Case Title: In re Adoption of Patty

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13220

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-05-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13220 
 
ADOPTION OF PATTY.1 
 
 
 
Essex.     March 7, 2022. - May 9, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Parent and Child, Adoption, Dispensing with parent's consent to 
adoption.  Adoption, Dispensing with parent's consent.  
Minor, Adoption.  Due Process of Law, Adoption, Presence of 
party in courtroom. 
 
 
 
Petition filed in the Essex County Division of the Juvenile 
Court Department on November 26, 2014. 
 
The case was heard by Garrett J. McManus, J., and a motion 
for a new trial, filed on June 25, 2021, was considered by him. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Alison R. Bancroft for the mother. 
Sherrie Krasner for the child. 
Lynne M. Murphy for Department of Children and Families. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
Masha Zilberman, Katherine Nemens, & Phillip Kassel for 
Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee. 
Ann Balmelli O'Connor, Samuel A. Aylesworth, Sarah 
LoPresti, & Karen Owen Talley, Committee for Public Counsel 
 
1 A pseudonym. 
2 
 
 
Services, & Maria Durant, Jerome McManus, J. Leon Smith, Jr., 
Tatum A. Pritchard, Jessica Berry, Deborah Silva, Chauncey B. 
Wood, Martin W. Healey, & Jamie Ann Sabino for Committee for 
Public Counsel Services & others. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  Given the special circumstances presented by 
the COVID-19 pandemic and its related restrictions on the 
ability of the Juvenile Court to conduct in-person proceedings, 
and in light of the unique and often time-sensitive interests 
involved in proceedings concerning the care and protection of 
children, we conclude that the use of an Internet-based video 
conferencing platform to conduct a trial on the issue whether to 
terminate a party's parental rights does not present a per se 
violation of due process provided that adequate safeguards are 
employed.  Lamentably, the first day of the two-day virtual 
bench trial conducted in this case was plagued by technological 
issues and inadequate safeguards, resulting in the self-
represented mother's inability to participate either by video or 
by telephone, interrupting the testimony of the witnesses 
presented by the Department of Children and Families 
(department) during its case-in-chief, causing the mother to 
miss all but a few minutes of the department's evidence against 
her, and leading the judge to acknowledge that plowing ahead in 
the mother's absence may be creating an "appealable issue."  
When the virtual trial resumed two days later, the mother was 
provided an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses whose 
3 
 
 
testimonies she had missed; however, the damage was done.  The 
judge, who eventually determined to take an adverse inference in 
light of the mother's "absence" on the first day of trial, 
issued a decree terminating the mother's parental rights to the 
child.2  See G. L. c. 119, § 26.  He also denied her request for 
a new trial.  We acknowledge that the mother's conduct on the 
second trial day was not above reproach; however, because the 
conduct of the trial violated the mother's right to due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and art. 10 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, we are 
required to vacate the decree insofar as it concerns the mother, 
and remand for a new trial.3 
1.  Background.  The subject child has been in the custody 
of the department since 2014, when she was four years old and 
the underlying petition was filed pursuant to G. L. c. 119, 
§ 24, alleging that she was a child in need of care and 
 
2 The judge also terminated the parental rights of the 
father, who did not participate in the trial and has not 
appealed. 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus letter submitted by Mental 
Health Legal Advisor's Committee and the amicus brief submitted 
by Committee for Public Counsel Services, Boston Bar 
Association, Citizens for Juvenile Justice, Children's Law 
Center of Massachusetts, Disability Law Center, Juvenile Rights 
Advocacy Program at Boston College Law School, Massachusetts 
Appleseed Center for Law and Justice, Massachusetts Association 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Massachusetts Bar Association, and 
Massachusetts Law Reform Institute. 
4 
 
 
protection.  In 2015, the department was granted permanent 
custody of the child, with the stipulation of the mother and the 
father; the goal, at that time, was working toward 
reunification.4  In 2016, the goal changed to adoption, and in 
2018, the child was placed with a preadoptive family, with whom 
she remains to this day. 
On September 9, 2020, a bench trial commenced to determine 
whether it was in the best interest of the child to terminate 
the mother's and the father's parental rights.  See G. L. 
c. 119, § 26 (b) (4).5  At the time, the Commonwealth was 
operating under a state of emergency declared by the Governor in 
response to the outbreak of COVID-19.  See Governor's 
Declaration of Emergency (Mar. 10, 2020).  Also, in an effort to 
stem transmission of the highly contagious respiratory disease, 
the Massachusetts court system was operating under one of a 
series of orders issued by this court that restricted in-person 
proceedings and required "most court business" to be conducted 
"virtually."  See Third Updated Order Regarding Court Operations 
 
4 Effectively, the father has been uninvolved in the child's 
life since she was permanently placed in the department's 
custody. 
 
5 A trial was held in person in January 2020 before a 
different Juvenile Court judge and resulted in the issuance of a 
decree terminating the mother's and the father's parental rights 
to the child.  The decree was vacated, however, for reasons that 
are not apparent from the appellate record. 
5 
 
 
Under the Exigent Circumstances Created by the COVID-19 
(Coronavirus) Pandemic, No. OE-144 (June 24, 2020).  In 
addition, the trial courts had issued COVID-19-related orders to 
address procedures in their respective courts.  Relevant to the 
present case, the Juvenile Court's order covering the relevant 
time period allowed termination trials to proceed at the 
discretion of the trial judge, but only virtually.  See Juvenile 
Court Standing Order 8-20(IV)(B) (2020).  As a result, the trial 
in the present case proceeded via a video conferencing platform 
provided by Zoom Video Communications, Inc. (Zoom). 
When the trial commenced, the judge, the clerk, the 
department's attorney, the child's attorney, and the mother's 
stand-by counsel6 were each connected to the virtual hearing room 
by video.  The mother, who was self-represented, was not 
connected, and it quickly became apparent that she had not been 
provided with instructions on how to join the proceedings.  
Stand-by counsel informed the judge that she had been in 
communication with the mother and understood that the mother 
wanted to participate, but did "not have video capacity."  
 
6 During the course of the child's case, the mother was 
represented by eight different attorneys, six of whom were 
allowed to withdraw due to breakdowns in communication with her.  
When the eighth attorney moved to withdraw shortly before trial, 
the judge, who was concerned that the mother was using it as "a 
delaying tactic," denied the request.  He allowed the mother to 
proceed pro se, however, with the eighth attorney acting as 
stand-by counsel. 
6 
 
 
Noting that there was a telephone number that could be used to 
connect to the Zoom proceedings by telephone, the judge recessed 
the proceedings for thirty minutes, while stand-by counsel 
provided the telephone number to the mother. 
When the trial resumed, the mother was connected by 
telephone, permitting her to hear but not to see the 
proceedings.  She informed the judge that she was currently 
living outside Massachusetts in a home she had rented for the 
summer due to the pandemic; and she moved to conduct the trial 
in person.  No inquiry was conducted regarding her access to 
technology that might allow her to participate in the Zoom 
hearing via video, so as to be on equal footing with the other 
participants.  Instead, the judge denied the mother's motion, 
stating "we're not doing in-person hearings at this point," and 
asked the department to call its first witness. 
The first witness, who appeared by video, was a department 
social worker who had been assigned to the case.  Shortly after 
the direct examination began, the technological problems that 
were to plague the first day of the virtual trial ensued.  
Specifically, the clerk realized that the mother had been 
disconnected from the virtual hearing room, but had attempted to 
7 
 
 
rejoin and was in the Zoom "waiting room."7  With the judge's 
permission, the clerk readmitted her to the virtual hearing 
room, and the trial resumed.  The record of the first day of the 
trial does not reflect how much of the first witness's testimony 
the mother missed before the clerk noticed her absence. 
After the department finished its direct examination of the 
first witness and the child's attorney conducted a short cross-
examination, the judge asked the mother if she had any 
questions.  The mother did not respond, although her telephone 
number still appeared on the screen, suggesting she might still 
be connected.8  The judge had the clerk place a telephone call to 
the mother's telephone number, which apparently was connected to 
the Zoom hearing; however, the mother did not answer, and the 
clerk left a message.  The judge directed the clerk to move the 
mother to the waiting room, hoping that would prompt her to ask 
to be readmitted.  Nothing in the record suggests that the 
 
7 According to Zoom, the host can control when participants 
join the hearing or meeting by admitting them, one by one or all 
at once, from the "waiting room," and can return participants to 
the "waiting room."  Zoom, Using Waiting Room (updated Mar. 22, 
2022), https://support.zoom.us/hc/en-us/articles/115000332726-
Using-Waiting-Room [https://perma.cc/QLJ6-W3PF]. 
 
8 According to the clerk, Zoom "highlighted" the trial 
participant who was speaking the loudest at any given moment.  
Every time the other participants were quiet, it would highlight 
the mother's connection, "which means there's noise happening 
where she is." 
8 
 
 
mother understood either that she was being moved to the waiting 
room or how to ask to be readmitted. 
When this attempt at troubleshooting did not have the 
desired effect, the judge directed the clerk to readmit the 
mother to the virtual hearing room, and the judge stated:  "I'm 
assuming there's some technical reason that you cannot join us.  
If there is a legitimate reason then you can hang up and try to 
call back in, reestablish the connection.  So I'm hoping you can 
hear me.  We really would like to have you participate in the 
hearing."  The mother did not respond.  After further suggesting 
that the mother call stand-by counsel to "[l]et us know what's 
going on," the judge had the clerk disconnect the mother from 
the hearing altogether.  It is not clear that the mother could 
hear the judge's statements. 
The department, meanwhile, asked the judge to draw an 
adverse inference against the mother for failing to participate, 
but he declined to do so because he could not determine whether 
her lack of participation was purposeful.  He then excused the 
first witness, subject to being recalled if the mother had a 
"legitimate reason" for her absence, and recessed the trial for 
one-half hour. 
Following the recess, the mother still was absent and had 
not contacted the clerk or stand-by counsel.  The judge 
concluded, "I don't think we have any choice but to continue.  
9 
 
 
It's possible that this could create an appealable issue, but we 
have tried just about everything we can to get mother engaged.  
I don't know if this is purposeful on her part, or not." 
The department called its second witness, another social 
worker assigned to the child's case, who appeared by video.  As 
soon as the direct examination commenced, the technological 
issues continued; the judge had difficulty hearing the witness.  
In an attempt to improve the connection, the witness 
disconnected from Zoom and rejoined.  The technological issues 
persisted, and the judge told the witness "to pretend" she was 
"yelling" at the department's attorney, so as to be heard.  
After the examination resumed, it was interrupted again due to 
the witness's connection "breaking up."  Eventually, the 
department completed its direct examination, and the child's 
attorney conducted a brief cross-examination. 
The department called its third witness, one of the child's 
current social workers, who also appeared by video.  Within 
minutes, however, the technological issues resurfaced; this time 
the witness's connection froze.  As a result, the clerk had to 
"knock her out" of the virtual hearing, hopeful that she would 
"come right back."  The witness tried to reconnect by video, 
without success.  Instead, she reconnected and continued her 
testimony by telephone. 
10 
 
 
During a lunch break, stand-by counsel attempted to contact 
the mother by sending a text message to her cellular telephone.  
When the break ended, the mother had not rejoined the trial.  
The judge decided to continue with the trial nevertheless, and 
the department completed its examination of the third witness. 
The department indicated that it had intended to call the 
mother as its fourth and final witness and repeated its request 
for the judge to draw an adverse inference from her absence.  
The judge again refused:  "I'm not going to do that.  Not unless 
I know what the reason for her absence is."  Instead, the judge 
suspended the trial for two days and issued a summons to be 
served on the mother at her last known address. 
The trial resumed two days later, again via Zoom.  
Following some initial difficulty, the mother managed to connect 
by telephone.  Once she was admitted from the waiting room, she 
informed the judge that her cellular telephone service had been 
"really bad" on the first day of trial; she could hear, but not 
be heard.  The judge did not inquire as to the extent of the 
first witness's testimony she had managed to hear on the first 
day prior to being disconnected.  Instead, the judge asked if 
she was ready to question that witness.  After again objecting 
to the denial of her request for an in-person trial, the mother 
responded affirmatively.  The department's attorney contacted 
the first witness and asked her to rejoin the proceedings. 
11 
 
 
As that was happening, the mother declared, "I'm done.  I'm 
so fucking done with this."  She then "hung up."  The judge 
determined to draw an adverse inference against the mother.  He 
dismissed the first witness and directed the department to begin 
closing argument. 
Shortly after the closing argument commenced, the mother 
reconnected to the trial, again by telephone.  The first witness 
rejoined the virtual hearing, and the judge allowed the mother 
to proceed with cross-examination.  When one of her first 
questions drew an objection, however, the mother declared, "This 
is a mock trial because of COVID.  I have plenty of paperwork 
here.  There's no way I can produce my evidence."  After 
confirming that the mother had no further questions for the 
first witness and did not "want to question anybody," the judge 
had the parties complete closing arguments.  The mother's 
closing argument was brief and consisted of a request for a 
"fair trial."  The judge took the matter under advisement. 
Three days later, the judge issued his decision, declaring 
the mother and the father unfit and terminating their rights to 
receive notice of or to consent to the child's adoption.  Nine 
months later, he issued extensive findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in support of the decision.  In the meantime, 
the mother moved for a new trial on the ground that the virtual 
trial violated due process.  In a supporting affidavit, she 
12 
 
 
asserted that she heard only six or seven minutes of the first 
witness's testimony on the first day of trial due to poor 
cellular telephone service, despite driving around in a car in 
search of a better signal.  She further asserted that she had 
tried to dial back in, without success, and that she had called 
the clerk's office, but could not be reconnected to the virtual 
trial.  The judge denied the motion without a hearing. 
The mother appealed from the termination of her parental 
rights9 and the denial of her motion for a new trial.  The 
appeals were consolidated in the Appeals Court, and we 
transferred the case to this court sua sponte. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "In deciding 
whether to terminate a parent's rights, a judge must determine 
whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the parent 
 
9 The mother's notice of appeal was filed five days late, 
but the judge, over the department's and the child's objections, 
allowed the late filing after finding that it was the product of 
excusable neglect.  See Mass. R. A. P. 4 (c), as appearing in 
481 Mass. 1606 (2019) (upon showing of excusable neglect, court 
may extend time for filing notice of appeal for period not to 
exceed thirty days from original deadline).  The child cross-
appealed from that ruling.  The department did not appeal and 
concedes that the judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing 
the late filing.  See Care & Protection of Minor, 478 Mass. 
1015, 1015 (2017) (ruling on motion for leave to file late 
notice of appeal reviewed for abuse of discretion).  Because, on 
this record, we cannot "conclude the judge made a clear error of 
judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision such 
that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives" (citation and quotation omitted), L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014), we agree with the 
department. 
13 
 
 
is unfit and, if the parent is unfit, whether the child's best 
interests will be served by terminating the legal relation 
between parent and child."  Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 59 
(2011).  A finding of unfitness must be supported by clear and 
convincing evidence, based on subsidiary findings proved by at 
least a fair preponderance of evidence.  See Adoption of Elena, 
446 Mass. 24, 30-31 (2006).  "We give substantial deference to a 
judge's decision that termination of a parent's rights is in the 
best interest of the child, and reverse only where the findings 
of fact are clearly erroneous or where there is a clear error of 
law or abuse of discretion."  Adoption of Ilona, supra. 
The mother's constitutional claim presents a question of 
law, which we review de novo.  See Commonwealth v. McGhee, 472 
Mass. 405, 412-413 (2015) (due process challenge to statute 
"present[s] questions of law that we review de novo").  Where a 
judgment is void for failure to conform to the requirements of 
due process of law, we must vacate it.  See Gianareles v. 
Zegarowski, 467 Mass. 1012, 1014 (2014) (general principle that 
rulings on motions pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 [b], 365 
Mass. 828 (1974), are reviewed only for abuse of discretion is 
subject to "important exception" where judgment is void as 
result of failure to conform to requirements of due process of 
law).  See also Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (upon motion, court may 
relieve party from final judgment if judgment is void). 
14 
 
 
 
b.  Due process.  Previously, we have been asked to address 
the constitutional propriety of conducting specific types of 
criminal proceedings virtually during the COVID-19 pandemic.  In 
Vazquez Diaz v. Commonwealth, 487 Mass. 336 (2021), the court 
held, among other things, that in the then-prevailing 
circumstances of the pandemic, conducting a suppression hearing 
via an Internet-based video conferencing platform was not a per 
se violation of due process "so long as the video conferencing 
technology provides adequate safeguards."  Id. at 339-343.  
Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Curran, 488 Mass. 792 (2021), 
we "provide[d] guidance to trial courts that offer [criminal] 
defendants the opportunity to receive virtual or partly virtual 
bench trials during the COVID-19 pandemic."  Id. at 799-800.  
Now, we consider first whether a virtual bench trial, conducted 
in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, to determine whether to 
terminate parental rights, a civil proceeding, presents a per se 
violation of a parent's right to due process; we conclude that 
it does not.  We next consider whether the virtual bench trial 
conducted in this case violated the mother's due process rights; 
we conclude that it did. 
i.  Per se violation.  "Due process is not a technical 
conception with a fixed content, but varies with context, and 
therefore is a flexible concept that calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands" (citation 
15 
 
 
omitted).  Vazquez Diaz, 487 Mass. at 341.  In assessing whether 
the right to due process was satisfied, we consider the private 
interest that will be affected, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, the 
probable value of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards, and the government's interest involved.  See Mathews 
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).  See also Care & 
Protection of Rashida, 489 Mass. 128, 132 (2022); Vazquez Diaz, 
supra. 
 
A.  Private interests.  In considering the private 
interests affected, consideration must be given both to the 
parents' interests and the child's interests.  With regard to 
the former, there can be no doubt that the "loss of a child may 
be as onerous a penalty [to the parents] as the deprivation of 
the parents' [own] freedom" (citation omitted).  Care & 
Protection of Robert, 408 Mass. 52, 58 (1990).  Parents' 
interest in the care, custody, and control of their children "is 
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 
recognized by [the United States Supreme] Court."  Care & 
Protection of M.C., 479 Mass. 246, 256 (2018), S.C., 483 Mass. 
444 (2019), quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).  
Before parents can be deprived of custody of their child, 
therefore, the requirements of due process must be satisfied.  
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 752–754 (1982); Care & 
16 
 
 
Protection of M.C., supra.  At a minimum, due process requires 
that parents be provided with "an opportunity to be heard at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner" (citation and 
quotation omitted).  Brantley v. Hampden Div. of the Probate & 
Family Court Dep't, 457 Mass. 172, 187 (2010).  They must "have 
an opportunity effectively to rebut adverse allegations 
concerning child-rearing capabilities."  Adoption of Mary, 414 
Mass. 705, 710 (1993). 
We also are mindful that "[termination] proceedings are not 
criminal in nature.  As parens patriae, the State does not act 
to punish misbehaving parents but to protect children . . ." 
(citations and quotations omitted).  Adoption of Don, 435 Mass. 
158, 168 (2001).  Accordingly, "the full panoply of 
constitutional rights afforded criminal defendants does not 
apply in these cases."  Custody of Two Minors, 396 Mass. 610, 
616 (1986).  After a parent has received notice of proceedings 
affecting parental rights in the child, we require further that 
the parent be represented by counsel and that the Commonwealth 
prove the parent unfit by clear and convincing evidence.  See, 
e.g., Custody of a Minor (No. 2), 392 Mass. 719, 725 (1984) 
(requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence); Department 
of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 379 Mass. 1, 4-5 (1979) (affording 
indigent parents court-appointed counsel in contested 
termination proceedings).  However, because the proceedings are 
17 
 
 
civil in nature, certain constitutional rights attaching to 
criminal proceedings simply do not apply.  See, e.g., Adoption 
of Don, supra at 169 (children allowed to testify in manner that 
does not force them into face-to-face confrontation with their 
parents); Custody of Two Minors, supra at 617 ("the privilege 
against self-incrimination applicable in criminal proceedings, 
which prevents the drawing of a negative inference from a 
defendant's failure to testify, is not applicable in a child 
custody case"); Petition of the Dep't of Social Servs. to 
Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 384 Mass. 707, 711 (1981) 
(exclusionary rule does not apply); Custody of a Minor, 375 
Mass. 733, 746 (1978) (double jeopardy principles not 
applicable); Adoption of John, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 431, 435-436 
(2001) (colloquy similar to that required for plea agreements in 
criminal cases is not required when parent enters into agreement 
for judgment). 
Significantly, termination proceedings also affect the 
private interest of the child.  Accordingly, we have recognized 
that "[t]he right of parents to be free from intrusion by the 
State in matters of childrearing . . . is not absolute.  In 
custody proceedings, the rights of the children to a stable and 
safe environment assume an importance at least equal to the 
interest of the parents in a fair proceeding" (citations and 
quotation omitted).  Custody of Two Minors, 396 Mass. at 617.  
18 
 
 
See J.K.B., 379 Mass. at 5 (balance to be struck in termination 
proceedings is complex and involves consideration of not only 
rights of parents and interests of society, but also rights and 
needs of child).  A child also has an interest in timely 
adjudication in a termination proceeding.  "Unless proceedings 
involving the custody of a minor are expedited, they fail to 
accomplish their purpose.  Circumstances may change rapidly, and 
the harm sought to be avoided may worsen with the passage of 
time."  Custody of a Minor, 389 Mass. 755, 764 (1983). 
B.  Risk of erroneous deprivation.  As we have already 
concluded in Vasquez Diaz, 487 Mass. at 341, the risk of 
erroneous deprivation of these interests because a hearing is 
conducted via an Internet-based video conferencing platform like 
Zoom can be "minimal," even in certain criminal proceedings such 
as hearings on motions to suppress, if proper safeguards are 
provided and the judge carefully monitors the technology to 
ensure it is functioning as intended.  As we noted, "Although 
generally not preferable, with today's video conferencing 
technology, a virtual hearing can approximate a live physical 
hearing in ways that it could not previously."  Id. at 342.  We 
relied on several features of the Zoom platform, in particular, 
to buttress that conclusion, including, inter alia, the 
"breakout room" function, which allowed a party to privately 
consult with the party's attorney during the Zoom hearing, and 
19 
 
 
the "share screen" function, which permitted participants to 
show electronic documents to other participants.  Id. at 339. 
Zoom, however, is not the only choice available to trial 
judges in termination proceedings.  Even before the COVID-19 
pandemic, judges in such proceedings were "given some 
flexibility, consistent with the facts of each case, in 
determining among several of the currently available options, 
including but not limited to video or telephonic conferencing 
during the proceedings, how best to assure that a parent has a 
meaningful opportunity to respond to the evidence presented at 
trial" (citation omitted).  Adoption of Edmund, 50 Mass. App. 
Ct. 526, 530 (2000).  In Edmund, for example, the Appeals Court 
held "that an incarcerated parent does not have an absolute 
right to attend a hearing [in person] that could result in the 
termination of parental rights, particularly if the parent is 
represented at trial by a lawyer."  Id. at 529.  The ruling was 
in accord with those from a large number of other States.  See 
id. at 529 n.4 (collecting cases from other jurisdictions). 
Regardless of the technology employed, whether it be an 
Internet-based video conferencing platform like Zoom or the 
telephonic participation of an incarcerated parent represented 
by counsel, the judge must ensure, preferably in advance of the 
hearing, that the participants understand the procedures to be 
used when the technology does not work as intended.  Thus, in 
20 
 
 
Vasquez Diaz, we looked favorably on the fact that the hearing 
judge 
"outlined the steps that would be taken in the event any 
technological difficulties arose.  She stated that the 
court would suspend the hearing at the request of counsel 
and resume the hearing after the issue was resolved.  We 
emphasize[d] that this [was] an important protection and 
urge[d] judges to pay careful attention to the technology.  
If the technology does not function as described, it is 
crucial that the court suspend the hearing, rather than 
risk sacrificing certain of the defendant's constitutional 
rights." 
 
Vazquez Diaz, 487 Mass. at 342. 
 
While never ideal, given the unique restrictions placed on 
in-person proceedings required by health and safety 
considerations presented by the COVID-19 pandemic, and assuming 
the safeguards outlined above are provided and monitored by the 
judge, a parental rights hearing conducted via an Internet-based 
video conferencing platform may be conducted so as not to pose 
an undue risk of erroneous deprivation to a parent's right to 
participate, even where the parent is self-represented and only 
able to participate by telephone. 
C.  Government's interest.  As we concluded in Vazquez 
Diaz, 487 Mass. at 343, the government had a "significant" 
interest in protecting the public health during the COVID-19 
pandemic by holding virtual rather than in-person court 
proceedings.  Certainly, this was true at the point in the 
pandemic when the trial in this case took place.  The government 
21 
 
 
also has a significant interest in reaching a prompt resolution 
in termination cases given the benefits of permanency and 
stability to children.  See Adoption of Nancy, 443 Mass. 512, 
517 (2005) ("Stability in the lives of children is important, 
particularly in a case that has continued for a long period of 
time in the hope that [a parent] could and would successfully 
rehabilitate . . .").  See also Adoption of Don, 435 Mass. at 
170 (harm of delay in case "is unfortunately suffered 
principally by the children").  This interest was particularly 
acute here, given that the subject child's case was approaching 
six years old at the time of trial.  At the same time, the 
government also has an interest in making sure that parental 
rights decisions are the product of fair proceedings. 
D.  Balancing the factors.  The government's significant 
interest in protecting the public health during the COVID-19 
pandemic, combined with the interest in timely providing 
permanency and stability for children, would, in many instances, 
outweigh a self-represented parent's interest in appearing in 
person at a termination hearing so long as safeguards are in 
place and monitored by the judge to minimize the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation.  Accordingly, we conclude that, assuming 
the safeguards outlined above are provided and monitored, a 
termination trial conducted via an Internet-based video 
conferencing platform when, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
22 
 
 
in-person proceedings are not possible without jeopardizing the 
health and safety of the public, is not a per se violation of a 
parent's right to meaningfully participate, even where the 
parent is self-represented and only able to participate by 
telephone.10 
 
10 Other jurisdictions have also held that, during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, a termination trial on a virtual video 
conferencing platform is not a per se due process violation so 
long as there are sufficient safeguards.  See, e.g., Amira N. 
vs. Department of Health & Social Servs., Office of Children's 
Servs., No. S-18085 (Alaska Mar. 9, 2022) (mother, who was 
represented by counsel, was able to speak to counsel during 
video conference trial, and participated by telephone from her 
place of incarceration, was not deprived of due process); In re 
K.C., 2021 IL App (1st) 210305-U, ¶¶ 79-80 (mother, who was 
represented by counsel in virtual hearing, was not denied due 
process where she was able to communicate with counsel, and 
participated by telephone, testified by video conference, and 
additional video technology was made available to her); In re 
P.S., 2021 IL App (5th) 210027, ¶¶ 59-64, 76 (no due process 
violation when father was able to communicate with counsel in 
breakout rooms, was able to assist in cross-examination, and 
himself participated in termination hearing); Interest of C.T., 
61 Kan. App. 2d 218, 233 (2021) (termination proceedings 
conducted by video conferencing not per se violation of due 
process where there are adequate safeguards, including adequate 
audio quality, ability of participants to observe witnesses, 
ability of parties to access exhibits, and ability to confer 
with counsel privately); In re O.C. Smith, Nos. 355077, 355677 
(Mich. Ct. App. July 1, 2021) (no due process violation in 
termination trial conducted by video conferencing where father 
was incarcerated, was able to consult with his counsel in 
breakout rooms, and had opportunity to present witnesses and 
evidence); E.N. vs. Texas Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 
No. 03-21-00014-CV (Tex. Ct. App. June 17, 2021) (due process 
not violated given extensive procedural safeguards set forth in 
connection with video conference trial to determine parental 
rights); Matter of the Dependency of J.D.E.C., 18 Wash. App. 2d 
414, 422-424 (2021) (no due process violation where father, who 
was represented by counsel, chose to participate telephonically 
 
23 
 
 
ii.  As applied challenge in this case.  Our determination 
regarding the mother's due process challenge to the proceedings 
in this case is informed by our review of her objection to 
certain findings made by the judge as clearly erroneous and his 
decision to draw an adverse inference against her.  Accordingly, 
we review those factual findings before turning to assess the 
mother's due process challenge. 
A.  Adverse inference.  The judge supported his decision to 
terminate the mother's parental rights by, among other things, 
drawing an adverse inference against her for what he termed her 
"refusal to testify" and participate in the trial.  The drawing 
of an adverse inference is permissible in a parental rights 
proceeding.  See Custody of Two Minors, 396 Mass. at 616 
("unique characteristics of child custody proceedings do not 
require alteration or modification of the rule permitting 
inferences from a party's failure to testify in a civil case"); 
Adoption of Talik, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 367, 372 (2017) (judge has 
discretion to draw adverse inference from parent's failure to 
 
in video conference hearing to terminate his rights, was able to 
and did communicate with counsel using breakout room technology, 
provided information to his counsel for cross-examination, and 
directed whom counsel should call in his defense).  Cf. People 
in the Interest of E.B., 2022 COA 8, ¶¶ 15-17 (due process 
violated where father, who was represented by counsel, was 
denied continuance to obtain wireless connection to participate 
in virtual hearing to terminate his parental rights where father 
tried multiple times to secure connectivity and court failed to 
facilitate father's efforts to participate). 
24 
 
 
attend termination proceedings).  In exercising his discretion 
to draw the adverse inference in this case, the judge relied on 
the following findings: 
"The [termination] trial occurred on September 9 and 11, 
2020.  Mother initially joined the virtual trial via 
telephone on September 9, 2020.  However, mother hung up on 
the proceeding.  The court took a negative inference that 
mother could not conform her behavior to the trial 
standard.  Mother did rejoin the trial shortly thereafter.  
On September 11, 2020, the trial continued.  This time 
mother hung up stating 'I'm done -- I'm so fucking done'.  
The court drew a negative inference from mother's 
refusal/inability to attend the trial.  Again mother 
rejoined the trial some time later, and she was given the 
opportunity to question any witnesses and present her own 
case.  She chose not to." 
 
The judge also found that the "mother disconnected from the 
hearing without cause instead of cross-examining witnesses" and 
"terminated her participation in trial after the third witness 
began her testimony," and that the "[m]other refused to 
participate in trial, disconnecting from the call both days." 
 
The record does not support the finding either that the 
mother "hung up" from the trial during the first day of trial or 
that she did so after the third witness.  Instead, the record 
shows that the mother did not respond when the judge asked her 
if she had any questions for the first witness, although her 
telephone still seemed to be connected to the Zoom hearing.  As 
a result, the judge directed the clerk to move her to the Zoom 
waiting room; when that did not have the desired effect, the 
judge instructed the clerk to disconnect her from the trial 
25 
 
 
altogether.  Nor did the mother rejoin the trial "shortly 
thereafter"; instead, she missed the testimony of the second and 
third witnesses. 
Moreover, contrary to his findings, the judge did not draw 
an adverse inference against the mother on the first day of 
trial; instead, he expressly refused to do so because he did not 
"know . . . the reason for her absence" and whether it was 
"legitimate."  When the mother connected to the trial on the 
second day, she explained her inability to participate, stating 
that her cellular telephone service had been "really bad" on the 
first day.  While the judge need not credit the mother's 
explanation, the mother's assertion was not challenged; as 
discussed supra, she was not the only participant to encounter 
technological problems during the first trial day.  Yet, the 
mother was not asked any questions to explore further her 
efforts to reconnect.  Nor was an evidentiary hearing held on 
the mother's motion for a new trial, which might have provided 
some basis for a finding that the mother's absence on the first 
day was purposeful. 
All told, the record does not support the findings 
undergirding the judge's decision to draw an adverse inference 
against the mother and the evidence in its entirety leaves us 
"with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed" (citation omitted).  Adoption of Larry, 434 Mass. 
26 
 
 
456, 462 (2001).  The findings were clearly erroneous, and thus 
the decision to draw the adverse inference is unsupported.  
Adoption of Talik, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 375, quoting L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014) ("A decision is an 
abuse of discretion if it amounts to a 'clear error of 
judgment' . . ."). 
B.  Inadequacy of safeguards.  In light of the foregoing, 
we turn to consider the mother's due process challenge to the 
termination proceedings in this case, which unfortunately went 
forward with little adherence to the safeguards we have 
delineated supra.  In particular, it appears that no steps were 
taken in advance to determine whether the mother possessed the 
technology necessary to connect to Zoom, by video or otherwise.  
Then, when it was determined on the first day of trial that she 
did "not have video capacity," the judge immediately defaulted 
to having her participate by telephone.  At the very least, the 
judge should have determined what technology she might have 
available to her that would allow her to connect by video and, 
if she did not have any, whether it was possible to assist her 
in obtaining access to such technology.11  While a court's 
 
11 The COVID-19 court operations order that was issued by 
this court and in effect at the time of trial required as 
follows: 
 
 
27 
 
 
ability to assist in this regard may be limited, it should at 
least have been explored before requiring a self-represented 
parent to participate by telephone in a trial where such 
important rights were at issue, and where all other participants 
participated by video. 
Moreover, it is not clear whether the Zoom video 
conferencing platform utilized in this trial had a private 
"breakout room" function that would have allowed the mother to 
consult with stand-by counsel at any time during the hearing.  
If that feature was available, the record does not reflect that 
the judge made the mother aware of it on the record.  An 
explanation of what a breakout room is and how it can be 
requested and used during a trial should be part of the 
instructions provided before the commencement of a virtual 
trial.12 
 
"In cases with one or more self-represented litigants 
(SRLs) where a court is scheduling a videoconference, 
courts will recognize the possibility that SRLs may have 
limited access to the technology needed to conduct 
videoconferences or limited experience with it, and will 
either assist the SRL in being able to conduct a 
videoconference or offer an alternative to 
videoconferencing for the virtual hearing." 
 
Third Updated Order Regarding Court Operations Under the Exigent 
Circumstances Created by the COVID-19 (Coronavirus) Pandemic, 
No. OE-144, § 2 (June 24, 2020). 
 
12 According to Zoom, a participant connected by telephone 
can be added to a breakout room just like a participant 
 
28 
 
 
Further, the record does not reflect any consideration as 
to how documents and exhibits would be shared with the mother.  
The use of documents and exhibits can be difficult when 
participating in a remote hearing by telephone, especially for a 
self-represented litigant.  When participating by video, the 
platform typically has a "share screen" function, "which permits 
participants to show electronic documents to the other 
participants.  If a participant does not wish to use this 
function, or cannot use this function, he or she simply can hold 
a physical document in front of the camera to display it to the 
other participants."  Vazquez Diaz, 487 Mass. at 339.  A 
telephone participant can do neither. 
The challenge, however, is not insurmountable.  Documents 
and other exhibits could have been exchanged in advance, so that 
everyone had a copy and could follow when a particular document 
or exhibit was used to question a witness.  This is not an 
uncommon requirement in advance of a trial.  It becomes 
particularly important when participants are connected to a 
remote hearing by telephone.  The record here does not reflect 
whether such an exchange took place in this case, but the 
 
connected by video.  See Zoom, Participating in Breakout Rooms 
(updated Feb. 28, 2022), https://support.zoom.us/hc/en-us 
/articles/115005769646-Participating-in-breakout-rooms 
[https://perma.cc/7UUL-J8CP]. 
29 
 
 
department ultimately submitted at least thirty-five exhibits.13  
Indeed, it appears the mother had wanted to use some "paperwork" 
in connection with mounting her defense, but lacked the 
understanding of how to do so. 
"Our discussion so far would be academic if the telephone 
solution allowed [the mother] to meaningfully participate in the 
termination-of-parental-rights proceedings" (emphasis in 
original).  In re the Termination of Parental Rights to Idella 
W., 2005 WI App 266, ¶ 8 (incarcerated father not able to 
meaningfully participate in parental rights termination hearing 
where his "ability to hear the proceedings faded in and out, 
and, at least at one point, was temporarily interrupted by 
static").  It did not. 
Almost as soon as the first witness started to testify on 
direct examination, the mother was disconnected and had to be 
readmitted from the waiting room by the clerk.  Then, as 
detailed above, she was disconnected from the trial altogether 
at the direction of the judge when it was her turn to question 
the first witness and she was unresponsive.  Her explanation 
that her cellular telephone service on the first day was "really 
bad" stands unchallenged.  It is unclear how much of the first 
 
13 The trial judge's findings suggest that there were 
thirty-five exhibits.  The joint appendix of exhibits submitted 
by the mother and the child contains thirty-six. 
30 
 
 
witness's testimony she heard.  It is undisputed, however, that 
she then missed the entire testimony of the next two witnesses. 
The mother was not the only one to experience technological 
problems on the first day.  The second witness was disconnected 
at one point and had to be reconnected.  Technological issues 
persisted, and the witness was advised to yell, so as to be 
heard.  Technological issues also affected the department's 
final witness; indeed, the clerk then had to "knock [the third 
witness] out" of the Zoom hearing when her connection froze.  
When she tried to reconnect by video, she could not.  Instead, 
she had to complete her testimony by telephone.  "[L]ike all 
other technology, video conferencing is prone to both 
technological issues and user errors. . . .  The communication 
problems . . . can be exacerbated by a dropped connection, a 
frozen or lagged video display of a witness, or a pause in the 
proceedings to deal with a technological delay on the part of 
one or all participants."  Vasquez Diaz, 487 Mass. at 366-367 
(Kafker, J., concurring). 
To be sure, in-person trials are often riddled with 
obstacles, as well.  See Curran, 488 Mass. at 797 n.5 ("minor 
technological disruptions" during course of remote bench trial 
were "comparable to irregularities that routinely occur during 
in-person proceedings").  Whether it is a remote or in-person 
hearing, therefore, the integrity of the trial often will be 
31 
 
 
measured by how the obstacle is overcome, if at all.  Here, a 
recess of one-half hour was taken after the judge had the mother 
disconnected.  The clerk also attempted to contact her and left 
a message on her telephone.  When the recess was over and the 
mother had neither reconnected nor responded to the outreach, 
the judge concluded that he did not "have any choice but to 
continue" without her.  No doubt, the judge was dealt a 
difficult hand.  If discussions had occurred in advance of the 
hearing, the parties and court might have been better prepared 
to enact a troubleshooting plan to try to overcome the 
technological issues that presented.  Given the lack of 
safeguards in place, however, the proper course when it became 
apparent that the mother could not participate on the first day 
was to suspend the trial until the cause of the mother's absence 
could be determined.  See Vazquez Diaz, 487 Mass. at 342 (it is 
"crucial" to suspend trial when technological difficulties 
arise). 
The mother's conduct, in failing to contact the court, be 
it through the clerk, stand-by counsel, or someone else, is not 
above suspicion.  The problem, however, is that the court did 
not outline in advance the steps that would be taken if someone 
were to be disconnected and have difficulty rejoining the trial.  
See Vazquez Diaz, 487 Mass. at 342.  If it had, it may have been 
reasonable to infer from the mother's failure to comply with 
32 
 
 
those instructions that her absence was purposeful.  Instead, 
the judge pressed forward with the trial while acknowledging 
that he had no idea whether the mother's absence was purposeful 
or not. 
In his decision, the judge stated that he gave the "mother 
ample opportunity to resume participation in the case," but she 
refused.  It is clear that on the second day of trial, 
immediately after the mother informed the judge of the 
significant difficulties she had experienced with her cellular 
telephone service during the first day, he offered her the 
chance to cross-examine the witnesses from the first day.  The 
mother, however, had only heard a portion of the testimony of 
one of those witnesses, if that.  Thus, it was unreasonable to 
expect her to be in a position to conduct meaningful cross-
examination.  Again, other alternatives likely existed and, at 
the very least, should have been explored.  For example, the 
trial could have been suspended for a short time to allow the 
mother to review the testimony of the three witnesses, and then 
reconvened to allow her to conduct cross-examination. 
Under the circumstances, the trial in this case was 
conducted in violation of the mother's right to due process. 
33 
 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the decree 
terminating the mother's parental rights is vacated and the 
matter is remanded for a new trial.14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
14 Having already vacated the termination decree on other 
grounds, we need not reach the mother's claim that it should be 
vacated due to the department's failure to make reasonable 
efforts to reunify her with the child.