Case Title: Wilson v. State

Citation: 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 68

Docket Number: 29802

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2011-10-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
once

 

127 Nev, Advance Opinion G&
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

EDWARD THOMAS WILSON, No. 50057
Appellant, F ! L E D
‘THE STATE OF NEVADA, oct 27 2011

 

Respondent.
Appeal from an order dismissing a ae
lismissing a post-conviction petition

a writ of habeas corpus in a death penalty cas

Court, Washoe County; Steven P. Elliott, Judge.
Affirmed,

Schiller & Flexner, LLP, and Douglass A. Mitchell, Las Vegas;

Glynn B. Cartledge, Reno,
for Appellant.

Second Judicial District

 

 

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Richard A.
Gammick, District Attorney, and Gary H. Hatlestad, Chief Deputy District
Attorney, Washoe County,

for Respondent.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
OPINION

By the Court, HARDESTY, J.
Appellant Edward Thomas Wilson pleaded guilty to first-

 

degree murder and related felonies in the killing of an undercover Reno
police officer in 1979, A three-judge panel sentenced Wilson to death for

the murder. In this appeal from the denial of Wilson's third state habeas

"The Honorable Kristina Pickering, Justice, did not participate in
the decision in this matter.

1-3 3/2)

 

eee en nena ences
 

petition, we address whether our decision in McConnell v. State
(McConnell 1), 120 Nev. 1043, 102 P.3d 606 (2004), invalidates two of the
aggravating circumstances used to make Wilson eligible for the death
penalty. In particular, we consider whether McConnell I precludes the
State from relying on the same predicate felony to support felony murder
and felony aggravating circumstances when the defendant has pleaded
guilty to first-degree murder based on both premeditated and deliberate
murder and felony murder. We conclude that McConnell I does not
preclude the State from using the same predicate felony in those
circumstances. Because we conclude that this and Wilson's remaining
claims do not warrant relief, we affirm the district court’s order.

FACTS
‘The crime and the trial

In the afternoon of June 24, 1979, Reno Police Officer James
Hoff met with Wilson while posing as a narcotics dealer. Hoff and Wilson
discussed a drug transaction in which Wilson agreed to sell Hoff ten
‘ounces of cocaine for $1,600. During the meeting, Wilson and Hoff agreed
to complete the transaction around midnight that night,

Unbeknownst to Hoff, Wilson and John Olausen had been
plotting to make a drug deal and kill the dealer, After Wilson met with
Hoff, he and Olausen enlisted the help of David Lani and Fred Stites in
executing the plan, and the four men discussed how and where to kill the
drug dealer. ‘The group settled on a location near a convalescent center in
Reno. Once at the convalescent center, the four men cut and gathered
bushes to conceal themselves. Wilson left the area to contact Hoff while
the other three remained hidden in the bushes, each armed with a knife,

Meanwhile, Hoff was making his own preparations for the
meeting with Wilson. He obtained $1,600 in $100 bills which were
photocopied and their serial numbers recorded. He and another officer

2

 
non <a

 

installed a listening device on Hoff's vehicle. Numerous surveillance
teams were dispatched throughout the area to observe the transaction.

Shortly after midnight on June 25, Hoff met Wilson at a motel
in Reno. After the rendezvous, Hoff and Wilson drove around Reno until
approximately 1:30 a.m., at which time Hoff parked the car in a wooded
area near the convalescent center. Unfortunately, shortly after Hoff met
Wilson, the listening device on Hoffs vehicle malfunctioned and visual
contacts were lost on several occasions throughout the night,

As Hoff and Wilson got out of the car, Lani jumped out of the
bushes and stabbed Hoff in the back. The others emerged from their
hiding places and together stabbed Hoff repeatedly. About 15 minutes
later, the vehicle left the wooded area at a high rate of speed and the
surveillance teams lost contact with it near Verdi, Nevada. The vehicle
was found much later, unoccupied and stained with blood. After that
discovery, the police searched for Hoff and the suspects. They eventually
found Wilson and Olausen later that afternoon, sleeping in some bushes
alongside a trailer park. On the ground between them, police officers
found a vest containing approximately $1,600. Fourteen of the sixteen
$100 bills in the vest matched the prerecorded buy money. Wilson and
Olausen were immediately placed under arrest. A few hours later, officers
found Hoff’s body buried under a pile of rocks in a drainage ditch in Verdi.
Stites and Lani were arrested later in Oklahoma.

‘The State charged Wilson with first-degree murder, alleging
that the killing was willful, deliberate, and premeditated and/or was
committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of kidnapping
and/or robbery. The State also charged Wilson with kidnapping and
robbery, both with the use of a deadly weapon, Wilson pleaded guilty to
all of the charges. A three-judge panel found three circumstances
aggravated the murder—(1) the murder occurred during the commission of

3

 

 

 
   
 
 
   
   
  
   
  
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
   

a robbery, (2) the murder occurred during the commission of a kidnapping,
and (3) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain. The sentencing
panel found two mitigating cireumstances—Wilson had no significant
history of prior criminal activity, and he was 20 years old at the time of
the murder. Concluding that the mitigating circumstances found did not
outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the sentencing panel imposed a
sentence of death. We affirmed the convictions and death sentence.
Wilson v, State, 99 Nev. 362, 664 P.2d 328 (1983).
Post-conviction proceedings

Wilson filed two state post-conviction petitions, which were

 

denied in the district court. This court upheld the district court decisions
in both instances. Wilson v. State, 105 Nev. 110, 771 P.2d 583 (1989);
Wilson v. State, Docket No. 29802 (Order Dismissing Appeal, April 9,
1998). On November 21, 2005, Wilson filed his third post-conviction
petition, raising 29 claims for relief. The State sought to dismiss the
petition on the grounds that it was procedurally barred. ‘The district court
agreed, concluding that Wilson's claims were procedurally defaulted and
that he failed to demonstrate good cause and prejudice. The district court
further concluded that he did not make a colorable showing of actual
innocence or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to avoid the procedural
bars. ‘This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION

In this opinion, we focus on Wilson's challenge to the sentence
based on our decision in McConnell I and take this opportunity to answer
the corollary to a question left open after that decision: whether the use of
a felony aggravator is precluded if the defendant pleads guilty to first-
degree murder based on both a willful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing and a killing committed during the perpetration of or attempted

perpetration of the same felony. Before answering that question, we must

 

    

 
=

address the procedural defaults that apply to Wilson’s petition and
resulted in the district court's dismissal of the petition.

Because Wilson filed his petition approximately 22 years after
this court issued its remittitur on direct appeal from the judgment of
conviction and he had previously sought post-convietion relief, the petition
was untimely under NRS 34.726(1) and successive under NRS 34.810(2).
‘Therefore, the petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of
good cause and prejudice. NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3). McConnell I
applies retroactively, Bejarano v, State, 122 Nev. 1066, 1074-79, 146 P.3d.
265, 271-74 (2006), and Wilson raised his claim based on McConnell I
within a reasonable time after it became available. See Hathaway v.
State, 119 Nev. 248, 71 P.3d 503 (2003). We therefore conclude that
Wilson demonstrated good cause to excuse his delay in raising this
challenge to his death sentence and in raising it in this suecessive petition.
‘That leaves the question of whether he has demonstrated prejudice. We
conclude that he has not done so because the felony aggravating
circumstances are not invalid under MeConnell 1?

2We have considered Wilson’s challenges to the procedural default of
his other claims and conclude that they lack merit and the district court
did not err in denying the petition as untimely and successive under NRS
34.726 and NRS 34.810. Although Wilson suggests that the procedural
default statutes cannot be applied to his petition because this court
applies them inconsistently and in its discretion, we disagree for the
reasons expressed in State v, District Court (Riker), 121 Nev. 225, 236,
112 P.34 1070, 1077 (2005), and Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 886, 34
P.3d 519, 536 (2001). And to the extent that Wilson argues that his
second post-conviction counsel's alleged ineffective assistance provided
good cause to excuse his procedural default, we disagree because Wilson
was not entitled to the effective assistance of that counsel. See Crump v,
Warden, 113 Nev. 293, 303, 934 P.2d 247, 253 (1997) (stating that

continued on next page...

 

5

 

 
In McConnell I, we held that it is “impermissible under the
United States and Nevada Constitutions to base an aggravating

continued

“petitioner who has counsel appointed by statutory mandate is entitled to
effective assistance of that counsel”).

We have also considered Wilson's claims that failure to consider his
petition on the merits would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice
and therefore this court should overlook the procedural default. As to his
guilty plea, Wilson has not demonstrated that “in light of all the evidence,
it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted
him” even considering the evidence that trial counsel allegedly failed to
uncover and the evidence allegedly withheld by the State. See Bousley v,
United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (internal quotations omitted); U.S.
v. Torres, 163 F.3d 909, 914 (Sth Cir. 1999) (Dennis, J., concurring);
‘Trotter v. State, 907 So. 2d 397, 401 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). And as to the
death penalty, even assuming that new mitigating evidence previously
omitted due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel could provide a basis
for an actual innocence claim, see Sawyer v, Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 345-47
(1992), we are not convinced that Wilson demonstrated “by clear and
convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no reasonable
juror would have found him death eligible,” Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 887, 34
P.3d at 537. Nor are we convinced that he demonstrated actual innocence
based on his allegation that the sentencing panel did not find that the
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt. See McConnell v, State (McConnell ID, 125
Nev. 243, 254, 212 P.3d 307, 314-15 (2009).

We decline, however, to consider Wilson's challenge to the validity of
his guilty plea on various grounds related to our decision in Byford v.
State, 116 Nev. 215, 994 P.2d 700 (2000) (prospectively rejecting Kazalyn
instruction on premeditation), because this claim was not raised below, see
State v. Powell, 122 Nev. 751, 756, 138 P.3d 453, 456 (2006) (observing
that claims not raised below are generally barred from consideration on
appeal). As a separate and independent basis for denying relief, Byford
does not apply to this case because the conviction was final in 1985, long
before Byford changed the law, sce Nika v, State, 124 Nev. 1272, 1287, 198
P.3d 839, 849-50 (2008).

 

  

 
circumstance in a capital prosecution on the felony upon which a felony
murder is predicated.” 120 Nev. 1043, 1069, 102 P.3d 606, 624 (2004)
The genesis of McConnell I's holding was rooted in concerns that Nevada's
broad definition of felony murder with no specific intent requirement
beyond the intent to commit the underlying felony is insufficient to narrow
death eligibility and that although the felony aggravator in NRS
200.033(4) “is somewhat narrower than felony murder,” itis insufficient to
narrow death eligibility for felony murderers. Id. at 1065-69, 102 P.3d at
621-24.

Wilson first suggests that he pleaded guilty solely to felony
murder and therefore the State could not use the same underlying felonies
as aggravating circumstances consistent with McConnell I. ‘The record
does not bear that out. Wilson pleaded guilty to the charge of first-degree
murder, which included allegations that the killing was willful, deliberate,
and premeditated and that it was committed in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of a felony, Relative to willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder, the district court advised Wilson during the plea
canvass that one of the elements of murder was premeditation and asked
Wilson what premeditation meant, to which he responded, “We
preplanned it.” Wilson also acknowledged that premeditation included a
specific intent to kill. Later, during the plea canvass, the prosecutor asked
the district court to ensure that Wilson understood that he was pleading
guilty to premeditated murder as well as felony murder. And defense
counsel expressed to the district court that there was no objection to
Wilson pleading guilty to premeditated murder. Considering the record as
a whole, we conclude that Wilson pleaded guilty to premeditated and
felony murder. ‘This court reached the same conclusion on appeal from the

 

 

 
judgment of conviction when we declined to reach the issue later
addressed in McConnell I—whether a felony can be used as an
aggravating circumstance where the defendant has been convicted of first-
degree murder predicated on the felony-murder rule. Wilson v. State, 99
Nev. 362, 378 n.7, 664 P.2d 328, 335 n.7 (1983). We declined to reach that
issue specifically because Wilson “pleaded guilty to first degree murder
upon the theories of premeditation and deliberation, as well as robbery
and kidnapping.” Id. at 373, 664 P.2d at 335.

Alternatively, Wilson argues that McConnell I precludes the
use of the felony as an aggravator even if he pleaded guilty to
premeditated murder as well as felony murder. He primarily focuses on
the following language in McConnell I: “where the State bases a first-
degree murder conviction in whole or part on felony murder, to seek a
death sentence the State will have to prove an aggravator other than one
based on the felony murder’s predicate felony.” 120 Nev. at 1069, 102 P.3d
at 624 (emphasis added).

When read in the full context of the opinion, the language
highlighted by Wilson does not support his argument. Following the
highlighted language, the McConnell I opinion goes on to advise the State
to use a special verdict form during the guilt phase when it charges
alternative theories of first-degree murder that include felony murder and
intends to seek a death sentence, allowing jurors “to indicate whether they
find first-degree murder based on deliberation and premeditation, felony
murder, or both.” Id, We cautioned that absent “the return of such a form
showing that the jury did not rely on felony murder to find first-degree
murder, the State cannot use aggravators based on felonies which could
support the felony murder.” Id. Considering the context of the full

eon s

 

00 Se

 
 

discussion, the opinion reflects concern that any juror may have based the
murder conviction on felony murder given that there is no requirement
that the jury unanimously agree on the theory of liability, see Schad v.
Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 630-45 (1991) (plurality opinion); id, at 648-52
(Scalia, J., concurring); Anderson v, State, 121 Nev. 511, 515, 118 P.3d
184, 186 (2005). The language highlighted by Wilson contemplates the
circumstance where a jury has voted unanimously on a conviction for first-
degree murder but the verdict is silent as to the theory or theories the
jurors relied on to convict. In that circumstance, some jurors may have
relied on a felony-murder theory while others relied on the theory of
willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder to reach a unanimous finding
of first-degree murder—that is, a convietion based in part on felony
murder. As we explained in denying rehearing of McConnell I, the opinion
“makes clear that if one or more jurors decide to convict based only on a
finding of felony murder, then prosecutors cannot use the underlying
felony as an aggravator in the penalty phase.” McConnell v. State
(McConnell II), 121 Nev. 25, 30, 107 P.8d 1287, 1290-91 (2005); see also
Bejarano_v. State, 122 Nev. 1066, 1080, 146 P.3d 265, 275 (2006)
(explaining that “McConnell applies whenever it is possible that any juror
could have relied on a theory of felony murder in finding the defendant
guilty of first-degree murder"). But what the opinion “does not expressly
address (is] whether use of a felony aggravator is precluded if the jurors
find unanimously that a murder was deliberate and premeditated but also
find that it was felony murder.” McConnell II, 121 Nev. at 80, 107 P.3d at
1291.

‘This case presents a corollary to the question that McConnell I

left open as to a special verdict showing that the jury unanimously found

9

 

 
nen

 

 

that a murder was deliberate and premeditated and was felony murder: is
use of a felony aggravator precluded if a defendant pleads guilty to first-
degree murder based upon the theories of premeditation and deliberation
as well as felony murder? We answered that question in the negative in
Wilson's appeal from the judgment of conviction, Wilson, 99 Nev. at 373-

74, 664 P.2d at 335, and we see no reason to answer it differently based on

our intervening decision in MeConnel ‘The concerns expressed in
McConnell I about the insufficient narrowing of death eligibility for felony

murderers are not present when a defendant has pleaded guilty to first-
degree murder based on both premeditated and deliberate murder and
felony murder—the premeditation and deliberation shows that the
defendant thought about and intended to kill the vietim, and the felony
aggravators show that the murder is more aggravated and heinous than
other murders, thus both narrowing the class of death eligible defendants.
At least one other court that has recognized the same limitation that we
did in McConnell I has indicated that it is permissible to use the felony as
an aggravating circumstance in this situation. See, eg. State_v,
Goodman, 257 $.E.2d 669, 584-85 (N.C. 1979) (explaining that prior
decision allows use of felony aggravator only when defendant is convieted
for first-degree murder upon theory of premeditation and deliberation and
holding that felony aggravator was properly submitted to jury when
defendant found guilty upon theory of premeditation and deliberation
well as by virtue of the felony murder rule”). We therefore hold that the

 

use of a felony aggravator is not precluded where the defendant has

pleaded guilty to first-degree murder based on premeditation and
deliberation and felony murder.

10

 

 

 
Here, Wilson pleaded guilty to first-degree murder based on
premeditated and deliberate murder and felony murder. As explained
above, the plea was not limited to felony murder. His death eligibility
therefore was permissibly based on the felony aggravating circumstances
found by the sentencing panel. Accordingly, the district court did not err
by dismissing this claim.

CONCLUSION

We hold that where a defendant pleads guilty to a charge of
first-degree murder based on theories of premeditation and deliberation
and felony murder, the State is not precluded from seeking the death
penalty based on a felony aggravator using the felony murder's predicate
felony. Such is the case here. Having considered Wilson’s claims and
concluded that he failed to overcome applicable procedural bars or
demonstrate that he is actually innocent of the crimes or the death

8Wilson argues that the district court erred by dismissing his claim
that he is actually innocent of the receiving-money aggravator, NRS
200.033(6), because that aggravator is based on the same underlying facts
supporting the folony aggravator based on robbery. He recognizes that
this court previously rejected the same challenge to this aggravator in his
direct appeal from the judgment of conviction, Wilson v. State, 99 Nev.
362, 376-77, 664 P.2d 328, 337 (1983), but he urges this court to reconsider
this determination in light of our subsequent decision in Lane v, State,
114 Nev. 299, 304, 956 P.2d 88, 91 (1998), that robbery and receiving.
money aggravators are impermissibly duplicative when based on the same
facts. Lane was decided approximately 16 years after Wilson’s conviction
was final. We have yet to decide whether that case recognized existing
law or set forth a new rule, but we need not do so here. Even if the
receiving-money aggravator is invalid, Wilson is not actually innocent of
the death penalty because the felony aggravators based on robbery and
kidnapping remain. Accordingly, the district court did not er by
dismissing Wilson's challenge to his death sentence on this ground.

 

oan h
or ee

 

   
 

=

   

penalty, we conclude that the district court did not err by dismissing his
post-conviction petition. We therefore affirm the district court's order.

 

 

Parraguirre

“Because Wilson failed to overcome the procedural default rules and
did not demonstrate his actual innocence of the crimes or the death
penalty, the district court did not err by dismissing the petition as
procedurally barred, including the following claims: (1) the trial court
violated Wilson’s due process rights by refusing to conduct a hearing on
his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea; (2) the guilty pleas to
kidnapping and robbery were the product of ineffective assistance of
counsel and a deficient plea canvass; (9) trial counsel had a conflict of
interest; (4) the conviction is invalid due to prosecutorial vindictiveness;
(6) the State withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. Marvland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963), relating to five prosecution witnesses; (6) the admission of the
codefendants’ statements during the penalty hearing violated the
Confrontation Clause and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); (7)
appellate and post-conviction counsel were ineffective; (8) inadequate state
funding denied Wilson his right to effective assistance of counsel; (9) this
court inadequately reviewed the evidence supporting the aggravators on
direct appeal from the judgment of conviction; (10) the sentence is
disproportionate to those of his codefendants and was improperly imposed
by a three-judge panel; (11) the trial judge was not impartial; and (12) the
death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We note that
Wilson raised most of these claims in his second state post-conviction
petition.

   

 

12