Case Title: RON RETZ, an individual; ERNEST WILLIAMS, individually and as trustee for nieces and nephews of the decedent, William C. Rogers; ANNE BURWELL WILLIAMS, individually and as co-trustee for the nieces and nephews of the decedent, William C. Rogers; FRED CROUTER, individually and as trustee of the Ada Crouter Trust; AND BEVERLY CROUTER, an individual V. WILLIAM SIEBRANDT, an individual; SALVADOR ZARATE, an individual; CHARLES E. GRAVES, in his capacity as Successor Trustee of the Living Trust of WILLIAM C. ROGERS, deceased, and THE UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING FOUNDATION, a Wyoming nonprofit corporation

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0023

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
RON RETZ, an individual; ERNEST WILLIAMS, individually and as trustee for nieces and nephews of the decedent, William C. Rogers; ANNE BURWELL WILLIAMS, individually and as co-trustee for the nieces and nephews of the decedent, William C. Rogers; FRED CROUTER, individually and as trustee of the Ada Crouter Trust; AND BEVERLY CROUTER, an individual V. WILLIAM SIEBRANDT, an individual; SALVADOR ZARATE, an individual; CHARLES E. GRAVES, in his capacity as Successor Trustee of the Living Trust of WILLIAM C. ROGERS, deceased, and THE UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING FOUNDATION, a Wyoming nonprofit corporation2008 WY 44181 P.3d 84Case Number: S-07-0023Decided: 04/11/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
RON 
RETZ, an individual; ERNEST WILLIAMS, individually and as trustee for nieces and 
nephews of the decedent, William C. Rogers; ANNE BURWELL WILLIAMS, individually 
and as co-trustee for the nieces and nephews of the decedent, William C. Rogers; 
FRED CROUTER, individually and as trustee of the Ada Crouter Trust; AND BEVERLY CROUTER, an 
individual,Appellants(Plaintiffs),v.WILLIAM 
SIEBRANDT, an individual; SALVADOR ZARATE, an individual; CHARLES E. GRAVES, in 
his capacity as Successor Trustee of the Living Trust of WILLIAM C. ROGERS, 
deceased,Appellees(Defendants),andTHE UNIVERSITY OF 
WYOMING FOUNDATION, a Wyoming nonprofit corporation,Appellee(Nominal 
Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

C.M. 
Aron, Aron and Henning, LLP, Laramie, Wyoming; and Mattaniah Eytan, Law Offices 
of Mattaniah Eytan, Corte Madera, California.  Argument by Mr. 
Eytan.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Jason M. 
Tangeman, Jeff Anthony, and Philip A. Nicholas of Anthony, Nicholas & 
Tangeman, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming, for Appellees William Siebrandt and Salvador 
Zarate.  Paul J. Hickey, Roger C. 
Fransen, and Brandi L. Monger* of Hickey & Evans, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Appellee Charles E. Graves 
(Trustee).  Gregory C. Dyekman and 
Timothy L. Woznick of Dray, Thomson & Dyekman, P.C, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for 
Appellee The University of Wyoming Foundation.  Argument by Messrs. Hickey, Tangeman, and 
Woznick.  

 
 
 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and BURKE, JJ, and Ryckman, 
DJ.

 
 
*Order 
Granting Motion Allowing Brandi L. Monger to Withdraw as Counsel entered 
September 18, 2007.

 
 

VOIGT, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellants, Ron 
Retz, Ernest Williams, Anne Burwell Williams, Fred Crouter, and Beverly Crouter, 
request relief from the district court's grant of two separate motions for 
summary judgment, the last of which effectively disposed of Appellants' claims 
against Appellees William Siebrandt, Salvador Zarate, Charles E. Graves 
(Trustee), and The University of Wyoming Foundation.  Appellants also contest the district 
court's denial of a motion to amend the complaint.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]     1.   Did the district court abuse its 
discretion in denying Appellants' request for leave to amend the 
complaint?

 
 
           
2.   Did the district 
court properly grant summary judgment on the claim for breach of contract to 
make a will and on the claim challenging the validity of the 2002 
trust?

 
 
Appellants' 
Notice of Appeal also lists several other issues.  Appellants chose not to argue those 
issues in their briefs and we consider them waived.  

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Colonel William 
C. Rogers (the Colonel) died in Carmel, California, on April 30, 2003.  The Colonel was 96 years old, not 
married at the time of his death, and had no known children.  His only marriage was dissolved in 1966 
after protracted litigation.  During 
the divorce, the Colonel transferred most of his assets to various members of 
his immediate family with the apparent goal of keeping his wife from reaching 
those assets in the divorce.  When 
the divorce was completed, his family returned the Colonel's assets to him.  The Colonel ceased contact with his 
family at some point thereafter.  At 
the time of his death, the Colonel had not maintained contact with his family 
for more than 30 years.  Appellants 
Anne Burwell Williams and Ernest Williams are the children of two of the 
Colonel's sisters.  

 
 
[¶4]      The Colonel spent 
some years in Wyoming and Nebraska before moving to California in 1997.  By then, the Colonel was unable to walk 
and required assistance with the daily tasks of life.  He lived in several assisted living 
facilities before purchasing his own home, where he lived during his last years 
with the help of a caretaker.  The 
Colonel's closest companion during this time was Appellee William 
Siebrandt.  Mr. Siebrandt, who had 
known the Colonel for many years, helped the Colonel manage his significant 
investments, arranged for his care, and visited him daily.  The Colonel's relationship with 
Siebrandt was a problematic one, and both parties cut off contact with each 
other several times over the years before the Colonel moved to California.  Over the course of their relationship, 
the Colonel gave Siebrandt a series of generous monetary 
gifts.

 
 
[¶5]      The Colonel was 
meticulous in his estate planning.  
He created a series of instruments, including at least ten separate 
amended living trusts, over the course of the years.  The trusts have minor variations, but 
all contain a number of individual and charitable bequests and leave the 
residual estate to the University of Wyoming.  The Colonel also donated generously to 
the University during his life. 

 
 
[¶6]      During his life, 
the Colonel was trustee of his own revocable trust.  Upon his death, that responsibility 
passed to his attorney, Appellee Charles Graves.  Mr. Graves sent notice of the Amended 
Living Trust of William C. Rogers, dated February 16, 2002, to all beneficiaries 
in June of 2003.  Appellants, all of 
whom are either beneficiaries of the trust or claim some right to assets 
contained therein, filed the Complaint in this action on April 29, 2005.  Appellants alleged, inter alia, that the 2002 trust was 
executed under undue influence, that the trust was forged, that the trust was 
created in violation of a contract to make a will, and that the Trustee had 
violated his duty to the trust by refusing to bring suit in California to 
recover monies Appellants allege were misappropriated before the Colonel's 
death.  Appellees moved for summary 
judgment, which the district court partially granted on September 12, 2006. 
 After the Motion for Summary 
Judgment was filed but before the order partially granting summary judgment was 
entered, Appellants moved to amend their Complaint.  The district court denied that motion in 
part and granted summary judgment for Appellees on the remaining issues on 
November 28, 2006.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
A.        The Motion to 
Amend

 
 
[¶7]                              
The law in Wyoming is well settled that the decision to 
allow amendment to pleadings is vested within the sound discretion of the 
district court.  That decision will 
be reversed only for an abuse of discretion shown by clear 
evidence.

 
 
Leave to 
amend pleadings "shall be freely given when justice so requires."  We have identified the proper test as to 
what the trial court should consider when an amendment is proffered to be the 
following:

 
 
If the 
underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper 
subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on 
the merits.  In the absence of any 
apparent or declared reason  such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive 
on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments 
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance 
of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.  the leave sought should, as the 
rules require, be freely given.'

 
 

Armstrong 
v. Hrabal, 2004 
WY 39, ¶ 11, 87 P.3d 1226, 1230-31 (Wyo. 2004) (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted).

 
 
[¶8]      We cannot find 
that the district court abused its discretion in denying Appellants leave to 
amend the Complaint.  Several of the 
above-stated factors, any one of which gives a district court reason to deny 
amendment of a complaint, were present in this case.  Appellants filed their Motion to Amend 
Complaint on August 22, 2006, more than a year after filing the Complaint, and 
only days from the court-ordered discovery cut off.  At that time, Appellees' Motion for 
Summary Judgment was still pending.  Several of the changes to the Complaint 
modified claims that were the subject of that summary judgment motion.  Appellants also attempted to add new 
claims that would not be in danger from the pending summary judgment 
motion.  The requested changes would 
have required significant additional discovery, including retaking depositions, 
and would have entitled Appellees to further dispositive motions.1  Many of the proposed changes would also 
have been futile because the district court had already disposed of the 
underlying issues on summary judgment by the time the motion was decided.  The claims that had not yet been decided 
suffered from the same failures of proof that ultimately led the district court 
to dismiss summarily the remainder of Appellants' claims as discussed below, and 
amendment to add them would have been futile.  See infra ¶¶ 9-13.

 
 
[¶9]      Appellants Anne 
Burwell Williams and Ernest Williams, the Colonel's estranged niece and nephew, 
argue that the district court should have allowed them to amend the Complaint to 
add their claim to have Appellee Charles Graves removed as Trustee.  The district court found that this claim 
was a reiteration of Appellants' earlier request for injunctive relief, 
requesting that the court require the Trustee to sue Appellees Siebrandt and 
Zarate in California to recover trust monies Appellants 
feel were misappropriated.  The 
district court found that Mr. Graves had not abused his discretion as Trustee 
when it dismissed the former claim, and did not therefore abuse its discretion 
when it refused to allow Appellants to add another claim based on the same set 
of facts and allegations.

 
 
[¶10]   Appellants also take issue with the 
district court's refusal to allow them to amend their Complaint to add claims 
for the torts of elder abuse and undue influence.  Appellants have not made any cogent 
argument supported by law as to why a Wyoming 
court should have jurisdiction, or accept venue, over torts allegedly committed 
in California, by California residents, against another California resident.  Nor do Appellants give any reason they 
would have standing to bring such a claim on behalf of the Colonel 
personally.  The only justification 
Appellants give in their brief is that the district court stated in its 
September 12, 2006 decision letter that "[appellants'] concerns can be resolved 
fully and fairly in the current litigation and without resorting to additional 
litigation in California."  That statement was made in reference to 
the district court's disposition of Appellants' attempts to force the Trustee to 
file suit in California.  It does not have any bearing on the 
issues of jurisdiction or standing for tort claims brought directly by 
Appellants.  The district court did 
not abuse its discretion when it disallowed amendment to include these 
claims.

 
 
[¶11]   Appellants Fred and Beverly Crouter 
attempted to bring several claims on behalf of their mother, Ada Crouter, the 
Colonel's long-time friend and companion during his years in Wyoming and Nebraska.  First, they contest the district court's 
denial of their request to amend the Complaint to add several breach of contract 
claims against Colonel Roger's estate.  
The district court found, in addition to the timeliness issues, that the 
claims would be futile, and refused to allow the amendment.  The Crouters alleged that the Colonel 
promised to care for their mother, Ada Crouter.  However, Appellants failed to allege any 
form of consideration for the alleged promise.  "Absent some indicia of actual 
consideration, a contract will be held invalid by the courts."  Miller v. Miller, 664 P.2d 39, 41 
(Wyo. 
1983).  The district court did not 
abuse its discretion when it denied Appellants' request to add this futile claim 
to the litigation.

 
 
[¶12]   The last claim about which 
Appellants make specific argument on appeal is the Crouters' claim that the 
Colonel used a fraudulent document wrongfully to withdraw securities from an 
account he held jointly with Ada Crouter in 1991.  The district court properly denied the 
request to amend to add this claim because the Crouters could not have prevailed 
as a matter of law.  The statute of 
limitations on conversion is four years.  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(B) (LexisNexis 2007).  Although Wyoming counts the statute of limitations from 
the date of discovery of a claim, we have previously held 
that

 
 
the 
words until the discovery of the fraud' appearing in§ 1-18 mean from the 
time the fraud was known or could have been discovered in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence.  They do not 
necessarily mean until the party complaining had actual notice of the fraud 
alleged to have been committed.

 
 

Mason v. 
Laramie Rivers Co., 490 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Wyo. 1971).  

 
 
[¶13]   Ada Crouter was a joint holder of 
the account from which the Colonel withdrew the securities in 1991.  A simple inquiry at the brokerage would 
have shown her that the account had been emptied.  An account holder is charged with 
knowledge of the state of her account.  
O'Donnell v. Western Nat'l Bank of Casper, 705 P.2d 1242, 1245 (Wyo. 1985).  The Complaint in this action was filed 
on April 29, 2005, more than 13 years after the securities were withdrawn.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing the Crouters' request to add this 
claim.

 
 
B.        Summary 
Judgment

            

[¶14]               
            
When we review the granting of a summary judgment, we employ the same 
standards and use the same materials as were employed and used by the trial 
court.  We examine the record from 
the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and we 
give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn 
from the record.  Summary judgment 
is appropriate only when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the 
prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law.  A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would have the effect of establishing 
or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense which the 
parties have asserted.  We review a 
grant of summary judgment deciding a question of law de novo and afford no 
deference to the trial court's ruling.  
. . .  We will affirm a grant 
of summary judgment if it can be sustained on any legal ground appearing in the 
record.  

 
 

Platt v. 
Creighton, 2007 
WY 18, ¶ 7, 150 P.3d 1194, 1198-99 (Wyo. 2007) (citations and quotation marks 
omitted).

 
 
[¶15]   The district court granted summary 
judgment on all issues in two separate decision letters.  Appellants contest the district court's 
decision on two of those issues, which we will address here.2

 
 
1.         
Contract to Make a 
Will

 
 
[¶16]   Appellants Ernest Williams and Anne 
Burwell Williams claim that the Colonel entered into an agreement with their 
parents, his sisters, to leave all of his money to his family when he died.  In its Order Granting Partial Summary 
Judgment, the district court dismissed that claim because it found that 
Appellants were not able to produce any competent evidence3 to support the allegations 
contained therein.  However, the 
contract would be unenforceable even if evidence supported its existence.  Appellants claim that the Colonel agreed 
to leave his money to his sisters and their families in exchange for their help 
in hiding his assets from his then-wife during the divorce.  "Generally, a contract which is contrary 
to public policy will not be recognized by the court, and the parties to such 
contract will be left as the court finds them."  Tate v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 647 P.2d 58, 61 (Wyo. 1982).  It is certainly against public policy in 
this state to contract to hide assets in order to prevent a court sitting in 
divorce proceedings from considering all assets when dividing a marital 
estate.  We would decline to enforce 
such a contract without regard to the evidence presented.  The district court acted properly in 
summarily dismissing this claim.

            

2.         
Undue 
Influence

 
 
[¶17]     The district court 
summarily dismissed Appellants' claims that the 2002 trust instrument was either 
forged or executed under the undue influence of Appellees Siebrandt and 
Zarate.  The district court 
determined that Appellants had no standing to attack the 2002 trust.  In its November 28, 2006 decision 
letter, the district court reasoned that Appellants had no tangible interest in 
setting aside the 2002 trust because they would not take any differently under 
the previous trust instrument.  
Appellants argue that the proper course of action is to reinstate a will 
the Colonel executed in 1988, and not the 2000 trust that was the predecessor to 
the 2002 trust instrument. 

 
 
[¶18]   Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-407 
(LexisNexis 2007), "a trust is void to the extent its creation was induced by 
fraud, duress or undue influence."  
The 2002 trust was the means of revoking the previous (2000) trust 
instrument.  Appellants have 
presented no evidence showing that any independent revocation of the 2000 trust 
ever took place.  If the portions of 
the 2002 trust relating to Appellees Siebrant and Zarate were void because of 
undue influence, the University of Wyoming, as the residual beneficiary, 
would benefit, and there would be no change in the bequest to Appellants.  If the 2002 trust instrument were void 
in its entirety, and had no legal effect, then the 2000 trust would never have 
been revoked, and would remain in effect.  
In that case, the district court reasoned, if Appellants have not 
presented sufficient evidence to raise an issue of fact as to the validity of 
the 2000 trust,4 their claims must fail.  The parties have argued this issue 
extensively in their briefs.  
However, we may affirm a summary judgment on any grounds supported by the 
record.  Platt, 2007 WY 18, ¶ 7, 150 P.3d  at 
1198-99.  Here, we find that the 
more determinative issue is that Appellants have not raised an issue of material 
fact as to the validity of any part of the 2002 trust.  Therefore, we need not consider what 
would happen were that trust to be found void in whole or in part. 

 
 
[¶19]   In order to establish that a will 
(or in this case, a testamentary trust) was executed under undue influence, a 
party must establish:

 
 
(1) the 
relations between the one charged with exercising the undue influence and the 
decedent affording the former an opportunity to control the testamentary act; 
(2) that the decedent's condition was such as to permit * * * subversion of 
h[is] freedom of will; (3) that there was activity on the part of the person 
charged with exercising undue influence; and (4) that such person unduly 
profited as beneficiary under the will.

 
 

In re 
Estate of Loomis, 810 P.2d 126, 129 (Wyo. 1991). 

 
 
[¶20]   Appellees, as movants, bear the 
initial burden of establishing a prima 
facie case for summary judgment.  
In re Estate of McLean, 2004 WY 126, ¶ 12, 99 P.3d 999, 1004 (Wyo. 
2004).  In support of their Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Appellees provided a series of testamentary instruments 
dating back to 1988, all of which show a pattern of bequests similar to those 
found in the 2002 trust, with bequests to various individuals and a number of 
bequests to specific charities.  The 
University of 
Wyoming was the residual 
beneficiary under all of these instruments.  This pattern is consistent with the 
bequests in the 2002 trust. 

 
 
[¶21]   Appellees also provided an 
affidavit of Trustee Charles Graves, who attested that he had known the Colonel 
for decades, spoke with him on a regular basis, met with him occasionally over 
the years, and had observed, firsthand, the Colonel's relationship with Appellee 
Siebrandt.  Mr. Graves verified that 
he drafted the 2002 trust at the Colonel's instruction, that he spoke directly 
to the Colonel regarding the terms to be added to and removed from the 2000 
trust, and that he believed that the document was an expression of the Colonel's 
wishes, and not those of any other party exerting influence over him.  Mr. Graves also explained that he was 
personally aware that the Colonel transferred a significant amount of money in 
the form of gifts to Appellee Siebrandt throughout the Colonel's lifetime.  

 
 
[¶22]   Appellees also provided deposition 
testimony from several health care professionals who had known the Colonel over 
the years.  Louanna Blackton, an 
administrator at the Colonel's assisted living facility from 1997 to 1999, 
remembered the Colonel and testified that he was a very independent person and 
that he was always alert and aware.  
Diane Morton, another administrator, testified that the Colonel was 
resistant to the level of help he was offered at the facility, that he was 
extremely intelligent and opinionated, and that he always spoke his 
mind.

 
 
[¶23]   Appellees submitted the affidavit 
of Kathie Cuomo, an employee of The University of Wyoming Foundation who met 
with the Colonel in May of 2002 regarding his gifts to the University.  Ms. Cuomo found the Colonel in good 
health, and in full control of his faculties.  She met with the Colonel alone and never 
met Appellee Siebrandt.  Philip 
Dubois, also of the University, confirmed that he met with the Colonel in 1998 
and again in 2000.  Mr. Dubois 
testified that Siebrandt was not present at either visit, and that the Colonel 
seemed much happier at his home in Carmel in 2000 than he had been at the assisted 
living facility where he was living during the earlier 
visit.

 
 
[¶24]   Alejandro Cruz testified that he 
was the Colonel's primary caregiver until the Colonel's death in 2003.  Mr. Cruz described the last years of the 
Colonel's life, a daily routine that included regular trips to the library 
(where the Colonel was left alone to study) and frequent visits to the beach, 
despite the Colonel's confinement to a wheelchair and other medical issues.  Mr. Cruz discussed the various choices 
the Colonel made with respect to his daily activities, testimony that reflects 
that the Colonel had a very independent lifestyle for a man in his 
nineties.

 
 
[¶25]   The notary who notarized the 2002 
trust also testified in deposition that she remembered the Colonel.  She testified that the Colonel seemed 
alert, that she remembered him being talkative, and that she had no recollection 
of anyone being with the Colonel that day.  The notary recognized the Colonel from a 
picture on his driver's license at the deposition and confirmed that the person 
whose picture appeared on that license was, in fact, the person who came to her 
office to have the trust notarized.

 
 
[¶26]   We find that the district court was 
correct in finding that Appellees had met their burden under the summary 
judgment standard.  The burden then 
shifted to Appellants to "present specific and substantiated evidence showing 
the existence of a material fact" as to undue influence with respect to the 
trust document.  McLean, 2004 WY 126, ¶ 15, 99 P.3d  at 
1004.  Appellants failed to produce 
sufficient admissible evidence to raise such an issue.

 
 
[¶27]   Appellants produced the sworn 
testimony of Paul J. Barulich, an attorney who met with the Colonel at the 
assisted care facility in 1998 and reviewed the Colonel's estate documents.  Mr. Barulich testified that Appellee 
Siebrandt was visibly upset that the Colonel was meeting with a lawyer without 
Siebrandt's knowledge and that the Colonel refused to see Mr. Barulich after 
their initial meeting.  When Mr. 
Barulich was able to gain admittance to see him, the Colonel remained in bed, 
refused to look at him, and repeatedly told him to "go away."  Mr. Barulich also testified that 
Siebrandt was in the room during that visit.  However, Appellees produced a letter 
from the Colonel addressed to Mr. Barulich that requested the return of his 
papers and ordered Mr. Barulich not to complete any work on the Colonel's 
behalf.  Appellees have also 
produced the testimony of Trustee Charles Graves that he investigated Mr. 
Barulich's concerns, that the State of California conducted an independent 
investigation, and that his concerns about the matter were allayed.  Mr. Graves testified that he traveled to 
California to 
meet with the Colonel, that he met with the Colonel alone, and that the Colonel 
explained his displeasure with Mr. Barulich.  Mr. Graves then sent Mr. Barulich a 
letter explaining that he had investigated the matter and informing Mr. Barulich 
that the Colonel did not wish to receive any further communication from him, and 
that the Colonel did not intend to pay the bill he received, as he did not 
believe he had contracted with Mr. Barulich for any billable 
work.

 
 
[¶28]   In addition to Mr. Barulich's 
testimony, Appellants have produced photocopies of reams of correspondence from 
the Colonel to various people, most of which is illegible.  Appellants provided typed versions of 
these hand-written letters, but failed to give any reason such transcriptions 
would be admissible in court.  This 
Court does not know who transcribed the letters, and from the limited number of 
phrases legible to us, it is obvious the transcriptions contain multiple errors 
and do not accurately reflect the contents of the letters themselves.  We have reviewed the portions of the 
letters that can be deciphered and they show, at best, that the Colonel and 
William Siebrandt had a problematic relationship over the course of many 
years.  Nothing in these letters in 
any way proves or disproves the allegations of undue influence with respect to 
the 2002 trust instrument.  

 
 
[¶29]   Appellants also point to a number 
of gifts from the Colonel to William Siebrandt in the last years of the 
Colonel's life.  The record shows, 
however, that the Colonel was in the habit of making large gifts to Siebrandt 
over the course of his life.  An 
examination of the Colonel's net worth at the time shows that, while the gifts 
were substantial (sometimes approaching a million dollars at a time), the 
Colonel's net worth at that time ranged between $50 and $100 million.  Gifts of 1% of the Colonel's total 
estate to his primary caretaker and closest friend are not unusual or out of 
character enough to serve as convincing evidence that his will was 
overthrown.  

 
 
[¶30]   "In ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment, the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the 
substantive evidentiary burden."  Bitker v. First Nat'l Bank in Evanston, 
2004 WY 114, ¶ 11, 98 P.3d 853, 855-56 (Wyo. 2004) (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted).  "Clear 
proof of undue influence is required to render a will voidable."  Loomis, 810 P.2d  at 128 (quoting Macaraeg v. Wilson, 749 P.2d 272, 
277 (Wyo. 
1988)).  Given the state of the 
evidence discussed above, see supra 
¶¶ 16-29, Appellants have failed to raise an issue as to at least three of the 
factors required to show undue influence.  
Appellants have failed to make any showing that the Colonel was in a 
condition that permitted subversion of his will.  They have further failed to show that 
there was activity on the part of Siebrandt or Zarate with respect to the trust 
instrument.

 
 
It is 
not sufficient to show that a party benefited by a will had the motive and the 
opportunity to exert such influence but there must be evidence that he did exert 
it and did so control the actions of the testator that the instrument is not 
really the will of the testator.

 
 

Estate 
of Draper, 374 P.2d 425, 431-32 (Wyo. 1962).  There is no evidence that either of them 
unduly profited as beneficiary under the trust.  Siebrandt, who arranged for the 
Colonel's continued care and was his closest companion in the last years of his 
life, inherited the Colonel's house and enough securities to bring the bequest 
to a capped total value of $1.5 million.  The majority of the Colonel's assets were 
bequeathed to various charities and individuals, with his residual estate going 
to the University 
of Wyoming, of which he had 
long been a benefactor.  Zarate is 
not a beneficiary under the trust.  

 
 
[¶31]   Appellants are at a disadvantage in 
this litigation, in part because none of them had seen or had regular contact 
with the Colonel for more than 30 years.  Appellees, on the other hand, had visited 
the Colonel regularly (some daily) in his last years, and they were able to 
provide evidence accordingly.  
Appellants have not provided enough evidence to raise a material fact 
with regard to undue influence.

 
 
3.         
Forgery

 
 
[¶32]   Appellants also attack the 2002 
trust on the basis that the Colonel's signature on the document is a 
forgery.  The Colonel's signature on 
that trust is notarized.  Under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 32-1-107 (LexisNexis 
2007), "the certificate of a notary public over his hand and official seal, 
shall be received as presumptive evidence of the facts contained in such 
certificate; provided, that any person interested as a party to a suit may 
contradict, by other evidence, the certificate of a notary public."  "Cases considering this provision have 
applied the well-settled rule that, to rebut the presumption that the facts 
contained in the notary's certification are true, the challenging party must 
provide cogent, clear and convincing evidence of their falsity."  Wayt v. Urbigkit, 2007 WY 34, ¶ 11, 152 P.3d 1057, 1060 (Wyo. 2007).  

 
 
[¶33]   The notary whose signature and seal 
appear on the 2002 trust testified, as we noted above, that she remembered the 
Colonel and remembered notarizing his document.  See supra ¶ 25.  The notary also testified about her 
customary procedure for notarizing a document, which included reviewing the 
document for completeness, inspecting valid state identification, witnessing the 
client's signature, and having the client separately sign a notary journal.  She explained that her procedure for 
notarizing a jurat (which is what the notary certificate on the 2002 trust 
contained) required her to witness the act of signing, and that she would have a 
client resign the document if it were brought in to her with a signature already 
affixed.

 
 
[¶34]   As discussed above, Appellee 
Charles Graves stated that he prepared the trust at the Colonel's direction, 
that he dealt directly with the Colonel on the matter, and that he believes 
the 2002 trust reflects the Colonel's wishes.  See supra ¶ 21.  The Colonel returned the trust to Mr. 
Graves after it was notarized, and Mr. Graves held it until the Colonel's death 
in 2003.

 
 
[¶35]   Appellants offered the report of a 
forensic document examiner to refute the presumption in favor of the information 
(including the identification of the signer) in the notary certificate.  The document examiner's report is not 
well-worded, and refers to signatures in the body of the trust and to notarized 
signatures.  It appears to conclude 
that the notarized signature is genuine, while the signatures found elsewhere in 
the trust are not genuine.  This is 
the only evidence Appellants have produced on this matter.  This is not enough to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact with respect to the authenticity of a notarized signature 
given the testimony of the notary, the corroboration provided by the decedent's 
lawyer that the trust was legitimate, and the fact that the 2002 trust appears 
to be congruous with the testamentary scheme pursued by the Colonel throughout 
his life.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶36]   
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
Appellants' request to amend their Complaint.  The district court properly summarily 
disposed of Appellants' claims when they failed to produce enough evidence to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact on any claim.   We affirm.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1At the 
time of the hearing on the Motion to Amend Complaint, the deadline for filing 
dispositive motions had passed.

 
 

2Appellant 
carries the burden of bringing a complete record to this Court for review.  Stroup v. Oedekoven, 995 P.2d 125, 129 
(Wyo. 
1999).  Appellants filed several 
motions and supplements in opposition to the motions for summary judgment, but 
only designated one of those for inclusion in the record on appeal.  Although we review a grant of summary 
judgment de novo, that standard does 
not alter the fact that we only consider the portions of the record that the 
parties have properly designated for appellate review.  In this case, we have considered the 
arguments made and the exhibits cited in the documents we have in the 
record.

 
 

3The 
"evidence" filed in this case consists of thousands of pages of poorly 
organized, often illegible, largely irrelevant, painfully duplicative, and 
generally unexplained documents.  We 
have addressed the relevant documents cited by the parties amidst this 
cullage.  The fact that we review a 
district court's decision de novo in 
a case for summary judgment does not excuse the parties from proper citation to 
those portions of the record relevant to their respective 
arguments.

 
 

4Appellants 
claim that they could not be expected to attack the 2000 trust, because they 
were never served with proper notice of that instrument pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 4-10-813(b)(iii) (LexisNexis 
2007).  However, the district court 
was not enforcing the 2000 trust but instead was attempting to determine what 
effect the possible invalidity of the 2002 trust would have as a matter of 
law.  Once Appellees argued that a 
void 2002 trust could not have revoked the previous instrument, Appellants 
ignored the possibility that the court would accept that reasoning at their 
peril.