Case Title: State ex rel Click v. Brownhill

Citation: 

Docket Number: S46732

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2000-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: DECEMBER 29, 2000 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

State of Oregon ex rel KINGSLEY CLICK,State Court Administratorand PHIL McCOLLISTER,Clatsop County Trial Court Administrator,
	Relators,
	v.
PAULA J. BROWNHILL,Circuit Court Judge of Clatsop County,
	Defendant,
	and
ANTHONY SCOTT GARNER,
	Adverse Party.
(CC 98-1296; SC S46732)

	En Banc
	Original proceeding in mandamus.*
	Argued and submitted May 16, 2000.
	Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for relators.  With her on the
briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Michael D. Reynolds,
Solicitor General, and Kaye E. McDonald, Assistant Attorney
General.
	Kathleen M. Correll, Portland, argued the cause and filed
the brief for adverse party.  With her on the brief was Mark A.
Cross, Oregon City.
	GILLETTE, J.
	Alternative writ of mandamus dismissed.
	Durham, J. concurred and filed an opinion in which
Kulongoski, J., joined.
	*On petition for a writ of mandamus from an order of Clatsop
County Circuit Court, Paula J. Brownhill, Judge.
		GILLETTE, J.
		In this original mandamus proceeding, the State Court
Administrator and the Clatsop County Trial Court Administrator
(relators) seek a peremptory writ of mandamus commanding the
trial court to vacate an order that requires relators to provide
certain jury lists to the defendant in a pending criminal case. 
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the trial court did
not err in ordering the production of those lists.
  		In 1998, a Clatsop County grand jury indicted Anthony
Scott Garner on two counts of aggravated murder.  Before the case
was set for trial, Garner served relators with subpoenas duces
tecum requesting, among other things, a number of jury-related
records, including Clatsop County source lists, master lists,
term lists, and individual voir dire lists from 1990 to the date
of the subpoena.  Relators filed a motion to quash those
subpoenas on numerous grounds, including an assertion that
relators were precluded from disclosing the jury lists under ORS
10.215(1). (1)  Both parties filed further documents, and Clatsop
County Circuit Court Judge Brownhill heard testimony and argument
on the matter.  
		The trial court allowed the motion in part and denied
it in part.  The court's order required relators to produce
master and term jury lists for Clatsop County from 1996 to 1999,
lists of jurors who were summoned and who returned summons for
each jury term from 1996 through 1999 in Clatsop County, various
jury selection manuals, and jury studies, surveys, and
statistics.  In the letter announcing its ruling, the court
restricted Garner's use of the jury information to purposes
related to the pending litigation and prohibited Garner from
contacting persons whose names were on the jury lists.
		This mandamus proceeding followed.  Before this court,
relators challenge the trial court's order only to the extent
that the order requires them to provide the three types of jury
lists.  The dispositive issue presented in the case is whether
ORS 10.215(1), by implication, prohibits relators from providing
those lists to Garner. (2) 
		ORS 10.215(1) provides:  
		"The clerk of court shall cause to be prepared at
least once each year a master jury list containing
names selected at random from the source lists.  The
source lists are the most recent list of electors of
the county, the records furnished by the Department of
Transportation as provided by ORS 802.260(2) and any
other sources approved by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court that will furnish a fair cross section of
the citizens of the county.  Any source list obtained
from a public or private entity and any jury list
containing names selected from a source list shall not
be used for any purpose other than the selection and
summoning of persons for service as jurors and the
drawing of names of jurors."
(Emphasis added.)  Relators contend that the last sentence of ORS
10.215(1) unambiguously defines and limits the way in which the
jury lists described in the trial court's order may be "used." 
They assert that Garner's proposed utilization of the lists is a
"use," but not one of the enumerated ones.  And, they reason,
because Garner would not be "using" the lists in one of the
authorized ways, the statute implicitly forbids relators to
provide the lists to Garner.  More specifically, relators explain
that "selecting and summoning" persons for jury duty are
functions performed exclusively by court personnel or the sheriff
and that neither of those functions is performed by parties to
litigation.  Because parties to litigation cannot put the jury
lists to either of the specified statutory uses, relators
conclude, the statute does not authorize disclosure of jury lists
to them.
		Garner responds that examining the lists to determine
whether the jury pool represents a fair cross-section of the
county is, in fact, using those records for the purpose of jury
selection and, therefore, is a use that is permitted by the
statute.  He contends that relators construe the word "selection"
too narrowly.
		Whether ORS 10.215(1) forbids disclosure of the jury
lists in this case is a matter of statutory interpretation.  In
construing the statute, we use the analytical framework described
in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859
P2d 1143 (1993), in an effort to discern the intent of the
legislature.  At the first level of analysis, we examine the text
and context of the statute itself, giving words of common usage
their plain, natural, and ordinary meanings.  Id. at 610-11.  
Analysis of the text also includes consideration of "rules of
construction * * * that bear directly on how to read the text,"
including "the statutory enjoinder 'not to insert what has been
omitted, or to omit what has been inserted.'"  Id. at 611
(quoting ORS 174.010).  If the legislature's intent is clear from
the text and context, then our analysis ends.  PGE, 317 Or at
611.  
		We begin with two preliminary observations.  First, we
note that there is no dispute that the master and term jury lists
for the years 1996 to 1999, and the lists of jurors who were
served and who returned summons for each jury term from 1996 to
1999, are "jury list[s] containing names selected from a source
list" as that phrase is used in ORS 10.215(1). (3)  Second, although
ORS 10.215(1) does not speak directly to disclosure of jury lists
(the statute speaks, rather, in terms of the "purposes" for which
those materials may be "used") Garner does not assert that
relators may disclose the materials at issue for any unauthorized
"use."
		The first question before the court, then, is the scope
of the limitation on "uses" contemplated by the last sentence of
ORS 10.215(1).  As noted, that sentence limits the authorized
purposes for which the jury lists may be used to two:  the
"selection and summoning" of prospective jurors and "the drawing
of names of jurors."
		As noted, Garner attempts to bring himself within the
scope of the term "selection."  He argues that, because he
intends to use the jury lists to perform a statistical analysis
to determine whether the grand and petit juries in his case are
drawn from a jury pool that contains a fair cross-section of the
citizens of the county, he will, in fact, be using the jury lists
for the "selection" of jurors.  
 		The scope of ORS 10.215 appears to be confined to the
selection of the jury pool and the summoning of jurors from that
pool.  The term "selection," as used in ORS 10.215(1), is a part
of the phrase "selection and summoning."  The legislature's
choice to place the word "selection" before the word "summoning"
suggests that the "selection" process to which it refers is a
precursor to the "summoning" process -- in other words, that the
statute is concerned with selecting the pool of persons who then
will be summoned, before the commencement of any particular court
proceeding.  Relators rely on the fact that neither of those
functions is one that Garner can perform.  Thus, they argue, any
"use" that Garner might make of the lists would exceed those
authorized by the statute.
		Context supports relator's reading of the scope of ORS
10.215.  The statute is part of Title 1 of the Oregon Revised
Statutes -- the Oregon statutes devoted to the operation of
courts of record.  It appears in ORS Chapter 10 -- the chapter
that regulates the manner of calling persons for jury service
generally.  Moreover, the statutory scheme of which ORS 10.215 is
a part establishes that the jury selection and summoning
functions are performed exclusively by court personnel, well
before any particular case is called for trial.  Under that
scheme, the presiding judge for the judicial district first
prescribes a jury selection system or device.  ORS 10.205.  The
clerk of the court then prepares the master jury list.  ORS
10.215(1).  Next, at the direction of the presiding judge or the
clerk of court, a term jury list is prepared, based on names
selected randomly from the master jury list.  ORS 10.225(1). 
Finally, the clerk of court issues summons to the persons whose
names are on the term jury list.  ORS 10.225(5).  From the
foregoing, it is clear that individual litigants take no part in
the "selection and summoning" of prospective jurors or the
drawing of names of jurors, processes that are completed before
any litigant comes on the scene.  In terms of the present case,
Garner does not become involved until after the process
contemplated by ORS 10.215 has ended.  He thus is not involved in
the "selection" process qua process, and his argument in that
respect fails. 
		Our disposition of Garner's assertion that he is a part
of the "selection" process, however, does not end our inquiry,
however.  There remains the issue of the scope of the statute's
restriction on the permissible "uses" to which the source and
jury lists may be put.  Is examining the source and jury lists
solely for the purpose of determining whether the jury pool
represents a fair cross-section of the community a prohibited
use?  The answer to that question is not self-evident.
		"Use" means "the act or practice of using something:
EMPLOYMENT."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, 2523
(unabridged ed 1993). (4)  In the broadest sense, examining the
source and jury lists in an effort to assess compliance with the
requirements of ORS chapter 10 is a "use," because the lists are
being employed for that purpose.  But, did the legislature intend
that the term apply so broadly as to forbid even Garner's "use"? 
Context suggests that it did not.
		ORS 10.215(1) deals with the selection of venire panels
from which both criminal and civil petit juries are drawn.  With
respect to criminal juries, ORS 136.005(1) provides:
		"The district attorney or the defendant in a
criminal action may challenge the jury panel on the
ground that there has been a material departure from
the requirements of the law governing selection of
jurors."
The "requirements of law governing selection of jurors" are those
found in ORS chapter 10.  ORS 136.005(1) offers no explanation as
to how either the district attorney or the defendant is supposed
to obtain information that might justify the kinds of challenges
that the statute contemplates.  However, we think that it is
clear that a trial court need not entertain such challenges
unless they are supported by some preliminary evidentiary
showing.  
	Garner argues that the right to challenge a jury panel
presupposes that a party entitled to make that challenge will
have the relevant documentation necessary to prove the validity
of the challenge.  It follows, he reasons, that it would be
inconsistent with ORS 136.005(1) to interpret ORS 10.215(1) in a
manner that denies him access to the jury lists.
	Garner further notes that ORS 10.205 et seq, impose
numerous record preservation requirements concerning the jury
selection process.  See, e.g., ORS 10.215(6) (requiring clerk of
court to preserve previously filed master lists and related
papers); ORS 10.255 (requiring clerk of court to prepare and
maintain records of persons summoned to appear as jurors); ORS
10.265 (requiring clerk of court to preserve all orders, records,
and papers prepared in connection with selecting and summoning
persons to serve as jurors for particular jury term).  Garner
asserts that "the import of these provisions is that Oregon
litigants have access to the information necessary to press a
challenge to a jury composition."
	In addition to the contextual material relied on by
Garner, we find one other statutory provision that supports the
idea that there is no statutory prohibition to making the lists
available to litigants to assist them in determining whether the
jury pool and venire panel reflect a fair cross-section of the
community.  Respecting civil juries, ORCP 57 A provides a
specific procedure for challenging compliance with jury pool and
venire panel selection procedures:
		"(1) Within 7 days after the moving party
discovered or by the exercise of diligence could have
discovered the grounds therefor, and in any event
before the jury is sworn to try the case, a party may
move to stay the proceedings or for other appropriate
relief, on the ground of substantial failure to comply
with the applicable provisions of ORS chapter 10 in
selecting the jury.
		"(2) Upon motion filed under subsection (1) of
this section containing a sworn statement of facts
which, if true, would constitute a substantial failure
to comply with the applicable provisions of ORS chapter
10 in selecting the jury, the moving party is entitled
to present in support of the motion: the testimony of
the clerk or court administrator, any relevant records
and papers not public or otherwise available used by
the clerk or court administrator, and any other
relevant evidence. * * *
		"(3) The procedures prescribed by this section are
the exclusive means by which a party in a civil case
may challenge a jury on the ground that the jury was
not selected in conformity with the applicable
provisions of ORS chapter 10."
(Emphasis added.)
		The emphasized words in ORCP 57 A(2) appear to
contemplate explicitly that, in a civil case, the kinds of
materials that Garner seeks will be available to the challenging
party to substantiate a claim of failure to comply with the
requirements of ORS chapter 10.  Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine how a party would be able to obtain and put on such
evidence, if the party were unable to subpoena it.  It also is
difficult to imagine that the legislature intended to give civil
litigants greater access to records and papers than it gives
criminal litigants.
		We find the foregoing contextual materials to be
decisive.  Although the wording of the last sentence of ORS
10.215(1) is direct and sweeping when read in isolation, other
contextual statutes contemplate that contests over the selection
and summoning process will be possible, and that those involved
will have access to the lists to which the statute speaks.  We
are satisfied that the legislature did not intend that its
limitation on the "uses" to which the list could be put would
sweep so broadly as to include judicial scrutiny into the
selection and summoning process.  We conclude, after examining
text and context, that the legislature's intent respecting use of
jury lists for the purposes contemplated by Garner is clear: 
Such a use is permissible.  
		In sum, we conclude that the trial court permissibly
determined that "use" of the materials that it ordered disclosed
to Garner would not violate the statutory prohibition.  It
follows that the trial court had no legal duty to grant relators'
motions to quash and that our alternative writ of mandamus
directing the court to do so or to show cause why it had not done
so now should be dismissed.
		Alternative writ of mandamus dismissed. 
		DURHAM, J., concurring.
		The majority opinion provides a rationale that is
sufficient to justify dismissal of the alternative writ of
mandamus in this case.  The majority concludes that it is
difficult to imagine that the legislature would provide the
parties to a criminal action with the right to challenge the
lawfulness of the selection of jurors, ORS 136.005(1), but deny
them access to the clerk's source list and jury list, ORS
10.215(1), that might serve as the factual foundation for such a
challenge.  That rationale comports with common sense, and I join
it.  However, the majority's analysis does not expose completely
the ambiguity that inheres in ORS 10.215(1).  I will address that
problem, because the legislature may wish to consider amending
ORS 10.215(1) to resolve the ambiguity.
		ORS 10.215(1) provides:
		"The clerk of court shall cause to be prepared at
least once each year a master jury list containing
names selected at random from the source lists.  The
source lists are the most recent list of electors of
the county, the records furnished by the Department of
Transportation as provided in ORS 802.260(2) and any
other sources approved by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court that will furnish a fair cross section of
the citizens of the county.  Any source list obtained
from a public or private entity and any jury list
containing names selected from a source list shall not
be used for any purpose other than the selection and
summoning of persons for service as jurors and the
drawing of names of jurors."
(Emphasis added.)
		Ambiguity arises from the passive voice verb in the
third sentence in that statute: "shall not be used."  That
sentence fails to identify clearly the person or entity to whom
the legislature has addressed the statutory prohibition.
		The passive voice flaw in the statute spawned the
parties' legal dispute.  On the one hand, relators argue
plausibly that criminal defendants do not use source lists and
jury lists to select and summon jurors.  On the other hand,
because the first sentence of ORS 10.215(1) directs the clerk to
prepare a master jury list, the third sentence appears to state a
prohibition against misuse of source lists and jury lists by the
clerk, and no one else.  The majority opinion accepts relators'
argument, but does not resolve the ambiguity noted above in ORS
10.215(1), because other statutes appear to entitle Garner to use
the jury records that he seeks to challenge the jury selection in
his case.
		The ambiguity noted above might continue to cause
problems for relator, including the prospect of additional
litigation and the attendant expense.  For example, the public,
including the news media, cannot determine from the majority
opinion whether ORS 10.215(1) authorizes relators to refuse to
disclose source lists and jury lists to persons who are not
criminal defendants.  The legislature might wish to address the
ambiguity in ORS 10.215(1) before those problems arise.
		I concur.
		Kulongoski, J., joins in this opinion.

1. ORS 10.215(1) is quoted and discussed in more detail
below at 2-3, ___ Or at ___. 

2. Because of the manner in which we resolve the statutory
issue, we do not find it necessary to consider a second issue,
viz., whether disclosure of those documents is required under the
Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

3. The source lists include "the most recent list of
electors of the county" and"records furnished by the Department
of Transportation as provided in ORS 802.260(2)[.]"  ORS
10.215(1).  A "master list" is a list, "prepared at least once
each year" at the direction of the clerk of the court,
"containing names selected at random from the source lists[.]" 
Id.  "Term" jury lists, in turn, are composed of "names selected
at random from the master jury list[.]"  ORS 10.225(1).  

4. The word has many other definitions, but none helpful
to this inquiry.