Case Title: In re K.H.

Citation: 2008-Ohio-4825

Docket Number: 20072454

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as In re K.H., 119 Ohio St.3d 538, 2008-Ohio-4825.] 
 
 
IN RE K.H. ET AL. 
[Cite as In re K.H., 119 Ohio St.3d 538, 2008-Ohio-4825.] 
Termination of parental rights — Children’s best interest — Parent diagnosed as 
pedophile. 
(No. 2007-2454—Submitted June 24, 2008—Decided September 30, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County,  
No. L-06-1376, 175 Ohio App.3d 192, 2007-Ohio-6128. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶ 1} Appellants, Todd H. and Sarah H., appeal from the judgment of the 
Sixth District Court of Appeals that affirmed the order of the Lucas County Court 
of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, terminating their parental rights to their 
daughter, K.H., who was born in 2002, and son, J.H., who was born in 2004. 
{¶ 2} For the following reasons, we affirm. 
RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
{¶ 3} On March 4, 2005, the juvenile court granted the ex parte request 
of Lucas County Children Services (“LCCS”) for emergency shelter care of J.H., 
then four months old, after he was diagnosed with a subdural hematoma 
consistent with shaken-baby syndrome.  LCCS’s complaint in dependency, 
neglect, and abuse, filed on March 7, 2005, averred that J.H. was dirty when 
emergency medical workers transported him to the hospital. 
{¶ 4} LCCS’s complaint sought temporary-custody orders for J.H., K.H., 
and J.E.1  All three children were removed from appellants’ home in early March 
                                          
 
1. J.E. is Sarah’s son from a prior relationship.  In November 2005, the juvenile court granted 
legal custody of J.E. to his biological father.  That decision is not at issue in this appeal.  Facts 
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and placed in the temporary custody of relatives or LCCS.  K.H. and J.E. were 
later found to be dependent, and J.H. was found to be dependent and abused; 
appellants consented to the findings of dependency.  None of the three children 
resided in appellants’ home after the temporary-custody arrangements of March 
2005 were established. 
{¶ 5} LCCS also alleged in the complaint that Todd was a registered sex 
offender.  After temporary-custody arrangements were made, LCCS continued to 
investigate the family.  Based on that investigation, LCCS filed a motion for 
permanent custody on May 2, 2006. 
{¶ 6} During its investigation, LCCS found that in March 1991, Todd 
was indicted on 14 charges for offenses he committed against two young boys, 
aged five and seven years.  Those charges included multiple counts of gross 
sexual imposition, felonious sexual penetration, and illegal use of a minor in 
nudity-oriented materials. 
{¶ 7} In a “victim impact letter” that Todd wrote in 2006 as part of a 
“relapse prevention plan,” Todd explained in great detail that he had chosen the 
victims because their families trusted him; that he “groomed” the boys he targeted 
for abuse by buying them presents, spending time with them, and telling them 
how much he loved them; and that he persuaded the boys to refrain from telling 
anyone about the acts.  When the abuse was discovered, Todd denied that it had 
occurred and accused the boys and their mothers of lying. 
{¶ 8} Todd pleaded guilty to two counts of gross sexual imposition and 
one count of illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented materials and received an 
aggregate term of four to 15 years’ incarceration.  However, Todd’s motion for 
shock probation was granted, and he was released from prison in January 1998.  
                                                                                                                   
regarding J.E. are discussed only insofar as they are relevant to the determinations involving J.H. 
and K.H. 
 
January Term, 2008 
3 
The conditions of his five-year probation included participating in a sexual-
offender program, having no contact with his victims, and having no unsupervised 
conduct with minors.  In addition, Todd was classified as a sexually oriented 
offender.2 
{¶ 9} While on probation, Todd was required to attend sexual-offender 
treatment (“SOT”).  Although Todd’s probation was terminated as “successfully 
completed” in January 2003, there was ample evidence that his success was 
purely administrative.  Indeed, the evidence suggests strongly that Todd’s 
probation was terminated as “successful” merely because he technically had met 
all the conditions of probation set forth by the judge by attending group therapy 
sessions and paying court costs.  Todd’s SOT, however, had been terminated as 
unsuccessful with an indication that his unwillingness or inability to benefit from 
therapy should be strongly considered by the court.  Nancy Larson, Todd’s 
treating therapist for the five years he was on probation and an expert in SOT, 
testified at the permanent-custody hearing that rather than internalizing any 
therapeutic benefit from SOT, Todd refused to accept full responsibility for his 
actions and minimized his offenses, so that he was in a “pre-instructional therapy 
group” commonly called the “Deniers Group” during most of his probation and he 
never progressed into a full-fledged therapy group. 
{¶ 10} In light of Todd’s history, LCCS’s case plan for reunification of 
the family addressed Todd’s pedophilia and his history of sexually abusing 
children.  LCCS’s initial case plan, proposed on March 31, 2005, stated that Todd 
was a registered sex offender who had not completed treatment and did not 
“appear to have any remorse or thought for the crime he committed against a 
minor child.”  It also stated that “Sarah doesn’t appear to have any concerns for 
                                          
 
2.  Todd was initially classified as a sexual predator, but that designation was reversed on appeal 
due to a procedural error in conducting the classification hearing.  Although Todd was reclassified 
as a sexually oriented offender rather than as a predator, we note that his reclassification was the 
result of a pure legal question and not due to any error on the merits of the trial court’s decision. 
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her children or understand the seriousness of Todd’s crime.”  The plan required 
Todd to undergo SOT and required Todd and Sarah to learn the indicators and 
triggers of sexual abuse. 
{¶ 11} An amended case plan also stated that “[Todd] will learn the 
dynamics of sexual offending and he will not abuse any other individual.  He will 
learn to show empathy for victims, and he will work through his issues 
successfully.  [Todd] will complete SOT services with Unison Behavioral Health.  
He will follow all treatment recommendations.  He will demonstrate progress.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 12} Todd at one point objected to SOT as “unnecessarily burdensome” 
but withdrew his opposition before the juvenile court ruled on his objection.  The 
case plan was later approved by the juvenile court. 
{¶ 13} A guardian ad litem (“GAL”) appointed to protect the children’s 
interests in the juvenile court proceedings recommended that K.H.’s and J.H.’s 
temporary-custody arrangements continue.  The GAL expressed concern for the 
children’s physical safety because of the serious nature of J.H.’s injuries and the 
inability to identify the perpetrator.3  He also expressed significant concern about 
the ongoing risk of sexual abuse.  The GAL reported that Todd continued “to 
display denial of his issues with sexual abuse” and concluded that the children 
“would not be safe in the * * * household at this time.  Only time will tell if [Todd 
and Sarah] can show service providers that they have internalized the risks and 
concerns and can reduce the risks in their home so that it is a safe environment for 
[their children].” 
{¶ 14} However, serious questions continued about any meaningful 
progress in appellants’ therapy and education.  Moreover, the juvenile court was 
                                          
 
3.  Despite extensive investigation, the person responsible for J.H.’s injuries has never been 
identified. 
 
January Term, 2008 
5 
forced to remove K.H. from her temporary placement in her paternal 
grandparents’ custody after LCCS alleged that K.H.’s paternal grandmother left 
K.H. alone in the care of Todd and the paternal grandfather.  The paternal 
grandmother had been required to supervise any contact between K.H. and Todd 
or the paternal grandfather, who had been accused of sexually molesting family 
members.  LCCS was awarded temporary custody of K.H. 
{¶ 15} LCCS later moved to obtain permanent custody because J.H.’s 
abuser remained unidentified, there were ongoing concerns about Todd’s 
pedophilia and his lack of meaningful treatment, and Todd and Sarah would not 
separate.  In doing so, LCCS maintained that the home was too unsafe to allow 
for return of the children.  LCCS also alleged that in December 2005, during a 
supervised visit, Todd had K.H. straddling his lap in a manner deemed 
inappropriate given his history of sexually abusing children.  At the permanent-
custody hearing, William Emahiser, an expert in SOT who treated both Sarah and 
Todd in conjunction with their case plans, described that incident as a very 
significant problem in light of Todd’s previous “grooming behavior.”  Emahiser 
testified that Todd should have known better because he was at the end of his 
therapy at that time.  As Emahiser described it, the behavior was akin to sending 
“an alcoholic to go work as a bartender.” 
{¶ 16} Given the lack of progress in SOT, in July 2006, the GAL 
recommended that LCCS be granted permanent custody of K.H. and J.H.  The 
GAL’s report stated that Todd had “consistently downplayed” his sexual-abuse 
convictions and need for treatment, that his relapse-prevention plan was largely 
inadequate, that he had not successfully completed his sexual-offender treatment 
while on probation, and that he “continues to engage in manipulative behavior, 
show poor insight and has not demonstrated the core changes necessary to show 
he has made the progress he needs to make to be with the children.”  The GAL 
also asserted that Sarah had not demonstrated the ability to protect the children or 
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to be an adequate part of the relapse-prevention plan, and that she could not 
overcome Todd’s manipulative behavior. 
{¶ 17} Larson testified at the permanent-custody hearing that Todd is a 
pedophile, i.e., that sex with minor children is “the most gratifying sexual 
experience” possible for him and that a related fixation causes him to seek sexual 
experiences with minor children.  She testified that pedophilia does not go away 
and that to be rehabilitated, a pedophile must accept pedophilia as a part of his 
personality and commit to not reoffending.  The evidence suggests that Todd did 
not commit to the fundamental aspects of treatment. 
{¶ 18} Larson testified that not only did Todd not complete treatment, he 
never truly “even began treatment” because “the necessary attitudes were not 
there at the beginning and they were not there five years later.”  She described his 
participation in therapy as superficial and considered Todd’s therapy a wasted 
effort because he refused “to make efforts or make progress in five years” of 
SOT.  Documentary evidence introduced by LCCS during the permanent-custody 
hearing indicated that Larson found that Todd was a pedophile and a predator, 
that “he was in denial of both these facts throughout his entire time on probation,” 
and that he was “an extremely high risk to reoffend and that his time on probation 
had done nothing to lower that risk.”  Other evidence suggested that Larson had 
also found Todd to be at “medium/high risk” to reoffend and that he was unable 
“to develop insight or adequate controls of his behavior.” 
{¶ 19} Emahiser’s testimony during the permanent-custody hearing was 
somewhat more favorable to appellants than Larson’s.  His testimony, however, 
was not entirely positive; at best it was equivocal. 
{¶ 20} Emahiser testified that Todd had adequately demonstrated that he 
understood concepts about sexual abuse, and that he wrote an “adequate” victim-
impact letter as part of his relapse-prevention plan, accepted responsibility for his 
offenses, and made progress by the end of the therapy program.  Todd was 
January Term, 2008 
7 
assessed as a medium-low risk to reoffend based on a standard assessment test, 
but, significantly, Emahiser testified that Todd struggled with the concept of 
empathy for his victims.  Emahiser also testified that access to children would 
increase Todd’s risk of reoffending, making that risk high if he lived in a home 
with young children.  Finally, Emahiser testified that Todd’s risk factors for 
reoffending included any kind of behavior around or with children, and he 
recommended that Todd’s contact with children “be completely and utterly 
minimized” and always “supervised by someone who knows his offense history.” 
{¶ 21} We note that both Larson and Emahiser testified that there was no 
evidence that Todd had reoffended since 1991.  We also acknowledge the experts’ 
testimony that Todd’s lack of a substance-abuse problem, his age, prior jail 
sentence, and long-term significant relationship lowered his risk of reoffending.4 
{¶ 22} However, despite those positive indications, the experts and others 
who testified remained very concerned that Todd would reoffend.  In fact, after 
five years of working with Todd, Larson opined that he had not truly committed 
to avoid reoffending.  To the contrary, she believed that he was repositioning 
himself for further access to victims. 
{¶ 23} In part, Larson’s concerns were based on Todd’s refusal to 
recognize the danger of contact with minors in light of his pedophilia and his 
insistence on being around children.  Lawson testified that Todd routinely spent 
time at his sister’s daycare center while he was on probation and that he had 
developed a telephone relationship with an 11-year-old girl there. 
                                          
 
4.  Appellants’ briefs, which focus in part on the assertion that Todd poses only a medium-low risk 
to reoffend based on his assessment, cite studies indicating that if a pedophile’s first offense is 
against someone other than the offender’s own children, the offender is less likely to reoffend 
against his own children, and also cite other studies for additional arguments in their favor.  Those 
studies, however, were not presented to the juvenile court and are not part of the record before us.  
Because they played no role in the juvenile court’s decision, the studies have no relevance to our 
resolution of this appeal, regardless of their reliability or authoritativeness. 
 
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{¶ 24} Although there was no evidence that the 11-year-old girl was 
abused, the situation troubled the girl’s family as well as Larson, who saw Todd’s 
unsupervised contact with the girl as a sign of his unwillingness to reduce his risk 
of reoffending by modifying his behavior.  Larson expressed concern that Todd 
may have been “grooming” the minor to become his victim, i.e., that he was 
planning and preparing her for sexual abuse. 
{¶ 25} Larson also testified that she was very concerned that while Todd 
was undergoing therapy, he married Sarah, whose son, J.E., was the same age as 
the children Todd had been convicted of molesting and was autistic.  Larson felt 
that Todd had entered into a high-risk situation by becoming involved with J.E. 
and Sarah, and that marrying Sarah was a very high-risk choice. 5  Larson further 
testified that she believed that Todd had engaged in grooming and planning by 
moving into the house in which J.E. lived.  One of Todd’s probation officers 
expressed similar concerns about Todd’s developing association with J.E., which 
was described as “a high risk situation” involving a “target aged child of his 
preference.” 
{¶ 26} At the permanent-custody hearing, the efficacy of Todd’s relapse-
prevention plan was questioned.  The GAL attempted to talk to the five people, 
other than Sarah, that Todd had chosen to support his relapse-prevention efforts. 
Two of those people had moved and could not be found; the remaining three had 
inadequate knowledge of Todd’s past offenses and of his triggers for offending.  
One support person had no copy of the relapse-prevention plan and did not know 
Todd’s triggers; another said that Todd had never really explained his sex 
offenses, that he had no idea what Todd’s triggers are, and that Todd “is a very 
private person and doesn’t really say much to me.”  Moreover, the GAL 
                                          
 
5.  Todd and Sarah met “over the Internet.”  They married while he was still on probation. 
January Term, 2008 
9 
expressed that he was very concerned about the ability of the two primary support 
people, Sarah and Todd’s mother, to protect the children. 
{¶ 27} Emahiser testified that Sarah, who was Todd’s primary support 
person for his relapse-prevention plan, did not fulfill her role very well because 
she did not understand relapse prevention and she failed to sufficiently appreciate 
her responsibilities for supporting Todd and protecting the children.  Sarah at one 
point appeared to have an understanding of the important role she played in 
Todd’s relapse-prevention plan, and it was determined that she had successfully 
completed her individual counseling.  Less than two months after that 
determination had been made, however, Emahiser became very concerned when 
Sarah showed a complete inability to identify the information she previously had 
appeared to understand.  Sarah then returned for additional therapy sessions after 
which she developed, “at minimum, rote memorization of the concepts.”  
Emahiser was concerned that Sarah would not be able to identify inappropriate 
situations. 
{¶ 28} Emahiser testified that Sarah initially did not think that the incident 
with Todd having K.H. straddle his lap was a problem but that Sarah later 
expressed to him that “it didn’t look very good.”  Emahiser was very concerned 
that Sarah failed to appreciate the impropriety of the incident when it occurred; he 
stated that LCCS was not blowing the incident “out of proportion,” because it was 
definitely inappropriate and a high-risk factor. 
{¶ 29} There was testimony that sex offenders are inordinately deceptive 
and tend to resist treatment; thus, there was a need for constant and vigilant 
monitoring by people who were aware of Todd’s risk factors and his past 
behavior of “grooming.”  According to the experts at the hearing, a pedophile 
should not have unsupervised contact with children even for limited time periods, 
such as when another adult leaves the room to use the bathroom.  If Todd was 
reunited with the children, he could not attend any of their school activities, such 
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10 
as dance classes or soccer games, because those types of activities entailed too 
much risk. 
{¶ 30} Emahiser opined that it is “extremely difficult” for a mother to 
constantly supervise two children when the offender lives in the house.  “[I]t 
really puts a strain on the significant other to be everywhere all at once.”  
Although additional home-based therapy was available if reunification of the 
family occurred, and safety measures, such as placing locks on doors or alarms in 
the house to reduce the risk of Todd being alone with the children, might have 
been implemented, testimony raised considerable doubt about appellants’ 
commitment to using such safety devices. 
{¶ 31} The evidence also indicated that while Sarah was more assertive 
when she was out of Todd’s presence, he dominated the relationship and she was 
subservient whenever she was with Todd.  Sarah’s personality was guarded; she 
waited for Todd to set the tone before responding to questions.  Todd exerted 
considerable control over Sarah.  The GAL concluded that Sarah was not able to 
step forward to protect her children and that she was “much too laid back” for his 
comfort. 
{¶ 32} Todd was described as defensive and apt to minimize his history as 
a sexual offender.  The GAL testified that Todd felt strongly that he had 
successfully completed SOT while on probation and that he was very emotional 
about that fact, becoming angry and frustrated when confronted with the 
suggestion that the therapy was not successful.  Todd was described as likely to 
use manipulative or controlling behavior, to tell a story in half-truths, and to 
misinterpret events and conversations. 
{¶ 33} There was also evidence that Todd and Sarah discussed the notion 
of separating in order for Sarah to regain custody of the children.  They admitted, 
however, that they intended to use any separation as a temporary arrangement “to 
get the children back.” 
January Term, 2008 
11 
{¶ 34} The GAL testified that he believed that Todd loved his children 
and that Todd was “caught” in a difficult situation, but that Todd had never 
“bought and owned the issues” regarding his sexual-abuse history.  The GAL did 
not believe that Todd had changed to make sure that the people around him were 
safe.  The GAL also acknowledged that there was clearly a bond between K.H. 
and Sarah but stated that his major concern was appellants’ inability to protect the 
children from possible sexual abuse.  The GAL stated that no alternative 
placement had ever been proposed and expressed regret that the children should 
be separated from their parents, but he saw no good way for the children to be 
safe in the home when the parents had made it clear that they would not separate.  
The GAL viewed permanent custody to LCCS as “the unfortunate only option.” 6 
{¶ 35} The juvenile court found that there was clear and convincing 
evidence that permanent custody should be awarded to LCCS and that appellants’ 
parental rights should be terminated.  The court found that the permanent-custody 
award was in the best interest of the children.  The court determined that the 
children could not or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time 
because clear and convincing evidence supported findings under R.C. 
2151.414(E)(1), (2), (4), (14), and (16) as to Todd, and R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (4), 
(14), and (16) as to Sarah. 
{¶ 36} The juvenile court stated that “the father’s relapse prevention plan 
is flawed; * * * there is shallow empathy shown in the development of the plan, 
and the support persons chosen to guard against relapse are inadequate.  The 
Court * * * is especially mindful of testimony of the professionals who worked, 
especially, with [Todd].  The Court also has considered the fact that [Todd and 
Sarah] have chosen to remain together as a couple and advocate for return of the 
                                          
 
6.  After LCCS’s witnesses testified, Todd moved for a finding that LCCS had not established its 
case by clear and convincing evidence.  The juvenile court denied Todd’s motion, and appellants 
rested without presenting any witness testimony or additional evidence.  The GAL then testified 
regarding his recommendation that LCCS’s motion for permanent custody should be granted. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
children to a home they will maintain together.  The Court finds that this would 
not be a safe environment for these children and specifically finds that the reasons 
for removal cannot be remedied when one of the parents is diagnosed with sexual 
offending behaviors such as [Todd] exhibits, which diagnoses include that of 
sexual predator.” 
{¶ 37} The Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s 
judgment.  The appellate court disagreed with some of the trial court’s findings 
under R.C. 2151.414(E) but held that clear and convincing evidence supported the 
finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(2) that Todd’s mental illness was so severe that 
he was “unable to provide an adequate permanent home” at the time of or within 
one year after the hearing.  175 Ohio App.3d 192, 2007-Ohio-6128, 886 N.E.2d 
235, ¶ 47.  The appellate court also held that the finding under R.C. 
2151.414(E)(14) as to Sarah was supported by clear and convincing evidence 
because she was “unwilling to prevent her children from suffering sexual abuse 
by continuing to cohabit with a pedophile.”  Id. at ¶ 54.  The court of appeals also 
affirmed the juvenile court’s determination that the termination of parental rights 
was in the children’s best interest.  Id. at ¶ 61. 
{¶ 38} We asserted discretionary jurisdiction, 117 Ohio St.3d 1405, 2008-
Ohio-565, 881 N.E.2d 273, over a single proposition of law:  “A diagnosis of 
pedophilia by a natural parent of minor children, and the refusal by the other 
natural parent to divorce or permanently separate from the parent so diagnosed, is 
insufficient to justify permanent termination of parental rights to those children 
where there is no finding that the offending parent has ever offended against his 
children and where the only instance of criminal activity occurred many years 
before the termination of parental rights.” 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 39} We recognize the fundamental right at issue in this case.  In Troxel 
v. Granville (2000), 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49, the United 
January Term, 2008 
13 
States Supreme Court described the interest of parents in the care, custody, and 
control of their children as one of the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 
recognized in American law.  We also recognize that there is an essential and 
basic civil right to conceive and raise children.  In re D.A., 113 Ohio St.3d 88, 
2007-Ohio-1105, 862 N.E.2d 829, ¶ 9; Meyer v. Nebraska (1923), 262 U.S. 390, 
399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed.1042; Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942), 316 U.S. 535, 541, 
62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655. 
{¶ 40} Despite the fact that we have found that parents who are suitable 
have a paramount right to raise and care for their children, In re Murray (1990), 
52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157, 556 N.E.2d 1169; In re Perales (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 89, 
97, 6 O.O.3d 293, 369 N.E.2d 1047; Clark v. Bayer (1877), 32 Ohio St. 299, 310, 
it is equally well settled that “[t]he fundamental interest of parents is not 
absolute,” In re D.A., 113 Ohio St.3d 88, 2007-Ohio-1105, 862 N.E.2d 829, at ¶ 
11.  The constitutional right to raise one’s children does not include a right to 
abuse, exploit, or neglect them, nor is there a right to permit others to do so. 
{¶ 41} The state’s power to terminate parental rights is circumscribed, see 
In re Cunningham (1979), 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 105, 13 O.O.3d 78, 391 N.E.2d 
1034 (termination of parental rights should be a “last resort”), but when that 
authority is properly invoked, it is fully proper and constitutional to remove 
children from their parents’ care.  “[S]uch an extreme disposition is nevertheless 
expressly sanctioned * * * when it is necessary for the ‘welfare’ of the child.”  Id., 
quoting R.C. 2151.01(A). 
{¶ 42} In Ohio, the termination of parental rights is governed by R.C. 
2151.414.  R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) requires a court to determine, “by clear and 
convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent 
custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody,” 
and that certain other conditions apply.  This court has defined clear and 
convincing evidence as “that measure or degree of proof which is more than a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is 
required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in 
the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be 
established.” Cross v. Ledford (1954), 161 Ohio St. 469, 53 O.O. 361, 120 N.E.2d 
118, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 43} Here, the critical inquiry is threefold:  Did the courts properly 
consider Todd’s pedophilia pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(2); did the courts 
properly consider Sarah’s ability to protect the children in light of Todd’s 
pedophilia pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(14); and was the termination of parental 
rights in the children’s best interest?  As argued by appellants, the essential 
overall question is whether the juvenile court’s findings of Todd’s and Sarah’s 
parental unfitness were supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
{¶ 44} Under R.C. 2151.414(E)(2), a court must determine whether 
chronic mental illness of the parent “is so severe that it makes the parent unable to 
provide an adequate permanent home for the child at the present time and, as 
anticipated, within one year” after the hearing on permanent custody.  Appellants 
do not dispute that pedophilia is a “chronic mental illness” for purposes of this 
statute, and we therefore need not discuss that point. 
{¶ 45} We determine upon a thorough review of the record that clear and 
convincing evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that Todd’s risk of 
reoffending was unacceptably high, and that he was therefore unable to provide 
an adequate permanent home for the children.  The record contains unrefuted 
testimony that Todd did make some progress in his therapy, but he failed to 
achieve that level of progress necessary to reasonably ensure the safety of his 
children or for reunification to occur.  Specifically, although Todd “successfully” 
completed years of court-ordered SOT, multiple witnesses, including experts in 
SOT, expressed serious doubts as to how “successful” the SOT actually was.  
Furthermore, extensive testimony established that Todd failed to make the 
January Term, 2008 
15 
necessary commitment to adequately minimize his risk of reoffending, allowing 
the degree of risk to the children to remain unacceptably high. 
{¶ 46} Finally, we observe that although appellants make much of 
Emahiser’s testimony that a standard assessment test rated Todd as a medium-low 
risk to reoffend, Emahiser also testified that if Todd lives in a home with young 
children, his risk of reoffending becomes high.  Larson similarly opined that Todd 
was an extremely high risk to reoffend.  Thus, even the sparse evidence that 
appellants rely upon to argue that Todd’s risk to the children was minimal is far 
from compelling. 
{¶ 47} We likewise determine that the juvenile court’s decision to 
terminate Sarah’s parental rights is supported by clear and convincing evidence.  
Under R.C. 2151.414(E)(14), we must look to whether “[t]he parent for any 
reason is unwilling to provide food, clothing, shelter, and other basic necessities 
for the child or to prevent the child from suffering physical, emotional, or sexual 
abuse or physical, emotional, or mental neglect.”  Todd’s propensities, his 
diagnosis of pedophilia, and his lack of significant progress in therapy are also 
important considerations in the analysis of Sarah’s rights.  In light of Todd’s 
pedophilia, Sarah’s role in the couple’s relationship with the children was vital.  
However, the record contains extensive documentation that Sarah is not capable 
of adequately fulfilling her role as Todd’s primary support person and that she 
therefore cannot ensure that the children will be protected from Todd’s pedophilia 
and the possibility of his reoffending. 
{¶ 48} Under the best of circumstances, it would be extremely difficult for 
anyone in Sarah’s position to provide the necessary support.  Indeed, a near-
Herculean effort is required from a spouse responsible for monitoring and 
supporting a relapse-prevention plan in this situation.  The record is replete with 
references to Sarah’s inability to shoulder that burden and the circumstances here 
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fall well short of being in her favor.  Based on the evidence, reunification would 
not be in the children’s best interests. 
{¶ 49} Although there are some outward similarities between the situation 
in this case and that in In re D.A., there are also a number of significant 
differences.  In In re D.A., this court reversed a judgment that terminated the 
parental rights of a mentally retarded couple, holding that in a permanent-custody 
hearing, a trial court may not determine a child’s best interest based “solely on the 
limited cognitive abilities of the parents.”  113 Ohio St.3d 88, 2007-Ohio-1105, 
862 N.E.2d 829, syllabus.  In so holding, we found that the record lacked 
evidence of any harm or threat of harm to the child and that the trial court’s “sole 
reason for the termination of parental rights” was the low cognitive abilities of the 
parents.  Id. at ¶ 38. 
{¶ 50} In contrast, the record in this case contains specific clear and 
convincing evidence of a threat of harm to the children.  Although appellants’ 
proposition of law asserts that their parental rights were terminated solely because 
of Todd’s diagnosis of pedophilia and the refusal of Sarah to separate from him, 
the record belies that assertion, and thus In re D.A. has little application to this 
case. 
{¶ 51} Moreover, unlike the cognitive limitation of mental retardation at 
issue in In re D.A., this case presents a unique condition – pedophilia – that by its 
very nature necessarily poses a danger to children.  Because of that essential fact, 
courts addressing the custody of children must pay particular attention to the 
unique dangers pedophilia poses. 
{¶ 52} Although other courts have addressed whether a parent’s diagnosis 
of pedophilia or sex-offender status alone can form the basis for restricting or 
terminating parental rights, see, e.g., State v. Coreau (Me.1994), 651 A.2d 319; In 
re L.M. (2001), 319 Ill.App.3d 865, 254 Ill.Dec. 400, 747 N.E.2d 440; State ex rel. 
January Term, 2008 
17 
State Office for Services to Children & Families v. Burke (1999), 164 Ore.App. 
178, 990 P.2d 922, we need not specifically reach that issue on this record. 
{¶ 53} Appellants’ suggestion within their proposition of law that their 
rights were improperly terminated solely because of Todd’s pedophilia is not 
supported by the record.  This case is not about whether a diagnosis of pedophilia, 
standing alone, is a proper reason to terminate parental rights.7  To the contrary, 
the record demonstrates that many other factors went into the determination, 
including the nature and quality of Todd’s progress in therapy to treat his 
pedophilia, his behavior with K.H. and another young girl, the inadequacies of his 
relapse-prevention plan, and Sarah’s questionable ability to protect the children if 
Todd suffered relapsed. 
{¶ 54} Nor is this case about Sarah’s right to marry, and remain married 
to, Todd.  Although she has a constitutional right to remain married to a pedophile 
who has not made meaningful progress in therapy, that right does not ensure that 
her right to custody of her children is absolute.  The state has the right to 
intervene when the exercise of her rights presents a safety or health hazard to her 
children.  See, e.g., In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d at 106, 13 O.O.3d 78, 391 
N.E.2d 1034, quoting In re R.J.C. (Fla.App.1974), 300 So.2d 54, 58 (“ ‘the 
natural rights of a parent are not absolute, but are always subject to the ultimate 
welfare of the child, which is the polestar or controlling principle to be observed’ 
”); In re L.S., Summit App. No. 23523, 2007-Ohio-1583, ¶ 19-20 (mother’s 
fundamental rights to have custody of child and to marry are not absolute, but 
must yield when outweighed by the interests of the state in protecting the child). 
                                          
 
7.   To be sure, reunification of a pedophile parent with his family is fraught with inherent peril.  
But in this case, although the experts testified that familial reunification is difficult to achieve 
when a parent is a pedophile, they never testified that is impossible per se for a pedophile to 
reintegrate successfully with his family; Todd’s pedophilia was not the basis of the juvenile 
court’s decision. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
{¶ 55} The court of appeals discussed a perceived lack of evidence in the 
record that LCCS ever presented Sarah with an ultimatum that she needed to 
separate from Todd and maintain a separate household to regain custody of her 
children.  See 175 Ohio App.3d 192, 2007-Ohio-6128, 886 N.E.2d 235, ¶ 55-58.  
However, the record conclusively establishes that even if Sarah had separated 
from Todd and the couple had established separate living arrangements, they were 
unwilling to remain apart for any significant duration.  As detailed above, the 
GAL’s report stated that both Todd and Sarah had admitted that a separation 
would be only a temporary arrangement “to get the children back.”  The GAL 
testified that the couple saw separation as a tool to achieve reunification and that 
they anticipated that Todd would move back into the home shortly after LCCS 
closed the case.  The GAL told the couple that separation merely to regain 
custody would not work.  In addition, a caseworker testified that although Sarah 
and Todd “offered” to separate to reunite with the children and to resolve the case 
against them, the couple indicated that they did not intend to remain separated.  
The caseworker also testified that a temporary separation would not be effective 
and would not protect the children.  In light of this unrefuted evidence and 
Sarah’s documented shortcomings in her role in Todd’s relapse-prevention plan, 
no inherently unfair treatment occurred that impaired Sarah’s rights. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 56} Our decision in this case is based not upon the diagnosis of 
pedophilia, but on the lack of successful therapy and the concerns that appellants 
would not be able to implement Todd’s relapse-prevention plan.  We hold that the 
juvenile court’s decision that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate 
appellants’ parental rights was based on clear and convincing evidence.  We 
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
January Term, 2008 
19 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., 
concur. 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 57} Although concurring in judgment, I wish to emphasize further that 
the majority’s holding rests solely on the existence of clear and convincing 
evidence to terminate appellants’ parental rights in this case.  Nothing more. 
{¶ 58} This opinion, with its detailed recitation of facts, does not directly 
address the proposition of law originally accepted for review. See majority 
opinion at ¶ 38.  The majority acknowledges in its conclusion that it does not 
answer the question of whether a father’s diagnosis of pedophilia or a mother’s 
refusal to divorce or separate from her husband provides sufficient grounds for 
terminating parental rights. 
{¶ 59} Decisions to separate children from their parents are among the 
most difficult and troubling choices the state must make.  Accordingly, the 
particular facts and circumstances of one family’s case will often provide minimal 
– if any – instructional value to those making decisions based upon another 
family’s particular facts and circumstances.  The decision of the court today 
neither expands nor strengthens the state’s ability to separate a parent who has 
been diagnosed as a pedophile from his or her biological children; rather, it 
merely reaches a conclusion in one case based on one record. 
{¶ 60} I respectfully concur in judgment only. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
{¶ 61} I agree with Justice Lanzinger’s concurring opinion that the 
majority opinion is so fact-specific that it has almost no ongoing vitality. 
{¶ 62} The right of parents to custody of their children “is perhaps the 
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.” Troxel v. 
Granville (2000), 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49.  Furthermore, 
this fundamental liberty interest “does not evaporate simply because [parents] 
have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the 
State.”  Santosky v. Kramer (1982), 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 
L.Ed.2d 599.  There is no question that Todd H. and Sarah H. have not been 
model parents; otherwise, their children would not be in the temporary custody of 
Lucas County Children Services.  This court today prevents them from ever 
regaining custody because of Todd’s prior pedophilia offense, even though the 
majority opinion states that “there was no evidence that Todd had reoffended 
since 1991.”  The majority opinion goes to great lengths to state that this court’s 
decision is not based on Todd’s condition but rather on the unacceptable risk that 
he will reoffend.  It is a distinction without a difference. 
{¶ 63} I realize that there is a risk that Todd will reoffend; I find that risk 
exceedingly troubling.  But Todd has paid his debt to society for the crimes he 
pleaded guilty to, he has adhered to the terms of his probation, and he has 
submitted to sexual-offender treatment, though not as completely as his therapist 
or the members of this court, including me, would like.  The bottom line is that 
Todd is losing a fundamental liberty interest, the custody of his children, because 
of something he might do, not because of something he has done.  Even worse, 
Sarah is losing custody of her children permanently, not because of something she 
has done, but because of something Todd, her husband and the father of her 
children, might do.  I dissent. 
__________________ 
 
Thomas A. Sobecki, for appellants Sarah H. and Todd H. 
January Term, 2008 
21 
 
Dianne L. Keeler, for appellee Lucas County Children Services. 
______________________