Case Title: Michael Yauger v. Skiing Enterprises, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1994AP002683

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1996-12-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the 
official reports. 
 
 
No. 94-2683 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :               
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
MICHAEL YAUGER and BRENDA YAUGER, 
 
  
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
SKIING ENTERPRISES, INC., d/b/a HIDDEN VALLEY 
SKI AREA, a Wisconsin corporation and 
INVESTORS INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, a 
foreign corporation, 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 19, 1996 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed and 
remanded. 
 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.  Michael and Brenda Yauger (the 
Yaugers), seek review of a court of appeals’ decision holding 
that a liability waiver signed by Michael Yauger effectively 
relieved Skiing Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a/ Hidden Valley (Hidden 
Valley) of liability for its alleged negligence in the death of 
the Yauger’s then eleven-year-old daughter, Tara.  Hidden Valley 
argues that the exculpatory clause unambiguously relieves them 
from liability for the type of accident which gave rise to this 
litigation.  The Yaugers argue that the ambiguity in the language 
of the exculpatory contract renders it unenforceable, and 
therefore it does not protect Hidden Valley from a negligence 
 
 
No. 94-2683 
 
2
claim.  We conclude that the exculpatory contract signed by 
Michael Yauger is void as against public policy for two reasons: 
(1) it failed to clearly, unambiguously, and unmistakably explain 
to him that he was accepting the risk of Hidden Valley’s 
negligence; (2) the form looked at in its entirety failed to 
alert the signer to the nature and significance of the document 
being signed.  Accordingly, we reverse and remand. 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  On October 8, 1992, 
Michael Yauger purchased a 1992-93 season family ski pass at 
Hidden Valley’s ski shop.  The application form asked for the 
name, age, and relationship of his family members.  He filled in 
the names of his daughters, eight-year-old Felicia, and ten-year-
old Tara, and his wife, Brenda Yauger.  Immediately following the 
space provided for this information was the clause in question 
(see Appendix for reproduced application form).  It provided: 
In support of this application for membership, I 
agree that: 
1.  There are certain inherent risks in skiing and 
that we agree to hold Hidden Valley Ski Area/Skiing 
Enterprises Inc. harmless on account of any injury 
incurred by me or my Family member on the Hidden 
Valley Ski Area premises. 
 
There was nothing conspicuous about the paragraph containing 
the waiver.  It was one paragraph in a form containing five 
separate paragraphs.  Although the waiver paragraph was the first 
paragraph of text, it did not stand out from the rest of the form 
in any manner.  It did not require a separate signature. 
On March 7, 1993, Tara was skiing at Hidden Valley Ski Area 
when she allegedly collided with the concrete base of a chair 
 
 
No. 94-2683 
 
3
lift tower at the end of a ski run.  She died from injuries 
sustained in the collision. 
 
The Yaugers filed a wrongful death suit in circuit court 
alleging that  Hidden Valley negligently failed to pad the side 
of the lift tower.  Hidden Valley filed a motion for summary 
judgment based upon the exculpatory clause contained in the 
application for the season family ski pass signed by Michael 
Yauger.  The circuit court for Manitowoc County, Allan J. Deehr, 
Circuit Judge, granted the motion for summary judgment, finding 
the exculpatory clause valid and binding on both Michael and 
Brenda Yauger.  The court of appeals held that the exculpatory 
contract barred the Yaugers from suing Hidden Valley for 
negligence, and upheld the summary judgment finding that the term 
“inherent risks in skiing” plainly and simply described the risk 
of colliding with a fixed object while skiing.  Yauger v. Skiing 
Enterprises, Inc., 196 Wis. 2d 485, 499, 538 N.W.2d 834 (1995).  
We disagree. 
 
This case presents one issue: whether, as a matter of public 
policy, the form Michael Yauger signed bars the Yauger’s claim 
against Hidden Valley. 
 
In reviewing a decision affirming summary judgment, we apply 
the same standard applied by the circuit court when it granted 
the motion for summary judgment.  Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 
2d 1007, 1011, 513 N.W.2d 118 (1994); see Dobratz v. Thomson, 161 
Wis. 2d 502, 512-13, 468 N.W.2d 654 (1991)(describing the step by 
step analysis for reviewing the grant of a summary judgment 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2)).  If the court finds an 
 
 
No. 94-2683 
 
4
exculpatory contract void as against public policy, it will deny 
the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.  Dobratz at 512-13.  
Interpretation of a contract is a question of law which we review 
de novo.  Eder v. Lake Geneva Raceway, 187 Wis. 2d 596, 610, 523 
N.W.2d 429 (1994).  If the exculpatory contract is void as a 
matter of law, then it would be inappropriate to grant the 
defendants’ summary judgment motion insofar as there remains a 
material issue of fact.  We conclude that, as a matter of law, 
the form Michael Yauger signed was void as against public policy 
and, therefore, the clause does not bar the Yauger’s claim 
against Hidden Valley. 
Exculpatory contracts are not favored by the law because 
they tend to allow conduct below the acceptable standard of care.  
Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1015.  However, exculpatory contracts 
are not automatically void and unenforceable.  Id.  Rather, a 
court closely examines whether such agreements violate public 
policy and construes them strictly against the party seeking to 
rely on them.  Id.   
Wisconsin law on exculpatory contracts has recently been 
thoroughly reviewed.  Richards; Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 514-520; 
Arnold v. Shawano County Agr. Society, 111 Wis. 2d 203, 330 
N.W.2d 773 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Green Springs 
Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 317, 381 N.W.2d 582 (1985).  
There is no need to reiterate the basic principles here.  An 
examination 
of 
these 
three 
most 
recent 
cases 
involving 
exculpatory contracts as a defense to a negligence action leads 
 
 
No. 94-2683 
 
5
us to the conclusion that the form signed by Michael Yauger is 
void as against public policy.  
These cases, in different ways, involved an exculpatory 
clause that failed to disclose to the signers exactly what rights 
they were waiving.  In the first case, Arnold, the court held an 
exculpatory contract unenforceable because the accident that 
occurred was not “within the contemplation of the parties” when 
they signed the exculpatory agreement.  In contrast, in Dobratz, 
the court struck down on summary judgment a broad release on the 
ground that it was ambiguous and unclear, and that, as a matter 
of law, no contract was formed.  Finally, in Richards, the court 
concluded that the exculpatory contract was void as against 
public policy because its overbroad, general terms created 
ambiguity and uncertainty as to what the signer was releasing. 
The first case involved an accident during a stock car race 
at a county race track.  Arnold.  The plaintiff, a driver in the 
race, sustained severe brain damage when, after crashing through 
the guardrail 
surrounding 
the racetrack, racetrack 
rescue 
personnel sprayed chemicals into his burning car, creating toxic 
chemical fumes.  As a condition precedent to participating in the 
race, the driver had signed an agreement releasing defendants 
from liability from damages “whether caused by the negligence [of 
defendants] or otherwise” while he was in the “restricted area.”  
Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 212 (footnote omitted).  Concluding that 
the law does not favor exculpatory contracts, the court closely 
scrutinized this agreement and strictly construed it against the 
party seeking to rely on it.  Id. at 209.  The court examined the 
 
 
No. 94-2683 
 
6
facts and circumstances of the agreement to determine whether it 
expressed the intent of the parties with particularity and thus 
assured certainty to the parties involved.  Although this 
contract specifically referred to the defendants’ negligence, the 
court concluded that while injuries from negligent track 
maintenance may have been waived, a negligent rescue operation 
was not within the contemplation of the parties when they 
executed 
the 
agreement 
and 
therefore, 
the 
contract 
was 
unenforceable. 
Next, in Dobratz, while participating in a water ski show as 
a member of the Webfooter’s Water Ski Club, Mark Dobratz was 
killed when one of the motorboats in the show ran over him.  The 
circuit court rejected his widow’s wrongful death claim because 
of the exculpatory form signed by Dobratz prior to joining the 
club.  The form provided: [the signer] “knew the risk and danger 
to myself and property while upon said premises or while 
participating or assisting in this event, so voluntarily and in 
reliance, upon my own judgment and ability, and I there by assume 
all risk for loss, damage or injury (including death) to myself 
and my property from any cause whatsoever.”  Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d 
at 511 (emphasis added). 
Holding that the contract was unenforceable, the court 
explained that because particular provisions in the contract were 
“very broad and general” it was unclear whether the activities 
that took place immediately after Mark Dobratz fell into the 
water and up until the time he was injured were to be included 
within “the event,” or whether, alternatively, they constituted 
 
 
No. 94-2683 
 
7
something akin to the rescue operations in Arnold that were not 
clearly covered under the exculpatory contract.  Specifically, 
the court concluded that the contract failed to define several 
key terms:  neither the nature of the activity, nor the location 
where it was to take place was explained; “this event” was not 
defined; the type of skiing stunts the participant would be asked 
to perform were not indicated; and the level of difficulty or 
dangerousness of the stunts was not explained.  Dobratz, 161 Wis. 
2d at 522.  Because the terms in the contract were not clearly 
defined, the court found that the contract failed to express the 
intent of the parties with particularity.  The court held that 
the contract was unenforceable due to its ambiguity and 
uncertainty. 
 
Finally, in Richards, in order to accompany her truck driver 
husband while he worked, Mrs. Richards signed a “Passenger 
Authorization” form required by her husband’s employer, the 
Monkem Company.  The form purported to waive defendants’ 
liability for “intentional, reckless, and negligent conduct,” yet 
failed to circumscribe the specific time period or specific 
vehicle to be covered by the waiver.  Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 
1017.  The court concluded that the contract contravened public 
policy due to a combination of factors: the contract served two 
purposes; the release was extremely broad and all-inclusive; and 
the release was in a standardized agreement printed on the 
company’s form.  These factors indicated to the court that Mrs. 
Richards did not have a clear understanding of the form she was 
signing. 
 
 
No. 94-2683 
 
8
 
 Among the principles that emerge from these cases, two are 
relevant to our determination in this case.  First, the waiver 
must clearly, unambiguously, and unmistakably inform the signer 
of what is being waived.  Second, the form, looked at in its 
entirety, must alert the signer to the nature and significance of 
what is being signed.  The waiver in question fails in both 
respects.  Thus, the court finds this waiver void as against 
public policy under either of these principles. 
 
Addressing the first principle, we conclude that the waiver 
fails to clearly, unambiguously and unmistakably inform the 
signer that he is waiving all claims against Hidden Valley due to 
their negligence.  Although Hidden Valley argues that the form 
unambiguously relieves them from all liability for whatever cause 
including their own negligence, nowhere in the form does the word 
“negligence” appear.  Indeed, the form fails to exhibit any 
language expressly indicating Michael Yauger’s intent to release 
Hidden Valley from its own negligence.   
 
Although the contract uses the term “inherent risks in 
skiing,” nowhere in the contract is that term defined.  Hidden 
Valley argues that the type of accident which led to Tara’s 
injuries, collision with a fixed object, is inherent in the sport 
of skiing and therefore within the contemplation of the parties.  
That certainly is a plausible interpretation, but it is not the 
only plausible interpretation.  Equally plausible is that the 
effect of the “inherent risks” language was sufficient only to 
negate the possibility of a strict liability claim based on an 
inherently dangerous activity, or, again equally plausible, that 
 
 
No. 94-2683 
 
9
such term referred only to the hidden dangers of skiing not 
attributable to the owner’s negligence.   
The ambiguity of the phrase, “inherent risks of skiing,” is 
seen in a review of other cases interpreting this term.  The 
highest court of New Jersey defined “inherent risks of skiing” as 
those risks that “cannot be removed through the exercise of due 
care if the sport is to be enjoyed.”  Brett v. Great American 
Recreation, Inc. 677 A.2d 705, 715 (N.J. 1996)(interpreting the 
New Jersey Ski Statute).  The essence of the Yauger’s tort claim 
is that the danger from the lift tower could have been removed by 
placing padding around the entire lift tower.  Similarly, the 
Supreme Court of Vermont expressly found that a ski owner’s 
negligence is not an inherent risk of skiing.  Dalury v. S-K-I, 
LTD., 670 A.2d 795, 800 (1995).   
In contrast, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the 
“dangers that inhere in the [sport of skiing]” include natural 
conditions and “types of equipment that are inherent parts of a 
ski area, such as lift towers.”  Schmitz v. Cannonsburg Skiing 
Corp., 170 Mich.App. 692 (1988).  If judges disagree on the 
meaning of the term “inherent risks,” how can this court infer 
that a reasonable person would understand what rights he or she 
was signing away? 
Given the well established principle that exculpatory 
contracts are construed strictly against the party seeking to 
rely on them, and given the ambiguous nature of the term 
“inherent risks of skiing,” we must conclude that this waiver was 
void as against public policy because it failed to clearly, 
 
 
No. 94-2683 
 
10
unambiguously, and unmistakably inform Michael Yauger of the 
rights he was waiving.  Although we recognize that Dobratz and 
Arnold resolved the issue on a contractual basis, Richards 
reached the same result, yet departed from the contractual 
analysis and rested on public policy.  We conclude that public 
policy is the germane analysis.  Just as the overly broad 
releases in Richards, Dobratz, and Arnold raised questions about 
the plaintiff signers’ understanding, so too the ambiguity in 
this form raises troubling questions about Michael Yauger’s 
understanding of the waiver.  A valid exculpatory contract must 
be clear, unambiguous, and unmistakable to the layperson.  This 
form failed to unambiguously inform Michael Yauger that he was 
prospectively absolving Hidden Valley from responsibility for its 
negligence.  The form absolved Hidden Valley from the inherent 
risks of skiing, but failed to state whether Hidden Valley’s 
negligence was one of the inherent risks of skiing to which the 
clause referred. 
 
The second principle that emerges from our prior cases that 
is relevant here is that the form, looked at in its entirety, 
must clearly and unequivocally communicate to the signer the 
nature and significance of the document being signed.  This form 
violates that principle in a number of respects.
1   
First, the form was a one page form entitled “APPLICATION.”  
Thus, just as in Richards, this form was meant to serve two 
                                                          
 
1   We need not address the third ground articulated in Richards, 
i.e., standardized agreement which offers little or no 
opportunity for negotiation or free and voluntary bargaining, 
inasmuch as either of the above principles was sufficient to void 
this contract. 
 
 
No. 94-2683 
 
11
purposes: 1) an application for a season pass; and, 2) a release 
of liability.  Just as in Richards, this dual function is not 
made clear in the title of the contract, which merely states, 
“APPLICATION.”  The written terms indicate very clearly that this 
contract is more than a mere application for a season pass.  As 
we 
stated 
in 
Richards, 
“the 
release 
should 
have 
been 
conspicuously labeled as such to put the person signing the form 
on notice. . . Identifying and distinguishing clearly between 
those two contractual arrangements could have provided important 
protection against a signatory’s inadvertent agreement to the 
release.”  Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1017. 
Additionally, there was nothing conspicuous about the 
paragraph containing the waiver.  It was one paragraph in a form 
containing five separate paragraphs.  It did not stand out from 
the rest of the form in any manner.  It did not require a 
separate signature.
2   
                                                          
 
2   The following suggestions for conspicuousness were adapted 
from guidelines for practitioners governing warranty disclaimers 
under the Uniform Commercial Code  Stephanie J. Greer & Hurlie H. 
Collier, The Conspicuousness Requirement: Litigating and Drafting 
Contractual 
Indemnity 
Provisions 
in 
Texas 
After 
Dresser 
Industries, Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 35 S. Tex. L. Rev. 243, 
265-70, Apr. 1994. 
A clear, unambiguous, and unmistakable negligence waiver 
must be conspicuous.  The far better practice is to place the 
waiver in a separately titled section, highlighted from other 
parts of the contract.  In order to further bring the signer’s 
attention to the clause, it should be separately signed. 
The print type and placement of the negligence waiver add to 
its clarity and conspicuousness.  The waiver print should stand 
out from the surrounding print.  Factors that militate in favor 
of conspicuousness as to print include using a larger print for 
the negligence waiver, using a different color print, preferably 
red, and italicizing or boldfacing the waiver. 
The placement of the exculpatory clause also affects the 
signer’s awareness.  The negligence waiver should appear in an 
easy-to-find part of the document - not buried in the fine print.  
 
 
No. 94-2683 
 
12
The form, looked at in its entirety, must be such that a 
reviewing court can say with certainty that the signer was fully 
aware of the nature and the significance of the document being 
signed.  The combination of the above factors leads us to 
conclude that we cannot say with any degree of certainty that a 
reasonable person would be aware of the nature and significance 
of the waiver at the time of its execution..   
While the law grudgingly accepts the proposition that people 
may contract away their right to recovery for negligently caused 
injuries, 
the 
document 
must 
clearly, 
unambiguously, 
and 
unmistakably express this intention.  Furthermore, the document 
when looked at in its entirety must clearly and unequivocally 
communicate the nature and significance of the waiver.  This form 
before us fails in both respects.  Accordingly, it is void as 
against public policy.
3  We remand to the circuit court for a 
trial on the issues of negligence and contributory negligence. 
 
By the Court.The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
                                                                                                                                                                                           
It should be on the front of a one-page contract, not on the 
reverse.  If it is on the reverse, however, there should be 
language on the front calling the signer’s attention to the 
negligence waiver on the reverse.  If there are many pages in the 
contract, the disclaimer should be on the first page. 
Finally, the language of the negligence waiver should be 
readable.  The waiver should be preceded by a clear, not 
misleading, heading and should not be written in legal jargon. 
  
3  Petitioner raises two other issues: (1) enforceability of the 
exculpatory clause against Michael Yauger’s non-signing wife, 
Brenda Yauger, and (2) enforceability of the exculpatory clause 
with respect to claims arising under Wisconsin’s Safe Place 
Statute.  Because we find for the Petitioners on other grounds, 
we need not reach these issues. 
 
 
No. 94-2683 
 
13
 
SUPREME COURT 
OF WISCONSIN 
ROOM 715, 110 E. MAIN STREET 
POST OFFICE BOX 1688 
MADISON, WISCONSIN  53701-1688 
TELEPHONE:  (608)266-1880 
FAX:  (608)267-0640 
 
Marilyn L. Graves, Clerk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AN EXHIBIT HAS BEEN ATTACHED TO THIS OPINION.  THE EXHIBIT 
MAY BE OBTAINED UNDER SEPARATE COVER BY CONTACTING THE SUPREME 
COURT CLERK’S OFFICE. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.:  
94-2683 
 
Complete Title 
of Case:  
 
Michael Yauger and Brenda Yauger, 
 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
Skiing Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Hidden 
 
 
 
 
Valley Ski Area, A Wisconsin corporation 
 
 
 
 
and Investors Insurance Company of  
 
 
 
 
America, a foreign corporation, 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  196 Wis. 2d 485, 538 N.W.2d 834 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed:  
December 19, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument:  
September 4, 1996 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
 
Manitowoc 
 
JUDGE: 
 
Allan J. Deehr  
 
 
JUSTICES:  
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there 
were briefs by Gary L. Bendix, John M. Bruce and Savage, 
Gregorski, Webster, Stangel, Bendix & Bruce, S.C., Manitowoc and 
oral argument by John M. Bruce. 
 
 
 
No. 94-2683 
 
15
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by Thomas B. 
Hartley and Guttormsen, Hartley & Guttormsen, Kenosha and oral 
argument by Thomas B. Hartley. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert L. Jaskulski and 
Domnitz, Mawicke, Goisman & Rosenberg, S.C., Milwaukee for the 
Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Gregory J. Strasser and 
Terwilliger, Wakeen, Piehler & Conway, S.C., Wausau for the Civil 
Trial Counsel of Wisconsin.