Case Title: Commonwealth v. Sullivan

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13353

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2023-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13353 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSEPH SULLIVAN 
(and a companion case1). 
 
 
 
Hampden.     February 6, 2023. - May 16, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Misleading a Police Officer.  Grand Jury.  Constitutional Law, 
Grand jury, Indictment. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 5, 2019. 
 
Motions to dismiss were heard by Mark D. Mason, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the cases from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Jared B. Cohen, Assistant Attorney General (Stephen J. 
Carley & Dean A. Mazzone, Assistant Attorneys General, also 
present) for the Commonwealth. 
Daniel D. Kelly for Joseph Sullivan. 
Edward B. Fogarty for Derrick Gentry-Mitchell. 
 
 
 
 
1 Commonwealth  vs.  Derrick Gentry-Mitchell. 
2 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  The allegations in this case center on an 
alleged cover-up of an April 2015 altercation between off-duty 
Springfield police department (SPD) officers and four Black men 
(victims) near Nathan Bill's Bar & Restaurant in Springfield 
(Nathan Bill's).  The victims were injured, at least one 
severely so; the Commonwealth contends that the off-duty 
officers assaulted the victims following a verbal argument at 
the bar.  Investigations of the alleged misconduct of the off-
duty officers by local, State, and Federal authorities ensued; 
but, the Commonwealth maintains, the investigators were hampered 
by the false and misleading statements of responding SPD 
officers, including the defendant Derrick Gentry-Mitchell, and 
of other eyewitnesses, including the defendant Joseph Sullivan, 
who co-owned Nathan Bill's.  According to the Commonwealth, the 
tangled web of deception by the defendants, and others, lasted 
years and included misleading testimony before the grand jury. 
 
This case presents the question whether, where the grand 
jury were presented with numerous misleading statements made on 
various dates spanning several years to different investigators, 
an indictment charging a single count of misleading 
investigators, in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 13B, is defective 
under art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts 
Constitution, insofar as it poses the possibility that the 
defendants may be convicted of a felony for which the grand jury 
3 
 
did not indict.  Because the indictments charge the essential 
crime of willfully misleading investigators to impede the 
investigation of the same underlying event -- the off-duty 
police officers' alleged assault of the victim -- and because 
the misleading statements constituted a continuing course of 
conduct actuated by a single, continuing impulse or intent, or 
general scheme to conceal that event, we conclude that the 
indictments do not violate art. 12.  Accordingly, we vacate the 
motion judge's order dismissing the indictments. 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts presented to the grand 
jury in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving 
some details for subsequent discussion.  See Commonwealth v. 
Stirlacci, 483 Mass. 775, 780 (2020) ("An appellate court 
reviews the evidence underlying a grand jury indictment in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth"). 
 
a.  Assault.  According to the Commonwealth, on the evening 
of April 7, 2015, and into the early morning of April 8, 2015, 
several off-duty SPD officers gathered at Nathan Bill's.  After 
midnight, the officers argued with the victims.  The defendant 
Joseph Sullivan, a co-owner and manager of Nathan Bill's, 
intervened and asked one of the victims to leave the bar. 
 
Shortly after 1 A.M., SPD officers responded to a report of 
a disturbance outside of Nathan Bill's.  Among the responding 
officers were the defendant Gentry-Mitchell and his partner, 
4 
 
Jeremy Rivas, who together were on patrol that night.  When the 
SPD officers arrived, the victims were standing in the bar's 
parking lot, and other bar patrons and staff, including several 
off-duty SPD officers, were standing outside the bar's entrance.  
Sullivan spoke with some of the responding officers.  Following 
a brief interaction, the victims walked away from the bar, the 
other bar patrons and staff went back inside Nathan Bill's, and 
the responding SPD officers left the scene. 
 
Approximately one hour later, SPD officers responded to a 
911 call outside a convenience store located down the street 
from Nathan Bill's.  The responding SPD officers, including 
Gentry-Mitchell and Rivas, found the same victims there that 
they had seen earlier that evening outside of Nathan Bill's.  
Two of the victims were lying on the ground.  One was 
unconscious.  He had suffered a concussion, broken leg, 
dislocated ankle, torn ligaments, bruised head, and split lip; 
four of his teeth were knocked loose.  The other victims were 
bruised; one had been shocked by a "taser" or "stun gun." 
 
One of the victims told responding SPD officers:  "We just 
got jumped by [the] guys from the bar.  They just walked back to 
the bar."  An emergency medical technician (EMT) at the scene 
later testified that, within earshot of the responding officers, 
including presumably Gentry-Mitchell, the victims were loudly 
"going on about how they just got into a bar fight and had just 
5 
 
gotten beaten up by off-duty police officers."  One of the 
victims later testified before the grand jury that the off-duty 
officers involved in the assault had used a racial slur before 
attacking the victims; the victims were Black men. 
 
Rivas also testified before the grand jury.  Rivas 
confirmed that he learned while responding to the scene outside 
the convenience store that the victims had been attacked by the 
same individuals with whom the victims had argued at Nathan 
Bill's, that off-duty officers were at the bar, and that the 
attackers "could have been police officers." 
 
Rivas also testified that he and Gentry-Mitchell 
accompanied one victim back to the Nathan Bill's parking lot.  
When they arrived, they saw John Sullivan, a co-owner of the 
bar,2 and Jose Diaz, an off-duty SPD officer.  According to 
Rivas, Diaz appeared to be drunk and stated that he had lost his 
keys; Rivas and Gentry-Mitchell helped Diaz search for the keys 
while walking back toward the convenience store.  Along the 
walk, Diaz stated that he and "some of the guys" had been 
involved in a fight outside of Nathan Bill's, and that he had 
been "knocked out cold" by one of the "[B]lack guys."  Gentry-
 
 
2 John Sullivan and the defendant Joseph Sullivan are not 
related, but they co-own and comanage Nathan Bill's.  We refer 
to Joseph Sullivan as "Sullivan" in this opinion. 
6 
 
Mitchell was within ten feet of Diaz when Diaz made these 
statements. 
 
Rivas further testified that, later during their shift, he 
and Gentry-Mitchell spoke about the evening's events.  Rivas 
relayed to Gentry-Mitchell that off-duty officers may have been 
involved in the assault on the victims. 
 
b.  Investigations.  The victims repeatedly reported the 
assault to the SPD.  Two local investigations ensued.  One 
investigation was conducted by SPD's major crimes unit (MCU); 
the other investigation was conducted by SPD's internal 
investigations unit (IIU).3 
 
In November 2016, one of the victims reported the incident 
and alleged cover-up to the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI).4  The FBI referred the matter to the Massachusetts 
Attorney General's office (AGO), and the two entities continued 
a joint investigation.  In early 2018, the FBI and AGO brought 
their investigation before a Statewide grand jury.  Over the 
course of grand jury proceedings lasting several months, more 
 
 
3 The MCU referred the results of its investigation to the 
office of the district attorney for the Hampden district, which 
declined to bring criminal charges related to the April 2015 
events. 
 
 
4 After FBI agents in the Springfield regional field office 
investigated the matter, the United States Attorney's Office 
declined to pursue Federal criminal charges. 
7 
 
than three dozen witnesses testified, including, as explained 
infra, Gentry-Mitchell and Sullivan. 
 
c.  Misleading conduct.  i.  Gentry-Mitchell.  On July 22, 
2015, Gentry-Mitchell submitted a report to MCU investigators; 
on August 16, 2015, he submitted a report to IIU investigators.5  
On February 22, 2018, he testified before the grand jury.  On 
these three occasions, the Commonwealth alleges, Gentry-Mitchell 
falsely stated that he did not hear or see anything to indicate 
that off-duty officers might have been involved in the assault.  
Gentry-Mitchell did not disclose, in any of his three 
statements, that he saw Diaz after the assault, or that he 
learned any information from Diaz, Rivas, or any other source 
about the off-duty officers' involvement in the incident.  These 
omissions, the Commonwealth alleges, were false and misleading, 
and they hampered the investigations into the April 2015 
assaults. 
 
ii.  Sullivan.  The Commonwealth further alleges that 
Sullivan also misled investigators.  On June 19, 2015, in an 
interview with an SPD detective, Sullivan gave a statement in 
connection with the MCU investigation.  On February 24, 2017, 
and May 16, 2017, Sullivan was interviewed by FBI agents.  On 
March 15, 2018, he testified before the grand jury and made a 
 
 
5 Gentry-Mitchell did not file a police report on the night 
of the April 2015 incident. 
8 
 
statement to State police officers, FBI agents, and AGO 
investigators prior to his testimony.  The Commonwealth alleges 
that, on these four dates, Sullivan made false and misleading 
statements to investigators about the April 2015 incident, 
including about whether he could identify any patrons in Nathan 
Bill's that evening; whether he was aware that an altercation 
had taken place at the bar between two groups of patrons that 
evening; whether he knew the off-duty officers at the bar that 
evening; whether he noticed or was aware that any officers left 
the bar after the victims had left or whether the officers 
returned shortly thereafter; and whether he was aware that John 
Sullivan also left the bar, with the off-duty officers, and 
returned shortly thereafter. 
 
The Commonwealth also alleges that Sullivan stated falsely 
that he called a taxicab for the victims when they left the bar 
and that he saw the victims enter and exit the taxicab (thereby 
suggesting misleadingly that the victims chose to remain at the 
scene instead of leaving).  That factual account was not 
consistent with video evidence from a security camera outside 
Nathan Bill's, or with the testimony of multiple eyewitnesses, 
including the taxicab driver. 
 
d.  Grand jury indictments.  In 2019, the grand jury 
returned indictments against sixteen individuals.  Among those 
indicted were Gentry-Mitchell and Sullivan.  Gentry-Mitchell was 
9 
 
indicted on one count of perjury, one count of misleading 
investigators,6 and one count of making a false police report.  
Sullivan was indicted on one count of perjury and one count of 
misleading investigators.7 
 
e.  Motions to dismiss.  Relevant to the present appeal, 
the defendants each filed a motion to dismiss the indictments 
 
 
6 The indictment against Gentry-Mitchell for the offense of 
misleading investigators, in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 13B, 
provided: 
 
"on or about the 22nd day of July in the year two thousand 
fifteen at Springfield, in the County of Hampden, or on or 
about the 16th day of August in the year two thousand 
fifteen at Springfield, in the County of Hampden aforesaid, 
or on or about the 22nd day of February in the year two 
thousand eighteen at Worcester, in the County of Worcester, 
[Gentry-Mitchell] did directly or indirectly, willfully 
mislead a police officer, investigator, or grand juror with 
the intent to impede, obstruct, delay, harm, punish or 
otherwise interfere thereby with a criminal proceeding" 
(emphases added). 
 
 
7 The indictment against Sullivan for the offense of 
misleading investigators, in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 13B, 
stated: 
 
"on or about the 19th day of June in the year two thousand 
fifteen at Springfield, in the County of Hampden, or on or 
about the 24th day of February in the year two thousand 
seventeen at Springfield, in the County of Hampden 
aforesaid, or on or about the 16th day of May in the year 
two thousand seventeen at Springfield, in the County of 
Hampden aforesaid, or on or about the 15th day of March in 
the year two thousand eighteen at Worcester, in the County 
of Worcester, [Sullivan] did directly or indirectly, 
willfully mislead a police officer, federal agent, 
investigator, or grand juror with the intent to impede, 
obstruct, delay, harm, punish or otherwise interfere 
thereby with a criminal proceeding" (emphases added). 
10 
 
charging them with misleading investigators; they contended that 
the indictments violated art. 12.8  The Commonwealth opposed the 
motions, maintaining that the indictments were proper because 
they alleged that the defendants' misleading statements were 
part of a general scheme or single course of criminal conduct to 
mislead investigators regarding the April 2015 incident.  In the 
alternative, the Commonwealth moved to amend the indictments. 
 
Following a nonevidentiary hearing, the motion judge 
dismissed the indictments charging misleading investigators, 
relying on Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 421 Mass. 547 (1995).  In 
particular, the motion judge concluded that, because the 
indictments charged multiple acts in a single count, they 
presented the possibility that the defendants might be convicted 
of a felony offense without first being indicted of the same by 
a grand jury.  He declined to amend the indictments, concluding 
that any amendment would not cure the defect. 
 
The Commonwealth timely appealed.  We transferred the 
matters to this court sua sponte.9 
 
 
8 Gentry-Mitchell and Sullivan each also filed motions to 
dismiss the indictments for lack of probable cause; each motion 
was denied.  The motion judge also denied Gentry-Mitchell's 
motion to dismiss the indictments for alleged loss or 
destruction of exculpatory evidence. 
 
 
9 The defendants' cases were consolidated for the purposes 
of this appeal. 
11 
 
 
2.  Analysis.  We review determinations on issues of law in 
motions to dismiss de novo.  Commonwealth v. Ilya I., 470 Mass. 
625, 627 (2015). 
 
a.  Article 12 framework.  We have long construed art. 1210 
to require "that no one may be convicted of a crime punishable 
by a term in the State prison without first being indicted for 
that crime by a grand jury."  Barbosa, 421 Mass. at 549.  See 
Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray 329, 344 (1857) (art. 12 right is 
"justly regarded as one of the securities to the innocent 
against hasty, malicious[,] and oppressive public prosecutions, 
and as one of the ancient immunities and privileges of English 
liberty").  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 459 Mass. 538, 
543-544 (2011) (vacating conviction as violating art. 12 because 
indictment charged single count of armed home invasion, but did 
not specify alleged victim or home, where grand jury and trial 
jury were presented with evidence of two separate, unrelated 
armed home invasions occurring on same specified date). 
 
Accordingly, the offense as to which the grand jury have 
found probable cause, and thus have charged in an indictment, 
must be the same as the offense the Commonwealth seeks to prove 
at trial.  See Barbosa, 421 Mass. at 551, quoting Commonwealth 
 
 
10 Article 12 provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o subject 
shall be held to answer for any crimes or offence, until the 
same is fully and plainly, substantially and formally, described 
to him." 
12 
 
v. Dean, 109 Mass. 349, 352 (1872) ("It is the duty of the 
Commonwealth to prove the identity of the offence charged in the 
indictment with that on which it seeks to convict before the 
jury of trials"). 
 
i.  Unrelated, separate acts.  In Barbosa, 421 Mass. at 
551, we applied art. 12 in the context of an indictment charging 
a single offense where the grand jury heard multiple, unrelated 
acts, each of which separately could constitute the charged 
offense.  In particular, the grand jury had been presented with 
evidence that the defendant had engaged in two cocaine 
distribution transactions on the same date.  Id. at 550.  Other 
than occurring on the same date, the two transactions were 
unrelated, involving two different buyers and sharing neither a 
common intent nor a common theme.  Id. at 548, 550.  
Problematically, the grand jury returned only one indictment 
that failed to specify which of the two transactions formed the 
basis for the charged offense; instead, "on its face, the 
indictment appear[ed] to refer to a single act of distributing 
cocaine."  Id. at 551.  Given that both incidents occurred on 
the same day, the inclusion of a date in the indictment did not 
clarify this ambiguity.  See id. at 550 ("The result may be 
explained one of two ways.  First, the grand jury may have found 
probable cause to indict the defendant for one of the . . . 
transactions, but not the other.  Second, they may have intended 
13 
 
the indictment to encompass both transactions").  See also 
Campagna v. Commonwealth, 454 Mass. 1006, 1007-1008 (2009) (in 
Barbosa, it "was impossible to tell which of the two incidents 
gave rise to the indictment").  The defendant's pretrial motion 
to dismiss the indictment in violation of art. 12 was denied.11  
Barbosa, supra at 549, 553. 
 
At trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of cocaine 
distribution.  Id. at 549.  Like the grand jury, the jury were 
presented with evidence of the defendant's two separate and 
unrelated cocaine distributions, creating "the very real 
possibility that the defendant was convicted of a crime for 
which he was not indicted by a grand jury."12  Id. at 551.  For 
example, the jury could have convicted the defendant based on 
 
 
11 The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the 
basis of "duplicity," which the court understood to preserve the 
defendant's objection to the indictment on the basis that it 
charged "several separate offenses in a single count."  Barbosa, 
421 Mass. at 553 & n.10, quoting R.M. Kantrowitz & R. Witkin, 
Criminal Defense Motions § 9.7 (1991). 
 
 
12 The ambiguity could not be resolved by a bill of 
particulars.  Barbosa, 421 Mass. at 553.  The defendant was 
aware of the two incidents presented to the grand jury.  Id.  A 
bill of particulars would not have told the defendant which of 
the two formed the basis for the indictment.  Id. 
 
 
Neither could the defect be cured by requiring the 
Commonwealth to elect which of the two transactions it sought to 
pursue.  Id. at 553 n.7 ("In the case that the grand jury had 
indicted on only one of the incidents, to require the 
Commonwealth to choose one incident could still have resulted in 
a trial for an unindicted offense"). 
14 
 
the second transaction whereas the grand jury may have indicted 
the defendant on the first transaction, and vice versa.13  Id. at 
550. 
 
Because "there [was] a substantial risk that the defendant 
was convicted of a crime for which he was not indicted by a 
grand jury," Barbosa, supra at 554, the convictions "violated 
the requirement of art. 12 that punishment for 'infamous crimes' 
only be imposed after indictment by a grand jury," id. at 549.  
We concluded that we could not "apply a harmless error standard" 
to such a constitutional violation.  Id. at 554, quoting Stirone 
v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960) ("depriving defendant 
of 'right to be tried only on charges presented in an indictment 
returned by a grand jury' is 'far too serious to be treated as 
 
 
13 We considered whether a specific unanimity jury 
instruction could cure the constitutional error.  Barbosa, 421 
Mass. at 552.  A general unanimity instruction "informs the jury 
that the verdict must be unanimous," and a specific unanimity 
instruction "indicates to the jury that they must be unanimous 
as to which specific act constitutes the offense charged."  
Commonwealth v. Conefrey, 420 Mass. 508, 512 (1995).  See id. at 
513 ("where evidence of separate incidents is offered to the 
jury and any one incident could support a conviction, a general 
unanimity instruction may not suffice to ensure that the jury 
actually [do] reach a unanimous verdict").  We concluded that a 
specific unanimity instruction would not cure the defect because 
the intent of the grand jury remained unclear.  Barbosa, supra.  
The jurors at trial "may have reached unanimity only on a 
transaction for which the defendant was not indicted," so "the 
defendant still may have been 'held to answer' for a crime not 
set forth in the indictment."  Id.  Compare Dean, 109 Mass. at 
352 (where parties knew which of two assaults formed basis of 
indictment, proper jury instruction could have cured defect). 
15 
 
nothing more than a variance and then dismissed as harmless 
error'").  As such, we vacated the convictions.  Barbosa, supra. 
 
ii.  Continuing offenses occurring at divers times and 
places.  Critically, however, we differentiated the indictment 
in Barbosa, which charged two separate, unrelated drug 
distribution transactions and thus violated art. 12, from an 
indictment charging a "continuing offense occurring at several 
times and places over a period of time," which does not.  
Barbosa, 421 Mass. at 550-551, citing G. L. c. 277, § 32.14 
 
A.  General practice offense.  Such offenses include 
"continuing" offenses, which comprise a crime that is "the 
general practice, throughout the period of time alleged."  
Commonwealth v. Stasiun, 349 Mass. 38, 44 (1965).  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Runge, 231 Mass. 598, 599-600 (1919) (practicing 
medicine unlawfully); Commonwealth v. Peretz, 212 Mass. 253, 254 
(1912) (deriving support from earnings of prostitute); Wells v. 
 
 
14 General Laws c. 277, § 32, provides: 
 
"An allegation that a crime was committed or that certain 
acts were done during a certain period of time next before 
the finding of the indictment shall be a sufficient 
allegation that the crime alleged was committed or that the 
acts alleged were done on divers days and times within that 
period." 
16 
 
Commonwealth, 12 Gray 326, 327 (1859) (keeping house of ill 
fame).15,16 
 
B.  Offense characterized by shared intent, pattern, or 
scheme.  As we noted in Barbosa, "continuing offense[s] 
occurring at several times and places over a period of time" 
also include sexual offenses based on several acts.  Barbosa, 
421 Mass. at 551 & n.6, citing Commonwealth v. Conefrey, 420 
Mass. 508, 511 n.6, 514 (1995) (indictment charging one count of 
indecent assault and battery on child "at divers times and dates 
during" 1986 proper despite victim's description of eight 
different acts of sexual assaults), and Commonwealth v. Comtois, 
399 Mass. 668, 669-671 (1987) (affirming convictions for sexual 
assault of one victim "on divers dates between September 21, 
1982, and October 4, 1983," and another victim on "divers dates 
between October 1, 1982, and February 27, 1983" where each 
 
 
15 For continuing offenses that comprise a general practice, 
time is an essential component.  Double jeopardy protects a 
defendant from the government subsequently bringing an 
indictment covering time periods that overlap with the alleged 
time period, and at trial, only evidence of the offense from the 
time period alleged in the indictment is permitted.  See 
Commonwealth v. Megna, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 511, 513-514 (2003) 
("Since time is an essential element of a continuing offense, 
the defendant can never again be punished for engaging in the 
same criminal practice during the time period described in the 
indictment"). 
 
 
16 We agree with the defendants that the indictments 
charging the misleading of investigators do not allege a 
continuing offense comprising a general practice. 
17 
 
victim testified to multiple incidents).17  Those types of 
offenses are characterized by a shared intent, pattern, or 
scheme, and thus are distinguishable from the two unrelated 
cocaine distributions in Barbosa.18 
 
C.  Single criminal episode.  Nor is the art. 12 violation 
present in Barbosa mirrored where multiple acts are charged in 
an indictment as part of a single, continuing criminal episode 
occurring close in time.  See Commonwealth v. Smiley, 431 Mass. 
477, 479-480 (2000) (considering and rejecting art. 12 challenge 
and holding that single indictment charging one count of armed 
assault in dwelling was proper even though existence of two 
victims would have permitted separate indictments); Commonwealth 
v. Crowder, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 720, 721-722 (2000) (rejecting 
art. 12 challenge to indictment alleging single count of 
aggravated rape where grand jury heard evidence of four acts of 
forcible penetration because there was "only a single episode 
involving the same parties" and multiple acts of penetration 
"are part of a continuing criminal episode"). 
 
 
17 To be sure, neither Conefrey nor Comtois discussed art. 
12.  See Barbosa, 421 Mass. at 552-553. 
 
 
18 At trial, such an indictment may require a specific 
unanimity instruction to ensure the jury are unanimous as to the 
particular act underlying the offense.  See Conefrey, 420 Mass. 
at 511-513 (vacating conviction where judge gave general 
unanimity instruction, not specific unanimity instruction, 
because "evidence of separate incidents [was] offered to the 
jury and any one incident could support a conviction"). 
18 
 
 
Our decision in Smiley is instructive.  Smiley, 431 Mass. 
at 479-480.  There, the court considered a single indictment 
charging that the defendant "being armed with a dangerous 
weapon, namely a gun, did enter a dwelling house and while 
therein did assault the occupants with intent to commit a 
felony."  Id. at 479.  The record before the grand jury 
supported that the defendant had committed the charged armed 
assaults against two victims.  Id.  Relying on Barbosa, the 
defendant contended that the Commonwealth was required to bring 
two separate indictments, one for each victim who had been 
assaulted.  Id. at 479-480.  The court acknowledged that the 
Commonwealth could have sought two indictments.  Id. at 480.  
The offense, however, had transpired as one continuing criminal 
episode whereby the defendant entered a dwelling and therein 
assaulted both victims.  Id. at 478-479.  We rejected the 
defendant's art. 12 challenge, concluding instead that the 
Commonwealth was within its discretion in requesting and 
receiving a single indictment for armed assault in a dwelling.  
Id. at 480. 
 
D.  Single, continuing criminal impulse or intent, or 
general scheme.  Similarly, we have concluded that an indictment 
is proper where it alleges discrete acts, occurring over a 
period of time, that are "actuated by a single, continuing 
criminal impulse or intent or are pursuant to the execution of" 
19 
 
a "general scheme."  Stasiun, 349 Mass. at 43-45 (concluding 
that indictment properly charged solicitation, in violation of 
G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 268, § 8, where it stated that solicitation 
occurred "at various times between January 31, 1959, and 
July 31, 1959, the exact dates being . . . unknown").  Applying 
this principle in Stasiun, we concluded that wrongful 
solicitation, comprised of multiple requests for a bribe over 
the course of months, could be charged as a single offense, id. 
at 45; in so doing, we disagreed with the dissent that the 
indictment violated art. 12, id. at 57 (Kirk, J., dissenting). 
 
There, the victim desired to enter into a lease agreement 
to rent space in his building to the registry of motor vehicles.  
Id. at 40-41.  Over the course of several months, the defendants 
(one of whom was a State official) requested that the victim pay 
a bribe to the official for the official's favorable vote on a 
lease.  Id. at 41-42.  All told, several such requests were 
made; the requests, which varied in the amount of the bribe 
sought, were made in separate locations, at different times, and 
by different combinations of the defendants.  Id. at 41-42, 44.  
Yet, despite the separate incidents, each of which constituted a 
wrongful solicitation, in violation of the statutory 
prohibition, a single indictment issued, charging the defendants 
with one count of wrongful solicitation.  Id. at 44. 
20 
 
 
We rejected the dissent's contention that the indictment 
violated art. 12.19  The indictment was proper; we explained that 
"whether the request was repeated in one meeting, or in several 
meetings on a single day, or in meetings separated by days or 
weeks rather than minutes, each separate request was an integral 
part of the wrongful criminal solicitation, from one person, of 
one payment for one favor."  Id.  "Solicitation of a bribe 
[could] take the form of protracted negotiations," and "[a]n 
offer to give or accept a bribe, while it is outstanding, has a 
continuing effect."  Id. at 45.  Additionally, "the fact that 
all the solicitations related to the approval of the . . . lease 
. . . support[ed] the conclusion that there was one overall 
scheme."  Id.  The "essential" charge of the indictment was that 
the defendants on divers occasions solicited a bribe for the 
State official's vote on the lease.20  Id. at 47.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lee, 149 Mass. 179, 184 (1889) (indictment 
charging crime of obtaining goods "from time to time" by false 
pretense was proper because "the false pretense was a continuing 
 
19 The court rejected the conclusion of the dissenting 
justice that the indictment was "bad for duplicity in charging 
more than one offence in the same count."  See Stasiun, 349 
Mass. at 57 (Kirk, J., dissenting). 
 
 
20 Accordingly, we concluded, any defendant tried on that 
charge could not be tried again for that offense; if a 
defendant, charged with a single wrong occurring on multiple 
occasions, is acquitted on the charge, that "will end the matter 
in all of its aspects as to him."  Stasiun, 349 Mass. at 47. 
21 
 
one, and applicable to each delivery"); Commonwealth v. Megna, 
59 Mass. App. Ct. 511, 514-515 (2003) (indictment properly 
charged defendant with "a single wrong," namely extortion, "a 
discrete crime, but with a continuing criminal impulse or intent 
or in the pursuit of a general scheme"). 
 
b.  Application to misleading investigators charge.  
Similarly to Stasiun, 349 Mass. at 45, in the present action, 
the record before the grand jury warranted the conclusion that 
the defendants' discrete acts -- namely, their false or 
misleading statements to investigators -- were "actuated by a 
single, continuing criminal impulse or intent or . . . pursuant 
to the execution of a general . . . scheme"; accordingly, the 
acts may be charged pursuant to a single count of misleading 
investigators, in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 13B, as amended 
through St. 2010, c. 256, § 120.21  In particular, as presented 
 
 
21 General Laws c. 268, § 13B (1) (c) (iii), (iv), (v), as 
amended through St. 2010, c. 256, § 120, made it a felony to 
 
"willfully . . . mislead[] . . . a judge, . . . grand 
juror, prosecutor, police officer, federal agent, 
investigator . . . [or] a person who is furthering a . . . 
criminal investigation, grand jury proceeding, trial, [or] 
other criminal proceeding of any type. . . with the intent 
to impede, obstruct, delay, . . . or otherwise interfere 
thereby, or do so with reckless disregard, with such a 
proceeding." 
 
The statute was amended in 2018, in relevant part, to make it a 
felony to 
 
22 
 
to the grand jury, the Commonwealth's theory was that the 
defendants willfully misled investigators –- the MCU, IIU, FBI, 
AGO, and grand jury –- to cover up the alleged misconduct of 
off-duty SPD officers in connection with the April 2015 assaults 
on the victims.  The defendants, according to the Commonwealth, 
made false and misleading statements that together wove an 
inaccurate narrative in order to hide the truth from 
investigators.22  Cf. Stasiun, 349 Mass. at 45.  Although each 
misleading statement could form a separate charge for misleading 
investigators, the Commonwealth is not precluded by art. 12 from 
proceeding under one indictment, charging the essential crime of 
willfully misleading investigators to cover up the off-duty SPD 
officers' role in the assault on the victims on April 2015.23 
 
"willfully . . . mislead[] . . . another person who is a 
. . . judge, . . . grand juror, . . . police officer, . . . 
federal agent, [or] investigator, . . . with the intent to 
or with reckless disregard for the fact that it may . . . 
impede, obstruct, delay, prevent or otherwise interfere 
with:  a criminal investigation at any stage, [including] a 
grand jury proceeding." 
 
G. L. c. 268, § 13B (b), as appearing in St. 2018, c. 69, § 155. 
 
 
22 That the misleading statements are, in some particulars, 
inconsistent with one another is of no moment.  See, e.g., 
Stasiun, 349 Mass. at 43-45 (permitting one solicitation 
indictment despite record showing three different bribery 
requests). 
 
 
23 For this reason, the use of the disjunctive "or" to 
separate the dates on which the defendants' alleged misleading 
statements were made does not alter the analysis.  These dates 
are not an essential element of the crime.  See Megna, 59 Mass. 
23 
 
 
The defendants mistakenly contend that because the alleged 
misleading statements were made to different investigators, art. 
12 requires that the Commonwealth proceed by separate 
indictments.  Their contention is unsupported by our 
jurisprudence that allows indictments of continuing offenses 
occurring at divers times and places, discussed supra, or by the 
statutory language of the crime under which they were indicted.  
The statute setting forth the offense of misleading an 
investigator defined an "investigator"24 to include a "group of 
 
App. Ct. at 514.  By setting forth the dates in the indictments, 
the Commonwealth provided notice to the defendants of the 
misleading acts underlying the essential crime charged -– 
namely, that the defendants misled investigators by continuously 
telling a misleading narrative regarding the alleged assaults on 
April 2015.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Dingle, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 274, 
277-282 (2008) ("or" in indictment did not create ambiguity 
where indictment was sufficient to enable defendant to 
understand charge and prepare his defense). 
 
 
24 During the relevant time period, the statute defined an 
"investigator" as 
 
"an individual or group of individuals lawfully authorized 
by a department or agency of the federal government, or any 
political subdivision thereof, or a department or agency of 
the [C]ommonwealth, or any political subdivision thereof, 
to conduct or engage in an investigation of, prosecution 
for, or defense of a violation of the laws of the United 
States or of the [C]ommonwealth in the course of his 
official duties." 
 
G. L. c. 268, § 13B (2), as amended through St. 2010, c. 256, 
§ 120.  The definition was modified slightly in 2018 to include 
gender-neutral language.  See G. L. c. 268, § 13B (a), as 
appearing in St. 2018, c. 69, § 155 ("in the course of such 
individual's or group's official duties"). 
24 
 
individuals" authorized to perform the function of "conduct[ing] 
or engag[ing] in an investigation" of "a violation of the 
law[]."25  G. L. c. 268, § 13B (2), as amended through St. 2010, 
c. 256, § 120.  Thus, a violation of G. L. c. 268, § 13B, can be 
based on conduct of misleading multiple investigators.  Article 
12's requirement is satisfied where the misstatements were 
actuated by a single, continuing criminal impulse or intent or 
pursuant to the execution of a general scheme; here, the 
Commonwealth contends that the defendants' conduct underlay the 
general scheme to conceal the alleged misconduct of the off-duty 
SPD officers in April 2015.26  Nothing in art. 12 precludes the 
Commonwealth from so proceeding.  See, e.g., Smiley, 431 Mass. 
at 480 (indictment could charge armed assault on multiple 
 
 
25 Contrary to the defendants' argument, neither art. 12 nor 
G. L. c. 268, § 13B, requires a grand jury to indict for conduct 
misleading State officials investigating a violation of State 
law separately from conduct misleading Federal officials 
investigating a violation of Federal law.  The statute concerns 
acts that impede "investigation[s]," regardless of whether an 
otherwise unimpeded investigation might have led to a Federal or 
State charge. 
 
 
26 Gentry-Mitchell's assertion, without citation to any 
material in the record, that "the Commonwealth brought separate, 
distinct indictable offenses and not a continuing offense" is 
belied by the grand jury's decision to return one indictment for 
the continuing actions of the defendants each aimed at hiding 
the April 2015 events. 
25 
 
victims where offense could be characterized as occurring during 
one criminal episode).27,28 
 
3.  Conclusion.  Accordingly, we reverse the order allowing 
the defendants' motions to dismiss the indictments and remand 
for further proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
27 Given the Commonwealth's choice to proceed on this 
theory, double jeopardy would limit any conviction that results 
to one count of misleading investigators, even if multiple 
misleading acts were found by the jury.  See Commonwealth v. 
Rollins, 470 Mass. 66, 74 (2014).  Moreover, the Commonwealth 
would be precluded from prosecuting the defendants again for the 
same crime based on conduct preceding the indictments.  See 
Stasiun, 349 Mass. at 45, 47 (any defendant tried on charge of 
soliciting bribery actuated with single, continuing criminal 
impulse or intent, or under general scheme, "could not again be 
tried for that offence"). 
 
 
28 Because we conclude that the indictments were proper, we 
need not reach the Commonwealth's alternative argument that the 
motion judge erred in denying the Commonwealth's motion to amend 
the indictments.