Case Title: State v. McDonald

Citation: 2013-Ohio-5042

Docket Number: 2012-1177

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-11-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. McDonald, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-5042.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-5042 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. MCDONALD, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. McDonald, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-5042.] 
Criminal procedure—R.C. 2945.75—Requirements for verdicts indicating 
enhanced degree of offense—R.C. 2921.331. 
(No. 2012-1177—Submitted March 13, 2013—Decided November 20, 2013.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Lawrence County, No. 11CA1,  
2012-Ohio-1528. 
____________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, which involves a felony enhancement for failure to 
comply with the signal or order of a police officer under R.C. 
2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii), we consider whether a jury’s verdict complies with the 
requirements of R.C. 2945.75.  Specifically, we consider whether a jury verdict 
that includes a finding of “substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or 
property,” the enhancement element of R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii), is sufficient to 
sustain a third-degree-felony conviction for a violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) when 
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the verdict fails to set forth the degree of the offense and also fails to refer to or 
include language from R.C. 2921.331(B).  Pursuant to R.C. 2945.75, we find that 
such a verdict supports only a misdemeanor conviction. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} On September 30, 2010, Coal Grove Police Department officer 
Gleo Runyon observed appellant, Scotty R. McDonald, driving a motor vehicle at 
a high rate of speed on U.S. Route 52.  It was 3:00 a.m.  McDonald was headed 
west toward Ironton and, by Runyon’s radar, was traveling at 112 miles per hour.  
Officer Runyon activated his lights and began to pursue McDonald.  McDonald 
exited Route 52 at Marion Pike—about a mile down the road from where Runyon 
first saw him—and headed toward Ironton.  Runyon testified that during the 
pursuit, McDonald traveled at a high rate of speed through the town of Ironton, at 
times in excess of 80 miles per hour, running through stoplights and stop signs.  
McDonald passed at least one establishment that had people gathered outside.  
McDonald eventually came to a stop and was arrested and transported to the 
Ironton Police Department.  He was given a breath test that indicated a breath-
alcohol level of over twice the legal limit. 
{¶ 3} The grand jury indicted McDonald on a single, third-degree-felony 
count of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer, in violation 
of R.C. 2921.331(B) and (C)(5(a)(ii).  The indictment read: 
 
Scotty R. McDonald, on or about September 30, 2010, at 
Lawrence County, Ohio, did operate a motor vehicle * * * so as to 
willfully elude or flee a police officer after receiving a visible or 
audible signal from a police officer to bring his motor vehicle to a 
stop, and the operation of the motor vehicle caused substantial risk 
of serious physical harm to persons or property, in violation of 
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3 
 
Section 2921.331(B)(C)(5)(a)(ii) [“(B)(C)” sic] of the Revised 
Code. 
 
R.C. 2921.331 
{¶ 4} R.C. 2921.331 sets forth a range of violations of varying degrees 
for failure to comply with the order or signal of a police officer, spanning in 
severity from first-degree misdemeanors to third-degree felonies.  The statute 
provides: 
 
(A) No person shall fail to comply with any lawful order or 
direction of any police officer invested with authority to direct, 
control, or regulate traffic. 
(B) No person shall operate a motor vehicle so as willfully 
to elude or flee a police officer after receiving a visible or audible 
signal from a police officer to bring the person’s motor vehicle to a 
stop. 
(C)(1) Whoever violates this section is guilty of failure to 
comply with an order or signal of a police officer. 
(2) A violation of division (A) of this section is a 
misdemeanor of the first degree. 
(3) Except as provided in divisions (C)(4) and (5) of this 
section, a violation of division (B) of this section is a misdemeanor 
of the first degree. 
* * * 
(5)(a) A violation of division (B) of this section is a felony 
of the third degree if the jury or judge as trier of fact finds any of 
the following by proof beyond a reasonable doubt: 
* * * 
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(ii) The operation of the motor vehicle by the offender 
caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or 
property. 
 
{¶ 5} R.C. 2921.331(C)(1) names two separate activities—defined in 
subsections (A) and (B) of the statute—as “failure to comply with an order or 
signal of a police officer.”  But R.C. 2921.331(A) and (B) describe separate 
violations; R.C. 2921.331(A) prohibits the failure to comply with any lawful order 
of a police officer, whereas R.C. 2921.331(B) prohibits willfully fleeing or 
eluding a police officer after receiving a signal to stop.  Although both are 
denominated by R.C. 2921.331(C) as “failure to comply with an order or a signal 
of a police officer,” the potential penalties for each are significantly different.  
Under R.C. 2921.331(C)(2), a violation of subsection R.C. 2921.331(A) 
constitutes a misdemeanor.  Under R.C. 2921.331(C)(3), a violation of subsection 
R.C. 2921.331(B) also constitutes a misdemeanor except under certain 
circumstances; 
for 
instance, 
as 
relevant 
in 
this 
case, 
under 
R.C. 
2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii), a violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) is a felony of the third 
degree if the operation of the motor vehicle caused a substantial risk of serious 
harm to persons or property. 
Verdict Form and Verdict 
{¶ 6} McDonald was tried in the Lawrence County Court of Common 
Pleas.  The jury was presented with two verdict forms, one of which read:  
 
We, the jury, find the Defendant, Scotty R. McDonald, 
(Guilty or Not Guilty) of Count One: Failure to Comply with 
Order or Signal of Police Officer And Caused A Substantial Risk 
of Serious Physical Harm To Persons or Property. 
 
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5 
 
{¶ 7} A second verdict form submitted to the jury also referred to the 
offense of failure to comply with the order or signal of a police officer, but 
without the element of “substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or 
property.” 
{¶ 8} The jury returned the first verdict form with a guilty finding.  The 
court, concluding that the jury had convicted McDonald of a felony for violating 
R.C. 2921.331(B) and 2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii), sentenced McDonald to four years in 
prison. 
Appeal 
{¶ 9} McDonald appealed, arguing that pursuant to R.C. 2945.75, the 
verdict form at trial was deficient because it failed either to set out the degree of 
the offense or to list all the aggravating circumstances that elevated from a 
misdemeanor to a felony the crime of failure to comply with an order or signal of 
a police officer.  R.C. 2945.75(A)(2) provides as follows: 
 
(A) When the presence of one or more additional elements 
makes an offense one of more serious degree: 
* * * 
(2) A guilty verdict shall state either the degree of the 
offense of which the offender is found guilty, or that such 
additional element or elements are present. Otherwise, a guilty 
verdict constitutes a finding of guilty of the least degree of the 
offense charged. 
 
{¶ 10} McDonald argued that the verdict form the jury signed failed to 
state that he had “willfully * * * elude[d] or fle[d] a police officer after receiving 
a visible or audible signal from a police officer to bring [his] motor vehicle to a 
stop” as set forth in R.C. 2921.331(B).  McDonald argued that only a violation of 
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R.C. 2921.331(B) provides the necessary predicate for a felony punishment 
pursuant to R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii) and that the verdict form failed to include 
the jury’s finding on the elements of R.C. 2921.331(B). 
{¶ 11} The court of appeals affirmed the trial court.  The court held: 
 
[I]t is not the element of “willfully” fleeing or eluding that elevates 
the crime from a first degree misdemeanor to a third degree felony 
but, rather, the fact that the defendant is causing a substantial risk 
of physical harm to person/property.  Because that language from 
the statute was included in the jury verdict, we conclude that the 
verdict complied with R.C. 2945.75 and [State v.] Pelfrey [112 
Ohio St.3d 422, 2007-Ohio-256, 860 N.E.2d 735]. 
 
2012-Ohio-1528, 2012 WL 1142677, ¶ 9. 
{¶ 12} The appellate court recognized that its opinion was directly at odds 
with that of the Third District Court of Appeals in a case with similar facts, State 
v. Schwable, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-09-03, 2009-Ohio-6523, 2009 WL 4756435, 
and certified a conflict to this court.  This court agreed that a conflict exists and 
ordered briefing on the following issue: 
 
 
Is the inclusion of the “substantial risk of serious physical 
harm 
to 
persons 
or 
property” 
language 
from 
R.C. 
2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii) sufficient to sustain a third-degree-felony 
conviction for a violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) when the verdict 
fails to set forth the degree of the offense and also fails to reference 
or include language from R.C. 2921.331(B)? 
 
132 Ohio St.3d 1512, 2012-Ohio-4021, 974 N.E.2d 111. 
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 13} In Pelfrey, this court addressed the specificity that R.C. 2945.75 
requires in verdict forms in cases in which the degree of an offense becomes more 
serious with the presence of additional elements.  The court held:   
 
[P]ursuant to the clear language of R.C. 2945.75, a verdict form 
signed by a jury must include either the degree of the offense of 
which the defendant is convicted or a statement that an aggravating 
element has been found to justify convicting a defendant of a 
greater degree of a criminal offense. 
 
Pelfrey, 112 Ohio St.3d 422, 2007-Ohio-256, 860 N.E.2d 735, at ¶ 14. 
{¶ 14} This court called R.C. 2945.75 “a clear and complete statute” that 
“certainly imposes no unreasonable burden on lawyers or trial judges.” Id., ¶ 12.  
Its dictates are simple, and the resolution of cases that do not meet its 
requirements is also straightforward:  “The statute provides explicitly what must 
be done by the courts [when R.C. 2945.75(A)(1) is not followed]: the ‘guilty 
verdict constitutes a finding of guilty of the least degree of the offense charged.’ 
R.C. 2945.75(A)(2).” Id. at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 15} In Pelfrey, the defendant was an employee of an auto-emissions-
testing company that had a contract with the state of Ohio.  Pelfrey was allegedly 
involved in a scheme in which, for cash, he would provide fraudulent waivers for 
vehicles that had actually failed an emissions test.  He was charged with 
tampering with records, in violation of R.C. 2913.42; that statute provides for an 
enhanced charge of a third-degree felony when the tampering involves 
government records.  R.C. 2913.42(B)(4).  A jury found Pelfrey guilty, and he 
was sentenced to four years in prison on the third-degree-felony conviction. 
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{¶ 16} However, the verdict form signed by Pelfrey’s jury failed to set 
forth either the degree of the offense he was convicted of or that the records 
involved were government records. Pelfrey, 112 Ohio St.3d 422, 2007-Ohio-256, 
860 N.E.2d 735, ¶ 13.  Since the fact that the records tampered with were 
government records elevated the crime from a misdemeanor under R.C. 
2913.42(B)(2)(a) to a third-degree felony under R.C. 2913.42(B)(4), the failure of 
the verdict form to mention that crucial element—or that Pelfrey was found guilty 
of a third-degree felony—meant that, pursuant to R.C. 2945.75(A)(2), Pelfrey 
could be convicted only of misdemeanor records tampering on the jury’s finding 
of guilt. 
{¶ 17} Pelfrey makes clear that in cases involving offenses for which the 
addition of an element or elements can elevate the offense to a more serious 
degree, the verdict form itself is the only relevant thing to consider in determining 
whether the dictates of R.C. 2945.75 have been followed. 
 
Because the language of R.C. 2945.75(A)(2) is clear, this 
court will not excuse the failure to comply with the statute or 
uphold [a] conviction based on additional circumstances * * *. The 
express requirement of the statute cannot be fulfilled by 
demonstrating additional circumstances, such as that the verdict 
incorporates the language of the indictment, or by presenting 
evidence to show the presence of the aggravated element at trial or 
the incorporation of the indictment into the verdict form, or by 
showing that the defendant failed to raise the issue of the 
inadequacy of the verdict form. We hold that pursuant to the clear 
language of R.C. 2945.75, a verdict form signed by a jury must 
include either the degree of the offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or a statement that an aggravating element has been 
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
found to justify convicting a defendant of a greater degree of a 
criminal offense. 
 
State v. Pelfrey, 112 Ohio St.3d 422, 2007-Ohio-256, 860 N.E.2d 735, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 18} Thus, in this case, which involves a criminal statute in which the 
addition of certain elements enhances the crime of failure to comply with the 
order or signal of a police officer, we look only to the verdict form signed by the 
jury to determine whether, pursuant to R.C. 2945.75, McDonald was properly 
convicted of a third-degree felony. 
{¶ 19} To properly convict McDonald of a violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) 
as enhanced by R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii), the verdict would have to either state 
that McDonald was guilty of a third-degree felony or set forth the additional 
elements that transform the failure to comply with the order or signal of a police 
officer from a misdemeanor to a third-degree felony.  There is no dispute that the 
verdict at issue failed to state that McDonald was guilty of a third-degree felony.  
The dispute in this case is whether the verdict sufficiently set forth the elements 
that lead to a felony conviction.  We hold that the verdict in this case was 
deficient in that regard. 
{¶ 20} The verdict form stated that the jury found McDonald guilty of 
“Failure to Comply with Order or Signal of Police Officer And Caused A 
Substantial Risk of Serious Physical Harm To Persons or Property.”  As stated 
above, “failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer” is the name 
of a violation of either R.C. 2921.331(A)—a general failure to comply with the 
order of a police officer—or R.C. 2921.331(B)—willful flight in a motor vehicle 
from a police officer.  Only a violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) can be the basis of an 
enhancement under R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii) for creating a substantial risk of 
injury or damage to property. 
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{¶ 21} A violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) can also serve as the predicate for 
a fourth-degree felony under R.C. 2921.331(C)(4) if the offender was fleeing 
from an officer immediately after the commission of a felony, or for a third-
degree felony under R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a)(i) if the operation of the vehicle “was 
a proximate cause of serious physical harm to persons or property.”  And it makes 
sense that a violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) should be the gateway to more serious 
vehicular offenses, since in comparison to R.C. 2921.331(A), it involves more 
significant criminal activity.  R.C. 2921.331(A) can apply to an offender who is 
not even in an automobile and who simply ignores an officer’s traffic signal.  R.C. 
2921.331(B), on the other hand, requires the operation of a motor vehicle and the 
willful eluding or fleeing from a police officer after receiving a visible or audible 
signal to stop, a purposeful flouting of a police officer’s signal and an attempt to 
escape. 
{¶ 22} The only path to a felony conviction for failure to comply with the 
order or signal of a police officer is through R.C. 2921.331(B).  If only one type 
of failure to comply can lead to a felony, the particular elements of that type of 
failure to comply constitute one part of R.C. 2945.75’s “one or more additional 
elements [that] make[] an offense one of more serious degree.”  The first element 
of a felony charge under R.C. 2921.331 is that the failure to comply involved 
willful elusion or flight from a police officer.  Without that element, there can be 
no felony. 
{¶ 23} The verdict form in this case does not indicate that the elements of 
R.C. 2921.331(B) are implicated.  Therefore, the verdict form the jury signed 
does not set forth the additional elements that enhance the crime of failure to 
comply from a misdemeanor to a felony; it therefore supports only a misdemeanor 
conviction. 
{¶ 24} If the jury had believed that McDonald had simply failed to 
comply with the order of Officer Runyon but did not see or hear the signal or 
January Term, 2013 
11 
 
intentionally flee him, but in failing to comply managed to create a substantial 
risk to injury to persons or property, the very verdict form used in this case would 
have fit that conclusion.  And that conclusion would have yielded a misdemeanor, 
because it would have reflected only a violation of R.C. 2921.331(A).  That 
verdict form and a verdict form supporting a felony cannot be identical; a felony 
verdict form—if it does not state the degree of the offense—must state the 
elements that distinguish it from a misdemeanor offense. 
{¶ 25} The jury found that McDonald was guilty of failure to comply with 
the order or signal of a police officer.  Its further finding that McDonald had 
caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property was 
superfluous without a finding that the risk occurred when McDonald was in 
willful flight from a police officer.  Thus, pursuant to R.C. 2945.75(A)(2), the 
verdict form in this case yields a guilty verdict that “constitutes a finding of guilty 
of the least degree of the offense charged,” that is, a first-degree misdemeanor 
pursuant to R.C. 2921.331(C)(3). 
{¶ 26} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand the cause for the trial court to enter a judgment convicting McDonald of 
failure to comply with the order or signal of a police officer as a first-degree 
misdemeanor. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents and would affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals and answer the certified-conflict question in the affirmative. 
FRENCH, J., dissents. 
____________________ 
 
 
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LANZINGER, J., concurring. 
{¶ 27} It is misleading for the dissent to suggest that there is now a 
requirement for a verdict form to recite each and every element of the offense 
charged. 
{¶ 28} The jury verdict in this case was inartfully worded, finding 
McDonald guilty of “Failure to Comply with Order or Signal of Police Officer 
And Caused A Substantial Risk of Serious Physical Harm To Persons or 
Property.”  It is true that the court’s instructions at trial would have defined the 
elements of the offense for the jury. R.C. 2945.11 (“In charging the jury, the court 
must state to it all matters of law necessary for the information of the jury in 
giving its verdict”). But the jury itself determines the facts.  The United States 
Supreme Court has clearly held that a court may not usurp the fact-finding of a 
jury through judicial findings. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 
2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 
2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). We have also acknowledged that principle. State 
v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470. And as the majority 
opinion notes in this case, the jury verdict, as it is stated, fits a conclusion that 
would support only a misdemeanor violation under R.C. 2921.331(A). 
{¶ 29} The majority holds simply that the jury’s verdict must identify 
specifically the offense of which the defendant is found guilty: a reference to R.C. 
2921.331(B) and (C)(5)(a)(ii) would have been sufficient, as would a reference to 
the degree of the offense as a felony of the third degree.  This is a simple 
application of State v. Pelfrey, 112 Ohio St.3d 422, 2007-Ohio-256, 860 N.E.2d 
735, syllabus.  I respectfully concur. 
____________________ 
FRENCH, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 30} The majority erases the jury’s guilty verdict for one reason: the 
verdict did not recite each and every element of the offense charged.  Because 
January Term, 2013 
13 
 
there is no such requirement, and certainly none in R.C. 2945.75(A)(2), I 
respectfully dissent. 
{¶ 31} At the outset, there is no constitutional or statutory right to a guilty 
verdict reciting every element of an offense.  To the contrary, criminal law has 
long disfavored the practice of supplementing general verdicts with special 
verdicts, special interrogatories, or special findings.  “Juries at the time of the 
framing could not be forced to produce mere ‘factual findings,’ but were entitled 
to deliver a general verdict pronouncing the defendant’s guilt or innocence.”  
United States v. Guadin, 515 U.S. 506, 513, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 
(1995).  The practice of requiring more than a general verdict is relatively new 
and fraught with risks.  Special findings can “limit jury independence,” 6 LaFave, 
Criminal Procedure, Section 24.10(a), at 714 (3d Ed.2007),  “invite[] confusion 
and error,” State v. Lampkin, 116 Ohio App.3d 771, 774, 689 N.E.2d 106 (6th 
Dist.), fn. 1, and pose a “danger of * * * shifting or weakening * * * the 
government’s burden of proof,” United States v. Wilson, 629 F.2d 439, 442 (6th 
Cir.1980).  The jury instructions are what define the elements of an offense, see 
R.C. 2945.11, but there is simply “no requirement that the statutory definition of 
an offense be included on the verdict form.”  State v. Martin, 2d Dist. 
Montgomery No. 22744, 2009-Ohio-5303, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 32} R.C. 2945.75 contains a narrow exception to the preference for 
general verdicts, one that applies only “[w]hen the presence of one or more 
additional elements makes an offense one of more serious degree.”  R.C. 
2945.75(A).  If such an additional degree-raising element is involved, the jury’s 
guilty verdict “shall state either the degree of the offense of which the offender is 
found guilty, or that such additional element or elements are present.”  R.C. 
2945.75(A)(2).  Because the guilty verdict in this case did not state the degree of 
the offense, the question is whether the verdict sufficiently stated that the 
additional elements making the offense a third-degree felony were present. 
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{¶ 33} At issue here is the failure-to-comply statute, R.C. 2921.331, 
which identifies two base-level offenses: a division (A) violation—i.e., “fail[ure] 
to comply with any lawful order or direction of any police officer”—and a 
division (B) violation—i.e., “operat[ing] a motor vehicle so as willfully to elude 
or flee a police officer after receiving a visible or audible signal from a police 
officer to bring the person’s motor vehicle to a stop.”  Both violations are first-
degree misdemeanors, but a division (B) violation will rise to a third-degree 
felony if the jury finds that “[t]he operation of the motor vehicle by the offender 
caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property.”  R.C. 
2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii).  Therefore, the “substantial risk” element in R.C. 
2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii) is an additional element that raises a division (B) violation 
to a third-degree felony. 
{¶ 34} Here, the single-count indictment alleged only a division (B) 
violation, including the degree-raising “substantial risk” element in R.C. 
2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii).  The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of a 
division (B) violation and the degree-raising “substantial risk” element.  The jury 
returned a guilty verdict, which included a finding that McDonald “Caused A 
Substantial Risk of Serious Physical Harm To Persons or Property.”  Because the 
only degree-raising element was the “substantial risk” element in R.C. 
2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii), and because the jury’s guilty verdict explicitly found that 
element, I conclude that the jury’s verdict was sufficient to support a third-degree 
felony. 
{¶ 35} According to the majority, however, the jury’s verdict violated 
R.C. 2945.75(A)(2) because it did not recite every element of a division (B) 
violation.  But division (B) does not identify any “additional element” of the 
offense, nor does it identify elements that raise the degree of the offense.  The 
only other base-level offense identified in the statute is a violation of division (A), 
which the majority concedes is a “separate violation[].”  Majority opinion at ¶ 5.  
January Term, 2013 
15 
 
The elements that distinguish division (B) from division (A) are not degree-
raising elements.  By holding otherwise, the majority has relied on an 
unprecedented interpretation of R.C. 2945.75(A)(2), one that will apply to any 
statute that identifies two or more alternative forms of an offense. 
{¶ 36} The majority finds an R.C. 2945.75(A)(2) violation where I find 
none.  I would answer the certified-conflict question in the affirmative and affirm 
the judgment of the court of appeals.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
____________________ 
J.B. Collier Jr., Lawrence County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brigham M. 
Anderson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
The Owen Law Firm, L.L.C., Benjamin A. Tracy, and Todd A. Long, for 
appellant. 
________________________