Case Title: Matthews v. Wyoming Dept. of Agriculture

Citation: 

Docket Number: 85-7

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matthews v. Wyoming Dept. of Agriculture1986 WY 117719 P.2d 216Case Number: 85-7Decided: 05/16/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
James MATTHEWS doing 
business as Upton Processing, and James Matthews doing business as Newcastle 
Pack, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF 
AGRICULTURE, John Orton as Commissioner, Robert E. Fetzner, individually and as 
Director, and Douglas Krogman, individually and as Inspector, Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from District 
Court, WestonCounty, Paul T. Liamos, Jr., 
J.

Gordon W. 
Schukei, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Steven R. 
Czoschke of Sheehan, Stevens & Sansonetti, Gillette, for appellees.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and ROSE,[fn**] 
ROONEY,[fn***] BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

[fn**] Retired 
November 1, 1985.

[fn***] Retired 
November 30, 1985.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     James Matthews appeals 
from a summary judgment order issued by the district court in favor of the 
Wyoming Department of Agriculture and three of its employees. The district court 
held that the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, §§ 1-39-101 
through 1-39-119, W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985, barred all of Matthews' claims for 
damages. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

FACTS

[¶2.]     Appellant Matthews 
operates a commercial meat processing plant in Upton, Wyoming 
under a state license which subjects him to regulation by the Wyoming Department 
of Agriculture. Sections 35-7-701 through 35-7-710, W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985 
(Wyoming Wholesome Meat Act of 1969). On July 25, 1984, appellant initiated this 
action against the department; its commissioner, John Orton; the administrator 
of the state meat inspection program, Robert Fetzner; and a meat inspector, 
Douglas Krogman. Orton was named in his official capacity while Fetzner and 
Krogman were sued in both their official and individual capacities. Appellant 
sought to enjoin all the appellees from restricting the use of his cooling 
facilities and animal holding pens, and from otherwise interfering with his 
operations. He also sought compensatory and punitive damages for loss of 
business.

[¶3.]     On November 13, 1984, 
appellees filed a joint summary judgment motion supported by a memorandum and 
affidavits. The motion was limited to the action for damages and relied upon § 
1-39-104(a), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985, which states in 
part:

"A governmental entity 
and its public employees while acting within the scope of duties are granted 
immunity from liability for any tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 
1-39-112."

Appellees also 
discussed § 1-39-112, the law enforcement exception, which 
states:

"A governmental entity is 
liable for damages resulting from tortious conduct of law enforcement officers 
while acting within the scope of their duties."

[¶4.]     Appellees argued that 
they enjoyed governmental immunity because they were public employees of a 
governmental entity and because none of the exceptions to § 1-39-104(a), 
including the law enforcement exception, applied. In their affidavits, appellees 
Orton, Fetzner and Krogman outlined their official duties, emphasizing that none 
of those duties involved law enforcement. But neither Fetzner nor Krogman, who 
were sued in their individual capacities, stated whether they were acting within 
the scope of their official duties when the alleged tortious acts took place. 
The only evidence involving the actions of Fetzner and Krogman appears in 
transcripts they gave at a hearing on a motion to dismiss and a hearing on 
appellant's preliminary injunction claim. Although these transcripts have been 
included in the record on appeal, they were not attached to appellees' summary 
judgment motion or otherwise available to the district court. Appellees never 
mentioned the prior hearings in their summary judgment motion or brief 
accompanying that motion. If the district court based its summary judgment on 
the testimony contained in the transcripts, the court did so purely from memory. 

[¶5.]     The district court 
granted injunctive relief to appellant but also granted summary judgment to all 
appellees on all of appellant's damage suits. Appellant has raised the propriety 
of the summary judgment on appeal.

IMMUNITY UNDER THE 
GOVERNMENTAL CLAIMS ACT

[¶6.]     Appellant has sued all 
the appellees, including the department, in their official capacities. A person 
acting in an official capacity is, by definition, acting within the scope of his 
duties. Therefore, the exception in § 1-39-104(a) which permits suit against 
governmental employees who act outside the scope of their duties cannot apply to 
these "official capacity" claims. The basic immunity language of § 1-39-104(a), 
supra, bars appellant's "official capacity" claims unless one of the other 
statutory exceptions to immunity applies.

[¶7.]     The only exception that 
could arguably apply is the law enforcement exception, § 1-39-112, supra. 
Factually there is no genuine issue concerning the law enforcement aspects of 
appellees' duties. Appellees Orton, Fetzner and Krogman all submitted 
uncontradicted affidavits detailing their official duties. Commissioner Orton's 
affidavit is typical:

"5. I do not have the 
power under the Wyoming Statutes dealing with the Act, nor is it my duty under 
those statutes to hold in custody any person accused of a criminal offense or of 
a violation of the Act, or to arrest any person charged with committing a crime 
or a violation of the Act, nor is it one of my duties nor within my authority to 
maintain public order or to carry a weapon in the performance of my duties under 
the Act.

"6. That the Attorney 
General or the county and prosecuting attorney where the violation occurred has 
the responsibility pursuant to Wyoming Statute § 35-7-709 to charge persons with 
violations of the Act and to initiate criminal action under the 
Act."

[¶8.]     Because the department 
can act only through its employees and because the department's liability in 
this case derives solely from the acts of the three individual appellees, there 
was no need for the department to submit additional affidavits detailing the law 
enforcement powers of the department as a whole.1 The only official duties relevant 
to the department's liability in this case are the duties of the three 
individual appellees which were fully covered by their 
affidavits.

[¶9.]     Once the appellees 
established their official duties as a matter of fact, they were entitled to 
summary judgment if, as a matter of law, those duties did not make them law 
enforcement officers. We recently interpreted the term "law enforcement 
officers," for purposes of § 1-39-112 to mean only those public officials 
charged with traditional peace-keeping duties. Hurst v. State, Wyo., 698 P.2d 1130, 1134 
(1985).

[¶10.]  It is clear from appellees' affidavits 
that they are not charged with traditional peace-keeping duties and are not law 
enforcement officers. They have no power to maintain public order, to carry a 
weapon, or to hold or arrest persons accused of violating the act. Criminal 
enforcement of the act is delegated entirely to either the attorney general or 
the county or prosecuting attorney where a violation occurs. The law enforcement 
exception of § 1-39-112 does not apply to appellees. The portion of appellant's 
suit claiming damages against appellees in their official capacities is barred 
by § 1-39-104(a). The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor 
of all appellees, including the department, to the extent they were sued in 
their official capacities.

CONDUCT BY FETZNER AND 
KROGMAN OUTSIDE THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES

[¶11.]  In a summary judgment proceeding, the 
movant has "`a definite burden to clearly demonstrate there is no genuine issue 
of material fact * * *.'" Hickey v. Burnett, 
Wyo., 707 P.2d 741, 744 (1985), quoting Kover 
v. Hufsmith, Wyo., 496 P.2d 908, 910 
(1972).

"A material fact is one 
which, if proved, would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the 
essential elements of the cause of action or defense asserted by the parties." 
Colorado National Bank v. Miles, Wyo., 
711 P.2d 390, 393 (1985).

Until the movant 
has established that there is no issue of material fact requiring a trial, the 
non-moving party has no obligation to support his pleadings with affidavits or 
other evidence. O'Donnell v. City of 
Casper, Wyo., 696 P.2d 1278, 1287 (1985).

[¶12.]  Appellant sued appellees Fetzner and 
Krogman in their individual as well as official capacities. He alleged in his 
complaint that they committed wrongful acts outside the scope of their authority 
as public employees:

"12. The defendant Robert 
E. Fetzner has falsely, maliciously and without any legal or statutory basis or 
authority and in excess of and beyond the scope of his employment, accused 
plaintiff of committing criminal acts.

* * * * * 
*

"14. The defendant 
Douglas Krogman and Defendant Robert E. Fetzner have subjected the plaintiff 
James Matthews to a continuing pattern of harassment in plaintiff's daily 
operations and use of plaintiff's facilities and further said defendants have 
unfairly, arbitrarily and capriciously and maliciously applied standards, 
without any legal or statutory basis or authority, on plaintiff's operations and 
facilities."

The Governmental 
Claims Act bars suit against governmental employees only to the extent that they 
act within the scope of their duties. Therefore, appellees Fetzner and Krogman 
were entitled to summary judgment on the claims against them in their individual 
capacities only if they could establish that they acted solely within their 
official duties when they dealt with appellant. But the affidavits filed by 
Fetzner and Krogman in support of their motion for summary judgment do not 
establish these material facts.

[¶13.]  Appellees can supply the necessary 
material facts only if testimony from prior hearings in the case could be 
considered by the court at the summary judgment hearing. The prior testimony was 
presented at a preliminary injunction hearing and at a hearing on a motion to 
dismiss. At the preliminary injunction hearing the trial judge made it clear 
that he viewed appellees' testimony only in the context of the law of 
injunctions. He was looking for a risk of irreparable harm, inadequate remedy at 
law, and probability of success on the merits. And at the hearing on the motion 
to dismiss the judge correctly interrupted and disregarded appellee Fetzner's 
testimony because a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P. is based on 
the pleadings. The court accepts the averments in the pleadings as true. Carbon 
County School District No. 2 v. Wyoming 
State Hospital, Wyo., 
680 P.2d 773 (1984). The judge ignored Fetzner's statement that he had acted 
within the scope of his authority, and he did not permit appellee Krogman to 
testify at all. The judge stated at the hearing on the motion to 
dismiss:

"This isn't a motion for 
summary judgment. * * * [E]verything that this man says in his complaint must be 
taken as true in a motion to dismiss. So you have to admit this. You have to 
admit that they acted arbitrarily and capriciously and were negligent in 
supervision. * * * I don't need any testimony."

 

It is clear that 
the judge did not evaluate the prior testimony under summary judgment standards. 
Whether he later recalled that testimony or relied upon it in the summary 
judgment context must be questioned.

[¶14.]  Appellees did not file their motion for 
summary judgment until November 13, 1984, almost four months after the 
preliminary injunction hearing and two months after the hearing on the motion to 
dismiss. They never referred to the testimony from those hearings in their 
summary judgment motion or supporting memorandum. Instead, they stated 
that

"[t]he grounds upon which 
this motion are based are those as indicated in the attached Affidavits and 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment."

They did not 
rely on the prior testimony which indicated that they acted within the scope of 
their authority because they thought that they were entitled to summary judgment 
without making that showing. They erroneously suggested 
that

"[t]he sole issue on 
which the Motion for Summary Judgment is based is whether the actions of the 
defendants can be considered actions of a law enforcement 
officer."

[¶15.]  Even if appellees intended to rely upon 
the testimony from the prior hearings to support their summary judgment motion, 
they had to present that testimony to the district court in a form that would be 
admissible at trial.

[¶16.]  In Wyoming

"[t]he material presented 
to the trial court as a basis for summary judgment should be as carefully 
tailored and professionally correct as any evidence which is admissible to the 
court at the time of trial." Lane Company v. Busch Development, Inc., Wyo., 662 P.2d 419, 426 
(1983).

"[T]estimony given at a 
hearing or trial that is prior to the summary judgment hearing * * * may * * * 
be utilized at the summary judgment hearing, provided the testimony is properly 
presented at the latter hearing." 6 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, 
Moore's Federal 
Practice ¶ 56.11[8] at 56-295 (2nd ed. 1985). See also 10A C. Wright, A. Miller 
& M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2719 at 15-16 (1983); 
Sturm Jewelry, Inc. v. First National Bank, Franklin, Tex.Civ.App., 593 S.W.2d 813, 815 
(1980).

If the prior 
testimony was not before the district court in admissible form, we cannot 
consider it in this appeal.

"The scope of appellate 
review of a summary judgment is to examine the judgment `* * * in the same light 
as the district court, using the same material and information as did the 
district court.'" Dudley v. East Ridge Development Company, Wyo., 694 P.2d 113, 115 
(1985) (quoting Lane Company v. Busch Development, Inc., 
supra).

[¶17.]  Even if a court accurately recalls prior 
testimony, it would be unfair to allow summary judgment based on that testimony 
unless it is submitted with the summary judgment motion in admissible form, 
i.e., transcribed and authenticated. The party opposing summary judgment should 
have notice of the materials before the court so that he can prepare his defense 
to the motion. See Nation v. Nation, Wyo., 715 P.2d 198 (1986). Materials in the 
court's files, and affidavits, depositions and exhibits attached to the summary 
judgment motion fulfill this requirement. The only exception to the notice 
requirement involves oral testimony at the summary judgment hearing itself which 
most courts permit even though it can result in surprise to the non-moving 
party. 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Civil 2d § 2723 at 62 (1983). Unlike testimony from prior hearings, the judge 
hears the summary judgment testimony with summary judgment standards in mind and 
can take notes on what he finds relevant.

[¶18.]  We hold that in a summary judgment 
proceeding, a court may consider testimony from prior hearings only if that 
testimony is transcribed and authenticated. Sturm Jewelry, Inc. v. First 
National Bank, Franklin, supra, 593 S.W.2d  at 815. It must be 
submitted with the motion or already filed with the court. In this case, the 
transcripts of the preliminary injunction hearing and the hearing on the motion 
to dismiss were not before the district court when it considered the summary 
judgment motion. We cannot affirm the summary judgment based on what is in those 
transcripts.

[¶19.]  It is possible, despite the affidavits 
which were the only materials properly before the court, that Fetzner and 
Krogman acted outside the scope of their duties. In that case, the governmental 
immunity defense of § 1-39-104(a), supra, does not protect them because it only 
applies to employees acting within the scope of their duties. The district court 
improperly granted summary judgment to Fetzner and Krogman in their individual 
capacities. The suits against Fetzner and Krogman were properly dismissed on 
summary judgment only to the extent that they were sued in their official 
capacities.

RESPONSE TO OPINION 
CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART

[¶20.]  It is stated in Justice Rooney's 
concurring and dissenting opinion that we hold appellees Fetzner and Krogman are 
"liable individually because there is no averment that they were acting in their 
official capacities." Our opinion does not hold them "liable" but merely states 
that they are not entitled to summary judgment in their favor upon the record 
before the court. We recognize that in all probability there will be a new 
motion for summary judgment containing the necessary allegations. But we do not 
see that as a waste of judicial time and expense. It would be a sorry state of 
affairs if a court could grant summary judgment without any evidentiary basis 
simply because it thought that the motion could ultimately be supported by 
evidence. No rule provides for that kind of procedure.

[¶21.]  Summary judgment is affirmed as to all 
appellees in their official capacities but reversed as to appellees Fetzner and 
Krogman in their individual capacities.

FOOTNOTES

1 Even if we looked to the 
department's general statutory powers, we could not find any law enforcement 
duties. The Wyoming Wholesome Meat Act of 1969 empowers the commissioner of 
agriculture to issue licenses to meat slaughtering and processing plants, § 
35-7-704, to inspect such facilities for compliance with statutory and 
regulatory standards, § 37-7-705, to segregate or destroy meat when appropriate, 
§ 35-7-705(g) and (p), and to prohibit the use of unsanitary facilities, § 
35-7-705(t). The commissioner is also authorized to employ or contract with 
persons to implement the provisions of the act. The department's statutory 
duties do not involve keeping the peace as that concept is generally 
understood.

THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.

[¶22.]  I am in accord with that portion of the 
majority opinion which affirms the summary judgment entered in favor of the 
State and its officers. There is an additional reason for affirming that summary 
judgment. The complaint does not allege that Matthews ever filed a claim against 
the State as required by § 1-39-113, W.S. 1977, and the record does not disclose 
that such a claim was filed. The requirement for a claim is a condition 
precedent to suit. Board of Trustees of University of Wyoming v. Bell, 
Wyo., 662 P.2d 410 (1983); Awe v. University of Wyoming, Wyo., 534 P.2d 97 (1975). The failure to file 
such a claim is a jurisdictional defect. Board of Trustees of University of 
Wyoming v. Bell, supra; Utah Construction Company 
v. State Highway Commission, 45 Wyo. 403, 19 P.2d 951 (1933). Even though this 
defect was not relied upon by the defendant, I am of the view that this court 
should recognize jurisdictional defects and dispose of cases on that basis when 
they are present. Board of Trustees of University of Wyoming v. Bell, supra, and cases 
cited therein. I therefore concur in the majority disposition as to the State of 
Wyoming and 
its officers.

[¶23.]  I cannot agree, however, with the aspect 
of the majority opinion which reverses the summary judgment entered in favor of 
Krogman and Fetzner in their individual capacities. I join Justice Rooney in his 
opinion, and I also submit some additional observations.

[¶24.]  In material part Matthews' complaint 
alleges that:

"3. On or about February 
6, 1984, defendant Douglas Krogman inspected the premises known as Upton 
Processing.

"4. Pursuant to 
instructions from, and at the direction of and under the supervision of 
defendant Robert E. Fetzner, defendant Douglas Krogman tagged the kill floor 
portions of the plaintiff's premises as rejected.

"5. On or about February 
7, 1984, the said tag was removed and the plaintiff continued meat processing 
operations.

"6. On or about February 
8, 1984, defendant Douglas Krogman inspected the said 
premises.

"7. Pursuant to 
instructions from defendant Robert E. Fetzner, the defendant Douglas Krogman 
tagged the cooler and kill chute portion of the said premises as rejected and 
imposed a restriction of 14 carcasses in the cooler.

"8. On or about February 
29, 1984, the said tag was removed and plaintiff continued 
operations.

"9. On or about February 
29, 1984, pursuant to the instructions of defendant Robert E. Fetzner, defendant 
Douglas Krogman lifted the restriction of 14 carcasses to 16 
carcasses.

"10. Since February 9, 
1984, the defendant Douglas Krogman, by and through and pursuant to the 
instructions of defendant Robert E. Fetzner, has arbitrarily inspected the 
premises and subjected the plaintiff to unreasonable and excessive standards of 
sanitation and has imposed an arbitrary and illegal restriction on the number of 
carcasses in the plaintiff's cooler.

"11. The defendant 
Douglas Krogman, by and through the action of defendant Robert E. Fetzner, has 
ordered plaintiff to remove property not on his premises and belonging to other 
persons.

"12. The defendant Robert 
E. Fetzner has falsely, maliciously and without any legal or statutory basis or 
authority and in excess of and beyond the scope of his employment, accused 
plaintiff of committing criminal acts.

"13. The defendant Robert 
E. Fetzner has stated he would take away the plaintiff's license to do business 
in the State of Wyoming.

"14. The defendant 
Douglas Krogman and Defendant Robert E. Fetzner have subjected the plaintiff 
James Matthews to a continuing pattern of harassment in plaintiff's daily 
operations and use of plaintiff's facilities and further said defendants have 
unfairly, arbitrarily and capriciously and maliciously applied standards, 
without any legal or statutory basis or authority, on plaintiff's operations and 
facilities.

"15. The aforementioned 
actions of defendant Douglas Krogman and defendant Robert E. Fetzner are 
arbitrary, capricious and malicious, and are without any legal or statutory 
basis or authority, and plaintiff is entitled to punitive 
damages."

The answer of 
the defendants encompasses the following affirmative 
defenses:

"1. The defendants as an 
affirmative defense would state that the action against the defendants is 
prohibited by the Wyoming Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, based upon the 
Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity.

"2. That the action 
against the defendants is barred by the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act and that 
the actions of the defendants fail to fall within any of the statutory 
exceptions to said act.

"3. That the individually 
named defendants at all times relevant hereto were acting within the scope of 
their employment and pursuant to statutory authority, and are therefore immune 
from liability."

These pleadings 
structure an issue of fact as to whether Fetzner and Krogman acted within the 
scope of their employment.

[¶25.]  There were three hearings which have a 
bearing upon this issue. First there was a hearing on an application for a 
preliminary injunction at which the court took testimony and at which exhibits 
were introduced. This was followed by a hearing on defendant's motion to 
dismiss. Finally the court held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment. In 
arguing the motion to dismiss, Matthews' attorney substantially conceded that 
Krogman and Fetzner were at all times relevant to the complaint acting within 
the scope of their employment. He persisted in arguing, however, that the two 
were individually liable. The defendants presented testimony and argued from 
that testimony that they were not individually liable. This testimony was cut 
off by the trial court with the assertion that it didn't have anything to do 
with the case. Implicitly this was a recognition of the fact that Fetzner and 
Krogman had acted within the scope of their employment. The balance of that 
hearing was concerned with the question of whether the State and its officers 
fell within the statutory exception to immunity provided for health care 
providers in § 1-39-110, W.S. 1977. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss 
indicating that, although the department was not a health care provider, he 
thought perhaps it was subject to the law enforcement exception which would 
permit Matthews' action under § 1-39-112, W.S. 1977.

[¶26.]  Because the scope of the matter had been 
limited in this way the argument on the motion for summary judgment was 
addressed to the proposition that Fetzner and Krogman were not law enforcement 
officers. The supporting documents were tailored to support this proposition. 
The affidavits which are found by the majority to be insufficient to justify 
summary judgment for Fetzner and Krogman read as follows. Fetzner's affidavit 
says:

"2. That pursuant to 
statutory authority and the rules and regulations of the State Board of 
Agriculture, I am empowered and directed to carry out certain provisions of the 
Wyoming Wholesome Meat Act in conjunction with the Federal Meat Inspection 
Act.

"3. My duties require me 
to be involved in the license issuing process, the inspection program for 
licensed meat premises within the State of Wyoming, and to take certain action only 
pursuant to statutory authority against any operation not in compliance with the 
statutes and the rules and regulations of the State Board of 
Agriculture."

Krogman's 
affidavit recites:

"2. That pursuant to 
statutory authority and the rules and regulations of the State Board of 
Agriculture, I am empowered and directed to carry out the provisions of the 
Wyoming Wholesome Meat Act in conjunction with the Federal Meat Inspection 
Act.

"3. My duties require me 
to be involved in the license issuing process, the inspection program for 
licensed meat premises within the State of Wyoming, and to take action pursuant to 
statutory authority against any operation not in compliance with the statutes 
and the rules and regulations of the State Board of 
Agriculture."

[¶27.]  These affidavits can be read fairly to 
say in substance, "In the course of my official duties I was authorized to do 
the things I am alleged to have done." This is a sufficient statement of fact by 
affidavit to refute the conclusory allegations of Matthews' complaint that these 
individuals acted outside the scope of their employment or without authority. 
The burden then shifted to the plaintiff to submit affidavits demonstrating in 
which particulars these individuals exceeded their authority. Matthews failed to 
do this, and a summary judgment for these defendants was 
proper.

"* * * When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but * * 
* must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial." Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P.

This rule has 
been followed with respect to summary judgments in Wyoming for more than 20 
years. Vipont Mining Company v. Uranium Research and Development Company, 
Wyo., 376 P.2d 868 (1962); Matter of Estate of 
Wilson, Wyo., 399 P.2d 1008 (1965). These affidavits, 
when read in the light of the conclusory complaint (which charges Krogman with 
acting pursuant to the instructions of Fetzner) and the answer, are sufficient 
to support the summary judgment in the absence of counter-affidavits from 
Matthews.

[¶28.]  Furthermore, if I found it to be 
necessary in order to dispose of this case I would hold that the material facts 
from the testimony presented at the prior hearings can be relied upon in 
connection with the summary judgment. To the extent that the majority opinion is 
concerned with a problem of notice, the defendants' Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment refers to the hearing on the motion to dismiss and 
that hearing was mentioned by both attorneys at the hearing on the summary 
judgment motion. The authorities cited in support of the proposition that 
testimony from a prior hearing in the same proceeding can be utilized on a 
summary judgment only if it is transcribed and certified and properly noticed 
are distinguishable. I have no quarrel with the proposition set forth in the 
majority opinion that "[t]he material presented to the trial court as a basis 
for summary judgment should be as carefully tailored and professionally correct 
as any evidence which is admissible to the court at the time of trial. Newton v. Misner, Wyo., 
423 P.2d 648 (1967)." Lane Company v. Busch Development, Inc., Wyo., 662 P.2d 419, 426 
(1983). I must disagree with the proposed extension of the rule to these facts. 
In Lane the court was confronted with an unsworn affidavit. In Newton v. Misner, supra, 
the affidavits encompassed irrelevant data, conclusions and other impermissible 
material. The court held that such materials which were neither carefully 
tailored nor professionally correct enough to be admissible at trial should be 
stricken. Neither case addresses the facts involved in this instance in which 
prior testimony in the same proceeding in which the same judge and the same 
attorneys participated was relied upon. There does not seem to be any defect in 
that prior testimony which would cause it to be inadmissible at 
trial.

[¶29.]  Certainly Sturm Jewelry, Inc. v. First 
National Bank, Franklin, 593 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex.Civ.App. 
1980) is distinguishable. That case was decided pursuant to a procedural rule 
which "provides that no oral testimony shall be received at the hearing on a 
motion for summary judgment" together with a ruling of the state supreme court 
that, consequently, testimony from a prior hearing could be considered only 
where it was properly transcribed and certified before the court when the 
summary judgment motion was heard. Wyoming does not have such a provision in its 
rule, and in fact the trial court has discretion to permit oral testimony at the 
summary judgment hearing. Dudley v. East Ridge Development Company, Wyo., 694 P.2d 113 
(1985). In Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 2723, 
the authors note that the practice of taking oral testimony at a summary 
judgment hearing should be exercised "sparingly and with great care," lest the 
hearing become a preliminary trial or lest surprise and disadvantage result. 
"[W]hen testimony taken at an earlier stage in the case is sought to be used, 
there is little danger of the hearing turning into a `preliminary trial,' and 
therefore it should be more freely permitted once the testimony has been 
properly introduced." Id. Certainly in this instance the former testimony could 
not have been any surprise to Matthews.

[¶30.]  I would hold that the prior testimony 
could be relied upon by the court to settle any apparent issue of facts for 
purposes of summary judgment even though the trial court did not specifically 
articulate his reliance. There is no question that we can uphold the trial 
court's action for any correct reason appearing from the record. Litzenberger v. 
Merge, Wyo., 698 P.2d 1152 (1985); Hurst v. State, Wyo., 698 P.2d 1130 
(1985).

[¶31.]  Finally the exhibits that were introduced 
at the prior hearing were properly before the court as part of the record at the 
time the summary judgment motion was heard. Defendants' Exhibit A, "Wyoming 
Wholesome Meat Act of 1969 and Regulations; Wyoming Inedible Meat Rendering and 
Processing Act of 1969 and Regulations," (1980), and United States Department of 
Agriculture "Layout Guide for Small Meat Plants," Table 2., provide the trial 
court and this court with sufficient information to permit a decision that the 
factual allegations of the complaint that Fetzner and Krogman had acted outside 
the scope of their employment were incorrect. Thus there was no genuine issue of 
fact with respect to those allegations. The summary judgment in favor of Krogman 
and Fetzner should be affirmed.

ROONEY, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, with whom THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
joins.

[¶32.]  I concur with that part of the majority 
opinion which affirms the summary judgment against the Wyoming department of 
agriculture and appellee John Orton and that part of such opinion which 
recognizes that appellees Fetzner and Krogman are not law enforcement officers 
so as to be within the § 1-39-112, W.S. 1977, 1985 Cum.Supp.,1 exception to the grant of immunity 
to them while acting in the scope of their duties.2 I dissent from that part of the 
majority opinion which reverses the summary judgment in favor of appellees 
Fetzner and Krogman.

[¶33.]  I agree with the majority opinion in that 
we review the propriety of a trial court's action on a summary judgment from the 
same standpoint as did the trial court. Rompf v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc., 
Wyo., 685 P.2d 25 (1984); Schepps v. Howe, Wyo., 665 P.2d 504 
(1983); Lane Company ex rel. Lane v. Busch Development, Inc., Wyo., 662 P.2d 419 
(1983). In doing so, I do not agree with the majority opinion that the 
affidavits before the trial court failed to reflect appellees were acting solely 
within their official duties when they dealt with 
appellant.

[¶34.]  It seems strange to hold that the action 
is barred against appellees for actions taken by them in their official 
capacities and then hold that they are liable individually because there is no 
averment that they were acting in their official capacities. Part of the lawsuit 
is a claim against appellees for action in their official capacities. As 
recognized in the majority opinion, "A person acting in an official capacity is, 
by definition, acting within the scope of his duties." The majority opinion 
acknowledges the official duty status of appellees in upholding the summary 
judgment against appellees insofar as the action is against them in their 
official capacities. The appellant recognizes the same in his complaint, and the 
same is inherent in appellees' affidavits wherein they contend their actions to 
have been clothed with immunity since they were not within the exception to such 
as law enforcement officers.

[¶35.]  District judges should not be expected to 
close their eyes to reason. The district judge did not do so in this 
instance.

[¶36.]  Upon return of this case to the district 
court, the new motion for a summary judgment will contain the averment of action 
within the scope of their official duties, and the summary judgment will follow. 
Such is a waste of judicial time and expense.

[¶37.]  I believe the fact that the action was 
within the scope of appellees' duties was adequately expressed in that before 
the trial court when it acted on the motion for summary judgment. That required 
in Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P.,3 was sufficiently before the trial 
court for the granting of the motion.

[¶38.]  I would affirm in all 
respects.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 1-39-112, W.S. 
1977, 1985 Cum.Supp., provides:

"A governmental entity is 
liable for damages resulting from tortious conduct of law enforcement officers 
while acting within the scope of their duties."

2 Section 1-39-104(a), 
W.S. 1977, 1985 Cum. Supp., provides in pertinent part:

"A governmental entity 
and its public employees while acting within the scope of duties are granted 
immunity from liability for any tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 
1-39-112. * * *"

3 Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P., 
provides in pertinent part:

"* * * The judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. * * *"