Case Title: Montclair State University v. County of Passaic

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-16-17

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2018-08-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of
the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

           Montclair State University v. County of Passaic (A-16-17) (080084)

Argued April 10, 2018 -- Decided August 6, 2018

LaVECCHIA, J., writing for the Court.

        This appeal raises substantive and procedural issues about the immunity from local
zoning laws and regulation that Rutgers v. Piluso, 
60 N.J. 142 (1972), recognized for a state
university with respect to improvements on state-owned land. The Court reaffirms principles
expressed in the Rutgers decision and addresses the application of those principles when the
planned state agency activity is asserted to have a direct public safety impact affecting off-
site land for which local governmental authorities have a responsibility to act in the public
interest and could be potentially liable should a tort claim arise.

        Since 2004, plaintiff Montclair State University (MSU) has attempted to create a third
egress from its campus onto a county road. MSU consulted with both the County of Passaic
(County) and the City of Clifton (City), ultimately satisfying most of their concerns about the
project. When the County failed to respond to MSU’s permit applications, MSU filed this
action, seeking a judgment declaring that no permit or local approval was required, or
alternatively, an order compelling the County to issue all necessary permits.

        The trial court denied the relief sought. Relying on Rutgers, the court reasoned that
the parties must exchange updated traffic studies, consult further, and appear before the local
planning boards. Although MSU agreed to make more changes to its plan, the impasse
remained. The principal point of contention was the design speed of the campus roadway,
which the County and City claimed was unsafe. MSU declined to make the change proposed
by the County and the City, relying on its experts’ conclusion that the road’s planned design
speed and posted speed would be safe, and that the alternative design was unsafe. The matter
returned to the trial court, which dismissed MSU’s complaint because MSU had not returned
to the local planning boards to develop the record further.

       MSU appealed. The Appellate Division panel concluded that the trial court
“mistakenly exercised [its] discretion by . . . requiring the matter be heard by the municipal
and county planning boards for development of a record.” 
451 N.J. Super. 523, 530 (App.
Div. 2017). Rather, the panel held that MSU enjoys a limited immunity but that Rutgers
controls here and prohibits MSU from exercising its power in an “unreasonable fashion.” Id.
at 530-31. Accordingly, the panel reversed and remanded the matter, instructing that the trial
court determine whether MSU had adequately and reasonably consulted with the County and
City. Id. at 533. The Court granted the City’s petition for certification. 
231 N.J. 330 (2017).
                                                 1
HELD: First, under the qualified immunity addressed in Rutgers a state agency must be able to
demonstrate both that the planned action is reasonable and that the agency reasonably consulted
with local authorities and took into consideration legitimate local concerns. Second, although
an otherwise immune state entity may not be compelled to submit to review before a planning
board, when its improvement directly affects off-site property and implicates a safety concern
raised by a local governmental entity responsible to protect public safety with respect to that
off-site property, special judicial review and action is required. In circumstances such as are
presented here, a judicial finding that the cited public safety concern has been reasonably
addressed shall be a necessary additional requirement before a court may either compel local
regulatory action or grant declaratory relief that the planned action is exempt from land use
regulation. The Court does not specify what record warrants such a finding in every case.
Rather, the trial court should determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether it could make such a
finding via a summary proceeding or whether a more fulsome proceeding is necessary.

1. Prior to Rutgers, the Court considered two cases that involved local assertions of
municipal land use control of lands that had become subject to state authorities empowered
to construct highway road projects. In City of Newark v. Turnpike Authority, the Court
rejected the notion that the local governmental authority superseded the power granted to the
State agency by the Legislature. 
7 N.J. 377, 384 (1951). In Town of Bloomfield v. Highway
Authority, a municipality sought a declaration that the State Highway Authority was subject
to local land use controls. 
18 N.J. 237, 238 (1955). The Court took into account that there
were “widespread objections by local communities and residents . . . to the encroachments of
new highways,” but found that they “must, in the public interest, give way to the greater
good for the greater number.” Id. at 248. (pp. 16-20)

2. In Rutgers, the Court was asked to consider the extent to which a municipality’s zoning
ordinances could place limits on a housing expansion by a state university on its own lands,
where the municipality claimed that the project would impact municipal resources and
services. The Court rejected a “presumption of immunity” based exclusively on the
superiority one governmental entity may have over another in hierarchy and settled on a
case-by-case test that depends on “legislative intent . . . with respect to the particular agency
or function involved,” to be divined from a number of factors. Id. at 152-53. In the
application of its test, the Court determined that Rutgers, as a state university and
instrumentality of the State, is entitled to a qualified immunity. Id. 153. The Court stressed
that immunity came with caveats in its exercise. First, immunity from land use controls may
not “be exercised in an unreasonable fashion so as to arbitrarily override all important
legitimate local interests.” Ibid. Further, “even if the proposed action of the immune
governmental instrumentality does not reach the unreasonable stage . . . , the instrumentality
ought to consult with the local authorities and sympathetically listen and give every
consideration to local objections, problems and suggestions.” (pp. 20-24)

3. Rutgers identified a number of principles that would govern whether an entity is entitled
to claim immunity from local land use regulation: “the nature and scope of the
instrumentality seeking immunity, the kind of function or land use involved, the extent of the
public interest to be served thereby, the effect local land use regulation would have upon the
                                                 2
enterprise concerned[,] and the impact upon legitimate local interests.” Id. at 152-53. With
respect to the specific project for which immunity is sought, Rutgers requires a two-fold
analysis. First, the substantive action planned by the entity claiming immunity from local
land use control must itself be reasonable. Id. at 153. That determination is distinct, yet not
entirely disentangled from, the second condition required of a state governmental entity
acting in furtherance of its statutory mission and claiming immunity from local land use
control in connection with that action: The immune entity also has an obligation to
respectfully hear and consider legitimate concerns raised by local authorities to minimize
conflict between the two governmental authorities. Id. at 153-54. (pp. 24-25)

4. MSU enjoys the qualified immunity from local land use controls recognized in Rutgers.
The Court notes that the Appellate Division’s decision can be interpreted to have conflated
the two parts of the Rutgers analysis into one and, for clarification’s sake, reaffirms the two
parts to the analysis that must be applied on remand. Specifically, in order for the trial court
to grant MSU the relief it seeks, it must first assess the inherent reasonableness of the MSU
roadway plan in its entirety, including review of its off-site impact. Separately, the trial court
must also assess whether MSU reasonably consulted and took into consideration the
legitimate concerns of the local government entities. The trial court must address both
components, and the Appellate Division’s instructions are modified accordingly. (pp. 26-29)

5. A novel issue raised in this case is how and where public safety concerns factor into the
Rutgers analysis. The Court recognizes as significant the public interest inherent in a local
government entity’s reasonable concerns about the impact of an immune state entity’s
internal actions affecting public safety on non-state public property. Where, as here, a public
safety concern could affect local public property and the members of the public using that
property, the Court is compelled to add an additional inquiry to the test articulated in
Rutgers. A review by MSU and its experts asserting that it has reasonably addressed the
public safety concern is not sufficient, standing alone. In circumstances presented here,
where a facially legitimate public safety concern is raised about an immune entity’s planned
improvement to lands, which would have a direct impact on non-state-owned property, the
Court will require a showing by the immune entity that its planning has reasonably addressed
the public safety concern. The Court will require a discrete judicial finding that MSU’s
proposed action reasonably satisfies public safety concerns. Such a finding comes in
addition to the otherwise typical review of an immune entity’s modification to its own
property. A judicial finding is necessary to properly protect the general public and to fairly
provide an independent judicial determination on which other public entities may rely. The
Court leaves to the sound discretion of the trial court whether this matter may proceed along
the lines of a summary proceeding or whether the taking of live testimony or receipt of other
evidence is necessary. (pp. 29-34)

       AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA,
SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. JUSTICE
ALBIN did not participate.
                                  3
                                      SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                        A-
16 September Term 2017
                                                 080084

MONTCLAIR STATE UNIVERSITY,

     Plaintiff-Respondent,

          v.

COUNTY OF PASSAIC and CITY OF
CLIFTON,

     Defendants-Appellants.

          Argued April 10, 2018 – Decided August 6, 2018

          On certification to the Superior Court,
          Appellate Division, whose opinion is
          reported at 
451 N.J. Super. 523 (App. Div.
          2017).

          Marvin J. Brauth argued the cause for
          appellant City of Clifton (Wilentz, Goldman
          & Spitzer, attorneys; Marvin J. Brauth, of
          counsel and on the briefs).

          Michael H. Glovin, Deputy County Counsel,
          argued the cause for appellant County of
          Passaic (William J. Pascrell, III, Passaic
          County Counsel, attorney; Michael H. Glovin,
          of counsel and on the brief).

          Antonio J. Casas argued the cause for
          respondent (Windels Marx Lane & Mittendorf,
          attorneys; Antonio J. Casas and Samuel G.
          Destito, of counsel and on the briefs).

          Peter G. Verniero argued the cause for
          amicus curiae Rutgers, The State University
          of New Jersey (Sills Cummis & Gross,
          attorneys; Peter G. Verniero and James M.
          Hirschhorn, of counsel and on the brief, and
          Michael S. Carucci, on the brief).

                                1
          Christopher A. Edwards, Assistant Attorney
          General, submitted a brief on behalf of
          amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey
          (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General,
          attorney; Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant
          Attorney General, of counsel, and
          Christopher A. Edwards, on the brief).

     JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

     This appeal raises substantive and procedural issues about

the immunity from local zoning laws and regulation that Rutgers

v. Piluso, 
60 N.J. 142 (1972), recognized for a state university

with respect to improvements on state-owned land.

     Case law recognizes that a state higher educational

institution like MSU, statutorily vested with control over its

property, see 
N.J.S.A. 18A:64-7, has a form of immunity, or

exemption, from local land use controls when it comes to the use

and development of its own property.   However, that

discretionary authority is not absolute:   the freedom to act

independent of local land use control may not be exercised in

unreasonable ways.

     In this matter, Montclair State University (MSU) commenced

an action in the Law Division of the Superior Court, invoking

judicial authority over an impasse that had developed between

MSU and local governmental authorities concerning improvements

to the intersection of a campus road with a Passaic County

(County) road in the City of Clifton (City).   MSU sought an

                                2
order either (1) directing the County to issue three permits

related to the intersection and affiliated roadway improvements;

or, in the alternative, (2) declaring that state law exempts MSU

from local permitting requirements or approval for its desired

road improvements, regardless of whether a traffic signal is

installed at the intersection.

     The trial court declined the requested relief and dismissed

the action; the court told MSU either to appear before the local

planning board to establish a record on the public safety

concerns expressed by the local governmental authorities or to

appeal.   MSU appealed and the Appellate Division reversed the

dismissal of the action and remanded for further proceedings

before the trial court.

     We granted the City’s petition for certification, seeking

correction of the Appellate Division’s interpretive guidance on

Rutgers and clarification of that decision’s application in

circumstances, as here, where local authorities have raised

public safety concerns.   For the reasons that follow, we affirm

with modification the judgment of the Appellate Division.

     We now reaffirm principles expressed in the Rutgers

decision.   Further, we address the application of those

principles when the planned state agency activity is asserted to

have a direct public safety impact affecting off-site land for

which local governmental authorities have a responsibility to

                                 3
act in the public interest and could be potentially liable

should a tort claim arise.

     First, we clarify and hold that under the qualified

immunity addressed in Rutgers a state agency must be able to

demonstrate both that the planned action is reasonable and that

the agency reasonably consulted with local authorities and took

into consideration legitimate local concerns.   Meaningful

consultation with appropriate local public authority is a

necessary part, but consultation alone does not suffice to

conclusively address the essential question about the

reasonableness of the planned action.

     Second, we hold that when the otherwise immune state

agency’s improvement directly affects off-site property and

implicates a safety concern raised by a local governmental

entity responsible to protect public safety with respect to that

off-site property, special judicial review and action is

required.   We continue to recognize that the state entity may

not be compelled to submit to review before a planning board.

However, in circumstances such as are presented here, a judicial

finding that the cited public safety concern has been reasonably

addressed through the planning for the state agency’s

improvement shall be a necessary additional requirement before a

court may either compel local regulatory action or grant

                                 4
declaratory relief that the planned action is exempt from land

use regulation.

     We do not intend to specify what record warrants such a

finding in every case.   Rather, the trial court should

determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether it could make such a

finding via a summary proceeding or whether a more fulsome

proceeding is necessary.

                                I.

                                A.

     Since 2004, MSU has attempted to create a third egress from

its Passaic County campus onto Valley Road, also known as

Passaic County Road 621.   MSU wants to relieve traffic

congestion on its campus roads and provide easier access onto

and off of the campus and its roadways.   Specifically at issue

here, MSU wants to convert Yogi Berra Drive -- a campus road on

state property that intersects with Valley Road -- from an

ingress-only road to an ingress/egress road.

     MSU consulted with both the County and the City about the

project for almost six years.   During that extended process, MSU

submitted construction plans for review, retained experts to

study traffic and safety concerns, and, ultimately, agreed to

change portions of its plan to address concerns raised by both

the County and the City.   After conferring with both entities

                                 5
over several years, MSU was able to satisfy most concerns about

the project.

     On April 7, 2014, MSU submitted permit applications to the

County Engineer for the new egress.   The first permit

application was for a “right-of-way access permit/curb cut

permit,” that would allow MSU to relocate the access driveway to

a new location, and to install 320 feet of “full height (raised)

curbing.”   The permit application indicates that the purpose of

the work was to construct a new driveway and add a traffic

signal, and that the work would be located on Valley Road.     A

second permit application, asking for a storm drain connection,

requested that the County allow MSU to connect a storm drain

into the County’s existing system at Valley Road.   Finally,

consistent with an alternative plan for the access driveway, MSU

submitted another application also for a “right-of-way access

permit/curb cut permit,” allowing the University to relocate the

access driveway to a new location and to install 130 feet of

“full height (raised) curbing” alongside the county road.

     With respect to all of the permits, MSU asked for issuance

of approval either with or without the installation of a traffic

light to control the traffic on Valley Road as well as the entry

and exit of traffic flowing between Valley Road and Yogi Berra

Drive.   The MSU Board of Trustees also adopted a resolution

                                 6
committing to assume the cost and maintenance of a traffic

signal, if one were permitted.

     In its cover letter to the County Engineer that accompanied

the permit applications, MSU recounted the extended history of

discussion, public comment, and negotiation with local officials

about the project, as well as the changes that had been made to

its plans as a result of those consultations.   MSU sought a

statement that its application was now complete, asserting that

the University was exempt, under Rutgers, from seeking approval

for the project from the City’s land use boards.

     When the County failed to respond to MSU’s permit

applications, MSU filed this action against the County on July

29, 2014, seeking a judgment declaring that no permit or other

local approval was required, or alternatively, an order

compelling the County to issue all necessary permits.    The court

permitted the City to intervene.

     On the return date of an order to show cause, the trial

court denied MSU the relief sought.    The court addressed the

scope of the County’s authority over the proposed construction

on state land.   Relying on Rutgers, the court reasoned that the

parties must exchange updated traffic studies, consult further,

and appear before the local planning boards.    The court retained

jurisdiction in the event the parties could not reach a

resolution.

                                   7
     The parties met and conferred.     Although MSU agreed to make

more changes to its plans, the impasse over issuance of the

permits remained.

     The principal point of contention was the design speed of

the campus roadway, which the County and City claimed was

unsafe.   Yogi Berra Drive is built on an incline.   The County

and the City posited that the road curve should be altered and

that the road should have a thirty-five mile-per-hour design

speed with up to a twenty-five mile-per-hour posted speed.    MSU

declined to make that change, relying on its experts’ conclusion

that the road’s planned twenty mile-per-hour design speed and

fifteen mile-per-hour posted speed would be safe, and that the

alternative design was unsafe because it would encourage higher

operating speeds.   Ultimately, the County refused to issue the

permits, despite MSU’s issuance of a revised plan that addressed

most of the County’s concerns, because it believed the roadway

design failed to meet applicable safety standards and because

the City’s approval was necessary to locate a proposed traffic

signal on the roadway of Valley Road.

     MSU asked the trial court to relist the matter for issuance

of a decision.   Over the City’s objection based on MSU’s failure

to appear before City planning boards, the court heard the

matter again on February 25, 2016.    MSU argued that (1) it had

met all requirements under Rutgers; (2) its revised plans

                                 8
resolved the County’s and City’s safety concerns; and (3) the

only area on which the parties could not agree -- the design of

the roadway -- concerned a project located entirely on MSU’s

property and over which MSU had sole jurisdiction.   The County

and City argued that there were still safety issues due to the

roadway design and the ability of cars descending Yogi Berra

Drive at the intersection with the county road to maintain

control; that said, the County acknowledged that MSU had made

the project “safer” and had “accommodated” most of the County

Planning Board’s comments.

     The trial court dismissed MSU’s complaint for declaratory

and injunctive relief because MSU had not returned to the local

planning boards, as had previously been ordered, to develop the

record further.   The trial court advised MSU that its options

were either to appeal or “set something up so there can be a

record” concerning the roadway plans and MSU’s accommodations of

the recommendations made by the County and the City.

                                B.

     MSU appealed and argued that it was an abuse of discretion

by the trial court to dismiss the complaint “without determining

whether MSU met its obligation under Rutgers to act reasonably

and consult with the county and city,” and by mandating “that

MSU return to Clifton’s planning board for approval for any

reason, including, for the development of a record.”   Montclair

                                 9
State Univ. v. County of Passaic, 
451 N.J. Super. 523, 530 (App.

Div. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).     The Appellate

Division framed the question as whether known “limits [to] a

local government’s authority to regulate development of a state

university’s property that was confined to its campus . . .

apply to a state university’s construction of a roadway that

intersects with a county road.”    Id. at 527.

     The panel reversed and remanded “for reinstatement of

plaintiff’s complaint and a trial, if necessary, for the judge

to determine whether MSU satisfied its obligation under

Rutgers.”   Id. at 533.   The panel concluded that the court

“mistakenly exercised [its] discretion by . . . requiring the

matter be heard by the municipal and county planning boards for

development of a record.”   Id. at 530.    Rather, the panel held

that MSU enjoys a limited immunity but that Rutgers controls

here and prohibits MSU from exercising its power in an

“unreasonable fashion.”   Id. at 530-31 (quoting Rutgers, 
60 N.J.

at 153).

     The panel explained, first, that a “difference of opinion

as to the best method to address a local traffic safety concern

alone . . . does not support a finding that the state university

acted unreasonably.”   Id. at 532.     Turning then to the

consultation that occurred, the panel emphasized that MSU “must

reasonably take local safety concerns into consideration when

                                  10
formulating and executing its plans.”   Ibid.   However, the panel

clarified that “[t]he determination of whether a state

university has complied with its obligation to consult and

consider local concerns is a judicial function not conditioned

upon consideration by a local zoning board.”    Ibid.

Accordingly, the panel remanded the matter to the trial court

with the instruction that the court determine whether MSU had

adequately and reasonably consulted with the County and City.

Id. at 533.

     We granted the City’s petition for certification.     
231 N.J.
 330 (2017).1   We also granted the motions of the Attorney General

of New Jersey and of Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey

(Rutgers), to appear as amici curiae in this matter.

                                II.

                                A.

     The City argues that, as a general matter, state agencies

enjoy an immunity from local control but not an absolute

immunity.   It asserts that Rutgers set forth a multi-part test

for a trial court’s use in disputes involving a state entity’s

assertion of immunity from local land use and regulatory

controls.   According to the City, that test is as follows:   when

1  The County did not petition for certification but did move to
participate. We allowed the County to file its Appellate
Division brief and participate in oral argument.
                                11
a local governmental entity (1) raises an important local

interest, a court is required to assess (2) whether the state

agency invoking immunity is acting in an “unreasonable fashion

so as to arbitrarily override all important legitimate local

interests,” (quoting Rutgers, 
60 N.J. at 153), and (3) whether

the state entity has consulted with, listened to, and considered

“local objections,” (quoting Rutgers, 
60 N.J. at 154).

     The City argues that the Appellate Division ignored the

prong that addresses the reasonableness of the action by

focusing solely on the act of consultation with local agencies

and not considering reasonableness as a distinct query related

to the proposed project and its effect.   According to the City,

the Appellate Division decision allows a state agency to move

ahead with a project so long as the agency is satisfied with the

reasonableness of its own proposal, without regard to a dispute

between state and local entities as to the project’s safety.

The decision thereby grants the agency unfettered ability to

implement an unreasonable project, according to the City.

Moreover, the City maintains that the panel’s approach

forecloses judicial review of the state agency’s reasonableness

decision.

                               B.

     The County generally supports the City’s position.     It

distinguishes Rutgers from this case on the basis of the

                               12
County’s governmental powers.   It also asserts that the safety

concerns raised here are “different than the zoning regulations

raised” in Rutgers, limiting its applicability.   The County

posits that the design speed for the downhill travel on the

roadway at issue, coupled with the “somewhat sharp turn at the

bottom of the roadway at its connection with the Valley Road,”

is a legitimate safety concern.    The County expressed concern

about “how many vehicles could be stacking up at the new

proposed . . . [i]ntersection at any particular time and how

dangerous that stacking might be in relation to the vertical and

horizontal curvature of the roadway.”   Finally, the County notes

that if MSU’s design moves forward as planned, and the County’s

safety concerns materialize, then the County could be exposed to

tort liability it “might be powerless to deny.”

                                  C.

     MSU argues that the Appellate Division correctly applied

Rutgers when the panel remanded the case to the trial court.

MSU suggests that the City misreads the Appellate Division’s

decision, which “expressly reject[ed] the notion that a state

university can comply with the law without giving real

consideration to local concerns.”

     MSU asserts that in this matter there is substantial

evidence that it listened to the City and the County and

substantively addressed each issue, making significant changes

                                  13
to its plans to accommodate most local concerns.   It only

declined to redesign Yogi Berra Drive after its experts

concluded that the original design was safe and that the

proposed alternative could create an unsafe situation.    Thus,

MSU says it fully complied with Rutgers, as evidenced by its

meaningful consultations with the City and County and its

willingness to make reasonable adjustments for safety concerns,

despite a difference of opinion between the parties.

                               D.

     Two amici support MSU in this matter.

                               1.

     The Attorney General asks this Court to hold, consistent

with Rutgers, that the trial court must “balance State

sovereignty with important legitimate local interests by

employing deferential consideration of whether [MSU] reasonably

consulted” with the City and the County.   As long as the State

“hears local concerns and reasonably exercises its immunity in

light of those concerns,” the Attorney General asserts that,

consistent with Rutgers, state sovereign immunity “permits a

State project to go forward, even if local objection persists.”

     The Attorney General notes that state entities routinely

undertake projects that could touch on significant local issues.

The Attorney General argues that the State must have immunity

from local ordinances because “a shift in this well-established

                               14
balance” would undermine sovereign immunity and allow local

entities to stall State projects with “years of objections,”

effectively “giv[ing] the local entity an unfettered veto power

over the State project.”

                                2.

     Rutgers argues that although the Appellate Division

correctly understood the Rutgers standard, the panel erred in

remanding the case for further proceedings in the trial court.

State institutions, according to Rutgers, must retain autonomy

to improve facilities consistent with the best interest of their

stakeholders, including the public, so long as the institutions

provide appropriate attention to communicated local concerns and

land use requirements.   Rutgers submits that the Rutgers

decision struck the appropriate balance.     It urges us to reframe

the standard as requiring that “a State university’s land use

determinations w[ill] be upheld so long as the university had an

informed, rational basis for such determinations, after taking

local objections or concerns into account.”

     In arguing that there is no procedural hearing requirement,

Rutgers reasons that an arbitrary and capricious standard should

govern in this type of dispute.2     Consistent with that standard,

2  Rutgers argues that although this case was properly brought in
the Law Division because it originated as an action by MSU
against the County, once the City intervened the case became
                                15
Rutgers asserts that a court should uphold a university’s

proposed project if it falls on the spectrum of informed and

rational decision-making.   Finally, Rutgers acknowledges that a

reviewing court should consider the off-site impact on an

adjoining municipality that relates to the development of state

land, but argues that, without “such an off-site impact, there

can be virtually no local objections to the proposed land use.”

                               III.

                                A.

     In the 1972 Rutgers case, relied on by all parties to this

action, this Court considered the autonomy that a state

university has from local land use regulation.   In broaching the

immunity question in the setting of the then-only state

university, with the added unique status of Rutgers due to its

institutional history, this Court noted that determining which

governmental entities “are immune from municipal land use

regulations, and to what extent, is not . . . properly

reviewable directly in the Appellate Division as an appeal of
state agency action.

     Rutgers maintains that, in the setting of appellate review
of state agency action, the applicable standard reviews only for
arbitrary and capricious action. Rutgers urges us to hold that
land use disputes involving challenges to claims of immunity
under Rutgers should generally follow the typical appellate path
for judicial review of state agency action.

                                16
susceptible of [an] absolute or ritualistic answer.”    
60 N.J. at
 150.

       The issue of immunity from municipal land use controls had

arisen before for various types of governmental entities

including state authorities, a county entity, and in an instance

of an inter-municipality conflict.     Canvassing its prior case

law where immunity from local land use control was at issue, id.

at 151-52, the Court observed that no “absolute criteria” had

been adopted “as decisive,” id. at 151.

       Prior to Rutgers, this Court considered two cases that

involved local assertions of municipal land use control over

lands that had become subject to state authorities empowered to

construct highway road projects.

       In City of Newark v. Turnpike Authority, the City of Newark

brought an action seeking “to enjoin [a] . . . grading contract,

to prevent the construction of [a] portion of the turnpike in

the manner contemplated, [and] to have the Turnpike Authority

Act declared unconstitutional.”    
7 N.J. 377, 380 (1951).   This

Court rejected the notion that the local governmental authority

superseded the power granted to the state agency by the

Legislature, noting that the Turnpike Authority’s enabling act

specifically overrode all other general laws.    Id. at 384.    The

Court added that

                                  17
          the idea that any and every municipality along
          the route of the proposed turnpike could
          effectively veto either its location or the
          manner of its construction by a withholding of
          consent is in direct conflict with the very
          concept of a turnpike designed to serve the
          best interests of the entire State and not
          merely those of particular localities. . . .
          The Legislature has broad and well established
          powers over municipalities, and its ability to
          provide for the superiority of the Authority
          over the city in the respects here involved is
          therefore beyond question.

          [Id. at 387 (citation omitted).]

     In Town of Bloomfield v. Highway Authority, 
18 N.J. 237,

238 (1955), this Court more directly addressed a state entity’s

immunity from local land use controls.   There, a municipality

sought a declaration that the State Highway Authority “was

subject to local zoning and building regulations in the erection

of restaurants and gasoline stations at service areas along the

Parkway within the territorial limits of the Town.”   Ibid.   This

Court began its analysis by identifying the legal principles

underlying sovereign immunity in that context.   Id. at 241-43

(citing Port of N.Y. Auth. v. Weehawken Township, 
27 N.J. Super.
 328, 333 (Ch. Div. 1953), rev’d 
14 N.J. 570 (1954), for its

collection of cases supportive of view that “independent state

and bi-state authorities are generally immune from municipal

ordinances and other local regulations” (internal quotation

marks omitted)); see also Newark v. Tpk. Auth., 
7 N.J. at 387;

Interstate Bridge & Tunnel Comm. v. City of Jersey City, 93 N.J.

                               
18 Eq. 550, 553 (Ch. 1922) (“Municipalities are the creatures of

the state and the powers given to them are always subject to be

abridged or repealed by the sovereign who conferred them. . . .

[T]he state, in the act creating the bridge and tunnel

commission . . . with all the powers appropriate and necessary

for the proper performance of [its] duties, without any

limitation as to municipal control, overrode [the local code] to

the extent of nullifying its provisions so far as they required

compliance with them by the state.”).

     Finding that the Legislature had the clear power to

“immunize its public Authorities from the provisions of local

zoning and building restrictions,” the Court turned its

attention to whether the building of service areas was similarly

exempt from local zoning and building requirements.   Bloomfield

v. Highway Auth., 
18 N.J. at 244.   Acknowledging the importance

of the Parkway as a state project on public land, and the

“widespread” “belief” that the “need [for new highway

construction] is very urgent,” the Court concluded that the

legislation authorizing the highway construction “was intended

to and does immunize fully the Authority’s proper operations

from the restrictive provisions of the local zoning ordinances.”

Id. at 248-49.

     The Court took into account that there were “widespread

objections by local communities and residents . . . to the

                               19
encroachments of new highways and their untoward incidents.”

Id. at 248.   However, the Court perceived that a balancing of

interests tipped in favor of the proposed State action:

          Such objections . . . are, of course,
          understandable and are to be sympathetically
          heard and fairly considered by the agency
          charged with the high responsibility of
          effectuating the public objective with due
          regard for individual rights.      But these
          rights, valuable as they are, must, in the
          public interest, give way to the greater good
          for the greater number and where the agency
          has,   within   its   statutory   delegation,
          conscientiously selected the route of the
          highway and the sites of its incidental
          facilities, it is highly proper that the
          courts not intrude.

          [Id. at 248-49.]

     As those two cases reflect, when the issue of land use

controls arose in the setting of a state institution of higher

education in Rutgers, this Court had highly relevant precedent

concerning challenges by local governmental entities to state

construction projects on state-owned land on which to rely.

                                B.

     In Rutgers, we were asked to consider the extent to which a

municipality’s zoning ordinances could place limits on a housing

expansion by a state university on its own lands, where the

municipality claimed that the project would impact municipal

resources and services.   
60 N.J. at 144-50.   Rutgers planned to

build additional housing for student families on University-

                                20
owned land.   Id. at 145.   The location of the student-family

campus housing brought it within an area of Piscataway Township

in which the local zoning ordinance, according to the Township,

would have limited the married-student housing to 500 units but

“allow[ed] unlimited housing facilities for unmarried students.”

Id. at 146-47.

     Piscataway denied Rutgers building permits to construct

units in excess of the capped number.    Id. at 147.   Rutgers then

sought a variance from the Board of Adjustment, which was

denied.   Ibid.   Accordingly, Rutgers commenced an action in lieu

of prerogative writs in the Law Division of the Superior Court,

which ultimately resulted in a trial court order granting

Rutgers’ motion for summary judgment.    
113 N.J. Super 65, 66,

71-73 (Law. Div. 1971).     Among its arguments before the trial

court, and the only one advanced before this Court, Rutgers

contended that, “as an instrumentality of the state, [it was]

not subject to a local zoning ordinance.”    
60 N.J. at 147.

     At the outset of its analysis, our Court acknowledged some

general “black letter law” according to which,

           [a]bsent a waiver expressed by, or necessarily
           inferred from, the language of a state
           statute, a state is not amenable to the zoning
           regulations of its political subdivisions[,]
           and [a] public corporation or authority
           created by the state to carry out a function
           of the state is not bound by local zoning
           regulations.

                                  21
          [Id. at 150 (third alteration in original)
          (internal quotation marks omitted).]

However, the Court in Rutgers rejected a “presumption of

immunity” based exclusively on the superiority one governmental

entity may have over another in hierarchy, see id. at 152 n.4,

and settled on a test that depends on “legislative intent . . .

with respect to the particular agency or function involved,” to

be divined from a number of factors, id. at 152.   The factors

the Court listed as the “most obvious and common” are

          the nature and scope of the instrumentality
          seeking immunity, the kind of function or land
          use involved, the extent of the public
          interest to be served thereby, the effect
          local land use regulation would have upon the
          enterprise concerned[,] and the impact upon
          legitimate local interests.

          [Id. at 153.]

The Court emphasized the need for a case-by-case approach.

Ibid. (“The point is that there is no precise formula or set of

criteria which will determine every case mechanically and

automatically.”).   That said, the Court acknowledged that there

would be circumstances in which the “broader public interest”

would be “so important” as to necessitate immunity even when

compared with “local interests [that] may be great.”    Ibid.

     In the application of its test, the Court determined that

Rutgers, as a state university and instrumentality of the State,

is entitled to a qualified immunity.   Ibid. (explaining that in

                                22
“performing an essential governmental function for the benefit

of all the people of the state, the Legislature would not intend

that [Rutgers’] growth and development should be subject to

restriction or control by local land use regulation”).     The

Court stressed that the immunity being recognized came with

caveats in its exercise.   First, the immunity is not

“unbridled”; rather, the Rutgers Court instructed that immunity

from land use controls may not “be exercised in an unreasonable

fashion so as to arbitrarily override all important legitimate

local interests.”   Ibid.3 (citing Washington Township v. Village

of Ridgewood, 
26 N.J. 578, 584-86 (1958)).   The Court also

imposed a further requirement:

          [E]ven if the proposed action of the immune
          governmental instrumentality does not reach
          the unreasonable stage for any sufficient
          reason, the instrumentality ought to consult
          with the local authorities and sympathetically
          listen and give every consideration to local
          objections, problems and suggestions in order
          to minimize the conflict as much as possible.

          [Id. at 154 (citing Bloomfield v. Highway
          Auth., 
18 N.J. at 248).]

     As applied to the facts in Rutgers, the Court concluded

that it “fail[ed] to see the slightest vestige of

3  As an example, the Court posited that “it would arbitrary[] if
the state proposed to erect an office building in the crowded
business district of a city where provision for off-street
parking was required, [and] the state [chose] not to make some
reasonable provision in that respect.” Id. at 153-54.
                                 23
unreasonableness [in the University’s planned action] as far as

Piscataway’s local interests are concerned or in any other

respect.”    Ibid.   The Court noted that Rutgers presented the

proposal to local authorities via its variance application so a

form of fulsome consultation with local authorities took place.

Ibid.    Further, the Court rejected the idea that Piscataway’s

stated concern about the housing project’s impact on the fiscal

resources of the community (specifically the need to build more

schools) could be considered “a legitimate local interest from

any proper land use impact point of view.”    Ibid.   The Court

viewed Rutgers’ planned action -- to promote the housing and

welfare of its students -- to be substantively reasonable and

consistent with its statutory charge.    See ibid.    The Court

concluded that the Legislature “intended that the growth and

development of Rutgers, as a public university for the benefit

of all the people of the state, was not to be thwarted or

restricted by local land use regulations” and declared the

University, and specifically its proposed project, immune from

the zoning restriction capping the number of units.     Id. at 158.

                                  IV.

                                  A.

        Thus, Rutgers identified a number of principles that would

govern whether an entity is entitled to claim immunity from

local land use regulation.    The Court counseled consideration of

                                  24
“the nature and scope of the instrumentality seeking immunity,

the kind of function or land use involved, the extent of the

public interest to be served thereby, the effect local land use

regulation would have upon the enterprise concerned[,] and the

impact upon legitimate local interests.”     Id. at 152-53.

     With respect to the specific project for which immunity is

sought, Rutgers requires a two-fold analysis.    First, the

substantive action planned by the entity claiming immunity from

local land use control must itself be reasonable.    Id. at 153.

The determination as to whether the planned project satisfies

the reasonableness standard is distinct, yet not entirely

disentangled from, the second condition required of a state

governmental entity acting in furtherance of its statutory

mission and claiming immunity from local land use control in

connection with that action:   The immune entity also has an

obligation to respectfully hear and consider legitimate concerns

raised by local authorities to minimize conflict between the two

governmental authorities.   Id. at 153-54.   That its response to

legitimate concerns may overlap with components of a

reasonableness assessment reveals the intertwined nature of the

inquiries in some instances.

                                B.

                                1.

                                25
     Turning to the case before us, at the outset, we note that

MSU is an entity that clearly, in planning its alteration to its

campus roads in order to better serve its intra-campus traffic,

was acting in an immune capacity, pursuant to its statutory

authorization to control its property.   Like Rutgers, MSU is a

state university, and 
N.J.S.A. 18A:64-7 grants the Board of

Trustees of MSU with

          the powers, rights and privileges that are
          incident to the proper government, conduct and
          management of the college, and the control of
          its properties and funds and such powers
          granted to [it] or reasonably implied, may be
          exercised without recourse or reference to any
          department or agency of the State, except as
          otherwise   provided   by  this   article   or
          applicable law.

Similar language in the statute governing Rutgers was recognized

in the Rutgers decision as conferring broadly autonomous

governmental powers.   See Rutgers, 
60 N.J. at 158.

     MSU, as an agency of the State, acts for the State

generally when, in furtherance of its overall statutory

educational mission, it determines to improve its campus roads

(specifically here, Yogi Berra Drive) to better manage intra-

campus traffic concerns for its students, faculty, employees,

and guests.   The function involved fits squarely within its

statutory mission and its specific authority.   Moreover, the

public interest to be served supports that the Legislature

intended for MSU to be free of local land use regulation in

                                26
managing its internal road system so long as there is no

asserted impact on non-state-owned public property.   For such

actions, MSU needs autonomy to act in the way that best serves

its enterprise and its stakeholders, rather than to have to seek

local land use entanglement, nay approval.

     In sum, MSU is a state entity that enjoys the qualified

immunity from local land use controls with respect to management

of its own land and property that was recognized in Rutgers.     We

thus turn to review of the exercise of that immunity.

                                2.

     In this matter, we are in substantial agreement with the

judgment of the Appellate Division remanding this matter to the

trial court for further proceedings.   However, we modify the

instruction given to the trial court on the required Rutgers

analysis and, generally, how the judicial proceedings should be

conducted.

     Here the Appellate Division’s decision can be interpreted

to have inadvertently conflated the two parts of the Rutgers

analysis into one.   For clarification’s sake, we reaffirm the

two parts to the analysis that must be applied on remand.

     In order for the trial court to grant MSU the relief it

seeks, the court first must assess the inherent reasonableness

of the MSU roadway plan in its entirety.   See Rutgers, 
60 N.J.

at 152-53.   When an off-site impact to the improvement on state-

                                27
owned lands is asserted, review of the project must include

review of its off-site impact.   A state entity must be able to

demonstrate the reasonableness of its planned action if

challenged, as well as when it solicits judicial authority to

compel coordinated action by a local governmental entity.

     Separately, the trial court must also assess whether MSU

reasonably consulted and took into consideration the legitimate

concerns of the local governmental entities.    As noted

previously, consultation and consideration of important local

concerns is necessary but it does not answer the distinct first

question about the reasonableness of the project itself.    See

id. at 153-54.   The consultation function is meaningful to the

analysis, not merely procedural.      Ibid.

     We expect that any legislatively authorized State action

should be able to satisfy, minimally, an examination for

reasonableness to be a proper exercise of governmental action.

Moreover, it is compatible with the expectation that

coordination and cooperation between and among governmental

agencies, even when differentiated by hierarchy, is in the

public’s best interest generally.     See ibid.; cf. Garden State

Farms, Inc. v. Bay, 
77 N.J. 439, 455 (1978) (noting same outside

of Rutgers immunity context).    Thus, on remand, in addition to

the requirement set out below, the trial court must address both

components to the analysis required under Rutgers, and the

                                 28
Appellate Division’s instructions to the trial court are

modified accordingly.

                                C.

     Public safety concerns require pause because they merit

careful consideration.   The local governmental entities here

cite public safety concerns and voice apprehension about their

ability to fulfill their own duty of care to members of the

public, traveling on or along the county road, who may never

have occasion to enter upon MSU property but who may be

negatively affected by MSU’s plan design and its effect on the

intersection with the county road.   How and where those concerns

factor into the Rutgers analysis is a novel issue with respect

to our law on the qualified immunity recognized in this area.

     We recognize as significant the public interest inherent in

a local government entity’s reasonable concerns about the impact

of an immune state entity’s internal actions affecting public

safety on non-state public property.   In this instance, the

public safety concerns were raised in connection with

questioning the adequacy of the planning for the proposed

roadway alterations and their impact on- and off-site of MSU

property.

     The safety issue focuses on drivers descending the incline

of Yogi Berra Drive (presently solely an ingress with traffic

moving only up the incline), with its planned curve and speed

                                29
limit, and members of the public traversing the intersecting

county road who would be affected by the descending drivers

approaching the intersection.    The local governmental entities

have raised, facially, an important and legitimate planning

concern about public safety.    It is unlike the anticipated

future impact on a community like the issue raised in the case

concerning construction of service areas along the Parkway,

where municipal authorities expressed concerns about speculative

untoward incidents arising from motorists stopping at a rest

area located within the community’s borders.    See Bloomfield v.

Highway Auth., 
18 N.J. at 248.   In that case, the projected

fears were insufficient to rise to the level of a legitimate

local concern to weigh against the authority and the immunity

reposed in the Highway Authority.     See id. at 248-49.

     Regarding persons traveling the interior of the campus, MSU

bears responsibility for its roads under its statutory

authority.   However, there is a distinct duty owed by other

local governmental entities when a public safety concern could

affect local public property and the members of the public using

that property.   In such situations, we are compelled to add an

additional inquiry to the test articulated in Rutgers.

     Simply put, a review by MSU and its experts asserting that

it has reasonably addressed the public safety concern is not

sufficient, standing alone, to protect general public safety and

                                 30
also the interests of the local governmental entities with

regard to that local public safety concern.    MSU is not

legislatively authorized to act on issues of public safety on

county roads as part of its delegated tasks.   Cf. Holgate Prop.

Assocs. v. Township of Howell, 
145 N.J. 590, 594-95, 600-01

(1996) (noting environmental agency’s statutory authority over

use of composted “sludge-derived product” that preempted local

officials from enforcing zoning and soil removal ordinances);

Township of Cedar Grove v. Sheridan, 
209 N.J. Super. 267, 270,

279-80 (App. Div. 1986) (addressing Commissioner of Department

of Transportation’s statutory authority over installation of

traffic signal at state highway intersection despite opposition

by township and residents).

     Subject to the limitations contained in the Tort Claims

Act, local governments owe a duty of care to the public

regarding their roadways and ancillary public lands.   See

N.J.S.A. 59:4-6 (providing for and addressing scope of plan or

design immunity); Birchwood Lakes Colony Club, Inc. v. Borough

of Medford Lakes, 
90 N.J. 582, 599 (1982) (noting that plan or

design immunity not dependent on showing of reasonableness of

design, but rather, in order to claim immunity, public entity

must show that alleged dangerous condition was subject to

government approval or in accordance with approved standards).

The local governments here specifically owe a duty of care to

                               31
the motorists and pedestrians at and around the county road’s

intersection with Yogi Berra Drive.4   Accordingly, the entities

are acting well within their scope of responsibility in raising,

in good faith, what they claim is a public safety concern about

the proposed intersection alterations.

     In the circumstances presented here, where a facially

legitimate public safety concern is raised about an immune

entity’s planned improvement to lands, which would have a direct

impact on non-state-owned property, we will require a showing by

the immune entity that its planning has reasonably addressed the

public safety concern.   The local governments can argue

otherwise regarding the improvement’s impact on off-site public

property and whether public safety concerns have been reasonably

addressed, but the court will make the ultimate determination.

We will require a discrete judicial finding that MSU’s proposed

action reasonably satisfies public safety concerns.   Such a

finding comes in addition to the otherwise typical review of an

immune entity’s modification to its own property.   A judicial

finding is necessary to properly protect the general public and

to fairly provide an independent judicial determination on which

4  While providing certain immunities, the Tort Claims Act,

N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to -12-3, will factor prominently for those
governmental entities with respect to their responsibility in
the event the current intersection is changed and an accident
occurs.
                                32
other public entities, who will remain responsible for future

activity at the changed intersection, may rely.

     We do not suggest that protracted trial proceedings are

necessary whenever a public safety claim is advanced as a reason

for questioning immunity from local land use regulations.    In

the instant remand, we leave to the sound discretion of the

trial court whether this matter may proceed along the lines of a

summary proceeding or whether the taking of live testimony or

receipt of other evidence is necessary.   See, e.g., R. 4:67.     To

be clear, an immune entity is not to be subjected to a

requirement of submission to planning board review or the like.

We hold only that a public entity must show that its planning

has reasonably addressed public safety concerns identified by

local governments as having a direct impact on non-state public

property and that a judicial finding as to the reasonableness of

the public entity’s action with respect to public safety shall

be required.

     Accordingly, on the remand of this matter, we add that in

circumstances such as these, a judicial finding shall be

required on the reasonableness of the planned MSU project,

specifically as it affects public safety regarding the

intersection with the county road.

                               V.

                               33
     The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed as

modified by this opinion.

     CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-
VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion.
JUSTICE ALBIN did not participate.

                               34