Case Title: Matter of Patch

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-10-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matter of Patch1990 WY 113798 P.2d 839Case Number: 90-50Decided: 10/15/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF JAMES F. PATCH, 

AN EMPLOYEE OF WYOMING 
LIQUOR COMMISSION. 

STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. 
WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION,

APPELLANT 
(OBJECTOR-RESPONDENT),

v.

JAMES F. 
PATCH,

APPELLEE 
(EMPLOYEE-PETITIONER).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, J.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Robert A. Nicholas, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Larry Donovan, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., argued, for appellant.

George Santini, 
argued, of Graves, Santini & Villemez, Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J.*, and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, 
MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

CARDINE, Justice.

[¶1]      James Patch 
suffered a back injury while working at the Wyoming Liquor Commission 
(commission) warehouse. He was denied worker's compensation benefits by the 
administrative hearing examiner. The district court overruled the hearing 
examiner, finding Patch was a covered employee and awarded him worker's 
compensation benefits.

[¶2]      We affirm the 
decision of the district court.

[¶3]      Appellant Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Division frames the issue as:

"Whether the district 
court's decision overruling the administrative law judge is contrary to 
law."

[¶4]      By statute, the 
Wyoming Liquor Commission is the exclusive wholesale distributor and seller of 
alcoholic liquor within the state. W.S. 12-2-301. It purchases liquor at 
wholesale, stocks the liquor in its warehouse in Cheyenne, and sells it at a 
profit to licensed retail outlets. See W.S. 12-2-303. Patch, a liquor commission 
warehouse employee, hurt his back on April 7, 1988, while unloading, by hand, a 
shipment of liquor from a semi-trailer.

[¶5]      The Wyoming 
Liquor Commission and the Worker's Compensation Division objected to Patch being 
awarded benefits, claiming he was not a covered employee because his occupation 
was not extrahazardous nor had the commission elected to have him covered under 
worker's compensation. See W.S. 27-14-103 (June 1987 Repl.). The claim for 
worker's compensation benefits was heard by the office of administrative 
hearings. See W.S. 27-14-601 through -603 (June 1987 Repl.). The hearing officer 
found Patch was not covered because of a May 4, 1984 letter from the principal 
compliance officer of the Worker's Compensation Division to the liquor 
commission stating that the commission's clerical and warehouse workers were not 
covered employees and because the work done at the commission warehouse did not 
fit the statutory definition of "warehousing."

[¶6]      On petition for 
review, the district court reversed the hearing examiner's determination. The 
court reasoned that the liquor commission's warehouse operation, due to its 
unique arrangement of wholesaler selling liquor to a retailer, fit sufficiently 
into the definition of "warehousing" as contained in W.S. 27-14-103(f)(x). The 
court concluded that if Patch had been employed by a private employer, he would 
be entitled to worker's compensation benefits. The court held that under W.S. 
27-14-103(c), as a state employee engaged in an extrahazardous occupation, he 
was covered.

[¶7]      Disposition of 
this case depends on whether the work for which Patch was employed fell under 
one of the classifications of extrahazardous employment.1 Wyoming Statute 27-14-103(a) 
includes "warehousing" in a lengthy list of occupations which are 
extrahazardous. The Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act defines the term 
"warehousing" as

"an operation which 
principally stores for hire goods belonging to other persons, and does 
not include the storage of goods belonging to the operator of the business when 
the storage is incidental to the sale of the goods to their ultimate 
consumer[.]" W.S. 27-14-103(f)(x) (emphasis added).

Our task is to 
determine the meaning of "warehousing" in the context of the Worker's 
Compensation Act and to determine whether the job Patch performed fell within 
that category.

[¶8]      A statute must be 
viewed in terms of its object and purpose. Halliburton Co. v. McAdams, Roux and 
Associates, 773 P.2d 153, 155 (Wyo. 1989). The Worker's Compensation Act merits 
a liberal construction in favor of the worker whenever possible, so that the 
legislative goals that obviously are intended may be accomplished. Seckman v. 
Wyo-Ben, Inc., 783 P.2d 161, 165 (Wyo. 1989). The purpose of worker's 
compensation is to provide social insurance to victims of industrial accidents 
so that the employee can recover for injuries without proof of fault on the part 
of the employer. Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1353 (Wyo. 1981). Every word 
in a statute must be given meaning. Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow Committee, 
651 P.2d 778, 787 (Wyo. 1982).

[¶9]      The legislature 
added the "warehousing" definition when it recodified the Worker's Compensation 
Act in 1975. 1975 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 149. The first part of the definition is 
qualified by word "principally." The second part of the definition excludes from 
warehousing goods stored by the owner for sale to the ultimate consumer. If the 
second part of the definition were intended to exclude all warehouses operated 
by owners of goods, then the phrase "when the storage is incidental to the sale 
of the goods to their ultimate consumer" would be surplusage. We conclude that 
definition was intended to exclude the storage areas of retail outlets, such as 
grocery stores, pharmacies and the like, without excluding other storage 
operations such as where the operator-wholesaler owns the goods being stored and 
the storage is incidental to a sale to a retailer. Cf. Kelley v. Risenhoover, 
470 P.2d 334, 336 (Okla. 1970). Since the storage of goods at the commission's 
warehouse is incidental to their sale to a retailer who is not the ultimate 
consumer, we hold that the commission is engaged in the extrahazardous 
occupation of "warehousing" within the Worker's Compensation Act.

[¶10]   Unless specifically defined by the 
legislature, the enumerated types of extrahazardous occupations or employees are 
to embrace jobs that reasonably and liberally fit a description. In re Gimlin, 
403 P.2d 178, 181 (Wyo. 1965). The fit here is not unlike the fit in Gimlin 
where the employee was killed piloting a plane with a passenger hunting for 
coyotes. Id. at 180. Fremont County paid for this service. Id. We held that the 
pilot fit under the extrahazardous occupation of "county trapper." Id. at 181. 
See W.S. 27-14-103(a)(xxix) and W.S. 27-57(A) (1957).

[¶11]   We distinguish this case with 
Randell v. Wyoming State Treasurer, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Comp.Div., 671 P.2d 303 (Wyo. 1983). In Randell, the executive director of the Wyoming State Board 
of Nursing was denied worker's compensation benefits because the statutory 
functions of the Board of Nursing were administrative and not those of an 
extrahazardous occupation. Id. at 308. The same cannot be said of the Wyoming 
Liquor Commission. Although the commission does have some administrative 
functions, the commission also has the statutory function of purchasing liquor 
at wholesale and selling it at a profit to licensed retail outlets. W.S. 
12-2-301 through -306. The holding in Randell has no application 
here.

[¶12]   By holding that Patch is entitled 
to benefits as a covered employee, we are not ignoring the May 1984 division 
determination that liquor commission warehouse employees are not covered. We 
normally accord some weight to the construction of a statute by an 
administrative agency unless the agency's construction is clearly erroneous. 
Town of Pine Bluffs v. State Bd. of Control, 647 P.2d 1365, 1367 (Wyo. 1982). 
Greater weight will also be accorded if the legislature has failed to change the 
statute over a long period of time especially when legislative knowledge may be 
implied by virtue of the promulgation of written regulations. Id. See also In re 
Roby, 54 Wyo. 439, 93 P.2d 940 (1939). No reason or analysis of the statute is 
given for the conclusion drawn in the May 1984 letter. The record contains no 
evidence that the conclusion in the letter was promulgated in a regulation. 
Furthermore, the legislature has acted recently to amend W.S. 27-14-103 to 
include the affirmative statement that "[a]ll employees of the Wyoming liquor 
commission" are covered under the Worker's Compensation Act. W.S. 
27-14-103(b)(xii) (1990 Cum.Supp.) (emphasis added). Thus, the legislature 
disagreed with the division's conclusion that some liquor commission employees 
were not covered. We hold the commission's conclusion in the May 1984 letter to 
be clearly erroneous for the reasons set out above. The decision of the district 
court granting benefits to appellee is

[¶13]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Wyoming is presently the 
only state where a distinction between hazardous and nonhazardous employment is 
relevant in determining whether an employee qualifies for benefits. 1C, A. 
Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 55 (1990).