Case Title: Ensign v. State

Citation: 235 N.E.2d 162, 250 Ind. 119

Docket Number: 30,892

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1968-04-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
250 Ind. 119 (1968)
235 N.E.2d 162
ENSIGN
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 30,892.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed April 2, 1968.
*120 Palmer K. Ward, of Indianapolis, for appellant.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, Donald R. Ewers, Assistant Attorney General, and James B. Droege, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
JACKSON, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction in the Marion Criminal Court of Marion County, Indiana, Division Two. Appellant was charged by indictment with the crime of involuntary manslaughter, to which he entered a plea of not guilty. Trial by jury resulted in a verdict of guilty of assault and battery. Judgment was entered on the verdict sentencing appellant to the Indiana State Farm for one hundred fifty (150) days.
The indictment, omitting formal parts, reads as follows, to-wit:
On January 30, 1964, a Plea in Abatement was filed by the appellant alleging, inter alia, the indictment was illegal and void by reason of the failure to enter proper orders on the Order Book of the General Term of the Criminal Court of Marion County, Indiana and by reason of failure to comply with certain statutory requirements.
On February 18, 1964, the Prosecuting Attorney for the 19th Judicial Circuit filed answer to the Plea in Abatement in which he denied all material allegations, if any, contained in rhetorical paragraphs numbered 1 through 9, inclusive.
On June 5, 1964, a hearing was held on the Plea in Abatement, evidence was heard and concluded and the court took *122 the matter under advisement. On July 27, 1964, the court overruled the Plea in Abatement.
On October 7, 1964, appellant filed his Motion to Quash Indictment, which, omitting formal parts, reads as follows:
The Motion to Quash the Indictment was overruled by the court on January 11, 1965.
On January 25, 1965, appellant waived arraignment and entered his plea of not guilty.
Trial by jury began on July 6, 1964, and concluded on July 19, 1965, when the jury returned a verdict of guilty of assault and battery and fixed the punishment at imprisonment for one hundred fifty (150) days.
On July 28, 1965, a Motion in Arrest of Judgment was filed, which, omitting formal parts, reads as follows:
The Motion in Arrest of Judgment was overruled by the trial court on the day filed.
On August 5, 1965, the appellant filed his Motion to Modify Judgment, which, omitting formal parts, reads as follows:
*123 On August 10, 1965, the appellant filed his Motion for New Trial, which in pertinent parts reads as follows, to-wit:
Appellant's Assignment of Errors, omitting formal parts, reads as follows, to-wit:
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in overruling his Motion to Quash. He contends that the facts stated in the indictment do not constitute a public offense.
Appellant was charged with the crime of involuntary manslaughter which is defined by Acts 1941, ch. 148, § 2, p. 447, being § 10-3405 Burns' 1956 Repl., as follows:
The indictment against appellant has been previously set forth in this opinion. It is obvious that the allegations contained in the indictment are not based upon the violation of any statute of the State of Indiana. The indictment apparently attempts to charge violation of certain rules and regulations of the Fire Marshal of Indiana. The legislature cannot delegate its express authority defining criminal responsibility to anyone. The only statutes empowering the Fire Marshal to make rules and regulations specifically limits them. This Court has previously held those sections were not designed nor intended to confer law making power upon the Fire Marshal. His authority to make rules and regulations does not include legislative power. Hollywood Theatre Corp. v. City of Indianapolis (1941), 218 Ind. 556, 34 N.E.2d 28; Town of Kirkland v. Everman (1940), 217 Ind. 683, 28 N.E.2d 73, 29 N.E.2d 206.
Appellant's Motion to Quash should have been sustained.
Appellant next argues his assignment of error that the trial court erred in overruling his Motion to Modify Judgment on the theory that the crime of assault and battery is not a lesser included offense in the crime of involuntary manslaughter as charged in the indictment in the case at bar.
The crime of assault and battery is defined by Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 354, p. 584, as amended, being § 10-403 Burns' 1956 Repl., as follows:
We must look to the wording of the indictment to determine whether assault and battery is a lesser offense included therein. Sullivan v. State (1957), 236 Ind. 446, 139 N.E.2d 893.
In the case at bar the indictment for involuntary manslaughter contains no allegations to support or permit a conviction for assault and battery. The indictment fails to allege that appellant did anything in a rude, insolent or angry manner. The indictment fails to allege any of the essential elements of assault and battery; therefore, assault and battery cannot be a lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter as charged in the indictment.
In view of the determination we are compelled to make in this case we deem it unnecessary to discuss other issues raised by the appellant.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded with instructions to grant appellant's Motion for New Trial.
Lewis, C.J. and Hunter and Mote, JJ. concur; Arterburn, J. concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 235 N.E.2d 162.