Case Title: IN RE CHRISTOPHER C BROWN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 30, 2001  
In re HON. CHRISTOPHER BROWN (AFTER REMAND) 
Judge of the Fiftieth District Court, 
Pontiac, Michigan. 
No. 111840  
PER CURIAM  
This judicial disciplinary matter is before this Court  
after remand to the Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) to  
determine whether statements made by respondent following an  
automobile accident resulted in judicial misconduct that was  
clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice. In In  
re Brown, 461 Mich 1291 (2000), this Court set forth several  
factors that were among the criteria to be used in evaluating  
judicial discipline cases.  We then remanded the present  
matter to the JTC for an application of the suggested factors  
to the facts of this case.  The JTC, in a June 23, 2000  
supplemental 
decision 
and 
recommendation, 
found 
that  
respondent was “attempting to use the prestige of [his] office  
to gain a personal advantage” and, thus, recommended a  
sanction of suspension from the discharge of all judicial and  
administrative duties without pay for a period of fifteen  
days.
 Upon review, we hereby adopt the JTC’s recommended  
sanction of suspension from the discharge of all judicial and  
administrative duties without pay for a period of fifteen  
days.  
I  
These proceedings arise out of statements made by 50th  
District Court Judge Christopher C. Brown, respondent,  
following an automobile accident involving respondent and  
another driver.  The JTC filed a complaint and an evidentiary  
hearing was held.  Following the hearing, the master concluded  
in a report that respondent did not abuse his office.  The  
JTC’s examiner then filed written objections to the report  
with the JTC.  On review, the JTC made the following findings  
of fact:  
(1) Respondent, at all times hereinafter mentioned, was  
a Judge of the 50th District Court in the City of Pontiac,  
County of Oakland, State of Michigan.  
2  
  
(2) Respondent was involved in an automobile accident  
with Sue Lambouris on April 26, 1996.  
(3) The Pontiac Police Department was notified of the  
accident, and that officers Darryl Cosby and Craig Pesco  
responded to the location of the accident.  
(4) Respondent knew police officer Darryl Cosby.  
(5) Respondent told the police officers that Sue  
Lambouris was speeding.  Specifically, Respondent stated that  
Mrs. Lambouris was “doing 85 miles per hour.”  
(6) Respondent requested that Mrs. Lambouris’ name be  
“run on L.E.I.N. [Law Enforcement Information Network] and  
ticketed.”  
On the basis of its findings of fact, which we adopt for  
purposes of this per curiam opinion, the JTC determined that  
respondent was “attempting to use the prestige of [his] office  
to gain a personal advantage” and that such conduct was  
“clearly prejudicial” to the administration of justice in  
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 1, 2A, 2B  
and 2C.  The JTC then recommended that respondent be suspended  
from the discharge of all judicial and administrative duties  
without pay for fifteen days.  
Upon review of the JTC’s decision and recommendation,  
this Court remanded this matter to the JTC for the  
“articulation 
of 
standards of judicial discipline, and for the  
3  
application of those standards to the instant case.”  In re  
Brown, supra. As we stated in that case, the development of  
standards by the JTC will better enable the JTC to respond to  
“equivalent cases in an equivalent manner.”  Furthermore, the  
application of standards by the JTC will allow this Court to  
more 
meaningfully 
review 
the 
JTC’s 
disciplinary  
recommendations.
 In Brown, supra, we articulated several  
factors that were among the criteria to be used in evaluating  
judicial discipline cases.  The recommended factors are as  
follows:  
(1) misconduct that is part of a pattern or 
practice is more serious than an isolated instance 
of misconduct;  
(2) misconduct on the bench is usually more 
serious than the same misconduct off the bench;  
(3) misconduct that is prejudicial to the 
actual administration of justice is more serious 
than misconduct that is prejudicial only to the 
appearance propriety;  
(4) misconduct that does not implicate the 
actual administration of justice, or its appearance 
of impropriety, is less serious than misconduct 
that does;  
(5) misconduct that occurs spontaneously is 
less serious than misconduct that is premeditated 
or deliberated;  
(6) misconduct that undermines the ability of 
the justice system to discover the truth of what 
occurred in a legal controversy, or to reach the 
most just result in such a case, is more serious 
than misconduct that merely delays such discovery;  
(7)  misconduct that involves the unequal  
4  
 
application of justice on the basis of such  
considerations as race, color, ethnic background, 
gender, or religion are more serious than breaches 
of justice that do not disparage the integrity of 
the system on the basis of a class of citizenship. 
[461 Mich 1292-1293.]  
After 
remand, 
the 
JTC 
filed 
a 
supplemental  
recommendation.  In this recommendation, the JTC determined  
that respondent was “attempting to use the prestige of [his]  
office to gain a personal advantage.” Consequently, the JTC  
again recommended that this Court suspend respondent from the  
discharge of all judicial and administrative duties for a  
period of fifteen days. The JTC, however, did not expressly  
apply the recommended factors as set forth in In re Brown for  
the reason that its membership had changed between the  
original recommendation and the remand.  Therefore, before we  
“adopt, reject, or modify” the JTC’s recommended discipline,  
we will engage in a brief analysis of the Brown factors as  
applied to Judge Brown himself.  
II  
Upon review, we conclude that factors 1, 2, 4, and 5 are  
relevant to this case.  In particular, factors 1 and 4 support  
the JTC’s recommended discipline of respondent. Pursuant to  
factor 1, we find that respondent’s conduct was part of a  
pattern or practice of misconduct rather than an isolated  
instance of misconduct. 
As the JTC stated in its  
recommendation for discipline, respondent had been admonished  
5  
  
  
  
 
  
by the JTC on four prior occasions for acts of misconduct.1  
Additionally, pursuant to factor 4, respondent’s conduct  
implicated the appearance of impropriety.  The record shows  
that respondent knew one of the investigating officers who  
arrived at the scene.  This existing relationship, coupled  
with 
respondent’s attempted 
direction 
to 
the 
officer  
concerning the type of investigation that he should conduct  
with regard to the other driver, gave rise to an appearance of  
impropriety and had the potential to erode the public’s  
confidence in the judiciary.2  
1 
Even if the dissent is correct that respondent’s 
behavior is not properly characterized as part of a “pattern 
or practice” of misconduct, there is nothing at all  
inappropriate in the JTC taking into consideration in its 
proportionality decisions altogether unrelated instances of 
misconduct.  
2 We do not disagree with the dissent’s characterization 
of the rules of conduct with regard to “judge-victims.”   Post  
at 7. However, unlike the dissent, we believe that  
respondent’s conduct went well beyond a mere “report[ing] the 
underlying facts involved in the crime.” Post at 4. Rather, 
in this case, the respondent directed the officer to take two 
very specific actions: (a) run Ms. Lambouris’ name through the 
LEIN system, and (b) issue Ms. Lambouris a ticket. Though a 
fine line cannot always be drawn in these matters, the 
respondent’s direction to the officer, in our judgment, was 
not in the nature of a mere call to investigation, it was not 
simply a spontaneous expression of anger or pique, and it was 
more than a generalized call to the officer to do something 
about an unfortunate situation.  Rather, when made to an 
officer who was aware of respondent’s judicial status, such 
direction, in our opinion, invoked respondent’s judicial 
status in an inappropriate manner.  
6  
 
  
  
 
On the other hand, factors 2 and 5 mitigate against  
increasing respondent’s sanction.  Pursuant to factor 2, it is  
important to highlight that the misconduct at issue arose out  
of statements made pursuant to an automobile accident.  The  
misconduct did not occur while respondent was on the bench.  
Additionally, pursuant to factor 5, the remarks made by  
respondent appear to have been made spontaneously and under at  
least some stress, with respondent having just been involved  
in an automobile accident.  When the police officers arrived,  
respondent told the officers that Mrs. Lambouris was speeding  
at eighty-five miles an hour.  With regard to this remark, the  
JTC found that “[r]espondent knowingly made a false  
statement.” However, pursuant to the circumstances of this  
case, this Court concludes that this remark was merely a  
speculation concerning the rate of speed of the other driver.  
Concerning respondent’s request that the officers search Mrs.  
Lambouris’ name in the LEIN system and ticket her, we reach  
the same conclusion.  Respondent’s remark was merely a  
spontaneous reaction in the immediate aftermath of an  
automobile accident. After weighing the above factors, and  
applying them to the circumstances of this case, we believe  
that respondent’s past disciplinary indiscretions, as well as  
the appearance of impropriety that resulted from respondent’s  
statements to the police officers, one of whom he knew,  
7  
 
 
 
 
regarding the type of investigation that the officers should  
engage in was sufficient misconduct to warrant the adoption of  
the JTC’s recommendation of discipline. Thus, we hold that  
respondent be suspended from the discharge of all judicial and  
administrative duties without pay for a period of fifteen  
days.  
Pursuant to MCR 7.317(C)(3), the Clerk is directed to  
issue the judgment order forthwith.  
CAVANAGH, WEAVER, KELLY, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred.  
8  
_________________________________ 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
In re HON. CHRISTOPHER BROWN (AFTER REMAND) 
Judge of the Fiftieth District Court, 
Pontiac, Michigan. 
No. 111840  
CORRIGAN, C.J. (dissenting).  
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to  
suspend respondent for fifteen days for certain statements he  
made in the aftermath of an automobile accident.  I would hold  
that respondent’s actions, while certainly not exemplary, did  
not 
constitute 
judicial misconduct because his conduct was not  
clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice.  
I  
These proceedings arise from a car accident involving  
respondent and another driver in Pontiac.  Pontiac police  
officers responded to a call for assistance and investigated.  
Respondent told an officer with whom he was acquainted that  
the other driver had been traveling at eighty-five miles an  
hour.
 He then requested that the officer run the other  
driver’s name on the Law Enforcement Information Network  
(LEIN), and urged the officer to ticket the other driver.  The  
officer did not, however, issue a ticket.  The owner of the  
other car later brought an action in 50th District Court to  
recover his insurance deductible.  
The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) complaint alleged  
misconduct arising from (1) respondent’s conduct at the  
accident scene, (2) respondent’s transfer of the district  
court action to another judge, and (3) respondent’s conduct  
during the hearing on the district court lawsuit.  The  
complaint also alleged misconduct arising from respondent’s  
conduct during an unrelated criminal case and his unrelated  
actions in presiding over uncontested and default matters  
involving his court officer.  
At the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing, the master  
determined that the examiner failed to establish judicial  
impropriety and that respondent did not violate the code of  
judicial conduct, court rules, or the constitution.  The  
master found that respondent “informed the officers of [the  
other driver’s] excessive speed (the testimony varies between  
85 and 50 miles per hour) and . . . stated his desire to have  
[the other driver] run on a lien [sic] machine and ticketed  
. . . .”  The master further found that reason existed to  
believe that the other driver had been speeding, although the  
evidence did not support respondent’s claim that the car had  
been traveling at eighty-five miles an hour.  The master  
characterized respondent’s statement that the other car was  
2  
 
 
 
traveling “85 miles per hour” as a “hyperbolic exaggeration  
and not a deliberate falsification, similar perhaps to  
claiming that ‘she was going like a bat out of Hell.’”  The  
master rejected all the remaining allegations in the  
complaint.  
The JTC affirmed the master’s finding that respondent  
made the statements at the accident scene, but rejected the  
master’s conclusion that respondent had not abused the  
prestige of his office.  The JTC found that respondent’s  
conduct violated Canons 1 and 2(A)-(C) of the Code of Judicial  
Conduct.3  It found that respondent’s conduct constituted  
1 Canon 1 provides in part that “[a] judge should 
participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and 
should personally observe, high standards of conduct so that 
the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be 
preserved.”  
Canon 2(A)-(C) provides:  
A.  Public confidence in the judiciary is 
eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by 
judges.  A judge must avoid all impropriety and 
appearance of impropriety. A judge must expect to 
be the subject of constant public scrutiny.  A  
judge must therefore accept restrictions on conduct 
that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary 
citizen and should do so freely and willingly.  
B.  A judge should respect and observe the  
law.  At all times, the conduct and manner of a 
judge should promote public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 
Without regard to a person’s race, gender, or other 
protected personal characteristic, a judge should 
(continued...)  
3  
 
misconduct under MCR 9.205(C)(4) because it was clearly  
prejudicial to the administration of justice. The JTC adopted  
the master’s findings and conclusions regarding the other  
allegations of misconduct.  It recommended that this Court  
suspend respondent for fifteen days.  
II  
In this case, the JTC recommends discipline solely on the  
basis of respondent’s conduct at the accident scene.  Thus,  
while 
the 
complaint 
certainly alleged other misconduct, I have  
confined my review solely to judicial misconduct arising from  
respondent’s statements to the investigating officers because  
this Court may discipline a judge only “[o]n recommendation of  
the judicial tenure commission.”  Const 1963, art 6, § 30; see  
In re Mikesell, 396 Mich 517, 524-527; 243 NW2d 86 (1976). I  
conclude that the JTC failed to prove by a preponderance of  
the evidence4 that respondent attempted to use the prestige of  
(...continued) 
treat every person fairly, with courtesy and  
respect.  
C.  A judge should not allow family, social,  
or other relationships to influence judicial 
conduct or judgment.  A judge should not use the 
prestige of office to advance personal business 
interests or those of others.  A judge should not 
appear as a witness in a court proceeding unless 
subpoenaed.  
2 In re Loyd, 424 Mich 514, 521; 384 NW2d 9 (1986).  
4  
 
 
his office to gain a personal advantage and that his conduct  
was clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice.  
In my view, the determination whether respondent’s  
conduct was clearly prejudicial to the administration of  
justice hinges on respondent’s intent in making statements to  
the officers at the accident scene.  The master found that  
respondent was “shaken, excited and emotional” after the  
accident.
 The master further characterized respondent’s  
statement regarding the speed of the other driver’s car as  
“hyperbole.”
 I would defer to those findings because,  
although this Court reviews the record de novo, In re Loyd,  
424 Mich 514, 521; 384 NW2d 9 (1986), we accord deference to  
the master’s ability to observe witnesses’ demeanor and  
evaluate their credibility.  Id. at 535. I thus defer to the  
master’s 
credibility 
finding 
that 
respondent 
did not  
intentionally lie to the officer.  I am frankly puzzled by the  
JTC majority’s finding of an intentional falsehood.  They gave  
no reason for concluding that the master erred in his contrary  
credibility determination.5  
3 Under MCR 9.221(B), the JTC must make written findings 
of fact and conclusions of law along with its recommendations 
for action, but may adopt the master’s findings, in whole or 
in part, by reference.  In light of the master’s superior 
position for purposes of evaluating the credibility of 
witnesses, however, it is incumbent on the JTC to explain its 
reasons for rejecting a master’s finding that turns on such a 
determination.  Moreover, absent a hearing at which the 
(continued...)  
5  
 
I further agree with the majority’s characterization of  
respondent’s 
statement at the accident scene as a “spontaneous  
speculation” 
induced 
by “stress” in the immediate aftermath of  
an automobile accident.  I accept and see no clear error in  
the finding of the Master that Judge Brown’s statement was  
hyperbole.  Further, I accept the master’s finding that Judge  
Brown had no insidious motive.  
In light of this conclusion, I would not hold that Judge  
Brown knowingly and intentionally attempted to use the  
prestige of his office to gain a personal advantage.  I cannot  
say with any degree of certainty that he attempted to misuse  
the prestige of his office to gain a personal advantage.  His  
conduct seems to me equally likely the spontaneous reaction of  
a shaken accident victim.  
The majority rule is that a judge-victim who is  
acquainted with the police officers who are conducting an  
investigation may provide a report about the relevant facts,  
but cannot recommend any action on the basis of those facts.  
Thus, a judge who is a victim of an armed robbery may report  
the underlying facts involved in the crime, but may not say,  
(...continued) 
witnesses actually testify before the JTC, MCR 9.219, I 
question 
whether 
this Court should reject the master’s finding 
in favor of a contrary finding by the JTC.  
6  
“There’s the robber—arrest that man.”6
 The direction to  
arrest may demonstrate a misuse of office to advance personal  
interests in recovering the judge’s stolen property.  
Next, I cannot join the conclusion that Judge Brown’s  
statements at the accident scene were part of a “pattern and  
practice” of misconduct on the basis of prior JTC admonitions  
against Judge Brown.  Judge Brown’s excited utterances at the  
accident 
scene 
were 
unique, isolated events, different in kind  
from the events and statements that formed the basis of the  
prior JTC admonitions.  I cannot join the conclusion that  
Judge Brown’s conduct at the accident scene demonstrates a  
pattern and practice of misconduct.  
I would reject the JTC recommendation in this case  
because respondent’s conduct at the accident scene was not  
clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice.  The  
record does not reflect that the other driver heard  
respondent’s 
remarks.  Nor does it establish that respondent’s  
statements influenced the officer’s decision to issue a  
ticket. That a motorist whose vehicle has been struck in an  
accident would request in the immediate aftermath that the  
responding officer ticket the driver of the other car is not  
unusual.  That a judge, still shaken from the accident, would  
6 
 While an armed robbery is a crime, not an accident, 
both are startling events likely to trigger in the victim 
spontaneous, excited utterances.  
7  
 
make 
a 
similar 
request 
is 
not 
prejudicial 
to 
the  
administration of justice.  Moreover, respondent’s comment  
requesting a LEIN check does not, under the circumstances of  
this case, elevate respondent’s conduct to a level that  
clearly prejudices the administration of justice.  The master  
found that respondent acted without an insidious motive.  
Accordingly, I would decline to impose discipline on the basis  
of respondent’s conduct at the scene of the accident.7  
7Assuming 
that 
respondent’s 
actions 
constituted  
misconduct, the misconduct would not warrant a suspension.  I  
also part company from my colleagues in their application of 
the governing principles set out in our prior order to these 
facts:  
While we do not purport to substitute our 
judgment for that of the JTC in this regard, some 
of these standards are obvious.  For example, 
everything else being equal:  
(1) misconduct that is part of a pattern or 
practice is more serious than an isolated instance 
of misconduct;  
(2) misconduct on the bench is usual more 
serious than the same misconduct off the bench;  
(3) misconduct that is prejudicial to the 
actual administration of justice is more serious 
than misconduct that is prejudicial only to the 
appearance of propriety;  
(4) misconduct that does not implicate the 
actual administration of justice, or its appearance 
of impropriety, is less serious than misconduct 
that does;  
(5) misconduct that occurs spontaneously is 
less serious than misconduct that is premeditated 
(continued...)  
8  
 
 
III  
I conclude that respondent’s 
were not clearly  
prejudicial to the administration of justice.  I would  
therefore reject the JTC recommendation to discipline  
respondent. Accordingly, I dissent.  
7(...continued) 
or deliberated;  
(6) misconduct that undermines the ability of 
the justice system to discover the truth of what 
occurred in a legal controversy, or to reach the 
most just result in such a case, is more serious 
than misconduct that merely delays such discovery;  
(7) misconduct that involves the unequal 
application of justice on the basis of such  
considerations as race, color, ethnic background, 
gender, or religion are more serious than breaches 
of justice that do not disparage the integrity of 
the system on the basis of a class of citizenship. 
[461 Mich 1294-1295.]  
Application of these factors to this case suggests the 
lightest form of discipline for those members of this Court 
who conclude that respondent was engaged in judicial 
misconduct—a censure.  Respondent’s acts were spontaneous, 
isolated, occurred off the bench, and, at most, gave the 
appearance of impropriety. 
Respondent’s conduct did not 
implicate the actual administration of justice, and did not 
affect the ability of the justice system to discover the truth 
in a case.  Moreover, the alleged misconduct does not involve 
the unequal application of justice. Under the circumstances  
of this case, a suspension is not appropriate.  
9