Case Title: Swingholm v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-01-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Swingholm v. State1996 WY 13910 P.2d 1334Case Number: 95-79Decided: 01/29/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming

Thomas Quentin SWINGHOLM, 
Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County; 
Terrence L. O'Brien, Judge.

Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; and 
Deborah Cornia, Appellate Counsel, State Public Defender Program, Cheyenne, 
for appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. 
Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Sr. Assistant Attorney 
General; and Georgia L. Tibbetts, Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, 
for appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, 
TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Chief Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Thomas 
Swingholm (Swingholm) appeals his sentence proceeding on the grounds that the 
State presented evidence in breach of a plea agreement, violating his right to 
due process. Finding no breach and no due process violation by the sentencing 
proceedings, we affirm his sentence.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Only one issue is 
presented for our review by Swingholm and the State:

Did the sentencing 
proceeding violate Appellant's right to due process?

FACTS

[¶3]      On June 10, 1994, 
Swingholm was arrested and charged with one count of taking immodest, immoral or 
indecent liberties with a sixteen year old female, "MD." That same day, law 
enforcement officials conducted a search of Swingholm's residence and seized, 
among other things, numerous pornographic magazines, adult toys and photographs 
of nudes. Further investigation led to charges of sixteen counts of indecent 
liberties involving five more minors, both female and male. Swingholm's wife, 
Kate Swingholm, was also arrested in connection with the 
crimes.

[¶4]      Before 
arraignment, Swingholm and the State agreed he would plead guilty to two counts 
of indecent liberties with the minor female, "MM," in exchange for the State's 
dismissing the other fourteen charges. Additionally, the State also agreed to 
recommend a suspended prison sentence, that Swingholm serve a six-month split 
sentence in the Campbell County Detention Center followed by a term of 
supervised probation. As a condition of probation, Swingholm was to seek 
counseling from Dr. Bill Heineke of the Wyoming Regional Counseling Center. The 
State agreed to dismiss a juvenile court action against Swingholm and his wife 
regarding their infant daughter, dismiss felony charges against Swingholm's wife 
and recommend suspended sentences and unsupervised probation for Mrs. Swingholm 
on remaining misdemeanor charges.

[¶5]      Before accepting 
Swingholm's guilty pleas to the two felony counts, the district court thoroughly 
discussed the terms of the agreement with Swingholm:

Court: I have here 
a Statement of Agreement. Did you sign that Statement of Agreement, Mr. 
Swingholm?

Defendant: 
Yes.

Court: Okay. Okay. 
Now I want you to tell me what the agreement is. I don't want you to read it to 
me. I just want you to tell me what you understand it to 
be.

Now, I want to 
explain something to you before you start. The purpose of my asking - it's not a 
quiz - the purpose that I'm asking is that I want to make sure you understand 
what it is that you're entering into here, and the best way for me to insure 
that you know is not for you to merely agree with me if I read it, regurgitate 
it for you, but require you to tell me what it is. So I want you to do that 
now.

Defendant: I 
believe that it's an agreement that I would plead guilty to two counts of 
indecent liberties, 14 counts would be dismissed, and that the State would 
recommend sentencing to be split sentence of six months in the county 
jail.

Court: Okay. What 
about - there's a reference here to Dr. Heineke. Tell me about 
that.

Defendant: Yes, I 
would go to counseling with Dr. Heineke. Also, that there would be a term of 
probation. And also that there's an agreement made - or to be offered to my 
wife.

* * * * * *

Court: I see here a 
reference to a juvenile case. Tell me what you understand the agreement to be 
with reference to that juvenile case.

Defendant: That our 
daughter [S] would - or that the juvenile case would be dismissed also upon my 
plea.

* * * * * *

Court: Okay. Now, 
there's sometimes some confusion about these recommended agreements, and I want 
to make sure that you understand what the agreements are. First of all, if you 
plead guilty to two counts of taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties, 
what's the worst thing that could happen to you?

Defendant: The 
worst thing that could happen is I could be sentenced up to 20 years in 
prison.

Court: And $2,000 
fine.

Defendant: And 
$2,000 fine.

Court: The minimum 
that could happen to you would be a $200 fine.

Defendant: 
Yes.

Court: Now, I want 
to make sure you understand that what you have bargained for here is a 
recommendation and not a result. The State has agreed to recommend split 
sentence followed by probation, and if the State follows through on that 
recommendation - follows through and makes that recommendation, then you have 
got - then you've received what you've bargained for.

However, the - the 
decision about what sentence actually is imposed is up to the judge and not to 
the prosecutor, and the judge can follow the recommendation or can ignore the 
recommendation if the judge chooses to ignore the recommendation. Then you could 
be sentenced up to a maximum of two (sic) years in the 
penitentiary.

Do you understand 
that?

Defendant: 
Yes.

Court: Okay. If the 
judge doesn't go along with that agreement, you don't get to change your mind, 
you don't get to come back into court and withdraw your plea. If you enter your 
plea today, then it's done, and whatever sentence is imposed, even if it exceeds 
the plea agreement, is what you have to live with. Do you understand 
that?

Defendant: 
Yes.

Court: You 
understand that you still would have to make restitution?

Defendant: 
Yes.

[¶6]      Swingholm 
provided a factual basis for his guilty pleas when he admitted that on two 
separate occasions in October 1993, he had sexual intercourse with "MM," aged 
sixteen years, at his home in Campbell County. Swingholm was 30 years old. The 
court inquired whether Swingholm had any sexual contact with the other juveniles 
named in the dismissed charges and then advised Swingholm that he had the right 
to refuse to answer, but could be prosecuted for perjury if he lied in his 
answers.

Court: Okay. My 
purpose in asking these questions is not to - is not to further expose you to 
liability, but to determine when it comes time for sentencing the extent of this 
kind of aberrant behavior. If you don't tell me, you're still going to have to 
tell Dr. Heineke or whoever else does the evaluation, so we may as well get it 
out to begin with.

* * 
* * * *

Now, let me remind 
you of something. You can consult with your attorney if you want to. You can 
refuse to answer my questions if you want to, but if you lie to me, you can be 
prosecuted for perjury.

[¶7]      Except for one 
incident, Swingholm then denied any charged sexual contact with the other minor 
children. The court accepted Swingholm's pleas and ordered that a presentence 
investigation be conducted by the Department of Probation and Parole and an 
assessment of Swingholm be done by Dr. Heineke. The court also stated it would 
consider any aggravating factors that the State wished to present at the 
sentencing hearing.

[¶8]      After reviewing 
the presentence investigation report and Dr. Heineke's assessment of Swingholm, 
the district court wrote and informed the attorneys for both sides that these 
reports contained numerous allegations of prior sexual improprieties by 
Swingholm with children. The court stated that if the allegations were true, 
then the court would probably not abide the sentencing recommendation of the 
plea agreement. Based upon Swingholm's specific denials to some of these 
allegations, the district court advised the parties that WYO.R. OF CRIM.P. 
32(a)(3)(C) required that it make a factual determination with respect to 
controverted allegations. It expected the State to present testimony at the 
sentencing hearing, and if the State were unable or unwilling to support the 
"insinuations" contained in the sentencing papers, then the report's allegations 
would not form any part of the sentencing decision. The court stated further 
that:

In other words, the 
allegations of Mr. Swingholm's prior deviant behavior should either be 
supportable or they should not be made. Hearsay testimony is not necessarily 
excluded, but sentencing information must be reliable. I do not consider second 
and third hand accounts of disputed events to meet the reliability test, 
particularly when so much is at stake.

[¶9]      The sentence 
hearing was rescheduled. The State notified Swingholm that it intended to comply 
with the court's directive that it support the allegations made in the 
presentence report. Swingholm moved to compel the State to abide by the terms of 
the plea agreement, arguing that the agreement prohibited the State from 
presenting aggravating evidence at the sentencing hearing. In response, the 
State moved for denial of that motion and argued that it intended to honor the 
sentencing recommendation but would also comply with the court's 
letter.

[¶10]   The district court heard arguments 
and reiterated its concerns expressed in its letter regarding the veracity of 
the allegations contained in the reports. Concluding that the evidence was 
relevant for purposes of sentencing, the court reminded Swingholm that it was 
not bound by the State's sentence recommendation and plainly stated that it 
would not impose such a sentence if the facts were as alleged in the reports. 
The court also noted that it had an ethical duty to inquire into Swingholm's 
character and behaviors and to fashion an appropriate sentence based upon 
verifiable facts, not innuendos, accusations, insinuations or hearsay. In 
fairness to Swingholm, however, the court offered him the opportunity to 
withdraw his guilty pleas. Swingholm refused. The district court determined that 
the State intended to abide by the plea agreement and denied Swingholm's 
motion.

[¶11]   At the sentence hearing, several 
children testified about numerous episodes of sexual contact with Swingholm. 
Many of these episodes included Swingholm's wife and other men or children. The 
victim, "MM," read an impact statement and Dr. Heineke and the investigating 
officer also testified. Swingholm presented witnesses and made a statement to 
the court denying all the allegations except those involving "MM." The State did 
not recommend a sentence different from that contained in the agreement. 
Swingholm urged the court to sentence him pursuant to the plea recommendation. 
The court stated:

Court: I'll address 
again the argument with respect to the plea agreement.

When I accepted Mr. 
Swingholm's plea I advised him that what he had bargained for was a 
recommendation and not a result; that I would consider the State's 
recommendation but would independently reach a decision as to sentencing in this 
case. That's never changed.

When we had the 
prior hearing, Mr. Murray, and you raised this same question, I asked at that 
time if Mr. Swingholm wanted to withdraw his plea and go to trial on these - all 
of these charges and was advised after you consulted with him that he did not. 
That was well after he knew that the State was going to be putting on evidence 
and that I was going to be considering matters in aggravation of sentence as 
well as matters in extenuation and mitigation.

What I now hear 
argued is that the recommendation which I would have some discretion to accept 
or reject has now suddenly become mandatory, and I'm obliged to impose the 
sentence that was recommended by the State. And I decline to do 
that.

The district court 
then stated what it was considering in imposing sentence:

Mr. Swingholm, I've 
now listened to a day's evidence from a number of juveniles who have all 
testified in graphic detail about their sexual adventures with you and your 
wife. I've not heard anything that reasonably impugns those juveniles, nor have 
I heard anything which in any substantial way detracts from their credibility. I 
found the testimony to be believable, and in spite of your denials, it is my 
conclusion that these things happened.

What I see here is 
a couple who are sexually adventurous, and among consenting adults, there is 
nothing wrong with that in our society. It's acceptable. However, when you start 
bringing juveniles into that process, you have stepped well beyond the bounds of 
propriety and well beyond what's permissible under the 
law.

It seems to me that 
what you have done is engaged in the systematic exploitation of juveniles. Some 
of them may have been willing. Some of them may have while not been willing, not 
very assertive in spurning your sexual advances. Neither of those facts make any 
difference. You are an adult. They are children. Irrespective of their wishes, 
you are required under the law to act reasonably, appropriately, or with 
restraint.

It appears that you 
have engaged in inappropriate sexual contacts with juveniles, that you have 
subjected - that you have engaged in intercourse with juveniles, you have 
encouraged juveniles to participate in group sex with you and your wife and 
perhaps with others. Those things are perverse, illegal, and 
immoral.

[¶12]   The district court then sentenced 
Swingholm to consecutive terms of imprisonment of not less than three nor more 
than ten years. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

[¶13]   Swingholm contends that the 
sentencing hearing violated his right to due process, requiring a remand for a 
new and proper procedure. Specifically, Swingholm asserts due process was 
violated when he was promised by the initial prosecutor that she would not call 
witnesses at sentencing and this agreement was breached by a different 
prosecutor who called ten witnesses to testify at sentencing; when the court 
turned the sentencing proceeding into a trial; and when the court denied his 
request that a new presentence investigation report be prepared. We first 
examine whether the plea agreement was breached.

Breach of Plea 
Agreement

[¶14]   Swingholm asserts that the United 
States Supreme Court has held that when a plea rests in any significant degree 
on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part 
of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. Santobello 
v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S. Ct. 495, 499, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971); Clouse 
v. State, 809 P.2d 791, 795 (Wyo. 1991). In Cardenas v. Meacham, 545 P.2d 632 
(Wyo. 1976), this court agreed that the rationale for the Santobello decision 
was that

it would be unfair 
to accept a guilty plea where part of the bargain, upon which the plea was 
based, was breached. The defendant had not agreed to plead guilty to charges 
under terms other than those set forth in the agreement. Santobello was thus 
permitted to plead anew. This reasoning also should apply where a defendant 
reasonably believes that certain terms of an agreement exist when in fact they 
do not. His plea cannot be voluntarily entered within the meaning of Rule 11 or 
[WYO.R.CRIM.PROC.] Rule 15 until he is aware of the exact terms of the agreement 
and agrees to plead guilty under those terms.

Cardenas, 545 P.2d  at 638. Only when a 
defendant is not fairly apprised of the consequences of a plea agreement can his 
plea be challenged under the Due Process Clause. Clouse, 809 P.2d  at 794 (citing 
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 2547, 81 L. Ed. 2d 437 
(1984)).

[¶15]   Whether the plea agreement 
contained a term requiring the State to stand silent was a matter for the 
district court to determine before it accepted Swingholm's guilty pleas at 
arraignment and when it heard arguments on Swingholm's motion to compel the 
State to abide by the plea agreement. Clouse, 809 P.2d  at 794. Before accepting 
Swingholm's guilty pleas, the district court determined the terms and conditions 
of the plea agreement. No mention was made that it was a term of the agreement 
that the State would stand silent at the sentencing hearing and Swingholm 
articulated his understanding that the court could impose a greater sentence 
than the one recommended by the State. Following Swingholm's motion to compel 
the State to abide by the plea agreement, the district court again determined 
this term was not a part of the agreement. It is the district court - as the 
trier of fact - who must assess the credibility of witnesses and the weight to 
be given their testimony, in deciding whether there existed a valid plea 
agreement and its terms and conditions. Clouse, 809 P.2d  at 794. The court's 
finding will not be reversed upon appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Id. As 
set out in our discussion of the facts, the State agreed to recommend a sentence 
and nothing more. There was no due process violation.

Sentencing 
Proceedings

[¶16]   Swingholm asserts that the district 
court's reliance on the presentence report, and the district court's conduct as 
well as the State's conduct at the sentencing proceedings, violated due process. 
Our standard of review for such an assertion was set out in Mehring v. State, 
860 P.2d 1101, 1115 (Wyo. 1993):

We have said that 
filed presentence reports and information are evidence for the exercise of 
sentencing discretion, subject only to the rights of the convicted individual to 
deny, dispute or disprove. . . . [S]entencing will not be disturbed as violation 
of due process because of sentencing procedures unless the defendant can show an 
abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to him, and circumstances 
which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the 
public sense of fair play. . . . [T]he defendant had the burden to "establish 
that the sentencing judge in fact rested the sentence on false or improper 
premises."

Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 1115 (quoting Smallwood 
v. State, 771 P.2d 798, 802 (Wyo. 1989) (citations 
omitted)).

[¶17]   In Jackson v. State, 902 P.2d 1292 
(Wyo. 1995), the appellant contended he was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea 
because the State had breached its plea agreement to stand silent at sentencing 
by telling the sentencing court of an incident involving the appellant which had 
occurred during release before sentencing. Jackson, 902 P.2d  at 1293. This court 
said:

the fact that 
[WYO.R.CRIM.P.] Rule 11 allows the State to bargain away its opportunity to 
argue for a particular sentence does not include avoiding responsibility to 
provide complete information about the person to be sentenced. . . . Efforts by 
the State to provide relevant factual information are not tantamount to taking a 
position on the sentence and will not violate a plea agreement. A prosecutor has 
a duty to ensure that the sentencing court has complete and accurate information 
concerning the defendant, thereby enabling the court to impose an appropriate 
sentence. Thus, if the State is aware that the court lacks certain relevant 
information, the prosecutor has the duty, as an officer of the court, to bring 
that information to the attention of the court. In this case, the State promised 
to "stand silent" at the time of sentencing. That promise, however, did not 
require the prosecutor to withhold from the district court pertinent information 
on appellant's background and character.

Jackson, 902 P.2d  at 1294 (citations 
omitted).

[¶18]   In this case, the State agreed to 
recommend a particular sentence. That agreement was kept. Jackson requires the 
State to fulfill its duty to a sentencing court. Swingholm's remedy for any 
perceived plea agreement breach or due process violation would be withdrawal of 
his guilty plea. The record is clear that the court offered to permit Swingholm 
to withdraw his guilty plea. He declined. There was no due process violation by 
the State's conduct at the hearing.

[¶19]   Further, Swingholm has not 
demonstrated that the district court improperly relied upon the presentence 
report or that it conducted an improper sentencing 
proceeding.

[I]n imposing 
sentence, the trial court is given broad discretion to consider a wide variety 
of factors about the defendant and his crimes.

* * 
* * * *

In evaluating 
character, the trial court, in exercising its discretion, may consider a broad 
range of reports and information. . . . In imposing sentence, the trial court is 
permitted to go beyond the record to consider the defendant's past conduct and 
activities including evidence of crimes for which charges were filed but no 
conviction resulted. The scope of inquiry may include the factual basis of 
dismissed charges "as well as hearsay reports implicating the defendant in other 
crimes if such reports are deemed sufficiently reliable."

Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 
1115-17.

[¶20]   In sentencing, due process provides 
a right to be sentenced only on accurate information. Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 1117. 
The district court recognized the discrepancy between the contents of the 
presentence report and what Swingholm swore to at arraignment and, following 
testimony, resolved those inconsistencies against Swingholm. Due process was not 
violated by the sentencing proceedings.

[¶21]   Finding no constitutional error, 
Swingholm's sentence is affirmed.