Case Title: Kosmowski v. Atlantic City Medical Center, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-144-01

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2003-03-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
In September 1999, the trial judge notified plaintiff s counsel, Richard Simon, that he had been assigned to the case, that the case was scheduled to be tried on July 10th and that this was a peremptory trial date that would not be adjourned. In January of 2000, Simon requested that the trial date be adjourned to September because the discovery schedule was running late. The trial judge denied the request, stating there was no reason to carry the six-year-old matter any longer. Simon wrote again to request an adjournment, this time stating the reason for the request was to attend his family s scheduled reunion in Tennessee in July to celebrate his grandmother s 90th birthday. The judge again denied the request. Eventually, the judge rescheduled the trial for February 2001. The judge s chambers contacted counsel to make certain everyone was ready for the February 5th trial. On February 2, 2001, Simon spoke to Dr. Doyle s wife, learned that he was in Europe and she was not aware of the exact date he was scheduled to return. On the morning of February 5th, Simon spoke to Dr. Doyle by telephone and learned that he had returned from Europe and was in Baltimore. Dr. Doyle advised that he was unavailable during the week of February 5th because he had commitments in North Carolina and Philadelphia. He told Simon that he would be available during the latter part of the next week. After Simon spoke with Dr. Doyle, he sought an adjournment. Simon told the judge that he found out on Friday that Dr. Doyle was in Europe and was not going to be available for two weeks but did not advise the judge of his telephone conversation with Dr. Doyle. Simon advised the judge that he could not proceed without an expert and Kosmowski s complaint was dismissed with prejudice. On February 6, 2001, a defense attorney s secretary called Dr. Doyle in connection with another case. Dr. Doyle answered the telephone and said he had returned from Europe. Another hearing was held in March. When Simon was asked by the judge whether he had told the court that Dr. Doyle was unavailable because he was in Europe, Simon denied that he had made such a representation. The judge indicated that he would not have dismissed the case if he had been informed by Simon on February 5th that his expert was unavailable because he was in another state. The judge stated that he would have adjourned the case and ordered Simon to pay all expenses to videotape the expert or, in the alternative, would have made trial arrangements to allow Simon to present his expert. The trial judge did not reinstate the dismissed complaint following the rehearing. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion primarily because Simon s lack of candor deprived the court of an opportunity to make arrangements to accommodate plaintiffs expert. The Supreme Court granted Kosmowski s petition for certification. HELD: This matter is remanded to the trial court to consider whether restoration of the complaint would cause any prejudice to defendants caused by the delay; if the complaint is restored, the court should consider the range of sanctions to be imposed on counsel. (p.10) Simon s February 5th request for an adjournment due to the unavailability of Dr. Doyle was not proscribed by Best Practices. That said, other Best Practices rules govern cases filed prior to September 5, 2000 and discretionary rulings should be made reasonably consistent with the provisions and purposes of Best Practices. (p.7) In determining whether to adjourn the case due to the unavailability of plaintiffs expert, the court must focus on the tension between, on the one hand, the salutary principle that the sins of the advocate should not be visited on the blameless litigant and, on the other, the court s strong interest that management of litigation, if it is to be effective, must lie ultimately with the trial court and not counsel trying the case. (pp. 7-8) Plaintiffs have been denied their day in court based exclusively on the conduct of their attorney. When an attorney is unable to try a case due to the first unavailability of an expert, dismissal of the complaint with prejudice should not be invoked except in those cases where the actions of the party show a deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court s authority. The ultimate sanction of dismissal with prejudice should be imposed only sparingly. Dismissal will normally be ordered only when no lesser sanction will suffice to erase the prejudice suffered by the non-delinquent party. (pp.8-9) In view of the statements by the trial judge, this Court senses a desire on his part to reconsider the matter. The Court is not confident that he would have dismissed the case with prejudice if plaintiffs counsel had been candid and concludes that the trial judge should reassess his ruling in light of whether restoration of the complaint would cause any prejudice to defendants from the delay. (p.10) Judgment of the Appellate Division is MODIFIED and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court to reassess its ruling. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA concurs in Justice Coleman s opinion and adds that although the trial court has chosen not to pursue disciplinary charges, it clearly should be understood that a referral to disciplinary authorities is within the panoply of tools available to a trial court that is misled by an attorney; as a general matter, the attorney, not the client, should bear the brunt of a sanction for unethical conduct. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, VERNIERO, ZAZZALI and ALBIN join in JUSTICE COLEMAN s opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA has filed a separate concurring opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 144 September Term 2001 WALTER M. KOSMOWSKI, SR., Administrator ad Prosequendum for the Heirs-at-Law of Drew J. Kosmowski, deceased; WALTER M. KOSMOWSKI, SR., Administrator of the Estate of Drew J. Kosmowski, deceased; WALTER M. KOSMOWSKI, SR., Individually and ELEANOR KOSMOWSKI, Individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ATLANTIC CITY MEDICAL CENTER; RONALD VALLORINI, D.O. and SANDRA LEVINE, R.N., Defendants-Respondents, and WILLIAM F. PFEIFER, III, M.D.; BRUCE EIDELSON, M.D.; ANDREW GLASS, M.D.; SCOTT STRENGER, M.D.; SYKES, M.D., JOHN DOES M.D. and JANE DOES, M.D. (Fictitious physicians who treated decedent); MARY ANN JEFFRIE, R.N.; A.B. SACH R.N.; E. ROSENBATH, R.N.; BETH DOE, R.N.; JANE DOES R.N. and JIM DOES, R.N. (Fictitious nurses who cared for decedent) JANE DOES and JOHN DOES (Fictitious employees of defendant, Atlantic City Medical Center), Defendants. Argued January 21, 2003 Decided March 19, 2003 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Richard J. Simon argued the cause for appellants. Eric M. Wood argued the cause for respondents Atlantic City Medical Center and Sandra Levine, R.N. (Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, attorneys). Paul M. Schaaff, Jr., argued the cause for respondent Ronald Vallorini, D.O. (Orlovsky, Moody, Schaaff & Gabrysiak, attorneys; Jill R. O Keeffe, on the brief). The opinion of the Court was delivered by COLEMAN, J. The sole issue raised in this medical malpractice wrongful death case is whether the complaint should have been dismissed because of the unavailability of plaintiffs medical expert. We conclude that under the unique facts of this case, the trial court should reassess its discretionary ruling. WALTER M. KOSMOWSKI, SR., Administrator ad Prosequendum for the Heirs-at-Law of Drew J. Kosmowski, deceased; WALTER M. KOSMOWSKI, SR., Administrator of the Estate of Drew J. Kosmowski, deceased; WALTER M. KOSMOWSKI, SR., Individually and ELEANOR KOSMOWSKI, Individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ATLANTIC CITY MEDICAL CENTER; RONALD VALLORINI, D.O., and SANDRA LEVINE, R.N., Defendants-Respondents, and WILLIAM F. PFEIFER, III, M.D.; BRUCE EIDELSON, M.D.; ANDREW GLASS, M.D.; SCOTT STRENGER, M.D.; SYKES, M.D., JOHN DOES, M.D. and JANE DOES, M.D. (Fictitious physicians who treated decedent); MARY ANN JEFFRIE, R.N.; A.B. SACH R.N.; E. ROSENBATH, R.N.; BETH DOE, R.N.; JANE DOES, R.N. and JIM DOES, R.N. (Fictitious nurses who cared for decedent); JANE DOES and JOHN DOES (Fictitious employees of defendant, Atlantic City Medical Center), Defendants. LaVECCHIA, J., concurring. I concur in Justice Coleman's opinion for the Court. I write only to add the following. As adopted in New Jersey, Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 3.3 imposes on attorneys a stringent burden of disclosure. In re Forrest, 158 N.J. 428, 434 (1999); see also Kernan v. One Washington Park, 154 N.J. 437, 464 (1998) (Pollock, J., concurring)(observing that in New Jersey, RPC 3.3 exceeds the requirements of disclosure imposed by the ABA version ). RPC 3.3(a)(5) requires that a lawyer shall not knowingly fail to disclose to the tribunal a material fact with knowledge that the tribunal may tend to be misled by such failure. The duty to disclose material facts applies with equal force to matters relating to the substance of the underlying claim as well as to those that relate to procedural issues affecting management of the case. As the original comment to subparagraph (a)(5) stated, subparagraph (a)(5) has been added, which provides that attorneys shall not fail to disclose material facts that are likely to mislead the tribunal if counsel were to remain silent. This applies both to facts that are at issue in the case as well as facts relating to the management of the case. Thus, this Court has held that failure to disclose facts relating to the procedural handling of an action can merit ethical sanctions. In both In re Norton, 128 N.J. 520 (1992), and In re Whitmore, 117 N.J. 472 (1990), for example, violations of RPC 3.3(a)(5) were found when municipal prosecutors did not inform the trial court that the police officers in their respective cases had improper motives for not appearing to testify against DWI defendants, resulting in improper dismissal of the charges. Furthermore, in Kernan, supra, 154 N.J. at 459, Justice Pollock, in a concurring opinion, noted that an attorney s silence in respect of his defendant client s bankruptcy constituted a violation of the duty of disclosure required by RPC 3.3 because the attorney's failure to disclose tended to mislead the adversary and the court. A misrepresentation to a tribunal is a most serious breach of ethics because it affects directly the administration of justice. In re Johnson, 102 N.J. 504, 510 (1986). Although the trial court in this matter has chosen not to pursue disciplinary charges in connection with the attorney s conduct, it clearly should be understood that a referral to disciplinary authorities is within the panoply of tools available to a trial court that is misled by an attorney s misrepresentation or nondisclosure in connection with management of a case. As a general matter, the attorney, not the client, should bear the brunt of a sanction for unethical conduct. See In re Forrest, supra, 158 N.J. at 437 (observing that purpose of Rules of Professional Conduct is to protect the public from an attorney who does not meet the high standards of professional responsibility ). NO. A-144 SEPTEMBER TERM 2001 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court WALTER M. KOSMOWSKI, SR., Administrator ad Prosequendum For the Heirs-at-Law of Drew J. Kosmowski, deceased; et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ATLANTIC CITY MEDICAL CENTER; RONALD VALLORINI, D.O. and SANDRA LEVINE, R.N., Defendants-Respondents. DECIDED March 19, 2003 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Coleman CONCURRING OPINION BY Justice LaVecchia DISSENTING OPINION BY