Case Title: Christie v. Lucas

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-8-00

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Zazzali, J., writing for a unanimous Court. The issue in this appeal is whether plaintiff's malpractice action was subject to the Affidavit of Merit statute (AMS), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27, which took effect on June 29, 1995. Plaintiff Robert Christie retained an attorney, Robert Jeney, to pursue three claims on his behalf. Christie contends that Jeney negligently allowed the statute of limitations to run on the state-court defamation claim, failed to properly serve and plead a federal civil-rights claim, and failed to answer discovery requests in a state-court contract claim. Christie obtained new counsel, defendant Walter Lucas, and filed a three-count malpractice complaint against Jeney in December 1995. In May 1996, Jeney answered the complaint and demanded that Christie serve an affidavit of merit pursuant to the AMS. Christie failed to do so. After the complaint was amended in January 1997, Jeney answered and again demanded an affidavit of merit. None was provided. In April 1997, Jeney moved to dismiss the action for failing to satisfy the AMS. In response, Christie submitted an affidavit of merit. The Law Division denied Jeney's motion to dismiss, concluding that dismissals under the AMS were to be without prejudice and finding that such a remedy would serve no purpose in this case. In July 1997, the Appellate Division issued its decision in Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 313 N.J. Super. 81 (App. Div. 1997), and held, among other things, that dismissals under the AMS were to be with prejudice. Relying on that decision, Jeney moved for reconsideration of the Law Division's order. This Court, however, stayed the Appellate Division's decision in Cornblatt. Because of the stay, the Law Division denied Jeney's motion for reconsideration. In March 1998, this Court affirmed the portion of Cornblatt that held dismissals under the AMS were to be with prejudice. Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218 (1998). Jeney moved again for reconsideration of the Law Division's denial of his motion to dismiss. In June 1998, the Law Division concluded that the applicability of the AMS to Christie's complaint depended on the date of accrual of the claims. Finding that Christie's claims against Jeney accrued after the effective date of the AMS, the Law Division concluded that the statute applied to the claims against Jeney and, therefore, Christie's failure to provide a timely affidavit of merit required dismissal of the claims with prejudice. Christie then filed a second amended complaint adding as a defendant Walter Lucas, Christie's attorney in the action against Jeney. The amended complaint alleged that Lucas negligently failed to provide an affidavit of merit, leading to the dismissal of that action. By motion, Lucas challenged the June 1998 Law Division order dismissing Christie's complaint against Jeney. The Law Division denied the motion. The Appellate Division denied leave to appeal. HELD: The critical inquiry under the AMS is whether the actual conduct underlying the claim took place before the effective date of the statute. Jeney's actions in respect of Christie's three claims primarily occurred before the effective date of the AMS; therefore, the statute did not apply. 1. The AMS provided for an effective date of June 29, 1995, and stated that it would apply to causes of action which occur on or after that date. Although the Appellate Division's Cornblatt opinion construed the statute to apply to causes of action that are filed after the effective date, this Court reversed and held that the AMS applies only to those cases the underlying legally-significant facts of which happen, arise, or take place on or after the effective date of the statute. (Pp. 5-8). 2. Here, the Law Division interpreted this Court's definition of occur in our Cornblatt decision to be identical to the accrual date of the cause of action. Otherwise, the Law Division reasoned, courts would be required to make factual determinations about what proportion of the legally-significant facts occurring after the effect date of the statute is sufficient to trigger the affidavit requirement. The Law Division reasoned further that such determinations could result in inconsistent applications of the AMS. (Pp. 8-10). 3. This Court's Cornblatt decision did not decide whether occur means accrue, but held only that occur does not mean filed. The Court finds that the Legislature did not intend occur to mean accrue. Had the Legislature intended to make the accrual date dispositive, it would have employed the term accrual rather than occur. The Legislature's use of the word occur demonstrates that it intended to make the applicability of the AMS turn on the material facts and conduct underlying the cause of action, rather than on the legal construct of accrual. In respect of the Law Division's conclusion that using the accrual date is preferable because otherwise courts will have to engage in fact-sensitive analysis on a case-by-case basis, such an analysis will be necessary regardless of whether accrual or legally-significant facts is the governing standard. Moreover, the possible complexity of application is insufficient to override the statute's plain language. (Pp. 10 to 13). 4. As the Law Division recognized, the allegations of attorney malpractice almost entirely refer to conduct of Jeney before June 29, 1995. Therefore, the AMS does not apply to Christie's claims against Jeney. (Pp. 13-17). The judgment under review is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG and LaVECCHIA join in JUSTICE ZAZZALI's opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO did not participate. ROBERT CHRISTIE and SPOTLIGHT PRODUCTIONS, INC., Plaintiffs, v. ROBERT J. JENEY, JR., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent, and WALTER LUCAS, ESQ., Defendant-Appellant, and LAW OFFICE OF WALTER LUCAS, and LUCAS, SAVITS and MAROSE, LLC., Defendants, and CHRISTOPHER PATELLA, ESQ., and PATELLA & PLAIA, Defendants and Third- Party Defendants. On appeal from the Superior Court, Law Division, Somerset County. Robert B. Hille argued the cause for appellant (Contant, Scherby & Atkins, attorneys; Christina A. Stoneburner, on the letter brief). Meredith Kaplan Stoma argued the cause for respondent (Morgan, Melhuish, Monaghan, Arvidson, Abrutyn & Lisowski, attorneys; Elise Dinolfo, on the brief). The opinion of the Court was delivered by ZAZZALI, J. In 1995, the Legislature enacted the Affidavit of Merit statute (AMS), which provides that [t]his act shall take effect immediately [June 29, 1995] and shall apply to causes of action which occur on or after the effective date of this act. L. 1995, c. 139, 5 (emphasis added). In Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218 (1998), we rejected the contention that occur means that the statute applied to all actions filed after the effective date. In this case, we must determine whether occur means that the statute applies to all actions that accrued after the effective date. We conclude that occur does not mean accrue, and that the critical inquiry is whether the actual conduct underlying the claim took place before the effective date of the AMS. Because in this case that conduct primarily occurred before the effective date, we reverse and remand. NO. A-8 ROBERT CHRISTIE and SPOTLIGHT PRODUCTIONS, INC., Plaintiffs, v. ROBERT J. JENEY, JR., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent, and WALTER LUCAS, ESQ., Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED May 15, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz