Case Title: Shackelford v. Idaho

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Date: 2016-05-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket Nos. 42182/42331 
 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
 
       Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
       Respondent. 
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Boise, May 2016 Term 
 
2016 Opinion No. 60 
 
Filed: May 27, 2016 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Latah County.  Hon. John R. Stegner, District Judge. 
 
The orders of the district court are affirmed. 
 
Dale C. Shackelford, appellant pro se. 
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 
 
_____________________ 
 
J. JONES, Chief Justice 
Appellant Dale Carter Shackelford was sentenced to death after being convicted of two 
counts of first-degree murder and other crimes. He appealed and sought post-conviction relief, 
and his death sentence was set aside. At resentencing, Shackelford was sentenced to two 
consecutive fixed life sentences. Shackelford petitioned for post-conviction relief based on the 
resentencing proceeding. He also petitioned again for post-conviction relief based on the original 
criminal trial. The district court summarily dismissed both petitions and Shackelford appealed 
each. The appeals have been consolidated in this case. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The facts leading to Shackelford’s convictions were summarized in State v. Shackelford 
(“Shackelford I”): 
Dale Shackelford was convicted of the murders of his ex-wife, Donna 
Fontaine, and her boyfriend, Fred Palahniuk, which occurred near the Latah 
 
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County town of Kendrick, Idaho, in May 1999. The State alleged that Shackelford 
conspired with Martha Millar, Bernadette Lasater, Mary Abitz, Sonja Abitz, and, 
John Abitz. Millar and Lasater worked for Shackelford’s trucking business, 
Shackelford Enterprises, in Missouri. The Abitz family lived near the residence 
where the bodies of Donna and Fred were found. Sonja Abitz was Shackelford’s 
fiancée at the time of the murders, and John and Mary Abitz are Sonja’s parents. 
The alleged conspirators eventually pled guilty to charges related to the murders. 
Shackelford and Donna married in Missouri in December 1995 and the 
relationship ended in the summer of 1997, with the couple divorcing in November 
of that year. Donna accused Shackelford of raping her in July 1997, and charges 
were filed in 1998. In the spring of 1999, Donna developed a relationship with 
Fred and, on May 28, 1999, the two visited Donna’s brother, Gary Fontaine, at the 
home Gary and Donna’s daughter owned together outside of Kendrick. The 
morning of May 29, Donna, Fred, and Gary went to the Locust Blossom Festival 
in Kendrick, where they met John, Mary, and Sonja Abitz. 
After leaving the festival, Gary went to the Abitz’s house, but he left 
around dark, returned home, noticed Donna’s pickup in the driveway, and smelled 
smoke. Gary called the Abitz’s house and reported that his two-story garage was 
on fire. Mary, Sonja, Ted Meske (Mary’s brother), and Shackelford arrived at the 
fire and various individuals tried to extinguish it, but were unsuccessful. 
At 7:40 p.m., Latah County Sheriff Patrol Deputy Richard Skiles was 
called to investigate the fire at 2168 Three Bear Road. When Skiles arrived at the 
scene, nearly an hour later, he observed several persons—including Gary 
Fontaine, Mary Abitz, Sonja Abitz, Brian Abitz (Sonja’s brother), Ted Meske, 
and Shackelford—standing near the garage that was completely engulfed in 
flames. Based upon information obtained from Ted and Shackelford, Deputy 
Skiles contacted dispatch to have an on-call detective sent “because there was a 
possibility there could be a suicide victim in the fire.” By the time the fire 
department arrived, the garage had been utterly destroyed. Several hours later, 
after the fire had been extinguished, two bodies were found in the rubble. The 
bodies were subsequently identified as the remains of Donna and Fred. At trial, a 
state fire investigator testified as to his opinion that the fire was arson. 
Doctor Robert Cihak conducted autopsies of the remains, which were 
severely burned. Shotgun pellets were found in Donna’s right chest region and a 
bullet was found in the back of her neck. Dr. Cihak opined that the bullet wound 
was fatal and was inflicted when Donna was still alive. A bullet was also found in 
Fred’s body behind the upper breastbone, which Dr. Cihak concluded was the 
cause of death. Dr. Cihak offered his opinion that Donna and Fred were dead at 
the time of the fire. 
150 Idaho 355, 361–362, 247 P.3d 582, 588–589 (2010) (footnote omitted). 
 
Shackelford was charged with, and a jury convicted him of, two counts of first-degree 
murder, first-degree arson, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-
degree arson, and preparing false evidence. Id. at 362, 247 P.3d at 589. The trial court, rather 
than the jury, sentenced Shackelford to death for the murders. Id. Based on Ring v. Arizona, 536 
 
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U.S. 584 (2002), Shackelford argued in a petition for post-conviction relief that the death 
sentences violated the mandate that the jury and not the court weigh aggravating and mitigating 
factors in death penalty cases. Shackelford I, 150 Idaho at 363, 247 P.3d at 590. The district court 
set aside the death sentences, and we affirmed in Shackelford I. Id. at 386–388, 247 P.3d at 613–
615. We also remanded Shackelford I for resentencing. Id. at 388, 247 P.3d at 615. 
 
On March 18, 2011, Shackelford filed a “[Successive] Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
Capital Case” (“Successive Petition”) and a “Motion for Appointment of Counsel Capital Case.” 
The State filed an answer and a motion for summary disposition. On July 8, 2011, the district 
court denied all pending motions and suspended the Successive Petition pending the outcome of 
Shackelford’s resentencing. 
 
In Shackelford’s criminal case, the State filed a Notice of State’s Decision to Not Seek 
Death Penalty on Resentencing on June 20, 2011. In response, Shackelford contended that the 
court could not impose a sentence of fixed life absent a jury finding of a statutory aggravating 
circumstance, citing Idaho Code section 19-2515(7)(b). The district court rejected Shackelford’s 
argument and sentenced him to fixed life for each murder, to be served consecutive with each 
other and the other sentences. On appeal, we affirmed Shackelford’s fixed life sentences. State v. 
Shackelford (“Shackelford II”), 155 Idaho 454, 314 P.3d 136 (2013). 
 
Thereafter, Shackelford filed pro se motions to amend his Successive Petition, to appoint 
counsel, and to petition for post-conviction relief based on his resentencing (“Resentencing 
Petition”). After conducting a consolidated hearing on the pending motions in both cases, and 
permitting Shackelford to amend his Successive Petition (“Amended Successive Petition”), the 
district court granted the State’s motion for summary dismissal and denied Shackelford’s motion 
for counsel. Shackelford immediately appealed the district court’s orders in both cases and later 
timely filed amended notices of appeal after the court had entered a final judgment in each case. 
 
Shackelford was appointed appellate counsel in both cases, but counsel moved to 
withdraw in each after determining that he could not file an opening brief complying with I.A.R. 
11.2(a). Counsel’s motions were granted and Shackelford proceeded pro se. The appeals were 
consolidated by this Court. 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred in summarily dismissing Shackelford’s Amended Successive 
Petition. 
 
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2. Whether the district court erred in summarily dismissing Shackelford’s Resentencing 
Petition. 
3. Whether the district court committed reversible error in denying Shackelford’s Motion for 
Appointment of Counsel related to his Amended Successive Petition. 
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates an action that is civil rather than 
criminal. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443, 180 P.3d 476, 482 (2008). It is an entirely new 
proceeding, distinct from the criminal action which led to the conviction. State v. Beam, 115 
Idaho 208, 210, 766 P.2d 678, 680 (1988). 
The doctrine of res judicata applies to post-conviction relief cases. It bars defendants 
from raising issues decided on direct appeal in a subsequent post-conviction relief proceeding. 
State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 9, n.1, 966 P.2d 1, 9 n.1 (1998). Any issue which could have been 
raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction 
proceedings. I.C. § 19-4901(b); Beam, 115 Idaho at 210, 766 P.2d at 680. “Whether claim 
preclusion or issue preclusion bars relitigation between the same parties of a prior litigation is a 
question of law upon which this Court exercises free review.” Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 
Idaho 119, 122, 157 P.3d 613, 616 (2007). 
“Summary dismissal of a petition for post conviction relief is the procedural equivalent of 
summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56 and this Court must determine whether a genuine issue of 
material fact exists, with inferences liberally construed in favor of the petitioner.” Charboneau v. 
State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
A. The district court did not err in summarily dismissing Shackelford’s Amended 
Successive Petition. 
The district court summarily dismissed Shackelford’s Amended Successive Petition on a 
variety of grounds, holding that none of Shackelford’s claims could succeed as a matter of law. 
Shackelford raises several claims that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his 
Amended Successive Petition, each of which will be examined in turn. Because Shackelford’s 
claims are all procedurally barred for at least one reason, the merits of each will not be discussed 
in detail. First, Shackelford contends that dismissing the claim regarding alleged due process 
violations related to jury Instruction No. 33 was error. The district court dismissed this claim on 
 
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three alternative bases, concluding that Shackelford had not shown a due process violation and 
that the claim was barred both by res judicata and by Idaho Code section 19-4901(b). 
Shackelford offers no argument or authority suggesting that res judicata does not apply to bar 
this claim, other than to assert that “[w]hile this court did indeed rule on matters related to jury 
Instruction No. 33 [on direct appeal] . . . the specific issues raised on [direct] appeal and in the 
[instant] pro se petition . . . are distinctly different.” Nor does Shackelford argue why Idaho Code 
section 19-4901(b) should not bar this claim, or any of his other claims. 
The claim preclusion aspect of res judicata under Idaho law “bars a subsequent action 
between the same parties upon the same claim or upon claims relating to the same cause of 
action . . . which might have been made.” Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 123, 157 P.3d at 617 
(quotation marks omitted). It requires “(1) same parties; (2) same claim; and (3) final judgment.” 
Id. at 124, 157 P.3d at 618. “Claim preclusion bars adjudication not only on the matters offered 
and received to defeat the claim, but also as to every matter which might and should have been 
litigated in the first suit.” Id. at 126, 157 P.3d at 620 (quotation marks omitted). 
Shackelford concedes that the Court has previously ruled on matters related to Instruction 
No. 33. Accordingly, subsequent challenges claiming error related to that jury instruction are res 
judicata and the district court here did not err in so holding. 
Further, Idaho Code section 19-4901(b) provides in relevant part that 
Any issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited 
and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings, unless it appears to the 
court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing by affidavit, deposition or 
otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the 
reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, 
have been presented earlier. 
“[W]here a trial court grants summary judgment on two independent grounds and the appellant 
challenges only one of those grounds on appeal, the judgment must be affirmed.” Brown v. 
Greenheart, 157 Idaho 156, 165, 335 P.3d 1, 10 (2014) (quotation marks omitted). Shackelford 
did not challenge the district court’s conclusion that summary dismissal was appropriate because 
the claim was barred under Idaho Code section 19-4901(b). Thus, we also affirm on that ground. 
Second, Shackelford argues that the district court did not reference or otherwise rule on 
Claim B of the Amended Successive Petition, which alleged ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel for failure to adequately argue that jury Instruction No. 33 was deficient. But the district 
court did expressly reference the claim. Although the court did not independently examine this 
 
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claim in minute detail, it did address issues related to Instruction No. 33 and to the allegedly 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, concluding that res judicata barred each claim. The court 
ruled that “[n]one of Shackelford’s claims can succeed as a matter of law.” The entire basis of 
Shackelford’s appeal on this claim appears to rely on the incorrect assertion that the district court 
did not rule on the claim. We affirm the district court’s summary dismissal because the district 
court’s holding clearly specifies that “[n]one of Shackelford’s claims can succeed as a matter of 
law.” (emphasis added). 
Third, Shackelford asserts that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his claim 
related to an alleged Brady1 violation. Shackelford acknowledged that the district court had 
previously addressed and ruled on other Brady claims on direct appeal, but insists that the 
present claim is distinct from those claims. Shackelford alleges that the State committed a Brady 
violation by failing to turn over evidence tending to undermine the consistency of the State’s 
case. Specifically, Shackelford avers that on January 1, 1999, a radiologist x-rayed victim Donna 
Fontaine’s corpse and generated a report of the findings, and that the State did not disclose the 
report or x-ray to Shackelford until late in 2004. Attached to Shackelford’s Amended Successive 
Petition is a sworn affidavit from radiologist Dr. Roderick Saxey, opining that the bullet that 
allegedly killed Donna Fontaine appeared to have been sheared off, suggesting that it had 
ricocheted prior to entering her neck. Shackelford makes much of the apparent fact that the bullet 
retrieved from Fontaine’s body weighs less than it should. He appears to suggest that more than 
one third of the mass is missing because the bullet ricocheted before entering Fontaine’s body 
and that this supposition necessitates a finding that the murder could not have been premeditated. 
Shackelford offers vague argument that the prima facie requirements of a reversible Brady 
violation are present, but does not even attempt to explain why he did not raise this issue in his 
original petition for post-conviction relief, which was decided after Shackelford allegedly 
became aware of the evidence at issue.2 The district court summarily dismissed this claim both 
on the merits and because Shackelford’s claims regarding this evidence could previously have 
                                                 
1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), provides that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused . . . violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.” 
2 Shackelford also failed to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel’s failure to raise this 
Brady issue in his original petition for post-conviction relief. A subsequent claim on this issue is likely to be barred 
by Idaho Code section 19-4908. That section requires a petitioner to raise all grounds for relief in an original, 
supplemental, or amended application, and it provides that failure to do so results in waiver unless there is a 
“sufficient reason” for the failure. 
 
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been raised on appeal, but were not. Because Shackelford did not challenge the district court’s 
alternate basis for summary dismissal of this claim, we affirm its summary dismissal. Brown, 
157 Idaho at 165, 335 P.3d at 10. 
Fourth, Shackelford contends that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his 
claim alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to investigate ballistic data related 
to the bullet that killed Donna Fontaine. The district court summarily dismissed this claim 
because Shackelford had the opportunity to raise this issue on his prior appeal but failed to do so. 
Shackelford offers no explanation or excuse for not bringing this claim in his original post-
conviction petition for relief. Nor does he challenge the legal basis of the district court’s 
adjudication of this claim. His briefing merely reiterates the perceived merits of the substantive 
claim. Because Shackelford did not challenge the district court’s legal basis for summary 
dismissal of this claim, we affirm its summary dismissal. 
Fifth, Shackelford argues that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his claim 
of prosecutorial misconduct based on the prosecutor allegedly vouching for the credibility of 
State witnesses. Shackelford concedes that his trial counsel failed to object to the alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct. However, Shackelford contends that he personally undertook repeated 
and vehement attempts to have counsel make the objections and that his efforts somehow 
preserved the objections for appellate review. The district court summarily dismissed this claim 
both on the merits and based on a procedural bar arising from Shackelford’s failure to raise this 
issue on the prior appeal. Again, Shackelford fails to offer explanation or excuse for not bringing 
this claim in his original post-conviction action. Shackelford alleges that counsel would not 
permit him to raise the issue at trial, but fails to allege—let alone provide any evidence—that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal or in his original petition for post-
conviction relief. Because Shackelford did not challenge the district court’s alternate basis for 
summary dismissal of this claim, we affirm its summary dismissal. Brown, 157 Idaho at 165, 335 
P.3d at 10. 
The district court’s order as to each of the five issues related to the summary dismissal of 
Shackelford’s Amended Successive Petition was correct, either because he failed to challenge 
alternative bases relied upon by the district court or because a procedural bar provided by res 
judicata or Idaho Code section 19-4901(b) applies. For this reason, we affirm the district court’s 
order summarily dismissing Shackelford’s Amended Successive Petition. 
 
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B. The district court did not err in summarily dismissing Shackelford’s Resentencing 
Petition. 
Shackelford argues that the district court erred by sentencing him to a fixed life term for 
first-degree murder without a jury having found any aggravating factors. He insists that absent 
such a jury determination, the maximum legal sentence is indeterminate life imprisonment. The 
only authority he cites for this proposition is Idaho Code section 19-2515(7)(c), which provides: 
If the jury does not find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance or if 
the jury cannot unanimously agree on the existence of a statutory aggravating 
circumstance, the defendant will be sentenced by the court to a term of life 
imprisonment with a fixed term of not less than ten (10) years. 
Section 19-2515 applies in special sentencing proceedings where the death penalty is sought and 
is inapplicable here because the State did not pursue the death penalty on resentencing. Further, 
subsection (7)(c) sets out the information to be provided to the jury in a special sentencing 
proceeding and does not set the penalty that may be imposed by the court where the death 
penalty is not sought.  
 
Idaho Code section 18-4004 provides the statutory punishment for murder. The statute 
provides that “if the death penalty is not sought, the court shall impose a life sentence with a 
minimum period of confinement of not less than ten (10) years.” Shackelford does not explain 
how a term of fixed life imposed by a judge violates the statutory minimum of “not less than ten 
(10) years.” On its face, the statute imposes no maximum term of fixed imprisonment. A 
sentence of fixed life, therefore, does not exceed statutory sentencing limits. 
Shackelford also asserts that the fixed life sentence he received for conspiracy to commit 
first-degree murder exceeded the maximum allowed by law. However, as the district court noted, 
conspiracy to commit first-degree murder carries the same sentencing possibilities as first-degree 
murder. I.C. § 18-1701. This Court has previously upheld a fixed life sentence for first-degree 
murder. State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 272 P.3d 417 (2010). The district court further noted 
that even a second-degree murder conviction allows for a fixed life term to be imposed. State v. 
Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 253 P.3d 310 (2010). 
 
Finally, the State points out that the claims in Shackelford’s Resentencing Petition are 
barred by Idaho Code section 19-4901(b) because they could have been raised on direct appeal. 
The State accurately notes that Shackelford raised these issues at his resentencing but failed to 
raise them on direct appeal. Shackelford offers no reason for not bringing the claims in his direct 
appeal. Therefore, section 19-4901(b) also bars the claims. 
 
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Because the claims are barred by Idaho Code section 19-4901(b) and because, even were 
they not barred, Shackelford has failed to show that the sentences exceeded the statutory 
maximum, we affirm the district court’s order summarily dismissing Shackelford’s Resentencing 
Petition. 
C. The district court did not commit reversible error in denying Shackelford’s Motion for 
Appointment of Counsel. 
The district court denied Shackelford’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel, citing Idaho 
Code section 19-852(2)(c). The court also concluded that none of Shackelford’s claims can 
succeed as a matter of law. Shackelford contends that the district court erred in denying him 
post-conviction counsel because: (1) the court did not rule on his motion prior to summarily 
dismissing his Amended Successive Petition, (2) the court failed to give advance notice of its 
reasons for denying counsel, (3) the court improperly relied upon Idaho Code section 19-
852(2)(c), and (4) Shackelford alleged facts that would lead to the possibility of a valid claim. 
The State refutes each of these contentions and argues that any error was harmless. 
A decision to grant or deny a request for counsel in post-conviction cases is reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion. Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 393, 327 P.3d 365, 369 (2014). “A 
request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is governed by I.C. § 19-
4904, which provides that in proceedings under the UPCPA, a court-appointed attorney ‘may be 
made available’ to an applicant who is unable to pay the costs of representation.” Id. at 392–393, 
327 P.3d at 368–369 (quoting I.C. § 19-4904). “The standard for determining whether to appoint 
counsel for an indigent petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding is whether the petition alleges 
facts showing the possibility of a valid claim.” Id. at 393, 327 P.3d at 369 (citing Workman v. 
State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 (2007)). “In determining whether the appointment 
of counsel would be appropriate, every inference must run in the petitioner’s favor where the 
petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be expected to know how to properly allege 
the necessary facts.” Melton v. State, 148 Idaho 339, 342, 223 P.3d 281, 284 (2009) (quotation 
marks omitted).  
Shackelford asserts that it is reversible error for a district court to deny a petition for post-
conviction relief prior to deciding a motion to appoint counsel, citing several Idaho Court of 
Appeals cases. That proposition is indeed supported by Idaho Court of Appeals precedent. 
Swisher v. State, 129 Idaho 467, 469, 926 P.2d 1314, 1316 (Ct. App. 1996) (“When a request for 
 
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appointed counsel is presented . . . the court must act upon that request before ruling upon the 
substantive issues in the case.”). 
This Court has held at least twice that it is error for a district court to dismiss a petition 
for post-conviction relief without first determining whether the petitioner is entitled to court-
appointed counsel. In Charboneau v. State, we held that the district court in such a circumstance 
abused its discretion by dismissing the petition without ruling on the motion to appoint counsel. 
140 Idaho 789, 793, 102, P.3d 1098, 1112 (2004). We vacated the dismissal of the petition after 
having concluded that the appellant had raised the possibility of a valid claim. Id. In Melton, 
contrastingly, we affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief 
even though the court had failed to first address the petitioner’s motion for appointment of 
counsel. 148 Idaho at 342, 223 P.3d at 284. We held that “the district court erred in not 
specifically addressing Melton’s motion for appointment of counsel before it addressed the 
substantive merits of his petition. However, . . . such error did not affect Melton’s substantial 
rights because Melton’s successive petition for post-conviction relief did not raise the possibility 
of a valid claim.” Id. The Court relied on Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 61, which provides in 
relevant part that “[t]he court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect 
in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Melton, 148 Idaho 
at 342, 223 P.3d at 284. Because the petitioner had not raised the possibility of a valid claim, 
denying his motion for the appointment of counsel in the same order summarily dismissing his 
petition did not affect his substantial rights. Id. 
Here, even drawing inferences in Shackelford’s favor, his argument fails. Each of 
Shackelford’s claims is procedurally barred by res judicata or Idaho Code section 19-4901(b).3 
Because none of his claims can succeed, he has failed to raise the possibility of a valid claim 
sufficient to warrant reversal for the district court’s premature summary dismissal. Accordingly, 
we reject Shackelford’s argument for reversal on this basis. 
We resolve Shackelford’s remaining arguments on this issue in the same manner. 
Shackelford asserts that the district court failed to give him advance notice of the reasons it 
denied counsel and that it improperly relied upon Idaho Code section 19-852(2)(c). Assuming 
arguendo that these arguments have merit, there is nonetheless no basis for overturning the 
                                                 
3 Some or all of Shackelford’s instant claims may also be barred by Idaho Code section 19-4908. At this time, 
however, we express no opinion on the applicability of section 19-4908 to any of Shackelford’s instant claims. 
 
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district court’s denial. None of the claims in Shackelford’s petition can succeed because they are 
procedurally barred.4 He failed to raise the possibility of a valid claim, so any error by the district 
court could not have been significant enough to warrant reversal. Shackelford’s substantial rights 
were not violated by any alleged error so I.R.C.P. 61 requires the Court to disregard the error. 
Because Shackelford failed to raise the possibility of a valid claim, his substantial rights 
were not affected by the district court’s error in denying his motion for the appointment of 
counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying that motion. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the district court’s orders summarily dismissing Shackelford’s Amended 
Successive Petition and Resentencing Petition and denying Shackelford’s Motion for 
Appointment of Counsel. Costs to Respondent. 
 
Justices EISMANN, BURDICK, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR. 
                                                 
4 Separately, Shackelford seems to argue that he has alleged facts leading to the possibility of an ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel claim. This argument need not be analyzed because Shackelford failed to actually 
include such a claim in either his Amended Successive Petition or his Resentencing Petition. Thus, even if there 
were merit to the argument, Shackelford cannot pursue it now because he made no such claim in either of the instant 
petitions. Further, it is apparent that he will be barred by Idaho Code section 19-4908 from bringing it in a 
successive petition.