Case Title: Meighan v. Watts Const. Co.

Citation: 475 So. 2d 829

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1985-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
475 So. 2d 829 (1985)
Louise T. MEIGHAN
v.
WATTS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, et al.
83-911.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 3, 1985.
Rehearing Denied August 23, 1985.
Michael L. Roberts of Floyd, Keener & Cusimano, Gadsden, for appellant.
*830 Jack W. Torbert, Jr. of Torbert and Torbert, Gadsden, for appellees.
EMBRY, Justice.
Louise T. Meighan appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of Watts Construction Company and James E. Watts[1] constituting a holding that her suit against Watts was barred by the six-year statute of limitations. We reverse.
The motion for summary judgment was submitted on the pleadings; written interrogatories, and answers thereto; the depositions of Mrs. Meighan, F.H. Ashley, and James Watts; and documents produced in discovery proceedings. All of these disclose that Mrs. Meighan, of 613 Reynolds Street, Gadsden, executed, on 15 June 1973, under seal, a deed of easement. This occurred because the City of Gadsden was to put in a new storm sewer pipeline near her property and residence. By this deed, Mrs. Meighan conveyed to the City a permanent easement upon a portion of her property for the construction and maintenance of a permanent storm sewer drainage pipeline, and also a temporary construction easement upon another portion of her property to afford ingress and egress to the permanently installed pipeline, and for piling dirt, stone, gravel, and other such substances while excavations were being made. This instrument, executed by Mrs. Meighan under seal, also provided:
The bid opening for this construction project, Reynolds Street-Haralson Avenue Storm Sewer Project, was scheduled by the City for 19 June 1973. Watts Construction Company was awarded the contract. The contract consisted of several documents: an instrument labeled "Contract," dated 5 July 1973; a performance bond executed by Watts under seal; a labor and material payment bond, executed by Watts under seal; a bid form dated 21 June 1973; various change orders, and the voluminous "Specifications & Contract Documents." These documents imposed upon Watts certain obligations regarding repair of damage to, and protection of, adjoining property. Watts, in the course of this project, undertook to restore to the original condition homeowners' premises that had been damaged or altered. There were no other contractors, or any city construction workers, that undertook to do this restoration or replacement work.
In that connection, Watts took up and replaced the driveway on Mrs. Meighan's property. At times, Watts had a number of employees and various heavy equipment on Mrs. Meighan's premises.
In the fall of 1981, Mrs. Meighan first noticed a drainage problem at her home. She saw a small crack that began in the brick wall under her living room window which kept expanding as time passed. She hired F.H. Ashley, a building contractor, who examined it and gave her an estimate of damages in April 1982. Mr. Ashley testified there were cracks in the wall the size of two hands, and a window was so skewed there was paper, rock, and other matter present around the window larger than one's fist.
Ashley commenced work to attempt the repair of the damage and further, to find the cause of the problem. He determined that a drain pipe which ran across the front and down the side of her house had been crushed or mashed. The site of the crushed or collapsed drain pipe was under the driveway which had been replaced by Watts during the 1973 construction work. This crushed pipe, after the driveway was replaced, gradually filled with dirt and became blocked. The water that had formerly drained through this pipe backed up, causing the damage to the wall and the foundation. In Ashley's expert opinion the pipe had been crushed with a heavy piece of machinery while the driveway was being *831 replaced. Cost of the repairs done by Ashley was $23,731.07.
Mrs. Meighan states the issues to be:
Crucial to a determination of these issues is resolution of the question of whether the instruments are deemed to be under seal so that applicable statute of limitations is ten years.
Watts contends they are not and says the six-year statute of limitations is applicable. Watts, in answer to the complaint, specifically denied that it was delegated, and assumed the duties, responsibilities, and obligations of the City to Mrs. Meighan. Watts further contends there was no assignment of the sewer project contract to Watts by the City, and further, that the contract was separate and apart from the deed of easement, the performance bond, and the labor and material payment bond. This contention rests primarily upon Article 4 of the "Contract," which states:
Reference to the "Performance Bond" shows:
Reference to the "Labor & Material Payment Bond" shows:
Regarding the contention that Watts was not delegated, and did not assume the duties, responsibilities, and obligations of the City, we find the record quite revealing. The specifications and contract documents contain, among others, the following provisions:
"...
By virtue of these documents, and other evidence, it is clear that Watts's contention is not well founded. We think the better reasoned view is that expressed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina:
Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 282 N.C. 643, 194 S.E.2d 521 (1973).
Under the documents in evidence and the actions upon the part of Watts in performing the work designated in those documents, it is clear that the duties and responsibilities were delegated to and assumed by Watts. It is also clear that Watts undertook to fulfill those obligations, duties, and responsibilities for the benefit of Mrs. Meighan and others similarly situated. It is also clear that Watts, not the City, enjoyed the benefits granted under the deed of easement giving rights of access to Mrs. Meighan's property for the purpose of carrying out what the assigned contract called for: construction and restoration.
All of the above being true, it is evident that Mrs. Meighan may maintain an action to recover damages for Watts's failure to perform the obligations imposed by the contract, as we have defined it to be, as a third-party beneficiary of that contract made for the benefit of her and those similarly situated.
We therefore hold the ten-year statute of limitations to be the one applicable in this case and reverse the judgment below and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, FAULKNER, JONES, ALMON, SHORES, BEATTY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
[1]  The defendants shall be referred to as "Watts."