Case Title: In re McDonough

Citation: 

Docket Number: S49503

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2003-10-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed: October 2, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re Complaint as to the Conduct of 
MICHAEL MCDONOUGH,
									Accused.
(OSB 00-20; SC S49503)
	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
	Argued and submitted May 5, 2003.
	J. Michael Alexander, Salem, argued the cause and submitted
the brief for the accused.
	Martha M. Hicks, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake
Oswego, filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.*
	PER CURIAM
	The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of 18 months, effective 60 days from the filing of this
decision.
	*Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
		PER CURIAM
		In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (Bar) charged Michael L. McDonough (the accused) with
violating Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule
(DR) 1-102(A)(2) (committing criminal act that reflects adversely
upon lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice
law) and with being subject to discipline under ORS 9.527(1)
(conduct justifying denial of admission to Bar).  A trial panel
of the Disciplinary Board concluded that the accused was guilty
of the alleged misconduct and imposed an 18-month suspension. 
Our review is automatic, ORS 9.536(2); BR 10.1, and de novo, ORS
9.536(3); BR 10.6.  The Bar has the burden of establishing the
alleged misconduct by clear and convincing evidence.  BR 5.2. 
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the accused
violated DR 1-102(A)(2) and is subject to discipline under ORS
9.527(1).  We also conclude that an 18-month suspension from the
practice of law is the appropriate sanction for that misconduct.
		The following facts are undisputed.  In three separate
incidents that occurred between 1983 and 1985, the accused twice
committed the crime of Reckless Driving, a Class A misdemeanor,
and twice committed the crime of Driving Under the Influence of
Intoxicants (DUII), also a Class A misdemeanor.  
		In 1994, the accused again was charged with the crime
of DUII, for which he ultimately was convicted in 1996.  The
accused unsuccessfully appealed his conviction, and, in January
1998, he was fined and sentenced to 30 days in jail (with 28 days
suspended), he was placed on probation for 12 months, and his
driver license was suspended for one year.  Nine months later, in
September and early October of 1998, the accused was charged with 
Driving While Suspended, a Class A misdemeanor, on three separate
occasions.
		On October 11, 1998, the accused and his then-
girlfriend, Wardell, spent an evening drinking heavily at a
tavern in Salem.  Although the accused knew that Wardell was
intoxicated, he allowed her to drive when they left the tavern. 
Wardell drove to Interstate 5, and, on the freeway entrance ramp,
the accused and Wardell became engaged in a physical struggle. 
The accused ultimately pulled Wardell out of the vehicle by her
hair and ordered her to get into the passenger seat of the
vehicle.  When Wardell refused, the accused started to drive, and
Wardell jumped on the hood of the vehicle.  The accused continued
to drive onto the freeway and then attempted to throw Wardell off
the vehicle by hitting his brakes.  After he had driven
approximately a quarter of a mile with Wardell still clinging to
the hood of the vehicle, a state police trooper stopped and
arrested the accused.  The accused registered a blood alcohol
level of 0.14, and he was charged with Driving While Suspended,
DUII, Assault in the Fourth Degree, Recklessly Endangering
Another Person, and Reckless Driving.  Wardell suffered minor
injuries from the incident.
		From the charges from that incident on October, 11,
1998, together with the accused's three prior 1998 Driving While
Suspended charges, the accused ultimately was convicted of two
counts of Driving While Suspended, one count of DUII, and one
count of Recklessly Endangering Another Person.  For those
convictions, in February 1999, the accused was fined and
sentenced to 12 days in jail, he was placed on probation for 24
months, and his driver license was suspended for three years.
		Six months later, in August 1999, the accused again was
charged with the crime of Driving While Suspended, for which he
was convicted in December 1999.  For that conviction, the accused
was sentenced to 180 days in jail (with 150 days suspended).
		Finally, on January 24, 2001, and on September 5, 2001,
the accused again was charged with Driving While Suspended.  Both
those charges subsequently were dismissed.
		In October 2001, the Bar filed a Second Amended Formal
Complaint, alleging that the accused had violated DR 1-102(A)(2)
and was subject to discipline under ORS 9.527(1) because he had
committed the following criminal acts: 
		"1. In 1983, Reckless Driving, a Class A
Misdemeanor;
		"2. In 1984, Driving Under the Influence of
Intoxicants and Reckless Driving, Class A Misdemeanors;
		"3. On August 19, 1985,  Driving Under the
Influence of Intoxicants, a Class A Misdemeanor;
		"4. On December 27, 1994, Driving Under the
Influence of Intoxicants, a Class A Misdemeanor;
		"5. On September 22, 1998, Driving While
Suspended, a Class A Misdemeanor;
		"6. On September 30, 1998, Driving While
Suspended, a Class A Misdemeanor;
		"7. On October 6, 1998, Driving While Suspended, a
Class A Misdemeanor;
		"8. On October 11, 1998, Driving While
Suspended/Revoked, a Class A Misdemeanor;
		"9. On October 11, 1998, Driving Under the
Influence of Intoxicants, a Class A Misdemeanor;  
		"10. On October 11, 1998, Recklessly Endangering
Another, a Class A Misdemeanor;
		"11. On October 11, 1998, Assault IV, a Class A
Misdemeanor;
		"12. On October 11, 1998, Reckless Driving, a
Class A Misdemeanor;
		"13. August 12, 1999, a violation of probation;
		"14. On August 12, 1999, Driving While Suspended,
a Class A Misdemeanor;
		"15. On January 24, 2001, Driving While 	Suspended, a Class A Misdemeanor;
		"16. On September 5, 2001, Driving While
Suspended, a Class A Misdemeanor."
		At the disciplinary hearing in January 2002, the trial
panel determined that the accused had committed all the alleged
criminal acts and that, in doing so, had violated DR 1-102(A)(2)
and was subject to discipline under ORS 9.527(1).  As noted, for
that misconduct, the trial panel suspended the accused from the
practice of law for a period of 18 months.
		On review, the accused admits to all the criminal
conduct that the Bar alleges, except the two allegations of
Driving While Suspended on January 24, 2001, and on September 5,
2001 (acts 15 and 16 in the Bar's Second Amended Formal
Complaint).  He disputes, however, that his criminal acts
constitute a violation of DR 1-102(A)(2) or cause him to be
subject to discipline under ORS 9.527(1).  He also contends that,
in any event, the 18-month suspension that the trial panel
imposed is an excessive sanction.
		From our review of the record, we agree with the
accused that the Bar has failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the accused was guilty of Driving While
Suspended in January and September of 2001.  We accept the
accused's admission as to the truth of the other alleged criminal
acts.  On de novo review, we now must determine whether, by
engaging in such criminal conduct, the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(2) and is subject to discipline under ORS 9.527(1) and, if
so, the appropriate sanction for that misconduct.		DR 1-102(A)(2) provides:
		"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to 
	* * * [c]ommit a criminal act that reflects adversely
on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to
practice law[.]"
		As noted, the accused here admits to committing the
following Class A misdemeanors: (1) four acts of DUII, ORS
813.010; (2) five acts of Driving While Suspended, ORS 811.182;
(3) three acts of Reckless Driving, ORS 811.140; (4) one act of
Assault in the Fourth Degree, ORS 163.160; and (5) one act of
Recklessly Endangering Another Person, ORS 163.195.  He also
admits to a probation violation.  In light of those admissions,
the focus of our inquiry under DR 1-102(A)(2) is whether the
accused's criminal acts reflect adversely upon his "honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness to practice law[.]" 
		The Bar does not contend that the criminal acts at
issue raise doubts as to the accused's honesty or
trustworthiness; rather, the Bar contends that those acts reflect
adversely upon the accused's fitness to practice law.  In In re
White, 311 Or 573, 589, 815 P2d 1257 (1991), this court explained
that, for a criminal act to reflect adversely upon an accused
lawyer's fitness to practice law within the meaning of DR 1-102(A)(2), a rational connection must exist between the criminal
conduct and the accused lawyer's fitness to practice law aside
from the fact of the criminality of the act alone.  The court in
White identified a number of factors that this court considers in
making that determination, including:
	"the lawyer's mental state; the extent to which the act
demonstrates disrespect for the law or law enforcement; 
the presence or absence of a victim; the extent of
actual or potential injury to a victim; and the
presence or absence of a pattern of criminal conduct."
Id.
		Applying those factors here, we agree with the Bar that
the accused's criminal acts reflect adversely upon his fitness to
practice law.  The accused knew that the law prohibited him from
driving while he was intoxicated and while his license was
suspended; however, despite that knowledge and despite criminal
sanctions that he had received for such conduct, the accused
nevertheless repeatedly chose to drive in violation of those
laws.  Based upon those facts, we conclude that the accused's
repeated criminal offenses were intentional and demonstrated a
substantial disrespect for the law.  See In re Lawrence, 332 Or
502, 510, 31 P3d 1078 (2001) (when accused lawyer knew of duty to
file tax returns timely, his repeated failure to do so was
intentional and reflected disrespect for law).  In addition,
every time that he chose to drive while intoxicated, the accused
risked serious bodily injury to others, and, on October 11, 1998,
he in fact caused bodily injury to Wardell.  Finally, the
accused's multiple acts of driving while intoxicated and while
his license was suspended reveal a pattern of criminal conduct. 
The accused is guilty of violating DR 1-102(A)(2).
		The Bar also alleges that, by committing the above
criminal acts, the accused is subject to discipline under this
court's authority set out in ORS 9.527(1), which provides:
		"The Supreme Court may disbar, suspend or
reprimand a member of the bar whenever, upon proper
proceedings for that purpose, it appears to the court
that * * * [t]he member has committed an act or carried
on a course of conduct of such nature that, if the
member were applying for admission to the bar, the
application should be denied[.]"
		ORS 9.220 provides, in part:
		"An applicant for admission as attorney must * * *
show that the applicant * * * [i]s a person of good
moral character and fit to practice law. * * * For
purposes of this section[,] * * * the lack of 'good
moral character' may be established by reference to
acts or conduct that reflect moral turpitude or to acts
or conduct which would cause a reasonable person to
have substantial doubts about the individual's honesty,
fairness and respect for the rights of others and for
the laws of the state and the nation.  The conduct or
acts in question should be rationally connected to the
applicant's fitness to practice law."		
As discussed above, the accused's criminal conduct,
particularly his refusal to abide by sanctions imposed for that
conduct, reflects a substantial disrespect for the law and
rationally is connected to the question of his fitness to
practice law.  Because such conduct would cause us to deny the
accused's admission if he were an applicant to the Bar, we
conclude that the accused also is subject to discipline under ORS
9.527(1).  See In re Rowell, 305 Or 584, 586-88, 754 P2d 905
(1988) (applicant's criminal activity demonstrated lack of
requisite moral character for admission to Bar at time of
conduct). (1)
		Having concluded that the accused is guilty of
violating DR 1-102(A)(2) and is subject to discipline under ORS
9.527(1), we now must determine the appropriate sanction.  In
doing so, we follow this court's well-established methodology by
referring to the American Bar Association's Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards)
and to this court's case law for guidance.  See, e.g., In re
Kimmell, 332 Or 480, 487-88, 31 P3d 414 (2001) (describing
methodology).
		Under the ABA Standards, we first make a preliminary
determination of the appropriate sanction by considering the duty
that the accused violated, the accused's mental state, and the
injury that the accused's misconduct caused.  ABA Standard 3.0. 
In this case, the accused violated his duty to the public to
maintain his personal integrity when he engaged in repeated acts
of unlawful conduct.  ABA Standard 5.1; see Kimmell, 332 Or at
488 (accused lawyer violated duty to maintain personal integrity
by engaging in illegal conduct).  As previously noted, the
accused's conduct here was intentional, and he caused actual
injury to Wardell on October 11, 1998, and potential injury to
the public every time that he drove while intoxicated.  Moreover,
when he repeatedly chose to drive after his driver license was
suspended for his crimes of driving while intoxicated, the
accused caused actual injury to the legal system by undermining
the orders that had suspended his driving privileges and by
demonstrating an indifference to the law.  The accused's criminal
offenses also caused potential injury to the legal profession by
damaging the public's confidence in lawyers.  The preliminary
sanction under the ABA Standards for such conduct is a suspension
from the practice of law.  ABA Standard 5.12. 
		We next consider the existence of any aggravating or
mitigating circumstances that may affect the degree of the
sanction to be imposed.  ABA Standard 3.0.  In this proceeding,
we find several aggravating factors.  When he drove after his
driver license had been suspended, the accused acted with a
selfish motive, that is, to serve his own personal convenience. 
ABA Standard 9.22(b).  The accused also engaged in a pattern of
misconduct by repeatedly committing multiple criminal offenses. 
ABA Standard 9.22(c).  In addition, the accused has substantial
experience in the practice of law, having been admitted to the
Bar in 1976.  ABA Standard 9.22(i).  Finally, we agree with the
trial panel that the accused has failed to appreciate the
seriousness of his misconduct.  ABA Standard 9.22(g).
In mitigation, we first note that chemical dependency,
including alcoholism, can operate as a mitigating factor when the
accused lawyer shows that (1) there is medical evidence that such
a dependency exists; (2) the dependency caused the misconduct;
(3) the accused lawyer has accomplished a meaningful and
sustained period of recovery from such dependency; and (4) the
recovery arrested the misconduct, and recurrence of the
misconduct is unlikely.  ABA Standard 9.32(i) (amended 1992); see
In re Murdock, 328 Or 18, 29-30, 968 P2d 1270 (1998) (discussing
those factors).  In this proceeding, we determine that the
accused has provided medical evidence that he suffers from
alcoholism.  However, because a number of the accused's criminal
acts involved no use of alcohol at all, we cannot say that the
accused's struggle with alcoholism caused all his misconduct.  In
addition, although the accused declares that he now recognizes
the need for treatment of his alcoholism, the accused has not
established that he has accomplished a meaningful and sustained
recovery from his alcohol dependency.  We therefore conclude that
the mitigating factor of chemical dependency is inapplicable to
this proceeding. (2) 
		We find the existence of several other mitigating
factors.  The accused has no prior disciplinary record, ABA
Standard 9.32(a), and he introduced evidence that he has a
reputation for honesty in the legal community, ABA Standard
9.32(g).  The accused also cooperated during the disciplinary
proceeding, ABA Standard 9.32(e), and other penalties have been
imposed against the accused in the form of criminal sanctions,
ABA Standard 9.32(k).  In addition, in determining the
appropriate sanction for the accused's misconduct, we place
diminished weight upon the accused's criminal acts that occurred
in 1983, 1984, and 1985, because of the lengthy delay between the
time that the accused committed those criminal offenses and the
Bar's pursuit of disciplinary proceedings.  See ABA Standard
9.32(j) (amended 1992) (delay in disciplinary proceedings is
mitigating factor). 
		We now turn to a consideration of the appropriate
sanction in light of this court's case law.  The accused argues
that this court should craft a sanction to address the accused's
alcohol dependency by imposing a period of probation with the
condition that the accused participate in alcohol treatment.  The
Bar disagrees and contends that the 18-month suspension that the
trial panel imposed is the appropriate sanction.
		In considering the appropriate sanction for
disciplinary violations involving criminal conduct, this court
previously has observed that
	"[p]roceedings for the discipline of an attorney are
not to punish the attorney for the commission of a
crime.  That matter is left to the criminal courts. 
The objects of the proceedings here are to uphold the
dignity and respect of the profession, protect the
courts, preserve the administration of justice and
protect clients."
In re Carstens, 297 Or 155, 166, 683 P2d 992 (1984); see also
Kimmell, 332 Or at 488 (same).  
		To protect the public and to uphold the respect of the
legal profession, this court's case law demonstrates that
disbarment or a lengthy suspension generally is appropriate when
a lawyer intentionally has committed criminal acts in violation
of DR 1-102(A)(2).  See, e.g., In re Davenport, 334 Or 298, 49
P3d 91, modified and adh'd to on recons, 335 Or 67, 57 P3d 897
(2002) (accused lawyer suspended for two years for false
statements under oath in violation of DR 1-102(A)(2), among other
violations); In re Albrecht, 333 Or 520, 42 P3d 887 (2002)
(accused lawyer disbarred for participation in criminal money
laundering scheme in violation of DR 1-102(A)(2), among other
violations); In re Gustafson, 333 Or 468, 41 P3d 1063 (2002)
(accused lawyer disbarred for false testimony under oath and
violating juvenile expungement order in violation of DR 1-102(A)(2), among other violations); In re Kirkman, 313 Or 181,
830 P2d 206 (1992) (accused lawyer disbarred for forgery, false
declaration, and bigamy in violation of DR 1-102(A)(2) and DR 1-102(A)(3)).  
		In Kimmell, 332 Or 480, this court imposed a six-month
suspension upon an accused lawyer who had committed a single act
of second-degree theft.  In imposing that sanction, the court
stated that it considered theft, even theft that did not involve
a violation of a fiduciary duty, to be a serious act of
misconduct that demonstrated a disrespect for the law.  Id. at
491.  The court further noted that, in that case, the accused
lawyer had acted intentionally and that multiple aggravating
factors, but only one mitigating factor, applied.  Id. at 488-90.
		In In re Allen, 326 Or 107, 949 P2d 710 (1997), this
court imposed a one-year suspension upon an accused lawyer who
had committed criminal acts of attempted possession of a
controlled substance and aiding and abetting another in the
commission of a crime.  In doing so, the court emphasized that it
was convinced that the accused lawyer's misconduct was an
aberration that was inconsistent with the accused lawyer's
general good character and that similar misconduct was unlikely
to reoccur.  Id. at 130.  The court also stressed that, in that
case, the mitigating factors substantially outweighed the
aggravating factors.  Id.  Nevertheless, in light of the
seriousness of his criminal conduct and, particularly, the fact
that the accused lawyer's misconduct had contributed to the death
of another person, the court concluded that a lengthy suspension
was warranted.  Id. at 130-31.
Unlike the accused lawyers either in Kimmell or in
Allen, the accused here engaged in criminal conduct time and time
again.  The accused's repeated criminal acts and, particularly,
his refusal to abide by sanctions imposed for his criminal
conduct, reflect a substantial disrespect for the law.  In
addition, although his misconduct here did not culminate in such
serious consequences to others as did the accused lawyer's
misconduct in Allen, the accused's conduct on October 11, 1998,
risked serious bodily harm to Wardell, and, every time that he
chose to drive while intoxicated, the accused risked serious harm
to the public.  Unlike the accused lawyer in Allen, the accused
also acted with a selfish motive, that is, to avoid his own
personal inconvenience, when he repeatedly drove when his driver
license was suspended.  In addition, as noted, we agree with the
trial panel that the accused has failed to appreciate the
seriousness of his misconduct. 
		Although a number of mitigating factors also apply in
this proceeding, we find that the above listed aggravating
factors outweigh those mitigating factors.  The accused's
repeated criminal acts persuade us that the accused presently
lacks good moral character and fitness to practice law.  We agree
with the trial panel that the appropriate sanction is a
suspension from the practice of law for a period of 18 months. 
		The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of 18 months, effective 60 days from the filing of this
decision.



1. 	Although we conclude that the accused is subject to
discipline under ORS 9.527(1), that finding does not enhance the
sanction for the accused's misconduct in light of our
determination that the accused's conduct also constituted a
violation of DR 1-102(A)(2).  See In re Kimmell, 332 Or 480, 487,
31 P3d 414 (2001) (noting that this court's finding that same
conduct violated both Code of Professional Responsibility and
provision of ORS chapter 9 generally has not served to enhance
sanction).

2. 	On review, the accused argues that the trial panel
erred by admitting the testimony of a number of witnesses whose
testimony related to the accused's use of alcohol and his
compliance with alcohol treatment because, according to the
accused, that testimony was not relevant to any issue in the
disciplinary proceeding.  See BR 5.1(a) (trial panel should
exclude irrelevant evidence in disciplinary hearing).  We
disagree.  Although that testimony was not relevant to the issue
whether the accused had committed the alleged misconduct, that
evidence was relevant to the issue of the appropriate sanction
and, particularly, the existence of the mitigating factor of
chemical dependency.  The trial panel did not err by admitting
that evidence.