Case Title: Kimberly Hurrell-Harring v. The State of New York

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2010-05-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 66  
Kimberly Hurrell-Harring, et al.,
            Appellants,
        v.
The State of New York et al.,
            Respondents. 
Corey Stoughton, for appellant.
Barbara D. Underwood, for respondents.
District Attorneys Association of the State of New
York; National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al.;
The Fund for Modern Courts; Michael A. Battle et al.; Legal Aid
Society; New York State Defenders Association; Innocence Project,
amici curiae.
LIPPMAN, Chief Judge:
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees a criminal defendant "the right to . . . have the
assistance of counsel for his defense," and since Gideon v
Wainwright (372 US 335 [1963]) it has been established that that
entitlement may not be effectively denied by the state by reason
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of a defendant's inability to pay for a lawyer.  Gideon is not
now controversial either as an expression of what the
Constitution requires or as an exercise in elemental fair play. 
Serious questions have, however, arisen in this and other
jurisdictions as to whether Gideon's mandate is being met in
practice (see e.g., Lavallee v Justices in the Hampden Superior
Court, 442 Mass 228 [2004]) . 
In New York, the Legislature has left the performance
of the State's obligations under Gideon to the counties, where it
is discharged, for the most part, with county resources and
according to local rules and practices (see County Law articles
18-A and 18-B).  Plaintiffs in this action, defendants in various
criminal prosecutions ongoing at the time of the action's
commencement in Washington, Onondaga, Ontario, Schuyler and
Suffolk counties, contend that this arrangement, involving what
is in essence a costly, largely unfunded and politically
unpopular mandate upon local government, has functioned to
deprive them and other similarly situated indigent defendants in
the aforementioned counties of constitutionally and statutorily
guaranteed representational rights.  They seek a declaration that
their rights and those of the class they seek to represent are
being violated and an injunction to avert further abridgment of
their right to counsel; they do not seek relief within the
criminal cases out of which their claims arise.
This appeal results from dispositions of defendants'
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motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 to dismiss the action as non-
justiciable.  Supreme Court denied the motion, but in the
decision and order now before us (66 AD3d 84 [2009]) the sought
relief was granted by the Appellate Division.  That Court held
that there was no cognizable claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel other than one seeking post-conviction relief, and,
relatedly, that violation of a criminal defendant's right to
counsel could not be vindicated in a collateral civil proceeding,
particularly where the object of the collateral action was to
compel an additional allocation of public resources, which the
Court found to be a properly legislative prerogative.  Two
Justices dissented.  They were of the view that violations of the
right to counsel were actionable in contexts other than claims
for post-conviction relief, including a civil action such as that
brought by plaintiffs.  While recognizing that choices between
competing social priorities are ordinarily for the Legislature, 
this did not, in the dissenters' judgment, excuse the judiciary
from its obligation to provide a remedy for violations of
constitutional rights (id. at 95),  especially when the alleged
violations were "so interwoven with, and necessarily
implicate[d], the proper functioning of the court system itself"
(at 96).
Plaintiffs have appealed as of right from the Appellate
Division's order pursuant to CPLR 5601 (a) and (b) (1).  We now
reinstate the action, albeit with some substantial qualifications
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upon its scope.
Defendants' claim that the action is not justiciable
rests principally on two theories: first, that there is no
cognizable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel apart from
one seeking relief from a conviction, and second, that
recognition of a claim for systemic relief of the sort plaintiffs
seek will involve the courts in the performance of properly
legislative functions, most notably determining how public
resources are to be allocated.
The first of these theories is rooted in case law
conditioning relief for constitutionally ineffective assistance
upon findings that attorney performance, when viewed in its
total, case specific aspect, has both fallen below the standard
of objective reasonableness (see Strickland v Washington, 466 US
668, 687-688 [1984]), and resulted in prejudice, either with
respect to the outcome of the proceeding (id. at 694) or, under
this Court's somewhat less outcome oriented standard of
"meaningful assistance," to the defendant's right to a fair trial
(People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 713-714 [1998]).  Defendants
reason that the prescribed, deferential (see Strickland, 466 US
at 689; Benevento, 91 NY2d at 712) and highly context sensitive
inquiry into the adequacy and particular effect of counsel's
performance, cannot occur until a prosecution has concluded in a
conviction, and that, once there is a conviction, the appropriate
avenues of relief are direct appeals and the various other
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established means of challenging a conviction, such as CPL 440
motions and petitions for writs of habeas corpus or coram nobis. 
They urge, in essence, that the present plaintiffs can, based
upon their ongoing prosecutions, possess no ripe claim of
ineffective assistance and that any ineffective assistance claims
that might eventually be brought by them would, given the nature
of the claim, have to be individually asserted and determined; 
they argue that a finding of constitutionally deficient
performance -- one necessarily rooted in the particular
circumstances of an individual case -- cannot serve as a
predicate for systemic relief.  Indeed, they remind us that the
Supreme Court in Strickland has noted pointedly that "the purpose
of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is
not to improve the quality of legal representation, although that
is a goal of considerable importance to the legal system[,] . . .
[but rather] to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair
trial"  (466 US at 689).
These arguments possess a measure of merit.  A fair
reading of Strickland and our relevant state precedents supports
defendants' contention that effective assistance is a judicial
construct designed to do no more than protect an individual
defendant's right to a fair adjudication; it is not a concept
capable of expansive application to remediate systemic
deficiencies.  The cases in which the concept has been explicated
are in this connection notable for their intentional omission of
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any broadly applicable defining performance standards.  Indeed,
Strickland is clear that articulation of any standard more
specific than that of objective reasonableness is neither
warranted by the Sixth Amendment nor compatible with its
objectives:
"More specific guidelines are not
appropriate. The Sixth Amendment refers
simply to 'counsel,' not specifying
particular requirements of effective
assistance. It relies instead on the legal
profession's maintenance of standards
sufficient to justify the law's presumption
that counsel will fulfill the role in the
adversary process that the Amendment
envisions. The proper measure of attorney
performance remains simply reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms ... In
any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim,
the performance inquiry must be whether
counsel's assistance was reasonable
considering all the circumstances ... No
particular set of detailed rules for
counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take
account of the variety of circumstances faced
by defense counsel or the range of legitimate
decisions regarding how best to represent a
criminal defendant. Any such set of rules
would interfere with the constitutionally
protected independence of counsel and
restrict the wide latitude counsel must have
in making tactical decisions. Indeed, the
existence of detailed guidelines for
representation could distract counsel from
the overriding mission of vigorous advocacy
of the defendant's cause"
(466 US at 688-689 [internal citations omitted]).  We too have
for similar reasons eschewed the articulation of more specific,
generally applicable performance standards for judging the
effectiveness of counsel in the context of determining whether
constitutionally mandated representation has been provided (see
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People v Benevento, 91 NY at 712; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137,
146-147 [1981]).  This is not to say that performance standards
are not highly relevant in assuring that constitutionally
effective assistance is provided and in judging whether in a
particular case an attorney's performance has been deficient,
only that such standards do not and cannot usefully define the
Sixth Amendment-based concept of effective assistance.  While the
imposition of such standards may be highly salutary, it is not
under Strickland appropriate as an exercise in Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence.  
Having said this, however, we would add the very
important caveat that Strickland's approach is expressly premised
on the supposition that the fundamental underlying right to
representation under Gideon has been enabled by the State in a
manner that would justify the presumption that the standard of
objective reasonableness will ordinarily be satisfied (see
Strickland, 466 US at 687-689, supra).  The questions properly
raised in this Sixth Amendment-grounded action, we think, go not
to whether ineffectiveness has assumed systemic dimensions, but
rather to whether the State has met its foundational obligation
under Gideon to provide legal representation.
Inasmuch as general prescriptive relief is unavailable
and indeed incompatible with the adjudication of claims alleging
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, it follows
that plaintiffs' claims for prospective systemic relief cannot
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stand if their gravamen is only that attorneys appointed for them
have not, so far, afforded them meaningful and effective
representation.  While it is defendants' position, and was
evidently that of the Appellate Division majority, that the
complaint contains only performance-based claims for ineffective
assistance, our examination of the pleading leads us to a
different conclusion.
According to the complaint, ten of the 20 plaintiffs --
two from Washington, two from Onondaga, two from Ontario and four
from Schuyler County -- were altogether without representation at
the arraignments held in their underlying criminal proceedings. 
Eight of these unrepresented plaintiffs were jailed after bail
had been set in amounts they could not afford.  It is alleged
that the experience of these plaintiffs is illustrative of what
is a fairly common practice in the aforementioned counties of
arraigning defendants without counsel and leaving them,
particularly when accused of relatively low level offenses,
unrepresented in subsequent proceedings where pleas are taken and
other critically important legal transactions take place.   One
of these plaintiffs remained unrepresented for some five months 
and it is alleged that the absence of clear and uniform
guidelines reasonably related to need has commonly resulted in
denials of representation to indigent defendants based on the
subjective judgments of individual jurists.
In addition to the foregoing allegations of outright
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1This claim, referred by plaintiffs as one based on "lack of
consistent vertical representation" is raised by each of the four
Suffolk County plaintiffs.
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non-representation, the complaint contains allegations to the
effect that although lawyers were eventually nominally appointed
for plaintiffs, they were unavailable to their clients -- that
they conferred with them little, if at all, were often completely
unresponsive to their urgent inquiries and requests from jail,
sometimes for months on end, waived important rights without
consulting them, and ultimately appeared to do little more on
their behalf than act as conduits for plea offers, some of which
purportedly were highly unfavorable.  It is repeatedly alleged
that counsel missed court appearances, and that when they did
appear they were not prepared to proceed, often because they were
entirely new to the case, the matters having previously been
handled by other similarly unprepared counsel.1  There are also
allegations that the counsel appointed for at least one of the
plaintiffs was seriously conflicted and thus unqualified to
undertake the representation.
The allegations of the complaint must at this stage of
the litigation be deemed true and construed in plaintiffs' favor,
affording them the benefit of every reasonable inference (Leon v
Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), the very limited object
being to ascertain whether any cognizable claim for relief is
made out (id.).  If there is a discernible claim, that is where
the inquiry must end; the difficulty of its proof is not the
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2It is, however, alleged that in the counties at issue pleas
are often elicited from unrepresented defendants at arraignment.
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present concern.  The above summarized allegations, in our view, 
state cognizable Sixth Amendment claims.
It is clear that a criminal defendant, regardless of
wherewithal, is entitled to "'the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him'" (Gideon v Wainwright,
372 US at 345, quoting Powell v Alabama, 287 US 45, 68-69
[1932]). The right attaches at arraignment (see Rothgery v
Gillespie County, __ US __, 128 S Ct 2578 [2008]) and entails the
presence of counsel at each subsequent "critical" stage of the
proceedings (Montejo v Louisiana, __ US __, 129 S Ct 2079
[2009]).
As is here relevant, arraignment itself must under the
circumstances alleged be deemed a critical stage since, even if
guilty pleas were not then elicited from the presently named
plaintiffs,2 a circumstance which would undoubtedly require the
"critical stage" label (see Coleman v Alabama, 399 US 1, 9
[1970]), it is clear from the complaint that plaintiffs' pretrial
liberty interests were on that occasion regularly adjudicated
(see also CPL 180.10 [6]) with most serious consequences, both
direct and collateral, including the loss of employment and
housing, and inability to support and care for particularly needy
dependents.  There is no question that "a bail hearing is a
critical stage of the State's criminal process" (Higazy v FBI
Agent Michael Templeton, 505 F3d 161, 172 [2d Cir 2007] [internal
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No. 66
3It does not appear that any of the plaintiffs who were
arraigned without counsel and jailed when they could not afford
the bail consequently fixed, agreed to proceed without a lawyer.  
The dissent's assertion (fn 7) that plaintiffs were not "forced"
to participate in bail hearings without counsel, is, apart from
being without any support in the record, irrelevant given the
clear entitlement to counsel under the statute, and indeed the
Constitution. 
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quotation marks and citation omitted]).  
Recognizing the crucial importance of arraignment and
the extent to which a defendant's basic liberty and due process
interests may then be affected, CPL 180.10 (3) expressly provides
for "the right to the aid of counsel at the arraignment and at
every subsequent stage of the action" and forbids a court from
going forward with the proceeding without counsel for the
defendant, unless the defendant has knowingly agreed to proceed
in counsel's absence (CPL 180.10 [5]).3   Contrary to defendants'
suggestion and that of the dissent, nothing in the statute may be
read to justify the conclusion that the presence of defense
counsel at arraignment is ever dispensable, except at a
defendant's informed option, when matters affecting the
defendant's pretrial liberty or ability subsequently to defend
against the charges are to be decided.  Nor is there merit to
defendants' suggestion that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
is not yet fully implicated (see Rothgery, 128 S Ct at 2589).  
The cases cited by the dissent in which the allegedly
consequential event at arraignment was the entry of a not guilty
plea (United States ex rel. Caccio v Fay, 350 F2d 214, 215 [2d
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Cir 1965]; United States ex rel. Combs v Denno, 357 F2d 809, 812
[2d Cir 1966]; United States ex rel Hussey v Fay, 220 F Supp 562
[SD NY 1963]; Holland v Allard, 2005 WL 2786909 [ED NY 2005]), do
not stand for the  proposition that counsel, as a general matter,
is optional at arraignment.  Indeed, such a proposition would
plainly be untenable since arraignments routinely, and in New
York as a matter of statutory design, encompass matters affecting
a defendant's liberty and ability to defend against the charges. 
The cited cases rather stand for the very limited proposition
that where it happens that what occurs at arraignment does not
affect a defendant's ultimate adjudication, a defendant is not on
the ground of non-representation entitled to a reversal of his or
her conviction.  Plaintiffs here do not seek that relief. 
Rather, they seek prospectively to assure the provision of what
the Constitution undoubtedly guarantees -- representation at all
critical stages of the criminal proceedings.  In New York,
arraignment is, as a general matter, such a stage.
Also "critical" for Sixth Amendment purposes is the
period between arraignment and trial when a case must be
factually developed and researched, decisions respecting Grand
Jury testimony made, plea negotiations conducted, and pre-trial
motions filed.  Indeed, it is clear that "to deprive a person of
counsel during the period prior to trial may be more damaging
than denial of counsel during the trial itself" (Maine v Moulton,
474 US 159, 170 [1985]).
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This complaint contains numerous plain allegations that
in specific cases counsel simply was not provided at critical
stages of the proceedings.  The complaint additionally contains
allegations sufficient to justify the inference that these
deprivations may be illustrative of significantly more widespread
practices; of particular note in this connection are the
allegations that in numerous cases representational denials are
premised on subjective and highly variable notions of indigency,
raising possible due process and equal protection concerns. 
These allegations state a claim, not for ineffective assistance
under Strickland, but for basic denial of the right to counsel
under Gideon.
Similarly, while variously interpretable, the numerous
allegations to the effect that counsel, although appointed, were
uncommunicative, made virtually no efforts on their nominal
clients' behalf during the very critical period subsequent to
arraignment, and, indeed, waived important rights without
authorization from their clients, may be reasonably understood to
allege non-representation rather than ineffective representation. 
Actual representation assumes a certain basic representational
relationship.  The allegations here, however, raise serious
questions as to whether any such relationship may be really said
to have existed between many of the plaintiffs and their putative
attorneys and cumulatively may be understood to raise the
distinct possibility that merely nominal attorney-client pairings
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No. 66
4We note that Cronic is careful to distinguish this distinct
claim from one for ineffective assistance (Cronic, 466 US at 654
n 11). 
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occur in subject counties with a fair degree of regularity,
allegedly because of inadequate funding and staffing of indigent
defense providers.  It is very basic that
"If no actual 'Assistance' 'for' the
accused's 'defence' is provided, then the
constitutional guarantee has been violated.
To hold otherwise 'could convert the
appointment of counsel into a sham and
nothing more than a formal compliance with
the Constitution's requirement that an
accused be given the assistance of counsel.
The Constitution's guarantee of assistance of
counsel cannot be satisfied by mere formal
appointment.' Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444,
446, 60 S. Ct. 321, 322, 84 L. Ed. 377
(1940)"
(United States v Cronic, 466 US 648, 654-655 [1984] [footnote
omitted]).
While it may turn out after further factual development
that what is really at issue is whether the representation
afforded was effective -- a subject not properly litigated in
this civil action -- at this juncture, construing the allegations
before us as we must, in the light most favorable to plaintiffs,
the complaint states a claim for constructive denial of the right
to counsel by reason of insufficient compliance with the
constitutional mandate of Gideon.4   The dissent's conclusion
that these allegations assert only performance based claims, and
not claims for non-representation, seems to us premature.  The
picture which emerges from a fair and procedurally appropriate
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reading of the complaint, is that defendants are with some
regularity going unrepresented at arraignment and subsequent
critical stages.   As noted, half the plaintiffs claim to have
been without counsel at arraignment, and nearly all claim to have
been left effectively without representation for lengthy periods
subsequent to arraignment.  If all that were involved was a
"lumping together of 20 generic ineffective assistance of counsel
claims," (dissent at 6) we would agree with the dissent that no
cognizable claim had been stated, but we do not think that this
detailed, multi-tiered complaint meticulously setting forth the
factual bases of the individual claims and the manner in which
they are linked to and illustrative of broad systemic
deficiencies, is susceptible of such characterization.   
Collateral preconviction claims seeking prospective
relief for absolute, core denials of the right to the assistance
of counsel cannot be understood to be incompatible with
Strickland.  These are not the sort of contextually sensitive
claims that are typically involved when ineffectiveness is
alleged.  The basic, unadorned question presented by such claims
where as here the defendant-claimants are poor, is whether the
State has met its obligation to provide counsel, not whether
under all the circumstances counsel's performance was inadequate
or prejudicial.  Indeed, in cases of outright denial of the right
to counsel prejudice is presumed.   Strickland itself, of course,
recognizes the critical distinction between a claim for
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ineffective assistance and one alleging simply that the right to
the assistance of counsel has been denied and specifically
acknowledges that the latter kind of claim may be disposed of
without inquiring as to prejudice:
"In certain Sixth Amendment contexts,
prejudice is presumed. Actual or constructive
denial of the assistance of counsel
altogether is legally presumed to result in
prejudice. So are various kinds of state
interference with counsel's assistance. See
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S., at 659,
and n. 25, 104 S.Ct., at 2046-2047, and n.
25. Prejudice in these circumstances is so
likely that case-by-case inquiry into
prejudice is not worth the cost. 466 U.S., at
658, 104 S.Ct., at 2046. Moreover, such
circumstances involve impairments of the
Sixth Amendment right that are easy to
identify and, for that reason and because the
prosecution is directly responsible, easy for
the government to prevent"
(466 US at 692).  
The allegations before us state claims falling
precisely within this described category.  It is true, as the
dissent points out, that claims, even within this category, have
been most frequently litigated post-conviction, but it does not
follow from this circumstance that they are not cognizable apart
from the post-conviction context.  Given the simplicity and
autonomy of a claim for non-representation, as opposed to one
truly involving the adequacy of an attorney's performance, there
is no reason -- and certainly none is identified in the dissent -
- why such a claim can not or should not be brought without the
context of a completed prosecution. 
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No. 66
5Defendants' contention that the action is, in light of this
circumstance, moot overlooks the well-established exception to
the mootness doctrine for recurring claims of public importance
typically evading review (see Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, 50
NY2d 707, 714-715 [1980]). 
6It follows that if plaintiffs' claims are found to be
meritorious after trial, such a determination will not entitle
them to vacatur of their criminal convictions.  And, although the
issue is not specifically raised, we note in the same connection
that, in view of the circumstance that this action will not
disturb the progress or outcomes of plaintiffs' criminal actions
(cf. Matter of Lipari v Owens, 70 NY2d 731 [1987]; Matter of
Veloz v Rothwax, 65 NY2d 902 [1985]), and that the action seeks
relief largely unavailable in the context of the underlying
individual criminal actions, the rule generally applicable to bar
collateral claims for equitable intervention in ongoing criminal
prosecutions (see e.g. Kelly's Rental v City of New York,44 NY2d
700 [1978]) would not be properly relied upon by the State here. 
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Although defendants contend otherwise, we perceive no
real danger that allowing these claims to proceed would impede
the orderly progress of plaintiffs' underlying criminal actions. 
Those actions have, for the most part been concluded,5 and we
have, in any event, removed from the action the issue of
ineffective assistance, thus eliminating any possibility that the
collateral adjudication of generalized claims of ineffective
assistance might be used to obtain relief from individual
judgments of conviction.6  Here we emphasize that our recognition
that plaintiffs may have claims for constructive denial of
counsel should not be viewed as a back door for what would be
non-justiciable assertions of ineffective assistance seeking
remedies specifically addressed to attorney performance, such as
uniform hiring, training and practice standards.  To the extent
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that a cognizable Sixth Amendment claim is stated in this
collateral civil action, it is to the effect that in one or more
of the five counties at issue the basic constitutional mandate
for the provision of counsel to indigent defendants at all
critical stages is at risk of being left unmet because of
systemic conditions, not by reason of the personal failings and
poor professional decisions of individual attorneys.  While the
defense of indigents in the five subject counties might perhaps
be improved in many ways that the Legislature is free to explore,
the much narrower focus of the constitutionally based judicial
remedy here sought must be simply to assure that every indigent
defendant is afforded actual assistance of counsel, as Gideon
commands.  Plainly, we do not, even while narrowing the scope of
this action as we believe the law requires, deny plaintiffs a
remedy for systemic violations of Gideon, as the dissent
suggests.  It is rather the dissent that would foreclose
plaintiffs from any prospect of obtaining such relief.  And, when
all is said and done, the dissent's proposed denial is premised
solely upon the availability of relief from a judgment of
conviction.  Neither law, nor logic, nor sound public policy
dictates that one form of relief should be preclusive of the
other. 
As against the fairly minimal risks involved in
sustaining the closely defined claim of non-representation we
have recognized must be weighed the very serious dangers that the
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alleged denial of counsel entails.  "'Of all the rights that an
accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by
far the most pervasive for it affects his ability to assert any
other rights he may have'" (United States v Cronic, 466 US at
654, quoting Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure,
70 Harv L Rev 1, 8 [1956]).  The failure to honor this right,
then, cannot but be presumed to impair the reliability of the
adversary process through which criminal justice is under our
system of government dispensed.  This action properly understood,
as it has been by distinguished members of the prosecution and
defense bars alike, does not threaten but endeavors to preserve
our means of criminal adjudication from the inevitably corrosive
effects and unjust consequences of an unfair adversary process.   
It is not clear that defendants actually contend that
stated claims for the denial of assistance of counsel would be
non-justiciable; their appellate presentation, both written and
oral, has been principally to the effect that the claims alleged
are exclusively predicated on deficient performance, a
characterization which we have rejected.  Supposing, however, a
persisting, relevant contention of non-justiciability, it is
clear that it would be without merit.  This is obvious because
the right that plaintiffs would enforce -- that of a poor person
accused of a crime to have counsel provided for his or her
defense -- is the very same right that Gideon has already
commanded the States to honor as a matter of fundamental
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constitutional necessity.  There is no argument that what was
justiciable in Gideon is now beyond the power of a court to
decide.  
It is, of course, possible that a remedy in this action
would necessitate the appropriation of funds and perhaps,
particularly in a time of scarcity, some reordering of
legislative priorities.  But this does not amount to an argument
upon which a court might be relieved of its essential obligation
to provide a remedy for violation of a fundamental constitutional
right (see Marbury v Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 147 [1803] ["every
right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its
proper redress"]).  
We have consistently held that enforcement of a clear
constitutional or statutory mandate is the proper work of the
courts (see Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 86
NY2d 307 [1995]; Jiggets v Grinker, 75 NY2d 411 [1990]; McCain v
Koch, 70 NY2d 109 [1987]; Klostermann v Cuomo, 61 NY2d 525
[1984]), and it would be odd if we made an exception in the case
of a mandate as well-established and as essential to our
institutional integrity as the one requiring the State to provide
legal representation to indigent criminal defendants at all
critical stages of the proceedings against them.  
Assuming the allegations of the complaint to be true,
there is considerable risk that indigent defendants are, with a
fair degree of regularity, being denied constitutionally mandated 
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counsel in the five subject counties.  The severe imbalance in
the adversary process that such a state of affairs would produce
cannot be doubted.  Nor can it be doubted that courts would in
consequence of such imbalance become breeding grounds for
unreliable judgments.  Wrongful conviction, the ultimate sign of
a criminal justice system's breakdown and failure, has been
documented in too many cases.  Wrongful convictions, however, are
not the only injustices that command our present concern.  As
plaintiffs rightly point out, the absence of representation at
critical stages is capable of causing grave and irreparable
injury to persons who will not be convicted.  Gideon's guarantee
to the assistance of counsel does not turn upon a defendant's
guilt or innocence, and neither can the availability of a remedy
for its denial.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be modified, without costs, by reinstating the complaint in
accordance with this opinion, and remitting the case to that
court to consider issues raised but not determined on the appeal
to that court, and, as so modified, affirmed.
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Kimberly Hurrell-Harring v State of New York
No. 66 
PIGOTT, J.(dissenting) :
There is no doubt that there are inadequacies in the
delivery of indigent legal services in this State, as pointed out 
by the New York State Commission on the Future of Indigent
Defense Services, convened by former Chief Judge Kaye.  I
respectfully dissent, however, because, despite this, in my view,
the complaint here fails to state a claim, either under the
theories proffered by plaintiffs--ineffective assistance of
counsel and deprivation of the right to counsel at a critical
stage (arraignment)--or under the "constructive denial" theory
read into the complaint by the majority.  
The majority rightly rejects plaintiffs' ineffective
assistance cause of action; such claims are limited to a case-by-
case analysis and cannot be redressed in a civil proceeding. 
Rather than dismissing that claim, however, the majority replaces
it with a "constructive denial" cause of action that, in my view,
is nothing more than an ineffective assistance claim under
another name.  
The allegations in the complaint can be broken down
into two categories:  (1) the deprivation of "meaningful and
effective assistance of counsel," and (2) the deprivation of the
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No. 66
1  Presumably this refers to the fact that in some
jurisdictions, a defendant may be represented by one lawyer in
the local criminal court and have a different lawyer assigned in
Superior Court.
2  Much of the focus of the majority is on the so-called
Strickland standard, with respect to ineffective assistance of
counsel.  However, the "meaningful representation" standard
obviously remains the standard to be applied in this State (see
People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137 [1981]).
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right to counsel at a "critical stage" of the proceedings, i.e.,
the arraignment.  The claims under the former category are many:
lack of a sufficient opportunity to discuss the charges with
their attorney or participate in their defense; lack of
preparation by counsel; denial of investigative services; lack of
"vertical representation;"1 refusal of assigned counsel to return
phone calls or accept collect calls; inability to leave messages
on assigned counsel's answering machine due to a full voicemail
box, etc. 
The majority rejects plaintiffs' main claim that the
complaint states a cause of action for ineffective assistance of
counsel under Strickland v Washington (466 US 668 [1984])2,
finding "a measure of merit" to defendants' arguments that such
claims are premised on trial counsel's constitutionally deficient
performance and do not form the basis for systemic relief (maj
op, 5).  I agree, and would affirm the Appellate Division's
determination in that regard, because the Strickland standard is
limited to whether an individual has received the effective
assistance of counsel and cannot be used to attack alleged
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systemic failures, and the allegations of the complaint support
no broader reading.    
 Rather than stopping at its rejection of the
Strickland standard with respect to these allegations, however,
the majority advances a third theory, and reads the complaint as
stating a claim for "constructive denial" of the right to
counsel, i.e., that upon having counsel appointed, plaintiffs
received only "nominal" representation, such that there is a
question as to whether the counties were in compliance with the
constitutional mandate of Gideon (maj op, 12-13).  
In support of this rationale, the majority relies on
United States v Cronic, which recognizes a "narrow exception" to
Strickland's requirement that a defendant asserting an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim must demonstrate a
deficient performance and prejudice (Florida v Nixon, 543 US 175,
190 [2004]).  In other words, Cronic, too, is an ineffective
assistance of counsel case--decided on the same day as
Strickland--but one that allows the courts to find a Sixth
Amendment violation "without inquiring into counsel's actual
performance or requiring the defendant to show the effect it had
on the trial, (citation omitted), when 'circumstances exist that
are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of
litigating their effect on a particular case is unjustified'"
(Wright v Van Patten, 552 US 120, 124 [2008] [citations
omitted]).
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3  Even the defendant in Cronic was not entitled to rely on
any of the exceptions delineated in that opinion, notwithstanding
the fact that his retained counsel withdrew shortly before the
trial date and, just 25 days before trial, the court appointed a
young lawyer with a real estate practice to represent defendant
in a mail fraud case that had taken the Government 4 ½ years to
investigate.  Supreme Court held that any errors by counsel at
trial were to be examined using the Strickland test.
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Cronic's "narrow exception" applies to individual cases
where: (1) there has been a "complete denial of counsel;" i.e.,
the defendant is denied counsel at a critical stage of the trial;
(2) "counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to
meaningful adversarial testing;" or (3) "the likelihood that any
lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective
assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is
appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial"
(id. at 659-660).   
Cronic's holding is instructive, if only to point out
that the Supreme Court was reaching the obvious conclusion that,
in individual cases, the absence or inadequacy of counsel must
generally fall within one of those three narrow exceptions.3 
Constructive denial of counsel is a branch from the Strickland
tree, with Cronic applying only when the appointed attorney's
representation is so egregious that it's as if defendant had no
attorney at all.  Therefore, whether a defendant received
ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland or is entitled
to a presumption of prejudice under Cronic is a determination
that can only be made after the criminal proceeding has ended;
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neither approach lends itself to a proceeding like the one at bar
where plaintiffs allege prospective violations of their Sixth
Amendment rights. 
The majority does not explain how it can conclude, on
one hand, "that effective assistance is a judicial construct
designed to do no more than protect an individual defendant's
right to fair adjudication" and "is not a concept capable of
expansive application to remediate systemic deficiencies" (maj,
op, 5 [emphasis supplied]), and on the other hand that a
"constructive denial" of counsel theory could potentially apply
to this class of individuals who, when they commenced the action,
had not reached a resolution of their criminal cases.  Courts
reviewing the rare constructive denial claims have done so by
looking at the particular egregious behavior of the attorney in
the particular case after the representation has concluded (see
e.g. Burdine v Johnson, 262 F3d 336 [5th Cir 2001] cert denied
535 US 1120 [2002] [defense counsel slept during capital trial];
Restrepo v Kelly, 178 F3d 634 [2d Cir 1999]; Rickman v Bell, 131
F3d 1150 [6th Cir 1991] cert denied 523 US 1133 [1992] [defense
counsel acted as second prosecutor]; Tippins v Walker, 77 F3d
682, 686 [2d Cir 1996] [counsel slept through trial]; Harding v
Davis, 878 F2d 1341 [11th Cir 1989] [constructive denial where
counsel responded to defendant's displeasure of his
representation by remaining silent and inactive at trial until
replaced by the pro se defendant]; Jenkins v Coombe, 821 F2d 158,
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4  Nor, in my view, are such claims any different from the
generic ineffective assistance of counsel claims routinely
analyzed by state court's under this State's "meaningful
representation" standard as enunciated in Baldi.
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161 [2d Cir 1987] cert denied 484 US 1008 [1988] [filing cursory
five-page brief on appeal]).
That is not to say that a claim of constructive denial
could never apply to a class where the State effectively deprives
indigent defendants their right to counsel, only that the various
claims asserted by plaintiffs here do not rise to that level. 
Here, plaintiffs' complaint raises basic ineffective assistance
of counsel claims in the nature of Strickland4 (i.e., counsel was
unresponsive, waived important rights, failed to appear at
hearings, and was unprepared at court proceedings) and not the
egregious type of conduct found in Cronic.  Plaintiffs' mere
lumping together of 20 generic ineffective assistance of counsel
claims into one civil pleading does not ipso facto transform it
into one alleging a systemic denial of the right to counsel.  
Addressing plaintiffs' second theory--deprivation of
the right to counsel at the arraignment--the majority posits that
plaintiffs have stated a cognizable claim because 10 of them were
arraigned without counsel, and eight of those remained in custody
because they could not meet the bail that was set (maj op, at 8-
9).  
It is undisputed that a criminal defendant "'requires
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
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No. 66
5  CPL 180.10 addresses the procedure to be followed at a
defendant's arraignment on a felony complaint and the defendant's
rights in that regard.  Other provisions of the Criminal
Procedural Law contain similar requirements.  For instance, CPL
210.15 addresses the scenario where a defendant is arraigned on
an indictment; however, in the latter scenario, the court's
duties and responsibilities to apprise a defendant of his rights
when appearing without counsel are essentially the same.  CPL
170.10 addresses arraignments relative to an information,
simplified information, prosecutor's information or misdemeanor
complaint, and sets forth the procedures the court must follow in
apprising a defendant of his right to counsel and/or assignment
of counsel.   
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against him,'" (Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335, 345 [1963]
quoting Powell v Alabama, 287 US 45, 68-69 [1932]).  But the
majority's bare conclusion that any arraignment conducted without
the presence of counsel renders the proceedings a violation of
the Sixth Amendment, flies in the face of reality.
The framework of CPL article 180.00 illustrates this
point.5  That provision presupposes that a criminal defendant,
upon arraignment, may not have yet retained counsel or, due to
indigency, requires the appointment of one.  CPL 180.10 mandates
that, in addition to apprising him of, and furnishing him with, a
copy of the charges against him (see CPL 180.10 [1]), the court
must also inform an unrepresented defendant that he is entitled
to, among other things, "an adjournment for the purpose of
obtaining counsel" (CPL 180.10 [3]) and the appointment of
counsel by the court if "he is financially unable to obtain the
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No. 66
6  Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States has
favorably cited to CPL 180.10 in support of its observation that
New York is one of the 43 States that "take[s] the first step
toward appointing counsel 'before, at or just after initial
appearance'" (Rothgery v Gillespie County, 128 S.Ct. 2578, 2586-
2587 n14 [2008]).  
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same" (CPL 180.10 [3] [c]).6  The court must also give the
defendant the opportunity to avail himself of those rights and
"must itself take such affirmative action as is necessary to
effectuate them" (CPL 180.10 [4]).  This statute is a
prophylactic one whose purpose is to protect a defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights because, even in a situation where a defendant
chooses to go forward without counsel, "the court must permit him
to do so if it is satisfied that he made such decision with the
knowledge and significance thereof" and, in a situation where it
is not so satisfied, may decide not to proceed until defendant
obtains or is appointed counsel (CPL 180.10 [5]).
Giving plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable
inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), the
complaint nevertheless fails to state a cause of action for the
deprivation of the right to counsel at arraignment.  One reason
is that there is no allegation that the failure to have counsel
at one's first court appearance had an adverse effect on the
criminal proceedings.  The Second Circuit has rejected the
assertion "that the absence of counsel upon arraignment is an
inflexible, per se violation of the Sixth Amendment" (United
States ex rel. Caccio v Fay, 350 F2d 214, 215 [2d Cir 1965]). 
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No. 66
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Where a criminal defendant is arraigned without the presence of
counsel and pleads not guilty--or the court enters a not guilty
plea on his behalf--there is no Sixth Amendment violation (see
United States ex rel. Combs v Denno, 357 F2d 809, 812 [2d Cir
1966]; United States ex rel Hussey v Fay, 220 FSupp 562 [SDNY
1963]; see also Holland v Allard, 2005 WL 2786909 [EDNY 2005]). 
The explanation as to why this is so is simple:
"Under New York law, a defendant suffers no .
. . prejudice [by the imposition of a not
guilty plea on arraignment without benefit of
counsel], for whatever counsel could have
done upon arraignment on defendant's behalf,
counsel were free to do thereafter.  There is
nothing in New York law which in any way
prevents counsel later taking advantage of
every opportunity or defense which was
originally available to a defendant upon his
initial arraignment" (Hussey, 220 FSupp at
563 citing People v Combs, 19 AD2d 639, 640
[2d Dept 1963]).
As pleaded, none of the 10 plaintiffs arraigned without
counsel entered guilty pleas and, indeed, in compliance with the
strictures of CPL 180.10, all met with counsel shortly after the
arraignment.  Nor is there any claim that the absence of counsel
prejudiced these plaintiffs (cf. White v Maryland, 373 US 59
[1963] [defendant, at initial proceeding without counsel, pleaded
guilty without the knowledge that even if that plea was vacated
after counsel was appointed, it was still admissible at trial,
such that lack of counsel at initial proceeding required reversal
of conviction]; Hamilton v Alabama, 368 US 52 [1961] [denial of
counsel at arraignment was reversible error where, under Alabama
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No. 66
7  The majority observes that a bail hearing is a critical
stage of the criminal process (maj op, 10).  While that may be a
correct statement of the law, it has little application to these
facts, as none of these plaintiffs asserts that they were forced
to participate in a bail hearing without the aid of counsel.
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law, certain defenses had to be asserted during that proceeding
or could have been "irretrievably lost"]).  
The majority implies that the complaint pleads a Gideon
violation because certain of the plaintiffs were not represented
when the court arranged for the imposition of bail at the
arraignment (see CPL 170.10 [7]; 180.20 [6]; 210.15 [6]).7  Quite
often this initial appearance inures to the benefit of defendant
who may be released on his own recognizance or on manageable bail
within hours of arrest.  The only substantive allegations
plaintiffs make relative to bail is that assigned counsel failed
to advocate for lower bail at the arraignment or move for a bail
reduction post-arraignment.  If anything, the complaint alleges a
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel under the federal or
state standard, but the majority has rejected such a claim in
this litigation (maj op, 5-7). 
Finally, the majority notes that plaintiffs do not seek
relief within the context of their own criminal cases, and
therefore allowing plaintiffs to proceed on their claims "would
[not] impede the orderly progress of [the] underlying criminal
actions," asserting that even if plaintiffs' claims are found to
be meritorious after trial they would not be entitled to a
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No. 66
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vacatur of their criminal convictions (maj op, 14-15; n6).  In my
view, if plaintiffs are able to establish a violation of Gideon,
they should not be foreclosed from seeking a remedy; if
plaintiffs are willing to waive any remedy to which they may be
entitled, as they are doing here, then I see no reason why the
courts have any business adjudicating this matter.
While the perfect system of justice is beyond human
attainment, plaintiff's frustration with the deficiencies in the
present indigent defense system is understandable.  Legal
services for the indigent have routinely been underfunded, and
appointed counsel are all too often overworked and confronted
with excessive caseloads, which affects the amount of time
counsel may spend with any given client.  Many, if not all, of
plaintiffs' grievances have been acknowledged in the Kaye
Commission Report, which is implicitly addressed--as it should
be--to the Legislature, the proper forum for weighing proposals
to enhance indigent defense services in New York.  This complaint
is, at heart, an attempt to convert what are properly policy
questions for the Legislature into constitutional claims for the
courts. 
Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the Appellate
Division.
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*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order modified, without costs, by reinstating the complaint in
accordance with the opinion herein and remitting the case to the
Appellate Division, Third Department, for consideration of issues
raised but not determined on the appeal to that court, and, as so
modified, affirmed.  Opinion by Chief Judge Lippman.  Judges
Ciparick, Graffeo and Jones concur.  Judge Pigott dissents and
votes to affirm in an opinion in which Judges Read and Smith
concur.
Decided May 6, 2010