Case Title: Miller v. Dept. of Corrections

Citation: 

Docket Number: S114097

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed 7/18/05 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
EDNA MILLER et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
S114097 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C 040262 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al., ) 
 
 
) 
Sacramento County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 99AS03354 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiffs, two former employees at the Valley State Prison for Women, 
claim that the warden of the prison at which they were employed accorded 
unwarranted favorable treatment to numerous female employees with whom the 
warden was having sexual affairs, and that such conduct constituted sexual 
harassment in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act 
(FEHA).  (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.)  The trial court granted summary judgment 
in favor of defendants, concluding that the conduct in question did not support a 
claim of sexual harassment, and the Court of Appeal affirmed.  We must 
determine whether, in light of the evidence presented in support of and in 
opposition to the summary judgment motion, the lower courts properly found that 
plaintiffs failed to present a prima facie case of sexual harassment under the 
FEHA. 
For the reasons explained below, we conclude that, although an isolated 
instance of favoritism on the part of a supervisor toward a female employee with 
 
 
2
whom the supervisor is conducting a consensual sexual affair ordinarily would not 
constitute sexual harassment, when such sexual favoritism in a workplace is 
sufficiently widespread it may create an actionable hostile work environment in 
which the demeaning message is conveyed to female employees that they are 
viewed by management as “sexual playthings” or that the way required for women 
to get ahead in the workplace is by engaging in sexual conduct with their 
supervisors or the management.  We further conclude that, contrary to the Court of 
Appeal’s determination, the evidence presented in the summary judgment 
proceedings was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment 
under the appropriate legal standard, and thus that the Court of Appeal erred in 
affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants.  
Accordingly, we shall reverse the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeal.   
I 
On June 15, 1999, plaintiffs Edna Miller and Frances Mackey1 brought this 
action against the California Department of Corrections (Department), the Valley 
State Prison for Women, Cal Terhune as Director of the Department, and various 
unnamed persons (all of whom shall be referred to collectively as the Department 
or defendants).  In their first cause of action, Miller and Mackey alleged that 
during their employment with the Department, they were subjected to sexual 
discrimination and harassment in violation of the FEHA.  They also alleged that 
                                              
1  
Having been informed that plaintiff Frances Mackey died in 2003, we have 
substituted her son Sterling Odom as a party in his capacity as personal 
representative of her estate.  We have designated plaintiff Edna Miller as the lead 
plaintiff and have retitled the case accordingly.  
 
 
3
defendants retaliated against them for complaining about the discrimination and 
harassment.2 
On August 17, 2001, the trial court granted defendants’ motion for 
summary adjudication of issues with respect to plaintiff Miller, except as to her 
claim for disability discrimination.  The court also granted summary judgment in 
favor of defendants with respect to plaintiff Mackey.  Miller voluntarily dismissed 
her complaint as to her remaining cause of action for disability discrimination, and 
judgment was entered in favor of defendants.  This appeal followed. 
The declarations, deposition transcripts, and other evidence submitted in 
support of and in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment and for 
summary adjudication of issues disclose the following facts. 
A 
Plaintiff Edna Miller began working for the Department as a correctional 
officer in 1983.  In 1994, while she was employed at the Central California 
Women’s Facility (CCWF), she heard from other employees of the Department 
that the chief deputy warden of the facility, Lewis Kuykendall, was having sexual 
affairs with his secretary, Kathy Bibb, and with another subordinate, associate 
warden Debbie Patrick.  In her declaration, Miller stated that she often heard 
Kuykendall at work arguing with Patrick concerning his relationship with Bibb.  
Another Department employee at CCWF, Cagie Brown, told Miller that she, too, 
was having an affair with Kuykendall.  Brown admitted in her deposition that her 
affair with Kuykendall began at CCWF in 1994.  
                                              
2  
The other causes of action were for sexual discrimination in violation of 
public policy, retaliation in violation of public policy, disability discrimination in 
violation of the FEHA and public policy (Miller), negligent retention and 
promotion, invasion of privacy, assault and battery (Miller), false imprisonment 
(Miller), defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.   
 
 
4
In 1994, plaintiff Miller complained to Kuykendall’s superior officer at the 
CCWF, Warden Tina Farmon, about what she considered the “inappropriate 
situation” created by Kuykendall’s relationships with Bibb, Brown, and Patrick.  
Farmon informed Miller that she had addressed the issue.   
In February 1995, the Department transferred plaintiff Miller to the Valley 
State Prison for Women (VSPW), where Kuykendall now served as warden.  In 
May 1995, Miller served on an interview committee that evaluated Bibb’s 
application for a promotion to the position of correctional counselor, a position 
that would entail a transfer to VSPW.  (Bibb by now was serving as an instructor 
at CCWF.)  When the interviewing panel did not select Bibb, Miller and other 
members of the panel were informed by an associate warden that Kuykendall 
wanted them to “make it happen.”3  Miller declared:  “This was . . . the first of 
                                              
3  
The trial court sustained defendants’ hearsay objection to a similar 
statement contained in Miller’s declaration, but our review of the record indicates 
defendants failed to object to the deposition testimony reciting the same statement.  
Defendant’s failure to object to the deposition testimony bars any hearsay 
objection on appeal.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(5) [“[e]videntiary 
objections not made at the hearing shall be deemed waived”]; id., § 437c, subd. 
(c); Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1181, 1186-1187, fn. 1, 
disapproved on another ground in Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 
Cal.4th 826, 853, fn. 19; Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 
Cal.4th 666, 670, fn. 1.) 
 
In this court, defendants complain that plaintiffs have referred to evidence 
that was excluded by the trial court, although they fail to specify to which of 
plaintiffs’ references they object.  We have examined the trial court’s evidentiary 
rulings and are satisfied that our statement of facts does not contain references to 
evidence that was excluded by that court.  Defendants claim that we should refer 
only to facts that appear in the Court of Appeal’s opinion, on the ground that 
plaintiffs did not petition for rehearing with respect to the Court of Appeal’s 
recitation of facts.  We are not persuaded.  Although as a matter of policy we 
normally will accept the Court of Appeal opinion’s statement of the facts (Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 28(c)(2)), our review of a grant of summary judgment or 
summary adjudication is de novo and we examine the record independently of the 
(footnote continued on following page) 
 
 
5
many incidents which caused me to lose faith in the system . . . and to feel 
somewhat powerless because of Kuykendall and his sexual relations with 
subordinates.”  There was evidence Bibb had bragged to plaintiff Mackey of her 
power over the warden, and a departmental internal affairs investigation later 
concluded Kuykendall’s personal relationship with Bibb rendered his involvement 
in her promotion unethical. 
Bibb’s promotion was awarded despite the opposition of Patrick, who by 
now also had been transferred to VSPW.  Miller believed that, as a result of 
Patrick’s sexual affair with Kuykendall, Patrick had been awarded the transfer to 
VSPW and enjoyed unusual privileges, such as reporting directly to Kuykendall 
rather than to her immediate superior. 
Miller confronted Brown, who now also was employed at VSPW, 
concerning Brown’s affair with Kuykendall.  Brown, admitting the affair, bragged 
about her power over Kuykendall and stated her intention to use this power to 
extract benefits from him.  Another Department employee, Frances Gantong, 
confirmed that, prior to Brown’s transfer to VSPW, Brown told Gantong that 
Kuykendall promised to secure Brown’s transfer to VSPW and to aid in her 
promotion to the position of facility captain.  Miller also claimed Brown received 
special assignments and work privileges from Kuykendall, and Kuykendall’s 
secretary, Sandra Tripp, agreed with this assessment.  (Miller believed Tripp’s 
employment had been terminated after she made Kuykendall and Brown’s affair 
public.) 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(footnote continued from preceding page) 
Court of Appeal and the trial court.  We consider “all of the evidence the parties 
offered in connection with the motion (except that which the court properly 
excluded) . . . .”  (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.)   
 
 
6
In July 1995, Brown and Miller competed for a promotion to a temporary 
post as facility captain at VSPW.  Brown announced to Miller that Kuykendall 
would be forced to give her, Brown, the promotion or she would “take him down” 
with her knowledge of “every scar on his body.”  Kuykendall served on the 
interview panel, conduct that the departmental internal affairs investigation report 
later branded unethical because of his sexual relationship with Brown.  Brown 
received the promotion, despite Miller’s higher rank, superior education, and 
greater experience.  According to Miller’s deposition, the officers involved in the 
selection process expressed surprise that Brown had been promoted, because they 
had recommended Miller for the higher position, and these officers and other 
employees commented to Miller that Brown’s selection was unfair.  According to 
plaintiff’s estranged husband, William Miller, also a Department employee, many 
employees were upset by Brown’s promotion.  They attributed the promotion to 
the sexual affair between Kuykendall and Brown, believing Brown to be 
unqualified.  Brown and Miller later competed for promotion to a permanent 
facility captain position, and Brown again secured the promotion.   
Within a year and a half, Brown was promoted to the position of associate 
warden, a pace of promotion that was unusually rapid.  Kuykendall again served 
on the interview panel.  Miller’s failure to be promoted to the position of facility 
captain made her ineligible to compete for higher-ranking positions, and Brown 
became her direct supervisor.  According to Cooper, the internal affairs 
investigator, William Miller informed Cooper that other employees were outraged 
by the pace of Brown’s promotions and “employees were saying things like, what 
do I have to do, ‘F’ my way to the top?” 
Miller stated in her deposition that she was afraid of complaining, because 
of the adverse employment actions taken against two other female employees who 
 
 
7
had complained concerning the warden’s affairs, Frances Gantong and Sandra 
Tripp.   
Department employees were aware of all three of Kuykendall’s sexual 
affairs at CCWF and VSPW, according to the Department’s internal affairs 
investigation and the declarations and deposition testimony of employees.  The 
internal affairs report noted that, as to Bibb and Brown, “[b]oth relationships were 
viewed by staff as unethical from a business practice standpoint and one [sic] that 
created a hostile working environment.”  During his investigation, internal affairs 
investigator Cooper encountered several employees who believed that persons 
who had sexual affairs with Kuykendall received special employment benefits.  In 
her deposition, Cagie Brown acknowledged that there were widespread rumors 
that sexual affairs between subordinates and their superior officers were “common 
practice in the Department of Corrections” and that there were rumors that 
employees, including Bibb, secured promotion in this way. 
Kuykendall conceded he had danced with Bibb at work-related social 
gatherings and there was evidence he telephoned her at home hundreds of times 
from his workplace.  Employees, including Mackey and Miller, witnessed Bibb 
and Kuykendall fondling each other on at least three occasions at work-related 
social gatherings occurring between 1991 and 1998 where employees of the 
institution were present.  One Department employee, Phyllis Mellott, also 
complained that at such a gathering Kuykendall had put his arms around her and 
another employee and made unwelcome groping gestures.  Kuykendall was 
present with Bibb in 1998 when she was arrested for driving under the influence of 
alcohol, a circumstance of which Miller and other employees were aware.  
Kuykendall failed to initiate an internal affairs investigation concerning the 
incident or report his own involvement.  He also conceded he had heard 
 
 
8
complaints that Patrick received favorable treatment because of her relationship 
with him.   
Plaintiffs presented evidence that the three women who were having sexual 
affairs with Kuykendall ― Patrick, Bibb, and Brown ― squabbled over him, 
sometimes in emotional scenes witnessed by other employees, including Miller. 
Miller experienced additional difficulties when chief deputy warden Vicky 
Yamamoto arrived at VSPW and interfered with Miller’s direct access to the 
warden.  Miller initially believed the conflict between the two women was not 
gender based, but came to believe that Yamamoto’s subsequent interference with 
Miller’s authority occurred because Miller had refused dinner invitations that 
Yamamoto did not extend to male employees.  Miller refused these invitations 
because she had heard that Yamamoto was a lesbian, and Miller assumed 
Yamamoto’s interest in her was sexual.  Rumors circulated among prison 
employees that Yamamoto and Brown were engaged in a relationship that was 
“more than platonic.”   
According to Miller, in 1997, during a peer review audit at another prison, 
Miller complained to Gerald Harris, a chief deputy warden at the facility who also 
served as a sexual harassment advisor for the Department, concerning 
Kuykendall’s sexual relationship with Brown and Brown’s close relationship with 
Yamamoto, adding that Yamamoto was disrupting the work of the institution and 
that Kuykendall had not disciplined Yamamoto.  In her declaration, plaintiff 
Miller stated she informed Harris that “I felt I was working in a hostile 
environment based on the sexual relationship between Brown and Kuykendall and 
the close relationship between Brown and Yamamoto.”  Following her meeting 
with Harris, Miller complained to Kuykendall concerning Brown and Yamamoto’s 
interference with her duties. 
 
 
9
According to Miller, after her complaint to Kuykendall, Brown and 
Yamamoto made Miller’s work life miserable and diminished her effectiveness by 
frequently countermanding her orders, undermining her authority, reducing her 
supervisorial responsibilities, imposing additional onerous duties on her, making 
unjustified criticisms of her work, and threatening her with reprisals when she 
complained to Kuykendall about their interference.  
In September 1997, Miller telephoned Brown to confront Brown 
concerning her relationship with Kuykendall and to complain about the 
mistreatment she had suffered at the hands of Brown and Yamamoto.  During this 
conversation, which Miller permitted Mackey and others to overhear, Brown 
acknowledged that Yamamoto was heaping unjustified abuse on Miller and that 
Kuykendall was aware of Yamamoto’s mistreatment of Miller but would do 
nothing to rectify the situation.  Miller subsequently informed Cooper, the internal 
affairs investigator, that during this telephone conversation Miller had threatened 
to make a public announcement concerning the affair between Brown and 
Kuykendall. 
The next day, Brown accused Miller of tape-recording their telephone 
conversation.  Brown entered Miller’s office, ordered plaintiff Mackey (Miller’s 
assistant) to leave, and then physically assaulted Miller, holding her captive for 
two hours.  When Mackey went to Yamamoto to secure assistance for Miller, 
Yamamoto did not intervene.  When Miller reported the affray to Kuykendall and 
threatened to report his relationship with Brown to higher authorities within the 
Department, Kuykendall responded that no one would believe her.  Kuykendall 
told Miller to take time off from work and that upon her return she would not be 
required to report to Brown or Yamamoto.  He subsequently awarded her a 
promotion.  Kuykendall failed to investigate the assault after Miller complained to 
him.  The internal affairs investigation concluded that Brown had committed 
 
 
10
assault and false imprisonment and that Kuykendall’s failure to intervene or to 
discipline Brown constituted a violation of Department policy.   
Brown and Yamamoto continued to interfere with Miller’s work.  Miller 
made further complaints to Kuykendall in 1998, eventually stating she planned to 
file a harassment complaint.  Kuykendall explained there was nothing he could do 
about the harassment, because of his relationship with Brown and Brown’s 
relationship with Yamamoto.  He complained of Brown’s untrustworthiness, 
stating he was “finished” with Brown and adding, “I should have chose[n] you.”  
Miller understood these words to mean “he should have chose[n] me to have a 
relationship with,” explaining, “I knew what he meant.  He didn’t say what, but he 
meant as a relationship.  That’s what I took it as.”  When Miller announced she 
intended to file a harassment complaint against Kuykendall for his failure to 
control Brown and Yamamoto, Kuykendall advised her not to do so, stating she 
would only cause an ugly scandal.  Miller continued that thereafter, “[p]retty much 
the institution was exploding . . . everybody was basically taking complaints to 
Mr. Kuykendall, and that’s when [the Office of Internal Affairs] came into the 
institution.”   
Miller stated that she joined three other employees early in 1998 in 
complaining confidentially to Lewis Jones, Kuykendall’s superior officer and the 
Department’s regional administrator, concerning Yamamoto (and Kuykendall’s 
failure to curtail Yamamoto’s abuse of Miller), stating that the “institution was out 
of control.”  She recalled that Jones stated “he was dealing with Mr. Kuykendall 
on the disruption of the institution,” but Miller did not observe any follow-up.  She 
did not complain to Jones specifically about sexual harassment.  
Later in 1998, regional administrator Jones recommended a departmental 
Office of Internal Affairs investigation, which, as noted above, began investigating 
misconduct on the part of Kuykendall, Yamamoto, and Brown.  Miller was 
 
 
11
required to cooperate, and she informed investigating officer Cooper of 
Kuykendall’s sexual affairs with Brown, Bibb, and Patrick, and of the substance of 
Brown’s statements to her.  Despite Cooper’s assurance of confidentiality, Miller 
soon found that Brown was aware of Miller’s statements, and Brown began a 
campaign of ostracism against Miller.  According to Miller’s declaration and 
deposition testimony, Yamamoto also harassed Miller with unannounced 
inspections and interference with her orders; Kuykendall withdrew 
accommodations that previously had been accorded Miller because of a physical 
disability,4 and even the inmates appeared to believe that Miller had attempted to 
have Kuykendall’s employment terminated.  On one occasion, Brown angrily 
confronted Miller about her statements to the internal affairs investigator, would 
not allow Miller to terminate the conversation, and followed Miller home to 
continue the harangue.  Upon Miller’s complaint, a court order issued requiring 
Brown to stay away from Miller.   
Miller suffered increasing stress and resigned from the Department on 
August 5, 1998.  She filed a government tort claim with the Department in 
November 1998, followed by a complaint with the Department of Fair 
Employment and Housing in March 1999.  She filed her complaint in superior 
court on June 15, 1999.   
As a result of the internal affairs investigation, Kuykendall retired, 
Yamamoto was transferred and demoted, and Brown resigned with disciplinary 
proceedings pending. 
                                              
4  
As noted, Miller also filed a disability discrimination claim.  In October 
1995, Miller was diagnosed with sarcoidosis, and the resulting inflammation 
affected her ability to walk.  Initially, Kuykendall met her need for a flexible 
schedule and made other accommodations, but late in 1998 these accommodations 
began to be withdrawn. 
 
 
12
B 
Plaintiff Frances Mackey joined the Department in 1975 as a clerk and 
received a number of promotions.  She was transferred to VSPW in 1996 as a 
records manager, with the promise that she would continue to receive “inmate 
pay” (which apparently comprised certain enhanced salary benefits that emanate 
from handling inmates directly).  At her interview for the new position, she 
announced her ambition to be promoted to a position as a correctional counselor.  
Kuykendall told her if she improved the VSPW records office, he would award her 
such a promotion.  
Mackey was aware of Kuykendall’s sexual affairs with Bibb and Brown.   
In July 1997, Mackey learned that Brown, then associate warden of VSPW, 
believed Mackey had complained to Kuykendall concerning the sexual affair he 
was having with Brown.  Mackey’s supplemental “inmate pay” was withdrawn.  
Brown also subjected Mackey to verbal abuse in the presence of coworkers.  
Mackey believed these actions constituted a warning not to disclose the affair 
between Kuykendall and Brown.  Mackey was certain that Brown was promoted 
to the position of associate warden not because of merit, but because of her sexual 
affair with Kuykendall.  Mackey claimed Brown demeaned her in the presence of 
other employees and impeded the execution of Mackey’s duties in various 
respects, and stated:  “This situation created hostility among the employees in 
[Mackey’s] Department.”  As observed by the Court of Appeal, “[t]he 
environment around the office became increasingly hostile because of 
Kuykendall’s inability to control Brown.”  Mackey “felt powerless to take any 
action about the situation.”  Mackey was persuaded not to jeopardize her career, 
having observed the termination of the employment of another woman who had 
complained about Kuykendall’s “improper affair.”  In September 1997, Mackey 
overheard Brown’s telephone call to Miller and the next day observed Brown’s 
 
 
13
physical assault on Miller.  Mackey attempted to intervene to assist Miller.  Miller 
told Mackey the assault occurred after she informed Brown she planned to 
complain concerning Brown’s relationship with Kuykendall and “how it was 
affecting her career.”  Brown continued to demean Mackey in the presence of 
other employees and to interfere with the execution of her duties. 
According to Mackey, correctional employee Greg Mellott told Mackey 
that his wife, also a correctional employee, had heard arguments between Bibb and 
Brown concerning Kuykendall.  In her declaration, Mackey stated that “Greg 
Mellott revealed to me that the sexual relationships Kuykendall was having with 
Bibb and Brown [were] creating an impossible environment for his wife to work 
in” and that his wife had filed a complaint “about the improper practices she 
experienced in her employment.”  
Mackey was assured that her statements to the internal affairs investigator 
would be kept confidential, but they were not.  Kuykendall subsequently reduced 
her responsibilities and denied her access to the work experience she needed in 
order to be promoted to the position of correctional counselor.  Mackey testified in 
her deposition that she believed she failed to receive a promotion to that position 
because she was not sexually involved with Kuykendall.   
In addition, Brown repeatedly interrogated Mackey about her statements to 
the internal affairs investigator and attempted to contact Mackey outside of work.  
Stress led to health problems, and Mackey was unable to work between August 
1998 and January 1999.  Upon her return to work, Mackey was demoted and 
suffered further mistreatment and humiliation.  A few months later she resigned, 
finding the conditions of employment intolerable.  Mackey filed a government tort 
claim with the Department in February 1999 and filed a complaint with the 
Department of Fair Employment and Housing in March 1999.  Mackey joined 
 
 
14
Miller in filing suit on June 15, 1999, alleging, among other claims, sexual 
discrimination and retaliation in violation of the FEHA. 
C 
As noted, defendants moved for summary judgment or summary 
adjudication of issues.  The trial court determined the evidence of the warden’s 
sexual favoritism did not constitute discrimination or harassment under the FEHA 
and rejected plaintiffs’ retaliation claim.  Miller’s cause of action for disability 
discrimination survived, but summary adjudication in favor of defendants was 
awarded on the remaining claims.  Miller subsequently dismissed her complaint 
with its single remaining cause of action for disability discrimination; the court 
entered judgment in favor of defendants, and plaintiffs appealed.  
The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that a supervisor who grants 
favorable employment opportunities to a person with whom the supervisor is 
having a sexual affair does not, without more, commit sexual harassment toward 
other, nonfavored employees.  According to the Court of Appeal, plaintiffs were in 
the same position as male employees who failed to acquire the benefits that 
Kuykendall accorded to Bibb, Patrick, and Brown.  With respect to the claim that 
Kuykendall’s behavior created an actionable hostile work environment, the 
appellate court observed:  “Ignoring for the moment evidence of retaliation for 
threatened, or actual, reporting of the relationships, plaintiffs have demonstrated 
unfair conduct in the workplace by virtue of Kuykendall’s preferential treatment 
of his various sexual partners.  However, beyond the fact of those relationships 
and the preferential treatment, plaintiffs have not shown a concerted pattern of 
harassment sufficiently pervasive to have altered the conditions of their 
employment on the basis of sex.  Plaintiffs were not themselves subjected to 
sexual advances, and were not treated any differently than male employees at [the 
 
 
15
prison].  Hence the trial court correctly concluded there is no evidentiary basis for 
plaintiffs’ various sex discrimination and harassment claims.”   
With respect to plaintiffs’ claim that defendants retaliated against them 
because they protested practices forbidden by the FEHA, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that defendants properly had prevailed on plaintiffs’ retaliation claim, 
evidently because the appellate court found the record demonstrated that plaintiffs 
did not exhibit a subjective belief, when they made their complaints, that they 
were reporting conduct prohibited by the FEHA or that they were complaining of 
sexual discrimination or sexual harassment. 
II 
A 
We emphasize at the outset that the present case comes to us on appeal 
from a grant of summary judgment and summary adjudication.  A trial court 
properly grants a motion for summary judgment only if no issues of triable fact 
appear and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); see also id., § 437c, subd. (f) [summary adjudication of 
issues].)  The moving party bears the burden of showing the court that the plaintiff 
“has not established, and cannot reasonably expect to establish, a prima facie 
case . . . .”  (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768.)  On 
appeal from the granting of a motion for summary judgment, we examine the 
record de novo, liberally construing the evidence in support of the party opposing 
summary judgment and resolving doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that 
party.  (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 
1142.) 
 
 
16
B 
The FEHA expressly prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace.5  It is 
an unlawful employment practice “[f]or an employer . . . because of . . . sex . . . to 
harass an employee . . . .”  (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(1).)  The FEHA also 
provides that “[sexual] [h]arassment of an employee . . . by an employee, other 
than an agent or supervisor, shall be unlawful if the entity, or its agents or 
supervisors, knows or should have known of this conduct and fails to take 
immediate and appropriate corrective action.”  (Ibid.)  For the purposes of the 
relevant provisions of the FEHA, “ ‘harassment’ because of sex includes sexual 
harassment, gender harassment, and harassment based on pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical conditions.”  (Id., § 12940, subd. (j)(4)(C).)   
According to the Fair Employment and Housing Commission (FEHC), the 
agency charged with administering the FEHA, harassment on any basis prohibited 
by the FEHA includes (but is not limited to) verbal harassment, including 
“epithets, derogatory comments or slurs on a basis enumerated in the Act”; 
                                              
5  
Plaintiffs asserted claims for sexual discrimination and sexual harassment 
under the FEHA.  In their complaint, plaintiffs styled these claims as constituting a 
single cause of action, and the Court of Appeal treated them as such.  As we noted 
in Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 646, 657, however, claims for sexual 
discrimination and sexual harassment are distinct causes of action, each arising 
from different provisions of the FEHA.   
 
Plaintiffs based their sexual discrimination and harassment claim on the 
same circumstances, and the thrust of their argument in the trial court, the Court of 
Appeal, and this court has been that they were subjected to sexual harassment.  
Observing that sexual harassment is a form of sexual discrimination (see 
Accardi v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 341, 348, and cases cited; see 
also Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 129 
[harassment on the basis of race is a form of employment discrimination]), the 
Court of Appeal analyzed plaintiffs’ claim principally under the law applicable to 
sexual harassment, and we shall do the same.   
 
 
17
physical harassment, including “assault, impeding or blocking movement, or any 
physical interference with normal work or movement, when directed at an 
individual on a basis enumerated in the Act”; and visual harassment, including 
“derogatory posters, cartoons, or drawings on a basis enumerated in the Act.”  
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 7287.6, subd. (b)(1)(A),(B) & (C).)  The regulations also 
specify that “[u]nwanted sexual advances which condition an employment benefit 
upon an exchange of sexual favors” constitute harassment.  (Id., § 7287.6, subd. 
(b)(1)(D).)  In the specific context of sexual discrimination, prohibited harassment 
may include “verbal, physical, and visual harassment, as well as unwanted sexual 
advances.”  (Id., § 7291.1 subd. (f)(1).) 
Past California decisions have established that the prohibition against sexual 
harassment includes protection from a broad range of conduct, ranging from 
expressly or impliedly conditioning employment benefits on submission to or 
tolerance of unwelcome sexual advances, to the creation of a work environment that 
is hostile or abusive on the basis of sex.  (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital 
(1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 607-608; see also Mogilefsky v. Superior Court (1993) 
20 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1414-1415.)6  Such a hostile environment may be created 
even if the plaintiff never is subjected to sexual advances.  (Mogilefsky v. Superior 
                                              
6  
Some cases draw a sharp distinction between the two types of harassment, 
namely so-called quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment.  (See 
Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 607.)  Later 
cases have acknowledged that the two theories of liability are intertwined.  (See 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth (1998) 524 U.S. 742, 751; Mogilefsky v. 
Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1415; Bihun v. AT&T Information 
Systems, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 976, 1005 [characterizing the two types of 
harassment as not distinct forms of harassment but “poles of a continuum”], 
disapproved on another point in Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 
Cal.4th 644, 664.) 
 
 
18
Court, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1414-1415.)  In one case, for example, a cause 
of action based upon a hostile environment was stated when the plaintiff alleged she 
had been subjected to long-standing ridicule, insult, threats, and especially exacting 
work requirements by male coworkers who evidently resented a female employee’s 
entry into a position in law enforcement.  (Accardi v. Superior Court, supra, 17 
Cal.App.4th at p. 347-348.)   
We have agreed with the United States Supreme Court that, to prevail, an 
employee claiming harassment based upon a hostile work environment must 
demonstrate that the conduct complained of was severe enough or sufficiently 
pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create a work environment 
that qualifies as hostile or abusive to employees because of their sex.  (See Aguilar 
v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 130, relying upon Harris v. 
Forklift Systems, Inc. (1993) 510 U.S. 17, 21.)  The working environment must be 
evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances: “[W]hether an environment 
is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined only by looking at all the 
circumstances.  These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its 
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive 
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work 
performance.”  (Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., supra, 510 U.S. at p. 23.) 
The United States Supreme Court has warned that the evidence in a hostile 
environment sexual harassment case should not be viewed too narrowly:  “[T]he 
objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a 
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering ‘all the circumstances.’  
[Citation.] . . . . [T]hat inquiry requires careful consideration of the social context 
in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target. . . .  The real 
social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of 
surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully 
 
 
19
captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.  
Common sense, and an appropriate sensibility to social context, will enable courts 
and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing . . . and conduct 
which a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or 
abusive.”  (Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. (1998) 523 U.S. 75, 81-
82; see also Beyda v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 511, 517-518.) 
Our courts frequently turn to federal authorities interpreting Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) (Title VII) for assistance in 
interpreting the FEHA and its prohibition against sexual harassment.  (See 
Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 129-130; 
Beyda v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 517.)  Although the 
FEHA explicitly prohibits sexual harassment of employees, while Title VII does 
not, the two enactments share the common goal of preventing discrimination in the 
workplace.  Federal courts agree with guidelines established by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency charged with 
administering Title VII, in viewing sexual harassment as constituting sexual 
discrimination in violation of Title VII.  (See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson 
(1986) 477 U.S. 57, 64-65.)  In language comparable to that found in the FEHA 
and in FEHC regulations, federal regulatory guidelines define sexual harassment 
as including unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other 
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature that has the “purpose or effect of 
unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an 
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”  (29 C.F.R. 
§ 1604.11(a)(3).) 
A lengthy policy statement issued by the EEOC has examined the question 
of sexual favoritism, relying in part upon a number of federal court decisions that 
have considered the kind of harassment claim brought by plaintiffs, namely one 
 
 
20
based principally on the favoritism shown by supervisors to employees who are 
the supervisors’ sexual partners.  (Ofc. of Legal Counsel, Policy Guidance on 
Employer Liability Under Title VII for Sexual Favoritism (Jan. 12, 1990) 
No. N-915-048 in 2 EEOC Compliance Manual foll. § 615 (EEOC Policy 
Statement No. N-915-048.)  In its 1990 policy statement, the EEOC observed that, 
although isolated instances of sexual favoritism in the workplace do not violate 
Title VII, widespread sexual favoritism may create a hostile work environment in 
violation of Title VII by sending the demeaning message that managers view 
female employees as “ ‘sexual playthings’ ” or that “the way for women to get 
ahead in the workplace is by engaging in sexual conduct.”7  We believe the policy 
statement provides a useful guide in evaluating the issue before us.  
The EEOC policy statement is entitled Policy Guidance on Employer 
Liability under Title VII for Sexual Favoritism.  It covers three topics: isolated 
favoritism, favoritism when sexual favors have been coerced, and widespread 
favoring of consensual sexual partners.  The policy statement begins with an 
explanation that “[a]n isolated instance of favoritism toward a ‘paramour’ (or a 
spouse, or a friend) may be unfair, but it does not discriminate against women or 
men in violation of Title VII, since both are disadvantaged for reasons other than 
their genders.  [Fn. omitted.]  A female charging party who is denied an 
employment benefit because of such sexual favoritism would not have been 
treated more favorably had she been a man, nor, conversely, was she treated less 
                                              
7   
The policy statement was issued in 1990 by the EEOC and specifies that it 
was approved by Clarence Thomas — then the Chairperson of the EEOC and now 
an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court.   
 
 
21
favorably because she was a woman.”  (EEOC Policy Statement No. N-915-048, 
supra, § A, italics added.)8   
The policy statement next explains the commission’s position with respect 
to coerced sexual activity, including the situation in which the coercion results in 
employment benefits for a victim who is not complaining.  Because coercion is not 
alleged in the present case, this element of the policy statement is not relevant to 
the question before us. 
Finally, the EEOC discusses sexual favoritism that is more than isolated 
and that is based upon consensual affairs:  “If favoritism based upon the granting 
of sexual favors is widespread in a workplace, both male and female colleagues 
who do not welcome this conduct can establish a hostile work environment in 
violation of Title VII regardless of whether any objectionable conduct is directed 
at them and regardless of whether those who were granted favorable treatment 
willingly bestowed the sexual favors.  In these circumstances, a message is 
implicitly conveyed that the managers view women as ‘sexual playthings,’ thereby 
creating an atmosphere that is demeaning to women.  Both men and women who 
find this offensive can establish a violation if the conduct is ‘sufficiently severe or 
pervasive “to alter the conditions of [their] employment and create an abusive 
working environment.” ’  [Citations.]  [Fn. omitted.]  An analogy can be made to a 
situation in which supervisors in an office regularly make racial, ethnic or sexual 
jokes.  Even if the targets of the humor ‘play along’ and in no way display that 
                                              
8  
This portion of the EEOC policy statement reflects the position of a great 
majority of federal courts.  (See DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Center 
(2d Cir. 1986) 807 F.2d 304, 308; see also Schobert v. Illinois Dept. of Transp. 
(7th Cir. 2002) 304 F.3d 725, 733; Womack v. Runyon (11th Cir. 1998) 147 F.3d 
1298, 1300; Taken v. Oklahoma Corp. Com’n. (10th Cir. 1997) 125 F.3d 1366, 
1369-1370.) 
 
 
22
they object, co-workers of any race, national origin or sex can claim that this 
conduct, which communicates a bias against protected class members, creates a 
hostile work environment for them.  [Citations.]”  (EEOC Policy Statement 
No. N-915-048, supra, § C.)   
In addition, according to the EEOC, “[m]anagers who engage in 
widespread sexual favoritism may also communicate a message that the way for 
women to get ahead in the workplace is by engaging in sexual conduct or that 
sexual solicitations are a prerequisite to their fair treatment.  [Fn. omitted.]  This 
can form the basis of an implicit ‘quid pro quo’ harassment claim for female 
employees, as well as a hostile environment claim for both women and men who 
find this offensive.”  (EEOC Policy Statement No. N-915-048, supra, § C.)   
To illustrate its point, the EEOC discussed Broderick v. Ruder (D.D.C. 
1988) 685 F.Supp. 1269, in which the court concluded sexual favoritism 
contributed to a hostile work environment that violated Title VII.  The plaintiff, in 
that case an attorney, alleged that two of her supervisors had given employment 
benefits to two secretaries with whom they were conducting sexual affairs and that 
another supervisor favored an attorney because of his sexual attraction to her.  As 
the EEOC also noted, there were “isolated” unwanted sexual advances made to the 
plaintiff.  The EEOC stressed the court’s discussion of sexual favoritism in the 
workplace, which “undermined plaintiff’s motivation and work performance and 
deprived plaintiff, and other . . . female employees, of promotions and job 
opportunities.”  (Broderick v. Ruder, supra, 685 F.Supp. at p. 1278; EEOC Policy 
Statement No. N-915-048, supra, § C.)  The EEOC policy statement commented 
that, although the Broderick decision turned upon a hostile work environment 
analysis, the facts also could have supported an implied quid pro quo claim “since 
the managers, by their conduct, communicated a message to all female employees 
 
 
23
in the office that job benefits would be awarded to those who participated in 
sexual conduct.  [Citations.]”  (Ibid.) 
The one pertinent California decision generally indicates that the standards 
and reasoning embodied in the EEOC policy statement provide appropriate 
guidelines in interpreting and applying the relevant provisions of the FEHA.  In 
Proksel v. Gattis (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1626, although the court rejected a claim 
based upon favoritism arising from a single affair in a small office, it recognized 
sexual favoritism could create a hostile environment.  In dictum, the court in 
Proksel suggested that sexual favoritism by a manager may be actionable when it 
leads employees to believe that “they [can] obtain favorable treatment from [the 
manager] if they became romantically involved with him” (id. at p. 1629), the 
affair is conducted in a manner “so indiscreet as to create a hostile work 
environment,” or the manager has engaged in “other pervasive conduct . . . which 
created a hostile work environment.”  (Id. at pp. 1629-1630.)  The Court of Appeal 
in Proksel cited the Broderick decision (Broderick v. Ruder, supra, 685 F.Supp. 
1269) and another federal court decision suggesting that overt manifestations of 
sexual favoritism may create a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII 
when they convey the message that a woman cannot be “evaluated on grounds 
other than her sexuality.”  (Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp. (3rd Cir. 1990) 
904 F.2d 853, 862; see id. at p. 861, fn. 15.)  Indeed, the concept of conduct that 
gives rise to a hostile work environment by creating a work atmosphere that is 
demeaning to women is not new.  (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 7287.6, subd. 
(b)(1)(C) [stating that harassment may include the posting of derogatory images]; 
Accardi v. Superior Court,  supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at pp. 347-348; EEOC v. 
Farmer Bros. Co. (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 891, 897 & fn. 3 [recognizing 
demeaning gender-based conduct as sexual harassment]; Lipsett v. University of 
 
 
24
Puerto Rico (1st Cir. 1988) 864 F.2d 881, 905 [recognizing the posting of lurid 
images as sexual harassment].) 
Following the guidance of the EEOC, and also employing standards 
adopted in our prior cases, we believe that an employee may establish an 
actionable claim of sexual harassment under the FEHA by demonstrating that 
widespread sexual favoritism was severe or pervasive enough to alter his or her 
working conditions and create a hostile work environment.  (See Aguilar v. Avis 
Rent A Car System, Inc., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 130.)  Furthermore, applying this 
standard to the circumstances of the present case, we conclude that the evidence 
proffered by plaintiffs, viewed in its entirety, established a prima facie case of 
sexual harassment under a hostile-work-environment theory.  As we shall explain, 
a trier of fact reasonably could find from the evidence in the record set forth below 
that a hostile work environment was created in the workplace in question.  
C 
Over a period of several years, Warden Kuykendall engaged concurrently 
in sexual affairs with three subordinate employees, Bibb, Patrick, and Brown.  
There was evidence these affairs began in 1991 and continued until 1998.  The 
affairs occurred first while Kuykendall and the women worked at CCWF, then 
continued when these individuals all transferred to VSPW.  Kuykendall served in 
a management capacity at both institutions and served as warden at VSPW.  When 
Kuykendall transferred from CCWF to VSPW, there was evidence he caused his 
sexual partners to be transferred to the new institution to join him.  There was 
evidence Kuykendall promised and granted unwarranted and unfair employment 
benefits to the three women.  One of the unfair employment benefits granted to 
Brown evidently was the power to abuse other employees who complained 
concerning the affairs.  When plaintiffs complained, they suffered retaliation (and 
they believed two other employees were similarly targeted).  Kuykendall refused 
 
 
25
to intervene and himself retaliated by withdrawing previously granted 
accommodations for Miller’s disability after she cooperated with the internal 
affairs investigation. 
Further, there was evidence that advancement for women at VSPW was 
based upon sexual favors, not merit.  For example, Kuykendall pressured Miller 
and other employees on the personnel selection committee to agree to transfer 
Bibb to VSPW and promote her to the position of correctional counselor, despite 
the conclusion of the committee that she was not eligible or qualified.  Committee 
members were told to set aside their professional judgment because Kuykendall 
wanted them to “make it happen.”   
In addition, on two occasions Kuykendall promoted Brown to facility 
captain positions in preference to Miller, although Miller was more qualified.  
Brown enjoyed an unprecedented pace of promotion to the managerial position of 
associate warden, causing outraged employees to ask such questions as, “What do 
I have to do, ‘F’ my way to the top?”  Even Brown acknowledged that affairs 
between supervisors and subordinates were common in the Department and were 
widely viewed as a method of advancement.  Indeed, Brown made it known to 
Miller that the facility captain promotion belonged to her because of her intimate 
relationship with Kuykendall, announcing that if she were not awarded the 
promotion she would “take him [Kuykendall] down” because she “knew every 
scar on his body.” 
There also was evidence that Kuykendall promoted Bibb from clerical to 
correctional staff duties despite her lack of qualifications, and at the same time 
refused to permit Mackey to secure the on-the-job training that would have 
enabled her to make a similar advance.  On the basis of her knowledge of 
Kuykendall’s sexual affairs, Mackey believed the reason he denied her this 
opportunity was that she was not his sexual partner. 
 
 
26
The evidence suggested Kuykendall viewed female employees as “sexual 
playthings” and that his ensuing conduct conveyed this demeaning message in a 
manner that had an effect on the work force as a whole.  Various employees, 
including plaintiffs, observed Kuykendall and Bibb fondling one another on at 
least three occasions at work-related social gatherings.  One employee reported 
that Kuykendall had placed his arm around her and another female employee 
during one such social event, adding that Kuykendall had engaged in unwelcome 
fondling of her as well.  Bibb and Brown bragged to other employees, including 
plaintiffs, of their power to extort benefits from Kuykendall.  Jealous scenes 
between the sexual partners occurred in the presence of Miller and other 
employees.  Several employees informed the internal affairs investigator that 
persons who were engaged in sexual affairs with Kuykendall received special 
benefits.  When Miller last complained to Kuykendall, he told her that Brown was 
manipulative, adding he was “finished” with Brown and should have chosen 
Miller — a comment Miller reasonably took to mean that he should have chosen 
Miller for a sexual affair.  
There was evidence Kuykendall’s sexual favoritism not only blocked the 
way to merit-based advancement for plaintiffs, but also caused them to be 
subjected to harassment at the hands of Brown, whose behavior Kuykendall 
refused or failed to control even after it escalated to physical assault.  This 
harassment, apparently retaliatory, included loss of work responsibilities, 
demeaning comments in the presence of other employees, loss of entitlement to a 
pay enhancement and to disability accommodation, and physical assault and false 
imprisonment.  Kuykendall explained to Miller that, because of his intimate 
relationship with Brown, he would not protect plaintiffs.  In this manner, his 
sexual favoritism was responsible for the continuation of an outrageous campaign 
of harassment against plaintiffs. 
 
 
27
Considering all the circumstances “from the perspective of a reasonable 
person in the plaintiff’s position” (Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 
supra, 523 U.S. at p. 81), and noting that the present case is before us on appeal 
after a grant of summary judgment, we conclude that the foregoing evidence 
created at least a triable issue of fact on the question whether Kuykendall’s 
conduct constituted sexual favoritism widespread enough to constitute a hostile 
work environment in which the “message [was] implicitly conveyed that the 
managers view women as ‘sexual playthings’ ”  or that “the way for women to get 
ahead in the workplace is by engaging in sexual conduct” thereby “creating an 
atmosphere that is demeaning to women.”  (EEOC Policy Statement 
No. N-915-048, supra, § C.)  In terms we previously have borrowed from the 
United States Supreme Court in measuring sexual harassment claims, there was 
evidence of “ ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive’ ” conduct that “ ‘ “alter[ed] the 
conditions of [the victims’] employment” ’ ” such that a jury reasonably could 
conclude that the conduct created a work environment that qualifies as hostile or 
abusive to employees because of their gender.  (Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car 
System, Inc., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 130.) 
D 
In reaching its contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeal essentially 
conceded that widespread sexual favoritism could support a claim for sexual 
harassment if the accompanying conduct were sufficiently pervasive or severe, but 
concluded plaintiffs had failed to make an adequate showing in this respect, 
especially in the absence of any evidence that they had been sexually 
propositioned or that the sexual affairs were nonconsensual.  But California law 
(like the EEOC policy statement quoted above) provides that plaintiffs may 
establish the existence of a hostile work environment even when they themselves 
have not been sexually propositioned.  (Beyda v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 65 
 
 
28
Cal.App.4th at p. 519; Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital, supra, 214 
Cal.App.3d at pp. 610-611; EEOC Policy Statement No. N-915-048, supra, § C, 
example 3.)  Further, as the EEOC policy statement points out, even widespread 
favoritism based upon consensual sexual affairs may imbue the workplace with an 
atmosphere that is demeaning to women because a message is conveyed that 
managers view women as “sexual playthings” or that the way required to secure 
advancement is to engage in sexual conduct with managers.  In focusing upon the 
question whether the sexual favoritism was coercive, the Court of Appeal 
overlooked the principle that even in the absence of coercive behavior, certain 
conduct creates a work atmosphere so demeaning to women that it constitutes an 
actionable hostile work environment.  
The Court of Appeal commented that the Broderick and Drinkwater 
decisions discussed not only evidence of widespread sexual favoritism but also the 
assertedly coercive effect of a supervisor’s sexual advances to the plaintiff and of 
a generally sexually charged atmosphere.  In Broderick, the court referred to 
pervasive “conduct of a sexual nature” and noted isolated instances in which 
sexual advances were made upon the plaintiff, but it also observed that the more 
important consideration was the effect of sexual favoritism on the work 
environment.  (Broderick v. Ruder, supra, 685 F.Supp. at p. 1278.)  Similarly, in 
Drinkwater the court, although referring to an atmosphere of “sexual innuendo” or 
a “sexually charged” work atmosphere created by a sexual affair, also explained 
that “[t]he theoretical basis for the kind of environmental claim alleged here is that 
the sexual relationship impresses the workplace with such a cast that the plaintiff 
is made to feel that she is judged only by her sexuality.”  (Drinkwater v. Union 
Carbide Corp., supra, 904 F.2d at p. 861 & fn. 15.)  Again, the important and 
underlying inquiry in these cases was whether the conduct in question conveyed a 
message that demeans employees on the basis of their sex.   
 
 
29
Putting aside the question whether the Broderick and Drinkwater cases 
properly can be distinguished from the circumstances of the present case, we 
believe it is clear under California law that a plaintiff may establish a hostile work 
environment without demonstrating the existence of coercive sexual conduct 
directed at the plaintiff or even conduct of a sexual nature.  (See Beyda v. City of 
Los Angeles, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 519 [“ ‘The plaintiff’s work environment 
is affected not only by conduct directed at herself but also by the treatment of 
others’ ”]; Accardi v. Superior Court, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 345 [sexual 
harassment under a hostile-work-environment theory “does not necessarily involve 
sexual conduct.  It need not have anything to do with lewd acts, double entendres 
or sexual advances”; see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., supra, 
523 U.S. at p. 80 [“harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire”]; 
Mogilefsky v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1414; 2 Chin et al., Cal 
Practice Guide: Employment Litigation (The Rutter Group 2004)  [¶][¶] 10:240-
10:246, pp. 10-40-10-41.)  Finally, we believe that even those courts focusing on a 
“sexually charged environment” would be satisfied that a triable issue of fact was 
presented by the evidence in this case, in view of the bragging, squabbling, and 
fondling that occurred. 
We stress that, because this is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment 
in favor of defendants, a reviewing court must examine the evidence de novo and 
should draw reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.  (Wiener v. 
Southcoast Childcare Centers Inc., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1142.)  We believe the 
Court of Appeal failed to draw such inferences and took too narrow a view of the 
surrounding circumstances.  (See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 
supra, 523 U.S. at pp. 81-82; see also Beyda v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 65 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 517-518; Accardi v. Superior Court, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 350-351.) 
 
 
30
Defendants attempt to counter plaintiffs’ claims by referring to a number of 
the cases holding that isolated preferential treatment of a sexual partner, standing 
alone, does not constitute sexual discrimination.  (See fn. 8, ante, at p. 21.)  The 
Court of Appeal also cited these cases.  In such instances, the discrimination is 
said to turn merely on personal preference, and male and female nonfavored 
employees are equally disadvantaged.  Although we do not dispute the principle 
stated by these cases, we believe the Court of Appeal and defendants err in 
equating the present case with those cases.  Whether or not Kuykendall was 
motivated by personal preference or by discriminatory intent, a hostile work 
environment was shown to have been created by widespread favoritism.  As 
discussed, plaintiffs in the present case alleged far more than that a supervisor 
engaged in an isolated workplace sexual affair and accorded special benefits to a 
sexual partner.  They proffered evidence demonstrating the effect of widespread 
favoritism on the work environment, namely the creation of an atmosphere that 
was demeaning to women.  Further, as the EEOC policy statement observes, an 
atmosphere that is sufficiently demeaning to women may be actionable by both 
men and women.   
Defendants urge that, in the asserted absence of evidence that Kuykendall 
flaunted his consensual sexual affairs, coerced or sought to derive advantage from 
other employees in connection with them, or engaged in “open sexual conduct, 
sexual discussions, or other indiscreet behavior in the workplace,” the facts of the 
present case show nothing more than the kind of standard sexual favoritism claim 
that has been rejected as a basis for liability under the FEHA and Title VII.  We 
disagree.  Again, defendants have overlooked the circumstance that widespread 
sexual favoritism may be actionable because of the effect it has on the work 
environment.   
 
 
31
Further, we question the factual premise of defendant’s argument.  There 
was evidence of considerable flaunting of the relationships affecting the 
workplace, consisting of Bibb’s and Brown’s bragging and the jealous scenes 
between these two women, along with Kuykendall’s indiscreet behavior at a 
number of work-related social gatherings.  The favoritism that ensued from the 
sexual affairs also was on public display, reflected in Kuykendall’s permitting 
Brown to abuse plaintiffs, his directive to the interview committee to promote 
Bibb, and his repeated admissions that he would not or could not control Brown 
because of his sexual relationship with her.  It may even be inferred that 
Kuykendall solicited sexual favors in return for employment benefits, in light of 
Bibb’s and Brown’s boasts, the sequence of promotions awarded by Kuykendall, 
and his comment to Miller, “I should have chose[n] you.” 
To the extent defendants’ contention is that a reasonable person in 
plaintiffs’ position would not have found the work environment to have been 
hostile toward women on the basis of widespread sexual favoritism, we conclude 
that the lower courts erred in precluding plaintiffs from presenting this issue to a 
jury.  The internal affairs investigation within the Department confirmed that 
Kuykendall’s sexual favoritism occurred and was broadly known and resented in 
the workplace, and that several employees — including Brown — concluded that 
engaging in sexual affairs was the way required to secure advancement.  There 
was evidence from which a jury reasonably could conclude that the entire scheme 
of promotion at VSPW was affected by Kuykendall’s favoritism.. 
Certainly, the presence of mere office gossip is insufficient to establish the 
existence of widespread sexual favoritism, but the evidence of such favoritism in 
the present case includes admissions by the participants concerning the nature of 
the relationships, boasting by the favored women, eyewitness accounts of 
incidents of public fondling, repeated promotion despite lack of qualifications, and 
 
 
32
Kuykendall’s admission he could not control Brown because of his sexual 
relationship with her ― a matter confirmed by the Department’s internal affairs 
report.  Indeed, it is ironic that, according to defendants, a jury should not be 
permitted to consider evidence of widespread sexual favoritism that the 
Department itself found convincing. 
Finally, defendants warn that plaintiffs’ position, if adopted, would inject 
the courts into relationships that are private and consensual and that occur within a 
major locus of individual social life for both men and women — the workplace.  
According to defendants, social policy favors rather than disfavors such 
relationships, and the issue of personal privacy should give courts pause before 
allowing claims such as those advanced by plaintiffs to proceed.  Defendants urge 
it is safer to treat sexual favoritism as merely a matter of personal preference, and 
to recall that the FEHA is not intended to regulate sexual relationships in the 
workplace, nor to establish a civility code governing that venue.   
We do not believe that defendants’ concerns about regulating personal 
relationships are well founded, because it is not the relationship, but its effect on 
the workplace, that is relevant under the applicable legal standard.  Thus, we have 
not discussed those interactions between Kuykendall and his sexual partners that 
were truly private.  Moreover, the FEHA already clearly contemplates some 
intrusion into personal relationships.  Specifically the FEHA recognizes that 
sexual harassment occurs when a sexual relationship between a supervisor and a 
subordinate is based upon an asserted quid pro quo.   
III 
As noted, plaintiffs also alleged a cause of action for retaliation in violation 
of the FEHA. 
The FEHA protects employees against retaliation for filing a complaint or 
participating in proceedings or hearings under the act, or for opposing conduct 
 
 
33
made unlawful by the act.  (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (h).)  Specifically, section 
12940, subdivision (h), declares that it is an unlawful employment practice for 
“any employer . . . or person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against 
any person because the person has opposed any practices forbidden under this part 
or because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding 
under this part.”   
This enactment aids enforcement of the FEHA and promotes 
communication and informal dispute resolution in the workplace.  (Flait v. North 
American Watch Corp. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 476-477.)  Employees may 
establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation by showing that (1) they 
engaged in activities protected by the FEHA, (2) their employers subsequently 
took adverse employment action against them, and (3) there was a causal 
connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.  
(Id. at p. 476.) 
Miller asserted she engaged in protected activity in complaining about 
“improper relationships and sexual favoritism” and that “[w]hen Miller 
complained to Warden Tina Farmon about Kuykendall’s affair with Bibb, when 
she complained to Gerald Harris about the Warden’s [Kuykendall’s] affairs and 
resulting harassment, when she complained to Brown about the affairs and 
resulting harassment, when she told Kuykendall of Brown’s assault and battery on 
her, when she participated in Internal Affairs investigation, and when she 
subsequently wrote to Richard Ehle that [the Department] had failed to protect her 
after she testified, she was opposing the hostile work environment at [the 
Department] which resulted from the Warden’s sexual favoritism.”  Miller added 
that she engaged in protected activity in seeking accommodation for her physical 
disability, and complained that the resulting accommodation was withdrawn after 
she cooperated in the internal affairs investigation.  
 
 
34
Miller asserted that she suffered retaliation in a number of additional ways.  
She presented evidence that, in response to her complaints, supervisorial 
employees Brown and Yamamoto undermined her authority in various respects, 
publicly demeaned her, imposed additional onerous duties upon her, and subjected 
her to ostracism.  Brown, a management employee, physically assaulted Miller in 
an effort to silence her, and threatened Miller with retribution as a result of 
Miller’s cooperation with the internal affairs investigation.  As previously noted, 
there was evidence that Kuykendall withdrew accommodations previously 
accorded Miller on account of her physical disability, and that he refused to curb 
Brown’s abuse. 
Plaintiff Mackey claimed she “engaged in protected activity under the 
FEHA when she complained on numerous occasions about what she and other 
women perceived to be a hostile work environment based on the sexual affairs of 
the Warden and the unchecked harassment suffered as a result of those affairs.  In 
1997, she discussed with her superior, Edna Miller, the harassment by Brown 
which went unchecked because of the Warden’s affair with Brown.  Miller then 
raised the issue with a sex harassment advisor Gerald Harris and with Warden 
Kuykendall.  Mackey complained to chief deputy warden Vicky Yamamoto and to 
Warden Kuykendall about Brown’s assault on Miller which resulted from Miller’s 
stating she would report the affairs and favoritism, and neither Yamamoto nor 
Kuykendall took appropriate corrective action.  In 1998, Mackey complained to 
Internal Affairs about the sexual affairs, favoritism and the unchecked harassment 
which resulted.”   
Mackey claimed she suffered retaliation, providing evidence she was 
deprived of eligibility for a promotion, lost special pay for inmate contact, suffered 
ostracism, and was reassigned to tasks well below her capacity.  She also alleged 
 
 
35
that Brown verbally abused and threatened her as a result of Mackey’s cooperation 
with the internal affairs investigation. 
Neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeal reached the question whether 
defendants had taken an adverse employment action against plaintiffs based on 
their complaints of sexual harassment, or the question whether there was a causal 
connection between the asserted protected activity and any adverse action, because 
each court determined that plaintiffs had failed to make a prima facie showing that 
they had engaged in protected activity by opposing sexual harassment that was 
prohibited by the FEHA. 
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that, under certain circumstances, a 
retaliation claim may be brought by an employee who has complained of or 
opposed conduct, even when a court or jury subsequently determines the conduct 
actually was not prohibited by the FEHA.  Indeed, this precept is well settled.  
(Flait v. North American Watch Corporation, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 477 [the 
plaintiff may prevail “even if the harassment was not sufficiently severe or 
pervasive that it altered [the plaintiff’s] work environment”]; Moyo v. Gomez (9th 
Cir. 1994) 40 F.3d 982, 985; Gifford v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (9th 
Cir. 1982) 685 F.2d 1149, 1157.)  An employee is protected against retaliation if 
the employee reasonably and in good faith believed that what he or she was 
opposing constituted unlawful employer conduct such as sexual harassment or 
sexual discrimination.  (Flait v. North American Watch Corporation, supra, 3 
Cal.App.4th at p. 477; see also E.E.O.C. v. Crown Zellerbach Corp. (9th. Cir. 
1983) 720 F.2d 1008, 1013, fn. 2.) 
The Court of Appeal concluded, however, that although plaintiffs had 
opposed Kuykendall’s conduct, they had not engaged in protected activity,  
 
 
36
because they had not expressed opposition to sex discrimination or sexual 
harassment.  As the court understood the record, “[p]laintiffs were not 
complaining about sexual harassment but unfairness.  This is not protected activity 
under the FEHA.”   
The appellate court faulted plaintiffs for not having complained to 
defendants “that the affairs and related conduct created an atmosphere whereby 
they felt they were being judged on their sexuality rather than on merit.  Neither 
woman claimed to have been propositioned by a supervisor, expressly or 
impliedly, or to have been the subject of unwanted sexual attention.  Neither 
woman claimed that the atmosphere had become so sexually charged that they 
could no longer do their work.  Rather, plaintiffs’ complaints and reports 
concerned the unfairness of promotions and other benefits given to paramours and 
the resulting mistreatment of them by those paramours.”  The Court of Appeal 
added that plaintiffs had not complained that they “were being forced to work in 
an atmosphere where they had to run a gauntlet of sexual abuse or where they 
were judged on their sexuality rather than on the merits.  This is not a situation 
where plaintiffs honestly, but mistakenly, believed they were engaging in 
protected activity by reporting sexual harassment.  Plaintiffs did not even attempt 
to report sexual harassment.”  
We have concluded above, contrary to the determination of the Court of 
Appeal, that the conduct plaintiffs complained of may constitute sexual 
harassment in violation of the FEHA.  We do not believe employees should be 
required to elaborate to their employer on the legal theory underlying the 
complaints they are making, in order to be protected by the FEHA.  (See Moyo v. 
Gomez, supra, 40 F.3d at p. 985 [in analyzing retaliation claims, courts should 
recognize that plaintiffs have limited legal knowledge]; Gifford v. Atchison, 
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., supra, 685 F.2d at p. 1157 [“It requires a certain 
 
 
37
sophistication for an employee to recognize that an offensive employment practice 
may represent sex or race discrimination that is against the law”]; see also 
Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., supra, 904 F.2d at p. 866 [although the 
plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim based upon isolated sexual favoritism 
did not survive summary judgment, her retaliation claim did — “[Union Carbide] 
is not free to retaliate against plaintiff simply because she has failed to build her 
sex discrimination claim properly,” and she was not required “to guess the 
outcome of New Jersey law correctly”].)  Furthermore, even if ultimately it is 
concluded defendants’ conduct did not constitute a violation of the FEHA, we are 
not persuaded by defendant’s claim that only an employee’s mistake of fact, and 
not a mistake of law, may establish an employee’s good faith but mistaken belief 
that he or she is opposing conduct prohibited by the FEHA.  (See Moyo v. Gomez, 
supra, 40 F.3d at p. 985 [the employee’s good faith “reasonable mistake may be 
one of fact or law”]; Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., supra, 904 F.2d at p. 
866 [sanctioning a retaliation claim in light of the plaintiff’s reasonable belief 
concerning the law].)   
Particularly in view of the EEOC policy statement quoted at length above, 
whether or not a jury or a court ultimately concludes defendants’ conduct 
constituted sexual harassment, employees such as plaintiffs reasonably could 
believe they are making a claim of sexual harassment in violation of the FEHA 
when they complain of sexual favoritism in their workplace.  Although plaintiffs 
may not have recited the specific words “sexual discrimination” or “sexual 
harassment,” the nature of their complaint certainly fell within the general purview 
of the FEHA, especially when we recall that this case is before us on review of a 
grant of summary judgment.   
The FEHA’s stricture against retaliation serves the salutary purpose of 
encouraging open communication between employees and employers so that 
 
 
38
employers can take voluntary steps to remedy FEHA violations (Flait v. North 
American Watch Corp., supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 476), a result that will be 
achieved only if employees feel free to make complaints without fear of 
retaliation.  The FEHA should be liberally construed to deter employers from 
taking actions that would discourage employees from bringing complaints that 
they believe to be well founded.  The act would provide little comfort to 
employees, and thereby would fail in its ameliorative purpose, if employees feared 
they lawfully could lose their employment or suffer other adverse action should 
they fail to phrase accurately the legal theory underlying their complaint 
concerning behavior that may violate the act. 
Similar concerns recently were expressed by the United States Supreme 
Court in commenting upon the need to protect whistle blowers who complained 
that a recipient of federal education funding intentionally discriminated on the 
basis of sex.  (Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ. (2005) ___ U.S. ___ [125 S.Ct. 
1497].)  The court concluded that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 
(20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (Title IX)) provides the whistle blower with a private 
right of action for retaliation.  The high court, observing that Title IX would be 
unenforceable if persons feared retaliation in the event they complained 
concerning discriminatory practices, stated:  “Congress enacted Title IX not only 
to prevent the use of federal dollars to support discriminatory practices, but also 
‘to provide individual citizens effective protection against those practices.’  
[Citation.]  We agree with the United States that this objective ‘would be difficult, 
if not impossible, to achieve if persons who complain about sex discrimination did 
not have effective protection against retaliation.’  [Citation.]  If recipients [of 
federal funds] were permitted to retaliate freely, individuals who witness 
discrimination would be loathe to report it, and all manner of Title IX violations 
might go unremedied as a result.  [Citation.] [¶] Reporting incidents of 
 
 
39
discrimination is integral to Title IX enforcement and would be discouraged if 
retaliation against those who report went unpunished.  Indeed, if retaliation were 
not prohibited, Title IX’s enforcement scheme would unravel.”  (Jackson v. 
Birmingham Bd. of Educ., supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 1508].) 
Defendants contend, and the Court of Appeal apparently concluded, that 
plaintiffs did not demonstrate that at the time of their complaints they held a 
subjective, good faith belief that they were complaining about sexual harassment.  
They assume such a subjective mental state must be demonstrated even when a 
plaintiff is not relying upon a good faith mistake.  Whether or not this assumption 
is accurate, we conclude that the subjective belief of the plaintiffs before us may 
be inferred from the nature and content of their repeated complaints.  The issue of 
a plaintiff’s subjective, good faith belief involves questions of credibility and 
ordinarily cannot be resolved on summary judgment.  (See, e.g., Flait v. North 
American Watch Corp., supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 477.) 
Because the Court of Appeal concluded plaintiffs failed to establish that 
they were engaged in protected activity when they complained about potential 
sexual harassment, that court did not reach the question whether plaintiffs 
established a prima facie case on the remaining elements of their retaliation 
claim — specifically, whether plaintiffs suffered an adverse employment action in 
response to their sexual harassment complaints, and whether any adverse action 
was caused by their protected activity.9  The court also did not reach defendants’ 
claim that plaintiffs failed to file their administrative complaint within the period 
established by law.  (See Gov. Code, § 12960, subd. (d) [plaintiffs must file their 
                                              
9  
The only aspect of the Court of Appeal’s discussion that pertained to the 
issue of causation concerned Miller’s claim of retaliation on the basis of her 
demand for disability accommodation. 
 
 
40
complaints with the FEHC within one year of the alleged unlawful employment 
practice].)  We conclude it is appropriate to permit the Court of Appeal to address 
these questions in the first instance on remand.  
IV 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed 
to the extent it is inconsistent with our opinion, and the matter is remanded to the 
Court of Appeal for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Miller v. Department of Corrections 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 105 Cal.App.4th 945 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S114097 
Date Filed: July 18, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Sacramento 
Judge: Joe S. Gray 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Lawless & Lawless, Barbara A. Lawless, Aelish M. Baig and Sonya L. Smallets for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants. 
 
Law Offices of Philip Edward Kay and Lawrence A. Organ for The Civil Rights Forum as Amicus Curiae 
on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Law Offices of Jeffrey K. Winikow and Jeffrey K. Winikow for California Employment Lawyers 
Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
The Lucas Law Firm and Kathleen M. Lucas for Equal Rights Advocates’ as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
The Sturdevant Law Firm, James C. Sturdevant; Law Offices of Daniel U. Smith, Daniel U. Smith; Ian 
Herzog; Michael Adler; Sharon J. Arkin; Stuart B. Esner; Brian S. Kabateck; David A. Rosen; Christine D. 
Spagnoli; Lea-Ann Tratten, Steven B. Stevens; and Scott H. Z. Sumner for Consumer Attorneys of 
California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Jacob Appelsmith, Assistant Attorney General, Vincent J. Scally, Jr., 
Timothy G. Yeung, Diana L. Cuomo and David J. Neill, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and 
Respondents. 
 
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Rebecca D. Eisen, Thomas M. Peterson and Shannon B. Nakabayashi for The 
Employers Group as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Daniel U. Smith 
Law Offices of Daniel U. Smith 
Post Office Box 278 
Kentfield, CA  94914 
(415) 461-5630 
 
David J. Neill 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 327-4853