Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Mitchell J. Barrock

Citation: 2007 WI 24

Docket Number: 2005AP002180-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 24 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2180-D 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Mitchell J. Barrock, Attorney at Law: 
 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Mitchell J. Barrock, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST BARROCK 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 22, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins the concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., dissents in part.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
2007 WI 24
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP2180-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Mitchell J. Barrock, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Mitchell J. Barrock, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 22, 2007 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the referee's recommendation 
that the license of Attorney Mitchell J. Barrock to practice law 
in this state be suspended for a period of 60 days due to his 
professional misconduct.  
¶2 
Neither the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) nor 
Attorney Barrock has appealed the referee's recommendation.  
Thus, the matter is submitted to the court for its review 
No. 
2005AP2180-D   
 
2 
 
pursuant to SCR 22.17(2).1  In conducting our review, we will 
affirm the referee's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sosnay, 
209 Wis. 2d 241, 243, 562 N.W.2d 137 (1997).  We review the 
referee's conclusions of law, however, on a de novo basis.  See 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, 
¶29, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 636 N.W.2d 718.  Finally, in accordance 
with our authority to supervise the practice of law in this 
state, we determine the level of discipline that is appropriate 
under the particular circumstances, independent of the referee's 
recommendation, but benefiting from it.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 
N.W.2d 686. 
¶3 
After our independent review of the record, we adopt 
the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Further, 
we agree with the referee's recommendation that Attorney 
Barrock's license to practice law in this state be suspended for 
a period of 60 days.  We also decide that Attorney Barrock 
should pay the full costs of this disciplinary proceeding. 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(2) provides:  Review; appeal. 
(2) If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme 
court shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject 
or modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2005AP2180-D   
 
3 
 
¶4 
On August 26, 2005, the OLR filed a complaint against 
Attorney Barrock that alleged six counts of professional 
misconduct, which are explained below.  The OLR's complaint 
sought a 60-day suspension of Attorney Barrock's license to 
practice law.  Attorney Barrock initially filed an answer that 
admitted some of the factual allegations of the complaint, 
denied other factual allegations, and denied any violation of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct.  Reserve Judge Dennis J. 
Flynn was appointed referee. 
¶5 
Just prior to the scheduled disciplinary hearing, 
Attorney Barrock entered into a stipulation and no contest plea.  
The stipulation provided that Attorney Barrock was withdrawing 
his answer and was now pleading no contest to each of the six 
counts alleged in the complaint.  The stipulation further stated 
that the referee could use the factual allegations of the OLR's 
complaint, with the exception of two paragraphs not central to 
the 
complaint's 
charges, 
as 
the 
factual 
basis 
for 
a 
determination of misconduct.  The stipulation set forth the 
parties' joint request that the court impose the 60-day 
suspension.  Finally, the stipulation stated that Attorney 
Barrock was entering into the stipulation and no contest plea 
voluntarily and with knowledge of the relevant facts and rights 
that he was waiving and that Attorney Barrock's plea was not the 
result of plea-bargaining. 
¶6 
The referee accepted Attorney Barrock's no contest 
plea.  Based on the allegations of the complaint, he concluded 
No. 
2005AP2180-D   
 
4 
 
that Attorney Barrock had violated the Rules of Professional 
Conduct as alleged in the six counts of the complaint. 
¶7 
According to the OLR's complaint, which has been 
stipulated as true, Attorney Barrock practices law with his 
father in Brookfield.  He was privately reprimanded in 1992 for 
having violated SCR 20:1.16(d) and the attorney's oath found in 
SCR 40.15. 
¶8 
The misconduct in the present case relates to a 
personal injury matter involving W.F.  W.F. originally retained 
the law firm of Michael H. Hupy & Associates (Hupy) to pursue a 
claim stemming from an automobile accident.  W.F. signed a 
retainer agreement with Hupy that stated that Hupy would receive 
33 1/3 percent of any monies that W.F. received in connection 
with his claim.  The retainer agreement further provided an 
attorney lien in favor of Hupy for such percentage. 
¶9 
On June 15, 2000, approximately one year after W.F. 
entered 
into 
the 
retainer 
agreement 
with 
Hupy, 
Attorney 
Barrock's father, Attorney James Barrock, sent a letter to Hupy 
stating that W.F. wished to have another attorney take over his 
case.2  The letter proposed alternatives for dividing the 
attorney fees produced by the case. 
¶10 Hupy rejected all of the alternatives proposed by 
James Barrock's letter.  Instead, Hupy put forth another 
                                                 
2 At this time, Attorney Barrock and his father shared 
office space. 
No. 
2005AP2180-D   
 
5 
 
alternative and asked that the expenses already incurred by Hupy 
be protected. 
¶11 On June 23, 2000, although the attorney fee issue had 
not been resolved, Attorney Barrock entered into a fee agreement 
with W.F. 
¶12 On March 20, 2001, Hupy sent James Barrock a letter 
reminding him of the existence of the lien that Hupy had on any 
monies generated by W.F.'s claim.  Hupy also requested an update 
on the progress of W.F.'s claim. 
¶13 A couple of days later, Attorney Barrock responded to 
Hupy's letter.  Attorney Barrock's letter stated that he did not 
have a copy of any lien in his file and that W.F. had informed 
him that Hupy had released its interest against W.F.'s case. 
¶14 On April 23, 2001, Hupy replied to Attorney Barrock's 
letter and referred him to the initial, June 15, 2000 letter, 
written by James Barrock.  Hupy requested that Attorney Barrock 
state whether he acknowledged Hupy's lien. 
¶15 Attorney Barrock and Hupy exchanged additional letters 
in June 2001.  Hupy reiterated that it had a valid lien on any 
recovery obtained by W.F.  Attorney Barrock stated that Hupy had 
done little work on W.F.'s claim and that he doubted that W.F. 
would be willing to pay any attorney fee to Hupy. 
¶16 In early August 2002 W.F. entered into a settlement 
agreement with Omni Insurance (Omni), by which Omni would pay 
$34,135 to W.F.  This amount was deposited into Attorney 
Barrock's trust account on August 8, 2002.  Those funds were 
disbursed to various parties that same day.  The closing 
No. 
2005AP2180-D   
 
6 
 
statement showed that the attorney fees totaled $11,378.33.  
Attorney Barrock disbursed $6225.17 to his father and $5689.16 
to himself, for a total of $11,914.33.  Attorney Barrock also 
gave W.F. a check for $17,195.69, pursuant to the closing 
statement. 
¶17 On October 1, 2002, Hupy sent a letter to Attorney 
Barrock again stating that Hupy had a lien against any funds 
recovered by W.F. 
¶18 In a response letter, Attorney Barrock told Hupy that 
W.F. had instructed him not to acknowledge Hupy's lien and that 
Attorney 
Barrock 
had 
therefore 
made 
all 
appropriate 
disbursements. 
¶19 Hupy then requested Attorney Barrock to confirm that 
he had disbursed disputed funds from his trust account.  By copy 
of this letter, Hupy advised Omni's attorney that Hupy was 
demanding to receive one-third of the settlement. 
¶20 Omni's attorney then wrote a letter to Attorney 
Barrock 
telling 
him 
that 
it 
was 
Attorney 
Barrock's 
responsibility to address any attorney liens granted by his 
client, W.F. 
¶21 On November 14, 2002, Attorney Barrock sent a letter 
to Hupy, stating that W.F. did not believe that Hupy had a 
"justifiable lien" and that W.F. had instructed Attorney Barrock 
not to honor it. 
¶22 On November 19, 2002, Hupy demanded that Attorney 
Barrock place one-third of the settlement amount in Hupy's trust 
account within ten days or else Hupy would file a lawsuit.  When 
No. 
2005AP2180-D   
 
7 
 
Attorney Barrock did not satisfy Hupy's demand, Hupy filed a 
lawsuit against Attorney Barrock and Omni seeking one-third of 
the settlement amount.  Attorney Barrock filed an answer and 
cross-complaint.  Attorney Barrock's cross-complaint stated that 
W.F. had told him that Hupy had released W.F. from all 
contracts.  Attorney Barrock also asserted that W.F. had agreed 
to indemnify him for all claims and liens connected with 
Attorney Barrock's representation, including prior attorney 
fees.  W.F. had not made any such indemnification agreement. 
¶23 Although 
Attorney 
Barrock 
continued 
to 
have 
an 
obligation to W.F. to represent him regarding the fee dispute 
with Hupy, Attorney Barrock did not do so and did not seek 
W.F.'s consent to withdraw and pursue Attorney Barrock's own 
claims.  W.F., on his own, chose to retain a third attorney to 
represent him in connection with the fee dispute.  Attorney 
Barrock ultimately executed a "Covenant Not to Sue" W.F.  This 
covenant related to any potential claims arising out of Attorney 
Barrock's representation of W.F. 
¶24 Attorney Barrock was deposed in June 2003.  At that 
deposition, Attorney Barrock was asked whether he had in fact 
disbursed the attorney fees from W.F.'s settlement.  Attorney 
Barrock responded, "No.  They're in the trust account."  This 
was not true, as Attorney Barrock had made disbursements to 
himself and to his father in August 2002. 
¶25 In response to the OLR's investigation about the 
disputed attorney fees, Attorney Barrock wrote in a January 12, 
2004 letter, "I have held $5,000.00 in fees in our trust account 
No. 
2005AP2180-D   
 
8 
 
to cover Attorney Hupy's potential lien interest."  He further 
stated, "I have withdrawn for attorney fees regarding this case 
in the amount of $5,689.17."  Attorney Barrock did not disclose 
the disbursement of the attorney fee of $6225.17 to his father.  
In a subsequent letter, after the OLR noted the bank records 
showing the full disbursement of the attorney fees, Attorney 
Barrock further stated that the funds necessary to protect 
Hupy's interest were still being held in trust in funds that had 
been "earmarked" for Attorney Barrock. 
¶26 Finally, during the OLR's review of Attorney Barrock's 
trust account records, the OLR discovered an August 14, 2002 
check for $300 that had been drawn on Attorney Barrock's trust 
fund account and that had the notation "loan" in the memo line.  
Attorney Barrock claimed that the check was not a personal loan 
from 
trust 
funds, 
but 
actually 
represented 
a 
partial 
distribution of attorney fees that he had earned.  The OLR then 
requested additional trust account records from Attorney Barrock 
to verify this claim, including a "side sheet" that he allegedly 
maintained.  Attorney Barrock was not able to produce the trust 
account records requested by the OLR, claiming that they had 
been discarded when his firm switched to a new accounting 
program in 2002. 
¶27 On the basis of the facts as described above, the 
referee concluded that Attorney Barrock had committed six 
violations of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct 
for Attorneys.  First, the referee concluded that by failing to 
hold in his trust account a portion of the settlement proceeds 
No. 
2005AP2180-D   
 
9 
 
despite his knowledge of Hupy's lien on those funds, Attorney 
Barrock had violated SCR 20:1.15(d).3 
¶28 By knowingly misrepresenting in his cross-complaint 
that W.F. had agreed to indemnify him for all claims and liens, 
including prior attorney fees, relating to his representation of 
W.F., Attorney Barrock knowingly advanced a factual position 
without a basis for doing so, in violation of SCR 20:3.1(a)(2).4 
¶29 The referee also stated that Attorney Barrock had  
continued to represent W.F. while at the same time attempting to 
implead W.F. as a third-party defendant in a pending lawsuit in 
which Attorney Barrock was a named defendant.  The referee 
concluded that this situation represented a conflict of interest 
for which Attorney Barrock had not obtained a written waiver, 
contrary to SCR 20:1.7(b).5 
                                                 
3 SCR 20:1.15(d) provides in relevant part:  Prompt notice 
and delivery of property.   
(3) Disputes regarding trust property.  When the 
lawyer and another person or the client and another 
person claim ownership interest in trust property 
identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or 
contract, the lawyer shall hold that property in trust 
until there is an accounting and severance of the 
interests.  If a dispute arises regarding the division 
of the property, the lawyer shall hold the disputed 
portion in trust until the dispute is resolved. . . . 
4 SCR 20:3.1(a)(2) provides that in representing a 
client, a lawyer shall not "knowingly advance a factual 
position unless there is a basis for doing so that is not 
frivolous." 
5 SCR 
20:1.7(b) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not 
represent a client if the representation of that client may be 
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another 
client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interest." 
No. 
2005AP2180-D   
 
10 
 
¶30 With 
respect 
to 
the 
fourth 
count, 
the 
referee 
concluded that Attorney Barrock's deposition testimony that the 
attorney fees remained in his trust account constituted conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, in 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).6 
¶31 Next, the referee found that Attorney Barrock had 
failed to disclose to the OLR that he had disbursed attorney 
fees to his father and had asserted that he continued to 
maintain funds in trust to cover Hupy's lien when in fact all 
funds had been disbursed.  The referee concluded that this 
conduct had violated SCR 22.03(6),7 in further violation of SCR 
20:8.4(f).8 
¶32 Finally, the referee determined that Attorney Barrock 
had violated SCR 20:1.15(e)9 when he had failed to maintain 
                                                 
6 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
7 SCR 22.03(6) provides that "[i]n the course of the 
investigation, 
the 
respondent's wilful failure to provide 
relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 
are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 
in the grievance." 
8 SCR 20:8.4(f) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme 
court order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of 
lawyers." 
9 SCR 20:1.15(e) provides in relevant part:  "(6) Record 
retention.  A lawyer shall maintain complete records of trust 
account funds and other trust property and shall preserve those 
records for at least 6 years after the date of termination of 
the representation." 
No. 
2005AP2180-D   
 
11 
 
records of trust account funds for the required minimum of six 
years, including records relating to the August 14, 2002 check. 
¶33 With respect to the question of discipline, the 
referee did not note many aggravating or mitigating factors in 
this case.  On the aggravating side, the referee pointed to the 
fact 
that 
Attorney 
Barrock 
had 
already 
been 
privately 
reprimanded in 1992.  On the mitigating side, the referee noted 
that Attorney Barrock had recently attended an OLR-sponsored 
seminar on trust account practices.  In the end, the referee 
concluded that the 60-day suspension stipulated to by the 
parties was a reasonable level of discipline given Attorney 
Barrock's admitted misconduct.  In addition, the referee 
recommended that Attorney Barrock be required to pay the costs 
of this disciplinary proceeding.  Those costs totaled $6942.90, 
as of June 20, 2006. 
¶34 After independently reviewing the record in this 
matter, we adopt the referee's findings of fact based on the 
allegations in the OLR's complaint, to which Attorney Barrock 
stipulated.  We further adopt the referee's legal conclusions 
that the stipulated facts prove each of the OLR's six counts of 
professional misconduct against Attorney Barrock.  We agree that 
Attorney Barrock's serious violation of the rules regarding 
disputed trust account monies, in connection with his other 
misconduct, warrants a 60-day suspension of his license to 
practice law in this state.  Finally, we determine that Attorney 
Barrock should be required to pay the full costs of this 
disciplinary proceeding. 
No. 
2005AP2180-D   
 
12 
 
¶35 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Attorney Mitchell J. 
Barrock to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period 
of 60 days, effective April 6, 2007. 
¶36 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Attorney Mitchell J. Barrock shall pay to the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding.  If 
the costs are not paid within the time specified and absent a 
showing to this court of his inability to pay those costs within 
that time, the license of Attorney Barrock to practice law in 
Wisconsin shall remain suspended until further order of the 
court. 
¶37 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if he has not already done 
so, 
Attorney 
Mitchell 
J. 
Barrock 
shall 
comply 
with 
the 
provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person whose 
license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended. 
 
No.  2005AP2180-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶38 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
dissent harkens back to an earlier dissent in Yorgan v. Durkin, 
2006 WI 60, 290 Wis. 2d 671, 715 N.W.2d 160.1  The dissent 
concludes that Attorney Barrock "should not be disciplined for 
the alleged violation of SCR 20:1.15(d)(3) because this court 
has concluded [in Yorgan] that it is permissible [for an 
attorney] to fail to hold settlement proceeds received from a 
personal injury claim in an attorney trust account when the 
attorney knows there is a claim by another person to a portion 
of those proceeds."2   
¶39 Because the dissent omits key facts and applicable 
law, the dissent obliterates any difference between a civil 
action and a discipline action and any difference between an 
attorney's claim and a chiropractor's claim.3  The dissent cites 
no authority (and it cannot) for conflating a civil liability 
claim against a lawyer by a chiropractor (Yorgan) and an Office 
of Lawyer Regulation claim against a lawyer for ignoring a 
statutorily protected attorney lien in violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys (Barrock).  This conflation 
contravenes the law and the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
                                                 
1 Yorgan v. Durkin, 2006 WI 60, ¶¶53-80, 290 Wis. 2d 671, 
715 N.W.2d 160 (Roggensack, J., dissenting). 
2 Dissent, ¶61. 
3 "I cannot agree that it is not contrary to public policy 
to distribute trust account funds to which a chiropractor makes 
a claim, but it is contrary to public policy to distribute trust 
account funds to which an attorney makes a claim.  Therefore, I 
conclude Attorney Barrock did not violate SCR 20:1.15(d)(3)."  
Dissent, ¶76.  
No.  2005AP2180-D.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶40 I write to help avoid "confusion and delay."4  The 
dissent is, in my opinion, off track, using the wrong vehicle to 
express continuing disagreement with the Yorgan case. 
¶41 Barrock and Yorgan are rooted in different causes of 
action, have materially different facts, are governed by 
different laws, and are in different forums that are resolving 
different issues.  The crux of the discipline action in the 
present case (generally speaking) is that the lawyer has, 
contrary to the Rules of Professional Conduct, released funds in 
his or her possession knowing that a lawyer claims a statutory 
lien upon all or part of the funds.  The crux of a civil action 
against a lawyer who has released funds is (generally speaking) 
that a court is to determine the rights of the various claimants 
against the lawyer and others claiming an interest in the funds.     
¶42 I shall summarizes the two cases quickly and then 
discuss them in more detail. 
¶43 Barrock is a disciplinary proceeding based on the 
Rules of Professional Conduct.  Simply stated, a state statute 
recognizes an agreement between a client and an attorney 
granting the attorney a lien upon proceeds from a personal 
injury recovery to protect the attorney's fees.  The Rules of 
Professional Conduct provide that an attorney must protect such 
a lien upon the proceeds by keeping the proceeds in trust.  
Attorney Barrock disbursed the funds without protecting the 
                                                 
4 Sir Topham Hatt, the railroad controller on the children's 
television 
series 
"Thomas 
the 
Tank 
Engine 
and 
Friends," 
frequently scolds the engines with, "You have caused confusion 
and delay!" 
No.  2005AP2180-D.ssa 
 
3 
 
alleged lien and thus violated the Rules and faced disciplinary 
proceedings.  The attorney sued Attorney Barrock in the 
Milwaukee County circuit court for payment of the attorney's 
bill for legal services rendered the client.  The attorney's 
civil liability claim (upon his claimed lien) against Attorney 
Barrock is not before us.  That is a separate civil suit.5 
¶44 In contrast, Yorgan was a small claims action by a 
chiropractor against a lawyer for payment of the chiropractor's 
bill for services rendered a patient.  Simply stated, the 
chiropractor demanded that the lawyer pay the chiropractor the 
fees for services rendered a patient who was the lawyer's client 
and for whom the lawyer recovered funds for personal injury on 
the ground that the chiropractor had a lien on the funds.  This 
court dismissed the chiropractor's small claims action, holding, 
inter alia, that the chiropractor has no lien on the proceeds 
and that the attorney was not a party to the agreement between 
the chiropractor and the patient.  Accordingly, the attorney was 
not civilly liable to the chiropractor under the facts of that 
case.  Yorgan was not a disciplinary proceeding based on the 
Rules of Professional Conduct.  Yorgan is comparable to the 
separate civil action against Attorney Barrock in the Milwaukee 
County circuit court.    
¶45 I shall now discuss each case in greater detail.   
                                                 
5 Michael F. Hupy & Assocs. v. Omni Ins. Co., No. 
2002CV11870 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct.).   
No.  2005AP2180-D.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶46 The Barrock Case.  This case is a discipline case, 
governed by a lien statute and the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.   
 
¶47 An injured person hired Attorney Michael Hupy to 
pursue a claim and signed a contract granting the attorney a 
lien upon any proceeds for the payment of his fee.  The person 
later retained Attorney Barrock to pursue the same claim. 
 
¶48 Hupy's contractual lien is protected by statute.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 757.36 validates an attorney-client contract 
that grants the attorney a lien upon the proceeds derived in any 
action brought for the enforcement of the cause of action, as 
security for fees in the conduct of the litigation.  The statute 
further provides that when notice of the contract is given to 
the opposite party or his or her attorney, no settlement or 
adjustment of the action may be valid as against the lien so 
created.6   
 
¶49 Attorney Barrock settled the claim and received funds 
to which his client was entitled. Attorney Barrock knew of 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 757.36 provides as follows: 
Any 
person 
having 
or 
claiming 
a 
right 
of 
action . . . may 
contract 
with 
any 
attorney 
to 
prosecute the action and give the attorney a lien upon 
the cause of action and upon the proceeds or damages 
derived in any action brought for the enforcement of 
the cause of action, as security for fees in the 
conduct of the litigation; when such agreement is made 
and notice thereof given to the opposite party or his 
or her attorney, no settlement or adjustment of the 
action 
may 
be 
valid 
as 
against 
the 
lien 
so 
created . . . . 
See also Wis. Stat. §§ 757.37, .38. 
No.  2005AP2180-D.ssa 
 
5 
 
Attorney Hupy's asserted lien on the funds and nevertheless 
disbursed the funds without making payment to Attorney Hupy.  
 
¶50 The Rules of Professional Conduct (SCR 20:1.15(d)(3)) 
require that, when "the client and another person claim 
ownership 
interest 
in 
trust 
property 
identified 
by 
a 
lien . . . , the lawyer [here, Barrock] shall hold that property 
in trust until there is an accounting and severance of the 
interests."7   
 
¶51 Attorney Barrock failed "to hold in his trust account 
a portion of the settlement proceeds despite his knowledge of 
[the lawyer's] lien on those funds," and thus he violated SCR 
20:1.15(d).  Majority op., ¶27.8 
¶52 The Yorgan Case.  Yorgan involved a lawyer's personal 
civil liability to a client's creditor when the creditor did not 
have a lien on the funds.  Yorgan is not a lawyer discipline 
case.   
                                                 
7 SCR 20:1.15(d)(3), Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys, reads as follows: 
(3) Disputes regarding trust property.  When the 
lawyer and another person or the client and another 
person claim ownership interest in trust property 
identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or 
contract, the lawyer shall hold that property in trust 
until there is an accounting and severance of the 
interests.  If a dispute arises regarding the division 
of the property, the lawyer shall hold the disputed 
portion in trust until the dispute is resolved. . . .  
8 For a discussion of a lawyer's duty regarding property in 
the lawyer's possession, see 1 Restatement (3d) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers §§ 44-45 (1998). 
No.  2005AP2180-D.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶53 In Yorgan, the chiropractor rendered services to a 
patient for injuries incurred in a car accident.  At the 
chiropractor's request the patient signed an "Authorization and 
Doctor's Lien" stating that funds from any settlement from the 
accident be used to compensate the chiropractor.  The patient 
retained Attorney Thomas Durkin to handle the personal injury 
claim.  The attorney knew about the "lien authorization 
contract" but nevertheless disbursed the funds without paying 
the chiropractor. 
¶54 The chiropractor sued the attorney in small claims 
court for payment of the fees for the chiropractic services.  On 
a petition for review, this court held against the chiropractor, 
reasoning as follows: the chiropractor had no statutory, 
equitable, or common law lien upon the proceeds of the 
settlement; 
the 
contract 
between 
the 
patient 
and 
the 
chiropractor contemplated that, before the attorney was bound by 
the contract, the attorney would have to sign it; the attorney 
never signed the agreement or otherwise accepted the terms of 
the "lien authorization contract" and therefore was not bound by 
the contract; even if the attorney had a duty to the client to 
pay the chiropractor, the applicable general rule is that an 
attorney is not liable to third parties for breach of a duty to 
the client; and public policy does not favor an attorney being 
liable to creditors and assignees of the client.  Based on this 
reasoning, the court held that the attorney was not civilly 
liable to the chiropractor for having disbursed the funds 
without paying the chiropractor.     
No.  2005AP2180-D.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶55 The Yorgan court considered the applicability of SCR 
20:1.15(d), as did Justice Wilcox's concurrence in that case.  
Both opinions conclude that SCR 20:1.15(d) of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct was not determinative of an attorney's 
civil liability.9  The Preamble to SCR 20 explicitly states that 
the Rules of Professional Conduct do not provide an independent 
basis for civil liability.10  The Yorgan court addressed civil 
liability and refrained from addressing the applicability of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct to the circumstances of the case.11  
¶56 Synthesis and Conclusion.  According to the dissent, 
the determinative factor in both the present discipline case and 
in the Yorgan civil liability case is the attorney's knowledge 
that a claim exists.  While both cases involve an attorney who 
holds a client's funds knowing of the claims of another, the 
similarities end there. 
¶57 In the present discipline case, a statute recognizes 
an attorney's lien on the proceeds, and SCR 20:1.15(d) prohibits 
an attorney from paying the proceeds and ignoring the lien.  
Attorney Barrock violated the Rule and is being disciplined.  In 
Yorgan, the court determined that the chiropractor had no 
                                                 
9 Yorgan, 290 Wis. 2d 671, ¶25. 
10 Id.  The Yorgan court also cited Williams v. Rexworks, 
Inc., 2004 WI App 228, ¶20, 277 Wis. 2d 495, 691 N.W.2d 897 
("[I]t is clear from the preamble, and from the lack of any 
authority to the contrary, that the [Rules of Professional 
Conduct for Attorneys] do not provide an independent basis for 
civil liability, and do not create any presumption that a legal 
duty has been breached."); and Nauga, Inc. v. Westel Milwaukee 
Co., 216 Wis. 2d 306, 318 n.5, 576 N.W.2d 573 (Ct. App. 1998). 
11 Yorgan, 290 Wis. 2d 671, ¶25.  
No.  2005AP2180-D.ssa 
 
8 
 
protected rights or interests in the proceeds against the lawyer 
and the lawyer was not liable in a civil claim.  The Yorgan 
court never addressed whether that attorney violated the Rules 
of Professional Conduct.  Discipline was not an issue in the 
case.  
¶58 The applicable law and the nature of the proceedings 
conspire to distinguish the two cases.  In perceiving an analogy 
when none exists, the dissent creates an analysis when none is 
required. 
¶59 For the reasons set forth, I write separately.   
¶60 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
No.  2005AP2180-D.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶61 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J. 
(dissenting 
in 
part).   The court's per curiam decision approves the discipline 
of Attorney Mitchell J. Barrock for violations of various 
supreme court rules.   Per curiam op., ¶3.  I agree that 
Attorney Barrock should be disciplined for rule violations.  I 
write in partial dissent because I conclude that Attorney 
Barrock should not be disciplined for the alleged violation of 
SCR 20:1.15(d)(3) because this court has concluded that it is 
permissible to fail to hold settlement proceeds received from a 
personal injury claim in an attorney trust account when the 
attorney knows there is a claim by another person to a portion 
of those proceeds.  Yorgan v. Durkin, 2006 WI 60, ¶2, 290 
Wis. 2d 671, 715 N.W.2d 160.  In my view, the court's decision 
in Yorgan modifies when an attorney has an obligation to retain 
settlement proceeds in his trust account, to which proceeds 
another person makes a claim.  The court has concluded that a 
known claim to a portion of the proceeds is insufficient to 
lawfully prevent an attorney from distributing the proceeds to 
him and others.  Id.  Rather, the court has concluded that what 
is required to validly assert such a claim is either the 
agreement of the attorney into whose trust account the proceeds 
were paid or an equitable lien against the proceeds.  Id.  The 
court also concluded that public policy does not favor imposing 
liability on an attorney who disburses all of the proceeds 
without paying one who makes a claim to the attorney in 
possession of those proceeds.  Id.  Given the court's reasoning 
in Yorgan, in my view, Attorney Barrock should not be sanctioned 
No.  2005AP2180-D.pdr 
 
2 
 
for a violation of SCR 20:1.15(d)(3) on the facts of this case.  
Accordingly, I would remand to the referee for a recommendation 
for discipline that should be imposed when the violation of SCR 
20:1.15(d)(3) is not considered, and I respectfully dissent, in 
part, from the majority opinion. 
¶62 No one cites Yorgan to us.  Perhaps that is because it 
was not released until June 2, 2006 and the referee issued his 
Decision and Recommendations on May 31, 2006. Of course there 
may be differences between a civil claim that settlement 
proceeds have been distributed in contravention of an alleged 
contractual right of recovery against them and an allegation 
that the Rules of Professional Conduct have been violated 
because 
settlement 
proceeds 
have 
been 
distributed 
in 
contravention of an alleged contractual right of recovery 
against them.  However, as we recognized in Yorgan, disciplinary 
cases may be based in factual contexts similar to those on which 
civil actions are based.1  In addition, the factual context in 
which Yorgan arose is on all fours with the facts related by the 
                                                 
1 Yorgan v. Durkin, 2006 WI 60, ¶22, 290 Wis.2d 671, 715 
N.W.2d 160 (citing In the Matter of Allen, 802 N.E.2d 922, 924 
(Ind. 2004) and Matter of Rawson, 833 P.2d 235, 238 (N.M. 
1992)), two disciplinary cases, as support for the court's 
conclusion that Dr. Yorgan should have had Attorney Durkin sign 
a letter of protection, if Dr. Yorgan expected Attorney Durkin 
to protect Dr. Yorgan's interest in the settlement proceeds.  
No.  2005AP2180-D.pdr 
 
3 
 
referee as a precursor to his conclusion that Attorney Barrock 
violated SCR 20:1.15(d)(3).2  
¶63 Dr. Yorgan is a chiropractor who provided chiropractic 
services to Ms. Hernandez for personal injuries that resulted 
from an automobile accident.  Yorgan, 290 Wis. 2d 671, ¶53.  
Because Ms. Hernandez was not able to pay for the health care 
she required, Ms. Hernandez made a written assignment to Dr. 
Yorgan of proceeds that may be received from her personal injury 
claim.  That agreement provided: 
I hereby authorize and direct you, my attorney, 
to pay directly to Dr. Yorgan such sums as may be due 
and owing him for health services rendered to me by 
reason of this accident and to withhold such sums from 
any settlement, judgement [sic] or verdict as may be 
necessary to protect his interests.   
Id., ¶56. 
¶64 Attorney Durkin represented Ms. Hernandez in her civil 
claim for the same accident that resulted in the personal 
injuries for which Dr. Yorgan provided treatment.  Id., ¶53.  
Moreover, the circuit court found that Ms. Hernandez's written 
assignment was sent to Attorney Durkin's office at the time Dr. 
Yorgan transmitted 
Ms. Hernandez's treatment records that 
Attorney Durkin had requested, about November 1, 2000.  Id., 
¶57.  The circuit court also found that Attorney Durkin settled 
Ms. Hernandez's personal injury claim about June, 2003, and that 
                                                 
2 Many of the facts I quote come from the dissent in Yorgan.  
However, the majority opinion in Yorgan did not dispute that 
Attorney Durkin knew that Dr. Yorgan made a claim to the 
settlement proceeds from Ms. Hernandez's personal injury claim 
based on the written agreement he sent to Attorney Durkin.  See 
Yorgan, 290 Wis. 2d 671, ¶1. 
No.  2005AP2180-D.pdr 
 
4 
 
prior to reaching a settlement, Attorney Durkin contacted Dr. 
Yorgan to see if he would reduce the amount then due for 
chiropractic services.  Id.  When Dr. Yorgan refused to do so, 
Attorney Durkin paid himself from the settlement proceeds and 
sent the rest of it to Ms. Hernandez, who was subsequently 
nowhere to be found.  Id.  There was no evidence in the record 
that Ms. Hernandez provided Attorney Durkin any instructions 
about the disbursement of the settlement proceeds to Dr. Yorgan 
that were contrary to the assignment she executed in favor of 
Dr. Yorgan.  Id.  Accordingly, Attorney Durkin had notice of an 
assignment, expressly created by his client.  Id., ¶1 and ¶57. 
¶65 This court concluded that Attorney Durkin had no 
obligation to pay Dr. Yorgan from the settlement proceeds 
Attorney Durkin received because Attorney Durkin did not sign an 
agreement to do so.  Id., ¶2.  In so concluding, it also 
concluded that Attorney Durkin had no obligation to retain the 
disputed funds in his trust account.  Accordingly, Dr. Yorgan 
was denied all recovery for the health care he provided.  Id., 
¶2.   
¶66 In the disciplinary case now before us, Attorney 
Barrock is found to have violated SCR 20:1.15(d)(3), which 
provides in relevant part:   
Disputes regarding trust property.  When the 
lawyer and another person or the client and another 
person claim ownership interest in trust property 
identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or 
contract, the lawyer shall hold that property in trust 
until there is an accounting and severance of the 
interests.  If a dispute arises regarding the division 
of the property, the lawyer shall hold the disputed 
portion in trust until the dispute is resolved. 
No.  2005AP2180-D.pdr 
 
5 
 
¶67 Attorney Barrock's violation of SCR 20:1.15(d)(3) 
arises from a claim made against settlement proceeds by Attorney 
Hupy, who initially represented Attorney Barrock's client, W.F., 
for the same personal injury claim for which Attorney Barrock 
collected settlement proceeds.  As part of Attorney Hupy's 
representation of W.F., W.F. signed a contingency fee agreement 
whereby Attorney Hupy allegedly would receive 33-1/3% of any 
recovery and would have a lien on the proceeds of the personal 
injury claim for the payment of that contingency fee.3   Per 
curiam op., ¶8.  
¶68 Approximately one year after Attorney Hupy entered 
into the agreement to represent W.F., W.F. decided to retain 
Attorney Barrock.  Id., ¶9.  As part of Attorney Barrock's 
representation of W.F., W.F. also entered into a retainer 
agreement with Attorney Barrock.  Id., ¶11. 
¶69 When Attorney Hupy became aware of Attorney Barrock's 
representation, 
he 
asked 
Attorney 
Barrock 
to 
acknowledge 
                                                 
3 The fee agreement between Attorney Hupy and W.F. is not a 
part of the record before this court.  Therefore, because 
statutory liens under Wis. Stat. § 757.37 do not arise as a 
matter of course, we do not know whether Attorney Hupy's 
agreement actually granted him a statutory lien.  See Weigel v. 
Grimmett, 173 Wis. 2d 263, 271, 496 N.W.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1992) 
(concluding that even with a written fee agreement there must be 
separate proof of an agreement for a lien); see also In the 
Matter of Richland Bldg. Sys., Inc., 40 B.R. 156, 157 (Bankr. 
W.D. Wis. 1984) (concluding that a written fee agreement was 
insufficient to support an attorney's lien because there was no 
specific proof of the granting of the lien).  However, in my 
view, the basis for the claim against settlement proceeds makes 
no difference in regard to whether SCR 20:1.15(d)(3) applies 
because the Rule covers disputes that arise because of a claimed 
"lien, court order, judgment, or contract." 
No.  2005AP2180-D.pdr 
 
6 
 
Attorney Hupy's lien against proceeds received in the future 
from W.F.'s personal injury claim.  Id., ¶14. 
¶70 Attorney Barrock did not do so.  Id., ¶15.  Attorney 
Barrock continued to represent W.F. and obtained a settlement of 
$34,135.  Id., ¶16.  However, he paid Attorney Hupy nothing, but 
distributed the proceeds to himself, to his father, who was also 
an attorney, and to W.F.  Id.  When Attorney Hupy learned that a 
distribution had been made, he sued Attorney Barrock and also 
reported Attorney Barrock's actions to OLR.  Id., ¶22. 
¶71 The referee's conclusion of law, that was adopted by 
this court in its disciplinary decision, determined that: 
Attorney Barrock failed to hold in his Trust Account a 
portion of the settlement he had negotiated with Omni 
Insurance Company despite his actual knowledge of a 
dispute regarding Attorney Hupy’s firm’s lien as to a 
portion of those funds.  This is a direct violation of 
SCR 20:1.15(d). 
¶72 I write dissenting in part because the attorney 
conduct in Yorgan is the same as Attorney Barrock's conduct 
here.  Both attorneys knew another person claimed an interest in 
settlement proceeds that came into their hands.  This knowledge 
caused the settlement funds that each attorney deposited into 
his trust account to be subject to a dispute about the ownership 
of those funds, which would appear to cause each attorney's 
conduct to fall within the ambit of SCR 20:1.15(d)(3).  However, 
it appears to me that Yorgan put a gloss on when a portion of 
settlement proceeds is in "dispute."  That is, this court 
concluded that Attorney Durkin was not bound to retain the 
settlement proceeds from Ms. Hernandez's lawsuit because he had 
No.  2005AP2180-D.pdr 
 
7 
 
not signed an agreement to be bound by the contractual 
assignment Ms. Hernandez made to Dr. Yorgan.  Yorgan, 290 
Wis. 2d 671, ¶2.  We also concluded that the failure to pay Dr. 
Yorgan did not violate public policy.  Id.  If Attorney Durkin 
was not bound to retain the settlement proceeds in his trust 
account, under law or public policy until a court had determined 
whether Dr. Yorgan had a valid claim against the proceeds, then 
how 
could 
those 
proceeds 
be 
in 
"dispute" 
under 
SCR 
20:1.15(d)(3), which requires retaining them when a dispute is 
present? 
¶73 The concurrence asserts that the dissent "conflates" 
Attorney Hupy's OLR complaint with his civil claim.  Per curiam 
op., ¶39 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).  The concurrence then 
goes on to assert that the "crux" of this disciplinary action is 
that a lawyer released trust account funds to which he knew 
another lawyer claimed an interest, while the "crux" of a civil 
action is a court determination of whether a claimant has a 
valid claim to the funds.  Id., ¶41.   
¶74 While I acknowledge that the focus is different in the 
two actions, does the concurrence really believe a disciplinary 
action will lie against Attorney Durkin in the Yorgan matter 
after we have determined that Attorney Durkin properly ignored 
Dr. Yorgan's claim to a portion of the trust account funds?  The 
court did conclude that Attorney Durkin's distribution did not 
violate any rights of Dr. Yorgan and did not violate public 
policy.  Yorgan, 290 Wis. 2d 671, ¶2.  Certainly, the Supreme 
Court Rules contained in SCR ch. 20 are grounded in public 
No.  2005AP2180-D.pdr 
 
8 
 
policy.  To me, the OLR case and the civil action, while having 
differing 
focuses, 
should 
not 
result 
in 
public 
policy 
conclusions that are inconsistent with one another.    
¶75 In summary, in this disciplinary action, it was an 
attorney who claimed an interest in the funds in an attorney's 
trust account.  In Yorgan, it was a chiropractor who claimed an 
interest in the funds in an attorney's trust account.  In my 
view before this court's decision in Yorgan, it did not matter 
whether the interest claimed was grounded in a common law lien, 
a statutory lien or a contract assigning a portion of the 
proceeds to another.  The terms of SCR 20:1.15(d)(3) covered all 
such claims if they showed the proceeds were in "dispute."  
However, in Yorgan, we concluded that the distribution of all of 
the settlement proceeds to others violated no law and was not 
contrary to public policy.  Id.  
¶76 Therefore, the court's determination in Yorgan put a 
gloss on what type of claim can be made against trust account 
proceeds, which gloss affects this case.  To explain further, I 
cannot agree that it is not contrary to public policy to 
distribute trust account funds to which a chiropractor makes a 
claim, but it is contrary to public policy to distribute trust 
account funds to which an attorney makes a claim.  Therefore, I 
conclude Attorney Barrock did not violate SCR 20:1.15(d)(3).  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the 
discipline imposed for a violation of SCR 20:1.15(d)(3), and I 
would remand the matter to the referee to make a recommendation 
No.  2005AP2180-D.pdr 
 
9 
 
about discipline that does not include a finding that Attorney 
Barrock violated SCR 20:1.15(d)(3) under the facts of this case. 
 
 
No.  2005AP2180-D.pdr 
 
1