Case Title: State ex rel. Sullivan v. Ramsey

Citation: 2010-Ohio-252

Docket Number: 20091118

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Sullivan v. Ramsey, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-252.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-252 
THE STATE EX REL. SULLIVAN, APPELLEE, v. RAMSEY, JUDGE, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Sullivan v. Ramsey,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-252.] 
Prohibition — Trial court — Writ to prohibit trial judge from taking action while 
appeal is pending — Issuance of amended qualified domestic relations 
order while appeal from original order is pending — Trial court patently 
and  unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to amend order once appeal was 
perfected — Writ granted. 
(No. 2009-1118 — Submitted January 26, 2010 — Decided February 3, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, No. L-09-1118, 
2009-Ohio-2279. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment granting a writ of prohibition (1) 
to prevent a domestic relations judge from taking any action inconsistent with the 
court of appeals’ ability to affirm, modify, or reverse the judge’s January 9, 2009 
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judgment entry and qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”) in an underlying 
case and (2) to vacate the judge’s amended QDRO that was issued while the 
appeal was pending.  Because the judge’s action was inconsistent with the court 
of appeals’ authority to review the January 9 judgment and QDRO, we affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
Facts 
Divorce Decree 
{¶ 2} In November 1986, appellee, Daniel J. Sullivan, married Janet M. 
Sullivan.  The parties had one child born during their marriage. 
{¶ 3} In July 1997, the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic 
Relations Division, entered a final judgment granting the Sullivans a divorce and 
incorporating their agreement concerning all of the matters in the case, including 
the division of their property. 
{¶ 4} More specifically, the court ordered that Daniel “shall assign and 
transfer to the Plaintiff, Janet M. Sullivan, through a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order, or  separate Judgment Entry, whichever is applicable, twenty-
five percent (25%) of the accrued monthly benefit that the Defendant, Daniel J. 
Sullivan, was entitled to receive as of May 14, 1997, from Defendant, Daniel J. 
Sullivan’s interest in his retirement plan with the Civil Service Retirement 
System, pursuant to the provision of the Spouse Equity Act of 1984.”  
(Underlining sic.)  The court further ordered that Janet’s “rights to designate a 
beneficiary, for survivor benefits, or other related rights under the above 
described plan, shall be subject to the terms and conditions of the plan.” 
January 2009 Judgment Entry and QDRO 
{¶ 5} After the parties divorced, no QDRO or separate judgment was 
timely entered to implement the court’s division of Daniel’s retirement plan.  
Daniel, without notice, removed his retirement plan from the Civil Service 
Retirement System and transferred it to the District of Columbia Police Officers’ 
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and Firefighters’ Retirement Plan.  He retired in 2003 and began receiving all of 
the pension benefits without allocating anything to Janet pursuant to the divorce 
decree. 
{¶ 6} In July 2006, Janet filed motions for the approval of a QDRO, 
retroactive benefits, and attorney fees.  On January 9, 2009, appellant, Judge 
Donald L. Ramsey, sitting by assignment in the domestic relations court, granted 
the motions and held that Janet was entitled to a monthly sum of $1,325.07 from 
Daniel’s retirement plan, that Janet be awarded $76,185.92 as well as statutory 
interest for retroactive benefits due her but paid to Daniel, and that she be 
awarded $24,684 in legal fees and litigation expenses, together with statutory 
interest.  Judge Ramsey held that Daniel’s deliberate actions had denied Janet 
“those benefits of the pension rights awarded to her pursuant to the parties’ 
divorce decree.” 
{¶ 7} On that same date, Judge Ramsey issued a QDRO reflecting the 
parties’ rights to Daniel’s pension benefits.  The QDRO provided that “[t]he 
benefit to be paid from the Plan directly to the alternate payee pursuant to the 
participant’s assignment of benefits, in compliance with the D.C. Spouse Equity 
Act of 1988, as amended, shall be * * * ($1,325.07) of the participant’s gross 
monthly benefit.” 
{¶ 8} The QDRO also provided for later amendment to constitute a 
proper QDRO according to the plan administrator’s instructions: 
{¶ 9} “The intent of this Order is to provide the alternate payee with a 
retirement payment that fairly represents the alternate payee’s marital share of the 
retirement benefits set forth herein.  In the event any Order submitted to the Plan 
Administrator is held not to be a Qualified Domestic Relations Order within the 
meaning of the D.C. Spouse Equity Act of 1988, as amended, the parties shall 
submit to and request this Court or any other Court of competent jurisdiction to 
amend or modify the Order, but only for the purpose of establishing or 
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maintaining its qualifications as a Qualified Domestic Relations Order in such a 
manner that will reflect the parties’ and the Court’s intent as expressed herein, 
said amendment or modification Order is to be entered Nunc Pro Tunc if 
appropriate and Jurisdiction is hereby reserved for this purpose.” 
Appeal and Amended QDRO 
{¶ 10} On January 20, 2009, Daniel appealed from the January 9 
judgment entry and QDRO to the Court of Appeals for Lucas County. 
{¶ 11} On April 7, while the appeal from the January 9 judgment and 
QDRO was pending, Judge Ramsey issued an amended QDRO, which – similar 
to the original QDRO – provided that “[t]he Alternate Payee shall receive * * * 
($1,325.07) of the Participant’s gross monthly benefit, as much [sic, such] amount 
is adjusted by any cost-of-living adjustments.  The Participant shall retain all 
remaining interest in the Plan.”  Judge Ramsey did not issue the amended QDRO 
as a nunc pro tunc order, as he was authorized to do under the terms of the 
original QDRO.  The amended QDRO also differed in certain respects from the 
original QDRO.  For example, the original QDRO specified that it was “issued 
pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Sections 3105.171 and 3105.18 which relate to 
the provision of marital property rights and spousal support payments,” and the 
amended QDRO generally stated only that the order was issued “pursuant to the 
domestic relations laws of the State of Ohio.”  In addition, the amended QDRO 
specified that the order was intended to be a QDRO “as that term is used in 
Section 206(d) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
[‘ERISA’],” whereas ERISA was unmentioned in the original QDRO. 
Prohibition Case 
{¶ 12} Three weeks after Judge Ramsey issued the amended QDRO, on 
April 28, Daniel filed a complaint in the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition 
to vacate the amended QDRO and to prevent the judge from taking any further 
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action that interferes with or is inconsistent with the appellate court’s ability to 
affirm, modify, or reverse the January 9, 2009 judgment entry and QDRO. 
{¶ 13} On May 7, without waiting for a response from the judge, the court 
of appeals entered a judgment granting the writ of prohibition ordering Judge 
Ramsey to refrain from taking any action inconsistent with that court’s ability to 
affirm, modify, or reverse the January 9, 2009 judgment entry that is the subject 
of the appeal and vacating the amended QDRO. 
{¶ 14} This cause is now before the court upon the judge’s appeal as of 
right.1 
Legal Analysis 
Prohibition 
{¶ 15} To be entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, Daniel was 
required to establish that (1) Judge Ramsey was about to exercise judicial or 
quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and 
(3) denying the writ will result in injury for which no other adequate remedy 
exists in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Sliwinski v. Burnham Unruh, 
118 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-1734, 886 N.E.2d 201, ¶ 7.  Judge Ramsey 
exercised judicial authority by issuing the amended QDRO. 
{¶ 16} For the remaining requirements, “[i]f a lower court patently and 
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed in a cause, prohibition * * * will 
issue to prevent any future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the 
results of prior jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.”  State ex rel. Mayer v. 
Henson, 97 Ohio St.3d 276, 2002-Ohio-6323, 779 N.E.2d 223, ¶ 12. 
Pending Appeal from Initial QDRO 
{¶ 17} The court of appeals based its issuance of the writ on the fact that 
Daniel’s appeal from the January 9 judgment entry and QDRO was pending when 
                                                 
1.  We deny Daniel’s motion to strike. 
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Judge Ramsey issued the amended QDRO.  “[W]e have consistently held that 
once an appeal is perfected, the trial court is divested of jurisdiction over matters 
that are inconsistent with the reviewing court’s jurisdiction to reverse, modify, or 
affirm the judgment.”  State ex rel. Rock v. School Emp. Retirement Bd., 96 Ohio 
St.3d 206, 2002-Ohio-3957, 772 N.E.2d 1197, ¶ 8; State ex rel. Everhart v. 
McIntosh, 115 Ohio St.3d 195, 2007-Ohio-4798, 874 N.E.2d 516, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 18} As Judge Ramsey observes, a QDRO is different from the usual 
court order.  A QDRO is an order “which creates or recognizes the existence of an 
alternate payee’s right to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all 
or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant under a plan.”  
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Section 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I), 
Title 29, U.S.Code, and Section 414(p)(1)(A)(i), Title 26, U.S.Code.  “The QDRO 
must be drafted to include very specific information with explicit instructions to 
the plan administrator.  It is then the responsibility of the plan administrator to 
review the order of the trial court and determine whether it constitutes a QDRO 
pursuant to Section 414(p), Title 26, U.S.Code.”  (Footnote omitted.)  Hoyt v. 
Hoyt (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 177, 180, 559 N.E.2d 1292. 
{¶ 19} “The QDRO implements a trial court’s decision of how a pension 
is to be divided incident to divorce or dissolution.”  Wilson v. Wilson, 116 Ohio 
St.3d 268, 2007-Ohio-6056, 878 N.E.2d 16, ¶ 7.  “[A] divorce decree is a final, 
appealable order, regardless of whether it calls for a QDRO that has not yet 
issued; the QDRO merely implements the divorce decree.”  Id. at ¶ 15.  
Consequently, “[a] QDRO is merely an order in aid of execution on the property 
division ordered in the divorce or dissolution decree.  So long as the QDRO is 
consistent with the decree, it does not constitute a modification, which R.C. 
3105.171(I) prohibits, and the court does not lack jurisdiction to issue it.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Bagley v. Bagley, 181 Ohio App.3d 141, 2009-Ohio-688, 908 
N.E.2d 469, ¶ 26.  Therefore, when a divorce decree is appealed and there is no 
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stay of the judgment pending appeal, the trial court is not divested of jurisdiction 
to issue a QDRO consistent with the decree because the order merely executes 
orders previously specified in the divorce decree. 
{¶ 20} Nevertheless, for the following reasons, Daniel’s appeal from the 
domestic relations court’s actions on January 9, 2009, granting Janet’s postdecree 
motions and issuing the original QDRO, patently and unambiguously divested 
Judge Ramsey of jurisdiction to issue the amended QDRO. 
{¶ 21} First, Daniel did not appeal from the divorce decree.  Instead, he 
appealed from Judge Ramsey’s judgment on Janet’s postdecree motions and the 
associated QDRO.  Once the original QDRO was appealed, Judge Ramsey lacked 
jurisdiction to modify it.  See Albertson v. Ryder (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 765, 
769-770, 621 N.E.2d 480 (trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify QDRO when 
appeal from order was pending). 
{¶ 22} Second, there is no evidence or argument that the condition 
specified in the original QDRO for amendment or modification of the order – the 
parties’ request for it – had been met. 
{¶ 23} Third, by issuing an amended order rather than a nunc pro tunc 
order, Judge Ramsey effectively acknowledged that the original QDRO was being 
amended or modified rather than merely corrected to rectify a clerical error.  See 
State ex rel. Mayer v. Henson, 97 Ohio St.3d 276, 2002-Ohio-6323, 779 N.E.2d 
223, ¶ 14, quoting State ex rel. Fogle v. Steiner (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 158, 164, 
656 N.E.2d 1288 (“nunc pro tunc entries ‘are limited in proper use to reflecting 
what the court actually decided, not what the court might or should have decided’ 
”). 
{¶ 24} Based 
on 
the 
foregoing, 
Judge 
Ramsey 
patently 
and 
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to issue the amended QDRO while the original 
QDRO was being appealed.  “In cases of a patent and unambiguous lack of 
jurisdiction, the requirement of a lack of an adequate remedy of law need not be 
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proven because the availability of alternate remedies like appeal would be 
immaterial.”  State ex rel. State v. Lewis, 99 Ohio St.3d 97, 2003-Ohio-2476, 789 
N.E.2d 195, ¶ 18. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 25} Because Judge Ramsey’s issuance of an amended QDRO was 
inconsistent with the court of appeals’ jurisdiction to review the January 9 
judgment and QDRO, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals granting the 
writ of prohibition to prevent the judge from taking any further action inconsistent 
with that court’s authority to review the judgment being appealed and to vacate 
the amended QDRO. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Thomas A. Matuszak, L.L.C., and Thomas A. Matuszak; and Law Offices 
of Stephen D. Long and Stephen D. Long, for appellee. 
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and John A. Borrell, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
______________________