Case Title: JOHN MICHAEL GRISSOM V. STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-10-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
JOHN MICHAEL GRISSOM V. STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 132121 P.3d 127Case Number: 04-154Decided: 10/13/2005
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
JOHN 
MICHAEL GRISSOM,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),)

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

 
 

            
Ken 
Koski, Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Marion Yoder, Senior 
Assistant Public Defender.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

 
 

            
Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Eric Johnson, Director, Prosecution Assistance 
Program; and Jenny L. Craig, Student Director.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
  
            
VOIGT, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In February 2004, 
a NatronaCounty jury found John 
Michael Grissom (the appellant) guilty of three crimes: possession of 
methamphetamine (a misdemeanor); possession of marijuana (a misdemeanor); and 
possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver (a felony).  The appellant now appeals those 
convictions, claiming that his trial counsel were ineffective because they did 
not file a suppression motion and that the evidence received at trial was 
insufficient to prove that he intended to deliver the methamphetamine in his 
possession.  We affirm. 

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
            
1.         
Whether the appellant's trial counsel were ineffective because they did 
not file a motion to suppress the evidence seized from the appellant's 
person?

 
 
            
2.         
Whether the appellant's trial counsel were ineffective because they did 
not file a motion to suppress the appellant's statements to law 
enforcement?

 
 
3.         
Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that the appellant intended 
to deliver the methamphetamine in his possession?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶2]      On September 19, 
2003, Stephanie Syverson (Syverson) "attempted to run over an officer" 
(presumably a law enforcement officer) near the Eastridge Mall in Casper and was therefore 
"wanted for allegations of committing a felony . . .."  An employee at a local hotel informed 
the police later that day that a vehicle matching the description of Syverson's 
vehicle was parked at the hotel, and that the employee had observed a female 
enter the vehicle and then return to a particular hotel room.  Casper police officer Roger Burns was 
dispatched to the hotel at about 3:00 or 3:30 p.m., where he verified with the 
front desk that the hotel room at issue was indeed registered to Syverson.  Casper police officer Toby Buhler also arrived 
at the hotel and observed the subject vehicle in the hotel parking 
lot.

 
 
[¶3]      The ground-floor 
hotel room registered to Syverson had both a door that opened into the hotel and 
a door that opened into the hotel parking lot.  The officers decided that Officer Buhler 
would enter the hotel and watch the door that opened into the hotel "so nobody . 
. . would leave and so no one attempted to make contact from the outside" and 
that Officer Burns would exit the hotel and watch the door that opened into the 
hotel parking lot.

 
 
[¶4]      Officer Buhler, 
who was familiar with Syverson from previous contacts, entered the hotel and 
spotted Syverson ahead of him in the hallway relatively close to her room 
door.  Syverson turned and looked 
back, but the officer "played dumb" by staring into the hotel's office windows 
because he was worried that Syverson would dash into her room, shut the door, 
and thereby complicate the officer's objectives.  Syverson went two or three more steps 
and entered her hotel room.  Officer 
Buhler waited in the alcove of the hotel room adjacent to Syverson's room, 
suspecting that she would look through her door's "spy hole" to see whether the 
officer passed by her room and continued down the hallway, or instead came to 
her door.  The officer figured that 
Syverson's curiosity would overcome her and she would ultimately open the door 
and look for the officer.

 
 
[¶5]      Syverson 
eventually opened her door, looked down the hallway, and Officer Buhler "rushed 
her."  Syverson tried to run back 
into her hotel room and slam the door, but the officer wedged his feet between 
the door and the door frame and attempted to push and squeeze his way into the 
hotel room.  As he was struggling to 
keep the door open, Officer Buhler saw Syverson on the opposite side of the door 
(nearly horizontal in her attempt to push the door closed), another female 
sitting on a bed, and the appellant in the back of the room.  As soon as the appellant saw the officer 
coming through the door, the appellant exhibited a "look of fear in his face," 
grabbed something that was on a table, and ran out the room's other door into 
the hotel parking lot.  At some 
point, Syverson relented and backed away from the room's interior door.1

 
 
[¶6]      Meanwhile, 
Officer Burns was conferring with Casper police sergeant Chris Hadlock outside 
the hotel room when the appellant suddenly ran out of the room, saw the 
officers, and ran the opposite direction.  
Officer Burns pursued the appellant, who stopped approximately fifty to 
one-hundred feet from the hotel room and put his hands up in the air.  The officer "took [the appellant] down 
to the ground so he didn't take off running on [the officer] or have a chance to 
fight with [the officer] . . .."  
Upon observing a sheathed eight-inch hunting knife attached to the belt 
on the appellant's hip, Officer Burns handcuffed him for safety reasons and 
proceeded to pat him down for additional weapons.  The officer wanted to find out who the 
appellant was, why he ran, and whether he was the subject of any outstanding 
arrest warrants.  When Officer Burns 
asked the appellant for his name and identification, the appellant was 
cooperative, provided his name, and indicated that his identification was in his 
wallet.  The officer ultimately 
arrested the appellant because he was the subject of an outstanding arrest 
warrant.

 
 
[¶7]      When he was 
arrested, the appellant was wearing a fanny pack around his waist.  The following items were, at some point, 
seized from the fanny pack and/or the appellant's person:  (1) a small digital scale containing a 
white powder residue Officer Burns suspected was methamphetamine; (2) eight 
small baggies with a white powder residue that a forensic chemist later 
testified was methamphetamine; (3) two small baggies, each with a substance 
containing tetrahydrocannabinol (the active ingredient in marijuana); (4) a 
small plastic container with methamphetamine residue; (5) a spoon containing 
methamphetamine residue; (6) five empty syringes; (7) two razor blades; (8) a 
glass methamphetamine pipe, and a brass marijuana pipe; (9) various other 
baggies, some of which baggies appeared to contain an unidentified residue and 
112 of which baggies appeared to be unused; (10) an address book and a phone 
number book; (11) business cards and numerous pieces of paper in a small 
notebook; and (12) a cell phone.  A 
forensic chemist testified that the total weight of the substances that 
contained methamphetamine was 1.39 grams.

 
 
[¶8]      Officer Burns 
placed the appellant in the back seat of a patrol vehicle, whereupon the 
appellant indicated that he wanted to talk to DCI (the Wyoming Division of 
Criminal Investigation).  A call was 
placed to DCI and NatronaCounty deputy sheriff Keith Wilhelm (who 
was at that time assigned to DCI's drug task force) arrived at the scene shortly 
thereafter.  Deputy Wilhelm located 
the appellant in Officer Burns' patrol vehicle and read him his Miranda rights.  According to Deputy Wilhelm, the 
appellant indicated that he understood his rights and that he wanted to waive 
those rights and make a statement.  
The appellant then stated: (1) that he had purchased two grams of 
methamphetamine "about an hour" before the police arrived at the hotel; (2) that 
he was very familiar with Syverson;2 (3) that he knew she was staying in 
the hotel room; (4) that he went there to "get high, to party;" (5) that he had 
been in the hotel room for fifteen minutes before the police arrived; and (6) 
that he had already arranged to purchase a quarter-ounce of methamphetamine 
later that afternoon and trade it to another individual.

 
 
[¶9]      The appellant was 
charged with: (1) possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, a 
felony in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2003); (2) 
possession of methamphetamine, a misdemeanor in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1031(c)(i); and (3) possession of marijuana, a misdemeanor in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i).  
On February 19, 2004, a NatronaCounty jury found the appellant guilty of 
all three charges.  The district 
court sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for eight to twelve years for the 
felony conviction and also imposed sentences for the misdemeanor 
convictions.  The appellant now 
appeals from the district court's judgment and sentence.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel

 
 
[¶10]   Two public defenders represented 
the appellant at trial.  On appeal, 
the appellant asserts that his trial counsel were ineffective because they did 
not file a motion to suppress the evidence seized from the appellant's person 
(essentially the contents of the appellant's fanny pack) or the statements the 
appellant made to law enforcement.

 
 
            
Standard of 
Review

 
 
[¶11]                           
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed under the 
following standard:

 
 
"When 
reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the paramount 
determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's 
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance.  Herdt v. State, 891 P.2d 793, 796 
(Wyo.1995); Starr v. State, 888 P.2d 1262, 1266-67 (Wyo.1995); Arner v. State, 872 P.2d 100, 104 
(Wyo.1994); Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 (Wyo.1986).  The reviewing 
court should indulge a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate 
assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable 
professional judgment.  Herdt, at 796; Starr, at 1266; Arner, at 104; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 
80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

 
 
Under 
the two-prong standard articulated in Strickland and Frias, an appellant claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the record that counsel's performance 
was deficient and that prejudice resulted.  
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064; Starr, at 1266; King v. State, 810 P.2d 119, 125 
(Wyo.1991) (Cardine, J., dissenting); Campbell v. State, 728 P.2d 628, 629 
(Wyo.1986); Frias, 722 P.2d  at 
145.  In other words, to warrant 
reversal on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must 
demonstrate that his counsel failed to render such assistance as would have 
been offered by a reasonably competent attorney' and that counsel's deficiency 
prejudiced the defense of the case.'  
Lower v. State, 786 P.2d 346, 
349 (Wyo.1990).  The benchmark for 
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.'  Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 686, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064."

 
 

Asch [v. State, 2003 WY 18, ¶ 11, 62 P.3d 945, 
950 (Wyo.2003)] (quoting Becker v. 
State, 2002 WY 126, ¶ 12, 53 P.3d 94, ¶ 12 (Wyo.2002); Reyna v. State, 2001 WY 105, ¶ 19, 33 P.3d 1129, ¶ 19 (Wyo.2001); Chapman v. 
State, 2001 WY 25, ¶ 6, 18 P.3d 1164, ¶ 6 (Wyo.2001); Grainey v. State, 997 P.2d 1035, 1038-39 
(Wyo.2000)).  The burden of proving 
that counsel was ineffective rests entirely on an appellant.  Asch, at ¶ 11 (citing Barkell v. State, 2002 WY 153, ¶ 10, 55 P.3d 1239, ¶ 10 (Wyo.2002)).  To 
satisfy his burden, an appellant must provide more than mere speculation or 
equivocal inferences.  Sincock v. State, 2003 WY 115, ¶ 37, 76 P.3d 323, ¶ 37 (Wyo.2003) (citing Barkell, at ¶ 13).

 
 

Duke v. 
State, 2004 
WY 120, ¶ 36, 99 P.3d 928, 943 (Wyo. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2513 
(2005).

 
 
[¶12]   We have further stated that an 
appellant

 
 
"must 
demonstrate the existence of a reasonable probability that, absent that 
deficiency, the result of the proceedings would have been different.  Counsel's ineffectiveness must be so 
serious as to undermine this court's confidence that the outcome was fair.  Laing v. State, 746 P.2d 1247, 1248-49 
(Wyo.1987); Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336, 342 (Wyo.1987); Frias v. State, 
722 P.2d 135, 145-47 (Wyo.1986)."

 
 

Rutti v. 
State, 2004 
WY 133, ¶ 23, 100 P.3d 394, 405 (Wyo. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1990 
(2005) (quoting Lower v. State, 786 P.2d 346, 
349-50 (Wyo. 
1990)).  When ineffective assistance of counsel 
is alleged due to counsel's failure to file a suppression motion, "[p]rejudice 
to a defendant can only be shown where, had the motion been made, it would have 
been granted, and had the evidence been suppressed, "only a limited amount of 
evidence was available to the prosecution to support a conviction."'"  Page v. State, 2003 WY 23, ¶ 8, 63 P.3d 904, 909 (Wyo. 2003), abrogated on other 
grounds by TJS v. State, 2005 WY 68, 113 P.3d 1054 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, 
¶ 59, 43 P.3d 80, 102 (Wyo. 2002) and Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 612 
(Wyo. 1992)).

 
 

[¶13]   A failure to "make the required 
showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the 
ineffectiveness claim."  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 700, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  Indeed, if "it is easier to dispose of 
an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we 
expect will often be so, that course should be followed."  Id. 
at 697.

 
 
            
Evidence Seized from the 
Appellant's Person

 
 
[¶14]   The appellant first argues that his 
trial counsel were ineffective because they did not file a motion to suppress 
the evidence seized from his person.  
The appellant's argument focuses on whether Officer Buhler's entry into 
the hotel room at issue was reasonable or lawful.  According to the appellant, that entry 
improperly created an exigency which then "precipitated the emergence of [the 
appellant], an admitted drug user, from that motel room, his warrantless seizure 
and the warrantless search and seizure of his person and personal effects;" in 
other words, because of the appellant's trial counsel's "failure to challenge 
the constitutionality of the police's clearly non-consensual, warrantless entry 
[into the hotel room], the fruits stemming from the police's improper conduct 
came [into evidence at trial] without opposition."  The State asserts that the appellant has 
not demonstrated that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel 
room and that the appellant therefore cannot challenge the legality of Officer 
Buhler's warrantless entry into the hotel room.3

 
 

[¶15]   The Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.4  Vassar v. State, 2004 WY 125, ¶ 13, 99 P.3d 987, 992-93 (Wyo. 2004).  However, the "capacity to claim the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment depends . . . upon whether the person who 
claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in the invaded place."  Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978).  See also Putnam v. State, 995 P.2d 632, 636 (Wyo. 
2000).  "The burden of proving that a reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists is on the proponent of a motion to suppress."  Id. 
at 636.

 
 

[¶16]   We have previously considered the 
merits of an appellant's capacity to allege a Fourth Amendment violation within 
the rubric of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  See, for example, Beadles v. State, 984 P.2d 1083, 1086 (Wyo. 1999).  The appellant in the instant case 
clearly anticipated the issue because it is referenced in his principal 
appellate brief.  He acknowledges in 
that brief that his capacity "to assert privacy rights in the motel room, and 
especially his own rights to be free from unreasonable seizure and search, 
necessarily involve fact-intensive inquiries," but takes the following position 
regarding the trial record in the instant case: 

 
 
In this 
case, Mr. Grissom may well have had to show his "standing" to assert a Fourth 
Amendment privacy interest in Ms. Syverson's motel room.  . . .  From the few facts available on the 
record, nothing can be determined with certainty 
about Mr. Grissom's privacy interests (and the right not to be barged in upon in 
Ms. Syverson's room), but it cannot be baldly assumed, from the few 
facts given at trial, that he had no such rights.  Had suppression been sought to explore 
this point, standing testimony Mr. Grissom might have given at a hearing on it 
could not have been used against him at trial even if he lost on the standing 
issue.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  The State ultimately did 
raise the issue in its appellate brief,5 but the appellant did not file a 
reply brief.  Interestingly, the 
appellant's appellate counsel further stated at oral argument that "had there 
been a suppression motion filed, we would have some evidence in the record to 
show whether or not [the appellant] had standing to assert a right to privacy in 
that hotel room, but we don't have any of that information" and "there is not 
enough in the record to make a standing argument."

 
 

[¶17]   It is the appellant's burden to 
prove that his trial counsel were ineffective and that he was prejudiced by his 
trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness.  
When that alleged ineffectiveness is due to the failure to file a 
suppression motion, the appellant must show that if such a motion had been made, 
it would have been granted.  The 
State questions whether the appellant had the capacity to challenge Officer 
Buhler's entry into the hotel room at issue.  It is therefore incumbent upon the 
appellant to demonstrate that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in that 
hotel room.  The appellant has 
essentially conceded on appeal that he cannot do so from the record currently 
before us, so we need not consider the issue further.6  See Olsen v. State, 2003 WY 46, ¶ 81, 67 P.3d 536, 567 (Wyo. 2003) ("ineffectiveness claim should not be 
brought on appeal where the trial record is insufficient to determine the 
claim") and Beadles, 984 P.2d at 
1086 (Beadles had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in area searched and counsel was therefore not ineffective in failing to 
pursue a "previously filed motion to suppress evidence""counsel was not 
ineffective in declining to pursue an argument which must 
fail").

 
 

[¶18]   In what amounts to a one-sentence 
argument in his appellate brief, the appellant further contends that the "State 
should have been required to show why [the appellant's] exit [from the hotel 
room] gave [law enforcement] cause to tackle him, and why anything beyond a Terry stop could have legally been made 
when he did bolt from it."  The 
appellant also states in passing that law enforcement did not have probable 
cause to arrest him.  This argument 
can hardly be deemed cogent, and we have "consistently held that we will not 
consider claims unsupported by cogent argument . . .."7  Barkell v. State, 2002 WY 153, ¶ 32, 55 P.3d 1239, 1245 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
            
The Appellant's Statements to Law Enforcement

 
 
[¶19]   The appellant contends that his 
trial counsel were also ineffective because they did not file a motion to 
suppress his statements to law enforcement.  The appellant claims that he was 
arrested at "the moment he was taken to the ground by Officer Burns" and that he 
then made incriminating statements to Officer Burns and Sergeant Hadlock without 
having been advised of his Miranda 
rights.  According to the appellant, 
the subsequent statements he made to Deputy Wilhelm (who testified that he did 
advise the appellant of his Miranda 
rights) were therefore "fatally tainted by the unwarned preceding statements he 
made while in custody.'"

 
 
            
Statements made by a suspect during custodial interrogation are 
admissible into evidence, providing certain advisements are made.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).  Statements made 
during custodial interrogation must be excluded upon a showing that the 
defendant was not advised of his Miranda rights.  Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000), cert. 
denied, 535 U.S. 1106, 122 S. Ct. 2315, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1069 (2002).  In Dickerson, 530 U.S.  at 435, 120 S. Ct. 2326, the United States Supreme Court stated:

 
 
"Accordingly, 
we laid down concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies 
and courts to follow.'  . . .  Those guidelines established that the 
admissibility in evidence of any statement given during custodial interrogation 
of a suspect would depend on whether the police provided the suspect with four 
warnings.  These warnings (which 
have come to be known colloquially as Miranda rights') are: a suspect has the 
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court 
of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he 
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning 
if he so desires.'"

 
 
            
Custodial interrogation means "questioning initiated by law enforcement 
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 
freedom of action in any significant way."  
Miranda, 384 U.S.  at 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602.  See also Glass v. State, 853 P.2d 972, 
976 (Wyo.1993) and Wunder v. State, 
705 P.2d 333, 334 (Wyo.1985).  
Neither general on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime 
nor statements volunteered freely without compelling influences are considered 
to fall within this definition.  Miranda, 384 U.S.  at 477-78, 
86 S. Ct. 1602.  

 
 
. . 
.

 
 
            
The giving of Miranda 
warnings, by itself, does not suffice to render a statement admissible.  The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States 
Constitution, and Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 6 and 11, require that 
statements also must be voluntary.  
Lewis [v. State], 2002 WY 92, 
¶ 18, 48 P.3d [1063,] 1068 [(Wyo.2002)]; Mitchell v. State, 982 P.2d 717, 721 
(Wyo.1999); Doyle v. State, 954 P.2d 969, 971-72 (Wyo.1998).

 
 

Gunn v. 
State, 2003 
WY 24, ¶¶ 7-11, 64 P.3d 716, 719-20 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶20]   Even if we were to assume, for 
purposes of this appeal, that the appellant was in custody during the relevant 
time period, the key consideration in the instant case remains whether Officer 
Burns or Sergeant Hadlock interrogated him.  We have said that Miranda's

 
 
"safeguards 
come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express 
questioning or its functional equivalent.  
* * *  [I]nterrogation under 
Miranda refers not only to express 
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other 
than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know 
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.  The latter portion of this definition 
focuses primarily on the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of 
the police."

 
 

Doyle v. 
State, 954 P.2d 969, 972 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Daniel v. State, 644 P.2d 172, 
176 (Wyo. 
1982)).

 
 
[¶21]   It does not appear from the record 
that either officer subjected the appellant to express questioning, or its 
functional equivalent.  Rather, it 
appears that the appellant spontaneously requested to speak with DCI and 
Sergeant Hadlock simply asked the appellant about that request.  Officer Burns testified, in pertinent 
part, as follows: 

 
 
Q.  [The prosecutor]  All right.  Now, after . . . you completed your 
search of Mr. Grissom, what did you do with him?

 
 
A.  [Officer Burns]      He was placed in 
the cage portion of my patrol car.

 
 
Q.        Is 
that in the back seat?

 
 
A.        
Yes.

 
 
Q.        All 
right.  And what, if anything, did 
he tell you or say to you, ask of you?

 
 
A.        The 
only thing that he told me is he wanted to talk to DCI.

 
 
Q.        All 
right.  When he told you that, what 
did you do?

 
 
A.        I 
informed my sergeant of that.  And 
my sergeant came over and asked him the same question  or, you know, asked him 
about that.  And he made the same 
statement to him.

 
 
Q.        That 
he wanted to talk to DCI?

 
 
A.        
Yes.

 
 
Q.        All 
right.  And so what did you or 
Sergeant Hadlock do to help out on that request?

 
 
A.        Used 
the cell phone from the sergeants' car to call up to the DCI office, which in 
turn, [Deputy] Wilhelm responded to the [hotel].

 
 
Deputy 
Wilhelm contacted the appellant, advised him of his Miranda rights, and proceeded to 
interview him.

 
 
[¶22]   On appeal, the appellant asks that 
we presume that his request to speak with DCI "must 
have included a degree of questioning for [the request] to be executed" 
and while "the record does not reveal the reasons he must 
have given the officer for this desire, they must 
have been sufficiently believable to inspire the officer to pass on the 
request to his superior, and for the sergeant to make the call and get DCI down 
to the" scene.  (Emphasis 
added.)  This is just the sort of 
speculation that is forbidden by the applicable standard of review.  We conclude that the appellant has not 
demonstrated that a suppression motion based on this alleged Miranda violation would have been 
granted because it does not appear that the appellant was subjected to express 
questioning, or its functional equivalent, prior to being advised of his Miranda rights.

 
 

Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 
[¶23]   The appellant asserts that the 
evidence received at trial was insufficient to prove that he possessed 
methamphetamine with the specific intent to deliver that methamphetamine.  According to the appellant, the facts 
proved possession, but not possession with intent to deliver, because law 
enforcement "did not observe the completed act of delivery, nor did they have 
any evidence of a present intention on the part of [the appellant] to deliver 
any controlled substance [that he actually possessed] to another person."  The appellant characterizes the evidence 
as indicating that he "had a methamphetamine habit, a relatively small amount of 
methamphetamine, and had divided that methamphetamine up into several very small 
amounts, all of which he kept in his own fanny pack, along with the 
paraphernalia needed to use it himself."

 
 
[¶24]   Our standard of review is as 
follows:

 
 
When 
reviewing an appeal based on sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence, 
and any applicable inferences based on the evidence, in a light most favorable 
to the State.  Nixon v. State, 994 P.2d 324, 329 
(Wyo. 1999); 
and see Pool v. State, 2001 WY 8, 17 P.3d 1285 (Wyo.2001).  In conducting 
such a review, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the jury; rather, 
we determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or 
even could, have found the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Id.

 
 

McFarlane 
v. State, 2001 
WY 10, ¶ 4, 17 P.3d 31, 32 (Wyo. 2001).  See also Leyo v. State, 2005 WY 92, ¶¶ 
11-16, 116 P.3d 1113, 1116-18 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 

[¶25]   "To be convicted of possession with 
the intent to deliver a controlled substance under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031, 
the State must present sufficient evidence that 1) the defendant possessed, 2) 
with the intent to deliver, 3) a controlled substance."8  Thomas v. State, 2003 WY 53, ¶ 18, 67 P.3d 1199, 1204 (Wyo. 2003).  "The intent-to-deliver element may be 
proven by a showing that a completed delivery occurred or that the defendant 
held the specific intent to deliver the controlled substance.'"  Hughes v. State, 2003 WY 35, ¶ 25, 65 P.3d 378, 385 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Urrutia v. State, 924 P.2d 965, 
968 (Wyo. 
1996)).  Circumstantial evidence, "which is 
proof of facts and circumstances from which the main fact to be proved 
reasonably follows according to common experience of mankind,' is sufficient to 
establish the elements of a crime."  
Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 620 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Murray v. State, 671 P.2d 320, 
328 (Wyo. 1983) and Russell v. State, 583 P.2d 690 (Wyo. 
1978)) 
(evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence regarding Saldana's "intent to 
deliver").

 
 
[¶26]   We find that the record contains 
sufficient evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, from 
which a jury reasonably could infer that the appellant intended to deliver the 
methamphetamine found in his possession.  
The appellant, who had admittedly purchased methamphetamine earlier in 
the day, was present in a hotel room with two females to "get high" and to 
"party."  When the police arrived, 
the appellant exhibited a "look of fear," retrieved something from a table, and 
fled the hotel room.  A fanny pack 
subsequently seized from the appellant's person contained methamphetamine and 
marijuana, and it does not appear that any other controlled substances (with 
which to "get high" or to "party") were discovered in the hotel room, in the 
possession of either female present therein, or in Syverson's 
vehicle.

 
 
[¶27]   The appellant's fanny pack also 
contained items consistent with the use of methamphetamine and marijuana, as 
well as items consistent with an intent to deliver the methamphetamine.  Deputy Wilhelm9 testified at length regarding the 
significance of these items in light of his training and experience.  We will summarize the portions of his 
testimony relevant to whether the appellant intended to deliver the 
methamphetamine in his possession:

 
 
            
1.         
Ninety-five to ninety-nine percent of methamphetamine traffickers also 
use methamphetamine.

 
 
2.         
In determining whether someone intended to distribute a particular 
controlled substance, the deputy generally looks for the presence of multiple 
baggies of small quantities of the substance, scales, surplus unused packaging, 
and records of drug sales and buys.

 
 
3.         
A "person that uses methamphetamine for personal use has no reason to 
weigh out the methamphetamine" and "no reason to have it separated into several 
different small baggies."  Instead, 
the person would keep the methamphetamine in "one concentration" and "cut it off 
and use what they want off of the main baggie;" it is "not common" for a user to 
cut a quantity off and put it in smaller packages for a "premeasured 
dose."

 
 
4.         
Likewise, scales are used to "weigh out the product" and the scale seized 
from the appellant's fanny pack (which scale contained suspected methamphetamine 
residue) was "consistent with what is found in drug trafficking." Someone 
"trafficking the drug would buy one quantity [of the drug] . . . and then would 
break that up into" separate, smaller quantities for 
resale.

 
 
5.         
When a quantity of methamphetamine is broken down into smaller quantities 
for resale, multiple unused baggies (112 of which baggies were seized from the 
appellant's fanny pack) are used to package these smaller individual 
quantities.  A person purchasing 
methamphetamine solely for personal use would not need extra baggies because the 
person would continue to use the drug from one concentration maintained in its 
original packaging.

 
 
6.         
Razor blades are used to divide a quantity of methamphetamine into 
smaller quantities, and to mix other substances with a quantity of 
methamphetamine (or "cut" it) for resale (thereby increasing the quantity to be 
sold and the purchase price).

 
 
7.         
The notebook seized from the appellant's person contained indicia of a 
"pay owe" sheet.  A "pay-owe" sheet 
is "a record of purchases and drug debt which one person might owe another 
person for the purchase of drugs."

 
 
8.         
It is fairly common for "drug traffickers to have cell 
phones."

 
 
9.         
The appellant stated that he had already arranged to purchase a 
quarter-ounce of methamphetamine later that day and trade10 it to another individual.  One can reasonably infer from this 
statement that the appellant was not merely a methamphetamine 
user.

 
 
The jury 
obviously accepted and relied upon this testimony, and the appellant raises no 
appellate issue concerning the propriety of such 
testimony.

 
 

[¶28]   When we view the evidence in the 
instant case in the light most favorable to the State, as we must, the evidence 
clearly is sufficient to prove the "intent to deliver" element of the crime 
charged.  While the appellant 
emphasizes other inferences which one might make based on the evidence, we have 
said that even though "other inferences may be drawn from the evidence 
presented, the trier of fact has the responsibility to resolve conflicts in the 
evidence."  Wetherelt v. State, 864 P.2d 449, 452 
(Wyo. 
1993).

 
 
[¶29]   We affirm.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Officer 
Buhler testified that he did not have a warrant to enter into the 
room.

 
 

2About two 
weeks prior to this incident, the appellant offered to serve as a confidential 
informant for Deputy Wilhelm.  The 
appellant attempted to set up drug buys with several individuals, including 
Syverson; however, after two or three days, the appellant failed to keep in 
contact with or meet Deputy Wilhelm and the officer terminated the appellant as 
a confidential informant.

 
 

3We note 
that the United States Supreme Court has stated that in "determining whether a 
defendant is able to show the violation of his (and not someone else's) Fourth 
Amendment rights, the definition of those rights is more properly placed within 
the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of 
standing.'"  Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88, 119 S. Ct. 469, 
142 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1998) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978)).  See also United States v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222, 1225-26 n.2 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1030 
(1999).

 
 

4The 
appellant cursorily references the Wyoming Constitution in his appellate brief, 
but does not present an independent state constitutional analysis; a failure to 
present such an analysis limits our consideration to federal constitutional 
principles.  Vassar v. State, 2004 WY 125, ¶ 14, 99 P.3d 987, 993 (Wyo. 2004).  The Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides:

 
 
            
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.

 
 

5Because 
the appellant is claiming that his trial counsel were ineffective for not filing 
a suppression motion, this appeal was obviously the State's first opportunity to 
raise the issue.  The appellant does 
not contend that the State should be precluded from raising the issue in the 
instant case.

 
 

6We note 
that the appellant did not request a remand for an evidentiary hearing to 
develop the record pursuant to Calene v. 
State, 846 P.2d 679 (Wyo. 1993) (wherein, as we said in Hornecker v. State, 977 P.2d 1289, 1291 
(Wyo. 1999), we 
"described in detail the procedures that are available in bringing an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim where the deficiencies of counsel are 
not apparent on the face of the record").

 
 

7Aside 
from challenging Officer Buhler's entry into the hotel room, the appellant does 
not otherwise offer any compelling argument in his appellate brief regarding the 
propriety of the search of his fanny pack.

 
 

8The 
district court instructed the jury that the elements of the crime were "On or 
about the 19th day of September, 2003;" "In 
Natrona County, Wyoming;" "The Defendant, John Michael Grissom;" "Possessed a 
controlled substance, to wit: methamphetamine;" "With intent to deliver it to 
another person."

 
 

9Deputy 
Wilhelm testified that he was an eight-year veteran of the Natrona County 
sheriff's office who: (1) had been assigned to the drug task force "to 
investigate drug crimes to become familiar with the drug trade;" (2) had 
"received training from the Federal Government and along with the State 
Government on investigating drug crimes, packaging evidence, interview, 
techniques;" and (3) had investigated "close to a hundred" drug-trafficking 
crimes, ninety of which crimes involved methamphetamine.

 
 

10Deputy Wilhelm testified that 
controlled substances are not always sold for money; they are frequently traded 
for "anything with value."