Case Title: Dice v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 91-43

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Dice v. State1992 WY 13825 P.2d 379Case Number: 91-43Decided: 01/30/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Max DICE, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Natrona County, Harry E. Leimback, J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender and Donald E. Miller, Cheyenne, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Barbara L. Boyer, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program, and 
Stuwert B. Johnson, Student Intern, for appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

URBIGKIT, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Max 
Dice was caught in the act during a nighttime bar burglary and appeals from his 
conviction. Dice contends the trial court erred in denying a requested 
intoxication instruction, in allowing prosecutorial misconduct and in the 
improper introduction of his confession and other evidence.

[¶2]      We find no 
reversible error and affirm the conviction.

I. STATED 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Max Dice, for 
reversal of his burglary conviction, asks:

I.                      
Whether the trial court erred in refusing appellant's requested 
Instruction "A" which set forth in one instruction that the burden of proof was 
upon the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was not 
intoxicated to the extent that he was unable to form the required specific 
intent to be found guilty of burglary.

II.                      
Did the prosecutor's closing comments amount to prosecutorial misconduct 
when the prosecutor erroneously stated the appellant had the burden of proving 
intoxication?

III.                     
Whether it was improper for the trial court to allow into evidence 
irrelevant and prejudicial testimony and evidence regarding appellant's worker's 
compensation claim and his in forma pauperis affidavit.

IV.                    
Should the appellant's initial statements and confession given to police 
officers have been suppressed by the trial court on the grounds that the 
statements were given while under threats and intimidation, that appellant was 
too intoxicated to voluntarily and knowingly waive his Fifth Amendment rights 
and for failure by the police to properly Mirandize appellant?

V.                    
Did the refusal to give appellant's jury Instruction "A", the 
prosecutorial misconduct, the admission of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence 
and the denial of appellant's motions to suppress appellant's statement and his 
confession create cumulative errors which were pr[e]judicial to 
appellant?

[¶4]      The State 
rephrases:

I.                      
Did the district court err in refusing to give appellant's requested jury 
instruction on the intoxicated defense?

II.                      
Was the prosecutor's closing argument erroneous in that it informed the 
jury that the burden to prove the defense of intoxication lay upon the defendant 
or that the state's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt did not apply to 
appellant?

III.                                 
Did the district court err in admitting into evidence appellant's 
affidavit for court-appointed counsel and testimony regarding his employment 
status?

IV.                    
Did the district court err in denying appellant's motion to suppress 
statements he had given to the police?

V.                    
Did the district court commit multiple errors the cumulative effect of 
which requires reversal of appellant's conviction?

II. FACTS

[¶5]      This case 
presents no significant factual conflict except for the theory of defense that 
Dice was too intoxicated to know what he was doing when he entered Fran's 
Starlite Lounge late at night after it was closed and proceeded to gather up the 
cash register money. The money was found by the police in Dice's pockets when he 
was apprehended and arrested inside the building. Dice claimed intoxication 
prevented formation of the specific intent for burglary.1 He did not deny making the entry 
and the attempted taking. The jury returned a guilty verdict resulting in a 
two-and-one-half to three-and-one-half year confinement sentence with credit for 
presentence time in jail.

[¶6]      Shortly after 
3:00 a.m., alert Casper, Wyoming police officer Karen Flint and another officer 
on business building patrol observed a broken and opened barroom building 
window. Officer Flint entered the building and then discovered and apprehended 
Dice. He was found hiding in the rafters above the women's rest room in the back 
of the building. Upon arrest, his pockets contained a key ring holding four cash 
register keys and change from the register consisting of 107 quarters, 219 
dimes, one half-dollar and fifty-eight nickels, a total of $52.05. The cash 
registers were open and empty but for a few pennies.

[¶7]      As Dice was 
placed under arrest, he was asked, without Miranda warning, whether there was 
anyone else in the building. His response creates one of the appellate issues. 
That event, without conflict in the record, is described in the testimony of 
Officer Flint:

Q.        Prior to 
that time [process of handcuffing], had you asked him any questions?

A.        As he was 
being handcuffed, I asked him what his name was.

Q.        Did 
he give you that?

A.        Max 
Dice.

Q.        Did he have 
any hesitancy about that?

A.        
No.

Q.        What else 
did you ask him? 

A.        I asked him 
if there was anyone else in there.

Q.        Why did you 
ask him that?

A.        For officer 
safety, to know whether we needed to look further at that particular point, if 
the other guy was still going to keep going. We still didn't know if he would 
say if there was anyone else in there.

Q.        What did he 
respond to that?

A.        He said no. 
Then he said, "Can I talk to you?"

Q.        Was that in 
response to any question you had asked?

A.        
No.

Q.        After he 
said he wanted to talk to you, did he say anything else?

A.        He told me 
that his friends had forced him to do it, that they had broken the window and 
thrown him inside.

[¶8]      Immediately after 
his arrest, Dice was taken to the police station. After a Miranda warning, Dice 
gave police officers a statement admitting he entered the bar through the broken 
window and removed change from the cash registers. The interrogating officer 
recorded the statement in the officer's handwriting. Dice wrote and signed the 
final paragraph of the statement at 5:05 a.m.:

I MAX DICE HAVE READ THE 
ABOVE STATEMENT CONSISTING OF THIS PAGE AND ONE OTHER, AND IT IS TRUE & 
CORRECT AS WRITTEN.

[Written Signature] Max 
Dice

The State's case 
consisted of a suspect caught in the act at the location, with stolen money in 
his pockets, and the accommodating signed statement.

III. 
DISCUSSION

A. Denied "Theory of the 
Defense" Intoxication Instruction

[¶9]      At the time of 
the burglary, Dice was twenty-years old and, consequently, any drinking he might 
have done was illegal. On the day just prior to these events, he had returned to 
Casper from South Dakota. Dice spent the afternoon and evening in a steady 
course of drinking beer followed with Canadian Lord Calvert or Jack Daniels 
which was mixed with Coke. Generally, the substance of Dice's testimony at trial 
was that he had become too drunk to know what was going on and had no personal 
recollection or knowledge of events during the late evening including the period 
of some substantial time before the breakin occurred.

[¶10]   Dice's proposed Instruction "A," 
which was rejected by the trial court, stated:

YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that 
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not 
intoxicated to the extent that he was unable to form the required specific 
intent to commit the offense of Burglary.

[¶11]   In addition to the general 
presumption of innocence instructions, the trial court also gave instructions 
relating to specific intent and intoxication:

INSTRUCTION NO. 
8

The crime charged in this 
case is a serious crime which requires proof of specific intent before the 
defendant can be convicted. Specific intent, as the term[] implies, means more 
than the general intent to commit the act. To establish specific intent, the 
state must prove that the defendant knowingly did an act which the law forbids, 
specifically intending to violate the law. Such intent may be determined from 
all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.

INSTRUCTION NO. 
9

To constitute the crime 
charged there must be a union of two essential elements - an act forbidden, and 
a specific intent.

Specific intent means 
more than the general intent to commit the act. To prove a crime which involves 
specific intent, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt:

1. That the defendant did 
the act charged; and

2. That he did it with 
the specific intent described in the crime charged. 

The specific intent in 
the crime charged is the specific intent to commit larceny, and that must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt as any other fact in the case.

INSTRUCTION NO. 
10

Voluntary intoxication is 
no excuse for the commission of a crime. However, pertinent portions of the 
Wyoming Statutes provide that "[w]here a crime rests in intention, the 
inebriated condition of the defendant at the time of committing the offense may 
be proved to the jury, as bearing upon the question of intention."

Thus, evidence that a 
defendant acted or failed to act while in a state of intoxication is to be 
considered in determining whether or not the defendant acted, or failed to act, 
with specific intent as charged.

INSTRUCTION NO. 
11

The degree of voluntary 
intoxication necessary to constitute a defense to the charge herein must [be] of 
such a nature as to render the accused incapable of forming the specific intent 
to steal.

INSTRUCTION NO. 
16

YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that 
it is the defendant's theory of the case that he, Max Dice, did not enter or 
remain in Fran's Lounge, Casper, Natrona County Wyoming on August 10, 1990, with 
the intent to commit a larceny. The defendant contends that he was intoxicated 
to such an extent that he could not have formed the specific intent to commit a 
larceny.

[¶12]   We find the instructions which were 
given to be adequate and complete. The theory of defense was carefully described 
and, in addition, no objection was taken by Dice to the text of any of those 
instructions which were given. The proposed Instruction "A" was not actually a 
theory of defense instruction. It presented a substantive legal adaptation as a 
rule to be used to support the theory of defense. The theory of defense was 
specifically and accurately defined by Instruction No. 16 which was given. The 
necessity for another instruction on the same subject could be properly rejected 
as repetitive. Oien v. State, 797 P.2d 544 (Wyo. 1990); Griffin v. State, 749 P.2d 246 (Wyo. 1988). The criteria and requirement for a theory of defense 
instruction addressed in detail in Oien was satisfied completely by the 
instructional process followed here by the trial court. As the Supreme Court in 
Connecticut stated: "`"a request to charge which is relevant to the issues of 
the case and which is an accurate statement of the law must be given. * * * [A] 
refusal to charge in the exact words of a request will not constitute error if 
the requested charge is given in substance."'" State v. Gabriel, 192 Conn. 405, 
473 A.2d 300, 308 (1984) (quoting State v. Cooper, 182 Conn. 207, 211, 438 A.2d 418 (1980)). See also State v. Jennings, 216 Conn. 647, 583 A.2d 915 (1990). We 
find no instructional error.

B.        
Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument Regarding Burden of Proof on 
Intoxication

[¶13]   The substance of the prosecutor's 
contested comments in final argument involved his challenge to the credibility 
and reliability of the testimony presented by both Dice and his associate who 
was "around" during the day-and-night drinking episode and the time subsequent 
to the bar-building entry. The prosecutor referenced one of the trial court's 
instructions that the jury is the judge of the witnesses' credibility and then 
stated:

Perhaps the most 
important part of the Instruction says that in so doing, you may take in to 
consideration all of the facts and circumstances in the case and give such 
weight as you think the same are entitled to in the light of your experience and 
knowledge of human affairs. What that tells you, Ladies and Gentlemen, is to use 
your common sense.

The Defendant has many 
rights in our system. He is entitled to a jury trial. He is entitled to a 
presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt and all those things. 

The State would have you 
give him those things, but one thing that he is not entitled to is an acquittal 
based on the type of testimony that he and Mr. Lemp presented to 
you.

To come before you 
because I am the Defendant, you must believe this stuff and you must find beyond 
a reasonable doubt that I committed the crime. That is one thing he is not 
entitled to.

This argument 
generally contained the "you do not have to believe him" attack on defense 
testimony. The prosecutor addressed an essential thesis of Dice's lack of 
credibility as a testifying witness.

[¶14]   This court addressed the standard 
of review for reversal of a conviction based on contended prosecutorial error 
where no objection was made in Jeschke v. State, 642 P.2d 1298, 1301-02 (Wyo. 
1982):

In presenting a closing 
argument, the prosecutor is entitled to reflect upon the evidence and to draw 
reasonable inferences from that evidence in order to assist the jury in its 
function. * * * The purpose of closing argument is to give both the prosecution 
and defense counsel the opportunity to explain the significance of the evidence 
and how it should be viewed. * * * Finally, we have previously said that the 
scope of permissible argument, as well as the injury caused by misconduct, are 
best determined by the trial judge.

The reviewing 
court's examination must focus on whether there was a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice. Com. v. Haskins, 411 Mass. 120, 578 N.E.2d 788 
(1991).

[¶15]   The trial court must permit counsel 
a wide latitude in the scope of argument to avoid unreasonable restraint in 
commenting on or interpreting the evidence. Herdt v. State, 816 P.2d 1299, 1301 
(Wyo. 1991). The breadth of permissible argument was examined in State v. 
Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 816 P.2d 1002, 1006 (1991):

Counsel for both sides 
traditionally have been afforded considerable latitude in their arguments and 
have the right to discuss fully the evidence and inferences and deductions 
arising therefrom.

It is clear that 
great latitude is allowed counsel in argument of cases, but counsel must keep 
within the evidence, not make statements calculated to inflame prejudice or 
mislead the jury, nor permit or encourage witnesses to make remarks which would 
have a tendency to inflame prejudice or mislead the jury. People v. Wright, 218 
Ill. App.3d 764, 161 Ill.Dec. 444, 578 N.E.2d 1090 (1991).

[¶16]   The first responsibility for the 
deterrence of contended improper conduct by the prosecution belongs to 
appellant's trial counsel. See Barela v. State, 787 P.2d 82 (Wyo. 1990). The 
prompt objection to misconduct allows the trial court to weigh the impact of the 
comments and assess curative measures. These measures occupy a varied range 
including: simply sustaining the objection; sustaining the objection and 
admonishing or instructing the jury to ignore the comments; or, for the most 
flagrant abuse, ordering a mistrial or a directed verdict for the defendant. See 
Noetzelmann v. State, 721 P.2d 579 (Wyo. 1986) and Vess, Walking a Tightrope: A 
Survey of Limitations on the Prosecutor's Closing Argument, 64 J.Crim.L. and 
Criminology 22 (1973). Cf. Adams v. State, 585 So. 2d 1092 (Fla.App. 1991) and 
State v. Bolt, 108 Or. App. 746, 817 P.2d 1322 (1991), where proper objections 
were made.

[¶17]   The trial counsel initiates the 
curative process with the decision to object. J. Stein, Closing Argument § 86 
(1985 & Supp. 1991). However, trial counsel, acting as a zealous advocate 
for his client, may make a tactical decision not to object perhaps from the 
belief that drawing attention to the prosecutor's comments lends credibility or 
perhaps because in trial counsel's estimation, the jury has not been swayed by 
the comment. See State v. Brown, 310 Or. 347, 800 P.2d 259 (1990). The fact that 
such routine strategic decisions are made during the course of a trial supports 
the well-reasoned rule that failure to object is considered a waiver. Bennett v. 
State, 377 P.2d 634 (Wyo. 1963).

[¶18]   In context of the openness 
permitted during closing arguments, the prosecutor's comments in this case, 
although perhaps imprecisely phrased or even confusing when examined out of 
context, were at best questionable error and certainly not plain error. Plain 
error in closing argument must remain hard to find because otherwise the trial 
court becomes charged with an adversary responsibility to control argument even 
when objection is not taken by the opposing attorney. This exchange certainly 
does not fit within the plain error requirement for prosecutorial misconduct in 
closing argument. We find no error in the prosecutor's argument which, in the 
context of plain error, requires our consideration of reversal of the jury 
verdict in this case. Wheeler v. State, 691 P.2d 599, 605 (Wyo. 1984); People v. 
Pecoraro, 144 Ill. 2d 1, 161 Ill.Dec. 296, 578 N.E.2d 942 (1991).

C.        Testimonial 
Error Regarding Worker's Compensation Injury Status

[¶19]   A basic component of the defense 
was the allegation that because of excessive drinking before the burglary, Dice 
did not remember talking to the officer at the jail nor reading and signing any 
statement. Consequently, voluntariness of his signed statement was attacked by 
diligent defense counsel in suppression efforts both before and during trial. 
The trial court's admission of the statement placed at issue Dice's alcohol 
consumption and memory on the date of the burglary as well as his signature 
pattern.

[¶20]   Dice, in his initial testimony, 
stated in answering a question of his counsel that at the time of the arrest he 
was working for a drilling company. Cross-examination pursued his contrary 
status of having received a worker's compensation injury approximately three 
weeks before the burglary, having filed a claim and then never having returned 
to work before the date of this offense. Dice not only denied any knowledge of 
signing the statement, but on cross-examination could not remember being injured 
or previously signing the worker's compensation claim document, which also 
contained his apparent handwriting. Dice did admit he had signed an affidavit to 
request legal services. After careful examination of potential prejudice, the 
trial court admitted the affidavit but not the claim form as a handwriting 
comparator with his writing on the confession statement.

[¶21]   A review of Dice's testimony 
demonstrates his skilled selective recall on the issue of alcohol 
consumption:

Q.        [By 
appellant's counsel on direct examination]: Is there any time during the evening 
at Fran's that you don't remember?

A.        [By 
appellant]: Yes.

Q.        Can 
you describe those circumstances?

A.        I remember 
walking in to the Bar and sitting down and drinking mixed drinks and beer. I 
don't remember nothing [sic] after that. * * *

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

Q.        [By the 
prosecutor on cross examination]: When you were at Fran's, did you remember 
buying any drinks?

A.        [By 
appellant]: No, I don't remember.

Q.        Do you 
remember what you were drinking the whole time you were there?

A.        No I 
don't.

Q.        Do you 
recall any of what you were drinking while you were there?

A.        
No.

*           
*           *           
*           
*           
*

Q.        [By 
appellant's counsel on redirect]: Do you recall what it was you were drinking 
that night [at Fran's]?

A.        [By 
appellant]: Yes.

Q.        What was 
it?

A.        I started 
out with CLC [Canadian Lord Calvert] and Coke and Budweiser.

[¶22]   The extended course of denials in 
Dice's testimony surely tested credibility and we find no decision of the trial 
court which reaches an abuse of discretion. Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802 (Wyo. 
1980). It is an evidentiary rule uniformly applied that admission of evidence 
rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. L.U. Sheep Co. v. Board of 
County Com'rs of County of Hot Springs, 790 P.2d 663 (Wyo. 1990). The course of 
Dice's testimony was consistent but for his denials of clearly determinable 
facts such as his handwriting style. The jury undoubtedly considered these 
denials in the assessment of credibility. Broom v. State, 695 P.2d 640 (Wyo. 
1985). We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in the admission of the 
testimony which related both to credibility and to the style of Dice's 
handwriting as demonstrated by documents which he had signed. Longfellow v. 
State, 803 P.2d 1383 (Wyo. 1991); Ortega v. State, 669 P.2d 935 (Wyo. 
1983).

D. 
Suppression

[¶23]   In actuality, the prior issues are 
precursory because this issue was essentially decisive. Dice's statement 
coincided directly with both undisputed facts and the testimony of the arresting 
officer. It would likely follow that introduction of the statement would be 
determinative for the jury. If the jury found Dice was competent to know what he 
said in the statement when he said it, they would probably also assess that he 
knew what he did a couple of hours earlier in using the rock found in his pocket 
to break the outside window in order to crawl into the bar to rifle through the 
cash registers, as he unquestionably did.2

[¶24]   The first admissibility dispute 
arose after the arresting officer, as a trial witness, repeated Dice's statement 
about his having been pushed into the building. Dice made this statement while 
he was being handcuffed lying face down on the barroom floor. If the 
non-responsive statement was culpable, it was certainly noninterrogative. 
Officer Flint properly asked Dice, for her safety and that of others at the 
scene, if anyone else was in the bar. Such police questioning prompted out of 
concern for officer safety or public safety does not require prior Miranda 
warnings. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550 
(1984). The officer's question was not directed toward obtaining evidence 
against Dice, but instead toward the immediate necessity of determining whether 
someone else was inside the bar presenting a potential threat. United States v. 
Padilla, 819 F.2d 952 (10th Cir. 1987). Dice's subsequent voluntary statement 
was not obtained in violation of Fifth Amendment rights and does not require 
suppression as an illegal fruit of a Miranda violation.

[¶25]   The trial court's consideration of 
suppression of Dice's barroom comment and written statement that followed two 
hours later in the jail provided a factual examination of the evidence of 
voluntariness. That evidence demonstrated realistically that Dice could talk 
logically, could read and write, and what he said made practical sense within 
the totality of all of the facts and circumstances presented. In responding to 
the suppression request at the first suppression hearing, the trial court 
summarized and determined:

THE COURT: Well, I am 
going to deny the Motion to Suppress. I don't find any basis whatsoever to the 
suggestion that the Defendant was so intoxicated he couldn't freely and 
voluntarily respond. To the contrary, I find that the statements attempted to be 
suppressed were voluntary at the outset at the store, were made without inquiry 
at the police station and after full [c]onstitutional warnings were fully 
understood.

The Motion will be 
denied.

[¶26]   Further in camera examination was 
pursued at the commencement of the trial when the trial court again 
ruled:

THE COURT: It is the 
ruling of the Court that the motion to suppress is, in all respects, denied. I 
think and I so find that the Defendant was adequately advised of his 
[c]onstitutional rights and that he knowingly waived those rights.

I further find that the 
statements made to the nurse were made in the Jail and within a reasonable time 
after the cautioning[] by the detective of the Defendant's [c]onstitutional 
rights; that he should have been well aware of, at that time, of the 
consequences of discussing this matter with the nurse.

[¶27]   A further effort was made to 
preclude introduction of the jailhouse statement during trial. The objection was 
again overruled.

[¶28]   Suppression or admission of a 
confession when based on conflicting evidence invokes a burden of the proof of 
voluntariness required of the prosecution and leaves the decision to be made 
factually by the trial court. See Stone v. State, 745 P.2d 1344 (Wyo. 1987), 
which addressed the similar question of the defense of intoxication to render a 
confession involuntary.

[¶29]   A careful and comprehensive 
analysis of the decisional process for admission of a confession found to be 
voluntary was provided by this court in Garcia v. State, 777 P.2d 603, 605-06 
(Wyo. 1989), where we held:

The State always has the 
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was 
voluntary. * * *

*           
*           
*           *           
*           
*

The due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no state shall "deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The purpose of the 
clause is to exclude evidence that has been obtained in violation of the 
Constitution. Therefore, whenever the State obtains a confession it has the 
burden by a preponderance to demonstrate that the statement was not obtained in 
violation of the Miranda doctrine and that the statement was given voluntarily. 
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163, 107 S. Ct. 515 [519], 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 
(1986). A confession is not voluntary if extracted by threats or improper 
influences or promises. * * *

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

* * * [T]his court has 
applied a two-part test to determine if the waiver of the right to remain silent 
was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. First, the relinquishment of 
the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a 
free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. 
Secondly, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the 
nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to 
abandon it. Frias v. State, 722 P.2d [135] at 142 [(Wyo. 1986)]. In determining 
whether the statement made by an accused is voluntary, the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation must be examined. Id.[3]

[¶30]   We find no error in the denial of 
the suppression of either the comment or the statement within the facts and 
circumstances provided by this record. Green v. State, 784 P.2d 1360 (Wyo. 
1989); Stone, 745 P.2d 1344.

E. Cumulative 
Error

[¶31]   This argument is resolved by the 
determination of contentions included in the prior issues presented for appeal. 
There is no cumulative error requiring reversal by this court. Jennings v. 
State, 806 P.2d 1299 (Wyo. 1991); Justice v. State, 775 P.2d 1002 (Wyo. 
1989).

[¶32]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1           
W.S. 6-3-301(a) provides:

A person is guilty of 
burglary if, without authority, he enters or remains in a building, occupied 
structure or vehicle, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with 
intent to commit larceny or a felony therein.

2           
Photographs of the rafter area where Dice was found by the arresting 
officers tend to demonstrate that a considerable degree of agility was required 
to ascend and crawl into the ceiling-height confined location. The jury probably 
considered whether an extremely intoxicated person could ever have been able to 
climb upward and get into that space. Judging from the photograph, most persons 
might have trouble doing so when completely sober.

3           
By coincidence, the trial judge in Dice was also the district judge who 
was assigned to sit with the Wyoming Supreme Court on Garcia, 777 P.2d 603 and, 
as an assigned judge, authored the court's opinion.