Case Title: Grant v. Butler

Citation: 590 So. 2d 254

Docket Number: 1901592

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1991-11-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
590 So. 2d 254 (1991)
James N. GRANT and Barbara A. Grant
v.
Howard BUTLER, et al.
1901592.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
November 22, 1991.
*255 John A. Wilmer and Walter A. Kelley of Wilmer & Shepard, P.A., Huntsville, for appellants.
Julian D. Butler and R. David Proctor of Sirote & Permutt, P.C., Huntsville, for appellees.
John Richard Carrigan of Balch & Bingham, Birmingham, for amicus curiae Birmingham Area Chamber of Commerce.
HOUSTON, Justice.
The plaintiffs, James N. Grant and his wife, Barbara A. Grant, appeal from the dismissal of those portions of their complaint claiming damages for an alleged wrongful termination of employment. We affirm.
The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the defendants, Howard Butler, Mary Jane Butler, Jack Butler, and Butler Imports, Inc. (all hereintogether referred to as "the company"), wrongfully terminated their employment because they had reported certain hazardous conditions that existed in the company's Huntsville warehouse to the Huntsville Fire Department and to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"). The plaintiffs sought to recover both compensatory and punitive damages in tort for the alleged bad faith breach of an implied "covenant of good faith and fair dealing" (count three) and for the alleged denial "of [their] right to act in the interest of public health, safety, and welfare" (count four).[1] In essence, the plaintiffs sought to recover damages in tort under the theory that the defendants had acted in bad faith in terminating their employment or, in the alternative, under the theory that the termination of their employment was in contravention of the public policy of this state. As to counts three and four, the trial court granted the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6), Ala.R.Civ.P., motion to dismiss, ruling that those counts failed to state claims that were cognizable under Alabama law. This appeal followed.
The standard by which the plaintiffs' complaint in this case must be reviewed is well established:
Greene County Board of Education v. Bailey, 586 So. 2d 893 (Ala.1991), quoting *256 Fontenot v. Bramlett, 470 So. 2d 669, 671 (Ala.1985). (Emphasis added.)
Although every contract contains either an express or an implied covenant that the parties will act in good faith in performing the contract, in Alabama only insurance contracts give rise to a duty imposed by law on which a tort claim for bad faith performance can be based. We have consistently declined in the past, and we decline again today, to extend to the area of general contract law the tort of bad faith that we have recognized in the context of insurance contract cases. See Harrell v. Reynolds Metals Co., 495 So. 2d 1381, 1388 (Ala.1986). Because the plaintiffs in this case sought to recover in tort under Alabama law for the bad faith breach of their employment contract, the trial court properly dismissed count three.
The employee-at-will doctrine, first recognized in this state 100 years ago in Howard v. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry., 91 Ala. 268, 8 So. 868 (1891), provides that an employment contract terminable at the will of either the employer or the employee may be terminated by either party at any time with or without cause. Through the years, this Court has steadfastly declined to modify the employee-at-will doctrine by recognizing a cause of action sounding in tort for the wrongful termination of an employment contract when the employer's actions were in contravention of this state's public policy, but has chosen, instead, to rely upon legislative action to ameliorate some of the harshness of the employee-at-will doctrine. See, e.g., McClain v. Birmingham Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 578 So. 2d 1299 (Ala. 1991); Salter v. Alfa Ins. Co., 561 So. 2d 1050 (Ala.1990), and the cases cited therein. Concurring specially in Salter, Chief Justice Hornsby, joined by Justice Shores, most eloquently made the case for the judicial creation of a public-policy-based remedy for employees who may be subjected to "employment blackmail" for doing or not doing certain acts. He aptly noted that "[i]t is beyond question that the employment-at-will rule allows employers to effectively pressure employees to commit wrongful or illegal acts through the threat of dismissal for not complying with the employee's demands." 561 So. 2d  at 1055. However, all of the Justices who voted in Salter recognized that Salter did not present facts that would justify the creation of a "public policy exception" to the employee-at-will doctrine.
The plaintiffs insist that the facts of the present case would support the creation of a public-policy-based remedy, such as the one discussed by Chief Justice Hornsby in Salter. Although we recognize that it may become necessary for this Court to adopt a limited public-policy-based tort remedy for wrongfully terminated employees, this case, like Salter, does not present facts that would justify the judicial creation of such a remedy. Faced with the question whether it should create a new tort remedy for employees who were terminated by their employers for reporting hazardous conditions in the workplace, the Supreme Court of Oregon, in Walsh v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 278 Or. 347, 563 P.2d 1205, 1208-09 (1977), held:
We find the rationale of the Supreme Court of Oregon to be persuasive. In the present case, the plaintiffs had an adequate remedy under the anti-retaliation provision of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c), which provides:
This remedy is adequate to protect both the public's interest in maintaining safe conditions in the workplace (i.e., the protections afforded employees under the statute encourage employees to report safety and health violations to OSHA, which is charged with the responsibility of investigating those reports, eliminating any violations, and, if necessary, punishing employers for those violations in accordance with federal law) and the interests of employees who are discharged for complaining to OSHA about safety and health problems in the workplace (i.e., the statute provides for "all appropriate relief including rehiring or reinstatement of the employee to his former position with back pay"). Therefore, we find it unnecessary to create a new tort remedy to cover this kind of situation. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed count four.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment dismissing counts three and four is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and SHORES and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, J., concurs in the result.
[1]  The plaintiffs' complaint also claimed damages for breach of contract, and that claim remains pending below. The trial court certified its judgment dismissing counts three and four as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala.R.Civ.P.
[2]  The record does not indicate whether the plaintiffs sought a remedy under this federal statute.