Case Title: New Jersey v.Miller

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2019-02-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the
Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.

                        State v. Michael D. Miller (A-70-17) (079342)

Argued November 28, 2018 -- Decided February 20, 2019

FERNANDEZ-VINA, J., writing for the Court.

        In this appeal, the Court first considers whether it is an abuse of discretion for a trial
court to apply aggravating factor one when sentencing a defendant convicted of possessing
and distributing child pornography. Second, the Court considers whether defendant Michael
Miller was appropriately sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment for his possession
and distribution of child pornography.

       Miller was convicted of possessing and distributing over 900 images and videos of
child pornography through the use of online peer-to-peer file-sharing programs. He was also
in possession of thirty-three CDs and DVDs, eleven of which contained photographs and
recordings of child pornography separate from those found on his computer.

        At Miller’s sentencing hearing, the trial judge applied aggravating factor one, the
nature and circumstances of the offense,  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1), because the pornography
possessed and distributed by Miller depicted the rape, penetration, and sexual assault of
extremely young children, at least one of whom was an infant. The court also applied
aggravating factor two, the gravity of harm to the victim; aggravating factor three, the risk
defendant will commit another offense; and aggravating factor nine, the need for deterrence.
The court applied mitigating factor seven, no prior criminal history, as the sole mitigating
factor. The court then concluded that it would not merge counts one and two together,
explaining that “[Miller]’s possession of the child pornography was not fleeting and was for
a substantial period of time. And his use of the child pornography [was] distinct from his
making the files available by way of the [p]eer-to-[p]eer programs.” The court ultimately
sentenced Miller to seven years’ imprisonment for the distribution charge and one year of
imprisonment for the possession charge. The court determined that the sentences must run
consecutively, reasoning that Miller’s crimes “were independent of one another, involv[ing]
separate acts committed at different times.”

        The Appellate Division reversed and remanded Miller’s sentence. The panel
concluded that the trial court “engaged in impermissible double-counting,” reasoning that
“[b]y its nature, child pornography inherently is especially heinous, cruel and depraved, and
[Miller]’s possession and distribution of it in this case was no different.”  449 N.J. Super. 460, 476 (App. Div. 2017). The panel asserted that, “under the specific facts presented” in
this case, Miller’s convictions for fourth-degree possession of child pornography and second-
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degree distribution of child pornography should have been merged. Id. at 477. The panel
opined that Miller’s “crimes were reasonably proximate in time and place, and [Miller’s] use
of the file-sharing programs was a necessary ingredient and [an] integral part of both his
possession” and his distribution of the child pornography. Ibid. The panel ultimately
affirmed Miller’s conviction but remanded the matter, directing the trial court to re-sentence
him without consideration of aggravating factor one, and to merge count one with count two.
Ibid.

       The Court granted the State’s petition for certification.  234 N.J. 1 (2018).

HELD: The Appellate Division’s opinion deprives trial judges of their discretion to make
nuanced assessments of the nature and circumstances of offenses involving child
pornography. Miller’s possession charge involved child pornographic material beyond that
involved in his distribution charge -- there was pornographic material in Miller’s possession
for an extended period of time that was not encompassed in the distribution charge. The
possession and distribution offenses were therefore distinct, and the trial court appropriately
determined that the offenses did not merge for sentencing purposes.

1. Aggravating factor one requires the trial court to consider “[t]he nature and circumstances
of the offense, and the role of the actor therein, including whether or not it was committed in
an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.”  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1). When it assesses
whether a defendant’s conduct was especially “heinous, cruel, or depraved,” a sentencing
court must scrupulously avoid double-counting facts that establish the elements of the
relevant offense. The Court has recognized that facts that established elements of a crime for
which a defendant is being sentenced should not be considered as aggravating circumstances
in determining that sentence. Nevertheless, a sentencing court may consider aggravating
facts showing that a defendant’s behavior extended to the extreme reaches of the prohibited
behavior. Thus, in appropriate cases, a sentencing court may justify the application of
aggravating factor one, without double-counting, by reference to the extraordinary brutality
involved in an offense. (pp. 17-19)

2. At the time Miller committed the relevant offenses in this case, the statute he violated
defined a “child” as any person under sixteen years old and prohibited the possession of
material depicting a child engaging in a “prohibited sexual act,” defined as “sexual
intercourse” and “nudity,” among other things.  N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4 (2012). At Miller’s
sentencing hearing, the court explained that the child pornography found on defendant’s
computer “depicted rape essentially, penetration, bondage, really horrific displays of . . .
cruel treatment to these children.” The extraordinary brutality depicted in defendant’s
pornography demonstrated that his possession and distribution of such content extended to
the extreme reaches of the behavior prohibited by  N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4. Further, the trial judge
appropriately considered the victims’ ages when applying aggravating factor one.  N.J.S.A.
2C:24-4 contained an element of age, but that element did not preclude consideration of the
victims’ ages for sentencing purposes because it did not distinguish between a sixteen-year-
old girl who sends an explicit photo to her fifteen-year-old boyfriend and an individual who
acquires violent child pornography involving the sexual assault of toddlers. Like any other
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fact, age is for the determination of the factfinder. The immaturity and extreme youth of the
victims in this case allowed the trial judge to determine that “infants” and “very young
children” were caused to engage in sexual activities. The appellate panel’s opinion in this
case deprives trial judges of their discretion to make nuanced assessments of the nature and
circumstances of offenses involving child pornography. (pp. 19-21)

3. State v. Brown sets forth the Court’s general approach to merger issues, a “flexible
approach . . . that requires . . . focus on the elements of the crimes and the Legislature’s
intent in creating them, and on the specific facts of each case. The overall principle guiding
merger analysis is that a defendant who has committed one offense cannot be punished as if
for two.”  138 N.J. 481, 561 (1994) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Such an
approach entails “[the] analysis of the evidence in terms of, among other things, the time and
place of each purported violation; whether the proof submitted as to one count of the
indictment would be a necessary ingredient to a conviction under another count; whether one
act was an integral part of a larger scheme or episode; the intent of the accused; and the
consequences of the criminal standards transgressed.” State v. Davis,  68 N.J. 69, 81 (1975).
Guidance also arises from the principle that “the [L]egislature is empowered to split a single,
continuous transaction into stages, elevate each stage to a consummated crime, and punish
each stage separately.” Id. at 78. In Davis, the Court considered the issue of merger in the
context of the crimes of possession and distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, and
found them to be separate offenses subject to separate punishments. Ibid. The Court
explained that if a defendant’s “possession were contingent upon and inseparable from the
sale itself, a 'mere fleeting and shadowy incident of the sale,’ then only one offense ha[d]
been committed.” Id. at 83. The Davis Court then explained that there was “ample evidence
to support the conclusion that Davis was not engaged in 'fleeting and shadowy’ possession
preceding and purely incidental to imminent distribution, as would be true of an agent of or
go-between for a seller,” but rather was in possession for a “substantial period of time
separate and apart from his possession merely incident to a particular imminent sale.” Id. at
83-84. (pp. 21-24)

4. In this case, prior to the period during which Miller began to distribute the pornography,
there was a period of over two years in which he possessed it but had not yet distributed it.
Further, in addition to the over 900 child pornographic images and videos stored on Miller’s
computer, there were eleven CDs and DVDs containing photographs and video recordings of
child pornography that were found inside his home, separate from the pornography on his
computer. The possession and distribution offenses were therefore distinct and the trial court
appropriately determined that they did not merge for sentencing purposes. (pp. 24-25)

     The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and Miller’s sentence is
REINSTATED.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON,
SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’S opinion.

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       SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
             A-
70 September Term 2017
                       079342

                State of New Jersey,

                 Plaintiff-Appellant,

                          v.

                 Michael D. Miller,

               Defendant-Respondent.

       On certification to the Superior Court,
   Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at
        449 N.J. Super. 460 (App. Div. 2017).

     Argued                         Decided
 November 28, 2018              February 20, 2019

Lisa Sarnoff Gochman, Legal Assistant, argued the cause
for appellant (Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Monmouth
County Prosecutor, attorney; Lisa Sarnoff Gochman, of
counsel and on the briefs).

Michael T. Denny, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora,
Public Defender, attorney; Michael T. Denny, of counsel
and on the briefs, and William Welaj, Designated
Counsel, on the briefs).

Regina M. Oberholzer, Deputy Attorney General, argued
the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New
Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney;
Regina M. Oberholzer, of counsel and on the brief).
                          1
      JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA delivered the opinion of the Court.

      In this appeal, we first consider whether it is an abuse of discretion for a

trial court to apply aggravating factor one when sentencing a defendant

convicted of possessing and distributing child pornography. Second, we

consider whether defendant Michael Miller was appropriately sentenced to

consecutive terms of imprisonment for his possession and distribution of child

pornography.

      Miller was convicted of possessing and distributing over 900 images and

videos of child pornography through the use of online peer-to-peer file-sharing

programs. He was also in possession of thirty-three CDs and DVDs, eleven of

which contained photographs and recordings of child pornography separate

from those found on his computer. At Miller’s sentencing hearing, the trial

judge applied aggravating factor one, the nature and circumstances of the

offense,  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1), because the pornography possessed and

distributed by Miller depicted the rape, penetration, and sexual assault of

extremely young children, at least one of whom was an infant. After

considering the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, the trial judge

sentenced Miller to seven years’ imprisonment for the distribution charge, and

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one year of imprisonment for the possession charge, to be served

consecutively. Miller subsequently appealed.

      The Appellate Division reversed and remanded Miller’s sentence. In a

published opinion, which instructed the trial court to re-sentence Miller

without consideration of aggravating factor one and to merge Miller’s

possession and distribution convictions. The appellate panel determined that

the trial court engaged in impermissible double-counting when it applied

aggravating factor one because child pornography is inherently heinous, cruel,

and depraved, and Miller’s possession and distribution of such pornography in

this case was no different. The panel further held that the trial court should

have merged Miller’s possession and distribution convictions because the

crimes were reasonably proximate in time and place, and Miller’s use of the

file-sharing programs was a necessary ingredient and an integral part of both

his possession and his distribution of the child pornography.

      We conclude that the panel’s opinion deprives trial judges of their

discretion to make nuanced assessments of the nature and circumstances of

offenses involving child pornography. We further conclude that Miller’s

possession charge involved child pornographic material beyond that involved

in his distribution charge -- there was pornographic material in Miller’s

possession for an extended period of time that was not encompassed in the

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distribution charge. The possession and distribution offenses were therefore

distinct, and the trial court appropriately determined that the offenses did not

merge for sentencing purposes. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the

Appellate Division and reinstate Miller’s sentence.

                                        I.

                                        A.

    From 2010 to 2012, Freehold Township Police Officer Richard Hudak was

assigned to the Computer Crimes Unit of the Monmouth County Prosecutor’s

Office (MCPO) as part of the Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) task

force. By using “undercover computers,” Hudak was able to locate computers

within Monmouth County that were making suspected images and videos of

children performing prohibited sexual acts available for download. As was the

case with defendant Michael Miller, these pictures and videos were oftentimes

shared via peer-to-peer file-sharing. Peer-to-peer networks allow computer

users to exchange audio, video, and image files with each other over the

internet, with the computers being referred to as “peers.” When users

download a particular peer-to-peer software program, they offer their

computers and files to other users for sharing, and can download files from

others using the same software.

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       Through his investigation, Officer Hudak was able to determine that

Miller’s computer was sending and receiving files containing child

pornography via peer-to-peer networks. On February 1, 2012, Hudak and

other members of the MCPO ICAC task force executed a search warrant at

Miller’s Keansburg residence. The officers seized thirty-three CDs and DVDs,

and several computers -- including an Acer Aspire 4315 laptop. Eleven of

those CDs and DVDs were found to contain images or videos of child

pornography. Miller was brought to the Keansburg Police Station, where he

was read and waived his Miranda1 rights. While being questioned by police,

Miller acknowledged that he had been living alone at his residence for two

years and that he previously used the peer-to-peer file-sharing program

LimeWire until it was shut down in 2010, at which time he began using

FrostWire. When asked if he was admitting to downloading child

pornography, Miller replied “Yes.”

       Miller was then asked about his understanding of peer-to-peer networks

and responded, “[I]f you have a song on your computer, I can download it and

share [it].” Miller explained, “I know it’s wrong to distribute. I didn’t realize

that I was distributing [it], because it was on my library,” but he later

acknowledged, “I never thought it through . . . that if I have it on here, other

1
    Miranda v. Arizona,