Case Title: Myers v. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2016AP001517

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2019-01-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
2019 WI 5 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP1517 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Terrie Myers and Philip Myers, 
          Petitioners-Appellants-Cross- 
          Respondents-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 
          Respondent-Respondent-Cross-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 378 Wis. 2d 220, 904 N.W.2d 144  
(2017 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 18, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 25, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Ashland 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert E. Eaton 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
A. W. Bradley, J. dissents (opinion filed).  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
petitioners-appellants-cross-respondents-
petitioners, there were briefs filed and an oral argument by 
Matthew A. Biegert and Doar, Drill & Skow, S.C., New Richmond.  
 
For the respondent-respondent-cross-appellant, there was a 
brief filed and an oral argument by Gabe Johnson-Karp, assistant 
attorney general, with whom on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, 
attorney general. 
 
 
 
2019 WI 5
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    2016AP1517 
(L.C. No. 
2015CV36) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Terrie Myers and Philip Myers, 
 
          Petitioners-Appellants- 
          Cross-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent- 
          Cross-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
JAN 18, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.    Philip and Terrie Myers 
seek review of an unpublished per curiam decision of the court 
of appeals1 affirming in part and reversing in part the circuit 
court.2  The Myers seek review of the Wisconsin Department of 
Natural Resources' (DNR) unilateral amendment to their pier 
permit.   
                                                 
1 Myers v. DNR, No. 2016AP1517, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2017). 
2 The Honorable Robert E. Eaton of Ashland County Circuit 
Court presided.   
No. 
2016AP1517   
 
2 
 
¶2 
In 2001, the Myers were granted a permit by the DNR 
and built a pier at their waterfront property on Lake Superior.  
In 2012 and 2013, the DNR received complaints from a neighboring 
property owner about the Myers' pier.  The DNR conducted an 
investigation and requested that the Myers substantially modify 
their pier.  The Myers declined to make the DNR's proposed 
changes.  The DNR then issued a "Notice of Pending Amendment," 
held a public informational hearing, and ultimately issued a 
formal permit amendment requiring the Myers to significantly 
change their pier in one of two ways.   
¶3 
The Myers declined to comply with the DNR's permit 
amendment and instead filed a petition for Wis. Stat. ch. 227 
(2015-16)3 judicial review in the Ashland County Circuit Court.  
The circuit court denied the Myers' petition, finding that the 
DNR had the authority to issue an amendment to the Myers' pier 
permit.  The circuit court then remanded the case to the DNR, 
finding 
that 
more 
fact-finding 
was 
needed 
as 
to 
the 
applicability of several statutory exemptions which could bar 
the DNR's action.  Both parties appealed the circuit court's 
decision.   
¶4 
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
conclusion that the DNR had the authority to issue the Myers' 
permit amendment.  The court of appeals reversed the circuit 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP1517   
 
3 
 
court as to the statutory exemptions, concluding as a matter of 
law that the statutory exemptions did not apply.   
¶5 
On petition to this court, the Myers seek review of 
three issues:  (1) whether the DNR had the authority to amend 
their 
permit; 
(2) 
whether 
two 
exemptions 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 30.12(1k) barred the DNR's actions; and (3) whether the court 
of appeals could rely on "implicit findings" made by the DNR at 
a public informational hearing to conclude that the statutory 
exemptions in § 30.12(1k) did not apply to the Myers' pier.   
¶6 
We conclude that the DNR did not have the authority to 
unilaterally amend the Myers' permit.  We therefore reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals.  Because the DNR did not have 
the authority to amend the Myers' permit, we need not reach the 
issues related to the application of the statutory exemptions 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 30.12(1k).   
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶7 
The Myers own waterfront property on Madeline Island 
on Lake Superior.  In December 1999, the Myers filed an 
application, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 30.12, to construct a 
rock-filled pier next to the remnants of a dock that had been 
built on their property in the 1930s.  The DNR received several 
objections to the Myers' application.  The objectors were 
concerned that the proposed pier would result in beach erosion 
and other shoreline changes related to "littoral drift," the 
process of moving sediment along the shore.   
¶8 
In June 2001, the DNR held a contested hearing on the 
Myers' permit application.  On July 23, 2001, an administrative 
No. 
2016AP1517   
 
4 
 
law judge (ALJ) granted the Myers "a permit under Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.12 for the construction of a structure."  The permit 
granted the Myers permission to construct a pier consisting of 
"rock-filled cribs 10 feet in width extending 70 feet waterward 
from an existing 16-foot crib."  The pier design also included a 
14-foot L-extension with a 12-foot "flow-through opening" that 
would allow water and sediment to flow underneath and through 
the structure.  The ALJ concluded that it was "unlikely that 
there [would] be detrimental impacts relating to shoreline 
alterations."  However, the ALJ found that it was not always 
possible to predict the impact of a particular structure so he 
included the following language in the Myers' permit:  "[t]he 
authority herein granted can be amended or rescinded if the 
structure becomes a material obstruction to navigation or 
becomes detrimental to the public interest" ("Condition 1").  
The ALJ explained that Condition 1 would be "protective of 
unexpected impacts on neighboring properties relating to sand 
accumulation or beach starvation."   
¶9 
The Myers completed construction of their pier in 
October 2001 in accordance with the specifications set forth in 
the permit.  In 2012 and 2013, the DNR received complaints from 
a neighboring riparian property owner who alleged that there was 
No. 
2016AP1517   
 
5 
 
shoreline erosion and a loss of riparian property4 due to the 
Myers' pier.   
¶10 As a result of these complaints, the DNR conducted an 
investigation and consulted with a coastal engineer, Gene Clark.  
Clark visited the Myers' property and wrote a report, detailing 
his opinion as to the effects of the Myers' pier.  Clark 
ultimately concluded that because of "complexity of the mix of 
older and newer structures," as well as the fact that some 
littoral material "existed with just the older structures in 
place several decades ago," it was "extremely difficult to 
estimate how much if any additional littoral material trapping 
is occurring due only to the [Myers'] newer pier structures."  
The DNR sent the Myers a letter in July 2013, informing them 
that their pier was not in compliance with the 2001 permit.  The 
DNR informed the Myers that the flow-through opening was not 
functioning as intended.  Further, the DNR required the Myers to 
remove the two 24-foot cribs and replace the "bridge" between 
the crib and the L with a different system that allowed for the 
free movement of water and sediment.  The Myers declined to 
institute the DNR's proposed changes.5   
                                                 
4 Riparian rights are "special rights to make use of water 
in a waterway adjoining [an] owner's property."  Movrich v. 
Lobermeier, 2018 WI 9, ¶22, 379 Wis. 2d 269, 905 N.W.2d 807 
(citation omitted). 
5 Shortly thereafter, the Myers filed a petition for 
administrative review of the DNR's July 2013 letter.  However, 
the DNR denied the request for review on the ground that no 
final agency action had taken place. 
No. 
2016AP1517   
 
6 
 
¶11 In November 2013, the DNR issued a Class I "Notice of 
Pending Amendment" indicating that it proposed to amend the 
Myers' 2001 permit to require expansion of the flow-through 
opening from 12 to 60 feet.  The notice requested public comment 
on the proposed amendment.  On January 7, 2014, the DNR held a 
public informational hearing on the amendment.  An engineer 
testified in support of the Myers at the public informational 
hearing, asserting that the amendment was not supported by the 
site observations or any relevant technical evaluation.    
¶12 On April 21, 2015, 14 years after the original permit 
was issued, and 15 months after the public hearing, the DNR 
issued an amendment which required the Myers to modify their 
pier in one of two ways.  The DNR gave the Myers the following 
options:  (1) remove two waterward cribs on the main stem of the 
pier to expand the flow-through opening from 12 to 60 feet; or 
(2) provide the DNR with certified engineering plans that depict 
an alternative opening to allow for the free movement of water 
and sediment.  The DNR asserted that it had authority under Wis. 
Stat. § 30.12(3m) to issue this permit amendment.  The DNR gave 
the Myers 30 days to decide on a modification option and 18 
months to complete that modification.   
No. 
2016AP1517   
 
7 
 
¶13 The Myers filed a petition for Wis. Stat. ch. 227 
judicial review in the Ashland County Circuit Court.6  In that 
action, the Myers asserted that:  (1) the DNR lacked authority 
to apply for and grant itself an amendment; (2) their pier was 
exempt 
from 
permit 
requirements, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 30.12(1k)(b); (3) their pier was exempt from enforcement 
actions, pursuant to § 30.12(1k)(cm); and (4) the evidence did 
not support the DNR's decision to amend their permit.   
¶14 The circuit court rejected the Myers' claim that the 
DNR lacked the authority to amend their 2001 permit.  However, 
the circuit court remanded the case to the DNR for additional 
factual development as to whether the exemptions in Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.12(1k) applied to the Myers' pier.  The Myers appealed the 
circuit court's decision.  The DNR cross-appealed the circuit 
court's decision to remand for additional fact-finding.   
¶15 The court of appeals issued a decision affirming in 
part and reversing in part the circuit court.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the circuit court's holding that the DNR had 
the authority to amend the permit and reversed the circuit 
court's remand for additional fact-finding.  The court of 
appeals concluded as a matter of law that neither of the 
                                                 
6 Following the DNR's issuance of the permit amendment, the 
Myers filed a request for a contested case hearing.  After the 
DNR granted the request, the Myers waived that hearing and 
pursued judicial review.  The parties entered into a stipulation 
that the DNR would not raise the exhaustion doctrine as a 
defense to the Myers' petition.   
No. 
2016AP1517   
 
8 
 
exemptions applied because of "implicit findings" made by the 
DNR at the public informational hearing.   
¶16 The Myers raise three issues on appeal to this court:  
(1) whether the DNR had authority to amend their permit; (2) 
whether two exemptions in Wis. Stat. § 30.12(1k) barred the 
DNR's actions; and (3) whether the court of appeals could rely 
on "implicit findings" made by the DNR at a public informational 
hearing to conclude that the statutory exemptions in § 30.12(1k) 
did not apply to the Myers' pier.   
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶17 On a Wis. Stat. ch. 227 appeal we review the decision 
of the agency, not the circuit court.  Hilton ex rel. Pages 
Homeowners' Ass'n v. DNR, 2006 WI 84, ¶15, 293 Wis. 2d 1, 717 
N.W.2d 166.  We have ended our practice of deferring to 
administrative agencies' conclusions of law.  Tetra Tech EC, 
Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, ¶3, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21.  
Instead, we give "due weight" to the experience, technical 
competence, and specialized knowledge of an administrative 
agency 
in 
evaluating 
the 
persuasiveness 
of 
the 
agency's 
argument.  Id.  When a determination of the scope of an agency's 
power is central to resolution of the controversy, as in this 
case, we independently decide the extent of the agency-authority 
that the statute provides.  See Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. 
DNR, 2013 WI 74, ¶¶61-62, 350 Wis. 2d 45, 833 N.W.2d 800.   
¶18 This case involves interpretation of Wis. Stat. ch. 
30, which regulates navigable waters.  Statutory interpretation 
is a question of law that this court reviews de novo.  Noffke ex 
No. 
2016AP1517   
 
9 
 
rel. Swenson v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, ¶9, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 
N.W.2d 156.  The purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
"determine what the statute means so that it may be given its 
full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the 
statute.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  Statutory language is 
"given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning," unless there 
are technical or specially-defined words or phrases.  Id., ¶45.  
If the statutory language yields a "plain, clear statutory 
meaning, then there is no ambiguity," and there is no need to 
consult extrinsic sources of interpretation.  Id., ¶46.   
III.  ANALYSIS  
¶19 This dispute centers around whether the DNR had 
authority to unilaterally amend the Myers' permit 14 years after 
their pier was placed.  Although not explicitly argued by the 
DNR, the court of appeals held that the DNR had the authority to 
amend the Myers' permit by reserving to itself that authority in 
Condition 1.  Before this court, the DNR cites to two statutory 
authorizations of power in support of its ability to amend the 
Myers' permit:  Wis. Stat. § 30.12(3m)(d)2. and Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.2095(2).  The DNR asserts that § 30.12(3m)(d)2. statutorily 
authorizes the placement of Condition 1 in the Myers' permit.  
Alternatively, the DNR argues that even absent Condition 1, 
§ 30.2095(2) provides it with the authority to modify or rescind 
the permit for "good cause" because the Myers' permit never 
expired.  We address each argument in turn.   
No. 
2016AP1517   
 
10 
 
A.  Reservation of Authority 
¶20 We first address the court of appeals' holding that 
the DNR could, absent statutory authorization, reserve to itself 
the authority to amend the Myers' permit in Condition 1.  See 
Myers v. DNR, No. 2016AP1517, unpublished slip op., ¶14 (Wis. 
Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2017).  Condition 1 reads "[t]he authority 
herein granted can be amended or rescinded if the structure 
becomes 
a 
material 
obstruction 
to 
navigation 
or 
becomes 
detrimental to the public interest."  The court of appeals 
looked to the language of Condition 1 and held that no other 
explicit grant of authority was necessary.  See Myers, No. 
2016AP1517, ¶14 & n.2.  The court of appeals also placed an 
additional burden on the Myers to cite to law indicating that 
the DNR was unable to reserve to itself such authority.  See 
Myers, No. 2016AP1517, ¶14 & n.2.  The court of appeals further 
determined that the Myers "agreed to the condition allowing 
amendment by accepting the permit."7  See Myers, No. 2016AP1517, 
¶14.   
¶21 We conclude that the court of appeals erred in holding 
that Condition 1 in and of itself provided the DNR the authority 
to amend the Myers' permit.  It is important to remember that 
administrative agencies are creatures of the legislature.  An 
administrative agency has only those powers expressly conferred 
                                                 
7 As the ALJ noted, this type of condition was "standard for 
solid dock structures on Lake Superior."  There is no support 
for the premise that by accepting the permit the Myers waived 
their right to challenge future DNR actions.   
No. 
2016AP1517   
 
11 
 
or necessarily implied by the statutory provisions under which 
it operates.  See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of 
Wis., 110 Wis. 2d 455, 461-62, 329 N.W.2d 143 (1983); Brown Cty. 
v. DHSS, 103 Wis. 2d 37, 43, 307 N.W.2d 247 (1981); American 
Brass Co. v. Wisconsin State Bd. Of Health, 245 Wis. 440, 448, 
15 N.W.2d 27 (1944).  We resolve any reasonable doubt pertaining 
to an agency's implied powers against the agency.  See Kimberly-
Clark Corp., 110 Wis. 2d at 462.  We conclude that absent 
statutory authorization, Condition 1 in and of itself cannot 
provide the DNR the authority to amend the Myers' permit.  We 
next turn to whether the DNR had statutory authorization to 
amend the Myers' permit.   
B.  Wisconsin Stat. § 30.12(3m)(d)2. 
¶22 The DNR argues that it had statutory authority 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 30.12(3m)(d)2. to insert Condition 1 
in the Myers' 2001 permit because that condition implemented 
the criteria under § 30.12(3m)(c)1.-3.  Section 30.12(3m)(d)2. 
allows the DNR to "promulgate rules that limit the issuance of 
individual permits for solid piers."8  The statute further 
explains that these rules "may establish reasonable conditions 
to implement the criteria under par. (c)1. to 3."  Section 
30.12(3m)(c) reads: 
(c)  The department shall issue an individual permit 
to a riparian owner for a structure . . . if the 
                                                 
8 The rules promulgated by the DNR for pier-permitting 
standards are found in Wis. Admin. Code § NR 326 (Apr. 2005). 
No. 
2016AP1517   
 
12 
 
department 
finds 
that 
all 
of 
the 
following 
requirements are met: 
1.  The structure or deposit will not materially 
obstruct navigation. 
2.  The 
structure 
or 
deposit 
will 
not 
be 
detrimental to the public interest. 
3.  The structure or deposit will not materially 
reduce the flood flow capacity of a stream. 
¶23 The 
DNR 
likens 
Condition 
1 
to 
a 
"reasonable 
condition[] to implement the criteria under par. (c)1. to 3.," 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 30.12(3m)(d)2.  The DNR reads the 
language of § 30.12(3m)(c) as imposing a requirement that a 
permit continuously satisfy the criteria in paragraphs 1. 
through 3.  Therefore, according to the DNR, when, if at all, a 
permit fails to satisfy all three criteria in § 30.12(3m)(c)1.-
3., the DNR may amend or rescind the permit pursuant to 
Condition 1.   
¶24 There is no support in the plain language of Wis. 
Stat. ch. 30 for the DNR's claim that a pier permit carries with 
it an ongoing requirement to satisfy the criteria in Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.12(3m)(c)1.-3.9 
 
The 
language 
of 
§ 30.12(3m)(c)1.-3. 
explicitly uses the past tense "met" when it lists the 
requirements for granting a permit, thus signifying that the 
                                                 
9 We decline to address legislative history or alleged 
legislative intent because the statute is unambiguous.  If 
statutory language yields a "plain, clear statutory meaning, 
then there is no ambiguity," and there is no need to consult 
extrinsic sources of interpretation.  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.   
No. 
2016AP1517   
 
13 
 
conditions must be fulfilled before the permit is granted.  
Courts must avoid interpretations that require inserting words 
into statutes.  See Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 
2009 WI 27, ¶14, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652; C. Coakley 
Relocation Sys., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2008 WI 68, ¶24, 310 
Wis. 2d 456, 750 N.W.2d 900.  There is no language in ch. 30 
that requires a permit to continuously satisfy the criteria in 
§ 30.12(3m)(c)1.-3. and we will not read such language into the 
statute.   
¶25 The DNR also argues that "the entire tenor" and 
"spirit" of Wis. Stat. ch. 30 suggests that a permit includes a 
requirement to continuously satisfy the criteria in Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.12(3m)(c)1.-3.  When pressed at oral argument, the DNR 
cited to several sections of ch. 30 that allegedly illustrate 
the legislature's intent that permits continue to govern piers 
indefinitely.  This brings us to the question of whether a 
permit issued under § 30.12 is akin to a building permit or is a 
permit governing possession.  This question is intertwined with 
the DNR's alleged second statutory authorization of power, Wis. 
Stat. § 30.2095.   
C.  Wisconsin Stat. § 30.2095 
¶26 Apart from the alleged authorization given to the DNR 
in Wis. Stat. § 30.12(3m)(d)2., the DNR relies on Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.2095(2) as a separate avenue of independent authority to 
amend the Myers' permit.  Section 30.2095(2) reads:  "[f]or good 
cause, the department may modify or rescind any permit or 
contract issue under ss. 30.01 to 30.29 before its expiration."  
No. 
2016AP1517   
 
14 
 
The DNR's argument rests on the premise that because the Myers' 
pier was completed within three years, the Myers' permit never 
expired.  Therefore, the DNR could modify or rescind the Myers' 
permit at any time pursuant to § 30.2095(2) for "good cause."  
We must first address the parties' dispute as to whether the 
permit was akin to a building permit or is a permit governing 
possession, and, accordingly when, if at all, the Myers' permit 
expired.   
¶27 The Myers contend that their permit was akin to a 
building permit and that, according to its terms, it expired on 
July 23, 2004, three years after its issuance.  The DNR asserts, 
and the court of appeals agreed, that because the pier was 
completed within the time limit set forth in the permit, the 
Myers' permit did not expire.  As additional support for its 
position, the DNR asserts that a permit controls ongoing 
maintenance and use of a pier, even after its placement.10   
¶28 We agree with the Myers' interpretation and conclude 
that, based upon a plain reading of the language of Wis. Stat. 
ch. 30, a permit issued under Wis. Stat. § 30.12 is akin to a 
building permit.   
¶29 The Myers were granted "a permit under Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.12 for the construction of a structure" that expired "three 
years from the date of [July 23, 2001], if the structure is not 
                                                 
10 However, the DNR conceded at oral argument that there is 
no statutory language that indicates that a pier permit is a 
"possession permit."   
No. 
2016AP1517   
 
15 
 
completed before then."  This language comports with the 
language set forth in Wis. Stat. § 30.2095(1)(a) which provides, 
in pertinent part, that a permit "issued under ss. 30.01 to 
30.29 . . . is void unless the activity or project is completed 
within 3 years after the permit or contract was issued."  
Section 30.2095(1)(b) allows for an extension of the permit for 
"no longer than an additional 5 years if the grantee requests an 
extension prior to expiration of the initial time limit."   
¶30 "[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in 
which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in 
relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related 
statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  By employing the phrase 
"unless the activity or project is completed" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.2095(1)(a) as a reference point for when the permit becomes 
void, the legislature expressed its intent that the permit be 
for the completion of the activity or project for which the 
permit was granted, i.e., the placement of a pier.  When 
§ 30.2095(1) is read in conjunction with § 30.2095(2), it is 
clear that the "expiration" for the modification of a permit 
discussed in § 30.2095(2) is the earlier of the expiration date 
of the permit or the actual date when pier placement was 
completed.11 
                                                 
11 Because a permit to build a pier expires upon its 
placement, the Myers' permit expired in October 2001 and would 
have been void by July 23, 2004 had the pier not been placed. 
No. 
2016AP1517   
 
16 
 
¶31 According to the DNR and the court of appeals, if pier 
placement is complete within the timeframe determined by Wis. 
Stat. § 30.2095(1)(a), the permit never expires.  If that were 
the case, the phrase "before its expiration" in § 30.2095(2) 
becomes superfluous since the DNR could "[f]or good cause" 
modify or rescind any non-void permit or contract at any time.   
¶32 It is also noteworthy that the legislature made a 
distinction between the term "void," as used in Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.2095(1)(a), 
and 
the 
term 
"expiration," 
as 
used 
in 
§ 30.2095(1)(b) and (2).  These terms are presumed to have 
distinct meanings.  See Johnson v. City of Edgerton, 207 Wis. 2d 
343, 351, 558 N.W.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1996).  Given its plain 
meaning, where a grantee needs additional time to complete a 
project, he or she may ask to extend the expiration date of a 
permit pursuant to § 30.2095(1)(b) to prevent a permit from 
becoming void under § 30.2095(1)(a).  The DNR possesses a 
limited right to modify a permit until the earlier of the 
expiration date of the permit or the date when pier placement 
was completed, as set forth in § 30.2095(2).  However, that 
right does not include the ability to require partial removal of 
a pier, and substantial modification to a permit, over 14 years 
after a pier was placed.12    
                                                 
12 The dissent opines that the DNR selected a "permit 
amendment 
track," 
via 
its 
necessarily 
implied 
authority.  
Dissent, ¶73.  The DNR did not follow any statutorily proscribed 
procedures; instead, the DNR appeared to act unilaterally in 
demanding changes to the Myers' pier.   
No. 
2016AP1517   
 
17 
 
¶33 A review of the language used in ch. 30 further 
supports the conclusion that a pier permit is akin to a building 
permit and includes no additional requirements for ongoing 
maintenance and use.  As previously noted, "[s]tatutory language 
is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in 
isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶45.  Pier permits are described throughout ch. 30 in reference 
to the "placement" of a structure.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.12(1)(a)(providing that a permit is required to "place 
any structure 
upon 
the 
bed 
of 
any 
navigable 
water"); 
§ 30.12(3m)(a)(providing that a permit is required "in order 
to place the structure for the owner's use").  The Merriam 
Webster Dictionary defines place as "to put in or as if in 
a particular place or position:  set."  "Place," Merriam Webster 
Online 
Dictionary 
(2018), 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/place.  Therefore, "[p]lacement" refers to setting a 
pier in the navigable waters, not the ongoing use of a pier. 
¶34 Where 
the 
legislature 
intends 
to 
include 
the 
responsibility of ongoing maintenance, it specifies as such, as 
seen in Wis. Stat. § 30.131, which regulates piers "placed and 
maintained by persons other than riparian owners."  If "placed" 
was synonymous with "maintained," the word "maintained" in 
§ 30.131 would be surplusage.  Additionally, in enacting 
regulations for a permit for a dam, the legislature clarified 
that the permit also includes ongoing maintenance.  See, e.g., 
No. 
2016AP1517   
 
18 
 
Wis. Stat. § 31.05 (describing the permit as one "to construct, 
operate and maintain a dam").  We look to the words chosen by 
the legislature in the context of the entirety of Wis. Stat. ch. 
30 and conclude that the Myers' pier permit was akin to a 
building permit.   
¶35 Because we conclude that the DNR lacked authority to 
amend the Myers' permit, we need not reach the issues that 
surround the application of the statutory exemptions in Wis. 
Stat. § 30.12(1k), including the court of appeals' reliance on 
"implicit findings" made by the DNR at a public informational 
hearing.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶36 On petition to this court, the Myers sought review of 
the DNR's authority to amend their 2001 pier permit.  The Myers 
also sought review as to whether two exemptions in Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.12(1k) barred the DNR's actions.  Lastly, the Myers sought 
review of whether the court of appeals could rely on "implicit 
findings" made by the DNR at a public informational hearing to 
conclude that the statutory exemptions in § 30.12(1k) did not 
apply to the Myers' pier.   
¶37 We conclude that the DNR could not reserve to itself 
the authority to amend the Myers' permit through Condition 1.  
We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 30.12(3m)(d)2. did not provide the 
DNR with statutory authorization to insert Condition 1 in the 
Myers' permit.  Further, we conclude that because the Myers' 
permit expired, Wis. Stat. § 30.2095 did not provide the DNR 
with the authority to modify or rescind the Myers' permit for 
No. 
2016AP1517   
 
19 
 
"good cause."  Because the DNR had no authority to amend the 
Myers' permit and we reverse the court of appeals' decision, we 
need not address whether the statutory exemptions found in 
§ 30.12(1k) applied to the Myers' pier.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No.  2016AP1517.awb 
 
1 
 
¶38 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Although the 
administrative law judge initially found that granting the 
Myers' permit request would likely not have detrimental effects, 
he also observed "it is not always possible to predict the 
impact of a particular structure in such a dynamic system." 
¶39 The ALJ's admonition proved prescient.  A decade after 
the Myers completed construction of their pier, the DNR received 
complaints from neighbors that the Myers' pier was not operating 
as intended.  Specifically, the neighbors asserted that the pier 
was exacerbating shoreline erosion and causing "loss of riparian 
property."  Majority op., ¶9. 
¶40 To remedy the now-apparent defects in the pier, the 
DNR issued a permit amendment requiring that the Myers modify 
their pier in one of two ways.  Id., ¶12.  The Myers declined to 
pursue either modification option presented by the DNR and 
instead have pursued judicial review of the DNR's action. 
¶41 Upon review, the majority concludes that the DNR lacks 
the statutory authority to amend the permit.  Id., ¶37; see Wis. 
Stat. §§ 30.12(3m)(d)2., 30.2095.  It reaches this erroneous 
conclusion by writing words into the statutes, failing to follow 
its own analytical construct, and arriving at an unreasonable 
result that could leave the DNR toothless to address some piers 
that violate the public interest.  In my view, the pier-
permitting statutes necessarily imply a grant of power to the 
DNR to amend permits.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
No.  2016AP1517.awb 
 
2 
 
I 
A 
¶42  The majority's first error lies in reading words into 
the pier-permitting statutes that simply are not there. 
¶43 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 30.12(1), all structures that 
are "placed" upon the bed of any navigable water require a 
permit.  In the majority's view, "placement" "refers to setting 
a pier in the navigable waters, not the ongoing use of a pier."  
Majority op., ¶33.  Accordingly, in the majority's estimation, a 
pier permit is "akin to a building permit," and is not required 
for the ongoing maintenance of a pier.  Id., ¶28. 
¶44 Such a distinction is salient because if the permit is 
for building only, then the permit conditions would not govern 
the ongoing maintenance of the pier.  Conversely, if the permit 
is required for maintenance of a pier, then the obligations it 
creates do not end when construction is complete. 
¶45 As a threshold to its analysis, the majority correctly 
sets forth the principles that govern statutory interpretation.  
See majority op., ¶18.  Statutory interpretation begins with the 
language of the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
If the meaning of the statute is plain, we need not further the 
inquiry.  Id.  However, we must interpret statutes reasonably, 
to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.  Id., ¶46. 
¶46 With repeated assurances to the reader that it is 
embracing a plain meaning interpretation, the majority warns of 
the nemesis of plain meaning, i.e. writing words into the 
No.  2016AP1517.awb 
 
3 
 
statute.  Majority op., ¶24.  And it advises the reader that we 
will refrain from doing so here.  Id.  Nevertheless, after such 
proclamations and protestations, the majority fundamentally 
alters the statute by writing into it an outcome-determinative 
word not written by the legislature.  Although it pays lip 
service to a plain meaning interpretation, the majority fails to 
follow it. 
¶47 Nowhere in the statutes on which the majority relies 
does the legislature delineate that a pier permit is a 
"construction" or "building" permit.  This stands in marked 
contrast to the numerous statutes where the legislature has 
specified that a permit is a "construction" permit or "building" 
permit.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 31.05 (specifying that a permit 
is to "construct, operate and maintain a dam"); § 66.1036 
(referring to the requirement that a "building permit" be the 
provided to county clerk); 
§ 101.654(1)(a) (setting forth 
requirements for the issuance of a "building permit"); § 145.195 
(referring to a "permit for construction" of any structure); 
§ 285.60(1)(a) 
(referencing 
a 
"construction 
permit" 
for 
construction, reconstruction, replacement, or modification of a 
stationary air pollution source).  When the legislature wants a 
permit to be a construction or building permit, it knows how to 
indicate as much. 
¶48 Additionally, 
a 
standard 
principle 
of 
statutory 
interpretation requires that, except for technical or specially 
defined words, we give words their common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  Yet, contrary 
No.  2016AP1517.awb 
 
4 
 
to this principle, the majority asserts that the word "building" 
is essentially a substitute for the word "placement."  In the 
majority's view, "placement" cannot be ongoing.  Such an 
assertion lacks citation and support in either the statute or 
the dictionary.1 
¶49 The Merriam Webster dictionary offers two sentences as 
examples for the use of the word "placement" indicating that 
"placement" does not end when an object is initially installed.  
"Placement," 
Merriam 
Webster 
Online 
Dictionary 
(2018), 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/placement. 
 
Neither 
supports the majority's assertion.2  Another commonly utilized 
dictionary includes in the definition of "placement," "[t]he 
state of being placed or arranged."  The American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 1382 (5th ed. 2011).  There 
is no indication that this "state of being" is not ongoing. 
¶50 As set forth in chapter 30, the plain language of the 
statutory scheme leads me to the conclusion that a permit is 
required to maintain a pier, not only to construct one.  For 
example, the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 30.12(3m)(c) states 
that the DNR "shall issue an individual permit to a riparian 
owner for a structure" if the statutory requirements are met 
                                                 
1 See State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, ¶21, 573 N.W.2d 187 
(1998) 
("For 
purposes 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
or 
construction, the common and approved usage of words may be 
established by consulting dictionary definitions."). 
2 Two examples offered are "the strategic placement of 
products at the entrance of a store" and "the placement of 
microphones around the room." 
No.  2016AP1517.awb 
 
5 
 
(emphasis added).  The statute does not say that a permit shall 
be issued for the construction or building of a structure only.  
By reading the word "building" into the statute, the majority 
violates our established framework of statutory interpretation. 
¶51 The upshot of my analysis is that the Myers' permit 
did not "expire" when construction on their pier was finished.  
Rather, the statutes set forth a continuing obligation to meet 
the requirements of the permit. 
B 
¶52 The majority's second error lies in its failure to 
follow its own analytical construct. 
¶53 It correctly observes that "[a]n administrative agency 
has only those powers expressly conferred or necessarily implied 
by the statutory provisions under which it operates."  Majority 
op., ¶21 (emphasis added) (citing Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 110 Wis. 2d 455, 461-62, 329 N.W.2d 143 
(1983)).  However, the majority's analysis suffers from a 
singular focus on powers "expressly conferred" by chapter 30 
while neglecting to analyze those "necessarily implied." 
¶54 A permit for the placement of a pier shall not issue 
if the pier materially obstructs navigation, is detrimental to 
the public interest, or materially reduces the flood flow 
capacity of a stream.  Wis. Stat. § 30.12(3m)(c).  In the 
majority's view, these three requirements need only apply at the 
time a pier is constructed, and "[t]here is no support in the 
plain language of Wis. Stat. ch. 30 for the DNR's claim that a 
No.  2016AP1517.awb 
 
6 
 
pier permit carries with it an ongoing requirement to satisfy" 
them.  Majority op., ¶24. 
¶55 Essentially, the majority determines that the DNR has 
the power to issue a permit that is akin to a building permit, 
but not a permit for the maintaining of a pier.  It bases its 
conclusion on the language of the statute, but neglects to even 
consider that such a power is "necessarily implied" in the 
statutory scheme.  In my view, it is. 
¶56 Wisconsin Stat. § 30.12(3m)(c) clearly provides that a 
permit shall issue if the three enumerated criteria are met.  As 
a corollary, if any of the criteria are not met, a permit shall 
not issue. 
¶57 The question raised in this case is what happens when 
a pier meets the criteria of Wis. Stat. § 30.12(3m)(c) when it 
is initially installed, but at some point conditions change and 
the pier no longer meets the statutory requirements.  The 
statute dictates that if the requirements are not met, then a 
permit shall not issue.  This means that the non-compliant 
condition must be corrected. 
¶58 In order to bring the pier into compliance with the 
statute, 
the 
permit 
must 
be 
amended, 
and 
the 
statute 
"necessarily implies" that the DNR has this power.  If the DNR 
did not have this power, the result would be a host of piers 
that violate the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 30.12(3m)(c), and 
the DNR possibly left with no means to address them.  See infra, 
¶¶59-66.  As I discuss next, this is an unreasonable result that 
the legislature could not have intended. 
No.  2016AP1517.awb 
 
7 
 
C 
¶59 The majority's third error lies in reaching an 
unreasonable result. 
¶60 In denying the DNR the ability to amend the Myers' 
permit, the majority allows for the very thing the legislature 
has explicitly prohibited in Wis. Stat. § 30.12(3m)(c), i.e. it 
allows a pier to remain even if it obstructs navigation, is a 
detriment to the public interest, or reduces flood flow 
capacity.  Further, the majority's interpretation may deprive 
the DNR of any remedy at all in similar situations. 
¶61 The majority's result is unreasonable because it 
allows for a pier to remain in a state of disrepair and 
impairment 
of 
the 
public 
interest. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 30.12(3m)(c)2. is clear in its mandate that a permit shall not 
issue if a structure will be detrimental to the public interest.  
Yet, the majority allows for this very thing——as long as a pier 
does not begin to become detrimental to the public interest 
until after it is constructed, the permit for that pier can 
never be amended. 
¶62 It is also unreasonable to potentially leave the DNR 
toothless in the face of a pier that obstructs navigation, is 
detrimental to the public interest, or will reduce the flood 
flow capacity of a stream.  If the DNR cannot modify the permit 
to remedy a detrimental condition in a pier, its remaining 
option (absent informal resolution) is to bring an enforcement 
No.  2016AP1517.awb 
 
8 
 
action.  See Wis. Stat. § 30.03(4)(a) (authorizing DNR to bring 
an enforcement action).3 
¶63 However, in some situations a pier may be exempt from 
enforcement.  See Wis. Stat. § 30.12(1k)(cm).  In such a 
situation, the majority would leave the DNR powerless to act to 
remedy a defect that is detrimental to the public interest or 
the riparian rights of surrounding landowners.  I view this 
result as unreasonable. 
¶64 Although the Myers' pier was not contrary to the 
public interest when it was built, it is perfectly plausible 
that conditions may change.  Here it is alleged that the pier 
has become contrary to the public interest or interferes with 
the rights of other riparian owners. 
¶65 Indeed, the DNR determined that "the existing 12-foot 
flow-through opening is not functioning as intended consistently 
enough to provide sufficient movement of water and sediment on a 
regular basis to prevent the interruption of the natural 
littoral processes."  The impact is that "[t]his disruption, in 
turn, is exacerbating the formation of land on the bed of Lake 
Superior and starving adjacent 'down-drift' properties of 
sediment." 
¶66 If the DNR cannot modify a permit and cannot bring an 
enforcement action because of an exemption, the public interest 
                                                 
3 An enforcement action can be maintained for "a possible 
violation of s. 281.36 or of the statutes relating to navigable 
waters or a possible infringement of the public rights relating 
to navigable waters."  Wis. Stat. § 30.03(4)(a). 
No.  2016AP1517.awb 
 
9 
 
in maintaining the waters of this state falls by the wayside in 
the event lake conditions change.  The DNR should not be so 
hamstrung in fulfilling its duty. 
II 
¶67 Because I determine that the DNR has the necessarily 
implied authority to amend the Myers' pier permit, I briefly 
address the Myers' arguments that statutory exemptions bar such 
permit amendments.4  The Myers cite to two statutory exemptions 
in an attempt to avoid the DNR's permit amendments.  First, they 
assert 
that 
the 
grandfather 
exemption, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 30.12(1k)(b), applies to their pier.  Second, they contend 
that the enforcement exemption, § 30.12(1k)(cm), bars the permit 
amendments in this case.  Neither provision has the effect the 
Myers desire. 
¶68 The grandfather exemption, Wis. Stat. § 30.12(1k)(b), 
provides in relevant part: 
                                                 
4 The Myers also argue that the evidence presented at the 
informational hearing was insufficient to support the permit 
amendment.  The DNR made the following factual finding: 
Based 
on 
the 
information 
gathered 
and 
further 
discussion with the Sea Grant coastal engineer, the 
Department has determined that the existing 12-foot 
flow-through opening is not functioning as intended 
consistently enough to provide sufficient movement of 
water and sediment on a regular basis to prevent the 
interruption of the natural littoral processes.  This 
disruption, in turn, is exacerbating the formation of 
land on the bed of Lake Superior and starving adjacent 
'down-drift' properties of sediment. 
Such a finding is certainly sufficient to support the 
determination that the pier is detrimental to the public 
interest. 
No.  2016AP1517.awb 
 
10 
 
[A] riparian owner of a pier or wharf that was placed 
on the bed of a navigable water before April 17, 2012, 
is exempt from the permit requirements under this 
section unless any of the following applies: 
1m.  The department notified the riparian owner 
before August 1, 2012, that the pier or wharf is 
detrimental to the public interest. 
2. The pier or wharf interferes with the riparian 
rights of other riparian owners. 
¶69 If the grandfather exemption applies, the consequences 
are set forth in Wis. Stat. § 30.12(1k)(e): 
[A] riparian owner who is exempt . . . may do all of 
the following: 
1.  Repair and maintain the exempt structure 
without obtaining a permit from the department 
under this section unless the owner enlarges the 
structure. 
2.  If the exempt structure is a pier or wharf, 
relocate or reconfigure the pier or wharf if the 
riparian owner does not enlarge the pier or 
wharf. 
In other words, if the exemption applies, the Myers need not 
obtain a permit to repair and maintain the pier. 
¶70 The DNR contends that the grandfather exemption does 
not apply here because the Myers possess a permit for their 
pier.  I agree.  The grandfather exemption states that if the 
conditions are met, a pier owner is not required to "obtain" a 
permit 
in 
order 
to 
maintain 
the 
pier. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 30.12(1k)(e)(1).  The use of the word "obtain" indicates that 
a pier covered by the statute did not have a permit before, 
hence the need to "obtain" one.  As analyzed above, I determine 
that 
the 
Myers' 
pier 
was 
permitted. 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
grandfather exemption does not apply. 
No.  2016AP1517.awb 
 
11 
 
¶71 Similarly, the enforcement exemption does not apply.  
The enforcement exemption provides: 
The department may not take any enforcement action 
under this chapter against a riparian owner for the 
placement of any of the following: 
1. A structure for which the department has 
issued a permit under this section, if the 
structure is in compliance with that permit. 
2.  A structure for which the department has 
issued a written authorization, if the structure 
is in compliance with that written authorization. 
3.  A structure that is exempt under par. (b) 
[the grandfather exemption]. 
Wis. Stat. § 30.12(1k)(cm). 
¶72 Any argument that this exemption is applicable must be 
based on the premise that DNR's actions here in amending the 
permit constitute an "enforcement action."  This premise fails. 
¶73 Pursuant to chapter 30 of the Wisconsin statutes, the 
DNR can remedy a defect in a pier by following one of two 
tracks:  permit amendment by way of its necessarily implied 
authority or enforcement via Wis. Stat. § 30.03.  In this case, 
the DNR chose to follow the permit amendment track.  The DNR did 
not bring an "enforcement action" here, thus the "enforcement" 
exemption is not applicable. 
¶74 There are key differences between the permit amendment 
and enforcement tracks.  An enforcement action is brought 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 30.03.  Enforcement hearings proceed in 
accordance with ch. 227.  See § 30.03(4)(a).  The end result of 
an enforcement action can be an order issued by a hearing 
examiner "directing the responsible parties to perform or 
No.  2016AP1517.awb 
 
12 
 
refrain from performing acts in order to comply with s. 281.36 
or to fully protect the interests of the public in the navigable 
waters."  § 30.03(4)(a). 
¶75 That is not what happened in this case.  Here there 
was only a public informational hearing.  A hearing examiner did 
not enter any injunction against the Myers.  Rather, the DNR 
issued a permit amendment.  Because there was no enforcement 
action, the enforcement exemption is inapplicable. 
¶76 In sum, the majority allows a pier with clear defects 
to remain in a state of disrepair and impairment of the public 
interest.  The impact of the majority opinion, however, is not 
limited to the Myers' pier.  On bodies of water large and small, 
the majority opinion raises the specter that riparian owners 
cannot rely on the DNR to protect the public interest if a 
neighboring pier stops working as intended due to shifting lake 
conditions.  Because this result is contrary to the legislative 
intent, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  2016AP1517.awb 
 
1