Case Title: In re Application of Jones

Citation: 2018-Ohio-4182

Docket Number: 2018-0496

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2018-10-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re Application of Jones, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-4182.] 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-4182 
IN RE APPLICATION OF JONES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as In re Application of Jones, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-4182.] 
Attorneys—Character and fitness—Prof.Cond.R. 5.5—A lawyer admitted to 
practice law in another jurisdiction who provides legal services exclusively 
in that jurisdiction from Ohio pending resolution of an application for 
admission to Ohio bar without examination and who otherwise complies 
with Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(c) is providing legal services on temporary basis and 
therefore has not engaged in unauthorized practice of law—Application for 
admission without examination approved. 
(No. 2018-0496—Submitted July 17, 2018—Decided October 17, 2018.) 
ON REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Character and Fitness of the 
Supreme Court, No. 668. 
____________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A lawyer admitted to practice law in another jurisdiction who provides legal 
services exclusively in that jurisdiction from an office in Ohio pending 
resolution of an application for admission to the Ohio bar without 
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examination and who otherwise complies with the provisions of 
Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(c) is providing legal services on a temporary basis and 
therefore has not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 
____________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} Alice Auclair Jones is licensed to practice law in Kentucky and 
applied for admission to the practice of law in Ohio without examination.  The 
Board of Commissioners on Character and Fitness found that after Jones filed her 
application, she engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by practicing Kentucky 
law from an Ohio office and failed to prove she has the requisite character, fitness, 
and moral qualifications to practice law in Ohio; therefore, it recommends that we 
disapprove her application.  Jones objects to the findings and the recommendation. 
{¶ 2} The issues presented are whether Jones violated Prof.Cond.R. 
5.5(c), which permits a lawyer to “provide legal services on a temporary basis in 
this jurisdiction” under certain circumstances, and whether this court should 
approve her application.  We conclude that a lawyer admitted to practice law in 
another jurisdiction who provides legal services exclusively in that jurisdiction 
from an office in Ohio pending resolution of an application for admission to the 
Ohio bar without examination and who otherwise complies with the provisions of 
Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(c) is providing legal services on a temporary basis and therefore 
has not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.  Because Jones complied with 
the rule, we conclude she did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law and 
has the requisite character, fitness, and moral qualifications to practice law in Ohio, 
and we approve her application pursuant to Gov.Bar R. I(9)(F)(1). 
Background 
{¶ 3} Jones graduated from George Mason University School of Law, was 
admitted to practice law in Kentucky in 2009, and is a member in good standing of 
the Kentucky bar.  She initially practiced as an assistant commonwealth attorney in 
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3 
 
Jefferson County, Kentucky, and in 2014, took a position with Huddleston Bolen, 
L.L.P., a law firm in Louisville, Kentucky, that subsequently merged with 
Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P. 
{¶ 4} On October 26, 2015, Jones applied for admission to the Ohio bar 
without examination pursuant to Gov.Bar R. I(9).  In November 2015, she moved 
to Cincinnati, Ohio, for personal reasons and transferred to the Cincinnati office of 
Dinsmore & Shohl, where she practiced law exclusively in matters related to 
pending or potential proceedings before tribunals in Kentucky.  She also maintained 
an office at the firm’s Louisville location and frequently went to Kentucky for 
depositions and hearings. 
{¶ 5} The admissions committee of the Cincinnati Bar Association 
recommended approval of her character, fitness, and moral qualifications to 
practice law.  However, due to a concern that Jones was engaging in the 
unauthorized practice of law, the Board of Commissioners on Character and Fitness 
invoked its sua sponte investigatory authority conferred by Gov.Bar R. 
I(10)(B)(2)(e) and appointed a panel to conduct a hearing on the matter. 
{¶ 6} At the hearing, Jones argued that Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(d)(2) permitted 
her to establish an office in Ohio if she provided legal services she was authorized 
to provide by Ohio law and that Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(c) authorized her to provide legal 
services in Ohio on a temporary basis.  Jones testified that in her view, the services 
she is providing from Ohio during the pendency of her application are temporary 
because if she is not admitted, she will have to “find a place to practice in the state 
of Kentucky,” and if she is admitted, she will “integrate into the Cincinnati, Ohio, 
office” and her “practice will change.” 
{¶ 7} The panel found Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(c) did not apply because it “does 
not appear that Ms. Jones meets the requirement that she regularly be practicing 
law in Kentucky since by her own testimony she has lived and worked in Ohio since 
2015” and the panel did “not believe that her practice of law has been temporary as 
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contemplated by” that  rule.  Thus, the panel found she was currently engaged in 
the unauthorized practice of law in Ohio.  Although Jones “otherwise [had] no 
issues that would affect her character and fitness,” the panel was “disturbed” by the 
ongoing nature of her conduct and recommended that the board hold the matter in 
abeyance and give Jones 30 days to cease the practice of law in Ohio and provide 
an affidavit representing that she is engaging only in services that could be rendered 
by a law clerk or paralegal. 
{¶ 8} The board found Jones was currently engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law and followed the panel’s recommendation, but Jones did not cease 
her practice in Ohio and instead moved for reconsideration and filed an affidavit 
indicating she would continue to practice in Ohio during the pendency of her 
application. 
{¶ 9} The panel recommended the board deny the motion for 
reconsideration, again rejecting the claim that Jones’s services were temporary for 
purposes of Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(c).  It explained that the term “temporary” should be 
contrasted with “the earlier reference in the rule to establishing an office or a 
systematic and continuous presence.  If a lawyer has established an office and a 
continuous and systematic presence, then it can reasonably be concluded that the 
services being rendered by the lawyer are not temporary.”  To support this 
interpretation, the panel relied on Gov.Bar R. I(9)(H) and a proposal of the 
American Bar Association for a model rule on practice pending admission.  It found 
that Jones “has maintained an office and a continuous and systematic presence in 
Ohio and has been practicing law,” was engaged in the unauthorized practice of 
law, and had “failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she possesses 
the character, fitness, and moral qualifications for admission to the practice of law 
in Ohio.” 
{¶ 10} The board adopted the panel’s report and recommends that we 
disapprove Jones’s application for admission without examination. 
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5 
 
Objections to Board Recommendation 
{¶ 11} Jones has filed objections to the board’s findings and 
recommendation.  She asserts the term “temporary” “is readily and correctly 
understood as the opposite of ‘permanent’ ” and she complied with Prof.Cond.R. 
5.5(c)(2), which she claims permits a lawyer to “provide legal services in Ohio 
during the temporary period in which the lawyer’s application to be admitted by 
reciprocity to the Ohio Bar is pending” if the lawyer satisfies the other requirements 
of the rule.  She maintains the panel’s emphasis on her establishing an office or 
other systematic and continuous presence in Ohio is misplaced because 
Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(c)(2) permits such conduct for a temporary period and that 
alternatively, her practice “cannot reasonably be interpreted as a ‘systematic and 
continuous’ Ohio presence.”  In addition, Jones asserts that “a resolution against 
her * * * clashes with” the Due Process Clause and the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the United States Constitution. 
{¶ 12} The Cincinnati Bar Association supports her position. 
Issue 
{¶ 13} The issue presented is whether Jones provided legal services on a 
“temporary basis” in Ohio for purposes of Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(c). 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 14} Gov.Bar R. I(11)(D)(1) specifies that an applicant for admission to 
the Ohio bar must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she “possesses 
the requisite character, fitness, and moral qualifications for admission to the 
practice of law.”  And the “[c]ommission of an act constituting the unauthorized 
practice of law” is one factor to be considered in evaluating an applicant’s 
character, fitness, and moral qualifications.  Gov.Bar R. I(11)(D)(3)(c). 
{¶ 15} Gov.Bar R. I(9)(H) generally prohibits applicants for admission 
without examination from engaging “in the practice of law in Ohio prior to the 
presentation of the applicant to the Court pursuant to division (G) of this section.”  
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However, Gov.Bar R. VII(2)(A)(1)(f) specifically excepts from the definition of 
the unauthorized practice of law “[r]endering legal services in accordance with Rule 
5.5 of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct.” 
{¶ 16} Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(b)(1) prohibits “[a] lawyer who is not admitted to 
practice in this jurisdiction” from establishing “an office or other systematic and 
continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law,” “except as 
authorized by these rules or other law.”  Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(d)(2) provides that “[a] 
lawyer admitted and in good standing in another United States jurisdiction may 
provide legal services in this jurisdiction through an office or other systematic and 
continuous presence” if “the lawyer is providing services that the lawyer is 
authorized to provide by * * * Ohio law.” 
{¶ 17} Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(c)(2) authorizes a lawyer to “provide legal 
services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction” if (1) the lawyer “is admitted in 
another United States jurisdiction,” (2) the lawyer “is in good standing in the 
jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted,” (3) the lawyer “regularly practices 
law,” (4) “the services are reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding 
before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction,” and (5) “the lawyer, or a person 
the lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding 
or reasonably expects to be so authorized.”  (Italics sic.) 
{¶ 18} “Temporary” means “[l]asting for a time only; existing or 
continuing for a limited (usu. short) time; transitory.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1693 
(10th Ed.2014); accord Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2353 
(2002). 
{¶ 19} Comment 6 to Prof.Cond.R. 5.5 notes: 
 
There is no single test to determine whether a lawyer’s 
services are provided on a “temporary basis” in this jurisdiction, and 
may therefore be permissible under division (c).  Services may be 
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7 
 
“temporary” even though the lawyer provides services in this 
jurisdiction on a recurring basis, or for an extended period of time, 
as when the lawyer is representing a client in a single lengthy 
negotiation or litigation. 
 
(Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 20} A lawyer who applies for admission without examination to the 
Ohio bar in accordance with Gov.Bar R. I(9) and thereafter provides legal services 
from Ohio in the jurisdiction where that applicant is already admitted to practice 
law pending the resolution of that application is providing services on a temporary 
basis because those services are transitory and will continue only until the 
application is resolved. 
{¶ 21} Here, the record establishes that Jones satisfied the requirements of 
Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(c)(2).  She is a lawyer who is admitted in Kentucky, is in good 
standing in that jurisdiction, regularly practices law, and is providing legal services 
from an office in Ohio, and those services are reasonably related to pending or 
potential proceedings before tribunals in Kentucky, where she is authorized by law 
to appear in such proceedings.  Although Jones began practicing Kentucky law 
from Ohio more than two years ago, after she had applied for admission prior to 
moving to Ohio, her practice from Ohio pending her application is on a temporary 
basis because the continuation of her practice depends on the resolution of her 
application. 
{¶ 22} This case stands in contrast to In re Egan, 151 Ohio St.3d 525, 2017-
Ohio-8651, 90 N.E.3d 912, in which Shannon O’Connell Egan, an attorney 
admitted to the Kentucky bar, established offices in Cincinnati, Ohio, from which 
she practiced Kentucky law for more than ten years.  Although this court concluded 
she “engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in this state for an extended period 
of time,” id. at ¶ 12, Egan practiced in Ohio for six years before filing the first of 
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two applications for admission to the Ohio bar without examination and she 
admitted that her practice was not temporary for purposes of Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(c). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 23} A lawyer who resides in Ohio and who practices only the law of an 
out of state jurisdiction from an office in Ohio and appears only before tribunals in 
a foreign jurisdiction pending the resolution of an application for admission without 
examination to the Ohio bar is providing services on a temporary basis for purposes 
of Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(c).  Because Jones satisfied the requirements of Prof.Cond.R. 
5.5(c)(2) by practicing Kentucky law from an office in Ohio pending the resolution 
of her application, she has not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and 
therefore she does possess the requisite character, fitness, and moral qualifications 
to practice law in this state.  Accordingly, we conclude that Jones did not engage in 
the unauthorized practice of law.  We approve her application for admission without 
examination. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, and FISCHER, JJ., concur. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY 
and DEGENARO, JJ. 
__________________ 
DEWINE, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 24} Does an out-of-state attorney who practices law exclusively in the 
courts of the state where she is licensed engage in the unauthorized practice of law 
because she happens to work out of an office in Ohio?  Prof.Cond.R. 5.5, a rule 
promulgated by this court, seems to say that the answer is yes.  But in my view, the 
rule—as applied in the situation before us and others like it—runs afoul of 
constitutional guarantees. 
{¶ 25} The majority reaches the correct result in approving Alice Auclair 
Jones’s application for admission without examination.  Majority opinion at ¶ 23.  
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It does so by concluding that the Board of Commissioners on Character and Fitness 
misread the rule.  Id. at ¶ 20.  But as I see it, the problem is not that the board 
misread the rule; I’m convinced that the board’s reading is correct.  The problem is 
that as applied here, the rule is irrational and arbitrary and cannot constitutionally 
be enforced.  I therefore concur in the court’s judgment approving Jones’s 
application, but I do so because I find the rule to be unconstitutional when applied 
to Jones and others like her. 
I.  The majority incorrectly reads the unauthorized-practice-of-law 
provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
{¶ 26} The Ohio Constitution grants this court original jurisdiction over the 
“[a]dmission to the practice of law, the discipline of persons so admitted, and all 
other matters relating to the practice of law.”  Article IV, Section 2(B)(1)(g), Ohio 
Constitution.  Pursuant to that authority, we have promulgated sets of rules and 
established boards to oversee the implementation of those rules on our behalf.  This 
case involves the construction of one such set of rules—the Rules of Professional 
Conduct—and a recommendation from one of our boards—the Board of 
Commissioners on Character and Fitness. 
{¶ 27} It is undisputed that Jones practiced law exclusively in matters 
related to pending or potential proceedings before tribunals in Kentucky.  She did 
not hold herself out to be an Ohio attorney.  She did not practice in Ohio courts.  
And she did not advertise for business in Ohio.  In short, she conducted her practice 
like any other Kentucky attorney, but she happened to be working out of an office 
located in Ohio while doing so.  We might say—as we do of many employees in 
today’s world—that she was working remotely. 
{¶ 28} Confronted with these facts, the board concluded that Jones had 
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(b).  
Under the rule, unless authorized by the professional-conduct rules or other law, a 
lawyer who is not admitted to practice in Ohio “shall not * * * establish an office 
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or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of 
law.”  Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(b)(1). 
{¶ 29} Jones conceded that she had established an office and a continuous 
physical presence in Ohio, but she maintained that her practice was authorized 
because she was providing services on a “temporary basis” as authorized by 
Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(c), which states:   
 
A lawyer who is admitted in another United States 
jurisdiction, is in good standing in the jurisdiction in which the 
lawyer is admitted, and regularly practices law may provide legal 
services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction if * * *: 
* * * 
(2) the services are reasonably related to a pending or 
potential proceeding before a tribunal in * * * another jurisdiction, 
if the lawyer * * * is authorized by law or order to appear in such 
proceeding * * *. 
 
(Italics sic.)  The board rejected Jones’s argument, finding that her practice was not 
temporary.  As a consequence, it recommended that her application for admission 
without examination be denied. 
{¶ 30} The majority determines that Jones falls within the Prof.Cond.R. 
5.5(c)(2) exception because she was providing services on a temporary basis in 
Ohio.  Majority opinion at ¶ 21.  But as much as the majority strains to find 
otherwise, the provision does not apply.  The provision does not define 
“temporary,” but its meaning becomes clear when read in the context of the entire 
rule.  Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(b) begins with language of exclusion, stating that a lawyer 
not admitted to practice in Ohio may not “establish an office or other systematic 
and continuous presence in the jurisdiction for the practice of law.”  Prof.Cond.R. 
January Term, 2018 
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5.5(b)(1).  It then sets up two categories of exceptions: subsection (c) applies to 
attorneys whose out-of-state practice requires them to come into Ohio to perform 
work on their cases on a temporary basis, and subsection (d) prescribes when an 
out-of-state lawyer can practice in Ohio “through an office or other systematic and 
continuous presence.”1  Thus, practicing on a “temporary basis” in subsection (c) 
is juxtaposed with practicing “through an office” in subsection (d).  It is clear, then, 
that an attorney who sets up an office in Ohio is not providing services on a 
“temporary basis” within the meaning of the rule. 
{¶ 31} The comments to the rule support this reading.  Regarding 
subsection (c), the comments explain that the provision “does not authorize a 
lawyer to establish an office * * * in this jurisdiction without being admitted to 
practice generally here.”  Prof.Cond.R. 5.5, Comment 5.  Similarly, “a lawyer who 
is admitted to practice law in another jurisdiction and who establishes an office * * 
* in this jurisdiction must become admitted to practice law generally in this 
jurisdiction,” except as permitted in subsection (d).  Prof.Cond.R. 5.5, Comment 
15. 
{¶ 32} Because she established an office in Ohio, Jones’s practice was not 
temporary within the meaning of Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(c).  Thus, her arrangement was 
not authorized by our rules.  The question remains, however, whether disapproving 
Jones’s application under these circumstances would violate her constitutional 
rights. 
II.  This case presents issues under the federal and state Constitutions 
{¶ 33} In addition to her argument regarding the construction of 
Prof.Cond.R. 5.5, Jones asserts that disapproval of her application would violate 
                                                 
1 The services that may be provided “through an office or other systematic and continuous presence” 
without admission to the Ohio bar are limited to services provided to an employer or its 
organizational affiliates for which a tribunal’s permission to appear pro hac vice is not required, 
services that the lawyer is authorized to provide by federal or Ohio law, and certain pro bono 
services.  Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(d). 
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the Due Process and Privileges or Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 of the United States Constitution. 
{¶ 34} Missing from Jones’s argument is any claimed violation of the Ohio 
Constitution.  Ordinarily, we will not consider a constitutional claim that has not 
been raised.  But this case presents a circumstance that is different from the usual.  
Here, we are confronted not with a challenge to a legislative enactment, as is 
typically the case, but with a challenge to rules promulgated by this court under the 
authority granted to us by the Ohio Constitution.  “This court may no more 
disregard or infringe upon the constitutional rights of our citizens in the exercise of 
its regulatory functions than may any other branch of government.”  Shimko v. 
Lobe, 103 Ohio St.3d 59, 2004-Ohio-4202, 813 N.E.2d 669, ¶ 27.  Because it is our 
own rule that is at issue, we are obligated in the first instance to ensure that the rule 
comports with constitutional guarantees.  Thus, in addition to the federal 
constitutional claims raised by Jones, I consider whether our rule as applied to Jones 
comports with the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 35} In reviewing the constitutionality of our rules, we use the same 
standards applied to any other constitutional challenge.  Our rules “must comply 
with the state and federal constitutions like any other rules and may be tested in any 
court of competent jurisdiction.”  Christensen v. Bd. of Commrs. on Grievances & 
Discipline, 61 Ohio St.3d 534, 537, 575 N.E.2d 790 (1991). 
A. The Ohio and federal Constitutions protect one’s right to pursue a chosen 
profession free from arbitrary and unreasonable governmental restraints 
{¶ 36} The Ohio Constitution recognizes that all people possess “certain 
inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and 
liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and seeking and obtaining 
happiness and safety.”  Article I, Section 1, Ohio Constitution.  This concept dates 
back to the founding days of our state.  While the language was introduced in its 
January Term, 2018 
13 
 
current form in 1851 with the enactment of our modern constitution, Ohio’s first 
constitution contained substantially similar language:  “[A]ll men are born equally 
free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and unalienable rights; 
amongst which are the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, 
possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and 
safety * * *.”  Article VIII, Section 1, Ohio Constitution of 1802. 
{¶ 37} This court has long held that the liberty and property rights 
guaranteed by Article I, Section 1 encompass a right to pursue one’s chosen 
profession:    
 
The word “liberty,” as used in the first section of the Bill of 
Rights, does not mean a mere freedom from physical restraint or 
state of slavery, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to be free 
in the enjoyment of the faculties with which he has been endowed 
by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for 
the common welfare. 
 
Palmer v. Tingle, 55 Ohio St. 423, 441, 45 N.E. 313 (1896).  Thus, we have 
affirmed that “[t]he right to labor, to contract, to do business or to engage in any of 
the common occupations of life is one of the inalienable rights of the citizen.”  
Sanning v. Cincinnati, 81 Ohio St. 142, 156, 90 N.E. 125 (1909); see also 
Cincinnati v. Correll, 141 Ohio St. 535, 49 N.E.2d 412 (1943); Frecker v. Dayton, 
153 Ohio St. 14, 90 N.E.2d 851 (1950). 
{¶ 38} Historically, we have understood that “[t]he rights guaranteed by 
Article I of the Constitution are not unrestricted rights but are subject to limitation 
or abrogation to such extent as may be necessary to promote the health, safety, 
morals or general welfare of society as a whole.”  Correll at 538.  Thus, we have 
held that a statute proscribing fortune-telling was not “an unreasonable, arbitrary, 
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and oppressive exercise of the police power,” Davis v. State, 118 Ohio St. 25, 28, 
160 N.E. 473 (1928), because “fortune-telling and similar crafts are fraudulent 
practices, and therefore not within the protection afforded to a lawful business,” id. 
at 31.  On the other hand, we have determined that a municipal regulation limiting 
the hours during which one could operate a barber shop was an impermissible 
exercise of the police power because “[w]hether the patrons of a barber shop get a 
hair cut, shave, shine, or any other service rendered in a barber shop between the 
hours of 8:00 o’clock a.m. and 8:00 o’clock p.m. or at some other time of the day 
or night * * * can have no possible relation to the safety, morals or general welfare 
of the public.”  Correll at 540-541. 
{¶ 39} Most recently, we have stated the test for “reviewing legislation that 
impacts the rights guaranteed by Section 1, Article I” as follows: “[T]he legislation 
will be upheld if it bears a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare, and if the legislation is not arbitrary or unreasonable.”  
State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 524, 728 N.E.2d 342 (2000), citing Benjamin 
v. Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 110, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957).  The same standards 
apply to rules promulgated by this court.  See Christensen, 61 Ohio St.3d 534, 575 
N.E.2d 790. 
{¶ 40} The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution also has 
been held to protect the right of an individual to pursue and continue in a chosen 
occupation free from unreasonable government interference.  Dent v. West 
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121-122, 9 S.Ct. 231, 32 L.Ed. 623 (1889); Allgeyer v. 
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589, 17 S.Ct. 427, 41 L.Ed. 832 (1897); Truax v. Raich, 
239 U.S. 33, 38-41, 36 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 131 (1915).  The state may set standards 
and regulate professions with the aim of protecting the public from “the 
consequences of ignorance and incapacity, as well as of deception and fraud.”  Dent 
at 122.  But the state “cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any 
other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or 
January Term, 2018 
15 
 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Schware v. New Mexico 
Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-239, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1957), 
citing Dent.  Rational-basis review applies to such claims.  As the court explained 
in Schware, professional qualifications imposed by the state on the practice of law 
“must have a rational connection with the applicant’s fitness or capacity to practice 
law.”  Id. at 239. 
B. Ohio does not have any legitimate government interest in regulating an 
attorney who does not practice in Ohio courts or provide Ohio legal services 
{¶ 41} Under both the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution, the constitutional 
question here turns on identifying Ohio’s interest in prohibiting Jones from 
representing her Kentucky clients while working in a Cincinnati office.  The short 
answer is that there is none. 
{¶ 42} Two state interests generally have been identified as supporting 
attorney-regulation schemes.  First, a state’s interest in regulating attorneys arises 
from the role that lawyers serve in administering justice through the state’s court 
system.  As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “[the] interest of the 
States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the 
primary governmental function of administering justice, and have historically been 
‘officers of the courts.’ ”  Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792, 95 
S.Ct. 2004, 44 L.Ed.2d 572 (1975). 
{¶ 43} The other state interest in regulating attorneys is the protection of 
the public.  Our unauthorized-practice-of-law regulations flow from the notion that 
such rules are “generally necessary to protect the public against incompetence, 
divided loyalties, and other attendant evils that are often associated with unskilled 
representation.”  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. CompManagement, Inc., 104 Ohio St.3d 
168, 2004-Ohio-6506, 818 N.E.2d 1181, ¶ 40; see also Middlesex Cty. Ethics 
Commt. v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U.S. 423, 434-435, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 
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L.Ed.2d 116 (1982).  That sentiment is reiterated in the Ohio Rules of Professional 
Conduct; “limiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public 
against rendition of legal services by unqualified persons,” Prof.Cond.R. 5.5, 
Comment 2.  Likewise, the provisions of Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(c) are meant to protect 
“the interests of clients and the public.”  Prof.Cond.R. 5.5, Comment 8. 
{¶ 44} But when applied to a lawyer who is not practicing Ohio law or 
appearing in Ohio courts, Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(b) serves no state interest.  Plainly, as 
applied to such a lawyer, the rule does not further the state’s interest in protecting 
the integrity of our court system.  Jones, and others like her, are not practicing in 
Ohio courts.  Nor does application of the rule to such lawyers serve the state’s 
interest in protecting the Ohio public.  Jones and others in her situation are not 
providing services to or holding themselves out as lawyers to the Ohio public.  
Jones’s conduct as a lawyer is regulated by the state of Kentucky—the state in 
whose forums she appears. 
{¶ 45} The problem is that unless a specific exception applies, 
Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(b)(1) holds one to be engaged in the “unauthorized practice of 
law” and subject to legal sanction therefor simply because one has established an 
office or a systematic and continuous presence in the state.  The rule deems such a 
lawyer to have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law regardless of whether 
her practice touches on the Ohio public or Ohio courts.  In an earlier age, perhaps 
such a rule made sense.  Before the advent of the Internet, electronic 
communication, and the like, a lawyer who worked in Ohio was almost always 
practicing Ohio law.  But today that is hardly the case.  Any number of lawyers, for 
any number of reasons, may choose to do their work from Ohio.  Yet that does not 
give Ohio a right to prohibit their conduct. 
{¶ 46} Indeed, imagine what would happen if the rule were strictly 
enforced.  Are we to ban lawyers from setting up a secondary office inside their 
homes so that they can access their files remotely simply because their homes 
January Term, 2018 
17 
 
happen to be in Ohio and their practices in another state?  What about a New York 
attorney who maintains an Ohio vacation home on Lake Erie and is there for several 
months of the year?  Certainly such an attorney has a continuous and systematic 
presence in Ohio, but are we really going to say that she has engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law because she does New York legal work at her vacation 
home? 
{¶ 47} I would conclude that as applied to an out-of-state attorney who is 
not practicing in Ohio courts or providing Ohio legal services, Prof.Cond.R. 
5.5(b)(1) violates Article I, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution and the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.2  As applied 
to such an attorney, the rule violates Article I, Section 1 both because it does not 
“bear[] a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare” and because it is “arbitrary” and “unreasonable,” Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 
at 524, 728 N.E.2d 342.  Similarly, applying the rule to such an attorney violates 
the Fourteenth Amendment because it does not bear a rational relationship to any 
discernable state interest.  See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728, 117 
S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 
348 U.S. 483, 491, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955). 
III.  Jones’s application should be granted 
{¶ 48} The board recommended denial of Jones’s application for the sole 
reason that she had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of 
Gov.Bar R. VII(2)(A).  Because I find the rule relied upon by the board to be 
unconstitutional when applied to Jones and others who are similarly situated, and 
                                                 
2 Because of my conclusion that the rule as applied to Jones violates Article I, Section 1 of the Ohio 
Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is not necessary to 
consider her arguments that it also violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
Section 2 of the United States Constitution and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
because there was no other basis for the board’s recommendation, I concur in the 
court’s judgment approving Jones’s application. 
KENNEDY and DEGENARO, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_______________ 
 
Bieser, Greer & Landis, L.L.P., and David C. Greer, for applicant. 
 
Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., Brian G. Dershaw, and Justin D. Flamm, 
for the Cincinnati Bar Association. 
 
Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., Brian S. Sullivan, Mark A. Vander Laan, and 
Heidi W. Dorn, for amicus curiae Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., in support of 
applicant. 
 
Frost Brown Todd, L.L.C., and Matthew C. Blickensderfer, in support of 
none of the parties for amicus curiae Frost Brown Todd, L.L.C. 
 
Thompson Hine, L.L.P., Thomas L. Feher, Frank R. DeSantis, and Karen 
E. Rubin, in support of none of the parties for amicus curiae Thompson Hine, L.L.P. 
 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., and Randolph C. Wiseman, in support of none of 
the parties for amicus curiae Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P. 
 
Squire Patton Boggs, L.L.P., and Pierre H. Bergeron, in support of none of 
the parties for amicus curiae Squire Patton Boggs, L.L.P. 
 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., Robert W. Trafford, and Charles 
C. Warner, in support of none of the parties for amicus curiae Porter, Wright, 
Morris & Arthur, L.L.P. 
 
Keating, Muething & Klekamp, P.L.L., and James R. Matthews, in support 
of none of the parties for amicus curiae Keating, Muething & Klekamp, P.L.L. 
__________________