Case Title: McCLOSKEY v PORTER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1973-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12314 I N THE SUPKEME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A NORA MAKLE I~CCLUSKEY, Individually and a s Administratrix of the Estate of JOHN M. McCLOSKEY, Deceased, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, DENISE G R O S S PORTER, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Boone, Karlberg and Haddon, Missoula, Montana. Sam E. Haddon argued, Missoula, Montana. For ~espondent : Worden, Thane, Haines and Williams, Missoula, Montana. Shelton C. Williams argued, Missoula, Montana. Submitted: November 30, 1972 Decided : , ttd j ~5 JAN 3 O 1973 Filed: , ! I - . Xr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment entered i n the d i s t r i c t court of the fourth j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , county of Missoula. P l a i n t i f f , Nora Marie McCloskey, brought the action against defendant Denise Gross Porter, individually and a s administratrix of the e s t a t e of her deceased husband, John M. McCloskey, f o r personal i n j u r i e s sustained by each of them i n an automobile accident which occurred i n Missoula on May 14, 1970. T r i a l before a jury began on April 19, 1972. During the presentation of defendant's case, the t r i a l judge granted defendant's motion f o r a directed verdict a f t e r denying p l a i n t i f f ' s o f f e r of proof regarding alleged ambigaity'in c e r t a i n agreements. From the judgment entered pursuant t o the di- rected v e r d i c t , p l a i n t i f f appeals. The accident occurred a s a r e s u l t of defendant's f a i l u r e t o stop her vehicle a t a stop sign, thereby c o l l i d i n g i n t o the side of the ~ c C l o s k e y s ' pickup truck. Defendant's f a i l u r e t o stop i s not denied. The pickup truck was turned on i t s side, but p l a i n t i f f and her husband did not f e e l it necessary t o c a l l an ambulance. Some friends l a t e r took them t o St. Patrick's Hospital i n Missoula, where both were treated and released, In June 1970, John McCloskey was hospitalized f o r a few days with neck problems which had ap- parently responded t o treatment by the time of h i s death. Over a course of several months, p l a i n t i f f was treated f o r broken o r sprained r i b s and other i n j u r i e s . I n December 1970, t h e McCloskeys were involved i n a separate accident wherein John McCloskey received i n j u r i e s r e s u l t i n g i n his death. Neither t h a t accident nor the i n j u r i e s sustained therein a r e a p a r t of t h i s l i t i g a t i o n . Shortly a f t e r the accident i n question, John McCloskey contacted the adjuster f o r Safeco Insurance Company, defendant's insurer. A s a r e s u l t of several meetings between the adjuster and t h e Mc- Closkeys, the p a r t i e s entered i n t o two agreements. These agreements were e n t i t l e d "Agreement and Release", one was signed by p l a i n t i f f and the other by her husband. The agreements, i d e n t i c a l printed forms, r e c i t e d t h a t t h e p a r t i e s "* * * intend t h a t t h i s agreement s t a t e a l l terms of t h e i r mutual settlement of demands made against John Gross", the f a t h e r of defendant. A t the time of the accident, defendant was a minor. She was insured under her f a t h e r ' s automobile insurance policy with Safeco Insurance Company, These agreements were executed on May 28, 1970, fourteen days a f t e r the accident occurred, I n pertinent p a r t , both agree- ments s t a t e : "(4) Claimant and Claimant's Spouse agree a s follows : "(a) Those named i n Paragraph 1 [John Gross] a r e released from a l l l i a b i l i t y r e s u l t i n g because of the accident. This release i s intended t o apply t o l i a b i l i t y f o r o r because of property damage, death, bodily i n j u r i e s which a r e known t o Claimant and bodily i n j u r i e s of which Claimant is not yet aware. " (Emphasis added) . Under these agreements McCloskeys were paid a t o t a l of $4,200 on the day the agreements were executed, plus medical ex- penses f o r a d e f i n i t e period following the accident, not t o exceed c e r t a i n d o l l a r l i m i t s . I n addition, they were issued checks t o t a l i n g $674.60 f o r medical expenses incurred a f t e r the agree- ments were signed. However, of t h a t amount a check f o r $406.90 was not negotiated, on advice of counsel. P l a i n t i f f maintained t h a t a portion of the compensation received was f o r property damage only; t h a t is, since two of the d r a f t s equaled the exact amount her husband had paid f o r the truck, chose d r a f t s were intended t o compensate t h e loss of the truck only. Defendant, on the other hand, noted t h a t the agreements i n no way l i m i t the amount s t a t e d a s being only f o r property damage. Rather, the agreements s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f e r t o " a l l l i a b i l i t y r e s u l t i n g be- cause of the accident.!' p l a i n t i f f s main contention was t h a t the agreements do not protect defendant, while defendant's main defense was the agreements. Numerous issues a r e raised on appeal but the determinative issues are these: (1) whether the t r i a l court erred i n directing a verdict for defendant, and (2) whether the t r i a l court correctly denied p l a i n t i f f ' s offer of proof. Before discussing these issues, we must f i r s t determine the effect of the agreements signed by p l a i n t i f f and her husband when only the defendant's father's name appears on the face of each agreement. Section 31-131(b), R,C.M, 1947, provides that the negligence of a minor shall be imputed t o the person signing the application for a driver's license, making that person jointly and severally l i a b l e for any damages caused by the minor. John Gross had signed defendant's application, and, by statute, would be l i a b l e for damages caused by h i s daughter's negligence. Plaintiff argues that negligence, being a legal word of a r t , cannot exist u n t i l it i s determined by a t r i e r of the facts; that is, since defendant had not been adjudged negligent by a judge or jury, she cannot take advantage of the statute, P l a i n t i f f ' s argument i s circular; i f a jury was t o determine that defendant was indeed negligent, the statute would absolve her through her father's release, the result of which i s discussed l a t e r i n t h i s opinion. On the other hand, i f a juryd&rmined she was not negligent, the result would be the same. Moore v, Jacobsen, 127 Mont. 341, 263 P,2d 713. The thrust of p l a i n t i f f ' s argument is that since John Gross could not be jointly and severally l i a b l e for the damages caused by the negligence of defendant u n t i l a f t e r her negligence was judicially determined, the release of John Gross does not release defendant. In other words, Gross and defendant were not joint tortfeasors a t the time the releases were signed. That view misses the point. I f , i n fact, a jury did find defendant negligent, she would not be negligent from the date of the judi- c i a l determination, but rather from the date of the t o r t . Sleeper v. Woodmansee, 1 1 C.A.2d 595, 54 P.2d 519, 521, Any release of defendant or her father would date back to the accident, not t o the date the jury found her negligent. Having found t h a t John Gross was j o i n t l y l i a b l e with de- fendant, we proceed t o the e f f e c t of the releases. Does a release of Gross, release the defendant? Yes, it does. I n Montana, the r u l e has long been established t h a t t h e release of one j o i n t t o r t - feasor releases the others, unless there a r e c l e a r provisions i n the r e l e a s e t o the contrary. Black v. Martin, 88 Mont. 256, 266, 292 P. 577; Lisoski v. Anderson, 112 Mont. 112, 117,118, 112 P.2d 1055; Beedle v. Carolan, 115 Mont. 587, 590, 148 P.2d 559. Lisoski was an automobile personal injury case, There p l a i n t i f f was a passenger i n a taxicab owned by the defendant. The taxicab was involved i n an intersection c o l l i s i o n with another c a r belonging t o Glasgow Motors. P l a i n t i f f signed an instrument s p e c i f i c a l l y releasing Glasgow Motors and " a l l other persons * * * from a l l claims". P l a i n t i f f urged she be allowed t o show t h a t the release was not intended t o cover the defendant. Answering t h a t argument, t h i s Court said: I I The language could not be more p l a i n t o show the intention t o make the release operate a s t o a l l her claims against a l l persons which would include these defendants. 11 W e believe t h e language of Clause (4) of the two "Agreement and el ease" documents i n the i n s t a n t case t o be no l e s s p l a i n q 6 Blashfield, Automobile Law and Practice, 3rd Ed, 5257.52,states the r u l e i n t h i s manner: "The general r u l e t h a t , i n the absence of s t a t u t e , the release of one tort-feasor extinguishes and discharges the l i a b i l i t y of other tort-feasors applies where a motor vehicles accident occasions an injury. It has been held t h a t the amount paid for the release i s not material or open f o r question provided i t has been accepted i n f u l l s a t i s f a c t i o n and discharge of the claim. The r u l e t h a t a release of one operates a s a discharge of a l l l i a b l e f o r the injury i s based on the view t h a t a release and dis- charge c o n s t i t u t e a s a t i s f a c t i o n of the claim, 1: Mere, there i s no mention i n the release agreements of any reservation regarding possible future action against defendant, a s opposed t o an action against her father. Certainly, it cannot be asserted here t h a t Clause (4), heretofore quoted, should be given any meaning d i f f e r e n t from the plain import of those words. I n Lisoski, t h i s Court said: "* + : * the r u l e i s t h a t t o save the r i g h t of recourse against t h e other feasors, the release must be i n the nature of a covenant not t o sue o r there must be words i n the release which show t h a t it i s not i n f u l l s a t i s f a c t i o n of the claim and t h a t he [claimant] does not thereby discharge the others from l i a b i l i t y . " Here, w e do not find the release agreements contained any such covenants, Furthermore, the d r a f t s by which p l a i n t i f f and her husband were paid a l l r e c i t e on the back of each these words: I I B y endorsement hereof payee hereby releases a l l claims a r i s i n g out of the occurrence re- ferred t o on the face hereof against 1 I Safeco Insurance Company of America "and, where applicable, i t s insured. " Tn and of i t s e l f , such a statement on the reverse of a check would be suspect. But,when coupled with the c l e a r and unambiguous language of the release agreements, the i n t e n t is obvious. W e find it d i f f i c u l t t o allow p l a i n t i f f t o endorse f i v e d r a f t s before r a i s i n g questions concerning the e f f e c t of the language appearing on them. This Court has considered such releases and t h e i r e f f e c t many times. Black v. Martin, 88 Mont. 256, 292 P. 577, presents a learned and authoritative account of the law concerning releases. The v a l i d i t y of the r u l e s s t a t e d i n Black has repeatedly been affirmed. I n Chisholm v. Vocational School, 103 Mont. 503, 511, 64 P.2d 838, we said: h he voluntary payment of a debt by one not l e g a l l y l i a b l e t o do so nevertheless extinguishes the debt a s t o the c r e d i t o r 9 ; * * and the r e s u l t i s t h e same where one of two j o i n t tort-feasors pays the damages claimed. * * JC "1n a case such a s t h i s , i f the two p a r t i e s t o whom the injured person looks f o r compensation a r e j o i n t tort-feasors , where the injured person accepts f u l l s a t i s f a c t i o n o r what the law con- s i d e r s such * * * it i s a bar t o an action against the other ** * *". W e believe that r u l e t o be correctly stated. See also: Tanner v. Bowen, 34 Mont. 121, 124, 85 P. 876. A s t o the determinative issues: Plaintiff, i n her offer of proof, contended she should not be bound by the releases, She offered t o show, by o r a l testimony, a situation different than that appearing on the face of the "Agreement and ele ease" forms, She argues further that the validity of the agreements was i n dispute. Plaintiff r e l i e s upon section 93-401-13, R.C.M, 1947, regarding when evidence other than the contents of a written agreement may be introduced; and, section 93-401-17, R.C.M. 1947, noting that surrounding circumstances should be considered, A t the same time, p l a i n t i f f contends that one of the agreements was t o cover the damage t o the truck, and the other medical expenses and her "difficulty" up t o that time. That argument, however, goes merely t o the scope of the agreements, not t h e i r validity. Plaintiff also claims the issue of fraud was raised i n the offer of proof. W e do not find that issue raised, nor can it now be raised on appeal. W e note that p l a i n t i f f ' s offer of proof came a t the end of the case, and a f t e r defendant had made a motion for a directed verdict. The offer of proof purported t o show plaintiff was not bound by her release because: (1) she did not intend t o release Denise Gross; (2) the release was intended t o cover just property damage, medical b i l l s , and pain and suffering t o the date of the release; (3) she was allegedly told that even i f she signed a release she would be able t o bring a lawsuit within three years; (4) Safeco failed t o pay a l l the b i l l s it was re- quired t o pay under the terms of the release. W e find no error i n the t r i a l court's denial of the offer of proof. Here, a p r e t r i a l order was prepared and executed by counsel; plaintiff made no contentions a t the p r e t r i a l stage as t o her competency, as t o fraud or mistake o r lack of consideration for the release. These are a l l affirmative matters which should have been raised as contentions a t p r e t r i a l and t o r a i s e them when she did, was too late. P l a i n t i f f r e l i e s upon the recent case of L i t t s v. Pierce County, 5 Wash.App. 531, 488 P.2d 785, 790, and asks t h i s Court t o adopt the r u l e s e t down i n t h a t case. W e decline t o consider t h i s authority f o r f a c t u a l l y it i s not applicable. I n L i t t s , the p l a i n t i f f was injured i n a two c a r accident a t an intersection of two roads maintained by the county. Suit against the adverse driver was s e t t l e d and s u i t was then i n s t i t u t e d against t h e county, alleging t h a t the i n j u r i e s resulted from the negligent a c t s and omissions of the county. The court ruled: It* * * we adopt t h e r u l e t h a t a r e l e a s e by an injured party of one of several concurrent t o r t - feasors, whose obligation is solidary, does not release the other concurrent tort-feasors unless it can be established a s a f a c t e i t h e r (1) t h a t the injured party intended t o release a l l t o r t - feasors or (2) t h a t the release constitued s a t i s - faction of t h e obligation. l I Here, the t r i a l court distinguished L i t t s , where there were separate independent a c t s of negligence by two separate actors producing t h e injury, and t h e i n s t a n t case. Even i f w e were t o adopt t h i s r u l e , the holding would be the same f o r only one a c t , not two independent a c t s of negligence, produced the injury. Further, t h a t r u l e is not consistent with Montana This Court i n Webber v. Killorn, 66 Mont. 130, 132, 212 P. 852, said it is elementary: "* fc * t h a t when a contract has been reduced t o writing the contents of such writing cannot be added t o , contradicted, a l t e r e d , o r varied by par01 o r e x t r i n s i c evidence, and t h a t such writing supersedes a l l o r a l negotiations concerning i t s matter which preceded, accompanied, o r led up t o its execution. I I See also: West River Equip. Co, v. Holzworth, 134 Mont. 582, 588, 335 P.2d 298; United States v. Willard E, Fraser Co., 308 F.Supp. 557, a f f 'd 459 F.2d 483. There must be some point a t which a properly executed release, accompanied by adequate consideration, is immutable. The s i t u a t i o n here seems t o indicate t h a t p l a i n t i f f became dis- s a t i s f i e d with the "Agreement and Release" forms a f t e r they were executed. But the f a c t remains t h a t the instruments were signed and l a t e n t discontent cannot be grounds f o r a l t e r a t i o n of t h e i r express terms. Therefore, we find the releases were v a l i d and e f f e c t i v e with regard t o defendant and constituted complete s a t i s f a c t i o n of p l a i n t i f f ' s claim. P l a i n t i f f ' s o f f e r of proof attempting t o vary the express terms of the written release agreements was properly rejected. Finally, we hold the d i s t r i c t court did not e r r i n d i r e c t i n g a verdict f o r defendant. The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court i s affirmed. '---k"--~"--a- i A sociate J u s t i c ................................ Associate J u s t i c e s , Mr, J u s t i c e Haswell and M r , J u s t i c e Daly specially concurring: W e concur i n the r e s u l t but not i n t h e r a t i o n a l e of the majority opinion. I n our view, the release agreements here bar p l a i n t i f f ' s action on two grounds: (1) t h e l i a b i l i t y of father and daughter i s inseparable and i d e n t i c a l , both i n kind and i n amount, so t h a t settlement and release of one must necessarily c o n s t i t u t e s e t t l e - ment and release of the other, and (2) r a t i f i c a t i o n of the release agreements. The releases here bar p l a i n t i f f ' s action, not because Denise and her father a r e j o i n t t o r t f e a s o r s which they a r e not, but because the l i a b i l i t y of each i s i d e n t i c a l , i n d i v i s i b l e , and inseparable. L i a b i l i t y of the father i s imputed by s t a t u t e , wholly derivative, and i n l i k e amount t o t h a t of the daughter. Accordingly, settlement of the one claim must necessarily include settlement of the other. Additionally, t h e acceptance of pa.yment and the conduct of the p a r t i e s c o n s t i t u t e s r a t i f i c a t i o n of t h e releases under section 13-325, R,C,M. 1947, which provides: I I A voluntary acceptance of the benefit of a trans- action i s equivalent t o a consent t o a l l the obliga- tions a r i s i n g from i t , so f a r a s the f a c t s a r e known, o r ought t o be known, t o the person accepting. 11 / Associate Justices. f