Case Title: ROBERT DETTLOFF V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 05-217

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-02-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
ROBERT DETTLOFF V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 29152 P.3d 376Case Number: 05-217Decided: 02/16/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
ROBERT 
DETTLOFF,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Ken 
Koski, State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Tina N. 
Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Ms. Kerin.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Causey.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1] 
Robert Dettloff was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to deliver 
methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine, possession of marijuana and 
possession of oxycodone.1  He appeals claiming defense counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance in representing him on his motion to suppress 
and the trial court erred in denying the motion; insufficient evidence was 
presented to support his convictions; and the district court erred in admitting 
uncharged misconduct evidence.  We 
find no error and affirm the convictions.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]  Mr. Dettloff presents the following 
issues for this Court's consideration:

 
 
 I.         
Was defense counsel ineffective in representing appellant with regard to 
the motion to suppress evidence and did the trial court err in denying the 
motion?

 
 
II.         
Was there insufficient evidence to support appellant's convictions, and 
appellant denied his right to a unanimous jury verdict 
thereby?

 
 
III.        Did 
the trial court err in admission of uncharged misconduct evidence and argument 
concerning same?

 
 
The 
State phrases the issues substantially as Mr. Dettloff presented 
them.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  On August 30, 2004, at approximately 
9:45 p.m. Dan Slattery and Justin Lindberg, patrolmen for the Town of Mills, 
Wyoming, observed two vehicles at a stop sign on Boles Road in Mills.  One of the vehicles, a grey Mercedes, 
turned north onto Chamberlin 
Road.  
The other vehicle, a brown Lincoln, followed the Mercedes through the stop 
sign without stopping and turned north on Chamberlin Road as well.  The patrolmen followed the vehicles and 
observed that they appeared to be swerving.  

 
 
[¶4]  The vehicles pulled into a Subway 
restaurant parking lot.  The 
patrolmen drove beyond the Subway, turned and came back.  The Mercedes and the Lincoln were parked 
in the lot and Mr. Dettloff was inside the Subway watching the patrol car.  Patrolman Lindberg got out of the patrol 
car.  As he did so, Mr. Dettloff 
moved toward the back of the store where he appeared to try the office and 
bathroom doors and then turned toward the rear exit.  Patrolman Slattery drove around to the 
back of the building.  Mr. Dettloff 
was just coming out the door.  When 
he saw the patrol car, he turned and went back inside. 

 
 
[¶5]  Patrolman Lindberg walked back around to 
the front and entered the building.  
Mr. Dettloff was standing at the counter next to a young woman.  Patrolman Lindberg asked the woman if 
she was with Mr. Dettloff.  She 
responded negatively and stepped away. Mr. Dettloff acted nervous and agitated, 
and kept putting his hands in and out of his pockets.  As he was speaking with Mr. Dettloff, 
Patrolman Lindberg noticed a clip knife sticking out of one of Mr. Dettloff's 
pockets.  The patrolman reached over 
and took it and discovered it was a switch blade.  He informed Mr. Dettloff it was a 
violation of a town ordinance to carry a concealed weapon.  

 
 
[¶6]  Patrolman Slattery asked Mr. Dettloff 
his name.  Mr. Dettloff responded 
that he did not want to tell them his name.  The patrolmen advised him if he did not 
tell them his name they would arrest him for interfering with a peace 
officer.  Patrolman Lindberg reached 
over in an attempt to handcuff Mr. Dettloff.  He pulled away and ran toward the 
door.  The patrolmen went after him, 
grabbed him, took him to the ground and placed him under arrest.  Patrolman Slattery searched Mr. Dettloff 
and found $549 in cash and a cigarette lighter.  

 
 
[¶7]  Mr. Dettloff told the patrolmen he had 
been driving the Mercedes.  His 
companions were identified as Sterling Freeman, the driver of the Lincoln, and D.S., a 
fifteen year old minor.  They 
confirmed Mr. Dettloff had been driving the Mercedes.  The patrolmen searched the Mercedes and 
found a pencil case containing three packages of methamphetamine in quantities 
of 7 grams, 1 gram and .2 grams; a package containing 3.1 grams of marijuana; an 
oxycodone capsule; and drug paraphernalia.

 
 
[¶8]  The patrolmen ascertained the Mercedes 
belonged to Penny Strickland.  After 
searching the vehicle, they contacted Ms. Strickland and notified her that the 
car was in the Subway parking lot.  
She stated the car had been in storage for two years and she had asked 
D.S. and Mr. Freeman to get it out of storage and bring it to her.  The patrolmen asked Ms. Strickland if 
the methamphetamine found in the Mercedes was hers and she said it was not.  The patrolmen left the vehicle in the 
parking lot for Ms. Strickland to retrieve. 

 
 
[¶9]  Mr. Dettloff was charged with felony 
possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2005); felony possession of methamphetamine 
in a powder or crystalline form exceeding three grams in violation of § 
35-7-1031(c)(ii); misdemeanor possession of marijuana in violation of § 
35-7-1031(c)(i); and misdemeanor possession of oxycodone in violation of § 
35-7-1016(b)(i)(B) (LexisNexis 2005).  
Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress the evidence 
seized in the search of the Mercedes.  
Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion.  

 
 
[¶10]  During the trial, the State solicited 
testimony from Mr. Freeman that he, D.S. and Mr. Dettloff smoked marijuana 
supplied by Mr. Dettloff earlier in the day Mr. Dettloff was arrested.  After a two day trial, the jury returned 
a verdict of guilty on all four counts.  
The district court sentenced Mr. Dettloff to concurrent terms of eight to 
twelve years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary for possession of methamphetamine 
with intent to deliver; four to six years in the penitentiary for possession of 
methamphetamine; one year in the Natrona County Detention Center for possession 
of marijuana; and one year in the detention center for possession of 
oxycodone.       

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

1.                  
Denial 
of Motion to Suppress 

 
 
[¶11]   In his first issue, Mr. Dettloff 
claims defense counsel ineffectively represented him during the suppression 
motion proceedings and the district court erred in denying the motion.  We address these issues separately, 
beginning with the claimed error in denial of the suppression motion.  The following standards govern our 
review of alleged error in denying a motion to suppress: 

 
 
            
Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion 
of the trial court. We will not disturb such rulings absent a clear abuse of 
discretion.  An abuse of discretion 
occurs when it is shown the trial court reasonably could not have concluded as 
it did. Factual findings made by a trial court considering a motion to suppress 
will not be disturbed unless the findings are clearly erroneous.  Because the trial court has the 
opportunity to hear the evidence, assess witness credibility, and draw the 
necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions, we view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the trial court's determination. Whether an unreasonable 
search or seizure occurred in violation of constitutional rights presents a 
question of law and is reviewed de novo.  

 
 
 O'Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, ¶ 18, 117 P.3d 401, 407 (Wyo. 2005) (citations omitted).

 
 
[¶12]  In its order denying the suppression 
motion, the district court found:  
1) Mr. Dettloff lacked standing to challenge the search of the Mercedes; 
2) the search of the Mercedes was incident to a lawful arrest and in accord with 
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 124 S. Ct. 2127, 158 L. Ed. 2d 905 (2004); and, 3) the police had probable 
cause to believe the Mercedes contained evidence of a crime or contraband and to 
search it without a warrant in accordance with Borgwardt v. State, 946 P.2d 805 (Wyo. 
1997).  Mr. Dettloff asserts each of 
these conclusions was erroneous.

 
 
[¶13]  With regard to the first issue, Mr. 
Dettloff contends he had standing to challenge the search because Ms. Strickland 
authorized him to be in possession of and drive the vehicle, giving him a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle.  He further asserts he had standing 
because he was the subject of the lawful arrest giving rise to the vehicle 
search.  The State contends the 
district court correctly concluded Mr. Dettloff did not have standing to 
challenge the search because he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in a vehicle owned by someone else and because he disavowed ownership of the 
pencil box in which the evidence was found. 

 
 
[¶14]  We have said:

 
 
A 
defendant may challenge a search as being unconstitutional only if he can 
demonstrate that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property 
searched.  The defendant must show 
"both an actual subjective expectation of privacy and a reasonable expectation 
of privacy that society is prepared to recognize."  There are four factors that courts 
consider to determine whether an individual possesses a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the property searched:  

 
 
(1) the 
precautions taken in order to maintain one's privacy; (2) the likely intent of 
the drafters of the United States and Wyoming Constitutions; (3) the property 
rights a claimant possesses in the invaded area; (4) the legitimacy of the 
individual's possession of or presence in the property which was searched or 
seized.  

 
 

Andrews 
v. State, 2002 
WY 28, ¶ 20, 40 P.3d 708, 712-13 (Wyo. 2002) (citations omitted).  

 
 
[¶15]  We have applied these principles in 
other cases with varying results depending upon the particular facts 
presented.  In Parkhurst v. State, 628 P.2d 1369, 1374 
(Wyo. 1981), 
we held the vehicle owner's brother had standing to challenge the search because 
he was present in the vehicle as the owner's guest.  In Putnam v. State, 995 P.2d 632, 636 (Wyo. 
2000), we held the defendant did not have standing to challenge a vehicle search 
because he did not have permission to use or possess the vehicle at the time of 
the search.  In Andrews, we held the defendant did not 
have standing to challenge the search of a duffle bag because he disavowed 
ownership of the bag and its contents at the time of the search.  

 
 
[¶16]  In claiming that he had standing to 
challenge the vehicle search, Mr. Dettloff points to evidence showing the owner 
of the vehicle, Ms. Strickland, asked D.S., Mr. Freeman and Mr. Dettloff to go 
to the storage unit and retrieve the Mercedes.  However, he points to no evidence 
showing Ms. Strickland gave him permission to drive the vehicle.  Mr. Freeman was also licensed to drive a 
motor vehicle, the three-some drove to the storage unit in Mr. Dettloff's 
Lincoln and no 
evidence was presented as to how or why Mr. Dettloff ended up driving the 
Mercedes.  The district court's 
conclusion that Mr. Dettloff did not have standing to challenge the search was 
correct.  Mr. Dettloff failed to 
carry his burden of proving that he was legitimately present in the 
vehicle.  Mr. Dettloff's lack of 
standing to challenge the search is determinative of this issue making 
consideration of the district court's other rulings on the suppression motion 
unnecessary.   

            

2.         
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

 
 
[¶17]  Mr. Dettloff claims defense counsel was 
ineffective because she failed to argue that the vehicle search violated Art. 1, 
§ 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.  An appellant claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the record that:  1) counsel's performance was deficient 
and 2) prejudice resulted.  Hirsch v. State, 2006 WY 66, ¶ 15, 135 P.3d 586, 594 (Wyo. 2006), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  Both components of the ineffectiveness 
inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact.  Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 
698.  Our review, therefore, is de novo.  United 
States v. Owens, 882 F.2d 1493, fn. 16 
(10th Cir. 1989).   

 
 
[¶18]  When reviewing a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the paramount determination is whether, in light of all 
the circumstances, trial counsel's acts or omissions were outside the wide range 
of professionally competent assistance.  
Hirsch, ¶ 15, 135 P.3d  at 
593.  We indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant 
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.  Id.  Under the two-prong standard articulated 
in Strickland, to warrant reversal on 
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate that 
his counsel failed to render such assistance as would have been offered by a 
reasonably competent attorney and that counsel's deficiency prejudiced the 
defense of the case.  Id.  "The benchmark for judging any claim of 
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result."  
Id., quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 
686.

 
 
[¶19]  The burden of proving that counsel was 
ineffective rests entirely on the appellant. Martinez v. State, 2006 WY 20, ¶ 23, 128 P.3d 652, 663 (Wyo. 2006).  The appellant 
must also demonstrate the existence of a reasonable probability that, absent the 
deficiency in counsel's performance, the result of the proceedings would have 
been different.  Id.  A failure to make the required showing 
of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats an 
ineffectiveness claim.  Id.  An ineffectiveness claim may be disposed 
of solely on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice.  Id.  When ineffective assistance of counsel 
is alleged due to counsel's failure to file a suppression motion, prejudice to a 
defendant can only be shown where, had the motion been made, it would have been 
granted, and had the evidence been suppressed, only a limited amount of evidence 
remained to support a conviction.  
Grissom v. State, 2005 WY 132, 
¶ 12, 121 P.3d 127, 132-33 (Wyo. 2005)

 
 
[¶20]  Mr. Dettloff argues defense counsel was 
ineffective in failing to present a particular argument in support of the motion 
to suppress.  Under Grissom and our other precedent, he must 
show that presentation of the argument would have resulted in suppression of the 
evidence.  We have concluded that 
the district court correctly ruled Mr. Dettloff did not have standing to 
challenge the vehicle search, and that conclusion applies to the 
constitutionality of the search under the state and United States 
constitutions.  Because Mr. Dettloff 
did not have standing, he cannot show that presentation of an adequate state 
constitutional claim would have resulted in suppression of the evidence.  Therefore, his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel must fail.

 
 

3.                  
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 
[¶21]  Mr. Dettloff claims there was 
insufficient evidence to support his convictions.  His claim in this regard is 
twofold.  First, he claims other 
individuals had access to the Mercedes and there was no evidence linking the 
drugs found in the vehicle to him.  
Second, he claims a jury instruction given over his objection allowed the 
jury to convict him on the basis of two alternatives and there was not 
sufficient evidence to support both alternatives. 

 
 
[¶22]  When reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence, this Court accepts as true the State's evidence and affords it those 
inferences which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from it.  Jones v. State, 2006 WY 40, ¶ 9, 132 P.3d 162, 165 (Wyo. 2006).  We do 
not consider conflicting evidence or inferences that can be drawn from such 
evidence.  Id.  Our duty is to determine whether a 
quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to 
the same result as the jury actually did.  
Id.

 
 
[¶23]  Applying these standards, we review the 
evidence the State presented, and inferences that may be drawn from it, to 
determine whether a reasonable jury could have concluded the State proved the 
charges against Mr. Dettloff beyond a reasonable doubt.  After a careful review of the record, we 
have no doubt the evidence the State presented met that standard. 

 
 
[¶24]  The patrolmen testified the Mercedes and 
the Lincoln were weaving as they headed north on Chamberlin 
Road.  As 
the patrolmen followed in a marked patrol car, it appeared "there was something 
going on with that Mercedes and that the Lincoln was trying to block our [the 
patrolmen's] view of the Mercedes so that we couldn't see something in that 
vehicle."  When the patrolmen pulled 
into the Subway parking lot, the Mercedes and Lincoln were parked and Mr. 
Dettloff was watching them from inside the building.  Patrolman Lindberg started to get out of 
the patrol car in front of the Subway and Mr. Dettloff headed toward the back of 
the Subway. The patrolmen drove around to the back as Mr. Dettloff was coming 
out the door.  Upon seeing the 
patrol car, Mr. Dettloff went back inside.  
These evasive movements combined with the patrolmen's prior observations 
of the Lincoln 
running the stop sign and appearing to run interference for the Mercedes and 
both vehicles weaving gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of illegal 
activity.

 
 
[¶25]  When Patrolman Lindberg approached Mr. 
Dettloff, he appeared "extremely nervous and agitated," "fidgety," "he couldn't 
keep still," "he kept his hands moving around, in and out of his pockets."  His speech was slurred and very hard to 
understand.  Both patrolmen 
testified Mr. Dettloff's behavior was consistent with someone under the 
influence of methamphetamine and they believed at that point they had a possible 
driver under the influence of a controlled substance.           

 
 
[¶26]  After his arrest, Mr. Dettloff informed 
the patrolmen he had been driving the Mercedes.  A search of Mr. Dettloff's person 
revealed he was carrying over $500 in cash.  Patrolman Slattery testified he found 
the pencil case containing the controlled substances and paraphernalia under the 
front seat on the driver's side of the Mercedes where Mr. Dettloff had been 
seated.    

 
 
[¶27]  To refute any claim the controlled 
substances found in the Mercedes were left in the vehicle when it was put in 
storage two years before, the State presented testimony from a forensic chemist 
that Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the active ingredient in marijuana, degrades 
over time and would not be found in marijuana more than a year old.  The witness testified in his opinion the 
marijuana found in the Mercedes was less than a year old.  The State also presented Mr. Freeman's 
testimony that Mr. Dettloff had possessed and used marijuana earlier in the day 
of his arrest.  

 
 
[¶28]  The State also presented the expert 
testimony of a drug task force agent who testified that in his opinion the 
person who possessed the items seized was engaged in drug trafficking.  Specifically, he testified the scales, 
packaging material, and quantities of methamphetamine found in the pencil case 
in the Mercedes and the amount of money Mr. Dettloff was carrying were 
indicative of someone engaged in drug trafficking.  The witness testified the other items 
seized were indicative of someone engaged in using methamphetamine, 
specifically, the lighter found on Mr. Dettloff and the spoons and syringes 
found in the Mercedes.  

 
 
[¶29] 
From the evidence the State presented, we conclude a reasonable inference can be 
made that Mr. Dettloff was under the influence of methamphetamine when he was 
arrested and had used and possessed marijuana prior to his arrest the same 
day.  A reasonable inference also 
can be made that the methamphetamine, marijuana, oxycodone and drug 
paraphernalia found in the pencil case in the Mercedes under the seat in which 
Mr. Dettloff had been sitting just prior to entering the Subway was his.  Additionally, a reasonable inference can 
be made from the quantities of methamphetamine, the paraphernalia and the amount 
of cash Mr. Dettloff was carrying that he possessed the methamphetamine with the 
intent to deliver it to others.  We 
hold sufficient evidence was presented from which a jury could conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Mr. Dettloff committed the offenses 
charged.

 
 
[¶30]  Mr. Dettloff cites numerous cases in his 
brief for the proposition that evidence showing drugs were found in a place 
where the defendant was not the sole occupant is insufficient to support a 
controlled substances conviction.  
See, e.g., Cordero v. State, 589 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1991); In the Interest of 
E.H., 579 So. 2d 364 (Fla. App. 4th Dist. 
1991); Johnson v. State, 444 So. 2d 891 (Ala. Cr. App. 1983).   
Unlike the present case, however, none of the cases he cites involved 
other facts from which the defendant's possession could be inferred.  Specifically, none of the cases cited 
involved evidence that the defendant was under the influence of a controlled 
substance, smoked marijuana earlier in the day, attempted to evade law 
enforcement, changed his story several times, was carrying a large amount of 
cash, refused to identify himself, and ran when law enforcement attempted to 
arrest him.   

 
 
[¶31]  Mr. Dettloff's next contention is that 
the following instruction, to which he objected, allowed the jury to convict him 
on the basis of two alternatives and there was not sufficient evidence to 
support both alternatives.  
Instruction 19 stated as follows:

 
 
YOU ARE 
INSTRUCTED that "possession," as that term is used in this case, may be of two 
kinds:  actual possession and 
constructive possession.  A person 
who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing at a given time is in 
actual possession of it.

 
 
A person 
who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the 
intention, at a given time, to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either 
directly or through another person or person, is in constructive possession of 
it.

 
 
You may 
find that the element of possession, as that term is used in these instructions, 
is present if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had actual 
or constructive possession, either alone or jointly with 
others.

 
 
Citing 
Bush v. State, 908 P.2d 963 
(Wyo.1995) and its progeny, Mr. Dettloff claims the instruction improperly 
contained the alternative elements of actual and constructive possession upon 
which the jury could base his conviction.

 
 
[¶32]  We recently addressed precisely the same 
claim in Doherty v. State, 2006 WY 
39, ¶ 16, 131 P.3d 963, 969 (Wyo. 2006).  
We said:

 
 
Jury 
Instruction No. 9 merely defined the word possession.  Pursuant to the instruction, possession 
could be "actual" or "constructive."   
Either would suffice to constitute possession.  The use of the terms "actual" and 
"constructive" did not "have the effect of charging an alternative ground for 
conviction."     

 
 
 In reaching this result, we quoted Miller v. State, 2006 WY 17, 127 P.3d 793 (Wyo. 2006) in which we distinguished Bush and its progeny as follows:  

 
 
In the 
Bush line of cases, we held that when 
a crime may be committed in alternative ways, and the jury is instructed on each 
alternative and returns a general verdict of guilt, the verdict must be set 
aside unless sufficient evidence exists to support a finding of guilt as to each 
alternative.  The holding of those 
cases pertain[s] to elements instructions which quote directly from a criminal 
statute containing alternative grounds for conviction of the crime charged.  For example, Bush and Tanner concerned Wyoming's burglary 
statute, Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 
6-3-301(a) (LexisNexis 2005).  In 
each case, the jury was instructed that it could find the defendant guilty of 
the crime of burglary if the evidence showed he entered a building without 
authority with the intent to commit larceny or the intent to commit a 
felony.  Because the evidence was 
not sufficient to show entry with the intent to commit both larceny and a 
felony, we reversed the burglary conviction in each case.  

 
 
            
The problem that existed in Bush and the other cases, however, does 
not exist in this case.  Here, the 
elements instruction given to the jury on the charged offense did not contain 
alternative elements upon which Miller's convictions could be based.  Miller's jury was only required to 
determine if the evidence proved Miller delivered a controlled substance to 
Justin Miller, nothing more.  
Instruction No. 19 merely defined the term "deliver" and did not have the 
effect of charging an alternative ground for conviction.  Bush and its progeny simply are 
inapplicable to the definitional instruction given in this case.  

 
 

Doherty, ¶ 15, 
131 P.3d  at 968, quoting Miller, ¶¶ 
24-26 (footnote omitted).  As stated 
in Gabbert v. State, 2006 WY 108, ¶ 
19, 141 P.3d 690, 696 (Wyo. 2006), Bush does not apply to definitional 
instructions.  The instruction given 
in Mr. Dettloff's case did not improperly contain alternative elements upon 
which the jury could convict him.

 
 

4.                  
Uncharged 
Misconduct Evidence

 
 
[¶33]  Mr. Dettloff's final claim is that the 
district court erred in allowing the presentation of evidence of uncharged 
misconduct.  Mr. Dettloff asserts 
our review of this issue is governed by the abuse of discretion standard.  The State contends the plain error 
standard applies because Mr. Dettloff did not object to the 
testimony.

 
 
[¶34] 
 In Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, ¶ 18, 57 P.3d 332, 340 (Wyo. 2002), we said the standard for reviewing rulings under 
W.R.E. 404(b) generally is abuse of discretion but where the defense fails to 
object to such evidence at trial the plain error standard applies.  More recently, however, we 
said:

 
 
[W]here 
a defendant files a pretrial demand for notice of intent to introduce evidence 
under W.R.E. 404(b), the same shall be treated as the making of a timely 
objection to the introduction of such evidence.  The State must then respond with 
sufficient information to meet the balance of the Huddleston test adopted in Vigil [i.e., the State must justify the 
evidence as proper under one of the exceptions to character evidence articulated 
in W.R.E. 404(b) or the general expansion of that rule and demonstrate that the 
evidence is relevant for the proposed purpose].    

  

Williams 
v. State, 2004 
WY 117, ¶ 12, 99 P.3d 432, 439 (Wyo. 2004).   Thus, in accord with Williams, a defendant is not required to 
object to uncharged misconduct evidence at trial if he has filed a pretrial 
demand for notice of intent to introduce Rule 404(b) evidence.  The rationale for this rule is that 
"rulings on uncharged misconduct evidence are too important to be made in the 
heat and pressure of a trial, with the jury twiddling its thumbs in the next 
room."  Id., at 
440.

 
 
[¶35]  Mr. Dettloff filed a demand for notice 
of intent to introduce Rule 404(b) evidence.  The State responded with notice of its 
intent to introduce Rule 404(b) evidence but the notice did not identify the 
evidence Mr. Dettloff now claims was improperly admitted under the rule.  At trial, when the State presented the 
evidence, Mr. Dettloff did not object.  

 
 
[¶36]  The initial question here is whether the 
challenged evidence actually was uncharged misconduct evidence falling within 
the confines of Rule 404(b).  At 
trial, the State asked Mr. Freeman, Mr. Dettloff's companion and the driver of 
the Lincoln, about the events leading up to their arrival at Subway.  Mr. Freeman testified he had spent most 
of the day with D.S. at his house.  
Mr. Dettloff joined them there around 3:00 p.m.  At this point, Mr. Freeman testified as 
follows:

 
 

Q.                
All 
right. And after Mr. Dettloff arrived . . . , what did the three of you 
do?

A.                 
We sat 
down; we smoked some marijuana; and basically just had some fun.  Just chilled and kind of BS'd about the 
day and what had been going on.

Q.                
Okay.  And where did the marijuana come 
from?

A.                 
Mr. 
Dettloff.

Q.                
And did 
you see it personally?

A.                 
I did 
only for the brief moment before it was loaded in the pipe and passed 
around.

Q.                
How was 
he carrying it?

A.                 
It was 
in a plastic bag in his pocket. 

Q.                
You mean 
like a - - what kind of bag?

A.                 
Just a 
sandwich baggie.

Q.                
And it 
was in his pocket?

A.                 
Yes, 
sir.

Q.                
Front 
pocket?

A.                 
I 
believe so.

Q.                
All 
right.  And so all three of you 
smoked some pot?

A.                 
Uh-huh.

 
 
[¶37]  In closing argument, the State used this 
testimony as follows:

 
 
Mr. 
Dettloff and his comrades had been smoking marijuana earlier in the day, * * * 
as Mr. Freeman testified it was marijuana provided by the defendant, which Mr. 
Freeman testified he saw in a little plastic baggie.  * * * [I]t's completely consistent, 
ladies and gentlemen, with the marijuana found in that pencil 
case.

 
 
            
Now, even if you did not believe everything that Sterling Freeman 
testified, why in the world would he testify under oath and admit to what 
essentially is a crime, why would he do that if it weren't so?  Why? Doesn't that fly in the face of 
your knowledge of human affairs? Is there any reason that he would have to say 
they had been smoking pot earlier in the day if it didn't happen?  So from that, you can deduce that Mr. 
Dettloff had marijuana in his possession earlier in the day, which is completely 
consistent with the marijuana found in the pencil case that was at his feet only 
moments before he entered the Subway.

 
 
[¶38]  Mr. Dettloff claims this testimony 
concerned uncharged misconduct.  He 
claims its admission was error because the State failed to give notice of its 
intent to present the testimony and, consequently, no hearing was held in 
accordance with Gleason, 57 P.3d 332.  He claims the testimony was 
prejudicial because:  1) it told the 
jury Mr. Dettloff provided marijuana to and smoked it with a minor earlier in 
the day; 2) the State used it to argue Mr. Dettloff's possession of marijuana 
earlier in the day must mean he possessed it later in the day; and 3) the 
State's case was not particularly strong and there was no direct evidence 
connecting Mr. Dettloff with the items found in the Mercedes, but upon hearing 
he possessed marijuana earlier in the day, the jury would conclude the drugs 
found in the Mercedes were his.   

 
 
[¶39]  W.R.E. 404(b) 
provides:

 
 
Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

 
 
The 
problem with Mr. Dettloff's claim is that the State did not present Mr. 
Freeman's testimony as "evidence of other crimes" under Rule 404(b).  Rather, the State used the testimony to 
raise the inference that the marijuana Mr. Dettloff possessed earlier in the day 
was the same marijuana found in the Mercedes later in the day.  The testimony was not evidence of 
uncharged misconduct and the principles governing Rule 404(b) evidence do not 
apply.       

 

[¶40]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Oxycodone is 
a pharmaceutical pain reliever that comes in capsule or tablet form.  It is a Schedule II controlled substance 
because it is subject to abuse.