Case Title: Baros v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Baros v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div1992 WY 76834 P.2d 1143Case Number: 91-255Decided: 07/08/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Raymond A. BAROS, 

Appellant 
(Employee-Claimant),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, ex rel. 
WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION,

 Appellee 
(Objector-Defendant).

Appeal from District 
Court, Goshen County, John T. Langdon, J.

George Santini 
of Graves, Santini & Villemez, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., and Darrell V. Goodman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT,* and 
GOLDEN, JJ.

* Chief Justice at the 
time of oral argument. 

MACY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Raymond 
A. Baros appeals from the district court's order affirming the administrative 
hearing examiner's decision to deny Baros' application for extended permanent 
total disability payments.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Baros raises two 
issues on appeal:

1. Was [Baros'] 
application for extended permanent total disability benefits arbitrarily 
denied?

     2. Was [Baros] denied 
the right to a fair and impartial hearing as a result of the failure to consider 
whether he is suffering from a mental or psychic injury arising from his 
original work-related accident which continues to impair his earning 
capacity[?]

[¶4]      Baros was injured 
on October 29, 1983, in the course of his employment with the Town of 
Torrington. He was assisting a co-employee in locating a leak in a water service 
line when a backhoe bucket struck him in the abdomen. As a result of this 
injury, Baros was awarded temporary disability payments on April 27, 1984. The 
district court awarded compensation to Baros for his permanent total disability 
on June 7, 1985. The court found that, pursuant to the evaluations and 
recommendations of Baros' treating physician, Baros was unable to perform work 
at any gainful occupation for which he was reasonably suited by experience or 
training.

[¶5]      Baros applied for 
extended permanent total disability payments on September 27, 1988, and the 
parties entered into a stipulation and agreement on February 17, 1989. According 
to this stipulation and agreement, Baros would continue to receive extended 
permanent total disability benefits until October 31, 1989, provided that he, 
among other things, would participate in a duration-endurance program, a weight 
loss program, and a vocational rehabilitation program. Baros reapplied for 
extended permanent total disability payments on October 30, 1989. The Workers' 
Compensation Division refused to process Baros' application for benefits because 
he failed to comply with the February 17, 1989, stipulation and 
agreement.

[¶6]      The parties 
subsequently entered into a second stipulation and agreement on May 14, 1990. In 
this second agreement, the Workers' Compensation Division agreed to pay benefits 
to Baros for the months of November 1989 through October 1990 if Baros would 
enroll in and complete a reconditioning program at the Rocky Mountain Medical 
Group, P.C. in Denver, Colorado. The parties were to evaluate Baros' condition 
upon his completion or discharge from the program to determine whether he could 
return to work. Baros reported to the Rocky Mountain Medical Group in August 
1990 but was discharged shortly thereafter because his test results indicated 
that he was not capable of completing a reconditioning program. Upon receiving 
the Rocky Mountain Medical Group's report, the employer objected to paying any 
further extended benefits after October 31, 1990, and a hearing was held on 
March 11, 1991.

[¶7]      The hearing 
examiner concluded:

[A]lthough Mr. Baros 
indeed continues to complain of debilitating pain, substantial medical testing 
fails to reveal any significant injury-related basis for his continuing 
complaints. Based upon all the evidence presented, it appears as though Mr. 
Baros' present earnings impairment results from his choosing an idle existence 
over a productive one. This Office has not been persuaded that Mr. Baros' choice 
arises out of the original 1983 compensable injury.

(Footnote 
omitted.) The district court reviewed the hearing examiner's decision and 
concluded that the issue was strictly factual and that sufficient evidence 
existed to support the hearing examiner's findings. An order affirming the 
hearing examiner's decision was entered on November 4, 1991.

[¶8]      Baros contends 
that the hearing examiner's decision was arbitrary because he ignored the 
treating physician's testimony which attributed Baros' pain and physical 
limitations to the original work-related injury. Baros' concern, stated in the 
alternative, is whether the hearing examiner's decision was supported by 
substantial evidence. To determine whether substantial evidence existed to 
support an agency decision, we employ the following test:

     "We examine the entire 
record to determine if there is substantial evidence to support an agency's 
findings. If the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, we 
cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the agency, and must uphold 
the findings on appeal. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a 
reasonable mind might accept in support of the conclusions of the 
agency."

Dougherty v. 
J.W. Williams, Inc., 820 P.2d 553, 555 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting Trout v. Wyoming Oil 
and Gas Conservation Commission, 721 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Wyo. 1986) (citation 
omitted)).

[¶9]      Baros, his wife, 
and his daughter testified at the hearing that Baros' chronic pain severely 
restricted his physical activities around the house. Additional evidence 
consisted of the deposition testimony of Wendell F. Ropp, M.D., Baros' treating 
physician, as well as the report of Brent V. Lovejoy, D.O., a physician at the 
Rocky Mountain Medical Group who evaluated Baros' condition. Dr. Ropp diagnosed 
Baros as suffering from a chronic pain syndrome of his low back with sciatic 
neuritis, an inflammatory condition of the sciatic nerve. Dr. Ropp attributed 
Baros' chronic pain to his original work-related injury. Dr. Ropp admitted that 
his findings concerning Baros, except for his finding of some localized 
tenderness, were in large part subjective; however, he thought that Baros had 
been honest regarding his physical problems. Contradicting Dr. Ropp's testimony 
was Dr. Lovejoy's report. Dr. Lovejoy concluded that Baros had no occupational 
disorder related to the 1983 accident and that his test results manifested 
evidence of severe symptom magnification, disuse syndrome, and probable 
malingering. The hearing examiner summarized both doctors' conclusions in his 
decision letter, but he found that Dr. Lovejoy's opinion was more 
compelling.

[¶10]   Dr. Lovejoy's report constituted 
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to deny Baros' 
application for extended benefits. The fact that the doctors' conflicting 
reports made it possible to reach two inconsistent conclusions does not preclude 
us from determining that the hearing examiner's decision was supported by 
substantial evidence. Toltec Watershed Improvement District v. Associated 
Enterprises, Inc., 829 P.2d 819, 821 (Wyo. 1992); Burlington Northern Railroad 
Company v. Public Service Commission of Wyoming, 698 P.2d 1135, 1139 (Wyo. 
1985).

[¶11]   Baros also contends that the denial 
of his application for extended benefits was arbitrary because the hearing 
examiner refused to consider data in the record indicating that the original 
physical trauma caused a psychological or nervous injury. Baros cites McGuire v. 
State Department of Revenue and Taxation, 809 P.2d 271 (Wyo. 1991), for the 
proposition that this Court must, when reviewing an administrative agency's 
decision, examine the record to determine whether the agency based its decision 
upon all relevant factors and whether the decision was rational. 809 P.2d  at 
274. According to Baros, the possibility that the original physical trauma 
caused a psychological injury was a relevant factor which the hearing examiner 
ignored.

[¶12]   The indications in the record of 
Baros' possible psychological impairment consisted of medical reports by Dr. 
Lovejoy and others.1 In his report, Dr. Lovejoy found 
that Baros' performance on strength tests was nonphysiological and indicated 
symptom magnification and/or overt manipulation of the tests. Dr. Lovejoy 
recommended that Baros receive counseling because his physical limitations 
appeared to be constrained by psychological factors rather than physiological 
ones. Other medical reports in Baros' file likewise suggested that he get 
counseling. Rather than ignoring the reports' references to a possible 
psychological basis for Baros' impairment, the hearing examiner noted in his 
decision letter:

The only fact which this 
Office is persuaded of is that Mr. Baros is presently suffering from an extreme 
case of the miseries. What remains unclear to this Office, is the cause of Mr. 
Baros' present problems, which appear to be driven by psychological or 
emotional factors not sufficiently shown to be the result of the original 
compensable injury.

(Emphasis added 
and footnote omitted.) Given the hearing examiner's specific conclusion 
regarding a possible psychological problem, we perceive no merit in Baros' claim 
that the hearing examiner arbitrarily ignored a possible psychological basis for 
his impairment.

[¶13]   Finally, Baros claims that the 
hearing examiner denied him a fair and impartial hearing by admitting Dr. 
Lovejoy's report into evidence without providing an opportunity for Baros to 
cross-examine the doctor. This Court recently considered the issue of when a 
claimant in an administrative proceeding is entitled to confront and/or 
cross-examine a doctor whose medical report is admitted into evidence. Hansen v. 
Mr. D's Food Center, 827 P.2d 371 (Wyo. 1992). In Hansen, we recognized that 
Wyoming's governing statutes, evidentiary rules, and agency regulations were 
consistent with the majority rule that "medical reports in a written form are 
admissible so long as `the elementary fairplay requirements of notice, timely 
furnishing of copies, and right of cross-examination if requested, are 
observed.'" Id. at 374 (quoting 2B ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 
79.25(c) at 15-426.89 to 15-426.91 (1989)). Our review of the record in this 
case discloses that the hearing examiner complied with the "fairplay" 
requirements set forth in Hansen. The Attorney General's office mailed a copy of 
Dr. Lovejoy's report to Baros' attorney on September 24, 1990, some five months 
prior to the hearing, thus giving Baros notice and a timely copy of the report. 
Pursuant to Hansen's third requirement, Baros was entitled to cross-examine Dr. 
Lovejoy "if requested." 827 P.2d  at 374. Nothing in the record indicates that 
Baros requested an opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Lovejoy, nor did he object 
at the hearing to the hearing examiner's admission of Dr. Lovejoy's report. We 
conclude that Baros waived his right to cross-examine the doctor and hold that 
the hearing examiner did not deprive Baros of a fair and impartial hearing by 
admitting Dr. Lovejoy's report.

[¶14]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The only medical 
evidence introduced at the hearing was Dr. Ropp's deposition testimony and Dr. 
Lovejoy's report; however, the hearing examiner's order scheduling the hearing 
notified the parties that he would take official notice of the entire file 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-108(d) (1990).