Case Title: Carrillo v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-09-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Carrillo v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.1999 WY 129987 P.2d 690Case Number: 98-219Decided: 09/21/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
SHELLIE A. CARRILLO, Appellant (Petitioner),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING, ex 
rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee 
(Respondent).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Converse County: The Honorable Barton R. Voigt, 
Judge.

Donald L. 
Painter, Casper, WY, representing appellant.

Gay Woodhouse, 
Chief Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; and Darrell V. Goodman, Assistant Attorney General, representing 
appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Retired November 2, 
1998.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      A hearing 
examiner from the Office of Administrative Hearings denied appellant Shellie 
Carrillo's claim for worker's compensation benefits, concluding that Carrillo 
had failed to prove that her knee injury was work related. Carrillo filed a 
petition for review with the district court, and the district court affirmed the 
hearing examiner's determination. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that 
the hearing examiner's determination was not an abuse of discretion, and we 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant 
Carrillo poses the following issue:

Whether any 
evidence supports the denial of compensation benefits in this 
case.

Appellee State, 
ex rel. Workers' Safety and Compensation Division (Division) presents the issue 
as:

Were the Hearing 
Examiner's findings supported by substantial evidence?

 

FACTS

[¶3]      On the evening of 
June 12, 1997, Shellie Carrillo was working as a waitress at Debi-J's, a 
restaurant in Glenrock. Carrillo contends she injured her knee twice during her 
shift. She claims that she was exiting the kitchen through a swinging door when 
a coworker, Lisa Marie Cargile, stepped on her foot. In response, Carrillo 
alleges she jerked her foot from underneath Cargile's and let out an 
exclamation. Cargile testified that she has no recollection of stepping on 
Carrillo's foot or of hearing Carrillo's comments. Carrillo also claims that 
same evening she banged her knee into the same swinging door as Debi Simpson, 
one of the owners of the restaurant, entered the kitchen. Simpson testified that 
she has no recollection of running into Carrillo. At the end of her shift, 
Carrillo allegedly placed her leg on a restaurant chair and massaged her right 
knee. Neither Cargile nor Simpson saw her with her knee on the 
chair.

[¶4]      A few days later, 
Carrillo mentioned the incident to her supervisor. The supervisor relayed the 
information to the restaurant owners; and, on June 18, the owners met with 
Carrillo and filled out a worker's compensation injury report. The Division 
received the report on June 24, 1997. Carrillo's last day of work was June 
25.

[¶5]      Carrillo 
self-treated the injury until she saw a physician's assistant a few days after 
the incident. On July 10, 1997, she visited an orthopedic surgeon (physician) 
who ultimately determined that Carrillo had sprained her right knee. The 
physician saw her once more in July and again in August. He noted improvement in 
August, but also expressed concerns about torn cartilage associated with the 
knee ligament sprain. Carrillo saw the physician again on October 16, 1997. 
During that visit, the physician found Carrillo's knee tender and puffy and 
recommended surgery. As of December 1, 1997, surgery had not been performed. 
Carrillo has, however, participated in physical therapy.

[¶6]      The Division 
denied Carrillo's application for benefits, and Carrillo objected to that 
determination. On review, a hearing examiner from the OAH also denied Carrillo's 
claim for benefits finding that Carrillo failed to prove she suffered a 
compensable injury on June 12, 1997. The hearing examiner based his conclusion 
on several determinations which centered around Carrillo's credibility. The 
hearing examiner found Cargile's testimony more credible than Carrillo's. This 
decision was influenced by the fact that Cargile no longer worked or associated 
with the Simpsons. Also, the hearing examiner attached little significance to 
Carrillo's physician's opinion which placed the cause of Carrillo's injury on 
the alleged work incident. In dismissing the physician's opinion, the hearing 
examiner noted that the physician based his opinion entirely on Carrillo's 
version of the events of the evening of June 12, 1997.

[¶7]      Carrillo filed a 
petition for review with the district court, and that court affirmed the hearing 
examiner's decision. This timely appeal followed.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶8]      When reviewing a 
hearing examiner's determination, we accord no special deference to the district 
court's decision. Instead, we review the action as if it had proceeded directly 
from the hearing examiner to us. B-F Drilling, Inc. v. State, ex rel. Workers' 
Safety & Compensation Div., 942 P.2d 392, 395 (Wyo. 1997); Wyoming Steel 
& Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 875 (Wyo. 1994). A claimant requesting 
worker's compensation benefits has the burden of proving all essential elements 
of a claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Pederson v. State, ex rel. 
Workers' Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo. 1997); Goddard v. Colonel 
Bozeman's Restaurant, 914 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Wyo. 1996). To prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the claimant must bring forth "proof which leads 
the trier of fact to find that the existence of the contested fact is more 
probable than its non-existence." Thornberg v. State, ex rel. Workers' 
Compensation Div. 913 P.2d 863, 866 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Scherling v. Kilgore, 
599 P.2d 1352, 1359 (Wyo. 1979)).

[¶9]      When a hearing 
examiner concludes that a claimant has failed to meet his or her burden of 
proof, that conclusion is reversed only if it is found to be arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or not in accordance with law. Pederson, 939 P.2d  at 742; City of Casper v. Utech, 895 P.2d 449, 452 (Wyo. 1995); Bohren v. 
State, ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 883 P.2d 355, 357-58 (Wyo. 1994). 
Under the arbitrary, capricious and abuse of discretion standard, we are charged 
with examining the entire record. Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (Lexis 1999); 
Utech, 895 P.2d  at 452. In our examination and review of a hearing examiner's 
determination, we defer to the hearing examiner's findings of fact. Pederson, 
939 P.2d  at 742; Robles, 882 P.2d  at 875. We will examine conflicting and 
contradictory evidence to see if the hearing examiner reasonably could have made 
its findings based on all the evidence before it. Pederson, 939 P.2d 742, and 
cases therein cited. The findings of fact may include determinations of witness 
credibility, as the hearing examiner is charged with determining the credibility 
of the witnesses. Pederson, 939 P.2d  at 742; Utech, 895 P.2d  at 451, and cases 
therein cited. In our review, we will not overturn the hearing examiner's 
determinations regarding witness credibility unless they are clearly contrary to 
the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Nellis v. Dep't of Transp., 932 P.2d 741, 743 (Wyo. 1997); Pederson, 939 P.2d  at 742; Robles, 882 P.2d  at 
875.

DISCUSSION

[¶10]   Under the statutory definition of 
injury, Carrillo must prove her injury arose out of and in the course of 
employment. Wyo. Stat.Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (Michie Cum.Supp. 1996); Goddard, 
914 P.2d  at 1236. The hearing examiner's order provided:

Carrillo has 
testified to an incident that occurred on June 12, 1997. The other people 
present on that date, Cargile and Simpson, have presented testimony which brings 
into question or contradicts Carrillo's version of the evening. Cargile is no 
longer employed at Debi J's and there is no question that she is not a friend of 
the Simpsons. Her testimony is very credible and does not concur with the 
testimony of Carrillo. With this conflicting testimony this Office cannot find 
that a compensable injury occurred on June 12, 1997.

[¶11]   The physician treating Carrillo 
believed that the incidents that transpired on the evening of June 12, 1997, 
caused Carrillo's knee injury. In reviewing the opinion of the physician, the 
hearing examiner stated:

The opinion of 
[the physician] is based on Carrillo's version of what happened on June 12, 
1997. Since Carrillo's version is in question, little weight can be given to the 
doctor's opinion. Carrillo has failed to meet her burden and has failed to 
establish that she suffered a compensable injury on June 12, 
1997.

[¶12]   The hearing examiner is in the best 
position to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Goddard, 914 P.2d  at 1237; 
Utech, 895 P.2d  at 451. The hearing examiner noted the inconsistencies between 
Carrillo's testimony and that of Cargile and Simpson. He determined that 
Cargile's testimony was more credible because she had nothing to gain from her 
testimony. At the time of her testimony, she did not work for the Simpsons, and 
she was not on friendly terms with them. Under these circumstances, we will not 
overturn the hearing examiner's credibility determination.

[¶13]   As with lay witnesses, the hearing 
examiner is also in the best position to judge and evaluate the expert witnesses 
and their opinions. Goddard, 914 P.2d  at 1237; Thornberg, 913 P.2d  at 869. The 
hearing examiner is charged with determining relevancy, assigning probative 
value and ascribing relevant weight to medical testimony. Clark v. State, ex 
rel. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 934 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Wyo. 1997). 
When the agency finds an expert opinion is unreasonable or not adequately 
supported by the facts upon which it is based, he may disregard that opinion. 
Clark, 934 P.2d 1271. Carrillo's physician based his opinion on information 
given to him by Carrillo. The hearing examiner, having concluded Carrillo's 
testimony was not as compelling as the other witnesses, determined that the 
physician's opinion carried little weight. The hearing examiner's determinations 
were reasonable in light of the evidence before him. 

CONCLUSION

[¶14]   The hearing examiner did not abuse 
his discretion in determining that Carrillo failed to meet her burden of proving 
her knee injury was work related. Based on our review of the whole record, we 
find the hearing examiner's conclusion was reasonable. The decision of the 
district court, which affirmed the hearing examiner's decision, is 
affirmed.