Case Title: Portage County v. J.W.K.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017AP001574

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2019-05-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
2019 WI 54 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP1574 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the matter of the mental commitment  
of J. W. K.: 
Portage County, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
J. W. K., 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 21, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 11, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Portage 
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas T. Flugaur 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
DALLET, J., concurs and dissents, joined by 
ABRAHAMSON, J. and A.W. BRADLEY, J. (opinion 
filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Katie R. York, assistant state public defender. There 
was an oral argument by Katie R. York. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Briana L. Sweeney and Interim Deputy Corporation Counsel, 
Stevens Point. There was an oral argument by Briana L. Sweeney.   
 
 
2019 WI 54
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2017AP1574   
(L.C. No. 
2013ME18B) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the matter of the mental commitment of 
J.W.K.:   
 
Portage County,   
 
 
Petitioner-Respondent,   
 
 
v. 
 
J.W.K.,   
 
 
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.   
FILED 
 
MAY 21, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   An issue is moot when its 
resolution will have no practical effect on the underlying 
controversy.  In this review of a Chapter 51 recommitment order, 
we 
consider 
whether 
J.W.K.'s 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
challenge to the 2016 order extending his commitment is rendered 
moot because the 2016 order expired after the court extended his 
commitment in 2017 under a separate order.1  Reversing the 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20 uses "recommitment" and "extension 
of a commitment" interchangeably and we do as well.  See 
§ 51.20(13)(g)2r ("Twenty-one days prior to expiration of the 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1574   
 
2 
 
expired 2016 order for insufficient evidence would have no 
effect on subsequent recommitment orders because later orders 
stand on their own under the language of the statute.  We 
therefore hold that J.W.K.'s sufficiency challenge is moot, and 
we affirm the court of appeals' decision dismissing the appeal.2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
J.W.K. was originally committed in February 2016 for 
six months under Wis. Stat. § 51.20 (2017-18).3  In July 2016, 
Portage County filed a petition seeking to extend J.W.K.'s 
commitment for twelve months.  The petition alleged J.W.K.:  (1) 
was "currently committed for involuntary treatment" at an 
inpatient facility; (2) was a proper subject for commitment; (3) 
had the mental illness of schizophrenia; (4) was "presently 
dangerous as set forth in Sec. 51.20(1)(a) or based on 
                                                                                                                                                             
period of commitment under subd. 1., the department . . . shall 
file an evaluation of the individual and the recommendation of 
the department or county department regarding the individual's 
recommitment with the committing court and provide a copy of the 
evaluation and recommendation to the individual's counsel and the 
counsel designated under sub. (4). . . . A failure of the 
department or the county department to which an individual is 
committed to file an evaluation and recommendation under this 
subdivision does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over a 
petition 
for 
recommitment." 
(emphasis 
added)); 
see 
also 
§ 51.20(13)(g)3 ("Upon application for extension of a commitment 
by the department or the county department having custody of the 
subject, the court shall proceed under subs. (10) to (13)." 
(emphasis added)).  
 
2 Portage Cty. v. J.W.K., No. 2017AP1574, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2018). 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2017AP1574   
 
3 
 
[J.W.K.'s] treatment record . . . would be a proper subject for 
commitment if treatment were withdrawn as evidenced by:  in the 
past when commitment has expired, [J.W.K.] has discontinued 
psychotropic medications and became a danger to self or others 
or demonstrated inability to care for self"; and (5) was "not 
competent to refuse psychotropic medication or treatment."  
¶3 
The circuit court held a hearing on the extension 
petition in August 2016.  At the hearing, the County presented 
only the testimony of Dr. James Persing, who testified J.W.K. 
was suffering from schizophrenia, and the symptoms included 
"most 
prominently . . . delusional 
thinking 
and 
paranoia."  
Persing said that J.W.K. was being treated with medication, and 
this medication helped "organize [J.W.K.'s] thought processes" 
and clear his delusional thinking and hallucinations.  Persing 
also opined that J.W.K. would be a proper subject for commitment 
if treatment were withdrawn.  On cross-examination, Persing 
clarified that he based his opinion on J.W.K.'s "history" and 
"overall struggles with chronic mental illness for many years 
with variable levels of compliance with treatment, and leading 
up to a point of [a] variety of altercations."  The doctor made 
clear J.W.K.'s "need for mental health commitment."4   
¶4 
J.W.K. testified on his own behalf.  When his attorney 
asked whether he understood the hearing was to determine whether 
                                                 
4 Persing based his opinion primarily on J.W.K.'s treatment 
history; he met with J.W.K. for "approximately five minutes or 
less."  
No. 
2017AP1574   
 
4 
 
his commitment would be extended, J.W.K. responded that the 
hearing "involve[d] more than that," and proceeded to tell the 
circuit court that his family was stealing his money by 
"breaking 
and 
entering 
into" 
his 
"private 
property 
and . . . private 
home . . . and 
removing" 
his 
important 
"documents."  When his attorney interrupted to redirect him, 
J.W.K. told the circuit court he would continue treatment on an 
outpatient basis and take his medication even if he were not 
committed.   
¶5 
At the conclusion of the testimony, the circuit court 
found the statutory dangerousness standard was satisfied because 
"there is a substantial likelihood that [J.W.K.] would be a 
proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn."  
Accordingly, the circuit court extended J.W.K.'s commitment for 
twelve months, ending on August 2, 2017.  
¶6 
J.W.K. did not timely appeal this order, but filed a 
pro se motion asking for an extension "due to the lack of 
exchange of information due to conflicting interest."  The court 
of 
appeals 
granted 
the 
motion, 
reinstated 
J.W.K.'s 
postconviction rights and gave J.W.K. until April 24, 2017 to 
seek postcommitment relief.  The State Public Defender's office 
appointed counsel for J.W.K.  On April 3, 2017 his counsel filed 
a notice of intent to seek postcommitment relief and on August 
7, 2017 filed a notice of appeal.  
¶7 
Meanwhile, with J.W.K.'s 2016 extension order expiring 
on August 2, 2017, the County filed a petition seeking another 
No. 
2017AP1574   
 
5 
 
twelve-month extension of J.W.K.'s commitment, which the circuit 
court granted after holding a hearing on July 21, 2017.   
¶8 
In September 2017, the court of appeals ordered J.W.K. 
to file a memorandum addressing whether his appeal of the August 
2016 order was moot, given he filed his notice of appeal after a 
new order extending his commitment had been entered in July 
2017.  After considering submissions addressing mootness from 
J.W.K. and the County, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal 
as moot "because J.W.K. is no longer subject to the order being 
appealed."  The court of appeals acknowledged that "exceptions 
to dismissal based on mootness exist, as for example, when an 
issue is of great public importance or arises frequently but 
evades review," but it did not consider the mootness exceptions 
because J.W.K. did "not argue that any of the exceptions 
appl[ied] in this case."    
¶9 
J.W.K. petitioned for review, arguing his appeal was 
not moot and asserting the evidence presented at the August 2016 
extension hearing was insufficient to prove he was dangerous.  
We granted the petition. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶10 Mootness is a question of law we review de novo.  PRN 
Assocs. LLC v. DOA, 2009 WI 53, ¶25, 317 Wis. 2d 656, 766 
N.W.2d 559.  J.W.K.'s argument requires us to interpret Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20; statutory interpretation is a question of law we 
review de novo.  Waukesha Cty. v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, ¶14, 375 
Wis. 2d 542, 
895 
N.W.2d 783. 
 
"[S]tatutory 
interpretation 
No. 
2017AP1574   
 
6 
 
'begins with the language of the statute.'"  State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoted source omitted).  We give 
statutory language "its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, 
except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are 
given their technical or special definitional meaning."  Id.  If 
this process yields a plain meaning, our inquiry ends.  Id. 
B.  Discussion 
¶11 Before 
addressing 
J.W.K.'s 
substantive 
claim 
on 
sufficiency of the evidence, we must first consider the 
threshold issue of whether J.W.K.'s appeal is moot.  If the 
appeal is moot, then we do not reach J.W.K.'s sufficiency 
argument.  "An issue is moot when its resolution will have no 
practical effect on the underlying controversy."  PRN Assocs. 
LLC, 317 Wis. 2d 656, ¶25; see also City of Racine v. J-T 
Enters. of Am., Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 691, 700, 221 N.W.2d 869 (1974) 
("This court has consistently adhered to the rule that a case is 
moot when 'a determination is sought which, when made, cannot 
have any practical effect upon an existing controversy.'" 
(quoted source omitted)).   
A moot case has been defined as one which seeks to 
determine an abstract question which does not rest 
upon existing facts or rights, or which seeks a 
judgment in a pretended controversy when in reality 
there is none, or one which seeks a decision in 
advance about a right before it has actually been 
asserted or contested, or a judgment upon some matter 
which when rendered for any cause cannot have any 
practical legal effect upon the existing controversy. 
No. 
2017AP1574   
 
7 
 
Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Fort Howard Corp., 273 Wis. 356, 360, 
77 N.W.2d 733 (1956) (quoted source omitted); see also State ex 
rel. Ellenburg v. Gagnon, 76 Wis. 2d 532, 535, 251 N.W.2d 773 
(1977).   
¶12 Appellate courts generally decline to reach moot 
issues, and if all issues on appeal are moot, the appeal should 
be dismissed.  See id.; PRN Assocs. LLC, 317 Wis. 2d 656, ¶¶25, 
29.  We may, however, choose to address moot issues in 
"exceptional or compelling circumstances."  J-T Enters., 64 
Wis. 2d at 702.  There are several established exceptions under 
which this court may elect to address moot issues:  (1) "the 
issues 
are 
of 
great 
public 
importance;" 
(2) 
"the 
constitutionality of a statute is involved;" (3) the situation 
arises so often "a definitive decision is essential to guide the 
trial courts;" (4) "the issue is likely to arise again and 
should be resolved by the court to avoid uncertainty;" or (5) 
the issue is "capable and likely of repetition and yet evades 
review."  G.S. v. State, 118 Wis. 2d 803, 805, 348 N.W.2d 181 
(1984).  With these principles in mind, we turn to the record to 
evaluate whether J.W.K.'s appeal is moot.  
¶13  The record is undisputed as to several critical 
facts.  First, J.W.K. is no longer subject to the August 2016 
recommitment order forming the basis for this appeal.  That 
order lapsed when the court entered a new commitment order on 
No. 
2017AP1574   
 
8 
 
July 21 2017.5  Second, J.W.K. does not allege any defects in the 
July 2017 recommitment order.  This makes J.W.K.'s challenge to 
the 2016 commitment order moot.  
¶14 An appeal of an expired commitment order is moot.  See 
Winnebago Cty. v. Christopher S., 2016 WI 1, ¶¶30-31, 366 
Wis. 2d 1, 878 N.W.2d 109 ("In Christopher's case, the issues 
are moot because he is no longer subject to the orders being 
appealed.").6  Reversing J.W.K.'s expired 2016 order "will have 
no practical effect on the underlying controversy," see PRN 
Assocs. LLC, 317 Wis. 2d 656, ¶25, because he is no longer 
subject to the 2016 order. 
¶15 J.W.K. acknowledges the apparent lack of a live 
controversy, but he argues this case is not moot, and urges the 
court to address his sufficiency argument.  He hinges his 
argument on what he construes to be different evidentiary 
standards 
governing 
initial 
commitment 
orders 
versus 
recommitment orders.  J.W.K. contends a reversal of the August 
2016 recommitment order would necessarily invalidate all later 
extensions, 
creating 
a 
domino 
effect 
voiding 
subsequent 
recommitment orders.  Citing State ex rel. Serocki v. Circuit 
                                                 
5 J.W.K. is no longer subject to the July 21, 2017 
commitment order; it was in effect for only twelve months and 
expired in July 2018. 
6 In Winnebago Cty. v. Christopher S., 2016 WI 1, 366 
Wis. 2d 1, 
878 
N.W.2d 109, 
we 
nevertheless 
exercised 
our 
discretion to address the issues raised (despite their mootness) 
because they were "of great public importance" and "likely to 
evade appellate review."  Id., ¶32.   
No. 
2017AP1574   
 
9 
 
Court for Clark Cty., 163 Wis. 2d 152, 471 N.W.2d 49 (1991), 
J.W.K. maintains a recommitment order is merely a continuation 
of the original commitment and creates a chain linking each 
prior commitment order to any extension that follows it.  Under 
J.W.K.'s theory, reversing the August 2016 recommitment order 
nullifies any subsequent commitment order, thereby requiring 
reversal of the July 2017 order and any succeeding recommitment 
order.  J.W.K. contends reversal of the August 2016 order would 
create a gap between the original commitment in February 2016 
and the July 2017 recommitment order, thereby making the 
commitment orders no longer consecutive.  J.W.K. argues that 
this break in the chain means the State must start over with an 
original commitment instead of petitioning for an extension.  
J.W.K. describes the original commitment procedures and burden 
of proof as "more onerous" than those required to extend the 
commitment.  J.W.K. argues that reversal of the 2016 order would 
mean the circuit court lacked competency to issue the 2017 
extension order.  J.W.K. also invokes due process, contending 
that if the 2016 order falls, his commitment under the 2017 
order deprived him of his liberty without the requisite showing 
that he was mentally ill and dangerous.  The concurrence/dissent 
echoes 
J.W.K.'s 
arguments, 
maintaining 
that 
the 
original 
commitment and any extensions of that commitment "create[] a 
chain linking each prior order to any extension that follows."  
Concurrence/dissent, ¶35.  We disagree.   
¶16 "[C]ommitment 
for 
any 
purpose 
constitutes 
a 
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process 
No. 
2017AP1574   
 
10 
 
protection."  Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983) 
(quoted source omitted). The County comports with due process 
when it "confine[s] a mentally ill person if it shows 'by clear 
and convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and 
dangerous.'"  Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) 
(quoting Jones, 463 U.S. at 362).  The commitment, however, 
cannot continue after the constitutional basis for it ceases to 
exist; the findings of mental illness and dangerousness must be 
current, not retrospective.  See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77-78.  
While the Supreme Court determined that the Constitution 
requires a showing of dangerousness, and not mental illness 
alone, it "has declined to prescribe 'strict boundaries for 
legislative determinations of what degree of dangerousness is 
necessary for involuntary commitment.'"  See State v. Dennis H., 
2002 WI 104, ¶13, 255 Wis. 2d 359, 647 N.W.2d 851 (quoting State 
v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 312, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995)).   
¶17 To 
initiate 
commitment 
proceedings 
involving 
a 
mentally ill individual under Wis. Stat. § 51.20, the County 
must file a petition alleging the individual is (1) mentally ill 
and a proper subject for treatment, and (2) "[t]he individual is 
dangerous."  § 51.20(1)(a)1-2; see also J.W.J., 375 Wis. 2d 542, 
¶18.  The statute contains five standards by which the County 
may show the individual is dangerous.  § 51.20(1)(a)2.a-e.  Each 
requires the County to identify recent acts or omissions 
demonstrating that the individual is a danger to himself or to 
others.  See id.  During the final hearing, the County bears the 
burden of proving the allegations in the petition by clear and 
No. 
2017AP1574   
 
11 
 
convincing evidence.  § 51.20(13)(e); J.W.J., 375 Wis. 2d 542, 
¶19.  If the grounds in the petition are proven, then the court 
"shall" order commitment.  § 51.20(13)(a)3; see also M.J. v. 
Milwaukee Cty. Combined Cmty. Servs. Bd., 122 Wis. 2d 525, 529-
30, 362 N.W.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1984).  The initial period of 
commitment cannot exceed six months.  § 51.20(13)(g)1.   
¶18 Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20 allows the initial commitment 
order to be extended for "a period not to exceed one year."  
§ 51.20(13)(g)1, (13)(g)3.   
Upon application for extension of a commitment by the 
department or the county department having custody of 
the subject, the court shall proceed under subs. (10) 
to (13).[7]  If the court determines that the 
individual is a proper subject for commitment as 
prescribed 
in 
sub. 
(1)(a)1. 
and 
evidences 
the 
conditions under sub. (1)(a)2. or (am) . . . it shall 
order judgment to that effect and continue the 
commitment[.] 
§ 51.20(13)(g)3 (emphasis added).  An extension requires the 
County to prove the same elements by clear and convincing 
evidence:  (1) the individual is mentally ill and a proper 
subject for treatment, and (2) the individual is dangerous.  See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a), 
(am); 
see 
also 
J.W.J., 
375 
Wis. 2d 542, ¶20 ("Upon each petition to extend a term of 
commitment, a county must establish the same elements with the 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20(10) details the requirements for 
hearings, subsection (11) addresses jury trials, subsection (12) 
delineates an exception to the requirement of open hearings, and 
subsection (13) deals with the disposition of the petition for 
involuntary commitment.  § 51.20(10)-(13). 
No. 
2017AP1574   
 
12 
 
same quantum of proof.").  However, in addition to the five 
standards for showing dangerousness by recent acts or omissions 
under § 51.20(1)(a)2.a-e, the County may prove dangerousness 
under § 51.20(1)(am).   
¶19 Because an individual's behavior might change while 
receiving treatment, Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am) provides a 
different avenue for proving dangerousness if the individual has 
been the subject of treatment for mental illness immediately 
prior to commencement of the extension proceedings: 
If the individual has been the subject of inpatient 
treatment for mental illness . . . immediately prior 
to commencement of the proceedings as a result 
of . . . a commitment or protective placement ordered 
by a court under this section . . . the requirements 
of a recent overt act, attempt or threat to act under 
par. (a)2. a. or b., pattern of recent acts or 
omissions under par. (a)2. c. or e., or recent 
behavior under par. (a)2. d. may be satisfied by a 
showing that there is a substantial likelihood, based 
on the subject individual's treatment record, that the 
individual would be a proper subject for commitment if 
treatment were withdrawn[.] 
§ 51.20(1)(am) (emphasis added).  Under this provision, if the 
individual who is the subject of extension proceedings is under 
commitment "immediately prior" to the extension proceedings, 
then the County may, as an alternative to the options outlined 
in 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.a-e, 
prove 
dangerousness 
by 
showing 
"a 
substantial likelihood, based on the subject individual's 
treatment record, that the individual would be a proper subject 
for commitment if treatment were withdrawn."  § 51.20(1)(am).  
This paragraph recognizes that an individual receiving treatment 
may not have exhibited any recent overt acts or omissions 
No. 
2017AP1574   
 
13 
 
demonstrating dangerousness because the treatment ameliorated 
such behavior, but if treatment were withdrawn, there may be a 
substantial likelihood such behavior would recur.  In this way, 
paragraph (am) functions as an alternative evidentiary path, 
reflecting 
a 
change 
in 
circumstances 
occasioned 
by 
an 
individual's commitment and treatment.  However, dangerousness 
remains an element to be proven to support both the initial 
commitment and any extension.   
¶20 After the initial commitment period, which may last no 
longer than six months, "all subsequent consecutive orders of 
commitment of the individual may be for a period not to exceed 
one year."  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)1.  The circuit court must 
hold a hearing on the petition for extension before the previous 
order expires or it loses competency to extend the commitment.  
See G.O.T. v. Rock Cty., 151 Wis. 2d 629, 633, 445 N.W.2d 697 
(Ct. 
App. 
1989) 
(explaining 
that 
"[a]n 
initial 
commitment . . . expires at the end of six months and cannot be 
extended beyond that period unless a statute permits its 
extension," and "[f]or that reason, the trial court must hold 
the extension hearing before the initial commitment expires"); 
Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)1, 3 (allowing for extension of 
consecutive orders of commitment); see also City of Eau Claire 
v. Booth, 2016 WI 65, ¶21, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 882 N.W.2d 738 ("a 
circuit court may lose competency to enter judgment in a 
particular case if statutory requirements are not met"). 
¶21 J.W.K.'s domino theory that each extension depends on 
the validity of previous commitment orders is not supported by 
No. 
2017AP1574   
 
14 
 
the text of the statute.  First, reversing the August 2016 
recommitment order does not retroactively deprive the circuit 
court that issued a subsequent commitment order of competency.  
The statute permits the extension of an individual's commitment 
for up to one year at a time, and contemplates consecutive 
orders of commitment.  See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)1.  As long 
as the extension is made prior to the expiration of the previous 
commitment order, the circuit court may order the extension if 
the County proves its case under the statutory criteria.8  See 
§ 51.20(13)(g)1, 3; G.O.T., 151 Wis. 2d at 633.  Each order must 
independently be based upon current, dual findings of mental 
illness and dangerousness; accordingly, the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting prior orders has no impact on any subsequent 
order.   
¶22 While J.W.K. correctly notes the circuit court lacks 
competency to extend a commitment order once the previous order 
expires, the August 2016 order remained in effect at the time 
J.W.K.'s commitment was extended in July 2017.  Accordingly, the 
circuit court had competency to extend the commitment.  An 
appellate court's later conclusion that the evidence was 
                                                 
8 The concurrence/dissent concludes that a later judicial 
determination of insufficient evidence to support the August 
2016 order renders that order retroactively invalid, resulting 
in the expiration of the original commitment before any valid 
extension. 
 
Concurrence/dissent, 
¶¶34,36. 
 
The 
concurrence/dissent misunderstands the text of Chapter 51.  When 
the commitment was extended in July 2017, the August 2016 order 
remained in place, and as a factual matter, the orders were 
therefore consecutive.  Accordingly, the circuit court retained 
competency to extend J.W.K.'s commitment in 2017. 
No. 
2017AP1574   
 
15 
 
insufficient to support the August 2016 extension order would 
not retroactively change the fact that at the time the circuit 
court entered the extension order in July 2017, the prior order 
had 
not 
expired; 
therefore, 
the 
circuit 
court 
retained 
competency to enter the unchallenged July 2017 order.   
¶23 Second, J.W.K. fails to identify any provision in Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20 
making 
the 
validity 
of 
an 
unchallenged 
recommitment order vulnerable to the invalidation on appeal of 
the 
previous 
recommitment 
order. 
 
Contrary 
to 
the 
concurrence/dissent's insistence that "[t]he statutory language 
supports 
[the] 
premise" 
that 
"an 
extension 
order 
is 
a 
continuation of the original commitment and creates a chain 
linking each prior order to any extension that follows,"9 no such 
language appears in the statute, and the availability of the 
alternate evidentiary standard in paragraph (am) requires 
nothing more than "the individual ha[ving] been the subject of 
inpatient treatment for mental illness . . . immediately prior 
to commencement of the proceedings as a result of . . . a 
commitment or protective placement ordered by a court under this 
section[.]"  § 51.20(1)(am).  The statute says nothing about the 
validity of the preceding order of commitment or protective 
placement and does not condition the availability of the 
alternate means of establishing dangerousness on the legitimacy 
of the prior order for treatment.  This makes sense, because the 
alternate means for establishing dangerousness is predicated 
                                                 
9 Concurrence/dissent, ¶35. 
No. 
2017AP1574   
 
16 
 
upon the fact that treatment may have had the desired effect of 
ending the dangerous behaviors that led to the individual's 
original commitment in the first place.  "Because of the therapy 
received, evidence of recent action exhibiting 'dangerousness' 
is often nonexistent," and "the emphasis [during extension 
proceedings] is on the attendant consequence to the patient 
should treatment be discontinued."  M.J., 122 Wis. 2d at 531.  
Despite the absence of recent acts demonstrating dangerousness, 
an individual may nevertheless pose a danger to himself or to 
others based on a substantial likelihood that he would exhibit 
those behaviors if treatment were withdrawn.  Paragraph (am) 
"allow[s] extension of a commitment when the patient's condition 
has not improved enough to warrant discharge."  Serocki, 163 
Wis. 2d at 160 (quoted source omitted).         
¶24 Each extension hearing requires the County to prove 
the same elements with the same quantum of proof required for 
the initial commitment.  See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(e), (g)3 
("The petitioner has the burden of proving all required facts by 
clear and convincing evidence.").  The dangerousness standard is 
not more or less onerous during an extension proceeding; the 
constitutional mandate that the County prove an individual is 
both mentally ill and dangerous by clear and convincing evidence 
remains unaltered.  Each extension hearing requires proof of 
current dangerousness.  It is not enough that the individual was 
at one point a proper subject for commitment.  The County must 
prove the individual "is dangerous."  § 51.20(1)(a)2 and 
(13)(g)3 (emphasis added).  The alternate avenue of showing 
No. 
2017AP1574   
 
17 
 
dangerousness under paragraph (am) does not change the elements 
or quantum of proof required.  It merely acknowledges that an 
individual may still be dangerous despite the absence of recent 
acts, omissions, or behaviors exhibiting dangerousness outlined 
in § 51.20(1)(a)2.a-e.   
¶25 Accordingly, even if we assume the insufficiency of 
the County's proffered evidence to support its petition for an 
extension of J.W.K.'s commitment in August 2016, J.W.K. received 
due process during the July 2017 recommitment proceedings 
because the County was required to establish the same elements 
required for any commitment or recommitment:  J.W.K.'s mental 
illness and dangerousness.  J.W.K. does not suggest the County 
failed to carry its burden of proof during the 2017 proceeding; 
therefore, J.W.K.'s due process rights were fully protected.10   
¶26 We reject J.W.K.'s and the concurrence/dissent's claim 
that Serocki supports J.W.K.'s domino theory.  The issue in 
Serocki was whether an individual being committed timely filed a 
request for substitution prior to "any preliminary contested 
matters." 
 
Serocki, 
163 
Wis. 2d at 
156-57. 
 
Because 
a 
recommitment hearing is not "an entirely new proceeding" the 
"circuit court continues to receive evidence in the same case" 
                                                 
10 Contrary to the concurrence/dissent's characterization of 
our 
due 
process 
analysis 
as 
"pay[ing] 
lip 
service" 
to 
constitutional protections afforded the mentally ill, we explain 
that because subsequent extension proceedings require the dual 
showings of mental illness and current dangerousness, the 
proceedings in this case protected J.W.K.'s due process rights.  
The concurrence/dissent misreads the applicable statutes (and 
apparently this opinion) in concluding otherwise.  
No. 
2017AP1574   
 
18 
 
and may rely on "the individual's present condition and past 
response to treatment."  Id. at 159-60.  We concluded a 
recommitment hearing was "a continuation of the original 
commitment proceeding and previous recommitment hearings" in the 
context of the substitution request under Wis. Stat. § 801.58(1) 
(1989-90).  Serocki, 163 Wis. 2d at 156, 160.  This conclusion, 
however, was driven by the language of § 801.58(1) (1989-90) and 
limited to "the context of a request for substitution."  
Serocki, 163 Wis. 2d at 160.  Because a substitution request 
must be made prior to the circuit court hearing any preliminary 
contested matters, as a procedural matter the individual subject 
to commitment proceedings must make his substitution request in 
the context of the original commitment proceedings, not later.   
¶27 However, the fact that recommitment proceedings are 
procedurally part of the original commitment action does not 
mean 
that 
the 
requisite 
findings 
of 
mental 
illness 
and 
dangerousness necessary to support a recommitment may be 
borrowed from the original proceeding.  To the contrary, in 
Serocki, we explicitly acknowledged that "the circuit court must 
make a new determination of the individual's suitability for 
commitment at the recommitment hearing."  Id. at 159.  The 
"evidence 
presented 
at 
each 
recommitment 
hearing 
may 
be 
different from evidence presented at the original commitment 
proceeding or a previous recommitment hearing."  Id.  We never 
stated or implied that the validity of each recommitment order 
depended on the validity of every commitment order preceding it.   
No. 
2017AP1574   
 
19 
 
¶28 Because a decision invalidating the August 2016 
recommitment order has no impact on subsequent extensions, each 
of which independently requires the County to meet the statutory 
burden of proof, J.W.K.'s argument that insufficient evidence 
supported the August 2016 order is moot.11 
¶29 J.W.K. argues that concluding his case is moot may 
deprive him of meaningful appellate review because appellate 
proceedings in Chapter 51 commitments are rarely completed 
before a subsequent recommitment order is entered.  The 
concurrence/dissent similarly laments the "lack of remedy," 
which it considers "especially troubling in light of the fact 
that an extension order is valid for no more than one year, and 
therefore, by the time an appeal is heard, there is likely to be 
a subsequent extension order in effect."  Concurrence/dissent, 
¶37 (footnote omitted).  That a recommitment order will likely 
expire before appellate proceedings conclude does not transform 
a moot issue into a live controversy.  Rather, such concerns may 
be addressed under the well-established exceptions to dismissal 
for mootness, particularly, issues capable of repetition yet 
                                                 
11 Our holding that J.W.K.'s sufficiency challenge is moot 
is 
limited 
to 
situations 
where, 
as 
here, 
no 
collateral 
implications of the commitment order are raised.  J.W.K. points 
out there may be "a variety of reasons other issues in chapter 
51 cases are not moot even though a subsequent extension order 
has 
been 
entered 
or 
the 
order 
expired," 
including 
"the 
implications of a firearms ban when initially committed, 
potential civil claims related to an illegal commitment," and 
any attempt by the County to recover its cost of care.  J.W.K. 
does not argue any of these collateral circumstances; therefore, 
we do not address them.  
No. 
2017AP1574   
 
20 
 
evading review.  In G.S. v. State, we explained the exceptions 
to dismissal for mootness include situations involving:  (1) 
"issues 
[] 
of 
great 
public 
importance;" 
(2) 
"the 
constitutionality of a statute;" (3) issues that arise so often 
"a definitive decision is essential to guide the trial courts;" 
(4) "issue[s] . . . likely to arise again and [that] should be 
resolved by the court to avoid uncertainty;" or (5) an issue 
"capable and likely of repetition and yet evades review because 
the appellate process usually cannot be completed and frequently 
cannot even be undertaken within a time that would result in a 
practical effect upon the parties."  G.S., 118 Wis. 2d at 805 
(emphasis added).   
¶30 J.W.K. makes no argument that any of the exceptions to 
dismissal for mootness apply, and his sufficiency challenge does 
not appear to fit into any of the exceptions.  J.W.K.'s 
sufficiency challenge is fact-specific. While it is undoubtedly 
extremely important to J.W.K., the issue is not of great public 
importance; the sufficiency of the evidence will be different in 
each 
case. 
 
J.W.K. 
raises 
no 
arguments 
concerning 
the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 51.20.  Additionally, we do 
not perceive a lack of definitive guidance on the issue J.W.K. 
raises, or uncertainty in the lower courts that warrants our 
intervention.  Finally, this case is not "likely of repetition."  
See G.S., 118 Wis. 2d at 805.  The "'capable of repetition, yet 
evading review' doctrine" is limited to situations involving "a 
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be 
subjected to the same action again."  State ex rel. Clarke v. 
No. 
2017AP1574   
 
21 
 
Carballo, 83 Wis. 2d 349, 357, 265 N.W.2d 285 (1978) (quoting 
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (emphasis 
added)).  This is not the case for J.W.K.  He argues the 
evidence was insufficient during a particular hearing; he raises 
no issues concerning the subsequent application of § 51.20 to 
him under later recommitment orders. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶31 We agree with the court of appeals and hold J.W.K.'s 
sufficiency of the evidence argument is moot because J.W.K. is 
no longer subject to the recommitment order he is appealing.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' decision dismissing 
J.W.K.'s appeal as moot. 
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2017AP1574.rfd 
 
1 
 
 
¶32 REBECCA 
FRANK 
DALLET, 
J.   (concurring 
in 
part, 
dissenting in part).  The majority opinion concludes that 
because J.W.K. received due process during the July 2017 
hearing, the validity of the August 2016 extension order is 
irrelevant and J.W.K.'s challenge to that order is moot.1  I 
respectfully disagree.  I conclude that the sufficiency of the 
evidence presented at J.W.K.'s August 2016 extension hearing 
determines the validity of the August 2016 extension order and 
necessarily also determines the validity of any subsequent 
extension orders.  Thus, although J.W.K. is no longer subject to 
the order being appealed, the appeal from the August 2016 
extension order is not moot.  Accordingly, I examine the 
evidence presented at the August 2016 extension hearing and 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
finding 
of 
current 
dangerousness was not erroneous.  
¶33 In order to confine someone who is mentally ill, the 
County must show by clear and convincing evidence that the 
person is currently mentally ill and dangerous.  Foucha v. 
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).  There are two evidentiary 
paths to prove dangerousness pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 51.20.  
                                                 
1 The majority uses the term "recommitment," however, I use 
the language included in the statutory provision which governs 
commitment beyond the initial commitment order.  See majority 
op., ¶1 n.1.  That section refers to the filing of an 
"application for extension of a commitment" and requires proof 
that the individual "is in need of continued commitment" in 
order for the circuit court to enter judgment to "continue the 
commitment."  See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)3.  
No.  2017AP1574.rfd 
 
2 
 
The first path, applicable to initial commitment proceedings, 
requires the County to identify recent acts or omissions 
demonstrating the individual is a danger to themselves or 
others, pursuant to § 51.20(1)(a)2.a.-e.  In what the majority 
opinion refers to as the "alternative evidentiary path," the 
County may prove current dangerousness by showing there is "a 
substantial likelihood, based on the subject individual's 
treatment record, that the individual would be a proper subject 
for commitment if treatment were withdrawn," pursuant to 
§ 51.20(1)(am). 
 
Majority 
op., 
¶19. 
 
This 
alternative 
evidentiary path is only available if the individual has been 
the 
subject 
of 
inpatient 
treatment 
for 
mental 
illness 
"immediately prior to commencement of the proceedings as a 
result 
of . . . a 
commitment . . . under 
this 
section."  
§ 51.20(1)(am) (emphasis added).2  The circuit court "must make a 
new 
determination 
of 
the 
individual's 
suitability 
for 
commitment" at each extension hearing and evidence presented at 
each extension hearing "may be different from evidence presented 
at the original commitment proceeding."  State ex rel. Serocki 
v. Circuit Court for Clark Cty., 163 Wis. 2d 152, 159, 471 
N.W.2d 49 (1991).  
¶34 As recognized by the majority, the circuit court lacks 
competency to extend a commitment order once the initial 
commitment order has expired.  Majority op., ¶22.  See G.O.T. v. 
                                                 
2 There are other paths in Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am) that 
the County could follow, but those paths are not applicable 
here.  
No.  2017AP1574.rfd 
 
3 
 
Rock Cty., 151 Wis. 2d 629, 633, 445 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. App. 
1989)("[a]n initial commitment . . . expires at the end of six 
months and cannot be extended beyond that period unless a 
statute permits its extension").  If current dangerousness was 
not established at the August 2016 extension hearing, the August 
2016 extension order was invalid.  As such, the initial 
commitment order would have expired prior to it being extended 
and the circuit court would have lacked competency to enter any 
subsequent extension orders.  Contrary to the majority opinion, 
even if dangerousness were established during the July 2017 
hearing, this does not cure the circuit court's lack of 
competency to issue an extension order in July 2017 or render 
the two orders somehow permissibly "consecutive."  Majority op., 
¶21 n.8. 
¶35 J.W.K. properly asserts that an extension order is a 
continuation of the original commitment and creates a chain 
linking each prior order to any extension that follows.  The 
statutory language supports this premise. See Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(13)(g)3. (referring to the court order after the filing 
of an "application for extension" as an order to "continue the 
commitment" requiring proof that the individual "is in need of 
continued commitment"); see also § 51.20(1)(am) (creating an 
alternative 
path 
to 
prove 
current 
dangerousness 
if 
the 
individual is subject to a commitment order "immediately prior" 
to the extension hearing).  Additionally, in Serocki, in the 
context of a request for substitution, this court concluded that 
the legislature intended for an individual's extension hearing 
No.  2017AP1574.rfd 
 
4 
 
to be "a continuation of the original commitment proceeding and 
previous recommitment hearings."  Serocki, 163 Wis. 2d at 154.   
¶36 If the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am) were 
not met at the August 2016 extension hearing, J.W.K. would not 
have been subject to a valid commitment order immediately prior 
to the July 2017 hearing.  Once the chain of commitment was 
broken, 
the 
County 
would 
be 
required 
to 
prove 
current 
dangerousness as it did at the initial commitment hearing, by 
establishing a factor set forth in § 51.20(1)(a)2.a.-e.  If the 
County did not do so, any subsequent extension orders would be 
rendered invalid.3   
¶37 The 
importance 
of 
the 
circuit 
court 
making 
a 
sufficient 
finding 
of 
current 
dangerousness 
prior 
to 
an 
extension of commitment cannot be overstated.  The United States 
Supreme Court has emphasized that in order to confine a mentally 
ill individual, due process requires the County to show by clear 
and convincing evidence that the individual is currently 
mentally ill and dangerous.  Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80; see also 
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 362 (1983).  Absent this 
finding, any extension order will not only violate Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20, but also J.W.K.'s due process rights.  Although the 
majority pays lip service to the due process protection required 
                                                 
3 At the July 2017 hearing, the County followed the 
alternative evidentiary path to prove current dangerousness 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am).  The parties did not 
brief the issue of whether that testimony also established 
current 
dangerousness 
pursuant 
to 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.a.-e. 
and 
therefore I will not address it.    
No.  2017AP1574.rfd 
 
5 
 
to deprive a mentally ill individual of their fundamental right 
to liberty, it provides no consequence for a County's failure to 
prove current dangerousness and the corresponding violation of 
due process.  A lack of remedy is especially troubling in light 
of the fact that an extension order is valid for no more than 
one year,4 and therefore, by the time an appeal is heard, there 
is likely to be a subsequent extension order in effect.  
According 
to 
the 
majority, 
the 
County 
can 
violate 
an 
individual's due process rights without any practical effect.  
See majority op., ¶14.  The majority ignores the possible remedy 
for an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty that would have a 
practical effect on any individual and would help to ensure the 
protection of due process rights for the mentally ill:  release 
from confinement.   
¶38 Because I find that J.W.K.'s appeal of the sufficiency 
of his August 2016 extension order is not moot, I reach the 
issue J.W.K. sought to raise on appeal:  whether the County 
proved by clear and convincing evidence at the August 2016 
extension hearing that J.W.K. would still be a proper subject 
for commitment if treatment were withdrawn.5  This court defers 
to the circuit court's factual findings unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  See Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 
2009 WI 74, ¶34, 319 Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 615.   
                                                 
4 See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)1. 
5 The circuit court extended J.W.K.'s commitment prior to 
completion of briefing on appeal.  
No.  2017AP1574.rfd 
 
6 
 
¶39 On 
direct 
examination, 
Dr. 
James 
Scott 
Persing 
testified that he examined J.W.K. and that, in his opinion, 
there was a substantial likelihood that J.W.K. would be a proper 
subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am).  Had this been the extent of the 
testimony to prove the dangerousness prong, J.W.K.'s argument 
regarding the sufficiency of the evidence would be stronger.  
However, the hearing continued and Dr. Persing was questioned on 
cross-examination regarding the basis for his opinion.  Dr. 
Persing responded that he based his opinion:  "[o]n the history 
of the overall struggles with chronic mental illness for many 
years with variable levels of compliance with treatment, and 
leading up to a point of variety of altercations, or need for 
mental health commitment."  Dr. Persing further described how 
assessment of J.W.K. was difficult because he had been isolative 
and was not participating in therapeutic and recreational 
activities.   
¶40 The circuit court found that based upon the testimony 
of Dr. Persing and J.W.K., there was a substantial likelihood 
that J.W.K. would be a proper subject for commitment if 
treatment were withdrawn.  While the testimony supporting Dr. 
Persing's opinion as to J.W.K.'s current dangerousness was 
minimal, I nevertheless conclude that the findings of the 
circuit court are not clearly erroneous and must be upheld.   
¶41 In sum, I conclude that J.W.K.'s appeal of his August 
2016 extension order is not moot and therefore I would reverse 
the court of appeals' decision.  Further, I reach the issue 
No.  2017AP1574.rfd 
 
7 
 
regarding the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the 
August 2016 extension hearing, which the majority opinion and 
court of appeals failed to address, and conclude that the 
circuit court's finding that J.W.K. was dangerous was not 
clearly erroneous.  Therefore, I concur in part and would affirm 
the circuit court's August 2016 extension order.     
¶42 For the foregoing reasons, I concur in part and 
dissent in part. 
¶43 I am authorized to state that Justices SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this concurrence/dissent. 
 
No.  2017AP1574.rfd 
 
 
 
1