Case Title: Griffith v. Aultman Hosp.

Citation: 2016-Ohio-1138

Docket Number: 2014-1055

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2016-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Griffith v. Aultman Hosp., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-1138.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-1138 
GRIFFITH, EXR., APPELLANT, v. AULTMAN HOSPITAL, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Griffith v. Aultman Hosp., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-1138.] 
Medical records—R.C. 3701.74—Data generated in the process of a patient’s 
healthcare treatment that pertains to the patient’s medical history, 
diagnosis, prognosis, or medical condition qualifies as a medical record—
The physical location of the data is not relevant to the determination 
whether than data qualifies as a medical record. 
(No. 2014-1055—Submitted September 2, 2015—Decided March 23, 2016.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, 
No. 2013CA00142, 2014-Ohio-1218. 
_________________ 
 
KENNEDY, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal from the Fifth District Court of Appeals, we consider 
the definition of “medical record” as it is used in R.C. 3701.74.  Appellant, Gene’a 
Griffith (“Griffith”), advances the following proposition of law:  “A hospital should 
not be permitted to withhold portions of a patient’s medical record by unilaterally 
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selecting and storing those medical records in a department other than its medical 
records department.” 
{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we conclude that because the Ohio 
General Assembly did not limit the definition of “medical record” in R.C. 
3701.74(A)(8) to data in the medical-records department, the physical location of 
the data is not relevant to the determination whether that data qualifies as a medical 
record.  Instead, the focus is whether a healthcare provider made a decision to keep 
data that was generated in the process of the patient’s healthcare treatment and 
pertains to the patient’s medical history, diagnosis, prognosis, or medical condition.  
We hold that for purposes of R.C. 3701.74(A)(8), “maintain” means that the 
healthcare provider has made a decision to keep or preserve the data. 
{¶ 3} We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the 
matter to the trial court. 
I. 
Facts and Procedural History 
A. 
Howard’s Surgery and Death 
{¶ 4} On May 2, 2012, Howard Griffith (“Howard”), Gene’a Griffith’s 
father, was admitted by appellee, Aultman Hospital, for surgery.  After being 
transferred out of intensive care to a step-down unit, Howard developed intermittent 
atrial fibrillation and was placed on continuous cardiac monitoring. 
{¶ 5} Around 4 a.m. on May 6, 2012, a nurse in the step-down unit assessed 
Howard and found that he was doing well.  About 45 minutes later, an x-ray 
technician found Howard in his bed with his gown ripped off, the cardiac monitor 
no longer attached to his body, his central line lying on the floor, and his chest tube 
disconnected.  Howard was unresponsive and did not have a heartbeat.  Medical 
personnel resuscitated him and moved him to the intensive-care unit.  However, 
Howard had suffered severe brain damage and after he made no neurological 
improvement, his family decided to remove him from life support on May 7, 2012.  
Howard died approximately nine hours later on May 8, 2012. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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B. 
Requests for Howard’s Medical Record  
{¶ 6} On July 24, 2012, Griffith requested a copy of Howard’s complete 
medical record.  The hospital provided some documents in response to this request.  
Another written request was made on October 17, 2012.  On October 22, 2012, the 
hospital produced the medical record for the period May 2 through 8, 2012, that 
existed in the medical-records department.  On December 12, 2012, Griffith’s 
representative made an in-person request and was permitted to review what was 
represented to her as the complete medical record.  On December 14, 2012, another 
written request was made for the medical record.  On December 31, 2012, the 
hospital again produced the medical record that existed in the medical-records 
department for the period May 2 through 8, 2012. 
{¶ 7} Griffith then filed this action pursuant to R.C. 3701.74 and 2317.48 
to compel the production of Howard’s complete medical record.  The complaint 
alleged that the hospital had failed to produce any monitoring strips or nursing 
records from Howard’s hospital stay. 
{¶ 8} After filing the complaint, Griffith served the hospital with requests 
for admissions and interrogatories.  In response, the hospital admitted that prior to 
filing the action, it had failed to produce Howard’s “entire and complete medical 
record in response” to each of Griffith’s medical-record requests.  In the answer to 
interrogatories, Jennifer Reagan-Nichols, the director of medical records and 
transcription at the hospital, verified that after Griffith filed the action, the hospital 
produced Howard’s entire medical record.  Contemporaneously with the answer, 
the hospital produced hard copies of cardiac-monitoring data from May 6, 2012, 
“as responsive documents from the visit that are not part of the medical record.”  
Thereafter, Reagan-Nichols was deposed. 
{¶ 9} In the initial deposition on March 11, 2013, Reagan-Nichols testified 
that the hospital had produced Howard’s cardiac-rhythm strips from 4:00 a.m. to 
4:51 a.m. on May 6 in response to the request for documents.  While monitoring 
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strips for a patient that are received by her department would be made part of the 
medical record, she explained that Howard’s printouts were not part of his medical 
record because the nursing staff had not provided them to the medical-records 
department.  She did not know who directed the nurses not to print Howard’s data.  
Reagan-Nichols did not know whether the strips met the legal definition of medical 
record, but she did not have any reason to believe they did not meet the definition. 
{¶ 10} On March 14, 2013, the hospital filed a motion for summary 
judgment, arguing that a complete copy of Howard’s medical record had been 
produced.  In support, the hospital provided the sworn interrogatory answers of 
Reagan-Nichols. 
{¶ 11} On March 27, 2013, Reagan-Nichols submitted an errata sheet to 
correct some of her deposition testimony.  In that sheet, she stated that the May 6 
rhythm strips did not meet the legal definition of medical records.  She also stated 
that the rhythm strips “were printed from electronic monitoring equipment after the 
discharge of the patient at the direction of hospital Risk Management.  The data in 
this equipment is not part of the medical record.” 
{¶ 12} Subsequently, the trial court ordered a second deposition to address 
the issues presented by the errata sheet.  In that deposition, Reagan-Nichols stated 
that to make sure her answers in her first deposition were correct, she asked 
questions of the hospital’s director of risk management and a registered nurse with 
the cardiac unit.  Reagan-Nichols testified, based on information she had received 
from the hospital’s director of risk management, that the May 6 rhythm strips 
provided to Griffith were printed from Howard’s cardiac monitor by a registered 
nurse after Howard’s death at the direction of the hospital’s risk-management 
department.  She did not know when risk management ordered the nurse to print 
Howard’s data or whether the nurse printed all the data on the monitor relevant to 
Howard. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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{¶ 13} Reagan-Nichols stated that the cardiac monitor electronically stored 
a patient’s data for 24 hours after that patient’s discharge.  After 24 hours, however, 
the information was deleted from the monitor unless a physician ordered that the 
data be saved.  Reagan-Nichols did not know for how long the data would be saved.  
She believed that all of Howard’s monitoring data was saved. With respect to 
Howard, Reagan-Nichols did not know if “discharge” meant his transfer from the 
step-down unit to the intensive-care unit or after his death. 
{¶ 14} After the second deposition, the hospital produced a cardiac-rhythm 
strip for Howard from May 3, 2012, at 2:51 a.m. without qualification. 
C. 
Lower Court Proceedings 
{¶ 15} The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital.  
It concluded that the hospital had produced Howard’s medical record, as defined 
by R.C. 3701.74(A)(8). 
{¶ 16} On appeal, the Fifth District affirmed the trial court’s judgment in a 
two-to-one decision.  The majority agreed with the hospital that the word 
“maintained” in R.C. 3701.74(A)(8) pertains only to records that “ ‘a hospital 
determines needs to be maintained by a health care provider in the process of a 
patient’s health care’ ”: “ ‘not everything having to do with the patient’ ” and “ ‘not 
that which a Plaintiff in a * * * medical malpractice case thinks should be 
maintained.’ ”  2014-Ohio-1218, ¶ 22, quoting the argument made by the hospital 
attorney on the motion for summary judgment.  Therefore, the court held that “the 
medical record consists of what was maintained by the medical records department 
and information that the provider decides not to maintain is not part of the medical 
record.”  Id.  Documents kept by any other department, including risk management, 
“do not meet the definition of a medical record because they were not ‘maintained’ 
by the medical records department.” Id. at ¶ 30. Because the hospital had certified 
that it produced Howard’s medical records, as that term was defined by the statute, 
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the court of appeals found that the trial court did not err in granting summary 
judgment for the hospital.  Id. at ¶ 22. 
II. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 17} This appeal requires us to determine what constitutes a “medical 
record” as that term is used in R.C. 3701.74(A)(8).  We agree with the Fifth District 
that the term “medical record” in R.C. 3701.74(B) does not include all patient data 
but includes only that data that a healthcare provider has decided to keep or preserve 
in the process of treatment.  However, the Fifth District erred in holding that the 
medical record consists only of information maintained by the medical-records 
department.  The statute defines “medical record” to mean any patient data 
“generated and maintained by a health care provider,” without any limitation as to 
the physical location or department where it is kept.  R.C. 3701.74(A)(8).  We 
therefore remand this cause to the trial court to determine whether the hospital met 
its burden on a motion for summary judgment to show that it had produced 
Howard’s entire “medical record” in accordance with our decision. 
A. 
Definition of “medical record” in R.C. 3701.74(A)(8) 
{¶ 18} When interpreting a statute, this court’s paramount concern is 
legislative intent.  State ex rel. United States Steel Corp. v. Zaleski, 98 Ohio St.3d 
395, 2003-Ohio-1630, 786 N.E.2d 39, ¶ 12.  “[T]he intent of the lawmakers is to 
be sought first of all in the language employed, and if the words be free from 
ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly, and distinctly the sense of the 
lawmaking body, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation.”  
Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574 (1902), paragraph two of the 
syllabus.  We apply the statute as written, Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 
125 Ohio St.3d 510, 2010-Ohio-2550, 929 N.E.2d 448, ¶ 20, and we refrain from 
adding or deleting words when the statute’s meaning is clear and unambiguous, 
Armstrong v. John R. Jurgensen Co., 136 Ohio St.3d 58, 2013-Ohio-2237, 990 
N.E.2d 568, ¶ 12. 
January Term, 2016 
 
7
{¶ 19} R.C. 3701.74(B) sets forth the procedure by which a “patient, a 
patient’s personal representative, or an authorized person” may “examine or obtain 
a copy of part or all of a medical record.”  “Medical record” is defined as “data in 
any form that pertains to a patient’s medical history, diagnosis, prognosis, or 
medical condition and that is generated and maintained by a health care provider in 
the process of the patient’s health care treatment.”  R.C. 3701.74(A)(8). 
{¶ 20} The meaning of the word “maintain” lies at the heart of this dispute.  
The hospital argues that “maintain” connotes an exercise of discretion and a level 
of management that brings the data into a discrete set of records.  Therefore, the 
medical record, according to the hospital, consists of the information that the 
healthcare provider deems appropriate to maintain in a discrete location for the care 
of the patient.  Griffith argues, consistent with the view of the Fifth District’s 
dissenting judge, that the statute does not authorize the hospital to limit the medical 
record to include only those records it sends to its medical-records department. 
{¶ 21} The legislature did not define “maintain” in R.C. 3701.74.  
Moreover, the word has not “acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether 
by legislative definition or otherwise,” that we are required to apply here.  R.C. 
1.42.  Therefore, to resolve the question, we look to the ordinary, common meaning 
of the word “maintain.”  See Weaver v. Edwin Shaw Hosp., 104 Ohio St.3d 390, 
2004-Ohio-6549, 819 N.E.2d 1079, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 22} “Maintain” is defined as “[t]o continue in possession of.”  Black’s 
Law Dictionary 1097 (10th Ed.2014).  Contrary to the hospital’s assertion, the 
definition of “maintain” does not depend on a managerial decision to keep or 
preserve the data in a discrete location or file.  Instead, the ordinary and common 
meaning conveys that the healthcare provider has made a decision to keep or 
preserve the data. 
{¶ 23} R.C. 3701.74(A)(8) does not state that a medical record must be kept 
in a specific physical location.  To interpret R.C. 3701.74(A)(8) as limiting a 
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medical record to data, generally or in a discrete set, in the medical-records 
department would require us to insert words not used by the General Assembly.  
“In matters of construction, it is the duty of this court to give effect to the words 
used, not to delete words used or to insert words not used.”  Cleveland Elec. Illum. 
Co. v. Cleveland, 37 Ohio St.3d 50, 524 N.E.2d 441 (1988), paragraph three of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 24} By comparison, Ark.Code Ann. 16-46-402 defines “medical 
records” as “health care records * * * maintained by the medical records department 
of a * * * medical facility.”  The Arkansas General Assembly expressed the intent 
that the record must be in the physical location of the medical-records department.  
The Ohio General Assembly did not. 
{¶ 25} We therefore disagree with the reasoning of the Fifth District and 
conclude that the physical location of patient data is not relevant to the 
determination whether that data qualifies as a medical record under R.C. 
3701.74(A)(8).  Rather, the definition focuses on whether a healthcare provider 
made a decision to keep data that was generated in the process of the patient’s 
healthcare treatment and pertains to the patient’s medical history, diagnosis, 
prognosis, or medical condition. 
B. 
The hospital’s evidentiary burden  
{¶ 26} We now consider whether the hospital met its burden on a motion 
for summary judgment to show that there was no genuine issue of material fact that 
it produced Howard’s entire medical record.  See Civ.R. 56(C).  A party seeking 
summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court of 
the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record before the trial 
court which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material 
element of the nonmoving party’s claim.”  Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292, 
662 N.E.2d 264 (1996).  The hospital argued in its motion for summary judgment 
that it had met its initial burden by producing a certified copy of Howard’s medical 
January Term, 2016 
 
9
record as it existed in the medical-records department.  According to the hospital, 
the May 6 cardiac-monitoring strips, which were printed after discharge at the 
direction of the risk-management department, did not meet the definition of 
“medical record” because they were not kept in the medical-records department. 
{¶ 27} Reagan-Nichols testified that the data on the cardiac monitor is 
deleted 24 hours after discharge unless it is saved at the direction of a physician.  If 
indeed saved at the direction of a physician before discharge, the cardiac-
monitoring information—and other patient data saved by a healthcare provider but 
not kept in the medical-records department—would fall under the definition of 
“medical record.”  However, because the proceedings below focused only on 
medical records kept in the hospital’s medical-records department, the record 
before us is insufficient to determine whether the hospital produced the entirety of 
Howard’s medical record.  Therefore, we remand to the trial court to apply the 
definition of medical record as set forth in this decision, to order further 
proceedings if needed to develop the evidentiary record, and to make a 
determination whether the hospital has met its burden. 
C. 
No requirement in R.C. 3701.74 to state a reason when requesting 
medical records 
{¶ 28} Finally, we conclude that the plain language of R.C. 3701.74 does 
not require that a patient seeking a medical record state a reason for doing so.  The 
Fifth District found that the purpose of R.C. 3701.74 is to “enable the patient to 
obtain his or her file in order, for example, to obtain a second opinion or transfer to 
another medical provider.”  2014-Ohio-1218, ¶ 23.  Justice Lanzinger’s dissenting 
opinion suggests that settlement of Griffith’s medical-malpractice action moots any 
further inquiry into the production of the medical record.  In establishing a patient’s 
right of access to medical records, however, the General Assembly has not imposed 
upon the patient or the patient’s representative any burden of demonstrating a 
reason for accessing the medical record.  All that is required of a patient or a 
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patient’s representative is to “submit to the health care provider a written request 
signed by the patient * * * dated not more than one year before the date on which 
it is submitted.”  R.C. 3701.74(B). 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 29} Because the Ohio General Assembly did not limit the definition of 
“medical record” in R.C. 3701.74(A)(8) to data in the medical-records department, 
the physical location of the data is not relevant to the determination whether that 
data qualifies as a medical record.  Instead, the definition focuses on whether a 
healthcare provider made a decision to keep data that was generated in the process 
of the patient’s healthcare treatment and that pertained to the patient’s medical 
history, diagnosis, prognosis, or medical condition.  We hold that for purposes of 
R.C. 3701.74(A)(8), “maintain” means that the healthcare provider has made a 
decision to keep or preserve the data. 
{¶ 30} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause is 
remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
PFEIFER, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in judgment only. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents with an opinion. 
LANZINGER, J., dissents with an opinion. 
_________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 31} Respectfully, I dissent. 
{¶ 32} Records generated and maintained by a hospital’s risk management 
department for risk-management purposes following the death of a patient are not 
records “used in the process of a patient’s health care treatment,” and therefore, 
they are not “medical records” as defined by R.C. 3701.74(A)(8). Accordingly, 
January Term, 2016 
 
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because Aultman Hospital produced the entire medical record of Howard Griffith 
and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law in connection with the request for the 
production of documents, I would affirm the judgment of the Fifth District Court 
of Appeals. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 33} On May 2, 2012, Aultman Hospital admitted Howard Griffith for 
surgery to remove a portion of his left lung. Following that surgery, he developed 
intermittent atrial fibrillation, and the hospital placed him on continuous cardiac 
monitoring.  On May 6 around 4:00 a.m., a nurse assessed him, but approximately 
45 minutes later, an x-ray technician found him unresponsive with the leads to his 
cardiac monitor detached from his chest and without a heartbeat.  Medical 
personnel resuscitated him and placed him on life support, but his family decided 
to remove him from life support, and he died on May 8. The discharge summary 
dated May 12, 2012, stated that “a retrospective review of his monitor at the nurse’s 
station showed that the EKG leads did not show any kind of rhythm,” starting 
around 4:00 in the morning, until the x-ray tech found him. 
{¶ 34} Gene’a Griffith, executor for the estate of Howard E. Griffith, 
subsequently attempted to obtain a complete copy of her father’s medical record. 
Aultman Hospital provided her with the medical record maintained by its medical 
records department, but after reviewing the documents provided by the hospital, 
Griffith believed she had not received the complete medical record. As a result, she 
filed this action to compel the production of the complete medical record in 
accordance with R.C. 3701.74 and 2317.48. 
{¶ 35} The complaint alleged that the hospital failed to produce any 
monitoring strips from the cardiac monitor or any nursing records from her father’s 
stay in the hospital. The hospital denied that it had withheld the complete medical 
record, but it nonetheless produced monitor strip printouts “as responsive 
documents from the visit that are not part of the medical record.”  The printed strips 
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from the cardiac monitor reflected the activity from 4:00 a.m. to 4:51 a.m. on May 
6, 2012. 
{¶ 36} Griffith then deposed Jennifer Reagan-Nichols, Aultman Hospital’s 
medical records director, who explained that the medical records department does 
not maintain all medical data generated during a patient’s stay at the hospital—
printing out all of the data from the equipment monitoring patients 24 hours a day 
would result in “loads of paper in your chart.”  She noted that a doctor or a nurse 
had discretion to make printouts from the monitoring strips part of the medical 
record by sending them to the medical records department, but she also testified 
that “the nursing staff does not provide them to us” and that the electronic data on 
the monitoring machines is not accessible to or maintained by the medical records 
department as part of a patient’s medical record. 
{¶ 37} According to Reagan-Nichols, the monitoring data is retained only 
for 24 hours after a patient’s discharge; after that time, the machine automatically 
deletes the data unless a doctor ordered it saved.  Thus, she explained, if medical 
data is not documented by a doctor or a nurse, it is not maintained as part of the 
patient’s medical record by the hospital. 
{¶ 38} When asked whether Griffith’s electronic monitoring data had been 
retained on the monitoring equipment after his death, Reagan-Nichols testified, “I 
don’t know.”  However, she explained that the monitoring strips provided in 
discovery “were printed from electronic monitoring equipment after the discharge 
of the patient at the direction of hospital Risk Management” and stored there and 
that “[t]he data in this equipment is not part of the medical record.”  She clarified 
that Cathy Rainieri, the director of the risk management department, had ordered 
the charge nurse on the cardiac floor to print out the electronic monitoring data after 
Howard Griffith’s death and subsequent discharge from the hospital.  Reagan-
Nichols could not say whether the charge nurse printed out all of the data from the 
equipment or just a part of it. 
January Term, 2016 
 
13 
{¶ 39} The trial court granted summary judgment to Aultman Hospital, 
finding that it had produced the complete medical record. The Fifth District 
affirmed that judgment, concluding that “the medical record consists of what was 
maintained by the medical records department and information that the provider 
decides not to maintain is not part of the medical record.”  2014-Ohio-1218, ¶ 22.  
The appellate court also noted that R.C. 3701.74 is a miscellaneous provision to 
enable a patient to obtain his or her file, not a broad discovery device. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 40} On appeal to this court, Griffith presents one proposition of law: “A 
hospital should not be permitted to withhold portions of a patient’s medical record 
by unilaterally selecting and storing those medical records in a department other 
than its medical records department.”   This proposition of law implies that a health 
care provider could conceal a medical record by storing it in a location other than 
the provider’s medical records department.  This focus on concealment and location 
is misleading. 
{¶ 41} R.C. 3701.74(A)(8) defines “medical record” to mean “data in any 
form that pertains to a patient’s medical history, diagnosis, prognosis, or medical 
condition and that is generated and maintained by a health care provider in the 
process of the patient’s health care treatment.”   A careful reading of this statute 
reveals that a health care provider is required to produce only those records it has 
generated and maintained in the process of the patient’s health care treatment. 
{¶ 42} Thus, a demonstration that medical data exists or has been generated 
and maintained by a hospital does not automatically require that it be produced as 
a medical record. Rather, the General Assembly has directed health care providers 
to give access to medical records as defined in the statute—data that pertains to 
medical history, diagnosis, prognosis, or medical condition and that is generated 
and maintained by a health care provider in the process of the patient’s health care 
treatment.  The legislature could have mandated that health care providers maintain 
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and produce all patient data generated for any purpose, but it did not do so. Rather, 
it particularly specified that medical records are those generated and maintained by 
a medical provider in the process of the patient’s health care treatment.  Thus, to 
resolve this appeal, we only need to apply R.C. 3701.74 as written. 
{¶ 43} Although Aultman Hospital electronically monitored Howard 
Griffith on a cardiac monitor during the course of his stay, no provider maintained 
that data in the process of Griffith’s treatment. Here, the facts show that Aultman 
Hospital’s risk management department generated and maintained the cardiac 
monitoring strips at issue here following his discharge from the hospital.  At that 
point, the hospital was no longer providing any medical care to him, and therefore, 
the risk management department could not have generated and maintained that data 
“in the process of the patient’s health care treatment.”   The department’s purpose 
for maintaining this data is not immediately apparent from this record, but it is 
manifest that it was not in furtherance of providing health care treatment. It is also 
apparent that a health care provider did not generate or maintain this data in the 
process of the patient’s treatment. 
{¶ 44} For these reasons, these documents are not medical records that R.C. 
3701.74 required Aultman Hospital to produce. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 45} The evidence shows that Aultman Hospital produced the complete 
medical record from its medical records office in conformity with Griffin’s request.  
The disputed cardiac monitor strips are not medical records as defined by R.C. 
3701.74(A)(8) because they were not generated and maintained by a health care 
provider in the process of Howard’s health care treatment. Rather, the risk 
management department of Aultman Hospital generated them for its own purposes 
after Howard Griffin’s death. Accordingly, although Aultman Hospital produced 
this data in discovery, it had no obligation to do so. 
January Term, 2016 
 
15 
{¶ 46} For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Fifth District 
Court of Appeals. 
_________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 47} I respectfully dissent. In reversing the court of appeals’ judgment 
and remanding to the trial court, the majority continues an action in which 
appellant, Gene’a Griffith, seeks records for a wrongful-death claim that has 
already been settled.  There is no real controversy between the parties, and res 
judicata bars the action since both the claim for production of documents and the 
underlying claim for malpractice are founded on the medical care provided to the 
decedent, Howard Griffith.  I would dismiss this appeal on that basis, and I 
respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals and remand to the trial court. 
{¶ 48} Although the majority reads the word “maintain” within the statute 
defining “medical records” to mean “keep or preserve,” by reversing the judgment 
in this case, the majority sidesteps the crucial argument made by appellee, Aultman 
Hospital, that the healthcare provider should have discretion to decide when data 
should be considered part of the patient’s medical record.  I do agree that R.C. 
3701.74(A)(8) does not require that data be stored in a particular place to qualify 
as medical records, but I do not agree that the Fifth District permitted the healthcare 
provider to define a medical record based solely on the place where the data is 
stored.  The appellate court affirmed the grant of summary judgment by adopting 
appellee’s understanding of the word “maintain”: 
 
“[T]he only meaning that can [be] attached to it, is that the hospital 
record is to be that which the hospital maintains, not that which a 
Plaintiff in a legal malpractice case—or in a medical 
malpractice case thinks should be maintained, not everything having 
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to do with the patient, but that which a hospital determines needs to 
be maintained by a health care provider in the process of a patient’s 
health care.” 
 
2014-Ohio-1218, ¶ 22. 
{¶ 49} The court of appeals then simply determined that the trial court had 
not erred in granting summary judgment on the facts presented, namely that “the 
medical record consists of what was maintained by the medical records department 
and information that the provider decides not to maintain is not part of the medical 
record.”  Id. 
{¶ 50} The definition of “medical record” within  R.C. 3701.74(A)(8) may 
be broken down into four components: 1) any data, regardless of its form 2) 
pertaining to a patient’s history, diagnosis, prognosis, or medical condition 3) 
generated and maintained by a healthcare provider 4) in the process of the patient’s 
health care treatment.  A “health care provider” is defined in R.C. 3701.74(A)(5) 
as “a hospital, ambulatory care facility, long-term care facility, pharmacy, 
emergency care facility or health care practitioner.”  And a “health care 
practitioner” is broadly defined in 3701.74(A)(4)(a) through (r) to cover all types 
of medical professionals. 
{¶ 51} Appellee and amici curiae1 detailed the current status of 
recordkeeping and explained that a hospital must handle its data pursuant to all laws 
and regulations, including R.C. 3701.74, to which it is subject.  They also have 
raised serious practical concerns over appellant’s interpretation of the statute and 
the unintended consequences that would follow.  The judgment of treating 
healthcare providers must be relied upon to determine what is (or is not) part of a 
                                                          
 
1 The Academy of Medicine of Cleveland and Northern Ohio and the Ohio Hospital Association, 
the Ohio State Medical Association, the Ohio Osteopathic Association, and the Ohio Alliance for 
Civil Justice filed briefs in support of appellee. 
 
January Term, 2016 
 
17 
patient’s medical record, those providers being best able to determine what 
information is relevant to a patient’s treatment.  Hospitals and other providers have 
teams of employees dedicated to collecting and maintaining this information, and, 
as the amici curiae have noted, many hospitals have multidisciplinary committees 
that determine what information should be included in a medical record.  The 
information in the medical record presents the relevant and necessary information 
that is always subject to being supplemented in the clinical judgment of the treating 
providers. 
{¶ 52} In the highly regulated area of health care, appellant’s concerns over 
the routine “sanitization” of medical records are overblown.  The purpose of R.C. 
3701.74 is to deliver medical records to patients upon request both efficiently and 
cost-effectively, but nothing in the statute suggests it is to be a broad discovery tool.  
While a medical record may include data in any form, R.C. 3701.74(A)(8) specifies 
that in order for data to be a part of the medical record, that data must be generated 
and maintained by the healthcare provider “in the process of the patient’s health 
care treatment.”  (Emphasis added.)  This language implies that it is within a 
hospital’s discretion, through its employees, to select, preserve, and store records 
relevant to the health care of a particular patient in the manner it sees fit. 
{¶ 53} In my view, there are no material issues of fact in this case, even if 
it were appropriately before us.  R.C. 3701.74(A)(8) permits a healthcare provider 
to exercise discretion in generating and retaining a specific set of records for a 
patient’s healthcare treatment.  Those records were, in fact, provided to appellant.  
The record and subsequent filings show that appellant obtained the additional 
information she requested through interrogatories and that the parties have already 
settled their case.  It is difficult to know what the trial court should do upon remand, 
because any order for the further production of records would have no effect.  
Because I do not believe there is a case or controversy before us, I would dismiss 
this appeal, and I therefore respectfully dissent. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
_________________ 
 
Tzangas Plakas Mannos, Ltd., Lee E. Plakas, and Megan J. Frantz Oldham, 
for appellant. 
 
Milligan Pusateri Co., L.P.A., Richard S. Milligan, Paul J. Pusateri, and 
Thomas J. Himmelspach, for appellee. 
 
Vivian Whalen Duffrin and Kathleen Tatarsky, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae Stark County Association for Justice. 
 
Willis & Willis Co., L.P.A., and Mark C. Willis, urging reversal for amici 
curiae Ohio Association for Justice and Summit County Association for Justice. 
 
Nurenberg, Paris, Heller & McCarthy Co., L.P.A., Kathleen J. St. John, and 
David M. Paris, urging reversal for amicus curiae AARP. 
 
Freking & Betz and Mark W. Napier, urging reversal for amicus curiae 
Southwest Ohio Trial Lawyers Association. 
 
Reminger Co., L.P.A., Martin T. Galvin, and David Valent, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae Academy of Medicine of Cleveland and Northern 
Ohio. 
 
Squire Patton Boggs, L.L.P., Keith Shumate, and Heather Stutz, urging 
affirmance for amici curiae Ohio Hospital Association, Ohio State Medical 
Association, Ohio Osteopathic Association, and Ohio Alliance for Civil Justice. 
 
Sean McGlone, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Hospital 
Association. 
___________________