Case Title: Columbus S. Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm.

Citation: 1997-Ohio-39

Docket Number: 19970842

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
COLUMBUS SOUTHERN POWER COMPANY ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES 
COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Columbus S. Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 1217.] 
(No. 97-842 — Submitted June 25, 1997 — Decided July 3, 1997.) 
APPEAL from the Public Utilities Commission, No. 96-406-EL-COI. 
ON MOTION TO DISMISS, MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE, MOTION TO STAY 
BRIEFING, and MOTION TO EXPEDITE. 
__________________ 
 
Edward J. Brady and Marvin I. Resnik, for appellants Columbus Southern 
Power Company and Ohio Power Company. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Duane W. Luckey, Chief, Public 
Utilities Section, Paul A. Colbert and Jodi J. Bair, Assistant Attorneys General, 
for appellee Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease and M. Howard Petricoff; and Janine L. 
Migden, for interviewing appellee Enron Capital & Trade Resources, Inc. 
__________________ 
 
This cause is pending before the court as an appeal from the Public Utilities 
Commission of Ohio.  Upon consideration of the motion to intervene of Enron 
Capital & Trade Resources, Inc.; appellee's motion to dismiss; and appellants' 
motion to stay briefing and motion to expedite motion to stay briefing,  
 
IT IS ORDERED by the court that the motion to intervene be, and hereby is, 
granted. 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that appellee's motion to dismiss be, and 
hereby is, sustained. 
 
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED by the court that this cause 
be, and hereby is, dismissed. 
 
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DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur in judgment. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., would dismiss the 
appeal for failure of appellants to file their notice of appeal with the court and the 
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio as required by S.Ct.Prac.R. II(3)(B)(1) and 
R.C. 4903.13. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring in judgment.  I concur with the judgment of the 
majority to dismiss these cases.  The Public Utilities Commission’s entry on 
rehearing permitted appellant-relator (AEP) to file tariffs with the commission 
with regard to the establishment by the commission of guidelines for Conjunctive 
Electric Service (“CES”) in Ohio.  If AEP decided not to file tariffs, then it had the 
option of proceeding to a hearing in a separate case to explain why it believed it 
did not have to offer CES. 
 
Apparently accepting the commission’s invitation, AEP did not file tariffs re 
CES.  Therefore, pursuant to the order of the commission, AEP, arguably, elected 
to proceed to hearing.  The commission has not yet held such a hearing and has 
not even, as yet, set a hearing date.  Accordingly, the commission has not required 
AEP to offer CES and, thus, there is no final order of the commission affecting 
AEP.  Under these circumstances, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
(case No. 97-842) of AEP, even if timely filed, and that case along with the 
mandamus action (case No. 97-1082) must be dismissed. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the commission, in its argument in support of 
dismissal, makes some strong statements about the filing requirement with the 
commission being of a dual nature — filing with the commission and service upon 
the chairman — and that these requirements are jurisdictional.  In support of its 
position, the commission cites Clyde v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 
1418, 670 N.E.2d 1005, and Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1993), 66 
 
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Ohio St.3d 1435, 608 N.E.2d 1081 (two cases).  The commission’s citation of 
these cases is misleading to the court.  While the commission’s position may be, or 
may not be, an accurate interpretation of the law (R.C. 4903.13), the entries of the 
court as cited by the commission certainly do not, without more, stand for the 
proposition for which they are cited by the commission.  All that the cited entries 
say is “cause dismissed.”  Those cases could have been dismissed for any one of a 
number of reasons (premature appeal, late filing, wrong parties, defective notice of 
appeal, etc.).  To say that the cases were dismissed because of a violation of a dual 
filing requirement is, or at least should be, beyond the ken of the commission. 
 
Such activity by the commission and its legal staff is, in addition to the 
court’s constitutional and statutory duties, yet another good reason for the court to 
do an exhaustive review of the undertakings of the commission.  If not the court 
— who? 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion.