Case Title: Bearpaw v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-12-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Bearpaw v. State1990 WY 136803 P.2d 70Case Number: 89-214Decided: 12/07/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
Stan W. 
BEARPAW,

 Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Fremont County, D. Terry Rogers, J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender and Mike Cornia, Appellate Counsel, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne and Roger C. 
Fransen, Sr. Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J.,* and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

URBIGKIT, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      This appeal from 
a second degree murder conviction presents basic questions of an inadequate 
record, ineffectiveness of trial counsel, and fundamental concerns about the 
fairness of the trial. We reverse and remand for retrial.

I. ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant 
initially contends:

ISSUE 1

     Whether the trial 
court erred in instructing the jury that they could infer malice from the use of 
a deadly weapon and that one of the elements of manslaughter was killing without 
malice, expressed or implied.

ISSUE 2

     Whether the trial 
court's instructions concerning second degree murder and manslaughter 
impermissibly shifted the burden to the Appellant to prove that the killing was 
without malice and reckless.

ISSUE 3

     Whether there was 
insufficient evidence for the jury to find the Appellant guilty of second degree 
murder.

[¶3]      Appellee's 
initial issues are:

I. Was the evidence 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilt of second degree 
murder?

II. Did the trial court 
correctly respond to questions asked by the jury during their 
deliberations?

III. Did the trial court 
err in instructing the jury that malice may be inferred from the use of a deadly 
weapon?

IV. Did the trial court 
err in not instructing the jury on the appellant's defense of 
accident?

V. Was it reversible 
error to instruct the jury that absence of malice is an element of the lesser 
included offense of manslaughter?

[¶4]      An incomplete 
record of the trial was presented for appellate review and supplemental briefing 
was requested. Appellant's further issues then address:

I. Should the failure of 
counsel to designate the entire record have any effect on this 
appeal?

II. Whether the State's 
inability to provide the entire record is grounds for reversal.

III. Did the Appellant 
receive effective assistance of counsel?

Appellee then 
asks:

I. Does the failure of 
defense counsel to designate the entire transcript of the trial court 
proceedings for inclusion in the record on appeal and the subsequent 
unavailability of the transcript of voir dire, opening statements and closing 
arguments necessitate reversal of Appellant's conviction? 

II. Did Appellant have 
effective assistance of counsel at trial?

[¶5]      We reverse the 
conviction and remand for retrial on the basis of the inadequate record 
presented for a determination by this court of whether a fair trial existed and 
whether effective assistance of counsel was provided.

II. PLEADING AND 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[¶6]      On March 2, 1989, 
Stan W. Bearpaw (Bearpaw) shot and killed Rita Bownes (Bownes). The two lived 
together and Bownes was the mother of their two month old son.1 Following a day of drinking 
alcohol, Bearpaw shot Bownes in the right eye with a .22 single action revolver 
from a distance of two to six feet. The shooting occurred just outside the Wind 
River Indian Reservation on non-Indian land.

[¶7]      On the day of the 
death, events followed a rather aimless visiting around and drinking pattern, 
including consumption of "purple passion" at an acquaintance's house, before 
returning to the rented residence in Hudson, Wyoming in the late afternoon, 
early evening period. After they arrived home, the two adults started arguing 
and the only evidence of what happened is found in the disorganized and confused 
statement given by Bearpaw at the sheriff's office later that night in Lander, 
Wyoming. That statement is somewhat in conflict with Bearpaw's version as 
provided to the parole officer for preparation of a presentence investigation 
report, but essentially the same general scenario develops.

[¶8]      Bownes was 
folding clothes and Bearpaw was apparently watching while they engaged in an 
argument. For whatever reason, Bearpaw got a .22 single action revolver out of 
the bureau and shot Bownes in the right eye with a single shot from a distance 
of two to six feet. Bearpaw then held Bownes for a time and then, leaving her on 
the floor, took the baby and walked out of the house. There were no other 
persons present at any time during the events.

[¶9]      Since no phone 
existed in the home, Bearpaw, after walking to an adjoining residence, called 
the sheriff's office and was thereafter taken to Lander where a late night 
interrogation commenced.2 A rambling, inconsistent 
explanation followed during the early-morning-hour extended interview, which was 
recorded and transcribed. This interview was then introduced without objection 
into evidence as a trial exhibit.

[¶10]   Bearpaw was held in jail and a 
complaint of second degree murder (purposely and maliciously, but without 
premeditation), W.S. 6-2-104, was filed on March 6, 1989 in the Fremont County 
Court. An appearance bond of $10,000 was established but never posted. A public 
defender was appointed for representation. Following a preliminary hearing, 
Bearpaw was bound over for trial and the information was filed in the district 
court on April 20, 1989. Arraignment followed on May 3, 1989 when Bearpaw pled 
not guilty. A pre-trial date of June 21, 1989 and trial date for July 17, 1989 
were set by the Fremont County resident district court judge.

[¶11]   In compliance with a pre-trial 
order, the State filed a comprehensive list of witnesses and exhibits. No 
filings or motions of any kind were made in behalf of Bearpaw to support or 
sustain his defense phased in avoidance of the intentional homicide criminal 
charge.

[¶12]   The pre-trial conference was 
conducted by the resident district court judge and the case assigned for trial 
to the other district court judge for the Ninth Judicial District, resident 160 
miles away at Jackson, Wyoming in Teton County. The defense at the pre-trial 
conference, enunciated by defense counsel, was lack of purposefulness in 
commission. The district court judge inquired:

     All right. We have a 
second degree murder charge. What is the nature of the defense here?

     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: 
Well, the basic nature is that I don't believe that the State can prove second 
degree. It can maybe prove manslaughter, but -

     THE COURT: So you're 
putting the State to their proof on the charge?

     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: 
Yes.

     THE COURT: Why don't 
you think - you think one of the elements of second degree is missing here 
apparently. I suppose it's maliciously or purposely.

     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The 
purposely more than anything.

The county 
attorney responded when the district court asked:

What does the State 
contend happened here?

     [COUNTY ATTORNEY]: Well, basically that 
the defendant and the deceased were arguing, and that he pulled his pistol out 
of a drawer there in the dining area, cocked it and shot her between the 
eyes.

     THE COURT: This 
occurred over in Hudson as I recall.

     [COUNTY ATTORNEY]: 
That's correct.

     THE COURT: These 
people weren't married, though, but they were living together?

     [COUNTY ATTORNEY]: 
That's correct.

     THE COURT: All right. 
And had been living in Hudson for some time?

     [COUNTY ATTORNEY]: 
Yes.

     THE COURT: Was there 
alcohol involved?

     [COUNTY ATTORNEY]: At 
some point in the evening, the defendant was drinking. I don't know when for 
sure.

[¶13]  As to witnesses, the district court 
asked:

     THE COURT: The State 
has filed a list of witnesses and exhibits. Have you got such a list prepared, 
[defense counsel]?

     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I 
thought that I filed - oh. No, I didn't file one because the only other witness 
besides the witnesses that they have that I might possibly call would be my 
client, at least at this time. Our investigator was working on the case and then 
she took off for two weeks and so she hasn't got back with me with a final 
report yet. But I don't anticipate that we will need more witnesses than this, 
because for instance, they have my client's sister and her husband listed, and 
they would be two of our primary witnesses, but the State's already listed them. 
So we have no other witnesses other than what's already been listed by the 
State.

[¶14]   As the session concluded, the 
district court asked:

Mr. Bearpaw, do you have 
any questions?

     THE DEFENDANT: If I 
have any questions later, I can talk to [Defense counsel].

     THE COURT: Okay. 
That's always the best advice is to talk to your attorney.

[¶15]   The next entry in the record, 
except for an order of district court judge reassignment and Bearpaw's two 
proposed instructions, is a letter from Bearpaw addressed to the initial 
district court judge. The letter, dated July 6, 1989, fifteen days after the 
pre-trial conference and eleven days before trial, stated:

     I Stan Bearpaw do not 
want to go to trial with [Defense Counsel] as my lawyer[.] I do not believe he 
will even try to prove my innocence. I've been in jail 126 days and maybe talked 
to him 20 min. in all that time. He either has a soccer game to go to or when he 
said he would come by he never would. I have nothing against this man but I 
don't believe he will with all his ability try to prove my innocence. You asked 
me in court at the arraignment if he was sati[s]factory I said yes cause [sic] I 
thought he might change but he still leaves me in the dark. I myself know what 
happened was a auful [sic] accident and I don't feel [Defense Counsel] will try 
his best in court. This is my life and my future at stake and I don't want to 
take any unnessary [sic] chances. I would like to have another laywer [sic]. I 
have met Donna Sears from Sear Law Offices and, would like to request her to 
take over my case.

Sincerely

/s/ Stan W. 
Bearpaw

Seven days later 
and four days before trial, a further letter to the district court judge was 
written:3 

     Today is the first 
time my lawyer [Defense Counsel] has talked to me in detail about my defence 
[sic] and about witnesses for my defence [sic], I went over statements and 
evidence. I don't feel going over evidence and just now getting to see my lawyer 
about my case and trying to get witnesses three days before trial is enough 
time. I ask the court to put off my trial for a later date so we can notify my 
witnesses[] and they will have time to get to Wy.

     I have not talked to 
my lawyer long enough to know if I want him to represent me at my trial. This is 
the second of 2 letters I have written you. Have not had an answer to the 
first.

Sincerely

/s/ Stan W. 
Bearpaw

No motions for 
defensive purposes had been filed, including either a motion to suppress or a 
motion for change of venue.

[¶16]   The trial convened on July 17, 1989 
at 1:30 p.m. The jury was impaneled (proceedings not transcribed) and voir dire 
completed (proceedings not transcribed), followed by the testimony of the first 
two witnesses during the afternoon before the trial recessed at 5:10 p.m. The 
State completed its testimony by four additional witnesses during the next day. 
In chambers, Bearpaw advised the district court that he elected not to testify 
and the defense then presented no evidence in his behalf of any kind, including 
character witnesses or psychiatric review. Preparation of instructions was 
completed that afternoon (not reported) and the next morning, the jury was 
instructed (not transcribed) and closing argument made (not transcribed).4

[¶17]   The only interruption in the 
expeditious progress of the proceeding was a request of the jury to have the 
forty-five page interview, which was the sole evidence of the occurrence, 
available for their perusal during deliberation. This request was denied. Two 
additional questions regarding the relationship of manslaughter and murder were 
presented at 4:00 p.m. with the guilty verdict then announced at 5:00 p.m. A 
sentence of twenty to thirty years followed after a presentence investigation 
report was prepared.

[¶18]   The record then reflects a Notice 
of Appeal filed August 24, 1989, which stated:

     COMES NOW Defendant 
and hereby gives his Notice Of Appeal to that Judgment And Sentence entered by 
the [District Court] on the 16th day of August, 1989, and filed on the 18th day 
of August, 1989. This Appeal is taken to the Wyoming Supreme Court.

     Concurrently herewith 
Defendant has ordered a transcript from * * *, Court Reporter and has filed a 
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis pursuant to Rule 10.06 W.R.A.P.

A Motion for 
Leave to Proceed on Appeal in Forma Pauperis was also filed and 
stated:

     COMES NOW the 
above-named Defendant, by and through his appointed counsel, and respectfully 
moves this Court for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The Defendant seeks 
leave to proceed in forma pauperis as to all costs and fees of the appeal, 
including attorney's fees, court costs, and costs of the record and transcript 
on appeal.

[¶19]   A designation of the record 
pursuant to W.R.A.P. 4.02 was not made by trial counsel for Bearpaw. Following 
receipt of the "record for appeal" consisting of one volume in the 
clerk's office of this court, appellate counsel for the office of the public 
defender filed a motion entitled Motion to Supplement Record and Stay Running of 
Time for Filing of Brief, which stated:

     COMES NOW, the 
Appellant, by and through his counsel and respectfully moves this court for an 
order allowing supplementation of the record and staying the running of time for 
filing of Appellant's brief until said transcript is filed.

     In support of said 
motion, counsel for Appellant respectfully states:

     1. On October 7, 1989 
[sic (mailed 29 September, 1989)], counsel received notification of the filing 
of the record in the case of Bearpaw v. State, No. 89-214.

     2. On October 4, 1989, 
counsel picked up the record.

     3. A subsequent 
examination of the record revealed that Mr. Bearpaw was convicted of second 
degree murder after a jury trial.

     4. Further examination 
revealed that the record contained no transcript of the trial proceedings but 
rather contained only a transcript of an in chambers hearing concerning jury 
questions to the trial judge.

     5. Given the severity 
of the charge; the facts that Appellant was sentenced to 20 to 30 years in 
prison and the preclusive effect of failing to raise an issue on appeal, counsel 
for * * * Appellant feels that it is absolutely essential that a transcript of 
the proceedings be reviewed prior to preparation of the brief.

     WHEREFORE, counsel for 
Appellant respectfully requests that this court issue an order allowing 
supplementation of the record; setting a deadline for filing of the transcripts 
of November 17, 1989; and staying the running of the 30 days for filing of 
Appellant's brief until such time as the supplemental material is 
filed.

[¶20]   This court entered an order of 
October 18, 1989 granting the motion to supplement the record and stay the 
running of time for filing the brief which stated:

     The above captioned 
matter coming before the court upon the appellant's Motion to Supplement Record 
and Stay Running of Time for Filing of Brief and the court finding sufficient 
cause, it is therefore

     ORDERED that the 
record on appeal of this case be supplemented by the inclusion of the 
transcripts of all trial court proceedings and so supplemented and certified by 
November 17, 1989, pursuant to Rule 4.04, W.R.A.P.; and, it is 
further

     ORDERED that the time 
in which the appellant's brief is scheduled to be filed is hereby extended to 
thirty (30) days after the record is supplemented and certified and filed with 
this court.

It was then 
determined in communication between this court and counsel that the text of the 
interview had not been reported and was available only as an exhibit - then 
unlocated; that extensive off-the-record exchanges had occurred; and that the 
voir dire, opening statements and closing arguments had been reported but not 
transcribed. Initially, other trial evidence had not been transcribed, but was 
subsequently transcribed after an order from this court. A supplemental filing 
was made which included that transcript and a deposit of exhibits which had not 
been delivered. After having been discovered, the interview text, Exhibit 19, 
was filed on January 23, 1990.

[¶21]   On January 8, 1990, Bearpaw's 
counsel renewed his motion to supplement:

     COMES NOW, the 
Appellant, Stan W. Bearpaw, through his counsel and respectfully moves this 
Court for an Order to allow supplementation of the record with the following 
materials: 1) A transcript of voir dire; 2) a transcript of opening and closing 
statements; 3) all exhibits, including but not limited to a) a transcript of the 
in-custody interview with the Appellant which was read to the jury but not 
recorded b) a copy of the written statement signed by Appellant.

     In support of said 
motion counsel for Appellant respectfully states:

     1. The Appellant 
stands convicted of second degree murder.

     2. As originally 
received, the only transcript of the trial proceedings consisted of a five (5) 
page transcript of an in-camera hearing concerning jury questions. 

     3. Counsel filed a 
Motion requesting that this record be supplemented with a transcript of all 
trial proceedings.

     4. On October 17, 
1989, this Court ordered that: "the record on appeal of this case be 
supplemented by the inclusion of the transcripts of all trial court 
proceedings." * * *

     5. Although vior [sic] 
dire and opening and closing statements were recorded, these proceedings were 
not transcribed "pursuant to direction of counsel." * * *

6. At trial a transcript 
of an in-custody statement was read to the jury but was not 
recorded.

     7. A written statement 
of the Appellant was offered as an exhibit.

     8. The exhibits in 
this case were not received by the Clerk of the Wyoming Supreme 
Court.

     9. There is no 
designation of the record in the record.

     10. There were no 
witnesses other than the Appellant to the alleged homicide.

     11. Based on counsel's 
reading of the record as it now exists it appears that the inclusion of the rest 
of the trial court proceedings is necessary to a just determination of this 
case.

     WHEREFORE, counsel for 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court order that transcripts of vior 
[sic] dire and opening and closing statements be prepared by January 23, 1990 
and that these transcripts and all exhibits in the case be supplemented to the 
record.

     FURTHER, counsel 
respectfully requests that Appellant's brief be due seven (7) days after the 
supplemented material is certified and field [sic] with this Court.

[¶22]   The transcript stated:

     AFTERNOON SESSION, 
MONDAY, JULY 17, 1989

     THE COURT: Good 
afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

     (Veniremen, having 
been summoned, were sworn, interrogated, and a jury of twelve was duly impaneled 
and sworn. The voir dire was reported and is not herein transcribed, pursuant to 
direction of ordering counsel.)

     (Whereupon, the Court 
read the preliminary instruction to the jury.)

     (Whereupon, opening 
statements of counsel for the State and Defendant were made and reported but are 
not herein transcribed, pursuant to direction of ordering counsel.)

     THE COURT: You may 
call your first witness.

* * * * * *

     (Whereupon, the Court 
read the jury charge to the jury.)

     (Whereupon, [County 
Attorney] gave a closing argument on behalf of the State, which was reported, 
but not here transcribed pursuant to direction of ordering counsel.)

     (Whereupon, [Defense 
Counsel] gave a closing argument on behalf of the defendant, which was reported, 
but not here transcribed pursuant to direction of ordering counsel.)

     (Whereupon, [County 
Attorney] gave a closing rebuttal argument on behalf of the State, which was 
reported, but not here transcribed pursuant to direction of ordering 
counsel.)

Nothing was 
filed of record which supported a designation of less than the complete record. 
It was also determined that the tape which had been taken during the trial had 
been erased and that a transcript of impaneling, voir dire, opening statements 
and closing arguments could not be obtained since the basic source of material 
had been destroyed by the court reporter following whatever exchange had 
occurred between himself and trial counsel about the requested 
transcript.

[¶23]   Following receipt of original 
briefs, this appeal was reassigned from the Supreme Court expedited docket to 
the oral argument docket with a request for additional briefing 
stating:

     This case was assigned 
to the expedited docket and came on regularly before the court; and the court 
having reviewed the briefs, record and files, finds that the parties should 
provide additional briefs upon the effect of failure to designate the entire 
record, inability now to supply the entire record, and whether appellant had 
effective assistance of counsel; the court further finds that this case should 
be reassigned to the argument docket; wherefore, it is hereby

     ORDERED that 
appellant, on or before 20 days from the date of this order, and appellee, 
within 15 days thereafter, shall file their additional briefs presenting their 
positions upon the effect of failure to designate the entire record, inability 
now to present the entire record in this case, and whether appellant had 
effective assistance of trial counsel; it is

     FURTHER ORDERED that 
this case is reassigned to the argument docket for hearing after briefing is 
complete.[5]

[¶24]   As a result of supplemental 
briefing, a broad collection of ineffectiveness and procedural issues were 
created, including the quandary whether recreation of the record pursuant to 
W.R.A.P. 4.036 might be satisfactory at that time. 
The difficulty with any mutually agreed settlement of the record would involve 
self-justification by the trial counsel who initially failed to file an adequate 
designation of the record.

[¶25]   Items of concern within the 
historical facts of this homicide from the standpoint of defense for which 
present review is not possible could include general criminal trial issues of 
unintended occurrence and intoxication among others.

III. DISCUSSION OF 
INADEQUATE RECORD

[¶26]   This court cannot rationally 
analyze the merits of any potential defense within the concepts of adequacy of 
representation without a comprehensive record. We conclude that at least some of 
the questions do require resolution before we can determine that a fair trial 
was held. Because we cannot make that determination, this case is remanded for 
retrial.

[¶27]   The controlling Wyoming decision 
requiring a retrial where a complete and adequate transcript is not available is 
Richardson v. State, 15 Wyo. 465, 89 P. 1027 (1907). The facts of Richardson 
have a remarkable similarity except for its death penalty homicide conviction. 
In that case, the court reporter lost some of his notes and could not provide a 
complete record upon which an adequate bill of exception, then constituting the 
Wyoming appellate process, could be prepared. See Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Cr.App. 1989).

[¶28]   Although sufficiency of the 
evidence was a significant issue, also in contention without record for review 
was "alleged error in overruling the defendant's challenge of one of the jurors 
for cause." Richardson, 89 P.  at 1034-35.

[¶29]   In its early years, this court 
determined "[t]here is no more reason for permitting a party to be deprived of 
his legal rights through a failure or a refusal of the official stenographer to 
perform his duties than through the failure or refusal of the judge or any other 
officer of the court to perform a duty imposed by law." Id. at 1030. The court 
recognized an absolute right of appeal in a criminal case and the corollary 
right to be provided a complete record. Otherwise, the court noted, the 
defendant is effectively deprived of the right of appeal. Richardson held that a 
new trial is required when a necessary record is absent.7

[¶30]   The rule of Richardson regarding 
irreplaceable and missing record was followed in State v. Thomas, 38 Wyo. 72, 
264 P. 1017 (1928), when the trial court determined that an exchange during 
trial directed by the trial court not to be reported, and was not reported to 
which exception was immediately taken, constituted reversible error. Richardson 
was quoted as controlling precedent with approval in granting a new 
trial:

The grave point before us 
on this assignment of error is that we are asked to review that part of a record 
which the defendant, through no fault of his own or his counsel, was prevented 
by the action of the trial court from making. It would seem that the appellate 
jurisdiction of this court is affected.

Thomas, 264 P. 
at 1020.

[¶31]   No more recent cases are available 
in this jurisdiction which may serve to limit the Richardson rule. Comparable 
authorities from other jurisdiction are supporting and illustrative of the 
continued national vitality of the Richardson principle. The necessity of a 
complete record for appeal including voir dire was mostly recently recognized by 
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in the capital murder case of Hernandez v. 
State, 785 S.W.2d 825 (Tex.Cr. App. 1990). That court said "[v]iolations of 
[the] mandatory language [of the Texas Rules of Appeal] are not subject to a 
harmless error analysis." Id. at 826-27. See, likewise, the rule that a 
mandatory requirement for the court reporter to record all proceedings in a 
criminal case establishes a principle which cannot be overridden by any local 
practice, United States v. Brumley, 560 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1977). That court, 
in quoting United States v. Selva, 559 F.2d 1303, 1306 (5th Cir. 1977), 
emphasized that "`[w]hen . . . a criminal defendant is represented on appeal by 
counsel other than the attorney at trial, the absence of a substantial and 
significant portion . . . of the record' will result in a presumption of 
prejudice sufficient to mandate reversal * * *." Brumley, 560 F.2d  at 
1281.

[¶32]   The Oklahoma courts are in 
agreement:

     The Court therefore 
finds that due to the illness of said court reporter, it is impossible for him 
to complete the record of evidence in the District Court; and it is therefore 
impossible for defendant to provide this Court with the record and testimony in 
this case; and that counsel asserts by affidavit that it is impossible for him 
to provide such testimony from memory.

     We have repeatedly 
held that where a timely request for a record has been made and through no fault 
of the defendant the record cannot be prepared or certified by the court 
reporter a new trial will be granted.

Colwell v. 
State, 477 P.2d 398, 399 (Okla. Cr. 1969). Accord Cole v. United States, 478 A.2d 277 (D.C.App. 1984); Emerson v. State, 664 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. App. 1984); and 
People v. Adkins, 461 N.W.2d 366 (Mich. 1990). Here, if explanation is directed 
to the action of the counsel for Bearpaw, an ineffectiveness of counsel 
constitutional rights violation is created. Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135 (Wyo. 
1986); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 
(1984).

[¶33]   Reversed and remanded for 
retrial.

THOMAS, 
J., 
concurred in the result only.

CARDINE, 
J., 
specially concurred and dissented in part.

CARDINE, Justice, specially 
concurring and dissenting in part.

[¶34]  Since this case came here on appeal, our 
rules have been amended to specifically require the transcripts in criminal 
cases to consist of all proceedings. W.R.A.P. 4.01 was amended effective July 
10, 1990, to include this paragraph:

"Transcripts in criminal 
cases shall consist of all proceedings held in open court including but not 
limited to voir dire, opening statements and final arguments, conferences with 
the presiding judge in open court and in the court chambers, in addition to the 
testimony of the case and other required materials."

Before this 
amendment the reporting of voir dire, opening statements and final argument was 
upon request of counsel and not required as part of the record on appeal. These 
were reported here but deliberately not ordered by Bearpaw's trial counsel when 
filing his notice of appeal. The court reporter, upon being advised these 
portions of the trial were not required for appeal, destroyed them. After the 
destruction, Bearpaw's appellate counsel asked for their inclusion in the 
record.

[¶35]   Although I foresee that this case 
may ultimately be remanded, the majority is premature in now reversing and 
ordering a new trial. In arriving at this result, the court ignores the correct 
procedure which requires the parties to recreate the record pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
4.03. The refusal of this court to again abide by its own rules is found in the 
following sentence:

"The difficulty with any 
mutually agreed settlement of the record [is that it] would involve 
self-justification by the trial counsel who initially failed to file an adequate 
designation of the record." Maj. opin. at 15-16.

Besides lacking 
any basis for this statement, I cannot comprehend why any "self-justification by 
the trial counsel" would necessarily make recreation of the record a problem. 
First, it is probable that the trial counsel concluded that error did not occur 
in the voir dire, opening statement or final argument portions of the trial. 
Second, the record can only be settled by agreement of the prosecuting attorney, 
defense attorney, and the court. Although settlement of the record may be 
difficult, it is not impossible. Most in the legal profession, whether fresh out 
of law school or weathered from years of practice, are thick-skinned enough to 
prevent criticism from impeding them in performing a court-mandated 
responsibility. An opportunity to settle the record should have been afforded 
counsel in this case.

[¶36]   A closer reading of the case upon 
which the court relies to require a new trial at this time reveals error now 
being made. In Richardson v. State, 15 Wyo. 465, 485, 89 P. 1027, 1034 (1907), 
we said:

"Incidental to the power 
to compel a correct record to be sent up, or a bill of exceptions to be settled, 
is the power, as it seems to us, of ordering a new trial of the cause, where 
it is made to appear that the only record in the cause has been destroyed 
without the possibility of substitution * * *." (emphasis added)

This statement 
embraces the very purpose of W.R.A.P. 4.03. A statement of the evidence and the 
proceedings approved by the parties and court in the manner dictated by the rule 
can be an "adequate substitute[], equally as good as a transcript." Draper v. 
Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 495, 83 S. Ct. 774, 779, 9 L. Ed. 2d 899 
(1963).

[¶37]   Furthermore, we have considered 
cases involving incomplete transcripts subsequent to Richardson with differing 
results. In State v. Riggle, 76 Wyo. 1, 298 P.2d 349 (1956), cert. denied 352 U.S. 981, 77 S. Ct. 384, 1 L. Ed. 2d 366 (1957), the appellant, facing capital 
punishment, challenged his conviction, inter alia, on grounds that the 
court reporter had not attended the proceedings after the case was sent to the 
jury. This court found no error because it was not necessary for a reporter to 
be in attendance after the parties rest. 298 P.2d  at 370.

[¶38]   Although Riggle is arguably 
distinguishable in that appellant's counsel acquiesced in the reporter's 
absence, a more contemporary case details the consequences of not attempting to 
reconstruct the record. In Petersen v. State, 594 P.2d 978 (Wyo. 1979), 
appellant's trial for driving while under the influence was recorded 
electronically using cassette tapes. While preparing to appeal his conviction, 
it was discovered that one of the cassette tapes was defective and unusable. 
This court held that while the rule which preceded W.R.A.P. 4.03 was permissive, 
failure to use the procedure may adversely affect the appeal. Id. at 980. We 
then said that when a defendant makes no attempt to settle a record, we will not 
consider an issue that could be raised had the defendant done so. 
Id.

[¶39]   In Bearpaw's case, this court 
ignores the purpose of W.R.A.P. 4.03 in granting Bearpaw a new trial without 
having to identify what potential error occurred during voir dire, opening 
statement or argument and then attempting settlement of the record. If an 
attempt to settle the record were unsuccessful, then Bearpaw should have to show 
that the missing portion of the record is "substantial and critical" before a 
new trial would be ordered. United States v. Pilling, 721 F.2d 286, 296 (10th 
Cir. 1983). See also United States v. Smaldone, 583 F.2d 1129, 1133-34 (10th 
Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 1073, 99 S. Ct. 846, 59 L. Ed. 2d 40 
(1979).

[¶40]   I would require that the parties 
first proceed as outlined above.

 FOOTNOTES

1 Stan W. Bearpaw, age 
thirty-two, an Oklahoma Cherokee Indian, was born in Los Angeles, California. He 
had four children by a previous relationship and had lived with the victim for 
about two years. A baby son was born from their association. A couple of years 
before the date of this occurrence, he had followed his mother to the Wind River 
Shoshoni/Arapahoe Indian Reservation in central Wyoming where an older sister 
lived.

2 Bearpaw did not testify 
at trial and whatever is demonstrable from the present evidence, consisting 
essentially of the record of his rambling explanation during that night to the 
sheriff's officers, there is no other evidence except inference from result of 
firearm firing and shooting death to establish intent to commit a homicide or to 
do any serious physical harm to his two-month old son's mother. The statement 
recorded by the officers lends credence to the possibility that he really did 
not know himself what, why or how it happened.

3 The subject of these 
letters regarding sufficiency of counsel came up on the second day of 
trial:

     THE COURT: Okay. On 
the record. We're in chambers out of the presence of the jury. Both counsel and 
the defendant are present. There [are] two issues that need to be addressed. The 
first thing is the issue of what we were going to do with the statements that 
Mr. Bearpaw has made to the investigators in this case. And where we stand at 
the moment is that the 45 page transcript of the tape recorded interview has 
been admitted into evidence.

     [Defense Counsel], I 
understand that you would like the entire 45 page transcript read to the jury at 
this point.

     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: 
That's correct, Your Honor.

     THE COURT: And [County 
Attorney] would rather ask questions of the investigator from the transcript in 
an order which you choose.

     [COUNTY ATTORNEY]: 
That's correct.

     THE COURT: I've reflected on this for a 
bit and I think that if I'm going to error I'm going to error on the side of 
[Defense Counsel] out of an abundance of caution, so at this point I want to 
have it read in its entirety to the jury.

     Who should read it? 
[Defense Counsel], who do you want to read it or, [County Attorney], what's your 
position?

     [COUNTY ATTORNEY]: I 
suppose that I could read the part of Investigator Coppock and he could read the 
part of the defendant.

     THE COURT: Is that 
satisfactory with you, [Defense counsel]?

     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: 
That's fine, Your Honor.

     THE COURT: Okay. And 
then, [County Attorney], after that I think you would be permitted to ask your 
questions of the investigator as to what the defendant's demeanor was with 
regard to any particular part of it. It may take a while to get through this, 
but I think out of an abundance of caution that's the way I want to proceed. So 
that takes care of the first issue.

     The second issue, Mr. 
Bearpaw, I was recently assigned this case and I got the case file in my office 
in Jackson last week. And then when I came here yesterday I saw a letter in the 
file. They placed it in the file after I brought it back here; you had written 
to Judge Kail, and I don't remember the date of the letter. The case file's in 
the courtroom. But you said in the letter, in essence, that you didn't want to 
be represented by [Defense Counsel] and that you wanted to be represented by 
another lady, I guess her name was Dean, or something of that 
nature.

     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: 
Donna Sears.

     THE COURT: Sears. 
Okay. And then I had spoken with [Defense Counsel] and [County Attorney] on the 
phone last week, and [Defense Counsel] indicated to me he didn't think there 
were any problems with his representing you in this matter and I thought that 
was laid to rest. And then this morning when we came in from the recess there's 
a letter dated July 13, 1989, apparently in your handwriting and your signature 
addressed to Judge Kail saying that you wanted to put off your trial until a 
later date. What's your position with regard to these matters now?

      MR. BEARPAW: On 
that, me and [Defense Counsel] discussed that already, and it was just that I 
didn't really get to speak with him, you know. I didn't, you know, know enough 
to really know who he was to represent me.

     And on the - as far as 
the delay and the trial, you know, I didn't get to see no evidence or anything 
or discuss witnesses for a while. I didn't really care, you know, my own 
outcome. But for my son, you know, I thought I would fight this the best way you 
can. This is all new to me, so I just needed time to get to know [Defense 
Counsel] and see exactly where we stand on this because I didn't know too 
much.

     THE COURT: Okay. Well, 
we're almost a full day into the trial now and [Defense Counsel]'s representing 
you. The law on that is -

     MR. BEARPAW: I have no 
problem with [Defense Counsel] representing me.

     THE COURT: Okay. So 
you're satisfied with his representation?

     MR. BEARPAW: 
Yes.

     THE COURT: And at this 
point being into the trial now it would be very difficult to delay it or 
something. We're going over the evidence very carefully. Are you satisfied with 
that set up?

     MR. BEARPAW: Yes. It 
was just that I was afraid. This whole trial and everything is, you know, 
nothing I've been through before.

     THE COURT: 
Yes.

     MR. BEARPAW: I just 
don't want to take no chances with my future.

     THE COURT: Okay. So 
you've talked with [Defense Counsel] then about proceeding with the 
trial?

     MR. BEARPAW: 
Yes.

     THE COURT: And you're 
satisfied we can go ahead and proceed with the trial?

     MR. BEARPAW: Yes, 
sir.

     THE COURT: All right. 
Either counsel want to say anything for the record at this time?

     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, 
Your Honor.

     COUNTY ATTORNEY]: No, 
Your Honor.

4 This court's admonition 
in Valdez v. State, 727 P.2d 277, 279 (Wyo. 1986) that "the waiver of a court 
reporter in any portion of the criminal trial is, at best, procedurally risky," 
had gone unheeded.

5 At the time of the 
supplemental briefing request, this court adopted an amendment to W.R.A.P. 4.01, 
which states in part:

Transcripts in criminal 
cases shall consist of all proceedings held in open court including but not 
limited to voir dire, opening statements and final arguments, conferences with 
the presiding judge in open court and in the court chambers, in addition to the 
testimony of the case and other required materials.

6 W.R.A.P. 4.03 
states:

If no report of the 
evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is 
unavailable, the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or 
proceedings from the best available means, including his recollection. The 
statement shall be served on the appellee, who may serve objections or propose 
amendments thereto within ten (10) days after service. Thereupon the statement 
and any objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted to the district 
court for settlement and approval and as settled and approved shall be included 
by the clerk of the district court in the record on appeal.

7 Sole blame in this case 
is not assessed against the court reporter since he probably did act upon 
undocumented instructions. Participants in the state court criminal proceedings 
should never forget that separate review in the federal court system is always 
possible and, if there is an incomplete record, it would likely turn out to be, 
at the very least, embarrassing to the entire state judicial system.