Case Title: Commonwealth v. Fernandez

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-09264

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-08-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-09264 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ANTONIO FERNANDEZ. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     January 9, 2018. - August 24, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Practice, Criminal, Continuance, Fair 
trial, Sentence, Capital case.  Constitutional Law, Fair 
trial, Sentence.  Due Process of Law, Fair trial, Sentence.  
Fair Trial. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 6, 2002. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Isaac Borenstein, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on May 29, 2015, was heard by 
Beverly J. Cannone, J. 
 
 
 
John H. Cunha, Jr., for the defendant. 
 
Pamela L. Alford, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  Almost as quickly as a verbal spat between two 
groups of teenagers erupted, it dissipated.  The defendant, 
Antonio Fernandez, and his friends turned their backs and began 
riding their bicycles away.  Unprovoked, the defendant got off 
2 
 
 
his bicycle, turned to one of his friends, and said, "Fuck that 
shit."  He then took out a handgun, cocked it, and walked back 
toward the victim.  The defendant aimed the handgun at the 
victim and shot him in the chest.  The victim collapsed nearby 
and died a short time later. 
 
At trial, it was uncontroverted that the defendant killed 
the victim; the defendant presented a theory of self-defense.  A 
Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of murder in the 
first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation and 
possession of a firearm without a license.  The defendant does 
not challenge that he shot and killed the victim.  He does, 
however, argue that (1) the judge abused his discretion by 
denying the defendant's motions for funds for an expert and for 
a continuance on the eve of trial, (2) the circumstances of the 
killing and the fact that he was sixteen at the time of the 
killing require a reduction of the verdict, and (3) the 
defendant's right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution was violated because the court 
room was closed during jury empanelment.  We discern no 
reversible error and, after thorough review of the record, 
decline to order a new trial or to direct the entry of a verdict 
of a lesser degree of guilt under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  However, 
we remand the matter to the Superior Court for resentencing 
3 
 
 
consistent with Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk 
Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 666 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015). 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts as the jury could have 
found them, reserving certain details for later discussion as 
they relate to other issues raised on appeal. 
 
On the evening of June 20, 2002, the victim attended a 
cookout in Brookline to celebrate his graduation from high 
school.  Following the cookout, the victim and several friends, 
all of whom were between the ages of fifteen and nineteen years 
old, traveled to a nearby park to "hang out."  Shortly after 
arriving, the victim and his friends saw three male teenagers, 
one of whom was the defendant, approach the park on bicycles.1  
The defendant and his two friends had traveled from Boston to 
Brookline, supposedly "to see some girls."  The defendant and 
his friends were all between the ages of fourteen and sixteen; 
the defendant was sixteen years old at the time.  The defendant 
and his friends entered the park, approached the victim and his 
friends, and asked if they had any marijuana.  One of the 
victim's friends said that they did not, and the three Boston 
teenagers left the park.  Neither the victim nor any of his 
friends knew or recognized the defendant or either of his 
companions. 
                                                 
 
1 There was evidence that the defendant and one of the other 
individuals he was with were riding bicycles, while the third 
individual approached on foot. 
4 
 
 
 
The defendant and his friends made their way to a nearby 
street, where one of the teenagers sat on the hood of a parked 
motor vehicle while the defendant and the third individual sat 
on their bicycles.  A short time later, the victim and his 
friends also left the park and approached the defendant's crew; 
a verbal confrontation ensued.  Although the accounts of the 
encounter differed slightly, it appears that the defendant's 
group had been laughing at the victim and his friends, and one 
of the victim's friends asked the defendant and his friends if 
they had a problem.  When this interaction began, the victim was 
not involved and instead was riding his bicycle nearby.  The 
demeanor of the interaction intensified, with one member of the 
defendant's group proclaiming, "Brookline is a bunch of 
bitches."  One of the victim's friends told the defendant and 
his friends to leave.  When they did not leave, one of the 
victim's friends asked the defendant and his friends if they 
wanted to "shoot the fair ones," meaning have a fist fight.  The 
defendant and his friends group declined, responding, "We don't 
fight fair."  At this point, the victim got off his bicycle and 
stood by his friend who had been interacting with the 
defendant's group.  The victim raised his hands as if ready to 
fight and told the defendant and his friends to "[g]et the fuck 
out of here."  No punches were thrown, and the spat between the 
groups did not escalate beyond name-calling and posturing. 
5 
 
 
 
One of the defendant's friends suggested that they leave, 
warning the defendant that the victim might have a weapon.  The 
defendant responded, "He doesn't know what I got."  One of the 
defendant's friends responded to him, "Don't do anything 
stupid."  At that point, the defendant and his crew turned away 
from the victim and his friends and began leaving; it appeared 
that the confrontation had ended. 
 
The defendant rode his bicycle away from the victim and his 
friends.  It took the defendant about fifteen seconds to ride in 
the vicinity of forty-five feet away from the victim and his 
friends.  At that point, having moved away from the scene of the 
confrontation, the defendant, unprovoked, stopped and put his 
bicycle down.  He turned to one of his friends and said, "Fuck 
that shit."  The defendant then pulled out a handgun, cocked it, 
and began making his way back toward the victim.  The victim had 
not moved, and his hands were in the air; he was not holding 
anything.  The defendant stated, "I don't shoot the fair ones," 
pointed the handgun at the victim's chest, and fired.  The 
bullet struck the victim in the center of his chest, passing 
through his left lung and heart before leaving his body.  The 
victim collapsed nearby, bleeding profusely from his chest.  The 
defendant ran away laughing.  He and his friends fled the scene. 
 
Police responded almost immediately and began performing 
first aid on the victim, but he died shortly after being shot. 
6 
 
 
No gun, and no other weapon, was found on or near the victim's 
person. 
 
Later that night, the defendant bragged about the shooting, 
proclaiming that he was "the number one clapper," meaning that 
he was the number one shooter.  The following day, the defendant 
telephoned one of his friends who was with him during the 
shooting and asked if the friend would travel with him to the 
Dominican Republic. His friend declined, and the defendant fled 
to New York, where he was apprehended three days later. 
 
At trial, the defendant did not contest that he killed the 
victim; instead, he claimed that he was acting in self-defense.  
Defense counsel argued that the defendant believed the victim or 
one of the victim's friends was armed, and the defendant 
believed he was facing serious and imminent bodily harm.  The 
jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on 
the theory of deliberate premeditation and possession of a 
firearm without a license. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Motion for funds for an expert and a 
continuance.  After several continuances, the defendant's trial 
was scheduled to begin on November 13, 2003.2  On November 10, 
three days before trial, the defendant filed a motion for funds 
                                                 
 
2 The defendant's trial was originally scheduled for October 
14, 2003.  On September 17, 2003, the trial date was continued 
and set for November 10, 2003.  On October 24, 2003, the trial 
was further continued and set for November 13, 2003. 
7 
 
 
to hire an expert on adolescent brain development to evaluate 
the defendant and testify in his defense.3  When defense counsel 
filed this motion, she had been representing the defendant for 
approximately one and one-half years.  Although defense counsel 
sought funds to hire an expert on the eve of trial, she did not 
claim that she was unprepared for trial.  The trial judge 
construed the defendant's "motion for funds" as a motion for a 
continuance because granting the motion to hire an expert would 
necessitate a continuance of the trial by several months. 
 
The defendant's motion generally asserted that an expert 
could evaluate the development of his brain by conducting a 
brain scan.  In the event the scan indicated that the 
defendant's brain was underdeveloped for purposes of decision-
making and impulse control, the defendant could then argue, with 
the support of expert testimony, that he did not have the 
capacity to form the specific intent necessary to commit murder 
in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation.  
In support of the motion, the defendant attached an article 
published by the National Juvenile Defender Center describing 
how the science of adolescent brain development had progressed 
considerably over the previous five years, and that the 
adolescent brain was generally less developed than previously 
                                                 
 
3  The defendant also filed a motion in limine to admit the 
expert testimony on adolescent brain development. 
8 
 
 
believed.  The article further posited that adolescents with 
less developed brains tended to react with "gut instinct" rather 
than organized, reasoned thought.  The defendant also included 
an article describing the technology used to scan the brain as 
having "a brilliant future in medicine, psychology, psychiatry, 
and in the neurosciences in general, for studying the relation 
between [brain] structure and function."  There was nothing in 
the materials submitted in support of the defendant's motion 
indicating that all adolescent brains develop at the same rate, 
or that there was necessarily a direct correlation between an 
individual's age and his or her brain development.  According to 
the defendant, brain development directly correlated to an 
adolescent's ability to control impulses, perform organized 
thought, and form specific intent. 
 
A hearing on the defendant's motion took place the day 
before trial was set to begin.  Defense counsel explained that 
she began Internet research the week prior, looking for possible 
ways to "break this case down from a murder to a manslaughter."  
In the course of this research, defense counsel discovered the 
materials describing the advances in the science of adolescent 
brain development that gave rise to the request for funds to 
hire an expert and a continuance.  The article the defendant 
principally relied on had been published in April, 2003, 
approximately six months earlier.  Defense counsel argued that 
9 
 
 
conducting scans of the defendant's brain could demonstrate the 
extent to which the defendant's brain was developed, which, in 
turn, could potentially indicate whether the defendant was more 
likely to think impulsively and whether he was capable of 
forming the specific intent to commit murder in the first 
degree. 
 
The judge, who was aware of the advances in the science of 
adolescent brain development, acknowledged that the material 
submitted indicated that adolescents are "subject to these 
potential risks and dangers," but noted that "no study says that 
all juveniles develop in the same way," and that the studies had 
margins of error.  Critically, the judge noted that the 
defendant failed to provide any information suggesting that the 
defendant fell within the group of adolescents identified in the 
literature.  In other words, the defendant failed to submit 
sufficient evidence, such as psychological or behavioral 
studies, suggesting brain scans would provide useful information 
for the defendant's case.  The judge also noted that although 
defense counsel had been representing the defendant for 
approximately one and one-half years, she raised this issue for 
the first time on the eve of trial.  The judge's decision to 
deny the defendant's motion centered on the fact that the 
defendant had belatedly requested the continuance and failed to 
10 
 
 
substantiate that the defendant fell within the group of 
adolescents generally described by the studies.4 
 
Because the judge's denial had nothing to do with the 
request for funds itself, but instead focused on the defendant's 
implicit request for a continuance, we consider whether the 
judge erred in denying the defendant's motion for a 
continuance.5,6  "Whether a motion for continuance should be 
granted lies within the sound discretion of the judge, whose 
                                                 
 
4 In denying the defendant's motion for a continuance, the 
judge stated: 
 
"I don't think it would have been unreasonable at that 
time, a year-and-a-half ago, to immediately request funds 
for such an evaluation." 
 
The judge further explained:  
 
"Here we are on the eve of trial, for the first time 
without specific supporting information, you're asking me, 
without the Commonwealth having the opportunity to rebut, 
get their own evidence, witnesses, whatever, for what 
essentially is a several months long, at least, continuance 
to be able to fully explore this to be fair to both sides.  
I don't think the motion is fairly raised at the right time 
without any supporting information.  And I'm going to deny 
it for those reasons." 
 
 
5 The defendant filed a posttrial motion to reduce the 
verdict and a renewed motion for funds to hire an adolescent 
brain development expert.  The trial judge denied both motions. 
 
 
6 The defendant filed a motion for reconsideration 
concerning the denial of the motion for funds and a continuance.  
The trial judge reiterated that the denial had nothing to do 
with the defendant's indigent status or the fact that the 
defendant had requested funds.  Rather, the judge denied the 
motion based on its lack of support and the belated timing of 
the motion given that counsel had been involved in the case for 
approximately fifteen months. 
11 
 
 
action will not be disturbed unless there is patent abuse of 
that discretion, which is to be determined in the circumstances 
of each case."  Commonwealth v. Pena, 462 Mass. 183, 189 (2012), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Bettencourt, 361 Mass. 515, 517-518 
(1972).  See Commonwealth v. Snell, 428 Mass. 766, 771-772 
(1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1106 (2000) (motion to continue 
filed ten days before trial seeking further deoxyribonucleic 
acid testing properly denied).  A judge considering a motion for 
a continuance may not exercise his or her discretion "in such a 
way that denial of a continuance deprives a defendant of the 
right to effective assistance of counsel and to due process of 
law."  Pena, supra at 190.  See Commonwealth v. Miles, 420 Mass. 
67, 85 (1995) (counsel must have reasonable opportunity to 
prepare defense).  Although there is no "mechanical test" for 
determining whether the denial of a continuance constituted an 
abuse of discretion, Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, 371 Mass. 46, 51 
(1976), "we are guided by the circumstances present in every 
case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge 
at the time the request is denied" (citation and quotation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Cruz, 456 Mass. 741, 747 (2010).  See 
Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 459 Mass. 271, 285 (2011), quoting 
Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964).  "A judge should 
grant a continuance only when justice so requires, balancing the 
requesting party's need for additional time against concerns 
12 
 
 
about inconvenience, cost, potential prejudice, and the burden 
of the delay on both the parties . . . ."  Commonwealth v. Melo, 
472 Mass. 278, 305 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Ray, 467 
Mass. 115, 128 (2014).  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 10 (a) (1), 378 
Mass. 861 (1979) ("a continuance shall be granted only when 
based upon cause and only when necessary to insure that the 
interests of justice are served").  The judge must also consider 
the over-all administration of justice, and "give due weight to 
the interest of the judicial system in avoiding delays which 
would not measurably contribute to the resolution of a 
particular controversy."  Commonwealth v. Chavis, 415 Mass. 703, 
711 (1993), quoting Cavanaugh, supra. 
 
Based on the particular circumstances presented in the 
defendant's request for a continuance, we conclude that the 
judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion.  After 
representing the defendant for approximately one and one-half 
years, and having successfully moved for funds to hire a private 
investigator and a ballistics expert on April 30, 2003, defense 
counsel moved for what would amount to the functional equivalent 
of a continuance at least several months long, three days before 
trial.  Beyond the belated nature of this request, the defendant 
did not support the motion with information or evidence -- other 
than the defendant's age at the time of the offenses -- 
indicating that the requested brain scans would yield helpful 
13 
 
 
information.  Defense counsel did not present evidence 
concerning the defendant's medical, psychological, or behavioral 
history; school records; or any information suggesting that he 
was a particularly psychologically troubled adolescent who might 
fall within the group of adolescents described in the 
literature.  The defendant's motion relied exclusively on 
articles, which do not appear to be peer-reviewed medical or 
psychological studies or journals, that discuss generally the 
advancement of the science of adolescent brain development in 
the previous five years, and that argue that juvenile brains, in 
general, are less developed than adult brains.  In short, the 
defendant failed to support his motion with any evidence 
specific to him suggesting that a continuance to hire an 
adolescent brain development expert would furnish exculpatory 
evidence in his case.  See Snell, 428 Mass. at 772. 
 
In support of his argument, the defendant focuses on our 
scientific and legal understanding of adolescent brain 
development as it exists in 2018, not the understanding of the 
science or law as it existed at the time of his trial in 2003.  
There is no question that our scientific and legal understanding 
of adolescent brain development has advanced since the 
defendant's trial.  See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479-480 
(2012) (invalidating sentencing scheme that mandates life in 
prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders 
14 
 
 
convicted of homicide offenses); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 
75 (2010) (prohibiting life sentence without possibility of 
parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses); Roper 
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (invalidating death penalty 
for juveniles).  See also Commonwealth v. Okoro, 471 Mass. 51, 
59-60 (2015); Diatchenko, 466 Mass. at 658.  It is now well 
established, based on "science, social science, and common 
sense," that adolescents are significantly different from adults 
for purposes of analysis under the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  Diatchenko, supra at 660, citing 
Miller, supra at 471.  See Okoro, supra ("[s]cientific and 
social science research on adolescent brain development and 
related issues continues").  Therefore, our acknowledgement that 
adolescents are constitutionally different from adults has been 
precisely limited to our consideration of juvenile sentencing, 
not whether a juvenile defendant is capable of committing 
murder.  See Okoro, supra; Diatchenko, supra at 659-660.  See 
also Commonwealth v. Perez, 477 Mass. 677, 682-683 (2017);  
Commonwealth v. Brown, 474 Mass. 576, 590 n.7 (2016) (holding of 
Miller focuses on "prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment . . . as it applied to 
sentencing and punishment of juveniles," and did not address 
"intent, knowledge, or deliberate premeditation as elements of a 
crime"); Commonwealth v. Ogden O., 448 Mass. 798, 804 (2007) 
15 
 
 
("While a delinquent child may not have the maturity to 
appreciate fully the consequences of his wrongful actions 
. . . , that does not mean that a delinquent child lacks the 
ability to formulate the specific intent to commit particular 
wrongful acts").  But see Okoro, supra at 65-66 (trial judge was 
correct in both allowing expert testimony concerning that 
particular juvenile defendant's "capacity for impulse control 
and reasoned decision-making on the night of the victim's 
death," and precluding expert from suggesting that "it 
was impossible for anyone [fifteen years old] to formulate the 
necessary intent to commit [murder in the second degree]"). 
 
Despite these changes in the science and law as they relate 
to juvenile sentencing, we do not impute our contemporary legal 
or scientific understanding of adolescent brain development in 
evaluating whether the trial judge abused his discretion by 
denying the defendant's motion for a continuance on the eve of 
trial in 2003.7  Instead, "we are guided by the circumstances 
                                                 
 
7 On appeal, the defendant does not claim that the 
advancements in adolescent brain development since his trial 
constitute newly discovered evidence.  See Commonwealth v. 
Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 306 (1986) (evidence is newly discovered 
where it was "unknown to the defendant or his counsel and not 
reasonably discoverable" through "reasonable pretrial 
diligence").  Similarly, the defendant's appellate counsel, who 
was not the same counsel representing him at trial, stated at 
oral argument that he considered raising a claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel, but ultimately chose not to raise 
the claim because, in 2003, lawyers who commonly represented 
defendants in murder trials were not aware of the issues 
16 
 
 
present in [this] case" (citation and quotation omitted), Cruz, 
456 Mass. at 747, reflecting the law and general understanding 
of adolescent brain development in 2003, Commonwealth v. Lally, 
473 Mass. 693, 704-705 (2016) (concluding that although 
scientific guidelines had changed, method used at trial was 
"reliable method . . . at the time of trial").  See Commonwealth 
v. Bastaldo, 472 Mass. 16, 31 (2015) ("we evaluate the alleged 
errors under the existing law at the time of trial"); 
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 245 (2014) (judge did 
not abuse discretion where decision "was in accord with the case 
law existing at the time of her decision").  See also 
Commonwealth v. LeFave, 430 Mass. 169, 181 (1999) (discussing 
"conflict between the constantly evolving nature of science and 
the doctrine of finality"). 
 
From the circumstances presented here, notably the 
defendant's failure to substantiate his request with specific 
evidence -- other than his age -- the defendant failed to make a 
"case-specific argument for granting a continuance at that 
juncture."  Ray, 467 Mass. at 129.  See Cruz, 456 Mass. at 748 
(no abuse of discretion in denying motion for continuance where 
"defendant failed to provide a persuasive reason for a 
                                                                                                                                                             
concerning adolescent brain development, particularly prior to 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).  After a full review 
of the record before us on appeal, we cannot say that counsel 
was ineffective. 
17 
 
 
continuance and instead relied on general assertions that the 
defense could 'benefit' from more time").  Viewing the evidence 
presented by the defendant in his motion for funds and for a 
continuance in light of the science in 2003, and its acceptance 
in our legal system, it is unlikely that a delay could have 
measurably contributed to the fair resolution of the case.  Ray, 
supra, citing Miles, 420 Mass. at 85.  The judge's decision was 
not a "myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a 
justifiable request for delay."  Pena, 462 Mass. at 190.  
Instead, it reflected careful examination of the circumstances 
presented, particularly the lack of support offered to 
substantiate the request for a continuance.  See Cruz, supra.8  
Accordingly, we affirm the trial judge's denial of the 
defendant's motion for a continuance. 
 
b.  Sufficiency of the evidence of premeditation.  The 
defendant contends that the evidence in his case indicates 
spontaneity rather than deliberate premeditation, and therefore, 
                                                 
 
8 Even under the case law as it exists today, it is far from 
clear that a similar motion, three days before trial, would be 
allowed on this record -- a record devoid of evidence concerning 
this particular defendant's psychological or behavioral status 
or evidence suggesting that a scan of his brain would furnish 
helpful evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Okoro, 471 Mass. 51, 66 
(2015) (expert testimony admissible concerning particular 
juvenile defendant's "capacity for impulse control and reasoned 
decision-making on the night of the victim's death" because it 
"did not amount to an opinion that the defendant [or any other 
fifteen year old] was incapable of forming the intent required 
for murder in the first or second degree simply by virtue of 
being fifteen"). 
18 
 
 
that we should exercise our extraordinary authority under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, to reduce his verdict from murder in the first 
degree to murder in the second degree or manslaughter.  Pursuant 
to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, our duty is "to consider broadly the 
whole case on the law and the facts to determine whether the 
verdict is consonant with justice" (citation and quotation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Howard, 469 Mass. 721, 747 (2014).  
In undertaking this duty, we may, "if satisfied that the verdict 
was against the law or the weight of the evidence . . . or for 
any other reason that justice may require[,] . . . direct the 
entry of a verdict of a lesser degree of guilt."  G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E. 
 
We begin by noting that "a primary consideration" in 
determining whether a conviction of murder in the first degree 
based on deliberate premeditation is consonant with justice "is 
whether the killing reflects spontaneity rather than 
premeditation" (citation and quotation omitted).  Commonwealth 
v. Ruci, 409 Mass. 94, 98 (1991).  In order to prove deliberate 
premeditation, the Commonwealth must show that "the plan to kill 
was formed after deliberation and reflection.  However, no 
particular length of time is required in order for deliberate 
premeditation to be found."  Commonwealth v. Bolling, 462 Mass. 
440, 446 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Caine, 366 Mass. 366, 
374 (1974).  "The law recognizes that a plan to murder may be 
19 
 
 
formed within a few seconds."  Commonwealth v. Chipman, 418 
Mass. 262, 269 (1994).  See Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 
34 (2017) ("No particular length of time of reflection is 
required to find deliberate premeditation, and the decision may 
be made in only a few seconds").  To prove deliberate 
premeditation, the Commonwealth must demonstrate that the 
defendant had the opportunity to reflect, however brief, and 
actually reflected on the decision to kill.  See Commonwealth v. 
Bins, 465 Mass. 348, 367 (2013).  "As such, it is the sequence 
of the thought process rather than the time which is taken to 
think that is the key to determining whether someone acted with 
deliberate premeditation."  Chipman, supra, citing Commonwealth 
v. Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 494-495 (1905) (this thought process 
is often characterized as "[f]irst the deliberation and 
premeditation, then the resolution to kill, and lastly the 
killing in pursuance of the resolution"). 
 
In Commonwealth v. Colleran, 452 Mass. 417, 431-432 (2008), 
we set forth a number of factors to consider in deciding whether 
a defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree based on 
deliberate premeditation should be reduced.  "Each case depends 
on its peculiar facts.  No one fact is conclusive."  Id. at 432, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Gaulden, 383 Mass. 543, 556 (1981).  The 
defendant contends that the circumstances of his case embody 
20 
 
 
each of the mitigating factors enunciated in Colleran, supra at 
431-432.  A careful review of the record belies this contention. 
 
There was a brief verbal spat between two groups of 
teenagers.  No punches were thrown.  The interaction, although 
hostile, only consisted of name-calling and posturing.  The 
squabble between the two groups ended, and the defendant turned 
away from the victim, got on his bicycle, and began to ride 
away.  After having traveled approximately forty-five feet, the 
defendant stopped his bicycle and exclaim to his friend, "Fuck 
that shit."  At that point, he then took out a handgun, cocked 
it, walked back toward the victim, and shot him in the chest. 
 
The circumstances here indicate that the defendant did not 
shoot the victim in the midst of a senseless brawl or in the 
heat of sudden combat.  It was reasonable for the jury to 
conclude that the defendant had time to reflect as he was riding 
away from the scene, and that his statement, "Fuck that shit," 
before cocking the gun and walking back toward the victim, 
evinced that the defendant had an opportunity to reflect, 
actually reflected on the situation, and formed the intent to 
kill before shooting the victim.  In addition to a period 
sufficient for the defendant to have "cooled off" and formed the 
intent to kill, the events here also show that the defendant 
left the scene of the altercation and returned with the weapon 
with the intent to kill the victim.  See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 
21 
 
 
463 Mass. 857, 870 (2012) (where ample time to cool off after 
fight but defendant returned to victim's house with firearm and 
shot victim, killing not in heat of passion); Commonwealth v. 
Jiles, 428 Mass. 66, 75 (1998) (defendant went to scene of crime 
with loaded gun for purposes of shooting suspected rival gang 
members).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Jones, 366 Mass. 805, 809 (1975) 
(defendant was reasonably in fear of sudden attack by victim 
with razor blade immediately prior to killing). 
 
There is no question that this was a minor controversy that 
exploded into the killing of a human being.  See Commonwealth v. 
Baker, 346 Mass. 107, 109-110 (1963).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 364 (2016).  It is also true that the 
defendant and the victim were strangers to each other and there 
was no indication of prior trouble between them.  See 
Commonwealth v. Ransom, 358 Mass. 580, 583 (1971).  The 
defendant was also sixteen at the time he shot and killed the 
victim.  See Brown, 474 Mass. at 592 (upholding seventeen year 
old's conviction of murder in first degree based on deliberate 
premeditation).  Indeed, the prosecutor acknowledged the 
defendant's age in his closing argument:  "[O]ne of the factors 
in this case that you have to think about -- and I think I have 
to mention it, is how old [the defendant] was at the time -- 
sixteen years, sixteen years, ten months old.  That's young.  
That's young.  You will decide what to do."  Closing arguments 
22 
 
 
are not evidence, but the prosecutor's statement reflects that 
the defendant's age was known to the jury, and that fact was 
available for their consideration.  Although the defendant's age 
is not dispositive, the jury were free to consider the 
defendant's age in determining the extent of the defendant's 
guilt.  See Okoro, 471 Mass. at 66 (expert testimony concerning 
adolescent brain development admissible to assist jury in 
"determining whether the defendant was able to form the intent 
required for deliberate premeditation . . . at the time of the 
incident").  However, in these circumstances, the defendant's 
age does not outweigh the compelling evidence that his actions 
were the product of deliberate premeditation, not spontaneity.  
Accordingly, we decline to exercise our authority under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the defendant's conviction of murder in 
the first degree based on deliberate premeditation. 
 
c.  Court room closure claim.  The defendant avers that his 
right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution was violated because during jury empanelment 
the trial judge conducted individual voir dire of the jurors in 
a court room that was not open to the public.  During the final 
pretrial conference, defense counsel specifically requested that 
the judge conduct individual voir dire of the jurors for 
purposes of asking questions related to self-defense.  The judge 
allowed the request and set forth the procedure he intended to 
23 
 
 
use for conducting the voir dire:  After asking general 
questions of the venire in the court room where the case was 
being tried, prospective jurors would be individually brought 
into an adjacent court room and questioned by the trial judge in 
the presence of the defendant, counsel for both sides, and the 
court reporter.  After the judge outlined this proposed 
procedure, defense counsel agreed to it and thanked the judge 
for accommodating her request for individual voir dire.  Jury 
empanelment and the individual voir dire occurred exactly as the 
judge and defense counsel had agreed on at the final pretrial 
conference.  Moreover, counsel and the defendant were present 
for the individual voir dire procedure and did not object. 
 
Where defense counsel not only requested individual voir 
dire and agreed to the individual voir dire procedure used in 
this case, but also was present for it and did not raise a 
contemporaneous objection, we conclude that the defendant did 
not preserve his court room closure claim.  Commonwealth v. 
Robinson, 480 Mass. 146, 154 (2018).  See Ray, 467 Mass. at 121-
122 (public trial right waived where "[c]ounsel for the 
Commonwealth and the defendant affirmatively agreed to the 
procedure"); Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 Mass. 728, 734, 736-737 
(2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 1026 (2012) (defendant waived 
right to public trial by consenting to individual juror voir 
dire in judge's chambers).  The defendant has failed to advance 
24 
 
 
any grounds supporting his contention that the individual voir 
dire procedure used in his case created a substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice or otherwise resulted in a 
fundamentally unfair empanelment procedure.  See Weaver v. 
Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1909–1910, 1912 (2017). 
 
d.  Relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant was 
sixteen years old at the time of the crime.  After conviction, 
he received the mandatory sentence for murder in the first 
degree under G. L. c. 265, § 2 -- life without the possibility 
of parole.  Pursuant to our holding in Diatchenko, 466 Mass. at 
658–659, the defendant's life sentence remains in force, but the 
exception then present in G. L. c. 265, § 2, rendering him 
ineligible for parole, is no longer applicable.  Commonwealth v. 
Brown, 466 Mass. 676, 688–689 (2013), S.C., 474 Mass. 576 
(2016).  Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's convictions of 
murder in the first degree and carrying a firearm without a 
license, and affirm the order denying the defendant's motion for 
a new trial, but remand for resentencing consistent with 
Diatchenko, supra.  We have reviewed the entire record pursuant 
to our obligation under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and conclude that 
there are no grounds for reversing the defendant's convictions 
or for granting any other relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.