Case Title: McMillion v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 446, 2010

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2010-11-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MARVIN McMILLION,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 446, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 9312012871 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 24, 2010 
 
 
 
 
   Decided:  November 3, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 3rd day of November 2010, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a)it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Marvin McMillion, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s June 18, 2010 order denying his third motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior 
 
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Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening 
brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that, in 1994, McMillion was found guilty 
of Attempted Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree, Robbery in 
the First Degree, Burglary in the First Degree, Unlawful Sexual Penetration 
and Criminal Mischief.  He was sentenced to a total of 41 years of Level V 
incarceration.  McMillion’s convictions were affirmed by this Court on 
direct appeal.2  McMillion filed 2 previous postconviction motions, the first 
in 1997 and the second in 2004.  In each case, the Superior Court’s denial of 
the motion was affirmed by this Court.3 
 
(3) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his third 
postconviction motion, McMillion claims that a) the Superior Court abused 
its discretion when it denied his request for DNA testing of a hair found on 
the victim, which, he claims, would prove that the victim misidentified him 
as the perpetrator; and b) his counsel provided ineffective assistance by not 
insisting upon DNA testing of the hair. 
 
(4) 
When considering a postconviction motion pursuant to Rule 61, 
the Superior Court must apply the procedural requirements before 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 McMillion v. State, Del. Supr., No. 378, 1994, Veasey, C.J. (May 19, 1995). 
3 McMillion v. State, Del. Supr., No. 490, 1997, Walsh, J. (Feb. 6, 1998); McMillion v. 
State, Del. Supr., No. 220, 2004, Steele, C.J. (Dec. 6, 2004). 
 
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considering the substantive merits of the claims asserted.4  In this case, the 
Superior Court properly concluded that McMillion’s claim regarding DNA 
testing is barred as untimely,5 repetitive,6 and formerly adjudicated.7  
McMillion may overcome the time and procedural bars only if he can 
demonstrate that the interest of justice so requires8 or that there is a colorable 
claim of a constitutional violation.9   
 
(5) 
The record reflects that the 80-year old victim had known 
McMillion for virtually his entire life and was able to identify him by his 
voice even though McMillion had covered her eyes before attacking her.  
The record further reflects that the jury was aware of the hair McMillion 
seeks to have tested and that it did not belong to McMillion.  As such, DNA 
testing of the hair at this point would be useless to McMillion as a means of 
overturning his convictions.  There is, therefore, no basis for considering the 
merits of McMillion’s first claim either in the interest of justice or due to a 
colorable claim of a constitutional violation.     
 
(6) 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that his counsel’s representation fell 
                                                 
4 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
5 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2). 
7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 
8 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2) and (4). 
9 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5). 
 
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below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s 
errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings 
would have been different.10  Although not insurmountable, the Strickland 
standard is highly demanding and leads to a strong presumption that 
counsel’s representation was professionally reasonable.11  McMillion has 
presented no support for his claim that, even had DNA testing of the hair 
been done, the outcome of his trial would have been different.  There was 
more than sufficient evidence supporting his convictions.  McMillion’s 
ineffectiveness claim is, therefore, without merit. 
 
(7) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
   
 
                                                 
10 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
11 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990).