Case Title: Tharpe v. Saunders

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2013-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
JEFFREY W. THARPE, ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
  OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 120985 
JUSTICE ELIZABETH A. MCCLANAHAN 
 
 
 
     FEBRUARY 28, 2013 
J. HARMAN SAUNDERS, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HALIFAX COUNTY 
Theodore J. Markow, Judge 
 
In this defamation case, Jeffrey W. Tharpe ("Tharpe") and 
Shearin Construction, Inc. ("Shearin"), appeal from the judgment 
of the circuit court sustaining the demurrer filed by J. Harman 
Saunders ("Saunders") and J. Harman Saunders Construction, Inc. 
("Saunders Construction").  Because we find the circuit court 
erred in ruling that the alleged defamatory statement 
constituted an expression of opinion, we will reverse the 
circuit court's judgment. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
Since this case was decided below on demurrer, we accept as 
true the well-pleaded facts sets forth in the amended complaint 
and all inferences fairly drawn therefrom.  Hawthorn v. City of 
Richmond, 253 Va. 283, 284-85, 484 S.E.2d 603, 604 (1997); Russo 
v. White, 241 Va. 23, 24, 400 S.E.2d 160, 161 (1991). 
 
Shearin, acting through its agent, Tharpe, contracted with 
the United States government to perform excavation work at Fort 
Pickett.  During the excavation, Shearin encountered rock and 
entered into a change order for compensation above the amount of 
 
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the original contract price upon the basis that encountering the 
rock was a changed condition.  Subsequently, Shearin, also 
acting through Tharpe, contracted with the Southside Regional 
Service Authority (the Authority) to perform excavation work at 
Butcher's Creek Landfill in Mecklenburg County.  A dispute arose 
between Shearin and the Authority after Shearin encountered rock 
during the excavation and requested a change order for 
compensation above the original contract price.  
 
Saunders, owner and operator of Saunders Construction, a 
business competitor of Shearin, allegedly made the following 
statement to Wayne Carter, the Mecklenburg County Administrator 
and the Authority's Executive Director: "Tharpe told me that 
Tharpe was going to screw the Authority like he did Fort 
Pickett."  This statement was allegedly made again by Saunders 
to Carter and another named individual, then repeated and 
republished by and to the Authority, people of the community, 
and the news media.  Tharpe and Shearin assert that Tharpe never 
told Saunders "[he] was going to screw the Authority like he did 
Fort Pickett" and, therefore, such statement is false.  They 
further assert that Saunders made the statement knowing it to be 
false, or in reckless disregard of whether it was false, because 
of personal spite, hatred, ill will, or a desire to hurt the 
business reputation of Tharpe and Shearin.   
 
3 
 
Tharpe and Shearin contend that the "clear meaning" of the 
statement as understood by the Authority, the community, and the 
general public "was that Tharpe, acting as agent for Shearin, 
intended to screw1 the Authority by making a[n] unjustified 
change order request as a result of encountering rock on the 
Authority Project" and "that Tharpe, acting as agent for 
Shearin, previously screwed the United States, who contracted 
for the Fort Pickett Project, by making an unjustified change 
order request as a result of encountering rock on the Fort 
Pickett Project."  Thus, Tharpe and Shearin contend that the 
words in the statement "in their normal usage" were understood 
by the Authority, the community, and the general public "to harm 
Tharpe's and Shearin's business reputation." 
 
It is further alleged that as a "direct and proximate 
cause" of the statement, the Authority filed suit alleging fraud 
against Tharpe and Shearin causing them to incur "significant 
                     
 
1 Tharpe and Shearin contend that the "the word 'screw' as 
used in the [s]tatement . . .means to unfairly take advantage of 
another or to act dishonestly in the transaction of business" 
and that "the word 'screw' was so understood by the Authority, 
people of the community, and the general public."  Cf. Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary 2041 (1993)("to oppress or 
dispossess by unreasonable or extortionate actions or 
conditions" or "to extract by pressure of threat"); Oxford 
English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989, rev. online ed. Dec. 2012), 
http://www.oed.com/veiw/entry/173460 (last visited Feb. 6, 
2013)("[t]o defraud (a person, esp[ecially] of money), to cheat; 
to deceive").  
 
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attorneys' fees."  Additionally, Shearin has not been invited to 
"submit bids on several large construction projects," "the 
business reputations of Tharpe and Shearin have been severely 
and permanently damaged," and Tharpe and Shearin "have been and 
will continue to be financially harmed."  
 
In this present defamation suit filed by Tharpe and 
Shearin, Saunders and Saunders Construction demurred to the 
amended complaint on the ground that the statement allegedly 
made by Saunders did not contain a provably false statement, but 
was an expression of opinion.2  The circuit court agreed, 
explaining that "[w]hether the quoted statement was made or not 
is certainly factual subject to being disproved," but "the basis 
for the claim of defamation is not dependent upon that fact."  
The circuit court reasoned that the claim of defamation is 
dependent on the ability to prove that Tharpe was going to 
"screw" the Authority and that Tharpe had "screwed" Fort 
Pickett.  According to the circuit court, because what is meant 
by the word "screw" is dependent upon the speaker's viewpoint, 
the alleged defamatory statement was an expression of opinion.  
 
                     
 
2 Although the demurrer contained several alternative 
grounds for dismissal, the only issue addressed by the circuit 
court, which it found dispositive, was whether the alleged 
defamatory statement was an expression of opinion. Accordingly, 
this is the only issue before us on appeal. 
 
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II. ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, Tharpe and Shearin argue that the circuit court 
erred in holding that the alleged defamatory statement by 
Saunders that "Tharpe told me that Tharpe was going to screw the 
Authority like he did Fort Pickett" was an expression of 
opinion.   
 
The elements of defamation are "(1) publication of (2) an 
actionable statement with (3) the requisite intent."  Jordan v. 
Kollman, 269 Va. 569, 575, 612 S.E.2d 203, 206 (2005).  "To be 
actionable, the statement must be both false and defamatory."  
Id.  "Causes of action for defamation have their basis in state 
common law but are subject to principles of freedom of speech 
arising under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of 
Virginia."  Yeagle v. Collegiate Times, 255 Va. 293, 295, 497 
S.E.2d 136, 137 (1998). 
The First Amendment to the Federal Constitution 
and article 1, section 12 of the Constitution of 
Virginia protect the right of the people to 
teach, preach, write, or speak any such opinion, 
however ill-founded, without inhibition by 
actions for libel and slander.  "[E]rror of 
opinion may be tolerated where reason is left 
free to combat it."  Thomas Jefferson's First 
Inaugural Address (1801).  "However pernicious an 
opinion may see[m], we depend for its correction 
not on the conscience of judges and juries but on 
the competition of other ideas."  Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974). 
 
 
6 
Chaves v. Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 119, 335 S.E.2d 97, 102 (1985).  
"But there is no constitutional value in false statements of 
fact."  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340. 
 
Accordingly, "pure expressions of opinion" are 
constitutionally protected and "cannot form the basis of a 
defamation action."  Williams v. Garraghty, 249 Va. 224, 233, 
455 S.E.2d 209, 215 (1995).  "Statements that are relative in 
nature and depend largely upon the speaker's viewpoint are 
expressions of opinion."  Fuste v. Riverside Healthcare Ass'n, 
265 Va. 127, 132, 575 S.E.2d 858, 861 (2003).  Furthermore, 
"[s]peech that does not contain a provably false factual 
connotation" is generally considered " 'pure expression[] of 
opinion.' "  WJLA-TV v. Levin, 264 Va. 140, 156, 564 S.E.2d 383, 
392 (2002).3 
 
"Whether an alleged defamatory statement is one of fact or 
of opinion is a question of law to be resolved by the trial 
court."  Id. at 156-57, 564 S.E.2d at 392; Tronfeld v. 
                     
 
3 "While pure expressions of opinion are not actionable, 
'[f]actual statements made to support or justify an opinion 
. . . can form the basis of an action for defamation.' "  
Raytheon Tech. Servs. Co. v. Hyland, 273 Va. 292, 303, 641 
S.E.2d 84, 90 (2007) (quoting Williams, 249 Va. at 233, 455 
S.E.2d at 215).  Because "expressions of 'opinion' may often 
imply an assertion of objective fact," the United States Supreme 
Court has refused to "create a wholesale defamation exemption 
for anything that might be labeled 'opinion.' "  Milkovich v. 
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990); see also Raytheon, 
273 Va. at 303, 641 S.E.2d at 91. 
 
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Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 272 Va. 709, 714, 636 S.E.2d 447, 450 
(2006); Fuste, 265 Va. at 132-33, 575 S.E.2d at 861.  Because 
this determination is an issue of law, we conduct a de novo 
review of the statement in question.  Raytheon, 273 Va. at 304, 
641 S.E.2d at 91.  In conducting our review, we do not determine 
whether the alleged defamatory statement is true or false, but 
whether it is capable of being proved true or false.  Id.  
 
Applying these principles, Saunders' statement that "Tharpe 
told me that Tharpe was going to screw the Authority like he did 
Fort Pickett" is indisputably capable of being proven true or 
false.  The statement can be disproved by evidence, if adduced, 
that Tharpe did not tell Saunders he "was going to screw the 
Authority like he did Fort Pickett."  It is neither an 
expression of Saunders' opinion that Tharpe made this statement 
to Saunders, nor is it dependent on Saunders' viewpoint.  See, 
e.g., Tronfeld, 272 Va. at 715-16, 636 S.E.2d at 451.4  For that 
reason, the constitutional right to speak opinion "without 
inhibition by actions for libel and slander" is not implicated 
                     
 
4 To illustrate this point further, if it were alleged 
instead that Saunders said "Tharpe is going to screw the 
Authority like he did Fort Pickett," one might argue that such a 
statement by Saunders is an expression of Saunders' opinion or 
dependent on his viewpoint.  In contrast, the allegation in this 
case is that Saunders made a false statement of fact – that 
Tharpe said he was going to "screw" the Authority like he did 
Fort Pickett. 
 
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since it is Saunders' alleged false statement of fact, not any 
expression of his opinion, that subjects him to potential 
liability.  Chaves, 230 Va. at 119, 335 S.E.2d at 102. 
 
Although the circuit court recognized that "[w]hether the 
quoted statement was made or not is certainly factual subject to 
being disproved," it nevertheless required that the statement 
attributed to Tharpe by Saunders also contain a provably false 
connotation.  However, Tharpe's and Shearin's claims of 
defamation are based solely on the false attribution to Tharpe 
of the quoted statement, which he denies having spoken, not the 
falsity of the assertion contained within that alleged 
statement. 
[R]egardless of the truth or falsity of the 
factual matters asserted within the quoted 
statement, [a false] attribution may result in 
injury to reputation because the manner of 
expression or even the fact that the statement 
was made indicates a negative personal trait or 
an attitude the speaker does not hold. 
 
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 511 (1991) 
(emphasis added).5  The gravamen of the amended complaint is that 
                     
 
5 In fact, "[a] self-condemnatory quotation may carry 
more force than criticism by another."  Masson, 501 U.S. 
at 512.  As the Supreme Court noted, 
[i]t is against self-interest to admit one's own 
criminal liability, arrogance, or lack of integrity, 
and so all the more easy to credit when it happens.  
This principle underlies the elemental rule of 
evidence which permits the introduction of 
 
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Saunders allegedly attributed a fabricated quotation to Tharpe 
that, as a quotation, caused injury to the reputations of Tharpe 
and Shearin.  Such allegations give rise to a claim of 
defamation regardless of the truth or falsity of the matters 
asserted in the statement allegedly attributed to Tharpe or 
whether such assertions are fact or opinion.  Id. at 511-12 
(where a public-figure psychoanalyst was falsely quoted as 
stating he was "the greatest analyst who ever lived," the Court 
explained that "one need not determine whether [he] is or is not 
the greatest analyst who ever lived in order to determine that 
it might have injured his reputation to be reported as having so 
proclaimed").   
 
Although we have not previously addressed fabricated 
quotations, other jurisdictions have recognized that quotations 
falsely attributed to a plaintiff are actionable as defamation 
regardless of the truth or falsity of the substance of the 
quotation when it injures the plaintiff's reputation.  See, 
e.g., Levesque v. Doocy, 560 F.3d 82, 89-90 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(false attribution of comments to plaintiff encouraged listeners 
                                                                  
statements against interest, despite their hearsay 
character, because we assume "that persons do not 
make statements which are damaging to themselves 
unless satisfied for good reason that they are 
true."   
Id. at 512 (quoting Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. 
Rule Evid. 804(b)(3), 28 U.S.C. App., p. 789). 
 
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to form negative conclusions about plaintiff tending to harm his 
reputation); Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 127 P.2d 577, 581 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942) (defamation may be accomplished by 
falsely putting words into the mouth of the person defamed and 
imputing to such person a willingness to use them "where the 
mere fact of having uttered or used the words" would produce 
harm to plaintiff's reputation); Selleck v. Globe Int’l, Inc., 
212 Cal. Rptr. 838, 845 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (article containing 
both direct and indirect quotations of statements made by 
plaintiff imputing a betrayal of his son "[did] not merely 
express defendant's opinion that plaintiff made statements about 
his son" but "assert[ed] as a fact that plaintiff made the 
statements”); Schmalenberg v. Tacoma News, Inc., 943 P.2d 350, 
357 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (a statement may be provably false 
because it is falsely attributed to a person who did not make it 
even if the matter asserted in the statement is true).6 
                     
 
6 In Schmalenberg, the court recognized at least three ways 
in which a statement may be provably false: because it falsely 
represents the state of mind of the person making it, because it 
is falsely attributed to a person who did not make it, or 
because the assertion made within the statement is false.  
Thus, if Doe says, "I think Smith said that Jones 
lied about the accident," the statement may be false 
(a) because Doe does not really think that Smith 
said Jones lied about the accident; (b) because 
Smith did not say that Jones lied about the 
accident, even though Jones did; or (c) because 
 
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Similarly, Tharpe's and Shearin's claims are not dependent 
on the ability to prove that Tharpe was going to "screw" the 
Authority and that Tharpe had "screwed" Fort Pickett.  It is 
irrelevant to their claims whether these assertions are capable 
of being proven false.  Rather, Saunders' statement of fact – 
"Tharpe told me that Tharpe was going to screw the Authority 
like he did Fort Pickett" – if believed by the hearer as coming 
from Tharpe, by its very nature is alleged to have defamed 
Tharpe and Shearin.  Therefore, regardless of the truth or 
falsity of the matters asserted in the quote attributed to 
Tharpe, Saunders' statement is an actionable statement of fact. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, we hold the circuit court erred in ruling the 
alleged defamatory statement was an expression of opinion and in 
sustaining the demurrer on that ground.  Accordingly, we will 
reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand for further 
proceedings. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
                                                                  
Jones did not lie about the way in which the 
accident happened. 
Schmalenberg, 943 P.2d at 357.