Case Title: Pocta v. Kleppe Corporation

Citation: 154 N.W.2d 177

Docket Number: 

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1967-11-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
154 N.W.2d 177 (1967) Stanley POCTA and Milo Pocta, Plaintiffs, Appellants, and Cross-Respondents, v. KLEPPE CORPORATION and Anna C. Kleppe, as agent of said Corporation, Defendants, Respondents, and Cross-Appellants. No. 8322. Supreme Court of North Dakota. November 16, 1967. *178 F. C. Rohrich, Linton, and E. T. Christianson, Bismarck, for plaintiffs, appellants, and cross-respondents. Robert Chesrown, Linton, for defendants, respondents, and cross-appellants; Robert Vogel, Mandan, of counsel. KNUDSON, Judge. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial. The court denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and granted the motion for a new trial. The plaintiffs appealed from the order granting the new trial and the defendants cross-appealed from the order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The plaintiffs had farmed the defendants' farmland for 15 years, prior to and including the year 1964, on an oral year-to-year lease providing for a one-fourth share of the crops to the defendants, with all expenses of the production of the crop paid by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs brought this action alleging that the defendants had refused to rent the land to them for 1965, that the plaintiffs had not been properly notified, that such termination was without justification *179 and reason, and that they had been damaged as a result of this wrongful termination. The plaintiffs claimed actual damages of $3,350 for certain rock picking operations, for summer-fallowing, and for elimination of quack grass, performed in preparation for the crop year of 1965. The plaintiffs claimed additional damages of $15,000 for loss of use of the land for the crop year of 1965, and asked for treble damages provided for in N.D.C.C. § 32-03-29. They further claimed punitive damages of $50,000 for an alleged malicious prosecution by the defendant Anna C. Kleppe. The latter claim was based on a complaint signed by Mrs. Kleppe charging the plaintiff Stanley Pocta with trespassing on the land in April of 1965 when he went onto the land to begin spring seeding. When the case came on for a jury trial the plaintiffs proceeded to try the case on the theory of a renewal of the prior oral year-to-year lease, but during the presentation of the plaintiffs' testimony the plaintiffs changed their theory to that of an express oral lease allegedly entered into on September 16, 1964. They were allowed to amend their complaint accordingly. At the close of the plaintiffs' case the defendants moved for dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to prove any of the allegations therein. The court dismissed the claim for malicious prosecution for failure of proof, and denied the motion as to the other allegations of the complaint. At the close of all of the evidence the defendants moved for a directed verdict on the following grounds: This motion was resisted by the plaintiffs and was denied by the court, and the case was submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for damages for breach of the oral farm lease in the sum of $3,713.36, and allowed nothing for the plaintiffs' claim for labor and services performed in summer-fallowing, picking rocks and eradicating quack grass. The defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative for a new trial, on substantially the following grounds: The court denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but granted the alternative motion for a new trial on all the issues on the cause of action for breach of said contract on the alleged oral farm lease entered into on September 16, 1964. *180 The plaintiffs appealed from the order granting the motion for new trial and specified as error: The defendants cross-appealed from the order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and specified as error: On a review of an order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict we are limited to a consideration of the evidence. If the record is such that there is some issue of fact for the jury, and the jury rendered a verdict thereon, then the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be denied. Nelson v. Scherling, 71 N.D. 337, 300 N.W. 803. Such motion will not be granted where there is an issue of fact for the jury to pass upon under the evidence, as it does not go to the weight of the evidence. Nelson v. Scherling, supra. On a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the one in whose favor the jury returned a verdict. Linington v. McLean County, 146 N.W.2d 45 (N.D.1966). After the taking of the testimony for some time of Milo Pocta the trial judge called a recess and requested the attorneys for the parties to retire to his chambers with him. In chambers the court said, "It makes it a little difficult for me to rule when I don't know what the theory of the lawsuit is." After some discussion with the attorneys, the trial court said, "Yes. Now the testimony that you have been eliciting so far is to the effect that there is supposed to have been at least an express lease entered into in 1964 for '65." To which statement Mr. Christianson, one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs, replied, "This is right." Following a further discussion with the attorneys the court said, "I think you have to make an election which way you are going so that I can intelligently rule." Then the following colloquy ensued: The complaint, as amended, alleged that on September 16, 1964, the plaintiffs entered into an oral contract with the defendants to farm the defendants' land for the 1965 crop year; that said lease was not legally terminated; that they suffered damages for service and labor performed in 1964 in anticipation of the 1965 crop year; and realleged the other allegations in the previous complaint and prayer as before. After the conference in chambers the following testimony regarding the alleged express oral lease of September 16, 1964, was elicited. Milo Pocta testified to the conversation he had with Lars Kleppe on that date on a tract of land adjoining the Kleppe land, on which Milo Pocta was combining. On recross-examination, Mr. Milo Pocta testified as follows: The testimony of the plaintiff is somewhat vague; he nowhere specifically states that he agreed to farm the land upon the terms and conditions stipulated in the old lease. There is a total lack of evidence to show that any of the terms and conditions *183 of the lease were discussed. The conversation between the parties on September 16, 1964, amounted to little more than preliminary negotiations and no oral lease resulted. It is true the plaintiffs expected to lease the Kleppe land for 1965, and on the strength of such expectations summer-fallowed and picked rock on the land, but this did not constitute a lease or estop defendants to deny the existence of a lease. The defendants contend that the plaintiffs have failed to prove the allegations of the amended complaint, and, therefore, the defendants are entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and granted the motion for a new trial because, in his opinion, justice would best be served thereby, as stated in the following portion of his memorandum opinion: It was within the discretion of the trial court to deny the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and grant the motion for a new trial in this case. We have held many times that a motion for new trial based on the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict invokes the trial court's legal discretion to be exercised in the interest of justice. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co. v. Johnston's Fuel Liners, 130 N.W.2d 154 (N.D.1964) And, unless abuse of discretion is shown, the action of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal Sahli v. Fuehrer, 127 N.W.2d 900 (N.D.1964). In Olson v. Thompson, 74 N.W.2d 432 (N.D.1956), we said: In Nelson v. Scherling, supra, 300 N.W. at 806, we said: From the record it appears that none of the parties were prepared to try the case on the theory of an express oral lease. And this may be particularly true of the plaintiffs, who, so far as the record shows, have failed to prove their allegations of an express oral lease. Although there is no *184 evidence to support the verdict we do not order judgment notwithstanding the verdict under the circumstances in this case, as it is reasonable to believe the defects may be supplied upon a new trial. We believe justice is better served by affirming the order of the district court granting a new trial. The order granting a new trial is affirmed. TIEGEN, C.J., and ERICKSTAD and STRUTZ, JJ., concur. PAULSON, J., not being a member of the Court at the time of submission of this case, did not participate.