Case Title: Shoemaker v. Gindlesberger

Citation: 2008-Ohio-2012

Docket Number: 20070113

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-05-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Shoemaker v. Gindlesberger, 118 Ohio St.3d 226, 2008-Ohio-2012.] 
 
 
 
 
SHOEMAKER, EXR., ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. GINDLESBERGER, APPELLEE, ET AL. 
[Cite as Shoemaker v. Gindlesberger, 118 Ohio St.3d 226, 2008-Ohio-2012.] 
Torts — Negligence — Attorneys — Beneficiary of decedent’s will may not 
maintain negligence action against attorney for the preparation of a deed 
that results in increased tax liability for the estate. 
(No. 2007-0113 – Submitted January 8, 2008 – Decided May 7, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Holmes County, 
 No. 05 CA 010, 2006-Ohio-6916. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A beneficiary of a decedent’s will may not maintain a negligence action against 
an attorney for the preparation of a deed that results in increased tax 
liability for the estate.  (Simon v. Zipperstein (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 74, 
512 N.E.2d 636, approved and followed.) 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} This discretionary appeal invites us to review Simon v. Zipperstein 
(1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 74, 512 N.E.2d 636, which establishes that an attorney is 
not liable to third persons arising from his good-faith performance of acts on 
behalf of a client.  For the reasons that follow, we decline the invitation to 
overrule Zipperstein and instead hold that a beneficiary of a decedent’s will may 
not maintain a negligence action against an attorney for the preparation of a deed 
that results in increased tax for the estate. 
I.  Case Background 
{¶ 2} Margaret Schlegel, the decedent, was a client of attorney Thomas 
Gindlesberger, the appellee. In 1986, Gindlesberger prepared a will for her, and 
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he later drafted two codicils.  Her three children, Roy Schlegel, Robert Schlegel, 
and Anna Mae Shoemaker, were beneficiaries under the will.  In 1990, Margaret, 
who owned two tracts of land, the “Hanna farm” and the “home place,” contacted 
Gindlesberger for assistance with the transfer of some property.  Her son Roy was 
interested in expanding his dairy farm; to assist him, his mother wanted to convey 
most of the Hanna farm while retaining a life interest in the land.  Gindlesberger 
drafted a general warranty deed that retained a life estate for Margaret and 
transferred a joint life estate to Roy and his wife, with a remainder over in fee 
simple to the survivor. 
{¶ 3} Margaret Schlegel died in 2003.  When her will was admitted to 
probate, the Schlegel children learned that estate assets would have to be sold to 
pay state and federal estate taxes owed on the transfer of the Hanna farm.  The 
appellants, Robert Schlegel, as executor and as a beneficiary, and Anna Mae 
Shoemaker, as a beneficiary, argued that Gindlesberger was negligent in 
preparing the document for the transfer of the Hanna farm and in failing to advise 
their mother of the tax consequences of the transfer. 
{¶ 4} The appellants filed a complaint against Gindlesberger alleging 
that he was negligent because his preparation of the document transferring the 
Hanna farm to their brother, Roy Schlegel, increased the estate’s tax liability.  
They also sued Roy for unjust enrichment, claiming that he had received the 
Hanna farm while the estate received the tax liability, which had depleted their 
inheritance.  Because Roy received property and Robert and Anna Mae did not, 
the appellants complained that their mother’s intent to divide her assets evenly 
had been frustrated by Gindlesberger’s faulty advice. 
{¶ 5} Roy Schlegel filed a cross-claim for negligence against 
Gindlesberger, asserting that Robert and Anna Mae’s lawsuit claiming depletion 
of their inheritance was caused by Gindlesberger’s lack of knowledge of tax law.  
Gindlesberger responded that because there was never an attorney-client 
January Term, 2008 
3 
relationship between the Schlegel children and himself, none of the children had 
standing to bring a claim of negligence.  The trial court denied Roy Schlegel’s 
motion for summary judgment on the unjust-enrichment claim filed by the 
appellants, finding a genuine issue of material fact.1  The trial court granted 
Gindlesberger’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the negligence claims 
filed by the Schlegel children. In granting Gindlesberger’s motion, the court, 
citing Simon v. Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d 74, 512 N.E.2d 636, held that there was 
“no evidence that an attorney-client relationship or sufficient privity with an 
attorney-client relationship, existed between Defendant Gindlesberger and the 
Plaintiffs Robert and Anna Mae Shoemaker, or Defendant Roy Schlegel.” 
{¶ 6} On appeal, the appellants2 claimed that the trial court erred in 
granting Gindlesberger’s motion for summary judgment, arguing that the general 
rule of privity applied by the trial court should be abandoned in favor of a rule 
that allows beneficiaries to sue an attorney who is negligent in creating an estate 
plan.  The appellate court disagreed, holding that the only person having an 
attorney-client relationship with Gindlesberger was their deceased mother, 
Margaret. 
{¶ 7} We accepted this case as a discretionary appeal.  The appellants 
propose that a beneficiary of a decedent’s will may maintain an action against an 
attorney who is negligent in the creation of the estate plan even though the 
beneficiary is not in privity with the attorney’s client.  Gindlesberger responds 
that the limited exception to the strict rule of privity, which imposes liability only 
if a lawyer acts fraudulently or maliciously, should not be expanded.  We agree 
with Gindlesberger. 
                                                 
1.  That claim is stayed pending the resolution of this appeal.   
 
2.   In the years since the trial court action, Robert Schlegel has died, and the appellants, who have 
been substituted as parties, are Anna Mae Shoemaker, as executor of the estate and in her own 
right, and Nola M. Schlegel, executor of Robert Schlegel’s estate. 
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II.  Legal Analysis 
{¶ 8} To establish a cause of action for legal malpractice based on 
negligence, the following elements must be proved:  (1) an attorney-client 
relationship, (2) professional duty arising from that relationship, (3) breach of that 
duty, (4) proximate cause, (5) and damages.  Vahila v. Hall (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 
421, 427, 674 N.E.2d 1164; Krahn v. Kinney (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 103, 105, 538 
N.E.2d 1058.  If a plaintiff fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to 
any of the elements, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment on a legal-
malpractice claim. 
{¶ 9} The appellants assert that because Gindlesberger improperly 
drafted the will and a deed that allowed Margaret Schlegel to retain an interest in 
the Hanna farm, they have suffered damages in the form of increased estate tax 
liabilities.  But attorneys in Ohio are not liable to a third party for the good-faith 
representation of a client, unless the third party is in privity with the client for 
whom the legal services were performed.  Scholler v. Scholler (1984), 10 Ohio 
St.3d 98, 10 OBR 426, 462 N.E.2d 158, paragraph one of the syllabus.  This rule 
is rooted in the attorney’s obligation to direct attention to the needs of the client, 
not to the needs of a third party not in privity with the client.  Simon v. 
Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d at 76, 512 N.E.2d 636. 
{¶ 10} The Schlegel children all concede they had no attorney-client 
relationship with Gindlesberger and that they must, therefore, demonstrate privity 
with his client, Margaret Schlegel, or malice on the part of Gindlesberger.  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines privity as “[t]he connection or relationship 
between two parties, each having a legally recognized interest in the same subject 
matter.” (8th Ed.2004) 1237.  In Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d 74, 512 N.E.2d 636, 
this court addressed privity in a similar context.  An attorney prepared a will for a 
client who had a son, and upon the father’s death, the son’s guardian filed suit 
against the attorney for legal malpractice in the drafting of the will.  Id. at 74-75, 
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512 N.E.2d 636.  The court held that the son’s guardian could not sue the attorney 
because the son did not have a vested interest in the estate and thus was not in 
privity with the client.  Id. at 77, 512 N.E.2d 636.  The same applies here — the 
appellants were not in privity with their mother, the client, because they were only 
potential beneficiaries to her will and their rights as beneficiaries did not vest until 
her death.  Margaret Schlegel retained the right to revoke or amend her will 
during her lifetime.  For these reasons, the appellants do not have standing to file 
their negligence suit against Gindlesberger. 
{¶ 11} The necessity for privity may be overridden if special 
circumstances such as “fraud, bad faith, collusion or other malicious conduct” are 
present.  Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d at 76, 512 N.E.2d 636.  The appellants, 
however, did not plead fraud, bad faith, collusion, or malice. 
{¶ 12} The appellants’ argument rests on two public-policy grounds.  
They advocate for a change in what some refer to as Ohio’s antiquated rule on 
privity, arguing that Ohio law should grant beneficiaries standing to sue an 
attorney who allegedly was negligent in providing services to a decedent.  In 
support of their position, they present a survey of several jurisdictions that allow 
beneficiaries to bring malpractice claims.  It is true that Ohio is in the minority of 
states retaining a strict privity rule, but Ohio was also in the minority of states 
when Zipperstein was decided over 20 years ago. 
{¶ 13} Appellants’ second reason for asking for an exception to the privity 
rule is the need to have attorney accountability in the area of estate planning and 
wealth transfer.  Because any mistakes that an attorney makes in drafting a will or 
giving advice about an estate plan generally do not arise until after the death of 
the client, the harm from an attorney’s errors will most likely befall the intended 
beneficiaries.  The appellants argue that an attorney who drafts a will for a client 
is aware that his or her professional competence affects not only the client but 
also those whom the client intends to benefit from the will.  They argue, 
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consequently, that they should be permitted to maintain a suit against an attorney 
who negligently drafts or supervises the preparation of a will, to hold the attorney 
accountable for negligence. 
{¶ 14} Public policy justifies adherence to the privity rule, as stated by 
courts in jurisdictions that apply the strict privity requirement.3  Primarily, the rule 
is used to protect the attorney’s duty of loyalty and the attorney’s effective 
advocacy for the client.  Lewis v. Star Bank, N.A., Butler Cty. (1993), 90 Ohio 
App.3d 709, 712-713, 630 N.E.2d 418.  The strict privity rule ensures that 
attorneys may represent their clients without the threat of suit from third parties 
who may compromise that representation.  Barcelo v. Elliott (Tex.1996), 923 
S.W.2d 575, 578-579.  Otherwise, an attorney’s preoccupation or concern with 
potential negligence claims by third parties might diminish the quality of legal 
services provided to the client if the attorney were to weigh the client’s interests 
against the possibility of third-party lawsuits.  See Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d at 
76, 512 N.E.2d 636. 
{¶ 15} Second, without the strict privity rule, the attorney could have 
conflicting duties and divided loyalties during the estate planning process. Third, 
there would be unlimited potential liability for the lawyer.  See generally Sav. 
Bank v. Ward (1879), 100 U.S. 195, 203, 25 L.Ed. 621 (without privity of 
contract, “absurd consequences to which no limit can be seen” will ensue). In 
Ward, the United States Supreme Court, in its seminal case discussing privity, 
noted that “[t]he only safe rule is to confine the right to recover to those who enter 
into the contract; if we go one step beyond that, there is no reason why we should 
not go fifty.” Id. Rather than expose the lawyer to the 50, we conclude that 
                                                 
3.  Robinson v. Benton (Ala.2002), 842 So.2d 631, 637; McDonald v. Pettus (1999), 337 Ark. 265, 
275, 988 S.W.2d 9; Nevin v. Union Trust Co. (Me.1999), 726 A.2d 694, 701; Noble v. Bruce 
(1998), 349 Md. 730, 757-758, 709 A.2d 1264; Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc. 
(Tex.2006), 192 S.W.3d 780, 783. 
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7 
lawyers should know in advance whom they are representing and what risks they 
are accepting. 
{¶ 16} The comment to Ohio’s conflict-of-interest rule, Prof.Cond.R. 1.7, 
states:  “The principles of loyalty and independent judgment are fundamental to 
the attorney-client relationship and underlie the conflict-of-interest provisions of 
these rules. Neither the lawyer's personal interest, the interests of other clients, nor 
the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute the lawyer's loyalty to 
the client.”  The rules of professional responsibility, therefore, also underscore the 
need to ensure that a lawyer is not liable to parties who are not in privity with the 
lawyer’s client. 
{¶ 17} We decline the appellants’ invitation to relax our strict privity rule.  
Although the court of appeals commented that this rule does not allow a remedy 
for the wrong, that is not necessarily so.  Other courts have suggested that a 
testator’s estate or a personal representative of the estate might stand in the shoes 
of the testator in an action for legal malpractice in order to meet the strict privity 
requirement. See Noble v. Bruce (1998), 349 Md. 730, 758-759, 709 A.2d 1264; 
Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc. (Tex.2006), 192 S.W.3d 780, 
784.  These cases have suggested that the claims should be brought in the name of 
the estate.  See Nevin v. Union Trust Co. (Me.1999), 726 A.2d 694, 701 (holding 
that the better rule is to allow only personal representatives, not beneficiaries, to 
sue for estate planning malpractice, because what may be good for one 
beneficiary is not necessarily good for the estate as a whole).  This may well be a 
solution to the problem, but it is a question for another day. 
{¶ 18} While recognizing that public-policy reasons exist on both sides of 
the issue, we conclude that the bright-line rule of privity remains beneficial.  The 
rule provides for certainty in estate planning and preserves an attorney’s loyalty to 
the client.  In this case, for example, Gindlesberger maintains that he did exactly 
what Margaret Schlegel wished.  She wished to transfer the Hanna farm but also 
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wanted to retain a life estate.  The deed Gindlesberger prepared accomplished just 
that.  Moreover, appellants’ claim is that the deed and the will drafted by 
Gindlesberger created a tax liability for the estate that depleted its assets.  It is 
conceivable that a testator may not wish to optimize tax liability, instead seeking 
to further a different goal.  In those instances, what is good for one beneficiary 
may not be good for another beneficiary, or for the estate as a whole.  In this case, 
the basis for extending liability is even more tenuous because the increased tax 
liability to the estate arose from the transfer of the Hanna farm, not from the 
decedent’s will. 
{¶ 19} A holding that attorneys have a duty to beneficiaries of a will 
separate from their duty to the decedent who executed the will could lead to 
significant difficulty and uncertainty, a breach in confidentiality, and divided 
loyalties.  See Nevin, 726 A.2d at 701. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 20} To overrule Zipperstein and develop a new rule relaxing the well-
established privity requirement would require an overruling of a precedent based 
solely on public policy.  We decline to change the rule of law in this state that 
bars an action for negligence against a lawyer by a plaintiff who is not in privity 
with the client. 
{¶ 21} We therefore hold that a beneficiary of a decedent’s will may not 
maintain a negligence action against an attorney for the preparation of a deed that 
results in increased tax liability for the estate. 
{¶ 22} Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for 
Holmes County. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur 
separately. 
January Term, 2008 
9 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurring. 
{¶ 23} I agree with the majority that we should reject the exception to the 
privity rule proposed by the appellants.  Under the proposed exception, an 
attorney could be liable to his client’s beneficiaries for negligence in connection 
with a large and loosely defined group of transactions; the appellants do not 
present compelling reasons for creating such a broad exception to the privity rule.  
Nevertheless, I write separately to distinguish the exception proposed by the 
appellants in this case and the one considered in Simon v. Zipperstein (1987), 32 
Ohio St.3d 74, 512 N.E.2d 636, and to acknowledge that, in a case with different 
facts, there would be compelling reasons for adopting the exception we rejected in 
Zipperstein. 
{¶ 24} In the present case, the beneficiaries seek to hold the decedent’s 
attorney liable for negligence in a financial transaction independent of the will.  
In particular, the beneficiaries alleged negligence in the attorney’s preparation of 
a deed that transferred the decedent’s property to her son and reserved a life estate 
for the decedent.  In Zipperstein, the beneficiary sought to hold the decedent’s 
attorney liable for negligence in the preparation of the will.  Among other things, 
the beneficiary sought damages for the attorney’s failure to include a provision in 
the will renouncing an existing antenuptial agreement.  Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d 
at 75, 512 N.E.2d 636. 
{¶ 25} The appellants cite no case in which a court in any jurisdiction 
allows beneficiaries to sue the decedent’s attorney for negligence in a financial 
transaction independent of the will.  Instead, the appellants cite cases in which 
courts in other jurisdictions recognized a cause of action that is almost identical to 
the one considered in Zipperstein:  in each case, the court allowed either a 
beneficiary or an intended beneficiary to sue the decedent’s attorney for errors in 
the preparation of a will or codicil.  See Lucas v. Hamm (1961), 56 Cal.2d 583, 15 
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Cal.Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685; Guy v. Liederbach (1983), 501 Pa. 47, 51, 459 A.2d 
744; Succession of Killingsworth (La.1973), 292 So.2d 536; Ogle v. Fuiten (1984) 
102 Ill.2d 356, 80 Ill.Dec. 772, 466 N.E.2d 224; McAbee v. Edwards 
(Fla.App.1976), 340 So.2d 1167; and Licata v. Spector (1966), 26 Conn.Supp. 
378, 225 A.2d 28.  The appellants assert, without significant explanation, that if 
we approve of the result in any of these cases, we should find a cause of action 
here:  “The only difference * * * is that here the error was not in the drafting of a 
will but in not understanding the import of another type of document prepared in 
furtherance of the attorney’s client’s dispositive scheme.  This * * * is a 
difference without distinction.”  I disagree with the appellants’ assertion.  The 
cause of action proposed by the appellants is readily distinguishable from those 
recognized in the aforementioned cases. 
{¶ 26} First, the appellants’ broad description of the error in this case 
demonstrates that a cause of action based on the present facts would have a far 
greater scope than the cause of action recognized in any of the above cases.  In the 
appellants’ description of the error as a failure to “understand[] the import of 
another type of document prepared in furtherance of the attorney’s client’s 
dispositive scheme,” the phrase “another type of document” provides no threshold 
limitation.  The phrase “in furtherance of the attorney’s client’s dispositive 
scheme” would also be difficult to define or limit and would almost certainly 
include transactions in which attorney errors and the resultant damage were 
readily discoverable before the death of the client. 
{¶ 27} Second, damage to beneficiaries is more readily foreseeable in a 
will-drafting case than in the present case.  The Supreme Court of California has 
held that because one of the main purposes of a will is to transfer property to the 
named beneficiaries, damage to those beneficiaries in the event of attorney 
negligence in drafting the will is “clearly foreseeable.”  Lucas, 56 Cal.2d at 589, 
15 Cal.Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685.  Here, the main purpose of the transfer of land 
January Term, 2008 
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was to benefit the decedent and her son—not the other beneficiaries.  The damage 
to the beneficiaries described in the present case is therefore far less foreseeable 
than the damage to the beneficiaries in a case where an attorney was negligent in 
preparation of the will. 
{¶ 28} Despite these objections to the cause of action proposed by 
appellants, I believe that there would be compelling reasons to recognize a cause 
of action by an intended beneficiary against the decedent’s attorney for 
negligence in preparation of a will. 
{¶ 29} Courts in many states have recognized a cause of action for 
beneficiaries alleging attorney error in the preparation of a will or codicil.  The 
Supreme Court of California, when it held that a decedent’s beneficiaries have a 
cause of action against the decedent’s attorney for negligently preparing 
testamentary instruments, noted that such a cause of action does not impose a new 
or unexpected burden on the decedent’s attorney.  Lucas, 56 Cal.2d at 589, 15 
Cal.Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685.  See also Licata, 26 Conn.Supp. 378, 225 A.2d 28 
(holding that a decedent’s beneficiaries can sue the decedent’s attorney for 
negligently preparing a will). 
{¶ 30} The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, holding that a named 
beneficiary may, as an intended third-party beneficiary, sue the decedent’s 
attorney, rejected the idea that its holding would impose a costly and undesirable 
burden on attorneys:  “Overarching all of appellants’ arguments is the basic policy 
argument that allowing suits such as appellee’s would perhaps lower the quality 
of legal services rendered to clients because of attorneys’ increased concern over 
liability to third persons, and certainly make them much more expensive.  We 
cannot accept the proposition that insuring the quality of legal services requires 
allowing as limited a number of persons as possible to bring suit for malpractice.”  
(Citations omitted.)  Guy, 501 Pa. at 62-63, 459 A.2d 744. 
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{¶ 31} In the dissent to this court’s decision in Zipperstein, Justice Brown 
argued that, in an action by an intended beneficiary alleging negligence in the 
preparation of a testamentary instrument, no real conflict of interest exists:  
“Where the attorney’s job is to draft a will, * * * the needs of the client simply 
require the attorney to competently construct an instrument that will carry out the 
client’s intentions as to the distribution of his or her property upon death.  If the 
attorney negligently fails to fulfill those needs, with the result that an intended 
beneficiary receives less than the client desired, surely the client, if he or she were 
still alive, would want the intended beneficiary to bring an action against the 
attorney.”  (Emphasis sic.)  32 Ohio St.3d at 78, 512 N.E.2d 636. 
{¶ 32} Justice Brown also recognized that there were significant policy 
reasons to recognize an intended beneficiary’s cause of action for negligence.  In 
particular, he argued that without such a cause of action, attorneys who commit 
malpractice in preparing a will are immune from liability.  32 Ohio St.3d at 77, 
512 N.E.2d 636.  He also noted that we have recognized causes of action by third 
parties against physicians, architects, and accountants, despite a lack of privity:  
“In the law of torts, the use of privity as a tool to bar recovery has been riddled 
(and rightly so) to the extent that we are left with legal malpractice as, perhaps, 
the only surviving relic.”  Id. 
{¶ 33} I am persuaded that, as Justice Brown argued, the issue of an 
attorney’s conflict of interest does not arise if an intended beneficiary has a cause 
of action in negligence for an attorney’s preparation of a will.  I am also 
persuaded that there is a strong need for attorney accountability in preparing wills.  
It serves no purpose to continue to invoke a strict rule of privity to protect the 
malpractice of a lawyer when we have abrogated that rule with respect to the 
liability of other professionals, such as accountants and architects.  For this 
reason, if presented with a different set of facts, I would be in favor of revisiting 
January Term, 2008 
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our decision in Zipperstein in the context of the holding of Westfield Ins. Co. v. 
Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256. 
 
PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Ronald L. Rosenfield Co., L.P.A., and Ronald L. Rosenfield, for 
appellants. 
John C. Nemeth & Associates, John C. Nemeth, and Michael J. Collins, 
for appellee. 
Frederick M. Morgan Jr.; and Volkema Thomas, L.P.A., and Michael S. 
Miller, urging reversal on behalf of amicus curiae, Ohio Association for Justice. 
______________________