Case Title: O's Gold Seed Co. v. United Agri-Products Financial Services, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88-12

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-09-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
O's Gold Seed Co. v. United Agri-Products Financial Services, Inc.1988 WY 118761 P.2d 673Case Number: 88-12Decided: 09/23/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
O'S GOLD SEED COMPANY, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

UNITED AGRI-PRODUCTS 
FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, PlatteCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

Eric M. Alden, 
of Jones, Jones, Vines & Hunkins, Wheatland, for appellant.

Frank J. Jones, 
Wheatland, for 
appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This case is before the 
Court for a second time. In the prior appeal, United Agri-Products Financial 
Services, Inc. v. O's Gold Seed Company, 733 P.2d 252 (Wyo. 1987), we held, in 
reversing the district court, that the perfected security interest of United 
Agri-Products Financial Services, Inc. (UAP) in certain corn seed held by an 
insolvent retailer was superior to the consignor's interest retained by O's Gold 
Seed Company (O's Gold). Since O's Gold had previously retaken possession of the 
corn seed and apparently shipped it back to the company headquarters in 
Iowa, the 
hearing upon remand was limited to the issue of damages resulting from the 
wrongful taking. O's Gold, as appellant in the instant case, contests the 
district court's award of damages, interest, and costs to appellee 
UAP.

[¶2.]     We modify the award of 
interest and costs and affirm the judgment as modified.

[¶3.]     O's Gold states the 
issues as follows:

I. The Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law contained in the Trial Court's Order are not adequate to 
meet the standards of Rule 52 W.R.C.P.

II. The Trial Court's 
decision is not supported by the evidence produced in this 
matter.

III. The pre-judgment 
interest granted in the Trial Court's Order is not allowed by 
law.

IV. The costs awarded in 
the Order were not supported by any claim of record.

[¶4.]     Much of the factual 
background of this case is described in United Agri-Products Financial Services, 
Inc., 733 P.2d 252. In order to clarify the issues presented in this second 
appeal, however, a certain amount of repetition is 
unavoidable.

[¶5.]     Beginning in 1984, O's 
Gold, an Iowa corporation, delivered corn seed 
to Rocky Mountain Feed & Grain, Inc. (RockyMountain), a retailer of agricultural supplies in 
Platte County, Wyoming, for sale to area ranchers and 
farmers. Pursuant to the agreement between O's Gold and Rocky Mountain, the seed 
was provided to Rocky Mountain on a consignment basis under which Rocky Mountain 
would pay O's Gold at the end of the season for the seed sold and would return 
to O's Gold any unsold seed, receiving a commission for the seed that had been 
sold. This procedure worked satisfactorily the first year.

[¶6.]     In December 1984, 
RockyMountain obtained financing 
for its business operations from UAP and, in turn, granted UAP a security 
interest in its inventory and accounts receivable. UAP perfected its security 
interest in accordance with the applicable statutes. O's Gold subsequently 
delivered seed to RockyMountain for the 1985 season. In June 
1985, RockyMountain was forced to 
close its business due to financial difficulties. Upon closing, RockyMountain had in its possession 375 bags of 
corn seed that it had received from O's Gold.

[¶7.]     In July 1985, O's Gold 
initiated a replevin action against RockyMountain and UAP, seeking a determination 
that it was entitled to possession of the seed, an order directing that the seed 
be relinquished to it, and damages. On September 3, 1985, O's Gold posted a 
replevin bond, and the district court ordered that the seed be delivered to O's 
Gold. After a bench trial, the district court entered its judgment and order on 
May 19, 1986, finding that O's Gold was entitled to the seed free and clear of 
any claims by RockyMountain or UAP. Upon the appeal of UAP, 
we reversed, holding that, although the seed was held by Rocky Mountain on a 
consignment basis, it was nevertheless subject to UAP's security interest, 
because the consignment did not fall within any of the exceptions found in W.S. 
34-21-243(c) of Wyoming's enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code. United 
Agri-Products Financial Services, Inc., 733 P.2d 252.

[¶8.]     Upon remand, and 
pursuant to a motion by UAP, the district court set a hearing to determine the 
amount of damages UAP was entitled to as a result of the wrongful taking. The 
hearing was held on July 31, 1987, and, after issuing revised findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, the district court entered judgment in favor of UAP in 
the amount of $19,972.50, plus interest in the amount of $4,492.44 and costs of 
$161.75, for a total judgment of $24,626.69. The district court calculated the 
damages on the basis of O's Gold's customer price list for the seed minus the 
commission that would have been paid to RockyMountain if the seed had been 
sold.

[¶9.]     O's Gold's first 
contention is that the findings and conclusions made by the district court are 
inadequate. At the outset of the damages hearing, counsel for O's Gold requested 
that the court make findings of fact and conclusions of law as provided by 
W.R.C.P. 52(a).1 After the hearing, the district 
court issued the following revised findings and 
conclusions:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Rocky Mountain Seed 
and Grain, Inc., a Wyoming corporation purchased seed corn from O's Gold Seed 
Company, an Iowa corporation during the crop year of 1983.[2]

2. The corn was shipped 
to Rocky Mountain Seed and Grain, freight paid, by O's Gold and was billed out 
according to a customer price list (Exhibit A).

3. The normal business 
practice of O's Gold is to bill out seed corn at the prices listed in the 
customer price list, Exhibit A.

4. Upon the completion of 
the crop of the growing season the unsold seed corn is in the regular course of 
business, returned to O's Gold, freight pre-paid.

5. The customers' account 
is then credited for the returned seed corn and the customer billed for the 
amount of seed corn sold, less the commission to be paid the sales agent 
according to the sales agent commission schedule.

6. On September 3, 1985, 
O's Gold took possession of the seed corn located in Wheatland, Wyoming as follows:

50 bags of GB 
95

86 bags of 
6880

15 bags of 
2230

75 bags of 
2310

40 bags of 
GB115

109 bags of 
2330

7. If the seed corn had 
been returned in the regular course of business, RockyMountain would have been credited for the 
full list price of the seed corn.

8. The seed corn had a 
value as of September 3, 1985 as set out in the list price (Exhibit A) less the 
commission which would have been paid had the corn been 
sold.

9. United[] 
Agri[-]Products Financial Services are entitled to pre-judgment interest on a 
liquidated claim, defined as a claim which is readily computable by basic 
mathematical calculations, Holst vs. Guynn, 696 P.2d 632, (Wyo[.] 
1985).

10. United Agri-Products 
Financial Services, Inc. had a secured interest.

11. The property was 
wrongfully taken by O's Gold Seed Company on September 3, 1985. United 
Agri-Products Financial Services, Inc.[] vs. O's Gold Seed Company, 733 P.2d 252 
(Wyo. 
198[7]).

12. The value of the 
property at the time of the wrongful taking was $19,972.50. Defendant's Exhibit 
A (O's Gold price list, less commission).

CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW

1. United Agri-Products 
Financial Services, Inc. had the right to the seed corn. United Agri-Products 
Financial Services[,] Inc.[] vs. O's Gold Seed Company, 
[s]upra.

2. The value of the seed 
corn as of September 23, 1987 is as follows:

50 bags of GB 95 
............... $ 1,445.00 

86 bags of 6880 
.................... 5,495.40 

15 bags of 2230 
...................... 958.50 75 

bags of 2310 
.................... 4,492.50 

40 bags of GB115 
..................... 916.00 

109 bags of 2330 
................... 6,965.10 

TOTAL 
............................ $19,972.50

3. United Agri-Products 
Financial Services, Inc. is entitled to damages in the amount of $19,972.50 plus 
interest of $3994.50 (computed at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of 
taking through September 3, 1987, plus accruing interest from September 3, 1987 
and costs of $161.75 for a total judgment of $24,128.75 plus accruing interest 
after September 3, 1987.)[3]

[¶10.]  This Court has said that findings 
pursuant to a W.R.C.P. 52(a) request must be sufficient to indicate the factual 
basis for the decision on the contested matters. Lebsack v. Town of Torrington, 698 P.2d 1141, 
reh. denied and case remanded 703 P.2d 338, order amended 707 P.2d 1389 
(Wyo. 1985). 
We have further stated:

[T]he requested findings 
need not be set forth in elaborate detail but need only be clear, specific and 
complete in concise language informing the appellate court of the underlying 
bases for the trial court's decision.

Whitefoot v. 
Hanover Insurance Company, 561 P.2d 717, 720 (Wyo. 1977).

[¶11.]  The findings by the district court are 
more than sufficient to apprise this Court of the factual basis for the damage 
award. The district court set out the method of computation used in arriving at 
a figure for the seed (O's Gold's list price less commission) and then broke it 
down lot by lot to arrive at a total figure. The method used by the district 
court for assessing interest is similarly well delineated. The findings, 
however, do not indicate a factual basis for the award of costs. This omission 
will be discussed in connection with O's Gold's fourth issue, infra. Other than 
with respect to the award of costs, we conclude that these findings meet the 
requirements we have established for W.R.C.P. 52(a) 
findings.

[¶12.]  We turn now to the related question, and 
O's Gold's second issue, of whether the district court's findings are adequately 
supported by the evidence. O's Gold contends that the district court's decision 
that on September 3, 1985, the corn seed had a value equal to the list price of 
the corn seed less the sales agent's commission lacks evidentiary support. We 
disagree.

[¶13.]  The standard of review applied by this 
Court when the sufficiency of the evidence is at issue is well settled. We 
assume that the evidence of the prevailing party is true, leaving out of 
consideration the evidence presented by the other party in conflict therewith, 
and giving every favorable inference to the evidence of the successful party 
that may fairly and reasonably be drawn from it. Harmon v. Town of Afton, 745 P.2d 889 (Wyo. 
1987); M & M Welding, Inc. v. Pavlicek, 713 P.2d 236 (Wyo. 1986). The findings 
of the trial court are presumed to be correct and will not be disturbed by this 
Court unless they are clearly erroneous, inconsistent with the evidence, or 
contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Eddy v. First Wyoming Bank, N.A. - 
Lander, 750 P.2d 294 (Wyo. 1988); Pancratz 
Company, Inc. v. Kloefkorn-Ballard Construction/Development, Inc., 720 P.2d 906 
(Wyo. 
1986).

[¶14.]  The measure of damages for the loss, 
conversion, or destruction of personal property is the fair market value of the 
property at the time of loss, or, when there is no ascertainable market value, 
the actual economic value to the owner. Broyles v. Broyles, 711 P.2d 1119 
(Wyo. 1985); D'Arge v. Davis, 710 P.2d 830 (Wyo. 1985). See also Shikany v. Salt Creek 
Transp. Co., 48 Wyo. 190, 45 P.2d 645 (1935). Valuation of 
property is a question of fact, and there is no universal standard for such a 
determination. Thus, the question is left to the trier of fact to be decided on 
the basis of the facts and circumstances of each case. D'Arge, 710 P.2d 830. We 
have said that damages must be susceptible of ascertainment with a reasonable 
degree of certainty, Reiman Construction Company v. Jerry Hiller Company, 709 P.2d 1271 (Wyo. 1985); Cates v. Barb, 650 P.2d 1159 (Wyo. 1982), and that a 
court may not speculate or conjecture in awarding damages. Broyles, 711 P.2d 1119; State 
Highway Commission of Wyoming v. Brasel & Sims Construction Co., Inc., 688 P.2d 871 (Wyo. 
1984). We further observed in Douglas Reservoirs Water Users Association v. 
Cross, 569 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Wyo. 1977), quoted in Reiman Construction 
Company, 709 P.2d  at 1277, that:

[W]hile damages may not 
be calculable with absolute certainty, they should be susceptible of 
ascertainment with a reasonable degree of certainty and if there is evidence 
from which a reasonable estimate of money damages may be made that is 
sufficient, the primary objective being to determine the amount of loss, 
applying whatever rule is best suited to that purpose.

 

[¶15.]  The district court in this case 
determined that the value of the corn seed at the time of the wrongful taking 
was list price (O's Gold's) minus the commission that RockyMountain would have received if the seed 
had been sold. In making this determination, the district court relied upon the 
value assigned to the seed by O's Gold in its customer price list, which was 
introduced into evidence. In addition, there was testimony at the hearing that 
the wholesale value of the seed was approximately $22,000 and that the customer 
list price represented what RockyMountain would have had to pay O's Gold if 
the seed had been sold, with the commission payment being refunded later. 
Testimony at the hearing, as supported by the sales agent commission schedule, 
also indicated that, had RockyMountain sold the remaining 375 bags of 
seed, its commission would have been approximately six dollars per bag. While 
there also was testimony that little or no market for the seed existed at the 
time of year when the wrongful taking occurred, the district court, in a 
post-hearing letter to counsel, aptly observed:

[I]t appeared to me that 
the only evidence of the value of the seed corn was the price lists submitted by 
the Plaintiff and I still believe that to be the case. The Plaintiff would have 
had me [arbitrarily] set a low value on the seed corn without any basis other 
than a guess.

[¶16.]  Accepting the evidence of UAP as true and 
disregarding O's Gold's evidence in conflict therewith, as we must in accordance 
with our standard of review, we conclude that there is evidence to support the 
district court's award of damages and that the award was calculated with a 
reasonable degree of certainty. Although the evidence was not overwhelming, it 
was sufficient, and we cannot say the district court's findings were clearly 
erroneous. Thus, O's Gold's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must 
fail.

[¶17.]  O's Gold next contends that the district 
court erred in awarding prejudgment interest to UAP at a rate exceeding that 
which is allowed by law. We agree with O's Gold on this issue, and UAP has 
conceded the point on appeal.

[¶18.]  Prejudgment interest is recoverable in 
Wyoming on 
liquidated claims but not on unliquidated claims, with a liquidated claim being 
defined as one that is readily computable by basic mathematical calculation. 
Holst v. Guynn, 696 P.2d 632 (Wyo. 1985); Brasel & Sims Construction 
Co., Inc., 688 P.2d 871. We have established that, in the absence of a 
contractual provision to the contrary, W.S. 40-14-106(e) is applicable in 
determining the rate of prejudgment interest to be awarded. Holst, 696 P.2d 632; 
Rissler & McMurry Company v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 559 P.2d 25 
(Wyo. 1977). 
W.S. 40-14-106(e) provides:

If there is no agreement 
or provision of law for a different rate, the interest of money shall be at the 
rate of seven percent (7%) per annum.

[¶19.]  In the instant case, the district court 
correctly determined that UAP's claim, which is readily computable, is a 
liquidated claim. The district court, however, then awarded UAP prejudgment 
interest at the rate of ten percent per annum from the date of the taking 
(September 3, 1985) through December 3, 1987, the date the judgment was entered. 
By using this improper rate of interest, the district court awarded UAP 
prejudgment interest in the amount of $4,492.44 upon the $19,972.50 judgment. 
According to our calculations, using the seven percent per annum rate, the 
correct award of prejudgment interest should have been $3,145.67. We need not 
reverse the district court, however, in order to correct this 
error.

[¶20.]  In Robert W. Anderson Housewrecking and 
Excavating, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, School District No. 25, Fremont County, 
Wyoming, 681 P.2d 1326, 1333 (Wyo. 1984), we said:

[W]here the judgment does 
not result from passion or prejudice and any error may be ascertained by 
mathematical calculations, the supreme court may modify without 
reversing.

See also Adel v. 
Parkhurst, 681 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1984). The quoted rule is applicable in 
this situation. Accordingly, we affirm the award of prejudgment interest and 
order that it be modified to reflect the proper amount as set forth 
above.

[¶21.]  As its final issue, O's Gold contends 
that UAP was not entitled to the award of $161.75 for costs absent any claim or 
evidence of record to support the award. We agree.

[¶22.]  In its revised findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, and in the final judgment, the district court determined 
that UAP was entitled to an award of costs in the amount of $161.75. No 
explanation is given for the basis of this figure. As O's Gold correctly points 
out, the record is devoid of any evidence of or even a claim by UAP for 
costs.

[¶23.]  Costs were unknown at common law, and 
therefore they are recoverable and may be awarded only when authorized by 
statute or rule. Bi-Rite Package, Inc. v. District Court of Ninth Judicial 
District of Fremont County, 735 P.2d 709 (Wyo. 1987). In Wyoming, an award of 
costs to the prevailing party is authorized by W.R.C.P. 54(d) and W.S. 
1-14-124.4 State v. Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1 
(Wyo. 1985). 
In Bi-Rite Package, Inc., 735 P.2d  at 712, we said that costs may be awarded 
only "in amounts supported by evidence as having been incurred and reasonable." 
In Dieringer, we disallowed deposition costs awarded by the trial court, because 
the appellees in that case did not establish on the record that the claimed 
costs were reasonably necessary for trial preparation. In that case, we held 
that, under the circumstances, we could not sustain the district court's 
exercise of discretion in awarding such costs.

[¶24.]  In the case at bar, where there is total 
absence of any record evidence of costs incurred by UAP or of even a claim or 
petition for costs, we hold that it was an abuse of discretion for the district 
court to award these costs to UAP. The judgment of the district court is 
modified to delete the award of $161.75 in costs.

[¶25.]  The judgment in this case, as modified to 
reflect the correct rate of prejudgment interest and to delete the award of 
costs, now totals $23,118.17. The judgment of the district court is affirmed but 
remanded with directions to vacate the award of $24,626.69 and to enter judgment 
in favor of UAP for $23,118.17.

FOOTNOTES

1 W.R.C.P. 52(a) provides 
in relevant part:

General and special 
findings by court. - Upon the trial of 
questions of fact by the court, or with an advisory jury, it shall not be 
necessary for the court to state its findings, except generally for the 
plaintiff or defendant, unless one of the parties requests it before the 
introduction of any evidence, with the view of excepting to the decision of the 
court upon the questions of law involved in the trial, in which case the court 
shall state in writing its special findings of fact separately from its 
conclusions of law * * *.

2 The district court's 
recitation of the year 1983 undoubtedly represents a clerical error, because the 
events at issue in this case occurred in 1985.

3 The figures for 
prejudgment interest and for total judgment were increased in the final judgment 
to reflect the additional prejudgment interest that accrued prior to the entry 
of final judgment.

4 UAP also refers us to 
W.S. 1-34-112 as providing a basis for the award of costs in this action. That 
section provided for the award of costs to a defendant in a replevin action if a 
judgment was entered against the plaintiff. W.S. 1-34-112 was repealed effective 
May 22, 1987. The law in effect on the date of judgment determines the right to 
costs. 20 Am.Jur.2d, Costs § 7 (1965). Judgment in this case was entered on 
December 3, 1987; therefore, W.S. 1-34-112 has no bearing on UAP's right to 
costs.