Case Title: State v. Robinson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1991-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
 that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 90-549


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

 Michael Robinson                             December Term, 1991


 Alan W. Cook, J.

 William Sorrell, Chittenden County State's Attorney, and Pamela Hall
   Johnson, Deputy State's Attorney, Burlington, for plaintiff-appellee

 E.M. Allen, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate Attorney,
   Montpelier, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   After a trial by jury, the district court convicted
 defendant of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child.  He appeals, arguing
 that a statement he made to the arresting officer, "I never thought this
 would happen again," was improperly admitted under the Vermont Rules of
 Evidence and was involuntarily given in violation of his constitutional
 rights.  He further argues that testimony given by the police officer
 relating statements made to him by the complainant child was improperly
 allowed because the child made the statements after a motive to falsify had
 arisen.  We affirm.
      The charges against defendant centered on defendant's contact with the
 child, who was four years old at the time of the incident and seven years of
 age at trial, while he babysat for the child one night in his apartment.
 The State alleged that defendant fondled the child's penis and had the
 child touch his penis.  Defendant testified at trial that the only touching
 that took place was when the child momentarily touched defendant's penis,
 out of a child's innocent curiosity, and that defendant told the child to
 stop as soon as he was aware of the contact, and sent him to another room.
      Following an investigation that included an interview with the child, a
 Burlington police officer spoke with defendant.  Defendant confirmed that he
 had babysat for the child and the officer asked defendant to accompany him
 to the police station.  There, the officer informed defendant of his rights
 and arrested him.  Defendant spoke over the phone with an attorney, who
 advised him not to discuss the charge, and he declined to answer questions.
 During the officer's routine booking procedure, defendant answered questions
 regarding his address, employment, age and so forth, defendant asked the
 officer if he was going to be jailed and told the officer that he was "sick"
 and that he was an outpatient at a mental health clinic.  The officer
 responded to the defendant's questions.  After the booking inquiries
 resumed, defendant said, not in response to any question, "I didn't think
 anything like this would happen again."
      That statement is the focus of this appeal.  Although defendant
 objected, the trial court allowed the State to introduce this statement as
 an admission.  The court also denied defendant's motion to suppress the
 statement on the ground that it had been given involuntarily.
      We first address the admissibility of the statement to the arresting
 officer under the Vermont Rules of Evidence.  Defendant first argues that
 the statement should have been excluded under V.R.E. 404(b), which states
 that evidence of prior bad acts is "not admissible to prove the character of
 a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith," but allows
 such evidence for other purposes.
      It is important at the outset to understand the parties' respective
 positions.  The State argues that the statement was an admission that
 defendant committed the offense for which he is charged.  It is interested
 in the apparent reference to another charge only insofar as the reference
 bolsters its interpretation of the words.  The defendant, on the other hand,
 seeks to exclude the whole statement even if it is an admission to the
 current charge.  He argues that, if interpreted as the State seeks, it is
 also an admission to a prior crime, and that admission is barred under
 V.R.E. 404(b).
      The rule on which defendant relies bars propensity evidence -- that is,
 evidence that is presented in order to convince the jury that it is more
 likely that defendant did the act presently charged because it is similar to
 something he has done in the past.  See State v Hurley, 150 Vt. 165, 168,