Case Title: Workers' Compensation Fund v. Industrial Accident Board

Citation: 

Docket Number: 457, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
§  
FUND, 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 457, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§   Court Below – Superior Court 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   C.A. No. 06M-05-112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD §  
and KENT CONSTRUCTION CO., §  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Defendants Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellees.  
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
   Submitted:  March 21, 2007 
 
 
 
 
      Decided:  May 1, 2007 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
This first day of May 2007, it appears to the Court that: 
1) 
The 
plaintiff-appellant, 
Workers’ 
Compensation 
Fund 
(“Fund”), appeals the Superior Court’s dismissal of its complaint seeking a 
writ of prohibition and declaratory judgment preventing the Industrial 
Accident Board (“Board”) from hearing the appellee Kent Construction 
Co.’s (“Kent”) “true second injury” petition, pursuant to 19 Del C. § 2327.  
The Fund makes two related arguments on appeal.  First, it claims that the 
Superior Court erred when it denied its writ of prohibition.  Second, it claims 
that the Superior Court erred as a matter of law when it dismissed its 
complaint without allowing the Fund to be “fully heard.”  We have 
 
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concluded that neither claim is meritorious.  Therefore, the judgment of the 
Superior Court is affirmed. 
2) 
The defendant-appellee, Kent Construction Co. (“Kent”), 
employed James Smith on November 15, 1999, when Smith ruptured a disk 
in his lower back as a result of a work injury.  Kent began paying total 
disability benefits on or around November 30, 1999.  By Agreement and 
Final receipt dated March 30, 2001, Kent acknowledged a 16.5 percent 
permanent impairment to Smith’s lumbar spine.  Pursuant to an Industrial 
Accident Board (“Board”) Order dated November 9, 2004, Smith was 
awarded total disability benefits as of October 2, 2003.  The first payment of 
total disability benefits was made on December 8, 2004. 
3) 
On September 30, 2005, Kent filed a “true second injury” 
petition,1 alleging that Smith sustained an injury prior to his employment 
with Kent and that injury contributed to Smith’s permanent disability.  The 
Workers’ Compensation Fund (“Fund”) filed a motion to dismiss, claiming 
that Kent’s petition was time barred.  After a hearing, the Board denied the 
motion, finding that the two-year time limitation in section 2327 did not 
begin to run until the first payment of total disability payments were made 
                                          
 
1 See 19 Del. C. § 2327.  In a “true second injury” petition, the employer paying benefits 
seeks reimbursement from the Workers Compensation Fund because the claimant 
suffered a previous unrelated injury occurred while employed by a different employer 
and that injury contributed to the claimant’s permanent disability.   
 
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after Smith’s injury became permanent. The record reflects the first payment 
of total disability after the injury became permanent was made on November 
10, 2004.2  Thus, under the Board’s interpretation of section 2327, Kent’s 
September 30, 2005, petition was timely. 
4) 
On May 22, 2006, the Fund filed a complaint against Kent and 
the Board in the Superior Court seeking a writ of prohibition preventing the 
Board from hearing Kent’s petition for reimbursement.  The Fund also 
sought a declaratory judgment that the two-year limitation in 19 Del. C. § 
2327 begins to run upon the date of the first payment of total disability 
benefits following the date of the second accident.  In a written opinion, the 
Superior Court dismissed the Fund’s complaint on July 17, 2006.3  We 
review the dismissal of the Fund’s complaint de novo.4 
5) 
The purpose of a writ of prohibition is to prevent a lower 
tribunal from exceeding its jurisdiction.5  “The writ of prohibition is a writ 
                                          
 
2 Citing its own decision in Benton v. Allied Systems, Ltd., the Board stated, “[t]o the 
effect the overall intent of Section 2327(a), which is to share the burden of total disability 
payments in second injury cases, the most reasonable reading of the statute is that ‘first 
payment’ refers to the first payment of total disability after the second injury becomes 
permanent.  An employer cannot be expected to know that reimbursement is even an 
option until the injury is permanent.” 
3 In addition to dismissing the Fund’s complaint, the Superior Court ordered that the 
underlying matter be set for a hearing.  According to Kent, a hearing to determine the 
merit of Kent’s petition was held on February 26, 2006.  Apparently, no ruling has been 
issued. 
4 Account v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 780 A.2d 245, 248 (Del. 2001). 
5 In re Petition of Edwards, 2007 WL 44049 (Del. Supr.).   
 
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issued by a superior to an inferior tribunal to prevent it from exercising 
jurisdiction over matters not legally within its cognizance, or to prevent it 
from exceeding its jurisdiction in matters over which it admittedly has 
cognizance.”6  The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy, and 
cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal. Thus, it “will be denied if the 
petitioner has another adequate and complete remedy at law for the 
correction of the asserted error of the court below.”7   
(5) 
A writ of prohibition will only be granted when the lower 
court’s lack of jurisdiction is “manifestly apparent” on the record.8  In this 
appeal, the Fund argues, as it did before the Superior Court, that the two year 
limitation in section 2327 is a statute of repose, as opposed to a statute of 
limitations, and therefore, the Board is without jurisdiction to hear Kent’s 
petition and the writ should be issued.  However, the Board’s lack of 
jurisdiction is not “manifestly apparent” on the record.   
6) 
Whether the Board has jurisdiction over Kent’s petition 
depends upon two questions.  First, the Board’s jurisdiction depends on 
when the payment that begins the two-year time limitation in section 2327 
was made.  Second, it depends on whether the time period in section 2327 is 
                                          
 
6 Canaday v. Superior Court, 116 A.2d 678, 681 (Del. 1955). 
7 Id. at 682. 
8 Petition of Hovey, 545 A.2d 626, 628 (Del. 1988).  
 
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a statute of limitations or a statute of repose.  The Board expressly 
determined that the two-year period begins with the first payment after the 
second injury becomes permanent and implicitly determined that section 
2327 is a statute of limitation.  Whether the Board erred in either 
determination is a question that can, and should, be addressed on an appeal 
from the Board’s final decision in the case.  Interlocutory appeals from 
Board decisions are not permitted.9  Accordingly, we hold that a writ of 
prohibition is inappropriate in this case.   
7) 
The Fund also argues that the Superior Court should not have 
ruled on whether the writ should be issued until it had an opportunity to fully 
brief the merits of the case.  The Superior Court denied the Fund’s request 
and based its ruling solely on the complaint.  It is clear on the face of the 
complaint that a writ should not be issued in this case because an adequate 
and complete remedy at law is available on appeal.  Thus, the Superior Court 
did not err when it dismissed the complaint without briefing on the merits. 
                                          
 
9 Schagrin Gas Co. v. Evans, 418 A.2d 997, 998 (Del. 1980) (“[I]nterlocutory orders of 
the Industrial Accident Board are unappealable. Appellate review of an interlocutory 
order must await appellate review of the final determination of the Board.”) (citing 
Eastburn v. Newark School District, 324 A.2d 775, 776 (Del. 1974)). 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment 
of the Superior Court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice