Case Title: Browne v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 590, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CECIL BROWNE, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 590, 2002 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr.A. Nos. IN98-09-0970 thru  
§                               0974 
§ 
 
Submitted:  April 4, 2003 
Decided:  June 9, 2003 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and STEELE, Justices 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 9th day of June 2003, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal and the 
record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Cecil Browne, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s October 3, 2002 order denying his motion for postconviction  
relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find no merit to the 
appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM.   
 
(2) 
In September 1999, a Superior Court jury found Browne guilty  of 3 
counts of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the Third Degree and 2 counts of 
 
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Attempted Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the Third Degree.1  Browne was 
sentenced to a total of 40 years incarceration at Level V, to be suspended after 11 
years for 15 years of decreasing levels of probation.  Browne’s convictions and 
sentences were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.2   
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Browne claims that: a) his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance; b) he was denied his right to a speedy trial; c) his pretrial statement 
should not have been admitted into evidence; d) the judge should have granted a 
mistrial; and e) the indictment was illegal.  In his reply brief, Browne makes the 
additional claim that his sentences are illegal.   
 
(4) 
In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
Browne must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there 
is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been 
different.3  Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly 
demanding and leads to a “strong presumption that the representation was 
professionally reasonable.”4   
                                                          
 
1Browne was acquitted of one count each of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the 
Commission of a Felony and Aggravated Menacing.  In addition, two counts of Noncompliance 
with Bond were dismissed. 
2Browne v. State, Del. Supr., No. 598, 1999, Walsh, J. (Nov. 29, 2000). 
3Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
4Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
 
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(5) 
Browne claims that his first public defender provided ineffective 
assistance by filing untimely motions and failing to interview witnesses.  He 
further claims that his second public defender, who represented him at trial, did not 
raise these issues due to a conflict of interest, thereby also providing ineffective 
assistance.  We find these claims to be without merit, since the record is devoid of 
any evidence that any alleged error on the part of either of Browne’s public 
defenders resulted in any prejudice to him.  
 
(6) 
Browne next claims that he was denied his right to a speedy trial.  He 
contends that the public defender’s requests for continuances unduly delayed his 
trial for a year from the date of his arrest.  Because Browne did not assert this 
claim in his direct appeal, it is procedurally defaulted5 unless he can establish either 
cause for relief from the procedural default and prejudice from a violation of his 
rights6 or a miscarriage of justice due to a constitutional violation.7  Whether there 
has been a violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial depends 
on the specific facts of the case.8  The court applies a balancing test to the facts, 
weighing the conduct of the defense and the prosecution to determine whether a 
                                                          
 
5SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (3). 
6SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (3) (A) and (B). 
7SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (5). 
8Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 
(1972)).  See also Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1079 (Del. 1987). 
 
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speedy trial violation has occurred.9  The factors to be weighed include the length 
of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right and 
prejudice to the defendant.10   
 
(7) 
Browne’s claim of a speedy trial violation is without merit. Browne 
was arrested on September 11, 1998.  His first trial was scheduled for June 10, 
1999.  Prior to trial, Browne’s original public defender was replaced and, on June 
1, 1999, his new public defender requested a continuance in order to become 
familiar with the case.  The trial was then scheduled for September 14, 1999, 
which was a date mutually convenient for the defense and the prosecution.  The 
record does not reflect any prejudice to Browne as a result of the delay.  In fact, the 
delay appears only to have benefitted Browne since it gave his counsel additional 
time to prepare.  Under these circumstances, Browne has failed to establish any 
justification for our consideration of his procedurally defaulted speedy trial claim.  
 
(8) 
Browne’s next claim is that his pretrial inculpatory statement should 
not have been admitted into evidence at trial.  Because Browne did not assert this 
claim in his direct appeal, he must provide justification for the procedural default11 
in order for this Court to consider the claim.  The appellate standard of review in 
                                                          
 
9Id. 
10Id. 
11SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (3) (A) and (B); SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (5). 
 
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determining whether the Superior Court should have admitted evidence at trial is 
abuse of discretion.12  There is no basis for our consideration of Browne’s claim 
since he has not demonstrated a violation of any right as the result of the admission 
of his statement.  
 
(9) 
Browne next claims that the Superior Court judge should have sua 
sponte granted a mistrial after the jury sent him a note during deliberations stating 
that they were unable to reach agreement on all counts of the indictment.  Again, 
because Browne did not assert this claim in his direct appeal, he must provide 
justification for the procedural default.13  Having reviewed the trial record, we 
conclude that the Superior Court’s failure to sua sponte declare a mistrial did not 
violate any right of Browne14 and, therefore, this claim, too, is without merit.        
 
(10) Browne next claims that the indictment was illegal.  Because Browne 
previously challenged the indictment in his direct appeal, he is barred from 
pursuing the claim in these postconviction proceedings unless reconsideration is 
warranted in the interest of justice.15  Our review of the record in this case does not 
lead us to conclude that reconsideration of this claim is warranted in the interest of 
justice. 
                                                          
 
12DEL. R. EVID. 401, 402, 403; Reyes v. State, 819 A.2d 305, 311-12 (Del. 2003). 
13SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (3) (A) and (B); SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (5). 
14MacDonald v. State, 816 A.2d 750, 754-56 (Del. 2003). 
 
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(11) Browne’s final claim is that his sentences were illegal because they 
were based on erroneous information and exceeded the Truth-In-Sentencing 
guidelines.  Because this claim was not raised in Browne’s direct appeal, he must 
provide justification to excuse the procedural default.16  We have reviewed the 
transcript of the sentencing hearing and find no violation of any right of Browne 
and, therefore, no justification to excuse the procedural default. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
15SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (4). 
16SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (3) (A) and (B); SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (5).