Case Title: City of St. Albans v. Northwest Regional Planning Commission

Citation: 167 Vt. 466, 708 A.2d 194

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1998-03-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
St. Albans v. Northwest Regional Planning Commission  (97-268); 
167 Vt. 466; 708 A.2d 194

[Filed 13-Mar-1998]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            No. 97-268

City of St. Albans                           Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
    v.                                       Franklin Superior Court

Northwest Regional Planning Commission       December Term, 1997

Linda Levitt, J.

       Robert E. Farrar, St. Albans, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

       Paul S. Gillies of Tarrant, Marks & Gillies, Montpelier, for
  Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       SKOGLUND, J.  Plaintiff City of St. Albans appeals from a Franklin
  Superior Court order granting defendant Northwest Regional Planning
  Commission's (NWRPC) motion for summary judgment.  City of St. Albans
  contends the court erred in concluding that the method of selecting NWRPC's
  commissioners does not violate the equal protection clause of the United
  States Constitution and its "one person, one vote" principle.  We affirm.

       NWRPC was created to serve the 24 towns, villages, and city (St.
  Albans) of Grand Isle and Franklin counties.  See 24 V.S.A. § 4341 ("A
  regional planning commission may be created . . . by the act of the voters
  or the legislative body of each of a number of contiguous municipalities .
  . . .").  While a regional planning commission (RPC) is required to
  "contain at least one representative appointed from each member
  municipality," id. § 4342, individual RPCs may have more than one
  representative per member municipality if its charter and bylaw so permit. 
  See id. § 4343.  NWRPC's bylaws provide that each municipality, regardless
  of its population, must appoint two commissioners to represent them and
  each commissioner has one

 

  vote.  Thus, there are forty-eight NWRPC commissioners.  In addition,
  NWRPC's bylaws provide that each member municipality will be assessed a
  share of NWRPC's expenses based upon the member municipality's population
  compared to the total population of NWRPC.

       The general purpose of an RPC is to "encourage the appropriate
  development of all lands." Id. § 4302(a).  "Appropriate development"
  requires RPCs to consider the impact development has on a long list of
  delineated subject areas, including public health and safety, the general
  welfare, taxes, traffic, arts, architecture, and the environment.  See id.
  § 4302(a). Sections 4302(b) and (c) require an RPC to "engage in a
  continuing planning process" to further a number of specific goals,
  including developing "a coordinated, comprehensive planning process and
  policy framework to guide decisions by municipalities, [RPCs], and state
  agencies."  St. Albans (hereinafter `City') is the largest member
  municipality in NWRPC.(FN1)  Because each

 

  member municipality of NWRPC is represented by two votes regardless of that
  member municipality's population and because the expenses of NWRPC are
  shared on a per-capita basis, the City sought a declaratory judgment in
  Franklin Superior Court, pursuant to 12 V.S.A. § 4711.  The City claimed
  that the current NWRPC commissioner-selection scheme violates the
  Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (FN2) because NWRPC
  fails to provide apportionment on a "one person, one vote" basis and,
  thereby, denies the residents of the City equal protection under the law. 
  Both the City and the NWRPC subsequently filed motions for summary judgment
  claiming that there was no genuine issue of material fact -- the City
  claiming that NWRPC's apportionment scheme violated the equal protection
  clause and NWRPC claiming that the equal protection clause was inapplicable
  to NWRPC's apportionment scheme.  The court, concluding that the equal
  protection clause did not apply to NWRPC's apportionment scheme because
  NWRPC commissioners are appointed officials and NWRPC has a special and
  limited purpose, granted NWRPC's motion for summary judgment.  This appeal
  followed.

       In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we apply the same standard
  as the trial court. See Madden v. Omega Optical, Inc., 165 Vt. 306, 309,