Case Title: Medical Mutual v. Davis

Citation: 365 Md. 477

Docket Number: 59/99

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2001-09-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 59, September Term, 1999
Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society of Maryland v. Williette Davis, et al. 
[When Post-judgment Interest Begins To Accrue On A Money Judgment For Tort Damages,
Based On A Jury Verdict, When The Judgment Is Subsequently Reduced, Via A Remittitur, By
The Trial Court]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 59
September Term, 1999
___________________________________________
MEDICAL MUTUAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE SOCIETY OF MARYLAND
v.
WILLIETTE DAVIS, et al.
__________________________________________
        
Bell, C.J.,
Eldridge
        * Rodowsky
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell,
                                
         JJ.
___________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
__________________________________________
     
Filed:   September 14, 2001
* Rodowsky, J., now retired, participated in the hearing
and conference of this case while an active member of
this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the
Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated
in the decision and adoption of this opinion.
1
As the only issue in this case relates to post-judgment interest, we need not set forth the underlying
facts of the medical malpractice claims. 
This case presents the single question of when post-judgment interest begins to accrue
on a money judgment for tort damages, based on a jury verdict, when the judgment is
subsequently reduced, via a remittitur, by the trial court.  The defendant, Medical Mutual
Liability Insurance Society of Maryland, asks us to determine whether the Circuit Court erred
as a matter of law in awarding post-judgment interest, on the reduced judgment, from the date
of the original judgment.
The plaintiffs, Williette Davis and Massaquoi Kamara, filed in the Circuit Court for
Prince George’s County wrongful death and survivor actions against Doctor Vibhakar Mody,
based on alleged negligence in connection with the birth of their son, Sana Kpehe Kamara.  The
child died when he was about two years old, allegedly as a result of the negligence at the time
of his birth.1  On November 7, 1996, the jury found Dr. Mody negligent and returned verdicts
in favor of Williette Davis and Massaquoi Kamara, individually, on the wrongful death claims,
and a verdict in favor of the estate of Sana Kpehe Kamara on the survivor claim. On
November 13, 1996, a judgment was entered on the Circuit Court’s docket as follows:
Estate of Sana Kpehe Kamara:
Medical Expenses
$ 1,313,283.30
Noneconomic Damages
$ 2,000,000.00
Williette Davis:
Noneconomic Damages
$1,000,000.00
Massaquoi Kamara:
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2
The statutory cap on noneconomic damages did not apply to the parents’ individual noneconomic
damage awards because their claims arose before the Legislature made the cap applicable to wrongful
death actions. 
Noneconomic Damages
$1,000,000.00.
Two days later, on November 15, 1996, Dr. Mody filed a motion for a new trial or, in
the alternative, for a remittitur.  After numerous pleadings, replies, memoranda, and hearings,
the Circuit Court filed an opinion and order on September 11, 1997, making the following
determinations. First, the court accepted the parties’ suggestion that the noneconomic damages
awarded to the estate of Sana Kpehe Kamara be reduced from $2,000,000.00 to $350,000.00,
in light of the then cap on noneconomic damages set forth in Maryland Code (1974, 1998
Repl. Vol.), §11-108(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.  Second, the court
“denied Defendants’ Motion for a New Trial, or in the Alternative, Motion for Remittitur, for
the noneconomic award to the parents.”  Thus, the court did not disturb the wrongful death
judgments entered in favor of Williette Davis and Massaquoi Kamara, individually, because the
court “found that the jury awarded these amounts based upon credible evidence and th[e] court
was unwilling to invade the jury’s province in that regard.”2  Third, the court granted in part the
defendant’s motion for a new trial or a remittitur, limited to the issue of medical expenses
awarded to the estate of Sana Kpehe Kamara.  
In light of the Circuit Court’s rulings, the clerk, on September 11, 1997, entered on the
docket a “total judgment [of] $2,350,000.00 with costs” against the defendants, subject to the
estate’s acceptance of the remittitur.  On September 25, 1997, the estate accepted a remittitur
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3
The insurance policy issued by Medical Mutual required the payment of post-judgment interest in
addition to the liability insurance limit.
4
No issue has been raised in this case regarding the procedure employed by the plaintiffs.  The same
procedure, under somewhat similar circumstances, was followed in Brown v. Medical Mutual, 90 Md.
App. 18, 21, 599 A.2d 1201, 1205, cert. denied, 326 Md. 366, 605 A.2d 101 (1992).
reducing the medical expense portion of the survivorship award to zero, and thus reducing the
entire survivorship award to $350,000.00.  Therefore, the total judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs for $2,350,000.00 became final on September 25, 1997. 
The plaintiffs then sought payment of the judgment from Dr. Mody’s insurance carrier,
Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society of Maryland (Medical Mutual).  On February 19,
1998, Medical Mutual tendered payment of Dr. Mody’s insurance policy liability limit of
$1,000,000.00 plus post-judgment interest in the amount of $95, 288.32.3  The post-judgment
interest was calculated from September 25, 1997, the date of the plaintiffs’ acceptance of the
remittitur. 
The plaintiffs subsequently filed, directly against Medical Mutual, a “Request for Writ
of Garnishment for Post-Judgment Interest,” seeking additional post-judgment interest, on the
reduced judgment, in the amount of $206,670.58.4  They argued that post-judgment interest
should accrue from the date of the original jury verdict assessing liability, which was
November 7, 1996.  After a hearing, the Circuit Court awarded to the plaintiffs post-judgment
interest on the reduced judgment amount but accruing from the date of the original judgment
entered by the court on November 13, 1996.  
Medical Mutual then filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  Prior to argument
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5
Section 11-107(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article reads as follows:
“(a) Legal rate of interest on judgments. --  Except as provided in §11-106 of this
article, the legal rate of interest on a judgment shall be at the rate of 10 percent per annum
on the amount of judgment.”
Rule 2-604(b) states:
(continued...)
in the Court of Special Appeals, this Court issued a writ of certiorari.  Medical Mutual
Liability Insurance Society of Maryland v. Williette Davis, 355 Md. 610, 735 A.2d 1105
(1999).
As previously mentioned, Medical Mutual raises a single issue on appeal, namely
whether the Circuit Court erred as a matter of law in making an award of post-judgment interest
from the date of the original judgment after having reduced the judgment pursuant to Medical
Mutual’s post-judgment motions.  Medical Mutual contends that interest on a tort judgment
begins to run from the “date of entry of the judgment,” and that in the present case, such entry
occurred on September 25, 1997, the date the plaintiffs accepted a remittitur on the jury
verdict award and the date on which the judgment became final and appealable.  The plaintiffs
agree that interest on a tort judgment begins to run from the date of entry of the judgment.
They contend, however, that in the present case such entry occurred on November 13, 1996,
the date of the original entry of judgment upon the jury verdict.
Under Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.), §11-107(a) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article, and Maryland Rule 2-604(b), post-judgment interest accrues at the rate
of 10% per annum “from the date of entry” of the judgment.5  The “date of entry” of a judgment
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5
(...continued)
“(b) Post-judgment interest.  A money judgment shall bear interest at the rate
prescribed by law from the date of entry.”
6
Rule 2-601 provides in pertinent part as follows:
“Rule 2-601.  Entry of judgment.
(a) Prompt entry – Separate document.  Each judgment shall be set forth on a
separate document.  Upon a general verdict of a jury or upon a decision by the court
allowing recovery only of costs or a specified amount of money or denying all relief, the
clerk shall forthwith prepare, sign, and enter the judgment, unless the court orders
otherwise.  Upon a special verdict of a jury or upon a decision by the court granting other
relief, the court shall promptly review the form of the judgment presented and, if approved,
sign it, and the clerk shall forthwith enter the judgment as approved and signed.  A
judgment is effective only when so set forth and when entered as provided in section (b)
of this Rule.  Unless the court orders otherwise, entry of the judgment shall not be delayed
pending determination of the amount of costs.
(b) Method of entry – Date of judgment.  The clerk shall enter a judgment by
making a record of it in writing on the file jacket, or on a docket within the file, or in a
docket book, according to the practice of each court, and shall record the actual date of
the entry.  That date shall be the date of the judgment.”
is the date on which the clerk of the court makes a written record of the judgment pursuant to
Rule 2-601.6  In this case, there were two different times when “judgments” were entered on
the docket: November 1996  and September 1997.  Nonetheless, as November 13, 1996, was
the first date on which there was “entry” of a money judgment, the language of Rule 2-604(b)
indicates that post judgment interest would properly begin to run from that date.
In support of its argument that post-judgment interest should not have begun to run until
September 25, 1997, Medical Mutual relies on the definitions of “Judgment” and of “Money
judgment” set forth in Rules 1-202(n) and 1-202(p).  Those definitions are as follows:
“(n) Judgment. ‘Judgment’ means any order of court final in its
nature entered pursuant to these rules.”
-6-
* * *
“(p) Money judgment.  ‘Money judgment’ means a judgment
determining that a specified amount of money is immediately payable to
the judgment creditor. * * * ”
Medical Mutual contends that, “[f]or an order to be ‘final in its nature,’ it must be both
appealable and enforceable under the Maryland Rules. * * * [W]hen a party files a motion for
new trial in accordance with Maryland Rule 2-533, the Circuit Court retains jurisdiction to
affirm, modify, amend, or vacate the judgment.  Maryland Rule 8-202(c).  Therefore, the
judgment cannot be considered ‘final in its nature.’  For this reason, the Court of Appeals held
that the order disposing of the post-trial motion becomes the only final and appealable
judgment in the case.  B & K Rentals v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 319 Md. 127, 132, 571
A.2d 1213 (1990) . . . .”  (Appellant’s brief at 6-7).  
The flaw in Medical Mutual’s argument is that the judgment of November 13, 1996, was
final in its nature and was appealable at the time of its entry on November 13, 1996.
Furthermore, absent any subsequent action being taken, it was “payable to the judgment
creditor.”  See Rule 2-632(b).  If no post-judgment motions were filed, it would be the only
“money judgment” entered in the case.  Consequently, on the date of entry, the November 1996
judgment would appear to have been a “judgment” within the definitions set forth in Rules 1-
202(n) and 1-202(p) and thus a “judgment” for purposes of Rule 2-604(b).  
Medical Mutual’s theory seems to be that any order of a court, which would be a
“judgment” within the meaning of Rules 1-202(n) and 1-202(p) at the time of entry, is actually
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7
Rule 8-202(c) provides as follows:
“(c) Civil action – Post judgment motions.  In a civil action, when a timely
motion is filed pursuant to Rule 2-532, 2-533, or 2-534, the notice of appeal shall be filed
within 30 days after entry of (1) a notice of withdrawing the motion or (2) an order denying
a motion pursuant to Rule 2-533 or disposing of a motion pursuant to Rule 2-532 or 2-
534.  A notice of appeal filed before the withdrawal or disposition of any of these motions
does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to dispose of the motion.”
not a judgment within the meaning of those rules if any action is taken after the date of entry
which has the effect of abrogating the order’s finality for purposes of appeal.  In the case at bar,
Medical Mutual’s motion under Rule 2-533 for a remittitur or new trial, filed within ten days
of the November 13, 1996, judgment, rendered the November 13th judgment nonfinal for
purposes of appeal.  See Rule 8-202(c); B & K Rentals v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., supra,
319 Md. at 132, 571 A.2d at 1216 (“Consequently, ‘when a motion to alter or amend an
otherwise final judgment [or a motion for new trial] is filed within ten days after the
judgment’s entry, the judgment loses its finality for purposes of appeal,’” quoting Unnamed
Atty. v. Attorney Griev. Comm’n, 303 Md. 473, 486, 494 A.2d 940 (1985), emphasis supplied,
brackets in original).7
If Medical Mutual’s theory were correct, and if the word “judgment” in the Maryland
Rules meant only a “judgment” not susceptible of losing its finality by subsequent action,
numerous rules would make little or no sense.  For example, Rule 2-533 itself, as well as
Rules 2-532(b) and 2-534, all provide for various motions to be filed “within ten days after
entry of judgment,” and, as pointed out above, such motions cause judgments to lose their
finality for purposes of appeal.  These rules obviously treat as “judgments” orders similar to
-8-
8
At the time of the decision in I. W. Berman and other earlier cases, the post-judgment interest rule
(continued...)
the order entered in this case on November 13, 1996.  They specifically deal with “judgments”
which lose their finality because motions are filed within ten days.  Rules 2-532, 2-533, and
2-534 would be nonsensical if they were using the word “judgment” in accordance with
Medical Mutual’s theory.  Other rules also use the word “judgment” to include an order which
is final at the time of entry even though subsequent action may cause the order to lose its
finality for purposes of appeal.  See, e.g., Rules 2-522(a), 2-535, 2-601, 2-611, 2-613(f), 2-
614, 2-615, 2-622, 2-632.
Accordingly, the entry of judgment on November 13, 1996, would seem to constitute
the “entry” of a “money judgment” within the meaning of Rule 2-604(b).  We do not, however,
intend to suggest that post-judgment interest always begins to accrue whenever a money
judgment is entered and is final at the time of entry.  Rule 2-604(b) must be applied to various
situations in accordance with the purpose of post-judgment interest and the considerable case-
law governing the running of post-judgment interest.
This Court has stated that the “purpose of post-judgment interest is obviously to
compensate the successful suitor for the same loss of the use of the monies represented by
a judgment in its favor, and the loss of income thereon, between the time of entry of the
judgment nisi - when there is a judicial determination of the monies owed it - and the
satisfaction of the judgment by payment.”  I. W. Berman Prop. v. Porter Bros., 276 Md. 1, 24,
344 A.2d 65, 79 (1975).8  In the present case, upon the entry of judgment on November 13,
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8
(...continued)
provided for the running of post-judgment interest on money judgments at law from the jury’s verdict or
the judgment nisi instead of from the entry of final judgment.  Except for the change to final judgment,
however, the basic principles set forth in the earlier cases remain generally applicable.
1996, there was a judicial determination that the plaintiffs were entitled to at least
$2,350,000.00 (the ultimate reduced amount), and no subsequent action changed this judicial
determination.  While the judgment entered on November 13, 1996, lost its finality for
purposes of appeal, and might not have been effective for some other purposes, it did not
disappear.  Furthermore, while the actual November 1996 judgment was later modified, the
minimum amount of $2,350,000.00 owed to the plaintiffs was not modified.  Therefore, in
light of the purpose of post-judgment interest, the plaintiffs were entitled to the loss of
income on the $2,350,000.00 from November 13, 1996.  Presumably, Medical Mutual earned
interest on that sum during the ten-month period from November 1996 to September 1997.
Although the parties have not called to our attention any prior Maryland cases involving
the same circumstances as those in the present case, the principles set forth in prior cases
clearly support the position of the plaintiffs-appellees and the decision of the Circuit Court.
For example, let us suppose that the Circuit Court in September 1997, instead of simply
reducing the amount of the November 1996 judgment, had set aside that judgment and either
entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Rule 2-532 or awarded a new trial
pursuant to Rule 2-533.  In this hypothetical scenario, if the plaintiffs had taken an appeal, and
if the Court of Special Appeals had reversed the September 1997 judgment and had held that
the November 1996 judgment should not have been set aside, post-judgment interest would run
-10-
from November 1996 rather than from the appellate court’s mandate.  The filing of motions
under Rules 2-532 or 2-533 within ten days of the November 13, 1996, judgment would not
have prevented post-judgment interest from accruing as of November 13, 1996.  See, e.g.,
Cook v. Toney, 245 Md. 42, 50, 224 A.2d 857 (1966) (“if the motion of [the defendant] Toney
for a new trial had been overruled or if the granting of a new trial had . . . been reversed by this
Court on appeal, the plaintiff would have been entitled to [post-judgment] interest from the
date of the original [judgment] against Toney”); Hodgson v. Phippin, 159 Md. 97, 101, 150
A. 118 (1930) (where the delay after the verdict was caused by a motion for a new trial, post-
judgment interest ran from the date of the verdict, as “a litigant should not be penalized for
delay from motions made”); Brown v. Medical Mutual, 90 Md. App. 18, 21, 599 A.2d 1201,
1202, cert. denied, 326 Md. 366, 605 A.2d 101 (1992) (“as successful plaintiffs in a case in
which the trial court’s grant of j.n.o.v. has been reversed on appeal, they are entitled to post-
judgment interest from the date of entry of the original judgment on the verdict”).  
The above-cited Maryland cases stand for the principle that post-judgment motions or
appeals, which may cause a money judgment for a plaintiff to lose some aspects of its finality,
ordinarily do not have the effect of postponing the accrual of post-judgment interest from the
date that the original money judgment was entered.  Cases in other jurisdictions, under rules
or statutes similar to Maryland Rule 2-604(b), are generally to the same effect.  See, e.g.,
Tinsley v. Sea-Land Corporation, 979 F.2d 1382, 1383 (9th Cir. 1992, cert. denied, 510 U.S.
817, 114 S.Ct. 69, 126 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993); H. J. Inc. v. Flygt Corporation, 925 F.2d 257,
261-262 (8th Cir. 1991); Northern Natural Gas Company v. O. W. Hegler, 818 F.2d 730,
-11-
737-738 (10th Cir. 1987); Isaacson Structural Steel Co. v. Armco Steel Corp., 640 P.2d 812,
818 (Alaska 1982); Pascack Valley Bank and Trust Co. v. Ritar Ford Sales, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct.
646, 295 A.2d 667 (1972); Knapp and State of Maryland v. Shepherd, 741 A.2d 1026 (Del.
1999); Bell v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 507 A.2d 548, 555-556 (D.C. App. 1986); CRS
Sirrine, Inc. v. Dravo Corp., 219 Ga. App. 301, 304-305, 464 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1995);
Lippert v. Angle, 215 Kan. 626, 527 P.2d 1016 (1974); Reimers v. Frank B. Connet Lumber
Co., 273 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. 1954); Hewitt v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 5 Utah 2d 379,
302 P.2d 712 (1956).
Moreover, under circumstances similar to those in the present case, where a judgment
in favor of a plaintiff is subsequently reduced via the plaintiff’s acceptance of a remittitur,
courts elsewhere consistently hold that post-judgment interest runs from the date of the
original judgment.  See, e.g., Dunn v. HOVIC, 13 F.3d 58, 61-62 (3rd Cir. 1993) (“We see no
reason why Dunn should be disadvantaged in the calculation of interest because the jury
overestimated his damages”); Coal Resources, Inc. v. Gulf & Western Industries, 954 F.2d
1263, 1275 (6th Cir. 1992) (“The remittitur merely reduced the damages by a distinct amount
easily determined from the facts of the case. * * * [W]e ORDER that interest on the damages
awarded in this case be calculated from the date of the original District Court judgment”);
Schulte v. Smith, 708 So.2d 138, 140 (Ala. 1997) (“We conclude that interest on the remitted
judgment . . . accrues from the date the trial court entered the original judgment”); Scioto
Memorial Hospital Association, Inc. v. Price Waterhouse, 74 Ohio St. 3d 474, 479, 659
N.E.2d 1268, 1273-1274 (1996) (where the plaintiff “chooses to accept a remittitur,” then
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“post-judgment interest should run from the date of the original . . . judgment entry”).
Under the circumstances of the case at bar, the Circuit Court correctly held that post-
judgment interest began to accrue on November 13, 1996, the date the original judgment was
entered.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY AFFIRMED.
APPELLANT TO PAY THE COSTS.