Case Title: State v. Bryant

Citation: 2022-Ohio-1878

Docket Number: 2020-0599

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2022-06-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Bryant, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-1878.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-1878 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BRYANT, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Bryant, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-1878.] 
Criminal law—Felony sentencing—When a defendant’s outburst or other 
courtroom misbehavior causes a significant disruption that obstructs the 
administration of justice, that behavior may be punishable as contempt of 
court and not with an increased prison sentence—Court of appeals’ 
judgment reversed and cause remanded. 
(No. 2020-0599—Submitted April 14, 2021—Decided June 7, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lake County, 
No. 2019-L-024, 2020-Ohio-438. 
__________________ 
STEWART, J. 
{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from a judgment of the Eleventh District 
Court of Appeals, we consider whether the appellate court erred by affirming the 
trial court’s judgment increasing appellant Manson Bryant’s prison sentence by six 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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years in response to Bryant’s reaction to the length of a previously imposed prison 
sentence. We hold that the Eleventh District erred, and we reverse the judgment 
affirming the trial court’s judgment increasing Bryant’s sentence.  If a defendant’s 
outburst or other courtroom misbehavior causes a significant disruption that 
obstructs the administration of justice, that behavior may be punishable as contempt 
of court.  See R.C. 2705.01.  The behavior, however, may not result in an increased 
sentence for the underlying crime. 
I. The Role of the Judiciary 
{¶ 2} Being a trial-court judge is not an easy job.  In the criminal-justice 
context, trial-court judges are tasked with, among other things, (1) hearing the 
sordid facts of a case, (2) acting as gatekeepers by deciding what evidence is 
admissible, (3) protecting the federal and state constitutional rights of the accused, 
(4) determining whether the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a bench 
trial, (5) deciding whether to overturn a jury’s finding of guilt when the defense 
moves for a judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence of guilt, and 
(6) imposing a sentence that fulfills the purposes and principals of sentencing set 
forth in the Revised Code when the accused is found guilty.  Against this backdrop, 
we expect a lot from trial-court judges.  We expect them to (1) provide a safe space 
for victims who come before the court to tell their stories, (2) have sympathy and 
compassion for those victims, (3) maintain control over their courtrooms to assure 
the safety of those in attendance and maintain an atmosphere of respect for 
everyone who comes into the courtroom, (4) fairly, impartially, and dispassionately 
mediate disputes between opposing parties over discovery, evidentiary issues, and 
other litigation matters, and (5) treat those who are accused of crimes and those 
who are convicted of crimes with courtesy, dignity, and respect.  Essentially, we 
ask trial-court judges to appraise wrongdoing, attribute blame, absolve the 
innocent, and punish the wrongdoer, all while creating an atmosphere that 
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facilitates justice and fairness through neutral and careful decision-making.  This is 
no easy task.  And like all jobs, it is one that is impossible to do perfectly. 
{¶ 3} To have any type of honest and meaningful discussion about why the 
Eleventh District’s judgment should be reversed and Bryant’s 28-year sentence 
vacated—and a 22-year prison sentence reimposed—it is important to acknowledge 
that the very act of presiding over a criminal case, with all its accompanying 
pressures and responsibilities, often exacts an emotional toll on the trial-court 
judge.  Even the most experienced, even-keeled, and unflappable trial-court judge 
is subject, every day, to stressors that may generate a range of emotions.  In a perfect 
world, every trial-court judge would be able to control his or her emotions and not 
let those emotions get in the way of sound and just decision-making.  But we do 
not live in a perfect world.  The best that we can do as a society is to give trial-court 
judges the tools and support they need to help them productively funnel their 
emotions and vast powers over the life and liberty of individuals into just outcomes.  
The best we can do as reviewing courts—because we have a broader perspective 
on the wide-reaching impacts of individual trial-court decisions and the better 
position to neutrally evaluate those decisions—is to correct errors in judgment and 
provide guidance.  But to do these things, we need to start by acknowledging what 
is uncomfortable to acknowledge: that trial-court judges do get offended and angry, 
that anger clouds judgment, and that clouded judgment often results in unjust 
outcomes.  The record in this case demonstrates that fundamentally, this is what 
happened when the trial-court judge added an additional six years of incarceration 
to Bryant’s prison sentence after Bryant had an emotional outburst upon being 
sentenced to 22 years in prison. 
II. Background 
{¶ 4} In October 2018, a Lake County grand jury indicted Bryant on seven 
criminal counts related to his involvement, along with a codefendant, in an armed 
burglary of an occupied trailer home.  Counts One and Two charged Bryant with 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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aggravated burglary, a felony of the first degree, in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(1) 
(Count One) and R.C. 2911.11(A)(2) (Count Two).  The remaining counts were: 
Count Three, aggravated robbery, a felony of the first degree, in violation of R.C. 
2911.01(A)(1); Count Four, kidnapping, a felony of the first degree, in violation of 
R.C. 2905.01(A)(2); Count Five, abduction, a felony of the third degree, in 
violation of R.C. 2905.02(A)(2); Count Six, having a weapon while under a 
disability, a felony of the third degree, in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2); and 
Count Seven, carrying concealed weapons, a felony of the fourth degree, in 
violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2).  Each count contained a forfeiture specification 
pursuant to R.C. 2941.1417 and 2981.04.  Counts One through Five included one- 
and three-year firearm specifications pursuant to R.C. 2941.141 and 2941.145. 
{¶ 5} Bryant pleaded not guilty to all counts in the indictment and the case 
proceeded to a jury trial on Counts One through Five and part of Count Seven.  The 
portion of Count Seven that Bryant elected to have tried to the jury was renumbered 
to Count Six (“jury-count six”).  Bryant waived his right to a jury trial on Count 
Six and the remaining part of Count Seven, electing to have a bench trial on those 
counts.  The jury found Bryant guilty of Counts One through Five and jury-count 
six.  The trial court found him guilty of Counts Six and Seven. 
{¶ 6} The matter proceeded to sentencing on March 1, 2019.  The court 
began the sentencing hearing by explaining the jury’s findings of guilt and how it 
would handle several merger issues.  The court merged the two counts of 
aggravated burglary (Counts One and Two), the abduction and kidnapping counts 
(Counts Four and Five), and the two counts of carrying a concealed weapon (jury-
count six and Count Seven).  The court also merged the abduction and kidnapping 
counts (Counts Four and Five) with the-aggravated robbery count (Count Three) as 
well as the one‐year and three‐year firearm specifications for Counts One and 
Three.  After merger, the trial court stated that Bryant would be sentenced on Count 
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One, aggravated burglary; Count Three, aggravated robbery; Count Six, having 
weapons while under a disability; and Count Seven, carrying concealed weapons. 
{¶ 7} Before sentencing Bryant, the court gave Bryant’s attorney, Bryant, 
and the assistant prosecutor a chance to make a statement.  Bryant’s attorney began 
by distinguishing Bryant’s conduct from that of his codefendant’s, in that Bryant 
was an “aider and abettor,” as opposed to his codefendant, who was the principal 
actor in the commission of the burglary.  Bryant’s attorney reminded the court that 
Bryant’s codefendant was sentenced to a 12-year prison term, and the attorney 
asked the court to sentence Bryant to a 10-year prison term. 
{¶ 8} Thereafter, Bryant was given the chance to speak directly to the court.  
He stated: 
 
Your Honor, I know you [are] very well aware of my history.  I made 
a lifetime of bad decisions.  And those bad decisions has caused pain 
to a lot of people in my family.  For that I am truly sorry.  Most of 
my bad decisions have been driven by my addiction to drugs, and to 
do whatever I can to continue to get high.  My ability to stay clean 
has me to spend most of my life in prison.  There’s no way for a 
person to live—that’s no way for a person to live.  And it’s not how 
I want to finish my life.  Despite the circumstances of my 
upbringing, I understand that I can’t continue to blame others for my 
actions and my behaviors.  I have become jaded towards the legal 
system.  By having this trial, was honest and open eye for me.  I 
have never gone through trial before.  I have a new found respect for 
the efforts of the attorneys, judges, jurors, and goal in living as an, 
as giving an accused person a opportunity to have a case heard.  
That’s all anyone can ask.  I am thankful for the opportunity afforded 
by the court, by the day in court, and I respect the decision that the 
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juries has made.  I alone have the power to end the cycle of 
incarceration, and all I ask is for you to give me an opportunity to 
still make something out of my life, sir.  I don’t want to die in prison, 
sir.  I’m not a bad person, sir.  I do have a drug problem.  I’ve been 
in front of you multiple times.  I respect you.  And I respect your 
decision that you make today. 
 
{¶ 9} After Bryant made his remarks, the trial court allowed the state to 
present its position regarding Bryant’s sentence.  The state opposed Bryant’s 
request for leniency, disagreeing that Bryant was merely an aider and abettor in the 
commission of the offenses.  The state also pointed to Bryant’s extensive criminal 
history and previous probation and postrelease-control violations as reasons for 
imposing a lengthier sentence than the sentence that had been imposed on Bryant’s 
codefendant.  The state suggested that an aggregate sentence of at least 20 years in 
prison would be appropriate. 
{¶ 10} Thereafter, the trial court made the following statements: 
 
The Court has considered the record, the oral statements made, the 
victim impact statements, the trial testimony and evidence, the pre-
sentence report from several years ago, the updated criminal history, 
[the] conference in chambers with counsel and probation, and the 
statements of [Bryant] and [Bryant’s] counsel.  The Court has also 
considered the overriding purposes of felony sentencing pursuant to 
Revised Code 2929.11 * * * [and] all relevant factors, including the 
seriousness and the recidivism factors set forth in division’s B 
trough E of Revised Code 2929.12.  * * * There’s been a 
rehabilitation failure after previous convictions and delinquency 
adjudications, and a failure to respond in the past to probation or 
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post release control.  The Court determines that the offenses were 
committed under circumstances very likely to recur, and the Court 
determines to make recidivism less likely that the offender shows a 
certain amount of remorse. 
 
{¶ 11} The court then proceeded to sentence Bryant to eight years in prison 
on Count One, eight years in prison on Count Three, 36 months in prison on Count 
Six, and 18 months in prison on Count Seven.  The court ordered the sentences for 
Counts One and Two to be served consecutively to each other, and the sentences 
for Counts Six and Seven to be served concurrently with each other and with the 
sentences for Counts One and Three.  The trial court also imposed two consecutive, 
mandatory three-year prison terms for the firearm specifications attached to Counts 
One and Three, for an aggregate prison term of 22 years. 
{¶ 12} Just as the court finished announcing Bryant’s sentence, the 
following exchanged occurred:  
 
BRYANT:  Fuck your courtroom, you racist ass bitch.  Fuck 
your courtroom, man.  You racist as fuck.  You racist as fuck.  
Twenty-two fucking years.  Racist ass bitch.  (CONTINUED 
OUTBURST BY DEFENDANT, SWEARING, YELLING, MUCH 
UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
COURT:  Remember when— 
BRYANT:  You ain’t shit. 
COURT:  Remember when I said that you had some 
remorse? 
BRYANT:  You ain’t shit.  You never gave me probation. 
COURT:  Wait a minute. 
BRYANT:  You never gave me a chance. 
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COURT:  When I said that you had a certain amount of 
remorse, I was mistaken.  (DEFENDANT CONTINUES 
YELLING).  The Court determines—  
BRYANT: 
Fuck you. 
COURT: 
 
The 
Court 
determines 
that 
maximum 
imprisonment is needed, so it’s eleven years on Count 1 and eleven 
years on Count 3. 
BRYANT:  Fuck that courtroom.  You racist bitch.  You 
ain’t 
shit. 
 
(MALE 
VOICE 
SAYING 
“MANSON” 
REPEATEDLY).  Let me out the courtroom, man.  (MORE 
SHOUTING AND SWEARING). 
COURT:  So, it’s twenty-eight years with credit for two 
hundred and thirty-one days.  Hold on.  (DEFENDANT STILL 
SHOUTING).  Does counsel waive your client’s presence for the 
remainder of the advisements I have to give? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Yes, Your Honor. 
COURT:  Alright.  You can take him.  The Court determines 
that [Bryant] has shown no remorse whatsoever.  I was giving him 
remorse, a certain amount of remorse in mitigation of the sentence.  
[Bryant] has shown me that he has no remorse whatsoever, and 
therefore the Court determines that maximum imprisonment is 
needed. 
 
 
(Capitalization sic.) 
{¶ 13} The sentencing judgment was journalized on March 4, 2019, 
reflecting an aggregate 28-year prison term that was increased from the original 
sentence of 22 years. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
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{¶ 14} Bryant appealed to the Eleventh District Court of Appeals raising 
three assignments of error.  In his first assignment of error, Bryant argued that the 
trial court erred when it added six years to his prison sentence because of his 
courtroom outburst.  Bryant argued that although his courtroom misbehavior may 
have amounted to contempt of court, and may have been punished as such, it was 
error for the trial court to punish such conduct by adding six additional years onto 
his sentence for the underlying crimes.  He argued that his statements did not 
amount to a showing of no remorse for his crimes but rather were a verbal attack 
on the trial court. 
{¶ 15} Relying on its earlier decision in State v. Thompson, 2017-Ohio-
1001, 86 N.E.3d 608 (11th Dist.), in which it upheld a similar sentence increase by 
the same trial court under similar circumstances, the court of appeals rejected 
Bryant’s argument.  It began by explaining that at the time the trial court increased 
Bryant’s sentence, the sentence was not yet final because it had not been 
journalized.  Accordingly, the court of appeals determined that the trial court was 
not prohibited from revisiting Bryant’s sentence following his outburst.  The court 
of appeals then explained that the trial court “could” have construed Bryant’s 
behavior “as a sign that his previous statements of remorse and contrition were not 
genuine.”  2020-Ohio-438, ¶ 24.  The court of appeals qualified that statement, 
however, by noting that Bryant’s “sudden verbal eruption [did] not necessarily 
reflect a lack of remorse,” reasoning that Bryant “could possess deep regret for the 
crimes he committed and the harm he caused and, at the same time, have a highly 
negative emotional reaction to the court’s sentence.”  Id.  The court of appeals 
rejected Bryant’s first assignment of error as well as the remaining two and affirmed 
his conviction and sentence. 
{¶ 16} Bryant appealed to this court pro se.  We accepted review over one 
proposition of law: “The trial court erred when it imposed an additional six years 
on Bryant’s sentence after his outburst in court,” see 159 Ohio St.3d 1468, 2020-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Ohio-3884, 150 N.E.3d 125, and we appointed the Office of the Ohio Public 
Defender to represent Bryant, id.  In his merit brief, Bryant, through appointed 
counsel, restates the accepted proposition of law as follows: “A defendant’s 
disrespect towards the trial court, when done in response to a judicial ruling, is 
punishable as contempt of court, but does not provide a lawful basis for increasing 
the defendant’s sentence.” 
{¶ 17} Bryant asserts that the trial court increased his sentence as 
punishment for disrespecting the court, not because his outburst demonstrated that 
he had no remorse for his crimes.  He argues that although trial courts have a great 
deal of discretion in fashioning sentences, ultimately, they are constrained by the 
sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, none of which allow a court to 
consider a defendant’s show of disrespect toward a court when it decides what 
sentence is appropriate.  While Bryant agrees that trial courts are permitted to 
consider a defendant’s showing of “genuine remorse” or lack thereof pursuant to 
R.C. 2929.12 (D)(5) and (E)(5), respectively, he argues that his outburst may not 
reasonably be construed as evincing a lack of remorse.  At bottom, Bryant’s 
argument is that the trial court’s stated justification for increasing his sentence (lack 
of remorse) was pretextual in nature.  He maintains that the real reason the trial 
court increased his sentence was to punish him for his offensive, in-court behavior 
and disrespectful attitude toward the court—actions that are not included in R.C. 
2929.11 or 2929.12, therefore rendering his sentence contrary to law.  Bryant points 
to both the context and content of the outburst as support for his position that the 
outburst was in response to the length of his sentence and was not a demonstration 
of no remorse for his crimes.  Specifically, he notes: (1) the outburst immediately 
followed the trial court’s pronouncement of his sentence, (2) that his statements 
were solely directed at the trial court and had nothing to do with his crimes or the 
victims, and (3) that his statements reflected his belief that the trial court’s sentence 
was predetermined and racially motivated. 
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{¶ 18} The state takes the position that the trial court had the legal authority 
to change its previous sentence after Bryant’s outburst because, at the time of the 
outburst, the sentence had not yet been journalized and was therefore not final.  The 
state also argues that the trial court could have construed Bryant’s outburst as a sign 
that his previous statements of remorse and contrition were not genuine and were 
made from a desire to receive a more lenient sentence. 
III.  Analysis 
A.  Reviewability 
{¶ 19} Prior to oral argument, the state filed a notice of supplemental 
authority citing this court’s recent decision in State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 
2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649,1 in which we determined that appellate review 
of a trial court’s sentencing decision under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not permit an 
appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based on a lack of support in the 
record for the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.  Although the 
state did not mention or otherwise make use of this authority at oral argument, we 
find it prudent to address the state’s apparent suggestion that Bryant’s claim may 
be unreviewable in light of Jones.  After careful consideration, we find that our 
review of this matter is not constrained in any way by Jones. 
{¶ 20} A court reviewing a criminal sentence is required by R.C. 
2953.08(F) to review the entire trial-court record, including any oral or written 
statements and presentence-investigation reports.  R.C. 2953.08(F)(1) through (4).  
Although a court imposing a felony sentence must consider the purposes of felony 
sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors under R.C. 2929.12, 
“neither R.C. 2929.11 nor 2929.12 requires [the] court to make any specific factual 
findings on the record.”  Jones at ¶ 20, citing State v. Wilson, 129 Ohio St.3d 214, 
 
1.  Jones was decided on December 18, 2020, after the close of briefing and prior to oral argument 
in this matter. 
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2011-Ohio-2669, 951 N.E.2d 381, ¶ 31, and State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215, 
724 N.E.2d 793 (2000). 
{¶ 21} In Jones, the Eighth District Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, 
vacated the ten-year sentences of parents who had caused the death of their disabled 
child after finding that the sentences did not advance the overriding purposes of 
felony sentencing as set forth in former R.C. 2929.11(A), 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
86.  Jones at ¶ 2-7, 12-15.  The issue on appeal to this court in Jones was a purely 
legal one.  It concerned only whether appellate review of a trial court’s sentencing 
decision under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) allowed an appellate court to review the record 
and modify or vacate a sentence based on its determination that the record did not 
support the sentencing court’s findings under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.  Based on 
the history of the amendments to R.C. 2953.08, this court held that R.C. 
2953.08(G)(2) permits a record-does-not-support-the-sentence review only for 
sentences that are imposed pursuant to certain enumerated statutes, which do not 
include R.C. 2929.11 or 2929.12.  Jones at ¶ 35-39.  This court determined that 
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not permit an appellate court to conduct an independent 
review of a trial court’s sentencing findings under R.C. 2929.12 or its adherence to 
the purposes of felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11.  See Jones at ¶ 41-42. 
{¶ 22} This case is markedly different from Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 
2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649.  Unlike the present case, Jones did not involve 
a claim that a trial court’s sentencing findings were pretextual.  Instead, the question 
before this court in Jones presupposed that a sentencing court would consider and 
apply the R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 sentencing factors, and only those factors, in 
determining what sentence is appropriate under the unique circumstances of each 
felony case.  The narrow holding in Jones is that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not allow 
an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based on its view that the sentence 
is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.  See Jones at ¶ 31, 
39.  Nothing about that holding should be construed as prohibiting appellate review 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
13 
of a sentence when the claim is that the sentence was improperly imposed based on 
impermissible considerations—i.e., considerations that fall outside those that are 
contained in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.  Indeed, in Jones, this court made clear that 
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) permits appellate courts to reverse or modify sentencing 
decisions that are “ ‘otherwise contrary to law.’ ”  Jones at ¶ 32, quoting R.C. 
2953.08(G)(2)(b).  This court also recognized that “otherwise contrary to law” 
means “ ‘in violation of statute or legal regulations at a given time.’ ” Id. at ¶ 34 
quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 328 (6th Ed.1990).  Accordingly, when a trial court 
imposes a sentence based on factors or considerations that are extraneous to those 
that are permitted by R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, that sentence is contrary to law.  
Claims that raise these types of issues are therefore reviewable. 
B.  Authority to revise a sentence prior to journalizing the sentence 
{¶ 23} In addition to reviewability, another threshold issue in this case is 
whether the trial court had the authority to revise Bryant’s sentence after orally 
pronouncing it but before it was entered on the court’s journal as a signed 
sentencing entry.  This court has recognized that, as a general rule, a court speaks 
only through its journal.  Kaine v. Marion Prison Warden, 88 Ohio St.3d 454, 455, 
727 N.E.2d 907 (2000); Schenley v. Kauth, 160 Ohio St. 109, 113 N.E.2d 625 
(1953), paragraph one of the syllabus (“A court of record speaks only through its 
journal and not by oral pronouncement or mere written minute or memorandum”). 
This general rule is also reflected in Crim.R. 32(C), which states: 
 
A judgment of conviction shall set forth the fact of 
conviction and the sentence.  Multiple judgments of conviction may 
be addressed in one judgment entry.  If the defendant is found not 
guilty or for any other reason is entitled to be discharged, the court 
shall render judgment accordingly.  The judge shall sign the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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judgment and the clerk shall enter it on the journal.  A judgment is 
effective only when entered on the journal by the clerk. 
 
This court has further stated that a judgment of conviction is not a final order subject 
to appeal until the various components of Crim.R. 32(C) are met.  See State v. 
Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, ¶ 11.  But even 
though a trial court may revise a sentence prior to its becoming final, the court may 
do so only for lawful reasons. 
C.  A review of Bryant’s outburst and the trial court’s six-year sentence increase 
{¶ 24} Bryant’s angry, profanity-laced tirade was, in no uncertain terms, 
disrespectful to the court.  Not only did Bryant accuse the trial-court judge of being 
a racist, but he did so using derogatory terms and in open court.  As impertinent as 
this tirade was, however, we agree with Bryant that it is clear from the timing and 
content of what was said that his outburst was in reaction to the length of his prison 
sentence. Nothing more. 
{¶ 25} To begin, there is no disputing the fact that Bryant’s words and 
statements were directed solely at the trial-court judge who had just sentenced 
Bryant to 22 years in prison after having sentenced his codefendant to 12 years in 
prison for the same criminal acts.  The sentencing-hearing transcript shows that 
immediately after hearing the words “22 years,” Bryant got upset, cursed at the 
judge, and accused the judge of being a racist.  From start to finish, Bryant’s focus 
never deviated from the sentencing judge as the subject of his ire.  The content of 
Bryant’s statements reveal that he was shocked by the length of the prison sentence 
that the judge had just imposed and believed that the judge should have imposed a 
lesser sentence so that he could have the opportunity to rehabilitate himself and 
successfully reenter society.  And Bryant’s statements did not relate to or address 
his crimes or the victims in any manner that might indicate a lack of remorse or that 
any remorse he had shown earlier was negated. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
15 
{¶ 26} There is no provision in the sentencing statutes that authorizes a trial 
court to impose or increase a defendant’s prison sentence merely because the 
defendant had an outburst or expressed himself in a profane and offensive way.  
And while a defendant’s showing of remorse is a sentencing factor to be considered 
by the trial court when applicable, it is hard to conceive of any honest and logical 
assessment of Bryant’s outburst that could be construed as being motivated by, or 
evincing, no remorse for his crimes. 
{¶ 27} Indeed, it is not clear what exactly Bryant said that made the trial 
court change its belief that Bryant had shown a “certain amount of remorse” to its 
belief that Bryant had shown “no remorse whatsoever.”  The judge never disclosed 
what aspect or aspects of Bryant’s behavior led to this immediate conclusion.  And 
while R.C. 2929.12 does not require a trial court to explain its findings, the total 
absence of any explanation in the wake of such an immediate and severe sentencing 
increase raises serious doubts about the trial court’s true motivations. 
{¶ 28} The court of appeals did not point to any rationale that justified the 
trial court’s decision to increase Bryant’s sentence.  The best the court of appeals 
could do was to say that “the [trial] court could construe [Bryant’s] outburst as a 
sign that his previous statements of remorse and contrition were not genuine and 
were more a reflection of his desire to receive leniency.”  (Emphasis added.)  2020-
Ohio-438 at ¶ 24.  But this statement does not answer how or why the trial court 
could logically construe Bryant’s outburst as a demonstration of no remorse for his 
crimes.  The court of appeals needed to answer those how-and-why particulars 
before it could say with any confidence that the increase in Bryant’s sentence was 
not merely retaliatory. 
{¶ 29} Additionally, there is a certain incongruity between the findings that 
the trial court made before and after Bryant’s outburst that sheds some light on this 
case.  At sentencing, the court first found that Bryant’s pre-outburst statements 
evinced remorse because Bryant explained that he had a drug addiction, that he 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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knew he had hurt people, and that he believed he could do better if he were given 
the chance to rehabilitate himself.  Stripping away the profanity and the 
disrespectful nature of Bryant’s outburst, what he said to the trial court after hearing 
that he was being sentenced to 22 years in prison remained on message with his 
earlier sentiments regarding his belief that he would be amenable to rehabilitation 
if he were given a chance to rehabilitate himself.  To find then that these sentiments 
somehow evinced no remorse, when moments earlier those statements, albeit 
expressed differently, were found to evince remorse, is concerning.  The only 
significant differences between the two expressions are the words used and the way 
in which the words were conveyed.  But what is perhaps most concerning about the 
trial court’s decision to increase Bryant’s sentence is that without a moment’s 
reflection, it added an additional six years onto a sentence that had already been 
imposed. 
{¶ 30} At bottom, no matter how one looks at this situation, the statements 
that Bryant made to the trial court during his allocution and during his outburst 
were nothing more than a plea for leniency based on his belief that he could be 
rehabilitated if he were given a chance to overcome his drug addiction.  The express 
purpose behind the sentencing considerations in R.C. 2929.12(D)(5) (“[t]he 
offender shows no genuine remorse for the offense”) and (E)(5) (“[t]he offender 
shows genuine remorse for the offense”) is that they are to be used to help determine 
whether an offender is likely to commit future crimes.  It would be ironic for the 
trial court to view Bryant’s outburst as an indication that he is likely to commit 
future crimes, which in turn warranted a six-year increase in the sentence in order 
to protect the public, when the plain purpose behind Bryant’s statements was to 
communicate his disbelief that he received a 22-year sentence, thereby not 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
17 
affording him a meaningful opportunity to reenter society as a law-abiding citizen 
after rehabilitation.2 
{¶ 31} In light of the foregoing, we find that Bryant’s sentence was 
increased by six years for disruptive and disrespectful courtroom behavior.  
Because neither R.C. 2929.11 nor 2929.12 permit trial courts to consider disruptive 
or disrespectful courtroom behavior when fashioning sentences that comport with 
the principles and purposes of felony sentencing, we hold that the increase in 
Bryant’s sentence was contrary to law. 
 
 
 
2. Several research studies into the psychology of those tasked with imposing punishment have 
attempted to answer whether punishment decisions are primarily motivated by consequentialist 
justifications for punishment—that is the aim to produce the best overall consequences for all 
concerned, such as deterring future harmful conduct—or retributivist motivations for punishment—
that is to give wrongdoers what the punisher thinks or feels they deserve based on what the 
wrongdoer has done.  See, e.g., Joshua D. Greene, The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul, 3 Moral 
Psychology 35, at 37, 50, 71 (2008).  In summarizing these studies, Greene, a Harvard experimental 
psychologist who studies retribution, stated: 
 
When people are asked in a general and abstract way why it makes sense 
to punish, consequentialist arguments are prominent.  However, when people are 
presented with more concrete cases involving specific individuals carrying out 
specific offenses, people’s judgments are largely, and in many cases completely, 
insensitive to factors affecting the consequences of punishment.  This is so even 
when the consequentialist rationale for responding to these factors is highlighted 
and when people are explicitly instructed to think like consequentialists.  It seems, 
then, that consequentialist thinking plays a negligible role in commonsense 
punitive judgment and that commonsense punitive judgment is almost entirely 
retributivist * * *, as long as the matter is sufficiently concrete.  Moreover, the 
available evidence, both from self-reports and neuroimaging data, suggests that 
people’s * * * retributivist punitive judgments are predominantly emotional, 
driven by feelings of anger or “outrage.”  
 
(Citations omitted.)  Id. at 54-55.  In essence, as Greene explains, “[p]eople punish in proportion to 
the extent that transgressions make them angry.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 51. 
 
These studies provide additional, objective support for the conclusion that the trial court’s 
decision to increase Bryant’s sentence likely had nothing to do with the trial court genuinely finding 
that Bryant displayed no remorse for his actions and was therefore likely to commit future crimes 
but was instead motivated by a desire to punish Bryant for his transgression, i.e., his offensive 
outburst. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
IV. Conclusion 
{¶ 32} Because a defendant’s display of disrespect toward a trial court is 
not a permissible sentencing factor that the court may consider under R.C. 2929.11 
and 2929.12, we conclude that the six-year increase in Bryant’s sentence is contrary 
to law.  We therefore reverse the judgment of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals 
and, pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b), modify Bryant’s sentence to the originally 
imposed, aggregate, 22-year prison term that the trial court ordered prior to 
increasing Bryant’s sentence by six years.  We remand to the trial court with 
instructions to issue a corrected sentencing entry that reflects this court’s decision. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and DONNELLY and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by FISCHER and DEWINE, JJ. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 33} This case is not about vindictive sentencing.  While it may be about 
that issue in the minds of the majority, that is not the issue this court accepted.  The 
only question this court accepted is whether a defendant’s in-court outburst “is 
punishable as contempt of court, but does not provide a lawful basis for increasing 
the defendant’s sentence.”  Majority opinion, ¶ 16. 
{¶ 34} The correct answer to that question is: it depends.  It depends on the 
in-court outburst. 
{¶ 35} When a defendant has an in-court outburst during a sentencing 
proceeding, and the defendant’s statements not only relate directly to a sentencing 
finding that the trial court made pursuant to R.C. 2929.12 but also negate support 
for that finding, the trial court is not limited to simply holding that defendant in 
contempt of court.  The trial court is permitted to consider that in-court outburst in 
sentencing: here, the in-court outburst directly related to whether appellant, Manson 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
19 
Bryant, had displayed genuine remorse for committing various crimes or whether 
he was just pretending to have remorse with the hope of receiving a more lenient 
sentence.  See R.C. 2929.12(D)(5).  And under this court’s holding in State v. Jones, 
163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, neither this court nor the 
court of appeals has the authority to review Bryant’s increased sentence.  Because 
the majority holds differently, I dissent. 
Bryant’s original sentence was not final 
{¶ 36} “A criminal sentence is final upon issuance of a final order.”  State 
v. Carlisle, 131 Ohio St.3d 127, 2011-Ohio-6553, 961 N.E.2d 671, ¶ 11.  A 
judgment of conviction is a final order when it sets forth (1) the fact of the 
conviction; “(2) the sentence; (3) the signature of the judge; and (4) [is entered] on 
the journal by the clerk of court.”  State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-
3330, 893 N.E.32d 163, syllabus, as modified by State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 
303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 37} In this case, when the trial court reconsidered the R.C. 
2929.12(D)(5) (“The offender shows no genuine remorse for the offense”) and 
(E)(5) (“The offender shows genuine remorse for the offense”) sentencing factors, 
found that Bryant’s in-court outburst negated its prior finding that Bryant had 
exhibited genuine remorse, and increased Bryant’s aggregate sentence, Bryant’s 
judgment of conviction was not yet final.  Therefore, because the trial court had the 
authority to modify Bryant’s original sentence, the increased sentence is not 
contrary to law. 
Criminal-sentencing considerations 
{¶ 38} In sentencing an offender, a trial court is guided by two statutes, R.C. 
2929.11 and 2929.12.  State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 
N.E.2d 470, ¶ 36-37, abrogated on other grounds by Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 
129 S.Ct. 711, 172 L.Ed.2d 517 (2009).  R.C. 2929.11(A) provides that the trial 
court “shall be guided by” the overriding purposes of felony sentencing, which 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
include “protect[ing] the public from future crime by the offender and others [and] 
punish[ing the offender.”  R.C. 2929.11(B) provides that a felony sentence “shall 
be reasonably calculated to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony 
sentencing” and be “commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of 
the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences 
imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.”  And R.C. 2929.11(C) 
provides that a sentence “shall not [be] base[d] * * * upon the race, ethnic 
background, gender, or religion of the offender.” 
{¶ 39} R.C. 2929.12(A) grants the trial court discretion “to determine the 
most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing set 
forth” in R.C. 2929.11.  “In exercising that discretion, the court shall consider the 
factors set forth in [R.C. 2929.12(B) and (C)] relating to the seriousness of the 
conduct, the factors provided in [R.C. 2929.12(D) and (E)] relating to the likelihood 
of the offender’s recidivism, * * * and, in addition, may consider any other factors 
that are relevant to achieving those purposes and principles of sentencing.”  Id. 
{¶ 40} And as stated in R.C. 2929.12(D)(5), when determining a 
defendant’s likelihood to commit future crimes, the trial court “shall” consider 
whether the defendant shows “no genuine remorse.”  Conversely, the trial court 
“shall” also consider whether the defendant shows “genuine remorse” when 
determining whether he is unlikely to commit future crimes.  R.C. 2929.12(E)(5). 
Appellate courts’ general authority to review sentences 
{¶ 41} Article IV, Section 3(B)(2) of the Ohio Constitution provides courts 
of appeals with jurisdiction to “review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or 
final orders of the courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the 
district.”  “But the General Assembly—and the General Assembly alone—has the 
authority to provide by law the method of exercising that jurisdiction.”  In re M.M., 
135 Ohio St.3d 375, 2013-Ohio-1495, 987 N.E.2d 652, ¶ 21, citing Cincinnati 
Polyclinic v. Balch, 92 Ohio St. 415, 111 N.E. 159 (1915), paragraph one of the 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
21 
syllabus.  Therefore, the scope of our review of a felony sentence is generally 
confined to what the General Assembly has authorized.  The legislature has 
thoroughly defined “the parameters and standards—including the standard of 
review—for felony-sentencing appeals” in R.C. 2953.08.  State v. Marcum, 146 
Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 21.  Therefore, an appellate 
court’s authority to review a sentence is limited by R.C. 2953.08.  Jones, 163 Ohio 
St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, at ¶ 27. 
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) defines the limitations of appellate-court review 
{¶ 42} R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides that an appellate court “shall review 
the record, including the findings underlying the sentence or modification given by 
the sentencing court” and may modify or vacate a sentence if it clearly and 
convincingly finds either: 
 
(a)  That the record does not support the sentencing court’s 
findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division 
(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 
2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any is relevant; or  
(b)  That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. 
 
{¶ 43} This court recently interpreted R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) in Jones.  And in 
Jones, this court made two important points in its comprehensive analysis of the 
evolution of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).  See Jones at ¶ 33-37.  First, at the time that R.C. 
2953.08 was enacted in 1995, the term “otherwise contrary to law” in former R.C. 
2953.08(G)(4), Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136, 7565, was 
defined as “ ‘in violation of statute or legal regulations at a given time,’ ” Jones at 
¶ 34, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 328 (6th Ed.1990), and “meant something 
other than an appellate court finding that the record does not support a sentence.  
This is because such a finding would have fallen under the provision permitting the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
appellate court to vacate a sentence if ‘the record does not support the sentence,’ ” 
id. at ¶ 38, quoting former R.C. 2953.08(G)(1), 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, at 7564.  
Second, since R.C. 2953.08 was first enacted, the legislature has not expanded or 
modified the term “otherwise contrary to law” to include a sentence that is not 
supported by the record.  Jones at ¶ 38.  This is evident in the General Assembly’s 
amendment to R.C. 2953.08(G) in 2000, when it enacted the narrower provision 
under which “an appellate court’s authority to modify or vacate a sentence is limited 
to situations in which it concludes that the record does not support the sentencing 
court’s findings under certain specified statutes, not including R.C. 2929.11 and 
2929.12,” Jones at ¶ 37, while leaving unchanged the otherwise-contrary-to-law 
provision, which currently remains in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b), id.; Sub.H.B. No. 
331, 148 Ohio Laws, Part I, 3414, 3418-3420.  Therefore, we concluded that R.C. 
2953.08(G)(2)(b) “does not provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or 
vacate a sentence based on its view that the sentence is not supported by the record 
under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.”  Jones at ¶ 39. 
The trial court’s finding that Bryant’s in-court outburst 
showed a lack of genuine remorse is not subject to appellate review 
{¶ 44} After Bryant’s allocution, the trial court made specific findings on 
the record, including that Bryant had demonstrated genuine remorse.  See R.C. 
2929.12(E)(5).  After Bryant’s in-court outburst, however, the trial court revisited 
that finding and increased his aggregate sentence.  See R.C. 2929.12(D)(5). 
{¶ 45} As discussed above, under R.C. 2929.12(D) and (E), the trial court 
was required to consider whether Bryant was or was not remorseful.  And because 
of the limitation on this court’s appellate authority, we may not review those 
findings to determine whether the trial court erred in reaching that conclusion.  See 
Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649. 
 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
23 
The majority relies on an argument Bryant never raised: 
“retaliatory sentencing” 
{¶ 46} The majority concludes that it is “not constrained in any way by 
Jones.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 19.  And it states that “[u]nlike the present case, 
Jones did not involve a claim that a trial court’s sentencing findings were 
pretextual.”  Id. at ¶ 22.  The majority reasons that: 
 
Nothing about [the] holding [in Jones] should be construed as 
prohibiting appellate review of a sentence when the claim is that the 
sentence was improperly imposed based on impermissible 
considerations—i.e., considerations that fall outside those that are 
contained in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.  Indeed, in Jones, this court 
made clear that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) permits appellate courts to 
reverse or modify sentencing decisions that are ‘ “otherwise 
contrary to law.’ ”  
 
Id. at ¶ 22, quoting Jones at ¶ 32, quoting R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b). 
{¶ 47} But the problem with categorizing the trial court’s R.C. 2929.12 
sentencing findings as “pretextual” or based on “impermissible considerations” that 
fall outside the permissible considerations in in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, is that 
it requires the majority to do what this court expressly prohibited courts from doing 
in Jones—reviewing (on an appellate level) the trial court’s R.C. 2929.11 and 
2929.12 sentencing findings and deciding whether it agrees with those findings. 
{¶ 48} What is more problematic is that the majority reviews Bryant’s in-
court outburst.  The majority writes: 
 
And while a defendant’s showing of remorse is a sentencing factor 
to be considered by the trial court when applicable, it is hard to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
conceive of any honest and logical assessment of Bryant’s outburst 
that could be construed as being motivated by, or evincing, no 
remorse for his crime. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Majority opinion at ¶ 26. 
{¶ 49} How does the majority get there?  No one knows.  The 
majority does not find that the trial court’s finding of remorse was wrong.  
So, is the majority stating that the trial court’s original finding of remorse 
was erroneous and, consequently, that Bryant’s in-court outburst did not 
matter for sentencing purposes?  Or is the majority stating that the trial 
court’s original finding of remorse was proper and that Bryant’s in-court 
outburst just does not contradict that finding? 
{¶ 50} In my view, what actually motivates the majority’s judgment 
is its belief that the sentencing judge could not separate his obligations as a 
judge from his personal feelings about Bryant after Bryant’s in-court 
outburst.  The majority explains: 
 
[W]e need to start by acknowledging what is uncomfortable to 
acknowledge: that trial-court judges do get offended and angry, 
that anger clouds judgment, and that clouded judgment often 
results in unjust outcomes. The record in this case demonstrates 
that fundamentally, this is what happened when the trial-court 
judge added an additional six years of incarceration to Bryant’s 
prison sentence after Bryant had an emotional outburst upon 
being sentenced to 22 years in prison. 
 
Id. at ¶ 3. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
25 
{¶ 51} But there is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court 
erred.  The record is devoid of any evidence indicating that the trial court 
engaged in either a shouting match or a heated exchange with Bryant.  The 
trial court simply stated, “Remember when I said that you had some 
remorse?  * * * When I said that you had a certain amount of remorse, I was 
mistaken. (DEFENDANT CONTINUES YELLING).”  (Capitalization sic.) 
{¶ 52} What the majority actually believes is that the increase in 
Bryant’s sentence had nothing to do with the sentencing factors but was in 
fact “retaliatory” based on his in-court outburst.  (Emphasis added).  
Majority opinion at ¶ 28  The problem with the majority’s analysis, 
however, is that Bryant never alleged or argued that the sentence was 
retaliatory.  And his brief never cites any case law on the issue of retaliatory 
sentencing.  Therefore, his argument that an in-court outburst may be 
punishable only as a contempt-of-court sanction may not be construed to 
assert a retaliatory-sentence challenge. 
{¶ 53} The process of judicial review depends on the parties to 
identify, preserve, and present issues for appeal.  See Sizemore v. Smith, 6 
Ohio St.3d 330, 333, 453 N.E.2d 632 (1983), fn. 2 (“justice is far better 
served when [this court] has the benefit of briefing, arguing, and lower court 
consideration before making a final determination”).  This court is “not 
obligated to search the record or formulate legal arguments on behalf of the 
parties, because ‘ “appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal 
inquiry and research, but [preside] essentially as arbiters of legal questions 
presented and argued by the parties before them.” ’ ”  (Brackets added in 
Bodyke.)  State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 
N.E.3d 900, ¶ 19, quoting State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-
2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, ¶ 78 (O’Donnell, J., concurring in part and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
dissenting in part), quoting Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 
(D.C.Cir.1983). 
{¶ 54} Because the majority is convinced that the trial court acted in 
retaliation when it increased Bryant’s aggregate prison term, it has written 
Bryant’s brief, pronounced itself convinced by the very issue that it has 
researched and written, and ruled in Bryant’s favor.  See Chen v. Holder, 
737 F.3d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir.2013) (an appellate court “cannot write a 
party’s brief, pronounce ourselves convinced by it, and so rule in the party’s 
favor” when a party fails to raise a particular argument). This is not how our 
“adversarial system of adjudication works.”  Id. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 55} The legislature gives trial courts the discretion to impose a sentence 
after considering various sentencing factors pursuant to R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.  
In this case, it was in the discretion of the trial court to determine whether Bryant 
had expressed remorse and whether that remorse was genuine.  See R.C. 
2929.12(E)(5). 
{¶ 56} Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), the General Assembly has limited 
the authority of appellate courts to review a felony sentence and does not afford 
appellate courts the authority to review a trial court’s determination of the R.C. 
2929.11 and 2929.12 sentencing factors.  Our holding in Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 
2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, bears out the limits of appellate review.  Because 
the limited matter before us hinges on whether the trial court erred when it made 
certain sentencing findings in accordance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, and 
because we have no authority to review those findings, I would affirm the judgment 
of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals.  Because the majority decides otherwise, 
I dissent. 
FISCHER and DEWINE, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
27 
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jennifer A. 
McGee, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Max Hersch, Assistant Public 
Defender, for appellant. 
_________________