Case Title: Commonwealth v. Robinson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-07-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-09265 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JASON ROBINSON. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 10, 2018. - July 26, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Fair trial, Waiver of constitutional rights.  
Due Process of Law, Fair trial.  Practice, Criminal, New 
trial. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 27, 2000. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Barbara J. Rouse, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on September 11, 2015, was heard 
by Kenneth W. Salinger, J. 
 
 
 
Paul B. Linn, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Rosemary Curran Scapicchio for the defendant. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  The issue before us is whether a defendant who 
failed to raise a timely objection to an improper court room 
closure at trial nevertheless preserved the claim by raising the 
issue for the first time in his motion for a new trial, thirteen 
years after his convictions.  Otherwise stated, by failing to 
2 
 
raise the claim at trial, did the defendant "procedurally waive"1 
his entitlement to the standard of review designated for 
preserved and meritorious claims of structural error, regardless 
of whether counsel and the defendant were subjectively unaware 
that the court room had been closed at trial?  We answer the 
question in the affirmative:  where a defendant fails to raise a 
timely objection to such a closure at trial, thus depriving the 
judge of the opportunity to either fix the error or analyze the 
closure under the standard set forth in Waller v. Georgia, 467 
U.S. 39, 48 (1984), the defendant forfeits or procedurally 
waives review of his or her claim under the standard designated 
for preserved claims of structural error.2  We emphasize that, 
                                                          
 
 
1 Our cases analyzing whether a defendant has properly 
preserved a claimed violation of the public trial right under 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution have 
almost uniformly referred to the defendant's failure to preserve 
the claimed error at trial as a "procedural waiver."  Unlike a 
waiver of a right, which ordinarily must be knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary, a procedural waiver more closely 
resembles a forfeiture.  See Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 894 n.2 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(waiver is "the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a 
known right or privilege," which is more exacting than 
forfeiture and "merely one means by which a forfeiture may 
occur").  Significantly, the defendant does not procedurally 
waive or forfeit the right to raise the claimed error in this 
context; however, by failing to object to the closure at trial, 
the defendant forfeits or procedurally waives the presumption of 
prejudice that attaches to preserved and meritorious claims of 
structural error. 
 
 
2 The concurrence suggests that the procedural waiver of the 
defendant's claim was triggered by his delay in raising the 
issue after trial, not his failure to raise the issue at trial.  
3 
 
although a defendant who fails to object to the closure at trial 
forfeits or procedurally waives the more favorable standard of 
review, the defendant does not waive the right to raise the 
claim.  We review unpreserved court room closure claims to 
determine whether the improper closure created a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice.3  Because we conclude that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
The cases analyzing procedural waiver (or forfeiture) focus on 
the defendant's failure to object at trial, not the lapse in 
time between the defendant's convictions and when he first 
raised the issue.  See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 471 Mass. 262, 
268-269, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1158 (2016); Commonwealth v. 
Wall, 469 Mass. 652, 672-673 (2014).  See also Weaver v. 
Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1912 (2017) (whether claim is 
preserved depends on issue being timely raised at trial, not 
when or in what posture it was later raised).  Our cases have, 
however, emphasized the conclusiveness of a procedural waiver by 
commenting that in addition to a failure to raise the issue at 
trial, there was also a delay in raising the issue in a first, 
or subsequent, motion for a new trial, but the delay in raising 
the claim after trial is not the dispositive issue.  See 
Jackson, supra ("defendant did not raise an objection when the 
court room was closed . . . .  The issue also was not raised in 
his first motion for a new trial that preceded sentencing"); 
Wall, supra at 672 (issue not raised at trial, "[n]or was it 
raised in the defendant's first motion for a new trial" and his 
second motion for new trial was filed "almost four years after 
he filed his first motion for a new trial, and over seven years 
after his conviction"). 
 
 
3 Based on the circumstances of this case, we need not 
determine how the standard articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1910, for unpreserved 
claims compares to the substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice standard.  However, we emphasize that the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights cannot provide less protection for 
defendants than the Federal Constitution.  See Commonwealth v. 
LaChance, 469 Mass. 854, 858 (2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
317 (2015) (we interpret substantial risk of miscarriage of 
justice standard as being essentially same as prejudice 
requirement for claim of ineffective assistance of counsel). 
4 
 
defendant's claim was not preserved, the grant of the 
defendant's motion for a new trial must be reversed. 
 
Background.  In 2002, a jury in the Superior Court in 
Suffolk County convicted the defendant of murder in the first 
degree on a felony-murder theory, armed robbery, and unlawful 
possession of a firearm.4  Approximately thirteen years after he 
had been convicted, the defendant filed his first motion for a 
new trial, claiming that his Sixth Amendment right to a public 
trial had been violated because the court room had been 
improperly closed during jury empanelment.  The defendant did 
not claim that his counsel had been ineffective for failing to 
object to the closure at trial.  This was the first time that 
the defendant raised the claim, as his trial counsel had not 
objected to the closure at any point during trial. 
 
Following an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion 
for a new trial, the motion judge (the trial judge having since 
retired) concluded that court officers had impermissibly closed 
the court room during jury empanelment and had excluded members 
of the public from entering the court room, including the 
defendant's family.  The judge found that defense counsel did 
not object to the closure because neither counsel nor the 
defendant was aware that the court room had been closed during 
                                                          
 
 
4 During sentencing, the judge dismissed the defendant's 
conviction of armed robbery, which was the felony underlying the 
conviction of felony-murder. 
5 
 
empanelment; the trial judge did not order the court room 
closure, nor was she aware of it.  Defense counsel's focus on 
the jury selection process, according to the judge, was the 
reason counsel was unaware of the court room closure. 
 
Although counsel was aware that court rooms in the 
Commonwealth would occasionally close during empanelment to 
accommodate large venires, counsel was unaware whether this was 
a practice in Suffolk County court rooms at the time of the 
defendant's trial.5  Similarly, counsel was unaware that the 
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extended to jury 
empanelment.  As a result, counsel stated, and the judge 
credited, that if he knew that the defendant's family members 
had been barred from the court room during jury selection, "he 
would have asked that they be admitted, but probably would not 
have made any other kind of objection." 
 
The judge determined that because the defendant and his 
counsel were unaware that the court room had been closed during 
empanelment, counsel's failure to contemporaneously object to 
the closure did not constitute a procedural waiver of his Sixth 
Amendment public trial claim.  Instead, the judge concluded that 
the defendant preserved his claim by raising it in his first 
                                                          
 
5 The motion judge credited testimony that, in 1998, it was 
a regular practice in the Superior Court in Suffolk County to 
close the court room during jury selection, but no evidence was 
presented as to whether this custom was in practice at the time 
of the defendant's trial in 2002. 
6 
 
motion for a new trial, which was filed while his direct appeal 
was pending in this court.  The motion judge did not examine 
whether the defendant and counsel, as a factual matter, had an 
opportunity to perceive that members of the public had been 
excluded from the court room or that only prospective jurors 
were present during empanelment, or whether they otherwise 
should have perceived the exclusion of the public from the court 
room during empanelment.6  Construing the defendant's claim as a 
preserved structural error, the judge granted the defendant's 
motion for a new trial. 
 
Discussion.  The Commonwealth contends that the judge 
erroneously concluded that the defendant's Sixth Amendment 
public trial claim had not been procedurally waived despite 
counsel's failure to lodge a contemporaneous objection at trial 
to the closed court room.  We agree. 
 
We review the disposition of a motion for a new trial for 
"a significant error of law or other abuse of discretion."  
Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 469, 488 (2014), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307 (1986). 
 
The Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to the 
jury selection process, and a violation of that right 
                                                          
 
 
6 The motion judge did, however, determine that because 
defense counsel did not know whether it was a custom and 
practice in Suffolk County to close court rooms during jury 
empanelment, he did not have constructive notice of the closure 
in that limited sense. 
7 
 
constitutes structural error.  See Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 
S. Ct. 1899, 1910 (2017); Commonwealth v. Wall, 469 Mass. 652, 
672 (2014); Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. 94, 105-106 
(2010).  See also Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 213 (2010).  
It is similarly well settled that "[w]here a defendant timely 
raises and preserves a meritorious claim of structural error, 
this court 'will presume prejudice and reversal is automatic.'"  
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 471 Mass. 262, 268 (2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1158 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. 
LaChance, 469 Mass. 854, 857 (2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
317 (2015).  See Weaver, supra ("in the case of a structural 
error where there is an objection at trial and the issue is 
raised on direct appeal, the defendant generally is entitled to 
'automatic reversal' regardless of the error's actual 'effect on 
the outcome'" [emphasis added; citation omitted]). 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of the right to a public 
trial, it, "like other structural rights, can be waived" 
(citation omitted).  Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. at 105-106.  
"Where counsel fails to lodge a timely objection to the closure 
of the court room, the defendant's claim of error is deemed to 
be procedurally waived."  LaChance, 469 Mass. at 857.  See 
Commonwealth v. Alebord, 467 Mass. 106, 112, cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 2830 (2014).  A claim is procedurally waived regardless 
of whether counsel's failure to object to the closure was a 
8 
 
tactical decision or "where the failure to object is 
inadvertent."  Commonwealth v. Lang, 473 Mass. 1, 9 (2015), 
quoting Wall, 469 Mass. at 672.  See Commonwealth v. Morganti, 
467 Mass. 96, 102, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 356 (2014) 
(inadvertent procedural waiver where no tactical reason for 
counsel's failure to object).  See also Commonwealth v. Vargas, 
475 Mass. 338, 357 (2016) ("Such waiver need not be consented to 
by the defendant").  Indeed, a claim is procedurally waived 
"whenever a litigant fails to make a timely objection," 
including where counsel was unaware of the court room closure.  
Jackson, 471 Mass. at 269, quoting Wall, supra. 
 
In reviewing a defendant's claim that the court room was 
improperly closed, the threshold inquiry is whether that claim 
was properly preserved at the time of the alleged closure.  This 
court recently observed that in Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1910-1912, 
"the United States Supreme Court distinguished sharply between 
preserved and unpreserved errors on appeal."  Commonwealth v. 
Kolenovic, 478 Mass. 189, 203 (2017).  Reaffirming the principle 
that a contemporaneous objection to an offending court room 
closure is required to preserve the claim, we held that the 
dispositive inquiry is "not whether the claim was made in the 
direct appeal or in the motion for new trial, but rather whether 
the court room closure issue was preserved at trial" (emphasis 
added).  Id. at 203 n.13.  A contemporaneous objection is 
9 
 
indispensable for purposes of preserving the claimed error on 
appeal because when the alleged error is raised 
contemporaneously with the closure, "the trial court can either 
order the court room opened or explain the reasons for keeping 
it closed."  Weaver, supra at 1912. 
 
Furthermore, a contemporaneous objection to an improper 
court room closure also creates a record that can be directly 
reviewed by an appellate court without the need for collateral 
proceedings to develop the court room closure issue.  See 
Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1912 (when appellate courts adjudicate 
preserved errors raised on direct appeal, "the systemic costs of 
remedying the error are diminished to some extent . . . because, 
if a new trial is ordered on direct review, there may be a 
reasonable chance that not too much time will have elapsed for 
witness memories still to be accurate and physical evidence not 
to be lost").  Absent a contemporaneous objection to the court 
room closure at trial, concluding that a claim is preserved 
"would tear the fabric of our well-established waiver 
jurisprudence . . . and would defeat the core purposes of the 
waiver doctrine:  to protect society's interest in the finality 
of its judicial decisions, and to promote judicial efficiency."  
LaChance, 469 Mass. at 858, quoting Morganti, 467 Mass. at 102.  
See Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 294 (2002).  Our 
waiver doctrine prevents claims that are raised for the first 
10 
 
time in postconviction proceedings from "function[ing] as a way 
to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not 
presented at trial, thus undermining the finality of jury 
verdicts" (quotation and citation omitted).  Weaver, supra. 
 
The principles underpinning the doctrine of procedural 
waiver are deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence, and were 
recently reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court in 
Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1912.  As stated, analyzing whether a 
claimed error was properly preserved depends on whether the 
defendant contemporaneously objected to the closure at trial.  
See Jackson, 471 Mass. at 268-269.  Indeed, only where a 
defendant raises a contemporaneous objection to an improper 
court room closure at trial has this court held that the 
defendant's claimed Sixth Amendment public trial violation was 
preserved.  See Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. at 118.  In that case, 
the defendant objected to the court room closure when defense 
counsel first discovered that the court officers had placed a 
sign on the court room door stating, "Jury empanelment Do not 
enter."  Id. at 98.  We concluded that the defendant properly 
preserved the public trial error because he objected "at a time 
when the violation could have been remedied by beginning the 
empanelment process anew."  Id. at 118 n.35, citing Commonwealth 
v. McDuffee, 379 Mass. 353, 359 (1979) (noting that "rationale 
behind the requirement of a specific exception is to enable the 
11 
 
judge to make any necessary correction").  See Commonwealth v. 
Lavoie, 464 Mass. 83, 89 n.11, cert. denied, 569 U.S. 981 (2013) 
(noting that defendant's claim was factually different from 
claim in Cohen (No. 1) "in at least one important respect:  
Cohen's defense counsel objected to the court room closure at 
his trial"). 
 
Conversely, where a defendant fails to contemporaneously 
object to an improper court room closure at trial, we have 
steadfastly held that the defendant's claim is procedurally 
waived.  See, e.g., Lang, 473 Mass. at 7-9 (no objection at 
trial; claim raised in first motion for new trial as Sixth 
Amendment violation while direct appeal pending); Jackson, 471 
Mass. at 268-269 (no objection at trial; claim raised as Sixth 
Amendment violation in motion for new trial); Alebord, 467 Mass. 
107-108 (no objection at trial; claim not raised in first motion 
for new trial or direct appeal and asserted as claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel); Lavoie, 464 Mass. at 84 (no 
objection at trial; claim raised as Sixth Amendment violation in 
defendant's first motion for new trial).  Absent a 
contemporaneous objection, it is immaterial when or in what form 
the defendant later raises the claim in postconviction 
proceedings.  See Kolenovic, 478 Mass. at 203 n.13 ("the 
important distinction is . . . whether the court room closure 
issue was preserved at trial").  Cases noting that a defendant 
12 
 
also failed to raise the claim in his or her first motion for a 
new trial or on direct appeal only serve to emphasize the 
egregiousness of the defendant's delay in raising the claim -- 
like here, where the defendant first raised the issue 
approximately thirteen years after his convictions.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Celester, 473 Mass. 553, 577-578 (2016) (no 
objection at trial, and issue raised in second motion for new 
trial); Jackson, 471 Mass. at 268-269 (no objection at trial, 
and "issue also was not raised in his first motion for a new 
trial that preceded sentencing"); Wall, 469 Mass. at 672 (no 
objection at trial, "[n]or was it raised in the defendant's 
first motion for a new trial"). 
 
We now turn to the nucleus of the defendant's argument, 
that despite his counsel's failure to contemporaneously object 
to the improperly closed court room, his claim was not 
procedurally waived because the defendant and his counsel were 
factually unaware of the closure when it occurred at trial.  We 
have considered and rejected substantially similar arguments on 
a number of occasions.  See Jackson, 471 Mass. at 269; 
Commonwealth v. Fritz, 472 Mass. 341, 346 (2015); Wall, 469 
Mass. at 672-673 & n.24.  For the reasons underpinning our 
doctrine of procedural waiver discussed supra, we have held that 
a defendant procedurally waives a court room closure claim by 
failing to contemporaneously object to the closure, regardless 
13 
 
of whether the defendant or counsel was factually aware that the 
court room was closed.  See Jackson, supra; Fritz, supra; Wall, 
supra.  In Jackson, supra, where the defendant and his counsel 
were unaware that the court room had been closed, this court 
specifically rejected the argument that the defendant's claim 
"cannot be procedurally waived when neither counsel nor the 
defendant knew of the occasion for objection."  We concluded 
that the defendant's attempt to shield his claim from the 
doctrine of procedural waiver was at odds with our decision in 
Wall, supra, because the "right to a public trial may be 
procedurally waived whenever a litigant fails to make a timely 
objection," regardless of whether counsel or the defendant 
perceived the court room closure when it occurred.  Jackson, 
supra, quoting Wall, supra at 672.  This rationale applies with 
equal force where counsel was unaware of the occasion for 
objection because he or she did not realize that the defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extended to jury 
empanelment.  See Fritz, supra. 
 
The defendant attempts to distinguish his case from 
Jackson, 471 Mass. at 269, and Wall, 469 Mass. at 672-673 & 
n.24, because he raised the court room closure claim in his 
first motion for a new trial while his direct appeal was 
pending.  Yet, as we previously emphasized, "the important 
distinction is not whether the claim was made in the direct 
14 
 
appeal or in the motion for new trial, but rather whether the 
court room closure issue was preserved at trial."  Kolenovic, 
478 Mass. at 203 n.13.  Furthermore, our determination that the 
defendant in Jackson, supra at 265-266, 269, procedurally waived 
his claim was predicated on his failure to timely object at 
trial, not because he first moved for a mistrial and motion for 
a new trial prior to sentencing without raising the closed court 
room issue,7 and then subsequently raised the issue in his first 
motion for a new trial postsentencing.  The defendant in 
Jackson, like the defendant in this case, was apparently unaware 
of the court room closure prior to filing his first 
postsentencing motion for a new trial.  Id. at 268-269.  In both 
cases, the dispositive inquiry is whether the defendant objected 
to the closure at trial, and not a hypertechnical analysis of 
the precise procedural posture in which the claim is first 
raised posttrial.  See id. 
 
For purposes of determining whether the defendant's claim 
was properly preserved at trial, it is also legally irrelevant 
that he now presents the claim as a Sixth Amendment violation 
rather than a claim that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to perceive and object to the closure.  
                                                          
 
 
7 In Jackson, 471 Mass. at 265-266, prior to sentencing, the 
defendant orally moved for a new trial and for a mistrial when 
it was learned that one of the jurors was not a United States 
citizen.  Both motions were denied. 
15 
 
Regardless of the reason for counsel's failure to lodge a 
contemporaneous objection to the closure, the trial judge is 
deprived of the opportunity to evaluate the claim "at a time 
when the violation could have been remedied."  See Cohen (No. 
1), 456 Mass. at 118 n.35.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
defendant's failure to contemporaneously object to the court 
room closure constituted a procedural waiver of his claim. 
 
Where a procedurally waived Sixth Amendment public trial 
claim is raised in a motion for a new trial, a reviewing court 
analyzes the claimed error to determine whether the error, if 
any, created a "substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice."  
LaChance, 469 Mass. at 857.  See Commonwealth v. Hill, 432 Mass. 
704, 710 n.14 (2000).8  The substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
                                                          
 
8 We have observed that "where the defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial has been subject to procedural 
waiver, the defendant after conviction may still make a 
collateral attack on the issue based on ineffective assistance 
of counsel for failure to object to the court room closure."  
Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 357 (2016).  In the 
context of reviewing a procedurally waived claim that is 
appropriately advanced as a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel due to counsel's failure to contemporaneously object to 
the closure at trial, the United States Supreme Court announced 
in Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1911, that "prejudice is not shown 
automatically.  Instead, the burden is on the defendant to show 
either a reasonable probability of a different outcome in his or 
her case or . . . that the particular public-trial violation was 
so serious as to render his or her trial fundamentally unfair."  
Id., citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984) 
("when a court is evaluating an ineffective-assistance claim, 
the ultimate inquiry must concentrate on 'the fundamental 
fairness of the proceeding'").  Although the defendant has not 
raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we have 
16 
 
justice standard applies even where the defendant, in a capital 
case, files a postconviction motion for a new trial while the 
defendant's direct appeal is pending in this court.  See Hill, 
supra.  Only where the motion for a new trial is denied, and 
that denial is consolidated with the defendant's direct appeal, 
does this court review the totality of the defendant's case to 
determine whether there is a "substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice" under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  See 
Celester, 473 Mass. at 560; Jackson, 471 Mass. at 269.  
Accordingly, we reverse the grant of the defendant's motion for 
a new trial and remand the case to the Superior Court for the 
motion judge to determine whether the improper court room 
closure created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
interpreted the substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice 
standard as being essentially the same as the prejudice 
requirement where the defendant raises an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim due to counsel's failure to object to the court 
room closure.  LaChance, 469 Mass. at 858, citing Commonwealth 
v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 686-687 (2002).  However, as discussed 
in note 3, supra, this court has not had occasion to analyze 
whether the standard articulated in Weaver, supra, is more or 
less protective than the substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice standard. 
 
BUDD, J. (concurring).  I agree that the defendant has 
procedurally waived, or inadvertently forfeited, his court room 
closure claim.  However, a criminal defendant should not be 
considered to have automatically forfeited such a claim by 
failing to object contemporaneously to the closure when neither 
he nor his defense counsel (nor the judge) knew or had reason to 
know of it.1  In my view, this question is primarily governed by 
principles expressed in the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, and I would conclude instead that the defendant 
forfeited his court room closure claim because we presume that 
he had the opportunity to discover this claim and bring it to a 
court's attention in a more timely fashion with the exercise of 
reasonable diligence. 
1.  Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure and 
procedural waiver.  Under Mass. R. Crim. P. 22, 378 Mass. 892 
(1979), and Mass R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 
(2001), there are at least two ways that a claim can be 
procedurally waived.  First, rule 22 generally requires 
                                                          
 
 
1 The motion judge heard and received testimonial evidence 
regarding whether the defendant or his counsel waived any 
objection to court room closure.  The motion judge credited 
defense counsel's testimony that if he knew that the defendant's 
family members had been barred from the court room during jury 
selection in this case, he would have asked that they be 
admitted, but probably would not have made an objection.  The 
court's opinion does not rest on defense counsel's testimony 
that he would not have objected at trial had he known about the 
court room closure, and I assume without deciding that his later 
testimony has no legal significance. 
2 
 
objections at trial in order to preserve claims of error.  If a 
claim is not objected to at trial, it is waived.  See Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 22.  However, the rule also states in pertinent part: 
"if a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or 
order, the absence of an objection does not thereafter 
prejudice him." 
 
Id. 
Additionally, a defendant may procedurally waive a 
preserved claim of error posttrial if he or she fails to raise 
it in his or her first motion for a new trial.  Rule 30 (b) 
permits a "trial judge upon motion" to "grant a new trial at any 
time if it appears justice may not have been done."  However, 
the rule also calls for the waiver of any claims that may be 
brought under rule 30 but are not raised in the defendant's 
first motion for a new trial: 
"All grounds for relief claimed by defendant under 
[provisions of rule 30] shall be raised by the defendant in 
the original or amended motion.  Any grounds not so raised 
are waived unless the judge in the exercise of discretion 
permits them to be raised in a subsequent motion, or unless 
such grounds could not reasonably have been raised in the 
original or amended motion." 
 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (2). 
These rules are consistent with the principle that a "right 
may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the 
failure to make a timely assertion of the right before a 
tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it."  Puckett v. 
3 
 
United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134 (2009), quoting Yakus v. United 
States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944). 
 
2.  Procedural waiver in court room closure cases.  In 
cases in which defense counsel had an opportunity to object at 
trial because he or she knew or had reason to know of the court 
room closure and failed to object, we have concluded, 
consistently with rule 22, that the defendant's public trial 
right was waived because the claim was not timely preserved 
(i.e., at trial).  See Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 478 Mass. 189, 
203 n.14 (2017);2 Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 357 
(2016); Commonwealth v. Lang, 473 Mass. 1, 9 (2015); 
Commonwealth v. Fritz, 472 Mass. 341, 346 (2015); Commonwealth 
v. LaChance, 469 Mass. 854, 855-856 (2014), cert. denied, 136 
S. Ct. 317 (2015); Commonwealth v. Alebord, 467 Mass. 106, 108, 
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2830 (2014); Commonwealth v. Morganti, 
467 Mass. 96, 102, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 356 (2014); 
Commonwealth v. Lavoie, 464 Mass. 83, 87-89, cert. denied, 569 
U.S. 981 (2013).  See also Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 
                                                          
 
2 The court places great emphasis on a footnote in 
Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 478 Mass. 189, 203 n.13 (2017), where 
we said that "the important distinction is not whether the claim 
was made in the direct appeal or in the motion for new trial, 
but rather whether the court room closure issue was preserved at 
trial."  However, in that case, defense counsel was aware of the 
court room closure at trial.  See id. at 203 n.14. 
4 
 
1899, 1906 (2017);3 Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 619 
(1960) (court room closure claim waived where "[c]ounsel was 
present throughout, and it is not claimed that he was not fully 
aware of the exclusion of the general public").4  In each case, 
we held the claim to be untimely, regardless of whether it was 
presented in a motion for a new trial or in a direct appeal, 
because the defendant had been aware of the closure and had 
failed to object to it at the time of the closure.  See Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 22. 
 
However, the question whether a claim was preserved at 
trial cannot fairly be asked in a situation in which a defendant 
did not have an opportunity to object contemporaneously with the 
                                                          
 
 
3 The court cites Weaver for the notion that a 
"contemporaneous objection is indispensable for purposes of 
preserving the claimed error on appeal because when the alleged 
error is raised contemporaneously with the closure, 'the trial 
court can either order the court room opened or explain the 
reasons for keeping it closed.'"  Ante at    , quoting Weaver v. 
Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1912 (2017).  However, the 
United States Supreme Court makes clear that there defense 
counsel was aware of the closure:  "In this case petitioner's 
mother told defense counsel about the closure at some point 
during jury selection.  But counsel 'believed that a courtroom 
closure for [jury selection] was constitutional.' . . .  As a 
result, he 'did not discuss the matter' with petitioner, or tell 
him 'that his right to a public trial included the [jury voir 
dire],' or object to the closure."  Id. at 1906. 
 
 
4 One hundred eighty-five years ago, this court explained 
how a defendant must have actual or constructive knowledge of 
the error in order for the defendant to be able to waive a claim 
of error by not objecting:  "[I]f the ground of exception is 
known and not seasonably taken, by implication of law, it is 
waived" (emphasis added).  Cady v. Norton, 14 Pick. 236, 237 
(1833). 
5 
 
closure.  See id.  We have considered at least two public trial 
cases where the defendant first raised a public trial right 
claim after the trial had concluded and defense counsel was 
unaware of the closure at the time of trial.5  See Commonwealth 
v. Jackson, 471 Mass. 262, 269 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
1158 (2016); Commonwealth v. Wall, 469 Mass. 652, 672-673 
(2014).  In both cases, we looked to indications of timeliness 
based on the circumstances presented in each case.  For example, 
in Wall, the defendant's claim was untimely not merely because 
he did not raise it at trial (when he was unaware of the 
exclusion), but because he also failed to raise the claim until 
his second motion for a new trial, filed "almost four years 
after he filed his first . . . and over seven years after his 
conviction."  Wall, supra at 672.  Importantly, we did not say 
that the objection needed to be contemporaneous with the error. 
 
In Jackson, 471 Mass. at 269, relying on Wall, we concluded 
that although neither the defendant nor his counsel knew of the 
court room closure at the time of trial, the defendant's public 
trial claim was untimely where he did not raise the issue until 
four years after his convictions in a second motion for a new 
trial.  Here again, we did not hold that the objection had to be 
contemporaneous in order to be timely where the defendant had no 
                                                          
 
 
5 It is unclear from the facts of a third case, Commonwealth 
v. Celester, 473 Mass. 553, 560 (2016), whether defense counsel 
had actual or constructive notice of the court room closure. 
6 
 
actual or constructive knowledge of the closure.  See id.  See 
also Commonwealth v. Celester, 473 Mass. 553, 560, 578 (2016) 
(claim procedurally waived when defendant first raised public 
trial claim eighteen years after trial). 
 
It is true that, thus far, we have not deemed timely a 
closed court room claim brought posttrial where the defendant 
was unaware of the error at trial.  However, we so concluded 
only after a review of the circumstances in each case.  See 
Jackson, 471 Mass. at 269; Wall, 469 Mass. at 673.  Rather than 
holding that the defendants' claims were untimely because they 
failed to make a contemporaneous objection at trial, we 
concluded that, on the facts presented, the claims were waived 
because the defendant in each case waited so long between the 
violation of his public trial right and bringing the claim to 
the attention of a court that it would be unreasonable to 
believe that he could not have discovered the violation earlier 
with the exercise of due diligence.  See Reporters' Notes to 
Rule 30 (c) (2), Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, at 1775 (LexisNexis 2016) (rule of waiver "not 
intended to foreclose from future consideration grounds which 
were not known and could not have been found out with the 
exercise of due diligence" [emphasis added]).  Cf. Commonwealth 
v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 308-309 (1986) (question is "whether 
the defendant met his burden of showing that reasonable 
7 
 
diligence would not have produced" testimony of allegedly newly 
discovered witnesses at earlier time). 
Today, the court takes the holdings of Wall and Jackson a 
significant step further and, for the first time, equates a 
timely objection6 with a contemporaneous one, "including where 
counsel was unaware of the court room closure."  Ante at    .  
This goes further than I believe is necessary or prudent, see, 
e.g., SCVNGR, Inc. v. Punchh, Inc., 478 Mass. 324, 330 (2017) 
("it is canonical that courts should, where possible, avoid 
unnecessary constitutional decisions"), and is inconsistent with 
rule 22.  The rules of a court have the force of law and are as 
binding on a court as are statutes.  Commonwealth v. Brown, 395 
Mass. 604, 606 (1985) ("Requiring courts to abide by their own 
rules is supported by the fundamental principle of justice that 
the law must treat persons similarly situated uniformly"). 
 
3.  Due process concerns.  In addition, I believe that the 
court's ruling is inconsistent with minimum standards of due 
process.  "For more than a century the central meaning of 
procedural due process has been clear:  'Parties whose rights 
are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that 
                                                          
 
 
6 A more fitting articulation of the question might be, as 
the Supreme Court has said, whether the defendant has made a 
"timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having 
jurisdiction to determine it."  Puckett v. United States, 556 
U.S. 129, 134 (2009), quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 
414, 444 (1944). 
8 
 
they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.'"  
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972), quoting Baldwin v. 
Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233 (1863). 
 
The court focuses on the fact that where, as here, a court 
officer acted alone and without notice to the judge or the 
parties, the judge is at a disadvantage because he or she did 
not have an opportunity to correct the error at the time it 
occurred.  However, the more troubling issue is that a 
defendant, who has no opportunity to bring the closure to the 
court's attention, suffers the consequences of the error.  
Today's ruling has the effect of barring defendants from 
asserting their constitutional rights in a timely way through no 
fault of their own.7 
                                                          
 
 
7 In addition, there are important constitutional and policy 
reasons to ensure that a judge is, in fact, aware of, and in 
control of, what takes place in his or her court room.  
Consider, for example, Riley v. Deeds, 56 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th 
Cir. 1995).  In that case, a jury requested that a certain 
witness's testimony be reread.  Id. at 1119.  The trial court 
judge could not be located, and in his absence, a law clerk 
convened the court.  Id.  On appeal, the court considered the 
implications of the law clerk's actions, which were independent 
and in absence of the judge.  Id. at 1121.  Where there is an 
"abdication of judicial control over the process . . . there 
[is] no opportunity to make any meaningful objection."  Id.  In 
the same manner, when an agent of the court, a court officer, 
makes a decision independent of the judge to close a court room 
without actual or constructive notice to defense counsel (and 
the judge), "there is a breakdown in the construct of the 
trial," id. at 1120, in a manner where we cannot say the 
defendant "acquiesced."  See Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 
8, 24 (1999) (Fried, J., concurring). 
9 
 
 
4.  The instant case.  In this case, the defendant waited 
nearly fourteen years between the initial trial and bringing the 
court room closure to the attention of a court.  Although the 
motion judge found that neither he nor his counsel had notice of 
the closure at the time of trial, we must presume that the 
defendant had the opportunity to discover this claim and bring 
it to a court's attention in a more timely fashion with the 
exercise of reasonable diligence.  Even considering the lack of 
knowledge of the court room closure at the time of trial, I do 
not consider a nearly fourteen-year span a "timely assertion of 
the right."  Puckett, 556 U.S. at 134, quoting Yakus, 321 U.S. 
at 444.  See Jackson, 471 Mass. at 269, quoting Wall, 469 Mass. 
at 672 (requiring "timely objection" to error). 
 
Therefore, I would conclude that the defendant has 
forfeited his public jury trial claim, but would leave for 
another day what might constitute a timely objection.8 
                                                          
 
 
8 A determination whether a claim under the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution that was raised after the 
trial because the defendant was unaware of the closure at the 
time of trial was timely brought would depend upon a review of 
the circumstances of the closure, including whether the 
defendant or counsel should have known of the closure, the 
length of time between the trial and when the claim was brought, 
and when and how the closure was discovered, among other 
factors.