Case Title: State v. Miller

Citation: 111 So. 2d 108, 237 La. 266

Docket Number: 

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 1959-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
111 So. 2d 108 (1959) 237 La. 266 STATE of Louisiana v. Glenn Clyde Stanley MILLER. No. 44490. Supreme Court of Louisiana. April 27, 1959. Ossie B. Brown, Baton Rouge, for appellant. Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., M. E. Culligan, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. St. Clair Favrot, Dist. Atty., Thomas B. Pugh, Asst. Dist. Atty., Baton Rouge, for appellee. *109 HAMLIN, Justice. Defendant, who was indicted for the crime of aggravated rape (LSA-R.S. 14:42), appeals from his conviction of the crime of simple rape (LSA-R.S. 14:43) and sentence to serve twenty years at hard labor in the Louisiana State Penitentiary. Presented for our consideration are three Bills of Exceptions reserved during the course of trial. Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was reserved to the trial judge's overruling of defendant's objection to the introduction in evidence and subsequent showing on a "movie" screen of certain colored slides showing bruises on the prosecuting witness' body alleged by her to have been inflicted by the defendant. Counsel stated that the "blown up" colored slides when magnified on the screen showed gruesome details which would prejudice the jury. Mr. Ray Herd, Chief Criminologist for the Crime Laboratory, Louisiana State Police, stated that the prosecuting witness was photographed in Ansco Color film and Plus X black and white film. He testified: The State utilized the colored photographstaken shortly after the commission of the alleged crimeto corroborate the victim's testimony. The bruises having healed at the time of trial, black and white photographs were claimed to be inadequate to reveal them. The State contended that not only were the photographs essential to its case, but that they were the only means by which it could show the bruises. The State further argued that the slides were not gruesome or morbid. We have examined the slides, which were submitted to this Court as a part of the evidence attached to this bill of exceptions, and we do not find them gruesome, morbid, or of any other character as would prejudice the jury. In State v. Johnson, 198 La. 195, 3 So. 2d 556,[1] 559, we properly reviewed as follows, the rules with respect to the admission of photographs in evidence: We conclude that the slides served the same purpose as photographs and were properly admitted in evidence. The State presented them on screen to the jury to corroborate its testimony going to prove that the defendant had physically injured the prosecuting witness. Since screening the color slides was a reasonable method of exhibiting a duplication of the bruises suffered by the prosecuting witness, we find that it was proper and not prejudicial. There was no abuse of discretion by the trial judge, particularly in view of his statement in per curiam that Bill of Exceptions No. 1 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 2, reserved when the trial judge overruled defendant's motion for a new trial, averred: LSA-R.S. 14:42 defines aggravated rape as follows: Simple rape is defined in LSA-R.S. 14:43 as: As stated supra, defendant was indicted for aggravated rape and convicted of simple rape. To support his contention that the State did not prove that he had committed the crime of simple rape, defendant attached to the present bill of exceptions all of the testimony taken during the course of trial. Being aware of the rule of law that in prosecutions in which the State fails to produce any evidence establishing one or more of the elements of the crime of which an accused stands convicted, he will be discharged State v. La Borde, 234 La. 28, 99 So. 2d 11we have carefully reviewed the evidence herein; and we find that at the time the defendant had sexual intercourse with the prosecuting witness, her state of mind was confused and abnormal. This condition, an ingredient of the crime of simple rape, was engendered by fearfear of the defendant and of his actions. Her testimony recites: The foregoing evidence supports the conviction. We have repeatedly held: The following per curiam of the able trial judge additionally convinces us that there is no merit to Bill of Exceptions No. 2: Bill of Exceptions No. 2 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 3 was reserved to the overruling of defendant's motion in arrest of judgment. This bill averred that the verdict of simple rape is not *113 responsive to an indictment for the offense of aggravated rape, since the crime of aggravated rape does not contain the elements of the lesser crime of simple rape. It also averred that Article 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (LSA-R.S. 15:386) is unconstitutional, in that it made the verdict of guilty of simple rape responsive to the charge of aggravated rape. We must determine, in the light of the foregoing statutes, whether the elements of the crime of aggravated rape (the greater offense) necessarily contains all of the elements of the crime of simple rape (the lesser offense). State v. Clayton, supra. This question has been ably answered by the competent trial judge, and we quote with approval from his reasons for overruling the motion in arrest of judgment: It is beyond human comprehension that anyone would not believe that a female faced by an attacker, who intends to commit the crime of rape upon her, is not immediately thrown into a state of great fear or an abnormal condition of mind. This abnormal state of mind, which is one of the ingredients of simple rape, is, therefore, always included within the greater crime (aggravated rape). In the case of State v. Broussard, 217 La. 90, 46 So. 2d 48, 52, the defendant was charged with an attempt to commit aggravated rape and found guilty of an attempt to commit simple rape. In this Court counsel contended that the verdict was illegal, or rather, unconstitutional, because attempted simple rape is not responsive to the charge of attempted aggravated rape. We answered the contention by stating: We conclude that the verdict of simple rape is entirely responsive to a charge of aggravated rape. This conclusion precludes the necessity of our passing upon defendant's attack on the constitutionality of LSA-R.S. 15:386. However, we feel constrained to mention that counsel for the defendant made no objection when the able trial judge carefully instructed and charged the jury that it could render a verdict of guilty of simple rape. It was incumbent upon him that he object at that time. Article 391, Code of Criminal Procedure (LSA-R.S. 15:391).[2] Bill of Exceptions No. 3 is without merit. For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed. [1] There the photographs were made by an expert photographer shortly after the body of the deceased was found and before it was moved or touched by any person. The photographs were properly identified and their admission was permitted by the trial judge for the purpose of showing the nature of the crime and the facts and circumstances surrounding its commission. [2] "Every objection to the charge given, or to a refusal to charge as requested, or to a refusal to give the charge in writing, shall be by means of a bill of exceptions reserved before the jury shall have retired to deliberate upon their verdict, and the bill of exceptions shall be accompanied by such a statement of facts as shall show the error in the charge given, or in the refusal to charge as requested, or that the request to give the charge in writing was refused." LSA-R.S. 15:391.