Case Title: Adams v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 124, 2010

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
EVAN ADAMS,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  No. 124, 2010 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  Court Below – Family Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Case No. 0901008717 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
   Submitted:  November 3, 2010 
 
 
 
 
      Decided:  December 20, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, and RIDGELY, 
Justices, and WITHAM, Judge,1 constituting the Court en Banc 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 20th day of December 2010, it appears to the Court that: 
1) 
The defendant-appellant, Evan Adams (“Adams”), a juvenile, 
entered a plea to Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Second Degree, a felony, 
pursuant to title 11, section 768 of the Delaware Code.  The Family Court 
sentenced Adams to a Level IV placement at Stetson School, a residential 
sex offender treatment program, for a period of eighteen months.  The 
Family Court denied Adams’ Petition for Relief From Registration as a Sex 
Offender and designated him as a Tier II sex offender.  Adams filed a 
                                          
 
1 Sitting by designation pursuant to Del. Const. art. IV, § 12 and Supr. Ct. R. 2 and 4.  
 
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motion for clarification.  The Family Court issued a decision that held it 
does not have any discretion to relieve a juvenile adjudicated delinquent of a 
felony-level sex offense from registration.   
2) 
Adams has raised five issues in this appeal:  first, he is eligible 
to seek relief from registration as a sex offender based on the legislative 
changes in the wording of subsection (6) of title 11, section 4121(d) of the 
Delaware Code; second, the classification, notification, and registration 
provisions of title 11, sections 4120 and 4121 as applied to juvenile 
adjudications violate constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual 
punishments under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and Article I section 11 of the Delaware Constitution; 
third, the classification, notification, and registration provisions of title 11, 
sections 4120 and 4121 as applied to juvenile sex offender adjudications 
violate the Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and the Due Process Clause under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Article I, section 7 of the Delaware Constitution; fourth, 
the classification, notification, and registration provisions of title 11, 
sections 4120 and 4121 as applied to juvenile sex offender adjudications 
violate the separation of powers; and fifth, the provisions under title 11, 
section 4121(d)(6) which set out persons who can seek relief from sex 
 
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offender registration violate Due Process under the United States 
Constitution and Article I, section 9 of the Delaware Constitution since it is 
impermissibly vague.   
 
3) 
Subsection 4121(d)(6) of title 11, currently provides: 
Notwithstanding any provision in this section or in § 4120 of 
this title to the contrary, any person who would otherwise be 
designated as a sex offender pursuant to this section and to § 
4120 of this title may petition the sentencing Court for relief 
from such designation, and from all obligations imposed by this 
section and § 4120 of this title if: 
 
a. 
The Tier II or Tier III offense for which the person 
was convicted was a misdemeanor and the victim was not 
a child under 13 years of age; and 
b. 
The person has not previously been convicted of a 
violent felony, or any other offense set forth in paragraph 
(a)(4) of this section, or of any offense specified in the 
laws of another state, the United States, or any territory 
of the United States, or any offense in a foreign 
jurisdiction which is the same as, or equivalent to, such 
offenses; and 
c. 
The 
sentencing 
court 
determines 
by 
a 
preponderance of the evidence that such person is not 
likely to pose a threat to public safety if released from the 
obligations imposed by this section, and by § 4120 of this 
title. 
 
Notwithstanding anything in this paragraph to the contrary, no 
person designated as a Tier II or Tier III sex offender shall be 
afforded relief from designation as a sex offender if the victim 
of any of the offenses for which the person was convicted were 
less than 12 years old at the time of the crime, unless the person 
was also less than 18 years old at the time of the crime in which 
case the prohibition set forth in this sentence shall not apply . . .2 
                                          
 
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4121(d)(6).  
 
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4) 
The only issue that Adams raised in the Family Court is 
whether he qualifies for relief from sex offender registration under the 
exception in section 4121(d)(6).  In the Family Court, Adams did not raise 
any of the arguments he now presents that section 4121(d)(6) is in violation 
of the state and federal constitutions.  This Court reviews issues not 
presented to the Family Court for plain error.3  Plain error is error “so clearly 
prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of 
the trial process.”4  We decline to review Adams’ unpreserved constitutional 
claims of error because the vagueness issue is without merit and Adams’ 
other contentions are controlled by the prior decisions of this Court in 
Helman,5 Clark,6 and Coleman.7   
5) 
Having considered this matter after oral argument and on the 
briefs filed by the parties, the Court has determined that the final judgment 
of the Family Court should be affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons 
assigned by the Family Court in its decision dated February 4, 2010. 
                                          
 
3 Supr. Ct. Rule 8; Hardin v. State, 844 A.2d 982, 990 (Del. 2004).  
4  Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
5 Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058 (Del. 2001). 
6 Clark v. State, 2008 WL 3906890 (Del. Sept. 4, 2008).  
7 Coleman v. State, 729 A.2d 847 (Del. 1999). 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment 
of the Family Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
Justice