Case Title: Clipp v. Weaver

Citation: 451 N.E.2d 1092

Docket Number: 883S295

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1983-08-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
451 N.E.2d 1092 (1983)
Mary CLIPP, et al., Appellants (Plaintiffs below),
v.
Charles WEAVER, et al., Appellees (Defendants below).
No. 883S295.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
August 12, 1983.
William Wagner, Wagner, Cunningham, Vaughan & McLaughlin, Tampa, William J. Cohen, Slabaugh, Cosentino, Walker & Shewmaker, Elkhart, for appellants.
James H. Pankow, South Bend, for appellee, Charles Weaver.
HUNTER, Justice.
Plaintiffs Mary Clipp, individually, and Ruth Joanne Clipp, Administratrix of the Estate of Gerald Clipp, filed suit against defendant Charles Weaver in the Kosciusko Circuit Court. The court entered summary judgment in favor of defendant, and plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals, Fourth District, reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for trial. Clipp v. Weaver, (1982) Ind. App., 439 N.E.2d 1189. In so doing, the court held that the standard of care a boat operator owes to his guest is one of reasonable care. Id. at 1193. Because this holding conflicts with the decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in McDonnell v. Flaharty, (1980), 636 F.2d 184 (applying Indiana law), we are granting Weaver's petition to transfer to resolve the conflict and therefore vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals. However, we have carefully examined Judge Conover's excellent opinion and believe he is absolutely correct in his approach to the law regarding the operation of watercraft. Thus, we adopt much of the language from Judge Conover's opinion in resolving the following issue: What standard of care does a boat operator owe to his guest?
Judge Conover summarized the facts of the case as follows:
439 N.E.2d  at 1190.
We first note the standard used to review a summary judgment:
439 N.E.2d  at 1190.
The trial court found there was no genuine issue of material fact because the defendant, Weaver, owed only a duty "not to willfully, wantonly or recklessly" injure his guest. It appears the trial court relied on McDonnell in reaching this decision. The Court of Appeals determined that this reliance was erroneous and that the proper standard was that of reasonable care. The Court of Appeals construed Ind. Code § 14-1-1-16 (Burns 1981 Repl.) to reach this result.
On transfer, Weaver argues that statutory construction is inappropriate because the limited, common law liability of social hosts is judicially created. He would have this Court apply Indiana's common law on host-licensee liability for property owners to boat operators. He also rather incongruously argues that, because the legislature has made no limited guest passenger liability provision in the watercraft statute, Ind. Code §§ 14-1-1-1 to 63, the statute does not apply in this situation. Weaver argues that the court in McDonnell correctly analyzed Indiana's common law and public policy and correctly determined that Indiana would apply a willful and wanton standard of care to boat operators in order to promote hospitality. 636 F.2d 186-87. We disagree.
Indiana does allow limited liability to property owners when the host-guest (or licensee) relationship exists. See Blake v. Dunn Farms, Inc., (1980) Ind., 413 N.E.2d 560; Neal v. Home Builders, Inc., (1953) 232 Ind. 160, 111 N.E.2d 280; Barbre v. Indianapolis Water Co., (1980) Ind. App., 400 N.E.2d 1142; Xaver v. Blazak, (1979) Ind. App., 391 N.E.2d 653. However, Indiana common law has distinguished premises from conveyances. In Munson v. Rupker, (1925) 96 Ind. App. 15, 148 N.E. 169, the court said:
Id. at 29-30, 148 N.E. 173-74 (emphasis added).
As the McDonnell court noted, Munson led to the enactment of our motor vehicle guest statute, Ind. Code § 9-3-3-1 (Burns 1980 Repl.), which invokes the willful and *1094 wanton standard.[1] The legislature has not extended this standard to boats, however, and we see no reason to make a judicial extension of the rule.
The rationale in Munson applies even more to the operation of boats. As does an automobile driver, a boat operator takes his passenger's life into his keeping when he starts the boat in motion. However, because boats are used mainly for recreation in Indiana, rather than for transportation, the average passenger is not as familiar with the operation of a boat as he is with a car. Neither is he as familiar with the rules and regulations governing boats. Therefore, the operator of the boat, who normally has more expertise than his guest, and a better awareness of the potential dangers associated with boats, owes a duty of reasonable care to his passenger.
Furthermore, our legislature has clearly indicated that the standard of ordinary care is to be applied to boats and their operation. Ind. Code § 14-1-1-16 provides:
(Emphasis added.) As Judge Conover stated:
439 N.E.2d  at 1193.
Other sections of the Act support this construction. The definition of the term "person" in Section 14-1-1-1(f) includes "any and every natural person." Section 14-1-1-20 provides that "[n]o person shall operate any boat in such a manner as to unnecessarily endanger the person or property of any other person... ." Section 14-1-1-22 deals with the rate of speed when operating a boat and again uses the term "reasonable and prudent" along with the words "in the exercise of reasonable care." In Section 14-1-1-31, the legislature has provided that all provisions of the Watercraft Act "with respect to the operation of boats or motorboats shall apply" to any person being towed on water skis, a watersled, aquaplane, or similar object.
A statute is to be interpreted as a whole, and the words given their common and ordinary meaning. Foremost Life Ins. Co. v. Department of Insurance, (1980) Ind., 409 N.E.2d 1092; Combs v. Cook, (1958) 238 Ind. 392, 151 N.E.2d 144. When the watercraft statute is examined as a whole, it is obvious the legislature has determined that a boat operator owes a duty of reasonable care to all persons, including guests. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
GIVAN, C.J., and DeBRULER, PRENTICE and PIVARNIK, JJ., concur.
[1]  Ind. Code § 9-3-3-1 was first enacted in 1929. In 1951, the legislature applied the willful and wanton standard to aircraft. Ind. Code § 8-21-5-1 (Burns 1980 Repl.).