Case Title: Eley v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 118, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2002-08-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
  
RAPHUS ELEY, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 118, 2002 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr.A. Nos. 99-07-0027, 0028 
§                             0031-0033 
§ 
 
Submitted: July 12, 2002 
    
 
   
Decided:    August 12, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and STEELE, Justices 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 12th day of August 2002, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Raphus Eley, filed an appeal from the 
February 19, 2002 order of the Superior Court denying his motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.1  We find no 
merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 
                                                 
1The Superior Court also denied a number of other motions filed by Eley. 
 
 
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(2) 
In this appeal, Eley claims that: a) his original trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to file a timely appeal; b) he is entitled to a new 
trial because of the attorney’s ineffective assistance; c) his subsequent counsel 
provided ineffective assistance during the post-trial proceedings; d) his coerced 
confession was improperly admitted into evidence at trial; and e) there was 
insufficient evidence presented at trial to sustain his conviction.  To the extent 
Eley has not argued other grounds to support his appeal that were raised 
previously, those grounds are deemed waived and will not be addressed by this 
Court.2 
                                                 
2Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993).  In his motion for postconviction 
relief, Eley also claimed that his waiver of a preliminary hearing was involuntary, his arrest 
warrant was not based on probable cause, the consolidation of his arrest warrants was 
erroneous, and he was not advised of his right to elect a trial in the Court of Common Pleas. 
(3) 
On October 27, 1999, a Superior Court jury found Eley guilty of 2 
counts of Burglary in the Third Degree, 1 count of Assault in the Third Degree 
and 2 counts of Misdemeanor Theft.  On December 10, 1999, Eley was 
sentenced, on one of the burglary convictions, to 3 years incarceration at Level V, 
to be suspended for Level III probation following the successful completion of 
 
 
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the Key Program and a Level IV Residential Substance Abuse Treatment 
Program.  Eley received suspended sentences and probation on the remaining 
convictions.  
(4) 
On January 28, 2000, Eley’s trial counsel filed an untimely notice of 
appeal from Eley’s convictions and sentences.  This Court concluded that Eley 
had been provided ineffective assistance when trial counsel failed to perfect a 
timely appeal.  Accordingly, we dismissed the untimely appeal and remanded the 
case to the Superior Court for resentencing and the appointment of new 
counsel.3  Eley’s new counsel then filed a timely appeal and moved to withdraw.4 
 Eley’s convictions and sentences were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.5 
                                                 
3Eley v. State, Del. Supr., No. 42, 2000, Walsh, J.(Feb. 29, 2000). 
4SUPR. CT. R. 26(c). 
5Eley v. State, Del. Supr., No. 137, 2000, Steele, J. (Dec. 20, 2000). 
 
 
-4- 
(5) 
In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
Eley must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been 
different.6  Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly 
demanding and leads to a “strong presumption that the representation was 
professionally reasonable.”7 
(6) 
Eley has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the representation 
provided by his trial counsel.  While this Court previously ruled that Eley’s trial 
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,8 there 
was no prejudice to Eley, since the matter was remanded to the Superior Court 
for resentencing and the appointment of new counsel, and Eley’s direct appeal 
proceeded as it would have had his trial counsel filed a timely appeal.  Nor does 
the trial record reflect that Eley’s attorney’s performance at trial resulted in any 
prejudice to him.  Moreover, the record of the proceedings following the 
                                                 
6Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
7Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
8Eley v. State, Del. Supr., No. 42, 2000, Walsh, J.(Feb. 29, 2000). 
 
 
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Superior Court’s appointment of new counsel9 does not reflect any error on the 
part of that attorney resulting in prejudice to Eley. 
                                                 
9These proceedings included the resentencing hearing and a hearing on Eley’s motion 
for postconviction relief. 
 
 
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(7) 
Eley’s claim that his trial counsel’s ineffective assistance entitles him 
to a new trial was not raised below,10 thus precluding our consideration of the 
claim here.  There is no merit to the claim in any case, since Eley has failed to 
demonstrate any error in his trial counsel’s performance that would entitle him 
to such a remedy.11  
(8) 
Eley’s claim that his coerced confession was improperly admitted 
into evidence at trial is without any factual basis.  There is simply no evidence in 
the record to support Eley’s claim of a coerced confession.  The issue of coercion 
was never raised by Eley, either during the pretrial phase or at trial.  Indeed, 
while the arresting officer testified at trial that Eley made a confession and 
expressed remorse,12 Eley adamantly denied that he had ever made a confession 
at all.  
                                                 
10SUPR. CT. R. 8. 
11SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 33. 
12The officer testified that he did not record the confession, but later noted in his 
written report what he remembered about it. 
 
 
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(9) 
Eley’s final claim that there was insufficient evidence presented at 
trial to sustain his conviction is procedurally defaulted, since the claim was raised 
neither at trial nor on direct appeal,13 and there is no evidence of cause for relief 
or prejudice from a violation of Eley’s rights.14  There is, moreover, no evidence 
of a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined 
the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings 
leading to the judgment of conviction.15  Our review of the trial transcript reflects 
that Eley’s claim of insufficiency of the evidence is clearly without merit in any 
case.         
(10) In its February 19, 2002 decision denying Eley’s motion for 
postconviction relief, the Superior Court also denied a number of other motions 
filed by Eley, including motions for production of documentary evidence, 
production of transcripts, correction of illegal sentence, credit for time served, 
and an amended sentence.  To the extent Eley claims error with respect to the 
Superior Court’s disposition of those motions, that claim is without merit since 
                                                 
13SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (3). 
14SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (3) (A) and (B). 
15SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (5). 
 
 
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our review of the record reveals no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the 
Superior Court. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ E. Norman Veasey 
Chief Justice