Case Title: State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley

Citation: 2008-Ohio-1770

Docket Number: 20062239

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 118 Ohio St.3d 81, 2008-Ohio-1770.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, A DIVISION OF GANNETT 
SATELLITE  NETWORK, INC. v. JONES-KELLEY, DIR. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 118 Ohio St.3d 81, 
2008-Ohio-1770.] 
Mandamus — Public records — Absent evidence showing that a list of names and 
addresses of certified foster caregivers discloses which, if any, is a public-
assistance recipient, the list is not excepted from disclosure under federal 
and state law — Section 671(a)(8), Title 42, U.S.Code — Section 205.50, 
Title 45, C.F.R. — R.C. 5101.27(A) — A judicially created “good sense” 
rule does not except a public record from disclosure under R.C. 149.43. 
(No. 2006-2239 ─ Submitted January 8, 2008 ─ Decided April 17, 2008.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. 
Federal and state law except from disclosure information concerning 
individuals assisted under the state foster-care plan and public-assistance 
recipients, but absent evidence showing that a list of the names and 
addresses of certified foster caregivers discloses which, if any, of those 
caregivers is a public-assistance recipient, the list is not excepted from 
disclosure under federal and state law.  (Section 671(a)(8), Title 42, 
U.S.Code, Section 205.50, Title 45, C.F.R., and R.C. 5101.27(A), 
construed.) 
2. 
Exceptions to disclosure under the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, are 
strictly construed against the public-records custodian, and the custodian 
has the burden to establish the applicability of an exception.  A custodian 
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does not meet this burden if it has not proven that the requested records 
fall squarely within the exception.  (State ex rel. Carr v. Akron, 112 Ohio 
St.3d 351, 2006-Ohio-6714, 859 N.E.2d 948, ¶ 30, followed.) 
3. 
A judicially created “good sense” rule does not except a public record 
from disclosure under R.C. 149.43.  (State ex rel. WBNS TV, Inc. v. Dues, 
101 Ohio St.3d 406, 2004-Ohio-1497, 805 N.E.2d 1116, ¶ 30-39, 
followed; State ex rel. Keller v. Cox (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 279, 707 
N.E.2d 931, and State ex rel. McCleary v. Roberts (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 
365, 725 N.E.2d 1144, clarified.) 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} This is an original action for a writ of mandamus to compel the 
director of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (“ODJFS”) to 
provide access to an electronic copy of a database of the names and addresses of 
certified foster caregivers in the state.  Because the director failed to meet her 
burden to establish that the requested record is excepted from disclosure, we grant 
the writ. 
{¶ 2} Relator, the Cincinnati Enquirer, a division of Gannett Satellite 
Network, Inc. (“Enquirer”), operates and does business as the Cincinnati 
Enquirer, a newspaper of general circulation in Cincinnati, Ohio.  In September 
2006, a reporter for the Enquirer requested that Barbara Riley, who was then the 
director of ODJFS, provide “an electronic copy of the ODJFS database containing 
the names and addresses of all foster associations, institutions or homes certified 
by the state under O.R.C. Chapter 5103.”  ODJFS provided the Enquirer with a 
list of private agencies certified to perform foster-care-related functions, but the 
department did not provide a list of the names and addresses of certified foster 
homes.  As of August 1, 2007, there were 9,985 certified foster homes in Ohio.  
According to an ODJFS official, during one investigation, the department learned 
January Term, 2008 
3 
that approximately 80 percent of all foster homes have had a foster child in the 
past year.  The department did not present evidence that these foster homes had 
either applied for or received financial assistance from the federal or state 
government. 
{¶ 3} In December 2006, the Enquirer filed this action for a writ of 
mandamus to compel Riley, in her capacity as director of ODJFS, to provide the 
requested foster-home record.  Respondent, Helen Jones-Kelley, succeeded Riley 
as the director of ODJFS, filed an answer, and is automatically substituted as the 
respondent in this case.  S.Ct.Prac.R. X(2) and Civ.R. 25(D)(1).  After the parties 
attempted mediation, we granted the Enquirer’s application to dismiss Count Two 
of its complaint, a separate, unrelated public-records claim, and we granted an 
alternative writ on the remaining count.  The parties submitted evidence and 
briefs, and the Public Children Services Association of Ohio, County 
Commissioners’ Association of Ohio, Ohio Association of Child Caring 
Agencies, and Ohio Family Care Association submitted amicus curiae briefs in 
support of the director.  The parties presented oral argument on January 8, 2008. 
{¶ 4} This cause is now before us for our consideration. 
Mandamus 
{¶ 5} “Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel compliance with 
R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Act.”  State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for 
Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 
2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 6; R.C. 149.43(C).  In determining a public-
records mandamus claim, “R.C. 149.43 is construed liberally in favor of broad 
access, and any doubt is resolved in favor of disclosure of public records.”  State 
ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton Cty. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 374, 376, 662 
N.E.2d 334. 
{¶ 6} For purposes of R.C. 149.43, ODJFS is a public office and its 
director is a public official.  See R.C. 149.011(A), defining “public office” to 
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include “any state agency”; R.C. 149.011(B), defining “state agency” to include 
“every department * * * established by the * * * laws of this state for the exercise 
of any function of state government”; R.C. 149.011(D), defining “public official” 
to include “all officers, employees, or duly authorized representatives or agents of 
a public office.” 
{¶ 7} The director of ODJFS is the custodian of the department’s 
records.  The requested electronic copy of the database containing the names and 
addresses of foster caregivers in the state is a record under the Public Records Act 
because maintaining a record of names and addresses of foster caregivers is part 
of the department’s duty in certifying foster caregivers.  R.C. 149.011(G) (“ 
‘Records’ includes any document, device, or item, regardless of physical form or 
characteristic, including an electronic record as defined in section 1306.01 of the 
Revised Code, created or received by or coming under the jurisdiction of any 
public office of the state or its political subdivisions, which serves to document 
the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other 
activities of the office”). 
{¶ 8} Therefore, in the absence of any exception to disclosure under the 
Public Records Act, the Enquirer is entitled to a copy of the requested names and 
addresses of certified foster caregivers in the state. 
Exceptions to Disclosure:  Construction and Burden of Proof 
{¶ 9} The director asserts that the requested electronic copy of the names 
and addresses of all foster caregivers certified by the state is excepted from 
disclosure by (1) federal and state law because foster caregivers are recipients of 
payments from a government program, (2) state law concerning data entered into 
the 
uniform, 
statewide, 
automated 
child-welfare-information 
system 
(“SACWIS”), and (3) a “good sense” rule consistent with public-records 
precedent. 
January Term, 2008 
5 
{¶ 10} Exceptions to disclosure under the Public Records Act, R.C. 
149.43, are strictly construed against the public-records custodian, and the 
custodian has the burden to establish the applicability of an exception.  State ex 
rel. Carr v. Akron, 112 Ohio St.3d 351, 2006-Ohio-6714, 859 N.E.2d 948, ¶ 30; 
State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Akron, 104 Ohio St.3d 399, 2004-
Ohio-6557, 819 N.E.2d 1087, ¶ 23.  A custodian does not meet this burden if it 
has not proven that the requested records fall squarely within the exception.  The 
director relies on R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v), which excepts from disclosure “[r]ecords 
the release of which is prohibited by state or federal law.” 
Exceptions to Disclosure:  Foster-Care Maintenance Payments 
{¶ 11} “The Congress has enacted several statutes aimed at improving 
child welfare services provided by the several States,” including Title IV-E of the 
Social Security Act, Section 670 et seq., Title 42, U.S.Code, which makes federal 
funds available to state programs that provide “ ‘foster care and transitional 
independent living programs for children’ and ‘adoption assistance for children 
with special needs.’ ”  Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. Dept. of 
Health & Human Servs. (C.A.D.C.2006), 435 F.3d 326, 327, quoting Section 670, 
Title 42, U.S.Code. 
{¶ 12} Under Section 671, Title 42, U.S.Code, a state is eligible for 
federal payments if it has an approved plan that, among other things, “provides 
for foster care maintenance payments in accordance with section 672 of this title” 
and “provides safeguards which restrict the use of or disclosure of information 
concerning individuals assisted under the State plan” to the specified purposes, 
including the administration of the plan.  Sections 671(a)(1) and (8), Title 42, 
U.S.Code.  “Foster-care maintenance payments” are “payments to cover the cost 
of (and the cost of providing) food, clothing, shelter, daily supervision, school 
supplies, a child’s personal incidentals, liability insurance with respect to a child, 
and reasonable travel to the child’s home for visitation.”  Section 675(4)(A), Title 
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42, U.S.Code.  Federal regulations reiterate the requirement of confidentiality 
specified in the act.  See Section 1355.21(a), Title 45, C.F.R. (“The State plans for 
titles IV-E and IV-B must provide for safeguards on the use and disclosure of 
information which meet the requirements contained in section 471(a)(8) of the 
Act”); Section 205.50(a)(1)(i), Title 45, C.F.R. (“use or disclosure of information 
concerning applicants and recipients” of “financial assistance” is limited to 
specified purposes); Section 205.50(a)(1)(iv), Title 45, C.F.R. (“Publication of 
lists or names of applicants and recipients will be prohibited”). 
{¶ 13} Ohio has implemented its plan by designating ODJFS as “the 
single state agency to administer federal payments for foster care and adoption 
assistance made pursuant to Title IV-E” and requiring counties to make payments 
“on behalf of each child eligible for foster care maintenance payments under Title 
IV-E * * * to cover the cost of providing * * * [t]he child’s food, clothing, shelter, 
daily supervision, and school supplies.”  R.C. 5101.141(B) and (C)(1)(a); see also 
Weaver v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 153 Ohio App.3d 331, 2003-Ohio-
3827, 794 N.E.2d 92, ¶ 4-6. 
{¶ 14} In compliance with Section 671(a)(8), Title 42, U.S.Code, R.C. 
5101.27(A) generally provides that “no person or government entity shall solicit, 
disclose, receive, use, or knowingly permit, or participate in the use of any 
information regarding a public assistance recipient for any purpose not directly 
connected with the administration of a public assistance program.”  “Public 
assistance” includes “financial assistance, medical assistance, or social services 
provided under a program administered by the department of job and family 
services or a county agency pursuant to Chapter * * * 5101 * * * of the Revised 
Code.”  R.C. 5101.26(F). 
{¶ 15} The director claims that because foster-care maintenance payments 
under these federal and state provisions are made to foster caregivers on behalf of 
the foster children, foster caregivers are “individuals assisted under the State 
January Term, 2008 
7 
plan” pursuant to Section 671(a)(8), Title 42, U.S.Code, “applicants and 
recipients” of “financial assistance” under Section 205.50, Title 45, C.F.R., and 
“public assistance recipient[s]” under R.C. 5101.27(A) and that their names and 
addresses are thus excepted from disclosure under the Public Records Act. 
{¶ 16} The Enquirer counters that because the ODJFS director admitted in 
her deposition that the foster-care maintenance payments pay foster caregivers for 
their services in caring for children and are not considered to be “public 
assistance,” the court should reject the director’s claimed exception.  The 
Enquirer’s contention, however, lacks merit because ─ as the director asserts ─ 
the interpretation of the pertinent federal and state provisions raises a legal 
question rather than an evidentiary issue to be determined by witness testimony.  
See, e.g., Shimko v. Lobe, 103 Ohio St.3d 59, 2004-Ohio-4202, 813 N.E.2d 669, ¶ 
60; Pinchot v. Charter One Bank, F.S.B., 99 Ohio St.3d 390, 2003-Ohio-4122, 
792 N.E.2d 1105, ¶ 39. 
{¶ 17} In construing the pertinent federal and state provisions, our 
paramount concern is the intent in enacting them.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Russell v. 
Thornton, 111 Ohio St.3d 409, 2006-Ohio-5858, 856 N.E.2d 966, ¶ 11.  
“Determining this intent requires us to read words and phrases in context and 
construe them in accordance with rules of grammar and common usage.”  Id.  A 
“recipient” is “one that receives.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
(1986) 1895.  To “receive” means “to take possession or delivery of.”  Id. at 1894.  
“Assistance” means “the act or action of assisting:  aid, help.”  Id. at 132. 
{¶ 18} Foster-care maintenance payments, although made on behalf of an 
eligible child, are delivered to the possession of and thus are received by a foster 
caregiver or by a public or nonprofit, private, child-placement or child-care 
agency.  Section 672(b), Title 42, U.S.Code (“Foster care maintenance payments 
may be made under this part only on behalf of a child described in subsection (a) 
of this section who is ─ (1) in the foster family home of an individual, whether 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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the payments therefore are made to such individual or to a public or private child-
placement or child-care agency”).  Although the children are the ultimate 
beneficiaries, the foster caregivers become assisted individuals who are partially 
reimbursed for certain costs related to child care.  See Timmy S. v. Stumbo (C.A.6, 
1990), 916 F.2d 312, 315 (“The relevant benefits contemplated under the Act 
include foster care maintenance payments to licensed foster parents and 
training”); Harden, Foster Children in the Courts (1983) 142 (“Payments to foster 
families may represent needed money that makes possible better care, clothing, 
and entertainment for the children”). 
{¶ 19} This construction of the pertinent provisions is supported by 
precedent.  In Claudio v. Dowling (1997), 89 N.Y.2d 567, 575, 656 N.Y.S.2d 599, 
678 N.E.2d 1211, the Court of Appeals of New York ─ that state’s highest court 
─ held that “[s]ince foster care [maintenance] payments always are made as 
reimbursements, the foster parent may logically be considered the recipient of 
‘payments to cover the cost of * * * food, clothing, shelter, daily supervision, 
school supplies * * *.’ ”  (Emphasis omitted.)  Id., quoting Section 675(4)(A), 
Title 42, U.S.Code.  In fact, in holding that the foster caregivers had the requisite 
standing to request an administrative hearing to contest the amount of foster-care 
maintenance payments received, the New York Court of Appeals reasoned that 
foster caregivers are also “beneficiaries of [state] case plans.”  Id. at 574, 656 
N.Y.S.2d 599, 678 N.E.2d 1211.  If the foster caregivers are not reimbursed for 
these costs, they have, in effect, donated them. 
{¶ 20} Similarly, even if foster caregivers are not considered at least 
partial beneficiaries of foster-care maintenance payments, they would still be 
recipients of these payments.  See In re Estate of Bundy (1977), 81 Wis.2d 32, 36, 
259 N.W.2d 701 (“a receiver is thought of in legal terms as one who takes 
possession of property for the benefit of others”), in which the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court held that a person could be the recipient of public-assistance 
January Term, 2008 
9 
payments even if the person received the payments in part for the benefit of 
another person. 
{¶ 21} Therefore, based on the plain language of Section 671(a)(8), Title 
42, U.S.Code, Section 205.50, Title 45, C.F.R., and R.C. 5101.27(A), certified 
foster caregivers could qualify as “individuals assisted under the State plan,” 
“applicants and recipients” of “financial assistance,” and “public assistance 
recipient[s]” for purposes of these confidentiality provisions.  As amici curiae 
Ohio Association of Child Caring Agencies and Ohio Family Care Association 
note, “[w]hile the dependent child is the beneficiary of funds and services made 
available through Title IV-E, the foster care parent is the recipient, on behalf of 
the child in his or her case, of the assistance provided.”  (Emphasis sic.)   
{¶ 22} Nevertheless, the director still bears the burden of establishing that 
these federal and state exceptions to disclosure are applicable to the requested 
record, which is a list of the names and addresses of certified foster caregivers in 
Ohio.  In this regard, the director has not yet introduced evidence that all of the 
certified foster caregivers in the requested record had received or were receiving 
foster-care maintenance payments or had applied for them at the time of the 
Enquirer’s request.  Notably, under Section 672(a), Title 42, U.S.Code, these 
payments can be made only on behalf of eligible children.  There is again no 
evidence in the record that all of the certified foster caregivers were caring for 
eligible children when the Enquirer made its request.  At best, the director 
submitted evidence that about 80 percent of all foster homes had a placement in 
the year before a certain investigation occurred.  There is no indication that the 
placements cited were of eligible children or that every certified foster caregiver 
had applied for or received foster-care maintenance payments at the time of the 
records request. 
{¶ 23} Therefore, the director has not yet met her burden to establish that 
the disclosure of the list of names and addresses of certified foster caregivers 
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would necessarily disclose which, if any, of the certified foster caregivers are, in 
fact, public-assistance recipients or applicants.  The mere fact that ODJFS has 
certified certain individuals as foster caregivers does not make these individuals 
“assisted” under the state plan for purposes of federal law or “public-assistance 
recipients” or “applicants” under state law. 
{¶ 24} In other words, federal and state law except from disclosure 
information concerning individuals assisted under the state foster-care plan and 
public-assistance recipients, but absent evidence showing that a list of the names 
and addresses of certified foster caregivers discloses which, if any, of those 
caregivers is a public-assistance recipient, the list is not excepted from disclosure 
under federal and state law.  Section 671(a)(8), Title 42, U.S.Code; Section 
205.50, Title 45, C.F.R.; R.C. 5101.27(A). 
{¶ 25} Based on the foregoing, the director’s contention that federal and 
state law except the foster caregivers’ names and addresses from disclosure 
because they are recipients of foster-care maintenance payments lacks merit. 
{¶ 26} Now that we have interpreted the applicable law, the status of the 
requested records can be established.  We believe that the proper course is to 
allow the director to establish which information fits into this exception to 
disclosure, which had been undefined before our analysis.  Forcing the director to 
make full disclosure of the names and addresses of all foster caregivers may 
jeopardize Ohio’s eligibility to receive federal funding for the state’s foster-care 
program and irrevocably destroy the privacy of foster caregivers whose identities 
are required under federal and state law to remain confidential. 
Exception to Disclosure:  R.C. 5101.131 
{¶ 27} Under Section 674(a)(3)(C), Title 42, U.S.Code, each state that has 
an approved plan is entitled to partial reimbursement of expenses for the creation 
of certain statewide, mechanized, data-collection and information-retrieval 
systems.  The General Assembly enacted R.C. 5101.13, which requires ODJFS to 
January Term, 2008 
11 
establish and maintain SACWIS and to finalize statewide implementation of it not 
later than January 1, 2008.  R.C. 5101.13(A) and (B). 
{¶ 28} R.C. 5101.13(A) provides that the system shall contain the 
following records: 
{¶ 29} “(1) Investigations of children and families, and children’s care in 
out-of-home care, in accordance with sections 2151.421 and 5153.16 of the 
Revised Code; 
{¶ 30} “(2) Care and treatment provided to children and families; 
{¶ 31} “(3) Any other information related to children and families that 
state or federal law, regulation, or rule requires the department or a public 
children services agency to maintain.” 
{¶ 32} In general, “information contained in or obtained from the 
information system established and maintained under section 5101.13 of the 
Revised Code is confidential and is not subject to disclosure pursuant to section 
149.43 or 1347.08 of the Revised Code.”  R.C. 5101.131. 
{¶ 33} The director contends that all of the names and addresses of foster 
caregivers are excepted from disclosure based on R.C. 5101.131 because they are 
being entered into SACWIS as records relating to the “[c]are and treatment 
provided to children and families” under R.C. 5101.13(A)(2).  But the director has 
not yet introduced sufficient evidence on the possible applicability of this 
exception.  The evidence regarding SACWIS is limited to a brief reference in the 
director’s deposition in which she noted that the system would allow the state to 
have information “about all the children in care, [and] all of the systems that are 
operating with those children and families.”  In her merit brief, the director 
conceded that “some names and addresses are not yet protected under R.C. 
5101.13[1]” because they have not been entered into the system.  In fact, the 
director submitted no evidence on how many, if any, foster caregivers’ names and 
addresses were contained in SACWIS at the time of the Enquirer’s request. 
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{¶ 34} Again, we believe that the proper course is to allow the director to 
establish which information fits into this exception to disclosure. 
Exception to Disclosure:  “Good Sense” Rule 
{¶ 35} Finally, the director and some of the amici claim that the names 
and addresses of foster caregivers should be held confidential under the “good 
sense” rule mentioned in State ex rel. Keller v. Cox (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 279, 
282, 707 N.E.2d 931, and State ex rel. McCleary v. Roberts (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 
365, 370, 725 N.E.2d 1144. 
{¶ 36} In Keller, 85 Ohio St.3d at 282, 707 N.E.2d 931, we held that the 
constitutional right of privacy prevented an attorney representing a criminal 
defendant from obtaining access to a police officer’s personnel files because 
“[p]olice officers’ files that contain the names of officers’ children, spouses, 
parents, home addresses, telephone numbers, beneficiaries, medical information, 
and the like should not be available to a defendant who might use the information 
to achieve nefarious ends.”  We further observed that “[t]his information should 
be protected not only by the constitutional right of privacy, but, also, we are 
persuaded that there must be a ‘good sense’ rule when such information about a 
law enforcement officer is sought by a defendant in a criminal case.”  Id. 
{¶ 37} In McCleary, 88 Ohio St.3d 365, 725 N.E.2d 1144, syllabus, we 
held that “[p]ersonal information of private citizens, obtained by a ‘public office,’ 
reduced to writing and placed in record form and used by the public office in 
implementing some lawful regulatory policy, is not a ‘public record’ as 
contemplated by R.C. 149.43.”  In that case, the relator sought a copy of a city’s 
database containing information about children who used the city’s recreational 
facilities.  We found that the personal information requested did not constitute a 
record for purposes of R.C. 149.43 because it did not document any of the 
functions of the city’s recreation and parks department. Id. at 368-370, 725 
N.E.2d 1144. 
January Term, 2008 
13 
{¶ 38} We also noted in dicta that even if the requested information 
constituted a record subject to R.C. 149.43, the record would be excepted from 
disclosure because of the constitutional right of privacy in that “release of 
personal information of this nature creates an unacceptable risk that a child could 
be victimized.”  Id. at 370-372, 725 N.E.2d 1144. 
{¶ 39} For the following reasons, neither Keller nor McCleary supports 
the application of a “good sense” exception to disclosure under the Public 
Records Act in this case. 
{¶ 40} First, our decision in Keller was premised upon the constitutional 
right of privacy, and the director does not claim that the requested record here is 
protected by this right.  See Conley v. Corr. Reception Ctr. (2001), 141 Ohio 
App.3d 412, 417, 751 N.E.2d 528 (“As we read Keller, the Supreme Court based 
its decision to deny access to the personnel records on the officers’ constitutional 
right to privacy and their right to personal security and to bodily integrity”). 
{¶ 41} Second, “to the extent that Keller also suggests a good-sense rule 
regarding the release of public records, the rule appears to be inextricably 
intertwined with the facts of Keller, which involved requests by criminal 
defendants for personal information about law enforcement personnel.”  State ex 
rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Bodiker (1999), 134 Ohio App.3d 415, 430, 
731 N.E.2d 245. 
{¶ 42} Third, our holding in McCleary relied on the fact that the requested 
database did not constitute a record for purposes of the Public Records Act.  By 
contrast, the requested copy here is a record.  Moreover, our dicta in McCleary 
relied on the constitutional right of privacy, which the director does not assert in 
this case. 
{¶ 43} Fourth, like the lead-citation notices at issue in State ex rel. 
Cincinnati Enquirer v. Daniels, 108 Ohio St.3d 518, 2006-Ohio-1215, 844 N.E.2d 
1181, and unlike the city database at issue in McCleary, the requested information 
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in this case does not include specific identifiable information about children.  See 
Daniels at ¶ 17. 
{¶ 44} Finally, “the General Assembly is the ultimate arbiter of policy 
considerations relevant to public-records laws * * * and it is for the legislature to 
‘weigh[] and balance[] the competing public policy considerations between the 
public’s right to know how its state agencies make decisions and the potential 
harm, inconvenience or burden imposed on the agency by disclosure.’ ”  Kish v. 
Akron, 109 Ohio St.3d 162, 2006-Ohio-1244, 846 N.E.2d 811, ¶ 44, quoting State 
ex rel. James v. Ohio State Univ. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 168, 172, 637 N.E.2d 911.  
A judicially created “good sense” rule cannot override this precedent.  See, e.g., 
State ex rel. WBNS TV, Inc. v. Dues, 101 Ohio St.3d 406, 2004-Ohio-1497, 805 
N.E.2d 1116, ¶ 36-37. 
{¶ 45} In sum, a judicially created “good sense” rule does not except a 
public record from disclosure under R.C. 149.43. 
Conclusion - Mandamus Claim 
{¶ 46} Based on the foregoing, the director is ordered to divulge the 
database containing the names and addresses not otherwise excluded by 
application of the law as explained in this opinion. 
Attorney Fees 
{¶ 47} The Enquirer also requests an award of attorney fees.  An award 
under the applicable version of R.C. 149.43 is not mandatory.1  State ex rel. Fox 
v. Cuyahoga Cty. Hosp. Sys. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 108, 529 N.E.2d 443, 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  “In granting or denying attorney fees under R.C. 
149.43(C), courts consider the reasonableness of the government’s failure to 
                                                 
1.  Effective September 29, 2007, R.C. 149.43 was amended and subsection (C) provides new 
standards for awarding attorney fees in public-records mandamus cases.  2006 H.B. No. 9.  That 
amendment does not include language that makes it applicable to records requests and cases filed 
before the effective date.  Cf. State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Ohio Dept. of Health 
(1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 1, 2-3, 553 N.E.2d 1345. 
January Term, 2008 
15 
comply with the public records request and the degree to which the public will 
benefit from release of the records in question.”  State ex rel. Wadd v. Cleveland 
(1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 50, 54, 689 N.E.2d 25. 
{¶ 48} The director’s position was reasonable because of the possible 
applicability of the claimed federal and state exceptions to the requested database 
of names and addresses.  We have not previously considered these claimed 
exceptions.  “ ‘[C]ourts should not be in the practice of punishing parties for 
taking a rational stance on an unsettled legal issue.’ ”  Daniels, 108 Ohio St.3d 
518, 2006-Ohio-1215, 844 N.E.2d 1181, at ¶ 32, quoting State ex rel. Olander v. 
French (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 176, 179, 680 N.E.2d 962. 
{¶ 49} Moreover, the director introduced evidence of four instances in 
which biological parents located children who had been removed from their 
homes and proceeded to harm or threaten to harm the children and their 
caregivers.  The state official in charge of overseeing foster-care and adoption 
programs for ODJFS has opined that the release of the names and addresses of 
foster caregivers would harm children, discourage adoption, and make it difficult 
to recruit and retain foster caregivers.  Four separate groups have filed amicus 
curiae briefs in support of the director.  In February 2008, the governor signed 
into law Am.Sub.H.B. No. 214, effective May 14, which exempts identifying 
information of current and prospective foster caregivers, including records of the 
type sought here.2 
                                                 
2.  The parties submitted supplemental briefs addressing what impact, if any, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
214, which generally exempts this type of record, has on this case.  We find that the act does not 
apply retroactively to this case, because the General Assembly has not so specified.  State v. 
LaSalle, 96 Ohio St.3d 178, 2002-Ohio-4009, 772 N.E.2d 1172, ¶ 14; R.C. 1.48.  Nor is there any 
indication that the General Assembly was merely clarifying existing law.  In fact, the Legislative 
Service Commission concluded in its analysis of the amendment that “existing statutory law does 
not specifically exclude foster caregiver information from being considered a public record.” 
(Emphasis added.  LSC Bill Analysis of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 214, at 7. http://lsc.state.oh.us/analyses 
127h0214-rs-127.pdf. The General Assembly thus modified rather than clarified existing law.  
Finally, it does not make “good sense” for courts to judicially legislate exceptions to the Public 
Records Act that have not been retroactively applied to pending claims by the General Assembly.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
{¶ 50}   This evidence thus establishes that the public benefit of disclosing 
this information is at best questionable. 
{¶ 51} Based on the foregoing, we deny the Enquirer’s request for 
attorney fees. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, LANZINGER, and CUPP, 
JJ., concur. 
 
O’CONNOR, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Graydon, Head & Ritchey, L.L.P., John C. Greiner, and Jeffrey B. Allison, 
for relator. 
 
Marc Dann, Attorney General, William P. Marshall, Solicitor General, 
Elise Porter, Deputy Solicitor, Henry G. Appel, Assistant Solicitor, and Jeffrey 
W. Clark, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for respondent. 
 
Randall B. Muth, urging denial of the writ for amici curiae Public 
Children Services Association of Ohio and County Commissioners’ Association 
of Ohio. 
 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., and Kathleen M. Trafford, urging 
denial of the writ for amici curiae Ohio Association of Child Caring Agencies and 
Ohio Family Care Association. 
______________________ 
                                                                                                                                     
See WBNS TV, 101 Ohio St.3d 406, 2004-Ohio-1497, 805 N.E.2d 1116, ¶ 36-37. Thus, the 
enactment of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 214 does not alter our conclusion that the Enquirer is entitled to 
the requested extraordinary writ of mandamus.