Case Title: Beckwith v. Weber

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0101

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-04-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
MARCIA BECKWITH v. KARL AND TINA WEBER, husband and wife, dba GROS VENTRE RIVER RANCH2012 WY 62Case Number: S-11-0101, S-11-0245Decided: 04/25/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
MARCIA 
BECKWITH,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.KARL AND TINA WEBER, 
husband and wife, dba GROS VENTRE RIVER 
RANCH,Appellees(Defendants).
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County
The 
Honorable Timothy C. Day, Judge 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Gerard 
R. Bosch of Law Offices of Jerry Bosch, LLC, Wilson, 
Wyoming
 
Representing 
Appellees:
Katherine 
L. Mead of Mead & Mead, Jackson, Wyoming
 
 
Before 
GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ., and DAVIS, 
DJ.
 
DAVIS, 
District Judge.
 
[¶1]      These 
consolidated appeals arise from a judgment on jury verdict in a case involving 
personal injuries suffered by Appellant Marcia Beckwith.  She fell from a horse while on a trail 
ride operated by the Gros Ventre River Ranch in Grand Teton National Park.  The jury found that Ms. Beckwith’s 
injuries were the result of an inherent risk of horseback riding as defined by 
the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act, and she therefore recovered no damages for 
her injuries.   In Case No. 
S-11-0101, Ms. Beckwith claims the district court erred in failing to instruct 
the jury as she requested.  In Case 
No. S-11-0245, she claims the district court erred in awarding costs to 
Appellees due to her indigence.  We 
affirm.
 
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      In Case No. 
S-11-0101, the issues are:
 
1.            
Did 
the District Court err when it declined to instruct the jury that a duty of care 
could arise from a contract and in refusing a verdict form which would have 
asked the jury to determine if Appellees provided skilled 
guides?
 
2.            
Did 
the District Court err in declining to instruct the jury on the meaning of the 
terms “characteristic,” “intrinsic,” and “integral” as they are used to define 
the term “inherent risk” in the Wyoming Recreation Safety 
Act?
 
3.            
Did 
the District Court err in declining to instruct the jury that exculpatory 
clauses are to be strictly construed?
 
4.            
Did 
the District Court err in declining to instruct the jury that Appellant was 
exercising due care at the time she was injured?
 
[¶3]      In Case No. 
S-11-0245, the issue is:
 
1.         
Did the District Court abuse its discretion in awarding costs to 
Appellees?
 
FACTS
 
[¶4]      The Gros Ventre 
River Ranch is a guest ranch located in Teton County.  The ranch offers trail rides in Grand 
Teton National Park near the Gros Ventre River.  Appellees Karl and Tina Weber are the 
owners of the ranch.  

 
[¶5]      Appellant Marcia 
Beckwith lives near Detroit, Michigan.  
In 1993 she began coming to the guest ranch annually with her companion, 
James Tasse, and continued to do so until she was injured in 2006.1  She had no experience with horses other 
than that gained at the guest ranch.  
Ms. Beckwith and Mr. Tasse stayed at the ranch and usually rode daily for 
up to two weeks during their annual visits.  
 
[¶6]      The guest ranch 
offered guided trail rides of three levels of difficulty depending on whether 
the horses were walked, trotted, or loped.  
A walk is a slow four-beat gait.  
A trot is faster and occurs when the horse’s diagonal hind and forelegs 
reach out and land at the same time.  
At a lope, a horse moves still faster, with a three-beat gait followed by 
a brief period of suspension with none of its hoofs touching the ground.  Lope is the western term for what might 
be called a canter elsewhere.  A 
horse’s fastest gait is the gallop, which is a four-beat rhythm with legs 
further extended.  The risk that the 
horse will fall or stumble and that the rider will fall or be thrown increases 
with the speed of the horse’s gait.
 
[¶7]      On the advanced 
ride, the horses loped for between 15 and 30 seconds.  Ms. Beckwith participated in all of the 
levels over the years.  She signed 
up for an advanced ride on July 20, 2006.  
She was required to sign a document entitled “Visitor’s Acknowledgment of 
Risk (for Grand Teton National Park).”  
The record indicates that the form was used because the guest ranch was a 
concessionaire in the park.  It 
provided as follows:
 
Although 
The Gros Ventre River Ranch has taken reasonable steps to provide you with 
appropriate equipment and skilled guides so you can enjoy an activity for which 
you may not be skilled, we wish to remind you this activity is not without 
risk.  Certain risks cannot be 
eliminated without destroying the unique character of this activity.  The same elements that contribute to the 
unique character of this activity can be causes of loss or damage to your 
equipment, or accidental injury, illness or in extreme cases, permanent trauma 
or death.  We do not want to 
frighten you or reduce your enthusiasm for this activity, but we do think it is 
important for you to know in advance what to expect and be informed of the 
inherent risks.  The following 
describes some, but not all, of those risks.
 
A 
horse, irrespective of its training and usual past behavior and characteristics, 
may act or react unpredictably at times, based upon instinct or fright, which is 
an I [sic] inherent risk assumed by a horseback rider.  Unforeseeable actions by a horse may 
cause the rider to lose control of or fall off of the 
animal.
 
I 
am aware that horseback riding entails risks of injury or death to myself.  I understand the description of these 
risks is not complete and that other unknown or unanticipated risks may result 
in injury or death.  I agree to 
assume responsibility for the risks identified herein and those risks not 
specifically identified.  My 
participation in this activity is purely voluntary, no one is forcing me to 
participate, and I elect to participate in spite of the 
risks.
 
I 
certify that I am fully capable of participating in this activity. Therefore, I 
assume full responsibility for myself, including my minor children, for bodily 
injury, death and loss of personal property and expenses thereof as a result of 
those inherent risks and dangers and of my negligence in participating in this 
activity.
 
I 
have read, understand [sic] and accepted the terms and conditions stated herein 
and acknowledge that this agreement shall be effective and binding upon myself, 
my heirs, assigns, personal representative and estate and for all members of my 
family, including any minors accompanying me.
 
[¶8]      The reverse side 
of this document contained a “Rider’s Application & Liability Agreement,” 
which included the following:
 
I 
acknowledge that the use, handling and riding of a horse involves a risk of 
physical injury to any individual undertaking such activities. I expressly 
assume all inherent risks involved in the use, handling and riding of the horse, 
whether those risks are known or unknown. Inherent risks are those dangers or 
conditions that are characteristic of, intrinsic to, or an integral part of the 
use, handling and riding of a horse.  
Inherent risks include, but are not limited to:
 
(1)          
the 
propensity of the horse to behave in unpredictable ways, irrespective of its 
training and usual past behavior and characteristics, and to otherwise behave in 
ways that may result in injury, harm or death to person on or around 
them;
 
(2)          
the 
unpredictability of the reaction of a horse to sounds, sudden movement, and 
unfamiliar objects, persons, or other animals; 
 
(3)          
certain 
hazards such as surface and subsurface conditions;
 
(4)          
collisions 
with other horses or objects;
 
(5)          
the 
potential of a participant to act in a negligent manner that may contribute to 
injury to the participant or others, such as failing to maintain control over 
the animal or not acting within his or her ability.
 
I 
understand that Gros Ventre River Ranch, its officers, agents, employees, 
stockholders, and all other persons or entities associated with Gros Ventre 
River Ranch . . . are not legally responsible for any 
and all damage, injury or death to me or other persons or property that results 
from the inherent risks that may arise from the use, handling and riding of the 
horse.  I further understand that 
The Gros Ventre River Ranch is not required to eliminate, alter or control the 
inherent risks that arise from the use, handling and riding of the horse. 
[Emphasis in original.]
 
I 
hereby waive any claim against the Gros Ventre River Ranch and hold it harmless 
for any physical injury to myself, physical injury to others, or for property 
damages.  
 
[¶9]      Following the 
above language was a section entitled “Help Us Pick The Right Horse For You,” 
which included a questionnaire concerning the rider’s age, height, and riding 
ability.  For the July 20, 2006, 
ride, Ms. Beckwith was assigned to Fox, a large horse she had ridden before and 
liked.
 
[¶10]   During the course of the half-day 
trail ride, Ms. Beckwith fell or was thrown from Fox and suffered compression 
fractures and other damage to her cervical and lumbar spine.  The evidence indicated that the group on 
the trail ride had loped their horses for a brief period of time, and that Fox 
stepped in a badger hole about the size of a basketball as or shortly after the 
trail guide signaled the group to slow from the lope to a walk.  Ms. Beckwith was unable to stay in the 
saddle after her horse stepped in the hole.  
 
[¶11]   Ms. Beckwith claims that she was 
left at the scene with Mr. Tasse after the accident because the trail guide did 
not know what to do, and therefore started back to the ranch with the rest of 
the group at a walk, planning to send help when she got there.  Mr. Tasse became concerned that the 
couple had no water and that there were bison and other potentially aggressive 
wildlife in the area where they had been left.  He helped Ms. Beckwith walk to a nearby 
residence, which was difficult for them because she was in considerable 
pain.  From there they were able to 
use a telephone to summon help.    
 
[¶12]   In Case No. S-11-0101, Ms. Beckwith 
claimed that the ranch owners and their employees caused her injuries through 
negligence, and that their negligent acts were not inherent risks of horseback 
trail riding at a dude ranch.  She 
identified the following acts of claimed negligence:
 
·         
The 
guide on the trail ride was not adequately trained.  
·         
There 
should have been two trail guides instead of one.
·         
The 
horses should have had more space between them when loping than they 
did.
·         
Ms. 
Beckwith was not appropriately screened to determine her ability to participate 
in a trail ride that included loping.
·         
The 
area in which the ride took place was inappropriate for loping with a group of 
horses because of badger holes and other features which might cause a horse to 
stumble or fall.
·         
The 
ranch did not prepare its guides adequately for emergencies on its trail 
rides.
·         
The 
trail guides should have had some means of communicating with the ranch in the 
event that a participant was injured on the trail.  
 
PROCEEDINGS 
BELOW  
 
[¶13]   Appellees moved for summary 
judgment on the theory that the events which caused Appellant’s injuries were as 
a matter of law inherent risks of horseback trail riding under the Wyoming 
Recreation Safety Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-1-121 to 123.  
They also argued that the Rider’s Application and Liability Agreement on 
the reverse side of the Visitor’s Acknowledgment released all of Appellant’s 
claims for personal injury.  Ms. 
Beckwith responded that the negligent acts she identified were not inherent 
risks of the activity, and that the form she signed did not release claims 
relating to the guest ranch’s negligence.
 
[¶14]   The district court denied the 
motion for summary judgment.  It 
found that reasonable minds could differ as to whether Appellant’s injury was 
“atypical, uncharacteristic, not intrinsic to, and thus not inherent” in the 
recreational activity of participating in a guided horseback ride.  It therefore concluded that the issue of 
whether she was injured as the result of an inherent risk of horseback riding 
was a question to be resolved by the trier of fact.  It also held that the Rider’s 
Application and Liability Agreement waived liability only for risks inherent in 
the activity of horseback riding.  
In other words, a determination by the jury as to whether Ms. Beckwith 
suffered injury from something which was or was not an inherent risk of 
horseback riding would resolve both the Recreation Safety Act and release 
issues.  
 
[¶15]   The case was tried to a jury of 
twelve from November 15-19, 2010.  
Both parties called fact and expert witnesses during the trial.  Ms. Beckwith sought to prove that her 
injuries resulted from acts of negligence which could not be considered inherent 
risks of horseback riding.  
Appellees strove to persuade the jury that her horse simply stumbled in a 
badger hole, which they claimed was an inherent risk of trail riding.    
 
[¶16]   At the jury instruction conference, 
Appellant’s counsel argued that the Visitor’s Acknowledgment of Risk contained a 
promise that Gros Ventre River Ranch had hired “skilled guides.”  The language Ms. Beckwith relied upon is 
this phrase:
 
Although 
The Gros Ventre River Ranch has taken reasonable steps to provide you with 
appropriate 
equipment and skilled guides so that you 
can enjoy an activity for which you may not be skilled, we wish to remind 
you this activity is not without risk. . . . [Emphasis 
added.]
 
[¶17]   Plaintiff offered a verdict form 
which would have required the jury to decide the following questions:2
 
1.            
Did 
the Defendant Gros Ventre River Ranch fail to provide skilled 
guides?
 
                        
Yes_______                                  
No______
 
            
IF YOUR ANSWER IS “YES,” GO TO QUESTION NO 3.
 
2.            
Did 
the Plaintiff’s injuries result from an inherent risk of a half day guided trail 
ride provided by a dude ranch?
 
                                                
Yes_______             
No______
 
                                                            
* * * * 
 
3.    
Were 
Defendants Karl and Tina Weber d/b/a Gros             
Ventre River Ranch negligent?
 
                  
Yes_______                                  
No_____
 
* 
* * *
 
The 
verdict form as submitted would have taken the question of whether Appellant was 
injured as the result of an inherent risk of trail riding from the jury if it 
found that the ranch did not provide skilled guides.
 
[¶18]   The district court commented as 
follows concerning Appellant’s proposed verdict form:
 
THE 
COURT:            
All right.  On the verdict – 
on the verdict form, [Appellant’s counsel] will be quick to notice I did not 
start it off as he would have hoped I would have.  I did start it off with the gatekeeping 
question looking at this case as an inherent risk case under the Recreational 
Safety Act and a negligence case.
 
            
And so I didn’t give that first one, I started right off with whether 
they think this is an inherent risk and then go right into the negligence if 
they find it wasn’t.  And I think 
more or less the rest of it is pretty much – might be slightly, slightly 
different language, but it’s more or less kind of how you each set it up with 
the negligence issues.
 
[¶19]   Appellant’s counsel made a timely 
objection to the district court’s failure to use his proposed verdict form.  He argued that the Visitor’s 
Acknowledgment of Risk was a contract by which the guest ranch promised to 
provide skilled guides and that if it did not do so, it could not assert a 
defense of assumption of risk under the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act.  
 
[¶20]   The district court persisted in its 
ruling, which it further explained by stating that the case had been pled as one 
sounding in negligence, and that the contract duty of care theory had not been 
raised previously.  Moreover, it 
concluded that allowing Ms. Beckwith to assert a new theory at that late stage 
of the case would be unfairly prejudicial to the defendants.  It also found that the phrase Plaintiff 
relied upon did not create a duty which removed the case from the assumption of 
risk provisions of the Act.  The 
verdict form the district court ultimately selected asked the jury to first 
determine whether Ms. Beckwith’s injuries were caused by an inherent risk of a 
half-day guided trail ride provided by a dude ranch.  If they were not, the jury would be 
required to answer questions concerning negligence, causation, and damages.  
 
[¶21]   Appellant’s counsel also offered an 
instructionas to sources of a duty of care:
 
A 
duty may arise by contract, statute, common law, or when the relationship of the 
parties is such that the law imposes an obligation on the defendant to act 
reasonably for the protection of the plaintiff.  Authority:  Hatton v. Energy Electric Co., 148 P.3d 8, 151 WY 2006 (Wyo. 2006).  

 
The 
district court rejected this instruction for the same reasons that it rejected 
Appellant’s proposed verdict form   
It also noted that whether a duty of care exists or not is a question of 
law for the court and not an issue for the jury.  
 
[¶22]   Appellant also submitted an 
instruction which sought to explain the terms used to define the phrase 
“inherent risk” in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-122(a)(i):
 
            
Characteristic is defined as belonging to or especially typical or 
distinctive of the character or essential nature of.  Intrinsic means belonging to the inmost 
constitution or essential nature of a thing: essential or inherent.  Integral is defined as:  of, relating to, or serving to form a 
whole: essential to completeness.   
Authority:  Cooperman v. David, 214 F.3d 1162, 1173, 
1186 (10th Cir. 2000).
 
The 
district court held that the instruction was unnecessary because the words used 
in the statute each had a plain and ordinary meaning which did not require 
further definition, citing Masias v. 
State, 2010 WY 81, 233 P.3d 944 (Wyo. 2010).  
 
[¶23]   Appellant offered other 
instructions which were refused, and she also challenges those rulings in this 
appeal.  It is not necessary to 
discuss those instructions in detail at this point.
 
[¶24]   In his closing argument, counsel 
for Appellant argued that the acts of negligence she had identified were not 
inherent risks of horseback riding.  
Counsel for Appellees argued as she had throughout the case that 
Appellant’s injuries were caused by an inherent risk of trail riding on 
horseback.
 
[¶25]   The jury returned its verdict on 
November 19, 2010.  It answered only 
the first question as directed by the verdict form.
 
We, 
the jury, duly empaneled and sworn in this case, do unanimously find as 
follows:
 
1.    
Did 
the Plaintiff’s injuries result from an inherent risk of a guided horseback 
trail ride at a dude ranch?
 
Yes 
   X                
            
No ______
 
            
IF YOUR ANSWER IS “YES,” DO NOT ANSWER ANY MORE QUESTIONS.  Have the foreperson sign the verdict and 
deliver it to the bailiff.  IF YOUR 
ANSWER IS “NO,” GO TO THE NEXT QUESTION.  

 
[¶26]   The district court entered judgment 
on the jury’s verdict on March 3, 2011.  
It awarded costs to Appellees in an unspecified amount.  Appellant filed a timely notice of 
appeal in Case No. S-11-0101, raising the issues listed above.3
 
[¶27]   On March 23, 2011, Appellees 
applied for $8,864.47 in costs under Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) 
and Uniform Rule of District Court 501.  
Appellant timely objected, disputing specific items claimed by Appellees, 
but also contending that no award of costs should be made because of (1) the 
financial condition of the Appellant, (2) the impact of the loss of this case on 
Appellant, (3) the financial ability of the Appellees’ insurance company to pay 
the costs incurred in their defense, (4) the novelty, importance and closeness 
of the issues, and (5) the impact of the trial on Appellees.  She subsequently filed financial 
information reflecting her annual earnings.  
 
[¶28]   The district court held a hearing 
related to the issue of costs on July 15, 2011, and issued an order awarding 
costs on August 31, 2011.  It 
disallowed most of the costs claimed by Appellees, allowing them $3,707.65.  It declined to deny Appellees all costs, 
noting that Appellant had identified no Wyoming case law supporting the denial 
of costs based on the considerations she argued, and that she had made no 
showing that she was in bankruptcy or completely incapable of paying costs.  It held that in the absence of such an 
extreme showing it would decline to exempt her from the rule which generally 
allows for an award of costs to the prevailing party.
 
[¶29]   Appellant timely appealed the 
ruling on costs in Case No. S-11-0245.  

 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
Case 
No. 
S-11-101
 
[¶30]   
Appellant seeks review of the district court’s decisions regarding a 
proposed verdict form and jury instructions.  The following standards 
apply:
 
            
It is the duty of the district court to provide instructions to a jury 
which clearly express the law in a manner sufficient to allow the jury to apply 
the correct law to the facts as they have determined them.  Baier v. State, 891 P.2d 754, 756 (Wyo. 
1995).  A shortfall in those 
instructions which either misleads or confuses the jury will presage an 
injustice to the parties and require remand for a new trial. Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 960 (Wyo. 1990).
 
            
It does not follow, however, that this court will impress a de novo review of jury instructions as 
we do with most questions of law.  
Rather, it is incumbent upon the party alleging mistaken instructions to 
demonstrate error.  Vasquez By and Through Vasquez v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 913 P.2d 441, 443 (Wyo. 1996).  Prejudicial error is never 
presumed.  McWilliams v. Wilhelm By and Through 
Wilhelm, 893 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Wyo. 1995).  The party alleging error must show that 
the instructions had a tendency to confuse or mislead the jury before this court 
will consider reversal.  Bigley v. Craven, 769 P.2d 892, 895 
(Wyo. 1989).  Our review of 
allegedly errant jury instructions proceeds in light of the instructions as a 
whole rather than singling out particular instructions in a piecemeal 
fashion.  Ellison v. State, 3 P.3d 845, 849 (Wyo. 
2000).
 
            
Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 49, the submission of a particular form of special 
verdict is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Turcq v. Shanahan, 950 P.2d 47, 53 (Wyo. 
1997).  It follows that reversal may 
only be predicated upon an abuse of that discretion.  A party alleging error in a special 
verdict form must be vigilant.  
Failure to object to a special verdict form will not be considered on 
appeal if the complaining party failed to object or present their own 
alternative at trial.  Duffy v. Brown, 708 P.2d 433, 439 (Wyo. 
1985).
 
Addakai 
v. Witt, 
2001 WY 85, ¶¶ 14-16, 31 P.3d 70, 73 (Wyo. 2001); see also Loya v. Wyo. Partners of Jackson Hole, Inc., 
2004 WY 123, ¶ 13, 99 P.3d 972, 977 (Wyo. 2004). 
 
[¶31]   As this Court has previously 
observed, claimed errors in instructions must be viewed in the context of the 
entire trial to determine whether they are prejudicial:
 
Errors 
of substantive law contained in the language of an instruction require reversal 
if the error is prejudicial.  In 
reviewing the content of a challenged jury instruction, the charge is considered 
as a whole.  To measure the degree 
of prejudice, jury instructions are viewed in the light of the entire trial, 
including the allegations of the complaint, conflict in the evidence on critical 
issues and the arguments of counsel.  
The goal of our review is to determine if the charge presents a 
comprehensive, balanced and fundamentally accurate statement of the governing 
law to the jury.  The charge is 
deemed adequate if it is not likely to confuse or mislead the jury.  The fact that an instruction may have 
been more precisely drafted or drafted in a way more favorable to a party does 
not warrant reversal for a new trial.  

 
Betts 
v. Crawford, 
965 P.2d 680, 686 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 832 (Wyo. 1994) (citations 
omitted)).
.
Case 
No. 
S-11-0245  

 
[¶32]   A district court’s award of costs 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  
Wilson v. Tyrrell, 2011 WY 7, 
¶ 58, 246 P.3d 265, 281 (Wyo. 2011); Meyer v. Hatto, 2008 WY 153, ¶ 25, 198 P.3d 552, 557 (Wyo. 2008).  To 
prevail, the party contesting the district court’s ruling must show that the 
court “act[ed] in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the 
circumstances.”  Id.
 
DISCUSSION
 
Case 
No. 
S-11-0101

Verdict 
Form and Instruction on Sources of Duty of Care 
 
 
[¶33]   Section 1-1-123 provides, in 
pertinent part, as follows:
 
            
(a) Any person who takes part in any sport or recreational opportunity 
assumes the inherent risks in that sport or recreational opportunity, whether 
those risks are known or unknown, and is legally responsible for any and all 
damage, injury or death to himself or other persons or property that results 
from the inherent risks in that sport or recreational 
opportunity.
 
            
(b) A provider of any sport or recreational opportunity is not required 
to eliminate, alter or control the inherent risks within the particular sport or 
recreational opportunity.
 
            
(c) Actions based upon negligence of the provider wherein the damage, 
injury or death is not the result of an inherent risk of the sport or 
recreational opportunity shall be preserved pursuant to W.S. 
1-1-109.
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-1-123 (LexisNexis 2009).
 
[¶34]   “Inherent risk” is defined as 
“those dangers or conditions which are characteristic of, intrinsic to, or an 
integral part of any sport or recreational opportunity.”  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-122 (LexisNexis 
2009). The parties agreed that horseback riding at the Gros Ventre River Ranch 
qualified as a sport or recreational activity falling with the scope of the Act. 

 
[¶35]   This Court has previously held that 
the question of whether a particular risk is inherent in an activity covered by 
the Recreation Safety Act is generally one for the jury to decide.  That decision can be made as matter of 
law on summary judgment only when the case involves undisputed facts and when 
reasonable persons could only conclude that an injury or death was caused by an 
inherent risk.  Jackson Hole Mtn. Resort Corp. v. 
Rohrman, 2006 WY 156, ¶¶ 3, 15, 150 P.3d 167, 168, 172 (Wyo. 2006); Muller v. Jackson Hole Mtn. Resort, 2006 
WY 100, ¶ 14, 139 P.2d 1162, 1167 (Wyo. 2006); Halpren v. Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 566 
(Wyo. 1995).   

 
[¶36]   As already explained, the district 
court interpreted the Visitor’s Acknowledgement of Risk to release liability 
only for risks which were inherent in a horseback ride at a dude ranch.  That decision has not been challenged on 
appeal.  Its ruling anticipated that 
the jury’s decision as to whether Ms. Beckwith’s injuries were caused by an 
inherent risk of trail riding would resolve all issues relating to the 
applicability of both the Recreation Safety Act and the Rider’s Application and 
Liability Agreement.  If they were 
not, the claim would be barred by neither, and the jury could award damages if 
it found negligence, causation, and proven damages.
 
[¶37]   Appellant disagrees with this 
approach.  She argues that the 
language “[a]lthough The Gros Ventre River Ranch has taken reasonable steps to 
provide you with appropriate equipment and skilled guides so you can enjoy an 
activity for which you may not be skilled” created an obligation to provide 
skilled guides, which somehow removed the case from the scope of the Act.  The proffered verdict form would have 
directed the jury – upon finding that the guide involved in this case was not 
“skilled” – to proceed immediately to questions of negligence and damages, 
skipping over the question of whether Appellant was injured by an inherent risk 
of the trail ride.  The proffered 
instruction stating that contracts may be a source of a duty of care would in 
her view have tied the “skilled guides” language to the question on the verdict 
form.
 
[¶38]   Appellant points out that the 
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming dealt with a related 
issue in Carden v. Kelly, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (D. Wyo. 2001).  That 
case also involved a fall from a horse, which occurred in the Bridger-Teton 
National Forest.  The plaintiff 
argued that certain federal regulations preempted the Recreation Safety 
Act.  An acknowledgement of risk was 
also involved, although its contents are not set out in the report of the 
case.  The court in Carden held that the federal regulations 
did not preempt the Recreation Safety Act. Id. at 1326.  It also observed that the defendants “did 
not undertake or engage in a contractual duty which could potentially conflict 
with the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act.”  
Id. 
 
[¶39]   Building on this phrase in Carden, Appellant argues that the ranch 
agreed to do something (provide skilled guides) which would avoid limitations of 
the Recreation Safety Act, as well as the release language of the Rider’s 
Application and Liability Agreement.  
She characterizes the Visitor’s Acknowledgement of Risk as creating a 
duty of care rather than constituting a contractual guarantee of some kind. She 
contends that the district court should have adopted her verdict form, which 
would have taken the question of inherent risk from the jury if it believed the 
ranch had failed to provide the allegedly promised “skilled 
guides.”
 
[¶40]   There are a number of flaws in this 
argument.  First of all, even if a 
duty of care could arise from the acknowledgment of risk form, the existence and 
scope of a duty are questions of law for the court, not for the jury, as the 
district court correctly ruled.  Rice v. Collins Commc’n, Inc., 2010 WY 
109, ¶ 10, 236 P.3d 1009, 1014 (Wyo. 2010); Andersen v. Two Dot Ranch, Inc., 2002 WY 
105, ¶ 11, 49 P.3d 1011, 1014 (Wyo. 2002).  

 
[¶41]   Secondly, one of the “settled rules 
of contract interpretation” is that a court must “begin with the language of the 
contract.”  Wyo. Bd. of Land Comm’rs v. Antelope Coal 
Co., 2008 WY 60, ¶ 8, 185 P.3d 666, 668 (Wyo. 2008).  The words used in a contract are 
afforded the plain meaning that a reasonable person would give to them.  Doctors’ Co. v. Ins. Corp. of America, 
864 P.2d 1018, 1023 (Wyo. 1993).  
When the provisions in the contract are clear and unambiguous, the court 
looks only to the four corners of the document in arriving at the intent of the 
parties.  Hunter v. Reece, 2011 WY 97, ¶ 17, 253 P.3d 497, 502 (Wyo. 2011) (quoting Amoco 
Prod. Co. v EM Nominee Partnership, 2 P.3d 534, 540 (Wyo. 2000)).   
 
[¶42]   The language Appellant relies upon 
simply does not say what she claims it means.  It does not as a matter of law guarantee 
“skilled guides” – at most, it offers an assurance that the guest ranch used 
“reasonable efforts” to provide them.  
As the district court correctly held, neither the phrase in question nor 
the document as a whole can rationally be construed as a promise which somehow 
removed the case from the scope of the Recreation Safety Act.  
 
[¶43]   Throughout the trial, Appellant 
sought to prove and forcefully argued that the guide in charge when she was 
injured was not properly trained or adequately experienced.   This amounted to a contention that 
the ranch was negligent because it had failed to provide an adequately skilled 
guide.  Under the district court’s 
ruling, that argument went to an issue entrusted to the jury and was entirely 
proper.  However, by her verdict 
form, she asked the district court to go farther and to treat the language she 
refers to as some sort of guarantee which would have waived the benefit of the 
Recreation Safety Act and the exculpatory language of the Rider’s Application 
and Liability Agreement.   

 
[¶44]   The district court correctly held 
that the “gatekeeping” question as to both the Act and the Visitor’s 
Acknowledgement of Risk form was whether Ms. Beckwith’s injuries were caused by 
an inherent risk of the activity.  
It did not abuse its discretion in refusing Appellant’s proffered verdict 
form, which would have sidestepped a question properly entrusted to the 
jury.   Rohrman, §§ 13, 15, 150 P.3d  at 168, 
172.  It likewise did not err in declining 
to instruct the jury on potential sources of duties of care, as that was a 
question of law.
 
Further 
Definition of “Inherent Risk”  
 
[¶45]   Appellant also argues that the 
Court erred in failing to give her proposed instructions defining 
characteristic, intrinsic, and integral, which are words used by the legislature 
to define the term “inherent risk.”  
The Court would first note that it must look at the instructions as a 
whole to determine whether they were adequate.  Addakai, ¶ 15, 31 P.3d  at 73.  
Neither party designated the instructions that were given as part of the 
record on appeal, and they are therefore not before us.  A party seeking review of a district 
court’s decision must provide an adequate record for appellate review, and 
failure to do so would justify this Court in declining to review this issue at 
all.  Nish v. Schaefer, 2006 WY 85, ¶ 21, 138 P.3d 1134, 1142 (Wyo. 2006); Meyer v. 
Rodabaugh, 982 P.2d 1242, 1244 n.1 (Wyo. 1999).  
 
[¶46]   However, it is possible to glean 
from the record and from what appears to be agreement in the briefs that the 
district court instructed the jury on the statutory definition of the term 
“inherent risk.”  As already stated, 
that term is defined by the Recreation Safety Act as “characteristic of, 
intrinsic to, or an integral part of any sport or recreational 
opportunity.”  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§1-1-122(a)(i).  This Court has 
previously held that it is not necessary to define a term that does not have a 
technical or legal meaning different from that of its common meaning.  Masias v. State, 2010 WY 81, ¶ 25, 233 P.3d 944, 951 (Wyo. 2010); Ewing v. 
State, 2007 WY 78, ¶¶ 9-10, 157 P.3d 943, 946-47 (Wyo. 2007). 

 
[¶47]   The legislature has defined the 
term “inherent risk.”   It used 
words which have a common meaning to do so.  The district court did not err in 
declining to further define the language the legislature 
chose.
 
Instruction 
Concerning Exculpatory Clause 
 
 
[¶48]   Appellant argues the district court 
should have given an instruction that exculpatory clauses such as those used in 
the Rider’s Application and Liability Agreement must be strictly construed.  We are once again hampered in our 
understanding of the totality of the instructions because they are not of record 
on this appeal, and because it is clear that the district court modified some of 
the parties’ proposed instructions before they were given.    
 
[¶49]   However, it is clear from the 
record that the district court held that the exculpatory clause applied only to 
inherent risks of the trail ride, making its scope coterminous with the coverage 
of the Recreation Safety Act, and that it instructed the jury to that 
effect.  That ruling has not been 
appealed.  Knight v. TCB Constr. & Design, LLC, 
2011 WY 27, ¶ 15, 248 P.3d 178, 183 (Wyo. 2011); Triton Coal Co. v. Husman, Inc., 846 P.2d 664, 667 (Wyo. 1993).  

 
[¶50]   A claimed error which could not 
affect the outcome of a case cannot be the basis for a successful appeal.  DeJulio v. Foster, 715 P.2d 182, 187 
(Wyo. 1986); Nalder v. W. Park Hosp., 
254 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir. 2001).  
The jury was adequately instructed that the Rider’s Application and 
Liability Agreement did not pertain to anything other than an inherent risk of 
horseback trail riding.  That term 
was defined consistently with the Recreation Safety Act in other instructions to 
which there was no objection.  The 
district court had already construed the exculpatory language narrowly and 
limited the jury’s use of it by the instructions it gave.  The proffered instruction would have 
been superfluous and failure to give it could not have been prejudicial or have 
affected the outcome.  

 
Presumption 
of Due Care  
 
[¶51]   Appellant also offered an 
instruction which would have informed the jury that she was presumed to have 
been using due care when she was injured.  
Such instructions have been given in certain wrongful death cases because 
the decedent cannot testify.  DeJulio, 715 P.2d at 186-87; Gish v. Colson, 475 P.2d 717 (Wyo. 
1970).  Appellant cites no authority 
for the proposition that such an instruction should be given in a case involving 
a living plaintiff and eyewitnesses to her fall from the horse.  
 
[¶52]   In any event, Appellees abandoned 
their defense of contributory fault before the case was submitted to the 
jury.  Moreover, because the jury 
found that the fall that caused Appellant’s injuries was the result of an 
inherent risk of horseback riding, it did not reach any issue of 
negligence.  This claimed error 
therefore could not have affected the outcome of the case, and cannot be a basis 
for overturning the jury’s verdict.  
DeJulio, 715 P.2d at 186-87; 
Nalder, 254 F.3d  at 
1176.
 
Case 
No. 
S-11-0245
 
[¶53]   Appellant argues that the district 
court abused its discretion in awarding costs to Appellees.  Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) 
provides in pertinent part that “[e]xcept when express provision therefore is 
made either in a statute or in these rules, costs other than attorney’s fees 
shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs . . . .”
 
[¶54]   The award of costs under Rule 54(d) 
rests within the sound discretion of the district court.  
Bellis v. Kersey, 2010 WY 138, ¶ 23, 241 P.3d 818, 825 (Wyo. 2010); Snyder v. Lovercheck, 2001 WY 64, ¶ 6, 
27 P.3d 695, 697 (Wyo. 2001); Abraham v. 
Andrews Trucking Co., 893 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Wyo. 1995); Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 767 P.2d 158, 168 (Wyo. 1989).  The 
award must be reasonable under the circumstances, and the ruling must be neither 
arbitrary nor capricious.  Bellis, ¶ 23, 241 P.3d  at 825.  
“Abuse of discretion occurs when a court exceeds the bounds of reason or 
commits an error of law.”  Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 55 
(Wyo. 1993).    

 
[¶55]   Appellant argues that the district 
court should have denied Appellees all costs based on the four factors set forth 
above.  She argues that she is 
either indigent or nearly so, that the Appellees are wealthy, and that in any 
event their costs were paid by their insurance carrier.  
 
[¶56]   Appellant relies upon Badillo v. Central Steel and Wire Co., 
717 F.2d 1160, 1165 (7th Cir. 1983) (the presumption in favor of awarding costs 
may be overcome by a showing of indigence), Maldonado v. Parasole, 66 F.R.D. 388, 
390 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); and Boas Box Co. v. 
Proper Folding Box Corp., 55 F.R.D. 79 (E.C.N.Y. 1971) (indigence is a 
proper ground for denying costs in cases in which there is a wide disparity of 
economic resources).  She also 
argues that she pursued her claims in good faith, which should also be taken 
into consideration along with the economic disparity of the parties, citing Schaulis v. CTB/McGraw-Hill, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 666 (N.D. Cal. 1980).  
Finally, she argues that imposition of costs in the circumstances of this 
case would have a chilling effect on the willingness of litigants to seek their 
legal remedies.  

 
[¶57]   The district court considered 
Appellant’s arguments.  The record 
before it showed that Ms. Beckwith had a small annual income of between $829.77 
and $14,281.85 over a five-year period from 2006 to 2010.  The record did not show that she was 
suffering from extreme poverty, the usual definition of indigence.  The district court was aware from the 
evidence at trial that Ms. Beckwith and her companion had the resources to pay 
to spend up to two weeks at a guest ranch annually.  It also heard trial testimony which 
indicated that she was not so disabled that she could not engage in gainful 
employment.  In addition, the court 
took a sharp pencil to Appellees’ claim for costs, reducing it by over 50 
percent.  
 
[¶58]   We do not find it necessary to 
determine whether a district court should consider the factors argued by the 
Appellant.  The district court did 
in fact consider her arguments and rejected them.  Its decision was by no means beyond the 
bounds of reason, and it did not result from an error of law.  The Court therefore cannot find it to be 
arbitrary or capricious.    

 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶59]   The district court properly 
instructed the jury as to Appellant’s claims, and also provided an appropriate 
form of special verdict for the jury’s use.  The award of costs it made was not an 
abuse of discretion.  The judgment 
of the district court and its order awarding costs are therefore affirmed.  
 
FOOTNOTES
1She returned to the ranch in 2007 but did not ride.  
2Appellees argue that Appellant failed to submit an alternative verdict 
form.  The proposed form was 
evidently not specifically offered and marked as refused at the instruction 
conference, which would have been the common and better practice.  However, the district court subsequently 
filed Appellant’s proposed instructions and verdict form, which had been in the 
court’s possession.  Because it is 
clear that the district court saw and rejected the verdict form proposed by 
Appellant and because we can identify it from the record, we will consider the 
issue on the merits.  

3Appellant 
also disputed the award of costs, which were not established at the time her 
notice of appeal was filed, and which therefore became the subject of Case No. 
S-11-0245.