Case Title: Ex parte Nicholson Manufacturing Ltd.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1130411

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2015-05-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:05/29/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015
_________________________
1130411
_________________________
Ex parte Nicholson Manufacturing Limited
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Gerald A. Templeton, as administrator of the Estate
of Casimiro Deleon Ixcoy, deceased
v.
KyKenKee, Inc., et al.)
(Tuscaloosa Circuit Court, CV-12-901218)
SHAW, Justice.
Nicholson Manufacturing Limited ("Nicholson") petitions
this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Tuscaloosa
Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in its favor on the
1130411
ground that Gerald A. Templeton's substitution of Nicholson
for a fictitiously named defendant was made after the
expiration of the applicable statutory limitations period and
does not "relate back" to the filing of the original
complaint.  We grant the petition and issue the writ. 
Facts and Procedural History
On December 31, 2010, Casimiro Deleon Ixcoy died as the
result of injuries sustained at KyKenKee, Inc., a sawmill
where he was employed.  At this sawmill, logs are cut and, by
way of an "in-feed" conveyor, fed into a "debarker" machine
that removes the bark from the logs.  When the debarking
process is complete, the logs are carried on an "out-feed"
conveyor to another station, where they are then cut into
boards.  The conveyors were manufactured by Morbark
Industries, Inc.; the debarker machine was manufactured by
Nicholson.  As Ixcoy was walking through the debarking area,
he was struck on the head by a 160-pound log that fell from a
conveyor overhead.  He died as a result of the injury.  
Templeton, the administrator of Ixcoy's estate, retained
the services of an attorney to investigate any potential
wrongful-death claims.  On January 5, 2011 -- five days after
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the accident -- the attorney sent a letter to KyKenKee, 
demanding that evidence regarding the accident be preserved. 
Nearly two years later, in December 2012, a second attorney
was hired to assist in filing a complaint. 
On December 28, 2012, Templeton, through the second
attorney, filed a complaint  seeking damages for wrongful
death 
against 
several 
named 
and 
fictitiously 
named 
defendants.
Among other things, the complaint alleged that the accident
that resulted in Ixcoy's death was a result of negligent,
wanton, willful, and intentional conduct. Additionally,
Templeton sought damages on a products-liability theory.
On January 2, 2013 -- two days after the expiration of
the two-year statutory limitations period -- Templeton filed
an amendment to the original complaint seeking to substitute
Nicholson, as the manufacturer of the debarker machine, for
one of the fictitiously named defendants, claiming that
Nicholson was liable as the manufacturer of a defective
product.  Nicholson filed an answer and raised the two-year
statute of limitations as an affirmative defense.
Subsequently, Nicholson moved for a summary judgment in
its favor.  It argued that its substitution as a defendant
3
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after the expiration of the two-year limitations period did
not "relate back" to the date the original complaint was filed
and that, therefore, the claims against it were time-barred.
In response, Templeton filed an opposition and requested that
the trial court deny Nicholson's summary-judgment motion. 
Following a hearing, the trial court denied Nicholson's
motion. Nicholson then petitioned this Court for a writ of
mandamus.   
Standard of Review
This Court will issue a writ of mandamus when the
petitioner shows: "'(1) a clear legal right to the order
sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another
adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of
the court.'"  Ex parte General Motors of Canada Ltd., 144 So.
3d 236, 238 (Ala. 2013) (quoting Ex parte BOC Grp., Inc., 823
So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001)).  This Court generally will not
review by a writ of mandamus a trial court's denial of a
motion for a summary judgment unless one of a limited number
of exceptions apply.  The case before us satisfies one such
exception: 
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"'...In a narrow class of cases
involving 
fictitious 
parties 
and 
the
relation-back doctrine, this Court has
reviewed the merits of a trial court's
denial of a summary-judgment motion in
which 
a 
defendant 
argued 
that 
the
plaintiff's claim was barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.   See Ex
parte Snow, 764 So. 2d 531 (Ala. 1999)
(issuing the writ and directing the trial
court to enter a summary judgment in favor
of the defendant); Ex parte Stover, 663 So.
2d 948 (Ala. 1995) (reviewing the merits of
the trial court's order denying the
defendant's motion for a summary judgment,
but denying the defendant's petition for a
writ of mandamus); Ex parte FMC Corp., 599
So. 2d 592 (Ala. 1992) (same); Ex parte
Klemawesch, 549 So. 2d 62, 65 (Ala. 1989)
(issuing the writ and directing the trial
court "to set aside its order denying [the
defendant's] motion to quash service or, in
the alternative, to dismiss, and to enter
an order granting the motion"). ...'"
Ex parte Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 74 So. 3d 424, 427-28 (Ala.
2011) (quoting Ex parte Jackson, 780 So. 2d 681, 684 (Ala.
2000)).
Discussion
The parties do not dispute that a two-year statute of
limitations applies to the claims against Nicholson.  The
accident that resulted in Ixcoy's death occurred on December
31, 2010; Templeton filed his original complaint on December
28, 2012.  The parties likewise do not dispute that on January
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2, 2013--the date Templeton attempted to amend the complaint
to substitute Nicholson for one of the fictitiously named
defendants--the two-year limitations period had expired. 
Rule 9(h), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
"When a party is ignorant of the name of an opposing
party and so alleges in the party's pleading, the
opposing party may be designated by any name, and
when the party's true name is discovered, the
process and all pleadings and proceedings in the
action may be amended by substituting the true
name."
This rule permits a party who is "ignorant of the name of an
opposing party" to identify that party by a fictitious name. 
Once the true name of the opposing party is discovered, the
party may amend the pleadings to substitute that true name. 
Rule 15(c)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that such an
amendment shall "relate[] back to the date of the original
pleading when ... relation back is permitted by principles
applicable to fictitious party practice pursuant to Rule
9(h)." 
"However, the relation back principle applies only
when the plaintiff 'is ignorant of the name of an
opposing party.'  Rule 9(h); Harmon v. Blackwood,
623 So. 2d 726, 727 (Ala. 1993) ('In order to invoke
the relation-back principles of Rule 9(h) and Rule
15(c), a plaintiff must ... be ignorant of the
identity of that defendant ....'); Marsh v. Wenzel,
732 So. 2d 985 (Ala. 1998)."
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Ex parte General Motors, 144 So. 3d at 239.
"'The requirement that the plaintiff
be ignorant of the identity of the
fictitiously 
named 
party 
has 
been 
generally
explained as follows: "The correct test is
whether the plaintiff knew, or should have
known, 
or 
was 
on 
notice, 
that 
the
substituted defendants were in fact the
parties described fictitiously."  Davis v.
Mims, 510 So. 2d 227, 229 (Ala. 1987)....'"
Ex parte Mobile Infirmary, 74 So. 3d at 429 (quoting Crawford
v. Sundback, 678 So. 2d 1057, 1060 (Ala. 1996)(emphasis
added)).
In addition to being ignorant of the fictitiously named
party's identity, the plaintiff has a duty to exercise "due
diligence" in identifying such a defendant.  Ex parte Mobile
Infirmary, 74 So. 3d at 429; Crowl v. Kayo Oil Co., 848 So. 2d
930, 940 (Ala. 2002).  It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to
exercise due diligence both before and after the filing of the
complaint.  Ex parte Ismail, 78 So. 3d 399 (Ala. 2011).  Only
if the plaintiff has acted with due diligence in discovering
the true identity of a fictitiously named defendant will an
amendment substituting such a party relate back to the filing
of the original complaint.  Ex parte Mobile Infirmary, 74 So.
3d at 429.  Therefore, if at the time the complaint is filed,
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a plaintiff knows the identity of the fictitiously named party
or should have discovered that party's identity, relation 
back
is not permitted and the running of the statute of limitations
is not tolled:
"[A]n amendment substituting a new defendant in
place of a fictitiously named defendant will relate
back to the filing of the original complaint only if
the 
plaintiff 
acted 
with 
'due 
diligence 
in
identifying the fictitiously named defendant as the
party the plaintiff intended to sue.'  Ignorance of
the new defendant's identity is no excuse if the
plaintiff should have known the identity of that
defendant when the complaint was filed ...."
  
74 So. 3d at 429 (quoting Ex parte Snow, 764 So. 2d 531, 537
(Ala. 1999)(emphasis added)).  
Nicholson argues that Templeton did not act with due
diligence in attempting to discover its identity because, it
says, Templeton should have known when he filed the original
complaint that Nicholson manufactured the debarker machine. 
Specifically, Nicholson argues that Templeton failed to
recognize that both a sheriff's incident report and a
Department of Labor decision and order issued following the
accident identified Nicholson as the manufacturer of the
debarker machine.  With its summary-judgment motion below,
Nicholson provided a copy of the incident report, which 
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included multiple photographs of the debarker machine 
on 
which
was posted a clearly legible label stating "NICHOLSON." 
Further, Nicholson also provided a copy of a November 13,
2012, Department of Labor decision and order discussing the
accident that resulted in Ixcoy's death and identifying,
within 
the 
inspection-summary 
section, 
the 
equipment 
allegedly
involved in the accident as a "Nicholson" debarker machine. 
Nicholson thus argues that Templeton had sufficient and
readily available sources of information to lead to the
discovery of its identity.
In Ex parte Mobile Infirmary, supra, the plaintiff filed
a wrongful-death action against an entity he identified in the
complaint as Infirmary Health Systems, Inc., which had
allegedly treated the decedent.   74 So. 3d at 427.  After the
statutory limitations period had run, the plaintiff attempted
to 
substitute 
Mobile 
Infirmary 
Association 
("Mobile
Infirmary") for a fictitiously named defendant.  Id.  In
deciding whether the substitution related back to the filing
of the original complaint, we stated:
"The evidence attached to Mobile Infirmary's
summary-judgment 
motion 
indicates 
that 
[the
plaintiff] did not act with due diligence.  When he
filed the original complaint, [the decedent's]
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family had possessed her medical records for 20
months, and [the plaintiff] had possessed [the
decedent's] medical records for at least 3 months,
including various paperwork from Mobile Infirmary,
which indicated that [the decedent] had been
admitted to the [Mobile Infirmary] Medical Center,
had undergone surgery there, and had been treated
there following her surgery.  A reasonably diligent
plaintiff possessing that information should have at
least attempted to identify the corporation doing
business as Mobile Infirmary Medical Center and
include it as a defendant.  See Fulmer v. Clark
Equip. Co., 654 So. 2d 45, 46 (Ala. 1995) (holding
that where plaintiff knew the allegedly defective
forklift was manufactured by 'Clark' and possessed
forklift manuals providing Clark's name but did not
attempt to amend the complaint until after the
limitations period had run, the plaintiff 'did not
act diligently in attempting to learn Clark
Equipment's identity').  As this Court has said, 
"'[i]f the plaintiff knows the identity of
the 
fictitiously 
named 
parties 
or 
possesses
sufficient facts to lead to the discovery
of their identity at the time of the filing
of the complaint, relation back under
fictitious party practice is not permitted
and the running of the limitations period
is not tolled.'
"Clay v. Walden Joint Venture, 611 So. 2d 254, 256
(Ala. 1992)."
74 So. 3d at 429-30 (emphasis added).  See Marsh v. Wenzel,
732 So. 2d 985, 990 (Ala. 1998) (holding that one could not
reasonably conclude that a plaintiff was ignorant of the name
of her pathologist when the pathologist was identified by name
in the plaintiff's medical records).
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Like the plaintiff in Mobile Infirmary, Templeton had
access to information that would have led him to discover the
identity of the manufacturer of the debarker machine:
photographs included in the incident report clearly showing
the "NICHOLSON" label on the debarker machine and the
Department of Labor decision and order identifying Nicholson
as the manufacturer of the debarker machine.  Templeton
argues, however, that he was not actually in possession of the
incident report at the time the complaint was filed and,
nevertheless, 
that 
he 
acted 
with 
due 
diligence 
in
investigating 
and 
discovering 
Nicholson's 
identity. 
Specifically, he argues that his current counsel did not
receive copies of the  incident report until after the 
statute of limitations had run. He also contends that the
Department of Labor decision and order does not provide proper
notice because, he says, it is "unsigned" and "non-final."
Lastly, he argues that his current counsel had been denied
access to inspect the accident site and, therefore, was
prohibited from identifying the manufacturer of the debarker
machine. 
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The materials before us demonstrate that the incident
report containing the photographs of the Nicholson debarker
machine had been available to the public since September
2011.  Further, despite the fact that the Department of Labor
1
decision and order, available since November 13, 2012, was
neither 
final 
nor 
signed, 
it 
nevertheless 
identifies 
Nicholson
as the manufacturer of the debarker machine.  Both sources
would have led to the discovery of Nicholson's identity with
the exercise of due diligence.  
It is true that at the time of filing the complaint
Templeton was not in possession of the incident report. 
However, simply lacking information that discloses an
unidentified 
defendant 
does 
not 
necessarily 
excuse 
the 
failure
to exercise due diligence.  In Crowl, supra, the plaintiff,
Crowl, was injured when he slipped and fell at a gasoline-
service station.  848 So. 2d at 932.  He attempted to initiate
an action against the owner of the gasoline-service station;
after the statute of limitations had run, Crowl discovered the
name of, and attempted to substitute for a fictitiously named
defendant, the actual owner of the service station, Kayo Oil
Templeton did not request a copy until December 2012. 
1
12
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Company.  848 So. 2d at 933-34.  This Court held that Crowl
had failed to exercise due diligence because Crowl did nothing
to ascertain Kayo Oil's identity before the statutory 
limitations period expired.  Id. at 937.  Specifically, we
stated that the identity of Kayo Oil could have been
ascertained 
by 
requesting 
and 
reviewing 
the 
publicly 
available
property-tax records.  Id.  
The 
circumstances 
surrounding 
the 
discovery 
of
Nicholson's identity are analogous to those in Crowl.  The
incident report had been available for nearly 15 months and
the Department of Labor decision and order had been available
for nearly 2 months before the expiration of the statutory
limitations period.  Consequently, Templeton, like the
plaintiff in Crowl, could have easily obtained 
those 
documents
before filing the complaint.   The documents are products of
2
standard investigations into a work-site-related death.  Due
diligence in identifying an unknown defendant should lead a
Indeed, Templeton's counsel states in an affidavit that
2
the photographs in the incident report gave him the
information 
necessary 
to 
file 
the 
amended 
complaint
substituting Nicholson for a fictitiously named defendant.
That information was available some 15 months before the
complaint was filed, and copies of the report had previously
been requested by other attorneys/law firms and by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration.  
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party to seek out and to consult readily and publicly
available documents of importance regarding a standard
investigation of an accident forming the basis of a claim. 
Crowl, supra.  See also Ex parte Nationwide Ins. Co., 991 So.
2d 1287, 1291 (Ala. 2008) (finding that the substitution of a
defendant for a fictitiously named party does not relate back
when the plaintiff could have discovered the insurer's
identity by, among other things, reviewing an accident
report).  The fact that Templeton was not in possession of
both documents is the result of a failure to exercise due
diligence in attempting to discover Nicholson's identity.    
Furthermore, we note that the evidence in this case
discloses that the debarker machine is labeled with the name
of its manufacturer. In a products-liability action, a party 
cannot claim ignorance of the identity of the manufacturer of
the product--the very subject of the lawsuit--when a simple
inspection of that most crucial piece of evidence would have
revealed the name of the manufacturer, which is clearly stated
on the allegedly defective product itself.  Ex parte General
Motors, 144 So. 3d at 239 (holding that the plaintiff failed
to exercise due diligence to learn the identity of an
14
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automobile manufacturer because, among other things, no
inspection of the automobile was undertaken that would have
discovered a label identifying the manufacturer required by
federal regulations); Fulmer v. Clark Equip. Co., 654 So. 2d
45, 46 (Ala. 1995)(holding that exercising due 
diligence would
have revealed the name of the forklift manufacturer, which was
clearly stated on the identification plate on the forklift);
and Jones v. Resorcon, Inc., 604 So. 2d 370, 373 (Ala. 1992)
(holding that the plaintiff failed to exercise due diligence
by not inspecting the allegedly defective blower fan labeled
with the manufacturer's name).  
Templeton argues that he was denied access to the
accident site in December 2012 and was thus prevented from
discovering Nicholson's identity.  However, the refusal of
access to inspect an allegedly defective product that is the
subject of a products-liability action, this Court has
previously held, does not necessarily excuse the failure to
examine it to learn the identity of the manufacturer:    
"It is relevant to the question of due diligence
that an inspection of the fan would almost certainly
be necessary to maintain the product liability
action against any defendant.  If Jones's assertions
that USX refused access are true, then due diligence
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would have required an attempt to obtain a court-
ordered inspection."
Jones, 604 So. 2d at 373 (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, as in Jones, Templeton--in the two
years following the accident--could have requested a court-
ordered inspection of the equipment forming the basis of the
defective-product claim.  Unlike Jones, however, other
information that would have revealed the name of the
manufacturer of the 
debarker 
machine was readily available and
ascertainable from two other sources--the incident report and
the Department of Labor decision and order--both of which were
available to the public.  Therefore, Templeton's failure to
ascertain this information amounts to a lack of due diligence
in identifying Nicholson as the manufacturer.  See Crowl, 848
So. 2d at 937.
Because Templeton failed to act with due diligence in
discovering the identity of the fictitiously named defendant,
the trial court had no discretion other than to grant
Nicholson's motion for a summary judgment in its favor on the
statute-of-limitations ground.   For the foregoing reasons, we
3
Templeton argues that his current  counsel was hired
3
shortly before the expiration of the statutory limitations
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grant Nicholson's petition and issue a writ of mandamus
directing the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court to enter an order
granting Nicholson's motion for a summary judgment. 
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Murdock, Main, Wise, and Bryan,
JJ., concur.  
Moore, C.J., dissents.
period and acted as diligently as possible during that short
time.  However, as Nicholson notes, the duty to exercise due
diligence is the party's, and Templeton had almost two years
to discover Nicholson's identity.  We see no authority
excusing a party's duty to exercise due diligence when new
counsel is acquired at the eve of the expiration of the
statutory limitations period.  Cf. Ex parte General Motors,
144 So. 3d at 241.
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MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I dissent because I do not believe that the petitioner
has satisfied its burden of establishing the elements
necessary for mandamus relief.
"Mandamus 
is 
an 
extraordinary 
remedy 
and 
will be
granted only where there is '(1) a clear legal right
in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court.' Ex parte Alfab, Inc.,
586 So. 2d 889, 891 (Ala. 1991). This Court will not
issue the writ of mandamus where the petitioner has
'"full and adequate relief"' by appeal. State v.
Cobb, 288 Ala. 675, 678, 264 So. 2d 523, 526 (1972)
(quoting State v. Williams, 69 Ala. 311, 316
(1881))."
Ex parte Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 872 So. 2d 810, 813 (Ala.
2003). Because there is a reasonable basis for controversy
concerning 
whether 
Gerald 
A. 
Templeton 
exercised 
due 
diligence
in identifying Nicholson Manufacturing Limited ("Nicholson")
as the manufacturer of the debarker machine involved in the
death of Casimiro Deleon Ixcoy, I do not believe that
Nicholson has a clear legal right to a summary judgment.
Furthermore, because nothing indicates that Nicholson sought
a permissive appeal of the trial court's denial of summary
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judgment under Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P., Nicholson also failed
to exhaust its other adequate remedy.
The facts indicate that Nicholson's right to the relief
sought is far from clear and that the trial judge acted within
its discretion in denying its motion for a summary judgment.
Before the two-year statutory limitations period expired,
Templeton's attorney requested permission to inspect the
facility at which the fatal accident occurred, and the request
was denied.  When Templeton filed his complaint within the
4
limitations period, he also filed interrogatories requesting
the name of the manufacturer of the "conveyor and/or machinery
which is at the basis of this lawsuit." Despite the fact that
the debarker machine was on the property, and presumably
within the control of one or more defendants, other named
defendants -- Treeline Transportation, Inc., Newton Lumber
The majority cites Jones v. Resorcon, Inc., 604 So. 2d
4
370 (Ala. 1992), in concluding that Templeton should have
sought a court-ordered inspection of the debarker machine.
However, Jones's lack of due diligence was exhibited by a
totality of circumstances. "When Jones did begin efforts ...
to determine the true manufacturer, his efforts were sporadic
and ineffectual ...." 604 So. 2d at 374. After obtaining leave
from the trial court to substitute the proper defendant more
than a year after the limitations period had run, Jones waited
another 26 days to file his amended complaint. 604 So. 2d at
371-72.
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Company, LLC, Kutz, LLC, Burt Holdings, LLC, and Burt Lumber
Co., Inc. -- denied knowing the identity of the manufacturer
of the relevant machinery in responses dated five months after
the statutory limitations period had expired.
Templeton's attorney requested the incident report kept
by the Tuscaloosa Sheriff's Department within the limitations
period but did not receive it until two days after the
limitations period had expired. The nonfinal decision issued
by the Department of Labor, publicly available for less than
2 months before the limitations period expired, is a 13-page
document containing a single reference to "Nicholson," not
"Nicholson Manufacturing Limited." 
"The clear legal right must be an 'indisputable
right to a particular result.' Ex parte Rudolph, 515
So. 2d 704, 706 (Ala. 1987) (emphasis added). '[T]he
right to the relief sought [must be] clear and
certain, with no reasonable basis for controversy.'
Ex parte Nissei Sangyo America Ltd., 577 So. 2d 912,
914 (Ala. 1991) (emphasis added)."
Ex parte General Motors of Canada Ltd., 144 So. 3d 236, 243-44
(Ala. 2013) (Moore, C.J., dissenting). I agree with the
sentiment expressed by the trial court in its order denying
Nicholson's summary-judgment motion that this is a "close
case." In close cases, we generally defer to the reasoned
20
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judgment of the fact-finder. Because a reasonable basis for
controversy exists as to whether Templeton exercised due
diligence in identifying Nicholson as the manufacturer of the
debarker machine, Nicholson has not established a clear legal
right to the relief sought. 
Furthermore, the materials before us do not show that
Nicholson sought to avail itself of the alternative remedy of
a permissive appeal under Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P. "In the
normal case where a party may, under Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P.,
petition for permission to appeal, this court will not
entertain a petition for a writ of mandamus, because such a
petition may not substitute for an appeal." Ex parte Burch,
730 So. 2d 143, 145 (Ala. 1999). Had Nicholson sought and been
denied permission to appeal, it might have established the
lack of an adequate remedy. See Ex parte Jackson, 780 So. 2d
681, 685 (Ala. 2000) ("If [the petitioners] had asked the
trial court to give the certification required by [Rule 5] and
the trial court had refused, this might be a different
case.").5
Although the Jackson Court purported to acknowledge an
5
exception to the rule that mandamus cannot substitute for an
appeal in "cases involving fictitious parties and the
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Nicholson fails to plead the elements necessary for the
extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus in its petition or
reply brief, much less shows how it satisfies those elements.
"Moreover, if [the petitioner] had adequately pleaded the
required elements, [the petitioner] would still not be
entitled to the writ" because it lacks a clear legal right to
the relief sought and because it failed to take advantage of
another adequate remedy. General Motors of Canada Ltd., 144
So. 3d at 246 (Moore, C.J., dissenting). I believe that by
relaxing a defendant's burden to prove entitlement 
to 
mandamus
relief in cases involving fictitiously named parties and the
relation-back doctrine, this Court has turned the elements of
mandamus relief into a hollow refrain. Therefore, I
respectfully dissent.
relation-back doctrine," that statement was dicta, because
relation back was not an issue in Jackson. See Jackson, 780
So. 2d at 684.
22