Case Title: Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Re: Additional Homestead Tax Exemption

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC04-942

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2004-07-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC04-942
____________
ADVISORY OPINION TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL RE:
ADDITIONAL HOMESTEAD TAX EXEMPTION
[July 15, 2004]
PER CURIAM.
The Attorney General has requested that this Court review a proposed
amendment to the Florida Constitution.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. IV, § 10;
art. V, § 3(b)(10), Fla. Const.
I. FACTS
Families for Lower Property Taxes, Inc., a political committee registered
pursuant to section 106.03, Florida Statutes (2003), has invoked the petition
process of article XI, section 3, of the Florida Constitution to propose a
constitutional amendment through citizen initiative.  The amendment would provide
an additional homestead exemption of $25,000 for persons having title to real estate
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on which they maintain their permanent residence. 
The ballot title for the proposed amendment is “Additional Homestead Tax
Exemption.”  The summary for the proposed amendment provides:
This amendment provides property tax relief to Florida home owners
by increasing the homestead exemption on property assessments by
an additional $25,000.
The full text of the proposed amendment reads as follows:
Article VII Section 6 of the Florida Constitution is hereby amended to
add the following paragraph (g).
(g) By general law and subject to conditions specified therein,
effective for assessments for 2005 and each year thereafter, an
additional homestead exemption of twenty-five thousand dollars shall
be granted to any person who has the legal or equitable title to real
estate and maintains thereon the permanent residence of the owner.
The Secretary of State submitted the amendment to the Attorney General,
pursuant to section 15.21(2), Florida Statutes (2003).  Pursuant to section
16.061(1), Florida Statutes (2003), the Attorney General petitioned this Court for an
advisory opinion as to whether the text of the proposed amendment complies with
the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3, Florida Constitution, and
whether the ballot title and summary comply with the requirements of section
101.161, Florida Statutes (2003).  Families for Lower Property Taxes, Inc. has filed
a brief in favor of the amendment.  The Florida School Boards Association, the
1.  The Florida School Boards Association and the Florida Association of
District School Superintendents filed a joint brief. 
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Florida Association of District School Superintendents,1 Floridians for Responsible
Tax Reform, Florida Association of Counties, Inc., and the Florida League of
Cities have filed briefs in opposition.   
II.  THIS COURT'S INQUIRY
When the Court renders an advisory opinion concerning a proposed
constitutional amendment arising through the citizen initiative process, no lower
court ruling exists for the Court to review.  Therefore, no conventional standard of
review applies.  Instead, the Court limits its inquiry to two issues: (1) whether the
amendment violates the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3, Florida
Constitution, and (2) whether the ballot title and summary violate the requirements
of section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (2003).  See, e.g., Advisory Op. to Att’y
Gen. re Amendment to Bar Gov’t From Treating People Differently Based on Race
in Pub. Educ., 778 So. 2d 888, 890-91 (Fla. 2000).  
In addressing these two issues, the Court's inquiry is governed by several
general principles.  First, we will not address the merits or wisdom of the proposed
amendment.  See, e.g., Amendment to Bar Gov't From Treating People Differently
Based on Race in Pub. Educ., 778 So. 2d at 891.  Second, "[t]he Court must act
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with extreme care, caution, and restraint before it removes a constitutional
amendment from the vote of the people."  Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151, 156
(Fla. 1982).  Specifically, where citizen initiatives are concerned, "the Court has no
authority to inject itself in the process, unless the laws governing the process have
been 'clearly and conclusively' violated."  See Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. re Right
to Treatment and Rehabilitation for Non-Violent Drug Offenses, 818 So. 2d 491,
498-99 (Fla. 2002); see also Amendment to Bar Gov't From Treating From
Treating People Differently Based on Race in Pub. Educ., 778 So. 2d at 891 ("In
order for the Court to invalidate a proposed amendment, the record must show that
the proposal is clearly and conclusively defective.").
III.  THE SINGLE-SUBJECT RULE
A threshold issue raised by the interested parties in this case is whether the
single-subject rule applies to the proposed amendment.  Article XI, section 3
provides an exception to the single-subject rule for proposed amendments which
limit the power of government to raise revenue.  "In order to meet this exception,
the initiative's focus must be limited solely to the power of government to raise
revenue."  Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. re People's Property Rights Amendments,
699 So. 2d 1304, 1310 (Fla. 1997).  Here the initiative's focus is to provide an
additional homestead exemption which, although it would reduce the taxable value
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of certain homestead property, does not in any way limit the basic power of the
government to raise revenue.  Cf. Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen re Tax Limitation, 673
So. 2d 864, 865 (Fla. 1996) (finding that an initiative requiring a two-thirds vote for
new constitutionally imposed state taxes or fees fell within this exception to the
single-subject rule).  Accordingly, the proposed amendment does not fall within the
exception to the single-subject rule.
Article XI, section 3, Florida Constitution, sets forth the requirements for a
proposed constitutional amendment arising via the citizen initiative process and
contains the single-subject rule:
SECTION 3.  Initiative.—The power to propose the revision or
amendment of any portion or portions of this constitution by initiative
is reserved to the people, provided that, any such revision or
amendment, except for those limiting the power of government to raise
revenue, shall embrace but one subject and matter directly connected
therewith.
Art. XI, § 3, Fla. Const. (emphasis added).  The single-subject requirement is a
"rule of restraint" that was "placed in the constitution by the people to allow the
citizens, by initiative petition, to propose and vote on singular changes in the
functions of our governmental structure."  Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. re
Prohibiting Public Funding of Political Candidates' Campaigns, 693 So. 2d 972,
975 (Fla. 1997) (quoting Fine v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984, 988 (Fla. 1984)). 
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Specifically, the single-subject rule prevents an amendment from engaging in either
of two practices: (a) logrolling, or (b) substantially altering or performing the
functions of multiple branches of state government.
A.  Logrolling
Logrolling is "a practice wherein several separate issues are rolled into a
single initiative in order to aggregate votes or secure approval of an otherwise
unpopular issue." In re Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen.—Save Our Everglades, 636
So. 2d 1336, 1339 (Fla. 1994); see also Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. re Limited
Casinos, 644 So. 2d 71, 73 (Fla. 1994) ("A primary reason for the single-subject
restriction is to prevent 'logrolling,' a practice whereby an amendment is proposed
which contains unrelated provisions, some of which electors might wish to support,
in order to get an otherwise disfavored provision passed."); Fine, 448 So. 2d at 993
("The purpose of the single-subject requirement is to . . . avoid voters having to
accept part of a proposal which they oppose in order to obtain a change which
they support.").  In addressing this issue, the Court utilizes a “oneness of purpose”
standard.  See Fine, 448 So. 2d at 990 (“[T]he one-subject limitation deal[s] with a
logical and natural oneness of purpose.”).  A proposed amendment meets this test
when it “may be logically viewed as having a natural relation and connection as
component parts or aspects of a single dominant plan or scheme.  Unity of object
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and plan is the universal test . . . .”  Id. (quoting City of Coral Gables v. Gray, 19
So. 2d 318, 320 (Fla. 1944)).
In this case, the proposed amendment embraces one purpose, an increase in
the homestead exemption.  Accordingly, the amendment does not violate the single-
subject rule by engaging in impermissible logrolling. 
B.  Altering or Performing the Functions of Multiple
Branches of Government
The single-subject rule also prevents "a single amendment from substantially
altering or performing the functions of multiple branches of government and
thereby causing multiple 'precipitous' and 'cataclysmic' changes in state
government." Right to Treatment and Rehabilitation for Non-Violent Drug
Offenses, 818 So. 2d at 495.  We previously have held that while most amendments
will “affect” multiple branches of government, this fact alone is insufficient to
invalidate an amendment on single-subject grounds:
As the proponents of the amendment point out, the fact that an
amendment affects multiple functions of government does not
automatically invalidate a citizens’ initiative.  As we explained in detail
in [a prior case]:
We recognize that the petition, if passed, could
affect multiple areas of government.  In fact, we find it
difficult to conceive of a constitutional amendment that
would not affect other aspects of government to some
extent.  However, this Court has held that a proposed
amendment can meet the single-subject requirement even
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though it affects multiple branches of government.
Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Fla. Transp. Initiative, 769 So. 2d 367, 369-70 (Fla.
2000) (emphasis added).  Further, "the possibility that an amendment might interact
with other parts of the Florida Constitution is not sufficient reason to invalidate the
proposed amendment."  Limited Casinos, 644 So. 2d at 74.  The abiding test is as
follows:
A proposal that affects several branches of government will not
automatically fail; rather, it is when a proposal substantially alters or
performs the functions of multiple branches that it violates the
single-subject test.
Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, 705 So. 2d
1351, 1353-54 (Fla. 1998) (emphasis added).
In this case, opponents of the amendment raise essentially two main
arguments with regard to this aspect of the single-subject rule.  First, they assert
that the amendment substantially alters or performs the functions of multiple
branches and levels of government essentially by reducing the funds available to
them.  Several opponents cite to Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re
Requirement for Adequate Public Education Funding, 703 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1997),
in support of their position.  In that case, the Court considered a proposed
amendment which would require allocation of forty percent of state appropriations
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to public education.  In striking this proposed amendment from the ballot, the
Court concluded that not only did it "substantially alter the legislature's present
discretion in making value choices as to appropriations among the various vital
functions of State government," but by arbitrarily limiting agencies, local
governments and special districts to the remaining sixty percent of appropriations,
it substantially altered the "operation of the various requirements for finance and
taxation in article VII in respect to bonded indebtedness and State mandates to
local governments, thereby affecting the functioning of all State agencies, local
governments, and special districts."  Id. at 449.  Additionally, the Court concluded
that the amendment would limit the Governor's power of line-item veto and the
constitutional function of the Governor and Cabinet in reducing the state budget in
the event of a revenue shortfall.  Id. 
Here, opponents' basic argument is that the potential loss of revenue resulting
from the additional homestead exemption will make it harder for counties,
municipalities and special districts to perform many of their functions, and may
require, among other things, budgeting changes, reduction in funding for various
services, and changes in millage rates.  Opponents also argue that the loss of
revenue may require the Legislature to take certain actions to ensure adequate
funding for public education.  These potential adverse effects are distinguishable
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from the type of "multiple 'precipitous' and 'cataclysmic' changes" described in the
Adequate Public Education Funding case. See also Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. re
People's Property Rights Amendments, 699 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1997) (concluding
proposed amendment requiring full compensation be paid to owner when
government restricts use of private real estate in certain circumstances would
substantially affect Legislature's power to enact legislation establishing standards
and criteria for land use regulation, Legislature's constitutional duty to regulate land
use to protect natural resources and scenic beauty, multiple functions of the
executive branch, and more than one level of government).  While an additional
homestead exemption may result in a loss of revenue which would most certainly
affect the governmental entities to which that revenue previously flowed, it would
not essentially dictate and control the use of funds actually received, as the
proposed amendment in Adequate Public Education Funding would have. 
Accordingly, we find that the proposed amendment does not substantially alter or
perform the functions of multiple branches of government in violation of the single-
subject rule.
Second, opponents of the amendment assert that it substantially affects other
provisions of the constitution without identification.  We disagree.  The proposed
amendment provides for an additional homestead exemption in article VII, section
2.  Article X, section 4 exempts certain homestead property from forced
sale, judgment, or liens, but of course, that is a different kind of "homestead
exemption" than that addressed by the proposed amendment.  
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6.  No provisions of the Florida Constitution outside of article VII involve 
homestead property tax exemptions.2  In addition, the Court has repeatedly stated
that "the possibility that an amendment might interact with other parts of the Florida
Constitution is not sufficient reason to invalidate the proposed amendment." 
Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. re Fee on Everglades Sugar Prod., 681 So. 2d 1124,
1128 (Fla. 1996) (quoting Limited Casinos, 644 So. 2d at 74).  
Accordingly, the proposed amendment satisfies the single-subject
requirement of article XI, section 3, of the Florida Constitution.  
IV.  BALLOT TITLE AND SUMMARY
Section 101.161, Florida Statutes (2003), sets forth the requirements for the
ballot title and summary of a proposed constitutional amendment and provides in
relevant part:
[T]he substance of the amendment or other public measure shall be an
explanatory statement, not exceeding 75 words in length, of the chief
purpose of the measure.  The ballot title shall consist of a caption, not
exceeding 15 words in length, by which the measure is commonly
referred to or spoken of.
§ 101.161(1), Fla. Stat. (2003).  The basic purpose of this provision is "to provide
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fair notice of the content of the proposed amendment so that the voter will not be
misled as to its purpose, and can cast an intelligent and informed ballot."  See
Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. re Fee On Everglades Sugar Prod., 681 So. 2d 1124,
1127 (Fla. 1996).
The Court in In re  Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General—Save Our
Everglades, 636 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1994), explained further:
“[S]ection 101.161 requires that the ballot title and summary for
a proposed constitutional amendment state in clear and unambiguous
language the chief purpose of the measure.”  Askew v. Firestone, 421
So.2d 151, 154-55 (Fla.1982).  This is so that the voter will have
notice of the issue contained in the amendment, will not be misled as
to its purpose, and can cast an intelligent and informed ballot.  Id. at
155.  However, “it is not necessary to explain every ramification of a
proposed amendment, only the chief purpose.”  Carroll v. Firestone,
497 So.2d 1204, 1206 (Fla.1986)
Save Our Everglades, 636 So. 2d at 1341; see also Ltd. Casinos, 644 So. 2d at 74. 
Specifically, in conducting its inquiry into the validity of a proposed amendment
under section 101.161(1), the Court asks two questions.  First, the Court asks
whether "the ballot title and summary . . . fairly inform the voter of the chief
purpose of the amendment."  Right to Treatment and Rehabilitation for Non-
Violent Drug Offenses, 818 So. 2d at 497.  Second, the Court asks "whether the
language of the title and summary, as written, misleads the public."  Advisory Op.
to Att'y Gen. re Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, 705 So. 2d
3. An “ad valorem tax” is a tax based upon the assessed value of property. 
See § 192.001(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). The term “ad valorem tax” is used
interchangeably with the term “property tax.” See id.  Article VII, section 9(b)
provides:
(b) Ad valorem taxes, exclusive of taxes levied for the payment
of bonds and taxes levied for periods not longer than two years when
authorized by vote of the electors who are the owners of freeholds
therein not wholly exempt from taxation, shall not be levied in excess
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563, 566 (Fla. 1998).   As we explain below, this ballot summary does not fulfill the
statutory requirements.
The proposed ballot summary in this case states:  "This amendment provides
property tax relief to Florida home owners by increasing the homestead exemption
on property assessments by an additional $25,000."  Although the amendment’s
chief purpose is to provide an additional homestead exemption for some
homeowners, that is not what the ballot summary says.  The summary states that
the amendment “provides property tax relief” to all Florida homeowners by
increasing the homestead tax exemption.  Whether the amendment would ultimately
result in “tax relief,” however, depends on a variety of factors independent of the
amendment.
 
The Florida Constitution both authorizes local taxing authorities to levy ad
valorem property taxes and limits the percentage of property values they may tax. 
See Art. VII, § 9, Fla. Const.3  The constitution establishes a cap of ten mills for
of the following millages upon the assessed value of real estate and
tangible personal property: for all county purposes, ten mills; for all
municipal purposes, ten mills; for all school purposes, ten mills; for
water management purposes for the northwest portion of the state
lying west of the line between ranges two and three east, 0.05 mill; for
water management purposes for the remaining portions of the state,
1.0 mill; and for all other special districts a millage authorized by law
approved by vote of the electors who are owners of freeholds therein
not wholly exempt from taxation.  A county furnishing municipal
services may, to the extent authorized by law, levy additional taxes
within the limits fixed for municipal purposes.
4. A “mill” is one-tenth of one cent, Black’s Law Dictionary 993 (6th ed.
1990), or “one one-thousandth” of a dollar.  § 192.001(10), Fla. Stat. (2003).
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counties, municipalities, and school districts.  Id.4  
The amount a homeowner pays in property tax, therefore, is a function of
two factors:  the assessed value of the property and the millage rate applied to the
property.  This amendment affects only the first factor: the property’s valuation.  It
does not, as we stated above, affect a taxing authority’s power to determine the
millage rate.  Local government entities that have not reached the constitutional ten
mill cap may still raise millage rates to account for the decreased revenue resulting
from this amendment.  See § 200.065, Fla. Stat. (2003) (providing taxing authorities
the power to adopt “rolled back rate” to provide the same ad valorem tax revenues
as the prior year).
Many local taxing authorities remain under the constitutional millage cap.  For
5. These are Calhoun, Dixie, Gadsden, Gilchrist, Glades, Hamilton, Holmes,
Jefferson, Lafayette, Liberty, Madison, Suwannee, Union, Wakulla, and
Washington counties.  See Florida Department of Revenue, “2003 Millage by
County,” in  Property Valuations and Tax Data, 177-78 (Dec. 2003) (report
available at http://www.myflorida.com/dor/property).
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example, only fifteen counties currently are at the cap of ten mills.5  That leaves
fifty-two counties—the vast majority—the option of increasing the millage rate to
account for the proposed homestead exemption.  Therefore, even if this
amendment is passed, “tax relief” is far from a fait accompli. 
Of course, whether any local taxing authorities will raise millage rates in
response to the amendment is not the issue.  As counsel stated at oral argument, an
increase in the millage rate is entirely speculative.  Equally speculative is that
authorities will not raise the rates.  We simply do not know one way or the other.   
Yet the summary states that the amendment will “provide[] property tax relief.” The
fact that the power to raise rates belongs to the local taxing authorities, however,
and that this amendment does not affect that power renders the ballot summary
misleading.
Our determination in a prior case that a ballot summary was misleading led us
to strike from the ballot an amendment that addressed the taxation of property.  In
Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re People’s Property Rights
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Amendments Providing Compensation for Restricting Real Property Use May
Cover Multiple Subjects, 699 So. 2d 1304, 1309 (Fla. 1997), the ballot summary of
one of the three amendments we considered stated only that the proposed
amendment required voter approval of new taxes and that “[n]ew taxes include[d]
the initiation of new taxes, increases in tax rates and eliminating tax exemptions.” 
Id.  We found this statement to be fatally inaccurate because the summary did not
differentiate between two related but not synonymous terms—the amount of taxes
paid on property and the rate of taxation.  Id. at 1311.  Further, we found the
absence of a “more complete” definition for “exemption” to be misleading
“because the voting public would not readily understand the distinction between an
exemption and immunity from taxation.”  Id.  The ballot summary in this case is
similarly flawed.  The proposed tax exemption affects the valuation of property, but
it does not necessarily affect the amount of money to be paid.  That is, the
amendment does not “provide property tax relief” because it does not affect the
rate of taxation and the power of local government entities to set that rate.
We have previously stated that the “ballot summary should tell the voter the
legal effect of the amendment, and no more.”  Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351,
1355 (Fla. 1984).  This summary flies under false colors with a promise of “tax
relief.”  See Askew, 421 So. 2d at 156 (“A proposed amendment cannot fly under
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false colors . . . .”).  The use of the phrase “provides property tax relief” clearly
constitutes political rhetoric that invites an emotional response from the voter by
materially misstating the substance of the amendment.  See In re Advisory Op. to
the Att’y Gen.—Save Our Everglades, 636 So. 2d 1336, 1341-42 (Fla. 1994)
(finding “emotional language” of ballot title and summary to be misleading as it
resembled “political rhetoric” more than “accurate and informative synopsis”); 
Evans, 457 So. 2d at 1355 (holding ballot summary defective in part because
phrase “thus avoiding unnecessary costs” constituted “editorial comment”).  This
misleading language does not reflect the true legal effect of the proposed
amendment.  See Advisory Op. to the Att’y Gen. re Tax Limitation, 644 So. 2d
486, 490 (Fla. 1994) (stating that the ballot summary must be accurate and
informative and “objective and free from political rhetoric”).
The citizen initiative constitutional amendment process relies on an accurate,
objective ballot summary for its legitimacy.  Voters deciding whether to approve a
proposed amendment to our constitution never see the actual text of the proposed
amendment.  See §101.161(1), Fla. Stat.  They vote based only on the ballot title
and the summary.  Therefore, an accurate, objective, and neutral summary of the
proposed amendment is the sine qua non of the citizen-driven process of amending
our constitution.  Without it, the constitution becomes not a safe harbor for
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protecting all the residents of Florida, but the den of special interest groups seeking
to impose their own narrow agendas.
V.  CONCLUSION
We caution that our opinion today is limited to the above issues and must
not be construed in any way as a ruling on the underlying merits or wisdom of the
amendment. Based on the foregoing analysis, therefore, we hold that the present
initiative petition complies with the single-subject requirement of article XI, section
3, Florida Constitution.  The ballot summary in this case, however, is misleading
and does not comply with the requirements of section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes
(2003).  Accordingly, we strike the proposal from the ballot. 
It is so ordered.       
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS and CANTERO, JJ., concur.
BELL, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, C.J., concurs.
QUINCE, J., concurs in result only with an opinion, in which BELL, J., concurs.
ANSTEAD, J., dissents.
LEWIS, J., dissents with an opinion.
NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED.
BELL, J., specially concurring.
I concur with both the majority opinion and Justice Quince's concurring in
result only opinion.  As the majority states, "[t]he citizen initiative constitutional
amendment process relies on an accurate, objective ballot summary for its
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legitimacy . . . . [A]n accurate, objective, and neutral summary of the proposed
amendment is the sine qua non of the citizen-driven process of amending our
constitution."  Majority op. at 17.  Justice Quince describes the inaccuracy of the
ballot summary.  The ballot summary fails to inform voters that the proposed
amendment is limited to one of two classes of homeowners.  And, as the majority
opinion discloses, the ballot summary's promise of "tax relief" is not an accurate,
objective, and neutral summary.  Accordingly, for both reasons, the proposal
should be stricken from the ballot.
The irony of this result is difficult to ignore.  The deficiencies in this twenty-
two-word ballot summary could easily have been avoided by simply submitting the
actual amendment itself, which is less than seventy-five words.  I would encourage
future proponents of proposed amendments where no summary is necessary to
carefully consider whether or not it is best to simply submit the amendment itself in
lieu of a summary.
PARIENTE, C.J., concurs.
QUINCE, J., concurring in result only.
I agree with the majority that the ballot summary for the proposed
amendment is misleading and does not comply with the requirements of section
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101.161(1), Florida Statutes (2003).  While I agree with the majority that this
proposed amendment should not be placed on the ballot, I do so on another
ground.  I believe the ballot summary is misleading because it fails to inform the
voter that not all homeowners will be entitled to this additional homestead
exemption.  As the majority explains, section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (2003),
requires this Court to consider whether the ballot title and ballot summary fairly
inform the voter of the chief purpose of the amendment, and whether the title
summary is misleading to the public.  Majority op. at 11, 12; see also Advisory Op.
to Att’y Gen. Re Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, 705 So. 2d
563 (Fla. 1998) (holding that this Court must determine whether the language of the
ballot title and ballot summary misleads the public).  The ballot summary in this
case violates section 101.161(1) because it misleads voters by failing to inform
them that the proposed homestead exemption is not applicable to all homeowners. 
Under the current homestead exemption provision, any person who holds the
legal or equitable title to real estate and who maintains that real estate as his or her
permanent residence, “or another legally or naturally dependent upon the
homeowner,” is allowed a certain tax exemption.  Art. VII, § 6, Fla. Const.
(emphasis added); see also Reinish v. Clark, 765 So. 2d 197, 205 (Fla. 1st DCA
2000) (holding that even a non-Florida resident can claim a homestead exemption
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where the property is the permanent residence of another legally or naturally
dependent on the non-resident).  The proposed amendment provides for an
additional exemption.  However, the proposed amendment limits the application of
the additional exemption to “any person who has the legal or equitable title to real
estate and maintains thereon the permanent residence of the owner.”  Thus, not all
homeowners who are eligible for the current homestead exemption are eligible for
the proposed additional exemption.  The ballot summary does not explain this
limitation.
I conclude that the failure of the ballot summary to inform voters that the
increased exemption would not apply to all homeowners currently eligible for the
homestead exemption renders it clearly and conclusively defective.  I would
therefore invalidate the proposed amendment on this basis.
BELL, J., concurs.
LEWIS, J., dissenting.
In my view, the title and summary of the citizen’s ballot initiative to increase
the homestead exemption from $25,000 to $50,000 complies with the dictates of
section 101.601(1) to fairly inform the voters in this state of the chief purpose of
the proposed amendment, and should be approved for placement on the ballot. 
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The majority’s conclusion to the contrary rests on a completely self- generated and
self-constructed misapprehension of the plain language of the summary and the
practical effect of the proposed amendment.  In reaching its conclusion, the
majority completely misapplies established principles for determining whether a
summary is “misleading” and therefore subject to a denial of a place on the ballot
for consideration by all Floridians.  For these reasons, as further explained below, I
dissent from the majority’s decision.
In my view, the error in the decision today stems from the completely flawed
logic it employs.  As a threshold matter, I disagree with the majority’s contention
that the chief purpose of the proposed amendment is to “provide an additional
homestead exemption for some homeowners.”  Majority op. at 13.  That is simply
a restatement of the title of the proposed amendment and a regurgitation of what the
proposed amendment will do.  The purpose of providing the additional homestead
exemption is to afford a measure of tax relief.  In fact, I can think of no other
reason or purpose to include an additional homestead exemption in the constitution
except to provide the citizens of this state with tax relief.  
Furthermore, the majority opinion essentially posits that because a
homeowner’s tax burden depends on the millage rate as well as the property
valuation, an amendment which increases the homestead exemption thereby 
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impacting only property valuation subject to taxation misleads the Florida citizen to
the extent it promises “tax relief.”  This position misconstrues the operation of the
amendment as clearly expressed in the summary.
The amendment increases the homestead exemption to $50,000 thus allowing
Florida homeowners to protect an additional $25,000 of the value of a homestead
from taxation.  The increased exemption, and concomitant decrease in the base
amount upon which the tax is applied would result in lower property taxes than
would exist in the absence of the amendment (i.e., “tax relief”).  This relief in the
form of a greater exemption amount would occur regardless of whether, or how
high, the millage rate applied is increased to derive the ultimate property tax.  For
example, an owner of a home valued at $100,000 subject to a 6 mill property tax
will pay $450 in annual property taxes.  If the millage rate remains constant, the
owner would pay only $300 in property taxes under the proposed amendment.  If
one were to assume that a homeowner’s local taxing authority would increase the
millage rate applicable to the property to the constitutional cap of 10 mills, the
owner would still reap “tax relief” by operation of the proposed amendment.  With
a theoretical millage increase to 10 mills, the homeowner would pay $750 in
property taxes under the current scheme, but if the  amendment were adopted, the
tax burden would be reduced to $500.
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The proposed amendment would relieve or remove the burden of taxation
from an additional $25,000 of property value.  In my view this concept is accurately
described as “tax relief.”  Focusing on the dual component nature of the property
tax scheme, the majority contends that the summary’s stated intent to “provide
property tax relief” is misleading because it effectively promises that local
authorities will not raise millage rates.  See Majority op. at 15.  It would be generous
to call this argument strained—sophistry is a more apt description.  Further, if the
proposed amendment had included both the concept of the exemption and also
millage rates, the single subject requirement would have then become operative to
reject the proposal.
As the majority recognizes, this Court’s constitutional mandate is to
determine whether the “ballot title and summary . . . fairly inform the voter of the
chief purpose of the amendment,” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Right to
Treatment and Rehabilitation for Non-Violent Drug Offenses, 818 So. 2d 491, 497
(Fla. 2002), and “whether the language of the title and summary, as written,
misleads the public.”  Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Right of Citizens to Choose
Health Care Providers, 705 So. 2d 563, 566 (Fla. 1998).  In rendering this decision,
we have recognized that voters are “presumed to have a certain amount of common
sense and knowledge.”  Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Tax Limitation, 673 So. 2d
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864, 868 (Fla. 1996).  
The proposed ballot summary at issue here more than satisfies this standard. 
The ballot is entitled “Additional Homestead Tax Exemption.”  The ballot summary
explains in simple language, “This amendment provides property tax relief to
Florida home owners by increasing the homestead exemption on property
assessments by an additional $25,000.”  Thus, in merely 22 words, the summary
clearly communicates that the “tax relief” being referred to is an increase in the
amount of the homestead exemption.  Voters can properly be presumed to know
from learning and experience that the taxable value of property is only one and not
the only factor in determining the ultimate amount of tax owed.  Despite the clear
and unambiguous language, the majority concludes that voters will assume the
amendment will freeze local millage rates in perpetuity, resulting in a lower total tax
bills.  This is a conclusion drawn without substance and certainly is not based on
the words of the summary.  I seriously doubt that the average Florida voter would
exhibit the total ignorance concerning the assessment of property taxes or the
inability to logically reason necessary to reach such a conclusion.
Importantly, the ballot summary does not indicate that the amendment will
provide Florida home owners with a “property tax cut” or “lower property tax
rates.”  That would be misleading.  Nor does the summary baldly assert that it will
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provide “tax relief” without explaining the context in which that relief would be
derived.  It clearly explains that it provides tax relief by permitting Florida
homeowners to protect a greater share of the value of their homes from the basis
upon which taxes are assessed.  That is a true, correct, and complete statement of
the amendment’s purpose, regardless of whether an individual’s property tax rises
as a result of some future hypothetical millage rate increase.  Any potential for the
phrase “tax relief” to mislead results directly and solely from the majority’s
decision to analyze that phrase in isolation, divorced from the explanation and
connection that the intended tax relief will result from an increased homestead
exemption.
I believe the majority’s reliance on this Court’s decision in Advisory Opinion
to the Attorney General re People’s Property Rights Amendments, 699 So. 2d
1304 (Fla. 1997), is misplaced.  There, this Court determined that the summary for
an initiative involving voter approval for new taxes was misleading.  See id. at 1311. 
The summary at issue read:
Requires voter approval of new state, local or other taxes. New
taxes include initiation of new taxes, increases in tax rates and
eliminating tax exemptions. 
Allows emergency tax increases, lasting up to 12 months, if
approved by three-fourths of a taxing entity's governing body.
Id. at 1309.  We deemed the summary’s definition of “new tax” as “increases in tax
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rates” misleading because it did not distinguish between an increase in the amount
of money paid on taxable property or the actual rate at which the property is being
taxed.  See id. at 1311.  We also determined that the absence of a more complete
definition of the term “exemption” was misleading because the voting public would
not understand the distinction between exemption and immunity from taxation.  See
id.
I submit that the considerations factored into our decision in People’s
Property Rights do not compel a similar conclusion here.  The ballot initiative in
that case held out the promise that voters, not legislatures or taxing authorities,
would make the ultimate decisions regarding whether or when to initiate new or
increased taxes.  Obviously, such an amendment would place a tremendous amount
of authority and responsibility in the hands of the voters.  Thus, we were correct in
requiring a clear and detailed explanation of the scope of that authority.  Such is not
the case here.  The instant proposal does not represent a fundamental change in the
manner and method for assessing taxes in this state.  It simply provides for tax
relief by virtue of an increase in the homestead exemption.  The summary clearly
explains the purpose and operation of the proposed amendment.  
Furthermore, I believe the majority overreaches in its assessment that the
ballot summary at issue “flies under false colors,” and that the promised “tax relief”
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constitutes political rhetoric which improperly invites an emotional response from
the voter.  See Majority op. at 16-17.  Even a cursory comparison of the ballot
initiative proposed in the instant matter to those deemed to involve emotional
appeals reveals the softness of the majority’s conclusion in this regard.  
In Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re Save our Everglades, 636
So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1994), we determined that the emotional language of the ballot
title and summary could mislead voters as to the contents of the proposed
amendment.  The ballot initiative in that case was entitled, “Save Our Everglades,”
which was an objectively emotional appeal communicating that one of the most
beloved resources in this state would be lost without a favorable vote.  See id. at
1341.  The text of the amendment, by contrast, explained that the purpose of the
amendment was to restore the Everglades to their original condition, not to “save”
the area from peril.  See id.  The summary also averred that the sugarcane industry
had “polluted the Everglades,” without explaining the nature or severity of that
pollution.  See id.  On this basis, we concluded that the summary was a “subjective
evaluation of the impact of the proposed amendment as opposed to a summary of
the legal effect.”  Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Protect People from the Health
Hazards of Second Hand Smoke, 814 So. 2d 415, 420 (Fla. 2002) (discussing the
decision in Save Our Everglades); see also Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351,
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1355 (Fla. 1984) (determining that language indicating that the summary judgment
portion of a proposed amendment was intended to avoid “unnecessary costs”
constituted an improper subjective evaluation of special impact).
The present ballot initiative, by contrast, is decidedly devoid of emotional
appeal or political rhetoric.  The title “Additional Homestead Tax Exemption”
could not be more matter-of-fact—the proposed amendment provides an additional
homestead exemption.  The brief summary states the purpose of the amendment (to
provide property tax relief), and the means for achieving that purpose (by
increasing the homestead exemption on property assessments by an additional
$25,000).  Under no reasonable construction could this summary be deemed a
“subjective evaluation” of the impact of the proposed amendment.  See Protect
People from the Health Hazards of Second Hand Smoke, 814 So. 2d at 420
(determining that the phrases “protecting” people from the “hazards” of second
hand smoke did not constitute impermissible political rhetoric); see also Advisory
Op. to Att’y Gen. re Casino Authorization, 656 So. 2d 466, 469 (Fla. 1995)
(determining with scant analysis that language indicating that the amendment
“prohibits casinos unless approved by the voters” constituted political rhetoric of
the type denounced in Save Our Everglades). 
While I cannot subscribe to the majority’s make-weight analysis and faulty
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conclusion that the phrase “tax relief” is misleading, I believe the summary’s failure
to inform voters that the increased homestead exemption would not apply to all
property currently eligible for the homestead exemption presents a closer question. 
The homestead exemption currently applies to two types of property:  (1) property
upon which the owner maintains his or her permanent residence, and (2) property
upon which a legal or natural dependent of the owner maintains a permanent
residence.  See Art. VII, § 6(a), Fla. Const.  The increased homestead exemption
would only apply to the owner’s permanent residence—a fact not mentioned in the
summary. 
Certainly, in a perfect world, the summary would explain the limited nature of
the tax relief available.  However, our constitutional mandate in assessing whether
or not a ballot initiative should be rejected as misleading does not require or permit
us to determine what language would perfect a summary.  To the contrary, our
review is constrained by the principle that “[i]n order for a court to interfere with
the right of the people to vote on a proposed constitutional amendment the record
must show that the proposal is clearly and conclusively defective.”  Askew, 421
So. 2d at 154.  Common sense would dictate that the majority of Florida voters
currently eligible for the homestead exemption claim it on their permanent
residence.  Additionally, only one homestead exemption can be claimed by any
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individual or family unit or with respect to any residential unit.  See Art. VII,  §
6(b), Fla. Const.  Thus, the failure of the ballot summary to state that the increased
exemption will not apply to property upon which dependents of the owner reside
does not, in my view, constitute a clear and conclusive defect that would render the
summary misleading in violation of section 101.161(1) of the Florida Statutes.
It is my opinion that instead of evaluating the plain language of the ballot
summary in accordance with the applicable standard of review, the majority has
placed its thumb on the scales to ensure that the instant initiative does not appear
on the ballot in the upcoming election.  The majority’s decision is out-of-step with
the seasoned precedent that has shaped this Court’s section 101.161(1) analysis. 
For these reasons, I dissent from the majority’s decision to disapprove placement
of the homestead exemption initiative on the ballot.  I realize and certainly
understand that the negative impact of this amendment upon government operations
and services may be expansive and totally undesirable from a view of merit. 
However, we are now prohibited from factoring merit into our analytical equation. 
However commendable or vile the idea of this proposed amendment may be, the
purpose is certainly clear in its title and summary.
Original Proceeding - Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General
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Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida
for Petitioner
Jeffrey Saull, Chair, West Palm Beach, Florida; and Barry S. Richard of Greenberg
Traurig, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; Arthur J. England, Jr., and Charles M.
Auslander of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Miami, Florida, on behalf of Families for
Lower Property Taxes, Inc.,
for Proponents
Joy Causseaux Frank, General Counsel to Florida Association of District School
Superintendents, Tallahassee, Florida; and Jon Mills and Timothy McLendon,
Gainesville, Florida on behalf of Florida School Boards Association and Florida
Association of District School Superintendents; and Virginia Saunders Delegal,
General Counsel, Florida Association of Counties, Inc., Tallahassee, Florida on
behalf of Florida Association of Counties, Inc.; and Victoria L. Weber, Dan R.
Stengle, and Gary V. Perko of Hopping Green and Sams, P.A., Tallahassee,
Florida on behalf of Florida League of Cities; and Katherine E. Giddings, Joseph
W. Hatchett, Nancy Mason Wallace, James E. Joanos of Akerman Senterfitt, P.A.,
Tallahassee, Florida, on behalf of Floridians for Responsible Tax Reform,
for Opponents