Case Title: BAKER v. PENA

Citation: 

Docket Number: 00-309

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
BAKER v. PENA2001 WY 12236 P.3d 602Case Number: 00-309Decided: 12/10/2001

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                
     

 

FERN A. 
BAKER, 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

JERRY G. 
PENA, 

Appellee(Defendant).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Weston County

The 
Honorable Terrence L. O'Brien, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Michael 
P. Reynolds of Quinn, Day & Barker, Prof. L.L.C., Belle Fourche, South 
Dakota; and David A. Bradsky, Rapid City, South Dakota 

 Representing 
Appellee:

            
Kay Lynn Bestol of Sundahl, Powers, Kapp & Martin, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming  

 

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

  
            
KITE, Justice.

 [¶1]      Fern Baker (the 
tenant) was injured when a board in the deck appurtenant to the residential 
premises she leased from Jerry Pena (the landlord) rolled underneath her.  The tenant brought an action for damages 
against the landlord on two theories of liability.  The district court determined there was 
no genuine issue of material fact and granted the landlord's motion for summary 
judgment.  We agree with the 
district court that a genuine issue of material fact does not exist as to 
whether the tenant's claim fits within the fourth exception to the general rule 
of landlord immunity.  However, we 
adopt Restatement (Second) of Torts § 362 (1965) to further define the fifth 
exception to the general rule of landlord immunity.  On this basis, we affirm the district 
court's order in part, reverse it in part, and remand the case for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The tenant 
presents this issue for our review:

 

            
1.  Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists precluding 
summary judgment on [the tenant's] claims that [the landlord] had contracted to 
repair the premises and/or was negligent in making 
repairs.

 

The 
landlord sets the issue out as follows:

 

            
Under the common law rule of landlord immunity for tort liability in 
effect in Wyoming prior to July 1, 1999, a tenant cannot recover from her 
landlord for injuries arising from a failure to repair unless the landlord had 
first promised to make repairs.  
There is no evidence that [the] landlord . . . promised or 
agreed to make repairs.  May [the 
tenant] recover for injuries caused by the alleged failure to 
repair?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      The facts adduced 
from the record are examined in the light most favorable to the tenant 
consistent with our well settled jurisprudence.  The evidence presented for our review is 
comprised of deposition materials and affidavits.  This case arose out of a landlord/tenant 
relationship between the parties.  
In June of 1995, the tenant leased the premises for $250 a month subject 
to an oral lease.  In the early 
morning hours of August 13, 1997, the tenant returned home from work after a 
brief stop at a local bar.  She 
proceeded up the ramp to her deck, and the top decking board apparently rolled 
resulting in her injury.

 

[¶4]      The tenant 
recalled four prior incidents in which either she or her social guests had 
fallen as a result of the deck's state of disrepair.  First, in 1995 her granddaughter's leg 
went through the deck when a board broke.  
Next, in 1996 the tenant fell through a board that had broken on the 
ramp.  A few months later, the 
tenant's friend fell through the deck when a board broke.  Finally, in 1997 the tenant's sister 
fell through the ramp when two boards broke.  The tenant stated that after each 
occurrence the landlord replaced the broken boards. The final incident was the 
only occasion the landlord could recall when he had been notified that someone 
had fallen as the result of the deck, and it was the only time he could recall 
being asked to repair the deck.

 

[¶5]      On April 27, 
1999, the tenant filed a complaint against the landlord for injuries she 
suffered as the result of her fall.  
She contended the landlord was responsible for the maintenance and repair 
of the leased premises, including the deck.  She also claimed he was negligent in the 
construction, maintenance, and repair of the deck.  On May 15, 2000, the landlord moved for 
summary judgment and asserted that, as a landlord, he was immune from tort 
liability and the tenant's claim did not fit within one of the recognized 
exceptions to the general rule.  On 
July 27, 2000, the district held a hearing on this matter.  On August 29, 2000, it granted the 
landlord's motion for summary judgment, and this appeal followed.1 

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW 

 

[¶6]      Summary judgment 
is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the 
prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law.  Eklund v. PRI Environmental, 
Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶10, 25 P.3d 511, ¶10 (Wyo. 2001); see also 
W.R.C.P. 56(c).  A genuine issue of 
material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would have the 
effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action 
or defense which has been asserted by the parties.  Williams Gas ProcessingWamsutter 
Company v. Union Pacific Resources Company, 2001 WY 57, ¶11, 25 P.3d 1064, 
¶11 (Wyo. 2001).  We examine the 
record from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the 
motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may 
fairly be drawn from the record.  
Id.  We evaluate the 
propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and by using the 
same materials as were employed and used by the lower court.  Scherer Construction, LLC v. Hedquist 
Construction, Inc., 2001 WY 23, ¶15, 18 P.3d 645, ¶15 (Wyo. 2001).  We do not accord any deference to the 
district court's decisions on issues of law.  Id.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶7]      At the time of 
the injury, Wyoming followed the common-law rule of landlord immunity for 
liability in most circumstances.2  Taylor v. Schukei Family Trust by and 
through Schukei, 996 P.2d 13, 16 (Wyo. 2000).  As a general rule, immunity relieves the 
landlord of a duty to the tenant or the tenant's guests for dangerous or 
defective conditions of the premises.  
Id.  The common law 
developed from the concept that "the tenant was the owner and occupier subject 
to all the responsibilities of one in possession and burdened with maintaining 
the premises in a reasonably safe condition to protect persons who came upon the 
land."  Ortega v. Flaim, 902 P.2d 199, 202 (Wyo. 1995).  However, 
Wyoming has recognized the following exceptions to the general rule of landlord 
immunity:

 

1.  Undisclosed 
conditions known to lessor and unknown to the lessee which were hidden or 
latently dangerous and caused an injury.

 

2.  The 
premises were leased for public use and a member of the public was 
injured.

 

3.  Part 
of the premises was retained under the lessor's control, but was open to the use 
of the lessee.

 

4.  Lessor 
had contracted to repair the premises.

 

5.  Negligence 
by lessor in making repairs.

 

Id. 
(citations omitted); see also Pavuk v. Rogers, 2001 WY 75, ¶5, 30 P.3d 19, ¶5 (Wyo. 2001).  The tenant 
asserts the fourth and fifth exceptions are applicable and determinative of her 
claim.  We will address each 
exception separately.

 

A.        
Lessor Contracted to Repair the Premises

 

[¶8]      In 
Hefferin v. Scott Realty Co., 71 Wyo. 114, 254 P.2d 194 (1953), we 
examined the common-law rules of landlord liability.  In that case, a tenant sued her landlord 
for injuries resulting from the landlord's improper furnishing of ventilation in 
the leased premises.  254 P.2d  at 
194.  The parties' lease did not 
contain any provisions which referenced an obligation on the landlord's part to 
make repairs.  254 P.2d  at 195.  We held that, in the absence of an 
agreement to the contrary, a landlord is not obligated to make repairs upon the 
leased premises during the lease period whether the defects existed at the time 
he leased the premises or occurred thereafter.  254 P.2d  at 197.  This is so even if the premises are in a 
dangerous condition.  
Id.  This principle is 
based on the theory that a landlord should not be liable for defects in the 
leased premises where he has not made any warranty or contract as to the 
condition of those premises or as to the repair of defects and is guilty of no 
willful wrong or fraud.  
Id.  Essentially, the 
duty to repair arises out of the existence of the contract to repair; therefore, 
the contract defines the extent of the duty.  Montelongo v. Goodall, 788 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Tex. App. 1990).  In 
Hefferin, the tenant did not rely on a contract contained in the lease, 
but instead she alleged the landlord made a promise to properly install a new 
ventilation system.  254 P.2d  at 
197.  In response to the tenant's 
claim, we held the landlord is under no obligation to make repairs unless such a 
stipulation is made a part of the original contract or any subsequent promise to 
make repairs is supported by consideration and not founded merely on the 
relation of the parties.  
Id.  Sufficient 
consideration exists when a tenant, who is not bound to a term of tenancy, 
relies upon a landlord's promise to make repairs made to induce the continuation 
of the tenancy.  Id.  However, in Hefferin, the 
tenant agreed to a definite three-year lease term, and we concluded there 
was no new consideration present for a promise or contract.  Thus, the promise made by the landlord 
was wholly gratuitous, and therefore the landlord could not be liable.  Id.  Moreover, we held that a landlord's 
agreement to make repairs must take the form of an express contract and should 
not be implied from the parties' conduct.  
Id.; see also Taylor, 996 P.2d  at 18.

 

[¶9]      The resolution of 
this matter centers on whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 
the existence of an agreement to make repairs.  The tenant argues there are three 
indications in the record which prove there was, in fact, a mutual agreement 
that the landlord would make repairs.  
First, the tenant speculated that Dale Stietz, her boyfriend at the time 
and a party to the lease, made an agreement with the landlord.  However, she admitted that she did not 
have any personal knowledge of such an agreement, and Mr. Stietz did not recall 
one.  A genuine issue of material 
fact would be present if either the tenant herself made an agreement with the 
landlord or she had personal knowledge of an agreement between the landlord and 
Mr. Stietz and did not have to resort to speculation to prove an agreement was 
made.  Next, she points to the fact 
that the landlord responded in his deposition as follows:

 

Q.  . . . I 
guess I can just ask you.  Whose 
responsibility was it to make repairs on the house?

 

            
. . . .

 

A.  Okay.  I -- mine, I 
guess.

 

Q.  . . . Okay.  So 
if she had a leak under the sink, or something like that, she'd call you and 
you'd come take care of it?

 

A.  Yes.

 

Q.  Okay.

 

A.  I 
did.  I don't know that it was really my responsibility, but I did 
--

 

The 
tenant contends this statement constitutes the landlord's admission that it was 
his responsibility to make repairs.  
On the contrary, these remarks hardly suffice as evidence of a required 
express agreement to make repairs or a promise supported by sufficient 
consideration.3  Taylor, 996 P.2d  at 18.  There was no evidence to prove an 
express agreement was made or the repairs were made as consideration to induce 
the continuation of tenancy.  
Finally, the tenant attempts to argue a reasonable inference may be drawn 
that an agreement existed because the landlord made repairs to the deck after 
each alleged incident.  However, we 
have clearly held that an agreement may not be inferred from the conduct of the 
parties.  Id. 

 

[¶10]   Importantly, the tenant's inference 
of a prior agreement is contradicted by direct evidence in both the landlord's 
and Mr. Stietz's affidavits.  The 
landlord asserts he did not make an agreement with either the tenant or Mr. 
Stietz to make repairs to the deck or any other part of the house.  Nor was it a condition of leasing the 
premises.  Further, Mr. Stietz 
stated he did not recall a discussion with the landlord regarding fixing up or 
repairing the deck, and there was no agreement that the deck was to be repaired 
as a condition of leasing the premises.  
While Mr. Stietz's statement does not specifically preclude the existence 
of an agreement that the landlord would make general repairs to the premises, on 
summary judgment the landlord's direct testimony cannot be overcome by the 
tenant's inference to the contrary.  
Blackmore v. Davis Oil Company, 671 P.2d 334, 337 (Wyo. 
1983).  The record presented for our 
review discloses the tenant's mere speculation versus the landlord's unequivocal 
denial of an agreement.  To succeed 
on summary judgment, after the movant establishes a prima facie case, the burden 
shifts to the opposing party to show a genuine issue of material fact or present 
competent evidence of specific facts countering the facts presented by the 
movant.  Bender v. Phillips, 
8 P.3d 1074, 1077 (Wyo. 2000).  The 
tenant failed to contradict the affidavits of the landlord and Mr. Stietz and 
therefore did not satisfy her burden.

 

[¶11]   The facts of this case closely 
resemble the facts in Ortega, 902 P.2d 199.  In that case, a residential home was 
leased by the landlord to tenants through an oral lease with a bare bones 
commitment by the tenants to pay rent in return for the landlord's surrender of 
possession.  902 P.2d  at 201.  The parties agreed there was no 
understanding regarding repairs.  
The tenants' social guest sustained personal injuries when she fell down 
the stairs at the home.  
Id.  In the absence of 
a contractual provision to repair, we held the landlord had no duty to repair 
patent defects on the premises.  902 P.2d  at 204.  We affirmed the 
district court's grant of summary judgment.  Id.  In the same vein, we cannot discern 
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in this case sufficient to 
withstand summary judgment on the fourth exception to landlord 
immunity.

 

B.        
Negligence by Lessor in Making Repairs

 

[¶12]   The common-law rule of landlord 
immunity relied upon the premise that, if there was not a contract governing the 
landlord/tenant relationship, the tenant in possession of the property was in a 
better position to be aware of hazards and to undertake repairs.  Therefore, absent a specific agreement 
otherwise, the landlord was not responsible for repairs.  This court has consistently followed 
that rule in cases involving the extent of a landlord's contractual duties.  See Ortega, 902 P.2d  at 204; 
Hefferin, 254 P.2d  at 197.  
However, when a landlord has agreed or covenanted to repair the premises 
during the tenancy, he has a duty to exercise reasonable care and is liable for 
negligence.  Brubaker v. Glenrock 
Lodge International Order of Odd Fellows, 526 P.2d 52, 58 (Wyo. 1974).  

 

[¶13]   In the instant case, the tenant 
does not point to any evidence of a promise supported by sufficient 
consideration which would create a contractual obligation and open the door to 
the landlord's liability.  Nor was 
there any evidence presented that, at the time the tenant leased the premises, 
the landlord promised to maintain the property in good repair.  Hence, our discussion must turn on 
whether, under any circumstances, a gratuitous undertaking subjects a landlord 
to tort liability.  

 

[¶14]   Brubaker is the only Wyoming 
case which has directly addressed the viability of the fifth exception to 
landlord immunitynegligence in performing repairs.  In that case, this court held landlord 
liability for negligent repair could arise because the landlord, pursuant to a 
specific agreement, moved and installed a stairway which collapsed causing Mr. 
Brubaker's injuries.  We held the 
repairs and remodeling of the stairs were undertaken as an inducement and 
consideration for the entry into the lease; therefore, the issue of the 
landlord's failure to properly perform the agreement was a proper issue to be 
determined by a jury.  The question 
of a truly gratuitous undertaking of repairs by a landlord was not at issue in 
Brubaker.  Therefore, we are 
faced with a question of first impressionwhether a landlord is liable in tort 
for damages caused by a failed repair when (1) the landlord undertakes a repair 
with no contractual obligation to do so and (2) accomplishes the repair 
negligently and in such a fashion as to cause the tenant to believe the repair 
corrected a safety problem when it did not.

 

[¶15]   Regarding negligent repairs made by 
a lessor, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 362  (1965) provides:

 

A lessor 
of land who, by purporting to make repairs on the land while it is in the 
possession of his lessee, or by the negligent manner in which he makes such 
repairs has, as the lessee neither knows nor should know, made the land more 
dangerous for use or given it a deceptive appearance of safety, is subject to 
liability for physical harm caused by the condition to the lessee or to others 
upon the land with the consent of the lessee or sublessee. 

 

 

This 
section clearly provides that a lessor who makes negligent repairs and has made 
the land more dangerous for use or given it a deceptive appearance of safety is 
subject to liability.  This 
liability arises when tenants rely upon the deceptive appearance of safety and 
subject themselves or their social guests to danger.  We adopt the Restatement standard for 
application to situations where a landlord gratuitously undertakes repairs and 
performs them negligently.  Our 
adoption of this standard is harmonious with our prior case law.  Until now, this court has not been 
presented with a comparable factual situation wherein a deceptive appearance of 
safety was potentially created by the landlord's conduct and where a contractual 
based analysis was not determinative.  
See Brubaker, 526 P.2d  at 59.  

 

[¶16]   As an appellate court, we are not 
fact finders in the first instance.  
The district court's grant of summary judgment did not determine whether 
a genuine 
issue of material fact exists as to whether, viewed 
in the light most favorable to the tenant, the 
landlord's repair made the land more dangerous for use or gave the deck a 
deceptive appearance of safety.  We 
therefore reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment and remand the 
case for such further proceedings as are appropriate and consistent with this 
decision.

 

[¶17]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1This court 
notes the absence in the record of any district court analysis in its 
determination to grant the landlord summary judgment.  A summary judgment analysis evident in 
the record would undoubtedly assist appellate 
review.

 

  
2As we stated in 
Flores v. Simmons, 999 P.2d 1310, 1313 n.1 (Wyo. 2000), "On July 1, 1999, 
statutes governing residential rental property became effective.  Those statutes set out the duties of 
owners and renters and could, perhaps, alter the existing law which governs the 
landlord and tenant relationship.  
Wyo. Stat.  Ann. §§ 1-21-1201 
to -1211 (LEXIS 1999)."   

3An express agreement has been defined in 
Taylor as "[a] contract whose terms the parties have explicitly set 
out.'"  996 P.2d  at 18 (quoting 
Black's Law Dictionary 321 (7th ed. 1999)).