Case Title: STEVEN D. BONNEY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0164

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-03-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
STEVEN D. BONNEY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 51Case Number: S-10-0164Decided: 03/22/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
STEVEN 
D. BONNEY,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kathleen 
M. Karpan and Margaret M. White of Karpan and White P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming 

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; David L. 
Delicath, Senior Assistant Attorney General

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant Steven 
D. Bonney appeals from the order of the district court denying his motion for a 
sentence reduction.  We will 
affirm.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      The issue for 
this Court's determination is whether the district court abused its discretion 
when it denied Bonney's motion for a sentence reduction.

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In March 2008, 
the State charged Bonney with four counts of second degree sexual assault 
(sexual intrusion) under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-303(a)(v) (LexisNexis 2005) and 
one count of third degree sexual assault (sexual contact) under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-304(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005)1 for crimes alleged to have occurred 
in 2000 and 2001.   Two of the 
second degree sexual assault counts involved victim TN and the other three 
counts involved victim VB.  The 
victims were both around eight years old at the time the offenses were 
committed, and Bonney was sixteen or seventeen years of age. 

 
 
[¶4]      Eventually, 
Bonney entered into a stipulated plea agreement wherein he agreed to plead 
guilty to two counts of second degree sexual assault in exchange for dismissal 
of the other counts.  As part of 
that agreement, the State agreed to forego filing similar charges involving 
another minor victim, PM, and to recommend that Colorado authorities not pursue 
charges related to allegations that Bonney committed similar crimes with another 
minor victim in that state.  The 
plea agreement also provided for Bonney to receive consecutive prison sentences 
of fifteen to twenty years,2 with the second sentence to be 
suspended in favor of probation.3    

 
 
[¶5]      Pursuant to that 
agreement, Bonney entered his guilty pleas on November 13, 2008.  The State provided the factual basis for 
the pleas, which Bonney did not contest.  
That factual basis established that Bonney had committed acts of vaginal 
and anal intercourse with TN and acts of anal intercourse with VB.  On February 26, 2009, the district court 
sentenced Bonney in accordance with the plea agreement to consecutive sentences 
of fifteen to twenty years, and suspended the second sentence in favor of 
fifteen years of supervised probation.  
Bonney did not appeal his convictions or the sentences 
imposed.

 
 
[¶6]      Thereafter, on 
June 15, 2009, Bonney, through new counsel, petitioned the district court for 
post-conviction relief, alleging multiple instances of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel.  Following an 
evidentiary hearing, and after careful consideration of Bonney's claims and the 
evidence presented in support of those claims, the district court denied 
relief.  Bonney did not timely seek 
review of that denial.

 
 
[¶7]      Bonney 
subsequently moved the district court, pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 35(b), for a 
reduction of his sentence.  That 
motion, and the supporting memorandum filed therewith, relied extensively on the 
allegations and evidence underlying the post-conviction action and focused 
primarily on attacking his convictions, the victims, and trial counsel's 
representation.  Bonney also 
supported his motion with letters of support from friends and relatives, letters 
from two former supervisors who indicated they would rehire him, and a progress 
report from the state penitentiary indicating he was a good worker and did not 
have any disciplinary infractions since arriving at the penitentiary.  After a hearing, the district court took 
the matter under advisement.  In an 
order entered on April 27, 2010, the district court denied the motion, finding 
in pertinent part:

 
 
3)         
. . . Defendant previously filed a petition for post-conviction relief 
which the Court denied after an evidentiary hearing.  The Court is therefore familiar with 
many of the factual allegations contained in Defendant's Motion for Reduction of Sentence. The 
Court incorporates its decisions in the post-conviction relief petition in this 
matter.

 
 
4)         
This Court has broad discretion in deciding whether to reduce a sentence 
or not.  McFarlane v. State, 781 P.2d 931, 932 
(Wyo. 1989), relying on Mower v. 
State, 750 P.2d 679 (Wyo. 1988). . . .

 
 
5)         
This case involved a stipulated plea under Wyoming Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11(e)(1)(c), meaning that Defendant could have withdrawn his guilty 
plea if the Court did not sentence as called for in the plea agreement.  No request to withdraw the plea was made 
before sentencing.

 
 
6)         
The Court imposed the original sentence called for in the stipulated plea 
agreement after giving due consideration to all pertinent sentencing factors, 
including but not limited to the gravity of the offense, Defendant's criminal 
record, all sentencing alternatives, and the legitimate objects of criminal 
sentencing.  Despite its concern 
about a stipulated plea, after consideration of the above factors, the Court 
concluded that the sentence required by the plea agreement was fair and just to 
Defendant, the State, and the victims.

 
 
7)         
The manner in which the factual basis for Defendant's guilty plea[s] was 
taken was not in accordance with the Court's usual practice.  A defendant is normally required to 
answer detailed questions put by the Court, the responses to which must 
establish each and every element of each and every count to which a guilty plea 
is offered beyond a reasonable doubt.  
This process serves the purpose of allowing the Court to assure itself 
that the State could prove its case, and gives the Defendant an opportunity to 
accept responsibility for his actions.

 
 
8)         
In this case, defense counsel requested that the District Attorney 
provide the factual basis.  At the 
time, the Court believed this was intended to spare Defendant the embarrassment 
of admitting that he had molested [the minor victims] in front of his entire 
family.  In the context of a 
stipulated plea, this was allowed.  
Defendant was given the opportunity to disagree with the District 
Attorney's description of what he could prove, and did not do so.  The Court is thus in the position of 
having reluctantly deviated from its customary procedures at the request of the 
defense.  The Court is satisfied 
that the factual basis provided was sufficient to fulfill the purpose of 
W.R.Cr.P. 11, which is to prevent those charged with a crime from being misled 
into a waiver of substantial rights.  
Jones v. State, 2009 WY 33, ¶ 
23, 203 P.3d 1091, 1097 (Wyo. 2009)

 
 
9)         
The Court can find no reason to depart from the sentence required by the 
stipulated plea agreement.  When 
reviewing a request for a sentence reduction, it is important to consider the 
benefit of finality for victims of crimes to prevent "re-victimization."  Nixon v. State, 2002 WY 118, ¶ 27, 51 P.3d 851, 858 (Wyo. 2002).  As the 
United Sates Supreme Court has said:

 
 
It 
goes without saying that, at some point, judicial proceedings must draw to a 
close and the matter deemed conclusively resolved; no society can afford forever 
to question the correctness of every judgment.

 
 

Id. 
(quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1468, 113 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1991)).  

 
 
This 
appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 

[¶8]      This 
Court has repeatedly stated that a trial court enjoys broad discretion in 
determining whether to reduce a criminal defendant's sentence.  LeGarda-Cornelio v. State, 2009 WY 136, 
¶ 6, 218 P.3d 968, 969 (Wyo. 2009); Hodgins v. State, 1 P.3d 1259, 1261 
(Wyo. 2000); McFarlane v. State, 781 P.2d 931, 932 (Wyo. 1989).  On 
review, we afford considerable deference to the trial court's determination, and 
we will not disturb that determination absent demonstration of a clear abuse of 
that discretion.  Hodgins, 1 P.3d  at 1261; see also Mower v. State, 750 P.2d 679, 680 (Wyo. 
1988); Fortin v. State, 622 P.2d 418, 
420 (Wyo. 1981).  "Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously."  Vaughn v. 
State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo.1998). 

 
 
Analysis

 
 
[¶9]      Bonney argues the 
district court improperly denied his W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) motion for a sentence 
reduction.  Bonney's argument is 
two-fold.  He first argues the 
district court based its ruling on a mistaken belief that it was foreclosed by 
the stipulated plea agreement from reducing his sentence.  He also argues the district court failed 
to consider the information he submitted in support of the motion before denying 
his request for a sentence reduction.4  We find no merit in Bonney's 
arguments.

 
 
[¶10]   The district court's order clearly 
indicates that it considered the contents of Bonney's motion, in conjunction 
with the court file.  It is also 
abundantly clear the district court declined to reduce Bonney's sentence after 
giving due consideration to that motion in light of the facts of the case, not 
because the court believed it was precluded from doing so by the plea 
agreement.  After reviewing the 
entire record and giving the required deference to the district court's ruling, 
we cannot say the court abused its discretion in refusing to reduce Bonney's 
sentence.  The order of the district 
court denying Bonney's motion for a sentence reduction is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1These statutes were repealed in 2007.  2007 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 159, § 3.  The prohibited conduct as charged in 
this case is now found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-314(a)(i) and § 6-2-315(a)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2009), respectively.

 
 

2The potential sentence for each count was five years to life.  § Wyo. Stat. Ann. §  6-2-306 (LexisNexis 
2005).

 
 

3Bonney later signed an amended plea agreement that contained the same 
provisions as the original agreement, and additionally allowed PM and KS 
(another alleged minor victim of Bonney's uncharged criminal acts) to speak at 
his sentencing hearing.  

4Interwoven in Bonney's arguments is a contention that the district court 
was required to specifically articulate in the order its findings regarding the 
information presented on the motion and its reasons for discounting that 
information.  Bonney has not cited 
any authority, nor have we found any, imposing such a requirement on the 
district court.