Case Title: David E. Hammer v. Board of Bar Examiners

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019AP001974-BA

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2020-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
2020 WI 59 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP1974-BA 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of the Bar Admission of David E. 
Hammer: 
 
David E. Hammer, 
          Petitioner, 
     v. 
Board of Bar Examiners, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
BAR ADMISSION OF DAVID E. HAMMER 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 25, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Per Curiam. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the petitioner, there were briefs filed by David E. 
Hammer, Tampa, Florida. There was an oral argument by David E. 
Hammer. 
 
For the respondent, there was a brief filed by Jacquelynn 
B. Rothstein, Director and Legal Counsel. There was an oral 
argument by Jacquelynn B. Rothstein.  
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 59
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2019AP1974-BA 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of the Bar Admission 
of David E. Hammer: 
 
David E. Hammer, 
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Board of Bar Examiners, 
 
          Respondent. 
FILED 
 
JUN 25, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
Review of Board of Bar Examiners' decision.   Decision 
affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   This is a review, pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule (SCR) 40.08(7), of a final decision of the Board of 
Bar Examiners (Board) declining to certify that the petitioner, 
David 
E. 
Hammer, 
satisfied 
the 
character 
and 
fitness 
requirements for admission to the Wisconsin bar set forth in 
SCR 40.06(1).  The Board's decision was based primarily on the 
fact that Mr. Hammer, who was a licensed Florida lawyer from 
2006-2011, was disbarred in Florida for trust account violations 
and misappropriation of client funds.   
No. 
2019AP1974-BA   
 
 
2 
¶2 
Mr. Hammer resides in Florida.  He graduated from the 
University of Florida Levin College of Law in 2005 and completed 
an LL.M. in Taxation in 2006.  He was admitted to the Florida 
bar on May 19, 2006.  From his admission in May 2006 until his 
law license was suspended on August 23, 2010, Mr. Hammer had 
what he describes as "an ill-advised solo practice" in Florida, 
built around a single client group: the family and friends of 
Paul Bilzerian and their companies.1  As relevant here, in 2001, 
long before Mr. Hammer ever worked for the Bilzerian client 
group, a federal district court issued a sweeping injunction 
limiting Bilzerian's access to the courts, in an effort to stem 
Bilzerian's frivolous court filings (2001 Injunction).  The 2001 
Injunction provides:  
Paul A. Bilzerian, his agents, servants, employees and 
attorneys, and those persons in active concert or 
participation with them, who receive actual notice of 
this Order by personal service or otherwise, are 
prohibited from filing or causing the filing of any 
complaint, proceeding or motion in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida, 
or 
from 
commencing 
or 
otherwise 
causing 
the 
commencement of any proceedings in any court, other 
than in this Court or in appeals of this Court's 
Orders to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia, without prior application to and 
approval of this Court . . ..  
                                                 
1 Bilzerian was convicted of securities fraud and conspiracy 
to defraud the United States in 1989.  United States v. 
Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming conviction). 
The Securities and Exchange Commission then filed a civil suit 
against him in the summer of 1989 and obtained a judgment for 
approximately $62 million.  S.E.C. v. Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (affirming judgment).  
No. 
2019AP1974-BA   
 
 
3 
Mr. Hammer acknowledges that he received actual notice of the 
2001 Injunction in December 2006.  
¶3 
We focus on the Board's primary reason for declining 
to certify Mr. Hammer.  On August 23, 2010, four years after his 
admission to practice law, the Supreme Court of Florida issued 
an emergency suspension against Mr. Hammer's law license, 
alleging that he had misappropriated client trust funds.  A 
formal disciplinary complaint followed.  Eventually, Mr. Hammer 
stipulated that in November 2009, Bilzerian had directed that 
certain outstanding invoices and cost reimbursements not be paid 
to Mr. Hammer.  Mr. Hammer believed these amounts were valid and 
owed to him.  At the time, Mr. Hammer had access to funds in a 
trust account belonging to another Bilzerian-related entity.  In 
January 2010, Mr. Hammer began taking money from that trust 
account for his own personal use.  In May 2010, the client 
requested the money held in trust.  By then, the trust fund was 
approximately $27,000 short of funds.  To replace the missing 
client funds, Mr. Hammer accessed funds from another account to 
which he was a signatory, paying himself director fees and other 
amounts.  
¶4 
On August 30, 2011, the Florida Supreme Court issued 
an order disbarring Mr. Hammer, nunc pro tunc to September 22, 
2010, 
No. 
2019AP1974-BA   
 
 
4 
for misappropriating client funds.2  Eventually, Mr. Hammer 
distanced himself from the Bilzerian client group, started a 
business, 
regained 
financial 
stability, 
and 
became 
chief 
information officer of Elevant, an entity that licenses a case 
management software program.  
¶5 
On January 1, 2018, Mr. Hammer applied for admission 
to the Wisconsin bar.  In February 2018, he took and 
subsequently passed the Wisconsin bar exam.  On January 15, 
2019, the Board advised Mr. Hammer that his bar application was 
at risk of being denied on character and fitness grounds.  
Mr. Hammer, by counsel, requested a hearing and in May 2019, 
Mr. Hammer also voluntarily commenced an ethics tutorial with 
Wisconsin Attorney Dean R. Dietrich.  
¶6 
On August 2, 2019, the Board conducted a hearing at 
which Mr. Hammer appeared by counsel and testified.  The Board 
also heard testimony from Mr. Hammer's prospective employers, 
who advised the Board that they will employ Mr. Hammer as an 
attorney if he is admitted to the Wisconsin bar.  Attorney 
                                                 
2 Meanwhile, on January 21, 2011, Mr. Hammer was publicly 
reprimanded by the Florida Supreme Court for actions in both 
state and bankruptcy courts that he knew or should have known 
were not meritorious but merely disruptive to the tribunals.  
Board Order, ¶12. 
 
On March 31, 2011, the Florida Supreme Court further 
suspended Mr. Hammer's law license for 91 days, concurrent with 
his underlying suspension in the misappropriation matter, based 
on Mr. Hammer's failure to demonstrate that he had notified 
clients, 
opposing 
counsel, 
and 
tribunals 
of 
his 
license 
suspension.  Board Order, ¶13. 
No. 
2019AP1974-BA   
 
 
5 
Dietrich testified in support of Mr. Hammer's character and 
fitness to practice law in Wisconsin.   
¶7 
On September 19, 2019, the Board issued an adverse 
decision concluding that Mr. Hammer had failed to demonstrate to 
the Board's satisfaction that he has the necessary character and 
fitness to practice law in Wisconsin.  The Board cited Mr. 
Hammer's Florida disbarment; abuse of process; extensive traffic 
record; and its conclusion that Mr. Hammer failed to demonstrate 
significant rehabilitation.  The Board added that Mr. Hammer has 
not reapplied to the Florida bar.   
¶8 
This petition followed.  Mr. Hammer asks this court to 
reverse the Board's adverse decision and permit him to become a 
member of the Wisconsin bar.  He indicates that he would accept 
conditions on his law practice.  In his initial brief Mr. Hammer 
presents three issues:  
(1) Whether Hammer satisfies the character and fitness 
requirements of SCR 40.06, as interpreted by this 
Court's prior decisions, or Hammer should be forever 
banned from practicing law in the State of Wisconsin;  
(2) Whether the conclusions of the [Board] that Hammer 
does not satisfy the requirements of SCR 40.06 are 
mere 
pretext 
for 
unconstitutional 
discrimination 
against a resident of Florida; and  
(3) Whether the [Board] committed clear error in 
reaching certain Findings of Fact, based on the record 
evidence.  
¶9 
This 
court 
has 
the 
ultimate 
responsibility 
for 
admission to the Wisconsin bar.  In re Bar Admission of Rippl, 
2002 WI 15, ¶16, 250 Wis. 2d 519, 639 N.W.2d 553.  When, as 
here, we review an adverse determination, the court adopts the 
No. 
2019AP1974-BA   
 
 
6 
Board's findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous.  Id.  
The 
court 
then 
determines, 
de novo, 
whether 
the 
Board's 
conclusions of law, based on the non-erroneous facts, are 
proper.  Id.  When conducting our de novo review, we, like the 
Board, use the guidelines established in Bar Admission Rules 
(BA) 6.01-6.03.3   
¶10 Supreme Court Rule 40.06(1)4 requires that applicants 
for bar admission establish good moral character and fitness to 
practice law.  The burden rests with the applicant to establish 
character and fitness to the satisfaction of the Board.  See 
SCR 40.06(3) and SCR 40.07.  Bar Admission Rule 6.01 provides 
that "[a] lawyer should be one whose record of conduct justifies 
the trust of clients, adversaries, courts and others with 
respect to the professional duties owed to them."  Bar Admission 
Rule 6.02 provides that in determining whether an applicant 
possesses the necessary character and fitness to practice law, 
12 factors constitute "cause for further inquiry."  In assigning 
weight and significance to these 12 factors the Board is to 
                                                 
3 The Appendix to SCR ch. 40 contains the Board's rules that 
provide additional guidance to the Board and to applicants. 
4 SCR 40.06(1) provides:  
An applicant for bar admission shall establish 
good moral character and fitness to practice law. The 
purpose of this requirement is to limit admission to 
those applicants found to have the qualities of 
character and fitness needed to assure to a reasonable 
degree of certainty the integrity and the competence 
of services performed for clients and the maintenance 
of high standards in the administration of justice. 
No. 
2019AP1974-BA   
 
 
7 
consider additional information set forth in SCR ch. 40 App., BA 
6.03.5   
¶11 It is undisputed that the Supreme Court of Florida 
disbarred Mr. Hammer in 2011.  Supreme Court Rule 40.06(4) 
provides that suspension or revocation in another jurisdiction 
is a sufficient basis for denial of certification.6  Arguably, 
this is the end of our inquiry.  However, neither party 
considered this rule dispositive so we address the parties' 
arguments.  
¶12 We begin by evaluating whether the factual findings 
underlying the Board's decision are clearly erroneous.  Mr. 
                                                 
5 The Board considers the 12 factors that constitute cause 
for further inquiry in light of: (a) the applicant's age at the 
time of the conduct; (b) the recency of the conduct; (c) the 
reliability of the information concerning the conduct; (d) the 
seriousness of the conduct; (e) the mitigating or aggravating 
circumstances; (f) the evidence of rehabilitation; (g) the 
applicant's 
candor 
in 
the 
admissions 
process; 
(h) 
the 
materiality of any omissions or misrepresentations; and (i) the 
number of incidents revealing deficiencies.  SCR ch. 40 App., 
BA 6.03. 
6 SCR 40.06(4) provides:   
The board shall not certify an applicant while an 
attorney disciplinary matter against the applicant is 
pending 
or 
the 
applicant 
is 
certified 
by 
the 
department of workforce development as delinquent in 
making court-ordered payments of support or failing to 
comply with a subpoena or warrant, as those terms are 
defined in SCR 11.04(1).  If an applicant's license to 
practice law in another jurisdiction is suspended or 
revoked 
for 
reasons 
related 
to 
professional 
responsibility at the time the application is filed or 
at any time that the application is pending, the 
suspension or revocation is a sufficient basis for 
denial of certification. 
No. 
2019AP1974-BA   
 
 
8 
Hammer takes issue with many of the Board's factual findings but 
ultimately acknowledges that none of the alleged factual 
discrepancies would have altered the Board's decision.  Hammer 
Br. at 34, fn. 2.  Several of his objections can be broadly 
characterized as relating to imprecise rhetoric used by the 
Board to describe his past conduct.  These include: 
 An objection to the Board's finding that there were 
companies from whom Mr. Hammer "converted money. . . ."  
Board Order, ¶14 (emphasis added).  Mr. Hammer says there 
was never a finding that he "converted" money. 
 An objection to the Board's statement that "[Hammer] was 
also a signatory on another account, [owned by Hammer's] 
client . . .."  Board Order, ¶7.  Mr. Hammer clarifies he 
did not take the money used to reimburse another client 
from a client's account.   
 An objection to the Board's statement that in March 2011 he 
was suspended for failure to notify clients, opposing 
counsel, and tribunals of a license suspension.  Board 
Order, ¶13.  Mr. Hammer clarifies that he did provide 
notice of his suspension.  He failed to timely submit the 
affidavit 
confirming 
that 
he 
had 
made 
the 
required 
notifications to the Florida bar.  
 An objection to the Board's characterization of his driving 
record, e.g., that he "was most recently cited for a 
speeding offense in 2017."  Board Order, ¶21.  Mr. Hammer 
says the 2017 incident wasn't a speeding offense but rather 
No. 
2019AP1974-BA   
 
 
9 
a "Violation of the Rules of the Pennsylvania Turnpike 
Commission."  He objects to the Board's statement that he 
"reported having his driving privileges suspended nineteen 
(19) times."  Mr. Hammer clarifies that 16 of the 
suspensions 
were 
for 
failure 
to 
timely 
pay 
traffic 
citations.  He also observes that various Board members 
made statements during his hearing implying that his 
driving record was a trivial or even amusing matter. 
¶13 Mr. Hammer also challenges the factual basis for the 
Board's legal conclusion that Mr. Hammer engaged in "abuse of 
process," a stated "cause for further inquiry."  SCR ch. 40 
App., BA 6.03(e).  The Board found that he used a 2013 Chapter 
13 personal bankruptcy proceeding to forestall his family's 
eviction from their home.  Board Order, ¶18.  Mr. Hammer 
explains that no eviction was pending when he filed his 
bankruptcy petition.  He states that he felt compelled to file 
the bankruptcy petition because of another existing legal 
dispute.  He also defends his decision to commence a civil 
lawsuit in 2010 against 32 defendants, which the Board described 
as abuse of process, finding it alleged "fantastical claims."  
¶14 We need not decide whether the Board committed clear 
error in characterizing these two incidents as abuse of process. 
There is ample evidence to support the Board's conclusion that 
Mr. Hammer engaged in abuse of process, as evidenced by having 
been found in civil contempt.  See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Bilzerian, 
729 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2010).  In that opinion, the court 
No. 
2019AP1974-BA   
 
 
10 
relates that Mr. Hammer was found in civil contempt for 
violating the 2001 Injunction for his role commencing and 
prosecuting several lawsuits on behalf of Bilzerian.  The 
federal court ordered Mr. Hammer to purge his contempt "by 
ceasing his representation of Bilzerian in any capacity in any 
litigation matters and withdrawing as counsel, if listed as 
counsel of record, in any of the above cases."  Id. at 2 
(citing Mem. Order and Op. 11, August 12, 2009, 641 F. Supp. 2d 
16 (D.D.C. 2009), ECF No. 1053).  The federal court also 
ordered Mr. Hammer to file a sworn statement that he had 
complied with the order within ten days.  Id.  Instead, Mr. 
Hammer waited 15 days to file a sworn statement that said, 
among other things, that "he has never represented Paul 
Bilzerian."  Statement of Compliance, May 26, 2009, ECF 
No. 993.  The federal court stated: "That outright lie was 
paradigmatic 
of 
Hammer's 
habit 
of 
misleading 
courts."  
Bilzerian, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 11.  The federal court offered 
other examples: 
[Mr. Hammer] told Judge Paskay of the Bankruptcy Court 
for the Middle District of Florida that the show cause 
proceedings in this Court had already concluded, when 
in fact they were still under advisement.  Paskay 
Order 12, ECF No. 980.  Judge Paskay found that 
Hammer's "blatant disregard" of the Court's order was 
"typical 
and 
additional 
proof 
of 
Mr. 
Hammer's 
litigious nature...."  Id.  In a separate matter, 
Judge 
Paskay 
characterized 
Hammer's 
conduct 
as 
"obstructive, defiant and inappropriate" and his suit 
as an "unethical use of the legal system."  See Docket 
19, ECF No. 1029.  Judge Paskay is not the only judge 
who has found it necessary to reprimand Hammer, 
though. Judge Martha J. Cook, in the Thirteenth 
No. 
2019AP1974-BA   
 
 
11 
Circuit, Hillsborough County, Florida, has labeled 
Bilzerian 
and 
Hammer's 
conduct 
"egregious," 
"sanctionable," and "clearly unethical."  Cook's Order 
10, 12, ECF No. 951.  She went on to say that Hammer 
had 
participated 
in 
"sandbagging, 
disrupting 
discovery, and walking down a road that would get him 
in a lot of trouble." In light of all this, she was 
"inclined to order him to attend peer review or some 
sort of remedial training." Id. at 9-12. 
Id. 
¶15 On July 13, 2010, the federal court held Mr. Hammer in 
civil contempt for the second time for violating the 2001 
Injunction.  Id.  (citing Mem. Op., 729 F. Supp. 2d at 2-
3, 2010 WL 2771844 at *1).  The federal court once again ordered 
Mr. Hammer to purge his contempt and ordered him to file a sworn 
statement affirming that he had complied with the court's 
conditions.  Id.  Mr. Hammer waited nearly a year before 
informing the federal court that he had complied and then asked 
the federal court to vacate the contempt finding. The federal 
court declined.  Although Mr. Hammer's law license was, by then, 
already suspended, the federal court stated: 
It is true that Hammer, dispossessed of his Bar 
license, is a much less serious threat to this Court's 
[2001 Injunction]. Still, the Court is convinced that 
its [2010 contempt order] must remain in place despite 
Hammer's suspension. It is possible that Hammer could 
be licensed by another Bar or re-admitted to the 
Florida Bar, in which case, he would again pose an 
immediate threat to the Court's [2001 Injunction]. 
Id. at 19.  In the face of the stinging rebukes his conduct 
elicited 
from 
judges 
serving 
several 
different 
courts, 
Mr. Hammer's effort to characterize his conduct as some "complex 
technical violation" rings hollow.  
No. 
2019AP1974-BA   
 
 
12 
¶16 Mr. Hammer also challenges the Board's finding that he 
was not credible and failed to show remorse.  Mr. Hammer claims 
his application was extremely thorough, complete, and candid, 
and notes that the Board made no finding to the contrary.7  He 
complains that "the Board did not once say what it believed to 
be the truth, if it disbelieved Hammer."  We are disinclined to 
second guess credibility determinations made by factfinders.  In 
re Bar Admission of Nichols, 2017 WI 55, ¶18, 375 Wis. 2d 439, 
895 N.W.2d 831. And, nothing in this record suggests that it was 
"clearly erroneous" for the Board to decide that Mr. Hammer's 
explanations for his misconduct were insufficient to excuse that 
misconduct.  
¶17 Mr. Hammer also objects to the Board's determinations 
that his voluntary ethics training with Attorney Dietrich was 
"limited" or "brief" and that Attorney Dietrich "lacked an 
adequate foundation to render a reliable opinion of Mr. Hammer's 
character and fitness to practice law."  He defends the value 
and scope of the ethics training.  He argues that Attorney 
Dietrich considered the same materials that the Board considered 
and argues that the Board does not explain why it was able to 
evaluate Mr. Hammer comprehensively, but Attorney Dietrich was 
not.  However, as Attorney Dietrich himself acknowledged, it is 
the Board, not the expert selected by the applicant, who is 
charged by this court with evaluating the character and fitness 
                                                 
7 This assertion, of course, predated the Board's recent 
motion to supplement the record.  See infra, ¶25, fn. 10. 
No. 
2019AP1974-BA   
 
 
13 
of bar applicants.  SCR 30.01.  We decline to disturb the 
Board's decision to discount Attorney Dietrich's favorable 
testimony.  We conclude that the primary factual findings on 
which the Board based its conclusion that Mr. Hammer failed to 
satisfy SCR 40.06(1) are not clearly erroneous.8  
¶18 We turn to Mr. Hammer's claim that the Board's adverse 
determination 
is 
a 
"mere 
pretext 
for 
unconstitutional 
discrimination against a resident of Florida."  Mr. Hammer's 
effort to elevate his bar admission case to a constitutional 
challenge fails and is, moreover, constructed upon a faulty 
foundation.  Mr. Hammer claims that he should have been offered 
conditional admission pursuant to SCR 40.075(1).  In this, 
Mr. Hammer 
is 
incorrect. 
 
Conditional 
admission 
was 
not 
appropriate on this record.  Only applicants who are able to 
meet character and fitness requirements are considered for 
conditional admission.  See, e.g., In re Bar Admission of 
Hausserman, 2018 WI 115, ¶26, fn. 5, 385 Wis. 2d 70, 921 
N.W.2d 211; In re Bar Admission of Jarrett, 2016 WI 39, ¶35, 
fn. 3, 368 Wis. 2d 567, 879 N.W.2d 116.  Conditional admission 
is not designed to address applicants who exhibit a lack 
honesty, integrity, or credibility for admission.  Id. 
                                                 
8 To the extent that we have not discussed each of 
Mr. Hammer's objections it is because we agree they are 
insufficient to alter the outcome of this matter.  "'An 
appellate court is not a performing bear, required to dance to 
each and every tune played on an appeal.'"  County of Fond du 
Lac v. Derksen, 2002 WI App 160, ¶4, 256 Wis. 2d 490, 647 
N.W.2d 922 (citation omitted). 
No. 
2019AP1974-BA   
 
 
14 
¶19 Based on this faulty premise, Mr. Hammer then reasons 
that because he was not offered conditional admission there 
"must be some additional factor, beyond Mr. Hammer's past 
conduct, which has weighed in the Board's decision to decline to 
certify Mr. Hammer's admission."  Mr. Hammer suggests that the 
"unspoken factor" is his Florida residency.  He thus claims the 
Board's decision violates the privileges and immunities clause 
of the United States Constitution, citing Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985).  Piper is inapposite.  
There, a New Hampshire court rule that excluded nonresidents 
from practicing law in New Hampshire was ruled invalid; the 
Constitution prohibits a state bar from excluding applicants on 
the basis of their state of residence.  Id.  Wisconsin has no 
such rule and Mr. Hammer offers not a shred of evidence that the 
Board employs a different standard for evaluating the character 
and fitness of resident and non-resident bar applicants. 
¶20 Mr. Hammer's misunderstanding appears predicated on 
his oft-repeated claim that if he had committed the same 
professional misconduct in Wisconsin, rather than Florida, he 
would have been suspended, not disbarred.9  Assuming, arguendo, 
this is true, reinstatement of a person's law license following 
a disciplinary suspension is governed by different rules, 
                                                 
9 In Florida, disbarment is the presumed sanction for 
lawyers found guilty of theft from a lawyer's trust account or 
special trust funds received or disbursed by a lawyer as 
guardian, personal representative, receiver, or trustee.  See FL 
R. Disc. 3-5.1(f). 
No. 
2019AP1974-BA   
 
 
15 
SCR chs. 21-22, and administered by a different court agency, 
the 
Office 
of 
Lawyer 
Regulation. 
 
Nor 
is 
the 
formal 
reinstatement process as automatic as Mr. Hammer appears to 
believe.  See, e.g., Rule Petition 19-06, In the Matter of 
Repealing and Recreating Supreme Court Rule 22.30 pertaining to 
license reinstatement following disciplinary suspension, filed 
March 13, 2019 (discussing the "more complex and time-consuming 
reinstatement process required for respondent attorneys whose 
licenses are revoked or suspended for six months or longer.")  
¶21 Mr. Hammer points to the Board's comment that he has 
not, for instance, "made no effort to become reinstated to the 
Florida Bar, despite being eligible to do so . . .."  Board 
Order, p. 10.  Mr. Hammer says that "[c]ertainly, this same 
expectation would not be had of a Wisconsin resident."  However, 
SCR 40.06(4) clearly provides that a bar applicant's license 
status in other jurisdictions is a relevant inquiry.  In In re 
Bar Admission of Littlejohn, 2003 WI 36, ¶23, 261 Wis. 2d 183, 
661 N.W.2d 42, we declined to admit an applicant who had been 
professionally disciplined when he was a dentist.  Although 
Littlejohn was later admitted to practice before the Minnesota 
bar, we observed that "is entirely appropriate for the [Board] 
to take into account the favorable decision made by the other 
state, but we see no reason to require the [Board] to expressly 
discuss or reject the other state's determinations.  While the 
other state's decision may be a relevant factor, the [Board] 
should be free to accord it whatever weight the [Board] deems 
No. 
2019AP1974-BA   
 
 
16 
appropriate."; See also Bar Admission of Hausserman, 385 
Wis. 2d 70, ¶17 (noting that Iowa Board of Law Examiners had 
declined to let the applicant take Iowa bar exam because of 
character and fitness concerns).  We reject Mr. Hammer's claim 
that the Board discriminated against him by virtue of his 
Florida residency.  
¶22 We turn to Mr. Hammer's primary claim:  that the 
Board's conclusion is inconsistent with this court's resolution 
of other bar admission cases.  Mr. Hammer identifies several 
common themes in cases when we were persuaded to admit 
applicants despite an adverse determination, including excellent 
character references, affirmative evidence of rehabilitation, 
candor in the application process, commitment to the community, 
and, critically, the passage of time since the problematic 
conduct.  See, e.g., In re Bar Admission of Rippl, 2002 WI 15, 
¶16, 250 Wis. 2d 519, 639 N.W.2d 553; In re Bar Admission of 
Vanderperren, 2003 WI 37, 261 Wis. 2d 150, 661 N.W.2d 27; In re 
Bar Admission of Anderson, 2006 WI 57, ¶26, 290 Wis. 2d 722, 715 
N.W.2d 586; In re Bar Admission of Jarrett, 2016 WI 39, 368 
Wis. 2d 567, 879 N.W.2d 116; and In re Bar Admission of Nichols, 
2017 WI 55, 375 Wis. 2d 439, 895 N.W.2d 831.  
¶23 While we have, on occasion, overruled the Board and 
admitted certain applicants despite troubling past conduct, we 
conclude that Mr. Hammer cannot be admitted to their ranks.  We 
acknowledge that a decade has passed since the misconduct 
culminating in Mr. Hammer's Florida disbarment and that Mr. 
No. 
2019AP1974-BA   
 
 
17 
Hammer cannot undo his past misconduct.  This conundrum does not 
mean, however, that we are somehow compelled to offer him a law 
license.  While the passage of time may aid a bar applicant's 
case, nothing in our prior bar admission cases should be 
construed to imply that an applicant enjoys a presumption of 
admission after some period of time has elapsed.  Lathrop v. 
Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 237, 102 N.W.2d 404, 408 (1960) 
(observing that the practice of law is not a right but a 
privilege).  
¶24 With the serious nature of his misconduct, coupled 
with the number of incidents revealing deficiencies (BA 6.03(d), 
(i)), Mr. Hammer has created a very heavy burden for himself.  
In such cases the passage of time may not be sufficient to 
persuade us that an applicant should be admitted to the practice 
of law.   
¶25 Based on our own review of the non-erroneous facts of 
record before the Board at the time of its decision, we agree 
that Mr. Hammer has failed to meet his burden under SCR 40.07 to 
establish the requisite moral character and fitness to practice 
law "to assure to a reasonable degree of certainty the integrity 
and the competence of services performed for clients and the 
maintenance 
of 
high 
standards 
in 
the 
administration 
of 
No. 
2019AP1974-BA   
 
 
18 
justice."10 
 
Accordingly, 
we 
affirm 
the 
Board's 
decision 
declining to certify Mr. Hammer for admission to the Wisconsin 
bar. 
¶26 IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Board of Bar 
Examiners declining to certify that David E. Hammer has 
satisfied the requirements for admission to the practice of law 
in Wisconsin is affirmed. 
¶27 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the documents submitted under 
seal are deemed confidential, and will be maintained under seal 
until further order of the court. 
 
                                                 
10 On April 30, 2020, the Board moved to supplement the 
record with evidence that as of October 2019, Mr. Hammer was a 
named defendant in two separate lawsuits and had failed to 
disclose the existence of these lawsuits to the Board. The Board 
contends this violated Mr. Hammer's continuing duty to amend his 
bar application.  See BA 14.03 ("Applicants are required to 
notify the Board in writing of any changes with respect to the 
information elicited by the application, and each application 
must be amended to reflect the facts throughout the entire time 
that the application is pending.")  Mr. Hammer claims that he 
had no duty to disclose the litigation because the Board had 
rendered its adverse decision before these lawsuits were filed 
so his bar application was no longer "pending."   
By separate order we took judicial notice of the existence 
of the two lawsuits, Wis. Stat. § 902.01(2)(b) & (3), and 
dismissed the parties' motions.  The new information did not 
influence this court's decision to affirm the Board's adverse 
determination.  
However, the continuing obligation set forth in the bar 
application and provided in SCR ch. 40 App., BA 14.03, applies 
to applicants during the pendency of an appeal from an adverse 
determination of the Board. 
No. 
2019AP1974-BA   
 
 
 
 
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