Case Title: Findley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: west-virginia

Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2002-12-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA September 2002 Term FILED RELEASED December 6, 2002 No. 30842 December 6, 2002 RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA OF WEST VIRGINIA LAURA A. FINDLEY, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, V. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant Below, Appellee, NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Intervenor. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Barbour County Honorable Alan D. Moats, Judge Civil Action No. 00-C-71 AFFIRMED Submitted: November 14, 2002 Filed: December 6, 2002 J. Michael Benninger, Esq. Paul T. Farrell, Jr., Esq. Wilson, Frame, Benninger & Metheney, PLLC Morgantown, West Virginia James M. Pietz, Esq. Malakoff, Doyle & Finberg, P.C. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Attorneys for the Appellant Clarence E. Martin, III, Esq. Catherine D. Munster, Esq. James A. Varner, Sr., Esq. Debra Tedeschi Herron, Esq. McNeer, Highland, McMunn and Varner, L.C. Clarksburg, West Virginia Attorneys for the Appellee J. Michael Weber, Esq. Susan R. Snowden, Esq. Ronald S. Rossi, Esq. Martin & Seibert, L.C. Martinsburg, West Virginia Attorneys for the Intervenor Mary E. Alexander, Esq. President Jeffrey R. White, Esq. Counsel The Association of Trial Lawyers of America Washington, District of Columbia William L. Frame, Esq. Wilson, Frame, Benninger & Metheney, PLLC Morgantown, West Virginia Attorneys for Amicus Curiae, The Association of Trial Lawyers of America Bert Ketchum, Esq. Greene Ketchum Bailey & Tweel Huntington, West Virginia Attorney for Amicus Curiae, West Virginia Trial Lawyers Association Dean A. Furner, Esq. Spilman Thomas & Battle, PLLC Parkersbug, West Virginia Attorneys for Amici Curiae, West Virginia Insurance Federation, West Virginia Chamber of Commerce, West Virginia Manufacturers Association, West Virginia Business and Industry Council, West Virginia Bankers Association, Builders Supply Association of West Virginia, West Virginia Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors, West Virginia Automobile and Truck Dealers Association, and The Professional Independent Insurance Agents of West Virginia CHIEF JUSTICE DAVIS delivered the Opinion of the Court. JUSTICE STARCHER concurs and reserves the right to file a concurring opinion. JUSTICE MCGRAW concurs, in part, and dissents, in part, and reserves the right to file a separate opinion. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. This Court reviewsde novothe denial of a motion for summary judgment, where such a ruling is properly reviewable by this Court. 2. “Determination of the proper coverage of an insurance contract when the facts are not in dispute is a question of law.” Syllabus point 1, Tennant v. Smallwood, 211 W. Va. 703, 568 S.E.2d 10 (2002). 3. “‘Thepresumptionisthatastatuteisintendedtooperate prospectively, and not retrospectively, unless it appears, by clear, strong and imperative words or by necessaryimplication,thattheLegislatureintendedtogivethestatuteretroactive force and effect.’ Pt. 4, syllabus, Taylor v. State Compensation Commissioner, 140 W. Va. 572[, 86 S.E.2d 114 (1955)].” Syllabus point 1, Loveless v. State Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, 155 W. Va. 264, 184 S.E.2d 127 (1971). 4. “‘Astatute that diminishes substantive rights or augments substantive liabilitiesshouldnotbe applied retroactively to events completed before the effective date of thestatute(orthedateofenactmentifnoseparateeffective date is stated) unless the statute provides explicitly for retroactive application.’ Syllabus Point 2,Public Citizen, Inc. v. First National Bank in Fairmont, 198 W. Va. 329, 480 S.E.2d 538 (1996).” Syllabus point 2, i Smith v. West Virginia Division of Rehabilitative Services & Division of Personnel, 208 W. Va. 284, 540 S.E.2d 152 (2000). 5. Standingiscomprisedofthreeelements:First,the partyattemptingto establish standing must have suffered an “injury-in-fact”--an invasion of a legally protected interestwhichis(a)concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent and not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct forming the basis of the lawsuit. Third, it must be likely that the injury will be redressed through a favorable decision of the court. 6. “Indetermining whether to extend full retroactivity, the following factors aretobeconsidered:First,thenatureofthesubstantiveissueoverruledmustbedetermined. If the issue involves a traditionally settled area of law, such as contracts or property as distinguishedfromtorts,andthenewrulewasnotclearlyforeshadowed, then retroactivity is less justified. Second, where the overruled decision deals with procedural law rather than substantive, retroactivity ordinarily will be more readily accorded. Third, common law decisions, when overruled, may result in the overruling decision being given retroactive effect, sincethesubstantive issue usually has a narrower impact and is likely to involve fewer parties. Fourth,where,ontheotherhand,substantialpublicissuesare involved, arising from statutory or constitutional interpretations that represent a clear departure from prior precedent, prospectiveapplicationwillordinarilybefavored. Fifth, the more radically the new decision ii departsfromprevious substantive law, the greater the need for limiting retroactivity. Finally, this Court will also look to the precedent of other courts which have determined the retroactive/prospective questioninthesamearea of the law in their overruling decisions.” Syllabus point 5, Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W. Va.332,256 S.E.2d 879 (1979). 7. The holdings of Mitchell v. Broadnax, 208 W. Va. 36, 537 S.E.2d 882 (2000), which allow insureds to pursue a cause of action against insurers to enforce the requirements of W. Va. Code § 33-6-31(k) (1995) (Repl. Vol. 1996), apply only to those exclusionstoinsurancecoverageincorporatedintopoliciesofmotor vehicle insurance on or aftertheeffectivedateofourdecisiontherein,i.e.,February18,2000, and before the effective date of the Legislature’s amendments to W. Va. Code § 33-6-30 (2002) (Supp. 2002), i.e., June 5, 2002. 8. “Thereisnocommonlawright to stack coverage available for multiple vehiclesunderthesamepolicyor under two or more insurance policies. The right to stack mustarisefromthe insurance contract itself (as thatistheagreementoftheparties)orfrom a statute (as in the uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage statutes).” Syllabus point 1, Payne v. Weston, 195 W. Va. 502, 466 S.E.2d 161 (1995). 9. “When an insurer issues an automobile insurance policy which provides both liability and underinsured motorists coverage, but which policy contains what is iii commonlyreferredtoas a ‘family use exclusion’ for the underinsured motorist coverage, and when, in a single car accident, the passenger/wife receives payments under the liability coverage for the negligence of the driver/husband, such exclusion is valid and not against the publicpolicyofthisstate. That exclusion, which excludes from the definition of ‘underinsured motorvehicle’anyautomobileownedbyorfurnishedfortheregularuseof the insured or a relative, has the purpose of preventing underinsured coverage from being converted into additional liability coverage.” Syllabus point 2,Thomas v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 188 W. Va. 640, 425 S.E.2d 595 (1992). 10. “Where an insurance policy specifically excludes any motor vehicle ownedbythepolicyholderfromthedefinitionofan‘underinsuredmotorvehicle,’ thenthe underinsured motorist coverage was intended to protect the insured against losses caused by thenegligenceofanothermotorist who is underinsured.” Syllabus point 4, in part,Alexander v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co., 187 W. Va. 72, 415 S.E.2d 618 (1992). 11. “WestVirginiaCode§33-6-31(1992)does not forbid the inclusion and applicationofan anti-stacking provision in an automobile insurancepolicywhereasingle insurancepolicyisissuedbyasingleinsurerandcontains an underinsured endorsement even though the policy covers two or more vehicles. Under the terms of such a policy, the insured isnotentitledtostackthecoveragesofthemultiplevehiclesandmayonly recover up tothe policy limits set forth in the single policy endorsement.” Syllabus point 5, Russell v. State iv Automobile Mutual Insurance Co., 188 W. Va. 81, 422 S.E.2d 803 (1992). 12. “Amotionfora summary judgment should be granted if the pleadings, exhibitsanddiscoverydepositionsuponwhichthemotion is submitted for decision disclose thatthecaseinvolvesnogenuineissueastoanymaterialfactandthattheparty who made the motion is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Syllabus point 5, Wilkinson v. Searls, 155 W. Va. 475, 184 S.E.2d 735 (1971). v Davis, Chief Justice: The appellant herein and plaintiff below, Laura A. Finley, individually and in her representative capacity1[hereinaftercollectivelyreferredtoas“Ms.Findley”],appealsfrom an August 1, 2002, order entered by the Circuit Court of Barbour County in favor of the appelleehereinanddefendantbelow,StateFarm Mutual AutomobileInsuranceCompany [hereinafter referred to as “State Farm”]. By the terms of that order, the circuit court concluded that State Farm was entitled to summary judgment because (1) the vehicle in which Ms.Findleywasriding at the time of the accident was not an underinsured motor vehicle, and therefore,shewas not entitled to recover underinsured motorist [hereinafter referred to as “UIM”]benefits from State Farm; (2) the multi-car discount contained in the applicable State Farmpolicyprecludedthestackingofcoveragesundermultiple State Farm policies available to Ms. Findley; and(3)theprovisionsofW.Va.Code§§33-6-30(b-c)(2002)(Supp.2002) barred Ms. Findley’s cause of action. Onappealtothis Court,Ms. Findley argues that the circuit court erredby(1) retroactively applying W.Va.Code§§33-6-30(b-c);(2)concludingthatshedoes not have 1AlthoughMs.Findley originally filed her suit against State Farm individually, during the proceedings underlying this appeal, she moved for, and was granted, permission to amendhercomplainttotransformitintoaclassactionproceeding. Despite this procedural posture,wewill nevertheless collectively refer to the plaintiffs below and appellants herein as “Ms. Findley” to maintain consistency with the circuit court’s rulings and the parties’ arguments. For further discussion of the class action status of this suit, seeinfra note10and accompanying text. 1 standing to challenge, pursuant to Mitchell v. Broadnax, 208 W. Va. 36, 537 S.E.2d 882 (2000), State Farm’s definition of an underinsured motor vehicle; (3) upholding the anti- stacking provisions contained in her State Farm motor vehicle insurance policy; and (4) denyingher cross-motion for summary judgment. State Farm additionally asserts several cross-assignments of error urging the affirmance of the circuit court’s rulings. Upon a review oftheparties’arguments,therecord designated for appellate consideration, and the parties’ arguments,weaffirmthedecisionoftheCircuitCourtofBarbourCounty. In summary, we findthat(1) the provisions of W. Va. Code §§ 33-6-30(b-c) do not apply retroactively; (2) Ms. Findley cannot assert aclaimforreliefpursuanttoourpriordecisionin Mitchellv.Broadnax, 208W.Va.36, 537 S.E.2d 882 (2000); (3) the anti-stacking exclusions contained in the State Farmpolicyatissuehereinarevalid and enforceable; and (4) Ms. Findley is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Thefacts uponwhichthisproceedingisbasedwerefoundbythecircuitcourt asfollows. On March 18, 2000, Ms. Findley was riding as a passenger in a 1987 Chevrolet Cavalier, which she jointly owned with her estranged husband John Findley2 [hereinafter 2Mr. and Ms. Findley were married on November 22, 1996. 2 referredtoas“Mr.Findley”]andofwhichshe had beengivenexclusiveuse.3 At the time of thesingle car accident,Rusty Hyde,who did notownanautomobileandthushadnomotor vehicleinsurance, was driving the Cavalier with Ms. Findley’s permission. Ms. Findley was injuredasaresultofthisaccident, and recovered under the $50,000 liability provisions of Mr. Findley’s State Farm policy insuring said vehicle.4 Whenthesecoveragelimitsprovedtobeinsufficient tofullyrecompenseher injuries, Ms. Findley attempted to also collect under the UIM provisions of this policy, as well as under the UIM provisions of two other policies of motor vehicle insurance held by Mr. Findley, 5 all of which coverage was denied by State Farm. In support of its denial of coverage, StateFarmrelieduponthepolicydefinitionsofUIM coverage and underinsured motor vehicle. Pursuant to this policy, “underinsured motorist coverage” is described as follows: [w]e will pay for damages for bodily injury and property 3ByorderenteredNovember17,1999,inconnection with the Findleys’ marital separation, Ms. Findley was awarded temporary relief, including the exclusive use and possession of the Chevrolet Cavalier. 4Mr.FindleyhadinsuredtheChevroletCavalierwithStateFarm on September 26, 1991, under State Farm Policy No. 232-7297-D24-48D. The coverage limits of this policy of motor vehicle insurance included $50,000 liability coverage and $50,000 underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. Although it does not appear that Ms. Findley was specificallynamedasaninsured on the declarations page of this policy until April 6, 2000, she presumably was nevertheless covered thereby as Mr. Findley’s spouse. 5Theseadditional policies of motor vehicle insurance, issued by State Farm and purchased by Mr. Findley, consisted of State Farm Policy No. 8580-C24-48, issued on June 29,1998,andinsuringa1985ChevroletS10Blazer,and State Farm Policy No.257-9255- A30-48B, issued on January 30, 1996, and insuring a 1999 Ford E250 Van. 3 damage an insured is legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an underinsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury or property damage must be caused by accident arising out of the operation, maintenance, or use of an underinsured motor vehicle. An“underinsuredmotorvehicle”isfurther defined to exclude “a land motor vehicle . . . insured underthe liability coverage ofthispolicy[.]”6 Moreover, the policy in question contains an anti-stackingexclusion:“Ifotherunderinsured motor vehicle coverage issued by us to you, yourspouse,oranyrelativeapplies,thetotal limits of liability under all such policies shall not exceed that of the policy with the highest limit of liability.”7 6Thecircuitcourtfound,withrespecttothispolicyprovision,thatState Farm submittedAmendatoryEndorsement6069AG, containing such language, to the West Virginia InsuranceCommissionerforapprovalinNovember,1989. The Commissioner approved this definition of underinsured motor vehicle in December, 1989, and this Amendatory Endorsement became effective January 1, 1990. Pursuant to the circuit court’s findings of fact,“[n]oevidencehas been propounded demonstrating that State Farm adjusted premiums frominclusionoftheseamendatoryendorsements in 1989, although State Farm contends the overall premium was consistent with the policy provisions.” See infra note 7. 7With respect to the above-quoted anti-stacking language, the circuit court found that,onAugust 16, 1995, State Farm submitted to the Insurance Commissioner a form filing requisitetotheincorporationofsuchanexclusioninitspoliciesofmotorvehicleinsurance. Presumably, this language,containedinAmendatoryEndorsement6090AQ, received the Commissioner’s approval. The circuit court also found that State Farm “did not decrease UIM premiums in 1995 when anti-stacking language was re-incorporated into the automobile insurance policy in Amendatory Endorsement 6090AQ, but alleges the premium charged was consistent with the policy provisions.” Furthermore,relevanttobothAmendatoryEndorsementsatissueherein,the circuit court noted that ItisthepositionoftheInsuranceCommissioner’s Office that: (continued...) 4 Thereafter,Ms.Findleyinstitutedtheunderlyingdeclaratory judgment action8 against State Farm in the Circuit Court of Barbour County on November 21, 2000. Subsequently,on May 8, 2001, Ms. Findley moved to amend her complaint 9toconverthersuit into a class action proceeding;10 the circuit court granted Ms. Findley’s motion by order 7(...continued) a. It is the exclusive duty and responsibility of the InsuranceCommissioner’s Office to insurethatthebenefitsof insurance policies are reasonable in relation to the premium charged. “Exclusions are consistent with the premiums charged when the Rates and Forms Division of the Insurance Commissioner’s Office approves them.” b. In determining the appropriate premium adjustment for purposes of West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(k), numerous factors mustbeconsidered. Thus, the addition of an exclusion may quite properly not resultinapremiumreductionbecausetheeffectof the exclusion is offset by the increases produced by the other factors. (Citations omitted). 8Declaratoryjudgmentactionsaregoverned by W. Va. Code § 55-13-1,et seq. W. Va. Code § 55-13-2 (1941) (Repl. Vol. 2000) provides [a]ny person interested under a deed, will, written contract, orotherwritingsconstitutingacontract,orwhoserights,status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any questionofconstructionorvalidity arising under the instrument, statute,ordinance,contractorfranchiseandobtainadeclaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. 9Ms.Findleyfiledherfirst amended complaint on November 22, 2000, wherein she sought underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage from State Farm. 10In support of her motion to convert her suit into a class action,Ms. Findley (continued...) 5 enteredJuly10,2001. Ms. Findley then filed her First Amended Class Action Complaint on July 25, 2001. Following discovery, State Farm moved for summary judgment on February 14, 2002,and Ms. Findleycross-movedforsummaryjudgmentonApril10,2002. On May 16, 2002,StateFarmfiledasecondmotionforsummaryjudgment, asserting additional theories upon which it based its entitlement to relief. After a hearing on these motions, the circuit courtultimatelyruledinfavor of State Farm by order entered August 1, 2002, concluding that: [1.] State Farm is entitled to the granting of its First MotionforSummary Judgment (filed February 14, 2002), on the application of the “intra-policy setoff” provision, for the following reasons: a. The Court finds as a matter of law that the subject vehicle is not an “underinsured motor vehicle” under the applicable insurance policy, as the definition of underinsured motor vehicle clearly and unambiguously precludes UIM 10(...continued) averred [t]his class action is brought on behalf ofWestVirginia StateFarmpolicyownersandinsureds as to whom State Farm has overcharged and/or denied Underinsured Motorist (UIM) coverage. For UIM coverage to be effective under West Virginia law,theinsurermustofferpolicyholders, as part of the insurance contract,anoptionto purchase full, unlimited, unrestricted UIM coveragewhichincludesapolicyholder’sright to reject full UIM coverage and pay lower premiums for limited UIM coverage. State Farm,however,failsto contract for UIM coverage in the mannermandatedbyWest Virginia law. Thus, thousands of West Virginia State Farm policyholders and/or insureds have been overcharged for and/or illegally denied UIM coverage. See generally W. Va. R.Civ.P.23 (setting forth criteria for class action proceedings). See also note 1, supra, discussing class action status in the case sub judice. 6 coverageforavehicleinsuredunderthe same policy for liability purposes. See Thomas v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 188 W. Va. 640, 425 S.E.2d [595] (1992); Alexander v. State [Automobile] Mutual Insurance Company, 187 W. Va. 72, 415 S.E.2d 618 (1992). b. The definition of “underinsured motor vehicle” as contained within the applicable State Farm policy originally issued September 26, 1991 is consistent with the statutory requirements of the West Virginia Code and is in accord with public policy. c. Moreover, as found by our state supreme court, to declare this provision invalid would“emasculate” this State’s underinsured motorist statutory provisions, and, in effect, would transform the underinsured coverage into liability coverage. This finding is controlled by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals rulings in Thomas v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 188 W. Va. 640, 425 S.E.2d 595 (1992); and Alexander v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company, 187 W. Va. 72, 415 S.E.2d 618 (1992). d. The plaintiff’s [Ms.Findley’s] Broadnax arguments cannot be applied to this provision of the subject policy. The policyinquestionwasissuedSeptember 26, 1991. Endorsement 6069AG received approval in December 1989 and became effectiveJanuary1, 1990, prior to issuance of the subject policy. Ifachallengetotheendorsementcouldbe brought,theCourtis oftheopinioniscould only be done by persons owing policies on January 1, 1990, alleging benefits were deleted from their policies without corresponding adjustments to premiums. [2.] State Farm is entitled to the granting of its First Motion forsummaryjudgmentontheissue of Laura Findley’s stacking claim in lightoftheclearandunambiguousexclusion prohibitingstacking,forwhich John Findley received a multi-car discount. TheissueofwhetherLaura Findley has standing to [assert] a“Broadnax”claimisfactuallyindispute. However, the Court findsthe“Broadnax”claimnotapplicable as hereinafter set forth. 7 [3.] StateFarmisalsoentitledtosummary judgment as a matterof law for the reasons set forth in its Second Motion for SummaryJudgmentasthe plaintiff’s cause of action is barred by the provisions of West Virginia Code § 33-6-30(b) and (c) for the following reasons: a. West Virginia Code § 33-6-30(b) and (c) is a clarification of existing law and does not overrule Mitchell v. Broadnax. b. As clarified by West Virginia Code § 33-6-30(b) and (c), nothing in Broadnax or West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(k) requires a quid pro quo premium adjustment for the incorporation of policy terms and exclusions. c. Broadnax does not require an overall premium reductionifit is shown that the policy,withtheexclusions,has an appropriate premium for the coverage provided. d. As State Farm’s policy language and premium rates were approved by the West Virginia Insurance Commissioner’s Office prior to use, State Farm has met its statutory burden of demonstratingthatthecoverageafforded,including definitions and exclusions, were “consistent with the premium charged.” e. The language contained within West Virginia Code §33-6-30(b)and(c)expressesthe Legislature’s intention for the same to apply to existing cases. f. As a clarification of existing law, West Virginia Code § 33-6-30(b) and(c)istoberetroactivelyapplied. See Hutchens v. Progressive Paloverde Insurance Company, et al., [211 F. Supp. 2d 788 (S.D. W. Va. 2002)]. . . . . [4.] The plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment should be denied for all of the reasons set forth above[.] 8 Fromtheserulings,Ms.Findleyappealedtothis Court. In conjunction with her Petition for Appeal, she moved this Court to expedite its consideration thereof given that “[t]his matter will provide controlling precedent for numerous civil actions pending in circuit courts throughout the State of West Virginia, gives rise to constitutional implications regarding recent remedial legislation, and impacts thousands of State Farm insureds residing intheStateofWestVirginia.” By orders entered October 10, 2002, we granted said motion and granted Ms. Findley’s Petition for Appeal. Thereafter, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company[hereinafter referred to as “Nationwide”], who earlier hadbeengrantedleaveto appear as an AmicusCuriaetothisproceeding,movedtointervene11herein. In so moving, Nationwide averred that it was currently defending a class action in the Circuit Court of Taylor Countywithissuesvirtuallyidenticaltothoseraisedherein; by order entered November 12, 2002, we granted Nationwide’s motion, according it intervenor status. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Procedurally, this matter arises asan appeal from the circuit court’s grant of summaryjudgment to State Farm and denial of such relief to Ms. Findley. In such matters, we typically apply a plenary review to the circuit court’s ruling. “A circuit court’s entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.” Syl. pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W. Va.189,451 11See generally W. Va. R. App. P. 22 (establishing intervention criteria). 9 S.E.2d 755 (1994). Similarly, we previously have stated, and now so hold, that this Court “review[s] de novo . . . the denial of [a] motion for summary judgment,” Adkins v. Chevron, USA,Inc.,199 W. Va. 518, 522, 485 S.E.2d 687, 691 (1997) (per curiam), where such a ruling is properly reviewable by this Court. See, e.g., Syl. pt. 8, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Federal Ins. Co. of New York, 148 W. Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963) (“An order denying a motion for summary judgmentismerelyinterlocutory,leaves the case pending for trial,and is not appealableexcept in special instances in whichaninterlocutoryorderisappealable.”). See also Section III.D., infra. Also at issue in this proceeding is the circuit court’s interpretation of the relevant statutory language. To this decision, we likewise employ a de novo standard of review. See, e.g., Syl. pt. 1, Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Dep’t of West Virginia, 195 W. Va. 573, 466 S.E.2d 424 (1995) (“Interpreting a statute or an administrative rule or regulation presents a purely legal question subject to de novo review.”); Syl. pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L.,194 W. Va.138,459 S.E.2d 415 (1995) (“Where the issue on an appeal fromthecircuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.”). Lastly,wearecalledupontointerpretthepertinentportionsoftheStateFarm policyofmotorvehicleinsuranceupon which this proceeding is based. We recently held that “[d]etermination of the proper coverage of an insurance contract when the facts are not in 10 dispute is a question of law.” Syl. pt. 1, Tennant v. Smallwood, 211 W. Va.703,568 S.E.2d 10 (2002). Therefore, we will review anew the circuit court’s ruling in this regard. See,e.g., Syl.pt.1, Appalachian Power Co., 195 W. Va. 573, 466 S.E.2d 424; Syl. pt. 1, Chrystal R.M., 194 W. Va.138,459 S.E.2d415. With these standards in mind, we proceed to consider the merits of the parties’ arguments. III. DISCUSSION OnappealtothisCourt,Ms.Findleyraisesfourassignments of error charging thatthecircuit court erred by (1) retroactively applying W. Va. Code §§ 33-6-30(b-c) (2002) (Supp.2002);(2)concludingthatshe does not have standing to challenge, pursuant to Mitchell v. Broadnax , 208 W. Va. 36, 537 S.E.2d 882 (2000), State Farm’s definition of an underinsuredmotorvehicle;(3)upholding the anti-stacking provisions contained in her State Farm motor vehicle insurance policy; and (4) denying her cross-motion for summary judgment. In response to the issues raised by Ms. Findley, State Farm asserts cross- assignmentsoferrorinsupportof the circuit court’s rulings,namelythatthecircuitcourt’s order should be affirmed based upon (1) the filedratedoctrine;(2)Ms.Findley’sfailureto exhaustheradministrativeremediesrelativetochallenging State Farm’s previously approved ratesandforms;(3)theseparationofpowersdoctrine;and(4) the adverse effect Ms. Findley’s collateralattackontherate making process would have on State Farm’s constitutional rights. 11 We will address each of these arguments in turn.12 A. Retroactivity of W. Va. Code §§ 33-6-30(b-c) Ms.Findley first contends that the circuit court erred by affording W. Va. Code §§33-6-30(b-c)(2002)(Supp.2002) retroactiveeffectratherthanapplyingthesestatutory provisions prospectively. In this regard, the circuit court ruled that, “[a]s a clarification of existinglaw,West Virginia Code § 33-6-30(b) and (c) is to be retroactively applied.”13 To support her contentions, Ms. Findleyrelies upon various legislative enactments and court decisions, including the Contracts Clauses of the United States and West Virginia Constitutions,14legislativedirectivesregarding retroactivity,15 and characterization of the 12Atthisjuncture,wewishtothankthenumerousAmici Curiae for appearing in thisproceeding. We will consider their arguments in conjunction with those of the parties. Likewise, we will consider the arguments of the intervenor herein, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, in connection with those advanced by State Farm. 13Inthisregard,thecircuitcourtalso determined that “[r]etroactive application of West Virginia Code § 33-6-30(b) and (c) does not impermissibly infringe upon the constitutional Contracts Clause[.]” 14See U.S.Const.art.I,§10,cl.1(“NoStateshall...passany...Lawimpairing the Obligations of Contracts.”); W. Va. Const. art. III, § 4 (similar). 15See W. Va. Code § 2-2-10(bb) (1998) (Repl. Vol. 2002) (“A statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless expressly made retrospective[.]”). See also Syl. pt. 2, in part, Conley v. Workers’ Comp. Div., 199 W. Va. 196, 483 S.E.2d 542 (1997) (“A statute is presumed to operate prospectively unless the intent that it shall operate retroactivelyisclearlyexpressedbyitstermsorisnecessarilyimpliedfromthelanguageof the statute.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 12 subjectstatuteasa“specialinterpretivestatute”16or “declaratory statute”17. State Farm, in rejecting Ms. Findley’s arguments, likewise cites to numerous authorities to support its assertionthat retroactive application of these statutory provisions doesnotimpermissibly impaircontractualrightsinviolation of the Contracts Clause 18andisnecessitatedbytheclear andunambiguous language of W. Va.Code § 33-6-30.19 State Farm also contends that Ms. Findleycannotassertanewtheoryonappeal,i.e., denominating W. Va. Code § 33-6-30 to be a “special interpretive statute,” that she did not advance to the circuit court during the 16See 1A Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 27.4, at 632-33 (6th ed. 2002 rev.) (“Theusualpurposeofaspecial interpretive statute is to correct a judicial interpretation ofapriorlawwhichthelegislatureconsiders inaccurate. Where such statutes are given any effect,theeffectisprospective only. Any other result would make the legislature a court of last resort.” (footnotes omitted)). 17See State ex rel. White v. Wirt County Court , 63 W. Va. 230, 245, 59 S.E. 884,982(1907)(Miller,J.,dissenting) (indicating that “[a] declaratory statute . . . put[s] an end to doubt as to what is the common law or the meaning of another statute, and . . . declares what it is and ever has been” (internal quotations and citation omitted)). See also United States v. Claflin, 97 U.S. 546, 549, 24 L. Ed. 1082, 1084 (1878) (“[A] declaratory act, or an act directing how a former act shall be construed, is inoperative on the past[.]”). 18See Syl. pt. 4, Shell v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 181 W. Va. 16, 380 S.E.2d 183(1989)(“IndeterminingwhetheraContractClauseviolation has occurred, a three-step test is utilized. The initial inquiry is whether the statute has substantially impaired the contractualrightsofthe parties. If a substantial impairment is shown, the second step of the testisto determine whether there is a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the legislation. Finally, if a legitimate public purpose is demonstrated, the court must determine whethertheadjustmentoftherights and responsibilities of contracting parties is based upon reasonable conditions and isofacharacterappropriateto the public purpose justifying the legislation’s adoption.”). 19See United States v. $80,180.00 in U.S. Currency, 303 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir.2002)(“Whendecidingwhether a statutory provision appliesretroactivelytopending cases, we look to the text and legislative history of the provision to determine if Congress manifested a clear intent regarding the scope of the law’s applicability.”). 13 proceedings below. Having considered bothparties’arguments,wefindthattheissueofwhether W. Va. Code §§ 33-6-30(b-c) should be applied retroactively may easily be resolved by reference to this State’s statutory law and judicial precedent concerning retroactivity. Before examiningtheprecise statute at issue before us, however, it is necessary to first briefly review the context within which such amendments were enacted. The statute in question, W. Va. Code § 33-6-30, was amended by the Legislature following this Court’s decision in Mitchell v. Broadnax , 208 W. Va. 36, 537 S.E.2d 882 (2000). In that case, we were called upon to interpret a related statutory provision, W. Va. Code§33-6-31(k) (1995) (Repl. Vol. 1996), 20whichstatesthat“[n]othingcontainedherein shallpreventanyinsurerfromalso offering benefits and limits other than thoseprescribed herein,norshallthissectionbeconstruedaspreventing any insurer from incorporating in such terms, conditions and exclusions as may be consistent with the premium charged.” Our interpretation of this language in Mitchell resulted in the following holdings: When an insurer incorporates, into a policy of motor vehicle insurance, an exclusion pursuant to W. Va. Code § 33-6-31(k) (1995) (Repl. Vol.1996), the insurer must adjust 20W. Va. Code § 33-6-31 has been amended since our decision in Mitchell v. Broadnax, but the subsection under consideration therein has remained unchanged. Compare W. Va.Code § 33-6-31(k) (1995) (Repl.Vol.1996) with W. Va.Code § 33-6-31(k) (1998) (Repl. Vol. 2000). 14 the corresponding policy premium so that the exclusion is “consistent with the premium charged.” Whenaninsurerhasfailedto satisfy the statutory criteria ofW.Va.Code§ 33-6-31(k) (1995)(Repl.Vol.1996)requisite to incorporating an exclusion in a policy of motor vehicle insurance,theenforcementofsuchan exclusion is violative of this State’s public policy. Syl. pts. 5-6, Mitchell v. Broadnax, 208 W. Va. 36, 537 S.E.2d 882. Thereafter, the Legislature, in response to this Court’s decision in Mitchell, amended W. Va. Code § 33-6-30 (2002) (Supp. 2002). In relevant part, the amendatory language provides (b) The Legislature finds: (1)Thatconsumersand insurers both benefit from the legislative mandate that the insurance commissioner approve the forms used and the rates charged by insurance companies in this state; (2) That certain classes of persons are seeking refunds of insurance premiums and seeking to void exclusionsandotherpolicy provisions on the basis that insurance companies allegedly failed to provide or demonstrateareduction in premiums chargedinrelationtocertainterms or exclusions incorporated into policies of insurance; (3) That historically,as aprerequisiteto a rate or formbeingapproved,neithertheLegislature nor theinsurancecommissioner has ever required that the insurer demonstrate that there was a specific premium reduction for certain exclusions incorporated into policies of insurance; (4) That the provisions of this chapter were 15 enactedwiththeintentofrequiring the filing of all ratesandformswiththeinsurancecommissioner to enable the insurance commissioner to review and regulate rates and forms in a fair and consistent manner; (5) That the provisions of this chapter do not provide and were not intended to provide the basis for monetary damages in the form of premium refunds or partial premium refunds when the form used and the rates charged by the insurance company have been approved by the insurance commissioner; (6) That actions seeking premium refunds or partial premium refunds have a severe and negative impact upon insurers operating in this state by imposing unexpected liabilities when insurers have reliedupontheinsurance commissioner’s approval of the forms used andtherateschargedinsureds; and (7) That it is in the best interest of the citizens of this state to ensure a stable insurance market. (c) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as requiring specific line item premium discounts or rate adjustments corresponding to any exclusion, condition, definition, term or limitation in any policy of insurance, including policies incorporating statutorily mandated benefits or optional benefits which as a matter of law must be offered. Whereany insurance policy form,including any endorsement thereto, has been approved by the commissioner, and the correspondingrate has been approved by the commissioner, there is a presumption that the policy forms and rate structure are in full compliance with the requirements of this chapter. It is the intent of the Legislature that the amendments in this section enacted during the regular session of two thousand two are: (1) A clarification of existing law as previously enacted by the Legislature, including, but not limited to, the provisions of subsection (k), section thirty-one of this article; and, (2) 16 specifically intended to clarify the law and correct a misinterpretation and misapplication of the law that was expressed in the holding of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in the case of Mitchell v. Broadnax, 537 S.E.2d 882 (W. Va. 2000). These amendments are a clarification of the existing law as previously enacted by this Legislature. (Emphasisadded). It is this statutory language, particularly the Legislature’s clarification of the effect of W. Va. Code § 33-6-31(k) and this Court’s holding in Mitchell v. Broadnax enunciatedinsubsection c,whichthecircuitcourtfound to be retroactive, and which we are called upon to examine in the case sub judice. Whendeterminingwhether a statute or statutory amendment should be applied retroactively, we are guided by the Legislature’s own pronouncement that [t]hefollowingrule[]shall be observed in the construction ofstatutes,unlessadifferentintentonthepartof the Legislature be apparent from the context: . . . . (bb) A statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless expressly made retrospective[.] W. Va. Code § 2-2-10(bb) (1998) (Repl. Vol. 2002). Applying this provision, we have understood it to mean that “‘[t]he presumption is that a statute is intended to operate prospectively,andnotretrospectively, unless it appears, by clear, strong and imperative words orbynecessaryimplication,thattheLegislatureintendedtogive the statute retroactive force and effect.’ Pt. 4, syllabus, Taylor v. State Compensation Commissioner, 140 W. Va. 572[, 86 S.E.2d 114 (1955)].” Syl. pt. 1, Loveless v. State Workmen’s Comp. Comm’r, 155 W. Va. 17 264, 184 S.E.2d 127 (1971). Accord Syl. pt. 2, Conley v. Workers’ Comp. Div., 199 W. Va. 196, 483 S.E.2d 542 (1997); State v. Bannister, 162 W. Va. 447, 453, 250 S.E.2d 53, 56 (1978). Thus, “[t]he general rule is that statutes are construed to operate in the future only and arenotgiven retroactiveeffectunlessthelegislatureclearlyexpressesitsintentiontomake them retroactive.” Loveless, 155 W. Va. at 266, 184 S.E.2d at 129 (citations omitted). Despitethisgeneralruleofprospectiveness,wehavenevertheless determined that “[s]tatutory changes that are purely procedural in nature will be applied retroactively.” Syl. pt. 1, Joy v. Chessie Employees Fed. Credit Union, 186 W. Va. 118, 411 S.E.2d 261 (1991). Thisissobecauselegislativeenactments that do notaffectsubstantiverightsarelesslikely tounconstitutionally infringeupontherights of those relying upon the statutory language at issue. See Public Citizen, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank in Fairmont, 198 W. Va. 329, 335, 480 S.E.2d538, 544 (1996) (observing that, “[i]n these situations, the reliance interest that is the foundationoftheinterpretiveprinciplelimitingretroactive application is not engaged”). See also Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 266, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1497, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229,253 (1994) (“The Legislature’s unmatched powers allow it to sweep away settled expectations suddenly and without individualized consideration.”). Where,however,“anew.. . provision would, if applied in a pending case, attach anewlegalconsequencetoacompletedevent,thenitwill not be applied in that caseunless the Legislature has made clear its intention that it shall apply.” Id. See also Gribben v. Kirk, 18 197W.Va.20,26,475 S.E.2d 20,26 (1996) (per curiam) (observing thattheLegislature’s “unmatchedpowerdoes not allow [it] to retroactively change statutes soastosweepaway vested property rights” (citations omitted)); Lester v. State Comp. Comm’r, 123 W. Va.516, 521,16S.E.2d920,924(1941)(notingthatlegislation cannot be made retroactive “when the effect will be to impair the obligation of contracts or to disturb vested rights” (internal quotations and citation omitted)), overruled on other grounds by Sizemore v. State Workmen’sComp.Comm’r,159W.Va.100,219 S.E.2d 912 (1975). Indeed, we specifically have held that “[a] statute that diminishes substantive rights or augments substantive liabilities should not be applied retroactively to eventscompleted before the effectivedateofthestatute(orthe date of enactment if noseparateeffectivedate is stated) unless the statute provides explicitly for retroactive application.” Syllabus Point 2, Public Citizen, Inc. v. First National Bank in Fairmont, 198 W. Va. 329, 480 S.E.2d 538 (1996). Syl. pt. 2, Smith v. West Virginia Div. of Rehabilitative Servs. & Div. of Pers., 208 W. Va. 284, 540 S.E.2d 152 (2000). Inthecase subjudice, the legislative amendments to W. Va. Code §§ 33-6-30(b- c) are most certainly substantive in nature. The effect of such amendatory language is to extinguishany litigable rights that have accrued as a result of this Court’s holding in Mitchell v.Broadnax,208W.Va.36,537S.E.2d882(2000),and to foreclose lawsuits that have been initiated as a result thereof. However, absent explicit statutory language or a clear expression oflegislativeintentthatsuchamendmentsaretoapplyretroactively,wearedirected,bythe 19 Legislature,itself, to afford them prospective only application. See W.Va.Code§2-2-10(bb). See also Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296-97, 88 S. Ct. 438, 442, 19 L. Ed. 2d 530, 535-36 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[A] State cannot be permitted to defeat the constitutionalprohibitionagainsttaking propertywithoutdueprocessoflawbythesimple deviceofassertingretroactively thatthepropertyithastakenneverexistedatall.”); Mildred L.M. v. John O.F., 192 W. Va.345, 351 n.10, 452 S.E.2d 436,442 n.10 (1994) (“It has been stated repeatedly that new legislation should not generally be construed to interfere with existingcontracts,rightsof action,suits,or vested propertyrights.” (emphasisandcitation omitted)); State v. Hensler, 187 W. Va. 81, 83, 415 S.E.2d 885, 887 (1992) (per curiam) (“[D]ue process places a limitation on retroactive judicial application of statutory enactments whichprecludesthecourtfromeffecting a result which the legislature is barred from achieving as a result of the ex post facto prohibition.” (citation omitted)).21 Accordingly, we disagree 21OurdecisionofthisissueiscontrarytotheconclusionreachedbytheUnited StatesDistrictCourtforthe Southern District of WestVirginiaduringitsassessmentofthe retroactivityofW.Va.Code § 33-6-30,anduponwhichthecircuitcourtreliedinrendering its decision. See Hutchens v. Progressive Paloverde Ins. Co., 211 F. Supp. 2d 788, 794 (S.D. W. Va. 2002) (concluding that W. Va. Code § 33-6-30 has retroactive effect). We note, however,thatthisCourtisnot bound by this authority, and, in this regard, we have specifically heldthat“[t]hedecisionofthehighestcourtofaStateinthe construction of its statutes...is thecontrollingruleofdecisioninfederalcourts,wherethereisnofederal question.” Syl. pt. 3, in part, Clarksburg Elec. Light Co. v. City of Clarksburg, 47 W. Va. 739, 35 S.E. 994 (1900). Accord Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587, 591, 10S.Ct.348,349,33 L. Ed.784,785 (1890) (“[T]he construction of [a] statute oftheState by itshighest court . . . must be accepted as conclusive[.]”); State ex rel. Strickland v. Melton, 152W.Va.500,513,165S.E.2d 90, 98 (1968) (refusing to adopt federal court’s construction ofWestVirginiastatute,recognizingthat“this Court is not bound by and is not required to adheretosuchinterpretation”where the statute at issue had not been “interpreted by any prior (continued...) 20 with the circuit court’s ruling to the contrary. B. Standing Ms. Findley next argues that the circuit court incorrectly found that she does not have standing to challenge,pursuant to Mitchell v. Broadnax,208W.Va.36,537 S.E.2d 882 (2000),State Farm’sdefinitionofanunderinsuredmotorvehicle. In the subject policy, the definitionofan“underinsuredmotorvehicle”specificallyexcludes “a land motor vehicle . . . insured under the liability coverage of this policy.”22 During its deliberation and decision of this matter, the circuit court determined that [t]he definition of “underinsured motor vehicle” as contained within the applicable State Farm policy originally issued September 26, 1991 is consistent with the statutory requirements of the West Virginia Code and is in accord with public policy. . . . . The plaintiff’s [Ms. Findley’s] Broadnax arguments cannot be applied to this provision of the subject policy. The policy in question was issued September 26, 1991. Endorsement 21(...continued) decision of this Court”); Clarksburg Elec. Light Co., 47 W. Va. at 746, 35 S.E. at 996 (“The decisionofthestatecourtoflastresortuponrightsdependentaloneupon its law, its statutes, is conclusive upon the Federal judiciary.”). See also Syl. pt. 4, State v. Wender, 149 W. Va. 413, 141 S.E.2d 359 (1965) (“In construing our state constitution, the Supreme Court of Appeals is not bound by rulings of courts of other states or of the United States Supreme Court.”). 22ThislanguagewasaddedtoStateFarm policies of motor vehicle insurance on January 1, 1990, through Amendatory Endorsement 6069AG. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 21 6069AG received approval in December 1989 and became effectiveJanuary1,1990,priortoissuanceofthesubject policy. Ifachallenge totheendorsementcouldbebrought,theCourtis oftheopinioniscouldonlybedoneby persons owing policies on January 1, 1990, alleging benefits were deleted from their policies without corresponding adjustments to premiums.[23] (Footnoteadded). On appeal to this Court, Ms. Findley argues that the circuit court improperly denied her standing to assert her claim when she is a proper party to bring a declaratory judgmentactionpursuanttoW. Va.Code § 55-13-2(1941)(Repl.Vol.2000).24 State Farm responds, however, that Ms. Findley lacked standing to assert the claims in this proceeding and that the circuit court’s ruling on this point should be affirmed. Giventheproceduralpostureofthe instant appeal, the questions presented for ourconsiderationbythisassignmentoferrorarewhetherMs.Findleyhasstanding to assert a claim pursuant to the DeclaratoryJudgment Act,§ W. Va.Code § 55-13-1, et seq., and to obtainthereliefsheseeks thereunder in accordance withthisCourt’sholdingsin Mitchellv. Broadnax. Generally, standing is defined as “[a] party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicialenforcementofadutyorright.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1413 (7th ed. 1999). More specifically, it is well-recognized, and we now so hold, that [s]tanding...iscomprisedofthreeelements:First,the party . . . [attempting to establish standing] must have suffered an 23The circuit court further found that Ms. Findley’s “‘Broadnax’ claim [was] not applicable.” 24For the text of W. Va. Code § 55-13-2 (1941) (Repl. Vol. 2000), see supra note 8. 22 “injury-in-fact”--an invasionofalegally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent and notconjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection [between] the injury and the conduct forming the basis of the lawsuit. Third, it must be likely that the injury will be redressed through a favorable decision of the court. Colemanv.Sopher,194W.Va.90,95 n.6,459 S.E.2d 367,372n.6 (1995)(emphasisadded). Accord Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 364 (1992); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S. Ct.752,758,70 L. Ed.2d 700, 709 (1982); Guido v. Guido, 202 W. Va.198,202,503 S.E.2d 511,515(1998)(per curiam). Furthermore, [s]tandingdoesnotrefer simply to a party’s capacity to appear in court. Rather, standing is gauged by the specific common-law, statutory or constitutional claims that a party presents. “Typically, . . . the standing inquiry requires careful judicial examination . . . to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.” International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 77, 111 S. Ct. 1700, 1704, 114 L. Ed. 2d 134, 143 (1991) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.737,752,104 S.Ct.3315,3325,82 L. Ed. 2d 556, 570 (1984)) (emphasis in original) (additional citation omitted). Accord Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343, 354 (1975) (“In essence, the question of standing is whetherthelitigantisentitledtohavethecourtdecidethemerits of the dispute or of particular issues.”). “In other words, when standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether 23 the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue[.]” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 1952,20 L. Ed.2d 947, 961 (1968) (footnote omitted). Accord Louisiana Environmental Action Network v. Browner, 87 F.3d 1379, 1382, 318 U.S.App.D.C.370,373 (1996) (“Our standing inquiry focuses on the appropriateness of a party bringing the questioned controversy to the court.”); American Alternative Energy Partners II v. Windridge, Inc., 42 Cal. App. 4th 551, 559, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d686,691(1996)(“[S]tandingtosue--therealpartyin interest requirement--goes to the existence of a cause of action, i.e., whether the plaintiff has a right to relief.”). This requirement of the propriety of a party to assert a particular claim and his/her likelihood of success thereon is echoed in our case law discussing standing in the context of declaratory judgment actions. “It is a primary requirement of the Declaratory JudgmentsActthatplaintiffsdemonstrate they have standing to obtain the relief requested.” Shobe v. Latimer, 162 W. Va. 779, 784, 253 S.E.2d 54, 58 (1979). As Ms. Findley’s declaratory judgment action is premised upon her claim for relief pursuant to Mitchell v. Broadnax, because the subject policy language allegedly does not comport with the requirements of our holdings therein,we must thus decidewhethersheis entitled to assert such a cause of action. Underthefactsofthecase subjudice,itisapparent that State Farm incorporated thechallengedpolicylanguage,wherebyit limited its definition of an underinsured motor 24 vehicle,onJanuary 1, 1990, following the Commissioner’s approval thereof. Additionally, the recorddoesnotindicatethatthischallengedexclusionarylanguage has been amended, altered, orotherwise modified since its initial incorporation into policies of motor vehicle insurance in1990. Subsequently, on September 26, 1991, Mr. Findley contracted with State Farm for themotorvehicle insurance coverageatissueherein. Although Ms. Findley ultimately has become an insuredandapolicyholderunder this insurance policy,25 her attempt to assert a claimforreliefinthiscontextiseffectivelyarequest that this Court retroactivelyapplyour holdings in Mitchell v. Broadnax so as to bring within its scope an insurance contract which was entered into before this Court’s decision therein andwhichcontracthascontained the allegedly objectionable language since the date of the policy’s issuance. See Syl. pt. 3, Sizemore v. State Workmen’s Comp. Comm’r, 159 W. Va. 100, 219 S.E.2d 912 (1975) (“A law is not retroactive merely because part of the factual situation to which it is applied occurred prior to its enactment; only when it operates upon transactions which have been completed or upon rights which have been acquired or upon obligations which have existed prior to its passage can it be considered to be retroactive in application.” (emphasis added)). When such a request for retroactivity is made, we cautiously consider whether such retrospective application is indeed warranted. In determining whether to extend full retroactivity, the following factors are to be considered: First, the nature of the substantive issue overruled must be determined. If the issue involves a traditionally settled areaoflaw,suchascontracts or 25See supra notes 2 & 4. 25 property as distinguished from torts, and the new rule was not clearly foreshadowed, then retroactivity is less justified. Second, wherethe overruled decision deals with procedural law rather than substantive, retroactivity ordinarily will be more readily accorded. Third, common law decisions, when overruled, may resultin the overruling decisionbeinggivenretroactiveeffect, sincethesubstantiveissueusuallyhasanarrowerimpactandis likelytoinvolvefewerparties. Fourth, where, on the other hand, substantialpublicissuesareinvolved,arisingfromstatutoryor constitutional interpretations that represent a clear departure frompriorprecedent,prospectiveapplicationwillordinarily be favored. Fifth, the more radically the new decision departs from previous substantive law, the greater the need for limiting retroactivity. Finally, this Court will also look to the precedent of other courts which have determined the retroactive/prospective questionin the same area of the law in their overruling decisions. Syl. pt. 5, Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W. Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979). Accord Syl.pt.4, Kincaid v. Mangum, 189 W. Va. 404, 432 S.E.2d 74 (1993); Syl. pt. 4, King v. Kayak Mfg. Corp., 182 W. Va. 276, 387 S.E.2d 511 (1989). See also Bowers v. Wurzburg, 205W.Va.450,468,519S.E.2d148,166(1999) (declining to afford judicial decision broad retroactivitywhere,beforeitsissuance,thereexisted“lack of clear authority in this State,” which resulted in “uncertainty of the law” as to issue decided (footnote omitted)). Applying these criteria to our holdings in Mitchell v. Broadnax, we conclude thatour decision in Mitchell should notbeappliedretroactivelytopermittheprosecutionof Ms.Findley’sclaimthereunder. In short, retroactivity is not warranted because our decision in Mitchell involvedamatterofsubstantive law, namely W. Va. Code § 33-6-31(k), which had, priortoourdecisiontherein,receivedsparsetreatmentinourjudicialdecisionsandhad not 26 beenamendedbytheLegislature since its original enactment in 1979. 26 Given this dearth of interpretiveauthority,itgoeswithoutsayingthattheholdings we announced inMitchell were “not clearly foreshadowed.” Syl. pt. 5, in part, Bradley, 163 W. Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879. Furthermore,thesubstantialpublicpolicyissuesimplicatedin our holdings,andexplicitly identified by the Legislature in W. Va. Code § 33-6-30(b), mitigate in favor of a rule of prospectiveness. See id. Finally, as noted above, while we long have held exclusions in insurance policies to be valid,27 we had not, prior to Mitchell, delineated the express requirements therefor contained in W. Va. Code § 33-6-31(k). Thus,forthesamereasonswedeclinedtoapplyW.Va.Code§§33-6-30(b-c) retroactivelyinordertosafeguardthesubstantive rights of insureds that had accrued before its passage, we likewise decline to apply our holdings in Mitchell v. Broadnax retroactively inorder to shield insurers from the imposition of augmented substantive liabilities that did not clearly exist prior to the announcement of such holdings. See Syl. pt. 2, Smith, 208 W. Va. 26To date, W. Va. Code § 33-6-31(k) has not yet been amended, although its provisionshavebeenclarifiedasaresultoftheLegislature’senactment of W. Va. Code § 33- 6-30(c). See W.Va.Code § 33-6-31(k) (1998)(Repl.Vol.2000);W.Va.Code§33-6-30(c) (2002) (Supp. 2002). 27See Syl. pt. 3, Deel v. Sweeney, 181 W. Va. 460, 383 S.E.2d 92 (1989) (“Insurers may incorporate such terms, conditions and exclusions in an automobile insurance policyasmaybeconsistent with the premium charged, so long as any such exclusions do not conflict with the spirit and intent of the uninsured and underinsured motorists statutes.”). Accord Syl. pt. 4, American States Ins. Co. v. Tanner, 211 W. Va. 160, 563 S.E.2d 825 (2002); Syl. pt. 3, Mitchell v. Broadnax, 208 W. Va. 36, 537 S.E.2d 882 (2000); Syl. pt. 1, Thomas v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 188 W. Va. 640, 425 S.E.2d 595 (1992). 27 284, 540 S.E.2d 152. Having found Mitchell to have prospective only application, it is imperativetoexplainhowthisdecisioninterplayswithourprevious conclusion that W. Va. Code§33-6-30 also has only prospective application. Therefore, we hold as a matter of law, thattheholdingsof Mitchell v. Broadnax, 208 W.Va.36,537S.E.2d882(2000),whichallow insureds to pursue a cause of action against insurerstoenforce the requirements of W. Va. Code § 33-6-31(k) (1995) (Repl. Vol. 1996), apply only to those exclusions to insurance coverageincorporatedintopoliciesofmotorvehicleinsuranceonorafterthe effective date of our decision therein, i.e., February 18, 2000, and before the effective date of the Legislature’samendmentstoW.Va.Code§33-6-30(2002)(Supp.2002),i.e.,June 5, 2002. We make no determination, however, as to the success of such claims in light of the Commissioner’s responsibility to evaluate the propriety of premiums as an essential and integral part of its function to approve insurance forms used in this State.28 See generally 28Based upon the very existence of the instant proceeding, and the Legislature’s amendments to W. Va. Code § 33-6-30 following our decision in Mitchell v. Broadnax, we feel the need to further clarify theintendedscope and effect of the holdings we previously announced therein. In spite of the plethora of recent lawsuits claiming to the contrary, we did not intend in Mitchell to declare that a quid pro quo premium adjustment is required to accompany every exclusion incorporated into a policy of motor vehicle insurance or even to suggest that such a corresponding premium necessary reflects a reduction thereof. Rather, the solitary goal that we wished to achieve through that decision was the elucidation and enforcement of the all but forgotten legislative directive containedinW.Va.Code § 33-6- 31(k),whichspecifically instructs that “insurer[s are not prevented] from incorporating in such terms, conditions and exclusions as may be consistent with the premium charged.” (Emphasis added). In hindsight, however, it is evident that, although we ordinarily must presumethatthe Legislature means what it says in its enactments and thatwemustapplya statute’s plain language without further interpretation of its terms, the construction we affordedtosubsection k did not comport with theLegislature’sunderstandingthereof. See (continued...) 28 W.Va.Code§33-6-9(e)(1957)(Repl.Vol.2000)(directingthat“[t]hecommissionershall disapprove any such form of policy, application, rider, or endorsement or withdraw any previous approval thereof . . . [i]f the benefits provided therein are unreasonable in relation to the premium charged”). Applying this rule to the facts of the case sub judice, we conclude that Ms. Findleydoesnothavestandingtoassertaclaimpursuantto Mitchell v. Broadnax becausethe exclusionarylanguageof which she complains was neither incorporatedintoherpolicyof 28(...continued) Martin v. Randolph County Bd. of Educ., 195 W. Va. 297, 312, 465 S.E.2d 399, 414 (1995) (“‘[C]ourtsmustpresumethat a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.’” (quoting Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.249,253-54,112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149, 117 L. Ed. 2d 391, 397 (1992)). See also Syl. pt. 4, Daily Gazette Co., Inc. v. West VirginiaDev.Office,206 W. Va.51,521 S.E.2d 543 (1999) (“‘“A statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous and plainly expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted by the courts but will be given full force and effect.” Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Epperly, 135 W. Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951).’ Syllabus point 1, State v. Jarvis, 199 W. Va. 635, 487 S.E.2d 293 (1997).”). Above all, we wish to make abundantly clear that our most basic and preeminentconcerninthe Mitchell case,asinthecase sub judice,isthatinsuranceconsumers andinsurancepurveyorsalikereceivethebenefitoftheirbargained for exchange when they meet to contract for motor vehicle insurance coverage. See generally Syl. pt. 5, Mitchell v. Broadnax,208W. Va. 36, 537 S.E.2d 882 (recognizing simultaneous rights of insureds to pay premiumsconsistentwithpolicycoverageandinsurers to incorporate exclusionary language in policies of motor vehicle insurance). Moreover,we reiterate ourprioradmonishmentthatitistheresponsibilityof thisState’sInsurance Commissioner to review such policy exclusions and to ensure that they are consistent with the premiums charged for such coverage. See Mitchell v. Broadnax, 208 W. Va. at 48-50, 537 S.E.2d at 894-96. We further applaud the Legislature’s express recognition and explanation of the Commissioner’s function in this regard. See W.Va.Code §§ 33-6-30(b-c). 29 motorvehicleinsurancenormodified so as to require a corresponding premium adjustment during the narrow temporal window described above. Absent an entitlement to the relief sought in accordance with Mitchell, Ms. Findley lacks standing to pursue her declaratory judgment action based thereon. See Shobe v. Latimer, 162 W. Va. at 784, 253 S.E.2d at 58. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s ruling insofar as it determined that Ms. Findley did not have standing to assert a claim pursuant to Mitchell v. Broadnax, 208 W. Va. 36, 537 S.E.2d 882 (2000).29 C. Anti-Stacking Provisions Ms. Findley further asserts that the circuit court improperly determined that she wasnotentitledtostackcoveragesunderher State Farm motor vehicle insurance policy. This argument is premised upon two types of anti-stacking provisions contained in the subject policy. First, the definition of an “underinsured motor vehicle” effectively precludes an insured,whosevehicleisinsuredunderthepolicy’sliabilitycoverage,from also collecting UIMbenefitswithregardtothesamevehicle involved in the same covered occurrence. 30 On this point, the circuit court found “as a matter of law that the subject vehicle is not an ‘underinsured motor vehicle’ under the applicable insurance policy, as the definition of 29Although we are affirming the circuit court’s dismissal of Ms. Findley’s Mitchell v. Broadnax claim, we wish to make clear that, because the circuit court did not certify this case as a class action, the dismissal of Ms. Findley’s claim does not affect the rights of potential members of the class she purported to represent. 30See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 30 underinsuredmotorvehicleclearly and unambiguously precludes UIM coverage for a vehicle insured under the same policy for liability purposes.” (Citations omitted). The court continued that, “to declare this provision invalid would ‘emasculate’ this State’s underinsured motoriststatutoryprovision,and,ineffect,would transform the underinsured coverage into liability coverage.” Thesecondanti-stackingprovisionatissuehereinprecludes aninsuredfrom stackingtheUIMcoveragesof vehicles owned by the same insured but covered under different StateFarmpoliciesandlimitssuchrecoverytoanamountnottoexceed the policy providing the highest level of liability coverage.31 With respect to this exclusion, the circuit court determined that “State Farm is entitled to the granting of its . . . [m]otion for summary judgment on the issue of Laura Findley’s stacking claim in light of the clear and unambiguous exclusionprohibitingstacking,forwhich John Findley received a multi-car discount.” As to bothsuchanti-stackingprovisions,Ms.FindleyurgesthisCourttofindthattheyviolatethe requirements of W. Va. Code § 33-6-31(k) as that statute was interpreted in Mitchell v. Broadnax, while State Farm maintains that such exclusions are valid and enforceable. We noted above that Ms. Findley does not have standing to assert a claim pursuant to Mitchell v. Broadnax under the facts presently before this Court. Therefore, her 31See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 31 argument that the anti-stacking provisions contained in her State Farm policy are not enforceablebecausetheydonotcomplywiththe requirements of theholdingsof Mitchell is without merit. Nevertheless,werewetofindMs.Findleytobeentitledtothereliefsheseeks under Mitchell,herclaimisgovernedby our well-established precedent upholding both types of anti-stacking exclusions. Thereisnocommonlawrighttostackcoverage available formultiplevehiclesunder the same policy or under two or more insurance policies. The right to stack must arise from the insurancecontractitself(as thatistheagreementoftheparties) orfromastatute(asin the uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage statutes). Syl. pt. 1, Payne v. Weston, 195 W. Va. 502, 466 S.E.2d 161 (1995). Regarding policy languagethat prohibits the recovery of UIM benefits where liability coverage has already been collected, we have held that [w]henaninsurerissuesanautomobile insurance policy which provides both liability and underinsured motorists coverage,butwhichpolicycontains what is commonly referred to as a “family use exclusion” for the underinsured motorist coverage,andwhen,inasingle car accident, the passenger/wife receivespaymentsundertheliability coverage for the negligence ofthedriver/husband,suchexclusionis valid and not against the publicpolicy of this state. That exclusion, which excludes from thedefinitionof“underinsuredmotorvehicle”anyautomobile owned by or furnished for the regular use of the insured or a relative,hasthe purpose of preventing underinsured coverage from being converted into additional liability coverage. Syl.pt.2, Thomas v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 188 W. Va. 640, 425 S.E.2d 595 (1992). See 32 also Syl.pt.3, Payne v. Weston, 195 W. Va.502,466 S.E.2d 161 (“An insured is not entitled to stack liability coverages for every vehicle covered byhisorherpolicywhenthe insured receivedamulti-car discount, when only one vehicle was involved in the accident, and when thepolicycontainslanguagelimiting the insurer’s liability.”). This is so because “[w]here an insurance policy specifically excludes any motor vehicle owned by the policy holder from the definitionofan‘underinsuredmotorvehicle,’ then the underinsured motorist coverage was intended to protect the insured against lossescausedbythenegligenceofanother motorist who is underinsured.” Syl. pt. 4, in part, Alexander v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 187 W. Va. 72, 415 S.E.2d 618 (1992). Likewise, we have found policy language precluding the stacking of UIM coverages for different vehicles to be valid and enforceable. WestVirginiaCode§33-6-31 (1992) does not forbid the inclusion and application of an anti-stacking provision in an automobileinsurancepolicywhereasingleinsurancepolicyis issued by a single insurer and contains an underinsured endorsement even though the policy covers two or more vehicles. Under the terms of such a policy, the insured is not entitled to stack the coverages of the multiple vehicles and may only recover uptothepolicylimitssetforthinthesinglepolicy endorsement. Syl. pt. 5, Russell v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 188 W. Va. 81, 422 S.E.2d 803 (1992). See also Syl. pt. 4, Starr v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 188 W. Va. 313, 423 S.E.2d 922 (1992) (“UnderW.Va.Code,33-6-31(c)(1988),one who is entitled to uninsured orunderinsured motoristbenefitssolelybyvirtueof his or her occupancy or use of the policyholder’s vehicle 33 maynotstackthepolicyholder’s uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage on another vehicle not involved in the accident.”). Cf. Syl.pt.3, State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Youler, 183 W. Va. 556, 396 S.E.2d 737 (1990) (“So-called ‘antistacking’ language in automobile insurance policiesisvoidunder W.Va.Code,33-6-31(b),as amended, to the extent thatsuchlanguage is purportedly applicable to uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage, and an insured covered simultaneously by two or more uninsured or underinsured motorist policy endorsements may recover under all of suchendorsementsuptotheaggregatedorstacked limits of the same, or up to the amount of the judgment obtained against the uninsured or underinsured motorist, whichever is less, as a result of one accident and injury.”). Based upon these prior decisions upholding anti-stacking policy provisions such asthose atissueinthecase subjudice,weaffirmthecircuitcourt’srulingupholdingtheanti- stacking provisions contained in Ms. Findley’s State Farm policy. D. Summary Judgment Lastly, Ms. Findley claims that the circuit court erred by denying her cross- motion for summary judgment. At the conclusion of its August 1, 2002, order, the circuit court determined that Ms. Findley had not demonstrated grounds for the relief she had requested. On appeal to this Court, Ms. Findley asserts that she is, in fact, entitled to judgment asamatter of law. State Farm, however, concurs in the circuit court’s ruling which denied Ms. Findley relief. 34 Summaryjudgmentisproperwhen“thereisnogenuineissue as to any material factand. . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” W. Va. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Stated otherwise, [a]motionfora summaryjudgmentshouldbegrantedif the pleadings, exhibits and discovery depositions upon which the motionissubmittedfordecisiondisclosethatthecaseinvolves no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the party who made the motion is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Syl. pt. 5, Wilkinson v. Searls, 155 W. Va. 475, 184 S.E.2d 735 (1971). Accord Syl. pt. 4, Benson v. Kutsch, 181 W. Va. 1, 380 S.E.2d 36 (1989); Syl. pt. 1, Floyd v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 164 W. Va. 661, 264 S.E.2d 648 (1980) (per curiam). See also Syl. pt. 3, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Federal Ins. Co. of New York, 148 W. Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963)(“Amotionforsummaryjudgmentshouldbegranted only when it is clear that there is nogenuineissueoffacttobetriedandinquiryconcerningthefacts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law.”). Ordinarily, “[a]n order denying a motion for summary judgment is merely interlocutory,leaves the case pending for trial, and is not appealable except in special instances inwhichaninterlocutoryorderisappealable.” Syl. pt. 8,Aetna, 148 W. Va.160,133S.E.2d 770. See also Syl., Wilfong v. Wilfong, 156 W. Va. 754, 197 S.E.2d 96 (1973) (“The entry ofanorderdenyingamotionforsummaryjudgmentmadeat the close of the pleadings and beforetrial ismerelyinterlocutoryandnotthenappealabletothisCourt.”). Nevertheless, a partymay“appeal...adenial of summary judgment after the conclusion of a trial and the entry 35 of a final order.” Coleman v. Sopher, 201 W. Va. 588, 594 n.3, 499 S.E.2d 592, 598 n.3 (1997). Accord Wilfong, 156 W. Va. at 759, 197 S.E.2d at 100. Likewise,where,as in the case subjudice,the order denying one party’s motion for summary judgment simultaneously grantssummaryjudgmenttoanotherparty, such an order is final and appealable. In this regard, we have observed that “[a] motion for summary judgment which is granted . . . is an appealable final order.” Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Leeber, 180 W. Va. 375,377 n.5,376 S.E.2d 581,583 n.5 (1988) (citation omitted). This is so because, “an order qualifies as a final order when it ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.’” Durm v. Heck’s,Inc.,184W.Va.562,566,401 S.E.2d 908,912 (1991) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S. Ct. 631, 633, 89 L. Ed. 911, 921 (1945)) (additional citation omitted). Mindful of these principles, we now consider Ms. Findley’s assignment of error. Based upon the issues presented by the instant appeal, we concur with the circuit court’sdecisiontodenyMs.Findley’scross-motion for summary judgment. As noted above, an integral precondition to such relief is a legal entitlement thereto. In this proceeding, however,Ms.Findleyhasnotasserted grounds upon which she may legally recover. We have determined that she is not a proper party to assert a claim pursuant to Mitchell v. Broadnax, 208W.Va.36,537S.E.2d882(2000),andourdecisiontoapplyW.Va.Code§§33-6-30(b- c)prospectivelyonlylikewisedoesnotaffordher relief. Moreover, we have concluded that theanti-stackingexclusionscontainedintheStateFarmpolicyatissuehereinare valid and 36 enforceable. Thus, give our determination of the foregoing questions of law, we conclude that Ms. Findley has not demonstrated her entitlement “to a judgment as a matter of law” as required by Rule 56(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s ruling denying Ms. Findley’s cross-motion for summary judgment.32 IV. CONCLUSION Insummary,weconcludethat(1) the language of W. Va. Code §§ 33-6-30(b-c) (2002)(Supp.2002)doesnot apply retroactively; (2) Ms. Findley cannotassertaclaimfor relief pursuant to Mitchell v. Broadnax, 208 W. Va.36,537 S.E.2d 882 (2000); (3) the anti- stackingexclusions contained in the State Farm policy of motor vehicleinsuranceatissue herein are valid and enforceable;and(4)Ms.Findleyisnotentitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, the August 1, 2002, order of the Circuit Court of Barbour County is hereby affirmed. Affirmed. 32Inlightofthisdecision, we need not further address or consider State Farm’s cross-assignments of error. See generally Section III., supra. 37