Case Title: Commonwealth v. Bigelow

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11974

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-09-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11974 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  HARVEY J. BIGELOW. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     January 8, 2016. - September 27, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ.1 
 
 
Criminal Harassment.  Constitutional Law, Freedom of speech and 
press.  Practice, Criminal, Argument by prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Taunton Division of 
the District Court Department on November 18, 2011. 
 
 
The case was tried before Gregory L. Phillips, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Diana Cowhey McDermott for the defendant. 
 
David B. Mark, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  In 2013, the defendant Harvey Bigelow was 
convicted of two counts of criminal harassment under G. L. 
                     
 
1 Justice Duffly participated in the deliberation on this 
case and authored her separate opinion prior to her retirement.  
Justices Spina and Cordy participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
c. 265, § 43A (§ 43A).  The charges were based on five letters 
the defendant allegedly wrote and sent to Michael Costello and 
Susan Costello2 in 2011, following a local election in the town 
of Rehoboth (town) in which Michael had been elected as a town 
selectman.  We consider here the defendant's appeal from these 
convictions; his principal claim is that both convictions must 
be reversed because the letters consisted of political speech -- 
expressions of dissatisfaction with Michael's performance as a 
selectman -- that is constitutionally protected.  We reverse the 
defendant's conviction of criminal harassment of Michael and 
order that count of the complaint dismissed; we vacate his 
conviction of criminal harassment of Susan, set aside the 
verdict, and remand for a new trial on the count of the  
complaint relating to Susan. 
 
Background.  In April, 2011, Michael was elected as a 
selectman of the town.  Between May 9 and July 23, 2011, at 
approximately two-week intervals, the Costellos received five 
anonymous, type-written letters that were mailed to their home.  
The letters were addressed to both Costellos or to Susan, and 
all were authored by the defendant.3 
                     
 
2 Because Michael Costello and Susan Costello share a last 
name, we refer to each by his or her first name to avoid 
confusion. 
 
 
3 The defendant does not challenge on appeal the sufficiency 
of the evidence that he was the author of the five letters, most 
3 
 
 
 
The first letter, received around May 9, was sent to the 
Costellos in an envelope addressed to "Mr. and Mrs. Costello," 
but the salutation in the letter itself mentioned only Michael.  
Although the letter included a variety of personal insults 
directed to and at Michael, in significant part it consisted of 
statements criticizing Michael's performance as a selectman, 
including, as its opening salvo, the following: "Michael 
Costello -- The biggest fucking loser I have ever met.  You 
should be utterly ashamed of yourself for even suggesting that 
anyone take you seriously as 'chairman of the board of 
selectm[e]n.'  It won't be long before you crash and burn big 
time."4  The letter ended as follows: 
"This is how it will go down real soon -- you will be 
arrested at town meeting, relieved of all your town 
positions, and ultimately be sent to prison as a [two] time 
loser convicted felon.  I'm guessing maybe [ten] years this 
time if nothing else comes out.  Sound good you fucking 
asshole.  Can't wait to see you handle Monday night.  We 
will all be staring at you!!!!!!!!!!  This letter will be 
                                                                  
of which purported to be from "a concerned citizen," and 
therefore we treat as established his identity as the author. 
 
 
4 This introduction was followed by other, thematically 
similar comments that appeared later in the letter, including: 
 
"You are not even close to being capable in any way to be a 
selectman, never mind a floor sweeper.  Totally not capable 
to do the job. . . .  The tide is turning against you in 
town and people are talking about you -- negatively. . . .  
I hear that a group of people will be at all future town 
meeting[s] to stare you down, talk ou[t] of turn, criticize 
-- just like you used to do.  Look for the big shit 
eatin[g] grins." 
4 
 
 
all over town by then as well as at selectmens'[sic] 
meeting. You really fucked up this time Mikey boy."5 
 
 
The envelope of the second letter, sent on May 26, was 
addressed to Susan, but again the text of the letter itself 
appeared to be directed to Michael.  The letter referred to 
Michael's "criminal mess" and stated that Michael "is indeed 
being investigated by not only the inspector general, but also 
by the Attorney General and the FBI"; that Michael "is guilty of 
fraud . . . [and] screwed a nice old senior citizen . . . out of 
his house by scamming the lottery"; and that he "was indeed 
convicted of stealing from Horner Millwork and sentenced to 
three years in prison plus probation and restitution . . . we 
will have [the public record of his conviction] at Tuesday's 
meeting."  The letter exhorted Michael to "resign immediately or 
else.  Or be put on administrative leave -- pending 
investigation," and later repeated, "resign immediately I 
suggest."  The letter added, "this is such a good letter I think 
I will send it around and post it at Vino's."6 
 
Attached to either the second or the third letter was a 
separate, handwritten note that stated: 
                     
 
 
5 The record contains no evidence that the letter was -- or 
indeed that any of the letters were -- read at any meeting of 
the board of selectmen. 
 
6 There was no evidence that the letter was "posted" or made 
public in any venue. 
5 
 
 
"Mikey + Susan --  
 
 
"Please forward your new address AFTER YOU MOVE.  I 
know where you can buy a tent or maybe you have $245,000 to 
buy that house in our development. 
 
 
"The Horner boys [and] the newsmen will be there 
Tues[day].  I wouldn't show up if I were you.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"A Concerned Citizen" 
 
The third and fourth letters, respectively sent June 15  
and sometime near or at the end of that month, were each sent in 
an envelope addressed to Susan and the salutation of each letter 
was also directed to her.  The third letter began, "I am sure 
you are not surprised to receive another letter regarding the 
disgusting cheat you are married to. . . .  [W]hat were you 
thinking getting tied up with such a scum bag."  Following 
another three paragraphs of derogatory comments about Michael 
and rhetorical questions asking how Susan could defend him, the 
letter ended with a suggestion that Susan would need to move out 
of her home:  "Have you selected a new place to live?  Maybe now 
would be a good time to preplan your future. . . .  If I were 
you, I'd spend less time defending this worthless human being 
and more time worrying about yourself." 
 
The fourth letter enclosed a copy of a page from a 
newspaper containing a critical letter to the editor written by 
a retired attorney about Michael's "abuses" and the fact that 
Michael was being investigated by the Attorney General and other 
6 
 
 
State authorities; across the copy was a handwritten comment 
stating, "Suzie -– Preview of Coming Attractions" (emphasis in 
original).  The fourth letter itself stated, "[t]he authorities 
will continue to hound [Michael] until you and he can't stand it 
anymore.  Maybe you will have to live like Whitey Bulger 
frequenting plastic surgeons to have any hope of a peaceful 
lifestyle.  The only difference is Whitey has unlimited funds 
and you don't." 
 
The envelope containing the fifth letter was addressed to 
"Susan 'The Maid' Costello" and was sent July 23.  The 
salutation of the letter itself was addressed to "Lorraine," but 
handwritten across the top was a message stating, "Hey Sue – why 
don’t you come to the meeting on Mon."  The letter asked if 
Lorraine was "screwing" Michael, and stated that "[w]ord about 
town is that he is screwing the assistant town clerk or 
treasurer, or maybe both.  There are pictures being circulated 
that prove it."  The letter then asked if Lorraine knew that 
Michael had undertaken a series of criminal acts, including 
stealing, and forging checks, and further that he "forged title 
to his wife's car[,] set fire to his wife[']s house with her in 
it[,] [and] screwed the cleaning lady then married her."7 
 
After receiving and opening the first letter, Michael 
brought it to the police.  Thereafter, the police began an 
                     
 
7 We infer the reference was to Susan. 
7 
 
 
investigation and Michael delivered all five letters to the 
police department, receiving back copies of the letters from the 
police a few days later.  Both Costellos read all five letters, 
either at the time they arrived by mail at their home or at a 
later point when the police provided the copies.  Michael 
testified at trial that he "felt like [his] character was run 
through mud and . . . it was [not] fair" and that he suffered a 
"bad" emotional reaction, principally because of the effect on 
his wife:  he "felt bad that [his] wife had to go through a 
situation like this because [he] was [aspiring] to be a 
selectman."  Susan testified that she "was hysterical," and that 
she "couldn't stop crying, couldn't sleep," was "afraid to live 
in" her own home, and "afraid to be alone."  She further 
testified the letters were "affecting [her] whole life" and she 
was "ready to move" by the time she received the fifth letter 
because she was "scared out of [her] mind" to be living in the 
town and specifically at the their house. 
 
On November 18, 2011, a two-count complaint issued out of 
the District Court charging the defendant with criminal 
harassment in violation of § 43A.  The first count named Michael 
and the second count named Susan as the person at whom the 
alleged acts of harassment were directed.  The defendant filed a 
motion to dismiss that was denied by a District Court judge.  
Trial took place in August, 2013, and the jury found the 
8 
 
 
defendant guilty on both counts.8  He was sentenced to one year 
of supervised probation, and as conditions of probation, was 
ordered to stay away from Susan and to write a letter of apology 
to the Costellos, with the letter to be published in three local 
newspapers.  The defendant filed a timely appeal and we 
transferred this case on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Protected speech and § 43A.  The criminal 
harassment statute punishes "whoever willfully and maliciously 
engages in a knowing pattern of conduct or series of acts over a 
period of time directed at a specific person, which seriously 
alarms that person and would cause a reasonable person to suffer 
substantial emotional distress."9  G. L. c. 265, § 43A (a).  The 
statute specifies that conduct or acts qualifying as criminal 
harassment under its terms "shall include, but not be limited 
to, conduct or acts conducted by mail."  Id. 
"[Section] 43A is a statute directed at a course of 
conduct, rather than speech," Commonwealth v. Johnson, 470 Mass. 
300, 308 (2014), but unquestionably, the statute reaches speech, 
                     
 
8 The defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty 
at the close of the Commonwealth's case; the motion was denied. 
 
 
9 This court has specified that to prove a "pattern of 
conduct or series of acts," under G. L. c. 265, § 43A (§ 43A), 
the Commonwealth must "prove three or more incidents of 
harassment."  Commonwealth v. Welch, 444 Mass. 80, 89 (2005), 
overruled on another ground by O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 
415 (2012). 
 
9 
 
 
treating speech as a form of conduct.  See Commonwealth v. 
Welch, 444 Mass. 80, 87-89 (2005).  On various occasions, this 
court has grappled with the application of § 43A and its 
relationship to the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution where speech is involved.  See Welch, supra at 93-
100.  See also Johnson, supra at 307-312.  Cf. O'Brien v. 
Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 420-421, 425 & n.7 (2012) (discussing 
§ 43A in case involving civil harassment statute, G. L. 
c. 258E).  In Welch, supra, where the defendant's criminal 
harassment convictions were based solely on incidents of pure 
speech, id. at 92 & n.13, the court reviewed § 43A and its 
legislative history, and concluded that in "carefully crafting" 
§ 43A, the Legislature "intended the statute be applied solely 
to constitutionally unprotected speech."  Welch, supra at 99. 
See id. at 98-99.10  Accord, O'Brien, supra at 420, 425.11  We 
                     
 
10 In the Welch case, the court reversed the defendant's 
convictions of criminal harassment and ordered the complaints 
dismissed because there were an insufficient number of incidents 
of alleged harassment to satisfy the statutory requirements of 
"pattern" or "series."  Welch, 444 Mass. at 93. 
 
 
11 In Welch, 444 Mass. at 99, the court considered only 
"fighting words" as a category of unprotected speech that § 43A 
could constitutionally reach, but in O'Brien, 461 Mass. at 425 
n.7, and Commonwealth v. Johnson, 470 Mass. 300, 311 (2014), the 
court subsequently clarified that true threats, along with other 
"well-defined and limited categories," id., of constitutionally 
unprotected speech, fall within the scope of § 43A.  Another 
relevant category of speech that the United States Supreme Court 
has recognized as falling into the unprotected category, as 
Johnson, supra, points out, is "[s]peech integral to criminal 
10 
 
 
added in the Welch case that "[s]hould the Commonwealth attempt 
to prosecute an individual for speech that is constitutionally 
protected, we would have no hesitation in reading into the 
statute such a narrowing construction to ensure its application 
only to speech that is accorded no constitutional protection."  
Welch, supra at 100.12,13 
                                                                  
conduct."  See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-469 
(2010), and cases cited. 
 
 
12 This narrow construction of § 43A, first announced in 
Welch, 444 Mass. at 100, reflects the court's determination that 
it represented the Legislature's intent in enacting the criminal 
harassment statute, and comports with the general intent of the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution to bar the 
government from infringing on the freedom of speech, one of the 
fundamental personal rights and liberties guaranteed by the 
Constitution.  See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 
2537, 2543 (2012) ("[A]s a general matter, the First Amendment 
means that government has no power to restrict expression 
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its 
content" [citation omitted]).  Although the government may, in 
certain circumstances, regulate speech based on its content, 
see, e.g., Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 
U.S. 726, 744-745 (1978),  nonetheless, the Constitution 
"demands that content-based restrictions on speech be presumed 
invalid . . . and that the Government bear the burden of showing 
their constitutionality" (citation omitted).  Ashcroft v. 
American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004).  
Accord Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244 
(2002) ("The government may violate [the mandate of the First 
Amendment] in many ways, . . . but a law imposing criminal 
penalties on protected speech is a stark example of speech 
suppression" [citations omitted]); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377, 382 (1992) ("The First Amendment generally prevents 
government from proscribing speech, . . . or even expressive 
conduct, . . . because of disapproval of the ideas expressed.  
Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid" [citations 
omitted]).  See generally Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 
U.S. 46, 50-51 (1988) ("[T]he freedom to speak one's mind is not 
only an aspect of individual liberty -- and thus a good unto 
11 
 
 
 
The defendant argues that § 43A only punishes 
constitutionally unprotected speech, and that his convictions 
cannot stand because each of the letters forming the basis of 
                                                                  
itself -- but also is essential to the common quest for truth 
and the vitality of society as a whole" [quotation omitted]). 
 
13 The dissent suggests that the Welch case was "improvident 
and should be revisited" to the extent our opinion may be 
understood to interpret "§ 43A as applicable only to 
constitutionally unprotected speech" in order to narrow it 
sufficiently to be constitutional.  Post at note 10.  This view 
misreads Welch, at least in part.  We concluded in Welch that in 
drafting § 43A, the Legislature "intended the statute be applied 
solely to constitutionally unprotected speech" (emphasis added). 
Welch, 444 Mass. at 99.  In other words, we were seeking to 
implement legislative intent, not simply to apply a judicially-
created, narrowing construction to the statute in order to 
preserve its constitutionality.  In the O'Brien case, we 
returned to, and repeated, the same characterization of the 
Legislature's intent in enacting § 43A.  See O'Brien, 461 Mass. 
at 420, 425.  The Johnson case also implicitly accepts the view 
of the Welch and O'Brien cases that insofar as speech is 
concerned, the Legislature intended the proscriptions of § 43A 
to be limited to classes of constitutionally unprotected speech.  
See Johnson, 470 Mass. at 308-312.  Since Welch was decided, the 
Legislature has amended § 43A, see St. 2010, c. 92, § 10, but 
not in a manner to suggest a change in the statute's purpose or 
intent in relation to the types of speech it reaches.  We see no 
reason, therefore, to abandon or reject in the present case our 
previously articulated, and by now established, interpretation 
of that intent, and our decision in this case is expressly 
premised on it.  Moreover, this interpretation does meet the 
legislative goal, emphasized by the dissent, see post at    , of 
closing "a perceived loophole" in the criminal stalking statute, 
G. L. c. 265, § 43, because the stalking statute requires proof 
of an intent to place the alleged victim "in imminent fear of 
death or bodily injury, see O'Brien, supra at 420 n.5 (citation 
omitted; emphasis added), whereas §  43A, the criminal harassment 
statute, has no such requirement of imminence.  See id.  For 
this reason, the dissent's reliance on Commonwealth v. Walters, 
472 Mass. 680 (2015), see  post at note 4, is not directly 
apposite because the cited language from Walters was considering 
the stalking statute, not the criminal harassment statute. 
12 
 
 
the charges qualified as constitutionally protected political 
speech under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  In substance, the defendant's argument challenges 
the sufficiency of the evidence:  if the evidence of "conduct or 
acts" of alleged criminal harassment consists solely of 
protected speech, the Commonwealth did not, and cannot, meet its 
burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  We consider this argument in relation to each of the 
charges separately. 
 
2.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  a.  Complaint concerning 
Michael.  A conviction under § 43A requires proof that "(1) the 
defendant engaged in a knowing pattern of conduct or speech, or 
series of acts, on at least three separate occasions; (2) the 
defendant intended to target the victim with the harassing 
conduct or speech, or series of acts, on each occasion; (3) the 
conduct or speech, or series of acts, were of such a nature that 
they seriously alarmed the victim; (4) the conduct or speech, or 
series of acts, were of such a nature that they would cause a 
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress; and 
(5) the defendant committed the conduct or speech, or series of 
acts, willfully and maliciously."  Johnson, 470 Mass. at 307, 
quoting Commonwealth v. McDonald, 462 Mass. 236, 240 (2012). 
 
The defendant's argument is that even if at least three of 
the five letters sent to Michael might qualify as separate acts 
13 
 
 
constituting "a knowing pattern of conduct or speech" (first 
element), these acts cannot be prosecuted as criminal harassment 
and subject to criminal punishment because the essence of the 
conduct was speech, and in particular, constitutionally 
protected political speech.  As to Michael, we agree.  That is, 
when those letters that were arguably "directed at" (see § 43A 
[a]) or targeted Michael14 are considered, their central thrust 
is criticism of him as a selectman in the town; the personal 
insults and allegations concerning Michael's alleged criminal 
past and sexual improprieties appear to be intended to persuade 
him to resign from his elected position.  Because these letters 
were directed at an elected political official and primarily 
discuss issues of public concern -- Michael's qualifications for 
and performance as a selectman -- the letters fall within the 
                     
 
14 The parties at trial treated all five letters as being 
"sent" to both Michael and Susan.  Under §  43A, however, the 
pertinent question is whether the letters were "directed at" 
Susan and Michael.  We do not think that all five letters were 
"directed at," or targeted, Michael, nor do we think all five 
letters were "directed at," or targeted, Susan.  It is true, as 
the dissent points out, post at    , that if a threat were 
directed at Susan but contained in a letter addressed to Michael 
and the letter were sent to him "with the reasonable expectation 
that he would communicate [the threat] to her," the threat would 
still qualify as a threat directed at Susan.  But the dissent is 
mistaken that we consider the same language in the same letter 
to qualify as constitutionally protected political speech in 
relation to Michael but unprotected speech in relation to Susan. 
See post at    .  Rather, our analysis of the criminal 
harassment complaint concerning Michael in large part considers 
different language or content in different letters from what we 
consider in relation to the criminal harassment complaint 
concerning Susan. 
14 
 
 
category of constitutionally protected political speech at the 
core of the First Amendment.  See Commonwealth v. Lucas, 472 
Mass. 387, 392 (2015), quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("Our constitutional system 'presupposes 
that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a 
multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative 
selection.  To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we 
have staked upon it our all'").  Where matters of public concern 
are the focus –- that is, "any matter of political, social, or 
other concern to the community" (citation omitted), Snyder v. 
Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011) -- the First Amendment 
protections are often more rigorous than when matters of private 
significance are at issue.  See id. at 452. 
 
In considering the First Amendment's protective reach, 
"critical" to the examination is the context and content of the 
speech at issue.  See Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica 
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744 (1978).  It is true that the letters 
were sent to Michael at his home, a location where the 
homeowner's privacy is itself entitled to constitutional 
protection.  Cf. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 
U.S. 728, 736, 738 (1970).  Cf. also Cohen v. California, 403 
U.S. 15, 21 (1971) ("[T]his Court has recognized that government 
may properly act in many situations to prohibit intrusion into 
the privacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas which 
15 
 
 
cannot be totally banned from the public dialogue").  But 
Michael was an elected town official, and as Michael himself 
testified, receiving mail from disgruntled constituents is usual 
for a politician.  A person "who decides to seek governmental 
office must accept certain necessary consequences of that 
involvement in public affairs . . . [and] runs the risk of 
closer public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case."  Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).  Here, given 
Michael's status as a selectman and the content of the letters, 
it cannot be said that Michael's "substantial privacy interests 
[were] invaded in an essentially intolerable manner."  Cohen, 
supra.  See State v. Drahota, 280 Neb. 627, 630-631, 637-638 
(2010) (defendant's abusive, outrageous, electronic mail 
messages to former professor running for State elective office, 
insofar as they did not qualify as fighting words, were 
protected speech not subject to criminal punishment under 
disturbing peace statute despite professor's previous 
instruction not to send further messages).  See also United 
States v. Popa, 187 F.3d 672, 673, 677-678 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(defendant's seven anonymous telephone messages left on United 
States Attorney's office telephone, containing racial epithets 
directed at United States Attorney and complaints about abusive 
police officers, constituted protected speech directed at public 
official; statute punishing anonymous telephone calls made with 
16 
 
 
intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass held unconstitutional 
as applied to defendant, requiring reversal of conviction); 
State v. Fratzke, 446 N.W.2d 781, 784-785 (Iowa 1989) (First 
Amendment precluded defendant from being punished under criminal 
harassment statute for offensive, profane letter written to 
State trooper to protest speeding ticket where no "fighting 
words" were included).  Contrast Hott v. State, 400 N.E.2d 206, 
208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (upholding defendant's conviction of 
making indecent telephone call based on vulgar calls made to 
police chief and prosecuting attorney at their respective homes 
late at night to complain about police sergeant). 
 
Conceding that the letters contain protected political 
speech, the Commonwealth urges that, as in Johnson, the 
defendant's speech was integral to a larger course of harassing 
conduct directed at Michael that caused Michael serious and 
reasonable alarm.  The argument fails.  With respect to the 
issue of integrated speech and conduct, this case is very 
different from Johnson.  The facts before the court in Johnson, 
470 Mass. at 303-305, demonstrated that the defendants used 
their speech intentionally to initiate and carry out a plan of 
harassment of the victims through the conduct of (many) third 
parties. 15  See Welch, 444 Mass. at 99 n.15, quoting Giboney v. 
                     
 
15 In the Johnson case, the defendants twice posted false 
advertisements on the Internet Web site "Craigslist" about items 
17 
 
 
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) ("it has 
never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to 
make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was 
in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of 
language, either spoken, written, or printed").  Here, however, 
the defendant's speech did not initiate or carry out any 
separate conduct that could be deemed harassing or illegal for 
an independent reason (i.e., a separate crime).  The only 
conduct of the defendant's at issue is his writing and mailing 
the anonymous letters; as previously indicated, there was no 
evidence that the defendant's letters caused any other person to 
undertake any type of action in relation to Michael. 
 
There is a second, independent, reason for rejecting the 
Commonwealth's argument in support of Michael's conviction:  the 
evidence presented at trial was insufficient to persuade a 
rational fact finder that Michael was himself "seriously 
alarmed" by the receipt of the letters, one of the elements of 
                                                                  
that the victims supposedly were giving away or selling, causing 
members of the public to arrive at the victims' home and to 
telephone repeatedly, looking for the items.  Johnson, 470 Mass. 
at 303-304.  The defendants also sent an anonymous and ominous 
electronic mail (e-mail) message containing all the victims' 
personal identifying information; filed a false report with the 
Department of Children and Families (DCF) alleging that one of 
the victims physically abused his son, an act that caused DCF 
staff to initiate an investigation; and sent to one of the 
victims an e-mail message and letter from a fictitious person 
that falsely accused the victim of having sexually abused that 
person in the past.  See id. at 304-305. 
18 
 
 
the crime that the Commonwealth was obligated to prove.  Michael 
testified that he felt it was "unfair" that his "character was 
really run through the mud[,]" but recognized his election as 
selectman opened him up to some criticism, and that the 
emotional distress he experienced by receipt of the letters was 
"mostly [his] wife[,] because of her -- the way it impacted 
her."  He stated that he "felt bad that [his] wife had to go 
through a situation like this" because he aspired to be a 
selectman; "[i]t affected [him] very much because . . . [he] was 
putting her through this."  He did not identify any specific 
emotional consequences or impacts he suffered directly as a 
consequence of his receipt of the letters. 
 
Michael's experience of being upset or distressed by his 
wife's experience does not qualify as the "serious[] alarm[]" or 
"substantial emotional distress" required by § 43A because his 
distress was not caused by his own receipt of the letters but 
rather was derivative of his wife's distress at her receipt of 
them.  Nothing the defendant did or said appeared to have 
"seriously alarm[ed]" Michael directly.  See Commonwealth v. 
Braica, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 244, 247-248 (2007).  Cf. Commonwealth 
v. Kessler, 442 Mass. 770, 773-774 (2004) (prosecution for open 
and gross lewd and lascivious behavior; insufficient evidence of 
shock and alarm). 
19 
 
 
 
In sum, in light of the generous constitutional protections 
afforded to political speech by the First Amendment (as well as 
art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights), and the 
lack of evidence of serious alarm on Michael's part, we conclude 
that the evidence was not sufficient to support the defendant's 
conviction of criminal harassment of Michael.16 
 
b.  Complaint concerning Susan.  We turn to the sufficiency 
of the evidence as to Susan. 
 
Three of the defendant's five letters were specifically 
directed at or targeted Susan: the third, fourth, and fifth.17  
Susan was married to Michael, but she was not a selectman, did 
not hold any political office, and had not run for election.  We 
                     
 
16 The defendant argues that that the Commonwealth failed to 
prove that the defendant targeted Michael on three separate 
occasions, which is a required element of the crime.  See Welch, 
444 Mass. at 89-90.  Of the five letters mailed by the 
defendant, the first and second letters were the ones 
specifically "directed at" Michael, i.e., the ones that 
specifically targeted him.  The handwritten note addressed to 
"Mikey and Susan" also arguably targeted Michael (as well as 
Susan).  However, the record is unclear whether this note was 
attached to either the second or the third letter.  If this note 
was in fact attached to and sent with the second rather than the 
third letter, we agree with the defendant that there may well 
not have been three separate incidents of alleged harassment, 
and that this could be a separate reason warranting reversal of 
his conviction.  We need not decide the question, however, given 
the other two reasons why the conviction cannot stand. 
17 The third and fourth letters were sent to Susan, the 
salutations in them were to Susan, and the contents of those 
letters also make clear that they were directed at her.  The 
fifth letter was addressed to her, but the salutation was to 
"Lorraine."  However, the note on the letter and their contents 
certainly indicated that the intended target of the letter was 
Susan -- or so the jury could have found. 
20 
 
 
do not agree with the defendant's suggestion that being married 
to a public office holder makes one in effect his alter ego.  
The defendant's speech directed at Susan, fairly considered, was 
not an expression of political views about a public official but 
rather a series of offensive personal comments about her and her 
husband Michael.  But the fact that the speech may not be 
categorically protected as political speech does not mean that 
it therefore automatically qualifies as constitutionally 
unprotected speech.  Given this court's interpretation of § 43A 
and its underlying legislative intent, however, the speech must 
fit in a category of unprotected speech if the defendant's 
conviction of criminally harassing Susan based on the contents 
of his speech is to stand.  See Federal Communications Comm'n v. 
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 744 ("content and context of speech 
are critical elements of First Amendment analysis"). 
 
It is clear that the defendant's letters addressed to Susan 
do not contain "fighting words," the category of unprotected 
speech that Welch primarily discussed.18  In addition, for the 
reasons we have previously stated, we disagree with the 
Commonwealth that this case is like Johnson, and that the 
                     
 
18 "Fighting words" are words "which by their very utterance 
inflict injury and or tend to incite an immediate breach of the 
peace and words plainly likely to cause a breach of the breach 
by the addressee" (quotations and citations omitted).  Welch, 
444 Mass. at 94.  Accord, O'Brien, 461 Mass. at 423. 
 
21 
 
 
defendant's speech contained in the letters directed at Susan 
was sufficiently intertwined with conduct to be treated as 
unprotected.  Contrast Johnson, 470 Mass. at 309-311.  Nor is 
there any suggestion that the letters contain other possible 
categories of unprotected speech such as words that incite 
violence, obscenity, defamation,19 or fraudulent speech.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-469 (2010), 
and cases cited.  "True threats," however, are different.  True 
threats represent a category of unprotected speech that our 
cases have noted is relevant to criminal harassment as defined 
and proscribed by § 43A.  See Johnson, 470 Mass. at 311 n.12.  
See also O'Brien, 461 Mass. at 423-425 & n.7.  We have stated 
that: 
"[a] true threat does not require an explicit 
statement of an intention to harm the victim as long as 
circumstances support the victim's fearful or apprehensive 
response. . . .  Nor does a true threat threaten imminent 
harm; sexually explicit or aggressive language directed at 
and received by an identified victim may be threatening, 
notwithstanding the lack of evidence that the threat will 
be immediately followed by actual violence or the use of 
physical force. . . .  
 
". . .  
 
"[T]he 'true threat' doctrine applies not only to 
direct threats of imminent physical harm, but to words or 
                     
19 On the record presented, the speech would not qualify as 
defamatory because there was no evidence presented that the 
speech was false.  See, e.g., Harrington v. Costello, 467 Mass. 
720, 728 n.15 (2014), quoting White v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
of Mass., Inc., 442 Mass. 64, 66 (2004), and Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 558 (1977). 
22 
 
 
actions that -- taking into account the context in which 
they arise -- cause the victim to fear such harm now or in 
the future and evince an intent on the part of the speaker 
or actor to cause such fear"(quotations and citations 
omitted). 
 
O'Brien, supra at 424-425.20  See Commonwealth v. Chou, 433 Mass. 
229, 236 (2001) (true threats include "words that are intended 
to place the target of the threat in fear, whether the threat is 
veiled or explicit"). 
 
 We conclude that, viewed in context, a jury reasonably 
could conclude that the defendant's speech directed at Susan 
that was contained in each of the last three letters qualified 
as true threats.  That is, because -- in contrast to the speech 
directed at Michael -- we cannot conclude as a matter of law 
                     
 
20 See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-360 
(2003) ("The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the 
threat.  Rather, a prohibition on true threats 'protect[s] 
individuals from the fear of violence' and 'from the disruption 
that fear engenders,' in addition to protecting people 'from the 
possibility that the threatened violence will occur'" [citation 
omitted]); United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st 
Cir. 1997) ("whether [the defendant] should have reasonably 
foreseen that the statement he uttered would be taken as a 
threat by those to whom it is made"); Shackelford v. Shirley, 
948 F.2d 935, 938 (5th Cir. 1991) ("[E]xpression has special 
value only in the context of 'dialogue' . . . .  As speech 
strays further from the values of persuasion, dialogue and free 
exchange of ideas the [F]irst [A]mendment was designed to 
protect, and moves toward threats made with specific intent to 
perform illegal acts, the [S]tate has greater latitude to enact 
statutes that effectively neutralize verbal expression").  Cf. 
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (distinguishing 
between unprotected true threats and protected political 
speech).  See generally, Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-
Many Speech, Criminal Harassment Laws, and "Cyberstalking", 107 
Nw. U.L. Rev. 731, 740-744 (2013). 
23 
 
 
that the speech directed at Susan that was contained in these 
three letters qualified as protected speech, it becomes a 
question for the fact finder to determine whether the speech was 
unprotected speech.  Cf. United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287, 
298 (3d Cir. 2013) ("In the usual case, whether a communication 
constitutes a threat or a true threat is a matter to be decided 
by the trier of fact. . . . It is not unprecedented for a court 
to conclude that a communication does not legally qualify as a 
threat or true threat. . . . [A] court may properly dismiss an 
indictment as a matter of law if it concludes that no reasonable 
jury could find that the alleged communication constitutes a 
threat or a true threat" [quotations and citations omitted]). 
 
These three letters contained vulgar and hateful insults 
and comments that in their choice of language and their 
repetitive nature were disturbing, reflecting what could be 
found to be an obsessive interest in private matters relating to 
Susan -- especially her marital relationship.  But more to the 
point, some of the specific comments in the letters, such as 
Susan's possible future need to have plastic surgery to change 
her appearance as a self-protective measure, her current need to 
move out of their home, provocative warnings to Susan about 
attending town meetings, and the reference to Michael having 
burned the home of his first wife with her in it, by themselves 
24 
 
 
could be found to qualify as expressing a danger to Susan's 
personal safety, especially in her home. 
 
Furthermore, the text of the letters must be viewed 
contextually.  From Susan's perspective these letters were three 
out of a total of five letters written to her by a person who 
refused to identify himself or herself except as a "concerned 
citizen," and were sent at regular, two-to-three week intervals 
over two months -- ceasing, it can be inferred, only after the 
defendant's son effectively revealed his father's identity.  The 
anonymity of the letters made evaluation of the sender's intent 
impossible, and therefore could be found to have greatly 
increased the letters' potential to instill in Susan a fear of 
future harm, including physical harm, being visited on her in 
her home.21 
 
As part of the contextual analysis, an individual's right 
"to be let alone" in her home is relevant.  Cf. Rowan v. United 
States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. at 736, 738 ("But the right 
of every person 'to be let alone' must be placed in the scales 
with the right to communicate. . . .  We therefore categorically 
reject the argument that a [mail order] vendor has a right under 
the Constitution or otherwise to send unwanted material into the 
                     
 
21 It also is worth noting that because the letters were 
anonymous, Susan would have been unable to halt their arrival at 
her home, such as requesting a block at the post office or, 
perhaps, seeking a civil restraining order pursuant to G. L. 
c. 258E. 
25 
 
 
home of another . . . .  That we are often 'captives' outside 
the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech 
and other sound does not mean we must be captives otherwise").  
Cf. also People v. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d 529, 536 (1995) ("The Rowan 
analysis may be extended to [New York's telephone harassment 
statute]").  Not being a public official, Susan's right of 
privacy in her home was substantial.  Cf. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 
U.S. 474, 476, 484-485 (1988) (upholding content-neutral ban 
against residential picketing:  "The State's interest in 
protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home 
is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized 
society . . . [and] individuals are not required to welcome 
unwanted speech into their own homes" [quotations and citations 
omitted]). 
 
Susan testified (and the jury could credit) that the 
defendant's acts of sending the series of anonymous letters made 
Susan feel no longer physically safe in her own home to the 
point that she wanted to move away.  See United States v. 
Bellrichard, 994 F.2d 1318, 1321 (8th Cir. 1993) ("As a general 
proposition, correspondence of this sort delivered to a person 
at home or at work is somewhat more likely to be taken by the 
recipient as a threat than is an oral statement made at a public 
gathering, which was the situation in Watts [v. United States, 
394 U.S. 705 (1969)]").  The repetitive mailing of anonymous 
26 
 
 
letters to Susan's home -- indicating, obviously, that the 
sender knew where she lived -– could reasonably be found by a 
jury as supporting and indeed amplifying the message of threat 
to Susan's personal safety that the three letters contained.  
See Hrycenko v. Commonwealth, 459 Mass. 503, 504, 511 (2011) 
(letter sent to judge's home "made it clear . . . that [the 
defendant] knew where [the judge] lived" and showed intent to 
intimidate judge).  See also United States v. Mabie, 663 F.3d 
322, 327, 331 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 107 
(2012) (letters sent to prosecutors' unlisted home addresses 
constituted true threats).  Cf. Commonwealth v. O'Neil, 67 Mass. 
App. Ct. 284, 285-286, 294 (2006) (affirming conviction of 
criminal harassment where defendant mailed five letters from 
jail to victim at her home and two more to her family; although 
letters contained no explicit threats, they "presumed a 
familiarity with the victim" who had never socially interacted 
with defendant, and had "obsessive tone," establishing over-all 
threatening effect; no issue concerning First Amendment raised 
in case).22,23 
                     
 
22 We disagree with the dissent that our discussion of true 
threat has "stretch[ed] the meaning of 'true threat' far beyond 
common understanding, removing broad swaths of speech from 
constitutional protection and imposing potential criminal 
liability on statements that might, in another's eyes, seem 
merely rude and offensive."  Post at    .  We apply here the 
definition of true threats set out in the O'Brien case, and that 
definition is built on and follows Supreme Court precedent.  See 
27 
 
 
 
Our determination that in relation to Susan, a fact finder 
reasonably might find that the defendant's letters qualify as 
true threats does not mean that the defendant is guilty of 
criminal harassment; it means only that the speech on which the 
complaint of criminal harassment is premised might be found to 
qualify as fitting within a constitutionally unprotected 
category of speech that may be subject to prosecution under 
                                                                  
O'Brien, 461 Mass. at 423-425.  (Our disagreement with the 
dissent in this case, at least in part, seems to be based on 
differing interpretations of the facts, not on the definition of 
what constitutes a true threat.) As for subjecting "broad 
swaths" of constitutionally protected speech to criminal 
sanction, it would seem that the dissent's proposed 
interpretation of § 43A, which explicitly permits 
criminalization of constitutionally protected speech, has the 
potential to place far more protected speech at risk of criminal 
sanction than does our interpretation of the statute. 
 
23 The dissent suggests that there is no distinction between 
a true threat and the common-law offense of threatening to 
commit a crime, set out in G. L. c. 275, § 2.  See post at    .  
We disagree.  A threat to commit a crime within the scope of 
G. L. c. 275, § 2 –- the subject of Commonwealth v. Sholley, 432 
Mass. 721 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 980 (2001), on which 
the dissent relies -- may well qualify as a true threat, but the 
opposite is not always true: not every "true threat" satisfies 
the elements of this crime.  "The elements of threatening a 
crime include an expression of intention to inflict a crime on 
another and an ability to do so in circumstances that would 
justify apprehension on the part of the recipient of the 
threat."  Id. at 724-725, quoting Commonwealth v. Robicheau, 421 
Mass. 176, 183 (1995).  With a true threat, the focus is not so 
much on the defendant’s intent and ability to "inflict a crime" 
on the alleged target but rather on protecting the alleged 
target from fear of violence and "from the disruption that fear 
engenders" (citations omitted).  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. at 
359. 
 
28 
 
 
§ 43A as a form of criminal harassment.24  That is, in a 
prosecution for criminal harassment under § 43A based solely on 
a defendant's speech, if it cannot be concluded that, as a 
matter of law, the speech at issue is constitutionally protected 
speech, the question whether the speech fits within a category 
of unprotected speech constitutes a question of fact for the 
fact finder to decide.  In this particular case, the question 
whether the defendant's challenged speech at issue qualified as 
true threats and therefore as constitutionally unprotected falls 
under the first of the five elements of the crime, see McDonald, 
462 Mass. at 240, because it represents an essential part of the 
definition of "speech" as we have interpreted the term in the 
Welch, O'Brien, and Johnson cases. 
                     
24 In addition to his constitutional challenge, the 
defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with 
respect to two elements of the crime of criminal harassment 
directed at Susan.  The Commonwealth, he claims, failed to prove 
that (1) the defendant intended to target Susan on three 
separate occasions (second element); and (2) the defendant's 
speech would cause a reasonable person in Susan's position to 
suffer substantial emotional distress (fourth element).  We 
disagree.  The last three letters sent to the Costellos' home 
constituted three separate occasions on which the defendant 
could be found to have directly targeted Susan.  Further, and 
contrary to the defendant's argument, the evidence was 
sufficient for a jury to find that a reasonable person in 
Susan's position would have suffered substantial emotional 
distress due to the receipt of the series of personal letters, 
given their content, and that they were anonymous and mailed at 
regular intervals to her home over a period of approximately two 
months. 
29 
 
 
 
At trial, the judge instructed the jury on the elements of 
criminal harassment in accordance with Instruction 6.640 of the 
Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court 
(rev. 2013).25  These instructions did not explain that the 
"conduct or series of acts," G. L. c. § 43A (a), that the 
Commonwealth claimed qualified as harassment consisted solely or 
at least principally of speech -- i.e., the contents of the 
letters.  Nor did the instructions address specifically the 
character -- protected or unprotected -- of the defendant's 
                     
 
25 The judge instructed the jury in part as follows: 
 
 
"In order to prove the Defendant guilty of this 
offense, the Commonwealth must prove five things beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
 
"First, that the Defendant engaged in a known pattern 
of conduct or speech or series of acts on at least three 
separate occasions; 
 
 
"Second, that the Defendant intended to target [Count 
I] Michael Costello and Count II, Susan Costello with a 
harassing conduct or speech or series of acts on each 
occasion; 
 
 
"Third, that the conduct or speech or series of acts 
were such in nature that they seriously alarmed, Count I, 
Michael Costello, Count II, Susan Costello; 
 
 
"Fourth, that the conduct or speech or series of acts 
was of such nature that they would cause a reasonable 
person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and; 
 
 
"Five, that the Defendant committed the conduct or 
speech or series of acts willfully and maliciously. 
 
 
"To satisfy the first element of the offense, the 
Commonwealth must prove the pattern of conduct, which 
includes a minimum of three incidents of harassment. . . ." 
30 
 
 
speech on which the two counts of the complaint were based.  
Although the defendant did not object to the instructions at 
trial, the failure to instruct the jury that where the complaint 
is based on incidents of pure speech, they must find the 
defendant's challenged speech constituted a true threat -- and 
therefore was constitutionally unprotected speech -- created a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  Cf., e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Claudio, 418 Mass. 103, 117-119 (1994), 
overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Britt, 465 Mass. 
87, 99-100 (2013) (failure of judge to define "felony" as 
portion of charge on felony-murder, although not objected to at 
trial, was of "sufficient magnitude" to require, along with 
other instructional errors, reversal of defendant's convictions 
of murder in first degree); Commonwealth v. Niziolek, 380 Mass. 
513, 526-527, 529 (1980) (failure of judge to define one of 
elements of arson, along with other instructional errors, 
required reversal of arson conviction).  Cf. also United States 
v. Ream, 506 Fed. Appx. 842, 845 (10th Cir. 2013) ("Whether a 
statement constitutes a true threat under 18 U.S.C. § 115 
[threatening Federal official] represents a jury question" 
[citation omitted]); State v. Moulton, 310 Conn. 337, 340, 362-
363 (2013) (offense of second-degree harassment proscribes 
harassing speech as well as conduct, but "in order to ensure 
that a prosecution under that [statute] does not run afoul of 
31 
 
 
the [F]irst [A]mendment, the court must instruct the jury on the 
difference between protected and unprotected speech whenever the 
[S]tate relies on the content of a communication as substantive 
evidence of a violation of [the statute]"; reversal of 
defendant's conviction required on somewhat different grounds); 
State v. Schaler, 169 Wash. 2d 274, 278 (2010) (provision of 
State harassment statute must be read to proscribe only "true 
threats"; jury instructions following statutory language 
erroneous because failed adequately to limit jury's 
consideration to true threats; reversal of conviction required); 
State v. Perkins, 243 Wis. 2d 141, 145-146, 165-167 (2001) (jury 
instruction on nature of threat required for conviction of crime 
of threatening judge was inadequate because it may have "failed 
to shield the defendant from a conviction based on 
constitutionally protected speech"; conviction reversed).  The 
defendant is entitled to a new trial on the count of the 
complaint alleging criminal harassment of Susan, a trial at the 
conclusion of which the jury are to be instructed on the 
unprotected character of speech that they must find the 
Commonwealth to have proved beyond a reasonable doubt, along 
with all the elements of the offense in order for the jury to 
find the defendant guilty of criminal harassment.26 
                     
26 Where the Commonwealth asserts, for example, that the 
defendant's speech is unprotected because it constitutes a true 
32 
 
 
 
3.  Prosecutorial error.27  We briefly address one of the 
defendant's remaining claims insofar as it may arise again if 
there is a new trial.  The defendant claims that in the 
prosecutor's comments about whether a reasonable person would 
experience "substantial emotional distress," see § 43A (a), the 
prosecutor erroneously asked the jurors to individually 
"evaluate your feelings" after reading the letters and use 
"common sense." 
 
The prosecutor's statements asking the jury to use their 
common sense clearly was not improper.  Cf. Opinion of the 
Justices, 360 Mass. 877, 880 (1971), quoting Williams v. 
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) ("[T]he essential feature of a 
jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and 
his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, 
and in the community participation . . . [which] results from 
that group's determination of guilt or innocence").  However, we 
agree that the suggestion to the jurors to evaluate their 
                                                                  
threat, the judge would have to explain to the jury that the 
Commonwealth was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant's words, considered in light of all the 
surrounding facts that provide context, constituted a direct 
threat of imminent physical harm to the alleged victim or caused 
the alleged victim to fear physical harm now or in the future, 
and must further prove that the defendant intended to cause such 
fear.  See O'Brien, 461 Mass. at 424-425. 
 
 
27 Because Count 1 of the complaint relating to Michael must 
be dismissed, our consideration of these remaining arguments is 
only relevant to Count 2 of the complaint, relating to Susan. 
33 
 
 
feelings would have been better left unsaid.  Application of a 
reasonable person standard, as is called for in assessing the 
issue of "substantial emotional distress," calls for an 
objective assessment to be made, but the exhortation to the 
jurors to evaluate their individual feelings suggests instead 
that a subjective assessment would be appropriate, or at least 
poses a risk that the jurors might substitute their individual, 
subjective reactions to the letters for a collective and 
objective assessment. 
 
Conclusion.  The defendant's conviction on Count 1 of the 
complaint, relating to Michael Costello, is reversed and the 
complaint is to be dismissed.  The defendant's conviction on 
Count 2 of the complaint, relating to Susan Costello, is vacated 
and the verdict set aside, and the case is remanded to the 
District Court for a new trial consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  (dissenting, with whom Spina and Hines, JJ., 
join).  I agree with the court that the defendant's conviction 
of criminal harassment under G. L. c. 265, § 43A (§ 43A), as to 
Michael Costello, should be reversed because the evidence 
introduced at trial, in Michael's own words, did not establish 
that he was "seriously alarm[ed]" by receipt of the defendant's 
letter on at least three of the occasions that he received one.1 
I write separately because I do not agree with the court's 
conclusion that the defendant's conviction as to Michael's wife, 
Susan Costello, based on speech in letters directed to her, is 
supported under the court's prior, long-standing definition of 
what constitutes a "true threat."  See Virginia v. Black, 538 
U.S. 343, 359-360 (2003).  The court maintains that its decision 
to expand the reach of the types of speech that now will be 
labeled unprotected "true threats" "comports with the general 
intent of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
to bar the government from infringing on the freedom of speech, 
one of the fundamental personal rights and liberties."  Ante at 
note 12.  In reality, however, the court today removes large 
quantities of heretofore protected speech from any 
constitutional protection.  Rather than expanding the definition 
                     
1 Because Michael Costello and Susan Costello share the same 
last name, I refer to them by their first names. 
2 
 
 
of what constitutes a true threat, as the court does today, I 
would instead consider whether the defendant's speech, even if 
protected, may still subject him to conviction under § 43A, 
because the statute serves "a compelling state interest" and is 
"narrowly drawn to achieve that end" (citation omitted).  See 
Commonwealth v. Lucas, 472 Mass. 387, 398 (2015); id. at 393, 
quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-384 (1992) ("The 
fact 'that these areas of speech can, consistently with the 
First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally 
proscribable content . . . . [does] not [mean] that they are 
categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so 
that they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination 
unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content").  See 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989); 
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 368 Mass. 580, 584 (1975) (under 
First Amendment, review of crime which regulates speech requires 
strict scrutiny). 
Until now, "true threats" have been defined as being 
limited to 
"those cases where the defendant expresses an intention to 
inflict a crime on another, has the ability to carry out 
that crime, causes the victim to fear harm, and does so in 
circumstances that make the victim's fear justifiable." 
 
3 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Sholley, 432 Mass. 721, 727 (2000), cert. 
denied, 532 U.S. 980 (2001).  Cf. O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 
415, 425 (2012) (discussing § 43A in case involving civil 
harassment statute, G. L. c. 258E, and stating that true threats 
do not require "direct threats of imminent physical harm," 
where, "taking into account the context in which they arise," 
words or actions would "cause the victim to fear such harm now 
or in the future and evince intent on the part of the speaker or 
actor so cause such fear").  We have recognized these 
limitations to be necessary so that "the offense of threatening 
to commit a crime only reaches cases of 'true threats' that 
would not qualify as protected speech."  Commonwealth v. 
Sholley, supra.  Whether direct or indirect, the common 
denominator has been a threat of physical harm to the person, 
"now or in the future."  O'Brien v. Borowski, supra.  See ante 
at note 20, quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. at 360 ("a 
prohibition on true threats 'protect[s] individuals from the 
fear of violence' and 'from the disruption that fear engenders,' 
in addition to protecting people 'from the possibility that the 
threatened violence will occur'" [citations omitted]).  Under 
the court's analysis today, however, henceforth speech will be 
considered unprotected if the statements, "when viewed in 
4 
 
 
context," could be found to increase the "potential to instill 
[in an intended target] a fear of future harm," because the 
recipient is unable to determine the speaker's intent.2  See ante 
at    . 
The court's expansion of what heretofore have been "well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of" constitutionally 
unprotected speech, O'Brien v. Borowski, supra at 422 (citation 
omitted), results essentially in the creation of a broad and 
amorphous category of unprotected speech.  Where the conduct at 
issue is speech, it also effectively eviscerates a critical 
difference between the criminal harassment statute and the 
                     
2 The court notes that a jury may consider "surrounding 
facts that provide context" in order to find that a defendants 
speech or conduct "constituted a direct threat."  See ante at 
note 26.  Compare Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-410 
(1974) (defendant's activity of hanging marked flag from his 
bedroom window, combined with factual context, "lead to the 
conclusion that he engaged in a form of protected expression").  
While the court asks the jury to determine whether, given the 
unspecified "context" it must consider, the defendant's speech 
to Susan constituted a true threat, "[t]he inquiry into the 
protected status of speech is one of law, not fact."  Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983).  The limits of each 
unprotected category of speech "have been determined by the 
judicial evaluation of special facts that have been deemed to 
have constitutional significance."  Bose Corp. v. Consumers 
Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505 (1984).  A court will 
review "to be sure that the speech in question actually falls 
within the unprotected category and to confine the perimeters of 
any unprotected category within acceptably narrow limits in an 
effort to ensure that protected expression will not be 
inhibited."  Id. 
5 
 
 
stalking statute (criminalizing "[w]hoever [1] willfully and 
maliciously engages in a knowing pattern of conduct or series of 
acts over a period of time directed at a specific person which 
seriously alarms or annoys that person and would cause a 
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and 
[2] makes a threat with the intent to place the person in 
imminent fear of death or bodily injury").  See G. L. c. 265, 
§ 43 (a); Commonwealth v. Walters, 472 Mass. 680, 691 (2015) 
("Comparing the definition of 'true threat' to the threat 
component of the stalking statute, we conclude that any verbal 
or written communication that qualifies as a threat as defined 
in the statute is also a 'true threat,' and therefore is not 
entitled to protection under the First Amendment"). 
The court does not explain the nature of the threatened 
crime it sees reflected in the letters sent to the Costellos, or 
in those sections of the letters it deems directed particularly 
at Susan, and does not state whether the threat is a threat to 
cause physical harm to Michael or to Susan.3  Nor, despite its 
                     
3 The court describes the speech directed at Susan in the 
last two letters as containing "vulgar and hateful insults" in 
language that could "reflect[] . . . an obsessive interest in" 
private matters, "especially her marital relationship."  Ante at   
.  The court does not explain the nature of the threatened harm 
to Susan's "personal safety" that it sees reflected in those 
sections of the letters, and how a jury could find that the 
6 
 
 
efforts to distinguish specific portions of the letters as 
directed at one or the other, does it explain how statements in 
a letter addressed to a husband and wife, in their home, are 
protected political speech as to him, while, as to her, the 
statements constitute constitutionally unprotected speech that 
leaves the defendant subject to criminal liability not only 
under § 43A, but presumably under other criminal statutes such 
as G. L. c. 275, § 2, threatening to commit a crime.  See 
Commonwealth v. Sholley, supra.  Instead, in the court's view, 
because the letters were anonymous, Susan was unable to evaluate 
the nature of the author's intent, which the court posits is 
sufficient to instill a greatly increased fear of future harm.  
Ante at    .  Thus, Susan's imagination as to what the author 
might have been intending is now enough to "cause the victim to 
fear [physical] harm," O'Brien v. Borowski, supra at 425, a far 
cry from the well-established definition of a true threat 
                                                                  
statements constitute "a serious expression of an intent to 
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or 
group of individuals."  See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 
(2003).  The court also appears to disregard the fact that, in 
the letter in which the statements about Susan's husband were 
made, the defendant asked in the same portion of the letter how 
Susan could continue to support "such a bum" remaining in his 
role as a selectman.  See discussion, infra. 
 
7 
 
 
discussed in Commonwealth v. Sholley, supra.4  This cannot be 
what the framers intended in drafting the First Amendment. 
                     
4 Compare, for example, the court's statement in 
Commonwealth v. Walters, 472 Mass. 680, 695-696 (2015), 
regarding what may constitute a "true threat" within the meaning 
of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, in 
reviewing a conviction under the stalking statute, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 43 (a): 
 
"Turning to the quotation on the page, '[m]ake no 
mistake of my will to succeed in bringing you two idiots to 
justice,' in the circumstances of this case, it is 
reasonable to interpret the 'two idiots' as referring to 
the victim and [her boy friend].  But even if one reads the 
sentence in combination with the photograph of the 
defendant, any particular violent message that might be 
attributed to the defendant from the presence of these two 
elements on the same page is speculative.  Although the 
photograph depicts the defendant holding a gun, nothing 
else about that image suggests a clear intent to commit 
violence. Furthermore, like the photograph, the word 
'justice' is amenable to a reasonable, nonviolent 
interpretation, namely, that the defendant intended to 
pursue whatever legal means might be available to right 
wrongs he perceived the victim and [her boy friend] had 
inflicted on him. . . . 
 
"Finally, the Commonwealth asserted during oral 
argument that, given the limited total number of items on 
the defendant's Facebook profile page, the combined 
presence of (1) the photograph of the defendant with a gun, 
(2) the quotation about justice, (3) the reference to 
Rihanna [a well-known singer and survivor of domestic 
violence], and (4) the reference to the 'Governors . . . 
Task Force on Police Corruption,' suggested that the page 
could have had little meaning except to project the 
appearance of a threat against the victim and [her boy 
friend].  We agree that the page as a whole could have come 
across as vaguely ominous or disturbing.  However, because 
no evidence was introduced at trial regarding the 
defendant's opinion of or even knowledge about Rihanna, or 
8 
 
 
The court's attempt to distinguish the speech in the 
letters it deems directed at Susan rather than at Michael 
(although the parties, here and at trial, treated all of the 
letters as having been sent to both Michael and Susan) does not 
provide the support it seeks in this distinction.  If Susan were 
the intended victim, a threat to her, communicated in a letter 
to Michael, with the reasonable expectation that he would 
communicate it to her, is no less a true threat than one sent to 
Susan directly, and whether the statement constituted a true 
threat (as opposed to whether the defendant's conduct met the 
requirements of § 43A) is determined based on an objective, 
reasonable person standard.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. James, 
73 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 385-387 (2008), and cases cited ("When a 
defendant utters a threat to a third party who would likely 
communicate it to the ultimate target, the defendant's act 
constitutes evidence of his intent to communicate the threat to 
                                                                  
about whether the defendant did or did not participate in a 
task force on police corruption, we question whether it is 
reasonable to ascribe to these items the meaning that the 
Commonwealth suggests, and to then infer that the defendant 
in fact created and intended to use the page to place the 
victim in imminent fear of bodily harm.  Ultimately, based 
on the trial record, we conclude that the evidence of the 
defendant's intent concerning the creation of the Facebook 
profile was insufficient with respect both to whether the 
page constituted a threat within the scope of § 43 (a) (2) 
and to the reasonableness of the victim's fear." 
9 
 
 
the intended victim").  Similarly, a threat to Michael, 
delivered in a letter addressed to Susan, would likewise be a 
true threat. 
The court sees a statement in the fourth letter, addressed 
to Susan and accompanied by a newspaper article about the 
Attorney General's investigation of Michael and his "abuses," as 
potentially a true threat to her.5  See ante at    ,    .  
Applying the court's analysis, however, it would appear equally 
likely to be a potential threat to Michael, intended to be 
communicated through Susan.  Similarly, the fifth letter, 
addressed to "Lorraine," in an envelope addressed to "Susan 'The 
Maid' Costello," also contained comments about Michael's 
performance as a selectman that might be viewed as a threat 
under the court's analysis, and that seemingly were intended to 
be communicated to him.6  In addition, both the first and second 
letters stated that the defendant intended their content to be 
                     
5 The court's reference is to the statement that, "[t]he 
authorities will continue to hound [Michael] until you and he 
can't stand it anymore.  Maybe you will have to live like Whitey 
Bulger frequenting plastic surgeons to have any hope of a 
peaceful lifestyle.  The only difference is Whitey has unlimited 
funds and you don't."  See ante at    . 
 
6 The letter stated, as the court notes, that Michael 
"forged title to his wife's car[,] set fire to his wife's house 
with her in it[,] [and] screwed the cleaning lady then married 
her," but continues, "Lorraine -- how stupid can you be to 
support such a bum -- this is a reflection on you too." 
10 
 
 
distributed publically.7  See Commonwealth v. Walters, 472 Mass. 
680, 693 (2015), and cases cited ("Where communication of the 
threat is indirect --  for example, through an intermediary -- 
the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant intended the threat to reach the victim").  In any 
event, a "true threat" is no less a threat because it involves a 
political subject or is directed at a politician.  See Virginia 
v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358-361 (2003); Watts v. United States, 
394 U.S. 705, 707-708 (1969) (per curiam). 
The result of the court's decision today -- under which the 
same language, in an anonymous letter directed at an individual 
in the privacy of his or her home, may be political speech that 
is accorded the highest constitutional protection, or 
unprotected speech, depending on whether the reader holds an 
elected office -- will be "a standardless sweep [that] allows 
policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their [own] 
personal predilections" (citation omitted).8  Commonwealth v. 
                     
7 "This letter will be all over town by then as well as at 
the selectmen['s] meeting"; "This is such a good letter I think 
I will send it around and post it at Vino's." 
 
8 It is not clear, for example, whether, under the court's 
analysis, if Susan were an elected member of the town's school 
committee, the letter involving Michael's conduct as a selectman 
would, as to her, be transformed from an unprotected "true 
threat" to protected political speech. 
11 
 
 
Williams, 395 Mass. 302, 304 (1985).9  Based on this expansive 
view of a "true threat," no reasonable person would be able to 
ascertain the nature of the prohibited conduct to be avoided so 
as not to be subject to criminal liability.  Conduct that is so 
broad and vague that it is not readily discernable cannot 
constitutionally support a criminal conviction. 
A conclusion that the speech at issue here is 
constitutionally protected, however, need not, in my view, 
preclude prosecution of the defendant under § 43A as to the 
conduct directed at Susan.  That a government regulation may 
reach protected speech does not alone render it 
unconstitutional.  See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-488 
(1988), and cases cited.  See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 
191, 198, 209-210 (1992) (one hundred-foot restriction on 
political speech near polling sites necessary to serve 
                     
9 The court states that it considers, in large part, 
different portions of the language in that letter, or different 
letters, with respect to its determination whether the content 
was directed to Michael or to Susan.  See ante at note 14.  This 
purported distinction cannot be sustained.  It is not clear how 
a recipient of a letter addressed to "Mr. and Mrs. Costello," as 
some of the letters were, or addressed in some form to Susan, 
containing content evidently intended to be shared with Michael, 
would know which portions of the letter were "directed" to him 
or her.  See id.  It is particularly unclear how a recipient 
would understand that a letter addressed to Susan actually was 
"directed" at Michael, see ante at    , or how one letter, 
addressed to a husband and wife, actually was only directed at 
the wife, as the court concludes.  See ante at note 14. 
12 
 
 
"compelling State interest" and "narrowly drawn to achieve that 
end" [citation omitted]); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 
781, 803 (1989) (upholding regulation of constitutionally 
protected speech); Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-
303 (1974), and cases cited ("Although American constitutional 
jurisprudence, in the light of the First Amendment, has been 
jealous to preserve access to public places for purposes of free 
speech, the nature of the forum and the conflicting interests 
involved have remained important in determining the degree of 
protection afforded by the Amendment to the speech in 
question"). 
Although the court's decision in Commonwealth v. Welch, 444 
Mass. 80, 98-100 (2005) (Welch), commented that it would "no[t] 
hesitat[e]" to interpret the language of § 43A as applicable 
only to constitutionally unprotected speech, more specifically 
only to true threats, because it considered such a narrowing 
necessary in order to deem § 43A as constitutional, that 
statement was made in circumstances quite distinct from those 
confronting the court here.10  While the court states today that 
                     
10 In Commonwealth v. Welch, 444 Mass. 80, 82-83 (2005) 
(Welch), the factual context before the court involved a 
question of pure speech, where the offense statements were made 
in public.  This was the lens through which the court considered 
what the Legislature must have intended in order to render § 43A 
13 
 
 
it must interpret § 43A as applicable only to unprotected 
speech, such as a true threat, or the provision would run afoul 
of constitutional protections, I do not agree that 
constitutionally protected speech must, in all circumstances, 
categorically be excluded from prosecution under § 43A, given 
that the statute considers specific types of harassing speech in 
conjunction with a pattern of conduct or series of acts.  The 
United States Supreme Court has noted that "the States are free 
to ban the simple use, without a demonstration of additional 
justifying circumstances, of so-called "fighting words," Cohen 
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971), citing Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), but government also retains the 
ability, "consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse 
solely to protect others from hearing it . . . upon a showing 
that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an 
essentially intolerable manner," even where the speech at issue 
otherwise would be entitled to constitutional protection.  Cohen 
v. California, supra at 21.  A conclusion that § 43A may never 
                                                                  
sufficiently narrow to pass constitutional muster.  In O'Brien 
v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 425 n.7 (2012), the court held that, 
in Welch, it "erred in concluding that the criminal harassment 
statute was limited in its reach to 'fighting words.'"  To the 
extent that Welch interpreted § 43A as applicable only to 
constitutionally unprotected speech, in my view, that decision 
was improvident and should be revisited. 
14 
 
 
apply to protected speech is inconsistent with these well-
established principles, and would eviscerate the legislative 
purpose underlying its enactment. 
The Legislature enacted § 43A in order to provide "a remedy 
to [stalking] victims before 'nonthreatening' harassment 
escalates into life-threatening assault."  Welch, supra at 100.  
The provision "was passed in response to a perceived loophole in 
the stalking statute," which "left without remedy those victims 
plagued by harassment that, although potentially dangerous, did 
not include an overt 'threat' and thus was not actionable under 
existing law."  Id. at 87-88.  "'[S]talkers who become lethal 
move from non-threatening behavior to direct threats . . .' and 
'criminal harassment law establishes a continuum along which law 
enforcement may confront stalking behaviors.'"  Id. at 100, 
quoting Kirkman, Every Breath You Take:  Massachusetts Steps up 
its Efforts to Stop Stalkers, 85 Mass. L. Rev. 174, 181, 183 
(2001).  It would be reasonable to conclude that, with the 
enactment of the criminal harassment statute, the Commonwealth 
need not wait until it is too late to protect victims of 
potentially dangerous violent crimes, and that, under ordinary 
tenets of First Amendment jurisprudence, the Commonwealth has 
demonstrated a compelling interest in criminalizing conduct and 
15 
 
 
speech that does not include a true threat, but nonetheless is 
"potentially dangerous" as contemplated by § 43A.  Welch, supra 
at 88.  Cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987). 
A conviction under § 43A requires proof that "(1) the 
defendant engaged in a knowing pattern of conduct or speech, or 
series of acts, on at least three separate occasions; (2) the 
defendant intended to target the victim with the harassing 
conduct or speech, or series of acts, on each occasion; (3) the 
conduct or speech, or series of acts, were of such a nature that 
they seriously alarmed the victim; (4) the conduct or speech, or 
series of acts, were of such a nature that they would cause a 
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress; and 
(5) the defendant committed the conduct or speech, or series of 
acts, 'willfully and maliciously.'"  Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
470 Mass. 300, 307 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. McDonald, 462 
Mass. 236, 240 (2012).  The requirement of the criminal 
harassment statute that speech be "directed at" one victim, on 
at least three occasions, removes the majority of protected 
speech from the statute's reach, and ensures, in the plain 
language of the statute, that § 43A will not apply to any 
speaker who disseminates a political, religious, or other 
protected message to a general audience, albeit that the message 
16 
 
 
contains vulgar, offensive, or disturbing speech.  Cf. Frisby v. 
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1998).  Additionally, to support a 
conviction under § 43A, the fact finder must determine that each 
of the three acts to which liability attaches would be 
understood as "harassing" by a reasonable person, ensuring that 
a defendant is not "at the mercy of a hearer's sensitivities."  
Commonwealth v. Johnson, supra at 308.  Cf. Texas v. Johnson, 
491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (distinguishing between expressions of 
dissatisfaction with political policies and direct personal 
insults); Van Liew v. Stansfield, 474 Mass. 31, 38-39 (2016) 
(addressing insults about local public official's performance as 
political speech).  Thus, rather than the expansion of the 
meaning of a "true threat" that the court undertakes, § 43A 
could be viewed as adequately ensuring that constitutionally 
protected speech is not penalized, while, at the same time, 
avoiding "negat[ing] the Legislature's clear attempt to protect 
victims of harassment before that behavior escalates into more 
dangerous conduct."11  See Commonwealth v. O'Neil, 67 Mass. App. 
Ct. 284, 293 (2006). 
                     
11 "Typically, stalking behaviors involve obsessional 
attractions to victims and are not necessarily intended to harm 
or frighten them."  Commonwealth v. O'Neil, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 
284, 293 (2006). 
17 
 
 
Given this, there is no need to pursue the path the court 
chooses today, by stretching the meaning of "true threat" far 
beyond common understanding, removing broad swaths of speech 
from constitutional protection and imposing potential criminal 
liability on statements that might, in another's eyes, seem 
merely rude and offensive.