Case Title: In re Adoption of Quan

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11748

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2014-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11748 
 
ADOPTION OF QUAN. 
 
 
December 18, 2014. 
 
 
Adoption, Dispensing with parent's consent. Parent and Child, 
Dispensing with parent's consent to adoption, Adoption. 
Practice, Civil, Adoption, Stipulation, Record. 
 
 
 
 
The Department of Children and Families (department) and 
the child in this case, whom we refer to as Quan,1 appealed from 
an order of a Juvenile Court judge vacating decrees terminating 
the parental rights of Quan's biological mother and father.  A 
panel of the Appeals Court, in a memorandum and order pursuant 
to that court's rule 1:28, Adoption of Quan, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 
1103 (2014), reversed the judge's order, effectively reinstating 
the termination decrees, and remanded the case to the Juvenile 
Court for a so-called "best interest" hearing regarding the 
permanent placement of the child.  We granted the parents' 
applications for further appellate review.  We affirm the 
judge's order. 
 
 
Background.  In July, 2011, the department filed a petition 
pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 24, for the care and protection of 
Quan, who at that time was one year old.  Both the mother and 
father eventually stipulated to the entry of decrees (one 
against each of them) adjudicating the child to be in need of 
care and protection, committing him to the custody of the 
department, and terminating their parental rights.  The parents 
expressly waived the right to trial on the petition, as well as 
the right to appeal from a final decree entered pursuant to the 
                                                          
 
 
1 A pseudonym. 
 
2 
 
stipulation, but purported to reserve a right to participate in 
a subsequent best interest placement hearing.  Each parent 
additionally stipulated that "[t]he adoption of [the child] 
shall be final and not subject to review," that his or her 
agreement was "voluntary," and that he or she had "not relied on 
any representations other than those contained in this 
agreement."  Each parent proposed adoptive or guardianship 
resources and acknowledged that the department had recruited 
Quan's foster parents as adoptive resources.   
 
 
The judge accepted the stipulations.  The final decrees 
indicate that he considered the factors enumerated in G. L. 
c. 210, § 3 (c), and the placement plan proposed by the 
department, and that he "found that [each] parent lacks the 
ability, capacity, fitness and readiness to assume parental 
responsibility for said child, and is currently unfit."  The 
final decrees terminated the parents' parental rights. 
 
 
Approximately nine months later -- but before any further 
hearing on the child's permanent placement -- the parents moved 
for relief from the final decrees.  Their motions apparently 
were prompted by the Appeals Court's recent decision in Adoption 
of Malik, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 436 (2013).2  The mother's supporting 
affidavit averred that her agreement to the termination of her 
parental rights was the result of an "agreement and assurances" 
that she would be "entitled to participate in a best interest 
hearing," and that she was "assured" that she could appeal from 
any decision following such a hearing.  The father's affidavit 
averred that he had agreed to termination of his rights on the 
                                                          
 
 
2 Adoption of Malik, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 436 (2013), was 
decided by the Appeals Court after the decrees terminating 
parental rights in this case were entered, but before the 
parents moved for relief from the decrees.  That case also 
involved parents who stipulated to their unfitness but purported 
to reserve a right to participate in the placement hearing.  The 
Appeals Court concluded that a parent who has stipulated to 
termination of his or her parental rights has no right, after 
the stipulation has been accepted and a termination decree has 
entered, to participate in the placement hearing or to challenge 
any adverse placement decision on appeal.  The court suggested, 
however, that "the birth parent and the department could agree 
in a particular case to defer entry of a termination decree, 
based upon a parental stipulation of unfitness, until after the 
permanency hearing."  Id. at 441 n.10.  We express no view on 
the correctness of the court's holding in Adoption of Malik, 
supra. 
3 
 
understanding that he "would have a best interest hearing" and 
that, based on his belief that there would be such a hearing, he 
did not appeal.  He further alleged that the department had 
decided to leave Quan in his current placement without a best 
interest placement hearing and, therefore, that the father had 
been deprived of his right to appeal. 
 
 
After a hearing, the judge vacated the decrees terminating 
the mother's and father's parental rights.  He concluded that 
the parents' stipulations had not been knowing or voluntary, but 
instead were the product of a collective misunderstanding by the 
parents, their counsel, and the judge, all of whom believed that 
parental rights could be terminated in advance of a best 
interest placement hearing with the parents retaining the right 
to participate in the placement hearing and to appeal from any 
adverse placement decision.3 
 
 
Discussion.  The judge granted relief from the decrees 
terminating parental rights on the ground that there had been a 
material mistake of law or neglect, in the sense that the 
applicable law had changed.4  See Hingham v. Director of the Div. 
of Marine Fisheries, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 908, 909 (1979) (Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 60 [b] [1], 365 Mass. 828 [1974], is appropriate vehicle 
for raising question of change in law).5  Motions for relief from 
                                                          
 
 
3 The judge stated in his order that he, "and presumably the 
parties, utilized this process in reliance on two unpublished 
court decisions.  Adoption of Uriah, [Appeals Court     
No. 2010-P-1783 (May 6, 2011)], and Adoption of Kiara, [Appeals 
Court No. 2009-P-1705 (February 3, 2010)].  In each of these 
cases, the parents stipulated to a termination of their parental 
rights and then later participated in a hearing as to the best 
interests of the subject child vis-à-vis competing permanent 
placement plans." 
 
 
 
4 See note 2, supra. 
 
 
5 The parents moved for relief, and the judge purported to 
act, pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60, 365 Mass. 828 (1974).  
Although the rules of civil procedure do not apply in care and 
protection and parental termination proceedings in the Juvenile 
Court, and although the Juvenile Court Rules for the Care and 
Protection of Children do not expressly contain a rule on relief 
from judgment, we have little doubt that a Juvenile Court judge 
has authority to grant such relief, if warranted, and that Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 60 provides "a cogent standard" in this respect, at 
least in the circumstances of this case.  See Care & Protection 
4 
 
final judgment are commended to the judge's discretion, and "a 
judge's decision will not be overturned, except upon a showing 
of a clear abuse of discretion."  Scannell v. Ed. Ferreirinha & 
Irmao, Lda., 401 Mass. 155, 158 (1987).  That applies with 
particular force where, as here, the motion judge was the same 
judge who conducted the colloquies, accepted the stipulations, 
and entered the decrees.  See Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 
303, 307 (1986) (same general principle in criminal context).  
Cf. Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 423 Mass. 584, 589 
(1996) (deference given to motion judge's "determination of his 
or her contemporaneous intent" for purposes of Mass. R. Civ. P. 
60 [a], 365 Mass. 828 [1974]).   
 
 
The Juvenile Court docket indicates that the judge 
conducted colloquies with both parents before accepting the 
stipulations, and the decrees indicate that the judge considered 
the proposed placement plans.  The parents' attempt to reserve 
their rights regarding a placement hearing was clearly the 
subject of some thought and discussion.  Notably absent from the 
record on appeal, however, is any transcript of the colloquies, 
or a statement in lieu of a transcript of what transpired at the 
colloquies.  It was incumbent on the department and the child, 
as the appellants, to provide a record adequate for appellate 
review.  Commonwealth v. Woody, 429 Mass. 95, 96-99 (1999).  See 
Mass. R. A. P. 8 (a), as amended, 378 Mass. 932 (1979) (record 
includes transcript of proceedings).  See also Mass. R. A. P. 
8 (c), as amended, 378 Mass. 932 (1979) (if transcript not 
available, statement of evidence or proceedings may be 
substituted).  The record they have provided is not adequate to 
the task.  Without a record of what transpired at the 
colloquies, we cannot say that the motion judge's findings 
concerning the stipulations and the circumstances in which they 
were made were unsupported by or contrary to the evidence; nor 
can we say, on this record, that the appellants have 
demonstrated an abuse of discretion in the judge's order 
vacating the termination decrees.  
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion.  The order granting the parents' motions for 
relief from the final decrees terminating their parental rights 
is affirmed.  The matter is remanded to the Juvenile Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this decision.  It has been 
approximately twenty-two months since the entry of the final 
decrees in this case.  Given the very significant, time-
sensitive interests of Quan and his biological parents that are 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of Richard, 456 Mass. 1002, 1002 n.3 (2010), citing Care & 
Protection of Zelda, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 869, 871 (1989). 
5 
 
at stake, we expect that the proceedings on remand will be 
concluded expeditiously.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
Roberta Mann Driscoll for the father. 
 
Ann Balmelli O'Connor, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, for the mother. 
 
Brian R. Pariser for Department of Children and Families. 
 
Robert J. McCarthy, Jr., for the child.