Case Title: Armstrong v. Hill

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1170650

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2019-05-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: May 10, 2019
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2018-2019
____________________
1170650
____________________
Emma Armstrong
v.
Betty Hill
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-16-759)
PER CURIAM.
This is a dog-bite case that is procedurally unique.
Betty Hill sued Emma Armstrong and another defendant after
Hill was bitten by three dogs. When Armstrong and her trial
counsel failed to appear at trial at the appointed time, the
1170650
trial court declared from the bench that a default would be
entered against Armstrong for liability and that Hill would
have an opportunity to put on evidence of damages.
Approximately 13 minutes after the trial began, however,
Armstrong appeared in the courtroom (her trial counsel never
arrived). When the trial court noted Armstrong's appearance,
it proceeded to hold a nonjury trial on the merits -- though
the conditions under which evidence would be taken were never
made clear. The trial court thereafter entered a judgment in
favor of Hill and against Armstrong in the amount of $75,000.
This appeal followed.
We have been asked by Armstrong to determine whether the
evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain the
judgment against her. Based on our review of the applicable
law and the evidence taken at trial, it is clear, even under
a standard of review that is deferential to the trial court,
that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the
judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial
court and remand the cause with instructions for the trial
court to enter a judgment in favor of Armstrong.
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Facts and Procedural History
Armstrong owned a house on Kelly Lane in Montgomery ("the
Armstrong property"), which she leased to Michelle McKithen.
Hill lived across the street from the Armstrong property. On
May 21, 2016, Hill was watering plants outside her house when
she noticed dogs barking at children in the vicinity of the
Armstrong property. She yelled to the children, warning them
to stay away from the dogs. Three dogs then ran across the
street and attacked her. The attack caused injuries to Hill's
right hand and left elbow, requiring surgery and physical
therapy. On December 8, 2016, Hill sued Armstrong and
McKithen, asserting negligence, wantonness, and premises-
liability claims.1
On December 4, 2017, the Montgomery Circuit Court held a
nonjury trial. When the trial began, neither Armstrong nor her
attorney was present. Although there is no indication in the
record that Hill moved for a default against Armstrong,2 the
trial court announced: "No one having appeared for Ms.
1The trial court entered a default judgment against
McKithen. That judgment is not at issue in this appeal.
2In her brief to this Court, Hill states that she moved
the trial court for an entry of default. The record, however,
contains no evidence of such a motion.
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Armstrong, I will grant [Hill's] motion for a default against
Ms. Armstrong." The trial court then told those present: "If
[Hill] want[s] to create some record as to the damages
associated with the injuries, we can do that at this time, and
I think that will probably conclude the proceeding." After the
trial court gave those instructions, Hill took the witness
stand.
Hill testified that three dogs resembling pit bulls
approached her from the vicinity of the Armstrong property and
attacked her in her yard.  She introduced a deed from 2008
showing that Armstrong was the owner of the Armstrong property
and 
a humane-society 
animal-bite 
incident 
report. 
In
accordance with the trial court's instruction, all other
evidence that Hill presented went to the issue of damages.
Approximately 13 minutes after the trial began, Armstrong
entered the courtroom.3 Armstrong's trial attorney was not
with her and never appeared at trial. When Hill's direct
testimony 
concluded, 
the 
trial 
court 
discovered that 
Armstrong
had entered the courtroom.  The trial court welcomed Armstrong
3According to the trial transcript, Armstrong entered the
courtroom at 10:13 a.m. The trial court's subsequent comments
suggest that the trial began at 10:00 a.m. and that Armstrong
was present for most of Hill's direct examination.
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but never informed her of its entry of default against her or
that the only issue before the court was the issue of damages.
The trial court told Armstrong that she had "the right to come
forward and ask Hill any questions that [she] want[ed]." The
trial court did not tell Armstrong that she should limit her
cross-examination of Hill to the issue of damages.
Armstrong proceeded to 
cross-examine Hill. 
Hill 
testified
that she knew that the Armstrong property was being rented and
that the tenant kept dogs on the property. Hill admitted that
she did not know to whom the dogs belonged. Counsel for Hill
did not 
object to any portion of Armstrong’s cross-examination
of Hill and at no point requested that the scope of the cross-
examination be limited to damages.
Following Hill's testimony, the trial court explained to
Armstrong her options: "Now, Ms. Armstrong, that was their
witness that they called to prove their case. Now it's your
turn. ... If you want to take the stand and tell your side of
the story, you are welcome to sit in the [witness] box."
Armstrong was reluctant, stating that she did not "really have
a side of the story." The trial court then reminded her twice
that it was her "day in court." It explained to Armstrong that
"the purpose of this lawsuit is to determine whether or not
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you ... are at fault and if you are at fault, what are the
damages .... [S]o that's the purpose of this day." Armstrong
then took the witness stand.
Armstrong testified that she was not aware of any dogs
being kept at the Armstrong property. She entered into the
record her lease with McKithen, which states: "No animal ...
of any kind shall be kept on or about the premises, for any
amount of time, without obtaining the prior written consent
and meeting the requirements of [Armstrong]."  On cross-
examination by Hill's counsel, Armstrong testified that she
had owned the Armstrong property for six or seven years and
that she knew McKithen prior to leasing her the house.
According to Armstrong, McKithen had resided at the Armstrong
property with McKithen's boyfriend and her two children for
about seven months before the dog attack.  Armstrong testified
that she never went to the Armstrong property to retrieve rent
checks (that was done by Armstrong's boyfriend) but that she
had gone to inspect the residence twice and had not seen any
pets on the property. 
Following the trial, the trial court issued an order
entering judgment against Armstrong and McKithen for $75,000
plus costs. The order noted that a default judgment had
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previously been entered against McKithen but made no mention
of a default judgment against Armstrong. The order contained
no findings of fact or rationale for Armstrong's liability.
 On January 25, 2018, Armstrong filed what she titled as
a "Motion to Set Aside Judgment." Armstrong argued that the
judgment should be set aside because, she said, Hill had
produced insufficient evidence demonstrating that Armstrong
should have known there were animals on the Armstrong
property, that Armstrong should have known those animals were
dangerous, and that Armstrong had failed to exercise
reasonable care in maintaining the safety of the Armstrong
property. The trial court interpreted Armstrong's motion as a
"motion to vacate or modify" the judgment and denied the
motion.4 Armstrong timely appealed.
Nature of the Judgment Below
In her brief on appeal, Hill contends that the trial
court entered a default against Armstrong and thus relieved
Hill of her obligation to present evidence of liability.
4Armstrong filed an almost identical motion on April 5,
2018, just four days before she filed her notice of appeal.
The trial court never ruled on that motion. We treat that
essentially duplicative motion as a motion to reconsider and
do not consider it in this appeal.
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According to Hill, after the trial court entered a default,
the only issue that remained to be determined was the amount
of damages to be assessed.5 Based on the law and evidence
presented, however, it is clear that no default judgment was
ever entered against Armstrong. Instead, the proceeding below
was a trial that resulted in a judgment on the merits against
Armstrong.
Defaults and default judgments are generally governed by
Rule 55, Ala. R. Civ. P. This Court has noted the distinction
between defaults and default judgments. See Ex parte Family
Dollar Stores of Alabama, Inc., 906 So. 2d 892, 896 (Ala.
2005) ("[I]t is probably helpful to talk in terms of an entry
of 'default' and an entry of a 'judgment by default,'
respectively, to differentiate between the two events."). The
first event that must occur is the entry of default by the
clerk of the trial court. See Rule 55(a), Ala. R. Civ. P.
("When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief
is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided
5With the notable exception of asking us to review this
case under the standard of review for default judgments, Hill
does not explicitly contend that the judgment at issue is a
default judgment. Nevertheless, because her argument makes
sense only if she is contending that a default judgment, not
merely a default, was entered, we construe it in that manner.
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by [the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure], and that fact is
made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall
enter the party's default."); see also Coke v. Family Sec.
Credit Union, [Ms. 2160912, May 4, 2018] ___ So. 3d ___, ___
(Ala. Civ. App. 2018) ("'[A] party must first obtain an entry
of default by the clerk or the trial court before he or she
can obtain a default judgment from the trial court.'" (quoting
Griffin v. Blackwell, 57 So. 3d 161, 163 (Ala. Civ. App.
2010))). An entry of default does not constitute a final
judgment -- it is an interlocutory order. See Boudreaux v.
Kemp, 49 So. 3d 1190, 1194 (Ala. 2010) (citing McConico v.
Correctional Med. Servs., Inc., 41 So. 3d 8, 12 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2009)); Alfa Auto Sales, L.L.C. v. Miller, 177 So. 3d
903, 909 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015) ("We note that the ... entry of
default ... was an interlocutory order subject to being set
aside at any time before a judgment was entered."). 
Because an entry of default is an interlocutory order,
the procedure for its entry is governed by Rule 58(c), Ala. R.
Civ. P. That rule provides that an order is not deemed
"entered" until it is input into the State Judicial
Information System ("the SJIS"). The absence of any entry of
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default in the electronic docket in this case indicates that
no default was entered into the SJIS.6 Because no entry of
default preceded the judgment, we presume that the judgment
from which Armstrong appeals was a judgment on the merits. 7
This presumption is buttressed by the face of the
judgment against Armstrong.  The trial court's order states
that it is a default judgment against McKithen but makes no
such reference regarding the judgment against Armstrong. 
The presumption is further strengthened by Hill's failure
to follow the required procedures for obtaining a default
judgment under Rule 55(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P.  That rule
requires a party seeking a default judgment to "apply to the
6Because we conclude that no default was entered, we need
not discuss whether the trial court's oral pronouncement of
default amounted to a valid rendering. See Rule 58(a), Ala. R.
Civ. P.
7The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals has recognized that
the failure to enter a default before entering a default
judgment can be a harmless error that will not render void an
otherwise appropriate default judgment. See Meares v. Meares,
437 So. 2d 578, 579 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983); Hilbish v. Hilbish,
415 So. 2d 1114, 1116 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982). Those holdings
are not disturbed by today's decision. In this case, we are
not addressing whether to void a default judgment based on a
failure to enter a default. Rather, we are addressing whether
a trial court's final judgment was a default judgment or a
judgment on the merits. Whether a default was actually entered
is highly probative of that question. 
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court therefor."  Hill never applied for a default judgment.8 
In addition, Rule 55(b)(2) provides that parties like
Armstrong who have appeared in an action must have three days'
notice of the application for a default judgment. The only
exception to this notice requirement is that a trial court may
enter a default judgment on the day the case is set for trial.
Here, the trial court's judgment was not entered on the day
the case was set for trial; the judgment was entered 23 days
after trial. The disconnect between the judgment against
Armstrong and the procedural requirements of Rule 55(b)(2)
demonstrates that the judgment against Armstrong is a 
judgment
on the merits, not a default judgment. 
Finally, our determination that the judgment against
Armstrong is a judgment on the merits comports with what
occurred at trial.  No one in the courtroom was operating
under the impression that a default was in place once
Armstrong arrived at trial. The trial court did not notify
8The trial court announced on the record that it would
"grant [Hill's] motion for 
default against Ms. Armstrong." The
record contains no motion by Hill for a default against
Armstrong. Even assuming Hill moved for default, however, such
a motion would not be the equivalent of moving for a default
judgment.
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Armstrong upon her arrival that she was in default. The trial
court, when instructing Armstrong about the scope of her
cross-examination of Hill, did not instruct Armstrong to 
limit
her questioning to the issue of damages.  And Hill herself did
not object when Armstrong cross-examined her on liability. 
Once Armstrong finished cross-examining Hill, the trial
court invited Armstrong to "tell [her] side of the story";
told her that "the purpose of" the trial was "to determine
whether or not [she] ... [was] at fault"; and repeatedly
reminded her that this was her "day in court." And when
Armstrong took the stand to tell her side of the story, the
trial court asked her several questions that pertained to
liability rather than damages. Clearly, after Armstrong
arrived, trial was conducted on the premise that the issue of
liability was unresolved. Accordingly, we reject Hill's
contention that she was excused from her burden of presenting
evidence of liability against Armstrong.
Nature of Armstrong's Postjudgment Motion
Having determined that the trial court's judgment against
Armstrong constitutes a judgment on the merits, we now examine
the trial court's denial of Armstrong's postjudgment motion,
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which contests the sufficiency of the evidence of her
liability. As noted, Armstrong styled the motion as a "Motion
to Set Aside Judgment." The trial court, in its order denying
the motion, referred to the motion as a "motion to vacate or
modify." On appeal, Armstrong asks us to characterize the
motion as one for a new trial, presumably under Rule 59(a),
Ala. R. Civ. P. 
It is well settled that the substance of a motion, not
its title, determines how the motion is to be considered.
Brasfield & Gorrie, L.L.C. v. Soho Partners, L.L.C., 35 So. 3d
601, 604 (Ala. 2009); Pontius v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co., 915 So. 2d 557, 562 (Ala. 2005). The only relief 
Armstrong specifically requested in her postjudgment motion
was that the trial court "set aside the judgment against her
in this case." This Court has treated "motions to set aside
judgments" as Rule 59(e) motions to alter, amend, or vacate
the judgment when those motions are filed within 30 days of
the entry of judgment. See, e.g., Ex parte Owen, 860 So. 2d
877, 879 n. 2 (Ala. 2003); J.M.H. v. J.L.W., 66 So. 3d 799,
800 n. 1 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011); McMurphy v. East Bay
Clothiers, 892 So. 2d 395, 397 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004). The
13
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trial court correctly characterized Armstrong's postjudgment
motion as a Rule 59(e) motion, and we will treat the motion as
such.
Standard of Review
When a trial court, during the course of a nonjury trial,
hears oral testimony, or ore tenus evidence, an appellate
court must give great deference to the trial court's
determinations of fact. The rationale for this ore tenus rule
is that the trial court, as the finder of fact in a nonjury
trial, is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of
the witness providing the testimony. Board of Sch. Comm’rs of
Mobile Cty. v. Weaver, 99 So. 3d 1210, 1216 (Ala. 2012)
(citing Hall v. Mazzone, 486 So. 2d 408, 410 (Ala. 1986)).
Thus, under the ore tenus rule, "'"'a presumption of
correctness attends the trial court’s conclusion on issues of
fact, and this Court will not disturb the trial court’s
conclusion unless it is clearly erroneous and against the
great weight of evidence.'"'" Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Boles
Invs., Inc., 53 So. 3d 60, 68 (Ala. 2010), quoting in turn
other cases). Moreover, "when a trial court makes no specific
findings of fact, 'this Court will assume that the trial judge
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made those findings necessary to support the judgment.'" New
Props., L.L.C. v. Stewart, 905 So. 2d 797, 799 (Ala. 2004)
(quoting Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. AmSouth Bank,
N.A., 608 So. 2d 375, 378 (Ala. 1992)). This presumption of
correctness, however, "'"has no application when the trial
court is shown to have improperly applied the law to the
facts,"'" Board of Sch. Comm’rs, 99 So. 3d at 1216 (quoting
Kennedy, 53 So. 3d at 68, quoting in turn another case),
because "[q]uestions of law are reviewed de novo." Alabama
Republican Party v. McGinley, 893 So. 3d 337, 342 (Ala. 2004).
"Whether to grant relief under Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., is
within the trial court's discretion." Bradley v. Town of Argo,
2 So. 3d 819, 823 (Ala. 2008). 
Discussion
Despite the high degree of deference accorded to the
trial court's factual findings, we can identify no evidence in
the record to sustain the judgment entered against Armstrong
on the basis of (1) negligence and/or wantonness or (2)
premises liability.
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Negligence and/or Wantonness
Hill first claimed that Armstrong's alleged negligence
and/or wantonness caused her injuries. To have properly found
Armstrong liable for common-law negligence, the trial court
must have been presented with evidence from which it could
have inferred that Hill's injuries were caused by Armstrong's
breaching a duty Armstrong owed Hill. See, e.g., Armstrong
Bus. Servs., Inc. v. AmSouth Bank, 817 So. 2d 665, 679 (Ala.
2001) (reciting elements of a common-law negligence claim). 
Under Alabama law, only owners and keepers of dogs have
a duty to prevent their dogs from biting others. Humphries v.
Rice, 600 So. 2d 975, 966 (Ala. 1992). Therefore, to support
a conclusion that Armstrong was negligent, there must be
sufficient evidence that Armstrong owned or kept the dogs that
attacked Hill. Hill does not claim that Armstrong owned the
dogs.9 Accordingly, the only way Armstrong could be found
liable for negligence is if she were found to be a "keeper" of
the dogs.
9Because there is no evidence to suggest that Armstrong
owned the dogs, her liability cannot be premised on § 3-6-1,
Ala. Code 1975, which imputes strict liability to dog owners
in certain instances.
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In Humphries, a delivery man was attacked by a pit bull
that belonged to the defendant's son, who lived on the
defendant's property. 600 So. 2d at 975.  The defendant was
not an owner of the dog; thus, she could be found liable only
if it were proven that she was a keeper of the dog. Although
the delivery man presented evidence that the defendant had
interacted with the pit bull, he presented no evidence that
the defendant cared for or took any responsibilities with
regard to the pit bull. Id. at 977. Therefore, this Court held
that the defendant was not the "keeper" of the dog and was not
liable for negligence. 
Here, Hill presented no evidence that Armstrong ever had
any interaction with any of the dogs that attacked her, much
less evidence tending to show that Armstrong cared for or took
responsibility for them. If the defendant in Humphries could
not be characterized as a "keeper," neither can Armstrong.10
Because there is not sufficient evidence that Armstrong was
either an owner or a keeper of the dogs that attacked Hill,
there is no basis on which to find Armstrong liable for
negligence. To the extent the trial court based its judgment
10Indeed, even Hill, in her brief to this Court, does not
appear to contend that Armstrong was a "keeper" of the dogs.
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against Armstrong on a finding of negligence, it misapplied
the law.
As mentioned above, Hill also claimed that her injuries
were caused by Armstrong's wantonness.  "Wantonness" is
qualitatively different from "negligence" and involves "the
conscious doing of some act or omission of some duty while
knowing of the existing conditions and being conscious that,
from doing or omitting to do an act, injury will likely or
probably result."  Ex parte Essary, 992 So. 2d 5, 9 (Ala.
2007).  There is no evidence in the record that Armstrong
wantonly caused Hill's injuries. 
Premises Liability
Hill also claims that Armstrong is liable for her
injuries under a theory of premises liability. According to
the trial testimony, Hill's injuries occurred outside her
house, on her own property, and across the street from the
Armstrong property. Hill does not contend that she ever set
foot on the Armstrong property. 
This Court has never held that a landlord may be liable
under a premises-liability theory for dog bites that occur on
premises not owned by the landlord. The Court of Civil Appeals
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recently recognized this limitation in Berg v. Nguyen, 201 So.
3d 1185, 1189 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016). Regardless of how far off
premises a landlord's premises liability may reach, however,
the record contains no evidence that Armstrong was ever aware
of the presence of the dogs on the Armstrong property or of
the danger they presented. The lease that was entered into
evidence 
clearly 
prohibited 
Armstrong's 
tenant, 
McKithen, 
from
keeping a dog on the premises, and Armstrong testified that
she was not aware of the dogs' presence on the Armstrong
property. Armstrong testified that she visited the Armstrong
property twice to inspect it and that she announced each of
those visits to McKithen beforehand. The mere fact that she
visited the Armstrong property on two occasions cannot support
the conclusion that she knew McKithen was keeping dogs, much
less the conclusion that she knew the dogs constituted a
dangerous condition.11 
11Hill 
claims 
that 
evidence 
of 
fencing 
and 
"dog
structures" on the Armstrong property should have put
Armstrong on notice of the presence of dogs. When questioning
Armstrong at trial, however, Hill did not inquire into whether
Armstrong had knowledge of the fencing or "dog structures,"
and there is no evidence in the record indicating that
Armstrong was aware of those items.  Even if we were to
assume, however, that Armstrong was aware of the fencing or
"dog structures," it is doubtful that such evidence, by
itself, would suffice to place Armstrong on notice that a
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Hill's premises-liability claim cannot survive without
any evidence that Armstrong was aware of a dangerous condition
on the Armstrong property. See Gentle v. Pine Valley
Apartments, 631 So. 2d 928, 935 (Ala. 1994) ("[N]otice to the
premises owner, either direct or imputed, of the dangerous
condition is the sine qua non of liability."). See also Berg,
201 So. 3d at 1189 (same); Scott v. Donkel, 671 So. 2d 741,
744 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995) (same). To the extent the trial
court found Armstrong liable under a premises-liability
theory, it misapplied the law.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, we reverse the judgment
entered by the trial court in favor of Hill and remand the
cause with instructions for the trial court to enter a
judgment for Armstrong.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Sellers, and Stewart, JJ.,
concur.
Bolin, Bryan, and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result.
Wise and Mitchell, JJ., concur in part and dissent in
part.
dangerous condition existed on the Armstrong property. 
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MITCHELL, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).
Although I concur with the Court's analysis and its
conclusion that Betty Hill did not meet her evidentiary
burden, I dissent from its instruction that the trial court
enter a judgment in favor of Emma Armstrong. There is a
reasonable likelihood that Hill was prejudiced by the trial
court's instruction to limit her case-in-chief to evidence of
damages. That instruction was never explicitly rescinded. And
while the Court correctly concludes that the trial court
conducted a trial on the merits, the ultimate classification
of those proceedings would not have been apparent to Hill
during most, if not the entirety of, her case-in-chief. Hill
claims that, absent the trial court's instruction, she would
have presented additional evidence of liability. Given the
unique circumstances of this case, she should have that
opportunity, either through a new trial or by other means.
Therefore, I would instruct the trial court that it may not
enter a judgment for Armstrong without providing Hill an
opportunity to present all the evidence she may have of
liability.
Wise, J., concurs.
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