Case Title: Sy-Lene v. Starwood

Citation: 376 Md. 157

Docket Number: 132/02

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. 226131
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 132
September Term, 2002
SY-LENE OF WASHINGTON, INC.
v.
STARWOOD URBAN RETAIL II, LLC
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J. 
Filed:   July 29, 2003
1The original term of the lease was from September 1, 1998, through January 30,
2009, with an abatement for September 1, 1998, through December 31, 1998, while Sy-
Lene performed renovations to the demised premises.
In this case, the parties disagree as to the construction of a contract providing for
parking spaces in a retail shopping plaza located in Chevy Chase, M aryland.  Petitioner, Sy-
Lene, filed a complaint pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,
Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol., 2001 Cum. Supp.) § 3-406 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article, seeking construction of the lease agreement and a declaration of the
parties’ rights under it.  The trial court granted respondent Starwood’s Motion to Dismiss.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed.  We will reverse, finding the lease terminology
ambiguous as a matter of law.
I.  Background
Petitioner, Sy-Lene of Washington, Inc., (“Sy-Lene”), operates a retail lingerie shop.
In June 1998, Sy-Lene entered into a ten-year lease1 with Somerset Properties Limited
Partnership (“Somerset”) to lease retail space in the shopping center located at 5500-5516
Wisconsin Avenue, Chevy Chase.  In October 1998, respondent, Starwood Urban Retail
(“Starwood”), purchased the plaza from Somerset and assumed the lease with Sy-Lene.  The
parties’ dispute pertains to Article XL of the lease, which provides, in relevant part: “Tenant
shall pay to Landlord $30.00 per month for each employee parking space as is needed for its
employees at the Premises. . . .  Landlord reserves the right to limit the number of employee
parking spaces to be provided Tenant pursuant to this Article.”
2Starwood changed garage managers several times between January 1999 and
November 2001.  None of the garage managers are a party to this suit, and, for
simplicity’s sake, we will refer to all of them as one entity.
2
On or about January 30, 1999, Sy-Lene requested from Starwood’s garage manager
five reduced-fee employee parking spaces for February 1999.2  The garage manager refused
Sy-Lene’s request, and Sy-Lene contacted Starwood directly.  Starwood informed Sy-Lene,
by letter, that there was “currently no availability” for employee parking.  Over the next two-
and-a-half years, Starwood, through its garage manager, denied many of Sy-Lene’s requests
for monthly reduced-fee employee parking spaces.  During that time, Starwood’s garage
manager charged Sy-Lene as much as $85.00 per month per employee space.  Finally, on
October 24, 2001, Starwood, through its garage manager, notified Sy-Lene that it would
cancel Sy-Lene’s monthly parking agreement effective November 1, 2001, and that the only
parking available to Sy-Lene’s employees would be daily parking at a cost of $8 per day.  
On October 29, 2001, Sy-Lene brought suit against Starwood in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, under the Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Maryland
Code (1973, 1998 Repl. Vol., 2001 Cum. Supp.), § 3-406 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article.  In its Complaint, in Count I, captioned Declaratory Judgment, Sy-Lene
sought a construction of Article XL and a declaration that the lease required Starwood to
supply Sy-Lene with at least ten reduced-fee employee parking spaces; in Count II, captioned
Injunction, Sy-Lene sought an injunction, directing Starwood’s parking garage managers to
provide a minimum of ten reduced-fee employee parking spaces, enjoining its managers to
3
reflect these reduced fees retroactively and prospectively, and directing Starwood to provide
Sy-Lene with detailed information regarding common area maintenance costs, which Sy-
Lene was required to pay to Starwood under the lease; and in Count III, captioned Damages,
Sy-Lene sought damages for the costs Sy-Lene incurred in paying for parking for its
employees, plus court costs and attorneys’ fees. 
Starwood filed a Motion to Dismiss.  Following a hearing on the motion, the court
dismissed the Complaint, ruling as follows:  
“The Court does not feel that [Article XL] is ambiguous.
It is as clear and as plain as day.  If there are parking spaces
available, the employees can have parking spaces as is needed,
but the landlord reserves the right to limit the number, and
implicit in that, quite clearly—to limit the number means it can
be zero.
“And the plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action as
to Count 1.  The motion to dismiss is granted.
“As to Count 2—I suppose Count 2 and 3 really follow
my ruling with respect to Count 1.
. . .
“Accordingly, I will grant the motion with respect to
Count 2. . . .
“And Count 3 asks for damages.  Considering the ruling
in Count 1 and Count 2, Count 3 is dismissed as well.” 
The Circuit Court filed a written Order reflecting the oral ruling.  
Sy-Lene filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that the trial
court erred because it dismissed the complaint without issuing a declaration of the parties’
3Neither party sought review of the portion of Court of Special Appeals’ ruling
dealing with the accounting of the common area maintenance costs.
4
rights under Article XL of the lease, and because under Maryland law, Sy-Lene was entitled
to an itemized accounting of common area maintenance costs.  In an unreported opinion, a
majority of the appellate court panel held that the trial court properly dismissed the
Complaint because the court, at the hearing on the motion, declared the rights of the parties
with respect to Article XL of the contract.  Quoting from the transcript of the hearing, the
majority noted that the trial court determined that Article XL was not ambiguous and that it
did not require Starwood to provide any reduced-fee parking for Sy-Lene’s employees.  With
respect to Sy-Lene’s request for detailed accounting of the common area maintenance costs,
the intermediate appellate court reversed, holding that Sy-Lene was entitled to an accounting
of those costs, and that the trial court should not have denied Sy-Lene’s request merely
because it was improper in form, presented as a request for an injunction rather than as a
request for an accounting.3  
We granted Sy-Lene’s petition for writ of certiorari.  Sy-Lene v. Starwood, 373 Md.
406, 818 A.2d 1105 (2003).
II.  Standard of Review
The interpretation of a contract, including the determination of whether a contract is
ambiguous, is a question of law, subject to de novo review.  See Langston v. Langston, 366
Md. 490, 506, 784 A.2d 1086, 1095 (2001); Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, 363 Md. 232, 250,
4Apart from our finding that the trial court’s interpretation of the contract
amounted to legal error, we additionally find fault in the trial court’s dismissal of the
declaratory judgment action.  The Court of Special Appeals upheld the trial court’s
dismissal on the ground that the trial court, at the hearing on the motion, declared the
rights of the parties.  As we recently pointed out, a trial court may not dismiss an action
and then declare the rights of the parties.  In Brown v. Fire and Police Employees’
Retirement System, ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___ (2003), we explained that “once
a court dismisses an entire action, there is nothing then pending, and the court is without
authority to issue an order with respect to the matter.”  Id. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (citing
State v. Sampson, 297 S.2d 120, 122 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. 1974) and Hagan v. Robert &
Co., 150 S.E.2d 663, 665 (Ga. 1966)).  The trial court should not have dismissed the
action and the Court of Special Appeals erred in upholding the dismissal.
5
768 A.2d 620, 629-30 (2001); Auction Reps. v. Ashton, 354 Md. 333, 340, 731 A.2d 441, 445
(1999); Calomiris v. Woods, 353 Md. 425, 434-35, 727 A.3d 358, 362-63 (1999).  Although
the factual findings of the trial court considering parol evidence are to be reviewed under the
clearly erroneous standard, such evidence is only admissible after the court finds the contract
to be ambiguous.  Calomiris, 353 Md. at 435, 727 A.2d at 363.
In the case sub judice, the trial court dismissed the action but then went on to declare
the rights of the parties, ruling that Article XL was not ambiguous and thus Sy-Lene was not
permitted to introduce parol evidence.  The court also found that Sy-Lene was not entitled
to ten reduced-fee employee parking spaces, and that Starwood could limit the number of
such spaces to zero.  The Court of Special Appeals, in reviewing the trial court’s findings of
law with respect to the lease’s construction, correctly identified those rulings as findings of
law.  Nonetheless, in reviewing this legal conclusion, the majority opinion applied the clearly
erroneous standard.4  The court stated: 
“In a declaratory judgment proceeding, a trial court
6
determines both issues of law and fact.  Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Brethren Mutual Ins. Co., 38 Md. App. 197, 206
[379 A.2d 1234, 1239] (1977).  We will not disturb the trial
court’s conclusions as to the facts ‘unless found to be clearly
erroneous.’  Id.  Therefore, on appeal, we examine the trial
court’s factual conclusions and ascertain whether they were
clearly erroneous.  Id. at 206-07.
“In the instant case, the court determined as a matter of
law that the contract did not obligate [Starwood] to provide [Sy-
Lene] with ten reduced-fee parking spaces.  It was reasonable
for the court to find that the contract language in question was
not susceptible to more than one meaning.  Because the contract
was not ambiguous, [Sy-Lene] was not entitled to produce parol
evidence to establish supplemental terms.  
“[Sy-Lene] asserts that the trial court erred in finding that
the lease provision permitting [Starwood] to ‘limit’ the number
of spaces thereby allows it to provide no spaces.  Although [Sy-
Lene] claims that ‘limit’ can never mean ‘reduce to zero,’ it does
not cite, nor can we find, any Maryland case law supporting
such a proposition.  Consequently, it was not in error for the trial
court to find that the lease did not prevent [Starwood] from
restricting the number of available reduced-fee parking spaces
to zero.”
As this Court made clear in Calomiris, and again more recently in Lema v. Bank of America,
N.A., ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___ (2003), an appellate court reviews de novo the
trial court’s findings of law with respect to a contract’s ambiguity.  “Contract ambiguity . . .
is not a factual issue and is not, therefore, subject to the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard of
review.”  Id. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___.  Thus, the Court of Special Appeals erred when it
employed the clearly erroneous standard in reviewing the trial court’s findings of law.  We
shall review de novo the trial court’s finding that the contract is unambiguous.  
5Although not raised below, Sy-Lene also argues that the landlord’s refusal to
provide reduced-fee employee parking is unconscionable and violative of the lease’s
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Starwood contends that Sy-Lene’s
argument regarding breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not
properly before the Court, because Sy-Lene failed to raise the issue below, and there are
no exceptional circumstances that would warrant the Court reviewing the issue.  We
agree, and will not address this argument.  See Maryland Rule 8-131(a) (“Ordinarily, the
appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to
have been raised in or decided by the trial court.”).  
7
III.  Discussion
Before this Court, Sy-Lene contends that the trial court’s finding was incorrect
because the lease is ambiguous, that standard rules of construction support construction in
its favor, and that parol evidence should be admitted to determine the intent of the parties.5
Starwood concedes that the Court of Special Appeals employed the incorrect standard
of review, but argues that the result was legally correct nonetheless and should be affirmed.
According to Starwood, the plain language of Article XL does not prescribe any lower or
upper limit on the number of spaces that Starwood must provide, and thus Starwood may
limit the number of such spaces to zero.  Because the lease is not ambiguous, Starwood
argues, parol evidence is not admissible to establish the existence of an oral agreement that
requires the landlord provide at least ten reduced-fee employee parking spaces, and Sy-
Lene’s arguments regarding standard rules of construction are irrelevant.  
Maryland follows the law of objective contract interpretation.  Long v. State, 371 Md.
72, 84, 807 A.2d 1, 8 (2002); Langston v. Langston, 366 Md. 490, 506, 784 A.2d 1086, 1095
(2001); County Commissioners v. St. Charles, 366 Md. 426, 444, 784 A.2d 545, 556 (2001);
8
Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, 363 Md. 232, 250, 768 A.2d 620, 630 (2001); Village Green v.
Randolph, 361 Md. 179, 189, 760 A.2d 716, 721 (2000); Auction Reps. v. Ashton, 354 Md.
333, 340, 731 A.2d 441, 444 (1999); Calomiris v. Woods, 353 Md. 425, 435-36, 727 A.3d
358, 363 (1999); State v. Attman/Glazier, 323 Md. 592, 604, 594 A.2d 138, 144 (1991);
Cloverland v. Fry, 322 Md. 367, 372-73, 587 A.2d 527, 530 (1991); Feick v. Thrutchley, 322
Md. 111, 114, 586 A.2d 3, 4 (1991); General Motors Acceptance v. Daniels, 303 Md. 254,
261, 492 A.2d 1306, 1310 (1985); Orkin v. Jacobson, 274 Md. 124, 128, 332 A.2d 901, 903
(1975); Kasten Constr. v. Rod Enterprises, 268 Md. 318, 328, 301 A.2d 12, 17-18 (1973).
The court’s duty is to determine the intention of the parties as reflected in the terms of the
contract.  County Commissioners, 366 Md. at 444, 784 A.2d at 556. 
Under the objective test of contract interpretation, “the written language embodying
the terms of an agreement will govern the rights and liabilities of the parties, irrespective of
the intent of the parties at the time they entered into the contract.”  Long, 371 Md. at 84, 807
A.2d at 8 (quoting Slice v. Carozza Prop., Inc., 215 Md. 357, 368, 137 A.2d 687, 693
(1958)).  A contract’s unambiguous language will not give way to what the parties thought
the contract meant or intended it to mean at the time of execution; rather, “if a written
contract is susceptible of a clear, unambiguous and definite understanding . . . its construction
is for the court to determine.”  See Langston, 366 Md. at 507, 784 A.2d at 1095 (quoting
Wells, 363 Md. at 251, 768 A.2d at 630); Auction Reps., 354 Md. at 340, 731 A.2d at 444-45.
When the clear language of a contract is unambiguous, the court will give effect to its plain,
9
ordinary, and usual meaning, taking into account the context in which it is used.  Langston,
366 Md. at 506, 784 A.2d at 1095; Wells, 363 Md. at 251, 768 A.2d at 630.
As we summarized in Calomiris, when the court is called upon to interpret a contract,
its task is as follows:
“Determine from the language of the agreement itself
what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would
have meant at the time it was effectuated.  In addition, when the
language of the contract is plain and unambiguous there is no
room for construction, and a court must presume that the parties
meant what they expressed.  In these circumstances, the true test
of what is meant is not what the parties to the contract intended
it to mean, but what a reasonable person in the position of the
parties would have thought it meant.  Consequently, the clear
and unambiguous language of an agreement will not give way
to what the parties thought that the agreement meant or intended
it to mean.”
Calomiris, 353 Md. at 436, 727 A.2d at 363 (quoting General Motors, 303 Md. at 261, 492
A.2d at 1310).
A contract is ambiguous if it is subject to more than one interpretation when read by
a reasonably prudent person.  Langston, 366 Md. at 506, 784 A.2d at 1095; County
Commissioners, 366 Md. at 445, 784 A.2d at 556; Auction Reps., 354 Md. at 340, 731 A.2d
at 444; Calomiris, 353 Md. at 435, 727 A.2d at 363.  “If the contract is ambiguous, the court
must consider any extrinsic evidence which sheds light on the intentions of the parties at the
time of the execution of the contract.”  County Commissioners, 366 Md. at 445, 784 A.2d at
556 (quoting Heat & Power v. Air Products, 320 Md. 584, 596-97, 578 A.2d 1202, 1208
(1990)). 
10
We turn to the language of the contract, and the heart of the issue before the Court.
There is no case law in Maryland construing the term “limit.”  The Oxford English
Dictionary includes the following definitions of the word “limit”:
“1.  To assign within limits; to appoint, fix definitely; to specify.
. . .
“2.  To confine within limits, to set bounds to. . . .  Also, to
prohibit (a person) from something. . . .
“3.  To border upon (a country). . . .
“4.  To beg within specified limits.”
VIII Oxford English Dictionary 964 (2d ed. 1989).  See also Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary Unabridged 1312 (Philip Babcock Gove, ed., Merriam-Webster
1986) (defining “limit” as: “to assign to or within certain limits; fix, constitute, or appoint
definitely; to set bounds or limits to; to curtail or reduce in quantity or extent”); Random
House Webster’s College Dictionary 762 (Sol Steinmetz, ed., Random House 2d ed. 1997)
(defining “limit” as: “to restrict by or as if by establishing limits; to confine or keep within
limits”).  Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “limit” as: “1. A restriction or restraint.
2. A boundary or defining line.  3. The extent of power, right or authority.”  Black’s Law
Dictionary 939 (7th ed. 1999).
Each of these definitions of the term “limit” incorporates the concept of a boundary
or restraint.  To limit something is to define its extent, and in so doing, to quantify it.
Starwood’s suggestion that the concept of elimination is contained within the term limit
6Before 1976, the Court of Appeals was the highest state court in Kentucky.
11
conflicts with this idea that a limit defines an area or range.  
In comparing the terms “limit” and “eliminate,” we find the analysis of one of our
sister states persuasive.  In Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Helm Hotel Cocktail Lounge,
Inc., 357 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. 1962), the Court of Appeals of Kentucky6 interpreted a statute
authorizing the state liquor board to limit the number of liquor licenses it issued.  The court
in Helm Hotel held that the agency’s power to limit did not include the power to eliminate,
stating: “As generally understood, a limitation is a boundary, restriction or circumscription
of something.  There must always be a base upon which the limitation can operate.  The
power to limit is not the power to destroy the base.”  Id. at 892.  
We agree with Sy-Lene that “right to limit” does not mean “right to eliminate.” 
 Under
the ordinary meanings of the words, Starwood’s right to limit the number of parking spaces
did not permit it to reduce that number to zero.  The wording of the contract, however,
provides no indication as to what limit is acceptable.  Sy-Lene asserts that no less than ten
spaces were intended as the lowest limit.  Starwood disputes that there was any intent to
restrict its ability to limit the reduced-fee employee parking spaces.  Therefore, we must
remand to the trial court, and direct it to determine the parties’ intentions at the time of the
lease’s execution.  To this end, and in light of the absence of a quantity in the contract, the
trial court may permit the parties to submit parol evidence.
12
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED
TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
REVERSE 
THE 
JUDGMEN T 
OF 
THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY
COUNTY AND TO REMAND THE CASE TO
T H A T  
C O U R T  
F O R  
F U R T H E R
PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION.  COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID
BY RESPONDENT.