Case Title: In re Children of Alecia M.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020 ME 58

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2020-05-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 58 
Docket: 
Pen-19-475 
Submitted 
On Briefs: May 4, 2020 
Decided: 
May 12, 2020 
Panel: 
MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILDREN OF ALECIA M. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  Alecia M. appeals from an order of the District Court (Bangor, 
Jordan, J.) finding that her four children are in circumstances of jeopardy 
pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4035(2) (2020).  She contends that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the court’s determination that the children are in 
jeopardy.1  We affirm. 
[¶2]  In this matter, the trial court consolidated three child protection 
cases for a jeopardy hearing.  The first child protection proceeding began in 
July 2017, when the Department filed a petition for a child protection order as 
to the mother’s two older children.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4032 (2020).  The petition 
                                         
1  At the jeopardy hearing, the Department of Health and Human Services did not seek to establish 
jeopardy as to the father of the two older children, and the court ordered that he continue to have 
custody of those children following the hearing.  The court found both jeopardy and the existence of 
an aggravating factor, see 22 M.R.S. §§ 4002(1-B), 4036(1)(G-2) (2020), as to the father of the two 
younger children.  That father did not appeal from the court’s order.  Therefore, neither father is a 
party to this appeal. 
 
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alleged that the mother had problems with substance abuse and that she was 
in a relationship with a man—not the father of the two older children—who 
had a history of violence.  On December 17, 2017, the court entered an 
agreed-to finding that the children were in circumstances of jeopardy in the 
mother’s care and placed the children in the custody of their father, against 
whom the Department did not allege jeopardy. 
[¶3]  The mother gave birth to her third child in March 2018.  In 
June 2018, the mother’s second oldest child sustained and was treated for 
significant injuries, including a broken clavicle and multiple bruises on various 
parts of her body.  The next day, the Department filed a request for a 
preliminary protection order (PPO) and a new petition for a child protection 
order as to all three of the mother’s children, alleging that they were threatened 
with the immediate risk of serious harm due to the threat of neglect and 
physical abuse.2  See id.  In this petition, the Department alleged jeopardy as to 
                                         
2  Although the court had already found that the two older children were in circumstances of 
jeopardy in their mother’s care and had placed the children in the custody of their father, the request 
for a PPO included an affidavit that indicated that those children had been living, at least part time, 
in the mother’s household.  The Department’s second petition alleged additional grounds for 
jeopardy as to those children and asked the court to make a new finding of jeopardy based on the 
injuries suffered by the second oldest child. 
 
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the mother, the father of the two older children, and an individual who was then 
identified as the putative father of the third child.3 
[¶4]  That day, the court granted the PPO and placed all three children in 
the Department’s custody.  See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4034(2), 4036(1)(F) (2020).  In 
December 2018, six months after the children had been removed from their 
parents’ custody, but before a jeopardy hearing, the court returned custody of 
the two older children to their father after the Department informed the court 
that it was amending its petition to no longer allege that those children were in 
circumstances of jeopardy in their father’s care. 
[¶5]  The mother had a fourth child in May 2019.  The Department filed a 
third petition for a child protection order, accompanied by a request for a PPO, 
the following day, alleging that this child was in circumstances of jeopardy in 
the mother’s care for the reasons set forth by the Department in its previous 
petitions.  The petition also identified the father of the third child as the father 
of the fourth child.  The court issued a PPO that day, placing the child in the 
Department’s custody. 
[¶6]  By agreement of the parties, the three petitions were consolidated 
for a single jeopardy hearing regarding all four children.  The court held a 
                                         
3  That individual was later identified as the father of the mother’s third child. 
 
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five-day contested hearing in May, July, and September 2019.4  At the hearing, 
the mother and the Department presented competing expert witnesses, both of 
whom testified as to the likely cause of the injuries suffered by the second 
oldest child.  The Department’s expert testified that, upon his review of the 
child’s injuries, he had determined “with appropriate medical certainty” that 
the injuries were inflicted.  In contrast, the mother’s expert testified that “there 
is more evidence for accidental injury than there is for abuse.” 
[¶7]  Based on the evidence at the hearing, the court found that the 
children are in circumstances of jeopardy due to neglect and the infliction of 
serious injury upon one of the children.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4002(1), (6)(A), (10)(A) 
(2020).  The mother timely appealed.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4006 (2020); M.R. 
App. P. 2B(c)(1). 
[¶8]  In its written order finding jeopardy as to the mother, the court 
made the following findings of fact, all of which are supported by competent 
record evidence.  See In re Child of Whitney M., 2020 ME 29, ¶ 5, --- A.3d ---. 
 
In June of 2018, [the second oldest child] was found to have 
injuries to her mouth, both sides of her jaw, a fracture of her 
clavicle and numerous bruises.  The issues before the Court center 
upon whether the injuries were accidental or inflicted. 
                                         
4  The substantial delays in this case appear to have been caused by the court’s willingness to allow 
the mother to attempt to find an expert witness to counter the State’s assertion that the second oldest 
child’s injuries had been inflicted. 
 
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. . . . 
 
The Court concludes that more likely than not the injuries 
were inflicted.  The fact that there are possible accidental ways for 
the injuries to have occurred does not change the conclusion that 
more likely than not they were inflicted.  The multitude of injuries, 
the locations of the injuries, the patterns of bruising, and the 
broken clavicle all support a finding that the injuries were inflicted. 
 
The rest of the testimony and supporting evidence 
strengthens the conclusion that more likely than not these are 
inflicted injuries.  The [oldest child] repeatedly volunteered the 
same accounts of [the father of the two younger children] hurting 
[the second oldest child] and assaulting [the mother].  The 
circumstances surrounding those revelations are supportive of 
[the oldest child’s] credibility.  The child has previously said her 
mother told her not to talk to people about what happened.  
Although the mother denies that [the father of the two younger 
children] was present, she has acknowledged lying on other 
occasions about his being present at the home. 
 
. . . . 
 
The Court concludes that more likely than not [the father of 
the two younger children] inflicted the broken clavicle injury.  The 
fact that [the mother] is protecting him demonstrates that she lacks 
protective capacity for her children. . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
The Court finds that jeopardy exists for [all four children] as 
regards to [the mother]. . . . 
 
[¶9]  We review the court’s factual determinations for clear error.  
See In re Nicholas S., 2016 ME 82, ¶ 9, 140 A.3d 1226.  We will affirm the court’s 
 
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jeopardy determination “unless there is no competent record evidence that can 
rationally be understood to establish as more likely than not that the child[ren] 
[are] in circumstances of jeopardy to [their] health and welfare.”  Id. (quotation 
marks omitted). 
[¶10]  Contrary to the mother’s contention, the court did not err in 
crediting the testimony of the Department’s expert witness over the testimony 
of the mother’s competing expert witness.  See In re Child of Dawn B., 2019 
ME 93, ¶ 10, 210 A.3d 169 (“[T]he assessment of the weight and credibility of 
the evidence [is] for the trial court alone.”).  The court’s supported findings of 
the mother’s history and the nature of the second oldest child’s injuries were 
sufficient for the court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
children would be in circumstances of jeopardy if they were returned to the 
mother’s care.  See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4002(6)(A), (10)(A), 4035(2). 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Joseph P. Belisle, Esq., Bangor, for appellant mother 
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Meghan Szyvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Bangor District Court docket numbers PC-2017-73; PC-2018-139; PC-2019-61 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY