Case Title: Aguilar and Kent on Contempt

Citation: 

Docket Number: S099667A

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2004-09-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed 9/23/04  (Contempt proceeding arising out of appeal with same docket number) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
In re RAUL V. AGUILAR and  
) 
ALLEN J. KENT on Contempt. 
) 
__________________________________ ) 
 
 
) 
RAUL V. AGUILAR, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S099667 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
ESTHER R. LERNER, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
THE COURT: 
On February 18, 2004, we ordered Attorney Raul V. Aguilar and Attorney 
Allen J. Kent to show cause before this court why each should not be held in 
contempt of court for the willful neglect of the duty to appear for oral argument 
before this court in Aguilar v. Lerner (2004) 32 Cal.4th 974 on February 10, 2004.  
Each attorney filed a return and thereafter appeared before this court, by counsel 
and in person, on March 9, 2004, providing statements and arguments and 
answering questions posed by the court. 
On March 17, 2004, after considering the returns to the order to show 
cause, the declarations and other written submissions by both attorneys and 
counsel, and the oral presentations before this court on March 9, 2004, we issued 
an order declining to discharge the order to show cause, retaining jurisdiction over 
 
 
2
the contempt matter, and referring this matter to the State Bar Court for further 
investigation, an evidentiary hearing or hearings, and a report to this court on 
specified questions.1  The State Bar Court conducted an investigation, held a two-
day evidentiary hearing, and submitted a 26-page report to this court on April 30, 
2004, with findings pertaining to each of the referred questions.  At our request, 
Aguilar and Kent filed letter briefs on May 24, 2004, responding to the State Bar 
Court’s report and findings. 
After considering all the materials that have been filed in this case, 
including the oral presentations before this court on March 9, 2004, and the 
transcript of the evidentiary hearing before the State Bar Court, we conclude that 
Aguilar and Kent each should be held in contempt, that Kent should be fined 
$250, that Aguilar should be fined $1,000, and that Aguilar should be referred to 
                                             
 
1 
We submitted the following questions to the State Bar Court: 
 
1.  Did either Kent or Aguilar lie in any statement made to the Supreme 
Court in writing or orally (under penalty of perjury or otherwise)? 
 
2.  Would Kent have breached any professional or ethical obligation to his 
client (present or former) by notifying the Supreme Court, prior to February 10, 
that he would not be appearing for appellant at the February 10 oral argument? 
 
3.  Did Kent breach any professional or ethical obligation to the Supreme 
Court by failing to notify the Court that he would not be appearing at the February 
10 oral argument? 
 
4.  Did Aguilar know, prior to receiving a telephone call from the 
Clerk/Administrator of the Supreme Court on February 10, 2004, that the case of 
Aguilar v. Lerner was scheduled to be argued before the California Supreme Court 
on February 10, 2004? 
 
5.  Did Aguilar know, or should he have known, prior to February 10, 
2004, that Kent would not be appearing for the appellant in Aguilar v. Lerner at 
the oral argument before the Supreme Court scheduled for February 10, 2004?  If 
so, did Aguilar breach any professional or ethical obligation to the Supreme Court 
by failing to appear or to assign another attorney to appear at oral argument?  
 
 
3
the State Bar for investigation and, if appropriate, the imposition of additional 
disciplinary sanctions.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1218; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6086.7.) 
 
With regard to Kent, we find that he violated his professional obligation to 
this court by failing, without adequate justification, either to appear for oral 
argument before this court or to notify this court that he would not be appearing.  
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 1209, subd. (a)(3) [“willful neglect or violation of duty by 
an attorney”] and (5) [“[d]isobedience of any lawful . . . order . . . of the court].) 
 
Past California cases that have considered whether an attorney may be held 
in contempt of court for failure to appear in court establish that when an attorney 
is aware of an order requiring his or her appearance in court, and the attorney has 
the ability to appear but knowingly and intentionally does not appear, the attorney 
has “willfully” neglected or failed to appear.  (See, e.g., Lyons v. Superior Court 
(1955) 43 Cal.2d 755, 759 [“The commitment order thus establishes that the court 
concluded that petitioner had had the ability to appear punctually at 2 o’clock and 
that his failure or neglect to appear was wilful, i.e., with ‘a purpose or willingness 
to commit the act, or make the omission.’ ”  (Italics added.)].)  Once such willful 
failure to appear is shown, the propriety of a contempt judgment depends upon the 
validity or persuasiveness of the attorney’s excuse or justification for his or her 
nonappearance.  (See, e.g., Lyon, supra, 43 Cal.2d at p. 759; Arthur v. Superior 
Court (1965) 62 Cal.2d 404, 411-412; Innis v. Municipal Court (1965) 62 Cal.2d 
487, 491; In re Stanley (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 588, 591-592.) 
 
In this case, contrary to Kent’s claim, the order of this court, filed on 
January 14, 2004, setting the case of Aguilar v. Lerner for oral argument on 
February 10, 2004, constitutes a sufficiently specific order directing counsel’s 
presence before this court at the designated time and place.  Indeed, Kent clearly 
was aware of this obligation, because on January 29, 2004, he returned the form 
that the clerk’s office had sent to him with the Supreme Court’s February 2004 
 
 
4
oral argument calendar, expressly indicating that he would be presenting oral 
argument on behalf of appellant Aguilar on February 10, 2004.  Although we 
agree with Kent that the law firm of Aguilar & Sebastinelli, by whom Kent was 
employed, rather than Kent personally, was the formal attorney of record for 
appellant Aguilar, so that another attorney in the law firm could have appeared at 
oral argument for appellant Aguilar without the need for a formal substitution of 
counsel, it does not follow that in the absence of such an appearance by another 
attorney, Kent — who personally had signed all documents filed in this court on 
behalf of appellant Aguilar and had informed the court that he would be presenting 
oral argument on February 10 — may not personally be held in contempt for 
failing, without adequate justification, either to appear or at least notify the court 
that he would not be appearing.  The question whether Kent may and should be 
held in contempt depends upon an assessment of the validity of Kent’s excuse or 
justification for failing to appear or notify the court that he would not appear. 
 
In light of the circumstances disclosed by the record in this case, we do not 
find adequate justification to excuse Kent’s failure to notify this court that he 
would not be appearing at oral argument. 
 
Presentation of oral argument on appeal is an important responsibility for 
an attorney in any case, not only in light of the duty owed to the client but also 
because of the attorney’s professional obligations to the appellate court.  As a 
general rule, this court does not permit parties to waive oral argument in cases 
before this court, and we, like all other courts, rely upon the presentation of oral 
argument by well-prepared attorneys to assist us in reaching an appropriate 
resolution of the often difficult questions presented in the cases before us. 
 
In this case, Kent terminated his employment at Aguilar & Sebastinelli only 
five days prior to the oral argument scheduled in this court.  Even if, as Kent 
maintains, his departure from the firm properly can be characterized as a 
 
 
5
“constructive discharge” because of the significant reduction in salary and 
responsibilities that prompted his resignation, Kent’s decision to leave the firm did 
not automatically terminate his professional responsibilities either to his former 
client or to this court.  For purposes of this contempt proceeding, we need not 
determine whether Kent took adequate steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable 
prejudice to the rights of his client (or former client) (see Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 
3-700(A)(2)), but we do find that, under the circumstances of this case, Kent 
violated his responsibility to this court by failing to notify the court that he would 
not be appearing at oral argument. 
 
As noted above, on January 29, 2004, just one week prior to his departure 
from the firm, Kent specifically informed this court that he would be appearing for 
oral argument on behalf of Aguilar at the scheduled February 10 oral argument in 
Aguilar v. Lerner.  After his departure from the firm on February 5, Kent made no 
effort to notify this court that he would not be appearing in Aguilar v. Lerner 
because he no longer represented appellant Aguilar.  The evidence presented in 
this contempt proceeding makes clear that Kent had not been informed that 
another attorney actually had been assigned to the case and would appear before 
this court on February 10 in his place (and, of course, no such attorney had been 
assigned to make such an appearance).2  Contrary to Kent’s contention, Kent 
                                             
 
2  
The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing discloses that on the day 
prior to and the day of his departure from the law firm, Kent briefly mentioned the 
upcoming Supreme Court argument to two associates at the law firm, but not to 
Aguilar, the legal manager of the firm who made all assignments at the firm.  Kent 
testified that in his conversations with the associates he offered to provide 
assistance over the weekend if the case were assigned to either of them, but in 
their testimony at the hearing neither associate testified that any such offer was 
included in his brief conversation with Kent in which the upcoming oral argument 
was mentioned.  In any event, Kent further specifically testified that when he 
spoke to one of the associates on the Saturday or Sunday preceding the scheduled 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
 
6
would not have prejudiced his client (or former client) simply by notifying this 
court that he no longer represented appellant Aguilar, and in our view Kent could 
not reasonably have believed that providing such notice to this court would be 
improper. 
 
Accordingly, under the circumstances revealed by the record in this case, 
we conclude that there was no adequate justification for Kent’s failure to inform 
the court that he would not appear on February 10.  Although Kent might have 
been fortunate enough to avoid any sanction had another attorney been promptly 
reassigned to the case, been able adequately to prepare for oral argument, and 
appeared at and presented oral argument on behalf of appellant Aguilar, Kent 
cannot avoid his share of responsibility for the interference with this court’s 
operations that resulted when, without any advance notice, no attorney appeared 
on behalf of appellant Aguilar when the case of Aguilar v. Lerner was called for 
argument before this court on February 10, 2004. 
Under these circumstances, we find Kent in contempt of court for failing, 
without adequate justification, to notify the court that he would not appear for oral 
argument, and we conclude that an appropriate sanction for this contempt is a fine 
of $250. 
With respect to Attorney Aguilar, we find his derelictions significantly 
more serious than those of Kent.  We agree with the State Bar Court’s findings 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
Tuesday, February 10 oral argument, the associate informed Kent that the case had 
not been assigned to him (the associate), and Kent further acknowledged never 
having asked the other associate whether the matter had been assigned to that 
associate. 
 
 
7
that Aguilar repeatedly lied3 to this court when he stated, both in written 
documents filed in this court and in oral statements made before the court, that he 
was unaware of the time and date of the scheduled oral argument in Aguilar v. 
Lerner prior to receiving a telephone call from the Clerk/Administrator of the 
Supreme Court on February 10, 2004, the date of the scheduled argument. 
The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing establishes that on 
January 15, 2004, the day Kent received the order from this court setting the case 
of Aguilar v. Lerner for oral argument on February 10, 2004 at 2:00 p.m., Kent 
telephoned Aguilar in Los Angeles, informed him of the time and date of 
argument before this court in Aguilar v. Lerner, and also specifically discussed 
with him the need to seek a continuance of a conflicting oral argument in another 
case (assigned to Kent) that was then scheduled for oral argument in the Court of 
Appeal in Los Angeles on February 10.  The evidence also establishes that, prior 
to February 5, 2004, Aguilar personally reviewed a copy of the Supreme Court’s 
February 2004 oral argument calendar and made a handwritten notation of Kent’s 
first name (“Allen”) on the document.  
In a letter brief filed in response to the State Bar Court report, counsel for 
Aguilar effectively concedes that the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing 
demonstrates that Aguilar was aware before February 10 of the argument date in 
Aguilar v. Lerner, but asserts that because of the extraordinary economic pressure 
under which Aguilar had been operating during the latter half of January, Aguilar, 
by February 10, 2004, had forgotten the date scheduled for oral argument in 
Aguilar v. Lerner.  On this ground, counsel maintains that Aguilar “truthfully 
                                             
 
3  
We employ the term “lie” in its customary usage, as involving a deliberate 
misrepresentation.  (See, e.g., Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 1305.) 
 
 
8
reported his own state of mind” when he told the Clerk/Administrator of the Court 
on February 10 that he was unaware the case was scheduled for argument on that 
date. 
The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing casts grave doubt on 
even this limited claim, because one of the associates at Aguilar & Sebastinelli, 
William Henley, specifically testified at the hearing that on February 5, 2004, 
Kent’s last day at the firm, shortly after Henley helped Kent carry Kent’s 
belongings from his office to his car, he (Henley) informed Aguilar — in speaking 
of items that would have to be covered for Kent — that Kent had just indicated 
that he (Kent) had an oral argument scheduled in the California Supreme Court on 
the following Tuesday, February 10, 2004.  Henley further testified that Aguilar 
had replied at that time:  “Oh, we don’t need to go to that.”  Although Aguilar 
subsequently attempted to explain this response by suggesting he had confused the 
case to which Henley was referring with another case assigned to Kent that was 
then pending before the Court of Appeal, that explanation is unconvincing because 
Henley specifically referred to a case before the California Supreme Court and 
Aguilar v. Lerner was the only case that the firm then had — or had ever had — 
before the Supreme Court.4   
                                             
 
4  
Although counsel for Aguilar suggests there is no plausible reason Aguilar 
deliberately would have decided not to assign an attorney to appear for the oral 
argument in Aguilar v. Lerner, it certainly is not inconceivable that Aguilar may 
have determined that from his own economic perspective the oral argument in 
Aguilar v. Lerner — a legal malpractice case that Aguilar had instituted against his 
former divorce attorney and that had proven quite unsuccessful to date (see 
Aguilar v. Lerner, supra, 32 Cal.4th 874, 980-981) — had a lower priority than 
other matters to which Kent had been assigned and that were required to be 
immediately reassigned to other attorneys.  Of course, however rational such a 
decision may have appeared at that time from Aguilar’s personal economic 
perspective, from a professional perspective there could be no justification for 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
 
9
In any event, even if we were to credit the claim that when he spoke to the 
Clerk/Administrator of the Supreme Court in two telephone calls on February 10, 
Aguilar temporarily had forgotten that he previously had been informed of the 
date and time of the oral argument in Aguilar v. Lerner, Aguilar made that 
representation (that he was unaware of the scheduled court appearance) not only 
on the date of the scheduled argument itself, but repeated this misrepresentation in 
a letter sent to this court on February 11, 2004, in his response filed on 
February 27, 2004, to the order to show cause, and in his oral presentation to this 
court on March 9, 2004.  Aguilar certainly had adequate opportunity, prior to 
making these later statements, to review all records and to discuss the matter fully 
with employees of his law firm so as to refresh his memory.  Under the 
circumstances, we believe the evidence amply supports the State Bar Court’s 
finding that Aguilar lied to this court when he stated repeatedly that he was 
unaware, prior to February 10, 2004, of the date and time of the scheduled oral 
argument in Aguilar v. Lerner. 
 
It is, of course, an extremely serious breach of an attorney’s duty to a court 
to lie in statements made to the court (see Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (d); 
Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 5-200 (B)), and an intentionally false statement made by 
an attorney to a court clearly constitutes a contempt of court.  (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1209, subd. (a)(3); In re Ciraolo (1969) 70 Cal.2d 389, 394.)  We find Aguilar 
in contempt of court for lying to this court in stating that he was unaware, prior to 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
failing to ensure that a fully prepared attorney appeared and participated at an oral 
argument scheduled before this court. 
 
 
10
February 10, 2004, that the case of Aguilar v. Lerner was scheduled for oral 
argument in this court on February 10, 2004. 
 
In addition to finding that Aguilar lied to the court, we also conclude that 
Aguilar committed a contempt of court in intentionally failing, after the 
termination of Kent’s employment at Aguilar & Sebastinelli on February 5, to 
assign an attorney to appear at oral argument before this court.  As already noted, 
the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing indicates that on February 5, 
shortly after Kent’s departure from the firm, Aguilar was asked by an associate at 
Aguilar & Sebastinelli about Kent’s oral argument before the Supreme Court that 
was scheduled for the following Tuesday (February 10), and Aguilar replied:  
“Oh, we don’t need to go to that.”  We find Aguilar’s attempt to provide an 
innocent explanation of this statement unconvincing (ante, p. 8), particularly in 
light of Aguilar’s lack of veracity with regard to the other statements discussed 
above. 
 
Because we find that Aguilar (1) had knowledge of the court order 
scheduling oral argument in Aguilar v. Lerner for February 10, 2004, (2) had the 
ability, as the managing lawyer of Aguilar & Sebastinelli, to assign an attorney to 
appear at oral argument, and (3) made an intentional decision not to do so, we find 
Aguilar in contempt of court on this ground as well.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1209, 
subd. (a)(5).) 
In light of the serious nature of Aguilar’s contemptuous conduct, we 
conclude that Aguilar should be fined $1,000 and should be referred to the State 
Bar for further investigation and, if appropriate, the imposition of additional 
disciplinary sanctions. (Bus & Prof. Code, § 6086.7, subds. (a), (c).) 
Attorney Allen J. Kent is found in contempt of court and is ordered to pay a 
fine of $250. 
 
 
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Attorney Raul V. Aguilar is found in contempt of court and is ordered to 
pay a fine of $1,000.  Pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6086.7, 
subdivisions (a) and (c), the clerk is directed to notify the State Bar of this court’s 
action with regard to Attorney Aguilar by forwarding to the State Bar a copy of 
this opinion and judgment of contempt, and the clerk shall make available to the 
State Bar the complete record of this contempt proceeding. 
 
 
 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
I agree with the majority in holding Attorney Raul V. Aguilar in contempt 
of court, fining him $1,000, and referring him to the State Bar.  Unlike the 
majority, however, I would not hold Attorney Allen J. Kent in contempt and fine 
him $250. 
The majority describes this court’s order of January 14, 2004, setting the 
case of Aguilar v. Lerner for oral argument on February 10, 2004, as “a 
sufficiently specific order directing counsel’s presence before this court at the 
designated time and place.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 4, italics added.)  But Attorney 
Kent was not counsel of record for plaintiff Aguilar in that case.  Kent’s employer, 
the law firm of Aguilar & Sebastinelli, was.  Thus, after Kent’s departure from the 
firm, the latter had the responsibility of seeing to it that an attorney other than 
Kent would appear for the scheduled oral argument.   
Once Kent left the law firm of Aguilar & Sebastinelli, he had no obligation 
to appear for oral argument before this court on behalf of Aguilar, his former 
employer and the plaintiff in Aguilar v. Lerner.  Kent’s departure did not absolve 
him of the duty to remind Aguilar of the upcoming oral argument so Aguilar could 
assign another attorney to argue the case.  Kent did so:  The State Bar Court found 
that on February 5, 2004, five days before oral argument in this court in Aguilar v. 
Lerner, Kent had a closed door meeting with Aguilar and informed him that he 
was leaving the law firm.  Although Kent did not, in this meeting, specifically 
 
 2
notify Aguilar he would not appear for the scheduled Supreme Court oral 
argument in Aguilar v. Lerner, Kent mentioned the oral argument date to Attorney 
William Henley, an associate in Aguilar’s law firm, the same day and Henley in 
turn informed Aguilar of it the same day.  Moreover, there is no question Aguilar 
had actual knowledge of the date of the argument.  This gave Aguilar adequate 
time to assign the matter to another attorney.  He failed to do so.  As a result, there 
was no appearance on behalf of Aguilar in Aguilar v. Lerner.  But that was 
Aguilar’s fault, not Kent’s. 
According to the majority, Kent “violated his responsibility to this court by 
failing to notify the court that he would not be appearing at oral argument” (maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 5) because he “personally had signed all documents filed in this 
court on behalf of appellant Aguilar and had informed the court that he would be 
presenting oral argument . . . .” (id. at p. 4).  At an earlier time Kent did indeed tell 
this court he would argue on behalf of Aguilar in Aguilar v. Lerner, but that was 
when Kent was still employed by the law firm of Aguilar & Sebastinelli.  To the 
latter, as attorney of record in Aguilar v. Lerner, fell the responsibility of 
informing this court either that an attorney other than Kent would argue the case 
or that no attorney would appear for Aguilar. 
One additional point.  Although under no legal duty to do so in this matter, 
as a matter of courtesy and consideration Kent should have telephoned the clerk of 
this court to explain that because he was no longer in the employ of the law firm 
of Aguilar & Sebastinelli, he would not be appearing for oral argument in the case 
of Aguilar v. Lerner.  Kent insists that to have done so could have prejudiced his 
former client, Attorney Aguilar.  But, as the State Bar Court found, doing so 
would not have breached any professional or ethical obligation to Aguilar. 
 
 3
For the reasons given above, I would not hold Kent in contempt of court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
BROWN, J. 
 
 1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Raul V. Aguilar and Allen J. Kent on Contempt 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX (Order to show cause re contempt) 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S099667 
Date Filed: September 23, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: 
County: 
Judge: 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Raul V. Aguilar, in pro. per.; Rogers Joseph O’Donnell & Phillips, Pamela Phillips, Miranda Kane and 
Sean M. SeLegue for Raul V. Aguilar. 
 
Philip Scott Ryan for Allen J. Kent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Raul V. Aguilar 
Aguilar & Sebastinelli 
1700 California Street, Suite 400 
San Francisco, CA  94109 
(415) 771-9400 
 
Philip Scott Ryan 
944 Union Street 
San Francisco, CA  94133 
(415) 614-0859