Case Title: Industrial Commission v. EMERSON WESTERN COMPANY

Citation: 369 P.2d 791

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1962-03-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
369 P.2d 791 (1962) The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of the State of Colorado (Ex-Officio Unemployment Compensation Commission of Colorado), Norma Jean Tasker, Virginia L. Pate, Mildred J. Flood, and Rose Ruth Babbitt, Plaintiffs in Error, v. The EMERSON WESTERN COMPANY, a Colorado Corporation, Defendant in Error. No. 19794. Supreme Court of Colorado. In Department. March 19, 1962. *792 Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Peter L. Dye, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Industrial Commission. Graham & Scheunemann, Denver, for Individual Plaintiffs in error. Ernest O. Tullis, Clinton M. Cole, Colorado Springs, for defendant in error. Opinion by Mr. Justice SUTTON. This is an action for a penalty assessment against an employer under the Colorado Employment Security Act (C.R.S. '53, 82-4-9(1)). The sole determinative question is whether the defendant in error employer, hereinafter called Emerson, made a false statement as to the reason for the separation of employees from its service which in turn resulted in a delay in the payment of benefits to certain former employees who are claimants here. The applicable penalty, if Emerson is guilty, is one and one-half times the amount of benefits due during the delayed period. The pertinent facts are as follows: Four female employees of Emerson (Tasker, Pate, Flood and Babbitt) left their place of employment in Colorado Springs during their lunch period and admittedly purchased some beer to drink with their meal. They, together with five employees not involved in this writ of error, were subsequently discharged because of events which later transpired. The four named employees, following their lunch period, allegedly carried four cans of beer back to the plant. Then one or more of them carried it surreptiously, according to Emerson, into employer's plant in thermos bottles contrary to regulations. It was then drunk by them or shared with others, these claimants becoming noisy and failing to work as required. After complaints from other employees as to this conduct Emerson satisfied itself as to the facts, held a hearing with the employees involved and subsequently discharged them. The Industrial Commission of Colorado as ex-officio Unemployment Compensation Commission of Colorado, through its Department of Employment Security, requested the necessary wage and separation information from Emerson as to the grounds of dischargesuch information being essential to determine the proper amount of the unemployment compensation claimed by the discharged employees. In response to the written request Emerson responded that each claimant was "Discharged for drinking during the work day and misconduct." Based on this information a deputy penalized the claimants for gross misconduct which ruling was later overturned at a hearing before a referee. In the meantime and before the referee heard the case, *793 the department requested data on what had transpired from the claimants and they replied that they had been discharged for drinking one beer each on their lunch period; that this was off Emerson's premises; and that they had not been accused of misconduct. Then followed a further request by the department to Emerson which recited the claimants' position and then stated: Emerson then replied by forwarding to the department a written statement dated March 2, 1960, purporting to be the minutes of an interview with the claimants when they were discharged. The statement is as follows: "Subject: *794 Following receipt of Emerson's statement a deputy of the department imposed upon all the claimants in a consolidated order the maximum penalty under the Act and set forth as the basis for the penalty as to each claimant that: The claimants appealed the decision of the deputy as it related to each of them and a hearing was held before Referee Richard M. Lee in Colorado Springs on April 26, 1960. At this hearing three company officials testified that they had received reports that there had been drinking on the day of the discharge and that the claimants had been "implicated" as participants in a "party." At the conclusion of their testimony the referee advised the company representative that the company The company representatives indicated that after the lunch recess they would produce the witnesses who had made the reports to the company officials upon which the discharges had been based. When the hearing reconvened, however, a representative made the following statement: Counsel for the claimants then moved that the department set aside the disqualification of the claimants and that it penalize the company for having made false statements to the department resulting in a delay in the payment of benefits to claimants. On May 5, 1960, the referee issued his findings in which he found that none of the claimants had been guilty of misconduct and that "No disqualification seems indicated as to any of these appellants." He denied the request to penalize the company. No appeal was filed from the referee's decision removing the disqualification, but claimants appealed to the Industrial Commission from the referee's refusal to penalize the company. A transcript of the record was made and furnished the claimants and the company and written arguments were submitted to the Commission. Along with its written argument the company submitted affidavits from numerous witnessesnone of whom had appeared at the hearingto support its charges of misconduct. On July 7, 1960, the Industrial Commission issued its order, finding that Emerson's statement by dictionary definition was "not true; incorrect; as, a false statement." The Commission's order read in further pertinent part: The Commission affirmed the referee's order as to there being no disqualification of benefits for the discharged employees, but reversed it as to the statutory penalty on the employer for making false and misleading statements. Emerson, which up to then had been appearing pro se, engaged counsel and sought review in the district court where after hearing that part of the order imposing the penalty was vacated. Plaintiffs in error assert several grounds for reversal, but as stated earlier the real question here is whether Emerson did in fact make a false statement in its reply to the department. Turning to the evidence before the department it discloses: First, Emerson was asked why it had discharged the claimants. It replied to the request, and following denial of the charges by claimants, was asked for more details as to the reason for the discharges. In response it gave its version of the incidents leading to the discharges. Nothing in this record proves that Emerson had other than its stated reasons for the discharges. Whether the reasons given for discharge were in law sufficient to reduce the normal unemployment benefits to claimants is immaterial. The issue here is whether the employer made a false statement as the reason for the discharges. Had Emerson stated at the hearing that it had discharged the claimants for some reason other than set forth in its responses to the Commission, one or the other would have been a falsehood. Without intent to falsify being shown, Emerson could not be held liable for making a false statement. The fact that Emerson did not choose to elaborate on the reasons for discharge or support them with additional testimony at the hearing is immaterial, and is not proof that what had been reported was not the reason for the discharges. The statute in question is not intended to penalize an employer where, as here, the grounds assigned for discharge are ample if believed by the employer, even though given a contrary construction by others. There is no presumption under the statute of a malicious intent on the part of an employer. There being no material conflicts in the evidence before the Commission, the courts may reach their own conclusions, and are not bound by the findings of fact of the Commission. Arvas v. McNeil Coal Corp., 119 Colo. 289, 203 P.2d 906 (1949). We conclude that the statements furnished by Emerson, not being willfully or deliberately false, are not such as come within the penal terms of the statute. See McBride v. People, 126 Colo. 277, 248 P.2d 725 (1952) for definitions of "false" used by this court in a criminal case, and see 35 C.J.S. False, pp. 613-618 for definitions and general usage of the term "False". Cross error is assigned by Emerson but in view of our holding it is not necessary to determine the issues raised thereunder. The judgment is affirmed. Mr. Justice McWILLIAMS and Mr. Justice PRINGLE concur.