Case Title: HMH v. State, Dep't of Family Servs.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-12-0094

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION OF THE PARENTAL RIGHTS TO: SMH, KDH, MJH, and APH, MINOR CHILDREN. HMH, a/k/a HM and HB v. STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES2012 WY 165Case Number: S-12-0094Decided: 12/21/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before final publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume. 
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 
2012 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION OF THE PARENTAL RIGHTS TO:  
SMH, KDH, MJH, and APH, MINOR 
CHILDREN.
 
HMH, a/k/a HM 
and HB,
 
Appellant
(Respondent),
 
v.
 
STATE OF WYOMING, 
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES,
 
Appellee
(Petitioner).
 
Appeal from the 
District Court of Johnson County
The Honorable John G. 
Fenn, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
John C. Abraham, 
Liberty Law Offices, P.C., Gillette, Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory A. Phillips, 
Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; Jill E. 
Kucera, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by 
Ms. Kucera.
 
Guardian Ad 
Litem:
Stacey 
L. Obrecht and Dan S. Wilde, Wyoming Guardian Ad Litem 
Program, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. Wilde.
 
Before KITE, 
C.J., and HILL, VOIGT, BURKE, and DAVIS, JJ.
 
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
Appellant, HMH 
(Mother), appeals from the district court’s order terminating her parental 
rights pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-2-309(a)(iii) and (a)(v).  
She contends there was insufficient evidence to support the district 
court’s decision.  We affirm.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]        
Mother presents the 
following issue for our consideration:1
 
Was the district 
court’s finding that parental rights to the minor children should be terminated 
established by clear and convincing evidence?
 
The Department of 
Family Services (DFS) and the children’s guardian ad litem 
state the issue in a substantially similar manner.
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]        
Appellant is the 
mother of MJH, born in 1999, SMH, born in 2001, KDH, born 
in 2003, and APH, born in 2005.2 
 After living most of her life in Michigan, Mother relocated 
with her children in 2007 to Buffalo, Wyoming, where her father resides. 
 While living in Michigan with her children, Mother abused 
prescription drugs and used heroin on a daily basis.  
According to Mother, she eventually treated her heroin addiction through 
methadone therapy and moved to Wyoming with the hope of turning her life 
around.  Following the family’s move to Wyoming, however, 
Mother’s substance abuse issues continued.  Mother began a 
relationship with EW, whose behavior had been addressed “religiously” by 
Buffalo law enforcement for several years prior to Mother’s arrival. 
 Approximately one month after meeting EW, Mother and 
her children moved into an apartment with him.  Mother’s 
substance abuse during her habitation with EW eventually led 
to DFS’s involvement in this case.
 
[¶4]        DFS 
initially offered services to Mother in August, 2008, after receiving a report 
expressing concerns about her drug use.  Mother refused this 
offer of services.  Subsequently, in October, 2008, and again 
in January, 2009, DFS received reports that Mother’s children had 
been locked outside of her home for an extended period, unsupervised, and 
without proper attire.  In response to the January 
incident, DFS offered parenting services to Mother, which she 
accepted.  At that time, DFS enrolled Mother in 
parenting classes and provided assistance to Mother in filling out a subsidized 
housing application, finding employment, and obtaining a driver’s 
license.  DFS also initiated counseling services 
for all four of Mother’s children.
 
[¶5]        
On April 2, 2009, 
Mother attended a parenting class at the DFS office in Buffalo with 
her sister.  Mother had difficulty staying awake at the class, 
her speech was slurred, and her movements were slow.  Law 
enforcement was called, and Mother reported to officers of the Buffalo Police 
Department that she had taken Xanax and methadone pursuant to her 
prescriptions.  After the officers discovered that Mother had 
recently filled two methadone prescriptions, Mother reported that one of her 
prescriptions had been stolen while she was out of state. 
 During a subsequent search of Mother’s home, however, the 
officers found the prescription that Mother claimed had been stolen.  
Mother was placed under arrest for interference with a peace officer, use 
of a controlled substance, and deception in purchasing prescription medication. 
 At the time of Mother’s arrest, EW was serving a 
jail term as the result of a third conviction for driving while under the 
influence.
 
[¶6]        
Upon Mother’s arrest, 
the Buffalo Police Department took her children into protective custody 
and DFS subsequently placed them in non-relative foster care. 
 At that time, it was discovered that all of the children had 
significant dental and vision needs that had not been addressed.  
Each of the children required multiple visits to the dentist to have 
teeth pulled and to have crowns placed on cavities.  Mother’s 
youngest child, APH, required oral surgery for his dental needs. 
 All four of the children required glasses.  
Additionally, after receiving medical exams, SMH 
and KDH were diagnosed with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder 
and were placed on prescription medications. 
 
[¶7]        
The county attorney 
filed a neglect petition in juvenile court on April 6, 2009.  
Mother eventually admitted to the allegations of neglect, stating in a 
stipulated order that she “failed and was otherwise unable to provide adequate 
care and supervision of her minor children.”  The order 
provided that Mother’s children would remain in foster care and would be 
returned to her after she obtained acceptable housing and completed one month of 
consecutive drug tests yielding clean results.  The order also 
required that Mother successfully complete an intensive outpatient drug abuse 
treatment program, that she continue individual counseling, and that she follow 
all recommendations for additional services provided by her treatment facility. 
 A DFS caseworker developed a family service plan, 
echoing the requirements of the stipulated order, and a multi-disciplinary team 
(MDT) was organized to review the requirements of the plan and make 
recommendations relating to Mother’s rehabilitation and the care of her 
children.  The case plan identified a goal of reunification 
for Mother and her children.
 
[¶8]        
While Mother was in 
jail following her arrest, DFS coordinated a substance abuse 
evaluation.  Pursuant to the recommendation of her substance 
abuse evaluator, Mother entered an inpatient treatment program in Sheridan upon 
her release.  After only eighteen days in treatment, however, 
Mother left the inpatient program against staff advice.  Her 
discharge summary from the program recommended successful completion of the 
inpatient treatment program followed by completion of an intensive outpatient 
treatment program.  Mother enrolled in an outpatient treatment 
program in June, 2009, but she was subsequently dropped from the program due to 
her sporadic participation.
 
[¶9]        
At the beginning of 
October, despite Mother’s failure to complete a substance abuse treatment 
program, Mother was reunified with her children after she obtained suitable 
housing and submitted one month of clean drug tests.  However, 
on October 23, both Mother and EW violated probation by testing 
positive for methamphetamine.  Mother and EW were 
arrested and placed in detention the following day.  The 
children were again removed from Mother’s home and, after living with Mother’s 
father for a short period, DFS placed the children in non-relative 
foster care.  During the three weeks that the children were in 
Mother’s home, the children did not attend their individual counseling 
appointments and did not receive their prescription medications.  

 
[¶10]     
After the children 
returned to foster care, MJH reported to the family doctor 
that EW had hit his brothers, and SMH reported 
that EW had played with his penis.  In November, 
SMH, who was eight years old at the time, was admitted to the Wyoming 
Behavioral Institute (WBI) for an evaluation and medical 
assessment.  SMH returned to WBI in 
April, after exhibiting suicidal tendencies.  At that time, he 
received several mental health diagnoses, including major depressive disorder, 
post-traumatic stress disorder, and oppositional defiant disorder. 
 In May, SMH was placed in residential treatment, 
where, through weekly therapy sessions, he reported that he had been physically 
and sexually abused by EW.  SMH told his 
psychologist that he did not want to go home as long as EW was in 
the house, and that he did not want to go home if his mother was drinking or 
using drugs.
 
[¶11]     
MJH, 
KDH, and APH also manifested symptoms of mental health 
problems in individual counseling sessions, and all were eventually diagnosed 
with depression, anxiety, and adjustment disorders by their mental health 
counselor.  Additionally, all of the children expressed fear 
of EW.  When Mother was informed of her children’s 
statements relating physical and sexual abuse by EW, she “adamantly 
denied” that such abuse had occurred.
 
[¶12]     
While Mother was in 
jail following her probation violation, DFS developed a new case 
plan which required Mother to live her life free of drugs, complete an inpatient 
substance abuse treatment program, and obtain housing and employment upon her 
release from jail.  The new case plan included a goal of 
adoption concurrent to the goal of reunification.  Mother’s 
visitation with the children continued under the new case plan, and was 
conducted via phone and jail visits while Mother was incarcerated.  
During this time, the children began demonstrating signs of anxiety 
before, during, and after visitation.  As a result of his 
emotional state, APH became incontinent and broke out in hives 
before and after visitation.  Both APH 
and KDH manifested their anxiety by chewing on their 
shirts.  SMH was given the choice whether to 
participate in visitation every week due to the stress it induced.  
In one particularly disturbing episode, after feeling that he had been 
ignored by Mother during a phone visitation, MJH had a meltdown at 
school in which he wrote on the bathroom wall with his own feces.
 
[¶13]     
Upon her release from 
jail, Mother entered an inpatient treatment program in Casper, which she 
completed in February.  Mother’s discharge summary from the 
treatment program recommended that she complete a community-based outpatient 
treatment program and that she submit to random urinalysis testing. 
 However, Mother’s attendance at the outpatient treatment 
program was inconsistent, and she missed numerous drug tests in February, March, 
and April.  In the outpatient treatment program, missed drug 
tests were considered positive tests.  Additionally, in March, 
law enforcement officers responded to a 911 call reporting a domestic dispute 
between Mother and EW.  During the officers’ 
investigation of the incident, which resulted in EW’s arrest for 
public intoxication, Mother admitted that she had been drinking.
 
[¶14]     
In April, the MDT 
recommended that the permanency goal be changed from reunification to adoption 
due to Mother’s failure to make sufficient progress in achieving the goals set 
out in her case plan.  Mother’s caseworker noted that Mother 
had not demonstrated a commitment to remaining sober, and that Mother continued 
to deny and minimize her children’s concerns regarding EW. 
 On the same day as the MDT meeting, officers from the Buffalo 
Police Department responded to an anonymous report of drunk driving.  
Upon locating the reported vehicle, the officers discovered that Mother 
was a passenger in the vehicle, and that she was highly intoxicated.
 
[¶15]     
Ten days later, on 
May 3, the juvenile court held a hearing to determine the appropriate permanency 
goal for Mother and her children.  The court determined that 
the goal of reunification should no longer be part of the permanency plan, 
finding “clear and convincing evidence that it is not in the best interests of 
the children to return home.”  The court further concluded 
that (1) DFS had made reasonable efforts towards family 
reunification, which had not been successful, (2) that Mother had failed in her 
rehabilitative efforts, and (3) that the children’s health and safety would be 
seriously jeopardized by returning to Mother’s care.  The 
juvenile court changed the permanency goal to termination of parental rights and 
adoption of the children.
 
[¶16]     
In 
December, DFS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights 
alleging two separate statutory grounds for termination.  
First, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii), DFS asserted 
that the children had been neglected, that reasonable efforts to rehabilitate 
the family had been unsuccessful, and that the children’s health and safety 
would be seriously jeopardized by returning to their mother. 
 Second, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309(a)(v), DFS asserted that the children had been in foster 
care under the responsibility of the State of Wyoming for fifteen of the most 
recent twenty-two months, and that Mother was unfit to have custody and control 
of her children.  A three-day bench trial was set for October, 
2011.
 
[¶17]     
Prior to trial, while 
Mother was pregnant with EW’s child, law enforcement responded to 
another domestic disturbance between Mother and EW.  
Mother reported that EW, who was highly intoxicated, had shoved 
her and slapped her in the face.  As a result of the 
incident, EW was arrested and was taken into 
custody.  EW was eventually convicted of domestic 
battery.
 
[¶18]     
At trial, the 
district court received testimony from DFS caseworkers, officers of 
the Buffalo Police Department, the children’s mental health counselors, the 
children’s principal, the children’s court-appointed special advocates, Mother’s 
substance abuse and mental health therapists, Mother, Mother’s father, and 
EW.  DFS contended that Mother had not made 
sufficient progress to reunite with her children, and that it should not be 
required to expend additional time and effort in an attempt to rehabilitate 
Mother at the cost of further uncertainty as to her children’s future. 
 The children’s guardian ad litem agreed. 
 Mother, however, claimed that DFS had not made 
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her family, and that she had not been given 
sufficient time to address DFS’s concerns with respect to EW. 
 Further, Mother asserted that her ability to care for her new 
baby without DFS assistance demonstrated that she was fit to care 
for her four older children.  In an order issued January 27, 
2012, the court determined that clear and convincing evidence supported 
termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309 
(a)(iii) and (a)(v).  Mother appeals the district court’s 
order.
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶19]     
Mother contends 
that DFS presented insufficient evidence to support termination of 
her parental rights.  We recently set forth our standard of 
review in this context as follows:  
 
We apply traditional 
principles of evidentiary review when a party challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting termination. R.L.A. v. State Dep’t of 
Family Services (In re L.A.), 2009 WY 109, ¶ 12, 215 P.3d 266, 
268 (Wyo. 2009). We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
party prevailing below, assume all favorable evidence to be true, and disregard 
conflicting evidence presented by the unsuccessful party. Id. Because the 
right to associate with one’s family is fundamental, however, we strictly 
scrutinize petitions to terminate parental rights. M.L. v. 
Laramie County Dep’t of Family Servs. (In the Interest of L.L.), 2007 
WY 92, ¶ 9, 159 P.3d 499, 501 (Wyo. 2007). As part of our strict 
scrutiny standard, we require that a case for termination of parental rights 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Clear and 
convincing evidence is that kind of proof that would persuade 
a trier of fact that the truth of the contention is highly probable. 
Id.            

ZMETS v. 
State, 2012 WY 68, ¶ 8, 
276 P.3d 392, 394-95 (Wyo. 2012).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶20]     DFS 
sought termination of Mother’s parental rights under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
14-2-309(a)(iii) and (a)(v) (LexisNexis 2009), which provide as 
follows:
 
§ 
14-2-309.  Grounds for termination of parent-child relationship; clear 
and convincing 
evidence.           
(a) The 
parent-child legal relationship may be terminated if any one (1) or more of the 
following facts is established by clear and convincing evidence:
 
. . 
.       (iii) The child 
has been abused or neglected by the parent and reasonable efforts by an 
authorized agency or mental health professional have been unsuccessful in 
rehabilitating the family or the family has refused rehabilitative treatment, 
and it is shown that the child’s health and safety would be seriously 
jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the parent;
 
. . 
.       (v) The child 
has been in foster care under the responsibility of the state of Wyoming for 
fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, and a showing that the 
parent is unfit to have custody and control of the child[.]
 
Because the statutory 
bases for termination of parental rights are separate and independent, proof of 
either of these grounds by clear and convincing evidence provides sufficient 
justification for termination of parental 
rights.  ZMETS, ¶ 18, 
276 P.3d  at 397; MDW v. Hot Springs County Dep’t of 
Family Servs. (In re SRJ), 2009 WY 94, ¶ 10, 
212 P.3d 611, 614 (Wyo. 2009).  
 
[¶21]     
We begin our analysis 
with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v), which, as we have previously noted, 
requires proof of two elements to support termination of parental rights: (1) 
the children have been in foster care under the State’s responsibility for at 
least fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months; and (2) the Mother is unfit 
to have custody and control of the children.  
ZMETS, ¶ 18, 276 P.3d  at 397. 
 Although the term “unfit” is not defined in the statute, we 
have stated that 
 
[F]itness 
includes the ability to meet the ongoing physical, mental and emotional needs of 
the child. Whether a parent is fit to have custody and control of a child is a 
decision that must be made within the context of a particular case and depends 
upon the situation and attributes of the specific parent and child.  

 
AJJ v. 
State (In re KMJ), 2010 WY 142, ¶ 15, 
242 P.3d 968, 971 (Wyo. 2010).  Parental fitness 
is examined at the time of the termination proceedings.  
Nonetheless, we have noted that “[e]vidence of past behavior is . 
. . plainly relevant in determining current parental 
fitness.”  R.L.A. v. State Dep’t of 
Family Services (In re L.A.), 2009 WY 109, ¶ 17, 215 P.3d 266, 
269 (Wyo. 2009).
 
[¶22]     
Mother contends there 
was not sufficient evidence to terminate her parental rights pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v).  She concedes that her children 
had been in foster care for over fifteen months at the time the petition for 
termination was filed, satisfying the first element of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309(a)(v).  Further, Mother also concedes, in her claim 
that there was insufficient evidence to support termination of her parental 
rights under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii), that her children’s welfare 
would be seriously jeopardized if they were returned to her care.  
Notwithstanding this concession, however, Mother contends 
that DFS did not present any evidence indicating that she was unfit 
to have custody and control of the children at the time of trial.  
We do not agree.
 
[¶23]     
Initially, we note 
that, at trial, Mother acknowledged that she would not be capable of caring for 
her children if they were immediately returned to her.  In 
response to a question asking how Mother would like to proceed to regain custody 
of her children, Mother stated that “we all should be eased into it.” 
 In explanation, Mother stated that she would like to 

 
Start off with 
visitation and then maybe even start family counseling all together, you know, 
all of us: me, [EW], the children, and then start with, like, kind of how 
we did before, to where the visits were kind of, you know, supervised and then 
monitored, and then to where they got to come over, even spend a night, you 
know, or whatever.  Something like that.
 
In closing, Mother’s 
counsel recapitulated her testimony that she was not prepared to take 
responsibility for the care of her children:
 
Your Honor, I guess 
at the end of the day, nobody is suggesting that if the Court gives an opinion 
letter two, three weeks down the road and says: “Termination failed,” there’s 
nobody suggesting mom’s going to drive over and pick up [SMH], mom’s 
going to go gather up her kids and move them into her house and that would be 
the end of it. . . . I think that’s foolishness.  Mother 
herself says: That wouldn’t be wise.
 
We find that Mother’s 
own testimony suggests that she was not able to meet the significant, ongoing 
needs of her children.  Apart from Mother’s concessions, 
however, we find clear and convincing evidence to establish that she is unfit to 
have custody and control of her children.
 
[¶24]     
First, we find clear 
and convincing evidence demonstrating that Mother failed to make sufficient 
progress in treating her substance abuse problem, which DFS 
identified as the “primary barrier to achieving a permanency plan of 
reunification.”  After her initial failure to complete 
inpatient or outpatient substance abuse treatment and her subsequent 
incarceration for methamphetamine use, Mother eventually completed an inpatient 
treatment program in February, 2010, ten months after her children were 
initially placed in foster care.  With regard to this 
treatment program, DFS found it “imperative” that Mother 
successfully follow through with any discharge recommendations.  
At the MDT meeting held in April, however, it was noted that Mother was 
not consistently participating in the outpatient program recommended upon her 
discharge from the inpatient treatment facility.  Mother 
responded to only four of eight random drug tests in March, and missed half of 
her outpatient treatment meetings in April.  Further, although 
the MDT had recommended that Mother attend weekly AA meetings following her 
release from the inpatient treatment program, Mother had not attended any AA 
meetings as of the MDT meeting in March.  Despite Mother’s 
sporadic participation in the outpatient treatment program, she reported at the 
April MDT meeting that she had not consumed alcohol since her release. 
 Her statements, however, were contradicted by a police report 
generated as a result of EW’s arrest for public intoxication on 
March 30.  The police report noted that there “was an apparent 
altercation between [Mother] and [EW] over a cell phone” and that, during 
investigation of the incident, “[Mother] admitted to the deputy that she had 
been drinking.”  Additionally, on the same day in April that 
Mother told the MDT that she “had not drank at all,” an officer of the Buffalo 
Police Department responding to a report of drunk driving found Mother to be 
“highly intoxicated” in the passenger seat of the reported vehicle.
 
[¶25]     
At trial, Mother 
stated that she had achieved sobriety and that she had turned her life 
around.  The district court, however, did not find Mother to 
be a credible witness:
 
There was very little 
[corroborative] evidence to support Mother’s testimony.  As 
often is the case, the Court is placed in a position of determining the 
credibility of witness testimony concerning not only the testimony itself but 
also the demeanor and surrounding circumstances in which it was 
presented.  The Court specifically discounted Mother’s 
testimony in this matter.
 
We defer to the 
district court’s assessment of Mother’s credibility.  
See DLH v. JLA (In re 
AMP), 2012 WY 132, ¶ 20, 286 P.3d 746, 753 (Wyo. 
2012).          

 
[¶26]     
In addition to 
Mother’s failure to make sufficient progress toward maintaining her life free of 
drugs and alcohol, the evidence relating to Mother’s continued association 
with EW also demonstrates that she is unfit to have custody and 
control of her children.  After Mother’s release from 
inpatient treatment in February, 2010, she identified the need to refrain from 
associating with persons who abused alcohol or drugs.  Despite 
this goal, however, Mother would not acknowledge that her continued relationship 
with EW, whose arrest for public intoxication on March 30 demonstrated 
his continued problems with substance abuse, was an impediment to her successful 
rehabilitation. Her caseworker noted that, during a meeting held in March, “When 
[Mother was] asked specifically about [EW], and how she would support 
herself and the boys if she did find that [EW] had begun drinking or 
using drugs, [Mother] would not respond.”  By the time of the 
MDT meeting in April, Mother had moved back in with EW. 
 
[¶27]     
More importantly, 
however, Mother’s relationship and cohabitation with EW posed a 
direct risk of irreparable damage to the children in light of their reports and 
fears of physical and sexual abuse by EW, as well as Mother’s failure to 
acknowledge these issues.  In a quarterly progress report 
issued in April, DFS summarized the concerns relating 
to EW as follows:
 
[Mother] has been 
informed of the boys[’] concerns about living with [EW], both by 
professionals and by the boys themselves.  She continues to 
deny any problems or allegations of abuse to the boys by [EW].
 
            
The significant barriers to reunification for each of the four boys [are] 
their expressed fears of [EW], their lack of trust that their mom will be 
able to live a life without pills, drugs or alcohol, on-going domestic violence, 
and [Mother’s] denial of the abuse allegations against [EW].  
While [APH] is not able to verbalize his feelings as clearly as 
the three older boys, simply due to his young age, all four have made it clear 
that they are angry with their mom for again using drugs and breaking her 
promise to them that she would “never ever” do so again.  
[MJH], [SMH], and [KDH] have also been able to 
inform their therapist and social workers that they do not want to live with 
[EW].  [EW] has been [Mother’s] live-in 
boyfriend and the boys are now feeling safe enough to talk about their fear of 
him due to his being “mean” i.e.: hitting them and yelling at them.  
The boys have also reported domestic violence in the home between 
[EW] and [Mother] that they have witnessed.
 
            
On January 13, 2010, the Department of Family Services received a report 
concerning [KDH].  The information provided was that he 
had previously been hit by [EW] during a time when the boys were in the 
home with their mom and [EW].  . . . Through separate 
interviews with all four boys, there were concerns expressed by all of physical 
and emotional abuse from [EW] and that their mom was in the home when 
these things did occur.  As far as [Mother] being aware of the 
incidents described by the boys, there were some things they were sure she knew 
about while others they didn’t know as “she was asleep on the couch and wouldn’t 
wake up.”  While the concern expressed by the boys covered a 
longer period of time, it was also apparent that some of the abuse occurred 
while they were back living with [Mother] and [EW] during the three week 
period of October 1-23, 2009. . . . [T]he boys were interviewed separately and 
all in one evening and their details of events were consistent with each 
other.  Additionally, their observed behaviors and statements 
of fear of [EW] are [] indicators that the abuse did occur.  
Behaviors observed have been [APH’s] incontinence after being 
informed by his mom during a visit that she was again living with [EW] 
and [SMH’s] refusal to visit his mother for two weeks in a row because he 
was afraid [EW] would be with her during the visit.  
Among the incidents described by the boys was that:
 
[EW] choked 
[APH] (more than one time)
 
[EW] hit 
[KDH]
 
[EW] broke a 
picture across [APH’s] back, breaking the glass and cutting 
[APH]
 
[EW] walked 
around the room, hitting the walls with a meat tenderizer and verbally 
threatening to “kill us”
 
[EW] 
threatened to lock [the children] in the basement where there were snakes, 
spiders and ghosts
 
            
In attempts to discuss her sons’ allegations and concerns with her, 
[Mother] states she does not believe any of this happened.
 
[¶28]     
Further, at 
trial, DFS presented the testimony of Dr. Kim Faulkner, a child 
psychologist who had seen SMH in weekly therapy sessions since May, 
2010, when SMH entered residential treatment.  Dr. 
Faulkner testified that he had diagnosed SMH with post-traumatic 
stress disorder, which was likely the result of physical and sexual abuse 
inflicted by EW.  In response to questioning about how 
he came to that conclusion, Dr. Faulkner testified as follows:
 
Counsel: . . . 
[Y]ou indicated that you believe that [SMH] has been physically 
abused.
 
Dr. 
Faulkner:  I do.
 
Counsel:  
How do you come to that belief?
 
Dr. 
Faulkner:  He’s told me.  And he’s described 
being hit, he’s described seeing the abuse of his brothers, and he also has some 
of the classic symptoms of someone who’s identified with an aggressor, in that 
the way he manifests his aggression is the way he’s been taught.  
And he’s done it with kicking, hitting, yelling, screaming.  
He learned those somewhere.
 
            
And with an IQ – a full scale IQ of 79, you’re not going to sit around 
and dream it up, it’s going to be taught to you.
 
Counsel: And do you 
have an understanding as to who his aggressor is?
 
Dr. 
Faulkner:  I do have an understanding as far as what he’s told 
me.
 
Counsel:  
And who is that?
 
Dr. 
Faulkner:  [EW]. [EW].
 
Counsel:  
And you indicated that you believe that [SMH] has been sexually 
abused.
 
Dr. 
Faulkner:  I do.
 
Counsel:  
And how do you come by that?
 
Dr. 
Faulkner:  Well, when you’re dealing with children that have 
been traumatized physically, sexually, with neglect, the neglect issue deals 
with the trust element; you’ve got to build that.  That takes 
quite a while.  And then you let them fulminate, come to you 
with what they want to talk about in terms of the genetic origins of their 
abuse, meaning that most children with PTSD, and particularly 
[SMH], they don’t want to think about anything bad; they just want to 
think about what’s good.
 
            
So what happens is they come at you with the least difficult trauma to 
deal with, from among the traumas, okay? That was physical abuse.  
And we got into that after about a year of therapy.
 
            
And once you’ve dealt with that . . . the trust issue is – is cemented 
well enough that . . . they’ve entered the process of therapy, then as they 
start trusting you, then in the transference, the issue comes out, they get mad 
at you and think you’re lying to them over something, but then – because they 
set you up for the physical abuse; but then they come back and they tell you 
about the sexual abuse.
 
            
So they unfold the levels of the onion according to how strong they are 
to be able to deal with it.  And he’s just recently revealed 
that to me in the last maybe two-and-a-half or three months. . . .
 
Counsel:  
And who is the aggressor with respect to the sexual abuse?
 
Dr. 
Faulkner:  [EW].
 
Dr. Faulkner also 
testified that Mother’s failure to acknowledge SMH’s reports of 
abuse posed a risk of re-traumatization and regression:
 
Counsel:  
Do you have an evaluation or do you have an opinion of [Mother’s] 
recognition of the needs and issues of [SMH] for therapy?
 
Dr. 
Faulkner:  Well, I have a conceptual understanding of 
it.  I have not evaluated her.  I do not 
know what I would come up with with that.  I have 
– all that I’ve read, the DFS’s and the multi-disciplinary team’s 
discussions about it, an opinion, but not a – not one filtered through my way of 
looking at things.
 
Counsel: 
 Okay.  And what is that conceptual thought 
that you have?
 
Dr. 
Faulkner:  Uhm, that she has taken a position wherein 
she – she doesn’t believe that this man has physically or sexually abused the 
child, any of the children, or [SMH], or that she was neglectful, and 
that the children are basically lying to her.
 
Counsel:  
And what effect would that position have on [SMH]?
 
Dr. 
Faulkner:  Well, it’s in – it’s insoluble – it’s intolerable 
in the sense that he can’t – he can’t – he can’t believe it.  
It’s like – it’s incredible.
 
Counsel:  
Okay.  Why is it important – or is it important that a 
parent be involved in the therapy of their children?
 
Dr. 
Faulkner:  Well, just for these reasons.  
And to understand that, you know, if you try to put someone back into an 
environment with – that came from that and they don’t acknowledge what happens, 
then any little disappointment that occurs is going to be perceived as a 
betrayal, the original betrayal and re-traumatization.  
So there has got to be some grounds for what if, and a discussion of 
that, at least on a what if basis.
 
            
I don’t know what happened.  I wasn’t – I don’t know 
for a fact.  I know what [SMH] tells me happened, and I 
believe him.
 
Counsel:  
Did you have an understanding of the fact that [SMH] returned home 
to his mother at one point?
 
Dr. 
Faulkner:  I read about the impact of that, and the results of 
that.  And we are – in fact, that’s when I was talking about 
the difference between chronic stress that’s a neglect pattern at least 
to PTSD and an acute traumatization.  
Putting the person back in the home is an acute 
traumatization.  Living in a neglectful environment for 
years is a PTSD situation brought about by ongoing chronic 
stress.
 
Counsel:  
Okay.  And has [SMH] had both of these things 
happen to him?
 
Dr. 
Faulkner:  Yes, he has.  Because this – he’s 
regressed now and it’s October and that was – that was precisely the time that 
they tried the re-integration of the family.
 
Counsel:  
Okay.  Based on your involvement with [SMH], do 
you have an opinion as to whether the physical and emotional welfare of 
[SMH] would be placed in jeopardy if he were to be returned to [Mother] 
today?
 
Dr. Faulkner: 
 An opinion? I have an opinion.
 
Counsel:  
And what is that opinion?
 
Dr. 
Faulkner:  Well, I think the position, if I understand it, as 
I think I do, [is] that: “That didn’t happen to them,” and it did; I think 
that’s an unworkable situation.  I don’t think that that’s 
going to work.  Whether it did or didn’t happen, I don’t 
really kind of get into that as much as I do – I know what [SMH] believes 
and what’s happened there.
 
            
So putting him back in that environment with no avenue whatsoever for 
there to be a rectification or a change in that belief system, I think it’s 
unworkable and, therefore, should not be done.
 
Counsel:  
Okay.  What would be the effect on [SMH] if he 
were to go back into an unstable environment?
 
Dr. 
Faulkner:  Well, I think that it will be worse than what it’s 
been since we’ve had him, since the last time.  
It’s gonna get worse if it happens again, because that’s a 
different level of betrayal and he’s kind of starting to trust the healthcare 
system – or at least the caretaking system.
 
            
If you put him back in it, it happens again, he’s gonna 
misperceive even slight disappointments as betrayals; without the proper 
handling of that, it’s going to re-traumatize him and it’s going to lead him to 
say “I need to get out of here.”  And he knows how to get out 
of there, because he’s shown us how he got out of there, and he’s going to up 
the ante probably about twice as intense.
 
Counsel:  
Okay.
 
Dr. 
Faulkner:  And we’re gonna have – 
we’re gonna have a real damaged kid on our hands, is what we’ll 
have.
 
[¶29]     
In addition to Dr. 
Faulkner’s testimony, the court heard testimony from Rosemont Harriet, a 
licensed professional counselor who provided individual counseling services to 
all of the children.  Ms. Harriet also stated that Mother’s 
failure to acknowledge her children’s reports of abuse posed a risk of 
regression.  She testified that 
 
[Mother] does still 
live with the same boyfriend [EW] that the children are very afraid of, 
which leads me to believe that she does not either believe or does not value the 
opinions of the other boys who have told her that that is an unsafe place for 
them; that they are afraid of him.  So their safety and 
concern immediately just comes to be an obvious question to me at that time. 

 
Although Mother 
claims that she was not sufficiently informed that EW’s presence in 
her life was a barrier to reunification, Ms. Harriet testified that she told 
Mother that “it would really benefit her if she would basically get rid of her 
boyfriend,” and that “multiple people suggested that to her.”  
Ms. Harriet’s testimony was supported by the testimony of Mother’s 
caseworker, who stated that “I expressed several times my concern to [Mother] 
about not believing the boys’ reports of abuse [by EW].” 
 When asked why she had supported the recommendation to change 
the permanency goal away from reunification, Mother’s caseworker stated that 

 
[I]n representing the 
boys and feeling like I was representing their feelings and their wants and 
needs, uhm, I felt very strongly that they had asked the mother not to 
reunite with [EW], that they – that they were really concerned about 
[EW], and that was a topic that kept coming up.  And it 
appeared at all costs that that reunification with [EW] was going to go 
on, and so I just didn’t see where it was in the best interest of the boys at 
that time.
 
In her own testimony, 
Mother acknowledged that after she was released from her inpatient treatment 
program, DFS workers had communicated that they had a “big issue” 
with EW.  However, she denied that her children had 
ever told her that they had been mistreated by EW.  
Mother also stated that she was afraid DFS would “come after” 
her youngest child because of “[e]verything [DFS has] pulled out 
of their hats.”
 
[¶30]     
Examining the 
evidence in the light most favorable to DFS, we find clear and convincing 
evidence to establish that Mother is unfit to care for her children.  
The evidence showed that Mother could not possibly meet the mental and 
emotional needs of her children while refusing to acknowledge that they were 
afraid of EW and that they did not want to live with 
him.  While we note that Mother’s minimization of the 
children’s fears was harmful to the children regardless of whether their 
allegations of abuse were true, we find that the evidence strongly suggests that 
the children were, in fact, abused by EW, and that he therefore posed a 
direct threat to the safety and well-being of Mother’s children.  
Again, however, notwithstanding the veracity of the children’s 
allegations, Mother’s refusal to address her children’s concerns and her failure 
to recognize the damage caused by her continued association with EW 
shows that she is not fit to care for her children.  Further, 
the evidence clearly indicates that Mother has not been able to maintain 
sobriety, despite multiple attempts by DFS to help her obtain 
treatment.  Mother’s continued drug and alcohol abuse further 
demonstrates that she is not fit to care for her children.  In 
light of this evidence, we find that termination of parental rights is justified 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v).  As a result, we 
need not consider whether termination was also warranted under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309(a)(iii).
 
[¶31]     
Affirmed.
[¶32]     
FOOTNOTES
1Mother originally 
presented a second issue challenging the petition for termination of parental 
rights on the grounds that it was not timely filed.  At oral 
argument, Mother withdrew that issue from the Court’s consideration based on our 
decision in HJO v. State (In re KMO), 2012 WY 
99, ¶ 15, 280 P.3d 1203, 1210 (Wyo. 2012).
2The children’s 
father, MHH, is currently incarcerated in Michigan as a result of his 
conviction for felony sexual assault of a minor.  The father 
did not appear in this action, and his rights are not at issue in this 
appeal.