Case Title: City of Carrington v. Foster County

Citation: 166 N.W.2d 377

Docket Number: 8524-8526

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1969-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
166 N.W.2d 377 (1969) The CITY OF CARRINGTON, a municipal corporation, Petitioner and Appellant, v. FOSTER COUNTY, North Dakota, a municipal corporation; and Carrington Township, North Dakota, a municipal corporation; and any qualified voter or freeholder in the territory proposed to be annexed or any adjoining municipal corporation, Respondents (three cases). Nos. 8524-8526. Supreme Court of North Dakota. March 6, 1969. *378 Fabian E. Noack, Carrington, for appellant. Mattson, Williams & Hovey, New Rockford, for respondent. Solberg, Anderson & Stewart, Fargo, for City of Fargo, as amicus curiae. Zuger, Bucklin, Kelsch & Zuger, Bismarck, for North Dakota League of Cities, as amicus curiae. ERICKSTAD, Judge (on reassignment). House Bill 722, introduced in the 1967 session of the state legislature, provided for the annexation and exclusion of unincorporated areas by municipal corporations and repealed N.D.C.C. ch. 40-51. On its passage it was designated ch. 338 of the 1967 session laws and was placed in the code as N.D.C.C. ch. 40-51.1. Acting pursuant to the provisions of § 40-51.1-06 the City of Carrington adopted separate resolutions to annex three parcels of land adjacent to the city. That section reads: Following the adoption of the resolutions annexing the various tracts of property and the publication of the resolutions, protests were filed by one-fourth or more of the property owners in each of the areas sought to be annexed. In each instance the City then sought annexation by petition to the district court pursuant to the provisions of §§40-51.1-07 and 40-51.1-08, which read: After due notice was given pursuant to § 40-51.1-08 a three-judge district court was convened in the Foster County Courthouse on November 13, 1968, pursuant to § 40-51.1-10. Before proceeding with the hearing the court on its own motion raised the question of its jurisdiction to act. Following a recess during which counsel for the respective parties were invited to research this question, the respondents moved that the petitions be dismissed on the ground that §§40-51.1-11 and 40-51.1-12 were unconstitutional as delegations of nonjudicial and legislative duties to the court. The court granted the motion as to each of the petitions, and it is from the order granting the motion for the dismissal of all three petitions that the City now appeals. Although the trial court referred to other authority, it relied principally for its position on Glaspell v. City of Jamestown, 11 N.D. 86, 88 N.W. 1023 (1902). In Glaspell the petitioners sought to exclude certain property from the city of Jamestown. Under the statutes then existing, the district court, when properly petitioned, was required to determine whether the petition should be granted. The pertinent section read: Revised Codes of North Dakota 1899. In finding that section and other related sections unconstitutional because they vested *380 legislative powers in the courts, this court said: The City asserts that although duties purely legislative in character may not be imposed upon the courts, duties quasi-judicial in character may be imposed upon them. In support of this view they refer us to Kermott v. Bagley, 19 N.D. 345, 124 N.W. 397 (1910), rendered by this court eight years after Glaspell. In Kermott the statute under consideration was ch. 183 of the 1909 session laws, which imposed upon judges of the district court the duty of determining whether statements contained in pharmacists' applications for licenses to sell intoxicating liquors and wines were true and, if so, the duty of granting permits. In upholding this statute against the attack that it must fail because it imposed upon the district courts nonjudicial duties, the court decided that the duties imposed were purely administrative and therefore quasi-judicial in nature and thus properly to be imposed on the district courts. *381 The court referred to § 96 of our constitution and said: "It is a very significant fact that no like provision is found with reference to the imposition of nonjudicial duties upon other courts or the judges thereof." Kermott v. Bagley, supra, 124 N.W. 398. The pertinent part of § 96 reads: North Dakota Constitution. Let us compare the pertinent parts of the statutes, commencing with the statutes in Kernzott: Laws of North Dakota 1909, ch. 183, §§ 1, 2, at 266-268. The pertinent parts of the statutes under consideration in the instant case follow: North Dakota Century Code. The 1909 statutes imposed upon the court primarily the duty of fact finding, whereas the 1967 statutes imposed upon it not only the duty of fact finding but, in requiring it to determine whether the petition should be granted, a policy decision requiring discretion. It is our judgment that the reasoning of Kermott should be permitted no further expansion, for that would subvert the objective of the division of governmental powers. The court in Kermott recognized that irrespective of the fact that a constitution does not contain a general distributing clause expressly providing for the division of governmental powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government (and ours does not contain such a clause), the creation of those branches of government operates as an apportionment of the different classes of power. As all of the branches derive their authority from the same constitution, there is an implied exclusion of each branch from the exercise of the functions of the others. Had our constitution not contained § 96, which specifically prohibited the imposition upon the Supreme Court or any of its judges of duties other than judicial, this court in Kermott might well have concluded that the fact that the constitution provided for the three separate branches of government was a prohibition of the imposition of other than judicial duties upon the district courts, they being a part of the judicial branch as established by our constitution. We think the court placed too much importance upon the fact that the framers of our state constitution expressly prohibited the imposition of nonjudicial functions or duties upon the Supreme Court and its judges while keeping silent on that issue as to the district courts. An annotation contained in American Law Review in the year 1930 is pertinent: But upon the question as to what constitutes a delegation of legislative power to the judiciary, the courts are not in accord. A majority of the cases would seem to favor the rule that a statute providing for the creation or change of a political district or municipal corporation, which grants to a court the exercise of any discretion as to whether the political subdivision should be created or changed, or requires of the court any other assistance than to determine whether the conditions precedent as declared in the statute have been complied with by the organizers of the district or corporation, or the district or corporation seeking a change, violates the constitutional limitation separating the powers of the government. * * * Annot., 69 A.L.R. 266, 267-268 (1930). It is our opinion that the majority rule is not only the better rule but that it expresses the intent of the framers of our state constitution. When § 20 (later designated as § 19) was being considered in the Committee of the Whole of the Constitutional Convention, Delegate Purcell pointed out that it would conflict with § 12. Section 20 read: Section 12, as then being considered, was equivalent to our Section 96. It read: Debates, at 229. Speaking in opposition to § 20 and thus indirectly in support of § 12, Delegate Carland had this to say: Debates, at 232-233. We find nothing in the proceedings of the convention which would indicate that the delegates intended that anything other *384 than judicial duties should be performed by the district courts. It seems that the main concern in adopting what ultimately became § 96 was in seeing to it that neither the Supreme Court nor its judges should be asked to render ex parte opinions. We are not unmindful of the oral arguments made in our court and the briefs filed with our court by the North Dakota League of Cities and the City of Fargo as amici curiae. They point out that chapter 40-51.1 was borrowed from the State of Virginia, and that although both the Virginia bill of rights and the Virginia constitution contain specific separation-of-powers provisions, the Virginia statute has been upheld by the Supreme Court of that state as not being in contravention of either. See Henrico County v. City of Richmond, 106 Va. 282, 55 S.E. 683 (1906). We are unable to accept the Virginia court's views. Our constitutional provisions relevant to this issue, or so much thereof as is pertinent, follow: North Dakota Constitution. Not only because our constitution provides for the usual branches of government, but because it contains a specific provision placing the responsibility for the organization of municipal corporations in the legislature, that duty must be performed by the legislature and cannot be imposed upon the judiciary. Although it may not be our province under any circumstance to judge the wisdom of the framers of our state constitution, we believe that in this instance they had good reason for dividing our government into the traditional three branches and in specifically imposing upon the legislative assembly the responsibility for the organization of municipal corporations. In this regard we quote a 1929 decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska, which was determining the validity of a Nebraska statute that imposed upon the district court the duty of ascertaining, after a hearing, whether a power district should be incorporated and what should be the extent of its boundaries. Although the Nebraska constitution contained a general distributing clause and our constitution does not, we think that what the Nebraska court said about the division of powers is pertinent to this case: We conclude that §§ 40-51.1-11 and 40-51.1-12 impose nonjudicial duties upon the district courts, and that in so doing they violate the separation-of-powers principle which is implicit in our state constitution. In addition, placing in the district courts a power specifically reserved to the state legislature by § 130 of our state constitution is an impermissible delegation of legislative power. For these reasons the sections are unconstitutional. Further, it is our view that the legislature intended §§ 40-51.1-11 and 40-51.1-12 to be integral parts of ch. 40-51.1, and that without those sections the chapter would be worthless except as it might relate to uncontested annexations. Because the sections are so tied together, we hold that the entire chapter fails. We do this especially in light of the fact that the state legislature is presently in session, and a bill may yet be enacted giving complete coverage of this subject rather than piecemeal treatment. Therefore this case is remanded with instructions to the three-judge district court to modify its order so that the entire chapter 40-51.1 is held to be unconstitutional. In all other respects the order is affirmed. STRUTZ, PAULSON and KNUDSON, JJ., concur. TEIGEN, Chief Justice (concurring specially). I join in the opinion of the majority. However, I wish to add a few words to emphasize another reason why I believe the Act unconstitutional. The Act provides an appeal may be taken from the decision of the court to the Supreme Court "as in other matters tried to the court and without a jury." Section 40-51.1-14, N.D.C.C. If allowed to stand, the Act imposes upon this Court a legislative function which is clearly unconstitutional. Section 96 of the North Dakota Constitution provides: I cannot assume the Legislature would have enacted the Act in question without the appeal provision and, therefore, I conclude it is not severable.