Case Title: Orion Flight Services, Inc. v. Basler Flight Service

Citation: 2006 WI 51

Docket Number: 2003AP001731

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2006-05-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
2006 WI 51 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP1731 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Orion Flight Services, Inc., 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Basler Flight Service, a division of Basler 
Turbo Conversions, LLC, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 222 
Reported at:  277 Wis 2d 819, 692 N.W.2d 804 
(Ct. App. 2004 – Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 19, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 12, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago   
 
JUDGE: 
T. J. Gritton   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Russell A. Klingaman, Jeffrey D. Patza and Hinshaw & 
Culbertson LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Russell A. 
Klingaman. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Laura A. 
Brenner, Joseph W. Voiland and Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren s.c., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Laura A. Brenner.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Colleen D. Ball and 
Appellate Counsel SC, Wauwatosa, on behalf of Midwest Airlines 
and Wisconsin Aviation Trades Association, Inc. 
 
2006 WI 51
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP1731  
(L.C. No. 
2003CV334) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Orion Flight Services, Inc., 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Basler Flight Service, a division of Basler 
Turbo Conversions, LLC, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 19, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   Orion Flight Services, Inc. 
("Orion") seeks review of a published decision by the court of 
appeals1 reversing the circuit court's preliminary injunction 
requiring that Basler Flight Service, a division of Basler Turbo 
Conversions, LLC ("Basler"), set the price of its aviation fuel 
                                                 
1 Orion Flight Servs., Inc. v. Basler Flight Serv., 2004 WI 
App 222, 277 Wis. 2d 819, 692 N.W.2d 804.   
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
2 
 
pursuant to the minimum markup provisions for motor vehicle fuel 
under the Wisconsin Unfair Sales Act.2 
¶2 
At issue in this case is whether aviation fuel 
constitutes "motor vehicle fuel" under the Wisconsin Unfair 
Sales Act, subjecting aviation fuel to the Act's minimum markup 
provisions for motor vehicle fuel.3   
¶3 
Upon review, we conclude that "motor vehicle fuel" 
does not include aviation fuel, that the minimum markup 
provisions in Chapter 100 of the Wisconsin Statutes do not apply 
to 
aviation 
fuel, 
and 
that 
Orion 
cannot 
rely 
on 
Wis. Stat. § 100.30 for a private cause of action against 
Basler.  We also conclude that the Wisconsin Administrative Code 
§ ATCP 105.001(4) (Sept., 1990) does not incorporate aviation 
fuel in its definition of "motor vehicle fuel," and is thus 
consistent with the statute.  We therefore affirm the court of 
                                                 
2  Wis. Stat. § 100.30 (2003-04).  All references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes hereinafter are to the 2003-04 version unless 
otherwise noted. 
The 
Wisconsin 
Unfair 
Sales 
Act 
prohibits 
Wisconsin 
merchants from selling products below cost.  The Act also 
establishes a particular pricing scheme for "motor vehicle fuel" 
by defining "cost" for the sale of "motor vehicle fuel" to 
include a markup, ranging from 3 percent to 9.18 percent.  
§ 100.30(2)(am)1m.c.  This minimum legal selling price is 
referred to as a "minimum markup."  See infra n.18-21 and 
accompanying text. 
3 It is not disputed that even if motor vehicle fuel does 
not encompass aviation fuel within the context of the Unfair 
Sales Act, aviation fuel cannot be sold below cost since no 
vendor can sell any merchandise of any type below cost.  
Wis. Stat. § 100.30(3).  See also § 100.30(2)(am)2. and (c)2. 
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
3 
 
appeals' decision reversing the circuit court's preliminary 
injunction. 
I 
¶4 
The relevant facts are undisputed.  In 1957, Winnebago 
County and Basler entered into an agreement for Basler to sell 
aviation fuel at the Wittman Regional Airport ("Wittman") in 
Oshkosh, Wisconsin.  Basler is a Fixed Based Operation ("FBO"), 
which is a vendor of services at an airport or airfield.  Basler 
sells "Jet A fuel" and "100 LL aviation fuel" at Wittman through 
a self-service pump for use by airplane owners, as well as 
through the use of a fleet of trucks that deliver the fuel to 
aircrafts.  Basler continues to operate under this agreement.   
¶5 
From 1957 to 2002, Basler had been the sole provider 
of aviation fuel for Wittman, and the only FBO under an 
agreement with Winnebago County.  However, on May 29, 2002, 
Winnebago County entered into an agreement with Orion to sell 
aviation fuel at Wittman.  Orion, like Basler, sells Jet A fuel 
and 100 LL aviation fuel.  Unlike Basler, Orion only delivers 
the fuel to aircrafts and does not operate self-service pumps.   
¶6 
 In 2002 and early 2003, the parties engaged in a 
"price war" where the price of aviation fuel at Wittman dropped 
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
4 
 
from $2.59 to a low of $1.599 per gallon.4  In November 2002, 
Orion filed a complaint with the Wisconsin Department of 
Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection ("DATCP").  Orion 
alleged that when Basler set its price of fuel at $1.599 per 
gallon, Basler set its fuel price below cost, in violation of 
                                                 
4 When Orion began operating at Wittman on August 21, 2002, 
its initial price per gallon on truck-delivered aviation fuel 
was $2.54.  At that time, Basler's truck-delivered aviation fuel 
price was $2.59 per gallon.  In early September 2002, Orion 
dropped its truck-delivered aviation fuel to $1.99 per gallon, 
and Basler subsequently reduced its price to $1.89 per gallon.  
Orion then dropped its price to $1.69 per gallon.  On September 
28, 2002, Basler set its price at $1.599 per gallon.  Basler 
raised its prices in early January 2003 to $1.65 per gallon, on 
January 8 to $1.80 per gallon, and again on February 20 to $1.99 
per gallon.   
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
5 
 
the Unfair Sales Act, Wis. Stat. § 100.30(3).5  DATCP began an 
investigation into Basler's fuel prices.6 
¶7 
On 
March 
19, 
2003, 
before 
DATCP 
completed 
its 
investigation, Orion filed a suit in Winnebago County alleging 
that Basler sold motor vehicle fuel below the statutory minimum 
required for motor vehicle fuel, in violation of the Unfair 
Sales Act, and seeking injunctive relief.   
                                                 
5 The section reads in full: 
Any sale of any item of merchandise either by a 
retailer, wholesaler, wholesaler of motor vehicle fuel 
or refiner, at less than cost as defined in this 
section with the intent or effect of inducing the 
purchase of other merchandise or of unfairly diverting 
trade from a competitor, impairs and prevents fair 
competition, injures public welfare and is unfair 
competition and contrary to public policy and the 
policy of this section.  Such sales are prohibited. 
Evidence of any sale of any item of merchandise by any 
retailer, wholesaler, wholesaler of motor vehicle fuel 
or refiner at less than cost as defined in this 
section shall be prima facie evidence of intent or 
effect to induce the purchase of other merchandise, or 
to unfairly divert trade from a competitor, or to 
otherwise injure a competitor. 
Wis. Stat. § 100.30(3). 
6 The 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Agriculture, 
Trade 
and 
Consumer Protection ("DATCP") has the statutory authority to 
"commence an action on behalf of the state to recover a 
forfeiture," Wis. Stat. § 100.30(4), or "issue a special order 
as provided in s. 93.18 against a retailer, wholesaler, 
wholesaler of motor vehicle fuel or refiner requiring the person 
to cease and desist from violating this section in the sale of 
cigarettes or other tobacco products, fermented malt beverages, 
intoxicating 
liquor 
or 
wine 
or 
motor 
vehicle 
fuel," 
§ 100.30(5)(a).  
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
6 
 
¶8 
Two days after Orion filed this suit, Basler received 
a warning letter from DATCP.  DATCP concluded that Basler's 
"cost" of the 100 LL aviation fuel was $1.78, and therefore 
Basler violated Wis. Stat. § 100.30 when it sold its 100 LL 
aviation fuel at prices below $1.78.7  In the warning letter, 
DATCP further concluded that the minimum markup requirement 
under the Unfair Sales Act for sales of "motor vehicle fuel" did 
not include aviation fuel.   
[W]e have explored the issue of whether or not 100 LL 
aviation fuel should be treated as "motor vehicle 
fuel" under the Unfair Sales Act . . . .  We have 
concluded that 100 LL aviation fuel is not "motor 
vehicle fuel" as the term is used in the statute.  We 
base this conclusion on the common sense fact that 
airplanes 
are 
generally 
not 
considered 
"motor 
vehicles" under various transportation statutes and 
codes.  Furthermore, it seems illogical that the term 
"motor vehicle fuel" as it is used in the statute was 
intended to be used outside of the contents of sales 
of fuel intended for highway use through the well 
established industry 
of 
retail gas stations and 
convenience stores.8 
¶9 
Although DATCP concluded that aviation fuel was not 
"motor vehicle fuel," it also warned Basler that "any person who 
is injured as a result of a competitor selling motor vehicle 
fuel below cost may sue for $2,000 per day or treble actual 
damages, whichever is greater, plus reasonable accounting and 
                                                 
7 Rod McNeil, Section 100.30, Wisconsin Statutes, The Unfair 
Sales Act Warning Letter Complaint number 4139, DATCP, March 21, 
2003 (noting that because Basler's "cost" was $1.78 per gallon, 
Basler "was no longer in violation of the Unfair Sales Act" when 
it "raised its price to $1.80 on January 8, 2003").   
8 Id.  
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
7 
 
attorney fees."9  In addition, later that same day, DATCP 
followed up with a second letter to Basler, stating that  
[S]ome 
additional 
information 
has 
come 
to 
our 
attention regarding the question of whether aviation 
fuel is covered under the Unfair Sales Act as "motor 
vehicle fuel."  Based on this new development, we have 
decided that we need to do additional research on this 
question before we issue a final interpretation on 
this issue.  Specifically, in the first paragraph on 
page 2 of the warning letter, we state an opinion that 
100 LL aviation fuel is not "motor vehicle fuel" under 
the Unfair Sales Act.  That paragraph and the opinion 
it expresses is hereby retracted.  However, the 
remainder of the warning letter still stands.10 
¶10 This second letter explicitly retracts "the opinion 
that 100 LL aviation fuel is not 'motor vehicle fuel.'"  
                                                 
9 Id. (emphasis added).  The authority for private action is 
rooted in the Wisconsin Unfair Sales Act, but only applies to 
motor vehicle fuel.  The statute reads: 
Any person who is injured or threatened with injury as 
a result of a sale or purchase of motor vehicle fuel 
in violation of sub. (3) may bring an action against 
the person who violated sub. (3) for temporary or 
permanent injunctive relief or an action against the 
person for 3 times the amount of any monetary loss 
sustained or an amount equal to $2,000, whichever is 
greater, 
multiplied 
by 
each 
day 
of 
continued 
violation, together with costs, including accounting 
fees and reasonable attorney fees, notwithstanding s. 
814.04(1).  An action under this subsection may not be 
brought after 180 days after the date of a violation 
of sub. (3). 
Wis. Stat. § 100.30(5m) (emphasis added). 
10 Rod McNeil, Retraction in part of warning letter issued 
March 21, 2003, in File Number 4139, DATCP, March 21, 2003 
(emphasis in original).  The court of appeals noted that this 
retraction was in response to communications between DATCP and 
Orion's attorney.   
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
8 
 
However, DATCP failed to retract its conclusion that the cost 
for Basler's 100 LL aviation fuel was $1.78.  The analysis used 
to reach the $1.78 figure did not include a minimum markup 
calculation.11 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 100.30(2)(am)1m.a. 
to 
e.  
Moreover, the record contains no final interpretation of "motor 
vehicle fuel," and no final order from DATCP.  
¶11 On March 19, 2003, the Winnebago County Circuit Court 
issued an ex parte temporary restraining order, ordering Basler 
to, among other things, "immediately refrain from selling any 
motor vehicle fuel below the minimum prices established by 
Wis. Stat. § 100.30, the Unfair Sales Act."12    
¶12 On May 2, 2003, the Honorable Thomas J. Gritton 
granted Orion's preliminary injunction request, finding that:  
The 
definition 
is 
clear 
to 
me 
and 
under 
the 
circumstances as we have them here the fuel that is 
being used is being placed into what I would consider 
to be under that definition a motor vehicle for 
purposes of the Unfair Sales Act.   
¶13 The circuit court ordered Basler to "immediately 
refrain from selling 100 LL fuel 'below cost' as defined in 
Wis. Stat. § 100.30(2)(am)1m.c."13  The circuit court based its 
                                                 
11 McNeil, DATCP Warning Letter, March 21, 2003.   
12 The March 19, 2003 Temporary Restraining Order also 
ordered Basler to produce "any and all written documentation 
concerning its purchase and sale of motor vehicle fuel from 
September 1, 2002 to the present."   
13 The statute states: 
In the case of the retail sale of motor vehicle fuel 
by a person other than a refiner or a wholesaler of 
motor vehicle fuel at a retail station, the invoice 
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
9 
 
decision on the definition of motor vehicle fuel in Wis. Admin. 
Code § ATCP 105.001(4).14  The court reasoned that the definition 
of motor vehicle is unambiguous in the code, and under the 
circumstances of the facts of this case, the fuel sold by Basler 
and Orion constitutes "motor vehicle fuel" for purposes of the 
Unfair Sales Act. 
¶14 Basler filed an interlocutory appeal. The court of 
appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed. The court of 
appeals concluded that including aviation fuel in the definition 
of "motor vehicle fuel" strayed too far from the legislature's 
                                                                                                                                                             
cost of the motor vehicle fuel to the retailer within 
10 days prior to the date of sale, or the replacement 
cost of the motor vehicle fuel, whichever is lower, 
less all trade discounts except customary discounts 
for cash, plus any excise, sales or use taxes imposed 
on the motor vehicle fuel or on its sale and any cost 
incurred for transportation and any other charges not 
otherwise 
included 
in 
the 
invoice 
cost 
or 
the 
replacement cost of the motor vehicle fuel, plus a 
markup of 6% of that amount to cover a proportionate 
part of the cost of doing business; or the average 
posted terminal price at the terminal located closest 
to the retailer plus a markup of 9.18% of the average 
posted terminal price to cover a proportionate part of 
the cost of doing business; whichever is greater. 
Wis. Stat. § 100.30(2)(am)1m.c. 
14 The Administrative Code reads: 
"Motor vehicle fuel" 
means any 
liquid 
prepared, 
advertised or sold for use as or commonly and 
commercially used as a fuel in internal combustion 
engines. 
Wis. Admin. Code § ATCP 105.001(4). 
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
10 
 
intent.15  The court of appeals also concluded that because the 
Unfair Sales Act excludes aviation fuel from the definition of 
"motor vehicle fuel," "the DATCP's definition may extend no 
further."16 
¶15 Orion asks this court to reverse the court of appeals 
and find that "motor vehicle fuel" includes aviation fuel for 
purposes of the Unfair Sales Act.  Orion contends that the court 
of appeals unnecessarily limited the definition of "motor 
vehicle fuel."  In contrast, Basler asks this court to affirm 
the court of appeals, asserting that the language of the 
statute, along with its context, structure, and its relationship 
with other statutes, indicate that aviation fuel is not "motor 
vehicle fuel" within the meaning of the Unfair Sales Act.   
II 
¶16 This 
case 
presents 
a 
question 
of 
statutory 
interpretation, which we review de novo. State v. Reed, 2005 WI 
53, ¶13, 280 Wis. 2d 68, 695 N.W.2d 315.  The purpose of 
statutory interpretation is to determine what a statute means in 
order to give the statute its full, proper, and intended effect.  
Id.  "We begin with the statute's language because we assume 
that the legislature's intent is expressed in the words it 
used."  Id.  Generally, language is given its common, ordinary, 
and accepted meaning.  Kalal v. Dane County Cir. Ct., 2004 WI 
58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  In addition, 
                                                 
15 Orion, 277 Wis. 2d 819, ¶24. 
16 Id., ¶27. 
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
11 
 
statutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is 
used, in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related 
statutes, 
and 
interpreted 
to 
avoid 
absurd 
or 
unreasonable results.  Id., ¶46.   
¶17 "If the meaning is plain, we ordinarily stop the 
inquiry."  Reed, 280 Wis. 2d 68, ¶13.  However, if a statute is 
ambiguous, we examine extrinsic sources, such as legislative 
history, to ascertain the legislative intent.  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶48.  A statute is ambiguous if "[t]he statute's 
ability to support two reasonable constructions creates an 
ambiguity which cannot be resolved through the language of the 
statute itself.  [A] statutory provision is ambiguous if 
reasonable minds could differ as to its meaning."  UFE Inc. v. 
LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 283, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996) (quotation 
omitted).   
¶18 This case also requires this court to examine the 
meaning of an administrative code provision.  The interpretation 
of an administrative code provision is "a question of law 
subject to independent appellate review."  State ex rel. Griffin 
v. Smith, 2004 WI 36, ¶18, 270 Wis. 2d 235, 677 N.W.2d 259.  
Interpretations of code provisions, and the determination as to 
whether the provision in question is consistent with the 
applicable statute, are subject to principles of statutory 
construction.17  Basinas v. State, 104 Wis. 2d 539, 546, 312 
                                                 
17 See Wis. Stat. § 227.27(1), which states:  
In construing rules, ss. 990.001, 990.01, 990.03(1), 
(2) and (4), 990.04 and 990.06 apply in the same 
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
12 
 
N.W.2d 483 (1981); Griffin, 270 Wis. 2d 235, ¶19; State v. 
Busch, 217 Wis. 2d 429, 441, 576 N.W.2d 904 (1998).  If a rule 
is ambiguous, we may resort to extrinsic aids to determine 
agency intent.  State ex rel. Staples v. Young, 142 Wis. 2d 348, 
354, 418 N.W.2d 333 (Ct. App. 1987).  In resolving the 
ambiguity, this court gives deference to an agency's settled 
"interpretation and 
application of 
its 
own 
administrative 
regulations unless the interpretation is inconsistent with the 
language of the regulation or is clearly erroneous."  Bergmann 
v. McCaughtry, 211 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 564 N.W.2d 712 (citations 
omitted). 
III 
¶19 We begin our analysis of whether the Unfair Sales Act 
applies to aviation fuel with an examination of the statute.   
¶20 The Unfair Sales Act establishes a statutory scheme 
for regulating vendor pricing in Wisconsin.  Although the Unfair 
Sales Act prohibits all vendors from selling merchandise below 
cost,18 the Act establishes a particular pricing scheme for 
"motor vehicle fuel" by defining "cost" for the sale of "motor 
vehicle fuel" to include a markup, ranging from 3 percent to 
                                                                                                                                                             
manner in which they apply to statutes, except that 
ss. 
990.001 
and 
990.01 
do 
not 
apply 
if 
the 
construction 
would 
produce 
a 
result 
that 
is 
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the agency. 
18 Wis. Stat. § 100.30(3). 
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
13 
 
9.18 percent.19  This minimum legal selling price is referred to 
as a "minimum markup."  The statute also contains markup 
provisions for computing costs for "cigarettes or other tobacco 
products, fermented malt beverages or intoxicating liquor or 
wine."20  No other merchandise is currently subject to a minimum 
markup.21   
¶21 Under the Unfair Sales Act: 
Any sale of any item of merchandise either by a 
retailer, wholesaler, wholesaler of motor vehicle fuel 
or refiner, at less than cost as defined in this 
section with the intent or effect of inducing the 
purchase of other merchandise or of unfairly diverting 
trade from a competitor, impairs and prevents fair 
competition, injures public welfare and is unfair 
competition and contrary to public policy and the 
policy of this section.  Such sales are prohibited. 
Evidence of any sale of any item of merchandise by any 
retailer, wholesaler, wholesaler of motor vehicle fuel 
or refiner at less than cost as defined in this 
section shall be prima facie evidence of intent or 
effect to induce the purchase of other merchandise, or 
to unfairly divert trade from a competitor, or to 
otherwise injure a competitor.22 
¶22 The statute also establishes a private right of action 
for merchants who sell motor vehicle fuel below cost, as defined 
                                                 
19 The percent markup depends upon whether the vendor is a 
refiner, a wholesaler, or a person other than a refiner or 
wholesaler, whether the vendor sells at a retail station or at a 
place other than a retail station, and whether the sale is a 
retail sale or wholesale sale.  Wis. Stat. § 100.30(2)(am)1m.a.  
to e.   
20 Wis. Stat. § 100.30(2)(am)1. 
21 See Wis. Stat. § 100.30(2)(am)2. and (c)2. 
22 Wis. Stat. § 100.30(3). 
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
14 
 
in subsection (3).  Wis. Stat. § 100.30(5m).  Under this 
subsection, "Any person who is injured or threatened with injury 
as a result of a sale or purchase of motor vehicle fuel" is 
authorized to bring an action against the merchant who violated 
this statute for "temporary or permanent injunctive relief" or 
for treble damages or $2,000 for each day the violation 
continues, whichever is greater.  Id.23    
¶23 The 
question 
before 
this 
court 
is 
whether 
the 
legislature intended aviation fuel to constitute "motor vehicle 
fuel" under the Unfair Sales Act.   
A 
¶24 The Unfair Sales Act does not define "motor vehicle 
fuel."  When a statute does not define an essential term, we 
examine the ordinary meaning of that term.  State v. Martin, 162 
Wis. 2d  883, 904, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991).  See also Bruno v. 
Milwaukee 
County, 
2003 
WI 
28, 
¶8, 
260 
Wis. 2d 633, 
660 
N.W.2d 656 (citing Weber v. Town of Saukville, 209 Wis. 2d 214, 
224, 562 N.W.2d 412 (1997)).  We normally turn to a "recognized 
dictionary to determine the common and ordinary meaning of the 
word."  Mared Industries, Inc. v. Mansfield, 2005 WI 5, ¶32, 277 
Wis. 2d 350, 690 N.W.2d 835 (quoting State v. Polashek, 2002 WI 
74, ¶19, 253 Wis. 2d 527, 646 N.W.2d 330)).   
¶25 Orion asserts that the meaning of "motor vehicle fuel" 
clearly and unambiguously includes aviation fuel, and therefore 
                                                 
23 The statute explicitly establishes a private right of 
action only for motor vehicle fuel, Wis. Stat. § 100.30(5m), and 
tobacco products, § 100.30(5r). 
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
15 
 
the court need not examine any extrinsic materials to discern 
the legislature's intent.  Orion contends that dictionary 
definitions of the words "motor," "vehicle," and "fuel," when 
considered together, compel the conclusion that the term "motor 
vehicle fuel" means a combustible matter used to run a 
comparatively small and powerful engine, such as an internal 
combustion engine, in any means of conveyance, which would 
include an aircraft.  Basler counters that a phrase must be 
understood according to its common usage and cannot be parsed 
into its least common denominators and recast into something 
new.  Basler implies that Orion's method produces absurd 
results, suggesting that, under Orion's approach, a "hot dog" 
would be defined as a domesticated, carnivorous animal that 
radiates heat.  Basler offers its own definition, contending 
that the plain meaning of "motor vehicle" commonly refers to 
fuel used by cars, trucks, and similar earth-bound vehicles. 
¶26 We find no dictionary definition for the phrase "motor 
vehicle fuel."  The dictionary defines "motor vehicle" as "[a] 
self-propelled wheeled conveyance, such as a car or truck, that 
does not run on rails."  American Heritage Dictionary of English 
Language, 1179 (3d ed. 1992).  In addition, though we find no 
definition of "aviation fuel," the dictionary defines "airplane" 
as "various winged vehicles capable of flight, generally heavier 
than air and driven by jet engines or propellers."  Id. at 39.  
Neither of these definitions, nor the definitions proffered by 
the parties, clarify whether motor vehicle fuel includes 
aviation fuel.  We therefore consider other intrinsic sources, 
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
16 
 
such as the statement of purpose and the context in which 
statutory language is used.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶49.  We 
begin by examining the legislature's statement of legislative 
intent. 
B 
¶27 The Wisconsin Legislature included a statement of 
policy when it passed the Unfair Sales Act.  The policy states:  
The practice of selling certain items of merchandise 
below cost in order to attract patronage is generally 
a form of deceptive advertising and an unfair method 
of competition in commerce. Such practice causes 
commercial dislocations, misleads the consumer, works 
back 
against 
the 
farmer, 
directly 
burdens 
and 
obstructs commerce, and diverts business from dealers 
who maintain a fair price policy.  Bankruptcies among 
merchants who fail because of the competition of those 
who 
use 
such 
methods 
result 
in 
unemployment, 
disruption of leases, and nonpayment of taxes and 
loans, and contribute to an inevitable train of 
undesirable 
consequences, 
including 
economic 
depression. 
Wis. Stat. § 100.30(1).24  
¶28 Under this express statement of intent, the policy of 
Wis. Stat. § 100.30 
is to 
protect 
Wisconsin 
consumers and 
merchants against unfair competition in commerce.  The statute 
seeks to achieve this policy by prohibiting the sale of 
merchandise below cost.25  This court has previously recognized 
that the legislative intent behind other state statutes similar 
                                                 
24 This statement of legislative intent was included in the 
original version of this law in 1939.  See ch. 56, Laws of 1939.   
25 Wis. Stat. § 100.30(3). 
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
17 
 
to the Unfair Sales Act is to address an "economic evil"26 and 
"promote[] the general welfare" by fostering free, open, and 
fair competition.27   
¶29 In concluding that "motor vehicle fuel" does not 
include aviation fuel for purposes of the Unfair Sales Act, the 
court of appeals relied heavily on its determination that "the 
legislature intended the Unfair Sales Act to prevent large 
vendors from driving small competitors out of business . . ." 
and that common sense would clearly reveal that the aviation 
fuel market is outside the scope "of the 'mom and pop' 
businesses the legislature intended to protect."  Orion, 277 
Wis. 2d 819, ¶¶22-23 (citation omitted).   
¶30 Orion contends that the court of appeals improperly 
concluded that the legislative intent behind the Unfair Sales 
Act did not include FBOs because they are not "mom and pop" 
businesses.  Basler's pricing scheme, Orion asserts, is exactly 
the type of unfair competition the legislature intended to ban 
through the Unfair Sales Act in an attempt to protect consumers 
and businesses.  Orion asks this court to conclude that the 
Unfair Sales Act applies to more than "mom and pop" convenience 
stores. 
¶31 Upon review we find nothing in the stated purpose of 
legislative intent that limits the Unfair Sales Act to "mom and 
                                                 
26 State v. Ross, 259 Wis. 379, 384, 48 N.W.2d 460 (1951). 
27 State v. Eau Claire Oil Co., 35 Wis. 2d 724, 733, 151 
N.W.2d 634 (1967). 
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
18 
 
pop" establishments.  The purpose of the Act is to protect 
consumers against unfair pricing.  To that effect, it is not 
disputed that Basler is prohibited under the Act from selling 
its fuel below cost.  But that is not the question before this 
court.  We must determine whether the cost of aviation fuel is 
to be calculated as "motor vehicle fuel" and therefore subject 
to the minimum markup, or whether the cost of aviation fuel is 
to be calculated like all other merchandise.  There is nothing 
in the stated purpose, or in the public policy recognized by 
this court in other cases, that suggests whether selling 
aviation 
fuel 
with 
or 
without 
the 
minimum 
markup 
would 
constitute a greater economic evil, foster unfair competition, 
or harm Wisconsin consumers.   
C 
¶32 Because we interpret statutory language "in relation 
to 
the 
language 
of 
surrounding 
or 
closely-related 
statutes . . . to avoid absurd or unreasonable results," Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46, our plain meaning analysis of the Unfair 
Sales Act also focuses on related statutes.   
¶33 Orion 
contends 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
properly 
determined that Chapter 78 and Wis. Stat. § 100.30 are not 
"related" because they concern different areas of law; Chapter 
78 is a taxation statute, whereas Chapter 100 addresses trade 
and marketing.  Therefore, according to Orion, the definition of 
"motor vehicle fuel" in Chapter 78 is inapplicable to § 100.30.   
¶34   In contrast, Basler urges this court to conclude 
that the Unfair Sales Act must be read together with Chapter 78, 
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
19 
 
which defines and distinguishes "motor vehicle fuel" and 
"aviation fuel," because the statutes relate to the same subject 
matter: Chapter 78 establishes the state excise taxes that a 
fuel seller must use to determine its minimum sale price for 
motor vehicles under the Unfair Sales Act.  According to Basler, 
interpreting 
the 
term 
"motor 
vehicle 
fuel" 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 100.30 to include aviation fuel would result in an 
absurd contradiction: the same aviation fuel would be subject to 
"aviation fuel" calculations under one statute (Chapter 78), but 
subject to "motor vehicle fuel" calculations under a related 
statute (Chapter 100).  This would create a conflict and an 
absurd relationship between the Unfair Sales Act and Chapter 78. 
¶35 We find Basler's argument persuasive.  Chapters 78 and 
100 relate to the same subject matter.  This court should 
therefore attempt to harmonize the two chapters, if possible, to 
avoid absurd results.  State v. Wachsmuth, 73 Wis. 2d 318, 326-
30, 243 N.W.2d 410 (1976) (concluding that when two statutes are 
"in pari material, the court must harmonize them if possible"). 
¶36 Chapter 78 distinguishes between motor vehicle fuel 
and general aviation fuel.  Under Wis. Stat. § 78.005(13), 
"'Motor vehicle fuel' means gasoline or diesel fuel."  Motor 
vehicle is defined as a conveyance that is "self-propelled by an 
internal combustion engine or motor and licensed for highway 
use."  Wis. Stat. § 78.005(12).   
¶37 In contrast, aviation fuel is defined separately from 
"motor vehicle fuel."  Under Chapter 78:  
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
20 
 
"General aviation fuel" means products placed in the 
fuel supply tank of aircraft, commonly or commercially 
known as aviation gasoline and jet turbine fuel and 
other combustible gases and liquids suitable for the 
generation of power for propulsion of aircraft.28  
¶38 It is clear from the Chapter 78 definitions that with 
respect to Chapter 78, the legislature has defined "motor 
vehicle fuel" as gasoline or diesel fuel used in vehicles 
capable of being driven on a highway, while general aviation 
fuel is defined as that which is specifically designed for 
aircraft.  The legislature approached these fuels differently 
for purposes of Chapter 78. 
¶39 In addition to Chapter 78, Orion also asserts that the 
court of appeals improperly relied on the definition of the term 
"motor vehicle" in Wis. Stat. § 340.  Although other sections of 
Chapter 100 cross-reference Chapter 340, the Unfair Sales Act 
does not.  Basler counters that although the term "motor 
vehicle" 
is 
not 
defined 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 100.30, 
numerous 
sections of Chapter 100 reference the definition of vehicle in 
chapter 340, which, like Chapter 78, limits the definition to 
highway use.   
¶40 Upon review, we find five subsections of Chapter 100 
that currently cross-reference the term "motor vehicle" as 
                                                 
28 Wis. Stat. § 78.55(3) (emphasis added).   
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
21 
 
defined in Wis. Stat. § 340.01(35).29  Chapter 340 refers to 
vehicles that are used on land and does not include airplanes.30   
¶41 Examining 
Wis. Stat. § 100.30 
in 
the 
context 
of 
Chapter 78, as well as in the context of the cross-references 
between Chapter 100 and § 340.01(35), we determine that when the 
                                                 
29 Wis. Stat. §§ 100.205(1)(c) ("'Rustproofing' means the 
application of materials and processes intended or represented 
to prevent or control rusting or corrosion of a motor vehicle as 
defined 
in 
s. 
340.01(35)"); 
100.21(1)(d) 
(addressing 
the 
substantiation of energy savings or safety claims, "'Motor 
vehicle' has the meaning provided under s. 340.01(35)"); 
100.42(1)(h) (addressing product safety, "'Motor vehicle' has 
the 
meaning 
given 
under 
s. 
340.01(35)"); 
100.45(1)(c) 
(addressing mobile air conditioners, "'Motor vehicle' has the 
meaning given in s. 340.01 (35)"); and 100.51(5)(1) (addressing 
motor fuel dealerships, "'Motor vehicle' has the meaning given 
in s. 340.01 (35)"). 
30 The statutes read: 
"Motor 
vehicle" 
means 
a 
vehicle, 
including 
a 
combination of 2 or more vehicles or an articulated 
vehicle, which is self−propelled, except a vehicle 
operated 
exclusively 
on 
a rail. 
"Motor 
vehicle" 
includes, 
without 
limitation, 
a 
commercial 
motor 
vehicle or a vehicle which is propelled by electric 
power obtained from overhead trolley wires but not 
operated on rails. A snowmobile and an all−terrain 
vehicle shall only be considered motor vehicles for 
purposes made specifically applicable by statute. 
Wis. Stat. § 340.01(35) (emphasis added).  "Vehicle" is further 
defined: 
"Vehicle" means every device in, upon, or by which any 
person or property is or may be transported or drawn 
upon a highway, except railroad trains. A snowmobile 
or electric personal assistive mobility device shall 
not be considered a vehicle except for purposes made 
specifically applicable by statute. 
Wis. Stat. § 340.01(74) (emphasis added). 
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
22 
 
legislature has defined "motor vehicle" or "vehicle," it has 
continuously referenced conveyances that operate on land and has 
not included aircraft.   
¶42 However, 
these 
statutory 
definitions 
of 
"motor 
vehicle," "motor vehicle fuel" and "general aviation fuel" are 
not cross-referenced in Wis. Stat. § 100.30.  When a statute 
with respect to one subject contains a given provision, "the 
omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a 
related subject is significant in showing that a different 
intention existed."  Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 
of Wisconsin, 110 Wis. 2d 455, 463, 329 N.W.2d 143 (1983) 
(quoting State v. Welkos, 14 Wis. 2d 186, 192, 109 N.W.2d 889 
(1961)).31  
¶43 We 
cannot 
ignore 
the 
legislature's 
consistent 
definitions 
of 
"motor 
vehicle" 
and 
"motor 
vehicle 
fuel" 
throughout the Wisconsin Statutes, nor can we ignore the fact 
that Wis. Stat. § 100.30 does not explicitly cross-reference any 
of these statutory definitions of "motor vehicle" or "motor 
vehicle fuel."  We therefore conclude that the language of the 
surrounding and closely-related statutes fails to clarify the 
meaning of "motor vehicle fuel" in § 100.30 as to whether it 
includes "aviation fuel." 
 
                                                 
31 In State v. Welkos, 14 Wis. 2d 186, 192, 109 N.W.2d 889 
(1961), this court reasoned that because the legislature had 
amended one statute but did not make a like change to a similar 
statute, the omission of that new provision from the similar 
statute demonstrated a different intent.   
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
23 
 
D 
¶44 Orion 
asserts 
that 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
this 
statutory definition of "motor vehicle fuel" includes gasoline 
used to power numerous types of motor vehicles, including 
aircraft, 
boats, 
farm 
equipment, 
construction 
machinery, 
motorcycles, and snowmobiles.  In contrast, Basler contends that 
"motor vehicle fuel" refers to the fuel used by cars, trucks, 
and similarly earthbound vehicles, and therefore the statutory 
language clearly does not include aviation fuel.   
¶45 Simply 
because 
parties 
disagree 
on 
the 
"plain" 
interpretation of a statute does not make the statute ambiguous.  
Preston v. Meriter 
Hosp., 
Inc., 
2005 
WI 
122, 
¶20, 284  
Wis. 2d 264, 700 N.W.2d 158.  However, we agree with the court 
of appeals and find that "neither party advances a definition 
wildly at odds with common sense."  Orion, 277 Wis. 2d 819, ¶21.  
In addition, neither party advances a definition at odds with 
the plain meaning of the statute.  The use of the term "motor 
vehicle fuel" in Wis. Stat. § 100.30, therefore, supports two 
reasonable constructions that cannot be resolved through the 
language itself.  See UFE, 201 Wis. 2d at 283.  We conclude that 
the statute is ambiguous because it is open to more than one 
reasonable interpretation.  We therefore turn to extrinsic 
sources to determine the legislative intent.   
IV 
¶46 Because we find the Unfair Sales Act ambiguous, we 
review the relevant administrative code provision, DATCP's 
interpretations of the statute and code, and the legislative 
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
24 
 
history of the statute.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶48, 50; 
UFE, 201 Wis. 2d at 282-83.   
A 
¶47 We begin with an examination of the administrative 
code provision that defines "motor vehicle fuel" for purposes of 
the Unfair Sales Act.  The Wisconsin Statutes authorize the 
legislature to delegate the authority to administrative agencies 
to 
make 
rules 
necessary 
to 
effectuate 
a 
statute.  
Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2)(a).  When an agency issues a rule 
pursuant to its rule-making authority, that rule has the effect 
of law.  Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13).  Our analysis reveals that the 
administrative code is ambiguous. 
¶48 The Wisconsin Legislature granted DATCP the authority 
to promulgate regulations to implement Chapter 93 through 
Chapter 100 of the Wisconsin Statutes.32  Pursuant to this rule-
making authority, DATCP issued a rule that defined "motor 
vehicle fuel" in the Wisconsin Administrative Code as follows:  
"Motor vehicle fuel" 
means any 
liquid 
prepared, 
advertised or sold for use as or commonly and 
commercially used as fuel in internal combustion 
engines. 
                                                 
32 According to Chapter 93, it is the duty of DATCP  
To make and enforce such regulations, not inconsistent 
with law, as it may deem necessary for the exercise 
and discharge of all the powers and duties of the 
department, and to adopt such measures and make such 
regulations as are necessary and proper for the 
enforcement by the state of chs. 93 to 100, which 
regulations shall have the force of law. 
Wis. Stat. § 93.07(1). 
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
25 
 
Wis. Admin. Code § ATCP 105.001(4).  
¶49 Orion 
asserts that 
DATCP 
properly 
promulgated a 
definition of "motor vehicle fuel" that indicates that aviation 
fuel constitutes motor vehicle fuel, and that the definition is 
entirely consistent with the purposes of the Unfair Sales Act.33  
According to Orion, the only limitation on motor vehicle fuel 
under ATCP § 105.001(4) is that the fuel must be used in an 
internal combustion engine, and this limitation does not exclude 
aviation fuel.  Orion contends that the court of appeals ignored 
the clear and unambiguous definition of motor vehicle fuel in 
§ ATCP 105.001(4).  Orion further contends that Basler was 
required to first file a separate declaratory judgment action to 
invalidate the rule under Wis. Stat. § 227.40.34   
¶50 In contrast, Basler contends that the court of appeals 
correctly rejected Orion's argument that the DATCP regulation 
should be read expansively to include aviation fuel.  According 
to Basler, the history of the regulation demonstrates that DATCP 
used Chapter 78 to create the definition, intending to limit 
"motor vehicle fuel" to fuel used by conveyances that are "self-
propelled by an internal combustion engine or motor and licensed 
for highway use . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 78.03(1) (1990).  In 
                                                 
33 Orion also asserts that the legislature ratified DATCP's 
definition when it amended the Unfair Sales Act.  Because we 
find the code ambiguous, we do not reach this issue. 
34 Under this statute, "the exclusive means of judicial 
review of the validity of a rule shall be an action for 
declaratory judgment as to the validity of such rule brought in 
the circuit court for Dane County."  Wis. Stat. § 227.40.  
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
26 
 
addition, Basler asserts that the history of the rule is 
consistent with DATCP's interpretations in its warning letter to 
Basler.  In response to Orion's assertion that the court lacks 
competence 
to 
proceed 
because 
Basler 
failed 
to 
file 
a 
declaratory judgment action under Wis. Stat. § 227.40, Basler 
contends that this statute only applies when a party seeks to 
invalidate a rule and Basler is not seeking to invalidate a 
rule.     
¶51 Because administrative code provisions are subject to 
rules of statutory construction, Basinas, 104 Wis. 2d at 546, we 
do not reach the history of § ATCP 105.001, on which Basler 
relies, unless we find the rule ambiguous.  Under § ATCP 
105.001(4), "motor vehicle fuel" includes "any liquid" that is 
used in an "internal combustion engine."  The definition is 
silent with regard to general aviation fuel.  Moreover, the code 
provision makes no reference to aviation gasoline or jet turbine 
fuel.  The code provision, therefore, fails to clarify the same 
term used in the statute that we concluded was susceptible to 
more than one reasonable interpretation with regard to aviation 
fuel.  Like a statute, "[a] rule is ambiguous if reasonable 
persons can understand it differently."  Staples, 142 Wis. 2d at 
354.  We conclude that the code provision is ambiguous as to 
whether "motor vehicle fuel" includes aviation fuel.  We 
therefore turn to the history of the formation of Wis. Admin. 
Code § ATCP 105.001(4) and the agency's interpretations of the 
regulation to determine the agency's intent and resolve the 
ambiguity in § ATCP 105.001(4). 
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
27 
 
1 
¶52 An analysis of the history of Wis. Admin. Code § ATCP 
105.001 reveals that DATCP intended to make the definition of 
"motor vehicle fuel" consistent with Chapter 78, excluding 
aviation fuel from the definition. 
¶53 On May 24, 1989, DATCP submitted proposed Rule 89-91 
to the Wisconsin Legislative Council staff for review.35  This 
proposed rule was ultimately promulgated as Wis. Admin. Code 
§ ATCP 105.001. 
¶54 On June 22, 1989, after completing its analysis, the 
Legislative Council sent to DATCP a Clearinghouse Report on Rule 
89-91.36  In the Clearinghouse Report, the Legislative Council 
wrote: "It is not clear why the term 'motor vehicle fuel' is 
used instead of 'motor fuel' or why a separate definition of the 
term is created instead of using the statutory definition of 
'motor fuel' contained in s. 78.04, Stats."  Clearinghouse 
Report, Rule 89-91 Comments, June 22, 1989. 
¶55 In 
a 
letter 
to 
Senator 
Fred 
Risser 
and 
then-
Assemblyman Thomas Loftus, sent March 5, 1990, Howard C. 
Richards, then-Secretary of DATCP, addressed these requests for 
clarification posed in the Legislative Council Clearinghouse 
                                                 
35 Wis. Stat. § 227.15(1) ("Prior to a public hearing on a 
proposed rule . . . an agency shall submit the proposed rule to 
the legislative council staff for review . . . .").  This 
statute has not changed and was in effect in 1989. 
36 Id. 
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
28 
 
Report regarding the agency's definition of motor vehicle fuel 
in proposed Rule 89-91.37  Secretary Richards stated: 
[T]hese phrases have different meanings and [] the 
unfair sales act specifically refers to "motor vehicle 
fuel" [draft], not "motor fuel".  "Motor fuel" is 
defined in s. 78.04, Stats., to cover only gasoline 
and some naphthas.  It excludes diesel and other 
special fuels, while "motor vehicle fuel," according 
to the definition of "motor vehicle" in s. 78.03(1) 
[89-90], Stats., includes diesel and other special 
fuels.  These terms are not synonymous, and the 
distinction 
between 
them 
must 
be 
taken 
into 
consideration . . . . 
Howard C. Richards, Secretary of DATCP, Notice and Report of 
Proposed Adoption of Rules Relating to Enforcing the Unfair 
Sales Act, ch. Ag 119, Wis. Admin. Code (Clearinghouse Rule No. 
89-91), March 5, 1990 (emphasis in original).38   
¶56 As stated above, Wis. Stat. § 78.005(12), like the 
former § 78.03(1),39 defines "motor vehicle": 
"Motor vehicle" means any automobile, truck, truck-
tractor, tractor, bus, vehicle or other conveyance 
that is self-propelled by an internal combustion 
engine or motor and licensed for highway use, except 
that "motor vehicle" does not include mobile machinery 
and equipment. 
Wis. Stat. § 78.005(12) (emphasis added). 
                                                 
37 Wis. Stat. § 227.19(2) ("An agency shall submit a notice 
to the presiding officer of each house of the legislature when a 
proposed rule is in final draft form.").  This statute has not 
changed and was in effect in 1989. 
38 We note that ch. Ag 119, Wis. Admin. Code was later 
renamed Agriculture Trade and Consumer Protection Chapter 105 of 
the Wisconsin Administrative Code ("§ ATCP 105"). 
39 Section 78.03(1) (1989-90), Stats., was renumbered as 
§ 78.005(12) in 1993.  1993 Wis. Act 16, § 1862.   
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
29 
 
¶57 The rule was referred to the committee on Commerce and 
Consumer Affairs on March 12, 1990.  The review period ended 
without objection from the legislature,40 and DATCP promulgated 
the rule, unchanged, effective September 1, 1990. 
¶58 DATCP's March 5, 1990, letter to the legislature 
explaining its definition of "motor vehicle fuel" reveals the 
agency's intent in structuring its definition.  The agency 
clearly intended to define the term "motor vehicle fuel" to 
include more than gasoline, but to limit the definition to 
ensure 
the 
administrative 
rule 
was 
consistent 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 78.03(1) (1989-90).  As a result, in implementing 
this rule, DATCP limited the definition of "motor vehicle fuel" 
to gasoline, diesel, and other special fuels used to power 
vehicles that are "self-propelled by an internal combustion 
engine or motor and licensed for highway use"41 as defined in 
Chapter 78.42  This historical analysis clarifies that DATCP did 
not intend for general aviation fuel to fall within its 
definition of motor vehicle fuel.   
 
 
                                                 
40 Wis. Stat. § 227.19(4)(e). 
41 Wis. Stat. § 78.005(12) (emphasis added). 
42 We note that three years after Wis. Admin. Code § ATCP 
105.001 was promulgated, the legislature defined "motor vehicle 
fuel" in the Wisconsin Statutes for the first time.  The 
definition reads: "'motor vehicle fuel' means gasoline or diesel 
fuel."  Wis. Stat. § 78.005(13); 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 1839. 
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
30 
 
2 
¶59 We next examine DATCP’s interpretation of the statute 
and the applicable portions of the administrative code as 
contained in its preliminary warning letters to Basler.  We 
conclude that DATCP's interpretations of the administrative code 
in this case offer no guidance for our analysis.  
¶60 This court ordinarily gives deference to a state 
agency's settled "interpretation and application of its own 
administrative 
regulations 
unless 
the 
interpretation 
is 
inconsistent with the language of the regulation or is clearly 
erroneous."  Bergmann, 211 Wis. 2d at 7 (citations omitted).  
Because the record in this case reveals that there is no settled 
agency interpretation, it is clear that the preliminary warning 
letters at issue in this case should not be given any deference.  
We therefore examine the meaning of the administrative code 
independently.  See Id. at 8. 
¶61 The record in this case indicates that there is no 
settled department interpretation of the regulation at issue.  
DATCP issued a preliminary warning letter informing Basler that 
"motor vehicle fuel" did not include aviation fuel, yet warned 
Basler that "any person who is injured as a result of a 
competitor 
selling 
motor 
vehicle 
fuel 
below 
cost 
may 
sue . . . ."43  Moreover, hours after issuing this warning letter 
to Basler, DATCP retracted its conclusion that "motor vehicle 
                                                 
43 Rod McNeil, Section 100.30, Wisconsin Statutes, The 
Unfair Sales Act Warning Letter Complaint number 4139, DATCP, 
March 21, 2003 (emphasis added).   
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
31 
 
fuel" did not include aviation fuel.44  In this retraction, DATCP 
stated it needed to conduct "additional research on this 
question before we issue a final interpretation" with regard to 
aviation fuel.45  The record does not contain any "final 
interpretation" by DATCP.   
¶62 Whether Wisconsin courts should give deference to a 
preliminary agency interpretation is irrelevant under the facts 
of this case, as no level of deference would be applicable to 
the inconsistent warning letters that were issued by DATCP. In 
its warning letters, DATCP's inconsistent interpretations of 
"motor vehicle fuel" under § ATCP 105.001 offer no guidance to 
this analysis.  We draw no conclusions as to whether, in 
general, an agency's interpretations of a statute or an 
administrative code that is embodied in warning or opinion 
                                                 
44 Rod McNeil, Retraction in part of warning letter issued 
March 21, 2003 in File Number 4139, DATCP, March 21, 2003.  
Basler asserts in its briefs and oral argument that this 
retraction was in response to communications between DATCP and 
Orion's attorney.  Orion does not dispute this. 
45 Id. 
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
32 
 
letters should be given deference by this court.46  Our 
examination of these letters simply demonstrates the agency’s 
confusion in interpreting the statute.   
                                                 
46 We note that the United States Supreme Court recently 
concluded that an agency's interpretation of an unambiguous 
regulation contained in an opinion letter, as opposed to 
interpretations that result from the adversarial process or an 
agency's explicit rule-making authority, "lack[s] the force of 
law [and therefore] do[es] not warrant Chevron-style deference."  
Christensen 
v. 
Harris 
County, 
529 
U.S. 
576, 
587 
(2000) 
(examining 
the agency's 
interpretation 
of 
its 
unambiguous 
regulation) (citations omitted).  In Chevron, the United States 
Supreme Court concluded that when an agency's regulation 
represents a reasonable interpretation of the statute and does 
not conflict with the statute, the rule is entitled to 
deference.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984). 
The Court also determined that even if an opinion letter is 
not entitled to deference, the letter is entitled to "respect" 
to 
the 
extent 
that 
the 
interpretation 
is 
persuasive.  
Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
Yet, the Court continued, "an agency's interpretation of 
its own regulation is entitled to deference . . . when the 
language of the regulation is ambiguous."  Christensen, 529 U.S. 
at 588 (emphasis added) (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 
461 (1997) (concluding that an agency interpretation of its own 
ambiguous regulation is controlling unless the interpretation is 
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation)).  The 
United States Supreme Court did not address, however, the degree 
of deference due to an agency's interpretation of its ambiguous 
regulation in either Auer or Christensen. 
In Preston v. Meriter Hosp., Inc., this court applied 
Chevron deference to the DHHA's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 
1395dd(a), a federal statute.  Preston v. Meriter Hosp., Inc., 
2005 WI 122, ¶¶28-38, 284 Wis. 2d 264, 700 N.W.2d 158. 
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
33 
 
B 
¶63 We have concluded that the definition of "motor 
vehicle fuel," promulgated by DATCP in § ATCP 105.001(4) 
excludes aviation fuel.  The validity of this rule depends upon 
whether the rule exceeds the bounds of Wis. Stat. § 100.30.  We 
therefore examine the legislative history of the statute in an 
effort to discern whether the rule is consistent with the 
statute.  We conclude that the legislature intended to limit the 
application of the minimum markup provisions, and that "motor 
vehicle fuel" should be read narrowly to exclude aviation fuel.   
¶64 In 
1939, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Legislature 
enacted 
the 
Wisconsin Unfair Sales Act, Wis. Stat. § 100.30.47  The 1939 Act 
established a minimum markup price of 3 to 6 percent for all 
                                                                                                                                                             
Relying on Christensen, a Wisconsin federal court similarly 
concluded that because the regulation in question was ambiguous, 
the informal interpretation of that regulation by the agency 
that promulgated the regulation was entitled to some level of 
deference.  DeBraska v. City of Milwaukee, 131 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 
1034-35 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (examining the preamble to the 
regulations 
under 
review, 
a 
1994 
opinion 
letter 
by 
an 
administrator in the Department, and an amicus curiae brief 
filed on behalf of one of the parties in the case) (citing Auer, 
519 U.S. at 461). 
We note that neither party briefed or argued this issue, 
and we decline to reach it.   
47 1939 Ch. 56.   
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
34 
 
merchandise sold in Wisconsin.48  The Act was amended several 
times but remained relatively unchanged from its original form 
until 1986.49   
¶65 In 1986, the legislature significantly amended the 
Unfair Sales Act.  The original draft of 1985 Wis. Act 313, 
Assembly Bill 219, would have eliminated the minimum markup for 
all merchandise except for cigarettes sold by wholesalers and 
would have eliminated the requirement that all other merchandise 
be sold at cost or higher.50  Assembly Bill 219 was amended in 
order to continue the markup for other tobacco products and 
motor vehicle fuel.51  The bill was further amended to include 
fermented malt beverages, intoxicating liquor, and wine.52  The 
bill was also amended to continue to prevent vendors from 
selling all merchandise below cost.53  Amendments that would have 
                                                 
48 The Act prohibited any retailer or wholesaler from 
advertising, offering for sale, or selling any merchandise below 
"cost."  Wisconsin's Unfair Sales Act: An Overview, Staff Brief 
80-10, Wisconsin Legislative Council Staff, July 9, 1980 
(emphasis added).  "Cost" included a minimum markup of 3 percent 
for wholesalers and 6 percent for retailers for all merchandise.  
Id.  This court concluded that the minimum markup scheme was 
constitutional.  Ross, 259 Wis. 379.   
49 Legislative Council Staff Brief, July 9, 1980.   
50 Drafting Request, Representative Shoemaker, January 10, 
1985.   
51 Legislative History of Assembly Bill 219.   
52 Id.   
53 Assembly Amendment 1 to Senate Substitute Amendment 1, 
adopted March 4, 1986. 
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
35 
 
continued the minimum markup for "foreign owned companies"54 and 
"groceries"55 were rejected.  The final revision to the Unfair 
Sales Act eliminated the minimum markup provisions for all 
merchandise except for "cigarettes or other tobacco products, 
fermented malt beverages, intoxicating liquor or wine or motor 
vehicle fuel."56   
¶66 The legislative documents and news reports surrounding 
passage of the bill indicate that the final law, 1985 Wis. Act 
313, constituted a compromise as to the particular merchandise 
that would retain the minimum markup calculations in their 
definitions of "cost."57   
                                                 
54 Assembly Amendment 2 to Senate Substitute Amendment 1, 
tabled March 4, 1986. 
55 Assembly Amendment 3 to Senate Substitute Amendment 1, 
tabled March 4, 1986. 
56 Revisions in the State Minimum Markup Law (1985 Wisconsin 
Act 313), Information Memorandum 86-12, Wisconsin Legislative 
Council Staff, May 9, 1986.  The 1986 revision also made 
violations of the Act subject to civil forfeitures, rather than 
criminal 
penalties, 
and 
granted 
DATCP 
the 
authority 
to 
independently enforce the statute by bringing a claim in court 
or issuing a cease and desist order.   
57 See, e.g., Charles E. Friederich, "Compromise on markup 
law 
advances," 
Milwaukee 
Journal, 
Feb. 
28, 
1986 
("The 
compromise, [then-Senator John Norquist] said, was necessary to 
get the bill through the Legislature.").  See also "State 
grocers endorse markup-law changes," Wisconsin State Journal, 
March 8, 1986; "Markup bill: Legislature makes needed changes in 
outdated state law," Editorial, Green Bay Press Gazette, March 
7, 1986; "Markup bill endorsed: Assembly OKs removal of 6 pct. 
minimum on most items," Green Bay Press-Gazette, March 5, 1986; 
Neil H. Shively, "Bill backed to ease 6% markup law" Milwaukee 
Sentinel, March 5, 1986; Wayne Corey, Wisconsin Independent 
Businessmen, "Minimum markup law beefed up," The Capital Times, 
April 29, 1986.   
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
36 
 
¶67 This history reveals that the legislature considered 
applying the minimum markup to various products and carefully 
crafted the amendment to limit the application of the minimum 
markup laws to particular merchandise.   
¶68 In addition, as the court of appeals noted in this 
case, the 1986 amendment was the first time the term "motor 
vehicle fuel" was used in the Unfair Sales Act.  Orion, 277 
Wis. 2d 819, ¶26.  Yet, when the legislature made this change, 
other provisions of Chapter 100 cross-referenced the term "motor 
vehicle" as defined in section 340:58    
"Motor vehicle" means a vehicle which is self-
propelled, including a trackless trolley bus, except 
that a snowmobile shall only be considered a motor 
vehicle for purposes made specifically applicable by 
statute.59  
Chapter 340 further defined "vehicle": 
"Vehicle" means every device in, upon or by which any 
person or property is or may be transported or drawn 
upon a highway, except railroad trains. A snowmobile 
shall not be considered a vehicle except for purposes 
made specifically applicable by statute.60 
¶69 We conclude that the legislature intended the term 
"motor vehicle fuel" to be read consistently with the terms 
                                                 
58 The same references to the definition of "motor vehicle" 
in Wis. Stat. § 340.01(35) in Chapter 100 exist under the 
current 
statutes. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 100.205(1)(c); 
100.21(1)(d); 100.42(1)(h) (2003-04).   
59 Wis. Stat. § 340.01(35) (1983-84).   
60 Wis. Stat. § 340.01(74) (1983-84) (emphasis added). The 
definitions of "motor vehicle" and "vehicle" are substantially 
the same today as they were when the Unfair Sales Act was 
amended in 1986.  See, supra, ¶24. 
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
37 
 
"motor vehicle" and "motor vehicle fuel" as defined and used in 
other related statutes at the time the Unfair Sales Act was 
amended to include a minimum markup for "motor vehicle fuel."  
The term "motor vehicle fuel" should be read narrowly to evince 
this legislative intent.  We therefore conclude that the term 
"motor vehicle fuel" does not include "aviation fuel."   
V 
¶70 We conclude that "motor vehicle fuel" does not include 
aviation 
fuel, 
that 
the 
minimum 
markup 
provisions 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 100.30 do not apply to aviation fuel, and that 
Orion cannot rely on § 100.30(5m) for a private cause of action 
against Basler.  We also conclude that § ATCP 105.001 is 
consistent 
with 
and 
does 
not 
exceed 
the 
bounds 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 100.30.  We therefore affirm the court of appeals' 
decision. 
By the Court.— The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2003AP1731   
 
 
 
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