Case Title: Ex parte The Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Anniston.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1190436

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2020-12-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: December 11, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2020-2021
____________________
1190436
____________________
Ex parte The Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Anniston
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Betty Milner and Teresa Holiday
v.
The Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Anniston)
(Calhoun Circuit Court, CV-18-900510)
BRYAN, Justice.
1190436
The Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Anniston ("the
Board") petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Calhoun
Circuit Court ("the trial court") to vacate its order entering a partial
summary judgment in favor of Betty Milner and Teresa Holiday
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "the plaintiffs").  For the reasons set
forth herein, we grant the petition.
Facts and Procedural History
On September 17, 2018, the plaintiffs sued the Board seeking
compensatory and punitive damages based on claims of breach of contract,
nuisance, continuing trespass, negligence, and wantonness.  The plaintiffs
alleged that in February 2016 they instructed the Board to cut off water
supply to a house they owned; that the plaintiffs "returned to reopen" the
house in February 2018 and discovered that the water supply to the house
had not been completely cut off; and, that the Board's failure to properly
cut off the water supply caused severe damage to the house.  The Board
filed an answer that included general denials of the plaintiffs' allegations
and asserted a number of "affirmative defenses," including that the
plaintiffs' injuries were the result of the "intervening and superseding"
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actions of an individual or entity other than the Board or anyone under its
control. 
Discovery began on November 1, 2018. On October 24, 2019, the
plaintiffs, based on the Board's alleged spoliation of the evidence,  filed a
motion for a partial summary judgment as to the Board's liability or, in
the alternative, to strike all of the Board's defenses to the plaintiffs'
claims, alleging that the alleged spoliation prevented them from
prosecuting their claims.  In support of the motion, the plaintiffs
presented evidence indicating that, at the plaintiffs' request, a service
technician for the Board, Dale Bryant, placed a "cap and lock device on the
cutoff valve attached to the water line which supplied water to the
plaintiffs' home" on February 10, 2016.  The record indicates that the
house was not inhabited for two years after water service was terminated.
Cam Stokes, chief executive officer of C. Stokes Construction, a contractor,
went to the house on February 24, 2018, to investigate the existence of
black mold at the house. Stokes saw the water meter and the cap and lock
device, and determined that the water had not been properly cut off.
Stokes put his findings in an e-mail dated February 25, 2018, in which he
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concluded that a continuous water leak was the source of the damage to
the plaintiffs' house and that he "would assume that the water company
would be at fault due to the failure to properly shut off [the] main water
valve." 1   
On February 28, 2018, Milner reported the problem to Wanda Crow,
a customer-service supervisor with the Board.  Milner provided Crow a
copy of Stokes's e-mail that detailed his conclusion that the Board was at
fault for the damage to the plaintiffs' house, and, during her deposition,
Crow stated that Milner "seemed to be claiming damages" against the
Board.  In response to Milner's report of water damage, Crow sent Bryant
back to the plaintiffs' house to address the complaint the same day; Crow
put a "note" in the Board's system that stated: "Please check. It has been
locked off since 2/2016. The customer said that the inspector found the
meter running and causing water to go under the house. Please give an
order back to [Crow]."  Bryant stated that, when he returned to the
1The recipient of Stokes's e-mail is not entirely clear from the
materials before us, but it appears that the e-mail was sent to one of the
plaintiffs.
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plaintiffs' house in February 2018 he was not aware of an allegation that
the plaintiffs' house had been damaged by any actions of the Board.  
According to Bryant, there was no water going through the meter
and into the pipes when he turned the water off in February 2016 but that
there was "just a little" water going through the meter when he returned
in February 2018.  Bryant recorded in his field notes that the cap and lock
device he had used in 2016 to shut off the water line to the plaintiffs'
house had been "tampered with" and that "the cap and lock were hanging
off [the] cutoff sideways."  Bryant removed both the cap and lock device he
had used in 2016 and the water meter at the plaintiffs' house and ensured
that there was no water running to the plaintiffs' house.  Bryant did not
keep the cap and lock device or the meter that he removed from the
plaintiffs' house.  During his deposition in June 2019, Bryant stated that
such equipment was either put into use at another residence or was
"scrapped."  
During Bryant's deposition, counsel for the plaintiffs asked the
Board to locate the "meter and equipment" the Board used to shut off the
water at the plaintiffs' house in 2016.  Counsel for the plaintiffs again
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requested that the Board "locate" that equipment in a letter to counsel for
the Board on July 11, 2019.  Counsel for the Board responded that the
Board no longer possessed the water meter removed from the house or the
cap and lock device that Bryant said was damaged and was also removed
from the house.  Counsel for the Board informed the plaintiffs' counsel
that older water meters contained lead and that the Board was required
to follow certain regulations in disposing of those meters, but the Board
offered to provide counsel with the same kind of cap and lock device that
had been used on the plaintiffs' meter for their inspection.
In their October 2019 motion for a partial summary judgment, the
plaintiffs argued that the Board was guilty of spoliation of evidence that
was necessary to prosecute their claims against the Board.  They alleged
that the Board knew of a potential claim against the Board when Milner
reported the water leak but that it failed to maintain possession of the
water meter or the cap and lock device that had allegedly been tampered
with by a third party.  The plaintiffs argued that the Board's defense was
based on an allegation that the cap and lock device had been tampered
with by a third party, that it was this third party's action that caused the
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water to run to the plaintiffs' house, and that, because the plaintiffs could
not inspect the cap and lock device or the water meter, the Board should
be sanctioned for its failure to maintain possession of the evidence the
plaintiffs needed to rebut the Board's defenses.  The plaintiffs moved the
trial court for a partial summary judgment finding the Board liable for the
plaintiffs' claims or, in the alternative, an order striking all the defenses
asserted by the Board. 
The Board filed a response in opposition to the plaintiffs' motion,
which included several attachments to support its argument that the
plaintiffs had not demonstrated that it was guilty of spoliation.  Included
with the Board's opposition was the deposition testimony of Crow in which
she stated that she was "sure" that she had not seen the e-mail report
from Stokes before the date of her deposition in August 2019.  However,
Crow also testified that she was not disputing that Milner provided
Stokes's e-mail to her on February 28, 2018, when Milner reported the
water leak, she just did not recall seeing it when Milner first reported the
water leak that day.   The Board argued that, although the plaintiffs had
filed this lawsuit on September 17, 2018, and although the parties had
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almost immediately engaged in discovery, the plaintiffs did not ask the
Board for the meter or the cap and lock device until June 26, 2019, during
Bryant's deposition.  The Board also presented evidence indicating that,
at the time Bryant removed the meter and the cap and lock device in
2018, he did not know that the plaintiffs were claiming that the damage
to their house was caused by the water not being properly cut off in 2016
and that the meter and the device were disposed of in the regular course
of business.  They also argued that the plaintiffs' contractor, Stokes, had
access to the meter and the cap and lock device for at least four days
before the Board knew there was a problem to resolve and that the
plaintiffs were aware of the problem with the water meter several days
before the Board was notified of the problem. 
The plaintiffs filed a response, which included additional evidence
to support their motion for a partial summary judgment.  Specifically, the
plaintiffs attached photographs and a video of the water meter and the
cap and lock device that were taken by Stokes and his partner, Willie
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May, on February 24, 2018,2 when they went to inspect the plaintiffs'
house. According to the plaintiffs, the photographs and video clearly
showed that "the blue cap covering the cut-off valve was in its proper place
and that the lock on that cap was intact."  The plaintiffs also attached an
affidavit from Hugh Buchanan, who lived near the plaintiffs' house.  He
stated that, in the spring of 2018, his wife complained about water
running into their yard from "up the street" and that, when Buchanan saw
someone from the Board at the plaintiffs' house, he went to speak with
him.  According to Buchanan, the Board employee, whom Buchanan
identified as Bryant, "stated that the water department was supposed to
have cut off the water to the [plaintiffs' house] but had apparently not cut
the water off properly which is why it was still running." 3  The plaintiffs
2The plaintiffs actually state in their response that the photographs
and video were taken on August 24, 2018.  In light of the fact that they
argue that this evidence "directly and profoundly contradicts ... Bryant's
testimony" that the cap and lock device were "hanging off the cut off
sideways" when he went to the plaintiffs' house on February 28, 2018, it
appears that the date in the motion is a typographical error and the
plaintiffs are alleging that the photographs and video were taken on
February 24, 2018, the day Stokes inspected the plaintiffs' house.
3Buchanan submitted two affidavits. The first is dated November 29,
2018, and generally sets forth the information provided above.  The second
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argued that this evidence "directly contradicts" Bryant's testimony
regarding the condition of the cap and lock device on February 28, 2018.
The Board moved to strike the plaintiffs' response and the
evidentiary submissions attached to it.  After the plaintiffs responded to
the Board's motion, the trial court conducted a hearing, and, on January
17, 2020, the trial court entered an order denying the Board's motion to
strike the plaintiffs' evidentiary submissions, granting the plaintiffs'
motion to strike the Board's defenses,4 and granting the plaintiffs' motion
for a partial summary judgment as to the Board's liability to the plaintiffs. 
The trial court stated that the remaining issue of the plaintiffs' damages
"shall be determined at the trial of this case," which would be set by
separate order.  The Board timely petitioned this Court for a writ of
mandamus.
affidavit, dated November 19, 2019, specifically identifies Bryant as the
Board employee whom Buchanan spoke to in spring 2018.
4The trial court's order states that it granted the plaintiffs' motion
to strike the Board's "affirmative defenses."  However, given that the
plaintiffs moved to strike all of the Board's defenses and that the trial
court entered an order establishing the Board's liability to the plaintiffs,
we construe the trial court's order as striking all of the Board's defenses,
not just its affirmative defenses.
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Standard of Review
" ' " 'Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ to be issued
only where there is (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to
the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent
to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court.' " ' Ex parte Sears, Roebuck & Co., 895
So. 2d 265[, 268] (Ala. 2004) (quoting Ex parte Mardis, 628 So.
2d 605, 606 (Ala. 1993)(quoting in turn Ex parte Ben-Acadia,
Ltd., 566 So. 2d 486, 488 (Ala. 1990))). 'The petitioner bears
the burden of proving each of these elements before the writ
will issue.' Ex parte Glover, 801 So. 2d 1, 6 (Ala. 2001)(citing
Ex parte Consolidated Publ'g Co., 601 So. 2d 423 (Ala. 1992))."
Ex parte Vance, 900 So. 2d 394, 397 (Ala. 2004).
Analysis
In its petition, the Board seeks an order vacating the trial court's
January 17, 2020, order striking its defenses and entering a partial
summary judgment establishing its liability to the plaintiffs. It is
undisputed that the Board has properly invoked the jurisdiction of this
Court by filing a timely petition for a writ of mandamus from the trial
court's January 17, 2020, order. See Rule 21, Ala. R. App. P.  Because the
petition comes to this Court in an unusual procedural posture -- from a
partial summary judgment on liability in favor of the plaintiffs -- we first
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consider whether the Board has demonstrated that it is entitled to the
extraordinary relief requested in this petition on the basis that it lacks
another adequate remedy.
The Board argues that Ex parte Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB, 872 So.
2d 810 (Ala. 2003), supports its argument that an appeal is not an
adequate remedy by which to seek review of the January 17, 2020, order
based on the particular circumstances of this case.  In Ocwen, this Court
recognized certain limited circumstances in which an eventual appeal of
a discovery order is not an adequate remedy and review by mandamus is
proper.  The Board references the third category of discovery orders that
this Court, in Ocwen, held are subject to mandamus review:
"[W]hen the trial court either imposes sanctions effectively
precluding a decision on the merits or denies discovery going
to a party's entire action or defense so that, in either event, the
outcome has been all but determined, and the petitioner would
be merely going through the motions of a trial to obtain an
appeal." 
Ocwen, 872 So. 2d at 813–14.5  
5In later cases, this Court summarized the third Ocwen category as
permitting mandamus review of discovery orders that "effectively
eviscerat[e] 'a party's entire action or defense.' " Ex parte Meadowbrook
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It is well settled that "discovery sanctions ... are available when
spoliation is charged against an opposing party." Smith v. Atkinson, 771
So. 2d 429, 438 (Ala. 2000).  Although the trial court's order entering the
partial summary judgment as to liability is not a typical "discovery order,"
this Court has addressed the issue of spoliation in the context of both a
discovery sanction entered pursuant to Rule 37, Ala. R. Civ. P., and a
summary judgment as a "sanction" for spoliation. See, e.g., Hartung Com.
Props., Inc. v. Buffi's Auto. Equip. & Supply Co., 279 So. 3d 1098 (Ala.
2018) (reversing a summary judgment in favor of the defendant based on
the plaintiff's spoliation of the evidence); and Iverson v. Xpert Tune, Inc.,
553 So. 2d 82 (Ala. 1989) (affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff's action
pursuant to Rule 37 based on the plaintiff's failure to respond to a
discovery request because the plaintiff discarded the evidence the
defendant sought to inspect). Because the entry of a summary judgment
on the basis of spoliation is considered a sanction, this Court, unlike in
other cases in which it is reviewing a "standard" summary judgment,
Ins. Grp., Inc., 987 So. 2d 540, 547 (Ala. 2007). 
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considers whether the trial court "exceeded its discretion" in entering the
summary judgment on the ground of spoliation. See Hartung, 279 So. 3d
at 1102-03; and Vesta Fire Ins. Corp. v. Milam & Co. Constr., 901 So. 2d
84, 88-89 (Ala. 2004).  Thus, this Court treats an order entering a
summary judgment based on spoliation in a manner similar to an order
imposing discovery sanctions for spoliation. Compare Vesta Fire, 901 So.
2d at 89 (holding that, "in determining whether the summary judgments
for the defendants were proper on the ground of spoliation of the evidence,
we consider whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in entering the
summary judgments"), and Iverson, supra (in reviewing an order
dismissing the plaintiff's complaint and entering a default judgment
against the plaintiff based on spoliation pursuant to Rule 37, this Court
stated that "[t]he choice of discovery sanctions is within the trial court's
discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal [unless the court exceeded
its] discretion").
At the heart of this case is the plaintiffs' request for production for
inspection of the cap and lock device and the water meter that the Board
removed from the plaintiffs' property and the Board's inability to allow
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inspection of those items because it was no longer in possession of either
of them.  This is akin to a failure of discovery and, even though the
plaintiffs did not cite Rule 37 or specifically seek "discovery" sanctions
under that rule, their motion for a partial summary judgment sought to
impose a sanction on the defendant for its alleged spoliation of the
evidence.  The trial court agreed and entered an order striking the Board's
defenses and establishing the Board's liability to the plaintiffs.  These are
sanctions specifically contemplated by Rule 37(d), Ala. R. Civ. P., based on
a party's failure to comply with a request for production.6  The trial court's
order is, in essence, a discovery sanction  "effectively precluding a decision
on the merits ... so that ... the outcome has been all but determined, and
the [Board] would be merely going through the motions of a trial to obtain
an appeal." Ocwen, 872 So. 2d at 813-14.  Thus, we conclude that the
6"An order to compel discovery is not required in order to bring Rule
37(d) into play. It is enough that a request for inspection or production has
been properly served on the party." Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Synergy Gas,
Inc., 585 So. 2d 822, 825–26 (Ala. 1991) (citing Iverson v. Xpert Tune, Inc.,
553 So. 2d 82 (Ala. 1989)).
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Board has demonstrated that, under the particular circumstances of this
case, an appeal is not an adequate remedy.
Accordingly, we now consider whether the Board has demonstrated
a clear legal right to an order vacating the trial court's order striking the
Board's defenses and establishing the Board's liability to the plaintiffs. 
As discussed above, to demonstrate a clear legal right to that relief, the
Board must demonstrate that the trial court exceeded its discretion in
entering a partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs as to the
Board's liability. See Story v. RAJ Props., Inc., 909 So. 2d 797, 802 (Ala.
2005) ("In determining whether the summary judgments for the ...
defendants were proper on the ground of spoliation of the evidence, we
consider whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in entering the
summary judgment instead of imposing another, less severe, sanction
against [the spoliator].").  In Vesta Fire, a decision reviewing a summary
judgment entered based on spoliation, the Court stated that, because a
summary judgment was under review, the evidence presented in support
of the motion for a summary judgment must be viewed in a light most
favorable to the nonmovant. 901 So. 2d at 96. In Story, another decision
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reviewing a summary judgment based on spoliation, this Court stated
that, when there are disputed issues that go to "whether the sanction of
a summary judgment entered on the ground of spoliation of the evidence
was appropriate", "[t]hat determination is one for the trial court to make."
909 So. 2d at 802. 
" 'Spoliation is an attempt by a party to
suppress or destroy material evidence favorable to
the party's adversary. May v. Moore, 424 So. 2d
596, 603 (Ala. 1982). Proof of spoliation will
support an inference of guilt or negligence. May,
424 So. 2d at 603. One can prove spoliation by
showing that a party purposefully or wrongfully
destroyed [evidence] that the party knew supported
the interest of the party's opponent. Id.'
"Wal–Mart Stores[, Inc. v. Goodman], 789 So. 2d [166,] 176
[(Ala. 2000)] (concluding that Wal–Mart was not entitled to a
new trial based on spoliation because 'nothing in the record
show[ed] that [the plaintiff] knew that the [allegedly spoliated
evidence] would be a key piece of evidence in her case, and
Wal–Mart provided no evidence to show that [the plaintiff]
intentionally destroyed [it] in order to inhibit Wal–Mart's
case.')."
Walker v. City of Huntsville, 62 So. 3d 474, 495 (Ala. 2010). 
"This Court has applied five factors in analyzing a
spoliation-of-the-evidence issue: (1) the importance of the
evidence destroyed; (2) the culpability of the offending party;
(3) fundamental fairness; (4) alternative sources of the
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information obtainable from the evidence destroyed; and (5)
the possible effectiveness of other sanctions less severe than
dismissal."
Story, 909 So. 2d at 802–03 (citing Vesta Fire, 901 So. 2d at 94–95).7 
Although we briefly address each factor listed above, this case turns on
the fifth factor -- the possible effectiveness of sanctions less severe than
an order striking the Board's defenses and establishing the Board's
liability to the plaintiffs.
The importance of the evidence destroyed -- the meter and the cap
and lock device -- in and of itself, is obvious.  That evidence would provide
the plaintiffs the best opportunity to prove their claim that the Board
never properly cut off the water in 2016 and to rebut the Board's
allegation that the cutoff was not effective only because a third party
tampered with the cap and lock device.  However, this Court has held that
the importance of the evidence destroyed "must be evaluated in the
context of the importance of the evidence that was preserved or otherwise
7Although the parties have not cited any authority indicating that
this Court has considered these five factors in analyzing whether a
defendant is subject to a sanction for spoliation, the parties use these
factors as a framework for their argument; therefore, we will do the same. 
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available," Vesta Fire, 901 So. 2d at 95, which implicates the fourth factor
set forth above.  Although no part of the meter or the cap and lock device
was preserved, the materials before us indicate that the plaintiffs did have
evidence available to them to support their contention that the Board did
not properly cut off the water in 2016, namely, the testimony of their
contractor, Stokes, who inspected the water meter four days before the
Board was made aware of the issue at the plaintiffs' house.  The plaintiffs
did not present any evidence indicating that Stokes was unavailable or
otherwise unable to testify regarding the condition of the cap and lock
device and the water meter when he inspected that equipment on
February 24, 2018, before the Board removed the equipment.8  Thus, the
8There is also some indication from the materials before us that the
plaintiffs are in possession of photographs and a video of the cap and lock
device and the meter that were taken before the Board removed that
equipment. See accompanying text and note 2, supra. In their response to
the Board's petition for a writ of mandamus, the plaintiffs argue that the
photographs and video are not adequate to rebut Bryant's testimony
concerning the condition of the cap and lock device on February 28, 2018. 
Notably, this argument appears to contradict the argument the plaintiffs
made to the trial court, i.e., that the photographs and video "directly and
profoundly" contradict Bryant's testimony concerning the condition of the
cap and lock device. Even if the photographs are not adequate, there is no
indication that Stokes is unavailable to offer evidence of the status or
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plaintiffs did not demonstrate that there was no alternate source for the
information that would have been obtainable from the destroyed evidence.
In considering the Board's culpability in failing to preserve the meter
or the cap and lock device, the Board argues that there was insufficient
evidence that it acted willfully in not preserving the items.  
"At its most flagrant level, the willfulness component of
the culpability factor involves knowledge and appreciation by
the spoliator that the evidence being destroyed would be
pertinent and materially favor the interest of his opponent in
litigation being anticipated by the spoliator. McCleery[ v.
McCleery, 200 Ala. 4, 75 So. 316 (1917)]; May[ v. Moore, 424
So. 2d 596 (Ala. 1982)]; Verchot v. General Motors Corp., 812
So. 2d 296 (Ala. 2001). 'When a party maliciously destroys
evidence, that is, with the intent to affect the litigation, that
party is more culpable for spoliation.' Cooper v. Toshiba Home
Tech. Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1274 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
Conversely, willfulness is not shown where the party disposing
of an item neither knew nor should have known that the item
would be key evidence in the case. Wal–Mart Stores[, Inc. v.
Goodman], 789 So. 2d [166,] 176 [(Ala. 2000)] ('[The defendant]
provided no evidence to show that [the plaintiff] intentionally
destroyed [the item of evidence] in order to inhibit [the
defendant's] case.')."
Vesta Fire, 901 So. 2d at 95.
condition of the cap and lock device and the meter before those items were
removed by the Board.
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The primary consideration in determining the Board's culpability is
whether it knew or should have known that the cap and lock device and
the water meter would be key evidence supporting the interests of the
plaintiffs in foreseeable litigation by the plaintiffs against the Board.  If
the Board had no reason to believe there was a threat of litigation at the
time it removed the equipment, the Board could not be held culpable. See
Russell v. East Alabama Health Care Auth., 192 So. 3d 1170, 1177 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2015) (holding that, when there was insufficient evidence that
the defendant had knowledge that there was a threat of litigation when
it destroyed certain evidence that might have been supportive of the
plaintiff's case, there was no basis from which to conclude that the
defendant had engaged in spoliation of the evidence).
Viewing the evidence before us in a light most favorable to the
Board, we conclude that the trial court could have assigned some
culpability to the Board. Although Crow did not recall reviewing Stokes's
e-mail that detailed his opinion that the Board was at fault for the
damage to the plaintiffs' house,  Crow did not dispute that Milner
provided Stokes's e-mail report to her before Bryant went to the plaintiffs'
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house in February 2018.  Crow testified that Milner "seemed to be
claiming damages" against the Board when Milner first reported the
water leak on February 28, 2018.  Yet Crow did not convey to Bryant that
Milner was attributing responsibility for her damage to the Board, nor did
she make any other effort to preserve the equipment that Bryant removed
from the plaintiffs' house.   Thus, the trial court could have determined
that the Board had some degree of culpability for failing to ask Bryant to
save the cap and lock device and the meter after he removed them from
the plaintiffs' house.  However, when the evidence is viewed in the light
most favorable to the Board, as it must be, Vesta Fire, 901 So. 2d at 96,
the materials before us indicate that neither Crow nor Bryant knew that
the plaintiffs would initiate litigation against the Board once it was
discovered that, at least from the Board's perspective, the water was
running to the plaintiffs' house only because a third party had tampered
with the cap and lock device, not because the Board had failed to properly
cut off the water in 2016.  Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Board, any culpability imputed to the Board based
on Crow's failure to maintain the equipment removed from the plaintiffs'
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house was in a relatively low range on the "continuum of fault." See Vesta
Fire, 901 So. 2d at 98.
Next, we consider whether notions of fundamental fairness
supported the trial court's order establishing the Board's liability to the
plaintiffs as a sanction for spoliation. Although we agree that it would be
fundamentally unfair to allow the Board to present evidence indicating
that a third party had tampered with the cap and lock device if the
plaintiffs were wholly unable to rebut that evidence entirely as a result of
the Board's conduct, we have already concluded that the plaintiffs failed
to demonstrate that there were not adequate alternative sources of
information from which they could rebut the Board's evidence in this
regard. Moreover, we conclude that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate
that fundamental fairness required the most severe sanction available to
the trial court to impose upon the Board. Cf. Hartung, 279 So. 3d at 1105
(noting that, when a plaintiff's action was dismissed based on the
plaintiff's spoliation of the evidence, " ' "the sanction of dismissal is the
most severe sanction that a court may apply .... Dismissal orders must be
carefully scrutinized and the plaintiff's conduct must mandate
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dismissal" ' " (quoting Vesta Fire, 901 So. 2d at 95, quoting in turn
Iverson, 553 So. 2d at 87)). In cases where the defendant is accused of
spoliating the evidence, this Court has repeatedly approved a jury
instruction on spoliation, which can include an inference of guilt, when an
adequate evidentiary foundation exists from the evidence presented. See
Campbell v. Williams, 638 So. 2d 804, 817 (Ala. 1994) (noting that
sufficient evidentiary foundation existed to support a jury instruction on
spoliation, which allowed for an inference of guilt, when the evidence
indicated that the defendant physician in a medical-malpractice action
attempted to conceal certain aspects of the decedent's care); Southeast
Environmental Infrastructure, L.L.C. v. Rivers, 12 So. 3d 32, 44–45 (Ala.
2008) (noting that sufficient evidentiary foundation existed for a jury
instruction on spoliation and holding that, "when there is evidence
indicating that a defendant has spoliated essential evidence in a case, it
is reasonable for the jury to infer that the defendant did so to prevent
anyone from seeing that evidence. Thus, where the evidence shows
spoliation, the jury may consider the defendant's spoliation of the evidence
as an implied admission of culpability."); and Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v.
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Sanders, 792 So. 2d 1069, 1081 (Ala. 2000) (holding that the plaintiff
presented sufficient evidence to support an instruction that allowed the
jury to determine whether the evidence supported a reasonable inference
of the defendants' " 'guilt, culpability, or awareness' " of their wrongdoing
when the evidence indicated that the defendant had falsified evidence to
support its defense).
In Alabama Power Co. v. Murray, 751 So. 2d 494 (Ala. 1999), the
Murrays sued Alabama Power ("APCo") alleging that a massive power
surge developed on APCo's power lines, bypassed APCo's "surge arrester,"
and caused a fire at the Murrays' house.  The Murrays alleged that APCo
failed to install sufficient surge arresters and that that failure allowed the
surge to travel unimpeded to the Murrays' house. Shortly after the fire,
engineers with APCo, intending to inspect the surge arrester at issue,
dropped the surge arrester and destroyed it.  The trial court gave the jury
the following spoliation charge from Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions:
Civil, 15.13 (2d ed., 1998 cum. supp.):
" 'In this case, the [Murrays claim] that the defendant
[APCo] is guilty of wrongfully destroying, hiding, concealing,
altering, or otherwise wrongfully tampering with [the]
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material evidence[, namely, the surge arrester at the Seale
Road substation]. If you are reasonably satisfied from the
evidence that [APCo] did or attempted to wrongfully destroy,
hide, conceal, alter, or otherwise tamper with material
evidence, then that fact may be considered as an inference of
[APCo's] guilt, culpability, or awareness of the defendant's
negligence.' "
Alabama Power, 751 So. 2d at 496. 
After a jury found in favor of the Murrays, APCo argued on appeal
that the trial court erred in giving an instruction on spoliation.  This
Court stated:
"In May v. Moore, 424 So. 2d 596 (Ala. 1982), this Court
held:
" 'Proof may be made concerning a [party's]
purposefully and wrongfully destroying a document
which he knew was supportive of the interest of his
opponent, whether or not an action involving such
interest was pending at the time of the destruction.
See Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 190.05
(3d ed. 1977). Additionally, the spoliation, or
attempt to suppress material evidence by a party to
a suit, favorable to an adversary, is sufficient
foundation for an inference of his guilt or
negligence. Southern Home Insurance Co. of the
Carolinas v. Boatwright, 231 Ala. 198, 164 So. 102
(1935); see also Gamble, McElroy's Alabama
Evidence § 190.02 (3d ed.1977).'
"424 So. 2d at 603.
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"The Murrays contend that evidence regarding the
condition of the surge arrester was vital to their case against
APCo. Further, claim the Murrays, APCo knew, when it was
removing the surge arrester, that the Murrays' potential claim
against it depended, in part, on the condition of the surge
arrester; thus, they say, the Seale Road surge arrester was
evidence that APCo 'knew was supportive of the interest of
[its] opponent[s].'
"These contentions, say the Murrays, when viewed in the
context of the inconsistent testimony of Jeff Roper and Bill
Obert and the statements of the Murrays' neighbors with
regard to electrical appliances in their homes that they say
were destroyed as a result of the same power surge, provided
a sufficient foundation for the jury charge on the doctrine of
spoliation. See Campbell v. Williams, 638 So. 2d 804 (Ala.
1994). Alabama Pattern Jury Charge 15.13 requires that the
fact-finder be reasonably satisfied from the evidence that
spoliation has occurred. The record contains sufficient evidence
to support the trial court's giving this charge and allowing the
jury to determine whether that evidence also supported a
reasonable inference of APCo's 'guilt, culpability, or awareness
of [its] negligence.' "
Alabama Power, 751 So. 2d at 497.
The plaintiffs did not demonstrate below, and they have not
demonstrated to this Court, why a similar jury instruction would not be
adequate to protect their interests, assuming a proper evidentiary
foundation is laid during trial.  Although we can conceive a circumstance
where it could be proper to strike all defenses of a defendant based on
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spoliation of the evidence, in most circumstances, a jury instruction on an
inference of guilt would suffice to protect the interest of the plaintiff and
the fundamental fairness of the proceedings.  See Alabama Power,
Campbell, Rivers, and Sanders, supra.
In the context of cases involving alleged spoliation of the evidence,
this Court has repeatedly recognized " 'a long-established and compelling
policy objective of affording litigants a trial on the merits whenever
possible.' " Hartung, 279 So. 3d at 1106 (quoting Iverson, 553 So. 2d at 89
and citing Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Auth. Sewer Serv., Inc., 524 So. 2d 600
(Ala. 1988), and Jones v. Hydro-Wave of Alabama, Inc., 524 So. 2d 610
(Ala. 1988)).  Accordingly, we must conclude that the trial court exceeded
its discretion in striking the Board's defenses and entering a partial
summary judgment establishing the Board's liability to the plaintiffs
based on spoliation.
Conclusion
The Board has established: a clear legal right to an order directing
the trial court to vacate the January 17, 2020, order striking its defenses
and establishing its liability to the plaintiffs; the trial court's refusal to
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vacate its order; the absence of another adequate remedy; and, the
properly invoked jurisdiction of this Court. See Ex parte Vance, 900 So. 2d
at 397.  Thus, the Board has demonstrated that it is entitled to the writ
of mandamus.  Accordingly, we grant the petition, issue the writ, and
order the trial court to vacate its January 17, 2020, order.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Bolin, Wise, Sellers, Stewart, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.
Shaw, J., concurs in the result.
Parker, C.J., and Mendheim, J., dissent.
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MENDHEIM, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.  I disagree with the main opinion's conclusion
that The Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Anniston ("the
Board") has demonstrated that an appeal is not an adequate remedy in
this case.  As the main opinion notes:
" ' " ' " Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ to be
issued only where there is[, among other things,] ... the lack of
another adequate remedy ...." ' "  Ex parte Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 895 So. 2d 265 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Ex parte Mardis, 628
So. 2d 605, 606 (Ala. 1993) (quoting in turn Ex parte
Ben-Acadia, Ltd., 566 So. 2d 486, 488 (Ala. 1990))).' "
Ex parte Vance, 900 So. 2d 394, 397 (Ala. 2004).  Stated differently, "[i]t
is well settled that mandamus is an extraordinary writ to be issued only
in situations where other relief is unavailable or inadequate and that it
is not a substitute for the appellate process. Continental Oil Co. v.
Williams, 370 So. 2d 953 (Ala. 1979)."  Ex parte Drill Parts & Serv. Co.,
590 So. 2d 252, 253 (Ala. 1991).
Ex parte Drill Parts & Service is instructive in determining whether
the Board had available to it an adequate remedy.  In Ex parte Drill Parts
& Service, Joy Manufacturing Company ("JMC") sued Drill Parts &
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Service Company ("DP&SC") alleging, among other things, that DP&SC
had misappropriated its trade secrets.  After the trial court entered a
preliminary injunction in favor of JMC, JMC filed a motion for a partial
summary judgment as to its misappropriation-of-trade-secrets claim; JMC
sought a judgment only as to liability on this one claim.  The trial court
granted JMC's partial-summary-judgment motion, determining that
DP&SC was liable, and set the matter for a hearing as to damages.
After the trial court refused to certify the matter for a permissive
appeal under Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P., DP&SC petitioned this Court for a
writ of mandamus, requesting that this Court set aside the trial court's
order.  This Court refused to consider DP&SC's mandamus petition,
stating, in pertinent part:
"We find it unnecessary to determine with respect to this
petition whether [the trial court] erred in entering the partial
summary judgment in favor of [JMC] on the issue of
[DP&SC's] liability for misappropriating trade secrets and
setting a hearing for a determination of damages.  It is well
settled that mandamus is an extraordinary writ to be issued
only in situations where other relief is unavailable or
inadequate and that it is not a substitute for the appellate
process.  Continental Oil Co. v. Williams, 370 So. 2d 953 (Ala.
1979).  [DP&SC] could not appeal [the trial court's]
interlocutory partial summary judgment in favor of [JMC] and
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the order setting a hearing for a determination of damages,
pursuant to Rule 5, [Ala. R. App. P.]; nevertheless, [DP&SC]
ha[s] an adequate remedy by appeal once a final judgment is
entered in this case.  ...  In the present case, after over eight
years of litigation, a partial summary judgment, albeit
interlocutory in nature, was entered against [DP&SC] on the
issue of liability for misappropriating trade secrets; thus, only
the question of damages is left to be resolved.  With the case
in this posture, [DP&SC] ha[s] an adequate remedy by appeal
once [the trial court] enters a final judgment. Accordingly,
mandamus is not the appropriate means of review in this
case."
Ex parte Drill Parts & Service, 590 So. 2d at 253-54.
In the present case, as in Ex parte Drill Parts & Service, the only
issue left to be resolved as to the plaintiffs' claims against the Board is the
issue of damages.  Mandamus is not the appropriate means of review of
the partial summary judgment entered by the circuit court.  The Board
has available to it an adequate remedy by appeal once the circuit court
enters a final judgment in this case.  Accordingly, given the posture of this
case, I dissent.
32