Case Title: Commonwealth v. Pope

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13202

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-06-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13202 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSEPH POPE. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 9, 2022. - June 7, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Postconviction relief, New trial, 
Disclosure of evidence, Capital case.  Evidence, Disclosure 
of evidence, Exculpatory.  Due Process of Law, Disclosure 
of evidence. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 15, 1984.   
 
 
Following review by this court, 406 Mass. 581 (1990), a 
motion for a new trial, filed on July 3, 2020, was heard by 
Debra A. Squires-Lee, J.   
 
 
A request for leave to appeal was allowed by Kafker, J., in 
the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk. 
 
 
 
Jeffrey G. Harris for the defendant. 
 
Paul B. Linn, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
John J. Barter for Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
 
Joshua M. Daniels & Sara E. Silva for Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
 
2 
 
 
LOWY, J.  The defendant was convicted of murder in the 
first degree in 1986, after a first trial, in 1985, resulted in 
a mistrial.  Pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E (§ 33E), this court 
reviewed and affirmed his conviction in 1990.  See Commonwealth 
v. Pope, 406 Mass. 581, 591 (1990).  Now, more than three 
decades later, we consider the defendant's case again, after a 
Superior Court judge denied his second motion for a new trial 
and a single justice of this court granted in part the 
defendant's gatekeeper petition to appeal.  See G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E.   
 
The single justice allowed the defendant to appeal from the 
denial of his motion for a new trial based on two recent 
developments.  First, in 2017, this court held in Commonwealth 
v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 807 (2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 
(2018), that "felony-murder is no longer an independent theory 
of liability for murder" but rather limited to an aggravating 
element of murder; the defendant here had been convicted solely 
on a theory of felony-murder.  Second, in 2018, the defendant's 
postconviction counsel discovered allegedly nondisclosed 
exculpatory evidence in the Commonwealth's possession.   
 
We conclude that the Commonwealth's nondisclosure of this 
evidence -- which goes to the credibility of the Commonwealth's 
key and only percipient witness, with whom this case rises and 
falls -- constituted a violation of its Brady obligation to 
3 
 
disclose all exculpatory evidence and prejudiced the defendant.  
We thus reverse the motion judge's denial of the defendant's 
motion for a new trial on those grounds and do not reach the 
defendant's argument regarding Brown and the felony-murder rule. 
 
Background.  In Pope, 406 Mass. at 582-584, we summarized 
the facts as the jury could have found them.  We do so again 
here, reserving some facts for later discussion.   
 
The victim's brother, Bienvenido DeJesus (Benny),1 served as 
the principal witness for the Commonwealth, with his testimony 
establishing the narrative of the incident.  Pope, 406 Mass. at 
582.  The defendant did not testify.  Id. at 584.  Conspicuously 
relying on Benny's trial testimony, we described the night of 
the murder as follows: 
"On the evening of May 23, 1984, [Benny] was at home [on 
Nonquit Street in the Dorchester section of Boston] with 
various members of his family who were visiting him.  At 
approximately 10 P.M., most of the visitors left, leaving 
[Benny], his two children, and [his brother Efrain] in the 
house.  [Benny] walked to a nearby liquor store, where he 
made some purchases.  He pocketed the change of 
approximately [fifteen dollars] and headed back to his 
house.  On the way, he noticed a gray van parked near his 
house on the opposite side of the street.  He observed the 
defendant emerge from the van and cross the street.  The 
defendant asked [Benny] if [Efrain] was home.  [Benny] said 
that he was.  [Benny] entered the house, went upstairs, and 
told [Efrain] that the defendant was downstairs asking for 
him.  [Efrain] went downstairs. 
   
 
 
1 Because the victim's brother and the victim share a 
surname, for ease of reference, we refer to the brother by his 
first name. 
4 
 
"[Benny] entered the upstairs bathroom [where he began to 
give his two children a bath].  Within a few minutes, 
[Benny] noticed [Efrain], the defendant, and a third 
person, later identified as Floyd Hamilton, walk by the 
bathroom door in the direction of [Efrain's] bedroom.  
[Benny] had never seen Hamilton before this moment.  A 
couple of minutes later, [Benny] saw the same three persons 
walk past the bathroom in the opposite direction, toward 
the room where [Efrain] did 'whatever he had to do with 
cocaine.' 
 
"[Benny] heard some people going downstairs.  Within 
seconds, [Benny] heard his brother say from the downstairs 
area of the house, 'Oh, no, not this.  You'll have to 
shoot.'  [Benny] heard stumbling, a scuffle, and, 
immediately afterward, a shot.  [Benny] then heard [Efrain] 
cry out, 'Compi,' a name which the brothers were accustomed 
to calling each other.  [Benny] walked to the bathroom 
door.  He stopped when a handgun was put to his forehead.  
At the other end of the gun was the defendant. 
 
"The defendant pulled [Benny] into the room where 
[Efrain's] drug transactions took place, keeping the gun at 
[Benny's] forehead.  Inside the room, the defendant backed 
away a couple of steps but continued to aim the handgun at 
[Benny].  The defendant said, 'Give me everything you got.'  
[Benny] took the change he had received at the liquor store 
out of his pocket and threw it on a table, where some 
cocaine lay. 
 
"At this point, [Benny] saw Floyd Hamilton running up the 
stairs.  Hamilton was carrying a shotgun.  He knelt down 
and pointed the shotgun at [Benny].  Hamilton [told the 
defendant it was time to go].  The defendant scooped up the 
money and cocaine from the table.  [Benny] told them to 
take everything and get out before the police arrived.  
Hamilton and the defendant left." 
 
Id. at 582-584. 
 
According to evidence presented at trial, at that point, 
Benny grabbed his children, who were still upstairs, and carried 
them downstairs, where the victim was lying in a pool of blood.  
Benny then took his children outside, put them in his car, and 
5 
 
drove them to his girlfriend's house nearby.  Minutes later, 
Benny returned home and called the police.  Among the responding 
officers were Officer Robert Flynn, his partner Officer William 
Baker, Detective Peter O'Malley, and Sergeant Detective James 
Curran.  The defendant and Hamilton were arrested not long 
thereafter. 
 
The defendant and Hamilton first were tried together in 
1985.  After this first trial resulted in a hung jury and 
mistrial, the defendant was tried alone in 1986.  This second 
trial resulted in a conviction of murder in the first degree on 
the theory of felony-murder, as well as a conviction of armed 
robbery.  Pursuant to § 33E, this court conducted a plenary 
review of the record and affirmed the defendant's convictions in 
1990.  See Pope, 406 Mass. at 591.  The defendant filed motions 
for a new trial in 1996 and 2020; each was denied by a judge in 
the Superior Court.  In 2021, the defendant petitioned this 
court for leave to appeal from the denial of his second motion 
for a new trial, and a single justice of this court granted the 
petition in part, allowing the defendant to appeal from the 
denial on the basis of purportedly newly discovered evidence and 
this court's modification of the felony-murder rule in Brown. 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  Where, as here, the 
motion judge was not the trial judge, did not conduct an 
evidentiary hearing, and instead relied on the trial 
6 
 
transcripts, affidavits, and other documentary evidence, we 
review de novo the denial of a motion for a new trial.  
Commonwealth v. Mazza, 484 Mass. 539, 547 (2020), citing 
Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 656 (2018), and 
Commonwealth v. Lykus, 451 Mass. 310, 325-326 (2008).   
 
2.  Gaps and inconsistencies in witness and police 
accounts.  a.  Previously disclosed evidence.  There is no doubt 
that the evidence disclosed at the time of the defendant's trial 
already betrayed certain inconsistencies in Benny's and the 
police's accounts of the shooting and subsequent investigation.  
The evolution of these accounts is apparent across the 
following, all of which were available to the defense at the 
time of trial: 
i. 
A police report written by Officer Flynn mere hours 
after the shooting; 
 
ii. Benny's testimony at the defendant's probable cause 
hearing, see G. L. c. 276, § 38, and Mass. R. Crim. P. 
3 (f), which took place on July 19, 1984, 
approximately eight weeks after the murder; 
 
iii. Sergeant Detective Curran's grand jury testimony, see 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 5; 
 
iv. Testimony from Benny, Officer Flynn, Officer Baker, 
and Sergeant Detective Curran at the defendant's 1985 
and 1986 trials. 
 
For example, while Benny initially seemed to tell police that 
the defendant was downstairs during the shooting, over time his 
story changed such that later he was sure the defendant was 
7 
 
upstairs during the shooting.  Similarly, while in his initial 
statements about the incident, Benny did not mention his 
children or the fact that he drove them to a girlfriend's house 
before telephoning the police, these details were prominent 
parts of his subsequent testimony.  Moreover, reports and 
testimony from Officers Flynn and Baker and Sergeant Detective 
Curran were inconsistent about whether the police recovered 
drug-related material from the scene of the shooting and, if so, 
what type of material.  While earlier police reports made no 
mention of drugs, later testimony suggested that the police 
found at least some drug paraphernalia at Benny's home. 
 
b.  Newly discovered evidence.  The purportedly newly 
discovered evidence consists primarily of a preliminary field 
report and a memorandum (the Goodale documents), both written in 
1984 by then Assistant District Attorney Robert Goodale.2  The 
documents were prepared by Goodale after he reported to the 
scene of the shooting as part of a "homicide response team."  
The preliminary field report was prepared early in the morning 
of May 24, less than twelve hours after the shooting, and the 
memorandum, which Goodale prepared for the district attorney, is 
dated May 29, 1984, less than a week after the shooting.   
 
 
2 The defendant alleges that a case summary written by 
Sergeant Detective Curran also was not disclosed to his trial 
counsel.  Beyond briefly describing the defendant's arrest, the 
summary is otherwise duplicative of disclosed police reports. 
8 
 
 
These documents memorialized some of Benny's earliest 
accounts of the night of the murder, as well as statements from 
the police about Benny and about evidence at the scene of the 
shooting.  The defendant contends that the Goodale documents 
would have served as vital impeachment evidence -- revealing or 
exacerbating inconsistencies in Benny's and the police's 
accounts -- and that they would have provided novel 
investigative avenues to the defense.  We agree.  In particular, 
and as also set forth in the Appendix to this opinion, the 
Goodale documents significantly exacerbate inconsistencies and 
contain novel information regarding the following aspects of 
this case. 
 
i.  The defendant's location at the time of the shooting.  
The Goodale documents accord with Officer Flynn's report and 
Sergeant Detective Curran's grand jury testimony, indicating 
that Benny placed the defendant downstairs at the time of the 
shooting.  The documents thus provide further evidence that 
Benny's testimony at trial -- in which he stated the defendant 
was in fact upstairs at the time of the shooting -- was 
inconsistent with prior statements. 
 
ii.  Benny's travel to a girlfriend's house and the 
girlfriend's identity and address.  As noted supra, Benny's 
statements about his actions in the immediate aftermath of the 
shooting changed over time.  Benny initially did not disclose to 
9 
 
the police that he went to a friend's or girlfriend's house 
after the shooting but before calling 911, but he later 
testified at great length about this detour during the 
defendant's probable cause hearing and at both trials.  The 
record suggests that the defendant's trial counsel could not 
locate the woman at issue, and she did not testify. 
 
Thus, it is quite notable that the Goodale memorandum -- 
which memorializes an interview between Benny and Detective 
O'Malley on the very night of the shooting -- contains a 
detailed account of Benny's travel.  Indeed, the memorandum 
provides important new information about the identity and 
address of Benny's friend, although he did not identify her as a 
"girlfriend" at the time.  This information is inconsistent with 
Benny's testimony from the probable cause hearing and the 1985 
and 1986 trials.   
 
Specifically, Goodale's memorandum is the only account on 
record that identifies Benny's friend or girlfriend as "Sonya 
Fernandez."3  At both trials, Benny instead identified the friend 
 
 
3 The memorandum records a conversation between the police 
and one "Sonia Fernandez," who identified herself as a friend of 
the residents of Benny's house on Nonquit Street, and notes that 
Benny stated he went to "Sonya Fernandez's" house after the 
shooting.  Based on the context, we reason that the memorandum 
is referring to the same woman in both places. 
 
10 
 
as "Jeanette Fernandez."4  In addition, the memorandum gives her 
address as a location on Monadnock Street around the corner from 
Benny's house on Nonquit Street, on the same side of Columbia 
Road; indeed, according to the memorandum, Benny stated that he 
simply ran to Fernandez's house after the shooting.  However, in 
his testimony at both trials, Benny described having to drive a 
few blocks, across Columbia Road to reach his friend's house, 
although he could not remember the precise address. 
 
iii.  The presence of Benny's children.  There is no 
mention of Benny's children in Officer Flynn's report or 
Sergeant Detective Curran's grand jury testimony, although Benny 
testified about the children at later proceedings.  There is 
likewise no mention of Benny's children in Goodale's preliminary 
field report.  Although the memorandum indicates that Benny 
acknowledged his children were present at his house at the time 
of the shooting, he does not mention them in relation to going 
 
 
4 Benny also provided the name of this friend at the 
probable cause hearing, but the piece of testimony was deleted 
from the transcript at the request of the court.  While we do 
not know what Benny said at the probable cause hearing, we do 
not think that this deleted testimony lessens the import of the 
identification of the friend as "Sonya" in the Goodale 
memorandum.  For one, Benny's description of the friend's 
location at the probable cause hearing was in keeping with his 
trial testimony about Jeanette Fernandez's location.  Moreover, 
the trial transcripts indicate that defense counsel seemed to 
accept Benny's identification of the friend as "Jeanette" and 
did not seek to contradict this identification in any way, 
despite extensive impeachment of Benny on other issues. 
11 
 
to his friend's house -- a trip Benny later claimed was 
motivated by a desire to remove his children from the scene of 
the shooting. 
 
iv.  The type of drug-related materials found at the scene.  
Goodale's memorandum is the only piece of the record that 
indicates that genuine cocaine was recovered from Benny's house.  
Officer Flynn's police report contains no mention of cocaine.  
Later testimony from Sergeant Detective Curran and Officers 
Flynn and Baker suggested that the police found a "burn" at the 
scene, although it remained ambiguous whether the "burn" 
consisted of packets filled with a white powdery substance or 
empty packets.5 
 
v.  The victim's drug usage.  Goodale's memorandum records 
statements from the victim's former fiancée, Marla Dickson, who 
claimed that the victim neither used nor sold cocaine.  These 
statements contradict Benny's repeated declarations that the 
victim both used and sold cocaine.  Dickson's assessment of the 
 
 
5 During his grand jury testimony, Sergeant Detective Curran 
defined a "burn" as "[a] small package to look like cocaine" 
with "sugar or a white substance in it."  But across the trials, 
at which Sergeant Detective Curran and either Officer Flynn or 
Officer Baker testified, there was some ambiguity about whether 
a "burn" refers specifically to the substance that is placed 
into prefolded packets and meant to serve as a "dupe" for 
cocaine -- as Sergeant Detective Curran indicated at the 
probable cause hearing -- or whether a "burn" can refer more 
broadly to the prefolded packets, even if empty.   
12 
 
victim's relationship, or lack thereof, with cocaine is nowhere 
else in the record. 
 
vi.  The police's suspicions about Benny.  Finally, 
Goodale's memorandum provides critical insight, likewise found 
nowhere else in the record, into the police's suspicions of 
Benny.  In particular, the memorandum notes that Detective 
O'Malley disbelieved Benny and thought that Benny himself was 
involved in dealing cocaine.  
 
Although all these areas of inconsistency or doubt could 
have weakened the Commonwealth's case, we focus our analysis on 
the Goodale memorandum's revelations about Sonya Fernandez and 
her address, Dickson's statements regarding the victim, and 
Detective O'Malley's suspicions regarding Benny.  Under the 
favorable standard of prejudice we must apply here, the 
nondisclosure of these pieces of information constitutes a 
prejudicial violation of the Commonwealth's Brady obligation and 
requires the defendant be granted a new trial.  
 
3.  Brady obligation.  "Under the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, a prosecutor 
must disclose exculpatory information to a defendant that is 
material to either guilt or punishment."  Matter of a Grand Jury 
Investigation, 485 Mass. 641, 646 (2020), citing Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  "[I]n Massachusetts, when we 
13 
 
speak of a prosecutor's Brady obligation, we mean not only the 
constitutional obligation to disclose exculpatory information 
but also the broad obligation under our rules to disclose any 
facts that would tend to exculpate the defendant or tend to 
diminish his or her culpability."  Matter of a Grand Jury 
Investigation, supra at 649.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 
14 (a) (1) (A) (iii), as amended, 444 Mass. 1501 (2005).  
"Where the government fails to comply with this duty to 
turn over exculpatory evidence to the defense, a convicted 
defendant may be entitled to a new trial."  Commonwealth v. 
Caldwell, 487 Mass. 370, 375 (2021).  To obtain a new trial on 
the grounds that the Commonwealth failed to disclose certain 
exculpatory evidence, "a defendant must establish (1) that the 
evidence [at the time of trial] was in the possession, custody, 
or control of the prosecutor or a person subject to the 
prosecutor's control, (2) that the evidence is exculpatory, and 
(3) prejudice" (quotations and alterations omitted).  Id., 
quoting Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 478 Mass. 369, 380 (2017).  Of 
course, inherent in that analysis is the presupposition that the 
exculpatory evidence at issue was actually undisclosed and is 
newly discovered.  See Commonwealth v. Caillot, 454 Mass. 245, 
261-262 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 948 (2010) ("To establish 
a Brady violation, a defendant must show that . . . the 
prosecutor failed to disclose the evidence").  Cf. Mazza, 484 
14 
 
Mass. at 547, quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 305 
(1986) ("A defendant seeking a new trial on the ground of newly 
discovered evidence must establish . . . that the evidence is 
newly discovered").  Here, the parties contest whether the 
defendant can establish that the Goodale documents were not 
disclosed at the time of his trial.  Thus, we consider four 
issues in turn:  first, whether the evidence was in the 
Commonwealth's possession at the time of trial; second, whether 
evidence was, in fact, not disclosed at that time; third, 
whether the evidence is exculpatory; and fourth, whether the 
nondisclosure of the evidence prejudiced the defendant. 
a.  Possession.  A prosecutor's duty to disclose "extend[s] 
to material and information in the possession or control of 
members of his staff and of any others who have participated in 
the investigation or evaluation of the case and who either 
regularly report or with reference to the particular case have 
reported to his office."  Commonwealth v. Woodward, 427 Mass. 
659, 679 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. St. Germain, 381 Mass. 
256, 261 n.8 (1980).  The Goodale documents were written by an 
assistant district attorney, and Goodale's memorandum was 
prepared specifically for the district attorney.  These 
documents were in the possession of the Commonwealth. 
b.  Disclosure.  In the Brady context, the defendant bears 
the burden of establishing that purportedly nondisclosed 
15 
 
exculpatory evidence was not in fact disclosed by the 
Commonwealth at the time of trial.  Cf. Mazza, 484 Mass. at 548 
("To demonstrate that the proffered evidence is newly 
discovered, a defendant must establish that the evidence was not 
discoverable at the time of trial despite the due diligence of 
the defendant or defense counsel" [quotation and citation 
omitted]).  The Commonwealth contends that the motion judge 
correctly found that the defendant failed to meet this burden 
here.  We disagree.  In Mazza, this court made clear that a 
defendant can meet this burden through circumstantial evidence.  
Id. at 550.  Here, the defendant has pointed to several 
compelling pieces of such evidence that "[w]hen viewed as a 
whole" effectively establish that the Goodale documents were not 
disclosed at the time of the defendant's trial.  Id.  As in 
Mazza, "this is not a case where the only evidence of absence is 
the absence of evidence."  Id. 
In Mazza, the defendant similarly sought a new trial on the 
basis of newly discovered evidence, which in that case consisted 
of certain witness statements.  Id. at 547.  As here, the 
defendant's trial counsel was deceased, and his case files could 
not be located.  Id. at 548.  And, as here, the Commonwealth 
argued that, because there was no affirmative proof that the 
proffered evidence was not disclosed at the time of trial, the 
defendant had failed to establish that the evidence was newly 
16 
 
discovered; the Commonwealth did not offer, however, any of its 
own affirmative proof that the evidence had been disclosed.  Id.  
In Mazza, this court reviewed affidavits from the defendant and 
from the defendant's postconviction counsel, each of which 
averred that the defense did not have the witness statements at 
issue at the time of trial, and trial transcripts, which 
revealed the defense's extensive use of other witness 
statements.  Id. at 548-550.  Based on this constellation of 
evidence, this court concluded that the defense must not have 
had the witness statements at issue and that they therefore 
constituted newly discovered evidence.  Id. at 550. 
In the instant case, the circumstantial evidence of 
nondisclosure is considerably greater.  First, the defendant's 
trial counsel repeatedly inquired about the existence of any 
notes regarding the police's initial investigation and interview 
with Benny.  Counsel presumably would not have asked such 
questions if he had had the notes at the time.  Second, and 
relatedly, in closing at each trial, defense counsel emphasized 
the lack of any such notes.  Third, the Commonwealth -- through 
both the prosecutor and police witnesses -- consistently 
asserted that no notes had been taken regarding the initial 
police interviews with Benny, and even mentioned the lack of 
notes in its closing argument.  The Commonwealth likely would 
not have so asserted if it had disclosed notes of precisely that 
17 
 
nature.  Fourth, as in Mazza, defense counsel's trial strategy 
provides additional circumstantial evidence of nondisclosure.  
For example, counsel sought to impeach Benny numerous times with 
prior inconsistent statements and spent a significant part of 
cross-examination questioning Benny about his claim that he 
drove his children to a girlfriend's house after the shooting.  
Despite counsel's strategic focus on impeachment and substantive 
focus on Benny's postshooting drive to a girlfriend's house, 
counsel never questioned Benny about inconsistencies in his 
statements about the identity and address of the girlfriend to 
whose house he went.  These inconsistencies would have been 
revealed only through the Goodale documents.   
Consequently, we disagree with the motion judge and 
conclude that counsel's trial strategy -- taken with the other 
significant circumstantial evidence -- does not suggest that 
counsel made a tactical decision not to use the Goodale 
documents but rather suggests that counsel never had the 
documents. 
c.  Exculpation.  "[E]xculpatory is not a narrow term 
connoting alibi or other complete proof of innocence" 
(alterations omitted).  Sullivan, 478 Mass. at 381, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Healy, 438 Mass. 672, 679 (2003).  Rather, 
"[e]vidence is exculpatory if it 'provides some significant aid 
to the defendant's case, whether it furnishes corroboration of 
18 
 
the defendant's story, calls into question a material, although 
not indispensable, element of the prosecution's version of the 
events, or challenges the credibility of a key prosecution 
witness.'"  Commonwealth v. Barry, 481 Mass. 388, 399, cert. 
denied, 140 S. Ct. 51 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Watkins, 
473 Mass. 222, 231 (2015).   
The Goodale documents constitute exculpatory evidence.  
First, the proffered evidence here reveals a number of 
inconsistencies in the testimony of Benny, the Commonwealth's 
key witness.  See Commonwealth v. Liebman, 388 Mass. 483, 489 
(1983) ("Evidence which impeaches the credibility of a key 
prosecution witness is exculpatory for the defendant").  Second, 
the Goodale memorandum exposes police doubt about Benny's 
reliability and may have lent itself to a Bowden defense, see 
part 3.d.iii, infra, which could have cast doubt on the 
prosecution's version of events by casting doubt on the 
underlying police investigation.  See Sullivan, 478 Mass. at 382 
("this evidence also was exculpatory because it bolstered the 
defendant's Bowden defense"). 
d.  Prejudice.  Thus, having determined that the 
Commonwealth possessed but did not disclose exculpatory evidence 
at the time of the defendant's trial, we now assess whether the 
nondisclosure of such evidence constituted a prejudicial error 
requiring a new trial.  The Commonwealth's case rose and fell 
19 
 
with the believability of a witness whose testimony was riddled 
with inconsistencies.  Given the additional inconsistencies and 
information laid bare by the Goodale documents, particularly the 
information about "Sonya Fernandez," Dickson's statements, and 
Detective O'Malley's concerns about the Commonwealth's key 
witness, we conclude that the nondisclosure of the Goodale 
documents amounted to prejudicial error. 
The defendant benefits from the standard of prejudice we 
apply when the defendant has made a specific request for 
exculpatory evidence.  The defendant argues and the Commonwealth 
concedes that the defendant had specifically requested the 
evidence at issue at the time of his trial.  "[W]hen the 
omission of the prosecution is knowing and intentional or 
follows a specific request, a standard of prejudice more 
favorable to the defendant is justified in order to motivate 
prosecutors to be alert to defendants' rights to disclosure."  
Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 407 (1992).  
Specifically, "a defendant need only demonstrate that a 
substantial basis exists for claiming prejudice from the 
nondisclosure."  Id. at 412.  See Healy, 438 Mass. at 680 ("In 
cases involving a specific request for evidence, we look to the 
record to determine whether we can be confident that, even if 
the prosecution had supplied the report to the defendant in 
timely fashion, the report or available evidence disclosed by it 
20 
 
would not have influenced the jury" [alteration, quotation, and 
citation omitted]).  "[T]he burden of establishing the requisite 
'substantial basis' for a claim of prejudice rests with the 
defendant."  Healy, supra.   
While we have often held that "[n]ewly discovered evidence 
that tends merely to impeach the credibility of a witness will 
not ordinarily be the basis of a new trial" (citation omitted), 
Sullivan, 478 Mass. at 383, this reasoning is not dispositive 
here.  It remains true that such evidence will not ordinarily be 
the basis of a new trial, particularly -- although not 
exclusively -- under a standard less favorable to defendants.  
See, e.g., Barry, 481 Mass. at 401-403; Commonwealth v. 
Hernandez, 481 Mass. 189, 194-198, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 168 
(2019); Commonwealth v. Sena, 441 Mass. 822, 830-832 (2004); 
Commonwealth v. Lo, 428 Mass. 45, 53 (1998).  Sometimes, 
however, such evidence is.   
"[W]e have never adopted an inflexible rule that newly 
discovered evidence that merely . . . impeaches a witness's 
testimony is an insufficient basis for a motion for a new 
trial."  Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 Mass. 607, 621 (2015).  
Even where we have held that newly discovered impeachment 
evidence was insufficient to merit a new trial, we have often 
considered the particularities of the scope and impact of that 
evidence and, importantly, the strength of the Commonwealth's 
21 
 
case.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Upton, 484 Mass. 155, 168 
(2020) (newly discovered impeachment evidence was insufficient 
to require new trial where there was "'web of evidence' strongly 
supporting the defendant's guilt" and "defendant's version of 
events . . . strained credulity"); Barry, 481 Mass. at 399-404 
(newly discovered impeachment evidence was insufficient to 
require new trial where evidence was "cumulative of evidence 
already before the jury" or was based on uncorroborated, 
unsubstantiated, or secondhand information); Hernandez, 481 
Mass. at 196-198 (newly discovered impeachment evidence was 
insufficient to require new trial where "only substantive 
testimony" of witness who would have been impeached "was 
ultimately made moot by the defendant's own admission");  
Sullivan, 478 Mass. at 384 (newly discovered impeachment 
evidence was insufficient to require new trial where 
"nondisclosed evidence . . . [was] not directly related to the 
crimes at issue"); Sena, 441 Mass. at 831-832 (newly discovered 
impeachment evidence was insufficient to require new trial where 
it revealed only "minor and inconsequential" inconsistencies in 
witness testimony); Lo, 428 Mass. at 54 (newly discovered 
impeachment evidence was insufficient to require new trial where 
evidence impeached one of multiple witnesses who testified as to 
criminal responsibility).  In rare cases, however, "we have 
found that . . . a new trial may be warranted 'where the 
22 
 
Commonwealth's case depends so heavily on the testimony of a 
witness' and where the newly discovered evidence 'seriously 
undermines the credibility of that witness'" (alteration 
omitted).  Cowels, supra, quoting Liebman, 388 Mass. at 489.   
i.  The identity and address of Benny's girlfriend.  As an 
initial matter, Benny's statements about "Sonya," as recorded in 
Goodale's memorandum, would have been a basis to cross-examine 
him about his prior inconsistent statements.  And based on 
counsel's trial strategy, see part 3.b, supra, it seems likely 
that counsel would have used Benny's prior inconsistent 
statements for that purpose.  Moreover, Goodale's memorandum 
notes that police spoke to Sonya at the scene of the shooting, 
and so defense counsel may have been able to inquire about Sonya 
during his cross-examination of police witnesses.  In addition, 
with this novel information about Benny's girlfriend, the 
defendant's counsel may have been able to investigate or 
presumably locate the girlfriend to whom Benny referred. 
Benny's testimony about driving to the house of a friend or 
girlfriend, whom he identified as "Sonya" in his initial police 
interview but "Jeanette" at trial, was particularly significant 
as it related to the defense's theory of Benny's bias.  Benny 
testified that he drove to a girlfriend's house -- before 
calling the police -- in order to remove his children from a 
dangerous crime scene, but defense counsel suggested that Benny 
23 
 
was instead trying to cover up his involvement in a drug 
business operated out of his house by bringing drugs or drug-
related items to another location.  The fact that Benny's 
statements related to his friend or girlfriend and her address 
changed over time could have lent credence to the defense's 
theory that Benny was a biased witness who may have had reason 
to mislead the Commonwealth about the events of the night of the 
shooting.   
The inconsistencies between Benny's earlier statements and 
his in-court statements are quite notable.  This person was one 
with whom Benny felt comfortable leaving his children and whom 
Benny identified at trial as his "girlfriend."  While we do not 
know what the jury would have inferred if confronted with the 
fact that Benny's in-court testimony was inconsistent with prior 
statements about this girlfriend, they may have been struck by 
the fact that Benny would misremember or confuse the name of 
someone seemingly so important to him.  Moreover, Benny 
described reaching this person's house differently in his police 
interview and at trial.  While at first, he told police he ran 
to a house around the corner -- and did not mention taking his 
children -- at trial he stated he drove his children to a house 
notably farther away.   
ii.  Marla Dickson's statements.  Likewise, Dickson's 
statements about the victim's lack of drug use could have served 
24 
 
as impeachment evidence going to Benny's bias and over-all 
credibility.  The defendant's trial counsel could have called 
Dickson to testify as to her personal knowledge of the victim 
and his drug usage.  This testimony would have been admissible 
for the truth of the matter asserted, impeaching Benny by 
contradiction and undermining the Commonwealth's theory of the 
case.  At trial, the Commonwealth argued that the robbery and 
resultant shooting were related to the victim's and the 
defendant's involvement with cocaine and drug dealing.  Benny 
testified that the victim used and sold cocaine and that it was 
the victim's involvement with drugs that entangled the victim 
with the defendant and Hamilton in the first place.  Dickson's 
statements would have directly contradicted this testimony.  Her 
prior statements would have called into question Benny's 
reliability and would have complicated aspects of the 
Commonwealth's proposed narrative of the events surrounding the 
shooting. 
iii.  Detective O'Malley's suspicions.  Finally, the 
Goodale memorandum reveals police skepticism about Benny's 
version of events -- the version of events eventually presented 
by the Commonwealth at trial -- and could have been used to 
formulate a compelling Bowden defense.  See Commonwealth v. 
Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 486 (1980).  "A defendant may rely on 
deficiencies or lapses in police investigations to raise the 
25 
 
specter of reasonable doubt."  Commonwealth v. Moore, 480 Mass. 
799, 807 (2018), citing Bowden, supra.  "Because any statements 
introduced as part of such a defense are offered not for their 
truth, but to prove that the police did not take 'reasonable 
steps to investigate,' those statements are not hearsay."  
Commonwealth v. Bizanowicz, 459 Mass. 400, 414 (2011), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Ridge, 455 Mass. 307, 316 (2009).  Accordingly, 
Detective O'Malley's statements, as recorded in the Goodale 
memorandum, would have been admissible to help demonstrate that 
the police should have investigated Benny's account further.   
Moreover, it seems quite likely that the defendant's trial 
counsel would have used the Goodale memorandum in this way.  In 
his closing argument at the 1986 trial, the defendant's trial 
counsel presented a theory to the jury that Benny was unreliable 
and biased and had misled the police; if given evidence that the 
police themselves were concerned about Benny's unreliability, 
counsel would likely have expanded his theory to include a 
Bowden defense.   
Such a defense could have powerfully undermined the 
strength of the Commonwealth's case.  The record demonstrates 
that the defendant's trial counsel sought to suggest that Benny 
was more involved with the cocaine than he claimed and that 
consequently he was a biased witness.  Taken with the 
inconsistencies in Benny's narratives, including his changing 
26 
 
descriptions about leaving the scene before calling the police, 
see supra, the police's admitted suspicion of Benny could have 
cast doubt on the adequacy of the police investigation.  See 
Commonwealth v. Mattei, 455 Mass. 840, 859 (2010) (trial judge 
erroneously "prevented the defendant from establishing that 
[certain witnesses] may have had an incentive to misdirect the 
police during the investigation to deflect attention away from 
themselves").  After all, the Commonwealth seemed ultimately to 
embrace straightforwardly Benny's account, and without Benny's 
account, the Commonwealth's case could not stand; yet, the 
Goodale memorandum indicates that the Commonwealth itself 
harbored doubts about Benny and the story he provided.   
Furthermore, the Commonwealth repeatedly asserted, 
including in its closing argument, that there were no notes 
taken during or about Benny's initial interviews with the 
police.  The very existence of the Goodale documents 
demonstrates the inaccuracy of these assertions and calls into 
question aspects of the Commonwealth's investigation or 
preparation for trial.  
In sum, given the potential impact of Benny's prior 
inconsistent statements about his girlfriend, Dickson's 
testimony, and Detective O'Malley's statements of suspicion 
about Benny, the defendant's specific request for exculpatory 
evidence and the concomitant lower burden, and the over-all 
27 
 
weaknesses in the Commonwealth's case, the defendant has 
established a substantial basis for claiming prejudice.  At 
trial, Benny provided the only percipient account of the 
shooting.  Benny was not simply the Commonwealth's key witness; 
he was the linchpin of the Commonwealth's entire case.  The 
Goodale documents not only exacerbate the inconsistencies 
already apparent in Benny's testimony, such as his changing 
statements about the defendant's location at the time of the 
shooting, but also reveal new inconsistencies in his testimony 
entirely different in kind.   
 
Conclusion.  Because the defendant has established that the 
Commonwealth failed to disclose exculpatory evidence and that 
such nondisclosure was prejudicial, we reverse the denial of the 
defendant's second motion for a new trial.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
Appendix. 
 
 
 
Defendant's 
location at 
time of 
shooting 
Cocaine at 
scene or 
victim's 
cocaine 
usage 
Presence of 
Benny's 
children 
Travel to 
friend's 
house and 
her 
identity 
Flynn 
report 
Downstairs 
No mention 
No mention 
No mention 
Curran's 
case 
summary* 
Downstairs 
No mention 
No mention 
No mention 
Goodale 
field 
report* 
Downstairs 
No mention 
No mention 
No mention 
Goodale 
memorandum* 
Downstairs 
Police 
found ten 
packets of 
cocaine at 
the scene.   
 
Benny knew 
the victim 
dealt 
cocaine and 
thought the 
defendant 
worked for 
the victim.   
 
Victim's 
former 
fiancée 
contested 
Benny's 
statements, 
saying the 
victim did 
not use or 
sell 
cocaine.   
 
Police were 
suspicious 
of Benny 
and thought 
he was 
involved in 
drug 
dealing. 
No mention 
Benny said 
that he 
"ran" to 
his 
friend's 
apartment 
after the 
shooting. 
 
Benny 
identified 
his friend 
as "Sonya 
Fernandez," 
and she 
provided 
her address 
as a 
location on 
Monadnock 
Street. 
2 
 
Probable 
cause 
hearing 
Upstairs 
Officer 
Flynn said 
no drugs 
were found 
at the 
scene. 
 
Benny 
testified 
that the 
defendant 
stole 
cocaine in 
addition to 
cash. 
Benny 
stated his 
children 
were 
upstairs at 
the time of 
the 
shooting. 
 
He said 
that he 
drove his 
children to 
a friend's 
house after 
the 
shooting. 
Benny's 
friend's 
name was 
not 
included in 
the 
transcript, 
and Benny 
could not 
provide the 
address of 
his 
girlfriend. 
Sergeant 
Detective 
Curran's 
grand jury 
testimony 
Downstairs 
Curran 
suggested 
the 
shooting 
was 
motivated 
by a drug 
transaction 
or rip-off.   
 
Curran 
described a 
"burn" 
found at 
the scene. 
No mention 
No mention 
1985 and 
1986 trials 
Upstairs 
Benny 
testified 
that the 
victim used 
and sold 
cocaine, 
some of 
which the 
defendant 
stole. 
 
Police 
testified 
about 
finding a 
"burn" or 
"papers" at 
the scene. 
Benny 
stated his 
children 
were 
upstairs at 
the time of 
the 
shooting 
and that he 
drove them 
to a 
friend's 
house 
immediately 
afterward. 
Benny 
identified 
his 
girlfriend 
as 
"Jeanette 
Fernandez" 
and 
described 
driving to 
her house a 
few blocks 
away, 
across 
Columbia 
Road. 
3 
 
 
* These items were not disclosed to the defense at the time of 
the defendant's trial.