Case Title: Muchow v. Varsity Contractors, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 40559

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2014-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 40559-2012 
 
DEANNE MUCHOW, 
 
Claimant-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
VARSITY CONTRACTORS, INC., 
 
Employer-Respondent, 
 
and 
 
IDAHO YOUTH RANCH, Cost 
Reimbursement Employer, and IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
Idaho Falls, May 2014 Term 
 
2014 Opinion No. 47  
 
Filed: June 17, 2014 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
Appeal from the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho. 
 
The order of the Industrial Commission is affirmed. 
 
DeAnne Muchow, Blackfoot, argued in her own behalf. 
 
Nathan R. Long, Pocatello, argued for respondent Varsity Contractors. 
 
 
 
EISMANN, Justice. 
 
This is an appeal from the Industrial Commission which held that the claimant was not 
entitled to receive unemployment benefits because she had been discharged for employment-
related misconduct.  We affirm the order of the Commission. 
 
I. 
Factual Background. 
 
 
DeAnne Muchow, the claimant, began working for Varsity Contractors, Inc., on February 
2, 2011, as a human resources assistant.  During her employment, the claimant had an ongoing 
conflict with her supervisor and had lodged several complaints about her supervisor with the 
 
2 
director of the department.  On June 26, 2012, the director decided to have a meeting with the 
claimant and her supervisor in an effort to resolve the conflict. 
 
During the meeting, the claimant and her supervisor both stated that they had 
documentation outlining their complaints.  The director told them to get their documentation and 
bring it back to his office.  The claimant asked if they could do so the following day because she 
wanted time to look over her documentation, but the director denied that request because he was 
leaving the next day on a business trip.  He did give the claimant a few minutes to look over her 
documentation.  She returned to her desk and after a few minutes printed her documentation.  
She took the documents and walked toward the director, who was standing outside his office.  
The claimant waved the documents in the air, told the director she had them and was going to 
shred them, and walked past him toward the shredder.  He told her not to shred them, but she 
continued to the shredder and shredded them.  The director then discharged her for 
insubordination. 
 
The claimant applied for unemployment benefits, which were initially denied.  She 
appealed, and an appeals examiner held an evidentiary hearing by telephone.  He later issued 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and reversed the ruling that the claimant was not entitled 
to unemployment benefits.  He held that as a matter of law there was no insubordination.  The 
basis of his ruling was that the director’s order not to shred the documents was not a directive 
that the director was authorized to give and entitled to have obeyed, because the documents 
belonged to the claimant and contained her personal notations about issues and problems she was 
having with a coworker.  The employer then appealed to the Industrial Commission. 
 
The commission adopted the findings of fact made by the appeals examiner.  However, 
the commission disagreed with the conclusions of law made by the appeals examiner.  Relying 
upon Dietz v. Minidoka County Highway District, 127 Idaho 246, 248, 899 P.2d 956, 958 (1995), 
the commission stated that misconduct in connection with an employee’s employment would 
include a disregard of standards of behavior that the employer has a right to expect of an 
employee.  The commission held that the director requested the documents because they 
pertained to a conflict between two employees that he was attempting to resolve; that he had a 
reasonable expectation that his order not to shred the documents would be obeyed; and that the 
claimant chose to disregard the director’s order and shredded the documents.  The commission 
concluded that her conduct constituted employment-related misconduct, and it reversed the 
 
3 
decision of the appeals examiner and held that the claimant was not eligible for unemployment 
benefits.  The claimant then appealed to this Court. 
 
II. 
Analysis. 
 
 
“Our review of decisions of the Industrial Commission is limited to questions of law.  
Whether the Commission’s factual findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence 
is a question of law, as is the application of the facts to the law.”  Stark v. Assisted Living 
Concepts, Inc., 152 Idaho 506, 508, 272 P.3d 478, 480 (2012) (citations omitted). 
 
A claimant under the Employment Security Law is not eligible for benefits if the claimant 
was “discharged for misconduct in connection with his [or her] employment.”  I.C. § 72–
1366(5).  The employer has the burden of proving that the employee was discharged for 
employment-related misconduct.  IDAPA 09.01.30.275.01. 
 
In this case, the alleged misconduct was in connection with the claimant’s employment.  
The documents requested by the director were to help him try to resolve a conflict between two 
employees.  See Stark, 152 Idaho at 508, 272 P.3d at 480 (an employee’s refusal to reveal the 
source of a rumor concerning another of the employer’s businesses was employment related even 
though it did not concern the employee’s specific duties). 
 
The claimant first challenges certain factual findings made by the commission.  “The 
Commission’s findings of fact will only be disturbed if not supported by substantial and 
competent evidence.”  Adams v. Aspen Water, Inc., 150 Idaho 408, 412, 247 P.3d 635, 639 
(2011).  
Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind 
might accept to support a conclusion.  Because the Commission is the fact finder, 
its conclusions on the credibility and weight of the evidence will not be disturbed 
on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous.  This Court does not weigh the 
evidence or consider whether it would have reached a different conclusion from 
the evidence presented. 
 
Eacret v. Clearwater Forest Indus., 136 Idaho 733, 735, 40 P.3d 91, 93 (2002) (citations 
omitted). 
 
In response to the claimant’s request to meet the following day, the commission found, 
“Since [the director] was leaving on a business trip the next morning, he informed Claimant that 
 
4 
they could not meet the next day but that she could have a few minutes to look it over.”  The 
claimant asserts that there was no evidence that the director was leaving on a business trip the 
next day.  The director testified, “She wanted some additional time to proof read and she actually 
asked to visit again tomorrow with the documentation, but I was leaving on a business trip at 
6:00 in the morning, so I wanted to get it now . . . .”  His testimony was substantial and 
competent evidence supporting the commission’s finding. 
 
The commission found:  “[T]he whole purpose of the meeting on June 26, 2012 was to 
get to the bottom of the conflict between Claimant and [her supervisor], and [the director] had 
not once informed Claimant that she was going to be fired.  Nor had [the director] made any 
decision to discharge Claimant prior to her shredding the documents.”  The claimant contends 
that this finding is not supported by the evidence and that the purpose of the meeting from the 
beginning was to dismiss her.  The director testified in response to questions from claimant:  
“I’m answering your questions as to . . . why I had that meeting and that it wasn’t 
preconceived—had no preconception to terminate you at that meeting.  I didn’t.”  His testimony 
was substantial and competent evidence supporting the commission’s finding. 
 
Finally, the commission found:  “As Claimant passed by [the director] and approached 
the paper shredder, [the director] told Claimant not to shred the documents.  Claimant shredded 
the documents anyway.”  The claimant contends that this finding was not supported by the 
evidence and that she was not instructed not to shred the documents until they were already in 
the shredder.  The director testified: 
I was walking past DeAnne’s cubicle area and she came out with a few pieces of 
paper, I don’t know how many, but she came walking out and she kind of flashed 
them near my face and said here is—here it is.  Here is the documentation.  I 
just—I just want to—I just want you to know that I’m not a liar, that I have it, and 
I’m going to shred it.  And I said, no, DeAnne, I said—I said don’t shred the 
documents, bring them into my office like we discussed, so—so I can look at 
your, you know, your documentation.  [The supervisor] is coming in with hers.  
Bring it in.  Well, she kept walking past my office and she said and she turned and 
said, “And I deleted it off my hard drive.”  . . .  Anyway, so she kept walking past 
my office and down the hall about 15 feet to the shredder and—and I continued to 
watch her and I didn’t really think she was going to shred the documents, to be 
honest.  I didn’t think she would do that.  And so she walked over to the desk of 
[the payroll clerk] where the shredder was located and I could tell she was trying 
to figure out how to turn it on and I guess [the payroll clerk] had flipped the 
switch on for her and she started lowering the documents down into the shredder 
and right at that point I just thought she’s—she really is trying to—and so the 
 
5 
documents went down and—were starting to go down right down in the shredder 
and I said, DeAnne, do not shred those documents and I was pretty stern at that 
point and I wanted to make it clear that those documents were not to be shredded, 
to be brought back to my office like we discussed and she was continuing to let 
them shred and we both watched as the documents were shredded and I was 
standing still outside my office and she came back and said I just want to clear the 
slate. 
 
The commission’s finding is supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
 
Many of the claimant’s arguments are based upon the contention that she was not ordered 
not to shred the documents until after they were already in the shredder.  Because the 
commission’s finding to the contrary is supported by substantial and competent evidence, we 
need not address those arguments. 
 
The claimant cites a case out of Michigan for the proposition: “[M]ere inefficiency, 
unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, 
inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or 
discretion are not to be deemed ‘misconduct’ within the meaning of the statute.”   Carter v. 
Michigan Emp’t Sec. Comm’n, 364 Mich. 538, 541, 111 N.W.2d 817, 819 (1961).  That 
statement is similar to IDAPA 09.01.30.275.03, which states, “Mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory 
conduct, failure of good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies, 
isolated instances of ordinary negligence, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not 
considered misconduct connected with employment.”  “The rule by its clear terms refers to an 
employee’s unintended substandard performance of his or her duties.”  Stark, 152 Idaho at 510, 
272 P.3d at 482.  The rule has nothing to do with intentional insubordination.  Id.  The claimant 
also cites Rasmussen v. Gem State Packing Co., 83 Idaho 198, 360 P.2d 90 (1961), although it is 
unclear how that decision is helpful to the claimant.  In that case, this Court held that an 
employee committed misconduct in connection with his employment for one act of disregarding 
the standards of behavior which the employer had a right to expect of him.  Id. at 203-04, 360 
P.2d at 93. 
 
In this case, the commission found that by disobeying the director’s order not to shred the 
documents, the claimant disregarded a standard of behavior that the employer has a right to 
expect of an employee.  “If the alleged misconduct involves a disregard of a standard of behavior 
which the employer has a right to expect of his employees, there is no requirement that the 
 
6 
claimant’s conduct be willful, intentional, or deliberate.  The claimant’s subjective state of mind 
is irrelevant.”  IDAPA 09.01.30.275.02.c. 
 
The claimant argues that the document “was owned by the claimant and was hers to do 
with as she saw fit.”  The document was prepared by the claimant on a company computer and 
printed on company paper, and it contained information relevant to the director’s attempt to 
resolve an ongoing conflict between the claimant and her supervisor.  The document was not the 
claimant’s to do with as she wished.  If, as in Stark, it was employment-related misconduct to 
refuse the employer’s demand to answer a question regarding the employer’s business, the 
claimant’s refusal to give the documents to the director was clearly misconduct in connection 
with her employment. 
 
The claimant also argues that she “did not engage in protracted argument after an order or 
directive was given and the law does not ‘require a standard of unswerving docility and 
servility,’ ” citing Avery v. B.B. Rental Toilets, 97 Idaho 611, 549 P.2d 270 (1976).  The issue in 
Avery was not the refusal of the employee to do what he had been ordered to do.  It was 
complaining about what he had been told to do by his employer.  Thus, we said, “A single 
incident of comparatively nonserious disrespect by complaining and arguing is not misconduct.”  
Id. at 615, 549 P.2d at 274.  In Stark, which involved an employee’s refusal to answer a question 
from her employer, we held, “Only a single incident is necessary to constitute misconduct under 
Idaho Code section 72–1366(5).”  152 Idaho at 510, 272 P.3d at 482.  Likewise, in Adams, a 
single incident of misconduct (taking three hours off work without permission) was sufficient to 
constitute misconduct. 150 Idaho at 414-15, 247 P.3d at 641-42. 
 
The claimant requests “reimbursement of all expenses and fees incurred by her due to the 
former employer’s unnecessary and unsubstantiated appeals,” pursuant to Idaho Code section 72-
1367.  Not only was the employer’s appeal to the commission meritorious, but the statute has no 
application to the awarding of costs on appeal. 
 
III. 
Conclusion. 
 
 
We affirm the order of the Industrial Commission, and we award respondent costs on 
appeal. 
 
 
7 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices J. JONES, W. JONES, and HORTON CONCUR.