Case Title: JESSE DAN BOLIN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
JESSE DAN BOLIN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 77137 P.3d 136Case Number: 05-129Decided: 06/29/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
JESSE 
DAN BOLIN,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Diane E. Courselle, Director DAP; Joseph J. Petrone, Student 
Director.  Argument by Mr. 
Petrone.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Matthew D. Obrecht, Student 
Intern.  Argument by Mr. 
Obrecht. 

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

[¶1] 
Jesse Dan Bolin was convicted by a jury of two counts of delivery of marijuana 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005).  He appeals claiming plain error occurred 
when the district court allowed expert testimony from a police detective 
concerning what is usually done in drug investigations rather than what was 
actually done in this investigation and the confidential informant's 
credibility.  He also asserts the 
district court erred in allowing him to appear pro se during sentencing without first 
ensuring he voluntarily waived his right to counsel. We conclude no error 
occurred and affirm the conviction.

  

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Bolin 
presents the following issues for our review:

 
 
I.          
Plain error occurred when the district court permitted irrelevant expert 
testimony concerning evidence of what is usually done in drug 
investigations rather that what actually was done in this case; permitted 
testimony explaining procedures in methamphetamine and crack cocaine 
investigations not related to the present marijuana case; and permitted 
detective Harper to vouch for the confidential informant's 
credibility.

 
 
II.          
The district court erred by allowing the defendant to proceed pro se during sentencing without first 
ensuring that his waiver of counsel was made voluntarily.

 
 
The 
State re-phrases the issues as follows:

 
 
I.          
Whether plain error occurred when detectives testified to standard 
department procedure related to the use of a confidential informant to make a 
controlled buy from a suspected narcotics dealer, and mentioned other illegal 
narcotics in addition to marijuana.

 
 
II.          
Whether plain error occurred when detective Harper testified concerning 
the procedure used to ensure that the confidential informant in this case 
provided the Cheyenne Police Department with reliable information during the 
controlled buys.

 
 
III.         
Whether the district court erred by allowing appellant to proceed pro se at his sentencing 
hearing.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  On March 8, 2004, the Laramie County 
District Attorney's Office issued an information alleging Mr. Bolin delivered 
marijuana in violation of § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) on February 2, 9 and 20, 2004,  and possessed marijuana with intent to 
deliver in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1014(d)(xiii) (LexisNexis 2005) 
on February 23, 2004.  The affidavit 
of probable cause issued with the information alleged a confidential informant 
told the Cheyenne Police Department where Mr. Bolin resided, what kind of 
vehicle he drove and that he was selling marijuana.  The affidavit further alleged detectives 
decided to attempt a controlled buy from him after confirming Mr. Bolin lived at 
the address identified.

 
 
[¶4] The 
affidavit further alleged the details of the controlled buy.  Detectives had the confidential 
informant place a recorded phone call to Mr. Bolin to make arrangements to 
purchase marijuana.  They provided 
the informant with money for the purchase, fitted him with a wireless 
transmitter, and kept him under surveillance as he proceeded to the meeting spot 
with Mr. Bolin.  During the 
encounter, detectives heard the informant count out $25.00 to Mr. Bolin.  After the encounter, the informant 
turned over approximately ten grams of marijuana to detectives. 

 
 
[¶5] The 
affidavit further alleged detectives and the confidential informant followed 
substantially the same process on February 9 and 20, 2004.  The only material differences on those 
dates were the purchases occurred at Mr. Bolin's residence and the informant 
purchased one-half ounce of marijuana.  
On February 23, 2004, detectives arrested Mr. Bolin at his residence and 
charged him with three counts of delivery and one count of possession of 
marijuana.  

 
 
[¶6] 
Pursuant to a motion filed by the district attorney's office, the district court 
dismissed the possession count prior to trial.1  The remaining three counts of delivery 
of marijuana were tried to a jury on November 8 and 9, 2004.  The State presented the testimony of 
three detectives and the confidential informant who described the events 
surrounding each of the drug transactions.  
At the close of the State's case, the defense moved for an acquittal, 
arguing the State had not proven its case because the only witness actually 
involved in the purchases, the confidential informant, was unreliable.  The district court denied the motion on 
the grounds that determining witness credibility was a jury function.  After the denial of its motion, the 
defense rested, presenting no witnesses of its own.  The jury returned a verdict finding Mr. 
Bolin guilty on the first two counts of delivery of marijuana and not guilty on 
the third count.2  Mr. Bolin was sentenced to consecutive 
terms of two to four years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. 

  

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]  The defense did not object at trial to 
the expert testimony about which Mr. Bolin now complains in his first two 
issues.  When no objection is made, 
the plain error standard applies.  
Plain error occurs when:  1) 
the incidents alleged as error clearly appear in the record; 2) the party 
claiming plain error demonstrates that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was 
violated; and 3) the party demonstrates he has been denied a substantial right 
resulting in material prejudice.  Farmer v. State, 2005 WY 162, ¶ 26, 124 P.3d 699, 709 (Wyo. 2005).  Because 
of the constitutional implications present when a defendant is forced to appear 
pro se after refusing, either 
explicitly or implicitly, to accept the services of appointed counsel, we 
conduct a de novo review of Mr. 
Bolin's third claim.  Trujillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 571 (Wyo. 
2000).3 

            

DISCUSSION

 
 

1.                  
Plain 
Error

 
 
a.   Expert Testimony Concerning Drug 
Investigations

 
 
[¶8] Mr. 
Bolin contends plain error occurred when detectives testified about the 
procedures generally followed by the 
Cheyenne Police Department when conducting drug investigations using a 
confidential informant but not about the procedures they followed in this drug investigation with this confidential informant.  He also claims plain error occurred when 
the detectives testified concerning drug investigations involving 
methamphetamine and crack cocaine in addition to marijuana.  The State argues no plain error 
occurred.

 
 
[¶9] In 
support of his claim of plain error in the testimony concerning general rather 
than specific investigative procedures, Mr. Bolin cites the following excerpt 
from Detective James Harper's trial testimony:

 
 
Q.  You mentioned something about searching 
a car. What's that all about?

 
 
A.  Well, if the informant is going to drive 
to a meet, we want to search the car.  
Basically, the only thing  we want to show that the only thing that the 
informant  only place he could have gotten drugs was from the dealer.  So he can't have any drugs in his 
car.  So we go on and search 
it.

 
 
Q.  How was that done?

 
 
A.  Well, everybody does it just a little 
bit differently.  I usually start in 
the front seat, look over the visors, look on the dash, look in the ashtray, 
pull out the ashtray, look behind the ashtray.  I  same thing with the glove box, look 
underneath the dash, any parts in the console, look in the console, see if any 
of those parts come out, and if they do, look in there and shine a flashlight 
around there, look under the front seat, look in the front seat.  

 
 
If it's 
got, like, seat covers, pull those up and look underneath the seat covers. I 
already said underneath the dash.

 
 
He also 
quotes the following testimony from Detective Jason Moon:

 
 
Q.  What's involved in a search like 
that?

 
 
A.  We, basically, go through the interior 
of the vehicle, make sure there's no contraband, no narcotics, no weapons, 
anything of that sort in the vehicle before we sent them out. 

 
 
[¶10] 
One difficulty with Mr. Bolin's argument is that it does not take into account 
other testimony and exhibits presented at trial.  The State introduced the agreement 
signed by the confidential informant setting forth the terms under which this 
informant was to act on behalf of law enforcement in this case specifically. 
 Additionally, Detective Harper 
testified he searched the informant in this case prior to the attempted purchase 
from Mr. Bolin.  He 
stated:

 
 
I had 
[him] take off his shirt, search that separately, kick off his shoes, and after 
the shoes are off, will feel around the socks, make sure there's [no] bulges or 
anything crinkly, anything like that, pat down the legs, feels down the legs all 
the way.  I don't make him take off 
his pants, but basically, run my hands over just every 
part.

 
 
Detective 
Harper also testified the searches he conducts do not vary depending on the type 
or quantity of drugs the confidential informant is attempting to buy.  He stated:  "We search everybody the same.  We search every vehicle the same."  He testified he searched the 
confidential informant involved in Mr. Bolin's case in accordance with the usual 
procedure before and after each of the buys.  Detective Moon testified he searched the 
informant's vehicle.  The 
confidential informant also testified the detectives searched him and his 
vehicle before the buys.  The 
testimony indicated the detectives searched the informant and his vehicle using 
the same procedure usually used in cases involving attempted drug purchases by a 
confidential informant.  The 
testimony concerning the searches violated no clear rule of law and Mr. Bolin 
has not shown it denied him a substantial right resulting in material 
prejudice.  Therefore, its admission 
was not plain error.

 
 
[¶11] 
Mr. Bolin cites Contreras v. State, 7 P.3d 917 (Wyo. 2000) as support for his contention that general testimony 
concerning police procedures is not admissible without testimony addressing the 
specific procedures followed in the particular case.  In Contreras, the defendant argued the 
trial court erred when it allowed a deputy to explain procedures used to ensure 
the reliability of drug buys, and to testify those procedures were followed in 
that case.  He claimed this 
testimony was improperly used to bolster the testimony of an informant.  Applying the plain error standard, we 
concluded Mr. Contreras could not show a clear and unequivocal rule of law was 
violated by admission of the testimony; therefore, there was no plain error. 

 
 
[¶12] 
Mr. Bolin argues there was no plain error in Contreras because the deputy testified 
the general procedures he described were followed in investigating Mr. 
Contreras.  Mr. Bolin argues there 
was plain error in his case because the deputies testified only concerning 
general procedures without saying those procedures were followed in using the 
confidential informant in his case.  
As reflected in the trial excerpts quoted above, the detectives in this 
case testified the same procedures were followed in using the confidential 
informant to investigate Mr. Bolin as were utilized in other confidential 
informant cases.  Additionally, the 
detectives testified concerning the actual investigation conducted in this case 
 the confidential informant placed telephone calls to Mr. Bolin, arranging 
times and places to meet; he was provided with money to purchase marijuana from 
Mr. Bolin; he and his vehicle were searched before and after he met with Mr. 
Bolin; and after each meeting he turned marijuana over to the detectives.  Contrary to Mr. Bolin's assertion, 
application of Contreras supports the 
conclusion that the testimony was not plain error.             

 
 
[¶13]  Mr. Bolin also asserts plain error in 
the admission of testimony concerning investigations involving methamphetamine 
and crack cocaine.  The testimony 
about which he complains was presented by Detective Harper on questioning by the 
State:

 
 

Q.                
. . 
we're just speaking in generalities here, but once you've been able to run some 
of this background information and satisfy yourself that you've got someone who 
really exists as a target, what do you do then with your confidential 
informant?

 
 

A.                 
Well, 
then we try to set up a time to make a controlled buy.

 
 
Q.  And how's that 
done?

 
 
A.  Usually, we try to make them  or have 
the informant make a phone call; otherwise, we're wasting a lot of time if the 
dealer's not home.  So usually, we 
try to make a phone call, set up either a place to meet or a time for the 
informant to come over.

 
 
Q.  Is this fairly straightforward in terms 
of, "Hi, this is Charlie Confidential.  
I want to come over and see you, Joe Druggie, and purchase 20 pounds of 
methamphetamine," or is that the sort of phone call you're used to being part 
of? 

 
 
A.  Absolutely not.

 
 
Q.  What do you generally 
see?

 
 
A.  Either the phone calls are coded or they 
just talk about meeting.

 
 
Q.  What do you mean, 
"coded"?

 
 
A.  One of the things  I'll give an 
example.  

 
 
      An eight ball is 
a measurement of either methamphetamine or cocaine, and it's referred to on the 
street as an eight ball. 

 
 
Q.  Why a name like eight ball, it is big 
and round and black or 

 
 
A.  No.  It's, actually, an eighth of an ounce, 
and usually, it comes  it's powder.  
If it's in a bag, it's a ball, so that's where it got the name of an 
eight ball, but there's been several times I'll have an informant call up and 
say, "Hey, I want to come over and play a game of pool." 

 
 
     Well, the dealer does 
not have a pool table, or anything like that, but they associate a game of pool 
with eight ball.

 
 
Mr. 
Bolin contends this testimony concerning "unrelated drug dealers, in unrelated 
drug transactions, involving different controlled substances" violated a clear 
rule of law prohibiting the admission of irrelevant evidence, violated his 
substantial right to be tried on the untainted evidence against him and 
materially prejudiced him because it concerned methamphetamine, a controlled 
substance of widespread concern to the community.

 
 
[¶14] In 
the context in which the testimony was given, i.e. the general procedures used 
by law enforcement in conducting drug investigations with confidential 
informants, the testimony about which Mr. Bolin complains was relevant.  When evidence forms part of the history 
of the event or serves to enhance the natural development of the facts, it is 
admissible as long as its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.  Williams v. State, 2004 WY 117, ¶ 11, 99 P.3d 432, 439 (Wyo. 2004).  Such 
evidence is proper unless we conclude it should have been excluded because the 
danger of unfair prejudice from its admission substantially outweighed its 
probative value.  W.R.E. 403.  Considered in the context of plain 
error, we do not believe the danger of prejudice from Detective Harper's 
testimony outweighed its probative value.  
It was clear from the testimony, jury instructions, and statements and 
arguments of counsel that this case involved delivery of marijuana and nothing 
more.  The discussion of other drugs 
during the detective's testimony clearly concerned drug investigations in 
general and served only as preliminary information.  It did not relate to the charges against 
Mr. Bolin and there is no indication from the record the jury thought 
otherwise.  We hold admission of the 
testimony did not violate a clear rule of law or deny a substantial right 
resulting in material prejudice. 

 
 
b.         
Expert Testimony Concerning Reliability of Confidential Informant 

 
 
[¶15] 
Mr. Bolin asserts plain error also occurred when Detective Harper testified 
concerning the confidential informant's reliability.  He cites the following excerpts from the 
detective's testimony:

 
 
Q. What 
sort of process do you follow up on being presented with somebody that may or 
may not be a potential informant?

 
 
A.  Well, first, we sit down and do an 
interview and we tell them right off the bat, "You have to be 100 percent 
honest.  If we think you're being 
dishonest with us at all, we're not going to use you.  You're not going to get this opportunity 
to work for us" . . . .

 
 
Q. Did 
you check his background?

 
 
A. I 
asked him about his background. He was very forthcoming, said he had a felony on 
his record, that it was for either accessory or conspiracy to robbery.  Actually, that was one of the things that 
gave me some good feelings, like maybe I could trust him, because it wasn't  he 
didn't try to downplay it.  Didn't 
lower it at all.  He just said, 
"Yeah, this is what I did.  This is 
what I got charged with." 

 
 
Mr. 
Bolin contends this testimony violated the clear rule of law prohibiting a 
witness from testifying as to another witness' credibility, denied him a 
substantial right to due process and a fair trial and materially prejudiced him. 

 
 
[¶ 16] 

 
 
Generally, 
one witness may not testify as to another witness' credibility. The purpose of 
this rule is to preserve the integrity of the jury process by protecting the 
jury's right to act as the final determiner of the credibility of the 
witnesses.  We have stated, however, 
that a trial court does not necessarily commit plain error when it allows 
testimony which illuminates some aspect of the case even though the testimony 
incidentally bolsters the credibility of another witness.

  

Strickland 
v. State, 2004 
WY 91, ¶ 22, 94 P.3d 1034, 1045-46 (Wyo. 2004) (citation omitted).  Applying these principles in Burton v. State, 2002 WY 71, ¶ 41, 46 P.3d 309, 320 (Wyo. 2002), we held it was not plain error to allow testimony 
from a detective to the effect that the victim's testimony at trial was in 
harmony with her earlier statements.   
We said:

 
 
[The 
detective] did not state that he believed the victim's version of the events or 
that he believed Burton was guilty of the offenses.  Even though the detective's testimony 
may have had the incidental effect of bolstering the victim's credibility, the 
trial court did not violate a clear and unequivocal rule of law when it allowed 
the testimony into evidence at trial. 

  

Id. 
(citation omitted).

 
 
[¶17] In 
Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, 34 P.3d 271 (Wyo. 2002), we likewise held there was no plain error in eliciting 
testimony from a detective to the effect that three teenage witnesses provided 
good detail and were obviously focused on the event and the victim's statement 
was consistent with their statements.  
After analyzing the detective's testimony, we concluded he did not state 
he "believed the young witnesses were credible.  He merely testified that the versions of 
what happened were consistent with one another and that he relied upon the 
statements in determining that sufficient probable cause existed to arrest 
Ogden."  Ogden, ¶ 29, 34 P.3d  at 278.

 
 
[¶18] In 
accord with our precedent, we hold that Detective Harper did not improperly 
comment on the credibility of the confidential informant.  He merely testified the informant was 
forthcoming in disclosing his prior conviction and he relied upon that 
disclosure in deciding to use him as an informant.  Detective Harper did not state he 
believed the informant was credible or encroach on the jury's right to determine 
his credibility.  Any incidental 
effect the testimony may have had to bolster the informant's credibility was not 
plain error. 

            
    

2.         
Voluntariness of Waiver of Right to Counsel

 
 
[¶19] In 
his final issue, Mr. Bolin asserts the district court erred when it allowed him 
to appear pro se at sentencing 
without first determining he voluntarily waived his right to counsel.  The facts underlying this claim are that 
after the jury returned its verdict, defense counsel moved to withdraw from 
representation of Mr. Bolin, stating a conflict had arisen.  Defense counsel also moved for the 
appointment of substitute counsel to represent Mr. Bolin.  The district court granted both motions 
and entered an order appointing substitute counsel.  Substitute counsel, like Mr. Bolin's 
trial counsel, worked with the public defender's office. 

 
 
[¶20] 
Mr. Bolin filed a motion to dismiss the public defender's office, claiming a 
conflict of interest existed on the part of the entire office because he had 
filed a complaint against trial counsel alleging he violated several rules of 
professional conduct.  With his 
motion to disqualify the public defender's office, Mr. Bolin also filed a motion 
for appointment of substitute counsel not associated with the public defender's 
office.  

 
 
[¶21] 
The district court held a hearing at which time it denied Mr. Bolin's motion, 
stating Mr. Bolin had the right to be represented by a public defender, but did 
not have the right to court appointed counsel of his own choice.  The district court gave Mr. Bolin the 
choice of appearing at sentencing without counsel or represented by a substitute 
attorney from the public defender's office.  Mr. Bolin declined representation by 
anyone associated with the public defender's office and elected to proceed 
without counsel. 

 
 
[¶22]  At that point, the following colloquy 
occurred:

 
 
THE 
COURT:  What is your 
age?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  
22.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  What is your level of 
education?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  
GED.

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
THE 
COURT:  You received a general 
equivalency degree or diploma? When was that?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  In 
'99.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  And how and where did you 
receive that?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  Newcastle, Wyoming, through the state boot camp 
program.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  How far did you go in 
school?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  Ninth 
grade.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  How well did you do in 
school? Did you pass grades while you were in school?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  Not 
really.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  In your view, what will be 
required for you to do at the sentencing hearing? What would be your 
objectives?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  My objective would be to 
cast doubt on  I don't know what kind of time DA's asking for. Until I know all 
that, I couldn't really say.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Well, you understand that 
the Court will be required to impose a sentence within the maximum provided by 
the legislature.

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  Zero to 
10?

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Right. You understand the 
Court will be required to impose a sentence within the maximum provided by the 
legislature?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes, 
sir.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  And you will be arguing for 
the lowest possible sentence; is that correct?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes, 
sir.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Generally, how do you intend 
to approach that?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  The fact that the 
amounts were quite small in this case  the amounts of marijuana that were 
transactioned; the fact that it is just marijuana, not something 
else.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Those certainly are all 
valid considerations. Do you intend to ask people to speak in your 
behalf?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT: I'll be trying to get ahold of people now that I know the 
day.

 
 
The 
district court concluded Mr. Bolin was articulate, understood and responded 
appropriately to questions, understood the issues involved in his sentencing and 
could adequately represent himself at sentencing.  Accordingly, Mr. Bolin appeared without 
counsel at his sentencing hearing.

 
 
[¶23]  Before addressing the voluntariness of 
Mr. Bolin's waiver of counsel, there is another matter we find it necessary to 
consider.   Mr. Bolin did not 
cite Rule 1.10(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct in support of his claim 
that appointment of substitute counsel from the public defender's office was not 
appropriate after trial counsel, also a public defender, withdrew because of a 
conflict of interest.  However, his 
claim cannot be fairly addressed without discussing the rule.  Rule 1.10(a), and this Court's 
interpretation of it in the context of legal services organizations like the 
public defender's office, is the basis upon which the propriety of the 
appointment of substitute counsel must be judged. Rule 1.10(a) 
provides:

 
 
While 
lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a 
client when any one (1) of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing 
so by Rule 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2.

 
 
Rules 
1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 and 2.2 are the rules of professional conduct relating to 
conflicts of interest.4 

 
 
[¶24]  The clear language of Rule 1.10(a) 
prohibits all attorneys in a firm from knowingly representing a client when any 
of the attorneys practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so because of a 
conflict of interest.  The comment 
following the rule defines "firm" to include not only private law firms but 
attorneys employed in legal services organizations.  We have said, however, the public 
defender's office warrants slightly different treatment than other 
"firms."

 
 
[¶25] In 
the context of an alleged conflict of interest based upon representation of 
co-defendants by separate attorneys from the public defender's office, we said a 
case-by-case inquiry, rather than per se disqualification, was appropriate. 
  Asch v. State, 2003 WY 18, ¶¶ 21-24, 62 P.3d 945, 953 (Wyo. 2003).  We 
provided several reasons for rejecting automatic disqualification of assistant 
public defenders under these circumstances: 

 
 
The 
first reason is aptly stated in Comment d(iv) to Section 203(2) of The 
Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers:

 
 
Public 
defenders who are subject to a common supervisory structure within an 
organization ordinarily should be treated as independent for purposes of 
[imputing conflicts of interest].  
The lawyers provide legal services, not to the public defender office, 
but to individual defendants.  
Ordinarily, the office would have no reason to give one defendant more 
vigorous representation than other defendants whose interests are in 
conflict.  Thus, while individual 
defendants should be represented by separate members of the defender's office, 
the representation of each defendant should not be imputed to other lawyers in 
an office where effective measures prevent communications of confidential client 
information between lawyers employed on behalf of individual 
defendants.

 
 
            
Similarly, there is no financial incentive for attorneys in a public 
defender's office to favor one client over another. The public defender does not 
receive more money if one client prevails and another does not. An assistant 
public defender, as a salaried government employee, simply does not have the 
financial interest in a case that is inherent in private practice.  

 
 
            
Another reason to adopt a case-by-case inquiry for conflicts of interest 
within the State Public Defender's Office is that to do otherwise would 
needlessly jeopardize the right of individual defendants to skilled and 
competent representation.  As noted 
by the Illinois Supreme Court, "[i]n many instances the application of such a 
per se rule would require the appointment of counsel with virtually no 
experience in the trial of criminal matters, thus raising, with justification, 
the question of competency of counsel."   

 
 

Id. 
(citations omitted).

 
 
[¶26]  We have also rejected a bright-line rule 
requiring disqualification of an entire "firm" in the context of an alleged 
conflict of interest based upon prosecution of a defendant by a district 
attorney's office that hired an attorney who formerly represented the 
defendant.  Johnson v. State, 2003 WY 9, ¶ 19, 61 P.3d 1234, 1243 (Wyo. 2003).  We 
said:  we decline to adopt an 
"appearance of impropriety" standard and adopt instead a "function approach," 
which focuses on preserving confidentiality and avoiding positions adverse to 
the client. Id. In the 
context of Johnson, we adopted a 
detailed screening procedure for avoiding conflicts and the appearance of 
impropriety.

 
 
[¶27]  Thus, Wyoming has not adhered to a per se 
disqualification rule for assistant district attorneys or public defenders when 
a conflict of interest is alleged.  
Rather, we have recognized important distinctions between those legal 
service providers and private law firms warranting a case-by-case approach to 
conflicts alleged against public defenders and district attorneys.  Applying this approach in Johnson, we held the defendant was not 
substantially prejudiced by the district attorney's handling of the case.  In Asch we concluded there was nothing in 
the record from which we could conclude a conflict of interest existed.  Although Asch and Johnson involved different fact 
situations, they are instructive in terms of the general principles 
espoused.

 
 
[¶28]  Applying those principles, it is clear 
Mr. Bolin was not entitled to automatic disqualification of substitute counsel 
from the public defender's office.  
Rather, he was entitled to have the district court consider the alleged 
conflict of interest based upon the particular facts of his case. Based upon 
those facts, we conclude the district court did not err in appointing substitute 
counsel from the public defender's office after allowing the assistant public 
defender who represented Mr. Bolin at trial to withdraw.  The reasons Mr. Bolin gave for his 
dissatisfaction with trial counsel did not warrant rejection of representation 
by another public defender.  There 
is nothing in the record from which we can conclude a conflict of interest 
existed or that Mr. Bolin would have been substantially prejudiced by the 
appointment of another public defender.  
There is likewise nothing in the record from which we can conclude the 
public defender's office would have failed to preserve confidentiality and avoid 
positions adverse to the Mr. Bolin during the sentencing phase of his case.  Absent some argument and evidence to the 
contrary, we presume the public defender's office has in place a detailed 
screening procedure for avoiding conflicts and the appearance of 
impropriety.

 
 
[¶29] 
Turning to the voluntariness of the waiver of counsel, Mr. Bolin claims his 
waiver was not voluntary because he was forced to choose between appearing 
either with incompetent, unprepared counsel or without legal representation, 
which was not really a choice at all.  
The Sixth Amendment provides the accused shall have the right to the 
assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions.  Trujillo, 2 P.3d  
at 573.  The Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, requiring the state to make 
appointed counsel available to indigent defendants in all criminal 
prosecutions.  Id.  Counsel is required at those critical 
stages in which the substantial rights of the accused may be affected.  Id.  We have held sentencing is a critical 
stage where substantial rights may be affected and, therefore, the right to 
counsel attaches.  Id.  

 
 
[¶30] 
The Sixth Amendment also guarantees the right of every citizen to conduct his 
own defense.  Id.

 
 
            
A defendant has a constitutional right to waive his right to counsel and 
to represent himself at criminal trial.  
However, to be valid, the trial judge must ensure that the waiver of 
counsel is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or 
privilege. Ideally, the trial judge should conduct a thorough and comprehensive 
formal inquiry of the defendant on the record to demonstrate that the defendant 
is aware of the nature of the charges, the range of allowable punishments and 
possible defenses, and is fully informed of the risks of proceeding pro 
se.

 
 

Id.  

 
 
[¶31] A 
defendant, by refusing to accept the services of appointed counsel, can waive 
his right to counsel.  In 
determining whether a defendant has made a valid waiver of the right to counsel, 
we determine first whether the defendant's waiver was voluntary.  Wilkie v. State, 2002 WY 164, ¶ 7, 56 P.3d 1023, 1024 (Wyo. 2002).  If we 
conclude the wavier was voluntary, we then determine whether the defendant 
waived the right knowingly and intelligently.  Id.  In making that determination, we indulge 
every reasonable presumption against waiver.  Id.  However, when a defendant is given a 
clear choice between waiver of counsel and retention of present counsel, the 
choice is voluntary so long as defendant's refusal to proceed with able 
appointed counsel is without good cause.  
Trujillo, 2 P.3d  
at 574.  We have also 
said:

 
 
The 
Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a meaningful relationship with appointed 
counsel; the purpose of providing assistance of counsel is to ensure that 
criminal defendants receive a fair trial. A defendant has no right to the 
appointed counsel of his choice nor to counsel who would blindly follow his 
instructions. In evaluating Sixth Amendment claims, the appropriate inquiry 
focuses on the adversarial process, not on the accused's relationship with his 
lawyer as such. A court's own evaluation of counsel and the effect of any 
substitution upon the scheduled proceedings are proper considerations in 
addition to the reasons given for a defendant's dissatisfaction.  

 
 

Allen v. 
State, 2002 
WY 48, ¶ 27, 43 P.3d 551, 560 (Wyo. 2002).  
A trial court has substantial latitude in deciding if counsel must be 
disqualified.  Johnson, ¶ 19, 61 P.3d  at 
1243.

 
 
[¶32]  Applying these principles, we hold Mr. 
Bolin voluntarily waived his right to counsel at the sentencing hearing.  When Mr. Bolin requested the appointment 
of substitute counsel, the district court appointed another attorney from the 
public defender's office.  Mr. Bolin 
then requested the appointment of an attorney outside the public defender's 
office, claiming the complaint he filed against trial counsel created a conflict 
of interest for the entire public defender's office.  The district court responded by stating 
there was no basis for appointing substitute counsel outside the public 
defender's office, the public defender's office did a competent, professional 
job representing Mr. Bolin at trial, and no showing had been made as to why 
substitute counsel from the public defender's office could not represent him 
during sentencing. 

 
 
 [¶33] The district court's appointment of 
substitute counsel gave Mr. Bolin a clear choice between appearing with legal 
representation or appearing pro se. 
Mr. Bolin was not entitled to appointed counsel of his own choosing.  He chose to proceed without counsel 
without showing good cause for refusing to accept representation by appointed 
substitute counsel.  At the time he 
made that decision, Mr. Bolin was aware of the risks involved in proceeding 
without legal representation  the jury had returned a guilty verdict on two 
counts of delivery of marijuana and, as reflected in the record, Mr. Bolin knew 
the maximum penalty he faced.  Given 
all of the circumstances, we hold the district court did not err in allowing Mr. 
Bolin to proceed without legal representation at his sentencing hearing.   

 
 
[¶34]  Affirmed.

    

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1At the time 
of the arrest, the arresting officer found marijuana in Mr. Bolin's home.  The defense moved to suppress evidence 
of the marijuana on the grounds Mr. Bolin was not informed of his Miranda rights prior to the questioning 
and search that led to discovery of the marijuana.  The State responded by filing a motion 
to dismiss the possession charge and vacate the suppression motion hearing.  The district court granted both motions, 
dismissing Count IV of the information and vacating the hearing on the motion to 
suppress.    

 
 

2There is no 
indication in the record as to the jury's reasoning for finding Mr. Bolin not 
guilty on Count III.

 
 

3The abuse of 
discretion standard applies when a trial court refuses to appoint substitute 
counsel. Allen v. State, 2002 WY 48, 
¶ 26, 43 P.3d 551, 560 (Wyo. 2002).  
That standard is not applicable here because the trial court did appoint 
substitute counsel, the services of whom Mr. Bolin refused to accept. 

 
 

4Rule 1.7(b) 
is the only provision referenced in Rule 1.10(a) relevant in the context of Mr. 
Bolin's case. It provides:  

 
 
RULE 1.7 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST:  GENERAL 
RULE

 
 
            
* * *

 
 
            
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that 
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another 
client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, 
unless:

            
     (1) the 
lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely 
affected;  
and

            
     (2) the 
client consents after consultation.  
When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, 
the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the common representation and 
the advantages and risks involved.