Case Title: Slager v. Bell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2021 ME 52

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2021-11-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2021 ME 52 
Docket: 
Yor-21-101 
Argued: 
October 7, 2021 
Decided: 
 November 2, 2021 
 
Panel: 
 STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, and HORTON, JJ. 
 
 
RANDY SLAGER 
 
v. 
 
LORI L. BELL et al. 
 
 
HUMPHREY, J. 
[¶1]  Randy Slager appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (York 
County, Fritzsche, A.R.J.) dismissing with prejudice his complaint seeking 
(1) judicial review of a decision of the Town of Kennebunkport’s code 
enforcement officer (CEO) to lift the CEO’s previous suspension of building and 
land use permits issued to Slager’s neighbors, Lori L. Bell and John W. Scannell, 
and (2) a declaratory judgment that structures on Bell and Scannell’s property 
violate municipal ordinances.  Slager argues that the court should have 
dismissed his complaint without prejudice because he filed a notice of 
voluntary dismissal before any answer or motion for summary judgment was 
served.  See M.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1).  We conclude that Rule 41(a)(1) did not 
 
 
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authorize dismissal with prejudice, and we remand for the court to dismiss the 
complaint without prejudice. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  On March 27, 2020, Slager filed a complaint in the Superior Court 
seeking judicial review of a decision by the CEO that lifted the CEO’s previous 
order suspending building and land use permits issued to Bell and Scannell.  In 
his complaint, as amended on April 6, 2020, Slager sought both a judicial review 
of governmental action pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B and a declaratory judgment.  
See M.R. Civ. P. 15(a).  In the declaratory judgment action, Slager alleged that 
the process for review of the CEO’s decision was inadequate and that he was 
entitled to a declaratory judgment that structures on Bell and Scannell’s 
property violated municipal ordinances. 
[¶3]  In May 2020, Bell, Scannell, and the Town (collectively, Bell)—the 
defendants named in Slager’s complaint—filed written appearances.  Slager 
filed his proposed record of the Town’s proceedings, see M.R. Civ. P. 80B(e)(1), 
on May 22, 2020, and applied, unsuccessfully, for transfer of the matter to the 
Business and Consumer Docket.  He also moved for a trial of the facts.  In June 
2020, Slager moved to supplement his complaint but later withdrew that 
motion. 
 
 
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[¶4]  On August 11, 2020, Slager moved for leave to file a second amended 
complaint that omitted the declaratory judgment claim.  Bell opposed the 
motion in part and objected to Slager’s proposed record, filing an alternative 
proposed record with the court.   
 
[¶5]  On October 2, 2020, Slager filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of 
the action pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which allows a voluntary dismissal without prejudice “at any time before 
service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, 
whichever first occurs.”  M.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(i).  Bell then moved for the court 
to dismiss the matter with prejudice, arguing that although no answer was 
served because no answer is required for purposes of a Rule 80B appeal, the 
function of the answer had been served by Bell’s appearance, and given the 
parties’ active litigation of the matter, a dismissal without prejudice should not 
be allowed.  Bell included a request for costs and attorney fees as a sanction for 
Slager’s alleged abuse of the litigation process.1   
                                         
1  Rule 41 authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss only “[f]or failure of the plaintiff to prosecute 
for 2 years or to comply with these rules or any order of court.”  M.R. Civ. P. 41(b)(2).  Thus, the rule 
did not authorize Bell’s motion to dismiss the action with prejudice, which, in context, is more 
appropriately characterized as an objection to Slager’s notice of dismissal and a motion for sanctions.  
The court denied Bell’s motion for sanctions, and Bell does not appeal from that ruling.   
 
 
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[¶6]  The court dismissed the matter with prejudice, stating that the 
provision in Rule 80B(b) dispensing with the need to file an answer but 
requiring an appearance, “coupled with the number of motions and pleadings 
and the associated costs,” justified a dismissal with prejudice.  The court denied 
Bell’s motion for sanctions.   
 
[¶7]  Slager moved for reconsideration, but the court denied his motion, 
stating, “Given that this case had advanced well beyond the preliminary phase 
dealt with in Rule 41[,] the appropriate dismissal was with prejudice.”  Slager 
timely appealed from the judgment.2  See 14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2021); M.R. Civ. P. 
80B(n); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶8]  We review the interpretation of Rule 41 de novo, looking to the plain 
language of the rule to determine its meaning.  Doe v. Hills-Pettitt, 2020 ME 140, 
¶ 5, 243 A.3d 461.  The rule must be construed consistently and harmoniously 
with all applicable rules of court.  See Me. Sav. Bank v. DeCosta, 403 A.2d 1195, 
1199 (Me. 1979). 
                                         
2  Although a complaint for judicial review of the CEO’s decision could not be commenced anew 
because such an appeal must be commenced within thirty days after the challenged governmental 
act or failure to act, see M.R. Civ. P. 80B(b), a new declaratory judgment action would not be 
time-barred, see 14 M.R.S. §§ 752, 5953 (2021).  Thus, this appeal seeking remand for a dismissal 
without prejudice could provide real and effective relief and is not moot.  See In re Involuntary 
Treatment of K., 2020 ME 39, ¶ 9, 228 A.3d 445. 
 
 
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[¶9]  Rule 41(a)(1)(i) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
“an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court . . . by filing 
a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an 
answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs.”  M.R. 
Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(i).  “Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal . . . the 
dismissal is without prejudice . . . .”  M.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1). 
[¶10]  For a Rule 80B complaint, an answer is not prohibited, but also not 
required: “No responsive pleading need be filed unless required by statute or 
by order of the court, but in any event any party named as a defendant shall file 
a written appearance within the time for serving an answer under Rule 12(a).”  
M.R. Civ. P. 80B(a); see also M.R. Civ. P. 12(a) (providing that, with certain 
exceptions, an answer must be filed “within 20 days after the service of the 
summons and complaint upon [the] defendant”).  There is no prohibition 
against filing a motion for summary judgment in a Rule 80B matter, including 
as to an independent claim for declaratory judgment.  See M.R. Civ. P. 56(b) 
(“A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, but within such time as not to 
delay the trial, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary 
judgment in the party’s favor as to all or any part thereof.”).   
 
 
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[¶11]  According to the plain meaning of Rule 41(a)(1)(i), only “service 
by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment” will 
terminate the period during which a plaintiff may file a notice of voluntary 
dismissal to terminate the action without prejudice.  Although Rule 80B(a) 
requires a written appearance to be filed “within the time for serving an 
answer,” neither Rule 41 nor Rule 80B indicates that the written appearance is 
an answer for purposes of Rule 41(a)(1)(i).  Without such an express provision, 
the plain meaning of Rule 41(a)(1)(i) must be given its effect. 
[¶12]  Abundant federal case law supports the strict, plain-language 
interpretation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)—the federal rule upon which Maine’s 
Rule 41(a)(1) is based.  See M.R. Civ. P. 41 Advisory Committee’s Notes 1989 
(indicating the intention to adopt the language of Federal Rule 41(a)(1) “to 
provide that the plaintiff may unilaterally dismiss an action only prior to the 
filing of the answer or a motion for summary judgment, rather than at any time 
prior to trial, as formerly”); Manze v. State Farm Ins. Co., 817 F.2d 1062, 1066 
(3d Cir. 1987) (holding that only the service of an answer or a motion for 
summary judgment extinguishes a plaintiff’s right to dismiss the complaint 
without prejudice); Marex Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 2 F.3d 
544, 546-47 (4th Cir. 1993) (same); Aero-Colours, Inc. v. Propst, 833 F.2d 51, 52 
 
 
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(5th Cir. 1987) (same); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Smith, 706 F.2d 793, 
795-96 (7th Cir. 1983) (same).  This interpretation has been applied even when 
extensive court proceedings have taken place.  See, e.g., Merit Ins. Co. v. 
Leatherby Ins. Co., 581 F.2d 137, 142-43 (7th Cir. 1978) (allowing voluntary 
dismissal despite proceedings on a motion to stay proceedings and to compel 
arbitration). 
[¶13]  Federal courts, when construing the corresponding federal rule 
based on its plain language, have also held that serving court documents other 
than an answer or motion for summary judgment does not suffice to prevent a 
plaintiff from voluntarily dismissing an action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
41(a)(1)(A)(i).  See, e.g., Sachs v. Italia Societa Anonima Di Navigazione, 
30 F. Supp. 442, 442-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (appearance); Universidad Cent. 
Del Caribe, Inc. v. Liaison Comm. on Med. Educ., 760 F.2d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 1985) 
(Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss); Marex Titanic, Inc., 2 F.3d at 545-48 
(motion for injunction); see also 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2363 at 499-500 (2020) (“‘Answer’ . . . does 
not mean appearance, and the mere fact that a defendant has appeared does 
not preclude a voluntary dismissal when the defendant has not answered or 
moved for summary judgment.”). 
 
 
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[¶14]  Federal courts have held that when a dismissal is effectuated 
through a notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1), the party dismisses as of 
right, and a court may not direct that the dismissal be with prejudice, see 
Winterland Concessions Co., 706 F.2d at 794-96; Manze, 817 F.2d at 1065-67, 
even if the defendant has incurred significant expenses, see, e.g., Universidad 
Cent. Del Caribe, Inc., 760 F.2d at 16-18.3  As one leading treatise states, “a 
defendant is in no position to complain about the inconvenience flowing from 
a voluntary dismissal, where the problem could have been averted by simply 
answering the complaint or moving for summary judgment.”  8 James W. Moore 
et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 41.33(5)(c)(vii) (3d ed. 2007).  Here, although 
Bell was not required to serve and file an answer, she could have done so or 
could have served a motion for summary judgment.  See M.R. Civ. P. 56(b).   
[¶15]  Because we apply the rule as it is written, consistent with federal 
precedent, see, e.g., Manze, 817 F.2d at 1066, and with our own rules for 
                                         
3  Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in one case held that a 
voluntary dismissal without prejudice was improper even though no answer or motion for summary 
judgment had been served, it held so when an extensive hearing had been held at which the merits 
of the controversy were raised.  See Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 203 F.2d 105, 107-08 
(2d Cir. 1953).  Moreover, even the Second Circuit has acknowledged that Harvey Aluminum has been 
discredited, see Thorp v. Scarne, 599 F.2d 1169, 1174-77 (2d Cir. 1979), and other jurisdictions have 
not followed its reasoning.  See, e.g., Winterland Concessions Co. v. Smith, 706 F.2d 793, 795 (7th Cir. 
1983) (noting that Harvey Aluminum “has been repudiated in its own Circuit and elsewhere” (citation 
omitted)). 
 
 
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construing unambiguous rules of court, see Hills-Pettitt, 2020 ME 140, ¶¶ 5-7, 
243 A.3d 461, we vacate the judgment and remand for a dismissal without 
prejudice. 
The entry is: 
 
Judgment vacated.  Remanded for dismissal of 
the complaint without prejudice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alan R. Atkins, Esq., and Fulton S. Rice, Esq. (orally), Alan R. Atkins & Associates, 
Portland; and Andrew W. Sparks, Esq., and William J. Kennedy, Esq., Drummond 
& Drummond, LLP, Portland, for appellant Randy Slager 
 
Daniel L. Rosenthal, Esq. (orally), Jennie L. Clegg, Esq., and Trey R. Milam, Esq., 
Marcus Clegg, Portland, for appellees Lori L. Bell and John W. Scannell 
 
Amy K. Tchao, Esq., and Jeana M. McCormick, Esq. (orally), Drummond 
Woodsum, Portland, for appellee Town of Kennebunkport 
 
 
York County Superior Court docket number AP-2020-07 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY