Case Title: Casper v. Am. Int'l S. Ins. Co.

Citation: 2011 WI 81

Docket Number: 2007AP000369

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2011-07-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
2011 WI 81 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NOS.: 
2006AP1229, 2006AP2512, 2007AP369 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Bryan Casper, Susan Casper, Michael Casper, a 
minor, by his Guardian ad Litem, Thomas Casper, 
a minor, by his Guardian ad Litem, Sara Janey, a 
minor, by her Guardian ad Litem, and Sharon 
Janey, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
Blue Cross Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 
Primax Recoveries, Inc., Allstate Insurance 
Company, American Family Mutual Insurance 
Company and Milwaukee County Department of 
Health & Social Services, 
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
American International South Insurance Company, 
Mark Wearing, Bestway Systems, Inc., RJW, Inc., 
Transport Leasing/Contract, Inc., Applied 
Industrial Technologies, Inc., Jeffrey E. 
Wenham, United States Fidelity and Guaranty 
Company, Federal Insurance Company, Continental 
Casualty Company, John Doe, 
          Defendants, 
 
Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. and Old Republic 
Insurance Company, 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
Bryan Casper, Susan Casper, Michael Casper, a 
minor, by his Guardian ad Litem, Thomas Casper, 
a minor, by his Guardian ad Litem, Sara Janey, a 
minor, by her Guardian ad Litem, and Sharon 
Janey, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
Blue Cross Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 
Primax Recoveries, Inc., Allstate Insurance 
Company, American Family Mutual Insurance 
Company and Milwaukee County Department of 
Health & Social Services, 
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
 
2
 
American International South Insurance Company, 
Mark Wearing, Bestway Systems, Inc., RJW, Inc., 
Transport Leasing/Contract, Inc., Applied 
Industrial Technologies, Inc., Jeffrey E. 
Wenham, Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., Old Republic 
Insurance Company, United States Fidelity and 
Guaranty Company, Federal Insurance Company, 
Continental Casualty Company and John Doe, 
          Defendants, 
 
National Union Fire Insurance Company of 
Pittsburgh, PA., 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
_______________________________________________ 
 
 
Bryan Casper, Susan Casper, Michael Casper, a 
minor, by his Guardian ad Litem, Thomas Casper, 
a minor, by his Guardian ad Litem, Sara Janey, a 
minor, by her Guardian ad Litem, and Sharon 
Janey, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
Blue Cross Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 
Primax Recoveries, Inc., Allstate Insurance 
Company, American Family Mutual Insurance 
Company and Milwaukee County Department of 
Health & Social Services, 
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
American International South Insurance Company, 
Mark Wearing, Bestway Systems, Inc., RJW, Inc., 
Transport Leasing/Contract, Inc., Applied 
Industrial Technologies, Inc., Ryder Truck 
Rental, Inc., Old Republic Insurance Company, 
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 
Federal Insurance Company, Continental Casualty 
Company, National Union Fire Insurance Company 
of Pittsburgh, PA., and John Doe, 
          Defendants, 
 
Jeffrey E. Wenham, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2010 WI App 2 
Reported at: 323 WI 2d 80. 779 N.W. 2d 444 
 
 
3
(Ct.App. 2010 – Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 19, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 1, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 COURT: 
Circuit Court   
 COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 JUDGE: 
Christopher R. Foley  
  
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 CONCURRED: 
CONCURRED/DISSENTED:        
      
BRADLEY, J. concurs in part; dissents in part 
(Opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C. J. joins concurrence/dissent.   
 DISSENTED: 
        
 NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
  
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
2006AP1229: For Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners there were 
briefs by Monte E. Weiss and Charles W. Kramer and oral argument 
by Alan H. Deutch, Deutch & Weiss, LLC. 
For the Defendants-Appellants there was a brief by Larry J. 
Britton and Shannon M. Trevithick, Britton & Associates, S.C.  
 
2006AP2512: For Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners there were 
briefs by Alan H. Deutch, Charle W. Kramer, James L. McAlister 
and Monte E. Weiss, Deutch & Weiss, LLC, and oral argument by 
Monte E. Weiss 
For Defendant-Respondent there was a brief by Ross A. 
Anderson and Timothy H. Posnanski, Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek S.C., 
and oral argument by Ross A. Anderson. 
 
2007AP369: For Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner there were briefs 
by Robert J. Lauer and Patti J. Kurth, Kasdorf, Lewis & 
Swietlik, S.C., and oral argument by Robert J. Lauer. 
For Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners there were briefs by 
Alan H. Deutch, Charle W. Kramer, James L. McAlister and Monte 
 
 
4
E. Weiss, Deutch & Weiss, LLC, and oral argument by Alan H. 
Deutch. 
 
An amicus brief was filed by James A. Friedman and 
Katherine Stadler, Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., for the Wisconsin 
Insurance Alliance and the Wisconsin Civil Justice Council, Inc. 
and by Andrew C. Cook, The Hamilton Consulting Group LLC, for 
the Wisconsin Civil Justice Council, Inc. 
 
An amicus brief was filed by Catherine M. Rottier, 
Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field LLP, for Wisconsin Defense 
Counsel. 
 
 
 
 
2011 WI 81
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369   
(L.C. No. 
2004CV5852) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Bryan Casper, Susan Casper, Michael Casper, a 
minor, by his Guardian ad Litem, Thomas Casper, 
a minor, by his Guardian ad Litem, Sara Janey, 
a minor, by his Guardian ad Litem, and Sharon 
Janey, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
Blue Cross Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 
Primax Recoveries, Inc., Allstate Insurance 
Company, American Family Mutual Insurance 
Company and Milwaukee County Department of 
Health & Social Services, 
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
American International South Insurance Company, 
Mark Wearing, Bestway Systems, Inc., RJW, Inc., 
Transport Leasing/Contract, Inc., Applied 
Industrial Technologies, Inc., Jeffrey E. 
Wenham, United States Fidelity and Guaranty 
Company, Federal Insurance Company, Continental  
Casualty Company, and John Doe, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. and Old Republic 
Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 19, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
Bryan Casper, Susan Casper, Michael Casper, a 
 
 
 
2
minor, by his Guardian ad Litem, Thomas Casper, 
a minor, by his Guardian ad Litem, Sara Janey, 
a minor, by her Guardian ad Litem, and Sharon 
Janey, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
Blue Cross Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 
Primax Recoveries, Inc., Allstate Insurance 
Company, American Family Mutual Insurance 
Company and Milwaukee County Department of 
Health & Social Services, 
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
American International South Insurance Company, 
Mark Wearing, Bestway Systems, Inc., RJW, Inc., 
Transport Leasing/Contract, Inc., Applied 
Industrial Technologies, Inc., Jeffrey E. 
Wenham, Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., Old Republic 
Insurance Company, United States Fidelity and 
Guaranty Company, Federal Insurance Company, 
Continental Casualty Company and John Doe, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
National Union Fire Insurance Company of 
Pittsburgh, PA., 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
Bryan Casper, Susan Casper, Michael Casper, a 
minor, by his Guardian ad Litem, Thomas Casper, 
a minor, by his Guardian ad Litem, Sara Janey, 
a minor, by her Guardian ad Litem, and Sharon 
Janey, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
Blue Cross Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 
Primax Recoveries, Inc., Allstate Insurance 
Company, American Family Mutual Insurance 
Company and Milwaukee County Department of 
Health & Social Services, 
 
 
 
3
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
American International South Insurance Company, 
Mark Wearing, Bestway Systems, Inc., RJW, Inc., 
Transport Leasing/Contract, Inc., Applied 
Industrial Technologies, Inc., Ryder Truck 
Rental, Inc., Old Republic Insurance Company, 
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 
Federal Insurance Company, Continental Casualty 
Company, National Union Fire Insurance Company 
of Pittsburgh, PA. and John Doe, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Jeffrey E. Wenham, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part and reversed in part.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision 
of 
the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
Casper 
v. 
American 
International 
South 
Insurance 
Co., 
2010 
WI 
App 
2, 
323 
Wis. 2d 80, 779 N.W.2d 444,1 affirming three orders of the 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Christopher R. Foley, Judge.  
The case arises out of a tragic accident that occurred when a 
                                                 
1 Three separate appeals were consolidated and decided by 
the court of appeals.  Casper v. Am. Int'l S. Ins. Co., 2010 WI 
App 2, ¶1, 323 Wis. 2d 80, 779 N.W.2d 444.  From that decision, 
the Caspers and Jeffrey Wenham appealed.  American International 
South Insurance Co. is not a party before this court. 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
4 
 
truck driven by Mark Wearing collided with the Casper family's 
minivan while it was stopped at an intersection.  Bryan, Susan, 
Michael, and Thomas Casper, as well as Sara Janey, another 
passenger in the Casper vehicle (collectively, the Caspers), 
were all injured, some very seriously, in the accident. 
¶2 
The Caspers brought suit against 14 named defendants.  
Only 5 are relevant for purposes of this appeal: Mark Wearing; 
his co-employers Bestway Systems, Inc. (Bestway) and Transport 
Leasing/Contract Inc. (TLC); Bestway's CEO, Jeffrey Wenham 
(Wenham); 
and 
TLC's 
excess 
insurer, 
National 
Union 
Fire 
Insurance Company of Pittsburgh PA. (National Union).  Both the 
Caspers and Wenham petitioned this court for review of the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
¶3 
These appeals present three issues to the court.  
First, did the circuit court properly exercise its discretion in 
granting National Union Fire Insurance Company an enlargement of 
time to answer the Caspers' Fifth Amended Complaint?  National 
Union failed to answer the amended complaint within the time 
period required by statute but it claimed excusable neglect.  
The circuit court agreed.  The Caspers contend that National 
Union did not satisfy the requirements for excusable neglect and 
that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion. 
¶4 
Second, can the Caspers maintain a direct action claim 
against National Union when its policy of insurance was neither 
delivered nor issued for delivery in Wisconsin but the insurance 
policy covers the insured's "business operations" conducted in 
this state?  Relying on Kenison v. Wellington Insurance Co., 218 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
5 
 
Wis. 2d 700, 582 N.W.2d 69 (Ct. App. 1998), the circuit court 
and court of appeals answered "no."  In this review, the Caspers 
contend that a plain reading of Wis. Stat. § 631.01(1), together 
with Wis. Stat. § 632.24, authorizes direct action against an 
insurer in any of four situations stated in the disjunctive in 
Wis. Stat. § 631.01(1).  Only one of these four situations 
requires delivery of the policy in Wisconsin.2 
¶5 
Third, can a corporate officer be held personally 
liable for a non-intentional tort that occurs while he is 
performing his job and which is within the scope of his 
employment for a solvent and insured corporation?  If the answer 
is "yes," do public policy factors preclude a finding of 
liability on the part of Jeffrey Wenham as a matter of law?  
Both the circuit court and the court of appeals concluded that a 
corporate officer may be held personally liable for negligence 
that occurs while the corporate officer is performing duties for 
the corporation.  Neither court addressed public policy issues.  
The court of appeals determined that there were sufficient 
issues of fact in the record to require additional proceedings 
rather than dismiss the claim on summary judgment. 
¶6 
We conclude the following: 
¶7 
First, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise 
its discretion in finding excusable neglect and granting 
National Union's motion to enlarge time by seven days to answer 
the amended complaint.  It also did not erroneously exercise its 
                                                 
2All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
6 
 
discretion by denying the Caspers' motion for default judgment.  
The decision of the court of appeals on this issue is affirmed. 
¶8 
Second, a liability insurance policy need not be 
delivered or issued for delivery in this state in order to 
subject the insurer to a direct action under Wis. Stat. 
§§ 632.24 and 803.04(2).  Kenison is accordingly overruled, and 
the decision of the court of appeals on this issue is reversed. 
¶9 
Third, a corporate officer may be liable for non-
intentional torts committed in the scope of his employment.  In 
this instance, however, Jeffrey Wenham's actions are too remote 
to provide a basis for personal liability.  We therefore reverse 
the court of appeals on this issue. 
¶10 In sum, the decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case is remanded to 
the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶11 The Casper and Janey families are from Sheboygan.  On 
May 10, 2003, the Caspers took a family trip to Milwaukee.  They 
were accompanied by son Michael's friend, Sara Janey. 
¶12 Bryan Casper was driving the family minivan when he 
stopped at the intersection of 51st Street and Brown Deer Road 
in Brown Deer.  Suddenly, the minivan was hit from behind by a 
truck driven by Mark Wearing.  Wearing was traveling at 
approximately 40 miles per hour. 
¶13 As a result of the collision, all five passengers in 
the Casper minivan were injured.  Michael Casper was rendered a 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
7 
 
quadriplegic.  Sara Janey suffered many serious injuries, 
including a traumatic brain injury, multiple leg and pelvis 
fractures, and loss of use of one of her kidneys.  Bryan, Susan, 
and Thomas Casper all suffered lesser, but still serious, 
injuries. 
¶14 Investigators found Wearing to be under the influence 
of oxycodone, diazepam, and nordiazepam at the time of the 
accident; they found two prescription pill containers in the cab 
of his truck. 
¶15 At the time of the accident, Wearing was co-employed 
by TLC and Bestway.  TLC is a foreign corporation doing business 
in Wisconsin, with its principal offices located in Minnesota.  
National Union is an insurer of TLC. 
¶16 Bestway is a foreign corporation doing business in 
Wisconsin, with its principal offices located in Ohio.  Jeffrey 
Wenham is the CEO of Bestway and an employee of Bestway's owner, 
RJW, Inc., a holding company.  Bestway operates van and flatbed 
equipment and handles the transportation of its customers.  
Bestway maintains both general liability and trucker's liability 
insurance. 
¶17 When Wearing collided with the Caspers' vehicle, 
Wearing was making a delivery for one of Bestway's customers, 
Applied Industrial Technologies, Inc. (AIT), whose corporate 
offices are in Cleveland, Ohio.  Wenham was the salesman for 
Bestway's AIT account, and Wenham allegedly approved the route 
Wearing used when he was driving for AIT.  This route was 536 
miles 
long 
and 
took 
him 
through 
Indiana, 
Illinois, 
and 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
8 
 
Wisconsin.  According to Wearing, AIT insisted that the route be 
completed overnight.  He said he had been told that if he did 
not complete the route, he would be let go. 
¶18 According to the Caspers' expert, the route Wearing 
was driving when the accident took place could not be driven 
within the hours of service requirements of the Federal Motor 
Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR).  In his deposition, Wearing 
stated that he contacted his supervisor at Bestway, Doug Hofmann 
(Hofmann), and told him that he could not "possibly do the run 
and keep this under the time with loading and unloading, and 
[the supervisor] said[,] well, what we do is mark that as off 
duty and that will give you the time."  Such practice, the 
Caspers' expert asserted, would violate FMCSR § 395.2, which 
requires that time spent loading and unloading a commercial 
vehicle must be recorded as "on-duty." 
¶19 For the purposes of his summary judgment motion and 
appeal, Wenham stipulated that he had approved the route driven 
by Wearing, although he asserts he did not set up the AIT 
routes.  The AIT routes were set up by Lyle Marion and Hofmann, 
employees of Bestway. 
¶20 In Wenham's own deposition, he explained that the 
initial route put together by Hofmann would not have required 
his approval.  The AIT routes were reviewed by Bestway's safety 
department for compliance with all applicable laws.  According 
to Hofmann's testimony, any changes would have been approved by 
Wenham.  Wenham never met Wearing and was never involved in 
Wearing's hiring, training, or supervision. 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
9 
 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶21 Following the accident, the Caspers brought suit 
against multiple parties.  National Union, TLC's excess insurer, 
was named in one of the early amended complaints.  On May 5, 
2006, the Caspers served National Union with the Fifth Amended 
Complaint.  National Union's claim specialist, Lynn Weisinger 
(Weisinger), received the Caspers' Fifth Amended Complaint in 
New Jersey on May 11, 2006.  On May 16, 2006, Weisinger's 
assistant mailed the Complaint to Charles Lanphear (Lanphear), a 
claims specialist in Atlanta, Georgia, who handled trucking 
liability 
accidents. 
 
However, 
the 
Complaint 
was 
either 
inadvertently mishandled or lost in the mail, and thus Lanphear 
never received the Complaint and did not file an Answer within 
the 45-day time limit set out in the Complaint and mandated by 
statute.  Wis. Stat. § 802.06(1). 
¶22 On June 20, 2006, the day after National Union's 
Answer was due, the Caspers moved for default judgment.  On June 
26, 2006, National Union filed its Answer and moved for an 
enlargement of time under Wis. Stat. § 801.15(2)(a).  The 
Caspers moved to strike National Union's Answer, but the motion 
was denied.  The circuit court granted National Union's motion 
to enlarge time, finding that National Union's failure to 
respond, due to the Complaint being "lost in the mail," 
satisfied the statutory requirement of excusable neglect. 
¶23 On August 15, 2006, National Union moved for summary 
judgment, claiming that the Caspers' direct action claims were 
impermissible under Wis. Stat. §§ 631.01 and 632.24 because 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
10 
 
National Union's insurance policy covering TLC was not delivered 
or issued for delivery in Wisconsin.  Relying on Kenison, the 
circuit court granted summary judgment to National Union, and 
the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's order.  
Casper, 323 Wis. 2d 80, ¶29.  National Union remained a party to 
the action, however, under Wis. Stat. § 803.04(2). 
¶24 The Caspers appealed both orders.  They argued that as 
a matter of law, "lost in the mail" could not constitute 
excusable neglect.  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court's decision, concluding that the Complaint being lost in 
the mail could happen to a reasonably prudent person and 
therefore satisfied the standard for excusable neglect under 
Hedtcke v. Sentry Insurance Co., 109 Wis. 2d 461, 326 N.W.2d 727 
(1982). 
¶25 The 
Caspers also challenged the circuit court's 
application of Kenison, but the court of appeals affirmed the 
order granting National Union's motion for summary judgment 
based on Kenison.  Thereafter, the Caspers petitioned this court 
for review. 
¶26 In a separate cause of action, the Caspers brought 
suit against Wenham, asserting various personal liability claims 
against him as an individual, including negligent training and 
supervision of Wearing, and claims pertaining to alleged 
violations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act and its 
related regulations.  The circuit court granted Wenham summary 
judgment on grounds there was no basis for personal liability, 
thereby dismissing all the Caspers' claims against Wenham.  Upon 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
11 
 
the Caspers' motion for reconsideration, however, the court 
reversed its earlier ruling and reinstated one claim against 
Wenham, pertaining to his approval of Wearing's allegedly 
illegal route.  In so doing, the court recognized that it had 
failed to consider testimony obtained in depositions that 
indicated Wenham had approved the route that Wearing followed on 
the date of the accident.  Wenham disputes that fact, claiming 
he admitted approving the route only for purposes of the summary 
judgment motion.  The circuit court found sufficient evidence in 
the record to raise material issues of fact surrounding Wenham's 
alleged negligent approval of the route driven by Wearing.  
¶27 Wenham appealed the circuit court's order reinstating 
the personal liability claim against him for negligence.  Wenham 
denied approving the route and argued that a corporate officer 
could not be held personally liable for negligence committed in 
the scope of his employment.  Alternatively, he contended that 
even if he had acted negligently, public policy precluded such 
personal liability.  Specifically, Wenham argued it was not 
foreseeable that Wearing would be under the influence of 
prescription drugs while driving. 
¶28 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
order reinstating the claim, thereby denying Wenham's motion for 
summary judgment. Casper, 323 Wis. 2d 80, ¶¶71-74.  Citing 
Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer, 86 Wis. 2d 683, 273 
N.W.2d 285 (1979), the court of appeals concluded that personal 
liability against corporate officers is not limited solely to 
the intentional tort of fraudulent misrepresentation; rather, 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
12 
 
personal liability against corporate officers may be applied 
generally to all torts.  Id., ¶71.  The court of appeals also 
affirmed the circuit court's finding that the record contained 
sufficient evidence to create a material issue of fact as to 
whether Wenham approved Wearing's route.  Id., ¶73. 
¶29 The Caspers and Wenham petitioned this court for 
review, which we granted on January 20, 2010. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶30 The first issue centers on the circuit court's finding 
of excusable neglect by National Union.  The decision to grant a 
motion to enlarge time for filing an answer, and correspondingly 
to deny a default judgment, rests in the sound discretion of the 
circuit court.  Hedtcke, 109 Wis. 2d at 470.  We review the 
decision of the circuit court for erroneous exercise of 
discretion; we do not look to "whether this court would or would 
not have granted . . . relief but rather whether the circuit 
court abused its discretion in reaching its decision."  Id. 
¶31 The second issue, whether National Union may be 
subject to a direct action under Wis. Stat. §§ 632.24 and 
631.01(1), requires the court to interpret both statutes.  
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we 
review de novo.  Konneker v. Romano, 2010 WI 65, ¶24, 326 
Wis. 2d 268, 785 N.W.2d 432. 
¶32 The third issue, whether a corporate officer may be 
held liable for a non-intentional tort committed in the scope of 
his employment, comes to this court via the circuit court's 
reinstatement of the claim against Wenham after it initially 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
13 
 
granted his motion for summary judgment.3  Summary judgment is 
appropriate when there is no material fact in dispute and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Blum 
v. 1st Auto & Cas. Ins. Co., 2010 WI 78, ¶14, 326 Wis. 2d 729, 
786 N.W.2d 78.  We review the circuit court's grant or denial of 
a motion for summary judgment de novo.  Id.  Whether public 
policy precludes liability in the context of a negligence claim 
also is a question of law.  Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 WI 68, 
¶27, 235 Wis. 2d 781, 611 N.W.2d 906. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
¶33 We first consider the question of excusable neglect 
and review the standard by which a circuit court must determine 
whether a party has demonstrated that its failure to timely 
respond may be excused.  Next, we turn to the interplay of Wis. 
Stat. §§ 631.01 and 632.24 and other statutes to determine 
whether insurers who have not delivered policies or issued 
policies for delivery in this state may be subject to direct 
action.  Finally, we consider whether Wenham, as a corporate 
officer, may be held personally liable for a non-intentional 
tort committed in the scope of his employment. 
A. 
Excusable Neglect 
                                                 
3At the court of appeals, the parties disagreed on whether 
Wenham was appealing the circuit court's order on motion to 
reconsider (an exercise of discretion) or the circuit court's 
order on motion for summary judgment (a question of law reviewed 
de novo).  Casper, 323 Wis. 2d 80, ¶69.  Before this court, the 
parties agree, and the court holds, that the proper standard of 
review is de novo. 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
14 
 
¶34 The Caspers appeal the circuit court's grant of 
National Union's motion to enlarge time to answer the Caspers' 
complaint and its denial of their motion for default judgment.  
Under Wis. Stat. § 802.06(1), an insurer defendant is required to 
serve a reply or answer within 45 days.  It is undisputed that 
National Union did not serve its answer within 45 days, and did 
not file its motion for enlargement of time until a full week 
after time to answer had passed. 
¶35 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.15(2)(a) provides: 
When an act is required to be done at or within a 
specified time, the court may order the period 
enlarged but only on motion for cause shown and upon 
just terms. . . .  If the motion is made after the 
expiration of the specified time, it shall not be 
granted unless the court finds that the failure to act 
was the result of excusable neglect. 
¶36 A circuit court's finding of excusable neglect "will 
not be disturbed by an appellate court unless an [erroneous 
exercise] of discretion is clearly shown."  Hedtcke, 109 Wis. 2d 
at 470.  The decision of the circuit court need not be one that 
this court would have rendered, but it must be based on a 
reasonable inquiry and examination of the facts.  Howard v. 
Duersten, 
81 
Wis. 2d 301, 
305, 
260 
N.W.2d 274 
(1977).  
Furthermore, the reasons for the circuit court's decision must 
be set forth as required under the statute.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.15(2)(a) ("The order of enlargement shall recite . . . the 
grounds for granting the motion."). 
¶37 We have defined excusable neglect as "that neglect 
which might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
15 
 
under the same circumstances," but which is not "synonymous with 
neglect, carelessness or inattentiveness."  Giese v. Giese, 43 
Wis. 2d 456, 461, 168 N.W.2d 832 (1969).  A circuit court must 
determine whether reasonable grounds exist for failing to meet 
the statutory time period to grant a party's motion under 
§ 801.15(2)(a).  Hedtcke, 109 Wis. 2d at 468. 
¶38 A determination of excusable neglect does not rest 
solely on the existence of reasonable grounds for the party's 
delay.  Id. at 469.  A court also must consider the interests of 
justice implicated by the grant or denial of the motion, and 
what effects such a ruling would have on the proceedings.  Id.  
The denial of a motion for enlargement of time often results in 
a default judgment for the plaintiffs, a result disfavored by 
the law, which "prefers, whenever reasonably possible, to afford 
litigants a day in court and a trial on the issues."  Dugenske 
v. Dugenske, 80 Wis. 2d 64, 68, 257 N.W.2d 865 (1977) (citing 
Quinn Distrib. V. Miller, 43 Wis. 2d 291, 296, 168 N.W.2d 552 
(1969)).  On the other hand, the court also must be cognizant of 
the policies of prompt adjudication that can be advanced when a 
party that has failed to timely respond is held accountable for 
such delay.  Id.  It is these considerations, together with the 
particular facts of the case, that must inform the circuit 
court's decision whether to grant a motion to enlarge time. 
¶39 Although the analysis in each case is fact specific, 
we find it helpful to examine some of the cases in which the 
court has considered excusable neglect in the past. 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
16 
 
¶40 Long before the advent of the statutory requirements 
of § 801.15(2)(a), this court held that the grant of a motion to 
enlarge time requires good cause, which must be supported by 
affidavit or a finding of fact by the circuit court.  Meyers v. 
Thorpe, 227 Wis. 200, 202, 278 N.W. 462 (1938).  In Meyers, this 
court reversed the circuit court's order enlarging plaintiff's 
time to serve a proposed bill of exceptions.  Id.  The 
explanation proffered by the plaintiff's attorney for failing to 
comply with the statutory timeframe was that he had been 
occupied by other cases requiring his attention.  Id. at 201.  
The court held that there was no evidence to show that the 
attorney's other cases required such continuous attention to 
justify his failure to serve the bill within 90 days, as 
required by statute.  Id. 
¶41 Similarly, in Giese, the court rejected the attorney's 
contention that other legal matters, summer vacations, and his 
client's medical treatment in another county excused the filing 
of a complaint 78 days after the statutory time limit.  Giese, 
43 Wis. 2d at 461-62.  Without "extraordinary" or "persuasive" 
explanation, these meager excuses were insufficient to support 
the motion for enlargement of time.  Id.  In affirming the 
circuit court, the court observed, "A trial court's discretion 
in the enlargement of statutory time limits cannot be predicated 
upon judicial grace but must rest upon cause and excusable 
neglect."  Id. at 463. 
¶42 In Hedtcke, this court reversed the circuit court's 
finding of excusable neglect on grounds that the circuit court 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
17 
 
had failed to follow the mandates of Wis. Stat. § 801.15(2)(a), 
and also failed to resolve the ambiguities raised by the 
affidavits in favor of the delinquent party.  Hedtcke, 109 
Wis. 2d at 474, 478.  It was not enough for Sentry to assert 
that its attorney had been occupied with another trial and out 
of state depositions; Sentry's prompt action in remedying its 
failure to file an answer could not overcome the statutory 
requirement to demonstrate excusable neglect for its dilatory 
actions.  Id. at 474-75.  The facts in the record were simply 
insufficient to support the circuit court's implicit finding of 
excusable neglect.  Id. 
¶43 Conversely, in Meier v. Champ's Sport Bar & Grill, 
2001 WI 20, ¶43, 241 Wis. 2d 605, 623 N.W.2d  94, the court 
affirmed the circuit court's finding of excusable neglect where 
the circuit court found that the dilatory action was a result of 
counsel's assumption that defendants were served simultaneously.  
Because the circuit court applied the proper standard and 
properly considered both the policies against default judgment 
and the lack of prejudice to the plaintiff, there was no basis 
to conclude that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion.  Id., ¶44. 
¶44 In this case, National Union put forth affidavits 
explaining its failure to respond within 45 days.  According to 
these 
affidavits, 
National 
Union 
has 
developed 
written 
procedures to handle lawsuits filed against it and its insureds.  
The Caspers' Complaint was served on National Union's authorized 
agent, and then received by Weisinger in New Jersey on May 11, 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
18 
 
2006.  Weisinger reviewed the Complaint and forwarded it on May 
16 to Lanphear, a claims specialist in Atlanta, Georgia, who 
handled trucking liability accidents.  It was not until the 
Caspers moved for default judgment on June 20 that National 
Union became aware that the Complaint had never been received by 
Lanphear. 
 
National 
Union 
promptly 
filed 
a 
motion 
for 
enlargement of time on June 26, 2006. 
¶45 The motion and supporting affidavits assert that the 
Complaint was inadvertently lost in the U.S. Mail between 
offices, despite the best efforts of Weisinger and National 
Union.  Lanphear's failure to ensure that an answer was filed 
was due to his complete ignorance that a Complaint had been 
served.  As this breakdown in communication was not the product 
of either Weisinger or Lanphear's actions, and occurred in spite 
of the established claim processing procedures, National Union 
argued that its failure to respond was the product of excusable 
neglect. 
¶46 The circuit court agreed.  In a July 27, 2006, 
hearing, Judge Foley cited Weisinger and Lanphear's affidavits 
as evidence to support excusable neglect in the failure to 
timely answer and "good faith and prompt efforts to rectify the 
oversight when it was discovered."  He noted that National Union 
has a process in place to assure timely answers, but "it appears 
that correspondence was lost."  Referencing the standard set 
forth in Sentry Insurance Co. v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 
196 Wis. 2d 907, 539 N.W.2d 911 (Ct. App. 1995), Judge Foley 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
19 
 
found 
that National Union's conduct constituted excusable 
neglect. 
¶47 At the court of appeals, the Caspers argued that "lost 
in the mail" cannot constitute excusable neglect as a matter of 
law.  The court of appeals rejected this argument, and we agree.  
We cannot reject out-of-hand the possibility that a packet was 
actually "lost in the mail," although courts should be skeptical 
of glib claims that attribute fault to the United States Postal 
Service.  Here, the affidavits from Weisinger and Lanphear show 
that these individuals acted in normal fashion and that their 
established routine worked previously to provide timely answers 
to the plaintiffs in this case.  When an entity is processing 
thousands of complaints, a few inadvertent mishaps are bound to 
occur.  Courts should carefully scrutinize what steps an 
organization has taken to avoid such mishaps, how quickly the 
organization responds when it discovers its delinquency, and 
whether its delay has caused prejudice to the plaintiffs.  The 
circuit court here considered these factors, and the Caspers 
have not shown that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion after considering all the circumstances involved. 
¶48 Our precedent has set "an extremely high bar to 
reverse excusable neglect determinations."  Phelps v. Physicians 
Ins. Co. of Wis., 2005 WI 85, ¶72, 282 Wis. 2d 69, 698 N.W.2d  
643 (Prosser, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(reversed and remanded on other grounds by Phelps v. Physicians 
Ins. Co. of Wis., 2009 WI 74, 319 Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d  615).  
As in Meier, the circuit court applied the proper standard and 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
20 
 
appropriately considered both the law's disfavor of default 
judgments and the lack of prejudice to the Caspers.  The Caspers 
have failed to meet the high bar required for reversal. 
¶49 Accordingly, upon review of the circuit court's order, 
together with the affidavits submitted and the surrounding 
circumstances, we conclude that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in granting National Union's 
motion to enlarge time. 
B. 
Direct Action Under Wis. Stat. §§ 632.24 and 631.01 
¶50 The second issue requires us to interpret multiple 
statutes related to insurance.  Statutory interpretation begins 
with the language of the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  "If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry."  Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, 
¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659.  Statutory language is 
given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except for 
technical or specifically defined words or phrases.  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  We interpret statutory language in context——
that is, "as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46 (citing cases). 
¶51 Chapter 631 of the Wisconsin Statutes is entitled 
"INSURANCE CONTRACTS GENERALLY."  Chapter 632 is entitled 
"INSURANCE CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES." 
¶52 Wisconsin Stat. § 632.24 relates to "Direct action 
against insurer."  It reads: 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
21 
 
Any 
bond 
or 
policy 
of 
insurance 
covering 
liability to others for negligence makes the insurer 
liable, up to the amounts stated in the bond or 
policy, to the persons entitled to recover against the 
insured for the death of any person or for injury to 
persons or property, irrespective of whether the 
liability is presently established or is contingent 
and to become fixed or certain by final judgment 
against the insured. 
¶53 The wording of this provision is broad enough to cover 
insurance policies delivered or issued for delivery in this 
state and insurance policies delivered or issued for delivery 
outside this state.  The words "Any . . . policy of insurance 
covering liability to others" make the statute exceptionally 
inclusive. 
¶54 National Union argues, however, that § 632.24 is 
governed and limited by the first section of ch. 631, namely, 
Wis. Stat. § 631.01(1), which reads in part: 
Application of statutes.  (1) General.  This 
chapter and ch. 632 apply to all insurance policies 
and 
group 
certificates 
delivered 
or 
issued 
for 
delivery in this state, on property ordinarily located 
in this state, on persons residing in this state when 
the policy or group certificate is issued, or on 
business operations in this state, except: 
 
. . . .  
(c) As otherwise provided in the statutes. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 631.01(1). 
¶55 National Union argues that Wis. Stat. § 631.01(1) 
covers only those policies delivered or issued for delivery in 
this state and issued (a) on property ordinarily located in this 
state, (b) on persons residing in this state when the policy or 
group certificate is issued, or (c) on business operations in 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
22 
 
this state.  In other words, National Union argues that delivery 
or 
issuance for delivery in this state is a threshold 
prerequisite under the statute, and because its policy was not 
delivered or issued for delivery to TLC in Wisconsin, it is not 
subject to direct action under § 632.24. 
¶56 National Union relies on Kenison.  In Kenison, the 
plaintiff brought suit against the Canadian insurer of a 
Canadian corporation whose employee was driving a car from one 
Canadian location to another.  Kenison, 218 Wis. 2d at 702-03.  
The insurer argued that it could not be subject to a direct 
action under § 632.24 because the insurance policy had not been 
delivered or issued for delivery in Wisconsin.  Id. at 703-04.  
The court of appeals concluded, "the unambiguous language of 
§ 631.01, Stats., limits the application of § 632.24, Stats., to 
insurance policies delivered or issued for delivery in this 
state."  Id. at 710. 
¶57 Both the circuit court and the court of appeals 
determined that Kenison was controlling in this case.4  However, 
the Caspers interpret § 631.01(1) differently and offer a 
grammatical construction of the statute not considered in 
Kenison.   
                                                 
4As the court of appeals correctly noted, it was without 
authority to modify, withdraw, or otherwise change the holding 
in Kenison even if it wanted to.  Casper, 323 Wis. 2d 80, ¶28.  
"[O]nly the supreme court, the highest court in the state, has 
the power to overrule, modify or withdraw language from a 
published opinion of the court of appeals."  Cook v. Cook, 208 
Wis. 2d  166, 189-90, 560 N.W.2d  246 (1997). 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
23 
 
¶58 The Caspers urge a disjunctive reading with four 
parallel, alternative clauses.  They contend that the "or" 
before the final clause makes clear that the clauses should be 
read in the alternative, or disjunctive.  In other words, the 
Caspers ask us to read the statute as follows: 
 
This chapter and ch. 632 apply to all insurance 
policies and group certificates: 
 
(1) delivered or issued for delivery in this 
state, or 
 
(2) on 
property 
ordinarily 
located 
in 
this 
state, or 
 
(3) on persons residing in this state when the 
policy or group certificate is issued, or 
 
(4) on business operations in this state. 
¶59 Under the Caspers' construction of the statute, direct 
action would be appropriate where any of these four conditions 
is met.  See V.D.H. v. Circuit Court for Ozaukee Cnty., 154 
Wis. 2d 576, 591 n.5, 453 N.W.2d  882 (1990) ("When a statute 
contains a list of conditions, the 'or' between the final 
subsections of the statutory list is to be read as a 
disjunctive.").  To read the statute as advanced by National 
Union, they argue, would do violence to the statutory language 
and render the clauses offset by commas superfluous. 
¶60 Before 
evaluating 
these 
interpretations 
of 
the 
statute, we think it is useful to examine the history of direct 
action in Wisconsin.  
¶61 One of Wisconsin's direct action statutes dates back 
to 1925.  Wisconsin Stat. § 632.24 has its origin in ch. 341, 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
24 
 
Laws of 1925.  Chapter 341 created Wis. Stat. § 85.25 (1925), 
which read: 
 
Any 
bond 
or 
policy 
of 
insurance 
covering 
liability to others by reason of the operation of a 
motor vehicle shall be deemed and construed to contain 
the following conditions: That the insurer shall be 
liable to the persons entitled to recover for the 
death of any person, or for injury to person or 
property, 
caused 
by 
the 
negligent 
operation, 
maintenance, use, or defective construction of the 
vehicle described therein, such liability not to 
exceed the amount named in said bond or policy. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶62 In the 1929 session, the legislature renumbered 
§ 85.25 to § 85.93.  § 2, ch. 454, Laws of 1929.  In 1957 
§ 85.93 was renumbered as Wis. Stat. § 204.30(4).  § 18, ch. 
260, Laws of 1957.  That renumbering made the direct action 
statute part of another important insurance provision passed in 
1925.  See ch. 372, Laws of 1925.5 
¶63 In 1931 the legislature created a parallel direct 
action statute.  Ch. 375, Laws of 1931.  The chapter amended an 
existing civil procedure statute, Wis. Stat. § 260.11 (1929), by 
adding the following language: 
In any action for damages caused by the negligent 
operation, management or control of a motor vehicle, 
any insurer of motor vehicles, which has an interest 
in the outcome of such controversy adverse to the 
plaintiff or any of the parties to such controversy, 
or which by its policy of insurance assumes or 
reserves the right to control the prosecution, defense 
or settlement of the claim or action of the plaintiff 
or any of the parties to such claim or action, or 
                                                 
5 See infra, ¶71. 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
25 
 
which by its policy agrees to prosecute or defend the 
action brought by the plaintiff or any of the parties 
to such action, or agrees to engage counsel to 
prosecute or defend said action, or agrees to pay the 
costs of such litigation, is by this section made a 
proper party defendant in any action brought by 
plaintiff on account of any claim against the insured. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶64 After adoption of the 1931 amendment, Wis. Stat. 
§ 204.30(4) and Wis. Stat. § 260.11(1) were consistently linked 
as Wisconsin's two direct action statutes. 
¶65 In 1950 this court addressed the effect of the 1931 
amendment to § 260.11 in an automobile accident case in which a 
deceased driver was covered by an insurance policy that was 
issued in Massachusetts.  Ritterbusch v. Sexmith, 256 Wis. 507, 
512, 41 N.W.2d 611 (1950).  The court said: 
If a policy containing a no-action clause is written 
in Wisconsin[,] of course the condition repugnant to 
our statute is void, Lang v. Baumann, [213 Wis. 258, 
251 N.W. 461 (1933)], but to say that the same thing 
automatically applies when the contract is entered 
into 
elsewhere 
gives 
Wisconsin 
statutes 
an 
extraterritoriality 
which 
we 
consider 
cannot 
be 
sustained. 
Id. 
 
¶66 The court noted that no Wisconsin case had been cited 
which held that the obligation of an automobile liability policy 
is to be interpreted by any law other than the law of the state 
in which the contract was made.  Id. at 515.  The court added: 
 
The policy stands, then, as a contract made in 
Massachusetts whose obligations are established and to 
be construed by the effect which Massachusetts law 
gives them.  It is conceded that in that state the no 
action clause is valid.  This being so, it secured to 
the insurer a valuable contractual right and an 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
26 
 
application 
of 
sec. 
260.11(1) 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
statutes at the time of performance would impair that 
right and is thus forbidden by sec. 10, art. I, of the 
United States constitution. 
Id. 
 
¶67 In a 1957 law review article, University of Wisconsin 
law professor James B. MacDonald observed: 
 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has consistently 
held . . . that in the absence of waiver, no right of 
direct action exists against an insurance company for 
an accident in Wisconsin if the policy contains a no-
action clause and was issued in a state in which such 
a clause is legal. 
James B. MacDonald, Direct Action Against Liability Insurance 
Companies, 1957 Wis. L. Rev. 612, 616. 
 
¶68 MacDonald railed against this result, arguing that the 
United States Supreme Court's decision in Watson v. Employers 
Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), eliminated 
constitutional concerns, id. at 621-22, and calling upon the 
Wisconsin legislature to "create a substantive right of direct 
action against liability insurers for all injuries within its 
boundaries without regard to where the policy was issued," id. 
at 623. 
 
¶69 The legislature responded in 1959.  Ch. 380, Laws of 
1959.  It amended Wis. Stat. § 260.11(1) by adding the following 
language: 
The right of direct action herein given against an 
insurer against liability for damages to persons other 
than 
the 
insured 
arising 
out 
of 
the 
negligent 
operation, management or control of a motor vehicle 
shall exist whether the policy of insurance sued upon 
was issued or delivered in the state of Wisconsin or 
not and whether or not the policy or contract of 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
27 
 
insurance contains a provision forbidding such direct 
action, provided the accident or injury occurred in 
the state of Wisconsin.   
Id. (emphasis added). 
¶70 This language was modified in 1967 to address the 
results in Koss v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 231 F. 
Supp. 376 (W.D. Wis.), aff'd 341 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1965), and 
Miller v. Wadkins, 31 Wis. 2d 281, 142 N.W.2d 855 (1966), which 
eliminated direct actions against insurers when the accidents 
occurred outside Wisconsin, irrespective of where the policy was 
delivered or issued for delivery.  The 1967 amendment eliminated 
the 1959 language and replaced it with the following: "If the 
policy of insurance was issued or delivered outside the state of 
Wisconsin, the insurer is by this section made a proper party 
defendant only if the accident or injury occurred in the state 
of Wisconsin."  See § 2, ch. 14, Laws of 1967. 
¶71 The 1967 language was proposed by the Legislative 
Council.  Its note in the drafting file explains: 
 
The last sentence of 260.11(1) [1959] has been 
deleted and a new provision added to change the result 
in Miller v. Wadkins.  The change makes it clear that 
the 1959 amendment relating to direct actions where 
the accident occurred outside Wisconsin was intended 
to apply to foreign issued contracts only.  The new 
language should permit direct action where the policy 
is issued or delivered outside Wisconsin, if the 
accident occurs in the state. 
Legislative Council drafter's note for Wis. Stat. § 260.11(1) 
(1967) (citations omitted). 
 
¶72 The essential language in former § 260.11(1) is now 
located in Wis. Stat. § 803.04(2).  The essential language in 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
28 
 
former Wis. Stat. § 204.30(4) is now located in Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.24. 
 
Section 
803.04(2) 
explicitly 
and 
§ 632.24 
by 
necessary implication are intended to apply to liability 
insurance policies delivered or issued for delivery outside 
Wisconsin, so long as the "accident, injury or negligence 
occurred in this state."  Wis. Stat. § 803.04(2)(a).  Of course, 
they apply to Wisconsin-issued policies as well. 
 
¶73 The question then is whether Wis. Stat. § 631.01(1) 
somehow overrides these two statutes to make the delivery or 
issuance for delivery within the state a prerequisite of direct 
action.  The answer is clearly "no."  If we were to accept the 
Caspers' interpretation of § 631.01(1), it would be consistent 
with our reading of Wis. Stat. § 632.24 and Wis. Stat. 
§ 803.04(2).  Conversely, if we were to accept National Union's 
interpretation of the same language, it would not eliminate the 
exception in Wis. Stat. § 631.01(1)(c), namely, "As otherwise 
provided in the statutes."  Direct action against an insurer is 
clearly "provided in the statutes" on the facts of this case, 
irrespective of where the insurance policy was delivered or 
issued for delivery. 
 
¶74 As noted above, several important changes in insurance 
law were made in 1925.  § 2, ch. 372, Laws of 1925 created Wis. 
Stat. § 204.30 (1925).  Subsection (1) of the new statute read: 
 
No policy of insurance against loss or damage 
resulting from accident to or injury suffered by an 
employe or other person and for which the person 
insured is liable, or against loss or damage to 
property caused by animals or by any vehicle drawn, 
propelled or operated by any motive power, and for 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
29 
 
which loss or damage the person insured is liable, 
shall be issued or delivered in this state, by any 
corporation or other insurer authorized to do business 
in this state, unless there shall be contained within 
such policy a provision that the insolvency or 
bankruptcy of the person insured shall not release the 
insurance carrier from the payment of damages for 
injury sustained or loss occasioned during the life of 
such policy, and stating that in case execution 
against the insured is returned unsatisfied in an 
action brought by the injured person, or his or her 
personal representative in case death results from the 
accident, because of such insolvency or bankruptcy, 
then an action may be maintained by the injured 
person, or his or her personal representatives against 
such corporation under the terms of the policy for the 
amount of the judgment in the said action not 
exceeding the amount of the policy. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
¶75 Over 
time, 
this 
provision 
was 
renumbered 
and 
reformulated.  It is now contained in Wis. Stat. § 632.22 and 
reads: 
 
Required 
provisions 
of 
liability 
insurance 
policies.  Every liability insurance policy shall 
provide that the bankruptcy or insolvency of the 
insured shall not diminish any liability of the 
insurer to 3rd parties and that if execution against 
the insured is returned unsatisfied, an action may be 
maintained against the insurer to the extent that the 
liability is covered by the policy. 
¶76 What is notable is that the new section begins with 
the words "Every liability insurance policy" and eliminates the 
language "issued or delivered in this state" that was in the 
former statute.  The Legislative Council Note to § 632.22 in ch. 
375, Laws of 1975, reads: "This section covers s. 204.30(1), 
slightly enlarged to cover all property damage liability 
insurance, and much edited." 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
30 
 
¶77 We think this section, like § 632.24, applies to 
insurance policies delivered or issued for delivery outside 
Wisconsin when the claim occurs in Wisconsin.  Thus, § 632.22 
would be another exception to Wis. Stat. § 631.01(1) if we 
agreed with National Union's interpretation of § 631.01(1). 
¶78 Accepting 
National 
Union's 
interpretation 
of 
§ 631.01(1) would require the court to reject the Caspers' 
grammatical interpretation of subsection (1), explain away the 
language in the Legislative Council's Note to the section,6 and 
shoehorn statutes like § 632.24 into the innocuous exception in 
paragraph (c) of the subsection.  On the other hand, accepting 
the Caspers' interpretation would have very broad implications 
for insurance policies that were not delivered or issued for 
delivery in Wisconsin——implications that go well beyond the 
issue of direct action. 
¶79 Our ultimate determination of the meaning and scope of 
§ 631.01(1) will fundamentally change the nature of the statutes 
that qualify as exceptions.  Depending on our interpretation of 
the subsection, the permitted exceptions will either be more 
expansive or more limited than the provision in the front of the 
subsection. 
 
We 
are 
not 
prepared 
to 
evaluate 
all 
the 
ramifications of such a determination. 
¶80 Consequently, we hold only that Wis. Stat. § 632.24 
applies 
to 
any 
policy 
of 
insurance 
covering 
liability, 
                                                 
6"Sub. (1) applies to contracts used in this state."  Wis. 
Stat. § 631.01(1) (emphasis added). 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
31 
 
irrespective of whether that policy was delivered or issued for 
delivery in Wisconsin, so long as the accident or injury occurs 
in this state.7  Accordingly, the decision in Kenison is 
overruled.  On the second issue regarding direct action, the 
decision of the court of appeals is reversed. 
C. 
Personal Liability of Corporate Officers 
¶81 The Caspers brought suit against Wenham for alleged 
negligence in approving the route driven by Wearing on the date 
of the accident——a route, they assert, that could not have been 
completed within federal safety requirements and was therefore 
illegal.  The claim is against Wenham as an individual who was 
allegedly negligent in the performance of his duties in his 
capacity as a corporate officer of Bestway.  Wenham asks us to 
hold that, as a matter of law, he cannot be held liable. 
¶82 The Caspers quote the following statement in their 
brief: "It is the general rule that an individual is personally 
liable for all torts the individual committed, notwithstanding 
the person may have acted as an agent or under directions of 
another.  This rule applies to torts committed by those acting 
in their official capacities as officers or agents of a 
corporation."  3A William Meade Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of 
the Law of Corporations, ch. 11, § 1135 (2011). 
¶83 Fletcher 
is 
a 
widely 
recognized 
treatise 
on 
corporations.  An earlier version of the treatise was cited in 
1979 
in 
Oxmans', 
86 
Wis. 2d at 
692-93, 
to 
support 
the 
                                                 
7 Wis. Stat. § 632.24 has the same reach as § 803.04(2). 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
32 
 
proposition that "[a]n individual is personally responsible for 
his own tortious conduct."8 
¶84 These 
propositions 
are 
readily 
understandable 
in 
situations 
involving intentional torts such as fraudulent 
misrepresentation, or situations like driving an automobile 
where a corporate officer's personal negligence would be treated 
the same as any other driver's.  Id., at 693.  These 
propositions are not so clear, however, when a plaintiff seeks 
to hold a corporate officer liable for his negligence in making 
an executive decision involving business. 
¶85 Oxmans' presented one side of this dilemma.  In 
Oxmans', the plaintiff meat company brought suit against 
Blacketer Restaurant Associates, Inc., and James Blacketer, an 
officer of the corporation, for more than $50,000 in unpaid meat 
delivered to Blacketer's restaurants.  Id. at 686, 690.  The 
lawsuit arose from a meeting between Oxmans' and Blacketer, at 
which Oxmans' presented a proposed schedule for payment of the 
Blacketer corporation's debt, and asked Blacketer to personally 
guarantee the outstanding account debt.  Id. at 690.  Blacketer 
                                                 
8 See also 1-6 Matthew Bender & Co., Liability of Corporate 
Officers and Directors § 6.07 (2010) ("A director or officer 
must participate in the tort in order to be liable therefor.  
The liability arises from one's conduct, not one's status as a 
director or officer."); W.A. Harrington, Annotation, Personal 
Civil Liability of Officer or Director of Corporation for 
Negligence of Subordinate Corporate Employee Causing Personal 
Injury or Death of Third Person, 90 A.L.R. 3d 916 (1980) ("An 
officer . . . is not, merely as a result of his standing as 
such, personally liable for torts of corporate employees; to 
incur responsibility he must ordinarily be shown to have in some 
way participated in or directed the tortious act."). 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
33 
 
told Oxmans' that he was willing to sign the guarantee, but that 
such an action was unnecessary because he personally, not the 
corporation, was a general partner, and he, Blacketer, was 
personally liable for the debt to Oxmans'.  Id.  It was later 
determined that the insolvent corporate defendant, not Blacketer 
personally, was the general partner in the restaurants.9  Id.   
¶86 The court held that Blacketer could be held personally 
liable for the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation based on the 
statements he made to Oxmans'.  Id. at 692.  Although the 
court's analysis focused on Blacketer's challenge to personal 
jurisdiction, it addressed the question of personal liability 
directly: 
A corporate agent cannot shield himself from personal 
liability 
for 
a 
tort 
he 
personally 
commits 
or 
participates in by hiding behind the corporate entity; 
if 
he 
is 
shown 
to 
have 
been 
acting 
for 
the 
corporation, the corporation also may be liable, but 
the individual is not thereby relieved of his own 
responsibility. 
Id. 
¶87 In an employment context, the court considered the 
liability of an employee driver where the liability of the state 
or municipal vehicle owner was precluded by statute.  Shannon v. 
                                                 
9 Wenham argues that because Bestway is a solvent corporate 
defendant, this court's holding in Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v. 
Blacketer, 
86 
Wis. 2d 683, 
273 
N.W.2d 285 
(1979), 
is 
distinguishable.  While it may be true that Wenham, unlike 
Blacketer, is not trying to "hide behind" an insolvent corporate 
defendant, 
the 
solvency 
of 
a 
corporation 
alone 
is 
not 
determinative of whether a corporate officer may be held 
personally liable. 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
34 
 
City of Milwaukee, 94 Wis. 2d 364, 289 N.W.2d 564 (1980).  The 
city's insurer, Continental Casualty Co., argued that the 
employee driver could not be sued because the action against the 
city as his employer was barred.  Id. at 369.  The court 
disagreed on the basis of the fundamental idea that the employee 
driver could be liable by virtue of his own alleged negligence.  
Id.  The Shannon court further explained:  
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior an employer 
can be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts 
of his employees while they are acting within the 
scope of their employment. The additional liability of 
the employer, however, does not shield the negligent 
employee from his own personal liability, nor does it 
supplant his liability with that of his employer. It 
provides only an alternative, and in some cases a more 
lucrative, source from which the injured party may 
recover his damages. 
Id. at 370 (citing Oxmans', 86 Wis. 2d at 692). 
¶88 In the instant case, we are not asked to reconsider 
either of these holdings.  Indeed, Wenham clearly states that he 
"does not contend that Oxmans' stands for the proposition that a 
corporate officer can never be held personally liable for non-
intentional conduct." 
¶89 Instead, Wenham distinguishes Oxmans' on the basis 
that the court was faced with an intentional tort committed by a 
corporate officer.  In this case, the Caspers do not allege any 
intentional tort; they allege negligence.  Wenham argues that 
the court of appeals erred in extending Oxmans' to this 
situation.  He also argues that the case law does not support 
personal 
liability 
for 
a 
non-intentional 
tort 
where 
the 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
35 
 
corporate officer of a solvent and insured company was acting in 
the scope of his duties. 
¶90 Wenham contends that, if the court of appeals' 
decision to allow personal liability for negligence is allowed 
to stand, "every CEO and officer of a trucking company can now 
be subjected to personal liability for every vehicular accident 
based upon virtually any negligence theory of liability."  We 
find this fear to be overstated.  Accordingly, we decline to 
hold that corporate officers may never be held personally liable 
for negligent acts committed in the scope of their corporate 
duties. 
¶91 In the alternative, Wenham argues that even if 
corporate officers may be liable for non-intentional torts 
committed in the course of performing their job, public policy 
considerations should preclude liability in this case.  In this 
respect, we agree. 
¶92 As a general rule, negligence is a question for the 
fact-finder, and is therefore unsuited to motions for summary 
judgment.  Lambrecht v. Estate of Kaczmarczyk, 2001 WI 25, ¶2, 
241 Wis. 2d 804, 623 N.W.2d 751.  Nevertheless, a court may 
determine that public policy precludes liability even where the 
plaintiff has proved the elements of negligence.  Gritzner, 235 
Wis. 2d 781, ¶26.  Accordingly, "when the facts are not complex 
and the relevant public policy questions have been fully 
presented, this court may determine whether public policy 
precludes liability before trial."  Id., ¶26. 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
36 
 
¶93 In this case, the Complaint states a claim for relief 
and an answer was filed.  The facts relevant to Wenham's alleged 
negligence are not particularly complex; indeed, some facts were 
conceded for the purpose of Wenham's summary judgment motion.  
Depositions were taken of Wenham, Wearing, Hofmann, and Marion, 
as well as Robert Coulter, a safety expert hired by the Caspers.  
We therefore conclude that the facts of record are sufficiently 
developed to allow the court to proceed to a public policy 
analysis.  See Butler v. Advanced Drainage Sys., 2006 WI 102, 
¶21, 294 Wis. 2d 397, 717 N.W.2d 760.  In doing so, "we assume 
there is negligence and that the negligence was a cause of the 
injury, but for reasons of public policy, we prevent the claim 
from proceeding."  Cole v. Hubanks, 2004 WI 74, ¶7, 272 
Wis. 2d 539, 681 N.W.2d 147. 
¶94 Traditionally, the court has identified six public 
policy factors that may operate to preclude liability: 
(1) the 
injury 
is 
too 
remote 
from 
the 
negligence; or (2) the injury is too wholly out of 
proportion 
to 
the 
culpability 
of 
the 
negligent 
tortfeasor; or (3) in retrospect it appears too highly 
extraordinary that the negligence should have brought 
about the harm; or (4) because allowance of recovery 
would place too unreasonable a burden on the negligent 
tortfeasor; or (5) because allowance of recovery would 
be too likely to open the way for fraudulent claims; 
or (6) allowance for recovery would enter a field that 
has no sensible or just stopping point. 
Id., ¶8. 
¶95 A court may find that liability is precluded on the 
basis of any one of these factors.  Smaxwell v. Bayard, 2004 WI 
101, ¶41, 274 Wis. 2d 278, 682 N.W.2d 923.  Wenham argues the 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
37 
 
first, second, fourth, and sixth factors to this court.  It is 
the first factor in particular——that the injury is too remote 
from the negligence——that we find compelling in this case. 
¶96 Wenham did not hire Wearing.  He did not train 
Wearing.  He did not supervise Wearing.  In fact, he never met 
the man driving the truck that collided with the Caspers' 
vehicle that day in May.  Any negligence on Wenham's part was 
remote from the Caspers' injury in terms of time, distance, and 
cause. 
¶97 The route that Wenham allegedly approved was designed 
at least a year and a half prior to the accident.  In Rockweit 
v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 427-28, 541 N.W.2d 742, we held 
that the injury of a child who fell in a fire pit was too remote 
from the alleged negligence of the defendant in choosing not to 
extinguish the embers the previous night.  We concluded as a 
matter of law "that the injury . . . suffered several hours 
later outside [the defendant's] presence is too remote from any 
alleged negligence on her part to impose liability."  Id. at 
428. 
¶98 Here, the injury suffered by the Caspers is similarly 
too remote from any alleged negligence Wearing may have 
committed one-and-a-half years prior to the accident. 
¶99 Wenham's alleged negligence was not only remote in 
time, but also remote in space.  Bestway was incorporated in 
Georgia, and its operating headquarters is located in Georgia.  
Wenham's office is located in Ohio.  Wearing's route, however, 
originated in Milwaukee, traveled through Indiana and Illinois, 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
38 
 
and ended in Milwaukee.  At no time did the route take Wearing 
through Ohio or Georgia.  Moreover, the accident itself took 
place in Wisconsin.  Any negligence on Wenham's part in 
approving a route, from his office in Ohio, to be driven 
entirely in other states, is simply too far removed from the 
injury the Caspers suffered in Wisconsin.10  We note that 
negligence attributable to acts outside Wisconsin would raise 
issues involving conflict of laws. 
¶100 Finally, and most significant, Wearing was under the 
influence of at least three prescription medications at the time 
of the accident.  The investigating officer's report notes, 
"Wearing was under the influence of these drugs to such a degree 
as to render him incapable of safely operating the motor vehicle 
he was driving at the time of the crash," in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 346.63(2)(a)1.  There is no allegation that Wenham was 
ever aware of Wearing's prescription drug use, or any evidence 
that Wearing's use of prescription pain killers was related to 
the allegedly illegal route he was driving.  Furthermore, while 
the investigating officer's report mentions two violations found 
in Wearing's logbook, "these were both from May 8, 2003 and 
probably did not have an effect on this crash."  Wearing's drug 
use raises significant questions of foreseeability for Wenham. 
¶101 Amici Wisconsin Insurance Alliance and Wisconsin Civil 
Justice Council direct us to the business judgment rule as 
                                                 
10 Oxmans', 86 Wis. 2d at 692, stressed the fact that 
Blacketer's misrepresentation to Oxmans' "is alleged to have 
been made . . . while he was physically present in the state." 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
39 
 
support for the proposition that corporate officers cannot be 
held liable in negligence for acts in the scope or course of 
their official duties.  In Einhorn v. Culea, 2000 WI 65, ¶19, 
235 Wis. 2d 646, 612 N.W.2d 78, the court described the business 
judgment rule as "a judicially created doctrine that limits 
judicial review of corporate decision-making when corporate 
directors make business decisions on an informed basis, in good 
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken is in the 
best interests of the company."  The business judgment rule is 
now reflected in part in Wis. Stat. § 180.0826: 
Unless the director or officer has knowledge that 
makes reliance unwarranted, a director or officer, in 
discharging his or her duties to the corporation, may 
rely on information, opinions, reports or statements, 
valuation reports any of which may be written or oral, 
formal or informal, including financial statements, 
valuation 
reports 
and 
other 
financial 
data, 
if 
prepared 
or 
presented 
by . . . [a]n 
officer 
or 
employee of the corporation whom the director or 
officer believes in good faith to be reliable and 
competent in the matters presented. 
¶102 However, the business judgment rule, as expressed in 
Einhorn and in Wis. Stat. § 180.0826, defines a corporate 
officer's duties to a company's shareholders, not to third 
parties.  Thus, the business judgment rule does not necessarily 
immunize a corporate executive from liability for negligence.  
Nonetheless, the very existence of a business judgment rule 
reflects public policy that corporate officers are allowed some 
latitude to make wrong decisions without subjecting themselves 
to personal liability.11 
                                                 
11 See also Wis. Stat. § 181.0855(1). 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
40 
 
¶103 This court has noted that "public policy is inexorably 
tied to legal cause in Wisconsin."  Fandrey v. Am. Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 2004 WI 62, ¶15, 272 Wis. 2d 46, 680 N.W.2d 345 
(internal quotations omitted).  The purpose of the public policy 
factors is to allow the court to step in to block liability, 
even though the negligence is a cause of the injury.  Id.  
Applying these well-established principles, we conclude that, 
even if Wenham's approval of Wearing's route was a cause of the 
accident, "the results are so unusual, remote, or unexpected 
that, in justice, liability ought not be imposed."  Koback v. 
Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 273, 366 N.W.2d 857 (1985) (superseded 
by statute on other grounds, as stated in Nichols v. Progressive 
Northern Insurance Co., 2008 WI 20, ¶9 n.5, 308 Wis. 2d 17, 746 
N.W.2d 220). 
¶104 In sum, even if Wenham approved the route driven by 
Wearing and even if such approval was negligent in light of 
federal safety regulations, the Caspers' injury is simply too 
remote to make him personally liable as an individual. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶105 In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
finding excusable neglect and granting National Union's motion 
to 
enlarge time. 
 Likewise, the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion by denying the Caspers' 
motion for default judgment.  We further hold that a policy need 
not be delivered or issued for delivery in this state in order 
to subject the insurer to a direct action under Wis. Stat. 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369 
41 
 
§§ 632.24 and 803.04(2).  Accordingly, we overrule Kenison v. 
Wellington Ins. Co.  Finally, we hold that, while a corporate 
officer may be liable in some situations for non-intentional 
torts committed in the scope of his employment, in this instance 
Wenham's actions are too remote to provide a basis for personal 
liability. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part and the cause is remanded 
to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶106 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (concurring 
in 
part, 
dissenting in part).  I agree with the majority that the circuit 
court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it 
enlarged the time for National Union to file an answer.  I 
further agree with the majority's determination that the 
plaintiffs may maintain a direct action claim against National 
Union under Wis. Stat. § 632.24.  Finally, I agree with the 
majority 
that 
Wenham, 
a 
corporate 
officer, 
may 
be 
held 
personally liable for negligent acts committed within the scope 
of his corporate duties.1   
¶107 I part ways with the majority, however, when it 
applies public policy considerations to preclude liability 
against Wenham at this early stage in the circuit court 
proceedings.  The majority's justification for remoteness based 
on time and distance is unsupportable in fact and in law.  
Further, I conclude that the facts are not sufficiently 
developed at this stage to determine whether Wenham's negligence 
was too remote from the cause of the accident to impose 
liability.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Lobato v. Pay Less Drug Stores, 261 F.2d 406, 
408-09 (10th Cir. 1958) ("It is the general rule that if an 
officer or agent of a corporation directs or participates 
actively in the commission of a tortious act or an act from 
which a tort necessarily follows or may reasonably be expected 
to follow, he is personally liable to a third person for 
injuries proximately resulting therefrom.  But merely being an 
officer or agent of a corporation does not render one personally 
liable for a tortious act of the corporation."); see also Escude 
Cruz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 619 F.2d 902, 907 (1st Cir. 
1980); Wilson v. McLeod Oil Co., 398 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. 1990). 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369.awb 
 
2 
 
I 
¶108 In this case, the relevant allegation against Wenham 
is that he negligently approved a route that was both illegal 
and unsafe.  It was illegal because it could not be completed 
within federal hours of service requirements, and it was unsafe 
because it permitted the driver no time to rest.   
¶109 The implications of this case extend well beyond 
Wenham.  The implications likewise extend beyond the plaintiffs, 
who sustained permanent and severe injuries in the accident.  
This case has implications for all of us who make use of the 
highways and byways of this state and assume that truck drivers 
are assigned routes that comply with federal safety regulations. 
¶110 For the purposes of its public policy analysis, the 
majority assumes——as it must——that Wenham's approval of the 
illegal route was negligent.2  Majority op., ¶93.  It sets forth 
the general rule that negligence is a question for the fact 
finder.  Id., ¶92.  It also recognizes an exception to the 
general rule: "when the facts are not complex and the relevant 
public policy questions have been fully presented, this court 
may determine whether public policy precludes liability before 
trial."  Id.  Relying on the fact that several depositions have 
                                                 
2 Although the majority asserts that it is assuming that 
Wenham was negligent and that his negligence was a cause of the 
injury, it undermines this assertion by referring to his 
"alleged" negligence and by minimizing the allegations against 
Wenham.  It likewise undermines this assertion by questioning 
whether Wearing's drug use was foreseeable.  The majority cannot 
have it both ways.  It cannot assume negligence for the sake of 
applying the public policy factors, but then assert that the 
public 
policy 
factors 
limit 
liability 
because, 
in 
its 
assessment, it has questions about whether Wenham was negligent. 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369.awb 
 
3 
 
been conducted,3 the majority contends that the relevant facts of 
this case are "sufficiently developed" and "not particularly 
complex."  Id., ¶93.  Ultimately, the majority concludes that, 
as a matter of public policy, this case should not be tried by a 
jury.  Id., ¶103. 
¶111 The reason given by the majority is that Wehman's 
negligence is too remote in time, distance, and cause.  Id., 
¶96.  In particular, the majority relies on the following facts: 
(1) the route Wenham approved was designed at least a year and a 
half 
prior 
to 
the 
accident, 
id., 
¶97; 
(2) 
Bestway 
is 
incorporated in Georgia and Wenham's office is in Ohio, whereas 
the accident occurred in Wisconsin, id., ¶99; and (3) the driver 
of the truck was under the influence of prescription medications 
at the time of the accident, id., ¶100.4   
II 
¶112 This court has cautioned against taking liability 
determinations away from the jury by the application of public 
policy factors.  We have stated that "cases in which a causally 
negligent tortfeasor is relieved of liability on judicial public 
policy grounds are infrequent and present unusual and extreme 
considerations."  Roehl Transp., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
                                                 
3 It appears that the record does not contain complete 
copies of the depositions.  Rather, it contains only excerpts.  
4 The majority also asserts that Wenham never met or 
directly supervised Wearing, the driver of the truck.  Majority 
op., ¶96.  This assertion is a red herring.  The relevant 
allegation here is that Wenham negligently approved the illegal 
and unsafe route that Wearing was driving, not that Wenham 
negligently trained or supervised Wearing.   
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369.awb 
 
4 
 
2010 WI 49, ¶141, 325 Wis. 2d 56, 784 N.W.2d 542; Butler v. 
Advanced Drainage Sys., 2006 WI 102, ¶19, 294 Wis. 2d 397, 717 
N.W.2d 760.  It is only when it would "shock the conscience of 
society to impose liability" that the court should intervene.  
Pawlowski v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 WI 105, ¶62, 322 
Wis. 2d 21, 777 N.W.2d 67.  
¶113 The majority's time-based justification for remoteness 
cannot be supported.  Wisconsin statutes and case law recognize 
that a tortious act may cause an injury at some later date, and 
that the tortfeasor can be held liable for the non-immediate 
consequences of his actions——well beyond the year-and-a-half at 
issue here.5  Additionally, Wisconsin has adopted what is known 
as the "discovery rule," under which the statute of limitations 
for tort claims begins to run on the date that the injured party 
discovers or should have discovered the injury.  Hansen v. A.H. 
Robins Co., Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983).  The 
discovery rule embodies Wisconsin's public policy——that a break 
in time between a negligent act and an injury need not preclude 
an injured plaintiff's recovery.  The majority's determination 
that the year-and-a-half interval between the negligence and the 
injury 
renders 
Wenham's 
negligence 
too 
remote 
to 
permit 
liability is unsupportable in fact and law. 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 893.89 (permitting a cause of 
action for injury resulting from improvement to real property 
when the injury occurs and the action commences within 10 years 
of the improvement); Zielinski v. A.P. Green Indus. Inc., 2003 
WI App 85, 263 Wis. 2d 294, 661 N.W.2d 491 (plaintiff was 
allowed to maintain a lawsuit alleging that exposure to asbestos 
in 1957-1963 resulted in a 1999 diagnosis of mesothelioma). 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369.awb 
 
5 
 
¶114 Similarly, the majority's contention that remoteness 
in space warrants application of the public policy factors to 
preclude liability is a non-starter.  Bestway is engaged in a 
national business that sends drivers to many different states.  
Under those circumstances, Wenham can expect that his negligent 
approval of an illegal route may produce direct consequences in 
remote locations.  I see no relevant distinction between an 
accident in Georgia (where Bestway is incorporated) or Ohio 
(where Wehman keeps an office) and the accident that did occur 
in Wisconsin, across several borders.     
¶115 In this case, the real questions revolve around 
causation.  The legal cause question is whether Wenham's 
negligent approval of an illegal route that was unsafe because 
it would not permit the driver an opportunity to rest was 
sufficiently remote from the accident that it would "shock the 
conscience of society to impose liability."  Pawlowski, 322 
Wis. 2d 21, ¶62.  There also remain factual questions about 
causation.  Such questions generally are "for the jury unless 
the facts are so clear that reasonable persons could not differ 
on the question."  Stewart v. Wulf, 85 Wis. 2d 461, 469, 271 
N.W.2d 79 (1978).   
¶116 The majority foregoes factual development and short-
circuits a jury determination.  It appears to find that 
Wearing's use of prescription medication was the factual cause 
of 
the 
accident 
and 
that 
Wearing's 
use 
of 
prescription 
medication was unrelated to the illegal route he was driving.  
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369.awb 
 
6 
 
See majority op., ¶100.  It implies that any violation of safety 
standards "probably did not have an effect on this crash."  Id.    
¶117 When I search the record and the depositions relied 
upon by the majority, I conclude that the facts are not so 
clear.  Instead, I determine that many factual questions remain.   
¶118 The majority bases its finding of fact that Wearing's 
use of prescription medication was the factual cause of the 
accident on a single sentence contained within an investigator's 
four-page report.  See id.  When I review the report, I conclude 
that it is significantly more ambiguous than the majority 
contends.   
¶119 A blood sample was drawn from Wearing immediately 
after the accident, and it was later analyzed by an analyst at 
the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory.  The blood was found to 
contain 
Oxycodone, 
Diazepam, 
Nordiazepam, 
Caffeine, 
and 
Tocopheral (Vitamin E).   
¶120 According to the investigator's report, the analyst 
said "she would not use the word 'impaired' in any testimony she 
would give" regarding the drug levels in Wearing's blood: 
[The analyst] told me that Diazepam and Nordiazepam 
are basically the same drug and can be considered as 
one when looking at the levels of it in the blood.  
[The analyst] said she would not use the word 
"impaired" in any testimony she would give regarding 
these blood levels.  She said she would testify that 
these drugs are central nervous system depressants and 
at these levels in a person's blood would cause an 
increase in drowsiness and have a general sedating 
effect on the person.  [The analyst] told me that the 
amount of Oxycodone in Wearing's blood was slightly 
above normal therapeutic levels, but she would need to 
know more about the amounts taken and the timeframe 
that 
they 
were 
taken 
in 
before 
making 
a 
more 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369.awb 
 
7 
 
definitive statement about this.  She said that the 
levels of Diazepam/Nordiazepam were slightly below 
normal therapeutic levels, but again provided the same 
caveat regarding the dosage and timeframe in which the 
drug was taken.             
Ultimately, the investigator concluded that the accident "was 
caused by driver error on the part of Wearing." 
¶121 It is likewise unclear from this record that Wearing's 
prescription drug use was unrelated to the illegal route.  
Wearing stated that he developed back pain in May of 2003, three 
years after he began driving routes for Bestway, and that he had 
been prescribed the three medications he was taking at the time 
of the accident for his pain.     
¶122 In his deposition, Wearing explained that Bestway's 
routes required him to mark his unloading time as off-duty, a 
practice that violates federal safety regulations: "I would have 
to mark my unloading time as off duty because I would run out of 
hours."  He stated that he felt tired on the day of the accident 
and that he has felt tired on his overnight runs.     
¶123 It may be that Wearing's fatigue and back pain stemmed 
from driving an illegal route that could not be completed within 
federal safety standards and was unsafe because it permitted 
Wearing no time to rest.  It may be that Wenham's negligent 
approval of the illegal route directly contributed to the 
accident.      
¶124 Once the facts are developed, reasonable minds may 
differ as to whether the plaintiffs' injuries are too remote 
from Wenham's negligence to impose liability.  However, on this 
record, I determine that many factual questions remain.  Because 
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369.awb 
 
8 
 
this case does not present "unusual and extreme circumstances" 
such that the application of public policy considerations is 
appropriate at this time, I would remand to the circuit court 
for trial.6  Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and 
dissent in part. 
¶125 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence/dissent.   
         
 
 
 
                                                 
6 I also conclude that the business judgment rule, cited by 
the majority at ¶101, is irrelevant to a public policy analysis.  
As the majority acknowledges, the business judgment rule 
circumscribes 
an 
officer's 
liability 
to 
the 
company's 
shareholders, not to third parties, and therefore does not 
immunize 
a 
corporate 
executive 
from 
liability 
for 
his 
negligence.  Id., ¶102.  
No.  2006AP1229 & 2006AP2512 & 2007AP369.awb 
 
 
 
1