Case Title: Ex parte Charles Philon. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Chadwick Timber Company v. Charles Philon)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1061210

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 12/19/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1061210
____________________
Ex parte Charles Philon
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: Chadwick Timber Company
v.
Charles Philon)
(Choctaw Circuit Court, CV-02-78;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2050697)
PER CURIAM.
The petition for the writ of certiorari is denied.
1061210
2
In denying the petition for the writ of certiorari, this
Court does not wish to be understood as approving all the
language, reasons, or statements of law in the Court of Civil
Appeals' opinion.  Horsley v. Horsley, 291 Ala. 782, 280
So. 2d 155 (1973).
WRIT DENIED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, and Bolin, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs specially.
1061210
3
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially).
The Court in this case denies the petition for the writ
of certiorari, but in so doing explains that it "does not wish
to be understood as approving all the language, reasons, or
statements of law in the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion."
___ So. 2d at ___.  I concur in the order denying the
petition.  The purpose of this separate writing is to explain
my reasons for "not wish[ing] to be understood as approving
all the language, reasons, or statements of law in the Court
of Civil Appeals' opinion."
I.  Background Facts and Procedural History
Charles Philon sued his employer, Chadwick Timber Company
("Chadwick"), seeking worker's compensation benefits for an
alleged permanent total disability arising from injuries to
his left leg and his back.  Philon worked as a "chainsaw hand"
for Chadwick.  On March 8, 2001, Philon was injured in an on-
the-job accident when a tree he was cutting snapped back and
broke his left leg immediately below the knee.  Philon
testified that, during this incident, he also suffered an
injury to his back when he fell and hit his back on a tree
limb.  
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4
During surgery on his leg the next day, three screws were
placed in his left leg to repair the fracture.  Dr. Albert
Pearsall IV was the treating physician.  At the trial of this
case in September 2005, Philon testified that he experienced
substantial pain in his left leg and lower back.  The
materials before us do not indicate, however, to what degree
this pain was attributable to his leg injury as opposed to his
back. 
After a trial at which evidence was presented ore tenus,
the trial court entered a judgment finding Philon to be
permanently and totally disabled and awarding benefits
accordingly.  Chadwick appealed with respect to the award of
worker's compensation benefits for the injury to Philon's
back. 
 
Chadwick 
contends 
that 
Philon 
should 
receive
compensation only for the injury to his leg. 
The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's
judgment; it concluded that Philon had not presented
substantial evidence of medical causation with respect to his
back injury.  Chadwick Timber Co. v. Philon, [Ms. 2050697,
March 16, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2007).  Philon
1061210
5
then filed the present petition for the writ of certiorari
with this Court.
II.  Analysis
A.
Was there substantial evidence that Philon hurt his back
during the March 8, 2001, accident?
The Court of Civil Appeals first considered whether the
record contained substantial evidence to support the trial
court's factual determination that Philon injured both his leg
and his back in the accident.  The standard of appellate
review in workers' compensation cases is governed by § 25-5-
81(e), Ala. Code 1975, which provides that "[i]n reviewing
pure findings of fact, the finding of the circuit court shall
not be reversed if that finding is supported by substantial
evidence."  "Substantial evidence" is  "'evidence of such
weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the
fact sought to be proved.'"  Ex parte Trinity Indus., Inc.,
680 So. 2d 262, 269 (Ala. 1996) (quoting West v. Founders Life
Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989)). 
The medical records from the two facilities at which
Philon was treated on March 8, 2001, contain no mention of any
1061210
The records from Philon's visit to the hospital at the
1
University of South Alabama on March 8, 2001, state that
Philon did not complain of any injury other than the injury to
his left leg.
The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals states:
2
"At the hearing, Philon testified that he had
informed Dr. Pearsall several times that he was
having back pain; Philon acknowledged, however, that
6
complaints by Philon of back pain.   Dr. Pearsall testified
1
that his first notation that Philon complained of back pain
was dated September 28, 2001.  Philon repeated his complaint
of back pain to Dr. Pearsall again in October 2001 and also
told his physical therapist in the fall of 2001 that he was
experiencing back pain.
According to the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals,
however, Philon testified at trial that he did injure his
lower back in the March 8, 2001, on-the-job accident.  That
opinion also notes that Philon testified that he informed
medical personnel at both medical facilities he visited
immediately following the accident that he was experiencing
back pain.  The Court of Civil Appeals' opinion also indicates
that Philon testified that he informed Dr. Pearsall "several
times" before September 2001 that he was experiencing back
pain.2
1061210
he 'might have' told Dr. Pearsall that that back
pain was mild. Dr. Pearsall testified that he could
have failed to document one complaint of back pain
before September 2001 but that he would 'find it
almost impossible to believe that [Philon] would
have mentioned [his claim of back pain] to me on
multiple occasions and I would have ignored him on
every occasion.'"
___ So. 2d at ___.
7
Based on the above-described conflicting evidence, the
trial court made the following specific factual findings: 
"2.  That on March 8, 2001, while employed with
Chadwick Timber Company as a chainsaw hand, [Philon]
sustained injuries while performing his job and such
injuries arose out of and in the course of his
employment.  [Philon] received an injury to his left
leg and lower back in the course of performing his
work as a chainsaw hand.  ...  The Court is
satisfied that [Philon] proved causation in the
present case.
"....
"8. ...  [Philon] testified and was a very
believable witness.  ..."
The Court of Civil Appeals took up the issue whether "the
evidence in the record ... support[s] a conclusion that the
March 8, 2001, on-the-job accident caused an injury to
Philon's back."  ___ So. 2d at ___.  The court found that 
"[o]ther than his own testimony that he fell and hit
his back on a tree limb, Philon failed to present
any evidence tending to indicate that he had
1061210
8
suffered a back injury as a result of his March 8,
2001, on-the-job accident.  Given the evidence in
the 
record, 
we 
must 
hold 
that 
the 
'overall
substance' of the evidence in the record does not
support a conclusion that Philon suffered a back
injury on March 8, 2001.  See Ex parte Southern
Energy Homes, Inc., [873 So. 2d 1116, 1122 (Ala.
2003)]; Jackson Landscaping, Inc. v. Hooks, [844
So. 2d 1267 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002)]."
___ So. 2d at ___ (emphasis added).
In voting to deny the petition in this case, I do not
wish to be understood as approving the Court of Civil Appeals'
assertion that the testimony by Philon that "he fell and hit
his back on a tree limb" is the only evidence he presented
indicating that he hurt his back during the March 8, 2001,
accident; as already noted, the Court of Civil Appeals'
opinion describes other testimony by Philon that supports such
a finding.  Moreover, I do not wish to be understood as
approving (1) the suggestion by the Court of Civil Appeals
that the testimony of Philon –- whom the trial court expressly
found to be a credible witness –- that he hurt his back when
he fell and hit a tree limb in his March 8, 2001, on-the-job
accident, 
cannot 
constitute 
"substantial 
evidence" 
that 
Philon
hurt his back in his March 8, 2001, on-the-job accident, or
(2) the finding by the Court of Civil Appeals, contrary to the
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9
factual finding made by the trial court based on conflicting
evidence, that the record cannot "support a conclusion that
Philon suffered a back injury on March 8, 2001."  ___ So. 2d
at ___.
Nonetheless, denial of certiorari review is appropriate
in this case. Even though the Court of Civil Appeals took up
this issue, that court also acknowledged that, "in his brief
submitted to [that] court Philon maintain[ed] that he did not
seek to establish in the trial court that he suffered an
injury to his lower back on March 8, 2001, when he injured his
leg in the on-the-job accident."  ___ So. 2d at ___ n. 1
(emphasis added).  Moreover, Philon's petition to this Court
contains no request for relief based on this issue.  It is for
these reasons that I agree that no relief should be given in
this case based on this issue.
B.
Could the Court of Civil Appeals examine the "change-of-
gait" theory for Philon's back pain under the principle
that an appellate court can affirm a trial court's
judgment on any valid legal ground?
After addressing the issue whether the evidence supported
a conclusion that Philon directly injured his back on March 8,
2001, the Court of Civil Appeals turned its attention to the
alternative factual theory that Philon's back injury was
1061210
10
caused over time by changes in his gait resulting from his leg
injury. The Court of Civil Appeals stated its reason for
addressing this issue as follows: "This court may affirm a
correct judgment for any reason, even if the trial court did
not rely on that reason in reaching its judgment."  ___ So. 2d
at ___.  Even though the trial court made no finding on this
factual issue, the Court of Civil Appeals coupled the
foregoing statement with the assertion that "if properly
supported by the evidence, such a claim could support the
trial court's judgment."
It is important to note, however, that, although an
appellate court may affirm a judgment of a trial court on a
ground not relied upon by the trial court, this is so only if
the alternative ground is a "valid legal ground."  Liberty
Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. University of Alabama Health Servs.
Found., 881 So. 2d 1013, 1020 (Ala. 2003) (emphasis added)
(subject to due-process constraints, appellate courts "will
affirm the trial court on any valid legal ground presented by
the record, regardless of whether that ground was considered,
or even if it was rejected, by the trial court"); Smith v.
Equifax Servs., Inc., 537 So. 2d 463, 465 (Ala. 1988) (an
1061210
11
appellate court "'will affirm the judgment appealed from if
supported on any valid legal ground,'" even if that ground is
not raised below (quoting  Tucker v. Nichols, 431 So. 2d 1263,
1265 (Ala. 1983) (emphasis added))); Pavilion Dev., L.L.C. v.
JBJ P'ship, 979 So. 2d 24, 41-43 (Ala. 2007) (Murdock, J.,
concurring specially).  The role of an appellate court is to
decide questions of law.  As this Court stated in Curtis White
Construction Co. v. Butts & Billingsley Construction Co., 473
So. 2d 1040, 1041 (Ala. 1985):
"It is the function of a trial judge sitting as
factfinder to decide facts where conflicts in the
evidence exist.  ...  The appellate courts do not
sit in judgment of the facts, and review the
factfinder's determination of facts only to the
extent of determining whether it is sufficiently
supported by the evidence, that question being one
of law."
(Emphasis added.)  See also Ex parte Golden Poultry Co., 772
So. 2d 1175, 1177 (Ala. 2000) (after determining that the
trial court had applied the erroneous legal standard, the
Court of Civil Appeals erred by weighing the evidence under
the correct standard; the case should have been remanded for
the trial court to make the necessary findings under the
proper standard; an appellate court "is not authorized to
independently weigh the evidence").
1061210
Here, in fact, we are presented with a factual theory
3
that is different from the express factual findings made by
the trial court. 
12
Applying the foregoing principles to the present case, I
note first that the trial court made no factual finding as to
whether Philon's back injury was caused over time by changes
to his gait resulting from his leg injury.  Therefore, the
only basis upon which the Court of Civil Appeals could have
affirmed the judgment of the trial court on this alternative
factual theory is if the Court of Civil Appeals could have
determined, as a matter of law, that the record before it
could not reasonably support any conclusion other than that
Philon's back injury occurred in the stated manner.  See
Gartman v. Hill, 874 So. 2d 555, 559 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)
("While it is true that this court will affirm the judgment
appealed from if supported on any valid legal ground, the
evidence in this case falls well short of what would be
required for this court to hold, as a matter of law, that [the
plaintiff] is entitled [to prevail on a factual theory as to
which the trial court made no finding].").   See generally
3
§ 25-5-81(e), Ala. Code 1975; Ex parte Trinity Indus., Inc.,
680 So. 2d at 268-69.  
1061210
13
The evidence of which we have been made aware is far from
sufficient to support the altered-gait theory as the only
reasonable factual explanation for Philon's back injury.  The
verified statement of facts set forth in Philon's petition
mentions several occasions over the course of the year
following his injury in which Philon complained of some degree
of pain in his back, but the verified statement of facts
contains no mention of any attribution by Philon, on any such
occasion, of his back pain to changes in his gait resulting
from his leg injury.  Unable to rely on any such attribution,
Philon takes the tack in his petition to this Court of arguing
that "Chadwick Timber offered no evidence of any other cause
of Mr. Philon's back pain" other than changes to his gait
resulting from his leg injury.  (Emphasis added.)
The burden of proving medical causation lies with the
plaintiff, not the defendant.  Ex parte Moncrief, 627 So. 2d
385, 388 (Ala. 1993) ("[F]or an injury to be compensable under
the Workers' Compensation Act, the employee must establish
both legal and medical causation."); Hammons v. Roses Stores,
Inc., 547 So. 2d 883 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989).  The foregoing
evidence, as postured by Philon, the plaintiff, provides no
1061210
Notwithstanding Philon's testimony (according to the
4
trial court) that he hurt his back on March 8, 2001, the
opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals contains a brief
statement at one point that "Philon testified that his leg
injury caused him to suffer back pain."  ___ So. 2d at ___.
Philon's petition makes no meaningful argument based on
whatever testimony he gave in this regard.
14
basis upon which the Court of Civil Appeals could have
concluded as a matter of law that there was no explanation for
Philon's back injury other than the alleged changes to his
gait resulting from his leg injury.
Philon's petition contains a passing reference to the
fact that he testified about his back pain, but it does not
explain what that testimony was or how it supports his
alternative factual theory.   The only other evidence offered
4
by Philon in support of this alternative theory is the
testimony 
of 
his 
treating 
physician, 
Dr. 
Pearsall.
Dr. Pearsall, however, testified only that a change in a
person's gait resulting from a knee injury "potentially could"
"have an effect on the back."  When asked, "could that be
causing Mr. Philon to have lower back pain," Dr. Pearsall
merely testified, "it could, yes."  When asked further if he
had an opinion "as to whether or not Mr. Philon experienced
back pain or back problems as a result of any changes in his
1061210
15
gait," Dr. Pearsall testified, "I think that's possible."
Dr. Pearsall apparently was not asked for and did not offer
any opinion as to whether it was "probable" or "likely" that
Philon experienced problems with his back as a result of
changes in his gait caused by his leg injury.  As the Court of
Civil Appeals recognized, Dr. Pearsall's testimony amounts to
"'evidence of mere possibilities that would only serve to
'guess' the employer into liability.'"  ___ So. 2d at ___
(quoting Ex parte Southern Energy Homes, Inc., 873 So. 2d
1116, 1122 (Ala. 2003), quoting in turn Hammons v. Roses
Stores, Inc., 547 So. 2d at 885 (emphasis added)).  
The record presented to the Court of Civil Appeals did
not support an affirmance of the trial court's judgment on the
alternative ground that Philon's back injury was a result of
changes in his gait caused by his leg injury.  Accordingly, as
to this alternative theory, I find no probability of merit in
the petition for the writ of certiorari.  I therefore vote to
deny the petition.