Case Title: State v. Tancak

Citation: 2023-Ohio-2578

Docket Number: 2022-0515

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2023-08-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Tancak, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2578.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-2578 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. TANCAK, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Tancak, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2578.] 
Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently accepted. 
(No. 2022-0515―Submitted April 4, 2023―Decided August 1, 2023.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County, 
No. 21CA011725, 2022-Ohio-880. 
__________________ 
{¶ 1} This cause is dismissed as having been improvidently accepted. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and STEWART and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
DEWINE, J., concurs, with an opinion joined by FISCHER and DETERS, JJ. 
BRUNNER, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by DONNELLY, J. 
_________________ 
DEWINE, J., concurring. 
{¶ 2} Once a case has been fully briefed and argued by the parties, I am 
generally reluctant to dismiss it as having been improvidently accepted.  This is 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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true even in cases, like this one, that I did not vote to take up on review.  See 167 
Ohio St.3d 1467, 2022-Ohio-2490, 191 N.E.3d 437.  But it is necessary to do so 
here, because the question presented in this appeal is premised on an assumption 
that we are unable to address. 
{¶ 3} Justin Tancak pleaded guilty to eight counts in a criminal indictment.  
One count charged him with failure to comply with an order or signal of a police 
officer.  See R.C. 2921.331(B).  Any prison sentence imposed for that crime must, 
by law, be served consecutively to any other prison term.  R.C. 2921.331(D).  The 
trial judge did not tell Tancak this before accepting his pleas.  Tancak appealed, 
and the state conceded that this omission violated the trial court’s obligation to 
ensure that a defendant understands “the nature of the charges and * * * the 
maximum penalty involved,” Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), before entering a plea.  The 
Ninth District Court of Appeals agreed and vacated Tancak’s plea on the failure-
to-comply count.  2022-Ohio-880, ¶ 13.  The court of appeals affirmed his 
convictions on the remaining counts.  Id. at ¶ 23. 
{¶ 4} Tancak appealed to this court, asserting that the Ninth District erred 
by declining to vacate his pleas on the other counts.  In essence, he asks us to 
determine the proper remedy for a trial court’s failure to notify a defendant that a 
particular charge carries a consecutive-sentence requirement: Should the 
defendant’s plea be vacated on that count alone or is he entitled to have his pleas 
vacated on all the counts? 
{¶ 5} Of course, that proposition assumes that Crim.R. 11 requires the trial 
court to inform the defendant about the consecutive-sentence requirement in the 
first place.  That is an important question in its own right, and one that this court 
has never weighed in on.  But it is not appropriate for us to answer that question in 
this case, because the parties did not dispute the issue below and have not briefed 
it in this appeal. 
January Term, 2023 
 
3 
{¶ 6} That defect makes this case a poor vehicle for addressing the scope of 
the remedy.  In my view, it would be nonsensical to address the remedy for a trial 
court’s failure to tell a defendant that his sentences must be served consecutively 
without first deciding whether a trial court has any such obligation.  For that reason, 
I join this court’s judgment dismissing this case. 
FISCHER and DETERS, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
BRUNNER, J., dissenting. 
INTRODUCTION 
{¶ 7} While intoxicated, appellant, Justin Tancak, fled from the police on 
his motorcycle with his girlfriend riding double.  He crashed the motorcycle, and 
his girlfriend died as a result.  He pled guilty to and was convicted in the Lorain 
County Common Pleas Court of several offenses, including aggravated vehicular 
homicide and felony failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer, 
the latter of which required any prison sentence for that offense to be served 
consecutively to  any other.  Although the trial court advised him of the penalties 
for each offense to which he pled guilty, Tancak was not advised that the prison 
sentences could be (and here, that the failure-to-comply sentence was required to 
be) served consecutively. 
{¶ 8} The trial court did not “personally” inform Tancak, either “in-person 
or by remote contemporaneous video,” of “the maximum penalty involved,” 
Crim.R. 11(C)(2), in that it failed to inform him of even the possibility of 
consecutive prison sentences, let alone that the failure-to-comply sentence had to 
be served consecutively.  This was such a failure to adhere to Crim.R. 11(C)(2) that 
Tancak was not required to prove that he would not have entered a guilty plea if he 
had been properly advised by the trial court.  See State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 
86, 2008-Ohio-509, 881 N.E.2d 1224, ¶ 22.  We should reverse the court of 
appeals’ judgment and vacate Tancak’s convictions because his plea was not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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knowingly and intelligently entered—Tancak was not made aware of the 
“maximum penalty,” Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), to which his plea exposed him.  And we 
should remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
{¶ 9} The majority’s dismissal of this appeal as having been improvidently 
accepted deprives us of the opportunity to provide much-needed explanation to the 
trial courts that advising a defendant of the maximum penalty involved under 
Crim.R. 11 includes informing the defendant that individual sentences could be (or, 
as in this case, must be) served consecutively.  Because a majority of this court 
decides to dismiss this case as having been improvidently accepted, there remains 
little instruction to trial and appellate courts to prevent the mistake that occurred in 
this case from happening again.  One member of this court, joined by two others, 
writes separately, offering a reason why the majority now refuses to review the 
case—that “the parties did not dispute the issue below and have not briefed it in 
this appeal” renders the case unsuitable for review.  Concurring opinion, ¶ 5.  I 
disagree; we should not ignore an issue that was properly preserved for appeal 
merely because the question’s answer is so obvious that even the adverse party does 
not dispute it.  I therefore respectfully dissent and write to explain why this case 
should not be dismissed and how it should be resolved. 
CASE BACKGROUND 
{¶ 10} On November 23, 2016, Tancak was indicted in Lorain County on 
two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide, one count of third-degree-felony 
failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer, one count of obstructing 
official business, three counts of operating a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs (“OVI”), and one count of operation of a vehicle with willful or 
wanton disregard of safety on a highway.  The charges stemmed from an incident 
in which Tancak, while intoxicated by alcohol and marijuana, fled from the police 
on his motorcycle with his 21-year-old girlfriend riding as a passenger on the back 
January Term, 2023 
 
5 
of the motorcycle.  While fleeing at high speed, Tancak crashed, and his girlfriend 
was pronounced dead at the scene. 
{¶ 11} On August 10, 2018, Tancak pled guilty to all the counts in the 
indictment.  During the plea hearing, the trial court engaged him in the following 
colloquy: 
 
 
THE COURT: All right.  For the record, you are Justin 
Tancak. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: How old are you, Justin. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: 21. 
 
THE COURT: 21. You’re able to read and write? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: Okay.  You’re a citizen of this country? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: Okay.  And are you under the influence of 
any medications, drugs, or alcohol that would get in the way of— 
 
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: —having a conversation with me, okay.  
Your attorney has indicated you wish to change your plea from not 
guilty to guilty to the following: one count of aggravated vehicular 
homicide, a violation of 2903.06(A)(1)(a), a second degree felony; 
another 
count 
of 
aggravated 
vehicular 
homicide, 
under 
2903.06(A)(2)(a), a third degree felony; one count of failure to 
comply with order of a police officer, under 2921.331(B), a third 
degree felony; one count of obstructing official business, under 
2921.31(A), a fifth degree felony; one count of driving under the 
influence, under 4511.19(A)(1)(a), a first degree misdemeanor; one 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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count of operating a vehicle under the influence, under 
4511.19(A)(1)(F), a first degree misdemeanor; and another count of 
driving under the influence, under 4511.19(B)(1), a first degree 
misdemeanor; and lastly, one count of willful and wanton disregard 
of safety, under 4511.20(A), a minor misdemeanor. 
 
So are those the eight counts that you understand you’re 
pleading guilty to. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: Okay.  Do you understand the following are 
the potential penalties for each of these: Count 1 carries two to eight 
years in prison, maximum fine, $15,000; Count 2, nine to 36 months 
in prison, maximum fine, $10,000; Count 3, nine to 36 months in 
prison, maximum fine, $10,000; Count 4, six to 12 months in prison, 
maximum fine, $2,500; Counts 5, 6, and 7 all carry with it up to 180 
days in the county jail, maximum fine a thousand dollars[?] 
 
The State is going to elect, obviously, you weren’t guilty of 
three separate OVI violations, just one, and so they have to pick 
which one that they would have you sentenced under, and they have 
selected Count 6.  So, for Count 6, you’re required to spend at least 
six days in jail, or three days in jail, plus a driver’s intervention 
program; fines ranging from $375 minimum to a maximum of 
$1,075. 
 
I could order treatment for substance abuse, alcohol, in 
particular; your license would be suspended from one to three years, 
and you could have driving privileges after 15 days; is that 
understood. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
January Term, 2023 
 
7 
 
THE COURT: You know, as I’m—Madam prosecutor, and 
counsel, for aggravated vehicular homicide, is there a license 
suspension. 
 
[Defense]: That’s mandatory, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: That’s what I thought.  And I didn’t see that 
on here. 
 
[Prosecution]: Oh, yes, Judge.  You’re right. 
 
THE COURT: What is the range of the mandatory— 
 
[Defense]: I think it’s 15 to life.  15 to life.  Is that correct, 
felonies? 
 
[Prosecution]: I’m not sure. 
 
THE COURT: I’m going to, I’m going to give you the advice 
of 15 years to life, and if it’s less than that, your attorneys can figure 
that out, but I want you to know the worst case scenario when 
someone is charged and found guilty of aggravated vehicular 
homicide, you’re going to, you’re going to lose your driver’s 
license, is a strong likelihood that that will be the case. 
 
[Defense]: I explained that to him already, Judge. 
 
THE COURT: All right.  Now, okay.  So those are the 
potential penalties; do you understand that. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: Okay.  Very good, Justin.  You understand 
court costs would be assessed against you as well. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: Okay.  Because a couple of these charges are 
felonies, you are now prohibited from having possession of any kind 
of firearm.  If you are in possession of a gun that would be a brand 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8 
new crime called having a weapon under disability, and you could 
go to prison for three, up to three years, understood. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: Okay.  If you were sent to prison, upon your 
release from prison, you would have three years of mandatory Post 
Release Control supervision.  That means the Adult Parole 
Authority would have to supervise you for three years.  And that 
means you’d have to follow the rules and regulations of being on 
probation. 
 
And if you violated those rules, they could do a number of 
things, they could extend the time they supervise you, they could 
place restrictions on your freedom.  The most common one is to give 
you a curfew and say you can’t be out after a certain time, they could 
do that, if they felt like that was necessary.  They can even send you 
back to prison if you violate their rules.  One rule violation and you 
could be in prison for nine months, and continue to go back to prison 
for repeat violations until you had served half of your stated prison, 
up to half of what was your stated prison term.  So, you understand 
that. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: Okay.  Very good.  Let’s see.  Your prison 
term on aggravated vehicular homicide is a mandatory— 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
 
THE COURT: And I didn’t say that, do you understand 
whatever time I impose you have to serve that time. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: Okay. 
 
[Defense]: Judge, I explained that to him in the holding cell. 
January Term, 2023 
 
9 
 
THE COURT: Okay.  I figured you did, but I just wanted to 
make sure on the record that I covered it as well and I know you’d 
be thorough, [defense counsel]. 
 
So I’m not going to go over community control because 
these other matters will be concurrent probably with what we do 
here. 
 
Now, really I shouldn’t go over judicial release either 
because once I figure out what the mandatory time is you’ve got to 
serve that time; do you understand that. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: Okay.  That’s what we’re gonna do.  Now, I 
have the legal authority, Justin, to sentence you today after you plead 
guilty.  I’m not going to do that, I really still want, again, a 
presentence investigation report, so I have some sense of who you 
are, and what would be the appropriate sentence, but you understand 
technically I could send you to prison today. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: And you do understand that the time you’ve 
been serving in jail, you’ll be given credit for that towards your 
sentence; do you understand that. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: Now, you are entering a plea of guilty, Justin, 
but you’re not required to.  No one can force you to enter a plea of 
guilty because you have a Constitutional right to demand a jury trial 
with 12 jurors from the community who don’t know any of the 
parties involved hear the evidence, or you could waive a jury and 
say Judge, you just hear the case without a jury, but by pleading 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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guilty today you are giving up your Constitutional right to have a 
trial; do you understand that. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.  Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: You understand that if you went to trial you 
don’t have the burden of proof to prove to anybody that you’re 
innocent, instead, it’s always up to the prosecutor to come up with 
evidence to prove that you are guilty and they have to meet the 
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  If they just have 
evidence that proves that you probably did something that’s not 
good enough, it’s got to be proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
understood. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: Okay.  If you went forward with a trial, 
Justin, your attorney would have the right to cross-examine every 
witness called against you, no one would get a free ride, they would 
be subject to cross-examination, understood. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: And if there are witnesses that could help 
your case, [defense counsel] could subpoena them and that’s a court 
order, the witness has to come to court even if they don’t want to be 
here.  And if they don’t show up, we’ll send out a sheriff’s deputy 
to find them and bring them here for you so you have your witnesses 
in court, understood. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: Now, if you went forward with a trial, but 
you did not want to testify, and instead wanted to exercise your Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent, that’s fine, and I’ll protect that 
January Term, 2023 
 
11 
right, no one would be allowed to comment on your silence, or use 
your silence against you in any way; do you understand that. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
 
THE COURT: Okay. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: Okay.  If you went forward with a trial, and 
you were found guilty, if I then imposed the maximum sentence of 
eight years, you would have an automatic right to appeal the 
sentence, so that the Court of Appeals, three judges, would be 
selected to judge me, to determine whether they think I was 
following the sentencing guidelines, or whether there was evidence 
that I was motivated by something I shouldn’t have been motivated 
by, something that would have been improper, like prejudice against 
you, understood. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: Okay.  Since you are pleading guilty today, 
we’re not going to have a trial, and if there is no trial your rights to 
appeal the sentence are more limited; do you understand that. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: If at the time of sentencing you think I have 
done something wrong and you wish to exercise those limited rights 
to appeal, you have to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of that 
date that you were sentenced.  If you wait beyond 30 days, you can’t 
appeal; do you understand that. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.  Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: All right.  Generally when someone comes to 
court and says Judge, whether it’s a serious case or a small case, in 
any case, if you say Judge, I want to change my plea from not guilty 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
to guilty, you are making an admission to me; you’re saying Judge, 
when all is said and done I need to take responsibility for breaking 
the law here and I’m willing to do it, I’m willing to give up my 
Constitutional right to have a trial and all these other rights you’ve 
just covered with me, I need to get this case over with, and I need to 
move on with my life.  Is that a pretty fair summary of why, what 
you’re thinking today as you’re changing your plea. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Pretty much.  Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: All right.  I have a guilty plea form of three 
pages, Justin, and I just need to confirm on this signature line that’s 
your signature— 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: —Mr. Tancak.  Before you signed this form 
is it correct that you went over it and reviewed it with your attorney. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.  Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: Did he explain the form to you and answer 
any question you had to your satisfaction. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: He explained it thoroughly and 
answered all my questions. 
 
THE COURT: Were any promises made to get you to sign 
this, like, don’t worry, the Judge will only sentence you to two 
weeks in jail or something— 
 
THE DEFENDANT: No promises, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: No promises, okay.  Did anybody threaten 
you and force you to sign this against your will. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: No threats, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: All right.  Very good.  Is it fair for me to 
conclude that you signed this document voluntarily; is that right. 
January Term, 2023 
 
13 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: All right.  Do you have any objections then 
to a guilty plea being entered on your behalf to the charges in this 
indictment. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: Any objection. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
 
THE COURT: Okay. Are you satisfied with the advice and 
services of [defense counsel]. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions for me about what 
we’re doing? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
 
(Capitalization sic.) 
{¶ 12} In addition to this oral exchange, Tancak signed a plea form that, 
among other warnings, contained language warning him that “[p]rison terms for 
multiple charges, even though not mandatory consecutive, may, nonetheless, be 
imposed consecutively by the court.”  Following his guilty plea, the trial court 
merged several of the offenses and sentenced Tancak to a mandatory prison term 
of seven years for aggravated vehicular homicide; two years in prison for failure to 
comply with an order or signal of a police officer, to be served consecutively to the 
aggravated-vehicular-homicide sentence; and 180 days in jail for OVI, to be served 
concurrently. 
{¶ 13} In 2021, the Ninth District Court of Appeals granted Tancak’s 
request for leave to file a delayed appeal.  2022-Ohio-880, ¶ 5.  On appeal, Tancak 
raised two, interrelated assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred when it failed 
to notify him during the plea colloquy that the prison sentences for the aggravated-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
vehicular-homicide and failure-to-comply convictions would, as a matter of law, 
run consecutively and (2) his entire plea was obtained in violation of the United 
States Constitution and Crim.R. 11(C).  2022-Ohio-880 at ¶ 7, 15.  The state 
conceded in the court of appeals that the trial court erred by failing to advise Tancak 
during the plea hearing that the failure-to-comply sentence would be served 
consecutively to any other sentence.  Id. at ¶ 7. 
{¶ 14} The Ninth District concluded, in accord with the state’s concession, 
that the trial court had failed to even partially comply with Crim.R. 11 as to the 
failure-to-comply count, vacated Tancak’s conviction on that count, and remanded 
as to that count only.  Id. at ¶ 13, 23.  It concluded that because Ohio has rejected 
the “sentence package” doctrine and because Tancak’s plea was not part of “a plea 
agreement between * * * [him] and the State that would unify [his] plea to all of 
the charges against him,” the counts were separate and the trial court’s failure to 
properly inform him as to one of them did not necessitate reversal as to all of them.  
Id. at ¶ 19-21.  And it observed that Tancak acknowledged in his written plea that 
the trial court had the authority (at least in theory) to impose consecutive sentences 
for all the offenses.  Id. at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 15} We accepted Tancak’s appeal to consider a single proposition of law: 
 
 
When the Court fails to inform the Defendant of mandatory 
consecutive sentences required on one or more of the counts of the 
indictment at the time of plea, is the plea entered knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntary on the remaining counts that do not have 
mandatory consecutive sentences, rendering the entire plea invalid 
under Crim.R. 11. 
 
See 167 Ohio St.3d 1467, 2022-Ohio-2490, 191 N.E.3d 437. 
January Term, 2023 
 
15 
ANALYSIS 
Crim.R. 11 Requires Oral Advisement by the Trial Court of the Maximum 
Penalty Faced by the Defendant 
{¶ 16} Because a no-contest or guilty plea involves a waiver of 
constitutional rights, a defendant’s decision to enter such a plea must be knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.  Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-29, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 
L.Ed.2d 391 (1992).  If the plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily, enforcement of it is unconstitutional.  State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 
239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 25.  Because of this legal truth, Crim.R. 
11(C) requires a trial court to advise a defendant who seeks to plead no contest or 
guilty to a felony as follows: 
 
 
(2) In felony cases the court * * * shall not accept a plea of 
guilty or no contest without first addressing the defendant 
personally either in-person or by remote contemporaneous video in 
conformity with Crim.R. 43(A) and doing all of the following: 
 
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea 
voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of 
the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant 
is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community 
control sanctions at the sentencing hearing. 
 
(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the 
defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, 
and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with 
judgment and sentence. 
 
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the 
defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the 
rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s 
favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be 
compelled to testify against himself or herself. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Crim.R. 11(C).  Our focus in enforcing Crim.R. 11 “has not 
been on whether the trial judge has ‘[incanted] the precise verbiage’ of the rule, 
State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 92, 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977), but on whether the 
dialogue between the court and the defendant demonstrates that the defendant 
understood the consequences of his plea, State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-
Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 15-16; Clark at ¶ 26; State v. Miller, 159 Ohio St.3d 
447, 2020-Ohio-1420, 151 N.E.3d 617, ¶ 19.”  (Brackets added in Dangler.)  State 
v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 17} Not all the advisements under Crim.R. 11 are treated equally.  For 
example, “[w]hen a trial judge fails to explain the constitutional rights set forth in 
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), the guilty or no-contest plea is invalid ‘under a presumption 
that it was entered involuntarily and unknowingly.’ ”  Clark at ¶ 31, quoting State 
v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d 51, ¶ 12.  However, 
when a court’s advice is defective as to an aspect of the plea that does not concern 
a constitutional right, “a defendant must show prejudice before [the] plea will be 
vacated for [the] court’s error involving Crim.R. 11(C) procedure.”  Veney at ¶ 17.  
In essence, the defendant must show that but for the court’s failure to properly 
advise, he or she would not have entered the plea.  State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 
108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990).  But even in cases in which the trial court failed to 
advise the defendant about aspects of the plea not involving the defendant’s 
constitutional rights, the “trial court’s complete failure to comply with [that] portion 
of Crim.R. 11(C) eliminates the defendant’s burden to show prejudice.”  Dangler 
January Term, 2023 
 
17 
at ¶ 15, citing Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, 881 N.E.2d 1224, at 
¶ 22. 
{¶ 18} The issues in this case are what was “the maximum penalty 
involved,” Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), and whether Tancak was sufficiently advised of 
the maximum penalty such that he understood it before he entered his guilty plea.  
The “maximum penalty involved” does not implicate a constitutional right such 
that defective advisement on it obviates the defendant’s need to prove prejudice.  
Dangler at ¶ 23.  But a complete failure (as we have here) to advise a defendant 
about a portion of his maximum sentence obviates the defendant’s need to prove 
prejudice.  See Sarkozy at ¶ 22. 
{¶ 19} Absent certain exceptions, “a prison term, jail term, or sentence of 
imprisonment shall be served concurrently with any other prison term, jail term, or 
sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court of this state, another state, or the 
United States.”  R.C. 2929.41(A).  However, one such exception exists in the 
Revised Code provision making it a crime to “operate a motor vehicle so as 
willfully to elude or flee a police officer after receiving a visible or audible signal 
from a police officer to bring the person’s motor vehicle to a stop,” 
R.C. 2921.331(B).  Specifically, such “willfully” fleeing and eluding becomes a 
felony when “the offender was fleeing immediately after the commission of a 
felony,” R.C. 2921.331(C)(4), “[t]he operation of the motor vehicle by the offender 
was a proximate cause of serious physical harm to persons or property,” 
R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a)(i), or “[t]he operation of the motor vehicle by the offender 
caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property,”  
R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii).  For felony violations of the prohibition on willfully 
fleeing and eluding, R.C. 2921.331(D) provides that “if the offender is sentenced 
to a prison term for th[e] violation, the offender shall serve the prison term 
consecutively to any other prison term or mandatory prison term imposed upon the 
offender.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
{¶ 20} It is undisputed that Tancak, who was pleading guilty for having fled 
on a motorcycle from a police officer, crashing the motorcycle, and thereby causing 
the death of his girlfriend, qualified as an offender required to serve the prison term 
for the fleeing-and-eluding offense “consecutively to any other prison term or 
mandatory 
prison 
term 
imposed 
upon 
[him],” 
R.C. 2921.331(B), 
(C)(5)(a)(i), and (D).  Yet the trial-court judge merely advised Tancak: 
 
Do you understand the following are the potential penalties for each 
of these: Count 1 carries two to eight years in prison, maximum fine, 
$15,000; Count 2, nine to 36 months in prison, maximum fine, 
$10,000; Count 3, nine to 36 months in prison, maximum fine, 
$10,000; Count 4, six to 12 months in prison, maximum fine, 
$2,500; Counts 5, 6, and 7 all carry with it up to 180 days in the 
county jail, maximum fine a thousand dollars[?] 
 
Tancak answered in the affirmative.  The judge then added the following about the 
mandatory nature of the sentences: 
 
 
THE COURT: Okay.  Very good.  Let’s see.  Your prison 
term on aggravated vehicular homicide is a mandatory— 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
 
THE COURT: And I didn’t say that, do you understand 
whatever time I impose you have to serve that time. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
But at no point did the judge advise Tancak that any portion of his sentence could 
be ordered to run consecutively, and the judge certainly never mentioned that part 
of the sentence was required to be served consecutively. 
January Term, 2023 
 
19 
{¶ 21} It is true that Tancak signed a plea form that, among other warnings, 
stated that “[p]rison terms for multiple charges, even though not mandatory 
consecutive, may, nonetheless, be imposed consecutively by the court.”  But what 
might be “mandatory consecutive” was never identified, and such boilerplate 
language does not satisfy Crim.R. 11, which provides that a court “shall not accept 
a plea of guilty or no contest without first addressing the defendant personally 
either in-person or by remote contemporaneous video in conformity with 
Crim.R. 43(A)” (emphasis added), Crim.R.  11(C)(2).  A boilerplate form is not a 
sufficient substitute for the trial court’s personally addressing the defendant to 
satisfy the plain terms of Crim.R. 11. 
{¶ 22} The trial court never advised Tancak according to the terms of 
Crim.R. 11(C)(2) of the “maximum penalty involved,” in that it failed to inform 
him of even the possibility, to say nothing of the certainty, of his being ordered to 
serve consecutive sentences.  This complete failure to comply with the rule excuses 
Tancak from having to prove that he would not have entered the plea had he been 
properly advised.  See Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, 881 N.E.2d 
1224, at ¶ 22.  The correctness of this conclusion is aided, certainly, by the state’s 
concession on the issue.  But analysis of this question, as demonstrated, is by no 
means impeded by the state’s concession. 
A Trial Court’s Complete Failure to Orally Inform a Defendant of “the 
Maximum Penalty Involved” Means the Defendant’s Entire No-Contest or 
Guilty Plea Was Entered Without the Required Knowledge or 
Understanding 
{¶ 23} As discussed above, Crim.R. 11(C)(2) requires a trial court to 
“address[] 
the 
defendant 
personally 
either 
in-person 
or 
by 
remote 
contemporaneous video” and “[d]etermin[e] that the defendant is making the plea 
voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum 
penalty involved.”  (Emphasis added.)  Here, Tancak was informed of the maximum 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
sentence for each count to which he was pleading guilty but not “the maximum 
penalty” to which his guilty plea exposed him, because he was not told that the 
sentences could be (or, with respect to the failure-to-comply sentence, was required 
to be) served consecutively.  The result of that failure, under the plain language of 
Crim.R. 11, is that Tancak did not make the plea “voluntarily, with understanding 
of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  His plea was entered without his understanding of the maximum penalty 
involved and was not knowing and intelligent, requiring that all his convictions be 
vacated and his plea withdrawn. 
{¶ 24} The Ninth District’s decision below and the state and amicus curiae 
Ohio Attorney General here correctly point out that Ohio has rejected the sentence-
package doctrine.  See 2022-Ohio-880 at ¶ 19; see also State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio 
St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, paragraphs one and two of the 
syllabus.  This means that in Ohio, a sentence is “the sanction or combination of 
sanctions imposed for each separate, individual offense,” id. at paragraph one of 
the syllabus, and that regarding errors in imposing a sentence for an offense, “[a]n 
appellate court may modify, remand, or vacate only a sentence for an offense that 
is appealed by the defendant and may not modify, remand, or vacate the entire 
multiple-offense sentence based upon an appealed error in the sentence for a single 
offense,” id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 25} However, this holding in Saxon does not apply to the circumstances 
here.  The question here is not whether Tancak was appropriately sentenced for one 
or more offenses.  The question is whether he was personally advised by the judge 
of the “maximum penalty,” Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), that could result from his guilty 
plea before he entered the plea.  Because he was not advised that the prison 
sentences for his offenses could be ordered to be served consecutively (and, in fact, 
that the failure-to-comply sentence was required to be served consecutively), the 
inescapable conclusion is that Tancak was not advised of the “maximum penalty 
January Term, 2023 
 
21 
involved,” id.  That conclusion is not an example of treating sentences as a package; 
it is merely a recognition that individual sentences can (and, in this case, must) run 
consecutively.  And here, Tancak was not properly advised of that fact, with the 
result being that his entire plea was made without the required knowledge. 
We Should Adhere to Our Decision to Accept this Case for Review 
{¶ 26} The majority dismisses this case as having been improvidently 
accepted without providing any reasoning for doing so.  But one member of the 
majority writes separately, suggesting that dismissing the case is appropriate 
“because the question presented in this appeal is premised on an assumption that 
we are unable to address” due to the fact that the state conceded that the trial court’s 
failure to inform Tancak that his failure-to-comply sentence must be served 
consecutively amounted to failing to inform him of the maximum penalty involved.  
Concurring opinion at ¶ 2.  I respectfully disagree with both the majority’s 
judgment and the reasoning given in the concurring opinion. 
{¶ 27} Tancak raised the Crim.R. 11 deficiency issue at every appropriate 
opportunity, and it remains an important predicate issue now.  It is true that “[a]s a 
general rule, this court will not consider arguments that were not raised in the courts 
below.”  Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners’ Assn. v. R.E. Roark Cos., Inc., 67 
Ohio St.3d 274, 279, 617 N.E.2d 1075 (1993), citing State v. 1981 Dodge Ram Van, 
36 Ohio St.3d 168, 170, 522 N.E.2d 524 (1988).  But “if we must resolve a legal 
issue that was not raised below in order to reach a legal issue that was raised, we 
will do so.”  Id.  Furthermore, the fact that the state conceded the issue and the 
Ninth District accepted the concession as a correct statement of the law is no failure 
of Tancak’s.  There is no impediment to our reviewing the predicate question 
whether the trial court erred by not informing Tancak of the prospect of consecutive 
sentences and considering the proposition of law regarding the appropriate scope 
of the remedy.  To the extent that the majority might be uncomfortable with the 
lack of  briefing on the predicate question here, it could order additional briefing—
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
as we have done sua sponte in a number of recent cases.  See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 
169 Ohio St.3d 1478, 2023-Ohio-1027, 206 N.E.3d 715; State v. Johnson, 169 Ohio 
St.3d 1478, 2023-Ohio-1027, 206 N.E.3d 716; Repp v. Best, 169 Ohio St.3d 1478, 
2023-Ohio-1027, 206 N.E.3d 716; see also Davis v. McGuffey, 169 Ohio St.3d 
1499, 2023-Ohio-1331, 207 N.E.3d 833 (ordering parties to show cause why case 
should not be dismissed). 
{¶ 28} The facts of this case are not unique, nor are the questions raised by 
it unusual.  People plead guilty to crimes in Ohio every day.  Every day, Ohio’s 
trial courts “address * * * defendant[s] personally either in-person or by remote 
contemporaneous video” to “[d]etermin[e] that the defendant is making the plea 
voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum 
penalty involved” (emphasis added), Crim.R. 11(C)(2).  And Ohio’s trial and 
appellate courts need to know that informing a defendant in a criminal case of “the 
maximum penalty involved” means informing the defendant of any possibility (or 
certainty) of consecutive prison sentences, and they need to know the consequences 
for failing to provide such advisement.  We should not shy away from our duty to 
decide this case of great general and public interest, see Ohio Constitution, Article 
IV, Section 2(B)(2)(e), and we should aid trial and appellate courts across the state 
by providing clarity on these issues. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 29} Tancak pled guilty without being personally addressed and advised 
by the trial court of “the maximum penalty involved,” Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), under 
his plea.  He was advised of the maximum sentences for each count but not of the 
possibility—and, in fact, the certainty—that sentences would run consecutively.  
Thus, he was not advised of “the maximum penalty” to which his plea exposed him.  
This was obvious—so obvious, in fact, that the state conceded the point and the 
parties merely briefed for this court the question whether the trial court’s failure to 
January Term, 2023 
 
23 
properly inform Tancak affects just one of his convictions under the plea or all of 
them. 
{¶ 30} Rather than provide much-needed guidance on the common issue of 
a trial court’s duty to advise a defendant about a plea of no contest or guilty and its 
consequences, the majority dismisses this case as having been improvidently 
accepted, and three justices justify the dismissal based on the state’s concession 
that the trial court’s failure to inform Tancak that his failure-to-comply sentence 
must be served consecutively amounted to failing to inform him of the maximum 
penalty involved.  I respectfully dissent.  The concession of a predicate issue is no 
bar to examining the issue briefed.  And if the majority is uncertain of the answer 
to the predicate issue conceded, it could  request further briefing—as we have done 
in a number of other recent cases. 
{¶ 31} We owe it to the lower courts and to practitioners to provide clarity 
in this area of the law.  We should instruct that a trial court’s advisement under 
Crim.R. 11 as to “the maximum penalty involved” must include informing the 
defendant, when applicable, that sentences may or must be served consecutively.  
We should further determine that a trial court’s complete failure to advise the 
defendant of “the maximum penalty involved” means the plea was entered without 
the required knowledge and understanding and permits withdrawal of the entire 
plea.  Because the majority instead declines to resolve this appeal, I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
DONNELLY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
J.D. Tomlinson, Lorain County Prosecuting Attorney, and Lindsey C. 
Poprocki, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Bremke Law, L.L.C., and Giovanna V. Bremke, for appellant, Justin 
Tancak. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, and 
Stephen P. Carney, Deputy Solicitor General, urging affirmance for amicus curiae 
Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost. 
Russell S. Bensing, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
_________________