Case Title: People v. Blaylock

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89082

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-11-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 89082-Agenda 11-September 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								CAMERUN BLAYLOCK, Appellant.
Opinion filed November 21, 2002.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	This case presents us with a unique set of circumstances. The
original issue raised before this court is whether the State could
retry defendant for first degree murder where the trial exhibits
from defendant's first trial, allegedly favorable to defendant, were
lost by the circuit clerk of Vermilion County. After this issue was
fully briefed by both parties, but before oral arguments, the
missing box of trial exhibits were found in the clerk's office. We
stayed proceedings and remanded the cause to the circuit court for
a hearing on the status of the recently discovered evidence. The
circuit court completed this hearing in February 2002. We allowed
defendant's motion to file a supplemental brief concerning the
issues raised and findings made on remand. We must now
determine whether the original issue raised before this court is
moot in light of the reappearance of the missing trial exhibits and
whether this court should consider the new issue raised in
defendant's supplementary brief.

BACKGROUND
	In 1993, defendant was indicted on five counts of first degree
murder and six counts of home invasion in connection with the
murder of Robin Jackson. The testimony at trial showed that
defendant, Ranterris Landfair and Arnell Render drove to the
victim's house. While Landfair waited in the car, Render and
defendant kicked in the front door of the house and gained
entrance. Once inside the house, Render stabbed the victim with
a jagged knife two times and defendant shot the victim three times.
As the three men drove away from the house, defendant and
Render undressed and threw the clothes and shoes they were
wearing out of the car window. At trial, defendant argued that he
could not be found guilty because the State's witnesses, Landfair
and Render, were not believable. He pointed out that the jacket
and shoes that were recovered by the police did not fit defendant
but, instead, fit Landfair. Defendant's theory was that he was not
at the scene of the crime. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury
returned a guilty verdict as to the home invasion counts, but
deadlocked on the first degree murder counts. Defendant was
sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment in the Department of
Corrections.
	The trial court granted the State's motion to retry defendant
on the murder counts. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
murder charges arguing that retrial violated double jeopardy
grounds. The trial court denied this motion and defendant
appealed. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling and
remanded for retrial. People v. Blaylock, No. 4-95-0381
(December 26, 1997) (unpublished order under Supreme Court
Rule 23). This court denied defendant's petition for leave to
appeal. People v. Blaylock, 178 Ill. 2d 584 (1998) (leave to appeal
denied).
	In 1998, defendant learned that the clerk's office had lost the
exhibits admitted into evidence at the previous trial. During the
trial, the State had 59 exhibits admitted into evidence and
defendant had 33 exhibits admitted into evidence. The items
admitted into evidence included the clothing that defendant and
Render had thrown out of the car after the commission of the
crime, the gun, bullets and shoes that were discarded, a card
written by Render to his girlfriend, and the shoes defendant wore
at the time of his arrest. The only exhibits that could be located
were the gun, bullets, and bullet casings.
	 After learning that the majority of the evidence used during
first trial was lost, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the murder
indictment, arguing that retrying him without the lost exhibits
deprived him of due process of law.
	Defendant argued that the trial exhibits were exculpatory.
Specifically, he contended that the shoes and the jacket that were
recovered by the police did not fit defendant but, rather, fit
Landfair. Defendant argued that these exhibits were used to
impeach the State's witnesses and show that defendant was not
present at the crime scene. The trial court agreed, finding that the
missing evidence was "critically important" to defendant and, in
December 1998, granted defendant's motion to dismiss the
indictment. The State appealed this order (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1))
and the appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court and
again remanded for retrial. 311 Ill. App. 3d 399.
	We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal in May
2000. The parties proceeded to brief the issue of whether
defendant's right to due process would be violated if the State
retried him on the murder charges without the missing evidence.
On November 30, 2000, while briefing was still in progress, the
circuit clerk of Vermilion County informed the parties that the
missing evidence in question had been found. Defendant filed a
motion for a stay of appeal and a limited remand to the circuit
court for a review of the evidence and a determination of whether
it was the same evidence used in the first trial. This court granted
defendant's motion.
	The trial court conducted hearings on several dates. It
concluded that the evidence found by the clerk's office was, in
fact, the evidence used at defendant's first trial. Defendant sought
clarification of this court's mandate, and, following an order from
this court clarifying its mandate, the circuit court held a second
hearing concerning the evidence. The circuit court found that the
evidence was missing as early as June or July 1997. The court
further found that the evidence was not in the possession or
custody of the clerk's office during this time, either in the vault
where it was eventually found or elsewhere within the clerk's
office or space. The location of the evidence during this time, the
identity of the person or persons who had custody of the evidence,
and the circumstances surrounding its mysterious reappearance are
unknown. The trial court specifically found that the sheriff's office
was not responsible for the missing evidence. According to the
trial court, the State knew of the missing evidence in June or July
of 1997, during the first appeal, but did not disclose this fact to the
court or defendant until September 1998, more than a year later.
The court specifically made no determination of whether the
evidence was in the same condition as it was at the time of trial.
	Following the conclusion of the proceedings in the circuit
court, defendant sought leave from this court to file a
supplemental brief, which this court granted. In his supplemental
brief, defendant argues that his right to a speedy trial would be
violated if he were retried now after a period of more than three
years.

ANALYSIS
	In light of the reappearance of the missing trial exhibits, we
must address whether the original issue raised in defendant's
appeal is moot. Defendant maintains that this court should decide
how it would have ruled on the original issue of whether his due
process rights were violated. Specifically, defendant argues that
this court should consider the original issue as part of the speedy-trial issue raised in the supplemental brief. That is, defendant
contends that this court must determine whether it was reasonable
for him to have failed to file a speedy-trial demand. In making this
determination, this court should decide how it would have ruled on
the original due process issue. The State counters that any
consideration of the original due process issue is inappropriate
since the evidence has been located, rendering the original due
process issue moot.
	We agree with the State and find that the original issue in this
case is clearly moot. A question is said to be moot when it presents
or involves no actual controversy, interests or rights, or where the
issues involved have ceased to exist. Chicago City Bank & Trust
Co. v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 386 Ill. 508
(1944); see Hill v. Murphy, 14 Ill. App. 3d 668 (1973) (the
function of the courts is to decide controverted issues in adversary
proceedings; moot cases which do not present live issues are not
ordinarily entertained). Courts of review will generally not
consider moot or abstract questions because our jurisdiction is
restricted to cases which present an actual controversy.
Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 522-23 (2001).
When a reviewing court has notice that substantial questions
involved in the trial court no longer exist, it will dismiss the
appeal. People v. Redlich, 402 Ill. 270 (1949).
	Here, defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal from the
appellate court's reversal of the trial court's dismissal of the
murder charges against him. The issue on appeal was whether the
trial court incorrectly ruled that a retrial without the missing
exhibits violated defendant's due process rights. Before oral
arguments on the due process issue, the missing trial exhibits were
found. Once the exhibits were found, we stayed defendant's due
process appeal and remanded this cause back to the trial court for
a hearing to determine the status of the missing evidence and any
pertinent findings regarding the disappearance and reappearance.
The trial court determined that the exhibits were, in fact, those that
were used in defendant's first trial. Because the trial exhibits have
resurfaced, we need not determine how we would have ruled on
the original due process issue when the exhibits were missing. The
issue has been rendered moot by the reappearance of the missing
trial exhibits.
	Defendant further urges this court to vacate the appellate
court's judgment and affirm the trial court's dismissal of the
murder charges against him on the basis of a violation of his
constitutional right to a speedy trial. He argues that if the entire
course of events following defendant's filing of the motion to
dismiss are attributable to the State, then retrial has been delayed
in violation of defendant's right to a speedy trial. He urges this
court to apply a four-part balancing test to make this
determination, including a consideration of (1) length of delay; (2)
reason for delay; (3) prejudice to defendant; (4) defendant's
assertion of his rights. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972); People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42
(2001). He notes that three years and three months have elapsed
since the trial court dismissed the first degree murder charges
against defendant. Defendant maintains that this is a delay of such
magnitude that this court should recognize it as presumptively
prejudicial so as to trigger a speedy-trial analysis. Defendant
further maintains that it would be in the interest of judicial
economy for this court to address the speedy-trial issue in this case
rather than remand it to the trial court to rule on the issues first.
	The State counters that this court lacks jurisdiction to review
the speedy-trial issue. The State contends that jurisdiction in this
matter is conferred by Supreme Court Rule 604(a), which permits
appeals by the State from orders dismissing a charge, and Supreme
Court Rule 315, which provides for petitions for leave to appeal.
The sole issue on appeal, the State notes, was the propriety of the
trial court's ruling that defendant's due process rights would be
violated if he were retried without the missing trial exhibits. The
State contends that the due process issue is the only one that is
properly before this court on appeal from the appellate court's
reversal of the trial court's order, not the speedy-trial issue raised
in the supplemental brief. Because there was no order from the
trial court, final or otherwise, with regard to a speedy-trial
violation, the State argues that it is improper for this court to
consider that issue.
	We conclude that we need not address the State's jurisdiction
argument because, given the unique procedural history of this
case, the record before us is inadequately developed. This issue
has never been raised in the trial court. Following the reappearance
of the missing evidence, the trial court made certain findings.
Specifically, the trial court determined that the missing evidence
is the same evidence used in defendant's first trial, the clerk's
office was not in possession of the evidence, the evidence was
missing as early as June or July 1997, the sheriff's office was not
responsible for the missing evidence, and the State knew that the
evidence was missing in June or July 1997. These were the only
findings that the trial court made. The location of the evidence,
during its mysterious disappearance, has yet to be determined. The
identity of the person or persons who had custody of the evidence
and the circumstances surrounding its sudden reappearance are
unknown. Further, the condition of the evidence is unclear. We
believe that the trial court is in the best position to make these, and
any other determinations, necessary for the resolution of the
speedy-trial issue. Consequently, we decline to review the speedy-trial issue based on limited information and an undeveloped
record.
	For the foregoing reasons, defendant's appeal is dismissed
and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.
Appeal dismissed.