Case Title: Commonwealth v. Grassie

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-01-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12061 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  BRYAN M. GRASSIE. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     September 6, 2016. - January 6, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon.  
Evidence, Self-defense.  Self-Defense.  Practice, Criminal, 
Argument by prosecutor, Verdict, Grand jury proceedings.  
Grand Jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 21, 2012. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Frank M. Gaziano, J., and a 
renewed motion for a required finding of not guilty was 
considered by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Kenneth H. Anderson (Greg L. Johnson with him) for the 
defendant. 
 
Robert C. Thompson, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Argie K. Shapiro, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
Attorney General, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  The defendant appeals from his convictions of 
murder in the second degree and a related charge.  He argues 
that, based on the evidence presented at trial and the 
prosecutor's closing argument, his murder conviction should be 
reversed or reduced to a conviction of manslaughter.  We 
conclude that there was sufficient evidence to convict the 
defendant of murder in the second degree and that the 
prosecutor's closing argument was not improper.  However, for 
the reasons discussed below, we do not decide whether the 
defendant is entitled to a reduced verdict. 
 
The defendant argues as well that this court should expand 
its holding in Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 808 (2012), to 
require that in all cases where the Commonwealth seeks to indict 
a person for murder, whether the person is a juvenile (as in 
Walczak) or an adult (as here), and there is substantial 
evidence of mitigating circumstances or defenses presented to 
the grand jury, the grand jury must be instructed on the 
elements of murder and the significance of mitigating 
circumstances and defenses.  We conclude that this defendant is 
not entitled to relief based on the absence of any such 
instructions.  However, we also believe it is important for the 
court to gain a better understanding of current grand jury 
instruction practices before deciding whether the holding of the 
Walczak case should be expanded in the future.  Accordingly, we 
3 
 
 
 
will appoint a committee to study and make recommendations about 
this question.1 
 
Background.  1.  Facts.  The jury could have found the 
following.  The fatal altercation occurred in the East Wareham 
section of Wareham outside a high school graduation party hosted 
by Dylan Burns.  The gathering began on the afternoon of July 
28, 2012, and extended into the early morning hours of July 29.  
The two victims, Brendan Mahoney and Brian Mahoney,2 arrived at 
the party around 2 or 3 P.M. on July 28 and, like many of the 
partygoers, were drinking alcohol despite being underage.  All 
told, a "half keg" and two thirty-packs of beer were consumed 
throughout the day and night.  The defendant, Bryan Grassie, 
arrived at the party after midnight on July 29, appearing 
intoxicated and acting "confrontational" and "aggressive."  The 
defendant had not been invited to the party, but he knew Burns, 
the host. 
 
Over the next few hours, the defendant repeatedly 
confronted others at the party, including the Mahoney brothers, 
and either discussed fighting or offered to fight them.  For 
example, the defendant at one point told the brothers, "[I]f 
                                                 
 
1  
We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Attorney General. 
 
 
2 For convenience, we will use only first names when 
referring to the Mahoney brothers individually. 
4 
 
 
 
there's a problem right now, we can go outside and take care of 
it."  During a confrontation, the brothers forced the defendant 
up against a wall and told him "no one there wanted to fight" 
and "to leave before he got hurt."  Brendan then removed a 
cigarette from behind the defendant's ear and threw it in the 
defendant's face.  Brian spoke with Burns and asked him to get 
the defendant "the fuck out of here before I [Brian], like, hit 
him or something."  Eventually, Burns did intervene.  However, 
the defendant and the Mahoney brothers continued to exchange 
words about the possibility of fighting at a nearby beach.  As 
Burns was leading the defendant away from the brothers, Brian 
reached over Burns's shoulder and pushed the defendant's face 
away. 
 
Burns was able to coax the defendant outside, although the 
defendant remained confrontational.  He told Burns, "My problem 
is with . . . the Mahoney [b]rothers," and said, "[H]ave them 
come outside and . . . we'll solve it.  We'll take care of it 
with them."  Once outside, the defendant at first would not 
leave the front of the house, and yelled at the Mahoneys to come 
outside and fight him.  When Brian came out, the defendant said, 
"[L]et's go down to the beach.  We'll fight there," and Brian 
said, "[A]lright, I'll see you in like [ten] minutes," before 
going back inside.  The defendant continued to yell about 
fighting.  After some time outside, however, the defendant began 
5 
 
 
 
to walk away from the party.  He headed down Priscilla Avenue, 
in the direction of his home and also the beach; as he walked, 
he continued shouting insults back toward the party. 
 
The events at the heart of this case occurred shortly 
thereafter.  The trial witnesses essentially agreed that after 
the defendant began walking away from the party, the Mahoney 
brothers pursued him down Priscilla Avenue, followed by several 
others from the party.  One witness testified that the defendant 
was "walking backwards" -- that is, facing the party -- as he 
left.  This witness described the defendant as "turned around" 
and "waiting" in a "fighting stance" or "in a ready position 
waiting to fight," with his feet "shoulder width apart" and his 
hands out of his pockets as the brothers approached.  The 
defendant and the brothers then engaged in physical combat in 
the shadows beyond a streetlight.  A surveillance audio-video 
system mounted on the outside of a nearby home on Priscilla 
Avenue captured audio from the fight, as well as some video 
images from before and after. 
 
The following is apparent from the audio-video recording.  
Footsteps walking can be heard, and a very shadowy figure 
(identified by several witnesses as the defendant) can vaguely 
6 
 
 
 
be made out, moving down the road away from the party.3  Over the 
first twenty seconds of the recording, the defendant can be 
heard saying, "Follow me, let's go . . . .  Follow me, you 
little pussies.  I'll wait there, dude.  I'll wait there for 
you.  You guys are fucking bitches, you guys won't come.  You 
fucking pussies.  I'll fight you guys like one-on-one.  Not even 
one-on-one.  Two-on-one, three-on-one, you fucking little 
pussies."  Over the next three seconds, the defendant says 
nothing further as he continues to walk down Priscilla Avenue 
and his shadowy figure moves out of the camera's view.  As it 
does so, the sound of running footsteps becomes audible.  
Although the video recording does not reveal any visual image of 
a person or persons, the witnesses at trial essentially agreed 
that the Mahoney brothers were the first partygoers to run down 
Priscilla Avenue after the defendant, followed by Burns, James 
Waitz, and Matthew Ingargiola.  Within three seconds of the 
sound of running footsteps, a series of thuds or crashes is 
heard, along with additional running footsteps.  Approximately 
ten seconds elapse between the first crash and the sound of 
someone's voice saying, "He's got a knife," followed immediately 
                                                 
 
3 As mentioned, one witness testified that the defendant was 
walking backward as he left the party.  Another witness 
testified that -- at least once the Mahoney brothers began their 
pursuit -- the defendant started to run away from them.  It is 
impossible to tell from the recording alone which direction the 
defendant was facing at any given time. 
7 
 
 
 
by a scream.  Six seconds later, someone says, "Call the 
ambulance."  About five seconds after that, a video image shows 
Brendan limping quickly away from the fight, back toward the 
site of the party, accompanied by Brian and two others running 
beside him, identified at trial as Burns and Waitz. 
 
Each Mahoney brother had been stabbed several times.  
Brendan suffered five stab wounds and one incised wound.  One of 
the stab wounds was to the abdomen, identified by the medical 
examiner as the only wound that could have caused his death.  
The remaining wounds were to Brendan's legs or buttocks.  
Following surgical intervention, Brendan died on July 31, 2012.  
Brian suffered two stab wounds to his abdomen and side, and 
others to the buttocks; the injuries required surgical repair. 
 
Although the weapon used in the stabbings was not 
recovered, there was testimony that the defendant had exhibited 
a folding knife, in a nonthreatening manner, to one person at 
Burns's party and to a different person at an earlier party held 
the same night.  The Commonwealth introduced in evidence two 
knives that were described by those two individuals as looking 
similar to the knife the defendant had shown to them.  Each of 
the model knives has a blade approximately three and one-half 
inches long and a handle approximately four and one-half inches 
long.  The model knives can be opened with one hand by pressing 
certain areas of the handle. 
8 
 
 
 
 
2.  Procedural history.  A Plymouth County grand jury 
indicted the defendant for murder in the first degree (Brendan), 
armed assault with intent to murder (Brian), and assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon (Brian).  The defendant 
moved to dismiss the indictments because the Commonwealth had 
failed to instruct the grand jury on the elements of murder in 
the first degree, murder in the second degree, and voluntary 
manslaughter, and on mitigating circumstances and defenses.  The 
motion was denied.  The defendant sought review before a single 
justice in this court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  The single 
justice denied relief. 
 
The defendant thereafter was tried before a jury.  At the 
close of the Commonwealth's case and at the close of all the 
evidence, the defendant moved for a required finding of not 
guilty insofar as the indictments alleged murder (in both 
degrees) and armed assault with intent to murder.  The trial 
judge denied the motions.  With respect to the murder 
indictment, the judge instructed the jury on murder in the first 
degree (on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme 
atrocity or cruelty); murder in the second degree; voluntary 
manslaughter; self-defense; and the mitigating circumstances of 
(1) heat of passion on reasonable provocation, (2) heat of 
passion induced by sudden combat, and (3) the use of excessive 
force in self-defense.  The jury found the defendant guilty of 
9 
 
 
 
murder in the second degree and assault and battery by means of 
a dangerous weapon; the defendant was found not guilty of armed 
assault with intent to murder and the lesser included offense of 
armed assault with intent to kill. 
 
Following the verdicts, the defendant renewed his motion 
under Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b) (2), as amended, 420 Mass. 1502 
(1995), for a required finding of not guilty on the charge of 
murder.  In the alternative, he moved under the same rule for a 
reduction in the verdict of murder in the second degree to 
manslaughter, or for a new trial.  The trial judge denied all 
three aspects of the motion.  The defendant appealed from his 
convictions to the Appeals Court, and we transferred the case to 
this court on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Motion for a required finding of not 
guilty.  The defendant first argues that the judge erred in 
denying his motion for a required finding of not guilty insofar 
as the indictments alleged murder.  Essentially, he argues that 
the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt the absence of mitigating circumstances -- to 
wit, the absence of heat of passion induced by reasonable 
10 
 
 
 
provocation or sudden combat,4 and the absence of excessive force 
in self-defense.  We disagree. 
 
When reviewing a motion for a required finding of not 
guilty, the "question is whether, after viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt" (emphasis in original).  Commonwealth 
v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1979).  The evidence and the 
inferences drawn therefrom must be of sufficient force to bring 
minds of ordinary intelligence and sagacity to the persuasion of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Latimore, supra at 676, citing 
Commonwealth v. Cooper, 264 Mass. 368, 373 (1928).  More than 
slight evidence must support each essential element, and "a 
conviction may not 'rest upon the piling of inference upon 
inference or conjecture and speculation.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Reaves, 434 Mass. 383, 390 (2001), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Mandile, 403 Mass. 93, 94 (1988). 
 
Where, as in this case, there is evidence supporting the 
proposition that in stabbing Brian, the defendant acted out of 
heat of passion, whether induced by reasonable provocation or 
                                                 
 
4 There is substantial overlap, at least in this case, 
between the theories of heat of passion induced by reasonable 
provocation and heat of passion induced by sudden combat.  We 
address both theories infra. 
11 
 
 
 
sudden combat, the jury are instructed to consider whether a 
reasonable person, either as a result of reasonable provocation 
or induced by sudden combat, would be "provoked to act out of 
emotion rather than reasoned reflection."  Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide 67-68 (2013).5  If the jury make such a 
finding or, more specifically, find that the Commonwealth has 
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was 
not so provoked, they cannot return a verdict of murder, whether 
of first or second degree.  See id.  Because the jury in this 
case returned a verdict of murder in the second degree, our task 
is to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to allow 
them to find the Commonwealth did prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt the absence of heat of passion resulting from either 
reasonable provocation or sudden combat.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 427 Mass. 714, 715–716 (1998), citing 
Commonwealth v. Boucher, 403 Mass. 659, 661-662 (1989) (because 
malice and adequate provocation are "mutually exclusive," 
Commonwealth must prove beyond reasonable doubt absence of 
provocation in order to sustain murder conviction). 
 
With respect to heat of passion induced by reasonable 
provocation, the crucial inquiry is whether an action by the 
victim or victims in relation to the defendant would have roused 
                                                 
 
5 The jury were so instructed in the present case. 
12 
 
 
 
in an ordinary person such a state of passion, anger, fear, 
fright, or nervous excitement as would eclipse the defendant's 
capacity for reflection or restraint, and whether it actually 
did produce such a state of mind in the defendant.  Commonwealth 
v. Burgess, 450 Mass. 422, 439 (2008), citing Commonwealth v. 
Walden, 380 Mass. 724, 728 (1980).  The jury must find a causal 
connection between the provocation, the heat of passion, and the 
killing.  Burgess, supra at 438, citing Commonwealth v. 
Garabedian, 399 Mass. 304, 313 (1987).  The jury here could have 
credited the following evidence:  the defendant was walking 
backward down Priscilla Avenue, beckoning people to fight him 
"three-on-one," with the knowledge that he had a knife in his 
pocket and no indication that anyone else was carrying a weapon.  
Seconds later, the brothers came after him and Brendan landed 
one punch.  Virtually immediately thereafter, the brothers were 
stabbed.  If the jury believed these facts, as they were 
entitled to do, they could rationally infer that the defendant's 
decision to use deadly force reflected a previously formed 
intention to do so, not an impulsive action resulting from a 
state of passion induced by provocation supplied by Brendan's 
opening punch.  If the jury found that the defendant's intent to 
stab preexisted Brendan's landing that first punch, there would 
be no causal connection between the punch and the defendant's 
13 
 
 
 
state of mind -- and thus no mitigation due to reasonable 
provocation.  See Burgess, supra. 
 
We reach the same conclusion with respect to sudden combat.  
The mitigating circumstance of sudden combat contemplates a 
scenario in which "two meet, not intending to quarrel, and angry 
words suddenly arise, and a conflict springs up in which blows 
are given on both sides, without much regard to who is the 
assailant."  Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 461 Mass. 100, 107 
(2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 308 
(1850).  "[I]f no unfair advantage is taken in the outset, and 
the occasion is not sought for the purpose of gratifying malice, 
and one seizes a weapon and strikes a deadly blow, it is 
regarded as homicide in heat of blood."  Rodriquez, supra.  The 
jury could reasonably infer that the defendant uttered the 
words, "I'll fight you guys like one-on-one.  Not even one-on-
one.  Two-on-one, three-on-one," because he had already formed 
the intent to stab anyone who accepted his invitation to fight.  
In other words, this evidence at least permits (although 
certainly does not require) an inference that the defendant 
solicited a fight with the Mahoney brothers as a pretext for his 
use of deadly force.  See Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 380 Mass. 
840, 849-850 (1980) (sufficient evidence to warrant jury's 
finding of malice and returning verdict of murder in second 
degree where defendant, after professing intention to injure 
14 
 
 
 
victims, intentionally used deadly weapon on them).  Such a 
finding would defeat any entitlement to mitigation based on heat 
of passion induced by sudden combat. 
 
The issue of excessive force used in self-defense is much 
closer.  Because the actual physical confrontation that ended 
with Brendan's death raised an issue whether the defendant used 
a knife -– deadly force6 -- in proper self-defense, the 
Commonwealth was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant did not engage in the proper use of self-
defense.  See Commonwealth v. Glacken, 451 Mass. 163, 166–167 
(2008).  As relevant here, our cases and the model jury 
instructions, to which the trial judge scrupulously adhered and 
which neither party challenges on appeal, set out alternative 
ways for the Commonwealth to carry this burden.  See Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide, supra at 20-21.  In a deadly force 
self-defense case, the Commonwealth may establish the absence of 
proper use of self-defense by proving beyond a reasonable doubt 
at least one of the following propositions:  (1) the defendant 
did not actually believe that he was in immediate danger of 
                                                 
 
6 The defendant correctly does not dispute that his use of a 
knife constituted deadly force.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Pring-Wilson, 448 Mass. 718, 733 (2007), citing Commonwealth v. 
Toon, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 642, 644 n.3 (2002) (stabbing victim 
with knife constitutes use of deadly force); Commonwealth v. 
Albert, 391 Mass. 853, 860-861 (1984) (jury were entitled to 
infer malice from intentional use of deadly force [knife] to 
stab victim). 
15 
 
 
 
death or serious bodily harm from which he could save himself 
only by using deadly force; (2) a reasonable person in the 
defendant's position would not reasonably have believed that he 
was in immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm from 
which he could save himself only by using deadly force; (3) the 
defendant did not use or attempt to use all proper and 
reasonable means in the circumstances to avoid physical combat 
before resorting to the use of deadly force; or (4) the 
defendant used more force than was reasonably necessary in all 
the circumstances.7  See id.  See also Glacken, supra at 167.  If 
the Commonwealth fails to prove the first, second, or third 
proposition, but does prove the fourth proposition -- that is, 
if the only way the Commonwealth proves that the defendant did 
not act in proper self-defense is by proving that the defendant 
used excessive force -- then the jury must return a verdict of 
not guilty of murder but, if the other required elements of 
murder are proved, must find the defendant guilty of voluntary 
                                                 
 
7 The Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 21 (2013) also 
provide a fifth option that may be applicable where there is 
evidence that the defendant was the initial aggressor.  The 
defendant agreed with the trial judge's decision that including 
this fifth option was not warranted in this case, because as a 
general matter, words alone cannot make one into a first 
aggressor, and did not do so with respect to this defendant.  We 
agree as well.  See Commonwealth v. Harris, 464 Mass. 425, 435-
436 & n.12 (2013) (generally "conduct involving only the use of 
nonthreatening words will not be sufficient to qualify a 
defendant as a first aggressor"). 
16 
 
 
 
manslaughter.  See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide, supra at 
71.  See Glacken, supra, and cases cited.  See also Commonwealth 
v. Santos, 454 Mass. 770, 775 (2009). 
 
The trial evidence here would permit a rational jury to 
conclude that the Commonwealth had proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant did not act in the proper exercise of 
self-defense.  In particular, the jury could have credited the 
surveillance video recording depicting the defendant offering to 
fight people from the party "two-on-one" or "three-on-one"; 
that, as one witness testified, the defendant was "walking 
backwards" and shouting back toward the party as he departed 
down Priscilla Avenue; and that, as the same witness stated, the 
defendant was "turned around" and "waiting" in a "fighting 
stance" with his hands out of his pockets as the brothers 
approached.8  This evidence would permit the jury to conclude 
that the defendant had invited the fight and was waiting for it 
rather than trying to use all reasonable options to avoid it.  
That the jury reasonably could so conclude means that the 
Commonwealth could prove beyond a reasonable doubt the third 
                                                 
 
8 The witness who testified to these observations, James 
Waitz, also testified that he saw nothing in the defendant's 
hands at this exact moment, but the jury were not required to 
accept that testimony.  There was no question that it was very 
dark where the fight took place, and there was evidence that the 
knife in the defendant's possession had a black blade with a 
black handle. 
17 
 
 
 
proposition listed in the previous paragraph, namely, that "the 
defendant had not availed himself of all proper means to avoid 
physical combat before resorting to the use of deadly force."  
Glacken, 451 Mass. at 167.  See Santos, 454 Mass. at 773; 
Commonwealth v. Bertrand, 385 Mass. 356, 362 (1982) (defendant 
"did not attempt to avoid a fight" with victim, but rather 
"anticipated a fight that evening" and remained on scene until 
after participating in fight). 
 
In addition, the jury rationally could have concluded that 
the defendant sought out a fight in which he was outnumbered 
precisely because he knew that he could use, and intended to 
use, the knife in his pocket against anyone who accepted his 
invitation to fight.  Such a mental state is inconsistent with 
the defendant harboring a subjective fear of serious bodily 
injury from which he could only save himself by using deadly 
force.  See Santos, supra ("A person using a dangerous weapon 
[or deadly force] in self-defense must also have actually 
believed that he was in imminent danger of serious harm or 
death").  Again, because the jury permissibly could make such 
findings, it follows that the Commonwealth could carry its 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
did not have an actual belief that he could not protect himself 
absent the use of deadly force -- i.e., the second proposition 
listed previously.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Torres, 420 Mass. 479, 
18 
 
 
 
492–493 (1995) (defendant not entitled to self-defense 
instruction absent evidence of reasonable and actual belief that 
he or another was in imminent danger of death of serious bodily 
harm). 
 
If the jury rationally could conclude that the Commonwealth 
had proved the defendant was not entitled to use deadly force in 
self-defense, there would be no basis for a finding that the 
defendant had used excessive force in self-defense.  See Santos, 
454 Mass. at 775 ("The jury cannot reach the question of 
excessive force in self-defense unless they decide that the 
defendant has exercised his right of self-defense in the first 
place"); Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 Mass. 213, 218 (2005) ("a 
voluntary manslaughter verdict based on excessive force in self-
defense would have been precluded if the Commonwealth proved 
that the defendant was not entitled to use deadly force").  See 
also Commonwealth v. Roberts, 433 Mass. 45, 57 (2000) (excessive 
force instruction unavailable absent evidence that defendant 
reasonably believed he was in imminent danger of death or 
serious bodily injury and used all reasonable means of avoiding 
combat); Commonwealth v. Berry, 431 Mass. 326, 335 (2000) 
(defendant did not take advantage of every opportunity to avoid 
combat when "at least at some point he had adequate means of 
escape"). 
19 
 
 
 
 
Of course, this was no by means the only conclusion 
available to the jury.  As the defendant correctly points out, 
there was other evidence that could have led the jury to embrace 
any of his theories of mitigation.  The defendant was just 
eighteen years old and appeared intoxicated before the fight 
began around 3:30 in the morning.  Brendan's punch knocked the 
defendant to the ground or into a fence, and the defendant at 
that point was facing what very well may have looked like a 
group of at least five attackers (Brendan, Brian, Burns, Waitz, 
and Ingargiola).  The jury had ample evidence from which to 
conclude that the defendant used deadly force in response to 
reasonable provocation or that he had a right to defend himself 
but used excessive force in doing so.  However, that state of 
affairs merely entitled the defendant to jury instructions on 
mitigation and self-defense -- which he received in the words of 
the model jury instructions.  Compare Boucher, 403 Mass. at 661-
662 (error when instructions failed to inform jury that malice 
and adequate provocation are "mutually exclusive"); Commonwealth 
v. Kendrick, 351 Mass. 203, 212–213 (1966) (error where 
instructions foreclosed jury from finding manslaughter based on 
excessive force used in self-defense). 
 
Once the jury were properly instructed on mitigating 
circumstances and self-defense -- and no one argues they were 
not -- it was for them to decide whether the defendant properly 
20 
 
 
 
used deadly force in the heat of passion or in self-defense -- 
or, alternatively, if he used deadly force because of a 
preexisting intent to stab anyone who accepted his invitation to 
fight.  See Daniels v. Commonwealth, 455 Mass. 1009, 1009–1010 
(2009) (defendant's "claim that the Commonwealth failed to 
disprove that she acted in self-defense beyond a reasonable 
doubt fails because, while the evidence at her trial, viewed 
most favorably to her, entitled her to a self-defense 
instruction, the jury were not required to credit her version of 
the altercation"); Hartfield v. Commonwealth, 443 Mass. 1022, 
1022 (2005) ("The flaw in [the defendant's] argument is that the 
jury were not required to credit the evidence supporting her 
contention that she acted on provocation or in self-defense.  
The evidence is examined in the light most favorable to the 
defendant in determining whether instructions on provocation or 
self-defense are warranted, . . . but that is not to say that 
the jury must believe that evidence -- or that a judge or an 
appellate court, in assessing the sufficiency of the 
Commonwealth's evidence to support a conviction of murder, must 
assume that the jury would believe that evidence" [citation 
omitted]).  Because there was legally sufficient evidence to 
support the jury's verdict of murder in the second degree, the 
defendant's motions for a required finding of not guilty insofar 
as the indictments alleged murder were properly denied. 
21 
 
 
 
 
2.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant also 
argues that we should vacate his convictions because the 
prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof by discussing 
the defendant's "claim" of self-defense during her closing 
argument.  We disagree.  In context, the prosecutor's comments 
"do not appear to represent an effort to place a burden on the 
defendant."  Commonwealth v. Williams, 450 Mass. 879, 889 
(2008).  To the contrary, they were merely "an attempt to meet 
the Commonwealth's burden of disproving self-defense."  Id.  The 
argument was not improper. 
 
3.  Motion to reduce the verdict from murder in the second 
degree to manslaughter.  The defendant contests the judge's 
denial of his motion under the second sentence of Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 25 (b) (2) to reduce the jury's verdict to manslaughter.9  He 
argues that the weight of the evidence so strongly supports the 
presence of mitigating circumstances -- that is, excessive force 
in self-defense and heat of passion -- that the judge's denial 
of his motion was an abuse of discretion.  For the reasons 
discussed below, we do not decide this issue at the present 
time. 
                                                 
 
9 The second sentence of Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b) (2) 
provides:  "If a verdict of guilty is returned, the judge may on 
motion set aside the verdict and order a new trial, or order the 
entry of a finding of not guilty, or order the entry of a 
finding of guilty of any offense included in the offense charged 
in the indictment or complaint." 
22 
 
 
 
 
Under rule 25 (b) (2), a trial judge has broad authority to 
reduce a jury's verdict, despite the presence of legally 
sufficient evidence to support it.  Commonwealth v. Sokphann 
Chhim, 447 Mass. 370, 381 (2006).  "A judge's discretion to 
reduce a verdict pursuant to rule 25 (b) (2) is appropriately 
exercised where the weight of the evidence in the case, although 
technically sufficient to support the jury's verdict, points to 
a lesser crime."  Commonwealth v. Rolon, 438 Mass. 808, 821 
(2003).  In exercising his or her rule 25 (b) (2) powers, the 
trial judge should be guided by the same considerations that 
have guided this court in the exercise of its power and duties 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce a verdict.  Commonwealth v. 
Gaulden, 383 Mass. 543, 555 (1981). 
 
The role of this court in reviewing a trial judge's ruling 
on a motion to reduce the verdict is "not to decide whether we 
would have acted as the trial judge did."  Sokphann Chhim, 447 
Mass. at 381.  Instead, we decide only whether the judge abused 
his or her discretion or committed an error of law.10  Id., 
                                                 
 
10 We are cognizant of the fact that a narrower scope of 
review applies to our analysis of second-degree murder 
convictions compared with our review of first-degree murder 
convictions under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, given that § 33E no 
longer provides plenary review by this court in cases where a 
defendant is convicted of murder in the second degree.  See 
Commonwealth v. Maillet, 400 Mass. 572, 579 n.9 (1987) 
(comparing St. 1962, c. 453, which required review by this court 
under § 33E where defendant indicted for murder in first degree 
 
23 
 
 
 
citing Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 557.  Abuse of discretion arises 
where "the judge made 'a clear error of judgment in weighing' 
the factors relevant to the decision . . . such that the 
decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives" 
(citation omitted).  L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 
n.27 (2014). 
 
That said, there must be some mechanism by which an 
appellate court can meaningfully assess whether a judge acted 
appropriately in granting or denying rule 25 (b) (2) relief.  
For instance, if a judge grants a motion to reduce a verdict, 
the expectation is that the judge will explain his or her 
reasoning in a written ruling or an oral explanation on the 
record.  See Commonwealth v. Woodward, 427 Mass. 659, 669 (1998) 
("We do expect a judge to state the reasons for a reduction in 
verdict" under rule 25 [b] [2]); Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 555–556 
(noting that judge who reduces verdict under rule 25 [b] [2] 
should state reasons for doing so).  This allows the appellate 
court to test the judge's reasoning for abuse of discretion.  We 
                                                                                                                                                             
is convicted of murder in either first or second degree, with 
St. 1979, c. 346, § 2, which does not require review where 
defendant, so indicted, is convicted of murder in second 
degree).  See also Commonwealth v. Gaulden, 383 Mass. 543, 553-
554 (1981) (similar).  One possible explanation for this 
disparity in treatment of the two degrees of murder is that 
those convicted of murder in the first degree are sentenced to 
life without the possibility of parole, whereas those convicted 
of murder in the second degree eventually become eligible for 
parole.  See G. L. c. 265, § 2; G. L. c. 279, § 24. 
24 
 
 
 
have never required such a statement of reasons when, as here, 
the judge denies a motion to reduce and leaves the jury’s 
verdict intact.  Even so, the task of the appellate court is the 
same:  to determine whether "the judge made 'a clear error of 
judgment in weighing' the factors relevant to the decision . . . 
such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives" (citation omitted).  L.L., 470 Mass. at 185 n.27. 
 
In this case, the trial judge did not state his reasons for 
denying the defendant's motion to reduce the verdict.11  Without 
a statement of reasons, we are unable to determine whether the 
decision not to reduce the verdict was an abuse of discretion.12 
                                                 
11 The judge's ruling consisted of two handwritten lines:  
"The motion is denied.  The court declines to disturb the jury's 
verdict." 
 
 
12 As just stated, we have never required a detailed 
explanation as a sine qua non of denying a motion to reduce a 
verdict, nor do we intend to do so now.  That said, even a brief 
explanation of the judge's rationale for denying a motion under 
rule 25 (b) (2) assists the understanding of the parties, the 
public, and the appellate courts of the judge's decision, and 
especially in close or difficult cases, we urge judges to 
provide a statement articulating with some specificity their 
reasons for denying a rule 25 (b) (2) motion.  See L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 182–183 (2014), quoting Long v. 
Wickett, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 380, 402 (2000) (even where judge has 
"broad discretion," it is "essential . . . that a reviewing 
court have some basis for distinguishing between well-reasoned 
conclusions arrived at after a comprehensive consideration of 
all relevant factors, and mere boiler-plate approval phrased in 
appropriate language but unsupported by evaluation of the facts 
or analysis of the law"). 
25 
 
 
 
The usual remedy for this predicament -- where the record is 
inadequate for an appellate court to test a judge's rule 
25 (b) (2) ruling for abuse of discretion -- would be to remand 
to the trial judge, who had a firsthand view of the evidence, 
for findings or an explanation of reasons.13  See Woodward, 427 
Mass. at 669; Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 555–556.  However, such a 
remedy would be ineffectual in the circumstances of this case 
because Justice Gaziano, who was the trial judge, has since 
become a member of this court.  See Gaulden, supra at 547 
                                                 
 
13 In other contexts, although not perfectly analogous to 
this case, we have remanded when it appeared necessary or at 
least desirable for additional explication from the trial or 
motion judge.  See Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422, 439 
(2013), S.C., 473 Mass. 832 (2016) (remanding for findings 
related to defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim); 
Commonwealth v. Greineder, 458 Mass. 207, 219-220 (2010), S.C., 
464 Mass. 580 (2013) (discussing result after remanding for 
factual findings on defendant's claim of closed court room 
during jury empanelment); Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 
334, 338 (2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 818 (2008) (remanding for 
further factual findings in context of motion to suppress); 
Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 421 Mass. 272, 278–280 (1995) 
(vacating dismissal of criminal complaint and remanding for 
determination on issue of prejudice from prosecutor's conduct); 
Commonwealth v. Caso, 377 Mass. 236, 237, 241-242, 244 (1979) 
(remanding for further findings on issue of voluntariness of 
witness's statements).  See also Boston Hous. Auth. v. 
Bridgewaters, 452 Mass. 833, 849–851 (2009) (remanding for 
individualized assessment regarding reasonable accommodation for 
public housing tenant); Weber v. Community Teamwork, Inc., 434 
Mass. 761, 775–776 (2001) (remanding employment discrimination 
case for finding on elements of animus and causation); Rosenberg 
v. Merida, 428 Mass. 182, 185 (1998) (remanding because judge 
made no findings concerning amount of child support obligation, 
which left appellate court unable to determine whether he 
followed correct approach). 
26 
 
 
 
("Because the judge has retired, we cannot readily remand the 
case for him to make findings at this time"). 
 
Nonetheless, this court does have the power to transfer 
cases, or parts of cases, from a lower court to this court.  See 
G. L. c. 211, § 4A, third par.14  Thus, given the unusual posture 
of this case, pursuant to § 4A, we will exercise jurisdiction 
over the motion to reduce the verdict -- a component of the case 
that, ordinarily, we would simply remand to the trial judge.15  
Having jurisdiction over that part of the case, we will transfer 
it to the county court to permit Justice Gaziano, acting as 
single justice, to review anew the defendant's motion to reduce 
the verdict.  In conducting that review, the single justice may 
reconsider his prior ruling and reach a different result or he 
may not, but his resolution should be accompanied by a statement 
explaining the reasons for his decision.  Once the single 
justice has done so, he should report the case to the full 
court. 
                                                 
 
14 The third paragraph of G. L. c. 211, § 4A, provides: 
 
"The supreme judicial court may also direct any cause or 
matter to be transferred from a lower court to it in whole 
or in part for further action or directions, and in case of 
partial transfer may issue such orders or directions in 
regards to the part of such cause or matter not so 
transferred as justice may require." 
 
 
15 This exercise of jurisdiction requires us to remand the 
case to the Superior Court and then transfer it back to this 
court pursuant to our powers under G. L. c. 211, § 4A. 
27 
 
 
 
 
We add the following, in light of the close correspondence 
between the review conducted by a trial judge on a motion to 
reduce the verdict and this court's consideration whether to 
reduce a verdict pursuant to § 33E.16  See Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 
555–556.  In performing our duty under § 33E, we have 
occasionally reduced verdicts, or approved of reduced verdicts, 
based largely on "the particulars of the fight that led to the 
victim's death."  Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 365 
(2016).  In several cases, those "particulars" bear striking 
factual similarities to this case.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Keough, 385 Mass. 314, 320-321 (1982).17  See also Commonwealth 
                                                 
 
16 Reviewing convictions of murder in the second degree is 
familiar territory for this court, albeit more in the past than 
the present.  Before 1979, the court's review under § 33E 
extended to cases, like this one, that involved a conviction of 
murder in the second degree based on an indictment charging 
murder in the first degree.  G. L. c. 278, § 33E, as amended 
through St. 1974, c. 457.  See Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 553.  In 
1979, § 33E was amended to limit this court's review function 
under that statute to convictions of murder in the first degree; 
under the rules of criminal procedure, trial judges in all 
criminal cases have "a power to enter a finding of a lesser 
degree of guilt in the same manner that this court has had such 
a power under . . . § 33E, on the appeal of a capital case."  
Id. 
 
 
17 In Commonwealth v. Keough, 385 Mass. 314 (1982), this 
court affirmed the trial judge's decision to reduce a verdict of 
murder in the second degree to manslaughter on facts that bear a 
substantial similarity to the facts here.  We stated: 
 
 
"We agree with the judge's statement that '[t]his is a 
tragic case in which a minor controversy between strangers 
exploded into the killing of a human being.'  A number of 
 
28 
 
 
 
v. Jones, 366 Mass. 805, 806, 809 (1975) (reducing verdict from 
murder in second degree to manslaughter where victim "struck the 
defendant a heavy blow on the jaw which sent him reeling 
backward several steps" before defendant stabbed victim in chest 
with fishing knife defendant carried with him every day); 
Commonwealth v. Kinney, 361 Mass. 709, 710-713 (1972) (reducing 
two convictions of murder in second degree to manslaughter where 
defendant was set upon by group of women, struck in head, and 
dragged into stairwell before firing two shots, killing one 
woman and one child); Commonwealth v. Ransom, 358 Mass. 580, 
582-583 (1971) (reducing conviction of murder in second degree 
to manslaughter where defendant stabbed victim after victim 
first attacked defendant and then pursued defendant into alley 
                                                                                                                                                             
significant facts are undisputed.  The judgment of the 
persons involved appears to have been affected by the 
consumption of alcohol.  The defendant and the victim had 
had no previous confrontation.  The defendant had the 
murder weapon in his possession.  He did not leave to 
obtain it and return to confront the victim.  At the 
crucial moment, the victim sought out the defendant for 
confrontation.  There were four persons in the victim's 
group and only two in the defendant's.  The entire incident 
was characterized by senseless conduct by both groups.  
There was no evidence of the defendant's prior criminality. 
 
 
"Although each case depends on a consideration of its 
particular circumstances, the judge's conclusion here fits 
into the pattern of those cases involving senseless 
encounters in which, under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we have 
ordered the entry of a finding of a lesser degree of 
guilt." 
 
Id. at 320–321, and cases cited. 
29 
 
 
 
and up to fence where defendant could run no further).  It also 
bears noting that some § 33E cases have given weight to factors 
such as age and intoxication, both of which were also at issue 
in this case.  See Commonwealth v. McDermott, 393 Mass. 451, 
460-461 (1984) (defendant was seventeen years old, and had drug 
and alcohol problems); Ransom, supra at 583 (alcohol and drugs 
may have played role in killing).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Colleran, 452 Mass. 417, 431–432 (2008) (collecting cases that 
discuss factors that have been relevant to reducing murder 
verdicts under § 33E).  Because these considerations have 
informed this court's § 33E analysis, they should also provide a 
framework for the judge to explain his reasons in resolving the 
rule 25 (b) (2) question. 
 
4.  Grand jury instructions.  Finally, the defendant asks 
that we expand the court's holding in Commonwealth v. Walczak, 
463 Mass. 808 (2012), to apply whether the accused is a juvenile 
or an adult.  Under such a rule, the defendant suggests, the 
grand jury in this case should have received legal instructions 
on mitigating circumstances and self-defense.  He argues that 
because no such instructions were given, the integrity of the 
grand jury was impaired, and the indictment must be dismissed. 
 
In the Walczak case, four Justices agreed that "where the 
Commonwealth seeks to indict a juvenile for murder and where 
there is substantial evidence of mitigating circumstances or 
30 
 
 
 
defenses (other than lack of criminal responsibility) presented 
to the grand jury, the prosecutor shall instruct the grand jury 
on the elements of murder and on the significance of the 
mitigating circumstances and defenses."  Walczak, 463 Mass. at 
810 (per curiam).  That holding reflected the common ground 
between two concurring opinions.  Justice Lenk, noting that 
"juveniles charged with murder are uniquely treated as adults 
for all purposes by virtue of the grand jury's decision to 
indict," advocated a rule requiring that in any presentment in 
which the Commonwealth seeks to indict a juvenile for murder the 
grand jury be instructed on elements of the crime, as well as 
any defenses or mitigating circumstances raised by the evidence.  
See id. at 832–833 (Lenk, J., concurring).  Then Justice Gants, 
in an opinion joined by two other Justices, proposed a slightly 
different rule.  He suggested that grand juries should receive 
legal instructions on murder in the second degree and mitigating 
circumstances when the prosecutor seeks an indictment for murder 
despite "evidence of mitigating circumstances that is so 
substantial that concealing it would impair the integrity of the 
grand jury," regardless of whether the person accused is a 
juvenile or an adult.  Id. at 837 (Gants, J., concurring).18 
                                                 
 
18 Justice Spina, joined by two Justices, concurred in part 
and dissented in part.  He believed there should be no change to 
then-existing law regarding instructions to grand juries.  See 
 
31 
 
 
 
 
The holding of the Walczak case, by its own terms, does not 
help the defendant here.  For one, the rule agreed upon in 
Walczak does not require additional instructions to be provided 
to the grand jury in cases, like this one, involving accused 
persons who are adults.  Id. at 810.  Moreover, as the defendant 
acknowledges, even if the Walczak case had applied to adults, 
that case was decided nearly three months after the indictments 
issued in the present case, and we stated in Walczak that other 
than the defendant then before the court, the rule would apply 
only to "future cases."  Id.  Finally, the Walczak case came to 
this court in a very different posture from this one -- an 
appeal from the dismissal of an indictment, not an appeal from a 
conviction following a full jury trial.  See id. at 809. 
 
Because this case does not require us to decide it, we 
leave to another time the question whether to expand the holding 
of the Walczak case to apply to adults.  Meanwhile, we will 
convene a committee to assist us in gaining a better 
understanding of current practices employed by the various 
district attorneys and the Attorney General before considering 
an extension of the rule adopted in the Walczak case to similar 
                                                                                                                                                             
Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 808, 844 (2012) (Spina, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
32 
 
 
 
types of grand jury proceedings involving adults.19  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Walker, 460 Mass. 590, 604 n.16 (2011) 
(announcing that study committee would convene regarding 
eyewitness identification procedures and related model jury 
instructions).20  Independent of the work of that committee, 
however, we decide today that, following the issuance of the 
rescript in this case, the entire grand jury proceeding -- with 
the exception of the grand jury's own deliberations -- is to be 
recorded in a manner that permits reproduction and 
transcription.  This shall include any legal instructions 
provided to the grand jury by a judge or a prosecutor in 
connection with the proceeding, as well as a record of all those 
present during the proceeding.21 
                                                 
 
19 By "similar types of grand jury proceedings," we mean 
grand jury proceedings in which the Commonwealth seeks an 
indictment for murder and in which there is evidence presented 
of mitigating circumstances or defenses (other than lack of 
criminal responsibility) sufficiently strong that the integrity 
of the grand jury would have been impaired if it were withheld, 
and the subject of the investigation is an adult.  See Walczak, 
463 Mass. at 810 (per curiam), 837 (Gants, J., concurring). 
 
 
20 We will ask the committee to report on the range of 
practices employed by the various district attorneys' offices as 
well as the office of the Attorney General with respect to grand 
jury presentments; the reasons supporting the different 
practices; the substance of the instructions that grand juries 
receive from those district attorneys who currently provide 
them; and any recommended best practices. 
 
 
21 The Attorney General indicates that, in general, only the 
judge's instructions at empanelment of the grand jury are 
 
33 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion.  The case is transferred to the Supreme 
Judicial Court for Suffolk County for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
recorded, whereas a prosecutor's subsequent instructions are 
not.  It is this practice we seek to change by requiring that 
the entire grand jury proceeding, including all instructions by 
either a judge or a prosecutor, be placed on the record.  We 
disagree with the Attorney General's suggestion that such a 
practice may jeopardize the secrecy of the grand jury, because 
grand jury minutes are already required to be made available to 
the parties.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (A) (ii), as 
amended, 444 Mass. 1501 (2005). 
 
 
 
LOWY, J. (concurring).  I agree that the evidence supports 
a verdict of murder in the second degree and that the 
prosecutor's closing argument was not improper.  I also agree 
with the approach of transferring the portion of the case 
concerning the denial of the defendant's motion to reduce the 
verdict to the county court for review by Justice Gaziano, 
acting as single justice.  I write separately because I believe 
that convening a study group "to assist us in gaining a better 
understanding of current practices employed by the various 
district attorneys and the Attorney General before considering 
an extension of the rule in the Walczak case to similar types of 
grand jury proceedings involving adults" is unnecessary and 
imprudent.  I believe it is unnecessary for the reasons stated 
in Justice Spina's opinion in Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass 
808, 844-856 (2012) (Spina, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 
I believe extending the Walczak protocol to adult murder 
cases is imprudent for a number of reasons.  First and foremost, 
while the grand jury is an arm of the court and this court's 
superintendence power reaches its proceedings, the manner of 
presentation of evidence to the grand jury rests with the 
executive branch, absent impairment of the integrity of the 
grand jury.  Second, should the court intrude into grand jury 
proceedings in murder prosecutions, why should it not do so in 
2 
 
 
armed assault with intent to murder cases when there is evidence 
of mitigation, or in indecent assault and battery cases when 
there is evidence that the touching was accidental or 
consensual?  Third, will the Commonwealth now have to anticipate 
evidence of mitigation through the eyes of defense counsel or 
proactively investigate evidence of mitigation at the earliest 
stages of a prosecution?  Finally, adopting such a rule will add 
a plethora of new motions and appeals relative to the quality or 
absence of the Commonwealth's instructions.  Trial judges are 
not infrequently reversed for failing to give a manslaughter 
instruction or because of error in instructions inadvertently 
shifting the burden of proof of mitigation to the defendant.  
Should Walczak be extended to adult murder cases, countless 
issues will be raised concerning the need for and quality of 
such instructions.  While these issues are of paramount 
importance at trial, a grand jury proceeding is not a trial.  
For the past 236 years the grand jury has been an investigatory 
and accusatory body in this Commonwealth.  Commonwealth v. 
Moran, 453 Mass. 880, 884 n.7 (2009).  The convening of a study 
group will be but a first step in the erosion of that vital and 
historic function.