Case Title: Johnson v. Roane County

Citation: 370 S.W.2d 496

Docket Number: 1703

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1963-09-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
370 S.W.2d 496 (1963) Wady E. JOHNSON et al. v. ROANE COUNTY, Tennessee. Supreme Court of Tennessee. September 11, 1963. *497 Frank Montgomery, Knoxville, for plaintiffs in error. George F. McCanless, Atty. Gen., J. Malcolm Shull, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for defendant in error. DYER, Justice. Plaintiffs in error, Wady E. Johnson, Rachel E. Johnson and Kingston Bank and Trust Company will hereafter be referred to as plaintiffs, and defendant in error, Roane County, Tennessee as defendant. On June 25, 1959 in the Circuit Court for Roane County being Docket No. 1703, plaintiffs under Section 23-1423, T.C.A. instituted suit against defendant. In this suit plaintiffs alleged they own land adjacent to the right-of-way of a new road being constructed, and due to certain cuts and fills made in the construction of the new road their property has been damaged, which amounts to a taking of valuable property rights. To this action defendant filed a plea in abatement on the ground other persons than the plaintiffs not parties to the suit owned a substantial interest in the land alleged to be damaged. The Trial Judge sustained this plea and dismissed the suit on January 16, 1961. On January 16, 1962 plaintiffs caused to be issued a summons from the Circuit Court of Roane County against defendant, "in an action to their damage in the sum of $20,000.00." This summons given Docket No. 2122 is the cause now before the Court on appeal. On May 21, 1962 plaintiffs under Docket No. 2122 filed their petition styled, "Reversed Petition for Condemnation." In this petition plaintiffs recite the history of this cause under Docket No. 1703, and allege they now have acquired full title to the land and have a right to file this petition and request a jury of inquest under provisions of Sections 23-1423, T.C.A. That the former adjudication of this cause was other than on the merits. The petition prays for proper process; that the petition be treated as a reverse petition for condemnation; that a proper award be made for compensation for the taking and damage to their property; that a jury of inquest be selected to fix the damages; and for general relief. The Trial Judge upon demurrer has dismissed this cause as barred by the statute of limitations under Sections 23-1424 and 28-106, T.C.A. Under the record before us it is not disputed this action first filed under Docket No. 1703 was filed within one year from the alleged taking as required by Section 23-1424, T.C.A. and said cause was dismissed other than on its merits. Such being the case under Section 28-106, T.C.A. plaintiffs would have a year from the date of the dismissal of their action under Docket No. 1703 to refile their suit. Brooksbanks v. Roane County, 207 Tenn. 524; 341 S.W.2d 570. The summons taken out by plaintiffs on January 16, 1962 was timely issued in accordance with the Brooksbanks case. The plaintiffs in their brief state the question here for decision as follows: Chapter 14 of Title 23, T.C.A. deals with eminent domain and Section 23-1423, thereof sets out the rights of a land owner where his land has actually been taken for internal improvement, and the party so taking has not filed suit for condemnation of same. This section is as follows: This statute provides an aggrieved land owner with two or alternative rights or remedies, and such seems to be the heart of the problem in this suit. First he may petition for a jury of inquest, which in practice is generally referred to as a reverse or inverse petition for condemnation; or, Second he may sue for damages in the ordinary way. In regard to the second remedy allowed by Section 23-1423, that is suit for damages in the ordinary way this Court in the case of Duck River Valley Narrow Gauge Railroad Company v. Cochrane, 71 Tenn. 478 said: The summons of January 16, 1962 was a proper way to commence an action under this statute (23-1423) as a suit for damages in the ordinary way, and was timely filed. The difficulty here is that no pleadings, such as a declaration were ever filed pursuant to this summons, unless the petition of May 21, 1962 can be so treated. Plaintiffs in the body of their petition filed May 21, 1962 state; "They have a right to file this petition and request a jury of inquest under provisions of T.C.A. 23-1423," and in the prayers to this petition further state; "That a jury of inquest be selected at the next regular term of this Court and that said jury be charged in the usual manner to go upon the property and fix the damages." This petition filed under Section 23-1423, T.C.A. both by name and by substance seeks the first remedy allowed by the statute, that is the appointment of a jury of inquest; and such being the case this statute provides, "in which case the same proceedings may be had, as near as may be, as hereinbefore provided." The "hereinbefore provided" refers to Sections 23-1401 through 23-1422, T.C.A., which in effect makes the procedure the same in reverse, as if the party who has taken the land for internal improvements had filed the petition. Section 23-1404, T.C.A. requires a condemnor to file a petition in the circuit court of the county where the land lies and Section 23-1405 sets out the requirements in regard to notice to the land owner. These statutes make no provision for bringing the owner of the land before the Court in any other way than by notice and publication, and does not provide for the issuance of process against them in the ordinary sense, such as proceedings being under the law an exception, by necessary inference, to the general statutory provision (Section 20-201, T.C.A.), that all civil actions at *499 law in courts of record, except as otherwise provided, shall be commenced by summons. In the case of In Re: Condemnation Suits by the United States, 6 Cir., 234 F. 443-445 the Court in commenting on Code Sections 23-1404 and 23-1405, T.C.A. stated: By their nature condemnation proceedings are sui generis and the petition required to be filed by Section 23-1404, T.C.A. is analogous to a petition for compensation under our Workmen's Compensation Statutes this Court in the case of Bowling v. Whitley, 208 Tenn. 657; 348 S.W.2d 310, said: The petition of May 21, 1962 would not be saved from the bar of the statute of limitations by the issuance of the summons of January 16, 1962, since the clerk of the court was without authority to issue this summons as notice required by Section 23-1405, T.C.A. until the petition of May 21, 1962 had been filed. Judgment affirmed.