Case Title: Knight v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC13-564

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2016-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-564 
____________ 
 
JONATHON KNIGHT, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[March 10, 2016] 
 
QUINCE, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal in Knight v. State, 107 So. 3d 449 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).  The 
district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decisions of the 
First District Court of Appeal in Evans v. State, 32 So. 3d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2010), and Cook v. State, 571 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); the decisions of the 
Second District Court of Appeal in P.M.M. v. State, 884 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2004), N.K.W., Jr. v. State, 788 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), and S.B. v. 
State, 657 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); and the decision of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in E.H.A. v. State, 760 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).  The 
 
 
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conflict concerns the proper application of the circumstantial evidence standard of 
review and whether the standard should continue to apply in Florida.  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  We decline to abandon use of the 
standard but reject its use in Knight’s case because this is not a wholly 
circumstantial case.  We instead uphold Knight’s conviction as supported by 
competent, substantial evidence. 
FACTS 
On November 21, 2010, Orange County Deputy Sheriff Donald Murphy 
conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle being driven by Jonathon Knight, but owned 
by Knight’s friend, Chaka Miller, who was riding in the front passenger seat of the 
vehicle.  Knight, 107 So. 3d at 451-52.  Knight’s other friend, Chad Harris, was 
sitting in the backseat.  Id. at 452.  Once Knight had pulled over and parked the car 
in a convenience store parking lot, Deputy Murphy ordered him out and led him to 
the front of the car, leaving the remaining passengers in place.  Id.  Minutes later, 
as Deputy Murphy issued Knight a citation for a noise violation, a K-9 officer also 
pulled into the same parking lot.  Id.  After Murphy released Knight, Knight 
walked into the convenience store.  Id.  “At approximately the same time, the K-9 
officer made an ‘impromptu’ decision to run his dog” around the car.  Id.  The dog 
alerted to the passenger side door, and Murphy re-detained Knight as he exited the 
store.  Id.  Murphy’s search of the vehicle recovered a small bag of cannabis, 
 
 
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weighing 24.4 grams, which was found in a suitcase that had been sitting on the 
backseat of the car.  Id.  The luggage tag on the suitcase identified Knight as the 
owner of the suitcase.  Id.  Knight was charged with (1) possession with intent to 
sell or deliver, and (2) possession of more than 20 grams of cannabis.  Id.  At trial, 
after the State rested, Knight moved for a judgment of acquittal.  Id.  The trial court 
denied the motion.  Id. 
Knight’s friend, Miller, testified as the first defense witness.  Id.  He 
explained that he, Knight, and Harris were in Orlando the weekend of the arrest for 
the “Florida Classic” football game.  Id.  Miller testified that the cannabis did not 
belong to him, nor had he seen Knight with marijuana or heard him discuss it at all 
during their trip.  Id.  Miller did not contradict the State’s evidence that Knight 
owned the suitcase, but he did testify that Harris was left in the backseat next to the 
suitcase after Deputy Murphy removed Knight from the car—“implying that Harris 
could have placed the cannabis in the suitcase at that time.”  Id. 
Knight, testifying in his own defense, also reiterated that Harris was seated 
in the backseat of the car until the search occurred.  Id. at 453.  Knight testified that 
the cannabis was not his, and although he did not expressly admit ownership of the 
suitcase, Knight did not contradict the State’s evidence that he owned it either.  Id. 
 
 
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at 452-53.1  “On cross-examination, the State immediately sought to have Knight 
reiterate” what it viewed as “Knight’s admission that the suitcase was his,” but 
Knight denied owning the suitcase or that the luggage tag identified him as the 
owner.  Id. at 453.  When all the evidence was presented, Knight renewed his 
motion for judgment of acquittal, which the trial court again denied.  Id.  The jury 
deliberated and returned a verdict of guilty on count two only, for the crime of 
possessing more than 20 grams of cannabis.  Id.  Knight appealed, arguing that the 
trial court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal.  Id. at 451. 
Recognizing that Knight was convicted under a theory of constructive 
possession, the Fifth District described the two elements of the crime as requiring 
proof that the defendant had dominion and control over the contraband and 
knowledge that the contraband was in his presence.  Id. at 453.2  The district court 
acknowledged that other district courts have applied the circumstantial evidence 
                                          
 
 
1.  “There was one exchange between Knight and his counsel during which 
the jury could have understood Knight to be agreeing that the suitcase was his. 
However, the question was poorly worded and could have been intended by Knight 
as simply an acknowledgement that Deputy Murphy had identified the suitcase as 
belonging to him.”  Id. at 453 n.4. 
 
2.  Some older cases may describe constructive possession as having one 
additional element—that the defendant knew of the illicit nature of the contraband. 
See, e.g., Brown v. State, 428 So. 2d 250, 252 (Fla. 1983).  However, as explained 
by the Fifth District, the Legislature eliminated that element, effective May 13, 
2002.  Knight, 107 So. 3d at 453 n.5; see also, § 893.101, Fla. Stat. (2002); Ch. 
2002-258, § 1, at 1848, Laws of Fla. 
 
 
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standard of review in constructive possession cases.  Id. at 454.  However, the Fifth 
District rejected that approach because the standard only applies in “wholly 
circumstantial” cases, which it held are those in which all the elements of an 
offense are proven by circumstantial evidence alone.  Id. at 462.  The Fifth District 
noted that possession cases such as this one typically include direct evidence of 
dominion and control in the form of testimony that contraband was found near the 
defendant.  Id. at 462-63.  Because of the direct evidence of dominion and control, 
the district court found that these cases cannot be deemed wholly circumstantial, 
making application of the circumstantial evidence standard inappropriate.  Id.  The 
court certified conflict with constructive possession cases in which it believed 
other district courts had instead applied the circumstantial evidence standard where 
only one element had been entirely demonstrated by circumstantial evidence.  Id. 
at 451. 
Nonetheless, the Fifth District applied the circumstantial evidence standard 
to the instant case in the following manner: 
Turning to this case, the two inferences that could logically be 
drawn from the circumstantial evidence are that: (1) Knight knew that 
the marijuana was in his suitcase (and is guilty); or, (2) Knight did not 
know that the marijuana was in his suitcase because Chad Harris 
placed it there without his knowledge after Deputy Murphy removed 
Knight from the car (Knight’s hypothesis of innocence).  This is 
admittedly a close case.  However, we believe that a reasonable fact-
finder could reject Knight’s hypothesis of innocence as unreasonable 
based upon: (1) the very short window of opportunity Harris would 
have had to move the marijuana from another hiding place to the 
 
 
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suitcase (the K-9 deputy arrived within minutes of the stop); (2) the 
fact that an inference could reasonably be drawn from [Chaka] 
Miller’s testimony that Harris did not place the marijuana in Knight’s 
suitcase (Miller was in a position to detect any attempt by Harris to 
hide 24.4 grams of marijuana in Knight’s suitcase, but did not testify 
to any facts indicating that Harris actually did so); and (3) the jury’s 
unique ability to assess Knight’s demeanor on the witness stand 
during the whole of his testimony. 
 
Id. at 468.  The court noted that the same outcome would result under what it 
viewed as the appropriate standard of review: 
If after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a 
rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient evidence exists to sustain 
a conviction.  Applying this general standard in no way changes the 
fact that there are two possible inferences that could be drawn from 
the evidence relating to the knowledge element in this case, or that a 
conviction can only be sustained if a trier of fact could rationally find 
guilt by rejecting the second inference as unreasonable, speculative, 
imaginary or forced based upon the evidence. 
 
Id. (internal citation omitted).  The district court then affirmed Knight’s conviction.  
Id. at 468-69.  Knight now appeals. 
ANALYSIS 
This Court has described the circumstantial evidence standard as follows: 
“[w]here the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the 
evidence may suggest guilt[,] a conviction cannot be sustained unless the evidence 
is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.”  Jaramillo v. State, 
417 So. 2d 257, 257 (Fla. 1982).  The standard applies upon appellate review, id., 
and when a trial judge rules on a motion for judgment of acquittal, State v. Law, 
 
 
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559 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla. 1989).  In the instant opinion, the Fifth District engaged 
in a lengthy discussion about why this Court should reconsider use of this standard 
in Florida.  Knight, 107 So. 3d at 455-62.  However, we find that discussion and 
the rationale raised by the State to be unpersuasive.  Accordingly, we uphold the 
continued use of the standard in Florida.  Having done so, we next address the 
certified conflict issue by clarifying when the standard applies. 
I.  Certified Conflict 
The Fifth District found that the circumstantial evidence standard should 
apply only where both elements of constructive possession are proven solely by 
circumstantial evidence.  Knight, 107 So. 3d at 462.  The court then certified 
conflict with constructive possession cases from other district courts which seemed 
to apply the circumstantial evidence standard where only one element had been 
established by purely circumstantial evidence.  Id. at 451 (certifying conflict with 
Evans, P.M.M., N.K.W., E.H.A., S.B., and Cook).   
While there is some confusion as to when the circumstantial evidence 
standard applies, we agree with the Fifth District that it should not be applied based 
on any particular element of a crime being itself proven entirely by circumstantial 
evidence.  As we stated in Jaramillo, the circumstantial evidence standard applies 
“where the only proof of guilt is circumstantial.”  417 So. 2d at 257 (emphasis 
added).  Thus, in determining whether the circumstantial evidence standard 
 
 
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applies, the relevant evidence is that which points to the defendant as the 
perpetrator.  Courts should ask whether the evidence of that particular defendant’s 
guilt is entirely circumstantial, not whether all of the State’s evidence of the crime 
is circumstantial.  See Davis v. State, 90 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. 1956) (stating that 
“[e]vidence which furnishes nothing stronger than a suspicion, even though it 
would tend to justify the suspicion that the defendant committed the crime, . . . is 
not sufficient to sustain conviction” and that although “circumstantial evidence is 
sufficient to suggest a probability of guilt, it is not thereby adequate to support a 
conviction if it is likewise consistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence”); 
Mayo v. State, 71 So. 2d 899, 904 (Fla. 1954) (“[E]vidence which leaves one with 
nothing stronger than a suspicion that the defendant committed the crime is not 
sufficient to sustain a conviction.”). 
For example, in a first-degree murder case, the victim’s body is direct 
evidence of the first element of the crime—that the victim is dead.  However, it is 
not direct evidence of any particular defendant’s involvement in the murder in the 
way that the other elements—premeditation and an act of the defendant causing the 
victim’s death—are.  Therefore, where those other elements are supported by 
circumstantial evidence alone, the special standard of review would apply.  This 
explains why there are first-degree murder cases in which a body has been found 
that still have been characterized as wholly circumstantial.  See, e.g., Dausch v. 
 
 
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State, 141 So. 3d 513, 515, 517 (Fla. 2014) (finding that “the State relied solely on 
circumstantial evidence to obtain its conviction,” even though dead body was 
direct evidence of victim’s death).  We now expressly hold that the circumstantial 
evidence standard of review applies only where all of the evidence of a defendant’s 
guilt—i.e., the evidence tending to show that the defendant committed or 
participated in the crime—is circumstantial, not where any particular element of a 
crime is demonstrated exclusively by circumstantial evidence. 
While the Fifth District has certified conflict with six cases, the opinions in 
three of those cases can be read to be in agreement with the Fifth District and our 
holding here.  For example, in Evans, officers executing a search warrant on the 
defendant’s home discovered a glass smoking device and a pain reliever bottle 
containing miscellaneous controlled substances in pill form.  32 So. 3d at 189.  The 
items were found inside a toiletry bag located within a duffel bag that was sitting 
on the bed in the master bedroom.  Id.  The duffel bag also contained the 
defendant’s passport and a memo book.  Id.  While the bedroom was identified as 
the defendant’s, the owner of the duffel bag was unknown.  Id.  In reversing the 
defendant’s convictions for constructive possession, the First District stated: 
The presence of appellant’s passport in the duffel bag suggests he 
could have placed the passport there.  Such an inference, however, 
provides no time frame with regard to when the contraband came to 
reside in the bag, nor any help as to appellant’s present dominion over 
the contraband.  Without more, the mere presence of the passport is no 
better proof of appellant’s knowledge of, and dominion over, the 
 
 
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contraband than S.B.’s acknowledgment of ownership of the grocery 
bag or N.K.W.’s admission of ownership of the wallet where officers 
found the drugs [in two other similar cases]. 
 
Id. at 191 (emphasis added).  As is clear from the above passage, the First District, 
in fact, discussed the circumstantial evidence as to both elements of the crime, not 
only one. 
Likewise, in Cook, the defendant was convicted of constructive possession 
of a crack pipe, and its residue, found in her open purse during a raid of the bar 
where she worked as a dancer.  571 So. 2d at 531.  The defendant testified that she 
had left her purse on the bar during one of her performances.  Id.  The raid 
occurred while she was on stage.  Id.  The First District concluded that “no direct 
evidence connected the defendant to the contraband [(dominion and control)], and 
the evidence suggesting that appellant knew of the presence of the crack pipe 
within her purse [(knowledge)] was entirely circumstantial.”  Id. at 531-32 
(emphasis added).  Again, the First District discussed the circumstantial evidence 
as to both elements of constructive possession.  The district court even described 
the special standard in reference to the entire crime: “When constructive 
possession is shown by circumstantial evidence, as here, the evidence must be 
inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of innocence.”  Id. at 531 (emphasis 
added).  Thus, the First District recognized that the standard applies where both 
elements of constructive possession are proven solely by circumstantial evidence. 
 
 
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In that same way, the Fourth District characterized E.H.A. as “a 
circumstantial evidence case” and analyzed it in terms of both elements of the 
crime.  760 So. 2d at 1119.  The court explained that “[t]he only evidence 
presented by the State was the fact that the contraband was found in a backpack 
and wallet owned by E.H.A.; E.H.A. was not in proximity to the contraband when 
it was discovered [(dominion and control)] and there was no independent evidence 
that he was aware of the contraband’s presence in his backpack [(knowledge)].”  
Id.  As the courts in those three cases have actually applied the circumstantial 
evidence standard in the manner we find proper, we hereby approve Evans, Cook, 
and E.H.A. 
Although the remaining three certified conflict cases can possibly be read in 
agreement with our holding today, the language within the opinions is not as clear 
and could just as easily be read as applying the standard where only one element is 
supported entirely by circumstantial evidence.  S.B., 657 So. 2d at 1253 (reversing 
conviction for constructive possession, stating “Beyond the mere location of the 
marijuana, the [S]tate relies upon S.B.’s admission that he owned the grocery bag 
to establish constructive possession.  Unfortunately, the officer never asked if S.B. 
owned the container, did not inventory the contents of the bag, and did not obtain 
fingerprints from the container.  There is only circumstantial evidence to find that 
S.B. knew that the container was in his presence and that it contained a small 
 
 
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quantity of marijuana.”); N.K.W., 788 So. 2d at 1038 (relying on S.B and stating 
“Although N.K.W. acknowledged ownership of his wallet, he was never asked if 
he owned the plastic bag contained within the wallet, and no fingerprints were 
obtained from that bag.  He testified that he did not purchase the LSD contained 
within the bag and denied that anyone had given him the LSD [directly].  No direct 
evidence was introduced to establish that N.K.W. knew that the bag was in his 
presence or that it contained contraband.”); P.M.M., 884 So. 2d at 420 
(characterizing N.K.W. and S.B. as being reversed “because the State’s 
circumstantial evidence, necessary to prove that the juvenile knew his bag 
contained marijuana, was not inconsistent with the juvenile’s theory” and “because 
there was no direct evidence that the juvenile knew the drugs were in his wallet,” 
then reaching same result in P.M.M.’s case).  Because the language in S.B., 
N.K.W., and P.M.M. is not as clear as in the other three conflict cases, we hereby 
disapprove S.B., N.K.W., and P.M.M. only to the extent that the courts in those 
cases applied the circumstantial evidence standard upon finding that only one 
element of constructive possession was proven entirely by circumstantial evidence. 
II.  This Case 
Because Knight’s conviction is based on a theory of constructive possession, 
the State was required to prove two elements: that Knight had (1) dominion and 
control over the contraband and (2) knowledge that the contraband was within his 
 
 
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presence.  Knight, 107 So. 3d at 453.  In discussing the evidence, the Fifth District 
deemed Deputy Murphy’s testimony about the location of the cannabis to be direct 
evidence of dominion and control.  Id. at 462-63.  Whether this Court agrees with 
that finding or not, defense counsel conceded at oral argument that such testimony 
was direct evidence as to dominion and control.  We proceed with our analysis 
based on that concession. 
With direct evidence of dominion and control, Knight’s case cannot be 
considered wholly circumstantial—despite the circumstantial evidence of the 
knowledge element.  Therefore, the circumstantial evidence standard of review 
does not apply.  Instead, we review the trial court’s denial of Knight’s motion for 
judgment of acquittal de novo, reversing only where the conviction is not 
supported by competent, substantial evidence.  Greenwade v. State, 124 So. 3d 
215, 220 (Fla. 2013).  The conviction is supported by sufficient evidence where a 
rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
State.  Id.  That burden is met in this case. 
The State demonstrated Knight’s dominion and control over the cannabis by 
introducing evidence that Knight owned the suitcase containing it.  Although 
Knight did not testify that he owned the luggage, the jury could have instead 
accepted Deputy Murphy’s testimony that the suitcase contained a luggage tag 
 
 
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identifying Knight as its owner.  As to the knowledge element, the jury could have 
also rejected Knight’s testimony about his friend Chad Harris having the 
opportunity to place the drugs into the suitcase.  Knight’s case may present a close 
call as to the elements of constructive possession being established, but this Court 
is not at liberty to reweigh the evidence.  That is the jury’s role, and here, the State 
has produced sufficient evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
State, that a rational jury could find these two elements established beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we approve the Fifth District’s decision in Knight 
and uphold his conviction for constructive possession.  We also approve the First 
District’s decisions in Evans and Cook and the Fourth District’s decision in E.H.A.  
However, we disapprove the Second District’s decisions in P.M.M., N.K.W., and 
S.B. 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
 
 
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CANADY, J., concurring in result. 
I agree with the majority that the Fifth District was correct in affirming 
Knight’s conviction.  But I disagree with the majority’s decision to retain the 
reasonable-hypothesis-of-innocence special standard of review. 
As Judge Lawson cogently explains, the special standard of review is both 
confusing and misleading.  See Knight v. State, 107 So. 3d 449, 456-61 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2013).  It is a striking and inexplicable anomaly that we have rejected the 
reasonable-hypothesis-of-innocence jury instruction but have nonetheless retained 
the special standard of review.  I agree with Judge Lawson that this anomaly in our 
jurisprudence should be corrected by eliminating the special standard of review. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Fifth District - Case No. 5D11-2875 
 
 
(Orange County) 
 
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, Robert Earl Wildridge, Assistant Public 
Defender, and Edward J. Weiss, Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial 
Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Wesley Harold Heidt, 
Bureau Chief, and Kristen Lynn Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona 
Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent