Case Title: Walsh v. Swapp Law

Citation: 

Docket Number: 46885

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2020-04-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO   
Docket No. 46885 
SHARON WALSH, 
 
     Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
SWAPP LAW, PLLC, a foreign business 
entity, 
dba 
CRAIG 
SWAPP 
& 
ASSOCIATES; and STEPHEN REDD, an 
individual attorney, 
 
     Defendants-Respondents, 
 
and 
 
DOES I-X, 
 
     Defendants. 
 
 
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Boise, February 2020 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: April 22, 2020 
 
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk  
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada 
County. Samuel Hoagland, District Judge.   
The district court’s decision is affirmed. 
Beckett Law Firm, for Appellant. Kristian S. Beckett argued. 
Powers Farley, PC, for Respondents. James S. Thomson, II, argued. 
_____________________________ 
 
 
BURDICK, Chief Justice.  
This appeal arises from a legal malpractice action in which the district court awarded 
summary judgment in favor of Swapp Law, PLLC, d/b/a Craig Swapp & Associates, and Stephen 
Redd, an employee of the firm (collectively, “CS&A”). Sharon Walsh retained CS&A after she 
was involved in two car accidents in 2013. In the negligence action stemming from the first 
accident, Walsh followed Redd’s advice and settled the case. Walsh then changed representation 
and, with her new counsel, settled the second case. On March 2, 2017, Walsh filed this action 
 
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alleging, among other things, that CS&A was negligent in advising her to settle the first case 
while the second case was still pending and by failing to advise her of an underlying subrogation 
responsibility in the first case. CS&A moved for summary judgment. It argued that Walsh’s claim 
was time-barred under Idaho Code section 5-219(4)’s two-year statute of limitations because her 
malpractice claim began to accrue when she released the first claim. The district court agreed and 
granted the motion. Walsh timely appeals.   
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On February 8, 2013, Sharon Walsh was rear-ended by Jake Hanson (the “First 
Collision”). Her vehicle was damaged and Walsh sustained injuries for which she sought medical 
treatment, including regular chiropractic care for neck pain at Jon Gray Chiropractic. Three 
months later, on May 7, 2013, Walsh was involved in a second motor-vehicle collision with 
Donald LaMott (the “Second Collision”). She was injured again and experienced what she 
described as “new or different pain,” starting in her neck. She later underwent surgical correction 
for a damaged disc in her cervical spine and sustained a permanent partial disability.  
 
After the Second Collision, Walsh retained Craig Swapp & Associates to represent her on 
both collisions. CS&A assigned Walsh’s case to a pre-litigation “pod” where Paul Swainstrom 
acted as the supervising attorney and Stephen Redd acted as the “settlement negotiator.” On April 
30, 2014, Redd sent a statement of claim to Hanson’s insurer, American National Property and 
Casualty Insurance Company (“American National Insurance”) offering to settle the First 
Collision claim for $16,500. In September 2014, CS&A reorganized personnel and Craig Swapp 
took over as the supervising attorney for Walsh’s case. Around the same time, CS&A obtained an 
apportionment opinion from Dr. Jon Gray that Walsh’s injuries could be apportioned 15% to the 
First Collision and 85% to the Second Collision. In January 2015, American National Insurance 
offered to settle the case for $8,000 plus an agreement to pay a $5,000 outstanding medical lien.  
 
On February 2, 2015, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Idaho wrote CS&A to assert a 
subrogation interest of $60,572.08 against the proceeds from the First Collision and $3,980.31 
for the Second Collision. It is unclear when CS&A received this letter, but Redd testified that he 
thought he received it after the First Collision case had settled. He also testified that, upon 
receiving the letter, he contacted Blue Cross to dispute their apportionment. CS&A never 
informed Walsh of this letter nor the asserted subrogation interest while the firm represented her. 
She only learned of its existence via discovery in the instant action. On the morning of February 
 
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4, 2015, Redd discussed American National Insurance’s offer with Walsh and told her that it was 
likely the “best offer [she] was going to get for the [First Collision].” Based on Redd’s 
recommendation, Walsh authorized the settlement and signed a release of claims on February 5, 
2015. American National Insurance remitted payment a day later. On February 10, 2015, Blue 
Cross sent another letter to CS&A after receiving Redd’s. It reads:  
Thank you for advising us that you are in the process of settling Sharon 
Walsh’s claim arising out of [the First Collision]. She also has a claim for injuries 
as a result of [the Second Collision]. Blue Cross of Idaho has a subrogation claim 
for medical bills Ms. Walsh incurred from both accidents. The total subrogation 
interest is $61,304.21. Apparently there is confusion over which medical bills are 
attributable to which collision. Until the confusion is resolved, we ask that you 
keep $61,304.21 in trust pursuant to Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15, or 
the Idaho Rules of Professional conduct 1.15, whichever is applicable. 
 
On April 29, 2015, CS&A filed a lawsuit against LaMott on Walsh’s behalf. In June 2015, 
because the case had not yet settled, CS&A assigned Walsh’s case to a new litigation associate in 
the firm, Kristian Beckett. Beckett is also Walsh’s attorney in this malpractice case and appeal. In 
his first meeting with Walsh, Beckett asked why she settled the First Collision case. After she 
explained that Redd advised her to settle, Beckett told her that “it was not a good idea to settle 
one of two claims where the claim is still pending in litigation where there is an overlapping 
injury.” He also said that “there would be an ‘empty chair’ that would be difficult to deal with.” 
Shortly after receiving Walsh’s case, Beckett informed Swapp that he believed that the firm 
might have committed malpractice by advising Walsh to settle the First Collision case before the 
Second Collision case was resolved.  
 
On February 22, 2016, Dr. Tyler Frizzell, a Boise neurosurgeon, produced an 
independent-medical-exam opinion for CS&A. In it, Dr. Frizzell attributed 15% of Walsh’s 
medical care and total expenses to the First Collision and the remaining 85% to the Second 
Collision.  
In late March 2016, LaMott’s attorney deposed Walsh during discovery for the Second 
Collision litigation. Based on that deposition, Beckett believed that LaMott would argue that 
Walsh’s damages were caused by something other than the Second Collision. After the 
deposition, Beckett informed Walsh that he believed that the firm had committed malpractice 
when it advised her to settle the First Collision claim. On April 1, 2016, Beckett sent an email to 
Swapp, detailing his belief that “malpractice was committed with regard to settling [the First 
Collision case]” and that CS&A “need[ed] to withdraw from representing [Walsh] on the second 
 
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claim.” He explained that when he received Walsh’s file, his “first inclination” was that 
malpractice had occurred and that he had expressed that concern at that time. The email further 
detailed Beckett’s belief that “[t]he full measure of the malpractice was realized” on February 22, 
2016, when Dr. Frizzell opined that Walsh sustained a permanent disability rating of 19%, of 
which he apportioned 16% to the Second Collision, and that 15% of the medical-care costs 
following the Second Collision should be apportioned to the First Collision. Beckett also wrote 
that he had “change[d] [his] original opinion” that the firm should continue to represent Walsh on 
the Second Collision case. He explained that he now believed that CS&A should disclose the 
malpractice, surrender her file, and advise her to seek legal representation.  
Shortly after this email, in April 2016, Beckett terminated his employment with CS&A. 
Though CS&A assigned another litigator to her case, Walsh decided to continue with Beckett as 
her attorney independent of CS&A.  
On March 2, 2017, Walsh, with Beckett acting as her attorney, filed a complaint against 
CS&A alleging legal malpractice. In a later amended complaint, Walsh alleged that the CS&A 
and Redd were negligent in advising her to settle the first case, failing to appropriately 
investigate her injuries to determine which were attributable to which collision, and by failing to 
inform her that Blue Cross had asserted a subrogation interest in her case. On July 31, 2017, 
CS&A filed an answer in which they asserted, among other defenses, that Walsh’s claim was 
barred by Idaho Code section 5-219(4)’s two-year statute of limitations.  
Around August 28, 2017, LaMott agreed to settle the Second Collision litigation for the 
policy limits. This included the full amount of LaMott’s liability policy limit ($100,000) and the 
full amount of the underinsured-motorist policy limit under Walsh’s own policy ($100,000). 
LaMott and Walsh signed a settlement release on September 21, 2017. On October 12, 2017, the 
Second Collision case was dismissed with prejudice based upon the parties’ stipulation. 
Meanwhile, CS&A moved to disqualify Beckett on grounds that he would become a material 
witness if Walsh’s case were to go to trial. In December 2017, the district court denied the 
motion to disqualify Beckett, ruling that he could continue as counsel for purposes of pre-trial 
litigation, but expressly told the parties it would consider a renewed motion 90 days before trial.1 
                                                 
 
1 Because it was not raised as an issue on appeal, we express no opinion as to the correctness of this decision. 
 
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After additional discovery, CS&A filed a motion for summary judgment arguing Walsh’s 
claim was time-barred under Idaho Code section 5-219(4)’s two-year statute of limitations. 
CS&A pinpointed February 5, 2015—the date Walsh released the First Collision claim—as the 
moment Walsh’s malpractice claim began to accrue.  
On September 6, 2018, Walsh lodged two filings. First, Walsh filed a motion for leave to 
file a second amended complaint to add James Craig Swapp as an additional defendant, “clarify 
the issues,” and seek punitive damages. Second, Walsh filed her response to CS&A’s motion for 
summary judgment. She offered two principal arguments against the motion along with a 
supporting affidavit and exhibits. Walsh argued that CS&A disregarded Idaho’s recognition of 
the completed-tort theory, which required that “some damage” be ascertainable for the cause of 
action to accrue. Walsh further argued that her claim was subject to the one-year tolling period 
under Idaho Code section 5-219(4) because CS&A knew that they had committed malpractice 
and concealed it from her. To support this argument, Walsh zeroed-in on the Blue Cross 
subrogation letter and CS&A’s failure to provide it when they surrendered her file.  
 
In response, CS&A argued that Walsh’s fraudulent concealment claim did not preclude 
summary judgment because she had notice of a potential malpractice claim when she met with 
Beckett in June 2015. CS&A further argued that Beckett’s knowledge of the malpractice should 
be imputed to Walsh as his client. CS&A also opposed Walsh’s second motion to amend the 
complaint by arguing, among other contentions, that Walsh’s assertions based on fraudulent 
concealment were futile as a matter of law.  
The district court granted CS&A’s motion for summary judgment and denied Walsh’s 
motion to amend the amended complaint. It determined that Walsh’s malpractice claim accrued 
on February 5, 2015, when she signed a release agreement for the First Collision claim. 
Assuming the fraudulent-concealment exception applied, the district court determined that 
Walsh’s claim was also untimely under that provision. 
Walsh filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that Idaho Code section 5-219(4) is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to legal-malpractice claims, the district court erroneously 
applied the “some damage” standard, and disputed material facts should have precluded 
summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. In its written order, the district court 
emphasized that the “law does not require that the full extent of damages occur or be known in 
order to start the statute of limitations from running.” Addressing the fraudulent-concealment 
 
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exception, the court stressed that the standard was “when [Walsh] knew or in the exercise of 
reasonable care should have been put on inquiry regarding the malpractice” (emphasis in 
original). Concluding that Beckett’s knowledge could be imputed to her, the court determined 
that Walsh could not show that the facts of the case failed to put her on inquiry. In support, the 
court pointed to Beckett’s comments to Walsh in June 2015, Beckett’s concerns conveyed to 
Swapp in June 2015, and Beckett’s statement that a doctor’s report received on February 2016 
made him “realize the ‘full measure’ of the malpractice.” Lastly, the district court determined 
that Idaho Code section 5-219(4) was not unconstitutionally vague because it unambiguously 
provided for how the statute of limitations functioned for typical claims and for those that were 
fraudulently concealed. 
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err when it determined that Walsh’s malpractice cause of action 
began to accrue on the date she signed the release of claims for the First Collision case? 
2. Did the district court err when it determined that, assuming Idaho Code section 
5-219(4)’s one-year tolling for fraudulent concealment applied, Walsh’s cause of action 
was nevertheless time-barred because she was put on inquiry of the malpractice in June 
2015?  
3. Is Idaho Code section 5-219(4) unconstitutionally void for vagueness?  
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court’s standard of review 
is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and the only remaining questions are questions of law. This Court 
liberally construes all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and draws 
all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the record in favor of the 
party opposing the motion.  
Jackson v. Crow, 164 Idaho 806, 810–11, 436 P.3d 627, 631–32 (2019) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted). “If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a 
question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review.” Brooks v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 164 Idaho 22, 27, 423 P.3d 443, 448 (2018) (quoting Lockheed Martin Corp. v. 
Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006)).  
When this Court reviews the district court’s decision on a motion for reconsideration, this 
Court applies the same standard of review used by the district court to decide the motion for 
reconsideration. Id. On a proper motion for reconsideration, the district court “must consider any 
new admissible evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory 
 
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order . . . . But the motion need not be supported by any new evidence or authority.” Id. “When 
the district court grants summary judgment and then denies a motion for reconsideration, this 
Court must determine whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact to defeat 
summary judgment.” Idaho First Bank v. Bridges, 164 Idaho 178, 186–87, 426 P.3d 1278, 1286–
87 (2018) (quoting Massey v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 156 Idaho 476, 480, 328 P.3d 456, 460 
(2014)).  
 “The date for when a cause of action accrues may be a question of fact or law.” Reynolds 
v. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A., 154 Idaho 21, 24, 293 P.3d 645, 648 (2013) (quoting 
C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 142, 75 P.3d 194, 196 (2003)). “[I]f 
no disputed issues of material fact exist, when a cause of action accrues is a question of law for 
determination by this Court.” Id. “Whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague is a pure 
question of law and therefore reviewed de novo.” State v. Cook, 165 Idaho 305, 309, 444 P.3d 
877, 881 (2019) (citation omitted). 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
Walsh argues that the district court erred in awarding summary judgment. She first 
asserts that the district court misapplied this Court’s approach to determining when her 
malpractice action accrued. Alternatively, she argues that when her cause of action accrued was a 
disputed issue of material fact that should have precluded summary judgment. Walsh next asserts 
that, even if her cause of action was barred under the normal operation of Idaho Code section 
5-219(4), the fraudulent-concealment exception should apply. Alternatively, she argues that 
whether CS&A fraudulently concealed its malpractice from her is a disputed question of fact. 
Lastly, Walsh contends that Idaho Code section 5-219 is unconstitutionally vague. For the 
reasons below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.   
A. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to CS&A because 
Walsh’s malpractice action accrued when she released the First Collision claim.  
The district court determined that Walsh’s cause of action accrued on February 5, 2015, 
the date she signed the release on the First Collision case. The district court selected this date by 
reasoning that it was the point in time when the rights of the parties became fixed and Walsh 
could no longer recover an additional sum from Jake Hanson. Walsh argues that the earliest date 
her malpractice cause of action could have accrued was September 21, 2017—the date the 
Second Collision case settled. Up to that point in time, Walsh maintains that any damages related 
to her malpractice claim would have been entirely speculative because the Second Collision case 
 
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could have resolved in a manner that would have left her undamaged. Thus, she continues, her 
release of claims did not constitute “some damage” because there were no “objectively 
ascertainable” damages. Alternatively, she argues that disputes of material fact preclude 
summary judgment. Given Walsh’s theory of her malpractice claim, and the unique 
circumstances of this case, we determine that her claim is barred by the statute of limitations 
because she would have experienced “some damage” from CS&A’s alleged malpractice on the 
date she released her claim in the First Collision case.  
“An action to recover damages for ‘professional malpractice’ must be commenced within 
two years after the cause of action has accrued.” Minnick v. Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, 
LLP, 157 Idaho 863, 866, 341 P.3d 580, 583 (2015) (citing Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 
585, 51 P.3d 396, 399 (2002)); I.C. § 5-219. The plain language of Idaho Code section 5-219 
provides that a legal malpractice claim begins to accrue at the time the negligent act or omission 
occurs.2 I.C. § 5-219(4) (“[T]he cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued as of the time of 
the occurrence, act or omission complained of, and the limitation period shall not be extended by 
reason of any continuing consequences or damages resulting therefrom or any continuing 
professional or commercial relationship between the injured party and the alleged 
                                                 
 
2 The relevant provision of Idaho Code section 5-219 provides as follows: 
  
Within two (2) years: . . .  
4. An action to recover damages for professional malpractice, or for an injury to the person, or for 
the death of one caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, including any such action 
arising from breach of an implied warranty or implied covenant; provided, however, . . . when the 
fact of damage has, for the purpose of escaping responsibility therefor, been fraudulently and 
knowingly concealed from the injured party by an alleged wrongdoer standing at the time of the 
wrongful act, neglect or breach in a professional or commercial relationship with the injured party, 
the same shall be deemed to accrue when the injured party knows or in the exercise of reasonable 
care should have been put on inquiry regarding the condition or matter complained of; but in all 
other actions, whether arising from professional malpractice or otherwise, the cause of action shall 
be deemed to have accrued as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of, and 
the limitation period shall not be extended by reason of any continuing consequences or damages 
resulting therefrom or any continuing professional or commercial relationship between the injured 
party and the alleged wrongdoer, and, provided further, that an action within the foregoing foreign 
object or fraudulent concealment exceptions must be commenced within one (1) year following 
the date of accrual as aforesaid or two (2) years following the occurrence, act or omission 
complained of, whichever is later. The term “professional malpractice” as used herein refers to 
wrongful acts or omissions in the performance of professional services by any person, firm, 
association, entity or corporation licensed to perform such services under the law of the state of 
Idaho. 
I.C. § 5-219. 
 
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wrongdoer . . . .”). However, under this Court’s interpretation of section 5-219(4), a malpractice 
cause of action cannot begin to accrue until “some damage” has occurred. City of McCall v. 
Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 659, 201 P.3d 629, 632 (2009) (citing Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 
254, 678 P.2d 41, 46 (1984)). The “some damage” requirement reflects the simple understanding 
that a plaintiff must prove damages in order to succeed on a claim of negligence. Id. (“[S]ome 
damage is required because it would be nonsensical to hold that a cause of action is barred by the 
statute of limitations before that cause of action even accrues.”). In other words, “[Idaho Code 
section 5-219(4)’s] accrual standard operates under a completed tort theory in that the cause of 
action accrues when the tort is completed, an event that corresponds with the first objectively 
ascertainable occurrence of some damage.” Minnick, 157 Idaho at 867, 341 P.3d at 584. The 
“objectively ascertainable damage” standard is “an additional analytical tool” to determine when 
“some damage” occurs. Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 Idaho 482, 487, 835 P.2d 1293, 1298 (1992). 
Our prior case law helps define the outer perimeter of what constitutes “some damage.” 
Of course, it “must be damage that the client could recover from the professional in an action for 
malpractice.” Buxton, 146 Idaho at 659, 201 P.3d at 632. However, “[p]otential harm or an 
increase in the risk of damage is not sufficient to constitute some damage.” Id. Put succinctly, 
“[n]egligence that increases the risk that a client will be harmed does not trigger the running of 
the statute of limitations until harm actually occurs.” Id. at 661, 201 P.3d at 634 (citing Parsons 
Packing, Inc. v. Masingill, 140 Idaho 480, 95 P.3d 631 (2004)). This Court has cautioned that 
“[t]he determination of what constitutes both damage and objective proof must be decided ‘on 
the circumstances of each case.’” Reynolds v. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A., 154 Idaho 21, 
25, 293 P.3d 645, 649 (2013) (citing Buxton, 146 Idaho at 662, 201 P.3d at 635). The central 
question is whether the alleged malpractice actually caused damage to occur or whether it merely 
increased or created the potential for damages. Id.  
When an attorney’s action or advice merely creates the potential for damage, this Court 
has held that the cause of action does not accrue until the damage is actually suffered. For 
example, in City of McCall v. Buxton, the client, the City of McCall, terminated its contract with 
a vendor and withheld payment from a different vendor on the advice of counsel. Buxton, 146 
Idaho at 658, 201 P.3d at 631. When both vendors sued the City, this Court determined that, until 
there was an adverse judgment against the City, there was no damage, noting that an attorney’s 
advice “often carries with it the risk of litigation[.]” Id. at 662, 201 P.3d at 635.  
 
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Similarly, in Parsons Packing, Inc. v. Masingill, an attorney failed to properly secure a 
client’s interest in property that was the subject of an installment-lease purchase agreement. 140 
Idaho 480, 481–82, 95 P.3d 631, 632–33 (2004). The client sued for malpractice after the buyer 
defaulted and entered bankruptcy. Id. at 481, 95 P.3d at 632. The district court ruled that the 
cause of action accrued when the property was transferred without the adequate security, but this 
Court reversed, holding that the faulty transfer only created the potential for damage, but that the 
client was not actually damaged until the buyer declared bankruptcy and the client lost its 
opportunity to fully recover. Id. at 483, 95 P.3d at 634. This Court took the same approach in 
Bonz v. Sudweeks, where an attorney filed a release of lis pendens in the wrong county’s 
recorder’s office. 119 Idaho 539, 540, 808 P.2d 876, 877 (1991). This Court held that the cause of 
action accrued when an investor refused to invest in the property because of the cloud of title—
not when the misfiling occurred. Id. at 543, 808 P.2d at 880.  
Conversely, where the allegedly negligent act immediately results in actual damages, the 
cause of action accrues simultaneously with the events comprising the malpractice. For example, 
City of McCall v. Buxton also addressed the City’s claim that it was negligently advised to release 
a claim against an adverse party and reject a settlement offer from another one. 146 Idaho at 663, 
201 P.3d at 636. Unlike the claims involving the contract termination and withheld funds, this 
Court held that the claims for negligent advice to release a claim and negligent rejection of a 
settlement offer accrued the instant the City released the claim and rejected the settlement offer. 
Id. The Court reasoned that the City lost its opportunity to recover and receive that specific 
settlement the moment it released the claim and rejected the settlement. Id.  
Similar reasoning is found in Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 51 P.3d 396 (2002). 
There, an attorney’s secretary disbursed the entire sum of funds held in trust for the client to a 
third party (instead of distributing it incrementally and securing the client’s approval for each 
increment as agreed upon). 137 Idaho at 584, 51 P.3d at 398. This Court held that the client 
“suffered some damage when his funds were allegedly wrongfully disbursed,” because that was 
the moment the funds were no longer held in trust as agreed upon and the client could have 
recovered against the attorney. Id. at 588, 51 P.3d at 402. Though the client argued that the 
borrower might still have made all the payments, this Court held that the possibility of repayment 
did not delay the statute of limitations: “The mere hope that the loss may be recovered from 
another party in the future does not toll the statute of limitation for malpractice.” Id. at 586, 51 
 
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P.3d at 400 (quoting Figueroa v. Merrick, 128 Idaho 840, 844, 919 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Ct. App. 
1996)). 
The unique facts and circumstances of this case demonstrate that Walsh experienced 
actual damage the moment she released her First Collision claim. Walsh alleged malpractice 
based on the following events: 
 CS&A’s failure to advise her that settling the First Collision case might 
adversely impact the Second Collision case; 
 CS&A’s failure to adequately investigate her injuries prior to settling the First 
Collision case; 
 CS&A’s failure to inform her of Blue Cross’s asserted subrogation interest 
when she was advised to settle the First Collision case; and 
 CS&A’s withholding of the Blue Cross letter when CS&A released her file.  
While these events comprise her malpractice claim, the focus remains on Walsh’s sought-after 
damages to determine when her cause of action accrued. At oral argument, Walsh’s counsel 
clarified that her theory of damages is based on settling the First Collision case for too little. 
Walsh settled the Second Collision case for policy limits. Walsh did not claim that she settled 
that case for a lesser amount as a result of the first settlement. Nor did Walsh argue that she 
incurred additional expense in the second case as a result of settling the first case. Finally, Walsh 
alleged no impairment of the second claim as the result of settling the first claim. As a result, the 
only damages Walsh could complain of were those stemming from the First Collision i.e.  
CS&A’s alleged negligence caused her to settle for less than the subrogation interest or the 
overlapping injuries should have suggested to her attorneys. Accepting this premise, her cause of 
action would have accrued the moment the First Collision claim was released, not when the 
Second Collision case settled. Once she signed the release, Walsh could no longer recover the 
full amount she believed she was entitled to receive from Jake Hanson for the First Collision 
case. And so, for purposes of her malpractice claim, Walsh’s claim accrued on February 5, 2015, 
because that’s when she experienced “some damage” as that’s the moment she “lost [her] 
opportunity to recover” from Jake Hanson.  
 Although Walsh argues that the overlapping injuries between the two accidents should 
yield a different result, we disagree. Walsh concedes that hindsight may reveal her damages were 
incurred the moment she signed the release, she nevertheless claims that the damages stemming 
from the alleged malpractice could not have been “objectively ascertainable” because LaMott 
 
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could have fully compensated her for those damages. However, the possibility of fully 
recovering from LaMott does not change the conclusive action of releasing the first claim against 
Hanson. As explained, any damages claimed for the difference between the injuries sustained 
from the First Collision and settlement would have amounted to actual damages on the day of the 
release because the release revoked Walsh’s ability to recover those damages. That she might 
have been fully compensated in the future does not change that the sought-after damages were 
incurred the instant she signed the release. Thus, the possibility of compensation from LaMott 
did not stay the running of the statute of limitations. See Lapham, 137 Idaho at 586, 51 P.3d at 
400. 
 
Having determined that Walsh’s claim accrued on February 5, 2015, we must next 
address Walsh’s alternative argument that genuine issues of material fact should have precluded 
summary judgment. Walsh puts forward factual disputes relevant only under her view of the 
accrual standard. She does not dispute that she released all claims for the First Collision on 
February 5, 2015. As this is the lynchpin of the analysis in this case, no factual dispute precluded 
the district court from awarding summary judgment. Thus, we find no error.   
B. The district court did not err when it determined that, even if the fraudulent-
concealment exception applied, Walsh’s claim was still time-barred.  
The district court determined that, even if the fraudulent-concealment exception under 
Idaho Code section 5-219 applied, Walsh’s claim was nevertheless untimely. The court 
determined that Walsh could not show that the facts of the case failed to put her on inquiry 
notice, which was all that was required under the statute. In support of this conclusion, the 
district court imputed Beckett’s knowledge to Walsh and highlighted Beckett’s comments to her 
in June 2015, Beckett’s concerns conveyed to Swapp in June 2015, and Beckett’s statement that 
a doctor’s report received in February 2016 made Beckett “realize the ‘full measure’ of the 
malpractice.” Walsh argues that the district court erred by imputing Beckett’s knowledge while at 
the firm to her because the firm was actively concealing information from her. She further argues 
that CS&A fraudulently concealed their malpractice from her by failing to include the Blue Cross 
letter when they released her file. Alternatively, Walsh argues that this issue should have been 
presented to the jury.  
Idaho Code section 5-219 contains a specific one-year statute of limitations for 
circumstances where the offending party fraudulently conceals his malpractice. It begins to run 
“when ‘the injured party knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been put on 
 
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inquiry’ of the alleged malpractice . . . .” Bliss Valley Foods, Inc. v. Walker, 127 Idaho 12, 12, 
896 P.2d 338, 338 (1995) (citing I.C. § 5-219). In assessing when the client should have been put 
on inquiry notice, this Court has made clear that “the matter complained of refers to the alleged 
malpractice, not to the fact of damage.” Id. at 15, 896 P.2d at 341 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Thus, while the “discovery rule” has been eliminated from general claims of 
malpractice under section 5-219, it continues to exist within the fraudulent-concealment 
exception of the statute: 
While prior decisions of this Court have eliminated the discovery rule for 
professional malpractice not involving fraudulent concealment or fraud, and have 
replaced it with the “some damage” rule, this provision makes clear that when 
professional malpractice involves fraudulent or intentional concealment of the 
wrongdoing, even when the initial wrongdoing is merely negligent, the statute of 
limitations contained in I.C. § 5–219(4) is tolled until the injured party “knows or 
in the exercise of reasonable care should have been put on inquiry regarding the ... 
matter complained of.” 
McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 772, 820 P.2d 360, 367 (1991) (quoting I.C. § 5-219.4) 
(citations omitted). To emphasize: the inquiry is focused “on when the client learned of the 
lawyer’s actions that constituted the malpractice.” Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 127 Idaho at 15, 896 
P.2d at 341 (emphasis added). 
Discovery of the events comprising the underlying malpractice for purposes of 
commencing the statute of limitations is a factual question for the jury “unless there is no 
evidence creating a question of fact.” Id. at 16, 896 P.2d at 342 (quoting McCoy, 120 Idaho at 
773, 820 P.2d at 368). For example, in McCoy v. Lyons, this Court determined that where the 
plaintiff’s complaint was untimely under the usual two-year statute of limitation period under 
section 5-219(4), the district court erred in awarding summary judgment to the defendant 
because the plaintiff’s verified complaint alleged that the attorney concealed his malpractice to 
escape liability. 120 Idaho at 775, 820 P.2d at 370. The Court reasoned that the date of when the 
plaintiffs knew or should have known of the lawyer’s malpractice was a question of fact that 
should have gone to the jury. Id.  
Likewise, in Bliss Valley Foods, Inc. v. Walker, this Court determined that summary 
judgment was improperly granted to the defendants. 127 Idaho at 14–16, 896 P.2d at 340–42. 
The plaintiffs’ affidavit alleged that the defendant had advised them to incorporate their 
partnership by telling them that the bank requested it, but the attorney had concealed that he 
suggested incorporation at a limited partner’s meeting as a means to oust the plaintiffs or 
 
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neutralize their influence. Id. This Court focused on the interrelationship between the facts 
underlying the alleged malpractice and its concealment:  
There is an interrelationship between the alleged malpractice in this case and the 
concealment of the malpractice. Although [the attorney] contends that the alleged 
malpractice concerning the loan agreement was the inclusion of § 3.10, this is not 
the way the [plaintiffs] characterized the loan agreement malpractice. The 
[plaintiffs] alleged that they were “falsely advised by [the attorney] that . . . no 
material changes had been made” in the loan agreement since the earlier draft. It 
is this misrepresentation, together with [the attorney’s] failure to disclose his 
opinions regarding the advisability of accepting the provisions contained in § 3.10 
and his agreement with the loan officer, that [the plaintiffs] characterize as 
malpractice. 
Id. at 15, 896 P.2d at 341.   
 
Here, the unique facts of this case lead us to conclude that the district court properly 
determined that Walsh failed to present enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material 
fact. Walsh asserts that she could not have known Redd’s advice amounted to malpractice even 
with Beckett’s comments in June 2015. She spotlights the Blue Cross letter and CS&A’s failure 
to advise her of it when they received it and their failure to include it when they surrendered her 
file. However, our inquiry is focused “on when the client learned of the lawyer’s actions that 
constituted the malpractice.” Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 127 Idaho at 15, 896 P.2d at 341.  
As a preliminary matter, we agree with Walsh that Beckett’s knowledge or beliefs should 
not have been imputed to her until he began to represent her independently of CS&A. However, 
we disagree with Walsh that this requires reversing the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment. CS&A and the district court are correct that many jurisdictions have case law which 
impute the knowledge of the attorney to the client in statute-of-limitations circumstances.3 
However, the unique facts of this case take it outside the purview of the general rule. The 
imputed-knowledge doctrine is based on two rationales: (1) the unity between the attorney and 
client; and (2) that it will be presumed that the attorney’s knowledge was communicated with the 
client. See W.A.E., Imputation of attorney’s knowledge of facts to his client, 4 A.L.R. 1592 
(2018). Here, neither theory finds purchase. Beckett worked at CS&A until April 2016. Until 
Walsh left CS&A with Beckett, he represented Walsh as a litigator, but Craig Swapp continued as 
                                                 
 
3 See, e.g., Strong v. Sutter Cty Bd. of Sup’rs, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 498, 509–10 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); In re Marriage of 
Mierlak, 426 N.E.2d 1010, 1012 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); McKinney v. Waterman S.S. Corp, 925 F.2d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 
1991).  
 
 
15 
 
 
the supervising attorney. So while Beckett may have personally believed that the firm committed 
malpractice, CS&A’s official stance was that it had not. Thus, one may ask which attorney’s 
knowledge should be imputed to Walsh—Beckett’s or Swapp’s—making the “unity” rationale 
fragmented at best. Likewise, because the company line was that no malpractice had occurred, 
the record demonstrates that Beckett did not unequivocally advise Walsh of his opinion that 
malpractice occurred until March 2016. Thus, we cannot impute Beckett’s knowledge or belief 
under the imputed-knowledge rationale until that point in time. However, because Beckett 
unequivocally expressed his belief that malpractice had occurred, we need not impute that 
knowledge because it had been actually communicated.  
Thus, Beckett’s statements to Walsh in June 2015 were sufficient to put her on inquiry 
that CS&A may have committed malpractice. In that initial meeting, Beckett informed Walsh 
that “it was not a good idea to settle one of two claims where the other claim is still pending in 
litigation where there is an overlapping injury” and “that there would be an empty chair and that 
it would be difficult to deal with.” Understanding that the party just needs to be alerted to the 
lawyer’s actions comprising the malpractice—not that the actions rose to the level of 
malpractice—Beckett’s comments were sufficient to put Walsh on inquiry of CS&A’s alleged 
malpractice. Not only was Walsh aware of the actions underlying the malpractice, Beckett’s 
comments were sufficient to alert her to the possible negligent nature of those actions. So while 
Walsh focuses on the Blue Cross letter to assert that CS&A fraudulently concealed their 
malpractice from her, the Blue Cross subrogation interest was only one component of her 
malpractice action and was not the cornerstone of her malpractice claim. That Walsh filed her 
malpractice action before she claims she was aware of the Blue Cross letter supports that fact.    
To sum up, Beckett’s knowledge and belief regarding CS&A’s alleged malpractice should 
not have been imputed to Walsh until he began to represent her apart from CS&A sometime in 
April 2016. Because that moment occurred after Beckett explicitly informed Walsh that he 
believed the firm committed malpractice in March 2015, there is no need to apply the imputed-
knowledge doctrine in this case. However, for purposes of triggering the fraudulent concealment 
exception under Idaho Code section 5-219, the client need not be fully apprised of the legal 
malpractice, only of the facts or actions that comprised the legal malpractice. Here, Walsh was 
alerted to the actions that comprised her legal malpractice claim in June 2015 when Beckett 
alluded to the possibly negligent nature of CS&A’s advice to settle the First Collision case. This 
 
16 
 
 
was sufficient to put her on inquiry under Idaho Code section 5-219(4) because that is when she 
would have “know[n] or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been put on inquiry 
regarding the . . . matter complained of.” Accordingly, to be timely under the fraudulent 
concealment exception, Walsh should have filed her complaint in June 2016. Because she filed in 
March 2017, her cause of action is untimely, even under the fraudulent-concealment provision. 
C. Idaho Code section 5-219(4) is not unconstitutionally vague.   
The district court denied Walsh’s motion for reconsideration finding, in part, that Idaho 
Code section 5-219(4) was not unconstitutionally void for vagueness as applied to Walsh’s 
claims. Walsh argues that this Court should determine that section 5-219(4) is unconstitutionally 
vague by arguing that she, or any member of the public, could not have fair notice of what the 
statute required.  
“The Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution embodies the principle of void-for-
vagueness, which is that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so 
vague that people of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to 
its application violates the first essential of due process of law.” Haw v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 
140 Idaho 152, 157, 90 P.3d 902, 907 (2004) (citing Tuma v. Board of Nursing, 100 Idaho 74, 
593 P.2d 711 (1979)). Generally speaking, “the party asserting the unconstitutionality of a statute 
bears the burden of showing its invalidity and must overcome a strong presumption of validity.” 
Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 709, 791 P.2d 1285, 1288 (1990) (citing Leliefeld v. 
Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d 111 (1983)). “It is generally presumed that legislative acts are 
constitutional, that the state legislature has acted within its constitutional powers, and any doubt 
concerning interpretation of a statute is to be resolved in favor of that which will render the 
statute constitutional.” Id. (citations omitted).  
The void-for-vagueness doctrine results in the invalidation of statutes that are so vague as 
to invite incongruous results because it would leave the “public uncertain as to the conduct it 
prohibits” and “judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is 
prohibited and what is not in each particular case.” Id. at 715, 791 P.2d at 1294. In her brief, 
Walsh claims that section 5-219(4) meets this standard because it fails to provide fair notice of 
when her claim accrued. However, the statute is clear as to the conduct it prohibits i.e. 
malpractice causes of action are barred within certain timeframes. The “some damage” accrual 
standard stems from this Court’s case law on the issue. While many of the cases this Court has 
 
17 
 
 
decided regarding when a cause of action accrues reach different results under different 
circumstances, this is explained by the highly fact-specific nature of the inquiry. See Reynolds v. 
Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A., 154 Idaho 21, 25, 293 P.3d 645, 649 (2013) (“The 
determination of what constitutes both damage and objective proof must be decided ‘on the 
circumstances of each case.’”). Furthermore, this Court’s articulation of the “some damage” 
standard can only serve to extend the otherwise cut-and-dry rule announced in the statute. 
Accordingly, Walsh has failed to carry her burden to show that Idaho Code section 5-219(4) is 
unconstitutional on void-for-vagueness grounds.  
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, we determine that the district court did not err in awarding summary 
judgment to CS&A. The district court properly determined that Walsh’s claim is time barred 
under Idaho Code section 5-219 because her cause of action accrued when she signed the release 
of claims for the First Collision case more than two years prior to her filing the action at hand. 
Further, the district court properly determined that the fraudulent-concealment provision of Idaho 
Code section 5-219(4) did not apply because Walsh was put on inquiry of CS&A’s alleged 
malpractice in June 2015, more than one year prior to filing this action. The district court’s 
decision granting CS&A’s motion for summary judgment and its final judgment are affirmed. 
Costs are awarded to CS&A. 
 
Justices BRODY, BEVAN, STEGNER, and MOELLER CONCUR.