Case Title: Parker v. Harris Pine Mills, Inc.

Citation: 206 Or. 187, 291 P.2d 709

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1955-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Reversed and remanded December 30, 1955.
*189 John F. Kilkenny argued the cause for appellant. On the briefs were Kilkenny & Fabre, of Pendleton.
Robert L. Dressler, of Portland, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief was Willis A. West, of Portland.
Before WARNER, Chief Justice, and TOOZE, BRAND and LATOURETTE, Justices.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TOOZE, J.
This is an action to recover damages for alleged breaches of certain provisions of a timber deed, brought by Laura Johnson Parker, as plaintiff, against Harris Pine Mills, Inc., as defendant. A verdict in favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the sum of $26,860 was returned by the jury, and judgment was entered accordingly. Defendant appeals.
Defendant is an Oregon corporation engaged in the timber business. Plaintiff is the owner of approximately 9,000 acres of land located in townships 2 and 3 south, range 32 east, of the Willamette meridian, Umatilla county, Oregon, and is engaged in the livestock business thereon, herding and grazing cattle and sheep.
On or about July 23, 1943, plaintiff executed and delivered to defendant a timber deed conveying all the *190 merchantable timber on her ranch to defendant. The instrument of conveyance was in the form of a warranty deed and gave the grantee the right to remove the timber at its pleasure at any time within the succeeding 20 years and to construct necessary roads to accomplish its purposes. The deed also imposed certain obligations upon the grantee which are stated in the conveyance as follows:
During 1952 and 1953 the defendant entered a portion of the premises known as the Stanley Creek range, which contains approximately 3,600 acres in all, and cut timber and removed logs therefrom. Although the timber deed describes thousands of acres of land, yet the evidence shows that the timber in this area grows in the canyons or along the creeks. The cut-over area was approximately 1,000 acres, while the land affected by treetops, limbs, and other debris incident to the logging operations would be 400 acres.
The evidence on behalf of plaintiff shows that large sections of the line fences were destroyed by defendant during the logging operations, and that neither gates nor cattle guards were constructed to prevent the escape from the premises of plaintiff's livestock. The evidence also discloses that the streams were filled with debris and the roads damaged by defendant. Furthermore, up to the commencement of this action and even as late as the date of the second amended complaint, November 30, 1953, defendant had failed to remove any of the slashings which had accumulated upon the ground in the logged-off area, with the result that about 400 acres of the Stanley Creek range were covered with debris.
The allegations of the complaint respecting damages are as follows:
The jury awarded damages in a lump sum in the full amount claimed in the complaint. From the complaint, the instructions of the court, and the course which the entire trial followed, it is clear that of the total amount awarded as damages, $17,500 represented the cost of disposal of the slashings, and $9,360, the value of loss of use of the premises. The total amount of the verdict, $26,860, is the sum reached by adding together the several specific amounts alleged in paragraphs VIII, IX, and X of the complaint, supra.
The award for loss of use was arrived at by computing the reasonable rental value of the 3,600 acres as a cattle ranch for two years which, according to evidence produced, gave a figure of $7,200, and the remaining $2,160 was the value placed on its use in the sheep operation for the same length of time. This verdict was reached under plaintiff's theory that the destruction of the fences, roads, and the regular flow *194 of streams on the 1,000 acres actually logged over, and the covering of 400 acres of this with slashings and other debris resulted in depriving her of the use of the entire Stanley Creek range.
The $17,500 allowed for cost of disposal of the slashings was based upon testimony by plaintiff's witness Schroeder that six to seven million board feet of timber were taken by defendant from plaintiff's lands, and that the reasonable cost of hand piling and burning the slashings therefrom would be between $2 to $2.50 per thousand feet of timber cut. The jury apparently adopted the largest of these figures in both instances, allowing plaintiff $2.50 per thousand feet on a total of seven million feet. Defendant's office records showed a total of 4,080,435 board feet cut and removed from the property.
Defendant objected to the testimony of the witness as the basis of allowing damages for cost of removal of the slashings upon the ground that it was speculative and mere guess work. Obviously, the figures "six to seven million feet", and "$2.00 to $2.50 per thousand feet" are not definite and certain; they are speculative. The jury was left to speculate whether the actual amount removed was six million feet or any other amount in excess of that up to seven million feet, and also as to the true cost of removal. The purely speculative character of Schroeder's testimony is well illustrated by the following quotations from the record.
On direct examination the witness was asked:
Immediately following the above testimony and on cross-examination the witness testified as follows:
A motion to strike the testimony of the witness was made by defendant and overruled by the court. The witness then further testified on cross-examination as follows:
1. In every case actual damages sustained must be established by evidence upon which their existence and amount may be determined with reasonable certainty. Speculative damages are never allowed. Schroeder testified that needle burning of slashings would cost $1 per thousand feet of timber cut. There was no attempt made to segregate that portion of the debris which might be disposed of by needle burning, the maximum required by state statute (ORS 477.242), from that which would require hand piling in order to dispose of it. The $2 to $2.50 figure was based on hand piling. Neither was any account taken of the slashings already disposed of by defendant, nor of the amount of debris caused by natural windfalls.
In Porter Const. Co. v. Berry et al., 136 Or 80, 93, 298 P 179, Mr. Justice ROSSMAN, speaking for the court, said:
Also see Gardner v. Dollina, 206 Or 1, 288 P2d 796, 816; Wintersteen v. Semler, 197 Or 601, 636, 250 P2d 420, 255 P2d 138; Becker v. Tillamook Bay Lumber Co., 194 Or 134, 142, 240 P2d 237.
2. Before giving further consideration to the question of damages, we must ascertain and determine the duties owed by defendant to plaintiff under the terms of the timber deed. That requires a construction of the *198 contract obligations. The contract is to be construed as a whole, and the intention of the parties arrived at from the terms of the deed.
3. At the outset, it must be kept in mind that the deed stresses the livestock operations of the plaintiff. Clearly, it was the intent of the parties that those operations should not be interfered with any more than was reasonably necessary to permit the logging to be done in removal of the timber. Yet it is manifest that some interference with the livestock business of plaintiff would be necessary, and this interference is anticipated by the very terms of the deed. We construe such interference to be a reasonable interference, having in mind the nature of logging operations. In considering any loss of use of the premises for livestock purposes, this right of defendant to interfere reasonably with such business must be taken into consideration.
4. The provision in the deed respecting the duties of defendant as to line fences, cattle guards, and gates is very specific and wholly unambiguous and speaks for itself. No right to a reasonable interference with the livestock operations of plaintiff can relieve the defendant of its definite obligations in this regard.
The principal dispute between the parties arises out of the requirement that defendant make a proper disposal of the slashings and other debris deposited on the premises as a result of its logging operations. We will first consider the duty owed by defendant with respect to such disposal. The deed provides:
5. We interpret this provision to mean that defendant will dispose of all the slashings and other debris deposited on the premises as the result of its logging operations. It might accomplish this by burning, or in any other feasible manner, provided that if it adopted burning as the method of disposal, it would comply with the rules and regulations of the state of Oregon and of the United States in such cases made and provided. These rules and regulations are directed to fire hazards. ORS 477.242; ORS 477.244. ORS 477.242 requires the annual burning of slashings, but such burning must be done under permit and not between April 1 and December 31 of any year. ORS 477.152. Defendant, however, was given the option to burn the slashings as a method of disposal. Therefore, the agreement contemplated that such burning might and should be done only at the times permitted by law. During the periods of time when burning was not permitted under the statute, the presence of the slashings on the premises was permissible, and plaintiff could complain of no loss of use of her property during such periods on account thereof.
6. The deed provides that the defendant shall properly dispose of the slashings. Defendant contends that to "properly dispose of" means to make a reasonable disposition thereof. We do not so interpret the contract, because the agreement requires a disposal of all the slashings and other debris, and that means a complete disposal. The word "properly" has reference to the requirements of the statute respecting the time and method of burning, when burning is used as the means of disposal. Of course, under the statute needle burning only is required in order to prevent fire *200 hazards, but under the terms of the deed much more is demanded. Needle burning will not completely dispose of the slashings, so mere compliance with the provisions of the statute would not discharge the obligation owed by defendant under the agreement. That the word "properly" relates to the time and method of burning is further demonstrated by the use of the word "proper" in connection with the "season of the year". Burning can be done only "at the proper season of the year." (Italics ours.) It is manifest that the season of the year would have nothing whatever to do with any method of disposal other than burning.
Defendant took exception to the following instructions given by the court:
*202 We are of the opinion that the learned trial judge correctly stated the law in these instructions, and that his interpretation of the contractual duty owed by defendant to dispose of the slashings was correct. However, as shall later appear, the giving of those instructions was improper in this case because of a lack of basis therefor in the complaint.
The second sentence of the paragraph of the deed just discussed reads as follows:
As to this portion of the deed, defendant in its brief presents the following argument:
7. Had defendant's contractual duty been limited to a disposal of the slashings and other debris at the time and in the manner required by the statute, then there would have been merit in defendant's contentions. But, as before pointed out, defendant's obligation went much further than that; it was required to make a complete disposal by burning or other method. Reading the paragraph as a whole, it is evident that the purpose of the indemnity clause was to protect the plaintiff, as owner of the property, from any loss or damage occasioned third parties by such disposal, and for which she might be held liable under the law. This would include her liability to the state, if any, for her failure as owner to see that the statute was complied with as to the annual burning of slashings. Of course, such clause would not become operative until a loss or damage occurred and plaintiff's legal liability therefor was determined. We are of the opinion that the indemnity clause did not, nor was it the intention of the parties that it should, in any manner modify *204 the positive duty of defendant to dispose of all the slashings and other debris by burning or otherwise.
8. We shall now consider the question of damages. The evidence conclusively shows that there was no permanent injury to the land caused by any alleged wrongful acts of the defendant. Such injuries as may have occurred are temporary in nature. In such circumstances what is the proper measure of damages?
In 25 CJS 604, Damages, § 84, the following rules are stated:
*205 9, 10. In other words, for a breach of the agreement on defendant's part to dispose of the slashings and other debris as required, plaintiff was entitled to recover the reasonable cost of removing such part thereof as defendant failed to dispose of, and also for such loss of use of the premises, if any, as she may have sustained during the period of time when such slashings and other debris wrongfully remained undisposed of and proximately caused by their presence on the land, subject to a duty on her part to use reasonable efforts to mitigate the damages by herself restoring the premises to their original condition and thereby making them available for the continuation of her livestock business thereon. 25 CJS 502, Damages, § 34. However, this duty to mitigate the damages is not applicable where the party whose duty it is primarily to perform a contract "has equal opportunity for performance and equal knowledge of the consequences of nonperformance." In such cases, while the contract is subsisting and in force, such party cannot be heard to say that plaintiff might have performed for him. 25 CJS 505, Damages, § 34.
The same measure of damages applies also to the alleged breach of the contract on the part of defendant respecting line fences, gates, and cattle guards. The cost of restoration, plus any loss of use of the premises during the time defendant's default continued, and proximately caused by such default, are matters for consideration in fixing damages. 15 Am Jur 519, Damages, § 110.
11. In any event, the evidence must disclose the damages sustained with reasonable certainty, and they must be shown to be the proximate result of defendant's wrongful acts in violation of its contractual duties. In Allen et ux. v. McCormick, 193 Or 604, 612, 238 P2d *206 220, we quoted with approval the following from 15 Am Jur 413, Damages, § 22:
Moreover, if plaintiff lost any livestock as the result of defendant's failure to maintain the line fences, gates, and cattle guards as required, the reasonable value thereof would also be a proper item of damage. Furthermore, if livestock escaped from the premises due to defendant's failure to comply with the contract respecting the line fences, etc., and were captured and returned by plaintiff, the expenses incident thereto would also be a proper item of damage.
On the trial of the instant case, plaintiff sought to establish a loss of use of the entire Stanley Creek range of 3,600 acres for a period of two years as above noted. However, her own evidence revealed that during the time in question she ran 200 head of sheep under the control of a sheepherder on this particular land, and also "a few head of cattle." Thus under her own testimony, she had some use of the premises for livestock purposes during the time of which complaint is made. "A few head of cattle" might mean anything; ten, twenty, *207 fifty, one-hundred, or two-hundred head might well be within the limits of "a few head of cattle." Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Robinson, 157 Ind 414, 61 NE 936; Allen v. Kirwan, 159 Pa St 612, 28 A 495; Klann v. Minn, 161 Wis 517, 154 NW 996. The testimony discloses that 200 head of cattle was the limit for the range in question. Plaintiff cannot use the premises for her livestock business and at the same time claim damages from defendant for its full loss of use. "You cannot sell the cow and have the milk too." It is manifest from the record that the loss of use, if any, was partial only and not complete. To entitle plaintiff to damages for such partial loss of use, the evidence should establish with certainty the extent thereof, and defendant's responsibility therefor.
We come now to a consideration of the allegations of the complaint to determine if they present a proper statement of plaintiff's case in accordance with the foregoing principles. We have said that defendant's wrongful actions entitled plaintiff to recover the cost of repair and restoration and the value of the use of the premises for the time which the defendant denied it to her wrongfully. Undoubtedly this is what plaintiff had in mind during the course of the trial, and this is the measure adopted by the trial court and acted upon by the jury in returning its verdict.
In reading the complaint, however, it becomes obvious that such a case is not presented by the allegations therein. In fact it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the defendant, from a reading of this pleading alone, to determine just what the plaintiff actually had in mind as a basis for recovery. It contains references to particular breaches of the contract and to particular injuries caused thereby. It also presents a demand, ostensibly, for compensation for a *208 resulting diminished value of the freehold, for which the measure of damages would be the difference between the reasonable market value of the premises before and after the damage was done. Nowhere does plaintiff allege directly that a claim will be pressed for the loss of use of the range when the cause comes to trial.
12. It is true that the allegations are those which might properly be stated in connection with a claim for loss of use, but the difficulty with this complaint is that it did not go far enough. The pleader has failed to distinguish between what are termed by the law "general damages," those naturally and necessarily resulting from a breach of the contract, and "special damages," or those naturally but not necessarily resulting from the breach complained of. The rule is that the former may be pleaded generally, while the latter, if they are to be recovered at all, must be particularly or specially pleaded. Smith v. Pallay, 130 Or 282, 289, 279 P 279; 25 CJS 753, Damages, § 131c (1).
In 25 CJS 753, Damages, § 131c (1), supra, the rule is thus stated:
In reading the second amended complaint in this case the reason for the rule and its application are sharply illustrated. An allegation that fences were destroyed, that gates and cattle guards were not properly *209 installed, that cattle escaped, and that streams and roads were damaged presents facts upon which it would be concluded that the damage naturally and necessarily resulting therefrom would be the cost of correcting these deficiencies, and that is the claim which defendant was required, and no doubt prepared, to meet. It would not necessarily result that plaintiff would lose the use of her premises entirely, although that might be a natural result of such wrongful acts. Thus defendant no doubt believed, and was entitled to believe, that the claim being a general one only, the damages sought would be general ones. However, the recovery permitted under the allegations of paragraphs VII and VIII of the complaint, supra, was for the loss of use of the premises which was an element of special damage. The defendant was under no obligation to defend against such a claim. Evidence of that character, repeatedly objected to by defendant, was therefore improperly received.
By giving a liberal construction to the allegations of paragraph X of the complaint, supra, we might possibly conclude that they are sufficient for the purpose of claiming damages in the sum of $2,160 for loss of use. However, that is more or less a strained construction. But if plaintiff actually lost the use of her premises because of the wrongful acts of defendant as alleged, the value of her property would be diminished to the extent of the reasonable rental value thereof during the period of time defendant's default continued. Yet it is but fair to state that as a claim for "loss of use", the allegations as to the diminishing of the value of plaintiff's property are misleading. On the face of the pleading, one would naturally conclude that a permanent injury to the freehold was being alleged and a claim for damages was being made *210 on account thereof, and that is the view taken by defendant. If loss of use is plaintiff's theory, then it is clear that the allegation should be made more definite and certain.
What we have said with respect to paragraph X of the complaint applies with equal force to paragraph IX thereof, supra. Under paragraph IX, the plaintiff speaks about the value of her property being diminished in the sum of $17,500, claim for which is made and recovery for which sum was had. In that regard, she pleaded special damages. Yet the proof related exclusively to the costs of disposal of the slashings and other debris remaining on the ground, items of general damage. The allegations contained in paragraph IX expressly negate any claim other than one either for temporary or for permanent injury to the freehold. This is made clear by the following part of paragraph IX:
There is not the remotest suggestion in paragraph IX that on the trial general damages in the sum of $17,500 would be claimed as the cost of restoring the premises to their former condition. Although under a proper pleading such damages would have been recoverable (provided, of course, that such costs did not exceed in amount the reasonable value of the premises involved), yet it is manifest that under the pleading *211 in this case they were not; and evidence received pertaining thereto was improper, and instructions based thereon constituted error.
13. Upon the trial plaintiff stated that she was making no claim of any permanent injury to the freehold, but was claiming only for loss of use and the costs incident to the removal of the slashings and debris. But her claims on the trial were inconsistent with her pleadings and unquestionably took defendant by surprise. The judgment in this case must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trail, but in the light of all the facts and circumstances existing, we are of the opinion that plaintiff should be permitted to apply to the trial court for leave to amend her complaint.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for new trial.