Case Title: STATE v EAGAN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1978-08-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13440 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1978 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, GLORIA RAY EAGAN, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, Honorable Alfred B . Coate, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Patrick J. Kelly argued, Miles City, Montana David J. Patterson, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Hom. P i l i k e Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Allen B . Chronister argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Denzil Young argued, County Attorney, Baker, Montana Filed: qul;z i9lkjl Submitted: June 5, 1978 Decided: q&G 2 - !9]@ M r . J u s t i c e John C. Sheehy delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal by defendant Gloria Ray Eagan from her conviction of t h e offense of mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homi- c i d e , entered i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Sixteenth Judi- c i a l D i s t r i c t , Fallon County, Montana. The s i n g l e i s s u e t o be decided on t h i s appeal i s whether t h e r e was impropriety i n t h e handling of a problem t h a t a r o s e during defendant's t r i a l when one of t h e empaneled jurors made statements i n a public place, o u t s i d e t h e p l a c e of t r i a l , i n d i c a t i n g h i s prejudice, and implying t h a t o t h e r s on t h e jury panel might a l s o be prejudiced a g a i n s t defendant. Accordingly, t h e f a c t s can be b r i e f l y s t a t e d a s f a r as t h e alleged crime i s concerned. Defendant was charged by information with t h e o f f e n s e of d e l i b e r a t e homicide a r i s i n g o u t of t h e shooting death of one Russell Hanson on J u l y 13, 1975. Defendant claimed t h a t Russell Hanson, while a g u e s t a t her home i n t h e e a r l y morning hours of t h a t d a t e , had attacked her and attempted t o rape h e r , and t h a t she was required t o r e p e l h i s aggression by threatening t o use a 30.30 r i f l e a g a i n s t him. Defendant s t a t e d she had ordered t h e decedent t o g e t o u t of her mobile home and t h a t t h e decedent, i n s t e a d of leaving, had taken a s i t t i n g p o s i t i o n on a couch i n t h e home. A t a t i m e when he was apparently s t a r t i n g t o g e t up from t h e couch, defendant claimed t h e r i f l e a c c i d e n t a l l y discharged while she was holding it a t w a i s t l e v e l , and t h e b u l l e t therefrom s t r u c k Hanson and caused h i s death. The case was t r i e d beginning February 2 , 1976, i n D i s t r i c t Court. The jury was empaneled on t h e f i r s t day and opening statements w e r e made. T r i a l continued through February 3, 1976, with t h e c a l l i n g of witnesses. O n February 4 , 1976, when t h e defense was presenting its case and defendant h e r s e l f had been examined and cross-examined, counsel f o r defendant informed t h e c o u r t t h a t he had j u s t learned t h a t one of t h e j u r o r s , Roland Kruger, had made statements i n a bar i n t h e downtown a r e a t h e evening before. The person t o whom he made t h e statements w a s eventually c a l l e d before t h e c o u r t t o r e p o r t what was s a i d . Here i s what t h e record shows with r e s p e c t t o t h e out-of-court statements: "THE COURT: Let t h e record show t h a t t h e Court is i n chambers with Counsel and t h e Clerk and t h a t it is 1:00 o'clock. Immediately p r i o r t o t h e noon break, Counsel appeared i n chambers and advised t h e Court t h a t one of t h e jurors on t h e panel s i t t i n g i n t h e Cause now being t r i e d had been downtown l a s t evening i n t h e b a r discussing t h i s c a s e i n public and t h e Court then ordered t h a t t h i s meeting be held a t 1:00 and t h a t t h e person who overheard t h e juror be brought before t h e Court - In Camera and h i s testimony be taken. "JOHN MEYERS, having been f i r s t duly sworn by t h e Clerk, t e s t i f i e d upon h i s oath as follows: "BY THE COURT: "Q. For t h e record, w i l l you s t a t e your name. "A. John Meyers. "Q. Where do you l i v e ? "A. Phebus T r a i l e r Court. "Q. It i s m y understanding t h a t you w e r e down- town l a s t evening, i s t h a t c o r r e c t ? "A. Y e s . "Q. Where were you a t ? "A. Corner Bar. "Q. A t what time was t h i s ? "A. About 9:30. "Q. What happened i n t h e Corner Bar a t about 9:30? "A. W e l l , Roland Kruger was t e l l i n g m e t h a t , you know, t h a t he w a s on jury duty and as f a r a s he was concerned, t h a t she was g u i l t y and he a l s o t o l d me t h a t half of t h e jury i s Hanson's friends. "Q. W h o e l s e was present when he was t a l k i n g t o you? "A. H e was j u s t by m e a t t h e end of t h e Bar. "Q. There wasn't anyone e l s e t h a t overheard t h a t conversation? "A. No. "THE COURT: D o Counsel have any other questions? "BY MR. YOUNG: "Q. Have you seen him other nights down there? Has he been down Monday night? "A. W e l l , l e t me see. I d i d n ' t go uptown Mon- day night. "MR. KELLY: I have no questions. "Q. (By M r . Young) W a s he drunk? "A. Yes. "Q. Which is frequent t o him? "A. Y e s . "THE COURT: D o you have any o t h e r questions, Denzil? "MR. YOUNG: No, I d o n ' t think so. "MR. KELLY: I have one. "Q. He communicated d i r e c t l y with you? "A. Yes. "MR. KELLY: That is a l l I have. Thank you. "THE COURT: Okay. That i s a l l , Thank you. " (Witness excused. ) "THE COURT: Now, I think t h a t w e should c a l l him i n and a s k him, give him a n opportunity t o explain it o r deny it o r admit it. "MR. YOUNG: I suggested t o P a t t h a t i f , you know, i f t h i s were supported, r a t h e r than c r e a t e a f u r o r on t h e jury, w e could w a i t u n t i l t h e case i s i n and excuse him and use t h e f i r s t a l t e r n a t e . I f he were c a l l e d i n here and examined, he would be ex- cused and there--I w a s thinking, it might cause a l i t t l e d i s t r a c t i o n f o r t h e jury i f he disappeared suddenly. "THE COURT: W e l l , t h i s is f i n e . I think t h a t w e ought t o have him i n and have him t e s t i f y . "MR. KELLY: I agree. "THE COURT: Whether w e do it now o r do it following recess a t t h e conclusion of today's t r i a l is im- material t o me. "MR. YOUNG: It doesn't matter t o me. "THE COURT: Then i n t h e event t h a t he says, 'Yeah, I d i d it,' what a r e Counsel's suggestions? "MR. KELLY: M y suggestion--well, f i r s t of a l l , a s t o him, I think t h a t he should be excused a t t h e conclusion of t h e case p r i o r t o t h e jury going t o t h e deliberations. I think t h e proper a l t e r n a t e should be p u t i n h i s stead. I have a second question. Does t h i s i n d i c a t e a problem other than with him on t h i s jury? And I a m wondering i f w e have any information from t h e B a i l i f f regarding conversations. Have they been discussing t h i s case p r i o r t o t h e t i m e of being charged? I j u s t d o n ' t know. That is a question I d o n ' t have any answer. With him, I have no doubts he should be excused. "MR. YOUNG: I w i l l ask him i f he has discussed it with any of t h e o t h e r jurors. "THE COURT: Well, I think t h i s is a proper in- quiry t o ask him. I f he has been discussing t h e case with t h e o t h e r jurors, t h a t is--and whether t h e rest of t h e jury have indicated t h a t they have made t h e i r minds up and i f t h e o t h e r members of t h e jury have, then I suppose we have a mistrial. And i f we have a m i s t r i a l , I suppose t h a t w e bet- ter f i n d o u t about it today. "MR. YOUNG: W e d o n ' t have any reason t o think t h a t t h e r e s t of t h e jury i s contaminated. "THE COURT: No, b u t i f he says t h i s is what has happened and t h e whole jury is contaminated, then I think we may a s well declare a m i s t r i a l and start over again. I f , on t h e other hand, he says, no, he h a s n ' t talked with t h e rest of t h e jury, o r he h a s n ' t heard any of them t a l k , then I think what we ought t o do i s g e t r i d of him and p u t an a l t e r n a t e i n and go ahead and complete t h e t r i a l . I a m n o t going t o presume t h a t a l l of these people break t h e i r oath. "ROLAND KRUGER, being f i r s t duly sworn by t h e Clerk, t e s t i f i e d upon h i s oath as follows: "BY THE COURT: " Q . Roland, it has been brought t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e Court t h a t l a s t night you w e r e downtown i n t h e Corner Bar a t about 9:30 and while you were there, you advised a person that you had made up your mind that the defendant was guilty. You fur- ther advised this individual that about half of the jury were personal friends of the Hanson family. Is this charge true? "A. Pardon? "Q. Is this charge true? "A. Not to my knowledge, nope. " Q . Were you downtown last night? "A. Yes. "Q. Were you in the Corner Bar? "A. Yes, I was. " Q . Were you there about 9 : 3 0 ? "A. I would assume so. "Q. And while you were there, you were down at the end of the bar talking to John Meyers? "A. John Meyers? I don't even know the guy personally. What does he do? " Q . He is a very dark complected person. Black hair. "A. Oh, did he used to work for Signal? Yes, I was uptown, but any statement I made, I made a joke of it. There was no -- "Q. Well, have you discussed this case with any of the other jurors? "A. No, I haven't. "Q. Have any of the jurors discussed it with you? "A. No, they sure haven't. No, I am positive. I am not that type of guy. "THE COURT: Do Counsel have any questions? "MR. YOUNG: No. "MR. KELLY: No. "A. No, i f I said anything, it was in the line of bull. There was no business talk. "THE COURT: Okay, you may leave. Tell the Bailiff that I will advise him when we are ready to proceed. " (Witness excused. ) "THE COURT: Okay, what is t h e suggestion? "MR. KELLY: H i s answer was t h a t anything he s a i d was made i n a -- s a i d i n a humorous fashion. So I t a k e it a s some of t h e admission i n connection with h i s conversation of t h i s case. I would t h i n k , a t t h e very l e a s t , he should be excused. "THE COURT: I think so. "MR. KELLY: I would a l s o suggest t h a t he might -- H e appears t o be e i t h e r extremely hung over o r perhaps he i s under t h e influence r i g h t now. "THE CLERK: Hard of hearing, I think. "MR. YOUNG: He worked f o r many years, r i g work, has probably a f f e c t e d h i s hearing. I haven't talked t o him f o r a couple of years and I am not aware of t h a t problem. "THE COURT: A l l r i g h t . Now, d i d you want m e t o excuse him now o r a t t h e conclusion of today's case? "MR. KELLY: I d o n ' t think he should be excused now. I think a t t h e conclusion of today's case. "MR. YOUNG: Fine. "THE COURT: A l l r i g h t . L e t ' s go." Thereafter, t h e D i s t r i c t Court resumed t h e t r i a l , with M r . Kruger s t i l l s i t t i n g i n t h e jury f o r t h e balance of t h e afternoon, during which t i m e t h e remaining testimony i n t h e case was completed. That evening t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s were s e t t l e d , whereupon counsel f o r defendant moved t h e c o u r t f o r a m i s t r i a l of t h e cause upon t h e ground t h a t t h e r e had been improper conduct on t h e p a r t of t h e jury a s evidenced by t h e hearing e a r l i e r had t h a t day. The motion was denied by t h e District Court. O n the following morning, February 5, 1976, t r i a l was resumed a t 9:30 a.m. a t which t i m e t h e following proceedings took place i n chambers: " I N C H A M B E R S : " ( M r . Xruger c a l l e d i n . ) "THE COURT: After thinking about t h i s matter we discussed yesterday, t h e consequences a r e t h a t i f it w e r e provable, i f you made these statements, we would have a m i s t r i a l and we would have t o go through t h e whole thing one more time a t a considerable expense t o the county. "A. Yes. "THE COURT: Not only t h a t , but i f it were provable, you would have v i o l a t e d a t l e a s t two laws, those being contempt of c o u r t and f a i l u r e t o perform your o f f i c i a l d u t i e s . And I am n o t i n t e r e s t e d i n seeing you charged with a crime. I am n o t i n t e r e s t e d i n anything other than seeing t h a t t h i s t r i a l i s properly, f a i r l y conducted and t h a t t h e county i s n ' t p u t t o t h e expense of r e t r y i n g it. And so, f o r t h a t rea- son, I think it would be b e s t of a l l i f I re- move you a s a juror and put one of t h e a l t e r n a t e s i n your spot. And t h a t i s what I a m going t o do. "A. Y e s . "THE COURT: And I think t h a t , f i r s t of a l l , a s f a r a s you a r e concerned, I a m going t o i n s t r u c t you not t o discuss t h i s t r i a l o r not t o discuss the reason t h a t you were removed with anybody, and i f you do, I w i l l charge you with contempt of c o u r t because I d o n ' t want a b u i l t - i n e r r o r i n t h i s case. I t i s too important of a case. "A. Yes, I r e a l i z e t h a t . "THE COURT: So it might be b e t t e r f o r you and f o r everybody i f you j u s t say you g o t s i c k today and you c o u l d n ' t s i t . "A. Well, I have a question i f I may ask it. W h o c a l l e d t h i s i n ? "THE COURT: Well, t h e r e p o r t came t o t h e Court through defense counsel. Somebody advised him. I d o n ' t know, I d i d n ' t ask. "A. W h o would it come t o ? "THE COURT: W e l l , defense counsel i s t h e person t h a t t o l d me. Now, I d o n ' t know where he heard it. "A. Yes, because i f I remember r i g h t , it was-- W a s it Meyers? "THE COURT: Y e s . I t i s an unfortunate thing and what you can do is s t a y here and I w i l l c a l l t h e jury i n and then -- "(Whereupon M r . Kruger was replaced by Alternate Juror NO. 1. ) " Thereafter, with Kruger excused, and t h e a l t e r n a t e juror s i t t i n g i n h i s place, t h e jury r e t i r e d t o consider i t s v e r d i c t , and returned i t s finding t h a t defendant was g u i l t y of mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide. O n February 2 6 , 1976, defendant was sentenced t o a term of f i v e years i n t h e s t a t e prison. She moved f o r a new t r i a l on t h e ground she had been denied her c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l jury. The motion f o r new t r i a l was denied on March 11, 1976, and t h e r e a f t e r t h i s appeal ensued. Defendant s t a t e s two i s s u e s f o r review on appeal: 1. Was t h e statement made by J u r o r Kruger such t h a t it c o n s t i t u t e d s u f f i c i e n t misconduct and p r e j u d i c e on t h e p a r t of t h e jury s o a s t o r e q u i r e a m i s t r i a l ? 2. Did t h e a l t e r n a t i v e remedy chosen by t h e c o u r t , t h a t is, replacing t h e jury with an a l t e r n a t e , cure t h e t r i a l d e f e c t ? W e w i l l consider t h e i s s u e s together. The r i g h t of a defendant t o speedy public t r i a l by an i m p a r t i a l jury i s s o sacred t o our system of jurisprudence t h a t it i s preserved both i n our s t a t e and f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u - t i o n s . A r t i c l e 11, Section 2 4 , 1972 Montana Constitution; S i x t h Amendment, United S t a t e s Constitution. The verbatim excerpt from t h e t r a n s c r i p t i n d i c a t e s t h e D i s t r i c t Court, a s w e l l a s counsel, were f u l l y aware of t h e s a n c t i t y of defendant's r i g h t t o an i m p a r t i a l jury. W e a r e c a l l e d upon here t o determine whether t h e course of a c t i o n taken by t h e D i s t r i c t Court upon t h e discovery of a d i s q u a l i - f i e d juror d i d i n f a c t remove any p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t occa- sioned thereby s o t h a t defendant was accorded her r i g h t of f a i r t r i a l . For t h e most p a r t , it seems t h a t w e would regard a s persuasive t h e finding o r determination of t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h a t any p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t of misconduct by a juror had i n f a c t been removed. Certainly i n such matters a s whether, f o r example, t h e responses of a prospective juror on v o i r d i r e i n d i c a t e h i s s t a t e of mind, o r whether a juror had i n f a c t d i s q u a l i f i e d himself by p r e j u d i c i a l statements, t h e determination by t h e D i s t r i c t Court would be given considerable weight by t h i s Court. I n t h e s i t u a t i o n pre- sented here, however, it appears t h a t t h i s Court i s i n a s good a p o s i t i o n a s t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o make t h i s judgment where t h e r e a r e no f a c t u a l c o n f l i c t s apparent regarding t h e conduct i t s e l f . A s was s t a t e d i n People v. Brown, (1976), "Some cases have t r e a t e d t h e i s s u e of t h e p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t of jury misconduct a s being a question of f a c t f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t and have held t h a t a f i n d i n g of no prejudice i m - p l i e d i n t h e d e n i a l of a new t r i a l should not be s e t a s i d e u n l e s s t h e r e i s no evidence t o s u s t a i n it. * * * W e a r e of t h e view however t h a t t h e more enlightened and appropriate r u l e i s t h a t s i n c e jury misconduct challenges t h e fundamental r i g h t t o an unprejudiced jury and t h e f a i r n e s s of t h e t r i a l proceedings, t h i s i s s u e i s an independent a p p e l l a t e i s s u e t o be adjudicated by t h i s c o u r t based upon t h e whole record. * * *" From t h e record it appears t h a t t h e challenged juror d i d i n f a c t make t h e statements a t t r i b u t e d t o him i n a public place t o a t h i r d person, while t h e t r i a l was i n progress. When t h e juror was brought before t h e c o u r t i n chambers, he f i r s t denied t h a t he knew t h e t h i r d person. Then t h e juror i n d i c a t e d t h a t he was merely joking a s t o any statements he had made. Following t h a t he s t a t e d he had n o t discussed t h e case with any of t h e o t h e r jurors. When t h e juror was excused a f t e r h i s examination, t h e r e was a discussion by c o u r t and counsel a s t o whether he was "under t h e influence" o r hung over, o r whether he was i n f a c t hard of hearing. A t any r a t e , t h e juror was permitted t o s i t with t h e remainder of t h e jury f o r t h e balance of t h e t i m e t h a t testimony was taken t h a t day. Further, t h e record r e f l e c t s t h a t i n t h e period when t h e challenged juror was s i t t i n g with t h e jury, following h i s examination i n chambers, four r e c e s s e s w e r e taken by t h e c o u r t during t h e remainder of t h e afternoon. There w a s a r e c e s s taken while c o u r t and counsel r e t i r e d t o chambers t o d i s c u s s a l e g a l p o i n t , and a f u r t h e r r e c e s s f o r t h e same purpose. A rest-period r e c e s s was taken midafternoon, and a t t h e conclusion of t h e testimony, an evening r e c e s s was declared u n t i l 9:30 a.m. t h e following morning. O n each of t h e s e occasions it appears t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury with t h e usual admonition t h a t they should not d i s c u s s t h i s case with each o t h e r o r among themselves o r with o t h e r s ; b u t , it i s a l s o t o be noted t h a t t h e same admonition had been given p r i o r t o t h e discovery of t h e p r e j u d i c i a l s t a t e - ments, which admonition t h e challenged juror apparently ignored. Allowing t h i s juror t o s i t with t h e remainder of t h e jury, including t h e a l t e r n a t e , a f t e r t h e discovery t h a t he was a d i s q u a l i f i e d juror i s t h e f i r s t d i f f i c u l t y we f i n d i n t h e procedure followed by t h e District Court. The second d i f f i c u l t y r e l a t e s t o t h e balance of t h e statements a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e same juror--that i s , "he a l s o t o l d me t h a t half of t h e jury is Hanson's f r i e n d s " . The questions by t h e D i s t r i c t Court on t h i s p o i n t t o Kruger d i d n o t q u i t e reach t h e source of t h i s j u r o r ' s information as t o t h i s statement, nor t h e implication t h e r e i n t h a t half of t h e jury was a l s o prejudiced a g a i n s t defendant. The third difficulty relates to whether the disquali- fied juror may have made known his prejudice to the other members of the jury. The District Court relied completely upon the responses of the challenged juror that he had not discussed the case with the other jurors. At no stage of the trial were the other jurors interrogated by the District Court as to what contact or expression of opinion the chal- lenged juror may have made to them while he was sitting with them on the jury panel. This is important because as pointed out in People v. Brown, supra: "In approaching the issue of prejudice, it first must be noted that a unanimous verdict is re- quired in a criminal case. Thus, the disquali- fication of a single juror could have resulted in a different verdict on any of the counts." 132 Cal.Rptr. at 221. The duty to preserve a fair trial for the defendant rests in the first instance upon the trial judge. People v. Shaw, (Mich. 1969), 164 N.W.2d 7, 12, 13. When a juror is found to have been guilty of improper conduct, such improper conduct is charged to the entire panel, Kinkaid v. Wade, (Kan. 1966), 410 P.2d 333, 337, since the jurors operate as a unit, and since public policy demands that misconduct be discouraged and insofar as possible prohibited. Kinkaid, at 337. We cannot assume therefore that the remainder of the jury panel had been safeguarded from contamination in the absence of some interrogation addressed to those jurors to dispel the possibility that prejudice existed, either from friendship, or from prejudicial comments by Kruger. It is this factor that distinguishes this case from State v. Baugh, (1977), Mont . , 571 P. 2d 779, 34 St.Rep. 1315. Baugh was a case where the District Court learned during the course of the trial that one of the jurors had, before the trial, viewed a videotape of the exhumation of t h e deceased. The c o u r t learned of t h i s f a c t f i v e days a f t e r t h e t r i a l had commenced. The c o u r t c a l l e d t h e juror i n t o chambers and determined t h e r e t h a t t h e juror had i n f a c t previewed t h e videotape. The juror, upon t h e c o u r t ' s question, indicated t h a t no o t h e r juror knew t h a t she had viewed t h e videotape. The c o u r t immediately excused t h e juror from f u r t h e r s e r v i c e and allowed t h e t r i a l t o proceed by s e a t i n g one of t h e a l t e r n a t e jurors. However, t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n Baugh took one more important s t e p . After t h e jury had reached i t s v e r d i c t , b u t before t h e v e r d i c t was announced, t h e c o u r t questioned t h e jury and asked them i f a t any time during t h e t r i a l t h e d i s q u a l i f i e d juror had discussed with any of them any of t h e evidence on t h e t r i a l . A l l of t h e jury responded "No". I n t h i s case w e have no such reassuring i n t e r r o g a t i o n . There is l e f t hanging i n t h e a i r here t h e implication t h a t one h a l f of t h e jury i n t h i s case were f r i e n d s of t h e decedent over whose death defendant was being t r i e d ; moreover, t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e d i s q u a l i f i e d juror may have communicated h i s prejudice t o o t h e r members of t h e jury was n o t f u l l y searched o u t . I n t h a t s i t u a t i o n it cannot be s t a t e d unequivocally t h a t no prejudice a g a i n s t defendant had occurred. It i s t h e r u l e i n t h i s s t a t e t h a t i f jury misconduct is shown tending t o i n j u r e t h e defendant, prejudice t o t h e defendant i s presumed; however, t h e presumption i s n o t absolute and may be rebutted by t h e use of testimony of t h e j u r o r s t o show f a c t s which prove t h a t prejudice o r i n j u r y d i d n o t o r could not occur. S t a t e v. Jackson, (1890), 9 Mont. 508, 522, 24 P. 213, 216. Putro v. ~ a l c e r and Mannix ~ l e c t r i c , Inc., (1966), 1 4 7 Mont. 139, 147, 410 ~ . 2 d 717, 7 2 2 . The procedure followed by t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court i n Baugh had t h e e f f e c t of overcoming t h e presumption of prejudice caused by jury misconduct. The response of t h e j u r o r s , before t h e i r v e r d i c t was announced, overcame t h e presump- t i o n . I n t h i s case, t h e members of t h e jury were not s o i n t e r r o g a t e d , and t h e r e f o r e t h e presumption of prejudice remains. What t h i s Court s a i d i n Putro, supra, bears repeating: "The guiding p r i n c i p l e of our l e g a l system i s f a i r n e s s . W e must tenaciously adhere t o t h e i d e a l t h a t both s i d e s of a lawsuit be guaranteed a f a i r t r i a l . Sec. 27, A r t . 111, Montana Con- s t i t u t i o n . The function of t h e jury is t o de- c i d e t h e f a c t s of t h e case only on evidence introduced a t t r i a l . I t has been noted t h a t 'There i s no p r a c t i c a b l e method t o s o analyze t h e mental operation of t h e j u r o r s a s t o deter- mine whether, i n p o i n t of f a c t , t h e v e r d i c t would have been t h e same i f t h e t r i a l had been conducted, a s both p a r t i e s had a r i g h t t o expect, according t o law and upon t h e evidence i n c o u r t . ' McDaniels v. McDaniels, 40 V t . 3 6 3 . The t r i a l c o u r t should have declared a m i s t r i a l i n j u s t i c e t o i t s e l f a s w e l l a s t o p a r t i e s , s o t h a t a f a i r t r i a l may re- s u l t and t h e v e r d i c t when rendered may be e n t i t l e d t o t h e r e s p e c t of both p a r t i e s and t h e confidence of t h e court. W e cannot be t o o s t r i c t i n guarding t r i a l s by j u r i e s from improper influences. This s t r i c t n e s s i s necessary t o g i v e due confidence t o p a r t i e s i n t h e r e s u l t s of t h e i r causes, and t o enlighten t h e p u b l i c who have recourse t o our c o u r t s t h a t any improper influence which has t h e n a t u r a l tendency t o prejudice t h e v e r d i c t is grounds f o r a m i s t r i a l . * * *" 147 Mont. 147, 148, 410 P.2d 722. W e r e v e r s e t h e judgment of conviction a g a i n s t defendant and remand f o r a new t r i a l . We concur: Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison dissenting: I dissent. By sheer speculation the majority finds, without a scintilla of proof, that the jury might have been influenced by something Juror Kruger said or did before being removed at the conclusion of the case. Our recent case of State v. Baugh, (1977), Mont. , 571 P.2d 779, 34 St.Rep. 1315, is in my view con- trolling. In that case we held: "Defendant was not prejudiced by the occurrence involving juror Kolar. While serious prejudice may have arisen if juror Kolar had participated in the verdict, those problems were thus arrested by replacing her with an alternate juror and the further safeguards taken by the trial judge." 571 P.2d 784. The same can be said here. The trial court questioned the offending juror to insure he had not discussed the case with the other jurors. The defense counsel agreed that the court should wait until the conclusion of the evidence to dismiss the juror so as not to disrupt the jury. The court went further by instructing the juror not to discuss his removal with anyone and to say he was sick, if asked. In addition, there is nothing in the record to show prejudice to the appellant. The fact the juror said the victim's family "enjoyed the friendship of most people in the area" falls far short of the prejudice that would pre- vent a fair trial. This fact came out during voir dire examination. The juror himself contradicted any factual basis for the statement when he denied talking to any of the jurors or that any had talked to him. Here, t h e t r i a l c o u r t had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o t a k e what c u r a t i v e measures w e r e necessary b e f o r e t h e j u r y ' s d e l i b e r a - t i o n s began and I can f i n d no b a s i s f o r f i n d i n g any pre- judice a g a i n s t t h e a p p e l l a n t warranting a new t r i a l . ra M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Has el1 concurs with t h e d i s s e n t . f 1 w Chief J u s t i c e