Case Title: Bd. of Supervisors of Prince George County v. McQueen

Citation: 

Docket Number: 130279

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2014-01-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present: All the Justices 
 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF  
PRINCE GEORGE COUNTY, ET AL. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
      OPINION BY 
 
 
 
v.  Record No. 130279 
      JUSTICE ELIZABETH A. McCLANAHAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        January 10, 2014 
JOHN B. MCQUEEN 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE GEORGE COUNTY 
W. Allan Sharrett, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court erred 
in holding that the landowner, John B. McQueen (McQueen), 
acquired a vested right under Code § 15.2-2307 to develop his 
property in Prince George County (the County) as a cluster 
subdivision.  We conclude that the "compliance letter" McQueen 
received from the County zoning administrator, upon which his 
vesting claim was based, did not constitute a "significant 
affirmative governmental act" as required under Code § 15.2-2307 
for a land use right to become vested.  Therefore, we will 
reverse the judgment of the circuit court. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The CLO Ordinance 
 
The County's Board of Supervisors (the Board) in 2007 
adopted a new zoning ordinance that included a set of 
provisions, entitled collectively the "CLO Cluster Overlay 
District" (hereinafter, the "CLO Ordinance"), permitting the 
 
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development of cluster subdivisions.1  CLO Ordinance §§ 90-332.2 
through -332.16.  A cluster subdivision proposed in accordance 
with the standards contained in the CLO Ordinance was a 
"permitted use by-right."  CLO Ordinance § 90-332.4(A).  The 
standards consisted of categories of both general and specific 
requirements.  CLO Ordinance §§ 90-332.6 through -332.14.  The 
four general standards, which are implicated here, pertained 
only to minimum acreage, the provision of water and sewer, the 
exclusion of conservation areas, and the number of dwelling 
units allowed per acre.  CLO Ordinance §§ 90-332.6. 
 
In the application process for developing a cluster 
subdivision, the applicant was required to meet with the zoning 
administrator to review the requirements for a proposed cluster 
subdivision, arrange a site visit, and prepare a "property 
resource map" of the proposed site depicting such items as, for 
example, total acreage, slope percentages, flood plains, 
historic structures and woodlands.  CLO Ordinance § 90-
332.16(A).  The applicant was then required to submit a 
preliminary plat in accordance with the County's subdivision 
regulations.2  CLO Ordinance § 90-332.16(B).  Finally, upon the 
                     
1 The CLO Ordinance was described as "offer[ing] an 
alternative to conventional subdivision development by allowing 
for compact clusters of housing units rather than spaced lots 
that encompass the entire property."  CLO Ordinance § 90-332.2. 
2 The following additional items were also required to 
accompany the preliminary plat under CLO Ordinance § 90-
 
3 
County's approval of the preliminary plat, the applicant was 
required to submit a final plat in accordance with the County's 
subdivision regulations.  CLO Ordinance § 90-332.16(C). 
B.  McQueen's Proposed Development 
 
McQueen, an owner of a large tract of land in the County, 
initiated plans to develop his property as a cluster 
subdivision.  In early May 2008, McQueen and his engineer "met 
informally" with Pamela Thompson (Thompson), the Deputy County 
Administrator and Interim Director of Planning, to review the 
requirements for such use of McQueen's property.  McQueen's 
attorney subsequently submitted an "application" letter to 
Thompson describing in general terms McQueen's proposed 
development of "approximately 250 clustered residential 
dwellings," and "request[ing] a formal meeting" as required 
under CLO Ordinance § 90-332.16(A). 
 
McQueen, his engineer, and attorney, then met with Thompson 
on May 23, 2008.  McQueen presented Thompson with a document 
consisting of a combined resource map and draft of a preliminary 
plat of McQueen's proposed development, and the four of them 
reviewed it that day.  It was only after the May 23rd meeting, 
McQueen's engineer confirmed, that "we put together a formal 
                                                                
332.16(B): notation on the plat of all conservation and open 
space areas; deed restrictions and covenants that would apply 
to private streets, public services, open space, and cluster 
subdivision lots; and the location of the building lots to be 
conveyed. 
 
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submittal of the preliminary plat for the [C]ounty," which, he 
acknowledged, was filed on July 1.  He further indicated that 
the draft of the preliminary plat "could have changed" between 
May 23rd and July 1. 
After the May 23rd meeting, McQueen expected to receive "an 
approval letter within days" from Thompson.  When that did not 
occur, McQueen filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a 
determination whether he was entitled to develop his property 
"by right" or only pursuant to a special exception.  Shortly 
thereafter, McQueen nonsuited the action upon receiving a 
"compliance letter" from Thompson around June 19th. 
C.  Thompson's Compliance Letter 
In the compliance letter, Thompson recited the four general 
standards set forth in CLO Ordinance § 90-332.6 and indicated 
that McQueen's property met those standards.  Thompson then 
stated, "[p]lease let this letter serve as notice that your 
property does meet the provisions of the CLO [O]rdinance for by-
right development in Prince George County."  (Emphasis added.)  
Thompson also advised that McQueen would "need to meet all other 
applicable provisions of federal, state, and local codes."  In 
addition, she explained, "[o]nce final approval of the proposed 
development is obtained through the CLO [O]rdinance you will 
need to obtain Site Plan Approval and a Land Disturbance Permit 
prior to beginning any work on the site."  According to 
 
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Thompson, the letter was not required by the CLO Ordinance, and 
it did not approve a specific project. 
D. McQueen's Present Declaratory Judgment Action 
Several months after Thompson issued the compliance letter, 
the Board repealed the CLO Ordinance.  In response, McQueen 
filed this declaratory judgment action against the County and 
the Board (collectively, "the County").  McQueen sought a 
declaration that he obtained a vested right under Code § 15.2-
2307 to develop his property "as a by-right cluster subdivision" 
in accordance with the terms of the CLO Ordinance. 
Under Code § 15.2-2307, a landowner may establish a vested 
right in a land use when he "(i) obtains or is the beneficiary 
of a significant affirmative governmental act which remains in 
effect allowing development of a specific project, (ii) relies 
in good faith on the significant affirmative governmental act, 
and (iii) incurs extensive obligations or substantial expenses 
in diligent pursuit of the specific project in reliance on the 
significant affirmative governmental act."  The statute does not 
define what constitutes a significant affirmative governmental 
act.  Instead, it provides a list of seven acts "deemed to be 
significant affirmative governmental acts."3  Id.  The list is 
                     
3 The seven "deemed" significant affirmative governmental 
acts in Code § 15.2-2307 consist of the following: (i) accepting 
proffers related to a zoning amendment; (ii) approving a 
rezoning application, (iii) granting a special exception or use 
 
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non-exclusive, however, as the statute expressly provides that 
the list is "without limitation."  Id.  At the time Thompson 
issued the compliance letter, the statute listed acts one 
through six; the seventh act was added by legislative amendment 
in 2010.  See 2010 Acts ch. 315.4 
McQueen asserted that Thompson's compliance letter 
constituted a significant affirmative governmental act, that he 
relied in good faith on that act, and that he incurred extensive 
obligations and substantial expenses in diligent pursuit of 
developing his property as a cluster subdivision.  Therefore, 
McQueen concluded, he met the three elements set forth in Code § 
15.2-2307 for the vesting of a right to use his property for 
that purpose. 
As to the first statutory element, McQueen acknowledged 
that the compliance letter did not represent any one of the six 
significant affirmative governmental acts listed in Code § 15.2-
2307 at that time.  Rather, McQueen contended, the letter 
                                                                
permit, (iv) approving a variance, (v) approving a preliminary 
subdivision plat, site plan or plan of development, (vi) 
approving a final subdivision plat, site plan or plan of 
development, and (vii) issuing a written order, requirement, 
decision or determination regarding the permissibility of a 
specific land use that is no longer subject to appeal and that 
is no longer subject to change or reversal under Code § 15.2-
2311(C). 
 
4 Code § 15.2-2307 was also amended in other respects by 
2010 Acts ch. 698, however, those amendments are not germane 
to the issues considered in this appeal. 
 
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constituted a significant affirmative governmental act under 
this Court's case law, citing Board of Supervisors v. Crucible, 
Inc., 278 Va. 152, 158-61, 677 S.E.2d 283, 286-87 (2009) 
(applying the "without limitation" provision of the statute).  
McQueen argued that the letter was clear and unambiguous, not 
subject to change, and affirmatively approved his proposed 
development, thereby meeting the criteria set forth in Crucible 
for determining when a zoning administrator's letter may 
constitute a significant affirmative governmental act.  See id. 
at 160, 677 S.E.2d at 287-88.  In further support of this 
position, McQueen asserted that the letter represented a 
"determination of legislative compliance," leaving only 
ministerial approvals for his proposed development. 
Alternatively, McQueen argued that the compliance letter 
met the terms of the seventh governmental action subsequently 
added to Code § 15.2-2307, and that this provision should be 
applied retroactively for the circuit court to reach that 
determination. 
The County responded by arguing, inter alia, that 
Thompson's compliance letter was not in the nature of a 
legislative act, and did not constitute an unambiguous approval 
of McQueen's proposed development.  Rather, the County asserted 
that it was simply a courtesy to McQueen to confirm that his 
property qualified for a cluster subdivision as a permissive use 
 
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by-right under the CLO Ordinance's general standards, and 
nothing more.  Thus, the County contended, the letter did not 
constitute a significant affirmative governmental act, thereby 
negating McQueen's vesting claim. 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court ruled 
in favor of McQueen, finding that he established each of the 
three elements required under Code § 15.2-2307 for a land use 
right to become vested.  As to the first statutory element, the 
circuit court agreed with the parties that the issuance of 
Thompson's compliance letter did not fall within any one of the 
six significant affirmative governmental acts set forth in the 
statute at that time.  Nor did the circuit court apply the 
seventh act retroactively, as urged by McQueen.  Citing 
Crucible, the circuit court indicated that its ruling on the 
first statutory element was, instead, based on case law - 
pursuant to the "without limitation" provision of the statute.  
Code § 15.2-2307.  The circuit court accordingly declared in its 
final order that McQueen's "land use rights [to develop his 
property as a cluster subdivision] have vested." 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
 
The sole issue raised by the County on appeal is whether 
Thompson's compliance letter constituted a significant 
affirmative governmental act for purposes of Code § 15.2-2307 – a 
threshold determination in the circuit court's adjudication of 
 
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McQueen's claim of vested land use rights.  Crucible, the County 
argues, is closely analogous to the present case, and supports 
its position that the circuit court erred by holding the 
compliance letter satisfied this first element of the statute. 
 
We agree with the County that this case is controlled by 
Crucible.  Similar to McQueen and his proposed cluster 
subdivision, the plaintiff in Crucible sought confirmation 
from the Stafford County zoning administrator that its 
proposed security training facility met the definition of a 
"school" under the local zoning ordinance in an A-1 zoning 
district.  If it met the definition, the facility could be 
constructed "on a 'by right' basis, i.e., without additional 
discretionary approval by the County."  278 Va. at 156, 677 
S.E.2d at 285.  Cf., e.g., Byrum v. Board of Supervisors, 217 
Va. 37, 41-44, 225 S.E.2d 369, 372-34 (1976) (addressing 
legislative discretion involved in issuing special use 
permits). 
 
After meeting with the zoning administrator, the plaintiff 
in Crucible received a letter, titled "'Zoning Verification,'" in 
which the zoning administrator stated that plaintiff's proposed 
facility "'would be classified a "school" by definition in the 
Stafford County Zoning Ordinance,' and that the '[v]erification 
is valid as of [the date of the letter] and is subject to 
change.'"  278 Va. at 156, 677 S.E.2d at 285.  However, before 
 
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the plaintiff obtained approval of a site plan for the proposed 
facility, the Stafford County Board of Supervisors adopted a 
zoning ordinance that required a conditional use permit for 
locating a school in an A-1 zoning district.  Id. 
 
Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a 
declaration that it had a vested right, pursuant to Code § 15.2-
2307, to construct a school on its property "on a 'by right' 
basis."  Id. at 157, 677 S.E.2d at 285.  The trial court entered 
declaratory judgment in favor of the plaintiff on this theory 
based in part on the court's determination that the zoning 
verification letter constituted a significant affirmative 
governmental act "substantially similar and equally serious" to 
the six examples then listed in the Code section.  Id.  On 
appeal, this Court disagreed and reversed the judgment of the 
trial court.  Id. at 161, 677 S.E.2d at 288. 
 
The Court explained in Crucible that when the particular act 
at issue, such as the verification letter, does not fall within 
one of the enumerated acts in Code § 15.2-2307 "we rely on this 
Court's case law to determine whether [the] particular act 
constitutes a significant affirmative governmental act."  Id. at 
160, 677 S.E.2d at 287.  The Court then explained that "[t]he 
alleged significant affirmative governmental act should be 
interpreted according to the plain meaning of the language used 
in the act" and "the evidence to support the claim to [vested 
 
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land use] rights must be clear, express, and unambiguous."  Id. 
(citing Hale v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 277 Va. 250, 274, 673 
S.E.2d 170, 182 (2009)).  Evidence of "only a future expectation" 
that the landowner will be allowed to develop his property in 
accordance with a current zoning classification under the 
ordinance is therefore insufficient to establish a vested 
property right in the continuation of the property's existing 
status.  Id. (quoting Hale, 277 Va. at 271, 673 S.E.2d at 180).  
Furthermore, "statements of the zoning board's general support of 
the plan and informal assurances of future approval are not 
enough to constitute a significant affirmative governmental act."  
Id. (citing Board of Zoning Appeals v. CaseLin Sys., Inc., 256 
Va. 206, 212-13, 501 S.E.2d 297, 401-02 (1998)). 
 
Based on these principles, the Court concluded that the 
statement of zoning classification contained in the zoning 
administrator's verification letter to the plaintiff was not a 
significant affirmative governmental act.  Id. at 161, 677 
S.E.2d at 288.  The Court reasoned that, "[a]ccording to the 
plain meaning" of the language in the verification letter, the 
zoning administrator did not "affirmatively approve" the 
plaintiff's project, and made "no commitment" to it.  Id. at 
160, 677 S.E.2d at 287.  "The zoning administrator simply 
answered the question concerning the classification of 
[plaintiff's] project according to the Stafford County Zoning 
 
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Ordinance in place on the date the request was made," and added 
that "the verification was subject to change."  Id. 
 
Like the "verification letter" for the proposed project 
in Crucible, the "compliance letter" in this case did not 
affirmatively approve McQueen's proposed development of a 
cluster subdivision.  Nor did it make any commitment to 
McQueen regarding this project.  Rather, the compliance letter 
confirmed that McQueen's proposed development met the general 
standards for a cluster subdivision.5  By definition, such 
confirmation was essentially limited under CLO Ordinance § 90-
332.6 to a determination of whether the proposal met the 
requirements for minimum tract size and maximum number of 
residential units per acre - a simple mathematical 
calculation.  Because McQueen's proposal complied with those 
standards, Thompson advised McQueen in the compliance letter 
that he was entitled to pursue his project as a matter of 
right, i.e., without discretionary approval by the County.  
                     
5 Our analysis of the compliance letter is unaffected by the 
fact that McQueen was required under CLO Ordinance § 90-332.16 
to meet with Thompson prior to preparation of the preliminary 
plat to review the requirements for a cluster subdivision, and 
to prepare a "property resource map" of his property (merely 
depicting the property in its undeveloped state), both of which 
occurred before the letter was issued.  Neither the meeting nor 
McQueen's preparation of the map and presentation of it to 
Thompson directly resulted in anything that could be 
characterized as a significant affirmative governmental act vis-
à-vis the compliance letter.  Indeed, no specific action was 
required of Thompson under the ordinance in response to either 
the meeting or presentation of the map. 
 
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That, of course, was far short of the "clear, express, and 
unambiguous" approval of, or commitment to, a specific plan of 
development by McQueen as required for the creation of a 
vested development right.6  Crucible, 278 Va. at 160, 677 
S.E.2d at 287. 
 
Manifestly, McQueen's right to so pursue his project was 
not dependent upon his receipt of the compliance letter from 
Thompson.  The CLO Ordinance did not require McQueen to seek 
such confirmation, nor did it require Thompson to provide it.  
As the County correctly contends, McQueen's right to pursue his 
project as a "permitted use by-right" pursuant to the express 
terms of CLO Ordinance § 90-332.4(A) did not derive from a 
discretionary act of a local zoning administrator, but rather 
the legislative action of the Board in adopting the CLO 
Ordinance.7 
                     
6 The first governmental approval required under the CLO 
Ordinance was an approval of the landowner's preliminary plat of 
a proposed cluster subdivision.  CLO Ordinance § 90-332.16(B).  
With the filing of the preliminary plat, the landowner was, for 
the first time, required to account for the numerous specific 
standards for the project under the CLO Ordinance along with the 
County's subdivision regulations.  McQueen did not file his 
preliminary plat with the County until several days after 
Thompson issued the compliance letter.  Thus, the letter could 
not have been interpreted as some implied approval of the plat.  
Nor did Thompson make any mention of an earlier draft of the 
preliminary plat in her letter. 
 
 
7 McQueen alternatively argues, as he did below, that the 
issuance of the letter would constitute the seventh significant 
affirmative governmental act added to Code § 15.2-2307 in 2010, 
 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we conclude that the zoning 
administrator's issuance of the confirmation letter was not a 
significant affirmative governmental act.  The circuit court 
thus erred in holding that McQueen acquired a vested right under 
Code § 15.2-2307 to develop his property as a cluster 
subdivision.  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the 
trial court, and enter final judgment for the County. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
                                                                
which we should apply retroactively.  Because the General 
Assembly expressed no intent that the statute be applied 
retroactively, we will not do so.  Goyonaga v. Board of Zoning 
Appeals, 275 Va. 232, 241 n.4, 657 S.E.2d 153, 258 n.4 (2008); 
Adams v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 261 Va. 594, 599, 544 S.E.2d 
354, 356 (2001).