Case Title: Stice v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-10-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Stice v. State1990 WY 120799 P.2d 1204Case Number: 89-294Decided: 10/29/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
STEWARD NATHAN STICE, 

APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 

APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Goshen County, John T. Langdon, J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, and Barbara L. Lauer, Asst. Public Defender, 
for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Richard E. Dixon, Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J.*, and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
case conference.

CARDINE, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Steward 
Nathan Stice challenges the propriety of his guilty plea to a charge of 
attempted voluntary manslaughter under W.S. 6-1-301(a) and W.S. 6-2-105(a)(i). 
The issues he raises require us to decide whether:

"I. The district court 
erred in accepting appellant's plea of guilty to attempted voluntary 
manslaughter because the court did not personally address him concerning all the 
items required by Rule 15(c), W.R.Cr.P.

"II. The district court 
erred in finding a sufficient factual basis for the guilty plea as required by 
Rule 15(f), W.R.Cr. P."

In addition to 
confronting these two issues, the State raises the following issue:

"I. May the 
jurisdictional mandate of W.R.A.P. 2.01 be waived when the record is devoid of 
any indication of ineffective assistance of counsel?"

[¶2]      We hold that this 
court has jurisdiction of this case and affirm it on its merits.

FACTS

[¶3]      On August 9, 
1988, Stice shot his wife, Annette, in the neck and then shot himself in the 
head at their Hawk Springs mobile home. He was angry with her for alleged 
infidelity.

[¶4]      Stice had spent 
the previous four days in the Albany County jail because his employer had failed 
to pay fines for the overweight truck he had been driving. Stice had expected 
his wife to pick him up at Laramie after he was released. When she failed to do 
so, Stice hitched a ride to Cheyenne where he met Annette. Annette drove Stice 
to Hawk Springs, and they both drank beer along the way.

[¶5]      When they arrived 
home, Stice noticed clothing that he believed belonged to some other men 
scattered about the house. Stice went to the bar at which Annette worked, where 
he drank part of another beer and told her boss that Annette would be late for 
work. Annette's boss told Stice that Annette had not been to work all weekend. 
An angered Stice returned to the mobile home, where a fight ensued. Stice 
accused Annette of having sexual relations with other men. He retrieved his 
handgun, struck her with it and then fired it at her but missed. Stice fired a 
second shot, striking Annette in the neck and penetrating her carotid artery. He 
then shot himself in the head. Both Annette and Stice survived the gun shot 
wounds. Stice's self-inflicted wound destroyed part of the right frontal lobe of 
his brain and his right eye. 

[¶6]      Stice was 
originally charged with attempted second degree murder. At his arraignment on 
August 31, 1988, Stice pleaded not guilty, not guilty by reason of mental 
illness or deficiency, and not triable by reason of mental illness or 
deficiency. The court ordered Stice transferred to the state hospital for a 
mental examination.

[¶7]      An October 8, 
1988 report from the state hospital indicated Stice was competent to stand 
trial. On Stice's motion, the court ordered a further evaluation. Stice was 
examined by a neurologist in Cheyenne and a second time at the state hospital. A 
December 9, 1988 report from the state hospital indicated that he was no longer 
competent to stand trial because he developed an uncooperative nature about him. 
Following a competency hearing, the court found Stice unfit to stand trial and 
ordered him to the state hospital for treatment.

[¶8]      On February 15, 
1989, the state hospital reported that Stice had responded to treatment, and it 
now considered him competent to stand trial. A competency hearing was held in 
April. The court declined to make a finding as to competency.

[¶9]      On June 23, 1989, 
the court found Stice competent to stand trial. At the same hearing, Stice was 
allowed to change his plea to guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter. 
Following questioning of Stice by his attorney, the prosecutor, and the court 
and the establishment of a factual basis for a guilty plea, the court accepted 
the plea. More details of the conduct of the hearing will be related below as 
necessary. The court sentenced Stice to a term of 15 to 18 years in 
prison.

DISCUSSION

Appellate 
Jurisdiction

[¶10]   The court entered its judgment and 
sentence on August 14, 1989. Stice filed his notice of appeal on November 24, 
1989. The State maintains that this delay should result in a denial of 
jurisdiction of the appeal. The State bases its assertion on W.R.A.P. 2.01, 
which states in part:

"An appeal, civil or 
criminal, permitted by law from a district court to the Supreme Court, shall be 
taken by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court within 
fifteen (15) days from entry of the judgment or final order appealed from and 
concurrently serving the same in accordance with the provisions of Rule 5, 
W.R.A.P., unless a different time is provided by law, except that: (1) upon a 
showing of excusable neglect the district court in any action may extend the 
time for filing the notice of appeal not exceeding fifteen (15) days from the 
expiration of the original time prescribed herein, provided the application for 
extension of time is filed and the order entered prior to the expiration of 
thirty (30) days from entry of judgment or final order appealed from * * 
*."

Stice made a 
motion in the trial court for leave to file a late appeal in November. However, 
the trial court declined to act on the motion, stating that it lacked the 
authority to act.

[¶11]   Allowing an untimely first appeal 
as of right in a criminal case is sometimes warranted in order to prevent a 
denial of due process and ensure effective assistance of counsel. Price v. 
State, 716 P.2d 324, 327 (Wyo. 1986). In Price, the appellant failed to file his 
notice of appeal within the requisite time after final judgment was entered. 
Instead, he appealed nearly a year later when an order was entered transferring 
him from the state hospital to the penitentiary. Relying upon Evitts v. Lucey, 
469 U.S. 387, 396, 105 S. Ct. 830, 836, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821 (1985), we allowed Price 
his appeal. 716 P.2d  at 327. Circumstances in Stice's case warrant we allow his 
appeal.

[¶12]   When Stice entered his guilty plea 
on June 23, 1989, the court was prepared to pronounce sentence. The court, 
however, ordered a presentence investigation in part to allow time for Stice to 
undergo reconstructive surgery, needed as a result of his self-inflicted wound, 
before being transferred to the state penitentiary. When Stice was sentenced on 
August 11, 1989, this surgery had yet to be performed, some of which was 
scheduled to be performed in Scottsbluff, Nebraska on August 19. Correspondence 
from Stice to his counsel and from his counsel to the State Public Defender 
indicate that Stice wished to appeal, but his counsel thought Stice lacked any 
basis for appeal. Stice's appellate counsel has raised two important issues. We 
will not deny Stice his right to due process due to counsel's oversight. In 
order to ensure that Stice be afforded effective assistance of counsel, we will 
decide Stice's issues on their merits.

Acceptance of 
the Plea

[¶13]   At the change of plea hearing, 
after the court found Stice competent to proceed, Stice's counsel, Leonard 
Munker, informed the court of a plea agreement and Stice's desire to plead 
guilty to attempted voluntary manslaughter. The court addressed Stice, asking 
him how he pleaded to the charge, and Stice responded he pleaded guilty. The 
court then had Stice take the witness stand, and Munker questioned 
him.

[¶14]   Munker asked Stice if he understood 
the maximum penalties and advised him that he had the right to go to trial by 
jury of twelve which must reach an unanimous verdict; that he had a right to 
counsel if he went to trial; that he had a right to call witnesses on his 
behalf; that he had a right to confront witnesses against him; and that he had a 
right to testify himself if he wished. Stice indicated he understood those 
rights. Munker asked him if he had conferred with an attorney. Stice answered he 
had conferred with Munker and another attorney. Munker then asked Stice through 
a series of questions to establish that he understood he waived those rights if 
he pleaded guilty. Stice indicated he understood. Munker then questioned Stice 
concerning the facts relating to the shooting.

[¶15]   When Munker concluded questioning 
Stice, the court stated:

"I have no problem with 
what you did. You did an excellent job, but the statute requires that the Court 
do this, personally, insofar as Rule 15 is concerned, so I am going to have to 
quickly go over that which you did, and it is certainly no reflection, Mr. 
Stice, upon the ability of your counsel. He did just exactly what I would have 
done or will do, but a better job, but we will do that again."

W.R.Cr.P. 15 
states in pertinent part:

"(c) Advice to 
defendant. - Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court 
must address the defendant personally in open court and inform him of, and 
determine that he understands, the following:

"(1) The nature of the 
charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by 
law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law; and

"(2) If the defendant is 
not represented by an attorney, that he has the right to be represented by an 
attorney at every stage of the proceeding against him and, if necessary, one 
will be appointed to represent him; and

"(3) That he has the 
right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has already been 
made, and that he has the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial has the 
right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses against him, and the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself; 
and

"(4) That if he pleads 
guilty or nolo contendere there will not be a further trial of any kind, so that 
by pleading guilty or nolo contendere he waives the right to a trial; 
and

"(5) That if he pleads 
guilty or nolo contendere, the court may ask him questions about the offense to 
which he has pleaded, and if he answers these questions under oath, on the 
record, and in the presence of counsel, his answers may later be used against 
him in a prosecution for perjury or false statement.

"(d) Insuring that the 
plea is voluntary. - The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, 
determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or 
of promises apart from a plea agreement. The court shall also inquire as to 
whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty or nolo contendere results 
from prior discussions between the attorney for the state and the defendant or 
his attorney.

* * * * * *

"(f) Determining 
accuracy of plea. - Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the 
court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as 
shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea."

[¶16]   After allowing the prosecutor to 
cross-examine Stice, the court questioned him. Upon questioning by the court, 
Stice indicated he understood the nature of the original charge and the penalty; 
that he did not have to plead guilty to a reduced charge and instead could stand 
trial for the original charge; and that, although he retained his right to 
counsel, his guilty plea resulted in a waiver of his right to a trial by jury, 
to confront witnesses, to have witnesses testify in his behalf and not to 
testify against himself. Stice then indicated that he had not been coerced into 
entering the guilty plea and was entering the plea voluntarily. The court failed 
to question Stice about his knowledge of the maximum penalty for attempted 
voluntary manslaughter, as required by W.R.Cr.P. 15(c)(1), a crime which does 
not carry a mandatory minimum penalty.

[¶17]   We have long held that strict 
compliance with W.R.Cr.P. 15 is mandatory. Duffy v. State, 789 P.2d 821, 834 
(Wyo. 1990); Cardenas v. Meacham, 545 P.2d 632, 635 (Wyo. 1976). We reserved 
however, until the proper case confronted us, to discuss the question of whether 
the harmless error doctrine applies to deviations from the requirements of 
W.R.Cr.P. 15. Crawford v. State, 701 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Wyo. 1985). That case 
confronts us now.

[¶18]   Any error in accepting a guilty 
plea under W.R.Cr.P. 15 must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because such 
an error implicates a denial of constitutional rights. Crawford, 701 P.2d  at 
1153; Campbell v. State, 589 P.2d 358, 367 (Wyo. 1979). The court erred in not 
questioning Stice directly about his knowledge of the maximum penalty for an 
attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction. However, in response to a 
non-leading question by Munker, Stice was able to tell the court that the 
maximum penalty for the crime was twenty years in prison. Stice repeated this 
understanding when Munker followed up with a leading question. It is clear from 
the record that Stice understood the consequences of his guilty 
plea.

[¶19]   The opinion concurring in the 
result proposes that we adopt the position of the State from its brief 
that

"error cannot be 
predicated upon the defendant's understanding of sentencing options when, at the 
time of his guilty plea, the defendant affirms on the record his precise 
understanding of possible sentences by describing those sentences in response to 
a non-leading question from his own attorney."

The suggestion 
is that we adopt a "no-error rule" in the special situation in which the 
defendant's own attorney informs him in open court of the maximum and minimum 
penalty. Such a rule finds no support anywhere in the law. If adopted, the rule 
would provide that it is not error for the judge, when accepting a guilty 
plea, to fail to

"address the defendant 
personally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he understands, 
the following:

"(1) The nature of the 
charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by 
law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law." W.R.Cr.P. 
15.

The rationale 
for the proposed rule is that the judge need not satisfy the obligation imposed 
by W.R.Cr.P. 15 where the defendant knows the maximum and minimum penalty for 
the crime to which he pleads because there is no error. The proposed rule 
differs from the opinion of the court as written, in that the opinion of the 
court holds it error for the court to fail to advise the defendant of the 
maximum and minimum penalty, as required by W.R.Cr.P. 15, but holds that in the 
circumstances of this case the error is harmless. The harmless error rule finds 
substantial support in existing case law. Perhaps something is gained by 
avoiding harmless error and adopting a special rule for this case only. We are 
unable to identify any efficacy in the proposed rule or the benefits to be 
derived therefrom.

[¶20]   We do not approve of the trial 
court's failure to comply with the requirements of the rule and direct strict 
compliance in the future. York v. State, 619 P.2d 391, 398 (Wyo. 1980). However, 
the purposes behind the requirements of the rule were served. Those purposes are 
to assist the judge in making the constitutionally required determination that a 
defendant's plea is truly voluntary, to produce a complete record at the time 
the plea was entered of the factors relevant to this voluntariness 
determination, and to enable more expeditious disposition of the numerous and 
often frivolous post-conviction attacks on the constitutional validity of guilty 
pleas. Britain v. State, 497 P.2d 543, 545 (Wyo. 1972). Stice was not prejudiced 
by the deviation. Cf. York, 619 P.2d  at 398. We hold that the trial court's 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

[¶21]   Stice also contends that the court 
failed to adequately inform him of the nature of the charge to which he was 
pleading. Before accepting the plea, the court explained the charge to Stice 
with a summary of the statute and the date and location of where the shooting 
occurred. Munker also questioned Stice about the nature of the crime of 
voluntary manslaughter.

[¶22]   We have no hard and fast rule 
regarding how much information is necessary to explain the nature of a charge to 
a defendant. The actions required of the district court in any particular case 
depend largely on whether elements of the offense are difficult to understand, 
considering the complexity to the average person with no legal training and the 
sophistication of the individual defendant. Peper v. State, 768 P.2d 26, 30 
(Wyo. 1989). Viewing the hearing as a whole, id. we find the court sufficiently 
described the charge to Stice, who demonstrated an understanding of the nature 
of the offense.

Factual 
Basis

[¶23]   One way to establish the factual 
basis for the plea as required under W.R.Cr.P. 15(f) is to have the accused 
describe the conduct that gave rise to the charge. Where this does not yield the 
desired result, something more obviously needs to be done. Sanchez v. State, 592 P.2d 1130, 1135 n. 6 (Wyo. 1979). When the examination of Stice failed to 
provide the factual basis, the prosecutor had a Goshen county undersheriff 
testify as to statements made to him days after the shooting from both Stice and 
the victim. The deputy sheriff testified that, according to those statements, on 
August 9, 1988, at the Stices' mobile home, Stice was angered when he returned 
to the home, accused Annette of infidelity, struck her with the gun, fired a 
shot into the wall, asked her if she had been cheating on him, and then shot her 
in the neck. The deputy further testified as to the number of bullets fired from 
Stice's gun and the proximity from where they were fired to where Annette was 
wounded. Stice offered no objection to these statements nor did he attempt to 
refute any of this through cross-examination. E.g., York, 619 P.2d  at 
397.

[¶24]   Voluntary manslaughter entails the 
taking of a life voluntarily in a sudden heat of passion, completely free of 
express, implied, constructive or legal malice, but committed without a legal 
excuse, privilege or justification. Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 919 (Wyo. 
1984), quoting from State v. Helton, 73 Wyo. 92, 276 P.2d 434, 442 (1954); W.S. 
6-2-105(a)(i). To establish the factual basis here for attempted voluntary 
manslaughter, the record must show that Stice, with the intent to commit 
manslaughter, took a substantial step towards the commission of the crime. W.S. 
6-1-301(a)(i). The record shows that Stice retrieved a handgun and angrily fired 
it at his wife. These circumstances establish that Stice possessed the intent 
required here. Lopez v. State, 788 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Wyo. 1990). The fact that he 
fired and struck her establishes that Stice took a substantial step toward the 
commission of voluntary manslaughter. A factual basis for the plea was 
established.

[¶25]   We hold that the trial court erred 
by failing to ask Stice personally about his understanding of the maximum 
penalty for the charge to which he was pleading guilty. We further hold the 
error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt inasmuch as Stice, himself, correctly 
advised the court that he knew the maximum penalty for manslaughter to be 20 
years.

[¶26]   Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, C.J., filed an opinion 
concurring in the result in which GOLDEN, J., joined.

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, 
concurring in the result, with whom GOLDEN, Justice, joins.

[¶27]   I concur in affirming the decision 
and the sufficiency of the trial court proceedings for proper entry of the 
guilty plea. However, I would not agree to reach that result by creating a 
harmless error disconnect for attachment to our established strict compliance 
standard for application of W.R.Cr.P. 15. Harmless error and strict compliance 
cannot be mechanically or logically operated together. They are intrinsically 
antagonistic and mutually exclusive concepts. This court, by present opinion, 
goes even further than suggested or requested by the State, which in brief 
announced:

     It is important to 
understand that the State, in advocating for resolution of the sentencing 
question pursuant to the holding in Worthen v. Meachum, supra [842 F.2d 1179 
(10th Cir. 1988)], eschews argument for adoption of a so-called "harmless error" 
rule. Crawford v. State, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1150 at 1153 (1985). It is the position 
of the State that error cannot be predicated upon the defendant's understanding 
of sentencing options when, at the time of his guilty plea, the defendant 
affirms on the record his precise understanding of possible sentences by 
describing those sentences in response to a non-leading question from his own 
attorney.

[¶28]   I agree with the posture espoused 
in that statement by the State in behalf of affirming the action of the trial 
court. There is here neither the need for nor am I willing to add any harmless 
error attachment to the present W.R.Cr.P. 15 mechanism. Smallwood v. State, 748 P.2d 1141 (Wyo. 1988); Cardenas v. Meacham, 545 P.2d 632, 635 (Wyo. 
1976).