Case Title: TIMOTHY FLOYD BUTZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-09-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
TIMOTHY FLOYD BUTZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 152167 P.3d 650Case Number: 06-215Decided: 09/21/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
TIMOTHY 
FLOYD BUTZ,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSheridanCounty

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Diane 
Courselle, Director, DAP; Patricia Lara, Student Intern, DAP.   Argument by Ms. Lara.  

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Pojman.

            

Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      Mr. Butz 
challenges his conviction for endangering his children by knowingly and 
willfully allowing them to remain in a dwelling where he knew methamphetamine 
was possessed.  He claims there was 
insufficient evidence to justify the jury's finding that the State proved the 
"knowingly and willfully" element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and the 
jury was not properly instructed on that element.  Mr. Butz also contends the prosecutor 
committed misconduct when he made an inaccurate statement about the evidence 
during the rebuttal portion of his closing argument.  

 
 
[¶2]      We conclude there 
was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict and the jury instructions 
were not erroneous.  In addition, 
although the prosecutor misstated the trial evidence, we conclude Mr. Butz was 
not prejudiced.  Consequently, we 
affirm.    

  

ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      Mr. Butz presents 
the following issues on appeal:

 
 
[1.]       Was there 
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mr. Butz knowingly and willfully 
permitted his daughters to remain in a room or dwelling where methamphetamine 
was possessed when the State's evidence showed that, while he and his daughters 
were helping a friend pack up his house, Mr. Butz unexpectedly came upon a small 
baggie of methamphetamine, and that baggie was placed in a different room than 
the one in which his daughters remained?

 
 
[2.]       Did the 
trial court commit plain error when it did not instruct the jury on the 
definition of "knowingly"  a key element of the child endangerment 
statute?

 
 
[3.] 
      Did 
prosecutorial misconduct occur when in summation the prosecutor relied upon 
facts that had never been presented to the jury; was this conduct likely to 
mislead the jury and to result in a conviction based upon improper outside 
factors in violation of Mr. Butz's due process rights?

 
 
The 
State presents the same issues, phrased somewhat differently.  

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      Mr. Butz 
worked as a handyman for David Raths, who is legally blind.  Mr. Raths used marijuana and 
methamphetamine and sold methamphetamine.  
Mr. Butz informed Mr. Raths that he did not like methamphetamine.  Mr. Raths told Mr. Butz that, if he 
would continue to help him, he would cease his involvement with 
methamphetamine.   

 
 
[¶5]      Mr. Butz 
apparently invited Mr. Raths to move into the Butz family home.  On August 2, 2005, Mr. Butz and his two 
daughters, ages 11 and 13, traveled from Billings, Montana to Mr. Raths' home in 
Sheridan, Wyoming to pack his belongings.  
Mr. Raths did not accompany them that day.     

 
 
[¶6]      SheridanCounty law enforcement had been 
investigating Mr. Raths' involvement with illegal drugs.  When officers observed that he was 
moving, they secured a warrant to search his home.  Law enforcement executed the search 
warrant on the evening of August 2, 2005.  
The Butz family was still there when the officers arrived to search the 
home.   The officers found the 
girls in a spare bedroom, watching television and eating dinner.  While searching Mr. Raths' bedroom, 
officers discovered a plastic tray sitting atop a tobacco can.  There was a small shard of 
methamphetamine on the plastic tray.  
The officers also found a bag containing a small amount of 
methamphetamine inside the tobacco can.         

 
 
[¶7]      One of Mr. Butz's 
daughters identified the tobacco can as belonging to her father.  An officer asked Mr. Butz about the can 
and the methamphetamine found inside of it.  Mr. Butz said that he had found the 
packet of methamphetamine behind the freezer in the house earlier in the day and 
had secured it in the can "for the time being."  Mr. Butz was arrested and charged with 
child endangerment, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-405(b) (LexisNexis 
2007), for allowing his daughters to remain in a dwelling where methamphetamine 
was possessed.    

 
 
[¶8]      After a trial in 
April 2006, the jury returned a guilty verdict.  The district court entered a judgment 
and sentence, and Mr. Butz appealed.     

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 

            
1.         
"Knowingly and Willfully" 
Element

 
 
[¶9]      Mr. Butz's 
first two issues pertain to the "knowingly and willfully" language of § 
6-4-405(b).  The full text of the 
statutory section states:

 
 
            
(b) No person having the care or custody of a child shall knowingly and 
willfully permit the child to remain in a room, dwelling or vehicle where that 
person knows that methamphetamine is possessed, stored or 
ingested.

 
 
Section 
6-4-405(b).  

 
 

a.         Sufficiency of the Evidence  

 
 
[¶10]   Mr. Butz claims the State did not 
present sufficient evidence to prove the "knowingly and willfully" element of 
the crime.  In determining whether 
there was sufficient trial evidence to sustain a conviction, we apply the 
following standard of review:

 
 
[W]e 
examine and accept as true the State's evidence and all reasonable inferences 
which can be drawn from it. We do not consider conflicting evidence presented by 
the defendant.  We do not substitute 
our judgment for that of the jury; rather, we determine whether a jury could 
have reasonably concluded each of the elements of the crime was proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  This standard 
applies whether the supporting evidence is direct or circumstantial.  

 
 

Martin 
v. State, 2007 WY 
2, ¶ 32, 149 P.3d 707, 715 (Wyo. 
2007), citing Butcher v. State, 2005 
WY 146, ¶ 16, 123 P.3d 543, 549 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶11]   The district court instructed the 
jury on the elements of the charged crime, as follows:

 
 
Instruction 
No.  4

 
 
            
The elements of the crime of Endangering Children, as charged in this 
case are: 

 
 

1.                  
On or 
about the 2nd day of August, 
2005.

2.                  
In 
Sheridan County, Wyoming.

3.                  
The 
Defendant,

4.                  
Having 
the care and custody of a child

5.                  
Knowingly 
and willingly (sic)1

 
 

6.                  
Permitted 
the child to remain in a dwelling where the Defendant knew that methamphetamine 
was possessed.

 
 
            
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of 
these elements has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find 
the defendant guilty.

 
 
            
If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the 
evidence that any of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty.

 
 
(footnote 
added).  

  

[¶12]   Mr. Butz argues:  "The State should have been required to 
prove that (1) Mr. Butz knew that methamphetamine was possessed in the room 
where his daughters were present; and (2) that he knowingly and willfully 
endangered his daughters by permitting them to remain in that room."  Using this standard, Mr. Butz claims 
that there was insufficient evidence to convict him because there was no 
evidence he knowingly and willfully placed his children in danger.  In fact, he argues, the evidence is to 
the contrary because he secured the methamphetamine in the tobacco can and 
placed it away from his daughters in Mr. Raths' bedroom.     

 
 
[¶13]   Mr. Butz's argument implicates the 
difference between general and specific intent crimes. This distinction has been 
described as follows: 

 
 
When the 
statute sets out the offense with only a description of the particular unlawful 
act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future 
consequence, the trial judge asks the jury whether the defendant intended to do 
the outlawed act.  Such intention is 
general intent.  When the statutory 
definition of the crime refers to an intent to do some further act or attain 
some additional consequence, the offense is considered to be a specific intent 
crime and then that question must be asked of the jury. 

 

Britt v. 
State, 752 P.2d 426, 430 (Wyo. 1988), quoting Dorador v. State, 573 P.2d 839, 843 
(Wyo. 
1978).  

 
 
[¶14]   We have consistently ruled that 
criminal statutes including the mental elements "knowingly" and/or "willfully" 
describe general intent crimes.  See, e.g., Tillett v. State, 637 P.2d 261, 264-65 
(Wyo. 1981); 
King v. State, 2002 WY 27, ¶ 23, 40 P.3d 700, 706 (Wyo. 2002).  Mr. Butz 
argues, nevertheless, that we should interpret § 6-4-405(b) as requiring the 
State to prove that he knowingly and willfully placed his daughters in danger by allowing them to remain in the area 
with the methamphetamine.  His 
interpretation urges adoption of a specific intent because it would require the 
State to prove that he intended a further consequence, to endanger his 
daughters, when he permitted them to remain in the house with the 
methamphetamine.  

 
 
[¶15]   Under the clear language of § 
6-4-405(b), the State was simply required to prove that Mr. Butz knowingly and 
willfully permitted the children to remain in a place where he knew 
methamphetamine was possessed.  The 
statute contains no additional requirement that the State prove he knowingly and 
willfully placed the children in danger by allowing them to remain in the 
place.  Section 6-4-405(b), 
therefore, describes a general intent crime.  The legislature made the policy 
determination that performing the act forbidden by the statute, i.e. permitting 
a child to remain in an area where the person knows methamphetamine is 
possessed, with the requisite mental state, i.e., knowingly and willfully, was 
sufficient to endanger the child and, consequently, legislated against it.  Mr. Butz's position that the State 
should be required to prove he knowingly and willfully placed the children in 
danger enlarges the State's burden under § 6-4-405(b) beyond that imposed by the 
legislature.    

 
 
[¶16]   Mr. Butz admitted that he had found 
the packet of methamphetamine and placed it in the tobacco can; thus, the trial 
evidence clearly showed that he knew methamphetamine was possessed in the 
home.  The undisputed evidence 
established that Mr. Butz brought his daughters with him to Mr. Raths' house on 
August 2, 2005, and they were still in the home when law enforcement arrived to 
execute the search warrant, which was after Mr. Butz had already found the 
packet of methamphetamine and placed it in the tobacco can.  Consequently, the trial evidence, 
together with the reasonable inferences flowing from it, was clearly sufficient 
to justify the jury's finding that the State had proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt he knowingly and willfully allowed the children to remain in the dwelling 
where he knew methamphetamine was possessed.   

 
 
                        
b.         
Jury 
Instructions

 
 
[¶17]   Jury Instruction No. 4 described 
the elements of the charged crime in accordance with the statutory language, as 
tailored to the charge alleged in the case.  The district court also instructed the 
jury on the definitions of "child" and "possession."  It did not, however, instruct the jury 
on the meaning of the term "knowingly."  
Mr. Butz argues on appeal the district court erred by failing to instruct 
the jury about the technical definition of the word 
"knowingly."

 
 
[¶18]   Mr. Butz did not offer an 
instruction defining the term or otherwise object to the jury instructions.  Consequently, we review his claim using 
the plain error standard.  Lapp v. State, 2004 WY 142, ¶ 7, 100 P.3d 862, 864 (Wyo. 2004).  Under 
the plain error standard, the appellant must "show a clear and unequivocal rule 
of law was violated, the violation clearly appeared in the record, and the 
violation resulted in denial of a substantial right to [his] material 
prejudice."  Id.  See also, Simmons v. State, 2003 WY 84, ¶ 25, 72 P.3d 803, 812 (Wyo. 2003).  

 
 
            
We afford significant deference to the trial court in instructing the 
jury:

 
 
"The 
trial judge is afforded latitude to tailor the instructions to the facts of the 
case, and reversible error will not be found as long as the instructions when 
viewed as a whole and in the context of the entire trial fairly and adequately 
cover the issues."

 
 

Wilson 
v. State, 14 P.3d 912, 915 (Wyo. 2000) (citations omitted).

 
 

Lapp, 
¶ 7, 100 P.3d  at 864-65.  Nevertheless, a 
fundamental error occurs when the trial court fails to give an instruction on an 
essential element of a criminal offense.  
Id., ¶ 10, 100 P.3d  at 865.  "The test of whether a jury has been 
properly instructed on the necessary elements of a crime is whether the 
instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be 
found to have been committed."  
Id., citing Wheaton v. State, 2003 WY 56, ¶ 20, 68 P.3d 1167, 1176 (Wyo. 2003).  

 
 
[¶19]   We have also articulated rules 
regarding the trial court's duty to define terms in jury instructions.  

 
 
A court 
need not give an instruction defining a term unless it has a technical legal 
meaning so different from its ordinary meaning that the jury, without further 
explanation, would misunderstand its import in relation to the factual 
circumstances.  Prejudicial error 
must be demonstrated by appellant and prejudice will not be presumed unless the 
instruction confused or misled the jury with respect to the proper principles of 
law.  Failure to instruct properly 
on an element of a crime does not constitute plain error where that element is 
not contested at trial or where evidence of the defendant's guilt is 
overwhelming.

 
 

Wilson, 14 P.3d  at 916.

 
 

Lapp, 
¶ 10, 
100 P.3d  at 865.  

 
 
[¶20]   The ordinary meaning of "knowingly" 
is  "with awareness, deliberateness, 
or intention" as distinguished from inadvertently or involuntarily.   Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1252 
(2002).  Similarly, "willfully means 
intentionally, knowingly, purposely, voluntarily, consciously, deliberately, and 
without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from carelessly, inadvertently, 
accidentally, negligently, heedlessly or thoughtlessly."  Dean v. State, 668 P.2d 639, 642 
(Wyo. 1983), quoting Matter of Adoption of CCT, 640 P.2d 73, 
76 (Wyo. 
1982).  See also, Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42, 54 
(Wyo. 
1986).  

 
 
[¶21]   In Schmidt v. State, 2001 WY 73, ¶ 24, 29 P.3d 76, 83 (Wyo. 2001), we said, in the context of the indecent liberties 
statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105 (LexisNexis 2001), the district court did 
not commit plain error by failing to define the term "knowingly" in the jury 
instructions because that term does not have a technical meaning.  We have also held that the term 
"willfully" is sufficiently self-explanatory that no additional definition in 
jury instructions is necessary.  See, e.g., Durham v. State, 422 P.2d 691, 692 (Wyo. 1967).  Our precedent, therefore, makes it clear 
that the statutory terms "knowingly" and "willfully" generally do not have 
specialized meanings any different from their common meanings.  

 
 
[¶22]   Despite this precedent, Mr. Butz 
argues the term "knowingly" has a technical legal meaning in the context of § 
6-4-405(b) because the term is used in two different senses in the statute.   Section 6-4-405(b) criminalizes knowingly and willfully permitting a 
child to remain in a room, dwelling or vehicle where the defendant knows methamphetamine is possessed, 
stored or ingested.  Mr. Butz's 
argument that the legislature's use of the two terms, "knowingly" and "know," in 
the statute requires that "knowingly" be defined for the jury is not 
convincing.  Reasonable jurors, 
being familiar with the English language, would understand the instruction in 
accordance with the ordinary meanings and uses of the words.  They would certainly discern that the 
State was required to prove Mr. Butz knew, or was actually aware, 
methamphetamine was present and he knowingly and willfully, i.e. deliberately, 
allowed the children to remain in the dwelling.  

 

[¶23]   Mr. Butz also reiterates, in his 
jury instruction argument, his earlier contention that the "knowingly and 
willfully" element requires a showing that he placed the children in 
danger.  We have already rejected 
Mr. Butz's argument that the terms "knowingly and willfully" as used in § 
6-4-405(b) imposed a specific intent requirement that the children be 
endangered.  

 
 
[¶24]   Mr. Butz has not convinced us the 
term "knowingly" in the child endangerment statute has a technical definition 
"so different from its ordinary meaning that the jury, without further 
explanation, would misunderstand its import in relation to the factual 
circumstances."  Wilson, 14 P.3d  
at 916.  The district court did not 
violate a clear and unequivocal rule of law by failing to instruct the jury on a 
"technical" meaning of the intent element of the crime. 

 
 

2.      
Prosecutorial 
Misconduct

 
 
[¶25]   Mr. Butz claims the prosecutor 
committed misconduct when he misstated the facts in evidence during the rebuttal 
portion of his closing argument. 

 
 
"In 
reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument, the court 
looks at the entire record to determine whether the defendant's case was so 
prejudiced by the improper comments as to result in the denial of a fair 
trial."  Burton v. State, 2002 WY 71, ¶ 11, 46 P.3d 309, ¶ 11 (Wyo. 2002).  We judge the 
challenged comments in the context of the prosecutor's entire argument, 
considering the context of the statements and comparing them with the evidence 
produced at the trial.  Id. The burden 
of establishing prosecutorial misconduct rests upon the appellant who raises the 
issue.   

            
  

Wilks v. 
State, 2002 WY 
100, ¶ 26, 49 P.3d 975, 986 (Wyo. 2002).   We review Mr. Butz's claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct for plain error because he did not object to the 
prosecutor's statements at trial.  

 
 
[¶26]   The two statements Mr. Butz 
challenges were made during the rebuttal portion of the prosecutor's closing 
argument.  The prosecutor began his 
rebuttal argument by stating:

 
 
            
Ladies and Gentlemen, the defense suggested that Tim Butz did not want to 
be caught in possession.  Let's take 
a look at that one fairly quickly.  
It is found in the freezer, out 
in the garage.  Did he leave it 
there on the floor where it is not associated with any individual?  No.

            

(emphasis 
added).  Later in his argument, the 
prosecutor remarked:

 
 
And 
consider . . . what the defendant was doing in putting [the methamphetamine] in 
the tobacco can, was that he was trying to hide it from his kids, protect his 
kids in some way. Well, he found it out 
in the garage behind the freezer.  
So 

does he 
toss it into the garbage bag there, or leave it in the garage?  No.  

 
 
(emphasis 
added).  

 
 
[¶27]   The trial evidence established that 
Mr. Butz found the methamphetamine behind the freezer in the house, rather than 
in the garage.  Thus, the 
prosecutor's statements were incorrect.  
We have said that prosecutors must limit their argument to the evidence 
admitted at trial and reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that 
evidence.  See, e.g., Condra v. State, 2004 WY 131, ¶ 22, 100 P.3d 386, 392 (Wyo. 2004); Marshall v. 
State, 2005 WY 164, ¶ 16, 125 P.3d 269, 275 (Wyo. 2005).  The prosecutor's misstatement of the 
evidence in this case clearly appeared in the record and was a violation of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law.  
Thus, the first two elements of the plain error standard are arguably 
satisfied here.  

 
 
[¶28]   We turn then to the third element 
of our plain error testwhether Mr. Butz has demonstrated he has been denied a 
substantial right resulting in material prejudice.2  Of course, it is unprofessional for a 
prosecutor to intentionally misstate the evidence during his summation.  Wilks, ¶ 27, 49 P.3d  at 987, quoting Trujillo v. State, 2002 WY 51, ¶ 5, 44 P.3d 22, 24 (Wyo. 2002) which cited I A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice 
3-5.8 at 3.87 to 3.88 (2d ed. 1980).   
Evidence was admitted at trial indicating that two freezers were located 
on the premisesone in the house and one in the garage.  Under these circumstances, there is no 
indication the prosecutor's misstatement that Mr. Butz found the methamphetamine 
behind the garage freezer instead of the house freezer was 
intentional.

 
 
[¶29]   Mr. Butz claims that the 
misstatement about the location of the methamphetamine was particularly critical 
because there was no evidence that Mr. Butz was aware of any other drugs in the 
house besides the methamphetamine he secured in the tobacco can.  Thus, according to him, the "question 
[of] whether Mr. Butz knowingly' permitted his daughters to remain in a room or 
dwelling where methamphetamine was present depended largely on what he knew 
about and did with the methamphetamine in the baggie."      

 
 
[¶30]   We are not convinced the 
prosecutor's statements prejudiced Mr. Butz.   Whether Mr. Butz found the 
methamphetamine in the garage and brought it back into the house to hide it in 
the tobacco can or found it behind the freezer in the house and then secured it 
in the can is irrelevant to a determination of whether he was guilty of 
violating § 6-4-405(b).  Either way, 
he knew there was methamphetamine in the dwelling and he knowingly and willfully 
allowed his daughters to remain there.  
The misstatement is significant only if we accept Mr. Butz's argument 
that the State was required to prove he "endangered" his daughters, a position 
that we have already rejected.  
Moreover, the jury was specifically instructed that the attorneys' 
arguments were not "evidence" in the case.  
Under these circumstances, there is no basis for concluding Mr. Butz was 
prejudiced by the prosecutor's misstatement.  

 
 
[¶31]   Affirmed. 

 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Mr. Butz 
does not raise any issue regarding the typographical error in the instruction, 
whereby the jury was instructed that he had to act "knowingly and willingly" as 
opposed to "knowingly and willfully," as stated in the 
statute.

  

2In his 
reply brief, Mr. Butz claims:  "The 
State makes the new argument that Mr. Butz has not adequately demonstrated that 
the prosecutor's misstatement of the evidence prejudiced Mr. Butz."    He apparently argues that we should 
overrule our precedent requiring the party asserting plain error to show 
prejudice and rule that, if the first two elements of the plain error standard 
are satisfied, the State is required to show an absence of prejudice.  First of all, we do not agree the State 
presented a new issue by simply arguing the elements of the plain error 
standard.  Accordingly, under 
W.R.A.P. 7.03, Mr. Butz's argument was not properly raised in his reply 
brief.  Moreover, the doctrine of stare decisis requires us to resist 
overruling established precedent.  
Stare decisis is "an important 
principle which furthers the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent 
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and 
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial 
process.'"  SLB v. JEO, 2006 WY 74, ¶ 6, 136 P.3d 797, 799 (Wyo. 2006), quoting Goodrich v. 
Stobbe, 908 P.2d 416, 420 (Wyo. 1995).   Mr. Butz's relatively short 
argument in his reply brief does not convince us that we should overrule our 
well-established precedent that the party claiming plain error has the burden of 
showing prejudice.