Case Title: Matter of Parental Rights of SCN

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-15

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matter of Parental Rights of SCN1983 WY 21659 P.2d 568Case Number: C-15Case Number: C-15Decided: 03/03/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN 
THE MATTER OF PARENTAL RIGHTS OF SCN ANDNAN, MINOR CHILDREN. SC, APPELLANT (PETITIONER),

v.

DN, APPELLEE 
(RESPONDENT). No. C-15

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty, R.M. Forrister, 
J.

Nancy E. 
Thornton, Casper, for appellant.

Richard H. Peek, 
Casper, for appellee.

Before ROONEY*, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE** and BROWN, JJ.

* Became Chief Justice on 
January 1, 1983.

** Chief Justice 
at time of oral argument.

RAPER, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     We are called on, in 
this appeal, to review the district court's dismissal of a mother's petition to 
terminate a father's legal parent-child relationship with his children. The 
petition was brought by SC (appellant), the natural mother of two minor 
children, SCN and NAN, to terminate the legal parent-child relationship of the 
children's natural father (appellee), DN. Appellant brought the petition 
pursuant to § 14-2-308, et seq., W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1982, entitled 
"Termination of Parental Rights," for the grounds contained in § 14-2-309(a)(i), 
W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1982.1 The following three issues are 
raised by appellant on appeal:

"1. Did the Court abuse 
its discretion in failing to consider all available information concerning 
Appellee, his ability to support his minor children, and his relationship with 
the minor children?

"2. Did the Court err in 
failing to consider the opinion of the Guardian Ad Litem in the exercise of 
discretion regarding the issue of support? 

"3. Are three support 
payments within a year sufficient to be considered support of a minor 
child?"

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellee and appellant 
were married in February 1971. Two children were born to the couple during their 
marriage - SCN was born in 1973 and NAN was 
born in 1974. During their marriage, the couple resided in Oklahoma near the home of 
appellee's parents. On March 1, 1979, appellee and appellant were divorced by a 
decree of divorce entered in the District Court of the Seventh Judicial 
District, Natrona County, 
Wyoming. At the time the divorce 
was granted, the children were placed in the custody of appellant, and appellee 
was ordered to pay $50 per month per child for their support. Appellee was 
awarded reasonable visitation rights to see his children. Appellant and her 
children have resided in Casper, Wyoming since the 
divorce.

[¶4.]     Since the divorce 
appellee has resided in Oklahoma where, for the most of that time, he 
has lived with his parents. Appellee's children have only visited him twice 
there since the divorce - once for a few weeks during the summer of 1979, and 
then again for a few weeks during the summer of 1980. Appellee has made 
occasional phone calls to his children in the meantime. He has also sent his 
children cards and gifts at birthdays and at Christmas. The children were not 
allowed to visit their father in Oklahoma during 1981 because, although 
appellee had requested such a visit, appellant, on the advice of counsel, 
refused.

[¶5.]     Appellee has not made 
regular child support payments since the divorce. As a result of his failure to 
make regular support payments, appellee was ordered by a district court in 
Oklahoma, 
pursuant to provisions of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, to 
pay the $100 per month support payment plus an additional $50 per month on the 
payments in arrears. Despite that court order, appellee's support payments 
continued to be irregular until the time this action 
commenced.

[¶6.]     The district court 
found that during the one-year period preceding the commencement of this action, 
appellee made four monthly child support payments. Appellee claimed that his 
failure to make regular support payments resulted from his lack of income and 
his inability to keep and maintain employment; he testified at trial that he 
made payments whenever he was employed. There was a considerable amount of 
testimony detailing appellee's difficulties in the job market. He was unemployed 
for more time than he was employed.

[¶7.]     On December 4, 1981, 
appellant filed the petition to terminate the legal parent-child relationship 
between appellee and the children, which is the subject of this appeal, for the 
grounds contained in § 14-2-309(a)(i), supra fn. 1. Appellee responded denying 
the grounds alleged by appellant and praying that appellant's petition be 
denied. Appellee, in his response, petitioned the district court to modify the 
original divorce decree to grant him specific visitation rights with his minor 
children.

[¶8.]     After the action 
commenced, the district court ordered that social studies be conducted of both 
appellee and appellant in accordance with the provisions of § 14-2-314, W.S. 
1977, Cum.Supp. 1982. Those studies were completed by the appropriate agencies 
in Casper, Wyoming and Frederick, Oklahoma and made part of the record for the 
court's consideration. The district court also appointed an attorney guardian ad 
litem to represent the interests of the minor children pursuant to § 14-2-312, 
supra. After both parties filed and had their motions for summary judgment 
disposed of, trial on appellant's petition was had before the district court on 
July 2, 1982. At trial, attorneys for appellant and appellee, as well as the 
guardian ad litem, made opening statements, presented evidence, cross-examined 
witnesses, and made final arguments. On July 16, 1982, the district court 
entered its judgment in the case dismissing appellant's petition and granting 
certain specific visitation rights to appellee. This appeal followed. 

I

[¶9.]     At trial, appellant 
attempted to present evidence of an alleged drug problem suffered by appellee. 
The court refused to admit such evidence because it was irrelevant to the 
specific proceedings before it. Appellant also unsuccessfully attempted to 
introduce a picture of appellee purportedly engaged in the act of preparing to 
smoke marijuana. The district court's failure to consider the aforementioned 
evidence, together with its failure to grant the appellant's petition based on 
evidence before the court of appellee's inability to obtain and keep a job, form 
the basis of appellant's first issue. Appellant contends essentially that the 
district court failed to consider the best interests of the children in reaching 
its decision.

[¶10.]  Since this is only the second opportunity 
we have had to deal with the current termination of parental rights statutes - § 
14-2-308, et seq., supra - we turn for guidance to our earlier discussions under 
the current law's predecessors. See, Matter of Parental Rights of PP, 
Wyo., 648 P.2d 512 (1982). We have held that parental rights are fundamental rights and that 
the statutes aimed at terminating a parent's legal relationship with his/her 
children will be strictly construed. Matter of Parental Rights of PP, Id; Matter of Adoption of CCT, Wyo., 640 P.2d 73 (1982); DS v. Dept. of Public Assistance and Social 
Services, Wyo., 607 P.2d 911 (1980); Matter of Adoption of Voss, 
Wyo., 550 P.2d 481 (1976). This court has stated the 
standard of review we continue to adhere to as:

"* * * [A]doption 
statutes [terminating the legal parent-child relationship] are strictly 
construed when the proceeding is against a non-consenting parent and every 
reasonable intendment is made in favor of that parent's claims. [Citations.] 
"There is a reason for that tenet. Paraphrasing * * *, the earliest and most 
hallowed of the ties that bind humanity, in all countries considered sacred, is 
the relationship of parent and child. * * *" Matter of Adoption of Voss, supra at 
485; see, Matter of Parental Rights of 
PP, supra; DS v. Dept. of Public 
Assistance and Social Services, supra; and Matter of Adoption of CCT, 
supra.

[¶11.]  Prior to the enactment of the current 
termination-of-parental-rights statutes, the then-existing law was criticized as 
not creating clear standards to guide courts in determining whether or not 
parental rights should be terminated. DS 
v. Dept. of Public Assistance and Social Services, supra; 16 Land & 
Water L.Rev. 295 (1981). In apparent response to that criticism, the current law 
was enacted in 1981 to include § 14-2-309, supra, which contained four separate 
grounds for termination of the legal parent-child relationship. 1981 Wyoming Session Laws, ch. 
102, § 1. That section gave the district court the discretion to terminate the 
legal parent-child relationship if any one or more of the four grounds were 
established by clear and convincing evidence. We are called on here to deal only 
with the first ground for termination - § 14-2-309(a)(i), supra fn. 1. Our task 
is to determine whether, in view of the specific ground alleged by appellant, 
the district court acted within its discretion in rejecting the evidence at 
issue as irrelevant to the proceedings. We further must determine whether, in 
view of the evidence received, the district court acted within its discretion in 
denying appellant's petition.

[¶12.]  In general, when we are called on to 
review the propriety of a district court's exercise of discretion, our review is 
limited to the question of whether there was an abuse of that discretion. That 
is so in cases dealing with the termination of parental rights. Matter of Adoption of CCT, supra. We 
said in that case that:

"A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances. * * *" Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(1980).

Clearly, as 
pertains to evidentiary questions, a district court's decision on the relevancy 
and materiality of evidence is within its sound discretion and will be upheld 
absent the showing of a clear abuse of discretion. Weathers v. State, Wyo., 652 P.2d 970 (1982); Taylor v. State, Wyo., 642 P.2d 1294 
(1982).

[¶13.]  Section 14-2-309(a)(i), supra fn. 1, 
allows the court the discretion to terminate a parent's rights if it is shown by 
clear and convincing evidence that:

"(i) The child has been 
left in the care of another person without provision for the child's support and 
without communication from the absent parent for a period of at least one (1) 
year. In making the above determination, the court may disregard occasional 
contributions, or incidental contacts and communications."

That provision 
does not call upon the district court to consider matters having to do with the 
best interests of the child other than those specifically contained therein, 
i.e., matters having to do with support and communication. Under our rule 
requiring strict construction of the statute, it would be error for the district 
court to consider any ground not specifically included in the statute as a basis 
for terminating a parent's legal relationship with his/her children. The 
specific grounds in this subsection have to do with support and communication. 
We cannot find where the court abused its discretion, in this instance, in 
refusing to hear or consider evidence of appellee's alleged drug problems. As to 
appellee's joblessness, the district court properly considered that fact, but in 
its discretion failed to terminate appellee's parental rights on that basis. The 
court apparently felt that, under the circumstances, appellee's joblessness 
alone was an insufficient basis for severing the parent-child relationship. We 
agree.

[¶14.]  We note that the best interests of the 
children are not considered in the same light in § 14-2-309(a)(i), supra, that 
they are in § 14-2-309(a)(iii) where neglect and abuse are also considered. In 
this case the children are in the custody of appellant and not appellee, so 
neglect and abuse were not at issue. In § 14-2-309(a)(i), supra, the court can 
only consider the best interests of the children as those interests relate to 
support and communication and then termination is left to the court's 
discretion. Appellant fails to call our attention to anything that would 
indicate the district court abused its discretion. Therefore, we hold that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on the evidence at issue or 
in the decision it reached considering the evidence that was before 
it.

II

[¶15.]  Appellant next argues that the district 
court erred in not considering the recommendation of the guardian ad litem 
appointed to represent the interests of the minor children in reaching its 
decision. Appellant informs us that in its unreported closing remarks the 
district court stated it would not consider the recommendations of the guardian 
ad litem in reaching its decision. Rule 4.03, W.R.A.P.2 provides a method of reconstructing 
unreported portions of a proceeding so that we have a record with which to 
consider. The procedure provided in Rule 4.03, W.R.A.P. was not followed in this 
case; therefore, we are without a record to consider or upon which we can make a 
decision. Without an acceptable record of what the court said, we are unable to 
rule on this issue. This court has held that it will not consider any matter 
upon which the record is silent. Mountain 
Fuel Supply Co. v. Emerson, Wyo., 
578 P.2d 1351 (1978). We continue to so hold.

III

[¶16.]  The final issue raised by appellant would 
have us rule as a matter of law that the number of monthly support payments made 
by appellee was insufficient to allow the district court to rule as it did in 
favor of appellee. Essentially, appellant argues that it was an abuse of 
discretion to dismiss her petition in view of the fact that appellee had only 
made four monthly support payments in the year preceding the filing of the 
petition.3 We disagree.

[¶17.]  Appellant cites as authority for her 
proposition our decision in Matter of 
Adoption of CCT, supra, 640 P.2d  at 73. In that case, we were faced with an 
action brought to terminate a father's legal relationship with his children 
under the provisions of § 1-22-110(a), W.S. 1977 - Wyoming's 
adoption-without-parental-consent statute. There, the mother alleged, among 
other things, that the nonconsenting father had willfully failed to contribute 
to the support of his minor children for the one-year period prior to the filing 
of the petition for adoption. We upheld the district court's decision to grant 
the adoption for, among other reasons, the father's willful failure to pay any 
support payment in the year immediately preceding the filing of the adoption 
petition.

[¶18.]  The only other authority cited by 
appellant on this issue dealt with cases where parental rights had been 
terminated by the use of adoption-without-consent statutes. In re Adoption of Infants Reynard, 252 
Ind. 632, 251 N.E.2d 413 (1969); In re 
Ackenhausen, 244 La. 730, 154 So. 2d 380 (1963). In both of 
those cases, the courts upheld adoptions where the nonconsenting parents had 
failed to make all but token portions of court-ordered support payments without 
excuse or justification. Even disregarding the fact that neither case is legally 
on point, we note that, in viewing the facts as we must in the light most 
favorable to appellee, Matter of Parental 
Rights of PP, supra, the instant case is distinguishable on its facts. 
Appellee has set out his employment difficulties as the cause of his 
irregularity in making support payments which the district court could take into 
account in exercising its discretion.

[¶19.]  In the instant case, we are not dealing 
with an attempt to terminate appellee's parental rights under the 
adoption-without-consent statute. We are called on and must deal with the 
particular statute relied upon by appellant in her petition - § 14-2-309(a)(i), 
supra. We are reminded at this point that, in the absence of ambiguity, the 
plain language of the statute controls in determining that statute's meaning. People v. Fremont Energy Corp., Wyo., 
651 P.2d 802 (1982); Board of County 
Commissioners of County of Campbell v. Ridenour, Wyo., 623 P.2d 1174 (1981). 
To terminate parental rights under § 14-2-309(a)(i), supra, the district court 
must decide, for purposes of this discussion, that a minor child has been "left 
* * * without provision for the child's support." Under § 1-22-110(a)(iv), 
supra, the district court has discretion to grant an adoption without consent if 
it finds a willful failure on the part of the nonconsenting parent to support 
for the year preceding the petition. Where, under the adoption statute, a court 
may exercise its discretion and decide that the failure to make a certain number 
of monthly support payments is sufficient reason to terminate parental rights by 
granting adoption, that is not the standard under § 14-2-309(a)(i), supra. Under 
§ 14-2-309(a)(i) the court must determine whether the child has been left 
without provision for support rather than whether a parent has willfully failed 
to support the child.

[¶20.]  The facts in this case indicate that the 
two minor children were placed in the custody of appellant by the court that 
granted the divorce. The children were not left in appellant's care by appellee. 
Further, the same order that placed the children in appellant's custody also 
provided for their support by ordering appellee to make monthly support 
payments. In view of those facts, the fact that appellee failed to make all but 
four monthly support payments is not relevant here where the court could not get 
past the threshold question presented in the statute. Appellee's failure to pay 
regularly would be relevant under an adoption-without-consent proceeding or in 
an action to compel payment, but not here where the children have been placed in 
one parent's custody and the action to terminate parental rights is against the 
non-custodial parent. To hold otherwise would ignore our rule of strict 
construction in these cases and would allow § 14-2-309(a)(i) to be used in a 
manner for which it was not intended.

[¶21.]  For the aforementioned reasons, we are 
unable to hold that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing 
appellant's petition in the face of appellee's failure to make all but four 
monthly support payments in the year preceding the petition. Therefore, we 
uphold the district court's dismissal of appellant's petition to terminate the 
legal parent-child relationship between appellee and his two 
children.

[¶22.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 14-2-309, W.S. 
1977, Cum.Supp. 1982, provides in pertinent part:

"(a) The parent-child 
legal relationship may be terminated if any one (1) or more of the following 
facts is established by clear and convincing evidence:

"(i) The child has been 
left in the care of another person without provision for the child's support and 
without communication from the absent parent for a period of at least one (1) 
year. In making the above determination, the court may disregard occasional 
contributions, or incidental contacts and communications."

2 Rule 4.03, W.R.A.P., 
provides:

"If no report of the 
evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is 
unavailable, the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or 
proceedings from the best available means, including his recollection. The 
statement shall be served on the appellee, who may serve objections or propose 
amendments thereto within ten (10) days after service. Thereupon the statement 
and any objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted to the district 
court for settlement and approval and as settled and approved shall be included 
by the clerk of the district court in the record on 
appeal."

3 Appellant's third issue 
indicates appellee had only made three support payments, but the district court 
specifically found that appellee had made four support payments. We will use the 
district court's specific findings.