Case Title: J.L. v. Miller

Citation: 174 Vt. 288, 817 A.2d 1

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2002-10-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
J.L. v. Miller (2000-430); 174 Vt. 288; 817 A.2d 1

[Filed 18-Oct-2002]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                No. 2000-430


  J.L.	                                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 Washington Superior Court


  Sutherland Miller, et al.	                 January Term, 2002


  Mary Miles Teachout, J.

  John J. McCullough III, Vermont Legal Aid, Inc., Waterbury, for
    Plaintiff-Appellee J.L.

  O. Whitman Smith of Mickenberg, Dunn, Kochman, Lachs & Smith, PLC,
    Burlington, for Plaintiffs-Appellees R.B., S.H. and Vermont 
    Protection and Advocacy, Inc.

  Robert Appel, Defender General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee R.B.

  William Sorrell, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Jennifer L. Myka,
    Assistant Attorney General, and Sean Brown, Law Clerk (On the Brief), 
    Waterbury, for Defendants-Appellants.


  PRESENT:  Morse, J., and DiMauro, D.J., Allen, C.J. (Ret.) and 
            Gibson J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

        
       MORSE, J.   Defendants Sutherland Miller, Commissioner, Vermont
  Department of Developmental and Mental Health Services; Rodney Copeland,
  Superintendent, Vermont State Hospital; Brij Sarran, Staff Psychiatrist,
  Vermont State Hospital; Nancy Belle Collett, Staff Psychiatrist, Vermont
  State Hospital; and Rafael E. Garcia, Staff Psychiatrist, Vermont State
  Hospital, appeal the denial of a motion for relief from judgment under
  V.R.C.P. 60(b)(5).  

 

  Defendants had asked the superior court to vacate the "J. L. Consent
  Decree," entered into in May 1985, because in 1998 the Legislature adopted
  legislation expressly stating that "the J. L. v. Miller consent judgment
  [is] no longer applicable."  1997, No. 114 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 (codified as
  18 V.S.A. § 7629(d)).  We hold that the legislative enactment of Act 114
  supercedes the J.L. Consent Decree by operation of law, compelling us to
  reverse the trial court's ruling and grant the motion for relief from
  judgment.

       The underlying case dates back to May 28, 1985, when the Washington
  Superior Court approved a consent decree entered into by J.L. and the
  Vermont Department of Developmental and Mental Health Services.  The decree
  was intended to provide both procedural and substantive protections to
  members of a class of individuals who had been committed to the Vermont
  State Hospital at Waterbury and were facing involuntary, non-emergency
  medication.  The rules established by that decree have effectively
  withstood continued challenges and provided the controlling regulations for
  involuntary mental health treatment since its entry in 1985.  See, e.g., 
  J.L. v. Miller, 158 Vt. 601, 614 A.2d 808 (1992) ("J.L. I").
   
       Both expressly and in substance, Act 114 replaced the decree.  The
  Legislature's primary purpose in passing Act 114 was to provide a judicial
  process through which "the right of a legally competent person to determine
  whether or not to accept medical treatment" would be protected.  18 V.S.A.
  § 7629(a).  However, while Act 114 provides a new and different set of
  procedures for the treatment of individuals facing involuntary medication,
  it also has some substantial similarities to the J.L. Consent Decree.  For
  instance, both Act 114 and the J.L. Consent Decree provide for the patient
  to receive representation, as well as an independent psychiatric
  evaluation, 18 V.S.A. § 7625(a); J.L. v. Miller, No. 5-418-84-WnC, at 8
  (Vt. Sup. Ct. Washington County, May 28, 1985) 

 

  ("J. L. Consent Decree"), and each requires a demonstration of proof by
  clear and convincing evidence in their respective hearings.  18 V.S.A. §
  7625(b); J. L. Consent Decree, at 8.

       It is in those hearings that the differences are found.  While the
  Consent Decree provided that a hearing prior to any involuntary
  nonemergency medication occur in front of an officer appointed by agreement
  between the Human Services Board and the Commissioner of Developmental and
  Mental Health Services, J. L. Consent Decree, at 7,  Act 114 requires a
  comparable hearing to take place in family court, after the filing of a
  petition by the same commissioner.  18 V.S.A. § 7625(a).  That petition
  requires certification by a treating physician which describes the person's
  mental illness, the necessity of involuntary medication, a list of proposed
  medications, a statement of risks and benefits, the person's prognosis with
  and without medication, the current state of the person's health, the
  current relevant facts concerning the individual, what alternate treatments
  were proposed and why they were ruled out, and whether the person has
  executed a durable power of attorney for health care.  Id. §
  7624(c)(1)-(7). 
   
       Under the J.L. Consent Decree, an application for a hearing must
  include the original request to pursue involuntary treatment, the approval
  and recommendation of the Medical Director of the Vermont State Hospital,
  and the facts relied on in the assertion of incompetence.  J. L. Consent
  Decree, at 9.  Included in the last consideration must be: the nature of
  the mental illness, the effect of the mental illness on the ability to
  assimilate information, the information provided to the patient prior to
  refusal, an assessment of specific areas in which the patient may lack the
  capacity to make or communicate informed decisions, the individualized
  treatment plan, the reasons for refusal, a description of alternative
  remedies and the likelihood of success, a description of any past side

 

  effects experienced by the patient from the proposed treatment, and a
  statement of any potential benefits and risks to the patient if treatment
  proceeds. Id.

       At the hearing, if the presiding officer finds that the patient is
  incompetent, the officer's decision on whether to administer medication is
  based upon a "substituted judgment" standard. Id. at 10.  That standard
  requires the officer to consider whether a patient would voluntarily
  consent to medication if competent, and relies on previously expressed
  preferences, religious convictions, the impact of the decision on the
  patient, other patients and staff, the patient's family, and the possible
  risks and benefits of treatment in making that determination.  Id.  In
  contrast, Act 114 requires that a different standard be applied.  Under the
  statute, upon a finding of incompetence, the family court is required to
  determine whether involuntary medication is supported by the factors
  enumerated in § 7627(c).  18 V.S.A. § 7627(e).  Those factors are similar
  to those considered under the J. L. Consent Decree, and mentioned above.

       However great we may believe the differences are between the J.L.
  Consent Decree and Act 114, the most significant connection between the two
  is enunciated in 18 V.S.A. § 7629(d).  In that provision, the Legislature
  recorded its specific intention to "render the J. L. v. Miller consent
  judgment no longer applicable."  Id.
   
       When defendants' motion was first filed, many members of the original
  class did not oppose it.  However, certain individual intervenors and a
  subclass represented by plaintiff-appellees S.H. and R.B. contested the
  motion, seeking continued application of the terms of the original decree. 
  They were joined shortly thereafter by another plaintiff, R.B., on behalf
  of a subclass of prison inmates subject to involuntary medication.  After
  granting the motions to intervene and certifying the subclasses, the
  superior court heard arguments from all parties.  Following the court's
  denial of 

 

  their motion for relief from judgment and after an unsuccessful motion for
  reconsideration, defendants appeal.

       The parties maintain that the question before the Court is whether the
  superior court erred in applying the standard established by the United
  States Supreme Court in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,