Case Title: Franklin v. White

Citation: 82 So. 2d 247

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1955-08-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
82 So. 2d 247 (1955)
John FRANKLIN
v.
Russell L. WHITE.
6 Div. 867.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 18, 1955.
*248 Morel Montgomery, Birmingham, for appellant.
Kingman C. Shelburne, Birmingham, for appellee.
GOODWYN, Justice.
The single question for decision is whether an adoptive parent inherits from his adopted child.
The appellant, John Franklin, adopted Ruby Louise White on July 3, 1924, by a written declaration of adoption acknowledged by him before the Judge of Probate of Jefferson County, Alabama, and recorded in said probate office, all in accordance with the then existing law. § 5202, Code 1907, as amended by Act No. 132, approved March 11, 1911, Gen.Acts 1911, p. 114. The same law was carried into the 1923 Code as § 9302, which went into effect on August 17, 1924, pursuant to Proclamation by the Governor of July 17, 1924. At the time of adoption, Ruby Louise White was 15 years of age. In appellant's declaration of adoption he stated that "he wishes her hereafter to be known by her present name, and desires that she inherit his estate, all as provided by Section 5202 of the Code of Alabama, as amended by the Act of the Legislature of Alabama entitled `An Act to amend Section 5202 of the Code of Alabama', approved March 11, 1911."
*249 Ruby Louise White died intestate in Jefferson County, Alabama, on December 23, 1953, leaving a personal estate of an estimated value of $6,000. Her natural parents predeceased her. Letters of administration, issued on the petition of Russell L. White, named as her only surviving heirs at law her natural brothers and sister, viz.: the petitioner, Russell L. White, Louie White, John L. Franklin, Jr., and Lorene White. Appellant filed a petition to intervene in the administration proceedings praying that he be declared a legal heir of the intestate and a distributee of her estate. Appellant's claim is based entirely on his relation as adoptive father of the intestate. The Probate Court entered a decree denying him relief. This appeal is from that decree. Code 1940, Tit. 7, §§ 775-776; Hudson v. Reed, 259 Ala. 340, 341, 66 So. 2d 909; Purcell v. Sewell, 223 Ala. 73, 74, 134 So. 476; Awbrey v. Estes, 216 Ala. 66, 67, 112 So. 529.
The question presented is one of first impression in Alabama. However, this court has recognized the principle that "the right of adoption is purely statutory, and in derogation of the common law", and that unless the statute by express provision or necessary implication confers upon an adoptive relative the right to inherit the property of an adoptive relative who dies intestate, such right does not exist. Benefield v. Faulkner, 248 Ala. 615, 618, 29 So. 2d 1; Meeks v. Cornelius, 244 Ala. 532, 14 So. 2d 145.
The prevailing rule is stated in 1 Am.Jur., Adoption of Children, § 55, pp. 654-655, as follows:
With these general principles in mind we proceed to an examination of the adoption laws of this state to determine whether the legislature, either by express provision or necessary implication, has, in derogation of the common law, given an adoptive parent the right of inheritance from his adopted child.
The adoption law, as it existed at the time of the adoption of Ruby Louise White in 1924, provided as follows, § 5202, Code 1907, as amended by Act No. 132, approved March 11, 1911, Gen.Acts 1911, p. 114, supra:
The applicable law as of the time of Ruby Louise White's death in 1953 was, in pertinent part, as follows, Code 1940, Tit. 27, § 5:
Appellant contends, and appellee agrees, that appellant's rights are to be determined by the law in effect at the time of the child's death rather than the law in effect at the time of her adoption. That appears to be the generally accepted rule, 2 C.J.S., Adoption of Children, § 64, p. 458; and we have so considered this case.
Appellant takes the position that § 5, Tit. 27, supra, particularly the phrase that "the natural parents of the child if living shall be divested of all legal rights and obligations due from them to the child or from the child to them", operates to divest the children of the natural parents, that is, the adopted child's natural brothers and sister, of any rights which they might otherwise have in the adopted child's estate. We see nothing in the quoted phrase justifying that interpretation. The Ohio Court of Appeals, in National Bank of Lima v. Hancock, 85 Ohio App. 1, 88 N.E.2d 67, 74, was called upon to answer a similar contention in construing a phrase from their adoption statute identical to the one relied on here by appellant. What was there said is sufficient, we think, to dispose of the contention, viz.:
Appellant further contends that the phrase, "the adopting parent or parents of *251 the child shall be invested with every legal right in respect to obedience and maintenance on the part of the child as if said child had been born to them in lawful wedlock", should be construed as vesting in the adoptive parent the right to inherit from his adopted daughter. We find no merit in this contention. It may be answered by simply pointing out that the legislature has seen fit to limit the adoptive parents' "legal rights" to rights of "obedience and maintenance".
According to the weight of authority "the general statutes of inheritance are modified and set aside by statutes regulating the effect of adoption only so far as there is some specific provision in the statutes for adoption inconsistent with the application, in such cases, of the general inheritance statutes." Baker v. Clowser, 158 Iowa 156, 138 N.W. 837, 839, 43 L.R.A., N.S., 1056; Edwards v. Yearby, 168 N.C. 663, 85 S.E. 19, L.R.A.1915E, 462; Hole v. Robbins, 53 Wis. 514, 10 N.W. 617; In re Kay's Estate, 127 Mont. 172, 260 P.2d 391; McKinney v. Minkler, Tex.Civ.App., 102 S.W.2d 273; Upson v. Noble, 35 Ohio St. 655; White v. Dotter, 73 Ark. 130, 83 S.W. 1052; Dodson v. Ward, 31 N.M. 54, 240 P. 991, 994, 42 A.L.R. 521; National Bank of Lima v. Hancock, supra; Russell v. Jordan, 58 Colo. 445, 147 P. 693.
Under our general statutes on descents and distributions, Code 1940, Tit. 16, §§ 1(5), 10, the property of Ruby Louise White goes to her natural brothers and sister, her natural parents having predeceased her. And unless there is "some specific provision in the statutes for adoption inconsistent with the application" of the descent and distribution statutes the latter control. It seems too clear to admit of argument that our present law of adoption confers the right of inheritance on the adopted child only, and must be confined to that. We see no necessity of referring to the numerous cases from other jurisdictions construing adoption statutes with varying provisions. We are satisfied to rest our decision on the provisions of our own statute, which, it seems to us, clearly confers on the adopted child the right to inherit from the adopting parent but does not confer on the adopting parent the right to inherit from the adopted child.
Appellant earnestly insists that to deprive an adoptive parent of the right of inheritance from his adopted child would, in many cases, result in harsh and unreasonable consequences inconsistent with the principles of equity and justice. To this insistence we must answer that the right of inheritance by an adoptive parent from his adopted child must be given solely by statute and cannot be based on principles of equity.
What was said by the Supreme Court of Oregon in In re Frazier's Estate, 180 Or. 232, 177 P.2d 254, 261, 170 A.L.R. 729, is particularly appropriate here:
The decree of the Probate Court is due to be, and is, affirmed.
Affirmed.
LAWSON, MERRILL and MAYFIELD, JJ., concur.