Case Title: State v. David Allen Bruski

Citation: 2007 WI 25

Docket Number: 2005AP001516-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 25 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP1516-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
David Allen Bruski, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 53 
Reported at: 289 Wis. 2d 704, 711 N.W.2d 679 
(Ct. App. 2006—Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 22, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 13, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Douglas   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael T. Lucci 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Margaret A. Maroney, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by Stephen 
W. Kleinmaier, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2007 WI 25
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP1516-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2005CF60) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
David Allen Bruski, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 22, 2007 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This is a review of a published 
court of appeals decision, State v. Bruski, 2006 WI App 53, 289 
Wis. 2d 704, 711 N.W.2d 679, reversing an order of the Douglas 
County Circuit Court, Michael T. Lucci, Judge, which granted 
David Allen Bruski's motion to suppress evidence. 
¶2 
In the course of assisting a vehicle owner locate her 
keys, a City of Superior police officer searched her vehicle.  
His search included opening a travel case that contained drug 
paraphernalia and led to Bruski's arrest.  Bruski argues that 
the warrantless search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.  We 
hold that Bruski lacked standing to assert a Fourth Amendment 
No. 
2005AP1516-CR   
 
2 
 
claim because he failed to prove that he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in either the vehicle in which the police 
found the travel case or the travel case itself.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the court of appeals. 
I 
¶3 
The events relevant to this case commenced with a 
citizen's call to the City of Superior Police Department on 
March 3, 2005, regarding a suspicious vehicle and occupant 
parked behind a residence.  Officer James Olson responded to the 
call.   
¶4 
Upon Officer Olson's arrival on the scene at about 
8:00 a.m., he found Bruski in the driver's seat of the vehicle.  
The vehicle was not running.  Bruski appeared as though he might 
be dead.  He had a piece of a sandwich in his mouth, with the 
rest of it in his lap.   
¶5 
After closer inspection, Officer Olson discovered 
Bruski was merely passed out.  Officer Olson shook Bruski and 
asked him repeatedly to wake up.  Although Officer Olson had 
difficulty 
understanding 
Bruski's 
speech, 
Bruski 
finally 
identified himself and informed Officer Olson that he was 
waiting for a friend.  Bruski had no idea how he had gotten to 
his current location.  He never acknowledged operating the 
vehicle.     
¶6 
Officer Olson determined that the vehicle Bruski 
occupied was registered to Margaret Smith.  The vehicle had not 
been 
reported 
stolen, 
but 
Officer 
Olson 
had 
the 
police 
communications center contact Ms. Smith to inform her of the 
No. 
2005AP1516-CR   
 
3 
 
whereabouts of her vehicle.  Ms. Smith did not request any 
action be taken related to the vehicle.  She speculated that her 
daughter Jessica, who had been allowed to use the vehicle, may 
have allowed a friend to operate it. 
¶7 
A couple of hours later, Ms. Smith became concerned 
about her daughter and her vehicle.  She went to the Superior 
Police Department.  From there, Officer Olson escorted her to 
the scene where her car was located.   
¶8 
When Officer Olson and Ms. Smith arrived on the scene, 
Officer Gerald Beauchamp was already there.  He had been keeping 
an eye on Bruski while Officer Olson escorted Ms. Smith.  Bruski 
remained passed out in the driver's seat of the vehicle.  As 
Officer Olson, Officer Beauchamp, and Ms. Smith approached the 
vehicle, Bruski woke up. 
¶9 
Officer Olson asked Bruski to step out of the vehicle.  
With Bruski out of the vehicle, Ms. Smith stated that she did 
not recognize Bruski and had never heard his name.  Bruski was 
asked if he knew Ms. Smith's daughter.  He responded that he 
knew Jessica, but did not know her last name.   
¶10 Ms. Smith wanted to take possession of her vehicle, 
but did not have the keys.  As Officer Olson, Ms. Smith and 
Bruski stood near the hood of the vehicle on the driver's side, 
Ms. Smith became upset and asked Bruski for the keys to her 
vehicle.  Officer Olson asked Bruski if he had the keys for Ms. 
Smith's vehicle.  Bruski said that he did not. 
¶11 As Officer Olson and Ms. Smith continued asking Bruski 
about the whereabouts of the keys, Officer Beauchamp opened the 
No. 
2005AP1516-CR   
 
4 
 
front passenger door of Ms. Smith's vehicle and began searching 
it for the keys.  Officer Olson, Ms. Smith, and Bruski remained 
standing as a group near the driver's door.  The group stood in 
a position where they could see the interior of the vehicle.   
¶12 Officer Beauchamp searched on the seats, between the 
seats, in the glove compartment, and in the ashtray.  Before 
looking for the keys, Officer Beauchamp had not asked Ms. Smith 
for permission to look for the keys in the car.  Ms. Smith had 
neither given nor denied permission for Officer Beauchamp to 
search her vehicle.   
¶13 Having not located the keys, Officer Beauchamp then 
opened a travel case that was in plain view on the floor in 
front of the front passenger seat.  The travel case was 
approximately ten inches wide, sixteen inches long, and eight 
inches deep.  The case was hard and opaque.  It had no 
identifying information on it.  Although both Ms. Smith and 
Bruski stood in view of the interior of the vehicle, neither 
said anything when Officer Beauchamp opened the case.   
¶14 Officer Beauchamp did not find the keys inside the 
case.  He found a glass smoking pipe, a cigarette box with a 
green leafy substance that appeared to be marijuana, plastic 
baggies, weights, a digital scale, and a notebook.  Ms. Smith 
said she had never seen the case before.  Officer Olson arrested 
Bruski.   
¶15 After 
placing Bruski under arrest, the officers 
noticed what appeared to be Jessica's clothes in the back seat.  
With Jessica's whereabouts unknown, the officers suspected that 
No. 
2005AP1516-CR   
 
5 
 
Jessica may be in the trunk of the vehicle.  Officer Beauchamp 
confirmed with Ms. Smith that he had permission to search the 
trunk of the vehicle.  Nothing illegal was found. 
¶16 Incident to Bruski's arrest, Officer Olson searched 
Bruski's person.  Officer Olson discovered methamphetamine, a 
large flip-open knife, Jessica's cell phone, and keys for Ms. 
Smith's vehicle.  As Officer Olson walked Bruski to the squad 
car after searching Bruski's person, Bruski said, "Just shoot 
me."  Bruski later asked if he could speak with a narcotics 
agent about sharing information in exchange for making a deal. 
¶17 The 
State 
charged 
Bruski 
with 
possession 
of 
methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, THC, and a concealed 
weapon.  He filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in the 
travel case and gathered incident to his arrest, arguing that 
the 
police 
violated 
his 
Fourth 
Amendment 
right 
against 
unreasonable searches.  The circuit court granted Bruski's 
motion.  According to the circuit court, the evidence from the 
travel case needed to be suppressed because he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the travel case and did not give the 
officers consent to search it.  The circuit court also concluded 
that the evidence gathered subject to his arrest also needed to 
be suppressed because Bruski's arrest resulted from an illegal 
search.  The result was the suppression of evidence found in the 
travel case and on Bruski's person.  After the circuit court 
denied that State's motion to reconsider, the State appealed. 
¶18 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court.  
According to the court of appeals, Bruski lacked standing to 
No. 
2005AP1516-CR   
 
6 
 
assert a Fourth Amendment claim because he lacked a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in either the vehicle or the travel case.  
The court of appeals also noted that "[w]ithout a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the vehicle, he ha[d] no expectation 
of privacy relative to his travel case as a matter of law, even 
though he owned the case."  Bruski, 289 Wis. 2d 704, ¶19.         
¶19 The issue before this court is whether Bruski, who was 
passed out in another person's vehicle, is entitled to Fourth 
Amendment protections related to the search of the travel case.  
Whether an individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
an area subjected to a search by a government agent is a 
question of constitutional law, which we review de novo.  State 
v. Dixon, 177 Wis. 2d 461, 466-67, 501 N.W.2d 442 (1993).  Only 
clearly erroneous findings of fact underlying the circuit 
court's determination of whether an individual had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy will be set aside.  Id. at 467. 
II 
¶20 In moving to suppress the evidence, Bruski claimed his 
Fourth Amendment rights had been violated.  The Fourth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution provides that 
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
Bruski, as the proponent of a motion to suppress, has the burden 
of establishing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated 
No. 
2005AP1516-CR   
 
7 
 
by the search.  Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980); 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n. 1 (1978).1  
¶21 To have a Fourth Amendment claim, the proponent must 
initially satisfy two requirements.  First, the search must have 
been done by a government agent.  Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616, 630 (1886).  The Fourth Amendment protects citizens 
from government intrusion.  Given that Officer Beauchamp, a 
government agent, conducted the search, Bruski has satisfied 
this requirement. 
                                                 
1 Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, like 
the Fourth Amendment, guarantees citizens the right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures.  It reads as follows:   
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched and the persons or things to 
be seized.   
Wis. Const. art. I, § 11.  This court generally follows the 
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the search and 
seizure provision of the Fourth Amendment in construing Article 
I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  State v. Young, 
2006 WI 98, ¶30, _ Wis. 2d _, 717 N.W.2d 729.   
No. 
2005AP1516-CR   
 
8 
 
¶22 Second, an individual must have standing.2  Rakas, 439 
U.S. at 140.  There is not a bright-line test for determining 
when an individual has standing, but standing exists when an 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.  Id. at 144.  
The proponent of a Fourth Amendment claim bears the burden of 
proving that he or she had a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
State v. Whitrock, 161 Wis. 2d 960, 972, 468 N.W.2d 696 (1991) 
(citing Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 104).3 
¶23 Whether an individual had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in an area subjected to a search depends on two prongs.  
                                                 
2 Fourth Amendment standing differs from traditional notions 
of standing.  Fourth Amendment standing analysis "focuses on the 
extent of a particular defendant's rights under the Fourth 
Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but 
invariably intertwined concept of standing."  Rakas v. Illinois, 
439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978).  Defining an individual's Fourth 
Amendment rights "is more properly placed within the purview of 
substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing."  
Id. at 140.  Standing, in the context of the Fourth Amendment, 
refers to a threshold substantive determination, which is 
distinct from Article III standing.     
3 In his brief, Bruski urged the court to overrule State v. 
Callaway, 106 Wis. 2d 503, 317 N.W.2d 428 (1982), and construe 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution to confer 
automatic standing to defendants charged with possession of 
illegal material.  In Callaway, 106 Wis. 2d at 519-20, this 
court discontinued its adherence to the automatic standing rule 
and decided to adopt the reasonable expectation of privacy test 
set forth in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980), to 
determine a person's standing to make a Fourth Amendment claim.  
Given our agreement with the United States Supreme Court that 
"'Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some 
other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted,'" 
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133-34 (internal citation omitted), we 
continue to follow the Court's interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment when construing Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.   
No. 
2005AP1516-CR   
 
9 
 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Dixon, 177 
Wis. 2d at 468.  First, whether the individual's conduct 
exhibited an actual (i.e., subjective) expectation of privacy in 
the area searched and the item seized.  Then, if the individual 
had the requisite expectation of privacy, courts determine 
whether such an expectation of privacy was legitimate or 
justifiable (i.e., one that society is willing to recognize as 
reasonable).    
¶24 In considering whether an individual's expectation of 
privacy constitutes a legitimate or justifiable one, our court 
has stated that the following factors may be relevant: 
(1) whether the accused had a property interest in the 
premises; (2) whether the accused is legitimately 
(lawfully) on the premises; (3) whether the accused 
had complete dominion and control and the right to 
exclude 
others; 
(4) 
whether 
the 
accused 
took 
precautions 
customarily 
taken 
by 
those 
seeking 
privacy; (5) whether the property was put to some 
private use; (6) whether the claim of privacy is 
consistent with historical notions of privacy.   
Id. at 469 (citing State v. Fillyaw, 104 Wis. 2d 700, 711 n. 6, 
312 N.W.2d 795 (1981)).  The list is neither controlling nor 
exclusive.  Rather, courts consider the totality of the 
circumstances when evaluating the latter prong of the reasonable 
expectation test. 
¶25 Related to the vehicle, we conclude that Bruski did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.  His conduct 
indicates that he did not have an actual expectation of privacy.  
In his initial conversation with Officer Olson, he indicated 
that he did not know how he had gotten to his current location.  
No. 
2005AP1516-CR   
 
10 
 
After Ms. Smith and Officer Olson had asked Bruski about the 
whereabouts of the keys, and Officer Beauchamp entered Ms. 
Smith's vehicle to search for the keys, Bruski did nothing to 
indicate that he expected privacy related to the vehicle.  There 
is not any indication from his conduct that he had an actual 
expectation of privacy in the vehicle.   
¶26 Even if Bruski did have an actual expectation of 
privacy, he still would not have a Fourth Amendment claim.  The 
totality of the circumstances does not support Bruski having a 
legitimate or justifiable expectation of privacy in Ms. Smith's 
vehicle.   
¶27 First, Bruski had no property interest in the vehicle.  
His only connections to the vehicle were that he passed out in 
it and claimed to know the owner's daughter.  The fact that he 
did not even know Ms. Smith's daughter's last name suggests that 
he did not have any relationship with the owner of the vehicle 
that would support a conclusion that he had a property interest 
in Ms. Smith's vehicle.   
¶28 Second, 
Bruski 
took 
no 
precautions 
customarily 
associated with those seeking privacy.  He did not even know how 
he had gotten to his current location, let alone taken steps to 
retain his privacy.  Although he argues that parking the car 
behind a residence constitutes an effort to retain his privacy, 
this lacks persuasiveness given that he did not even acknowledge 
being the person to drive the vehicle to that location.     
¶29 Third, Bruski lacked the right to exclude others from 
the vehicle.  He did not own the vehicle.  He did not establish 
No. 
2005AP1516-CR   
 
11 
 
any possessory interest in the vehicle.  As mentioned above, but 
also relevant to this factor, his only connections to the 
vehicle were that he passed out in it and claimed to know the 
owner's daughter.  His lack of knowledge about how he got to his 
current location also undermines his authority to exclude others 
from the vehicle.   
¶30 Finally, Bruski's claim of privacy in Ms. Smith's 
vehicle is not consistent with historical notions of privacy.  
The Dixon court noted the following: 
[S]everal courts have held that a non-owner driver 
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the interior of a vehicle.  In one recurring fact 
pattern, the accused's relationship to the owner of 
the vehicle or to the vehicle is too attenuated to 
allow the court to hold that the accused has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.   
Dixon, 177 Wis. 2d at 472 (citing United States v. Obregon, 748 
F.2d 1371 (10th Cir. 1984) (accused driving a rented car and not 
named on the rental agreement; an unrelated third party, not 
present in the car, arranged the rental of the car; no 
reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Erickson, 
732 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1984) (accused's possession of and 
authority to fly airplane unexplained; no reasonable expectation 
of privacy); United States v. Ospina, 682 F.Supp. 1182, 1183-85 
(D. Utah 1988) (accused claimed permission to drive vehicle 
rented by another whose surname, address and telephone number 
accused did not know; no reasonable expectation of privacy); 
United States v. Peters, 791 F.2d 1270, 1280-82 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(accused, former owner of car, and others, drove car on 
No. 
2005AP1516-CR   
 
12 
 
occasional but not regular basis, with the owner's permission; 
accused not in possession of car at time of search; no 
reasonable expectation of privacy); Missouri v. Gollaher, 628 
S.W.2d 365 (Mo. Ct. App.1982) (accused has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy when holding car under statutory lien for 
debt and not in possession of car at time of search); New York 
v. Ayala, 147 Misc. 2d 278, 557 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1990) (lienholder 
does not have reasonable expectation of privacy); State v. 
Swift, 105 N.C. App. 550, 414 S.E.2d 64, 68-69 (1992) (non-owner 
passenger who was to protect car from others has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy); Commonwealth v. Freeman, 295 Pa. Super. 
Ct. 467, 441 A.2d 1327, 1329-1330 (1982) (accused in possession 
of stolen car; no legitimate expectation of privacy)).  
¶31 Accordingly, even if Bruski did have an actual 
expectation of privacy in Ms. Smith's vehicle, we conclude it 
was not a legitimate or justifiable one based on the totality of 
the circumstances in this case.  Bruski lacked a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in Ms. Smith's vehicle.   
¶32 Bruski argues that he had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his travel case, even if he did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in Ms. Smith's vehicle.  The question of 
whether an individual may have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in personal property found inside a vehicle that he or 
she does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in has not 
been addressed by the United States Supreme Court.  It is a 
matter of first impression in this state. 
No. 
2005AP1516-CR   
 
13 
 
¶33 Jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have 
reached a wide array of holdings.  Some courts have held that an 
individual that does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a vehicle cannot have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in personal property found inside the vehicle.  United 
States v. Wellons, 32 F.3d 117, 119 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding 
that the defendant, who was an unauthorized driver of a rental 
car, did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in either 
the car or his luggage); Obregon, 748 F.2d at 1375 (holding that 
the defendant, who was not an authorized driver of a rental car, 
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle 
he was driving or his garment bag that contained clothing and a 
cardboard 
box 
that 
contained 
cocaine); 
United 
States 
v. 
Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 413 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that the 
defendant, who had stolen a vehicle, could not reasonably expect 
privacy in the vehicle or the personal property found in the 
vehicle).  The holdings of these courts suggest that a bright-
line rule exists that would bar an individual from having a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in personal property found in 
a vehicle in which he or she lacks a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.   
¶34 The court of appeals in this case seemingly followed 
the bright-line rule rationale of the Wellons, Obregon, and 
Hargrove courts, noting that "[w]ithout a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the vehicle, [Bruski] ha[d] no expectation of 
privacy relative to his travel case as a matter of law, even 
though he owned the case."  Bruski, 289 Wis. 2d 704, ¶19.  
No. 
2005AP1516-CR   
 
14 
 
However, we reject adopting a bright-line rule.  The Fourth 
Amendment does not lend itself to bright-line rules, see Rakas, 
439 U.S. at 147, and we will not adopt one in this case.    
¶35 A number of courts have determined whether individuals 
have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in personal 
property within vehicles without a bright-line rule.  Some of 
these courts have held that the defendants failed to establish a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their personal property 
found in vehicles in which they did not establish a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  United States v. Sanchez, 943 F.2d 110, 
114 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that a defendant, who got stopped 
driving a car registered to someone he could not identify by her 
full name, failed to establish a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the car or the area behind a rear panel, where a 
government agent discovered a kilogram of cocaine); Gov't of 
Virgin Islands v. Williams, 739 F.2d 936, 939 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(holding that the defendant, who had no property interest in the 
vehicle, failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the areas under the seat, inside the torn seat or inside the 
ripped ceiling); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 510 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1985) (holding that a defendant, who was a passenger in a 
vehicle, failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the trunk of the vehicle because he did not have a possessory 
interest in the vehicle or the property seized).  Other courts 
have held that the defendants did have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in their personal property, even though they did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle.  United 
No. 
2005AP1516-CR   
 
15 
 
States v. Edwards, 242 F.3d 928, 936-37 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that a defendant, who was not an authorized driver of a 
rental car, did not have standing to challenge the search of the 
car, but did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
luggage he owned and stored in the trunk); United States v. 
Buchner, 7 F.3d 1149, 1154 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that a 
defendant, who was not an authorized driver of a rental car, had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the partially open 
shoulder bag he left on the front seat of the car); People v. 
Young, 363 Ill. App.3d 268, 270, 843 N.E.2d 489 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2006) (holding that the defendant, who was a passenger in a 
vehicle during an inventory search by a government agent, did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, but 
did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the closed 
suitcase he owned and stored in the trunk). 
¶36 The holdings reached in other jurisdictions seem to 
indicate that the result of not having a bright-line rule is 
having holdings as varied as the facts.  Although Fourth 
Amendment analysis does not lend itself to bright-line rules, 
see Rakas, 439 U.S. at 147, that does not mean the whim of 
judges determines the outcome of cases.  We are obligated to 
look to all the facts and circumstances of the specific case in 
light of the principles set forth in prior decisions.  South 
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375 (1976). 
¶37 The Court has set forth principles that are especially 
pertinent 
in 
resolving 
whether 
Bruski 
had 
a 
reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the travel case.  First, personal 
No. 
2005AP1516-CR   
 
16 
 
property found in vehicles is treated differently than personal 
property found in dwellings.  There is a lesser expectation of 
privacy in vehicles.  Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 
(1999); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1986); Rakas, 
439 U.S. at 148; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 
561 (1976); Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367.  Second, neither 
ownership nor possession of an item alone establishes a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  United States v. Salvucci, 
448 U.S. 83, 91-93 (1980).  It is an individual's expectation of 
privacy in the space, rather than concepts of property law, that 
is critical.  Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 104-05. 
¶38 With the Fourth Amendment principles as a framework, 
and based on the evidence in light of the same two prongs that 
applied 
to 
determining 
whether 
Bruski 
had 
a 
reasonable 
expectation of privacy in Ms. Smith's vehicle, we conclude that 
Bruski did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
travel case.  Not only is there no evidence from his conduct 
that he thought he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the 
travel 
case, 
but 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances 
establishes that any expectation of privacy he did have was 
illegitimate and unjustifiable.  Given the specifics of Bruski's 
claim of privacy, this is not one that is "consistent with 
historical notions of privacy." Dixon, 177 Wis. 2d at 469.4   
                                                 
4 The dissent contends that historical notions of privacy 
provide a "particularly compelling" reason to conclude that 
Bruski had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the travel 
case.  Dissent, ¶69.  It cites cases that discuss the private 
nature of items like luggage, purses, and footlockers.  Id. 
No. 
2005AP1516-CR   
 
17 
 
¶39 As mentioned above, there is a reduced expectation of 
privacy in vehicles.  Houghton, 526 U.S. at 303; Class, 475 U.S. 
at 112-13; Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 
561; Opperman, 428 U.S. at 375.  Bruski left the travel case in 
a vehicle that he did not own.  He left it in a vehicle in which 
he had established no connection.  He left it in a vehicle where 
he had no reasonable expectation of privacy.5   
¶40 Courts "have been reluctant to find a reasonable 
expectation of privacy where the circumstances reveal a careless 
effort to maintain a privacy interest."  United States v. 
Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130, 1135 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing United 
States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir. 1998)).  
                                                                                                                                                             
The dissent puts too much emphasis on the type of property, 
rather than the type of claim made by the movant.  The factors 
provided in State v. Dixon, 177 Wis. 2d 461, 501 N.W.2d 442 
(1993), which the dissent applies as though they are controlling 
and exclusive, include the following factor: "whether the claim 
of privacy is consistent with historical notions of privacy."  
Id. at 469 (emphasis added).  It does not read "whether the 
property is consistent with historical notions of privacy." 
5 The dissent argues that 
[a]pplying the principle that a person may have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in baggage within a 
vehicle 
in 
which 
that 
person 
does 
not 
have 
a 
reasonable expectation of privacy requires that we 
analyze the person's privacy interest in the baggage 
separately from the person's privacy interest in the 
vehicle.   
Dissent, ¶55.  Such a requirement conflicts with considering the 
totality of the circumstances.  Dixon, 177 Wis. 2d at 469 
(stating "[t]he totality of the circumstances is the controlling 
standard" after listing the reasonable expectation of privacy 
factors). 
No. 
2005AP1516-CR   
 
18 
 
Bruski left his travel case in a vehicle he did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy to while he was in such a 
state that he appeared dead, and required physical shaking to be 
roused.   
¶41 The ease with which Officer Beauchamp came across the 
travel case illustrates Bruski's carelessness and failure to 
take "precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy."  
Dixon, 177 Wis. 2d at 469.  Officer Beauchamp searched the 
travel case during the course of assisting Ms. Smith to locate 
her keys.  He had already searched in places where they may have 
fallen or been placed: the seats, between the seats, in the 
glove compartment, and in the ashtray.  When the keys still had 
not turned up, he looked in the travel case.  It was large 
enough for the keys to fit in.  It was close enough to the 
ignition of the vehicle for it to be a logical next place to 
look.  Additionally, Bruski had not done anything to protect any 
privacy interest he may have had.  The travel case was not 
locked.  It did not have identifying information on its 
exterior.  Nothing indicated that Bruski had an expectation of 
privacy in the travel case.  Even when Officer Beauchamp was in 
the process of opening it, Bruski had neither a verbal or 
nonverbal response.    
¶42 One factor going in Bruski's favor is his ownership of 
the travel case.  However, neither ownership nor possession of 
an item alone establishes a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 91-93. 
No. 
2005AP1516-CR   
 
19 
 
¶43 The evidence indicates that Bruski did not have an 
actual expectation of privacy in the travel case.  Assuming 
Bruski did have an actual expectation of privacy in the travel 
case, the totality of the circumstances establish that he did 
not have a legitimate or justifiable expectation of privacy.  
Accordingly, we conclude that Bruski lacked a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the travel case.       
¶44 We hold that Bruski lacked standing to assert a Fourth 
Amendment claim because he failed to prove that he had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in either the vehicle in which 
the police found his travel case or the travel case itself. 
¶45 Our holding that Bruski lacks the necessary standing 
to make a Fourth Amendment claim completes our resolution of 
this case.  It is unnecessary for us to address whether Ms. 
Smith granted Officer Beauchamp the requisite consent to conduct 
a valid search.  Consent analysis would be appropriate only if 
we concluded that Bruski satisfied the requirements to bring a 
No. 
2005AP1516-CR   
 
20 
 
Fourth Amendment claim.  See State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, 241 
Wis. 2d 52, 621 N.W.2d 891.6   
III 
¶46 Bruski failed to prove that he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in either the vehicle or the travel case.  
Therefore, he did not have standing to make a Fourth Amendment 
claim to suppress the evidence.  For the reasons set forth, we 
affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
                                                 
6 State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, 241 Wis. 2d 52, 621 
N.W.2d 891, presented a different issue than the one that arises 
in this case.  Defendant Jennifer Matejka claimed the government 
had violated her Fourth Amendment rights when it searched her 
jacket.  The court held that the search of Matejka's jacket was 
reasonable based on the driver's consent to the search of his 
vehicle.  Her jacket (i.e., personal property) had been 
retrieved from the vehicle being searched.  Before a government 
agent searched the jacket, it had been removed from the vehicle 
and the agent had been given a description of her specific 
jacket.  The Matejka court did not address whether Matejka had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in her jacket.  Her standing 
to challenge the search of her jacket may be inferred because 
the court addressed her Fourth Amendment claim.  Matejka 
involved personal property that had been removed from a vehicle, 
facts that do not exist in this case.    
No.  2005AP1516-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶47 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The facts of 
this case are deceptively simple.  The police find the mother's 
parked car, with a young intoxicated man passed out inside.  The 
police call the mother and she ultimately arrives at the parked 
car, accompanied by police.  The daughter, who had been allowed 
to use the vehicle, is nowhere in sight. 
¶48 Mom wants to move the car.  The keys cannot be found. 
The police look for the keys in the car, and finding none, 
search for them in the young man's travel case.  Inside the 
travel case they find no keys, but they do find a green, leafy 
substance and drug paraphernalia.  
¶49 The problem lies not in the search of the car, which 
seems eminently reasonable, but in the search of the travel 
case.  Although the travel case was in plain view in the 
interior of the car, it was opaque, made of a solid, non-
transparent material, and it was closed.  If the police can 
search this man's travel case, without a warrant or an exception 
to the search warrant requirement, then they can search a closed 
purse, a closed briefcase, and a closed suitcase. 
¶50 And before you know it, the fabric of Fourth Amendment 
protection is frayed.  We will then not just be talking about 
the constitutional rights of some drunk or drugged kid who woke 
in the morning to find his travel case searched.  Rather, the 
majority opinion establishes the Fourth Amendment parameters for 
us all.  What we are really talking about in this opinion is the 
diminution 
of 
constitutional 
protection 
afforded 
to 
all 
citizens, your rights and mine. 
No.  2005AP1516-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
¶51 The majority, correctly in my view, allows that a 
person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a travel 
bag within a vehicle in which that person does not have a 
reasonable 
expectation 
of 
privacy. 
 
Majority 
op., 
¶34. 
Nonetheless, it concludes that Bruski did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his travel case.  However, the reasons 
the majority offers do not support its conclusion.  They either 
rely on Bruski's lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the vehicle itself, or do not implicate the factors that courts 
have used to determine reasonable expectations of privacy.  See 
majority op., ¶24 (citing State v. Dixon, 177 Wis. 2d 461, 468, 
501 N.W.2d 442 (1993)).  Indeed, an analysis of the facts of 
this case in light of those factors compels the conclusion that 
Bruski did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
travel case.1  
                                                 
1 The majority notes that this court generally follows the 
United States Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in 
analyzing the protections afforded by Article I, Section 11 of 
this state's constitution.  Majority op., ¶20, n. 1.  However, 
we are not required to do so.  Rather, "[i]t is fundamental that 
that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in 
interpreting their state constitutions."  Michigan v. Long, 463 
U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983). Thus, Article I, Section 11 may afford 
greater protections than the Fourth Amendment.  State v. Knapp, 
2005 WI 127, ¶59, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899; State v. 
Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶63, n.30, n.31, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 
625.  
No.  2005AP1516-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
¶52 The reasons that the majority offers in support of its 
conclusion that Bruski did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the travel case are set forth in paragraphs 39 
through 41 of the majority opinion.  Like the facts of this case 
which are deceptively simple, at first blush the reasons given 
seem straightforward and reasonable.  A closer analysis, 
however, reveals that the reasons given do not support the 
majority's conclusion.  I will examine each in turn.  
¶53 "Bruski left the travel case in a vehicle that he did 
not own.  He left it in a vehicle in which he had established no 
connection.  He left it in a vehicle where he had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy."  Majority op., ¶39. 
¶54 To begin, it is misleading to assert that Bruski 
"left" his travel case in the car, as if he abandoned it or 
stowed it someplace away from his person.  Bruski kept his 
travel case next to him until he was rousted from the car by the 
police officers who conducted the search.  The officers woke him 
up and asked him to step out of the car, and Bruski complied. 
Thus, his "leaving" the bag in the vehicle was not a result of a 
choice to abandon the bag, but the result of complying with a 
police request. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Some states do not employ the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test under their own state constitutions because of the 
"potential for inconsistent and capricious application," State 
v. Alston, 440 A.2d 1311, 1319 (N.J. 1981), and because "the 
United States Supreme Court's current use of the 'legitimate 
expectation of privacy' concept needlessly detracts from the 
critical element of unreasonable governmental intrusion" the 
constitution is aimed to guard against. Commonwealth v. Sell, 
470 A.2d 457, 469 (Penn. 1983). 
No.  2005AP1516-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
¶55 It is correct that Bruski had the travel case in a 
vehicle that he did not own, and in which he did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  However, the very question 
before the court is whether a person may have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a travel case that is in a vehicle in 
which that person does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  The majority answers this question affirmatively, but 
then engages in circuitous rationale.  It offers as a reason why 
Bruski does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
travel case that he did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the car.  This negates precisely the principle that 
the majority purports to establish.  Applying the principle that 
a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in baggage 
within a vehicle in which that person does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy requires that we analyze the person's 
privacy interest in the baggage separately from the person's 
privacy interest in the vehicle. U.S. v. Edwards, 242 F.3d 928, 
936-37 (10th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Buchner, 7 F.3d 1149, 1154 (5th 
Cir. 1993).   
¶56 Bruski "left" the travel case "while he was in such a 
state that he appeared dead, and required physical shaking to be 
roused."  Majority op., ¶40. 
¶57 The majority fails to explain why Bruski's being 
unconscious counts against his having a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his travel case, except to imply that being 
unconscious demonstrates carelessness.  Id.  It cites no 
authority 
for 
the 
proposition 
that 
sleeping 
people 
have 
No.  2005AP1516-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
diminished expectations of privacy or why society would be less 
likely to view the privacy expectations of the unconscious as 
unreasonable.  Further, it does not explain what factor Bruski's 
waking state implicates. 
¶58 "The ease with which Officer Beauchamp came across the 
travel case illustrates Bruski's carelessness and failure to 
take 'precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy.'" 
Majority op., ¶41.  
¶59 The majority's assertion that the ease with which an 
officer comes across a piece of luggage decreases a person's 
reasonable expectation of privacy in that luggage is surprising. 
Officers may easily come across any luggage, carrying case, or 
handbag that one happens to be holding.  In the majority's view, 
the fact that it is in a person's hands (and therefore easy to 
"come across") provides a reason that the person's reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the bag is diminished. 
¶60 "Bruski had not done anything to protect any privacy 
interest he may have had." Majority op., ¶41.  
¶61 Among the factors the majority cites as relevant in 
determining reasonable expectation of privacy is "whether the 
accused took precautions customarily taken by those seeking 
privacy."  Majority op., ¶24 (citing Dixon, 177 Wis. 2d at 469).  
Bruski did take such precautions.  The fact that Bruski kept his 
travel case close at hand supports the conclusion that he had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy because it evinces his 
ownership of the bag. 
No.  2005AP1516-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
¶62 Placing the travel case on the floor next to him 
demonstrates Bruski's reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
bag precisely because he did not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the vehicle.  Had Bruski left the travel case in 
the trunk of the car, rather than in the interior compartment, 
it would have been beyond his reach and therefore less clear 
that he owned the bag.  Under the factors listed in Dixon, and 
cited by the majority, placing the travel case somewhere other 
than the interior compartment would decrease his reasonable 
expectation of privacy. 
¶63 The search was conducted "during the course of 
assisting Ms. Smith to locate her keys."  Majority op., ¶41.  
¶64 The issue in this case is whether Bruski had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his travel case.  If Bruski 
did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his travel case, 
then a warrantless police search of the bag is per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless it falls under an 
exception to the warrant requirement.  State v. Payano-Romano, 
2006 WI 47, ¶30, 290 Wis. 2d 380, 714 N.W.2d 548; State v. 
Boggess, 115 Wis. 2d 443, 449, 340 N.W.2d 516 (1983).  The 
purpose of the search is relevant only to whether it falls under 
such an exception, not to whether there was a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the first place.  However, the 
majority does not argue that the search falls under an exception 
to the warrant requirement.  The purpose of the search is 
therefore irrelevant to its analysis, and fails to constitute a 
No.  2005AP1516-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
reason why Bruski would not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his travel case. 
¶65 For the above reasons, I do not think that the factors 
adduced 
by 
the 
majority 
to 
support 
its 
conclusion 
are 
persuasive.  Moreover, I think that the factors set forth in 
prior cases support the conclusion that Bruski did have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his travel case.  
¶66 As the majority notes, in Dixon this court outlined 
the following factors as relevant in determining whether an 
accused person has a reasonable expectation of privacy: 
(1) whether the accused had a property interest in the 
premises; (2) whether the accused is legitimately 
(lawfully) on the premises; (3) whether the accused 
had complete dominion and control and the right to 
exclude 
others; 
(4) 
whether 
the 
accused 
took 
precautions 
customarily 
taken 
by 
those 
seeking 
privacy; (5) whether the property was put to some 
private use; (6) whether the claim of privacy is 
consistent with historical notions of privacy. 
177 Wis. 2d at 468.  Although this list is not controlling, 
these 
factors 
support 
the 
conclusion 
that 
Bruski 
had 
a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his travel case.  
¶67 First, there is no question that Bruski had a property 
interest in the travel case; he owned it.  Although the travel 
case is not a "premises," we can extend the second factor to 
consider the vehicle.  There is no contention that Bruski was in 
the vehicle illegally.  Further, the fact that Ms. Smith stated 
that her daughter had possession of the car and may have lent it 
to a friend, and the fact that Bruski knew the daughter's first 
name, are some indication that he was there legitimately.  With 
No.  2005AP1516-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
respect to the third factor, Bruski had the right to exclude 
others from use of his travel case. 
¶68 Fourth, Bruski took precautions customarily taken by 
those seeking privacy.  He kept the bag in the car, near him, on 
the floor, and within his sight, just as one would do in order 
to protect a bag from being accessed by others.  The bag was 
opaque 
and 
hard-shelled, 
which 
prevented 
any 
external 
assessments of its contents.  With respect to the fifth Dixon 
factor, Bruski used the bag for personal belongings. 
¶69 Thus, I think that the first five Dixon factors 
provide ample reason to conclude that Bruski had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his travel case.  However, the sixth 
factor, "whether the claim of privacy is consistent with 
historical notions of privacy," is particularly compelling. 
There is little doubt that society has historically recognized a 
privacy claim in travel bags like Bruski's.  In U.S. v. Block, 
the Fourth Circuit made the case that expectations of privacy 
are at their most intense and most justifiable in precisely such 
places:  
Common experience of life, clearly a factor in 
assessing the existence and the reasonableness of 
privacy expectations, surely teaches all of us that 
the 
law's 
"enclosed 
spaces" 
mankind's 
valises, 
suitcases, 
footlockers, 
strong 
boxes, 
etc. 
are 
frequently 
the 
objects 
of 
his 
highest 
privacy 
expectations, and that the expectations may well be at 
their most intense when such effects are deposited 
temporarily or kept semi-permanently in public places 
or in places under the general control of another. 
590 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1978).  
No.  2005AP1516-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
¶70 Similarly, in U.S. v. Fultz the Ninth Circuit stated 
that "certain types of containers——suitcases, valises, purses, 
and footlockers, for instance——do command high expectations of 
privacy" and that even cardboard boxes used as luggage command 
similarly high expectations of privacy, even when located in a 
space that is not the exclusive province of the boxes' owner. 
146 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 1998). See also Robbins v. 
California, 453 U.S. 420, 424-25 (1981) (stating that, in 
contrast to the diminished expectations of privacy surrounding 
automobiles 
"[n]o 
such 
diminished 
expectation 
of 
privacy 
characterizes luggage; on the contrary, luggage typically is a 
repository of personal effects, the contents of closed pieces of 
luggage are hidden from view, and luggage is not generally 
subject to state regulation.").  
¶71 Clearly the privacy of personal luggage has historic 
importance, and society would certainly recognize claims to 
privacy in personal luggage as legitimate.2  At root, this case 
involves police searching Bruski's luggage, without a warrant, 
without probable cause, and without an exception to the warrant 
requirement.  Bruski's reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
luggage does not diminish just because he was asleep in an 
automobile.  
                                                 
2 The majority's distinction between the type of property 
and type of claim is unpersuasive.  Majority op., ¶36, n.4.  
This case is about a privacy claim in luggage, and the 
appropriate question under Dixon is therefore "whether the claim 
of privacy [in this case in personal luggage] is consistent with 
historical notions of privacy."  State v. Dixon, 177 Wis. 2d 
461, 469, 501 N.W.2d 442 (1993).  
No.  2005AP1516-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
¶72 The majority states that "[w]e are obligated to look 
to all the facts and circumstances of the specific case in light 
of the principles set forth in prior decisions."  Majority op., 
¶36 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375 (1976)). 
This affirmation rings hollow.  The majority neglects to show 
how, in light of principles set forth in prior decisions, the 
reasons it adduces support its conclusion that Bruski did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his travel case.  As 
I outline above, I think that the factors outlined in Dixon and 
the cases that recognize a privacy claim in luggage show that 
Bruski did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
travel case.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
¶73 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.  
 
 
 
No.  2005AP1516-CR.awb 
 
 
 
1