Case Title: RICHARD ALLEN TUCKER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0006

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
RICHARD ALLEN TUCKER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 162Case Number: No. S-10-0006Decided: 12/10/2010NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
RICHARD ALLEN 
TUCKER,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Fremont County

The 
Honorable Marvin L. Tyler, Judge

 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane E. Courselle, 
Director, UW Defender Aid Program; Kevin Ward, Student Intern.  Argument by Mr. 
Ward.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. Salzburg, 
Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Assistant Attorney 
General.  Argument by Ms. 
Pojman.

 
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, J., delivers 
the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, J., files a special 
concurrence.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Appellant, 
Richard Allen Tucker, challenges his convictions on two counts of aggravated 
vehicular homicide, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b)(i) (LexisNexis 
2007).  Appellant contends the 
district court erred when it allowed the investigating officer's testimony to be 
admitted as the opinion of a lay witness, and that there was insufficient 
evidence at trial to support the elements of aggravated vehicular homicide.  He also asserts that the district 
court's imposition of consecutive sentences violated his Fifth Amendment right 
to be free from double jeopardy and his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and 
unusual punishment.  We find no 
prejudicial error and affirm the convictions.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]      
Mr. Tucker presents 
the following issues:

 
 

1.    
Whether the district 
court improperly admitted lay testimony by a law enforcement officer which was 
in fact expert testimony?

 
 

2.    
Whether the evidence 
at trial was insufficient to prove the elements of aggravated vehicular 
homicide?

 
 

3.    
Whether the sentence 
imposed is in violation of the law and the United States Constitution and the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming?

 
 
The State frames the 
issues as follows:

 
 

1.    
Did the district 
court abuse its discretion when it admitted the portion of Trooper Badura's 
testimony challenged in the motion for new trial?

 
 

2.    
Was there sufficient 
evidence of Appellant's guilt?

 
 

3.    
Were Appellant's 
consecutive sentences illegal?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
On December 20, 2008, 
at approximately 6:00 p.m., Appellant, his girlfriend, K.P., and her son, Z.P., 
arrived at the Lucky Five Bar in Shoshoni, Wyoming.  At around 8:15 p.m., the bartender 
stopped serving Appellant alcohol due to his level of intoxication.  The bartender offered to find someone to 
drive Appellant home but Appellant refused.  At approximately 9:15 p.m., Appellant 
asked the bartender for help starting his truck, an extended-cab Dodge Dakota, 
because he believed that the battery was dead.  The bartender then asked another patron, 
a mechanic who had just arrived at the bar, to help Appellant with his 
vehicle.  

 
 

[¶4]        
The mechanic, 
Appellant, a nearby female patron, and K.P. then went outside to attempt to 
start Appellant's truck.  At this 
point, Z.P. was asleep in the backseat of the truck.  The mechanic pulled his vehicle 
nose-to-nose with Appellant's truck but, upon further inspection, determined 
that the truck would not start because the clutch had not been pressed.  During this time, Appellant was in the 
driver's seat attempting to start the truck, K.P. was in the passenger seat with 
her head against the passenger door, and Z.P. was asleep in the backseat.  After it was determined that the truck 
did not need a jump, Appellant got out of the truck momentarily while the female 
patron got into the driver's seat, pushed in the clutch, and started the 
truck.  Appellant got back into the 
driver's seat and the female patron saw Appellant drive away.  

 
 

[¶5]        
Approximately seven 
miles from Shoshoni, the truck left the road, flipped over, and crashed into a 
tree.  K.P. and Z.P. were ejected 
from the vehicle and were found dead at the scene of the accident.  Appellant, however, exited the vehicle 
of his own accord and was treated at Riverton Memorial Hospital for a concussion 
and for abrasions1 on various areas of his body.  Appellant's blood-alcohol content 
measured .26% approximately one and a half hours after the crash.  A subsequent toxicology analysis 
revealed that approximately three hours after the crash, K.P.'s blood-alcohol 
content was .28% and Z.P.'s blood-alcohol content was .27%.  

 
 

[¶6]        
Although most of the 
windows in the truck were destroyed, the driver's side of the vehicle had 
relatively little damage and the driver's side window and extended-cab window 
remained intact.  Blood samples were 
collected from the passenger's side dashboard, door-frame, and extended-cab 
window, and from the front and rear windshields.  The blood samples collected from the 
passenger's side extended-cab window and the passenger's side door frame were 
consistent with the DNA profile of Z.P.  

 
 

[¶7]        
Evidence produced at 
trial indicated that the amount of time that elapsed from Appellant's departure 
from the Lucky Five Bar and the accident was less than ten minutes.  The time frame was established by the 
fact that, just a few blocks from the bar, the truck was recorded as it passed a 
gas station surveillance camera at 9:45 p.m. and the fact that the passerby who 
discovered the accident called the police at 9:54 p.m.  The officer who responded to the call 
testified that it would take approximately six minutes, if driving the speed 
limit, to travel from the Lucky Five Bar to the scene of the accident.  

 
 

[¶8]        
Prior to trial, the 
district court issued a case management order instructing the parties to 
designate "[a]ll witnesses, including expert witnesses," and to provide a 
summary of their testimony.  In 
response, the State filed a witness list designating the investigating officer 
as a witness, and provided the following description of the officer's proposed 
testimony:

 
 
Trooper Badura will 
testify concerning all aspects of his investigation of the events and 
circumstances relevant to this case including his observations of the victims 
and defendant, interviews conducted with the defendant and witnesses, 
observations he made at the scene, and observations he made of defendant's 
vehicle, including the collection of potential evidence on or within defendant's 
vehicle by the Wyoming State Crime Lab. (See reports)

 
 
The State also 
provided a copy of the officer's traffic investigation report to defense 
counsel.  In that report, the 
officer stated that "[e]vidence leads this investigator to believe Richard 
Tucker was driving at the time of the crash . . . ."  The State did not designate the officer 
as an expert witness.  

 
 

[¶9]        
Shortly before trial, 
Appellant filed a "Motion to Exclude State's Expert,'" which sought to prevent 
the investigating officer from testifying as an expert.  The court granted the motion "in part" 
but also indicated that the officer could testify "in accordance with his 
designation."  

 
 

[¶10]     
During trial, and 
prior to the officer's testimony, Appellant again brought the matter to the 
attention of the court in an attempt to limit opinion testimony from the 
officer.  Counsel for the State 
advised the court: "Judge, the trooper is not testifying as an expert and I 
don't know how many times or different ways I can say it."  The court, after reviewing the State's 
witness designation, commented: "I don't read [the designation] to indicate that 
the trooper is offering any sort of an expert opinion about anything, I don't 
believe that the trooper would be qualified under this designation to offer 
expert opinion . . . ."  Before 
the hearing concluded, defense counsel attempted to clarify: 

 

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, just so it's 
absolutely clear, so Mr.  I'm sorry, Trooper Badura will not be stating that 
Mr. Tucker was driving the vehicle as his narration in the report says, before 
the State does that they need to notify the Court.  

 
 
[PROSECUTION]: Judge, 
that's an ultimate question and I'm not going to ask him that.  

 
 
COURT:  That would be in the area of an expert 
opinion, an expert is qualified to offer opinions about the ultimate issues, I 
don't think Trooper Badura's designation qualifies him as being able to offer 
that kind of opinion whether he possesses the qualifications or not. 

 
 

[¶11]     
Before the officer 
took the stand, another hearing was held concerning the anticipated 
testimony.  Counsel for the State 
indicated that the officer would provide lay opinion testimony pursuant to 
W.R.E. 701 regarding the positions of the occupants of the vehicle at the time 
of the crash.  It was the officer's 
opinion that Appellant was driving.  
Defense counsel objected, contending that the opinion testimony was not 
lay opinion testimony and was not admissible under W.R.E. 701.  The court stated that it would limit the 
officer's testimony to the matters described in the witness designation and that 
it would give a curative instruction to the jury in the event that the officer's 
testimony crossed into the realm of expert opinion. 

 
 

[¶12]     
During the State's 
examination of the officer, the prosecution asked him to describe his training 
in accident investigations and his experience in investigations involving 
ejections.  The officer stated that 
he had taken two accident investigation courses and had investigated roughly 50 
accidents involving ejections.  The 
State also asked the officer to give his opinion as to where the victims were 
seated prior to being ejected from the vehicle.  The officer testified that "[b]ased on 
the factors of the statements I have taken, the victims at the scene, their 
injuries, the blood splatters, the blood coming from the back and the side, the 
evidence taken for DNA, my opinion is that [Z.P.] was in the back seat, his head 
went through the passenger side."  
The officer further testified that "[b]ased on my opinion, I believe that 
[Z.P.] was in the back passenger side and that [K.P.] was in the passenger's 
side, the front passenger's side seat."  
Finally, when asked whether he thought the accident was influenced by 
alcohol impairment, the officer testified that "[m]y opinion based on the scene 
is that whoever was driving, out of the three occupants of the vehicle, they 
were all intoxicated, alcohol involvement [sic] impairment was a factor in the 
crash."

 
 

[¶13]     
Defense counsel 
repeatedly objected to the State's questions regarding the officer's training 
and experience, and to the officer's testimony regarding the position of the 
occupants of the vehicle, on the grounds that he was stating opinions that only 
an expert witness could provide.  In 
response, the court instructed the jury several times that the investigating 
officer could not provide expert opinions and as to how much weight, if any, 
should be given to opinion testimony from a witness who is not an expert 
witness.

 
 

[¶14]     
Ultimately, the jury 
found Appellant guilty on both counts of aggravated vehicular 
homicide.  Appellant was subsequently 
sentenced to 12 to 20 years for each conviction, with the sentences to be served 
consecutively.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

1.    
Lay Opinion 
Testimony

 
 

[¶15]     
Appellant contends 
that the officer's opinion as to the respective positions of the occupants of 
the vehicle before the crash was not properly admitted as lay opinion 
testimony.  He argues that the 
testimony should have been excluded because it was not based solely on the 
officer's own perceptions and because the testimony required the officer to draw 
on his specialized training.

 
 

[¶16]     
We review evidentiary 
rulings for an abuse of discretion.

 
 
A trial court's 
decision on the admissibility of evidence is entitled to considerable deference, 
and will not be reversed on appeal unless the appellant demonstrates a clear 
abuse of discretion. As long as there exists a legitimate basis for the trial 
court's ruling, that ruling will not be disturbed on 
appeal.

 
 

Phillip 
v. State, 
2010 WY 14, ¶ 10, 225 P.3d 504, 509 (Wyo. 
2010).

 
 

[¶17]     
Wyoming Rule of 
Evidence 701 governs the admission of opinion testimony by a lay 
witness:

 
 
If the witness is not 
testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is 
limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the 
perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his 
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.

 
 

[¶18]     
In defining the 
proper scope of lay opinion testimony, this Court stated in Schmunk v. State that W.R.E. 701 
incorporates the personal knowledge requirement of W.R.E. 602, which provides, 
in part, that "[a] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is 
introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the 
matter."  714 P.2d 724, 734 (Wyo. 
1986).  In Schmunk, we held that a son's testimony 
that he suspected his father of killing his mother was inadmissible because it 
was not based on personal knowledge or perception.  Id. at 735.  We explained that "[u]nder Rule 701, the 
witness must have perceived firsthand the pertinent events or matters, and his 
inferences or opinion must be rationally based on his perception; his testimony 
must be rejected if his firsthand observation was inadequate to support an 
opinion."  Id. (quoting 3 Louisell and Mueller, 
Federal Evidence § 376 at 618-619); see 
also United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 640-41 (8th Cir. Mo. 2001) 
(error to admit an investigator's opinion testimony under F.R.E. 701 where 
the investigator "lacked first-hand knowledge of the matters about which 
she testified" and based her opinions on "her investigation after the fact, not 
on her perception of the facts").

 
 

[¶19]     
Applying the rule 
articulated in Schmunk to this case, 
we find that the officer's testimony exceeded the scope of permissible lay 
opinion testimony because the officer relied on matters that were outside his 
personal knowledge and that were obtained through his investigation after the 
fact.  It is undisputed that the 
officer's opinion was not based solely on his personal perceptions.  He testified that his opinion as to the 
positioning of the occupants of the vehicle was based on "the factors of the 
statements I have taken, the victims at the scene, their injuries, the blood 
splatters, the blood coming from the back and side, [and] the evidence taken for 
DNA [testing] . . . ."  The 
secondhand accounts from the witnesses at the bar and the DNA evidence obtained 
after it was sent to a crime lab for testing contained evidence that was beyond 
the personal knowledge and perception of the officer.

 
 

[¶20]     
The officer's opinion 
testimony was also not based on matters within the realm of common 
experience.   Lay opinion 
testimony is intended "only to help the jury or the court to understand the 
facts about which the witness is testifying and not to provide specialized 
explanations or interpretations that an untrained layman could not make if 
perceiving the same acts or events."  Peoples, 
250 F.3d  at 641 (citing United States v. Cortez, 935 F.2d 135, 139-40 
(8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1244-45 
(9th Cir. 1997)).  
In accordance with 
this principle, we have held that "W.R.E. 701 cannot be read to allow a 
witness who fails to qualify as an expert to offer opinion testimony where the 
subject in question lies outside the realm of common experience and requires 
special skill or knowledge.'"  Carroll v. Bergen, 2002 WY 166, ¶ 21, 57 P.3d 1209, 1217 (Wyo. 2002) 
(citing Kemper Architects, P.C. v. McFall, Konkel & Kimball 
Consulting Engineers, Inc., 843 P.2d 1178, 1190 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting 3 David W. Louisell & Christopher 
B. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 376 at 419 (Supp. 1992)).  

 
 

[¶21]     
Confining lay opinion 
to the realm of common experience, in turn, is consistent with the distinction 
between lay and expert testimony that is made by W.R.E. 701 and W.R.E. 702. 
 Wyoming Rule of Evidence 702 
indicates that opinion testimony based on specialized knowledge is the province 
of an expert witness:

 
 
If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

 
 
If a witness's 
testimony draws on experience beyond the ken of the average person, that witness 
must meet the qualification requirements of Rule 702.  Offering lay opinion testimony that is 
based on specialized knowledge ignores the distinction made by W.R.E. 701 and 
W.R.E. 702, and further, subverts the disclosure and qualification requirements 
for expert witnesses.  See Peoples, 250 F.3d  at 641; Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d  at 1246.  Indeed, for 
these reasons, it is often stated that expert testimony may not be admitted 
under the guise of lay opinions.  See, e.g., Peoples, 250 F.3d  at 641.  

 
 

[¶22]     
In People v. Stewart, the Supreme Court of Colorado addressed the 
issue of whether an officer's reconstruction of an accident was within the 
proper bounds of lay opinion testimony under provisions of the Colorado Rules of 
Evidence that are identical to the Wyoming Rules of Evidence.  55 P.3d 107 (Colo. 2002).  In that case, although the prosecution 
did not seek to qualify the officer as an expert, "the officer attested that he had received 240 hours of 
instruction in investigating traffic accidents, including eighty hours of 
intense technique in accident investigation' and eighty hours in accident 
reconstruction," before offering 
an opinion as to how the incident at issue occurred.  Id. at 122.  The court applied the reasoning of Peoples and Figueroa-Lopez and 
concluded that "where, as here, an officer's 
testimony is based not only on [his] perceptions and observations of the crime 
scene, but also on [his] specialized training or education, [he] must be 
properly qualified as an expert before offering testimony that amounts to expert 
testimony."  Id. at 124.  The court further 
stated:

 
 
While 
[the officer's] testimony about his observations of the crime scene and his 
investigation of the incident were proper, it was inappropriate for the court to 
permit him to testify as a lay person about his reconstruction of the crime 
scene and his deductions about such matters as the vehicle's direction, 
position, and speed.

 
 

Id. 
The 
court found that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the 
officer's testimony without requiring that he be qualified as an expert.  Id.  However, the court ultimately held that 
the error was harmless because the officer's conclusions about the speed and 
angle of the vehicle were substantiated by the testimony of other 
witnesses.  Id.

 
 

[¶23]     
We find the reasoning 
of Stewart particularly persuasive in 
light of the factual similarity to the case at hand.  In this case, the investigating 
officer's opinion as to the respective positions of the occupants of the truck 
prior to the accident was based on his training and experience in accident 
investigations.  This is apparent 
from the officer's statements that he had taken and passed a 40-hour course in 
basic accident investigations and an 80-hour course in advanced traffic accident 
investigations, and that he had investigated roughly 50 traffic accidents 
involving ejections.  The officer 
described his training in detail:

 
 
Your advanced 
investigation courses will . . . go through your basic diagramming again and 
your measurements.  You're going to 
learn depth measurements using formulas, trip formulas, speed formulas, impact 
formulas[;] you've got other formulas to do with fall and rise and you will take 
into consideration elevation, slopes, the speed of the 
vehicle.

 
 
Moreover, the officer 
also created a diagram of the accident based on his measurements at the scene 
and explained the diagram as it was projected to the jury:  

 
 
[T]his is the point 
where [the truck] goes off the road right here for about 274 feet and these are 
markings that I observed in the road.  
And it comes back onto the asphalt in the lane of travel, overcorrects, 
comes back this way, and right here we'll have striation marks, the tire track, 
it's kind of the skid marks through here and then it goes into a broadway  a 
broadside skid on the last part of the pavement, into the dirt down to here and 
this is about the area where the vehicle, like I said, it trips or the center of 
gravity is now outside of the wheels of the tire base, the wheelbase, and it 
flips.  What happens is it will land 
about here, the first impact you can observe that I saw there and you can see 
it, and when it trips what it did is  looking at the vehicle, there's no impact 
on the right side so it actually flew in the air and it did a roll and it landed 
on the passenger side.

 
 
Appellant did not 
object to any aspect of the officer's "accident reconstruction."  He did not object to the officer's 
personal observations at the scene, to the testimony concerning the measurements 
that were taken, or to the officer's conclusions as to the path of the vehicle 
as it left the road and then crashed into a tree.  The objections to the officer's opinion 
testimony were limited to the locations of the occupants of the vehicle.  Nevertheless, the officer's training and 
expertise provided the background for that opinion testimony.  The State, however, never claimed that 
the officer was an expert and qualified to give that 
opinion.

  

[¶24]     
The officer's 
testimony was not proper lay opinion testimony.  The testimony was based on matters 
beyond the officer's personal knowledge or perception, and was based in large 
measure on the officer's training and experience, which were beyond the ken of 
the average person.  It was error to 
admit the evidence as lay opinion testimony under W.R.E. 
701.

 
 

[¶25]     
Having determined 
that error occurred, we must now consider whether that error was 
harmless.

  

The harmless error 
standard is set out in W.R.A.P. 9.04: "Any error, defect, 
irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be 
disregarded by the reviewing court."  See also W.R.Cr.P. 52(a). An error is harmful if there is a reasonable  possibility 
that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant had the error 
never occurred. To demonstrate harmful error, the defendant 
must show prejudice under "circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and 
injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play."  Johnson v. State, 790 P.2d 231, 232 (Wyo. 1990). 
 Under our harmless error analysis, 
we must judge whether the jury's verdict might have been different but for the 
witnesses' testimony.

 
 

Wilks v. 
State, 2002 
WY 100, ¶ 21, 49 P.3d 975, 985 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 

[¶26]     
Appellant contends 
that the testimony, particularly because it came from a law enforcement officer, 
was prejudicial and that, without this testimony, the resulting verdict would 
have been more favorable.  We 
disagree.  The overwhelming weight 
of the remaining evidence establishes that Appellant was the driver of the 
vehicle.  This evidence includes (1) 
the testimony from two eyewitnesses who placed Appellant in the driver's seat of 
the truck just before leaving the Lucky Five Bar, and who saw Z.P. asleep in the 
backseat and K.P. resting in the passenger seat; (2) the testimony from one of 
those witnesses who saw Appellant drive the truck away from the bar; (3) the 
short amount of time that elapsed from when Appellant left the bar to when the 
accident occurred; (4) the location of the blood collected from the truck; (5) 
the lack of damage to the driver's side of the truck; (6) the relatively minor 
injuries suffered by Appellant; and (7) the fact that Appellant owned the 
truck.  Furthermore, the district 
court instructed the jury several times as to the fact that the officer was not 
an expert and as to the weight, if any, to be accorded to opinion testimony from 
a witness who is not an expert.

   

[¶27]     
In light of the 
overall weight of the evidence and the curative instructions to the jury, we 
cannot conclude that there is a reasonable probability that, had the error not 
occurred, the verdict would have been more favorable to Appellant.  The error was 
harmless.

 
 

[¶28]     
Finally, although he 
did not object at trial, Appellant contends on appeal that the officer's opinion 
that alcohol impairment was a factor in the crash was also impermissible expert 
testimony.  Because Appellant did 
not object to this testimony, we apply the plain error standard of review.  See, e.g., Luftig v. State, 2010 WY 43, ¶ 11, 228 P.3d 857, 860 
(Wyo. 2010).

 
 

[¶29]     
Appellant argues that 
the officer was not relying on his personal knowledge of the facts in stating 
his opinion that alcohol impairment was a factor in the crash, and that the 
testimony is therefore inadmissible as lay opinion testimony.  We agree that the officer could not have 
known that the victims were intoxicated based on his personal observations 
because the officer did not know that the victims were intoxicated until he 
received the coroner's blood toxicity analysis.  The officer, through personal 
observation of Appellant at the scene of the accident, could have deduced that 
Appellant was intoxicated.  However, 
his opinion that Appellant was driving the vehicle was based upon factors beyond 
personal observation.  It was error 
to admit this testimony.

 
 

[¶30]     
We conclude, however, 
that this error was harmless.  The 
evidence introduced by the State established that all occupants of the vehicle 
had blood-alcohol concentrations that were over three times the legal 
limit.  Further, the evidence 
established that the occupants of the truck had been drinking at the Lucky Five 
Bar for several hours and that the bartender stopped serving Appellant alcohol 
due to his level of intoxication.  
The eyewitness testimony from the patrons at the bar also indicated that 
Appellant was so intoxicated that he needed assistance to start his truck 
despite the fact that it was in working order.  In light of the remaining evidence 
establishing that alcohol impairment was a factor in the crash, there is no 
reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to 
Appellant had the error not occurred.

 
 

2.    
Sufficiency of the 
Evidence

 
 

[¶31]     
Appellant next 
contends that there was insufficient evidence to establish his guilt.  The elements of aggravated vehicular 
homicide are identified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b)(i), which reads, in 
part, as follows:  

 
 
(b) A person is 
guilty of aggravated homicide by vehicle and shall be punished by imprisonment 
in the penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years, 
if:

 
 

(i) While operating 
or driving a vehicle in violation of W.S. 10-6-103, 31-5-233 or 41-13-206, he 
causes the death of another person and the violation is the proximate cause of 
the death.

 
 

[¶32]     
The vehicular 
homicide charge in this case was based on a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-5-233(b) (LexisNexis 2007), which provides: 

 
 

(b) No person shall 
drive or have actual physical control of any vehicle within this state if the 
person:

 
 

(i) Has an alcohol 
concentration of eight one-hundredths of one percent (0.08%) or more; 
or

(ii) To a degree which renders 
him incapable of safely driving:

(A)  
Is under the 
influence of alcohol.

 
 
Pursuant to these 
statutes, the State was required to prove that Appellant was intoxicated, that 
he was driving the vehicle, and that his intoxication was the proximate cause of 
the victims' deaths.  Appellant does 
not dispute that there was sufficient evidence to establish that he was 
intoxicated at the time of the crash.  
Rather, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he 
was driving the truck when it crashed or to establish that his intoxication was 
the proximate cause of the crash and resulting deaths.  

 
 

[¶33]     
The standard of 
review for determining whether evidence is sufficient to support a conviction is 
well-established:

            

In reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence . . . , we examine and accept as true the State's 
evidence and all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from it.  We do not consider conflicting evidence 
presented by the defendant.  We do 
not substitute our judgment for that of the jury; rather, we determine whether a 
jury could have reasonably concluded each of the elements of the crime was 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  This standard applies whether the 
supporting evidence is direct or circumstantial.  Martin v. State, 2007 WY 2, ¶ 32, 149 P.3d 707, 715 
(Wyo. 2007), citing Butcher v. State, 
2005 WY 146, ¶ 16, 123 P.3d 543, 549 (Wyo. 2005). See also, Garay v. State, 2007 WY 130, ¶ 2, 165 P.3d 99, 100 (Wyo. 
2007).

 
 

Anderson 
v. State, 
2009 WY 119, ¶ 6, 216 P.3d 1143, 1145 (Wyo. 
2009).

 
 

[¶34]     
Because there were no 
witnesses to the crash, the jury was required to rely on circumstantial evidence 
to conclude that Appellant was driving.  
Circumstantial evidence 
is "proof of facts or circumstances from which the existence or 
non-existence of other facts may reasonably be inferred."  John Q. Hammons, Inc. v. Poletis, 954 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Wyo. 1998).  "Circumstantial evidence is not evidence 
of a lower order; the law makes no distinction between the weight to be given to 
either direct or circumstantial evidence."  
Id. at 1357-58.  

 
 

[¶35]     
In reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence we do not distinguish between direct and 
circumstantial evidence.  Smith v. State, 2009 WY 2, ¶ 15, 199 P.3d 1052, 1057 (Wyo. 
2009).  A jury is entitled to 
draw reasonable inferences from the evidence in reaching a conclusion.  We have given the following description 
of a permissible inference: "An inference is a process of reasoning by which a 
fact or proposition is deduced fairly and logically from other facts proven or 
admitted.  An inference is truly 
evidence.  The weight to which it is 
entitled depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case . . . ."  Id. (citing Seeley v. State, 959 P.2d 170, 176 (Wyo. 
1998)).

 
 

[¶36]     
Accepting all 
reasonable inferences from the State's evidence, we find that the jury could 
have reasonably concluded that Appellant was driving at the time of the 
crash.  Excluding the investigating 
officer's opinion as to the positions of the occupants of the vehicle, there was 
ample evidence to support the conclusion that Appellant was driving.  Witnesses placed the victims in the 
passenger and back seats of the vehicle and saw Appellant drive away from the 
bar.  The accident occurred 
precisely within the time frame established by the State, which allowed little 
or no time for the occupants to adjust their positions.  In addition, the fact that there was 
very little damage to the driver's side of the vehicle, whereas the rest of the 
truck was destroyed, matches the relatively minor physical harm that Appellant 
experienced as compared to the victims.  We find that there was sufficient 
evidence for the jury to make the reasonable inference that Appellant was 
driving the vehicle at the time of the accident.

 
 

[¶37]     
We also find that 
there was sufficient evidence to establish that Appellant's conduct was the 
proximate cause of the victims' deaths.  
In order to establish proximate cause, there must be sufficient evidence 
that the crash and resulting deaths were the natural and probable consequence of 
Appellant's wrongful act of driving under the influence to a degree which 
rendered him incapable of safely operating a vehicle.  See Edwards v. State, 2007 WY 146, ¶ 10, 167 P.3d 636, 639 (Wyo. 
2007); 
Glazier 
v. State, 
843 P.2d 1200, 1204 (Wyo. 1992); 
Hodgins v. State, 706 P.2d 655, 657 (Wyo. 1985).

 
 

[¶38]     
Appellant argues that 
the State did not establish proximate cause because it failed to show what 
caused the truck to leave the road.  
Appellant suggests many possible events that could have caused the 
accident, such as an attempt to avoid wildlife in the road, an attempt to avoid 
an oncoming car, or a vehicle malfunction.  
However, there was no evidence that any of these events occurred.  On the other hand, there was 
overwhelming evidence that Appellant was driving while 
intoxicated.

 
 

[¶39]     
We have previously 
addressed proximate cause in this context.  
For example, in Glazier, the 
appellant and his girlfriend were riding on the appellant's motorcycle while the 
appellant was intoxicated.  The 
motorcycle skidded as it went around a turn and the crash resulted in the death 
of the appellant's girlfriend.  We 
found the evidence sufficient to establish proximate cause and explained: 

 

In this case, the 
motorcycle left the highway in broad daylight at a high rate of speed. Appellant 
was under the influence of alcohol and drugs. This accident resulted. This 
evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that appellant was 
incapable of safely driving and that this was the proximate cause of the 
accident. A reasonable person would foresee that driving a motorcycle while 
under the influence of impairing substances to such a degree that they are 
unable to drive safely might cause severe injury or death to themselves or 
another person.

 
 

Glazier, 
843 P.2d  at 1204; see also Allen v. 
State, 2002 WY 48, ¶ 43, 43 P.3d 551, 566 (Wyo. 2002) ("One 
who drinks and drives should reasonably foresee that some among the potential 
victims of drunken driving will not wear seat belts and that such victims, among 
others, might be seriously injured in an alcohol-induced collision."); Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 819 (Wyo. 1996) ("The 
jury could have reasonably concluded that Appellant was intoxicated, that he 
drove his vehicle in a reckless manner, and that either or both circumstances 
were the proximate cause of the victim's death.").  

 
 

[¶40]     
In this case, the 
prosecution introduced evidence that showed Appellant had a blood-alcohol 
content of .26% after the crash.  
The State proved that Appellant was driving the truck when it went off 
the road and crashed into a tree, and further, that the roads were dry that 
night and that weather conditions were good.  The evidence was sufficient for the jury 
to conclude that Appellant's driving under the influence was the proximate cause 
of the victims' deaths.

 
 

3.    
Fifth Amendment  
Double Jeopardy

 
 

[¶41]     
Appellant next argues 
that imposing multiple sentences for the same act violates his right to be free 
from double jeopardy under both the United States and Wyoming 
Constitutions.  The Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Wyoming 
Constitution guarantee that a person will not be placed twice in jeopardy for 
the same criminal offense.  Although 
the language of the respective double jeopardy provisions is dissimilar, "they 
have the same meaning and are co-extensive in application."   Vigil v. State, 563 P.2d 1344, 1350 (Wyo. 
1977).  We have followed the 
federal courts' interpretation of the United States Constitution in stating that 
"the double jeopardy provisions 
of both Constitutions provide an accused three protections: 1) protection against a second 
prosecution for the same offense following an acquittal; 2) protection against a second 
prosecution for the same offense after a conviction; and 3) protection against multiple 
punishments for the same offense." Meyers v. State, 2005 WY 163, ¶ 9, 124 P.3d 710, 714 (Wyo. 2005) 
(citing Pope v. State, 2002 WY 9, ¶ 14, 38 P.3d 1069, 1072 (Wyo. 
2002)).  In this case, Appellant 
argues that his sentence falls within the third category, the protection against 
multiple punishments.

 
 

[¶42]     
In instances where 
the protection against multiple punishments is implicated and multiple 
convictions are based on violations of different statutes, a double jeopardy 
claim is analyzed under the "same elements" test described in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932), which Wyoming adopted in State v. 
Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1131 
(Wyo. 1993).  That test asks 
"whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other 
does not."  Blockburger, 284 U.S.  at 304, 52 S. Ct.  at 182.  However, in cases that involve two 
violations of the same statute, the 
"same elements" test does not apply.  
Instead, when two violations 
arise from the same statute, we look directly to the intent of the legislature 
to determine the appropriate "unit of prosecution."  See Amrein v. State, 836 P.2d 862, 865 (Wyo. 1992). 
 In these situations, we have held 
that "statutory construction and legislative intent will control the 
determination whether, when there are multiple victims from a single act or 
course of conduct, there is only one crime or as many crimes as there are 
victims."  Id. at 864; Tuggle v. State, 733 P.2d 610, 612 (Wyo. 1987); Vigil, 563 P.2d at 1352-53; see also United States v. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118, 125 n.3 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Ordinarily, courts apply the so-called 
Blockburger test' to determine whether or not two charged offenses constitute 
different crimes.  That analysis is 
inappropriate in this case, because there is only one statute at issue, and so, 
nothing to compare.  Rather than 
determining whether one act falls within two distinct statutes, as in Blockburger, we are asking whether two 
acts constitute one statutory offense.") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 949, 125 S. Ct. 364, and cert. denied, 543 U.S. 960, 
125 S. Ct. 430 (2004); United States v. 
Weathers, 186 F.3d 948, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("Where two violations of the 
same statute rather than two violations of different statutes are charged, 
courts determine whether a single offense is involved not by applying the Blockburger test, but rather by asking 
what act the legislature intended as the unit of prosecution' under the 
statute."), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1005, 120 S. Ct. 1272 (2000).

 
 

[¶43]     
This 
Court has never specifically decided whether a violation of Wyoming's aggravated 
vehicular homicide statute includes as many separate offenses as there are 
victims when multiple deaths result from a single automobile accident.  However, we find guidance in two Wyoming 
cases that have addressed the issue in the context of other crimes.  In the first case, Vigil, the appellant shot a gun at an 
automobile carrying five occupants and the jury returned guilty verdicts on all 
five charges of assault with a deadly weapon.  563 P.2d at1346.  The appellant challenged the judgment on 
double jeopardy grounds, despite the fact that he received only one 
sentence.  In holding that a 
separate crime was committed with respect to each victim, we reasoned that 
because the statute at issue referred to an assault or battery upon "any human 
being," using the singular form of the noun, the statute was intended to protect 
individual persons.  See id. at 1351-52.  We noted that although the offenses 
arose from the same event, "each involves a separate victim and courts are 
protective of the individual citizen subjected to the criminal conduct of 
another."  Id. at 1351.  We also noted that many cases from other 
jurisdictions hold that "killing by culpable negligence several human beings in 
one automobile accident constitutes as many separate offenses as there are 
victims and consecutive sentences are proper."  Id. at 1352 (citing cases that stand for 
the proposition that, under a vehicular homicide statute, the killing of a human 
being is the "gravamen of the offense" as opposed to the act of unlawfully 
operating a vehicle). 

 
 

[¶44]     
In the second case, 
Amrein, the appellant was convicted 
on eight counts of cruelty to animals for failing to provide livestock with 
proper food, and was given eight consecutive sentences.  836 P.2d  at 863.  The appellant argued that his right 
against double jeopardy was violated because his sentences resulted from a 
single continuous criminal act.  Id.  We ultimately found that the statute was 
ambiguous and invoked the rule of lenity in holding that it was error for the 
appellant to have been sentenced on more than one conviction.  Id. at 865.  We found the statute ambiguous because, 
although it referred several times to the singular noun and pronoun (as in "any 
animal," "it," and "the animal"), the statute also used the plural "animals" in 
the opening clause and the modifier "any" when referring to "animal."  Id.  Adding further support for the decision, 
we noted that "[a]s a general proposition, with few exceptions, in crimes 
against the person, when contrasted with crimes against property, there are as 
many offenses as individuals affected."  
Id. at 864 (quoting Vigil, 563 P.2d at 
1352).

 

[¶45]     
In the present case, 
we find that the aggravated vehicular homicide statute includes as many separate 
offenses as there are individuals affected by the defendant's conduct.  The focus of the statute, as in other 
homicide crimes, is on the resulting death of the victim, which indicates that 
the legislature intended to protect each individual citizen from harm.   We agree with the courts that have 
addressed this issue and determined that the resulting death of the victim is 
the gravamen of the offense, as opposed to the act of unlawfully driving an 
automobile.  See, e.g., Bautista v. State, 863 So. 2d 1180, 1186 (Fla. 2003) ("[T]he 
gravamen of the offense of DUI manslaughter is not a traffic violation, but the 
killing of a human being."); Commonwealth 
v. Meehan, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 1028, 1029 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) ("[T]he 
gravamen of the offense is the killing of a human being as distinguished from 
unlawful operation of a motor vehicle."); Murray v. United States, 358 A.2d 314, 
321 (D.C. 1976)  ("The 
gravamen of the crime [of negligent homicide] is not the act of operating a 
motor vehicle negligently; rather, it is the killing of a human being."); State v. Whitley, 382 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Mo. 1964) ("The 
gravamen of the offense [of manslaughter] is the killing of a human being, and 
the statute by its terms contemplates that there shall be as many offenses as 
there are human beings killed, whether by one or several acts.").  

 
 

[¶46]     
An 
examination of the language of the vehicular homicide statute also leads us to 
the conclusion that the legislature intended to protect the lives of each 
individual.  The statute states that 
a person is guilty if he causes "the death of another person."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b)(i).  Comparing this language to the statutes 
at issue in Vigil and Amrein, we find that the legislature's use of 
"another person" in the singular form of the noun evidences an intent that each 
death caused under the statute constitutes a separate unit of prosecution.  Indeed, this is also consistent with our 
finding in Tuggle that the word "another," when used in an 
aggravated assault and battery statute, "is a singular term and thus means each 
time another' is affected by said crime, it is a separate offense.  The obvious intent of the legislature 
was to protect each individual."  733 P.2d  at 612.  Accordingly, we hold that each death that 
results from a violation of the vehicular homicide statute constitutes a 
separate unit of prosecution and that separate convictions and sentences for 
each death resulting from a single accident do not violate Appellant's right 
against double jeopardy.

 
 

4.    
Eighth Amendment  
Cruel and Unusual Punishment

 
 

[¶47]     
Appellant next 
contends that imposing consecutive sentences of 12 to 20 years for two counts of 
aggravated vehicular homicide is cruel and unusual punishment.  He argues that this sentence is 
disproportionate to the offense, yet he acknowledges that the same sentence was 
given for the same offense in Allen, 
43 P.3d 551.  The maximum penalty for each conviction 
under the vehicular homicide statute is 20 years.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-106(b).

 
 

[¶48]     
This Court has 
rejected the common-law view that a sentence is not subject to appellate review 
if it is within the minimum and maximum limits set by statute.  Sampsell v. State, 2001 WY 12, ¶ 6, 17 P.3d 724, 726 (Wyo. 2001).  Instead, when the imposition of a 
criminal sentence is within the limits set by the legislature, we review the 
sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion.  Id.  
In the context of sentencing 
decisions, this standard of review has been described as follows: "A sentence 
will not be disturbed because of sentencing procedures unless the defendant can 
show an abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to him, and 
circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which 
offends the public sense of fair play."  Smith v. State, 922 P.2d 846, 848 (Wyo. 1996) 
(quoting Wright v. State, 670 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Wyo. 1983)).

 
 

[¶49]     
The United States 
Supreme Court recently revisited its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in Graham v. Florida, 
130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825, 835 (2010): 

 
 
The Eighth Amendment 
states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 
To determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, courts must look beyond 
historical conceptions to "the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.'" Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 
102, 97 S. Ct. 285, [290,] 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976) (quoting Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S. Ct. 590, [598,] 2 L. Ed. 2d 630 (1958) 
(plurality opinion)). "This is because [t]he standard of extreme cruelty is not 
merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judgment. The standard 
itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores of 
society change.'" Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, ___, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649, 171 L. Ed. 2d 525, 538 (2008) (quoting Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382, 92 S. Ct. 2726, [2800,] 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972) 
(Burger, C. J., dissenting)).

The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the 
imposition of inherently barbaric punishments under all circumstances.  See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 
536 U.S. 730, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 153 L. Ed. 2d 666 (2002).  "[P]unishments of torture," for 
example, "are forbidden."  Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136, 25 L. Ed. 345 (1879).  These cases underscore the essential 
principle that, under the Eighth Amendment, the State must respect the human 
attributes even of those who have committed serious 
crimes.

For the most part, however, the Court's precedents consider 
punishments challenged not as inherently barbaric but as disproportionate to the 
crime.  The concept of 
proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.  Embodied in the Constitution's ban on 
cruel and unusual punishments is the "precept of justice that punishment for 
crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense."  Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S. Ct. 544, [549,] 54 L. Ed. 793 (1910).

 
 
In Solem v. Helm, the U.S. Supreme Court 
adopted the following proportionality analysis, which the Wyoming Supreme Court 
has followed since Oakley v. State, 
715 P.2d 1374, 1376-77 (Wyo. 
1986):

 
 
In sum, a court's 
proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by 
objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness 
of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same 
jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime 
in other jurisdictions.

 
 

Solem, 463 U.S. 277, 292, 
103 S. Ct. 3001, 3011, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983).  In Oakley, we stated that a proportionality 
analysis under Solem is only 
necessary where the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the 
crime.

 
 
We will not engage in 
a lengthy analysis under all three of the Solem criteria, including a 
consideration of the sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants in this 
and other jurisdictions, except in cases where the mode of punishment is unusual 
or where the relative length of sentence to imprisonment is extreme when 
compared to the gravity of the offense (the first of the Solem criteria). 
Oakley's sentence does not merit that kind of in-depth Solem analysis, 
and the Solem opinion does not require that kind of analysis in a case 
such as this.

 
 

Oakley, 715 P.2d  at 
1379.  In subsequent cases, we 
reiterated this principle, stating:

 
 
Our rule is in accord 
with the approach taken by the United States Supreme Court in Harmelin v. Michigan, where the court 
concluded that the Solem 
proportionality analysis is appropriate only "in the rare case in which a 
threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an 
inference of gross disproportionality."  [Harmelin], 501 U.S. 957, 1005, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2707, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).

 
 

Dodge v. 
State, 951 P.2d 383, 385 (Wyo. 1997). This 
application of Oakley is still followed by this Court.  Suval v. State, 6 P.3d 1272, 1274 (Wyo. 
2000).

 
 

Sampsell, ¶ 10, 17 P.3d  at 
728.  See also Graham, 130 S. Ct.  at 2021 (the 
Eighth Amendment proportionality principle "forbids only extreme sentences that 
are grossly disproportionate' to the crime").

 
 

[¶50]     
In this case, we do 
not need to engage in a proportionality analysis because the length of 
Appellant's sentence is not extreme or unusual when compared to the gravity of 
the offense.  Instead, we will use 
our standard rubric for assessing the reasonableness of the sentence, which 
gives consideration to the crime, its circumstances, and the character of the 
defendant.  Frederick 
v. State, 
2007 WY 27, ¶ 32, 151 P.3d 1136, 1146 (Wyo. 
2007). 
 In its sentencing decision, the 
district court noted that Appellant had a blood-alcohol content that was over 
three times the legal limit at the time of the accident.  The court noted that Appellant had a 
chronic history of alcohol and substance abuse that went untreated for decades, 
as well as a history of convictions for drunk-driving related offenses without 
any apparent attempt on his part to correct this behavior.  Finally, the court considered the fact 
that Appellant's conduct resulted in the deaths of two people.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in the sentencing decision in light of its careful consideration of 
the circumstances surrounding the crime and the character of 
Appellant.

 
 

5.    
Sentencing 
Factors

 
 

[¶51]     
Appellant's final 
argument focuses on the district court's recitation of aggravating factors as a 
basis for imposing consecutive sentences.  
Appellant argues that it was improper for the district court to consider 
aggravating factors when the legislature has not specified any aggravating 
factors for this particular offense.  
Appellant claims that our decision in Jones v. State, 2003 WY 154, 79 P.3d 1021 (Wyo. 2003) suggests that consecutive 
sentences can only be imposed upon some finding of aggravated circumstances that 
have been identified by the legislature.  
We disagree.  In Jones, we were unable to determine 
whether the district court had abused its discretion in imposing consecutive 
sentences because the court failed to provide an explanation for its sentencing 
decision:  

 
 
Given these 
circumstances, we are unable to effectively perform a meaningful review of the 
provision that the sentences be consecutive to the previous sentence. We are 
compelled to remand for another hearing at which the district court should 
enumerate the sources of its information, receive all information that may 
guide its decision, and make findings as appropriate. While such detailed 
findings are always beneficial to the review process, they are not always 
mandated. However, here, we remain as uncertain as to the foundation for 
imposition of consecutive sentences as we were prior to the remand. We conclude 
that a remand for further development of the record and the rendition of 
detailed findings is necessary under the unique circumstances of this 
case.

 
 

Id., ¶ 14, 79 P.3d  at 
1026-27.  In contrast to Jones, the district court in this case 
clearly described the factors that were considered in the sentencing 
decision.  The court considered each 
of the objectives of criminal punishment, including deterrence, incapacitation, 
retribution, and rehabilitation, and described on the record how Appellant's 
character and personal history related to each of these objectives.  Accordingly, we find no merit in 
Appellant's argument that the district court improperly considered aggravating 
factors in deciding to impose consecutive sentences.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶52]     
In sum, we hold that 
the district court erred in admitting the investigating officer's opinion as to 
the location of the occupants of the vehicle at the time of the crash and as to 
whether alcohol impairment was a factor in the crash.  However, in light of the remaining 
evidence produced by the State, these errors were harmless.  The evidence was sufficient to establish 
that Appellant was driving the vehicle and that his intoxication was the 
proximate cause of the crash and the resulting deaths of the victims.  Finally, we hold that Appellant's 
constitutional rights against double jeopardy and against cruel and unusual 
punishment were not violated by the imposition of consecutive sentences of 12 to 
20 years.  For these reasons, the 
decision of the district court is affirmed.

  

VOIGT, 
Justice, specially 
concurring.

 
 

[¶53]     
I concur in the 
result in this well-reasoned majority opinion, and I agree with nearly all of 
its analysis.  I write separately 
only to address a particular point.  
Plainly stated, it is beyond me why the State did not offer Trooper 
Badura as an expert witness under W.R.E. 702 and offer some form of Wyoming 
Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction No. 6.08A (2004), which instruction tells the 
jury how to consider the opinion of an expert witness.  The record clearly reflects that Trooper 
Badura is an expert in the field of accident investigation, and all of his 
opinions about the accident, including the position of the occupants within the 
vehicle, would have been admissible had he testified as an expert.  It is true that opinion testimony as to 
the guilt of a defendant is 
inadmissible, whether from a lay witness or an expert witness.  Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879, 881 (Wyo. 1990).  That prohibition is not based upon the 
fact that "guilt" is the ultimate issue, but upon the fact that the 
determination of guilt is a mixed question of law and fact that is the jury's 
province.  Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 66-67 (Wyo. 1989), overruled in part on other grounds by Large 
v. State, 2008 WY 22, ¶ 30, 
177 P.3d 807, 816 (Wyo. 
2008).  The law in Wyoming is as 
follows:

 
 
            
The selection of the particular testimony to which Saldana now objects 
suggests he would have us extend the holding in Stephens to reach, and exclude, all 
opinion testimony, expert or not, on any issue that could go to proving an 
element of the crime charged.  
Saldana's view is that any analysis offered by a witness on the evidence 
presented at trial is equivalent to a direct, and thus impermissible, comment on 
the defendant's guilt.  We are not 
inclined to accept this premise, especially in light of the provisions of 
Wyo.R.Evid. 702 that permit opinion evidence even on an ultimate issue.  Stephens; McCabe v. R.A. Manning Constr. Co., 674 P.2d 699 (Wyo. 1983).  An 
interpretation of the evidence by a witness, even though that interpretation may 
be important in establishing an element of the crime and thus leading to the 
inference of guilt, is not in the same category as an actual conclusional 
statement on the guilt or innocence of the accused party.  We are particularly firm in this 
determination if the record demonstrates the proffered opinion was helpful to 
the jury in determining the facts of the case and was elicited for that 
reason.  Wyo.R.Evid. 702.

 
 

Saldana v. 
State, 846 P.2d 604, 616-17 (Wyo. 1993).

 
 

[¶54]     
An expert in the 
field of accident investigation or reconstruction, particularly one who 
investigated the scene immediately after the accident and who interviewed the 
pre-accident witnesses, may opine as to the position of the occupants in the 
vehicle, assuming that he or she is able to testify as to a sufficient basis for 
that opinion.  That is what should 
have happened here.

 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The attending 
physician testified that an abrasion is an "indication of damage to the skin 
tissue, . . . it's not a laceration that requires surgery, that's just a bruise, 
basically, with damage to the skin."