Case Title: Ex Parte Yelder

Citation: 630 So. 2d 107

Docket Number: 1910345

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1992-08-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
630 So. 2d 107 (1992)
Ex parte Timothy John YELDER.
(Re Timothy John Yelder v. State).
1910345.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 14, 1992.
Rehearing Denied October 8, 1993.
Certiorari Denied March 21, 1994.
Johnny Hardwick, Montgomery, for petitioner.
James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Beth Jackson Hughes, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Certiorari Denied March 21, 1994. See 114 S. Ct. 1336.
ADAMS, Justice.
Timothy John Yelder petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review a judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming his convictions for burglary, sodomy, and rape. We granted the petition in order to determine whether the prosecution's use of peremptory strikes to eliminate potential black jurors from the jury venire violated the principles set forth by this Court in Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609 (Ala.1987), and Ex parte Bird, 594 So. 2d 676 (Ala.1991), guaranteeing the constitutional right to an impartial trial. We reverse and remand.
*108 In the trial of this case, the prosecution used 24 of its 32 peremptory strikes to remove 24 of the 27 black veniremembers. Following the defendant's timely objection to the racial composition of the prospective jury panel, the prosecution offered various explanations for the prosecution's strikes. A summary of some of those explanations, as set forth in Yelder v. State, 630 So. 2d 92 (Ala.Cr. App.1991), and as supplemented by the defendant pursuant to Ala.R.App.P. 39(k), follows:
(Emphasis added.)
In many respects, this case bears a remarkable resemblance to Ex parte Bird, 594 So. 2d 676 (Ala.1991). First, the statistics are strikingly similar. In Bird, although "black veniremembers comprised 36% of the venire," the percentage of black jurors actually seated on the jury represented "only 8% of the trial jury." Id. at 680. The State, in that case, "used 85% of [its] peremptory *109 challenges, that is, 17 of 20 strikes, to eliminate 89% of the black veniremembers." Id. at 681. In this case, the jury pool contained a total of 86 veniremembers of which only 27, that is, 31%, were black. The State then used 75% of its peremptory challenges24 of 32 strikesto reduce that 31% by another 89%.[1]
As we pointed out in Bird, the sheer weight of statistics such as these raises a strong inference of racial discrimination requiring clear and cogent explanations by the State in rebuttal. Id. at 680-81. Instead of such explanations, however, those proffered in this case virtually parallel the whimsical, ad hoc excuses we rejected in Birdin particular, the State's explanations for its challenges of veniremember number 26 (same name as someone allegedly prosecuted by the district attorney's office), id. at 682-83; veniremember number 76 (excluded because of prosecutrix's "gut reaction"), id. at 684; veniremember number 96 (excluded because of "body language"), id. at 685; and veniremember number 33 (alleged "communication difficulty"). Id.
Moreover, the "articulation" or "communication" difficulties cited by the State as reasons for its challenges of veniremember number 75 and number 132 are not supported by the record. Specifically, the trial court's voir dire of veniremember number 75 elicited the following responses:
Veniremember number 132 responded similarly to the court's voir dire:
Obviously, the State's allegations of communication deficiencies on the part of these veniremembers are not only wholly without support in the record, but are directly refuted by it. Perhaps most cogently, the record, which reveals a series of clear and unequivocal responses given by veniremember number 132, forcefully contradicts the prosecution's assertions that he "couldn't understand a word she said," because of "the way she put her sentences together." We are compelled to conclude that the explanations advanced by the State for its challenges of these veniremembers represent no more than a pretext for racial discrimination.
We regret that the conduct of the prosecution has, because of actions taken on the basis of race, once again necessitated a retrial, thus creating an additional strain on the judicial and economic resources of this state. At the present time, "blacks are serving in substantial numbers as jurors and meting out stiff sentences, including death. This is because, although in some instances blacks may be the perpetrators of crime, in even more substantial numbers, they are the victims of crime." Beck v. State, 396 So. 2d 645, 665 (Ala.1980) (Adams, J., concurring specially). Consequently, we look forward to the eventual demise of the notion that blacks possess an inherent bias in favor of defendants. In the instant case, however, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to remand to the trial court for a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, SHORES and INGRAM, JJ., concur.
HOUSTON, J., dissents.
HOUSTON, Justice (dissenting).
I concurred in part and concurred in the result in part in Ex parte Bird, 594 So. 2d 676 (Ala.1991). In the present case, I agree with Judge Taylor and all of the other Judges on the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, in the statement that "after a careful review of the reasons given by the prosecution for striking both black prospective jurors and white prospective jurors, we conclude that the strikes of black veniremembers were race-neutral." Yelder v. State, 630 So. 2d 92, 99 (Ala.Crim.App.1991).
[1]  Ultimately, two black veniremembers were seated on the jury.