Case Title: STATE v KLEMANN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 80-336

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1981-10-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 80-336 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, VS. JOHN KLEMANN, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone. Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Moses Law Firm, Billings, Montana r For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana Submitted on briefs: June 24, 1981 Decided: ( ) C T 7 1 9 8 1 Filed: o@T 6 ,3k' fl " ". Clerk M r . J u s t i c e Fred J. Weber delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. ~ e f endant, John Klemann, was found g u i l t y of aggravated a s s a u l t by a jury i n t h e Yellowstone County D i s t r i c t Court and sentenced t o s e r v e 1 2 years i n prison. Defendant claims f i r s t t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t erroneously denied h i s motion f o r a one week continuance of t h e t r i a l d a t e , and second, t h a t an aggravated a s s a u l t conviction i s n o t j u s t i f i e d . W e a f f i r m t h e D i s t r i c t Court. W e w i l l f i r s t d i s c u s s defendant's motion f o r a one week continuance. The offense took place on March 15, 1980. The information was f i l e d on March 20, followed by defendant's n o t g u i l t y p l e a on March 25, 1980. The case was set f o r jury t r i a l on April 28, 1980, and was subsequently reset t o June 9, 1980, and then t o June 16, 1980, then t o June 19, 1980, t h e d a t e on which t r i a l commenced. On t h e morning of t h e t r i a l , a f t e r t h e jury had been c a l l e d , t h e defendant's court-appointed counsel moved t h e c o u r t f o r a continuance of t h e case based on the f a c t t h a t defendant had evidenced i n t h e l a s t couple of days t h a t he was n o t c e r t a i n t h a t h i s appointed counsel would be a b l e t o help him i n t h e course of t h e t r i a l , t h a t t h e defendant had evidenced t h a t h i s mother had i n d i c a t e d she was going " t o t r y t o o b t a i n p r i v a t e counsel" f o r him, and f o r t h e reason t h a t defendant wanted f u r t h e r t i m e i n which t o consider an o f f e r by t h e S t a t e under which i f defendant plead g u i l t y t h e S t a t e would recommend a sentence of 5 years with a l l b u t one year suspended. Defendant's counsel requested a continuance of one week. The prosecution reviewed f o r t h e c o u r t t h e various a c t i v i t i e s which had occurred s i n c e the commission of t h e a l l e g e d offense. N o a d d i t i o n a l f a c t s were presented. The c o u r t denied t h e motion, and then heard the comments of t h e defendant. The defendant s t a t e d t h a t he wanted a d i f f e r e n t lawyer because h i s a t t o r n e y had been up t o see him only f i v e o r s i x times while he had been i n j a i l , and t h a t he had n o t talked with him f o r more than a t o t a l of two hours. He a l s o complained t h a t h i s a t t o r n e y had t o l d him t h a t i f he d i d go t o t r i a l , he would be convicted because he ( t h e a t t o r n e y ) c o u l d n ' t do anything about it. The c o u r t responded by pointing o u t t h a t it was t h e task of h i s counsel t o give an honest a p p r a i s a l of t h e evidence and probable r e s u l t s . Defendant f u r t h e r s a i d , "My mother has t o l d me t h a t s h e ' l l g e t another lawyer f o r me." The c o u r t r e p l i e d t h a t t h e c a s e has been pending f o r t h r e e months and t h a t t h e jury was i n t h e courtroom waiting f o r him t o be t r i e d . The defendant then asked, I' [wlhat i f I waive r i g h t t o f a s t and speedy t r i a l ? " The c o u r t again answered t h a t when everyone i s ready f o r t r i a l , t h e defendant c o u l d n ' t come i n and say he d o e s n ' t want t o go t o t r i a l . W e note t h a t preparation of t h e case f o r t r i a l by t h e S t a t e had included bringing t h e victim from C a l i f o r n i a t o t e s t i f y . The case proceeded t o t r i a l and was completed on t h e following day. W e have reviewed t h e t r a n s c r i p t and it d i s c l o s e s adequate r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by t h e defendant's appointed counsel during t h e p r e t r i a l , t r i a l and p o s t - t r i a l phases of t h e case. The t r a n s c r i p t does n o t show a reasonable f a c t u a l b a s i s t o suggest t h a t any r i g h t of t h e defendant was denied by t h e d e n i a l of t h e motion f o r continuance. The c o n t r o l l i n g s t a t u t e i s s e c t i o n 46-13-202, MCA, which s t a t e s : 'I (1) The defendant o r t h e s t a t e may move f o r a continuance. I f t h e motion i s made more than 30 days a f t e r arraignment o r a t any time a £ ter t r i a l has begun, t h e c o u r t may r e q u i r e t h a t it be supported by a f f i d a v i t . I' ( 2 ) The c o u r t may upon t h e motion of e i t h e r p a r t y o r upon t h e c o u r t ' s own motion order a continuance i f t h e i n t e r e s t s of j u s t i c e so re- q u i r e . " (3) A l l motions f o r continuance a r e addressed t o t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t and s h a l l be considered i n t h e l i g h t of t h e d i l i g e n c e shown on t h e p a r t of t h e movant. This s e c t i o n s h a l l be construed t o t h e end t h a t criminal cases a r e t r i e d with due d i l i g e n c e consonant with the r i g h t s of t h e defendant and t h e state t o a speedy t r i a l . " Subsection (3) states t h a t motions f o r continuance a r e addressed t o t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t and s h a l l be considered i n l i g h t of t h e d i l i g e n c e shown on t h e p a r t of t h e movant. Before a motion f o r a continuance is granted, t h e movant must show t h a t he has employed due d i l i g e n c e t o procure t h a t which he now r e q u e s t s a d d i t i o n a l time t o procure. S t a t e v. Kuilman (1941), 1 1 1 Mont. 459, 1 1 0 P.2d 969. The f a c t s support t h e d e n i a l of the motion by t h e c o u r t i n order t h a t t h e case be t r i e d i n a manner consonant with t h e r i g h t s of both t h e defendant and the S t a t e t o a speedy t r i a l . Waiting u n t i l t h e day of t r i a l t o make such a motion does n o t show d i l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t of t h e defendant. The case had previously been set f o r t r i a l . on two occasions, which should have brought i n t o focus t h e concerns of t h e defendant. Defendant u t t e r l y f a i l e d t o show an attempt o r a capacity t o o b t a i n p r i v a t e counsel. There i s a t o t a l absence of a showing t h a t defendant would have been i n an improved p o s i t i o n had a continuance of one week been granted. A s u b s t i t u t i o n of a t t o r n e y f o r purposes of appeal was n o t i n f a c t made f o r t h e defendant u n t i l December17,1980, s i x months a f t e r t h e t r i a l . This does n o t i n d i c a t e any capacity t o cure the problem within t h e one week following June 19. The r u l e regarding continuance i n criminal m a t t e r s i s Mont. well s t a t e d i n S t a t e v. Kirkland (1979), - - 1 - , 602 P.2d 586, 590, 36 St.Rep. 1963, 19671 where t h e c o u r t s t a t e d : "'Motions f o r continuance a r e addressed t o t h e d i s - c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t and t h e granting of a continuance has never been a matter of r i g h t . ( C i t a t i o n omitted. ) The d i s t r i c t c o u r t cannot be overturned on appeal i n absence of a showing of p r e j u d i c e t o t h e movant. ( C i t a t i o n omitted. ) "'Defendant's argument t h e r e f o r e must stand o r f a l l on t h e i s s u e of prejudice, f o r t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t can be s a i d t o have abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n only i f i t s r u l i n g was p r e j u d i c i a l . W e have n o t found a s i n g l e case . . . i n which t h e d e n i a l of a motion f o r a continuance was reversed without a showing of r e s u l t i n g prejudice t o t h e movant. ' S t a t e v. Paulson (1975), 167 Mont. 310, 538 P.2d 339." The statements of defendant' s counsel and t h e defendant' s statements themselves do n o t show any prejudice. The record does n o t d i s c l o s e any prejudice. There appears no b a s i s f o r a r e v e r s a l on t h i s ground under t h e d e c i s i o n s of t h i s Court. Such d e c i s i o n s appear c o n s i s t e n t with t h e holding of t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n Ungar v. S a r a f i t e (1964) , 376 U.S. 575, 589, 1 1 L.Ed.2d 921, 931, 84 S.Ct. 841, 850, i n which t h e Court said: "There a r e no mechanical tests f o r deciding when a d e n i a l of a continuance i s so a r b i t r a r y a s t o vio- l a t e due process. The answer must be found i n t h e circumstances p r e s e n t i n every case, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e reasons presented t o t h e t r i a l judge a t t h e time t h e r e q u e s t i s denied." The circumstances and t h e reasons presented t o the t r i a l c o u r t t o t a l l y f a i l t o j u s t i f y a conclusion t h a t t h e d e n i a l of a motion f o r continuance was a r b i t r a r y . W e a f f i r m t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of t h e motion. W e n e x t consider i f an aggravated a s s a u l t conviction was jus t i f ied. The record contains extensive evidence with regard t o events p r i o r t o t h e a c t u a l a s s a u l t which w e do n o t deem it necessary t o s e t o u t i n d e t a i l . The victim was a 19- year-old female, 5'6" t a l l and weighing 105 pounds. The v i c t i m had m e t t h e defendant only a few minutes before t h e time of t h e a s s a u l t . They were s i t t i n g i n a l i v i n g room on a couch. The defendant was s i t t i n g a f e w f e e t from t h e victim. They talked f o r approximately four minutes, a f t e r which t h e defendant made an advance toward t h e victim and s t a r t e d t o grab and p u l l her towards him. The victim s a i d : "Excuse me, I ' m n o t i n t o t h a t and I d o n ' t need anything l i k e t h a t . " The defendant then s a t back and resumed t a l k i n g . A f t e r a s h o r t a d d i t i o n a l t i m e , defendant again came toward t h e victim and t r i e d t o p u l l her t o him and k i s s her. The v i c t i m t e s t i f i e d t h a t she stood up and said: "Excuse me, I think you'd b e t t e r leave." The defendant then reached up, grabbed t h e victim and threw her onto a couch. While she was l y i n g on t h e couch, he h i t her on t h e head with a g l a s s ashtray. H e - h i t her on t h e s i d e of t h e head about f i v e t i m e s . She began screaming while t h e defendant t r i e d t o r o l l her over. Another person then banged on t h e apartment door, seeking admittance, and t h e a s s a u l t terminated. The evidence showed t h a t the a s h t r a y with which t h e defendant s t r u c k t h e victim weighed approximately 1 1 / 2 pounds, was square i n shape and had sharp edges. Besides various b r u i s e s , t h e victim sustained a c u t approximateli 1 1 / 2 inches long which required two s t i t c h e s t o close. The defendant was charged under s e c t i o n 45-5-202 (1) (b) , MCA, which s t a t e s : "A person commits t h e offense of aggravated as- s a u l t i f he purposely o r knowingly causes: . . . " (b) bodily i n jury t o another with a weapon . . . " Pursuant t o t h e Montana s t a t u t o r y provisions, t h e jury was i n s t r u c t e d a s follows regarding weapon, bodily i n j u r y and s e r i o u s bodily injury: " I n s t r u c t i o n No. 13 "'Bodily i n j u r y ' means physical pain, o r any impairment of physical condition. " I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 4 "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e t e r m 'weapon' a s used i n these i n s t r u c t i o n s means any instrument, a r t i c l e , o r substance which, r e g a r d l e s s of i t s primary function, i s r e a d i l y capable of being used t o produce death o r s e r i o u s bodily i n j u r y . " I n s t r u c t i o n No. " ' S e r i o u s bodily i n j u r y ' means bodily i n j u r y which c r e a t e s a s u b s t a n t i a l r i s k of death o r which causes s e r i o u s permanent disfigurement o r p r o t r a c t e d l o s s o r impairment of t h e function o r process of any bodily member o r organ." The evidence shows a c u t and b r u i s e s t o t h e victim which a r e s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n s t i t u t e bodily i n j u r y . It i s a l s o r e a d i l y apparent t h a t a g l a s s a s h t r a y of t h e s i z e and shape which was here involved c o n s t i t u t e s a weapon capable of being used t o produce s e r i o u s bodily i n j u r y . Q u i t e c l e a r l y , s t r i k i n g a person with an a s h t r a y of t h i s s i z e and shape could r e s u l t i n s e r i o u s permanent disfigurement, o r impairment of t h e function of a bodily member o r organ. The s e c t i o n under which t h e defendant was charged does n o t r e q u i r e proof i n f a c t of ser- i o u s bodily i n j u r y a s defined i n t h e s t a t u t e . I t is only necessary t h a t t h e evidence show t h a t t h e weapon was used i n such a manner a t t h a t t i m e and place and on t h a t victim s o t h a t s e r i o u s bodily i n j u r y was capable of being i n f l i c t e d . The evidence i s c l e a r l y s u f f i c i e n t t o s u s t a i n t h e j u r y ' s finding of aggravated a s s a u l t on t h e p a r t of t h e defendant. The D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed. W e Concur: Chief J u s t i c e