Case Title: In re Parentage of M.J.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92947

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2003-02-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 92947-Agenda 10-November 2002.
In re PARENTAGE OF M.J. et al., Minors (Alexis Mitchell, 
Indiv. and as Guardian and Next Friend on Behalf of Minors
M.J. and N.J., Appellant, v. Raymond Banary, Appellee).
Opinion filed February 6, 2003.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	Appellant, Alexis Mitchell, brought this action against
appellee, Raymond Banary, her former paramour, seeking to
establish paternity and to impose support obligations for twin boys
conceived through artificial insemination by an anonymous donor.
The circuit court of Cook County dismissed Alexis' suit. The
appellate court affirmed. 325 Ill. App. 3d 826. We allowed Alexis'
petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. We also granted the
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., leave to submit
an amicus curiae brief in support of Alexis. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.
We now affirm in part, reverse in part, and hold that the Illinois
Parentage Act does not bar common law claims for child support.



I. BACKGROUND
	We initially note that Raymond brought his motion to dismiss
Alexis' complaint under section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 1998)). A motion
to dismiss "admits all well-pled allegations in the complaint and
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts." In re Chicago
Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 184 (1997). With that
presumption in mind, we review the factual background of this
case.
	Alexis is a single woman who was 40 years old at the time of
the filing of her complaint, and Raymond is a male who was 57
years old at the time of the filing of the complaint. Alexis and
Raymond first met in 1986 and began an intimate relationship
lasting 10 years. When they met, Raymond introduced himself to
Alexis as "Jim Richardson" and told her that he was divorced.
	 During their 10-year relationship, the parties discussed
marriage. Alexis and Raymond are of different races and,
according to Alexis, Raymond told her that he would have to wait
until retirement to marry because his community would not accept
a mixed-race marriage. Raymond promised Alexis that upon his
retirement, they would move to another community and be
married.
	The parties also discussed Alexis' desire to have children with
Raymond. Despite their attempts to conceive, Alexis did not
become pregnant, and it became apparent that Raymond could not
father children. In 1991, Raymond suggested to Alexis that she
become artificially inseminated by an anonymous donor as a
means to have their child. Artificial insemination by a donor is
also known as heterologous artificial insemination. Alexis claims
that Raymond promised her that he would provide financial
support for any child born by means of artificial insemination.
However, Raymond's written consent to the procedure was never
obtained. Alexis contends that Raymond orally consented to the
procedure and that but for Raymond's promise to support the
children, Alexis would not have completed the procedure.
	According to Alexis, with Raymond's continuing consent and
active encouragement, she attempted to become pregnant through
artificial insemination. Raymond provided financial assistance for
the insemination procedure; accompanied Alexis to the doctor's
office for examinations; injected Alexis with medication designed
to enhance her fertility; and participated in selecting the donor so
that the offspring would appear to be a product of their
relationship.
	On the fifth attempt, Alexis became pregnant and gave birth
to twin boys in 1993. Raymond participated in selecting names for
the children. After the births, Raymond acknowledged the children
as his own. He also provided support for them in the form of
monthly payments of cash and the purchase of food, clothing,
furniture, toys, and play equipment. In her complaint, Alexis
further describes many family vacations with Raymond to 10
different states and Mexico, and alleges that Raymond also paid
for the children's medical, travel, and entertainment expenses.
	In 1996, Alexis discovered that Raymond was not named Jim
Richardson and that he was married. Upon discovering Raymond's
true name and marital status, Alexis ended their relationship. Since
1996, Raymond has provided no financial support for the children.
	Alexis filed a three-count complaint against Raymond seeking
to establish paternity and impose a support obligation for the
benefit of the twin boys. In the first two counts, Alexis sought to
impose child support obligations by invoking common law
theories of breach of an oral agreement and promissory estoppel.
In the remaining count of her complaint, Alexis sought a
declaration of paternity and establishment of child support
pursuant to the Illinois Parentage Act (750 ILCS 40/1 et seq. (West
1998)).
	Raymond filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Alexis'
common law claims, contained in counts I and II, were
unenforceable under the provisions of the Frauds Act (740 ILCS
80/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)) and contravened Illinois public
policy. Raymond also argued that all three counts should be
dismissed pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS
5/2-615 (West 1998)) because Alexis failed to set forth a legally
recognized basis for the imposition of a father-child relationship
or for child support under the Illinois Parentage Act (750 ILCS
40/1 et seq. (West 1998)).
	The circuit court granted Raymond's motion and dismissed
Alexis' complaint. The circuit court interpreted the Illinois
Parentage Act as requiring that a husband consent in writing
before he is treated in law as the natural father of a child conceived
to his wife by means of artificial insemination. The circuit court
commented that it would not be rational that unmarried couples
would have fewer safeguards in such a matter. The circuit court
therefore held that Alexis' common law theories were not
actionable because the Illinois Parentage Act expressly requires
written consent. The circuit court did not refer to the Frauds Act
in its dismissal of the complaint.
	Alexis appealed the circuit court's decision, and the appellate
court majority determined that Alexis' common law theories for
child support fail because the Illinois Parentage Act governs
artificial insemination and requires that the "husband's consent
must be in writing." The appellate court held that written consent
is required before an unmarried man becomes legally obligated to
support a child born as a result of artificial insemination. Based on
its decision, the appellate court did not reach the issue concerning
the Frauds Act.

II. DISCUSSION
	As previously noted, Raymond brought his motion to dismiss
under section 2-619.1 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West
1998)). Section 2-619.1 permits a litigant to combine a section
2-615 (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1998)) motion to dismiss and a
section 2-619 (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1998)) motion for
involuntary dismissal into one pleading. 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1
(West 1998). A section 2-619 motion raises certain defects or
defenses and questions whether Raymond is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 494 (1994). A section 2-615 motion questions whether a
complaint states a cause of action. Illinois Graphics Co., 159 Ill. 2d  at 488.
	When ruling on a motion to dismiss under either section
2-615 (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1998)) or section 2-619 (735
ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1998)) of the Code, the court must interpret
all pleadings and supporting documents in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d  at
189. A motion to dismiss should be granted only if Alexis can
prove no set of facts that would support a cause of action. Chicago
Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d  at 189. We review both the dismissal
of a complaint and the interpretation of a statute de novo. Chicago
Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d  at 189; People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 457 (1996).
	In construing a statute, this court must give effect to the intent
of the legislature. Antunes v. Sookhakitch, 146 Ill. 2d 477, 484
(1992). To ascertain legislative intent, we must examine the
language of the entire statute and consider each part or section in
connection with every other part or section. Castaneda v. Illinois
Human Rights Comm'n, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 318 (1989). Where the
language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statute
without resort to further aids of statutory construction. Davis v.
Toshiba Machine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85 (1999).
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the interpretation of
the Illinois Parentage Act.
	In 1984, the General Assembly enacted the Illinois Parentage
Act (750 ILCS 40/1 et seq. (West 1998)) "to define the legal
relationships of a child born to a wife and husband requesting and
consenting to *** artificial insemination." Pub. Act 83-1026, eff.
January 5, 1984. Section 3 of the Illinois Parentage Act provides:
			"(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician
and with the consent of her husband, a wife is
inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not
her husband, the husband shall be treated in law as if he
were the natural father of a child thereby conceived. The
husband's consent must be in writing executed and
acknowledged by both the husband and wife. The
physician who is to perform the technique shall certify
their signatures and the date of the insemination, and file
the husband's consent in the medical record where it shall
be kept confidential and held by the patient's physician.
However, the physician's failure to do so shall not affect
the legal relationship between father and child. All papers
and records pertaining to the insemination, whether part
of the permanent medical record held by the physician or
not, are subject to inspection only upon an order of the
court for good cause shown.
			(b) The donor of the semen provided to a licensed
physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman
other than the donor's wife shall be treated in law as if he
were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived."
750 ILCS 40/3(a) (West 1998).
Any child born as a result of artificial insemination is considered
the legitimate child of the husband and wife consenting to the use
of the technique. 750 ILCS 40/2 (West 1998). Our interpretation
of the express language of this provision of the statute indicates
that the primary purpose of the Illinois Parentage Act is to provide
a legal mechanism for a husband and wife to obtain donor sperm
for use in artificial insemination and to ensure that a child is
considered the legitimate child of the husband and wife requesting
and consenting to the artificial technique.
	Section 3(b) of the Illinois Parentage Act also provides a
statutory vehicle for women to obtain semen for artificial
insemination without fear that the donor may claim paternity. 750
ILCS 40/3(b) (West 1998). Additionally, section 3(b) protects
sperm donors from claims of paternity and liability for child
support.
	The parties dispute whether, under section 3(a) of the Illinois
Parentage Act, the failure to provide written consent will preclude
the establishment of a parent-child relationship and the imposition
of a support obligation. This court has not conclusively interpreted
the written-consent provision of the Act. We have, however,
commented that the provision in the Act that "the husband's
consent to the [artificial insemination] procedure 'must be in
writing' could be considered a mandatory requirement for
establishing a parent-child relationship pursuant to the statute."
(Emphasis added.) In re Marriage of Adams, 133 Ill. 2d 437, 444
(1990), citing Andrews v. Foxworthy, 71 Ill. 2d 13, 21 (1978) (the
word "must" is generally construed in a mandatory sense.)
	Whether a statutory provision is deemed mandatory or merely
directory depends upon the intent of its drafters. People v.
Youngbey, 82 Ill. 2d 556, 562 (1980). An important aid in the
determination of whether a provision is mandatory or directory is
the form of the verb used in the statute. Youngbey, 82 Ill. 2d  at
562. If the provision merely directs a manner of conduct, it is
directory. Andrews, 71 Ill. 2d  at 21. If the conduct is, however,
prescribed in order to safeguard one's rights, the statute is
mandatory. Andrews, 71 Ill. 2d  at 21.
 	The first sentence of section 3(a) provides for the
establishment of a parent-child relationship by consent. The
second sentence of section 3(a) unequivocally requires that the
consent for establishment of a parent-child relationship be in
writing. This provision is clearly designed to safeguard rights
concerning parentage. In light of the purpose of the written-consent requirement, we must conclude that the written-consent
provision of section 3(a) of the Illinois Parentage Act is
mandatory. Thus, section 3(a) of the Illinois Parentage Act
mandates that written consent be obtained before parental
responsibility may be established. Consequently, the failure to
provide or obtain written consent will preclude a claim for
paternity and child support under the Illinois Parentage Act.
Accordingly, the appellate court did not err in affirming the circuit
court's dismissal of count III of Alexis' complaint.
	We note that the language of the Illinois Parentage Act was
largely adopted from section 5 of the Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA) (Unif. Parentage Act §5, 9B U.L.A. 377 (1973)), as
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. The commentary to section 5 of the UPA
states:
			"This Act does not deal with the many complex and
serious legal problems raised by the practice of artificial
insemination. It was though [sic] useful, however, to
single out and cover in this Act at least one fact situation
that occurs frequently. Further consideration of other legal
aspects of artificial insemination has been urged on the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and is recommended to state legislators." Unif.
Parentage Act §5, 9B U.L.A. 408, Comment (1973).
	At the time the Illinois Parentage Act was enacted, the
legislature intended to clarify the legal relationships among the
parties involved in the artificial insemination procedure. See L.
Smith, The AID Child and In re Marriage of Adams: Ambiguities
in the Illinois Parentage Act, 21 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1173, 1192-93
(1990). However, as recognized by the commentary to section 5 of
the UPA, the artificial insemination legislation "does not deal with
the many complex and serious legal problems raised by the
practice of artificial insemination." Unif. Parentage Act §5, 9B
U.L.A. 408, Comment (1973). Accordingly, the UPA comment
urges that state legislators consider other legal aspects of artificial
insemination.
	In its current form, the Illinois Parentage Act fails to address
the full spectrum of legal problems facing children born as a result
of artificial insemination and other modern methods of assisted
reproduction. The rapid evolution of assisted reproduction
technology will continue to produce legal problems similar to
those presented in this case. We urge the Illinois legislature to
enact laws that are responsive to these problems in order to
safeguard the interests of children born as a result of assisted
reproductive technology.
	The need for reform to the Illinois Parentage Act is clear
where, as here, we are compelled to apply the statute, in its current
form, to a complex legal situation that the legislature did not
anticipate when it passed the Illinois Parentage Act nearly 20 years
ago.
	Based on our determination that written consent is a
prerequisite for invoking the protections of the Illinois Parentage
Act, we need not and do not make any determination with regard
to whether the Illinois Parentage Act applies to unmarried persons.
Section 3(a) of the Illinois Parentage Act is simply not satisfied in
this case because written consent was lacking.
	Our determination that Alexis may not maintain an action
under the Illinois Parentage Act does not end our inquiry. We must
now determine whether the Illinois Parentage Act precludes
common law claims for child support. Two Illinois appellate court
cases have addressed this issue. These cases are In re Marriage of
Adams, 174 Ill. App. 3d 595 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 133 Ill. 2d 437 (1990), and In re Marriage of Witbeck-Wildhagen, 281
Ill. App. 3d 502 (1996). Each case reached a different result based
on its unique facts.
	In Adams, the appellate court held that the Illinois Parentage
Act does not bar the imposition of a support obligation under an
estoppel or waiver theory and that the failure to execute a written
consent did not bar further inquiry into the circumstances
surrounding the decision to use artificial insemination. Adams, 174
Ill. App. 3d at 610-11. The appellate court affirmed the trial
court's finding that there was "actual consent" by the husband to
the insemination procedure, who twice attempted to have his
vasectomy reversed, had knowledge of and paid for tests and
medical bills, accepted joint responsibility for the child, and listed
the child as a dependent on his federal income tax return. Adams,
174 Ill. App. 3d at 613-15. This court reversed and remanded the
cause, on other grounds, holding that Florida law governed
because the parties had resided in that state when the procedure
was performed. Adams, 133 Ill. 2d  at 448. We did not, however,
reach the issue of whether a cause of action for child support could
be maintained under common law theories.
	In Witbeck-Wildhagen, 281 Ill. App. 3d 502, the husband
made it clear that he did not consent to the procedure, and the wife
acknowledged that he did not consent. Nonetheless, the wife
petitioned to have the husband declared the legal father of her
child and she sought child support. The appellate court upheld the
trial court's finding that the husband did not consent to the
insemination procedure since there was no evidence of the
husband's consent, written or otherwise. Witbeck-Wildhagen, 281
Ill. App. 3d at 506-07. The appellate court specifically stated that
it was not deciding whether the failure to obtain written consent
would be an absolute bar to the establishment of the father-child
relationship where the conduct of the father otherwise
demonstrated his consent. Witbeck-Wildhagen, 281 Ill. App. 3d at
506-07. The appellate court recognized that this was not a case
where the husband was "attempting to evade responsibility for his
own actions in helping to conceive or encouraging the conception
of a child." Witbeck-Wildhagen, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 507.
	Although the appellate court reached opposite conclusions in
Adams and Witbeck-Wildhagen, a finding of the existence or
nonexistence of consent was based on an examination of the
specific facts in each case.
	In interpreting the Illinois Parentage Act, this court has
specifically noted that "[i]t may be the case that a support
obligation will be found even in the absence of a parent-child
relationship." In re Marriage of Adams, 133 Ill. 2d 437, 445
(1990). In Adams, this court recognized its duty, in an action
where the interests of a minor are at stake, to ensure that the rights
of the child are adequately protected. Adams, 133 Ill. 2d  at 445,
citing Muscarello v. Peterson, 20 Ill. 2d 548 (1960). We also
suggested that estoppel might be available to prove consent.
Adams, 133 Ill. 2d  at 448.
	Illinois has articulated its public policy recognizing the right
of every child to the physical, mental, emotional, and monetary
support of his or her parents. See 750 ILCS 45/1.1 (West 1998).
Public policy considerations also seek to prevent children born as
a result of assisted reproductive technology procedures from
becoming public charges. See Department of Public Aid ex rel.
Cox v. Miller, 146 Ill. 2d 399, 411-12 (1992) (concluding that the
legislature intends to provide parental support for all minor
children and commenting that "[l]egislative common sense
dictates that if parents do not support their children, an already
strained State welfare system must do so"). Illinois has a strong
interest in protecting and promoting the welfare of its children. See
In re Marriage of Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d 414, 431 (1997). We believe
that, consistent with this important public policy, cases involving
assisted reproduction must be decided based on the particular
circumstances presented.
	In considering the reach of the Illinois Parentage Act, we note
that the statute contains only three sections: (1) the title section;
(2) a section declaring that children conceived as a result of
artificial insemination are deemed the same as the naturally
conceived legitimate child of the husband and wife; and (3) a
section concerning consent procedures of the "husband," and
protections for and against the sperm donor. In interpreting a
statute, courts should not add requirements or impose limitations
that are inconsistent with the plain meaning of the enactment.
Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996). Our examination of
these three sections of the Illinois Parentage Act finds nothing to
prohibit common law actions to establish parental responsibility,
and the state's public policy considerations support a finding in
favor of allowing common law actions. Moreover, this court has
a duty to ensure that the rights of children are adequately
protected. Adams, 133 Ill. 2d  at 445.
	We believe that if the legislature had intended to bar common
law actions for child support, it would have clearly stated its
intent, and we will not imply a legislative intent where none is
expressed. See Nottage, 172 Ill. 2d  at 395. We therefore determine
that the best interests of children and society are served by
recognizing that parental responsibility may be imposed based on
conduct evidencing actual consent to the artificial insemination
procedure.
	The courts of other states have reached similar results and
have assigned parental responsibility based on conduct evidencing
consent to the artificial insemination. See Gursky v. Gursky, 39
Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1963) (husband held liable for
support of a child conceived by artificial insemination under either
the basis of implied consent to support or the application of the
doctrine of estoppel); K.S. v. G.S., 182 N.J. Super. 102, 440 A.2d 64 (1981) (oral consent of husband was effective at the time
pregnancy occurs unless established by clear and convincing
evidence that consent has been revoked or rescinded); In re
Marriage of L.M.S., 105 Wis. 2d 118, 122-23, 312 N.W.2d 853,
855 (App. 1981) (sterile man who suggested to his wife that she
become pregnant by another man and promised that he would
acknowledge the child as his own has a legal obligation "to
support the child for whose existence he is responsible"); In re
Baby Doe, 291 S.C. 389, 353 S.E.2d 877 (1987) (husband's
consent to artificial insemination may be express, or implied from
conduct).
	Here, Raymond's alleged conduct evinces a powerful case of
actual consent. The allegations demonstrate a deliberate course of
conduct with the precise goal of causing the birth of these
children. In comparison, statutes and case law do not equivocate
in imposing child support obligations for other children born out
of wedlock. Moreover, a state may not discriminate against a child
based on the marital status of the parties at the time of the child's
birth. See Miller, 146 Ill. 2d  at 405; Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535,
538, 35 L. Ed. 2d 56, 60, 93 S. Ct. 872, 875 (1973); Mills v.
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 92, 71 L. Ed. 2d 770, 773, 102 S. Ct. 1549, 1551 (1982). Thus, if an unmarried man who biologically
causes conception through sexual relations without the
premeditated intent of birth is legally obligated to support a child,
then the equivalent resulting birth of a child caused by the
deliberate conduct of artificial insemination should receive the
same treatment in the eyes of the law. Regardless of the method of
conception, a child is born in need of support. Under the alleged
facts of this case, to hold otherwise would deprive the children of
financial support merely because of deception and a technical
oversight. Simply put, we cannot accept Raymond's argument that
these children and their mother must be left to fend for themselves.
	Claims of parentage and support of children produced as a
result of assisted reproductive technologies are unique and must
be decided based on the particular facts in each case. We hold that
the Illinois Parentage Act does not preclude Alexis' claims based
on common law theories of oral contract or promissory estoppel.
Accordingly, the circuit court erred in dismissing count's I and II
of Alexis' complaint on this basis, and the appellate court erred in
affirming that order. We make no determination on the merits of
Alexis' claims, or Raymond's affirmative defenses, including the
Frauds Act, since these claims and defenses must be developed in
the circuit court.
III. CONCLUSION
	Our holding is limited to the unique circumstances of this
case. We do not address issues raised by the amicus, because these
issues were not previously raised by the parties to this appeal. See
Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 62 (2001).
	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm that part of the appellate
court judgment affirming the circuit court's dismissal of count III
of Alexis' complaint, we reverse that part of the judgment of the
appellate court affirming the dismissal of Alexis' claim for child
support under counts I and II, and we remand the cause to the
circuit court of Cook County for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
Judgments affirmed in part and reversed in part;
cause remanded.