Case Title: THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF TETON COUNTY WYOMING v. THOMAS L. CROW and CAROL-ANN G. CROW; JAMES E. MOELLER and SOUTHPAC TRUST INTERNATIONAL, INC., TRUSTEES OF THE TLC/CGC TRUST; and JEFFREY S. OVERTON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-04-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF TETON COUNTY WYOMING v. THOMAS L. CROW and CAROL-ANN G. CROW; JAMES E. MOELLER and SOUTHPAC TRUST INTERNATIONAL, INC., TRUSTEES OF THE TLC/CGC TRUST; and JEFFREY S. OVERTON2006 WY 45131 P.3d 988Case Number: Nos. 05-111 & 05-112Decided: 04/13/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
 
 
THE BOARD 
OF COUNTYCOMMISSIONERS OF TETON COUNTY, WYOMING,    

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),   

            

                   
v.  

 
 
THOMAS L. 
CROW and CAROL-ANN G. CROW; JAMES E. MOELLER AND SOUTHPAC TRUST INTERNATIONAL, 
INC., TRUSTEES OF THE TLC/CGC TRUST; and JEFFREY S. OVERTON,     

Appellees 
(Defendants) .     

 
 
Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofTetonCounty

The 
Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
James L. 
Radda, Deputy County Attorney, Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

 
 
Bradford S. 
Mead and Katherine L. Mead of Mead & Mead, Jackson, Wyoming, and Tim Newcomb 
of Grant & Newcomb, Laramie, Wyoming.  
Argument by Ms. Mead.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, Chief 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, the 
Board of County Commissioners of TetonCounty (TetonCounty), challenges the district court's Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment with respect to the punishment imposed in 
this case that involves Appellee's, Thomas L. Crow's (Crow), violation of 
TetonCounty's Land Development 
Regulations (LDR or LDRs).

 
 
[¶2]      In earlier 
proceedings, the district court determined that Section 2450 of TetonCounty's LDRs, as it was applied to the 
circumstances of this case, violated Crow's substantive due process rights.  Section 2450 limited the maximum square 
footage allowed in Crow's residence.  
After the residence was constructed in a manner that complied with 
TetonCounty's LDRs and an 
occupancy permit issued, Crow remodeled and enlarged the newly built home in 
such a manner so as to violate Section 2450.  In addition, he did not acquire the 
permit required by Teton County LDR 1320 prior to having the remodeling and 
expansion work done.  We did not 
agree with the district court's conclusion that the LDRs at issue here violated 
Crow's substantive due process rights, and we reversed and remanded this case to 
the district court for additional proceedings.  Board of CountyCommissioners of TetonCounty v. Crow, 2003 WY 40, 65 P.3d 720 (Wyo. 2003) (Crow I).

 
 
[¶3]      After further 
proceedings on remand, the district court found generally in favor of TetonCounty and imposed the following fines on 
Crow:

 
 
            
1.  The Court orders that [Crow]  pay a fine in the amount of 
$750.00 per day, for developing without a permit in violation of Section 1320 of 
the Land Development Regulations, for the time period February 1, 1999 through 
September 30, 1999, for a total of 242 days, for an aggregate fine for said 
violation in the amount of $181,500.00.

 
 
.

 
 

            
3.  The Court orders that [Crow] pay a fine in the amount of 
$750.00 per day, for violating Section 2450 of the Land Development Regulations, 
pertaining to habitable space in excess of 8,000 square feet and total floor 
area in excess of 10,000 square feet, for the time period October 1, 1999 
through May 3, 2004, for a total of 242 days, for an aggregate fine for said 
violation in the amount of $181,500.00. 1

 
 
[¶4]      The district 
court did not order abatement (i.e., the removal) of the excess square footage 
in the Crow's home as requested by TetonCounty.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶5]      TetonCounty raises these 
issues:

 
 
1.  Given 
the intentional and substantial nature of Crow 's violation of Section 2450 of 
Teton County's Land Development Regulations, did the district court err in not 
ordering the abatement requested by the County in an enforcement action brought 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-205?

 
 
2.  Given 
the intentional and substantial nature of Crow's violation of section 2450 of 
Teton County's Land Development Regulations, did the district court abuse its 
limited discretion in not ordering the abatement requested by the County in an 
enforcement action brought pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
18-5-205?

 
 
3.  Was 
the district court's findings that the parties had agreed and stipulated that 
the applicable period for the imposition of any fines was from February 15, 1999 
to September 15, 1999 inclusive, clearly erroneous?

 
 
4.  Did 
the district court err, in both the original Judgment and the Corrected and 
Amended Judgment, in not imposing a fine against Crow for each day's 
continuation of his violation of Section 2450?

 
 
Crow poses 
these as the applicable issues:

 
 
I.          
Should this Court divest the district court in this and every other 
abatement case of its traditional prerogative in fashioning and enforcing 
an  equitable 
remedy?

 
 
II.          
Should this Court substitute its judgment about an appropriate remedy for 
that of the district court that was the finder of fact and arbiter of 
law?

 
 
III.         
Should this Court substitute its judgment for that of the district court 
 made and then reiterated  about the appropriate fine for a violation of 
County regulations?

 
 
FACTS AND 
PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶6]      For purposes of 
general background, as well as context for our further discussion of the issues, 
we iterate the facts set out in Crow I:

 
 
            
On March 21, 1995, Crow appeared through counsel at a meeting of the 
Teton County Board of CountyCommissioners and requested permission to 
construct a house with 12,000 square feet of habitable space.  Crow owned four contiguous lots in the 
Owl Creek subdivision and a portion of his argument was based upon a theory that 
since he could build four separate houses with 8,000 square feet of habitable 
space, then he should be permitted to build one house with the larger dimensions 
on two of the adjoining lots.  The 
covenants that applied to the Owl Creek subdivision permitted such a building 
plan.  The minutes of the Board of 
County Commissioners contain the following entry concerning the 
application:

 
 
3.  A 
request from Peter Moyer for his client Tom Crow.  Mr. Crow has two lots in Owl Creek.  He would like to combine the two lots 
and build a 12,000 square foot house.  
The Owl Creek covenants allow for this.  However, the County does not deal with 
covenants and the CountyPlan only allows for an 8,000 square foot 
house.  Bill Collins stated that Mr. 
Crow would need a Plan Amendment or a Variance.  Peter stated that it comes down to 
whether it is grandfathered.  
Sandy 
stated that this was not grandfathered when the Plan was 
adopted.

 
 
So far as 
the record on appeal shows, Crow did not seek a plan amendment or a variance, 
nor did he further explore by administrative means whether or not his property 
was "grandfathered" so as not to be affected by the adoption of the 1994 
LDR's.

 
 
            
In April of 1996, Crow, acting through Overton2 who is a general contractor, 
obtained a building permit to construct a house with approximately 8,000 square 
feet of habitable space, and 10,000 square feet overall, on Lot 36 (the permit 
was limited only to Lot 36 and did not relate 
to any of the other contiguous lots owned by Crow).

 
 
            
Shortly after the house was completed in December of 1998, Crow appears 
to have added about 3,000 square feet of habitable living space by adding two 
bedrooms and three bathrooms under the existing vaulted roofs of two attached 
garages and the master bed/bath, as well as converting a porch to habitable 
space.  It was Crow's contention 
that this work was done "for safety concerns, for purposes of heating efficiency 
and to accommodate the needs of his extended family."   Crow contends that this work did 
not change the exterior or "footprint" of the house at all, although TetonCounty claims that to some small extent it 
did.  It appears from some of the 
evidence in the record that the expansion of the Crow house was contemplated all 
along, but that the "Phase II" portion of the work was not begun until after the 
final inspection and approval of "Phase I" by TetonCounty, which was the initial 8,000 square 
feet of the house.  The remodeling 
work was done by Overton without benefit of a building permit.  Overton conceded that a permit was not 
sought because everyone knew one would not be granted.

 
 
            
In addition to seeking demolition of the unauthorized additions to Crow's 
house, TetonCounty sought authority to 
inspect the structure in order to ensure compliance with applicable laws and 
rules and regulations.  TetonCounty also seeks to collect the 
applicable fine of up to $750.00 per day for the entire time period at issue 
here (i.e., early January of 1999 until present time).  Crow raised a number of counterclaims, 
in particular, challenging the constitutionality of certain of TetonCounty's LDR's.  Crow also filed a separate action 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.  
The two actions were consolidated.

 
 
            
Crow articulated his "philosophy" with respect to the building, and then 
the expansion, of his TetonCounty house in this 
affidavit:

 
 
            
When Cally, my wife, and I were looking for the best possible place to 
build our retirement home, we decided upon TetonCounty from among many very desirable 
alternatives.  We did so, in part, 
because of the relatively limited amount of land which could ever be developed, 
leaving most of TetonCounty in its natural state.  It is very important to us to be able to 
reach [teach] our family, especially our grandchildren, the great value of 
associating with family and the importance and beauty of nature, especially as 
found in TetonCounty.

 
 
            
Among our many considerations in deciding where to retire was that we 
wanted to build a home, not only where we could spend our entire lives, but one 
that would be an especially attractive and suitable place for our entire family, 
including our children and particularly grandchildren.  We knew we would have to compete for our 
children's and our grandchildren's time, so we wanted to build a home where they 
would want to come and bring their friends.  Our approach has worked.  We have been blessed and continue to be 
blessed with numerous visits.  We 
are committed to teaching our family, especially our grandchildren, the 
incalculable importance of sense of family, of associating with one's family and 
of appreciating nature to a healthy and balanced life.  We wanted a home that could accommodate 
our extended family in a place where the beauty of nature is obvious and 
abundant.  We wanted a place which 
would be consistent with encouraging those values and conducive to passing them 
along to our grandchildren, especially.  
We felt the need to make a place that would be so attractive that other 
demands on their time would be overcome.  
That approach demanded that we build a home of a certain size with 
sufficient bedrooms.  Our approach 
would have the advantages that we would more likely see them more often, they 
would have exposure to those values that, for us, are among the most important 
in life, and incidentally, we would also get to know with whom they were 
consorting.  We have been visiting 
the Jackson area 
since 1995.  We are certain that 
Jackson Hole is the right place, and that our home is as it needs to be to 
accommodate our extended family and to attract our children and grandchildren in 
order to inculcate the values we believe they will need as they carry forth in 
their own lives.

 
 

Crow 
I, ¶¶9-13, 
65 P.3d  at 724-726.

 
 
[¶7]      On remand, a 
trial was conducted.  The evidence 
presented demonstrated that the alterations to Crow's home enlarged its 
inhabitable space from 7,998.7 square feet to 11,304 square feet.  The district court characterized the 
alterations as "substantial," indeed, they increased the habitable space of the 
home by over 41%.  The district 
court also concluded that the Crows "embarked on a clear, detailed, and 
premeditated plan to construct their residence to its ultimate dimensions with 
the knowledge that in doing so, they were violating and attempting to avoid the 
provisions of TetonCounty's Land Development 
Regulations."  In addition, the 
district court concluded that Crow's violation of the LDRs "resulted from 
conscious wrongdoing[.]"

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      The issues at 
hand are governed by statutes that were applied by the district court in this 
case.  The first of these statutes 
is Wyo. Stat. Ann § 18-5-204 (LexisNexis 2005):

 
 
No person 
shall locate, erect, construct, reconstruct, enlarge, change, maintain or use 
any building or use any land in violation of a resolution or amendment adopted 
by any board of county commissioners under W.S. 18-5-202(c).  Each day's continuation of such 
violation is a separate offense.

 
 
No issue is 
raised, and we acknowledge as well that none could be, but that Crow altered and 
enlarged his home in violation of a resolution adopting land use regulations for 
the purposes of planning and zoning.

 
 
[¶9]      Wyo. Stat. Ann § 
18-5-205 (LexisNexis 2005) provides:

 
 
Any zoning 
resolution passed by the board pursuant to W.S. 18-5-202(b) and (c) is 
enforceable in addition to other remedies provided by law by injunction, 
mandamus or abatement.

 
 
[¶10]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-206 
(LexisNexis 2005) provides:

 
 
Whoever 
violates any provision of W.S. 18-5-201 through 18-5-204 shall be fined not more 
than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00) for each 
offense.

 
 
[¶11]   No issues of statutory construction 
are invoked by this appeal and we perceive none to be self-evident.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-205 provides that 
abatement is one potential remedy that may be imposed by the district court for 
a violation such as that committed by Crow.  In these circumstances, abatement means 
that the offending alterations would be required to be removed.  Thus, it is our conclusion that in 
enforcing this statute, the district court is invested with a measure of 
discretion.  Our objective with 
respect to the enforcement of this statute is to ascertain if the district court 
abused its discretion by its failure to require abatement.

 
 
[¶12]   We have stated that judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  See Rodenbough v. 
Miller, 2006 WY 19, ¶8, 127 P.3d 800, 802 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Watson v. 
Watson, 2002 WY 180, ¶4, 60 P.3d 124, 125 (Wyo. 2002)).  With respect to the enforcement of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 18-5-206 the district court is afforded very little 
discretion.  The district court's 
task is to ascertain with accuracy the number of days the statute has been 
violated, as set out in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-204, and to impose a fine of not 
more than $750.00 for each of those days.  
We also look to the pertinent authorities concerning such zoning and 
planning violations as those at issue here in order to flesh out the more exact 
perimeters of the district court's discretion in these 
circumstances.

 
 
Abatement

 
 
[¶13]   A zoning authority, such as 
TetonCounty in this instance, is 
authorized to enforce applicable regulations.  Ordinarily, it is also the duty of a 
zoning authority to enforce such regulations, and mandamus may be brought to 
compel performance of this duty.  
101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning § 392 
(2005).

 
 
[¶14]   In this case, TetonCounty sought to enforce its LDRs by means 
of abatement of all additions completed in violation of the 
LDRs:

 
 
            
The violation of a zoning regulation or ordinance may be enjoined, in a 
proper case, even though an injunction is not specifically permitted or 
authorized by the ordinance.  
Moreover, the violation of a zoning regulation may be enjoined under 
various statutes which confer on municipalities the power to enact zoning 
ordinances or bylaws and also authorize an injunction to restrain violations of 
such laws.  In order to warrant 
injunctive relief, there generally must be proof of a violation, or a proposed 
violation, of some specific provision of a zoning 
ordinance.

 
 
            
As a general rule, the granting or refusal of an injunction to restrain 
the violation of a zoning regulation is a matter for the discretion of the 
court.

 
 
            
A municipality does not have to show irreparable injury where it is 
authorized to seek a statutory injunction to enjoin a zoning ordinance 
violation.  Furthermore, a 
municipality has authority to obtain a temporary restraining order and 
preliminary injunction strictly enforcing its zoning ordinances without alleging 
special injury or damage to the public, and the commission of the prohibited act 
ordinarily is sufficient to warrant granting the 
injunction.

 
 
            
If a zoning violation is substantial and involves conscious wrongdoing, a 
city may be entitled to an injunction, including a mandatory injunction to 
remove an offending structure, as a matter of course.  On the other hand, although it 
ordinarily is not necessary that a town show irreparable harm as a condition to 
obtaining injunctive relief in connection with an alleged ongoing zoning 
violation, whether such relief should be extended is still governed by equitable 
principles.  Since a suit for an 
injunctional order for ordinance violation is addressed to the discretion of the 
court, a balancing of the competing equities and interests involved may be 
required.  Thus, while a violation 
of a valid zoning ordinance may be sufficient to justify, or allow, the granting 
of injunctive relief, a violation is not necessarily sufficient, by itself, to 
mandate, or require, the issuance of an injunction.

 
 
101A C.J.S. 
Zoning and Land Planning § 396 (2005); also see 2 E.C. Yokley, Zoning 
Law and Practice, § 15-6 (4th ed. 2001 and Cum. Supp. 2005); Johnson v. 
Hermes Associates Ltd., 2005 UT 82, ¶17, 128 P.3d 1151, 1157 (Utah 2005) 
("[A] county may obtain an injunction against a party in violation of a 
zoning ordinance because a violation of a zoning ordinance is also a crime, a 
showing that the zoning ordinance has been violated is tantamount to irreparable 
injury  to the public.'"); Village of Hobart v. Brown County, 2005 WI 
78, ¶¶31-37, 698 N.W.2d 83, 91-93 (Wis. 2005) (trial court must weigh equitable 
considerations and determine if its equitable power to deny an injunction, or 
any other enforcement mechanism, was appropriate under the totality of the 
circumstances presented.); Town of Delafield v. Winkelman, 2003 WI App 
92, ¶9-20, 663 N.W.2d 324, 327-331 (Wis. App. 2003) (raze order is equitable in 
nature; trial court required to balance equities); County of Kendall v. 
Rosenwinkel, 353 Ill.App.3d 529, 288 Ill.Dec. 737, 818 N.E.2d 425, 434 
(Ill.App. 2 Dist. 2004) (It is well established that where government is 
expressly authorized by statute to seek injunctive relief, the three traditional 
equitable elements necessary to obtain injunction need not be satisfied, 
i.e., need not show (1) no adequate remedy at law, (2) possess a certain and 
clearly ascertainable right, and (3)  
will suffer irreparable harm); Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel, 
795 So. 2d 191, 206-209 (Fla.App. 4 Dist. 2001) (Where statute fixes injunction 
as primary enforcement mechanism, trial court lacks discretion; even inequitable 
loss to property owner not ground for denying injunction.); and In re 
Latourneau, 726 A.2d 31, 39 (Vt. 1998) ("We held in [Town of Sherburne v. 
Carpenter, 582 A.2d 145 (Vt. 1990)], and have subsequently reiterated, that 
[i]f the zoning violation is substantial and involves conscious wrongdoing, the 
[municipality] is entitled to an injunction, including a mandatory injunction to 
remove an offending structure, as a matter of course.'" (collecting 
cases)).

 
 
[¶15]   The district court reached these 
conclusions with respect to abatement:

 
 
105.  Abatement 
of the violation therefore requires serious consideration from the Court.  The conduct of the Crows and Overton was 
deliberate, premeditated, and egregious.  
However, the Court believes the interests of the citizens of TetonCounty are adequately addressed by the 
fines imposed herein.

 
 
106.  The 
Court's leniency in this regard should not, however, be misconstrued.  The Court has the authority to order 
abatement as a remedy for violations of Teton County's LDR's and these parties 
and future litigants are on notice that the remedy of abatement is likely for 
future violations brought to this Court's attention.

 
 
[¶16]   The district court was correct in 
sofar as it determined that it had the authority to order abatement.  However, based on the authority recited 
above, we agree that TetonCounty, the zoning and planning authority, 
need not make a showing of irreparable injury.  The violation of the LDR constitutes a 
basis for the imposition of an abatement order.  The district court is required to make 
specific findings balancing the equities.  
Only then may  the district 
court ascertain if its equitable power to deny an injunction, or any 
other enforcement mechanism, is appropriate under the totality of the 
circumstances presented.

 
 
Fines

 
 
[¶17]   As noted above, the district court 
imposed a fine on Crow for 242 days in connection with Crow's violation of the 
habitable space regulation.  It is 
evident that Crow's violation of that regulation continued for a considerably 
longer time than 242 days, although we decline to make a precise calculation in 
that regard in disposing of this appeal.  
It is also readily evident to this Court that Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 18-5-204 
and 18-5-206 make imposition of a fine mandatory for each day a violation 
continues.  See Merrill v. 
Jansma, 2004 WY 26, ¶42, 86 P.3d 270, 288 (Wyo. 2004); also see 2 E.C. 
Yokley, supra, § 15-2 at 15-3; and Wright v. City of Guthrie, 1 P.2d 162, 163-64 (Okla. 1931).  We 
agree with TetonCounty that the district court is required to impose a 
fine for each day Crow's habitable space violation continued, and that the 
record does not reflect a stipulation by TetonCounty that the fine should be imposed for 
a lesser period of time. 

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶18]   The Judgment of the district court 
is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1The 
district court's original judgment was filed on January 24, 2005.  On February 3, 2005, TetonCounty filed a motion to correct a 
clerical mistake in the judgment.  
On February 22, 2005, TetonCounty filed a notice of appeal making 
reference to the original judgment.  
On February 23, 2005, the district court entered an order amending the 
original judgment, and that amendment affected only paragraph 3, of the original 
judgment quoted in detail above.  On 
March 15, 2005, TetonCounty filed a notice of appeal making 
reference to the order amending the original judgment.  For these reasons, this case is 
captioned with two docket numbers, 05-111 and 05-112.  However, for purposes of disposition, we 
will treat the cases as consolidated.

 
 

2 
Jeffrey 
Overton is the contractor who did the initial construction, as well as the 
remodeling/expansion of Crow's home.  
He is not a party to this appeal, although he was fined the sum of 
$36,300.00 for his failure to obtain a development permit for the expansion 
project.