Case Title: Delgue v. Curutchet

Citation: 

Docket Number: 5831

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-01-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Delgue v. Curutchet1984 WY 14677 P.2d 208Case Number: 5831, 5832Decided: 01/31/1984GUILLAUME DELGUE, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

ALVINA CURUTCHET, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

FLORENCE BORDARRAMPE, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF PETER BORDARRAMPE, FLORENCE BORDARRAMPE, AND DEAN SMITH, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

ALVINA CURUTCHET, A/K/A MRS. ARNAUD CURUTCHET, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT). Nos. 5831, 5832

Supreme Court of Wyoming
GUILLAUME DELGUE, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

ALVINA CURUTCHET, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

FLORENCE BORDARRAMPE, EXECUTRIX 
OF THE ESTATE OF PETER BORDARRAMPE, FLORENCE BORDARRAMPE, AND DEAN SMITH, 
APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

ALVINA CURUTCHET, A/K/A 
MRS. ARNAUD CURUTCHET, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT). Nos. 5831, 
5832

Appeal from the District 
Court, JohnsonCounty, Leonard McEwan, 
J.

Henry A. Burgess 
and Hayden F. Heaphy, Jr., of Burgess & Davis, Sheridan, for appellants.

Lawrence A. 
Yonkee of Redle, Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER,* THOMAS, ROSE and BROWN, 
JJ.

* Retired June 13, 1983, 
but continued to participate in the decision of the court in this case pursuant 
to order of the court entered June 13, 1983. 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The essential 
substantive question which is presented by these cases involves the right of a 
lessee to make use of an appurtenant easement established by prescription in 
favor of the lands which he is leasing. In order to resolve this essential 
substantive question the court must first concern itself with whether the 
related doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel preclude an attempt by 
the lessee to establish his right to use of the easement because of language in 
the judgment establishing the easement which purports to exclude lessees. The 
trial court ruled that the owner of the dominant estate and her current lessee 
both were precluded by the prior judgment from attempting to establish the right 
of the current lessee to make use of the easement. It is our conclusion that the 
current lessee is not precluded by the prior judgment, and that he has the right 
to use the appurtenant easement in connection with his lease of the dominant 
estate. To that extent we shall reverse the district court. We have been unable 
to discern any rule which permits the owner of the dominant estate to pursue 
this issue by simply filing a new complaint in the prior action, and 
consequently, being persuaded that she failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the 
district court, we shall dismiss her appeal.

[¶2.]     The appellant, 
Bordarrampe, the owner, and Delgue, the current lessee, state the issues in 
these cases in their joint brief as follows:

"I. The permanent and 
perpetual right-of-way easement acquired by Florence Bordarrampe is an 
appurtenant easement running to the benefit of the land, and those persons in 
lawful possession of the land, including lessees.

"II. The Judgment 
originally entered in Civil Action Number 4963 was personal to Dean Smith, who 
sued as a Plaintiff-lessee of Florence Bordarrampe. The Judgment entered against 
Smith, that he was not entitled to a prescriptive easement, should not be 
enforced against the Appellant, Guillaume Delgue, who was not a party to that 
action, not in privity with Dean Smith, and claims an easement right on a 
different theory."

The appellee, 
Curutchet, the owner of the servient estate, has summarized her argument in her 
statement of the issues as found in her brief, in this 
way:

"In the action tried in 
1976, Florence Bordarrampe contended that her lessee was entitled to use the 
easement on the Curutchet land. Where this question was directly in issue in the 
former action and where it was judicially determined, that the easement did 
extend to a lessee, is that matter conclusively settled by the Judgment rendered 
September 7, 1976?

"Did the question 
concerning a lessee's use of the easement become res judicata, which may not be 
litigated again in a subsequent action between the same parties or their 
privies, regardless of the form that the issue may have taken in the subsequent 
actions?"

[¶3.]     In late 1974, there 
occurred a disagreement between neighboring landowners, Alvina Curutchet and 
Pete and Florence Bordarrampe together with their lessee, Dean H. Smith, over 
the use of a road which ran across the Curutchet lands from a county road to the 
lands owned by the Bordarrampes. The Bordarrampe lands had been leased to Dean 
H. Smith earlier in 1974, and Mrs. Curutchet objected to Smith's use of the road 
across her land, although it had been used for many years by the Bordarrampes 
and their predecessors in interest. Mrs. Curutchet advised Mrs. Bordarrampe that 
Smith could not use the road but would have to use a different road instead, and 
at that time Mrs. Bordarrampe asserted that Smith had a right to use the road. 
Thereupon, Mrs. Curutchet padlocked a gate across the road. An action then was 
brought by the Bordarrampes and Smith, seeking to establish on behalf of the 
Bordarrampes and Smith a prescriptive easement in their favor over the road 
across the Curutchet property.

[¶4.]     That dispute was 
resolved by the district court in 1976. The district court found the requisite 
prescriptive use by the Bordarrampes and their predecessors in interest, and in 
its conclusions of law stated in the part pertinent to this 
dispute:

"V.

"The Plaintiff is 
entitled to a permanent and perpetual easement across the lands of the Defendant 
for general social and ranch purposes, generally along the center line of the 
road as previously described herein.

"VI.

"The easement which the 
Plaintiff Bordarrampe acquired is limited to use for general ranch purposes by 
themselves, their employees, suppliers, truckers, or drovers moving livestock 
belonging to the Bordarrampes, and social purposes relating thereto, and to 
their successors in title. The easement does not extend to 
lessees."

The effect of 
the last sentence of these conclusions of law was to exclude Smith from use of 
the prescriptive easement.

[¶5.]     Pete Bordarrampe had 
died during the course of the litigation, and his estate was substituted as a 
party. After the entry of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Florence 
Bordarrampe and Smith filed a Motion for Reconsideration to adjust paragraph VI 
of the legal conclusions so that it would reflect that the easement extended to 
"the Bordarrampes, their lessees, * * * and their successors in title." The 
court denied this motion and entered its final judgment in that litigation. That 
judgment provided in the part pertinent to these cases as 
follows:

"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiff, FLORENCE BORDARRAMPE, her successors in 
title and assigns, and employees, suppliers, social guests, truckers, and 
drovers of livestock belonging to the Plaintiff or her successors and assigns, 
but not lessees shall, and do hereby have, a permanent and perpetual easement 
across the lands of the Defendant, Alvina E. Curutchet, for general ranch and 
social purposes, the approximate width of a motor vehicle along the center line 
as described as follows * * *."

None of the 
parties took an appeal from the 1976 judgment.

[¶6.]     After Dean H. Smith's 
lease expired, the Bordarrampe ranch was leased to the appellant Guilluame 
Delgue. According to the agreed facts, as expressed in the pleadings now before 
this court as a part of the record, Delgue used the road in issue to travel 
across the Curutchet lands to the Bordarrampe lands until early in June of 1982. 
Mrs. Curutchet then caused a padlocked chain to be placed across the road, 
making it impossible to use it in connection with the operations of the 
Bordarrampe ranchlands. She followed this action by filing a suit against Delgue 
in which she complained of his use of the road; alleged notification to Delgue 
that he was a trespasser; and sought relief in the form of an injunction 
restraining Delgue's use of the road during the pendency of the action and 
permanently thereafter and for compensatory and exemplary damages which were 
alleged to be $1,000 and $10,000 respectively. Delgue responded by filing an 
answer and a counterclaim in which he asserted that he had a right to use the 
easement across the Curutchet lands as a lessee of the Bordarrampe lands. In his 
counterclaim he sought a decree establishing his right to quiet and peaceful 
enjoyment of the easement, together with damages caused to him by denial of the 
right to use the road. In a separate complaint, which was filed approximately a 
month later in the court file in the prior case, Florence Bordarrampe sought 
equitable relief and a modification of the earlier judgment on the grounds of 
mistake or clerical error. Alternatively she prayed for an amendment to the 
earlier judgment so that it would reflect that it was personal to Dean H. Smith 
and did not affect the right of any present or future lessees of the Bordarrampe 
ranchlands to use the easement. In answering this complaint Mrs. Curutchet 
relied upon the defense of res judicata. She also relied upon the prior judgment 
in replying to the Delgue counterclaim pointing to the restrictive language 
relating to lessees.

[¶7.]     The district court 
consolidated the two cases, and a hearing was held on September 14, 1982. The 
parties agreed that the issue essentially was one of law and that the only 
record necessary for disposition was the record of the proceedings in the 
earlier action. At the conclusion of the hearing the district court made an oral 
finding to the effect that the easement established in the prior case was 
personal to the owners of the Bordarrampe property and would not be extended to 
include lessees of that property. There followed a formal judgment dismissing 
the complaint of Florence Bordarrampe and permanently enjoining Delgue from 
using the road over which the easement had been established or from entering the 
Curutchet property. It was from this judgment that these appeals have been 
taken.

[¶8.]     At the heart of this 
controversy there can be discerned a confusion on the part of the district court 
between appurtenant easements and easements in gross. If a prescriptive easement 
is recognized which is appurtenant to the land the right to use that easement is 
an indivisible aspect of the right to use the land to which it is appurtenant. 
That right obviously encompasses lessees from the record owners. Restatement of 
Property, § 487, comment (f) (1944).

[¶9.]     The judgment 
establishing the prescriptive easement in this case contains language that 
affords the appellant Bordarrampe "her successors in title and assigns * * * but 
not lessees * * * a permanent and perpetual easement across the lands of the 
defendant, Alvina E. Curutchet, for general ranch and social purposes * * *." 
This court has recognized the strong preference in the law to construe an 
easement as being appurtenant rather than in gross. Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., 
Wyo., 519 P.2d 972-975 (1974), citing Restatement of Property, § 454, p. 2917 
(1944). In the instant case the easement was created by prescription rather than 
grant, but its purpose was to benefit the legal and equitable owner of the 
Bordarrampe ranch in connection with the use of her own land. As such, this 
easement was appurtenant to the Bordarrampe ranch, and was transferred by any 
conveyance which was efficacious for the purpose of transferring the right of 
possession to the ranch. The transferee would acquire as a part of the right of 
possession of the ranch the right to use the easement to the extent that it was 
established by the prior judgment. Weber 
v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., supra; 2 American Law of Property, § 871, p. 
282-283 (1952); and Restatement of Property, § 487 and comment (c) (1944). The 
judgment specifically recognized successors in title and assigns as among those 
entitled to the benefit of the appurtenant easement, and the attempt in the 
initial judgment to prohibit lessees from use of the prescriptive easement was 
erroneous. Mrs. Curutchet says, however, that in any event, including that of an 
erroneous judgment, this action by Delgue is foreclosed by either the doctrine 
of res judicata or the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

[¶10.]  We then pause to note the preclusive 
effects afforded to prior judgments both as to claims and as to issues as 
outlined in Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 17, p. 148 (1982), as 
follows:

"§ 17. Effects of Former 
Adjudication - General Rules

"A valid and final 
personal judgment is conclusive between the parties, except on appeal or other 
direct review, to the following extent:

"(1) If the judgment is 
in favor of the plaintiff, the claim is extinguished and merged in the judgment 
and a new claim may arise on the judgment (see § 18);

"(2) If the judgment is 
in favor of the defendant, the claim is extinguished and the judgment bars a 
subsequent action on that claim (see § 19);

"(3) A judgment in favor 
of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in a subsequent action 
between them on the same or a different claim, with respect to any issue 
actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential to that 
judgment (see § 27)."

The Restatement 
sections which are referenced in § 17 read as follows:

"§ 18. Judgment for 
Plaintiff - The General Rule of Merger

"When a valid and final 
personal judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff:

""(1) The plaintiff 
cannot thereafter maintain an action on the original claim or any part thereof, 
although he may be able to maintain an action upon the judgment; 
and

"(2) In an action upon 
the judgment, the defendant cannot avail himself of defenses he might have 
interposed, or did interpose, in the first action."

"§ 19. Judgment for 
Defendant - The General Rule of Bar

"A valid and final 
personal judgment rendered in favor of the defendant bars another action by the 
plaintiff on the same claim."

"§ 27. Issue Preclusion - 
General Rule

"When an issue of fact or 
law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the 
determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a 
subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different 
claim."

[¶11.]  In this instance we find that the prior 
judgment was in favor of the plaintiffs to the extent of the establishment of 
the prescriptive easement, but it was in favor of the defendant with respect to 
the right of lessees to take advantage of the prescriptive easement. It follows 
from the summary of the law set forth above that to the extent that the prior 
judgment established the easement it represented a merger of the claim of Mrs. 
Bordarrampe to that easement in the judgment, but to the extent that the use of 
the easement was denied to the lessees it represented the extinguishment of a 
claim leading to the bar of a subsequent action on that claim. The inherent 
inconsistency in this judgment is obvious.

[¶12.]  Considering the appellant Delgue, it is 
clear that of the parties involved in the prior litigation he is in privity only 
with Mrs. Bordarrampe. In presenting his counterclaim it was not his intention 
to relitigate the claim to an easement, but he simply sought to establish his 
right to the benefit of the appurtenant easement. This is not the same claim as 
that presented by Mrs. Bordarrampe, and conceptually it is not barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata. If there is a preclusive effect with respect to 
Delgue, since his counterclaim presents a different claim from that of Mrs. 
Bordarrampe in the initial action, it must be because of the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel.

[¶13.]  In this jurisdiction the doctrine of res 
judicata and the related doctrine of collateral estoppel have been recognized in 
a number of decisions over the years. Barrett v. Town of Guernsey, Wyo., 652 P.2d 395 (1982); Roush v. Roush, 
Wyo., 589 P.2d 841 (1979); Bard Ranch 
Company v. Weber, Wyo., 557 P.2d 722 (1976); Blount v. City of Laramie, Wyo., 510 P.2d 294 (1973); Knight v. Boner, 
Wyo., 459 P.2d 205 (1969); Rubeling v. 
Rubeling, Wyo., 406 P.2d 283 (1965); Lee v. Brown, Wyo., 357 P.2d 1106 
(1960); Willis v. Willis, 48 Wyo. 
403, 49 P.2d 670 (1935), reh. denied 49 Wyo. 296, 54 P.2d 814 (1936); and Cook v. Elmore, 27 Wyo. 163, 192 P. 824 
(1920). See also Price v. Bonnifield, 
2 Wyo. 80 (1878). As recognized in this state, these doctrines incorporate a 
universal precept of common-law jurisprudence to the effect that a "right, 
question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of 
competent jurisdiction . . . cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the 
same parties or their privies." Montana 
v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S. Ct. 970, 973, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210 
(1979), quoting from Southern Pacific R. 
Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49, 18 S. Ct. 18, 27, 42 L. Ed. 355 
(1897). These doctrines are founded upon the interest held by society in having 
differences conclusively resolved in a single action thereby avoiding the 
vexation and expense which are associated with piecemeal litigation. The 
necessity for sustaining this social interest is the justification for the 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Montana v. United States, supra, 440 U.S.  at 153-154, 99 S.Ct. at 973-74; Barrett v. Town of Guernsey, supra, 652 
P.2d at 398-399; and Rubeling v. 
Rubeling, supra, 406 P.2d  at 284. These doctrines, which inhibit the 
relitigation of claims or issues upon which there has been a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate in a court of competent jurisdiction, promote the 
reliance by citizens of the state upon courts to settle their disputes and they 
conserve judicial resources.

[¶14.]  The interest served by both doctrines is 
essentially the same, but courts, including this court, have been careful to 
distinguish between the two. Res judicata can be described generally as that 
rule which precludes the presentation by parties or those in privity with them 
of the same claim that was resolved by an earlier judgment. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 
24 L. Ed. 195 (1877); Bard Ranch Company 
v. Weber, supra, 557 P.2d  at 727; Willis v. Willis, supra, 49 P.2d  at 673; 
and Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 17 (1982). The effect of collateral 
estoppel is that of preventing relitigation of issues which were involved 
actually and necessarily in the prior action between the same parties. Roush v. Roush, supra, 589 P.2d  at 843; 
Bard Ranch Company v. Weber, supra, 
557 P.2d at 726-727; Willis v. 
Willis, supra, 49 P.2d at 673-677; and Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 
27 (1982).

[¶15.]  Here the appellants urge upon the court 
the proposition that there still is open the issue of whether a lessee is 
entitled to the benefit of the easement in the road across the Curutchet ranch 
because Delgue was not a party in the original case, and he has proceeded with 
the presentation of a different claim from that asserted by the Bordarrampes in 
the prior action. The appellee, however, argues that the issue of utilization of 
the easement by a lessee actually and necessarily was before the court in the 
prior action and that the doctrine of res judicata (collateral estoppel) 
inhibits the Delgue counterclaim. It is our holding that res judicata does not 
prohibit this counterclaim by Delgue, and furthermore, the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel does not prevent him from asserting his 
counterclaim.

[¶16.]  The initial action established, according 
to Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, 
Inc., supra, 519 P.2d  at 975, citing Restatement of Property, § 454, p. 2917 
(1944), a prescriptive easement in Mrs. Bordarrampe which is an appurtenant 
easement rather than an easement in gross. Specifically the language in the 
judgment created an appurtenant easement in accordance with the strong 
preference in the law to that end. While there appears to be some argument as to 
the propriety of that aspect of the judgment inhibiting use by lessees, we are 
satisfied that the rules of law are clear that an appurtenant easement is 
available to any possessor of the dominant estate, including lessees, and that 
the attempt by the district court in the earlier judgment to limit the easement 
and prevent its utilization by lessees is erroneous.

[¶17.]  The real question with respect to the 
appellant Delgue then is whether he is foreclosed by the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel from raising the question in his counterclaim. Succinctly, the issue is 
whether that matter was actually and necessarily before the district court in 
connection with the claim of the Bordarrampes for a prescriptive easement. In Willis v. Willis, supra, 49 P.2d  at 
673-677, Justice Blume, writing for the court, stated the significant limitation 
upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel which is the requirement that the 
determination of the issue sought to be precluded must have been necessary or 
essential to the disposition reflected in the earlier judgment. In Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments, § 27, comment (h), p. 258 (1982), the proposition is 
stated as follows:

"If issues are determined 
but the judgment is not dependent upon the determinations, relitigation of those 
issues in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded. Such 
determinations have the characteristics of dicta, and may not ordinarily be the 
subject of an appeal by the party against whom they were made. In these 
circumstances, the interest in providing an opportunity for a considered 
determination, which if adverse may be the subject of an appeal, outweighs the 
interest in avoiding the burden of relitigation."

See also Roush v. Roush, supra, 589 P.2d  at 844; 
and Bard Ranch Company v. Weber, 
supra, 557 P.2d  at 727-728.

[¶18.]  With respect to the claim of the 
Bordarrampes for a prescriptive easement, the presence or absence of a lessee is 
not a fact material to their claim. It is true that the use of the claimed 
easement by a tenant could be tacked to the use by the Bordarrampes in 
determining whether the prescriptive use existed over the requisite period of 
the statute of limitations. Murray v. 
Fuller, 82 Cal. App. 2d 400, 186 P.2d 157 (1947); Gregory's Inc. v. Baltim, 142 Conn. 296, 
113 A.2d 588 (1955); Deregibus v. 
Silberman Furniture Co., 121 Conn. 633, 186 A. 553, 105 A.L.R. 1183 (1936); 
Benson v. Fekete, Mo., 424 S.W.2d 729 
(1968); Te Selle v. Storey, 133 Mont. 
1, 319 P.2d 218 (1957); Rosenblatt v. 
Kizell, 105 N.H. 59, 192 A.2d 613 (1963); Feldman v. Knapp, 196 Or. 453, 250 P.2d 92 (1952); and Shellow v. Hagen, 9 
Wis.2d 506, 101 N.W.2d 694 (1960). By the same token it is clear that the 
lessee, Smith, could not have established a prescriptive easement for himself 
over the Curutchet lands because any use by him would have to be incidental to 
his lease from the Bordarrampes. Deregibus v. Silberman Furniture Co., 
supra. This rule would support the conclusion of the court in the earlier 
judgment to the extent that it reflects that Smith did not have a prescriptive 
right of his own. Because the use by the lessee was not material to the 
Bordarrampes' claim, we now hold that Delgue was not estopped by the prior 
judgment from bringing his counterclaim against Curutchet.

[¶19.]  Even conceding for purposes of argument 
that that issue was necessary and essential to the prior judgment, we still find 
exceptions in the law which indicate that preclusive effect should not be given 
to the prior judgment. We initiate this proposition by noting the premise that 
"justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 
14, 75 S. Ct. 11, 99 L. Ed. 11 (1954). In Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest 
Brews, 53 Cal.L.Rev. 25, 37 (1965), the author asserts that "no legal principle, 
perhaps least of all the principle of collateral estoppel, should ever be 
applied to work injustice." See also Parklane Hosiery Company, Inc., v. 
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S. Ct. 645, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1979); Lundeen v. Hackbarth, 285 Minn. 7, 171 N.W.2d 87 (1969); City of Plainfield v. 
Public Service Electric and Gas Company, 82 N.J. 245, 412 A.2d 759 (1980); 
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. 
Century Home Components, Inc., 275 Or. 97, 550 P.2d 1185 (1976); Henderson v. Bardahl International 
Corporation, 72 Wn.2d 109, 431 P.2d 961 (1967); and Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments, § 28(2) and § 29(8) (1982). The resolution of this controversy in the 
trial court falls short of this standard in a substantial way. The injustice 
lies in providing disparate treatment to lawful possessors of the dominant 
estate depending upon whether the possessor acquired his right to possession by 
purchase, inheritance or assignment on one hand, or by leasing the Bordarrampe 
ranch on the other. There is no suggestion in this action of an attempt to 
expand upon the nature or extent of use of the prescriptive easement established 
by the judgment. Delgue is limited to the use of the road in exactly the same 
way that any other possessor of the Bordarrampe ranchlands would be. While we 
can appreciate the laudable attempt by the district court to effect a compromise 
between the parties in the original action, the inherent injustice to the 
recognized rights of the Bordarrampes with respect to the use of their property 
and the inconsistency between the exclusion of lessees and the recognition of a 
perpetual easement subject to assignment require that we reverse the district 
court.

[¶20.]  We note that other courts have recognized 
that the doctrine of collateral estoppel may not be invoked when adherence to 
the prior decision through preclusion of the issue as a matter of law results in 
inequitable administration of the law. See Montana v. United States, supra, 440 U.S.  at 147, 99 S. Ct.  at 970; Marsland v. 
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Hawaii, 657 P.2d 1035 
(1983); City of Plainfield v. Public 
Service Electric and Gas Company, supra; Torres v. Village of Capitan, 92 N.M. 
64, 582 P.2d 1277 (1978); and Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 28(2) and 
comment (c), § 29(7), and § 29(8) (1982). Still other courts have denied any 
preclusive effect to judgments which are inconsistent or ambiguous. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales 
Corporation, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982); Henderson v. Bardahl International 
Corporation, supra. Preclusion also has been denied in instances in which 
the judgment relied upon was rendered in circumstances indicating that it was 
the product of a compromise. Berner v. 
British Commonwealth Pacific Airways, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2nd Cir. 1965), 
cert. denied 382 U.S. 983, 86 S. Ct. 559, 15 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1966); Lundeen v. Hackbarth, supra; and 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 29(5) and comment (g) 
(1982).

[¶21.]  The difficulties with respect to the 
prior judgment in this instance are patent and have been noted. Under the 
circumstance it would seem that the authorities relied upon would justify Mrs. 
Bordarrampe in seeking a clarification of the judgment in an appropriate 
proceeding. We have not been able to identify any rule of this court which 
justifies the manner in which she attempted to raise that issue. She simply 
filed a new complaint in the prior action, and we know of no rule of civil 
procedure which justifies that. Consequently we conclude that Mrs. Bordarrampe 
did not appropriately invoke the jurisdiction of the district court. See Padlock Ranch, Inc. v. Washakie Needles Irr. 
Dist., 50 Wyo. 253, 61 P.2d 410 (1936). Consistently we should refuse 
jurisdiction over her contentions in this appeal. White v. Board of Land Commissioners, 
Wyo., 595 P.2d 76 (1979); Ginn v. 
Parrish, Wyo., 362 P.2d 824 (1961). We therefore reverse the judgment as to 
the appellant Delgue in Civil Case 82-6 Ci-78 in the District Court for the 
Fourth Judicial District of the State of Wyoming in and for Johnson County, and 
we remand that case to the district court for further proceedings in accordance 
with this opinion. We dismiss the appeal in Bordarrampe v. Curutchet based upon the 
attempt to raise the issues in Civil Case 4963 because there was no jurisdiction 
of the district court invoked by the procedure attempted by Mrs. 
Bordarrampe.

[¶22.]  ROSE, Justice, with whom BROWN, Justice, joins, 
dissenting.

[¶23.]  The judgment rendered in 1976 precludes 
the relitigation of the issues now raised by appellants - even if they are 
correct about the law of appurtenant easements. Therefore, I would have affirmed 
the judgment of the district court.

[¶24.]  The finality of judgments is a basic 
concept in our system of jurisprudence:

"A fundamental precept of 
common-law adjudication, embodied in the related doctrines of collateral 
estoppel and res judicata, is that a `right, question or fact distinctly put in 
issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . cannot 
be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies. . . 
.' Southern Pacific R. Co. v. United 
States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49, 18 S. Ct. 18, 27, 42 L. Ed. 355 (1897). Under res 
judicata, a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their 
privies based on the same cause of action. [Citations.] Under collateral 
estoppel, once an issue is actually and necessarily determined by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits 
based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation. 
[Citations.] Application of both doctrines is central to the purpose for which 
civil courts have been established, the conclusive resolution of disputes within 
their jurisdictions. [Citations.] To preclude parties from contesting matters 
that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their 
adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves 
judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the 
possibility of inconsistent decisions." Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 
153-154, 99 S. Ct. 970, 973, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1979).

[¶25.]  Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
a party is prevented from relitigating issues actually decided against him in a 
prior suit, where those issues were essential to the earlier judgment. Willis v. Willis, 48 Wyo. 403, 49 P.2d 670 (1935), reh. denied 49 Wyo. 296, 54 P.2d 814 (1936). The doctrine applies to 
preclude relitigation of both issues of law and issues of fact. United States v. Stauffer Chemical 
Company, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 575, 78 L.Ed.2d ___ 
(1984).

[¶26.]  The 1976 judgment with which this court 
is concerned in the present case is clear and unequivocal. The prescriptive 
easement awarded to Bordarrampe does not extend to lessees. It follows, 
therefore, that the trial court's determination concerning the rights of lessees 
to use the easement was essential to the judgment. Indeed, the determination was 
fundamental to the judgment and a proper matter for appeal by Bordarrampe and 
her lessee at that time. See Restatement of the Law, Judgments 2d, § 27, comment 
h, p. 258 (1982). Under the authority cited here and in the majority opinion, 
collateral estoppel should apply to preclude relitigation of this issue finally 
determined in 1976.

[¶27.]  The majority, however, hold that 
collateral estoppel is not a valid defense in the present case, because the 
issue of a lessee's right to use the easement was not material to Bordarrampe's 
claim in the prior case. Whether that issue was material to Bordarrampe's 
original claim would be relevant to a consideration of the applicability of res 
judicata. To determine whether collateral estoppel is appropriate, however, the 
court must focus on the issues actually decided, not the nature of the original 
claim.

[¶28.]  Since the sole question raised by Delgue 
was previously decided and incorporated into a valid judgment and since he is in 
privy with one of the parties to that action, it follows for me that the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes his claim. Bordarrampe's attempt to 
reopen the matter is precluded for the same reasons.

[¶29.]  The majority say that even assuming the 
issue concerning use of the easement by a lessee were essential to the prior 
judgment, considerations of justice prevent application of the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel. I would have held that considerations of justice support 
the invocation of the doctrine.

[¶30.]  The underlying rationale of mutual 
collateral estoppel1 - the conclusive resolution of 
disputes between the same parties - is promoted by its application in this case. 
Montana v. United States, supra, 440 U.S.  at 153, 99 S. Ct.  at 973. Bordarrampe had a previous opportunity to fully 
litigate the matter and Delgue's interests were adequately represented in that 
action. See Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion, Ch. 11, F. 3, V-338 (1969). 
Curutchet, having endured one lawsuit which purported to determine the contours 
of an easement across her land, had a right to rely on the final, unappealed 
judgment. While concerns about injustice might prevent application of the 
doctrine where a nonparty to the prior lawsuit seeks to preclude the 
relitigation of issues, see Parklane 
Hosiery Company, Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S. Ct. 645, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552 
(1979), the case at bar is not that situation.2 

[¶31.]  I believe that the majority's application 
of an exception to the doctrine of collateral estoppel in the present case 
frustrates the doctrine's purpose of protecting parties from burdensome 
relitigation and discourages reliance on adjudication to settle disputes. The 
effect of the court's decision today is to correct, some seven years after entry 
of the final judgment, a perceived misapplication of the law of appurtenant 
easements. I find it particularly ironic that the majority holding dismisses 
Bordarrampe's appeal for lack of jurisdiction and at the same time awards her an 
adjudicated easement which extends to her lessees. In my opinion, concepts of 
justice require affirmance of the district court's judgment in this 
case.

FOOTNOTES

1 Under the mutuality 
doctrine, collateral estoppel may be invoked only where both parties are bound 
by the prior judgment. Parklane Hosiery 
Company, Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-327, 99 S. Ct. 645, 649, 
58 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1979).

2 The propriety of 
applying the doctrine of mutual collateral estoppel against the United States 
government was recently affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Stauffer Chemical Company, 
___ U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 575, 78 L.Ed.2d ___ (1984).