Case Title: Luis Caballero v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC01-651

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC01-651
____________
LUIS CABALLERO,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[July 10, 2003]
PER CURIAM.
Luis Caballero appeals his convictions of first-degree murder, kidnapping,
robbery, and burglary, and his respective sentences, including the sentence of death
imposed for the crime of murder.  We have jurisdiction under article V, section
3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution.  For the following reasons, we affirm
Caballero's convictions and sentences.
FACTS
On July 15, 1995, the body of Denise Rose O'Neill was found dumped in a
1.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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canal near the Sawgrass Expressway in Broward County.  Her body was covered
by a sheet and was bound with black shoelaces, a multicolored dog leash, and
electrical cords at the ends of which were heating devices of the type used to warm
reptiles.  Her clothing had been cut along the right side of the crotch area. 
Police canvassed Denise O'Neill's apartment complex, looking for neighbors
with reptiles and dogs as pets, since a dog leash and cords with heating devices
had been found on the victim's body.  Investigators learned that Luis Caballero
lived next door to O'Neill and owned snakes and a dog.  When Caballero arrived
home, he agreed to accompany detectives to the police station. 
At the police station, following Miranda1 warnings, Caballero confessed to
O'Neill's murder.  In a taped statement, Caballero gave the following account.  He
said that a friend, Isaac Brown, had recently moved into Caballero's apartment.  On
the night before the murder, Brown told Caballero that he intended to rob O'Neill. 
Although Caballero was initially uncomfortable with the idea, he agreed to serve as
lookout. 
On the day of the crime, Caballero saw O'Neill carrying a laundry basket up
the stairs.  As she reached her door, Brown grabbed her, pushed her inside
Caballero's apartment, and shoved her to the floor.  O'Neill struggled, but Brown
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and Caballero restrained her, using items from her laundry basket: they tied her legs
and hands with towels and used a sock to gag her.  Caballero told O'Neill that
nothing would happen to her if she did what Brown said.  She cooperated, giving
the two men information regarding her credit cards and bank account.  
Caballero left in O'Neill's car and withdrew money from her accounts.  When
he returned to the apartment, Brown told Caballero that while he was out, O'Neill
had fought to free herself.  Brown had tied her more securely with electrical cords,
a multicolored dog leash, and a pillow case.  Caballero and Brown told O'Neill that
they would drop her off somewhere after dark.  Although Caballero said that he
hoped this was true, he was concerned because O'Neill was his next-door neighbor
and could turn him in if she was released.  
Caballero and Brown left O'Neill tied and went to the kitchen to make plans. 
They talked about killing her, but each wanted the other to do the killing.  Finally,
Brown said he would kill O'Neill if Caballero gave him more of O'Neill's money. 
Caballero agreed.  The two men returned to the bedroom and committed the
murder.
Although Caballero initially denied participating in the killing, he ultimately
admitted that he helped Brown kill O'Neill.  In a second recorded confession,
Caballero said that Brown tried to strangle O'Neill with an electrical cord, but
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O'Neill struggled and yelled, and the cord snapped.  Brown used another cord, and
Caballero covered O'Neill's mouth to muffle her screams while he pulled her head
and Brown pulled the cord.  O'Neill died after ten to twelve minutes.  After O'Neill
was dead, Caballero cut the crotch of her clothing and had sex with her, ejaculating
inside. 
Later that night, Caballero and Brown wrapped O'Neill's body in a sheet
from Caballero's bed and tied the sheet with black shoelaces and electrical cords. 
They loaded her body into the trunk of her car at around 5 a.m. and dumped her
body in a canal near the Sawgrass Expressway.  Caballero and Brown then used
the victim's credit cards to withdraw more money.  While eating breakfast, they
split the money.
At trial, the State introduced Caballero's taped confessions along with
evidence that Caballero's fingerprints were found inside O'Neill's car, and evidence
that his DNA matched the semen on vaginal swabs gathered during the autopsy. 
After the State rested, the defense chose not to testify or present evidence.  The
jury found Caballero guilty of first-degree murder, kidnapping, robbery, and
burglary.
During the penalty phase, several witnesses testified on Caballero's behalf,
but he did not take the stand.  The character witnesses testified that Caballero was
2.  The aggravating factors were: (1) the capital felony was committed while
the defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery or kidnapping; (2) the
crime was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest; (3)
the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (4) the capital
felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any
pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP). 
3.  The trial judge found the following mitigators applied: (1) Caballero had
no significant prior criminal history (little weight); (2) the crime was committed
while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance (some weight); (3) Caballero had a partial hearing loss and learning
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nonaggressive and a follower, and that he had attended special educational classes
due to learning disabilities.  While in prison awaiting trial, Caballero completed a
course in anger management and in parenting.  Caballero also presented the
testimony of a licensed psychologist who had administered several tests to
Caballero, including the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 2 (MMPI-2).  
The psychologist was unable to interpret the results of the MMPI-2 because
Caballero's answers to the test were consistent with an overreporting of problems,
possibly in an effort to exaggerate complaints.  Other test results indicated that
Caballero's IQ was below average (twelfth percentile).
The jury recommended death by a vote of eight to four.  The trial court
found that four separate aggravators2 were proven and found that each of the
aggravating circumstances, standing alone, would be sufficient to outweigh the six
mitigating circumstances.3  Accordingly, the judge sentenced Caballero to death.  
disabilities (some weight); (4) Caballero is a loving father for his two children and
never physically abused their mother (little weight); (5) Caballero was always a
loving brother and son (little weight); and (6) Caballero adjusted to prison life and
successfully completed substance abuse, anger management, and parenting
programs (some weight).  
4.  Caballero raises the following claims: (1) during the closing statements,
the prosecutor impermissibly commented on Caballero's right to remain silent; (2)
the trial court erred in finding that the capital felony was committed in a cold,
calculated, and premeditated manner; (3) the trial court erred in failing to consider
the defendant's age as a mitigator; (4) the trial court erred in ruling that admission of
testimony as to the codefendant's conviction of second-degree murder would
"open the door" to the admission of the codefendant's hearsay confession; (5) the
sentence of death is disproportionate when considering that his coperpetrator was
convicted of second-degree murder; (6) the sentence of death is disproportionate
when compared to other capital cases; and (7) Florida's capital sentencing scheme
is unconstitutional.
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ANALYSIS
Caballero raises seven issues in this appeal. 4  For the following reasons, we
conclude that he is entitled to no relief.
I.  Right to Remain Silent
In his first claim, Caballero asserts that the prosecutor impermissibly
commented during closing arguments on Caballero's exercising his right to remain
silent.  During closing arguments, defense counsel had argued that Caballero did
not want to kill O'Neill.  The prosecutor's closing statement rebutted this argument,
saying, "You can tell . . . what a man intends by what he does not by what he
desires.  What does he do?  According to the [defendant's] statement,
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uncontradicted, what does he do?"  Caballero objected to the prosecutor's
reference to the evidence as uncontradicted, contending this shifted the burden of
proof to Caballero.  The trial court overruled Caballero's objection to the
prosecutor's statement and denied Caballero's motion for a mistrial. 
Caballero argues that the prosecutor's statement was an impermissible
comment on his right to remain silent, and that the prosecutor's statement
improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defense.  We disagree.  A defendant
has the constitutional right to decline to testify against himself in a criminal
proceeding; therefore, "any comment on, or which is fairly susceptible of being
interpreted as referring to, a defendant's failure to testify is error and is strongly
discouraged."  Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 37 (Fla. 2000) (quoting State v.
Marshall, 476 So. 2d 150, 153 (Fla. 1985)).  However, it is permissible for the State
to emphasize uncontradicted evidence for the narrow purpose of rebutting a
defense argument since the defense has invited the response.  See id. at 38-39
(citing Barwick v. State, 660 So. 2d 685, 694 (Fla. 1995); Dufour v. State, 495 So.
2d 154, 160 (Fla. 1986)).  Here, the State emphasized the evidence of Caballero's
actions for the purpose of countering the defense argument that Caballero did not
want to kill O'Neill.  The defense's argument invited the State's response.  In this
context, the prosecutor's statement directed the jury's attention to the evidence of
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Caballero's actions in contrast to his professed desire, rather than to Caballero's
failure to testify. 
Further, even if one were to interpret the prosecutor's statement as a
comment on the defendant's failure to testify, Caballero would not be entitled to
relief.  Erroneous comments require reversal only where there is a reasonable
possibility that the error affected the verdict.  Rodriquez, 753 So. 2d at 39.  In this
case, Caballero's voluntary, detailed confession to the crime was substantiated by
physical evidence, including fingerprint and DNA evidence.  Based on this evidence
supporting the verdict, the asserted error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Caballero is not entitled to relief on this claim.  
II.  Aggravating Circumstances
Next, Caballero claims that the trial court erred in concluding that the murder
was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense
of legal or moral justification (CCP).  To establish the CCP aggravator, the
evidence must show 
that the killing was the product of cool and calm reflection and not an
act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage (cold), and
that the defendant had a careful plan or prearranged design to commit
murder before the fatal incident (calculated), and that the defendant
exhibited heightened premeditation (premeditated), and that the
defendant had no pretense of moral or legal justification. 
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Jackson v. State, 648 So. 2d 85, 89 (Fla. 1994) (citations omitted).  
In reviewing this claim, we do not second-guess the trial court's factual
findings; instead, we limit our review to ensuring that the trial court applied the
correct rule of law and, if so, that there is competent, substantial evidence to
support its findings.  See Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1997).  The
trial court based its finding of CCP on the fact that Caballero and Brown discussed
and planned the murder before the fatal incident began, and that Caballero had an
extended period of time in which to reflect upon the actions in which he was going
to participate.  The record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the
trial court's finding of this aggravator.
Alternatively, Caballero contends that the trial court improperly multiplied the
aggravating circumstances because it considered some of the same facts when
finding the three aggravating factors of CCP; heinous, atrocious, or cruel murder
(HAC); and murder committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest.  A finding of
multiple aggravating circumstances is improper where the aggravators refer to the
same aspect of the crime.  Griffin v. State, 820 So. 2d 906, 914-15 (Fla. 2002). 
Upon review of the record and sentencing order, we conclude that the trial court
relied on different aspects of the crime to find the aggravators of CCP, HAC, and
avoiding arrest.  The court found that avoiding arrest was the motive behind the
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murder, i.e., to eliminate the sole witness who could identify the perpetrators of the
completed crimes of burglary and robbery.  The aggravating factor of CCP was
based on the manner in which the killing was planned and discussed, i.e., the
coperpetrators engaged in a lengthy discussion on how the victim would be killed
and haggled over the amount of payment for killing her.  Finally, the method of the
killing constituted HAC, i.e., the perpetrators held the victim down while strangling
her for over ten minutes.  We conclude that the trial judge relied on different
aspects of the crime in finding each of these aggravators; thus, the finding of
multiple aggravating factors was proper.  See Griffin, 820 So. 2d at 916.
III.  Age as a Mitigating Circumstance
Caballero next argues that the trial court erred in failing to consider age as a
mitigating factor.  We disagree.  The determination of whether age is a mitigating
factor depends on the circumstances of each case, and is within the trial court's
discretion.  Scull v. State, 533 So. 2d 1137, 1143 (Fla. 1988).  Under our review
for abuse of discretion, we will uphold the trial court's determination unless it is
"arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable," so that no reasonable person would adopt the
trial court's view.  Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980).  This
Court has frequently held that a sentencing court may decline to find age as a
mitigating factor in cases where the defendants were twenty to twenty-five years old
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at the time their offenses were committed.  See Garcia v. State, 492 So. 2d 360,
367 (Fla. 1986); Mills v. State, 476 So. 2d 172, 179 (Fla. 1985).  The court found
that Caballero committed the crime at the age of twenty.  The court considered
Caballero's age in light of the evidence presented, including the results of
psychological tests.  The court concluded that Caballero did not demonstrate a
lack of mental or emotional maturity, nor did Caballero demonstrate that he was
unable to take responsibility or appreciate the consequences of his acts.  In light of
the record below, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
rejecting Caballero's age as a mitigating factor.
IV.  Coperpetrator's Confession
In his fourth claim, Caballero asserts that the trial court erred in ruling that, if
Caballero were permitted to introduce evidence that his coperpetrator, Isaac
Brown, was convicted at a separate trial of only second-degree murder, then the
prosecution would be permitted to introduce Brown's confession in order to show
the evidence on which Brown's conviction was based.  Caballero argues that he
should have been permitted to introduce the fact of Brown's conviction to support
a proportionality argument to the jury, i.e., to argue that his own sentence should
not exceed life imprisonment.  However, Caballero simultaneously argues that the
jury should not have been allowed to hear the evidence on which Brown was
5.  Brown's confession implicated Caballero as being more responsible for
the murder.
6.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
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convicted since this evidence, Brown's testimony in particular, would constitute
hearsay highly prejudicial to Caballero.5  
Caballero misstates the trial court's ruling on the issue and asks this Court to
rule on an issue not presented by the record.  At trial, when Caballero sought to
introduce Brown's second-degree murder conviction into evidence to support a
proportionality argument, the prosecutor argued that if Brown's conviction was
introduced, then the State should be permitted to introduce Brown's confession to
show the evidence on which the conviction was based.  The court initially indicated
that the proportionality issue could be raised before the court at a Spencer6 hearing. 
Caballero insisted that he wanted the jury to consider Brown's conviction, though
without being permitted to consider the confession underlying the conviction.  The
court explained that the problem with this approach would be that the jury would
not know the factual evidence on which Brown's conviction was based, and thus
could not appropriately assess the significance of the conviction.  The court
indicated that if Caballero introduced the conviction into evidence, the prosecution
would have an opportunity to explain the facts on which the conviction was based. 
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Since Caballero at that juncture abandoned his attempt to introduce Brown's
conviction into evidence, this Court has no way of knowing what the trial court's
evidentiary rulings on the substance of Brown's confession would have been. 
Caballero suggests that the trial court might have granted the prosecution an
unfettered right to introduce prejudicial and inflammatory aspects of Brown's
confession, but this is not what happened at trial.  This Court cannot rule on
assertions of errors which did not in fact occur.  Caballero is not entitled to relief
on this claim.
V.  Relative Culpability
Caballero next asserts that his sentence of death is disproportionate in light
of his coperpetrator Brown's sentence to life imprisonment.  He asserts that the
evidence shows that Brown was equally, if not more, culpable in the killing.  Where
more than one defendant was involved in the commission of a crime, this Court
performs an analysis of relative culpability to ensure that equally culpable
codefendants were treated alike in capital sentencing and received equal
punishment.  See Shere v. Moore, 830 So. 2d 56, 60 (Fla. 2002).  Here, however,
we cannot conduct a relative culpability analysis because Caballero and Brown
were not found to be equally culpable.  Instead, a jury at a separate trial convicted
Brown of only second-degree murder.  It is not this Court's role to consider or re-
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weigh the evidence that led to Brown's conviction of a lesser degree of murder than
Caballero's.  For our analysis, it is decisive that Brown's culpability was determined
to be less than Caballero's.  Where coperpetrators are not equally culpable, the
death sentence of the more culpable defendant is not disproportionate where the
other receives a life sentence.  See Jennings v. State, 718 So. 2d 144, 153 (Fla.
1998) ("[D]isparate treatment of codefendants is permissible in situations where a
particular defendant is more culpable."); Steinhorst v. Singletary, 638 So. 2d 33, 35
(Fla. 1994) (where a codefendant was convicted of second-degree murder, his life
sentence was not relevant to the petitioner's claim that the death penalty was
disproportionate).  This claim is denied.
VI.  Proportionality
Caballero further argues that his death sentence is disproportionate in light of
other capital cases.  In performing a proportionality review, this Court is committed
to reserving the death penalty for only the most aggravated and the least mitigated
of first-degree murders.  See Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416 (Fla. 1998). 
Proportionality review entails a qualitative analysis of the totality of the
circumstances in a case as compared to other cases in which the death penalty has
been imposed, thereby providing for uniformity in the application of the death
penalty.  See id.  Here, the trial court found that four aggravating factors were
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established and several nonstatutory mitigators applied.  The weight of these
aggravators and mitigators is comparable to those of other cases where we have
affirmed the death penalty.  See, e.g., Shellito v. State, 701 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 1997)
(affirming the death penalty of a twenty-year-old defendant where the trial court
found two aggravators and various nonstatutory mitigation consisting of alcohol
abuse, a mildly abusive childhood, difficulty reading, and a learning disability);
Spencer v. State, 691 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1996) (affirming the death sentence where
the trial court found HAC and prior violent felony aggravators outweighed two
statutory mental mitigators and numerous nonstatutory mitigators); Geralds v. State,
674 So. 2d 96, 105 (Fla. 1996) (affirming the death sentence where the murder was
HAC and committed during the commission of a robbery, and where both statutory
and nonstatutory mitigation was afforded little weight).  Accordingly, we deny this
claim.
VII.  Constitutionality of Florida's Capital Sentencing System
In his final claim, Caballero asserts that Florida's capital sentencing scheme
violates the United States Constitution under the holdings of Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584 (2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  This Court
has recently addressed this argument and denied relief.  See Jones v. State, 845 So.
2d 55 (Fla. 2003).  Additionally, one of the aggravating circumstances the judge
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considered was that Caballero committed the murder during the commission of a
burglary and kidnapping.  These crimes were charged in the indictment and found
by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  The trial judge determined that
any one of the aggravating factors, standing alone, would be sufficient to outweigh
the mitigating circumstances.  Caballero is not entitled to relief on this claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm Caballero’s convictions and
sentences, including his sentence of death.  
It is so ordered.
WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs specially with an opinion.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., specially concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion and write separately only to specify the
reason for my conclusion that Caballero is not entitled to relief under Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  As I have stated in other cases, in my view the
aggravating factor of a murder committed in the course of an enumerated felony,
resting on a unanimous verdict of guilt as to the enumerated felony, satisfies the
7.  The majority cites to Jones v. State, 845 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2003), as having
resolved the question of whether Florida's sentencing scheme violates Ring, but in
Jones the Court simply cited the previous plurality opinions in Bottoson v. Moore,
833 So. 2d 693 (Fla.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 662 (2002), and King v. Moore, 831
So. 2d 143 (Fla.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 657 (2002).  As I explained in Duest,
Bottoson and King were "only plurality opinions and a majority of justices (four),
wrote separate opinions acknowledging that Ring impacted Florida's death penalty
scheme in a variety of ways."  Duest, slip op. at 48 n.14.
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minimum requirements of Ring and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
See Nelson v. State, No. SC00-876 (Fla. July 10, 2003) (Pariente, J., specially
concurring); see also Cole v. State, 841 So. 2d 409, 431 (Fla. 2003) (Pariente, J.,
concurring in result only); Fotopoulos v. State, 838 So. 2d 1122, 1137 (Fla. 2002)
(Pariente, J., concurring in result only); Israel v. State, 837 So. 2d 381, 394 (Fla.
2002) (Pariente, J., concurring in result only), cert. denied, 71 U.S.L.W. 3775 (U.S.
June 16, 2003).
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
For the reasons I expressed in my opinion in Duest v. State, No. SC00-2366,
slip op. at 36-48 (Fla. June 26, 2003) (Anstead, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), I cannot agree with the majority's discussion of Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584 (2002) and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).7  Even if
we were to rewrite Florida's capital sentencing scheme to equate a guilt phase
8. Even if one aggravating circumstance is inherent in the jury's guilt phase
verdict, the trial judge in this case also found:  (1) the crime was committed for the
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest; (2) the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (3) the capital felony was committed in a
cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal
justification (CCP).  Notably, we have previously recognized that HAC and CCP
"are two of the most serious aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing
scheme."   Larkins v. State, 739 So. 2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999).
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conviction with an automatic finding of the aggravating circumstance that the
murder was committed during the commission of an enumerated felony, the fact
remains that the trial judge alone found three other serious aggravating
circumstances and utilized them in imposing the death sentence.8  Thus, in direct
violation of the tenets of Ring, the death sentence in this case is explicitly premised
on factfinding done by a judge alone.
The majority also refers to the judge's finding that "any one of the
aggravating factors, standing alone, would be sufficient to outweigh the mitigating
circumstances."  Majority op. at 16.  I do not find this additional finding of fact by
the judge to make any more compelling a case for finding a Ring violation harmless. 
Notably, the jury voted eight to four in favor of death, which means at least four
members of the jury disagreed that each of the aggravating circumstances standing
alone outweighed all of the mitigation.
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An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County, 
Susan Lebow, Judge - Case No. 95-15295CF10C
Lewis A. Fishman, Plantation, Florida,
for Appellant
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Melanie Ann Dale, Assistant Attorney
General, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Appellee