Case Title: Rapozo v. Better Hearing of Hawaii, LLC. ICA Opinion, filed 06/26/2008 [pdf], 118 Haw. 285. Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 09/10/2008. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 10/20/2008 [pdf]. S.Ct. Motion for Reconsideration and Order of Amendment, filed 01/14/2009 [pdf], 120 Haw. 237. S.Ct. Opinion on Motion for Fees and Costs, filed 03/19/2009 [pdf], 120 Haw. 257.

Citation: 119 Haw. 483

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
**°FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HANAI"

 

00:

 

MERVYN RAFOZO,
Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellee

  
 
 
 
  
 

S- 930 9002

BETTER HEARING OF HAWAII, LLC,
Respondent /Defendant Appel lant

oad

a

No. 27602

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CIV. NO. RC-05-A-0221)

DECEMBER 5, 2008

MOON, C.J, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

‘OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J
We hold that the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA)
erred in concluding that the findings of fact (findings) of the
district court of the fifth circuit (the court) to the effect
that (1) hearing aids purchased by Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellee

 

Mervyn Rapozo (Petitioner) were “nonconforming” under
Revised Statutes (HRS) § 481K-1 (Supp. 2007) of HRS chapter 481K,
the Assistive Technology Warranty Act (the Act) and that

(2) Respondent /Defendant-Appellant Better Hearing of Hawaii, LLC
‘FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER™

(Respondent) had a reasonable opportunity to repair the devices
pursuant to HRS § 481K-3 (Supp. 2007) of the Act were clearly
erroneous, and therefore that (3) the court erred in awarding
Petitioner a full refund of the costs of his hearing aids, a
double recovery of his alleged pecuniary losses, and attorney's
fees and costs under HRS chapter 481K. See Rapozo v. Better
Hearing of Hawaii, 118 Hawai'i 265, 293, 188 P.3d 798, 807 (App.
2008). Accordingly, the September 5, 2008 judgment of the ICA is
reversed in part for the reasons stated herein, and the court's
April 17, 2005 judgment is affirmed.

The petition for writ of certiorari was filed by
Petitioner on September 10, 2008, and accepted on October 20,
2008. In his application, Petitioner seeks review of the ICA's
Septesber 5, 2008 Judgment filed pursuant to its June 26, 2008
published opinion, reversing the Novenber 17, 2005 judgment of
the court? in favor of Petitioner and against Respondent. This
court heard oral argument on the merits on November 20, 2008.

1

on February 10, 2004, Petitioner purchased digital

hearing aids for both ears from Respondent at its Lihue, Kauai

location. Gary Woodard (Woodard) is the owner of the Lihu‘e

 

\ the published opinion was authored by Associate Judge Katherine G.
Leonard, who was’ Joined by Chief Juage Mark Recktenwald and Asssciate Judge
Corinne KA. Watanabe.

7 The Honorable Trudy K, Senda presided,

2
“FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

store. The aids were manufactured by Starkey Labs (Starkey),

which is located in Anah

 

, California. Respondent is a dealer
for Starkey. According to the purchase agreenent, the price was
$5,198.00 after an open house discount of $4,460.00. Hawaii
Medical Service Association, Petitioner's medical insurance
carrier, covered $1,044.00 of the cost, Petitioner paid $100, and
financed the balance of $4,054.00 through “GE Money Bank.” Prior
to purchasing the aids, Respondent gave Petitioner a general ear
examination to eliminate any potential that he might need a
medical referral.’ The results of the ear examinations were
normal. Petitioner was also given a hearing test, the data from
which was used to initially program the hearing aids. Respondent
took molds of Petitioner's ears and sent them to Starkey, who
then manufactured custom aids for Petitioner and shipped then to
Respondent within approximately ten days.

Petitioner testified that he did not recall receiving
any documents from Respondent when he purchased the devices.
Respondent asserts that Petitioner was provided with warranty
documents from Starkey, and two warranties from Respondent. The
“starkey Labs Warranty Card” stated that the hearing aids would

be repaired or replaced at the discretion of the manufacturer if

Woodard’ s testimony to this effect was that Ywhen the client
jes in we do an initial video to scope exan. That's where we have 2
fiber optic video camera,” It shows the ear canal on the T.v, This te the
check fer any perforations, any cysts, tumors, wax blockage. Anything that
Would require = medical referral,”

 
“***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER"**

  

failure occurred within the one-year warranty period. A paper

copy of the “Starkey Labs Standard One Year Warrant

 

y" referred to

 

free replacement due to loss of hearing aids once per side for
one year, replacement due to damage once per side for one year,
and unlimited refitting of the aids. However, there is no
address for Starkey on the warranty card or on the warranty
docunent. According to Woodard, generally there is no direct
contact between Starkey and end users of the product.

Respondent itself provided a “30 day total satisfaction
money back guarantee,” meaning that whether the aids worked or
not, a consumer could receive a full refund within the first
thirty days for any reason, and a “Life Time Custoner Service
Guarantee” for free office visits, hearing tests, cleaning and
adjusting of the aids, programming, and minor in-office repairs.

Respondent claims that all customers are advised prior
to purchasing the aids that they will have to be fitted for the
earpieces and then “must return for testing and adjustment . .
because the device is essentially a sophisticated amplifier which
requires digital adjustment based upon feedback from the
customer.” Respondent asserts that Petitioner was informed both
when he purchased the aids and when he returned to the store to
pick up the aids, that he would need to return for “at least 3-4

adjustments in the first 30 days.”
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAF' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
The facts regarding Petitioner's problems with the

nces of the “repairs” are disputed.

 

hearing aids and the circum
Aocording to Petitioner, he had ongoing problems with the aids
from the time of purchase. He heard all kinds of sounds, and
sometimes he could only hear sounds that were at a distance and
sometimes he could only hear sounds that were in close proximity.
He took the aids back to Respondent on four to five occasions
within the first few months, but continued to have the same
problems with them during the course of Respondent's
adjustments.”

It is undisputed that, sometime in May 2004, Petitioner
started hearing clicking sounds in the aids. According to
Respondent, despite the fact that Petitioner had visited the
store several times for adjustments, the first time that
Petitioner voiced any conplaint about the aids was when
Petitioner brought the aids into the Lihu‘e store in May of 2004
complaining of the clicking noises. Respondent sent the aids to
Starkey, the manufacturer, to be repaired at no cost, pursuant to
the one-year warranty. According to repair invoices dated
Nay 20, 2004, Starkey replaced the speaker and microphone on each
aid, Respondent claims that the aids vere likely out of
Petitioner’s possession for about ten days for this repair,
whereas Petitioner claims he was without the aids for “about a

month or so.”
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATI REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPOR}

 

‘The aids were returned by Starkey to Respondent at the
end of May 2004. Petitioner went to Respondent’s store to
retrieve the repaired aids and for an adjustment, which was
performed by Tara Kadar (Kadar), Respondent's technician.
Petitioner claims he continued to have problems after the aids
were returned. Sometime in late May or early June 2004, he
attended his class reunion and could not hear anyone at his

were emitted far from his

 

table, but could only hear sounds th:
table. In a letter dated June 17, 2004, Petitioner's wife, Fay

7. Rapozo (Mrs. Rapozo), wrote to Respondent asking whether the

 

aids could be returne:

I'm writing you quite disturbed and concerned that
[Peritioner) is not getting the effects required off of the
use of his nearing elde [sic]. ie carries it around ang

‘Burchased it And |-knoe yon can attest to that since ne
fas-been coming in ‘or adiustmest®. and pentioning to vo
she-problens.

 

Lwantto know if there is a oosibility that thé unit be
Eetitnads T can't see paying for something that does not
Work, it makes not [sic] sense.

T appreciate all that you have been doing, and it would have
been marvelous that the unit work cause he needs it, but in
the tight crunch of financing, paying four thousand’ dollars
fang having it sit on the shelf, just does not cut it for me.

(Emphases added.)
Woodard related that this was the first time that he

personally became aware of Petitioner's problems.‘ After

‘Woodard was apparently unaware thet the aids had been sent to
Starkey for repair until June of 2004, when he was informed of the repair by
Kagar. The coure’s finding 18 states’ that "Woodard had not been aware that
the hearing aid was sent to (Starkey) in May 2004 for repair.” finding 19
States that “(a]feer becoming avare of Mrs. Rapozo's letter, Woodard aise
learned of the attenptes repair sy [Starkey].

 

 

6
 

-FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

learning of these matters, Woodard stated that he instructed
Kadar to have Petitioner come in for more adjustments, but it
does not seem that Kadar ever passed this request on to

Petitioner in June 2004.*

 

In about September or October of 2004, Petitioner
returned the aids to Respondent indicating that he did not want
them because they were not functioning properly. Despite his
wite's written inquiry as to whether Petitioner could return the
devices and obtain a refund, Petitioner did not receive a refund.
Instead, in Decenber 2004, Respondent's representative brought
the aids to Petiticne:’s home and told Petitioner thet he had
purchased them and he should keep them, Kedar wrote a letter to

Petitioner, stating, in part:

 

Iam sorry about the way things happened with the hearing
aide, it Le my goal to help those that are seeking Relp with
Eheit hearing. “r know that you were very frustrated and
Feit hopeless with the aids that we had, I too felt very
helpless not providing you with the service chat you needed.

 

Wicodard admitted that he had never read HRS chapter 481K prior to
this suit; accordingly, his position was that a customer can only
return hearing aids within thirty days.
nm.
on July 13, 2005, Petitioner filed a complaint against
Respondent in the court. As paraphrased by the ICA, the

complaint alleged the following:

 

+ Finding 20 states that “Woodard instructed Kadar to have
[Petitioner] cone into [sic] [Respondent's] place of business for further
Aejustnents, bur [Petitioner] did not do so snd it does not appear that Hadar
fever communicated such request to [Petitioner] in June 2004.”

 

 

7
‘°° FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

(2) the hearing aids cane with a one-year guarantee:
(2) [Betitionee) returnea the hearing aids for repase at
Teast. five times within the one-year period? (3) the heering
SiSs were out of service for over thirty days?

(4). (Respondent fsiled to comply with (HRS § 482K-3) when
it tasied to accept the return of the hearing aids and make
3 refuna; and (5) therefore, pursuant to HRS (§ ¢81K-5
(supp. 20071], [Petitioner] was entitled to recover twice
the snount of’ his pecuntary loss, costs, disbursements, snd
Feasonable attorney's fees.

 

 

 

  

 

Rapozo, 118 Hawai'i at 287, 188 P.3d at 801."
A one-day bench trial was held on September 22, 2005.
Id. at 287-88, 188 P.3d at 901-02. The only witnesses were
Petitioner and Woodard. At the close of the hearing, the court
stated that the parties could submit written closing arguments by
October 6, 2005. In Respondent's closing argument filed on
October 5, 2005, it argued that there was no nonconformity’
because the aids “worked according to their design and industry
standards” and that the “only repair [to Petitioner’s devices}
|.» remedied any possible ‘non-conformity.’" Petitioner
submitted written argument on October 6, 2005, maintaining that
Respondent “sold an assistive device to a consumer without a
written warranty that the device was fit for the ordinary purpose
for which the device is used,” and that “[Petitioner]’s testimony

that he returned the aids with the same problem 4 or 5 times was

 

‘us § 481K-3(2) (Supp. 2007) and the relevant portion of HRS
§ 661K-5 (wnicn is the section that provides a right of action £0 consumers)
are set forth intea at page 16.

7 MRS § 482K-3(a) states that “[1)f the manufacturer or its agents
fail to correct a ponconformity as required by 2 warranty after a reasomble
Opportunsey to repait, the sanufacture: shall accept return of the assistive
Sevice from the consumer and refund the full purchase price or replace the
assistive device(.]” (Emphasis added.) The Act defines a *nonconformity” as
s'tasfece, salfunction, of condition that fails to conform to any warranty
applicable to an assistive device." HRS § 4€1K-1

8

 
‘FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*™*

a ‘reasonable opportunity to repair’ as there was a failure to
repair the same nonconformity with two attempts.”

Respondent filed a supplerental closing argument on
october 25, 2005, in response to the court’s October 12, 2005
directive asking for argument on the distinction between “repair”
and “adjustment.” To that effect, Respondent argued that hearing
aids “by design, require programming or ‘adjustments’ to maximize
use by the ouner,” and that “the [Act] does not apply to a
product which inherently operates by periodic adjustment.”
Petitioner, in his supplemental argument submitted on October 26,
2005, posited that “‘repair’ means the manufacturer is to take
whatever actions necessary to make the device conform to the
warranty,” and, therefore, “[t}he legislature intended, whatever
word is used, that the manufacturer deliver to a consumer a
device that is fit for the purposes for which it was sold.”

Following these submissions, on Novenber 3, 2005, the
court filed its findings, conclusions of law (conclusions), and
decision and order. The court decided that Petitioner’ s hearing
aids were nonconforming under the Act, and that Petitioner had
provided Respondent with a reasonable opportunity to correct that
nonconformity, Hence, the court concluded that Petitioner was
entitled to recovery pursuant to the Act.

ui.
on November 15, 2005, Respondent filed 2 Notice of

Appeal. On November 17, 2005, the court entered a judgment in
***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

Petitioner's favor in the amount of $8,610.66, pursuant to the
double recovery provision of HRS § 481K-5. Rapozo, 118 Hawai't
at 269, 183 P.3d at 803. Respondent then filed an amended notice
of appeal on November 25, 2005. The ICA issued its opinion on
June 26, 2008. The ICA reversed the court’s judgment,
determining that the court's findings that “adjustments” made by
Respondent constituted repairs under the Act and that the device
was therefore repaired or presented for repair on more than one
occasion," and that the device was nonconforming, were clearly
erroneous. Id, at 291-93, 168 P.3d at 805-07.
Ww.
In his Application, Petitioner presents the following

questions:

[2.1 Mnether the [Tcal gravely exzed in reversing
[the coutt)'s Judgment of November 17, 20057 (*)
T2:]. whether the ICA gravely efred in finding that

(the court) was clearly erroneous in finding that the
hearing alas ere not fit fer thelr ordinary purpose under
‘HBS clbaptes 421k Te

 

' the ICA states in its opinion that it is “left with a definite and
firm conviction that [the court] erred in finding that the adjustments to
[betitioner]'s bearing aids constituted repairs” and that “[ehe court] clearly
erred when it found and concluded that [Petitioner's] hearing aids were
Eepaired, of presented for repair, cn more than one occasion.” 118 Hawal'l at

186 itd at S06. But as discussed in more detail infra, the court does
ppear to have made the findings attributed to it by the ICR. Respondent

‘a point of erzor on appeal that [the court) erred in inplieitiy
Finsing and concluding that. (Petitioner]’s hearing aids were ‘repaired’ on
ore than one occasion.” (Esphasis added.) The ICk's conclusion seems to
Fefer to this supposed “implicit” finding. tn contrast, the relevant findings
Of the court were that "[tjhe manufacturer 4s presumed to have had a
Feasonable opportunity to repair the nonconformity sf St... foils to repaic

cTuith tno attonpte”; "[Petitioner) exercised reasonable effort. and
Galigence in returning to (Respondent) for adjustments to the hearing aid)
sng SIfetstioner] proviced (Respondent] with feasonable opportunity to" repatr
the hearing sig.”

 

       

 

 

 

+ this question poses the ultimate issue and therefore ite answer
gests on an analysis of questions 2, 3, and ¢ that follow.

10
 

‘FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACTFIC REPORTER:

13.) Whether the ICA gravely erred in finding that
[the court) was clearly erroneous in finding that
[Petstioner) "had ai 4

So'ineeir the Rearina aia)
her the Ich gravely erred in finding that
Clearly erroneous in finding that the

 

SGI IT

Ter] Whether the ICA gravely erred by not remanding
the case to [tne court] to award disuse unser BES.
Acinaptert 480.

(Enphases added.)

In conjunction with the fifth question he raises,
Petitioner argues that “[t]he ICA erred by not remanding the case
to (the court] to award damages under HRS [chapter] 480." This
argument ia based on language in HRS § 481K-5(c) that “failure by
a manufacturer to provide the warranty required by section 481-2
[(Supp. 2007)] . . . shall constitute prima facie evidence of an
unfair or deceptive practice under chapter 480.” The court had
found that the warranty provided by Respondent was inadequate
under HRS § 481K-2, and Woodard had admitted at trial that he had
no knowledge of the warranty required under the Act prior to
reading Petitioner’s complaint in this action.

Petitioner argued on appeal that the case should be
remanded for a determination of damages under HRS chapter 480 as
Petitioner reasoned that the court had not granted damages under
HRS chapter 480 because it had already provided for recovery
under chapter 481K. In this regard, the ICA agreed that the

written warranty provided by Respondent was inadequate under the

u
‘+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

Act," but did not remand the case for a determination of damages
because Petitioner did not establish that he had suffered danages
as a result of the violation and had not cross-appeaied from the
court’s judgment.:! 118 Hawai'i at 293, 188 P.3d at 807. The ICA
was correct that Petitioner’s argument as to HRS chapter 490 is
not meritorious inasmuch as Petitioner failed to cross-appeal
from the court’s judgment, which had not awarded damages under
HRS chapter 480. See id. Hence, the ICA’s judgment is affirmed

on this issue.

 

“with regard to the warranties, Respondent argued on appeal that

the court erred in concluding that “che warranties provided by [Respondent]
and the manufacturer, (Starkey), failed to comply with the provisions of HRS
S'4elk-2(a) and (b)-" The court's findings with regard to the warranty were
as follows:

     

33. Section 48iK-2(b) requires that the duration of the
warranty be “not less than one year after first possession
Of the assistive device by the Consuner” and tolls and
extends the warranty period under specific conditions.

34. The warranty docurentation provided to (Petitioner) by
[Respondent] did not comply with the express and unesbiguous
requirements set forth in ARS (§) 4€1K-2(a) and (bl; under
the provisions of HRS (6) 48iK-2(d), (Respondent) 18 deened
fo'have given [Petitioner] the warranty required by said
statutory sections,

Respondent's argunent is without merit, as there is nothing in the warranties
Te provided that warrants that the devices wil be fit for thelr ordinary
purpose, and that it would repair any nonconformity to that effect without
Eharge for at least one year, as required by IRS § 481K-2(a) and (b)

 

 

‘The TCA concluded that,

(nJotwithstanding [Respondent’ s) failure to provide
[Petitioner] with the required weitten warranty of fitness
for ordinary purposes Under HRS’ § 421K-2ia), [Petitioner]
did not establish that he suffered any “damages caused by
that violation.” Hes § 481K-5[c). - . (The court) did
ot award (Petitioner) damages under HRS chapter 480 and
[Petitioner] dia not cross-appeal from [the court]’s
judgment,

 

118 Hawai'i at 293, 188 F.3d at 807 (brackets omitted).

a2
*+*FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER™
ve

Initially we note that the question of whether

jent falls under the definition of “manufacturer” as

 

Resp:
defined by the Act, was not squarely addressed on appeal. HRS

§ 481K-2(a) mandates that “[nlo assistive device shall be sold,
leased, or delivered in this State to a consumer unless
accompanied by a written warranty under which the manufacturer
uartants that the assistive device is fit for the ordinary
purposes for which the device is used[.] HRS § 481K-1 provides
that a “manufacturer” is “a person who manufactures or assembles
assistive devices and agents of that person, including an
importer, a distributor, a factory branch, distributor branch,
and a warrantor of the manufacturer's assistive device, but does
not include an assistive device dealer.” (Emphases added.) An

“assistive device dealer” is defined as

 

person who is in the
business of selling new assistive devices.” HRS § 481K-1.

As the ICA noted, “{i]n [finding] 31, (the court]
found: [Starkey] i a manufacturer under the meaning of HRS
[5] 4@1K-1, [Respondent] ie an agent of [Starkey] and,
therefore, is also considered a ‘manufacturer’ within the meaning
of HRS [S$] 481K-1." Rapoze, 116 Hawai'i at 290 n.7, 188 P.3d at
804 n.7. Because Respondent did not challenge that finding on
appeal, the ICA did not address the issue of whether Respondent

qualified as a “manufacturer” under the statutory definition, but

3
‘\** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

only noted that assistive device dealers are excluded from the

statutory definition. see L

 

However, in his Application, Petitioner observed that
“{a]Lthough the ICA declined to address the issue of whether or
not [Respondent] was a manufacturer, . . . [t]he ICA questioned
(finding) 31 whereby [the court] found [Respondent] to be a
manufacturer.” Petitioner argues in his Application that “an
assistive device dealer who also serves as an agent and/or
warrantor of the manufacturer” should be included within the
definition of “manufacturer” because otherwise “[s]nyone who sold
new assistive devices [including a manufacturer through a factory
branch] could provide a warranty and be immune from suit on that
waranty.”

In this context, we observe that the court was not
clearly erroneous in finding that Respondent is an agent that wes
a wagrantor of the manufacturer's, ie, Starkey’s, assistive

device. The relevant evidence is set forth in the following

findings:
5. {Petitioner} sas given a Warranty Card which indicates
a warranty expiration date of February 16, 2008. s+ s
6." "According to the testimony [of Woodard], hearing aid

fitter/dealer and omer of {Respondent}, {Respondent}
provides its customers with a handout cuenarizing custoner
Service guarantess and nanufacturer warranty information.
‘The hangout states that all new hearing aid purchases cone
sath a 30 day total satisfaction money back guarantee, In
Zadition, the handout references (Starkey’s) replacenent and
repair coverages for the one year period after purchase.

 

 

251" According to Woodard, (Respondent) is the dealer for
[Starkey] in the County of Kauai, state of Hawaii.

26. Woodard testified that when @ hearing aid ia sold to
customer, there is no direct contact between (Starkey) and
the customer, Instead, (Respondent) 1s the Liaison and

14
“°-FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***
performs as (Starkev's) agent in the County of Kauai, state

DE Rawatt

31)" (Searkey) de a manafacturer under the nearing of HRS
[6] 482K-1... [Respondent] is tof {Starkey} andy
iferetore, 42 also considered a “manufacturer” within the
Feaning of HRS (5) 481K-1.

   

 

(citation omitted.) (Emphasis added.) Tt is undisputed that
Petitioner only had contact with Respondent and not Starkey, and
St was Respondent who provided Petitioner with the warranties.
As the warranty card indicated, Petitioner was to return to
Respondent if he had probleme with the aids, and was not provided
any contact information for Starkey. In selling Petitioner the
hearing aids Respondent wae apparently acting as an assistive
device dealer, Manifestly, Respondent was also acting as
Starkey’s agent in the capacity of a warrantor, and therefore, in
that capacity, was governed by the Act's requirements pertaining
to a “manufacturer.” See HRS § 481K-1, The alternative view,
under which the terms “manufacturer” and “assistive device
dealer” would be viewed as mutually exclusive, would allow for
the legally absurd result that consumers would be left without
any recourse under the Act, in the situation where a manufacturer
or an agent, in this case a warrantor, also served as a dealer of
new devices.
vi.

‘The questions raised in this case revolve around the

proper application of HRS chapter 481K. HRS § 481K-3(a) provides

in pertinent part:

15
‘++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

or its agents {aii to correct
wareanty afser 3 reasonable

Sfithe assistive device from the consumer and refund the
ull purchase orice or replace the assistive device »

(a), 1£ the manutacturi
a aoneontormity as requized by

 

  

 

 

(Emphases added.) The relevant portion of HRS § 481K-5 provides

for a right of action as follows:

{c) In addition to pursuing other remedies, a consuner
may bring an action to recover damages caused by'a violation

Sf this chapter. The court shall award a conauter uno
her with Srsenent, and reasonable

‘Aiioines fees, ond any equitable relief that the court may
Sotermine 12 appropriate

(Emphasis added.) Therefore, if a manufacturer fails to correct
a nonconforming device after a “reasonable opportunity to repair”
and does not provide the consumer with a refund or a replacenent,
then the consumer is entitled to recovery under HRS § 481K-5.
vir

‘The ICA’s holding that the court erred in concluding
that Petitioner was entitled to recovery was based entirely on
its belief that certain of the court's findings were clearly
erroneous. 118 Hawai‘i at 293, 188 P.3d at 807. The court’s
findings, as well as any conclusions that present mixed questions
of fact and law, are reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standard. Bmfac, Inc, v, Waikiki Beachcomber Inv, Co., 74 Haw.
85, 116-17, 119, 839 P.2d 10, 27-28, 29 (1992).

A [finding] is clearly erroneous when (1) the record lacks

Substantial evigence to support the finding, oF (2) despite
Substantial evidence in support of the finding, the
appellate court ss nonetheless left with a definite and
Conviction that a mistake has been made, Substantial
Gvidence is credible evidence which ss of sufficsent quality
and probative value to enable a person of Feasonable caution
fo support a conclusion.

   

 

   

16
‘<= FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

Office of Havaiian Affairs v. ey. Dev. Coy awaii
HODCH), 117 Hawa:

Estate of Klink ex rel. Klink v. State, 113 Hawai‘ 332, 351, 152
P.3d 504, 523 (2007)).

 

i 174, 189, 177 P.3d 884, 899 (2008) (quoting

‘The central conclusion of the court, that Respondent
violated chapter 481K, was based on its findings that
(2) Petitioner's hearing aids were not fit for their ordinary
purpose for which they were used and (2) Petitioner provided
Respondent with a reasonable opportunity to repair the hearing
aids, The ICA appears to have determined that there was a lack
of substantial evidence in the record for the court's finding
that the hearing aids were nonconforming, and, despite
substantial evidence regarding repairs, it was left with a
definite and firm conviction that the court erred in finding that
Respondent had a reasonable opportunity to repair the aids.
However, we conclude that the court’s findings that the hearing
aids were nonconforming and that Respondent had a reasonable
opportunity to repair the devices were not clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, the judgment of the ICA must be reversed, and the
decision of the court reinstated.
vint.

We believe that the ICA's error proceeds from its
narrow application of HRS chapter 481K. The plain language of
the Act is aimed at protecting the interests of individuals who

are dependent upon assistive technology devices in their daily

y
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER®**

 

Lives. Moreover, it is evident that the language of the Act is
broader in scope than that propounded by the ICA, Distinctions
that unnecessarily constrict the application of the Act redound
to the detriment of disabled consumers for whose protection the
Act was intended. As discussed below, the meanings of
“nonconfozmity” and “repair” are sufficiently broad to encompass
the circumstances of Petitioner's case.
ak,
In connection with the nonconformity issue raised in

‘the second question by Petitioner, the pertinent court findings

state as follows:

9. After [Petitioner] took delivery of the hearing aid
and attempted to use it ina variety of social settings, he
Ghperienced difficulties.” [peti

kines, he would be able to bear only sounds in_close
broxiBity at other tines. be wae unable to hear sounds at
lose range and could coly hear sounds at areater distances.
To, {Petitacner] testified that it was obvious to him th
the hearing aid needed to be adjusted and, to that end, he

   

TTS At ‘seme point approximately four to six months after
purchase, [Petitioner] noticed that,

is" Atter the hearing aid was returned fron (Starkey! ,
(Petitioner) went into (Respondent)"s place of business’ to
try the repairea hearing aid,” After ah adjustment by

Rot workine oroperiv, —ieetitioosr] teatitied that the

3 =

Rot hear eroneriy wath the hearina aid
TG, {Petitioner] testifies that, aiter the resair by

% Testimony in support of the Act was received from several
individuals and the following organizations: Office of Consumer Protection,
State Planning Council on Developmental Disabilities, Hawaii Assistive
Technology Training and Services, Havail Centers for’ Independent Living,
Protection and Advocacy Agency of Hawaii, and the Commission on Persons with
Disabilities. Sen. Stand, Comm. Rep. No. 792, in 1997 Senate Journal, at
1206-05; Hse, Stand. Comm, Rep. No. i663, in 1937 House Journal, at 1757

 

18
**FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER"

Starkevi, be attended hie class reunion and was unable to
ai CE

THEME) letter dated Jone 17, 2004, [Mrs. Rapoza) wrote to
Incapontent] ard informed [Respondent] that (Petitioner! was
inst getting the effects required off of the use of his
hearing aide (stc]." Mea. Fapozo inquired if there was a
possibility of retarning the Unit.

 

40." Seopite attempts at effecting adjustments and/or
fepair, {Petitioner! continued to experience problens such
Ger clicking in the hearing aid and difficulty in hearing
either close sounds or distant sounds.
i regarding the
problems he experienced white using the nearing aid,
Sones e for

Trotitioner|7a hearing aid therefore had
Rasneenforeity", within the mesning of ARS Section
abies 0)

 

 

(Emphases added.)
x

The ICA cited to the statutory definition of
snonconformity” in ite general discussion of the Act. But in
ruling that the court erred in finding the devices were
nonconforming, the ICA reasoned that “the need for adjustment,
without more, ig not a nonconformity ina hearing aid.” 118
Hawai'i at 293, 188 P.3d at 607. The ICA relied on the
“undisputed testimony” of Respondent that “the ordinary purpose
of a hearing aid is to provide amplification, but unfortunately,
these assistive devices do not provide a perfect replacement for

the fully functioning human ear." Id. The ICA then concluded

 

> Respondent's argunent on appeal to the ICA was that {the court!

erred in finding and concluding that [Fetitioner)’s hearing aids were not fit
fer thelr intended purpose and therefore had a ‘nonconformaty,’ within the
hesning of ARS § {2iR-i[,]" referring to finding 41. Ae ciscussed intra, this
teguvent. is without merit in that there was substantial evidence supporting
the court’s finding thet “[Petitioner)"s hearing aid was not fit for its
ordinary purpose.”

 

 

 

 

 

39
**° FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER***

 

that “[t]here is no evidence, including in (Petitioneri’s
hestinony, that the hearing aids were defective, malfunctioning
or were unfit for their ordinary purpose after the May 2004

repair{,]” and that Petitioner was “not willing to work on

 

further adjustments to the hearing aids.” Id, (emphasis added.)
However, first, the ICA's belief that “the need for

adjustment, without more, is not a nenconformity,” id., and that

 

F

 

itioner’s testimony was not evidence of “nonconformity,” is
inconsistent both with the broad definitions of “nonconformity”
adopted in the Act and with the purposes of the Act. See
discussion infra. According to the Act, a “nonconformity” is a
“defect, malfunction, or condition that fails to conform to any
warranty applicable to an assistive device.” HRS § 481K-1
(emphasis added). The foregoing underscored terms are not
defined in the Act. “This court has said that ‘[wle may resort
to legal or other well accepted dictionaries as one way to
determine the ordinary meaning of certain terms not statutorily
defined.’” Leslie v. Bd. of Appeals of County of Hawaii, 109
Hawai'i 384, 393, 126 P.3d 1071, 1080 (2006) (quoting Schetke v.
Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd., 96 Hawai'i 408, 424, 32 P.3d
52, 68 (2001)). The Webster’s dictionary definition of “defect”
includes “shortcoming” or “a want or absence of something
necessary for completeness, perfection, or adequacy in form or
function.” Webster's Third New Int’) Dictionary 591 (1961)
(emphasis added). “Malfunction” ineludes “to function badly or

20
 

“FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

imperfectly: fai] to cperate in the normal or usual manner.” Id.
at 1367 (emphases added). “Condition” includes “something

 

needing remedy.” Id, at 473 (emphasis added). It is evident,

then, that the term “nonconformity” encompasses a wide variety of

 

problems that might prevent consumers’ efficient use of assistive
devices.

‘The Act’s definition of “warranty” sheds further light

 

on the meaning to be attributed to “nonconformity.” HRS § 481K-
3a) requires the manufacturer to accept return of the device if
the manufacturer “fail{s] to correct a nonconformity as required
bya warranty(.]" (Emphasis added.) RS § 481K-2(a) in turn
requires the manufacturer to “warrant[] that the assistive device
is fit for the ordinary purposes for which the device is used,
and undertake[] to pay the full cost of both parts and labor
necessary to repair any nonconformity.” (Emphases added.) HRS
§ 481K-1, the definitions section of the statute, provides a
definition for “assistive device,” which includes “hearing [aids]
+ and other [aids] that enhance an individual's ability to
hear. . . and any other device that enables a person with a
disability to. . . hearl.]” (Emphases added.) Therefore,
Respondent's argument that the purpose of a hearing aid is solely
“to provide amplification,” without regard to whether it actually
assists the individual with his or her hearing, is inconsistent
with the statutory definition for a hearing aid. As Petitioner

responds, “[Respondent’s] definition confuses the ordinary

a1
 

"FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER’

 

purpose for which a hearing aid is used (to assist people with
their hearing) with the means by which the purpose is
accomplished (amplification of sound).”* (Emphasis in

original.)

‘The substantial evidence in the record supporting the
court’s findings that the devices were functioning inadequately
includes (1) Petitioner’s testimony that (a) he was hearing
“{a}1i kinds of sounds and things like that [and nJot hearing
what [he] wanted to hear up close when [he] needed to, and when
(he] needed to hear far away [he] couldn't hear”; (b) he “started
having clicking sounds”; (c} he “attended [his] class reunion,
and [he] could not hear anybody within [sic] [his] table, but
[he] could hear the sounds away from (his) table"; and (d) he did
not notice any change in his ability to hear throughout the
adjustment process, but continued to have the same problens;

(2) as well as the admission of Respondent’s technician, Kadar,
that (a) she “[knew] that [Petitioner was] very frustrated and
felt hopeless with the aids that we had” and (b) that she also
“felt very helpless not providing [Petitioner] with the service

he needed.” Hence, the ICA's conclusion that there was “no
evidence” supporting the court's finding that Petitioner’s
hearing aids were nonconforming, including after the May 2004

repair, 119 Hawai'i at 293, 188 P.3d at 807, was wrong.

“an referring to this statement, this court renders no judgment as
to whether the purpose of the digital hearing aids was only to amplify sound

22
“FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER™

B.

Second, the ICA erred in making the credibility
determination that “it appears” that Petitioner was “not willing”
to return for further repairs after May 2004. 118 Hawai'i at
293, 188 P.3d at 807. The credibility of Petitioner's testimony,
as well as the weight to be given his testimony and other
evidence on the question of nonconformance, as opposed to the
evidence submitted by Respondent, were not matters within the
province of the ICA, but were for the court to determine. See
LeMay v, Leander, 92 Hawai'i 614, 626, 994 P.2d 546, 558 (2000)
(This court has long observed that it is within the province of
the trier of fact to weigh the evidence and to assess the
credibility of the witnesses, and this court will refrain from
interfering in those determinations.”)

Based on the record, there is substantial evidence, as
indicated gupra, that Petitioner's devices were not functioning
“adequa(tely]” or “normal{ly].” See Webster's Third New Int’)
Dictionary at 591, 1367. The evidence shows that the devices
Were functioning poorly and inadequately, so much so that,
despite his hearing disability, there was evidence that
Petitioner never used the devices for a full day, and determined
that he was better off not using them at all. Based on
Petitioner’s testimony that he was at times only able to hear
sounds that were close and at times only able to hear sounds from

far away, and that he heard all kinds of noises, the court could

23
“°° FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER***

 

properly draw the conclusion that Petitioner’s hearing aids vere
not fit for their ordinary purpose."
x.

The legislative history confirms that the terms in the
Act should be Liberally applied, and supports the conclusion that
the ICA's application was too restrictive. As we reiterated in &
4.3 Lounge Operating Co. vs Liguor Commission of the city &
County of Honolulu, 118 Hawai'i 320, 335, 169 P.34 432, 447
(2008), “(IJegislative history may be used to confirm
Interpretation of @ statute’s plain languagel.]" (Citing
Blaisdell v. Dep't of Pub, Safety, 113 Hawai'i 315, 319 n.5, 181
P.3d 796, 800 n.$ (2007).)

According to the legislative history of the Act, “[t}he
purpose of the bill is to provide consumers with additional
warranty remedies in connection with the purchase of assistive

devices for persons with disabilities,” Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep.

 

© petitioner does not raise the ICA's conclusion that “there is no
evidence whatsoever to support [the court's) finding” that Petitioner
Sontinged to hesr clicking sounds afcer the May 2004 cepair, 118 Hawaii at
282, 188 P.3d at 806, as a point of error in his Application. The ICA had.
contluded that the ‘clicking sounds’ clearly constituted » nonconfornity,
and apparently decided that, because, according to Respondent, those were
Corrected by the May 2004 repair, Petitioner’ s devices were no longer
Ronconforming after chat posnt. id. at 291, 293, 188 P.34 at 605, 807.
However, the failure to claim exrar“on the pare of the ica as te this
Conclusion does not adversely inpact the court's ultimate finding that the
Sevices were nonconforming. As Petitioner argues, because the entirety of the
‘other evidence supported the conclusion that Petitioner's hearing aids were
ot working correctly, whether the clicking sounds continued after the May
repair was not necessary to the court's finding that the side were
Roneonforming. This addresses Respondent’ s argument on appeal that “(the

rt] erred in finding that, after repairs were completed by the manufacturer

(Petitioner) continued’ to experience ‘clicking sounds.’" Respondent had

Asieztod that the court's findings 15 and 40, set forth above in full suuza ae
pages 18, 13, were in error.

 

 

 

 

    

   

 

 

 

 

 

24
“+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER™

 

No. 1669, in 1997 House Journal, at 1757 (emphasis added), and to
“provide increased protection{,]” Sen. Stand. Conm. Rep. No. 792,
in 1987 Senate Journal, at 1205 (emphasis added); see also Kalina
vs State, 111 Hawai'i 64, 100, 137 P.3d 990, 1006 (2006) ("This
court has stated that remedial statutes should be liberally
construed to suppress the perceived evil and advance the enacted
remedy and has disfavored narrow interpretations that impede
rather than advance the remedies provided by such statutes.”
(Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.))

As noted in the Senate Conmittee Report for HRS chapter
481K, “assistive devices are an integral part of the lives of
many individuals, the elderly and persons with disabilities in
particular. For these people, it is absolutely critical to have
equipment that is reliable and effective.” Sen. Stand. Comm.
Rep. No, 792, in 1997 Senate Journal, at 1205 (emphases added) .
‘The legislature emphasized that “it is important that these
assistive devices work properly at all times,” Hse. Stand. conn.
Rep. No, 1663, in 1997 House Journal, at 1757 (emphasis added),
and “absolutely critical to have equipment that is xeliable and
effectivet,]” Sen, Stand. Conm. Rep. No. 792, in 1997 Senate
Journal, at 1204-05 (emphases added). Plainly, then, the Act
must be construed liberally in favor of those individuals for
whom it was enacted to protect. See, e.d., Buscher v. Boning,
114 Hawai" 202, 219, 159 P.34 614, 831 (2007) (recognizing that

“we must construe the fourth paragraph of HRS § 386-8 to give

2s
‘°FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

full effect to the intent of the legislature, which sought to
protect the rights of both employees and employers” (quoting
Shimabuku v. Mont: i , 19 Hawai'i 352, 358, 903
P.2d 48, 53 (1995))7 Camara v. Agsalud, 67 Haw. 212, 217, 685
P.2d 794, 797 (1984) (finding with regard to Hawaii's
unemployment compensation statute that “[i]n view of the basic

policy of the statute of protecting the worker from the hazard of

 

unemployment, our courts must view with caution any construction
which would narrow the coverage of the statute and deprive
qualified persons of the benefits thereunder”); Han v. Yana, 84
Hawai'i 162, 177, 931 P.2d 604, 619 (App. 1997) (finding that HRS
§ 480-2 “was constructed in broad language in order to constitute
a flexible tool to stop and prevent fraudulent, unfair or
deceptive business practices for the protection of both consumers
and honest businessmen and businesswomen” (internal quotation
marks, citation, and brackets omitted)).

xr.

With respect to Petitioner’s third and fourth questions
relating to the difference between “adjustments” and repairs, the
ICA accepted Respondent's formulation. The ICA decided that it
“must consider whether the ‘adjustments’ that preceded the May
2004 repair also constituted repairs[,]” 118 Hawai'i at 291, 198
P.3d at 805, instead of evaluating whether the court was clearly

erroneous in finding that Petitioner provided Respondent with a

Keasonable opportunity to repair the devices. in this regard,

26
*voFOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER™**

 

five grounds were set forth by the ICA: (1) “[a}1though the
[Act} does not state that the failure to repair after two

attempts or over thirty business days out of service are the

 

exclusive means for establishing that a manufacturer had a
reasonable opportunity to repair, no alternative theory or

evidence was offered in this case”; (2) the “adjustments” that

 

preceded the May 2004 repair did not constitute repairs because
they aze “anticipated and necessary for any hearing aid”; (3) the
“unchallenged and uncontroverted testimony [is] . . . that the
‘ordinary purpose’ of 2 hearing aid is to amplify sound for the
user by working with the user’s existing hearing ability through
a series of adjustments; (4) “there is no evidence that
[Petitioner] . . . provided [Respondent] with written notice that
the hearing aids were nonconforming"; and (5) “[Petitioner]
participated in an initial in-store adjustment of the refurbished
aids, but did not return for further adjustments after wearing
the aids in public.” 116 Hawai'i at 291-82, 188 P.3d at 805-06.
For those reasons, the ICA was “left with a definite and firm
conviction that [the court] erred in finding that the adjustments
« « constituted repairs” and therefore “[the court) clearly
erred when it found and concluded that [Petitioner] 's hearing
aids were repaired, or presented for repair, on more than one

occasion.” Id. at 292, 188 P.3d at 206.

20
 

‘**"FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER’

 

a
Because the ICA’s first ground focused on the

presumption in the statute that two attempts is evidence of a
“reasonable opportunity to repair,” its second ground necessarily
focused on whether the “adjustments” constituted repairs and
thereby satisfied that presumption. As a threshold matter st
must be observed that the term “repair” is not defined in the
Act. The meaning of “repair” includes “to make good” or
wrenedy,” and a repair includes “restoration to a state of
soundness, efficiency, or health.” Nebster's Third New Int’
Dictionary at 1923. See Leslie, 109 Hawai'i at 393, 126 P.3d at
1080 ("We may resort to legal or other well accepted dictionaries

+ to determine the ordinary meaning of certain terms not
statutorily defined” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)). That definition comports with a liberal construction
of the Act in line with the legislature's desize to ensure that
disabled and elderly consuners are in possession of efficiently
functioning assistive devices. See Hse. Stand. Conm. Rep. No.
1669, in 1997 House Journal, at 1757; Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No.
792, in 1997 Senate Journal, at 1204-05. However, the ICA
reasoned that “an adjustment is not = repair because the purpose
of an adjustment is not to fix a defect or other nonconformity,
but rather to make a properly working device perform at its best
for the users needs.” Rapozo, 118 Hawai'i at 291, 188 P.3d at
805.

28
‘+S FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

‘The Act does not employ the term “adjustment,” but the
terms “correct” and “repair.” It was Respondent that advanced a
purported distinction between “adjustments” and “repairs,” which
the ICA adopted on appeal. Respondent argues that “{a]lthough
unclear in [the court]’s [findings and conclusions], (the court]
appears to have improperly assumed . . . that the periodic
‘adjustments’ made to the hearing aids after [Petitioner]
purchased the aids and before the clicking sound presented
itself, constituted forms of ‘repair./”

Respondent speculates that the court's “erroneous
assumption” must be attributed to Petitioner's supplemental
argument pursuant to the court’s request for the parties to
address what is meant by “repair” in the context of the Act. It
argues that Petitioner's definition of “repair,” which is “the
placing of the device into compliance with the warranty,” is
“circular,” “self-serving,” and “without support.” However,
Petitioner is correct that HRS § 481K-3 conditions the consuner’s
recovery of a refund on whether “the manufacturer or its agents
fail to correct a nonconformity as required by a warranty.” HRS
§ 491K-3. As explained gupra, the warranty imposed by the
statute requires the manufacturer to ensure that the device is
fit for the ordinary purpose for which the device is used, in
this case to assist a consumer’s hearing, and Petitioner is
correct to assume that any repair would be directed toward

fulfilling that warranty.

29
 

-FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

‘The definition of ™

 

pair” adopted by the ICA does not
account for the dictionary meanings of “to make good” or to
“remedy” of to “restore[)" “to a state of soundness [and]
efficiency.” See Webster's Third New Int'] Dictionary at 1923.
Additionally, the language of the Act indicates that the terns

“correct” and “repair” are employed

 

relationship to one
another, ise., the consumer is to allow the manufacturer a
“reasonable opportunity to repair” in order to “correct (the)
nonconformity.” HRS § 481K-3 (emphases added.) Neither the ICA
nor Respondent considered the definition of “correct,” which,
according to the dictionary, means “to make or set right” or “to
alter or adjust so as to bring to some standard or required
condition.” Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary at 511
(emphasis added.)

The plain meaning of the term “correct” indicates the
Act contemplated that an “adjustment” is in fact in the realm of
actions a manufacturer might take in order to remedy a device
that is not functioning adequately. Accordingly, an adjustment
is included within the term “repair” inasmuch as the purpose of
the “repair” is to “correct” a nonconformity. The court thus
could find under the Act that the so-called “adjustments” were
efforts to correct or, in other words, to “repair” a
nonconformity. It appears, then, that the distinction between an
adjustment and a repair, attempted to be drawn by Respondent and

the ICA, is non-existent under the Act.

30
“++*FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

Indeed, the ICA’s definitions of “nonconformity” and
“repaie” are circular. Its conclusion that “an adjustment is not
a repair because the purpose of an adjustment is not to fix a
defect or other nonconformity,” and, thus, “the need for an
adjustment, without more, is not 2 nonconformity," Rapozo, 118

Hawai'i at 291, 293, 188 P.3d at 805, 807, defines the terms in

 

Light of one another without offering a meaningful definition for
either term. As Petitioner notes, if the ICA's construction of
the Act were to control, sll a manufacturer would need to do in
order to avoid liability under chapter 481K would be to define
whatever attempts it made to fix any problem identified by the
consumer as merely “adjustments.”

Thus, a manufacturer could alvays claim that what the
consumer perceived to be 2 malfunction was actually a “properly
working device” that was not performing “at its best.” Under
Respondent's formulation, a consumer would be compelled to keep
and pay for a device, and continue repeatedly to return for nore
and more “adjustments,” even when those adjustments were not
doing anything to “correct” the problem. This would conflict
with the language of the Act and defeat the intent of the Act,

for the legislature determined that “it is absolutely critical to

 

have equipment that is reliable and effective.” See Sen. Stand.
Comm, Rep. No. 792, in 1997 Senate Journal, at 1205.
‘Therefore, the ICA’s third ground that the

“unchallenged and uncontroverted testimony” by Respondent that

31
‘++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

the “Yordinary purpose of a hearing aid is to amplify sound .
through a series of adjustments,” is wrong. As addressed supra,
the Act’s definition of “assistive device” makes manifest that
the purpose of a hearing aid is to assist the consumer with his
or her hearing. Based on the court’s assessment of credibility
and its weighing of the evidence, see discussion infra, under the
cdzcunstances of this case, the devices did not perform according
to their ordinary purpose and were in need of repair, adjustment,
correction, of an appropriate remedy.
B

Moreover, the plain language of the Act requires that
if the manufacturer is provided a reasonable opportunity to
repair, and yet fails to correct the problen, as required by
warzanty, the consumer is entitled to a refund. The ICA’s first
and second grounds focus on the number of times that the devices
were or were not repaired by Respondent. However, the court did
not find that Respondent actually repaired the devices on more
than one occasion but, rather, as allowed under the Act, that
Petitioner provided Respondent with a reasonable opportunity to
xepair the device on more than one occasion. The court's

relevant findings are as follows:

 

ty to repair the honconformity if it (or its
agents} fails to repair the same nonconformity with to
attempts. (Gag HRS (5) ¢81K-3(b) (3))

55, agter taking possession of the hearing aid,

iatitionsr] exercised reasonable effort and diligence in
etutnlng to [nessonsent! for adtusteents to the hearing aid

ian efter to use the hearing aid for its ordinary
Himnaie-(Petitioner] also atlowed tRespondentl to ship the

 

32
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

hearing aid to (Starkey) for repair

ra a
sa titionerl continued fo experience prcplens such

a5 clidving in the Rearing aid and aifficuity in hearing
Sither close sounds of distant sounse

th. pased upen ‘the testinany of [eetitioner regarding the

probless he experiences while using the Rearing 33,

 

 

Bpumoss. [Petitioner's] nearing aia therefore had 2
Enonconformity” within the meaning of HRS (81 48iK-1.

 

a rvs
aonorkunisy to tenais the fearing aid oro Fo and attes
Eegussting a refund on the purchase price of the nearing
33

(Emphases added.)!* Therefore, although the Act codifies a
presumption that the manufacturer had a reasonable opportunity to
repair under certain circumstances," the court did not have to
rely on those presumptions. Correspondingly, it makes no
difference that no alternative theory was offered, as the ICA
contended should be the case, inasmuch as the Act does not
require a party to present an alternative theory. Rather, the
court could have properly concluded, based on the entirety of the
evidence adduced at trial and on the additional post-trial
briefing, that Petitioner provided Respondent with a reasonable

opportunity to repair, and that Respondent failed to correct the

 

* Respondent challenged findings 38 through 42 on appeal. Inasmuch
ag there was substantial evidence supporting those findings, they were not
Glearly erronecas, and therefore Respondent’ s challenge ig without merit.

BRS § 481K-3(b)(3) states as follows:

It shall be prosuted chat manufacturer has had a
“reasonable opportunity to repair” if the manufacturer or
its agente. fail

Including by reason of attenpts to repair one oF nore

nonconfornities, for a cumulative total of more than thirty
busines dave after the consumer has returned it for Fepaif.

 

(Bephases added.)
33
/=SFOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

problens that Petitioner was experiencing. ee HRS § 481K-3(a)
(CIE the manufacturer or its agents fail to correct a
nonconformity as required by a warranty after a reasonable
opportunity to repair, the manufacturer shall accept return of

the assistive device from the consumer and refund the full

 

purchase price or replace the assistive devicel.]”)
‘The evidence supporting the conclusion that Petitioner
provided Respondent with a reasonable opportunity to repair
includes Petitioner's testimony, as related in findings 10-12,
14-17, and 39-42," that (1) he returned the device four to five

times prior to the May repair; (2) he was without the device for

(3) he came

 

“about a month” during the course of the May repai.
in for another “adjustment” when the device was returned from the
manufacturer in late May? and (4) throughout the course of these
adjustaents, he noticed no change in the device but continued to
experience the same problens.

In making these findings, the court apparently relied

on the testimony of Petitioner and found such testimony credible.

 

the relevant court findings 10-11, 15-17, and 39-42, are set forth
in full supra.” Further evidence that Respondent bad’ a reasonable opportunity
to repair is laid out in findings 12 ang i¢, which state as follows?

 

12. In May 2004, after being informed of {Petitioner's}
Complaints about the performance of the hearing aid,
[Respondent] sent (Petitioner's) hearing sid to (Starkey)
for repair

 

is. " According to [Respondent], the repair by (Starkey)
took approxinately one snd one-half weeks; [Petitioner]
Fecails that he went without the hearing aia for
approximately 30 days during the sanufacturer’ a repair
period.

 

34
‘***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER***

 

It was for the court to make the credibility determination on
this testimony. See LeMav, 92 Hawai'i at 626, 994 P.2d at 558

(stating that the credibility of the witnesses and weight of the
evidence fall within the province of the trier of fact). Based
on the foregoing review of the evidence in the record, it cannot

be said that the court clearly made a mistake, as the ICA held,

 

in finding that Respondent had a reasonable opportunity to repair
the devices.
c.

Finally, the ICA’s fourth and fifth grounds for
concluding that the devices were not presented for repair on more
than one occasion were that the Petitioner did not return for
further repairs after May 2004, and that when he returned the
aids in September or October of 2004, “he was not making then
available for repair and did not provide notice of or otherwise
identify a nonconformity to be repaired.” 118 Hawai'i at 292,
ise P.3d at 806.

In reference to whether or not Petitioner provided

Respondent with adequate notice, the ICA in a footnote quoted

 

from HRS § 481K-2(f) as follows:

A consumer shall make sn assistive device available for
repair py grassnting it te the sanufacturer, its agent,
Fepresentative, authorized assistive device dealer, or
authorized assistive device Lessor prior to the expiration
of the warranty period and providing the manafacturer, its
Agent, represencative, authorized assistive device dealer,
of authorized sgsistive device lessor written notice of the

oncontormity.
[ds at 292 n.9, 188 P.3d at 806 n.9 (emphases supplied).

 

   

 

35
 

-FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER’

However, on appeal, Respondent did not raise the notice issue as

 

a basis for reversing the court's decision.” Accordingly,
Respondent did not challenge the notice given by Petitioner as
inadequate. Instead, Respondent opted to focus on whether the
devices were repaired on nore than one occasion.”

However, it is undisputed that Petitioner's wite
notified Respondent in writing in her June 17, 2004 letter of his
continued problems despite having cone in for adjustments. The
court’s findings indicate that Respondent received adequate
notice inasmuch as it found that “[Petitioner] brought in the
hearing aid. . . for adjustment some four or five times during
the first few months”; “[i]n May 2004, after being informed of
[Petitioner's] complaints about the performance of the hearing
aid, [Respondent] sent [Petitioner’s] hearing aid to [Starkey]
for repair"; (Mrs. Rapoze) wrote to [Respondent] and informed
[Respondent] that [Petitioner] was ‘not getting the effects
required off of the use of his hearing aide (sic]"; and
“(Betitioner] exercised reasonable effort and diligence in
returning to [Respondent] for adjustments to the hearing aid.”

‘There is no clear error with respect to these findings.

% Respondent aid not raise the notice issue on appeal. The TCA
apparently raised and decided this issue gua sponte in its snalysis.

% Because the ICA apparantly raised this matter, Petitioner in his
Application argued that “i]t is clear thet [Respondent)"s’ technician was aware
of the nature of the nonconformity and [Respondent] waz not prejudiced by che
Tack of any written notice, nor was [Petitioner] ever advised that a wriving
was necessary.”

36
‘FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER®**

With regard to whether Petitioner returned for repairs

following the May 2004 repair, according to the court's findings

 

(based on Petitioner's testimony), Petitioner went in for an
adjustment immediately following the return of the aids in May
2004, after which the aids were still not working properly.
Following that visit, Mrs. Rapozo notified Respondent in writing
that Petitioner was continuing to have problems with his aids and
asked about returning the aids. The court further found that
although Woodard claimed that he had instructed Kadar to tell
Petitioner to cone in for further adjustments, Kadar never did
0. The court did not find that when Petitioner returned the
devices in the fall of 2004, he was not making then available for
repair, but found that “[iJn late September or early October
2004, [Petitioner] returned the hearing aid to (Respondent]” and
‘that Respondent “made a few adjustments to the hearing aid...
[but] made no further attenpt to repair the hearing aid or to
send the hearing aid to [Starkey] . . . .” Therefore, the
evidence presented and the court’s findings do not support the
ICA’s conclusion that Petitioner was not making the aids
available for repair, To the contrary, it appears that, despite
further adjustments to the aids after the May 2004 repair, the
aids were still not functioning properly.
xin.
The court’s findings must be given appropriate

deference. See Briones v. State, 74 Haw. 442, 464, E48 P.2d 96,

37
“SFOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

977 (1993) ("Appellate courts defer to the judge or jury as fact
finder unless no substantial evidence existed for their finding
because the fact finder is uniquely qualified to evaluate the
credibility of witnesses and to weigh the evidence.”) Here, the
findings adopted by the court were supported by substantial
evidence and, considering the entire record, it cannot be said
reasonably that a mistake was made. Viewed in its entirety,
there was ample evidence to sustain the court's finding that
Petitioner purchased hearing aids that were “nonconforming” and,
based on the entire record, it was not clearly a mistake for the
court to have found that Respondent had a “reasonable opportunity
to repair” the devices under the Act.”
xq.
Based on the reasons noted above, the ICA’s September

5, 2008 judgment is affirmed as to Petitioner’s HRS 480 claim,

* on appeal Respondent challenged the following conclusions:

4. Pursuant to HRS [6] 481K-3(a) (1) (A, (Respondent) was
roquired to refund to [Petitioner] the full purchase price
Of the hearing aid plus all collateral charges. and
Incidental charges, less a reasonable allowance in use.

5. The acts and omissions of (Respondent) constituted a
violation of Chapter 481K, for unich (Petitioner) i=
entitled to recover twice the amount of any pecuniary loss,
Eogether with costs, disbursements and reasonable attorneys
fees, pursuant to HAS ($) 4BIK-5 (o)

6. (Petitionar] ss entitled to recover the principal amount
of $€,610.66 {84,305.33 x 2) from [Respondent] together with
Sosts’ and reasonable attorneys fee2.

 

 

‘That challenge was based entirely on Respondent’s arguments that
the court erred in finding that the devices had a nonconfornity cr that there
as “any viclation of HRS (chapter) 4BIK."" Ar discussed herein, Respondent's
Grgunents are not meritorious, and therefore, Petitioner was entities to
fecovery,

38
***POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAFT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

but is reversed in all other respects, and the November 17, 2005

judgment of the district court is affirmed,

 

Joe P. Moss for peti

vschete-tyan Bs take heels

(Kessner Umebayashi Bain &

 

 

  

) for respondent / Besasees Cuda a8
Vaan « Rokte

39