Case Title: State v. Dieringer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-10-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Dieringer1985 WY 154708 P.2d 1Case Number: 83-220Decided: 10/08/1985THE STATE OF WYOMING AND G.M. KINNIBURGH, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), 

v. 

SUSAN DIERINGER, BONNIE ROBERTS, AND CONNIE MARK, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING AND 
G.M. KINNIBURGH, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), 

v. 

SUSAN DIERINGER, BONNIE 
ROBERTS, AND CONNIE MARK, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

 
 

Appeal from the District 
Court, TetonCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

 
 

Glenn Parker and 
Alan B. Minier of Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, for appellants.

Richard H. 
Honaker, Rock Springs, and W. Keith Goody, 
Jackson, for appellees.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The primary questions 
which must be resolved in this appeal are whether an employee of the State of 
Wyoming is immune from suit by virtue of the provisions of the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, §§ 1-39-101, et seq., W.S. 1977, and whether the State 
of Wyoming can claim a bar to this suit by virtue of a settlement of a claim 
against a different State employee, also pursuant to the provisions of the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. Further issues are asserted relating to error 
by the district court in excluding additional witnesses and exhibits proffered 
by the defendants; the failure of the plaintiffs to establish that the actions 
of the defendant Kinniburgh were a proximate cause of the accident; and error 
with respect to a refusal to instruct the jury concerning the duty of an 
adjacent landowner. Finally the appellants assert error in the award of costs to 
the plaintiffs. We affirm the judgment entered by the trial court except for the 
amount of costs awarded, which we will require to be modified.

[¶2.]     The appellant, G.M. 
Kinniburgh, a patrolman for the Wyoming Highway Patrol, asserts as the primary 
issue relating to him that the trial court erred in denying his motion for 
summary judgment because he is immune from suit pursuant to the provisions of 
the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. The appellant, the State of Wyoming, further contends that it had achieved a 
compromise and settlement of any claims against it; the actions of the 
appellees, Susan Dieringer, Bonnie Roberts and Connie Mark, therefore were 
barred as to the State of Wyoming; and the trial court erred in not 
granting the State's motion for summary judgment. Both appellants claim error on 
the part of the district court in excluding the testimony of certain witnesses 
and certain exhibits on the ground that they had failed to give proper and 
timely notice of such additional witnesses and exhibits to the appellees prior 
to trial in accordance with the court's pretrial order. Both appellants assert 
as a further issue that this judgment must be reversed because the evidence did 
not establish that the conduct of patrolman Kinniburgh was a proximate cause of 
the injuries to the appellees, and the district court erred in refusing to grant 
their motion for a directed verdict, which in part was premised upon this 
insufficiency in the evidence. As a further issue the appellants assert that the 
district court erred in refusing to give to the jury their offered instruction 
relating to the duty and responsibility of Clark's Ready Mix, the owner of premises adjacent to the 
highway, which had been named as a party when the action was filed. The final 
issue asserted by both appellants is error on the part of the district court in 
awarding costs to the appellees.

[¶3.]     On a mild day in 
February 1981, water was running across Highway 22 near the twon of Jackson from property adjacent to the highway owned by 
Clark's Ready Mix. The source of this water 
apparently was melting snow. As the temperatures cooled in the evening of that 
day a patch of black ice began to form on the highway from water tracked along 
the highway by passing vehicles. As night began to fall and the temperatures 
dropped more the patch of ice became larger and larger. It was primarily forming 
in the right lane of the highway as travelers were leaving the town of Jackson, at a point just 
beyond the crest of a hill at the beginning of a curve where vehicles normally 
would accelerate.

[¶4.]     Around 7:30 p.m. a 
vehicle went out of control and off the road into the borrow pit when it 
encountered the ice. Patrolman Kinniburgh was called to the scene of that 
accident by a deputy of the Teton County Sheriff's Office. Marks at the scene of 
that accident indicated that other vehicles also had skidded off the road at 
that site, but apparently they were able to get back on the road without 
reporting any difficulty. At that time the deputy sheriff suggested that 
Patrolman Kinniburgh should call the Wyoming Highway Department to have the area 
sanded. Kinniburgh decided not to do that, articulating his decision in 
offensive language which undoubtedly had some impact upon the jury. He did not 
report the condition of the road or request that it be sanded.

[¶5.]     About four hours later, 
at approximately 11:30 p.m., the three appellees were riding as passengers in a 
vehicle which skidded on this patch of ice, went out of control, crossed over 
into the other lane of traffic, and was struck by an oncoming truck. All three 
appellees suffered severe injuries in that accident. They brought suit, seeking 
recovery from Patrolman Kinniburgh, Jack Oakley, the Wyoming State Highway 
Department, the State of Wyoming, Clark's Ready Mix and Construction, and Lynn Clark and 
Lewell Clark. The Wyoming State Highway Department and the State of Wyoming were named as co-defendants in the separate counts 
of the complaint seeking recovery from Patrolman Kinniburgh and Jack Oakley, 
both of whom were employees of the State of Wyoming.

[¶6.]     At the time Jack Oakley 
was employed by the Wyoming State Highway Department as the local maintenance 
foreman for the Wyoming State Highway Department. He was authorized to decide 
whether or not to sand the highway at any particular location, and he was not 
subject to the direction or control of Patrolman Kinniburgh. Lynn Clark and 
Lewell Clark owned the corporate stock of Clark's Ready Mix, and as indicated 
the water flowing across the highway came from premises owned by Clark's Ready Mix. Prior to trial, Lynn Clark, Lewell 
Clark, and Clark's Ready Mix stipulated with 
the appellees that the appellees' complaint against these parties would be 
dismissed with prejudice. Also prior to trial the State of Wyoming, Wyoming 
State Highway Department, and Jack Oakley moved for an order dismissing claims 
of the appellees against them because of a compromise and settlement of those 
claims. The order granting this motion was entered after the trial. The case 
actually went to trial then with only Patrolman Kinniburgh and the State of 
Wyoming as 
defendants. From judgments entered in favor of the several appellees appropriate 
appeals were taken which are consolidated in this case.

[¶7.]     We will first address 
Kinniburgh's claim that he is immune from suit. He relies upon § 1-39-104, W.S. 
1977 (1985 Cum.Supp.), which provides in pertinent part as follows:

"(a) A governmental 
entity and its public employees while acting within the scope of duties are 
granted immunity from liability for any tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 
through 1-39-112. * *"

Kinniburgh 
concedes that § 1-39-112, W.S. 1977 (1985 Cum.Supp.), provides:

"A governmental entity is 
liable for damages resulting from tortious conduct of law enforcement officers 
while acting within the scope of their duties."

It is his 
contention, however, that immunity is granted pursuant to § 1-39-104, W.S. 1977 
(1985 Cum.Supp.), and that § 1-39-112 creates an exception extending only to the 
governmental entity and not to the public employee. According to his theory it 
follows that there is no exception as to the public employee, and he enjoys 
immunity.

[¶8.]     We dealt with a 
substantially identical claim in denying the petition for rehearing in Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, Wyo., 697 P.2d 606 
(1985), reh. denied, 701 P.2d 1139 (1985). We there held that a public employee 
is not immune from suit based upon our analysis of the entire Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act.

[¶9.]     To what we said in Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, supra, we add 
the proposition that, given the state of the law in Wyoming at the time of 
the adoption of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, an employee of the State 
enjoyed immunity that can best be described as derivative from the immunity of 
the State. Against that legal history we can understand that in drafting the 
exceptions to immunity of the State and public employees the legislature must 
have assumed that when immunity of the State was withdrawn by virtue of an 
exception such as that contained in § 1-39-112 there remained no immunity for a 
public employee because that individual's immunity was purely dependent upon the 
immunity of the State. Read in this light the exceptions to immunity include 
both the State and the public employee involved, and the grant of the immunity 
in § 1-39-104, upon which Kinniburgh relies, must be perceived as limited to 
those situations not encompassed by the exceptions.

[¶10.]  We note that Oyler v. State, Wyo., 618 P.2d 1042 
(1980), which questioned the common-law immunity of public employees, had not 
been decided at the time of the adoption of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. 
The pertinent decisions at the time of the adoption of the act were Osborn v. Lawson, Wyo., 374 P.2d 201 (1962); and Price v. State Highway 
Commission, 62 Wyo. 385, 167 P.2d 309 (1946). The opinion in 
Price is somewhat equivocal because there was no need for this court to consider 
contributory negligence on the part of Price if Daly, the driver of the 
snowplow, was immune from liability. That proposition was substantially 
clarified in Osborn v. Lawson, supra, 
but it is there that the immunity of the employee is more clearly made dependent 
upon the immunity of the employer, the State of Wyoming.

[¶11.]  In the light of what we said in Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, supra, 
together with the historical articulation of public employee immunity, it is 
clear that in adopting the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act the legislature did 
not intend to immunize the public employee from suit. His protection is found in 
the duty of the State to provide him a defense and to save him harmless and 
indemnify him against any claim or judgment arising out of an act or omission 
occurring within the scope of his duties in accordance with § 1-39-104(b), W.S. 
1977 (1985 Cum.Supp.). There was no error in refusing to grant Kinniburgh's 
motion for summary judgment.

[¶12.]  The motion for summary judgment on behalf 
of the State of Wyoming specifically invokes the provisions of 
§ 1-39-116(b), W.S. 1977 (1985 Cum.Supp.), which provides:

"(b) The judgment in an 
action or a settlement under this act constitutes a complete bar to any action 
by the claimant, by reason of the same transaction or occurrence which was the 
subject matter of the original suit or claim, against the governmental entity or 
the public employee whose negligence gave rise to the claim."

The State of 
Wyoming then 
asserts the effect of its settlement of the counts of the complaint relating to 
the State of Wyoming, Wyoming State Highway Department, and Jack Oakley is to 
bar this action. The Motion to Dismiss, which was granted by the court in favor 
of the State of Wyoming, Wyoming State Highway Department, and Jack Oakley, 
stated, after reporting the basis of the settlement with the several 
appellees:

"* * * However, it is not 
the intention of Plaintiffs and said Defendants for the Court to dismiss claims 
against the State of Wyoming, Wyoming State Highway Department and G.M. 
Kinniburgh as alleged in Counts III and IV of Plaintiffs' Complaint and said 
claims have not been settled."

In the "Release 
and Covenant Not to Sue or Execute" attached to the Motion to Dismiss the 
following language is found:

"This agreement, however, 
is not intended by the parties hereto to release any claim against the State of 
Wyoming, Wyoming State Highway Department and G.M. Kinniburgh for injuries and 
damages sustained by Plaintiffs as a result of the intentional or negligent acts 
or omissions of G.M. Kinniburgh or other agents or employees of the Wyoming 
Highway Patrol, as alleged in Counts III and IV of Plaintiffs' Complaint. * * 
*"

We can say 
without fear of contradiction that separate insurance carriers were defending 
the claims asserted against Jack Oakley and Patrolman Kinniburgh. The State of 
Wyoming then 
accepted the Release and Covenant Not to Sue or Execute as limited by the 
language quoted above, and confirmed that limitation in its Motion to Dismiss 
presented to the district court. That limitation was recognized in the order 
entered which limited dismissal to those claims "as alleged in Counts II and 
IV." In a case not involving the State of Wyoming this court has upheld the reservation 
of a right to sue contained in a covenant not to execute. Lopez. v. Arryo, Wyo., 
489 P.2d 626 (1971).

[¶13.]  Without addressing the unconscionability 
of the position of the State of Wyoming in this instance, we hold that the 
issue of the State's claim that this action became barred by virtue of the 
Oakley settlement is resolved in the statute. Section 1-39-115, W.S. 1977 (1985 
Cum.Supp.), provides that when a claim is received the Insurance Claims Division 
of the Department of Administration and Fiscal Control shall send the claim to 
the insurance company insuring the risk involved for investigation and 
adjustment. In this instance two referrals were made, and that action by the 
State effectively identified separate claims. We are satisfied that the 
legislature intended the same connotation of the word "claim" in § 1-39-116, 
W.S. 1977 (1985 Cum.Supp.), as it intended for that word in § 1-39-115, W.S. 
1977 (1985 Cum.Supp.). The settlement of the claim against Oakley was not a 
settlement by reason of the same transaction or occurrence which was the subject 
matter of the original claim against Kinniburgh. Those two claims had been 
identified as separate and different by the State of Wyoming. Consequently the 
settlement of the claim against Oakley does not bar the assertion of the claim 
against Kinniburgh pursuant to § 1-39-116(b), W.S. 1977 (1985 Cum.Supp.). The 
district court did not err in denying the Motion for Summary Judgment by the 
State of Wyoming.

[¶14.]  Both Kinniburgh and the State of 
Wyoming 
complain of error in excluding additional witnesses whom the appellants wished 
to call and additional exhibits which they wished to offer on the ground that 
they had failed to comply with the pretrial order. The pretrial order provided 
in this regard:

"WITNESSES. 
All 
witnesses have been named. The parties will notify each other in writing not 
later than July 15, 1983 of any additional witnesses by name and address, along 
with a detailed statement of the 
testimony of each. That is not a summary, that is a detailed statement. 

"EXHIBITS. The parties have listed 
their exhibits. All exhibits will be marked before trial. Plaintiffs' with 
numbers in sequence and defendants' with appropriate letters in sequence. Each 
party will notify the other not later than July 15, 1983 of any other exhibits 
intended for use in the case and furnish copies of the same, or if not feasible, 
to make the same available for inspection. Unless written objection is filed and 
served not later than July 22, 1983, all exhibits which have been noticed will 
be admissible without further foundation." (Emphasis in original.)

The appellants 
claim that they complied with this requirement of the pretrial order by placing 
their notice of additional witnesses and exhibits in the mail addressed to the 
appellees on July 15, 1983.

[¶15.]  When the district judge first advised the 
appellants of his intention to exclude the additional witnesses and exhibits, he 
stated that "notification for the Court is that you notify somebody by a date of 
a particular happening, not mailing. Mailing is not notification in this 
instance." At the trial the appellants made an offer of proof concerning the 
additional witnesses. The district judge then denied the offer of proof on three 
grounds: First, the offer itself was not in proper form; second, the appellants 
had failed to give notification to opposing counsel by July 15; and third, the 
appellants had failed to give a "detailed statement of the testimony as opposed 
to a summary."

[¶16.]  The trial court in Wyoming has discretion in 
determining the requirements of adherence to pretrial and discovery orders. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Donahue, 
Wyo., 674 P.2d 1276 (1983); Caldwell v. 
Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd., Wyo., 648 P.2d 519 (1982), quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Kuhbacher, Wyo., 518 P.2d 1255 (1974). Furthermore, it is our rule of jurisprudence that this court 
will uphold the action of the trial court if any reason appears in the record 
which supports the trial court's determination. ABC Builders v. Phillips, Wyo., 
632 P.2d 925 (1981). In this instance the trial court was justified in 
determining that the required detailed statement of testimony of the witnesses 
was not provided. Even in briefs and arguments to this court the appellants have 
not specified the significance of the testimony of these additional witnesses by 
explaining clearly what the purpose and necessity of that testimony would have 
been in the case. We are justified in deeming the claim of error with respect to 
the additional exhibits waived because no offer of such exhibits was made at the 
trial. Consequently we cannot reach any conclusion with respect to 
prejudice.

[¶17.]  In their next claim of error the 
appellants insist that the plaintiffs failed to establish by sufficient evidence 
that any action of Patrolman Kinniburgh was a proximate cause of the accident. 
Unless reasonable people could not disagree on the question, proximate cause is 
a question to be resolved by the trier of fact. Buckley v. Bell, Wyo., 
703 P.2d 1089 (1985), and authorities therein cited. Since causation is a 
question of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact, this issue essentially 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding of the jury. 
In resolving that contention we must accept as true the evidence of the 
successful party, giving it every favorable inference which reasonably can be 
drawn, and we leave out of consideration contrary evidence by the unsuccessful 
party. E.g., Pine Creek Canal No. 1 v. Stadler, Wyo., 685 P.2d 13 
(1984); Anderson v. Bauer, Wyo., 681 P.2d 1316 (1984); Landmark, Inc. v. 
Stockmen's Bank & Trust Co., Wyo., 680 P.2d 471 (1984); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, Wyo., 677 P.2d 814 (1984). Specifically this record reveals that when the first reported 
accident occurred the patch of ice was about one hundred to two hundred feet 
long just after 7 p.m. It was black ice and extremely slick, making the road "as 
slick as an ice skating rink." The evidence disclosed that other cars had also 
gone off the road. It was dark and the ice was in an area of limited visibility, 
which caused people to be surprised by it. Patrolman Kinniburgh was told when he 
investigated the first accident that the road was slick and should be sanded. 
Usually the Maintenance Division of the Wyoming State Highway Department 
responds when the Highway Patrol requests that an area be sanded, and the 
Maintenance Division would take action if it were informed about such a hazard. 
The ice patch grew larger by 11 p.m., when the accident in this instance 
occurred. When the ambulance driver got out of his ambulance he fell down, there 
was difficulty in getting the gurney loaded into the ambulance, and difficulty 
in getting the ambulance underway. After that Officer Kinniburgh requested the 
sanding of the road. He did not have to go back to the area to investigate any 
other accidents that night. In the light of this information in the record, we 
have no difficulty in concluding that there was more than sufficient evidence to 
entitle the jury to conclude that Kinniburgh's conduct in not requesting that 
the road be sanded earlier was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm 
to these appellees.

[¶18.]  The appellants' next complaint relates to 
their asserted error with respect to the failure of the trial court to give the 
jury an instruction on the duty of care owed by Clark's Ready Mix. Clark's Ready Mix had been named as a defendant, but a 
stipulation to dismiss the complaint as to it was made prior to the trial. In 
assessing comparative negligence, however, the negligence of Clark's Ready Mix had to be submitted to the jury. Board of CountyCommissioners of CampbellCounty v. Ridenour, Wyo., 623 P.2d 1174 (1981), reh. denied 627 P.2d 163 
(1981). The instruction which the appellants offered with respect to the duty of 
Clark's Ready Mix reads as 
follows:

"A landowner, such as 
Clark's Ready Mix and its principals, Lynn and 
Lewell Clark, which is in close proximity to a public highway, must exercise 
reasonable care to avoid injury to the traveling public arising from 
unnecessarily dangerous conditions created by the landowner on the land, where 
the consequences of a failure to do so are reasonably foreseeable. A violation 
of this duty constitutes negligence.

"However, such a 
landowner is not considered negligent for allowing the natural accumulation of 
ice due to weather conditions where he has not created the condition. Further, 
when the danger arising from a natural accumulation of snow and ice is obvious 
or at least as well known to the driver of a vehicle as it is to the landowner, 
there exists no duty to remove the danger or warn plaintiff of its 
existence."

[¶19.]  The principles applicable in this 
instance are first that an instruction which is not sustained by the evidence 
should not be given. Hernandez v. 
Gilveli, Wyo., 626 P.2d 74 (1981); Beard v. Brown, Wyo., 616 P.2d 726 (1980); Gilliland v. Rhoads, Wyo., 
539 P.2d 1221 (1975). Furthermore, the court should refuse to give a tendered 
instruction which erroneously states the law. Edwards v. Harris, Wyo., 
397 P.2d 87 (1964). See Evans v. State, Wyo., 655 P.2d 1214 (1982); Nimmo v. State, Wyo., 607 P.2d 344 (1980); Simms v. State, Wyo., 492 P.2d 516 
(1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 886, 93 S. Ct. 104, 34 L. Ed. 2d 142 
(1972).

[¶20.]  We agree with the trial court that the 
record is not sufficient in this instance to justify a conclusion that there was 
any unnecessarily dangerous condition created by the landowner on the land in 
question. The evidence was simply to the effect that the water was coming out of 
the approach road to the premises of Clark's Ready Mix and onto the highway and 
its source may have been snow which had been plowed from Clark's access road. The creation of the condition, 
however, was not specifically described by the evidence. That portion of the 
instruction dealing with the duty of a landowner of premises adjacent to a 
public way apparently derives from Timmons v. Reed, Wyo., 569 P.2d 112, 
123-124 (1977), in which we said:

"The general rule 
applicable to the type of case now before us is stated in Restatement, Torts 2d, 
§ 371, as follows:

"`A possessor of land is 
subject to liability for physical harm to others outside of the land caused by 
an activity carried on by him thereon which he realizes or should realize will 
involve an unreasonable risk of 
physical harm to them under the same conditions as though the activity were 
carried on at a neutral place.'

"The defendant, 
therefore, is considered to have created only a risk as to injury, and with 
respect to the resulting damage his conduct cannot be called anything more than 
negligent. [Citation.] The landowner in close proximity to a public highway must 
exercise reasonable care to avoid injury to the traveling public arising from unnecessarily dangerous conditions 
created by him on the land, where the consequences of a failure to do so are 
reasonably foreseeable. [Citations.] A violation of this duty constitutes 
negligence." (Emphasis added.)

That portion 
dealing with the obvious danger rule is derived from Sherman v. Platte County, Wyo., 642 P.2d 787, 789 (1982). The instruction which was in issue in that case 
read:

"An owner or occupant of 
land or premises does not have an obligation to protect his invitees against 
dangers that are known to them or that are so obvious and apparent that they may 
reasonably be expected to discover such dangers."

In Cervelli v. Graves, Wyo., 661 P.2d 1032, 
1039 (1983), we pointed out that this instruction applies only in suits against 
owners of the premises and pertains to those persons who come upon the land and 
subsequently sue for injuries sustained because of an accumulation of ice or 
snow on the premises.

[¶21.]  We hold that in these circumstances the 
instruction complained of did not present a statement of the law which was 
correct in all respects, but instead was incorrect in part, and that further 
part of the proposed instruction was not supported by the evidence. The district 
court correctly refused to give the proposed instruction.

[¶22.]  Finally, we address the matter of costs. 
Specifically the appellants object to the award of costs in the following 
categories:

[¶23.]  1. They complain that the bill of costs 
included costs for service of the summons and complaint on Jack Oakley, Lewell 
and Lynn Clark, and Clark's Ready Mix, 
defendants with whom the plaintiffs settled. The total amount of those costs is 
$5.55.

[¶24.]  2. The appellants complain of costs 
awarded for service of subpoenas on witnesses who were not called to testify by 
the appellees. Those witnesses were Charles Gaudet, Chris Brackin, Jack Oakley, 
Bob Zimmer, Dr. Dennis Lyman, Nanette Olsen, and Debbie Conover. The total 
amount of the costs awarded for service of these subpoenas was 
$12.00.

[¶25.]  3. The appellants complain that costs 
were awarded for witness fees and mileage paid for witnesses who were not called 
to testify by the plaintiffs. These witnesses were Charles Gaudet, Chris 
Brackin, Jack Oakley, Bob Zimmer, Nanette Olsen, and Debbie Conover. The total 
amount of costs in issue under this item is $223.86.

[¶26.]  4. The appellants complain that costs 
were awarded for witnesses for days when the witnesses did not appear at the 
trial. We cannot discern the amount in issue here because the position of the 
appellants simply is that fees were paid for more days than the witnesses 
actually appeared, but the one specific example simply points out that the 
witness testified on two days but was paid a witness fee for five days. No 
further specific information is given.

[¶27.]  5. The appellants complain that expert 
witness fees of more than $25 per day were allowed without a showing of special 
circumstances for the actual payment of such fees. The amounts complained of 
were assessed as costs for the testimony of five physicians who testified at the 
trial. These amounts are significant, totaling $2,145.64.

[¶28.]  6. The appellants complain of the award 
of costs for a pretrial conference with a doctor in the amount of 
$60.

[¶29.]  7. The appellants complain of the award 
of costs for discovery depositions. These amounts total $1907.75.

[¶30.]  8. Finally the appellants complain of the 
award of costs for a transcript of Kinniburgh's testimony at trial in the amount 
of $260.00.

[¶31.]  The award of costs to the prevailing 
party is authorized pursuant to Rule 54(d), W.R.C.P., and § 1-14-124, W.S. 1977. 
This court previously has said that the proper costs to be assessed against the 
party who lost the case are not very clearly established in either the statute 
or the rule. Roberts Construction Company 
v. Vondriska, Wyo., 
547 P.2d 1171 (1976). The appellants have not offered any material assistance in 
terms of dealing with these issues in their brief. In Hecht v. 
Harrison, 5 Wyo. 279, 290, 40 P. 306 (1895), the court noted that "not only 
must there be harm in the error, but it must be so important as to merit the 
consideration of the appellate tribunal, and to take something more than nominal 
value from the complaining party." With respect to the specific contentions of 
the appellants, we hold that costs should not be awarded for service fees upon 
parties with whom the successful party has settled. In the absence of a showing 
that it was not reasonable to obtain the attendance of witnesses who ultimately 
were not called by the prevailing party, which the appellants have not presented 
in this instance, we hold that it was permissible for the district court to 
award costs for the service of those subpoenas. According to the provisions of § 
1-14-102, witnesses are entitled to receive fees for attending before a court, 
and therefore even if the witness does not testify, the cost is incurred. If it 
was reasonable for the witness to be subpoenaed then the award of costs for 
attending before the court is appropriate, and we have not been directed to 
anything in the record which would demonstrate an abuse of discretion on the 
part of the district judge in awarding the costs of witness fees and mileage for 
witnesses who were not called. If a witness did not attend before the court then 
a witness fee would not be payable for that day. This record, however, does not 
disclose when witnesses attended, but only the days on which they testified. 
Consequently there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the district judge 
in awarding witness fees for those days on which the witnesses attended, even if 
they did not testify on that day. The appellants have not shown by the record 
that any of the witnesses for whom the fees of which they complain were paid did 
not attend the requisite number of days. We shall address separately the 
question of the expert witness fees generally, but it does appear that, with 
respect to the payment of a fee for an expert witness, § 1-14-102(b), W.S. 1977, 
requires that the expert give testimony which is admitted as evidence in the 
case. Therefore, the costs awarded for the physician who did not testify are not 
proper costs under the statute. We conclude that there was an abuse of 
discretion by the district court in awarding the $60 in question.

[¶32.]  With respect to costs of discovery 
depositions, we espouse the rule that if the discovery deposition is reasonably 
necessary for the preparation of the case, then there is no abuse of discretion 
on the part of the district judge in awarding such costs. See for example, Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976); Griffin v. 
Collins, 443 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D.Ga. 1978); George R. Hall, Inc., v. Superior Trucking 
Co., Inc., 532 F. Supp. 985 (N.D.Ga. 1982); Kraeger v. University of Pittsburgh, 535 F. Supp. 233 (W.D.Pa. 1982); Wade v. 
Mississippi Cooperative Extension Service, 64 F.R.D. 102 (N.D.Miss. 1974); 
Mastrapas v. New York Life Insurance Co., 
93 F.R.D. 401 (E.D.Mich. 1982). With respect to the exercise of discretion 
as to such costs, however, the burden must be upon the party seeking the award 
of costs to justify to the district court that those costs were reasonably 
necessary for the preparation of the case for trial. If the depositions are 
introduced at the trial, or are used for purposes of impeachment or refreshing 
the recollection of a witness at the trial that would ordinarily satisfy the 
burden of demonstrating that they were reasonably necessary. Other uses of the 
deposition in connection with the trial proceedings such as motions for summary 
judgment might serve to persuade the district court that the depositions were 
reasonably necessary, but it would not be required to so conclude. In this 
instance, however, the record does not demonstrate that any of these events 
occurred, and the appellees made no other showing with respect to establishing 
that the taking of the depositions was reasonably necessary for the preparation 
of the case for trial. Even though many of the depositions were noticed by the 
appellants, the expense of a transcript also must be justified because often 
parties can rely upon the filed transcript in terms of preparing for trial. 
Because the appellees did not establish on the record that the claimed costs for 
depositions or transcripts were reasonably necessary to prepare the case for 
trial, we cannot sustain the exercise of the district court's discretion in 
awarding such costs, and they must be deleted from the judgment for costs in 
favor of the appellees.

[¶33.]  Substantially the same rule is applicable 
with respect to the award of costs for those witnesses who were subpoenaed to 
attend but did not testify. We note in this instance, however, that of those 
witnesses of whom complaint is made one of those witnesses was called by the 
appellants to testify. Three of them were not permitted to testify because 
notice of their testimony had not been given in a timely manner, but that ruling 
was not made by the district court until they already had appeared for trial. 
Finally, the conclusion not to call three of the other witnesses was reached 
after they had appeared and quite possibly because the trial court had indicated 
after the first day of trial that in its judgment negligence already had been 
established. Because of the familiarity of the trial judge with the dynamics of 
the trial, we sustain his exercise of discretion in awarding these 
costs.

[¶34.]  The appellant Kinniburgh was called as an 
adverse witness by the appellees early in the trial. The appellees then obtained 
a transcript of his testimony for use during the trial. We are not advised by 
the record or the appellants' brief as to the basis for any conclusion that this 
expenditure was not necessary and proper. In the brief it is argued that it was 
only for the convenience and advantage of plaintiffs at trial, which may not be 
a bad description of expenditures that are necessary and proper, and the 
appellants further contend that there is no authority for awarding the costs of 
such transcript. The trial judge obviously is in the best position to draw a 
conclusion as to whether this expenditure was necessary and proper. Because the 
appellants have failed to make any showing of an abuse of the district court's 
discretion in that regard, we hold that this was a proper item of 
costs.

[¶35.]  We turn to the matter of the expert 
witness fees with respect to which the appellants rely upon Buttrey Food Stores Division v. Coulson, 
Wyo., 620 P.2d 549, 20 A.L.R.4th 419 (1980). In that case we said that we did 
not know the amount awarded for the expert witness fee, and since there was no 
evidence as to the reasonableness of the unknown fee the trial court committed 
an abuse of discretion in awarding any amount in excess of $25. Two justices 
dissented because they were willing to conclude that the amount was not 
inappropriate for an expert witness fee for an orthopedic surgeon. In this 
instance the dollar amounts of the witness fee were specified, and since the 
record does not disclose that any complaint was made to the district court with 
respect to the excessive amount of those fees, the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in awarding these as costs. Apparently the appellants objected to 
the award of costs, and there is an indication that a letter was written with 
respect to them. That letter, however, is not a part of this record, and we do 
not know what the objection was that was called to the attention of the district 
court. It is the burden of the appellant to produce a record upon which we can 
decide the issues he presents. Sharp v. 
Sharp, Wyo., 671 P.2d 317 (1983), and 
authorities cited therein; Scherling v. 
Kilgore, Wyo., 599 P.2d 1352 (1979); Mentock v. Mentock, Wyo., 
638 P.2d 156 (1981). On the limited record present we distinguish Buttrey 
Food Stores Division v. Coulson, supra.

[¶36.]  We have found it difficult to arrive at 
any definitive rulings with respect to the costs in this case because our record 
is inadequate. We point out, however, that it is the obligation of counsel for 
all parties to furnish information to a trial court upon which it can make an 
informed exercise of its discretion. Failure to perform that obligation in the 
future well may lead to disallowance of costs that are claimed or to the 
allowance of costs that are resisted simply on the ground that counsel have not 
performed their duty to the district court.

[¶37.]  The judgment of the district court in 
this instance is modified by reducing the bill of costs by $1,973.30, which will 
reduce the judgments of the several appellees by $657.77 each. As modified, the 
judgments are affirmed.

ROSE, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶38.]  The majority opinion does not address the 
effect on this appeal of the defendants' failure to fully assert their rights 
under the comparative-negligence statute, § 1-1-109, W.S. 1977, and the 
contribution-among-joint-tortfeasors statutes, §§ 1-1-110 through 1-1-113, W.S. 
1977, even though Justice Rooney, in his dissenting opinion, treats these 
omissions as plain errors requiring reversal. While I cannot adopt the 
dissenting position that a possible misapplication of the comparative-negligence 
law amounted to plain error, I agree that the judgment in this case should be 
modified further to reflect the amount of consideration paid to appellees in the 
settlement of their claims against Jack Oakley and the State of 
Wyoming.

Comparative 
Negligence

[¶39.]  Wyoming's comparative-negligence statute, § 
1-1-109, W.S. 1977, provides in part:

"(a) Contributory 
negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or his legal 
representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury 
to person or property, if the contributory negligence was not as great as the 
negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought. Any damages allowed 
shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the 
person recovering.

"(b) The court may, and 
when requested by any party shall:

"(i) If a jury trial, 
direct the jury to find separate special verdicts; * * *"

When the 
plaintiff's negligence is at issue in a case, the jury, in arriving at its 
verdict, must ascertain the percentages of fault of all of the participants to 
an occurrence, including non-parties who settled with the plaintiff. Kirby Building Systems v. Mineral 
Explorations Company, Wyo., 704 P.2d 1266 
(1985); Board of County Commissioners of 
County of Campbell v. Ridenour, Wyo., 623 P.2d 1174, reh. denied 627 P.2d 163 
(1981). These determinations by the jury permit an accurate comparison of the 
plaintiff's contributory negligence, if any, with the negligence of each of the 
defendants in the action:

"* * * Logic dictates 
that, if the negligence of an actor who is not a party is not included in the 
comparative-negligence calculation, the percentage of negligence of defendants 
who are parties may be inflated, and this would have a detrimental impact upon 
the comparison of the fault of the plaintiff and the several defendants in 
reaching a determination as to liability of some or all of the defendants to the 
plaintiff." Kirby Building Systems v. 
Mineral Explorations Company, supra, 704 P.2d  at 1272-3.

[¶40.]  In the case at bar, the defendants, G.M. 
Kinniburgh and the State of Wyoming, did not request the trial court to 
place the settlor Jack Oakley on the verdict form for the jury's consideration. 
Nor have the defendants raised the issue of a defective verdict form on appeal. 
It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the defendants did not consider 
Oakley to be a participant to whom the jury properly could assign a 
proportionate share of the total causal negligence. 

[¶41.]  For purposes of discussion, however, I 
will assume that Oakley was an actor who should have appeared on the verdict 
form to permit an accurate determination of the parties' relative degrees of 
negligence. The question, therefore, becomes whether the failure of the court to 
instruct the jury to ascertain the negligence of participant Oakley amounts to 
plain, reversible error.

[¶42.]  The Wisconsin Supreme Court resolved a 
similar question in Patterson v. Edgerton 
Sand & Gravel Co., 227 Wis., 277 N.W. 636 (1938).1 The court held that the defendants 
had waived their right to have the jury determine the negligence of a nonparty, 
since no request was made of the trial court:

"Defendants also contend 
that the issue as to comparative negligence was not properly submitted because 
the jury was not directed by either the form of the questions or the court's 
instructions to include negligence on the part of [nonparty] Finley with that of 
[defendant] Wescott and the plaintiff in finding the proportion of the total 
causal negligence attributable to each of them, as is required under Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 
214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721, 92 A.L.R. 680 [1934]. However, the record herein 
discloses that the defendants are not entitled to a reversal on that ground for 
the following reasons: They did not request the submittal of any question to the 
jury, or the giving of any instruction in respect to the inclusion of negligence 
on Finley's part in the total negligence which the jury was to take into 
consideration in finding the proportions of causal negligence attributable to 
Wescott and to the plaintiff, respectively. In the absence of any such request 
and any finding by the jury on that subject, there is applicable the rule that, 
`When some controverted matter of fact not brought to the attention of the trial 
court but essential to sustain the judgment is omitted from the verdict, such 
matter of fact shall be deemed determined by the court in conformity with its 
judgment and the failure to request a finding by the jury on such matter shall 
be deemed a waiver of jury trial pro tanto.' [Citations.]" 277 N.W.  at 
640.

[¶43.]  We have applied similar reasoning to 
conclude that a defendant must timely exercise his right to file a third-party 
complaint or the right is waived. Pickett 
v. Associates Discount Corporation of Wyoming, 
Wyo., 435 P.2d 445 (1967). I see no reason to apply a different rule when the defendant, 
for whatever reasons, fails to include all of the participants to an occurrence 
on the verdict form. The defendant bears the responsibility for structuring his 
own defense, and his failure to avail himself of a possibly advantageous 
procedure or defense theory does not constitute grounds for 
reversal.

Contribution Among Joint 
Tortfeasors - The Effect of a Release or Covenant Not to Sue

[¶44.]  Section 1-1-113, W.S. 1977, of the 
contribution-among-joint-tortfeasors statutes concerns the effect of a release 
or covenant not to sue given in good faith to one of multiple 
tortfeasors:

"(a) When a release or a 
covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one (1) 
of two (2) or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same 
wrongful death:

"(i) It does not 
discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful 
death unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the claim against the others 
to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the 
amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and 

"(ii) It discharges the 
tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any other 
tortfeasor."

We analyzed the 
contribution-among-joint-tortfeasors statutes in Bjork v. Chrysler Corporation, Wyo., 702 P.2d 146 (1985), and said that the statutes and the release document must be 
considered together as constituting the entire agreement of the parties. We said 
that, under § 1-1-113, a release no longer extinguishes the plaintiff's claim 
against the remaining tortfeasors, as was the case at common law. Instead, the 
release reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors to the extent provided 
by the terms of the release or the amount of consideration received, whichever 
is the greater. 702 P.2d  at 151.

[¶45.]  Appellees in the case at bar executed a 
release in favor of Oakley and the State of Wyoming. This release is contained 
in the record and provides in part:

"* * * It is understood 
by the undersigned that this Release reduces their claim against any other 
tortfeasor by the $22,500.00 consideration paid * * *"

Under the terms 
of the release agreement and the provisions of § 1-1-113, appellees settled 
their cause of action to the extent of $22,500 and retained the right, subject 
to other settlement agreements, to enforce the remainder of their claim against 
the other tortfeasors. The jury, following trial, determined the appellees' 
total damages resulting from the tortious incident. The court, in entering 
judgment on the verdict, deducted the amount received by appellees under their 
settlement agreement with driver Peggy Jo Parker, but did not deduct the amount 
of consideration received from Oakley and the State of Wyoming. The question 
arises as to whether this court, in the absence of any request from appellants, 
should direct modification of the judgment to reflect the amount received in 
settlement from Oakley and the State of Wyoming.

[¶46.]  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals faced 
a related issue in Layne v. United 
States, 460 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1972). That court was asked to interpret 
Alaska's settlement statute which tracks § 1-1-113 in all aspects pertinent here 
and, like our enactment, derives from § 4 of the Uniform Contribution Among 
Tortfeasors Act. The court held that the failure of the defendant United States 
to formally raise the issue of the settlement agreement at trial did not deprive 
it of the right to a reduction in the damages award by the amount paid for the 
release:

"[Plaintiff] Layne admits 
the applicability of the [Alaska Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors] Act, 
but claims that the United States cannot rely on Section 09.16.040 [pertaining 
to releases and covenants not to sue] because it failed to raise the issue 
during the trial by placing the settlement in evidence and showing that the 
released defendant Wickersham, was in fact a joint tortfeasor. That Wickersham 
was not `one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury,' Layne 
contends, is demonstrated by the court's specific finding that the accident and 
Layne's resulting injuries `were caused solely by, and were the direct and 
proximate result of, the negligence of the . . . United States of 
America.'

"Layne misapprehends the 
purpose and effect of § 4 of the Uniform Act. While § 4 changed the common law 
in one respect (i.e., by providing that release of one joint tortfeasor does not 
automatically release the other joint tortfeasors), it retained that part of the common law rule 
embodying the sound public policy of permitting a plaintiff to receive only the 
amount of his adjudged damages and no more, regardless of the source of the 
recovery. Since the principle is that there can be but one satisfaction for the 
same injury, whether or not the released party is in fact jointly liable with 
the defendant against whom a judgment is rendered is not relevant. In either 
case, to prevent recovery by plaintiff of 
more than his legitimate damages, `the amount paid for the release or covenant 
not to sue must reduce pro tanto the injured person's judgment against 
another. Prosser, Law of Torts, 2nd Ed., Sec. 46, p. 246; 109 Pa.L.R. 311, 
313; Holland v. Southern Public Utilities 
Co., 208 N.C. 289, 180 S.E. 592, [1935] and cases cited; Jacobsen v. Woerner, supra, 149 Kan. 
598, 89 P.2d 24, [1939] and cases cited.' Steger v. Egyud, 1959, 219 Md. 331, 149 A.2d 762, 767-768. [1959] (applying New Jersey law).

* * * * * *

"The settlement between 
Layne and Wickersham was part of the record before the trial court in this case. 
The trial judge discussed the settlement with attorneys for all parties at 
length, in open court. In such circumstances it would have served no useful 
purpose for the United States to formally offer the settlement into evidence and 
we do not require that it be done. Layne's award of damages against the United 
States should therefore be adjusted downward by $50,000 * * *." (Emphasis 
added.) 460 F.2d  at 411.

Courts in other 
jurisdictions have applied similar reasoning in directing the reduction of a 
damages award to prevent "unjust enrichment" to the plaintiff, Clark v. Brooks, Del.Super., 377 A.2d 365, 369 (1977), or to bar the plaintiff from obtaining double recovery. Daugherty v. Hershberger, 386 Pa. 367, 
126 A.2d 730 (1956).

[¶47.]  Appellees in the case at bar received 
$22,500 pursuant to their settlement agreement with Oakley and the State of 
Wyoming. Under § 1-1-113, they retained the right to bring suit against the 
nonsettling tortfeasors for additional compensation of their injuries. Appellees 
do not possess a right to recover an amount in excess of their damages as 
determined by the jury. Therefore, in addition to the modifications approved by 
the majority, I would have reduced the judgment by the amount of the 
consideration received by appellees in settlement of their claims against Oakley 
and the State of Wyoming.

1 Wyoming's 
comparative-negligence statute derives from the Wisconsin statute. Woodward v. Haney, Wyo., 564 P.2d 844 
(1977). We have previously concluded that the legislature intended to adopt the 
Wisconsin judicial construction of the act as of 1973, the date of enactment in 
this state. Board of County Commissioners 
of County of Campbell v. Ridenour, supra; Woodward v. Haney, supra.

BROWN, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶48.]  The dissent brings to our attention the 
fact that Jack Oakley, a named defendant in the complaint, "was not included on 
that portion of the verdict form which allocated the percentage of negligence." 
What is said in the dissent appears to be on the assumption that the record 
discloses evidence of Mr. Oakley's negligence.

[¶49.]  In their complaint appellees alleged that 
"The negligence of the Defendant Oakley, while acting within the scope of his 
duties as an employee of the Wyoming State Highway Department, directly and 
proximately caused the injuries of the plaintiffs." They also allege several 
specific negligent circumstances implicating Mr. Oakley. An examination of the 
record, however, reveals that there was no evidence that Mr. Oakley was 
negligent.1 Interestingly, Mr. Oakley was not 
even on duty the day of the accident, although after the accident he was called 
to put sand on the road.

[¶50.]  Before a person can properly be placed on 
the form of verdict allocating percentage of negligence there must be some 
evidence of his negligence. ABC Builders, 
Inc. v. Phillips, Wyo., 632 P.2d 925 (1981). See also, Klemme v. Hoag Memorial Hospital 
Presbyterian, 103 Cal. App. 3d 640, 163 Cal. Rptr. 109 (1980).

[¶51.]  In the absence of a showing to the 
contrary, an appellate court will presume that the proceedings in the lower 
court were correct. 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error, § 1533, p. 1025 (1958). The 
record in this case does not indicate whether or not the court and counsel 
considered including the name of Jack Oakley on the verdict form. We must assume 
that the court and counsel were aware of the cases cited in the dissent and that 
Jack Oakley was not on the verdict form because there was no evidence of his 
negligence. In the absence of a showing to the contrary we cannot assume that 
Jack Oakley was left off the verdict form because the court and counsel knew not 
the law or because of inadvertence.

[¶52.]  An allegation of negligence in the 
complaint standing alone is insufficient. Furthermore, I do not believe that it 
is of any consequence that Jack Oakley made what appears to be a nuisance 
settlement with appellees before trial.

[¶53.]  I agree that this case should be 
affirmed.

1 Counsel do not contend 
that Mr. Oakley was negligent, and whether or not his name should have been on 
the verdict was not an issue at trial nor on appeal.

ROONEY,* Justice, 
dissenting.

* This case was assigned 
to Justice Thomas on March 22, 1984. He circulated the proffered opinion on 
August 1, 1985. The dissenting opinion without the addendum was circulated on 
August 7, 1985. Justice Brown circulated his specially concurring opinion on 
September 5, 1985. Justice Rose circulated his specially concurring opinion on 
September 6, 1985. The addendum to this dissenting opinion was circulated on 
September 9, 1985.

[¶54.]  The verdict form and the verdict in this 
case were fatally defective. Although settlement was reached with defendant Jack 
Oakley and the State with reference to liability based on Oakley's negligence, 
and although a release and covenant not to sue was given with reference thereto, 
he was not included on that portion of the verdict form which allocated the 
percentage of negligence.

[¶55.]  The verdict read:

"1. Considering 
all of the fault that produced the injury to the plaintiffs at 100%, what 
percentage of the total fault do you attribute to each of the 
following:

"Glen Kinniburgh 
and The State of Wyoming (0% to 100%)

"55 %

"Peggy Jo Parker 
    (0% to 100%)                        
   5 
%

"Dave Thorson 
and Teton County Sheriff's Office 

"(0% to 100%)                       
 40 %

"Clark's Ready 
Mix & Construction 

"(0% to 100%)                       
   0 
%

"Susan Dieringer 
     (0% to 100%) 
                       
   0 
%

"Bonnie Roberts 
       (0% 
to 100%)                        
   0 
%

"Connie Mark 
                       
(0% to 100%)                        
   0 
%

    "TOTAL                  
100 %"

[¶56.]  If Oakley and the State had been included 
on the verdict form, the percentage of negligence attributed to them may have 
considerably reduced that attributed to appellants, with a resulting decrease in 
the amount of the judgment.

[¶57.]  We have recently emphasized the 
requirement that all participants' fault must be ascertained, including that of 
nonparty actors, and even those with whom settlement has been made. Kirby Building Systems v. Centric 
Corporation, Wyo., 704 P.2d 1266 (1985).1 I need not elaborate on the 
exhaustive discussion contained therein. It was error to not include Oakley and 
the State on the verdict form.

[¶58.]  In this case, the verdict form itself was 
not specifically objected to and the issue was not presented to us. Normally, we 
would, thus, not consider the matter. Rule 51, W.R.C.P.; Anderson v. Foothill Industrial Bank, 
Wyo., 674 P.2d 232 (1984); Caterpillar Tractor Company v. Donahue, 
Wyo., 674 P.2d 1276 (1983); Alleman v. 
Alleman, 78 Wyo. 135, 319 P.2d 871 (1958); Rollins v. Duncombe, 24 Wyo. 341, 157 P. 896 (1916). However, under the circumstances of this case, I believe it is not 
only proper for us to consider the error, but it is our duty to do so in the 
interest of justice.

[¶59.]  The basis for requiring the objection at 
the trial level is to allow the trial court to consider and rule on the issue. 
Dennis v. Dennis, Wyo., 675 P.2d 265 
(1984). In this case, there are three reasons for not invoking the propositions 
that an objection must be made and the issue must be presented to us: One, the 
problem was before the trial court and, therefore, the reasons for the 
proposition do not exist; two, the error was with reference to a fundamental 
right, and we have said that the proposition is not applicable to jurisdiction 
or other fundamental rights; and three, the error was plain error, wherefore, a 
review of the error can be had without objection having been made to 
it.

[¶60.]  The potential of fault on the part of 
Oakley and his status as an actor in this incident were definitely brought to 
the attention of the court. For example, the complaint named Oakley as a 
defendant and alleged that his negligence "directly and proximately caused the 
injuries of the Plaintiff." A separate answer containing denials and affirmative 
defenses with reference to Oakley's liability was filed by Oakley and the State. 
Attached to the motion by appellees to dismiss their claims against Oakley and 
the State was a release and covenant not to sue Oakley and the State for any 
fault of Oakley, which release read in part:

"* * * It is understood 
by the undersigned that this Release reduces their claim against any other 
tortfeasor by the $22,500.00 consideration paid * * *."

And the motion 
was granted. Appellants filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that 
the release of Oakley and the State also released appellants. Appellees also 
released Peggy Jo Parker, driver of the vehicle in which they were riding, from 
claims arising out of the incident, and she was on the verdict form with the 
jury allocating five percent fault to her. Also on the verdict form were Clark's 
Ready Mix & Construction and Dave Thorson and Teton County Sheriff's Office, 
all of whom (Parker, Clark's Ready Mix, Thorson and the Teton County Sheriff's 
Office) were referred to in the instructions as nonparties.

[¶61.]  Additionally, this error is indirectly 
included in the first issue presented to us by appellants. A contention that the 
release of Oakley and the State operated to release appellant Dieringer and the 
State will naturally cause attention to be drawn to the verdict to determine the 
degree of fault attributed to the two of them and the amount received by 
appellants in settlement for fault of Oakley, which amount should be deducted 
from the jury award. In this case, the verdict form did not consider the fault 
of Oakley, and the amount received in settlement from him was not deducted from 
the award in the judgment. The judgment did deduct the amounts received in 
settlement with Parker.

[¶62.]  The improper conditions of the verdict 
form and the verdict were before the trial court, and they were sufficiently 
presented to us under the circumstances of this case. Reversal should 
result.

[¶63.]  Added to the foregoing is the fact that 
the error concerned the fundamental right of appellants to be responsible, under 
the comparative-negligence statute, only for their own degree of fault. We have 
said that we have the "right and duty * * * to decide the cause on a point not 
raised below where such matter is fundamental." Steffens v. Smith, Wyo., 477 P.2d 119, 
121 (1970). If only five percent of the fault, attributable to appellants, were 
charged to Oakley, there would be no recovery against appellants.

[¶64.]  In any event, we should consider the 
error as plain error. Rule 7.05, W.R.A.P., provides:

"Plain errors or defects 
affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to 
the attention of the court."

"* * * [W]e [the supreme 
court] are duty bound to consider an unassigned error under the plain error 
doctrine as well as our general supervisory powers, where the error is blatant 
and results in an unmistakable and unconscionable miscarriage of justice. * * *" 
Sanchez v. State, Wyo., 592 P.2d 1130, 1131 (1979).

[¶65.]  There is a duty to invoke the plain error 
doctrine when the error seriously affects the fairness or integrity of the 
judicial proceedings. Hopkinson v. 
State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79 (1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 
71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982); Jones v. 
State, Wyo., 580 P.2d 1150 (1978).

[¶66.]  This error is similar to an error caused 
by failing to join an indispensable party - the failure to join was in the 
verdict form. Reasoning should be the same in ascertaining the result of the 
party's absence.

[¶67.]  We have held that the lack of an 
indispensable party is of such importance that the supreme court may properly 
raise the question on its own motion. State by and Through Christopulos v. Husky 
Oil Company of Delaware, Wyo., 575 P.2d 262 (1978). We there quoted from 3A 
Moore's Federal Practice, 2d Ed., ¶ 19.05:

"`But the concept of 
indispensability goes beyond federal jurisdiction and touches the very power or 
the right of the court to make an equitable adjudication, where an indispensable 
party is not before it. In this situation, barring exceptional equities, it 
should not proceed without his joinder, * * *.'" 575 P.2d  at 269.

We have also 
held that failure to object to a defective judgment does not constitute a waiver 
of such defect. Cates v. Barb, Wyo., 
650 P.2d 1159 (1982).

[¶68.]  The three-part test to qualify an error 
as plain error was definitely met in this case: There is a clear record of that 
which occurred (the verdict form is before us), a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law exists (see Kirby Building Systems v. 
Centric Corporation, supra, and the Wyoming cases cited therein), and a 
substantial right was affected (appellants' degree of negligence could have been 
different). See Hopkinson v. State, 
Wyo., 664 P.2d 43 (1983); Mason v. 
State, Wyo., 631 P.2d 1051 (1981).

[¶69.]  My position, supra, would make more 
equitable the majority's decision to limit the release of Oakley, as it applied 
to the State, only to employee Oakley's fault and not to employee Kinniburgh's 
fault. However, I need not address the problem of there being a single injury 
with the resulting liability to be measured from that standpoint. A correct 
verdict form recognizes this fact.

ADDENDUM

[¶70.]  Justice Brown and Justice Rose each have 
circulated a specially concurring opinion in response to this 
dissent.

[¶71.]  In his opinion, Justice Brown would make 
it unnecessary to place a defendant on a verdict form in a negligence case if 
there was no evidence introduced as to his negligence2 - this to be done absent his 
removal from the case by virtue of a summary judgment in his favor (as occurred 
in ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 
Wyo., 632 P.2d 925 (1981) - the case cited by Justice Brown to support his 
contention) and absent the granting of any other motion removing him from the 
case.

[¶72.]  Such a precedent will really confuse the 
orderly procedure relative to the proper presence of a party in a lawsuit and 
relative to the factual determination of negligence by the jury.

[¶73.]  I not only disagree as to the premise for 
Justice Brown's argument, but I disagree with the conclusion even if the premise 
were correct.

[¶74.]  Justice Rose's opinion is also flawed. He 
finds some kind of waiver on the part of the defendant in not insisting that all 
participants be included on the verdict form. Justice Rose thus finds a waiver 
of plain error. Plain error is inconsistent with waiver. Justice Rose's 
argument, if valid, would apply to all of those cases decided by this court in 
the past on the basis of the presence of plain error. I have set out above the 
factors which we have said must be present for plain error, and I have 
designated wherein they are all present in this case.

[¶75.]  Additionally, the argument presented by 
Justice Rose to justify the failure to include participants Oakley and the State 
on the verdict form is inconsistent with his argument that the settlement amount 
received from Oakley and the State should be acknowledged and the judgment be 
reduced accordingly. Either there was a waiver by the parties for all 
involvement of Oakley and the State through an acceptance of the verdict form or 
there was not.

[¶76.]  The facts and errors in this case are 
plain; there should not be any effort of rationalizing or justifying 
them.

[¶77.]  I would reverse and remand for a new 
trial.

1 My dissent in Kirby was 
with reference to another issue.

2 The evidence relative to 
Oakley's duty to attend to the spreading of gravel on highways and to his 
failure to perform such duty was part of plaintiff's case against Oakley and the 
State. A settlement was made with Oakley for $22,500, and he was given a 
release. It is difficult to understand how he can be considered a 
nonparticipant.