Case Title: State v. Howard Carter

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015AP001311

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2018-04-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 WI 40 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP330 & 2015AP1311 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In re the commitment of David Hager, Jr.: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
David Hager, Jr., 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
In re the commitment of Howard Carter: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Howard Carter, 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 373 Wis. 2d 692, 892 N.W.2d 740 
(2015AP330) and 372 Wis. 2d 722, 892 N.W.2d 754 
(2015AP1311) 
PDC No:  2017 WI App 8 – Published (2015AP330) 
and 2017 WI App 9 – Published (2015AP1311) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 19, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 1, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Chippewa (2015AP330), Brown (2015AP1311) 
 
JUDGE: 
James M. Isaacson (2015AP330), Kendall M. Kelley 
(2015AP1311) 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
KELLY, J., concurs, joined by R.G. BRADLEY, J. 
(opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J., dissents, joined by A.W. 
BRADLEY, J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner (2015AP330), there 
were briefs filed by Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney 
 
 
2 
general, and Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.  There was an 
oral argument by Donald V. Latorraca, assistant attorney 
general. 
 
For the respondent-appellant (2015AP330), there was a brief 
filed by and an oral argument by Andrew R. Hinkel, assistant 
state public defender. 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner (2015AP1311), there 
were briefs filed by Len Kachinsky and Kachinsky Law Offices, 
Neenah.  There was an oral argument by Len Kachinsky. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent (2015AP1311), there was a 
brief filed by Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, 
and Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.  There was an oral 
argument by Donald V. Latorraca, assistant attorney general. 
 
 
2018 WI 40
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP330 & 2015AP1311 
(L.C. No. 
2007CI1 & 2007CI3) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the commitment of David Hager, Jr.: 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
David Hager, Jr., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
APR 19, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
In re the commitment of Howard Carter: 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Howard Carter, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
2 
 
REVIEW of two decisions of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed 
and cause remanded in State v. Hager; Affirmed in State v. 
Carter.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This is a review of two 
published decisions of the court of appeals, State v. Hager, 
2017 WI App 8, 373 Wis. 2d 692, 892 N.W.2d 740, and State v. 
Carter, 2017 WI App 9, 373 Wis. 2d 722, 892 N.W.2d 754.1  Both 
cases involve the discharge procedure for a person civilly 
committed as a sexually violent person pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
ch. 980 (2015-16) ("Chapter 980").2  David Hager, Jr., and Howard 
Carter both filed petitions for discharge from commitment as 
sexually violent persons pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.09 with 
the Chippewa County Circuit Court3 and Brown County Circuit 
Court,4 respectively, and both petitions were denied.  Hager and 
Carter appealed. 
¶2 
In Hager, the court of appeals reversed, concluding 
that the circuit court erred in two ways:  (1) by considering 
evidence unfavorable to Hager's discharge petition; and (2) by 
weighing the evidence in favor of the discharge petition against 
                                                 
1 We consolidated these two cases after oral argument 
because they present similar issues and facts. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 The Honorable James. M. Isaacson presiding. 
4 The Honorable Kendall M. Kelley presiding. 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
3 
 
the evidence opposed.  Hager, 373 Wis. 2d 692, ¶5.  Based on its 
review of the record, the court of appeals concluded that Hager 
had satisfied his burden of production5 and reversed and remanded 
the matter to the circuit court with instructions to conduct a 
discharge trial pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.09(3)-(4).  Id.  In 
Carter, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court, 
concluding that Carter had not satisfied the standard it had 
established in Hager.  Carter, 373 Wis. 2d 722, ¶3. 
¶3 
Both cases involve the proper interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 980.09(2), as amended by 2013 Wis. Act 84,6 which 
establishes the procedures for discharge from commitment.  
Carter raises two additional issues before this court:  (1) 
whether § 980.09(2) violates the right to due process of law as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 
1 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution; and (2) whether Act 84 applies retroactively to 
Carter.  We review this last issue, whether Act 84 applies 
retroactively to Carter, through the lens of ineffective 
                                                 
5 The 
party 
carrying 
the 
burden 
of 
production 
must 
"introduce enough evidence on an issue to have the issue decided 
by the fact-finder" and not by the court in a pre-trial ruling.  
Black's Law Dictionary 236 (10th ed. 2014). 
The party carrying the burden of persuasion must "convince 
the fact-finder to view the facts in a way that favors that 
party."  Black's Law Dictionary 236 (10th ed. 2014). 
6 For clarity, we refer to the entire section, as amended, 
as 
"Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.09(2)," 
and 
refer 
to 
the 
specific 
amendments made to § 980.09(2) by Act 84 simply as "Act 84." 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
4 
 
assistance of counsel because Carter's counsel did not contest 
the application of the amended standard to Carter.  See State v. 
Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 768, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999). 
¶4 
We hold as to both Hager and Carter that the court of 
appeals erred in concluding that Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) limits 
circuit courts to considering only the evidence favorable to 
petitions for discharge.  We hold that circuit courts are to 
carefully examine, but not weigh, those portions of the record 
they deem helpful to their consideration of the petition, which 
may include facts both favorable as well as unfavorable to the 
petitioner. 
¶5 
We further hold that Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) does not 
violate the constitutional right to due process of law as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 
1 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
and 
furthermore, 
Carter's 
counsel 
was 
not 
ineffective for failing to challenge retroactive application of 
Act 84 to Carter. 
¶6 
As to Hager, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the matter to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion; as to Carter, we 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals, albeit on different 
grounds. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A.  State v. Hager 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
5 
 
¶7 
Hager was involuntarily committed in 2008 as a 
sexually violent person pursuant to Chapter 9807 as he neared the 
completion of prison sentences he was serving as a result of 
having been convicted of two sexual offenses.   
¶8 
He filed the discharge petition we consider herein on 
February 27, 2014.  Hager attached to the petition the report of 
Hollida Wakefield, M.A.  In her report, Wakefield concluded that 
Hager did not satisfy the third criterion for commitment because 
he was not likely to engage in acts of sexual violence.  She 
based 
this 
conclusion 
on 
the 
results 
of 
two 
actuarial 
instruments, the Static-99R and MATS-1.8 
                                                 
7 The State must prove three criteria in order to commit a 
person as a sexually violent person pursuant to Chapter 980: 
(1) The person was "convicted of a sexually violent 
offense," was "found delinquent of a sexually violent 
offense," or was "found not guilty of a sexually 
violent offense by reason of mental disease or 
defect." 
(2) "The person has a mental disorder." 
(3) "The person is dangerous to others because the 
person's mental disorder makes it likely that he or 
she will engage in acts of sexual violence." 
Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2).  In order to initially commit an 
individual pursuant to Chapter 980, the State must prove these 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt.  Wis. Stat. § 980.05(3)(a).  
In order to continue commitment, the State must prove the same 
three elements by clear and convincing evidence at the discharge 
trial.  Wis. Stat. § 980.09(3). 
8 Understanding this decision requires a grasp of both 
actuarial instruments and their use in Chapter 980 proceedings. 
(continued) 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
6 
 
¶9 
The circuit court denied Hager's petition because 
Wakefield's report did not indicate any change in Hager; rather, 
the circuit court found "Mr. Hager is still the same person he 
was."  The circuit court was not persuaded that the development 
of the Static-99R9 constituted a change in professional knowledge 
sufficient to warrant a discharge trial under the standard 
                                                                                                                                                             
Often (as here), the only testimony in a Chapter 980 
proceeding is expert testimony.  The only witnesses are 
examiners, who describe the sexually violent person's history, 
offer diagnoses as to his mental condition, and opine about his 
dangerousness. 
In the 1990s, researchers began developing and releasing 
tools meant to give an objective picture of a sexually violent 
person's risk of reoffending.  These tools, sometimes called 
actuarial instruments, ask a series of questions about the 
sexually violent person's history and, based on the answers, 
place the sexually violent person in a particular category, 
usually indicated by a number.  Generally, a sexually violent 
person assigned a higher number is believed to present a greater 
risk, on average, than a sexually violent person assigned a 
lower number. 
The developers of these instruments also released tables 
indicating the re-offense rates for groups of sexually violent 
people assigned particular numbers.  Thus, for example, a score 
of 3 on the RRASOR (one of the first actuarial instruments 
developed) corresponded with a group of offenders of whom 24.8 
percent would reoffend within five years.  Those in the business 
of evaluating sex offenders for commitment often rely on these 
numbers in performing their assessments. 
The two actuarial instruments relied on by Hager and 
Carter, the Static-99R and MATS-1, are relatively new.  Neither 
existed at the time Hager and Carter were first committed. 
9 The circuit court did not make any findings regarding the 
MATS-1 in either its original decision or its decision on the 
motion for reconsideration. 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
7 
 
established in State v. Combs, 2006 WI App 137, ¶32, 295 
Wis. 2d 457, 720 N.W.2d 684.10  The court did not find "any 
change in the expert's knowledge of Mr. Hager or his offense." 
¶10 Hager filed a motion for reconsideration, which was 
denied. 
 
In 
its 
order 
denying 
Hager's 
motion 
for 
reconsideration, 
the 
circuit 
court 
amended 
its 
reasoning 
slightly, indicating that it had "tr[ied] to weigh [the] 
reports," and concluded that Hager did not satisfy his burden of 
production.  This appeal followed. 
¶11 The court of appeals determined that Act 84 did not 
abrogate our decision in State v. Arends, 2010 WI 46, 325 
Wis. 2d 1, 784 N.W.2d 513.  Accordingly, the court of appeals 
applied our holding in Arends——that circuit courts are not to 
weigh11 the evidence in favor of the petition against the 
evidence opposed——to Hager.  Hager, 373 Wis. 2d 692, ¶4.  
Rather, Act 84 both increased the burden of production necessary 
for committed individuals to receive a discharge trial and 
                                                 
10 In Combs, the court of appeals interpreted a prior 
version of Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) to require the petitioner to 
present "something more" than facts and professional knowledge 
considered at the last discharge trial in order to obtain a new 
discharge trial.  State v. Combs, 2006 WI App 137, ¶32, 295 
Wis. 2d 457, 720 N.W.2d 684.  Thus, new facts regarding the 
petitioner's condition (e.g., treatment milestones) or new 
research regarding likelihood to reoffend (e.g., new actuarial 
tools) would satisfy this standard.  Id. 
11 A circuit court weighs evidence when it "accept[s] one 
version of facts, [and] reject[s] another."  State v. Stietz, 
2017 WI 58, ¶18, 375 Wis. 2d 572, 895 N.W.2d 796 (quoting State 
v. Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d 122, 152, 258 N.W.2d 260 (1977)).   
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
8 
 
codified certain cases, namely Combs and its progeny.  Id., 
¶¶32, 40-41.  The court further concluded that Act 84 did not 
change our holding in Arends that circuit courts are limited to 
considering only the items in the record favorable to the 
petitioner.  Id., ¶37.  Under the court of appeals' reading of 
Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2), Hager had alleged sufficient new facts 
to 
warrant 
a 
discharge 
trial 
because 
Wakefield's 
report 
satisfied the criteria set forth in Combs by including new 
scientific research; namely, the Static-99R and MATS-1.  The 
court of appeals reversed and remanded the matter to the circuit 
court with instructions to conduct a discharge trial.  Id., 
¶¶45-46. 
B.  State v. Carter 
¶12 Carter was involuntarily committed as a sexually 
violent person under Chapter 980 in 2009 as he neared the 
completion of prison sentences he was serving as a result of 
convictions of multiple sexual offenses. 
¶13 He filed the discharge petition we consider herein on 
December 
13, 
2013, 
which 
was 
the 
day 
before 
Act 
84's 
publication.  Carter's attorney never challenged the application 
of the new standard to Carter. 
¶14 Carter attached to his petition the report of Dr. 
Diane Lytton, Ph.D.  Dr. Lytton concluded that Carter did not 
satisfy the third criterion for commitment.  She based this 
conclusion on three opinions.  First, Dr. Lytton stated that in 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
9 
 
her professional opinion, one of Carter's diagnosed mental 
disorders, paraphilia not otherwise specified, nonconsent,12 is 
not properly applied to a person such as Carter, who has 
forcibly raped another.  Second, Dr. Lytton opined that Carter's 
other 
diagnosed 
mental 
disorder, 
antisocial 
personality 
disorder,13 does not make it likely he will engage in acts of 
sexual violence.  Third, Dr. Lytton opined that, based upon her 
application of the Static-99R and MATS-1 assessments, Carter is 
not likely to engage in acts of sexual violence. 
¶15 The circuit court concluded that Dr. Lytton's report 
was insufficient to satisfy the Act 84 standard.  The court 
observed that relevant information from Carter's past did not 
appear in Dr. Lytton's report.  The court also noted the lack of 
citation and analysis regarding the validity of the Static-99R 
and MATS-1, which Dr. Lytton had relied on heavily in her 
                                                 
12 Dr. Lytton did not define paraphilia, not otherwise 
specified, nonconsent.  Dr. Woodley defined it as "intense, 
recurrent sexually arousing . . . fantasies, urges, or behaviors 
to other than consenting adults . . . which the person acted 
on . . . ."    See also American Psychiatric Association, 
Diagnostic and Statistics Manual of Mental Disorders 705 (5th 
ed. 2013). 
13 Dr. 
Lytton 
did 
not 
define 
antisocial 
personality 
disorder.  Dr. Woodley defined it as "a long-term maladaptive 
pattern of behavior involving . . . the following:  repeated 
unlawful acts, deceitfulness, violating the rights and safety of 
others, impulsivity or failure to plan ahead, repeated lying, 
consistent irresponsibility, and lack of remorse for harming 
others."  See also American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic 
and Statistics Manual of Mental Disorders 659 (5th ed. 2013). 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
10 
 
report.  The court described Dr. Lytton's report as "essentially 
an unsupported assertion." 
¶16 Carter then filed a post-commitment motion alleging 
that the circuit court's denial of a discharge trial was 
improper for four reasons:  (1) the court committed plain error 
in applying Act 84 to Carter; (2) Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) 
violates his right to due process; (3) he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to contest 
application of Act 84 to Carter; and (4) he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to contest 
application of Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1), the rule of evidence 
governing expert testimony,14 to the expert reports filed in 
Carter's case.  The circuit court denied the motion, concluding:  
(1) Act 84 is procedural, and thus applies retroactively to 
Carter; (2) § 980.09(2) does not violate Carter's right to due 
process because he can still obtain a discharge trial upon 
making a sufficient showing; (3) Carter's counsel was not 
deficient for failing to challenge the application of Act 84 
because the act did apply retroactively, and——even if his 
                                                 
14 Carter appealed the circuit court's conclusion that his 
trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to contest the 
application of Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1) to the expert reports in 
his case.  State v. Carter, 2017 WI App 9, ¶10 n.4, 373 
Wis. 2d 722, 892 N.W.2d 754.  However, he does not raise this 
issue for our review, and we do not consider it further.  See 
State v. Sulla, 2016 WI 46, ¶7 n.5, 369 Wis. 2d 225, 880 
N.W.2d 659 (quoting Jankee v. Clark Cty., 2000 WI 64, ¶7, 235 
Wis. 2d 700, 612 N.W.2d 297) ("If an issue is not raised in the 
petition for review or in a cross petition, 'the issue is not 
before us.'"). 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
11 
 
counsel's performance had been deficient in this regard——Carter 
suffered no prejudice because the court would have denied the 
petition even if it had used the prior standard; and (4) 
Carter's counsel was not deficient for failing to object to 
application of § 907.02(1) to the expert reports as the decision 
to do so was a legitimate strategic decision based on counsel's 
assessment that application of § 907.02(1) usually accrued to 
the benefit of the committed person, and, furthermore, Carter 
suffered no prejudice because the court would have made the same 
conclusions about Dr. Lytton's report under the prior standard.  
¶17 The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the 
amendments made by Act 84 did apply retroactively, therefore 
Carter's counsel was not deficient for failing to challenge 
retroactive application of Act 84.  Carter, 373 Wis. 2d 722, 
¶22.  The court of appeals further concluded that Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.09(2) does not violate the right to due process because, 
contrary to Carter's arguments before that court, § 980.09(2) 
does not require circuit courts to weigh evidence.  Id., ¶20.  
Because Carter did not contend that he had met the burden as 
established in Act 84,15 the court of appeals treated its holding 
that the amendments made by Act 84 applied to Carter as 
dispositive of his appeal.  Id., ¶21. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
                                                 
15 In his opening brief to the court of appeals, Carter 
"reluctantly" agreed with the State that he did not satisfy Act 
84's burden.  Before this court, Carter argues that he satisfies 
Act 84's burden as interpreted by the court of appeals in Hager.  
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
12 
 
¶18 This 
case 
requires 
us 
to 
interpret 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.09(2) to determine the burden of production a petitioner 
must satisfy in order to receive a discharge trial.  Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law we review de novo.  Arends, 
325 Wis. 2d 1, ¶13.  We give words their "common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning" unless a technical or specialized meaning 
applies.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  We interpret 
the statute in its full context in order to avoid creating 
absurd results or rendering any statutory language surplusage.  
Id., ¶46.  Though legislative intent may illuminate what the 
words of a statute mean, "it is the enacted law, not the 
unenacted intent, that is binding . . . ."  Id., ¶44. 
¶19 We then determine whether Hager and Carter are 
entitled to discharge trials.  We review the circuit court's 
determination of whether the statutory criteria for a discharge 
trial have been met de novo.  Combs, 295 Wis. 2d 457, ¶21.  
¶20 Carter alleges that Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) violates 
the right to due process.  The constitutionality of a statute is 
a question of law we review de novo.  State v. Alger, 2015 WI 3, 
¶22, 360 Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346.  A party challenging the 
constitutionality of a statute carries a heavy burden to 
overcome the presumption of constitutionality.  Id.  In a facial 
challenge, such as the one Carter makes, the "challenger must 
establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there are no possible 
applications or interpretations of the statute which would be 
constitutional."  State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶30, 264 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
13 
 
Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328 (quoting State v. Wants, 224 
Wis. 2d 679, 690, 592 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1999)).16 
¶21 Carter alleges that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to contest the application of Act 84 to his discharge 
petition.  Ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question 
of law and fact.  State v. Lombard, 2004 WI 95, ¶46, 273 
Wis. 2d 538, 684 N.W.2d 103.  The circuit court's factual 
findings as to what counsel did and did not do are upheld unless 
clearly erroneous.  Id.  "Whether counsel's performance was 
ineffective is a question of law we review de novo."  Id. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶22 The consolidated appeals of Hager and Carter present 
three issues for our review.  First, we must determine how 
circuit courts are to apply the "would likely conclude" standard 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.09(2). 
 
Next, 
we 
consider 
whether 
§ 980.09(2) violates the right to due process.  Finally, we 
address whether Carter's counsel was ineffective for failing to 
contest retroactive application of Act 84 to Carter. 
 
A.  Wisconsin Stat. § 980.09(2) Permits Circuit Courts to 
Consider the Entire Record, but Not to Weigh the Evidence Within 
It, to Determine Whether the Statutory Criteria for a Discharge 
Trial have been Met. 
1.  The changes made to Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) by Act 84. 
                                                 
16 This is in contrast to an as-applied challenge, which 
requires the court to determine whether a statute may be 
constitutionally applied to the challenger under the facts of 
the particular case.  State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶43, 264 
Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785. 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
14 
 
¶23 In order to fully appreciate the changes made to Wis. 
Stat. § 980.09(2) by Act 84, we first set forth the statutory 
criteria for a discharge trial as they existed prior to the 
changes made to them by Act 84.  Prior to those changes, the 
relevant portion of § 980.09 stated: 
The court shall deny the [discharge] petition under 
this section without a hearing unless the petition 
alleges facts from which the court or jury may 
conclude the person's condition has changed since the 
date of his or her initial commitment order so that 
the person does not meet the criteria for commitment 
as a sexually violent person. 
(2) The court . . . may hold a hearing to determine if 
it contains facts from which the court or jury may 
conclude that the person does not meet the criteria 
for commitment as a sexually violent person. In 
determining under this subsection whether facts exist 
that might warrant such a conclusion, the court shall 
consider any current or past reports filed under s. 
980.07, relevant facts in the petition and in the 
state’s written response, arguments of counsel, and 
any supporting documentation provided by the person or 
the state. 
Wis. Stat. § 980.09(1)-(2) (2005-06) (emphasis added).17  We 
construed this as creating a two-part review process.  Arends, 
325 Wis. 2d 1, ¶3. 
¶24 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.09(1) (2005-06) first required a 
paper review to determine whether the petition presented facts 
such that the trier of fact "may conclude" that the person no 
                                                 
17 Even though Wis. Stat. § 980.09 (2005-06) does not 
contain any subsection (1), we will refer to the paragraph 
preceding subsection (2) as subsection (1), as we did in Arends.  
State v. Arends, 2010 WI 46, ¶23 n.16, 325 Wis. 2d 1, 784 
N.W.2d 513.   
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
15 
 
longer fit the criteria for commitment, Arends, 325 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶27, analogous to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.06(2)(a)(6), id., ¶29. 
¶25 Second, Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) (2005-06) required 
circuit courts to determine whether the record contained facts 
that could allow a trier of fact to find that the petitioner was 
no longer a sexually violent person.  Arends, 325 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶38.  Circuit courts were not to weigh any evidence, but merely 
review the record for any facts in support of discharge.  Id., 
¶40.  We viewed this level of review as analogous to a motion to 
dismiss at the close of evidence pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.14(4).  Id., ¶42. 
¶26 The legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 980.09 in 2013.  
2013 Wis. Act 84.  The current version states: 
(1) The court shall deny the [discharge] petition 
under this section without a hearing unless the 
petition alleges facts from which the court or jury 
would likely conclude the person's condition has 
changed since the most recent order denying a petition 
for discharge after a hearing on the merits, or since 
the date of his or her initial commitment order if the 
person has never received a hearing on the merits of a 
discharge petition, so that the person no longer meets 
the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent 
person. 
. . .  
(2) In reviewing the petition, the court may hold a 
hearing to determine if the person's condition has 
sufficiently changed such that a court or jury would 
likely conclude the person no longer meets the 
criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person. 
In determining under this subsection whether the 
person's condition has sufficiently changed such that 
a court or jury would likely conclude that the person 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
16 
 
no longer meets the criteria for commitment, the court 
may consider the record, including evidence introduced 
at the initial commitment trial or the most recent 
trial on a petition for discharge, any current or past 
reports filed under s. 980.07, relevant facts in the 
petition 
and 
in 
the 
state's 
written 
response, 
arguments of counsel, and any supporting documentation 
provided by the person or the state. 
Wis. Stat. § 980.09(1), (2) (2015-16) (emphasis added). 
 
2.  Circuit courts may consider the entire record when deciding 
whether the statutory criteria for a discharge trial have been 
met. 
¶27 Hager and Carter argue that circuit courts are 
permitted to consider only those portions of the evidentiary 
record favorable to discharge when considering a petition for 
discharge from commitment filed pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.09.  
We disagree.  The language of § 980.09(2) permits circuit courts 
to consider the entire record——not just the facts favorable to 
the petitioner——when determining whether the statutory criteria 
for a discharge trial have been met.  The legislature set forth 
a broad scope of materials circuit courts may consider: 
In determining . . . whether the person's condition 
has sufficiently changed such that a court or jury 
would likely conclude that the person no longer meets 
the criteria for commitment, the court may consider 
the record, including evidence introduced at the 
initial commitment trial or the most recent trial on a 
petition for discharge, any current or past reports 
filed under § 980.07, relevant facts in the petition 
and in the state's written response, arguments of 
counsel, and any supported documentation provided by 
the person or the state.  
Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2).  The result of a plain reading of "the 
court may consider the record" is that courts are free to review 
everything in the record, no matter whether it is beneficial or 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
17 
 
detrimental to the petitioner's cause.  In order to illustrate 
the breadth of materials circuit courts may consider, the 
legislature included a host of examples of such materials, which 
by 
their 
nature 
will 
contain 
facts 
detrimental 
to 
the 
petitioner, including (1) "evidence introduced at the initial 
commitment trial or the most recent trial on a petition for 
discharge"; (2) "any current or past reports filed under 
§ 980.07"; (3) "relevant facts . . . in the state's written 
response"; (4) "arguments of counsel"; and (5) "any supporting 
documentation provided by . . . the state."  Id.  If, as Hager 
and Carter contend, circuit courts were limited to considering 
the facts favorable to the petitioner, the legislature would 
have had no reason to list these materials as examples of what 
courts may consider during their review of the discharge 
petition.  Accordingly, we reject Hager and Carter's proposed 
interpretation because we conclude that it would impermissibly 
render this language surplusage.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46. 
 
3.  We conclude that circuit courts may not weigh the evidence 
in determining whether the statutory criteria for a discharge 
trial have been met. 
¶28 Hager and Carter argue that circuit courts may not 
weigh the evidence in favor of a discharge petition against the 
evidence opposed to the petition when determining whether the 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
18 
 
committed person has met his burden of production.  We agree.18  
The court of appeals correctly held that Act 84 does not permit, 
much less require, circuit courts to weigh the evidence when 
they consider whether the statutory criteria for a discharge 
trial have been met.  As we held in Arends, if the legislature 
wanted 
circuit 
courts 
to 
weigh 
evidence, 
it 
could 
use 
appropriate 
terms 
of 
art 
such 
as 
"probable 
cause" 
or 
"preponderance of the evidence" to so indicate.  Arends, 325 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶37.  It did not use such terms in previous 
iterations of Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2), and it did not elect to do 
so in Act 84, either. 
¶29 The legislature did not provide a definition for what 
it meant when it directed circuit courts to "consider" the 
record.  Such being the case, we may ascertain the term's plain 
and ordinary meaning through sources such as dictionaries.  
Kalal, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
¶¶45, 
53. 
 
"Consider" 
has 
many 
dictionary definitions, but all coalesce around the concept of 
careful or attentive examination.  See, e.g., Black's Law 
                                                 
18 We note that in its briefs to us, the State withdrew its 
argument that Act 84 requires circuit courts to weigh the 
evidence, and now concedes that Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) does not 
allow circuit courts to weigh the evidence.  We choose to 
address this issue because to do so is helpful to our analysis 
of the proper application of § 980.09(2).  See State v. Hunt, 
2014 WI 102, ¶42 n.11, 360 Wis. 2d 576, 851 N.W.2d 434 ("we are 
not bound by a party's concession of law"). 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
19 
 
Dictionary 306 (6th ed. 1990)19 ("To fix the mind on, with a view 
to careful examination; to examine"); The New Century Dictionary 
310 (1952) ("To view attentively, or scrutinize; also, to 
contemplate mentally"). 
¶30 This leads us to the conclusion that when they review 
petitions for discharge, courts are to carefully examine, but 
not weigh, those portions of the record they deem helpful to 
their consideration of the petition, including facts both 
favorable as well as unfavorable to the petitioner.  That is, 
circuit courts cannot "accept one version of facts, [and] reject 
another."  State v. Stietz, 2017 WI 58, ¶18, 375 Wis. 2d 572, 
895 N.W.2d 796 (quoting State v. Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d 122, 152, 
258 N.W.2d 260 (1977)).  However, as we recognized in Arends, 
courts need not "take every document a party submits at face 
value" but should scrutinize the submissions to ensure they 
contain facts "upon which a trier of fact could reasonably 
rely."  Arends, 325 Wis. 2d 1, ¶39 (emphasis added).  
¶31 We note that by holding that the plain language of 
Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) does not allow circuit courts to weigh 
the evidence, we not only correctly apply the plain meaning of 
the statute, we also avoid constitutional conflict.  This is so 
because the effect of allowing circuit courts to weigh the 
                                                 
19 More recent editions of Black's Law Dictionary do not 
contain a definition for "consider."  See Black's Law Dictionary 
370 (10th ed. 2014); Black's Law Dictionary 347 (9th ed. 2009); 
Black's 
Law 
Dictionary 
324 
(8th 
ed. 
2004); 
Black's 
Law 
Dictionary 300 (7th ed. 1999).  
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
20 
 
evidence 
would 
be 
to 
impermissibly 
shift 
the 
burden 
of 
persuasion to the committed person to prove he is no longer a 
sexually violent person.  See Arends, 325 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶40-41; cf 
State v. West, 2011 WI 83, ¶81, 336 Wis. 2d 578, 800 N.W.2d 929 
(construing supervised release statute to place burden of 
persuasion on the committed person because the statute requires 
circuit courts to weigh evidence and make certain factual 
findings to grant supervised release).  Shifting the burden of 
persuasion 
for 
discharge 
to 
the 
committed 
person 
is 
impermissible because to do so would violate the committed 
person's right to due process.  See infra, ¶¶41-48.  While 
avoidance of constitutional conflict does not drive our reading 
of the statute, where we can reasonably adopt a saving 
construction of a statute to avoid a constitutional conflict, we 
do so.  Milwaukee Branch of NAACP v. Walker, 2014 WI 98, ¶¶63-
64, 357 Wis. 2d 469, 851 N.W.2d 262 (citing McConnell v. Fed. 
Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 180 (2003), and Semtek Int'l Inc. 
v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503 (2001)).  Therefore, 
our construction of § 980.09(2) to preclude circuit courts from 
weighing the evidence is commanded by both the plain language of 
the statute and the constitution.    
 
4.  Applying Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) 
a.  Application of Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) to Hager 
¶32 Both the court of appeals and the circuit court 
applied an incorrect interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) to 
Hager's petition.  The court of appeals erred in concluding that 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
21 
 
courts may consider only the evidence in the record favorable to 
the petitioner.  The circuit court erred when it "weigh[ed] 
[the] reports."  Though we could independently consider the 
record to determine whether a factfinder "would likely conclude" 
that Hager no longer meets the criteria for commitment, we 
determine that the better course as to Hager is to remand this 
matter to the circuit court "so that it may have an opportunity 
to conduct a review under § 980.09(2) following the procedures 
and applying the standards we announce today."  Arends, 325 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶48. 
b.  Application of Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) to Carter 
¶33 In Carter's case, we see no need for remand, as the 
circuit court properly applied Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) to 
Carter's discharge petition.  Our consideration of the record 
satisfies us that the circuit court carefully examined, but did 
not weigh, those portions of the record it deemed helpful to its 
consideration of the petition, including facts both favorable as 
well as unfavorable to the petitioner.   
¶34 First, it considered "the most recent reports, and 
generally, the file as well."  Next, it did not weigh the 
evidence.  The circuit court did not "accept one version of 
facts, [and] reject another."  Stietz, 375 Wis. 2d 572, ¶18.  
Rather, it concluded that the lack of supporting analysis for 
Dr. Lytton's conclusions meant that a factfinder could not 
"reasonably rely" on the report in reaching its conclusion. 
Arends, 325 Wis. 2d 1, ¶39. 
 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
22 
 
B.  Wisconsin Stat. § 980.09(2) Does Not Violate the Right to 
Due Process of Law. 
¶35 Carter argues that Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) violates the 
right to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution20 and Article I, 
Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.21  He argues that "Act 
84 pushes [Chapter 980] . . . down the slippery slope of 
unconstitutional 
preventative 
detention 
and 
violates 
due 
process" by shifting the burden of persuasion to the petitioner 
to prove he is no longer a sexually violent person.  In essence, 
Carter argues, Act 84 makes "discharge without approval from the 
State practically impossible," unless we adopt the court of 
appeals' construction in Hager. 
¶36 The State argues that rational basis scrutiny applies 
because the procedures for obtaining a discharge trial do not 
"implicate[] a fundamental right or discriminate[] against a 
protected class."  Carter argues that "[a] strict scrutiny 
                                                 
20 The 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
constitution 
states, 
in 
relevant 
part: 
 
"[n]o 
State 
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . ."  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 
§ 1.   
21 Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
states:  "All people are born equally free and independent, and 
have certain inherent rights; among these are life, liberty and 
the pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights, governments 
are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of 
the governed."  The protections afforded by Article I, Section 1 
of the Wisconsin Constitution are the "substantial equivalent" 
to those afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.   Neiman v. Am. Nat'l Prop. & Cas. Co., 
2000 WI 83, ¶8, 236 Wis. 2d 411, 613 N.W.2d 160. 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
23 
 
analysis is appropriate in Chapter 980 cases because of the 
liberty interest involved."   
¶37 We agree with the State and conclude that rational 
basis review applies.  Involuntary commitments in general 
implicate 
the 
fundamental 
right 
to 
be 
free 
from 
bodily 
restraint. 
 
Alger, 
360 
Wis. 2d 193, 
¶44. 
 
However, 
the 
procedures used in commitment proceedings do not implicate a 
fundamental right.  See id. (citing Milwaukee Cty. v. Mary F.-
R., 2013 WI 92, ¶38, 351 Wis. 2d 273, 839 N.W.2d 581).   
¶38 For example, in Alger, the committed person alleged 
that he was entitled to application of the amended version of 
Wis. Stat. § 907.02, which regulates the admissibility of expert 
testimony, in his discharge trial.  Id., ¶2.  We determined that 
he was not entitled to application of the amended statute.  Id., 
¶38.  The committed person further alleged that his right to due 
process required applying the amended version of the statute, 
and that it implicated a fundamental right triggering strict 
scrutiny.  Id., ¶40.  We held that "[a]lthough Chapter 980 
involuntary commitment implicates the right to freedom from 
bodily restraint, the availability of the [amended version of 
§ 907.02] in a Chapter 980 proceeding does not implicate that 
right 
so 
as 
to 
trigger 
strict 
scrutiny." 
 
Id., 
¶44.  
Consequently, "[t]here is no right to a particular evidentiary 
[standard] in a Chapter 980 discharge petition trial."  Id.  
¶39 Similarly, the burden of production required to obtain 
a discharge trial is a procedural matter that does not implicate 
the committed person's fundamental right to freedom from bodily 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
24 
 
restraint.  Consequently, we apply rational basis review as we 
did in Alger.  Under rational basis review, legislation is 
constitutional "unless it is 'patently arbitrary' and bears no 
rational relationship to a legitimate government interest."  
Id., ¶39 (quoting State v. Smith, 2010 WI 16, ¶12, 323 
Wis. 2d 377, 780 N.W.2d 90). 
¶40 The right to due process includes the right to both 
substantive due process as well as procedural due process.  
Substantive due process protects individuals from government 
action that "abridges the Constitution's fundamental constraints 
upon the content of what government may do to people under the 
guise of law" even if the action "adher[es] to the forms of 
law."  State v. Laxton, 2002 WI 82, ¶10 n.8, 254 Wis. 2d 185, 
647 N.W.2d 784 (quoting Reginald D. v. State, 193 Wis. 2d 299, 
307, 533 N.W.2d 181 (1995)).  Procedural due process requires 
that government action "be implemented in a fair manner."  Id. 
(citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)). 
 
1.  Act 84 does not violate the right to substantive due 
process. 
¶41 The right to substantive due process requires that the 
State carry the burden of persuasion at the initial commitment 
trial and at every subsequent discharge trial.  Addington v. 
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-32 (1979); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 
U.S. 71, 81-82 (1992).  The right to substantive due process is 
not violated, however, if committed persons carry a burden of 
production to ensure that a discharge trial would be worthwhile.  
State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 327, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995). 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
25 
 
¶42 We 
have 
recognized 
that 
Chapter 
980 
"passes 
constitutional muster because the physical confinement of the 
individual is linked to the dangerousness of the committed 
person."  State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 81, ¶66, 254 Wis. 2d 215, 657 
N.W.2d 762; see also Combs, 295 Wis. 2d 457, ¶28 (citing Post, 
197 Wis. 2d at 307 n.14, 313-16, 325-27) (internal quotes 
omitted) ("[P]eriodic re-examination and . . . hearing[s] for 
discharge . . . are among the protections that the supreme court 
has considered significant in concluding that Wis. Stat. ch. 980 
does not violate . . . the right to due process.").  An 
important consideration in this regard is the availability of 
various 
"methods . . . for 
regularly 
determining 
the 
dangerousness of the person and reducing or removing the 
physical restrictions when the person is less or no longer 
dangerous."  Rachel, 254 Wis. 2d 215, ¶66.  
¶43 The fundamental structure of Wis. Stat. § 980.09——
which we have consistently held comports with due process——was 
not changed by Act 84.  See, e.g., Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 327.  
Under both the Act 84 standard and the prior standard, the 
committed person receives a discharge trial only upon satisfying 
a burden of production; if the burden of production is met, a 
discharge trial is conducted where the State must prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that the person continues to meet the 
three criteria for commitment.  Compare Wis. Stat. § 980.09 
(2005-06) with Wis. Stat. § 980.09 (2015-16).  Because we 
conclude that § 980.09(2) does not permit circuit courts to 
weigh the evidence, Act 84 has not shifted the burden of 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
26 
 
persuasion to the committed person, as  the legislatively-
imposed burden on the committed person is not to convince the 
factfinder that he is no longer sexually dangerous.  Rather, his 
burden is to demonstrate to the circuit court that he is likely 
to succeed at a discharge trial.  "The principles of due process 
are not violated if a burden of production——as opposed to a 
burden of persuasion——is placed on the" committed person to 
present "some" evidence that he will prevail at a discharge 
trial.  State v. Shulz, 102 Wis. 2d 423, 430, 307 N.W.2d 151 
(1981) (applying doctrine in context of affirmative defenses in 
criminal proceedings).   
¶44 The changes made by Act 84 are rationally related to 
at least two legitimate government interests:  (1) protection of 
the public, State ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, ¶30, 
262 Wis. 2d 720, 665 N.W.2d 155; and (2) conserving public 
resources, see Arends, 325 Wis. 2d 1, ¶22.  Act 84 is reasonably 
related to protecting the public because it ensures a discharge 
trial only when a committed person presents sufficient facts to 
show that his condition has changed; as we identified in 
Marberry, "[r]elease of a [person committed pursuant to Chapter] 
980 . . . whose dangerousness or mental disorder has not abated 
[does not] serve[] to protect the public . . . ."  Marberry, 262 
Wis. 2d 720, ¶30 (quoting State ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2002 
WI App 133, ¶39, 254 Wis. 2d 690, 548 N.W.2d 522 (Brown, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part)).  Further, Act 84 is 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
27 
 
reasonably related to conserving public resources because it 
ensures that a discharge trial occurs only when the committed 
person demonstrates a likelihood of success in a discharge 
trial.   
2.  Act 84 does not violate the right to procedural due process. 
¶45 Procedural 
due 
process 
claims 
are 
analyzed 
by 
balancing three factors: 
(1) the private interest that will be affected by the 
state action;  
(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the 
private interest through the procedures utilized and 
the probable value of added or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and  
(3) the state's interest, which includes  the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens 
that the added or substitute procedural requirements 
would impose. 
State v. Kaminski, 2009 WI App 175, ¶13, 322 Wis. 2d 653, 777 
N.W.2d 654 
(quoting 
Patterson 
v. 
Bd. 
of 
Regents, 
119 
Wis. 2d 570, 580-81, 350 N.W.2d 612 (1984)). 
¶46 No party disputes that the private interest of liberty 
from physical restraint is a substantial interest.  See id., 
("[The committed person] has correctly identified the strong 
liberty interest implicated by Wis. Stat. ch. 980 . . . .").   
¶47 The risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty is slight 
because the standard ensures that a committed person receives a 
discharge trial when new facts are present that provide a 
likelihood of success at a discharge trial.  The only way to 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
28 
 
eliminate all risk of erroneous deprivation is to grant 
discharge trials on request no matter the facts alleged; 
however, this would infringe the State's interests in protecting 
the public from sexually violent offenders and preserving 
resources.  Marberry, 262 Wis. 2d 720, ¶30 (recognizing that 
protecting the public from sexually violent persons is a 
legitimate government interest); State v. Velez, 224 Wis. 2d 1, 
12, 589 N.W.2d 9 (1999) (recognizing that "conserve[ing] scarce 
judicial resources" is a legitimate government interest).  Act 
84 strikes a reasonable balance between ensuring committed 
persons are released when they are no longer sexually dangerous, 
protecting the public, and preserving scarce judicial resources 
by ensuring discharge trials occur only when the committed 
person is likely to succeed. 
¶48 In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the 
requirements of an initial burden of production imposed upon 
Carter by § 980.09(2) do not violate the right to due process as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 
1 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
 
C.  Carter's Counsel did not Perform Deficiently by Failing to 
Contest Application of Act 84 to Carter. 
¶49 Carter alleges that his counsel was ineffective 
because he did not challenge the application of Act 84 to 
Carter's discharge petition, even though the petition was filed 
before Act 84's effective date. 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
29 
 
¶50 In order to prevail on his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, Carter must prove that his counsel performed 
deficiently and that the deficiency prejudiced him.  State v. 
Lombard, 2004 WI 95, ¶49, 273 Wis. 2d 538, 684 N.W.2d 103 
(applying Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), to 
Chapter 980 commitment).  If Carter fails to prove either 
deficient performance or prejudice, we need not consider the 
other.  Id., ¶50.   
¶51 Though 
statutes 
generally 
apply 
prospectively, 
procedural and remedial statutes may apply retroactively.  
Trinity Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Co., 2007 WI 88, ¶40, 302 
Wis. 2d 299, 735 N.W.2d 1.  We determine whether a statute 
applies retroactively in three steps.  Id., ¶¶36-54.  First, we 
examine the text of the statute for an express statement 
concerning retroactivity.  Id., ¶36.  If the statute does not 
contain an express statement concerning retroactivity, we 
determine whether the statute is procedural or substantive and 
apply a presumption of retroactivity to procedural statutes.  
Id., ¶40.  If a statute is procedural, we determine whether one 
of three exceptions to retroactivity overcomes the presumption:  
interference 
with 
a 
vested 
right, 
interference 
with 
a 
contractual right, or imposition of an unreasonable burden.  
Id., ¶¶53-54.  We conclude that Act 84 applies retroactively 
because it includes within it no statements concerning its 
retroactivity; the Act is procedural in nature; and none of the 
three exceptions to the presumption of retroactive application 
of procedural statutes are present.  Accordingly, we hold that 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
30 
 
Act 84 applies retroactively to Carter.  Because Act 84 applies 
to Carter, his counsel could not have been deficient for failing 
to contest the retroactive application of Act 84 before the 
circuit court. 
 
1.  Act 84 contains no language concerning retroactive 
application. 
¶52 We look first to the language of Act 84.  Trinity 
Petroleum, 302 Wis. 2d 299, ¶36.  We conclude that Act 84 does 
not contain any language concerning its retroactive application.  
See 2013 Wis. Act 84. 
2.  Act 84 is procedural. 
¶53 Next, we consider whether Act 84 is substantive or 
procedural.  Trinity Petroleum, 302 Wis. 2d 299, ¶39.  If it is 
procedural, the presumption of retroactivity attaches; if it is 
substantive, 
the 
statute 
is 
presumed 
prospective. 
 
Id.  
Procedural 
statutes 
"prescribe[] 
the 
method . . . used 
in 
enforcing a right or remedy" whereas substantive statutes 
"create[], define[], and regulate[] rights and obligations."  
Id., ¶41 & n.25 (citing Betthauser v. Med. Protective Co., 172 
Wis. 2d 141, 147-48, 493 N.W.2d 40 (1992)). 
¶54 Carter concedes that Act 84 is procedural.  We agree.  
The substantive right at issue is the right to "an adversary 
hearing at which the State must prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that he [continues to be] demonstrably dangerous to the 
community."  Foucha, 504 U.S. at 81.  The substantive right is 
not to a certain burden of production to obtain the hearing 
described in Foucha.  Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 327.  Act 84 changes 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
31 
 
the method used to determine whether he is entitled to a 
discharge trial, but does not change the nature of the discharge 
trial itself, and so is procedural in nature. 
 
3.  None of the exceptions to retroactivity overcome the 
presumption of retroactivity for procedural statutes. 
a.  Carter does not have a vested right to a discharge trial. 
¶55 We turn next to a consideration of whether any of the 
three exceptions to retroactive application of a procedural 
statute overcome the presumption of retroactivity.  Id., ¶53.  
The first exception precludes retroactive application of a 
procedural statute if such application would interfere with a 
vested right.  Id., ¶54.  A right becomes vested when it is 
"presently legally enforceable . . . not dependent on uncertain 
future events."  Lands' End, Inc. v. City of Dodgeville, 2016 WI 
64, ¶68, 370 Wis. 2d 500, 881 N.W.2d 702. 
¶56 Carter has a constitutional right to a discharge trial 
"under the appropriate circumstances."  State v. Richard, 2014 
WI App 28, ¶17, 353 Wis. 2d 219, 844 N.W.2d 370.  Indeed, this 
ability to obtain a discharge trial is fundamental to Chapter 
980's constitutionality.  Id.  However, a right cannot be vested 
if contingent on some uncertain future event.  Lands' End, 370 
Wis. 2d 500, ¶50.   
¶57 Lands' End is instructive.  In that case, Lands' End 
made a statutory offer of settlement for $724,000 pursuant to 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
32 
 
Wis. Stat. § 807.01(4) (2009-10),22 which the defendant rejected.  
Id., ¶14.  Lands' End eventually recovered $724,292.68.  Id., 
¶16.  Lands' End was thus entitled to interest on its judgment 
pursuant to § 807.01(4) because it recovered more than was 
offered in the statutory offer of settlement.  Id., ¶17.  The 
question was whether Lands' End was entitled to 12 percent 
interest pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 807.01(4) (2009-2010), which 
was in effect when Lands' End made its offer of settlement, or 
one percent plus prime pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 807.01(4) (2013-
14), which was in effect when judgment was entered in favor of 
Lands' End.  See id., ¶¶17-18.  We held that Lands' End was 
entitled to interest at the rate of one percent plus prime 
because the right to interest did not vest until a judgment 
exceeding the statutory offer was entered.  Id., ¶72.  That is, 
the right to interest on a judgment exceeding the statutory 
offer is contingent upon such a judgment being entered.  Id.   
¶58 Similarly, Carter's right to a discharge trial was 
contingent on his meeting the burden of production set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2).  We agree with the court of appeals that 
satisfying the burden of production as set out in § 980.09(2) 
constitutes 
the 
"appropriate 
circumstances" 
entitling 
a 
                                                 
22 Wis. Stat. § 807.01 encourages settlement in civil 
actions by providing incentives for parties to make and accept 
settlement offers.  Subsection four, at issue in Lands' End, 
Inc. v. City of Dodgeville, 2016 WI 64, 370 Wis. 2d 500, 881 
N.W.2d 702, awards interest from the date of a statutory offer 
of settlement if the prevailing party recovers more than was 
offered.  § 807.01(4).   
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
33 
 
petitioner to a discharge trial.  Carter, 373 Wis. 2d 722, ¶18.  
Thus, the right could not vest until Carter met that burden of 
production, which he has not done. 
 
b.  Carter does not have a contractual right to a discharge 
trial. 
¶59 The second exception to retroactive application of a 
procedural statute is whether it interferes with a contractual 
right.  Trinity Petroleum, 302 Wis. 2d 299, ¶53.  No party 
claims that Carter had any contractual right to a discharge 
trial, and we cannot find any basis to conclude that he does. 
 
c.  Carter never articulates how retroactive application of Act 
84 unreasonably burdens him. 
¶60 The final exception to retroactive application of a 
procedural statute applies where a party faces an unreasonable 
burden if required to comply with the new statute.  Id.  Carter 
never articulates what "burden" he believes was imposed, much 
less an unreasonable one.  Carter's argument on this exception 
is a single sentence, stating: 
Carter submits the new burden imposed on him to 
warrant a discharge trial ("allegations of facts" or 
"change in a person's condition" from the record as a 
whole from which the court or jury would "likely" 
conclude the person's condition has changed since the 
most recent order denying a petition for discharge 
after 
a 
hearing 
on 
the 
merits) 
would 
be 
an 
unreasonable one. 
Carter never articulates what about retroactive application of 
Act 84 is an unreasonable burden on him.  Instead, he argues 
that the enactment of Act 84 itself is the unreasonable burden.  
The mere application of a statute that provides additional 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
34 
 
procedural hurdles to achieve a desired end is not an 
unreasonable burden.  See Ten Mile Invs., LLC v. Sherman, 2007 
WI App 253, ¶11, 306 Wis. 2d 799, 743 N.W.2d 442.   
¶61 Furthermore, whether the aggrieved party could have 
complied with the new statute is an important factor in 
determining whether retroactive application of a statute imposes 
an 
unreasonable 
burden. 
 
Id.; 
Modica 
v. 
Verhulst, 
195 
Wis. 2d 633, 645, 536 N.W.2d 466 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing Mosing 
v. 
Hagen, 
33 
Wis. 2d 636, 
148 
N.W.2d 92 
(1967)) 
("Such 
application . . . did not impose an unreasonable burden on the 
plaintiff since the plaintiff could have complied with the new 
statute."); see also Trinity Petroleum, 302 Wis. 2d 299, ¶¶85, 
89, 92 (remanding for circuit court to make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on the issue of unreasonable burden after 
noting that whether the aggrieved party could have complied with 
the new statute was in dispute).  Our review of the record 
demonstrates that Carter not only could have, but did in fact 
tailor his efforts to obtain a discharge trial around compliance 
with Act 84.  This is demonstrated by the fact that Carter's 
attorney argued Carter's case with the express understanding 
that Act 84 applied to Carter's case.  It is because of this 
express understanding, as well as the fact that Carter never 
develops any argument to the contrary, that we hold compliance 
with Act 84 would not have placed an unreasonable burden on 
Carter.  See State v. Robinson, 2014 WI 35, ¶50, 354 
Wis. 2d 351, 847 N.W.2d 352 (quoted source omitted) ("Typically, 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
35 
 
appellate courts do not take it upon themselves to create and 
develop arguments on a party's behalf."). 
¶62 Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that none of the 
enumerated exceptions to retroactivity apply.  Thus, the 
presumption of retroactivity controls and Act 84 applies 
retroactively to Carter's case.  Because Carter's counsel could 
not have been deficient for failing to bring a meritless motion, 
Carter's ineffective assistance claim fails.  State v. Allen, 
2017 WI 7, ¶46, 373 Wis. 2d 98, 890 N.W.2d 245. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶63 As to Hager, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the matter to the circuit court with 
directions to apply the statute in accordance with the analysis 
in this opinion to determine whether Hager is entitled to a 
discharge hearing.  As to Carter, we affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals because the circuit court applied the statute 
correctly in rejecting Carter's request for a discharge hearing. 
¶64 We hold as to both Hager and Carter that the court of 
appeals erred in concluding that Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) limits 
circuit courts to considering only the evidence favorable to 
petitions for discharge.  We hold that circuit courts are to 
carefully examine, but not weigh, those portions of the record 
they deem helpful to their consideration of the petition, which 
may include facts both favorable as well as unfavorable to the 
petitioner. 
¶65 We further hold that Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) does not 
violate the constitutional right to due process of law as 
Nos. 2015AP330 & 2015AP1311   
 
36 
 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 
1 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
and 
furthermore, 
Carter's 
counsel 
was 
not 
ineffective for failing to challenge retroactive application of 
Act 84 to Carter. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals in State 
v. Hager is reversed and cause remanded to the circuit court 
with directions; the decision of the court of appeals in State 
v. Carter is affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2015AP330 & 2015AP1311.dk 
 
1 
 
 
¶66 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring).  I join the court's 
opinion, except to the extent that it holds the court may not 
"weigh" evidence when it reviews a petition for discharge from a 
chapter 980 commitment.  Honoring that proscription, I think, is 
incompatible with the prescription that "circuit courts are to 
carefully examine . . . those portions of the record they deem 
helpful to their consideration of the petition, which may 
include facts both favorable as well as unfavorable to the 
petitioner."  Majority op., ¶4.  Contrary to the court's 
conclusion, I believe the 2013 amendments to Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.09(2) not only allow weighing, they require it. 
¶67 The parts of the statute in which we are immediately 
interested direct how courts are to review discharge petitions 
in two important ways.  The first addresses the information the 
court is to examine.  The second describes how the court is to 
analyze that information.  This case is here because, in 2013, 
the legislature amended how the court is to address each of 
these topics. 
¶68 As for the first directive, Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) now 
says the court may "consider" a large universe of information: 
[T]he 
court 
may 
consider 
the 
record, 
including 
evidence introduced at the initial commitment trial or 
the most recent trial on a petition for discharge, any 
current or past reports filed under s. 980.07, 
relevant facts in the petition and in the state's 
written response, arguments of counsel, and any 
supporting documentation provided by the person or the 
state. 
No.  2015AP330 & 2015AP1311.dk 
 
2 
 
Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2).1  The court concluded that "[t]he result 
of a plain reading of 'the court may consider the record' is 
that courts are free to review everything in the record, no 
matter 
whether 
it 
is 
beneficial 
or 
detrimental 
to 
the 
petitioner's cause."  Majority op., ¶27.  I agree that the 
purpose of the "may consider" directive is to identify the 
information the court is supposed to analyze. 
¶69 The statute's second directive instructs the court to 
analyze the information described by the first directive.  The 
purpose of the analysis is to determine what the jury would 
likely conclude from that information:  "If the court determines 
that the record contains facts from which a court or jury would 
likely conclude the person no longer meets the criteria for 
commitment, the court shall set the matter for trial."  Wis. 
Stat. § 980.09(2) (emphasis added).2  In the prior version of 
this statute, the standard was different.  It used to be that 
the court would determine whether the petitioner had identified 
"facts from which the court or jury may conclude that the person 
does not meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent 
person."  Wis. Stat. § 980.09(3) (2011-12) (emphasis added).  So 
our task here was to explain how a reviewing court is supposed 
                                                 
1 Prior to 2013, this provision directed the court to 
consider only a subset of the record. See Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) 
(2011-12). 
2 Prior to the 2013 amendments, the court was to determine 
only whether the petitioner had identified "facts from which the 
court or jury may conclude that the person does not meet the 
criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person."  Wis. 
Stat. § 980.09(3) (2011-12). 
No.  2015AP330 & 2015AP1311.dk 
 
3 
 
to apply the new "would likely conclude" standard to the facts 
identified by the first directive. 
¶70 Except we didn't analyze this change at all.  Instead, 
we went back to the first directive to consider what it means to 
"consider" the record.  We concluded it means "examine."  I 
think that's a perfectly suitable synonym for "consider," but 
neither term addresses itself to the purpose of that scrutiny.  
To what end is one to examine the evidence?  More to the point, 
what is one to do when the examination reveals that some of the 
evidence favors the petitioner and some of it does not?  
Certainly, the instruction that courts are to examine "facts 
both favorable as well as unfavorable to the petitioner" must 
mean more than acknowledging that one part of the record is in 
competition with another. 
¶71 The statute says the purpose of our examination is to 
determine what a fact-finder would likely conclude from the 
evidence of record.  The court says nothing about how to conduct 
this analysis except that we are not to "weigh" the evidence.  
Majority op., ¶28 ("Hager and Carter argue that circuit courts 
may not weigh the evidence in favor of a discharge petition 
against the evidence opposed to the petition when determining 
whether the committed person has met his burden of production.  
We agree.").  Part of the reason the court reached this 
conclusion is it saw no legislative authorization to do so: 
As we held in Arends, if the legislature wanted 
circuit courts to weigh evidence, it could use 
appropriate terms of art such as "probable cause" or 
"preponderance of the evidence" to so indicate.  It 
did not use such terms in previous iterations of Wis. 
No.  2015AP330 & 2015AP1311.dk 
 
4 
 
Stat. § 980.09(2), and it did not elect to do so in 
Act 84, either. 
Id., ¶28 (internal citation omitted). 
¶72 I disagree——the legislature did use such a term.  In 
fact, that's the whole point of the newly-formulated second 
directive.  We are supposed to determine whether, based on the 
evidence of record (both pro and con, according to the court), 
the fact-finder "would likely conclude" the petitioner no longer 
meets the criteria for commitment.  "Likely" means "probable," 
one of the very terms the court said indicates a legislative 
direction to weigh evidence.  Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 1310 (1986) (defining "likely" in first definition as 
"of such a nature or so circumstanced as to make something 
probable"). 
¶73 The other reason the court believes the evidence may 
not be weighed is a legitimate concern for the petitioner's due 
process rights.  The court says that "allowing circuit courts to 
weigh the evidence . . . shift[s] the burden of persuasion to 
the committed person to prove he is no longer a sexually violent 
person."  Majority op., ¶31 (citation omitted).  And "[s]hifting 
the burden of persuasion for discharge to the committed person 
is impermissible because to do so would violate the committed 
person's right to due process."  Id. (citation omitted). 
¶74 But the simple act of weighing, by itself, does not 
require the committed person to prove he is no longer sexually 
violent.  "Weighing" refers to the process of resolving various 
elements of evidence that exist in tension.  Whether the 
petitioner must prove he is no longer dangerous is not a 
No.  2015AP330 & 2015AP1311.dk 
 
5 
 
function of weighing, but of the standard the weighing must 
satisfy.  If the statute required the court to find that the 
"weighed" evidence satisfied a "preponderance of the evidence" 
standard, it would be fair to say the burden had shifted to the 
petitioner to prove he is no longer dangerous. 
¶75 But Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) does not contain that 
standard.  It says, instead, that the court must determine 
whether the fact-finder would merely be likely to find the 
petitioner no longer meets the criteria for commitment.  As 
discussed above, "likely" means "probable," and we have a fair 
amount of experience in evaluating whether a probability 
warrants a new trial.  In the "ineffective assistance of 
counsel" context, Strickland v. Washington requires a new trial 
when counsel's performance is both deficient and prejudicial.  
See 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  We measure the "prejudice" prong 
of the test by asking whether it is "reasonably probable" that 
the result of the trial would have been different absent 
counsel's deficient performance.  See id. at 694.  We apply that 
test even when the claimed deficiency is the failure to 
introduce helpful evidence or object to harmful evidence.  See 
e.g., State v. Jenkins, 2014 WI 59, ¶¶59-61, 355 Wis. 2d 180, 
848 N.W.2d 786 (holding "that the failure to call Jones as a 
witness at trial to give testimony contradictory to that of the 
State's eyewitness had a reasonable probability of affecting the 
result of the case" and was, therefore, prejudicial to the 
defendant); State v. Krueger, 2008 WI App 162, ¶¶17-18, 314 
Wis. 2d 605, 762 N.W.2d 114 (holding that counsel's deficient 
No.  2015AP330 & 2015AP1311.dk 
 
6 
 
performance in failing to object to testimony of a State's 
witness prejudiced defendant because there was a "reasonable 
probability that, but for trial counsel's error, the jury would 
have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt"); State v. Jeannie 
M.P., 2005 WI App 183, ¶27, 286 Wis. 2d 721, 703 N.W.2d 694 
(holding "that trial counsel's failure to investigate and 
present at trial facts that would cast doubt on the credibility 
of the State's principal witnesses" produced a "reasonable 
probability [that] the jury would have acquitted the defendant," 
thus constituting prejudice). 
¶76 Conducting the prejudice analysis in each of these 
cases required the court to evaluate the effect of the disputed 
evidence on the result of the trial.  That is to say, the court 
had to weigh the evidence to determine whether its inclusion or 
exclusion would have been likely to bring about a different 
result.  We have never said that the reasonable probability 
standard requires the defendant to prove the result would be 
different.  He must only demonstrate there is a reasonable 
probability it would be different.  There is no reason we cannot 
conduct the same analysis here, so long as the standard against 
which we measure the weighed evidence does not exceed the 
legislatively prescribed "likelihood." 
¶77 Therefore, because the legislature amended Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.09(2) to require the court to determine whether the 
evidence of record demonstrates a likelihood (that is, a 
reasonable probability) that a fact-finder would find the 
petitioner no longer meets the criteria for commitment, I 
No.  2015AP330 & 2015AP1311.dk 
 
7 
 
conclude that the court is to weigh the evidence of record.  And 
because demonstrating a reasonable probability does not shift 
the burden of persuasion to the petitioner, I conclude there is 
no due process violation.  For these reasons, I join the court's 
opinion except with respect to its conclusion that § 980.09(2) 
prevents the court from weighing conflicting evidence. 
¶78 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2015AP330 & 2015AP1311.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶79 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
majority addresses a myriad of issues raised by amendments to 
Chapter 980 of the statutes.  Although I largely disagree with 
the majority's views of the constitutionality and legality of 
the 
amendments, 
I 
confine 
my 
dissent 
to 
the 
majority's 
instructions about implementing §§ 21 and 23 of the 2013 Wis. 
Act 84 amendments to Wis. Stat. § 980.09. 
¶80 The majority delivers a useless, unworkable, and 
potentially unconstitutional standard for §§ 21 and 23 of the 
2013 Wis. Act 84 amendments to Wis. Stat. § 980.09 that is not 
helpful to the bench, bar, or litigants.   
¶81 The majority concludes that the 2013 amendments to 
Wis. Stat. § 980.09 require that a circuit court "carefully 
examine, but not weigh" the evidence in determining whether a 
jury "would likely conclude" that a petitioner's condition has 
changed such that the petitioner no longer meets the statutory 
criteria for commitment and should get a hearing.  Majority op., 
¶4 (emphasis added).  The majority describes the amendments as 
simply increasing the petitioner's burden of production——instead 
of being required to produce a quantum of evidence such that a 
reasonable factfinder could find in the petitioner's favor, the 
petitioner must now produce a larger quantum of evidence such 
that 
a 
reasonable 
factfinder 
would 
likely 
find 
in 
the 
petitioner's favor.      
¶82 How can a court determine what a jury "would likely 
conclude" without weighing the evidence favorable to discharge 
No.  2015AP330 & 2015AP1311.ssa 
 
2 
 
against the evidence unfavorable to discharge?  Moreover, how is 
this inquiry meaningfully different from a burden of persuasion 
by a preponderance of evidence?  Convincing a factfinder that a 
proposition is more likely true than not true is literally what 
it 
means 
to 
carry 
one's 
burden 
of 
persuasion 
by 
the 
preponderance of the evidence.  In the context of Chapter 980, 
the proposition that a petitioner must convince a judge is more 
likely true than not true is that a jury will find in 
petitioner's favor at a discharge hearing.   
¶83 The majority's interpretation of the amended statute 
creates additional problems.  If determining whether a jury 
"would likely conclude" in favor of petitioner is simply an 
increase in the petitioner's burden of production, could the 
legislature raise the burden of production further?  For 
example, what principle would prevent the legislature from 
conditioning a Chapter 980 discharge hearing on a petitioner's 
burden to first produce evidence such that it is beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a jury will conclude in favor of 
petitioner?  Under the majority's interpretation, is it possible 
to avoid weighing the evidence under a more stringent burden of 
production?  At what point under the majority's interpretation 
will a burden of production become so onerous as to necessitate 
the weighing of evidence and constitute a burden of persuasion? 
¶84 Rather than face reality and impart helpful direction 
to the bench and bar (or simply acknowledge that the amended 
statute requires the weighing of evidence and is therefore 
constitutionally suspect), the majority merely directs judges to 
No.  2015AP330 & 2015AP1311.ssa 
 
3 
 
"consider" 
or 
"carefully 
examine" 
(but 
not 
weigh) 
the 
allegations in the filings and the evidence in the record.  
Majority op., ¶¶4, 29-30, 64.   
¶85 In order to comply with the majority's useless 
direction to carefully examine but not weigh the evidence, the 
circuit court will simply use the words "consider" or "carefully 
examine" rather than the word "weigh" when applying the amended 
statute.  Such a subterfuge is not helpful in understanding or 
applying the statute.  If the amended statute truly does not 
necessitate the weighing of evidence, then the majority should 
better explain how a judge is to accomplish what Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.09 now requires without weighing evidence.        
¶86 For the reasons set forth, I dissent.   
¶87 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2015AP330 & 2015AP1311.ssa 
 
 
 
1