Case Title: Reid v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 113/11

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2012-08-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Reid v. State, No. 113, September Term 2011.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – FOURTH AMENDMENT – SEIZURE – USE OF A
TASER
The Court of Appeals held that a police officer’s use of Taser to fire two metal darts into
Reid’s back affected an arrest requiring probable cause, rather than a Terry stop requiring
only reasonable, articulable suspicion.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST
Reid’s arrest was not supported by probable cause under the facts of the case and, therefore,
the evidence recovered from his person and the statement he made after being arrested should
have been suppressed.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 113
September Term, 2011
DAVID REID
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
          Adkins
Barbera
McDonald,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Harrell, Barbera, and McDonald, JJ.,
dissent.
Filed:   August 24, 2012
1
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
2
At oral argument, the Assistant Attorney General explained that a Taser can be
used in either of two fashions: an officer may make contact directly with a suspect with
the Taser, which will discharge electricity without expelling any darts from the device or
the officer may use the Taser in what was described as dart mode, in which the metal
darts are expelled from the Taser and penetrate the skin before discharging electricity. 
The Taser in this case was used in dart mode, so our inquiry is limited to that usage.  
3
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968)
4
The dissent, in a leap of appellate fact finding, discusses the characteristics of a
Taser model, although any specifics were not part of the record in the case.  Most
importantly, the dissent disregards, in the entirety, the particulars of the force involved
when the darts penetrated Reid’s back and does not even mention that the darts remained
connected to Reid’s back, through wires, to the officer holding the Taser weapon, such
that Reid was leashed to the officer.  Furthermore, the dissent disregards the distinction in
this case from United States v. Colon, 654 F. Supp. 2d 326 (E.D. Pa. 2009), which
involved a defendant reaching into his waistband for a gun, which Reid did not do.
This case presents us with questions regarding the use of certain technology about
which we have not had occasion to opine before, in the context of the Fourth Amendment.1
 The primary issue before us is whether the use by Baltimore City police of a Taser2 that fired
two metal darts into the back of David Reid, the Appellant, affected a Terry3 stop or his
arrest.4  The determination of the type of detention is pivotal, affecting whether a statement
Reid made to the police that he had a gun in his pocket, and the gun itself, should have been
suppressed by the Circuit Court Judge who denied Reid’s Motion to Suppress.  
After having been convicted on an agreed-upon statement of the facts of wearing,
5
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).  
2
carrying, or transporting a handgun illegally and of being in possession of a handgun after
conviction of a disqualifying offense, Reid appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, but,
before any action was taken in that court, we, on our own motion, granted certiorari, 464 Md.
628, 37 A.3d 317 (2012), to consider the following questions:
1) Should the trial court have suppressed the evidence seized,
where the use of a “Taser” to effectuate a Terry stop, under the
circumstances of this case, violated the Fourth Amendment?
2) Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s motion to
suppress his statement made following arrest and prior to
Miranda warnings?5
The State, in its brief, presented the questions as:
1) Was the Fourth Amendment seizure of Appellant supported
by probable cause, and therefore reasonable, regardless of
whether it was a de facto arrest or investigatory detention?
2) Was Appellant’s statement that he had a gun in his pocket
properly admitted under the “public safety” exception to
Miranda, and even if the statement should have been
suppressed, was the gun found in Appellant’s pocket
nonetheless properly admitted, thus making the admission of the
statement harmless error?
We shall hold that the use of a Taser to fire two metal darts into Reid’s back converted
what otherwise may have been a Terry stop into a de facto arrest for Fourth Amendment
purposes, and that there did not exist sufficient probable cause to arrest Reid.  We shall
further hold that both Reid’s statement and the gun recovered from him should have been
suppressed. 
3
When the issue was addressed in the suppression hearing, Detective Scott Reid,
unrelated to David Reid, was the only individual who testified. The Circuit Court Judge
determined that the Detective was credible and made the following findings:  
With respect to the facts leading up to the encounter between Reid and police officers,
the judge found that officers received a call from an informant who told them that a tall,
black male was armed and selling drugs at a particular location in Baltimore City:
Detective Reid, he was credible, he provided evidence,
he was a relatively experienced officer, showed that he received
a call or information from another, a superior, a Lieutenant
McVicker about a confidential informant and provided
information, and as counsel noted, I don’t think this is
particularly significant. I mean, it was a confidential informant
so it was someone that they actually were aware of and it
provided certain information but it wasn’t particularly that
significant information in the sense that it wasn’t predicting any
sort of future activity on the targets but nonetheless did provide
information and in fact there was an individual, a taller
individual, who he associated with a black Honda in a particular
location.  
The judge went on to find that the officers arrived at the location and observed a group of
men, including a taller man, near a black Honda:
The officers responded at that location, I believe it was
about 12:30 during the day in a public street and saw an
individual sort of, Mr. Reid was described to be the taller
individual, I guess among the three or four individuals that were
present near this black Honda, he was the taller of the
individuals and the officers then went to respond, and the call
was for drugs, someone associated with drugs and/or guns in
this vehicle.   
The judge then found that the officers were wearing their badges and guns, thereby giving
4
Reid notice that they were police and that Reid moved to conceal the right side of his body
from one officer before running, as the officers approached: 
[the officers] were wearing indicia of being police,
meaning badges and they had their badges hanging down and I
believe a gun, the defendant was observed, at that particular
point in time, to try to enter the black Honda which I guess,
again, would corroborate the fact that he was somehow
associated with the Honda.  He also, as the officers came, the
officers indicated or the officer, Detective Reid, indicated that
he made some sort of actions to secrete himself or what he
called blading which I, for the record, is sort of turning yourself
away from the police officers so they couldn’t see the side
where in fact the gun would be, checking the area where the gun
would be, and then, as the officers approached, at that time, the
defendant ran.  
The judge also found that the officers called out to Reid to stop, and, when he did not, the
Detective fired two metal darts from his Taser at Reid.  The judge, relying on a case from the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, then determined that
the Detective effected a proper Terry stop by shooting the darts into Reid:
The officers at that particular point in time attempted to
stop the defendant by calling out to him and I would find at that
particular point in time, based on of all those observations, the
confidential informant information which is corroborated by
what the officers saw, by the fact that he made sort of evasive
maneuvers when the officers came, and then obviously the flight
when the officers came up, he ran.  And then while he was
running away, he had gym shorts on and in the gym shorts there
was a heavy object which made sort of a swinging motion which
would again be consistent with having a handgun or something
similar to a handgun in his pocket.
So at that point in time, I find that the officers had
articulable suspicion both to stop and to frisk the defendant.
The defendant did not respond when the officers identified
themselves and asked him to stop.  At that time he was struck
6
The public safety exception to the Miranda requirement was articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 81
L. Ed. 2d 550 (1984), in which the Court held that there is a narrow exception to the rule
that Miranda warnings must be given to a suspect in custody before interrogation may
begin in instances in which there exists a threat to public safety.
5
with a Taser.  It seems to me the case law is very consistent, I
mean, obviously when the officers have articulable suspicion to
stop someone, they can in fact use reasonable force to effectuate
the stop which could include tackling him, handcuffing him, and
I was able to find at least one case, there was a federal case, in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania which is United States v. Colon, 654 F. Supp. 2d
326 (E.D. Pa. 2011), in which the Court found that in fact it was
reasonable and appropriate to use a Taser to in fact stop the
defendant when, one, he was believed to be armed, and, two, he
was responding to what the officers asked – when the officers
asked him to stop and he was in a public street at that time, a
public location I should say.
The judge went on to consider whether or not Miranda warnings should have been
given to Reid because of his determination that a reasonable person in Reid’s position would
have believed he was in custody and “not free to go”: 
It seems to me at some point in time, a stop can get to the
point where someone is in custody and certainly it seems to me
under the facts of this circumstance where in fact this gentleman
was knocked down, he had two prongs in his back from where
he had been struck by the Taser and as the Detective indicated,
in fact it would take a medical technician or a medical personnel
to actually remove the Taser, I would find that in fact under
those circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that
they were in custody and not free to go.  
The judge concluded, however, that the public safety exception6 to Miranda applied and
denied suppression of Reid’s statement and the gun itself, but declined to rule on the issue
6
of inevitable discovery: 
At this particular point in time what the evidence shows
though is in fact the simple question was, I think the Detective
asked him if he had anything illegal on him, and this was in the
context of just having taken this person down, having articulable
suspicion to believe that he was armed, I would find that in fact
this would qualify under the safety, public safety exception that
was set out in New York v. Quarles which is 467 U.S. 49 and
then there were similar cases in Maryland, specifically – well,
not exactly a similar case but talked – discussed about the public
safety section which is Thomas v. State, which is 128 Md. App.
274 and there is also, I believe, was the case of Hamilton v.
State which is another public safety exception which was 62
Md. App. 603.
I think under the circumstances that these particular
officers were not asking that question for some sort of
investigatory term, certainly I would find at that point in time,
they would have had a right to frisk him, I think it was clearly
just to ask for a public safety, safety of the officers, just quickly
trying to get down to the reason why they stopped him and they
asked that and at that time, the defendant did respond that he had
a gun in his pocket, and the officers then searched his pocket.
And again, I don’t know if I have to go there, I don’t really find
the record would not – at this particular point would be
sufficient that there would be in a sense inevitable discovery but
I think that is irrelevant at this point.  I find there was a public
safety exception, therefore the statement was – the response to
the statement would be admissible and therefore the recovery of
the gun would be admissible.
In essence, the judge determined that the Detective attempted to initiate a Terry stop by
yelling at Reid to stop, but that the stop was converted into a custodial interrogation after the
two metal darts had been deployed and hit their mark, but that the public safety exception
“saved” the statement given by Reid prior to having been Mirandized and the gun from
suppression.  
7
Our consideration is the same as that of the trial judge, based on his findings at the
suppression hearing, more particularly, whether penetration by the two metal darts from the
Taser effected an arrest, requiring probable cause, or an investigatory stop, based upon only
reasonable, articulable suspicion, under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.  
In its landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889
(1968), the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment to permit a law enforcement
officer to stop an individual that the officer suspected may have been involved in criminal
activity.  The Court held if an officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the suspect
was armed, the officer could frisk the individual for weapons.  Id at 24, 88 S.Ct at 1881, 20
L.Ed 2d at 907-908.  The Court noted, however, that this exception to the requirement that
an officer have probable cause before conducting a search was narrowly drawn and limited
to frisking only the individual’s clothing for weapons.  Id. at 29–30, 88 S.Ct at 1884–85, 20
L.Ed. 2d at 911.  
The State asserts that what occurred in the present case was a Terry stop, because it
analogizes deployment of the two metal drats into Reid’s back to a “hard take down” that we
determined was a Terry stop in In re David S., 367 Md. 523, 789 A.2d 607 (2002).  In In re
David S., we considered whether ordering David S. and Hall, a man with him, to the ground
at gunpoint, “put[ing] them on the ground,” and handcuffing them constituted a proper Terry
stop.  In that case, officers were conducting a stakeout of a house they believed to be an open
air drug market, when they observed Hall engage in what they believed to be a drug
8
transaction.  Before being able to apprehend him, however, Hall entered the house.
Approximately half an hour later and after changing their stakeout location, the officers
observed Hall walking with David S. down a different street and stop at an abandoned house.
David S. went behind the house, returned, and showed Hall something in his waistband.  The
officers believed David S. had obtained a handgun and moved in “with their weapons drawn,
forced [David S.] to the ground and placed him in handcuffs.”  Id. at 539, 789 A.2d at 616.
After Hall and David S. were placed in handcuffs, the officers frisked David S. and found
a hard, wrapped object in his waistband that, once unwrapped, was determined to be cocaine.
Before analyzing the particulars of David S.’s detention to determine if it was a proper
Terry stop, we noted that “it is important to recognize that there are no per se rules or bright
lines to determine when an investigatory stop and frisk becomes an arrest.”  Id. at 534, 789
A.2d at 613.  We also reiterated the principle that the use of drawn weapons or handcuffs
does not per se convert a Terry stop into an arrest, so long as those tactics are reasonable
measures designed to ensure officer safety.  After considering the totality of the
circumstances surrounding David S.’s detention, we determined that the officers had
reasonable, articulable suspicion that David S. and Hall had committed or were about to
commit a crime.  Relying in part on the approval of “hard take downs” in Lee v. State, 311
Md. 642, 537 A.2d 235 (1987), we held that even though the intrusion onto David S.’s
Fourth Amendment rights was substantial, it was reasonable because of the threat to officer
safety, and thus the detention was a proper Terry stop.
In Lee v. State, 311 Md. 642, 537 A.2d 235 (1987), we considered circumstances in
9
which officers had received a tip that two men who were playing basketball on a public court
were in possession of a weapon used in a robbery.  When the officers arrived at the courts,
they maintained contact with the person who gave them the tip, who told them the gun was
in a bag hanging on the fence.  After spotting Lee coming out of a nearby house with a blue
bag, the officers moved in with shotguns drawn and ordered everyone, including Lee, to lie
down on the ground.  A subsequent search of the bag revealed the weapon.  
In reviewing the denial of Lee’s Motion to Suppress, we stated that the officer’s order
to Lee to lie down, made with guns drawn, did not elevate the stop to an arrest.  We noted
that the level of intrusion onto Lee’s person was minimal as he was only ordered to lie down
and was never physically touched by the officers until the gun was recovered.  We
considered the following circumstances to be relevant to our determination: that the tip
provided information that Lee was armed, that the officers were exposed to considerable
danger of being shot, that by ordering everyone to the ground the officers decreased the
likelihood of danger to bystanders, and that the detention only lasted two minutes.  We then
concluded that the use of force was reasonable under the circumstances, relying, in part, on
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S. Ct. 675, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985), in which
the Supreme Court expressly approved threatening a suspect with force, in that case deadly
force, when performing a Terry stop involving a suspect the officer reasonably believed to
be armed and dangerous.
While at the heart of the State’s argument are our decisions in In re David S. and Lee,
both Terry stop cases, Reid argues, conversely, that having two metal darts penetrate his
7
The trial  judge  apparently  believed  that once the Taser darts hit Reid in the
back,
Reid believed he was not free to go and, thus, was under a de facto arrest: 
he had two prongs in his back from where he had been struck by
the Taser and as the Detective indicated, in fact it would take a
medical technician or a medical personnel to actually remove
the Taser, I would find that in fact under those circumstances, a
reasonable person would believe that they were in custody and
not free to go.
10
body, such that medical assistance was needed to remove them, effected a de facto arrest.
To put de facto arrest in context, it is important to recognize that, while a formal arrest occurs
when an officer informs the suspect that he or she is under arrest, a de facto arrest occurs
when the circumstances surrounding a detention are such that a reasonable person would not
feel free to leave.7  In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed. 2d 824
(1979), the Supreme Court considered whether Dunaway’s seizure constituted a de facto
arrest under the Fourth Amendment and concluded that he was under arrest, because
Dunaway believed he was not free to go based on the facts that he was taken to the police
station in a squad car, was not told he was free to leave, and would have been physically
restrained were he to have attempted to leave.  Id. at 212, 99 S. Ct. at 2256, 60 L. Ed. 2d at
835–36.  In Owens v. State, 399 Md. 388, 924 A.2d 1072 (2007), we reiterated this standard
for a de facto arrest, when we opined that “a person is considered in custody when a
reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not free” to end the encounter and leave.
Id. at 428, 924 A.2d at 1095 (internal quotations omitted). 
We recently had occasion to again address the issue of what constitutes a de facto
11
arrest in Bailey v. State, 412 Md. 349, 987 A.2d 72 (2010).  In Bailey, police officers were
patrolling at night in Prince George’s County and saw Bailey standing in the shadows near
a house.  After calling out to Bailey and not hearing a response, the officers got out of their
car and approached him.  When they neared Bailey, the officers detected a strong scent of
ether and immediately grabbed him, put his hands over his head, and searched him,
recovering a glass vial filled with PCP.  Before us, Bailey argued that his seizure under these
circumstances was a de facto arrest.  
We agreed and concluded that the officer’s actions elevated Bailey’s detention to a
de facto arrest, because the officer “acted with actual authority and physically seized the
petitioner, and the petitioner had a clear understanding that he was not free to leave.”  Id. at
373, 987 A.2d at 87.  In reaching our conclusion, we relied in part on  our decision in Grier
v. State, 351 Md. 241, 718 A.2d 211 (1998), in which we stated, in the context of
determining whether Grier’s post-arrest silence could be used against him at trial, that being
subjected to an officer’s “custody and control” constituted an arrest:
[a]fter Grier came out of the dead-end alley, the officers
immediately arrested him.  The officers pursued Grier, “got”
him, and put him on the ground.  Once [Grier] was on the
ground and in the custody and control of the police officers, he
was certainly under arrest.  Although Officer Farley may have
had the right simply to detain and question [Grier] before
placing him in custody, he did not do so.
Id. at 252, 718 A.2d at 216-217 (internal citations omitted).  
Our colleagues on the Court of Special Appeals, in Dixon v. State, 133 Md. App. 654,
758 A.2d 1063 (2000), had occasion to consider the issue of whether a suspect had been
12
merely detained under Terry or subjected to a de facto arrest.  In Dixon, officers had received
a tip that Dixon would be transporting ten pounds of marijuana in a car and would be parking
on the second level of a garage at Montgomery Mall at 8:15 PM.  When the officers arrived,
Dixon’s car was already parked, and the officers saw him eventually return and get into the
car.  The officers then blocked the car in with their cruisers, removed and handcuffed Dixon,
whereupon nine gallon-sized bags of marijuana were recovered from the car’s trunk.  
The Court of Special Appeals held that the event was an arrest when Dixon was taken
out of his car and handcuffed, stating:
As we see it, the events in the garage exceeded an investigatory
stop under Terry and its progeny.  Accordingly, we do not agree
with either the State or the trial court that appellant was merely
detained prior to the car search.  Instead, we conclude that the
officers arrested appellant at the time they blocked his car,
removed him from his vehicle, and handcuffed him.
Id. at 673-74, 758 A.2d 1073.  In so holding, the Court of Special Appeals relied upon our
oft-quoted language from Grier for the principle that when a suspect is subjected to the
custody and control of an officer in such a significant way, he or she is arrested.
 Application of the principles from Terry and in the de facto arrest cases leads us, with
respect to the circumstances in the present case, to determine that a person shot in the back
with two metal darts, as was Reid, would reasonably believe that he or she was not free to
leave the encounter, especially when, as the trial judge found, a medical technician would
8
Although  not  found  by  the  trial  court,  it  appears  that  not  only  did  the  darts
puncture the body, but that they apparently remain connected to the Taser device, akin to
fastening a leash to the suspect, whereby the officer can maintain complete control over him
or her.  See Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 824 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The X26 [Taser] uses
compressed nitrogen to propel a pair of ‘probes’ – aluminum darts tipped with stainless steel
barbs connected to the X26 by insulated wires – toward the target at a rate of over 160 feet
per second.  Upon striking a person, the X26 delivers a 1200 volt, low ampere electrical
charge through the wires and probes into his muscles. . . .  The electrical impulse instantly
overrides the victim’s central nervous system, paralyzing the muscles throughout the body,
rendering the target limp and helpless.” (footnotes omitted)).
9
The State’s  argument  that a  Taser used in dart mode is analogous to tackling, and
thus permitted as a “hard take down” under In re David S., is not on point because tackling
was not the “hard take down” analyzed in In re David S.  The State, however, directs our
attention to various federal courts that have expressly considered tackling and determined
that it can effect a Terry stop. In United States v. Dykes, 406 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2005), for
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit considered
whether chasing after a suspect, who ran away after police pulled into a parking lot in which
he was standing, and tackling him to the ground was sufficient to elevate the encounter from
a Terry stop to an arrest. Id. at 718.  The Court concluded that tackling was a reasonable
method of effectuating the stop, noting that the “‘amount of force used to carry out the stop
(continued...)
13
have to have removed the prongs.8  These circumstances are very similar to those in Bailey,
Grier, and Dixon, in that Reid was subjected to the custody and control of the officer
detaining him by the use of physical force.  While we recognize that the suspects in Bailey,
Grier, and Dixon were not believed to be armed and that Reid was, such belief does not
convert a de facto arrest to a Terry stop found in In re David S. and Lee, because the levels
of intrusion and control involved in Reid’s detention are unquestionably greater than those
used to detain either Lee or David S.  The use of a Taser in dart mode penetrates the body
for an indefinite time period, differentiating it from a “hard take down,” the use of handcuffs,
and tackling.9  A reasonable person would not feel free, nor even be able, to go under these
9(...continued)
and search must be reasonable, but may include using handcuffs or forcing the detainee to
lie down to prevent flight.’” Id. at 721, quoting United States v. Laing, 889 F.2d 281, 285
(D.C. Cir. 1989).  Tackling, however, is not akin to the force at issue.
10
The  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Third  Circuit,  in an unpublished opinion, United
States v. Colon, 434 F. Appx. 88 (3rd Cir. 2011), affirmed a district court decision, United
States v. Colon, 654 F. Supp. 2d 326 (E. D. Pa. 2009), discussed infra, involving the use of
a Taser to effect a Terry stop.  The Third Circuit, however, did not address the Taser issue
in its unreported affirmance of the trial court.  
11
There  have  been  reported  cases  from  various  federal  circuit  courts  that  have
considered, in the context of claims brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, whether the use
of a Taser in dart mode was reasonable, but only in the context of an arrest, not a Terry stop.
Compare Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the use of a Taser
in dart mode was not reasonable to arrest a woman for interfering with the arrest of her
husband when she made only minimal contact with the officer) and Bryan v. MacPherson,
630 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the use of a Taser in dart mode was not reasonable
to effect an arrest of a man who got out of his car wearing only his underpants and was
screaming gibberish because he did not pose a threat to the officer) with Draper v. Reynolds,
369 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that the use of a Taser in dart mode to arrest a truck
driver who was becoming increasingly agitated and refusing to obey lawful commands was
reasonable) and Russo v. Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that the use of
a Taser in dart mode to arrest a man holding two knives and threatening officers was
reasonable).
14
circumstances: Reid was, thus, arrested.  
We have reviewed hundreds of cases involving the use of force in Terry stops, and no
appellate court has even considered,10 much less approved, the use of a Taser in dart mode
to effect a Terry stop.11  The only analogous situation to the present one is in the use of a
firearm expelling a bullet, which the Supreme Court assumed was an arrest in Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1699, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1, 7 (1985). 
The State, however, points to two federal district court cases in which the use of
Tasers was considered, United States v. Colon, 654 F. Supp. 2d 326 (E. D. Pa. 2009) and
15
United States v. Russ, 772 F. Supp. 2d 880 (N.D. Ohio 2011).  In Colon, officers saw Colon
walking down the street in a “high-crime” area late at night.  They followed him in their car,
eventually pulling up and asking him where he was going, because of their concern that he
might have been carrying a firearm in his waistband.  They also noticed that he was very
nervous and was continually looking over his shoulder, such that he almost ran into a wall.
When the officers got out of their car to speak with him, Colon fled. During the subsequent
chase, Colon reached into his waistband, where the officers believed he was carrying a gun,
and an officer eventually used his Taser to shoot Colon with metal darts.   
In ruling on a motion to suppress a gun eventually found on Colon, the district judge
analogized the use of a Taser in dart mode to tackling and did not consider the affront to
bodily integrity that two prongs in the back effected.  We disagree; the use of a Taser in dart
mode is not analogous to tackling, because the darts penetrate the skin of an individual, and
the individual must wait for medical personnel to remove them.
In Russ, officers were responding to a report of a brawl at a bar in Ohio, where they
saw Russ leaving the scene.  Russ appeared very startled and adopted a fighting stance, when
the officers approached.  Thereafter, Russ swung at an officer and then took off running.
When they took chase, the officers, fearful that a shiny object in his waistband was a gun,
fired darts at Russ from a Taser, which did not stop Russ from running.   
The trial judge determined that the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to
effect a Terry stop, and “the Officers were entitled to act for their own protection, and for the
protection of others in the area, and attempted to do so by deploying a taser.”  Russ, 772 F.
16
Supp. 2d at 891.  Obviously, the fact that the darts fired from the Taser did not immobilize
Russ differentiates that case from the instant case.  Further, Russ never raised the arrest issue
when he questioned the Taser attempt.  As a result, we do not find succor in the Russ case.
In the present case, the trial judge determined that Reid was in custody at the time he
was struck in the back by the metal darts fired from the Detective’s Taser – a determination
with which we agree.  The judge’s statement that “a reasonable person would believe that [he
or she was] in custody and not free to go” after having been struck in the back with metal
darts from a Taser is unquestionably correct.  No one who is subjected to the ongoing
application of force as is caused by having metal projectiles lodge themselves in one’s flesh
would feel free to go about his or her business.  Moreover, Reid wasn’t free to go after
having been shot by the darts because he had to wait for a medical technician to remove
them.  Reid unquestionably was subjected to the complete control of the police, so that he
was subjected to a de facto arrest when the darts penetrated his body and not a Terry stop.
As soon as the darts penetrated Reid’s body, a de facto arrest occurred for which probable
cause must have existed. 
To explore this issue, we are required to review the record developed at the
suppression hearing.  See Bailey, 412 Md. at 374-376, 987 A.2d at 87-88 (proceeding to
determine whether probable cause existed, after holding that Bailey’s detention was a de
facto arrest and not a Terry stop).  We have stated that we look at the totality of the
circumstances, in reviewing the record to see whether there existed probable cause at the time
of arrest, to determine whether “the facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge
12
Generally, it is difficult to wrest probable cause from a record developed in the
trial court to countenance a Terry stop; when we have been able to do so, it has been
when there had been evidence presented at the suppression hearing of a direct relationship
between the crime and what the police witnessed.  See State v. Elliot, 417 Md. 413, 10
A.3d 761 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed based on the smell of marijuana
when officers approached a car); Donaldson v. State, 416 Md. 467, 7 A.3d 84 (2010)
(holding that probable cause existed based on experienced narcotics officers witnessing a
sales transaction of vials of an unknown substance in an area known for drug sales). 
17
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being
committed.”  Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 501, 924 A.2d 1129, 1137 (2007) (alterations
in original).12
The findings in this case upon which a determination of whether probable cause would
have existed at the time Reid was arrested are: 
•
Reid matched a description given by an informant of “a taller individual . . .
associated with a black Honda in a particular location,” and the informant was
calling about “drugs, someone associated with drugs and/or guns and in the
vehicle”; 
•
Reid turned his body away from one officer and attempted to open the
passenger door of the car when the officers approached the car;
•
Reid “check[ed] the area where the gun would be”; 
•
Reid had something heavy in his pocket that caused it to sway; and
•
Reid ran from the police.
These facts are not sufficient to establish probable cause under our jurisprudence.  More
particularly, in Bost v. State, 406 Md. 341, 958 A.2d 356 (2008), when confronted with
similar facts, we found them sufficient to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, short of
probable cause.  We considered whether District of Columbia police officers had reasonable
suspicion to justify crossing into Maryland in hot pursuit of a suspect and effecting his arrest
13
The Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit is contained in Sections 2-304 to 2-309 of the
Criminal Procedure Article, Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.)
18
under the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit.13  The suspect in Bost was in an area known for drug
trafficking, fled at the approach of police officers, and clutched his side in such a way as to
indicate he could be carrying a gun.  We held that presence in a high crime area, unprovoked
flight, and furtive movements consistent with possessing a gun were, in the aggregate,
sufficient to establish reasonable, articulable suspicion, short of probable cause.  Id. at 359-
360, 958 A.2d at 367.  
In the present case, the only additional fact is the existence of the informant’s tip,
which the trial judge described as not “particularly significant,” because the tip itself was not
specific enough and was not based on special knowledge sufficient to foretell the future.  See
in this regard Lee v. State, 311 Md. at 654-657, 537 A.2d at 240-242 (holding, based on
police corroborating an informant’s tip that did not foretell and future activity on the part of
the defendants, “the police had a relatively high degree of reasonable and articulable
suspicion. . . [b]ut, at that time, the suspicion did not reach a level of ‘probability . . . of
criminal activity.’” quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2330, 76 L.
Ed. 2d 527, 546).
The judge had to have determined that there was probable cause, however, because
his application of the public safety exception articulated in United States v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1984), requires a lawful arrest for the exception to
be utilized to “save” a statement that had not been Mirandized.  In Quarles, the Supreme
19
Court held that an arrestee need not be given Miranda warnings before being questioned if
the officers’ questions were directed at eliminating a threat to the public’s, or their own,
safety, after the individual had been lawfully arrested.  
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit succinctly explained the application of the
Quarles public safety exception in United States v. Patzer, 277 F.3d 1080, 1085 (9th Cir.
2002).   In Patzer, an officer pulled over Patzer while he was driving for having a broken
taillight.  Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer noticed guns on the back seat and that
Patzer’s eyes were glassy.  Suspecting that Patzer had been smoking marijuana, the officer
ordered him out of the car and gave him a series of field sobriety tests, one of which Patzer
failed.  The officer then asked him to be honest, and Patzer responded that he had been
smoking marijuana earlier.  
Thereafter, the officer placed Patzer under arrest for driving under the influence and,
without giving him Miranda warnings, asked Patzer if he was hiding anything illegal in the
truck.  Patzer admitted that there were illegal guns and grenades in the back of the truck, and
the officer seized a sawed-off shotgun, a modified rifle, and grenades.  Patzer unsuccessfully
moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his truck and was subsequently convicted of
a host of weapons and drug charges.  
In reviewing the denial of Patzer’s motion to suppress his statements, the Ninth
Circuit first held that Patzer’s arrest for driving under the influence was not lawful under the
applicable motor vehicle code.  The Court then considered whether the un-Mirandized
statements made by Patzer were properly admitted under the public safety exception.  The
20
Court noted that the public safety doctrine exists for exigent circumstances in which a valid
arrest has been made and in which an officer has a reasonable belief that there is a threat to
public safety precipitating questions of the arrestee out of safety concerns.  Patzer had not
been lawfully arrested, and the Ninth Circuit then concluded that Patzer’s statements could
not be admitted under the public safety exception because, that “questions posed under
exigent circumstances might not be separate Fifth Amendment violations does not mean that
there is a break in the chain of events from the original Fourth Amendment violation.”  Id.
at 1085.  In so holding, the Court stated, “[j]ust as reading Miranda warnings to a suspect
after an unlawful arrest does not automatically act as a ‘cure-all’ and remove the Fourth
Amendment taint from subsequently obtained statements, neither does the existence of an
exception to the Miranda rule” remove the Fourth Amendment taint.  Id. 
In the present case, Reid was arrested without probable cause, so the Quarles public
safety exception is not applicable.  To do otherwise would be to eviscerate the requirement
of a lawful arrest.
The State asserts, however, that even if Reid’s statement were inadmissible because
of the Miranda violation, the gun that was recovered is admissible, relying on United States
v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 159 L. Ed. 2d 667 (2004) (plurality opinion), for
the principle that tangible, derivative evidence recovered as a result of a Miranda violation
can be admitted into evidence at trial, as long as the statement leading to the discovery of the
tangible evidence was not actually coerced.  See id. at 644, 124 S. Ct. at 2630, 159 L. Ed. 2d
at 679 (“[I]t is true that the Court requires the exclusion of the physical fruit of actually
21
coerced statements. . . .”).  This argument misses the mark for the same reason that Quarles
is inapplicable in the present case; Reid was not lawfully arrested.  
Were we to permit the admission of the gun, what would be the imperative for law
enforcement to adhere to Fourth Amendment arrest strictures?  The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Villa-Gonzalez, 623 F.3d 526 (8th Cir.
2010), considered this question when addressing an argument very similar to the State’s
argument in the present case.  In holding that the principle announced in Patane could not
be used to prevent the suppression of physical evidence discovered as a result of an un-
Mirandized statement following an unlawful seizure, the court stated, “[w]e find Patane
inapplicable here.  Rather, we are guided by Wong Sun v. United States. . . .  Here, like in
Wong Sun, the initial constitutional violation was a Fourth Amendment violation.”  Id. at 535
(internal citations omitted).  We agree; Reid was arrested without probable cause, so that the
Patane principle does not apply.  
 The State further argues that the admission of the statement was harmless error,
because the gun itself was properly admitted under the doctrine of inevitable discovery.  The
doctrine of inevitable discovery is not applicable on the facts of this case, however, so we do
not reach the harmless error argument.
In arguing inevitable discovery, the State relies on State v. Elliot, 417 Md. 413, 10
A.3d 761 (2010), in which we opined that the doctrine of inevitable discovery “is used to
overcome the presumed suppression of evidence gained from an unlawful search.  The State
must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the evidence inevitably would have been
22
discovered through lawful means.”  Id. at 436, 10 A.3d at 774.  In the present case, the trial
judge made no finding regarding whether the gun taken from Reid would have been found
inevitably, although the State did briefly argue inevitable discovery at the hearing on the
Motion to Suppress, saying only that “[w]hen he is stopped, he asked, well he’s asked is there
any weapon on you but they are going to frisk him, obviously, they believed he had a
weapon.” 
Were we to rely on our own fact-finding in this record, however, we would be running
afoul of our own jurisprudence, especially that which was articulated recently in State v.
Elliot, 417 Md. 413, 10 A.3d 761 (2010), in which we considered whether it was proper for
the Court of Special Appeals to address the issue of inevitable discovery sua sponte.  Officers
in that case received a tip from a reliable informant that a man named Winston would be
arriving at a shopping center in a black Nissan, inside of which would be a large quantity of
marijuana.  Elliot parked his car, which matched the informant’s description, at the shopping
center.  After he got out and began walking towards the stores, he was surrounded by SWAT
officers with assault weapons who ordered him to the ground.  After searching Elliot and his
companion and recovering the keys to the car, a Drug Enforcement agent went to the car,
detected the odor of marijuana, and opened the trunk, which smelled more strongly of
marijuana.  He closed the trunk and waited for a K-9 unit to arrive.  The dog alerted to the
trunk of the car, at which point the officers took Elliot and his companion to the police
station.  The car was searched at the station and police found twenty pounds of marijuana in
suitcases in the trunk.  Prior to trial, Elliot unsuccessfully sought to have the marijuana
23
suppressed.
After he was convicted, Elliot appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing
that he had been arrested without probable cause when he was ordered to the ground, and any
evidence seized thereafter should have been suppressed.  The Court of Special Appeals
agreed that he had been arrested at that time, but held that the motion to suppress the
evidence was properly denied because of the doctrine of inevitable discovery, which the
court raised sua sponte.  We granted Elliot’s Petition for Certiorari, as well as the State’s
conditional cross-petition, to consider, inter alia, whether it was proper for the Court of
Special Appeals to have upheld the denial of the motion to suppress under the inevitable
discovery doctrine.  We held that it was not proper, under the facts of the case, for the Court
of Special Appeals to have raised the issue sua sponte, because the record from the
suppression hearing did not contain any evidence showing what would have happened were
the illegal act not to have occurred.  In so holding, we relied on Stokes v. State, 289 Md. 155,
423 A.2d 552 (1980), in which we held that the inevitable discovery exception to the
exclusionary rule did not apply because the State “could not meet the burden of proving the
exception because no evidence was produced at the suppression hearing to support the
exception.”  Elliot, 417 Md. at 438, 10 A.3d at 776.
The State, in this case, asserts in its brief that, “[t]he record leaves little doubt that the
police would have discovered the gun without Appellant’s improper statement.”  The record
is devoid of any evidence of police procedure or the course of action the Detective would
have pursued had the unlawful arrest not occurred; the judge failed to make related findings.
24
To account for the lack of such direct evidence, the State argues that because the Detective
was investigating Reid for possession of a gun, “it is beyond question that Detective Reid
would have frisked Appellant’s shorts and discovered the gun.”  We stated in Stokes,
however, that “[i]t is true that the State avows in this Court that the police, absent Stokes’
statement, ‘would’ have searched the ceiling above petitioner’s bedroom.  This unsupported
assertion, however, is no substitute for evidentiary proof.”  Stokes, 289 Md. at 165, 423 A.2d
at 557–58.  Keeping in mind the principle that “speculation will not satisfy the demands of
the inevitable discovery doctrine,” Elliot, 417 Md. at 437, 10 A.3d at 774, quoting Williams
v. State, 372 Md. 386, 416, 813 A.2d 231, 249 (2002), the State’s argument must fail because
of our unwillingness to do appellate fact finding on a record devoid of evidence of what
would have occurred rather than what could have occurred.
Because the statement Reid made and the gun that was recovered from his person
were the products of an unlawful arrest, and none of the exceptions upon which the State
relies apply, we conclude that Reid’s Motion to Suppress should have been granted.   
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR BALTIMORE CITY REVERSED.
CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR
A NEW TRIAL.  COSTS TO BE PAID BY
THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF
BALTIMORE. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No.  113
September Term, 2011
                                                                             
DAVID REID
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                             
 
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
Barbera 
McDonald,
JJ.
                                                                             
Dissenting Opinion by Harrell, J., 
which  Barbera and McDonald, JJ., join.
                                                                             
Filed:   August 24, 2012
1 The word “TASER®” (in all capital letters) often refers to the largest manufacturer
of electronic control devices or “ECDs” (also known as “CEDs,” conductive energy devices).
The word “taser” is also the colloquial term for all ECDs on the market today, regardless of
the manufacturer.  I shall use taser or ECD as the generic noun for these devices and shall
use tase/tasing/tased as the appropriate tenses of verbs describing the action of deploying a
taser on a human subject.
The taser is often grouped with those weapons deemed “less-than-lethal.”  This term
of art is used interchangeably in academic journals with “non-lethal” and “less-lethal.”  Often
these terms refer to police methods, such as flexible batons, bean-bag shotguns, tasers,
pepper spray, canines, four-point restraints (hog-tie), and the baton (also known as a
nightstick) that fall short of the use of a firearm.  
2 Jack Cover, a NASA scientist, coined the term taser, which stands for Thomas A.
Swift Electric Rifle, a reference to Cover’s favorite childhood science-fiction character.
Sebastian N. Kunz et al., Functioning and Effectiveness of Electronic Control Devices Such
as the TASER® M- and X-Series: A Review of the Current Literature, J. Forensic Sci., 2012,
at 1. 
3 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to a Terry stop refer to the United States
Supreme Court’s explication in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884-85, 20
L. Ed. 2d 889, 911 (1968), in which the Court held that a police officer need only have
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot in order to stop and frisk a person for
weapons.  The lower level of suspicion is justified by the potential danger to the police
officer, as well as to the public-at-large.  
With respect, I dissent.  Detective Reid’s use of a taser1, 2 to effectuate a Terry3
stop and restrain Petitioner, David Reid (“Reid”) (no relation), was reasonable, given the
circumstances of this case.  Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City on the grounds that the police officer had reasonable suspicion to
effectuate a Terry stop and the use of the taser was a reasonable use of force, which did
not escalate the encounter to a de facto arrest requiring probable cause.
I. What is Reasonable Force in a Terry Stop Context?
A. Various Courts and Their Various Interpretations of Reasonable Force
As a formal detention, a Terry stop implicates a person’s Fourth Amendment rights
-2-
against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S. Ct. 1868,
1873, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 899 (1968).  Courts and scholars across the land approve varying
levels of force in order for a police officer to maintain his or her own safety and the safety
of the public-at-large when conducting an investigatory, or Terry, stop.  The Supreme Court
defines the reasonable force that does not convert a Terry stop into a de facto arrest as that
force which is “reasonably necessary to protect [the police officer’s or officers’] personal
safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop.”  United States v. Hensley,
469 U.S. 221, 235, 105 S. Ct. 675, 684, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604, 616 (1985).  Additionally, the
Supreme Court defines the outer boundary of reasonable force based on the danger that the
officer believed himself or herself to be facing at the time the force in question is used.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1699, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1, 7 (1985) (holding
that when a suspect is believed to be unarmed, the use of deadly force to prevent fleeing is
unreasonable).
The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedures is instructive on how much and
when force may be used by police during an investigatory stop.  The Model Code states, in
pertinent part:
(3) Use of Force.  In order to exercise [an investigatory-type
stop], a law enforcement officer may use such force, other than
deadly force, as is reasonably necessary to stop any person or
vehicle or to cause any person to remain in the officer’s
presence.
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 110.2(3) (1975).  The American Law Institute
-3-
reasoned there that it would be “frustrating and humiliating” to tell an officer he or she has
the authority to stop someone, but must stand by while that person ignores an order and flees.
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 110.2 cmt. (1975).  This sentiment, that
unchallenged escape should not be an acceptable outcome, was echoed by Justice Rehnquist
when he wrote, “The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise
level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and
allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.”  Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 92
S. Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 616 (1972).
Federal courts enumerate factors and a balancing test by which we should evaluate
the use of reasonable force.  The Seventh Circuit catalogs five factors (which other courts use
frequently) when evaluating the reasonableness of the force employed:  the nature of the
crime under investigation; the degree of suspicion; the location of the stop; the time of day;
and, the reaction of the suspect to the approach of the police.  United States v. Ocampo, 890
F.2d 1363, 1369 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing, among other cases, United States v. Serna-Barreto,
842 F.2d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 1988)).  The Ninth Circuit described the Fourth Amendment
balancing test as weighing “‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake’” or
“‘balanc[ing] the amount of force applied against the need for that force.’” Bryan v.
MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 823 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 8, 105 S. Ct.
at 1699, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 7, and Meredith v. Erath, 342 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
B. From Whose Vantage Point is Reasonableness to be Judged?
-4-
As articulated in Terry, the level and modality of force chosen by a police officer
should not be viewed in the first instance through the Court’s eyes; rather, it should be seen
through the eyes of a reasonable officer on the scene. 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880, 20
L. Ed. 2d at 906.  A judge must not engage in post hoc (some may say de novo) evaluation
of the police officer’s conduct when determining reasonable use of force because alternative
methods may always be imagined. In re David S., 367 Md. 523, 540, 789 A.2d 607, 616-17
(2002) (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L. Ed.
2d 605, 615 (1985)).  When reviewing a case originating in Maryland, the Fourth Circuit
noted, “‘The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation.’”  Young v. Prince George’s Cnty., 355 F.3d 751, 755 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 386-87, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1972, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443, 455-56
(1989)).  On this subject, the U.S. Supreme Court noted:
[W]e stress that a Terry investigation, such as the one that
occurred here, involves a police investigation “at close range,”
Terry, 392 U.S., at 24, when the officer remains particularly
vulnerable in part because  a full custodial arrest has not been
effected, and the officer must make a “quick decision as to how
to protect himself and others from possible danger . . . .”  Id., at
28.  In such circumstances, we have not required that officers
adopt alternative means to ensure their safety in order to avoid
intrusion involved in a Terry encounter.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1052, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3482, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1221-22
(1983) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 28, 88 S. Ct. at 1881, 1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 908, 910).
-5-
C. Examples of Reasonable Force Used in Effectuating a Terry Stop
There are several instructive cases involving varying degrees of force, akin to a “hard
takedown,” that do not result in a de facto arrest.  The holding that deployment of a taser was
reasonable in a Terry stop context in United States v. Colon, 654 F. Supp. 2d 326, 333 (E.D.
Pa. 2009), aff’d on other grounds 434 Fed. Appx. 88, 89 (3rd Cir. 2011), cert. denied, _ U.S.
_, 132 S. Ct. 1584, 182 L. Ed. 2d 199 (2012), is dismissed, without substantial justification,
by the majority opinion in the present case.  In Colon, police officers were patrolling a
known high-crime area.  654 F. Supp. 2d at 328.  The police observed Colon holding
nervously the right side of his pants.  Id.  He walked away from the police, even after being
ordered to stop.  Id.  When his path was blocked by a police cruiser, he ran.  Id.  The police
officers gave chase and tasered Colon, once to bring him to ground and twice more to prevent
him from reaching into his waistband, where, after a frisk for weapons, the officers found a
handgun.  Colon, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 330.  The district court held that a police officer may use
force to effect a Terry stop, and use of a taser in dart-mode was considered reasonable, given
the circumstances that Colon was armed most likely.  Colon, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 333; see also
United States v. Fields, 449 Fed Appx. 146, 148-49 (3rd Cir. 2011) (holding, in an
unpublished opinion, that the use of a taser did not elevate an investigatory Terry stop to an
arrest, because the defendant’s flight and lack of cooperation made the officers feel
vulnerable and fear for their safety).
Several jurisdictions hold that even significant intrusion on a person’s Fourth
Amendment rights does not convert necessarily a Terry stop into a de facto arrest situation.
-6-
In United States v. Lawshea, a law enforcement canine was used to subdue a fleeing
individual.  461 F.3d 857, 860 (7th Cir. 2006).  The Seventh Circuit held that this was a
reasonable level of force to effectuate a Terry stop, given that the individual fled from police
and the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe Lawshea may be armed.  Id.  The
aftermath of this takedown required hospital treatment of Lawshea for multiple canine bites
and administration of a tetanus shot.  Id.  The Seventh Circuit held that Lawshea’s own
actions, sprinting away from the officer and reaching for his waistband, justified the police
officer using the canine to subdue him.  Id.  Given the circumstances, the court held the Terry
stop was not converted into a de facto arrest at the release of the canine.  Id.  Surely, the
majority in the present case cannot imagine that Lawshea felt free to leave as the police
canine sunk its teeth into his shoulder, penetrating the skin in a more violent and less
controlled way than would have taser darts. Nor can it be said that police policy should not
dictate that an ambulance be called to treat Lawshea’s wounds.  The use of a law
enforcement canine, as in Lawshea, is an extreme example of force effectuating a Terry stop.
I do not suggest that this Court would find it necessarily an acceptable use of force in all
instances.  That determination must be made on a case-by-case basis, evaluated from the
perspective of the on-scene officer and what he/she confronted.  I offer Lawshea merely as
an example of a more extreme use of force than is present in Reid’s case, one that did not
result in transforming a Terry stop into a de facto arrest.
The Fourth Circuit upheld the throwing of an armed suspect on the ground head-first,
the jamming of an officer’s knee into the suspect’s back, and placing the individual in
-7-
handcuffs, as reasonable force during the effectuation of an investigatory stop.  Young,  355
F.3d at 756.  In United States v. Dykes, 406 F.3d 717, 718 (D.C. Cir. 2005), the Washington
D.C. Metropolitan police used a football-style tackle to effectuate a Terry stop, predicated
on a reasonable suspicion that Dykes was trafficking drugs.  Dykes fled when three police
cruisers entered a parking lot where he was conducting an illegal drug transaction.  Id.
Dykes was forced to the ground by one of the officers chasing him.  Id.  The court found this
to be an appropriate use of force to effectuate a Terry stop in that circumstance.  Dykes, 406
F.3d at 720.  Other courts have concluded similarly to the Dykes court.  See, e.g., United
States v. Franklin, 323 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003) (pulling down a person from a
chain-link fence and pinning him on the ground is not a de facto arrest requiring probable
cause); United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 218 (3rd Cir. 2004) (tackling does not elevate
a Terry into a de facto arrest); United States v. Jackson, 175 F.3d 600, 601-02 (8th Cir. 1999)
(same); United States v. Weaver, 8 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1993) (four officers tackling
a suspect did not cross the bounds of reasonable force in making a permissible Terry stop).
As will be discussed supra, these types of “hard takedowns” are themselves fraught with the
potential for injuries to the police officers and fleeing suspects.  These injuries could be as,
or more, serious than those associated with taser use.  The types of injuries, including
concussions, broken bones, lacerations, etc., could require medical attention, thereby
prolonging the length of what otherwise may have been a brief Terry stop, had not the
individual bolted or resisted.
D.  Was Reasonable Force Employed in Reid’s Circumstances?
4  There is some debate regarding the reliability of this anonymous tip.  The original
recipient of the tip, Detective Reid’s supervising lieutenant, was not at trial to testify.  The
veracity of the tip becomes less of an issue, however, after the officers in the field confirmed,
through observation, the facts given by the tipster, before attempting to make contact with
Reid.  Furthermore, Reid’s deliberate flight from police may be considered when determining
reasonable suspicion to engage in a Terry stop.    
5 If only Marshal Will Kane (Gary Cooper’s character in High Noon) had possessed
a taser, perhaps some of the bloodshed may have been avoided in that 1952 movie.  High
Noon (Stanley Kramer Productions 1952).
-8-
Detective Reid’s use of a taser was a reasonable use of force to effectuate a Terry stop
in the particular circumstances of his encounter with Petitioner Reid.  This Court should not
second-guess Detective Reid’s actions, as indulged by the majority opinion.
In considering whether a reasonable officer would consider the use of a taser
appropriate in the circumstances of this case, I begin with applying and weighing the factors
in Ocampo: the nature of the crime, the degree of suspicion, the location and time of day of
the stop, and the subject’s reaction to approaching police officers.  890 F.2d at 1369.  Here,
the undisputed facts militate in favor of taser use.  The police had an articulable suspicion,
generated by an anonymous tip,4 that a black man (taller than others in a group he was a part
of) would be found in the 1400 block of Pennsylvania Avenue, in control of a black Honda,
and would possess both drugs and a weapon.  The location was a known high-crime area
(although the time of day of the encounter was high noon5).  Moreover, Reid fled when the
officers approached on foot.  On balance, the Ocampo factors suggest strongly that the
officers needed to use elevated, yet still reasonable, force to effectuate a Terry stop of Reid.
Although there appears a dearth of reported cases involving the use of tasers in
6  The State argues that United States v. Russ, 772 F. Supp 2d 880, 891 (E.D. Ohio
2011) is on-point with the present case.  We agree, however, with the majority opinion that
it is unpersuasive.  The Ohio district court did not demonstrate clearly in its opinion that it
evaluated the use of a taser in a Terry stop context.
-9-
effectuating a Terry stop, the facts of Colon are strikingly similar to those of the present case.
Reid, suspected of being armed, was asked to stop by the officer, but ran off with a
perceptually heavy item swinging in a pocket of his shorts (remember the anonymous tip?).
The officers observed three of the four reasonable suspicion factors, set out in Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S 119, 123-25, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675-76, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 575-77 (2000),
to conduct a Terry stop:  Reid was in a known high-crime area; upon seeing the officers, Reid
began to act in a way that indicated to the officers, in their experience, that he was concealing
a weapon–“blading” his body to the approaching officers and performing weapon security
checks by patting his shorts’ pocket; and, Reid went into headlong flight as clearly
identifiable officers got closer.  The use of the taser was reasonable in Colon and should be
held reasonable here, as Detective Reid needed to act decisively and swiftly in order to
effectuate the Terry stop of a person the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe may be
armed.  See Colon, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 333.
While Colon is the most on-point case to the one before us,6 the levels of other forms
of force deemed reasonable by various courts when effectuating a Terry stop are instructive
by analogy.  Before comparing the effect of a taser to the effects of a canine bite or “hard-
tackle,” we need to recount certain background and contextual factual information regarding
the general operational characteristics of the kind of taser in question and the injuries it might
7 This Court has resorted frequently to taking judicial notice of additional facts (not
part of a record, strictly speaking, made in the trial court) that are either matters of common
knowledge or capable of certain verification.  See Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 444-45,
620 A.2d 327, 331 (1993) (relying on medical journals and reports to give context to what
was known at the time about AIDS and HIV); see also Armistead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 49-
50, 673 A.2d 221, 226 (1996) (relying on scientific journals as to the forensic use of DNA);
B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 139-40, 538 A.2d 1175, 1177-78 (1988) (relying on scientific and
technical publications to explicate the science of sexually-transmitted diseases); Pettit v. Erie
Ins. Exch, 117 Md. App. 212, 228, 699 A.2d 550, 558-59 (1997) (notice taken of definition
in Diagnostic Statistical Manual IV).  Therefore, in order to place the parties’ arguments in
proper context and engage in a rational analysis of them, I rely upon technical and scholarly
journals and reports to provide permissible, relevant, and well-established background
information about tasers.
8 The record in Reid’s case does not reveal explicitly the brand or model of taser
Detective Reid used in the incident on 22 June 2010.   In order for a Maryland police officer
to be authorized to carry an ECD, however, he or she must complete both classroom and
hands-on training in its proper use.  Code of Md. Regs. (COMAR) § 12.04.05.02,
12.04.05.03(B) (2012).  The Police Training Commission (hereinafter the “Commission”)
sets the minimum training standards for all Maryland Police and Correction Officers,
including the Baltimore City Police Department.  Maryland Code (2003, 2011 Repl. Vol.),
Pub. Safety Art., §3-201, §3-207.  COMAR 12.04.05.05 provides that only a Commission-
certified instructor may certify another police officer.  The Commission offers training on
two models of ECDs only, TASER® models X-26 and M-26.  Approved Training - Police,
Training Notes, February 1998-November 2011, available at http://www.mdle.net/tnotes.htm
(listing the training available to all Maryland police and correction officers at the end of the
monthly newsletter).  As the only Commission-certified instructors available were M-26 and
X-26 instructors, and Detective Reid, a member of the Baltimore City Police Department,
was required to be certified by one of those instructors, it is highly likely that Detective Reid
used a TASER® X-26 or M-26 to disable Reid.
-10-
(and might not) cause in greatest likelihood.  Although the four corners of the record in
Reid’s case are thin in this regard, there is a body of presumably reliable information that
provides an understanding from which to make an informed comparison regarding the
reasonableness of the force in question.7, 8
-11-
As explained in footnote 8, supra, Detective Reid most likely used either a TASER®
M-26 or X-26 model in subduing Petitioner Reid.  The X-26 is the newer model, smaller than
the M-26, and uses a rechargeable battery magazine as its power source, whereas the M-26
relies on two AA batteries.  Charlie Mesloh et al., Fla. Gulf Coast Univ. Weapons & Equip.
Research Inst., A Qualitative & Quantitative Analysis of Conducted Energy Devices:  TASER
X26 vs. Stinger S200, 13-14 (2008). The X-26 delivers the same shock level as the battery
wears down, but the shock from the M-26 diminishes as the battery wanes.  Id.
A taser operates in two modes:  stun (also known as drive-stun) and dart.  Report of
the Maryland Attorney General’s Task Force on Electronic Weapons, 2 n.1 (2009), available
at http://www.oag.state.md.us/Reports/ECWReport.pdf.  Stun mode is used typically in
close-quarters because the officer must press the taser directly onto the subject’s skin or
clothing.  Id.  Dart mode is used when the subject is beyond arms length.  Id.  The darts are
two barbed probes, often described as fish-hooks, cable of being propelled up to 35 feet.
Sebastian N. Kunz et al., Functioning and Effectiveness of Electronic Control Devices Such
as the TASER® — and X-Series: A Review of the Current Literature, J. Forensic Sci., Apr.
2012, at 1-2.  Compressed nitrogen gas propels the two darts at 180 feet per second.  Kunz,
supra, at 2; A. Bleetman et al., Implications for UK Emergency Departments: An Overview
of Electronic Weaponry, Emergency Med. J., Mar. 2004, at 136.
The X-26 and M-26 tasers deliver an electrical shock that will result in loss of
neuromuscular control, regardless of whether the probes attach to the subject’s clothes or
skin (penetrating up to one-inch with the largest of barbs).  Scott Savage, After the Zap:
9 The National Commission on Correction Health Care explained voltage versus
amperage.  
An electrical injury can be considered similar to being
struck on the foot with a falling stone.  When the stone hits you,
the amount of injury you receive will largely be mediated by
two factors: the size of the rock and height of the fall.
Obviously, a pebble falling from a roof will cause much less
injury than a 100-pound boulder falling even a few inches.
In electrical injuries, the voltage can be viewed as the
stone’s height and the amperage as its size.  Tasers have a high
voltage (tall height) but low amperage (small size).  Thus, a
Taser may fire with 50,000 volts, but it has minimal
amperage–like a small pebble that falls from a roof.  It stings,
but is unlikely to crush your foot the way the boulder would.
Scott Savage, After the Zap: Taser Injuries and How to Treat Them, Correct Care, Summer
2005, at 9, 19, available at http://ncchc.org/pubs/CC/archive/19-3.pdf.
-12-
Taser Injuries and How to Treat Them, Correct Care, Summer 2005, at 9, 19, available at
http://ncchc.org/pubs/CC/archive/19-3.pdf.  The darts on either taser model deliver an initial
voltage of up to 50,000 volts, ensuring the two probes complete the electrical circuit, and
then deliver approximately 5,000 Volts.  Barry E. Mangus et al., Taser and Taser Associated
Injuries: A Case Series, The Am. Surgeon, Sept. 2008, at 862.  The 5,000 volts are delivered
in a series of electrical pulses at a very low amperage, approximately 0.5-0.3 joules.  Savage,
supra, at 9.  Comparatively, the initial amperage of a defibrillator is 200 joules.  Id.  The
barbs deliver 15-20 pulses per second into the subject for up to a five-second cycle, which
may be repeated by the officer by depressing the trigger again.  Kunz, supra, at 2.  Thus, the
voltage is high, but the duration is short.9  Id.
  Although the pain experienced by a person subjected to a taser hit is not as mild as
10  Were it otherwise, certainly the police would not demonstrate the use of tasers to
trainees by subjecting a volunteer to its application, a technique frequently employed by
police trainers.
-13-
a static-cling shock, it is not, for analytical purposes, deadly force.10  Code of Maryland
Regulations § 12.14.01.01(B)(28) (2012) defines deadly force as “the force that a trained and
authorized professional employee uses with the purpose of causing, or which the authorized
professional employee knows will create, a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm.”
Although certain organizations describe the taser as lethal and the same level of force as
firearm, studies show that, absent a person’s underlying physical condition predisposing him
or her to an unpredictable injurious consequence, a taser is not lethal when used as intended
by an officer’s training.  See Kunz, supra, at 1; Justin Ready et al., Shock Value-A
Comparative Analysis of News Reports and Official Police Records on TASER Deployments,
Policing, 3 Oct. 2007, at 141, 151, available at www.emeraldinsight.com/1363951X.htm;
Wendy M. Denham et al., Injury Patterns Associated with Nonlethal Law Enforcement
Techniques, Topics of Emergency Med., Sept. 2009, at 30, 34; Mangus, supra, at 862.  The
Ninth Circuit labeled a taser as an “‘intermediate or medium, though not insignificant,
quantum of force,’”  noting also that tasers may often be used to diffuse a situation before
more serious or possibly deadly force becomes unavoidable.  Bryan, 630 F.3d at 811
(quoting, among other cases, Sanders v. City of Fresno, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1168 (E.D.
Cal. 2008)). 
One study found that less than one percent of tased suspects experienced serious
-14-
injuries due to the darts themselves or secondary injuries caused by falling during a tasing.
John Laub, Nat’l Inst. of Just., Dep’t of Just., Study of Deaths Following Electro Muscular
Disruption, 6-7 (2011) (citing Bozeman et al., Safety and Injury Profile of Conducted Energy
Weapons Used by Law Enforcement Officers against Criminal Suspects, Annals of
Emergency 
Med., 
2009, 
at 
480), 
available 
at https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/233432.pdf.  In fact, there have been no proven tasing deaths, absent a relative
few where an undisclosed underlying condition of the subject or other contributing factors,
such as PCP use or the subject having a pre-existing heart condition, were implicated.  See,
e.g., Denham, supra, at 34-35; Mangus, supra, at 862;  Laub, supra, at vii-viii. Therefore,
tasing should be considered for Terry stop analysis as “other than deadly force.”  Clearly that
was the case here as Reid survived, without any serious health consequences apparently.
With this knowledge of the painful, but rarely enduring, discomfort of a taser strike,
an effective comparison may be made between the use of a taser versus several types of other
force deemed reasonable by the relevant case law in criminal matters.  The officer in
Lawshea, without the benefit of an advance anonymous tip, observed Lawshea and another
person in a high crime area on a routine patrol around midnight.  Lawshea, 461 F.3d at 859.
After the officer exited the patrol car, Lawshea ran away.  Id.  The officer commanded
Lawshea twice to stop and then released the canine when he did not stop.  Id.  The canine
brought down Lawshea with a bite to the shoulder and was called off promptly by the officer.
Id.  When Lawshea attempted to run again, the canine was released again.  Lawshea, 461
F.3d at 860.  The Seventh Circuit ruled that Lawshea’s suspicious behavior at such a late
11 Unlike a trained law enforcement canine, a typical civilian dog’s jaw (pit bulls
excepted perhaps, see Tracey v. Solesky, __ Md. __ , __ A.3d __ (2012) (No. 53, Sept. Term,
2011) (filed 26 Apr. 2012)), exerts only  200-400 pounds of pressure per square inch.
Wendy M. Denham et al., Injury Patterns Associated with Nonlethal Law Enforcement
Techniques, Topics of Emergency Med., Sept. 2009, at 30, 36.
-15-
hour, combined with his repeated efforts to flee, served as reasonable suspicion for a
Terry stop and use of the canine was reasonable, given that Lawshea was likely armed.  Id.
It seems to me that the bites of a police canine are a more significant intrusion upon
a person’s Fourth Amendment rights than taser darts, which may be removed relatively
painlessly.  Canine bites can be deep, penetrating wounds, and often damage the surrounding
muscle.   Denham, supra, at 36.  Extensive soft tissue damage, bone injuries, and infections,
often requiring surgical and vascular intervention, are common in dog bites because law
enforcement canines are trained to exert typically 500-800 pounds per square inch of
pressure11 when released properly on a suspect.  Id.  Comparing these injuries to the likely
injuries of a taser dart used properly lead me easily to conclude that the use of a taser was
reasonable here.
The situations in Young, 355 F.3d at 756, Dykes, 406 F.3d at 718, Franklin, 323 F. 3d
at 1301, Bonner, 363 F.3d at 218, Jackson, 175 F.3d at 601-02, and Weaver, 8 F.3d at 1244-
45, demonstrate how a “hard takedown,” using what would be assaultive behavior if executed
by anyone other than a police officer in the execution of official duties, is a reasonable
amount of force if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the fleeing individual
may be armed.  Young presented the Fourth Circuit with a dramatic intrusion on a person’s
12  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed that it is not “‘sufficiently clear’”
whether a police officer’s use of a taser on a suspect constitutes excessive force under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.  Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 446 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149, __  (2011)), cert. denied,
__ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2682, __ L. Ed. 2d __ (2012).  Whether a particular force is excessive,
for purposes of § 1983, is highly circumstantial.  Mattos, 661 F.3d at 442.  The few cases that
discuss tasers and excessive force are factually similar, rendering it difficult to analogize
them to a broader context.  Mattos, 661 F.3d at 446–48. 
-16-
Fourth Amendment Rights because the police officer threw the suspect to the ground head-
first, placed his knee in the suspect’s back, and handcuffed him.  355 F.3d at 756.  The
takedown of Franklin could have posed significant risks of physical harm also as he was
pulled to the ground while climbing a chain link fence in an attempt to evade confrontation
with the officer; however, the Eleventh Circuit held the police conduct in securing him was
reasonable.  Franklin, 323 F.3d at 1301.12
  Because a wide array of federal circuits establish that several different modalities and
degrees of force effectuating a Terry stop were reasonable, all of which involve a significant
likelihood of injury and a potential intrusion on a citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights, this
Court should look to them for guidance in settling on a Maryland position.  Based on what
has been considered reasonable by the federal courts and the situation in the present case, the
intrusion on Reid’s person was less serious than that of a police canine bite and no more
serious than bringing a fleeing suspect to the ground by tackling or man-handling.  
II.  What Has Timing To Do Properly with Evaluating a Purported Terry Stop?
The majority opinion states that because Reid was detained for an “indefinite time
period” waiting for medical personnel to arrive to remove the taser barbs, the Terry stop
-17-
ripened surely into an arrest.   Reid, __ Md. at  __, __ A.3d at __  (Majority slip op. at 14-15).
In doing so, the majority opinion fails to consider two important factors.  First, when
considering the length of a Terry stop, the stopwatch stops as soon as either additional
reasonable suspicion or probable cause is developed. Crosby v. State, 408 Md. 490, 506, 970
A.2d 894, 903 (2009); accord Lee, 311 Md. at 652, 537 A.2d at 239-40.  Second, Reid’s own
actions contributed to prolonging the encounter unquestionably.  See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at
688-89, 105 S. Ct. at 1577, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 617 (Marshall, J., concurring)
We held in Crosby that a “Terry stop may yield probable cause, allowing the
investigating officer to elevate the encounter to an arrest or to conduct a more extensive
search of the detained individual.”  408 Md. at 506, 970 A.2d at 903 (citing Terry, 392 U.S.
at 10, 88 S. Ct. at 1874, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 899).  In Lee, the police ordered, at gun-point, the
defendants to the ground during a proper Terry stop because they had a reasonable suspicion
that the defendants possessed a handgun.  311 Md. at 652, 537 A.2d at 239-40.  The
investigatory stop in Lee ripened to an arrest with probable cause as soon as the officers
determined a backpack was too heavy to contain only summer-weight clothes (as claimed)
and likely concealed a weapon.  Id.  Mere moments elapsed between the defendants being
ordered on the ground (the Terry stop) and the elevation to an arrest.  Lee, 311 Md. at 662-
63, 537 A.2d at 245.
The functional stopwatch for the present investigatory stop began when the taser barbs
attached to Reid.  Upon reaching the incapacitated Reid, the officer inquired if he had any
illegal objects on his person.  Reid stated he had a gun.  The officers handcuffed him and
13 The majority opinion seems oblivious to the fact that the use of medical personnel
in similar circumstances is a department-by-department decision and without uniformity of
outcome.  For example, the U.S. Air Force permits police officers to remove the taser barbs
themselves, as long as they have not penetrated a vulnerable area of the body.  United States
Air Force Security Forces Command, Air Force Use of Force Manual, 94 (2009).  On the
other hand, the New York Police Department requires transportation to the hospital for dart
removal in all cases. A Government Accountability Office report to the House Subcommittee
(continued...)
-18-
recovered the gun in the right pocket of Reid’s shorts. As soon as the handgun was found,
there is no doubt the officers had probable cause to arrest Reid, similar to the situation in Lee.
Crosby, 408 Md. at 506, 970 A.2d at 903.  Although the record is silent on the exact amount
of time that passed between the tasing and the removal of the gun from Reid’s pocket, the
discovery of the gun was inevitable, under the circumstances, with the impending pat down.
Another factor in assessing the acceptable duration of a Terry stop is whether a
suspect’s actions lengthen the duration of what might have been otherwise a shorter Terry
stop.  A longer duration does not necessarily transform what commences as a Terry stop into
a de facto arrest.  Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 688-89, 105 S. Ct. at 1577, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 617
(Marshall, J., concurring) (while brevity in a Terry stop is important, the suspect’s own
actions extending the stop’s length cannot be overlooked). This was a key holding in
Lawshea, where the defendant’s actions, evading police while suspected of being armed,
caused the police canine to be utilized, leading to Lawshea being detained further, including
for resultant medical attention.  461 F.3d at 860-61.
The majority opinion fixates on the fact that the taser barbs penetrated Reid’s skin,
which, according to Baltimore City Police Department policy,13 may be removed only by a
13(...continued)
on National Security reported that many police departments allow police officers to decide
who may remove the barbs, and how the barbs are removed, on a case-by-case basis.  Gov’t
Accounting Office, Taser Weapons-Use of Tasers by Selected Law Enforcement Agencies,
16 (May 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05454.pdf. As of 2009, of the
24 Maryland law enforcement agencies that use tasers, only two require paramedics and an
ambulance be called; six require an ambulance to take the subject to a hospital; and, 12 leave
it to the officer’s discretion (four did not report their policy).  Report of the Maryland
Attorney General’s Task Force on Electronic Weapons, app. C (2009), available at
http://www.oag.state.md.us/Reports/ECWReport.pdf.
14 According to the National Commission on Correctional Care, there are three ways
to remove a taser dart that is not lodged in a vulnerable part of the body, e.g., the throat, face,
groin, any implants, or the female breasts: 1) remove the dart with a hemostat (a small
surgical clip) because the skin is anesthetized due to the stun; 2) use local anesthesia to
remove the dart with a hemostat, although often the administration of the anesthesia is more
painful than the removal; and 3) use a scalpel to make a small incision, and close the wound
with Dermabond®.  In the present case, Reid was struck in the back, as evidenced by
photographs taken by officers at the scene.  
-19-
paramedic.14  The majority opinion argues that this extended the Terry stop to an
impermissible length. Reid, __ Md. at __, __ A.3d at __ (Majority slip op. at 14-15, 17-18).
The majority does not consider that the need for medical personnel was occasioned by the
fact that Reid fled from the officers, requiring them to use reasonable force to detain him.
Rather, like the defendant in Lawshea, who did not feel free to leave after the law
enforcement canine bit him twice, Reid was also not free to leave during the lawful Terry
stop effectuated by reasonable force necessitated by his conduct.  Once the handgun was
found, probable cause existed for a warrantless arrest.  Crosby, 408 Md. at 506, 970 A.2d at
903; see Lawshea, 461 F.3d at 860-61; Lee, 311 Md. at 662-63, 537 A.2d at 245.
Additionally, the majority opinion appears enamored with the argument that because
-20-
Reid did not feel free to leave the encounter, it became an arrest requiring probable cause.
Whether a person feels free to leave the scene of a confrontation with police merely triggers
the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights against “unreasonable search and seizure.”  U.S.
Const. amend. IV (emphasis added).  Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d
at 909; Lee v, 311 Md. at 653-54, 637 A.2d at 241.  I am compelled to address this because
the majority opinion muddies the analytical waters regarding the two types of detentions
described in Terry–an investigatory stop requiring reasonable suspicion and an arrest
requiring probable cause.  
The majority opinion’s misconception appears most obvious where it states, “A
reasonable person would not feel free, nor even be able, to go under these circumstances:
Reid was, thus, arrested.”  Reid, __ Md. at __, __ A.3d at __ (Majority slip op. at 15).  This
conclusion leaps over entirely the possibility of an investigatory Terry stop, in which a
person is seized and not free to go, but is not arrested yet.  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.
Ct. at 1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 909.  Judge Moylan expressed clearly for the Court of Special
Appeals this scenario in Carter v. State, 143 Md. App. 670, 677, 795 A.2d 790, 794 (2002):
The appellant solemnly insists that he “was not free to leave.”
Of course, he wasn’t.  That’s why this was a Terry-stop
requiring the Terry level of Fourth Amendment justification.
Had he been free to leave, this would have been a mere
accosting and the Fourth Amendment would not have been
implicated. Under Terry, a stopee’s freedom of movement is
most definitely restricted under the command of law.  If he
attempts to leave after being ordered, perhaps at gunpoint, to
stop, he may be shot or otherwise forcibly restrained.  Such
consequences, notwithstanding the appellant’s urging to the
contrary, do not ipso facto transform a Terry-stop into an arrest.
15 The majority opinion unfurls several cases explaining how a suspect who was
detained physically was considered under arrest.  Reid v. State,__ Md. __, __ A.3d __ (2012)
(Majority slip op. at 11-18) (citing  Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 60
L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979) (an officer who lacks probable cause of involvement in a violent crime,
removes a person from a house, brings him to police station, and interrogates him is an
arrest); Bailey v. State, 412 Md. 349, 987 A.2d 72 (2010) (restraining a person in order to
frisk without suspicion of weapons is a de facto arrest); Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486,
520, 924 A.2d 1129, 1148 (2007) (handcuffing defendant without suspicion that defendant
was armed or violent resulted in a de facto arrest); Dixon v. State, 133 Md. App. 654, 659-60,
758 A.2d 1063, 1066 (2000) (having no indication of weapons, police arrested the defendant
by blocking his car, handcuffing him, and placing him in a squad car)).  As the majority
admits readily, all of these cases involved persons that were not suspected of being armed
and therefore differ significantly from the present case.  Whether a suspect is believed to be
armed weighs heavily on how much force may be considered reasonable when attempting
to detain and question the suspect.  See United States v. Ocampo, 890 F.2d 1363, 1369 (7th
Cir. 1989) (citing, among other cases, United States v. Serna-Barreto, 842 F.2d 965, 967 (7th
Cir. 1988)); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1707, 85 L. Ed.
2d 1, 10 (1985). 
-21-
Moreover, it cannot be questioned that an individual with multiple shotguns pointed at him
by police officers would not feel free to leave the scene, as was the case in Lee.  311 Md. at
666-67, 537 A.2d at 247.  Therefore, whether Reid felt free to leave is not a turning point in
this analysis; rather, whether the taser was a reasonable amount of force is the relevant
inquiry.15
Finally, we should consider the safety concerns of both police officers and suspects
when judging the reasonableness of the use of technology enhancements employed to
accomplish more effective policing.  A “hard takedown” may morph easily into a hand-to-
hand combat situation, which poses heightened physical risk to the suspect as well as the
officer.  A study funded by the National Institute of Justice, the research arm of the
Department of Justice, found that older-generation ECDs caused no major or moderate
-22-
injuries to suspects or officers.  Conversely, using a flashlight, baton, fists, or other forms of
bodily force to subdue a suspect caused moderate or major injury in 46 to 80 percent of the
cases studied.  Geoffrey P. Alpert, Police Use-of-Force Outcomes: Injuries and Control, The
Police Chief, Oct. 2010, at 109, available at http://ww.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/
naylor/CPIM1010/#/108.  As officers increase the amount of force used, the likelihood of
injury to both officer and suspect increases.  Id.  The use of tasers, however, has decreased
the amount of injuries to both suspects and officers.  Another study funded by the
Department of Justice found that the police departments in Orlando, Florida, and Austin,
Texas, after supplying tasers to their officers, experienced 50% and 30% reduction in injuries
to suspects, respectively, and a 60% and 25% reduction in police officer injuries,
respectively.  Alpert, supra, at 113-14.
Close-quarters combat can end in tragedy.  Reed v. City of Cleveland, 1:04CV0546,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96549, at *14 (N.D. Ohio 6 Sept. 2006), highlights this.  In Reed,
police officers attempted to make a routine investigatory stop and handcuff the two
defendants for the officers’ safety during questioning.  Reed, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96549,
at *13.  When one defendant ran, an officer gave chase, tackled the defendant, and a brawl
ensued.  Id.  The defendant, according to the officers’ testimony, attempted to take the
pursuing officer’s weapon.  Id.  In the ensuing fight, the officer received a bloody nose and
the defendant was shot and killed. Reed, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96549, at *14.
Speculatively, had the officer in Reed used a taser to subdue the fleeing suspect, it is likely
he would still be alive, or at least have a better chance of survival, as compared to the likely
-23-
outcome of a bullet to the heart at point-blank range.  This Court should encourage the
decrease of the likelihood of death of suspects and officers.
The situation in Reed highlights also why the majority opinion’s use of Garner to
equate the use of a taser to the use of a firearm is unpersuasive.  A bullet, when fired at the
center mass of a suspect, has the substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm, unlike a
taser.  Furthermore, the situation in Garner differs significantly from the present case:  the
officer in Garner surmised that Garner was not armed and used deadly force nonetheless to
subdue him for what amounted to suspicion of having committed a felony.  471 U.S. at 3,
105 S. Ct. at 1697, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 5.  The Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the
Tennessee law because the blanket approval of the use of deadly force to capture a suspect
thought to have committed a felony, regardless of whether the suspect was armed, was a
violation of the Fourth Amendment’s command against unreasonable search and seizures.
Garner, 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S. Ct. at 1707, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 10.  As explained supra, a taser
is not deadly ordinarily when used properly; conversely, a firearm would be considered
deadly and therefore subject to the restrictive view enunciated in Garner.  Id.
The consequences of causing police officers to hesitate to use a taser, where justified
by the extant circumstances, during a Terry stop to incapacitate a fleeing suspect cannot be
understated.  In the present case, the majority opinion would require Maryland police officers
either to use needlessly their martial arts or linebacker skills or stand by as the fleeing suspect
eludes into the sunset, even though the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe the suspect
is armed and a potential threat to the officer and the public.  Suffering an avoidable escape
-24-
was an option decried by the Supreme Court in Adams, 407 U.S. at 145, 92 S. Ct. at 1923,
31 L. Ed. 3d at 616.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the Circuit Court’s decision not to suppress
the weapon found on Reid.  The police officer seized the weapon during a lawful Terry stop,
based on reasonable suspicion, which was effectuated by reasonable force commensurate to
the particular situation.  I would uphold the denial of Reid’s request to suppress the evidence
acquired as a result of the use of the taser.  The judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City should be affirmed.
Judge Barbera and Judge McDonald authorize me to state that they join in the views
expressed in this dissenting opinion.