Case Title: Green v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 020757

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Carrico, S.J.1
 
KEVIN GREEN 
v.  Record No. 020757  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    June 6, 2003 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BRUNSWICK COUNTY 
James A. Luke, Judge 
 
 
This capital murder case is before the Court for the 
second time.  We previously reversed Kevin Green’s 
conviction for the 1998 capital murder of Patricia L. 
Vaughan and remanded the case to the circuit court for a 
new trial.  Green v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 105, 118, 546 
S.E.2d 446, 452 (2001).2  Upon retrial, a jury again 
convicted Green of capital murder during the commission of 
robbery in violation of Code § 18.2-31(4).  At the 
conclusion of the penalty phase of the bifurcated trial, 
the jury fixed Green’s punishment at death, finding “that 
there is a probability that [Green] would commit criminal 
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious 
                     
1 Chief Justice Carrico presided and participated in 
the hearing and decision of this case prior to the 
effective date of his retirement on January 31, 2003. 
 
2 Green’s convictions for robbery, the malicious 
wounding of Lawrence T. Vaughan, and three counts of the 
illegal use of a firearm were not before the Court in the 
prior appeal, Green, 262 Va. at 108, 546 S.E.2d at 447, nor 
are they at issue in the present appeal. 
threat to society” (the “future dangerousness” predicate), 
and “that his conduct in committing the offense [was] 
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that 
it involved . . . both aggravated battery to the victim and 
depravity of mind” (the “vileness” predicate).  See Code 
§§ 19.2-264.2 and –264.4(D).  The circuit court 
subsequently sentenced Green in accordance with the jury 
verdict. 
 
We consolidated the automatic review of Green’s death 
sentence with the appeal of his capital murder conviction.  
See Code § 17.1-313(F).  Upon considering the issues raised 
by Green and conducting our mandated review of the 
imposition of the death penalty, we find no error in the 
judgment of the circuit court.  Thus, we will affirm that 
judgment and the sentence of death in this case. 
I. FACTS 
A. GUILT PHASE  
 
The victim, Patricia L. Vaughan, and her husband, 
Lawrence T. Vaughan, owned and operated a small grocery 
store in Brunswick County.  As part of their grocery store 
operation, the Vaughans regularly cashed checks for 
employees of several nearby businesses, including a lumber 
company that paid its employees on Friday of each week.  
Consequently, Mr. Vaughan routinely went to a bank on 
 
2
Fridays to obtain sufficient currency to cash payroll 
checks for the lumber company employees.  And, he did so on 
Friday, August 21, 1998.  Upon returning from the bank on 
that Friday, he placed $10,000 in a bank bag that he kept 
in a cabinet underneath the cash register, another $10,000 
elsewhere in the store, and the remaining cash in a safe. 
 
On the day in question, as Mr. Vaughan was starting to 
eat lunch and to file an invoice, two men entered the 
store.  Mr. Vaughan saw them and recognized the taller of 
the two men as Kevin Green, the defendant.  Green had 
worked for the lumber company for approximately eight to 
ten weeks during the preceding spring, and had frequented 
the Vaughans’ grocery store at lunchtime, after work, and 
on Fridays to cash his payroll checks. 
 
When the two men entered the store, Mrs. Vaughan had 
her back to the door and was standing five or six feet from 
Mr. Vaughan.  Thinking that the shorter man was going over 
to the “drink box,”  Mr. Vaughan turned around to finish 
his filing.  As he did so, he heard his wife scream, “Oh, 
God.”  At trial, Mr. Vaughan described what he then heard: 
 
 
It was four bangs.  Bang, bang and I was 
hit.  I didn’t know where I was hit, but I was 
hurt.  I turned a complete turn and fell on the 
floor, sit [sic] down on my right foot and broke 
my right ankle.  And about [the] time I went 
down, I looked up and I realized it was a gun 
being fired.  I could see him, he shot toward my 
 
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wife with the fourth shot.  I saw his hand with a 
pistol in it.  He was holding [it] like he was 
target practicing. 
 
 
Mr. Vaughan testified that Green, after firing the 
four shots, walked back to the door and stood there “as a 
lookout” while the other man came around behind the counter 
and tried to open the cash register.  When the drawer on 
the cash register jammed, Green directed the shorter man to 
look under the counter.  Upon doing so, he found the bank 
bag containing approximately $9,000 in cash and Mr. 
Vaughan’s pistol, which he then used to shoot through the 
key hole in the cash register drawer.  Taking the bank bag 
and the pistol, the shorter man exited the store, but Green 
walked a few steps over to where Mrs. Vaughan was lying on 
the floor and pointed the gun at her again.  According to 
Mr. Vaughan, the gun misfired, and Green ejected a live 
cartridge onto the floor.  Green then fired two more shots 
in the direction of Mrs. Vaughan.  Lowering his head, Mr. 
Vaughan heard the gun “snap” one more time, but he did not 
know whether Green was pointing the gun at him or his wife.  
Only then, when the gun was empty, did Green leave the 
store. 
 
After Green left, Mr. Vaughan dragged himself 
approximately five feet across the floor of the store to a 
telephone and dialed the “911” emergency number, but he was 
 
4
too weak to reach his wife who was still lying on the 
floor.  One of the first police officers to arrive at the 
scene testified that he observed “puddles of blood just 
pouring out of [Mrs. Vaughan’s] nose, her mouth, [and] her 
head.”  A local volunteer medical examiner determined that 
Mrs. Vaughan had died at the scene of the shooting. 
 
A subsequent autopsy of Mrs. Vaughan’s body revealed 
that she sustained four gunshot wounds.  One bullet 
penetrated the left side of her head, passed through the 
temporal and frontal lobes of her brain, and lodged in the 
inner frontal sinus of her face.  Another bullet entered 
the right side of her chest and went into the upper lobe of 
her right lung.  A third bullet penetrated the left side of 
her back.  This was the only non-lethal wound.  The fourth 
bullet entered the right side of Mrs. Vaughan’s back and 
penetrated two lobes of her right lung.  According to the 
forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy, Dr. Jose 
Abrenio, this wound caused hemorrhaging in her thoracic 
cavity, which led to difficulty in breathing and had the 
effect of suffocating her.  Dr. Abrenio also opined that 
Mrs. Vaughan survived “seconds to minutes” after she was 
first shot. 
 
Four days after the murder, a warrant was issued to 
search Green, his residence, and automobile.  During the 
 
5
search of his home, six bullets were retrieved from the 
trunk of a tree in his yard.  The bullets were found behind 
a “makeshift target” hanging on the tree.  Forensic testing 
on those six bullets and the four bullets recovered from 
Mrs. Vaughan’s body during the autopsy revealed that all 
ten “caliber 25 Auto full metal jacketed bullets” had been 
fired from one weapon.  About 35 to 50 feet from the tree, 
16 25-caliber empty cartridge casings were also recovered. 
 
After Green was arrested, he executed a form waiving 
his Miranda rights and agreed to be questioned by law 
enforcement officers.  During that interrogation, Green 
admitted that he and his cousin, David Green, robbed the 
Vaughans’ grocery store and that he selected their store 
because he knew the Vaughans kept a lot of money there.  
Green and his cousin had originally planned to wear masks 
to conceal their faces.  However, they discarded the masks 
after they had to wait behind the store in their automobile 
for about an hour because other people were in the grocery 
store.  Green also admitted that he shot both of the 
Vaughans, hitting Mrs. Vaughan four times. 
B. PENALTY PHASE  
 
During the penalty phase of the trial, the 
Commonwealth presented testimony from several correctional 
officers who had supervised Green’s incarceration at 
 
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different times and facilities.  Much of their testimony 
described incidents during which Green exhibited disruptive 
behavior, refused to obey instructions, and made threats to 
the officers.  For example, one officer testified that 
Green “clinched” the bars of his cell and said, “I’ll get 
you, I will get you.”  Another officer stated that, when 
Green had to be placed in isolation because of his 
disruptive conduct, Green started throwing anything he 
could find, flushing the toilet, and throwing water into 
the hallway.  Green then told the officer that he was going 
to make the officer’s life “a living hell.”  Other 
personnel described incidents in which Green threw food, 
trash, and feces on the floor and refused to take his 
medication. 
 
In addition to this testimony, the Commonwealth called 
Clement Leon Cleaton, an acquaintance of Green.  Cleaton 
testified that Green had threatened to rob and kill him and 
that he had heard Green threaten to rob a man selling ice 
cream from a truck.  Cleaton also related an incident in 
which Green had shot several times toward Cleaton’s “hog 
pen” while Cleaton was feeding his hogs.  Cleaton had asked 
Green not to shoot in that direction. 
 
As evidence of mitigating circumstances, Green 
introduced testimony from Dr. Jack Daniel, an expert in the 
 
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field of forensic pathology.  Dr. Daniel had reviewed Mrs. 
Vaughan’s death certificate, the medical examiner’s report, 
and Dr. Abrenio’s autopsy report.  He testified that he 
found no evidence in those documents that Mrs. Vaughan had 
endured prolonged suffering before she died from the 
gunshot wounds.  However, Dr. Daniel agreed that it was not 
possible to determine whether the blood found in Mrs. 
Vaughan’s chest cavity during the autopsy was the result of 
an immediate bleeding at the time of the injury or 
accumulated during the hours following her death. 
 
The jury also heard evidence from Dr. Scott W. 
Sautter, an expert in neuropsychology who had tested 
Green’s I.Q. on two separate occasions using two different 
tests, the “Wechsler abbreviated intelligence scale” and 
the “Wechsler [A]dult [I]ntelligence [S]cale [R]evised.”  
Dr. Sautter testified that, while the formats of the two 
tests are similar, the “two tests are not exactly the 
same.”  Dr. Sautter reported that Green had a full-scale 
I.Q. score of 74 on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
and a score of 55 on the “abbreviated” test.  With that 
level of intellectual functioning, Dr. Sautter stated that 
Green could work best in a structured environment with 
guidance and supervision, and that he would expect Green to 
have difficulties in independent living, managing a budget, 
 
8
and going to a job on a consistent basis.  Based upon his 
evaluation of Green in a prison setting, Dr. Sautter also 
opined that, in a maximum-security situation, Green would 
not be a danger to others and his behavior would be 
appropriate.  However, in a less secure environment, Dr. 
Sautter opined that Green would be susceptible to harm from 
other people because of his limited capacity for 
communication. 
 
Two clinical psychologists testified for the 
Commonwealth in rebuttal to Dr. Sautter’s testimony.  Dr. 
Lynda J. Hyatt reported that Green had an I.Q. score of 84 
on the “Ammons & Ammons quick test,” which placed Green in 
the category of “low average” mental functioning.  Dr. 
Thomas A. Pasquale evaluated Green’s personality as well as 
his intellectual functioning.  Dr. Pasquale diagnosed 
depression, alcohol dependency, drug abuse, anti-social 
personality disorder, and malingering.  According to Dr. 
Pasquale, Green had a full-scale I.Q. score of 74 on the 
Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale, placing him in the 
“borderline range” of intellectual functioning.  With 
regard to Green’s adaptive functioning, Dr. Pasquale noted 
that Green had worked at a pizza restaurant where he 
functioned routinely in taking orders, delivering pizzas, 
and using the cash register; and that Green paid his own 
 
9
rent, lived with a friend, and had a driver’s license.  Dr. 
Pasquale also opined that Green is a high risk for violence 
in an “open community” but that, in a prison setting, the 
probability of such risk is low.3
II. ANALYSIS 
A. PRE-TRIAL ISSUES 
1. APPOINTMENT OF EXPERTS 
 
Green assigns error to the circuit court’s refusal to 
appoint an investigator, a mitigation specialist, and a 
jury expert to assist him in his defense.  Although Green 
moved the court to appoint an investigator, he never asked 
for a mitigation specialist or a jury expert.  Thus, he is 
now barred from raising any claim on appeal regarding the 
court’s failure to appoint those two experts.  See Rule 
5:25. 
 
As to his request for an investigator, Green asserted 
in his motion before the circuit court that he needed this 
type of expert assistance because he had no available 
investigative resources, and because his counsel lacked 
both formal training in criminal investigation and the time 
to interview essential witnesses.  Green claimed that an 
investigator would have “the expertise necessary to locate 
                     
3 We will present additional facts and proceedings as 
necessary to address specific issues. 
 
10
essential witnesses and data, examine and evaluate 
testimony and documents using his or her special knowledge 
of the issues likely to be significant at a capital murder 
trial, issues beyond the comprehension of the ordinary 
layman.”  On appeal, he asserts that the “imbalance” 
resulting from his lack of investigative resources as 
compared to the Commonwealth’s vast resources violated his 
equal protection and due process rights as well as his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
 
As this Court has previously stated, a defendant does 
not have an absolute right to the assistance of an 
investigator, even when charged with capital murder.  
Bailey v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 723, 737, 529 S.E.2d 570, 
578 (2000).  Instead, as with any request for the 
appointment of an expert, a defendant “must show a 
particularized need” by establishing “that the services of 
an expert would materially assist him in the preparation of 
his defense and that the denial of such services would 
result in a fundamentally unfair trial.”  Husske v. 
Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 212-13, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925-26 
(1996).  The determination whether a defendant has made an 
adequate showing of particularized need for expert 
assistance lies within the sound discretion of the trial 
court.  Id.; see also Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 
 
11
462, 544 S.E.2d 299, 305, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1003 
(2001); Bailey, 259 Va. at 737, 529 S.E.2d at 578. 
 
The reasons Green presented to the circuit court to 
justify his request for the appointment of an investigator 
are strikingly similar to those offered by the defendant in 
Bailey, 259 Va. at 737-38, 529 S.E.2d at 578.  Bailey, like 
Green, claimed he needed an investigator to “locate 
essential witnesses and data, [and] examine and evaluate 
testimony and documents . . . likely to be significant at a 
capital murder trial.”  Id.  We concluded that Bailey’s 
assertions fell “far short of demonstrating a 
particularized need for the services of an expert.”  Id.
We reach the same conclusion in the present case.  A 
particularized need is more than a “[m]ere hope” that 
favorable evidence can be obtained through the services of 
an expert.  Husske, 252 Va. at 212, 476 S.E.2d at 925-26.  
Thus, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Green’s motion for the appointment of 
an investigator.4
2. VILENESS AGGRAVATING FACTOR 
                     
4 To the extent that Green also argues that the Sixth 
Amendment requires the appointment of an investigator, we 
rejected that argument in Lenz, 261 Va. at 462, 544 S.E.2d 
at 305. 
 
12
 
Green filed a pre-trial motion asking the circuit 
court to rule that the evidence available to the 
Commonwealth would be insufficient, as a matter of law, to 
establish the “vileness” aggravating factor.  Green now 
claims that the court erred in denying that motion. 
 
There is no procedure in Virginia that allows a 
circuit court, in a pre-trial context, to rule on the 
sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence in a criminal 
case.  Instead, the court must determine the sufficiency of 
that evidence based on the record made at trial.  
Furthermore, as explained in Section (D)(2) below, there is 
sufficient evidence in this case to support the jury’s 
finding of the “vileness” predicate.  Thus, the circuit 
court did not err in denying this pre-trial motion. 
3. DISCOVERY 
 
Green assigns error to the circuit court’s order 
limiting discovery to the materials and information allowed 
by Rule 3A:11.  However, Green does not identify any 
specific evidence or information that he sought in 
discovery but which the Commonwealth refused to disclose.  
Thus, we find no merit in his argument that he was entitled 
to expanded discovery rights.  Additionally, the record 
reflects that he received all the discovery to which he was 
 
13
entitled under Rule 3A:11.  See Bailey, 259 Va. at 736, 529 
S.E.2d at 577. 
B. JURY SELECTION ISSUES 
1. CHANGE OF VENUE 
 
Prior to trial, Green moved for a change of venue or, 
in the alternative, for a venire from another county or 
city not bordering Brunswick County.  In support of his 
motion, Green submitted copies of 37 newspaper articles 
concerning this case, affidavits from six people, and the 
results of an informal survey conducted by Green’s counsel.  
Although Green initially stated that he would like to have 
the issue resolved quickly, the circuit court, after 
hearing argument, took the motion under advisement.  Green 
did not object to the court’s decision to do so. 
 
At the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial, 
the court remarked from the bench that the defense had 
moved for a change of venue “way back” and that “[i]t was 
taken under advisement.”  In order for the record to 
reflect a ruling on the motion, the court then stated that 
it considered the motion denied at the time the jury was 
empanelled.  The court memorialized its decision in an 
order entered nunc pro tunc October 29, 2001. 
Green now assigns error to the court’s ruling.  
However, the Commonwealth asserts that Green is barred 
 
14
under Rule 5:25 from arguing that the circuit court should 
have granted a change of venue or that the voir dire 
process was “unreliable and not above suspicion.”  The 
Commonwealth premises its argument on the fact that Green 
failed to renew his motion for a change of venue either 
after voir dire was completed or before the jury was 
empanelled and sworn. 
The record reflects that, after 24 jurors had been 
qualified and immediately before the parties made their 
peremptory strikes, the court asked if there were “[a]ny 
preliminary matters before we bring the jury in?”  Green’s 
counsel stated, “No, sir.”  When those 24 jurors returned 
to the courtroom, the court directed the parties to begin 
exercising their strikes.  At that point, Green’s counsel 
stated, “Defense is ready.”  When the parties completed 
their peremptory strikes, the court asked, “[I]s that your 
jury?”  Defense counsel answered, “Yes, sir.”  At no time 
did Green’s counsel ask the court to rule on the motion for 
a change of venue previously taken under advisement or 
renew that motion. 
Nevertheless, Green disputes any waiver of this issue.  
He argues that the court obviously knew that the motion for 
a change of venue was still pending since the court 
announced its ruling on the motion at the end of the trial.  
 
15
Green also asserts that he reminded the court of the 
outstanding motion when, just prior to commencement of voir 
dire, he introduced into evidence the newspaper articles 
and affidavits that he had previously attached to his 
memorandum in support of the motion. 
We do not agree with Green’s position.  The posture of 
the change of venue motion in this case is analogous to the 
situation presented in Hoke v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 303, 
377 S.E.2d 595 (1989).  There, the defendant moved for a 
change of venue but requested that the motion be continued 
in order to determine whether a jury could be empanelled.  
Id. at 306, 377 S.E.2d at 597.  The defendant agreed that 
he could renew the motion if, as a result of jury voir 
dire, there was a problem.  Id.  Because the defendant 
never renewed the motion, we refused to consider his 
contention on appeal that the trial court had abused its 
discretion by failing to grant a change of venue.  Id.
Although Green did not agree to continue his change of 
venue motion as did the defendant in Hoke, Green, however, 
did not object to the circuit court’s decision to take the 
motion under advisement pending the outcome of voir dire.  
Consequently, it was incumbent upon Green to renew the 
motion before the jury was empanelled and sworn, or at 
least remind the court that it was still pending and that 
 
16
he wanted the court to rule on it.  Cf. Lenz, 261 Va. at 
462-63, 544 S.E.2d at 305-06 (pretrial motion waived when 
defendant failed to request a ruling from the trial court).  
Indeed, that was precisely the procedure followed by the 
defendant in Thomas v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 216, 559 
S.E.2d 652 (2002), a case in which this Court reversed a 
trial court’s refusal to grant a change of venue.  Thomas 
filed a pre-trial motion for a change of venue, which the 
trial court took under advisement, but Thomas, unlike 
Green, renewed the motion following voir dire.  Id. at 230, 
559 S.E.2d at 659. 
Not only did Green fail to renew his motion for a 
change of venue once the court took it under advisement, he 
also implicitly consented to the seating of the jury in 
this case.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Washington, 263 Va. 298, 
304, 559 S.E.2d 636, 639 (2002) (holding defendant 
implicitly consented to trial court’s declaration of a 
mistrial); but cf. King v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 576, 577-
78, 570 S.E.2d 863, 863-64 (2002) (holding defendant did 
not expressly or implicitly waive objection raised in 
motion to strike the evidence when defendant later did not 
object to a jury instruction covering the same issue).  
After voir dire was completed but before the parties 
exercised their peremptory strikes, the court specifically 
 
17
asked whether the parties had any matters to bring before 
the court.  Similarly, when the parties completed their 
peremptory strikes, the court asked, “[I]s that your jury?”  
Instead of reminding the court about his pending change of 
venue motion at that point, Green’s responses to the 
court’s questions actually indicated that he had no 
remaining issues to raise with regard to jury selection or 
any objections to empanelling that jury.  In short, he gave 
the circuit court no reason to believe that he was still 
pursuing a change of venue.  Cf. Breard v. Commonwealth, 
248 Va. 68, 80, 445 S.E.2d 670, 677 (1994) (trial court 
reasonably could have assumed defendant acquiesced in 
seating a juror when defendant failed to renew motion to 
strike the juror after the court said it would rehear the 
motion upon completion of voir dire).  Green’s responses 
were tantamount to a waiver of his prior motion.  Thus, we 
will not address Green’s claim that the circuit court erred 
by refusing to grant his motion for a change of venue.5  See 
Rule 5:25. 
2. JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE 
                     
5 Green also asserts on brief that the voir dire 
process was unreliable and that the prospective jurors’ 
responses during voir dire were not forthcoming and 
credible.  Green presents this argument for the first time 
on appeal.  Thus, we will not consider it.  Rule 5:25. 
 
18
 
Green claims that the circuit court erred by denying 
his request to submit a questionnaire to prospective 
jurors.  At a pre-trial hearing, Green advised the court 
that he intended to file a written motion on this matter 
along with a sample questionnaire.  Our review of the 
record discloses that Green never filed either the motion 
or the sample questionnaire.  Nor does the record contain 
any argument, oral or written, in support of such a motion.  
Instead, we find only the court’s order denying a motion 
for a jury questionnaire.  Thus, Green is now barred from 
presenting argument for the first time on appeal with 
regard to this issue.  Rule 5:25. 
 
Moreover, we have previously held that the use of a 
juror questionnaire outside the courtroom would undermine 
the value derived from a trial court’s opportunity to 
observe and evaluate prospective jurors first hand.  
Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 492-93, 404 S.E.2d 
227, 234 (1991).  Accordingly, we find no abuse of 
discretion by the circuit court on this issue. 
3. VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS 
 
Green submitted a list of 79 proposed voir dire 
questions, which he later shortened to 52 questions.  On 
appeal, he claims that the circuit court erred by 
 
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specifically disallowing seven of those questions.  Those 
seven questions as enumerated on the longer list are: 
No. 59. You understand there are twelve people on 
the jury.  Why do you think there are twelve people on 
the jury? 
 
 
 
No. 60. If there is a unanimous verdict, 
what does this mean about your discussion about 
the case? 
 
No. 61. What do you think about the death 
penalty? 
 
No. 67. What is the first thing that comes 
into your mind when you look at the defendant?  
What else do you see in him? 
 
No. 68. What kinds of adjectives or 
descriptive words would you use to describe this 
defendant to a spouse or friend? 
 
No. 69. What are your assumptions or 
opinions about him just because he is sitting 
here on trial? 
 
No. 71. How do you feel about life in prison 
without parole as punishment? 
 
 
These seven questions were “an invitation to a 
rambling discourse on a broad range of emotions.”  Buchanan 
v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 402, 384 S.E.2d 757, 765 
(1989).  A defendant does not have a right to propound any 
question he wishes, Bell v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 172, 196, 
563 S.E.2d 695, 711 (2002), and “trial courts are not 
required to allow counsel to ask questions which are so 
ambiguous as to render the answer meaningless,” Buchanan, 
238 Va. at 401, 384 S.E.2d at 764.  Instead, voir dire 
 
20
questions must relate to the four statutory factors of 
relationship, interest, opinion, or prejudice.  See Code 
§ 8.01-358 (“counsel for either party shall have the right 
to examine under oath any person who is called as a juror 
. . . to ascertain whether he is related to either party, 
or has any interest in the cause, or has expressed or 
formed any opinion, or is sensible of any bias or prejudice 
therein”). 
 
We conclude that the circuit court provided Green with 
“a full and fair opportunity,” LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 
225 Va. 564, 581, 304 S.E.2d 644, 653 (1983), to determine 
whether each prospective juror could “stand indifferent in 
the cause,” Code § 8.01-358.  When, as here, a 
 
trial court affords ample opportunity to counsel 
to ask relevant questions and where the questions 
actually propounded by the trial court were 
sufficient to preserve a defendant’s right to 
trial by a fair and impartial jury, we will 
generally not reverse a trial court’s decision to 
limit or disallow certain questions from defense 
counsel. 
 
Buchanan, 238 Va. at 401, 384 S.E.2d at 764.  Furthermore, 
the circuit court stated that its voir dire of prospective 
jurors would cover the issues concerning the death penalty 
and life in prison without parole addressed in question 
Nos. 61 and 71 and that, depending on a juror’s responses, 
the court would allow follow-up questions by counsel.  
 
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Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
allow Green to ask these seven questions. 
 
Green also complains that the bifurcated procedure for 
felony trials prevented him from asking prospective jurors 
at the guilt phase about evidence of other crimes that the 
Commonwealth intended to use at the penalty phase to prove 
future dangerousness.  However, Green does not assert that 
he attempted to ask any specific questions about other 
crimes.  Nor did he argue to the circuit court that the 
bifurcated procedure prejudiced his ability to conduct voir 
dire of potential jurors.  Thus, we will not consider this 
issue on appeal.  Rule 5:25.  We note, however, that the 
court allowed Green to ask prospective jurors whether they 
could consider his lack of a violent criminal record prior 
to this incident as a reason for not imposing the death 
penalty. 
 
Green’s last assignment of error regarding voir dire 
deals with the following questions proposed by the 
Commonwealth: 
 
 
No. 16. What contact did you have with the 
police in connection with that incident?  Were 
you satisfied with the work of the police in 
connection with that incident[?]  Were you 
satisfied with the work of the Courts[?] 
 
 
 
No. 23. Have you, or a family member, 
friend, or acquaintance ever been prosecuted for 
 
22
a criminal offense?  Do you feel that person was 
treated fairly by our system of justice? 
 
 
We cannot find, nor does Green identify, any instance 
where the Commonwealth asked question No. 16.  Thus, the 
issue whether the circuit court abused its discretion by 
allowing that question is moot.  We also find no abuse of 
discretion by the court in allowing the Commonwealth to 
pose question No. 23 to prospective jurors.  That question 
was designed to discover a potential juror’s possible 
prejudice against the Commonwealth, which is a proper 
subject for inquiry under Code § 8.01-358. 
4. JUROR WILLIAMS 
 
Green contends that the circuit court erred by 
excusing prospective juror Williams for cause.  The court 
granted the Commonwealth’s motion to strike this juror 
because of the juror’s equivocal answers about whether he 
could render a guilty verdict in a case involving the death 
penalty.  We find no manifest error in the court’s 
decision.  Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 134, 410 
S.E.2d 254, 262 (1991) (trial court’s exclusion of 
prospective juror will not be disturbed on appeal absent 
manifest error). 
 
During voir dire, the circuit court asked prospective 
juror Williams if he could sentence someone in a case in 
 
23
which one of the possible punishments is the death penalty.  
The juror responded that he did not know whether he could.  
Questioning by the Commonwealth revealed that this juror 
had a cousin who had been convicted of murder and sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment.  When asked again whether he 
could listen to aggravating and mitigating evidence during 
the penalty phase of the trial and then decide whether to 
vote for life imprisonment or the death penalty based on 
that evidence, prospective juror Williams repeated that he 
did not know if he could.  He acknowledged that the 
situation with his cousin could affect his ability to make 
a decision in this case. 
During subsequent questioning by Green’s counsel, this 
juror could not say whether there could ever be a case so 
heinous that he could impose the death penalty.  Green’s 
counsel then asked the following questions: 
 
 
Q.  In this particular case, are you 
willing–if called as a juror–to listen to all of 
the evidence at the trial and then at the 
sentencing, and then come up with a decision as 
to whether to vote death or life imprisonment?  
Are you willing to do that as your duty, your 
civic duty as a juror? 
 
 
 
A.  I don’t want to, but I’ll do it. 
 
 
 
Q.  But you will? 
 
 
 
A.  Yeah. 
 
 
 
Q.  And you can come up with a decision? 
 
24
 
 
 
A.  I think I can. 
 
The voir dire of prospective juror Williams concluded 
with the following exchange between him and the 
Commonwealth: 
 
 
Q.  Mr. Williams, I want you to look at 
Mr. Green there. 
 
 
 
(The prospective juror complied) 
 
 
All right.  With what you have told us, 
could you under any circumstances vote to 
give him the death penalty?  I know it puts 
you on the spot and I apologize for it, but 
under any circumstances, could you vote to 
give him the death penalty? 
 
 
 
A.  Right now?  I mean, right now, no. 
 
Q.  I understand that.  Can you imagine any–
is there any amount of evidence that I could 
put before you, would anything–with the way 
you feel now, would anything change your 
mind? 
 
 
 
A.  No. 
A prospective juror is properly excused for cause when 
that person’s views concerning the death penalty would 
substantially impair or preclude the performance of his or 
her duty in accordance with the court’s instructions and 
the juror’s oath.  Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 
139, 547 S.E.2d 186, 195 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 
1094 (2002); Barnabei v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 161, 173, 
477 S.E.2d 270, 277 (1996).  In applying this principle on 
 
25
appeal, we recognize that a trial court is in a better 
position to determine whether a particular juror would be 
impaired or prevented in performing the duties of a juror 
because that court has seen and heard the juror’s responses 
to relevant questions.  Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 
497, 510, 537 S.E.2d 866, 875 (2000), cert. denied, 534 
U.S. 815 (2001).  Thus, we accord deference to a trial 
court’s decision to retain or excuse a juror.  Id.; 
Schmitt, 262 Va. at 139, 547 S.E.2d at 195. 
 
Based on prospective juror Williams’ responses during 
voir dire, the circuit court correctly excused this juror 
for cause.  The juror’s ability to follow the court’s 
instructions and to perform his duties in accordance with 
his oath was obviously impaired.  In short, prospective 
juror Williams never indicated that he could listen to the 
evidence and actually reach a decision about whether to 
impose the death penalty or a term of imprisonment for 
life.  See LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 583, 304 S.E.2d at 654 
(juror who stated, “I don’t know if I could be party to 
[the death penalty] or not[, t]here is some doubt in my 
mind[,]” was properly excused for cause). 
5. JUROR YOUNG 
 
The Commonwealth asked the following question during 
the voir dire of prospective juror Young: 
 
26
 
Q.  You may hear evidence in the case of one or 
more crimes committed by this defendant  on 
August 21st, 1998, other than the capital murder 
for which he is convicted--I mean for which he’s 
on trial.  The [c]ourt will instruct you as to 
the purpose for which you can consider those 
other crimes.  Would you be able to follow the 
Judge’s instructions in how you view that other 
evidence? 
 
Because of the Commonwealth’s misstatement “other than the 
capital murder for which he is convicted,” Green claims 
that the circuit court should have excused this juror for 
cause on the court’s own motion pursuant to Rule 3A:14(b).  
However, when the voir dire of juror Young was completed, 
the court asked both parties if they had any motions 
regarding this juror.  Counsel for Green responded, “No, 
sir.”  After each side exercised its peremptory strikes and 
juror Young was selected to serve in the case, the court 
asked counsel for both parties, “[I]s that your jury?”  
Green’s counsel stated, “Yes, sir.”  The court then 
directed the clerk to administer the oath to the jury.  
Because Green failed to raise any objection either during 
the voir dire of prospective juror Young or before she was 
empanelled and sworn as a juror to hear the case, he has 
waived the argument that he now presents on appeal.  Rule 
5:25; see also Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 278, 
427 S.E.2d 411, 418-19 (1993); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 
Va. 295, 306-07, 384 S.E.2d 785, 793 (1989).  The fact that 
 
27
Rule 3A:14(b) authorizes a trial court to excuse a juror 
for cause on its own motion does not relieve a defendant 
from complying with the requirements of Rule 5:25. 
C. GUILT-PHASE ISSUES 
1. TESTIMONY OF FORENSIC PATHOLOGIST 
 
Green asserts that the circuit court erred in 
overruling his motion for a mistrial that he made after the 
forensic pathologist, Dr. Abrenio, referred to his 
testimony “in the previous case.”  The statement at issue 
is found in the following exchange between the Commonwealth 
and Dr. Abrenio: 
Q.  When you say bleeding into the thoracic 
cavity, what are you referring to? 
 
A.  I’m referring to the lethal wound to the 
lungs and blood flow into the chest cavity. 
 
Q.  All right.  Is that actually into the 
lung or into the space around the lung? 
 
A.  Into the space around the lung.  And 
this was lethal.  The reason for this, as I 
testified in the previous case–shall I 
repeat? 
 
Q.  The reason for this was what?  You said 
That the blood– 
 
 
In response to Green’s motion for a mistrial, the 
Commonwealth suggested that the court give a cautionary 
instruction to the jury, but Green rejected that 
suggestion.  The circuit court then noted that the jurors 
 
28
knew that there had been a previous trial because they were 
being told that Green had been convicted of robbery.6  The 
court described Dr. Abrenio’s comment as “quick” and 
questioned whether the jury had paid any attention to it. 
 
The court subsequently overruled the motion for a 
mistrial.  In doing so, the court explained that great care 
had been exercised in selecting the jury in order to insure 
the jurors’ lack of knowledge regarding Green’s prior 
capital murder trial.  The court then stated: 
This comment coming from a medical examiner 
testifying about the cause of death was a lead 
into what he was actually talking about, to his 
actual point.  The [c]ourt would have to assume 
that the jurors know much more than voir dire 
indicated for this unsolicited phrase to have any 
effect, therefore, the motion for a mistrial is 
denied. 
 
 
We agree with the circuit court’s conclusions.  
Contrary to Green’s assertion, Dr. Abrenio’s reference to 
his prior testimony did not signal the jury that Green had 
been previously convicted for the capital murder of Mrs. 
Vaughan.  Thus, Green’s reliance on our decision in Barker 
v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 370, 375, 337 S.E.2d 729, 733 
                     
6 During opening statements, Green’s counsel advised 
the jury that Green had already been found guilty of 
robbery.  Just before the Commonwealth rested its case, a 
stipulation was admitted into evidence, stating that, on 
June 22, 2000, in the Brunswick County Circuit Court, Green 
had been convicted of the August 21, 1998 robbery of the 
Vaughans’ grocery store. 
 
29
(1985) (holding that a venire person who knew of the 
defendant’s prior conviction of the same offense for which 
he was being retried could not sit as a juror), is 
misplaced.  Although Dr. Abrenio did not elaborate on the 
context in which he had previously testified, the jury 
already knew, based on defense counsel’s opening statement, 
that Green had been convicted of the robbery of the 
Vaughans’ grocery store.  With that information, the jury 
could have reasonably inferred that Dr. Abrenio was 
referring to his testimony in that trial, irrespective of 
whether such testimony would have been relevant. 
 
The decision whether to grant a motion for mistrial 
lies within a trial court’s exercise of discretion.  Burns 
v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 341, 541 S.E.2d 872, 895, 
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1043 (2001); Beavers, 245 Va. at 
280, 427 S.E.2d at 420.  “When a motion for mistrial is 
made, based upon an allegedly prejudicial event, the trial 
court must make an initial factual determination, in the 
light of all the circumstances of the case, whether the 
defendant’s rights are so ‘indelibly prejudiced’ as to 
necessitate a new trial.”  Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 
78, 95, 393 S.E.2d 609, 619 (1990) (quoting LeVasseur, 225 
Va. at 589, 304 S.E.2d at 657).  Unless we can say that the 
 
30
trial court’s determination was wrong as a matter of law, 
we will not disturb its judgment on appeal.  Id. 
Considering Dr. Abrenio’s brief reference to his prior 
testimony in the context in which it occurred in this case, 
we cannot say that the circuit court’s refusal to grant a 
mistrial was wrong as a matter of law.  Green’s rights were 
not “indelibly prejudiced.”  Id.  Thus, we will not disturb 
the court’s decision. 
2. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE SEIZED DURING 
EXECUTION OF SEARCH WARRANT 
 
 
At trial, Green objected to the admission of evidence 
seized during the search of his home, specifically the 
“makeshift target,” the empty cartridge casings, and the 
bullets found in the tree trunk.  He argued that there was 
no connection between that evidence and the evidence that 
was recovered from the crime scene and from Mrs. Vaughan’s 
body during the autopsy.  Thus, according to Green, the 
evidence found at his residence was irrelevant, and its 
probative value was substantially outweighed by its 
tendency to cause unfair prejudice.  He now assigns error 
to the circuit court’s ruling allowing the admission of 
that evidence and makes the same argument on appeal. 
 
One of the issues at trial was whether Green intended 
to shoot Mrs. Vaughan or whether the “pistol went off,” as 
 
31
Green stated to a police investigator.  The issue of 
premeditation was a focal point in his counsel’s opening 
and closing remarks.  The fact that the bullets found in 
the tree trunk and those recovered from Mrs. Vaughan’s body 
were fired from one weapon established not only a nexus 
between the evidence but also the fact that Green had 
previously fired the weapon he later used to shoot Mrs. 
Vaughan.7  That fact, along with the “makeshift target” and 
the empty cartridge casings, suggests that Green knew how 
to shoot that particular firearm and was thus pertinent to 
the issue whether the “pistol went off.”  “Evidence is 
relevant if it tends to prove or disprove, or is pertinent 
to, matters in issue.”  Clay v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 253, 
257, 546 S.E.2d 728, 730 (2001).  Thus, we conclude that 
the evidence seized during the search of Green’s house was 
relevant to the issue of premeditation and that the circuit 
court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
the evidence. 
                     
7 Green had purchased a Lorcin L-25 semi-automatic 
pistol on July 13, 1998.  Forensic testing on six empty 
cartridge casings found on the floor of the Vaughans’ 
grocery store indicated that four of those cartridge cases 
were sufficiently marked to conclude that “[f]irearms that 
produce class characteristics like those present on these 
cartridges cases include, but are not limited to, pistols 
with the brand names of Bryco and Lorcin chambered to fire 
caliber 25 Auto cartridges.”  As a result of forensic 
 
32
4. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE REGARDING CAPITAL MURDER 
 
At the close of the Commonwealth’s evidence, Green 
moved to strike the evidence regarding capital murder on 
the basis that the Commonwealth had failed to prove that 
the killing of Mrs. Vaughan was willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated.  In support of his motion, Green relied 
primarily on his statement to a police investigator in 
which he had maintained that he only intended to commit a 
robbery and never meant to kill anyone.  The circuit court 
denied Green’s motion, finding that the evidence 
established that Green entered the grocery store and “said 
nothing before shooting; that he killed, wounded and then 
robbed; and that he did not bother to wear a mask which he 
had prepared.”  Green assigns error to the court’s ruling 
and makes the same argument here as he made before the 
circuit court. 
 
Premeditation is an intent to kill that needs to exist 
only for a moment.  Peterson v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 289, 
295, 302 S.E.2d 520, 524 (1983).  It is generally a factual 
issue.  Schmitt, 262 Va. at 143, 547 S.E.2d at 197; Clozza 
v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 124, 134, 321 S.E.2d 273, 279 
(1984).  When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence on a 
___________________ 
testing, the same conclusion was reached regarding eight of 
the empty cartridge casings found in Green’s yard. 
 
33
question of fact, we consider the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prevailing party below, in this case 
the Commonwealth, and accord that party’s evidence all 
reasonable inferences.  Beavers, 245 Va. at 281, 427 S.E.2d 
at 421. 
 
Here, the evidence showed that Green entered the 
Vaughans’ grocery store and shot Mrs. Vaughan without any 
warning.  After his cousin seized the bank bag containing 
the cash and exited the store, Green walked over to where 
Mrs. Vaughan was lying on the floor and fired two more 
shots in her direction.  Green did not leave the store 
until his gun was empty.  These facts clearly establish 
premeditation.  See Remington v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 
353, 551 S.E.2d 620, 632 (2001) (stabbing victim eight to 
ten times established premeditation), cert. denied, 535 
U.S. 1062 (2002).  Thus, we find no error in the circuit 
court’s refusal to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence 
regarding capital murder. 
D. PENALTY-PHASE ISSUES 
1. TESTIMONY OF DEPUTY WESSON 
 
During Deputy Kevin Wesson’s penalty phase testimony, 
he stated that, when he worked for a store selling 
electronic devices, Mrs. Vaughan inquired about having a 
security system installed at the Vaughans’ grocery store.  
 
34
According to Deputy Wesson, Mrs. Vaughan was concerned 
because of a robbery and murder that had occurred at a 
store in a neighboring county and was fearful that the same 
kind of crime could happen at the Vaughans’ store. 
 
Green claims that this testimony violated his rights 
under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the Constitution of the United States and the equivalent 
provisions of the Constitution of Virginia.  However, Green 
did not object to Deputy Wesson’s testimony at trial.  
Thus, he is barred from raising this claim for the first 
time on appeal.  Rule 5:25. 
2. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE OF VILENESS 
 AND FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS 
 
 
Green asserts that the circuit court erred in 
overruling his motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence 
regarding both the “vileness” and “future dangerousness” 
predicates and also in overruling his motion to set aside 
the jury verdict fixing the death penalty.  As to the 
“vileness” factor, Green argues that, since three of the 
four gunshot wounds sustained by Mrs. Vaughan were lethal, 
she died almost instantaneously without any other battery 
to her.  He also relies on the forensic pathologist’s 
testimony that Mrs. Vaughan died within “seconds to 
minutes” after she was first shot.  Thus, in Green’s view, 
 
35
the Commonwealth failed to prove either an aggravated 
battery to the victim or depravity of mind of the 
defendant. 
 
He also contends that the Commonwealth failed to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Green would 
probably commit criminal acts of violence in the future 
that would constitute a continuing serious threat to 
society.  According to Green, the testimony of Dr. Sautter 
and Dr. Pasquale established that Green would not be a 
future danger if confined to prison.  Green points to Dr. 
Sautter’s opinion that Green’s behavior would be 
appropriate in a maximum-security situation and to Dr. 
Pasquale’s statement that, in a prison setting, the risk of 
misbehavior by Green would be low.  In asserting that the 
Commonwealth failed to establish the “future dangerousness” 
predicate, Green also relies on the fact that he had no 
record of convictions for criminal offenses that pre-dated 
the present offenses involving the Vaughans.  Finally, he 
characterizes the Commonwealth’s evidence of unadjudicated 
prior bad acts as “‘benign’ run-ins with friends, family 
and employers.” 
 
With regard to the “vileness” predicate, the term 
“aggravated battery” means “a battery which, qualitatively 
and quantitatively, is more culpable than the minimum 
 
36
necessary to accomplish an act of murder.”  Smith v. 
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 478, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978).  
Contrary to Green’s assumption that Mrs. Vaughan died 
instantly, the forensic pathologist stated that he could 
not determine in what sequence Green had fired the four 
gunshots at Mrs. Vaughan.  He did opine, however, that the 
bullet that penetrated two lobes of her right lung caused 
hemorrhaging in the thoracic cavity, the effect of which he 
likened to suffocation.  “A killing inflicted by multiple 
gunshot wounds . . . when there is an appreciable lapse of 
time between the first shot and the last, and when death 
does not result instantaneously from the first” constitutes 
an “aggravated battery.”  Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 
379, 392, 464 S.E.2d 131, 139 (1995).  Likewise, multiple 
gunshot wounds, any one of which could have been fatal, 
constitute an “aggravated battery.”  Walker v. 
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 71, 515 S.E.2d 565, 575 (1999). 
 
We have construed the term “depravity of mind” to mean 
“a degree of moral turpitude and psychical debasement 
surpassing that inherent in the definition of ordinary 
legal malice and premeditation.”  Smith, 219 Va. at 478, 
248 S.E.2d at 149.  Green’s conduct established “depravity 
of mind” when he repeatedly shot Mrs. Vaughan in front of 
her husband and left them both to die merely so he could 
 
37
rob them.  The killing of Mrs. Vaughan was unprovoked and 
Green showed no mercy for her when he walked back over to 
where she was lying on the floor and emptied his gun at 
her.  See Walker, 258 Va. at 72, 515 S.E.2d at 575-76.  
Thus, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in 
refusing to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence or to set 
aside the jury verdict finding the aggravating “vileness” 
factor. 
 
As to the “future dangerousness” predicate, we reach 
the same conclusion.  The circumstances surrounding the 
murder of Mrs. Vaughan, including the shooting of Mr. 
Vaughan, are alone sufficient to establish Green’s future 
dangerousness.  See Code § 19.2-264.4(C) (future 
dangerousness can be based on “the circumstances 
surrounding the commission of the offense”); Kasi v. 
Commonwealth, 256 Va. 407, 423, 508 S.E.2d 57, 66 (1998).  
In addition, Cleaton, an acquaintance of Green, testified 
that Green had threatened to rob and kill him and had shot 
in Cleaton’s direction on one occasion even though Cleaton 
had specifically asked Green not to do so.  Cleaton also 
stated that he had heard Green threaten to rob a man 
selling ice cream.  Finally, several correctional officers 
who had supervised Green’s incarceration testified about 
 
38
Green’s disruptive behavior and his threats to the 
officers. 
E. ISSUES ALREADY DECIDED 
 
Several of Green’s assignments of error concern issues 
that this Court has already decided adversely to the 
position he now advances.  Green has offered no reason why 
we should depart from our precedents.  Thus, we affirm our 
prior holdings and find no merit in the following 
assignments of error: 
 
1. The trial court erred in overruling the defendant’s 
motion to declare Virginia’s death penalty statutes 
unconstitutional.  Green makes only a generalized argument 
on this issue.  We have rejected numerous specific 
challenges to the constitutionality of Virginia’s death 
penalty statutes in Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 387, 
484 S.E.2d 898, 907 (1997); Breard, 248 Va. at 74-75, 445 
S.E.2d at 675; Mickens v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 395, 403, 
442 S.E.2d 678, 684 (1994); Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 
Va. 220, 227-28, 421 S.E.2d 821, 826 (1992); Watkins v. 
Commonwealth, 238 Va. 341, 352, 385 S.E.2d 50, 56 (1989); 
Spencer, 238 Va. at 280-81, 384 S.E.2d at 777-78; and 
Smith, 219 Va. at 471-79, 248 S.E.2d at 145-49. 
 
2. The trial court erred in overruling the defendant’s 
motion for a bill of particulars.  Initially, we note that 
 
39
the circuit court granted Green’s motion in part.  To the 
extent that he now argues that he was entitled to a bill of 
particulars providing a “narrowing” construction of the 
“vileness” predicate and listing all the evidence that the 
Commonwealth intended to rely upon at sentencing, we have 
rejected such arguments in Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 
442, 454, 470 S.E.2d 114, 123 (1996); and Strickler, 241 
Va. at 490, 404 S.E.2d at 233, respectively. 
 
3. The trial court erred in overruling the defendant’s 
motion to preclude the Commonwealth from using evidence of 
unadjudicated acts at sentencing.  Although the circuit 
court denied Green’s motion, the court stated in its order 
that it would review each unadjudicated act for its 
relevance to the issue of future dangerousness and its 
probative value versus its prejudicial effect.  This Court 
has rejected Green’s arguments in Walker, 258 Va. at 64-67, 
515 S.E.2d at 571-73; Williams v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 
528, 536, 450 S.E.2d 365, 371 (1994); and Stockton v. 
Commonwealth, 241 Va. 192, 209, 402 S.E.2d 196, 206 (1991). 
 
4. The trial court erred in denying the defendant’s 
motion for additional peremptory challenges.  We have 
rejected this claim in Spencer, 240 Va. at 84, 393 S.E.2d 
at 613; Buchanan, 238 Va. at 405, 384 S.E.2d at 767; and 
 
40
O’Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 690, 364 S.E.2d 491, 
501 (1988). 
 
5. The trial court erred in denying the defendant’s 
motion for that court to conduct a proportionality review.  
As we have already ruled, nothing in Code § 17.1-313(E) 
requires a trial court to conduct such a review, Bailey, 
259 Va. at 742, 529 S.E.2d at 581, and the circuit court in 
this case did not abuse its discretion in refusing to do 
so.  See id.
 
6. The trial court erred by overruling the defendant’s 
motion to introduce evidence regarding conditions of 
imprisonment for life in rebuttal to the Commonwealth’s 
evidence of the defendant’s future dangerousness.  We have 
rejected all Green’s arguments on this issue in Bell, 264 
Va. at 199, 563 S.E.2d at 713; Burns, 261 Va. at 338-40, 
541 S.E.2d at 892-93; Lovitt, 260 Va. at 517, 537 S.E.2d at 
879; and Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 309-10, 513 
S.E.2d 642, 653-54 (1999).  We further note that the 
circuit court denied Green’s motion only “to the extent 
that it exceeds evidence of [Green’s] previous adjustment 
to incarceration.” 
F. STATUTORY REVIEW 
 
As with every case involving the imposition of the 
death penalty, we must determine whether the death sentence 
 
41
in this case was imposed under the influence of passion, 
prejudice, or other arbitrary factors.  Code § 17.1-
313(C)(1).  Green does not claim that any specific passion 
or prejudice affected the sentencing decision.  Upon 
reviewing the record, we find no evidence that any such 
factor was present in this case or influenced either the 
jury’s or the circuit court’s sentencing decision. 
 
We are also required by the provisions of Code § 17.1-
313(C)(2) to determine whether Green’s sentence of death is 
“excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in 
similar cases, considering both the crime and the 
defendant.”  Because of the statutory directive that we 
compare this case with “similar cases,” we have focused on 
cases in which an individual was murdered during the 
commission of robbery and the death penalty was imposed 
upon a finding of both aggravating factors.  Our 
proportionality review includes all capital murder cases 
presented to this Court for review and is not limited to 
selected cases.  See Burns, 261 Va. at 345, 541 S.E.2d at 
896-97.  Based on that review, we conclude that Green’s 
sentence of death is not excessive or disproportionate to 
sentences generally imposed in this Commonwealth for 
capital murders comparable to Green’s murder of Mrs. 
Vaughan, and we cite the following cases as examples:  
 
42
Akers v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 358, 535 S.E.2d 674 (2000), 
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1205 (2001); Stout v. Commonwealth, 
237 Va. 126, 376 S.E.2d 288 (1989); Poyner v. Commonwealth, 
229 Va. 401, 329 S.E.2d 815 (1985); and Edmonds v. 
Commonwealth, 229 Va. 303, 329 S.E.2d 807 (1985). 
 
In reaching this conclusion, we have considered 
Green’s argument that the death penalty in this case is 
disproportionate because the Commonwealth failed to show 
that Mrs. Vaughan endured prolonged suffering before she 
died and because Green had no criminal convictions prior to 
this offense.  He thus claims that this case involved “less 
aggravation” than many other cases in this Commonwealth in 
which death sentences have been imposed.  We do not agree 
and reiterate that the purpose of our proportionality 
review “is to reach a reasoned judgment regarding what 
cases justify the imposition of the death penalty.”  Orbe 
v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 390, 405, 519 S.E.2d 808, 817 
(1999).  We do not “insure complete symmetry.”  Id.
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated, we find no error in the 
judgment of the circuit court or in the imposition of the 
death penalty.  We also perceive no reason warranting 
commutation of the death penalty in this case.  Thus, we 
will affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
 
43
Affirmed. 
 
44