifting her shirt,
respondent's conduct would constitute coercion, persuasion or
enticement as set forth in the statute. In the absence of any such
evidence, however, we cannot hold that the stipulated facts were
sufficient to prove the elements of sexual exploitation of a child.
	Likewise, we cannot conclude that respondent enticed or
persuaded J.B. to lift her shirt simply by virtue of the fact that she
complied with respondent's request. The appellate court erred in
holding that respondent persuaded J.B. to lift her shirt because it was
logical to conclude that J.B.'s decision to lift her shirt "was influenced
solely by respondent's solicitation" and that J.B. "would not have
lifted her shirt had respondent not specifically urged her to do so."
Contrary to the appellate court's interpretation, the only logical
interpretation of the stipulated testimony is that J.B. lifted her shirt
because respondent asked her to lift her shirt. The legislature has not
made the mere asking of a child to remove her clothing a violation of
the sexual exploitation of a minor statute. This court must interpret
and apply statutes in the manner in which they are written, and we can
neither restrict nor enlarge the meaning of an unambiguous statute.
Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 394-95 (1998).
That J.B. complied with respondent's request, then, without more, is
not sufficient to establish a violation of the statute.
	Further, we agree with respondent that the appellate court
improperly shifted the burden of proof when it held that because
respondent failed to identify any other persuasive factor that would
have convinced J.B. to lift her shirt, the only rational conclusion was
that J.B. was persuaded or coerced by respondent into lifting her shirt.
The State must prove the elements of sexual exploitation of a child
beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d  at 336. Here,
the State failed to do so.
	The appellate court also finds coercion by virtue of the age
difference between J.B. and the respondent, stating that "[o]ne could
easily conclude that an 8-year-old girl would be intimidated by a 14-year-old boy who asked her to lift her shirt and expose her breasts."
Given respondent's relative youth, however, we will not presume that
the six-year age difference between respondent and J.B. in itself
established coercion. The age difference between the parties certainly
was a fact for the trial court to consider, and certainly could be
dispositive if the offender was an adult or a person in a position of
authority over the victim. As respondent observes, however, had the
legislature intended to criminalize conduct between two minors based
solely upon their age differences, the legislature would have included
a presumptive inference of culpability based upon age differences in
the statute. See People v. Reed, 148 Ill. 2d 1 (1992) (upholding
statute imposing greater penalty on adults who engage in sexual
conduct with minors when the adults are five or more years older than
the minors). Here, however, the stipulated testimony was not
sufficient to establish that the age difference between respondent and
J.B. alone was sufficient to establish coercion. The stipulated
testimony merely established that J.B. knew respondent from the
neighborhood. Had the testimony shown that J.B. knew respondent
from the neighborhood and believed him to be violent or threatening,
or was otherwise fearful of him, we would agree with the appellate
court that J.B. could have been intimidated when respondent asked
her to lift her shirt. In this case, however, we will not assume
intimidation merely because J.B. complied with respondent's request.
	Although we do not condone respondent's behavior in this case,
we must reverse the judgment of the circuit and appellate courts
adjudicating respondent a delinquent minor for committing the offense
of sexual exploitation of a child. As noted, the legislature has not
provided that merely asking a child to remove her clothing violates the
sexual exploitation of a child statute. Here, the stipulated evidence
established only that respondent asked J.B. to lift her shirt. Asking
does not constitute coercing, persuading or enticing as set forth in the
statute. Consequently, the stipulated testimony failed to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent knowingly enticed,
coerced or persuaded J.B. to lift her shirt.
	Because we reverse the judgment adjudicating respondent a
delinquent minor for committing the offense of sexual exploitation of
a child, we need not address respondent's challenge to the circuit
court's order requiring him to register as a sex offender or his
challenge to the constitutionality of the Registration Act.
	For all the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the circuit court
of Cook County and the appellate court are reversed.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment reversed.