Case Title: Furlong Development Co. v. Georgetown-Scott County Planning & Zoning Commission

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2014-SC-000594-DG

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 2016-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
RENDERED: DECEMBER 15, 2016
10 BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2014-SC-000594-DG

FURLONG DEVELOPMENT CO., LLC; APPELLANTS
AND GORDON STACY

ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
v. CASE NOS. 2011-CA-001771-MR AND 2012-CA-001925-MR
SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT NO. 11-Cl-00111

(GEORGETOWN-SCOTT COUNTY PLANNING APPELLEES
AND ZONING COMMISSION;
EGT PROPERTIES, INC.; AND
UNITED BANK & TRUST COMPANY
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM
AFFIRMING

Developer, Furlong Development Company and its owner, Gordon Stacy,
(collectively referred to as “Developer’), owned a 26-acre tract of real estate in
Georgetown, Kentucky. Developer intended to develop the property into 90
single-family residential lots known as “The Enclave.” Developer secured
financing through United Bank & Trust Company (hereinafter “the Bank"). The
Bank provided financing in excess of 4 million dollars. Gordon Stacy, acting
individually and in his capacity as Developer's owner, guaranteed the loans by
executing a promissory note and mortgage in favor of the Bank.

Pursuant to a local municipal ordinance, Developer was required by the

Georgetown-Scott County Planning and Zoning Commission (‘the
Commission’), to provide a surety bond in the amount equal to 125% of the
estimated cost of building certain infrastructure. Platt River Insurance
Company (hereinafter “Insurer”) backed the bonds. Notably, Developer agreed
to indemnify Insurer against any losses.

Insurer, as surety for the Developer, executed three separate instruments
each entitled “Subdivision Bond! (collectively referred to as “Bond
Agreements’). Each bond was fora different amount, totaling in excess of
$148,000. The Bond Agreements specifically provided:

WHEREAS, this bond is required in an amount to 125% of the

estimated costs of all improvements described in the plans
approved by (the Planning Commission}; AND

WHEREAS, [the Commission] has approved the improvement plans
for the project known as the Enclave Subdivision [] Sidewalk and
handicap Ramps, 1’ Asphalt Surfaced, and Storm Cleanup...

 

In 2008, the real estate market crashed. As a consequence,
Developer defaulted in its loan from the Bank.
At that time, “The Enclave" development was worth less than the amount

remaining on the loan. In other words, there was no equity in the land.

 

Nevertheless, the Bank agreed to accept a deed in lieu of foreclosure.
Developer executed the appropriate documents and deeded the property to the
Bank's property management company, BGT. In retum, the Bank released

Developer from its obligations under the various loan agreements. Gordon

 

Stacy was also released from his individual liability.
Sometime thereafter, the Bank transferred the property to another

internal holding company, EKT (hereinafter “Holding Company”). The Bank
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also sent a letter to the Commission requesting that the Commission call
Developer's bonds and that the proceeds be placed in escrow for the purpose of
reimbursing the Bank for the completion of the necessary infrastructure
projects required by the Developer's approved plat.

‘The Commission complied with the request, but both Developer and
Insurer refused to pay. Insurer filed a declaration of rights action against
Developer in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky,
‘seeking indemnity in the event that the Insurer was ordered to pay the bond
amount. The federal court entered an Agreed Judgment under which
Developer agreed to be jointly and severally liable to Insurer for $43,359.50,
with the court retaining jurisdiction to re-open and amend that judgment “in
the event the surety bonds issued by [Insurer] are eventually paid.”

Developer also filed a declaratory judgment action against the
Commission, the Bank, and the Holding Company in Scott Circuit Court. It
alleged that the bonds were not callable and that payment on the bonds would
result in the Bank receiving an unjust enrichment. The enrichment would
result with the Bank/Holding Company owning the land without any obligation
to incur the infrastructure cost. Although there was no equity in the property,
the deed in lieu of foreclosure had released Developer from any obligations
regarding the land.

At the trial court, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The
court granted the motion, holding that neither Insurer nor Developer was

released from their ol

 

tions under the Bond Agreements. In a split decision,

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the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, Although Insurer was added as a
party on appeal, Insurer did not file a brief or formally join Developer in their
arguments before the Court of Appeals. We granted Developer’s motion for
discretionary review. Insurer did not request discretionary review and is not a
party to this appeal. Having reviewed the record and the law, we affirm the
Court of Appeals’ decision.
Standard of Review

“The standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment is whether
the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any
‘material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Coomer v. CSX Transp. Inc., 319 8.W.3d 366, 370 (Ky. 2010). We review
a trial court's summary judgment ruling de novo. Blankenship v. Collier, 302
S.W.3d 665, 668 (Ky. 2010). We must also view the record in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all reasonable doubts in that
party's favor. Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 8.W.2d 476, 480
(Ky.1991).

Analysis
Developer contends that the plain language of the Bond Agreements is

not dispositive of the present matter and that additional evidence must be

 

considered in order to obtain the parties’ intent. We interpret the terms and
provisions of the Assignment according to well-established principles of
contract law. See, e.g., Hazard Coal Corp. v. Knight, 325 S.W.3d 290, 298 (Ky.

2010).
Legal Arguments

Despite the plain language of the Bond Agreements, Developer asserts
that the bonds were not callable because no homes had been built on the
development property prior to Developer's default. In support of its argument,
Developer urges this Court to adopt the reasoning presented in Westchester
Fire Insurance Co. v. Brooksville, 731 F.Supp.2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2010).

In that case, the city approved the development of a five-phase
subdivision community. Each phase had its own plat. Similar to the present
case, the city required that the developer post a bond to ensure the

construction of “several on-site improvements, including earthwork, roadway

 

storm lines, potable water lines, reclaimed water lines, and sanitary sewer lines
(the ‘Phase Two Improvements).” Id. at 1300. Before beginning construction
on Phase Two, the developer petitioned for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court
subsequently granted the developer's motion to abandon the development. As
f result, the city demanded payment on the bonds and filed suit against the
developer's surety in state court. The development property was eventually
sold to another development company.

The matter subsequently came before the U.S. District Court which
determined that, “the bonds and the ordinance construed together impose a
condition that construction of the development proceed before the City may
collect.” Id, at 1305, The ordinance to which the court was referring required

“the posting of a bond ‘to ensure that future owners [will] be able to connect
their lots to the City’s utility services.” id. at 1307. In holding that the neither
the developer nor its surety was obligated to pay the bond, the court reasoned:

Because no homeowner exists in Phase Two for whom the City
‘must ensure the availability of utility services, requiring payment
on the bonds both creates a cash windfall for the City and fails to
achieve the purpose of the City's ordinance. Because no home
exists in Phase Two that requires the City's utility services,
requiring the City to install improvements on undeveloped land
(and requiring [surety company] to reimburse the City's cost to
install the improvements) imposes an unreasonable forfeiture
against (surety company] and promotes an unreasonable windfall
for the City. Id. at 1307 (footnote omitted).

Unlike the documents at issue in Brooksville, the relevant documents in the
present case are very clear that Insurer, on behalf of Developer as principal,
was obligated to pay the bonds, The Bank release documents specifically state

that “there is no assumption by (Holding Company] of the ot

 

liabilities under any instruments or agreements with third parties and all such
obligations and liabilities remain the responsibility of [Developer] ....” The
Commission clearly constitutes a third party under the terms of the Bank's
release.

Furthermore, the Bond Agreements at issue here concerned the
Developer, Insurer, and the Commission; not the Bank, Therefore, neither the
Bank nor its Holding Company assumed liability under the bonds or had the
authority to discharge the bonds on behalf of the Commission.

In addition, the fact that the Bank’s representative requested that the
‘Commission call the bonds and then distribute those proceeds to the Holding
‘Company upon completion of the necessary improvements does not expressly

or implicitly violate the previously executed discharge agreement. Rather, the
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Bank's proposition to the Commission served to protect the Bank's investment
which, at that time, constituted a significant loss. This was an economically
rational and otherwise lawful request by the Bank. However, the extent to
which the bond funds may be allocated to new or additional improvements is a
different matter that will be subsequently discussed at length.

Another critical distinction between Brooksville and the present case is
the absence of any local ordinance that must be read in conjunction with the
Bond Agreements in order to “impose a condition that construction of the
development proceed before the City may collect.” Brooksville, 731 F.Supp.24
at 1305, Even if we were to accept the Brooksville court’s application of Florida
law as instructive, there is no ordinance in the present case that is relevant to
our determination.

More specifically, Developer's reliance on a 2003 Georgetown City

 

jinance is misplaced. That regulation provides in part:

‘Any proposed roadway to be dedicated to the City of Georgetown

for the maintenance can apply final inch of asphalt surface after

80 percent of the lots that are served by the roadway has received

a Certificate of Occupancy.

Neither the Bond Agreements nor this ordinance even remotely imply
that the construction of houses is a condition precedent to payment of the
bond. Also, the improvements enumerated in the Bond Agreements include
several improvements that are in addition to the roads referenced in the
regulation. There is no need to consider this irrelevant regulation.

In further contrast to Brooksville, the record in the present case indicates

that Developer completed significant aspects of the development prior to
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Developer's default and subsequent transfer of the property to the Holding
Company. Even though Developer had not begun building a single house on
the property, Developer admits in its brief that it developed the property “to the
point where houses coulld be built {and that it] attempted to sell individual

parcels.” Therefore, it is clear that the property had been irreparably converted

 

from rural farm land and had undergone significant stages of sub-division
development. This reduces both the Bank and potential buyers’ flexibility in
developing the land, which could also affect its value.

Lastly, Developer argues that it is not liable under the bond because the
Commission has not suffered any damages. We disagree. This same issue w
addressed in Bd. Of Supervisors of Stafford County v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America,
310 S.£.2d 445 (Va. 1983). Therein, the Supreme Court of Virginia held:

 

It was unnecessary for the County to prove a financial loss as a
prerequisite to recovery from [the surety]. A performance bond is
intended to guarantee completion of the improvements it covers.

Thus, the obligee of such a bond need not incur any expense or do

any work on the improvements before collecting on the bond. Id.

at 335,

We agree with the Court's reasoning and adopt it here.

In addition to Safeco, at least one other jurisdiction has also affirmed the
right of regulatory bodies to call performance bonds based on facts that are
extremely similar to those at issue here. See City of Merced v. American
Motorists ins. Co., 126 Cal.App.4th 1316 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). In sum, we find
Brooksville and its supporting cases to be distinguishable from the present

case and otherwise unpersuasive.
Unjust Enrichment

Developer also contends that ifit is required to pay the bond proceeds,
the Commission would then transfer those funds to the Holding Company,
thus resulting in an unjust enrichment to the Holding Company. This logic
presumably applies to any entity that receives the bond proceeds in order to
develop the property.

In order for a party to prevail under the theory of unjust enrichment, it
must prove three elements: “(1) benefit conferred upon defendant at plaintiff's
expense; (2) a resulting appreciation of benefit by defendant; and (3)
inequitable retention of benefit without payment for its value.” Jones v.
‘Sparks, 297 S.W.3d. 73, 78 (Ky. App. 2009); see also Guarantee Electric Co. v.
Big Rivers Electric Corp., 669 F.Supp. 1371, 1980-81 (W.D. Ky. 1987).

As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, unjust enrichment is,
unavailable when the terms of an express contract control. Sparks Milling Co.
v, Powell, 143 S.W.2d 75, 76 (Ky. 1940); and Bates v. Starkey, 279 S.W. 348,
350 (Ky. 1926). The facts of the present case provide no reason to depart from
this well-reasoned principle. As previously stated, the payment of the bonds is,
expressly controlled by the terms of the Bond Agreements.

Although this Court cannot provide stability in housing prices, we can
provide stability in contract. And although equity is no stranger to actions
involving real property and common interest communities in particular, the
present issue is most appropriately resolved as a matter of law in accordance

with sound contract principles.
New Subdivision Plat
Developer additionally argues that it should not be liable under the Bond

‘Agreements because the Bank, through the Holding Company has altered the

original development plan. In support, Developer has moved that we take

judicial notice of the current subdivision plat that is filed in the Scott County

 

Clerk's Office. See KRE 201. This document was obtained from the Scott
County Planning and Zoning Commission. We decline to take judicial notice of
the allegedly amended plat.! Our review is confined to the record presented to
the trial court when it considered and granted Appellees’ motions for summary
judgment.

‘Our holding is restricted to a developer's liability for the improvements
that were required under the original bonded plat. This comports with
decisions of other jurisdictions that have addressed similar issues. In City of
‘Merced v. American Motorists Ins. Co., for example the court held that when a
developer who is contractually responsible pursuant to a performance bond for
constructing public improvements in a subdivision and fails to perform, the
value of the public entity’s unfulfilled right is “the cost of bringing the
subdivision into compliance by installing the bargained-for improvements.”

126 Cal.App.4th at 1323 emphasis added). See also Safeco, 310 8.E.2d at
448-49 (observing that “a performance bond is intended to guarantee

completion of the improvements it covers.”) (emphasis added and citation

 

Developer's motions for judicial notice and to supplement are denied,

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omitted). Any improvements that are in addition to or materially distinct from

those presented in the original plat cannot be considered bargained for by the

developer. The developer would not be liable for those improvements.
Discovery Issues

First, Developer claims that it was entitled to additional discovery before
the court ruled on Appellees’ summary judgment motion. Developer takes
specific issue with the trial court’s order granting Appellees’ request for a
protective order to stay discovery until after the court considered Appellees’
motion for summary judgment. We review the trial court’s decision to stay or
suspend discovery for an abuse of discretion, Rehm v. Clayton, 132 8.W.3d
864, 869 (Ky. 2004),

The subject of the protective order was discovery requests tendered by
Insurer, not Developer. Therefore, Developer does not have standing to contest
the trial court's protective order. In its response to the Bank’s Summary
Judgment Motion, however, Developer requested “a reasonable time for
discovery.”

Developer has failed to specifically identify the items of evidence that it
‘was foreclosed from receiving and has also failed to state why the introduction
of those items into the record would have created a genuine issue of material
fact in order to survive Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. And for the
reasons previously discussed, the Bank had every right to request that the
‘Commission call the bonds and distribute the proceeds to the Bank and/or its

Holding Company as compensation for required improvements. Therefore, any

a
undisclosed materials that Developer argues may shed light on the Banks’
encouragement to call the bonds are irrelevant to the disposition of this case.

Lastly, Developer claims that the trial court erroneously denied their CR
60.02 motion. We review for an abuse of discretion. Bethlehem Minerals v.
Church and Mullins Corp., 887 S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 1994). The basis for the motion
was newly discovered evidence specifically, an affidavit of David Thornton, the
insurance agent who aided in brokering the bond purchase. Mr. Thornton
revealed that, in 2008, the Bank and Commission initially intended to release
Developer and Insurer from the Bond Agreements upon transfer of the
development property to the Bank.

[As the Court of Appeals correctly noted, the newly discovered evidence at
issue must be so significant that it would, with reasonable certainty, change
the outcome of the proceeding. See Foley v. Commonwealth, 55 S.W.3d 809,
814 (Ky. 2000), Developer has failed to satisfy this standard. The Commission
retained the liberty to discharge liability under the Bond Agreements and the
Bank retained the liberty to assume the bond liability on behalf of the
Developer and Insurer. This was their right under contract. In the end, the
Bank and the Commission chose a different path that was also lawful.

‘Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Developer's CR

 

60.02 motion.

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Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals. We also affirm the decision of the Scott Circuit Court granting
‘summary judgment in favor of Appellees.

All sitting, Minton, C.J.; Hughes, Keller, Noble, and Venters, JJ., concur.
Wright, J., dissents by separate opinion,

WRIGHT, J., DISSENTING: I respectfully dissent from the majority.
Forcing developer to forfeit the bonds in this case amounts to punitive
damages, which are not allowed in Kentucky contract law. At the outset, I
point out that the lower courts failed to consider the issue of damages and
whether they were punitive (and, therefore, prohibited by statute).
Understandably, the majority's opinion does not consider the issue because the
parties failed to raise or argue it.

1, BACKGROUND

Developer obtained property in Scott County and began plans for a
subdivision. It applied to the Georgetown-Scott County Planning and Zoning
Commission for a permit to develop the subdivision. Ordinances required
Developer to post a bond to ensure performance of certain work before selling
‘any lots. Accordingly, Developer purchased bonds from Platt River Insurance
‘Company for 125% of the estimated cost of building certain infrastructure.
Developer did the work necessary to sell lots in the subdivision, but before
selling any lots, the real estate market collapsed in 2008, leaving Developer
unable to sell the lots or to borrow additional money. Eventually, Developer

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agreed to transfer the property to the bank's Holding Company in exchange for
the bank's agreement to forego foreclosure proceedings.

‘The bank informed the Zoning Commission that Developer had
abandoned the project. The bank's Holding Company altered the subdivision
plan and began to develop the subdivision accordingly. At that point, the bank
suggested Developer had abandoned the project and that the bond should be
declared forfeited. The Holding Company asked the Zoning Commission to use
the forfeited bond money to pay the Holding Company the bond amounts
allocated for each portion of the project covered by the bonds as it completed
them. I point out that the ordinance provides for the partial release of bonds—
it is not an all-or-nothing proposition.

‘The Commission declared the bonds forfeited and Developer filed a
declaratory judgment action against the Zoning Commission, the bank, and the
Holding Company in Scott Circuit Court, The Zoning Commission moved for
summary judgment, The trial court ruled that, due to the amount of money
Developer had spent on the project, the nature of the property must have
changed. The trial court failed to conduct a hearing on the extent that
Developer's work had changed the property, whether development had been
connected to any public services, or whether any public services would be
required because of the development. The court entered summary judgment

and ordered the entire bond forfeited.

4
TL, ANALYSIS:
A. The Bond is a Contract
“A bond agreement is a contract ...." Five Star Lodging, Ine. v. George

Const., LLC, 344 S.W.3d 119, 123 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010). The particular bond at
issue in this case is a contract with the Zoning Commission as a third-party
beneficiary. This is consistent with the majority's opinion’s statement that
“{wle interpret the terms and provisions of the Assignment according to well-
established principles of contract law.” See City of Middlesboro v. Am. Sur. Co.
of N.Y., 211 S.W.2d 670, 671 (Ky. 1947) (discussing “whether a bond and the
renewals thereof constitute multiple contracts or one continuing contract’).
Having established that a bond is a type of contract, I will now examine the
types of damages available.

B. Damages
‘Two types of damages are available in contract: actual and liquidated.

Actual damages are not at issue here since the trial court failed to make any
determination of damages incurred. The majority affirms the trial court’s
decision that the entire bond is forfeited and the Zoning Commission did not
have to prove any damages. The ordinance fails to specify that the bonds
would constitute liquidated damages or that the entire bond amount would be
forfeited regardless of the actual cost of completion. Since actual damages are
irrelevant to the forfeiture here, then forfeiture of the bond must be for

liquidated damages.

15
Liquidated damages are allowed under Kentucky contract law, unless
their amount is substantially higher than the actual injury incurred. “If the
stated amount is substantially higher than the actual injury suffered, the
provision will be declared a penalty and not enforceable. G.D. Deal Holdings,
Inc. v. Baker Energy, inc., 501 F, Supp. 2d 914, 923 (W.D. Ky. 2007), aff'd sub
nom. G.D. Deal Holdings, LLC v. Baker Energy, Inc., 291 F. App'x 690 (6th Cir.
2008) (citing Coca-Cola Bottling Works (Thomas) Ine. v. Hazard Coca-Cola
Bottling Works, Inc., 450 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Ky.1970)); see also Patel v. Tuttle
Properties, LLC, 392 S.W.3d 384, 387 (Ky. 2013) (“A provision in a contract
providing for liquidated damages will be enforced, provided it is in actuality
liquidated damages and not a penalty. If such provision is in fact a penalty it
will not be enforced and the injured party will be entitled to recover the actual
damages suffered.” (quoting Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Jones, 256
Ky. 181, 75 8.W.2d 1057, 1060 (1934).

Furthermore, “[wJhere, at the time of the execution of the contract,
damages may be uncertain in character or amount, or difficult to reasonably
ascertain, a provision for liquidated damages will be enforced, provided the
amount agreed upon is not greatly disproportionate to the injury which might
result.” United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc, 241 8.W.34 335,
340-41 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006). The damages in the present case are certain in
character since they are specified in the subdivision plan. The damages are
also certain as to amount since the bond was set on the estimated cost plus

25%, Obtaining bids or estimates on the cost of completing the specified

16
infrastructure would be a routine part of normal business in the construction
industry. Therefore, the amount of any damages would be easy to reasonably
obtain. The forfeiture of the bonds in this case fails to meet any of the criteria
normally required for liquidated damages.

In the present case, the amount of liquidated damages could easily be far
in excess of any actual damages. Developer spent more than $4 million
developing the property and had reached the stage at which it could sell lots. It
‘would appear that much of the infrastructure development had been done, but
the trial court failed to make any determination as to how much completion
would cost. Rather, the trial court merely stated in its order granting summary
judgment that *[tJhere is proof that a great deal of the work necessary to turn
the property into a subdivision had been done in that the bank had distributed
over $4,000,000 at the time of the default .. ..” The liquidated damages
received as a result of any forfeiture would be 125% of the total cost of
developing the infrastructures. If Developer had completed most or a
substantial portion of the infrastructure construction, then the liquidated
damages of total bond forfeiture would be greatly disproportionate to the actual
injury. This would make forfeiture of the bonds—at least in part—a penalty

and, therefore, would amount to punitive damages. This is prohibited under

 

Kentucky law. In fact, we have a statute directly on point which reads, “|
case shall punitive damages be awarded for breach of contract.” KRS 411.184
(4). Since the trial court failed to make any finding as to the amount of

damages, if any, then there is an issue of fact and the summary judgment fails

7
to meet the standard under Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807
S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991).
©. Bond Vests Only When Lots Are Sold

Georgetown's governing ordinance specifies that the bond shall be posted
before lots can be sold. This makes the selling of the lots the triggering event
for the binding of the bond. As the Zoning Commission points out in its brief,
“{thhe public improvements that are covered by the bonds are sidewalks,
handicap ramps, storm cleanup, landscaping, and the final layer of asphalt
(Vol. I, Rec. 245-50). Once the bonds were in place, the Commission approved
the final plat, which allowed [Developer] to sell lots. (Vol. Il, R. 232; KRS

‘Therefore,

 

100.277(3).” In the present case, Developer did not sell any lot
nothing occurred to trigger the bonds or their forfeiture.

I would also point out that nothing in the ordinance indicates that the
entire bond (even portions already spent making the required developments—as
occurred here) should be forfeited, even if lots had been sold. As the Zoning
Commission also states in its brief, quoting the bond language: the insurance
carrier and Developer “are jointly and severally held and firmly bound unto

[the Zoning Commission|’ for ‘the costs of labor and materials and successful

 

construction, completion and acceptance of all improvements.” Here, the
majority takes the contractual terms bargained for by the parties and expands
them to take the complete bond, with no regard as to the amount it will

actually take for completion.

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D, Trial Court Did Not Determine Any Damages Occurred

‘The Zoning Commission would only have damages if lots had been sold,
thus leaving purchasers in need of the infrastructure, connections to public
utilities, or roads. The trial court failed to determine if any of these events had
occurred. If the Planning and Zoning Commission did not have any actual
‘damages, then forfeiture of the bonds would be punitive and prohibited by
statute,

IIL, CONCLUSION
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would remand this matter to

the trial court, as summary judgment was not properly granted.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS:

Jeffrey Clayton Rager

COUNSEL FOR GEORGETOWN-SCOTT COUNTY PLANNING AND ZONING
COMMISSION, APPELLEE:

Charles Perkins

COUNSEL FOR EGT PROPERTIES, INC., AND UNITED BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, APPELLEES:

Steven B. Loy
Monica Hobson Braun

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