Case Title: Emer's Camper Corral, LLC v. Western Heritage Insurance Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018AP000458

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2020-05-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
2020 WI 46 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP458 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Emer's Camper Corral, LLC, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Michael A. Alderman, Alderman, Inc. d/b/a 
Jensen-Sundquist  
Insurance Agency and Western Heritage Insurance 
Company, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 386 Wis. 2d 592,928 N.W.2d 641 
PDC No:2019 WI App 17 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 21, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 25, 2019   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Burnett   
 
JUDGE: 
Melissia R. Mogen   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
KELLY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ZIEGLER, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, DALLET and 
HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. ROGGENSACK, C.J., filed a dissenting 
opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Steven L. Miller and Miller Appellate Practice, LLC, River 
Falls, WI. There was an oral argument by Steven L. Miller.  
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by Rolf 
E. Sonnesyn, Beth L. LaCanne, and Tomsche, Sonnesyn & Tomsche, 
 
 
2 
P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota. There was an oral argument by Rolf 
E. Sonnesyn.  
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 46 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP458 
(L.C. No. 
2015CV25) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Emer's Camper Corral, LLC, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael A. Alderman, Alderman, Inc. d/b/a 
Jensen-Sundquist  
 
Insurance Agency and Western Heritage Insurance 
Company, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
FILED 
 
MAY 21, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KELLY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ZIEGLER, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, DALLET, and 
HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. ROGGENSACK, C.J., filed a dissenting 
opinion. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.   Emer's Camper Corral, LLC ("Camper 
Corral") thought its insurance agent had acquired a policy with a 
deductible of $1,000 per camper in the event of hail damage with 
a $5,000 aggregate deductible limit.  In actuality, the policy 
required a $5,000 deductible per camper, with no aggregate limit.  
Camper Corral did not discover the truth until after a hailstorm 
damaged many of the campers on its lot.   
No. 
2018AP458   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Camper Corral sued its insurance agent, Michael A. 
Alderman, and Alderman, Inc. d/b/a Jensen-Sundquist (collectively, 
"Mr. Alderman") claiming he was negligent because he procured a 
policy that did not conform to its requirements.1  The circuit 
court directed a verdict because Camper Corral's failure to 
introduce evidence that an insurer would have insured the company 
with the deductible limits it thought it had meant that it had not 
proven a causal link between the agent's negligence and the 
sustained loss.2 
¶3 
We granted Camper Corral's petition for review to 
determine whether it must prove not just that an insurance policy 
with the requested deductibles was commercially available, but 
also that an insurer would actually write that policy for Camper 
Corral in particular.  We hold that commercial availability is 
insufficient to establish causation; Camper Corral must also prove 
it would have qualified for an insurance policy with better terms 
than the policy it actually obtained.  Therefore, we affirm the 
court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND3 
                                                 
1 Camper Corral also filed a claim for reformation of contract 
based on mutual mistake against its insurer, Western Heritage 
Insurance Company.  That claim is not before us. 
2 This is a review of a published court of appeals opinion, 
Emer's Camper Corral, LLC v. Alderman, 2019 WI App 17, 386 
Wis. 2d 592, 928 N.W.2d 641, which affirmed the Burnett County 
Circuit Court, the Honorable Melissia R. Mogen, presiding. 
3 The facts are taken from the Complaint, trial testimony, 
and the circuit court's written order granting Mr. Alderman's 
motion for a directed verdict, which was filed on January 26, 2018. 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
3 
 
¶4 
Camper Corral (owned by Rhonda Emer and her husband) has 
been in the business of selling new and used camper trailers since 
approximately 2004.4  Since shortly after it started business, 
Camper Corral has obtained its insurance through its agent, Mr. 
Alderman.  In approximately 2007, it contacted Mr. Alderman to 
obtain an insurance policy to cover its camper inventory. 
¶5 
Mrs. Emer said Camper Corral's first garage policy 
(issued by General Casualty in 2007) included coverage for hail 
damage.  She said it carried a $500 deductible per camper and, to 
her knowledge, had no aggregate limit on the deductible.  The 
General Casualty policy commenced on September 30, and expired on 
September 30 of the following year.  Succeeding policies commenced 
immediately upon expiration of the preceding policy. 
 ¶6 In 2011, Camper Corral sustained approximately $100,000 
in damages to numerous campers in a hailstorm.  Camper Corral 
submitted a claim to General Casualty pursuant to the policy then 
in effect.  General Casualty duly paid the claim and subsequently 
renewed Camper Corral's policy under the same terms for the 2011-
2012 policy period.  Camper Corral again sustained hail damage 
totaling approximately $100,000 in the summer of 2012.  As before, 
General Casualty paid on the claim, but this time it sent Camper 
Corral a non-renewal letter prior to commencement of the 2012-2013 
policy term.   
                                                 
4 At the outset, Camper Corral focused on selling used campers 
only; however, in or around 2008, it also began selling new camper 
trailers. 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
4 
 
¶7 
Mr. Alderman told Camper Corral that its next insurance 
policy would have to come from "other markets," which Mrs. Emer 
understood to mean that Camper Corral would likely pay higher 
premiums and would have less favorable deductibles.  Ultimately, 
Camper Corral obtained coverage for the 2012-2013 policy period 
from Western Heritage Insurance Company ("Western Heritage").  
Mrs. Emer said she knew this policy contained a $5,000 deductible 
per camper for hail damage.  She also said she understood that, 
due to Camper Corral's recent claims history, she could not obtain 
a policy with more favorable terms.  Mr. Alderman told her that if 
Camper Corral remained claims free for one to two years, he could 
potentially get the deductible down to $1,000 per camper.  She 
understood, however, that this was a goal——not a promise that it 
would be possible.  
¶8 
Camper Corral did, in fact, go claims free during the 
2012-2013 policy period.  According to Camper Corral, as the 2013-
2014 policy period approached, Mr. Alderman contacted Camper 
Corral with the "great news" that he had obtained a policy from 
Western Heritage with a $1,000 deductible per camper for hail 
damage with a $5,000 aggregate deductible limit.  Unbeknownst to 
Camper Corral, however, the 2013-2014 policy placed by Mr. Alderman 
with Western Heritage actually required a $5,000 per camper 
deductible with no aggregate limit. 
¶9 
In August 2014, Mr. Alderman contacted Camper Corral to 
discuss policy options for the upcoming 2014-2015 period.  Mr. 
Alderman explained that he had obtained quotes from Western 
Heritage (the current provider) and Erie Insurance Company, an 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
5 
 
insurance company in the standard market.  According to Mrs. Emer, 
he indicated that both quotes offered a $1,000 per camper hail 
deductible and that the Western Heritage quote had the same terms 
as the soon-to-expire 2013-2014 policy.  Before the two could meet 
to discuss the quotes, however, Camper Corral sustained hail damage 
to 25 campers in its inventory on September 3, 2014.  As a result, 
Erie rescinded its quote.  Western Heritage, however, could not 
rescind its quote because, according to Mrs. Emer's trial 
testimony, the hail damage claim occurred within 60 days of the 
renewal period.  
¶10 After the hail event on September 3, 2014, Mrs. Emer 
discovered that the 2013-2014 Western Heritage policy actually 
contained a $5,000 per camper deductible for hail damage rather 
than the $1,000 deductible she thought it had, and that there was 
no aggregate deductible limit.  With damage to 25 campers, Camper 
Corral's total deductible came to $125,000. 
¶11 Camper Corral's lawsuit against Mr. Alderman claimed he 
breached his duty of care to Camper Corral by obtaining a policy 
for the 2013-2014 period with a $5,000 per camper deductible 
despite being aware that Camper Corral desired coverage with a 
lower deductible.  The Complaint alleges that Mr. Alderman is 
liable in the amount of $120,000——the difference between the 
$125,000 deductible Camper Corral paid for the September 3, 2014 
hail event and the $5,000 aggregate deductible Camper Corral 
believed it had obtained for the 2013-2014 policy period.  
¶12 Mr. Alderman moved for summary judgment, arguing that 
Camper Corral's negligence claim must fail because there was no 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
6 
 
evidence that Mr. Alderman had caused Camper Corral's damages.  
The circuit court denied the motion and the case proceeded to a 
jury trial. 
¶13 Before submitting the case to the jury, Mr. Alderman 
moved for a directed verdict challenging the causal connection 
between Camper Corral's damages and his failure to obtain an 
insurance policy with the desired terms.  Specifically, he argued 
there could be no causal connection unless Camper Corral had been 
eligible for an insurance policy with the more favorable terms it 
believed it had for the 2013-2014 policy period.  The circuit court 
took the motion under advisement and counsel for Mr. Alderman then 
read the deposition testimony of Robert Sutton, an insurance expert 
Camper Corral had hired but did not call at trial, to the jury.  
As relevant here, Mr. Sutton stated that, because of Camper 
Corral's claims history in 2011 and 2012, it was not possible for 
Camper Corral to have obtained an insurance policy with a $1,000 
hail deductible and $5,000 aggregate deductible for the 2013-2014 
policy period.  Mr. Alderman then renewed his motion, which the 
circuit court granted.  The circuit court stated that "[t]he 
evidence presented in this case through the testimony and the 
exhibits presents no evidence that the policy . . . was available 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
7 
 
or could have been available[,]" and therefore the claim failed as 
a matter of law.5   
¶14 The court of appeals affirmed, noting that "no credible 
evidence was introduced at trial to support a finding that, absent 
Alderman's alleged negligence, Camper Corral could have obtained 
a policy with a hail damage deductible of less than $5000 per 
unit. . . .  The circuit court's assessment of the evidence was 
not 'clearly wrong.'"  Emer's Camper Corral, LLC v. Alderman, 2019 
WI App 17, ¶24, 386 Wis. 2d 592, 928 N.W.2d 641 (internal citation 
omitted).  We granted Camper Corral's petition for review and now 
affirm the court of appeals. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶15 "A motion for a directed verdict challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence."  Marquez v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 
2012 WI 57, ¶47, 341 Wis. 2d 119, 815 N.W.2d 314; see also Wis. 
Stat. § 805.14(4) (2017-18)6 ("In trials to the jury, at the close 
of all evidence, any party may challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence 
as 
a 
matter 
of 
law 
by 
moving 
for 
directed 
                                                 
5 The circuit court determined that the case failed for the 
additional reason that, in a negligent procurement claim, expert 
testimony is necessary to establish the standard of care.  Camper 
Corral did not introduce any such testimony.  But because the court 
of appeals affirmed the circuit court on the question of causation, 
it did not address whether expert testimony on the standard of 
care was necessary.  Emer's Camper Corral, 386 Wis. 2d 592, ¶2, n. 
1.  It is unclear why the dissent discusses this issue inasmuch as 
Camper Corral did not raise it in its petition for review and we 
do not address it here.  See dissent, ¶8.    
6 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
8 
 
verdict . . . .").  The court may grant the motion if it "is  
satisfied that, considering all credible evidence and reasonable 
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party 
against whom the motion is made, there is no credible evidence to 
sustain a finding in favor of such party."   § 805.14(1).  Where 
a circuit court grants a motion for a directed verdict, we will 
uphold the circuit court's decision unless the circuit court was 
clearly wrong.  Gagliano & Co., Inc. v. Openfirst, LLC, 2014 WI 65, 
¶30, 355 Wis. 2d 258, 850 N.W.2d 845 (citing Weiss v. United Fire 
& Cas. Co., 197 Wis. 2d 365, 389, 541 N.W.2d 753 (1995)) (when 
reviewing a "circuit court's decision to grant a directed verdict, 
the verdict must stand unless the record reveals that the circuit 
court was clearly wrong.").  "A circuit court's evidentiary 
determination is clearly wrong when there is any credible evidence 
to support the position of the non-moving party."  Gagliano, 355 
Wis. 2d 258, ¶30. 
¶16 Whether the circuit court applied the proper legal 
standard in analyzing causation is a question of law we review de 
novo.  See State v. Greenwold, 181 Wis. 2d 881, 884-885, 512 
N.W.2d 237 (Ct. App. 1994). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶17 Camper Corral says it may have recovery against Mr. 
Alderman because he acted negligently when he obtained an insurance 
policy with higher than requested deductibles.  A plaintiff 
succeeds on such a claim by proving the standard quartet of 
negligence elements, which in this case comprise:  (1) Mr. 
Alderman's duty of care to Camper Corral; (2) Mr. Alderman's breach 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
9 
 
of that duty; (3) injury caused by Mr. Alderman's breach; and (4) 
actual loss or damage resulting from the injury.  See Avery v. 
Diedrich, 2007 WI 80, ¶20, 301 Wis. 2d 693, 734 N.W.2d 159; 
Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 WI 68, ¶19, 235 Wis. 2d 781, 611 
N.W.2d 906; Robinson v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 137 Wis. 2d 1, 15, 
402 N.W.2d 711 (1987). 
¶18 This case involves only the third of the four negligence 
elements.  To establish causation, Camper Corral must prove that 
it would not have sustained its alleged $120,000 loss absent Mr. 
Alderman's negligence.  The loss in this case represents the 
difference between the $125,000 aggregate deductible for which 
Camper Corral was responsible under the 2013-2014 Western Heritage 
policy and the $5,000 aggregate deductible for which it would have 
been responsible if Mr. Alderman had procured a policy with the 
terms Camper Corral requested.7   
¶19 The circuit court granted a directed verdict because it 
saw no evidence linking Mr. Alderman's breach to Camper Corral's 
loss.  It concluded that Mr. Alderman could not have caused the 
loss because nothing in the record indicated that Camper Corral 
would have qualified for a policy with the requested deductibles.  
Camper Corral argues, however, that its insurability under the 
requested terms is irrelevant.  Instead, it says it need only 
demonstrate 
that 
policies 
with 
the 
requested 
terms 
were 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Appleton Chinese Food Serv., Inc. v. Murken Ins., 
Inc., 185 Wis. 2d 791, 808, 519 N.W.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1994) 
("Damages arising out of a broker's failure to procure insurance 
are commonly determined by the terms of the policy the agent failed 
to procure."). 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
10 
 
commercially available.  We will refer to this as the "commercial 
availability" theory of causation.  Alternatively, it says it can 
prove a causal connection between Mr. Alderman's breach and its 
losses based on its reliance on his representation that he had 
obtained a policy with the requested deductibles.  If it had known 
Mr. Alderman had failed in that regard, Camper Corral says, it 
could have changed its business practices during the 2013-2014 
policy period to mitigate the vulnerability of its inventory to 
hail damage.  This is Camper Corral's "reliance" theory of 
causation.  We will address each of these theories in turn. 
A.  General Availability v. Particular Availability 
¶20 With the exception of the court of appeals' opinion under 
review, it appears there are no reported Wisconsin cases in which 
the court has determined whether, in establishing causation under 
the commercial availability theory, a policyholder must prove it 
was insurable under the policy terms the broker was supposed to 
obtain.  So our analysis will begin with general principles of 
causation and discern what lessons they have for us in these 
circumstances.  We will also consult the decisions of other courts 
that have addressed themselves to this issue. 
¶21 In negligence cases, "the test for causation is whether 
the conduct at issue was a 'substantial factor' in producing 
plaintiff's injury."  Baumeister v. Automated Products, Inc., 2004 
WI 148, ¶24, 277 Wis. 2d 21, 690 N.W.2d 1 (citing Estate of 
Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 202 Wis. 2d 290, 306, 550 N.W.2d 103 
(1996)).  Or, in the negative formulation, we ask whether the loss 
would have occurred even in the absence of Mr. Alderman's 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
11 
 
negligence:  "Causation is not established by testimony that even 
without defendant's negligence, the harm would have occurred 
anyway."  Beacon Bowl, Inc. v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 176 
Wis. 2d 740, 788, 501 N.W.2d 788 (1993) (citing 
§ 432(1), 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) ("[T]he actor's negligent 
conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to 
another if the harm would have been sustained even if the actor 
had not been negligent.")). 
¶22 Camper Corral's proposed "commercial availability" test 
is, certainly, a necessary prerequisite to satisfying the 
"substantial factor" standard of causation.  After all, if the 
insured requests a policy that is not available in the market, the 
insured's harm comes from its unavailability, not from the broker's 
failure to obtain what does not exist.  So the desired policy must 
be commercially available before the broker's failure can be a 
substantial factor in causing the insured's loss.  The question, 
therefore, resolves to whether "commercial availability" is a 
condition sufficient for that causal link. 
¶23 We 
conclude 
that 
Camper 
Corral's 
"commercial 
availability" standard does not fully answer whether the desired 
policy was available within the meaning of the "substantial factor" 
test.  An insurance policy is not a mass-produced good or service 
that is available to the public without regard for the 
circumstances of the prospective purchaser.  Instead, the 
coverage, terms, and premium depend on factors specific to the 
insured company, such as, for example, its claims history.  See, 
e.g., Leicht Transfer & Storage Co. v. Pallet Cent. Enters., Inc., 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
12 
 
2019 WI 61, ¶11, 387 Wis. 2d 95, 928 N.W.2d 534 (quoted source 
omitted) (explaining that we do "'not interpret insurance policies 
to provide coverage for risks that the insurer did not contemplate 
or underwrite and for which it has not received a premium'"); see 
also Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Montford, 52 F.3d 219, 222 
(9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that an insurance applicant's loss 
history is a fact material to the risk).  So when we say a policy 
with certain deductible limits is "commercially available," what 
we mean is that somewhere in the market there is an insurance 
company willing to write that policy for a hypothetical company 
with a hypothetical set of insurability factors.   
¶24 But just because an insurance company would write a 
specific policy for one company does not mean it would insure all 
companies under the same terms.  Consequently, "commercial 
availability" 
of 
the 
policy 
requested 
by 
Camper 
Corral 
establishes, at most, that some company somewhere could get the 
desired deductible limits.  It does not answer whether such a 
policy was available to Camper Corral.  So, if general commercial 
unavailability prevents formation of a causal link between a 
broker's negligence and an insured's loss, then it necessarily 
follows that the policy's unavailability to Camper Corral in 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
13 
 
particular must also prevent formation of a causal link.8  Whether 
the unavailability is general, or instead particular to Camper 
Corral, the policy's unavailability exists independently of any 
negligence on behalf of the broker.  And if that is so, then the 
broker's negligence cannot be a substantial factor in producing 
Camper Corral's loss because it would have occurred even if the 
broker had not been negligent.  See Beacon Bowl, Inc., 176 
Wis. 2d at 788 ("Causation is not established by testimony that 
even without defendant's negligence, the harm would have occurred 
anyway."). 
¶25 If we did not require Camper Corral to prove it could 
have obtained a policy with the desired deductible limits, we would 
create a substantive wrinkle in the burden of proof for this type 
of case.  Generally, we require a tort claimant to prove each 
element of its claim by a preponderance of the evidence.  See, 
e.g., Atkinson v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 69 Wis. 5, 13, 31 N.W. 164 
                                                 
8 Tri-Town Marine, Inc. v. J.C. Milliken Agency, Inc., 924 
A.2d 1066 (Me. 2007), provides additional instruction.  In that 
case, the insured asserted the commercial availability theory of 
causation, despite conceding that the scope of coverage it sought 
was "not offered by or available from any other insurer[.]"  Id. 
at 1069.  The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine analogized the case 
to 
legal 
malpractice 
cases 
"in 
which 
proof 
that 
better 
representation would have brought about a more favorable outcome 
is required."  Id. at 1070. 
Tri-Town Marine's analogy suggests that mere commercial 
availability of the desired coverage is insufficient to establish 
causation because it does not establish that a specific insured 
would have had a more favorable outcome but for the insurance 
agent's actions.  The insured would not have a more favorable 
outcome, of course, unless it was actually eligible for the desired 
policy terms. 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
14 
 
(1887) ("Negligence being an affirmative fact, necessary to be 
proved by the plaintiff who alleges it, the universal rule is that 
the plaintiff must prove the fact by a preponderance of the 
evidence."); Zillmer v. Miglautsch, 35 Wis. 2d 691, 700, 151 
N.W.2d 741 (1967) ("the plaintiff in a tort case does have the 
burden of proof and, in meeting this burden, he must come forward 
with evidentiary facts that establish the ultimate facts; and the 
degree of proof must be such as to remove these ultimate facts 
from the field of mere speculation and conjecture."); Ehlinger v. 
Sipes, 155 Wis. 2d 1, 12, 454 N.W.2d 754 (1990) ("To establish 
causation in Wisconsin, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving 
that the defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in causing 
the plaintiff's harm."); see also Wis JI——Civil 200 (2004) 
(explaining that the burden of proof "is to satisfy [the 
factfinder] by the greater weight of the credible evidence, to a 
reasonable certainty . . . .").   
¶26 But in asking us to accept "commercial availability" as 
sufficient proof of causation, Camper Corral is actually asking us 
to grant it an evidentiary presumption to help it bridge the gap 
between general and particular availability of the desired 
insurance policy.  It says this presumption is necessary so that 
we do not "impose [on the insured] the difficult task of having to 
retroactively 
prove——often 
years 
later——that 
an 
individual 
plaintiff could have obtained a better policy during the policy 
period at issue."  We do not think the difficulty of a task is a 
sufficient basis for relieving a plaintiff of its duty to prove 
the essential elements of its claim.  Alternatively, Camper Corral 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
15 
 
suggests we could make the presumption rebuttable by allowing the 
insurer to prove the required policy was not actually available to 
the insured.  See, e.g., United Capitol Ins. Co. v. Kapiloff, 155 
F.3d 488, 499 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Patterson Agency, Inc. v. 
Turner, 372 A.2d 258, 261 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977)).  This, of 
course, would require proof of a negative.  And because 
insurability is not susceptible of generalizations, Mr. Alderman 
would have to prove that no insurer in the market would insure 
Camper Corral under the requested terms.   
¶27 Aside from evidentiary difficulties, Camper Corral has 
offered no rationale for either relieving it of its duty to prove 
each element of its claim, or requiring Mr. Alderman to negate the 
presumption in favor of causation.  Therefore, we conclude that 
the general principles governing proof of causation do not support 
Camper Corral's "commercial availability" standard. 
¶28 Nor do we find anything in prior opinions (either ours 
or those of other courts) that suggests we should modify the 
teaching of our general principles.  Camper Corral directs our 
attention to Kapiloff, in which the Fourth Circuit recognized that, 
under Maryland law, "[t]he burden of proving the nonavailability 
of insurance coverage is on the insurer or the broker, because it 
is an affirmative defense that is within the peculiar knowledge of 
those familiar with the market."  155 F.3d at 499 (citing 
Patterson, 372 A.2d at 261).  The Kapiloff court relied on 
Patterson, a Maryland court of appeals opinion, which in turn 
relied on an A.L.R. annotation for its reasoning.  The annotation 
describes "a split of authority . . . as to who bears the burden 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
16 
 
of proof on the availability of insurance . . . ."  Patterson, 372 
A.2d at 261.  The annotation observed that several jurisdictions 
place the burden on the plaintiff: 
In addition to being required to establish the existence 
of a duty to procure insurance and its breach, the 
plaintiff in an action against an agent or broker for 
failure to procure insurance has often been required to 
show that there was a casual (sic [causal]) relationship 
between the negligence of the agent and the loss suffered 
by the client. In several jurisdictions, the causation 
requirement has been a formidable barrier to recovery, 
which has prevented a finding of liability against the 
agent or broker unless the client is able to clearly 
show that were it not for the agent's negligence, he 
would have been issued a valid policy which would have 
protected him against the loss which he suffered. 
Id. (footnote omitted) (citing MacDonald v. Carpenter & Pelton, 
Inc., 31 A.D.2d 952 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969) and Pac. Dredging Co. v. 
Hurley, 397 P.2d 819 (Wash. 1964)).  But not all courts employ 
that standard:  
[A] few courts, recognizing that the question of whether 
a valid policy would have been issued is a matter 
peculiarly within the knowledge of the agent or broker, 
have concluded that causation need not be proved by the 
client and will only enter the case if the issue is 
raised by the agent as an affirmative defense.   
Patterson, 372 A.2d at 261 (citing Annot., 64 A.L.R.3d 398, 407 
(1975); Hans Coiffures Int'l, Inc. v. Hejna, 469 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. 
App. 1971); Scott v. Conner, 403 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)).  
¶29 In response to the annotation's content, the Patterson 
court cryptically analogized the causation issue to a completely 
unrelated affirmative defense.  Specifically, it noted that when 
concurrent causes result in a loss, one covered by the insurance 
policy and one not, it is the insurer's burden to prove the loss 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
17 
 
resulted from the non-covered cause.  Based on this analogy, the 
Patterson court concluded that the "burden of proving the non-
availability [of the requested insurance] should be shouldered by 
the insurer, in the nature of an affirmative defense."  Patterson, 
372 A.2d at 261.  So Patterson, and by extension Kapiloff, provide 
guidance only if we were to conclude that Camper Corral's 
insurability is a piece of information peculiarly within Mr. 
Alderman's knowledge or that insurability is akin to a concurrent 
causation question.  But no party has alleged that Mr. Alderman 
alone would know whether an insurance company would deem Camper 
Corral insurable with the requested deductibles, and we discern 
nothing so peculiar about this information that it could not be 
established through alternative sources (such as other insurance 
brokers or an expert witness).  Further, the concurrent causation 
analogy is inapt because, under those circumstances, the insured 
still must prove the existence of a cause sufficient to explain 
the loss.  Here, however, the Patterson formulation would allow 
Camper Corral to establish causation without ever proving an event 
sufficient to result in its loss. 
¶30 Camper Corral also cites Appleton Chinese Food Serv., 
Inc. v. Murken Ins., Inc., 185 Wis. 2d 791, 519 N.W.2d 674 (Ct. 
App. 1994), and Rainer v. Schulte, 133 Wis. 130, 113 N.W. 396 
(1907), as examples of recovery without proof of insurability under 
more favorable terms.  It acknowledges that neither case explicitly 
addressed the question, and we agree with that assessment.  In the 
Appleton Chinese Food Service case, the court of appeals recounted 
our prior statement that "'[a]n insurance broker is bound to 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
18 
 
exercise reasonable skill and diligence in the transaction of the 
business entrusted to him and he will be responsible to his 
principal for any loss from his failure to do so . . . .'"  
Appleton Chinese Food, 185 Wis. 2d at 802–03 (alteration in 
original; one set of quotation marks omitted) (quoting Master 
Plumbers Ltd. Mut. Liab. Co. v. Cormany & Bird, Inc., 79 
Wis. 2d 308, 313, 255 N.W.2d 533 (1977)).  As a general statement 
of law, that is undoubtedly true.  But the statement does not 
extend far enough to address the question here, which is whether 
the broker's failure was actually responsible for the insured's 
loss.   
¶31 We had no need to address the issue in Rainer because we 
resolved the case on grounds that did not relate to the plaintiff's 
insurability under the requested terms.  There, we considered an 
alleged insurance agent's agreement to obtain an insurance policy 
for his customer, which he failed to do before the customer 
suffered a loss that would have been covered by the policy.  In 
considering a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence in support 
of the jury verdict, we said "it was immaterial whether the 
defendant, at the time, had authority to represent and bind some 
unnamed insurance company or some insurance agent.  The defendant 
certainly had authority to bind himself to procure such insurance."  
Rainer, 113 N.W. at 397 (internal citations omitted).  But that 
statement responded to the alleged agent's defense that "at the 
time of entering into said contract the defendant was not an 
insurance agent, and was not authorized to enter into said contract 
for or on behalf of any insurance company or person whatsoever[.]"  
No. 
2018AP458   
 
19 
 
Id.  What we said about immateriality is good support for the 
proposition that an alleged agent's lack of authority to obtain 
insurance is not a bar to a successful claim.  But it does not 
necessarily support the proposition that a promise to obtain 
insurance is actionable without regard to whether the person was 
insurable.  As a general rule, if a defendant does not contest a 
complaint's specific allegation, it is taken as admitted and the 
parties do not contest it further.  See Wis. Stat. § 802.02(4).9  
The Ranier opinion does not say whether the defendant had put the 
plaintiff's insurability at issue, and so the opinion's silence on 
that subject may simply reflect that the defendant conceded the 
issue. 
¶32 But just as there are no cases authoritatively 
establishing that Camper Corral need not prove an insurer would 
have written a policy with the requested deductibles, there are no 
cases authoritatively establishing the converse.  A majority of 
jurisdictions require, at the very least, evidence that a policy 
with the requested terms was commercially available.  See, e.g., 
Hawk v. Roger Watts Ins. Agency, 989 So.2d 584, 591 (Ala. Civ. 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.02(4) provides: 
Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading 
is required, other than those as to the fact, nature and 
extent of injury and damage, are admitted when not denied 
in the responsive pleading, except that a party whose 
prior pleadings set forth all denials and defenses to be 
relied upon in defending a claim for contribution need 
not respond to such claim.  Averments in a pleading to 
which no responsive pleading is required or permitted 
shall be taken as denied or avoided. 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
20 
 
App. 2008) (lack of evidence that the desired coverage was 
commercially available resulted in inability to establish 
causation); Johnson & Higgins of Alaska Inc. v. Blomfield, 907 
P.2d 1371, 1374-75 (Alaska 1995) (explaining that the majority 
rule requires evidence of commercial availability); Bayly, Martin 
& Fay, Inc. v. Pete's Satire, Inc., 739 P.2d 239, 244 (Colo. 1987) 
(requiring 
plaintiff 
to 
introduce 
evidence 
of 
commercial 
availability before requiring defendant to introduce evidence of 
noninsurability); Tri-Town Marine, Inc. v. J.C. Milliken Agency, 
Inc., 924 A.2d 1066, 1069-1070 (Maine 2007) (collecting cases).  
But as discussed above, "commercial availability," while a 
necessary condition to a successful claim, is not necessarily a 
sufficient condition. 
¶33 We find the Minnesota case Melin v. Johnson, 387 
N.W.2d 230 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), particularly helpful in 
addressing the question of general versus particular availability 
of the requested policy terms.  In Melin, the plaintiff sought 
long-term disability coverage through his insurance agent.  Id. at 
231.  The agent obtained coverage through a group policy because 
the plaintiff was not insurable under an individual policy.  Id.  
But the agent did not tell Mr. Melin that his coverage under the 
group policy was less favorable than what he had expected.  Id.  
So Mr. Melin sued his agent for his "negligen[ce] in failing to 
inform [him] of limitations contained in the insurance policy he 
procured."  Id. at 232.  With respect to Mr. Melin's "negligent 
procurement" cause of action, the court said that, "[w]ithout some 
evidence that reasonable care would have produced a better policy, 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
21 
 
there is no breach of duty under this doctrine."  Id.  A better 
policy could not be produced, of course, unless the plaintiff was 
actually insurable under the better terms.  So the Melin court 
concluded that "[i]f the jury's verdict was based on the theory 
that [the agent] was negligent in his duty to procure insurance, 
the evidence is conclusive against that verdict."  Id.  The same 
result obtained with respect to the plaintiff's "negligent failure 
to inform" cause of action. 
¶34 Here in Wisconsin, we have hinted that availability of 
the insurance policy to the particular plaintiff is important, not 
just generalized commercial availability.  In Wallace v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 212 Wis. 346, 248 N.W. 435 (1933), we 
addressed causation in the context of an insurance company's 
unreasonable delay in rejecting a life insurance application.  In 
that case, Mr. Bell, the prospective insured, did not know the 
insurer had rejected his application before he died.  Upon the 
intended beneficiary's claim of negligence in notifying Mr. Bell 
of the underwriting decision, the court concluded that "there is 
no evidence tending to show that the assured could have obtained 
other insurance of the same kind and character."  Id. at 436 
(emphasis added).  Without such evidence, it was "evident that 
plaintiff has proved no damages."  Id.  Our conclusion did not 
depend on the general commercial availability of life insurance 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
22 
 
policies in the desired amount, but instead on whether Mr. Bell in 
particular was insurable.10 
¶35 Wallace and Melin are consistent with our general 
principles regarding causation.  "Causation is not established by 
testimony that even without defendant's negligence, the harm would 
have occurred anyway."  Beacon Bowl, Inc., 176 Wis. 2d at 788.  It 
necessarily follows that if the harm would have occurred even in 
the absence of the defendant's negligence, then it is impossible 
for the negligence to have been a "substantial factor in producing 
[plaintiff's injury]."  Baumeister, 277 Wis. 2d 21, ¶24; see also 
                                                 
10 Chief Justice Roggensack says Wallace v. Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co., 212 Wis. 346, 248 N.W. 435 (1933), "has no relevance" 
because it addressed life insurance whereas this case addresses 
casualty insurance.  Dissent, ¶62.  But she does not say why that 
difference affects the proposition that there can be no causation 
unless the plaintiff could have obtained a policy with the desired 
terms. 
The dissent prefers Kukuska v. Home Mut. Hail-Tornado Ins. 
Co., 204 Wis. 166, 235 N.W. 403 (1931), in which we held that a 
farmer had a good cause of action  for an insurer's failure to 
timely accept or reject an insurance application because, the 
dissent says——quoting Kukuska——"'had [the farmer] been seasonably 
notified, other insurance could have been readily obtained.'"  
Dissent, ¶63 (citing Kukuska, 204 Wis. at 173-74) (brackets in 
Chief Justice Roggensack's dissent).  But the full sentence from 
which the dissent takes that quote shows that the case does not 
support the dissent's proposition.  We said:  "So that, upon any 
theory, the defendant would be liable to the plaintiff for the 
amount of damages sustained where it appeared, as the court found 
in this case, that, had he been seasonably notified, other 
insurance could have been readily obtained."  Kukuska, 204 Wis. at 
173-74 (emphasis added).  This was not a normative statement; it 
was instead an observation that the circuit court had found, in 
that case, that the farmer could have readily obtained the 
insurance.  Not that it was commercially available, but that it 
was obtainable.  Camper Corral, of course, has not shown it could 
obtain an insurance policy with the desired deductible terms. 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
23 
 
Bayly, 739 P.2d at 244 ("[E]vidence that the type of insurance 
sought by the plaintiff was not generally available in the 
insurance industry when the broker or agent procured the 
plaintiff's insurance policy, or that, even if this type of 
insurance was generally available, the plaintiff nonetheless was 
uninsurable" precluded a finding of causation (emphasis added)). 
¶36 Based on these principles, and fortified by both Wallace 
and Melin, we conclude that Camper Corral cannot prove causation 
under the commercial availability theory in the absence of evidence 
that it was insurable under a policy with more favorable terms.  
Evidence establishing mere commercial availability demonstrates 
only that someone may qualify for insurance under the specified 
terms.  It does not establish that the desired insurance terms 
were available to Camper Corral in particular.  Without evidence 
that an insurer would have written a policy for Camper Corral with 
more favorable terms, it is not possible to say that Mr. Alderman's 
negligence was a substantial factor in causing the loss, and no 
such evidence exists in this case.  As far as the state of the 
record is concerned, it cannot be said that Camper Corral's loss 
would not have happened in the absence of Mr. Alderman's 
negligence.  Indeed, Camper Corral's own expert testified that, 
based on Camper Corral's claim history in 2011 and 2012, he did 
not believe it would have qualified for a $1,000 hail deductible 
per camper with a $5,000 total maximum deductible during the 2013-
2014 policy period.  Therefore, the circuit court did not err in 
holding there was no credible evidence from which the jury could 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
24 
 
find that Mr. Alderman's negligence caused Camper Corral's loss 
under the commercial availability theory.11 
¶37 Chief Justice Roggensack's dissent would make this an 
entirely academic discussion by finding that Camper Corral proved 
it was actually insurable under a policy with a $1,000 deductible 
per unit and a $5,000 aggregate limit.  Camper Corral did not make 
that argument here, nor in the court of appeals, nor in the circuit 
court.  In fact, in the entire history of this case, Chief Justice 
Roggensack is the only one who has suggested Camper Corral was 
insurable under those terms.  Even Mrs. Emer did not make this 
claim in her testimony.  What she said was that the summary sheet 
from a Western Heritage insurance quote (Exhibit 103)12 led her to 
believe that Camper Corral's insurance policy contained the 
favorable deductible terms.  But she never claimed the quote proved 
                                                 
11 Chief Justice Roggensack is worried that this conclusion 
"is unnecessarily harsh on the consumer" because it "will immunize 
misrepresentations by insurance agents who have superior knowledge 
of how to search the insurance industry to determine whether the 
insured was eligible for particularized insurance."  Dissent, ¶61.  
It is not harsh at all.  It simply prevents a plaintiff from 
imposing liability on a defendant for failing to procure something 
for which the plaintiff was not eligible.  If the insurance agent's 
representations cause the insured to expose itself to risk it would 
not have undertaken if it had known it was not eligible for the 
requested insurance, the insured may have a reliance claim (as 
described below).  If we were to agree with the Chief Justice, we 
would be awarding a windfall to Camper Corral by allowing it a 
recovery when there is no evidence any company would have insured 
it under the requested terms.  Denying a recovery to which Camper 
Corral is not entitled is not harsh, it is just. 
12 In the trial, Mrs. Emer actually referred to Exhibit 8, 
which is the same as Exhibit 103.  Exhibit 8 was not admitted into 
evidence, so we refer to Exhibit 103 instead. 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
25 
 
she was actually insurable under a policy with the $1,000/$5,000 
deductible terms.  Nor did anyone else, until the Chief Justice's 
dissent.  Indeed, Camper Corral's attorney even conceded this 
specific point when he acknowledged that if Camper Corral were 
required to prove it could have obtained a better policy during 
the 2013-2014 policy period, then "the claim fails."13 
                                                 
13 Chief Justice Roggensack also finds significance in the 
difference between Exhibit 103 (Western Heritage's quote from 
August 2, 2013) and Exhibit 106 (Western Heritage's revised quote 
from September 12, 2013).  Based on those differences, the Chief 
Justice concludes that "nevertheless, Michael Alderman increased 
the deductible for hail damage.  A review of Rhonda Emer's 
testimony in regard to the $7,493 premium she believed she paid 
and the coverage afforded by Exhibit 8, as also shown on Exhibit 
103, comes in sharp contrast to the lower premium of Exhibit 106, 
which has a higher hail damage deductible."  Dissent, ¶58. 
This is erroneous for two reasons.  First, the differences in 
the quotes are not necessarily attributable to some nefarious plan 
executed by Mr. Alderman.  There is a much more innocent 
explanation, one offered by Mrs. Emer herself.  She testified that 
the first quote was not acceptable to her because she wanted the 
policy's total coverage reduced from $800,000 to $300,000, and she 
wanted the per camper coverage increased from $25,000 to $50,000.  
So she rejected the quote contained in Exhibit 103. 
Secondly, the Chief Justice's argument depends on the unsound 
assumption that Exhibit 103 proves Camper Corral was, in fact, 
eligible for $1,000/$5,000 deductible terms (which is not a 
warranted assumption, as described above).  Although it is true 
that Exhibit 106 refers to the hail deductible on the summary page 
and Exhibit 103 does not, that has nothing to do with what the 
policy's actual terms would be.  Both Exhibit 103 and Exhibit 106 
indicate that the hail damage deductible would be found in Form 
WHI 26-0496.   
No. 
2018AP458   
 
26 
 
B.  Reliance 
¶38 Alternatively, Camper Corral says it can establish a 
causal connection between Mr. Alderman's negligence and its loss 
through the principle of detrimental reliance.  It refers us to 
Runia v. Marguth Agency, Inc., 437 N.W.2d 45 (Minn. 1989), as an 
example of how this principle would function in the context of a 
broker's failure to obtain an insurance policy on the terms 
requested by the insured.  The case involved an insured's request 
that his agent obtain coverage on a snowmobile he owned.  Id. at 
46-47.  The insured told the agent that the policy should cover 
himself, his daughter, and any other individual who may use the 
snowmobile.  Id.  The agent obtained a policy and attached the 
coverage to the insured's homeowner's policy.  Id. at 47.  The 
insured then loaned the snowmobile to his daughter, who was injured 
in an accident while riding it with her fiancé.  Id.  In the 
ensuing lawsuit, the insured's daughter obtained a judgment 
against the fiancé, but the insurance company denied coverage 
because only the father was covered by the policy it wrote.  Id.  
                                                 
The Chief Justice suggests that, in making this point, we are 
not accounting for the binding nature of an insurance quote.  
Dissent, ¶59.  This is not about whether a quote is binding, it is 
about what the quote's summary page says.  The absence of a 
separate hail deductible on the quote's summary page does not prove 
the quote did not provide for a separate hail deductible.  One of 
the unavoidable aspects of a summary is that, by definition, it is 
less than comprehensive.  The absence of a piece of information on 
the summary page is not evidence it does not exist elsewhere in 
the quote, it is just evidence it didn't make it to the summary 
page.  And, as already mentioned, the quote did say the hail 
deductible would be found in Form WHI 26-0496.  So the absence of 
the hail deductible on the summary page proves precisely nothing. 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
27 
 
The court agreed the insurance company had no duty to indemnify.  
Id. 
¶39 There then arose a second lawsuit, this time against the 
insurance agent for negligently failing to obtain an insurance 
policy on the requested terms.  Upon the question of whether the 
failure to procure an insurance policy on those terms caused the 
loss, the Runia court held that if the plaintiffs had known they 
did not have the coverage they believed they had, they simply could 
have "elect[ed] not to engage in the uninsured activity."  Id. at 
49. 
 
Thus, 
the 
court 
stated 
that 
"[l]iability 
attaches 
independently of whether any insurance policies would have 
provided the requested coverage."  Id.   
¶40 Camper Corral says it could have altered its behavior, 
just like the Runia plaintiffs could have, if it had known its 
policy had deductible limits higher than requested.  For example, 
it says it could have reduced or eliminated its on-site inventory, 
or stored its inventory under cover, or made alternate arrangements 
with the supplier, or stopped selling new campers altogether.  Any 
of these alternatives, it argues, would have allowed Camper Corral 
to minimize or eliminate its uninsured risk.  And that, it 
concludes, proves a causal connection between Mr. Alderman's 
actions and its damages. 
¶41 We do not preclude the possibility of proving causation 
under the reliance theory, but we need not resolve the issue here.  
Camper Corral offered the many ways by which it could have 
mitigated or eliminated its exposure to high deductibles as 
theoretical possibilities.  But it referred to no evidence in the 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
28 
 
record to suggest it actually would have availed itself of one of 
these methods of risk mitigation.  Because the record contains no 
evidence that Camper Corral would have changed its business 
practices had it known of the higher deductibles, the circuit court 
did not err in concluding there was no credible evidence of 
causation. 
 
C.  Camper Corral Forfeited Its Alternate Theories of 
Recovery 
¶42 Finally, Camper Corral argues that it is entitled to 
damages under the benefit of the bargain rule because its 
Complaint, although asserting a single negligence cause of action, 
can nevertheless be construed as having stated claims for breach 
of 
contract 
and 
strict 
responsibility 
misrepresentation.  
According to Camper Corral, these alternate theories of recovery 
are available because the circuit court's decision was actually a 
decision on a summary judgment motion rather than a motion for a 
directed verdict.  This is so, says Camper Corral, because the 
circuit court relied on materials outside the trial record in 
reaching its decision.  We disagree, for two reasons. 
¶43 First, the court of appeals properly analyzed Camper 
Corral's argument that the circuit court actually decided the 
motion as a request for summary judgment rather than a directed 
verdict.  See Emer's Camper Corral, LLC, 386 Wis. 2d 592, ¶13 
(explaining that it would review the circuit court's ruling under 
the directed verdict standard because the circuit court did not 
cite evidence outside the trial record in the portion of its 
written decision addressing Mr. Alderman's causation argument and 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
29 
 
that the expert deposition testimony the circuit court referenced 
was read to the jury at trial).  We agree with the court of appeals 
and see no need to further expand upon its rationale. 
¶44 Second, and perhaps more importantly, we will not 
consider these issues because Camper Corral did not present them 
to us in its petition for review.  See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.62(6) ("If a petition is granted, the parties cannot raise or 
argue issues not set forth in the petition unless ordered otherwise 
by the supreme court.").  Here, Camper Corral's petition for review 
identified one issue:  "In a suit for failure to procure requested 
insurance, must the plaintiff prove causal damages by showing she 
could have personally obtained an insurance policy equal to or 
better than the policy promised to her by her agent?"  Camper 
Corral acknowledges that its petition did not list its alternate 
theories of recovery as reviewable issues, but says its summary of 
its position in a lengthy footnote adequately preserved them for 
presentation in their merits briefs.  However, our order granting 
review in this case said that Camper Corral "may not raise or argue 
issues not set forth in the petition for review unless otherwise 
ordered by the court . . . ."  We have been presented with no 
adequate reason for departing from the terms of our order, and 
therefore will not address Camper Corral's alternative theories of 
recovery.14 
                                                 
14 The court of appeals likewise declined to address Camper 
Corral's alternate arguments regarding breach of contract and 
strict responsibility misrepresentation because Camper Corral 
failed to raise the arguments in the circuit court.  Emer's Camper 
Corral, LLC, 386 Wis. 2d 592, ¶¶26-27. 
No. 
2018AP458   
 
30 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶45 In a cause of action for negligent procurement of an 
insurance policy, the insured cannot establish the insurance 
agent's negligence was a "substantial factor" in causing its loss 
under the commercial availability theory without evidence that a 
policy with the requested terms was available to the insured.15  
Because Camper Corral failed to introduce any evidence that it was 
eligible for an insurance policy with the requested deductible 
limits, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in granting 
Mr. Alderman's motion for a directed verdict. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Our decision today does not foreclose the possibility of 
establishing causation under the reliance theory. 
No.  2018AP458.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶46 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   (dissenting).  The 
majority opinion is wrong on the law and wrong on the facts.  
First, it creates a new and rigid evidentiary burden for causation 
that immunizes an insurance agent's misrepresentations about the 
insurance policy he said that he was providing and the policy he 
actually provided, all at the expense of the consumer.1  Second, 
even if I were to accept the new evidentiary burden the majority 
opinion places on insureds, Rhonda Emer's trial testimony and trial 
Exhibit 103 provided a factual basis to show that coverage with a 
$1,000/$5,000 deductible for hail damage that she thought she 
bought was commercially available and that Camper Corral was 
eligible for that coverage during the 2013-14 policy term from 
Western Heritage because those are the terms that were on the 
exhibit provided to Camper Corral.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶47 This case was tried, in part, before a jury based on 
Camper Corral's claim that insurance agent, Michael Alderman, 
negligently did not provide the insurance policy for Camper Corral 
that he represented to Rhonda Emer that he was providing.2  Rhonda 
Emer based her claim on statements that her insurance agent, 
Michael Alderman, made orally and as provided in Exhibit 8, a quote 
from Western Heritage that he reviewed with her at their meeting 
for the 13/14 insurance renewal.  In support of her belief that 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶3. 
2 R. at 107, 65-66. 
No.  2018AP458.pdr 
 
2 
 
she had purchased a 2013-14 year policy that had a $1,000 hail 
damage deductible with a $5,000 cap (hereinafter $1,000/$5,000), 
Rhonda Emer testified about deductibles for hail damage that she 
believed Camper Corral purchased based on what Michael Alderman 
told her and the quote from Western Heritage that he reviewed with 
her: 
Q. 
I am showing you now what has been marked as 
Exhibit 8.  Do you recognize that document?  Just looking 
at the first page, do you recognize this document, the 
first page? 
A. 
Yes, definitely. 
Q. 
Can you describe what that first page is?  
A. 
Yes, it's a cover letter from Jensen-Sundquist 
signed by Michael Alderman.  
Q. 
Okay. Do you recall receiving that?  
A. 
Yes, I do.  
Q. 
When did you receive it?  
A. 
I received that at our meeting for the '13/'14 
renewal.[3]  
. . . .  
Q. 
What is the date on the first page of Exhibit 
No. 8?  
A. 
August 6, 2013.[4] 
. . . .  
Q. 
I'd like to turn your attention to Page No. 2.  
A. 
Okay.  
                                                 
3 R. at 107, 146. 
4 R. at 107, 148. 
No.  2018AP458.pdr 
 
3 
 
Q. 
Do you recognize that document?[5]   
A. 
Yes, I do.  
Q. 
And can you describe for the jury what that 
document is?  
A. 
This is a summary page, a declaration page 
that is a snapshot of your deductibles for a certain 
policy term.  
Q. 
Okay.  And what are your deductibles for wind 
and hail?  
A. 
Okay.  Well, this is where it gets explained 
to me by Mr. Alderman in person.  
Q. 
I am asking you -- 
A. 
Okay.  
Q. 
Review Page No. 2 of Exhibit 8, and tell me 
what your deductibles are for wind and hail.  
A. 
My deductible for wind and hail is $1,000 per 
unit with a $5,000 maximum aggregate out-of-pocket.  
. . . . 
A. 
It says under dealer physical damage comp and 
collateral 1,000/5,000.[6] 
. . . . 
Q. 
Is there anything in that document that 
specifically defines what the deductible for hail would 
be?  
A. 
Yes.  Under dealer physical damage comp and 
collateral 
is 
marked 
as 
1,000/5,000 
maximum 
aggregate.[7]  
. . . . 
                                                 
5 Id. 
6 R. at 107, 149.   
7 Id., 154.   
No.  2018AP458.pdr 
 
4 
 
Q. 
Okay.  And during this conversation with 
Mr. Alderman, when you saw Exhibit 8 for the very first 
time, did you confirm with him -- did you ask him to 
make sure that you only had a $1,000 hail deductible?  
A. 
Oh, most certainly, and then he pointed it out 
to me.[8] 
. . . .  
Q. 
Okay. And how long was it after that meeting 
that you got the policy?  
A. 
I never received the policy.  
Q. 
Ever?  
A. 
Not until I requested it after my hailstorm.  
Q. 
When was your hailstorm?  
A. 
September 3rd of 2014.[9]   
. . . . 
Q. 
And what is the premium for 2013-'14?  
A. 
$5,200 plus -- well, actually it's more than 
that.  It's $7,493 . . . .[10] 
Q. 
I am asking about the quote, Exhibit No. 8.  
A. 
Yes.[11] 
¶48 Through her testimony set out above, which is supported 
by trial exhibits, Rhonda Emer explained at least two things that 
are important to this appeal.  First, her testimony and Exhibit 
103, dated August 2, 2013 provided a factual basis to show that 
Camper Corral was eligible for a $1,000/$5,000 hail damage 
                                                 
8 Id., 158.   
9 Id., 163. 
10 R. at 108, 9.   
11 Id., 10.   
No.  2018AP458.pdr 
 
5 
 
deductible for the 2013-14 year, notwithstanding its history of 
hail damage, because those are the terms that were on the exhibit 
provided to Camper Corral.12  And second, the terms of what she 
thought she bought in August 2013 changed between the time when 
Michael Alderman reviewed the quote for the 2013-14 policy year 
with her and when she made her claim for damages due to the 
September 3, 2014 hail storm.13   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶49 The circuit court dismissed this case based on a motion 
for a directed verdict, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 805.14(3), and on 
summary judgment, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.08, during a jury 
trial.  In either case, judgment cannot be granted to a movant if 
there is any dispute of material fact.  Anthony Gagliano & Co., 
Inc. v. Openfirst, LLC, 2014 WI 65, ¶¶30-32, 355 Wis. 2d 258, 850 
N.W.2d 845.   
¶50 Although we have said that an appellate court should not 
overturn a circuit court's dismissal on directed verdict unless 
the circuit court is "clearly wrong," a circuit court is clearly 
wrong "when there is any credible evidence to support the position 
of the non-moving party."  Id., ¶30.  Furthermore, we review 
independently whether there is any credible evidence to support 
the non-moving party's position.  Id., ¶32.    
¶51 We also independently review whether summary judgment 
was properly granted, employing the same standards as the circuit 
                                                 
12 Id., Ex. 103.   
13 Id., Ex. 106.  
No.  2018AP458.pdr 
 
6 
 
court and the court of appeals, while "benefitting from their prior 
discussions."  Id., ¶33 (citing City of Janesville v. CC Midwest, 
Inc., 2007 WI 93, ¶13, 302 Wis. 2d 599, 734 N.W.2d 428). 
B.  Directed Verdict/Summary Judgment 
1.  Directed verdict 
¶52 The standard under which a directed verdict may be 
granted during a jury trial is set out in Wis. Stat. § 805.14(3), 
which provides: 
At the close of plaintiff's evidence in trials to the 
jury, any defendant may move for dismissal on the ground 
of insufficiency of evidence.  If the court determines 
that the defendant is entitled to dismissal, the court 
shall state with particularity on the record or in its 
order of dismissal the grounds upon which the dismissal 
was granted and shall render judgment against the 
plaintiff. 
In regard to the particularity for its decision, the circuit 
court's Order of January 26, 2018 provided: 
This Court does not find that Alderman's conduct 
was so obviously negligent as a matter of law, as such, 
expert testimony is necessary to ascertain whether 
Alderman's conduct fell within the scope of the usual 
care exercised by insurance professionals under the 
circumstances. . . .[14]  
In this case, Camper Corral has failed to produce 
any evidence that a policy was available or could have 
been available in the insurance market for the September 
30, 2013-September 30, 2014 time period with a $1,000.00 
per auto/camper deductible and a $5,000.00 aggregate for 
wind, hail, earthquake, and flood for Camper Corral.  
Further, Camper Corral has produced no evidence to 
demonstrate that Michael Alderman misrepresented the 
insurance coverage. . . .  
Based on the evidence provided, along with the fact 
that the cause of action pleaded by Camper Corral against 
                                                 
14 R. at 86, 3 
No.  2018AP458.pdr 
 
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Alderman for professional negligence requires expert 
testimony at the time of trial, and that Camper Corral 
has failed to provide any evidence where a reasonable 
jury could find that Alderman were a direct and proximate 
cause to the damages sustained by Camper Corral, and 
that expert testimony was needed to prove causation in 
this matter, the Court grants Alderman's motion.   
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:  Judgment for the Defendant 
is GRANTED.[15]     
¶53 The circuit court's decision that dismissal was required 
in part because Camper Corral did not provide expert testimony 
about standards applicable to insurance agents is without legal 
foundation and is clearly wrong in at least two respects.  First, 
no expert testimony is necessary to prove that an insurance agent 
misrepresented the terms of the policy that he sold to an insured.  
All that is needed to reach the jury on misrepresentation is trial 
testimony showing Alderman made a representation of material fact; 
it was untrue; Rhonda Emer believed the representation to be true; 
and she reasonably relied on it to the damage of Camper Corral.  
Whipp v. Iverson, 43 Wis. 2d 166, 169, 168 N.W.2d 201 (1969).  
Benefit of the bargain is the legal measure of damages for 
detrimental reliance, i.e., the difference between the payment 
Camper Corral would have received for the 2014 hail damage if the 
deductible had been $1,000/$5,000 and what she actually was paid.  
Appleton Chinese Food Serv., Inc. v. Murken Ins., Inc., 185 Wis. 2d 
791, 808, 519 N.W.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that damages 
are measured by the terms of the policy that the insurance agent 
failed to provide).  Michael Alderman asserted he did not represent 
that 
the 
2013-14 
policy 
had 
hail 
damage 
deductible 
of 
                                                 
15 Id., 7. 
No.  2018AP458.pdr 
 
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$1,000/$5,000.  This created a dispute of material fact that the 
jury should have decided and on which no expert testimony was 
required.  
¶54 Second, Camper Corral's trial did produce evidence that 
a policy with a $1,000/$5,000 deductible for hail damage was 
commercially available and that Camper Corral was eligible to 
purchase it.  The circuit court, the court of appeals and the 
majority opinion ignore Exhibits 103 and 10616 and Rhonda Emer's 
testimony, which is repeated above, that discusses the Western 
Heritage quote that Michael Alderman gave her shortly after August 
6, 2013, which shows Camper Corral's eligibility for that policy 
(Exhibit 8).17   
¶55 Rhonda Emer's testimony points out differences in the 
quotes:  the dates are different, the premiums for the year are 
different, and the statement about deductibles for hail damage are 
different.  Exhibit 103's quote is dated August 2, 2013 and Exhibit 
106's quote is dated September 12, 2013.  Exhibit 103 has a 
$1,000/$5,000 deductible, without singling out hail damage, but 
its premium for this coverage was $7,493 per year.  Exhibit 106 
has a notation at the bottom that said, "$5,000 DEDUCTIBLE APPLIES 
TO WIND, HAIL, EARTHQUAKE AND FLOOD."18  However, with that 
                                                 
16 Michael Alderman identified Exhibit 106.  R. at 108, 86. 
17 Each of Western Heritage's quotes for Camper Corral is 
titled "Garage Premium Summary."  Exhibits 8, 103 and 106 are 
quotes from Western Heritage.     
18 This statement about deductibles was not on exhibit 8, 
which Michael Alderman gave to her in early August 2013. 
No.  2018AP458.pdr 
 
9 
 
additional clause limiting payment for hail damage, the annual 
premium was reduced to $4,399.   
¶56 To explain more fully, the hail damage larger deductible 
shown on Exhibit 106 is not shown on Exhibit 103; the only notation 
about deductibles on Exhibit 103 is $1,000/$5,000 for "Comp & 
Coll."  Hail is not mentioned.  The policy premium shown on Exhibit 
103 is $7,493, which is the amount that Rhonda Emer testified 
Camper Corral paid.  Therefore, Exhibit 10319 combined with Rhonda 
Emer's testimony about Exhibit 8 shows that the deductible limits 
that she thought Camper Corral had purchased were commercially 
available from Western Heritage and Camper Corral was eligible for 
them at the $7,493 premium she agreed to pay in early August 2013.    
¶57 Michael Alderman testified that Camper Corral's premium 
and coverage are shown in Exhibit 106, which is a quote stating, 
"$5,000 DEDUCTIBLE APPLIES TO WIND, HAIL, EARTHQUAKE AND FLOOD" 
for an annual premium of $4,399.  The increased deductible for 
hail damage and the lower premium on Exhibit 106 create a dispute 
of material fact, as Rhonda Emer testified that she paid $7,493 
for her 2013-14 insurance that provided a $1,000/$5,000 deductible 
for hail damage.   
¶58 In light of two previous hailstorms that each created 
damage in excess of $100,000, reducing the deductible for hail 
damage was a major concern for Rhonda Emer, but nevertheless, 
Michael Alderman increased the deductible for hail damage.  A 
review of Rhonda Emer's testimony in regard to the $7,493 premium 
she believed she paid and the coverage afforded by Exhibit 8, as 
                                                 
19 Michael Alderman identified Exhibit 103.  R. at 108, 77. 
No.  2018AP458.pdr 
 
10 
 
also shown on Exhibit 103, comes in sharp contrast to the lower 
premium of Exhibit 106, which has a higher hail damage deductible.   
¶59 The majority opinion's response to Rhonda Emer's 
testimony is that Exhibit 103 is only a quote and therefore, it 
"has nothing to do with what the policy's actual terms would be."20  
However, an insurance quote is a proposal by an insurance company 
of the terms under which it will provide insurance and the cost 
thereof.  Kimberly J. Winbush, Supplement, Validity, construction, 
and effect of assault and battery exclusion in liability insurance 
policey at issue, 44 A.L.R. 5th 91 (1996) (citing Regis Ins. Co. 
v. All American Rathskeller, Inc., 976 A.2d 1157, 1167 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2009) (discussing a "pre-insurance quote" that identified 
subsequent limitations of the policy's coverage)).  Accordingly, 
the quote given to Rhonda Emer has probative value in regard to 
the terms of the policy that she could expect would follow.     
¶60 The majority opinion drifts into further error when it 
fails to recognize that "there may be several substantial factors 
contributing to the same result."  Blashaski v. Classified Risk 
Ins. Corp., 48 Wis. 2d 169, 175, 179 N.W.2d 924 (1970).  As we 
have explained, "[a]n injury may be produced by several substantial 
factors, acting in sequence or simultaneously, and responsibility 
need not be restricted to the last and most immediate factor."  
Stewart v. Wulf, 85 Wis. 2d 461, 469, 271 N.W.2d 79 (1978) 
(citation omitted).  "Cause is a question for the jury unless the 
facts are so clear that reasonable persons could not differ on the 
question."  Id. (citation omitted).  Michael Alderman's failure to 
                                                 
20 Majority op., ¶37, n.13.   
No.  2018AP458.pdr 
 
11 
 
provide the insurance policy he said he was providing is a 
substantial factor in causing Camper Corral's damage.    
¶61 Furthermore, although Camper Corral provided proof 
sufficient to reach a jury on whether a policy with $1,000/$5,000 
was commercially available and that Camper Corral was eligible to 
obtain it, I object to those requirements becoming legal 
requirements for causation in Wisconsin.  The majority opinion is 
unnecessarily harsh on the consumer and, as it has in this case, 
will immunize misrepresentations by insurance agents who have 
superior knowledge of how to search the insurance industry to 
determine whether the insured was eligible for particularized 
insurance.   
¶62 In addition, the majority opinion relies on Wallace v. 
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 212 Wis. 346, 248 N.W. 436 (1933), to reason, 
"we have hinted that availability of the insurance policy to the 
particular plaintiff is important, not just generalized commercial 
availability."21  However, Wallace addressed life insurance for a 
man with a known heart defect that permanently precluded his 
insurability.  Stated otherwise, Wallace could not change the 
condition of his heart; it always would affect his insurability.  
Therefore, Wallace's reasoning that "there is no evidence tending 
to show that the assured could have obtained other insurance of 
the same kind and character," id. at 350, has no relevance in 
regard to insuring for hail damage.  This is so because in any 
given year, hail may not be a factor affecting property damage for 
Camper Corral, but Wallace's heart condition always would be a 
                                                 
21 Majority op., ¶34.   
No.  2018AP458.pdr 
 
12 
 
factor affecting his actuarial longevity.  Also, Wallace 
distinguished Kukuska v. Home Mut. Hail-Tornado Ins. Co., 204 
Wis. 166, 235 N.W.403 (1931), which dealt with insurance coverage 
more analogous to the case-at-hand.   
¶63 In Kukuska, a farmer applied for crop insurance against 
hail damage in early July of 1928.  Id. at 167.  On August 1, 1928, 
the farmer was notified that his application had been rejected.  
Id. at 168-69.  That same day, a "violent hailstorm" damaged the 
farmer's crops.  Id. at 169.  We concluded that "had [the farmer] 
been seasonably notified, other insurance could have been readily 
obtained" and we affirmed the judgment in favor of the farmer.  
Id. at 173-74.  We did not place the burden on Kukuska that the 
circuit court placed and the majority opinion now places on Camper 
Corral.  Here there was no circuit court finding about whether 
insurance with a $1,000/$5,000 deductible for hail damage could, 
or could not, have been obtained.  Rhonda Emer's testimony, quoted 
above, simply was ignored.   
¶64 The majority opinion presumes that reliance provides an 
alternative theory for plaintiffs in insurance cases such as this, 
which is why it concludes that its decision is not harsh on 
consumers.22  It faults Rhonda Emer for not explaining what she 
would have done differently had she realized that Camper Corral 
was underinsured.  But what she would have done would be 
speculation because she believed Camper Corral was properly 
insured until after the September 3, 2014 hail storm.  Given the 
                                                 
22 Majority op., ¶36, n.11. 
No.  2018AP458.pdr 
 
13 
 
vigorous defense that counsel for the defendants provided, 
speculation would never have found its way to the jury.    
¶65 And finally, were I writing for the majority, I would 
conclude that once general commercial availability in the 
insurance industry has been shown by the plaintiff, plaintiff has 
satisfied its burden in regard to causation.  Johnson & Higgins of 
Alaska Inc. v. Blomfield, 907 P.2d 1371, 1374-75 (Alaska 1995); 
Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pete's Satire, Inc., 739 P.2d 239, 
244 (Colo. 1987).  If it is raised, uninsurability then becomes an 
affirmative defense for which the defendant bears the burden of 
proof.  Id.  In that manner, the entirety of causation for alleged 
negligence by an insurance agent can be placed before the finder 
of fact.     
2.  Summary Judgment 
¶66 We also have said that summary judgment, which rests on 
a legal conclusion by the court, can rest on the same legal theory 
as a directed verdict.  Gagliano, 355 Wis. 2d 258, ¶32 (citing 
Steven V. v. Kelly H., 2004 WI 47, ¶35, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 
856).  Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.  Sands v. Menard, 2017 WI 110, ¶28, 379 Wis. 2d 
1, 904 N.W.2d 789; Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).   
¶67 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.08(2) provides in relevant part: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. 
No.  2018AP458.pdr 
 
14 
 
When a motion for summary judgment is made before trial, we begin 
our review by determining whether the complaint and answer are 
sufficient to join issue.  Schwegel v. Milwaukee Cty., 2015 WI 12, 
¶20, 360 Wis. 2d 654, 859 N.W.2d 78.  Then, we examine the moving 
party's affidavits that support the motion and affidavits that 
oppose the motion.  Id.  Here, summary judgment was granted during 
the course of a jury trial.  Therefore, my starting point in this 
discussion differs from Schwegel; however, the ultimate test 
remains the same.  Summary judgment can be granted only when there 
is no dispute of material fact.  Id.  
¶68 Here, the circuit court ignored disputes of material 
fact and, as a legal conclusion, held that judgment should be 
entered for Michael Alderman.  As I pointed out above, and will 
not repeat here, there was credible evidence on disputes of 
material fact, e.g., what did Michael Alderman tell Rhonda Emer 
about the policy he sold to her.  If the jury believed Rhonda 
Emer's testimony and the related trial exhibits, the jury would 
have ruled in her favor.  Stated otherwise, taking all the 
testimony in the light most favorable to Camper Corral, there is 
no legal principle upon which Camper Corral's claim of negligent 
misrepresentation should have been taken from the jury and decided 
by a court in favor of Michael Alderman.  
¶69 And finally, every court has jumped the gun on this 
case:  First, the circuit court, who seemed to believe that 
everything an insurance agent says is ok unless there is an expert 
opinion saying that the agent's statement was not ok;  second, the 
court of appeals, who decided the case by importing into Wisconsin 
No.  2018AP458.pdr 
 
15 
 
law a new and heavy evidentiary burden on causation for insureds 
who were told one thing by their insurance agents and found the 
policy they were sold contained something else; and third, the 
majority opinion of this court, that affirms the court of appeals 
new evidentiary burden for proof of causation, but ignores trial 
court exhibits and testimony that show the evidentiary burden it 
creates actually was met at trial.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶70 In conclusion, the majority opinion is wrong on the law 
and wrong on the facts.  First, it creates a new and rigid 
evidentiary burden for causation that immunizes an insurance 
agent's misrepresentations about the insurance policy he said that 
he was providing and the policy he actually provided, all at the 
expense of the consumer.23  Second, even if I were to accept the 
new evidentiary burden the majority opinion places on insureds, 
Rhonda Emer's trial testimony and trial Exhibit 103 provide a 
factual basis to show that coverage with a $1,000/$5,000 deductible 
for hail damage was commercially available and that Camper Corral 
was eligible for that coverage during the 2013-14 policy term 
because those are the terms that were on the exhibit provided to 
Camper Corral.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
  
                                                 
23 Majority op., ¶3. 
No.  2018AP458.pdr 
 
 
 
1