Case Title: Ex parte William Ernest Kuenzel.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1141359

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2016-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
04/01/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2015-2016
____________________
1141359
____________________
Ex parte William Ernest Kuenzel
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: William Ernest Kuenzel
v.
State of Alabama)
(Talladega Circuit Court, CC-88-211.60;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-13-0899)
BRYAN, Justice.
1141359
WRIT DENIED. NO OPINION.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Moore, C.J., and Murdock, J., dissent.
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1141359
MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).
William Ernest Kuenzel has been on death row in Alabama
since 1988. He was convicted of murder for the killing of
Linda Jean Offord, a convenience-store clerk. The murder was
made capital because Offord was killed during an armed
robbery. See § 13A-5-40(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975. The main
witness against Kuenzel was Harvey Venn, with whom Kuenzel
shared a residence. Venn, who pleaded guilty as an accomplice
to the murder, testified that Kuenzel suggested robbing the
convenience store in Sylacauga. Venn owned a 1984 Buick Regal
automobile, which a number of witnesses testified to seeing at
the convenience store on the night of the murder with Venn in
the driver's seat and an unidentified man in the front
passenger seat. Venn testified that he sat in the car while
Kuenzel went inside the convenience store with a 16-gauge
shotgun. Venn heard a shot and saw the clerk fall backwards.
Offord died shortly thereafter from a gunshot wound to the
chest.
The only witness, apart from Venn, who identified Kuenzel
as being at the scene was then 16-year-old April Harris, who
testified that she was riding in a car past the convenience
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1141359
store approximately an hour before the murder and that she saw
Venn and Kuenzel inside the store. Without Harris's
identification, the evidence was insufficient to convict
Kuenzel. Alabama requires that accomplice testimony be
corroborated:
"A conviction of felony cannot be had on the
testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by
other evidence tending to connect the defendant with
the 
commission 
of 
the 
offense, 
and 
such
corroborative evidence, if it merely shows the
commission of the offense or the circumstances
thereof, is not sufficient."
§ 
12-21-222, 
Ala. 
Code 
1975 
(emphasis 
added). 
The
corroboration requirement exists to protect the innocent from
the natural tendency of malefactors to avoid the consequences
of their actions, thus "recognizing the fraility of human
nature and proneness of one caught in the meshes of the law to
lay his crime on another, if by so doing he may escape a just
punishment." Segars v. State, 19 Ala. App. 407, 407-08, 97 So.
747, 747 (1923). In the absence of the corroboration
requirement, "any guilty party is apt to implicate an innocent
party in exchange for a grant of immunity from prosecution."
Lindhorst v. State, 346 So. 2d 11, 15 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977). 
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1141359
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on direct appeal
found 
Harris's 
corroboration 
testimony 
adequate 
to 
satisfy 
the
statute:
"Excluding Venn's testimony, the evidence shows
that the murder was committed shortly after 11:00
p.m. April Harris testified that she saw Venn's car
at the store between 9:30 and 10:00 p.m. and that
she saw both Venn and [Kuenzel] inside the store at
that time. Other witnesses testified that Venn and
an unidentified white male were at the store sitting
in Venn's automobile around 10:00 or 10:30 p.m. In
our opinion, this testimony, while certainly not
overwhelming, was sufficient to corroborate Venn's
testimony and to satisfy the requirements of §
12-21-222."
Kuenzel v. State, 577 So. 2d 474, 514 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990),
aff'd, 577 So. 2d 531 (Ala. 1991).
I question whether the corroboration evidence was
sufficient to satisfy the statute. 
The 
methodology for testing
corroboration evidence is first to eliminate the accomplice's
testimony and then to see "if upon examination of all the
other evidence there is sufficient inculpatory evidence
tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the
offense." Sorrell v. State, 249 Ala. 292, 293, 31 So. 2d 81,
83 (1947) (quoting 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 752 (11th
ed.)). Leaving out Venn's testimony, the only evidence
presented to this Court tending to connect Kuenzel to the
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1141359
murder of Offord is Harris's drive-by sighting of Venn and
Kuenzel in the convenience store an hour or more before the
crime. Though one might speculate from this evidence that
Kuenzel was involved in the crime, the sighting is also
consistent with his innocence. "Corroboration, to be legally
sufficient, must be unequivocal and of a substantive
character. It must be inconsistent with innocence of the
defendant and do more than raise a suspicion of guilt." White
v. State, 48 Ala. App. 111, 117, 262 So. 2d 313, 319 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1972). Indeed, Harris's testimony, in the absence
of Venn's testimony, tends neither to incriminate nor to
exonerate Kuenzel. A fact presented to corroborate accomplice
testimony "is not sufficient if it is equivocal or uncertain
in character and must be such that legitimately tends to
connect the defendant with the crime." Sorrell, 249 Ala. at
293, 31 So. 2d at 83. 
"Being in the company of an accomplice in
proximity in time and place to the commission of a
crime is not always sufficient corroboration to meet
the requirements of our statute .... Yet, when the
accomplice and accused are seen together in rather
unusual places and times, in proximity to the scene
of the crime which was committed at an unseasonable
hour, the requirements of corroboration are met."
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1141359
Tidwell v. State, 37 Ala. App. 228, 230-31, 66 So. 2d 845, 847
(1953). 
One's presence in a convenience store at 9:30-10:00 p.m.
is not of itself unusual. Although connecting Kuenzel to the
place of the crime, his presence there does not connect him to
the crime itself or the time of its occurrence, which was
after 11:00 p.m. "[M]ere presence at the scene of the crime is
not enough to support a conviction." Ex parte Smiley, 655 So.
2d 1091, 1095 (Ala. 1995). Corroboration evidence "must tend
to connect the defendant with the crime or point to the
defendant, as distinguished from another person, as the
perpetrator of the crime." 2 Charles W. Gamble & Robert J.
Goodwin, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 300.01(5) (6th ed.
2009).
Regardless of the weakness of the corroboration evidence,
the merits of Kuenzel's murder conviction are not before us.
Kuenzel raised the corroboration issue on direct appeal, and,
as stated above, the Court of Criminal Appeals ruled against
him and this Court affirmed that judgment. He has now filed
his second Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition. Further review
of the corroboration evidence presented at Kuenzel's trial is
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1141359
precluded by the rule against successive petitions, Rule
32.2(b), Ala. R. Crim. P., and the bar against raising issues
in a Rule 32 petition that have already been decided on direct
appeal. Rule 32.2(a)(4), Ala. R. Crim. P. However, Kuenzel
does not seek review of the trial evidence. Instead he argues
that he wishes to present "newly discovered material facts,"
Rule 32.1(e), Ala. R. Crim. P., that require reversal of his
conviction. The evidence he proffers as newly discovered is
grand-jury 
testimony of April Harris, first disclosed in 
2010,
that, he claims, indicates she could not identify Kuenzel as
the man she saw in the convenience store on the night of the
murder. Because the discovery of this evidence occurred over
two decades after Kuenzel's conviction, his only procedural
route for bringing that evidence before the circuit court for
a hearing was a new Rule 32 petition filed within six months
of discovery of that evidence. Rule 32.1(c), Ala. R. Crim. P.
Kuenzel filed his current Rule 32 petition in September 2013,
long past the six-month filing deadline.
That deadline, however, is not jurisdictional and in
extraordinary circumstances may be disregarded under the
doctrine of equitable tolling. Ex parte Ward, 46 So. 3d 888,
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1141359
896-98 
(Ala. 2007). In general "equitable tolling is 
available
in 
extraordinary 
circumstances 
that 
are 
beyond 
the
petitioner's control and that are unavoidable even with the
exercise of diligence." 46 So. 3d at 897. Kuenzel argues that
he was litigating his postconviction claims in federal court
when he learned of the previously undisclosed grand-jury
transcripts  and that he deferred filing his Rule 32 petition
1
alleging 
newly discovered evidence 
until the 
federal
proceedings concluded. The Court of Criminal Appeals,
perceiving no reason why Kuenzel could not file his second
Rule 32 petition while his federal case was proceeding,
affirmed the circuit court's finding that the petition was
untimely.
Ordinarily, that would be the end of the matter. Because
of the irreversibility of the death penalty, however, I
believe some leeway may be warranted in this case. "'In a
capital case such as this, the consequences of error are
terminal, and 
we 
therefore pay particular attention to whether
principles of "equity would make the rigid application of a
In addition to the disclosure in 2010 of Harris's grand-
1
jury testimony, Kuenzel also claims that he became aware of
other exonerating  evidence at that time.
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1141359
limitation period unfair" and whether the petitioner has
"exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and bringing
[the] claims."'" Ex parte Ward, 46 So. 3d at 897 (quoting Fahy
v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2001), quoting in turn
Miller v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 618 (3d
Cir. 1998)). 
A significant consideration, I believe, in assessing the
equities in this matter is that Kuenzel's first Rule 32
petition, filed in 1993, was never heard on the merits because
of another missed deadline. Kuenzel's attorney at that time
apparently measured the time for filing his first Rule 32
petition from the denial of a petition for the writ of
certiorari by the United States Supreme Court rather than by
this Court. See Kuenzel v. State, [Ms. CR-13-0899, July 10,
2015] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2015). Ultimately
the trial court dismissed that petition as time-barred and
thus did not hold an evidentiary hearing. Id. Kuenzel
subsequently litigated his claims in federal court, but,
because of the procedural default in state court, had to meet
the high burden of demonstrating that "'it is more likely than
not that no reasonable juror would have found [Kuenzel] guilty
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1141359
beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Kuenzel v. Commissioner, Ala.
Dep't of Corr., 690 F.3d 1311, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). 
Kuenzel's counsel apparently delayed filing his second
Rule 32 petition in state court until the conclusion of the
federal proceedings. The current petition was filed September
23, 2013, four months after the United States Supreme Court
denied Kuenzel's petition for a writ of certiorari in his
federal case. Kuenzel v. Thomas, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2759
(2013). Because that petition has now also been defaulted,
Kuenzel 
has 
never 
had 
an 
opportunity 
to 
present 
a
postconviction claim on the merits in state court. Further,
the original state-court default adversely affected his
standard of proof in federal court. Although "[i]n noncapital
cases, 
attorney 
error, 
miscalculation, 
inadequate 
research, 
or
other mistakes have not been found to rise to the
'extraordinary' 
circumstances 
required 
for 
equitable 
tolling,"
Fahy, 240 F.3d at 244, I believe that in this capital case the
procedural errors that have consistently prevented Kuenzel
from having a Rule 32 petition considered on the merits may
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1141359
constitute an extraordinary circumstance that could justify
granting him relief from his second default. 
Another consideration may reinforce this argument.
Kuenzel argues in his brief that Alabama law prohibits the
same claims from being heard simultaneously in two different
courts in this state. "No plaintiff is entitled to prosecute
two actions in the courts of this state at the same time for
the same cause and against the same party." § 6-5-440, Ala.
Code 1975. "[T]he courts of this state" include federal
courts. Johnson v. Brown–Serv. Ins. Co., 293 Ala. 549, 307 So.
2d 518 (1974). Kuenzel argues that his delay in filing his
second Rule 32 claim while he was litigating the same matter
in federal court is consistent with the policy embodied in
that statute. I believe that certiorari review would allow the
Court to fully consider this argument too.
Because Kuenzel, a death-row inmate, has never had an
opportunity 
to present his postconviction claims on the 
merits
in any Alabama court and because the two procedural defaults
may not have arisen from a lack of diligence on his part in
pursuing his claims, but from unfortunate errors of counsel,
I would grant Kuenzel's petition for a writ of certiorari to
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1141359
examine whether he qualified for equitable tolling of the six-
month filing deadline for presenting newly discovered
evidence. Because the transcript of Harris's grand-jury
testimony may shed further doubt on what I consider to be a
questionable application of the accomplice-corroboration
statute, I believe that equitable tolling, if appropriate,
could potentially alter the 
ultimate 
disposition of this case. 
Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the decision to
deny Kuenzel's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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