Case Title: Kishmarton v. William Bailey Constr., Inc.

Citation: 2001-Ohio-1334

Docket Number: 20000636

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-09-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Kishmarton v. William Bailey Constr., Inc., 93 Ohio St.3d 226, 2001-
Ohio-1334] 
 
 
KISHMARTON ET AL., APPELLEES, v. WILLIAM BAILEY CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Kishmarton v. William Bailey Constr., Inc. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 226.] 
Contracts — Home construction — Where vendee and builder-vendor enter into an 
agreement for future construction of a residence, vendee’s claim for breach 
of an implied duty to construct house in a workmanlike manner arises ex 
contractu — Recovery for emotional distress damages when vendee’s claim 
of breach of implied duty to construct house in workmanlike manner is 
successful. 
(Nos. 00-636 and 00-684 — Submitted January 31, 2001 — Decided September 26, 
2001.) 
CERTIFIED by and APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 
74893. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  Where the vendee and builder-vendor enter into an agreement for the future 
construction of a residence, the vendee’s claim for breach of an implied duty 
to construct the house in a workmanlike manner arises ex contractu. 
2.  When vendee’s claim for breach of an implied duty to construct a house in a 
workmanlike manner is successful, recovery for emotional distress damages 
will be excluded unless the breach also caused bodily harm or the contract or 
the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional distress was a particularly 
likely result.  (Restatement of the Law 2d, Contracts [1981], Section 353, 
adopted and followed.) 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J.  On July 24, 1991, appellees Donald and Mary Kishmarton 
entered into a contract with appellant William Bailey Construction, Inc. (“Bailey”) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
for the construction of a residential home to be located in North Royalton, Ohio.  The 
Kishmartons agreed to pay $213,000 (with change orders, $219,000) to Bailey and 
Bailey agreed to build the house in a “workmanlike manner.” 
 
The Kishmartons moved into the house in May 1992.  The following winter, 
the Kishmartons became concerned about water leaking through the ceiling and down 
the walls.  One source of the leaks was the roof vents, which had been installed by 
Bailey.  The vents allowed snow to enter the attic during storms.  Another source of 
the water leaks was ice backup, a condition that occurs when water freezes on the 
roof area and upon melting leaks into a house.  Attempting to fix the problems, 
Bailey replaced a portion of the gutter near the garage.  This and all subsequent 
attempts to remedy the problem failed, and the leaks continued unabated for several 
years. 
 
The Kishmartons sued, alleging that Bailey (1) breached its implied warranty 
and duty to provide workmanlike construction service by building the home in a 
negligent manner, (2) breached the terms of the express warranty in the construction 
contract to perform the work in a workmanlike manner, and (3) was negligent in 
building and constructing the home.  After trial and after being instructed as to breach 
of contract and breach of implied duty to construct in a workmanlike manner, the jury 
awarded $24,000 damages to the Kishmartons, consisting of $5,000 for the 
reasonable restoration of the property and $19,000 for loss of enjoyment of the 
residence, annoyance, and discomfort.  The court of appeals upheld the $19,000 
award for loss of enjoyment.  However, it found the award of $5,000 for restoration 
to be against the manifest weight of the evidence and reduced that portion of the 
award to $3,725. 
 
The court of appeals, finding its judgment to be in conflict with the judgments 
in three other appellate districts, also certified two questions to this court: 
 
“(1)  Where the vendee and builder-vendor enter into an agreement for the 
future construction of a residence, does the vendee’s claim for breach of an implied 
duty to construct the house in a workmanlike manner arise ex contractu or ex delicto? 
January Term, 2001 
3 
 
“(2)  Regardless of whether the claim is in contract or tort, in such a case, can 
the plaintiff recover emotional distress damages for loss of enjoyment, annoyance or 
discomfort?” 
 
This court agreed with the certifying court that a conflict exists and accepted 
jurisdiction.  See 89 Ohio St.3d 1467, 732 N.E.2d 999. 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal (case No. 00-684) and on review of an order certifying a conflict 
(case No. 00-636). 
 
In Velotta v. Leo Petronzio Landscaping, Inc. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 376, 23 
O.O.3d 346, 433 N.E.2d 147, we held that “[a]n action by a vendee against the 
builder-vendor of a completed residence for damages proximately caused by failure 
to construct in a workmanlike manner using ordinary care—a duty imposed by law—
is an action in tort * * *.”  (Emphasis sic.)  We specifically did not address the nature 
of an action by a vendee against the builder-vendor for breach of a contract to build a 
residence in the future.  Id. at 378, 23 O.O.3d at 347, 433 N.E.2d at 150, fn. 2.  
Today, we close the loop by answering the first certified question and holding that 
such actions arise ex contractu. 
 
Doing so does little more than acknowledge the obvious.  In Velotta, the 
consideration for the purchase price was the structure, a finished product.  In this 
case, “the consideration is the services * * * [to] be performed by the contractor.  * * 
*  While the contractor is still required to perform the services in a workmanlike 
manner, the quality of the product will be governed by the language of the contract 
itself.”  Vistein v. Keeney (1990), 71 Ohio App.3d 92, 105, 593 N.E.2d 52, 61. 
 
The contract governs the warranty of good workmanship; therefore, the 
warranty of good workmanship arises from the contract.  It can hardly be otherwise.  
Several lower courts have held the same.  See, e.g., Vanderschrier v. Aaron (1957), 
103 Ohio App. 340, 3 O.O.2d 367, 140 N.E.2d 819; Lloyd v. William Fannin Bldrs., 
Inc. (1973), 40 Ohio App.2d 507, 510, 69 O.O.2d 444, 446, 320 N.E.2d 738, 741; 
Tibbs v. Natl. Homes Constr. Corp. (1977), 52 Ohio App.2d 281, 292-293, 6 O.O.3d 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
300, 306, 369 N.E.2d 1218, 1225; Barton v. Ellis (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 251, 252-
253, 518 N.E.2d 18, 20.  Accordingly, we hold that where the vendee and builder-
vendor enter into an agreement for the future construction of a residence, the 
vendee’s claim for breach of an implied duty to construct the house in a workmanlike 
manner arises ex contractu. 
 
Having determined that the claim arises ex contractu, we now address the 
merits of the contract action.  The jury found that Bailey breached its warranty of 
good workmanship and awarded damages.  The court of appeals affirmed and 
reduced the award for economic damages.  As did the court of appeals, we conclude 
that the finding of a breach was not against the manifest weight of the evidence but 
that the award of $5,000 was.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals on the merits on the issue of economic damages and affirm the reduction of 
the award on this issue. 
 
We now turn to the second certified question to address the issue of whether 
emotional distress damages may be recovered in this type of contract action.  “As 
[Bailey] has pointed out at length, there appears to be no case in Ohio, reported or 
unreported, in which a builder-vendor has been found liable for damages in the form 
of loss of enjoyment, annoyance and discomfort by a new home purchaser.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Kishmarton v. William Bailey Constr., Inc. (Mar. 23, 2000), 
Cuyahoga App. No. 74893, unreported, 2000 WL 300997, at * 13 (Porter, J., 
dissenting).  While acknowledging the truth of the statement, we recognize that the 
current status of the law on this issue places Ohio at odds with the Restatement of the 
Law of Contracts and, more importantly, runs contrary to our state Constitution. 
 
Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution states that “every person, for an 
injury done him * * * shall have remedy by due course of law.”  Emotional distress 
injuries are injuries for which our Constitution guarantees a right to a remedy.  
Further, it is reasonable to allow emotional distress damages because some contract 
breaches cause them.  To continue to disallow emotional distress damages unfairly 
exposes innocent persons to harm that a wrongdoer has no incentive to avoid or 
January Term, 2001 
5 
mitigate.  As one commentator put it, “the breaching party to a contract intentionally 
assumed must bear the full burden of the harm caused, and there should be no 
exception for emotional distress damages * * *.”  Whaley, Paying for the Agony:  
The Recovery of Emotional Distress Damages in Contract Actions (1992), Suffolk 
U.L.Rev. 935, 948. 
 
With regard to a breach-of-contract action, Section 353 of the Restatement 
states:  “Recovery for emotional disturbance will be excluded unless the breach also 
caused bodily harm or the contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious 
emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result.”  3 Restatement of the Law 2d, 
Contracts (1981) 149, Section 353.  Comment a to this section explains:  “Damages 
for emotional disturbance are not ordinarily allowed.  Even if they are foreseeable, 
they are often particularly difficult to establish and to measure.”  Id. 
 
Today we join the minority of courts that allow emotional distress damages in 
contract cases involving transactions between vendees and builder-vendors by 
answering the second certified question in the affirmative, consistent with Section 
353 of the Restatement of the Law 2d, Contracts.  See McGowan, Property’s Portrait 
of a Lady (2001), Minn.L.Rev. 1037, 1106-1108. 
 
We are confident that allowing emotional distress damages in breach-of-
contract actions involving vendees and builder-vendors will not open the floodgates.  
Section 353 significantly, and we believe rightly, limits the circumstances in which 
emotional distress damages may be granted.  Though proof of emotional distress 
damages in these cases will be difficult, we are convinced that wronged parties are 
constitutionally entitled to an opportunity to recover for emotional distress damages.  
Accordingly, we adopt Section 353 of the Restatement of Law 2d, Contracts (1981) 
and declare that when vendee’s claim for breach of an implied duty to construct a 
house in a workmanlike manner is successful, recovery for emotional distress 
damages will be excluded unless the breach also caused bodily harm or the contract 
or the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional distress was a particularly likely 
result. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
Nevertheless, we hold that the award of $19,000 for loss of enjoyment of the 
residence, annoyance, and discomfort was improper.  Given the instructions the jury 
received, the award sounds in tort and must be reversed.  Furthermore, given the 
record before us, we conclude that it is not possible for the Kishmartons to establish 
damages pursuant to Section 353.  Accordingly, we affirm the award of $3,725 for 
restoration of the property, but reverse the award of $19,000 for loss of enjoyment. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in syllabus and judgment. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent and would affirm the court 
of appeals in all respects. 
__________________ 
 
Mansour, Gavin, Gerlack & Manos Co., L.P.A., Thomas B. Bralliar, Jr. and 
Anthony J. Coyne, for appellees. 
 
David J. Pasz, for appellant. 
__________________