Case Title: WEST AMERICA HOUSING CORPORATION, a Wyoming Corporation, JEANNE L. JOELSON, SHEENA JOELSON/SHOOPMAN, BOBBIE CHARLES CRAVER V. DONALD PEARSON, a/k/a DONALD E. PEARSON

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0068

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-11-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
WEST AMERICA HOUSING CORPORATION, a Wyoming Corporation, JEANNE L. JOELSON, SHEENA JOELSON/SHOOPMAN, BOBBIE CHARLES CRAVER V. DONALD PEARSON, a/k/a DONALD E. PEARSON2007 WY 184171 P.3d 529Case Number: S-07-0068Decided: 11/16/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
WEST 
AMERICA HOUSING CORPORATION, a Wyoming Corporation, JEANNE L. JOELSON, SHEENA 
JOELSON/SHOOPMAN, BOBBIE CHARLES 
CRAVER,Appellants(Defendants),v.DONALD PEARSON, 
a/k/a DONALD E. PEARSON,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from theDistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

Mary 
Elizabeth Galvan, Laramie, 
Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Don W. 
Riske and Sean C. Chambers of Riske, Salisbury & Kelly, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellants, West 
America Housing Corp. (WAHC), Jeanne L. Joelson (Joelson), Sheena 
Joelson/Shoopman (Shoopman), and Bobbie Charles Craver (Craver) challenge a 
January 21, 2007 order of the district court which found that:  (1)  A quitclaim deed from Appellee, Donald 
E. Pearson (Pearson) to Larry D. Oltman (Oltman) (Oltman is Jeanne Joelson's 
brother)  was void for lack of 
consideration; and (2) that subsequent quitclaim deeds from Oltman to WAHC, and 
from WAHC to WAHC and Craver, were void because they were fraudulent 
conveyances.  It helps to clarify 
what follows, to note here that Joelson, Shoopman (daughter of Joelson), Craver, 
and Oltman purported to own WAHC.  
Having voided all three of the above-described deeds, the district 
court's order also quieted title to the disputed property in Pearson, but did 
not award him any monetary damages.  
Appellants claim that the district court's order is erroneous for several 
reasons.  We will 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Appellants raise 
these issues:

 
 
            
A.  Whether a fully executed quitclaim deed, acknowledging 
payment of consideration and containing no reservation of rights may be set 
aside as void for lack of consideration under the doctrines of merger and 
estoppel by deed.

            
B.  Whether the trial court's setting aside the quitclaim deed 
from Pearson to Oltman was plain error, requiring reversal to give effect to the 
doctrines of merger and estoppel by deed.

            
C.  Whether conveyance of the subject property to a party to 
the deed, by quitclaim deed, was sufficient to confer title in the property to 
the grantee, who could then dispose of the property by quitclaim deed to a 
subsequent grantee.

 
 
Pearson 
articulates these issues:

 
 
I.          
Whether the doctrines of merger and estoppel by deed should be considered 
by this Court on appellate review since they were not raised in the District 
Court.

II.         
Whether a fully executed quitclaim deed may be set aside as void for lack 
of consideration under the doctrines of merger and estoppel by 
deed.

III.        
Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law in setting aside as 
void the Oltman to "WAHC Deed" and from "WAHC to WAHC and Craver Deed" as 
fraudulent conveyances.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      Pearson initially 
filed this suit in the district court on September 13, 2004, and then filed an 
amended complaint on April 29, 2005.  
In his complaint, Pearson averred that he acquired the subject property 
(Tract 1, Read Tracts, Laramie 
County, Wyoming -- 
hereafter the "Wrangler Road Property") by warranty deed on August 9, 2002.  That deed was recorded on August 15, 
2002.  Pearson made a down payment 
of $75,755.23 on the property.  He 
also took out a mortgage on that property in the amount of $279,200.00.  About these two items there is no 
dispute.  It is clear from the 
proceedings in this case that Pearson expected Joelson, Craver, and/or WAHC to 
repay him for the down payment he made on that property, but that they never did 
so.  Joelson admitted that she (and 
WAHC) had tried to refinance the property to get Pearson off the mortgage, but 
had been unsuccessful in doing so. 

 
 
[¶4]      At trial Pearson 
testified in his own behalf.  
Pearson was 84 years of age at that time (November 6, 2006), and his 
testimony was not always as coherent as might be desired.  However, he did relate that he knew 
Joelson and that she asked him to purchase the Wrangler Road Property in her 
behalf.  The record does not reflect 
why he did this at her request, except for Joelson's explanation that he did it 
for the income tax deduction for the mortgage interest paid.  Pearson denied having a long-term 
working relationship with Joelson in the real estate business.  Joelson, however, contended that they 
had done business deals together for four or five years and had known each other 
for a long time, including that Pearson had once indicated he wanted to marry 
her.  Joelson explained that she 
asked Pearson to work with her with respect to the Wrangler Road Property 
because she was looking for a home in a drier climate for her brother, Larry D. 
Oltman.  Oltman had a lung ailment 
and lived in Minnesota.  Joelson testified that she obtained the 
keys to the residential property directly from the previous owners, after 
Pearson made the purchase.  Although 
the record is not crystal clear in this regard either, Joelson testified that 
WAHC made all the mortgage payments (which included the taxes), as well as the 
premiums for the insurance coverage, on the Wrangler Road Property.  Apparently, Joelson  has resided on that property since the 
time of its purchase (Joelson testified that Oltman had a stroke and never made 
it out to Wyoming).

 
 
[¶5]      Joelson admitted 
that Pearson was not paid the $75,755.23 at the time the quitclaim deed to 
Oltman was executed (as is recited in that deed), but she did assert that, on a 
date she could not remember, she repaid Pearson for the $75,755.23 down payment 
he had made in her behalf by delivering to him that amount of cash, which she 
carried in a shoebox, to his room at an assisted living facility.  Craver became involved in this matter 
because he claimed to have provided Joelson with $24,000.00 in hundred dollar 
bills (from the sale of a vintage Camaro automobile), and so he wanted an 
interest in the Wrangler Road Property to protect his "investment."  His $24,000.00 was included in the 
"shoebox" payment.  Craver recorded 
the quitclaim deed from Pearson to Oltman because he was told to do so by Oltman 
or Joelson.  Craver was given an 
opportunity to present some documentary evidence to support his story, but he 
did not do so.  Joelson had no 
receipts or other documentation of the cash payment (her share of the repayment 
came from cash she kept around the house, so there was no withdrawal slip or 
other documentation).  The district 
court stated on the record that he found Joelson's testimony to be "wildly 
unbelievable" and likely "perjury."  
Craver did not appear at the trial, nor did Shoopman.  The record was left open for Craver to 
supplement the record before the district court, but he did not do 
so.

 
 
[¶6]      On May 14, 2004, 
a quitclaim deed was recorded in LaramieCounty, probably by Craver.  That deed transferred ownership of the 
Wrangler Road Property to Oltman by quitclaim deed and indicated that Pearson 
had received $75,755.23 ("in hand paid") as consideration for that 
transaction.  Pearson denied ever 
receiving any money from anyone involved in this case and did not recognize the 
quitclaim deed as something he had done.1

 
 
[¶7]      On October 7, 
2003, Oltman executed and delivered a quitclaim deed for the subject property to 
WAHC.  This deed was recorded on 
February 11, 2005.  In turn, on 
February 11, 2005, WAHC executed and delivered a quitclaim deed to the subject 
property to WAHC and Craver.  That 
deed was recorded on that same date.  
Eventually, Oltman conceded the following allegations made in Pearson's 
complaint:

 
 
3.2  Defendant 
Larry Oltman, by and through his sister and agent, Jeannie Joelson, represented 
to [Pearson] that the Defendants would pay to [Pearson] the sum of Seventy Five 
thousand Seven Hundred Fifty-Five Dollars and twenty three cents ($75,755.23) 
and assume and pay the mortgage for the remainder of the purchase price if 
[Pearson] would purchase the subject property, pay the down payment of Seventy 
Five thousand Seven Hundred Fifty-Five Dollars and twenty three cents 
($75,755.23), execute the Mortgage and then convey the Subject Property to 
Defendant Oltman.

. . . 
.

 
 
5.3  Defendants 
assured [Pearson] that they would not record such deed until they had paid the 
down payment to [Pearson] and had assumed and paid the Mortgage 
obligation.

. . . 
.

 
 
5.5  The recording of such Quitclaim deed by 
Defendants was a fraudulent conveyance made by Defendants for the specific 
purpose of defrauding [Pearson].  
[Vol. I, 232, 90-91]

 
 
As a 
result, Oltman was dismissed from this litigation.

 
 
[¶8]      Pearson alleged 
that no consideration was paid to him, and that the quitclaim deed to Oltman (to 
the extent it was actually authentic) should be void for lack of 
consideration.  Pearson also asked 
the district court to quiet title to the property in him and to require the 
occupants to pay any damages due to him.  
Pearson further asserted that intermediate transactions between Oltman, 
WAHC, and Craver constituted fraud.  
Pearson also contended that the transactions described above unjustly 
enriched the Appellants and the Appellants should have to disgorge any and all 
profits derived from the series of transactions described above.  Finally, Pearson contended that the 
latter two transactions described above were fraudulent conveyances prohibited 
by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-14-108 (LexisNexis 2005).

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]      When a matter has 
been tried before the district court without a jury, our review of the court's 
findings of fact is under the clearly erroneous standard.  Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  Kimble v. Ellis, 2004 WY 161, ¶ 7, 
101 P.3d 950, 953 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   The issues raised in this appeal 
were not addressed to the district court in the proceedings 
below:

 
 
We have 
held that we will not consider issues that were not "raised below in any meaningful manner."  Beaugureau v. State, 2002 WY 160, 
¶ 11, 56 P.3d 626, 631 (Wyo.2002) (emphasis added).  "It is a basic premise of appellate 
practice that to preserve an issue for appeal, that issue must be called to the 
attention of the trial court in a clear 
manner."  Elder v. Jones, 608 P.2d 654, 660 
(Wyo.1980) (emphasis added).

 
 

Yates v. 
Yates, 2003 
WY 161, ¶ 15, 81 P.3d 184, 189 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶11]   Appellants assert that the district 
court committed plain error because the principles of merger and estoppel by 
deed mandate reversal of the district court's order.  The well known elements of plain error 
are:  (1)  The record clearly and unequivocally 
reflects the facts complained of; (2) the facts demonstrate a transgression of a 
clear rule of law; (3) the error affects a substantial right of the appellant; 
and (4) the appellant has been materially prejudiced by the violation.  Nish v. Schaefer, 2006 WY 85, ¶ 18, 138 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶12]   Appellants assert that the doctrine 
of "merger" precludes the district court from concluding that there was no 
consideration paid Pearson for the quitclaim deed because the quitclaim deed 
acknowledges that he received the consideration.  In Rehnberg v. Hirschberg, 2003 WY 21, 
¶ 13, 64 P.3d 115, 119 (Wyo. 2003) we noted:

 
 
A 
contract for the sale of realty is executory until closing, at which time the 
contract has been executed, it merges with the deed, and it is no longer 
separately enforceable.  Richardson v. Hardin, 5 P.3d 793, 798 
(Wyo.2000);  40 North Corp. v. Morrell, 964 P.2d 423, 
426 (Wyo.1998);  Bakken v. Price, 613 P.2d 1222, 1227 
(Wyo.1980).  Thereafter, the rights 
and obligations of the parties are controlled by the deed.  Bakken, 613 P.2d  at 1227.  An exception to merger, called the 
"collateral obligations rule," provides that contractual obligations that are 
collateral to the transaction survive closing and may be enforced under the 
contract.  Richardson, 5 P.3d  at 799; 
American Nat. Self Storage, Inc. v. 
Lopez-Aguiar, 521 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla.App.1988); and Lawrence Berger, Merger by Deed--What Provisions of a 
Contract for the Sale of Land Survive the Closing?, 21 Real 
Estate L.J. 22, 24 (1992).  A 
collateral obligation is one that is not "deed-related."   Lawrence Berger, supra, 21 Real 
Estate L.J. at 32.   
Deed-related provisions are those concerning " 'title, possession [and] 
quantities or emblements of the land....' " Bakken, 613 P.2d  at 1232 (McClintock, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Chavez v. Gomez, 77 N.M. 341, 423 P.2d 31, 33 (1967)).

 
 
[¶13]   The important role the above-stated 
doctrine plays in contract law generally, and in real estate transactions in 
particular, cannot be overstated, and we do not dilute it here by concluding 
that we will not consider the Appellants' contentions in that regard under the 
plain error rule.  The evidence is 
at best equivocal that Pearson actually signed the quitclaim deed to 
Oltman.  That deed was recorded by 
someone who was not a party to the deed.  
The beneficiary of the deed agreed that no consideration was paid to 
Pearson, and the only evidence to support the element of consideration was 
Joelson's "wildly unbelievable" tale of delivering the consideration to Pearson 
on an unknown date, in the form of cash in a shoe box, for which she obtained no 
receipt.  It was not plain error for 
the district court to conclude that the deed at issue was void for lack of 
consideration, despite the language on the face of the deed.  To the extent that that decision 
involved findings of fact, they are not clearly erroneous, and the district 
court's application of the law is not in error, given these unusual 
circumstances.

 
 
[¶14]   With respect to estoppel by deed we 
have said:

 
 
Estoppel 
by deed generally is based upon the covenants contained in a warranty deed, and 
does not, therefore, arise from a conveyance via quitclaim.  3 American Law of Property, supra, § 15.19; 28 Am.Jur.2d, supra, § 
6; 4 Herbert Thorndike Tiffany, The Law 
of Real Property § 1231 (3d ed.1975); 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 261 (2001).  This rule is not absolute, however, and 
despite being a quitclaim in form, a conveyance may give rise to estoppel by 
deed when it "contains language showing that the grantor intended to convey and 
the grantee expected to acquire a particular estate."  28 Am.Jur.2d, supra, § 6; 4 The Law of Real Property, supra, §§ 
1230-31.  Alternatively stated, a 
"quitclaim deed is one which purports to convey, and is understood to convey, 
nothing more than the interest or estate in the property described of which the 
grantor is seized or possessed, if any, at the time, rather than the property 
itself."  26A C.J.S., supra, § 17 (footnote omitted).  In that sense, a document that purports 
to convey a particular interest simply is not a quitclaim deed.  The nature of a particular conveyance is 
determined by the intent of the parties:

 
 

Kennedy 
Oil v. Lance Oil & Gas Company, Inc., 2006 
WY 9, ¶ 29, 126 P.3d 875, 884 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶15]   To avoid being redundant, we reject 
this claim of plain error for the same reasons we rejected the one immediately 
above, because it was not argued to the trial court and because the plain error 
rule does not mandate that we do consider it.

 
 
[¶16]   The Appellants' other arguments are 
dependent upon the threshold issues discussed above, which we have 
rejected.  Since we affirm the 
district court's conclusion that the initial quitclaim deed was void, it flows 
virtually without need for discussion that the succeeding deeds were also 
void.  However, the district court 
determined that they were fraudulent conveyances under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
34-14-108 (LexisNexis 2005),2 which provided: "Every conveyance 
made and every obligation incurred with actual intent, as distinguished from 
intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future 
creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors."  The record reflects that Oltman conceded 
that the second and third quitclaim deeds were recorded with intent to defraud 
Pearson.  The district court's 
findings in this regard are not clearly erroneous, and its application of the 
law is not in error.  The order 
setting aside those conveyances and declaring them void is not 
erroneous.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶17]   The judgment of the district court 
is affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1It would be 
more accurate to say that Pearson's testimony was equivocal about whose 
handwriting appeared in the blanks of the quitclaim deed form.  Pearson conceded that it looked like it 
could be his printing in the blanks, and part of the signature looked like his, 
but taken as a whole, his testimony indicated that he did not recognize the 
deed, that he did not complete or sign it, and he most certainly did not receive 
the consideration that the deed indicated was delivered to him at signing.  He also said he would not have signed 
such a deed without first being paid.

 
 

2That statute 
was repealed in 2006 and is now found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-14-201 through 
34-14-212 (LexisNexis 2007).