Case Title: State v. Glover

Citation: 

Docket Number: 392A19

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2020-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 392A19 
Filed 18 December 2020 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
v. 
BRUCE WAYNE GLOVER 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of 
the Court of Appeals, 267 N.C. App. 315, 833 S.E.2d 203 (2019), finding no error in 
part, and reversing and remanding in part, a judgment entered on 20 September 2017 
by Judge W. Erwin Spainhour in Superior Court, Henderson County. Heard in the 
Supreme Court on 9 March 2020. 
 
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Joseph Finarelli, Special Deputy 
Attorney General, for the State-appellee. 
 
Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Sterling Rozear, Assistant Appellate 
Defender, for defendant-appellant. 
 
 
MORGAN, Justice. 
 
The appeal in this drug possession case presents two questions for our 
consideration: First, whether the evidence adduced at defendant’s trial was sufficient 
to support the trial court’s instruction to the jury on the theory of acting in concert, 
and second, if the evidence presented was insufficient to support the instruction, 
whether the error was harmless. On the facts here, we conclude that the evidence did 
not support the trial court’s instruction on acting in concert.  Further, given the 
STATE V. GLOVER 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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potential for confusion on the part of the jury between the theories of acting in concert 
and constructive possession as bases for the return of guilty verdicts on the possession 
of controlled substance charges against defendant, the erroneous instruction was not 
harmless. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment in this case must be vacated and 
the matter remanded to the trial court for a new trial. 
Factual Background and Procedural History 
The charges in this matter arose from controlled substances discovered on 29 
September 2016 by officers with the Henderson County Sheriff’s Office who were 
investigating complaints of drug activity at a home where defendant Bruce Wayne 
Glover lived with several people, including Autumn Stepp. Stepp was not at the 
group’s residence when the officers arrived, having departed earlier in the day. Stepp, 
who regularly used controlled substances such as marijuana, heroin, and 
methamphetamine, kept materials that she collectively called her “hard time 
stash”—small amounts of heroin, cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine, a few pills, 
and various items of drug paraphernalia—in a small yellow tin. Before her departure 
from the home on 29 September 2016, Stepp placed the yellow tin in the drawer of a 
dresser that was located in an alcove near defendant’s bedroom, without telling 
defendant or any of her other housemates about this act.   
When the officers knocked on the door of the home, defendant stepped outside 
to speak with them. During the discussion, a detective asked defendant whether 
defendant had any contraband in his bedroom. Defendant told the detective that 
STATE V. GLOVER 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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defendant had used methamphetamine and prescription pills, admitting that the 
bedroom likely contained drug paraphernalia in the form of “needles and pipes.” 
However, defendant stated that he did not think that officers would find any illegal 
substances in his personal space in the home. Defendant gave consent for the officers 
to search his bedroom as well as the alcove near defendant’s bedroom which 
defendant stated that he considered to be part of his “personal space.”  
In defendant’s bedroom, the detective found a white rectangular pill wrapped 
in aluminum foil inside a dresser drawer; scales, rolling papers, plastic bags, and 
glass pipes in a small black pouch; and a small bag containing marijuana in a small 
safe. Officers also discovered the small yellow tin in the drawer of the dresser in the 
alcove where Stepp had placed it without defendant’s knowledge. Inside the tin, 
officers discovered three plastic bags with crystallized substances. Field tests on the 
contents of each bag “gave a positive indication for the presence of 
methamphetamine, cocaine[,] and heroin.” At trial, a State Crime Laboratory analyst 
testified that the three bags collectively contained 0.18 grams of heroin, 2.65 grams 
of methamphetamine, and less than 0.1 gram of both methamphetamine and cocaine, 
respectively.  
On 20 March 2017, the Henderson County grand jury indicted defendant on 
one count each of possession with the intent to sell and deliver methamphetamine, 
heroin, and cocaine, as well as one count of maintaining a dwelling house for the sale 
of controlled substances. On 24 July 2017, the grand jury indicted defendant for 
STATE V. GLOVER 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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having attained the status of an habitual felon.  
Defendant’s case came on for trial at the 18 September 2017 criminal session 
of Superior Court, Henderson County. In her trial testimony, Stepp testified that the 
yellow tin containing heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine was her personal “hard 
time stash” and that she had not informed defendant or anyone else that she had 
placed the tin in the dresser drawer before Stepp left the group’s house on 29 
September 2016. When asked during her testimony if she realized that she was 
admitting to her own possession of controlled substances, Stepp responded, “Yes. 
Yes.” On cross-examination, Stepp admitted to having used drugs with defendant, 
but denied that defendant had sold her any controlled substances.  When asked again 
during her testimony about ownership of the drugs discovered in the dresser, Stepp 
reiterated “if it was in the tin, it was mine.”   
At the close of the State’s evidence, defendant moved to dismiss the charges 
against him for possessing the controlled substances with the intent to manufacture, 
sell, and deliver them, and for maintaining a dwelling for the purpose of selling and 
using controlled substances. The trial court dismissed all charges against defendant 
except for the charge of simple possession of heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine. 
During the jury charge conference, the State requested a jury instruction on the 
theory of acting in concert in addition to the constructive possession instruction that 
the trial court had already decided to give to the jury. Defendant objected to the acting 
in concert instruction; and the trial court denied defendant’s request to refrain from 
STATE V. GLOVER 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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giving the instruction. At the end of the jury charge conference, defendant renewed 
his objection to the acting in concert instruction, which the trial court again 
overruled. The trial court thereafter gave instructions to the jury on both constructive 
possession and acting in concert as legal theories underlying the drug possession 
charges. 
The jury began its deliberations at 3:47 p.m. on the day that the case was 
submitted to it.  At 4:02 p.m. of the same day, the trial court brought the jury back in 
to the courtroom to address a note sent by the foreperson to the trial court, asking for 
a transcript of Stepp’s testimony. The trial court denied the jury’s request, and the 
jury resumed its deliberations. A short time later, the jury returned to the courtroom 
at 4:30 p.m. in order to render its verdict. The jury found defendant guilty of simple 
possession of methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine. The jury subsequently 
determined that defendant had attained the status of an habitual felon. In its 
judgment, the trial court imposed two consecutive sentences of 50 to 72 months of 
imprisonment. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court to the Court of Appeals.  
In the Court of Appeals, defendant raised several issues including, inter alia, 
that the trial court erred in instructing the jury, over defendant’s objection, that the 
jury could find defendant guilty of possession of the controlled substances at issue on 
the theory of acting in concert in addition to the theory of constructive possession.1 
                                            
1 Along with his appellate brief, defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief in the 
Court of Appeals on 7 September 2018. Matters pertaining to the motion for appropriate 
STATE V. GLOVER 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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The Court of Appeals panel divided on this issue: the majority rejected defendant’s 
contention that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support an 
instruction on acting in concert, State v. Glover, 267 N.C. App. 315, 320, 833 S.E.2d 
203, 207 (2019), while the dissenting judge concluded both that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the instruction and that the erroneous instruction was not 
harmless error, thus entitling defendant to a new trial. Id. at 329, 833 S.E.2d at 213 
(Collins, J., dissenting). 
The entire Court of Appeals panel agreed on the pertinent case law applicable 
to the resolution of defendant’s argument regarding the acting in concert jury 
instruction. “[I]t is error for the trial judge to charge on matters which materially 
affect the issues when they are not supported by the evidence.” State v. Jennings, 276 
N.C. 157, 161, 171 S.E.2d 447, 449 (1970). The charge at issue here was possession of 
drugs, which requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed a controlled 
substance. State v. Galaviz-Torres, 368 N.C. 44, 48, 772 S.E.2d 434, 437 (2015). In 
turn,  
[w]here the state seeks to convict a defendant using the 
principle of concerted action, that this defendant did some 
act forming a part of the crime charged would be strong 
evidence that he was  acting together with another who did 
other acts leading toward the crimes’ commission. . . . It is 
not . . . necessary for a defendant to do any particular act 
constituting at least part of a crime in order to be convicted 
of that crime under the concerted action principle so long 
as he is present at the scene of the crime and the evidence 
                                            
relief are not before the Court. 
STATE V. GLOVER 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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is sufficient to show he is acting together with another who 
does the acts necessary to constitute the crime pursuant to 
a common plan or purpose to commit the crime. 
 
State v. Joyner, 297 N.C. 349, 356–57, 255 S.E.2d 390, 395 (1979). Thus, in the case 
at bar, a jury instruction on possession of controlled substances under the theory of 
acting in concert was proper only if sufficient evidence was produced at defendant’s 
trial showing that defendant acted together with Stepp pursuant to a common plan 
or purpose to possess the contraband found in the yellow tin. See id. at 356, 255 S.E.2d 
at 395.  
In the view of the majority, in this case there 
was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have . . . 
determined that [d]efendant acted in concert to aid . . . 
Stepp’s 
constructive 
possession 
of 
the 
controlled 
substances found in the metal tin. Specifically, [d]efendant 
called . . . Stepp, who testified that she placed the metal tin 
in the dresser in [d]efendant’s personal space, that the 
drugs therein were hers, that she intended to come back 
later to use them, and that she and [d]efendant had taken 
drugs together in the past. This testimony is evidence that 
. . . Stepp possessed (constructively) the drugs in the metal 
tin. Further, based on . . . Stepp’s testimony along with the 
State’s evidence, the jury could have found that [d]efendant 
was aware of the presence of the drugs in the metal tin: (1) 
he admitted to the detective to having just used 
methamphetamine, and the only methamphetamine found 
in the house was in the metal tin; and (2) he admitted to 
the detective to having just ingested prescription pills, and 
a pill found in his bedroom matched a pill found in the 
metal tin. And the evidence was sufficient to support 
findings that (1) [d]efendant facilitated . . . Stepp’s 
constructive possession by allowing her to keep her drugs 
in a place where they would be safe from others; (2) 
[d]efendant did not intend to exert control over the 
STATE V. GLOVER 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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disposition of those remaining drugs, as they belonged to 
his friend, . . . Stepp, and that she controlled their 
disposition; and (3) [d]efendant was actually present when 
the drugs were in . . . Stepp’s constructive possession. 
 
Glover, 267 N.C. App. at 319–20, 833 S.E.2d at 207.  
The dissenting judge on the Court of Appeals panel noted that 
[a]lthough [d]efendant was present when the narcotics 
were found in the dresser drawer, and was thus present at 
the scene of the crime, there is no evidence that [d]efendant 
was present when the tin containing the narcotics was 
placed in the dresser drawer. Moreover, . . . Stepp admitted 
on the stand to her possession of the narcotics. . . . Stepp 
testified that the tin was hers and that the last place she 
had it was at Southbrook Drive, where she and [d]efendant 
used to live amongst other people. When asked where she 
last left the tin, . . . Stepp answered, 
I put it inside a drawer. I want to say I tried 
to put something over it. But I didn’t intend—
I wasn’t there. I wasn’t arrest[ed] that day, 
because I had just left. I didn’t intend to be 
gone long. But I didn’t get back as quickly as 
I would like to, and I didn’t tell anybody it was 
there, because I didn’t think it was relevant. 
 
Id. at 331, 833 S.E.2d at 214 (Collins, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge opined 
that the jury instruction on acting in concert was erroneous because the dissenter 
could discern no evidentiary support for the majority’s conclusion that defendant 
facilitated Stepp’s constructive possession by allowing her to keep her drugs in a place 
where they would be safe from others, surmising that “the acting in concert theory of 
possession has become confused with the constructive theory of possession in this 
case, which is precisely why the acting in concert theory is not generally applicable 
STATE V. GLOVER 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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to possession offenses.” Id. at 331–32, 833 S.E.2d at 214 (Collins, J., dissenting) 
(extraneity omitted). Citing our recent decision in State v. Malachi, 371 N.C. 719, 821 
S.E.2d 407 (2018), the dissent then conducted a harmless error analysis, under which 
a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that “there is a reasonable possibility 
that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been 
reached at the trial out of which the appeal arises.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a) (2019). 
Because “the evidence of [d]efendant’s constructive possession was not exceedingly 
strong” and because “Stepp admitted to possession of the controlled substances,” the 
dissenting judge concluded that “there is certainly a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the 
jury elected to convict [d]efendant on the basis of the unsupported legal theory of 
acting in concert to possess the controlled substances.” Glover, 267 N.C. App. at 333, 
833 S.E.2d at at 215 (Collins, J., dissenting). For this reason, the dissent would have 
vacated defendant’s convictions and remanded the matter to the trial court for a new 
trial. Id. (Collins, J., dissenting). On 8 October 2019, defendant filed notice of appeal 
to this Court on the basis of the dissent. 
Analysis 
A jury charge serves several critical purposes: “clarification of the issues, 
elimination of extraneous matters, and declaration and application of the law arising 
upon the evidence.” State v. Jackson, 228 N.C. 656, 658, 46 S.E.2d 858, 859 (1948). 
As such, “a trial judge should not give instructions to the jury which are not supported 
by the evidence produced at the trial.” State v. Cameron, 284 N.C. 165, 171, 200 
STATE V. GLOVER 
 
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S.E.2d 186, 191 (1973). In the present case, the jury was instructed that it could find 
defendant guilty of possessing the controlled substances in the yellow tin under the 
theory of constructive possession or the theory of acting in concert. 
“Constructive possession of contraband material exists when there is no actual 
personal dominion over the material, but there is an intent and capability to maintain 
control and dominion over it.” State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 568, 313 S.E.2d 585, 588 
(1984). “Although it is not necessary to show that an accused has exclusive possession 
of the premises where contraband is found, where possession of the premises is 
nonexclusive, constructive possession of the contraband materials may not be 
inferred without other incriminating circumstances.” Id. at 569, 313 S.E.2d at 589. 
As noted in both the majority and the dissenting opinions of the Court of Appeals in 
this matter, in order to support a jury instruction on the theory of acting in concert, 
mere presence at the scene of a crime—a fact undisputed in the case at bar—is 
insufficient; the State must also produce evidence that the defendant acted together 
with another who did the acts necessary to constitute the crime pursuant to a common 
plan or purpose to commit the crime. Joyner, 297 N.C. at 356–57, 255 S.E.2d at 395; 
see also State v. Wilkerson, 363 N.C. 382, 424, 683 S.E.2d 174, 200 (2009).  
All of the judges on the panel of the lower appellate court agreed that sufficient 
evidence supported a jury instruction on constructive possession by defendant of the 
drugs in the yellow tin. In the view of the Court of Appeals majority, the evidence 
presented at defendant’s trial also supported a conclusion that defendant did not 
STATE V. GLOVER 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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intend to exercise control over the contents of Stepp’s “hard time stash,” but that he 
did “facilitate[ ] . . . Stepp’s constructive possession by allowing her to keep her drugs 
in a place where they would be safe from others.” Glover, 267 N.C. App. at 320, 833 
S.E.2d at 207. Upon our careful review of the evidence presented at trial, we agree 
with the view of the Court of Appeals dissent that there was no evidence that 
defendant acted together with Stepp pursuant to any common plan or purpose 
regarding the controlled substances in the yellow tin; therefore, the trial court erred 
in giving a jury instruction on the theory of acting in concert. The evidence at trial 
tended to show that the yellow tin containing illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia 
was discovered in a dresser drawer in an area of a shared home that defendant 
considered his “personal area.” Although this fact could indicate defendant’s 
“capability to maintain control and dominion over” the tin, Brown, 310 N.C. at 568, 
313 S.E.2d at 588, and thereby support the theory of constructive possession, 
nonetheless the location of the tin, standing alone, does not shed light on any common 
plan or purpose which was devised between defendant and Stepp regarding the 
controlled substances in the yellow tin. Likewise, while the testimonial detail that a 
pill was discovered in defendant’s bedroom that was similar to pills found in the 
yellow tin could suggest that defendant had obtained the pill from the tin at issue, 
this circumstance would indicate, at most, defendant’s intent and capability to control 
the drugs in the tin—again, constructive possession—instead of a common plan or 
purpose in which defendant acted in concert with Stepp to protect her “hard time 
STATE V. GLOVER 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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stash.” Defendant acknowledged both having used illegal drugs on the day of the 
search and having used such drugs with Stepp in the past. While these admissions 
could potentially serve as “other incriminating circumstances” under a theory of 
constructive possession, id. at 569, 313 S.E.2d at 589, neither of them demonstrates 
the existence of a common plan or purpose between defendant and Stepp to possess 
the controlled substances in the yellow tin.  
Lastly, with regard to the evidence adduced at trial, defendant denied any 
knowledge that the tin was in the dresser in his personal area. Consistent with 
defendant’s unequivocal denial, Stepp testified that the yellow tin and its contents 
were hers alone and that she had not told defendant that she had placed the tin in 
the dresser drawer shortly before the search by law enforcement officers took place. 
This evidence does not support either of the theories of defendant’s guilt presented 
by the State of constructive possession of the drugs by defendant or acting in concert 
with Stepp pursuant to a common plan or purpose. Therefore, in reviewing all of the 
evidence at trial and determining the jury instructions which were correctly available 
for the trial court to deliver to the jury here, only a jury instruction premised on the 
theory of constructive possession properly qualifies, because the evidence is 
insufficient to support a jury instruction of acting in concert. State v. Hargett, 255 
N.C. 412, 415, 121 S.E.2d 589, 592 (1961) (holding that instructing the jury on aiding 
and abetting was error where the evidence at trial did not show that the defendant 
aided another person in committing the crime, but rather showed that the defendant 
STATE V. GLOVER 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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“was either guilty as the perpetrator or not guilty at all”). Accordingly, we agree with 
the dissenting judge of the Court of Appeals on this issue of the trial court’s erroneous 
jury instruction on defendant’s criminal culpability on the theory of acting in concert. 
In doing so, we find plausibility in the dissent’s view that the ability to conflate the 
theory of acting in concert and the theory of constructive possession with facts such 
as those presented in this case is tenable, as this confusion appears to plague the 
dissenting opinion of this Court.   
We next consider whether the trial court’s error was harmless; that is, whether 
there is a reasonable possibility that, absent the erroneous instruction, the jury would 
have reached a different verdict. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a); Malachi, 371 N.C. at 738, 
821 S.E.2d at 421. In this Court’s decision in Malachi, we emphasized that 
instructional errors like the one in the instant case are “exceedingly serious” and 
require “close scrutiny” to ensure that “there is no ‘reasonable possibility’ that the 
jury convicted the defendant on the basis of such an unsupported legal theory.” 371 
N.C. at 738, 821 S.E.2d at 421. Here, the heightened scrutiny referenced in Malachi 
is particularly important in light of the inherent likelihood of potential confusion 
between the theories of constructive possession and possession by acting in concert. 
See, e.g., State v. Diaz, 155 N.C. App. 307, 314, 575 S.E.2d 523, 528 (2002) (“The acting 
in concert theory is not generally applicable to possession offenses, as it tends to 
become confused with other theories of guilt.”); State v. Cotton, 102 N.C. App. 93,  97–
98, 401 S.E.2d 376, 379–80 (1991) (“An acting in concert theory is not generally 
STATE V. GLOVER 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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applied to possession offenses, as it tends to confuse the issues.”); State v. James, 81 
N.C. App. 91, 97, 344 S.E.2d 77, 81 (1986) (“We note that the acting in concert theory 
has not been frequently applied to possession offenses, as it tends to become confused 
with other theories of guilt.”).  
As we discussed upon determining the erroneous nature of the employment of 
the instruction on acting in concert here, there was some evidence at trial that would 
permit a jury to find defendant guilty under a theory of constructive possession: the 
yellow tin was secreted in an area of the shared home that defendant considered his 
personal area, defendant had a pill in his bedroom that was similar to pills found in 
the tin, and defendant admitted to being a user of at least one of the types of 
controlled substances found in the tin. On the other hand, there was also the trial 
evidence that defendant denied any knowledge of the yellow tin or its location in the 
dresser in his personal area, Stepp consistently admitted that the yellow tin 
contained her “hard time stash,” Stepp placed the tin and its illegal contents in the 
dresser drawer shortly before the tin’s discovery, and Stepp had not told defendant of 
the tin’s placement by her in defendant’s “personal space.” In Malachi, we observed 
that  
in the event that the State presents exceedingly strong 
evidence of defendant’s guilt on the basis of a theory that 
has sufficient support and the State’s evidence is neither in 
dispute nor subject to serious credibility-related questions, 
it is unlikely that a reasonable jury would elect to convict 
the defendant on the basis of an unsupported legal theory. 
 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Malachi, 371 N.C. at 738, 821 S.E.2d at 421 (emphasis added). Here, the State’s 
evidence supporting the theory of constructive possession was both “in dispute” and 
“subject to serious credibility-related questions” and, while certainly sufficient to 
warrant a jury instruction, was controverted and not “exceedingly strong.” Id. Given 
this circumstance, coupled with the recognized prospect of confusion presented by 
proceeding upon the theory of possession by acting in concert in conjunction with the 
theory of constructive possession, we conclude that there is a “reasonable possibility 
that, had the [trial court not instructed on acting in concert], a different result would 
have been reached.” As a result, we also agree with the dissenting position of the 
lower appellate court in evaluating the extent of the trial court’s error. 
Conclusion 
 
In light of our determination that the trial court committed prejudicial error 
in its instruction to the jury on the theory of acting in concert as a basis upon which 
to find defendant guilty, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, vacate 
defendant’s convictions and resulting judgments against him, and determine that 
defendant is entitled to a new trial. 
 
REVERSED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice NEWBY dissenting. 
 
The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the State when 
considering whether it was sufficient to warrant a jury instruction, much like when 
reviewing a motion to dismiss based on the sufficiency of the evidence. See State v. 
Taylor, 337 N.C. 597, 608, 447 S.E.2d 360, 367–68 (1994) (considering the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the State when reviewing whether an acting-in-concert 
instruction was supported by the evidence). Under a sufficiency of the evidence 
standard, “the State is entitled to every reasonable intendment and every reasonable 
inference to be drawn from the evidence; contradictions and discrepancies do not 
warrant dismissal of the case—they are for the jury to resolve.” State v. Earnhardt, 
307 N.C. 62, 67, 296 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1982).  
Here the majority does not consider the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the State but rather relies on Ms. Stepp’s statements of exclusive ownership. By doing 
so, it singles out certain evidence for consideration rather than reviewing the totality 
of the evidence, including that defendant admitted to having just used the specific 
drugs that were later found only in the yellow tin, under the proper standard. 
Considering Ms. Stepp’s statements in the light most favorable to the State, I agree 
with the Court of Appeals that there 
was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have . . . 
determined that [d]efendant acted in concert to aid Ms. 
Stepp’s 
constructive 
possession 
of 
the 
controlled 
substances found in the metal tin. Specifically, [d]efendant 
STATE V. GLOVER 
 
Newby, J., dissenting 
 
 
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called Ms. Stepp, who testified that she placed the metal 
tin in the dresser in [d]efendant’s personal space, that the 
drugs therein were hers, that she intended to come back 
later to use them, and that she and [d]efendant had taken 
drugs together in the past. This testimony is evidence that 
Ms. Stepp possessed (constructively) the drugs in the metal 
tin. Further, based on Ms. Stepp’s testimony along with the 
State’s evidence, the jury could have found that [d]efendant 
was aware of the presence of the drugs in the metal tin: (1) 
he admitted to the detective to having just used 
methamphetamine, and the only methamphetamine found 
in the house was in the metal tin; and (2) he admitted to 
the detective to having just ingested prescription pills, and 
a pill found in his bedroom matched a pill found in the 
metal tin. And the evidence was sufficient to support 
findings that (1) [d]efendant facilitated Ms. Stepp’s 
constructive possession by allowing her to keep her drugs 
in a place where they would be safe from others; (2) 
[d]efendant did not intend to exert control over the 
disposition of those remaining drugs, as they belonged to 
his friend, Ms. Stepp, and that she controlled their 
disposition; and (3) [d]efendant was actually present when 
the drugs were in Ms. Stepp’s constructive possession. 
 
State v. Glover, 267 N.C. App. 315, 319–20, 833 S.E.2d 203, 207 (2019). The jury could 
reasonably find from the evidence presented that a common plan or purpose existed 
between defendant and Ms. Stepp to possess the controlled substances in the yellow 
tin. When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence presented was 
sufficient to support the trial court’s instruction; the jury resolves any contradictions 
and discrepancies in the evidence. Thus, the trial court properly instructed the jury 
on the theory of possession by acting in concert. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.