Case Title: Commonwealth v. Gallett

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12214

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-03-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12214 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ALEXANDER GALLETT  
(and five companion cases1). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 7, 2018. - March 20, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Robbery.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Constitutional Law, 
Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, 
Confrontation of witnesses.  Evidence, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Joint enterprise, 
Statement of codefendant, Cross-examination.  Telephone.  
Joint Enterprise.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Motion 
to suppress, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of 
statement, Instructions to jury, Comment by judge, 
Confrontation of witnesses. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 2, 2010. 
 
 
Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by Charles 
J. Hely, J., and Janet L. Sanders, J., and cases were tried 
before Linda E. Giles, J. 
 
 
 
Jeffrey L. Baler for Alexander Gallett. 
 
Andrew S. Crouch for Michel St. Jean. 
                     
 
1 Two against Alexander Gallett and three against Michel St. 
Jean. 
2 
 
 
 
Sarah Montgomery Lewis, Assistant District Attorney 
(Jennifer Hickman, Assistant District Attorney, also present) 
for the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  On September 1, 2010, Richel Nova (victim) was 
robbed and stabbed to death after being lured to a vacant house 
in the Hyde Park section of Boston.  A jury convicted the 
defendants, Alexander Gallett and Michel St. Jean, of murder in 
the first degree by reason of extreme atrocity or cruelty and 
felony-murder.2  The defendants raise various arguments on 
appeal.  Gallett contends that the motion judge erred in denying 
his motion to suppress statements that he made to police during 
his interrogation.  St. Jean argues that there was insufficient 
evidence to support the murder conviction; he was prejudiced by 
the admission of statements from Gallett's redacted police 
interrogation; he was prejudiced by the admission of his own 
redacted statements; the judge erred in denying his requests for 
various jury instructions; and the judge improperly invoked 
juror sympathy.  In addition, Gallett and St. Jean argue that 
the judge erred both in limiting the cross-examination of 
certain witnesses and in declining to give a humane practice 
jury instruction. 
                     
 
2 The defendants were also convicted of armed robbery and of 
breaking and entering in the nighttime with the intent to commit 
a felony. 
3 
 
 
 
For the reasons stated infra, we affirm the defendants' 
convictions.  After a thorough review of the record, we also 
decline to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
grant a new trial or to reduce the verdicts of murder in the 
first degree. 
 
Background.  We briefly recite the evidence that the jury 
could have found, reserving pertinent facts for the discussion 
of the defendants' arguments.  In addition, we reserve the facts 
that the motion judge found for the discussion of Gallett's 
motion to suppress. 
 
During the afternoon of September 1, 2010, St. Jean, 
Gallett, and Gallett's girlfriend, Yamiley Mathurin, were 
together at Aline Valery's house in Hyde Park.  Valery overheard 
the defendants and Mathurin concocting a plan to rob someone.  
Valery left her house, but the defendants and Mathurin stayed 
behind.   
 
Gallett and St. Jean both owned knives.  Gallett's knife 
was larger than a pocket knife.  When opened, the blade would 
"cover the whole hand."  St. Jean's knife was smaller; the 
handle and blade both fit into the palm of a hand when opened.  
Gallett usually carried a knife whenever he left the house.  St. 
Jean always carried a knife on his person. 
 
At approximately 8 P.M., the defendants and Mathurin took a 
bus to a vacant house in Hyde Park.  At about 11 P.M., Mathurin 
4 
 
 
asked Marie Tunis, a resident of an adjacent home, to use her 
telephone.  Mathurin telephoned a pizzeria and placed an order, 
which included pizzas, chicken wings, and soda, to be delivered.  
She asked the pizzeria employee if the delivery driver would 
have change for a one hundred or fifty dollar bill.  Mathurin 
gave St. Jean's cellular telephone (cell phone) number as the 
call-back number and asked the pizzeria employee to send the 
delivery driver to the back door of the address to the vacant 
house.  At 11:30 P.M., Gallett asked a passerby on the street to 
use her cell phone.  The passerby testified at trial that 
Gallett used her cell phone in front of the vacant house.  
Gallett telephoned the same pizzeria. 
 
Soon thereafter, the victim arrived with the order.  
Mathurin met the victim in the driveway of the vacant house and 
escorted him up the rear staircase.  Five minutes later, the 
defendants and Mathurin left the house.  Mathurin was holding a 
pizza box.  St. Jean drove Gallett and Mathurin away in the 
victim's vehicle. 
 
The group abandoned the victim's vehicle in the rear of a 
church parking lot.  The pizzeria sign atop the vehicle had been 
removed and discarded behind the church.  Near or in the 
victim's vehicle, officers recovered a white pizza box and empty 
bleach and rubbing alcohol bottles.  The label on the outside of 
the pizza box listed the delivery address as that of the vacant 
5 
 
 
house and had St. Jean's cell phone number listed as the call-
back number. 
 
After abandoning the victim's vehicle, the group returned 
to Valery's residence.  Upon arriving, the group appeared 
anxious and smelled of bleach.  St. Jean had a cut on his right 
hand and was using a bandana to stop the bleeding.  Gallett had 
blood on his shirt and on the bottom of his sneakers. 
 
After the defendants and Mathurin had left the vacant 
house, Michael Tunis, who had witnessed the group drive away, 
investigated the house with his brother and a friend.  Upon 
entering the home, Tunis discovered blood and chicken wings on 
the floor near the entryway.  Further into the apartment, in a 
room off the kitchen, Tunis discovered the victim lying on his 
back.  The victim had visible puncture wounds and was 
unresponsive.  Tunis left the house and telephoned police. 
 
At approximately 12 A.M., police arrived at the vacant 
house.  Inside the residence, police discovered the victim's 
body along with blood all over the floor; a pizza warmer bag; a 
bloody chicken wing box; chicken wings; a knife handle; a bloody 
and slightly bent knife blade; and blood on the door frame 
leading into the kitchen.  The victim's pants pockets were 
pulled inside out. 
6 
 
 
 
Within two days, a police investigation led to the arrest 
of the defendants and Mathurin.3  At the defendants' trial, 
redacted inculpatory statements from both defendants were 
introduced in evidence by way of audio-video recordings.  In 
addition, a plethora of forensic evidence was introduced that 
implicated the defendants, including fingerprints and 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) found at the vacant house, in the 
victim's car, on the victim, on the pizza boxes, on the 
defendants' clothing, and on money that Mathurin gave to police 
after she was arrested. 
 
At trial, Gallett did not deny his involvement in the 
killing.  Instead, he argued that the evidence of his admissions 
to police coupled with his age -- eighteen at the time of the 
murder -- supported a conviction of murder in the second degree 
rather than murder in the first degree based on deliberate 
premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, or felony-murder.  
St. Jean's position was that, although he went with Gallett and 
Mathurin to the vacant house and broke into it by punching his 
fist through glass on the back door, he did not participate in 
the victim's murder or robbery, nor did he share the intent to 
commit the crimes. 
                     
 
3 Yamiley Mathurin was indicted for murder, but eventually 
pleaded guilty to manslaughter, armed robbery, and breaking and 
entering with the intent to commit a felony. 
7 
 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Gallett.  a.  Miranda warnings.  Two days 
after the murder, Gallett was questioned about the crime.  
During the questioning, Gallett confessed to the killing.  A 
redacted audio-video recording of his interrogation was admitted 
in evidence at trial.  On appeal, Gallett argues that the motion 
judge erred in denying his motion to suppress.  He claims that 
the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and voluntarily 
and knowingly made the inculpatory statements.  Gallett contends 
that he was incapable of voluntarily waiving his Miranda rights 
because of his age -- eighteen at the time of the murder -- 
coupled with his low intelligence quotient (IQ).  He also 
contends that his statements were not made voluntarily because 
the interrogating officers induced his statements by 
misrepresenting evidence and making false assurances.  Finally, 
he contends that the statements should have been suppressed 
because police delayed his arrest to prevent him from exercising 
his right to make a telephone call.  The Commonwealth argues 
that Gallett was not in custody for Miranda purposes during his 
interrogation.  Furthermore, the Commonwealth maintains that 
even if Gallett were subject to a custodial interrogation, he 
was advised of and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and his 
statements were not induced but made knowingly and voluntarily. 
8 
 
 
 
"In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, 'we 
accept the judge's subsidiary findings absent clear error "but 
conduct an independent review of [the] ultimate findings and 
conclusions of law."'"  Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 
429, 431 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Ramos, 470 Mass. 740, 
742 (2015).  The motion judge found the following.  On the 
evening of September 3, 2010, after police had gathered evidence 
about the killing of the victim, three officers of the Boston 
police department were instructed to locate Gallett and Mathurin 
and ask them to accompany the officers voluntarily to the police 
station for questioning.  Dressed in plain clothes, but with 
their badges visible, the officers approached Gallett and 
Mathurin.  Detective Aaron Blocker spoke with Gallett, and the 
two other officers spoke with Mathurin.  At the outset, Blocker 
informed Gallett that he was not under arrest and was free to 
leave.  Blocker asked Gallett to accompany him to the police 
station to speak with homicide detectives.  He told Gallett that 
Gallett did not have to go with him.  Gallett agreed to go to 
the station, but was concerned about Mathurin, who was crying.  
Blocker told Gallett that officers would give her a ride. 
 
Gallett rode with two officers in an unmarked police 
vehicle to the station.  He was not handcuffed at any time 
before or during the interrogation.  He arrived at the station 
9 
 
 
at 8 P.M.  Gallett watched television alone for about one and 
one-half hours before the interrogation began. 
At 9:37 P.M., Detectives Brian Black and Jeremiah Benton 
began a video-recorded interview with Gallett.  Prior to 
beginning the interview, Black read Gallett the Miranda 
warnings.  Black read the warnings one at a time.  Gallett 
listened to the warnings and then read them himself.  After each 
warning, he initialed the warning and informed the officers that 
he understood the warnings. 
At first, Gallett denied having any involvement with the 
killing.  As the interview progressed, Gallett asked Black what 
was happening with his girlfriend, Mathurin.  Black informed 
Gallett that she was being charged with murder, armed robbery, 
and breaking into a house.  Gallett responded, "Let's talk."  
Gallett proceeded to give a detailed account of his and St. 
Jean's involvement in the killing and stated that Mathurin just 
watched.4  The interview lasted one and one-half hours, at the 
end of which Gallett was charged with murder. 
The motion judge concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Gallett was not in custody for Miranda purposes during his 
interview with the officers at the police station, but that even 
                     
 
4 A redacted audio-video recording of the confession was 
admitted in evidence at trial.  The transcript of the 
interrogation was not admitted in evidence. 
10 
 
 
if he had been, there was no threatening or coercive tactics 
used by the officers; Gallett made a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights; and his statements to 
police were voluntary. 
 
b.  Voluntariness.  As a preliminary matter, we need not 
address whether Gallett was in custody at the time he made the 
inculpatory statements because he ultimately received his 
Miranda warnings before he made any inculpatory statements.  
"Because [Gallett] was advised of, and waived, his Miranda 
rights, the issue becomes whether the Commonwealth has proved, 
by a totality of the circumstances, that [Gallett] made a 
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his rights, and 
that his statements were otherwise voluntary."  Commonwealth v. 
LeBeau, 451 Mass. 244, 254–255 (2008).  See Commonwealth v. 
Medeiros, 395 Mass. 336, 343 (1985) (although voluntariness of 
Miranda waiver and voluntariness of statement are distinct 
inquiries, totality of circumstances test under each analysis is 
same).  In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we 
consider factors such as "promises or other inducements, conduct 
of the defendant, the defendant's age, education, intelligence 
and emotional stability, experience with and in the criminal 
justice system, physical and mental condition, the initiator of 
the discussion of a deal or leniency (whether the defendant or 
the police), and the details of the interrogation, including the 
11 
 
 
recitation of Miranda warnings."  Commonwealth v. Mandile, 397 
Mass. 410, 413 (1986).  "A voluntary statement is one that is 
'the product of a "rational intellect" and a "free will," and 
not induced by physical or psychological coercion.'"  
Commonwealth v. Monroe, 472 Mass. 461, 468 (2015), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 207 (2011).  We 
conclude that the motion judge's findings and conclusions are 
supported by the evidence. 
 
i.  Age and IQ.  Gallett contends that his age and 
relatively low IQ suggest that he did not voluntarily waive the 
Miranda warnings and voluntarily make inculpatory statements.  
After reviewing the interrogation video recording and hearing 
testimony from the interrogating officers, the motion judge 
found that Black read the Miranda warnings in a calm and careful 
manner and repeatedly informed Gallett that he could stop 
answering questions at any time.  Furthermore, the motion judge 
found that Gallett appeared calm, was responsive to the 
questions, and displayed well-organized thinking and rational 
decision-making on how to respond.  The motion judge concluded 
that Gallett understood the warnings, wanted to appear 
cooperative, and initially related events that he believed would 
be helpful to him. 
 
Based on the evidence presented at the hearing on the 
motion to suppress and our independent review of the recorded 
12 
 
 
interview, we conclude that the motion judge properly concluded, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Gallett made his statements 
voluntarily after a knowing and intelligent waiver of his 
Miranda rights.  Gallett was informed of his Miranda rights and 
indicated verbally and in writing that he understood the 
warnings.  Although his age -- eighteen at the time of the 
murder -- is a relevant factor to consider, it is not a 
determinative one.  Cf. Monroe, 472 Mass. at 471 (defendant's 
emotional and physical condition, while not determinative, is 
substantial factor).  Furthermore, Gallett was an average 
student in high school taking college preparatory classes.  
While his grades had declined in recent semesters, the motion 
judge attributed that to lack of attendance.  There is no 
indication that the defendant had cognitive limitations that 
would affect his waiver and voluntary statements.  Regardless, 
evidence of cognitive limitations "does not compel a 
determination as matter of law" that the defendant did not 
"knowingly and willingly waive his Miranda rights and make a 
voluntary confession."  Commonwealth v. Daniels, 366 Mass. 601, 
607 (1975). 
 
In addition, there is no indication that Gallett had 
trouble understanding or answering the detectives' questions 
during the interview.  He was not handcuffed, and the detectives 
neither yelled at nor acted aggressively toward him. 
13 
 
 
 
ii.  Misrepresentation, minimization, and assurances.  
Gallett argues that the interrogating officers misrepresented 
evidence that strengthened their case and made false assurances 
that ultimately induced Gallett into making inculpatory 
statements.  We conclude that the officers did not act 
impermissibly. 
 
We have suppressed a defendant's statements in 
circumstances where police use trickery or a ruse in obtaining a 
confession.  Those cases generally have additional circumstances 
-- apart from the ruse itself -- that rendered the confession 
involuntary.  See, e.g., Monroe, 472 Mass. at 469, 472 
(detective's use of minimization and false information, coupled 
with coercive tactics relating to defendant's son, rendered 
confession involuntary); Commonwealth v. Baye, 462 Mass. 246, 
257 (2012) (confession suppressed where police not only 
exaggerated strength of evidence against defendant, but also 
minimized moral and legal gravity of alleged crime; suggested 
that if he did not confess, he would be charged with more 
serious crimes; mischaracterized applicable law surrounding 
charged crime; and finally, after defendant invoked his right to 
counsel, dissuaded defendant from consulting with lawyer); 
Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 433–436 (2004) 
(confession suppressed where, in addition to presenting 
defendant with false evidence suggesting his guilt, police 
14 
 
 
minimized defendant's alleged criminal behavior and implicitly 
promised leniency as well as alcohol counselling if defendant 
confessed).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Cartright, 478 Mass. 273, 288 
(2017); Commonwealth v. Selby, 420 Mass. 656, 664–665 (1995) 
(confession admissible where only improper factor was police use 
of false information in which they pretended to have 
fingerprints from defendant at scene of crime to secure 
confession).  See also Commonwealth v. Feeney, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 
124, 133-135 (2013). 
Here, during the interrogation, officers asked Gallett 
whether video footage from inside the bus that dropped him off 
in front of the vacant house, his public transit card, or his 
cell phone records might reveal his location, movements, and 
telephone calls on the night of the murder.5  Officers also 
questioned him about possible forensic evidence that could be 
found in the victim's stolen vehicle.  The officers' tactics 
were well within permissible parameters and did not rise to the 
level of "intentional misrepresentation[s] that 'may undermine 
"the defendant's ability to make a free choice."'"  Commonwealth 
                     
 
5 For example, an officer asked Gallett:  "[T]here's cameras 
on there, on buses, right? . . .  So when you get off the bus, 
in theory if cameras are hooked up, I can see you getting off 
the bus, right?"  He also stated:  "And then when I pull your 
phone records, I haven't pulled them fully yet, I suspect maybe 
I'm going to see a phone call or two that's pinging off a tower 
right near that house." 
15 
 
 
v. Spray, 467 Mass. 456, 467–468 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Scoggins, 439 Mass. 571, 576 (2003).  Their comments did not 
impermissibly maximize the apparent strength of their case.  Nor 
did their questioning impermissibly suggest that they were in 
possession of incontrovertible evidence against Gallett. 
Likewise, the officer's use of minimization and assurances, 
to the extent they were employed, were not improper.  Gallett 
contends that the interrogating officers minimized the offense 
and made assurances by stating:  "You know, maybe there's some 
reason it happened"; "I sure wouldn't want to be sitting here 
having me thinking that you planned out a murder when maybe all 
you were planning out was to get a free meal"; and "It's always 
better if you have somebody there that can tell you the truth.  
It has to be the truth as to what happened up there, okay?" 
These questions and statements were "within the bounds of 
acceptable interrogation methods."  Cartright, 478 Mass. at 288. 
 
Finally, Gallett suggests that the officers coerced him 
into believing that his confession would help his girlfriend, 
Mathurin.  The officers' questioning was as follows: 
 
Gallett:  "What's happening to my girlfriend?" 
 
Officer:  "What do you think is going to happen to your 
girlfriend?" 
 
 
Gallett:  "Nothing." 
 
Officer:  "Well I'm going to tell you something.  Something 
is going to happen to your girlfriend, okay. . . .  [S]he's 
16 
 
 
been charged with murder and armed robbery and breaking 
into a house.  I'm going to be very honest about that, 
okay?" 
 
 
Gallett:  "Let's talk." 
Gallett proceeded to give a detailed account of the murder and 
stated that Mathurin only watched.  We conclude that while 
Gallett's confession was close temporally to the time he learned 
that Mathurin was being charged with murder, the officers' 
interrogation tactics were not "rife with threats to [Gallett's] 
ability to maintain contact with [Mathurin]."  Cf. Monroe, 472 
Mass. at 469 (police interrogation characterized as 
psychologically coercive where defendant was threatened with 
loss of contact with his child).  Nor did the tactics suggest 
that cooperation with police would result in leniency for 
Mathurin.  Gallett's will was not overborne, and the tactics did 
not rise to the level of psychological coercion.  See 
Commonwealth v. Scott, 430 Mass. 351, 355 (1999) (although 
"[c]oncern for a loved one may, in certain circumstances, render 
a confession involuntary," defendant's concern that his sister 
would face criminal liability for murder not enough to render 
confession involuntary).  Cf. Monroe, supra (detectives 
threatened defendant with loss of contact with his child by 
claiming repeatedly and falsely that if he did not tell them 
what happened, his child could be taken away and raised by 
17 
 
 
strangers).  The statement by the officer about Mathurin was 
accurate and made in answer to a question posed by Gallett. 
Based on the totality of these circumstances, we see no 
reason to disturb the judge's conclusion that the Commonwealth 
established that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and that his statements 
were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
iii.  Telephone call.  Gallett argues that his statements 
should be suppressed because police purposefully delayed his 
arrest to prevent him from making a telephone call.  We 
disagree. 
 
An arrested person has a statutory right to make a 
telephone call.  See G. L. c. 276, § 33A.  Denying an arrested 
person the statutory right to make a telephone call only 
necessitates suppression of evidence when the statute is 
intentionally violated.  See id.; Commonwealth v. Walker, 466 
Mass. 268, 278 (2013) (only intentional violation of defendant's 
right to make telephone call requires suppression of evidence; 
defendant bears burden of establishing intentional violation).  
The right to make a telephone call does not accrue when a 
defendant is brought in for questioning, but when the defendant 
is formally arrested.  Commonwealth v. Hampton, 457 Mass. 152, 
159 (2010).  Gallett was not arrested until his interview 
concluded, at which point he was given an opportunity to make a 
18 
 
 
telephone call.  Police may defer a decision on whether to 
arrest a defendant for nonnefarious purposes.  See id. at 155.  
There was no error. 
2.  St. Jean.  St. Jean makes several arguments on appeal.  
First, he contends that the evidence introduced at trial did not 
support his murder conviction.  Second, he maintains that he was 
prejudiced by the admission of his and Gallett's redacted police 
interrogations.  Third, he argues that the judge erred in 
denying his request for several jury instructions.  Fourth, he 
contends that the judge improperly invoked juror sympathy when 
she related a story about a jury's performance during the 
September 11, 2001, attacks. 
 
a.  Sufficiency of evidence.  St. Jean claims that there 
was insufficient evidence that he acted as either the principal 
or joint venturer in the killing and that his motion for a 
required finding of not guilty should have been allowed.  The 
Commonwealth contends that there was sufficient evidence to 
support St. Jean's conviction under a theory of felony-murder, 
with armed robbery as the predicate felony, and extreme atrocity 
or cruelty.  "We review the denial of a motion for a required 
finding of not guilty to determine whether the evidence, viewed 
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 'was sufficient 
to persuade a rational jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
existence of every element of the crime[s] charged.'"  
19 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Gomes, 475 Mass. 775, 781 (2016), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 
215 (2007) and 460 Mass. 12 (2011).  We do not "examine the 
sufficiency of the evidence separately as to principal and joint 
venture liability."  Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 468 
(2009).  Instead, we ask "whether the evidence is sufficient to 
permit a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant knowingly participated in the commission of 
the crime charged, with the intent required to commit the 
crime."  Id. 
 
To warrant a conviction of felony-murder as a joint 
venturer with armed robbery as the predicate felony, the 
Commonwealth had to prove that St. Jean was a joint venturer in 
an armed robbery and that the victim's death occurred in the 
commission or attempted commission of that armed robbery.  
Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 33 (2017).  To have found 
St. Jean guilty of the underlying felony of armed robbery, proof 
was required that St. Jean was part of a venture in which at 
least one of the coventurers was armed with a dangerous weapon, 
either applied violence to the victim's body or put the victim 
in fear, and took the victim's property with the intent to steal 
it.  Id.  Absent proof that St. Jean himself was armed, proof 
that he knew his coventurer to be armed suffices to satisfy the 
standard.  Id. 
20 
 
 
 
The evidence was more than sufficient to permit a 
reasonable jury to find that the defendant committed the murder 
under a theory of felony-murder.  Valery testified that she 
overheard the defendants and Mathurin planning to rob someone.  
Valery stated that St. Jean said the group was "looking for a 
vic."  The defendants and Mathurin ordered pizza to be delivered 
to a vacant house.  Mathurin asked if the delivery driver could 
change a one hundred or fifty dollar bill.  St. Jean always 
carried a knife on his person, and Gallett carried his knife 
when he left the house.  The jury reasonably could infer that 
St. Jean was armed with a knife; thus, the Commonwealth was not 
required to prove that St. Jean knew that Gallett was armed. 
The victim was lured into the vacant house and stabbed 
sixteen times.  There was evidence of St. Jean's bloody 
footprints inside the house, and St. Jean had the victim's blood 
on his jeans.  Furthermore, Tunis testified that he saw Mathurin 
walk the victim to the rear door of the house and then witnessed 
the defendants and Mathurin leave together.  The jury could 
reasonably infer that St. Jean was inside the house.  With St. 
Jean driving the victim's vehicle, the defendants and Mathurin 
then fled the scene.  The defendants and Mathurin abandoned the 
vehicle at the rear of a church parking lot.  An empty pizza box 
was discovered near the vehicle.  The pizzeria sign that had 
been atop the vehicle was found discarded behind the church.  
21 
 
 
Empty bottles of bleach and rubbing alcohol were discovered near 
or in the victim's vehicle.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Souza, 428 
Mass. 478, 490 (1998) (one who manifests indifference whether 
owner recovers possession may be found to intend to deprive 
owner of it permanently).  Valery testified that the defendants 
and Mathurin were nervous and smelled of bleach when she saw 
them later that night.  Upon discovering the victim's body, 
police noticed that the victim's pockets were turned inside out.  
Reasonable inferences from the evidence showed that St. Jean was 
armed with a knife, either applied violence to the victim's body 
or put the victim in fear, and took the victim's property -– the 
pizza, money, and vehicle -- with the intent to steal it. 
 
Likewise, the evidence was sufficient to support a 
conviction under a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  To 
warrant a conviction under this theory, the Commonwealth was 
required to prove that St. Jean knowingly participated in the 
killing, that he intended to cause death or grievous bodily harm 
or engaged in an act a reasonable person would know created a 
plain and strong likelihood of death, and that the killing was 
committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty.  Rakes, 478 Mass. at 
35.  "The evidence suffices to warrant a finding of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty if it establishes one or more of the so-
22 
 
 
called Cunneen factors."6  Id.  See Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 
Mass. 216, 227 (1983). 
 
Fair inferences from the evidence showed that St. Jean was 
armed with a knife, planned to rob someone, lured the victim 
into the vacant house, and attacked the victim.  The victim was 
stabbed sixteen times.  St. Jean contends that there is no 
evidence that he actually stabbed the victim.  To the contrary, 
St. Jean always carried a knife and had the victim's blood on 
his jeans and his sneakers.  Furthermore, he had multiple cuts 
on his right hand.  Although St. Jean's theory at trial was that 
he cut his hand by punching a window at the vacant house, St. 
Jean told doctors at a subsequent emergency room visit that he 
had cut his hand with a pocketknife; told officers during his 
interrogation that he was cut with a knife during a fight; and 
told his cousin that the injuries to his hands were knife 
wounds.  Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
the evidence supports the conviction of murder under a theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty as well. 
                     
 
6 The Cunneen factors are (1) whether the defendant was 
indifferent to or took pleasure in the victim's suffering; (2) 
the consciousness and degree of suffering of the victim; (3) the 
extent of the victim's injuries; (4) the number of blows 
inflicted on the victim; (5) the manner and force with which the 
blows were delivered; (6) the nature of the weapon used; and (7) 
the disproportion between the means used to cause death and 
those employed.  Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 35 n.8 
(2017).  See Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 (1983). 
23 
 
 
 
b.  Admission of statements.  Gallett did not testify, but 
a redacted audio-video recording of his statements was played 
for the jury.  A redacted transcript of his interrogation was 
given to the jury, but only for reference while they watched the 
recording.  The transcript was collected at the end of the 
recording and not admitted in evidence.  St. Jean argues that 
the admission of the redacted audio-video recording of Gallett's 
interrogation violated his constitutional rights under Bruton v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968), to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him.  Specifically, St. Jean 
claims that gaps in the audio-video recording and blank spaces 
in the transcript directly inculpated St. Jean by inviting the 
jury to speculate on the identity of the unnamed accomplice.  
The Commonwealth maintains that the admission of Gallett's 
redacted statements did not create a Bruton issue because it did 
not inculpate St. Jean in the crime.  Because St. Jean objected 
to the admission of his statements at trial, this court will 
review for error and, if error, whether that error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Commonwealth v. Bacigalupo, 455 
Mass. 485, 495-496 (2009). 
 
"Introduction of a nontestifying codefendant's 
extrajudicial statement that is 'powerfully incriminating' as to 
another codefendant violates a defendant's right to confront the 
witnesses against him under the Sixth Amendment to the United 
24 
 
 
States Constitution."  Commonwealth v. Santos, 463 Mass. 273, 
292 (2012), quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-136.  Such 
"powerfully incriminating" statements include not only direct 
mention of a named codefendant, but also substitutions such as 
use of the word "deleted" or some other symbol in place of the 
codefendant's name, where the jury will realize that the 
statement obviously refers to and implicates a specific 
codefendant.  See Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 194–197 
(1998); Bacigalupo, 455 Mass. at 493-495 (introduction of 
nontestifying codefendant's statement that his "friend" was 
present at shooting was sufficiently direct reference to 
defendant to violate his right to confrontation, notwithstanding 
limiting instruction).  A codefendant's statement that becomes 
incriminating "'only when linked with evidence introduced later 
at trial' . . . generally does not offend the Sixth Amendment, 
so long as an adequate limiting instruction is given" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Blake, 428 Mass. 57, 60 (1998). 
 
Here, St. Jean asks us to read between the lines and hold 
that the gaps in the redacted transcript and audio-video 
recording directly inculpated him.  We conclude that there was 
no Bruton violation because Gallett's redacted statements did 
not name expressly, implicate, or obviously refer to St. Jean so 
as to be "facially" incriminating.  See Gray, 523 U.S. at 196–
197. 
25 
 
 
 
There were three people involved with the killing of the 
victim -- Gallett, St. Jean, and Mathurin.  Gallett's statements 
made no express reference to St. Jean as his coventurer, and the 
blank spaces in the transcript that St. Jean contends were 
references to St. Jean easily could have been references to 
Mathurin.  See Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 462 Mass. 827, 843 
(2012).  Cf. Bacigalupo, 455 Mass. at 493 (only two people were 
on trial for shooting that one codefendant said was committed by 
himself and "friend").  It would not have been obvious to the 
jury that the blank space was specifically referring to St. 
Jean.  Cf. id.  Moreover, even if we read in specific pronouns 
to the transcript, a single pronoun, if not referencing a 
specific individual, would not raise a Bruton issue in these 
circumstances.  See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 
292, 294, 298 (1999) (admission of nontestifying codefendant's 
bare statement that "[w]e stabbed" victim did not violate Bruton 
by suggesting involvement of one or more other perpetrators). 
 
Although the jury were given a copy of the redacted 
transcript so that they could follow along with the audio-video 
recording, the transcripts were collected after the recording 
was shown and not admitted in evidence.  The judge instructed 
the jury that the transcripts were not evidence.  Even where 
pronouns such as "us" and "we" were redacted, the blank spaces 
that remained were in the transcripts only.  These facts 
26 
 
 
significantly detract from St. Jean's theory that the jury were 
able to consider the audio-video recording and the transcript 
together to form the opinion that the blank spaces in the 
transcript referred to St. Jean. 
 
Where one defendant gives an account of his and a 
coventurer's commission of a crime, "it would be a rare case 
where the process of redaction did not leave behind some 
peculiar language and awkward transitions."  Commonwealth v. 
Rivera, 464 Mass. 56, 70, cert. denied, 570 U.S. 907 (2013).  
"The law is clear, however, that inferential incrimination can 
be properly cured by a limiting instruction . . . ."  Id.  The 
judge in this case gave proper limiting instructions on multiple 
occasions.  Prior to the showing of the redacted audio-video 
recording, the judge instructed that "[c]ertain portions of the 
statements ha[d] been redacted based on rules of evidence and 
other applicable laws," and that the jury were "not [to] 
speculate about the gaps or the reasons for the gaps" and not to 
"hold the gaps against any party."  Despite St. Jean's 
contention that the "jurors could not be expected, even in the 
face of a limiting instruction, to ignore the . . . gaps in the 
statements," the jury are presumed to understand and follow 
limiting instructions.  See Commonwealth v. Martinez, 476 Mass. 
186, 194 (2017).  The judge's limiting instructions therefore 
27 
 
 
were sufficient to obviate St. Jean's concern over the gaps.  
See Blake, 428 Mass. at 59-63. 
 
Gallett's redacted statements incriminate St. Jean only to 
the extent that the jury accepted the other evidence against St. 
Jean that places him at the scene of the crime.  "This will be 
the case in virtually any joint trial in which [a codefendant's] 
statement is admitted."  Rivera, 464 Mass. at 71.  "The 
admission of such a statement -- which only implicates the 
codefendant circumstantially when combined with other evidence 
in the case -- does not offend Bruton or its progeny."  Id.  
There was no error. 
 
Furthermore, St. Jean argues that the vast scope of the 
redactions in both his and Gallett's statements created the 
potential for prejudice by inviting the jury to speculate on the 
missing portions.  We disagree.  After a thorough review of the 
redacted evidence from both Gallett and St. Jean, we conclude 
that there was no error.  In our view, the redactions from the 
audio-video recordings and transcripts would not lead to 
confusion or undue speculation.  In addition, St. Jean relied on 
his and Gallett's statements as a critical part of his defense.  
He maintained that he was at the scene of the crime, but that he 
did not participate in the victim's murder or robbery or share 
the intent to commit the crimes.  In light of Gallett's 
confession, St. Jean was able to advance his defense that it was 
28 
 
 
Gallett who robbed and killed the victim while St. Jean was 
merely present at the time of the murder.  Gallett's redacted 
confession and St. Jean's own statements supported St. Jean's 
defense at trial. 
 
St. Jean further benefited from redactions in his own 
statements that would have contradicted his theory on defense.  
For example, in his interrogation St. Jean admitted that he took 
the victim's wallet and car keys.  This statement was redacted 
from the evidence submitted at trial.  The statement, if 
admitted, would have supported the Commonwealth's theory of 
felony-murder with armed robbery as the predicate.  Thus, while 
there were certain gaps in his interrogation, St. Jean was not 
hindered by them. 
 
St. Jean also argues that there were two instances where 
the interrogating officers asked Gallett questions, but the 
entirety of his response was redacted.  St. Jean claims that the 
officers' questions are not admissible evidence.  Although 
questions asked of a witness are not evidence, the officers' two 
questions were not accusatory and the redactions that followed 
were inconsequential.7  Contrast Commonwealth v. Mejia, 463 Mass. 
243, 251 (2012); Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 799 
(2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 990 (2011).  There was no error. 
                     
 
7 The officers asked:  "Where were you?" and "What was 
supposed to happen?" 
29 
 
 
 
c.  Jury instructions.  St. Jean argues that the judge 
erred in declining to give two jury instructions:  a 
supplemental instruction for armed robbery, and an instruction 
on the lesser included offense of use of a motor vehicle without 
authority.  Because the defendants objected, we review the 
denial of the requested jury instructions for prejudicial error.  
See Commonwealth v. Henderson, 434 Mass. 155, 158 (2001). 
 
i.  Supplemental instruction.  St. Jean argues that the 
judge erred in denying his request for a supplemental jury 
instruction on armed robbery.  He requested that the judge 
instruct the jury that they "must find that the required intent 
to steal coincided with the use of force" to find him guilty of 
armed robbery and felony-murder.  The judge declined to give the 
instruction, stating:  "I think it's inappropriate based on the 
state of [the] evidence [of this case]." 
 
The judge's instructions on felony-murder with armed 
robbery as the predicate offense, as a whole, sufficiently 
explained to the jury that the Commonwealth was required to 
prove the defendant harbored an intent to steal at the same time 
he used force.  See Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 154 
(2014) (where jury charge, as whole, adequately covers issue, 
judge is not required to grant particular instruction).  
Specifically, the judge instructed the jury that "[t]he actual 
force and violence must be the cause of the defendant obtaining 
30 
 
 
possession of the property," and that "the Commonwealth must 
prove that the defendant took and carried away the property 
against the alleged victim's will with the intent to deprive the 
alleged victim of his possessions permanently."  These 
instructions -- located mere lines apart in the transcript -- 
necessitate that the "force and violence" coincided with the 
"intent to deprive" the victim of his belongings.  Furthermore, 
the judge's instruction on felony-murder also conveyed to the 
jury that the Commonwealth must prove "the killing occurred in 
connection with the felony, and at substantially the same time 
and place."  There was no error. 
 
ii.  Lesser included offense.  St. Jean further argues that 
the judge erred in declining to instruct the jury on use of a 
motor vehicle without authority as a lesser included offense of 
armed robbery.8  The Commonwealth argues that use of a motor 
vehicle without authority is not a lesser included offense of 
armed robbery in this case because the indictment listed three 
other stolen items9 and that the evidence does not provide a 
rational basis for acquitting the defendant of armed robbery in 
favor of use of a motor vehicle without authority.  The judge 
                     
 
8 In Commonwealth v. Souza, 428 Mass. 478, 494 (1998), we 
held that, in certain circumstances, use of a motor vehicle 
without authority is a lesser included offense of armed robbery. 
 
 
9 The indictment listed the following items in the 
conjunctive:  "$143.00 U.S. Currency, car, car keys, and food." 
31 
 
 
declined to give the instruction because she thought it was 
"highly inappropriate when [there were] four alternative items 
that are alleged to have been stolen" and that the instruction 
did not fit with "the facts and circumstances of this case." 
 
"[W]hen the evidence permits a finding of a lesser included 
offense, a judge must, upon request, instruct the jury on the 
possibility of conviction of the lesser crime."  Commonwealth v. 
Roberts, 407 Mass. 731, 737 (1990), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Hobbs, 385 Mass. 863, 871 (1982).  Where the evidence provides, 
however, no "rational basis for acquitting the defendant of the 
crime charged and convicting him of the lesser included 
offense," the lesser included instruction is not necessary 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Gould, 413 Mass. 707, 715 
(1992).  "Even when evidence is introduced that would justify 
conviction for a lesser included offense, the defendant is not 
entitled to an instruction thereupon unless the proof on the 
elements differentiating the two crimes is sufficiently in 
dispute so that the jury may consistently find the defendant 
innocent of the greater and guilty of the lesser included 
offense" (quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Egerton, 396 Mass. 499, 504 (1986).  "[A] judge is not required 
to instruct on a hypothesis that is not supported by the 
evidence" (citation omitted).  Gould, supra. 
32 
 
 
 
Here, the evidence did not warrant a finding of the lesser 
included offense of use of a motor vehicle without authority.  
The elements differentiating the two crimes were not 
sufficiently in dispute so that the jury could consistently find 
the defendant innocent of the greater and guilty of the lesser 
included offense.  See Egerton, 413 Mass. at 715.  Specifically, 
it was not sufficiently in dispute that the defendant intended 
to deprive the victim of his vehicle permanently.  The evidence 
showed that the defendant drove the vehicle to the back of a 
church parking lot, removed the pizzeria sign identifying it as 
a pizza delivery vehicle, emptied it out, cleaned it with bleach 
and rubbing alcohol, and left it there with a door and two 
windows open.  Cf. Souza, 428 Mass. at 490.  Moreover, as the 
judge noted, the indictment alleged St. Jean took more than just 
the car.  There was evidence that the victim's pockets were 
turned inside out, cash was taken, and the group was witnessed 
leaving the vacant house with a pizza box.  It would have been 
inappropriate to give the lesser included instruction where the 
evidence and circumstances of the case did not support it. 
 
d.  Juror sympathy.  On the first day of trial, 
September 11, 2013, the judge began by addressing the jury to 
acknowledge the anniversary of September 11, 2001.  The judge 
relayed a story from her past experience on the bench.  In sum, 
the judge presided over a trial on September 11, 2001, and was 
33 
 
 
forced to evacuate the court house.  She told the jury she was 
moved that the jurors "all voted unanimously to come back the 
very next day."  She told the current jury, "I just wanted to 
share that story with you because I'm sure you'll appreciate 
you're part of the government here, and the government did go on 
and has continued to go on and you are the government here.  So 
I wanted to share that story with you and hope you further 
appreciate your vital role in our justice system here in the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the United States of America."  
On appeal, St. Jean argues that the judge improperly invoked 
juror sympathy by relaying her story. 
 
The judge's remarks did not prejudice the defendant.  We 
are mindful that the "effect on the jury of whatever a judge 
says or does may be significant."  Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 
380 Mass. 840, 846 (1980).  Here, however, the judge's remarks 
were made to emphasize the importance of jury duty.  Her 
reference that the jury were part of the government was cursory 
and nonprejudicial.  Moreover, "because the judge's remarks were 
neither intemperate nor critical of the attorneys, there was no 
danger that the judge exhibited to the jury a bias against the 
defendant."  See Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 392 
(1995).  There was no error. 
 
3.  Gallett and St. Jean.  Both defendants raise several 
issues where our analysis coincides.  First, the defendants 
34 
 
 
argue that the judge impermissibly limited the cross-examination 
of two witnesses -- the medical examiner and an interrogating 
officer.  Second, the defendants claim that the judge erred in 
denying their request to give a humane practice instruction to 
the jury. 
a.  Cross-examination.  At trial, St. Jean attempted to 
cross-examine the Commonwealth's medical examiner on wounds on 
St. Jean's right hand.  Detective Benton testified that St. Jean 
had cuts on "the meaty side on the back of [his] right hand," "a 
laceration type injury on the heel near his wrist," and "on the 
knuckle."  Defense counsel asked the medical examiner, "If a 
person were wielding a knife and injured themselves on the knife 
that they were wielding, you would expect to see injuries to the 
interior of their palm; is that fair to say?"  The Commonwealth 
objected, and the judge sustained the objection.  At sidebar, 
defense counsel argued that he should be allowed to question the 
medical examiner about any defensive or offensive injuries he 
would expect to see in the circumstances raised in his question.  
The judge sustained the objection, concluding that she did not 
"think this witness [was] qualified to talk about the possible 
wounds that might be inflicted on knife wielders." 
 
Similarly, Gallett attempted to cross-examine Benton about 
Gallett's reaction to hearing about Mathurin's arrest during his 
interrogation.  The Commonwealth objected, and the judge 
35 
 
 
sustained the objection.  At sidebar, the judge emphasized that 
the issue of Gallett's change in behavior already had been 
thoroughly vetted at the motion to suppress stage. 
 
On appeal, the defendants argue that the judge violated 
their right to confrontation by limiting the cross-examination 
of the medical examiner and Benton.  The Commonwealth contends 
that the judge did not abuse her broad discretion by limiting 
either testimony. 
 
Both the Federal and State Constitutions "guarantee a 
criminal defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him 
through cross-examination."  Commonwealth v. Miles, 420 Mass. 
67, 71 (1995).  The right is "not absolute," however, and "the 
scope of cross-examination rests largely in the sound discretion 
of the trial judge."  Id.  In determining whether a limitation 
on cross-examination was permissible, "we weigh the materiality 
of the witness's direct testimony and the degree of the 
restriction on cross-examination."  Id. at 72.  We will not 
overturn the judge's determination unless the defendant can 
"demonstrate[] that the judge abused [her] discretion and that 
the defendant was prejudiced thereby."  Id. 
 
In St. Jean's case, the judge should have permitted St. 
Jean to cross-examine the medical examiner about theoretical 
wounds on St. Jean's hand.  The medical examiner testified that 
his duty was to perform postmortem examinations of victims' 
36 
 
 
bodies.  His duties included examinations of individuals who had 
sustained stab wounds.  Given the medical examiner's experience, 
it would have been reasonable for the medical examiner to opine 
on potential stab wounds on St. Jean's hands.  "A medical expert 
may testify, in response to a hypothetical question, that the 
type of injury he has observed is consistent with the 
Commonwealth's theory of how the wound was inflicted, so long as 
that theory is based on other evidence already introduced."  
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421, 438 (1974).  See 
Commonwealth v. Burke, 339 Mass. 521, 530 (1959). 
St. Jean is unable, however, to demonstrate that he was 
prejudiced by the judge's ruling.  First, the judge did not 
completely bar St. Jean from cross-examining the medical 
examiner about knife wounds.  St. Jean questioned the expert on 
the position of the attacker based on the victim's wounds, the 
direction of each stab wound, and the blood loss that would have 
resulted from such wounds.  Second, the judge ruled, over the 
Commonwealth's objection, that she would allow St. Jean to 
present expert testimony regarding the cut to his hand if she 
deemed it relevant after the Commonwealth rested.  St. Jean 
never sought to call such a witness.  Third, St. Jean was 
permitted to present other evidence to show he did not wield the 
knife, such as his right handedness, the lack of his blood on 
the knife's handle, and an explanation of the presence of his 
37 
 
 
blood in other places in the house by suggesting he injured his 
knuckle by punching a back door window.  St. Jean was not 
prejudiced. 
In Gallett's case, the judge did not abuse her discretion 
in limiting the cross-examination of Benton regarding the 
voluntariness of Gallett's confession.  As the judge noted, the 
issue previously was vetted by the motion judge.  Gallett 
actively took part in the redactions of his interrogation.  The 
jury viewed a portion of Gallett's police interrogation and 
followed along with a redacted transcript.  The part of the 
recording that showed Gallett's reaction to hearing about 
Mathurin and the corresponding lines in the transcript had been 
redacted.  As discussed in more detail infra, any reference to 
Mathurin was redacted from the recording and transcript because, 
at the time the redactions were litigated, Mathurin was still a 
codefendant.  It was not logical to allow Gallett to cross-
examine Benton on evidence that previously had been redacted 
from the jury's viewing.  The jury would not have had any 
context to Gallett's line of questioning.  Moreover, the judge 
did not further restrict the entirety of Gallett's cross-
examination of Benton.  Gallett was able to question Benton 
about Gallett's cooperation with the officer's investigation, 
which was consistent with his defense at trial that he was 
young, cooperative, and remorseful and therefore should be 
38 
 
 
convicted of murder in the second degree.  It also would have 
been permissible for Gallett to question Benton about Gallett's 
demeanor and temperament during the interrogation. 
 
Gallett's reliance on Commonwealth v. Adams, 416 Mass. 55, 
60–61 (1993), is misplaced.  In Adams, we held that, although 
the judge instructed the jury regarding the need to determine 
the voluntariness of the defendant's inculpatory statements, it 
was error to exclude testimony from the defendant's mother and a 
forensic psychiatrist that tended to show that the defendant had 
been coerced into a confession by the presence of his mother.  
Id.  As we examined in a later case, the defendant's mental 
health in Adams was a live issue at trial.  See Commonwealth v. 
Weaver, 474 Mass. 787, 812–813 (2016), aff'd, 137 S. Ct. 1899 
(2017).  Here, "while we regularly admit expert testimony 
regarding the voluntariness of a statement where the defendant 
suffers from a mental impairment or mental health issue, there 
is no evidence that [Gallett] had cognitive limitations or 
suffers from a mental illness that would affect his capacity to 
make a voluntary statement."  Id.  Therefore, there was no 
prejudicial error in limiting the cross-examination of Benton. 
 
b.  Humane practice instruction.  The defendants were 
interrogated separately in the immediate aftermath of the 
killing.  Both defendants made statements that implicated 
themselves in the crime.  Prior to trial, they both filed 
39 
 
 
motions to suppress their statements, which were denied.  During 
the motion in limine stage, the defendants participated in 
redacting the recordings and transcripts of their 
interrogations. 
 
At trial, the defendants requested a humane practice jury 
instruction.  The judge found that the defendants chose not to 
make the voluntariness of their statements a live issue at 
trial, and thus, the judge declined to give a humane practice 
instruction.  Gallett's counsel argued that he attempted to 
cross-examine Benton about Gallett's reaction to hearing that 
Mathurin was being charged with murder.  For evidentiary 
reasons, the judge found that Gallett was "clearly . . . 
prohibited from introducing any evidence about . . . Gallett's 
alleged reaction when . . . Mathurin's name was mentioned" and 
that Gallett "adduced no admissible evidence relative to 
voluntariness."  The judge continued by stating that the line of 
questioning to Benton was not foreclosed because counsel could 
have asked him "about [Gallett's] behavior."  She stated that 
Gallett's counsel "elected not to pursue questions which would 
have been permissible."  Most notably, the judge concluded that 
even if Gallett's counsel could argue that Gallett's demeanor 
did change in order to put into question the voluntariness of 
his statements, 
40 
 
 
"[a]ny statements that he made, supposedly when he was 
thinking about . . . Mathurin, . . . [had] nothing to do 
with the statements that were actually admitted in this 
trial.  The ones that were admitted were the ones we saw 
[in the audio-video recording] and nothing that I saw [in] 
that [recording] would in any way raise the issue of 
voluntariness." 
 
 
St. Jean's counsel took a different approach.  He stated 
that he "didn't raise [voluntariness] as an issue in the trial 
. . . [because he] believe[d] that the video [of St. Jean's 
interrogation] spoke for itself, and [he] didn't need to ask 
more questions about it." 
 
On appeal, the defendants argue that it was reversible 
error for the judge to decline to give a humane practice 
instruction.  We disagree. 
 
We begin with a brief historical account of the origins of 
the humane practice instruction.  Under the early English common 
law, confessions were admissible at trial without any 
restrictions.  Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 
34 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 14–18 (1949).  Even incriminating statements 
that were obtained by torture were not excluded.  Id. at 18.  
For the past 235 years, however, the common-law rule has been 
that a coerced or involuntary confession may not be admitted in 
evidence against a defendant at a criminal trial.  2 W.R. 
LaFave, J.H. Israel, N.J. King, & O.S. Kerr, Criminal Procedure 
§ 6.2(a) (4th ed. 2018) (LaFave).  This rule appears to have 
been first stated in 1783 in the case of The King v. 
41 
 
 
Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B. 1783).  The Warickshall 
court stated: 
"A free and voluntary confession is deserving of the 
highest credit, because it is presumed to flow from the 
strongest sense of guilt, and therefore it is admitted as 
proof of the crime to which it refers; but a confession 
forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the 
torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape when it 
is to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no 
credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is 
rejected." 
 
Id. at 235.  See LaFave, supra.  Undoubtedly, the birth of the 
English common law regarding confessions came about because the 
use of physical force was causing defendants to confess to 
crimes they did not commit.  In 1850, this court held for the 
first time that under the common law, "[c]onfessions, to be 
admissible, must be free and voluntary.  They are not considered 
voluntary, when obtained by any direct or implied promises of 
favor or benefit, to be gained thereby."  Commonwealth v. 
Taylor, 5 Cush. 605, 610 (1850).  Then, in 1854, we stated:  "To 
exclude [a] confession, there must appear to have been held out 
some fear of personal injury, or hope of personal benefit, of a 
temporal nature."  Commonwealth v. Morey, 1 Gray 461, 463 
(1854).  In Morey, we expressed our concern about the use of a 
defendant's confession as evidence:  a defendant "may be 
induced, by the pressure of hope or fear, to admit facts 
unfavorable to him, without regard to their truth, in order to 
obtain the promised relief, or avoid the threatened danger, and 
42 
 
 
therefore admissions so obtained have no just and legitimate 
tendency to prove the facts admitted."  Id. at 462–463. 
 
The term "humane practice" first appeared in 1885 in 
Commonwealth v. Preece, 140 Mass. 276, 277 (1885).  In Preece, 
we stated that if a judge determines that a confession is 
admissible at trial, "the humane practice in this Commonwealth 
is for the judge . . . to instruct the jury that they may 
consider all the evidence, and that they should exclude the 
confession, if, upon the whole evidence in the case, they are 
satisfied that it was not the voluntary act of the defendant."  
Id. 
 
Over time, the law in the Commonwealth developed into its 
current state.10  Nearly one hundred years after Preece, in 
Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 150, cert. denied, 457 
U.S. 1137 (1982), we extended the humane practice rule to apply 
not only to confessions, but to all incriminating statements 
                     
 
10 We note that prior to its decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States Supreme Court evaluated 
the admissibility of a suspect's confession under a 
voluntariness test.  See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 
428, 432-433 (2000).  "The roots of this test developed in the 
common law, as the courts of England and then the United States 
recognized that coerced confessions are inherently 
untrustworthy."  Id. at 433.  "Over time, [the Federal cases] 
recognized two constitutional bases for the requirement that a 
confession be voluntary to be admitted into evidence:  the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination and the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."  Id. 
43 
 
 
made by the defendant.  Now, the settled law in the Commonwealth 
is that "if the voluntariness of the defendant's statements 
remains a live issue at trial, the judge must submit the issue 
of voluntariness to the jury."  Commonwealth v. Sunahara, 455 
Mass. 832, 834 (2010).  "[T]he judge must instruct the jury that 
the Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the statement was voluntary and that the jurors must 
disregard the statement unless the Commonwealth has met its 
burden."  Id. at 835, quoting Tavares, supra at 152.  To be 
considered a live issue, "substantial evidence of 
involuntariness [must be] produced."  Commonwealth v. Kirwan, 
448 Mass. 304, 318 (2007).  If voluntariness is not a live issue 
at trial, the judge need not submit the question to the jury.  
Id.  However, the jury may still consider the voluntariness of a 
statement in evaluating whether to credit it.  This goes to the 
jury function of evaluating credibility, not to any role as a 
gatekeeper of the admissibility of evidence. 
 
Here, because the judge refused to give a humane practice 
instruction, the only question is whether the voluntariness of 
the defendants' statements was a live issue at trial to warrant 
the instruction; put another way, the question is whether 
"substantial evidence" of involuntariness was produced to 
warrant a humane practice instruction.  See Kirwan, 448 Mass. at 
318.  We conclude that the issue of voluntariness was 
44 
 
 
insufficiently raised to require the judge to give a humane 
practice instruction.  See Commonwealth v. Nieves, 429 Mass. 
763, 769 (1999). 
 
In Gallett's case, the instruction was not warranted for 
predominantly two reasons.  First, the focus of Gallett's 
defense at trial was that, because of his age, intellect, and 
cooperation with police, he should be convicted of murder in the 
second degree.  In fact, the focus of Gallett's closing argument 
was on how his own inculpatory statements warranted a conviction 
of murder in the second degree.  After discussing Gallett's age 
and the evidence that he was forthcoming with police, Gallett's 
counsel stated, "I suggest to you [Gallett's involvement] 
amounts to murder.  I suggest to you that it doesn't amount to 
first degree murder."  For the jury to have accepted that the 
defendant should be convicted of murder in the second degree, 
they were required to credit his confession.  A humane practice 
instruction would have contradicted Gallett's theory of defense.  
See Nieves, 429 Mass. at 769.  Voluntariness is not a live issue 
at trial where "[t]he defense did not focus on involuntariness."  
Id. 
 
Second, although Gallett attempted to present evidence 
regarding the voluntariness of his statements, he did not 
attempt to present admissible evidence.  As the judge noted, the 
jury were not privy to the portion of his interrogation 
45 
 
 
recording that showed his reaction to the news that Mathurin was 
being charged with murder.  That part of the recording was 
redacted before trial.11 
Even if the judge should have allowed Gallett to cross-
examine Benton about Gallett's reaction to hearing the news 
about Mathurin, Gallett cannot demonstrate prejudice.  Our 
review of the transcript suggests that references to Mathurin in 
the audio-video recording were redacted prior to the start of 
trial -- at a time that Mathurin was still a codefendant -- to 
avoid Bruton challenges.  If the agreed-upon redactions in the 
recording were reexamined prior to the jury seeing it -- after 
Mathurin already had accepted a plea offer -- the portion of the 
recording with references to Mathurin might have been 
admissible.  At that time, the issue whether substantial 
evidence was produced to question the voluntariness of Gallett's 
statements would have been a closer one.  See Kirwan, 448 Mass. 
at. 318.  Nevertheless, the judge did not completely foreclose 
questioning Benton about Gallett's demeanor, temperament, or 
behavior during the interrogation.  The judge only foreclosed 
                     
 
11 As stated, at trial, the defendants' video-recorded 
interviews were admitted in redacted form and played for the 
jury.  Redacted transcripts were also given to the jury during 
trial, but marked for identification only.  The redactions were 
made prior to trial and in accordance with a ruling by the 
motion judge denying Gallett's motion for relief from 
prejudicial joinder. 
46 
 
 
reference to Mathurin.  The jury were permitted to consider the 
voluntariness of Gallett's statements in their traditional role 
as fact finders.  The defendant cannot show prejudice. 
 
Nor did St. Jean produce sufficient evidence to warrant a 
humane practice instruction.  During the charge conference, St. 
Jean's counsel admitted that he "didn't raise [voluntariness] as 
an issue in the trial . . . [because he] believe[d] that the 
video spoke for itself, and [he] didn't need to ask more 
questions about it."  Moreover, St. Jean's theory of defense was 
that although he went with Gallett and Mathurin to the vacant 
house, and broke into the house by punching his fist through 
glass on the back door, he did not participate in the victim's 
murder or robbery, nor did he share the intent to commit the 
crimes.  This theory aligned with what he told the officers 
during his interrogation.  St. Jean did not require a humane 
practice instruction where his argument to the jury was that his 
interrogation statements were evidence that he was not culpable 
for the murder.  See Nieves, 429 Mass. at 769. 
 
Conclusion.  For these reasons, we affirm the defendants' 
convictions.  Furthermore, we have reviewed the record in its 
entirety and see no basis to grant extraordinary relief under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.