Case Title: People v. Yarbrough

Citation: 

Docket Number: S192751

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2012-07-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
Filed 7/19/12 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S192751 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2 B222399 
JAMMAL HANEEF YARBROUGH, 
) 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. PA065170 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
 
Burglary is committed when a person “enters any . . . building” with the 
intent of committing “larceny or any felony.”  (Pen. Code, § 459; further statutory 
references are to the Penal Code.)  In People v. Valencia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1, 11 
(Valencia), this court held that a building is entered when the building‟s “outer 
boundary” is crossed.  A building‟s outer boundary, Valencia said, encompasses 
“any element that encloses an area into which a reasonable person would believe 
that a member of the general public could not pass without authorization.”  (Ibid.)  
An “unenclosed balcony,” Valencia noted, would not satisfy that test because such 
a balcony cannot be “reasonably” viewed as being “part of the building‟s outer 
boundary.”  (Id. at p. 12, fn. 5, italics deleted.)   
 
Here, defendant was charged with residential burglary after climbing onto a 
second-story apartment‟s private balcony, which was surrounded by a metal 
railing some four feet in height and accessible only through the single bedroom‟s 
sliding glass door.  The trial court instructed the jury that such a balcony was 
 
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within the apartment‟s outer boundary, and the jury convicted defendant.  The 
Court of Appeal reversed, relying on a footnote in Valencia, supra, 28 Cal.4th 1, 
12, stating that an “unenclosed balcony” is not within a dwelling‟s outer boundary.  
(The Court of Appeal did not explain why it considered the second-floor balcony 
in this case to be “unenclosed.”)   
 
We granted the Attorney General‟s petition for review and now reverse the 
Court of Appeal‟s judgment.   
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Salvador Deanda and his family lived in a one-bedroom unit on the second 
floor of an apartment building.  The bedroom had a sliding glass door opening 
onto a balcony that was five feet wide by three feet deep and surrounded by a 
metal railing that Deanda, an adult, said came to his stomach.  The balcony‟s floor 
was eight or nine feet above the ground.   
 
On August 5, 2009, two bicycles were on the balcony and visible from the 
street.  Around midnight, Deanda was awakened by the barking of his dog.  He 
saw defendant standing on the balcony outside its railing.  The toes of defendant‟s 
shoes protruded under the railing, and defendant‟s fingers were clutching the top 
of the railing.  Deanda grabbed a stick and rushed at defendant, who either fell or 
jumped to the ground.   
 
At defendant‟s trial for residential burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. 
(a)), the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of burglary under 
CALCRIM No. 1700, as follows:  “A person enters a building if some part of his 
or her body or some object under his or her control penetrates the area inside the 
building‟s outer boundary.”  The court also instructed the jury that “[a] building‟s 
outer boundary includes the area inside a balcony” that is “attached to” an 
inhabited dwelling. 
 
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The jury convicted defendant of residential burglary, and the trial court 
sentenced him to six years in state prison.  The Court of Appeal reversed for 
instructional error.  Citing footnote 5 in Valencia, supra, 28 Cal.4th 1, 12, that an 
“unenclosed balcony” is not “part of a building‟s outer boundary,” the Court of 
Appeal stated, without any explanation, that Deanda‟s private, second-floor, 
railing-enclosed balcony was “unenclosed,” and that therefore defendant‟s entry 
onto that balcony did not constitute burglary.   
II.  THE CRIME OF BURGLARY 
A.  Common Law 
 
Under the common law, burglary was an offense against a landholder‟s 
right of habitation.  (3 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law (2d ed. 2003) p. 212; 
Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed. 1982) p. 255.)  The crime was defined as 
“the breaking and entering of the dwelling house of another in the nighttime with 
the intent to commit a felony.”  (3 LaFave, supra, at pp. 205-206.)  The word 
“dwelling” encompassed not only a building actually used for habitation but also 
any structure that was “within the curtilage or courtyard surrounding the house” 
and used in connection with the house.  (Perkins & Boyce, supra, at p. 259.)  The 
concern underlying the offense of burglary was that an intruder‟s entry into the 
curtilage of a dwelling would pose a “human risk,” as “the dweller or some 
member of his household might hear a prowler” and then “go to investigate.”  (Id. 
at p. 260.)    
B.  Statutory Law 
 
In 1872, the California Legislature drew upon the common law concepts in 
codifying the crime of burglary.  Section 459 now states that a “person who enters 
any . . . building . . . with intent to commit . . . larceny or any felony is guilty of 
burglary.”  Section 460 sets out two degrees of burglary:  Burglary of an inhabited 
dwelling (residential burglary) is burglary of the first degree.  (Id., subd. (a).)  “All 
 
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other kinds of burglary are of the second degree.”  (Id., subd. (b).)  As under the 
common law, however, the essence of burglary is “ „ “an entry which invades a 
possessory interest in a building.” ‟ ”  (Valencia, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 7; accord, 
Magness v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 270, 277.)   
III. THIS COURT’S VALENCIA DECISION  
 
Because this court‟s 2002 decision in Valencia, supra, 28 Cal.4th 1, is 
central to the issue here, we discuss that case in some detail.  
 
At issue in Valencia was whether an intruder‟s “penetration into the area 
behind a window screen” was an “entry” of a building sufficient to constitute 
burglary.  (Valencia, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 3.)  The defendant used a screwdriver 
to remove a bathroom window‟s screen and to pull back a bedroom window‟s 
screen, but he was unable to open either window.  He was charged with residential 
burglary.  (Id. at p. 4.)   
 
At trial, over the defendant‟s objection, the trial court in Valencia gave the 
jury this instruction:  “ „Any kind of entry, partial or complete, will satisfy the 
element of entry.  The entry may be made by any part of the body or by use of an 
instrument or tool.  In order for there to have been an entry, a part of the 
defendant‟s body or some instrument, tool or other object under his control must 
have penetrated the area inside where the screen was normally affixed in the 
window frame in question.‟ ”  (Valencia, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 5, italics omitted.)  
The jury found the defendant guilty of residential burglary.  (Ibid.)   
 
The Court of Appeal in Valencia reversed because of instructional error.  
(Valencia, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 5.)  It held that the defendant‟s removal of a 
window screen and his pulling back of another window screen, without succeeding 
in opening either window, was not an entry into the residence and therefore no 
burglary was committed.  (Ibid.)  The defendant‟s crime, the Court of Appeal said, 
was no more than attempted residential burglary.  (Id. at p. 6.)   
 
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In reversing the Court of Appeal, this court in Valencia stated that the 
defendant did enter the house by “penetration into the area behind” the two 
window screens in question.  (Valencia, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 12.)  Valencia 
observed that ordinarily a dwelling consists of walls, doors, windows, and a roof, 
architectural components marking the dwelling‟s “outer boundary.”  (Id. at p. 11.)  
But, Valencia added, when in a particular case it is not readily apparent what the 
dwelling‟s outer boundary is, a “reasonable belief test” should be applied.  (Ibid.)  
Under that test, the pertinent inquiry is whether the architectural component in 
question “encloses an area into which a reasonable person would believe that a 
member of the general public could not pass without authorization” (ibid.), which 
is a legal question for the court rather than a factual question for the jury (id., at 
p. 15).  In a footnote, Valencia stated that “the reasonable belief test necessarily 
refers only to an element of a building that reasonably can be viewed as part of the 
building’s outer boundary,” and that “[t]he test does not encompass any feature 
that is not such an element, such as a lawn, courtyard, unenclosed patio, or 
unenclosed balcony that may be located in front of or behind a building . . . .”  
(Valencia, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 12, fn. 5, second italics added.)   
 
Here, the Court of Appeal reversed defendant‟s burglary conviction for 
instructional error based on the trial court‟s jury instruction that “a building‟s outer 
boundary includes the area inside a balcony.”  Although the Court of Appeal relied 
on Valencia‟s statement in footnote 5 that an “unenclosed balcony” could not 
reasonably be viewed as marking a building‟s “outer boundary” (Valencia, supra, 
28 Cal.4th 1, 11), it described that statement as mere “dictum.”  Turning to the 
facts of this case, the Court of Appeal said that Deanda‟s second-floor, railed-in 
balcony was “unenclosed,” giving no reason for that conclusion.  That conclusion 
led the court to hold that, as a matter of law, the balcony did not mark the outer 
boundary of Deanda‟s second-floor apartment unit.    
 
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The Court of Appeal here was correct in describing as dictum the reference 
to an “unenclosed balcony” in Valencia‟s footnote 5.  Because Valencia, supra, 28 
Cal.4th 1, pertained to a defendant‟s entry of a building by pulling back two 
window screens and had nothing to do with a balcony, no need existed there for a 
reference to an “unenclosed balcony.”  (See People v. Vang (2011) 52 Cal.4th 
1038, 1047, fn. 3 [defining dictum as a comment “ „unnecessary to the decision in 
the case‟ ”]; Klein v. United States of America (2010) 50 Cal.4th 68, 85 [same].)  
Moreover, Valencia never explained what it meant by an “unenclosed” balcony.  
A balcony generally is surrounded by a railing, and to that extent is enclosed.  (See 
American Heritage Dict. (4th ed. 2000) p. 135 [A balcony is a “platform that 
projects from the wall of a building and is surrounded by a railing, balustrade, or 
parapet.”]: Webster‟s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 165 [A balcony is “an 
unroofed platform projecting from the wall of a building, enclosed by a . . . 
railing.”].)  Because the statement in People v. Valencia, supra, 28 Cal.4th 1, 12, 
footnote 5 pertaining to an “unenclosed balcony” was not necessary to its holding 
and may engender confusion, we disapprove it as ill-considered dictum.  (See 
Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 968 [disapproving dictum]; accord, 
People v. Lessie (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1152, 1168 [same].)  
 
The Court of Appeal here disagreed with People v. Jackson (2010) 190 
Cal.App.4th 918.  That case, like this one, involved an unauthorized entry onto an 
apartment‟s private balcony.  Applying the “reasonable belief test” from Valencia, 
Jackson concluded that the apartment‟s balcony in question comprised “an area into 
which a reasonable person would believe that „a member of the general public could not 
pass without authorization,‟ ” and thus that an intruder‟s entry onto that area would be 
burglary.  (Jackson, supra, at p. 925, quoting Valencia, supra, 28 Cal.4th 1, 11.) 
 
We need not apply Valencia‟s reasonable belief test, however, to decide 
whether an unauthorized entry onto a second-floor apartment‟s private balcony 
 
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with the requisite criminal intent will constitute burglary.  Whenever a private, 
residential apartment and its balcony are on the second or a higher floor of a 
building, and the balcony is designed to be entered only from inside the apartment 
(thus extending the apartment‟s living space), the balcony is part of the apartment.  
The railing of such a balcony marks the apartment‟s “outer boundary” (Valencia, 
supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 11), any slight crossing of which is an entry for purposes of 
the burglary statute.   
 
Our holding here that a second floor apartment‟s balcony is part of the 
apartment when the balcony is designed to be entered from and offers an extension 
of the apartment‟s living space was not fully reflected in the trial court‟s jury 
instruction.  In telling the jury simply that “[a] building‟s outer boundary includes 
the area inside a balcony” that is “attached to” an inhabited dwelling, the 
instruction‟s language was overbroad.  Defendant, however, was not prejudiced, 
because the balcony at issue here met our stated criteria:  The one-bedroom unit in 
which Salvador Deanda lived with his family was on the second floor.  Through 
the bedroom‟s sliding glass door, the Deanda family could enter onto a three-by-
five-foot private balcony, which was surrounded by a metal railing some four feet 
high.  The balcony was designed to be accessed only from the Deandas‟ 
apartment, extending their apartment‟s living space.  On these facts, we conclude 
that a properly instructed jury would not have reached a different verdict.1   
                                              
1   
We reject defendant‟s contention that affirming his burglary conviction 
would be an “ „unforeseeable judicial enlargement‟ ” of California‟s burglary 
statute.  (See People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 586; Bouie v. City of 
Colombia (1964) 378 U.S. 347, 353-354.)  We have never held that an intruder‟s 
entry onto a second floor apartment‟s private balcony, as occurred here, could not 
constitute the crime of burglary.   
 
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DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Yarbrough 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 193 Cal.App.4th 921 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S192751 
Date Filed: July 19, 2012 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Ronald S. Coen 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Laura S. Kelly, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Linda Charman Hayes, under appointment 
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka and Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorneys General, Blythe J. 
Leszkay, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Lawrence M. Daniels and David Zarmi, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Laura S. Kelly 
4521 Campus Drive, #175 
Irvine, CA  92612 
(949) 737-2041 
 
David Zarmi 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 576-1336