Case Title: Kamalu v. State.

Citation: 110 Haw. 269

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-04-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
‘#8 FOR PUBLICATION ***
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

000 —-

DAVID KAMALU and ROKANNE KAMALU,
Plaintiffs,

   

and

STATE OF HAWAT'T,
Defendant -Appellant /Cross-Appellee,

02:6 KY 61 Ya¥ 9000

 

PAREN, INC. d/b/a Park Engineering,
Defendant -Appel lee/Cross-Appellant,

and
HAWAII GEOTECHNICAL GROUP, INC., d/b/a Walter Lum Associates,
Defendant-Appel lee
No. 24671

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(Civ. No. 97-4959-12)

APRIL 19, 2006

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND ACOBA, JJ.,
AND CIRCUIT JUDGE MASUOKA, IN PLACE OF DUFFY, J., RECUSED

OPINION OF THE COURT BY LEVINSON, J.

As prevailing parties on appeal to this court in Kamalu

wu Parin, Inc., No. 24671, see summary disposition order (Haw.
Jan. 23, 2006) [hereinafter “SDO”], the defendant-appellee/cross-
appellant ParEn, Inc. (Parfn) and the defendant-appellee Hawaii

Geotechnical Group, Inc. (HGG) [hereinafter, collectively, “the

Appellees”) each filed a separate request for this court to award

them fees and costs incurred on appeal. ParEn requests a total

oat
 

FOR PUBLICATION +#*

of $305,397

 

7. HGG requests @ total of $20,837.78. The
defendant-appellant/cross-appeliee State of Hawai'i (hereinafter,
“the State”) filed a separate objection to
For the reasons discussed infra in parts 11.B and
II.C.2 to .4, we grant both of the Appellees’ requests in part as

 

ch request.

summarized infra in part III.

I. BACKGROUND
‘The underlying dispute arose out of an accident at the

site of a State-owned construction project. The plaintiff David

 

Kamalu was an employee of the Hawaiian Dredging and Construction
Company (HDCC), the general contractor.’ Effective August 6,
1992, ParEn entered into a contract with the State “wherein Parén
agreed to provide certain design services for the Project,
including the preparation of plans and specifications.” ParEn in
turn hired HGG as @ subcontractor. On December 7, 1995, “the
soil under the (moss-rock] wall that had been exposed by the
(project) failed, . . . causing . . . Kamalu to jump off a
working platform and sustain injuries.” On December 4, 1997,
Kamalu and the plaintiff Roxanne Kanalu (hereinafter,

collectively, “the Plaintiffs”] filed a complaint alleging in

 

relevant part

9. The State had the right, authority, end duty to
eins

 

Conditions existing thereon and adjacent thereto,

10. (Parin and the state] had full knowledge that
many persons, including Workers such as [David], would be
present on and about the construction

Ii. Althouga [ParEn and the State) knew of, of should
have known of, the dangerous and/or defective condition of
the wall, and/or the dangers in conducting construction
activities adjacent to the wall, (Paria and the statel,

 

 

 

 

 

 

+ Kenalu and HOCC were not parties to the appeal

2
 

$2, “Tdavial was injured ase direct and proximate
result of the pealigence of (Parkn and the State)

aS. “the inoident was caused by the Healicence,
actions and/or omissions of (barkn and the sxatel

1c 'She a direct and proximate resuit of JearBo's ond

BEA Mdsscriptions of injuries)

gol “Siaine state... retained (Parin] as its
consultant

JE"... pursuant to its contract with the State,
[Partn} was under a duty to provide services before and
Garing construction ves

1. (Paren] gealigenty performed or negligently
failed to perform ste duties, which pegligence cirectly and
Broximately resulted in the damages to. [the]
Pleineiets :

 

34)". . (paren and the State) are liable to [the]
Plaintiffs under the theories of bresch of warranty, implied
warranty, siist Lisbility, defective design, defective
fanotecture, failure to supervise, failure to warn,
ainteining of cresting unsafe premises and/or an unsafe
Place to work, Zeapondeat superior,

Sgency lisbilieyls] partnership iisbility(,] ang/or
otherwise

(Some emphases added and some in original.)

‘on May 14, 2000 and June 4, 2001, respectively, ParEn

and HGG filed cross-claims against the State. See Hawai'i Rules

of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 13(g).? Parn’s pleading averred

in relevant part:

 

against § covrarty

RCP Rule 13(g) provides:

1A pleading nay state az a cross-claim any claim by one party
either or ofa

Hat ia the subject patter
Elinterciain therein or releting to any property that is the

subject mat
Sneluge 2 claim that the party against whom it ie

   

‘of the original action. Such cross-claim may

sserted is oF

 

hoy be lisble bo the croes-clainant for sll-or part of a claim

Eeserted in the action ageinst the cros:

 

claiaant.

 
‘*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

2. If [the] Plaintiffs were injured and damaged as
alleges in their complaint, such injuries and danages were
é by the nealigense, strict Liability, breach of
"ss and/or inpiied warranty, breach of contract and/or

   

  

ox
Breach of other legal city of the Stare ©

neshingaca of ics oontenctors

te Any negligent act or omission on the part of ParEn
wias] passive and-secondary whereas the negligent acts oF
Oniseions of the State were primary and active, ang
therefore, Paren is entitled to indemnification from the
State.

 

&." 11. [re it be determined that aren is in any
way Liable, auch Liabilsty is the result of the acts and/or
onissions of the State...» and ParBn is entitled to
Feinbursenent, subrogation, indemnification and/or
contrizution irom the State

 

 

(Emphases added.) HGG’s pleading was materially identical,
substituting its own name for that of ParEn.

‘on June 21, 2001, the Appellees and the State
stipulated “that the total anount of damages in this action [is]
set at $1,150,000.00." On duly 11, 2001, the Appellees, the
State, and the Plaintiffs stipulated to the dismissal with
prejudice of “all clains of [the] Plaintiffs . . . against all
claims between (the state}

 

{d]efendants,” providing that “{c} ros:
and [the Appellees} are not dismissed.”
‘The Appellees’ cross-claims proceeded to trial. on

 

September 21, 2001, the circuit court entered findings of fact
(FOFs), conclusions of law (Cols), and an order in favor of the
Appellees and against the State for $1,150,000.00. On October
10, 2001, the circuit court entered 2 judgment providing that
“the State is solely liable for the injuries and damages
sustained by [the Plaintiffs], and accordingly, the State shall
pay the sum of $1,150,000.00 to (the Appellees] .”
 

*** FOR PUBLICATION
on November 6, 2001, the State timely filed its notice

of appeal from the circuit court’s October 10, 2001 judgment. on

 

Novenber 20, 2001, ParEn timely filed its notice of cross-appeal
from the September 21, 2001 FOFs, COLs and order. On January 23,
2006, via sunmary disposition order, we affirmed the circuit
court’s October 10, 2001 judgment. S00 at 3. This court filed
its notice of judgment on appeal on February 22, 2006. On March
7 and 8, 2006, ParEn and HGG, respectively, timely filed the

present requests.

IT, piscusston
A. Introduction

ParEn seeks reimbursement for: (1) attorneys’ fees for
(a) completed work ($55,888.00) and (b) work in progress
($2326.00); (2) the costs of (a) transcripts ($325.54), (b)
filing fees ($327.36), and (c) printing/copying of
briefs/appendices ($2,159.66); and (3) postjudament interest on
(a) the costs listed supra ($4.31), and (b) the $1,150,000.00
judgment in favor of the Appellees ($244,367.00). In support of
ite request, ParEn cites Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure
(HRAP) Rules 37, 39, 53(b), and 54(b) and Hawai'i Revised
Statutes (HRS) $§ 607-9 (1993), 607-14 (Supp. 1997) and 662-8
(1993).

 

HRAP Rule 37 provides in relevant part

Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for money in
a civil case is affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by la
Enall be payable from the date the judgnent was entered in the
circust of district cours.
(continued...)
   

FOR PUBLICATION *#1

 

HGG seeks reimbursement fo1

($16, 340.03)

 

(2) attorneys’

 

 

and (2) the costs of (a) printing/copying of
briefs/appendices ($13.60) and (b) trial transcripts ($225.78).

2. continued)

WRAP Rule 29 provides in relevant part:

 

 

(a)... Except in criminel cases or as otherwise provided

by law, dea Sodgrent is affirmed. . |, costs shail be

Caxed against the appellant ..... unless otherwise ordered...
(elo . \'Sa"Gases involving the state of Hawaii... if

an sare of Gots against the State is authorized by law, costs
Shall be awarded in accordance with the provisions of this rule:
Stherwise costs shall not be awarded for or against the State of
Maver

ic)... Coste in the appellate courts are defined as: (1)
tthe cost of the original and one copy of the reporter’ s
Llanscripte if necessary for the determination of the appeals

TESTS the fee for filing the appeal; (4) the cost of printing

Gr’ otherwise producing necessary copies of briefs and appendices,
Srovides thet copying costs shall not exceed 20¢ per pager and (3)
Shy other costs authorised by statute or rule.

(a tt)" party who desires an award of attorney's
fees of coats hall request them by submitting an itemized and
ferities Bill of fees ov costs s+

 

 

 

URS § 607-9 provides in relevant part

 

All actual disbursements, including but not Limited to - . -
incidental expenses, ineludiag’ copying costs, .. . sworn to by en
attorney, regnd deened reasonable by the Court, may be
Sllowed in taxation of costs

HRS § 607-14 provides in relevant part:

in al the courte, in all actions in the nature of assumpsit
«sy there shall be taxed as attorneys” fees, to be paid by the
jostag party ss sy 2 fee that the court determines tobe
Feasonable =. |

HRS § 662-8 provice

on ali final judgments rendered against the State in actions
instituted under this chapter, [the State Tort Liability Act.]
Interest shall be computed st the rate of four per cent s year
fron the date of jucgnent up to, Bot not exceeding, thirty days
after the date of approval of any approprietion act providing for
Payment of the judgment.

‘The renaining provisions cited by Parka are inapplicable. It apparently used
a superseded eaition of the local rules; HAP Rule 53(8) ‘wes repealed
Stfective January 1, 2006.” HRS § 54(b) does not exist, or, Af ParEn meant to
Cite to WRCP Rule 54, thet rule pertains to costs and fees in the circuit
Courts, gee WRCP Rule 1.

 

 

 

 

 

   
4#* FOR PUBLICATION *#*
In support, HGG cites HRAP Rule 39 and HRS $5 607-14, 607-15.5
(1993), and 607-24 (1993).

B. Attorneys’ Fees

ParEn claims that, inasmuch as it and the State “sought

 

contractual remedies such as damages for the breach of contract(
and} rescission, . . . the claims by and between the (State) and

(ParEn] remain{) fundamentally a contract lawsuit and in the

 

nature of assumpsit,” warranting reimbursement of its attorney:
fees pursuant to HRS § 607-14, see supra note 3, (Citing Blair
wsIng, 96 Hawai'i 327, 31 P.3d 184 (2001); Leslie v. Estate of
Tavares, 93 Hawai'i 1, 6, 994 P.2d 1047, 1052 (2000); Braham ve
Honolulu Amusement Co., 21 Haw. 583 (1913); Fogarty v. State, 5
Haw. App. 616, 705 P.2d 72 (1985); Hong v. Kona, 5 Haw. App. 174,
683 P.2d 833 (1984); Helfand v. Gerson, 105 F.3d 530 (9th Cir.
1997).

 

‘igs § 607-15.5 provides in relevant part
Im all tort actions in which a judgaent is entered by @
court of competent Jurisdiction, attomeys’ fees for both the
plaincit# and the defendant shail be limited to # reasonable
Gnount as approved by the court having Jurisdiction of the action.
{hvany tert action in which # setelenent ia effected, the
plaints! or che defendant nay request that the amount of their
Fespective attorneys” fees be subject to approval of the court
having Jurisaiction of the action.

 

 

 

HRS § €07-24 provides in relevant part:

Neither the State nor any county or any political
subdivision, beard, cr commission thereo!, nor any officer, acting
in the officer's official capacity on behalf of the State or any
County ef other political subdivision, board, oF commission.
Ehereof, shall be taxed costs Tp all cases in which &
Einal jadgnent . - + i8 obtained against the State, . .. the
prevailing party shall be reimbursed by the state() |! | all
Sctval disbursements, not including attorney"s fees or
CSnmissions, made by the prevailing party and approved by the

 
+4 FOR PUBLICATION ***
NGG asserts that “since @ contribution claim ‘sounds in
contract’ and is in the nature of assumpsit, HGG should recover
its... fees . . . pursuant to [HRS] § 607-14." HGG adds that
**courts in Hawai("]i regularly award attorneys’ fees . . .

against various governmental entities.‘” (Quoting Hawaiian Isles.

Enters, v. Citv § County of Honolulu, 76 Hawai'i 487, 493, 879
P.2d 1070, 1076 (1994).) In the alternative, HGG states:

 

“{elven S£ HGG’s judgment against the State... is. . . based
in tort rather than contract, HGG is still entitied to .

attorneys’ fe

 

pursuant to [HRS § 607-15.5, see supra note 47.”

In the State’s opposition to ParEn, we can divine no
coherent argument from its first subsection regarding fees:
“HRAP Rule 39(d) [, see supra note 3,] does not entitle prevailing
parties to recover attorney's fees in all appeals because it only
allows parties to file motions for attorney's fees and costs.”
(Emphases omitted.) The State further argues that the Appellee:
cannot recover fees pursuant to HRS § 607-14 because

{tine Judgment in the [ekrcust) court was not based on oF

pursuant cove contract claim... + The state was found

Folely Liable Based fon] negligence or tort law, not breach
of contract.

    

Luapiiity for contribution cannot be based on a breach
of contract because liability is based on the Uniform
Contribution Among Torefeasore Act(, HRS $§ 663-11 to -27)

ithe’appeliees*) citation to and reliance (on) URS
§ 607-14 is frivolous... .. The clains raised in this
Lawsuit did not “factually implicate” a contract or the
breach of a contract. The Complaint .. . as limited to
negiigence claims agoinat all partie

 

 

Ll line references to breach of contract were
decorative and not germane to the tort claims being
litigated

(Citing Drover v. Adams, 102 Hawai'i 399, 432, 77 P.3d 63, 116

 

®
4% FOR PUBLICATION *+*

(2003) Leplie, 93 Hawai'i at 6, 994 P.2d at 1052 (2000);
Karasawa v, TIG ins. Co., 88 Hawai'i 77, 80-81, 962 P.2d 1171,
1174-75 (App. 1998).)

Moreover, the State rejects HGG’s application of HRS
§ 607-15.5:

[t}hat statute does not authorize the Court to award
attorneys" fees in tort actione or entitle the prevailing
jarty to recover fees in tort actions. HGG does not inform
Ehe Court that the legislative intent underlying this
statute nas to grant (cJoures the “discretionary authority
fo review attorney's fees” in all tort actions including the
Contingent fee arrangements. The statute authorizes the
[cloures to review attorneys’ fees in order "to Limit
attorneys’ fees to s reasonable amount.” The legislative
history does not reflect an intent that: 1) attorneys’ fees
are recoverable in tore actions; or 2) Hawsif']: should
Gopart from the established principle that attorney's fees

 

 

 

   

  

 

Gre not recoverable... in tort sctions.
(citing Chun v. Park, 51 Haw. 462, 462 P.2d 905 (1969).)

Finally,’ the State asserts that the amounts that the
Appellees request in fees are unreasonable and inadequately
documented.

In its reply, ParEn argues that, in Fought & Co. v,
Stee] Eno’ & Erection, Inc., 87 Hawai'i 37, 951 P.2d 487 (1998),
we “awarded fees and costs to the prevailing part(y] and
explained that the doctrine of sovereign inmunity did not

preclude the award of appellate costs and attorney fees to (a)

The State inserts ite own “request” for attorneys’ fees, actually
a veiled motion for sanctions: “The State should be reinbursed for ite
attorney's fees to oppose [ParEn’s sJequest ‘The State's fees shoul
be borne by Par(EJn who should not have filed this frivolous Request to obtain
an Unwarranted windfall of mon{ie]s from the State.” While we Bay levy
onetary sanctions pursuant to ARAP Able 51, ParEn’s argument concerning HRS
$ 607-24 was not a0 Ranifestiy and palpably without nerit() so as to
indicate bed faith on (Parin's] part Such that argument to the coure was not
Fequired,’” ase Canalez v. Bob's Aucliance Serv, Ctr,, 99 Hawaii 292, 300,
592 P.2d 295, 209 (1999) (quoting Colle. Mecarthy, 12 Haw. 20, 23, 804 P.2¢
881, 87 (1992)). Consequently, we do not find thet sanctions’ are warranted

 

 

   

 

°
‘44 FOR PUBLICATION ##*
general contractor on [an] airport terminal construction contract
against the State Department of Transportation.”

“assumpsit is @ common law form of action which allows
for the recovery of damages for the non-performance of a
contract, either express or implied, written or verbal, as well
as quasi contractual obligations.” Schulz v. Honsador, Inc., 67
Haw. 433, 435, 690 P.2d 279, 2861 (1984); see also Scott v. Kone
Dew. Co., 22 Haw. 408 (1913) (*{A] breach of the promise declared

on is of the essence of the action of assumpsit.”). Wheth

 

“assumpsit” exists so as to trigger HRS § 607-14 depends upon the
“essential character of the underlying action in the trial
court.” See Leslie, 93 Hawai'i at 4, 994 P.2d at 1050-51.

In Healy-Tibbitts Constr. Co. v. Hawaiian Indep, Refs
Ince, 673 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1962) (applying Hawei' law), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
the plaintiff’s inclusion of two claims “arguably in tort” among
five contract claims in the complaint “{a]t most . . . raise(d] a

doubt as to whether the action was in assumpsit or in tort,” but

 

Gig not rebut “the presumption . . . that it sounded] in
assumpsit and not tort.” Id, at 285-86. Nonetheless, the court
acknowledged that “[i]£ the contract claims are merely
decorative, for instance, and not gexmane to the genuine dispute
being litigated, the court might appropriately decline to apply
the provisions of [HRS $] 607-14." Id. at 266 (in dictum).

In the present matter, the Plaintiffs’ claims sounded
in tort and not assumpsit. The essence of their allegations was

that ParEn’s and the State’s negligent failure to protect David

10
444 FOR PUBLICATION ***
from “dangerous and/or defective conditions” legally caused his
injuries. See supra part I. The Appellees’ cross-claims against
the State, in turn, essentially prayed for subrogation in the
event that the circuit court found either or both of then
negligent, on the theory that “the State [wa]s vicariously liable
for the negligence of its contractors.” Id. (emphasis added).
Although the Plaintiffs appended non-tort theories of recovery,
including the catch-all “and/or otherwise,” the underlying action
did not depend upon duties created by agreement among the
parties. Cf. Blair, 96 Hawai'i at 332-33, 31 P.3d at 189-90

(Without the implied contract, . . . [the p]laintiffs would have
no negligence claim.”); Braham, 21 Haw. at 585 ("The {complaint}
+ + + contain{ed) no allegation . . . of any breach of any duty

fixed by law independently of the will of the parties”).
Moreover, we agree with the State that HRS § 607-15.5

“does not authorize the Court to award attorneys’ fees in tort

actions.” Its plain language provides merely for a limitation on

in tort actions that would otherwise be

 

attorneys’ £1
allowed -- it states that “fees . . . shall be limited to a

reasonable amount” (emphasis added), not that “reasonable fe:

 

shall be awarded,” nor even that “reasonable fees may be
awarded.

 

In sum, the Appellees are not entitled to fees either

pursuant to HRS § 607-14 or to HRS § 607-15.5.¢

* paren further argues that the anocunt of fees it requests is
“reasonable.” Noneth Snasmuch ar Faren faile to show its entstlenent to
fees oe 4 matter of law, see discussion infra, we do not consider their
request's reasonableness

 

   

 

n
‘#8 POR PUBLICATION *#*

 

i. The parties’ araunents:
The Appellees seek costs as enumerated supra in part
IT-A. (Citing Einley v, Home Ins, Co., 90 Hawai'i 25, 43, 975

P.2d 1145, 1158 (1998); Mona v, Takeuchi, 88 Hawai'i 46, 54, 961
P.2d 611, 619 (1998); Eastman v. McGowan, 86 Hawai'i 21, 29, 946

P.2d 1317, 1325 (2997).)

In its objection to ParEn’s request, the State provides
no citation to authority but argues that “Par{E)n’s failure to
provide an accounting of its costs, by itself, dictates a denial
of its Request because it cannot place the burden on either this
court or the State to identify and calculate its claimed costs or
otherwise determine the basis for its calculations.”
Furthermore, the State seems to argue that certain costs declared
to this court duplicate certain costs that the Appellees already
requested in the circuit court and that the Appellees bear the
burden of demonstrating that the similarly labeled costs are not
duplicative and relate to the litigation of this appeal.

With respect to HGG’s request for costs, the State
urges that “HGG does not attach invoices or receipts from court
reporters . . . . Absent supporting documentation, HGG has not
provided th{ie clourt with any basis for finding that the costs
were actually incurred and . . . reasonable.”

In ite reply, ParEn notes that HRAP Rule 39, see supra
note 3, “clear(ly]” states that “'[i]n cases involving the State

) Afanaward of costs against the State is authorized by

aw, costs shall be awarded in accordance with . . . this rule.'”

2
 

FOR PUBLICATION *

 

(Some emphases added and some omitted.) Hence, ParEn argues
tautologically, its reimbursement of costs “is authorized by
law."

Finally,” ParEn replies that it did document its costs
through the receipts it attached to its request.

2. The State is not immune from costs.

Introduet

 

‘The Appellees cite HRAP Rule 39, see supra note 3, asa
basis for recovering costs. ParEn also cites HRS § 607-9, see

fupra note 3. HRAP Rule 39 prohibits awards of costs against the
State unless “authorized by law.” Consequently, our authority to

impose costs upon the State depends on the meaning of HRS § 607-
24, see supra note 4.*

Partn adds (1) that it w
requested costs fit within the cat

by HRS § 607-3, gee gunca note 3, and established by cai
afgunents are beyond the scope of the State's objections.

 

the prevailing party, and (2) that its
ries of recoverable expenses as defined
Tew, However, these

 

 

{te fing in the case law of this jurisdiction only one prior
attempt to interpret the relevant Language of this statute. In
Borthwick, 34 Haw. 245 (1937), we interpreted Revised Laws of Hawai: (RL) §
3795 (1935) (Iater recodified es anendes, HRS § 607-24) as follows: “The
purpose of (Li § 3795) 18 to provide # means by which « person who prevails
ina suit against the Territory() hay have restitution of costs expended
by him.” Id, at 254-55. However, wo invoked no authority or rationale for
our conclusien as to that “purpos

Moreover, the facts and holding of iaabt are so diffe
the present matter as to render it inapplicable.
ho prevailed in the circuit court and on sppeai ~~ had spperently deposited
Sn amount for costs with the clerk of the circuit court. Gee 4d, at 254, The
Gixeuit court had “order (ed) the clerk to reimburse [the] sppelices for the
fanount of the cost deposite.” id, We affirmed that award, gga id, at 255,
thereby restoring to the appellees the deposits that would presumably heve
been. awarded to the Territory of Hawas’s were it victorious —- in other words,
the Territory simply had to give the appellees’ their oxn money back, and we
Gid not have to decide whether to “tax[] costs” uncer RL § 3795.

Finally, while ParEn urges this court to apply Eouaht ¢ Col, which
auerdea costs against the State Department of Transportstion (DOT), 87 Hawai'i
57 at S6-57, 981 P-zd at S0E-07, the Feesoning in that case, concerning f
Se inapplicable to tne present issue of costs, in Fought, we held that, in

(cont inved.

 

      

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

13
##* FOR PUBLICATION ###

 

On its face, HRS § 607-24 consists of two mutually

exclusive provisions: ‘Neither the State nor (other governmental

entities) shall be taxed costs... . In all cases in which «
final judgment . . . is obtained against the State, . . . the
prevailing party shall be reimbursed by the State(] . . . actual
Gisbursenents . . . .” Accordingly, we must construe HRS

§ 607-24 by employing means extrinsic to its plain language.
Anong the statutes of other jurisdictions expressly
authorizing or exempting governments from costs, we find no such
ambiguity. See generally 26 U.S.C. $§ 1915(f) (1), 1922 (2000);
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-348.A to .B (Westlaw 2006); Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 57.111(4) (a) (Westlaw 2006); Towa Code Ann. § 625.29.1
(Westlaw 2006); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 549.02.3 (Westlaw 2006); Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 25-1603(1) (Westlaw 2005); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-19-1

 

(Westlaw 2006); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2335-39(8) (1) (Westlaw
2006); S.C. Code Ann. § 15~77-300 (Westlaw 2005); 4 V.I. Code
Ann. § 513(e) (Westlaw 2008); Wis. Stat. Ann. § €14.245(3)

(Westlaw 2006). Nor did the Hawai'i legislature simply adopt

"(continued
Light of the state's “express waiver of sovereign immunity
$ 661-1 [("The several circuit courts of the State ‘hall
Sriginal jurisdiction to hear and determine the following mattersi:
Glalns against the state founded upon. - = any contract... . with the State
cate ayfm tne state was lisble for attorneys” fees pursuant to HRS
3, "as an additional elenent of the prevailing

Party's Ganages, "87 Hewai't at 56, 951 P-2d at S08. This court implied that

Gispositive factor in the ovtcone was the absence in HRS § 607-16 of an
ipress(] retention of the State's inmunity- 1. Ultimately, fought also
iarded costs against DOT without application of HRS § 607-24, whieh, 35 we
acknowledged in dictum, “expressly restricted” state liability for expenses.
iii at S525, 951 F.2d at 505-07. Nor did any of the parties in
Fouahe cite Has § 607-36, ag did HOG. 67 Ha 4,951 Prod at 493
Sto fnus, the meaning of HRS § 607-24 remains a novel issue in the present
acter:

   

 

   

 

       

  
     

 

     

“4
‘#4 FOR PUBLICATION ***
model or uniform law “off the rack”; rather, we must attempt to
ascertain the intention of the legislature without analogy to
other existing law.
» : cy of HRS § 607-24

‘The perplexity of what is now HRS § 607-24 evolved
piecemeal. what would become its first sentence took effect on
April 15, 1907. See 1907 Haw. Sess. L. Act 63, §§ 1, 4 at 77-78
(codified as amended at HRS § 607-24) (hereinafter, “the first
sentence”]. The first sentence prohibited certain governmental
entities, including “the Territory,” from “be[ing] taxed costs or
required to pay the same or file any bond or make any deposit for
Ig
Effective June 2, 1933, the legislature added what is

 

the same in any casé

now the second sentence, see 1933 Haw. Sess. L. Act 212, $§ 1-2
at 270-71 (codified as amended at HRS § 607-24) [hereinafter,

“the second sentence”}. It read: “It is provided, however, that
in all cases in which a final judgment . . . is obtained against

the Territory, . . . [the prevailing party) shall be reimbursed

 

by the [Territory] . . . all actual disbursements, not including
attorney's fees or commissions, made by [the prevailing party]
and approved by the court.”

Between the section’s 1907 genesis and its 1933
amendment, the revisor of statutes apparently added the title “No
costs against government,” which appears in the 1925 codification
but was absent from the 1907 provision, which had no catch-line
at all. Compare RLH § 2546 (1925) with 1907 Haw. Sess. L. Act
63, § 1 at 77, Through its 1933 amendment, the legislature

as
#4 FOR PUBLICATION ***

itself amended the catch-line to r

 

1d “No bonds or costs to be
filed or paid by government.” 1933 Haw. Sess. L, Act 212, § 1 at
270.

Effective May 3, 1937, the legislature struck the
phrase “It is provided, however, that,” 1937 Haw. Sess. L. Act
126, $§ 1-2 at 139, but left the remaining language materially
unchanged.”

c. Analysis

We hold that the legislature’s purpose is best
preserved by reading “costs” in the first sentence to mean
amounts paid to the clerk of a court prior to litigation, whether
as fees for filing, service, or garnishment; supersedeas bonds?
or deposits for miscellaneous expenses. See, e.c., ERS
§§ 232-22, -23 (Supp. 2004) (concerning deposits for costs by
appellant in tax appeal court pursuant to Rule of the Tax Appeal
court 3(a): “[Z]£ an agreement . . . is made between the
appellant and. . . [a] proper officer, whereby a reduction is

made in the. . . tax asse:

 

J...» then a part of the costs
«ss proportionate to the amount of the reduction . . . shall be
returned to the appellant.”), 607-3 (1993) (concerning “[cJourt
costs, waiver of prepayment, reduction or remission of”)
(emphases added), 607-4, -5(a) (Supp. 2005) (concerning “fees

. ss paid... ae costs of court by the person instituting the
action or proceeding”) (emphases added), 607-5(c)(23), ~6(a), -7
(Supp. 2004) (concerning deposit of court costs on appeal); HRCP

 

> n subsequent amendment, effective July 1, 1973, did not affect the
statute in any respect germane to the present appeal. See 1972 Haw. Sess. L.
Ret 88, 65 Sin, 9 ae 387-36

 

16
 

FOR PUBLICATION *#*
Rule 72(h) (*(T]he appellant shall pay all costs, if any, and
furnish every bond or other security, if any, required by law.”);
Rule of the Circuit Courts 2.2 (concerning costs to be collected
by the clerk); Rule of the District Courts 25 (concerning order
for transcript); Rule of the Small Claims Division of the
District Courts 7 (concerning costs for jury trial); Hawai'i
Family Court Rule 72(h). On the other hand, we believe that
“actual disbursements” as used in the second sentence of HRS
§ 607-24, gee supra note 4, and in HRS § 607-9, see supra note 3,
refers to the expenses to “be reimbursed by the” losing party
after “a final judgment or decree.” To construe “costs” in the
first sentence and “actual disbursements” in the second sentence
as equivalent would render the two sentences mutually exclusive
as to the State’s liability, implying that the legislature in
1933 and again in 1937 mistakenly left the first sentence intact
while enacting and reenacting the second. Such interpretations
Would defy common sense as well as a canon of construction:
“(t]he legislature is presumed not to intend an absurd result,
and legislation will be construed to avoid, if possible,
inconsistency, contradiction, and illogicality.’” State vw.
Naititi, 104 Hawai'i 224, 234, 87 P.3d 893, 903 (2004) (quoting
State v. Cornelio, 84 Hawai'i 476, 484, 935 P.24 1021, 1029
(1997)); see also HRS § 1-15 (1993) (“Where the words of a law
are ambiguous: . . . (3) Every construction which leads to an
absurdity shall be rejected.”). Rather than deem either the 1907
act or the 1933 act nugatory, we reconcile the two. See, e.g,
vs Spencer, 68 Haw. 622, 624, 725 P.2d 799, 800 (1986)

uv
‘*** FOR PUBLICATION *#*
(noting the “presumptive validity of legislative enactments").
Bearing in mind the principle of noscitur a sociia,"” we believe
that the legislature’s placenent of “costs” in context with
“deposit” and “bond” in the first sentence shows that the “costs”
from which the State is immune are those amounts that the State
would otherwise have to “be taxed” before adjudication.

Moreover, again applying the canon of noscitur a sociis
to the catch-line of HRS $ 607-24 ("No bonds or costs to be filed
or paid by government”), the juxtaposition of “costs” and “bonds”
suggests that the legislature contemplated their similar
functions."

Further to the foregoing, we presume that the first and

second sentenc

 

|, employing different terns ("costs” versus
“actual disbursements”), mean different things. See generally
Spencer Enters. v. United States, 345 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir.
2003). By contrast, then, “actual disbursements” means amounts
paid after litigation.

In sum, a prevailing party having “obtained” “a final

 

Judgment” “against the State,” we hold that the court may award
the prevailing party its “actual disbursements” pursuant to HRS

95 607-9 and 607-24 and HRAP Rule 39.

 

20 w(e}reely translated as ‘words of @ feather flock together,” that

is, the meaning of # word is to be judged by the company it keep
city t*county se onchulu, 98 fanest 253, 256, 47 Fide 348, 971" (2002)
(citations and internal quotation signals omitted); ses alia BRS $ 1-15(1)
(Sthe meaning of... ambiguous words may be sought By examining the context,
With which the ambiguous words... may Be compared, in order to ascertain
their true meaning.”)

 

 

 

 

 

win construing an act, the title may be resorted to for the
perpose of ascerteining the meaning of the act.” Spears v. Honda, 51 Haw. 1,
1, 449 P.2a 130, 139 (2968)

 

ae
‘#4 FOR PUBLICATION ***

3. Reasonableness of particular costs"

a. Transcripts

‘The State suggests that the Appellees’ requests for
transcript fees duplicate their bills of costs in the circuit
court and that the Appellees did not submit proof of the
contrary. Moreover, the State disputes the necessity of the
transcripts for the Appellees’ litigation of the appeal and
cross-appeal. Finally, the State argues that ParEn’s documents
are generally inadequate.

‘The State attaches over seventy pages of exhibits to
each opposition, including what appear to be the Appellees’
verified bills of costs filed in the circuit court. ParEn’s bill
of costs apparently stated to the circuit court that ParEn
incurred “[t]rial transcript costs” of $2,016.25. HGG apparently
requested $18,657.61 for “(flees for court reporter and

 

1? gh Asght of the epparent similarity of Hong to the present matter,
we note its inapplicability. "in Mona, the prevailing party had filed « bill
Of Costs with the circuit court, pursuant co HRS § 607-8 and HRCP Rule 34(c),
fee guna note 3, 6 Hawari at 46-49, 52, 961 P.2d at 613-14, 617. The
{Ssing perty ad merely objected that ‘the prevailing party “did not
demonstrate that the costs were necessary.” 88 Hawaii at 49, 961 P.2¢ at
Gite the cireait coure had awardea an amount of costs that was reduced from
the anount requested, But. provides no “findings regarding or explanation of
the reductions." Jai Holding that the cizcuit court had abused its
Glscretion, we vacated and remanded for “determination of the appropriate
amount due to (the prevaliing party) for costs.” 68 Hawai at 48, 95, 96)
Pood’ se €13, 620. Re expressly Liaited our holding in Weng to requests in
Civii cases’ pursuant tovHRCP Rule 54(d) and HRS § 607-9." 66 Hawai’ at S¢
Bit, 961 P.2¢ at 619 n.7

Even assuming arguanda that we were to (1) extend the Hang rule to apply
in the appellate context under HRAP Role 39, gs@ supra note 3, and (2)
Gisregare the State's objections in this case, Hong did nct hold that all
Gnopposed requests for costs must be granted, but rather that: (1) expenses,
wLe"Seenes reasonable by the court,” should be reimbursed; and (2) sf the
CHheult court denies # request. for costs {t must offer an “explanation or &
Eesdliy ciscernible rationale.” 68 Hawai's at 48, 53-54, 961 P.2d at 613,
Eie-19 ("ithe prevailing party) would have to denionstrate @ compelling
Fetionale for the court te grant’ [routine expenses related to opereting a law
practice)... .") (emphasis added)

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

19
‘#44 POR PUBLICATION *#*

deposition transcripts for all or any part of trial transcripts

necessarily obtained for use in this case.” Nonetheless, the
State has not shown which, if any, such transcripts are
duplicative of those used in the present appeal. In any case,
the Appellees’ obtaining transcripts to prepare for Litigation
was reasonably necessary inasmuch as the State’s appeal and
ParEn’s cross-appeal challenged the evidentiary sufficiency of
the circuit court's findings of negligence.

Nevertheless, we agree with the State that “Pargn has
not explained the discrepancy between the” amount it hi

documented, $223.54," and its requested total of $325.54,

 

although the discrepancy may be the result of a simple
typographical error. Accordingly, we award only $323.54 to
ParEn.
b. Filing fees

The State contends that the filing fees requested by
ParEn are duplicative and/or that Parn “did not disclose the
purpose for paying the filing fees and when the filing fees were
paid.” Nor, argues the State, does ParEn prove which court
charged the fee(s) “or how the fee relates to this appeal.”

Inasmuch as appeals by non-indigent parties generally
require prepayment of fees, the “why,” “when,” and “to whon” are

self-evident as to $225.00 of the $327.36 requested. See HRAP

 

1) paren Liste two charges apparently related to transcript

production, to wit, $112.€0 for “Professional Fees =~ Christine Jordan,” and
Eliovse for “court Reporter Fees ~~ Phyllis Tsukayama.” ParEn also attaches
hat appears to be a photocopy of its own ledger, recording the outlays to
Sordan (Decenber 6, 2001) and Teukayana (Oecenber 24, 2001), Consequently,
Paren has reasonably demonstrated expenses of $112.60 plus $210.96, which
equals 323-54.

   

 

20
*## FOR PUBLICATION

 

Rule 45(e) (5) (Supreme Court filing fee of $100.00); HRS §§ 607-
5{c) (23) (Supp. 2004) (circuit court fee of $100.00 upon filing
of notice of appeal), 607-5.7 (Supp. 2001) ($25.00 surcharge for
indigent legal services); HRAP Rule 3(a), (f) (consequences of
failure to pay, including dismissal of appeal). Moreover, the
State’s suggestion that ParEn has attempted to double-dip by
requesting the same $225.00 in the circuit court is less than
candid, and unavailing: through standard and common procedure,
the Appellees would have been charged a different $225.00 by the
circuit court for their initial complaint against HOCC, see HRS
$8 607-5(b) (1) (Supp. 2004) (filing fee), 607-5.7, supra
(surcharge), and scrutiny of the State’s own exhibit reveals this
to be the case (receipts for “COMP/PAREN, INC VS HI DREOGING
CONST CO” ($200.00) and “SRCHG/PAREN, INC. VS HI DREDGING
CONSTRN” ($25.00).

Nonetheless, neither ParEn’s counsel's declaration nor
its copious exhibits document the expenditure of the remaining
$102.36. Consequently, we deny ParEn $102.36 of the requested
9327.36.

cs.  Sopies

ParEn requests $2,159.66 for “[p]rinting/copying of
briefs/appendices (# of pages @ .10-.15/page).” The state
asserts that the number of pages ParEn claims to have printed is
excessive, that fifteen cents per page is an excessive charge,
and that, once again, Parfn duplicated its request to the circuit
court. We agree with the State that the number of pages alleged

is unreasonable.

2
 

FOR PUBLICATION **#
Assigning a duly broad scope to “briefs and appendices”
a5 used in HRAP Rule 39(c) (4), see supra note 3, we need not
reimburse @ prevailing party for filings other than those briefs
‘encompassed by HRAP Rule 28, including the nunber of copies
required by HRAP Appendix A. ParEn’s opening brief was 179 pages
long, including appendices, the statenent of related cases
required by HRAP Rule 26(b) (11), and the certificate of service
required by HRAP Rule 26(a). ParEn’s answering brief (including
attachments as described supra) was 148 pages long. Its reply
brief (including attachments) was sixteen pages long. All in
all, Parén filed 343 pag

 

pursuant to HRAP Rule 26." HRAP
Appendix A requires the filing of two copies of each brief, and
HRAP Rule 28(a) requires service of two copies upon every other
party (in this case, HGG and the State). Allowing reimbursement
for all six copies plus one for Parln’s own records, see HAAP
Appendix A, the total number of pages for which ParEn may obtain
reimbursement is still only 7 times 343, or 2402.

Inasmuch as ParEn's three briefs were all filed before

July 2002, when its per-page price inexplicably decreased from

 

fifteen cents per page to ten cents, we reimburse ParEn for 2401
pages at fifteen cents per page, which equals $360.15.

The state does not object to HGG’s request for $13.60
in copying costs. Inasmuch as HGG’s answering brief was thirty-

four pages long and HGG was required to produce seven copies,

Rule 26(0

‘The bodies of Parin’s briefs satisfied the page maximuns of HRAP

22
‘*#* FOR PUBLICATION *#*
gee supra, we avard the full requested amount of $13.60.'*

4. Interest

Parkn seeks postjudgment interest on its appellate
costs and on the amount of its money judgment against the State,
calculated from the date of judgment in the circuit court.
(citing Tavlor-Rice v. State, 105 Hawai'i 104, 94 P.3d 659
(2008) .)

‘the State counters that its “liability for interest
commences from the filing of the Notice and Judgment on Appeal”
and that ParEn’s request is frivolous and does not cite legal

authority. (Citing Javlor-Rice, 105 Hawai'i at 112, 94 P.3d at

667; Littleton v. State, 6 Haw. App. 70, 708 P.2d 829 (1985).)
In Tavlor-Rice, we adopted the reasoning of the
Intermediate Court of Appeals, which held in Littleton that,

whenever the State loses a case “instituted under (the State Tort
Liability Act],” see HRS § 662-8, supra note 3, “‘the legislature
intended interest to run. . . from the date when the judgment is
conclusive, either after the judament on anpeal or after the time
to appeal from the trial court judgment has expired.'” 105

Hawai'i at 112, 94 P.3d at 667 (quoting 6 Haw. App. at 76, 708

 

P.2d at 833) (emphasis in original). The losing party in the
present matter was the State; hence, the time-period in the more
specific HRS § 662-8 (“after the judgment on appeal”) trumps the
more general HRAP Rule 37 (accruing interest “from the date the

judgment was entered in the circuit or district court,” with no

 

15 WRAP Rule 39(c) (4), aoe gupta note 3, provides that “the cost of
printing or otherwise producing Recessary copies’ of briefs and appendices

S ghali_pot exceed 20¢ per page.” Therefore, a reasonable anount could be
as high as 34 pps 7 * 20 €/p. = $47.60, which is greater than $13.60

23
444 FOR PUBLICATION ###
express exception for sovereign debtors). Inasmuch as (1) Parén
filed its request thirteen days after this court’s February 22,
2006 entry of judgment, (2) HGG did not request a proportionate
share of the interest, and (3) ParEn’s method of computing the
interest (simple interest accruing daily in increnents of 4% /
365) is reasonable, we hold that ParEn is entitled to thirteen
days’ interest computed using its own formula: the sum of
$1,150,000.00 (judgment), $323.54 (transcripts), $225.00 (filing
fees), and $360.15 (copies) is $1,150,908.69. Inte:

 

st on this
amount computed as four percent per year (four 365ths of a
percent per day) over thirteen days, rounded to the nearest cent,

equals $1,639.65.

III. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing analysis, we deny the
Appellees’ requests as to attorneys’ fees and grant them, in
part, as to costs. The State is ordered to pay (1) ParEn a total
of $2,548.34 for costs and interest and (2) HGG a total of
$239.38 for costs.

 

On the requests
Frank K, Goto, Jr.,

Fe Bet cet ee/
Siena Meee amt tera
secogzleton Haliee motes Nani ntenore

Hawaii Geotechnical Group, Inc.
d/b/a Walter Lum Associates

Gary S. Miyamoto, of
Ayabe, Chong, Nishimoto, Sia &
Nakamura, for the defendant-
appellant/cross-appellee
State of Hawai'i

24