Case Title: McGuire v. Lovell

Citation: 1999-Ohio-296

Docket Number: 19980946

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as McGuire v. Lovell, 85 Ohio St.3d 1216, 1999-Ohio-296.] 
 
 
 
 
 
MCGUIRE, APPELLEE, v. LOVELL ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as McGuire v. Lovell (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 1216.] 
Appeal dismissed as improvidently allowed. 
(No. 98-946 — Submitted April 21, 1999 at the Hardin County and Ohio Northern 
University Law School Session — Decided May 26, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Marion County, No. 9-97-77. 
__________________ 
 
J.C. Ratliff and Javier H. Armengau, for appellee. 
 
Day & Cook, L.P.A., David L. Day and Douglas J. Segerman, for appellants. 
__________________ 
 
The appeal is dismissed, sua sponte, as having been improvidently allowed. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting.  I believe this case raises a legal issue that should 
be decided by this court.  Accordingly, I dissent from the decision of the majority, 
which holds that jurisdiction in this case was improvidently allowed.  The legal 
issue is whether an off-duty police officer is entitled to the immunity protections of 
R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a) when responding in good faith to a police radio dispatch 
indicating a crime is in progress, even if the officer is not personally directed to 
respond.  I would hold that the immunity protections do apply and would reverse 
the judgment of the court of appeals.  Summary judgment is appropriate in this 
case because the plaintiff did not offer any evidence to contradict the premise that 
the officer was responding in good faith to an emergency call.  Plaintiff offered 
some evidence from which a jury could possibly have found that the officer 
negligently proceeded through an intersection, but in my view offered no evidence 
 
 
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raising an issue of material fact that would support a finding that Deputy Lovell 
acted in a willful, wanton, or reckless manner. 
I 
Facts 
 
The facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as are follows: 
 
On the afternoon of November 9, 1992, plaintiff, Harold L. McGuire, was a 
passenger in a pickup truck traveling north on Kensington Avenue.  As the truck 
entered the intersection of Kensington Avenue and State Route 309, it was hit by a 
police cruiser driven by off-duty police officer, defendant Deputy Brian  L. Lovell.  
As a result of this collision, McGuire sustained injuries. 
 
It is undisputed that Deputy Lovell proceeded through the intersection on a 
red light.  Although there is a dispute as to exactly when Deputy Lovell activated 
his lights and siren, it is undisputed that the lights were activated before he entered 
the intersection and that the siren was activated before the collision.  Plaintiff 
offered no evidence to contradict testimony from the officer and an independent 
eyewitness indicating that when he entered the intersection the officer was 
operating his vehicle at a speed between twenty and thirty-five m.p.h., which was 
at or under the legal speed limit.  The plaintiff alleges that the view from 
Kensington, upon entering this intersection, is hampered by a house, trees, and a 
utility pole, so that the driver of the truck may not have been able to see the police 
cruiser prior to entering the intersection. 
II 
Immunity 
 
Plaintiff does not challenge the premise that an off-duty police officer is 
immune from liability for negligent actions under R.C. 2744.02 when responding 
to an emergency call.  Nor has he challenged the fact that just prior to the accident, 
Deputy Lovell heard a radio transmission announcing a burglary in progress.  
 
 
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Rather, plaintiff argues that, because the radio dispatcher did not specifically ask 
Deputy Lovell, himself, to respond, there remains a question of fact as to whether 
he was responding to an “emergency call” as defined in R.C. 2744.01(A).  The 
court of appeals’ opinion supports the plaintiff’s premise.  Further, the court of 
appeals seems to hold that as a matter of law, an off-duty officer should not be 
protected by governmental immunity when responding to a radio dispatch unless 
the dispatch was directed personally to that officer.  I disagree. 
 
An emergency call is defined as “a call to duty, including, but not limited to, 
communications from citizens, police dispatches, and personal observations by 
peace officers of inherently dangerous situations that demand an immediate 
response on the part of a peace officer.”  R.C. 2744.01(A).  This is a broad 
definition and is not limited to circumstances where an officer is personally and 
explicitly instructed to report to the scene of a crime.  Further, plaintiff cites no 
Ohio case that has ever imposed such a limitation. 
 
To the contrary, we have previously held that an officer has a continuing 
duty to obey and enforce the criminal law whether on or off duty.  Warrensville 
Hts. v. Jennings (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 206, 211, 569 N.E.2d 489, 494.  Pursuant to 
R.C. 2921.44(A)(2), an officer may even be criminally liable for negligently failing 
to prevent or halt the commission of a crime or to apprehend an offender if it is 
within his or her power to do so.  Thus, when an officer becomes aware of a crime 
in progress, and is in a position to respond, the officer has a legal duty to do so. 
 
Deputy Lovell testified at deposition that he was responding to a police 
dispatch, and presented an affidavit of the Marion County Sheriff’s Department 
dispatcher and the dispatch report for November 9, 1992 corroborating this 
testimony.  This evidence was properly submitted in support of defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment.  Although the plaintiff implied in his argument opposing 
summary judgment that Deputy Lovell may not have been responding to a police 
 
 
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dispatch when he entered the intersection, it is well settled that the party opposing 
a summary judgment motion may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his 
pleadings.  Rather, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts to show that 
there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.  The plaintiff failed to meet this 
burden. 
 
On appeal, the plaintiff acknowledged that Deputy Lovell was on his way to 
the sheriff’s department to report to work when he allegedly heard a radio dispatch 
concerning a burglary in progress.  Though he was not personally dispatched to the 
scene, Deputy Lovell chose to respond to the call, believing in good faith that he 
was in a position to provide backup.  Because the radio dispatch communicated the 
existence of a crime in progress and because an officer is duty-bound to respond to 
such a call when it is within his or her power to do so, the radio communication 
was a call to duty constituting an “emergency call” under the immunity statute.  As 
plaintiff failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact that would prevent 
judgment for the defendants as a matter of law, there is no triable issue, and 
summary judgment determining that R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a) immunity applies 
under these facts was appropriate. 
III 
Wanton and Willful Exception 
 
In order to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding willful and 
wanton conduct, the plaintiff would have had to set forth specific facts indicating 
that Deputy Lovell acted with the intent, purpose, or design to injure, or that he 
failed to exercise “ ‘ “any care whatsoever toward those to whom he owes a duty 
of care.” ’ ”  Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth. (1996), 75 Ohio 
St.3d 312, 319, 662 N.E.2d 287, 294, quoting Hawkins v. Ivy (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 
114, 4 O.O.3d 243, 363 N.E.2d 367, syllabus.  The plaintiff did not meet this 
burden. 
 
 
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In the context of immunity, reckless conduct has been viewed as 
interchangeable with wanton conduct.  This, however, does not diminish the level 
of misconduct required to meet either standard.  Both standards refer to conduct 
that causes risk “ ‘substantially greater than that which is necessary to make [the] 
conduct negligent.’ ”  See Thompson v. McNeill (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 102, 104-
105, 559 N.E.2d 705, 708; Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept. (1994), 70 
Ohio St.3d 351, 356, 639 N.E.2d 31, 35.  “ ‘[M]ere negligence is not converted 
into wanton [or reckless] misconduct unless the evidence establishes a disposition 
to perversity on the part of the tortfeasor.’ ”  Fabrey at 356, 639 N.E.2d at 35, 
citing Roszman v. Sammett (1971), 26 Ohio St.2d 94, 96-97, 55 O.O.2d 165, 166, 
269 N.E.2d 420, 422. 
 
The opposition to summary judgment made no allegation that Deputy Lovell 
acted with intent, purpose, or design to injure.  Nor did it set forth any facts that 
would support a finding that Deputy Lovell failed to exercise “any care 
whatsoever” when entering the intersection.  The evidence does not establish, or 
even allege, that Deputy  Lovell acted with a disposition to perversity sufficient to 
convert negligence into wanton or reckless conduct. 
 
The undisputed facts show that Deputy Lovell heard a radio dispatch for a 
burglary in progress.  He chose to respond to the scene to provide backup.  En 
route to the scene, he turned on his lights and siren and proceeded through a red 
light, at a speed between twenty and thirty-five m.p.h., which is at or below the 
legal speed limit.  In doing so, he hit a truck, causing injury to the plaintiff, 
McGuire.  While these facts may present a question of fact as to whether Deputy 
Lovell’s conduct constituted negligence, as originally alleged in plaintiff’s 
complaint, they do not support a finding of wanton and willful conduct that would 
negate the immunity provisions of R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a).  It is possible that 
Deputy Lovell was negligent by not turning on his lights and siren sooner; it is 
 
 
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possible he was negligent for not stopping before proceeding through the 
intersection; and it is possible he was even negligent for proceeding in response to 
the radio dispatch without further authorization.  However, as it is undisputed that 
he was traveling at a low speed, at or below the legal speed limit, had activated his 
lights and siren before entering the intersection, and was responding in good faith 
to a perceived emergency, it cannot be said that he failed to exercise any care 
whatsoever. 
 
For the above-mentioned reasons, I would decide the legal issue, holding 
that an off-duty police officer is entitled to the immunity protections of R.C. 
2744.02(B)(1)(a) when responding to a police radio dispatch indicating a crime is 
in progress, even if the officer is not personally directed to respond, and would 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, as the plaintiff did not meet his 
burden of setting forth facts to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact 
sufficient to preclude judgment for the defendants, as a matter of law. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.