Case Title: Canarelli v. Eighth Judicial District Court

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 29

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2020-05-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
136 Nev., Advance Opinion 24
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA.

LAWRENCE D. CANARELLI; HEIDI No. 78883
CANARELLI AND FRANK MARTIN,
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE
ESTATE OF EDWARD C. LUBBERS,
FORMER TRUSTEES,

Petitioners,

vs.
‘THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE
GLORIA STURMAN, DISTRICT
JUDGE,
Respondents,

and
SCOTT CANARELLI, BENEFICIARY
OF THE SCOTT LYLE GRAVES
CANARELLI IRREVOCABLE TRUST
DATED FEBRUARY 24, 1998,
Real Party in Interest.

 

 

Original petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus
challenging a district court order compelling the production of documents
ina trust matter.

Petition granted.

Campbell & Williams and J. Colby Williams, Donald J. Campbell, and
Philip R. Erwin, Las Vegas,
for Petitioners.

Marquis Aurbach Coffing and Liane K. Wakayama, Las Vegas,

for Petitioner Frank Martin, Special Administrator for the Estate of
Edward C. Lubbers.

210-2008

 

 
Solomon Dwiggins & Freer, Ltd., and Dana A. Dwiggins and Tess E.
Johnson, Las Vegas,
for Real Party in Interest.

 

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, STIGLICH,
This court has not had the opportunity to address whether

 

there is a fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege, whereby a
fiduciary such as a trustee is prohibited from asserting the attorney-client
privilege against a beneficiary on matters of trust administration. Because
the Legislature created five specific exceptions to the attorney-client
privilege, none of which are the fiduciary exception, we expressly decline to
recognize the fiduciary exception in Nevada.

Petitioners are former trustees challenging a district court
order compelling the production of allegedly privileged documents in a trust
dispute with a beneficiary. The first group of documents at issue contains
a former trustee's notes related to a phone call with counsel, and the second
group of documents contains the former trustee’s notes taken during a
meeting with the other trustees, counsel, the opposing party, and an
independent appraiser. Because the former trustee communicated the
content of the first group of documents to counsel, we determine that these
documents are protected by the attorney-client privilege and are therefore
undiscoverable. Because the former trustee created the second group of
documents in anticipation of litigation and the substantial-need exception
to the work-product doctrine does not apply, we determine that these

 

 

 
od

documents are protected by the work-product doctrine and are therefore
undiscoverable. Accordingly, the district court acted in excess of its
jurisdiction in compelling the partial production of the disputed documents,
and we therefore grant a writ of prohibition.

BACKGROUND
Underlying trust dispute

Real party in interest Scott Canarelli is the beneficiary of the
Scott Lyle Graves Canarelli Irrevocable Trust, dated February 24, 1998 (the
Trust). Scott's parents, petitioners Lawrence and Heidi Canarelli, conveyed
minority interests in their various business entities to Scott, which Scott in
turn contributed to the Trust. Lawrence and Heidi served as the Trust’s
family trustees and, as such, made discretionary payments from the Trust,
‘to Scott for his health, education, support, and maintenance. In addition to
the two family trustees, the Trust had one independent trustee, Edward
Lubbers. Lubbers also served as Lawrence and Heidi’s personal attorney;
in this litigation, his interests are represented by petitioner Frank Martin
as Special Administrator of the Estate of Edward C. Lubbers.

Scott alleges that the trustees unlawfully withheld Trust
distributions. In 2012, Scott's attorney sent a letter to Lubbers stating that
the trustees were demanding receipts from Scott’s purchases in a manner
that was per se bad faith. The letter also threatened a lawsuit to redress
the trustees’ discretionary payment decisions and remove them from their
roles as trustees. After receiving the letter, Lubbers listed “Scott—lawsuit
threatened” as a line item on one of Lawrence and Heidi’s business entities’

meeting agendas.

 
om

In May 2013, Lawrence and Heidi resigned from their roles as
family trustees, and Lubbers became successor family trustee. A week after
Lawrence and Heidi resigned, Lubbers entered into a purchase agreement
exceeding $25 million on behalf of the Trust to sell off the Trust's ownership
in Lawrence and Heidi's business entities.

Scott subsequently filed a petition asking the district court to
compel Lubbers to provide all information related to the purchase
agreement and an inventory and accounting for the Trust. Less than two
weeks later, Lubbers retained attorneys David Lee and Carlene Renwick.
According to billing records, Lee and Renwick spoke on the phone with
Lubbers for approximately half an hour on October 14, 2013, about Lubbers’
“responses to petition.” Lee and Renwick continued to correspond with
Lubbers via phone and email over the next two days, and Lubbers filed a
response to Scott's petition on October 16, 2013. Scott filed a supplemental
petition asserting new claims of breach of fiduciary duty against Lawrence,
Heidi, and Lubbers. Lubbers resigned from his role as trustee in 2017 and
died six months later.

Disputed documents

During discovery, Lawrence, Heidi, and Lubbers inadvertently
disclosed documents containing Lubbers’ notes. ‘They attempted to claw
back the documents, citing the attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine.

The first group of disputed documents (Group 1 documents)
contains Lubbers’ notes related to his phone call with Lee and Renwick on
October 14, 2013. One document contains Lubbers’ typed notes composed
in preparation of this conversation. The other documents contain Lubbers’

handwritten notes contemporaneously memorializing the call. Lee and

 
Renwick confirmed in declarations that on their October 14, 2013, call with
Lubbers, Lubbers asked about his potential response to Scott’s petitions, of
which there were three pending. They also verified that Lubbers stated “his,
views about several matters related to the petitions and potential strategies
for defending against certain of the allegations contained therein.”

‘The second group of disputed documents (Group 2 documents)
contains Lubbers’ notes contemporaneously memorializing an in-person
meeting he attended on December 19, 2013, with the other trustees,
counsel, Scott, and an independent trust appraiser.

Procedural history

Scott moved for a determination of privilege. ‘The discovery
commissioner found that each of the disputed documents appeared to
contain Lubbers’ notes. The commissioner then concluded that a portion of
the Group 1 documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege and
the work-product doctrine, but that other portions were discoverable. For
the discoverable portions, the commissioner found that Lubbers’ notes
contained factual statements or information unrelated to the Trust.
Alternatively, to the extent the factual statements intertwined with
attorney-client privileged communications or work product, discovery was
nonetheless permitted because of the fiduciary and common-interest
exceptions to the attorney-client privilege and the substantial-need
exception to the work-product doctrine. The commissioner concluded that
the Group 2 documents were discoverable because, even if they constituted
work product and contained primarily factual information, the substantial-
need exception to the work-product doctrine applied,

 
‘The district court generally adopted the commissioner's
findings. However, the district court concluded that the commissioner's
findings as to the Group 1 document containing Lubbers’ typed notes were
based upon assumptions that the notes were communicated to counsel and
therefore protected by the attorney-client privilege. Nevertheless, the
district court agreed with the commissioner's conclusion that a portion of
the document was discoverable.

Lawrence, Heidi, and Lubbers petition this court for a writ of
prohibition preventing the district court from compelling production of the
disputed documents and a writ of mandamus directing the district court to
find the disputed documents undiscoverable and order their return or
destruction.

DISCUSSION

This original proceeding asks us to determine whether the
district court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in compelling the production
of allegedly privileged material. Because the disclosure of privileged
information is immediately harmful and this petition provides an
opportunity to address a novel issue of law, we consider the petition. In
doing so, we first consider whether the Group 1 documents are protected by
the attorney-client privilege, thereby evaluating whether petitioners proved
that the documents were communicated to counsel, whether the fiduciary
exception to the attorney-client privilege exists in Nevada, and whether the
‘common-interest exception to the attorney-client privilege applies. We then

 

"The commissioner and the district court disagreed as to one portion
of one Group 1 document containing Lubbers’ memorialization notes.
Whereas the commissioner found that the document was discoverable in its
entirety, the district court concluded that only a portion was discoverable
because the other portions did not involve matters of trust administration.

 
decide whether the Group 2 documents are protected by the work-product,
doctrine and assess whether the substantial-need exception to the work-
product doctrine is applicable.

Writ relief

“When the district court acts without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, a writ of prohibition may issue to curb the extrajurisdictional
act.” Toll v, Wilson, 135 Nev. 430, 432, 453 P.3d 1215, 1217 (2019) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Therefore, even though discovery issues are
traditionally subject to the district court’s discretion and unreviewable by a
writ petition, this court will intervene when the district court issues an
order requiring disclosure of privileged information.” Id. Writ relief is also
appropriate when “an important issue of law needs clarification” and this,
court's invocation of its original jurisdiction serves public policy. Diaz v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 88, 93, 993 P.2d 50, 54 (2000) internal
quotation marks omitted). “One such instance is when a writ petition offers
this court a unique opportunity to define the precise parameters of [al
privilege conferred by a statute that this court has never interpreted.” Id.
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Because the district court order compels the disclosure of
allegedly privileged information, we elect to entertain this petition for a writ,
of prohibition.? See Las Vegas Dev. Assocs., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 130 Nev. 334, 338, 325 P.3d 1259, 1262 (2014) (establishing that a

 

writ of prohibition, rather than a writ of mandamus, is the appropriate
mechanism to correct an order that compels disclosure of privileged

information). Our intervention will also clarify whether Nevada recognizes

“Therefore, the petition is denied insofar as it seeks a writ of
mandamus.

 
om ae

the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege and will serve public
policy by helping trustees and attorneys understand the extent to which
their communications are confidential.
Standard of review

“Discovery matters are within the district court’s sound
discretion, and we will not disturb a district court’s ruling regarding
discovery unless the court has clearly abused its discretion.” Club Vista
Fin, Servs., LLC v, Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 128 Nev. 224, 228, 276 P.3d
246, 249 (2012). Findings of fact are given deference and will not be set
aside unless they are clearly erroneous or not supported by substantial
evidence. Sowers v. Forest Hills Subdivision, 129 Nev. 99, 105, 294 P.3d
427, 432 (2013). Conclusions of law, including the meaning and scope of
statutes, are reviewed de novo. Dewey v. Redev. Agency of Reno, 119 Nev.
87, 93-94, 64 P.3d 1070, 1075 (2008).
The Group 1 documents are protected by the attorney-client privilege

Petitioners contend that the Group 1 documents are protected
by the attorney-client privilege because the content of the documents was
‘communicated to counsel. “The attorney-client privilege is a long-standing
privilege at common law that protects communications between attorneys
and clients.” Wynn Resorts, Ltd. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 133 Nev.
369, 374, 399 P.3d 334, 341 (2017). The purpose of the attorney-client
privilege “is to encourage clients to make full disclosures to their attorneys
in order to promote the broader public interests of recognizing the
importance of fully informed advocacy in the administration of justice.” Id.

‘The Legislature has codified the attorney-client privilege:

A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to
prevent any other person from disclosing,
confidential communications:

 

 
om

1. Between the client or the client's
representative and the client's lawyer or the
representative of the client’s lawyer.

3. Made for the purpose of facilitating the
rendition of professional legal services to the client,
by the client or the client's lawyer to a lawyer
representing another in a matter of common
interest.

NRS 49.095 (emphasis added). “Mere facts are not privileged, but
communications about facts in order to obtain legal advice are.” Wynn
Resorts, 133 Nev. at 374, 399 P.3d at 341. The party asserting the privilege
has the burden to prove that the material is in fact privileged. Ralls v.
United States, 52 F.3d 223, 225 (9th Cir. 1995).

“It is well settled that privileges, whether creatures of statute
or the common law, should be interpreted and applied narrowly.” See Clark
Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Las Vegas Review-Journal, 134 Nev. 700, 705, 429 P.8d
313, 318 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “if the
purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and
client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether
particular discussions will be protected.” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449
US. 383, 393 (1981).

We have not yet determined the extent to which an individual
must deliver his or her notes to an attorney for the notes to constitute
“communications” under NRS 49.095. Federal courts, however, have
concluded that physical delivery is unnecessary for common-law attorney-
client privilege to attach. See United States v. DeFonte, 441 F.3d 92, 96 (24
Cir, 2006) (reasoning that “(clertainly, an outline of what a client wishes to
discuss with counsel—and which is subsequently discussed with one’s

counsel—would seem to fit squarely within our understanding of the scope

 

 
of the privilege”); see also United States v. Jimenez, 265 F. Supp. 34 1348,
1351-53 (S.D. Ala. 2017) (determining that an individual's emails that
served as an outline for future attorney-client conversations but were never
delivered to his attorney were nonetheless privileged); Cencast Serus., L.P.
v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 496, 505-06 (Fed. Cl. 2010) (reasoning that it
should be sufficient to find an attorney-client privilege if a party created the
notes to aid in a meeting with an attorney),

We agree and conclude that, under NRS 49.095, the physical
delivery of notes is not required. NRS 49.095 clearly protects
communications. See NRS 49.095 (“A client has a privilege to refuse to
disclose, and to prevent any other person from disclosing, confidential
communications .. ..” (emphasis added)). ‘Thus, so long as the content of
the notes was previously or is subsequently communicated between a client
and counsel, the notes constitute communications subject to the attorney-
client privilege. Holding otherwise would discourage a client from diligently
preparing for a conversation with counsel and undermine a client's ability
to confidently memorialize any legal advice received. See Upjohn Co., 449
US. at 392 (construing the privilege to avoid discouraging a client from
conveying relevant information to counsel). As a result, an attorney would
be unable to provide fully informed advocacy. See Wynn Resorts, 133 Nev.
at 374, 399 P.3d at 341 (holding that the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege is to encourage clients to make full disclosures to their attorneys
to promote fully informed advocacy). In order to give full force to the
attorney-client privilege, notes that were communicated between a client
and counsel must therefore be protected.

10

 

 

 
After reviewing the Group 1 documents, we determine that the
district court clearly abused its discretion in finding that petitioners did not
prove that the notes were communicated to counsel. Petitioners presented
Lee and Renwick’s billing records, which indicated that Lee and Renwick
spoke by phone with Lubbers on October 14, 2013, about Lubbers’ response
to Scott’s petitions, one of which Scott filed just two weeks prior.
Furthermore, Lee and Renwick attested that on the call, Lubbers stated his
views about several matters related to Scott's petitions and potential
strategies for defending against them. Based on the date and content of the
Group 1 documents, it is clear that the content of both the preparation notes
and the memorialization notes was communicated between Lubbers and
counsel.

In 80 recognizing, we emphasize that the party asserting the
privilege does not have to prove that the client spoke each and every word
written in his or her notes to counsel verbatim. Such a requirement would
lead to the unreasonable result of permitting the disclosure of confidential
information that was not orally conveyed exactly as it was recorded on
paper, or vice versa. See City of Reno v. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of
N. Nev., 127 Nev. 114, 121, 251 P.3d 718, 722-23 (2011) (“{T)his court will
not read statutory language in a manner that produces absurd or
unreasonable results.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Lee and
Renwick’s billing records, along with their declarations, are sufficient proof
of communication.

We also hold that the district court clearly abused its discretion
to the extent it found that the factual information contained in the Group 1
documents was not subject to the attorney-client privilege. Although we
agree that the Group 1 documents contain factual information, facts

uu

 
 

communicated in order to obtain legal advice do not fall outside the
privilege’s protections. See Wynn Resorts, 133 Nev. at 374, 399 P.3d at 341
(holding that while facts are not privileged, communications about facts in
order to obtain legal advice are). Here, the factual information was relayed
in order to obtain advice about how to respond to Scott’s petitions. The
Group 1 documents are therefore protected by the attorney-client privilege.
There is no applicable exception to the attorney-client privilege

Scott argues that even if the Group 1 documents are subject to
the attorney-client privilege, they are nonetheless discoverable due to
(1) the fiduciary exception and (2) the common-interest exception.

L

‘Scott contends that this court should recognize the fiduciary
exception to the attorney-client privilege and apply it to the Group 1
documents. The fiduciary exception, as adopted in other states, “provides
that a fiduciary, such as a trustee of a trust, is disabled from asserting the
attorney-client privilege against beneficiaries on matters of trust
administration.” Murphy v. Gorman, 271 F-R.D. 296, 305 (D.N.M. 2010).
NRS 49.015 provides that privileges in Nevada are recognized only as
“required by the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Nevada”
or by a specific statute. NRS 49.115 expressly lists five exceptions to the
attorney-client privilege, none of which are the fiduciary exception.

This court has recognized “the legislature's demonstrated
ability to draft privilege statutes with very precise parameters.” Ashokan
v. State, Dep't of Ins., 109 Nev. 662, 670, 856 P.2d 244, 249 (1993). “The
maxim ‘EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS,, the expression
of one thing is the exclusion of another, has been repeatedly confirmed in
this State.” Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 26, 422 P.2d 237, 246 (1967);

12

 

 
see also Ramsey v. City of N. Las Vegas, 133 Nev. 96, 102, 392 P.3d 614, 619
(2017); Thomas v. Nev. Yellow Cab Corp., 130 Nev. 484, 488, 327 P.3d 518,
521 (2014). Jurisdictions with statutory attorney-client privileges like
Nevada have overwhelmingly refused to adopt a fiduciary exception by
judicial decree. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. Super. Court, 990 P.2d 591,
596 (Cal. 2000); Crimson Trace Corp. v. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, 326
P.8d 1181, 1195 (Or. 2014); Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 924-25 (Tex.
1996).

Because the Legislature adopted five specifically defined
exceptions to the attorney-client privilege in NRS 49.115, we decline to
create a sixth by judicial fiat. We therefore refuse to recognize the fiduciary
exception.

2.

Scott also argues that the common-interest exception to the
attorney-client privilege applies to the Group 1 documents. The common-
interest exception is statutory in Nevada and provides that there is no
attorney-client privilege “[als to a communication relevant to a matter of
common interest between two or more clients if the communication was
made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when
offered in an action between any of the clients.” NRS 49.115(5).

We hold that the common-interest exception does not apply to
the Group 1 documents. NRS 49.115(5) limits the common-interest
exception to situations where (1) an attorney is retained or consulted in
common and (2) the communication is relevant to a matter of common
interest. See Cromer v. Wilson, 126 Nev. 106, 109, 225 P.3d 788, 790 (2010)
(holding that where a statute is clear and unambiguous, this court gives

13

 
effect to the ordinary meaning of the plain language without turning to
other rules of construction).

First, Lee and Renwick were not retained or consulted in
common. The Legislature has made clear that an attorney representing a
trustee as a fiduciary does not result in an attorney-client relationship
between the attorney and the beneficiary. See NRS 162.310(1)* (“An
attorney who represents a fiduciary does not, solely as a result of such
attorney-client relationship, assume a corresponding duty of care or other
fiduciary duty to a principal.”).

Second, Lubbers’ communication with Lee and Renwick was not
relevant to a matter of common interest. Rather, Lubbers was adverse to
Scott at the time he communicated with counsel. Scott's counsel sent
Lubbers a letter alleging that the trustees acted in bad faith. Scott's
petition, asking Lubbers to provide information about the purchase
agreement he entered into on behalf of the Trust, contained adversarial
allegations as a result of the falling out between Scott and his parents and
led to Scott’s eventual claims that Lubbers breached his fiduciary duties. It
is therefore apparent that Lubbers consulted with Lee and Renwick for his
‘own protection, not for a matter of common interest.

While a beneficiary is ordinarily able to inspect a trust's books
and records, allowing a beneficiary to view communications between a
trustee and his or her attorney when the trustee is adverse to the

To the extent that the parties relied on Charleson v. Hardesty, 108
‘Nev. 878, 882-83, 839 P.2d 1303, 1306-07 (1992), for the proposition that an
attorney for a trustee owes a fiduciary duty to the beneficiary, we note that
this decision was superseded by NRS 162.310(1). See 2011 Nev. Stat., ch.
270, § 175, at 1465 (enacting NRS 162.310(1) in 2011, after Charleson was
published).

14

 
beneficiary would discourage trustees from seeking legal advice. See Huie,
922 S.W.2d at 924-25 (reasoning that a trustee “must be able to consult
freely with his or her attorney to obtain the best possible legal guidance”);
3 Austin Wakeman Scott, William Franklin Fratcher & Mark L. Ascher,
Scott and Ascher on Trusts § 17.6 (4th ed. 2007) (“{Wyhen there is a conflict
of interest between the trustee and the beneficiaries and the trustee
procures an opinion of counsel for the trustee's own protection, the
beneficiaries are generally not entitled to inspect it.”), Moreover,
individuals may be unwilling to serve as trustees if they fear that their
‘communications with counsel will be used against them, and attorneys
representing trustees may be reluctant to provide transparent advice.
‘Therefore, we conclude that NRS 49.115(5), the common-interest exception,
does not apply to the Group 1 documents. Because the Group 1 documents
are protected by the attorney-client privilege and no exception applies, the
district court clearly exceeded its authority when it allowed Scott to retain,
those documents.
The Group 2 documents are protected by the work-product doctrine
Petitioners argue that the Group 2 documents containing
Lubbers’ notes memorializing a meeting with the other trustees, counsel,
Scott, and an independent appraiser are protected by the work-product,
doctrine. As codified in NRCP 26(bX3XA), the work-product. doctrine
prevents a party from discovering documents “that are prepared in
anticipation of litigation . .. by or for another party. . ..” “(Documents are
prepared in anticipation of litigation when in light of the nature of the
document and the factual situation in the particular case, the document can
fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of
litigation.” Wynn Resorts, 133 Nev. at 384, 399 P.3d at 348 (internal

15

 
on

quotation marks and citation omitted). The court must consider the totality
ofthe circumstances. Id. at 384-85, 399 P.3d at 348,

For protected work product to become discoverable, a party
must show “that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare its ease
and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by
other means.” NRCP 26(bX3XAXii). The party seeking discovery bears the
burden, and “{al mere assertion of the need will not suffice.” Wardleigh v.
Second Judicial Dist. Court, 111 Nev. 345, 358, 891 P.2d 1180, 1188 (1995).

We determine that the district court clearly abused its
discretion in finding that the Group 2 documents were not protected by the
work-product doctrine. First, considering the totality of the circumstances,
we conclude that the Group 2 documents were prepared by Lubbers in
anticipation of litigation. Scott's counsel sent Lubbers a letter alleging that
the trustees acted in bad faith, upon which Lubbers added the line item
“Scott—lawsuit threatened” to Lawrence and Heidi’s business entities’
meeting agenda. Additionally, Scott's petition asking Lubbers to provide
information about the purchase agreement he entered into on behalf of the
‘Trust contained adversarial allegations and required a response with legal
implications. At the time Lubbers wrote the notes contained in the Group
2 documents, he anticipated adversarial litigation,

Second, we determine that the district court abused its
discretion to the extent it found that the substantial-need exception applied.
Our review of the Group 2 documents confirms that Lubbers’ notes
memorialized his meeting with the other trustees, counsel, Scott, and an
independent appraiser. Although Lubbers has since died, Scott was at the
meeting and therefore does not have a substantial need for the Group 2
documents. Moreover, Scott can access any pertinent information he may

16

 

 

 
have missed without undue hardship by deposing one of the other
attendees. Because the Group 2 documents are protected by the work-
product doctrine and the substantial-need exception does not apply, the
district court lacked authority to allow Scott to retain the Group 2
documents.
CONCLUSION

Because petitioners showed that Lubbers communicated the
content of the Group 1 documents to counsel, we determine that these
documents are protected by the attorney-client privilege and are therefore
undiscoverable, In doing so, we explicitly refuse to recognize by judicial
decree the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege and conclude
that the common-interest exception to the attorney-client privilege does not
apply to this case. Because Lubbers took the notes contained in the Group
2 documents in anticipation of litigation and the substantial-need exception
to the work-product doctrine is inapplicable, we determine that the Group
2 documents are protected by the work-product doctrine and are therefore
undiscoverable. Accordingly, the district court acted in excess of its
Jurisdiction in compelling the partial production of the disputed documents.

wy

 
We therefore grant this petition and direct the clerk of this court to issue a
writ of prohibition prohibiting the district court from compelling or allowing

the production of the disputed documents.

 

We concur:
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