Case Title: The 7s Enterprises, Inc. v. Rosario.

Citation: 111 Haw. 484

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-09-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
s++f0R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS**
ee

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
---000---
THE 7/S ENTERPRISES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
KRORU DEL ROSARIO, Defendant-Appellant
and
JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10;

DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10; DOB ENTITIES 1-10; and DOE
GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 1-10, Defendants

No. 27364

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. No. 4-1-1924)

SEPTEMBER 13, 2006

L436 HY €1 das 9000

 

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.

lie hold in this appeal by Defendant-Appellant Kaoru Del
Rosario (Defendant), who has been enjoined from working or
otherwise being employed as a “briefer” in the State of Hawai'i
for a period of three (3) years from July 31, 2004, that
(1) training that provides skills beyond those of 2 general
nature may be considered in weighing the reasonableness of @ non~
competition covenant (the covenant), when such training is

conbined with trade secrets, confidential information, or special

aad
 

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custoner relationships weighing in favor of a protectable
business interest, (2) the finding by the circuit court of the
first circuit (the court)! that the training of a briefer auch as
Defendant is “unique” was not clearly erroneous in light of the
evidence in the record, (3) under the circumstances of this case,
the court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the
reduction in Defendant's salary by Plaintiff-nppellee The 7's
Entexprises, Inc. (Plaintiff) did not amount to “unclean hands,”
(4) the court did not err in ruling that Plaintiff suffered
irreparable harm from Defendant’s continued work as @ briefer
folloving her resignation, and (5) the court did not err in
concluding that the three-year non-competition period was
reasonable. Accordingly, we affizm the May 24, 2005 judgment of
the court, as anended by the court's July 11, 2005 amended
judgment in favor of Plaintiff, except we remand to the court
with instructions to amend the judgment to reflect that Plaintiff
is enjoined from being employed as a briefer in the County of
Honolulu as provided for in the covenant rather than in the State

of Havai'i as the court concluded.

 

In 1994, Defendant entered into an Employment Agreement
with Plaintiff. According to the court, “[b]riefers enployed by
Plaintiff are primarily hired to promote and sell products from
its shop and to sell optional tours and souvenir items” to travel
agencies with which Plaintif® had contracted. The employment

+The Honorable Victorsa &. Marke presides.

2
 

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agreement contained a covenant which precluded an employee from
engaging in briefing services on the island of Oahu for a period
of three years after the termination of employment with Plaintiff
or resignation.’ Defendant wes aware of the covenant, but felt
it did not apply to her as long as she vas not directly employed
by @ tour company. There are only three briefing companies in
the State of Hawai'i, Plaintiff included.’

Defendant’s training included memorizing scripts,
observing actual briefing sessions, responding to questions from
customers, and being critiqued as part of the on-the-job
training. Defendant was paid $1,400.00 per month during her two-
month training period. After this time, Defendant's contract
base salary was $2,000.00 per month and she collected 18

commission on her sales.

 

+ the parties’ Exploynent Agreement includes the following nen~
competition covenant (the covenant)

Non-Conpetition. Baployee agrees that, during the terms
Gf chi *Rbfeenent ane for's period of three (3) years
thereafter, within the County of Honolulu. (Island of Oahu) ,
State of Hawaii, Employee will not directly or indirectly,
own, manage, operate, control, be employed as a “Briefer”
by, be contracted as'a “Briefer™ by, participate in, or be
Connected in any manner with the ownership, manegenent,
Operation, or control of, any business simiiar to the type
of business conducted by' the Employer at the tine this
Agreement terminates. In the event of the Employee’ s actual
oF threstened breach of this paragraph, the Employer shall.
be entitles to 2 preliminary Or temporary restraining order
fand injunction restraining Employee from violating ies
provision. Nothing in this Agreenent shall be construed to
Prohibit the Enployer from pursuing any other available
Fenedies for such breach or threatened breach, including the
Fecovery of danages fron the Employee.

 

 

 

> according to Fusami Laurent (Laurent), Plaintiff’s president,
other briefing companies de net require a covenant in their employment
Sereenent’s
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Defendant firet resigned in November 1995 and was

rehired by Plaintiff in August 1996. Upon rehiring, Defendant
entezed into a second employment agreement (the Agreement), which
was identical to the one she entered into in 1994.

Defendant was Plaintiff's lowest producer; she did not
garner as much business for Plaintiff's store as other briefers.
Between 1997 and 2000, Defendant's salary was reduced for certain
months by amounts between $200.00 and $800.00 based on her job
performance.‘ Defendant did not object to the salary reductions.
During this time, Defendant was paid all of her sales
commissions. Following the "9-11" incident, between Novenber
2001 and January 2002, employees of the company received reduced
salaries as a result of drop in tourism activity. In 2002,
Plaintiff began to use Defendant less. then Plaintiff did call
Defendant to work, Defendant was sent to smaller groups, thereby
reducing the possibility of significant commissions.

Defendant claimed that in June 2004, she discovered
that one of the tour companies that had contracted with Plaintiff

for briefers, H.I.S. Hawaii, Inc. (H.I.S.), intended to stop

 

using Plaintiff and to utilize briefers from another company
Defendant voluntarily resigned on July 31, 2004. According to

Plaintiffs president, Fusami Laurent (Laurent), she had learned

‘at evial, Laurent testified thet Defendant's salary was reduced at
rent points fron $2000.00 to 1800.00, to $1600-00, end to S600.

 

att

 

John Shortridge, chief operating officer of W.1.S. Hawaii, inc.,
testified that the company decided to cease using the services of Plaintiti
after receiving "many complaints” from tourists

4

 
 

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that H.1.S. management wanted to hire one of Plaintiff's
briefers, and in order to do this H.1.8. would make the employee
want to leave Plaintif#’s company in order to be employed by
H.I.8. After leaving Plaintiff, Defendant contacted H.1.S. to
inquire if it would hire her. H.I.S. stopped using Plaintiff in
August 2004, Shortly after leaving Plaintiff, Defendant formed a
company called Shiella LLC with her husband and began doing work
as a briefer. On August 15, 2004, Defendant began working for

Four Seasons Agency of Hawaii, Inc., which provided briefing

 

services through Shiella LIC to H.1.S., Pleintiff’s former
client.

on October 20, 2004, Plaintiff filed its Complaint for
Injunctive and Other Relief (the Complaint), seeking to enjoin

Defendant from continuing to engage in conduct in violation of

 

the Agreenent. Plaintiff also prayed that it be evarded general
‘and/or specific damages, attorney's fees and costs, and such
other and further relief waich the court “deems to be fair and
just.” On October 22, 2004, Plaintiff filed its Motion for
Issuance of Preliminary Injunction (motion for preliminary
injunction) requesting that the court enjoin Defendant from
working as a briefer until a trial on the merits.

on Novenber 12, 2004, Defendant filed her answer to the

@ counterclaim alleging, inter alia, that

 

Complaint as well
Plaintiff (1) “failed and refused to provide employment to
Defendant as required under the terms of the . . . Agreement,”

(2) “failed and refused to pay Defendant the full amount of

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commissions due under the terms of the . . . Agreement,” and
(3) “failed and refused to pay Defendant the full amount of base
salary due under the terms of the . . . Agreement.”

On March 1, 2005, following a hearing, the court
granted Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction. The court
issued, inter alia, the following findings of fact (findings):

2. Brieters employed by Plaintiff ere primarily
hired £6 prom Sell products from its shop end to sell
Optional tours and souvenir items for which Pleintitt hi
Entered into contracts with travel agencies

5. Laurent... traine the company e” (6) Fe!

     

 

oe
ener ine A ee eos
‘sf_Leicl actual briefina sessions and responding to
‘Susations from custoners,

‘There are only three (3) briefing companies in

 

5." “Defendant was aware that the Agreement contained
[che covenant], but felt that ie did not epply to her as
long a2 she wae fot employed directly by @ tour company.

iil’ After deciding to leave Plaintiff, Defendant

 

contacted. .« (H.t.8.] to inguire if it would hire
Defendant as\e (b)riefer. sss

is!" Defendant continued to sel) optional tours and
itt packeces for
Blaintife:

in!” eon tine to tine, plaints reduced Defendant's
hone sblony Eosoa‘en"her Seb"Perternance.

et” Gefendane’ dia sot coject co the Salary

15" “plalnuitt contims fondant ner

base salary after the 9-1] terroriat incident.
(Emphases added.) The court, in its conclusions of law
(conclusions) ruled as follows:

1. The (covenant) in the Acrespent was reasonable in

 

2. Defendant breached the Agreement by
continuing to work as 2 (bjriefer atter ane left Plaintitt.
3. Under the eliding scale standard set forth in

 

ARCO, inc. Vi Las, 18 F. Supp. 26 1116 (D. Haw. 1996),
there Te # strong Likelihood that Plaintiff wili prevall on

the merits of the case.
‘. There is a possibility that Plaintiff suffered

irreparable harm.

 
 

sse70n PUBLICATION IM WEST'S HOMATT REPORTS ANO PACIFIC REFORTERY
EO
5. Plaintite As entitled to preliminary injunctive

relief
(Emphasis added.) The court ordered that Defendant be
“innediately enjoined from working or otherwise being employed 23
a (b}riefer.“

on May 24, 2005, after a bench trial, the court found
for Plaintiff on its complaint for injunctive relief, and found
for Defendant on her counterclaim for breach of the employment
contract. The court adopted the findings filed on March 1, 2008,

regarding the motion for preliminary injunction. The court also

 

found, inter alia, as follow:

 

2. Blaintits has ond will gutter a loss of customers
or clients ata result of pefendane leaving PLaintite's
sr working el sa briefer
Fy
by Pua: a resul ant Le meee

qin-the purpose cf the (covenant) in the.
Agreenent wes to prevent @ briefer from seeking employment
Sieewhere sing the special training received while employed
by Plaineife

 

 

5. The training of and the services performed by a
briefer are unique.
6.
sols: not ta em pints
Tr MFaintif® did not pay Defendant... . her full

salary during the time that she was employed...
fi 2

her fold nat ean hands:
(Emphases added.) In its conclusions, the court ruled in the

following manner:

   

2. the (covenant) was reason: nd
a

f.Fiaintsf? Te entitled to 2 permanent injunction

enjoining Defendant . . + from working or otherwise being

 

«Having granted Defendant's request for an expedited trial date for
tthe permanent. injunction and danages, ‘the court also ordered thet no bond oF
other security was required of Plaintiff

>

 
“*POR PUBLICATION IN WEST! § HAWAZ'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTERS**

 

employed as a (biriefer in the state of Hawail for a period
of three (3) years from July 31, 2004
3

‘é,_ The statute of limitation bars Defendant{"s]
elaine for unpaid salary. .

 

(Emphases added.) (Citations omitted. )”

‘The judgment ordered that (1) Defendant be enjoined
from working or otherwise employed as a briefer in the State of
Hawai'i" for a period of three years from July 31, 2004,

(2) judgment be entered on the counterclaim in favor of Defendant

and against Plaintiff in the sum of $3,856.03, and (3) costs be

awarded in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant, in the sum

of $2,893.29. Defendant appealed from the judgment. Plaintiff

does not appeal the judgment entered on the Counterclaim, nor

does Defendant appeal the costs awarded in favor of Plaintiff.
qn.

On appeal, Defendant challenges the court’s ruling that
Plaintiff is entitled to a permanent injunction against
Defendant, as well as its determination that Defendant breached
the Agreement by continuing to work as a briefer after she left
Plaintiff's employ. Defendant argues that (1) Defendant was not

@ unique or extraordinary employee, (2) salary reductions made

 

> tn her points of error on appeal, and as discussed infra,
Defendant challenges the court's March 1, 2008" findings of fact” (findings)
nos. 15 and 18 and conclusions of lew (conclusions) nos. 1 and 2, ae well as
Sts May 24, 2005 findings nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, and 8, and conclusions nes. 2, 3,
Grand 5

 

+ re is noted that although the parties’ employment agreenent
provides that an enployee may not work during the tines of employment and
three years thereafter ss 2 arlefer in the County of Honolulu, the judgment
stated that Defendant is enjoined from working sn such capacity in the state
Of Hawai
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the covenant unenforceable, (3) speculative damage is not the
same as irreparable injury, and (4) the time restriction is
unreasonable. Defendant requests that this court reverse the
judgment below: or, in the alternative, reduce the time of the
injunction te two months, which is allegedly the time it would
take Plaintiff to train a new briefer to replace Defendant.’

Plaintiff answers that (1) the training and services
provided by Plaintiff were unique and extraordinary, (2) the
defense of unclean hands is not a bar to the enforcement of the
covenant in the Agreement, (3) Plaintiff suffered irreparable
injury because Defendant worked for another briefing company that
provided services for the same travel agency with the same
customer base as when she was employed by Plaintiff, and (4) the
courts have determined that three-year time restrictions of non-
competition provisions are reasonable.

Defendant replies that (1) Hawai'i law does not
recognize an employer's training to be a legitimate business
interest that can be protected by a restrictive employment
covenant, (2) unclean hands bars the enforcement of the covenant
because the salary provision was part of the consideration of the
same agreement, (3) harm suffered by Plaintiff is independent of
Defendant’s resignation and Defendant did not cause irreparable

injury, and (4) the time period is unreasonable because it is

 

+ tt may be noted that Dei
permanent injunction.

 

dant did not requ

 
‘s*+F0R PURLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERI*#

 

longer than required to facilitate Plaintiff's recovery from its
loss of Defendant's services.
ur.
This court reviews the trial court’s findings of fact
under the clearly erroneous standard. Bremer v. Weeks, 104

Hawai'i 43, 51, 85 P.3d 150, 158 (2004).

 

A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, despite
evidence to support the finding, the appellate court is left
with the definite and firm conviction in reviewing th
entire evicence that a mistake has been comaitted. A
Ending of fact is also clearly erroneous when the record
Lacks substantial evidence to support the finding. Me have
Gefined substantial evidence as credible evidence which is
of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person
Of reasonable caution to support a conclusion.

  

    

 

 

Id, (citations omitted). The appellate court reviews conclusions
of law de nove, under the right or wrong standard. Kienker v
Bauer, 110 Hawai'i 97, 105, 129 P.3d 1125, 1133 (2006) (citing
Roxas v. Marcos, 89 Hawai'i 91, 115, 969 P.2d 1209, 1233 (1998).
A conclusion of law is freely reviewable by the appellate court.
Wharton v. Hawaiian Blec. Co., 80 Hawai"i 120, 122, 906 P.24 127,
129 (1995).

A court's decision to invoke equitable relief, such as
the “unclean hands” doctrine, is a matter within its discretion.
See Veoka v, Syzmanski, 107 Hawai'i 386, 393, 114 P.3d 892, 899
(2005) (stating that “[t)he relief granted by a court (in) equity
is discretionary and will not be overturned on review unless the

[circuit] court abused its discretion” (quoting AIG Hawaii Ins.

Co. v. Bateman, 82 Hawai'i 453, 457, 923 P.2d 395, 399 (1996)));
O'Flaherty v. Belaun, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 286, 330 (Cal. Ct. App.

2004) (ruling that a “trial court's decision te grant an

10
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equitable defense such as unclean hands is reviewed for abuse of

discretion” (citing Dickson, Carlson & Campillo v. Pole, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 678, 687 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)). “A trial court abuse!
ite discretion when it clearly exceeds the bounds of reason or
disregards rules or principles of law or practice to the
substantial detriment of a party litigant.” Sugarman v. Kapu,
104 Hawasi 119, 124, 85 P.3d 644, 649 (2004) (quoting Indus.

Mortage Co. v. smith, 94 Hawaii 502, $11, 17 P.34 B51, 859 (App.
2001).

Ww.

a.

Ae to Defendant's first issue, as earlier stated, the
court found in its May 24, 2005 finding no. 9 that “[t]he
training of and the services performed by @ briefer are unique.”
nile the parties mention training and services, they only
present discernible arguments with respect to training. Hence we
discuss only those argunents.

According to Defendant, there was nothing unique or
extraordinary about the training she received as evidenced by
Laurent’s testimony that she trains briefers to “think of
[themselves] as the custoners or tourists” and to increase the

customer’s “curiosity” about the products they are selling."

“In addition, Defendant relies on Clark Paper § ta, Co. ¥.
‘Stenacher, 140 NE, 708 (tied, 1923), in support of her position that training
[ernot a protectibie interest. In Glark, the Court of Appeals of New York
feversed & tril court's juagment restreining and enjoining the defendant~
employee from working for the employer's competitor. Jd, at 708. With
respect to training, the Clark court ruled in the following manner:

  

 

(continue

a
 

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Defendant thus maintains that the court erred in its May 24, 2005
finding no. 5. Defendant proposes the test set forth in Reed,
Roberts Assocs, v, Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593-94 (N.Y. 1976),
which did not specifically involve the issue of training but
recognized “the legitimate interest an employer has in
safeguarding that which has made his business successful and to
protect [an employer] against deliberate surreptitious commercial
piracy” and that restrictive covenants concerning the same “will
be enforceable to the extent necessary to prevent the disclosure

or use of trade secrets or confidential customer information.”

™(..continoed)
‘That the defendant hae profited by the experience
which he obtained in the plaintiff's service may be tri
To use this acquired skill elsewhere is no legal wrong.
Experience, conpetency, and efficiency in selling goods are
qualifications which can hardly be so rare sa to require the
aid of equity to prevent an irreparable loss to
iho finds himself conpelled to substitute one sal
dnother:

 

    

at 712. However, at issue in this case is whether specialized or unique
training is a legitimate business interest which con be judicially protected
by'the enforcement of the covenant. The Clark court did not addrese. such
issue ang appeared to speak only of general knowleaze acquired through
training end experience gained from the plaintitf-employer in that case,
Hence, Glark is inapplicable.

wu . Under Bead, Roberts Assocs. v. Streunan, 253 N.E.2d 590, 593-94

(Wy, 1976), the following rule with Teapect to the enforcenent of restrictive
Covenants not to conpete was enunciate

 

 

 

   

IA) restrictive covenant will only be subject to specific
enforcenent to the extent that it is {(1)} reasonable in
Eine and area, [1211 rotect the “
lecitisate interests, [(5)] sot haraful to the general
public and {(41) net unreascnably burdensome to the
Employee. Undoubteaiy judicial disfavor of these covenante
ie provoked by powerful considerations of public policy,
hich militate ageinst sanctioning the loss of = man's
Livelihood. Indeed, cur economy is premised on the
Competition engendered by the uninhibited flow of servi
‘alent and ideas. therefore, no restrictions shoule feteer
an enployee’s right to apply to hie own best advantage the
SRLIIE ana knowledge acguized by the overall experience of

his previous employeent.) This includes thove techniquen
(eontinued. ..)

 

 

 

 

 

 

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On the other hand, Plaintiff argues it “has invested
and Defendant has been the recipient of the training provided by
Plaintiff which has allowed Defendant to provide such unique
services on Plaintiff's behalf.” Plaintiff adds that “(wJhile
the principles which were espoused may be common to all good
training programs and services, the technique which Plaintiff has
developed was specifically tailored to this type of position
which the Plaintiff was solely responsible for developing.”
Plaintiff cites two Florida cases for the proposition that
specialized training is a protectible interest. However, these

cases are distinguishable in that Florida provides by statute

-continuea)
which are but skillful variations of general processes known
to the particular trade-

Of course, the courte aust alse recognize the

thich-bes made his Dosinese suctessfal end to provect
Dinseif-acainst deliperate aurrectitious comercial piracy.
Thust-Ltestrictive covenants will be enforceable to the

Toner information.“

addstionL.1 iniunctive relief nev be available where an
smblovee's Services ate uniave or extracrdinery and the
‘Sovenant is reasonable.

(Emphases added.) (Internal citations and quotation marks

 

omitted.)

 

% see nero Kool Corp, v, Oosthuizen, 736 So. 2 25, 26 (Fla. Dist
ct. App. 1998) Iholding thet the covenant not’ to compete involved in chat case
ae Tesconable, explaining that under Florics statuee § 542.335 (198), 8
“egitinate Business interest” snclodes “extracrainary of specializes

ning”); Belasco v, Gulf Auto Holding, Iuc., 707 So. 24 658, 860 (Fla.
Dist. ce. App. 1998) (Fuling that under the sane statute involved in Baro
Koel, the non-competition provision at 1ssue in that case vas “necessary to
protect the substantial investment [the employer) makes in specialized
training for its sales staff"). Modifications to the common law
Feasonatleness analysis have generally been accomplished through statute.
Set, suc.) Vale Arne, Inc, v. Vaig, 363 F.3¢ 267, 295 (sth Cir. 2004) (Texas
Covenants Not to Compete Act provides criteria for enforceability of non=
competition provisions}

 

     

 

   

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that such training is 2 protected interest.”
While this court has yet to address whether unique or
specialized training is a factor in determining the
reasonableness of non-competition clauses, cases from other
jurisdictions recognize such s factor. Contrary to Defendant's
position that an employer's training was not recognized at common
law as legitimate business interest that needed protection,"
several jurisdictions have determined otherwise, but only if
training is unique in nature and if other factors are present.

In Vantage Tech., LLC, v. Cross, 17 $.W.3d 637, 640-44

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), the employer, a provider of cataract

 

» Florida Statutes § 542.335(b) (1997), entitled “Valid restraints
Of trade and. commerce,” protects through restrictive covenants » person's
Slegitinate business interest” including, but not limited to the following:

 

 

1. Trade secrets =.
2] Valusble confidential business ox professional
Gheornation that otherwise does not qualify
secrets:

5 Substantial x
existing custome!

ade

 

stionships with specific prospective or
Patients, or clients

4. Custoner, patient, or client goodwill associated with:
a! An ongoing! business or professional practice, by way of
fede nane, trademark, service mark, or “trade dress”;
B.A specific geographic location) or

©. A specific marketing or trade area.

s

 

 

    

(Exphosie edded.)

Min her reply brief, Defendant argues that the fact of training

Atself ie nots besis for granting an injunction. (citing 42 Am. Jur. 2
'§ 137 (2000) (stating that “(t]he fact that @ former employee was

trained by an exployer is not « basis for granting an injunction enforcing &
restrictive nonconperition covenant against the employes”) .
Goldstein, £12 F.26 163, 167 n.4 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that “the fact that &
2 forner cnployee was trained by an enployer is not a basis for granting an
Injunction enforcing @ restrictive covenant”)?
Peairesn, 493 \S.W.2d 326), 330. (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) noting “(e]hat «former
‘eeployee wee trained by the employer is not a ground for enforcing a
Festrictive covenant not to compete, even if the training was complex and
extensive"); Clark faper, 160 NE. st 71] (holding thet the skills learned by
employer in connection with sales of wrapping paper was fot a protectible
Interest)). However, the authorities cited by Defendant do not hold that

unique oF specialised training is nen-protectable.
uu

 

 

 

 
[FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER#*#
surgery equipment for hospitals in rural areas, requested

 

injunctive relief against its former employee, who was employed

 

as a technician. The employer sought to prevent the employ.
from working independently as a technician for doctors and
hospitals. ‘The employer argued, inter alia, that it had a
legitimate business interest in the specialized training it
provided to the employee, which included the operation of certain
medical equipment, attendance at monthly meetings, and assistance
in performing cataract surgeries. Id. at 643, 646. The trial
court concluded that the employee's training was not unique or
specialized so as to justify enforcenent of the restrictive
covenant involved. Id. at 646. On appeal, the Tennessee court
did observe that “an employer does not have @ protectable
interest in the genera) knowledge and skill of an employee.” Id.
at 644-45 (emphasis in original) (citing Hasty v. Rent-B-Driver,
Ince, 671 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tenn. 1984)). According to the

tJhis is not only true of knowledge and skill

 

Vantage court,
brought into the employment relationship, but also true as to

that acquired during the employment relationship, even if the
employee obtained such general knowledge and skill through
expensive training.” Id, at 645.

However, that court distinguished general knowledge
from unique knowledge and skill, explaining that, under the
latter, Yan employer may have a protectable interest . . . at
least when such training is present along with other factors
ending to show s protectable interest

 

" Id. (emphasis added) .

1s.
 

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‘Thus, “whether an employer has a protectable interest in its

depends on whether the skill

 

investment in training an employ
acquired as a result of that training is sufficiently special as
to make @ competing use of it by the employee unfair.” Id. In
addition to the training, the Yantage court considered whether
(a) trade secrets and confidential information were divulged, and

6.

 

(b) special custoner relationships were affected. Id, at 644
Ultimately, after determining that confidential information and
special custoner relationships were at stake in that case, the
appellate court held that “the totality of all of this amounts to
a legitimate business interest properly protectable by @ covenant
not to compete.” Id. at 646.

Specialized or unique training, as distinguished from
general skills, have also been ruled to be protectable but not
present in Moore Bus. Fors, Inc. v. Foppiano, 382 S.£.2d 499 (WW.
Va. 1989). In that case, the employer sought an injunction
Preventing the employee from engaging in the occupation of
selling business forms in a specified area for a period of two
years, as proscribed by the parties’ employment contract. Id. at
500. The trial court found that the employee violated a covenant
not to compete. Id, The employee argued on appeal that the
restrictive covenant was unreasonable and unenforceable, and the
Supreme Court of West Virginia agreed, Id.

Tt was determined that the employee was sent to a
training school for a two or three week period, where he became

familiar with the employer’s product line and sales techniques.

16
sespoR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ HOAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER***
Id. Following his training, the employer was assigned to a sales

given additional on-the-job training. Id, The

 

area and wi
employee eventually left the employer and opened his own

business. Id, at $01. He then solicited orders from the

 

e area to which he had

 

employer’s former customers within the
been formerly assigned. Id.
‘The Moore court held that the employer did not provide
any unique or specialized training, and stated as follows:
tn the case at bar, we do not believe that the
employer hes met its burden of demonstrating a legitimate
Business interest warranting the protection of the

Fectriceive covenant. the evidence dia not show that Moore
provided the defendant with any unique or specialized

 

   

 

  

Gleining in the course of his exployment. We have stated

(ehh

ae ea aa 7
es ech zr

a ntract enter: hp sus

Ids at $01-02 (quoting Helms Bove, Inc, vs Brady, 297 8.£.2¢ 840,
843 (W. Va. 1982). Tt was also determined that the enployer
failed to prove that the employee had access to “confidential
information such as knowledge of product prices, customer liste,
customer reorder cycles, customer inventory rooms, and company
profit margins[,]” and that “virtually all of the information
[the employer) considered confidential either was available to
other employees . . . through the [employer's] own publications
or was ascertainable by independent sources.” Id. at 502. The
Moore court also stated that the employer “failed to demonstrate
that the [employee] appropriated the ‘good will’ of his former
employer.” Id. The Moore court then reversed the trial court's
ruling in granting judgment in favor of the employer.

vv
‘s+#FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS+®

 

Other cases similarly suggest that specialized or

 

unique training may be protectible when a factor such as the
confidentiality of business information is present and at stake.
Compare Gill v. Guy Chipman Co., 681 S.W.2d 264, 269 (Tex. App.
1984) (upholding a non-competion covenant after noting that
employer “extensively trained prospective managerial employees in
all of ite methods of operating a real estate office .
[including] imparting to them training and knowledge specifically
useful to them or a competitor against [the employer which) would

except by virtue of her

 

not have been available to (employee
being a manager with (employer]” and that “confidential business
information has in fact been imparted to an employee”) with
Boisen v. Petersen Flying Serv., 383 N.W.2d 29, 34 (Neb. 1986)
(affirming denial of injunctive relief after observing that the
training given to employee was “no different from that which
would have been received from another employer” engaged in the
same business). See also Restatement of Contracts $ 516 comment
h (1932) (noting that, in general, “[a] promise of a former
employee will not ordinarily be enforced so as to preclude him
from exercising skill and knowledge acquired in his employer's
business, even if the competition is injurious to the latter,”
but that such a restriction can be enforced “so far as to prevent
theuse of trade secrets or lists of customers, or unless the
services of the emplovee are of a unigue character” (emphasis
added)). Hence, as a matter of law, we hold that training that

provides skills beyond those of a general nature is a legitimate

ae
   

/+POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER**/

sonableness

 

Anterest which may be considered in weighing the r
of a non-competion covenant, when conbined with other factors
weighing in favor of a protectable business interest such as
trade secrets, confidential information, or special customer
relationships.”

Under the circumstances of the instant case, it cannot
be said that the court's May 24, 2008 finding no. 5 was clearly
erroneous in stating that “[tJhe training of . . . a briefer (isl
unique.” At trial, Laurent testified such specialized training
included the use of a prepared script for the presentation of
information for products and services known only by Plaintiff, on
the job critiquing by Laurent, and continuous training throughout
the employment period. Laurent testified that she is the one who
provides all training on behalf of Plaintiff.

The training consisted of various components including
nenorization of scripts, question and response instruction, and
practice presentations. Laurent asserted that there is a
Gistinction between a briefer and a sales person or sales clerk
because of the difference in expertise. Laurent does not require
her sales clerks to sign agreenents containing non-competition
provisions, Laurent also confirmed that she restricts who can
attend sales presentations because there is “something secret”

about her style of sales presentation. Laurent also claimed that

 

 

* Inaenuch as the reaso

to compete are analyzed on 2 "eas
BiRe, 69 2x24 901, 904 iW

Fntendea te be exhaustive.

 

ybleness and enforceability of covenants not
bysease” bag
22008), the

 

 

factors listed are not

    

as
/+FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*#*

 

her techniques were specially designed and solely developed by
her over a nunber of years and has not been utilized by other
companies providing briefing services.

‘The chief operation officer of H.1.S., John Shortridge
(Shortridge), testified that, as a result of his company’s use of
Defendant's services, his company experienced “(t] renendous
sales” and that Defendant was able to generate approximately one
million dollars a month in average gross sales.

Hence, the record indicates that Defendant received
extensive training, specially designed by Laurent and proprietary
to Plaintiff's business in providing briefing services, and that
such training primarily consisted of information that was
confidential in nature. As a briefer with Plaintiff, Defendant
initiated a relationship with H.I.S. which she eventually
utilized by providing briefing services for H.1.8., seemingly at
Plaintiff's expense. As a result of such training, the services
provided by Defendant to H.I.S. resulted in a significant
increase in H.1.8. sales. Viewed in toto, these factors provide
a reasonable basis for the court to have concluded, in effect,
that a “legitimate business interest properly protectable by a
covenant not to conpete[,]” Vantage Tech., 17 $.W.3d at 646, was
present in this case.

Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the court's

 

 

May 24, 2005 finding no. § that the training of a bri:
unique was wrong as a matter of law or clearly erroneous in light

of the evidence in the record.

20
s+sPOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S EAWAZ'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*™|

 

With respect to Defendant's challenge to the March 1,
2005 finding no. 15 that “Defendant continued to sel optional
tours and gift packages for [H.1.3.]" in the same manner as when
she was employed with Plaintiff, no error exists. At trial,
Laurent testified that she saw Defendant providing briefing for
H.t.S. Shortridge testified that Defendant did briefing for
H.I.S., and Defendant herself stated that she sold tour packages
to H.t.8. Therefore, the Mazch 1, 2005 finding no. 15 was not
clearly erroneous, as substantial evidence existed to warrant

that finding.

 

As to her second issue, Defendant argues that
Plaintiff's failure to pay her full base salary renders the
covenant unenforceable, because of lack of consideration, or
under the doctrine of “unclean hands.” Based on this assertion,
Defendant challenges the court’s (a) March 1, 2005 finding no.
19, that “Plaintiff continued to pay Defendant her full base
salary after the 9-11 terrorist incident,” (b) May 24, 2005
finding no. 6 that “Defendant acquiesced to the reduction in her
salary and did not terminate her employment with Plaintiff at
that time despite having grounds to do so,” (c) May 24, 2005
finding no. @ that “Plaintiff's conduct in not paying Defendant
her full salary does not amount to unclean hands,” and
(a) May 24, 2005 conclusion no. 5 that “[t]he defense of unclean
hands does not bar Plaintiff’s clains.”

2
‘s*POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*#*

 

In this regard, Defendant maintains that salary
reductions are directly connected to the covenant because salary
and commissions were the consideration upon which the Agreenent

ced

 

was based. However, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant acqui
in the reductions, thus severing the connection between salary
reductions and the covenant.
Es

With respect to subpoint (a), it appears that Defendant
4s correct in that the court erred in finding that “Plaintife
continued to pay Defendant her full base salary after the 9-11
terrorist incident” in the Mazch 1, 2005 finding no. 19. The
record lacks substantial evidence to support this finding."
Plaintiff agrees in its brief that Defendant did not receive her
full salary following the 9-11 incident because of what Plaintiff
called “across the board” pay cuts. Therefore, this finding is
clearly erroneous and must be vacated. However, this finding has
no effect on the court's rejection of the defense of unclean

hands.

 

4 The court cites the trial transcript as evidence for this finding:
however, when read with the surrounding context it does not spear that this
finding’ is correct.” Laurent stated that everyone received a pay cut after the
"sci" incident But Defendant received her full salary several nonths
thereafter:

 

receiving that tho thousand dollar
years prior to her leaving?

‘A. The only time everyboay took s cUt in pay was the

9/11 terroristic incident several months after that, But,

other than that, everybody went back to their base eelary

     

 

thereafter
0. So, Mise Laurent, after... 9/11 Miss Del
Rosario wae receiving her sane base Salary of tue thousand

 

dollars a ponth; is that correct?
Yess

22
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—_—_—
B,

As to Defendant’s challenge to the court's May 24, 2005
finding no. 6 in subpoint (b), although Defendant contests this
finding, Defendant offers no rationale in either her opening or
reply briefe to support error in this finding. Moreover, as
earlier mentioned, Laurent testified thet Defendant did not
object to any reduction. Defendant neither rebutted this
testimony nor offered any evidence to the contrary. Accordingly,
this finding was not clearly erroneous.

c.

The court’s May 24, 2005 finding no. 8, that
“plaintiff’s conduct in not paying Defendant . . . her full
salary does not amount to unclean hands{,]” although entered as a
finding, must be deemed a conclusion of law. Defendant contends
that the court erred in this regard because a salary is a
material elenent of the contract, thus amounting to unclean hands
with regard to the Agreement. Plaintiff responds by arguing that
although the defense of unclean hands may have been a legitimate
defense during the time period when Defendant’s salary was
reduced, because such time period covering the reduction in
salary occurred over two years earlier, it no longer constituted

‘a viable defense. The court orally ruled that “in light of the

 

fact that there was in essence acquiescence to the change in bi
pay and that the Defendant chose not to terminate the employment

agreement, even though she had the option and ability to do so

23
‘+*4FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ § HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS+®

 

under the terms of the agreenent itself, that change in payment
of base salary does not amount to unclean hands.”

‘This court has limited the doctrine of “unclean hands,”
or the equitable maxim “he who comes into equity must cone with
clean hands,” in the following manner:

Broad as the principle is in its operation, it must still be
taken with resonable Limitations; it does not apply to
Svery uncenscientious act or inequitable conduct on the part

ofa plaintiff. the maxim, considered s2 2 general rule!
Scntrolling the adsiniatration of equitable relist In
Darticolar controversies, is confined to misconduct in

a sone Reasre affects

and
arising out of the transaction? st does not extend to any
hisconduet, however gross, which is unconnected with the
hatter in litigation, and with which the opposite party has
no concern. When a Court of equity is appealed to for
Fellef it will not go ssteide of the subject matter of the
controversy, snd make its interference to depend upon the
Character and conduct of the moving parey Sn no way,
Affecting the equitable right which he asserts againat the
Gefendant, oF the relief which he cemande:

Woodward v. Auyong, 33 Haw. 810, 611-12 (1936) (emphasis added).
It has also been stated by this court that the clean hands

 

 

 

 

doctrine “is not one of absolutes, and each case must be judged
Shinn v. Yee, $7
Haw, 215, 230-31, 583 F.2d 733, 744 (1976) (citing Keystone

Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933)).

Under the circumstances of this case, it does not

 

on its particular facts and circumstances.

appear the court abused its discretion in determining that
“Plaintiff’s conduct in not paying Defendant... her full

salary does not amount to unclean hands.” First, Defendant knew
about the covenant at the time she signed the Agreement. There

is no evidence that Plaintiff unfairly imposed such provision

24
‘*#FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTERC®#

a

upon her. Defendant never contended that the reduction in her
salary caused her to breach the covenant.

Second, as determined by the court in its May 24, 2005
finding no. 6, “Defendant acquiesced to the reduction in her
salary and did not terminate her employment with Plaintiff at
that time despite having grounds to do so.” Laurent testified
that when Defendant reduced her salary starting in 1997,
Defendant “{nJot even once” objected to the reduction. Defendant
only raised the objection of “unclean hands” as a defense to
Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief in 2004

Apparently, based on Laurent’s testimony, the court
entered its unchallenged March 1, 2005 finding no. 18, that
“Defendant did not object to the salary reduction.” See Anfac,

+ ¥. Waikiki Beachcomber Co., 74 Haw. 85, 117, 839 P.2d
20, 28 (1992) (noting that “[aln appellate court will not pass
upon issues dependent upon the credibility of witnesses and the
weight of the evidence; this is the province of the trial
Judge”). Defendant proffered no reason at trial as to why she
apparently acquiesced in the reduction. ence, the court could
conclude that Plaintiff’s reduction of Defendant’s salary at
certain times between 1997 and 2000 was not sufficiently
connected with Defendant's breach of the covenant so as to have
“affected the equitable relations subsisting between the
Parties.” Woodward, 33 Haw. at 811-12. Under the evidence, it
cannot be concluded as a matter of law thet the court “clearly

exceed[ed] the bounds of reason or disregardied) rules or

25
‘s*4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS*#

 

principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a
party 1itigant,” Sugarman, 104 Hawaii at 124, 85 P.3d at 649, on
this issue. Having ruled that the reduction in salary did not
amount to “unclean hands” in light of Defendant’ s apparent
acquiescence, it was within the court's discretion to deny
equitable relief under the “unclean hands” doctrine.

vi.

As to her third issue, Defendant axgues thet Plaintiff
failed to satisfy its burden of showing irreparable injury.
Defendant asserts that “speculative danage is not the sane as
irreparable injury,” and that Laurent could only speculate, as to
what her “irreparable injury” wes. Plaintiff adds that no
irreparable injury exists inasmuch as (a) Plaintiff has .
other briefers, who were more productive than Defendant [,]

(b) Plaintiff “wasn’t . . . using Defendant that much,”

(c) Plaintiff “sent Defendant to smaller groups in the last two

years of her employment, because of Defendant's poor sales

performance,” and (d) Plaintiff never attempted to replace

Defendant.” As such, Defendant contends that the court erred in
% puaineste argues that ¢ suffered sereperable harm, citing sn

support this court's definition of “irreparable damage” in

Nakane Valley Farms, Ltd,, 41 Haw. 267, 339-40 (1956), which stated a8
follows

 

 

(aln injury 4e irreparable, within the law of injunctios
here it is of auch a character that fair and reasonable
Fearess nay not be had in court of law, so that to refuse
the injunction would be a dental of justices where, in other
words, from the nature of the act, or from the circunstant
Surrounding the person injured, of from the financial
Condition ef the person committing it,

    

   

  

Tcontinved.

 
“POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***
a
its May 24, 2005 findings nos. 2 and 3, and its May 24, 2005

 

conclusion no. 3. See infra.

 

AL

As to the court’s May 24, 2005 finding no. 2, that
“Plaintiff has and will suffer a loss of customers or clients as
a result of Defendant leaving Plaintiffs employ and working
elsewhere as 2 briefer,” Defendant maintains that in June 2004,
she decided to leave Plaintiff after learning that H.1.8. wes
going to stop using Plaintiff. Defendant asserts, therefore,
that the harm resulting from #.1.S. terminating its relationship
with Plaintiff was not a consequence of Defendant leaving, but
stemmed from “many complaints,” see supra note 5, and because of
‘a change in the presidency of H.1.S.

on the other hand, during the trial, Laurent testified
that H.1.S. desired that one of Plaintiff's briefers quit so that
H.1.8. could cease working with Plaintiff and hire her former
briefer. According to Plaintiff, H.I.S. would not have stopped
using Plaintiff's services but for Defendant’s resignation.
Thus, Plaintiff contends, Defendant’s violation of the covenant

did result in injury to Plaintiff. It appears that the court

 

   

-+-continued)
mount her ae
sur fie

  

led.) Defendant does not dispute on appeal that H.1.S. was
‘Primary client, According to Plaintiff, the fact that Defendant
Eegan working for #.1-S-, Plaintift’s primary client, after leaving employment
fish Plaintiff ss sufficient to denonetrate irreparable harn because the
Gnount of berm ie Gifficult to ascertain. Plaintiff thus asserts that
Gnesmuch ae it demonstrated irreparable injury as defined under Klausmever,
the court correctly concluded that Plaineit® suffered irreperable harm, and
there was no adequate remedy at law.

 

 

 

2
 

'*FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER’

found credible Laurent’s contention that H.I.S, ceased using
Plaintiff's services as a result of Defendant's resignation. In
Light of the evidence adduced it cannot be concluded the court
was clearly erroneous in its May 24, 2005 finding no. 2. See
Amfac, 74 Haw. at 117, 639 P.2d at 28 (noting that “Laln
appellate court will not pass upon issues dependent upon the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence; this is
the province of the trial judge”).
B.

Defendant also contends that the court erred in its
May 24, 2005 finding no. 3, that “[iJt is difficult to measure
the damages suffered by Plaintiff as a result of Defendant
leaving Plaintiff's employ and working elsewhere as a briefer.”
However, Defendant does not present argument opposing this
finding except to say that Plaintiff did not suffer harm as a
result of the loss of Defendant. There being no discernable
argument, we do not consider it. See Norton v. Admin. Dir, of
Court, 60 Hawai'i 197, 200, 908 P.2d 545, 548 (1995) (stating
that this court may disregard a contention where no discernable
argument was made on appeal (citing Hall _v. State, 10 Haw. App.
210, 218, 863 P.2d 344, 348, cert, denied, 76 Hawai'i 246, 868
P.2d 464 (1993))). Thus, this finding will not be vacated.
Inasmuch as the court's May 24, 2005 conclusion no. 3 to the
effect that “Plaintiff suffered irreparable harm and there is no

adequate remedy at law” is dependent on its May 24, 2005 finding

28
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS®
ee

no. 3, it cannot be said that the court was wrong in making such
conclusion.
vin.

Defendant, in her fourth issue, argues that because
Defendant’s initial training period lasted two months, “the
duration of the injunction must be tailored to that period of
time that is necessary to enable Plaintiff to recover from its
loss of befendant; i.e., how long it would take for Plaintiff to
replace her.” In support of this proposition, Defendant cites to
Maltby v. Harlow Mever Savage, Inc., 633 N.¥.S.2d 926, 930 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996), where it was held that a period of six months
was reasonable “because that is the amount of time [the employer]
needs to recover from [the employees’ } departures it is not
unduly long so as to cause permanent injury or loss of ability to
earn a livelihood.” On the other hand, Plaintiff maintains that,
as indicated by the holdings in Tzaeser and UARCO, two and three
year non-conpetition clauses have been determined to be
reasonable.

Defendant’s citation to Maltby is unpersuasive. Maltby
considered the six-month covenant in that case to be reasonable
Anasmuch as six months was required for the employer to recover
from the enployee’s departure, and not the amount of time it took

to replace an employee. Thus, the amount of time necessary to

 

replace an employee is not necessarily determinative of the
reasonable length of time an injunction should remain in effect

with respect to non-competition provisions. Rather, in

29
POR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTERY*#

determining reasonableness as to time, what is required of the

 

courts is to determine whether the time period for the injunction
is reasonable, as discussed infra.

‘The court concluded that the covenant was reasonable in
scope and duration in its March 1, 2008 conclusion no. 1, that
“[t}he [covenant] was reasonable in scope and duration,” and its
May 24, 2005 conclusion no. 2, that “(t]he [covenant] was
reasonable in scope and duration under (Traeger) and [UARCO).”

In Txaeger, this court stated that the reasonableness
of @ restrictive covenant in 2 post-employment context is
determined by using a “reasonableness analysis.” 57 Haw. at 121,
91 P.2d at 170. As observed in Praeger, courts will find @ non-
competion provision unreasonable if “*(i) it is greater than
required for the protection of the person for whose benefit it is
imposed; (ii) it imposes undue hardship on the person restricted;
or (iii) its benefit to the covenantee is outweighed by injury to
the public.’” Id, (quoting Hervey J. Goldschmid, Antitrust’s

ted no Wi
Covenants Under Federal Law, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1193, 1196
(1973). Such a “reasonable analysis” is performed by the court
“as a matter of law[.]” Id, A court “must examine such factors
as geographical scope, length of time, and breadth of the
restriction placed on a given activity.” Id.

While Inaeger did not specifically apply the three-
factor analysis as to time, at least one conmentator has noted

that the same analysis is used to determine the reasonableness of

30
seer0R PUBLICATION IN WEST’ HAWAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***
_

time. See C.7. Drechsler, Annotation, Enforceability of

 

Duration of Restriction, 41 A.L.R.2d 55 (1955) (observing that
three requirements need to be met in determining the
reasonableness of a time limitation, in that the restraint as to
time must “(1) . . . be necessary in its full extent for the
protection of the legitimate interests of the employerl,]”

%(2) . . . not be so large as to injure the employee by
precluding [the employee] from pursuing (his or her] occupation
and thus preventing [him or her] from supporting himself [or
herself) and family[,]" and “(3) . . - not be so large as to
interfere with the interests of the general public by depriving
it of the restricted party’s industry or services”).

With respect to the first factor, it cannot be
concluded that the court was wrong as a matter of law in ruling
that a three-year period is reasonable. Laurent’s uncontroverted
testimony stated that Plaintiff was the first company to offer
briefing services, and that Plaintiff developed a method of
“priefing” over a number of years. Plaintiff guarded that method
and certain techniques from third parties and regarded the
method, and the position of a briefer as “unique.”

upon the end of her employment, Defendant ventured into
her own briefing services company and provided services to
Plaintiff's primary client. The value of Defendant's services
may be reasonably traced to her experiences with Plaintiff.

pefendant’s contact with H.I.S. also arises from her employment

2
‘**FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS

with Plaintiff. A three-year period may be reasonable under the
circumstances for the protection of Plaintiff’s interest in its

See Eastman Kodak Co, v, Powers Film Prods,, 179

N.Y.S. 325, 330 (N.Y. App. Div. 1913) (where employee learned

busines

 

certain skills in connection with the manufacture of photographic
film, a two-year period was held reasonable inasmuch as the
“lapse of time will have developed still further improvements and
changes, such as would render the knowledge now possessed by [the
employee) more or less ineffectual in harm of the [employer]”).

As to the second factor, it cannot be said that the
three-year period is unreasonable so as to preclude Defendant
from pursuing an occupation or prevent her from supporting her
family. At the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction,
Defendant testified on cross-examination that she understood that
she was precluded from working as a briefer for a three-year
period following her resignation." At the time she left
Plaintiff's employ, Defendant was able to work first as a bus
driver, then as a hair and makeup person. Defendant did not
adduce evidence that the covenant would impose a hardship on her
or her family.

As to the third factor, this court cannot discern an
injury to the public by the court’s enforcement of the three year
injunction at issue. It appears that the services of a briefer

is of primary benefit to a small number of conmercial enterprises

 

he impression that
threesyeer periog

 

“defendant testified thet she vas also under
‘she was precluded from working ss « tour guide for the
An the event her enployment with Plaintiff would terainet

32

    
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——
and such services are currently being provided by Plaintiff and

two other companies. Hence, the evidence satisfying all three
factors, it cannot be said that, as a matter of law, the court
was wrong in ite March 1, 2005 conclusion no. 1 or its May 24,

sonable.

 

2005 conclusion no. 2 determining the time period was r
vit.

Accordingly, we affirm the court’s May 24, 2005
judgment and July 11, 2005 amended judgment, except with respect
to finding no. 19" and insofar as the court erroneously ordered
that Defendant be enjoined from working as a briefer in the State
of Hawai'i. The case is remanded to the court to amend its
judgment to reflect that the injunction involved herein is

limited to the County of Honolulu.

on the briefs: Gin

Emlyn Higa for defendant- 2 er

appellant.

William L. Goo and Pia be os

Norman H. Suzuki

(Suzuki § Goo) for
plaintitf-appellee. IP

 

 

See supes Section VAL
33