Case Title: State v. Smith

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAW LIBRARY

 

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No, 26829

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STATE OF HAWAI'I, Plaintif£-Appeliee

cas

 

DERRICK SMITH, Defendant-Appellant
eee
APPEAL FROM THE FAMILY COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(FC-CR. NO. 03-1-0027)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION Of
Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, and Duffy, JJ.
and Acoba, ‘J., concurring and dissenting)

berrick smith [hereinafter

 

Defendant-appellant,

wsmith”], appeals from the first circuit court’s August 23, 2004

judgnent convicting Smith of the offense of second degree murder,

in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes [hereinafter “HRS”] $
707-701.5 (1993).! On appeal, Smith argues that: (1) the

circuit court erred by admitting his statement, “Do you want me

to drop that baby over the balcony,” which was uttered seven

weeks prior to the death of the babys (2) the circuit court erred

by adnitting a full-length photograph of Smith into evidences and

(3) the circuit court committed plain error by allowing the

HRS § 707-701.5 provides as follows:
15707-701.5] Murder in the second degree. (1) Except as
provided in section 707-701, a person commits the offense of
‘Second Gogree if the person intentionally or

Burder in =

Snowingly causes the death of another person.
TY Sinitser'in the second degree ise felony for which the

defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment es provided in

Section 706-656.

 

 
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deputy prosecuting attorney to engage in prosecutorial misconduct
by using, during his opening statements and closing arguments,
PowerPoint slides displaying photographs of Smith and the baby
and containing inappropriate and prejudicial text.

However, having carefully reviewed the record and the
briefs submitted by the parties and having given due
consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised,

we hol

 

(2) Sith failed to meet his burden of establishing
that the circuit court abused its discretion? by permitting
testimony as to Smith's statement, “Do you want me to drop that
baby over the balcony,” inasmuch as the record indicates that the
circuit court expressly balanced the probative value of the
statement against its prejudicial effect? and provided limiting

instructions to the jury on several occasions;‘ (2) the record

 

+ See State v, Eotencion, 63 Haw. 264, 267, 625 P.24 1040, 1063
(1981) ("the Burden of establishing abuse of discretion is on eppeliant, state

iy $3 Haw 40, 450 P.2d 936 (1969), and a strong. showing 49 required
te-establish ie-")

> See Hauai's Rules of Evidence [hereinafter HRE) Rule 403 (1993)
(stating that the circuit court should nevertheless exclude relevant evidence
SIE its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejucice"); Commentary to HRE Rule 40¢ (1993) ("when offered for the
Specified purposes other than mere character and propensity, however, ‘other
crimes, wrongs, or acts’ evidence nay be adnissible provided the Rule 403 test
is met."

 

<_te is well settled that juries are presuned to follow the
Anstructions provided by the circuit court. Seg State v. Knight, 60 Hawai'i
318, 327, 309'.2d 1133, 1142 (1896) (stating tnat “(ala rule, Juries are

 

presumed’ eo follow all of the trial court's instructions.©*) (citing
Sato vi Temata, 79 Hawai'l 14, 21, 897 P.24 941, 948 (1995) .) (Brackets in
original.) (Bilipses in original.)
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indicates that Smith did not make a specific objection to the
admission of the full-length photograph, and he therefore failed
to preserve the argument for appeal;* and (3) the circuit court
did not commit plain error by permitting the prosecution to
utilize PowerPoint presentations during its opening statements”

It is axiomatic that a party must make a specific objection in
order to prt SXpoint of error on appeal. See State vi Lona, 98 lawai's
SESt™SSS,PES°RiSa $58, Goo" (2002) (stating that “the purpose of requiring &
SESCHe' ottection is to inform the trial court of the error."); see alee
SPEEA FELOGOane Ge, 55) 760 P.2a 670, 675 (1988) (MFaizness co tne trial
Beate OED J Tecitation in full of the grounds supporting an objection to
the introduction of inedmiasible matters.) | (Citing
peter 'S3 Sew. 2éls 164, 429 P-2a 419, 421 (1971) (extations omitted) )

«© Alehough Smith only specifically objected to the prosecution’ s us
of the baby's photograph in its opening PowerPoint presentation, he now

‘Chetprosacerion's ninth, fourteenth, twenty-first, twenty-fifth,
Sechn ekensyceignth, thirtieth, tnizty-second, thirey-sixth, and
ERIERISctentn silage: Despite Smith's failure to object, we may nevertheless
cee eeveailegations of prosecutorial misconduct under the doctrine of plain
seeeet ee State ze Makisaka, 102 Hawai'i S04, 513, 78 B.34 327, 326 (2003)
Tree dete SESS GREY object at terial to prosecutorial sisconduct,
theless recognized such misconduct if plainly

       

 

 

     

 

    

 

 

thie coort nay ne
erroneous")

+ an State vs Valdivia, 9$ Hawas's 465, 24 P.3d 661 (20011, we
stated ae follows

Generally, “{aln opening statenent merely provides an opportunity
fer"Coongen to advise an(a) outline for the Jury, the facts and
Gesstions in the matter before then.” state v. Ganches, 62
Foeaits $17, S26, 323 P.2d 934, 945 (Rpp.), cere cenied, 84
Hawai'i 127, 930° p.2d 1015 (1996) (quot ing’ skate v. Sammsan, 64
Haw. 363, 569, 641 F.2d 320, 324 (2902) (citations omitted)
hoa, an’ attorney's opening statenent “is not an occasion for,
egunens.° far {citation emitted). As the Intermediate Court of
Appeals has explained:

Ordinarily, “the scope and extent of the opening
statenent 1s left to the sound discretion of the trie!
Judges”. «However, the trial court should “exclude
Uexelevant facte and stop argument if it occurs."
The (prosecution) should only refer in the opening ststenent
Retldence that it ha "e genuine good-faith belief” will
be produced at trial.

1d, (citations omitted). Horeover, “[ujhere the nature of the
Heeccutorial misconduct alleged is the failure of the prosecutor
Porprove or attempt to prove matters referred to in opening

 

 

 

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and closing arguments,* and such use did not constitute

prosecutorial misconduct.’ Therefore,

 

statenents, . . . the burden [48] on the defendant to show bad
faith on the part of the prosecutor, unless the fundanental rights
of the defendant were substantially’ prejudiced.”

82 Hawai's 202, 213, 921 P-2d 122, 133 (1996) (adopting the
“majority” approach) «

Ed, at 480-81, 24 8.36 at 676-77 (Brackets in original) (ellipses in
original) .

Considering the aforementioned principles, the prosecution’ s us
of the PowerPoint slides did not constitute inproper argument, inasmuch 26
(i) the photographs that served as background illustrations for the
prosecution’ s PowerPoint slides were previously adsitted into evidence by the
Eleouse courty ans (2) the text accompanying each slide merely communicated
the rudimentary facts of the prosecution's case.” Cf. valvigia, 98 Hawai'i at
41 ng, 24 P.3d at, 677 9.8 (concluding that "the circuit court erred in
overruling Vaividia’®s cbjection to the (deputy prosecuting attorney’ s]
Sranpage of terror’ and "sinost killed 4 100 people’ remarks");
Sanches, €2 Hawai’ S17, 526, 923 P.24 934, 945 (App. 1996) ("The prosecutor’s
Fenare in his opening statement thst "Defendant Wil do anything to stay out
Of trouble with the law except follow Lt" was improper argument.”)

 

 

 

 

+ see state v iuld, 101 Hawas's 196, 208, 65 P.34 143, 185 (2003)
(stating that *[t]he prosecution is permitted to draw reasonable inferences
fzom the evidence, and wide latitude is allowed in discussing the evidence.”I7

 

Eeate vs Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 413, 966 P-2d 1232, 1239 (1999) (stating chat
Sclosing argunent affords che prosecution... the opportunity to persuade

the jury that its theory of the case is valid, based upon the evidence adduced
and 211 reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom”)

+ in State vs Sucharen, 66 7.34 59 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003), review
denied, 66 P.34 59 (2003), the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that the
Exlal-court dig not abuse ite discretion when it permitted the prosecution to
tose a PowerPoint presentation during its Opening Statenents, stating 35
fellows?

 

 

Although @ computer was used in the presentation, the actual
presentation aid not include any computer simulation or other
Similar evidence; rather, it was essentially a slide show of
photographic exhibits. the photographs included in the
Presentation were the sane ones disclosed to defendant during
pretrial discovery and later adaitted into evidence at trial
Moreover, even though the photographs included superimposed
descriptive words and labels, the words and labels simply tracked
the subject matter of the prosecutor's opening statenent to the
jury, and defendant made no objection to any of the content or
Substance of the actual opening statement.” We conclude,
therefore, that there wag no abuse of ciscretion by the trial
court in permitting the State's use of the “PowerPoint”
presentation.
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IT 1S HEREBY ORDERED that the circuit court's
August 23, 2004 judgment is affirmed.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, March 28, 2006.
on the briefs:
James S. Tabe, Deputy
Public Defender, for
for defendant-appellant Ire
Derrick smith
Daniel H. Shimizu, Deputy Stab rison,

Prosecuting Attorney, for

plaintitf-appellee .
State of Hawai'i Pease Nene

 

Ide at 64, See also Miller vi tullin, 354 F.3d 1288, 1295 (20en Cir. 2004)
iSiule scknoniedge that the decision to allow the use of visual aids,
Including pedagogical, devices, rests squarely with the trial court."}; United
States 0) Crockett, 49 F-30 1357, 1360. (sth Cir. 1995) (The use of summary
Ee eee nd cther visual aids ie generally permissible in the sound
discretion of the trial court")