Case Title: James F. Ruble v. State of Indiana

Citation: 

Docket Number: 18S04-0608-CR-304

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2007-01-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Stan G. Wyrick 
Steve Carter 
Muncie, Indiana 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
Michael G. Worden 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 18S04-0608-CR-304 
 
JAMES F. RUBLE, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Delaware Circuit Court, No. 18C03-0407-FC-25 
The Honorable Robert L. Barnet, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 18A04-0507-CR-391 
_________________________________ 
 
January 3, 2007 
 
Shepard, Chief Justice. 
 
Appellant James F. Ruble pled guilty to operating a vehicle after his driving privileges 
had been suspended for life, a class C felony.  On appeal, he has contended that the trial court 
should have assigned him to serve his sentence through forensic diversion.  The Court of 
Appeals held that the Indiana Code mandates he be assigned to diversion, and reversed.  We 
conclude otherwise and affirm the trial court. 
 
 
 
The underlying facts reveal that on June 25, 2004, an officer of the Muncie Police 
Department ordered Ruble to halt his vehicle in the course of a traffic stop.  Instead, Ruble drove 
away, eventually wrecked the vehicle, and fled on foot. 
 
 
The State charged Ruble in multiple counts for this event.  The parties subsequently 
tendered a plea agreement that provided for dismissal of all but the present class C felony.  The 
agreement left sentencing to the discretion of the trial court, with a cap of two years executed 
time. 
 
 
The trial court ordered preparation of a pre-sentence report and agreed to Ruble’s request 
that he be evaluated for possible referral to the local Forensic Diversion Program, created under 
authority of Ind. Code Ann. ch. 11-12-3.7 (West 2006).  Forensic Diversion adds to the range of 
misdemeanor and felony dispositions by authorizing suspended sentences conditioned on 
treatment for mental illness or addictive disorders. 
 
The court conducted a sentencing hearing.  The director of the county’s Community 
Corrections program reported that Ruble “definitely has a substance abuse problem” and that the 
Forensic Diversion Program “would have no problem” with his participation.  (Tr. at 64-65.)  
Ruble asked the court to place him in Forensic Diversion.  The State said it had no objection to 
Forensic Diversion, but it requested that Ruble be ordered to serve some executed time. 
 
 
Explaining its sentence, the trial court found a number of mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances.  As mitigators, it noted Ruble’s decision to plead guilty, the fact that he 
maintained gainful employment and attempted to meet his family responsibilities, that long-term 
incarceration would be harmful to his children, and that Ruble retained some support among 
family and friends.  As aggravators, the court noted a history of contact with the criminal justice 
system going back to 1988, a record of fifteen misdemeanor convictions and one felony 
conviction, and three prior placements on probation.  It concluded that earlier attempts at 
probation and correctional treatment had not been successful.  It sentenced Ruble to five years, 
suspending three. 
 
 
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The Court of Appeals reversed.  It held that the Indiana Code requires a trial court to 
place on Forensic Diversion any person who meets the statutory eligibility criteria.  Ruble v. 
State, 849 N.E.2d 165, 169-70 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), vacated.  To be “eligible,” an offender must 
have an addictive disorder or a mental illness meeting diagnostic criteria in the latest edition of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; offenders being sentenced for violent 
crimes or drug dealing offenses, and those convicted for a violent offense in the previous ten 
years are not eligible.  Ind. Code Ann. § 11-12-3.7-12(a) (West 2006).  The Court of Appeals 
directed the trial court to place Ruble on Forensic Diversion for at least part of his sentence.  We 
granted transfer. 
 
 
The conclusion that Forensic Diversion is mandatory rested on part of section 12 of the 
Forensic Diversion statute that says: “If the person has been convicted of an offense that may be 
suspended, the court shall suspend all or a portion of the person’s sentence” and make successful 
completion of Forensic Diversion a condition of probation.  Ind. Code Ann. § 11-12-3.7-12(b) 
(West 2006) (emphasis added).  Similarly, it provides that when the person has been “convicted 
of an offense that is nonsuspendible, the court shall order the execution of the nonsuspendible 
sentence and stay execution of all or part.”  Ind. Code Ann. § 11-12-3.7-12(c) (West 2006). 
 
 
We conclude that the General Assembly did not intend mandatory suspension and referral 
of all persons meeting the minimum criteria in section 12 for two reasons, one based in statutory 
language and the other based on probable intent. 
 
 
First, because the idea of Forensic Diversion is to create additional treatment-based 
alternatives to incarceration, the legislature understandably elected to exempt sentences ordering 
such diversion from the provisions in Title 35 that mandate nonsuspendible sentences for certain 
crimes.  Those exemptions, also a part of the legislation creating Forensic Diversion, provide: 
“With respect to the following crimes listed in this subsection, the court may suspend only that 
part of the sentence that is in excess of the minimum sentence, unless the court has approved 
placement of the offender in a forensic diversion program under IC 11-12-3.7.”  Ind. Code Ann. 
§ 35-50-2-2(b) (West 2006). 
 
 
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The Forensic Diversion provisions in Title 11 and Title 35 complement each other only if 
they are understood as meaning that when a trial court approves placement of an offender on 
Forensic Diversion, it shall suspend at least a part of the sentence to probation and make 
successful completion of Forensic Diversion a condition of probation. 
 
 
Second, reading these two sections in Titles 11 and 35 without any reference to each 
other, and holding that the General Assembly made suspension and participation mandatory for 
all persons meeting the minimum Forensic Diversion criteria would create other anomalies the 
legislature is unlikely to have intended.  To take one example, it would mean that the legislature 
commanded nonsuspendible sentences for offenders who resist law enforcement by using deadly 
weapons (in section 35-50-2-2(b)(4)(L)), but permitted part or all of the sentence for such 
offenders to be suspended or waived (in section 11-12-3.7-12).  It seems apparent that the 
General Assembly has been more purposeful than that. 
 
 
We thus conclude that the trial court had the authority to determine, based on an 
evaluation of Ruble’s suitability for diversion, as well as the nature of the offense and the nature 
of the offender, whether to order Ruble placed on Forensic Diversion.  The record before the trial 
court reflected three convictions for driving while intoxicated, multiple convictions for motor 
vehicle violations leading to a lifetime suspension, and the failure of past grants of probation.  It 
was within the court’s range of responsible discretion to determine that Ruble was not a suitable 
candidate. 
 
 
We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
 
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur. 
 
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