Case Title: Almada v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Almada v. State1999 WY 174994 P.2d 299Case Number: 98-74Decided: 12/21/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

ORLANDO 
ALMADA, Petitioner,

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
Respondent.

 

                                 

Appeal from the Original 
Proceeding Petition for Writ of

Certiorari.

  

 

Sylvia Lee Hackl, State 
Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel. Argument by Ms. Domonkos, 
Representing Petitioner.

 Gay V. Woodhouse, Chief Deputy Attorney General; Paul 
S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; Stephen E. Weichman, Special Assistant Attorney General. 
Argument by Mr. Weichman, Representing Respondent.

 

    
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and HILL, 
JJ.

 

    
Golden, Justice.

   
[¶1]      Petitioner Orlando Jose Marie Almada 
(Almada) entered into a plea agreement with the State, reserving his right to 
appeal pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11. The plea agreement was conditioned on his right 
to appeal from four adverse determinations of law by the district court. 
Specifically, he appeals from the denial of his motion to remand for a 
meaningful preliminary hearing, motions to dismiss for alleged speedy trial and 
speedy preliminary hearing violations, motion to suppress wiretap evidence and 
motion to suppress search evidence.

 

  [¶2]      Almada's right to a speedy trial or 
preliminary hearing was not violated, as the majority of the delay occurred with 
the consent of Almada through express waivers of that right and four continuance 
motions. The district court did not err when it denied his motion for remand for 
a meaningful preliminary hearing because 
there is no right to discovery at that stage of a criminal proceeding. The 
slight inaccuracy in the affidavit supporting the request for a search warrant 
for Almada's residence did not affect the validity of the warrant or the search, 
and the warrant was supported by sufficient facts to support a finding of 
probable cause.

 

  [¶3]      Wyoming's Communication Interception Act 
does not require a court order before obtaining information through the use of 
electronic devices when one of the parties has consented to the recording and 
transmission of the conversation.1 Finally, although we are not bound 
by them, we find the cases decided by the United States Supreme Court and a 
majority of our sister states most persuasive in their consideration of the 
constitutionality of participant monitoring without court authorization. 
Accordingly, we hold the use of transmitting and recording devices in Almada's 
home did not violate his state constitutional right against unreasonable search 
and seizure.  Therefore, we 
affirm.

 

                               
ISSUES

 

  [¶4]      Petitioner Almada presents the following 
issues, in the form of arguments, for review:

 

I. The district court abused its discretion in 
denying petitioner's motion to suppress wiretap evidence.

 

II. The district court abused its discretion by 
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss for speedy trial or preliminary hearing 
violations.

 

III. The district court abused its discretion in 
granting an order upon writ of review which reversed the justice court's 
granting of petitioner's request for discovery.

 

IV. The district court abused its discretion in 
denying petitioner's motion to suppress search evidence.

 

  
Respondent State did not submit a statement of the 
issues.

 

                             
FACTS2

 

  [¶5]      On four occasions in May 1996, Almada 
sold marijuana and cocaine to two buyers who, in turn, delivered the drugs to 
confidential informants working for the Wyoming Department of Criminal 
Investigation (DCI). On the basis of affidavits prepared by DCI agents, the 
justice court issued a warrant to search Almada's apartment. The State's 
Information, charging Almada with conspiracy to deliver controlled substances, 
resulted in the issuance of a warrant for his arrest on the same 
day.

 

  [¶6]      Arrangements were made for a large 
purchase of cocaine from Almada on June 4, 1996. On that day, Almada invited an 
undercover DCI agent, the two confidential informants, and one of the buyers 
into his home. The DCI agent and one of the confidential informants were wearing 
microcassette recorders and body 
transmitters. Immediately after he sold the cocaine to the DCI agent, Almada was 
arrested, the search warrant was executed, and officers found additional 
controlled substances and drug paraphernalia in the 
apartment.

 

  [¶7]      After several continuances and motion 
hearings, which resulted in orders adverse to his defense, Almada entered into a 
conditional plea agreement with the State and changed his plea in the district 
court on June 9, 1997. Almada reserved the right to seek review of the district 
court's adverse rulings on four of his 
pretrial motions:  1) the denial of 
his motion to remand for a meaningful preliminary hearing or to dismiss counts 
from an amended information; 2) the denial of a motion to dismiss for violation 
of his right to a speedy preliminary hearing and speedy trial; 3) the denial of 
his motion to suppress "wiretap evidence;" and 4) the denial of his motion to 
suppress evidence he claims was obtained in an illegal search of his 
apartment.

 

                             
DISCUSSION

 

  I. 
Motion for Meaningful Preliminary Hearing

 

  [¶8]      Almada contends he did not receive a 
meaningful preliminary hearing because he was denied discovery before the 
preliminary hearing. Almada sought the cassette tapes of his conversations with 
the confidential informants and the identities of the undercover DCI agent and 
confidential informants before the preliminary hearing by way of a motion to the 
justice court pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 16 and a subpoena duces tecum served on one 
of the DCI agents. At his July 15, 1996, preliminary hearing, Almada asked for a 
continuance because he had not received the tapes. The justice court ordered the 
State to allow Almada to listen to and 
copy the tapes and reset the preliminary hearing. However, the State sought a 
writ of review in the district court to determine whether the tapes were 
discoverable before the preliminary hearing. The district court ruled Almada was 
not entitled to discovery before the preliminary hearing and remanded the matter 
to the justice court.

 

  [¶9]      We review discovery rulings for abuse of 
discretion. Dodge v. State, 562 P.2d 303, 307 (Wyo. 1977). Wyoming law 
concerning discovery and preliminary hearings is clear:

 

Rule 5.1(b), W.R.Cr.P., provides an accused the right 
to subpoena and call witnesses during his preliminary hearing, but this right is 
not absolute.  Garcia v. State, 667 P.2d 1148, 1154 (Wyo. 1983).  This 
right must be viewed in light of the true constitutional purpose of the 
preliminary hearing, which is to obtain 
a determination by a neutral, detached fact finder that there is probable cause 
to believe a crime has been committed and that the defendant committed it. Id. 
And although some discovery is the inevitable by-product of a preliminary 
hearing, discovery is not the purpose 
of the hearing. Id. Thus, 
discretion is left to the court to determine whether or not the purpose for 
which a defendant seeks to introduce testimony from a witness whom he has 
subpoenaed fits within the realm of discovery rather than the determination of 
probable cause. Id. To this end, we have stated that it is incumbent upon 
counsel to explain the relevance to the issue of probable cause of the testimony 
he seeks to introduce at the preliminary hearing, pursuant to a sufficient offer 
of proof. Id. at 1155.

 

  Madrid 
v. State, 910 P.2d 1340, 1343 (Wyo. 1996).

 

  [¶10] 
  Almada does not claim the 
information he sought was relevant to the determination of probable cause. The 
tapes he sought contained recordings from the drug transaction, and the subpoena 
requested the presence of those individuals who were a party to the transaction. 
However, both the State and Almada had witnesses prepared to testify about the 
transaction at the preliminary hearing. The finding of probable cause may be 
based upon hearsay evidence, in whole or in part. Hennigan v. State, 746 P.2d 360, 369 (Wyo. 1987). Although Almada has not informed the Court of the reason 
for his request, other than the need for a "meaningful preliminary hearing," we 
infer that he questioned the reliability of the testimony from the State. In 
Hennigan, we held "[i]n our judgment, the disclosure at trial of unreliable 
evidence is a sufficient control upon the prosecutor in the presentation of 
cases. . . . Questions of credibility and weight of the evidence are 
appropriately determined at trial, and there is no due process requirement for a 
determination of these issues in the course of determining probable cause." 
Hennigan, 746 P.2d  at 369 (citing Wilson v. State, 655 P.2d 1246 (Wyo. 1982)). 
In a felony case the right of discovery attaches under W.R.Cr.P. 16 only after 
the defendant has been bound over for trial in the district court. The justice 
court abused its discretion when it ordered the State to permit discovery of 
material which did not pertain to probable cause. As Judge Rogers opined in his 
well-reasoned order on writ of review:

 

In very few areas of the law has the Wyoming Supreme 
Court spoken so unequivocally and emphatically as it has in defining and 
reaffirming the purpose and the parameters of a preliminary hearing. These rules 
have been established and never modified in a string of approximately sixteen 
cases covering a period of the last twenty years.

 

The district court did not 
err in reversing the justice court's discovery order and quashing the subpoena 
duces tecum. Almada still received a meaningful preliminary hearing because the 
purpose of the hearing, establishing "the existence of probable cause to hold the accused 
for prosecution," was not affected by the absence of the information he sought 
through his discovery motions. Haight v. State, 654 P.2d 1232, 1235 (Wyo. 1982) 
(quoting Weddle v. State, 621 P.2d 231, 239 (Wyo. 1980)).

 

  II. Speedy Trial

 

  
[¶11] Almada 
contends the lengthy delay between his arrest and acceptance of his plea 
violated both W.R.Cr.P. 48 and state and federal constitutional guarantees of a 
speedy trial. "This court performs a de novo review of a conviction to ensure 
that the mandates of W.R.Cr.P. 48 and the constitutional guarantee of a speedy 
trial have been met." Vargas v. State, 963 P.2d 984, 989 (Wyo. 1998) (citing 
Yung v. State, 906 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Wyo. 1995)).

 

    A. Rule 48.

 

  
[¶12]   W.R.Cr.P. 48 is a 
procedural mechanism for enforcing the accused's constitutional right to a 
speedy trial. Yung, 906 P.2d  at 1032. Rule 48(b)(6) requires dismissal of any 
criminal case not tried within 120 days after arraignment unless the case was 
continued in accordance with the rule. Almada claims the district court violated 
Rule 48 when approximately 142 days passed between arraignment and acceptance of 
his plea by the district court. However, Almada's reliance on Mehring v. State, 
860 P.2d 1101, 1110 (Wyo. 1993), to argue the speedy trial clock continued to 
tick until the district court accepted his plea on July 16, 1997,3 is misplaced. Mehring did not implicate speedy 
trial issues and is not relevant.

 

  
[¶13]   Almada was arraigned 
on February 24, 1997. On June 9, 1997, the scheduled trial date, Almada 
participated in a change of plea hearing before the district court, and the 
court accepted his plea. Only 105 days passed between his arraignment and the 
conditional plea. Therefore, Rule 48 was not violated.

 

    B. Constitutional Right to Speedy 
Trial.

 

  
[¶14]   The right to a 
speedy trial is guaranteed to the criminally accused by the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
Phillips v. State, 597 P.2d 456, 460 (Wyo. 1979). This right is also 
secured by Art. 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution. Id.  Although compliance with Rule 48 
will go a long way in protecting a defendant's right to a speedy trial, it is 
also necessary to examine speedy trial issues in light of the constitutional 
factors which provide the underpinnings of the rule. Hall v. State, 911 P.2d 1364, 1370 (Wyo. 1996).

 

  
[¶15]   We have accepted the 
balancing test set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 
2192, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972), and consider the following factors:  1) the length of the 
delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) the defendant's assertion of his right to 
a speedy trial; and 4) prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay. 
Hall, 911 P.2d at 1370-71; Phillips, 597 P.2d  at 460. We weigh these factors in 
light of all relevant circumstances. Yung, 906 P.2d  at 1032.

 

  
[¶16]   For constitutional 
purposes the speedy trial clock started ticking when Almada was arrested. Id. 
Almada was arrested on June 4, 1996, and he did not enter his plea until June 9, 
1997.  This 
lengthy delay raises speedy trial concerns and is sufficient to warrant further 
analysis. Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435, 451 (Wyo. 1993) (citing Wehr v. 
State, 841 P.2d 104, 112 (Wyo. 1992) (320 and 238 days); Osborne v. State, 806 P.2d 272, 277 (Wyo. 1991) (244 and 301 days)); Phillips, 597 P.2d  at 460.

 

  
[¶17]   The second Barker 
factor is the reason for the delay. In its denial of Almada's motion to dismiss, 
the district court found all delays at the preliminary stage of the proceedings 
were occasioned by Almada. We agree. The justice court continued the June 18, 
1996, and July 15, 1996, preliminary hearings at Almada's request.

  

  
[¶18]   On July 15, 1996, 
before the scheduled preliminary hearing, the justice court ordered the State to 
comply with Almada's discovery requests. In response, the State filed a petition 
for writ of review in opposition to the justice court's discovery order and a 
motion for stay of proceedings with the district court. The district court stayed the 
proceedings and the justice court vacated the August 6, 1996, preliminary 
hearing date.

 

  
[¶19]   The district court 
accepted briefs from the parties and heard oral argument on October 23, 1996. 
Almada filed a demand for speedy preliminary examination and trial in the 
justice court on November 4, 1996. The justice court refused to set a 
preliminary hearing date until the district court resolved the discovery issue 
and lifted the stay of proceedings. The district court filed its decision on the 
petition for writ of review on December 11, 1996, the preliminary hearing was 
finally held on December 16, 1996, and arraignment was set for December 20, 
1996.

 

  
[¶20]   The district court 
granted Almada's motion to reset the arraignment for January 3, 1997. On that 
date Almada filed a motion to disqualify Judge Rogers pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 
21.1.  Judge 
Guthrie set the arraignment for January 7, 1997, but subsequently granted 
Almada's fourth motion for a continuance.  Almada was finally arraigned on 
February 24, 1997, and the district court scheduled the trial for June 9, 
1997.

 

  
[¶21]   Almada was 
responsible for all delays except the one occurring between his preliminary 
hearing date scheduled for August 6, 1996, and his arraignment scheduled for 
December 20, 1996. This delay occurred while the district court considered the 
State's petition for writ of review concerning the justice court's discovery order. Time required 
for the due administration of justice is excluded when computing time in a 
speedy trial analysis absent substantial prejudice to the accused. The district 
court heard oral argument on October 23, 1996, and issued its ruling on December 
11, 1996. Almada was not prejudiced by this reasonable delay inherent while the 
court considered legal issues presented by the parties' motions. On balance, the 
four-and-a-half-month delay occasioned by the district court's review of the 
justice court's discovery order is easily outshined by the seven months of delay 
for which Almada was solely responsible.

 

  
[¶22]   Next, we consider 
Almada's assertion of his right to a speedy trial. When Almada appeared before 
the justice court on June 6, 1996, he orally waived his right to a speedy 
preliminary hearing.  
He filed a written waiver of his right to a speedy preliminary hearing on 
June 14, 1996, and did not file his demand for speedy preliminary examination 
and trial in the justice court until November 4, 1996, although he knew all 
proceedings in the justice court were stayed pending determination on the writ 
of review.

 

  
[¶23]   The State suggests 
Almada's demands were less than sincere. We agree. His demand during a stay in 
the proceedings before the justice court appears to be no less than an attempt 
to abuse the judicial system. After the preliminary hearing was held, the 
district court continued the arraignment twice at Almada's request, and he never 
filed a speedy trial demand in the district court. Almada's less than vigorous 
assertions of his right to a speedy trial are given little weight, especially in 
light of his initial waiver and request for two additional continuances after 
asserting that right. See Hall, 911 P.2d  at 1371.

 

  
[¶24]   The fourth and final 
Barker factor is whether the accused was prejudiced by the delay. Almada claims 
various tapes and personal property were lost and he suffered anxiety while 
being jailed for "hundreds of days." The burden is on the petitioner to show 
prejudice. Osborne, 806 P.2d  at 278. Because Almada fails to explain how the 
delay caused the loss of tapes or his personal property, we turn to his anxiety 
claim. While it is true that some inconvenience and anxiety are part and parcel 
of the filing of any criminal charge, Almada has not demonstrated that he 
suffered any extraordinary or unusual prejudice. See Hall, 911 P.2d  at 1371. 
Absent any demonstration of prejudice caused by the delay, this factor in the 
speedy trial analysis weighs in favor of the State.

 

  
[¶25]   When these four 
factors are weighed and balanced in light of all the relevant circumstances, it 
is clear that Almada was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy 
preliminary hearing and trial. Although the delay between arrest and his change 
of plea was over a year, the other three Barker factors weigh heavily against 
Almada. We affirm the district court's order denying Almada's motion to dismiss 
for violation of his right to a speedy trial and preliminary hearing.

 

  III. Motion to Suppress Intercepted 
Communications

 

  
[¶26]   In his motion to 
suppress, Almada alleged the use of transmitters and recorders to monitor and 
record conversations which took place in his home, without first obtaining a 
warrant or other court order, violated both the Wyoming Communication 
Interception Act,4 and Art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.5  The district court determined a judicial order was not 
necessary in this situation and denied the motion. No facts are in dispute and 
the trial court did not make any factual findings. Statutory interpretation and 
legal issues involving whether an unreasonable search and seizure occurred in 
violation of an accused's statutory rights are reviewed de novo. Witt v. State, 
892 P.2d 132, 137 (Wyo. 1995); Gronski v. State, 910 P.2d 561, 563 (Wyo. 
1996).

 

    A. Wyoming Communication 
Interception Act.

 

  
[¶27]   Almada claims DCI's 
use of transmitting and recording devices during the June 4, 1996, cocaine 
transaction violated the Act.  He contends Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-3-602(b)(v) 
requires peace officers to obtain a court order authorizing the use of these 
devices pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-3-605 and -606. The State counters that Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-3-602(b)(iv), not (b)(v), applies to this situation because one of the 
parties to the conversation consented to the interception of the 
communication.

 

  
[¶28]   This Court's primary 
focus when interpreting a statute is to determine the legislature's intent upon 
enactment. Tietema v. State, 926 P.2d 952, 953 (Wyo. 1996). "The initial step in 
arriving at a correct interpretation . . . is an inquiry respecting the ordinary 
and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement 
and connection." Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). This Court gives effect to every word, clause and sentence and 
construes all components of a statute in pari materia. Parker, 845 P.2d 1042. 
We presume the legislature enacts statutes with full knowledge of the existing 
condition of the law and with reference to it. Parker, 845 P.2d  at 1044. "We 
will not construe statutes in a manner which renders any portion meaningless or 
produces absurd results." McAdams v. State, 907 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Wyo. 
1995).

 

  
[¶29]   The relevant 
sections of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-3-602 (LEXIS 1999) provide:

 

(a)  Except as provided 
in subsection (b) of this section, no person shall willfully:

 

            
(i)  
Intercept any wire, oral6 or electronic communication;

 

                          
* * *

 

    (b)  Nothing in subsection (a) of this section 
prohibits:

 

                          
* * *

(iv)  Any person from 
intercepting an oral, wire or electronic communication where the person is a 
party to the communication or where one (1) of the parties to the communication 
has given prior consent to the interception unless the communication is 
intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act;

 

(v)  A peace officer from 
intercepting, using or disclosing to another peace officer in the course of his 
official duties any wire, oral or electronic communication pursuant to an order 
permitting the interception under this act[.]

 

  
[¶30]   Subsection (a) of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-3-602 generally prohibits interception of certain 
communications, while subsection (b) provides a list of exceptions to that 
general rule. Almada does not dispute that the confidential informant consented 
to the interception of the conversations. However, he maintains that the Act 
also requires compliance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-3-605 and -606 before any 
communication may be intercepted. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-3-605 delineates the 
persons who may apply for court authorization and under what conditions. Among 
other things, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-3-606 describes the application procedure for 
obtaining the court's authorization.

 

  
[¶31]   Almada argues that 
because peace officers were involved in the interception of his conversation 
during the drug transaction, only subsection (b)(v) applies and the officers had 
to comply with Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-3-605 and -606. However, subsection (b)(iv) 
excludes from the statutory prohibition the interception of a communication by 
"any person" "where one (1) of the parties to the communication has given prior 
consent. . . ."  
Almada's position necessarily removes peace officers from the ranks of 
"any person." If the legislature intended to remove peace officers from the 
ranks of "any person," it certainly could have done so, either in subsection 
(iv): "any person, except peace officers as described in (b)(v)," or in 
subsection (v): "peace officers must comply with Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-3-605 and 
606 before taking any action under this Act, including (b)(iv)."  We hold Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-3-602(b)(iv) encompasses participant monitoring performed by "any 
person," including peace officers.

 

  
[¶32]   Almada contends this 
reading of the statute renders subsection (b)(v) and sections -605 and -606 
meaningless. However, peace officers clearly have the technical capability to 
intercept communications which do not require the consent of any party.  See e.g., People v. 
Collins, 475 N.W.2d 684, 686-87 (Mich. 1991).  In Collins, the Michigan Supreme Court 
compared participant monitoring with nonconsensual surveillance in the context 
of the federal wiretap statutes and constitutional challenges to their use. Id. 
Illustrations of nonconsensual surveillance requiring a court order included a 
police officer listening outside with a radio receiver in On Lee v. United 
States, 343 U.S. 747, 72 S. Ct. 967, 96 L. Ed. 1270 (1952), and federal agents 
attaching a listening and recording device to the outside of a public telephone 
booth in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 
(1967). The Act clearly requires a court order for "covert," nonconsensual 
communication interception by peace officers, where the peace officer is not a 
participant in the communication being intercepted. Based on just these two 
examples, subsection (b)(v) is not left meaningless by this interpretation of 
the statute.

 

  
[¶33]   Reading the statute 
in its entirety and accepting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words, as 
we are required to do, only Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-3-602(b)(v) refers to "an order 
permitting the interception under this act[.]" Because Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-3-602(b)(iv) does not refer to a court order, no such order was required, and 
-605 and -606 were not implicated when law enforcement officers intercepted the 
communication with Almada during the June 4, 1996, drug transaction.

 

    B. Wyoming Constitution.

 

  
[¶34]   In his motion to 
suppress the wiretap evidence, Almada claimed that the June 4, 1996, search and 
seizure of his residence and person contravened the United States and Wyoming 
Constitutions.7  Almada concedes the United States 
Supreme Court has determined participant monitoring without a warrant does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See United 
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 91 S. Ct. 1122, 28 L. Ed. 2d 453 (1971). Therefore, 
he urges this Court to perform an independent state constitutional analysis on 
the use of "participant monitoring" without prior court authorization. Taking 
the cue provided in Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 622 (Wyo. 1993) (Golden, J., 
concurring), Almada presents his argument that the Wyoming Constitution provides 
more protection than the United States Constitution in the participant 
monitoring context using the factors from State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 
1986). Those factors are:

 

(1) the textual language; (2) the 
differences in the texts;  (3) constitutional history; (4) preexisting 
state law;  (5) 
structural differences; and (6) matters of particular state or local 
concern.

 

Saldana, 846 P.2d  at 622 (Golden, J., concurring) (quoting 
Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 811).

 

  
[¶35]   The issue of whether 
Art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution provides more protection than the Fourth 
Amendment in situations where a body wiretap was used without a search warrant 
has never been decided by this Court. However, Vasquez v. State, No. 97-140, 
1999 WL 1034578 (Wyo. Nov. 16, 1999), considered whether our constitution 
provided more protection than the United States Constitution in another search 
and seizure context. Though not directly on point, Vasquez offers guidance for 
our analysis.

 

  
[¶36]   Vasquez involved the 
search of the passenger compartment in a vehicle incident to a lawful arrest. 
Vasquez, at *1. Because the United States Supreme Court had already decided the 
issue in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 
(1981), Vasquez looked for protection in the Wyoming Constitution. After an 
independent analysis of Wyoming's search and seizure provision, we held the 
search lawful. Vasquez, at *14.

 

  
[¶37]   Relying heavily on 
Vasquez for the first part of our analysis, we consider Almada's assertion that 
application of the Gunwall factors requires the conclusion that his rights were 
violated because the state constitution provides more protection than the 
Federal Constitution in this context. Vasquez addressed the textual language, the differences 
in text and the state constitutional history factors by noting that when the 
Supreme Court began restricting protection under the Fourth Amendment in the 
late 1970s and 1980s, the state courts were free "to return to analyzing these 
issues under their own constitutions, and leading constitutional authorities 
soon began urging independent interpretations for state courts." Id. at *7. 
However, our "recent search and seizure jurisprudence has not distinguished 
between the two provisions," id., and "[t]hose courts independently analyzing 
their state constitutions . . . usually have either a long tradition of such 
independent analysis or have sufficient constitutional history to permit 
departing from federal precedent through principled reasoning." Id.  Unfortunately, we 
have neither, making reliance on the text, the differences in text and state 
constitutional history factors found in Gunwall speculative at best. Id.

 

  
[¶38]   Analyzing the 
structural differences between the state and federal constitutions, Vasquez 
recognized:

 

No state constitutional history 
exists which would lead us to believe that Wyoming initially included individual 
rights as a strong statement of societal values or because it intended to 
provide greater protection of individual rights. The most that can be definitely 
ascertained from the differences in the constitutional histories of the two 
documents may well be explained by the simple fact that it was the prevailing 
view that protection of individual rights was considered to be the province of 
the state and the federal rights acted only upon the federal government, and the 
Wyoming drafters acted accordingly.

 

Id. at *8. Therefore, in terms of the factors used in a 
Gunwall analysis, Vasquez held that the text of Art. 1, § 4 did not indicate 
increased protection; any difference between Art. 1, § 4 and the Fourth 
Amendment "demonstrates little." Id. at *9. Wyoming does not have any 
helpful constitutional history, id. at *8, and any structural differences 
between the state and federal constitutions as a whole Ado not assist us one way 
or another in our determination." Id. at *9.  "Having decided that the Wyoming 
Constitution's declaration that people `be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures' requires an 
independent interpretation regardless of its similarities to or differences from 
the Federal Constitution," Vasquez examined preexisting state law and 
matters of particular state or local concern.8 Id. at *10.

 

  
[¶39]   At this point, our 
reliance on Vasquez ends. The remaining analysis concerns preexisting state law 
and matters of particular state or local concern in the particular circumstances 
of the case. Vasquez involved the search and seizure of the passenger 
compartment of a vehicle incident to a lawful arrest; therefore, the analysis 
considered both our vehicle search and search incident to arrest jurisprudence. 
Vasquez, at *12-14. In contrast, this case involves state law concerning the 
interception of communications for use in criminal proceedings.

 

  
[¶40]   "Previously 
established bodies of state law, including statutory law, may also bear on the 
granting of distinctive state constitutional rights." Gunwall, 720 P.2d  at 812. 
Our early decisions remind us that this constitutional provision was not idle 
ceremony, but the cornerstone of all state constitutions.  Vasquez, at *11. The 
provision is meant to restrain the legislature from enacting statutes which 
allow unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. (citing State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 
185, 198, 194 P. 342, 345 (1920)). It also fell "upon the judiciary to denounce 
as unlawful any unreasonable search and seizure." Id. Our next few ventures into 
search and seizure jurisprudence "issued from a standard of review that only 
unreasonable searches are forbidden, and whether or not a search is reasonable 
is a question of law to be decided from all the circumstances of a case whether 
the search was with or without a warrant." Id. (citing State v. George, 32 Wyo. 
223, 231 P. 683 (1924); State v. Crump, 35 Wyo. 41, 246 P. 241 (1926)).

 

   [¶41] Thus, we must consider whether our 
interpretation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-3-602(b)(iv), allowing warrantless 
interception of communications as long as one of the parties consents, passes 
muster under our state constitution. That is, does it violate a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and if so, was it unreasonable?  Like Congress, the Wyoming 
legislature has drawn a distinction between nonconsensual electronic 
surveillance and "participant monitoring" in its communication interception 
legislation. See Collins, 475 N.W.2d  at 688; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-3-602(b)(iv) 
and (v), -605, -606 (LEXIS 1999). Although we are not bound by the Fourth 
Amendment decisions of the United States Supreme Court in this case, we may 
certainly follow its lead when we find its reasoning persuasive.

 

  
[¶42]   The Supreme Court 
has held that "participant monitoring" does not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752-53, 91 S. Ct. 1122, 1126, 28 L. Ed. 2d 453 (1971).  
Although it was a plurality decision, Justice White opined in dicta that 
those who engage in criminal activity assume the risk that their confederates 
will later disclose their participation to law enforcement, and having been 
burdened with that risk, must also assume the risk of simultaneous disclosure. 
Id. A large majority of our sister states have held that the accused assumes the 
risk of disclosure by engaging in criminal activity with another, forfeiting the 
reasonable expectation of privacy which might otherwise sustain a constitutional 
challenge to the evidence. See Collins, 475 N.W.2d  at 696 n. 48 (compiling 
cases).9

  

  
[¶43]   Unable to improve on 
the rationale in Collins, we reiterate it here:

 

Benjamin Franklin once cautioned 
that "[i]f you would keep your secret from an enemy, tell it not to a friend." 
What a confidant who hears it chooses to do with a secret - whether he whispers 
it, records it, or broadcasts it - is beyond the control of the teller. We 
reject the notion that a wrongdoer has a constitutionally protected expectation 
that his confidant will be unable to repeat with accuracy and credibility the 
communicated secret. We agree with Justice White that courts should not be "too 
ready to erect constitutional barriers to relevant and probative evidence 
which    is also 
accurate and reliable."

 

  Collins, 475 N.W.2d  at 698 (quoting White, 401 U.S.  at 753, 91 S.Ct. at 1126).

 

  
[¶44]   Recognizing that 
both the Wyoming and United States Constitutions guarantee freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures when an individual's legitimate expectation 
of privacy is invaded, Saldana held:

 

The courts have drawn a balance 
between the interest of the state in protecting its citizens from the criminal 
conduct of others and its interest in preserving the freedom of the individual 
from overly intrusive governmental invasion. Consequently, the rule has 
developed that any search, assuming first that it does invade a subjective and 
legitimate expectation of privacy sufficient to invoke the constitutional 
protections, must be unreasonable in order to be impermissible.

 

Saldana, 845 P.2d  at 610 (citing United States v. Sharpe, 
470 U.S. 675, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985); United States v. Chadwick, 
433 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1977); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1976); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967); King v. State, 780 P.2d 943 (Wyo. 
1989); Jessee v. State, 640 P.2d 56, reh'g denied, 643 P.2d 681 (Wyo. 1982); 
Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079 (1980); 
State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223, 231 P. 683 (1924)).

 

  
[¶45]   Because statutory 
law may also bear on whether the state constitution grants distinctive rights, 
we now consider Wyoming's Communication Interception Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-3-601 et seq. (LEXIS 1999). See Gunwall 720 P.2d  at 812. The Act clearly 
recognizes the potential for, and protects against, unconstitutional 
interception of communications. Specifically, the Act protects against violation 
of our citizens' right not to be subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures 
by couching its language in terms familiar to Wyoming's search and seizure 
jurisprudence. For example, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-3-602(a)(i) (LEXIS 1999) 
prohibits the interception of any oral communication. An "oral communication" is 
defined as "any oral communication uttered by a person who reasonably expects and circumstances justify the 
expectation that the communication is not subject to interception. . . ." Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-3-601(a)(vii) (LEXIS 1999) (emphasis added).

 

  
[¶46]   In addition, if the 
communication is intercepted pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-3-602(b)(v), the 
Act requires peace officers to obtain a court order permitting the interception. 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-3-602(b)(v) (LEXIS 1999), and see Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-3-605 
and  -60610 (LEXIS 1999). Peace officers must follow 
stringent procedures clearly meant to protect against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. The required procedures include:  (1) written application for the order, upon 
oath or affirmation to a judge; (2) a full and complete statement of facts to 
support issuance of the order; (3) the judge's determination that the facts 
submitted support a finding of probable cause; and (4) the evidence derived from 
the interception may only be disclosed or used if it relates to an offense 
specified in the order permitting the interception or the agency executing the 
order must apply for an extension of the order. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-3-606(a), (c), and (r) (LEXIS 1999). Finally, the Act forbids the admission of 
any communication intercepted in violation of the Act as evidence in any trial, 
hearing or other proceeding, thereby invoking our constitutional remedy, 
suppression of evidence, if it is obtained in violation of the statute. Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-3-606(p) (LEXIS 1999).

 

  
[¶47]   The comprehensive 
nature of the Act and its many safeguards couched in constitutional terms 
suggest that compliance with the Act weighs heavily in favor of finding the 
interception constitutional on independent state grounds. The significant 
limitations placed on the interception of communications by peace officers clearly signifies a 
legislative intent to draw a balance between the interest of the state in 
protecting its citizens from crime and its interest in preserving individual 
freedom from overly intrusive governmental invasion. See Saldana, 846 P.2d  at 
610.

 

  
[¶48]   We hold participant 
monitoring without a warrant or court order pursuant to the Act does not violate 
Art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution. Almada had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy which might implicate constitutional protection in this case.

 

  
IV. Motion to Suppress Search Evidence

 

  
[¶49]   Almada filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the June 4, 1996, search of his 
residence, alleging that the search warrant issued was defective because it was 
based on a law enforcement affidavit which was not based on personal knowledge, 
contained material inaccuracies and untruths, and was not reviewed by a neutral 
and detached magistrate.  On appeal, he contends the district court 
erred in denying his motion to suppress because probable cause did not support 
the issuance of a search warrant.

 

  
[¶50]   The district court's 
factual findings concerning a motion to suppress evidence will not be disturbed 
on appeal unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 1994). Because the district court holds the hearing on the matter 
and has the opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, weigh the 
evidence and make the necessary inferences and conclusions, we view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the district court's determination. Id. However, 
the reasonableness of the particular search or seizure, and therefore the 
constitutionality of the same, remain a question of law, which we review de 
novo. Southworth v. State, 913 P.2d 444, 447 (Wyo. 1996).

 

  
[¶51]   The record simply 
does not support Almada's allegations.  During the motions hearing Almada focused his 
evidentiary questioning and argument on his assertions that the affiant did not 
articulate any faith in the reliability of the informants upon which he relied 
and that the affidavit contained facts which were not true. The district court 
found that the testimony presented at the hearing and the affidavit submitted in 
support of the warrant provided substantial evidence indicating the warrant was 
issued upon probable cause and denied the motion to suppress.

  

  
[¶52]   Review of the 
affidavit reveals that it specifically describes a series of surveilled drug 
transactions. Most of the representations made by the informants were confirmed 
by the personal knowledge of at least one of the officers involved in the case. 
It is also clear from the testimony of the agent who signed the affidavit that 
he relied in good faith on the informant's statement that Almada threatened one 
of his buyers with a gun. The informant told the officer Almada held a gun to 
the buyer's head, but the agent later learned Almada was using a pointed finger, not a gun. An 
aggrieved defendant must show that, absent the false statements, the affidavit 
is insufficient.  
Guerra v. State, 897 P.2d 447, 457 (Wyo. 1995). Testimony was undisputed 
that Almada threatened to kill his buyers if he got caught.  Officer protection 
was clearly a valid concern in this matter and the statement concerning the gun was presented to 
justify eliminating the knock and announce rule. The affidavit was sufficient to 
support a finding of probable cause. The search warrant in this case was 
properly issued, and the district court properly denied Almada's motion to 
suppress the evidence gathered as a result of the search.

 

                             
CONCLUSION

 

  
[¶53]   The orders denying 
Almada's motions to suppress wiretap and search evidence, motion to dismiss for 
speedy trial violations, and his motion to remand for a meaningful preliminary 
hearing are affirmed in all respects.

 

                              
Appendix

 

  
[¶54] Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-3-605 (LEXIS 1999) provides:

 

(a) The governor, the attorney 
general or the district attorney within whose jurisdiction the order is sought 
in conjunction with the attorney general, may authorize an application to a 
judge of competent jurisdiction for an order authorizing the interception of 
wire, oral or electronic communications by the Wyoming division of criminal 
investigation or any law enforcement agency of the state having responsibility 
for investigation of the offense for which the application is made, if the 
interception may provide evidence of an attempt to commit, conspiracy to commit, 
solicitation to commit or the commission of any of the following felony offenses 
or comparable crimes in any other jurisdiction:

 

            
(i) Violations of the Wyoming Controlled Substances Act of 1971;

 

(ii) Any of the following, if 
incident to or discovered during investigation of a violation of the Wyoming 
Controlled Substances Act of 1971:

 

                        
(A) Murder as defined in W.S. 6-2-101 and 6-2-104;

 

(B) Kidnapping or related felony 
offense as defined in W.S. 6-2-201, 6-2-202 and 6-2-204;

 

(C) First or second degree sexual 
assault as defined in W.S. 6-2-302 and 6-2-303;

 

                        
(D) Robbery as defined in W.S. 6-2-401;

 

                        
(E) Blackmail as defined in W.S. 6-2-402;

 

                        
(F) Burglary as defined by W.S. 6-3-301; or

 

(G) Felony larceny or related 
felony offense defined in W.S. 6-3-401 through 6-3-410.

 

  
[¶55] Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-3-606 (LEXIS 1999) provides:

 

(a) Each authorized application 
for an order permitting the interception of wire, oral or electronic 
communications shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a judge and 
shall state the applicant's authority under W.S. 7-3-605(a) to make the 
application. Each application shall include the following information:

 

            
(i) The identity of the peace officer;

 

(ii) A full and complete 
statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant to justify 
his belief that an order should be issued, including:

 

(A) Specific facts concerning the 
particular offense that is being investigated;

 

(B) A particular description of 
the nature and location of the equipment from which, or the place where, the 
communication is to be intercepted;

  

(C) A particular description of 
the type of communication sought to be intercepted;

 

(D) The identity of the person or 
persons, if known, who are suspected of committing the offense and whose 
communications are to be intercepted.

 

(iii) A complete statement as to 
whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and have failed, 
or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed or would be too 
dangerous;

 

(iv) A statement of the required 
duration of the interception. If the nature of the investigation will require 
that the interception not automatically terminate when the described type of 
communication has been first obtained, the application shall state facts 
sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that additional communications 
of the same type will occur after the initial interception;

 

(v) A full and complete statement 
by the applicant concerning all previous applications known to have been made to 
any judge:

 

(A) For permission to intercept 
wire, oral or electronic communications involving any of the same persons, 
equipment or places specified in the application; and

 

         
               
(B) Action taken by the judges on each previous application.

 

(vi) If the application is for 
extension of an order, a complete statement shall be made setting forth the 
results thus far obtained from the interception or a reasonable explanation of 
the failure to obtain any results.

 

(b) The judge may require the 
applicant to furnish additional testimony or documentary evidence in support of 
the application.

 

(c) Upon an application, the 
judge may issue an ex parte order, as requested or modified, permitting 
interception of wire, oral or electronic communications within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting, and outside that 
jurisdiction but within the state of Wyoming in the case of a mobile 
interception device authorized by a district court within such district, if the 
judge determines on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that:

 

(i) There is probable cause for 
belief that the named person is committing or has committed any of the offenses 
enumerated in W.S. 7-3-605;

 

(ii) There is probable cause for 
belief that particular communications concerning those offenses will be 
intercepted;

 

(iii) Normal investigative 
procedures have been tried and have failed, or reasonably appear to be unlikely 
to succeed or would be too dangerous;

 

(iv) There is probable cause for 
belief that the equipment from which, or the place where, the wire, oral or 
electronic communications are to be intercepted is or is about to be used in 
connection with any of the offenses enumerated in W.S. 7-3-605 or is leased to, 
listed in the name of or used by the person suspected in the commission of any 
enumerated offense.

 

(d) Each order permitting 
interception of wire, oral or electronic communications shall specify:

 

(i) The nature and location of 
the person or persons, if known, whose communications are to be intercepted;

 

(ii) The nature and location of 
the communications equipment or place where the interception is to occur;

 

(iii) A particular description of 
the type of communication sought to be intercepted and a statement of the 
particular offense or offenses to which it relates;

 

(iv) The period of time during 
which an interception is authorized including a statement as to whether or not 
the interception shall automatically terminate when the described communication 
is first obtained;

 

(v) The identity of the agency 
authorized to intercept the communications and of the person authorizing the 
application.

  

      (e) No order entered 
under this section may permit the interception of any wire, oral or electronic 
communication for any period longer than is necessary to achieve the objective 
of the authorization, or in any event longer than thirty (30) days. The thirty 
(30) day period provided by this subsection begins on the earlier of the day on 
which the peace officer first begins to conduct an interception under the order 
or ten (10) days after the order is entered.

 

(f) Extensions of an order may be 
granted upon an application for extension made in accordance with subsection (a) 
of this section and upon the findings required by subsection (c) of this 
section. The period of the extension shall be no longer than necessary to 
achieve the objective of the extension     and in any event no longer than 
thirty (30) days.

 

(g) Every order and extension 
thereof shall contain a provision that the permission to intercept shall be 
executed as soon as practicable, and that the execution of the permission shall 
be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception. Every order or 
extension thereof shall also provide that the interception terminate upon 
attainment of the objective, or in any event in thirty (30) days.

 

(h) The order or extension 
permitting interception may require reports to be made to the judge issuing the 
order, stating the progress which has been made toward achievement of the 
authorized objective and the need for continued interception.

 

(j) The 
contents of any wire, oral or electronic communication intercepted shall, if 
possible, be recorded on tape, wire or other comparable device.  The recording shall 
be performed to protect it from editing or other alterations. Immediately upon 
expiration of the period of the order, or extension thereof, the recording shall 
be submitted to the judge issuing the order and shall be sealed under his 
directions. A recording shall not be destroyed except upon an order of the 
judge, and in any event shall be kept for five (5) years.  Duplicate recordings 
may be made for use or disclosure pursuant to the provisions of this section. 
The presence of the seal provided for by this subsection, or a satisfactory explanation for its 
absence, is a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of any wire 
or oral communication or evidence derived therefrom.

 

(k) Applications made and orders 
granted under this section shall be sealed by the judge.  Custody of the 
sealed applications and orders shall be maintained at the direction of the 
judge. The applications and orders shall be disclosed only upon a showing of 
good cause before a judge and shall not be destroyed except upon order of the 
judge to whom the application was presented, and in any event shall be kept for five (5) 
years. Any information obtained pursuant to a court order permitting 
interception of wire or oral communications shall not be used, published or 
divulged except in accordance with the provisions of this act.

 

(m) Within a reasonable time, but 
not later than ninety (90) days after the denial of an application or the 
termination of the period of an order authorizing interception or extension 
thereof, the judge shall cause to be served upon each person named in the 
application and any other person the judge determines as in the interest of 
justice, notice of the following:

 

            
(i) That an order or application has been entered under this section;

 

(ii) The date of the entry and 
the period of permitted interception or the denial of the application;  and

 

(iii) Whether wire, oral or 
electronic communications were or were not intercepted.

 

(n) The judge, upon the filing of 
a motion, may, in his discretion, make available to the person or his counsel 
for inspection any portion of the intercepted communications, applications and 
orders as the judge determines to be in the interest of justice. On an ex parte 
showing of good cause to a judge, the service of the matter required by 
subsection (m) of this section may be postponed.

 

(o) The contents of any wire, 
oral or electronic communication intercepted pursuant to this section or 
evidence derived from that communication shall not be received in evidence or 
otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing or other proceeding unless the party 
offering the evidence, not less than twenty (20) days before the trial, hearing or proceeding, 
gives notice to the court or hearing officer and all other parties. The court 
may then order disclosure of the court order and accompanying application. If 
the order of interception and accompanying application has previously been 
disclosed, the offering party may furnish all other parties with the order of 
interception and accompanying application without further order of the court or 
hearing officer upon proper notice. This twenty (20) day period may be waived by 
the court or hearing officer if it finds that it was not possible to furnish the 
party with the information twenty (20) days before the trial, hearing or 
proceeding and that no party will be prejudiced by the delay in receiving the 
information.

 

(p) The contents of any 
intercepted wire, oral or electronic communication or evidence derived therefrom 
shall not be admitted as evidence in any trial, hearing or other proceeding in 
this state unless the interception was performed in accordance with this 
act.

 

(q) No otherwise privileged wire, 
oral or electronic communication intercepted shall lose its privileged 
character, unless the communications are in furtherance of a criminal or 
tortious act in violation of the laws of the United States or this state.

 

      (r) When a peace 
officer, while engaged in intercepting wire, oral or electronic communications 
relating to an offense specified in the order permitting interception, 
intercepts wire, oral or electronic communications relating to an offense other 
than those specified in the order, the contents thereof, and evidence derived 
therefrom, may be disclosed or used only if the offense constitutes a felony 
under the laws of the United States or this state. If the communication concerns 
an enumerated offense listed in W.S. 7-3-605, the agency executing the order of 
interception shall apply to the issuing court for an expansion of the order of 
interception pursuant to paragraph (a)(ii) of this section.  The application 
shall be made as soon as practicable.

 

      (s) In the event an 
intercepted communication is in a code or a foreign language, and an expert in 
that code or foreign language is not reasonably available during the 
interception period, any minimization required under this section shall be 
accomplished as soon as practicable after the interception.

 

  
                    

FOOTNOTES

 

1For simplicity, we will use the term "participant 
monitoring" which refers to the electronic monitoring (whether or not recorded) 
by a law enforcement agent of a conversation where one of the parties to the 
conversation has previously consented to the activity. See People v. Collins, 
475 N.W.2d 684, 685 n. 1 (Mich. 1991).

  

2Because Almada entered a conditional guilty plea, there was 
no jury trial. The facts presented were found in charging documents, motions, 
the plea agreement, the change of plea hearing and court orders. Generally, the 
facts are not in dispute. Rather, Almada challenges the trial court's 
application of the law to the facts.

  

3The district court did not sign the order for the change of 
plea until July 16, 1997. However, as that order makes clear, the plea agreement 
"was fully disclosed and accepted by the Court as required by Rule 11(d), 
W.R.Cr.P. . . ." during the change of plea hearing on June 9, 1997. Almada's 
claim to the contrary is not borne out by the record.

  

4Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-3-601 et seq. (LEXIS 1999) 
(hereinafter, the "Act.")

  

5Art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution provides:

 

      The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against    unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon    probable cause, supported by 
affidavit, particularly describing the place to be searched or the person 
or   thing 
to be seized.

  

6Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-3-601(a)(vii) (LEXIS 1999) defines "oral 
communication" as "any oral communication uttered by a person who reasonably expects and circumstances justify the 
expectation that the communication is not subject to interception but 
does not include any electronic communication[.]" (Emphasis added.)

  

7Although Almada's motion to suppress claimed violations of 
the United States and Wyoming Constitutions and he did not mention the Act in 
his motion to suppress, his oral argument before the trial court in the motions 
hearing was limited to the requirements of the Act. He did not make a 
constitutional argument in the motions hearing. On appeal Almada addresses the 
Act and his claim that the search and seizure violated the Wyoming 
Constitution.

  

8This is not an attempt to limit the factors which may be 
relevant to a state constitutional analysis. Rather, we are simply limiting our 
discussion to the factors discussed in the Vasquez and Almada briefs. See 
Saldana, 846 P.2d  at 622 (Golden, J., concurring) (The factors are "a list of 
useful `non-exclusive neutral criteria.'").

  

9Collins acknowledged other practical considerations weigh 
heavily against the imposition of a constitutional warrant requirement for 
participant monitoring. See Collins, 475 N.W.2d  at 696-98 (citing People v. 
Beavers, 227 N.W.2d 511, (Mich. 1975), revs'd by Collins. Even Beavers conceded 
that participant monitoring is practiced extensively throughout the country and 
represents a vitally important investigative tool for law enforcement. Collins, 
475 N.W.2d  at 696. In her Beavers dissent, Chief Justice Coleman noted the 
particular need for warrantless participant monitoring in drug-related 
investigations because the police "are charged with risking their own lives to 
find and arrest the `purveyors of death.'" Collins, 475 N.W.2d  at 697. The 
inherent necessity for privacy in drug sales and the small amount of the product 
present the police with "a uniquely difficult task." Id. "Participant monitoring 
often serves `to protect the life of the agent or informant. He plays a deadly 
game and the microphone allows him speedy access to help.'" Id. at 698. In 
Commonwealth v. Schaeffer, 536 A.2d 354 (Pa. Super. 1987), Justice Kelly, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, opined "it is often necessary for the 
police to resort to the use of informants of dubious character, reliability, and 
credibility. . . . Without tools such as participant monitoring to corroborate 
the disclosures of such informants, reasonable suspicions might never be 
developed into probable cause, lawful arrest, and just conviction." Collins, 475 N.W.2d  at 697.  
"Society seeks to foster truth, not to suppress it. . . . If the 
defendant speaks innocently, his own words will exculpate him.  However, if he 
implicates himself, the recordings prevent him from denying his participation in 
the conversation. Surely, society would not consider reasonable an expectation 
of privacy which would result in a more inaccurate version of the events 
in   
question." Id. at 698 (quoting State v. Reeves, 427 So. 2d 403, 418 (La. 
1982)).

       

10Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-3-605 and -606 are attached in an 
appendix. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-3-606 (LEXIS 1999) is extremely detailed and 
comprehensive in its protection of those whose conversations may be subject to 
interception by law enforcement without the consent of one of the parties. 
Indeed, the length of the statute precludes its inclusion in the text of this 
opinion.