Case Title: Uinta County v. Pennington

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-12-0020

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-10-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
UINTA COUNTY, WYOMING; UINTA COUNTY SHERRIFF LOUIS NAPOLI; and BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF UINTA v. JUDEE PENNINGTON2012 WY 129Case Number: S-12-0020Decided: 10/01/2012This opinion is subjected to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction can be made before final publication in the permanent volume. 
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 
2012 
 
UINTA COUNTY, 
WYOMING; UINTA
COUNTY SHERIFF LOUIS 
NAPOLI;
and BOARD OF 
COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS OF THE 
COUNTY
OF 
UINTA,
 
Appellants,
 
v.
 
JUDEE PENNINGTON,
 
Appellee.

Appeal from the 
District Court of Uinta County
The Honorable Wade E. 
Waldrip, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant Uinta County Sheriff Louis Napoli:
Gregory A. Phillips, 
Wyoming Attorney General; John D. Rossetti, Deputy Attorney General; 
and Misha E. Westby, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Westby.
 
Representing 
Appellants Uinta County, Wyoming, and Board of County Commissioners of the 
County of Uinta:
Richard Rideout 
of the Law Offices of Richard Rideout, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Mel C. Orchard, III, 
of The Spence Law Firm, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming; and V. Anthony Vehar 
of Vehar Law Offices, P.C., Evanston, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Vehar.
 
Before GOLDEN, HILL, 
VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ., and PARK, D.J.
 
PARK, District 
Judge.
 
[¶1]      Judee 
Pennington was sexually assaulted by Todd Hoover, a Uinta County detention 
officer, while she was an inmate at the Uinta County Detention Center. Ms. 
Pennington filed claims under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-39-101, et seq., against Hoover, Uinta County Sheriff Louis 
Napoli, and the Uinta County Board of Commissioners for damages stemming from 
this assault. Sheriff Napoli, Uinta County, and the County Commissioners are the 
Appellants in these proceedings. Ms. Pennington is the Appellee. The 
trial court denied the Sheriff’s and the County’s motions for summary judgment 
on claims against the Sheriff for negligent supervision and training, and on the 
Sheriff’s motion for qualified immunity; and also denied the County’s and the 
Board of Commissioners’ motions as to statutorily imposed liability. The Sheriff 
and the County appeal from the denial of their respective motions. Ms. 
Pennington does not appeal from the trial court’s ruling granting summary 
judgment in favor of the Appellants on her other claims. 
 
[¶2]      
We reverse the trial court’s decision.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶3]      
Appellants present several issues. The Court finds one question to be 
dispositive and does not consider the other matters presented. The dispositive 
issue presented on appeal is: 
 
Does the record 
support the trial court’s ruling that Sheriff Napoli was not entitled to assert 
the defense of qualified immunity?
 
FACTS
 
[¶4]      
Ms. Pennington was an inmate of the Uinta County Detention Center because 
she had been terminated from the drug court program and was waiting for a 
placement in a treatment program. While she was an inmate, she was given drugs 
by Todd Hoover, and she was sexually assaulted by him. 
 
[¶5]      
Todd Hoover (hereinafter “Hoover”) was a detention officer who worked for 
the Uinta County Sheriff from 2006 until 2007. Prior to working in Uinta County, 
Hoover had been a detention officer in Utah for nearly five years. He had no 
training in Wyoming, but he had been trained in Utah. His training included what 
were acceptable and unacceptable interactions with female inmates, as well as 
what would constitute unlawful sexual contact with female inmates. While he was 
in Utah, Hoover had back surgery and became addicted to pain pills. Because of 
his addiction, he would steal pills that were prescribed for inmates. 
 Hoover’s addiction and related drug thefts were not known to 
the Uinta County authorities and came to light only because he overdosed while 
on duty. As a result, the Sheriff conducted an internal investigation, and 
Hoover confessed to taking inmate drugs. Sheriff Louis Napoli and Hoover both 
agreed with recommendations that came out of the investigation. These 
recommendations included two weeks off without pay, extension of Hoover’s 
probationary period for an additional year, counseling and treatment as 
recommended by Dr. Eric Nielsen, disclosure and access to all of Hoover’s 
medical records relating to the drug theft, and random urinalysis.  

 
[¶6]      
Hoover met with Dr. Nielsen, who concluded that Hoover could supervise 
work crews outside of the jail; and that if counseling treatments were in place 
for pain management, substance abuse, and personal relationships with his wife, 
it would be appropriate for him to return to work inside the jail. 
 
[¶7]      
Hoover also met with Patricia Roberts, a licensed clinical social worker, 
for a substance abuse evaluation. Ms. Roberts recommended that Hoover should 
take only specifically prescribed pain medication; that he should consult with a 
pain clinic and follow its treatment recommendations; that he should complete a 
residential treatment program for controlled substances; that he should continue 
treatment with his therapist; and that he should be supervised when handling 
prescription medications at the jail. 
 
[¶8]      
The parties disagree as to the extent that Hoover was following the 
recommendations of Dr. Nielsen and Ms. Roberts. This disagreement is not 
important because while he was in treatment, he committed the sexual assault, 
making further progress on his drug problem irrelevant. After the assault, 
Hoover’s employment was terminated. Criminal charges were filed against him. He 
entered a guilty plea and served a prison sentence. 
 
[¶9]      
Ms. Pennington initially filed an action in federal court. Subsequently, 
all the federal claims were dismissed, and the federal judge declined to retain 
jurisdiction over the state claims. Ms. Pennington then filed in state court. 
She asserted claims against Sheriff Napoli under theories 
of respondeat superior, vicarious liability, negligent 
supervision and training, and claims for intentional and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. The trial court had some question as to the nature of her 
claims against the County, but concluded that Pennington’s claims were for 
vicarious liability for the conduct of Sheriff Napoli. 
 
[¶10]   
The Sheriff and the County filed motions for summary judgment. The trial 
court denied the motion on the claim against the Sheriff for negligent 
supervision and training and found that the Sheriff was not entitled to assert 
qualified immunity. The trial court also denied summary judgment as to the 
County’s and Board’s assertion that they were not statutorily liable for the 
actions of Sheriff Napoli. The trial court granted summary judgment as to all 
other claims. The Sheriff and the County filed an interlocutory appeal, 
asserting that the trial court should have granted the motions for summary 
judgment as to the claims for negligent supervision and training and qualified 
immunity. In general terms, the question before the Court is whether the trial 
court’s denial of summary judgment is supported by the record. 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
 
[¶11]   
The standard of review for summary judgments is well-established. We 
review a summary judgment in the same light as the district court, using the 
same materials and following the same standards. Gayhart 
v. Goody, 2004 WY 112, ¶ 11, 98 P.3d 164, 168 (Wyo. 2004). 
Summary judgment is proper only when there are no genuine issues of material 
fact, and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Id. Summary judgments are not favored in negligence actions. 
Cook v. Shoshone First Bank, 2006 WY 13, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 886, 
889 (Wyo. 2006). However, summary judgments have been upheld in negligence cases 
where the record did not establish the existence of a genuine issue of material 
fact. Id.

DISCUSSION
 
[¶12]   
Sheriff Napoli appeals from the denial of his motion for summary judgment 
in which he asserted the defense of qualified immunity. We must first determine 
whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. The denial of a motion for 
summary judgment is generally not an appealable final 
order. Gilstrap v. June Eisele Warren 
Trust, 2005 WY 21, ¶ 7, 106 P.3d 858, 861 (Wyo. 2005). An 
exception to this rule exists when a district court refuses to dismiss a case on 
the basis of qualified immunity. State ex rel. Dep’t of Corrections v. 
Watts, 2008 WY 19, ¶ 9, 177 P.3d 793, 795 (Wyo. 2008). An order 
denying a summary judgment on a claim of qualified immunity is appealable, and a 
grant of discretionary review is not necessary. Id. at ¶ 10, 
177 P.3d  at 796. The Court has jurisdiction to review the denial of 
the motions filed by the Sheriff and the County.
 
[¶13]   
A peace officer is entitled to qualified immunity if, while acting within 
the scope of his duties, he performed his discretionary duties reasonably and in 
good faith. Darrar v. Bourke, 910 P.2d 572, 575 (Wyo. 1996). This immunity defense was recognized at common law and was 
a policy “developed to give a measure of protection to a public official from 
the harassment and risk of being mulcted in damages for mistakes he may make in 
the performance of his public duties.” Blake v. Rupe, 
651 P.2d 1096, 1108 (Wyo. 1982). This Court, in Blake, 
adopted the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court 
in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974):
 
* * * [T]he common 
law soon recognized the necessity of permitting officials to perform their 
official functions free from the threat of suits for personal liability. This 
official immunity apparently rested, in its genesis, on two mutually dependent 
rationales: (1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of 
subjecting to liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of 
his position, to exercise discretion; (2) the danger that the threat of such 
liability would deter his willingness to execute his office with the 
decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good.
 
Id. at 239-40, 94 S. Ct.  at 1688.  We held 
in Kimbley v. City of Green River, 
663 P.2d 871, 883 (Wyo. 1983), that defendants retained any 
common-law defenses even if immunity was waived under the Governmental Claims 
Act. A defendant is entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity even 
though a plaintiff’s claims are based on the Governmental Claims Act. Id. 

 
[¶14]   
In order to establish a claim of qualified immunity, the claimant must 
prove: 1) the officer was acting within the scope of his or her duties; 2) the 
officer was acting in good faith; 3) the officer’s acts were reasonable under 
the circumstances; and 4) the officer’s acts were discretionary duties and not 
merely operational or ministerial duties. Darrar, 
910 P.2d  at 575-76. It is appropriate to review a denial 
of a claim for qualified immunity if the facts have been sufficiently developed 
through a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 577. The specific issue 
before this Court is whether Sheriff Napoli proved that there were no material 
questions of fact as to each of the elements of qualified immunity. If he 
carried this burden, then the trial court erred in denying summary judgment. If 
the record reflects that there are questions of fact, the trial court’s ruling 
is correct. 
 
[¶15]   
The trial court denied summary judgment as to the claim of qualified 
immunity and ruled that:
 
            
This Court concludes that there are genuine issues of material fact that 
prevent the grant of summary judgment as to the reasonableness of Sheriff 
Napoli’s actions and inactions. Dr. John Peters, an expert in law enforcement 
agency and detention policy and procedures, presented by Ms. Pennington, offers 
his opinion that Sheriff Napoli’s conduct was unreasonable and that the Sheriff 
failed his duties by allowing Mr. Hoover to remain in his position despite his 
drug abuse history and UCSO policy infractions. He further opines 
that Mr. Hoover should never have been in a position of supervising inmates at 
least until he had successfully completed an in-patient treatment program. This 
Court agrees with Ms. Pennington that the facts presented here do not permit the 
grant of summary judgment. A reasonable jury could question Sheriff Napoli’s 
decision to allow Mr. Hoover to remain employed as a detention officer and to 
return to an inmate-supervisory position. A reasonable jury also could question 
the Sheriff’s actions or inactions in ensuring that Mr. Hoover was completing 
recommended treatment. As a result, summary judgment must be DENIED. 

 
[¶16]   
The trial court correctly set out the factors that must be considered for 
a successful defense of qualified immunity; however, the trial court’s analysis 
is misdirected. The trial court focused on whether there were differences of 
opinion as to the reasonableness of the Sheriff’s actions that had to be 
determined by a jury. This is a negligence analysis. The issue before the trial 
court was not whether the Sheriff was negligent, but rather whether he was 
entitled to qualified immunity. Whether a public official is entitled to 
qualified immunity is a question of law which the court must 
resolve. Layland v. Stevens, 2007 WY 188, ¶ 12, 
171 P.3d 1070, 1073 (Wyo. 2007). Whereas differences of opinion 
might create disputed questions of fact in negligence situations, differences of 
opinion as to the propriety of an officer’s action have a different impact in 
determining whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity. As will 
be discussed more fully below, these differences of opinion might tend to show 
that Sheriff Napoli has qualified immunity. Since the trial court did not apply 
the proper rule of law, it is necessary for this Court to review the record to 
see if the Sheriff is entitled to qualified immunity.
 
[¶17]   
Both parties agree that Sheriff Napoli was acting in the scope of his 
duties. The next question is whether Sheriff Napoli was acting in good faith. We 
have previously defined “good faith” as “being honest, lawful intent, and the 
condition of acting without knowledge of fraud and without interest to assist in 
fraudulent or otherwise unlawful scheme,” and that “[g]ood faith consists 
in an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious 
advantage of another, even though the forms or technicalities of law, together 
with an absence of all information or belief of facts which would render the 
transaction unconscientious.” Darrar, 
910 P.2d  at 576. Other courts have held that an officer 
asserting this affirmative defense must show that a 
reasonably prudent officer, under the same or similar circumstances, could have 
believed that his conduct was justified based on the information he possessed 
when the conduct occurred. Telthorster v. 
Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457, 460 (Tex. 
2002).  
 
[¶18]   
Pennington argues the Sheriff was not acting in good faith because he 
allowed “Detention Officer Hoover to remain in his position despite his drug 
abuse history and previous policy infractions.” Pennington goes on to assert 
that “Sheriff Napoli’s actions and inactions caused the environment that allowed 
the sexual assaults.” She also claims the Sheriff should have “fired Hoover and 
never allowed him access to inmates such as 
[Pennington].”
 
[¶19]   
Previously when we determined that an official was acting in good faith, 
we did not review the public official’s testimony in detail. Rice v. Collins 
Communication, Inc., 2010 WY 109, ¶ 24, 236 P.3d 1009, 1018 
(Wyo. 2010). As in Rice, we find it unnecessary to include Sheriff 
Napoli’s entire testimony, but conclude from reviewing the record that Sheriff 
Napoli was acting in good faith. Sheriff Napoli testified that Dr. Nielsen’s 
report “indicates it appears likely that [Hoover] can still manage inmates,” but 
“that [Hoover] shouldn’t be around medications.” Sheriff Napoli, when asked “Did 
you personally have any indication prior to Judee Pennington coming 
forward that Todd Hoover would engage in sexual misconduct with an inmate,” 
answered “Absolutely not.” Pennington provided nothing that indicates a lack of 
good faith.  All evidence suggests that the Sheriff was 
honest, he had lawful intent, and he was not taking “unconscientious 
advantage” of Ms. Pennington. We find that Sheriff Napoli acted in good faith. 

 
[¶20]   
The next requirement is that Sheriff Napoli acted reasonably under the 
circumstances. The term “reasonable” has also been defined by this Court “as 
having the faculty of reason; rational; governed by reason; being under the 
influence of reason; thinking, speaking, or acting rationally, or according to 
the dictates of reason; agreeable to reason; just; rational.” 
Darrar, 910 P.2d  at 576. 
 
[¶21]   
As previously noted, the trial court held that there were differences of 
opinion as to whether Sheriff Napoli should have terminated Hoover. In order to 
show that he was entitled to qualified immunity, the Sheriff was not obligated 
to prove that all reasonably prudent law enforcement officers would have acted 
as he did. He was required to prove only that a reasonably prudent officer, 
under the same circumstances, might have reached the same decision. Haney v. 
Monsky, 311 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Ky. 2010). If officers of 
reasonable competence could disagree on the issue, the officer will be said to 
have acted in good faith as a matter of law. Cherqui 
v. Westheimer Street Festival Corp., 116 S.W.3d 337, 
351 (Tex. App. 2003). 
 
[¶22]   
Pennington contends that Sheriff Napoli was not acting reasonably because 
he “should have been well aware of the dangers Hoover posed to inmates, 
including [Pennington].” This presents the question of whether Sheriff Napoli 
knew or should have known that when he elected to retain Hoover in his position, 
he placed female inmates at risk of possible sexual assault. If Hoover’s attack 
on Ms. Pennington was not reasonably foreseeable, the Sheriff acted reasonably. 
Pennington’s argument is based on statements that people who are addicted to 
drugs sometimes exercise poor judgment and have low inhibitions to establish the 
necessary foreseeability. The fact that a person may show “poor judgment” 
does not lead to the conclusion that the person will commit a sexual assault; 
not all people with poor judgment commit sexual assaults. The nexus between a 
drug addict with poor judgment and the foreseeability of a sexual 
assault by this person is simply not present. Pennington also attempts to 
show foreseeability by pointing to statements in the record 
indicating that sex between detention officers and inmates is a recognized 
problem. This refers to a previous incident in Uinta County which occurred about 
ten years prior to this case when detention officers gave prescription 
medications to female inmates in exchange for sex. However, the assaulting 
detention officers in the previous incident were not shown to have been 
addicted to drugs; these facts do not lead to the conclusion that a detention 
officer with drug-related problems would commit sexual assaults. 
 
[¶23]   
Finally, Pennington asserts that Sheriff Napoli should have terminated 
Hoover either at the disclosure of his drug problem or during the course of his 
continued probation. She argues that it was not safe for Hoover to be around 
inmates and attempts to support her position with recommendations from Hoover’s 
therapists. It is correct that Mr. Hoover’s counselors suggested that Mr. Hoover 
should be supervised when he was with inmates, and they recommended that the 
Sheriff ensure that Mr. Hoover was a “safe” employee; however, the two 
counselors were not worried about a sexual assault. A reading of the record 
shows that Dr. Nielsen’s recommendations were solely to prevent Mr. 
Hoover from taking medications from inmates. Ms. Roberts also suggested that Mr. 
Hoover be supervised, but she also was concerned about his access to 
medications. Both counselors were concerned only with keeping Mr. Hoover away 
from drugs. There is nothing to suggest that either Dr. Nielsen or Ms. Roberts 
considered or should have considered the possibility of an attack on an inmate. 
Likewise, nothing in the record shows that Sheriff Napoli should have been 
alerted to the possibility of physical danger to inmates from Hoover. On the 
contrary, the Appellants provided evidence that Sheriff Napoli had no reason to 
suspect that Mr. Hoover would assault Ms. Pennington. Further, even 
the Appellee’s own expert, Dr. John Peters, Jr., could not establish 
a link between drug use and sexual assaults. 
 
[¶24]   
Sheriff Napoli hired Hoover as an experienced detention officer with 
several years of service. While Hoover concedes that he had a drug problem at 
the time he was hired, the Sheriff did not know and could not have known of this 
addiction. During his employment, until the overdose episode, there is nothing 
in the record to indicate that Hoover had any job-related problems, especially 
any indication that he might commit a sexual assault. After the overdose brought 
Hoover’s drug dependency to the surface, the disciplinary plan was appropriate 
given the nature of the problem, Hoover’s experience, and lack of other 
employment problems. The ultimate test of the reasonableness of Sheriff Napoli’s 
actions turns on whether he should have known that in retaining Hoover under the 
terms of the disciplinary plan, he was placing inmates in jeopardy. There are no 
disputed facts concerning the foreseeability of Mr. Hoover’s 
actions; instead, the record establishes that Mr. Hoover’s assault was not 
foreseeable. Under these facts, retention of Hoover under the terms of the 
disciplinary plan was reasonable. The third factor of the test is 
satisfied.
 
[¶25]   
The last factor to be considered is whether the public official was 
acting in a discretionary or a ministerial capacity. We have defined ministerial 
acts as: “A public official’s duty is ministerial when . . . it is absolute, 
certain, and imperative, involving merely the execution of a set task, and when 
the law which imposes it prescribes and defines the time, mode, and occasion of 
its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or 
discretion.” Oyler v. State, 618 P.2d 1042, 1048-49 (Wyo. 1980). We have adopted the rule that “discretionary acts are 
those which are of a judgmental, planning, or policy nature.” Board of 
Cty. Comm’rs of Teton Cty. v. Bassett, 
8 P.3d 1079, 1087 (Wyo. 2000). The specific question presented here 
is whether Sheriff Napoli was acting in a discretionary capacity when he elected 
to retain Hoover and not terminate his employment. Several courts have held that 
decisions involving the hiring, training, and supervision of employees involve 
the policy judgments protected by the discretionary requirement. Doe v. Holy See,  557 F.3d 1066, 1084 (9th Cir. 
2009); Sydnes v. United States,  
523 F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir. 2008); Vickers v. 
United States, 228 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 996, 1001-02 
(9th Cir. 2000); Burkhart v. Washington 
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 112 F.3d 1207, 1216-17 
(D.C. Cir. 1997); Tonelli v. United 
States, 60 F.3d 492, 496 (8th Cir. 1995); Bolduc v. United States, 402 F.3d 50, 61 (1st Cir. 2005); Attallah v. United 
States, 955 F.2d 776, 784-85 (1st Cir. 1992). We agree with these courts and hold that when Sheriff 
Napoli decided to retain Hoover under the disciplinary plan, he was 
acting in a discretionary manner. 
 
[¶26]   
There are four requirements that must be established by the record when a 
public official asserts qualified immunity. The first factor is not an issue. 
The factors in dispute are whether Sheriff Napoli acted in good faith, whether 
he acted reasonably when he opted not to terminate Hoover’s employment but to 
retain him under the disciplinary plan, and whether he was acting in a 
discretionary manner. The good faith and reasonableness depend on whether 
Sheriff Napoli should have anticipated that Hoover was likely to assault an 
inmate. The record contains nothing that should have alerted the Sheriff to this 
risk. The concern about Hoover was his drug dependency and the potential that he 
would take drugs belonging to inmates, not the possibility that he would 
sexually assault a female inmate. Finally, Sheriff Napoli was supervising and 
training an employee, which is a discretionary act. The trial court erred when it denied 
summary judgment as to Sheriff Napoli’s qualified immunity.
 
[¶27]   
The only remaining question is the status of Uinta County and the Board 
of County Commissioners. The order entered by the trial court denied the 
County’s and the Board’s motions for summary judgment “as to the statutorily 
imposed liability for the Sheriff’s actions and inactions mandated by the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act.” Based on our holding that Sheriff Napoli is 
entitled to qualified immunity, the ruling against the County and the Board must 
also be reversed. Darrar, 910 P.2d  at 578 (“If 
the officer is entitled to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, the 
conduct of the officer is not tortious, and no vicarious liability exists 
on the part of the governmental entity.”).
 
[¶28]   
We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for entry of an 
order consistent with this opinion.