Case Title: American Family Life Assurance Co. of Columbus v. Parker

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13090

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-01-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13090 
 
AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF COLUMBUS  vs.  JOANN 
PARKER & another.1 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     September 8, 2021. - January 10, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Insurance, Life insurance:  change of beneficiary.  Divorce and 
Separation, Separation agreement, Agreement respecting life 
insurance.  Uniform Probate Code.  Statute, Construction, 
Retroactive application.  Practice, Civil, Summary 
judgment. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
June 3, 2019. 
 
 
The case was considered by Debra A. Squires-Lee, J., on 
motions for summary judgment, and a motion for reconsideration 
was also considered by her. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Daniel A. Capodilupo for Dawn Diana-Parker. 
 
Edmund P. Hurley for Joann Parker. 
 
 
 
1 Dawn Diana-Parker. 
2 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  Sean Parker purchased a life insurance policy 
naming his then wife, Dawn Diana-Parker, as the primary 
beneficiary, and his mother, Joann Parker, as alternative 
beneficiary.  Sean2 and Dawn divorced, but Sean did not amend his 
beneficiary designation.  After Sean's death, his insurer, 
American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus (AFLAC), 
filed this interpleader action in Superior Court to determine 
whether the Massachusetts Uniform Probate Code's "Revocation of 
probate and nonprobate transfers by divorce" provision, G. L. 
c. 190B, § 2-804, terminated Dawn's beneficiary status by 
operation of law.  The motion judge entered summary judgment in 
favor of Joann.  We affirm. 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts based on the 
evidence that was before the motion judge.  Sean and Dawn were 
married in 1999.  The marriage produced two sons, who are still 
minors.  In late 2010, Sean purchased a twenty-year term life 
insurance policy with a $100,000 death benefit through his 
employer.  The primary beneficiary was Dawn.  Sean's mother, 
Joann, was the sole alternative beneficiary.  The policy also 
contained a "spouse rider" and a "child rider," essentially sub-
policies on Dawn's and the sons' lives with Sean as beneficiary, 
supported by additional premiums.  The policy did not mention 
 
2 Because the parties all share a last name, we refer to 
them by their first names. 
3 
 
the effect of a divorce on Sean's beneficiary designation.  
According to Dawn, shortly after taking out the policy Sean lost 
his job, and she began paying the premiums out of her "sole 
account" at his direction. 
 
Sean and Dawn divorced in 2016.  The parties, representing 
themselves, declared their personal assets and submitted a 
separation agreement based on a court-provided form to the 
Probate and Family Court.  Sean agreed to pay Dawn $163.50 per 
week in child support, and both spouses waived alimony.  The 
agreement stated that the "Husband and Wife have already divided 
between themselves all of their personal property and are 
satisfied that the division was fair."  The agreement 
specifically referenced the couple's cars and credit card debt, 
but it did not mention Sean's life insurance policy.  It did so 
even though the form, in its child support section, contained 
options to include an agreement for the spouses to maintain life 
insurance in favor of their children rather than their spouse, 
which were not selected.  The separation agreement also 
contained an integration clause stating, "The parties have 
included in this Agreement their entire understanding.  No 
spoken or written statement outside this Agreement was relied on 
by either party in signing the Agreement." 
According to Dawn, Sean instructed her to continue making 
payments on the policy until he died in 2018.  Dawn then filed a 
4 
 
"Proof of Death -- Beneficiary's Statement" with AFLAC and a 
death certificate that listed Sean as divorced and Dawn as his 
"Last Spouse."  Upon learning that the couple had divorced, 
AFLAC requested a copy of the divorce decree and any property 
settlements with Sean so it could review her claim.  It informed 
Dawn, through her counsel, that her rights were extinguished 
because "AFLAC was not aware of the existence of any express 
agreement pertaining to the distribution of the life insurance 
proceeds." 
Attempts to settle between the two putative beneficiaries 
failed.  AFLAC directed Joann to file a beneficiary statement 
through her daughter and attorney-in-fact, Paige F. Staples, so 
it could file an interpleader action. 
 
AFLAC commenced the action in June 2019.  AFLAC 
subsequently deposited with the court the insurance proceeds, 
with interest, and was discharged from the case.  The remaining 
parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, focusing 
primarily on whether G. L. c. 190B, § 2-804, applied 
retroactively.  In support of her arguments, Dawn filed an 
affidavit and discovery responses indicating that she continued 
to pay the premiums at Sean's direction and that he intended for 
the proceeds to be used to support her and their sons.3  Although 
 
3 Joann moved to strike these statements and certain other 
evidence that Dawn filed because they were hearsay or 
5 
 
both parties requested a hearing, the motion judge decided the 
matter on the papers.4  The judge held that § 2-804 applied to 
Sean's policy, and granted summary judgment for Joann. 
 
Dawn appealed following the entry of judgment.  Afterward, 
Dawn filed a motion for reconsideration, expressly arguing for 
the first time that she fell into § 2-804's contractual 
exception, based on an oral contract with Sean.  The judge 
denied the motion for reconsideration, noting that any 
predivorce oral agreement did not survive the integrated 
separation agreement, and that a postdivorce oral agreement did 
not "supersede[]" § 2-804.  This court granted direct appellate 
review sua sponte. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  We review a grant 
of summary judgment de novo.  Conservation Comm'n of Norton v. 
Pesa, 488 Mass. 325, 330 (2021).  Summary judgment will be 
 
irrelevant.  Simultaneous to ruling on the motions for summary 
judgment, the motion judge denied the motion to strike as moot, 
noting that she did not consider any inadmissible evidence in 
her ruling. 
 
4 There is a presumption in favor of holding hearings on 
summary judgment motions.  Rule 9A(c)(3) of the Rules of the 
Superior Court (2018).  However, we note the motions were filed 
on March 18, 2020, the day after this court issued an emergency 
order severely restricting access to court houses for in-person 
proceedings due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  See Supreme Judicial 
Court, Order Limiting In-Person Appearances in State Courthouses 
to Emergency Matters That Cannot be Resolved Through a 
Videoconference or Telephonic Hearing, No. OE-144 (Mar. 17, 
2020). 
6 
 
granted if there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law."  Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 
(2002).  Whether the motion judge erred in her interpretation of 
§ 2-804 and its retroactive effect are "[q]uestions of statutory 
construction" and therefore "questions of law, to be reviewed de 
novo" (citation omitted).  Concord v. Water Dep't of Littleton, 
487 Mass. 56, 60 (2021).  We review "the same record as the 
motion judge."  Meyer v. Veolia Energy N. Am., 482 Mass. 208, 
211 (2019).  "Because the parties filed cross motions for 
summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was 
entered."  Conservation Comm'n of Norton, supra. 
b.  Legal background.  At common law, divorce or annulment 
did not affect posthumous transfers.  See Sveen v. Melin, 138 
S. Ct. 1815, 1819 (2018); Hertrais v. Moore, 325 Mass. 57, 61 
(1949).  See also G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 191, § 9 (providing for 
revocation of previous will upon marriage but not divorce).  The 
onus was on the donor to revoke or amend any instruments in 
favor of an ex-spouse or ex-spouse's relatives, despite the 
obvious inference that, in most cases, the divorce would affect 
the decedent's testamentary plans for these people.  See Sveen, 
supra (describing how maintaining divorced spouse as beneficiary 
is generally inconsistent with intent of donor).  As divorce 
7 
 
became increasingly common, State legislatures, following the 
lead of Uniform Probate Code,5 enacted automatic revocation-on-
divorce provisions.  Id.  The change came first to wills.  See, 
e.g., G. L. c. 191, § 9, as amended by St. 1976, c. 515, § 6, 
repealed by St. 2008, c. 521, § 10; Uniform Probate Code § 2-508 
(1969). 
Thereafter, the Uniform Probate Code and State legislatures 
chose to address "the recognition that will substitutes and 
other inter-vivos transfers have so proliferated that they now 
constitute a major, if not the major, form of wealth 
transmission."  Uniform Probate Code, art. II, prefatory note 
(2006).  See Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future 
of the Law of Succession, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1108, 1110-1111 
(1984).  For these nonprobate assets, including life insurance, 
the rule had until that point remained that "the burden is on 
the insured to effect a change in beneficiary in accordance with 
the terms of the policy."  Stiles v. Stiles, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 
514, 515 n.3 (1986), citing Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Feinberg, 318 Mass. 246, 250–251 (1945). 
 
5 The Uniform Probate Code is published by the Uniform Law 
Commission (also known as the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws), a State-supported, 
national organization that proposes uniform codes for State 
legislatures to encourage uniformity and clarity in important 
areas of State law.  Uniform Law Commission, About Us, 
https://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/overview [https://perma.cc 
/QRB6-A4Q9]. 
8 
 
That would change with the passage of § 2-804, a national 
model provision that would eventually appear in the 
Massachusetts Uniform Probate Code.  It states: 
"Except as provided by the express terms of a governing 
instrument, a court order, or a contract relating to the 
division of the marital estate made between the divorced 
individuals before or after the marriage, divorce, or 
annulment, the divorce or annulment of a marriage: 
 
"(1) revokes any revocable (i) disposition or appointment 
of property made by a divorced individual to the 
individual's former spouse in a governing 
instrument . . . ." 
 
G. L. c. 190B, § 2-804 (b).  See Uniform Probate Code § 2-804(b) 
(2006). 
 
According to the Uniform Law Commission, the section was 
intended to "unify the law of probate and nonprobate transfers" 
and to "cover 'will substitutes' such as revocable inter-vivos 
trusts, life-insurance and retirement-plan beneficiary 
designations, transfer-on-death accounts, and other revocable 
dispositions . . ." (emphasis added).  Uniform Probate Code § 2-
804 comment (2006).6 
 
6 Because the Legislature adopted § 2-804 essentially as 
proposed by the Uniform Law Commission at the time, we consider 
its comment an instructive source for interpreting the statute.  
Although there have been updates to the Uniform Probate Code as 
recently as 2019, we will consider the model provisions and 
commentary as they existed when the code was enacted in 
Massachusetts in 2009. 
9 
 
The Massachusetts act, like the national model, also 
contained retroactivity provisions.  As relevant here, the 
Massachusetts version stated: 
"Except as provided elsewhere in this act, on the effective 
date of this act [March 31, 2012]:[7] 
 
"1.  this act shall apply to pre-existing governing 
instruments, except that it shall not apply to governing 
instruments which became irrevocable prior to the effective 
date of this act . . . ." 
 
St. 2008, c. 521, § 43 (1).  See Uniform Probate Code § 8-
101(b)(1).  The act also provided in another subsection that 
"any rule of construction or presumption provided in this 
act applies to governing instruments executed before the 
effective date unless there is a clear indication of a 
contrary intent, except that it shall not apply to 
governing instruments which became irrevocable prior to the 
effective date of this act." 
 
St. 2008, c. 521, § 43 (5).  See Uniform Probate Code § 8-
101(b)(5) (2006) (equivalent provision of model code). 
c.  Scope of § 2-804.  Dawn argues first that § 2-804 does 
not cover life insurance policies or beneficiary designations.  
This is obviously incorrect.  Massachusetts's revocation-on-
divorce provision applies to any "disposition or appointment of 
property made by a divorced individual to the individual's 
former spouse in a governing instrument."  G. L. c. 190B, § 2-
 
 
7 The original effective date, July 1, 2011, was extended to 
March 31, 2012.  See St. 2008, c. 521, § 44 (original effective 
date); St. 2010, c. 409, § 23 (extending effective date to 
January 2, 2012); St. 2011, c. 224 (extending effective date to 
March 31, 2012). 
10 
 
804 (b) (1).  "Governing instrument" is defined as "a deed, 
will, trust, insurance or annuity policy, . . . or a donative, 
appointive, or nominative instrument of any other type" 
(emphasis added).  G. L. c. 190B, § 1-201 (19).  A "beneficiary 
designation" is defined as "a governing instrument naming a 
beneficiary of an insurance or annuity policy, . . . or other 
nonprobate transfer at death" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 190B, 
§ 1-201 (4).  For the purposes of § 2-804, a "'[d]isposition or 
appointment of property' includes a transfer of an item of 
property or any other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a 
governing instrument" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 190B, § 2-
804 (a) (1).  As noted above, the Uniform Law Commission 
expressly intended § 2-804 to "cover . . . life-insurance and 
retirement-plan beneficiary designations."  Uniform Probate Code 
§ 2-804 comment (2006).  Consequently, there is no merit to 
Dawn's argument that the provision does not extend to life 
insurance. 
d.  Retroactivity.  Dawn next claims that § 2-804 does not 
apply retroactively to Sean's policy.  Most, if not all, of her 
argument for why the statute does not apply retroactively is 
based on her belief that the United States Supreme Court wrongly 
decided Sveen, and that the dissent in that case is correct.  
See Sveen, 138 S. Ct. at 1826-1831 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
In Sveen, the Supreme Court concluded that the retroactive 
11 
 
application of Minnesota's version of § 2-804 did not violate 
the contracts clause of the United States Constitution.  Id. at 
1818.  In concluding that the act was constitutional, the court 
stressed three reasons: 
"First, [§ 2-804] is designed to reflect a policyholder's 
intent -- and so to support, rather than impair, the 
contractual scheme.  Second, the law is unlikely to disturb 
any policyholder's expectations because it does no more 
than a divorce court could always have done.  And third, 
the statute supplies a mere default rule, which the 
policyholder can undo in a moment." 
 
Id. at 1822.  As our version of § 2-804 tracks the language of 
Minnesota's, we certainly cannot reach the opposite conclusion 
of the United States Supreme Court on Federal constitutional 
grounds.  Retroactive application of § 2-804 is thus 
constitutional. 
The next question is whether, and if so how, the 
Massachusetts version of § 2-804 applies retroactively.  
"Whether a statute applies to events occurring prior to the date 
on which the statute takes effect is in the first instance a 
question of legislative intent."  Sliney v. Previte, 473 Mass. 
283, 288 (2015).  "If the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, it is conclusive as to legislative intent" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Id. 
The act itself contains two retroactivity provisions that 
require analysis.  The first is plain and unambiguous: 
12 
 
"[T]his act shall apply to pre-existing governing 
instruments, except that it shall not apply to governing 
instruments which became irrevocable prior to the effective 
date of this act." 
 
St. 2008, c. 521, § 43 (1).  On its face, § 43 (1) clearly makes 
the entire act, including the revocation-on-divorce provision in 
§ 2-804, apply retroactively to Sean's policy, because the 
policy was revocable until his death in 2018.  This 
comprehensive retroactivity provision appears consistent with 
the intentions of the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code and 
the interpretation of all the courts and commentators that have 
considered the question of retroactivity.  The drafters of the 
Uniform Probate Code, like the Supreme Court in Sveen, concluded 
that the new default rule it adopted better reflected the 
intention of divorced spouses than the old rule it replaced.  
That intention, as summarized by the Joint Editorial Board for 
the Uniform Probate Code, was "that when spouses are 
sufficiently unhappy with each other that they obtain a divorce, 
neither is likely to want to transfer his or her property to the 
survivor on death."  Joint Editorial Board Statement Regarding 
the Constitutionality of Changes in Default Rules as Applied to 
Pre-Existing Documents, 17 ACTEC Notes 184, 184 (1991) (Joint 
Editorial Board Statement).  This rule, as the drafters and 
courts have recognized, better reflects the intentions of those 
who drafted the relevant documents before as well as after the 
13 
 
passage of the act, and thus the rule should be applied 
retroactively. 
Although not briefed or argued by the parties, our 
retroactivity analysis must also address the purpose and effect 
of St. 2008, c. 521, § 43 (5), which states that "any rule of 
construction or presumption provided in this act applies to 
governing instruments executed before the effective date unless 
there is a clear indication of contrary intent."  This 
provision, on its face, appears to be directed at the various 
provisions in the act that are expressly defined as rules of 
construction or presumptions with language indicating that they 
apply absent a clear indication of contrary intent.  See G. L. 
c. 190B, art. II, part 6, §§ 2-601 et seq. ("Rules of 
Construction Applicable Only to Wills"); G. L. c. 190B, art. II, 
part 7, §§ 2-701 et seq. ("Rules of Construction Applicable to 
Donative Dispositions in Wills and Other Governing 
Instruments"); G. L. c. 190B, § 2-507 (c), (d) (expressly 
setting forth "presumption").  Indeed, § 43 (5) seems just to 
make clear that these provisions apply retroactively the same 
way they apply prospectively.  Thus, the combination of § 43 (1) 
and (5) render the entire act retroactive. 
 
Based on the language and purpose of § 2-804, we therefore 
conclude that the Legislature intended for § 2-804 to be 
retroactive and it did so pursuant to § 43 (1).  We further 
14 
 
conclude that § 43 (5) is limited to those sections expressly 
defined as rules of construction or presumptions applicable 
absent contrary intent and thus does not apply to § 2-804, which 
is not described as a rule of construction or presumption and 
does not employ the open-ended absence of contrary intent 
formulation.  Rather, § 2-804 includes its own more specific 
rules of application and exception, thereby displacing a 
generalized contrary intent inquiry. 
We recognize that some courts and commentators have in 
other contexts, and in order to provide for the retroactive 
application of § 2-804, interpreted § 2-804 as a rule of 
construction.  A good example is the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of Utah's 
retroactivity provision in Stillman v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity 
Ass'n College Retirement Equities Fund, 343 F.3d 1311 (10th Cir. 
2003).  Notably, Utah's Uniform Probate Code differed from the 
Massachusetts Uniform Probate Code in that the equivalent of 
§ 43 (1) was limited to "wills."  Utah Code § 75-8-101(2)(a).  
The only retroactivity provisions applicable to other 
instruments in Utah were provisions related to rules of 
construction.  See Utah Code §§ 75-8-101(2)(e), 75-2-1301(2).  
In this context, where § 2-804 would not otherwise be 
retroactive, the Tenth Circuit interpreted § 2-804 as a rule of 
construction. 
15 
 
Similarly, in defending the constitutionality of the 
retroactive application of the Uniform Probate Code prior to the 
Supreme Court's decision in Sveen, Lawrence Waggoner, the chief 
reporter for the Uniform Probate Code editorial board, stated, 
"[Section 2-804] merely establishes a rule of construction 
designed to implement intention.  It reflects a legislative 
judgment that when the insured leaves unaltered a will, 
trust, or insurance-beneficiary designation in favor of an 
ex-spouse, the insured's failure to designate substitute 
takers more likely than not represents inattention rather 
than intention.  The legislative judgment yields to a 
contrary intention." 
 
Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our Multiple-Marriage Society:  The 
Revised Uniform Probate Code, 26 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 683, 
700 (1992).  Although instructive on the importance of applying 
§ 2-804 retroactively, we decline to adopt such an expansive and 
unnecessary interpretation of rules of construction and 
presumptions in the context of § 43 (1) and (5) of the 
Massachusetts act, relying instead on the plain language of our 
statute.  Section 43 (1) clearly encompasses § 2-804, rendering 
it fully retroactive.  Section 43 (5), on its face, applies only 
to those rules of construction and presumptions so entitled.  If 
§ 43 (5) were applicable to § 2-804, it would also limit and not 
expand the retroactive effect of § 2-804, which cuts against the 
thrust of the Tenth Circuit and Waggoner interpretations.  For 
all these reasons, we conclude that § 2-804 is to be applied 
16 
 
retroactively, pursuant to § 43 (1), according to the terms of 
both provisions. 
e.  Application of the exceptions to § 2-804.  We therefore 
consider the question whether summary judgment should have also 
been allowed pursuant to § 2-804.  Unless one of the statute's 
express exceptions applies, the beneficiary designation to Dawn, 
the divorced spouse, would be revoked as a matter of law.  As 
provided by § 2-804, however, disposition made by a divorced 
individual to a former spouse would not be revoked if "provided 
by the express terms of a governing instrument, a court order,[8] 
or a contract relating to the division of the marital estate 
made between the divorced individuals before or after the 
marriage, divorce, or annulment."  G. L. c. 190B, § 2-804 (b).9  
Importantly, § 2-804 only applies to governing instruments 
"executed by the divorced individual before the divorce or 
annulment" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 190B, § 2-804 (a) (4).  
This means that another method of avoiding application of § 2-
804 is redesignating the ex-spouse as beneficiary after the 
 
8 Dawn admits that the couple failed to provide for life 
insurance in their separation agreement.  As a result, the 
divorce judgment, which incorporated the separation agreement, 
contains no terms on the insurance policy.  Therefore, this 
exception does not apply. 
 
9 There is also an exception, not applicable here, for when 
the divorced parties remarry or the divorce or annulment is 
nullified.  G. L. c. 190B, § 2-804 (e). 
17 
 
divorce; § 2-804 does not apply to such "beneficiary 
designations," G. L. c. 190B, § 1-201 (4).10  See Sveen, 138 
S. Ct. at 1823; Joint Editorial Board Statement, 17 ACTEC Notes 
at 184. 
The only two exceptions requiring further consideration are 
those related to a contract dividing the marital estate, and the 
express terms of Sean's life insurance policy.  We begin with 
the contract exception. 
i.  Contract relating to the division of marital property.  
As a preliminary matter, we address the issue whether the 
contract argument was waived.  It was certainly not the focus of 
the summary judgment proceedings.  Rather, counsel for Dawn 
directed most, if not all, of his argument toward his contention 
that § 2-804 did not apply retroactively.  It was not until he 
 
10 Like most life insurance policies, Sean's policy required 
that requests to change the beneficiary be in writing.  It is 
undisputed that Sean did not file a written redesignation after 
divorce.  In certain cases, we have recognized that even if an 
insured fails to meet the formal requirements of his or her 
policy, "a change of beneficiary is effected when the insured 
has done everything within [his or her] power to comply with the 
provisions for such change in the policy."  Alfama v. Rose, 323 
Mass. 643, 644 (1949), and cases cited.  However, "[a] mere 
intention on the part of an insured to change the beneficiary 
not acted upon in the manner required by the terms of the policy 
is ineffectual."  Henderson v. Adams, 308 Mass. 333, 338 (1941).  
See Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co., 318 Mass. at 250-251.  Therefore, 
even if we were to credit fully Dawn's evidence of Sean's 
intent, there is no evidence that he made any effort to comply 
with the terms of his policy to redesignate Dawn as beneficiary, 
and therefore there are no grounds to argue that he 
substantially complied. 
18 
 
filed a motion for reconsideration that he included argument 
specifically addressing the contract exception.  Dawn's counsel 
did, however, submit admissible evidence supporting her 
contention that she and Sean entered into an oral contract 
requiring Dawn to continue paying the premiums on the life 
insurance policy in exchange for Sean maintaining the policy.11 
The language of § 2-804, including its exceptions, was also 
presented to the motion judge.  Her analysis considered and 
applied § 2-804, and she specifically addressed the contract 
 
11 We disagree with the motion judge's characterization of 
this evidence as inadmissible.  On summary judgment, affidavit 
evidence must be "made on personal knowledge, [and] shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence."  Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 56 (e), 365 Mass. 824 (1974).  Dawn's testimony 
regarding her payment of the premiums and statements made by 
Sean to her about the policy are within her personal knowledge 
and would apparently be admissible at trial if Dawn were so to 
testify.  General Laws c. 233, § 65, provides: 
 
"In any action or other civil judicial proceeding, a 
declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible 
in evidence as hearsay or as private conversation between 
husband and wife, as the case may be, if the court finds 
that it was made in good faith and upon the personal 
knowledge of the declarant." 
 
Furthermore, statements of intent, including those by a 
deceased donor, would appear to fall within the hearsay 
exception for then-existing state of mind, Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 803(3) (2021), or as verbal acts, Shimer v. Foley, Hoag & 
Eliot LLP, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 302, 310-311 (2003), citing Jamaica 
Pond Garage, Inc. v. Woodside Motor Livery, Inc., 236 Mass. 541, 
542 (1920) (terms of offer not hearsay because they are legally 
operative facts, not offered to prove intent of offeror); Mass. 
G. Evid. § 801(c) note (2021).  More particularly, these 
statements would be introduced to show whether Sean contracted 
to maintain Dawn as his beneficiary. 
19 
 
exception in response to the motion for reconsideration.  
Although a close question, we conclude that the contract issue 
was not waived in these circumstances; therefore, we address it 
here as well. 
The motion judge concluded that Dawn's evidence did not 
meet the requirements of the contract exception because the 
separation agreement was fully integrated and did not include 
the insurance policies.  We agree.  The integrated separation 
agreement omitted any discussion of insurance policies even 
though the parties were invited to include them, divided up the 
entire marital estate, and stated that the separation agreement 
included all agreements between the parties.  It should 
therefore be enforced according to its terms.  See Ames v. 
Perry, 406 Mass. 236, 240-241 (1989) (specific enforcement of 
separation agreements "supports finality and predictability, 
allows the parties to engage in future planning, and avoids 
recurrent litigation in the highly charged emotional area of 
divorce law"); Matter of the Estate of DeWitt, 54 P.3d 849, 858 
(Colo. 2002) (recognizing purpose of § 2-804 as providing 
finality to divorce). 
More specifically, the separation agreement states in 
unequivocal terms, "The parties have included in this Agreement 
their entire understanding.  No spoken or written statement 
outside this Agreement was relied on by either party in signing 
20 
 
this Agreement."  It also states that "[t]he Husband and Wife 
. . . already divided between themselves all of their personal 
property and they are satisfied that the division was fair."  
Following that statement, they provided further information 
about their mutual responsibilities regarding the transfer of 
title and payments for automobiles and their joint obligation to 
pay the wife's credit card debt.  In so doing, the separation 
agreement defined and delimited their residual responsibilities 
regarding marital property.  There was no mention of the 
insurance policy, which was marital property at the time of 
divorce.  If Dawn's attestations are to be credited, the 
continuation of the insurance policy with her as the beneficiary 
would require the same type of mutual exchange of actions as 
described for the cars and credit card debt.  Sean also 
expressly declined to check a box that would have changed the 
beneficiary designation to his children. 
The contemporaneous written documentation therefore 
establishes that at the time of the divorce there was no 
contractual agreement to continue Dawn as the beneficiary of 
Sean's insurance policy.  Rather, Sean retained an insurance 
policy in his name and was free to change the beneficiary of it 
at any time.  Finally, following the divorce agreement the 
insurance policy was no longer a part of the marital estate, as 
the marital estate had been fully divided.  Divorcing couples 
21 
 
may choose not to address the division of the marital estate in 
their separation agreement or divorce judgment.  See Brash v. 
Brash, 407 Mass. 101, 104 (1990); Hay v. Cloutier, 389 Mass. 
248, 252 (1983); G. L. c. 208, § 34 (allowing action to divide 
marital estate "at any time after a divorce").  In such cases, 
application of § 2-804 can be avoided if the parties agree to 
maintain the ex-spouse's beneficiary status in a postdivorce 
contract.  However, where, as here, the separation agreement or 
judgment addresses the division of property, that division is 
final and there is no longer a marital estate to divide.  See 
Sahin v. Sahin, 435 Mass. 396, 404 n.10 (2001), quoting Heins v. 
Ledis, 422 Mass. 477, 483 (1996) ("Property settlements are 
designed largely to effectuate a final and complete settlement 
of obligations between the divorcing spouses"); Taverna v. 
Pizzi, 430 Mass. 882, 886 (2000).  After the division, the 
policy was Sean's to manage as he saw fit.  In these 
circumstances, there could be no "contract relating to the 
division of the marital estate made between the divorced 
individuals before or after the marriage, divorce, or annulment" 
despite Dawn's statements to the contrary.12  The motion judge 
 
12 We recognize that a divorced spouse would not ordinarily 
be expected to continue to make payments for an insurance plan 
for which neither she nor her children, but rather her mother-
in-law, was the beneficiary.  See Uniform Probate Code § 2-804 
comment (2006) ("Given that, during divorce process or in the 
aftermath of the divorce, the former spouse's relatives are 
22 
 
therefore properly rejected an argument that the contract 
exception in § 2-804 applied. 
ii.  Express terms of a governing instrument.  Section 2-
804 applies "[e]xcept as provided by the express terms of a 
governing instrument" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 190B, § 2-
804 (b).  We adopt the plain meaning of the exception.  The 
policy must expressly provide that the beneficiary designation 
is not revoked by divorce or words to that effect.  See, e.g., 
Buchholz v. Storsve, 2007 S.D. 101, ¶ 15 ("We hereby interpret 
the statute to require that the governing instrument contain 
express terms referring to divorce, specifically stating that 
the beneficiary will remain as the designated beneficiary 
despite divorce."); Hertzske v. Snyder, 2017 UT 4, ¶¶ 14-15 
("The generic language found in almost every life insurance 
policy regarding the standard method to change a beneficiary 
does not constitute 'express terms' enabling the beneficiary 
designation to survive revocation under [§ 2-804]. . . .  We 
therefore hold that a life insurance policy must contain 
language specifically stating that the beneficiary designation 
 
likely to side with the former spouse, breaking down or 
weakening any former ties that may previously have developed 
between the transferor and the former spouse's relatives, seldom 
would the transferor have favored such a result").  The reasons 
for such a payment in the instant case, however, are more 
complicated.  Dawn's spouse rider and her sons' child riders 
essentially made them coinsureds on the policy.  Thus, Dawn had 
other reasons for continuing to make such payments. 
23 
 
will remain in effect despite divorce to invoke the express 
terms exception").  It does not do so here. 
Dawn argues nonetheless that this exception applies because 
the terms of Sean's policy did not mention divorce and required 
Sean to change his beneficiary designation in writing.  But this 
is not enough to show that the "express terms of" the policy 
provide that her designation would survive divorce.  G. L. 
c. 190B, § 2-804 (b).  This type of argument by implication also 
ignores a provision in the policy which states that "[i]f any 
Beneficiary is disqualified from receiving the Proceeds by 
operation of law, then the Proceeds will be paid as though the 
Beneficiary died before the Named Insured," in this case meaning 
to the contingent beneficiary.  By expressly incorporating the 
disqualification by operation of law provision, the policy does 
not even imply what Dawn contends. 
Even if the policy did not contain such language, Dawn's 
argument would still fail.  Section 2-804 is designed, at least 
in part, to protect donors who made predivorce dispositions in 
favor of their ex-spouse and failed to follow the procedural 
requirements to change them.  Joint Editorial Board Statement, 
17 ACTEC Notes at 184.  A requirement that the insurer receive 
written notice of a change of beneficiary for it to be effective 
is "customary" for life insurance policies, meaning revocation 
would be precluded in almost every case.  See S. Plitt, D. 
24 
 
Maldonado, & J.D. Rogers, Couch on Insurance 3d § 60:20 (rev. 
ed. 2011).  Adopting Dawn's interpretation would essentially 
restore the pre-Uniform Probate Code rule that "the burden is on 
the insured to effect a change in beneficiary in accordance with 
the terms of the policy . . . [and d]ivorce does not revoke a 
designation of beneficiary unless . . . the insurance contract 
so provides."  Stiles, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 515 n.3. 
Because Dawn has not shown that the insurance policy 
expressly provided that her designation would survive divorce, 
the first exception does not apply. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  Our de novo review of the record before 
the motion judge reveals that summary judgment was properly 
allowed.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
13 We deny Joann's motion for fees and costs.  Although 
Dawn's arguments were mostly frivolous, the retroactive 
application of § 2-804 was a novel issue of law, the exact 
details of which this court and courts from other Uniform 
Probate Code jurisdictions have disagreed upon.  Therefore, the 
appeal was not frivolous.