Case Title: State v Jerry VanWinkle Jr

Citation: 2008 MT 208

Docket Number: f1aa5d83-b801-43b0-b3f5-756260bc6857

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED
DA 7.0151 ane 17 208
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2008 MT 208

 

STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
y
JERRY GENE VanWINKLE, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant,

 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
Inand For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DC 06-401
Honorable John W. Larson, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant
Brian C. Smith; Office ofthe Public Defender Missoula, Montana

For Appellee:

Hon. Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General; Mark Mattioli,
Assistant Attomey General, Helena, Montana

Fred Van Valkenburg, Missoula County Attorney; Patricia Bower,
Deputy County Attorney, Missoula, Montana

‘Submitted on Briefs: January 8, 2008
I: June 17, 2008

 

Filed:
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court

41 Jerry Gene VanWinkle, J. (VanWinkle) appeals from the judgment entered by the
Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, on his conviction and sentence for felony
burglary. We reverse and remand with instructions.

{2 The issue on appeal is whether the District Court imposed an illegal sentence when it
ordered VanWinkle to pay an $85 fee tothe local community service program asa condition
of his deferred imposition of sentence.

BACKGROUND

{3 On November 30, 2006, VanWinkle pled guilty o felony burglary pursuant toa plea
‘agreement he entered into withthe State of Montana (State). In exchange for the guilty plea,

the State agreed to recommend to the District Court that VanWinkle receive a three-year

 

deferred imposition of sentence, subject to various conditions. Two of the specified
‘conditions in the agreement provided that VanWinkle would complete 150 hours of
‘community service and “shall pay a fine to go to the community service program in the
amount of $85.00. Said fine shall be paid through the Clerk of District Court and according
toa schedule as set by his/her probation officer.” The plea agreement further specified that
‘VanWinkle “shall receive credit against his fine for pre-trial incarceration.” The District

Court accepted VanWinkle’s guilty plea, scheduled a sentencing hearing and ordered

 

preparation of a presentence investigation report (PSI). The PSI concurred in the State's
recommendation of a three-year deferred imposition of sentence, subject to conditions, The

PSI also recommended speci

 

conditions, including Condition No, 13 requiring that

Van\

 

Je “shall pay a fee of $85.00 to the Community Service Program.”
‘4 Atthe sentencing hearing, VanWinkle objected to Condition No. 13 on the basis that
the condition required payment of a “fee,” whereas the plea agreement provided for payment
‘ofthe $85 to the community service program as a “fine.” VanWinkle also argued that the
District Court was without statutory authority to impose the payment as a fee. The District
Court overruled Van Winkle’s objection, observing thatthe condition was one the judges in
‘the Fourth Judicial District had agreed to institute as a local rule and was to be designated as
fee, The District Court subsequently entered its written judgment deferring imposition of
‘Van Winkle’s sentence for a three-year period with conditions, including that VanWinkle
complete 150 hours of community service and Condition No. 13 that he “shall pay a fee of
‘$85.00 to the Community Service Program.” VanWinkle appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{5 VanWinkle challenges the legality of his sentence. We review the legality of a
criminal sentence to determine whether the sentence is within applicable statutory
Parameters. Siate v. Armstrong, 2006 MT 334, 48, 335 Mont. 131, $8, 151 P.3d 46,48.
DISCUSSION
{6 __ Did the District Court impose an illegal sentence when it ordered VanWinkle to pay

an S85 fee to the local community service program as a condition of his deferred
imposition of sentence?
{7 VanWinkle challenges the District Courts imposition of Condition No. 13 as illegal
because there is no statute authorizing sentencing courts to impose a fee for the support of
local community service programs. In response, the State first raises the threshold argument
‘that Van Winkle waived his right to challenge Condition No. 13 by explicitly and voluntarily
‘agreeing to pay $85 to the community service program when he signed the plea agreement.
‘The State contends VanWinkle should not be allowed to evade his agreement by challenging
the condition as being denominated a fee, rather than @ fine as specified in the agreement,
‘because “whether the assessment is considered a fee ora fine does not ‘affect the substantial
rights ofthe defendant’ ....” VanWinkle replies that the distinetion between a “fine” anda

“fee” is not mere semanti

 

, but has repercussions on a defendant obligated to make the
payment. Thus, according to VanWinkle, he was not—and is not—barred from challenging
the District Court’s imposition of the condition as a fee. We agree with VanWinkle

$8 Contrary tothe State's assertion, denominating a monetary obligation imposed on a
criminal defendant as a fee, rather than a fine, can “affect the substantial rights of the
defendant.” For example, § 46-18-403(2), MCA, provides that any defendant against whom
«fine is imposed upon conviction must be allowed eredit against that fine for each day
served in incarceration prior to the conviction. We have held that the term “fine” as used in
this statute does not encompass fees, costs or other court-imposed monetary obligations,

Voerding v. State, 2006 MT 125, § 16, 332 Mont. 262, 416, 136 P.34 02, 4 16. Thus,
defendant may only receive credit for pre-conviction incarceration against “ines” and not
against “fees.”

{9 Here, while the District Court expressly included in its written judgment that
VanWinkle was entitled to $7,275 credit toward his fines as a result of 97 days of pre-
conviction incarceration, the court deferred imposition of sentence and did not impose any
fine, Had the District Court imposed the $85 fine to which the parties agreed in the plea
agreement—and assuming. arguendo, such a fine would otherwise be legal—VanWinkle
‘would not have been obligated to pay it. In light of these facts, we conclude VanWinkle’s
plea agreement with the State to pay a fine of $85 did not bar him from challenging the
District Court's imposition of the condition as a fee. We tum, then, to the merits of
‘VanWinkle’s contentions.

{M10 tis well-established that a district court's authority to impose a sentence in a eriminal
case is defined and constrained by statute, State v. Blackwell, 2001 MT 198, § 6, 306 MT
267,416, 32 P.34 771, 6. Thus, “a district court has no power to impose a sentence in the
absence of specific statutory auth

.* Blackwell, 4 6 (quoting State v. Hatfield, 256 Mont.

   

 

340, 346, 846 P.2d 1025, 1029 (1993)). As stated above, VanWinkle contends that no statute

 

authorizes the District Court to impose a fee for the support of a local community service
program.
{11 Werecently addressed the identical issue raised here in State v. Stephenson, 2008 MT

(64,342 Mont. 60, 179 P.3d $02. In that case, Stephenson entered into a plea agreement with
the State by which he agreed to plead guilty to one felony and two misdemeanor offenses in
‘exchange for the State's agreement to recommend the district court impose an aggregate
sentence of three years, all suspended on specified conditions. Stephenson further agreed to
any additional probation conditions recommended in the PSI. Stephenson, 4§,2-3. One of
‘the additional recommended conditions in the PSI was that Stephenson pay a fine of $85 to
the local community service program. Stephenson, 414. At the sentencing hearing,
‘Stephenson objected to this condition on the basis that it was not included in the plea
‘agreement. Notwithstanding Stephenson's objection, the district court imposed the condition
‘and noted tha, although the $85 payment was denominated a fine, it viewed the payment as
in the nature of a surcharge fee. Stephenson, $9] 5-6, Stephenson moved to withdraw his
guilty plea the district court denied the motion and Stephenson appealed. Stephenson, $7
and 9.

12 On appeal, we addressed the legality of the condition as both a “surcharge fee” and a

 

ine." We observed that, although various Montana statutes authorize imposing specified
fees and surcharges when sentencing a defendant, no statute “authorizes an assessment “in
the nature of fa] surcharge fee” to be paid to the community service program.” Stephenson, §
29. We further determined that, while § 46-18-231, MCA, authorizes a sentencing court to
impose a fine on a defendant in either a felony or misdemeanor ease, § 46-18-235, MCA,
‘requires that money collected from the imposition ofa fine must be paid to specified entities.

No statute authorizes a district court to impose a fine and order the fine be paid to a local
community servi

 

program. Stephenson, $}28. Consequently, we held thatthe condition
requiring Stephenson to pay $85 to the local community service program, as ether «
surcharge fee o a fine, was illegal and must be stricken from the sentence. Stephenson, 36.
Similarly, inthis case, no statute authorizes the District Court to require that VanWinkle pay
$85 to the local community service program as ether a fee ora fine.

{13 The State contends, however, that the District Court was authorized to impose the $85
assessment as “a reasonable restriction or condition” on VanWinkle’s sentence pursuant to
8§ 46-18-201(4(0) and -202(1)(D, MCA. Addressing the latter statute first, § 46-18-
202(1)(0, MCA, provides that a sentencing judge may impose certain restrictions ot
conditions on a sentence “that the judge considers necessary to obtain the objectives of

rehabilitation and the protection of the vi

 

im and soci

 

"including “any other limitation

 

reasonably related to the objectives of rehabilitation and the protection of the vietim and
society.” We previously have upheld two types of sentencing conditions under this
provision: conditions limiting a defendant’s conduct and conditions requiring payment of
restitution toa victim ofthe offense. See State v. Krum, 2007 MT 229, § 18,339 Mont. 154,

18, 168 P36 658, 4 18,

 

{14 In Krum, we held that sentencing conditions which require a defendant to pay
monetary assessments to local community entities are not “limitations” on a defendant’s
conduct, but rather affirmative duties to make donations to those entities. Further, such

assessments cannot be considered restitution when the money is being paid to community
entities which are not victims of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced.
Krum, §20. Thus, the assessments were not authorized by the express language of § 46-18-

202(1)(, MCA, and were illegal. Krum, 21. Similarly, here, Condition No. 13 requiring

 

‘VanWinkle pay an $85 fee to the local community service program is not a “limitation” on

 

‘VanWinkle’s conduct, but an affirmative obligation to pay money to a local entity. Nor can
the condition be considered restitution, because the local community service program is nota
victim of VanWinkle’s burglary offense. Consequently, § 46-18-202(1}(f), MCA, does not

authorize imposition of Condition No. 13.

 

{15 Section 46-18-201(4)(0), MCA—the second statute upon which the State relies—
provides that, when deferring imposition or suspending execution of all or a portion of a
defendant's sentence, the sentencing court may impose on a defendant “any reasonable

restrictions or conditions...” including those “considered necessary for rehabilitation or for

 

the protection of the victim or society..." We recently held that, when imposing a
sentencing condition pursuant to this provision, the condition must have “a nexus to either
the offense for which the offender is being sentenced, orto the offender himself or herself.”
State v. Ashby, 2008 MT 83,415, 342 Mont, 187,415, 179 P.3d 164,415. In other words,
there must be factual support in the record, specific to the individual ease before the
sentencing court, which justifies imposition of the condition in that case.

{16 Here, the record reflects that the District Court did not impose Condition No. 13 based

‘on a nexus between the condition and either Van Winkle’s offense or VanWinkle himself. In
responding to VanWinkle’s objection to Condition No. 13, the District Court stated that the
condition was “one of the local rules in the district that the judges all agreed to... it's a
uniform condition of all the four judges here.” Nothing in § 46-18-201(4X0), MCA,
authorizes tial judges to simply agree—by local rule or otherwise—to impose a particular
condition on all defendants being sentenced in their judicial district.

{17 Finally, the State contends that Condi

 

m No. 13 is statutorily authorized as a

 

legitimate cost. We disagree.

 

{18 Section 25-10-201, MCA, enumerates various costs of litigation which a trial court
‘may award the prevailing party in an action, including at subsection (9), “such other
reasonable and necessary expenses as are taxable according to the course and practice ofthe
‘court or by express provision of law.” Moreover, § 46-18-232, MCA, provides that a
sentencing court may require a convicted defendant to pay costs as defined in § 25-10-201,
MCA. However, “[s}uch costs shall be limited to expenses specifically incurred by the
prosecution in connection with the proceedings against the defendant.” Section 46-18-
232(1), MCA. Here, the $85 to be paid in support of the local community service program
‘was not a cost incurred by the State in prosecuting VanWinkle for the burglary offense.
‘Consequently, Condition No. 13 is not authorized as.a cost pursuant to §§ 46-18-232 and 25-
10-201, MCA.

{19 We conclude that Condition No, 13—requiring VanWinkle to pay an S85 fee to the

local community service program—is not statutorily authorized and, therefore, is illegal. As
4 result, we hold the District Court imposed an illegal sentence when it ordered VanWinkle
to pay an $85 fee to the local community service program as a condition of his deferred

imposition of sentence. Accordingly, we reverse the District Courts imposition of Condition

 

No. 13 and remand this case with instructions to the District Court to strike the condition
from VanWinkle’s sentence,

{20 Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

 

We concur:

Tustices
Justice Patricia O. Cotter concurs,
{21 I concur with the Court's Opinion, but write separately to acknowledge what 1
believe is a good point raised by the Dissent. Specifically 1 agree with the Dissent that a
fee may be assessed against a defendant to cover the costs of his participation in a
rehabilitative program. Here, however, it does not appear thatthe District Court imposed
the $85 fee in connection with the order that the defendant complete 150 hours of
community service. The order to pay the fee is set forth as Condition 13, and it follows
seriatim the assessment of other fees in the court's sentencing order, The directive to

participate in community service is set forth later in the order at Condition 19. Moreover,

 

4 the Court notes, the District Court, upon VanWinkle’s objection to Condition 13, said

the condition was “one of the local rules in the district that the judges all agreed to... it’s

 

uniform condition of all the four judges here.” Opinion, § 16. Based upon this

 

affirmative representation, in combination with the
the order of community service, I must agree with the Court that the fee in this instance

was of the nature imposed in Stephenson, and is for that reason unlawful, I therefore

‘do

Justice
Justice Jim Rice, dissenting.
122 Ona daily basis, sentencing courts impose conditions which require defendants to

partici

 

ate in such programs as anger management counseling, sex offender treatment,
‘mental health or chemical dependency evaluations, parenting classes, and to complete

service tasks, in order to further their rehabilitation, Today the Court

 

holds that, despite having broad discretion to impose such conditions, sentencing courts
are powerless to require defendants to pay the fee which makes their participation in such
programs possible. In my opinion this decision not only lacks common sense, but is an
absurd rendering of the sentencing statutes.

{23 1 agree that “[n]othing in § 46-18-201(4X0), MCA, authorizes trial judges to
simply agree—by local rule or otherwise—to impose a particular condition on all

defendants being sentenced

 

their judicial district,)” Opinion, | 16, and that a
sentencing court is prohibited from instituting a uniform sentencing scheme that fails to
meet the Ashby nexus requirement as applied to each individual defendant, However,

these general principles ignore the fact that, as applied to VanWinkle, Condition 13 is a

 

related condition aimed at recouping rehal costs for VanWinkle’s own
rehabilitation.

{24 Pursuant to the plea agreement, VanWinkle agreed to “complete 150 hours of

 

‘community ser service program in the

 

ce” and to “pay a fine to go to the communit

 

 

amount of $85.00.” The District Court subsequently imposed payment of the $85,

as a “fee.” Accordingly, the Court likens this case to our decisions in Krum and

2
‘Stephenson. However, neither case requires the broad rule which the Court imposes
today,

{25 In Krum, the defendant was required to pay large sums of money to local
non-profit organizations such as Big Brothers and Sisters. Krum, 8. We concluded that
the assessments constituted “affirmative duties to make donations to community entities”
and were illegal sentencing conditions pursuant to § 46-18-202(1)(0, MCA. Krum, § 20
In Stephenson we determined that the same $85 fee at issue here was impermissible
because the court lacked statutory authority to impose it as @ condition of sentencing.
‘Stephenson, $33. Because the instant case involves the same $85 fee as in Stephenson
the Court concludes that the issues are “identical.” Opinion, 11. However, they are,
We did not consider in either Krum or Stephenson a sentence requiring payment of a
program fee by a defendant who participates in the program as part of his sentence.

{26 Here, as a participant in the community service program, VanWinkle was ordered

 

to pay an $85 fee 10 that program, Unlike our decisions in Krum and Stephenson, the fee
at issue here is neither a random charity payment nor a standard sentencing assessment
imposed to raise money for a court program. Rather, this fee was assessed to cover the

costs of VanWinkle’s own participation in a rehabilitative program. Sentencing courts

 

are authorized, pursuant to statute, to impose reasonable conditions,

 

cluding a wide
array of rehabilitative programs, and I believe the only reasonable interpretation of that

‘same statutory authority allows a court to impose a requirement for payment of the very

 

fees necessary for defendants to attend the programs.

B
{27 While the Court is rightly worried about blanket sentencing conditions, that is not
the issue here, Unfortunately, this holding will undermine legitimate sentencing

authority and interfere with the rehabilit

 

¢ efforts which courts are making in

thousands of eases. I dissent,

    

Justice