Case Title: Kline v. Landeis

Citation: 147 N.W.2d 897

Docket Number: 

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1966-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
147 N.W.2d 897 (1966) Orval H. KLINE, Jr., and Regina K. Kline, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Peter LANDEIS, Jr., and Tillie Landeis, Defendants and Appellants. No. 8344. Supreme Court of North Dakota. December 1, 1966. Rehearing Denied January 26, 1967. *898 Rausch & Chapman, Bismarck, for appellants. Kelsch & Wise, Mandan, for respondents. ERICKSTAD, Judge. The plaintiffs, Orval H. Kline, Jr., and Regina K. Kline, secured a judgment in the District Court of Sioux County against the defendants, Peter Landeis, Jr., and Tillie Landeis, on March 20, 1964. Notice of the entry of judgment was served by mail on Mr. and Mrs. Landeis on April 7, 1964. An execution was issued by the Clerk of the District Court of Sioux County on May 25, 1964, and returned by the sheriff unsatisfied on July 22, 1964. Notice of appeal from the judgment and undertaking for costs on appeal were served on Mr. and Mrs. Kline on September 16, 1964. The transcript of the trial court proceedings was completed and delivered to counsel for Mr. and Mrs. Landeis about October 15, 1964. On August 31, 1965, execution was again issued. The sheriff's return indicates that he was unable to find personal property upon which he could levy, and for that reason he levied against certain real property owned by Mr. and Mrs. Landeis. This property was sold by the sheriff at public auction on October 26, 1965, Mr. and Mrs. Kline being the highest bidders. Order confirming sale on execution was made by the district court on November 10, 1965. On January 20, 1966, Mr. and Mrs. Landeis made a motion for an order settling the statement of the case. This motion was heard on January 28, 1966, and on March 15, 1966, the district judge issued a memorandum opinion in which he determined that the motion should be denied. The court executed its order denying the motion on March 21, 1966. Thereafter, on May 17, 1966, Mr. and Mrs. Landeis appealed to this court from the order denying the motion for an order settling the statement of the case. The pertinent part of the controlling statute in this case reads as follows: North Dakota Century Code. In support of the motion before the trial court, the attorney for Mr. and Mrs. Landeis filed the following affidavit: The trial court, in its memorandum decision, stated that under Rule 6(b), N.D.R. Civ.P., it could, in its discretion, for good cause enlarge the time within which the statement of the case could be settled. We are inclined to believe that the trial court's authority to extend the time within which the statement of the case may be settled is derived, not from Rule 6 (b), N.D.R.Civ.P., but from § 28-18-06(1), N.D.C.C. However, we agree with the trial court that such an application must be made upon a showing of good cause, that the determination of whether good cause has been shown is for the trial court to make, and that unless the decision of the trial court indicates an abuse of discretion, it will not be reversed on appeal. In Schriock v. Schriock, a decision rendered by this court in 1964, we said: Schriock v. Schriock, 128 N.W.2d 852, 855 (N.D.1964). The trial court, after reviewing the affidavit filed in support of the motion, found that good cause had not been shown, and accordingly denied the motion. However, Mr. and Mrs. Landeis contend that good cause, although required to be shown under § 7666 of the Compiled Laws *900 of 1913, need no longer be shown, because the adoption of the Revised Code of 1943 omitted this section therefrom, and the cross-reference table notes that it was "superseded." They argue: Section 7655, C.L. of 1913, set forth the requirements for securing a settlement of the statement of the case. The language used therein is almost identical with the language used in the pertinent part of § 28-18-06, N.D.C.C. The pertinent part of § 7655 reads as follows: The predecessor of § 7655, C.L. of 1913, was § 7058, R.C. of 1905. It contained similar language. It is our view that the Legislature, in repealing § 7666, C.L. of 1913, intended no change in the previous construction of § 7655, C.L. of 1913 (which was carried into N.D.R.C. of 1943 in § 28-1806, and which now is § 28-18-06, N.D.C.C.), and that it was merely to eliminate duplicative material. We therefore believe that it is still proper to require that good cause be shown before an extension of time is granted. We have reviewed the affidavit and agree with the trial court's conclusion that it fails to establish good cause for extending the time for settling the statement of the case. The burden is upon Mr. and Mrs. Landeis to show good cause why the motion for settlement of the statement of the case, made approximately 22 months after the notice of the entry of the judgment, should be granted. Mr. and Mrs. Landeis, in arguing that the purposes of § 28-18-06 would be upheld in granting them an extension of time within which to secure a settled statement of the case, refer us to a part of a decision rendered by this court in 1910, wherein we found that the trial court had abused its discretion in not extending the time. Their reference reads as follows: *901 In so quoting from that decision, they stopped too soon, we believe, for immediately following that passage we note this language: Following this statement this court set forth certain tests to be used in determining whether a party applying after the expiration of the statutory time for a settled statement of the case is entitled to an extension of time. Test No. 2 reads as follows: Under No. 7 of the Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court an appellant is required to prepare his brief, serve it upon the respondent, and file it with the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken before or at the time the record of the case is transmitted to the Supreme Court. In failing to move within the statutory period for either an extension of time within which to settle the statement of the case or for an order settling the statement of the case, the appellants have delayed the time within which they would normally prepare, serve, and file their brief on appeal. We accordingly believe that if the extension applied for were granted, it would operate to delay the hearing of the appeal beyond the period required in the ordinary course. We do not believe that the delay is satisfactorily accounted for by the appellants. The only reason stated in the affidavit for Mr. and Mrs. Landeis's failure to move for a settled statement of the case within the statutory period is financial. If finances were a problem, an application could have been made within the statutory period for an extension of time within which to settle the statement of the case. As this was not done, we do not believe that the trial court's decision in denying the motion constitutes an abuse of the exercise of his judicial discretion. The order of the trial court is therefore affirmed. TEIGEN, C. J., and KNUDSON, MURRAY and STRUTZ, JJ., concur. ON PETITION FOR REHEARING. ERICKSTAD, Judge. The appellants have filed a petition for rehearing in which they allege that this court has engaged in "judicial legislation." They contend that the requirement that good cause be shown before an extension of time may be granted under § 28-18-06, N.D. C.C., has no statutory basis and has been engrafted by judicial fiat contrary to all tenets of fair play and justice. It would appear that they are arguing that, as § 7666, C.L.1913, was omitted from the Revised Code of 1943, good cause need no longer be shown to secure from the trial court an extension of time within which the statement of the case should be settled. *902 Their view is that this is clear from the reviser's note to Chapter 28-19, found in the Code Revision Report covering the work of the Code Revision Commission, 28th Session of the Legislative Assembly, which reads as follows: They say that this note indicates that good cause was not to be required in securing a settled statement of the case under § 28-1806, N.D.R.C. of 1943, now § 28-18-06, N.D.C.C., whereas it was to be required in securing a new trial under § 28-1903, N.D.R.C. of 1943, now § 28-19-03, N.D.C.C. In considering this argument we must resort to the rules of interpretation which are contained in Chapter 1-02, N.D.R.C. of 1943. There we note § 1-0211, which reads as follows: North Dakota Revised Code of 1943. Notwithstanding that rule, let us for the sake of argument analyze the reviser's note to Chapter 28-19. The note states that §§ 2 and 6 of Chapter 131 of the 1913 Session Laws contain specific provisions authorizing the court to extend the time, and that a similar provision has been inserted in § 28-1903. It is "our analysis of this statement that the reviser believed §§ 2 and 6 to contain similar provisions; otherwise, the statement that a similar provision had been inserted in § 28-1903 would be inaccurate. It should be noted at this point that there was no indication that § 28-1806 was treated differently from § 28-1903. It is our view that the reviser believed the authority granted in the phrase "within such further time as the court shall allow" to be equivalent to the authority contained in the phrase "unless the court, for good cause shown, shall extend the time." It is significant that since the adoption of the Revised Code of 1943 this court has construed the authority given the trial court in § 28-1806, N.D.R.C. of 1943, now § 28-18-06, N.D.C.C., as being discretionary. Mulhauser v. Becker, 76 N.D. 402, 37 N.W.2d 352; Schriock v. Schriock, 128 N.W.2d 852 (N.D.1964). The legislature, in failing to amend the statute in light of the court's construction, has acquiesced in that construction, and thus has indicated that the construction is in accord with legislative intent. See also: Riley v. Mayrath Machinery Company, Inc., 192 Kan. 120, 386 P.2d 210; Bressler v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 152 Neb. 732, 42 N.W.2d 617; Commissioner of Banking and Insurance v. Moresh, 122 N.J.L. 77, 3 A.2d 638; Boutin v. Cardinal Theatre Co., 267 Wis. 199, 64 N.W.2d 848. Another factor to be considered is that this matter is affected by a rule of this court. The most recent rules of practice in the Supreme Court of North Dakota *903 were adopted on June 29, 1950. Rule 22 reads as follows: We must assume that this court, in adopting Rule 22 in 1950, adopted the construction placed upon the statute relating to time within which a transcript may be obtained and a statement of the case may be settled. The construction of the statute, even after the adoption of the Revised Code of 1943, has been that the authority given the court to extend the time is a discretionary authority. The appellants contend that the language of § 28-1806 makes it mandatory that the trial court grant whatever time the appellants desire. We believe, however, that if the language of § 28-1806 is susceptible of a meaning other than the one we have given it, that meaning is that the court has been given the absolute power either to grant an extension of time or to deny it. The latter meaning would avail the appellants of no relief, for the reason that the trial court has denied the appellants their motion for an extension of time. If the trial court's authority is absolute, there is no basis on which we can review its action. We therefore adhere to our original view as expressed in our opinion, that whether an extension of time should be granted is within the trial court's discretion, that good cause must be the basis for determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, and that unless there is a showing that the trial court has abused its discretion, its decision will not be overturned. TEIGEN, C. J., and KNUDSON and STRUTZ, JJ., concur.