Case Title: In re Raymond Estate

Citation: 161 Vt. 544, 641 A.2d 1342

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1994-04-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN_RE_RAYMOND_ESTATE.93-453; 161 Vt. 544; 641 A.2d 1342

[Filed 15-Apr-1994]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

                                 No. 93-453


 In re Joan W. Raymond Estate                 Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
                                              Orange Superior Court

                                              March Term, 1994

 Alan W. Cook, J.

 Harvey B. Otterman, Jr. of Otterman and Allen, P.C., Barre, for appellant

 William B. Field of Valsangiacomo, Detora & McQuesten, Barre, for appellee


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   This appeal arises from a decision of the Randolph Probate
 Court awarding the entire estate of Joan W. Raymond, who died intestate, to
 her adopted half-brother Paul Dixon Raymond.  Appellants James, John and
 William Raymond, cousins of the deceased, appealed that decision to the
 Orange Superior Court, which affirmed in favor of the appellee, Paul
 Raymond's guardian, and now appeal here.  We affirm.
      Joan Raymond was born in 1921 to Joseph Raymond and Helen Wedgewood
 Raymond.  Joseph Raymond was previously married to Carrie Tewksbury Raymond.
 During that marriage, Joseph and Carrie adopted Carrie's sister Mary's son,
 Paul Dixon, on January 7, 1916.
      The only issue in this case involves the inheritance rights of an
 adopted sibling.  It is undisputed that if Paul Dixon Raymond is to be
 treated as if he were a natural sibling of the deceased, he will inherit her
 entire estate.  See 14 V.S.A. {{ 551(4), 552 (kindred of the half-blood

 

 shall inherit as kindred of the whole blood).  On the other hand, if Paul
 Dixon Raymond does not stand as a sibling, the estate of the deceased will
 go to appellants as her next of kin.  See 14 V.S.A. { 551(5).
      At the time of Paul Dixon's adoption in 1916, adoptions were governed
 by P.S. {{ 3264-3271, made effective in 1906.  Adoptee inheritance rights
 were specifically addressed in P.S. { 3270, which provided in relevant part:
             Upon the proper execution and filing of such an
           instrument [of adoption] the same rights, duties and
           obligations, and the same right of inheritance shall
           exist between the parties as though the person adopted
           had been the legitimate child of the person or persons
           making the adoption, except that the person adopted
           shall not be capable of taking property expressly
           limited to the heirs of the body or bodies of the
           parties making such adoption.

 In 1945, the Legislature revised the laws of adoption, setting out the new
 laws in 15 V.S.A. {{ 431-454.  See 1945, No. 41, {{ 1-23.  Thus, at the time
 of Joan Raymond's death in 1991, adoptee inheritance rights were governed by
 15 V.S.A. { 448, which provides in relevant part:
           Upon the issuance of a final adoption decree the same
         rights, duties and obligations, and the same right of
         inheritance shall exist between the parties as though
         the person adopted had been the legitimate child of the
         person or persons making the adoption, except that the
         person adopted shall not be capable of taking property
         expressly limited to the heirs of the body of the
         persons making such adoption.  The same right of
         inheritance shall exist between the person adopted and
         his issue on the one hand and natural or adopted
         children of the person or persons making the adoption
         and their issue on the other hand as though the person
         adopted had been the legitimate child of the person or
         persons making the adoption.

 For ease of reference, P.S. { 3270 will be referred to as the 1906 law,
 while 15 V.S.A. { 448 will be referred to as the 1945 law.
      The sole issue before us reduces to a question of which of the two
 statutes is applicable to Paul Dixon Raymond's inheritance rights -- the

 

 1906 law in effect at the time of his adoption or the 1945 law in effect at
 the time of Joan Raymond's death.  If the former, appellants would prevail
 because the statute permits an adoptee to inherit from, but not through, the
 adopting parent(s).  See In re Walworth's Estate, 85 Vt. 322, 333, 82 A. 7,
 11 (1912) (construing 1906 law) ("[T]he words 'between the parties' are
 intended to limit such right of the person adopted to inherit from the
 person or persons making the adoption, and to this end they in effect
 negative any right to inherit through such person or persons by right of
 representation . . . .").  If the latter, appellee prevails because the 1945
 law specifically allows for inheritance from siblings.
      Appellants see this primarily as a statutory construction case.  From
 the wording of the statute, they argue the Legislature's intent in enacting
 the 1945 law was not to affect existing inheritance rights of persons
 adopted before its effective date.  Further, they claim an alternative
 reading would apply the 1945 statute retrospectively, and there is a strong
 presumption against retrospective operation.  See Curran v. Marcille, 152
 Vt. 247, 250, 565 A.2d 1362, 1364 (1989) ("statute affecting legally
 existing rights should not be construed to operate retrospectively" absent
 clear langauge to that effect).  Although appellants' arguments draw some
 support from the statutory language, we reject them for three reasons.
      First, our precedents, as well as those of the vast majority of states,
 are against appellants' position.  The most important decision in Vermont,
 In re Estate of Hagar, 98 Vt. 235, 126 A. 507 (1924), concerned the right of
 the State to collect collateral inheritance and transfer taxes upon property
 devised by a decedent to her two adopted children.  Although Hagar was a tax
 case, the Court was required to choose between the law in effect at the time
 of adoption and the law in effect at the time of the testator's death.  To

 

 do so, it looked to the law that had developed in other states on the
 inheritance rights of adopted children.  Quoting extensively from Sorenson
 v. Rasmussen, 131 N.W. 325 (1911) and Gilliam v. Guaranty Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 127, 78 N.E. 697 (1906), the Hagar court reasoned:
         The rule is well settled that since the right of one
         person to inherit the property of another vests at the
         death of the latter, the statute in force at that time
         rather than the one in force at a prior or subsequent
         date governs the disposition of the estate.  And by the
         same rule the right of adopted children in the estate of
         adoptive parents is determined.

 Hagar, 98 Vt. at 241, 126 Vt. at 509 (citations omitted).
      We recognize that a great deal of time has passed since Hagar.  A
 review of existing precedents, however, indicates that the vast majority of
 states that have considered this issue have ruled in accordance with Hagar.
 See, e.g., McClure v. Noble, 602 So. 2d 377, 378 (Ala. 1992) ("The
 inheritance rights of adopted persons are governed by the law of adoption
 and descent and distribution in force at the time of death of the person
 whose estate is involved."); Brooks Bank & Trust Co. v. Rorabacher, 171 A. 655, 656-67 (Conn. 1934) ("[T]he right of an adopted child or his heirs to
 inherit from an adoptive parent and, as well, from relatives of such parent
 is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the death of the
 person from whom inheritance is claimed."); In re Williams,