Case Title: Pizza v. Walter

Citation: 345 Md. 664

Docket Number: 48/96

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1997-05-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Evelyn L. Pizza v. Stefanie J. Walter, No. 48, September Term, 1996
REAL PROPERTY - DEED OF TRUST - FORECLOSURE SALE -  CIRCUIT COURT
ERRED IN RATIFYING FORECLOSURE SALE OF WATERFRONT PROPERTY WHEN THE
ADVERTISEMENT OMITTED IMPORTANT DETAILS ABOUT PROPERTY, SUCH AS
AMOUNT OF WATER FRONTAGE, THE TRUSTEE FAILED TO FULFILL HER
OBLIGATION TO ENSURE THAT THE SALE WAS CONDUCTED SO AS TO MAXIMIZE
THE SALE PRICE, AND THE PROPERTY SOLD FOR AN INADEQUATE PRICE.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 48 
September Term, 1996
___________________________________
EVELYN L. PIZZA
  
v.
STEFANIE J. WALTER
___________________________________
Bell, C.J.
    *Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Raker
Wilner,
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Raker, J.
___________________________________
   Filed:  May 14, 1997
*  Judge Eldridge participated in  
   the oral argument, but did not  
   participate in the decision and 
   the adoption of the opinion.
We granted certiorari to consider whether the Circuit Court
for Anne Arundel County erred in overruling exceptions to a
mortgage foreclosure sale and ratifying the sale.
Respondent, Citizen's Bank of Maryland (the Bank), sold for
$325,000 certain property located at 8203 Ventnor Road, Pasadena,
Maryland under the power of sale conferred by a Deed of Trust.  The
Bank held a first Deed of Trust on the property.  The house was
owned by Robert A. Diemer.  Evelyn Pizza, Diemer's sister, held a
second Deed of Trust on the property and Samson Financial Group
held a third Deed of Trust on the same property.  When Diemer
defaulted on his payments to the Bank, the Bank filed a Deed of
Appointment prepared by its counsel, C. Edward Hartman, III,
appointing Stefanie J. Walter as Substitute Trustee (the Trustee).
Under the power of sale, the Trustee filed a foreclosure action in
the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County to sell the property.
The Bank served notice of the foreclosure proceedings to
Diemer, and to Pizza and Samson Financial as holders of the second
and third Deeds of Trust.  The circuit court granted Pizza and
Samson leave to intervene.  The sale was conducted on March 3,
1995, at the courthouse door.  The proceeds of the sale satisfied
the indebtedness to the Bank, but did not produce sufficient funds
to satisfy the indebtedness to Pizza or Samson.  Aggrieved by the
manner in which the sale was conducted, Pizza filed exceptions to
the ratification of the sale. 
The circuit court held a trial on Pizza's exceptions.  In an
- 2 -
  The Motion to Substitute Purchaser contained a certificate
1
of service to Charles J. Muskin, Pizza’s attorney, dated June 22,
1995.  The Order granting the motion was signed on the same date.
The Order was docketed in the circuit court on June 28, 1996, two
days after Hartman settled on the property.
order dated June 21, 1995, the court denied the exceptions and
ratified the sale.  On June 22, 1995, pursuant to Maryland Rule 
W 74, the Trustee filed a motion to substitute C. Edward Hartman,
III, and Cynthia Hartman as purchasers, and the court signed the
order on that date.   On June 26, 1995, the Trustee executed a Deed
1
conveying the property to C. Edward Hartman, III and Cynthia S.
Hartman, for $335,000; settlement was held the same day.
Pizza appealed to the Court of Special Appeals on June 27,
1995.  On the same day, she moved to set supersedeas bond and to
stay enforcement.  The Trustee opposed Pizza's motion, contending
that the motion to set supersedeas bond as well as Pizza's appeal
were moot because the property had been resold to a bona fide
purchaser, namely Hartman.  The circuit court agreed with the
Trustee and ruled that the motion for stay of enforcement pending
appeal was moot in light of the transfer of the subject property
before Pizza had filed a bond.
Before the Court of Special Appeals, Pizza again moved to set
supersedeas bond and to stay enforcement.  By an order dated August
22, 1995, the Court of Special Appeals enjoined Hartman from
alienating or encumbering the property and referred the case to the
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County to set a bond.  On remand,
- 3 -
the parties agreed on a nominal bond of $1000.  
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
circuit court in an unreported opinion.  The court concluded:
The trial court recognized that when the purchaser at the
foreclosure sale is the mortgagee or his assignee the
court will examine the sale closely to determine whether
it was bona fide and proper.  A sale will be set aside,
furthermore, upon "slight evidence of partiality,
unfairness or a want of the strictest good faith."  The
trial court concluded, however, that Pizza's assertions
did not establish unfairness or lack of good faith in the
conduct of the sale that would render the sale void.  We
conclude that the court's decision . . . should be
affirmed.  (citation omitted).
We granted Pizza's petition for a writ of certiorari.
Robert Diemer owned a large, single family dwelling on a
waterfront lot comprising approximately 3.6 acres with 600 feet of
water frontage.  The house measured over 4,300 square feet and
included four bedrooms, 3½ baths, a fireplace, an in-ground pool,
a dock, a three car garage, a tractor garage, marble tile, hardwood
floors, an alarm system, two central air conditioning units, and an
oil fired hot water furnace with three zones. 
Hartman prepared a Deed of Appointment on behalf of the Bank,
appointing Stefanie J. Walter, a paralegal in his law office,  as
Substitute Trustee.  The Trustee contacted Robert Campbell, an
auctioneer and professional appraiser, to conduct the sale of the
property.  Campbell appraised the property as having a fair market
value of $625,000 and provided the Trustee with a twenty-seven page
- 4 -
       Mr. Diemer testified at the trial that in his opinion, the
2
replacement value of the property at the time of the trial would be
$1,000,000.  The record also reflects that Samson Financial, the
third lienholder, appraised the property at $700,000.
       The Court of Appeals, by Order dated June 5, 1996,
3
effective January 1, 1997, rescinded Subtitle W of Chapter 1100 of
the Maryland Rules of Procedure and substituted Title 14.  Maryland
Rule W 74 required the person authorized to make the sale, in this
case the Trustee, to publish notice of the time, place and terms of
the sale at least once a week for three successive weeks prior to
the sale in a newspaper of substantial circulation in the county
where the property is located.  The provisions concerning the time,
place, and frequency of published notices are identical in Rule 14-
206(b).
appraisal report.   The home and improvements were valued at
2
$297,650.00 and accounted for approximately fifty percent of the
property value; the land was valued at $296,860.00 and accounted
for the other fifty percent.  With Hartman's aid, the Trustee
prepared the foreclosure action and legal advertisement.  
  The legal advertisement was placed in The Annapolis Capital
by the Trustee and ran once a week for three successive weeks prior
to the sale.   The property improvements were described in the
3
advertisement as follows:
The property is improved by a waterfront single family
dwelling consisting of 4 bedrooms, 3 ½ baths, fireplace,
pool, dock, and 3 car garage.  
The advertisement also included the address of the property and
described it in the following manner: 
Lot Numbered One (1) in the Diemer/Pizza Minor
Subdivision, as per plat thereof recorded among the Land
Records of Anne Arundel County, at Plat Book 4019, at
Plat 623.
Before the advertisement was placed in The Annapolis Capital,
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the auctioneer recommended to Hartman that he purchase additional
advertising.  Hartman refused, but passed the suggestion on to
Pizza.  After the advertisement was placed in The Annapolis
Capital, the auctioneer received only a few telephone inquiries
regarding the property.  At Pizza's request, the auctioneer placed
supplemental advertisements that ran on one day, the Sunday before
the sale, in The Baltimore Sun and The Washington Times.  The
supplemental advertisement ran under the heading of "Waterfront
Real Estate" and read as follows:
The subject property containing approximately 3.668 acres
+/- contains a large one story rambler with basement with
approximately 4,388 s.f. on the first floor.  The
residence contains a living room, dining room, kitchen,
pantry, den, master suite with private bath, 3 additional
bedrooms, 1 ½ additional baths on the first floor and
recreation room, bedroom, laundry/utility room, full
bath, built-in 3-car garage w/tractor garage on the
basement level.  The residence is heated by an oil fired
hot water furnace with 3-zones, cooled by two central air
conditioning units, and has many amenities such as
fireplace, marble tile and hardwood floors, alarm system,
and many executive home extras.  The property has a large
concrete patio, in-ground swimming pool, storage shed,
and a boat dock/pier.
Campbell testified at trial that during the week of the sale
following the supplemental advertisements he was overwhelmed with
phone inquiries, and there were more inquiries than he had ever
received for any other property in the twenty-five years that he
had been an auctioneer. 
The sale of the property was conducted at the courthouse door
with approximately seven people present.  Pizza and her attorney
- 6 -
  We note that Hartman's affidavit of purchaser does not fully
4
comply with Rule BR 6, the rule in effect at the time.   Rule BR
6.b.3(1), Affidavit by Purchaser, required that the purchaser file
an affidavit setting forth “whether he is acting as agent for
anyone; and if so, the name of his principal.”  Hartman's affidavit
is ambiguous, and does not specify whether he is acting in his own
capacity or as an agent for the Bank. 
were present, along with a lending officer from the Bank, Hartman,
the Trustee, a representative of Samson Financial, and one
prospective bidder.  The auctioneer was unable to secure any bids
for the property, and Hartman entered the bid of $325,000, the
approximate amount of the indebtedness to the Bank.  Hartman's bid
was the only bid; the lending officer from the Bank who was present
at the sale did not bid. 
The Contract of Sale filed by the Trustee in the circuit court
on March 6, 1995, was signed as follows:
Citizens Bank of Maryland
C. E. Hartman III
by C. Edward Hartman III
authorized agent
In the Affidavit of Purchaser, also dated March 6, 1995, Hartman
certified:
1.  I am the purchaser or agent of the
purchaser of the property known [as] 8203
Ventnor Road, Pasadena, Anne Arundel County,
Maryland.
2.  The property was purchased on March 3,
1995, for the sum of $325,000.00.
3.  I am acting for myself, or, if not acting
for myself, the name of my principal is
Citizens Bank of Maryland.4
The Affidavit of Purchaser is signed "C.E. Hartman III."
  
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Pizza filed exceptions to the foreclosure sale, requesting
that the sale be set aside on the following grounds:  first, the
price for which the land was sold was inadequate; second, the
property was not sufficiently advertised; and third, the Trustee
was not an independent officer of the court and had loyalties
adverse to the title owner of the property and to the exceptant.
Pizza also noted in her exceptions that the "attorney representing
the Bank is the actual purchaser of the property and this fact is
not revealed to the Court."
At the  trial on the exceptions, Pizza established the fair
market value of the Diemer property by presenting the testimony of
Robert Campbell, the auctioneer and appraiser whom the Trustee
retained to handle the sale.  Campbell testified that he appraised
the property as having a fair market value of $625,000 as of
October, 1994.  Campbell estimated that a decline in the real
estate market since that time may have decreased the fair market
value by approximately $15,000 to $25,000.
Pizza presented expert testimony from Daniel Billig, of Billig
Appraisal Corporation. Billig testified that an advertisement that
includes the important features of the property, such as the lot
size, water frontage and house amenities “[is] the difference
between having a successful auction and an auction that results in
a lender buy-back of the property.”  She also presented testimony
from Trudy Stevens, a real estate agent of some twelve years in
Anne Arundel County, who lives near the Diemer property.  Stevens
- 8 -
testified that The Annapolis Capital description of the property
more closely described the typical Pasadena home--a 50-foot wide
lot with a little cape cod or cottage-type home.  She further
testified that the fact that the Diemer house was on 3.6 acres was
extremely important to potential purchasers.  She said that "the
amount of property is very important to waterfront buyers.
Waterfront has become so expensive and land is at such a premium,
. . . it's very difficult to get large parcels of land, first of
all, and especially large parcels of waterfront land and people
coming to look for waterfront are often shocked at the little
amount of property that they get for their dollar."  She expressed
the opinion that the legal advertisement was insufficient to inform
the public that this home was not typical for the area, in that
this property included substantially more land, more waterfront,
and a larger, more luxurious house than the typical property in the
area.  
The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County denied Pizza’s
exceptions.  On June 26, 1995, Hartman and his wife, Cynthia,
settled on the property; they paid the seller, the Trustee,
$335,000 for the property. 
We shall first address the Trustee's Motion to Dismiss this
appeal as moot.  According to the Trustee, the appeal should be
dismissed as moot because Hartman purchased the property from the
successful bidder for valuable consideration and, therefore, title
- 9 -
to the property can no longer be affected by the reversal of an
order ratifying the sale.  Hartman, as counsel for the Trustee,
also represents in his Memorandum in support of the Motion to
Dismiss that neither he nor his wife are "the alter ego of
Citizen's Bank of Maryland, a publicly traded Maryland banking
corporation in which they own no stock, and are not employees,
officers or trustees." 
It is generally true that "the rights of a bona fide purchaser
of mortgaged property would not be affected by a reversal of the
order of ratification in the absence of a bond having been filed."
Lowe v. Lowe, 219 Md. 365, 368, 149 A.2d 382, 384 (1959); see also
Leisure Campground v. Leisure Estat., 280 Md. 220, 223, 372 A.2d
595, 598 (1977); Sawyer v. Novak, 206 Md. 80, 88, 110 A.2d 517, 521
(1955); Preske v. Carroll, 178 Md. 543, 551, 16 A.2d 291, 295
(1940); Parker v. Columbia Bank, 91 Md. App. 346, 374, 604 A.2d
521, 535, cert. denied, 327 Md. 524, 610 A.2d 796 (1992).  Thus, an
appeal becomes moot if the property is sold to a bona fide
purchaser in the absence of a supersedeas bond because a reversal
on appeal would have no effect.  Lowe, 219 Md. at 369, 149 A.2d at
385.  In order to enjoy this protection, the purchaser of the
foreclosed property must be a bona fide purchaser.  See Sawyer, 206
Md. at 89, 110 A.2d at 521.  Bona fide purchaser status extends
only to those purchasers without notice of defects in title, or in
this case, defects in the foreclosure sale.  See, e.g, Lewis v.
- 10 -
Rippons, 282 Md. 155, 162, 383 A.2d 676, 680 (1978); Grayson v.
Buffington, 233 Md. 340, 343, 196 A.2d 893, 895-96 (1964); Blondell
v. Turover, 195 Md. 251, 257, 72 A.2d 697, 699 (1950); Sines v.
Shipes, 192 Md. 139, 161, 63 A.2d 748, 759 (1949).  
This Court has recognized two exceptions to this general rule
protecting a bona fide purchaser from reversal of the ratification
of the sale in the absence of a supersedeas bond.  First, a bona
fide purchaser may be affected by a reversal of ratification when
"there is unfairness or collusion by the purchaser in the making of
the sale by the trustee."  Sawyer, 206 Md. at 88, 110 A.2d at 521.
Second, the rule does not apply when a mortgagee purchases at the
foreclosure sale and exceptions are taken to the sale.  Leisure
Campground, 280 Md. at 223, 372 A.2d at 598.  "This is so because
a mortgagee who buys at a foreclosure sale does not free himself
from the underlying dispute to which he is a party, and with the
land in his hands, there is no reason why he should not be bound by
a decision of the court requiring delivery of the property."  Id.
Several of our sister states have similarly refused to find
bona fide purchaser status when the subsequent purchaser of
property bought at a foreclosure sale had notice of the defects of
the sale.  See, e.g., Fountain v. Pateman, 66 So. 75, 78 (Ala.
1914); Jackson v. Klein, 320 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Mo. 1959); Swindell
v. Overton, 314 S.E.2d 512, 517 (N.C. 1984); Pender v. Dowse, 265
P.2d 644, 648 (Utah 1954); Miebach v. Colasurdo, 685 P.2d 1074,
- 11 -
1078-79 (Wash. 1984).   
For example, in Swindell v. Overton, 314 S.E.2d 512, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the subsequent purchasers
of land that was bought at a foreclosure sale "had notice of the
significant defect in the proceeding" and, accordingly, were not
afforded the protections of bona fide purchasers.  In Swindell, the
mortgagee commenced foreclosure proceedings on two parcels of land
owned by the Swindells.  The Swindells, in an effort to maximize
the sale price, had requested that the Trustee, Overton, sell the
two parcels separately.  The Trustee apparently disregarded this
request and sold both parcels together, despite the separate
advertisements for the two parcels, for approximately one-third of
the appraised value of the land and the crops growing on the land.
Id. at 517.  The court held that the Trustee's disregard of the
mortgagor's request concerning the conduct of the sale constituted
a material and prejudicial irregularity warranting setting aside
the sale.  Id.  The court also rejected the subsequent purchasers'
claim that they were protected as bona fide purchasers.  The court
wrote:
The Credles [the subsequent purchasers] claim the
status of "bona fide purchasers for value without any
notice of irregularity."  The advertisement of sale
itself disclosed separate debts secured by two separate
deeds of trust on two separate tracts of land.  We hold
that the purchasers had notice of the significant defect
in the proceeding.
Id.
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Likewise, we conclude that Pizza's appeal is not moot.
Although it is true that Hartman and the Trustee executed a Deed
for the property at a time when no supersedeas bond had been
posted, under the circumstances herein, Hartman cannot be
considered a bona fide purchaser.  The record reflects Hartman's
intimate involvement at all stages of this sale and the multiple
and often ambiguous roles he played throughout this transaction.
He was the attorney for the mortgagee, the Bank, while at the same
time performing many of the duties to be performed by the Trustee.
He was intimately involved in the drafting of the legal
advertisement for the sale and he declined the auctioneer's advice
to buy additional advertising for the property.  Hartman's role at
the auction and in the proceedings thereafter is ambiguous.  He bid
at the sale, despite the presence of a lending officer employed by
the Bank, rendering it unclear under these circumstances whether he
was bidding on his own behalf or on behalf of the bank.  The
documents he filed with the circuit court are also ambiguous as to
the capacity in which he was acting.  The Contract of Sale is
unclear whether Hartman signed as an individual or as agent for the
Bank.  The Affidavit of Purchaser also is unclear whether Hartman
was acting on his own behalf or as an agent for the Bank.  The
affidavit states "I am acting for myself, or, if not acting for
myself, the name of my principal is Citizen's Bank of Maryland."
Rule BR 6 required the purchaser to specify whether he was acting
as a principal or an agent, and did not permit the straddle
- 13 -
effected by Hartman.  Under any scenario, Hartman is not a stranger
to the proceedings, nor is he a bona fide purchaser.  
Hartman stands in no better position than did the Bank.  Given
his extensive involvement with the foreclosure proceeding, his
participation in preparing an inadequate advertisement, and the
ambiguity as to whether he was the purchaser or agent for the
purchaser, Hartman cannot be considered a bona fide purchaser for
purposes of the Motion to Dismiss.  See Sawyer, 206 Md. at 88-89,
110 A.2d at 521 (finding purchaser to be bona fide because, inter
alia, "[i]t is not suggested that the purchaser was responsible for
the alleged defect in the advertisement").  Accordingly, the Motion
to Dismiss is denied.  
We turn now to examine Pizza's contention that the sale should
be set aside.  Pizza contends that the property was sold for an
inadequate price.  The law is well settled that inadequacy of price
alone, unless it indicates fraud, unfairness or some misconduct or
mistake for which the purchaser should be held responsible,
ordinarily is not a sufficient ground to set aside a sale.  Arban
v. Rogers, 262 Md. 738, 740, 279 A.2d 457, 458 (1971); Bachrach v.
United Cooperative, 181 Md. 315, 322, 29 A.2d 822, 826 (1943); Ten
Hills Co. v. Ten Hills Corp., 176 Md. 444, 449, 5 A.2d 830, 832
(1939); Hurlock v. Mercantile, 98 Md. App. 314, 340, 633 A.2d 438,
451, cert. denied, 334 Md. 211, 638 A.2d 752 (1993).  Although
inadequate price alone does not ordinarily necessitate setting
- 14 -
aside a sale, when inadequate price is coupled with other evidence
of irregularity the sale may be set aside, even if the price might
not shock the conscience of the court.  Long v. Worden, 148 Md.
115, 122-23, 128 A. 745, 748 (1925); see also Walker v. Williams,
218 Md. 312, 316, 146 A.2d 203, 205 (1958); Chew v. Baker, 133 Md.
637, 642, 105 A. 756, 757 (1919); Kauffman v. Walker, 9 Md. 229,
236 (1856) (holding that inadequacy of sale price--under 50% of
fair market value--coupled with trustees failure to bring property
fairly into the market due to deficient advertising, required
vitiation of foreclosure sale); Hurlock, 98 Md. App. at 340-41, 633
A.2d at 451.  "Inadequacy of price is a strong auxiliary argument
in connection with circumstances which cast doubt or suspicion upon
the correctness of the sale."  Walker, 218 Md. at 316, 146 A.2d at
205.  In this regard, this Court observed in Waters v. Prettyman,
165 Md. 70, 74, 166 A. 431, 432 (1933):
It is settled law of this state that inadequacy of price,
standing alone, is no ground for the refusal to ratify a
mortgage sale, unless the price be so grossly inadequate
as to, in and by itself, indicate mistake, fraud, or
unfairness in the conduct of the sale.  It is equally
well settled that, if inadequacy of price be coupled with
any irregular or faulty advertisement or conduct in the
making or manner of sale, such as indicates that the
property has not been advertised or offered for sale, or
sold, under conditions and circumstances that would most
likely produce the largest revenue, the court will set it
aside and order a resale.  The test is:  Was the property
sold under such conditions and terms as to advertisement
and otherwise, as a prudent and careful man would employ,
seeking to obtain the best price for his own property.
(citations omitted).      
Pizza further contends that the sale must be set aside because
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the advertisement was insufficient and prejudiced the sale.  The
advertisement is generally sufficient if it describes the property
in a manner that enables it to be located by the exercise of
ordinary intelligence.  The failure to fully describe the nature
and extent of improvements will vitiate the sale only upon a
showing that the omission prejudiced the sale of the property.
Waring v. Guy, 248 Md. 544, 548, 237 A.2d 763, 766 (1968); Brooks
v. Bast, 242 Md. 350, 357, 219 A.2d 84, 88 (1966).  
Pizza further argues that the Trustee in this case failed to
fulfill her obligations to Pizza as a junior lienholder.  In the
case of a foreclosure sale, the court is the vendor of the property
and the trustee conducting the sale is considered to be an agent of
the court.  McCann v. McGinnis, 257 Md. 499, 505-07, 263 A.2d 536,
539-40 (1970); Fowler v. Fitzgerald, 82 Md. App. 166, 173, 570 A.2d
866, 869 (1990).  In Gould v. Chappell, 42 Md. 466, 470 (1875), the
Court reviewed the discretion reposed in the trustee.  Our
predecessors noted:
The discretion thus reposed in the trustees was not a
mere arbitrary discretion, but a discretion coupled with
a trust, and to be exercised solely for the benefit of
the cestuis que trust.  It was their duty, therefore, in
making a sale of the property to act in a prudent and
businesslike manner, with a view to obtain as large a
price as might, with due diligence and attention, be
fairly and reasonably obtainable under the circumstances.
In other words, to exercise that diligence and caution
which a careful and prudent owner would observe in the
sale of his own property.  If the sale be made under
circumstances of haste and imprudence, or if the trustees
fail in reasonable diligence in inviting competition, or
adopt an injudicious and disadvantageous mode of selling
- 16 -
the property, a Court of Equity ought not ratify the
sale. (emphasis in original).
In Robertson Co. v. Chambers, 113 Md. 232, 238, 77 A. 287, 289
(1910), in an opinion by Judge Pattison, it was said:  
It was the duty of the trustee, in the sale of this
property, to exercise the same degree of judgment and
prudence that a careful owner would have exercised in the
sale of his own property; and he was bound, for the
protection of the interest of all parties concerned, to
bring the property into market in such manner as to
obtain a fair market price therefor.  
The trustee has a duty to protect the interest of all concerned
parties to the foreclosure sale and to use reasonable diligence in
producing the largest revenue possible for the mortgaged property.
See Carroll v. Hutton, 88 Md. 676, 679, 41 A. 1081, 1082 (1898); A.
GORDON, GORDON ON MARYLAND FORECLOSURES § 20.05 (3d. ed. 1994).  The
trustee's duty extends to the mortgagor and persons claiming under
or through the mortgagor to exercise the same degree of care that
a prudent person of ordinary business judgment would use when
selling property to see that the best price is obtained at the
sale.  Webster v. Archer, 176 Md. 245, 253-54, 4 A.2d 434, 438
(1939); Wicks v. Westcott, 59 Md. 270, 277 (1883).
Considering all the circumstances presented herein, we shall
carefully scrutinize the sale in this case.  See Maryland Oil v.
Kaminetz, 260 Md. 443, 450, 272 A.2d 641, 645 (1971).  Although a
mortgagee is entitled to purchase the property at a foreclosure
sale in order to protect its interest in the foreclosed property,
see Md. Code (1974, 1996 Repl. Vol.) 7-105(e) of the Real Property
- 17 -
Article, the courts will examine the sale closely to determine
whether it was proper and will exercise a greater degree of caution
in passing upon the ratification of foreclosure when the sale is to
the secured party.  Walton v. Hospital Association, 178 Md. 446,
450-51, 13 A.2d 627, 629 (1940).
We are satisfied that the property was sold for an inadequate
price--a sum well below the market value.  The trial judge made an
explicit finding that the amount received from the sale was not
grossly inadequate.  Indeed, Pizza has not urged this Court to find
that the price received from the sale was grossly inadequate or
that the sale price alone would furnish grounds to set aside the
sale.  Inadequacy of price, however, has been called "a strong
auxiliary argument" in connection with circumstances which cast
doubt or suspicion upon the fairness of the sale.  Preske v.
Carroll, 178 Md. 543, 550, 16 A.2d 291, 294 (1940).  The question
then becomes: Does this inadequacy of price, when considered in
connection with all the circumstances surrounding this sale,
furnish sufficient grounds for setting aside the sale?  We conclude
that it does.   
We also conclude that the advertisement in this case is
inadequate.  Given the special characteristics of this property,
protection of the interests of all the parties required that the
advertisement include the acreage and the amount of waterfront--two
features that the evidence showed would be of particular
- 18 -
significance to potential bidders.  The original advertisement of
the sale failed to describe significant features of the property
adding to the value.  The advertisement should direct the attention
of the public to any unique or specially important factors
connected with the property having a tendency to increase the value
of the property, factors that a prudent person dealing with his or
her own property would not have omitted from the advertisement.
See Kres v. Hornstein, 161 Md. 1, 5, 155 A. 171, 173 (1931).     
The property in question included 3.6 acres of waterfront
property in Pasadena, an area that typically consisted of 50 foot
lots improved with summer cottages.  It seems unlikely that
potential purchasers, after reading the advertisement, would have
given the matter further consideration unless they were personally
familiar with Diemer's property.  It is clear that by including
this information in the advertisement the number of potential
purchasers would have increased.  Although the supplemental
advertisement that ran one time in the Baltimore Sun and the
Washington Times produced many inquiries, it ran only four days
before the sale.  Moreover, a supplemental advertisement cannot
cure a defective legal advertisement.  Ten Hills Co., 176 Md. at
452, 5 A.2d at 833.   
Of course, not every irregularity or deficiency in the
advertising will void the sale.  There can be no arbitrary rule of
thumb for determining in a given case whether the description of
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the property in the legal advertisement sufficiently informs the
buying public of the property, but that question must necessarily
be decided upon the facts and circumstances of each case.  Ten
Hills Co., 176 Md. at 450-51, 5 A.2d at 833.
We also agree with Pizza that the Trustee in this case failed
to fulfill her obligation to ensure that the sale was conducted so
as to maximize the price received for the property.  See Gould, 42
Md. at 470.  The trustee is bound to exercise the same degree of
care, diligence and judgment in selling the property that a prudent
person of ordinary business experience would exercise in selling
his or her own property to the best advantage.  Ten Hills Co., 176
Md. at 454, 5 A.2d at 835 (citing Webster v. Archer, 176 Md. 245,
4 A.2d 434 (1939)). 
After careful scrutiny, we hold that, based on the particular
facts of this case, the Court of Special Appeals erred in affirming
the circuit court's ratification of the foreclosure sale.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT  OF
SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED.
CASE 
REMANDED 
TO 
THAT
COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS
TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT
OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR 
ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY AND
TO REMAND IT TO THAT
COURT 
FOR 
FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THIS OPINION.  COSTS
IN THIS COURT AND THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT.
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