Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF: CG, a minor child v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0124

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-02-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF: CG, a minor child v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 28Case Number: No. S-10-0124Decided: 02/18/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

IN 
THE INTEREST OF: CG, a minor child,Appellant 
(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF WYOMING,Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina (Kerin) Olson, Appellate Counsel; Wyoming 
Public Defender Program.  Argument 
by Ms. Olson.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jessica Y. 
Frint, Student Director, and Crofton P. Sacco, Student Intern, of the 
Prosecution Assistance Program.  
Argument by Ms. Frint.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      CG, a minor, 
appeals from the order of the juvenile court adjudging her guilty of two 
delinquent acts  interference with a peace officer and unlawful contact.  She claims the evidence does not support 
the juvenile court's decision.  We 
disagree and affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      CG presents the 
following issues for our review:

 
 
I.          
Was there insufficient evidence that the officer was in the lawful 
performance of his official duties when he physically dragged CG from her 
neighbor's car?

 
 
II.         
Did the [juvenile] court err in finding that CG was not acting in 
self-defense when she struck the officer in the forearm?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In September 
2009, the Juvenile Court of Natrona County adjudicated CG, a fourteen year-old 
minor, a child in need of supervision (CHINS) for failing to attend school.1  The juvenile court placed CG on 
probation and ordered her to regularly attend school, without any unexcused 
absences or instances of tardiness.  
On the morning of September 15, 2009, CG's mother (Mother) woke her 
around 5:45 a.m. so she could prepare for school and catch the school bus.  For various reasons, CG did not get 
ready in time and she missed the bus.  

 
 
[¶4]      CG's stepfather 
was ill that morning and was unable to drive CG to school after she missed the 
bus.  Her mother did not have a 
driver's license and did not have any money for a taxi to take CG to 
school.  Mother reported the 
situation to CG's caseworker at the Department of Family Services.  The caseworker advised Mother to call 
the non-emergency number at the Casper Police Department and ask for assistance 
in getting CG to school, which she did.  

 
 
[¶5]      Shortly 
thereafter, Casper Police Officer Marcus Maton responded to CG's residence.  Mother informed Officer Maton of CG's 
increasingly disobedient behavior, her CHINS status, the need for CG to get to 
school, and of her refusal to do so.  
After entering the home, Officer Maton overheard CG, who was in her 
bedroom, screaming at her mother that she did not want to go to school.  Officer Maton then spoke with CG about 
going to school.  CG was rude to the 
officer, and he asked her to give him her iPod and cell phone because they were 
a distraction.  She complied, and 
the officer immediately gave the iPod and cell phone to Mother, with a 
suggestion that she return them only when CG behaved better.  

 
 
[¶6]      Eventually, the 
officer persuaded CG to get into a neighbor's van to be taken to school.  The neighbor drove, Mother rode in the 
front passenger seat, and CG was in the rear seat.  Officer Maton followed in his patrol 
car.  During the entire drive to 
school, CG was upset and angry; she was screaming and cussing at both Mother and 
the neighbor and demanding the return of her iPod and cell phone.  

 
 
[¶7]      When they arrived 
at the school, CG refused to get out of the neighbor's van.  Both Mother and the neighbor told her 
several times to get out, but CG refused to do so.  The neighbor then sought Officer Maton's 
assistance in getting CG out of the vehicle.2  Officer Maton went to the van and asked 
CG several times to get out.  CG 
refused.  Ultimately, Officer Maton 
decided to remove CG from the vehicle.  
He reached into the van, grabbed CG by the right wrist, and directed her 
to get out.  She responded, "No; get 
your hands off me; nobody touches me," and resisted by bracing herself against 
the driver's seat.  As the officer 
pulled her out of the vehicle, CG punched him in the right forearm.3  Officer Maton then placed CG under 
arrest for the assault.  

 
 
[¶8]      The next day, the 
State filed a delinquency petition in the juvenile court alleging that CG had 
committed two criminal offenses, to wit: that she had unlawfully touched Officer 
Maton in a rude, insolent or angry manner without intentionally using sufficient 
physical force to cause bodily injury in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-501(g)(i) (LexisNexis 2009); and that she had unlawfully and knowingly 
obstructed, impeded, or interfered with Officer Maton while he was engaged in 
the lawful performance of his official duties, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-5-204(a) (LexisNexis 2009).  
Following a detention hearing conducted that same day, the juvenile court 
determined that it was neither appropriate nor in the best interest of CG to 
remain in her home, and it committed her to the physical and legal custody of 
the Department of Family Services for placement in the Youth Crisis Center.  At her initial hearing, CG denied the 
allegations of the petition.  The 
juvenile court set the matter for an adjudication hearing on November 5, 2009, 
and continued CG's current out-of-home placement at the Youth Crisis 
Center.  

 
 
[¶9]      At the 
adjudication hearing, the juvenile court heard testimony from Officer Maton, 
Mother, the neighbor, and CG, and viewed the video recording of the 
incident.  At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the juvenile court found that the State had proven the allegations of 
the petition beyond a reasonable doubt and adjudicated CG a delinquent 
child.  The juvenile court ruled in 
pertinent part:

 
 
[T]he 
officer was, I would find, in the lawful performance of his duties, because she 
was in a vehicle.  Whether he was 
directly asked, implicitly, it was obvious his assistance was sought to remove 
her from the vehicle after she'd been requested to and refused.  And, therefore, the evidence shows that 
he was in the lawful performance of his official duties.  She refused his instruction to get out 
of the vehicle.  And I would find 
that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt those elements necessary for 
interference with a police officer.

 
 
The 
battery, unlawful touching, the elements as established back in Amin, A-M-I-N, versus State, 694 P.2d 119 [(Wyo. 
1985)], elements of battery are an unlawful  are an unlawful touching of 
another in a rude, insolent or angry manner.  It goes on to provide, [o]r 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily harm.  Well, we're not dealing with the "or" 
part.  We're dealing with the first 
part.

 
 
The 
argument as to her self-defense, the Iseli, I-S-E-L-I, [Iseli v. State, 2007 WY 102, 160 P.3d 1133 (Wyo. 2007)] case talks about when people can and cannot use self-defense 
involving a police officer.  And 
there's a little different discrepancy between this case and that case.  But here's the difficulty I see with 
your argument:  [Defense counsel], 
your argument is correct that she's entitled to use self-defense.  Then what it would place is a situation 
where the officer  and I've already found that he was in the lawful performance 
of his duties.

 
 
Then 
someone can resist arrest and  and basically do what's necessary to evade and 
avoid a situation where they're being placed in or being asked to do what 
they're legally required to do by directive of the police officer.  That would be utter chaos.  That is where people would get 
hurt.  That is where people  I 
mean, that elevates the situation.

 
 
And 
I don't believe that unless there's  it's  you're reasonably in fear of your 
life and there's excessive force being used by the police officer, he pulls a 
gun out, and  and, you know, you are trying to defend yourself or something, I 
don't see that as reasonable under the facts and circumstances, particularly 
when he's in the lawful performance of his duties.

 
 
She 
then refuses to leave, and in the process of that, he is struck.  And I don't believe that that striking 
was in self-defense nor would it be reasonably appropriate under the 
circumstances.

 
 
Moreover, 
it  I don't think that it requires  she certainly knew he was a police 
officer, and that goes back to the interference with a police officer.  But she was attempting to resist, and 
she struck him in the process, and that touching was in a rude, insolent, or 
angry manner.

 
 
And 
the [video] is evident. . . . I've seen officers escalate things much quicker 
and much more vigorously and physically than this officer did in this case.  He didn't get the stun gun out and shoot 
her.  He  he grabbed her by the 
wrist.  And I  I would have  I 
don't have any training, but that would have been my first reaction is to try to 
pull her from that and try to get her out of there.

 
 
And 
I don't see that that  his response was excessive or inappropriate.  I don't see that.  I certainly see that the evidence proves 
beyond a reasonable doubt that she unlawfully touched the officer in a rude, 
insolent, or angry manner.

 
 
Thereafter, 
the juvenile court placed CG on nine months of supervised probation under 
specified terms and conditions.  
This appeal followed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶10]   The issues as presented question 
whether the evidence sufficiently supports the juvenile court's adjudication of 
guilt as to both offenses.  To that 
end, we are guided by what we said in Trumbull v. State, 2009 WY 103, 214 P.3d 978 (Wyo. 2009):

 
 
 
 

In 
discussing the facts of this case, we apply the principle that the evidence 
should be examined in the light most favorable to the State when a question of 
the sufficiency of the evidence is raised.  
We accept as true evidence favorable to the State; we disregard evidence 
favorable to the defendant in conflict with the State's evidence; and we afford 
to the State's evidence every favorable inference which may reasonably and 
fairly be drawn from it. Harvey v. State, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1386 (1979); 
Hovee v. State, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1127 (1979).  Heretofore we have had occasion to apply 
these concepts only to cases tried before juries. We have no compunction, 
however, in joining other courts which have applied these concepts in trials to 
the court.  Simmons v. State, 
255 Ark. 82, 498 S.W.2d 870 (1973); People v. Johnson, 276 Cal. App. 2d 232, 80 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1969).  The 
function of the finder of fact in cases tried to a court is identical to that in 
cases tried to juries, and the same rules are applicable with respect to the 
standards and principles applied in appellate 
review.

 
 
 
 
 Trumbull, 
¶ 9, 214 P.3d  at 980 (quoting Fitzgerald 
v. State, 599 P.2d 572, 574 (Wyo. 1979)).  To the extent the issues concern a pure 
question of law, our review is de novo.  
Dougherty v. State, 2010 WY 
116, ¶ 4, 237 P.3d 403, 404 (Wyo. 2010).

 
 
Analysis

 
 
[¶11]   CG first takes issue with the 
juvenile court's finding that Officer Maton was engaged in the lawful 
performance of his official duties, a necessary requirement for a finding of 
guilt on the interference charge under § 6-5-204(a).  CG contends that, because she was not 
committing a crime, Officer Maton had no authority to either direct her to leave 
the neighbor's van or to forcibly remove her from the vehicle when she refused 
his request.  CG further argues that 
Officer Maton seized her within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, and 
that the seizure was unreasonable because it was not grounded on a perception 
that she had committed or was committing a crime.  Accordingly, CG contends that when 
Officer Maton seized her, he acted unlawfully and therefore was not engaged in 
the lawful performance of his official duties.

 
 
[¶12]   CG's argument is predicated on a 
narrow view of the scope of a peace officer's official duties.  However, a peace officer's duties are 
not limited to arrests for crimes, as CG contends, but encompass a broad range 
of activities.  In addition to 
performing traditional law enforcement activities, such as investigating crimes, 
arresting perpetrators, and issuing traffic citations, peace officers routinely 
engage in a variety of community caretaker functions that are unrelated to the 
detection and investigation of criminal activity, including performing welfare 
checks, helping stranded motorists, preserving property, and assisting and 
protecting citizens in need.  See Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 1998 U. Chi. Legal. F. 261; Mary Elisabeth Naumann, Note, The Community Caretaker Doctrine: Yet 
Another Fourth Amendment Exception, 26 Am. J. Crim. L. 325 (1998-1999); see also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706, 714-15 (1973); State v. D'Armour, 834 A.2d 214 (N.H. 
2003); State v. Lovegren, 51 P.3d 471, 473-75 (Mont. 2002); State v. 
Gocken, 857 P.2d 1074 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993); Crauthers v. State, 727 P.2d 9 (Alaska 
1986).  Community caretaking is 
based on the notion that police serve to ensure the safety and welfare of the 
citizenry at large.  Cady, 413 U.S.  at 447-48, 93 S. Ct.  at 
2531, 37 L. Ed. 2d  at 718; State v. 
Diloreto, 850 A.2d 1226, 1233 (N.J. 2004).  Over the years, this Court has 
recognized the community caretaker function of law enforcement in a variety of 
contexts.  See Shaw v. State, 2009 WY 18, ¶¶ 23-24, 201 P.3d 1108, 1113 (Wyo. 2009) (trooper performing a community caretaker duty when 
she stopped to assist driver whose vehicle was stuck in a snow drift); Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 
821-22 (Wyo. 1996) (officers engaged in a community caretaker activity when they 
continued to question a vehicular-homicide arrestee about the number of 
passengers in the vehicle at the time of the accident); Morris v. State, 908 P.2d 931, 935 (Wyo. 
1995) (officers acting in their community caretaker role when they escorted an 
unsteady and disoriented man to the sheriff's office so he could call a friend 
for a ride); Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 221-22 (Wyo. 1994) (officer performing a community caretaker duty when 
he stopped a limping man in the vicinity of a fire).

 
 
[¶13]   In the instant case, the record 
discloses that CG had refused to exit the neighbor's vehicle despite numerous 
requests by Mother and the neighbor.  
The neighbor clearly wanted CG out of her vehicle and requested Officer 
Maton's assistance in getting her out.  
Officer Maton acted upon the neighbor's request out of concern for her 
safety, as well as the safety of Mother and CG.  He testified that CG's behavior was 
escalating and he was concerned the situation might get physical if he did not 
intervene.  Given these facts, we 
conclude that Officer Maton was engaged in the performance of his community 
caretaker duties when he directed CG out of the neighbor's vehicle and when he 
physically removed her.  Therefore, 
the juvenile court correctly found that Officer Maton was acting in the lawful 
performance of his official duties at the time CG resisted his 
efforts.

 
 
[¶14]   In her second issue, CG complains 
that the juvenile court erroneously rejected her self-defense claim.  She maintains that Officer Maton used 
excessive force in removing her from the neighbor's vehicle.  This, she contends, gave rise to the 
right to use reasonable force to defend herself from attack and, thus, permitted 
her to respond by striking the officer.

 
 
[¶15]   Our response to CG's complaint will 
be brief.  The law in Wyoming is 
clear that self-defense is not available to a person where the peace officer has 
not used excessive force.  Yetter v. State, 987 P.2d 666, 669 (Wyo. 
1999); Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739, 
745 (Wyo. 1987); Roberts v. State, 
711 P.2d 1131, 1134-35 (Wyo. 1985); see 
also Iseli v. State, 2007 WY 102, 
¶¶ 18-20, 160 P.3d 1133, 1138-39 (Wyo. 2007).  Thus, a finding that CG acted in 
self-defense when she struck Officer Maton was contingent on a finding the 
officer used excessive force in effectuating her removal from the vehicle.  The evidence presented to the juvenile 
court showed that the degree of force employed by Officer Maton consisted of 
applying a compliance grip to CG's right wrist, which she testified hurt "a 
little," and physically pulling her from the vehicle.  The juvenile court found, and we believe 
correctly so, that the force used by the officer was not excessive under the 
circumstances.  Absent a finding of 
excessive force, the juvenile court had no legal basis upon which it could 
sustain CG's claim of self-defense.4

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶16]   We hold that sufficient evidence 
exists to sustain the juvenile court's finding of guilt as to both 
offenses.  We therefore affirm the 
order of the juvenile court adjudicating CG a delinquent 
child.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1CG had missed 31 days of school during the year preceding the CHINS 
action.  

 
 

2By this time, Officer Maton, who was parked behind the van, knew that CG 
was not complying with the neighbor's and Mother's requests to exit the vehicle 
and had activated his car's video camera. 

 
 

3Officer Maton employed a "wristlock" to remove CG from the vehicle, which 
essentially is a compliance hold.  

 
 

4Because self-defense was not available to CG absent a finding Officer 
Maton used excessive force, the State was not required to disprove her claim of 
self-defense, as she maintains.  Iseli, ¶ 20, 160 P.3d  at 
1139.