Case Title: State v. Jackson

Citation: 2010-Ohio-621

Docket Number: 20081499

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Jackson, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-621.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-621 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE, v. JACKSON, 
APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Jackson, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-621.] 
In a criminal proceeding against a public employee, the state may not make direct 
or derivative use of the employee’s statement that was compelled under 
threat of the employee’s removal from office (“Garrity statement”) — The 
state makes derivative use of a Garrity statement when the prosecutor 
presents to the grand jury testimony from a witness to a Garrity statement 
— The state makes derivative use of a Garrity statement when the 
prosecutor reviews a Garrity statement in preparation for trial — When 
the state fails to prove that it did not make any use of a Garrity statement 
in obtaining an indictment, the indictment must be dismissed. 
(No. 2008-1499 — Submitted September 29, 2009 — Decided March 3, 2010.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County,  
No. 2007CA00274, 2008-Ohio-2944. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} This case concerns a public employee’s statement given during an 
internal investigation under the threat of the employee’s termination from office, a 
so-called “Garrity statement.”  Garrity v. New Jersey (1967), 385 U.S. 493, 87 
S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562.  We are asked to determine whether the Garrity 
statement was “used” by the state in a later prosecution of the public employee 
and, if so, the consequences of such use. 
I.  Case Background 
{¶ 2} Anthony 
Jackson, 
appellee 
and 
cross-appellant, 
was 
on 
administrative leave from the Canton Police Department when he was involved in 
an incident that eventually led to his indictment for possession of a firearm in a 
bar.  On May 30, 2006, Sergeant Jon Roethlisberger of the Perry Township Police 
Department responded to a call that there was a fight at Lew’s Tavern in Perry 
Township.  Jackson and another person were involved, but neither wished to 
pursue criminal charges.  While talking to a bar patron on the night of the 
incident, Roethlisberger learned that Jackson had possessed a firearm inside the 
tavern. 
{¶ 3} Lieutenant David Davis investigated the incident on behalf of the 
Canton Police Department’s Internal Affairs Unit.  As part of this internal 
investigation, Davis ordered Jackson to submit to an interview and make a 
statement.  Davis gave Jackson a document titled “Garrity Warning” before this 
interview.  The warning stated:   
{¶ 4} “This questioning concerns administrative matters relating to the 
official business of the Canton Police Department.  During the course of this 
questioning, if you disclose information which indicates that you may be guilty of 
criminal conduct, neither your self-incriminating statements nor the fruits of any 
self-incriminating statements you make will be used against you in any criminal 
legal proceedings.  Since this is an administrative matter and any self-
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incriminating information you may disclose will not be used against you in a 
court of law, you are required to answer my questions fully and truthfully. * * *  
If you refuse to answer all my questions, this in itself is a violation of the rules 
and procedures of the department, and you will be subject to separate disciplinary 
action.” 
{¶ 5} In other words, the police department assured Jackson that neither 
his statement nor its “fruits” would be used later in any criminal proceeding. 
{¶ 6} Jackson gave detailed answers to questions regarding the May 30, 
2006 Lew’s Tavern incident (the “Garrity statement”).  He also disclosed the 
name of a potential witness, Vince Van.  The state acknowledges that no one 
connected to the investigation had previously been aware that a person named 
Vince Van was a potential witness.  After Jackson answered Davis’s questions, 
Davis continued to investigate by interviewing Van. 
{¶ 7} Both Roethlisberger and Davis testified before a grand jury on 
August 10, 2006.  The grand jury testimony, which the trial court ordered be 
included under seal as part of the record, reveals that Davis testified on the 
propriety of an officer’s carrying a firearm while on administrative leave and on 
the implications of administrative leave in general.  When Davis was asked 
whether he had spoken to Jackson about the incident, he acknowledged the 
existence of Jackson’s Garrity statement, but declined to divulge its contents.  
The grand jury returned an indictment against Jackson for possession of a firearm 
in a D-permit liquor establishment in violation of R.C. 2923.121(A). 
{¶ 8} It is not clear from the record whether the indicting prosecutor 
obtained a copy of Jackson’s Garrity statement before the indictment was 
returned, but the trial prosecutor, who was not the same person as the indicting 
prosecutor, acknowledged that he had obtained a copy of this statement sometime 
between July 24 and September 20, 2006. 
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{¶ 9} Jackson filed a motion to dismiss,1 arguing that the state had 
improperly used the fruits of his Garrity statement.  The trial court held that 
Davis’s testimony before the grand jury violated Jackson’s Fifth Amendment 
rights pursuant to Garrity, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562, because 
Davis had knowledge of Jackson’s compelled statements.  The court therefore 
dismissed the indictment. 
{¶ 10} The Fifth District Court of Appeals agreed that Jackson’s Fifth 
Amendment rights had been violated.  State v. Jackson, 5th Dist. No. 
2007CA00274, 2008-Ohio-2944, ¶ 31. However, the court of appeals reversed the 
portion of the trial court opinion that dismissed the indictment, and held that 
Jackson’s Garrity statement was not used to obtain the indictment but was used 
by the trial prosecutor after indictment.  Id. at ¶ 35. The court also held that the 
proper remedy for the Garrity violation was to purge the prosecutor’s files of the 
internal-affairs file, including the Garrity statement, and try the case with a new 
prosecutor.  Id. at ¶ 37. 
{¶ 11} We accepted jurisdiction over the state’s appeal on the following 
proposition of law:  “When a public employer compels an employee to give a 
statement under threat of removal from office, Garrity * * * prohibits the direct or 
derivative use of the statement in a subsequent criminal trial, but it does not 
prohibit a prosecutor’s knowledge, or ‘non-evidentiary’ use of it.”  We also 
accepted jurisdiction over Jackson’s cross-appeal on the following proposition of 
law:  “When a public employer compels an employee to give a statement under 
threat of removal from office, and then subsequently provides that statement to 
the prosecuting attorney who is pursuing a criminal conviction against the 
employee, State v. Conrad (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 1, 552 N.E.2d 214, requires 
                                                 
1.  Although the trial court noted that motions to dismiss are not permitted in criminal cases, it 
nevertheless treated the motion as one which may be considered under Crim.R. 12(C).   
 
January Term, 2010 
 
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dismissal of the case unless the prosecuting attorney can establish that the state 
has not made any use of the [Garrity statement] and that all of the evidence to be 
used at trial was derived from sources wholly independent of that [Garrity 
statement].”  In other words, we are asked to (1) define the meaning of “use” for 
Garrity purposes and (2) clarify the remedy for a Garrity violation. 
II. Legal Analysis 
{¶ 12} Statements such as Jackson’s Garrity statement are compelled 
statements and are subject to the constitutional protections of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.2  
A.  Garrity v. New Jersey and Kastigar v. United States 
{¶ 13} In Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 
562, police officers being investigated for criminal activity were given a choice to 
either answer the questions asked during the internal investigation or forfeit their 
jobs.  The officers chose to answer questions.  Later, some of their answers were 
used against them in criminal proceedings.  The United States Supreme Court 
held that the officers’ confessions had been compelled because they were given 
the choice between forfeiting their jobs and incriminating themselves.  Id. at 496-
498.  The court held that the protection against self-incrimination prohibits use in 
later criminal proceedings of statements made under threat of removal from 
office.  Id. at 499-500. 
{¶ 14} Five years later, the United States Supreme Court held that when a 
person is granted immunity to compel his or her testimony, that testimony and any 
evidence derived from it cannot be used against the declarant in a later criminal 
proceeding.  Kastigar v. United States (1972), 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 
                                                 
2.  The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, “No person * * * shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself * * *.”  The Fifth Amendment 
applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Ohio Constitution similarly provides, 
“No person shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself.”  Section 10, 
Article I, Ohio Constitution.  
 
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L.Ed.2d 212.  The court explained that full transactional immunity for crimes 
discussed in a compelled statement is broader than that which is required by the 
Fifth Amendment.  However, to be commensurate with the Fifth Amendment, the 
immunity must prohibit both “use” and “derivative use” of a compelled statement.  
“[A grant of immunity] prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using the 
compelled testimony in any respect, and it therefore insures that the testimony 
cannot lead to the infliction of criminal penalties on the witness.”  Kastigar at 
453.  In a criminal proceeding against a public employee, the state may not make 
direct or derivative use of an employee’s statement that was compelled under 
threat of the employee’s removal from office. 
B.  Use of Compelled Statements 
{¶ 15} The trial court in this case wrestled with the implications of the 
Kastigar holding: “The Kastigar decision seems straightforward enough when we 
are determining whether the government has ‘used’ immunized testimony as 
direct evidence in a case.  But what does the term ‘derivative use’ mean; what 
does the court mean when it says ‘barring the use of compelled testimony as an 
investigatory lead’ * * * [?]”   
{¶ 16} The federal courts have not consistently interpreted Kastigar 
regarding nonevidentiary use of a compelled statement.  Compare, e.g., United 
States v. McDaniel (C.A.8, 1973), 482 F.2d 305 (requiring the government to 
show no nonevidentiary use of compelled statement to which prosecutor had had 
access) with United States v. Byrd (C.A.11, 1985), 765 F.2d 1524, and United 
States v. Mariani (C.A.2, 1988), 851 F.2d 595 (declining to hold that prosecutors’ 
access to compelled statement required government to prove no nonevidentiary 
use). 
{¶ 17} Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion 
that the protection offered by immunity is limited to direct use of the statement 
itself:  “It has * *  * long been settled that [the Fifth Amendment’s] protection 
January Term, 2010 
 
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encompasses compelled statements that lead to the discovery of incriminating 
evidence even though the statements themselves are not incriminating and are not 
introduced into evidence.”  United States v. Hubbell (2000), 530 U.S. 27, 37, 120 
S.Ct. 2037, 147 L.Ed.2d 24.  Cases decided since Garrity, such as Kastigar and 
Hubbell, demonstrate that the “use” against which Garrity protects is broad, 
encompassing evidentiary and nonevidentiary use of any compelled statement. 
{¶ 18} In Jackson’s case, we must determine whether the state has met its 
Kastigar burden.  “[T]he Kastigar court established a two-prong test that the 
prosecution must satisfy where a witness makes the claim that his or her 
immunized testimony was used: (1) the government must deny any use of the 
accused’s own immunized testimony against him or her in a criminal case; and (2) 
the government must affirmatively prove that all of the evidence to be used at trial 
is derived from sources wholly independent of immunized testimony.”  (Emphasis 
sic.)  State v. Conrad (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 552 N.E.2d 214. 
1.  The Use of a Garrity Statement Before Indictment 
{¶ 19} The state argues that Jackson’s Garrity statement was not used in 
any way at the indictment phase.  It contends that although Jackson’s statement 
had disclosed the name of a previously unknown witness, the witness was never 
mentioned to the grand jury and Davis explicitly declined to discuss the content of 
Jackson’s statement.  The state also notes that it is not clear that the prosecutor 
even had access to the internal investigatory statement before the indictment was 
obtained. 
{¶ 20} Jackson argues that because Davis was present during the making 
of the Garrity statement and afterward became a witness before the grand jury, 
the statement was used to obtain the indictment.  We agree.  It is not the extent of 
the prosecutor’s own knowledge of the contents of the Garrity statement that 
creates the problem here.  The prosecutor chose to offer the testimony of the 
internal investigating officer who knew the substance of Jackson’s Garrity 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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statement and who used the statement to further his own internal investigation.  
As the trial court explained: “It is not the direct evidence that is of concern.  It is 
the ‘derivative use’ or the ‘non-evidentiary use’ of that information which poses a 
problem in this matter.”  The state makes derivative use of a Garrity statement 
when the prosecutor presents to the grand jury testimony from a witness to the 
statement. We agree with the trial court’s determination that Davis’s testimony 
before the grand jury constituted derivative use of Jackson’s statement by the state 
in violation of Garrity. 
{¶ 21} When Jackson claimed that his immunized testimony was used in 
violation of his constitutional rights, it was the state’s burden to satisfy both 
prongs of the Kastigar test: first, to deny that it had made any use of his 
immunized testimony, and second, to affirmatively prove that all the evidence to 
be used at trial was derived from wholly independent sources.  Although at the 
Kastigar hearing the state denied that it had used Jackson’s statement, the state 
did not address its derivative use of the statement by presenting to the grand jury 
the testimony of Davis, who witnessed the Garrity statement.  Nor did the state 
affirmatively prove that it could have learned of Vince Van’s existence or the 
contents of his statement from independent sources.  The trial court emphasized 
the lack of information introduced at the Kastigar hearing concerning the conduct 
of the prosecutors: “[T]here was no testimony as to the interaction, if any, 
between the grand jury prosecutor and Lt. Davis; interaction between the grand 
jury prosecutor and the trial prosecutor, if any, interaction between Lt. Davis and 
the trial prosecutor, if any; nor when the Internal Affairs investigative file was 
received by the prosecutor, who read it and what they read.”  We therefore hold 
that the state has not met either prong of the Kastigar test. 
2.  The Use of a Garrity Statement During Trial Preparation 
{¶ 22} The state argues that Jackson’s statement was not used in any 
respect in preparing for trial.  Vince Van, who was disclosed as a possible witness 
January Term, 2010 
 
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only in Jackson’s Garrity statement, was not on the state’s list of potential 
witnesses.  Although the trial prosecutor acknowledges having had a copy of the 
statement, the state argues that mere fact that the prosecutor had knowledge of the 
contents of the statement does not mean that the state improperly “used” the 
statement. 
{¶ 23} Jackson emphasizes that the prosecutor not only admitted to 
having a copy of the statement, but also acknowledged that he “had the benefit of 
Internal Affairs reports for the purposes of pretrial preparation.” 
{¶ 24} We share the concern of the trial court and court of appeals that the 
prosecutor, who admitted having reviewed Jackson’s Garrity statement, was 
afforded an impermissible advantage in trial preparation.  A defendant’s version 
of events provides the prosecutor with invaluable information, including the 
names of witnesses, potential defenses, and other information that could influence 
trial strategy.  In other words, the prosecutor possessed the type of information 
that the United States Supreme Court was most concerned with in Kastigar.  The 
state makes derivative use of a Garrity statement when the prosecutor reviews the 
statement in preparation for trial. 
{¶ 25} The state did have the opportunity to deny having used Jackson’s 
Garrity statement.  Nevertheless, as discussed above, the state did not 
affirmatively prove that all of the evidence to be used at trial was derived from 
wholly independent sources.  We therefore hold that the prosecutor’s possession 
of Jackson’s Garrity statement during trial preparation constituted an improper 
use within the meaning of Garrity.  In summary, we hold that the state makes 
derivative use of a Garrity statement both when the prosecutor presents to the 
grand jury testimony from a witness to a Garrity statement and when the 
prosecutor reviews a Garrity statement in preparation for trial. 
{¶ 26} The prosecutor’s use of the statement during trial preparation not 
only violated Jackson’s constitutional rights, but also revealed that the police 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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department broke its promise to Jackson that neither the statement nor the “fruits” 
of the statement would be used in a later criminal proceeding.  When such a 
promise has been made to a public employee, the public employer should not 
provide the prosecutor with the compelled statement.  When the state is free to 
review a Garrity statement, the public employer cannot ensure that the statement 
will not be used directly or derivatively.  The public employer may run a risk of a 
lawsuit if it turns over a Garrity statement to prosecutors, for the Sixth Circuit 
recently held in McKinley v. Mansfield (C.A.6, 2005), 404 F.3d 418, that police 
officers who turn over another officer’s compelled statement to a prosecutor can 
be held liable for violating the officer’s constitutional rights.  Id. at 436-439. 
{¶ 27} Although the issue of liability for turning over a compelled 
statement is not before us, we note that a public employer can ensure that it does 
not violate the defendant’s right against self-incrimination only by refraining from 
providing a compelled statement to the prosecutor when a criminal proceeding 
ensues.  A bright-line prohibition against providing a compelled statement to a 
prosecutor is both workable and practical.  First, because a prosecutor is not 
permitted to make any use of a compelled statement, denying the prosecutor the 
opportunity to view the statement will not hinder the prosecutor’s ability to 
prepare for trial.  Second, when a defendant cannot allege that the prosecutor has 
made use of the statement, there is no need to conduct a time-consuming Kastigar 
hearing.  Finally, when there is no threat that a prosecutor will eventually see the 
contents of a compelled statement, public employees will be more willing to 
comply with internal investigations. 
{¶ 28} The argument that denying prosecutors access to compelled 
statements will cause them to violate their constitutional obligation to reveal 
exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 
1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, is not well taken.  Any Garrity statement made during an 
January Term, 2010 
 
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internal investigation is by definition made by the defendant, who already has 
knowledge of its contents. 
C.  The Remedy for a Garrity Violation 
1.  For a Violation Before Indictment 
{¶ 29} In State v. Conrad, 50 Ohio St.3d 1, 552 N.E.2d 214, the 
prosecutor’s use of a compelled statement was found to have tainted the 
defendant’s indictment.  We held that “whenever compelled testimony is used 
against the witness who provided it, any error cannot be held harmless.”  Id. at 5.  
We therefore remanded the case for dismissal of the indictment.  In this case, 
Jackson’s statement was also used to obtain the indictment.  Therefore, the trial 
court has correctly determined that dismissal is the appropriate remedy.  When the 
state fails to prove that it did not make any use of a Garrity statement in obtaining 
an indictment, the indictment must be dismissed. 
{¶ 30} The state has argued that when a police department assigns the 
same person to both the criminal investigation and the internal investigation 
(which it claims is often necessary in small departments), our holding that the 
state makes derivative use of a Garrity statement when the prosecutor presents 
testimony to the grand jury from a Garrity-statement witness requires the 
department to choose between a criminal prosecution and an internal 
investigation.  However, a police department can always assign the internal 
investigation of a police officer to an officer who has not taken part in and will 
not take part in the criminal investigation.  In the alternative, a police department 
can simply wait until the conclusion of criminal proceedings before conducting an 
internal investigation. 
2.  For a Violation During Trial Preparation 
{¶ 31} The court of appeals held that the appropriate remedy for a Garrity 
violation after indictment was to purge the compelled statement from the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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prosecutor’s file and to appoint a replacement prosecutor to try the case.  State v. 
Jackson, 2008-Ohio-2944, ¶ 37.  We find this solution unnecessary. 
{¶ 32} Kastigar held that the proscription against using a defendant’s 
compelled statement is analogous to the proscription against using a defendant’s 
coerced confession.  Kastigar, 385 U.S. at 461, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562.  A 
coerced confession is inadmissible in a criminal trial, but does not bar 
prosecution.  Id. If a court rules that a confession was coerced in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment, the confession must be suppressed.  State v. Robinson (1990), 
67 Ohio App.3d 743, 745, 588 N.E.2d 876, citing Colorado v. Connelly (1986), 
479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473.  Likewise, when a trial court rules 
after a Kastigar hearing that a prosecutor has used the defendant’s compelled 
statement in preparation for trial after indictment, the appropriate remedy is for 
the trial court to suppress that statement and all evidence derived from the 
statement. 
{¶ 33} We acknowledge that a trial court will be unable to fully suppress 
all impermissible knowledge gained by a prosecutor who reviews a Garrity 
statement.  However, just as the exclusionary rule operates to discourage 
compelled confessions, which may provide the state with information otherwise 
unobtainable, suppression of a Garrity statement and its derivative evidence will 
discourage use of the statement in violation of the employee’s Fifth Amendment 
rights. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 34} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the state failed to meet its 
burden to show that it did not use Jackson’s Garrity statement either before the 
grand jury or during trial preparation.  Because the state did not meet its burden 
with respect to the indictment, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals 
and reinstate the judgment of the trial court dismissing the indictment. 
Judgment reversed. 
January Term, 2010 
 
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MOYER, C.J., and O’CONNOR, J., concur. 
 
PFEIFER and O’DONNELL, JJ, concur separately. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and CUPP, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurring. 
{¶ 35} I concur in the majority’s judgment that based upon the facts of 
this case, the state cannot demonstrate compliance with either Kastigar v. United 
States (1972), 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212, or Garrity v. New 
Jersey (1967), 385 U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562.  However, I write 
separately to emphasize that the state cannot use any information directly or 
indirectly derived from a Garrity statement in a criminal proceeding against the 
public employee who made the statement unless the state denies any use of the 
immunized testimony and also affirmatively proves an independent, legitimate 
source for all of the evidence to be introduced at trial.  In my view, if a prosecutor 
has reviewed a defendant’s Garrity statement before trial and fails to carry the 
burden to establish an independent source for the evidence, the only appropriate 
remedy is dismissal of the indictment. 
{¶ 36} In Garrity, the Supreme Court of the United States held that “the 
protection of the individual under the Fourteenth Amendment against coerced 
statements prohibits use in subsequent criminal proceedings of statements 
obtained under threat of removal from office, and that [the protection] extends to 
all, whether they are policemen or other members of our body politic.”  Garrity, 
385 U.S. at 500, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562.  In Kastigar, the court explained 
that the immunity used to compel such testimony is “coextensive with the scope 
of the privilege against self-incrimination,” and that it prohibits not only the use 
of compelled testimony, but also the use of any “evidence derived directly and 
indirectly therefrom.” Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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In sum, the court concluded that the grant of immunity prohibits the prosecution 
“from using the compelled testimony in any respect.”  Id. 
{¶ 37} To enforce the prohibition against the use of compelled testimony, 
the court reaffirmed the rule set forth in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm. of New 
York Harbor (1964), 378 U.S. 52, 79, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678, fn. 18, 
when it imposed an affirmative burden upon the state to demonstrate that its 
evidence was not tainted, by requiring the state to establish an independent, 
legitimate source for the disputed evidence.  Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460, 92 S.Ct. 
1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212.  The court emphasized, “This burden of proof, which we 
reaffirm as appropriate, is not limited to a negation of taint; rather, it imposes on 
the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to use 
is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled 
testimony.”  Id. at 460.  The court recognized that its holding placed a “heavy 
burden” on the government to demonstrate that it obtained all of its evidence from 
independent sources, thereby placing a defendant facing incriminating evidence 
obtained through a grant of immunity in a stronger position than a defendant 
asserting a Fifth Amendment claim related to a coerced confession.  Id. at 461. 
{¶ 38} In State v. Conrad (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 552 N.E.2d 214, this 
court applied Kastigar and held that when an accused asserts that the state has 
used evidence from a Garrity statement:  “(1) the government must deny any use 
of the accused’s own immunized testimony against him or her in a criminal case; 
and (2) the government must affirmatively prove that all of the evidence to be 
used at trial is derived from sources wholly independent of immunized 
testimony.”  (Emphasis sic.)   
{¶ 39} As the majority acknowledges, a defendant’s Garrity statement 
may provide a prosecutor with information that could lead to the discovery of 
additional evidence or witnesses for trial.  But regardless of the evidentiary 
consequences, information about the defendant’s theory of the case and 
January Term, 2010 
 
15 
 
knowledge of the defendant’s own version of the events give the prosecutor an 
unfair advantage in conducting an investigation and planning trial strategy.  
Kastigar and Conrad seek to eliminate both the direct and indirect use of 
information obtained in violation of a defendant’s constitutional right against self-
incrimination by broadly proscribing any use of a defendant’s compelled 
statement. Because knowledge of the information contained in a Garrity 
statement may imperceptibly influence a prosecutor’s view of a case, the 
government cannot plausibly deny any use of a defendant’s compelled statement 
when the prosecutor has read it before trial.  Therefore, I would hold that when a 
prosecutor has reviewed a defendant’s Garrity statement before trial and fails to 
establish an independent source for the evidence to be used at trial, dismissal of 
the indictment rather than suppression of the evidence is the appropriate remedy. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 40} Kastigar v. United States (1972), 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 
L.Ed.2d 212, requires a prosecutor to prove that the material the prosecutor 
proposes to use as evidence against the defendant came from a source 
independent of the defendant’s compelled statements.  Because I do not share the 
majority’s view that the state’s using Lt. Davis, who was present when Jackson 
gave his compelled statement, as a grand jury witness constituted derivative use 
of Jackson’s statement under Kastigar, I dissent from the majority’s holding that 
the indictment in this case must be dismissed. See United States v. Byrd (C.A.11, 
1985), 765 F.2d 1524, 1529 (“The government is not required to negate all 
abstract ‘possibility’ of taint”). 
{¶ 41} The court of appeals concluded that Jackson’s compelled statement 
was not used to obtain the indictment. The record supports that conclusion. When 
Lt. Davis was asked about Jackson’s statement during the grand jury proceedings, 
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he declined to answer. By contrast, in State v. Conrad (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 1, 4-
5, 552 N.E.2d 214, this court held that the indictment had to be dismissed because 
the prosecutor had used the defendant’s compelled statement to impeach her 
testimony before the grand jury. 
{¶ 42} The majority expresses concern that the prosecutor, who possessed 
and had reviewed Jackson’s compelled statement, was given an impermissible 
advantage in trial preparation. Majority opinion at ¶ 24. The court of appeals 
similarly noted that the state had learned of a potential witness to the alleged 
crime (Vince Van) through Jackson’s compelled statement. But the state did not 
present information from Van’s statement to the grand jury and did not list Van as 
a trial witness. This case differs from United States v. Hubbell (2000), 530 U.S. 
27, 120 S.Ct. 2037, 147 L.Ed.2d 24, a case in which the defendant’s testimonial 
act of producing extensive incriminating documents in response to a broadly 
worded government subpoena provided the evidence that was used to convict him 
of another crime.  Id. at 41-43, quoting the government’s brief (“It was only 
through respondent's truthful reply to the subpoena that the Government received 
the incriminating documents of which it made ‘substantial use * * * in the 
investigation that led to the indictment’ ”). In this case, the record does not 
establish that Jackson’s statement provided a “ ‘link in the chain of evidence 
needed to prosecute’ ” Jackson.  Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 38, quoting  Hoffman v. 
United States (1951), 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118. 
{¶ 43} Consequently, neither Kastigar nor Conrad requires dismissal of 
the indictment in this case. 
{¶ 44} Having concluded, erroneously in my view, that because Lt. Davis 
testified before the grand jury the indictment must be dismissed, the majority goes 
on to discuss its concern that the prosecutor’s having read Jackson’s compelled 
statement will give the state an impermissible advantage at trial. With regard to 
the evidence that the state intends to use at trial, the state must show that it has an 
January Term, 2010 
 
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“ ‘independent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence,’ ” Kastigar, 406 U.S. 
at 460, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212, quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm. of 
New York Harbor (1964), 378 U.S.  52, 79, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678, fn. 18. 
To the extent that any question remains about the state’s trial evidence, Jackson’s 
remedy is to move to exclude his statement and its fruits from evidence at trial.3  
{¶ 45} Assuming that the state will not introduce the compelled statement 
or its fruits at trial and will not use the statement for impeachment at trial, the 
only question that remains is whether the prosecutor’s exposure to the compelled 
statement and the internal-affairs file has directly affected the state’s trial strategy 
(such as choice of witnesses, for example). The federal courts of appeals have 
taken different approaches to claims that exposure to a defendant’s compelled 
statement may have affected the government’s trial strategy. Compare United 
States v. McDaniel (C.A.8, 1973), 482 F.2d 305, 311 (“[Immunity protection] 
must forbid all prosecutorial use of the testimony, not merely that which results in 
the presentation of evidence before the jury”) with United States v. Rivieccio 
(C.A.2, 1990), 919 F.2d 812, 815 (“To the extent the Government’s thought 
process or questioning of witnesses may have been influenced by Appellant’s 
immunized testimony, we hold that any such use was merely tangential and was 
therefore not a prohibited use”). 
{¶ 46} If the majority believes that the trial prosecutor in this case, who 
admitted to having reviewed Jackson’s compelled statement, was afforded an 
impermissible direct advantage in trial strategy, then the court should afford the 
state the option of accepting the court of appeals’ remedy—allowing the state to 
try the case without the disputed evidence and with a new trial prosecutor who has 
                                                 
3.  The majority, at one point in its opinion, apparently agrees that suppression of Jackson’s 
statement and any evidence obtained therefrom is the appropriate remedy for a Garrity violation. 
See majority opinion at ¶ 32. However, the majority also states that the state makes derivative use 
of a Garrity statement when the prosecutor reviews a statement in preparation for trial, and even 
when the prosecutor merely has possession of the statement, but does not review it.  Id. at ¶ 25. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
 
not seen any of the disputed evidence—instead of dismissing the case outright. 
This less drastic option also would further the majority’s stated goal of 
discouraging the improper sharing of compelled testimony obtained in an internal-
affairs investigation with the prosecution team in the related criminal proceeding.  
Apparently, the majority is disinclined to permit this reasonable solution as an 
optional remedy to the state. 
{¶ 47} For these reasons, I dissent from the majority’s decision to 
reinstate the trial court’s dismissal of the indictment in this case. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
John D. Ferrero, Stark County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kathleen 
Tatarsky, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant and cross-appellee. 
Bradley R. Iams, for appellee and cross-appellant. 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith 
Anton Lapp, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for amicus curiae, Ohio Prosecuting 
Attorney’s Association, in support of appellant and cross-appellee. 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, 
Alexandra T. Schimmer, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and David M. 
Lieberman, Deputy Solicitor, for amicus curiae, Ohio Attorney General, in 
support of appellant and cross-appellee. 
Kevin R. L’Hommedieu, Assistant Law Director for city of Canton; 
Schottenstein, Zox and Dunn Co., L.P.A., Stephen L. Byron, and Stephen J. 
Smith; John Gotherman; Robert L. Berry Co., L.P.A., and Robert L. Berry; and 
Pericles G. Stergios, Law Director for the city of Massillon, for amici curiae, city 
of Canton, Ohio Municipal League, city of Massillon, and Buckeye State Sheriffs’ 
Association, in support of appellant and cross-appellee. 
Crabbe, Brown & James, L.L.P., Larry H. James, Christina L. Corl, and 
Lindsay L. Ford; and Paul Cox, for amici curiae National Fraternal Order of 
January Term, 2010 
 
19 
 
Police and Fraternal Order of Police of Ohio, Inc., in support of appellee and 
cross-appellant. 
Mary Lou Sekula, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Canton Police 
Patrolman’s Association, in support of appellee and cross-appellant. 
Aaron Nisenson, for amicus curiae International Union of Police 
Associations, AFL-CIO, in support of appellee and cross-appellant. 
______________________