Case Title: Doud v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 100285

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2011-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, and Millette, JJ., and 
Russell, S.J. 
 
MELISSA DOUD, ADMINISTRATRIX  
OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES ELLIS PROFFITT 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 100285        SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
 
 
 
September 16, 2011 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RUSSELL COUNTY 
Henry A. Vanover, Judge 
 
 
This appeal presents the question whether the Commonwealth 
is liable, pursuant to the Virginia Tort Claims Act (VTCA), Code 
§ 8.01-195.1 et seq., for damages incurred by a prisoner 
resulting from the alleged negligence of a sheriff’s deputies. 
Facts and Proceedings 
 
The facts essential to the appeal are undisputed.  On 
January 22, 2001, James Ellis Proffitt was convicted in the 
Circuit Court of Russell County of a felony sexual offense 
involving a minor and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment.  
He was remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Russell County 
and was transported to the Russell County jail as a prisoner 
awaiting transfer to the custody of the Department of 
Corrections. 
 
The plaintiff alleges that during his incarceration, 
Proffitt was severely kicked, hit and beaten by fellow inmates, 
resulting in serious and permanent injuries.  The circuit court, 
shortly thereafter, determined that Proffitt was incapacitated 
and appointed Melissa Doud (the plaintiff) his guardian and 
conservator.  In July 2001, the plaintiff sent a notice of claim 
under the VTCA to the sheriff, the county administrator and the 
county attorney of Russell County, giving notice of a claim 
against the sheriff’s department for Proffitt’s injuries 
allegedly caused by the negligence of the sheriff’s department.  
In January 2002, the plaintiff gave notice of a claim against 
the Commonwealth based on the same cause of action and arising 
out of the actions of agents, officers and employees of Russell 
County "acting in the course of their employment and on behalf 
of the Sheriff." 
 
In 2003, the plaintiff brought the present action in the 
Circuit Court of Russell County against the county, the sheriff, 
a named deputy, unknown deputies and jailors, and the 
Commonwealth.  The plaintiff alleged that the sheriff’s 
employees had placed Proffitt in the general jail population 
where it was foreseeable that he would be attacked by fellow 
inmates because of the nature of his crime unless given 
protection, which the jailors had negligently failed to provide.  
Ultimately, the plaintiff nonsuited the claims against all 
defendants except the Commonwealth.  The plaintiff’s theory of 
recovery against the Commonwealth was based entirely on 
respondeat superior, in that the sheriff and his deputies and 
jailors "acted under the authority of and on behalf of . . . the 
Commonwealth of Virginia."  Proffitt died in 2005 and the 
plaintiff qualified as his administratrix and was substituted in 
that capacity as party plaintiff. 
 
The Commonwealth filed a plea of sovereign immunity, 
contending that the actions complained of were not within the 
purview of the VTCA.  In 2009, the court sustained the plea and 
entered an order dismissing the action on the basis of sovereign 
immunity.  We awarded the plaintiff an appeal. 
Analysis 
 
This appeal presents pure questions of law, to which we 
apply a de novo standard of review.  Syed v. ZH Technologies, 
Inc., 280 Va. 58, 69, 694 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2010). 
 
At common law, the Commonwealth was immune from liability 
for torts committed by its officers, employees and agents.  
VEPCO v. Hampton Red. Auth., 217 Va. 30, 32-33, 225 S.E.2d 364, 
367 (1976).  For the salutary reasons described in Messina v. 
Burden, 228 Va. 301, 307, 321 S.E.2d 657, 660 (1984), that 
immunity continues to apply in the absence of a legislative 
waiver by which the Commonwealth consents to be sued in its own 
courts.  Gray v. Virginia Sec'y of Transp., 276 Va. 93, 101, 662 
S.E.2d 66, 70 (2008).  In the VTCA, the Commonwealth has waived 
its sovereign immunity for tort claims in the circumstances to 
which the statute applies, but the waiver is a limited one and 
the VTCA, being an enactment in derogation of the common law, is 
strictly construed.  Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va. v. 
Carter, 267 Va. 242, 244-45, 591 S.E.2d 76, 78 (2004).  A waiver 
of sovereign immunity may not be inferred from general statutory 
language, but must be expressly and explicitly stated.  Afzall 
v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 226, 230, 639 S.E.2d 279, 281 (2007).  
In the absence of such an express waiver, the courts of the 
Commonwealth lack subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate tort 
claims against the Commonwealth.  Id.  
 
Accordingly, we must decide whether such an express waiver 
of sovereign immunity renders the Commonwealth liable for the 
negligent acts or omissions of deputies and jailors employed by 
a county sheriff.  The VTCA provides, in pertinent part: 
[T]he Commonwealth shall be liable for claims for 
money only accruing on or after July 1, 1982 
. . . on account of damage to or loss of property 
or personal injury or death caused by the 
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any 
employee while acting within the scope of his 
employment . . . . 
 
Code § 8.01-195.3 (emphasis added).  In Code § 8.01-195.2, the 
VTCA defines an "employee" as "any officer, employee or agent of 
any agency, or any person acting on behalf of an agency in an 
official capacity . . . ."  The same section defines an "agency" 
as "any department, institution, authority, instrumentality, 
board or other administrative agency of the government of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia . . . ."  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution of Virginia 
provides that the qualified voters of each county and city shall 
elect a treasurer, a sheriff, an attorney for the Commonwealth, 
a clerk of the court of record and a commissioner of the 
revenue.  These five are known as the "constitutional officers" 
because their offices are created directly by the constitution 
rather than by legislative enactment. 
[A] constitutional officer is an independent 
public official whose authority is derived from 
the Constitution of Virginia even though the 
duties of the office may be prescribed by 
statute.  While constitutional officers may 
perform certain functions in conjunction with 
units of county or municipal government, neither 
the officers nor their offices are agencies of 
such governmental units. 
 
Carraway v. Hill, 265 Va. 20, 24, 574 S.E.2d 274, 276 (2003) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 
Constitutional officers are responsible to the voters who 
elected them but do not depend upon either the government of the 
Commonwealth or upon the governing bodies of their counties or 
cities for their authority.  Accordingly, we hold that the 
sheriff of Russell County was not an "employee" of the 
Commonwealth within the definitions contained in the VTCA.  The 
sheriff’s deputies and jailors were employees of the sheriff, 
not of the Commonwealth.  The sheriff had sole authority to 
employ them, to discharge them, and to direct their work.  They 
were responsible to the sheriff and not to the government of the 
Commonwealth.  A fortiori, they were not "employees" of the 
Commonwealth within the express waiver of sovereign immunity 
contained in the VTCA. 
Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the sovereign immunity of the 
Commonwealth was not waived with respect to the plaintiff’s tort 
claim and the circuit court correctly dismissed the case for 
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate it.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment. 
Affirmed.