Case Title: Jankey v. Lee

Citation: 

Docket Number: S180890

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2012-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed 12/17/12 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
LES JANKEY et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
)  
S180890 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
)  
Ct.App. 1/4 A123006 
 
 
) 
SONG KOO LEE etc., 
)  
San Francisco City & County  
 
)  
Super. Ct. No. CGC07-463040 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
)  
 
____________________________________) 
 
Sued under state and federal law for disability access discrimination, 
defendant Song Koo Lee prevailed and sought attorney fees.  The trial court 
concluded fees for a prevailing defendant under Civil Code section 55 were 
mandatory and awarded $118,458, and the Court of Appeal affirmed.1  We 
consider two principal challenges to the award:  whether the trial court erred in 
determining that section 55 fees are mandatory, and whether an award of 
mandatory fees is preempted by the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; ADA).  We conclude the plain language of 
section 55 makes an award of fees to any prevailing party mandatory, and the 
ADA does not preempt this part of the state‟s attorney fee scheme for disability 
access suits.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
                                              
1  
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Civil Code. 
 
 2 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Lee owns and operates the K&D Market, a small grocery store in San 
Francisco‟s Mission District.  He does not own the building but has operated the 
market since 1985. 
Plaintiff Les Jankey, a wheelchair user, sued Lee for denying him and other 
similarly situated disabled persons access to the full and equal enjoyment of the 
goods and services offered by K&D Market.2  Jankey contended a four-inch step 
located at the entry of the market was an architectural barrier that prevented him 
and other wheelchair-bound individuals from wheeling into the store.  Jankey 
asserted violations of the federal ADA, the Unruh Civil Rights Act (§ 51 et seq.), 
the Disabled Persons Act (§ 54 et seq.),3 and Health and Safety Code section 
19955 et seq.  Among other relief, Jankey sought an injunction under state and 
federal law compelling Lee to make K&D Market readily accessible to individuals 
with disabilities.  (See § 55; 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2).) 
The trial court granted Lee summary judgment.  That K&D Market had a 
threshold step was undisputed, but Lee conclusively established as an affirmative 
defense that removal of the barrier was not readily achievable and he thus was 
entitled to judgment on all four disability access claims.  (See Munson v. Del 
Taco, Inc., supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 669 & fn. 6; Colorado Cross Disability v. 
Hermanson Family (10th Cir. 2001) 264 F.3d 999, 1002-1003; 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).) 
                                              
2  
Jankey was originally joined by a second plaintiff, a nonprofit disability 
rights organization, but the trial court concluded it lacked standing and the 
organization plays no role in this appeal. 
3  
“Part 2.5 of division 1 of the Civil Code, currently consisting of sections 54 
to 55.3, is commonly referred to as the „Disabled Persons Act,‟ although it has no 
official title.”  (Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 661, 674, fn. 8.) 
 
 3 
Lee moved for an award of attorney fees under section 55, which provides 
for prevailing party fees in actions to enjoin disability access violations.  Opposing 
the motion, Jankey argued that section 55 was preempted by the ADA.  (See 
Hubbard v. SoBreck, LLC (9th Cir. 2009) 554 F.3d 742, 745.)  In the alternative, 
Jankey contended an award could be made only upon a finding that the complaint 
was “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.”4  (Christiansburg Garment Co. v. 
EEOC (1978) 434 U.S. 412, 422.)  Without directly addressing preemption, the 
trial court concluded Lee was entitled to a mandatory fee award under Molski v. 
Arciero Wine Group (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 786.5  The court awarded Lee 
$118,458 in fees, most of the approximately $130,000 originally sought. 
While not contesting the summary judgment, Jankey appealed the trial 
court‟s award of attorney fees.  The Court of Appeal affirmed.  It “respectfully 
disagree[d] with the Hubbard [v. SoBreck, LLC, supra, 554 F.3d 742] court‟s 
preemption analysis,” concluding a mandatory fee award was both required by 
state law and permitted by federal law.  It upheld the trial court‟s fee award in its 
entirety. 
We granted review to address the conflict between the Ninth Circuit‟s 
opinion in Hubbard v. SoBreck, LLC, supra, 554 F.3d 742, finding preemption, 
and the Court of Appeal‟s decision, finding none. 
                                              
4  
Consistent with common practice, we use “frivolous” as shorthand for this 
formulation. 
5  
Accordingly, the trial court made no finding as to whether Jankey‟s claims 
could be characterized as frivolous. 
 
 4 
DISCUSSION 
I.  Federal and State Disability Access Remedies 
Congress and the Legislature have afforded persons with disabilities a 
range of legal tools for remedying denials of access.  The ADA and numerous 
state statutes each prohibit access discrimination on the basis of disability, but they 
vary in the remedies they provide. 
The ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in the 
enjoyment of public accommodations, including with respect to access.  (42 
U.S.C. § 12182.)  Businesses must “ „remove architectural barriers . . . in existing 
facilities . . . where such removal is readily achievable.‟ ”  (Munson v. Del Taco, 
Inc., supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 669, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).)  
Liability does not depend on proof of intentional discrimination, but a private 
litigant cannot obtain damages for the denial of access, only injunctive relief.  
(Munson, at pp. 669-670; 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a).) 
In 1992, shortly after passage of the ADA, the Legislature amended the 
state‟s disability protections “ „to strengthen California law in areas where it is 
weaker than the [ADA] and to retain California law when it provides more 
protection for individuals with disabilities than the [ADA].‟ ”  (Munson v. Del 
Taco, Inc., supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 669, quoting Stats. 1992, ch. 913, § 1, p. 4282.)  
Two overlapping laws, the Unruh Civil Rights Act (§ 51) and the Disabled 
Persons Act (§§ 54-55.3), are the principal sources of state disability access 
protection. 
The Unruh Civil Rights Act broadly outlaws arbitrary discrimination in 
public accommodations and includes disability as one among many prohibited 
bases.  (§ 51, subd. (b).)  As part of the 1992 reformation of state disability law, 
the Legislature amended the Unruh Civil Rights Act to incorporate by reference 
 
 5 
the ADA, making violations of the ADA per se violations of the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act.  (§ 51, subd. (f); Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., supra, 46 Cal.4th at 
pp. 668-669.)  This amendment was intended to extend to disabled individuals 
aggrieved by an ADA violation the full panoply of Unruh Civil Rights Act 
remedies.  (Munson, at p. 673.)  These include injunctive relief, actual damages 
(and in some cases as much as treble damages), and a minimum statutory award of 
$4,000 per violation.  (§ 52, subds. (a), (c)(3); Turner v. Association of American 
Medical Colleges (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1058.) 
The Disabled Persons Act substantially overlaps with and complements the 
Unruh Civil Rights Act.  (Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 675.)  
More narrow in focus than the Unruh Civil Rights Act, it generally guarantees 
people with disabilities equal rights of access “to public places, buildings, 
facilities and services, as well as common carriers, housing and places of public 
accommodation.”  (Munson, at p. 674, fn. 8; see §§ 54, subd. (a), 54.1, 
subd. (a)(1).)  As with the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the Legislature amended the 
Disabled Persons Act to incorporate ADA violations and make them a basis for 
relief under the act.  (§§ 54, subd. (c), 54.1, subd. (d); Munson, at p. 674; Wilson v. 
Murillo (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1131.)  The available remedies include 
actual damages (and in some cases as much as treble damages), with a $1,000 
minimum recovery.  (§ 54.3, subd. (a); Molski v. Arciero Wine Group, supra, 164 
Cal.App.4th at p. 792.)  Recognizing the overlap between the Unruh Civil Rights 
Act and the Disabled Persons Act, the Legislature expressly foreclosed double 
recovery.  (§ 54.3, subd. (c); Munson, at p. 675.) 
Section 55 is part of the Disabled Persons Act, but it offers an independent 
basis for relief.  (Molski v. Arciero Wine Group, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at 
 
 6 
p. 792.)6  It is broader in two respects than the private right of action authorized by 
section 54.3:  section 55 extends standing to those “potentially aggrieved,” not just 
those who have been actually denied access, and relief may be predicated on 
potential violations not only of sections 54 and 54.1 but also of various provisions 
in both the Government Code and the Health and Safety Code.7  (§ 55; see Turner 
v. Association of American Medical Colleges, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 1059; 
Molski, at p. 792.)  Section 55 is also narrower than section 54.3 in one significant 
respect:  it authorizes only injunctive relief, not damages.  (Molski, at p. 792.) 
II.  Section 55 Mandates Attorney Fees for Every Prevailing Party 
Here, Jankey sued (and lost) under each of the principal federal and state 
disability access laws—the ADA, the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and sections 54.3 
and 55 of the Disabled Persons Act.  Section 55, on which Lee predicated his fee 
request, is unique among these sources of law in containing a broadly worded two-
way fee-shifting clause:  “The prevailing party in the action” under section 55 
“shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney‟s fees.”  Before considering the 
interplay between this provision and the narrower fee provision of the ADA, we 
address, and reject, Jankey‟s challenge to the lower courts‟ conclusion that section 
55 grants a prevailing defendant a mandatory right to fees. 
                                              
6  
In full, section 55 provides:  “Any person who is aggrieved or potentially 
aggrieved by a violation of Section 54 or 54.1 of this code, Chapter 7 
(commencing with Section 4450) of Division 5 of Title 1 of the Government 
Code, or Part 5.5 (commencing with Section 19955) of Division 13 of the Health 
and Safety Code may bring an action to enjoin the violation.  The prevailing party 
in the action shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney‟s fees.”  
7  
Here, Jankey invoked relevant provisions of the Health and Safety Code, 
seeking injunctive relief for violations of Health and Safety Code section 19955 et 
seq. 
 
 7 
Two aspects of the plain language of section 55 are dispositive.  First, the 
statute was written to allow fees for a “prevailing party,” not just a prevailing 
plaintiff.  The Legislature knows how to write both unilateral fee statutes, which 
afford fees to either plaintiffs or defendants, and bilateral fee statutes, which may 
afford fees to both plaintiffs and defendants.  “When the Legislature intends that 
the successful side shall recover its attorney‟s fees no matter who brought the legal 
proceeding, it typically uses the term „prevailing party.‟ ”  (Stirling v. Agricultural 
Labor Relations Bd. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1305, 1311; see also Molski v. 
Arciero Wine Group, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 790; cf. §§ 52.1, subd. (h) 
[attorney fees only for “petitioner or plaintiff”], 54.3, subd. (a) [“Any person” who 
violates specified statutes “is liable for . . . attorney‟s fees as may be determined 
by the court”].)  The Legislature chose in section 55 to enact a bilateral fee statute, 
granting defendants as well as plaintiffs the opportunity for a fee award. 
Second, while the determination that a defendant is a prevailing party is 
generally discretionary (see Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1332), 
once a trial court determines that a defendant qualifies, the language of section 55 
mandates a fee award:  a prevailing party “shall be entitled” to reasonable fees.  
Here as well, the Legislature has routinely and clearly differentiated, using “may” 
in circumstances where it intends a fee award to be discretionary and “shall” in 
circumstances where it intends an award to be mandatory.  (Compare, e.g., 
§§ 52.1, subd. (h) [“the court may award the petitioner or plaintiff reasonable 
attorney‟s fees”], 3426.4 [“the court may award reasonable attorney‟s fees”] with 
§§ 1785.31, subd. (d) [“prevailing plaintiffs . . . shall be entitled to recover . . . 
reasonable attorney‟s fees”], 3344, subd. (a) [prevailing party “shall . . . be entitled 
to attorney‟s fees”].) 
Consistent with the plain language of section 55, every reported case to 
consider the question has concluded, as we do, that an award of fees to a 
 
 8 
prevailing defendant is mandatory.  (Molski v. Arciero Wine Group, supra, 164 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 790-792; Jones v. Wild Oats Markets, Inc. (S.D.Cal. 2006) 467 
F.Supp.2d 1004, 1011-1012; Goodell v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (E.D.Cal. 2002) 207 
F.Supp.2d 1124, 1126-1127.) 
Against the text of the statute and precedent, Jankey argues the legislative 
history behind section 55 shows the Legislature intended to afford only prevailing 
plaintiffs mandatory fees.  Section 55 was enacted by Assembly Bill No. 2471 
(1973-1974 Reg. Sess.).  Jankey selectively cites passages from analyses of this 
measure that confirm the Legislature‟s intent to afford prevailing plaintiffs 
attorney fees, but never demonstrates that the Legislature did not also intend to 
afford fees to prevailing defendants.  Indeed, the history is to the contrary and 
reveals a conscious choice to ensure prevailing defendants a right to fees.  As 
originally drafted, the new injunctive provision would have granted fees only to 
prevailing plaintiffs.  (Assem. Bill No. 2471 (1973-1974 Reg. Sess.) § 1, as 
introduced May 15, 1973 [“If successful in obtaining an injunction, the physically 
disabled person may be awarded reasonable attorney‟s fees . . . .”].)  The 
Legislature specifically amended Assembly Bill No. 2471 to make the fee 
provision bilateral.  (Assem. Bill No. 2471 (1973-1974 Reg. Sess.) § 1, as 
amended in Sen., Apr. 22, 1974 [substituting “prevailing party” language]; Legis. 
Counsel‟s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2471 (1973-1974 Reg. Sess.) 2 Stats. 1974, 
Summary Dig., p. 242 [the law “[s]pecifies that prevailing party is entitled to 
reasonable attorney‟s fees.”].)  We would do violence to the language of the 
statute were we to disregard that change.8 
                                              
8  
Jankey‟s reliance on the legislative history of a predecessor bill, Assembly 
Bill No. 1547 (1972 Reg. Sess.) is equally unpersuasive.  Like Assembly Bill 
No. 2471 (1973-1974 Reg. Sess.), Assembly Bill No. 1547 was originally drafted 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 9 
Jankey also argues section 55 is in pari materia with the ADA and other 
state laws protecting disability access, like the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and its fee 
provision thus should be interpreted similarly.  But statutes on the same subject 
will be read in a consistent fashion only “to the extent their language permits.”  
(Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1091.)  The text of section 55 
marks a clear departure from that of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (§ 52.1, subd. (h) 
[awarding fees only to a “petitioner or plaintiff”]) and the ADA (42 U.S.C. 
§ 12205 [allowing that a court “in its discretion, may allow” fees]).  Its fee 
provision mandates an award to all prevailing parties, including prevailing 
defendants. 
III.  Section 55 Is Not Preempted 
 
A.  The ADA’s Fee Regime 
We turn to Jankey‟s principal contention, that the ADA preempts section 55 
insofar as the state law affords prevailing defendants a broader entitlement to 
recovery of attorney fees than would federal law. 
In contrast with section 55, the ADA allows defendants fees only for 
responding to frivolous claims and makes fee recovery discretionary:  “In any 
action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to this Act, the court or 
agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable 
attorney‟s fee . . . .”  (42 U.S.C. § 12205.)  As the legislative history shows clearly, 
Congress intended that discretion to be exercised in accord with principles set 
forth in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, supra, 434 U.S. 412 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
to allow only prevailing plaintiffs attorney fees.  (Assem. Bill No. 1547 (1972 
Reg. Sess.) § 1, as introduced Mar. 15, 1972.)  But unlike Assembly Bill No. 
2471, it was never amended to extend fees to prevailing parties and went down to 
defeat. 
 
 10 
(Christiansburg).  (See H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(II), 2d Sess., p. 140 (1990), 
reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 423; H.R.Rep. No. 101-
485(III), 2d Sess., p. 73 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. 
News, p. 496.)  Under Christiansburg, while prevailing plaintiffs should receive 
fees unless an award would be unjust (Christiansburg, at pp. 416-417), prevailing 
defendants may receive fees only when the trial court finds that a plaintiff‟s claim 
is “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate 
after it clearly became so” (id. at p. 422; see, e.g., Bercovitch v. Baldwin School, 
Inc. (1st Cir. 1999) 191 F.3d 8, 11 [holding that fees are available to an ADA 
defendant only upon a showing of frivolousness]; Summers v. A. Teichert & Son, 
Inc. (9th Cir. 1997) 127 F.3d 1150, 1154 [same]; Bruce v. City of Gainesville, Ga. 
(11th Cir. 1999) 177 F.3d 949, 951-952 [same]).  Jankey contends Congress‟s 
adoption of this more stringent federal standard should preempt the award of fees 
under a lesser state standard for overlapping work done to defend against both 
state and federal claims. 
 
B.  General Preemption Principles 
“The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution establishes a 
constitutional choice-of-law rule, makes federal law paramount, and vests 
Congress with the power to preempt state law.”  (Viva! Internat. Voice for Animals 
v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 929, 935; see 
U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2; Arizona v. United States (2012) 567 U.S. ___, ___ [132 
S.Ct. 2492, 2500-2501].)  “Congress may exercise that power by enacting an 
express preemption provision, or courts may infer preemption under one or more 
of three implied preemption doctrines:  conflict, obstacle, or field preemption.”  
(Brown v. Mortensen (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1052, 1059.) 
In both express and implied preemption cases, whether preemption will be 
found in a given case depends foremost on congressional intent.  (Wyeth v. Levine 
 
 11 
(2009) 555 U.S. 555, 565; Brown v. Mortensen, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 1059-
1060.)  Significantly, we begin with a presumption against preemption and will 
override that presumption only when Congress has made “ „clear and manifest‟ ” 
its intent to displace state law with federal law.  (Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr (1996) 
518 U.S. 470, 485; accord, Brown, at p. 1060.)  As the party asserting preemption, 
Jankey has the burden of overcoming that presumption and establishing that 
Congress in fact intended to invalidate a law such as section 55.  (Viva! Internat. 
Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., supra, 41 
Cal.4th at p. 936.) 
 
C.  Section 501(b) of the ADA 
Here, Congress has spoken to preemption directly:  a construction clause in 
the ADA spells out the act‟s intended effect on state laws.  The clause disavows 
any broad preemptive intent, instead permitting states to enact and enforce 
complementary laws:  “Nothing in this Act shall be construed to invalidate or limit 
the remedies, rights, and procedures of any . . . law of any State or political 
subdivision of any State or jurisdiction that provides greater or equal protection for 
the rights of individuals with disabilities than are afforded by this Act.”  (42 
U.S.C. § 12201(b) (hereafter sometimes ADA § 501(b)).) 
On its face, this clause distinguishes state laws that afford equal or better 
protection to the disabled than the ADA from those that do not.  Laws in the 
former category are shielded from preemption; nothing in the ADA “shall be 
construed to invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and procedures” they provide 
those with disabilities.  (42 U.S.C. § 12201(b).)9  Laws in the latter category are, 
                                              
9  
See also House of Representatives Reports, report No. 101-485(II), 2d 
Session, page 135 (1990), reprinted in 1990 United States Code Congressional and 
Administrative News, page 418 (“Congress does not intend to displace any of the 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 12 
by negative implication, not shielded from preemption.  The construction clause, 
however, does not expressly preempt these less protective laws; it does not 
categorically declare that any law providing lesser protection than the ADA is 
invalid.  In the absence of either express preemption or a shield against 
preemption, it follows that such laws are invalid to the extent standard conflict or 
obstacle preemption principles would require their displacement.10 
We previously have recognized the congressional “ „power to preclude 
conflict [and obstacle] preemption, allowing states to enforce laws even if those 
laws are in direct conflict with federal law or frustrate the purpose of federal 
law.‟ ”  (Viva! Internat. Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail 
Operations, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 945, fn. 9; see Geier v. American Honda 
Motor Co. (2000) 529 U.S. 861, 872 [acknowledging that Congress has the 
constitutional power to limit implied preemption].)  Congress can determine that, 
so long as a state law affords equal or greater protection than the ADA, it 
categorically should be treated as not preempted.  (See Wood v. County of 
Alameda (N.D.Cal. 1995) 875 F.Supp. 659, 663-664 [ADA § 501(b) is intended to 
ensure plaintiffs are never denied on preemption grounds the benefits of such 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
rights or remedies available under other . . . state laws . . . which provide greater or 
equal protection to individuals with disabilities.”); House of Representatives 
Reports, report No. 101-485(III), 2d Session, page 70 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
United States Code Congressional and Administrative News, page 493 (same). 
10  
In contrast, neither express nor field preemption bears on state laws 
protecting the rights of individuals with disabilities.  ADA section 501‟s 
construction clause aside, the ADA contains no express preemption clause.  As 
well, ADA section 501‟s express preservation of the several states‟ authority to 
regulate in the area of disability discrimination negates any argument that 
Congress intended to occupy the field of disability rights protection. 
 
 13 
compatible state statutes].)  Our first task, then, is to determine whether section 55 
qualifies as such a law. 
Neither the text of the construction clause nor any other language in the 
ADA addresses how to determine whether a state law affords equal or greater 
protection than the ADA.  Accordingly, we may turn to the legislative history for 
insight.  (E.g., Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 770.)  The 
committee reports explaining the construction clause reveal an intent that a state 
law should qualify for protection from preemption whenever at a minimum some 
part of it is superior to the ADA in the protection it affords, such that an individual 
with a disability might choose to invoke it, even if the law may in other respects 
provide procedures or remedies that are arguably inferior. 
ADA section 501(b) was intended to ensure “all of the rights, remedies and 
procedures that are available to people with disabilities under . . . other state laws 
(including state common law) are not preempted by this Act.”  (H.R.Rep. No. 101-
485(II), 2d Sess., p. 135 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. 
News, p. 418; H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(III), 2d Sess., p. 70 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 493; see Wood v. County of Alameda, supra, 
875 F.Supp. at p. 663 [the purpose of ADA § 501(b) is to “maximize the options 
available to plaintiffs”].)  In lieu of broadly preempting every arguably lesser state 
remedy, Congress elected to maximize individuals‟ freedom to select whichever 
legal remedies they desired:  “A plaintiff may choose to pursue claims under a 
state law that does not confer greater substantive rights, or even confers fewer 
substantive rights, if the plaintiff‟s situation is protected under the alternative law 
and the remedies are greater.”  (H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(III), 2d Sess., p. 70 (1990), 
reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 493.)  The House Judiciary 
Committee gave as one example this state‟s Fair Employment and Housing Act 
(Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.), which at the time unlike the ADA did not protect 
 
 14 
those with mental disabilities, but did offer superior damages remedies.  Such a 
law should not be construed as conferring lesser rights because of its narrower 
scope; rather, ADA section 501(b) and the ADA as a whole should be read to 
preserve individuals‟ rights to decide whether to sue under the state law as well, or 
instead.  (H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(III), 2d Sess., p. 70 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 493.) 
The House Judiciary Committee‟s report reflects a congressional desire to 
preserve for the several states the ability to provide those with disabilities 
additional remedial options, even options that might in some respects be less 
inclusive than federal law or offer lesser relief, if another feature of the state 
avenue for redress might render it more desirable or beneficial.  Essentially, 
Congress embraced a cafeteria approach in which those with disabilities, rather 
than being restricted to a single federal remedy, could pick and choose from 
among federal and state remedies and procedures the avenues for relief they 
thought most advantageous.  It follows that if a state remedial scheme is in any 
regard superior to the ADA, courts should conclude it is not preempted and instead 
allow plaintiffs the choice whether to seek relief under federal law, state law, or 
both. 
Applying this approach to preemption, we think it evident section 55 
qualifies as a state law that affords, in at least some respects, greater protection 
compared to the ADA.  Most notably, section 55‟s standing provision is broader 
than its federal counterpart.  Under state law, because a plaintiff need only show 
he or she is “aggrieved or potentially aggrieved” (§ 55) to seek injunctive relief, 
“virtually any disabled person can bring an action to compel compliance with” 
state disability access guarantees (Urhausen v. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc. 
(2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 254, 266).  In contrast, the ADA requires proof of 
ongoing disability discrimination or reasonable grounds to believe the plaintiff is 
 
 15 
“about to be subjected to” such discrimination.  (42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1).)  A 
personal stake is essential; “[t]he ADA does not permit private plaintiffs to bring 
claims as private attorneys general to vindicate other people‟s injuries.”  (McInnis-
Misenor v. Maine Medical Center (1st Cir. 2003) 319 F.3d 63, 69; see also 
Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc. (9th Cir. 2011) 631 F.3d 939, 946 (en 
banc) [to obtain injunctive relief under the ADA, an access plaintiff “must 
demonstrate a „real and immediate threat of repeated injury‟ in the future”].)  
Thus, while courts have issued injunctive relief under state law without requiring 
proof that a plaintiff intends to encounter or has been deterred from encountering a 
given architectural barrier,11 courts interpreting the ADA have generally required 
more, denying injunctive claims for want of standing in the absence of evidence a 
plaintiff intends to use a facility or would do so but for the presence of the 
challenged barrier.12  Accordingly, an individual with a disability might choose to 
                                              
11  
See Hankins v. El Torito Restaurants, Inc. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 510, 526 
(upholding injunctive relief for a plaintiff who never attempted to use a 
noncompliant wheelchair lift because the plaintiff was still “at least potentially 
aggrieved”); Molski v. Arciero Wine Group, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at page 792 (a 
§ 55 plaintiff “will not be required to prove an actual attempt to access the 
facility” in order to obtain relief). 
12  
See, e.g., Steger v. Franco, Inc. (8th Cir. 2000) 228 F.3d 889, 893 
(rejecting the standing of access plaintiffs who argued simply that “they are 
disabled and may enter the building in the future.”); McInnis-Misenor v. Maine 
Medical Center, supra, 319 F.3d at pages 68-73 (affirming dismissal on standing 
grounds where a disabled plaintiff could show only that she potentially might 
encounter architectural barriers in a hospital, not that a denial of access was 
imminent); Milani, Wheelchair Users Who Lack “Standing”: Another Procedural 
Threshold Blocking Enforcement of Titles II and III of the ADA (2004) 39 Wake 
Forest L.Rev. 69, 84-85 and footnote 68 (collecting cases). 
 
 16 
sue under section 55, in addition to or instead of the ADA, because of this lower 
standing hurdle.  ADA section 501(b) preserves against preemption such a law.13 
Notably, it matters not for purposes of ADA preemption that other aspects 
of section 55, such as the differing attorney fee regime, might be viewed as less 
advantageous.14  ADA section 501(b) relieves courts of the need to parse every 
aspect of a state law to determine whether, on balance, the state law is equally or 
more advantageous as a whole.  Instead, that question is left to individual plaintiffs 
who may pick and choose the remedies they think worth invoking according to 
their particular circumstances. 
Jankey argues that ADA section 501(b) is an express preemption clause, 
that it nullifies all state laws less protective of the rights of the disabled than the 
                                              
13  
Standing is not the only way in which section 55 is broader than the ADA.  
Section 55 enforces a range of state access requirements above and beyond those 
contained in the ADA and its enabling regulations.  (See § 55; Gov. Code, § 4450 
et seq.; Health & Saf. Code, § 19955 et seq.)  For purposes of preemption, 
however, we need only identify at least one superior aspect of the state law 
remedy. 
14  
Whether all would-be plaintiffs would in fact view the different state law 
fee regime as less desirable than the ADA‟s regime is unclear.  Some potential 
plaintiffs might prefer the state rule, under which every prevailing plaintiff is 
“entitled” to recover reasonable attorney fees (§ 55), to the federal rule, under 
which fees can be denied a prevailing plaintiff if “ „special circumstances would 
render such an award unjust‟ ” (Christiansburg, supra, 434 U.S. at pp. 416-417, 
quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises (1968) 390 U.S. 400, 402).  And 
some plaintiffs might prefer as well the possibility of recovering fees under a 
catalyst theory, available under section 55 but not the ADA.  (Compare Mundy v. 
Neal (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 256, 259 [recognizing that under § 55 a plaintiff 
might recover fees for triggering voluntary changes in a defendant‟s conduct] with 
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and 
Human Resources (2001) 532 U.S. 598, 610 [holding that the ADA does not 
authorize catalyst theory recovery, instead requiring a favorable judgment or 
consent decree].) 
 
 17 
ADA, and that section 55 is such a law.  We are not persuaded.  First, as we have 
discussed, the text of ADA section 501(b) and the legislative history behind it 
reveal it not as an express preemption clause but as a clause insulating from 
preemption any state laws offering better protections in some respect.  Second, 
Jankey‟s contention that section 55 is less protective rests entirely on his 
assumption that all that matters is what protection or benefit he ultimately obtained 
from invoking section 55 in this case.  This assumption is unfounded.  Congress 
contemplated that state laws would be protected from ADA preemption if in 
principle they afforded superior protections in some regard.  (See H.R.Rep. No. 
101-485(III), 2d Sess., p. 70 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. 
News, p. 493.)  As we have discussed, section 55 does so.  Clearly Jankey himself 
at the time of filing saw some benefit to adding a section 55 claim to his ADA 
claim or else he would have omitted it.  Having invoked section 55, he cannot now 
be heard to complain that it has brought him only a bill for attorney fees. 
 
D.  Hubbard and Conflict Preemption 
In a single paragraph, and without addressing the import of ADA section 
501(b), the Ninth Circuit reached a contrary conclusion.  (Hubbard v. SoBreck, 
LLC, supra, 554 F.3d at p. 745.)  Hubbard reasoned that where parallel state and 
federal claims are filed, such that the work in defending the two claims overlaps, a 
grant of fees on the state law claim “is necessarily a grant of fees as to the ADA 
claim.”  (Ibid.)  In such circumstances, if state law provides for fees where federal 
law does not, there is a conflict and the state law must yield.  (Ibid.; see PLIVA, 
Inc. v. Mensing (2011) 564 U.S. ___, ___ [131 S.Ct. 2567, 2577] [“Where state 
and federal law „directly conflict,‟ state law must give way.”]) 
We disagree with the Ninth Circuit‟s premise, that fees for defending a 
state law claim are necessarily fees for ADA work if the claims overlap.  Lee 
would have been entitled to the same fees whether or not Jankey pleaded an ADA 
 
 18 
claim; the pleading of an ADA claim was neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
cause of the fee award.  The fee award here is not in any meaningful sense for or 
on account of having to defend against an ADA claim, but instead a consequence 
of Jankey‟s purely voluntary decision to seek additional state remedies.  State law 
does not declare ADA fees compensable, only section 55 fees; it does not dictate 
an outcome at odds with federal law.15 
Gagliardo v. Connaught Laboratories, Inc. (3d Cir. 2002) 311 F.3d 565 
illustrates that an award made under a parallel and overlapping state claim is not 
perforce an award made under the ADA.  There, the plaintiff sued under both the 
ADA and a “virtually identical” state statute and obtained a $2.5 million judgment, 
undifferentiated as between the two claims.  (Id. at p. 570.)  The defendant argued 
on appeal that a federal statute capping damages under the ADA  necessarily 
limited the damages award.  (See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).)  Drawing on the 
reasoning of two title VII cases, Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer 
Products (9th Cir. 2000) 212 F.3d 493 and Martini v. Fed. Nat. Mortgage Assn. 
(D.C. Cir. 1999) 178 F.3d 1336, the Third Circuit disagreed.  It explained that a 
state can authorize liability and damages for the very same acts prohibited by the 
ADA without any such award constituting an award for ADA violations and 
violating the ADA ceiling.  (Gagliardo, at pp. 570-572.)  So it is here; an attorney 
fee award under state law for defending against a nearly identical state law claim 
does not automatically become an award under the ADA, even if the same work is 
                                              
15  
Jankey repeatedly describes section 55 as a law imposing fees “for” a 
nonfrivolous ADA action.  Such a law would be preempted; a state law that 
provided state court defendants with prevailing party fees for defending against 
federal ADA access claims under 42 United States Code section 12182 would, in 
fact, conflict with federal law.  But section 55 does no such thing. 
 
 19 
involved, and thus need not conflict with the ADA‟s limits on defense attorney 
fees. 
The Ninth Circuit‟s finding of conflict preemption implicitly rests on the 
view that Congress not only established the rule for awarding attorney fees 
incurred on account of defending an ADA claim, but also intended to immunize 
plaintiffs from paying for any of that same work, absent grounds for payment 
under the ADA, even when it was also necessary to defend against an overlapping 
state law claim.  From the text of the ADA we discern no such intent.  Similarly, 
nothing in the available committee reports discussing the ADA suggests Congress 
even considered the question.  Absent congressional intervention, California has 
every right to adopt whatever fee regime it deems appropriate upon invocation of 
state law remedies.  It may establish both the costs of and the potential payoffs for 
seeking a state remedy while leaving undisturbed the corresponding costs and 
payoffs that flow from invocation of a comparable federal remedy. 
Accordingly, we respectfully disagree with the Ninth Circuit‟s conclusion 
that conflict preemption forecloses an award of fees for a section 55 claim that 
overlaps with a nonfrivolous ADA claim. 
 
E.  Obstacle Preemption 
Jankey argues that application of section 55‟s fee-shifting provision is 
preempted because it stands as an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of 
Congress in limiting the recovery of fees for defending against ADA claims.  (See 
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council (2000) 530 U.S. 363, 372-373; Viva! 
Internat. Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., supra, 
41 Cal.4th at p. 936.)  Even if we set aside ADA section 501(b)‟s insulation of 
statutes like section 55 from obstacle preemption, we can identify no way in which 
the fee award here poses a barrier to congressional objectives. 
 
 20 
As Jankey correctly notes, the policy behind the ADA‟s fee standard is the 
policy behind the Christiansburg standard for a defendant‟s recovery of attorney 
fees.  The United States Supreme Court identified a pair of competing 
considerations underlying its selection of that standard.  On the one hand, 
Congress “wanted to protect defendants from burdensome litigation having no 
legal or factual basis.”  (Christiansburg, supra, 434 U.S. at p. 420; accord, Fox v. 
Vice (2011) 563 U.S. ___, ___, fn. 3 [131 S.Ct. 2205, 2215, fn. 3].)  On the other, 
“[t]o take the further step of assessing attorney‟s fees against plaintiffs simply 
because they do not finally prevail would substantially add to the risks inhering in 
most litigation and would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous 
enforcement of the provisions of [civil rights law].”  (Christiansburg, at p. 422.)  
Fee awards in cases other than those truly “unreasonable or without foundation 
. . . . could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a 
prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success.”  (Ibid.)  The differentiated 
approach to fee awards in civil rights cases, with prevailing plaintiffs recouping 
fees more readily than prevailing defendants, is necessary to “advance[] the 
congressional purpose to encourage suits by victims of discrimination while 
deterring frivolous litigation.”  (Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper (1980) 447 U.S. 
752, 762.) 
These policies are not implicated in cases where a plaintiff voluntarily 
invokes a state law remedy that overlaps with the ADA.  The heightened ADA 
standard for defense fee awards, requiring a showing of frivolousness, is intended 
to avoid chilling the assertion of ADA claims.  But because it is only the 
invocation of the state law remedy, and not the ADA, that triggers the award of 
fees in cases of overlap, it is only the state law remedy, and not the ADA, that 
stands to be chilled by the broader availability of defense fees.  Plaintiffs can 
always sue under the ADA alone, safe in the knowledge that even if they lose, 
 
 21 
defense fees will be available only in accordance with Christiansburg.  
Alternatively, they can add one or more state law remedies if they view the 
potential benefits as superior to the potential burdens.  If instead the risks appear 
to exceed the potential rewards, they can omit a given state law claim, at no loss to 
enforcement of their ADA rights.  (See Molski v. Arciero Wine Group, supra, 164 
Cal.App.4th at p. 792; Goodell v. Ralphs Grocery Co., supra, 207 F.Supp.2d at 
p. 1129.)  Such a regime is fully consistent with Congress‟s apparent willingness 
to allow plaintiffs to freely determine what remedies they pursue.  (See H.R.Rep. 
No. 101-485(III), 2d Sess., p. 70 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & 
Admin. News, p. 493; Wood v. County of Alameda, supra, 875 F.Supp. at pp. 663-
664.)  Congress‟s concern about not discouraging would-be plaintiffs from 
availing themselves of the ADA thus offers no reason to preclude states from 
establishing different fee award regimes for independently established state law 
remedies. 
These conclusions do not shift if, as Jankey urges, we focus solely on the 
application of section 55 in this case.  (See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade 
Council, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 373 [obstacle preemption turns on whether, “ „under 
the circumstances of [a] particular case, [the challenged state law] stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress,‟ ” quoting Hines v. Davidowitz (1941) 312 U.S. 52, 67].)  Nothing in 
the prospect of owing attorney fees under section 55 could have deterred Jankey 
from invoking his federal ADA rights here.  He asserted them, and the trial court 
concluded they had not been impaired, a conclusion Jankey has not challenged.  
Nor will the fee award chill Jankey or others from asserting ADA rights in the 
future.  It may inspire reluctance to invoke section 55 rights, but that is a matter 
for the Legislature to consider; it is no concern of Congress‟s, and it is no basis for 
finding preemption. 
 
 22 
IV.  Fees for Work Overlapping Defense of the ADA Claim Are Not 
Barred Under State Law 
Preemption aside, Jankey and amicus curiae the Impact Fund argue that 
state law should be read to foreclose fees for overlapping work done to defend 
against both ADA and section 55 claims.  The general rule is that where a non-fee-
shifting claim overlaps with a fee-shifting claim, it does not limit fee awards under 
the fee-shifting claim.  (Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 
129-130.)  An exception may arise where to award fees on the fee-shifting claim 
would impair legislative policies implicated by the respective claims.  (E.g., Mann 
v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 342-343 [“The 
issue of the proper amount of fees to be awarded when an attorney‟s time is 
attributable to recoverable and nonrecoverable claims depends on the legislative 
intent and policies underlying the specific fee-shifting scheme at issue.”]; Carver 
v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 498, 504-506; cf. Fox v. Vice, 
supra, 131 S.Ct. at p. 2215 [under federal law, limiting the amount of fees for 
overlapping work based on a determination that Congress so intended].)  But as 
discussed in connection with conflict preemption, we have found no indication in 
the ADA or its legislative history that Congress intended state fees for overlapping 
state claims to be foreclosed, nor, as discussed in connection with obstacle 
preemption, are we able to discern any policy that would be impaired.  Likewise, 
we have found nothing in the text or sparse legislative history of section 55 to 
indicate fee recovery should be limited as a matter of state law based on overlap 
with federal remedies.  Accordingly, we decline to read state law as limiting an 
award of section 55 fees on this basis.16 
                                              
16  
Jankey and amicus curiae the Impact Fund also argue that section 55 does 
not authorize fees for work overlapping with Unruh Civil Rights Act and section 
54.3 defense.  (See Turner v. Association of American Medical Colleges, supra, 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 23 
DISPOSITION 
The Court of Appeal‟s judgment is affirmed.  Lee seeks his costs and 
attorney fees on appeal.  As the prevailing party, he is entitled to costs and, under 
section 55, to appellate attorney fees as well.  (See Morcos v. Board of Retirement 
(1990) 51 Cal.3d 924, 927.)  On remand, the trial court is to fix the amounts. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
193 Cal.App.4th at p. 1054.)  Jankey did not raise the issue in the trial court, the 
Court of Appeal, or the petition for review.  Because the issue is thus waived, we 
do not consider it. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Jankey v. Lee 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 181 Cal.App.4th 1173 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S180890 
Date Filed: December 17, 2012 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Francisco 
Judge: Patrick J. Mahoney 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Thomas E. Frankovich; Law Offices of Lynn Hubbard and Scottlynn J. Hubbard IV for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants. 
 
Brag Seligman for the Impact Fund, Disability Rights Advocates, Disability Rights California, Disability 
Rights Education and Defense Fund, Disability Rights Legal Center, Lawyers‟ Committee for Civil Rights 
of the San Francisco Bay Area, Public Advocates, Public Counsel, Public Justice and the Western Center 
on Law and Poverty as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Law Offices of Charles S. Roseman, Charles S. Roseman, Richard D. Prager; LaFave & Rice, John J. Rice; 
Law Office of Gary L. Simms and Gary L. Simms for Rosa Miller, Manuel Miller, Ana Maya, Blanca 
Miller and Aida Masliah as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Horvitz & Levy, David M. Axelrad, Andrea M. Gauthier; Livingston Law Firm, Renée Welze Livingston 
and Jason G. Gong for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney, Danny Chou, Chief of Complex and Special Litigation, and James M. 
Emery, Deputy City Attorney, for League of California Cities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant 
and Respondent. 
 
Weintraub Genshlea Chediak, Lizbeth V. West, Charles L. Post and Brenda J. Begley for the California 
Hotel & Lodging Association, the Golden Gate Restaurant Association, the California Parks Company, the 
California Restaurant Association, the California Business Properties Association, Small Business 
California, the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, Building Owners and Managers Association of 
California, the California Building Industry Association, the National Federation of Independent Business 
Small Business Legal Center and the California Chamber of Commerce as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Scottlynn J. Hubbard IV 
Law Offices of Lynn Hubbard 
12 Williamsburg Lane 
Chico, CA  95926 
(530) 895-3252 
 
Brag Seligman 
Impact Fund 
125 University Avenue, Suite 102 
Berkeley, CA  94710 
(510) 845-3473 
 
David M. Axelrad 
Horvitz & Levy 
15760 Ventura Boulevard, 18th Floor 
Encino, CA  91436-3000 
(818) 995-0800