Case Title: Menapace v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Menapace v. State1989 WY 18768 P.2d 8Case Number: 88-69Decided: 01/19/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOHN 
WILLIAM MENAPACE, II, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE 
OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty, Nicholas G. 
Kalokathis, J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, for 
appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., and Terry L. Armitage, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Presented for appeal 
decision is prosecutorial discretion to choose whether serious criminal offense 
charges against a minor, seventeen years of age or older, can alternatively be 
either initiated as an adult or in juvenile court. The inquiry embraces 
prosecutorial discretion and forum for transfer hearings which is for a minor 
under seventeen confined to juvenile court and over seventeen may be pursued in 
criminal court by initial decision of the prosecutor.

 
 

[¶2.]     John William Menapace, 
II (appellant) states his issue as:

 
 
     Did the district court 
deny procedural due process to the defendant, John William Menapace, II, when 
the court allowed the prosecution to declare him an adult in a criminal 
procedure?

 
 

[¶3.]     The State of Wyoming (appellee) 
restates the issue as:

 
 
Appellant 
was afforded all the process due him in his prosecution as an adult in district 
court.

 
 

[¶4.]     What this court is 
asked to determine is whether the state criminal prosecution system is validly 
emplaced in W.S. 14-6-203 so that under age thirteen exclusive jurisdiction for 
criminal proceeding is vested in the juvenile court. Between thirteen and 
seventeen, original jurisdiction is initially vested in the juvenile court where 
any transfer hearing is held. A minor who has attained the age of seventeen may 
be either immediately prosecuted as an adult or proceeded against in juvenile 
court at the discretion of the prosecuting attorney, with rights reserved to the 
minor when charged as an adult to request district court discretional 
consideration of transfer to the juvenile court.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶5.]     Appellant, seventeen at 
the time of the offense, was charged as one of three young participants in an 
exceptionally horrifying sexual assault, breaking and entering, and robbery 
incident jointly perpetrated by the three young men upon a defenseless woman. 
Fortuitously, the victim was not killed, but the perpetrators were immediately 
identified, arrested, and then confessed.1 Each of the three participants were 
charged with: Count I - sexual assault in the first degree; Count II - burglary; 
Count III - sexual intrusion through physical force; Count IV - kidnapping; and 
Count V - armed robbery.

 
 

[¶6.]     Appellant responded by 
a joint motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in the district court since 
the charged individual was a juvenile, and in second regard, that the 
proceedings should be transferred to the juvenile court if there was concurrent 
jurisdiction. A comprehensive evidentiary hearing was held by the district court 
resulting in denial of both motions. Appellant elected to plea bargain for 
criminal sentences on three charges and dismissal of the other two. In 
consideration of the statutory maximum of fifty years, concurrent sentences of 
five-to-eight years were moderate under the factual 
circumstances.

 
 

[¶7.]     This appeal followed to 
test the validity of initiation of the criminal charges for a person seventeen 
years of age as an adult at the discretion of the prosecuting attorney. 
Appellant does not realistically contend that the district court abused its 
discretion in denial of juvenile court transfer on the basis of transfer hearing 
evidence. Cf.State v. Woodward, 737 P.2d 569, amended 745 P.2d 1180 (Okla. Cr. 1987), where abuse of discretion was found 
in juvenile court remand for first degree murder offense.

 
 

[¶8.]     The argument presented 
by appellant defines a curious posture since he abjures a constitutional 
challenge which is normally the basis of attack on prosecutorial discretion to 
charge as an adult or the resulting burden of proof within the transfer process 
which can follow. The argument seems to challenge statutory validity on a 
procedural and not a constitutional basis. The contention seems to be 
under-slung with belief that the interstate compact on juveniles, W.S. 14-6-101, 
et seq., denies efficacy to the juvenile court code, W.S. 14-6-201, et seq., as 
a matter of construction and not constitutional application. This court has 
difficulty in understanding, either from the brief or questioning at oral 
argument, how the appellate advocacy separates procedural due process as an 
issue from constitutional due process and equal protection, as perhaps leaving 
only for argument statutory constitution, if unclear, to define the intent of 
the legislature.2 Cf. People v. M.A., 124 Ill. 2d 135, 
124 Ill.Dec. 511, 529 N.E.2d 492 (1988).

 
 

[¶9.]     We will address the 
substance presented in the context of the broad challenge to a statutory process 
that is presented by first, examination of the statutes; second, analysis for 
ambiguity; and third, application of the test of constitutionality. This latter 
question seems to pass beyond any direct contention of appellant, although 
clearly inculcated in any due process argument, no matter how packaged. See 
Comment, supra, XIX Land & Water L.Rev. 187.

 
 

[¶10.]  In first examination, the clarity and 
specificity of what the legislature has provided in the juvenile code, W.S. 
14-6-201, et seq., deserves recitation.

 
 

[¶11.]  In W.S. 14-6-203, it is 
stated:

 
 
     (d) The juvenile court 
has exclusive jurisdiction in all cases in which a minor who had not attained 
the age of thirteen (13) years is alleged to have committed a felony or a 
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for more than six (6) 
months.

 
 
     (e) Except as provided 
in subsection (f) of this section, all cases over which the juvenile court has 
concurrent jurisdiction shall be originally commenced in the juvenile court but 
may thereafter be transferred to another court having jurisdiction pursuant to 
W.S. 14-6-237.

 
 
     (f) The following 
cases may be originally commenced either in the juvenile court or in the 
district court or inferior court having jurisdiction:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
     (iii) Cases in which 
the minor has attained the age of seventeen (17) years. The prosecuting attorney 
shall consider those determinative factors set forth in W.S. 14-6-237(b)(i) 
through (vii) prior to commencing an action in the district court under this 
paragraph.

 
 
W.S. 
14-6-237(g) reads:

 
 
If any 
proceeding commenced in the district court is within the concurrent jurisdiction 
of the juvenile court, the district court may on motion of any party or on its 
own motion order any proceeding transferred to the juvenile court. The district 
court judge may, after notice and hearing, find the matter more properly suited 
to disposition under the provisions of this act. The order of transfer confers 
upon the juvenile court full jurisdiction in the matter as if originally 
commenced in the juvenile court.

 
 
W.S. 
14-6-237 defines the criteria as:

 
 
     (b) The court shall 
order the matter transferred to the appropriate court for prosecution if after 
the transfer hearing it finds that proper reason therefor exists. The 
determinative factors to be considered by the judge in deciding whether the 
juvenile court's jurisdiction over such offenses will be waived are the 
following:

 
 
     (i) The seriousness of 
the alleged offense to the community and whether the protection of the community 
required waiver;

 
 
     (ii) Whether the 
alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful 
manner;

 
 
     (iii) Whether the 
alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight being 
given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury 
resulted;

 
 
     (iv) The desirability 
of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one (1) court when the 
juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with 
a crime; 

 
 
     (v) The sophistication 
and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of his home, 
environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of 
living;

 
 
     (vi) The record and 
previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts with the law 
enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of 
probation to this court, or prior commitments to juvenile 
institutions;

 
 
     (vii) The prospects 
for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable 
rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the alleged 
offense) by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently available 
to the juvenile court.

 
 

[¶12.]  We find no ambiguity in legislative 
intent and discern as the jurisdictional criteria: (a) exclusive jurisdiction if 
under the age of thirteen; (b) initial jurisdiction with right to transfer to 
adult court if between the age of thirteen and under seventeen; and (c) joint 
jurisdiction if seventeen or older with initial discretion vested in the 
prosecutor to charge and with the right of the juvenile to then request transfer 
to juvenile court if initially charged as an adult.

 
 

[¶13.]  The factual circumstances preclude any 
realistic abuse of discretion inquiry, either in initial charge as adult or the 
subsequent denial of transfer by the district court. Woodward, 737 P.2d 569; 
Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986). Likewise, we summarily dispose of 
the contention that somehow the interstate compact restrains application of the 
specific terminology of the criminal transfer provisions of the juvenile code. 
The legislature meant what it said and said what it meant.3

 
 

[¶14.]  Realistically, the only inquiry left for 
this court is whether we should review the Jahnke dispositive conclusion of 
constitutionality. Re-examination by a review of more current cases does not 
diminish the validity of the procedural and constitutional conclusions on this 
issue in that case. Trolinger v. State, 736 P.2d 168, 170 (Okla. Cr. 1987) as 
citing for support McGown v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1961). See likewise, People v. Thorpe, 641 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1982), where 
prosecutorial discretion was directly considered and constitutionally 
approved.

 
 

[¶15.]  Transfer process determinants of 
confidentiality and burden of proof, as well as court of jurisdiction, have been 
uniformly held to constitutionally rest within legislative discretion. Jahnke, 
692 P.2d 911; Mullin v. State, 505 P.2d 305 (Wyo.), cert. denied 414 U.S. 940, 94 S. Ct. 245, 38 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1973); People v. Young, 124 Ill. 2d 147, 124 Ill.Dec. 516, 
529 N.E.2d 497 (1988); Com. v. Wallace, 495 Pa. 
295, 433 A.2d 856 (1981); State v. Jacobs, 144 Vt. 70, 472 A.2d 1247 (1984). The Wyoming legislature has 
clearly and validly established the courts and transfer processes for the trial 
of criminal offenses committed by persons under the age of 
majority.

 
 

[¶16.]  AFFIRMED.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 This is the kind of 
an offense which, until a fairly recent decision of the United States Supreme 
Court, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 53 L. Ed. 2d 982 (1977), 
would occasion a death sentence in many southern states and even today, on many 
occasions, would, for an adult, result in life term 
sentences.

 
 

2 The four citations 
given by appellant in his brief as exclusive of waiver by guilty plea do not 
provide assistance to define the issue or resolve the inquiry. Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972) determined what due process requirements there were for revocation of 
parole. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 
(1970) considers validity of a plea against contention of compulsion and 
inadequate representation as voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly given. 
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S. Ct. 472, 84 L. Ed. 716 (1940) considered a compulsive confession used for 
conviction and death sentence as violation of a due process guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Tumey v. State of Ohio, 
273 U.S. 510, 47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L. Ed. 749 
(1927) denied due process where the presiding judge had a pecuniary 
interest.

 
 
     The one case cited, 
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1966), is a basic juvenile rights determination for 
transfer without any evidentiary hearing. The case is specifically 
constitutional in interpretative construction of a juvenile court statute. 
Appellant (or appellee) did not cite nor discuss the excellent review of the 
Wyoming 
statute in Comment, Prosecution as a Juvenile or an Adult? Is the Discretion 
Vested in the District Attorney by Section 14-6-203(c) of the Wyoming Statutes 
Unconstitutional and Violative of the Proper Role of a Prosecutor? XIXLand & Water L.Rev. 187 (1984). Also 
not considered by appellate citation were Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911 
(Wyo. 1984) and Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991 
(Wyo. 1984), 
in each of which a motion for transfer to juvenile court was made and denied. 
After hearing, constitutionality of the process and result was directly 
considered in Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d  at 928. In reality, this appeal is an 
attack on that case.

 
 

3 Since passage of 
these provisions, the legislature did undertake an extensive alteration of the 
juvenile code which would have eliminated the prosecutorial discretion. Although 
the legislation was handily passed within the legislature, it was vetoed by the 
governor by reason of public request of certain district judges. See Comment, 
supra, XIX Land & Water L.Rev. at 201.