Case Title: New Jersey v. L.H.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2019-07-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the
Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.

                            State v. L.H. (A-59-17) (079974)

Argued March 11, 2019 -- July 22, 2019

ALBIN, J., writing for the Court.

        The primary issue in this appeal is whether the interrogation techniques that
included false promises of leniency induced defendant L.H. to confess to two alleged
sexual assaults and one alleged attempted sexual assault and overbore defendant’s will.
In this context, the Court must determine whether the State proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant’s confession was voluntary.
The Court also considers whether a remand is necessary because, when M.H., a victim,
identified defendant from a photographic lineup, the full dialogue between M.H. and the
administering officer in making the identification was not memorialized.

        Defendant, who was suspected of committing the alleged offenses, was stopped
and brought to the Bloomfield police headquarters on August 6, 2011, at about 2:30 a.m.
After being held for three hours, he was brought to an interview room. For the first fifty-
five minutes, Detective Lieutenant Joseph Krentz and Detective Thomas Fano secured
information from defendant about his education, employment, prior residences, family,
and his reason for driving in Bloomfield that evening. Almost an hour into the
interrogation, Detective Fano told defendant that he had a “problem.” For the next
twenty minutes, while defendant deflected questions that would have implicated him in a
crime, the two detectives suggested that, if defendant cooperated and incriminated
himself, he would receive counseling and help, not go to jail, and remain free to raise his
child. Indeed, defendant was told that the truth would set him free. The detectives’
assurances and suggestions that defendant would receive help and counseling, stay out of
jail, and be there for his daughter if he cooperated were aimed at assuaging the reluctance
defendant repeatedly expressed about giving up the right to remain silent.

        For example, Detective Krentz stated, “I just need to hear your side of the story so
I can find out exactly where you are as far as getting the help you need, the right help.”
Defendant asked, “The help I need is not sending me to jail is it?” Detective Krentz:
“Not at all. Nobody gets rehabilitated in jail.” Detective Fano: “Yeah, I agree.” The
detectives, moreover, continually minimized the nature of the assaults of which defendant
was suspected, telling him, “You’re not a bad guy,” and “You didn’t hurt anybody.”

                                             1
       One hour and fourteen minutes into the interrogation, defendant began to make
admissions about his involvement in the charged offenses. The interrogation ended at
8:51 a.m. -- more than three hours after it had begun. In his testimony at the hearing,
Detective Krentz conceded that “[e]very time [defendant] expressed hesitancy, [the
detectives] talked about the help he was going to get,” and that “it was clear . . . that
'help’ meant counseling.” The trial court rejected defendant’s argument that his will was
overborne by false promises and declined to suppress his confession.

       Defendant also moved for an evidentiary hearing because of the failure of the
police to record, electronically or otherwise, the identification procedure that led to M.H.
identifying defendant as her assailant. During the fourteen earlier identification
procedures, M.H. was unable to make a positive identification of her assailant. On
August 8, 2011, two days after defendant’s arrest, M.H. viewed a fifteenth photographic
array. In the report from that identification, the position of each photograph is given a
sequential number from one to six. Next to photo position number three -- designating
defendant’s photograph -- is the word “SUSPECT.” The report does not explain why the
word “SUSPECT” was used rather than the six-digit number and letter assigned to every
other photograph.

       The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a hearing, and defendant entered
guilty pleas to five counts in the indictment, preserving his right to appeal the denial of
both his motion to suppress his confession and his motion for an evidentiary hearing. In
an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court, vacating
defendant’s convictions and remanding for further proceedings. The Court granted the
State’s petition for certification.  233 N.J. 24 (2018).

HELD: The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, under the totality of
the circumstances, defendant’s statement was voluntary. Defendant may withdraw his
guilty plea. The failure to record the identification procedure as required by Delgado
requires a remand to allow defendant the benefit of a hearing to inquire into the reliability
of the identification and any other remedy deemed appropriate by the trial court.

1. Due process requires that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s
confession was voluntary and was not made because the defendant’s will was overborne.
A confession which is the product of physical or psychological coercion must be
considered to be involuntary and is inadmissible in evidence regardless of its truth or
falsity. The voluntariness determination weighs the coercive psychological pressures
brought to bear on an individual to speak against his power to resist confessing. Relevant
factors include the suspect’s age, education and intelligence, advice concerning
constitutional rights, length of detention, whether the questioning was repeated and
prolonged in nature, and whether physical punishment and mental exhaustion were
involved, as well as previous encounters with law enforcement. The ultimate
determination of voluntariness depends on the totality of the circumstances. (pp. 22-26)
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2. Because a suspect will have a natural reluctance to furnish details implicating himself,
an interrogating officer may attempt to dissipate this reluctance and may even tell some
lies during an interrogation. Certain lies, however, may have the capacity to overbear a
suspect’s will and to render a confession involuntary. Thus, a police officer cannot
directly or by implication tell a suspect that his statements will not be used against him
because to do so is in clear contravention of the Miranda warnings. Other impermissible
lies are false promises of leniency that, under the totality of circumstances, have the
capacity to overbear a suspect’s will. A court may conclude that a defendant’s
confession was involuntary if interrogating officers extended a promise so enticing as to
induce that confession. (pp. 26-30)

3. The video-recorded interrogation here reveals that the detectives made (1)
representations that directly conflicted with the Miranda warnings, (2) promises of
leniency by offering counseling as a substitute for jail, and (3) statements that minimized
the seriousness of the crimes under investigation -- all relevant factors under the totality-
of-the-circumstances test. In the totality of the circumstances, given the combination of
all the relevant evidence and factors, the State failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt
that the interrogators’ representations to defendant did not overbear his will and induce
him to confess. The detectives secured an involuntary confession. Because defendant
preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the confession,
defendant’s guilty plea must be vacated. (pp. 30-39)

4. In State v. Delgado, the Court required that “law enforcement officers make a written
record detailing the out-of-court identification procedure, including the place where the
procedure was conducted, the dialogue between the witness and the interlocutor, and the
results.”  188 N.J. 48, 63 (2006). The Court instructed that “[w]hen feasible, a verbatim
account of any exchange between the law enforcement officer and witness should be
reduced to writing,” and “[w]hen not feasible, a detailed summary of the identification
should be prepared.” Ibid. Without issuing a mandate, the Court added that “electronic
recordation is advisable.” Ibid. (pp. 39-40)

5. Here, Detective Michael Ruggiero, who administered the photographic array, did not
electronically record the identification procedure or make a “verbatim account” of the
words exchanged between him and the witness. Nor is there any explanation why he did
not do so. The failure to abide by the dictates of Delgado is all the more inexplicable
because the identification procedure was prearranged and occurred during normal
operating hours at police headquarters, where undoubtedly electronic recording devices
were available. The evidentiary hearing requested by defendant would have provided
defendant the opportunity to attempt to secure the information denied to him by the
Delgado violation. Accordingly, the Court remands for an evidentiary hearing to explore
the issue of suggestiveness in the identification process and for the determination of an
appropriate remedy for the Delgado violation, which may include a jury charge on the
State’s failure to follow the recordation procedures set forth in Delgado. (pp. 40-43)
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       The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.

        JUSTICE PATTERSON, concurring in part and dissenting in part, concurs
with the majority and the Appellate Division that the procedure used by police officers in
connection with defendant’s identification by M.H. did not comport with Delgado and
that a remand is needed so that the trial court may decide whether the identification
procedure entailed suggestiveness and, if necessary, impose an appropriate remedy.
Justice Patterson does not agree, however, that defendant’s confession should be
suppressed, stressing that the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress after it
reviewed the videotape of defendant’s confession and other evidence presented, made
detailed factual findings, and concluded that the State had met its burden to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary. In Justice Patterson’s view, neither
the Appellate Division nor the majority afforded the trial court’s findings the substantial
deference to which they are entitled. Although a portion of the interrogation crossed the
line between proper and improper police tactics, Justice Patterson explains, the trial
court’s finding that defendant’s confession was voluntary was supported by sufficient
credible evidence in the record, including the videotape.

JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE
ALBIN’s opinion. JUSTICE PATTERSON filed an opinion -- concurring in the
remand for an evidentiary hearing as to the identification procedure and dissenting
from the suppression of defendant’s confession -- in which CHIEF JUSTICE
RABNER and JUSTICE SOLOMON join.

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       SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
           A-
59 September Term 2017
                    079974

                 State of New Jersey,

                 Plaintiff-Appellant,

                          v.

                        L.H.,

               Defendant-Respondent.

        On certification to the Superior Court,
                  Appellate Division.

      Argued                         Decided
   March 11, 2019                 July 22, 2019

Kayla Elizabeth Rowe, Deputy Attorney General, argued
the cause for appellant (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
General, attorney; Kayla Elizabeth Rowe, of counsel and
on the briefs).

Alicia J. Hubbard, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora,
Public Defender, attorney; Alicia J. Hubbard, of counsel
and on the briefs).

Farbod K. Faraji argued the cause for amicus curiae
American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Gibbons,
and American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey
Foundation, attorneys; Farbod K. Faraji, Lawrence S.
Lustberg, and Alexander Shalom, on the brief).

Richard P. Lomurro argued the cause for amicus curiae
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey

                          1
            (Lomurro, Munson, Comer, Brown & Schottland,
            attorneys; Richard P. Lomurro, of counsel and Christina
            Vassiliou Harvey, of counsel and on the brief).

             JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court.

      No piece of evidence may have greater sway over a jury than a

defendant’s confession. For that reason, it is of critical importance that law

enforcement officers use interrogation techniques that will elicit confessions

by lawful means.

      To ensure that law enforcement officers turn square corners, New

Jersey’s jurisprudence requires that the State “prove the voluntariness of a

confession beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Galloway,  133 N.J. 631, 654

(1993). In their gatekeeping roles, our courts are charged with admitting into

evidence only lawfully secured confessions. False promises of leniency --

promises “so enticing” that they induce a suspect to confess -- have the

capacity to overbear a suspect’s will and to render the confession involuntary

and inadmissible. See State v. Hreha,  217 N.J. 368, 383 (2014).

      The primary issue in this appeal is whether the interrogation techniques

that induced defendant L.H. to confess crossed the forbidden line drawn by our

case law.

                                        2
       In this case, the police took defendant into custody on suspicion that he

had sexually assaulted two women and attempted to sexually assault another

woman. During an interrogation that lasted approximately three hours, the two

interrogating detectives repeatedly promised defendant counseling, indicating

that he would not go to jail if he cooperated. The detectives also told

defendant that “the truth would set him free” -- advice seemingly at odds with

the Miranda 1 warning given to defendant that anything he said could be used

against him. More than an hour into the interrogation, defendant made

incriminating statements that implicated him in all three crimes. He was

arrested and criminally charged.

       Two days later, one of the victims, while viewing a photographic lineup,

identified defendant as her assailant. The officer conducting the identification

did not record the full dialogue between him and the victim, or the degree of

confidence expressed by the victim in making the identification. Defendant

claimed that the failure to memorialize the identification procedure violated

State v. Delgado,  188 N.J. 48 (2006).

       In pretrial hearings, the trial court determined that defendant’s

confession and the victim’s identification were admissible. The court

determined that the interrogating detectives did not overbear defendant’s will

1
    Miranda v. Arizona,