Case Title: Los Angeles Dep't of Children & Family Servs.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S187587

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2012-07-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 7/5/12 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
In re ETHAN C. et al., Persons Coming 
) 
Under the Juvenile Court Law. 
) 
____________________________________) 
 
) 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY 
) 
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 
) 
AND FAMILY SERVICES, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S187587 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/1 B219894 
WILLIAM C., 
) 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CK-78508 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Under certain circumstances, found by a preponderance of evidence, and 
indicating that a minor child is bereft of care or support by a parent or guardian, or 
has suffered or risks actual or threatened serious injury, illness, emotional damage, 
or sexual abuse because of a custodial parent‟s or guardian‟s inadequacy, neglect, 
or mistreatment, the child may be adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court.  
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300.)1  A dependency adjudication is a preliminary step 
that allows the juvenile court, within specified limits, to assert supervision over the 
endangered child‟s care.  But it is merely a first step, and the system includes 
                                              
1  
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 
Code. 
 
2 
many subsequent safeguards to ensure that parental rights and authority will be 
restricted only to the extent necessary for the child‟s safety and welfare. 
Thus, unless a custodial parent or guardian has abandoned or voluntarily 
relinquished the child, the court may not remove a dependent child from the 
parent‟s or guardian‟s physical custody unless it finds, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that such action is necessary to protect the child from serious harm.  
(§ 361, subd. (c).)  Even if removal is ordered, the court must provide social 
services, including family reunification services, designed to facilitate the parent‟s 
or guardian‟s resumption of full custody and control, unless the court finds 
specified circumstances by clear and convincing evidence.  (§ 361.5.)  Only if the 
court permissibly denies reunification services, or such services have failed, may 
the court conduct permanency planning proceedings that contemplate a final 
termination of parental rights. 
Among the findings allowing an initial adjudication of dependency is that 
“[t]he child‟s parent or guardian caused the death of another child through abuse 
or neglect.”  (§ 300, subd. (f), italics added (section 300(f)).)  Here, a father‟s two 
young surviving children were adjudged juvenile court dependents, in part because 
of findings under section 300(f).  These findings were based on evidence that, in 
violation of law, the father transported his third child, an 18-month-old daughter, 
in an automobile without securing her in a child safety seat, and she was fatally 
injured when another vehicle collided with their car.  The Court of Appeal 
affirmed the juvenile court‟s judgment. 
We granted the father‟s petition for review to address three issues:  First, 
does the lethal neglect to which section 300(f) refers require criminal negligence, 
i.e., a degree of culpable misfeasance or malfeasance that would support the 
parent‟s or guardian‟s criminal conviction for causing a child‟s death?  Second, 
does section 300(f) require discrete evidence and findings that the particular 
 
3 
circumstances of the child fatality demonstrate a current risk of substantial harm to 
surviving children in the parent‟s or guardian‟s care?  Third, what is the meaning 
of “caused,” as used in section 300(f); i.e., is a substantial or contributing cause 
sufficient, and what is the effect, if any, of any intervening or superseding cause? 
Like the Court of Appeal majority in this case, we conclude that section 
300(f) does not limit its application to criminal negligence.  On the contrary, 
section 300(f) allows (but does not require) the juvenile court to adjudge a child a 
dependent if the court finds that the want of ordinary care by the child‟s parent or 
guardian caused another child‟s death.  We further conclude that the juvenile court 
may adjudicate dependency under section 300(f) without any additional evidence 
or finding that the circumstances surrounding the parent‟s or guardian‟s fatal 
negligence indicate a present risk of harm to surviving children in the parent‟s or 
guardian‟s custody. 
Finally, we determine that normal concepts of legal causation apply under 
section 300(f).  Here, we are persuaded, the father‟s negligent failure to secure his 
young daughter in a child safety seat was a substantial contributing cause of her 
death in an ensuing traffic accident.  The father‟s counsel conceded as much in the 
juvenile court.  Nor does the evidence permit a conclusion that the accident itself 
was an unforeseeable intervening or superseding event that absolves the father of 
causation responsibility.  The “superseding cause” doctrine cannot apply where, as 
here, the duty the father breached is intended to guard against the precise, and thus 
foreseeable, risk that materialized, i.e., a young child‟s injury or death in a traffic 
collision. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
4 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 
Defendant William C. (William)3 and his wife Kimberly G. (Kimberly) had 
three children, Ethan C. (Ethan), born in January 2006, Valerie C. (Valerie), born 
in November 2007, and Jesus C. (Jesus), born in November 2008.  In March or 
April of 2009, William and Kimberly separated.  Kimberly returned to her 
family‟s home, while Ethan, Jesus, and Valerie lived with William in the home of 
his mother (the children‟s paternal grandmother). 
On June 17, 2009, William left Valerie in the care of his mother and sister.  
When he returned to the house, he noticed that Valerie‟s arm was injured.  He 
decided to take her to the hospital to have the arm examined.  During the trip, 
Valerie was not secured in a child safety seat; she sat on an adult relative‟s lap.  En 
                                              
2  
The circumstances leading to the adjudications of Ethan and Jesus as 
dependent children are, for the most part, distilled and condensed from the Court 
of Appeal opinion.  These, in turn, are based on three case reports by plaintiff Los 
Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) that 
were admitted in evidence at the October 22, 2009, jurisdictional/dispositional 
hearing:  a detention report filed, along with the dependency petition, on August 
18, 2009, a jurisdiction/disposition report filed on September 8, 2009, and a 
document entitled “Last Minute Information for the Court” filed on October 22, 
2009.  No additional evidence was introduced at the jurisdictional/dispositional 
hearing.  The parties submitted the matter on the reports listed above.  With one 
exception discussed below, defendant has not significantly disputed the pertinent 
facts as set forth in these reports and in the Court of Appeal opinion. 
 
3  
In defendant‟s brief on the merits in this court, counsel advises that while 
defendant‟s legal given name appears to be Williamson, defendant more 
commonly uses William and prefers that usage.  The Court of Appeal identified 
defendant as William, both in the case title and in the text of its opinions.  In the 
captions of their briefs in this court, all parties have used Williamson.  However, 
to maintain title symmetry with the Court of Appeal decision, and to facilitate 
tracking and legal research by the bench, bar, and public, we continue to identify 
defendant as William.  (See Voices of the Wetlands v. State Water Resources 
Control Bd. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 499, 506, fn. 1.) 
 
5 
route to the hospital, another vehicle collided with William‟s car.  Valerie died as 
the result of blunt force injuries.  There is no indication William was at fault for 
the traffic accident itself.4 
A week after Valerie‟s death, the Department responded to a report that 
Ethan and Jesus were victims of general neglect by their parents.  Investigation 
revealed that the household in which William was living with the children 
included as many as 20 persons.  The conditions were unsanitary, and the children 
in the household were dirty and seemed unsupervised.  In particular, three-year-
old Ethan appeared to be a victim of inadequate care, and he showed signs of 
delayed development.  He lacked language skills, was confused about the 
difference between day and night, did not know how to use eating utensils, and 
had several rotten teeth that required extraction. 
The Department investigators were told that Kimberly had a history of 
sometimes suicidal depression, anger management problems, a diagnosis of 
borderline personality disorder, and cognitive impairments that limited her 
functioning to the level of an 11 year old.  They learned the couple had engaged in 
episodes of domestic violence, with Kimberly as the primary aggressor.  Members 
of Kimberly‟s family indicated she could care take care of her children, but only 
with extensive help and guidance.  A psychologist expressed serious reservations 
about her ability to do so.  On the other hand, members of Kimberly‟s family 
insisted that the children had been seriously neglected in the home of William‟s 
relatives, and that Jesus and Ethan would be in danger if they remained there. 
                                              
4  
The Court of Appeal described the accident as follows:  “As William, who 
had the right-of-way, drove into an intersection, another car traveling at a high rate 
of speed ran through a stop sign and struck William‟s car, causing it to spin into 
another car.  William‟s car was then struck by a fourth vehicle.” 
 
6 
William expressed extreme remorse about the fatal accident.  He told the 
investigators that Valerie‟s arm injury apparently happened when she fell out of 
bed while unsupervised.  He explained that when he decided to take Valerie to the 
hospital, his car, which had a child safety seat, was being used by someone else, 
and he was unable to get another seat from Kimberly, so he drove to the hospital 
with Valerie sitting unsecured in his sister‟s lap.  Kimberly indicated she was not 
sure William ever had a child safety seat. 
Initially, William, Kimberly, and the Department agreed to a voluntary plan 
whereby Ethan and Jesus would be temporarily removed from the physical 
custody of the parents, who would be allowed monitored visits with the children 
and would participate in a family reunification program.  William began parenting 
classes and grief counseling.  However, the Department‟s concern about his failure 
to leave his mother‟s home and establish a safe living environment for Ethan and 
Jesus, the pending criminal investigation against him in connection with Valerie‟s 
death,5 and Kimberly‟s serious mental health, cognitive, anger management, and 
physical violence issues, led to a departmental recommendation that the juvenile 
court take jurisdiction. 
                                              
5  
At the time the dependency petition was filed, the Department had been 
advised that William likely faced child endangerment charges in connection with 
Valerie‟s death.  In 2010, after the dependency adjudications at issue here, 
William was charged with felony child endangerment (Pen. Code, § 273a, 
subd. (a) [child‟s caretaker‟s or custodian‟s willful placement of child in situation 
dangerous to child‟s health or person]) based on his failure to restrain Valerie in a 
child safety seat.  By a letter to this court dated March 29, 2012, William‟s counsel 
represents that William recently admitted a violation of Vehicle Code section 
27360, subdivision (a) (transporting a young child on a highway in a motor vehicle 
without securing the child in a safety seat), and received the maximum $100 fine 
for this infraction.  According to counsel, all felony and misdemeanor charges 
relating to Valerie‟s death were dismissed. 
 
7 
On August 18, 2009, the Department filed a dependency petition alleging 
that Ethan and Jesus came within the juvenile court‟s jurisdiction under the 
provisions of section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (f), and (j).  Under subdivisions (a) 
and (b), the petition alleged that the parents‟ history of domestic violence placed 
the children at risk of serious harm (allegations a-1, b-2).  The petition further 
alleged under subdivision (b) that the children were placed in an endangering 
situation, and were at risk of serious harm, because Kimberly‟s cognitive 
limitations required the provision of extensive services to enable her to properly 
supervise and care for her children (allegation b-3).  Finally, the petition alleged 
under subdivisions (b), (f), and (j) that William had placed Ethan and Jesus at 
serious risk by driving their sibling, Valerie, without the use of a child safety seat, 
which omission resulted in Valerie‟s death in a traffic accident (allegations b-1, 
f-1, j-1). 
After a detention hearing that same day, and finding statutory cause, the 
juvenile court ordered Ethan and Jesus removed from the parents‟ physical 
custody pending a jurisdiction/dispositional hearing.  The court authorized the 
Department to place the children with any suitable relative, or in foster care, and 
the parents were granted monitored visits. 
The jurisdictional/dispositional hearing occurred on October 22, 2009.  As 
noted, both parties waived trial and submitted on the basis of the reports prepared 
by the Department‟s social workers.  William‟s counsel was permitted to argue, 
and did argue, that the allegations under section 300, subdivisions (b), (f), and (j) 
should not be sustained insofar as they were based on William‟s failure to secure 
Valerie in a child safety seat. 
In making this argument, William‟s counsel first asserted the Department 
reports were mistaken in claiming that Valerie was thrown from the car in the 
accident.  Counsel represented that the Department‟s attorney “was willing” to 
 
8 
enter a stipulation to that effect.  According to counsel, “[Valerie] was not thrown 
from the car.  [William‟s] mother was thrown from the car from the front seat.  
[Valerie] sustained head injuries in the backseat and died from blunt force trauma 
to the head.”  However, counsel agreed, “it is true, as alleged, that [Valerie] died 
from injuries sustained as a result of not being strapped in a safety seat.  That is 
what it says.”  (Italics added.) 
Nonetheless, counsel urged, dependency jurisdiction over surviving 
children cannot be based on a parent‟s mere ordinary negligence causing death to 
another child; the parent‟s acts or omissions, he insisted, must have risen to the 
level of criminal negligence.  William‟s failure to secure Valerie in a child safety 
seat, counsel argued, was no more than ordinary negligence, and thus would not 
support jurisdiction. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ordered allegations a-1 
(domestic violence raising danger of nonaccidental injury to children) and b-1 
(danger to siblings from Valerie‟s death while not restrained in child safety seat) 
dismissed or stricken.  However, the court sustained, by a preponderance of 
evidence, allegations b-2 (risk of harm to children from parents‟ domestic 
violence) and b-3 (danger to children from Kimberly‟s cognitive impairments) and 
the remaining allegations based on the fatal traffic accident (allegations f-1, j-1).  
On the safety seat issue, the court observed, “the law is absolutely clear about 
buckling a child in a child safety seat.  I mean, I can‟t even imagine what the 
argument could possibly be.  [¶] . . . The [section] 300([f]) count says the 
following:  The child‟s parent or guardian caused the death of another child 
through abuse or neglect.  [¶]  He neglected to put his one-year-old child in a child 
safety seat . . . .” 
The court adjudged Ethan and Jesus to be dependent children.  By clear and 
convincing evidence, the court further found that returning physical custody to 
 
9 
William and Kimberly would create a substantial risk of danger to the children's 
physical and emotional well-being, and that there were no reasonable means of 
protecting them without removing them from the parents‟ physical custody.  
Accordingly, the court placed the children under the Department‟s physical 
supervision.  With the Department‟s approval, the court further ordered that 
William and Kimberly should be allowed monitored visits with the children, and 
should receive family reunification services. 
William appealed, urging that the allegations under subdivisions (f) and (j) 
of section 300 (allegations f-1 and j-1, respectively) could not be sustained on the 
basis of his mere civil negligence in failing to secure Valerie in a child safety 
seat.6  William also argued there was insufficient evidence to sustain the 
allegations under subdivision (b) of section 300 concerning danger to the children 
from the parents‟ domestic violence and Kimberly‟s cognitive impairments 
(allegations b-2 and b-3, respectively).  The Department also appealed, asserting 
that the trial court had improperly dismissed the allegations under subdivision (b) 
of section 300 that were also based on the safety seat incident (allegation b-1). 
In a split decision, the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District, 
Division One, rejected William‟s arguments and accepted the Department‟s.  The 
Court of Appeal reversed the trial court‟s dismissal of allegation b-1, but 
otherwise affirmed. 
In the Court of Appeal, William made two arguments that Valerie‟s traffic 
death while she was unrestrained in a child safety seat could not be a basis for 
dependency jurisdiction.  First, William urged, as in the trial court, that the “abuse 
or neglect” leading to a child fatality, as specified in section 300(f), requires 
                                              
6  
Kimberly did not appeal, and has not been involved the proceedings either 
in the Court of Appeal or in this court. 
 
10 
criminal negligence — flagrant, aggravated, or reckless conduct — not a mere 
ordinary breach of care such as his single failure to secure Valerie properly in his 
vehicle.  Second, he insisted that the lack of a safety seat was not a “substantial 
contributing cause” of Valerie‟s death, which was the result of a traffic accident in 
which another driver was entirely at fault. 
In rejecting the first argument, the Court of Appeal majority noted that 
section 300(f) requires only a parent‟s or guardian‟s “abuse or neglect” (italics 
added) as a cause of another child‟s death.  Nothing in the statute‟s plain words, 
the majority noted, suggests that “neglect” means anything more than ordinary 
negligence.  If there is ambiguity, the majority concluded, it is resolved by the 
legislative history of section 300(f), on which William‟s argument also relied. 
As both William and the Court of Appeal noted, prior to 1996, dependency 
jurisdiction under section 300(f) required the parent‟s or guardian‟s criminal 
conviction of causing another child‟s death.  The stated purposes of the 1996 
revision were to eliminate the delay attendant on criminal proceedings, and to 
substitute a civil (preponderance of evidence) for a criminal (beyond reasonable 
doubt) standard of proof. 
William urged, however, that the implicit requirement of a criminal degree 
of negligence was unchanged by the 1996 amendment.  The majority disagreed.  
The Legislature, the majority reasoned, sought to lessen the burden of establishing 
a “child fatality” basis for dependency jurisdiction by reverting to language that 
simply requires neglect by a parent or guardian, resulting in the death of another 
child.  Such a construction, the majority observed, is consistent with the 
dependency statute‟s civil nature, and with its nonpenal purpose to protect children 
who are at risk in their parents‟ or guardians‟ care.  Hence, the majority 
 
11 
concluded, the allegations based on William‟s failure to secure Valerie in a child 
safety seat, after which she died in a traffic accident, were properly sustained.7 
The Court of Appeal dissent urged it was unnecessary to determine what 
level of negligence is necessary for dependency jurisdiction under section 300(f), 
because that provision requires that the surviving children under a parent‟s or 
guardian‟s care have suffered, or are currently at risk of, physical, sexual, or 
emotional harm.  In the dissenter‟s view, William‟s single failure to secure Valerie 
in a child safety seat, however tragic its consequences, was insufficient evidence 
of current risk of injury or harm to Ethan and Jesus. 
William sought review, raising the “criminal negligence” and “current risk 
of harm” issues.8  We granted review, and directed that, in addition to the 
arguments raised by the petition, the parties address the meaning of “caused,” as 
used in section 300(f).  Thus, our order provided that “[i]n addition to the issues 
specified in the petition for review, the parties are ordered to brief the following 
issue:  What is the definition of the word „caused‟ in the context of dependency 
jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (f)?  
Does it mean the sole cause, or the contributing cause, or should the existence of 
an intervening, superseding cause be considered as part of the analysis?”  We turn 
to these issues. 
                                              
7  
The Court of Appeal majority did not focus on the separate assertion by 
William that his negligence did not “cause[ ]” Valerie‟s death, within the meaning 
of section 300(f). 
 
8  
William did not seek review of the Court of Appeal‟s rejection of his 
appellate claims that there was insufficient evidence to support dependency 
jurisdiction on the grounds of domestic abuse between the parents and Kimberly‟s 
cognitive impairments. 
 
12 
DISCUSSION9 
1.  Overview of dependency scheme. 
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law,” the purpose of the juvenile 
dependency law (§ 300 et seq.) “is to provide maximum safety and protection for 
children who are currently being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, 
being neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and 
physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm.”  
(§ 300.2.)  “The focus shall be on the preservation of the family as well as the 
safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of the child.”  (Ibid.) 
The juvenile court takes a first, and preliminary, step in its protective duties 
by adjudging a minor to be a dependent of the court.  With qualifications not 
pertinent here, a minor may be adjudged a dependent (§§ 300, 360, subd. (d)) if 
the juvenile court finds, by a preponderance of evidence (§ 355, subd. (a)), any of 
the following:  (1) the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering (A) serious, 
nonaccidental physical harm inflicted by a parent or guardian (§ 300, subd. (a)) or 
(B) serious physical harm or illness because of a parent‟s or guardian‟s (i) “failure 
or inability” to adequately supervise the child, (ii) “willful or negligent” failure to 
provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or 
(iii) inability, due to mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse, 
                                              
9  
We note that amici curiae briefs have been filed on behalf of William by 
William Wesley Patton, a Whittier Law School professor, and by the Los Angeles 
County Public Defender.  An amicus curiae brief has been filed on behalf of the 
Department by the California State Association of Counties.  We also granted 
William‟s application that we consider, as part of his briefing in this matter, amici 
curiae briefs that were filed on the parent‟s behalf in a companion matter in this 
court, In re L.L. (review granted Mar. 30, 2011, S190230), by (1) California 
Appellate Defense Counsel, (2) Los Angeles Dependency Lawyers, Inc. and 
(3) sociology professors Drs. Amy D‟Andrade and Jill Berrick. 
 
13 
to provide regular care for the child (id., subd. (b)); (2) the child is suffering 
serious emotional damage because of a parent‟s or guardian‟s conduct or because 
there is no parent or guardian capable of providing appropriate care (id., subd. (c)); 
(3) the child has been sexually abused (A) by a parent, guardian, or household 
member, or (B) by another person when the parent or guardian “knew or 
reasonably should have known” of the danger of abuse but failed to adequately 
protect the child (id., subd. (d)); (4) the child is under five years old, and has 
suffered serious physical abuse by a person known to the parent or guardian, if the 
parent or guardian “knew or reasonably should have known” that the abuse was 
occurring (id., subd. (e)); (5) “[t]he child‟s parent or guardian caused the death of 
another child through abuse or neglect” (id., subd. (f), italics added); (6) the child 
has been abandoned without support, or an incarcerated or institutionalized parent 
or guardian is unable to arrange for appropriate care, or the parent‟s whereabouts 
are unknown and no other relative or adult custodian is willing to provide care and 
support (id., subd. (g)); (7) the child has been freed for adoption by relinquishment 
or by termination of parental rights, or an adoption petition has not been granted 
(id., subd. (h)); (8) the child has suffered acts of cruelty by a parent, guardian, or 
household member, or the parent or guardian “knew or reasonably should have 
known” the child was in danger of suffering acts of cruelty but failed adequately to 
protect the child from such acts (id., subd. (i)); or (9) “[t]he child‟s sibling has 
been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i),” and 
under the particular circumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling 
“there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as defined in 
those subdivisions” (id., subd. (j)). 
If the child has been taken into temporary protective custody, and remains 
in custody at the time the dependency petition is filed (see § 305 et seq.), the court 
must promptly hold a detention hearing to determine whether he or she should be 
 
14 
returned to the parent or guardian pending the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing.  
(§§ 315, 319.)  Absent other extenuating circumstances that make the child‟s 
release to the parent or guardian impossible or impractical (see § 319, subd. (b)(2)-
(4)), the court must order such release from custody unless it makes specific 
findings that the child‟s physical health is in danger, or the child is suffering 
severe emotional damage, and there are no means of protecting the child‟s 
physical or emotional health except by removing the child from the parent‟s or 
guardian‟s custody.  (Id., subds. (b), (e).)  The court must consider whether there 
are available services that would prevent the need for further detention (id., 
subd. (d)(1)), must provide such services if it believes they will allow the child to 
be returned to the parent or guardian (id., subds. (b), (e), (d)), and, in the event 
further detention is warranted, may order the child‟s placement with a suitable 
relative (id., subd. (f)). 
Even after a dependency finding has been made, the statutory scheme is 
designed to allow retention of parental rights to the greatest degree consistent with 
the child‟s safety and welfare, and to return full custody and control to the parents 
or guardians if, and as soon as, the circumstances warrant.  Thus, the juvenile 
court may limit the parent‟s or guardian‟s supervision and control of the child in 
specified ways (§§ 361, subd. (a), 362), but it cannot remove the child from the 
parent‟s or guardian‟s physical custody, except in cases of voluntary 
relinquishment of the child, unless it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
such custody would pose a substantial threat to the child of physical harm or 
sexual abuse, or that the child is suffering extreme emotional damage, and that 
there are no reasonable means of protecting the child‟s physical or emotional 
well-being short of such removal.  (§ 361, subds. (b)-(d).)  If separation from one 
parent or guardian, but not both, is necessary, the court may consider the 
alternatives of removing the offending parent from the child‟s home or allowing 
 
15 
the nonoffending parent to retain custody.  (Id., subd. (c)(1).)  If a fit nonresident 
parent is willing to assume custody, the court must order such placement (§ 361.2, 
subds. (a), (e)(1)), and it may otherwise authorize placement of the child in the 
approved home of a relative or a nonrelative extended family member (id., 
subd. (e)(2), (3)).  Preferential consideration must be given to a request for 
placement by a fit relative of the child.  (§§ 361.3, 361.4.) 
Other than in cases of voluntary relinquishment, the general rule is that 
when a dependent child is removed from the parent‟s or guardian‟s physical 
custody, child welfare services, including family reunification services, must be 
offered.  (§ 361.5, subd. (a).)  Reunification services “need not” be provided, 
however, when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of 
one or more specified circumstances, including the parent‟s or guardian‟s 
unknown whereabouts; mental disability; disinterest; severe untreated substance 
abuse; poor reunification performance, failure to obtain reunification services, or 
loss of parental rights, in another dependency case; indicators of violent 
recidivism; or severe or chronic abuse or neglect of the dependent child, a sibling, 
or another child.  (Id., subd. (b).)  Among the findings that will permit a denial of 
reunification services is that “the parent or guardian . . . has caused the death of 
another child through abuse or neglect.”  (Id., subd. (b)(4).)  But even in these 
specified circumstances, the court may provide reunification services if it finds, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the dependent child‟s best 
interest.  (Id., subd. (c).)10 
When offered, reunification services must be provided for at least six 
months unless earlier terminated for cause (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(2)), and for up to 24 
                                              
10  
As noted, the instant juvenile court ordered reunification services for 
William, and thus implicitly made such a finding. 
 
16 
months when it appears such extended services will result in the dependent child‟s 
return to the parent‟s or guardian‟s custody (id., subd. (c)(3), (4)).  Meanwhile, 
court status reviews must occur at least every six months, to determine whether 
reunification efforts should continue or be terminated for cause, and whether the 
dependent child may be returned to the parent or guardian.  (§§ 366, 366.21.)  At 
an 18-month permanency review hearing, the court must order the child‟s return 
unless the social worker responsible for managing the case can demonstrate, by a 
preponderance of evidence, that such return “would create a substantial risk of 
detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the 
child.”  (§ 366.22, subd. (a).)  If the child is not returned at this point, the court 
must order a permanency planning hearing (ibid.), at which parental rights may be 
terminated and the child may be placed for adoption (§ 366.26), except that 
permanency planning may be postponed in limited circumstances where a six-
month extension of reunification services is permitted (§ 366.22, subd. (b)). 
2.  Does a finding under section 300(f) require criminal negligence? 
William first urges that an initial adjudication of dependency based on the 
parent‟s or guardian‟s neglect leading to the death of another child (§ 300(f)) 
requires evidence that the parent or guardian was guilty of criminal negligence, 
not a mere want of ordinary care.  We disagree. 
We have indicated that “ „[c]riminal negligence refers to “ „a higher degree 
of negligence than is required to establish negligent default on a mere civil issue.  
The negligence must be aggravated, culpable, gross, or reckless.‟ ”  [Citations.]‟ ”  
(Stark v. Superior Court (2011) 52 Cal.4th 368, 399 (Stark).)  We see nothing in 
section 300(f)‟s language, history, or policies that demands such a standard. 
When construing a statute, we look first to its words, “ „because they 
generally provide the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.‟  [Citation.]  We 
give the words their usual and ordinary meaning [citation], while construing them 
 
17 
in light of the statute as a whole and the statute‟s purpose [citation].”  (Pineda v. 
Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 524, 529-530.)  “ „If there is no 
ambiguity in the language, we presume the Legislature meant what it said and the 
plain meaning of the statute governs.‟  [Citation.]  „Only when the statute‟s 
language is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, 
may the court turn to extrinsic aids to assist in interpretation.‟  [Citation.]”  (Id., at 
p. 530.) 
The noun “neglect” has a commonly understood meaning that is not 
confined to particularly gross, reckless, or blameworthy carelessness.  For 
example, lay dictionaries define “neglect,” when used as a noun, as “[w]ant of 
attention to what ought to be done; the fact of leaving something undone or 
unattended to; negligence” (10 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 301, col. 2); 
“the action of neglecting something,” where to “neglect” (as a verb) is “to fail to 
attend to sufficiently or properly : not give proper attention or care to” or “to 
carelessly omit doing (something that should be done)” (Webster‟s 3d New 
Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 1513, col. 3); or the “act or an instance of neglecting 
something” (Merriam-Webster‟s Collegiate Dict. (11th ed. 2003) p. 830, col. 1)), 
where to “neglect” (as a verb) is “to leave undone or unattended to esp. through 
carelessness” (id., p. 829, col. 2) or “[t]o fail to do or carry out, as through 
carelessness or oversight” (American Heritage Dict., (2d coll. ed. 1985) p. 835, 
col. 2). 
Resort to the most prominent legal reference work yields a similar result.  
Black‟s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (Black‟s) defines the noun “neglect” as 
“1.  [t]he omission of proper attention to a person or thing, whether inadvertent, 
negligent, or willful; the act or condition of disregarding” or “2.  [t]he failure to 
 
18 
give proper attention, supervision, or necessities, esp. to a child, to such an extent 
that harm results or is likely to result.”  (Id., p. 1061, col. 1, italics added.)11 
Moreover, we derive no different sense of the word “neglect,” as used in 
section 300(f), by reading this subdivision in conjunction with the other provisions 
of section 300.  Thus, section 300 permits such an adjudication where, for 
example, a child has suffered, or is at risk of suffering, serious harm because of the 
parent‟s or guardian‟s (1) “failure or inability” to “adequately supervise or 
protect” the child (§ 300, subd. (b)) or (2) “willful or negligent failure” to 
“adequately . . . protect” the child from a custodian with whom the child has been 
left or to provide the child with adequate food, shelter, or clothing (ibid., italics 
added); or because the parent or guardian has “failed” to “adequately protect” the 
child against actual or threatened sexual abuse, or from acts of cruelty, of which 
the parent or guardian “knew or reasonably should have known” (id., subds. (d), 
(i)); or because a very young child has suffered severe physical abuse of which the 
parent or guardian “knew or reasonably should have known” (id., subd. (e)); or 
when there is a substantial risk that the child will be “abused or neglected,” as 
measured by these standards, because his or her sibling has been similarly 
                                              
11  
In a note immediately following this definition, Black‟s observes:  
“ „ “Neglect” is not the same thing as “negligence.”  In the present connection the 
word “neglect” indicates, as a purely objective fact, that a person has not done that 
which it was his duty to do; it does not indicate the reason for this failure. . . .  A 
man can “neglect” his duty either intentionally or negligently.‟  [Citation.]”  
(Black‟s, p. 1061.)  Black‟s also defines subcategories of “neglect” that are 
commonly expressed in law, including “child neglect” (“[t]he failure of a person 
responsible for a minor to care for the minor‟s emotional or physical needs”), 
“culpable neglect” (“[c]ensurable or blameworthy neglect; neglect that is less than 
gross carelessness but more than the failure to use ordinary care”), and “willful 
neglect” (“[i]ntentional or reckless failure to carry out a legal duty, esp. in caring 
for a child”) (ibid.), but section 300(f) uses none of these qualifying terms. 
 
19 
“abused or neglected” (id., subd. (j)).  Nothing in these terms suggests that when 
serious harm to a child has occurred or is threatened, the Legislature intended to 
limit the neglect that can result in dependency to criminal negligence. 
We also note the definition of “neglect” contained in the Child Abuse and 
Neglect Reporting Act.  (Pen. Code, § 11164 et seq.)  The purpose of this law is to 
protect children from “abuse and neglect” (id., § 11164, subd. (b)) by requiring 
certain persons who, in their professional or employment capacities, come into 
regular contact with children (id., § 11165.7) to report their knowledge or 
reasonable suspicions that particular children are being abused or neglected (id., 
§§ 11166, 11166.05).  For purposes of this statute, “neglect” is defined as “the 
negligent treatment or the maltreatment of a child by a person responsible for the 
child‟s welfare under circumstances indicating harm or threatened harm to the 
child‟s health or welfare.  The term includes both acts and omissions on the part of 
the responsible person.”  (Id., § 11165.2, italics added.) 
Though the meaning of “neglect,” as used in section 300(f), thus seems 
plain and unambiguous on its face, William urges that the history of this particular 
provision compels a different interpretation.  As below, William stresses that prior 
to 1997, section 300(f) specified that a child came within the juvenile court‟s 
jurisdiction, and could be adjudged a dependent child of the court, if “[t]he 
minor‟s parent or guardian has been convicted of causing the death of another 
child through abuse or neglect.”  (Former § 300(f), as adopted by Stats. 1987, ch. 
1485, § 4, p. 5603, italics added.)  Any such criminal conviction, William reasons, 
would necessarily have required not merely a breach of ordinary care, but a 
criminal level of abuse or neglect — i.e., an “ „ “ „aggravated, culpable, gross, or 
reckless‟ ” ‟ ” act or omission (e.g., Stark, supra, 52 Cal.4th 368, 399) — leading 
to the child‟s death.  (Pen. Code, § 20; see, e.g., People v. Anderson (2011) 
51 Cal.4th 989, 994; People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 660; but cf. Pen. 
 
20 
Code, § 192, subd. (c)(2) [crime of vehicular manslaughter includes traffic death 
caused by driver‟s unlawful, nonfelonious act without gross negligence, or his or 
her lawful, potentially lethal act, performed in unlawful manner without gross 
negligence].)  Hence, William suggests, the word “neglect,” as used in former 
section 300(f), included the implicit requirement of a “criminal,” or “gross,” 
absence of care. 
In 1996, however, section 300(f) was amended to delete the requirement of 
a criminal conviction, and to provide simply for dependency jurisdiction on the 
basis that “[t]he minor‟s parent or guardian caused the death of another child 
through abuse or neglect.”  (Stats. 1996, ch. 1082, § 1, p. 7426, italics added.)  The 
legislative history of the 1996 amendment, William notes, indicates its purposes 
were (1) to lower the dependency standard of proof, in child fatality cases, from 
the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt to the usual civil dependency 
standard of a preponderance of evidence, and (2) perhaps to avoid the delay of 
waiting for a criminal adjudication before proceeding in the dependency matter.  
(Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2679 (1995-1996 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended May 14, 1996, pp. o-p.)  But these aims, William argues, 
implied no third purpose — to change the meaning of “neglect,” as used in the 
prior version of subdivision (f), from the criminal level to a mere civil level of 
negligence. 
However, we find nothing in section 300(f)‟s legislative history to support 
either William‟s premise, or his proposed conclusion.  We have carefully 
examined the history of Senate Bill No. 243 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 
No. 243), which had adopted, in chapter 1485 of the Statutes of 1987, the 
“criminal conviction” requirement in former section 300(f).  This history discloses 
that a purpose of Senate Bill No. 243, which made major revisions to the child 
dependency law, was to “[n]arrow[ ] the definition of abuse for purposes of 
 
21 
dependency proceedings.  The decision to remove a child from his or her home 
and/or terminate parental rights would be based on the immediate danger or threat 
of danger to the child.  Under current law, the definition of abuse is broader; it 
includes provisions regarding lack of parental control and is not focused solely on 
the immediate danger to the child.”  (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor 
Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 243 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended May 26, 1987, p. 1; see Sen. Robert Presley, letter to Governor 
Deukmejian, Sept. 17, 1987, urging signature.)  But nothing in the legislative 
materials reveals the reason for imposing a “criminal conviction” requirement.12  
In particular, nothing indicates the Legislature thereby sought, by implication, to 
alter the commonly understood meaning of “neglect.” 
Former section 300(f) merely required the existence of a criminal 
conviction arising from the lethal “abuse or neglect” of a child.  Neither the 
language nor the history of this section reveals any care or concern by the 
Legislature about the specific offense for which the parent or guardian was 
                                              
12  
Two letters from interested parties to Senator Robert Presley, the sponsor of 
Senate Bill No. 243, urged that the “criminal conviction” requirement be 
eliminated.  The California Children‟s Lobby proposed that section 300(f) be 
amended to read, “[t]here is reasonable cause to believe the minor‟s parent or 
guardian has caused the death of another child through abuse or neglect.”  (Cal. 
Children‟s Lobby, letter to Sen. Presley, June 24, 1987, attachment E, unnumbered 
p. 5, italics added.)  Dr. David L. Chadwick argued that the need to wait for a 
criminal conviction before dependency proceedings could be initiated was not in 
the surviving children‟s best interest.  (David L. Chadwick, M.D., Amer. Academy 
of Pediatrics, letter to Sen. Presley, June 30, 1987, p. 2 [writing as chair of the 
Academy‟s district IX (Cal.) committee on child abuse].)  These suggestions were 
not adopted in the final version of Senate Bill No. 243 in 1987, but the available 
legislative history fails to disclose the reason for retaining the “criminal 
conviction” language. 
 
 
22 
convicted, or about the elements of such a conviction, including any heightened 
standard of negligence or “neglect” that might apply in the criminal proceeding.13 
The effect of the 1996 amendment, on the other hand, was to “expand” the 
provision concerning a parent‟s or guardian‟s involvement in a child fatality “by 
eliminating the requirement of a conviction . . . and instead simply [to] provide[ ] 
that the parent has caused the death of another child.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, 
Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2679 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 14, 
1996, p. c, italics added.)  In sum, there is no basis in section 300(f)‟s history to 
conclude the Legislature ever specifically contemplated a special meaning of 
neglect, as used in the statute, such that a parent‟s or guardian‟s neglect resulting 
in the death of a child must have risen to the level of criminal negligence. 
We have found no precedent for the proposition William advances.  In In re 
A.M. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1380, the case closest on point, the Court of Appeal 
found sufficient evidence to support a dependency finding under section 300(f).  
There, the father sought to quiet his newborn baby, who was sleeping between him 
and the baby‟s mother.  The father pushed the child toward the mother, felt the 
baby turn on its side, heard sounds he knew indicated the child was struggling to 
breathe, but, after two minutes, went back to sleep.  While the father was sleeping, 
the baby suffocated, and the father‟s efforts to resuscitate the child failed.  The 
autopsy physician initially listed the death as “ „accidental,‟ ” but later changed the 
listing to “ „undetermined.‟ ”  (In re A.M., at p. 1385.)  He indicated he was unable 
to opine whether there was negligence, because simply allowing a baby to lie 
                                              
13  
Thus, for example, the “convict[ion]” requirement in former section 300(f) 
would certainly have been satisfied by a conviction of vehicular manslaughter of a 
child under Penal Code section 192, subdivision (c)(2), even though that offense 
specifically is committed “without gross negligence.”  (See pp. 19-20, ante.) 
 
23 
facedown is not generally sufficient to cause death, and he could not conclude that 
leaving the baby on its stomach for two minutes was reasonably likely to produce 
that result.  (Id., at p. 1386.) 
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal noted that the father knew there was a 
risk to his infant child, had the ability to assess the risk, was in a position to 
intervene, and failed to do so even though he heard the baby struggling to breathe.  
The appellate court did not suggest the father‟s actions could, or did, amount to 
criminal negligence.  It simply ruled that “[t]he evidence is sufficient to support 
the juvenile court‟s finding that [the father] caused the death of [the baby] through 
neglect.”  (In re A.M., supra, 187 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1388.) 
We are referred to a number of decisions that apply not section 300, but 
section 361.5.  As noted above, this latter statute governs the juvenile court‟s 
authority to order the provision of reunification services, after it has adjudicated 
dependency and after it has found, on clear and convincing evidence, the need to 
remove the dependent child from the parent‟s or guardian‟s custody.  Section 
361.5 specifies that the court “need not” provide reunification services when, by 
clear and convincing evidence, it has found that the dependent child‟s parent or 
guardian “has caused the death of another child through abuse or neglect” (id., 
subd. (b)(4)),14 and may not do so in such a case unless it further finds, by clear 
and convincing evidence, that such services are in the dependent child‟s best 
interest (id., subd. (c)).  In each cited case, the Court of Appeal simply found, on 
the particular evidence, that the aggravated circumstances surrounding the parent‟s 
                                              
14  
The language of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(4), which parallels that of 
section 300(f), previously also required a criminal conviction for causing a child‟s 
death (see former section 361.5, subd. (b)(4), as added by Stats. 1987, ch. 1485, 
§ 39, p. 5625), but was amended to its current language at the same time section 
300(f) was so amended.  (Stats. 1996, ch. 1083, § 2.7, p. 7528.) 
 
24 
or guardian‟s behavior leading to a child‟s death either supported the juvenile 
court‟s decision to deny or terminate reunification services, or demonstrated that 
the court‟s decision to grant such services was an abuse of discretion. 
Thus, in In re Alexis M. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 848 (Alexis M.), the Court 
of Appeal dismissed a presumed father‟s appeal from a juvenile court‟s decision to 
terminate reunification services originally offered to him, when, at the 12-month 
review, the court found that reunification would be detrimental to the child.  The 
Court of Appeal deemed the appeal, which was based on alleged technical 
deficiencies in the juvenile court‟s termination order, moot in light of the 
presumed father‟s intervening felony child abuse conviction arising from the death 
of the dependent child‟s sibling.  As the Court of Appeal noted, the dependent 
child‟s removal from parental custody had been based on that lethal incident, 
which involved “very serious acts of abuse” — acts “too shocking to ignore” when 
the issue was whether the offending parent should receive reunification services.  
(Id., at pp. 850-851.)  Though the presumed father‟s subsequent felony conviction 
was not a factor in the juvenile court‟s decision to end reunification efforts, the 
Court of Appeal concluded, “it would have been, in the wake of the conviction, an 
abuse of the juvenile court‟s discretion to have offered [the presumed father] 
reunification services.”  (Id., at p. 853.) 
In Patricio O. v. Superior Court (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 933, the Court of 
Appeal, upholding a denial of reunification services, cited evidence that the 
mother‟s children were victims of “battered child syndrome” at the hands of her 
former boyfriend (id., at p. 936); that chronic, severe physical abuse had led to the 
death of one child, for which the boyfriend was convicted of murder; that although 
made aware the boyfriend was mistreating the children, the mother had failed to 
take action to protect them; that she remained in denial about the severity of the 
abuse and continued to think of the homicide as an accident; and that because of 
 
25 
her psychological makeup, she was likely to be involved in similar abusive 
relationships in the future.  The Court of Appeal noted the juvenile court‟s 
comment that the evidence demonstrated the mother‟s “ „general reckless 
disregard for the welfare of the minors‟ ” (id., at p. 940), and further observed that 
the juvenile court had concluded the mother‟s “neglect rose to a level of criminal 
culpability” (id., at p. 942), but also stressed that the juvenile court had considered 
all the reunification factors set forth in former subdivision (h) (now subd. (i)) of 
section 361.5 before deciding that reunification services should not be provided.  
(Patricia O., supra, at pp. 943-944.) 
In In re Ethan N. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 55 (Ethan N.), the court relied 
heavily on Alexis M., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th 848, to conclude, under section 361.5, 
subdivisions (b)(4) and (c), that the evidence failed to support the juvenile court‟s 
decision to grant reunification services to a mother of dependent children removed 
from her custody.  The evidence indicated that the mother‟s neglect of all her 
children, fueled by her methamphetamine habit, had allowed her husband to 
murder her infant son through chronic physical abuse culminating in asphyxia 
caused by a golf ball-sized wad of paper lodged in the baby‟s esophagus (a crime 
for which the husband had been sentenced to life without parole).  The Court of 
Appeal acknowledged the mother‟s subsequent progress in drug rehabilitation, as 
stressed by the juvenile court.  Nonetheless, the appellate court applied the strong 
presumption against reunification services when a parent‟s or guardian‟s abuse or 
neglect has caused another child‟s death.  Though the Legislature has left open a 
“ „tiny crack‟ ” for reunification in such a case, the Court of Appeal explained 
(Ethan N., supra, at p. 65), a parent seeking reunification under such 
circumstances faces an “enormous hurdle,” and the cases in which a parent will be 
able to justify reunification will be “rare.”  (Id., at p. 68.)  “ „The enormity of a 
death arising out of . . . child abuse,‟ ” the Court of Appeal stated, “ „swallows up 
 
26 
almost all, if not all, competing concerns.‟ ”  (Id., at pp. 68-69, quoting Alexis M., 
supra, 54 Cal.App.4th 848, 853, fn. 5.) 
Finally, in Mardardo F. v. Superior Court (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 481, 
(Mardardo F.), the evidence indicated that the dependent child‟s father, when 15 
years old, raped and murdered another child.  He subsequently engaged in violent 
and sexually inappropriate behavior while confined in the former California Youth 
Authority (CYA), failed to complete a sex offender program while in CYA, was 
identified as a continuing threat to society with an antisocial personality disorder 
at the time of his dishonorable discharge from CYA at age 25, and had since 
sustained convictions for failing to register as a sex offender and for an episode of 
domestic violence.  (Id., at p. 492.)  Under these circumstance, the Court of 
Appeal concluded, the juvenile court‟s denial of reunification services was amply 
supported.15 
Pointing to the aggravated facts of the cases described above, and the 
opinions‟ various descriptions of the parents‟ abuse or neglect therein as “very 
serious,” “too shocking to ignore,” “ „reckless,‟ ” “criminal,” and “culpab[le],” 
William insists these decisions stand for the proposition that the strong 
                                              
15  
In Mardardo F., the father alternatively contended that section 361.5, 
subdivision (b)(4), by referring to a child fatality caused by the parent or guardian 
“of the [dependent] child” (italics added), required the death to have occurred 
while he was such a parent, and thus could not apply to the rape murder he 
committed at age 15, before he was a parent.  Otherwise, he suggested, section 
361.5, subdivision (b)(4) would extend to a parent whose long-past childhood or 
adolescent carelessness had caused another child‟s death.  Responding to this 
assertion, the Court of Appeal stated that section 361.5, subdivision (b)(4) requires 
“culpability, a concept that applies to [the] [f]ather,” and “does not concern mere 
tragic horseplay among children.”  (Mardardo F., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 481, 
487-488.)  But nothing in this statement implies that the requisite culpability 
cannot be satisfied by an adult’s breach of ordinary care leading to the death of a 
child. 
 
27 
presumption against reunification services when the parent or guardian “has 
caused the death of another child through abuse or neglect” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(4)), 
applies only to a criminal level of lethal negligence.  Hence, he urges, we must 
apply the same standard to the parallel language in section 300(f), the statute 
governing the initial adjudication of dependency. 
We disagree.  Contrary to the inferences William seeks to draw, we find no 
implication in these decisions that criminal negligence is required under either 
statute.  They merely concluded, in particular aggravated circumstances, that it 
was necessary, or proper, to apply the statutory presumption against reunification 
against a parent or guardian whose abuse or neglect had caused another child‟s 
death.  Nothing in the reasoning or results of these cases suggests that only 
criminal negligence leading to a child fatality will allow a dependency finding 
under section 300(f), or trigger the presumption against reunification set forth in 
section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(4) and (c). 
On the contrary, it is “ „[t]he enormity of a death‟ ” of a child arising from 
parental inadequacy that invokes the provisions of sections 300 and 361.5.  
(Ethan N., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th 55, 68, quoting Alexis M., supra, 
54 Cal.App.4th 848, 853, fn. 5, italics added.)  The Legislature has clearly 
provided that when one‟s abuse or neglect has had this tragic consequence, there is 
a proper basis for a finding that his or her surviving child may be made a 
dependent of the juvenile court, and that, if the circumstances then also justify the 
child‟s removal from the parent‟s or guardian‟s physical custody, a presumption 
against reunification should arise. 
On the other hand, a finding of dependency based on section 300(f) does 
not automatically lead to the denial of reunification services under section 361.5.  
This case illustrates the point.  With the Department‟s approval, the juvenile court 
granted such services to William, implicitly finding that, under all the 
 
28 
circumstances applicable here, efforts to reunify him with Ethan and Jesus, and to 
restore his full parental rights, were in the children‟s best interest.16 
William urges that an interpretation of section 300(f) to include mere 
ordinary negligence causing a child‟s death may produce collateral estoppel 
problems when the same fatality gives rise to both dependency proceedings and 
criminal prosecution.  As he notes, collateral estoppel issues were raised as 
concerns about the 1996 amendment to section 300(f), which eliminated the need 
for a criminal conviction as a prerequisite to dependency proceedings based on 
another child‟s death.  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2679 
(1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 14, 1996, p. o [“Care must be taken that 
the juvenile court action does not create a bar (collateral estoppel) as to any issues 
of fact.]”.)  However, the Legislature passed the 1996 amendments anyway.  Even 
under William‟s interpretation, these amendments reduced the standard of proof 
of lethal abuse or neglect in a dependency case, and thus created a potential bar to 
                                              
16  
Focusing on section 361.5, the “reunification bypass” provision, amici 
curiae D‟Andrade and Berrick suggest that unless subdivision (b)(4) of section 
361.5 (and thus section 300(f)) is limited to criminal abuse or neglect leading to 
the death of a child, the state risks losing federal funds for foster care and adoption 
assistance under the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) (Pub.L. 
105-89, 42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq.).  The ASFA generally requires a state to make 
reasonable efforts to reunify a family.  (42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B).)  However, as 
the Department observes, such reasonable efforts are not required when a court 
has found that the parent or guardian has subjected a child to “aggravated 
circumstances (as defined in State law, which definition may include but need not 
be limited to abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse).”  (Id., 
§ 671(a)(15)(D)(i), italics added).  Amici curiae fail to demonstrate that the state 
has contravened ASFA standards by providing, in plain terms, that reunification 
efforts must be denied when the juvenile court finds, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that a want of due care by the parent or guardian of a dependent child 
caused another child to die, unless the court then determines, with similar 
certainty, that reunification is in the dependent child‟s best interest. 
 
29 
criminal prosecution if an antecedent dependency proceeding resulted in a finding 
that criminal negligence had not been established by even a preponderance of 
evidence.  (See In re Nathaniel P. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 660, 670; Lockwood v. 
Superior Court (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 667, 672; but see People v. Percifull 
(1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1459; cf., Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 
335, 347.)  No additional potential interference with criminal prosecution arises 
from a dependency determination that even mere ordinary negligence was not 
established by a preponderance of evidence.  A fortiori, such a conclusion would 
mean that criminal negligence could also not have been shown by that standard. 
Conversely, an antecedent criminal finding, beyond reasonable doubt, that 
the parent or guardian was guilty of criminal culpability in a child‟s death would 
require that a dependency allegation under section 300(f) be sustained, regardless 
of whether the dependency standard was criminal, or mere civil, negligence.  (See 
People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 482; Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. 
Co., Ltd. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 601, 603-606; 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Schurtz (2001) 
92 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1192.)  Thus, William fails to persuade us that collateral 
estoppel considerations influenced the Legislature, contrary to the plain words of 
section 300(f), to require criminal negligence before a parent‟s or guardian‟s 
neglect that caused the death of another child can lead to a dependency 
adjudication. 
William cites In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, which held that a 
dependency allegation under subdivision (b) of section 300 (“[a] child has 
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical 
harm . . . as a result of” the parent‟s or guardian‟s failure “to adequately supervise 
or protect the child”) requires a finding of current risk, and thus cannot be based 
on a single episode of parental misjudgment, even when a child was thereby 
injured.  (In re J.N., at pp. 1022-1025, disagreeing with contrary suggestions in 
 
30 
In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1435.)17  But whatever the merits of that 
conclusion, it does not apply to section 300(f) so as to require criminal negligence, 
or otherwise bar a dependency finding, where a single episode of carelessness 
resulted in a child fatality.  By its plain terms, section 300(f) applies whenever a 
parent‟s or guardian‟s “abuse or neglect” caused the death of “another child.”  
This phrase is singular, not plural, and it leaves no room for a conclusion that 
multiple instances of lethal carelessness are required. 
William urges that applying a mere civil negligence standard to section 
300(f) would lead to absurd results.  He posits the examples of homeowning 
parents who fail to maintain the fence around their swimming pool, thus allowing 
a neighbor child to enter and drown in the pool, or a parent momentarily distracted 
by a cell phone conversation who, while driving, negligently strikes and kills a 
child who darts into the street.18 
But there is no absurdity in the plain language of section 300(f).  As we 
discuss in further detail below, the Legislature could rationally conclude that when 
a parent‟s or guardian‟s negligence has led to the tragedy of a child‟s death, the 
                                              
17  
In In re J.N., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, the evidence indicated that the 
family went to a restaurant for dinner, where the parents drank over their limit and 
became intoxicated.  On the way home, the father crashed the family‟s van into a 
light pole, injuring two of the couple‟s children, including a 14-month-old toddler 
who was not properly secured in a child safety seat.  When police officers arrived, 
they saw the mother holding a young child who was bleeding.  The mother 
ignored an officer‟s advice to apply pressure to the child‟s wound, refused to hand 
the child to the officer when asked to do so, and behaved in a belligerent manner 
toward another woman at the scene.  (Id., at pp. 1016-1017.)  The evidence 
indicated that the children were otherwise healthy, loved, and well cared for. 
 
18  
As William observes, section 300(f) merely refers to the death of “another 
child,” and does not specify that the deceased child necessarily must have any 
family or custodial connection to the “parent or guardian” who caused the death. 
 
 
31 
dependency court should have the power to intervene for the safety and protection 
of children remaining in the parent‟s or guardian‟s custody, even if the parent‟s 
lethal carelessness cannot necessarily be characterized as sufficiently “gross,” 
reckless, or culpable to be labeled “criminal.”  Indeed, the very purpose of the 
1996 amendment was to promote the child-protective purposes of the juvenile 
dependency scheme by allowing such intervention, in the case of a child fatality, 
without the necessity of a criminal conviction. 
The dependency scheme in general, and section 300(f) in particular, leaves 
ample room for discretionary treatment that allows for the equities of particular 
situations.  Informal investigation may confirm that no intervention by social 
service agencies is necessary in a particular case.  Or, as initially occurred here, 
parents may be offered voluntary services without judicial intervention.  Even 
where a dependency petition is filed, and its allegations are sustained, the court is 
not thereby required to declare dependency, or to remove children from the 
parent‟s or guardian‟s custody, or to deny reunification services.  (See discussion, 
ante.)19 
                                              
19  
Thus, we are not persuaded to depart from the plain language of section 
300(f), and to impose a “criminal negligence” standard the Legislature did not 
include, by insistent arguments that the parallel provision of section 361.5, 
subdivision (b)(4), applying a presumption against reunification services, 
otherwise “casts too wide a net.”  We are told that because section 361.5 virtually 
guarantees no reunification will occur when the presumption applies, subdivision 
(b)(4) of section 361.5, and by parity of construction section 300(f), should be 
reserved for the most culpable cases of parental “abuse or neglect” causing a 
child‟s death.  For the reasons set forth above, we are convinced that the statutory 
scheme, as written, does not unfairly preclude reunification in appropriate cases 
where a parent or guardian has “caused the death of another child through abuse or 
neglect.”  In any event, of course, these concerns are most appropriately addressed 
to the Legislature. 
 
32 
Under these circumstances, no inherent unfairness arises from applying the 
plain words of section 300(f).  Thus, the issues raised by William fail to 
demonstrate that we should depart from them.  Accordingly, we conclude that, for 
purposes of a dependency adjudication under section 300(f), the neglect by which 
a parent or guardian “caused the death of another child” may include the parent‟s 
or guardian‟s breach of ordinary care, and need not amount to criminal negligence. 
There can be no doubt that William‟s failure to secure his 18-month-old 
daughter in a child safety seat before driving her in a vehicle — a direct violation 
of statute (Veh. Code, §§ 27360, subd. (a), 27360.6) — constituted, at a minimum, 
a breach of ordinary care, and William does not argue otherwise.  Hence, the 
dependency findings based upon section 300(f) do not fail on grounds that he 
failed to meet the statutory standard of “abuse or neglect.” 
 
3.  Does section 300(f) require independent evidence of a current risk of 
harm to living children in the parent’s or guardian’s care? 
William next urges, as did the Court of Appeal dissent, that a dependency 
finding under section 300(f) requires specific evidence of a nexus between the 
particular circumstances of the child fatality caused by the parent or guardian and 
a substantial current risk of harm to living children in that person‟s custody and 
care.  Again, we disagree. 
William points to section 300.2‟s statement that the purpose of the 
dependency statutes “is to provide maximum safety and protection for children 
who are currently being . . . abused, . . . neglected, . . . or . . . exploited, and to 
ensure the safety, protection, and . . . well-being of children who are at risk of that 
harm.”  (Italics added.)  He also notes that many other subdivisions of section 300 
stress actual harm to a child, or a “substantial risk” that such a child will suffer 
harm, as a prerequisite to the child‟s eligibility for dependency.  (E.g., id., 
subds. (a) [child “has suffered,” or is at “substantial risk” of suffering, serious 
 
33 
physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally by parent or guardian], (b) [child “has 
suffered,” or is at “substantial risk” of suffering, serious physical harm due to 
inadequate care or protection by parent or guardian], (c) [child “is suffering,” or is 
at “substantial risk” of suffering, serious emotional damage as a result of parent‟s 
or guardian‟s conduct], (d) [child “has been sexually abused,” or is at “substantial 
risk” of suffering sexual abuse from household member, or as a result of parent‟s 
or guardian‟s inadequate protection], (j) [child is at “substantial risk” of harm as 
evidenced by parent‟s or guardian‟s abuse or neglect of child‟s sibling; juvenile 
court must consider whether risk to child is demonstrated by particular 
circumstances of sibling abuse or neglect].) 
But the examples William cites undermine, rather than support, his 
argument.  These examples demonstrate that the Legislature understands how to 
specify the need for particularized evidence that a child is currently suffering or at 
risk of harm when it intends to include such a requirement.  Yet section 300(f) 
contains no such language.  It simply provides that a minor in the parent‟s or 
guardian‟s care and custody may be adjudged a dependent child if the parent or 
guardian “caused the death of another child through abuse or neglect.” 
When language is included in one portion of a statute, its omission from a 
different portion addressing a similar subject suggests that the omission was 
purposeful.  (E.g., People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 670; In re Jose A. 
(1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 697, 701-702.)  We must thus reasonably infer that the 
Legislature did not intend to include a separate “current risk” requirement in 
section 300(f).  (In re A.M., supra, 187 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1389 [directly so 
holding].) 
The reason for such an omission seems both reasonably clear and fully 
consistent with the statutory purpose.  The Legislature apparently concluded that a 
parent‟s or guardian‟s neglectful or abusive responsibility for a child fatality may 
 
34 
inherently give rise to a serious concern for the current safety and welfare of living 
children under the parent‟s or guardian‟s care, and may thereby justify the juvenile 
court‟s intervention on their behalf without the need for separate evidence or 
findings about the current risk of such harm. 
William again suggests this interpretation leads to absurd results, because it 
allows application of section 300(f) as a basis for juvenile court intervention even 
when the circumstances under which one caused a child fatality are entirely 
divorced from his or her current performance as a parent or guardian.  William 
advances the example of a responsible and caring mother whose treatment of her 
children is exemplary, but who, long ago as a teenage driver, caused a traffic 
accident in which a child was killed. 
But the theoretical application of a statute‟s plain language to hypothetical 
extreme cases does not demonstrate that these literal words are absurd, and should 
therefore be disregarded or judicially modified to include a requirement the 
Legislature saw fit not to impose.  (See, e.g., People v. Washington (1996) 
50 Cal.App.4th 568, 578.)  There is no reason to suppose that section 300(f) would 
be employed in the arbitrary manner William posits.  Certainly it was not so 
applied in this case.  William, aware that he should do so, nonetheless failed to 
secure his 18-month-old daughter in a child safety seat before transporting her in a 
vehicle.  She died as a result.  Even if her arm injury warranted medical attention, 
there is no evidence of a threat to life or limb so serious that the need for 
immediate medical help reasonably outweighed the risk of injury or death that 
could well —and in this case did — befall an unrestrained child in a traffic 
accident. 
William‟s fatal misjudgment was thus directly relevant to his ability and 
willingness to ensure the safety and well-being of Valerie‟s young siblings, Ethan 
and Jesus, who were then also in his care.  The juvenile court evidenced its belief 
 
35 
that this was so by sustaining allegation j-1 of the dependency petition, which 
asserted that William‟s fatal abuse or neglect of Valerie demonstrated a danger of 
serious harm to Ethan and Jesus.  (See § 300, subd. (j).)  The court‟s finding to this 
effect appears amply supported. 
Accordingly, we reject William‟s contentions that section 300(f) expressly 
requires, or, in any event, that the evidence in this case fails to show, a current risk 
of harm to Ethan and Jesus arising from his responsibility, through abuse or 
neglect, for Valerie‟s death. 
4.  What does section 300(f) mean by “caused?” 
As noted above, we asked the parties to address the meaning of the word 
“caused,” as used in section 300(f) (parent or guardian “caused the death of 
another child through abuse or neglect” (italics added)).  Having examined the 
issue, we find no indication that the word “caused,” which has a commonly 
understood meaning in both criminal and civil law, was used in a special or 
different sense in section 300(f).  We further reject William‟s contention that his 
failure to secure Valerie in a child safety seat was not a “cause[ ]” of her death for 
purposes of section 300(f). 
One‟s wrongful acts or omissions are a legal cause of injury if they were a 
substantial factor in bringing it about.  (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 
643; Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205; People v. Sanchez 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 847 (Sanchez); Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 
16 Cal.4th 953, 968-969; Mitchell v. Gonzalez (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1041, 1048-
1054.)  If the actor‟s wrongful conduct operated concurrently with other 
contemporaneous forces to produce the harm, it is a substantial factor, and thus a 
legal cause, if the injury, or its full extent, would not have occurred but for that 
conduct.  Conversely, if the injury would have occurred even if the actor had not 
acted wrongfully, his or her conduct generally cannot be deemed a substantial 
 
36 
factor in the harm.  (Viner v. Sweet (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1232, 1243-1244; Rest.2d 
Torts, § 432(1).)  This “but for” limitation does not apply, however, if the actor‟s 
wrongful conduct alone would have produced the harm, even without contribution 
by other forces.  (Viner, supra, at p. 1240; Rest.2d Torts, § 432(2).) 
Nothing in the plain language, or the history, of section 300(f) suggests the 
Legislature had a more restrictive concept of “cause[ ]” in mind for purposes of 
that statute.  Indeed, a recent Court of Appeal decision has concluded that the 
normal principles of “substantial factor” causation apply to section 300(f).  (In re 
A.M., supra, 187 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1388.)  We find no reason to disagree. 
William nonetheless insists that the fatal accident, produced entirely by the 
other driver‟s negligence, was the sole legal cause of Valerie‟s death, and that, as a 
matter of law — or at least on this record — his antecedent failure to secure her in 
a child safety seat cannot be deemed a substantial factor in the fatality.  For this 
conclusion, he appears to advance two theories.  We reject both. 
First, William urges that the evidence is insufficient to show Valerie would 
not have died if she had been properly restrained.  Analogizing to the “seat belt 
defense” recognized in tort law (e.g., Housley v. Godinez (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 
737, 743), and noting the severity of the fatal collision, he urges it was the 
Department‟s burden to show that Valerie would have survived if restrained in a 
child safety seat, and that his negligence in this regard was thus a substantial factor 
contributing to her death. 
We need not linger on the question of how, or whether, a version of the 
“seat belt defense” — which invokes principles of contributory and comparative 
negligence for the purpose of establishing liability and monetary damages as 
among an injured plaintiff and one or more tortfeasors — should apply under the 
child protective purposes of section 300(f).  In the juvenile court, William waived 
any right to benefit from such a doctrine.  Aware of the allegation that he caused 
 
37 
Valerie‟s death by failing to restrain her in a child safety seat, William submitted 
the matter on the Department’s reports, which concluded that this failure was such 
a cause.  And, while William‟s counsel argued that, contrary to these reports, 
Valerie was not thrown from William‟s vehicle in the collision, counsel 
acknowledged, “it is true, as alleged, that [Valerie] died . . . as a result of not being 
strapped in a safety seat.” 20  William cannot now urge that the juvenile court erred 
by so finding. 
Equally unavailing is any suggestion that William is protected by the 
doctrine of intervening or superseding cause.  “[T]he term „superseding cause‟ 
means „an independent event [that] intervenes in the chain of causation, producing 
harm of a kind and degree so far beyond the risk the original [wrongdoer] should 
have foreseen that the law deems it unfair to hold him responsible.‟ ”  (Sanchez, 
supra, 26 Cal.4th 834, 855, quoting Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 
8 Cal.4th 548, 573, fn. 9.)  But application of this doctrine “depends on whether 
[one‟s] conduct „ “was within the scope of the reasons imposing the duty upon the 
actor to refrain from negligent conduct.  If the duty is designed, in part at least, to 
protect the [victim] from the hazard of being harmed by the intervening force . . . 
then that hazard is within the duty, and the intervening force is not a superseding 
cause.‟ ”  (Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 
1016-1017, quoting Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol (2001) 26 Cal.4th 703, 
725; see also Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel (1970) 3 Cal.3d 756, 769-770.) 
                                              
20 
At oral argument, William‟s appellate counsel, Christopher Blake, disputed 
that William‟s trial counsel, Morgan Spector, made such a concession, but 
appellate counsel is simply wrong in this regard. 
 
 
38 
There can be no question that the duty, mandated by statute, to secure a 
young child in a safety seat before transporting the child in a vehicle is intended to 
guard against the child‟s injury or death in any ensuing traffic accident, not just 
one in which the child‟s driver was at fault.  This is precisely the risk that 
materialized here.  As a matter of law, the collision in which Valerie was killed 
cannot be deemed a superseding cause of her death that absolves William from his 
negligence in failing to secure her in a child safety seat. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Ethan C. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 188 Cal.App.4th 992 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S187587 
Date Filed: July 5, 2012 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Sherri S. Sobel, Juvenile Court Referee 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, Judith A. Luby and 
Kim Nemoy, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Jennifer Henning; Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel (San Diego), John E. Philips, Chief Deputy 
County Counsel, and Tahra C. Broderson, Deputy County Counsel, for California State Associate of 
Counties as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Christopher Blake, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
William Wesley Patton as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Ronald L. Brown, Public Defender (Los Angeles), Albert J. Menaster and Karen Nash, Deputy Public 
Defenders, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Minor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Kim Nemoy 
Principal Deputy County Counsel 
201 Centre Plaza Drive, Suite 1 
Monterey Park, CA  91754-2142 
(323) 526-6189 
 
Tahra Broderson 
Deputy County Counsel 
4955 Mercury Street 
San Diego, CA  92111-1703 
(858) 492-2500 
 
Christopher Blake 
4455 Lamont Street, #B 
San Diego, CA  92109 
(858) 274-1772