Case Title: State v. Price

Citation: 385 Md. 261

Docket Number: 107/03

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2005-02-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
State of Maryland v. Wilbert Pelzie Price
No. 107, September Term, 2003
Headnote:
Motion to dismiss a re-indictment, following a nolle pros, is properly granted
when the purpose of the nolle pros was to circumvent the requirement of
Maryland Code (2002) § 6-103 of the Criminal Procedure Article and
Maryland Rule 4-271 that trials proceed except when there has been a finding,
by the administrative judge or designee, of good cause to continue the trial
date.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 107
September Term, 2003
______________________________________________
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
WILBERT PELZIE PRICE
______________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Greene
          
Eldridge, John C. 
                            
       (Retired, specially assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
  
Filed:    February 14, 2005
1Maryland Rule 4-347, Nolle prosequi provides:
“(a) Disposition by nolle prosequi. The State’s Attorney may terminate a
prosecution on a charge and dismiss the charge by entering a nolle prosequi
on the record in open court. The defendant need not be present in court
when the nolle prosequi is entered, but in that event the clerk shall send
notice to the defendant, if the defendant’s whereabouts are known, and to
the defendant’s attorney of record.
“(b) Effect of Nolle Prosequi. When a nolle prosequi has been entered on a
charge, any conditions of pretrial release on that charge are terminated, and
any bail bond posted for the defendant on that charge shall be released. The
clerk shall take the action necessary to recall or revoke any outstanding
warrant or detainer that could lead to te arrest or detention of the defendant
because of that charge.”
2Maryland Code (2002 ) § 6-103 of the Criminal Procedure Article, titled “Trial
Date,” provides:
“(a) Setting the date. – The date for trial of a criminal matter in a circuit
court:
“(1) Shall be set within 30 days after the earlier of:
“(i) The appearance of counsel; or 
“(ii) The first appearance of the defendant
before the circuit court, as provided in the
Maryland Rules; and 
“(2) May not be later than 180 days after the earlier of those
events.
“(b) Changing the date. –on motion of a party or on the court’s initiative
and for good cause shown, a county administrative judge or a designee of
that judge may grant a change of the circuit court trial date.
“(c) Court rules. – The Court of Appeals may adopt additional rules of
practice and procedure for the implementation of this section in circuit
This Court has been asked to decide whether Maryland Code (2002) § 6-103 of the
Criminal Procedure Article and Maryland Rule 4-271 were violated when, robbery and assault
charges, for which Wilbert Pelzie Price, the respondent, was under indictment, having been
nolle prossed,1 the State re-indicted the respondent for the same charges, but did not dispose
of those charges within 180 days of the initial indictment. The statute 2 and the Rule,3
courts.”
The predecessor to § 6-103,  Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Replacement Volume) Article
27, § 591, was identical. 
3Maryland Rules, §4-271(a) provides:
“(a) Trial Date in Circuit Court.
“(1) The date for trial in the circuit court shall be set within 30
days after the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first
appearance of the defendant before the circuit court pursuant
to Rule 4-213, and shall be no later than 180 days after the
earlier of those events. When a case has been transferred from
the District Court because of a demand for jury trial, and an
appearance of counsel entered in the District Court was
automatically entered in this circuit court pursuant to rule 4 –
214(a), the date of the appearance of counsel for purposes of
this rule is the date the case was docketed in the circuit court. 
On motion of a party, or allow the court’s initiative, and for
good cause shown, the county administrative judge or that
judge’s designee may grant a change of a Circuit Court trial
date.  If a circuit court trial date changed, any subsequent
changes of the trial date may be made only by the county
administrative judge or that judge’ designee for good cause
shown.
“(2) Upon a finding by the Chief Judge of the Court of
Appeals that the number of demand for jury trial filed in the
District Court for a county is having a critical impact on the
efficient operation of the circuit court for the county, the
Chief Judge,  by Administrative Order may exempt from this
section cases transferred to  that circuit court from the District
Court because of a demand for jury trial.”
2
together,  require that a criminal defendant be brought to trial within 180 days after the earlier
of either the appearance of defendant’s counsel or the first appearance of the defendant.
Concluding that the nolle pros of the initial indictment “was intended to circumvent that
portion of the rule, which leaves to the administrative judge to decide whether a case, once
4When continuing the trial date to August 12, the court scheduled a motions
hearing for August 1, 2002.  It was at this hearing, or shortly thereafter, that the State
learned from one of its detectives that the DNA analysis it had requested of the
3
set within 180 days, should be continued for good cause shown,” and noting that, as to that
indictment, more than 180 days had then elapsed since the prescribed appearances, the trial
court ruled that § 6-103 and Rule 4-271 had been violated and, therefore, dismissed the re-
indicted charges.  The Court of Special Appeals, agreeing with the trial court’s analysis,
affirmed.  State v. Price, 152 Md. App. 640, 644-45, 833 A. 2d 614, 617 (2003).   We granted
the State’s petition for writ of certiorari. State v. Price, 379 Md. 98, 839 A. 2d 741 (2004). 
We agree with the Circuit Court and the intermediate appellate court. 
I.
On May 9, 2002, the respondent was indicted, charged with robbery, first degree
assault, and second degree assault.  He appeared without counsel in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County on May 17, 2002 and his counsel entered his appearance five days later,
on May 22, 2002.  The trial date was set for July 23, 2002.  At a status conference, conducted
on June 21, 2002, noting the assigned prosecutor’s unavailability on the trial date due to a
conflict with the trial of another case, the State requested a continuance of the trial date.
Pointing to his incarceration, the respondent objected.   Nevertheless, after confirming that
both counsel were available on that date, the trial court continued the case to August 12,
2002. 
Prior to the new trial date,4 by motion filed August 5, 2002, the State sought to
Montgomery County Crime Lab had not been done.
5As the respondent reminds us, the August 12th trial date was a continued one.  
The original trial date was July 23rd and it was set at the respondent’s initial appearance in
the Circuit Court.  Thus, the respondent submits, assuming the crime lab also had been
notified of the trial date and a six weeks turn around time, the DNA results would have
4
continue the trial date once again.  When it did so, the State was subject to a court order,
entered in response to the respondent’s motion to compel discovery, pursuant to which the
State was required, within ten (10) days, to file a written answer to the respondent’s then
pending discovery motion and provide the respondent with certain enumerated material.   The
order also stated: “in the event the State fails to abide by this Order, the State shall be
prohibited from producing any witness, or evidence at trial or hearing which relates in any
way to the State’s non-disclosure.”    
At a hearing on the motion to continue, held August 12, 2002, the State argued that the
continuance was necessary because it had not received a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
analysis of evidence submitted to the crime lab on May 10, 2002.  In support of that argument,
the State informed the court that it is the crime lab’s practice not to begin DNA analyses until
it receives a subpoena with a trial date and that, although neither it nor the police officer had
advised the crime lab of the trial date or knew that they should, the analysis would not have
been ready in time for the August 12th trial date in any event, explaining:
“We had a status date on June 21st where this trial date was scheduled.   Even
if I knew on June 21st to notify them of that trial date, we still couldn’t have had
the trial date today because it would take them four to six weeks to do the
testing and we have to give 45 days notice, so that would have been a  middle
of September trial date anyway.” [5]
been available on June 28th.   Factoring in a forty-five day notice requirement results, he
further submits,  in their being available for use on the second trial date, August 12th.   
6State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A. 2d 356, on motion for reconsideration, 285
Md. 334, 403 A. 2d 368 (1979).
7The respondent filed, initially, on September 23, 2002, a motion to dismiss for
lack of speedy trial.   He filed, thereafter, on November 20, 2002, “Defendant’s Second
Motion to Dismiss - Violation of the Hicks’ Rule.”
5
Noting that the “[Hicks][6] date in this case doesn’t even run until the end of November.  This
case was just [indicted] the end of May, it’s a very serious matter,” it pointed out that “under
the 180 days he has until the middle to end of November to have [a speedy trial], and we have
a lot of time between the 2nd week in August and the end of November to set that.” 
Characterizing the State’s reason for requesting a continuance as “not even a poor
excuse, it’s a pitiful excuse,” and refusing to keep the respondent “sitting in jail,” the
administrative judge denied the motion for continuance.   Believing that the DNA evidence
was needed as part of its case, the State declined to go to trial without it.    Consequently, it
nolle prossed the charges against the respondent, stating, however, “we’ll get a new charging
document today to charge.”
The respondent was re-indicted for the identical charges.  That did not occur, however,
until September 19, 2002, some five weeks after the initial indictment was nolle prossed.   The
new indictment was met with a motion to dismiss for violation of the Hicks Rule.7 The
hearing on that motion was held on November 27, 2002.
In support of its motion, the respondent relied on his consistent demand, from the first
6
request for continuance by the State, for strict compliance with the Hicks  Rule and the order
to compel discovery.  Specifically, he pointed out that his first appearance under the initial
indictment occurred on May 17, 2002 and, consequently, at the time of the hearing, more than
180 days had expired.    With respect to the order to compel discovery, the respondent noted
that the State had not met the ten day deadline to provide discovery before its nolle pros of the
indictment terminated the case.   That order prohibited, moreover, he adds, the State “from
producing any witness or evidence at trial or hearing which relates in any way to the
nondisclosure.”   The trial date being beyond the Hicks date, the respondent concluded that
the State entered “a nolle pros to get around Judge Debelius’ order [to compel discovery]” and
“also to get around the Hicks’ date.”
The State disputed that analysis, emphasizing instead when in the 180 day period the
nolle pros was entered, on the eighty-third day, with “ninety-seven days remaining to reset the
case.”  It also submitted:
“The sole purpose of requesting the continuance was to get the [DNA] testing
done, and it couldn’t have been more clear as to why we were asking for the
continuance.   And whether or not the judge grants that or not that’s not really
the issue, the issue was the nolle pros to get around the 180, and the answer i[s]
clearly no, because there was over three months to reschedule the trial date.”
Accepting the State’s argument that it “acted not to circumvent the prohibition that a
case be tried within 180 days, because there were a number of days left,” the court
nevertheless granted the respondent’s motion to dismiss the indictment.  It did so because it
concluded that, in addition to the 180 day requirement, Rule 4-271, consistent with the statute
8In reaching its decision, the court considered State v. Brown, 341 Md. 609, 672 A.
2d 602 (1996), proffered by the State in support of its position, and Ross v. State, 117
Md. App. 357, 700 A. 2d 282 (1997), proffered by the respondent for his position, but
concluded that “neither one of them, really, ... is directly applicable to the facts of this
case.”  What the court found particularly relevant from the cases, Ross more so than
Brown,  is that “they talk about ... the whole reason for this rule and necessity to enforce
this rule.”
7
it implements, contains a second component,  prohibition of the continuance of a trial date
except for good cause found by the administrative judge or that judge’s designee.  Thus,
pointing out that “the supervision of the dockets is given to the administrative judge,” who,
by determining, in that capacity, or by designee, whether good cause exists to continue the
trial date, “decide[s] whether cases can and can’t be tried within the 180 days,” and noting that
the State does not have the right to appeal that good cause determination, the court was
satisfied that “it was the decision of the administrative judge of that county that the State had
not established a good cause” that was being sought to be circumvented.8 
Emphasizing that ninety-seven of the 180 day Hicks period remained when the State
nolle prossed the charges against the respondent due to the unavailability of DNA test results,
the Circuit Court expressly found that, “in this case what really is occurring is the State acted
not to circumvent the prohibition that a case be tried within 180 days ... that wasn’t what the
State was intending,” that the results of DNA testing were essential to its case and to
complying with both the respondent’s discovery request and the court’s order with respect
thereto, and that the nolle pros is a legitimate prosecutorial option available to the State, the
State submits that the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals erred in dismissing the
8
re-indictment of the respondent. It argues that dismissal is, in fact, inconsistent with the settled
pronouncements of this Court, pronouncements which, it says, have stated clearly that where
a case has been nolle prossed for unavailability of DNA evidence, the 180 day period runs
from the date of the appearances of counsel and defendant pursuant to the subsequent
indictment, rather than the one that was nolle prossed.  It is the State’s position, in other
words, that the “statute and rule [apply] only when the circumstances are such that, in the
absence of the nol pros, dismissal with prejudice was a certainty because the State was
absolutely incapable of trying the case within the 180 day period.”  The State relies on State
v. Brown, 341 Md. 609, 672 A. 2d 602 (1996); State v. Glenn, 299 Md. 464, 474 A. 2d 509
(1984); Curley v. State, 299 Md. 449, 474 A. 2d 502 (1984). 
The State is correct, “when a circuit court criminal case is nol prossed, and the state
later has the same charges refiled, the 180-day period for trial prescribed by §[6-103] and Rule
[4-271] ordinarily begins to run with the arraignment or first appearance of defense counsel
under the second prosecution.”  Curley, 299 Md. at 462, 474 A. 2d at 508.    There was an
exception to the general rule  recognized in Curley, however, “where the prosecution’s
purpose in filing the nol pros, or the necessary effect of the nol pros, was to circumvent the
requirements of §[6-103] and Rule [4-271].”  Glenn, 299 Md. at 467, 474 A. 2d at 511.  
Curley and Glenn both involve and, although they reach different results, elucidate the
“necessary effect” component of the exception.
In Curley, the State nolle prossed the charges against the defendant on “the final day
9
for trial,” 299 Md. at 453, 474 A. 2d at 504, and when there had not been a trial date set. 
Notwithstanding the State’s representation to the defendant as to the reason for the nolle pros,
that it was entered, “based on the combined factors of the apparent inadmissibility of the
blood alcohol content test as performed in the case and upon the request made of the State by
the family of the victim,” id. at 453 , 474 A. 2d at 504, and the trial court’s apparent
acceptance of that explanation, id. at 453, 474 A. 2d at 504, this Court reversed the trial
court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, containing the identical
charges, brought three months subsequently.   While recognizing the appropriateness of the
exception to the general rule applied by the trial court, the Court declared that exception to
be “too limited,” explaining: 
“Where the [S]tate’s action necessarily circumvents the statute and rule
prescribing a deadline for trial, this should be sufficient to continue the time
period running with the initial prosecution.”
Id. at 461, 474 A. 2d at 508 (emphasis added).    The Court concluded:
“When the nol pros was entered on March 23, 1981, which was the final day for
trial, it was too late for compliance with § 591 and Rule 746.   At the time a
trial date had not even been assigned.   The case could not have been tried on
March 23rd, as the defendant, his counsel, and witnesses were not present. 
There was no reason for them to have been present, as March 23rd was not the
assigned trial date.   As of the close of business on March 23rd, the case would
have had to have been dismissed for violation of § 591 and Rule 746.   In
reality, the prosecution had already lost the case under § 591 and Rule 746
when the nol pros was filed.   Regardless of the prosecuting attorney’s motives,
the necessary effect of the nol pros was an attempt to evade the dismissal
resulting from the failure to try the case within 180 days.”
Id. at 462-63, 474 A. 2d at 508-509.
10
By contrast, in State v. Glenn, supra, it was clear to the Court that the nolle pros in that
case did not have the “necessary effect” of circumventing the 180 day Rule.   In that case, the
Court first considered whether the record evidenced any intention on the part of the State to
circumvent the 180 day Rule and rejected that proposition.   It observed, in that regard, that
the State nolle prossed the charges against Glenn, as “[t]he record clearly establish[ed], with
no basis for a contrary inference ... because of a legitimate belief that the charging documents
were defective and because the defendant’s attorney would not agree to amendment of the
charging document.”  299 Md. at 467, 479 A. 2d at 511.    Addressing the effect of that action,
the Court opined:
“Unlike the situation in Curley, the necessary effect of the nol pros in these
cases was not to circumvent § 591 and Rule 746.   November 17, 1981, which
was the assigned trial date and the date of the nol pros, was only 123 days after
the arraignment and first appearance of counsel.   If the cases had not been nol
prossed, trial could have proceeded on November 17th.    If the cases had not
been nol prossed, and if for some reason trial had not proceeded when the cases
were called on November 17th, there remained fifty-seven days before the
expiration of the 180-day deadline.   In Curley, if the cases had not been nol
prossed on the 180th day, it necessarily would have been dismissed for a
violation of § 591 and Rule 746.   This is not the situation in the present cases.
 The effect of the nol pros in the present cases was not necessarily to evade the
requirements or sanction of § 591 and Rule 746.”
Id. at 467, 474 A. 2d at 511.
State  v. Brown, supra, is to similar effect.   The charges in that case were nolle prossed
forty-three days before the assigned trial date because, as in the case sub judice, the requested
DNA tests had not been completed, and charges were re-instituted via indictment filed three
months later.  Brown, 341 Md. at 612, 672 A. 2d at 604.     The State did not seek a
9To be sure, the defendant suggested that the State should have sought a
postponement rather than nolle pros the charges and, in fact, faulted the State for not
having done so.   The Court rejected the finding of fault concluding:
“[T]he decision whether to enter a nol pros or to seek a postponement
because of the delay in the DNA testing is for the prosecuting attorney and
not for an appellate court.  Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 35, 553 A.2d 233,
238 (1989) ( “‘The entry of a nolle prosequi is generally within the sole
discretion of the prosecuting attorney, free from judicial control,’”quoting
Ward v. State, 290 Md. 76, 83, 427 A.2d 1008, 1012 (1981)).   The State's
Attorney's office may have decided that if the DNA test results were
favorable to the defendant, the charges would not be refiled, and thus the
nol pros on October 5, 1993, would have ended the matter.   Whatever the
reason, however, the decision to enter a nol pros or to seek a postponement
was within the prosecuting attorney's discretion.”
Id. at 620-621, 672 A. 2d at 608.
11
postponement of the trial before entering the nolle pros and the defendant, conceding the
necessity of the test results and that a postponement most probably would have been granted,
had one been requested, argued only the nolle pros’s effect on the requirements of the statute
and the rule, and the Court confined its decision to that issue.9    Denying the defendant’s
motion to dismiss for violation of § 591 and Rule 4-271, after reviewing Curley and Glenn,
the Court concluded:
“a nol pros will have the ‘necessary effect’ of an attempt to evade the
requirements of § 591 and Rule 4-271 only when the alternative to the nol pros
would have been a dismissal with prejudice for noncompliance with § 591 and
Rule 4-271.” 
341 Md. at 619, 672 A. 2d at 607, citing State  v. Phillips, 299 Md. 468, 474 A.2d 512 (1984);
State v. Henson, 335 Md. 326, 335-336, 643 A.2d 432, 437 (1994).  Applying that rule, it
explained:
12
“It is obvious that the nol pros in the case at bar did not have the necessary
effect of an attempt to circumvent the requirements of § 591 and Rule 4-271.
 If the case had not been nol prossed on October 5, 1993, there would have been
43 days before the expiration of the 180-day period. In this respect, the case is
very much like the Glenn case. During this 43-day period, the State's Attorney's
office may have been able to expedite the DNA testing and obtain the results
so that trial of the case could have begun before the deadline.   Alternatively,
the State's Attorney's office may have obtained from the administrative judge,
in accordance with § 591 and Rule 4-271, a good cause postponement of the
trial to a date beyond the 180-day period. There was clearly a basis for such
postponement.”
Id. at 620, 672 A. 2d at 607-608.  
The “necessary effect” of the nolle pros is only one of the inquiries that informs the
decision whether, in a specific situation, the general rule that the 180 day period runs from the
date of the arraignment under the new indictment, should be applied, rather than the exception
recognized in our cases.   That exception, as articulated in Curley and reiterated in later cases,
see Glenn, 299 Md. at 466, 474 A. 2d at 511; Brown, 341 Md. at 614, 672 A. 2d at 604-605;
Henson, 335 Md. at 335 n.4, 643 A. 2d at 436 n. 4, has two components: the nolle pros’
purpose and the nolle pros’ effect.   See Baker v. State, 130 Md. App. 281, 289, 745 A. 2d
1142, 1146 (2000), in which the intermediate appellate court, stating the analytical framework
for re-indicted cases, recognized, as well as articulated, that the Curley exception was “a two
pronged” one.  This Court has not had the occasion to address, directly or extensively, the
former component.   The Court of Special Appeals has, however.   See State v. Akopian, 155
Md. App. 123,  841 A.2d 893 (2004); Ross v. State, 117 Md. App. 357,  700 A.2d 282 (1997).
In Akopian, faced with the prospect of proceeding to trial without its witness, a police
10As to the latter, the Court of Special Appeals observed:
“The State was willing to commence the trial on October 22, by litigating
pending motions and, thereafter, participating in jury selection. Appellee's
unexpected waiver of his right to trial by jury, and election of a bench trial,
effectively pulled the rug out from under the State.  Faced with the
unavailability of necessary police witnesses, and rather than go forward and
not be able to prove its case, the State chose to nolle prosequi and
re-indict.”
State v. Akopian, 155 Md. App. 123, 143, 841 A. 2d 893, 904 (2004).  
11The Court of Special Appeals enumerated, in detail, the numerous attempts the
State made to expedite the trial date to avoid a Hicks problem, and, by contrast,  the
factual basis for its conclusion that “the State was vigorous in its effort to advance the
trial date to fit within the original 180 day calendar.”
12As reported by the intermediate appellate, “appellee continued to appear without
counsel and continually refused the services of the public defender, despite the efforts of
the administrative judge to counsel him on the importance of being represented.  Having
exhausted its efforts to have appellee obtain counsel, the court finally set the case for
trial.”
13
officer on assignment in connection with the Washington/Virginia snipers, when the
administrative judge denied its request for a continuance and the defendant waived his jury
trial prayer and discovery motion,10 the State nolle prossed the charges against the defendant.
It re-indicted the defendant within two days and, thereafter, consistently sought to have the
case set in for trial within the 180 day period measured from initial appearance/arraignment
in the first indictment.11   Despite the defendant’s persistent appearance without counsel and
the administrative judge’s reluctance to set a trial date when the defendant was
unrepresented,12 the State succeeded in having the trial date set within 180 days of the initial
appearance, only to have the case not go forward on that date due to inclement weather.  
Although impressed by the State’s efforts to meet the Hicks deadline and sympathetic to the
13By this statement, we believe the court was holding that the “necessary effect” of
the nolle pros was not to circumvent the statute and the rule.
14
State’s position, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.  It reasoned:
“But the position I have taken with respect to these motions and this rule is that
there are two parts to that rule ... discussed in Hicks. 
“One is that trial has ... to be tried ... within 180 days.  The other part to the rule
... is that it may not be continued unless for good cause shown by the
administrative judge.   And the cases that have dealt with this issue on appeal
have discussed the importance of allowing the administrative judge to manage
this docket so that all cases can be handled in an efficient manner. 
“So ... it is not just the 180-day clause within the rule, but ... that the case
cannot be continued unless for good cause shown and found by the
administrative judge.  In this case, clearly the State entered the nol-pros to avoid
the order of the administrative judge which is that the case not be continued, no
good cause having been shown.  I will say that the State, through the
extraordinary efforts of [the State's Attorney], has managed in my view to
satisfy the 180-day prong of that rule [13] by managing to get the case set back
in on the re-indictment by December 11th, which makes this case different from
any case that is cited on appeal. 
“That notwithstanding, I think when you read those cases, they stand for the
proposition that ... notwithstanding that you were able to get it set back in, that
still the net effect of this was that you overruled the determination of the
administrative judge that there was no good cause for continuing the
prosecution of this matter. ”
Akopian, 155 Md. App. at 137, 841 A. 2d at 901.
  The Court of Special Appeals reversed.  Having concluded that “the State's action,
in and of itself, did not have the necessary effect of circumventing the 180-day rule,” there
being more than fifty days remaining in the original Hicks  period when the nolle pros was
entered, the intermediate appellate court turned to the purpose for entering the nolle pros.  As
15
to that prong, it discerned no facts from the record indicating “that the State's use of a nolle
prosequi had either the necessary effect or the purpose of circumventing the 180-day rule” and
it so held.  To the intermediate appellate court:  
“It [was] abundantly clear from the record that the State made extraordinary
effort to obtain a trial date well within the outside limit of the original 180-day
calendar.  In every instance the State's effort was thwarted by appellee's
appearance without counsel and, what we conclude to be, his refusal to be
represented.  It is true that the savvy defendant can manipulate the system to
obtain delays, and the facts before us lead to the inescapable conclusion that
appellee's goal was to delay trial to the point of a Hicks violation, despite the
State's best efforts to avoid that result.  The State should not suffer the
detriment of his manipulation.”
Akopian, 155 Md. App. at 143, 841 A. 2d at 904-905 (footnote omitted).
One of the cases to which the Akopian court referred, and whose holding it analyzed,
was Ross, supra.   In that case, on the scheduled trial date, the State nolle prossed drug
charges against the defendant immediately after its request for continuance,  made because
the drugs had not been analyzed, had been denied by the county administrative judge.  In
denying the motion, that judge expressly refused to find good cause to continue the case and
commented, “I don't think this case can be put back in. Our docket is too crowded.” 117 Md.
App. at 361, 700 A. 2d at 284.  The defendant was re-indicted eight days later and
subsequently tried within the 180 day period applicable to that indictment, but more than the
180 days applicable to the nolle prossed indictment.  Id.
Reversing the denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss for violation of the Hicks
Rule and statute, the Court of Special Appeals held “that the State entered the nol pros to
14We described that role, and its importance, as follows:
“The major safeguard contemplated by the statute and rule, for assuring that
criminal trials are not needlessly postponed beyond the 180-day period, is
the requirement that the administrative judge or his designee, rather than
any judge, order the postponement.   This is a logical safeguard, as it is the
administrative judge who has an overall view of the court's business, who is
responsible ‘for the administration of the court,’ who assigns trial judges,
who ‘supervise[s] the assignment of actions for trial,’ who supervises the
court personnel involved in the assignment of cases, and who receives
reports from such personnel. 
“Consequently, the administrative judge is ordinarily in a much better
position than another judge of the trial court, or an appellate court, to make
the judgment as to whether good cause for the postponement of a criminal
case exists.   Moreover, with regard to the extent of a postponement, even
though the administrative judge may not personally select or approve the
new trial date in a postponed case, such selection is made by personnel
operating under his supervision and reporting to him.   When he postpones a
case, he is generally aware of the state of the docket in the future, the
number of cases set for trial, and the normal time it will likely take before
the case can be tried.”
State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422,  453-54, 470 A.2d 1269, 1285-1286 (1984).
16
circumvent the 180-day limit.”  Id. at 370, 700 A. 2d at 289.     In support of that holding, the
court emphasized the requirement of the statute and the rule that a defendant be brought to
trial not later than 180 days of arraignment or first of appearance of counsel, that those
requirements are mandatory, dismissal being the sanction for violation, and the role of the
county administrative judge in overseeing compliance with those requirements.14  Id. at 363-
64, 700 A. 2d at 285-86.  As to the latter, more specifically, the court found significant that
the county administrative judge’s discretion to determine whether good cause exists to extend
the trial date “carries a heavy presumption of validity” and is “rarely subject to reversal upon
17
review.” Id. at 364-65, 700 A. 2d at 286, quoting Dalton v. State, 87 Md. App. 673, 682, 591
A.2d 531, cert. denied, 325 Md. 16, 599 A.2d 89 (1991) and State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422,
451, 470 A.2d 1269, 1284 (1984) (footnote omitted). 
The  Court of Special Appeals rejected the State’s argument, which, relying on  Brown,
341 Md. 609, 672 A.2d 602, and Glenn, 299 Md. 464, 474 A. 2d 509, stressed that there were
eighty-eight days left to run in the 180 day time period when the nolle pros was entered,
concluding that the nolle pros did not have the “necessary effect” of circumventing the 180
day period:
“In Brown, however, there was no ruling from the administrative judge.
Moreover, both parties had agreed that, if requested, a postponement for good
cause would have been granted, and that there was a possibility that the case
could have been brought to trial within the remaining forty-three days of the
180-day time period.   We also note that there was no decision from the
administrative judge in Curley and Glenn.   In the present case, however, a
postponement was requested and denied and, as found by the administrative
judge, the case could not be set in before the tolling of the 180-day limit. We
again stress that in light of the administrative judge's supervision of the docket,
we are unable to ignore his statement that the case could not be heard before
expiration of the 180-day time period.   In addition, immediately following the
judge's ruling, the State entered a nol pros in the case.   We can discern no
clearer attempt to circumvent the time period dictated by Art. 27, § 591 and
Rule 4-271.”
Ross, 155 Md. App. at 370, 700 A. 2d at 289.
We agree with the court’s result and its analysis. Just as the test for determining the
applicable 180 day period when there has been a nolle pros of one indictment and a re-
indictment containing the same charges is two pronged, the statute and the rule, as the Court
of Special Appeals and the Circuit Court recognized, have two aspects.   Section 6-103 and
18
Rule 4-271 “set forth [both] a definite time requirement for the trial of criminal cases and an
explicit procedure for postponing a case beyond the 180-day limit.”   Goldring and Lyles v.
State, 358 Md. 490, 493, 750 A. 2d 1, 2 (2000), quoting Dorsey v. State, 349 Md. 688, 701,
709 A. 2d 1244, 1249 (1998) (some citations omitted).   They “codify and implement the chief
legislative objective that ‘there should be a prompt disposition of criminal charges in the
circuit courts.’” Dorsey, 349 Md. 688, 700, 709 A.2d 1244, 1249 (1998), quoting State v.
Hicks, 285 Md. at 334, 403 A.2d at 369.   Their intended objectives, implemented via the
mechanism established by the statute and the rule, are to afford reasonably prompt trials, and
eliminate excessive scheduling delays and unjustifiable postponements. Hicks, 285 Md. at
316, 403 A.2d at 359;  Dorsey, 349 Md. at 701, 709 A. 2d at 1250; Farinholt v. State, 299 Md.
32, 41, 472 A. 2d 452, 456 (1984).  Thus, “the mechanism of the Hicks Rule serves as a
means of protecting society’s interest in the efficient administration of justice. The actual or
apparent benefits of § [6-103] and Rule 4-271 confer upon criminal defendants are purely
incidental. See Calhoun v. State, 299 Md. 1, 11-12, 472 A.2d 436 (1984); Curley v. State, 299
Md. 449, 460, 474 A.2d 502 (1984);  Frazier, 298 Md. at 456, 470 A.2d at 1286-87; Marks
v. State, 84 Md. App. 269, 277, 578 A.2d 828, 832 (1990).” Dorsey, 349 Md. at 701, 709
A.2d at 1250.
In the case sub judice, the State sought and was refused a continuance, the
administrative judge expressly finding no good cause for one.  The effect of that ruling was
to mandate that trial proceed, as scheduled.  The consequence of the State not going forward
15The Court of Special Appeals, in a footnote, opined, without citation of authority,
that: 
“The State is not precluded from prosecuting appellant after reindicting
him, in the case at hand, simply because it attempted to circumvent the
ruling of the trial judge that good cause did not exist to grant a continuance. 
Had the State exercised due diligence to reschedule the trial date within the
ninety-seven days remaining in the original 180-day period or had appellant
prevented the case from going to trial before the expiration of that deadline,
the “necessary effect of the nol pros” would not have been to circumvent
the requirements of § 591 and Maryland Rule 4-271.”  
State v.Price, 152 Md. App. 640, 655 n.3, 833 A. 2d 614, 623 n. 3 (2003).  See State v.
Akopian, 155 Md. App 123, 841 A. 2d 893 (2004).
It is not necessary that we address this issue and we do not, except to note what we
said in Curley v. State, 299 Md. 449, 462, 474 A.2d 502, 508 (1984), offered after
observing  that “no case has been brought to our attention in which a court has clung to
the view that the running of the speedy trial period begins with the second indictment
when confronted with facts indicating that the necessary effect of the earlier nol pros was
to defeat the time limitation imposed by the statute or rule,” “[a]doption of such a view
might open the door to widespread evasion of § 591 and Rule 746.”
19
or not producing evidence was dismissal of the case or an acquittal.   When the State nolle
prossed the case, it was, as the State concedes, to avoid those results.   Thus, the State is
correct, the nolle pros did not have the “necessary effect” of circumventing the 180 day
requirement of the statute and the rule; rather, it was for the purpose of circumventing, and,
indeed, that intention was achieved, the requirement of the statute and the rule that trials
proceed except when there has been a finding of good cause by the administrative judge.15 
 Accordingly, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that “the purpose for entering the
nol pros in the case under consideration was to circumvent the authority and decision of the
20
administrative judge.” State v. Price, 152 Md. App. 640, 654, 833 A. 2d 614, 623 (2003).
This case is stronger than Ross.  In addition to the administrative judge finding no good
cause for continuance and thus requiring the State to proceed to trial, the State was under, and
in violation of, a discovery order requiring it to respond and imposing sanctions for non-
compliance.   The nolle pros also avoided the effect of that order and, so, its “necessary
effect” was to circumvent that order.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.