Case Title: State v. Alexander

Citation: 2015 WI 6

Docket Number: 2013AP000843-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2015-01-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
2015 WI 6 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP843-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Danny Robert Alexander, 
          Defendant-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 352 Wis. 2d 755, 843 N.W.2d 711) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 27, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 7, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Wagner 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., concur. (Opinion 
filed.) 
PROSSER, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.) 
GABLEMAN, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.) 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by Matthew 
S. Pinix and Law Office of Matthew S. Pinix, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Matthew S. Pinix. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
2015 WI 6
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2013AP843-CR 
(L.C. No. 
12CF202) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Danny Robert Alexander, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 27, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals1 that granted resentencing based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel, which reversed the circuit 
court's2 
denial 
of 
Danny 
Robert 
Alexander's 
motion 
for 
resentencing.  Alexander contends his Fifth Amendment right not 
to be sentenced based on an improper factor was violated at 
sentencing because compelled, self-incriminating statements to 
                                                 
1 State v. Alexander, No. 2013AP843-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2014). 
2 The Honorable Jeffrey A. Wagner of Milwaukee County 
presided. 
No. 
2013AP843-CR   
 
2 
 
his probation agent were appended to the report of the 
presentence investigation (PSI) the circuit court reviewed.  The 
State does not contest Alexander's assertion that his statements 
to his probation agent were compelled; therefore, in this 
decision, we assume, without deciding, that they were compelled.  
In order to establish circuit court error, Alexander must prove 
the circuit court actually relied on his compelled statements.  
Accordingly, our review focuses on whether the circuit court 
actually relied on Alexander's compelled statements to his 
probation agent when the court sentenced him.  See State v. 
Harris (Landray M.), 2010 WI 79, ¶30, 326 Wis. 2d 685, 786 
N.W.2d 409.   
¶2 
We conclude that Alexander failed to prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion by actually relying on Alexander's 
compelled, 
incriminating 
statements 
in 
imposing 
sentence.  
Therefore, we conclude that Alexander was not prejudiced by his 
counsel's 
lack 
of 
objection 
to 
those 
same 
statements.  
Accordingly, it follows that Alexander was not denied effective 
assistance of counsel.  We reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and affirm the circuit court's denial of Alexander's 
motion for resentencing.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
This case arises from the circuit court's sentencing 
where compelled, incriminating statements that Alexander made to 
his probation agent were appended to the PSI.  Alexander moved 
for resentencing alleging a violation of his Fifth Amendment 
No. 
2013AP843-CR   
 
3 
 
right against compelled self-incrimination, which the circuit 
court denied.  We must decide whether the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion at sentencing by actually 
relying upon Alexander's compelled statements. 
¶4 
On January 13, 2012, Alexander was charged with one 
count of felony forgery.  The complaint alleged that Alexander 
presented two forged checks for payment at two U.S. Bank 
locations:  one for $1,749.13 and one for $1,456.23.3  The checks 
were drawn on the same Silver Mill Management Co. bank account.  
U.S. Bank gave Alexander cash for the checks.  Alexander cashed 
the forged checks while he was on extended supervision for an 
earlier conviction.   
¶5 
Alexander pled guilty to felony forgery.  The circuit 
court accepted Alexander's plea and ordered a PSI.  The circuit 
court received the PSI before the sentencing hearing.  The PSI 
included a description of the offense, a victim statement, an 
examination 
of 
Alexander's 
prior 
record 
and 
correctional 
experience, a personal history, and the recommendation of the 
Department of Corrections (DOC) agent who prepared the PSI.  The 
recommendation noted that Alexander committed the forgery 
offense while on extended supervision, just over a month after 
he 
was 
released 
from 
prison. 
 
The 
agent 
characterized 
                                                 
3 This figure reflects an error in the complaint.  The copy 
of this check attached to the complaint shows the amount of 
$1,461.23. 
No. 
2013AP843-CR   
 
4 
 
Alexander's offenses as brazen and said Alexander exhibited a 
willingness to commit illegal activities. 
¶6 
The PSI victim statement quoted a fraud investigator 
with U.S. Bank:  "Well here, we [U.S. Bank] have a total loss of 
$12,000 from Danny and his accomplices.  And that's just us; 
there are other victims here and other pending cases."  In the 
PSI author's recommendation for restitution, a $12,000 loss due 
to offenses committed by Alexander and his codefendants was 
again noted.4 
¶7 
Appended to the PSI report were two of Alexander's 
statements 
to 
his 
extended 
supervision 
agent.5 
 
In 
the 
statements, Alexander described cashing three checks from Dave's 
Machine Repair and two from Silver Mill, which are the checks 
from which this conviction arose.  In his plea, Alexander 
                                                 
4 U.S. Bank also completed a Crime Victim Impact Statement 
stating "U.S. Bank suffered a financial loss of $9,626.50 due to 
counterfeit checks cashed against Silver Mills Management LLC 
[sic].  Danny Alexander cashed two of them for $3,210.36." 
5 The DOC-1305/1305A  forms, upon which the DOC agent 
recorded Alexander's statements, each contain a header stating:  
I have been advised that I must account in a truthful 
and accurate manner for my whereabouts and activities, 
and that failure to do so is a violation for which I 
could be revoked.  I have also been advised that none 
of this information can be used against me in criminal 
proceedings. 
The header was followed by "I have read or have had read to me, 
the above warning," which Alexander initialed.  Alexander signed 
the statement and initialed each page.   
No. 
2013AP843-CR   
 
5 
 
admitted to the facts in the complaint that described cashing 
the Silver Mill checks and the dollar amount of each check. 
¶8 
At Alexander's sentencing hearing, the PSI report was 
discussed: 
THE COURT:  Counsel . . . is here for sentencing.  
Have you gone over the pre-sentence report with your 
client?  If you have, are there any additions or 
corrections to it? 
[ATTORNEY] JOHNSON:  Yes.  You saw the pre-sentence, 
right? 
[ALEXANDER]:  They didn't come and see me. 
. . . . 
THE COURT:  Okay.  But you looked——You have read this 
report, right? 
[ALEXANDER]:  Yes. 
THE COURT:  Okay.  Any additions or corrections by the 
state? 
[THE STATE]:  No.  
THE COURT:  So then we are ready to proceed, 
[Attorney] Johnson? 
[ATTORNEY] JOHNSON:  Yes. 
¶9 
After hearing the parties' recommendations, the court 
stated: 
Well, it appears based upon the U.S. Bank that 
these checks were from Silver [Mill] Management 
Company and in their statement, at least their 
investigator said that there were several individuals 
that were involved in fraudulent activities, involved 
in area businesses.   
I don't know whether or not you were one of those 
individuals, but apparently you did so in this case 
before the court.  Your prior record——Before the court 
No. 
2013AP843-CR   
 
6 
 
imposes a sentence the court takes into consideration 
the nature of the offense and what's been represented 
as to your character and the rights of the victim and 
the rights of the community that you present.  A 
punishment aspect as an objective of sentencing and a 
rehabilitative aspect and a deterrent aspect. 
 
It would appear that you haven't really been 
deterred from further criminal activity even though 
this may have been what was set as a crime of 
opportunity because every time, you know . . . there 
is a continued pattern of behavior that you have been 
on probation.  That was revoked.  You ended up in 
prison and then there was an armed robbery in '94 
where you had 96 months in prison.  And then there was 
a reckless second degree recklessly endangering safety 
that you received prison for.  
. . . . 
 
Quite frankly, it says as far as the assessment 
of yourself by the agent is that you were on your 
second chance of extended supervision and only been 
out of prison for just over a month when you committed 
the present offenses.  That [he has] been a repeat 
offender for the majority of his adult life and has 
several convictions.  
 
And 
it 
goes 
on 
to 
say 
that 
within 
those 
dispositions in the past he was afforded opportunities 
at treatment, skills and education, however the 
defendant has not truly made himself [amenable] to 
Correctional intervention that will motivate him to 
redirect the direction of his life.  Then [the PSI 
author goes on to] recommend the sentence that they 
do.  
¶10 The court after hearing the recommendations of the 
district attorney and Alexander's counsel sentenced Alexander: 
What the court will do, the court is going to 
follow the recommendation of the pre-sentence to some 
extent, and impose a sentence of seven years in the 
No. 
2013AP843-CR   
 
7 
 
Wisconsin state prison system.6  The court will make 
that concurrent to whatever time that you're serving 
now. 
The court believes that you have to have some 
extra time on this because of the fact . . . of your 
continuous undesirable behavior patterns.   
The court waived all costs but imposed the restitution amount, 
$3,210.32,7 to which Alexander had agreed.   
¶11 Alexander moved for resentencing.  Alexander argued 
that his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
was violated by the circuit court's reliance on the PSI with the 
appended statements he made to his probation agent.  Alexander 
argued that his statements were compelled because conditions of 
his extended supervision required truthful reporting of his 
activities.8 
¶12 The circuit court denied Alexander's motion for 
resentencing.  The court noted that Alexander agreed during 
sentencing that he had read the PSI.  Regarding the information 
contained in Alexander's compelled statements, the court said 
that when Alexander pled guilty he admitted the facts in the 
                                                 
6 The circuit court initially ordered three years of 
confinement and four years of extended supervision.  When 
advised that the extended supervision could not exceed three 
years, 
the 
court 
corrected 
the 
sentence 
to 
six 
years 
imprisonment, consisting of three years confinement and three 
years extended supervision. 
7 This figure was taken from the circuit court's order even 
though it is not the sum of the two checks attached to the 
complaint. 
8 As we have noted above, we assume without deciding that 
Alexander's statements were compelled.  
No. 
2013AP843-CR   
 
8 
 
complaint were true.9  The court also explained that while 
Alexander's statements referred to other forged and cashed 
checks in separate incidents, "the body of the [PSI] report also 
refers to an amount of loss suffered by the victim much greater 
than the $3,210.32" for the checks on which his conviction was 
based.  The court noted that the "Crime Victim Impact Statement 
also referenced a $9,626.50 loss by U.S. Bank from these 
transactions, indicating that the defendant had cashed two of 
the checks."  The court concluded:  
Clearly, the court and the parties were aware of the 
bigger picture of what had been going on, and the 
defendant's statement to his [probation] agent did not 
reveal anything not already known to the court. 
¶13 Alexander appealed the circuit court's denial of his 
motion for resentencing.  Alexander argued on appeal that the 
circuit court erred in denying his motion for resentencing due 
to the violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination that he alleged had occurred.  The court of 
appeals 
reversed 
the 
circuit 
court 
based 
on 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel, which the court of appeals raised sua 
sponte, and remanded for a new sentencing hearing.  State v. 
Alexander, No. 2013AP843-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶12-15 (Wis. 
Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2014).   
                                                 
9 During 
his 
guilty 
plea, 
Alexander 
acknowledged 
his 
understanding of the circuit court's statement:  "You would be 
waiving any possible defenses that you may have to the offense 
charged in the criminal complaint."  The court also explained 
that it would use the complaint as the factual basis for 
Alexander's plea. 
No. 
2013AP843-CR   
 
9 
 
¶14 We granted review, and now reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶15 We review the court of appeals' conclusion that 
Alexander was denied effective assistance of counsel in the 
context of the circuit court's review of the PSI report at 
sentencing.  Whether counsel was ineffective in failing to 
object to the PSI report because it appended compelled, self-
incriminating 
statements 
and 
whether 
the 
defendant 
was 
prejudiced by counsel's failure, present mixed questions of fact 
and law.  State v. Johnson, 2004 WI 94, ¶10, 273 Wis. 2d 626, 
681 N.W.2d 901.  We uphold a circuit court's factual findings 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  However, whether 
counsel's performance was deficient and whether a defendant was 
prejudiced thereby, present questions of law that we review 
independently.  Id.    
¶16 On review, we will affirm the sentencing decision of a 
circuit court so long as the court does not erroneously exercise 
its discretion.  Harris (Landray M.), 326 Wis. 2d 685, ¶3; State 
v. Brown, 2006 WI 131, ¶5, 298 Wis. 2d 37, 725 N.W.2d 262.   
B.  Sentencing Decision  
¶17 A circuit court erroneously exercises its sentencing 
discretion when it "actually relies on clearly irrelevant or 
improper factors."  Harris (Landray M.), 326 Wis. 2d 685, ¶66.  
A defendant bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing 
evidence, 
that 
the 
sentencing 
court 
actually 
relied 
on 
No. 
2013AP843-CR   
 
10 
 
irrelevant or improper factors.  Id.; see State v. Tiepelman, 
2006 WI 66, ¶26, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1 (concluding that 
a defendant who asserts that the circuit court erred by 
employing inaccurate information at sentencing must show that:  
(1) the information was inaccurate, and (2) the circuit court 
actually relied on the inaccurate information); see McCleary v. 
State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 278, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971) (concluding 
where the sentencing discretion was exercised on the basis of 
clearly irrelevant or improper factors, an erroneous exercise of 
discretion occurs10).  Before the court of appeals, Alexander 
claimed that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for 
resentencing because the circuit court based his sentence on the 
PSI that improperly appended a compelled statement. 
¶18 The two-step framework to determine whether a circuit 
court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion based on 
an improper factor that we set out in Tiepelman is helpful here.  
Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶26.  In Tiepelman, we noted that 
"[a] defendant has a constitutionally protected due process 
right to be sentenced [on] accurate information."  Id., ¶9.  We 
discussed the two-step framework wherein a defendant must prove 
that:  (1) information was inaccurate, and (2) the court 
actually relied on the inaccurate information in the sentencing.  
Id., ¶26.  If the defendant proves inaccuracy and actual 
                                                 
10 McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 278, 182 N.W.2d 512 
(1971), employed the term "abuse of discretion," a term we no 
longer employ.  We now employ the term "erroneous exercise of 
discretion."  
No. 
2013AP843-CR   
 
11 
 
reliance, the burden shifts to the State to prove the error was 
harmless.  Id., ¶¶26-27. 
¶19 In Harris (Landray M.), we also applied this framework 
to a contention that a sentencing court had relied on improper 
factors, 
rather 
than 
inaccurate 
information. 
 
Harris 
(Landray M.), 326 Wis. 2d 685, ¶24.  We concluded that race and 
gender, 
the 
two 
factors 
under 
examination 
in 
Harris 
(Landray M.), were improper sentencing factors.  Id., ¶33.  We 
recognized a defendant's due process right not to be sentenced 
on the basis of race and held that a defendant also has a due 
process right not to be sentenced based on gender.  Id.   
¶20 We 
discussed 
the 
difficulty 
in 
proving 
that 
a 
sentencing court actually relied on improper factors.  Id., ¶34.  
However, we concluded that requiring a defendant to prove his 
case "'promotes the policy of finality of judgments and 
satisfies the purpose of sentence modification, which is the 
correction of unjust sentences.'"  Id. (quoting State v. 
Littrup, 164 Wis. 2d 120, 132, 473 N.W.2d 164 (Ct. App. 1991)).   
¶21 Harris 
(Landray M.) 
explained 
how 
the 
two-part 
Tiepelman test applied to an "improper factor," as compared with 
"inaccurate information."  Id., ¶32.  "Proving inaccurate 
information is a threshold question——you cannot show actual 
reliance on inaccurate information if the information is 
accurate.  When the question relates to other improper factors 
like race and gender, only the second part of the test, actual 
reliance, is relevant."  Id., ¶33 n.10.     
No. 
2013AP843-CR   
 
12 
 
1.  Improper factor  
¶22 We first consider whether compelled statements are an 
improper factor to rely on at sentencing.  When sentencing a 
defendant, a circuit court should use three primary factors:  
the gravity of the offense, the character of the offender, and 
the need to protect the public.  State v. Harris (Denia), 119 
Wis. 2d 612, 623, 350 N.W.2d 633 (1984) (citing McCleary, 49 
Wis. 2d at 274-76).  The circuit court may also consider 
additional factors, including:  
(1) Past record of criminal offenses; (2) history 
of undesirable behavior pattern; (3) the defendant's 
personality, character and social traits; (4) result 
of 
presentence 
investigation; 
(5) 
vicious 
or 
aggravated nature of the crime; (6) degree of the 
defendant's culpability; (7) defendant's demeanor at 
trial; (8) defendant's age, educational background and 
employment record; (9) defendant's remorse, repentance 
and cooperativeness; (10) defendant's need for close 
rehabilitative control; (11) the rights of the public; 
and (12) the length of pretrial detention. 
Id. at 623-24 (quoting Harris (Robert Lee) v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 
513, 519-20, 250 N.W.2d 7 (1977)).  The circuit court's proper 
exercise of discretion includes individualizing the sentence "to 
the defendant based on the facts of the case" and may include 
"identifying the most relevant factors and explaining how the 
sentence imposed furthers the sentencing objectives."  Harris 
(Landray M.), 326 Wis. 2d 685, ¶29 (citing State v. Gallion, 
2004 WI 42, ¶¶39-48, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197). 
¶23 We have already decided that certain factors are 
improper for the circuit court to consider at sentencing and 
therefore violate a defendant's right to due process:  race or 
No. 
2013AP843-CR   
 
13 
 
national 
origin,11 
gender,12 
alleged 
extra-jurisdictional 
offenses,13 and the defendant's or victim's religion.14   
¶24 Alexander has a Fifth Amendment right not to be 
compelled to be a witness against himself.15  Rock v. Arkansas, 
483 U.S. 44, 51-53 (1987).  The Fourteenth Amendment requires 
that states afford the protections of the Fifth Amendment to 
defendants in state criminal actions.  State v. Lonkoski, 2013 
WI 30, ¶23 n.8, 346 Wis. 2d 523, 828 N.W.2d 552 (citing Malloy 
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964)).  The Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination continues after a plea and through 
sentencing.  State v. McConnohie, 121 Wis. 2d 57, 68, 358 N.W.2d 
256 (1984) (concluding that where a defendant has pleaded guilty 
to a criminal charge but has not yet been sentenced, he retains 
his 
constitutional 
privilege 
against 
compelled 
self-
incrimination).  Accordingly, a circuit court employs an 
improper factor in sentencing if it actually relies on compelled 
statements made to a probation agent. 
                                                 
11 State v. Harris (Landray M.), 2010 WI 79, ¶33 n.9, 326 
Wis. 2d 685, 786 N.W.2d 409 (citing United States v. Munoz, 974 
F.2d 493, 495 (4th Cir. 1992)). 
12 Id., ¶33. 
13 Rosado v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 280, 290-91, 234 N.W.2d 69 
(1975).   
14 State v. Ninham, 2011 WI 33, ¶96, 333 Wis. 2d 335, 797 
N.W.2d 451.   
15 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states in relevant part:  "No person . . . shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."   
No. 
2013AP843-CR   
 
14 
 
2.  Actual reliance 
¶25 The second part of our inquiry is to determine whether 
the circuit court actually relied on an improper factor in 
sentencing Alexander, i.e., Alexander's compelled statements.  A 
circuit court "must articulate the basis for the sentence 
imposed." 
 
Harris 
(Denia), 
119 
Wis. 2d 
at 
623. 
 
This 
articulation plays an important role in determining whether the 
circuit court actually relied on an improper factor.  We review 
the circuit court's articulation of its basis for sentencing in 
the context of the entire sentencing transcript to determine 
whether the court gave "explicit attention" to an improper 
factor, and whether the improper factor "formed part of the 
basis for the sentence."16  Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶14; 
State v. Travis, 2013 WI 38, ¶¶28, 31, 347 Wis. 2d 142, 832 
N.W.2d 491. 
¶26 We have evaluated whether a circuit court actually 
relied on an inaccuracy or an improper factor in many cases.  In 
some cases where we have concluded there was no actual reliance, 
the circuit court has made comments that allegedly constituted 
explicit attention to an improper factor.  State v. Lechner, 217 
                                                 
16 Though State v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 
717 N.W.2d 1, provides this method for determining actual 
reliance, we look to other cases for its application because 
Tiepelman is based in part on the parties' stipulation and 
therefore did not apply this method.  Id., ¶4 n.3.   
No. 
2013AP843-CR   
 
15 
 
Wis. 2d 392, 419-22, 576 N.W.2d 912 (1998)17 (stating that 
although the circuit court explicitly referred to an inaccurate 
number of prior convictions when considering the character of 
the defendant, it did so to recognize defendant's long history 
of drug and alcohol abuse); Harris (Landray M.), 326 Wis. 2d 
685, ¶¶45, 48-52 (reviewing comments by the circuit court 
allegedly constituting "explicit attention").  However, we 
reviewed the circuit court's comments in the context of the 
whole sentencing transcript and concluded that the court 
actually based its sentence on proper, rather than improper, 
factors.  Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d at 421-22 (stating that the 
circuit court considered the alleged convictions as "warning 
signals," focusing on the underlying factual events rather than 
actual convictions); see Harris (Landray M.), 326 Wis. 2d 685, 
¶¶52, 60, 64 (reviewing the circuit court's use of the term, 
"baby mama" in the context of the whole sentencing transcript 
and concluding that the defendant failed to prove the court 
actually relied on race or gender in sentencing him). 
¶27 In cases concluding that the circuit court actually 
relied on inaccurate information or improper factors, the 
circuit court explicitly considered the inaccurate information 
                                                 
17 After receiving no relief in state court, the defendant 
in Lechner v. Frank, 341 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2003), filed a 
habeas petition.  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed with our 
conclusion that the record did not demonstrate that the circuit 
court based its sentence in part on an inaccurate prior 
conviction history.  Id. at 639-40. 
No. 
2013AP843-CR   
 
16 
 
and also would not have sentenced the defendant in the same 
manner without the inaccurate information.  For example, in 
Travis, 
we 
noted 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
explicitly 
and 
repetitively referred to the inaccurate penalty information.  
Travis, 347 Wis. 2d 142, ¶¶32-33.  The circuit court also 
explained that if it were to impose a sentence, it had an 
obligation 
to 
impose 
the 
minimum 
sentence, 
which 
was 
inaccurately stated.  Id., ¶34.   
¶28 In State v. Anderson, 222 Wis. 2d 403, 588 N.W.2d 75 
(Ct. App. 1998), the defendant contended that the circuit court 
had relied on a portion of the PSI that included allegations of 
sexual assault that were later recanted.  Id. at 409-10.  The 
court of appeals held that the circuit court relied on that 
portion of the PSI.  Id. at 410.  In regard to reliance, the 
court of appeals stated:  "The tenor of the trial court's 
sentencing remarks is inconsistent with the facts of the 
offenses to which [the defendant] pled no contest," implying 
that the inaccurate allegations formed part of the court's basis 
for the sentence.  Id.; see also United States v. Tucker, 404 
U.S. 443, 447 (1972) (concluding that the sentencing transcript 
demonstrated the district court gave explicit consideration to 
the inaccurate number of previous convictions, and also actually 
relied on inaccurate information).  
¶29 When a sentencing challenge is grounded in the use of 
allegedly erroneous information, we look to the circuit court's 
articulation of its basis for imposing the sentence.  Harris 
(Denia), 119 Wis. 2d at 623.  In the context of the whole 
No. 
2013AP843-CR   
 
17 
 
sentencing transcript, we examine first whether the court gave 
explicit attention to the allegedly improper factor and second, 
whether the improper factor "formed part of the basis for the 
sentence," which could show actual reliance.  See Harris 
(Landray M.), 326 Wis. 2d 685, ¶¶53, 60, 64; Tiepelman, 291 
Wis. 2d 179, ¶14. 
3.  Application 
¶30 As we explained above, Alexander has the burden to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit court 
actually relied on an improper factor in imposing sentence.  
Compelled, incriminating statements are an improper factor in 
determining a defendant's sentence because their use would 
violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.  Rock, 483 U.S. at 51-53; Lonkoski, 346 Wis. 2d 
523, ¶23 & n.8.  Therefore, the remaining question before us is 
whether the circuit court actually relied on Alexander's 
compelled 
statements 
that 
were 
appended 
to 
the 
PSI.18  
Accordingly, we review the entire sentencing transcript to see 
whether the circuit court gave explicit attention to the 
compelled statements.  Harris (Landray M.), 326 Wis. 2d 685, 
¶45.  We also review whether the compelled, incriminating 
statements "formed part of the basis for the sentence," which 
could indicate that the circuit court actually relied on the 
                                                 
18 "When the question relates to other improper factors like 
race and gender, only the second part of the test, actual 
reliance, is relevant."  Harris (Landray M.), 326 Wis. 2d 685, 
¶32 n.10. 
No. 
2013AP843-CR   
 
18 
 
compelled statements.  Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶14; Travis, 
347 Wis. 2d 142, ¶¶28, 31.  We also review the court's 
statements 
made 
in 
response 
to 
Alexander's 
motion 
for 
resentencing.  Harris (Landray M.), 326 Wis. 2d 685, ¶49. 
¶31 In his compelled statements, Alexander admitted his 
role in the Silver Mill forgeries and in other forgeries not 
involved herein.  At sentencing, the circuit court referred to 
information that could be found in Alexander's compelled 
statement.  However, viewed in context, the circuit court 
actually based its reference to this information on the PSI 
victim statement and the Crime Victim Impact Statement of U.S. 
Bank's senior fraud investigator.19  The circuit court stated: 
Well, it appears based upon the U.S. Bank that 
these checks were from Silver [Mill] Management 
Company and in their statement, at least their 
investigator said that there were several individuals 
that were involved in fraudulent activities, involved 
in area businesses.   
I don't know whether or not you were one of those 
individuals, but apparently you did so in this case 
before the court. 
By referring to the fraud investigator's statement, the circuit 
court identified that the source for its reference to other 
offenses was the U.S. Bank investigator.  Additionally, when the 
court related that it did not know whether Alexander was one of 
                                                 
19 It was proper for the circuit court to consider the PSI 
victim statement and the Crime Victim Impact Statement, even 
though Alexander's involvement in other forgeries had not been 
proven.  Elias v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 278, 284, 286 N.W.2d 559 
(1980). 
No. 
2013AP843-CR   
 
19 
 
the individuals involved in the other forgeries, the court 
confirmed that the source of its information was not Alexander's 
compelled statements where his involvement was admitted. 
¶32 At Alexander's sentencing, the circuit court discussed 
other proper sentencing factors, including the nature of the 
offense, Alexander's record of past criminal convictions, 
Alexander's undesirable behavior pattern, and his character in 
failing to accept correctional intervention.  See Harris 
(Denia), 119 Wis. 2d at 623-24.  The circuit court stated that 
it was "going to follow the recommendation of the pre-sentence 
to some extent."  The PSI recommended a term of three to four 
years of initial confinement followed by a three year term of 
extended supervision.  The circuit court sentenced Alexander to 
three years initial confinement, consistent with the PSI's 
recommendation, 
and 
ultimately 
three 
years 
of 
extended 
supervision.20   
¶33 The sentencing transcript clearly reflects that the 
basis of Alexander's sentence overall was Alexander's history of 
criminal offenses and his failure to correct his behavior.  
Alexander's history was the focus of the court's discussion, 
including the court's response to Alexander's comments.  The 
sentencing transcript reveals that the circuit court did not 
give explicit attention to Alexander's compelled statements, and 
information from those statements did not form part of the basis 
                                                 
20 See note 6 above. 
No. 
2013AP843-CR   
 
20 
 
for the sentence imposed.  See Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶14; 
Travis, 347 Wis. 2d 142, ¶¶28, 31.  Therefore, the circuit court 
did not actually rely on an improper factor in sentencing 
Alexander, and did not erroneously exercise its discretion.  See 
Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶26. 
¶34 Our conclusion, based on our review of the entire 
sentencing transcript, is supported by the circuit court's order 
denying Alexander's motion for resentencing.  The circuit court 
explained that "the court and the parties were aware of the 
bigger picture of what had been going on, and the defendant's 
statement to his agent did not reveal anything not already known 
to the court."  The court noted alternative sources for the 
information 
included 
in 
Alexander's 
compelled 
statements.  
First, the court noted that Alexander admitted to the Silver 
Mills forgeries when he entered his guilty plea.  Second, the 
court explained that the body of the PSI referred to an amount 
of loss suffered by U.S. Bank greater than the sum of the Silver 
Mills checks that were the basis for Alexander's conviction.  In 
that regard, the court referred to a U.S. Bank senior fraud 
investigator's statement in the Crime Victim Impact Statement 
section of the PSI.  The investigator placed the amount of loss 
from "Danny and his accomplices" at $12,000, while Alexander was 
convicted of check forgeries totaling $3,210.32.  The circuit 
court explained that given the additional sources in the PSI 
indicating Alexander's potential involvement in other forgeries, 
the attachment of Alexander's compelled statements that also 
spoke of additional forgeries, did not affect the sentence it 
No. 
2013AP843-CR   
 
21 
 
imposed.  The court termed the attachment, "harmless at best."  
Third, the circuit court's order denying Alexander's motion for 
resentencing reiterated that the court did not actually rely on 
Alexander's compelled statements in sentencing him.   
¶35 In sum, after reviewing the sentencing transcript as a 
whole and the court's comments in denying Alexander's motion for 
resentencing, we conclude that the circuit court relied on 
proper factors in imposing sentence and did not actually rely on 
Alexander's compelled statements.  The circuit court considered 
the nature of the offense, Alexander's record of past criminal 
convictions, Alexander's undesirable behavior pattern, and his 
repeated failures to accept correctional intervention.  The 
circuit court explained its basis for imposing Alexander's 
sentence, 
both 
at 
sentencing 
and 
in 
its 
order 
denying 
Alexander's motion for resentencing.  We conclude there is 
nothing to indicate that the circuit court's sentence was an 
erroneous exercise of discretion.  
C.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
¶36 As we noted at the beginning of this decision, the 
court of appeals ordered resentencing based on its conclusion 
that Alexander was denied effective assistance of counsel.  
Alexander, No. 2013AP843-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶12-15.  In 
order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
a defendant must prove both deficient performance and prejudice.  
Johnson, 273 Wis. 2d 626, ¶11.   
No. 
2013AP843-CR   
 
22 
 
¶37 When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
made, the circuit court often holds a Machner hearing.21  State 
v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶8 n.3, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433.  
The circuit court did not hold a Machner hearing in this case 
because the court of appeals raised the ineffective assistance 
of counsel issue sua sponte.  Alexander, No. 2013AP843-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶¶12-15.  Therefore, we do not have a 
record describing why counsel did not object to the compelled 
statements appended to the PSI.   
¶38 However, because proof of prejudice is intertwined 
with whether the circuit court actually relied on Alexander's 
compelled statements when sentencing him and because we have a 
full record to review on sentencing, we are not hampered by the 
lack of a Machner hearing record.22   
¶39 Furthermore, 
if Alexander was not prejudiced by 
counsel's lack of an objection, we need not decide whether 
counsel's 
performance 
was 
deficient 
in 
not 
objecting 
to 
Alexander's compelled statements appended to the PSI.  Johnson, 
273 Wis. 2d 626, ¶11.    
¶40 In the discussion above, we concluded that the circuit 
court did not actually rely on Alexander's compelled statements 
when imposing sentence.  Accordingly, it follows that Alexander 
                                                 
21 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 804, 285 N.W.2d 905 
(Ct. App. 1979). 
22 A Machner hearing is not required where the record shows 
that the defendant cannot establish prejudice.  State v. 
Roberson, 2006 WI 80, ¶44, 292 Wis. 2d 280, 717 N.W.2d 111.  
No. 
2013AP843-CR   
 
23 
 
was not prejudiced by his counsel's lack of objection to those 
same statements.  Therefore, it also follows that Alexander 
cannot prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.     
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶41 We conclude that Alexander failed to prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion by actually relying on Alexander's 
compelled, 
incriminating 
statements 
in 
imposing 
sentence.  
Therefore, we conclude that Alexander was not prejudiced by his 
counsel's 
lack 
of 
objection 
to 
those 
same 
statements.  
Accordingly, it follows that Alexander was not denied effective 
assistance of counsel.  We reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and affirm the circuit court's denial of Alexander's 
motion for resentencing. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2013AP843-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶42 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  Compelled 
statements by the defendant to his extended supervision agent 
were erroneously appended to the presentence investigation 
report (PSI) in the instant case.  The defendant moved for 
resentencing, 
arguing 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
improperly 
considered these statements when imposing sentence, violating 
the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.   
¶43 The circuit court denied the defendant's motion.  The 
court of appeals granted the defendant resentencing based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel, an issue it raised sua 
sponte. 
¶44 I agree with the majority opinion that the court of 
appeals' decision granting the defendant resentencing based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel should be reversed.  I write 
to clarify several points of law. 
¶45 First, the majority opinion fails to correct errors in 
the court of appeals' approach to the issue of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Its silence about these errors might 
imply that it is endorsing the court of appeals' approach. 
¶46 The court of appeals erred in concluding that defense 
counsel's trial performance was deficient.  The court of appeals 
could 
not 
determine 
whether 
defense 
counsel 
performed 
deficiently without a Machner hearing.1 
¶47 Because the court of appeals in the instant case 
raised the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel sua 
                                                 
1 See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 804, 285 N.W.2d 905 
(Ct. App. 1979). 
No.  2013AP843-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
sponte, no Machner hearing had been held.  A Machner hearing is 
critical to address the competency of defense counsel and to 
preserve defense counsel's testimony.2  Indeed, a Machner hearing 
"is 
a 
prerequisite 
to 
a 
claim 
of 
ineffective 
representation . . . ."3 
¶48 Thus, the court of appeals should have remanded the 
cause to the circuit court for a Machner hearing.  The court of 
appeals erred in determining that the defendant received 
deficient assistance of counsel without first providing defense 
counsel an opportunity to explain "the reasons underlying his 
handling of [the] case."4 
¶49 The majority opinion determines that defense counsel's 
trial performance was not prejudicial.5  In contrast to the 
determination 
that 
defense 
counsel 
was 
deficient, 
the 
                                                 
2 In Machner, 92 Wis. 2d at 804, the court of appeals 
stated: 
We hold that it is a prerequisite to a claim of 
ineffective representation on appeal to preserve the 
testimony of trial counsel.  We cannot otherwise 
determine whether trial counsel's actions were the 
result of incompetence or deliberate trial strategies.  
In such situations, then, it is the better rule, and 
in the client's best interests, to require trial 
counsel to explain the reasons underlying his handling 
of a case. 
3 Machner, 92 Wis. 2d at 804. 
4 Id. 
5 After determining that defense counsel's trial performance 
was deficient, the court of appeals further concluded that the 
deficiency was prejudicial. 
No.  2013AP843-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
determination of prejudice can be made by an appellate court 
regardless of whether a Machner hearing has been held.6 
¶50 I do not object to the majority opinion's resolution 
of the ineffective assistance of counsel issue.  Rather, I take 
issue with the majority opinion's failure to clarify that a 
Machner hearing is required before an appellate court can 
determine that defense counsel's performance was deficient.  The 
majority opinion is too cryptic and fails to make the court of 
appeals' error clear. 
¶51 Further, after the court of appeals raised the issue 
of ineffective assistance of counsel sua sponte (which of course 
it may do), it failed to allow briefing on the matter.  This is 
particularly problematic considering the court of appeals 
determined that the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel 
was dispositive of the case.  Moreover, had the parties briefed 
the issue of defense counsel's competency, the court of appeals 
may not have erroneously disregarded the Machner requirement. 
                                                 
6 See State v. Roberson, 2006 WI 80, ¶44, 292 Wis. 2d 280, 
717 
N.W.2d 111 
("Because 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
record 
sufficiently establishes that Roberson was not prejudiced by his 
counsel's actions, we further conclude that the circuit court 
did not err in denying Roberson a hearing on his postconviction 
motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel in 
accordance 
with 
Machner" 
(citation 
omitted).); 
State 
v. 
Rodriguez, 2006 WI App 163, ¶40, 295 Wis. 2d 801, 722 N.W.2d 136 
("A Machner hearing here, however, was not required, because we 
agree with the trial court, on our de novo review, that 
Rodriguez has not shown the requisite prejudice.").  See also 
majority op., ¶38 n.22 ("A Machner hearing is not required where 
the 
record 
shows 
that 
the 
defendant 
cannot 
establish 
prejudice."). 
No.  2013AP843-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶52 We have previously admonished that before a court acts 
on its own initiative, it must accord the parties an opportunity 
to present their positions.7  (Admittedly, this court frequently 
fails to follow its own advice in this regard.8) 
¶53 Second, the majority opinion fails to caution that 
this court generally does not consider dispositive "[a] circuit 
court's after-the-fact assertion of non-reliance" on an improper 
factor at sentencing.9  Rather, "[a] reviewing court must 
independently review the record of the sentencing hearing to 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Bartus v. DHSS, 176 Wis. 2d 1063, 1073, 501 
N.W.2d 419 (1993) ("We therefore urge the courts to exercise 
caution when determining an issue sua sponte without the 
assistance of supplemental briefs and to ask for briefs unless 
the matter is quite clear."); Cemetery Servs., Inc. v. Wis. 
Dep't Reg. & Licensing, 221 Wis. 2d 817, 831, 586 N.W.2d 191 
(Ct. App. 1998) ("We cannot serve as both advocate and court.  
For this reason, we generally choose not to decide issues that 
are not adequately developed by the parties in their briefs.").  
See also Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 210 (2006) ("Of course, 
before acting on its own initiative, a court must accord the 
parties fair notice and an opportunity to present their 
positions."). 
8 See, e.g., Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, ¶¶119-121, 274 
Wis. 2d 28, 682 N.W.2d 866 (Abrahamson, C.J. & Crooks, J., 
concurring), overruled on other grounds by Bartholomew v. Wis. 
Patients Comp. Fund, 2006 WI 91, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216.  
In Maurin, Justice Crooks and I criticized the majority opinion 
for deciding the case on the basis of a "novel interpretation of 
the statutes" without first requesting supplemental briefs or 
reargument.  Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶120 (Abrahamson, C.J. & 
Crooks, J., concurring).  Our concurrence stated:  "We are at a 
loss to understand why the majority refuses to call for 
additional briefs."  Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶121 (Abrahamson, 
C.J. & Crooks, J., concurring). 
9 See State v. Travis, 2013 WI 38, ¶48, 347 Wis. 2d 142, 832 
N.W.2d 491. 
No.  2013AP843-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
determine the existence of any actual reliance on [an improper 
factor]."10 
¶54 The majority opinion concludes that the defendant is 
not entitled to resentencing because he has failed to meet his 
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the 
circuit court actually relied on an improper factor when 
imposing sentence.11 
                                                 
10 Travis, 347 Wis. 2d 14, ¶48.  The Travis court summarized 
the court's approach to the question of whether a circuit court 
relied on inaccurate or improper information at sentencing as 
follows: 
The standard, as stated in Tiepelman, to determine 
whether the circuit court "actually relied" on the 
incorrect information at sentencing is based upon 
whether the circuit court gave "explicit attention" or 
"specific consideration" to it, so that the inaccurate 
information 
"formed 
part 
of 
the 
basis 
for 
the 
sentence."  A circuit court's "explicit attention to 
the misinformation demonstrates [the circuit court's] 
reliance on that misinformation in passing sentence." 
"[T]he 
fact 
that 
other 
information 
might 
have 
justified the sentence, independent of the inaccurate 
information, is irrelevant when the court has relied 
on inaccurate information as part of the basis of the 
sentence." 
A reviewing court must independently review the record 
of the sentencing hearing to determine the existence 
of any actual reliance on inaccurate information.  A 
circuit 
court's 
after-the-fact 
assertion 
of 
non-
reliance on allegedly inaccurate information is not 
dispositive of the issue of actual reliance. 
Travis, 347 Wis. 2d 14, ¶¶46-48 (footnotes omitted; alterations 
& emphasis in original). 
11 See majority op., ¶¶2, 31-35. 
No.  2013AP843-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶55 In reaching this conclusion, the majority opinion 
relies on the circuit court's order, which states that "the 
court and the parties were aware of the bigger picture of what 
had been going on, and the defendant's statement to his agent 
did not reveal anything not already known to the court."12 
¶56 The circuit court did not say it did not actually rely 
on the inadmissible information appended to the PSI.  Rather, 
the circuit court declared that it did not need to rely on the 
defendant's inadmissible statements because it was already aware 
of the information contained in those statements. 
¶57 In 
any 
event, 
a 
circuit 
court's 
after-the-fact 
assertions 
are 
not 
dispositive. 
 
Nevertheless, 
after 
an 
independent review of the sentencing record, I agree with the 
majority opinion that the defendant has failed to prove the 
circuit court actually relied on an improper factor. 
¶58 Third, the majority opinion fails to explicitly 
conclude that the statements by the defendant that were 
erroneously appended to the PSI constitute compelled self-
incrimination.  The defendant, the State, and the court of 
appeals correctly state the law:  The defendant's statements 
                                                 
12 Majority op., ¶34. 
No.  2013AP843-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
were compelled self-incrimination and were inadmissible against 
him at sentencing in the present case.13 
¶59 The majority's unwillingness to acknowledge this clear 
instance of compelled self-incrimination is mystifying and may 
have the unintended consequence of raising questions about 
existing law.  As I recently stated in my concurrence in 118th 
Street Kenosha, LLC v. Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 
2014 WI 125, ¶67, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 856 N.W.2d 486 (Abrahamson, 
C.J., concurring): 
This court is developing the bad habit of assuming 
applicable legal principles without deciding the legal 
issues that are presented and briefed.  This habit 
"has the unfortunate effect of ducking [] vital 
issue[s] that should be decided," "fails to provide 
adequate guidance to litigants, the circuit courts, 
and the court of appeals," and flouts this court's 
"ultimate responsibility for development of the law."  
(Footnotes omitted.) 
¶60 In sum, I take issue with the majority opinion's 
failure to clarify three points of law:  (1) a Machner hearing 
is required for an appellate court to determine whether defense 
counsel's performance was deficient; (2) this court does not 
consider dispositive a circuit court's after-the-fact assertion 
                                                 
13 See State v. Alexander, No. 2013AP843-CR, unpublished 
slip op., ¶¶9-11 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2014).  See also State 
v. Spaeth, 2012 WI 95, ¶¶55-56, 343 Wis. 2d 220, 819 N.W.2d 769 
(stating that Wisconsin courts recognize "the right of the State 
to compel statements from probationers and the corresponding 
obligation to provide immunity coextensive with the Fifth 
Amendment privilege"); State v. Peebles, 2010 WI App 156, ¶19, 
330 
Wis. 2d 243, 
792 
N.W.2d 212 
("[I]f 
a 
probationer 
is 
compelled by way of probation rules to incriminate himself or 
herself, the resulting statements may not be used in any 
criminal proceeding."). 
No.  2013AP843-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
of non-reliance on an improper factor at sentencing; and (3) the 
statements by the defendant that were erroneously appended to 
the 
PSI 
constitute 
compelled 
self-incrimination 
and 
were 
inadmissible at sentencing in the present case. 
¶61 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
¶62 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
No.  2013AP843-CR.dtp 
1 
 
¶63 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  
This case 
involves alleged irregularities in the sentencing of Danny 
Robert Alexander, Sr. (Alexander). 
¶64 Alexander was charged with presenting two forged 
checks for payment at different U.S. Bank branches in Milwaukee 
County on December 15, 2011.  The two forgeries were contained 
in a single count that was filed on January 16, 2012. 
¶65 Alexander pled guilty to the single count on February 
21, 2012, before Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Jeffrey Wagner, 
who ordered a PSI.  He was sentenced on the Milwaukee forgeries 
on April 10, 2012. 
¶66 The agent who prepared the PSI for the court did not 
interview Alexander personally.  Instead, the agent attached to 
the PSI certain admissions that Alexander made to another agent 
on December 30 after his December 27 arrest.  The admissions 
acknowledged Alexander's involvement in additional forgeries in 
Waukesha County.  The form on which Alexander made the 
admissions (DOC-1305) included the following language at the top 
of the form: 
I have been advised that I must account in a truthful 
and accurate manner for my whereabouts and activities, 
and that failure to do so is a violation for which I 
could be revoked.  I have also been advised that none 
of this information can be used against me in criminal 
proceedings. 
¶67 The essence of Alexander's grievance is that these 
admissions 
were 
confidential, 
could 
not 
be 
used 
against 
Alexander in any criminal proceeding, and should not have been 
attached to the PSI.  He demands resentencing before a different 
judge, as ordered by the court of appeals. 
No.  2013AP843-CR.dtp 
2 
 
¶68 There is no dispute that Alexander should have been 
interviewed personally by the PSI writer.  If Alexander had been 
interviewed personally, he likely would have been asked about 
other forgeries because that information was known to the PSI 
writer.  There also is no dispute that Alexander's admissions to 
the other agent should not have been attached to the PSI by the 
PSI writer. 
¶69 Nonetheless, mistakes in criminal procedure are not 
uncommon and are normally evaluated in terms of their impact on 
the defendant.  "The court shall, in every stage of an action, 
disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings 
which shall not affect the substantial rights of the adverse 
party."  Wis. Stat. § 805.18(1). 
¶70 In 
this 
case, 
neither 
the 
defendant 
nor 
the 
defendant's attorney objected to the errant attachments.  This 
failure to object amounted to a forfeiture and shifted the case 
to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  No matter how 
one looks at the case, however, the defendant bears the burden 
of showing that he suffered prejudice from any alleged error. 
¶71 Plainly, there was no prejudice in this case.  This is 
evident from the following historical facts. 
¶72 First, the initial CCAP entry in the present case 
reads as follows: "01-16-12 Complaint filed.  Additional text: 
OTP from Waukesha County" (emphasis added).  This CCAP entry is 
in the record.  OTP means "order to produce" from Waukesha 
County, implying that Alexander was in custody in Waukesha 
County.  An inquiring mind would want to know why Alexander was 
in custody. 
No.  2013AP843-CR.dtp 
3 
 
¶73 Second, the PSI contained a statement from the victim: 
Mr. Harlan Peterson, Senior Fraud investigator for US 
Bank Corporation, was interviewed for the PSI.  Mr. 
Peterson stated that he has been highly involved in 
this case as there were several checks cashed by 
several suspects in a ring of fraudulent activities 
involving area businesses and US Bank, as well as 
other financial institutions.  Mr. Peterson stated, 
"I'm tired of the Danny Alexander's [sic] of the world 
who come into our banks and have the audacity to cash 
as many fraudulent checks as they want and leave.  
They are caught, because they usually don't care if 
they get caught; but at sentencing the Defense 
Attorney will say, 'well, it's only a couple thousand 
dollars.'  Well here, we (US Bank) have a total loss 
of $12,000 from Danny and his accomplices.  And that's 
just us; there are other victims here and other 
pending cases." 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶74 Third, 
the 
PSI 
also 
states, 
under 
the 
heading 
"PERSONAL HISTORY": "The defendant has five siblings: Jackie 
Alexander, John Alexander, Chris Alexander, Jamie Alexander, and 
Michael Alexander.  His brothers Chris, Jamie, and Michael are 
all suspects in offenses related to the present offense in both 
Milwaukee and Waukesha Counties." (Emphasis added.) 
¶75 Fourth, CCAP indicates that criminal charges were 
filed against Danny R. Alexander, Sr. in Waukesha County on 
March 13, 2012.  Alexander was charged with three counts of 
violating Wis. Stat. § 943.38(2) (forgery-uttering). 
¶76 The March 13, 2012, complaint was issued before the 
PSI in the Milwaukee case was filed (March 29, 2012) and before 
Alexander was sentenced in the Milwaukee case (April 10, 2012).  
Moreover, the Waukesha charges against Danny Alexander were part 
of 
a 
15-count 
complaint 
filed 
against 
Danny's 
brothers, 
Christopher N. Alexander, Jamie D. Alexander, and Michael C. 
No.  2013AP843-CR.dtp 
4 
 
Alexander, and three others.  All defendants pled to the charges 
against them in due course, and all the Alexander brothers 
received felony convictions. 
¶77 Is there any wonder then why there was no explicit 
discussion of the errant attachments to the PSI, which sugar-
coated Alexander's involvement in a substantial forgery scheme? 
¶78 Fifth, Danny Alexander was revoked on one of his 
multiple prior felony convictions on March 23, 2012 before he 
was sentenced on the Milwaukee forgery.  His sentence on the 
Milwaukee 
forgery 
was 
made 
concurrent 
to 
the 
revocation 
sentence, so that he will serve less than two years of his 
three-year confinement in prison solely because of the Milwaukee 
conviction.  Moreover, his sentence in Waukesha County on one 
felony count, plus two felony read-ins, was three years of 
extended supervision consecutive to the extended supervision in 
the Milwaukee case.  In other words, the Waukesha County court 
gave him no additional prison confinement time for the three 
Waukesha County forgeries. 
¶79 How exactly has the defendant been prejudiced by the 
mistaken attachments to the PSI?  Inasmuch as I believe there is 
no convincing answer to this question, I respectfully concur in 
the majority opinion. 
 
 
 
No.  2013AP843-CR.mjg 
 
1 
 
¶80 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the conclusion and analysis of the majority opinion and join it.  
I write separately, however, to explain that the court of 
appeals does, and should, have the power to raise and decide 
issues not briefed by the parties. 
¶81 The court of appeals raised the issue of whether 
Alexander's counsel was ineffective sua sponte.  Majority op., 
¶13.  The State argues that this was error because Alexander 
"forfeited" this argument, as he did not object to the 
statements in the PSI report at the circuit court or raise the 
issue to the court of appeals.  Before this court, both parties 
briefed the issue of whether the court of appeals has the power 
to raise and decide on its own an issue that is not raised or 
briefed by the parties.  The majority opinion does not address 
the issue squarely, but because it resolves the case on the 
issue of prejudice, rather than forfeiture, one might assume 
that this court agrees that the court of appeals has power to 
raise an issue sua sponte. 
¶82 I believe that we should answer the issue briefed by 
the parties more directly and reaffirm our previous holdings 
concerning the power of the court of appeals in this regard. 
¶83 Ordinarily, appellate courts "will not consider or 
decide issues which are not specifically raised on appeal."  
Waushara Cnty. v. Graf, 166 Wis. 2d 442, 451, 480 N.W.2d 16 
(1992).  However, it is axiomatic that this court is not bound 
by the issues presented or the arguments made by the parties.  A 
similar principle applies to the court of appeals.  See id. at 
No.  2013AP843-CR.mjg 
 
2 
 
453 (noting that "the court of appeals had no obligation to look 
beyond the issues presented" but that "it was within the court's 
discretion to do so").  The court of appeals is primarily an 
error correcting court.  Were it not allowed to reach certain 
issues not briefed by the parties, that purpose would be 
frustrated.   
¶84 Contrary to the argument advanced by the State, the 
court of appeals does, and should, have the power to raise the 
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel on its own.  In our 
"two-tiered appellate system, the court of appeals is destined 
to be the court of last resort for most cases."  Vollmer v. 
Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 15, 456 N.W.2d 797 (1990).  While the 
court of appeals does not have the broad powers that this court 
has to review any issue, in order to fulfill its purpose as an 
error correcting court the court of appeals must be able to 
reach issues such as ineffective assistance of counsel even when 
they are not raised by the parties.  See State v. Schumacher, 
144 Wis. 2d 388, 408 n.14, 424 N.W.2d 672 (1988) ("the court of 
appeals' discretionary power must extend to a discretionary 
power to review such matters as . . . ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims"). 
¶85 It will be the normal case where the parties to a 
particular action drive the litigation and frame the issues on 
appeal.  However, there are situations in which an issue such as 
ineffective assistance of counsel is not raised, but should have 
been.  In such a case it is appropriate for the court of 
No.  2013AP843-CR.mjg 
 
3 
 
appeals, or this court, to raise the issue on its own, and, if 
the record permits, decide the case on that ground. 
¶86 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
No.  2013AP843-CR.mjg 
 
1