Case Title: Ex Parte Alabama Dept. of Youth Services

Citation: 880 So. 2d 393

Docket Number: 1020480

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2003-10-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
880 So. 2d 393 (2003)
Ex parte ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES and J. Walter Wood, Jr.
(In re Jane Doe 1, a minor child who sues by her grandmother D.M. as her next friend, and Jane Doe 2, a minor child who sues by her mother M.T. as her next friend
v.
Alabama Department Of Youth Services et al.)
1020480.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 10, 2003.
*396 Kenneth L. Thomas, H. Lewis Gillis, Valerie L. Acoff, James L. Richey, and Tamica C. Richard of Thomas, Means, Gillis & Seay, P.C., Birmingham; and William J. Samford, Alabama Department of Youth Services, Mount Meigs, for petitioners.
Karen Sampson Rodgers and Kenneth Shinbaum of McPhillips, Shinbaum & Gill, LLP, Montgomery, for respondents.
JOHNSTONE, Justice.
The Alabama Department of Youth Services ("DYS") and J. Walter Wood, Jr., petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing Judge Tracy S. McCooey to grant their Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss the claims against them. We grant the petition in part and deny the petition in part.
Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2, by and through their respective next friends ("Doe plaintiffs"), sued DYS employees Jimmie Jenkins, John Zeigler, and Kenneth Green for committing various sexual assaults on the Doe plaintiffs and for sexually harassing them while the Doe plaintiffs were in the custody of DYS at its Chalkville campus. Jenkins, Zeigler, and Green are not parties to this petition.
The Doe plaintiffs sued DYS for violating Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., by failing "to respond and/or their inadequate response to" a "sexually hostile education environment and sexual abuse and harassment." Against DYS, the Doe plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees.
The Doe plaintiffs sued executive director of DYS J. Walter Wood, Jr.,[1] under various legal theories. All were based on Wood's, and certain other supervisory defendants', being "entrusted with the security of elementary students like the minor plaintiffs who are placed by operation of law into their charge."
*397 The Doe plaintiffs alleged a claim against Wood under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to their "right[s] to personal safety, security and privacy, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment" while Wood was "acting under color of state law." The Doe plaintiffs alleged that Wood "failed to develop, implement or administer procedures or policies reasonably designed to provide protection for the minor Plaintiffs from sexual harassment and abuse"; failed "to prevent male employees of DYS from sexually abusing and harassing them"; failed "to investigate prior complaints" against Green, Jenkins, and Zeigler; and failed "to protect the Plaintiffs from harm and from further harm after [Wood] received notice of the sexual harassment and abuse and the potential for sexual harassment of" them. The Doe plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages, "equitable relief," attorneys' fees, and costs. The prayer for relief does not specifically seek an injunction.
The Doe plaintiffs also alleged state-law claims against Wood, in his individual and official capacities, for "intentionally and recklessly caus[ing] them to suffer extreme emotional distress by [his] outrageous misconduct" and for negligently or wantonly hiring, supervising, investigating, and monitoring Green, Jenkins, Zeigler, and their supervisor, the principal of the school. The Doe plaintiffs alleged that Wood's acts or omissions in the torts alleged in these two claims were "malicious and intended to injure." The Doe plaintiffs also claimed against Wood in his individual and official capacities for "willfully, recklessly, and/or mistakenly represent[ing] to Plaintiffs a material existing fact, which the Plaintiffs relied on said false representation that caused damage to the Plaintiff[s] as a proximate result." The Doe plaintiffs asked for compensatory and punitive damages and costs for all of these claims.
DYS and Wood moved to dismiss the Doe plaintiffs' claims against them. DYS asserted that the claims against it should be dismissed on the ground that DYS is an agency of the State of Alabama entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 14, Alabama Constitution of 1901. Wood asserted that he is entitled to a dismissal of the claims against him in his official capacity on the ground of sovereign immunity under Art. I, § 14, Alabama Constitution of 1901, and that he is entitled to a dismissal of the claims against him in his individual capacity on the grounds of federal qualified immunity and state-agent immunity. Both DYS and Wood asserted that they are entitled to dismissal of the federal § 1983 claims against them on the ground that § 1983 precludes respondeat superior liability. The Doe plaintiffs responded in opposition to the motion to dismiss. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss filed by DYS and Wood.
Inasmuch as the issue before us is whether the trial court correctly denied a Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss, "[t]his Court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true." Creola Land Dev., Inc. v. Bentbrooke Housing, L.L.C., 828 So. 2d 285, 288 (Ala.2002). Moreover, as the defendants sought only a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal without resort to facts supplied by affidavit or other evidentiary material outside the allegations of the complaint, and as the trial court accordingly treated the motion only as what it was, a motion to dismiss and not a motion for summary judgment with evidentiary materials outside the allegations of the complaint, those allegations themselves are the only potential source of factual support for the defendants' claims of immunity. Rule 12(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Mooneyham v. State *398 Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 802 So. 2d 200 (Ala.2001); Garris v. Federal Land Bank of Jackson, 584 So. 2d 791 (Ala.1991); Hales v. First Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 380 So. 2d 797 (Ala.1980).
Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So. 2d 788, 789 (Ala.1998).
Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala.1993) (citations omitted). Accord Cook v. Lloyd Noland Found., Inc., 825 So. 2d 83, 89 (Ala.2001), and C.B. v. Bobo, 659 So. 2d 98, 104 (Ala.1995). "We construe all doubts regarding the sufficiency of the complaint in favor of the plaintiff." Ex parte Haralson, 853 So. 2d 928, 931 (Ala.2003). "[A] motion to dismiss is typically not the appropriate vehicle by which to assert [federal] qualified immunity or State-agent immunity and ... normally the determination as to the existence of such a defense should be reserved until the summary-judgment stage, following appropriate discovery." Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 837 So. 2d 808, 813-14 (Ala.2002).
DYS contends that, because it is an agency of the State of Alabama, it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and to the dismissal of all claims against it. The complaint shows, and the Doe plaintiffs concede, that the only claim against DYS is a Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., claim.
Title IX provides, in pertinent part: "No person ... shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a), provides:
Eleventh Amendment immunity from a Title IX claim is governed by federal substantive law. Powers v. CSX Transp., Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1299 n. 2 (S.D.Ala.2000), and Alabama State Docks *399 Terminal Ry. v. Lyles, 797 So. 2d 432 (Ala. 2001). DYS is a state agency entitled to the same Eleventh Amendment immunity available to the State of Alabama. See Jones v. Phyfer, 761 F.2d 642 (11th Cir. 1985).
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court have extended the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to suits by citizens against their own respective states. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363, 121 S. Ct. 955, 148 L. Ed. 2d 866 (2001).
The Supreme Court has "repeatedly treated Title IX as legislation enacted pursuant to Congress' authority under the Spending Clause[, Article I, § 8, cl. 1]." Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640, 119 S. Ct. 1661, 143 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1999). In Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 741, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 144 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1999), the United States Supreme Court addressed "[w]hether Congress has authority under Article I to abrogate a State's immunity from suit in its own courts," which it noted was "a question of first impression." The Supreme Court held that
Alden, 527 U.S.  at 748, 119 S. Ct. 2240. However, in Garrett, supra, addressing whether the Eleventh Amendment immunizes states against suits pursuant to Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 through § 12117, the Supreme Court explains:
"Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part:
531 U.S.  at 363-65, 121 S. Ct. 955 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
The Garrett Court ultimately held that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment did not authorize Congress to enact Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act insofar as that legislation would purport to authorize a state employee to sue the state for money damages for failing or refusing to accommodate that employee's disabilities for the purposes of the state employment. The bases for this conclusion were two-fold. The first basis was that the Congressional findings cited in support of this feature of the legislation "f[e]ll far short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on which § 5 legislation *401 must be based." Garrett, 531 U.S.  at 370, 121 S. Ct. 955. The second basis was that the remedy of money damages in favor of a "private individual" state employee against the state to redress its failure or refusal to accommodate the employee's disabilities would not "be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation." Garrett, 531 U.S.  at 374, 121 S. Ct. 955. Garrett held, therefore, that Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act did not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states against such suits. Garrett, 531 U.S.  at 374 n. 9, 121 S. Ct. 955.
The defects in or limitations on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, however, are not common to the Title IX legislation now before us. Both the pattern of unconstitutional sexual discrimination targeted by Title IX and the appropriateness of the remedy of money damages for the sexual discrimination are well recognized. Davis, supra; Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 112 S. Ct. 1028, 117 L. Ed. 2d 208 (1991); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 102 S. Ct. 1912, 72 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1982); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 60 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). Moreover, even Garrett recognizes that the Eleventh Amendment does not immunize the states against actions "by private individuals... for injunctive relief" from discrimination. Garrett, 531 U.S.  at 374 n. 9, 121 S. Ct. 955.
The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that "[i]n the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 100 Stat. 1845, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7, Congress abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title IX [of the Education Amendments of 1972, supra]...." Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S.  at 72, 112 S. Ct. 1028. "`Title IX [addressing sex discrimination]' ... `was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [addressing racial discrimination].'" Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280, 121 S. Ct. 1511, 149 L. Ed. 2d 517 (2001) (quoting Cannon, 441 U.S.  at 694, 99 S.Ct. 1946). Thus, the United States Supreme Court has held that "[s]ection 1003 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 100 Stat. 1845, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7, expressly abrogated States' sovereign immunity against suits brought in federal court to enforce Title VI" of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also. Alexander, 532 U.S.  at 280, 121 S. Ct. 1511 (emphasis added).
While the United States Supreme Court, in Franklin, supra, expressly recognized that Title IX was enacted by Congress pursuant to its powers under Article I of the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court, in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732, 102 S. Ct. 3331, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1090 (1982), also recognized that Title IX was enacted by Congress pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment, § 5, power. On this topic, the Franklin Court wrote:
503 U.S.  at 75 n. 8, 112 S. Ct. 1028.
While neither Franklin nor Alexander, supra, undertakes to reconcile their respective holdings that Title IX (sex discrimination) and Title VI (racial discrimination) abrogate the Eleventh Amendment *402 immunity of the states with the other United States Supreme Court cases holding that federal legislation based (like Title IX and Title VI) on the Article I powers of Congress does not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states, e.g., Alden and Garrett, supra, Garrett does seem to reconcile the apparent conflict. Garrett explains that an exception has emerged to the general rule that Congress cannot "base its abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity upon the powers enumerated in Article I," Garrett, 531 U.S.  at 364-65, 121 S. Ct. 955. The exception is that legislation enacted by Congress not only pursuant to its Article I powers but also "pursuant to a valid exercise of its § 5[, Fourteenth Amendment,] power" may subject nonconsenting states to suit in federal court or state court for money damages as well as injunctive relief for violation of the federal legislation. Garrett, 531 U.S.  at 364-65, and 374 n. 9, 121 S. Ct. 955. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 79, 80-82, 120 S. Ct. 631, 145 L. Ed. 2d 522 (2000); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1996); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456, 96 S. Ct. 2666, 49 L. Ed. 2d 614 (1976); Larkins v. Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 806 So. 2d 358, 363 (Ala.2001).
Therefore, because Congress enacted Title IX not only pursuant to its Article I powers, Davis and Franklin, supra, but also pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment, § 5, power, Hogan, supra, Congress successfully abrogated the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states from suits in federal and state courts for violations of Title IX. Garrett, 531 U.S.  at 364-65, 121 S. Ct. 955, and Franklin, 503 U.S.  at 72, 112 S. Ct. 1028. See Alexander, 532 U.S.  at 280, 121 S. Ct. 1511; Kimel, 528 U.S.  at 79, 80-82, 120 S. Ct. 631; Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S.  at 72-73, 116 S. Ct. 1114; Bitzer, 427 U.S.  at 456, 96 S. Ct. 2666; Larkins, 806 So. 2d  at 363. Accordingly, DYS is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from the Doe plaintiffs' Title IX claim.
Wood argues that he is entitled to federal qualified immunity from the Doe plaintiffs' federal § 1983 claim against him.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982). "Qualified immunity is designed to allow government officials to avoid the expense and disruption of going to trial, and is not merely a defense to liability." Hardy v. Town of Hayneville, 50 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1189 (M.D.Ala.1999). "An official is entitled to qualified immunity if he is performing discretionary functions and his actions do `"not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."'" Hardy, 50 F. Supp. 2d  at 1189 (quoting Lancaster v. Monroe County, 116 F.3d 1419, 1424 (11th Cir.1997)).
St. George v. Pinellas County, 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir.2002) (emphasis added).
Braddy v. Florida Dep't of Labor & Employment Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 802 (11th Cir.1998) (quoting Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir.1990) (citations omitted and emphasis added)). Accord George v. McIntosh-Wilson, 582 So. 2d 1058, 1062-63 (Ala.1991).
In C.B. v. Bobo, supra, this Court stated, in pertinent part:
659 So. 2d  at 103-04 (quoting Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 450-52 (5th Cir.1994)).
The Doe plaintiffs' complaint alleges Wood's violation of their clearly established constitutional right to "bodily integrity" pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, see C.B. v. Bobo, 659 So. 2d  at 104. The Doe plaintiffs' complaint further alleges that Wood failed "to protect the plaintiffs from harm and from further harm after he received notice of the sexual harassment and abuse and the potential for sexual harassment" (emphasis added) committed by DYS employees against the plaintiffs. Therefore, Wood has not shown a clear legal right to a dismissal of the Doe plaintiffs' § 1983 claim on the ground of federal qualified immunity.
DYS asserts that Art. I, § 14, Alabama Constitution of 1901, sovereign immunity entitles DYS to a dismissal of the federal Title IX claim. Article I, § 14, provides: "That the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity." "Under this provision, the state and its agencies have absolute immunity *404 from suit in any court." Alabama State Docks v. Saxon, 631 So. 2d 943, 945-46 (Ala.1994).
Powers, 105 F. Supp. 2d  at 1299 n. 2. The law of Eleventh Amendment immunity, not of state constitutional sovereign immunity, governs a Title IX claim brought against a state. Id. Therefore, DYS is not entitled to a dismissal of the Doe plaintiffs' Title IX claim on the ground of Art. I, § 14, sovereign immunity.
Wood argues that he is entitled to sovereign immunity from the state-law claims against him in his official capacity. "State officers and employees, in their official capacities and individually, also are absolutely immune when the action is, in effect, one against the state." Saxon, 631 So. 2d  at 946.
Lyons v. River Road Constr., Inc., 858 So. 2d 257, 261 (Ala.2003) (citations omitted). "[A]n indirect action against the State by suing a State official ... impermissibly seeks funds from the State treasury." Id. Consequently, Wood has shown a clear legal right to a dismissal of the Doe plaintiffs' state-law claims against him in his official capacity.
Wood argues that he is entitled to a dismissal of the Doe plaintiffs' state-law claims against him in his individual capacity on the ground of state-agent immunity because, he says, he "was clearly engaged in discretionary functions at the time of the alleged acts." Petition, p. 19. "Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala.2000), recounts the evolution of State-agent immunity," Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 913 (Ala.2000), and restates the law on that topic:
Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala.2000). "This restatement was adopted by our decisions in Ex parte Rizk, [supra,] and Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173 (Ala.2000)." Ex parte Blankenship, 806 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (Ala.2000).
The second paragraph of exceptions to state-agent immunity in Cranman expressly denies state-agent immunity for conduct that is willful, malicious, or fraudulent. 792 So. 2d  at 405. Each one of the plaintiffs' state-law claims against Wood expressly alleges that his conduct was either malicious, willful, "intended to injure the minor plaintiffs," or fraudulent. Some of the state-law claims allege a combination of these exceptions. Therefore, the allegations do not show, and Wood has not shown, that he has a clear legal right to a dismissal of any of these state-law claims on the basis of state-agent immunity.
Accordingly, we grant the petition only to the extent that we will issue our writ of mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss only the state-law claims against Wood in his official capacity. We deny the petition insofar as it seeks a writ directing the dismissal of the federal Title IX claim against DYS, the federal § 1983 claim against Wood, and the state-law claims against Wood in his individual capacity. Our opinion in this case does not address any defense other than the petitioners' claims of immunity and does not foreclose a reassertion of the immunity claims by way of a motion for summary judgment after appropriate discovery.
PETITION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; WRIT ISSUED.
HOUSTON, BROWN, and STUART, JJ., concur.
LYONS, HARWOOD, and WOODALL, JJ., concur in the rationale in part and concur in the result.
*406 HARWOOD, Justice (concurring in the rationale in part and concurring in the result).
I concur in the result as to the part of the opinion entitled "Eleventh Amendment Immunity." I concur fully in the remainder of the opinion.
LYONS and WOODALL, JJ., concur.
[1]  The Doe plaintiffs also sued other state officials who are not parties to this petition.