Case Title: Pratt v. Armenakis

Citation: 

Docket Number: S48306

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2002-10-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  October 24, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

JESSE CLARENCE PRATT,
	Petitioner on Review,
	v.
NICHOLAS ARMENAKIS,
Superintendent,
Oregon State Penitentiary,
	Respondent on Review.
(TC 93C-13559; CA A107068; SC S48306)

	En Banc
	On review from an order of the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted September 10, 2002.
	Eric M. Cumfer, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs
for petitioner on review.
	Robert B. Rocklin, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for respondent on review.  With him on the briefs were
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor
General.
	Michael Curtis, of Curtis & Correll, Portland, filed briefs
on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers
Association.
	DE MUNIZ, J.
	The order of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
	*Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Albin W. Norblad, Judge. Order of the Court of Appeals dated February 27, 2001.
	DE MUNIZ, J.
	We allowed review in this case to consider petitioner's
challenge to an order entered by the Chief Judge of the Court of
Appeals permitting petitioner to file an opening brief of 150
pages.  Petitioner contends that, although the Chief Judge
generally has discretion to place some limit on the length of the
opening brief, state and federal requirements constrain the
exercise of that discretion.  According to petitioner, the Chief
Judge's order must be modified, because a page limit of less than
the 260 pages that he requested will not permit him to vindicate
fully his constitutional rights in the appellate process.  We
conclude that petitioner has failed to make such a showing and
affirm the order of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals.
	Petitioner initially was convicted of two counts of
aggravated murder and sentenced to death.  This court reversed
the convictions and remanded for a new trial.  State v. Pratt,
309 Or 205, 785 P2d 350 (1990).  On retrial, petitioner again was
convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death, and this
court affirmed the convictions and sentence.  State v. Pratt, 316
Or 561, 853 P2d 827 (1993).
	In a subsequent post-conviction proceeding, petitioner
unsuccessfully attempted to have his convictions and sentence
vacated.  He then appealed from the judgment dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief. 
		In the Court of Appeals, petitioner requested
permission to file an extended brief of 260 pages.  The Chief
Judge granted the motion in part, extending the page limit for
the opening brief to 100 pages. (1)

  Petitioner then moved for
reconsideration, again requesting permission to file a brief of
260 pages.  The Chief Judge granted the motion for
reconsideration in part, extending the page limit to 150 pages. 
Still dissatisfied, petitioner sought review in this court of the
Chief Judge's order on reconsideration.
		Petitioner's primary contention is factual.  He asserts 
that a restriction on the length of his opening brief will
require him to omit some claims of error from the brief and limit
his ability to argue the claims fully.  On the basis of that
assertion, petitioner argues that requiring him to file a brief
of fewer than 260 pages implicates his state and federal
constitutional rights.  For example, petitioner argues that the
150-page limit violates the remedies clause of Article I, section
10, of the Oregon Constitution because, "[f]or the law to
recognize a right but deprive a person of a substantial remedy
for harm to his person would violate Article I, section 10." (2) 
Further, petitioner asserts that, under the remedies clause,
justice would not be "complete" unless the court considers all
the issues that he desires to raise.  
		Petitioner makes several federal arguments as well. 
For example, he asserts that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause (3) includes a right to be heard and that a page limit
prejudices that right.  He also contends that the page limit
violates the federal Supremacy Clause, (4) because the page limit
will require him to forego making several arguments based on
federal law.  In addition, he urges that the page limit
transgresses the concept of "meaningful appellate review" under
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution (5) and
Oregon's statutory right to counsel under ORS 138.590, (6) because
it will deprive petitioner of the opportunity to make all the
arguments that he desires to make.  
		We begin with ORAP 5.05(3)(a).  Two elements of that
rule are significant:  the moving party's specific reason to
extend the page limitation and the number of pages by which the
moving party desires to exceed the prescribed limit.  However,
stating a specific reason for exceeding the prescribed page limit
will not necessarily justify an extension to any length that the
moving party desires.  Some limit on the length of any appellate
brief is necessary.  ORAP 5.05(3)(a) provides the court with
discretion to decide whether the specific reason that the moving
party offers justifies extending the page limit and, if so, by
how much. 
		Here, however, petitioner's argument does not
acknowledge any legitimate exercise of discretion by the Court of
Appeals in this instance.  As previously noted, petitioner's
argument is based on the factual assertion that restricting the
page limit to fewer than the 260 pages that he requested violates
a number of his constitutional rights because it will force him
to choose not to brief potentially meritorious claims of error. 
That argument fails for two reasons.  First, that contention is
speculative.  Counsel for petitioner simply asserts, in part,
that he wants to raise "all issues that have arguable merit,"
that he "intends to raise at least 29 assignments of error," and
that he "anticipates that the argument section of the brief will
consume approximately 160 pages."  More is required.  For
example, petitioner could have submitted, in support of his
motion, a 150-page brief that concisely addressed only state law
claims, but failed to address arguable federal law claims due to
the page limit.  That kind of evidence would have constituted at
least some proof that limiting the brief to fewer than 260 pages
would force petitioner to make unacceptable choices in briefing
the necessary issues. 
		Second, petitioner has failed to show that he requires
260 pages to address all the worthy arguments that he desires to
advance in his appeal.  Courts depend on counsel to examine the
record, study the applicable law, and analyze the potentially
meritorious claims that should be advanced on appeal.  The
exercise of professional skill and judgment often requires a
lawyer to pick and choose among arguments or theories, and a
death penalty appeal is no exception to that requirement.  See
Smith v. Robbins, 528 US 259, 288, 120 S Ct 746, 145 L Ed 2d 756
(2000) (appellate counsel "need not (and should not) raise every
nonfrivolous claim, but rather may select from among them in
order to maximize the likelihood of success on appeal"). 
Effective appellate advocacy requires counsel to make those
choices.  Counsel's assertions in support of the motion do not
demonstrate that he analyzed those choices before seeking an
extended brief of 260 pages.
		Finally, petitioner argues that he must raise every
possible legal issue on appeal to preserve those arguments for
possible further review in federal court.  Petitioner is correct
that the federal courts do not consider that state remedies are 
exhausted unless an appellant has "fairly presented" a claim of
error to a state high court and that court has had an opportunity
to consider the argument and correct the asserted legal defect. 
Picard v. Connor, 404 US 270, 274-75, 92 S Ct 509, 30 L Ed 2d 438
(1971).  Federal courts require a habeas petitioner "to provide
the state courts with a 'fair opportunity' to apply controlling
legal principles to the facts bearing upon [petitioner's]
constitutional claim."  Anderson v. Harless, 459 US 4, 6, 103 S
Ct 276, 74 L Ed 2d 3 (1982).  Federal exhaustion requirements,
however, have no bearing on our determination whether petitioner
has shown that the number of pages that the Court of Appeals
authorized violates the constitutional rights on which he relies.
		Petitioner has not made a showing that the page limit
that the Chief Judge authorized will prohibit him from fully
vindicating his constitutional rights in the appellate process. 
Because petitioner has not made the requisite showing, the order
of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals authorizing an
extended brief of 150 pages is affirmed.
		The order of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.



1. 	Oregon Rules of Appellate Procedure (ORAP) 5.05(2)(a)
provides that no brief may exceed 50 pages.  However, rule
5.05(3)(a) provides, in part:  
		"On motion of a party stating a specific reason
for exceeding the prescribed limit, the court may
permit the filing of a brief * * * exceeding the page
limits prescribed in section (2) of this rule or
prescribed by order of the court."
2. 	Article I, section 10, provides, in part:
		"No court shall be secret, but justice shall be
administered, openly and without purchase, completely
and without delay, and every man shall have remedy by
due course of law for injury done him in his person,
property, or reputation."  
See Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or 83, 23 P3d 333
(2001) (discussing origins of remedies clause). 

3. 	The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, in part:
	"[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]"  
See Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 US 532, 542,
105 S Ct 1487, 84 L Ed 2d 494 (1985) (explaining that right to be
heard in court follows from due process requirement).

4. 	Article VI of the United States Constitution provides,
in part:
		"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby[.]"

5. 	"[N]or [shall] cruel and unusual punishments [be]
inflicted."  US Const, Amend VIII.  See Parker v. Dugger, 498 US
308, 321, 111 S Ct 731, 112 L Ed 2d 812, reh'g den 111 S Ct 1340,
113 L Ed 2d 271 (1991) (explaining that Eighth Amendment requires
meaningful appellate review to ensure that death penalty is not
imposed arbitrarily or irrationally).

6. 	If the circuit court determines that the petitioner is
indigent, then "the circuit court shall appoint suitable counsel
to represent petitioner."  ORS 138.590(4).