Case Title: State v. Frazier

Citation: 

Docket Number: 45/19

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2020-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
State of Maryland v. Kaleem Michael Frazier, No. 45, September Term, 2019.  Opinion 
by Hotten, J.  
 
CRIMINAL LAW—MERGER—FOURTH DEGREE SEXUAL OFFENSE—
SECOND DEGREE ASSAULT  
 
The Court of Appeals held that, under the merger rule articulated in State v. Lancaster, 332 
Md. 385, 631 A.2d 453 (1993), offenses and their sentences merge for purposes of 
sentencing.  The Court declined to overturn Lancaster, citing principles of stare decisis.  
Departure from stare decisis should occur sparingly and is only warranted when precedent 
is “clearly wrong” or when it is plainly obvious that adherence to the decision would result 
in substantial injustice.  Neither of those situations were implicated in this case.  
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of Special Appeals and held that 
convictions for fourth-degree sexual offense and second-degree assault merge.  Therefore, 
the only permissible punishment was the sentence for fourth-degree sexual offense—the 
offense having the additional element.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Harford County  
Case No.  12-K-16-001751 
Argued: February 6, 2020 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 45 
 
September Term, 2019 
 
__________________________________ 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
 
v. 
KALEEM MICHAEL FRAZIER 
__________________________________ 
 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Getty, 
Booth, 
Biran, 
Raker, Irma S. (Senior Judge, 
Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
__________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Hotten, J. 
__________________________________ 
 
Filed: July 14, 2020 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act  
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document 
is authentic.
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk  
Suzanne Johnson
2020-07-14 11:25-04:00
The events underlying this appeal stem from the sexual assault of a victim1 in 
October 2016, by her then-boyfriend, Kaleem Michael Frazier (“Respondent”).  
Respondent was charged with rape in the second degree (Count I), second-degree sexual 
offense (Count II), fourth-degree sexual offense (Count III), second-degree assault (Count 
IV), and false imprisonment (Count V).  On February 24, 2018, Respondent was convicted 
of second-degree assault and fourth-degree sexual offense after a seven-day jury trial in the 
Circuit Court for Harford County.  Respondent was sentenced on March 26, 2018 to a 
period of ten years’ incarceration with all but five years suspended for the second-degree 
assault count, and one year for the fourth-degree sexual offense charge to run 
consecutively, followed by supervised probation for a period of five years.    
The State presents the following questions for our review: 
1. Should this Court reconsider the rule articulated in [State v. Lancaster], 
332 Md. 385[, 631 A.2d 453] (1993), and hold that where two offenses 
are deemed the same for purposes of merger, a court may impose a 
sentence based on the offense that carries the greater penalty?  
 
2. If the Court permits a sentencing court to impose a sentence available 
pursuant to a lesser-included offense, even if it provides the greater 
penalty, was Respondent’s sentence legal?  
 
For the reasons discussed infra, we answer the first question in the negative, and in 
light of our resolution of the first question, need not address the second.  Accordingly, we 
shall affirm the decision of the Court of Special Appeals.  
                                              
1 To protect the privacy of the victim, we will not to refer to her by name.   
 
 
2 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Underlying Incident and Trial Court Proceedings2 
Respondent and the victim had been involved in a relationship since February of 
2016.3  On the evening of October 3, 2016, the couple attended football practice of the 
victim’s son.  Respondent had been drinking and became increasingly agitated with the 
victim.4  Respondent, the victim, and her minor sons returned to her townhome for dinner.   
After the victim prepared her sons for bed and retired to her bedroom, Respondent 
confronted the victim about a text message she had received from the football coach of a 
rival team.  The victim informed Respondent that the coach was just a friend, and that a 
few weeks before the incident, his team played against her son.  Respondent accused the 
victim of lying about the nature of that relationship.5  He became angry, called the victim 
several disparaging names, grabbed her by the shirt and “pulled [her] up,” forcibly pulled 
her hair, ripping out some of her extensions, and repeatedly called her a liar and a slut.  The 
victim also testified that Respondent slapped her across the face, and after locking her in 
the bedroom, forced her to perform oral sex.  The victim testified that she was crying as 
                                              
2 The facts underlying this appeal are summarized from the testimony provided by 
the parties at trial.  
 
3 Respondent and the victim had known one another for more than ten years and had 
been engaged in a sexual relationship “off and on” throughout that period.    
 
4 Respondent was upset with the victim because she left his sunflower seeds in her 
car.  They argued and Respondent left the area to purchase beer from the liquor store.  Upon 
his return, Respondent appeared to be intoxicated.   
 
5 The victim testified that the entirety of the text message exchange consisted only 
of messages about football.  
 
3 
 
she told Respondent “no” and asked him to “please stop,” but was afraid to scream for fear 
of waking her sons.  When asked about the events that transpired after Respondent locked 
the door, she stated:  
So[,] he told me that I was going to suck his dick and I said, no. And he said, 
yes, you are.  He was wearing basketball shorts, no shirt, no underwear.  He 
told me to take off my clothes.  I said, no, I don’t want to.  And he then 
grabbed my pants and like pulled me towards him and then took my shirt off 
and then he--I don’t remember how I got on the bed.  He got on the bed and 
he had already taken off his basketball [shorts] and he starts taking my head 
and putting it down there and I’m still asking him to please stop.  But he 
wouldn’t.  
 
The victim further testified that she begged Respondent “please, no, don’t do this.”    
According to the victim, Respondent “proceed[ed] to put his penis inside [her]” and 
squeezed her neck and throat as she was laying on her stomach.  The victim testified that 
she did not physically resist Respondent because she was “scared he would hurt [her] a lot 
more.”  She hoped that Respondent would become unaroused by her running nose, tears, 
and repeated pleas to “please stop.”   
Sometime after midnight on October 4, the victim attempted to leave the bedroom.  
Respondent told the victim that she could not leave.  When she informed Respondent that 
she just wanted to get something to drink, Respondent followed her to the kitchen, again 
calling her a “slut[]” and a “liar.”   The victim testified that Respondent then “grabbed [her] 
by the hair” and “slapped [her] in the face again.”   After violently pulling her hair and 
slapping her, the victim testified that: “He looks at me and says, ‘do you know what you 
and Nicole Brown Simpson … have in common?  [B]oth of your father’s names are Lou, 
and that is how long I have been thinking about killing you.’”  When the prosecution 
 
4 
 
questioned the victim regarding her reaction to the statement, she replied that she did not 
think she was “going to make it through the night.”  While in the kitchen, the victim asked 
Respondent for permission to go back upstairs to check on her sons.  He responded, “yeah, 
but I’m not done with you.”  When the victim entered her son’s bedroom, she found one 
of her sons awake and afraid.  He asked her if she was okay because he had heard arguing.  
While she was consoling her son, Respondent texted the victim, asking: “[W]hat are you 
doing, are you playing games[?]”  Respondent instructed the victim to come back to the 
room.  The victim returned to the bedroom and Respondent locked the door behind her.  
He told her, “you are going to fuck me again[,]” and took off her clothes.  The victim 
testified that he then raped her a second time.  The victim attempted to leave when it 
appeared Respondent had fallen asleep, but “he popped back up [again].”   
That morning, the victim dropped off her sons at school and Respondent at a nearby 
bus stop.  The victim testified that Respondent asked whether the relationship was over and 
she assured him that “everything [was] fine[]” and that they would “work through this.”     
The victim alleged that Respondent responded, “If you are lying, I’m going to kill you.”   
Thereafter, the victim called her mother to tell her what happened.  Her mother suggested 
that she go to her sister’s (“G.’s”) house to be safe.  At trial, G. testified that the victim 
appeared “frantic” and “very upset” when she arrived.   A family friend, E.T., had already 
been in contact with G. because one of the victim’s sons emailed E.T. in the middle of the 
night, alleging that Respondent was hurting the victim.  The victim reported the physical 
and sexual assault to the police.  Deputy Novak, the officer who conducted the preliminary 
interview, testified that she observed red bruises on the victim’s chest and neck that were 
 
5 
 
consistent with the victim’s statement of events, and that the victim told her that 
Respondent “ma[d]e her do some things she felt she didn’t want to do.”  Deputy Novak 
sent the victim to Harford Memorial Hospital for examination.   
A nurse performed a Sexual Assault Forensic Examination (“SAFE”) and a 
consulting expert testified that the results from that exam were inconclusive regarding 
whether the victim had been raped.6  After leaving the hospital, the victim filed for and was 
granted a protective order.  Respondent also testified at trial, describing his relationship 
with the victim as “up and down[,]” and that “trust issues[]” contributed to the tumultuous 
nature of the relationship.  He testified that he and the victim had consensual sexual 
intercourse and fellatio on the evening of October 2 and again, on the morning of October 
3.7  When asked about the events that transpired the evening of October 3, 2016, after 
football practice, Respondent testified that he was upset because the victim received a text 
message from an unsaved number and provided answers that he believed “didn’t add up[.]” 
Respondent admitted that he grew increasingly angry, and that he yelled at her 
because he was upset, but denied physically or sexually assaulting the victim.  In closing 
argument, the prosecutor stated: 
                                              
6 The expert stated that the results of the genital examination were “normal,” 
meaning there were no “physical or acute genital injuries.” She did note that the SAFE 
revealed the victim had sexual intercourse, but it could not be determined whether the 
encounter was forced or consensual.   
 
7 Respondent testified that he stayed at the victim’s house on the night of October 2 
because the couple agreed that he would watch her sons, who had the day off from school 
on October 3.  Respondent denied that he and the victim engaged in sexual acts on the 
morning of October 4 and that “[he] pushed her off [of him] while [they] were having 
sex[]” on the evening of October 3 because he was still “upset about [the text messages].”  
 
6 
 
[The victim] tells you all the while this is happening, he is threatening her.  
So[,] all of this is done by force.  He is pushing her down.  He is grabbing 
her hair.  But it is also by threat of force.  You only have to actually find as 
you saw in the elements, one of the two, that it is by force or threat of force.  
In this case, we actually have both because he is actually physically forcing 
her but he is also threatening her throughout, he is going to kill her over and 
over and over again.  One time she leaves the room because he will allow it.  
Okay.  I won’t harm you when you walk out of the room this time.  That is 
threat of force, ladies and gentlemen of the jury.  I will allow it.  Because had 
she walked out prior to that, you can bet the assault would have continued.  
And he slammed the door.  His own words. 
 
*** 
 
There is no question [the victim] didn’t consent.  And then you heard some 
testimony that she went downstairs and he continues to threaten her.  And 
still--in that bedroom[,] prior to letting her out, while he is physically 
assaulting her, slapping her, choking her, strangling her, and that when they 
go downstairs, he slaps her again.    
 
(Emphasis added).  Following deliberations, the jury convicted Respondent of second-
degree assault and fourth-degree sexual offense, and acquitted him of the remaining 
charges.  
At sentencing on March 26, 2018, the State argued that the trial judge should exceed 
the sentencing guidelines because of the “egregious nature of the harm,” and impose a 
sentence of eleven years—ten years for the second-degree assault and one year for the 
fourth-degree sexual offense to run consecutively—suspending all but six years.8   Defense 
counsel argued that the conviction for second-degree assault was the lesser included 
offense of the fourth-degree sexual offense conviction and, as such, both offenses should 
                                              
8 The guidelines range was three months to two years.  The court departed from the 
sentencing guidelines and imposed a harsher sentence because Respondent had been 
convicted of a domestically related crime, involving a different victim, once before.  
 
7 
 
merge for purposes of sentencing.  The sentencing judge rejected the merger argument, 
stating:  
With regard to the merger suggestion by [defense counsel] as made, my 
review of the evidence is that there were separate events of physical assault 
which was separate from or in addition to the sexual penetration of the victim.  
So[,] the Court sees this as a case in which[,] because there are these separate 
aspects of the acts of the [Respondent], both the slapping or smacking as 
[defense counsel] characterized it, and the push, putting the hands around the 
neck, as well as the sexual fourth[-]degree sex offense aspect, I believe that 
it is appropriate to sentence separately as to the two offenses.  
 
The judge imposed a sentence of ten years, suspending all but five years for the second-
degree assault and one year for the fourth-degree sexual offense, to be served 
consecutively, followed by five years of supervised probation.  Respondent timely 
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.  Frazier v. State, No. 344, Sept. Term, 2018, 
2019 WL 2539288 (Md. App. June 20, 2019).   
Appeal to the Court of Special Appeals 
The issue confronting the Court of Special Appeals was whether a jury found that 
the two offenses were based on the same act, or separate acts that could sustain the 
convictions for second-degree assault and fourth-degree sexual offense.9  Respondent 
contended that the circuit court failed to merge the two convictions, for purposes of 
sentencing, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
                                              
9 Respondent also argued that there was insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for fourth-degree sexual offense.  The Court of Special Appeals declined to 
address the legal sufficiency argument, finding that Respondent “failed to state with 
particularity why his motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted[,]” and therefore, 
his argument on the issue of whether the evidence was sufficient was not preserved for 
appellate review.  Id. at *4.  
 
8 
 
United States Constitution.  Id. at *4.  The State argued that the convictions were based on 
“separate and distinct acts,” not requiring merger.  Id.  The Court of Special Appeals 
disagreed and found that it was “unable [] to specifically determine, which act or acts were 
the basis for [Respondent’s] convictions[,]” because “the prosecutor muddled the second-
degree assault elements and the fourth-degree sexual offense elements in her last and final 
words to the jury.”  Id. at *5–6.  According to the Court of Special Appeals, the jury could 
have determined that the sexual offense and the physical assault were one continuous act—
not two distinct acts.  Id. at *6.    
The Court cited opening statements and closing argument, in which the prosecution 
repeatedly described the events as “continuing” from one place to the next, implying that 
the physical and sexual violence should be treated as one ongoing criminal act.  The Court 
noted that the record reflected two separate acts of assaultive conduct, but was not clear 
which act or acts formed the basis for each conviction and in the face of such “an 
unreasonable ambiguity[,]” the offenses must merge if the required evidence test is 
satisfied.  Id. at *6.  
The Court then applied the required evidence test to ascertain whether “all the 
elements of one crime are necessarily in evidence to support a finding of the other, such 
that the first is subsumed as a lesser included offense of the second.”  Id. at *7 (citing 
Monoker v. State, 321 Md. 214, 220, 582 A.2d 525, 527 (1990)).  According to the Court, 
the fourth-degree sexual offense bore a distinct element that the offense of second-degree 
assault lacked, and as such, the assault conviction merged into the sexual offense 
conviction under the required evidence test.  Id.  The Court acknowledged that the greater 
 
9 
 
offense carried a lesser penalty than the lesser included offense and reiterated that the 
prosecutor could have, and should have, clarified whether Respondent was being charged 
with two distinct acts of assaultive behavior or one, leaving no ambiguity regarding 
whether the jury convicted Respondent for one continuous act or two separate acts.  Id. at 
*6.  The Court reversed and remanded the case to the circuit court for resentencing 
consistent with the holding that the convictions merged.  
In the concurrence that was joined by Judge Andrea Leahy, Chief Judge Matthew 
Fader opined that the Lancaster rule—which the Majority opinion relied on in vacating the 
two separate sentences for convictions that merged—should be revisited.  Id. at *9 (Fader, 
C.J., concurring).  “[C]ourts in other jurisdictions facing the same issue have reached a 
result that is both consistent with [] double jeopardy jurisprudence and, at least in 
circumstances like [this one], more faithful to legislative intent and the amount of deference 
properly afforded jury verdicts.”  Id. at *10.  According to Chief Judge Fader, strict 
application of the Lancaster rule would mean that “by adding a sexual component to his 
assault of the victim, [Respondent] reduced 10-fold the maximum penalty for that 
assault[]” and that is neither the result the General Assembly could have intended, nor does 
it accord due regard to the weight of the jury verdict.  Id.  
DISCUSSION 
We begin our analysis with whether the respective sentences for second-degree 
assault and fourth-degree sexual offense should merge.  The State appears to concede that 
the offenses merged under the required evidence test, but disagrees that the merger of the 
offenses required the imposition of a sentence according to the “lesser included offense.”  
 
10 
 
The State invites this Court to overturn our holding in State v. Lancaster, 332 Md. 385, 631 
A.2d 453 (1993), and now hold that, where one offense merges into another, a trial judge 
may still impose the sentence based on the “lesser included offense,” if the lesser included 
offense carries the harsher penalty.  The State contends that “protecting double jeopardy 
rights by merging a conviction on a lesser [included] offense under the required evidence 
[test] does not require a court to disregard the potential sentence for that conviction.”  
According to the State, this portion of Lancaster and the decisions that followed, were 
wrongly decided, because they incorrectly interpreted the required evidence test to limit 
available sentences.  The State argues that the current rule unnecessarily restricts the trial 
judge’s ability to sentence upon merger of the lesser included offense.   
In contrast, Respondent argues that Lancaster was rightly decided and that 
Lancaster and its progeny mandate merger for purposes of conviction and sentencing.  
Respondent contends that the greater of the offenses, fourth-degree sexual offense, 
provides the sole sentence for his acts.  We agree.  We are not compelled to rewrite 
Maryland merger law, which provides that where the lesser included offense merges into 
the greater inclusive offense, the sentence merges as well.   
A. The offenses and their sentences merge.   
 
To understand the sentencing implications, it is useful to review and outline why 
state merger law requires the merger of the fourth-degree sexual offense and second-degree 
assault convictions, and their respective sentences.   
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the 
 
11 
 
Fourteenth Amendment, provides that no individual shall be tried or punished more than 
once for the same offense.10  See U.S. CONST., AMEND. V.  Double jeopardy rights “protect[] 
against three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a 
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the 
same offense.”  State v. Jones, 340 Md. 235, 242, 666 A.2d 128, 131 (1995) (quoting 
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1897 (1989)).  Additionally, 
“[t]he Supreme Court has held that states may impose cumulative punishment if it is clearly 
the intent of the legislature to do so.”  Jones v. State, 357 Md. 141, 163, 742 A.2d 493, 505 
(1999) (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 365–69, 103 S. Ct. 673, 677–78 (1983)).  
The Supreme Court has also indicated that the protection against multiple punishments 
derived from the Double Jeopardy Clause “does no more than prevent the sentencing court 
from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.”  Hunter, 459 U.S. at 
366, 103 S. Ct. at 678.   
Merger is the common law principle that derives from the protections afforded by 
the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Brooks v. State, 439 Md. 698, 737, 98 A.3d 236, 258 (2014).  
It is the mechanism used to “protect[] a convicted defendant from multiple punishments 
                                              
10 The Double Jeopardy Clause states that no person shall “be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb[.]”  The Maryland Constitution does 
not contain a double jeopardy clause.  Scott v. State, 454 Md. 146, 167, 164 A.3d 177, 189 
(2017) (citing Scriber v. State, 437 Md. 399, 408, 86 A.3d 1260, 1265 (2014)).   Merger 
and prohibition against double jeopardy are addressed in Maryland common law.  Id.; see 
also State v. Long, 405 Md. 527, 536, 954 A.2d 1083, 1089 (2008) (internal citations 
omitted).   
 
 
 
12 
 
for the same offense.”11  Id.  This Court has required merger “when: (1) the convictions are 
based on the same act or acts, and (2) under the required evidence test, the two offenses 
are deemed to be the same, or one offense is deemed to be the lesser included offense of 
the other.”  Id.  Both elements must be satisfied before merger is required.12   
1. Same Acts or Distinctive Acts  
We must first resolve whether Respondent’s respective convictions for second-
degree assault and fourth-degree sexual offense were predicated on “the same act or acts” 
or separately distinguishable acts.  Id.  In Nicolas v. State, we held that, in situations where 
there is a factual ambiguity regarding whether the convictions arose out of the same act or 
transaction, “that ambiguity is resolved in favor of the defendant.”  426 Md. 385, 400, 44 
                                              
11 See RICHARD P. GILBERT & CHARLES E. MOYLAN, JR., MARYLAND CRIMINAL 
LAW: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 452 (1983) (“When a defendant is convicted of a greater 
inclusive offense, double jeopardy considerations protect him from being punished 
separately for a lesser included offense.  To punish an individual both for an aggravated 
assault and for the lesser included simple assault would constitute multiple punishment for 
the same offense, one of the classic evils against which double jeopardy provision 
protects.”)  
 
12 Where the required evidence test has not been satisfied, the court may still pursue 
merger under the rule of lenity and fundamental fairness tests.  Under the rule of lenity, “if 
we are unsure of the legislative intent in punishing offenses as a single merged crime or as 
distinct offenses, we, in effect, give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and hold that the 
crimes do merge.”  Monoker v. State, 321 Md. 214, 222, 582 A.2d 525, 529 (1990).  A 
court may also merge in the interest of fundamental fairness.  In this situation, 
“[c]onsiderations of fairness and reasonableness reinforce our conclusion [to merge] ....  
We have ... looked to whether the type of act has historically resulted in multiple 
punishment[s].  The fairness of multiple punishments in a particular situation is obviously 
important.” Marlin v. State, 192 Md. App. 134, 169, 993 A.2d 1141, 1162 (2010) (quoting 
White v. State, 318 Md. 740, 746, 569 A.2d 1271, 1274 (1990)).   
 
 
 
13 
 
A.3d 396, 404 (2012); see also Brooks, 439 Md. at 739, 98 A.3d at 260.  Under these 
circumstances, the reviewing Court can “look to the record for other indications that might 
resolve the ambiguity in favor of non-merger.”  Id. at 741, 98 A.3d at 261.  However, in 
the case at bar, the record is “not so clear.”  Frazier, 2019 WL 2539288 at *5.  
As the Court of Special Appeals aptly acknowledged: 
The record reflects two separate acts of assaultive behavior.  One 
where [Respondent] choked and slapped the victim.  The second 
where [Respondent] raped the victim and forced the victim to perform 
fellatio on him.  The jury could have disbelieved the occurrence of the neck 
grabbing and slapping or could have believed that both the rape and forced 
fellatio were the assaultive conduct. The factual basis for the jury’s verdict 
is not readily apparent from the record before us and therefore creates an 
unreasonable ambiguity.  
 
 Id. at *6 (emphasis in original).    
In addressing the separate instances of physical assault, the sentencing judge 
regarded the “slapping and smacking” and neck-grabbing as separate acts of assaultive 
conduct, as distinguishable and “separate from or in addition to the sexual penetration of 
the victim.”  The trial court found independent acts of sexual and physical assault, which 
were sufficient to establish the required elements for both fourth-degree sexual offense and 
second-degree assault.  But, as the Court of Special Appeals noted, “the record looking at 
the trial in its entirety is not so clear.”  Id. at *5.  For example, the Court of Special Appeals 
observed that the pattern jury instructions did not inform the jury that they must find acts 
of physical assault and separate acts of sexual contact to convict the defendant of both 
 
14 
 
crimes.13  See Snowden v. State, 321 Md. 612, 619, 583 A.2d 1056, 1059 (1991) 
(“Snowden’s [case] was a court trial; had it been a jury trial[,] we could have looked to the 
judge’s instructions [to the jury] in hope of illuminating the rationale behind the verdicts.”).  
Additionally, the prosecutor did not focus the attention of the jury on which acts formed 
the basis for the fourth-degree sexual offense conviction as distinguished from those acts 
that supported a conviction for second-degree assault.  Between the deficiencies associated 
with the presentation of the State’s case and the pattern jury instructions, it was entirely 
unclear whether the jury based the two convictions on the same or different acts.  In the 
absence of a failure to specifically distinguish which acts formed the basis of each 
conviction, the ambiguity requires resolution in favor of merger.  
2. Required Evidence Test  
                                              
13  The trial court provided the jury with the following instructions:  
 
In order to convict the Defendant of fourth[-]degree sexual offense, 
the State must prove that the Defendant had sexual contact with [the victim] 
and that the sexual contact was made against the will and without the consent 
of [the victim].  Sexual contact means intentional touching of [the victim’s] 
genital or anal area or other intimate parts for the purposes of sexual arousal 
or gratification or for the abuse of either party.  
The Defendant is charged with second[-]degree assault. Assault is 
causing offensive physical contact to another person.  In order to convict the 
Defendant of assault, the State must prove that the Defendant caused 
offensive physical contact with [the victim]; that the contact was the result 
of an intentional or reckless act of the Defendant and was not accidental; and 
that the contact was not consented to by [the victim].  Reckless act means 
conduct that under all the circumstances shows a conscious disregard of the 
consequences to other people and is a gross departure from the standard of 
conduct that a law[-]abiding person would observe.  
 
Frazier, 2019 WL 2539288 at *5 n.3 (citing Maryland Pattern Jury Instructions).  
 
15 
 
In applying the required evidence test, we must consider whether the elements of 
second-degree assault are “subsumed” as a lesser included offense of fourth-degree sexual 
offense.  “‘The required evidence test focuses upon the elements of each offense; if all of 
the elements of one offense are included in the other offense, so that only the latter offense 
contains a distinct element or distinct elements, the former merges into the latter.’”  
Nicolas, 426 Md. at 401, 44 A.3d at 405 (internal citations omitted).  In other words, “the 
required evidence is that which is minimally necessary to secure a conviction for 
each…offense.”  Id.  If each of the two offenses requires proof of an element which the 
other does not, merger is not required.  Id. at 401–02, 44 A.3d at 405–06.   
Section 3-203 of the Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article (“Crim. Law”) prohibits 
assault in the second degree.  Our case law embraces three types of common law assault: 
“(1) intent to frighten, (2) attempted battery, and (3) battery.”  Jones v. State, 440 Md. 450, 
455, 103 A.3d 586, 589 (2014) (citing Snyder v. State, 210 Md. App. 370, 382, 63 A.3d 
128, 135 (2013)).  Upon conviction, the penalty for second-degree assault is a term of 
imprisonment not to exceed ten years, a $2,500 fine, or both.  Crim. Law § 3-203. 
It is well established that “[w]hen applying the required evidence test to multi-
purpose offenses, i.e., offenses having alternative elements, a court must examine the 
alternative elements relevant to the case at issue.”  Nicolas, 426 Md. at 403, 44 A.3d at 
406.   Common law battery—the type of assault at issue here—is an offensive or harmful 
contact with another person.  Id., 44 A.3d at 406–07.  A fourth-degree sexual offense 
requires “[s]exual contact,” which is “an intentional touching of the victim’s or actor’s 
genital, anal, or other intimate area for sexual arousal or gratification, or for the abuse of 
 
16 
 
either party.”  Crim. Law § 3-301(e)(1).  In order to be a crime, such contact must be 
without valid consent.14  Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr. further defined “sexual contact” 
thusly: “[P]urposeful tactile contact and tactile sensation, not incidental touching.  It is the 
sexually-oriented act of groping, caressing, feeling, or touching of the genital area or anus 
                                              
14 Crim. Law § 3-308 provides:  
Prohibited--In general 
(b) A person may not engage in: 
(1) sexual contact with another without the consent of the other; 
(2) except as provided in § 3-307(a)(4) of this subtitle, a sexual act with 
another if the victim is 14 or 15 years old, and the person performing the 
sexual act is at least 4 years older than the victim; or 
(3) except as provided in § 3-307(a)(5) of this subtitle, vaginal intercourse 
with another if the victim is 14 or 15 years old, and the person performing 
the act is at least 4 years older than the victim. 
*** 
 Penalty  
 
(d)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a person who 
violates this section is guilty of the misdemeanor of sexual offense in the 
fourth degree and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 1 
year or a fine not exceeding $1,000 or both. 
(2)(i) On conviction of a violation of this section, a person who has been 
convicted on a prior occasion not arising from the same incident of a 
violation of § 3-303, § 3-304, §§ 3-307 through 3-310 of this subtitle, § 3-
311 or § 3-312 of this subtitle as the sections existed before October 1, 2017, 
§ 3-315 of this subtitle, or § 3-602 of this title is subject to imprisonment not 
exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding $1,000 or both. 
(ii) If the State intends to proceed against a person under subparagraph (i) of 
this paragraph, it shall comply with the procedures set forth in the Maryland 
Rules for the indictment and trial of a subsequent offender. 
 
 
 
17 
 
or breasts of the female victim.”  Travis v. State, 218 Md. App. 410, 465, 98 A.3d 281, 313 
(2014).  As the State recognizes, the fourth-degree sexual offense must merge with second-
degree assault under Maryland merger law because the elements of second-degree assault 
are identical to those required for fourth-degree sexual offense, with the exception of one 
element—that the assaultive conduct be sexual in nature.  In other words, the sexual contact 
element is what distinguishes fourth-degree-sexual offense from any other “touching” 
sufficient for second-degree-assault.  We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that 
based on the required evidence test, the second-degree assault conviction is subsumed by 
the fourth-degree sexual offense.  Where the parties diverge is regarding the sentencing 
implications of this merger.   
3. Merger of Penalties Under the Lancaster Rule  
The State argues that sentencing according to the second-degree-assault conviction 
does not run afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and that federal merger law is silent 
regarding which of the two available punishments applies.15    
In accordance with federal double jeopardy principles, this Court has previously 
stated that, when two convictions, such as second-degree assault and fourth-degree sexual 
offense, merge, “separate sentences are normally precluded[,]” unless the General 
Assembly intended otherwise.  Nicolas, 426 Md. at 400, 44 A.3d at 405 (internal citations 
                                              
15 At oral argument, the State recognized that the sentencing judge sentenced 
Respondent on both convictions.  It concedes that sentencing on both convictions is 
inappropriate where merger is required, but argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause does 
not require that the sentence be capped by the maximum sentence for the greater offense 
when the lesser-included offense allows for a longer sentence.    
  
 
18 
 
omitted); see also Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 268, 373 A.2d 262, 266 (1977).  This is 
true “regardless of the maximum authorized sentence for each offense.”  Lancaster, 332 
Md. at 405, 631 A.2d at 464 (citing Johnson v. State, 283 Md. 196, 204, 388 A.2d 926, 930 
(1978)).    
Our case law also makes clear that “a sentence may be imposed only for the offense 
having the additional element or elements[,]” i.e., the greater offense.  Id. at 392, 631 A.2d 
at 457 (internal citations omitted); see, e.g., Hardy v. State, 301 Md. 124,134, 482 A.2d 
474, 480 (1984) (stating that it is “indelibly clear that in Maryland a defendant charged 
with a greater offense (that carries a lighter penalty) and a lesser included offense (that 
carries a heavier penalty) is only subject to the maximum penalty of the greater offense 
upon conviction”).  “Where there is a merger of a lesser included offense into a greater 
offense, we are not concerned with penalties—the lesser included offense generally merges 
into and is subsumed by the greater offense regardless of penalties.”  Spitzinger v. State, 
340 Md. 114, 125, 665 A.2d 685, 690 (1995).  Given that the convictions for fourth-degree 
sexual offense and second-degree assault merged, so should the punishment corresponding 
to the lesser included offense of second-degree assault.  See In re Montrail M., 325 Md. 
527, 534, 601 A.2d 1102, 1105 (1992) (stating that “[t]he permissible punishment is that 
imposed on the greater offense”).   
The principal case explicitly barring sentencing on the lesser included offense is 
State v. Lancaster.  In Lancaster, the defendant was convicted of fourth-degree sexual 
offense for “engaging in fellatio with another person who is 14 or 15 years of age” when 
“the person performing the sexual act is four or more years older than the other person.”  
 
19 
 
Id. at 389–90, 631 A.2d at 455–56.  The same acts giving rise to the fourth-degree sexual 
offense resulted in a conviction for the lesser included offense of “unnatural or perverted 
sexual practices[,]” which then punished a person for “taking into his or her mouth the 
sexual organ of any other person[.]”16  Id. at 399–400, 631 A.2d at 460–61.  Because 
Lancaster was convicted of two separate offenses predicated on the same act, the Double 
Jeopardy Clause mandated merger to prevent double punishment.  Nonetheless, Lancaster 
was sentenced according to both the fourth-degree sexual offense and the unnatural or 
perverted sexual practices charge.  Id. at 390, 631 A.2d at 456.  The maximum penalty for 
the former was one year; the statutory maximum was ten years for the latter.  Id. at 395, 
631 A.3d at 458.  Lancaster appealed and the Court of Special Appeals held that he was 
improperly sentenced because the convictions should have merged at sentencing.  We 
agreed and vacated the sentence for the unnatural or perverted sexual practices conviction, 
holding that the one-year sentence for fourth-degree sexual offense governed because the 
                                              
16 Md. Code, Art. 27, § 554 (repealed 2002).  Section 554 provided in pertinent part:  
 
§ 554.  Unnatural or perverted sexual practices. 
 
Every person who is convicted of taking into his or her mouth the sexual 
organ of any other person or animal, or who shall be convicted of placing his 
or her sexual organ in the mouth of any other person or animal, or who shall 
be convicted of committing any other unnatural or perverted sexual practice 
with any other person or animal, shall be fined not more than one thousand 
dollars ($1,000.00), or be imprisoned in jail or in the house of correction or 
in the penitentiary for a period not exceeding ten years, or shall be both fined 
and imprisoned within the limits above prescribed in the discretion of the 
court.  
 
See Lancaster, 332 Md. at 430 n.4, 631 A.3d at 477 n.4 (Chasanow, J., dissenting). 
 
 
20 
 
ten-year sentence was no longer an available sentence after applying the required evidence 
test and merging the convictions.  Id.   We reasoned that punishments should be imposed 
in accordance with the greater offense because this offense is “more specifically tailored 
to his or her conduct.”  Id. at 420, 631 A.2d at 472.  Moreover, “[t]he maximum penalty 
prescribed by the statute for the greater and more circumscribed offense [] represents a 
legislative judgment concerning the punishment for the precise type of conduct[.]”  Id.  
Accordingly, we affirmed the Court of Special Appeals and vacated the sentence for 
performing an unnatural or perverted sexual practice.  Id. at 422, 631 A.2d at 473.        
In a dissenting opinion, Judge John F. McAuliffe raised the very argument advanced 
by the State in the instant case.  He agreed that only one conviction could survive merger 
for purposes of sentencing.  Id. at 422–23, 631 A.2d at 473 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).  
However, he rejected the proposition that double jeopardy principles required that the 
“conviction left standing be of the offense having the greatest number of elements[]” and 
that the court must sentence according to this so-called greater offense.  Id. at 423, 631 
A.2d at 473.  Departing from the Majority, Judge McAuliffe would have “vacate[d] the 
judgment of conviction of fourth[-]degree sexual offense, and affirm[ed] the judgment for 
the more serious offense of committing an unnatural or perverted sexual practice.”  Id.   
Judge Howard Chasanow similarly disagreed with the Majority approach in Lancaster.  Id. 
at 426, 631 A.2d at 475 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).  It was clear to Judge Chasanow that 
the General Assembly intended for the two statutes to be cumulative, meaning that the 
appropriate sentence would have been ten years for the unnatural and perverted oral sex 
 
21 
 
act and one year for the fourth-degree sexual offense.  Id. at 433, 443–45, 631 A.2d at 483–
84.   
As recognized by the Lancaster majority and the respective dissents by Judge 
McAuliffe and Judge Chasanow, the rule requiring that punishments merge with 
convictions at sentencing is not explicit in federal merger law.  But, it logically follows 
from established merger principles that, upon merger of convictions, the only available 
sentence or punishment is the one accompanying the greater offense.  Montrail M., 325 
Md. at 534, 601 A.2d at 1105.  As a practical matter, if the conviction for the lesser included 
offense “flows into the judgment entered on the conviction into which it [is] merged,” so 
too does the corresponding sentence.  Id. at 533–34, 601 A.2d at 1105.  Furthermore, in 
imposing a particular punishment after merger, the imposition of that punishment should 
be according to the offense that most precisely reflects the conduct, which is the offense 
bearing the greater number of elements; in this case, fourth-degree sexual offense.  
Lancaster, 332 Md. at 420, 631 A.2d at 472.   
We also recognize—as did the Court in Lancaster—that in most cases, the greater 
offense for merger purposes also carries a more severe punishment.  However, as noted by 
the Court of Special Appeals, a fourth-degree sexual offense necessarily includes harmful 
or offensive contact sufficient for second-degree assault.  Yet, the General Assembly 
retained the one-year penalty for fourth-degree sexual offense.  In 1994, after the Lancaster 
decision, the General Assembly amended the fourth-degree sexual offense statute, but did 
not implement a harsher penalty or indicate that the assault statutes and fourth-degree 
sexual offense should be read to authorize cumulative punishment.  1994 Md. Laws, Ch. 
 
22 
 
523 (H.B. 96).  In fact, this crime is a misdemeanor with a one-year penalty for first-time 
offenders (three years for repeat offenders), and that “is an expression by the Legislature 
that certain acts of assault and battery should be reclassified as sexual offenses.  The penalty 
is suggestive that the proscribed acts, while crimes, are to be dealt with much less severely 
than the maximum penalty for common law assault and battery.”17  Gilbert & Moylan, Jr., 
MARYLAND CRIMINAL LAW: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 5.9 at 81.  Recognizing the 
merger implications post-Lancaster, if the General Assembly thought that a greater 
punishment for fourth-degree sexual offense was appropriate, it would have increased the 
penalty or allowed for duplicitous punishment.  See Lancaster, 332 Md. at 416, 631 A.2d 
at 469 (“[T]he General Assembly is well aware of the principles of merger under Maryland 
law and knows how to specifically or expressly provide for multiple punishments in 
situations where there would otherwise be a merger.”) (footnote omitted).     
The State relies on United States v. Peel to illustrate the point that sentencing judges 
can apply either sentence when the greater offense carries a lesser penalty, without 
violating double jeopardy rights.  595 F.3d 763, 767–68 (7th Cir. 2010).  There, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that merger of sentences was not 
required where the court found that the conviction for obstruction of justice merged with 
the conviction for bankruptcy fraud; obstruction of justice being the lesser included offense 
                                              
17 We note that the jury acquitted Respondent on the felony rape in the second-
degree, Crim. Law § 3-304, and felony second-degree sexual offense, Crim. Law § 3-306.  
These felonies carry a sentence of up to twenty years and a lifetime on the sex offender 
registry.  See id.; Md. Code, Criminal Procedure Article (“Crim. Proc.”) §11-707.  
 
23 
 
but harsher punishment.  Id.  According to the Seventh Circuit, the purpose of merger as a 
remedy is to 
eliminate the doubleness.  But which conviction must be vacated is not 
dictated by the Constitution.  It is a matter committed to the trial judge’s 
discretion because functionally it is a decision concerning the length of a 
defendant’s sentence. 
 
Id. at 768.  The Seventh Circuit cautioned that holding otherwise would lead to 
“paradoxical” results, because the defendant would have received a shorter sentence than 
he would have had the greater offense not been charged.  Id. (citing Lanier v. United States, 
220 F.3d 833, 842 (7th Cir. 2000)).  Like the Peel Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
has found that double jeopardy has no impact on the punishments imposable.  
Commonwealth v. Everett, 550 Pa. 312, 705 A.2d 837 (Pa. 1998).  In Everett, the defendant 
pleaded guilty to attempted murder and aggravated assault; attempted murder (the greater 
offense) carrying a maximum penalty of ten years and aggravated assault (the lesser 
included offense) carrying a maximum penalty of twenty years.  Id. at 314–15, 705 A.2d 
at 838.  The Everett Court declined to merge the convictions and their sentences, reasoning 
that the legislature imposed a greater penalty for conduct amounting to attempted murder 
and that penalty should control for sentencing purposes, regardless of merger.  Id. at 316, 
705 A.2d at 839.  We find neither Peel nor Everett persuasive, because those cases have 
no bearing on the law of merger in this state. 
Nonetheless, other jurisdictions have reached conclusions similar to Lancaster.  In 
State v. Dragoo, 277 Neb. 858, 765 N.W.2d 666 (Neb. 2009), the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska held that the driving under the influence (“DUI”) offense was the lesser included 
 
24 
 
offense of the DUI causing serious bodily harm offense, and the “conviction and sentence 
on the lesser [included] charge must be vacated,” regardless of which offense carries the 
greater penalty.  Id. at 865, 765 N.W.2d at 672; see also People v. Halstead, 881 P.2d 401, 
405–08 (Colo. App. 1994).  As explained above, we have consistently held that, where 
merger is required, sentences should be imposed according to the offense encompassing 
the additional element.  We see no reason to depart from that path.   
B. Departure from established precedent is inappropriate in this case.  
Under the doctrine of “stare decisis,” precedent “should not be lightly set aside[.]” 
Unger v. State, 427 Md. 383, 417, 48 A.3d 242, 261 (2012) (citing State v. Green, 367 Md. 
61, 78, 785 A.2d 1275, 1285 (2001)).  Adherence to precedent is the “preferred course 
because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal 
principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived 
integrity of the judicial process.”  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 
2609 (1991).  However, stare decisis is “not an absolute.”  Green, 367 Md. at 79, 785 A.2d 
at 1285.  This Court will depart from established precedent for one of two reasons: (1) the 
prior decision is “clearly wrong and contrary to established principles” or (2) the precedent 
has been “superseded by significant changes in the law.”  State v. Waine, 444 Md. 692, 
700, 122 A.3d 294, 294 (2015).   
Here, the fact that the greater included offense carries a lesser penalty does not 
render the Lancaster decision “clearly wrong.”  As noted by the Court of Special Appeals, 
the Lancaster rule only presents a problem when the lesser included offense bears a greater 
penalty.  However, this “so-called” Lancaster sentencing problem could have been averted.  
 
25 
 
By virtue of having charged the defendant with fourth-degree-sexual offense and second-
degree-assault, Respondent received a less severe punishment than he would have, if he 
had only been charged with second-degree-assault, because Lancaster mandates 
sentencing on the greater offense.  Notwithstanding this unintended consequence of 
Lancaster, any resulting sentencing issues could have been resolved during trial.  A jury 
instruction specifying that separate acts must form the basis for each conviction, and an 
explanation of which acts satisfied the elements for each crime would have prevented 
merger altogether.  See Cortez v. State, 104 Md. App. 358, 369, 656 A.2d 360, 365 (1995) 
(“In a jury trial, the solution…is the giving of an appropriate instruction.”).   
For example, the trial judge might instruct the jury that, if it found the 
defendant guilty of robbery (or kidnapping, or other compound crimes in 
which force or threat of force is an element), it could find the defendant guilty 
of battery (or assault, or both) only if it found that there was a use of force 
(or threat of force) separate from and independent of the force (or threat of 
force) employed to effect the greater offense.  
 
Id.  Had the jury been instructed accordingly, there would have been no question as to what 
act or acts formed the basis for convictions—if the jury then convicted Respondent on both 
counts, it would have been clear that the jury found two separate acts of sexual assault or 
physical assault.  See Brooks, 439 Md. at 741–42, 98 A.3d at 261 (mandating merger of 
false imprisonment and first-degree rape because neither the jury instructions nor the 
record reflected that the jury viewed the events as two distinct acts).    
At trial, prosecutors also have a responsibility to explain the required elements of 
the crime charged.  In closing argument, the prosecutor convoluted the applicable elements 
and acts, blurring the distinction between which act or acts supported the conviction for 
 
26 
 
second-degree assault and which supported a conviction for the fourth-degree sexual 
offense.  In closing, the prosecutor described forced vaginal intercourse and stated that the 
assault “continued” from the upstairs bedroom to the kitchen.  Had the prosecutor been 
clear regarding the acts sufficient to sustain a conviction for each, there may have been no 
“Lancaster problem.”   
Underlying the State’s argument is the premise that sexual assault should be 
punished more severely than what is currently prescribed in the fourth-degree sexual 
offense statute.  This, however, is an issue that must be addressed by the General Assembly.   
“Legislatures, not courts, prescribe the scope of punishments.”  Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368, 
103 S. Ct. 673 at 679.  There has been no clear expression of legislative intent that second-
degree assault and fourth-degree sexual offense should be punished cumulatively.  In the 
absence of clear legislative intent, a court in this circumstance may not impose a greater 
penalty than what is provided in the fourth-degree sexual offense statute.  
CONCLUSION  
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.  Lancaster requires the 
merger of both convictions and sentences.  Once there has been a merger of a conviction 
under the required evidence test, the sentence for the lesser included offense is no longer 
available to the sentencing judge.  We see no reason to overturn precedent, particularly 
where the problem the State cautions against may have been avoided. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 
OF SPECIAL APPEALS IS 
AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO BE 
PAID BY PETITIONER.