Case Title: Bond v. Bond

Citation: 109 S.E.2d 16

Docket Number: 

State: west-virginia

Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1959-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
109 S.E.2d 16 (1959) Marjorie M. BOND v. William J. B. BOND, Jr. No. 11033. Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. Submitted April 28, 1959. Decided June 2, 1959. *17 Horace S. Meldahl, Charleston, for appellant. No appearance for appellee. CALHOUN, Judge. This case is before this Court upon appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cabell County, refusing to grant an appeal from the domestic relations court of that county. In a suit for divorce, instituted in the domestic relations court, Marjorie M. Bond, hereinafter referred to as "plaintiff", was granted a divorce on June 18, 1957, from William J. B. Bond, Jr., her husband, herein referred to as the "defendant". By the divorce decree, the plaintiff was granted custody of the three infant children born to the marriage union "with the right and privilege reserved to defendant to visit and see said children, at reasonable times, and so long as defendant conducts himself in a proper and decorous manner upon such visitations". The decree also gave the plaintiff the right to occupy, with the infant children, the home owned jointly by the parties and to use the contents thereof. The decree further required the defendant to pay monthly to his wife the sum of $25 as alimony, and a like sum for the support of each child, aggregating the monthly sum of $100. In addition, the decree required the defendant to continue to pay the monthly payments of $46.10 in reduction of a lien indebtedness on the residence property. On August 14, 1957, the defendant gave notice to the plaintiff that, on August 19, 1957, he would apply to the domestic relations court for a modification of the provisions of the divorce decree. His petition filed in pursuance of the notice prayed: "That the use of the dwelling house by the plaintiff be limited to serving as a home for she and said infant children and not as a meeting place for the Jehovah's Witnesses; that the petitioner be allowed to see and be with said infant children during a definite space of time each week; that the payment of the alimony, provided in said former decree, be curtailed so long as the plaintiff is employed, * * *". To this petition plaintiff filed her answer praying: *18 "Your respondent, therefore, prays that the petition, filed against her, may be dismissed; that this Honorable Court will increase the support and maintenance provided for the infant children of the parties hereto, to such sums as will adequately support said children and to which this court shall seem just and rasonable. Your respondent further prays that the petitioner herein be required to pay to her a sufficient sum of money to pay her reasonable court costs and attorney fees in this cause expended and for such other and special and general relief as to the court shall seem proper." On August 26, 1957, a hearing was had before the court on the petition and answer thereto. In support of his petition the defendant expressed a desire that the court fix a definite formula for his visits with his three children. Specifically, he requested that he be given the privilege of having the children each Saturday evening from six o'clock to nine o'clock. Thereafter questions were propounded to the witness and he gave answers as follows: On cross-examination questions were asked and the witness gave answers as follows: *19 Thereupon, counsel for the husband interposed an objection as follows: The cross-examination of defendant was quite lengthy, dealing almost entirely with the tenets of Jehovah's Witnesses. At the conclusion thereof the defendant rested his case. The plaintiff then testified in support of her answer, followed by Billy Bond, age nine, the son of the parties hereto. Ten additional witnesses testified in behalf of plaintiff all affiliated with Jehovah's Witnesses. The entire testimony in behalf of plaintiff was in the main given as an explanation or justification of the tenets, beliefs and religious practices of Jehovah's Witnesses. It would serve no good purpose to relate such testimony in detail. From the entire record, however, it is obvious that the defendant is quite impatient with many of such tenets, beliefs and religious practices, and that he does not want the three infant children to be subject to the influence thereof. It is at this point that the unfortunate battle line is formed. Marjorie M. Bond testified as follows concerning the use of her home for religious services: Following the original cross-examination, the court propounded certain questions and the plaintiff gave answers as follows: On April 10, 1958, the court entered a decree, dated January 25, 1958, a portion of which is as follows: On July 25, 1958, the circuit court entered an order refusing an appeal from the judgment of the domestic relations court, and refusing to dissolve the injunction, on the ground that the judgment was "plainly right". The questions presented relate to: (a) The restraints placed upon plaintiff in the use of the home; and (b) the decretal provisions dealing with attorney fees, court costs and support. *23 It is fundamental in the history of this nation that the original settlers came to America, in a great measure, in pursuit of religious freedom. It was quite natural, therefore, that the founding fathers gave particular emphasis to that aspect of liberty in the architecture of the new nation. Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, (8th Ed.) Vol. 2, page 960. Article VI of the Constitution of the United States provides that: "* * * no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States"; and by the First Amendment it is further provided that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof * * *." In the Constitution of the State of West Virginia, Article III, Section 16, provides that: "The right of the people to assemble in a peaceable manner, to consult for the common good, * * * shall be held inviolate." Article III, Section 7 provides in part: "No law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, shall be passed; * * *". Article III, Section 1, deals in part with "* * * the enjoyment of life and liberty with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and of pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." Article III, Section 15, deals more specifically and at length with religious freedom as follows: Perhaps no single individual has made a greater contribution to the cause of religious liberty in the United States than the immortal Thomas Jefferson. He proudly proclaimed his authorship of the Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom, which was enacted in 1785 and which has formed a part of the Virginia Code to this date. It is said to have formed a model for statutes and constitutional provisions throughout the land. 4 W. & L.Law Rev. 35; 12 Va.Law Rev. 632; Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444. Its language is carried almost verbatim in Article III, Section 15 of the Constitution of West Virginia. The Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom was considered in the case of Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444, 445. From the opinion in that case it appears that two juveniles had been adjudged to be delinquent and each was released upon probation upon condition that he "attend Sunday School and Church each Sunday hereafter for a period of one year * * *." The Court, in holding that such *24 condition of probation violated constitutional requirements of religious freedom, stated: "There is preserved and assured to each individual the right to determine for himself all questions which relate to his relation with the Creator of the Universe. No civil authority has the right to require any one to accept or reject any religious belief or to contribute any support thereto." The case of United States ex rel. Hoce v. McGinnis, D.C.W.Va., 56 F. Supp. 668, involved a habeas corpus proceeding to test the validity of petitioner's detention on a charge of failure to report for induction into the armed services. The background of the case is stated in the Court's opinion as follows: The case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 1187, 87 L. Ed. 1628, 147 A.L.R. 674, involved West Virginia laws and a regulation of the State Board of Education requiring pupils in public schools of the State to salute the flag of the United States, and to repeat a pledge of allegiance thereto. In upholding the right of an individual to refuse to salute the flag or pledge allegiance thereto, the Court stated: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us." Texts and decisions of appellate courts dealing with the fundamental nature of religious liberty are almost without limit. "Such guaranties extend to persons of all creeds and religious beliefs or disbeliefs; religion is not defined under the guaranties, and the constitutional protection is not restricted to orthodox religious practices, and freedom of religious belief belongs to those whose beliefs are disapproved as well as to those whose tenets are approved". 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 206(1), p. 1025. Such guaranties are binding upon courts as upon all others in government. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 206(1), p. 1028. If living together, the father and mother have equal rights in the custody, care, instruction and training of their minor children. Code, Chapter 44, Article 10, Section 7. But where, as here, the matrimonial *25 craft is not sufficiently strong to weather the storms by which it may be buffeted, the infant children are the resulting and unfortunate flotsam. Then follows the duty of the court, often the most onerous and perplexing, to make that disposition of custody which appears most likely to subserve the best interests of the infants concerned. In such a background, the infant children in this case were placed in the custody of their mother because obviously that was deemed to be in their best interests. The husband now seeks to restrict or limit that custody. It is not shown that the children are being neglected in the usual sense; that they are abused or mistreated; or that they are subjected to any evil or immoral influence. While it appears that the home is used somewhat infrequently for small religious gatherings of Jehovah's Witnesses, it does not appear that such gatherings are characterized by loud noises, misconduct or any other sort of lack of decorum. Nor does it appear that the dwelling property is being defaced or abused. In essence, the husband displays a keen impatience with the tenets, teachings, beliefs and practices of Jehovah's Witnesses; he does not want his children reared in that religious faith; and, obviously, it is for this purpose that the defendant seeks to restrict the nature of the use the plaintiff and the infant children shall make of the home. In the case of Cory v. Cory, 70 Cal. App. 2d 563, 161 P.2d 385, 389, a divorce decree awarded custody of minor children to the wife. The husband petitioned the court to give him custody of the minor children. His reasons assigned were that the wife was a Jehovah's Witness, that the home was being used as a gathering place for people of such religious affiliation, and otherwise his complaint was similar to that of the husband in the instant case, though more detailed. In refusing to disturb custody in the wife, the Court stated: In the case of Reynolds v. Rayborn, Tex. Civ.App., 116 S.W.2d 836, 838, the trial court had removed custody of an infant daughter from the father because the father and the child were Jehovah's Witnesses. The appellate court, in reversing the lower court, stated: In the case of In re Doyle, 1884, 16 Mo. App. 159, involving custody of a minor *26 child, the Court stated in point 3 of the syllabus: "In determining what the child's interests are, the court looks only to its temporal welfare, and disregards all question of religion as affecting its spiritual interests." The role of the court in relation to matters of religion is stated in the same case at page 166 as follows: "The state of which we are citizens and officers, does not regard herself as having any competency in spiritual matters." The case of Denton v. James, 107 Kan. 729, 193 P. 307, 12 A.L.R. 1146, is one in which it was sought to change the custody of a child because the person having custody was a Roman Catholic. In refusing to recognize this fact as one proper for consideration, the Court quoted as follows from the case of Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 20 L.Ed. 666: "In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practise any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma." Plaintiff occupies the home in question, not only as a joint-owner thereof, but also by court order. She has a property right therein. It is her home, in which, by court order, she is charged with the responsibility of rearing, directing, training, instructing and caring for the infant children whose custody has been committed solemnly to her care. The use she is making of the home in instructing the children in the religious belief which makes the strongest appeal to her conscience is a normal use of a home. That home is her "castle" in the sense that this Court has no constitutional right or authority to "cross the threshold" in order to restrain her in the free but orderly and lawful exercise of her religious freedom. State v. Littleton, 108 W.Va. 494, 151 S.E. 713, 714. For the reasons stated, this Court holds that the provisions of the decree of the Domestic Relations Court of Cabell County which are designed to restrict plaintiff in the use of her home in matters pertaining to her religious faith is in violation of the letter and spirit of Article III, Section 15 of the Constitution of West Virginia, and, for that reason, such provisions of the decree are void and unenforceable. We cannot say that the decretal provisions for the support of plaintiff and the minor children, aggregating the sum of $100, are unreasonable or inadequate. In this connection, we bear in mind the fact that the plaintiff is given the right to occupy the home and to use the contents thereof, and the fact that the decree requires the defendant to pay the monthly installments of $46.10 on the lien indebtedness covering the dwelling property. We are unable to say that the trial court abused its discretion in relation to the award of court costs and counsel fees. The award of counsel fees in the sum of $50 covered only the services in the hearing before the trial court upon the motion to modify the provisions of the court's former decree. Such hearings are normally brief and rather informal. The trial court was justified in the view that the testimony was unnecessarily prolonged and that the record thereof was unnecessarily burdened by testimony on behalf of plaintiff designed to explain and justify the tenets, beliefs and religious practices of Jehovah's Witnesses. The court is not permitted to concern itself with the reasonableness, tenability or plausibility of such religious tenets, beliefs and practices. In matters relating to alimony, support of minor children, counsel fees and court costs, the trial chancellor enjoys a wide judicial discretion, and his judgment in relation to such matters will not be disturbed on appeal to this Court, unless it clearly appears that he has abused such discretion. State ex rel. Milyanic v. Eddy, 106 W.Va. 370, 145 S.E. 643; Hale v. Hale, 108 W.Va. 337, 150 S.E. 748; Finnegan v. Finnegan, 134 W. Va. 94, 58 S.E.2d 594; Witt v. Witt, 141 W.Va. 43, 87 S.E.2d 524. *27 The judgment of the Domestic Relations Court of Cabell County is reversed to the extent that its decree restricts the plaintiff in the use of her home for religious purposes, and in all other respects such judgment is affirmed. Reversed in part; affirmed in part.