Case Title: Apel v. Katz

Citation: 1998-Ohio-420

Docket Number: 19970641

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1998-08-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
APEL ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. KATZ ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Apel v. Katz (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 11.] 
Real property — Interpretation of scope of the reservation of the right to keep and 
maintain a roadway easement. 
(No. 97-641 — Submitted March 24, 1998 — Decided August 19, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 68294. 
 
This appeal revolves around a dispute over the scope of an easement on a 
parcel of land, and the often acrimonious relationship of the owners of the two 
properties directly affected by that easement.  Plaintiffs-appellants, Zeev and Atara 
Apel, are the holders of the dominant tenement benefited by the easement.  
Defendants-appellees, Shai and Linda Katz, are the holders of the servient 
tenement subject to the easement. 
 
The parcels now owned by appellants and by appellees at one time 
constituted one larger parcel, owned by Laura L. Goodman.  In 1976, Goodman, 
while retaining the rear, larger (south) parcel (now owned by appellants) for her 
own use, sold the front (north) parcel (now owned by appellees) to Angela M. 
Saporito and Marie C. Saporito.  The front parcel abuts on Pike Drive in the village 
of Orange, in Cuyahoga County.  The rear parcel does not abut any public access 
street.  The deed transferring the front parcel to the Saporitos contains the 
following provisions: 
 
“Grantor [Goodman] reserves for herself, her heirs and assigns, an easement 
to provide ingress and egress to and from the property owned by the Grantor 
abutting the above-described premises on the South.  Grantor shall be allowed to 
keep and maintain a roadway; 
 
“Further, Grantor reserves for herself, her heirs and assigns, the right to 
install upon the easement public utility lines and poles, or underground utilities, 
and sewer and water lines below ground.” 
 
2
 
The deed described the easement area as a thirty-foot-wide strip of land 
along the length of one side of the front property. 
 
Goodman conveyed the rear, larger parcel to appellants in 1979.  In the deed 
conveying the rear parcel, the following language appears: 
 
“TOGETHER WITH an easement as described in Deed from Laura L. 
Goodman to Angela M. Saporito and Marie C. Saporito  * * *, which easement 
provides ingress and egress to and from the above described property to Pike 
Drive, the right to keep and maintain a roadway, to install upon the easement 
Public utility lines and poles or underground utilities and sewer and water lines 
below ground.” 
 
In a deed recorded on December 12, 1988, the succeeding owner of the front 
parcel, Rose Marie Lentini, f.k.a. Rose Marie Saporito, transferred her interest in 
the parcel to appellees.  This deed contained the following provision: 
 
“And the Grantors [sic, grantor, Lentini]  * * * hereby covenant with the 
said Grantees [appellees]  * * * that the said Grantors [sic] are the true and lawful 
owners of said premises and are well seized of same in fee simple[,] have good 
right and full power to bargain[,] sell and convey the same in the manner aforesaid 
and that the same are free and clear of all encumbrances, EXCEPT  * * * 
conditions and restrictions of record and any conditions, reservations or easements 
created therewith * * *.” 
 
After appellees purchased the front parcel, they began to construct a house 
on the land.  A disagreement arose between appellants and appellees over the 
scope of the easement over the property.  One of the points of contention 
concerned a rough gravel road or pathway over the front parcel used by the 
appellants, and previously used by Goodman, to access the rear parcel.  The 
disagreement eventually escalated into animosity. 
 
3
 
On August 9, 1989, appellants filed a complaint in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Cuyahoga County, seeking a declaration of rights under the easement, 
damages, and an injunction.  Appellants alleged that appellees had interfered with 
their use of the easement.  In their answer, appellees disagreed with appellants’ 
position on the scope of the easement.  Appellees counterclaimed for 
compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees, alleging, inter alia, 
that appellants had exceeded the scope of the easement and had trespassed on their 
property. 
 
On October 10, 1990, appellees filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment.  Appellees did not dispute the existence of appellants’ easements for 
ingress and egress and for utilities, but did dispute that appellants possessed the 
right to keep and maintain a roadway on the front parcel.  Appellees argued that, 
by failing to include the phrase “heirs and assigns” or other terms of inheritance 
and succession in the “roadway” portion of the easement reservation, Goodman 
merely made a reservation of roadway rights personal to herself, which could not 
be passed on to future purchasers of the rear parcel.  The original reservation of the 
right to keep and maintain a roadway is hereinafter referred to as the “roadway 
provision,” and the issue of whether the reservation benefits subsequent owners is 
the “roadway issue.” 
 
Appellants responded in opposition to appellees’ motion, and requested 
summary judgment in their favor, asserting that Goodman’s reservation of roadway 
rights was a clarification of the scope of the easement for ingress and egress, and 
was not meant to be taken as a limitation of the rights retained by Goodman.  
Appellants also requested that the trial court order appellees to return the strip over 
which they had the easement to its previous condition, based on their allegations 
that appellees had improperly altered it.  Furthermore, appellants moved for 
 
4
summary judgment on appellees’ counterclaims, contending that there was no 
trespass and that appellees had suffered no damages. 
 
Appellees, in their reply brief, asserted that they had not obstructed or 
blocked the easement.  They attached an affidavit of a surveyor, stating that much 
of the gravel pathway used by appellants to reach the property in the rear was not 
on the thirty-foot-wide easement, to support their trespass claim. 
 
On June 11, 1991, the trial court, without opinion, issued the following 
journal entry unaccompanied by a declaration of the rights of the parties: 
 
“Motion of Defendants, Shai Katz, et al., for Partial Summary Judgment is 
GRANTED. 
 
“Motion of Plaintiffs, Zeev Apel, et al., for Summary Judgment is DENIED 
as there are genuine issues of fact regarding interference with the easement.” 
 
The case progressed toward a trial on appellees’ counterclaims.  Following 
some apparent misunderstandings regarding the assignment of a visiting judge and 
the setting of a trial date, an ex parte trial was held on appellees’ counterclaims on 
December 9, 1991, with counsel for appellants not present.  The trial court 
awarded appellees $12,530 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive 
damages, plus costs, on their counterclaims.  On appeal, the court of appeals 
reversed the damages awards and remanded for a new trial, holding that the ex 
parte trial had deprived appellants of their due process rights.  Apel v. Katz (Apr. 
29, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 63084, unreported, 1993 WL 135787.  The court of 
appeals declined to review appellants’ assignment of error regarding the trial 
court’s grant of partial summary judgment to appellees on the interpretation of the 
roadway reservation, finding that the remand for a new trial on damages on the 
counterclaims rendered that decision of the trial court an interlocutory, 
unappealable order. 
 
5
 
On remand, the trial court left undisturbed the earlier decision to grant 
partial summary judgment to appellees on the roadway issue.  The case proceeded 
to a jury trial on appellees’ counterclaims, with appellees dismissing their 
counterclaims against Atara Apel and proceeding on their trespass counterclaim 
against appellant Zeev Apel.  After the trial court denied appellant’s motion for a 
directed verdict, the jury returned a compensatory damage award in favor of 
appellees for $500, and also found appellant liable for punitive damages and 
attorney fees.  The trial judge later ruled that appellees were entitled to $500 in 
punitive damages and $14,298.78 in attorney fees.1 
 
Appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County.  
Appellees filed a notice of cross-appeal, but later withdrew their cross-appeal.  In 
their first assignment of error, appellants challenged the trial court’s grant of partial 
summary judgment in favor of appellees on the interpretation of the roadway 
reservation pertaining to the easement over appellees’ property.  In four other 
assignments of error, appellant Zeev Apel raised issues regarding the jury’s verdict 
against him on appellees’ trespass counterclaim. 
 
The court of appeals found that the trial court erred in granting partial 
summary judgment in favor of appellees on the roadway issue, in that a genuine 
issue of material fact remained to be determined regarding the rights and burdens 
of the parties.  The court of appeals declined to address the remaining assignments 
of error, relating to the trespass counterclaim, finding no need to address those 
assignments of error based on the disposition of the first assignment of error.  The 
cause was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 
 
Both appellants and appellees filed motions for reconsideration in the court 
of appeals.  Both contended that the court of appeals had erred in determining that 
the assignments of error relating to the trespass counterclaim were dependent on 
the trial court’s resolution on remand of the roadway issue.  The parties agreed that 
 
6
the trespass counterclaim was based on facts unrelated to the roadway dispute, and 
requested that the court reconsider its decision not to address the assignments of 
error regarding the trespass damages. 
 
In a journal entry issued after its opinion was announced, the court of 
appeals denied the motions for reconsideration, but clarified that, in remanding for 
further proceedings, it was not expressly ordering a trial on all issues, but was 
allowing the trial court on remand the discretion to determine what issues should 
be tried (or, presumably, retried), subject to appeal at the conclusion of all trial 
court proceedings. 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
__________________ 
 
J. Michael Goldberg, for appellants. 
 
Hahn, Loeser & Parks, L.L.P., Michael J. Garvin and Andrew S. Pollis, for 
appellees. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  This case first presents the issue of the correct 
interpretation to be given to the scope of the reservation of the right to keep and 
maintain a roadway over the easement on appellees’ property.  Second, the case 
raises various issues regarding the damage awards in appellees’ favor on their 
trespass counterclaim against appellant Zeev Apel.  For the reasons which follow, 
after a thorough review of the record, we determine that the trial court erred in 
ruling against appellants on their request for a declaratory judgment interpreting 
the scope of the easement across appellees’ property.  We also determine that the 
damages awarded to appellees on their trespass counterclaim were properly 
assessed against appellant.  We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, enter 
final judgment for appellants on the roadway issue, and enter final judgment for 
 
7
appellees on the compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees 
awarded on the trespass counterclaim. 
I 
 
In the initial ruling interpreting the scope of the reservation by Goodman in 
the deed to the Saporitos allowing Goodman to “keep and maintain a roadway” on 
the easement over the property now owned by appellees, the trial court granted 
appellees’ motion for partial summary judgment.  Since appellees had argued that 
the roadway provision was merely a personal reservation by Goodman, it seems 
logical to assume that the trial court must have accepted that argument in ruling the 
way that it did, and must have rejected appellants’ argument that the roadway 
easement was an express easement that runs with the land for appellants’ benefit.  
However, we share the concerns expressed by the court of appeals in this case that 
the trial court, in issuing what amounted to a declaratory judgment on the scope of 
the easement, should have included a determination of the rights of the parties 
involved.  The failure of the trial court to issue an explanation of the consequences 
of its ruling was the first in a series of misunderstandings and missteps involving 
this case that have compounded as the case has progressed to place it in the 
confusing posture we now encounter. 
 
The complaint in this case was filed in 1989.  Thus far, this case has gone 
through the trial court two times, and has also gone through the court of appeals 
two times, and it seems that the case is no closer to resolution now than it was prior 
to the issuance of any rulings by the trial court in its early stages.  In the opinion 
now being appealed from, the court of appeals has ordered yet another remand to 
the trial court, apparently for the trial court to readdress the scope of the roadway 
easement — the key question raised in appellants’ request for a declaratory 
judgment almost ten years ago.  There still has been no appellate review of the 
ultimate propriety of the trial court’s determination on this question, a question of 
 
8
law that in our view was ripe for decision at the time the trial court rendered its 
initial judgment on June 11, 1991. 
 
Our review of the record convinces us that this issue is capable of resolution 
from an examination of the materials before us.  We disagree with the 
determination reached by the court of appeals that “a genuine issue of material fact 
remains pending for litigation relative to whether the grantor intended to reserve 
for herself an express easement with the right to maintain a roadway.”  We see no 
reason to remand this cause to the trial court, and therefore we reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals ordering that result.  We proceed to an 
examination of the terms of the roadway provision of the reservation, to review 
what we understand to be the trial court’s construction of its scope. 
 
In arguing for what they each contend is the proper interpretation of this 
provision, the parties cite R.C. 5301.02, and dispute how that statute applies to the 
inquiry.  R.C. 5301.02 provides that “[t]he use of terms of inheritance or 
succession are [sic] not necessary to create a fee simple estate, and every grant, 
conveyance, or mortgage of lands, tenements, or hereditaments shall convey or 
mortgage the entire interest which the grantor could lawfully grant, convey, or 
mortgage, unless it clearly appears by the deed, mortgage, or instrument that the 
grantor intended to convey or mortgage a less [sic] estate.” 
 
In citing this statute, the parties dispute whether it even applies at all, with 
appellees arguing that the statute on its face applies only to grants, conveyances, 
and mortgages, not reservations, of interests.  In the event that this statute is found 
to apply, the parties dispute how it affects the outcome.  The parties also cite cases 
to support their interpretations. 
 
For purposes here, R.C. 5301.02 principally provides that the failure to 
include language of inheritance or succession, typically the phrase “heirs and 
assigns,” is not automatically fatal to the creation of a fee estate.  See, generally, 
 
9
Ewing v. McClanahan (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 46, 48, 514 N.E.2d 444, 445, fn. 4; 
DeShon v. Parker (1974), 49 Ohio App.2d 366, 367, 3 O.O.3d 430, 431, 361 
N.E.2d 457, 458.  Beyond that limited proposition, we find that the statute and 
other cited authorities are of little help in clarifying the specifics of our inquiry.  
R.C. 5301.02 in essence goes on to direct a court to look to the wording of the 
provision at issue to determine its meaning.  We see no need to rely on the statute 
or on the parties’ specific references to case law to support our interpretation of the 
roadway provision, but instead look to the wording of the reservation itself to 
determine its scope. 
 
In this situation, the language employed, considered in light of the 
surrounding circumstances, is the best indication of what Goodman and the 
Saporitos intended when they agreed to the transfer of the front parcel in 1976.  
See Gill v. Fletcher (1906), 74 Ohio St. 295, 78 N.E. 433, paragraph one of the 
syllabus.  While the authorities cited by the parties appear to consistently support 
this general approach in resolving disputes of this type, the specifics of such an 
inquiry depend upon the facts of each case.  Thus, regardless of whether we apply 
R.C. 5301.02 or not, the analysis is the same. 
 
We disagree with appellees’ contention, voiced throughout this litigation, 
that the roadway provision is a separate “clause” in the deed from Goodman to the 
Saporitos reserving the easement.  We instead agree with appellants’ contention 
that the roadway provision is a part of the same clause earlier reserving an 
easement for ingress and egress, and actually complements that earlier reservation.  
Appellees have not disputed that the easement for ingress and egress runs with the 
land.  Furthermore, appellees have not contended that the easement is limited to 
foot access to the property, and the reservation’s terms do not support such an 
interpretation.  Thus appellees must necessarily concede that access to vehicles is 
implied by the easement for ingress and egress.  It seems clear that to make vehicle 
 
10
access practicable and meaningful, the right to keep and maintain a roadway was 
contemplated by Goodman and the Saporitos to be a part of the right of ingress and 
egress, rather than an independent reservation. 
 
This view is buttressed by the language contained in the deed transferring 
the rear parcel to appellants from Goodman, in which the reservation of the 
easement is also passed, and in which Goodman describes that easement as 
providing “ingress and egress to and from the above described property to Pike 
Drive, the right to keep and maintain a roadway,” and utility access rights.  
(Emphasis added.)  Obviously, Goodman felt that she had reserved as an 
appurtenant easement running with the land the right to keep and maintain the 
roadway, and also felt that she could transfer that roadway right to appellants. 
 
Appellees’ position throughout this litigation implies that Goodman, in the 
deed transferring the rear parcel to appellants, must have been mistaken in her 
belief that the roadway easement could be transferred to appellants.  However, it 
seems to us to be more likely that it is appellees who are mistaken about the 
construction of the roadway provision, and about the intent of Goodman and the 
Saporitos evidenced in the 1976 deed for the sale of the front parcel. 
 
In conclusion, we find that no ambiguity is present in the provision at issue, 
and we resort to no specific rules of construction to resolve the easement’s scope.  
The trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment for appellees on this 
question, and instead should have granted summary judgment for appellants, and 
should have declared that appellants’ easement rights over appellees’ property 
include the right to keep and maintain a roadway in order to facilitate “ingress and 
egress to and from the property” of appellants.  The contours of the roadway right 
over the thirty-foot-wide easement are defined by what is reasonable under the 
circumstances present here. 
II 
 
11
 
The court of appeals below appears to have decided that it was unclear 
whether the issues raised in appellant Zeev Apel’s assignments of error regarding 
trespass damages were interrelated with the roadway issue remanded to the trial 
court, and so declined to address those remaining assignments of error.  The parties 
to this appeal agree that the trespass issues are unrelated to the roadway issue, and 
contend that the court of appeals erred in not addressing them.  The parties suggest 
that we order a remand on those questions to the court of appeals, accompanied by 
a directive from this court ordering the court of appeals to address those issues. 
 
To that end, the parties cite App.R. 12(A)(1), and argue that the court of 
appeals had a mandatory duty to review and rule on the remaining assignments of 
error.  App.R. 12(A)(1) provides: 
 
“On an undismissed appeal from a trial court, a court of appeals shall do all 
of the following: 
 
“ * * * 
 
“(c) Unless an assignment of error is made moot by a ruling on another 
assignment of error, decide each assignment of error and give reasons in writing 
for its decision.” 
 
After a thorough review of the record, we agree with the parties’ position 
that the trespass issues raised in the court of appeals were unrelated to the roadway 
issue raised there, and should have been addressed by the court of appeals.  
Furthermore, we have already determined that the court of appeals should not have 
ordered a remand to the trial court on the roadway issue.  However, rather than 
remanding this cause to the court of appeals with orders to address those 
assignments of error, we choose to decide the issues, based on the briefing of those 
issues by the parties both here and in the court of appeals. 
 
The remaining assignments of error raised in the court of appeals by 
appellant Zeev Apel are: 
 
12
 
“II.  The trial court erred in failing to sustain Zeev Apel’s motion for 
directed verdict; and, the jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the 
evidence. 
 
“III.  The trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to instruct the jury 
properly on the issue of restoration damages. 
 
“IV.  The trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to sustain Zeev Apel’s 
motion to dismiss the Katzes’ punitive damages claim. 
 
“V.  The trial court erred as a matter of law in permitting the jury to consider 
the issue of punitive damages.” 
 
In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that no compensatory 
damages for trespass should have been awarded in this case.  Appellant argues 
both that the elements of trespass were not proven, so that the trial court should 
have sustained his motion for a directed verdict, and further that the jury’s verdict 
was unfounded. 
 
Civ.R. 50(A)(4) provides: 
 
“When a motion for a directed verdict has been properly made, and the trial 
court, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against 
whom the motion is directed, finds that upon any determinative issue reasonable 
minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that 
conclusion is adverse to such party, the court shall sustain the motion and direct a 
verdict for the moving party as to that issue.” 
 
A motion for a directed verdict must be denied if substantial competent 
evidence supports the position of the party opposing the motion, so that reasonable 
minds might reach different conclusions based upon the evidence.  See Wagner v. 
Roche Laboratories (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 116, 119, 671 N.E.2d 252, 255; Strother 
v. Hutchinson (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 282, 284-285, 21 O.O.3d 177, 179, 423 
 
13
N.E.2d 467, 469.  Appellant argues that appellees did not raise a prima facie case 
of trespass against him. 
 
“A common-law tort in trespass upon real property occurs when a person, 
without authority or privilege, physically invades or unlawfully enters the private 
premises of another whereby damages directly ensue  * * *.”  Linley v. DeMoss 
(1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 594, 598, 615 N.E.2d 631, 633.  See, also, Chance v. BP 
Chemicals, Inc. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 17, 24, 670 N.E.2d 985, 991.  Based on our 
review of the record, we find that appellees raised a prima facie case of trespass 
sufficient to get the issue to the jury, so that appellant’s directed verdict motion 
was properly denied by the trial court.  Appellees presented evidence regarding 
appellant’s use of the portion of the gravel pathway located off the easement.  The 
trial court did not err in allowing the matter to go to the jury. 
 
Further, for the same reasons, we find on the record here that substantial 
competent evidence was presented to support the jury’s verdict, and we defer to the 
jury’s determination that a trespass occurred. 
 
In his third assignment of error, appellant takes issue with the trial court’s 
instruction to the jury on the proper measure of damages.  Appellant argues that the 
trial court erred by not instructing that appellees’ damage award was limited to the 
diminution in fair market value of the property caused by appellant’s conduct.  We 
find that appellant’s view of the measure of damages is unduly restrictive as 
applied to the facts of this case, and does not recognize that some flexibility is 
permissible in the ascertainment of damages suffered in the appropriate situation.  
See, e.g., Thatcher v. Lane Constr. Co. (1970), 21 Ohio App.2d 41, 48-49, 50 
O.O.2d 95, 99, 254 N.E.2d 703, 708 (“The general rule that the measure of 
damages for injury to real estate shall not exceed the difference in the market value 
of the entire tract immediately before and immediately after the injury is not an  * 
* * exact formula to be applied in every case without regard to whether its 
 
14
application would compensate the injured party fully for losses which are the 
proximate result of the wrongdoer’s conduct.”).  Furthermore, in the circumstances 
of this case, we find that the failure of appellees to put on evidence regarding the 
fair market value of their property before and after the trespass conduct occurred is 
not fatal to appellees’ claim for damages. 
 
In appellant’s fourth and fifth assignments of error, he challenges the 
propriety of punitive damages in this situation.  Appellant first argues that 
appellees’ counterclaim was based on an ordinary trespass, and that the trial court 
should have dismissed the punitive damages component of the counterclaim as 
insufficient as a matter of law.  In support of this position, in his fourth assignment 
of error, appellant argues that appellees failed to specifically plead malice or insult 
in their counterclaim, and also argues that appellees pled no facts to warrant 
punitive damages.  After a review of the record, we determine that appellees in 
their pleadings adequately put forth their punitive damages claim to put appellant 
on notice of the substance of the claim, and to avoid a dismissal of that claim by 
the trial court. 
 
Appellant, in his fifth assignment of error, next argues that the trial court 
should not have allowed the jury to consider whether appellees were entitled to 
punitive damages because the facts of this case do not, as a matter of law, support a 
punitive damages award.  The punitive damages in this case were awarded 
pursuant to former R.C. 2315.21.  The parties, not challenging the validity of that 
statute in the course of these proceedings, frame their arguments around whether 
the requirements of former R.C. 2315.21 are met in the circumstances of this case.  
The parties’ arguments focus on the following provisions of former R.C. 2315.21: 
 
“(B) * * * [P]unitive or exemplary damages are not recoverable from a 
defendant in question in a tort action unless both of the following apply: 
 
15
 
“(1) The actions or omissions of that defendant demonstrate malice, 
aggravated or egregious fraud, oppression, or insult  * * *; 
 
“(2) The plaintiff in question has adduced proof of actual damages that 
resulted from actions or omissions as described in division (B)(1) of this section. 
 
“(C) * * * 
 
“ * * * 
 
“(3) In a tort action, the burden of proof shall be upon a plaintiff in question, 
by clear and convincing evidence, to establish that he is entitled to recover punitive 
or exemplary damages.”  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1, 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1661, 1690-
1691. 
 
Because appellant was opposing the punitive damages sought in appellees’ 
counterclaim, he is the “defendant” for purposes of this statute, and appellees are 
the “plaintiffs.” 
 
Appellant, citing Bishop v. Grdina (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 26, 20 OBR 213, 
485 N.E.2d 704, argues that there must be a nexus between the underlying tortious 
action and the related punitive damages claim.  Further, citing former R.C. 
2315.21(B), appellant argues that punitive damages must flow directly from the 
tortious “actions or omissions” of the defendant.  Appellant contends that the 
required nexus is not present here, because the compensatory damages were based 
on his alleged trespassing onto appellees’ land (and the resulting damage to 
appellees’ property), while the punitive damages were based on verbal insults, or 
malicious behavior unrelated to that entry and damage. 
 
Appellees cite Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 638, 
635 N.E.2d 331, paragraph one of the syllabus, for the proposition that punitive 
damages may be awarded for acts different from those directly causing 
compensatory damages, so long as the punitive damages flow from a course of 
conduct related to the compensatory damages.  Appellant points out that this court 
 
16
in Moskovitz was not applying former R.C. 2315.21(B), because the cause of 
action in that case predated the effective date of the statute.  However, even though 
appellant may be correct in this regard, we find that Moskovitz is relevant to our 
consideration, because the argument of appellees based on Moskovitz is not 
inconsistent with the terms of former R.C. 2315.21(B).  We accept appellees’ 
position that the relationship between the tortious conduct and the punitive 
damages is not so remote in the circumstances of this case to make punitive 
damages unavailable under former R.C. 2315.21, and so disagree with appellant’s 
position that the required nexus is missing. 
 
Finally, appellant’s remaining contentions can be summarized as arguing in 
essence that appellees did not prove either “malice” or “insult” under former R.C. 
2315.21(B)(1) by the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of former R.C. 
2315.21(C)(3).  See Preston v. Murty (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 334, 512 N.E.2d 1174.  
Appellant argues that, at the most, his conduct leading to the punitive damages 
award was merely negligent, so that punitive damages should not have been 
awarded in this case. 
 
We acknowledge that this case does not present a classic punitive damages 
situation, as opposed to the situations in cases such as Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co. 
(1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 552, 644 N.E.2d 397 (punitive damages award based on 
allegation of bad faith refusal to settle claim against insurer), and Moskovitz 
(punitive damages award based on claim that defendant doctor in medical 
malpractice action altered patient records), which involved allegations of more 
egregious conduct.  We also recognize that the level of wrongfulness in appellant’s 
acts is somewhat open to question based on the differing interpretations the parties 
here place on their respective representations of the facts.  However, after a 
comprehensive review of the record, we conclude that the trial court was justified 
in allowing the question of punitive damages to go to the jury, precisely because 
 
17
the facts are open to interpretation.  Having concluded that the trial court did not 
err in submitting the punitive damages question to the jury, we defer to the jury’s 
finding that punitive damages were appropriate. 
 
In conclusion, for all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of 
appeals remanding this cause to the trial court is reversed.  Furthermore, on the 
merits, we grant judgment in favor of appellants on their complaint in accordance 
with the rights declared in this opinion, and grant judgment in favor of appellees on 
their counterclaim. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in part and 
dissent in part. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1. 
The trial judge determined the amount of punitive damages pursuant to 
former R.C. 2315.21(C)(2).  In Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 
552, 644 N.E.2d 397, paragraph two of the syllabus, this court found that R.C. 
2315.21(C)(2) violated the right to trial by jury set forth in Section 5, Article I of 
the Ohio Constitution, and held that, in a case tried to a jury, the jury rather than 
the judge is the proper assessor of the amount of punitive damages.  That the trial 
judge set the amount of punitive damages is not an issue pertinent to this appeal. 
 
Once punitive damages were found to be appropriate by the jury, the jury 
then also determined that attorney fees were appropriate as well.  Attorney fees are 
potentially recoverable as a part of compensatory damages when punitive damages 
have been awarded.  See Columbus Fin., Inc. v. Howard (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 
178, 183, 71 O.O.2d 174, 177, 327 N.E.2d 654, 658; Zoppo, 71 Ohio St.3d at 558, 
644 N.E.2d at 402. 
__________________ 
 
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COOK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I respectfully dissent 
from the majority decision on the issue of punitive damages. 
 
Compensatory damages in this case were awarded to the Katzes because Mr. 
Apel damaged weeds, grass, and wildflowers by driving outside the easement 
benefiting his property.  The punitive damage award, on the other hand, is not 
based on that activity.  Instead, it is tied to verbal insults that stem from the 
roadway dispute. 
 
The applicable version of R.C. 2315.21(B) provided: 
 
 “[P]unitive or exemplary damages are not recoverable from a defendant in 
question in a tort action unless both of the following apply: 
 
“(1) The actions or omissions of that defendant demonstrate malice, 
aggravated or egregious fraud, oppression, or insult, or that defendant as principal 
or master authorized, participated in, or ratified actions or omissions of an agent or 
servant that so demonstrate; 
 
“(2) The plaintiff in question has adduced proof of actual damages that 
resulted from actions or omissions as described in division (B)(1) of this section.” 
(Emphasis added.)  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1, 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1661, 1690-1691. 
 
Because it cannot be said that the tortious activity for which the Katzes 
recovered actual damages (i.e., physical damage to vegetation resulting from 
Apel’s driving off the easement) “resulted” from the acts or omissions 
demonstrating malice, fraud, oppression, or insult (i.e., verbal insults uttered by 
Apel and directed at the Katz family), the Katzes failed to demonstrate that they 
were entitled to punitive damages under former R.C. 2315.21(B). 
 
The long-standing rule in Ohio is that “[e]xemplary or punitive damages 
may not be awarded in the absence of proof of actual damages.”  Richard v. Hunter 
(1949), 151 Ohio St. 185, 39 O.O. 24, 85 N.E.2d 109, syllabus.  “The purpose of 
the Richard rule is to keep the punitive damages awarded a mere incident of the 
 
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cause of action, rather than let it become a cause of action in and of itself. * * * No 
civil cause of action in this state may be maintained simply for punitive damages.” 
(Emphasis sic.)  Bishop v. Grdina (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 26, 28, 20 OBR 213, 214, 
485 N.E.2d 704, 705.  Consistent with this rule, former R.C. 2315.21(B) required 
punitive damages to flow from the same tortious activity causing actual damages. 
 
The judicial policy preferences announced in Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. 
Ctr. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 638, 635 N.E.2d 331, cannot trump the unambiguous 
expression of the General Assembly in former R.C. 2315.21(B).  In Moskovitz, the 
court declined to “establish a rule requiring that malicious conduct giving rise to a 
claim for punitive damages must independently cause compensable harm before 
punitive damages may be awarded.”  Id. at 651, 635 N.E.2d at 343.  As noted by 
the majority, Moskovitz did not apply former R.C. 2315.21(B) because the cause of 
action predated the effective date of that statute.  But we are now squarely faced 
with conflicting legislative (former R.C. 2315.21[B]) and judicial (Moskovitz) 
views on a nonconsitutional issue, and the General Assembly’s view must prevail. 
 
The majority justifies its application of Moskovitz by reasoning that 
“Moskovitz is not inconsistent with the terms of former R.C. 2315.21(B).”  
Because I do not read the first paragraph of the syllabus of Moskovitz and former 
R.C. 2315.21(B) as being amenable to the majority’s reconciliation, I dissent.  A 
directed verdict was warranted on the punitive damages issue, and the Katzes are 
not entitled to a punitive damages award or attorney fees. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur in the foregoing opinion.