Case Title: Ford Motor Co. v. Benitez

Citation: 

Docket Number: 051769

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2007-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, ET AL.              OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
v.  Record No. 051769  
          January 12, 2007 
 
BERTA BENITEZ 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Jonathan C. Thacher, Judge 
 
 
This is an appeal from an order imposing monetary 
sanctions against an attorney.  The sanctions were imposed 
because the trial court found that the attorney had filed a 
pleading asserting affirmative defenses that were not “well 
grounded in fact” in violation of Code § 8.01-271.1. 
 
The facts pertinent to the appeal are not in dispute.  In 
2002, Berta Benitez filed an action in the trial court against 
Ford Motor Company (Ford) and Koons Ford, Inc. (Koons)1 to 
recover damages for injuries to her eyes caused by a defective 
air bag that deployed when a car, in which she was a 
passenger, collided with another vehicle.  Extensive discovery 
was had in that case, including depositions of witnesses as to 
the facts of the accident, but the plaintiff suffered a 
voluntary nonsuit on November 5, 2003, before the case came to 
trial. 
                     
1 Ford and Koons are collectively referred to as "the 
Defendants." 
 
2
 
The plaintiff filed this suit on the same cause of action 
on April 28, 2004.  The defendants responded with grounds of 
defense that contained, among other things, 13 affirmative 
defenses.  These were preceded by the statement:  “Ford will 
rely on the following affirmative defenses, if applicable, and 
if proved at trial.”  That was followed by allegations of (1) 
contributory negligence, (2) assumption of the risk, (3) 
negligence of third parties, (4) failure to state a cause of 
action, (5) lack of notice of warranty claims as required by 
the Uniform Commercial Code, (6) failure to mitigate damages, 
(7) claim barred by terms of limited warranty, (8) 
unauthorized misuse or alteration of vehicle by plaintiff or 
others, (9) failure to comply with terms of warranty, (10) 
constitutional bars respecting punitive damage claims, (11) 
bars imposed by the applicable statute of limitations, (12) 
“all other defenses that may become applicable or available up 
to and including the time of trial,” and (13) “release and/or 
accord and satisfaction.” 
 
The trial court entered a scheduling order setting the 
case for a jury trial, estimated to last eight days, beginning 
on November 7, 2005.  The order required expert witnesses to 
be identified 90 days before trial by the plaintiff and 60 
days before trial by the defendants.  Discovery was to be 
completed 30 days before trial. 
 
3
 
On April 8, 2005, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike 
the defendants’ affirmative defenses on the ground that she 
had propounded interrogatories, requests for admissions and 
for the production of any documents that would have provided 
any factual support for the defenses, and that the defendants 
had failed to furnish any such factual support for them. 
 
The parties filed memoranda with the trial court and the 
motion was argued on May 6, 2005.  Plaintiff’s counsel pointed 
out to the court that full factual discovery had been 
completed in the previous action before it was nonsuited, 
although experts had not been identified by the parties.  
Plaintiff’s counsel also showed to the court an interrogatory 
propounded to the defendants that asked:  “State with 
particularity all facts upon which you rely for your 
contention that you are not liable in this action.”  In their 
response, the defendants stated, inter alia, that “Plaintiff 
has also failed to provide any expert disclosures to explain 
her theory of liability in this case.  Without this 
information, Ford cannot say exactly which affirmative 
defenses it will continue to pursue.” 
 
The trial court then went through the defenses seriatim, 
asking defense counsel2 to state what factual basis the 
                     
2 Counsel representing the defendants at the hearing was 
Katherine M. Henry. She advised the court of her belief that 
 
4
defendants had for asserting them.  Counsel responded:  
“Presently we don’t have sufficient information” and argued 
that the motion to strike the defenses was premature because 
the cut-off time for discovery had not yet arrived.  Defense 
counsel also pointed out that the affirmative defenses had 
been asserted “upon information and belief” and had merely 
been reserved so that they would not be waived. 
 
The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion to strike 
the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of the 
risk, negligence of a third party, failure to mitigate 
damages, unconstitutionality of the claim for punitive 
damages, and the statute of limitations.  The court reserved 
for future decision the motion to strike the defenses of 
release and accord and satisfaction.  The court denied the 
motion to strike the three defenses relating to breach of 
warranty and denied the motion to strike the defendants’ 
reservation of the right to assert additional defenses that 
might later become applicable.  The defendants withdrew the 
remaining affirmative defenses. 
 
At the end of the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel moved the 
court to impose sanctions pursuant to Code § 8.01-271.1 on the 
                                                                
the pleading in question had been drafted by Brian K. Telfair. 
It was signed, however, only by Robert L. Wise. All three were 
with the law firm of Bowman and Brooke, LLP, which had 
represented the defendants in both cases. 
 
5
ground that defense counsel had admitted that there was no 
known factual basis for the stricken affirmative defenses when 
asserting them.  The court agreed that affirmative defenses 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 “were completely groundless.”  In response, 
defense counsel admitted:  “In those defenses there were not 
sufficient facts.” 
 
The issue then became a question of defense counsel’s 
knowledge that the defenses lacked factual support when 
signing the pleading asserting them.  Plaintiff’s counsel 
contended that the defense had obviously known of the lack of 
factual support because of the discovery the parties had 
conducted in the original action before it was nonsuited.  As 
an example, plaintiff’s counsel referred to the response 
defense counsel had made, earlier at the same hearing, when 
the court asked for the factual basis supporting the defense 
of contributory negligence.  The defense had explained its 
assertion of contributory negligence by arguing that evidence 
might later become available showing that the plaintiff, a 
passenger, “could have either been too close or potentially 
out of position, possibly leaning forward or leaning up 
against the door” when the car in which she was riding was 
involved in a collision, causing the air bag to deploy, thus 
incurring an injury that would not have resulted if she had 
been sitting in a normal position. 
 
6
 
Responding to that argument, Plaintiff’s counsel read to 
the court part of a deposition that had been taken, in the 
original action before it was nonsuited, of the driver of the 
car in which the plaintiff had been a passenger at the time of 
the collision: 
[Q] Now, Berta, was she seated?  You said she was 
seated normally.  And you gestured to your back.  
She was back against the seatback? 
 
[A] Yes. 
 
[Q] And her head was leaning back? 
 
[A] Yes. 
 
[Q] And you noticed her in that condition before the 
impact? 
 
[A] Correct. 
 
Plaintiff’s counsel argued that these responses showed 
that defense counsel had knowledge when signing his 
pleading that there was no factual support for his plea 
of contributory negligence in the present case. 
Plaintiff’s counsel stated that he had spent over fifteen 
hours in preparation for argument on the motion to strike 
the defenses and asked for an award of attorney’s fees in 
the amount of $200 per hour pursuant to Code § 8.01-
271.1. 
 
The court noted that the defense admitted a lack of 
factual support for six of the affirmative defenses, and 
 
7
also noted the evasive answer the defense had given to 
the plaintiff’s interrogatory asking what factual basis 
existed for the affirmative defenses.  The court found 
that affirmative defenses 1, 2, 3, 6, 10 and 11 were not 
grounded in fact when the pleading asserting them was 
signed, in violation of Code § 8.01-271.1, and awarded 
sanctions in the amount of $2000 against Robert L. Wise,  
the attorney for the Defendants who signed it.3  We 
awarded the Defendants and Wise an appeal.4 
Analysis 
 
Code § 8.01-271.1, enacted in 1987, provides, in 
pertinent part: 
Every pleading, written motion, and other paper of a 
party represented by an attorney shall be signed by 
at least one attorney of record in his individual 
name . . . . 
 
The signature of an attorney . . . constitutes a 
certificate by him that (i) he has read the 
pleading, motion, or other paper, (ii) to the best 
of his knowledge, information and belief, formed 
after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in 
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good 
faith argument for the extension, modification, or 
                     
3 Wise contends that the quantum of the award is not 
supported by the record and is not based on a rational 
standard.  Because this argument was never made to the trial 
court, we will not address it.  Rule 5:25. 
4 Although the defendants are nominal parties to this 
appeal, Wise, as the party aggrieved by the trial court's 
award of sanctions, joined in the petition for appeal.  Briefs 
amici curiae were filed by the Virginia Association of Defense 
Attorneys and the Virginia Trial Lawyers Association. 
 
 
8
reversal of existing law, and (iii) it is not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation. 
 
. . . . 
 
If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed or 
made in violation of this rule, the court, upon 
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon 
the person who signed the paper . . . an appropriate 
sanction, which may include . . . a reasonable 
attorney’s fee. 
 
 
Wise argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion in awarding sanctions and failed to follow the 
clear wording of the statute.  We begin our analysis by 
examining the relevant statutory provisions.  First, it 
is apparent that the General Assembly had the opportunity 
to make discretionary a court’s imposition of sanctions 
upon finding a statutory violation, but elected not to do 
so.  Instead, it used the mandatory words “shall impose 
. . . an appropriate sanction.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Nevertheless, we apply an abuse of discretion standard in 
reviewing a trial court’s determination that the statute 
has been violated.  Flora v. Shulmister, 262 Va. 215, 
220, 546 S.E.2d 427, 429 (2001). 
 
The reason for applying that standard is that we are 
usually confronted with a mixed question of law and fact 
in such cases.  Clause (ii) of the second paragraph of 
 
9
Code § 8.01-271.1 provides that an attorney’s signature 
to a pleading has a two-pronged effect:  the attorney 
certifies that the pleading is well-grounded in fact, to 
the best of his knowledge, and also that it is warranted 
by law, or a good faith argument for a change in the law.  
Indeed, all the cases we have heretofore decided under 
the statute have involved both prongs of clause (ii).  
Thus, the trial courts have been required to assess the 
attorney’s (or pro se litigant’s) actual knowledge, or 
lack thereof, concerning the facts, “formed after 
reasonable inquiry,” as well as the legal question 
whether the challenged pleading is warranted by existing 
law, or a good-faith argument that the law should be 
changed.  Such an inquiry into a person’s actual state of 
knowledge in the light of applicable principles of law 
can seldom present a clear-cut issue of fact, but 
requires the exercise of sound judicial discretion. 
 
Each of our prior decisions applying Code § 8.01-
271.1 turned on such mixed questions of fact and law. 
See, e.g., Flora, 262 Va. at 220-21, 546 S.E.2d at 429-30 
(should autopsy report have been produced under rules of 
court?); Flippo v. CSC Assocs., 262 Va. 48, 65-66, 547 
S.E.2d 216, 227 (2001) (did language used in a letter 
constitute fraud?); Gilmore v. Finn, 259 Va. 448, 466-67, 
 
10
527 S.E.2d 426, 436 (2000) (was pleading warranted by 
good faith argument for extension, modification or 
reversal of existing law?); Oxenham v. Johnson, 241 Va. 
281, 287-88, 402 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1991) (did complainant’s 
name on arrest warrant support inference of malice?); 
Nedrich v. Jones, 245 Va. 465, 471-72, 429 S.E.2d 201, 
204 (1993) (was it reasonable to believe pleading 
warranted by existing law?); County of Prince William v. 
Rau, 239 Va. 616, 620, 391 S.E.2d 290, 292-93 (1990) (was 
it reasonable to believe defense warranted by existing 
law?); Tullidge v. Board of Supervisors, 239 Va. 611, 
613-15, 391 S.E.2d 288, 289-90 (1990) (was it reasonable 
to believe pleading warranted by existing law?). 
 
The present case differs in that the second prong of 
clause (ii) is not involved.  There is no contention here 
that the affirmative defenses were not warranted by 
existing law or a good-faith argument for its extension, 
modification or reversal.  Five of the defenses stricken 
by the court were clearly based on valid principles of 
existing law and the remaining one, the claimed 
unconstitutionality of punitive damages, was based on a 
good-faith argument for the modification or reversal of 
existing law. 
 
11
 
Unlike the cases cited above, this appeal turns upon 
a single issue: was the pleading well grounded in fact to 
the best of the knowledge, information and belief of the 
attorney who signed it, formed after reasonable inquiry?  
Because defense counsel admitted at the hearing that 
“[p]resently, we don’t have sufficient information,” the 
first part of the issue was conceded.  The only question 
remaining for the trial court’s determination was whether 
defense counsel had knowledge, “formed after reasonable 
inquiry,” when signing the grounds of defense, that there 
was no factual support for the allegations he made.  As 
to that question, the trial court was not limited to the 
record in the present case, but could properly consider 
any relevant and admissible evidence tending to show the 
attorney’s state of knowledge at the time in question. 
 
This case, unlike its predecessors, is an action 
refiled after the nonsuit of a previous case in which 
full discovery was taken between the same parties by the 
same counsel.  All information obtained by counsel in 
that earlier case was known to the attorney who signed 
the grounds of defense in this case.  The evidence of the 
information defense counsel acquired when deposing the 
driver of the car in which the plaintiff received her 
injury was in itself a sufficient basis for a finding 
 
12
that counsel knew, when signing the grounds of defense in 
the present case, that no factual basis existed for the 
defenses of contributory negligence or assumption of the 
risk.  See Oxenham, 241 Va. at 289, 402 S.E.2d at 5.  
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial 
court’s finding that defense counsel had violated clause 
(ii) of the second paragraph of the statute. 
 
Wise contends that even if a violation of clause 
(ii) was shown, there was still no evidence to support a 
finding that defense counsel had an improper purpose in 
filing the pleading, such as an intent to harass, delay, 
or drive up the cost of litigation for the plaintiff, and 
that there was, therefore, no violation of clause (iii) 
of the second paragraph of the statute.  That argument is 
based on the fallacious premise that a violation of all 
three clauses must be shown before sanctions are 
mandated.  By clear statutory language, the General 
Assembly stated the three clauses in the conjunctive.  
Thus, an attorney’s signature to a pleading certifies 
compliance with all three clauses, and the attorney is 
subject to sanctions for failure to comply with any one 
of them. 
 
Wise further contends that the grounds of defense 
did not really assert the affirmative defenses, but 
 
13
merely reserved the right to rely on them “if applicable, 
and if proved at trial.”  He argues that such a 
“reservation” was necessary to avoid waiving the 
defenses, because facts might later be found to support 
them.  That argument ignores the fundamental purpose of 
pleadings in judicial proceedings:  to "inform[] the 
opposite party of the true nature of the claim or 
defense.”  See Rule 1:4(d).  “The purpose of a defensive 
pleading is to inform the opposite party, and to permit 
the court to determine, what is the true nature of the 
defense.”  Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hodge, 205 Va. 
36, 39, 135 S.E.2d 187, 189 (1964) (emphasis added).  A 
pleading that puts the opposing party to the burden of 
preparing to meet claims and defenses the pleader knows 
to have no basis in fact is oppressive.  It constitutes 
an abuse of the pleading process and results in the wrong 
that Code § 8.01-271.1 was enacted to prevent. 
 
That wrong is not dispelled by couching the pleading 
in language that merely threatens the use of the 
unsupported claim if it should later become available.  
The opposing party must still shoulder the burden of 
preparing to meet it.  The remedy for a party who hopes 
that evidence may later come to light in support of a 
claim or defense is to move to amend his pleadings when 
 
14
such evidence becomes available.  “Leave to amend shall 
be liberally granted in furtherance of the ends of 
justice.”  Rule 1:8.  That rule takes into account that 
new evidence may come to light during discovery, 
warranting the assertion of new claims or defenses.  A 
motion to amend gives the opposing party notice of the 
claimed factual basis for the newly-asserted claim or 
defense and an opportunity to prepare to meet it.  It is 
true that amendments are not a matter of right, but a 
trial court’s decision refusing leave to amend after a 
showing of good cause is, in ordinary circumstances, an 
abuse of discretion.  See Mortarino v. Consultant Eng'g 
Servs., 251 Va. 289, 295-96, 467 S.E.2d 778, 782 (1996).5 
 
Wise argues that it was premature for the trial 
court to rule on the plaintiff’s motion before the cut-
off date for discovery had arrived in the present case.  
That argument begs the question.  The issue before the 
trial court was the information defense counsel had at 
                     
5 The trial court stated to counsel:  “I can not imagine a 
single judge in this court [who wouldn’t rule] that if you 
develop through discovery facts that would support one of 
those defenses, you can move to amend.”  The trial court 
denied the motion to strike the defendants’ affirmative 
defense 12, which stated “Ford reserves the right to rely upon 
all other defenses that may become applicable or available,”  
saying, “I think you have a right to reserve those.  And if it 
comes to a factual basis, then you can ask to amend.” 
 
15
the time he signed the grounds of defense, not what 
information might come to light thereafter. 
 
In Flippo, 262 Va. at 65-66, 547 S.E.2d at 227, we 
pointed out that in applying an abuse of discretion 
standard to a trial court’s award of sanctions under Code 
§ 8.01-271.1, we use an “objective standard of 
reasonableness in determining whether a litigant and his 
attorney, after reasonable inquiry, could have formed a 
reasonable belief that the pleading was well grounded in 
fact.” 
 
Such an objective standard of reasonableness 
requires consideration of several factors.  As an 
example, if a plaintiff employs an attorney near the 
deadline of the statute of limitations, the attorney may 
have no alternative except reliance on the information 
his client imparts to him when preparing a last-minute 
pleading.  Similarly, a defendant may come to counsel at 
the last minute, leaving counsel no alternative but 
reliance on his client’s account if a responsive pleading 
is to be filed in time to avoid default.  The present 
case, however, is not of that kind, and in any event, 
Rule 1:8, as quoted above, permits amendment of the 
pleading in furtherance of the ends of justice if and 
when counsel acquires more complete information. 
 
16
 
The foregoing examples are not an exhaustive list, 
but they serve to show why an objective standard of 
reasonableness must be applied to the question whether 
the attorney "after reasonable inquiry, could have formed 
a reasonable belief that the pleading was well grounded 
in fact."  In no event may counsel file a pleading he 
knows to be unfounded in fact. 
Conclusion 
 
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 
decision, and therefore will affirm the judgment appealed 
from. 
Affirmed.