Case Title: BILLY KEITH MELTON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2006-SC-000080-MR

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 2007-11-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT . OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION. BILLY KEITH MELTON ,$UyrrjUr C~.aixxf of 2006-SC-000080-MR ON APPEAL FROM MONROE CIRCUIT COURT V . HONORABLE EDDIE C. LOVELACE, JUDGE NO . 04-CR-000089 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING I . Introduction 11 . Factual Background Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 507.020 . 2 KRS 510.040 . 3 KRS 502 .020 and KRS 524 . 100 . 4 KRS 524.040 . 5 Kentucky Constitution §110(2)(b) . RENDERED : NOVEMBER 21, 2007 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Billy Keith Melton was convicted of Murder,' two counts of Rape in the First APPELLEE Degree, Complicity to Tampering with Physical Evidence, and Intimidating a Witness . 4 Melton received a sentence of life for murder, twenty (20) years each for rape, five (5) years for complicity to tampering with physical evidence, and five (5) years for intimidating a witness . While each count was to run consecutively, Melton received a sentence of life in prison . Appealing to this Court as a matter of right, Melton argues the circuit court committed reversible error by denying his motion for a continuance, and by denying his repeated motions for a change of venue . Finding no error, we affirm . Melton was indicted on various offenses arising from the death of Jodi Pace . On September 17, 2004, Pace, a fourteen-year-old, had gone to spend the night with Kassandra Hudson, her eighteen-year-old friend . Together the girls contacted Melton to see if he could obtain methamphetamine for them . After several calls, Melton agreed to pick up the girls . Amanda Coe, Melton's cousin, lived with him at the time of the incident . Melton, Coe, and Coe's baby went to pick up Pace and Hudson . Upon arriving at Melton's home in Tompkinsville, Pace and Hudson were informed that Melton had not yet obtained the methamphetamine for them . While they waited, Coe witnessed Melton giving the two girls a handful of pills and marijuana . Coe testified that Melton gave them Loricet, Percocet, Oxycontin, Xanax, and an unidentified pill . At some point Melton agreed to provide Pace and Hudson with one gram of methamphetamine each in return for sex. Shortly after that, Melton had sexual relations with the girls . Pace and Hudson began to question Melton about the methamphetamine, so he gave them more pills . According to the testimony of Scottie Key and Clinton Rowe, Melton then had sexual relations with both girls again, although they were then passed out . Key and Rowe, who had shared a cell with Melton after his arrest, came forward and testified concerning various statements he had made in their presence in which he had bragged about the events that night . The testimony of Key and Rowe confirmed the sex-for-methamphetamine theory. In addition, both testified that on various occasions Melton had specifically said he had given the drug Seroquel to Pace . At some point in the early hours of September 18th, Coe informed Melton that Pace was not well and that they should get her help . Melton refused and threatened to harm Coe if she attempted to use the phone . Later that morning, Melton was informed that Pace was unresponsive . Melton, aware that Pace had overdosed, delayed calling for help in order to, give Coe time to collect the pill bottles and dispose of them in the woods adjoining his property . Further, Melton threatened to harm Coe if she told authorities what had happened . Once the pills were removed and Hudson was hidden, Melton called 911 for an ambulance . An ambulance was dispatched to Melton's residence at 9:21 a.m . During his conversation with the 911-operator, Melton claimed he did not know who the girl was . He stated that she had arrived with three other girls the evening before . Further, Melton stated that the girls were visiting with Coe when he went to sleep on the couch, but that Pace had not responded when they tried to wake her that morning . Pace was taken to the hospital and pronounced dead on arrival by the Monroe County Deputy Coroner. Once the ambulance left with Pace, Melton and Coe took Hudson back and dropped her off near her home . As a result of the night's events, Hudson was also taken to the hospital . It was there that officers found her later on September 18th . Officers from the Kentucky State Police (KSP) became involved shortly after Pace arrived at the hospital . KSP Detectives interviewed Melton on the afternoon of September 18, 2004 . Melton provided a story similar to that given to the 911-operator . With Melton's written consent, the officers searched Melton's house, his car, and the surrounding property . As a result of that search, the officers recovered various pill bottles, rolling papers, and a can modified for use with methamphetamine . Melton was subsequently interviewed at the Monroe County Sheriff's office . KSP Detective Atwood, having obtained a conflicting story from Coe, gave Melton his Miranda warnings and began a taped interview. Once again, Melton told the detective that four girls had arrived the night before to visit Coe . Melton repeated his assertion that no alcohol or drugs were used while he was present and that Pace had been fine when he went to sleep . When questioned, Melton did admit to having sexual relations with two of the girls . Melton told Detective Atwood that it had been a "group deal" with the two girls . After completing his statement, Melton admitted that marijuana had been used . He stated he had not mentioned it because he did not believe it was a drug . After further reflection, Melton told Detective Atwood that if he gave him the tape of the first interview, he would give him another statement . Detective Atwood informed Melton that he could not do that, but that he would listen to anything Melton wanted to say . Melton made no further statements . Melton was arrested following this interview. An autopsy on Pace revealed that the cause of death was an overdose of Seroquel . Lab reports also revealed the presence of Xanax, oxycodone, and hydrocodone . Given the circumstances surrounding Pace's death, officers obtained a rape collection kit on both Pace and Hudson . After obtaining a warrant, a rape suspect collection kit was obtained from Melton . Lab tests showed that samples of DNA taken from both Pace and Hudson matched Melton's DNA . In addition, Hudson's sample contained DNA from an unknown source . 111. Analysis A. Motion for a Continuance Melton's first argument on appeal is that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a continuance. Melton filed his motion in response to late discovery that was provided by the Commonwealth . The record reflects that on October 24th, two days before trial, the Commonwealth provided Melton with copies of Hudson's Health Department Records, ambulance records relating to Pace, and the Coroner's Report . On October 25th , the circuit court calendar reflects that the court (1) granted Melton access to the Child Fatality Team Report ; (2) conducted an in camera review of Coe's juvenile records and provided relevant data to both the Commonwealth and the defense ; (3) ruled that an evidentiary hearing would be required out of the presence of the jury before any evidence of prior sexual activity would be admitted concerning Hudson ; and (4) overruled Melton's motion for change of venue . On October 26th , the Commonwealth provided Melton with the Coroner's Child Fatality Report ; the Local Health Department's Fatality Report; a letter from Pace to her father saying she would be spending the night at Hudson's house ; and a copy of the Monroe County Sheriff's Daily Log . On October 28th , the Commonwealth provided Melton with a copy of the letter from Key to the Commonwealth in which he seeks a deal in return for his testimony ; a letter summarizing an oral statement made by Melton to the Sheriff ; and a letter summarizing an oral statement made by Melton to KSP Detective Atwood . In light of this disclosure, Melton argued that he needed additional time to investigate the sexual activity of Hudson . Further, he argues the letter from Key confirms the fact that he sought a deal in return for his testimony . The circuit court, upon reviewing the material, questioned whether some of it would be admissible . Further, the court found that none of it was exculpatory. Finally, the court noted that Melton had previously sought and was granted a continuance to prepare for trial . Thus, the court denied the motion . The pertinent language of the applicable Criminal Rule states, "[t]he court, upon motion and sufficient cause shown by either party, may grant a postponement of the hearing or trial ." See Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) Rule 9.04 . In reviewing the application of this rule, we have stated that the decision to grant or deny a continuance lies in the sound discretion of a trial judge . Williams v. Commonwealth, 644 S .W.2d 335, 336-37 (Ky . 1982). "The test for abuse of discretion is whether the principles ." Commonwealth v . English , 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). The factors a trial court should consider in exercising its discretion include : trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal (1) length of delay sought ; (2) whether there have been previous continuances ; (3) the inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses, counsel and the court ; (4) whether the delay is purposeful or is caused by the accused ; (5) the availability of competent counsel, if at issue; (6) the complexity of the case ; and (7) whether denying the continuance would lead to identifiable prejudice . Foley v . Commonwealth , 953 S .W .2d 924, 936-37 (Ky . 1997) . Melton argues these factors weigh in his favor. While he admits his initial motion sought a continuance for thirty (30) days, he orally amended his motion to a request for two (2) days . In addition, Melton points out that the delay must be attributed to the Commonwealth . Further, he argues that the Commonwealth took no position on the issue of inconvenience . Finally, Melton argues the prejudice occurs in his inability to investigate the final disclosures . In particular, the defense would have followed up on the oral statements attributed to Melton and Hudson's prior sexual activity . Melton's argument fails to address the court's finding that no exculpatory evidence was contained in the material . Nor does it address how he was prejudiced by the late disclosure . From our review of the record, we note that Melton had been provided with written copies of the statements of Key and Rowe in July and early October of 2005 . Melton had also been provided with the terms of the deal Key received in return for his cooperation . He merely claims that Key's letter would have caused him to investigate Key further. It was not an abuse of discretion for the circuit court to reject this claim . Likewise, we cannot find it an abuse of discretion for the circuit court to reject Melton's argument concerning Hudson's sexual activity . We note that Melton had filed two previous motions seeking an order allowing evidence of Hudson's sexual activity . These motions were filed on October 10th and on October 24th . At the time the motions were filed, Melton asserted that he had a good faith basis to believe the evidence existed and was relevant. In addition, the record supports the fact that Melton was aware in May of 2005, through the lab report concerning DNA matches, that Hudson had DNA matching Melton and an unidentified individual . Melton failed to show how the additional disclosure in the Health Department records either surprised him or would have led him to investigate Hudson's sexual activity any further. Having rejected the two principal areas of disclosure which Melton claims were prejudicial, we turn to the remaining information disclosed during October of 2005 . The Commonwealth plays with fire when it does not disclose information timely . However, we agree that Melton has failed to demonstrate prejudice . Further, the evidence disclosed by the Commonwealth appears to have been cumulative of information already available to Melton . See Wilson v . Commonwealth , 601 S.W.2d 280, 285 (Ky . 1980)(This Court noted there had been no showing of prejudice .); Este v. Commonwealth , 663 S.W .2d 213, 216 (Ky . 1983)(This Court noted the evidence was merely cumulative and would not have affected the outcome.) . Finally, we note that the circuit court reviewed the evidence disclosed, it noted that it had previously granted Melton a continuance, it found none of the new information was exculpatory, and the court felt most was inadmissible . Under these circumstances, we cannot say the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a continuance . B. Motion for Change of Venue Melton's second claim of error concerns the circuit court's decision to deny his repeated motions for a change of venue . The first motion was made on October 10, 2005 . This motion, which failed to comply with the requirements of KRS 452.220, was denied as facially deficient . 6 The second motion, which was verified and had three supporting affidavits, was filed on October 24, 2005 . Finally, Melton renewed his motion during voir dire . In support of his argument that the circuit court erred in denying his motion, Melton points out that both articles and editorials were published in area newspapers describing the events in question and summarizing his prior criminal record which included a previous conviction for sexual assault . Melton asserts that this coverage tainted the jury pool . In support of his assertion, Melton points out that of the seventy- nine (79) jurors called to hear his case, forty-eight (48) were dismissed for cause because they had formed an opinion as to his guilt . Further, Melton notes that of the thirty (30) selected for the final pool, all but four (4) had heard about the case . Given these numbers, Melton argues that prejudice can be implied . Kentucky's controlling statute states in pertinent part that When a criminal or penal action is pending in any Circuit Court, the judge shall, upon application of the defendant or the state, order the trial to be held in some adjacent county to which there is no valid objection, if it appears that the defendant or the state cannot have a fair trial in the county where the prosecution is pending . See KRS 452.210 . In applying this statute, this Court has stated that the moving party must show "that (1) there has been prejudicial news coverage, (2) it occurred prior to trial, and (3) the effect of such news coverage is reasonably likely to prevent a fair trial ." Brewster v. Commonwealth, 568 S .W.2d 232, 235 (Ky. 1978). See also Jacobs v. 6 The petition was neither verified, nor did it have the necessary supporting affidavits . 8 Commonwealth, 870 S .W .2d 412, 41 6 (Ky. 1994) . Further, we have held that the "trial judge has wide discretion in granting or denying a change of venue and his discretion is given great weight because he is present in the county and presumed to know the situation ." Nickell v . Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d 849, 850 (Ky. 1963) . Here, Melton has shown that media coverage existed and contained prejudicial material prior to his trial . Melton relies on a showing of the number of prospective jurors struck for cause and the number of jurors who had heard of his case prior to the trial . Melton argues that based on these statistics prejudice can be implied . Melton's reliance on the number of jurors struck for cause and the number who had heard of his case is misplaced . As we noted in Jacobs , "[w]e do not require that jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved ." 870 S.W.2d at 416. Further, "the mere fact that jurors may have heard, talked, or read about a case is not sufficient to sustain a motion for change of venue, absent a showing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the accounts or descriptions of the investigation and judicial proceedings have prejudiced the defendant." Brewster , 568 S.W.2d 235. We went on to say "[p]rejudice must be shown unless it may be clearly implied in a given case from the totality of the circumstances . Id . Stated another way, That prospective jurors merely have heard about the case is not sufficient to sustain a motion for a change of venue . Rather, the test is whether the jurors have heard something that causes a preconception concerning the defendant . Bowling v. Commonwealth , 942 S.W .2d 293, 298 (Ky. 1997) . While Melton has shown that nearly all of the jurors had heard about his case, he has not shown that the information had caused a preconception against him . Likewise, we reject Melton's claim that prejudice can be implied in this case . During voir dire, the circuit court allowed Melton to individually question jurors on what they had actually heard and on whether they had formed an opinion as to his guilt . As a result, forty-eight (48) jurors were excused for cause . Unlike Jacobs , supra , there is no claim that the circuit court allowed jurors to be rehabilitated . Once the juror stated they had formed an opinion concerning Melton's guilt, they were dismissed, . Further, there has been no showing that the jurors that remained, though they may have heard about the case, had an opinion . We will not imply prejudice merely because the pool from which the jury was selected has heard about the case. Neither can we imply prejudice based on that of excused jurors . Under these circumstances, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in denying Melton's motions for a change of venue . IV. Conclusion As Melton has failed to demonstrate that the circuit court abused its discretion, either in denying the motion for a continuance, or in denying Melton's repeated motions for a change of venue, we conclude the Monroe Circuit Court did not commit reversible error and we affirm Melton's conviction . All sitting . Abramson, Cunningham, Minton, and Schroder, JJ ., concur. Scott, J ., files a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which Lambert, CJ, and Noble, J . join . COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT : Karen Maurer Assistant Public Advocate Department of Public Advocacy 100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302 Frankfort, Kentucky 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE : Gregory D . Stumbo Attorney General Perry T . Ryan Assistant Attorney General Office of Attorney General Criminal Appellate Division 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204 Months later, after substantial local media coverage of the charges and events, and after his motion for change of a venue due to such coverage was denied, renewed in voir dire and denied again, Melton was convicted of various w charges, including murder and rape in the first degree, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment . The question presented is whether such a trial in a county inundated with publicity about Melton and the crime was fair. "It is readily acknowledged that wide discretion is, and usually should be, allotted to the trial court in determining a change of venue question ." Jacobs v . Commonwealth , 870 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Ky . 1994) . But that discretion is limited by "[t]he theory of our system that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print." Estes v . State of Texas , 381 U .S . 532, 551, 85 S .Ct . 1628, 1637, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965) (citation omitted) . Anything less violates the due process clause of the Fourteen Amendment to the United States Constitution, Sheppard v. Maxwell , 384 U .S . 333, 362, 86 S.Ct . 1507, 1522, 16 L . Ed.2d 600 (1966), as well as Section Eleven of the Kentucky Constitution . Sturgill v. Commonwealth , 516 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Ky . 1974) ; see also KRS 452.210 . Thus, "[a] change of venue is warranted where a fair trial is not possible ." Fugate v . Commonwealth , 993 S .W.2d 931, 939 (Ky . 1999) . In seeking such, a defendant "must show that there has been press or media coverage prejudicial to the defendant and that such coverage took place prior to the trial and the coverage is reasonably likely to prevent a fair trial ." Id. at 939-40 . This "prejudice must be shown unless it may be clearly implied in a given case from the totality of the circumstances ." Jacobs , 870 S.W.2d at 416. For example : It is ominous when from a pool of jurors, 74 per cent were excused for the reasons of having fixed opinions of guilt, being unable to presume innocence, and some inability to set aside publicity . Of the 38 jurors accepted by the court, from which the jury was ultimately selected, every member acknowledged an exposure to the continuing publicity . Prior to trial, Thomas moved for a change of venue, attaching seven news articles from the newspaper . The motion was denied, renewed after voir dire and denied again . Voir dire in Thomas revealed that 65 of 67 prospective jurors who were questioned on the record were knowledgeable about the case . "Of the 67 prospective jurors, the trial court struck 24 for cause when they admitted they could not be fair, .or expressed an opinion based on pre-trial publicity . Defense counsel unsuccessfully moved to strike ten more jurors for cause on grounds that they admitted they had read the details of this case in the paper." There was, indeed, an abuse of discretion by the trial court in Thomas . . ., but the abuse was the failure to grant a change of venue . Moraan v . Commonwealth , 189 S.W.3d 99, 106 (Ky . 2006) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted) . Here, 95% of the jury panel knew about the case and, once voir dire began, the appearance became overwhelming that Melton could not receive a fair trial in Monroe County at the time . Of the initial 32 jurors called, 17 had already formed an opinion about the case . Many more had heard about it . In fact, all but four of the final pool had heard about the case . Of the 17 jurors called to replace those first excused, 11 had already formed an opinion . Of the 11 replacing these, five had already formed an opinion . Of the five who were then called as replacements, four had heard about 3 the case and all four had already formed an opinion as to guilt or innocence of Melton . Four additional jurors were then called and again all four had already formed an opinion about the case . They were excused . Of the four new jurors then called to-replace them, all four had already formed an opinion about the case . Of the four additional jurors called next, one was excused because she worked for the Commonwealth Attorney's office ; the other three had heard about the case and two had already formed an opinion . Three additional jurors were then called and all three had already.formed an opinion about the case . Three additional jurors were again called ; all three had already formed an opinion about the case . After a 15 minute recess, the trial court called three more jurors . All three had heard about the case and two had already formed an opinion . Finally, the trial court asked the remaining panel, "who had not heard about the case?" Only four had not heard about it. As one juror succinctly put it during voir dire, "everyone in this town has surely to goodness heard about it." Despite this, Melton's renewed motion to change venue was denied. I realize the difficulty experienced by jurists in trying to construct a "bright line" rule applicable to change of venue questions, but wherever that "line" may ultimately fall, the facts of this case are over it . Thus, "[t]his appellant, as every defendant no matter how vicious the crime, must receive protections afforded by the Kentucky Constitution, the Kentucky statutes, and the United States Constitution, which interpret basic rights . The judiciary has no alternative but to protect such rights . . . ." Jacobs , 870 S.W.2d at 415 . Thus, I would reverse Appellant's convictions and remand for a new trial in another county, free from the taint of the publicity experienced in this case . Whatever the next verdict may be, justice will then have been served ; for if we give away Melton's -right to be judged in a fair trial, we give away such right for all Kentuckians . I cannot do that, so I record my dissent . Lambert, C.J ., and Noble, J., joins this dissent.