Case Title: Tart v. Martin

Citation: 353 N.C. 252

Docket Number: 174PA00

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2000-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
WILLIE B. TART v. JAMES L. MARTIN and PEGGY H. MARTIN
No. 174PA00
Filed 21 December 2000
1.
Motor Vehicles--negligent entrustment--insufficient evidence
of vehicle ownership
The Court of Appeals erred by reversing a summary judgment
arising from an automobile accident as to defendant Peggy Martin
where the Court of Appeals reversed on the issue of negligent
entrustment, but Ms. Martin’s name was not on the title to the
vehicle and there is no document that would support the
contention that she was the owner.
2.
Motor Vehicles--negligent entrustment--summary judgment--
insufficient evidence of careless driver
The Court of Appeals erred in an action arising from an
automobile accident by reversing the trial court’s summary
judgment for defendant James Martin on the theory of negligent
entrustment.   One moving violation by  the driver of the car
(defendant’s son, Jonathan) more that two years prior to the
collision and his no-fault involvement in three accidents one to
two years prior to the collision do not support a conclusion that
Jonathan was so likely to cause harm to others that entrusting a
motor vehicle to him amounted to negligent entrustment.
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a
unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 137 N.C. App. 371,
527 S.E.2d 708 (2000), affirming in part and reversing in part an
order for summary judgment entered by Eagles, J., on 10 February
1999, in Superior Court, Guilford County.  Heard in the Supreme
Court 16 October 2000.
Schlosser, Neill & Brackett, by Jan Elliott Pritchett, for
plaintiff-appellee.
Teague, Rotenstreich & Stanaland, L.L.P., by Kenneth B.
Rotenstreich and Paul A. Daniels, for defendant-appellants.
WAINWRIGHT, Justice.
This appeal involves the theory of negligent entrustment,
which imposes liability upon the owner of a motor vehicle for a
third party’s negligent operation of the vehicle.  On 5 October
1998, plaintiff Willie B. Tart filed suit against defendants
James L. Martin and Peggy H. Martin, alleging that defendants
were liable for their son’s negligence in an automobile accident
under the family purpose doctrine and the theory of negligent
entrustment.  Defendants answered denying their liability and
thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment.  On 10 February
1999, the trial court entered an order granting defendants’
motion for summary judgment as to all claims.  Plaintiff appealed
to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed summary judgment as to
the family purpose doctrine but reversed summary judgment as to
the theory of negligent entrustment.  Tart v. Martin, 137 N.C.
App. 371, 527 S.E.2d 708 (2000).  On 15 June 2000, this Court
allowed defendants’ petition for discretionary review.
On 6 October 1995, Jonathan Wayne Martin (Jonathan),
defendants’ son, drove a 1984 Ford vehicle through a stop sign
and collided with a vehicle driven by plaintiff.  As a result of
the collision, Jonathan was killed and plaintiff was injured.  At
the time of the accident, Jonathan was eighteen years old and a
member of defendants’ household.  The vehicle driven by Jonathan
was titled in the name of his father, James Martin.  At the time
of the purchase of the vehicle, Jonathan was unable to contract
for its purchase because he was a minor.  Because of this
limitation, as is often the practice in our society, Jonathan
reimbursed his parents for the automobile’s purchase and
maintenance.  Jonathan made regular payments to his father and
paid all repair, maintenance, insurance, and operating costs. 
Jonathan was the only person who drove the vehicle, and he kept
both sets of keys to the vehicle.  In sum, Jonathan kept the
vehicle for his own pleasure and convenience and had actual and
exclusive control of the vehicle.  Neither James nor Peggy Martin
drove the vehicle, as both defendants had their own automobiles.
Defendants, in their affidavits, admitted their prior
knowledge of Jonathan’s prior conviction for a moving violation
of driving fifty miles per hour in a thirty-five miles per hour
zone (reduced from a charge of seventy-five miles per hour in a
thirty-five miles per hour zone).  This conviction was entered on
17 September 1993, more than two years prior to the collision in
the instant case.  Defendants acknowledged that Jonathan had been
involved, but was not at fault, in three automobile accidents
between 15 March 1993 and 27 November 1994.  Defendants stated in
their affidavits that the first accident was caused by the driver
of a truck running a stop sign and colliding with Jonathan; the
second accident was caused by Jonathan swerving into a ditch to
avoid a collision with a car which suddenly stopped in front of
him; and the third accident occurred when Jonathan collided with
a motorcyclist who was stopped in the roadway on a dark, rainy
night without headlights or signal lights.  The record in this
case further reveals that Jonathan was a licensed driver since
age sixteen and that his license had never been suspended or
revoked.
[1] At the outset, the parties agree that the Court of
Appeals erred in reversing summary judgment as to defendant Peggy
Martin.  Her name is not on the title to the vehicle, and there
is no document that would support the contention that she was the
owner.  We agree and therefore reverse the Court of Appeals on
this issue.
[2] As a result of the foregoing, the remaining question is
whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s
order granting summary judgment to defendant James Martin on the
issue of negligent entrustment.
Summary judgment is properly granted when “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  N.C.G.S. § 1A-1,
Rule 56(c) (1999) (emphasis added); accord Fordham v. Eason, 351
N.C. 151, 159, 521 S.E.2d 701, 706 (1999).
Negligent entrustment is established when the owner of an
automobile “‘entrusts its operation to a person whom he knows, or
by the exercise of due care should have known, to be an
incompetent or reckless driver[,]’ [Heath v. Kirkman, 240 N.C.
303, 307, 82 S.E.2d 104, 107 (1954),] who is ‘likely to cause
injury to others in its use[,]’ [Bogen v. Bogen, 220 N.C. 648,
650, 18 S.E.2d 162, 163 (1942)].”  Swicegood v. Cooper, 341 N.C.
178, 180, 459 S.E.2d 206, 207 (1995).  Based on his own
negligence, the owner is “liable for any resulting injury or
damage proximately caused by the borrower’s negligence.”  Id.;
see also Roberts v. Hill, 240 N.C. 373, 377, 82 S.E.2d 373, 377
(1954).
Plaintiff contends, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that
the trial court improperly granted summary judgment on the issue
of negligent entrustment because, as a matter of law, Jonathan’s
only moving violation more than two years prior to the collision
and his no-fault involvement in three accidents support a
conclusion that he was an incompetent or reckless driver likely
to cause injury to others.  We disagree.
This Court has previously addressed the requisite evidence
that warrants submission of the issue of negligent entrustment to
the jury.  In Swicegood, for example, we held that the issue of
negligent entrustment was properly submitted to the jury where
the driver had accumulated three safe-movement violations and six
speeding convictions in a span of six years.  Swicegood, 341 N.C.
at 179, 459 S.E.2d at 206.  Also, in Dinkins v. Booe, 252 N.C.
731, 114 S.E.2d 672 (1960), this Court approved submission of
negligent entrustment to the jury where the owner of the
automobile knew that the driver had a “very serious” automobile
accident a few years earlier, had another accident two years
later, and had a conviction for driving without a license from
several years before.  Id. at 735, 114 S.E.2d at 675; see also
Boyd v. L.G. DeWitt Trucking Co., 103 N.C. App. 396, 405 S.E.2d
914 (submission to jury proper where driver had received two
convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol, three
convictions for reckless driving, and six convictions for
speeding), disc. rev. denied, 330 N.C. 193, 412 S.E.2d 53 (1991).
In the instant case, notwithstanding the issue of ownership,
or whether this was an entrustment arrangement, we hold that the
trial court’s granting of summary judgment was proper. 
Jonathan’s only moving violation more than two years prior to the
collision and his no-fault involvement in three accidents one to
two years prior to the collision will not, as a matter of law,
support a conclusion that Jonathan was so likely to cause harm to
others that entrusting a motor vehicle to him amounted to
negligent entrustment.
Having determined that summary judgment was proper, we need
not determine any other issues.  Accordingly, we reverse  the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
REVERSED.