Case Title: People v. Placek

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84685

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1998-12-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
People v. Placek, No. 84685 (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket No. 84685-Agenda 12-September 1998.
Opinion filed December 3, 1998.
JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, James Placek, was the focus of an undercover police investigation 
that targeted auto theft crimes. Approximately two years after the investigation 
began, the police shifted the focus of the undercover investigation from stolen 
auto parts to illegal drug transactions. An undercover police officer informed 
defendant that the officer's "boss" needed a cocaine supplier. Six weeks later, 
defendant sold cocaine to the undercover officer.
Defendant was charged by indictment in the circuit court of Cook County with 
one count of theft (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 16-1(a)(5)). Defendant 
was also charged by indictment in the circuit court of Cook County with one 
count of delivery of a controlled substance and one count of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to deliver (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 56½, par. 
1401(a)(2)). Over the State's objection, the circuit court granted defendant's 
motion to consolidate the two cases. The jury returned verdicts of guilty 
against defendant on all three counts, and the circuit court entered judgment on 
these verdicts. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing, inter 
alia, that the provision of the theft statute under which he was prosecuted 
had been found unconstitutional, approximately one year prior to his trial, in 
People v. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d 36 (1994) (declaring section 16-1(a)(5) 
of the theft statute unconstitutional because it failed to require a culpable 
mental state). The circuit court granted defendant's motion for a new trial and 
dismissed the theft charge.
Following a second jury trial on the two drug charges, defendant was 
convicted of delivery of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to deliver. The circuit court noted that the two drug 
charges merge and then sentenced defendant to 16 years' imprisonment in the 
Illinois Department of Corrections on the charge of delivery of a controlled 
substance. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed 
defendant's conviction and sentence. 292 Ill. App. 3d 521. We allowed 
defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 166 Ill. 2d R. 315. We now hold that 
the State's improper introduction of other-crimes evidence at defendant's second 
trial constitutes reversible error. We therefore reverse and remand for a new 
trial.
ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that reversal of his conviction is warranted because: (1) 
the circuit court erred in denying the defense motion to dismiss the drug 
charges on double jeopardy grounds; (2) the prosecution failed to prove 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence showed that the 
police entrapped defendant into committing the offense of delivery of a 
controlled substance; (3) defendant's right to a fair trial was prejudiced by 
the admission of other-crimes evidence; (4) the prosecution improperly 
introduced evidence that defendant was associated with two convicted drug 
traffickers; and (5) the prosecution improperly elicited evidence of alleged 
racial slurs made by defendant.
I. Double Jeopardy
Defendant first contends that reversal is required because his second 
prosecution for delivery of a controlled substance and possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to deliver violated constitutional guarantees 
against double jeopardy. Before his second trial, defendant filed a motion to 
dismiss the drug charges. Defendant argued that, because the prosecution knew or 
should have known that the theft statute was unconstitutional, a subsequent 
prosecution would violate double jeopardy. The circuit court denied the motion. 
Defendant now contends that the State was grossly negligent in prosecuting him 
for theft when it knew or should have known that the applicable statutory 
provision had been declared unconstitutional one year prior to defendant's 
initial trial. Therefore, defendant argues, his second prosecution for delivery 
of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent 
to deliver violated double jeopardy. We disagree.
Both the United States and Illinois Constitutions provide that no person 
shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. U.S. Const., amend. V; Ill. 
Const. 1970, art. I, §10. The double jeopardy clause protects against three 
distinct abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; 
(2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple 
punishments for the same offense. In re P.S., 175 Ill. 2d 79, 84 
(1997). Nevertheless, "[i]f a new trial is granted on the defendant's 
application, this is, in itself, no bar to a second trial on the same or amended 
indictment. [Citation.] The defendant cannot, by his own act, avoid the jeopardy 
on which he stands and then assert it as a bar to subsequent jeopardy." 
People v. Woodward, 394 Ill. 433, 435 (1946).
In the instant case, although defendant was required to stand trial twice for 
the drug charges, the second trial did not violate double jeopardy principles. 
It was not, as defendant argues, the State's gross negligence that caused 
defendant to suffer the burden of a second trial. To the contrary, the circuit 
court, pursuant to defendant's request, granted defendant a new trial on the 
drug charges. Moreover, defendant faced retrial on the drug charges, not on the 
unconstitutional theft charge.
Defendant further argues that the State's conduct in prosecuting him under an 
unconstitutional statute constitutes "overreaching." In support, defendant 
relies upon People v. Pendleton, 75 Ill. App. 3d 580 (1979). In 
Pendleton, the trial judge called a weekend recess while the 
complainant was on the witness stand and still subject to further 
cross-examination. During the recess, the prosecutor conferred with the 
complainant regarding her testimony and, when the complainant testified after 
the recess, she was better able to identify the men who raped her. The trial 
judge declared a mistrial, and, on retrial, the defendants were convicted. 
Pendleton, 75 Ill. App. 3d at 585-90. The appellate court reversed the 
defendants' convictions. The court held that the retrial of the defendants 
violated double jeopardy principles because the prosecutor's misconduct, which 
prompted the mistrial declaration, constituted "overreaching." Since the 
mistrial was the result of prosecutorial overreaching, the defendants' interest 
in finality overrode society's interest in law enforcement. Pendleton, 
75 Ill. App. 3d at 594-97.
Defendant's reliance on Pendleton is misplaced. The circuit court 
here did not declare a mistrial. Rather, as noted, the circuit court, pursuant 
to defendant's request, granted defendant a new trial on the drug charges. Even 
if defendant's first trial had resulted in a mistrial because of the 
unconstitutional theft charge, double jeopardy still would not have barred 
defendant's second trial. Double jeopardy does not bar reprosecution when a 
mistrial is attributable merely to prosecutorial or judicial error. See 
People v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163, 173 (1990) (noting that double 
jeopardy does not bar retrial of a defendant whose conviction is set aside 
because of trial error, as opposed to evidentiary insufficiency). Double 
jeopardy bars retrial only in situations where the prosecution intended to 
"goad" the defendant into requesting a mistrial. People v. Brisbon, 129 Ill. 2d 200, 220 (1989), citing Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676, 
72 L. Ed. 2d 416, 425, 102 S. Ct. 2083, 2089 (1982).
Here, the record reveals no evidence that the prosecution intended to "goad" 
defendant into requesting a mistrial or any other relief. The circuit court 
specifically found that what had occurred in the courtroom was not the State's 
fault, and that the State did not know before trial that the theft statute had 
been declared unconstitutional. The record reveals that the circuit court, the 
State, and the defense were all unaware during defendant's initial trial that 
the theft statute under which defendant was charged was unconstitutional. We 
further note that it was defendant who moved, over the State's objection, to 
consolidate the theft charge with the drug charges. Had defendant not done so, 
he would have had a separate trial on the drug charges, and a retrial presumably 
would not have been necessary. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude 
that subjecting defendant to a second trial on the drug charges did not violate 
double jeopardy principles.
II. Entrapment
Defendant next argues that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
of the drug charges because the evidence showed that he was entrapped into 
delivering the cocaine to the undercover police officer. Defendant maintains 
that the evidence did not show that he was predisposed to selling cocaine. We 
hold that the evidence supports the jury's finding that defendant was not 
entrapped into delivering the cocaine.
The evidence at the second trial established that defendant was the focus of 
an undercover police investigation, which targeted auto theft crimes in south 
suburban Chicago. Defendant was under police surveillance from the summer of 
1991 until the spring of 1993. In March of 1993, undercover police officer Kim 
Castro, a member of the South Suburban Auto Theft Interdiction Network, was 
introduced to defendant as "Tony" by police informant Daniel Dooz. Over the next 
few months, Officer Castro sold defendant what Officer Castro represented to be 
stolen auto parts.
Officer Castro testified that, during the auto parts transactions with 
defendant, their conversations often involved the topic of drugs. Defendant 
stated that he used marijuana; that he had connections for both marijuana and 
cocaine; and that he purchased his cocaine from Dickie Messino. Officer Castro 
revealed that Dickie Messino and his brother Clemente Messino had recently been 
convicted in federal court of trafficking cocaine.
Officer Castro testified that he eventually began having difficulties 
obtaining auto parts to sell to defendant. As a result, his unit shifted the 
focus of its investigation of defendant from stolen auto parts to illegal drug 
transactions. On June 4, 1993, Officer Castro met with defendant and informed 
him that Officer Castro's "boss" was in need of a cocaine supplier. Defendant 
indicated that he may be able to supply the cocaine. Five weeks later, Officer 
Castro called defendant and asked whether defendant could supply the cocaine. 
Over the next week, a series of telephone calls took place between defendant and 
Officer Castro. Officer Castro would call defendant to inquire about the cocaine 
supply, and defendant would tell Officer Castro to call back later because 
defendant had not yet reached his contact. Then, on July 21, 1993, defendant 
told Officer Castro that he was able to obtain the cocaine. The next day, 
defendant met with Officer Castro and another undercover agent at defendant's 
storage locker, from which defendant retrieved four packages of cocaine. While 
defendant weighed the cocaine on a scale, other officers arrived and arrested 
defendant.
Defendant asserted the defense of entrapment at trial. Defendant testified on 
his own behalf that he was in the business of buying and selling auto parts. He 
conducted this business under the name of Sans Dealer Service. Defendant only 
agreed to obtain cocaine for Officer Castro because he wanted Officer Castro to 
continue to supply him with auto parts. Defendant denied that he made statements 
regarding drug contacts to Officer Castro. Defendant also claimed that Officer 
Castro first brought up the discussions about drugs.
The defense of entrapment is found in section 7-12 of the Criminal Code of 
1961 (720 ILCS 5/7-12 (West 1992)), which states:
Accordingly, to establish the entrapment defense, the evidence must show (1) 
that the State improperly induced the defendant to commit the crime and (2) that 
the defendant lacked the predisposition to commit the crime. People v. 
Tipton, 78 Ill. 2d 477, 487-88 (1980); People v. Cross, 77 Ill. 2d 396, 405 (1979). Factors to be considered in assessing the defendant's 
predisposition to commit a drug-related offense include the defendant's initial 
reluctance or ready willingness to commit the crime; the defendant's familiarity 
with drugs and willingness to accommodate the needs of drug users; the 
defendant's willingness to make a profit from the illegal act; the defendant's 
prior or current use of illegal drugs; the defendant's participation in testing 
or cutting the drugs; and the defendant's ready access to a drug supply. See 
People v. Poulos, 196 Ill. App. 3d 653, 661 (1990) (and cases cited 
therein).
Once a defendant presents some evidence to support an entrapment defense, the 
State bears the burden to rebut the entrapment defense beyond a reasonable 
doubt, in addition to proving all other elements of the crime. Tipton, 
78 Ill. 2d  at 487. The question of whether the defendant was entrapped is to be 
resolved by the trier of fact. See Tipton, 78 Ill. 2d  at 487. Following 
a conviction, a reviewing court must affirm where, after reviewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
People v. Campbell, 146 Ill. 2d 363, 374-75 (1992); Tipton, 78 Ill. 2d  at 487.
Applying these concepts to the instant case, we conclude that the evidence 
supports the jury's rejection of defendant's entrapment defense. Officer Castro 
testified about his interactions with defendant. According to his testimony, 
defendant first raised the issue of drugs. When Officer Castro was first 
introduced to defendant through Daniel Dooz, the three men sat in a restaurant 
and talked. Officer Castro reported that the three men talked about stolen auto 
parts, but then defendant turned the conversation to the topic of drugs. 
Defendant told the men that he smoked marijuana and had eight pounds of it at 
home; that he was "into" cocaine; that he had connections for both marijuana and 
cocaine; and that his cocaine source was Dickie Messino. Only after defendant 
stated that his current marijuana connection "had been busted in Texas with 
twenty-two thousand dollars in his boots" did Officer Castro inform defendant 
that he might be able to obtain marijuana for him. In response, defendant asked 
Officer Castro to quote him a price for five pounds of marijuana, and informed 
Officer Castro that he paid his Texas connection $800 a pound for marijuana. 
This evidence of defendant's familiarity with and use of illegal drugs supports 
the conclusion that defendant was predisposed to commit a drug-related 
offense.
The evidence surrounding the cocaine exchange between defendant and Officer 
Castro further belies defendant's entrapment claim. Officer Castro testified 
regarding the circumstances surrounding the cocaine transaction. Officer Castro 
told defendant that his "boss" needed a source for cocaine. Initially, defendant 
replied that he would not be able to assist Officer Castro's "boss" because 
defendant owed his cocaine connection money. Officer Castro responded, "No 
problem." Later in the conversation, defendant informed Officer Castro that 
there was a possibility that he could supply him with cocaine because the 
transaction "would be his way of paying back his contact." This statement 
indicated that defendant was willing to make a profit from the exchange, in the 
form of reducing the debt owed his contact.
Officer Castro further testified that defendant set the price and the 
quantity of cocaine to be exchanged, and that defendant arranged the time and 
the place for the exchange. Laboratory testing revealed that the cocaine 
delivered by defendant to Officer Castro was an 89% "pure" product, which 
indicated that defendant was "close" to the cocaine source. Additionally, the 
transaction took place in defendant's storage facility, from which defendant 
retrieved and used his own scale to weigh the cocaine for Officer Castro. All of 
the foregoing is evidence of defendant's familiarity with drug transactions.
There is evidence in the record that supports defendant's entrapment claim. 
Periodic police surveillance of defendant for over two years revealed no 
evidence that defendant was buying and selling cocaine. Officer Castro admitted 
that, after he began having difficulty obtaining auto parts to sell to 
defendant, Officer Castro and his unit decided to "see what other criminal 
activity he [defendant] was involved in." Defendant had declined to participate 
in drug transactions on three occasions before the meeting at which defendant 
agreed to supply Officer Castro with cocaine. Six weeks later, defendant finally 
delivered the cocaine to Officer Castro.
Nevertheless, the aforementioned evidence was introduced at trial, and the 
jury was instructed as to the defense of entrapment. Based on its verdict, the 
jury found that defendant was not entrapped. We find that, upon reviewing all of 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence 
sufficiently supports the jury's rejection of defendant's entrapment defense, as 
well as its finding of guilt.
III. Other-Crimes Evidence
Defendant next argues that the prosecution improperly introduced other-crimes 
evidence at his second trial, and that the introduction of this evidence 
prejudiced him in violation of his right to a fair trial. First, defendant 
asserts that, throughout the trial, the prosecution improperly introduced 
evidence that defendant was involved in buying and selling "stolen" auto parts. 
Second, defendant asserts that the prosecution improperly introduced evidence 
that, shortly after defendant's arrest for delivering the cocaine to Officer 
Castro, the police searched defendant's home and surrounding property, and 
recovered marijuana, a stolen gun, and a stolen Corvette T-top from a barn on 
defendant's property.
Prior to his second trial, defendant filed a motion in 
limine to prevent the State from referring to defendant's dealings in 
auto parts as "criminal" behavior. The circuit court denied defendant's request 
and ruled that the State could admit evidence regarding the transaction of 
stolen auto parts between defendant and Officer Castro. The State was therefore 
permitted at trial to introduce Officer Castro's testimony regarding defendant's 
dealings in stolen auto parts. In his motion in limine, defendant also 
sought to exclude any reference to the recovered marijuana, stolen gun, and 
stolen T-top. The circuit court ruled that the State could introduce evidence 
that the police recovered marijuana from defendant's barn, but could not 
introduce evidence that defendant pled guilty, in the circuit court of Will 
County, to theft of the T-top. At this time, the circuit court did not rule on 
the admissibility of the stolen gun. During Officer Castro's direct examination, 
the State elicited testimony that the police recovered a stolen gun and T-top in 
defendant's barn. The defense objected, and the circuit court struck the 
testimony and instructed the jury to disregard this evidence.
The State argues that the evidence regarding defendant's dealings in stolen 
auto parts was admissible because it was intertwined with the evidence of the 
cocaine delivery. The relationship between Officer Castro and defendant 
developed because defendant was under surveillance for dealing in stolen auto 
parts. The State contends that the details of this relationship are critical to 
a determination of whether it induced defendant to deliver the cocaine to 
Officer Castro. Thus, the State argues, the other-crimes evidence was admissible 
to rebut defendant's entrapment defense. We do not find the State's arguments 
persuasive. We hold that the prosecution improperly introduced other-crimes 
evidence in defendant's second trial and that the introduction of this evidence 
warrants reversal and remand for a new trial.
Evidence of a crime for which a defendant is not on trial is inadmissible if 
relevant merely to establish the defendant's propensity to commit crime. 
People v. Manning, 182 Ill. 2d 193, 213 (1998). Such other-crimes 
evidence is objectionable because a jury, upon hearing this evidence, might 
convict the defendant merely because it feels that the defendant is a bad person 
who deserves punishment. Manning, 182 Ill. 2d  at 213-14. Other-crimes 
evidence may be admissible, however, when it is relevant to establish any 
material question other than the defendant's propensity to commit a crime. 
People v. Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d 441, 452 (1991). For instance, courts 
have long recognized that other-crimes evidence may be admissible to disprove a 
defense of entrapment. Tipton, 78 Ill. 2d  at 484-85, citing 
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451-52, 77 L. Ed. 413, 421-22, 
53 S. Ct. 210, 216 (1932). Even where other-crimes evidence is relevant for a 
permissible purpose, the circuit court must weigh the prejudicial effect of 
admitting the other-crimes evidence against its probative value. 
Manning, 182 Ill. 2d  at 214. The court should exclude evidence of 
other-crimes where its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative 
value. See Manning, 182 Ill. 2d  at 214-15. The admissibility of 
other-crimes evidence rests within the sound discretion of the circuit court. 
People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 53, 63 (1995). As such, the circuit 
court's decision will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. 
Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d  at 63.
In order for evidence of other crimes to be admissible to disprove a defense 
of entrapment, the evidence must involve crimes that are specifically relevant 
to the defendant's claim of entrapment. See Tipton, 78 Ill. 2d  at 485. 
In Tipton, the court considered whether evidence of criminal acts 
committed by the defendant after the time of the charged offense could be 
introduced against the defendant to rebut a claim of entrapment. 
Tipton, 78 Ill. 2d  at 484-86. The court held that evidence of other 
crimes, even crimes committed after the time of the charged offense, may be 
admitted to rebut an entrapment defense if relevant to the defendant's 
predisposition to commit the charged offense. Tipton, 78 Ill. 2d  at 
484-85. Such relevance may be demonstrated by the similarity of the other crime 
to the crime with which defendant is charged, and by the proximity in time of 
the commission of the crimes. See Tipton, 78 Ill. 2d  at 485.
Accordingly, in order for evidence of other crimes to be admissible to 
disprove a defense of entrapment, the evidence must involve crimes that are 
specifically relevant to the defendant's claim of entrapment. To hold otherwise 
would allow the entrapment exception to swallow the general rule prohibiting the 
admission of other-crimes evidence, as it would allow entry of other-crimes 
evidence merely to establish the defendant's propensity to commit crime in 
general. This would create the very danger that the prohibition on other-crimes 
evidence is intended to prevent, namely, that a jury might convict the defendant 
merely because it feels that the defendant is a bad person who deserves 
punishment.
In the instant case, the circuit court abused its discretion in allowing the 
admission of evidence that defendant dealt in stolen auto parts. This evidence 
was not admissible under the entrapment exception to the general rule 
prohibiting other-crimes evidence, because it was not specifically relevant to 
the crimes for which defendant claimed he was entrapped, i.e., delivery 
of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent 
to deliver. To the contrary, the evidence that defendant dealt in stolen auto 
parts merely served the improper purpose of establishing defendant's propensity 
to commit crime in general.
Indeed, a review of the record reveals that the prosecution's references to 
defendant's dealings in stolen auto parts had the likely effect of convincing 
the jury that it should find defendant guilty of the drug charges because 
defendant is a bad person who deserves to be punished. The State's improper 
references to the other-crimes evidence began with the first sentence of the 
prosecution's opening argument. The prosecutor stated: "Good morning. In 
September of 1991, the Illinois State Police received evidence that the 
defendant in this case, James Placek, was dealing in stolen auto parts." The 
prosecutor's opening statement continued to refer to the "stolen" auto parts by 
stating that the evidence would show that these "stolen" parts were bought and 
sold by defendant.
During the State's case in chief, Officer Castro testified that he was a 
member of the South Suburban Auto Theft Interdiction Network, and that the 
police had received information that defendant was involved in buying and 
selling stolen auto parts. Officer Castro stated that he met defendant through 
informant Daniel Dooz, a man whom defendant described as a "very good [car] 
thief." According to Officer Castro, he told defendant that he had certain 
stolen auto parts for sale, and defendant responded that these parts were "not 
good movers." Defendant explained what parts were "good movers" and told Officer 
Castro to contact him if he found good parts to sell. Officer Castro further 
testified regarding the details of three separate instances in which defendant 
purchased stolen auto parts from him.
The testimony that defendant dealt in stolen auto parts was not relevant to 
either the crimes with which defendant was charged or defendant's predisposition 
to commit those crimes. Defendant was charged with delivery of a controlled 
substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, not 
auto parts theft. Theft of auto parts is not similar to the crime of delivery of 
cocaine.
We recognize that both the State and the defense acknowledged the relevance 
of the prior relationship between defendant and Officer Castro to their 
respective arguments. In fact, defendant testified that he sold the cocaine to 
Officer Castro so that Officer Castro would continue to sell defendant auto 
parts. The information regarding the development of Officer Castro's 
relationship with defendant was therefore relevant to the State's drug case 
against defendant. Nonetheless, the State should have been required to present 
this information without referring to the auto parts as "stolen." Consequently, 
the circuit court abused its discretion in allowing the State to present 
evidence that defendant dealt in stolen auto parts. The erroneous admission of 
evidence of other crimes " `carries a high risk of prejudice and ordinarily 
calls for reversal.' " Manning, 182 Ill. 2d  at 214, quoting 
People v. Lindgren, 79 Ill. 2d 129, 140 (1980). We do not regard the 
State's numerous references throughout its case to defendant's dealings in 
"stolen" auto parts to be harmless error.
As to Officer Castro's testimony regarding the stolen T-top and gun, this 
evidence likewise does not relate to either the crimes with which defendant was 
charged or defendant's predisposition to commit those crimes. Thus, the 
prosecution should not have presented this evidence, and the circuit court 
properly sustained defendant's objection to the testimony. As to the recovery of 
the marijuana, however, this evidence is admissible because it is relevant to 
counter defendant's entrapment claim on the drug charges. Possession of 
marijuana is a crime similar to delivery of cocaine. We therefore find that the 
circuit court's ruling admitting this evidence was proper.
The State argues that a jury instruction cured any error in the improper 
admission of other-crimes evidence. The jury was instructed that "[e]vidence has 
been received that the defendant has been involved in conduct other than those 
[sic] charged in the indictment. This evidence has been received on the 
issue of the defendant's design and predisposition to commit a crime and may be 
considered by you only for that limited purpose. It is for you to determine 
whether the defendant was involved in that conduct and, if so, what weight to be 
given to this evidence on the issues of design and predisposition to commit a 
crime." However, we have held that the other-crimes evidence of defendant's 
involvement in stolen auto parts should not have been admitted because it was 
not relevant to the question of whether defendant was predisposed to delivering 
cocaine. The circuit court's instruction was therefore erroneous under the facts 
of this case, and certainly did nothing to cure the improper admission of the 
other-crimes evidence. Because of the improper introduction of other-crimes 
evidence at defendant's trial, we reverse defendant's conviction and remand for 
a new trial.
IV. Admission of Evidence Regarding Defendant's
Association with Convicted Drug Traffickers
Defendant also argues that the State improperly introduced evidence that he 
was associated with Clemente and Dickie Messino, who, according to defendant, 
are notorious drug dealers in defendant's community. Defendant contends that 
this improper evidence deprived him of his right to a fair trial. Specifically, 
defendant points to Officer Castro's testimony that when defendant was under 
surveillance, he was observed entering an auto parts store owned by Clemente 
Messino; that Clemente Messino and his brother Dickie Messino were convicted in 
federal court of trafficking cocaine; and that defendant stated that his cocaine 
source was Dickie Messino.
Defendant waived this argument because defense counsel neither objected to 
this testimony at trial, nor included this claim of error in his motion for a 
new trial. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Defendant 
urges us to consider this claim under the plain error doctrine. 134 Ill. 2d R. 
615(a). Given that we have already reversed defendant's conviction and are 
remanding for a new trial, we need not resolve whether the admission of this 
evidence constitutes plain error.
V. Admission of Evidence that Defendant Made Racial Slurs
Finally, defendant argues that the State purposefully elicited irrelevant 
testimony that defendant made racial slurs. Officer Castro testified that, on 
one occasion, he sold defendant a rear seat to a certain car. Defendant was 
apparently pleased with this purchase and told Officer Castro that "usually, the 
black guys he deals with can't get that, that they are too stupid to get them." 
Defendant waived review of this issue by failing to object to this testimony at 
trial, and by failing to raise the issue in his motion for a new trial. See 
Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 186. Defendant asks us to consider this claim 
under the plain error doctrine. As before, we need not resolve defendant's plain 
error claim since we have already reversed defendant's conviction and are 
remanding for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we reverse defendant's conviction and remand this 
cause to the circuit court for a new trial, consistent with the views expressed 
in this opinion. Double jeopardy principles do not bar the State from proceeding 
against defendant in a new trial. After thoroughly reviewing the evidence, we 
find it to have been sufficient to support defendant's conviction. As such, 
there is no impediment to a new trial. See People v. Hope, 116 Ill. 2d 265, 279 (1986). We, however, in no manner imply that we have made a finding as 
to defendant's guilt that would be binding on retrial. See People v. 
McDonald, 125 Ill. 2d 182, 202 (1988). The judgments of the appellate court 
and circuit courts are hereby reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit 
court.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment reversed;
cause remanded.