Case Title: State v. Mann

Citation: 

Docket Number: 29/19

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2019-12-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
State of Maryland v. Christopher Mann, No. 29, September Term, 2019 
 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL – PREJUDICE PRONG – 
PURPORTED ALIBI WITNESSES – Court of Appeals held that petitioner for 
postconviction relief failed to establish that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
of counsel by not requesting alibi jury instruction, as petitioner had failed to satisfy 
prejudice prong of test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), i.e., 
burden to prove that there was reasonable probability, or substantial or significant 
possibility, that jury would have acquitted him if his trial counsel had requested alibi jury 
instruction and trial court had given instruction.  Circumstance that petitioner’s trial 
counsel did not request alibi jury instruction did not prejudice petitioner because, upon 
closer inspection, none of four purported alibi witnesses’ testimony led to conclusion that 
petitioner could not have been at murder scene when victim was killed, and trial court’s 
giving of instructions on State’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt undercut 
claim of prejudice. 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 29 
 
September Term, 2019 
______________________________________ 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
 
v. 
 
CHRISTOPHER MANN 
______________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Booth 
Harrell, Glenn T., Jr. (Senior 
Judge, Specially Assigned) 
Greene, Clayton, Jr. (Senior 
Judge, Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Watts, J. 
Barbera, C.J., and Hotten, J., dissent. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: December 19, 2019 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No. 104002009 to 104002014  
Argued: October 31, 2019 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2019-12-19 
11:42-05:00
 
 
An alibi is “[a] defense [that is] based on the physical impossibility of a defendant’s 
guilt by placing the defendant in a location other than the scene of the crime at the relevant 
time.”  Alibi, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  An alibi is not an affirmative 
defense—that is, a defense that “[t]he defendant bears the burden of proving[.]”  
Affirmative Defense, Black’s Law Dictionary.  “An alibi is not an affirmative defense” 
because it “simply negates an element of the crime”—namely, the allegation that the 
defendant was the one who committed the crime, which the State has the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Harris v. State, 458 Md. 370, 411 n.31, 182 A.3d 821, 845 
n.31 (2018) (citations omitted). 
Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 5:00, addressing alibis, provides: 
You have heard evidence that the defendant was not present when the crime 
was committed.  You should consider this evidence along with all other 
evidence in this case.  In order to convict the defendant, the State must prove, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the crime was committed and the defendant 
committed it. 
 
Although Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 5:00 is known as an “alibi jury 
instruction,” it does not use the word “alibi” because doing so could “incorrectly suggest 
that alibi is an affirmative defense.”  MPJI-Cr 5:00 cmt.  Where an alibi jury instruction is 
applicable under a case’s facts, on request, a trial court must give an alibi jury instruction.  
See Smith v. State, 302 Md. 175, 180-81, 486 A.2d 196, 198-99 (1985). 
This case requires us to determine whether a petitioner for postconviction relief has 
satisfied, under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the burden of proving that 
he was prejudiced by his trial counsel not requesting, and the trial court not giving, an alibi 
jury instruction where purported alibi witnesses testified at trial. 
 
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In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, the State, Petitioner, charged Christopher 
“Crack” Mann, Respondent, with first-degree felony murder, kidnapping, conspiracy to 
kidnap, and other crimes.  At trial, the State offered evidence of the following events.  On 
April 22, 2003, sometime between 6:43 p.m. and 7:03 p.m., Mann and two of his friends, 
Tayvon “Tay” Whetstone and Kenneth “Kane” / “Kenny” Fleet,1 confronted the victim, 
Ricky “Little Rick” Prince, at a McDonald’s on Liberty Road near its intersection with 
Rolling Road, about him having been a witness for the State in a criminal case.  Fleet got 
into Prince’s vehicle and drove away.  Whetstone told Prince that he would take Prince to 
his vehicle.  Mann, Whetstone, and Prince got into a vehicle.  Ultimately, Whetstone drove 
to the area behind a nightclub called “Fantasies,” which is in the Curtis Bay neighborhood 
of Baltimore City.  There, in Mann’s presence, sometime during the evening of April 22, 
2003, Whetstone shot Prince.   
Mann’s trial counsel called four alleged alibi witnesses, who purported to account 
for Mann’s whereabouts from approximately 7:30 p.m. or 7:45 p.m. on April 22, 2003 to 
the morning of April 23, 2003.  Mann’s trial counsel did not request, and the circuit court 
did not give, an alibi jury instruction.  
After being convicted and pursuing an unsuccessful direct appeal, Mann petitioned 
for postconviction relief, contending that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 
of counsel by not requesting an alibi jury instruction.  The circuit court agreed and ordered 
                                              
1Mann and Whetstone were charged with first-degree felony murder and were tried 
separately.  Fleet was charged with, and pled guilty to, carjacking.  Neither Mann, 
Whetstone, nor Fleet testified in this case.   
 
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a new trial.  The State successfully applied for leave to appeal, and the Court of Special 
Appeals affirmed.  The State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which this Court 
granted.   
Before us, the State contends that an alibi jury instruction would not have 
significantly affected the jury’s deliberations.  Mann responds that it is reasonably possible 
that, in the absence of an alibi jury instruction, the jury believed that he had the burden to 
prove an alibi or did not consider the purported alibi witnesses’ testimony at all.  We hold 
that Mann has failed to satisfy the burden to prove that there is a reasonable probability, or 
a substantial or significant possibility, that the jury would have acquitted him if his trial 
counsel had requested an alibi jury instruction and the circuit court had given the 
instruction.  The circumstance that Mann’s trial counsel did not request an alibi jury 
instruction did not prejudice Mann because, upon closer inspection, none of the four 
purported alibi witnesses’ testimony indicated that Mann could not have been at the murder 
scene when Whetstone shot Prince, and the circuit court’s giving of other instructions 
regarding the State’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt diminishes the claim 
of prejudice. 
BACKGROUND 
Trial and Direct Appeal 
At trial, as a witness for the State, Detective Kevin Klimko of the Baltimore County 
Police Department testified that, on April 15, 2003, Jerrard “Tick” Bazemore pled guilty 
to the murder of Charles Edward Sharp.  During Mr. Bazemore’s guilty plea hearing, the 
prosecutor in that matter proffered that, had there been a trial, Prince—the murder victim 
 
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in this case—would have testified that he provided Bazemore with the gun that was used 
to fatally shoot Sharp.  After Bazemore said that he was pleading guilty, two individuals in 
the gallery “stood up and said[:] ‘You don’t have to go down like that, man,’ and pretty 
much objected to the fact that he was pleading guilty.”  The two individuals then left the 
courtroom.  Detective Klimko testified that he would not recognize the two individuals if 
he saw them again.  
As a witness for the State, Detective Gerald D’Angelo of the Baltimore County 
Police Department testified that, on April 23, 2003, he interviewed Mann, who said that, 
on the evening of April 22, 2003, he went to the McDonald’s to get something to eat and 
saw Prince there.  Mann said that he and Prince calmly talked about Prince having been a 
witness against Bazemore, and that, while they were talking, someone got into Prince’s 
vehicle and drove away.  Detective D’Angelo responded that he did not believe that Mann 
had told the truth.  Detective D’Angelo also said that he knew that Mann had gone to the 
McDonald’s with two other individuals, and that his conversation with Prince had been 
heated.  During the interview, Mann acknowledged that he had not told the truth.  Mann 
said that he had been driving a Ford Escort that belonged to his girlfriend, Tanea Jenkins, 
and needed to return it to her before her shift at a Target2 ended.  Mann said that two of his 
friends, Whetstone and Fleet, gave him a ride from the Target to the McDonald’s in a black 
1991 Chevrolet Caprice that belonged to Whetstone’s girlfriend.  Mann acknowledged that 
he had gotten into a heated argument with Prince about Prince having been, as Mann put 
                                              
2Multiple witnesses’ testimony indicated that the Target in question is on 
Reisterstown Road.   
 
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it, a “snitch” against Bazemore.  Mann said that Fleet got into Prince’s vehicle, a Toyota 
Corolla, and drove away, and that he told Prince that that he would get Prince’s vehicle 
back for him.  Mann said that he and Whetstone went to Mann’s father’s house,3 and then 
returned to the McDonald’s.   
While testifying, Detective D’Angelo read aloud a statement that Mann had 
handwritten and signed.  In his written statement, Mann alleged the following events, 
which we summarize.  On April 22, 2003, at 11 a.m. or 11:30 a.m., Mann drove Jenkins to 
the Target.  Afterward, Mann visited one of his friends, Jeffrey Johnson, at his house.4  At 
approximately 1:45 p.m. or 2 p.m., Mann left Johnson’s house.  At approximately 4:30 
p.m. or 5 p.m., Mann went to his mother’s house.5  Mann met with Whetstone and Fleet, 
who followed him to the Target.  At approximately 6:30 p.m. or 6:45 p.m., Mann dropped 
Jenkins’s vehicle off at the Target.  Jenkins gave Mann six dollars, and he, Whetstone, and 
Fleet left the Target.  At approximately 7 p.m., Mann, Whetstone, and Fleet arrived at the 
McDonald’s.  There, Mann talked to Prince about Bazemore.  While Mann was talking to 
Prince, Fleet got into Prince’s vehicle and drove away.  Mann and Whetstone went to 
Mann’s father’s house, where they stayed for at least five to ten minutes.  Afterward, Mann 
and Whetstone went to Johnson’s house.  After that, Mann and Johnson’s girlfriend went 
                                              
3Detective D’Angelo testified that Mann’s father lived at 3411 Kimble Road.  
Another law enforcement officer testified that Mann’s father’s house was approximately 
two blocks from the McDonald’s.  
4Johnson testified that he lived approximately a mile-and-a-half from the 
McDonald’s.   
5Detective D’Angelo testified that Mann’s mother lived at 1516 Lester Morton 
Court, in east Baltimore City.   
 
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to Mann’s mother’s house.  Mann requested a ride from Jenkins, who picked him up, 
dropped one of her friends off, and drove to Mann’s father’s house, where they spent the 
night.   
As a witness for the State, Detective Raymond Laslett of the Baltimore City Police 
Department testified that he recovered a recording that was made on April 22, 2003 by at 
least one surveillance camera at the Target where Jenkins worked.  The recording was 
played during Detective Laslett’s direct-examination, and he testified that it showed the 
following events, which we summarize.  In the Target’s parking lot, a black Ford Escort 
followed a black Chevrolet Caprice.  Afterward, Mann, Whetstone, and Fleet appeared 
together.  Then, Mann and Jenkins appeared together.  At 6:43 p.m., the Caprice left the 
Target’s parking lot.  According to Detective Laslett, the Escort that appeared in the 
recording belonged to Jenkins, and the Caprice that appeared in the recording belonged to 
Whetstone’s girlfriend.   
As a witness for the State, Jackie Davis, Prince’s mother, testified that, on the 
evening of April 22, 2003, Prince borrowed her burgundy Toyota Corolla so that he could 
pick up his paycheck from a Checkers.  At approximately 6:45 p.m., while Davis was at 
her house, Prince telephoned her, sounding “anxious and talking fast[.]”  According to 
Davis, Prince said that someone had “approached him and said that he had snitched” 
against Bazemore, and that someone had taken the Corolla.  Prince also said that “one 
individual out there was” Mann.  After hanging up, Davis telephoned 911 and reported the 
Corolla’s theft.  Two law enforcement officers arrived at Davis’s house and took her to a 
gas station on Liberty Road.  Along the way, Davis and the officers passed by the 
 
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McDonald’s.  Davis, who was looking for Prince, did not see him in the area of the 
McDonald’s.   
As a witness for the State, Officer Morris Gardner of the Baltimore County Police 
Department testified that, on April 22, 2003, at 7:03 p.m., he heard about a report of a theft 
of a burgundy Toyota Corolla in the area of the McDonald’s.  Officer Gardner drove to the 
area, saw a burgundy Toyota Corolla, contacted his supervisor, and confirmed that the 
license plate was that of the stolen Corolla.  The Corolla pulled into a gas station, and the 
driver, Fleet, exited the Corolla.  Officer Gardner parked his vehicle and arrested Fleet.  
Davis was brought to the gas station and said that she did not recognize Fleet.   
As a witness for the State, Derrick Harper (“Mr. Harper”)6 testified that he had 
known Prince, Mann, Whetstone, and Fleet.  On April 25, 2003, Whetstone asked Mr. 
Harper to move the Caprice (i.e., Whetstone’s girlfriend’s vehicle) because Whetstone did 
not want it to get towed and did not have a driver’s license.  That was the first occasion on 
which Mr. Harper had seen the Caprice.  Mr. Harper started driving the Caprice, and 
officers initiated a traffic stop and arrested Mr. Harper.   
From the night of April 25, 2003 to the morning of April 26, 2003, officers 
questioned Mr. Harper, who handwrote certain answers on a document.  The circuit court 
admitted the document into evidence, and the prosecutor read certain excerpts of it aloud 
while direct-examining Mr. Harper.  The document indicated that Mr. Harper wrote that 
Mann had alleged the following events, which we summarize.  When Mann was with 
                                              
6Derrick Harper was a witness for the State, and Rhonda Harper was a witness for 
Mann.  As far as the record reveals, Mr. Harper and Ms. Harper are unrelated. 
 
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Whetstone and Fleet at the McDonald’s, they encountered Prince.  Fleet punched Prince 
twice, Mann kicked Prince, and Fleet got into Prince’s vehicle and drove away.  Whetstone 
was afraid that he would get implicated in Fleet’s theft of Prince’s vehicle.  Mann wanted 
to scare Prince into not telling anyone about Fleet’s theft of Prince’s vehicle.  Whetstone 
told Prince that he would take Prince to his vehicle.  Mann, Whetstone, and Prince got into 
Whetstone’s vehicle, which was in the area of the McDonald’s, and Whetstone drove away.  
While Whetstone was driving, Mann tried to persuade Prince not to tell anyone about 
Fleet’s theft of Prince’s vehicle, and Prince promised not to do so.  Mann was satisfied 
with Prince’s promise, but Whetstone was not.  Whetstone shot Prince in the head.  
During Mr. Harper’s cross-examination, Mann’s trial counsel asked: “If you don’t 
take the beltway[,] and you go from [the] McDonald’s on Liberty Road to the 5[5]00 block 
of Pennington Avenue,[7] it would take about an hour, would it not?”  Mr. Harper 
responded: “Around.  I mean, that’s past Cherry Hill, Patapsco[ Avenue], and all that.”  
As a witness for the State, Officer Mark William Rejrat of the Baltimore City Police 
Department testified that, on April 23, 2003, at approximately 4 p.m., he went to the area 
behind a nightclub called “Fantasies,” which is at 5520 Pennington Avenue in the Curtis 
Bay neighborhood of Baltimore City.  Officer Rejrat explained that the area behind 
Fantasies is a former “city dump” that is “commonly known as . . . ‘bloody pond.’”  In a 
ditch near the pond, Officer Rejrat found a deceased man’s body.  A detective found a 
driver’s license with Prince’s name inside a wallet on the deceased man’s person.  
                                              
7Prince’s body was found near 5520 Pennington Avenue.  While cross-examining 
Mr. Harper, Mann’s trial counsel inadvertently referred to 5200 Pennington Avenue.  
 
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As a witness for the State, Jack Titus, M.D., the Deputy Chief Medical Examiner, 
was admitted as an expert in forensic pathology and postmortem examination.  Dr. Titus 
testified that, on April 24, 2003, he autopsied Prince’s body.  Prince had a gunshot entry 
wound on the back of the right side of his head, and a gunshot exit wound on the left side 
of his forehead.  Dr. Titus opined that the cause of death was a gunshot wound to the head, 
and the manner of death was homicide.  Dr. Titus estimated that the time of death was the 
evening of April 22, 2003, “roughly.”  Dr. Titus cautioned that he could make only a “[r]eal 
general approximation” as to the time of death because there were “just too many variables 
to say an exact hour.”   
As a witness for Mann, Johnson testified that, on April 22, 2003, sometime between 
12 p.m. and 2 p.m., Mann arrived at Johnson’s house.  For approximately fifteen minutes, 
Mann and Johnson talked; afterward, Mann left.  At approximately 7:30 p.m. or 7:45 p.m., 
Mann returned to Johnson’s house and said that Whetstone had just dropped him off.  For 
approximately forty-five minutes, Mann and Johnson played a video game.  At 
approximately 8:30 p.m., Mann and Johnson left Johnson’s house.  At approximately 8:45 
p.m., Mann and Johnson arrived at Mann’s mother’s house.  Shortly afterward, Johnson 
left.   
As a witness for Mann, Jenkins, his girlfriend, testified that, on April 22, 2003, she 
worked at the Target from 11 a.m. to 7 p.m.  At approximately 6:43 p.m. or 6:44 p.m., 
Mann, Whetstone, and Fleet came to see Jenkins.  Mann gave Jenkins the key to her 
vehicle.  Shortly afterward, Mann left.  After leaving the Target, Jenkins went to her house, 
then picked up one of her friends, Nikita Peay.  Afterward, Jenkins and Peay “just drove 
 
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around.”  At approximately 9 p.m., Mann telephoned Jenkins and asked her to pick him up 
from his mother’s house.  At approximately 9:30 p.m., Jenkins arrived at Mann’s mother’s 
house.  For approximately two hours, Mann, Jenkins, and Peay “just drove around[.]”  
Afterward, Jenkins dropped Peay off and drove herself and Mann to his father’s house, 
where they spent the night.   
As a witness for Mann, Peay testified that, on April 22, 2003, at 8 p.m., Jenkins 
picked her up.  Peay and Jenkins “drove around for a while[.]”  Mann telephoned Jenkins 
and asked her to pick him up.  At 9:30 p.m., Jenkins picked Mann up.  Afterward, Mann, 
Jenkins, and Peay “drove around.”  At 11:15 p.m., Jenkins dropped Peay off at her house.  
As a witness for Mann, Rhonda Harper (“Ms. Harper”), Mann’s cousin, testified 
that she lived with his father.  On April 22, 2003, sometime after 7 p.m., Ms. Harper left 
Mann’s father’s house to give a friend a ride.  At approximately 11:30 p.m. or 11:45 p.m., 
Ms. Harper returned to Mann’s father’s house, and saw Mann and Jenkins sitting outside.  
During the State’s initial closing argument, the prosecutor addressed the purported 
alibi witnesses, in pertinent part, as follows: 
Johnson [is] the one [whom] you should actually look for -- look at [] most 
closely, because this murder[ --] we know that [Prince] was taken right away 
from [the] McDonald’s, because we know that[,] when [Davis] gets there[,] 
[Prince is] not there.  Neither is [] Mann. 
Who had the motive and the opportunity?  [Mann] and [] Whetstone.  
Who else was there at the time?  And[,] ladies and gentlemen, this murder 
happened as soon as it -- as long as it takes to get from [the] McDonald’s to 
Curtis Bay; in that time period.  So[,] did [] Jenkins pick up [Mann] at 9:30[ 
p.m.]?  Maybe.  And ride around with [Peay] in the [Escort]?  Sure.  Maybe.  
After the murder.  Did [Ms.] Harper see [] Jenkins and [Mann] at [his 
father’s] house that night?  Sure.  Maybe.  Was [Mann] with [] Johnson at 
his house?  I submit to you, no.   
 
 
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During Mann’s closing argument, his trial counsel addressed Mr. Harper’s and 
Johnson’s testimony, in pertinent part, as follows: 
[Mr.] Harper[] was arrested with the [] Caprice [] in [Baltimore C]ity.  And 
he tells the police . . . that there’s a problem with the hood latch[,] and he 
can’t take it on the highway. . . . . To go from [the] McDonald’s on Liberty 
Road and Rolling Road to Curtis Bay, [twenty] miles on the [b]eltway[,] will 
take you probably a half[-]hour.  If you have to go to the side streets[,] it will 
take you probably an hour to an hour[-]and[-]a[-]half.  Why is that important?  
Because the time doesn’t fit. . . . [Mann] was at [] Johnson’s house.  
 
During the State’s rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor alleged the following 
events, which we summarize.  At 6:43 p.m., Mann, Whetstone, and Fleet left the Target. 
Afterward, Mann, Whetstone, and Fleet arrived at the McDonald’s and encountered Prince.  
Mann, Whetstone, and Prince got into a vehicle, and it took an hour to drive through 
Baltimore City and reach Curtis Bay.  At approximately 8 p.m., Prince was killed.  
Afterward, Whetstone drove Mann to Whetstone’s house,8 and Mann walked a short 
distance to his mother’s house.  At 9 p.m., Mann telephoned Jenkins and asked her to pick 
him up from his mother’s house.   
Mann’s trial counsel did not request, and the circuit court did not give, an alibi jury 
instruction.  While preliminarily instructing the jury at the start of the trial, the circuit court 
stated in pertinent part: “[T]he defendant may or may not call witnesses.  The defendant 
has no obligation to call witnesses.  The State has the burden of proving the defendant’s 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  The defendant does not have to prove innocence.”  While 
instructing the jury at the conclusion of the trial, the circuit court stated in pertinent part: 
                                              
8Mr. Harper testified that Whetstone lived on Lester Morton Court, “around the 
Caroline and Monument area[,]” in Baltimore City.  
 
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“The State has the burden of proving the guilt of the Defendant beyond reasonable doubt.  
The burden remains on the State throughout the trial.  The Defendant is not required to 
prove his innocence.”  After instructing the jury at the conclusion of the trial, the circuit 
court initiated a bench conference and asked counsel: “Is there anything [that] you want 
me to add or subtract?” Mann’s trial counsel responded: “No exceptions.”   
The jury found Mann guilty of first-degree felony murder, kidnapping, and 
conspiracy to kidnap.  Mann appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed.   
Petition for Postconviction Relief 
On June 9, 2014, almost ten full years after his conviction, in the circuit court, while 
representing himself, Mann filed a petition for postconviction relief.  On October 6, 2015, 
on Mann’s behalf, his postconviction counsel filed a supplemental petition for 
postconviction relief.  Both the petition and supplemental petition included the contention 
that Mann’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by not requesting an 
alibi jury instruction.  On September 27, 2017, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the 
petitions.  
At the hearing, as a witness for Mann, his trial counsel testified that, at trial, on 
Mann’s behalf, he pursued an alibi defense.  Mann’s postconviction counsel asked: “If you 
[did not] request an alibi [jury] instruction, is that something that you would have had 
reason for not requesting?”  Mann’s trial counsel responded: “No.  I mean, the defense was 
alibi.”  Mann’s postconviction counsel asked: “It would have been your expectation that 
there would have been an alibi [jury] instruction in this case?”  Mann’s trial counsel 
responded: “Irrespective of whether or not it was requested, yes.  Because that was the 
 
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defense.”   
At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court took the petition under 
advisement.  On February 12, 2018, the circuit court issued a Statement of Reasons and 
Order of Court in which it granted the supplemental petition in part, granted Mann’s request 
for a new trial, and denied his requests for other forms of postconviction relief.  The circuit 
court granted postconviction relief on the ground that Mann’s trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel by not requesting an alibi jury instruction, and denied 
postconviction relief on all other grounds.  Addressing the performance prong, the circuit 
court stated: 
[F]our defense witnesses[—i.e., Johnson, Jenkins, Peay, and Ms. Harper—
]and [Mann]’s [] statement[s to Detective D’Angelo] supported an alibi jury 
instruction[,] and [Mann’s] trial counsel was objectively deficient in [not] 
request[ing an alibi jury] instruction[, which] fully encapsulated [Mann]’s 
theory of the case. . . . [I]t cannot be said that [Mann’s trial] counsel’s actions 
were [the] result of any [] trial strategy, and [Mann’s trial counsel] testified 
as [m]uch. . . . [Mann’s] trial counsel’s omission . . . could not have been a 
result of reasonable professional judgment[.]   
 
(Citation omitted).  Addressing the prejudice prong, the circuit court reasoned: 
Without the [alibi jury] instruction, . . . it is reasonably possible that the jury 
might have placed the burden of proof on the defense with respect to 
“proving” the alibi. . . . Alternatively, it is reasonably probable that the jury 
may not have considered, as they were not instructed to, the defense theory 
of the case at all. . . . [T]rial courts commit reversible error [in] failing to give 
an alibi jury instruction when there is evidence [] to support it. . . . [I]t follows 
that . . . it [was] prejudicial to [Mann] when [his] trial counsel [did not] 
request a[ jury] instruction that epitomize[d] the only theory of the defense.  
 
(Cleaned up).  Addressing both the performance prong and the prejudice prong, the circuit 
court concluded: 
Based on the number of alibi witnesses, the substance of their 
 
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testimony, [Mann’s] trial counsel’s [] testimony that he did not have a 
strategic reason for not requesting an alibi [jury] instruction, and the State’s 
lack of direct and circumstantial evidence linking [Mann] to [Prince’s 
murder], . . . [Mann’s] trial counsel was deficient in [not] request[ing an alibi 
jury instruction], and there is a reasonable probability that the omission 
influenced the verdict[s.]   
 
(Footnote omitted). 
Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals 
The State filed an application for leave to appeal, which the Court of Special 
Appeals granted.  On May 1, 2019, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s 
judgment, stating: “Given the heightened sensitivity [that has been] expressed by Maryland 
courts concerning the importance of [an] alibi [jury] instruction, we hold that the failure 
(not the disinclination but the failure[]) of [Mann’s] trial counsel to request the [alibi jury] 
instruction in this case constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.”  State v. Mann, 240 
Md. App. 592, 606, 207 A.3d 653, 661 (2019) (emphasis in original). 
Addressing the performance prong, the Court of Special Appeals determined that 
Mann’s trial counsel not requesting an “alibi jury instruction fell below the ‘broad range of 
reasonable professional judgment’ standard . . . and therefore constituted deficient 
performance.”  Id. at 602, 207 A.3d at 658-59 (citation omitted).  The Court of Special 
Appeals stated that “there [was] no question [] that Mann generated an alibi[.]”  Id. at 600, 
207 A.3d at 658.  The Court of Special Appeals observed that the State conceded that 
Mann’s trial counsel did not request an alibi jury instruction because of an oversight, as 
opposed to strategy.  See id. at 601, 207 A.3d at 658.  The Court of Special Appeals 
reasoned that “the record here is devoid of any strategic reason for not requesting an alibi 
 
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[jury] instruction[,]” and that Mann’s trial counsel not requesting an alibi jury instruction 
was not because of a “‘disinclination’ to request [an] alibi [jury] instruction[.]”  Id. at 601, 
207 A.3d at 658 (citation omitted). 
Addressing the prejudice prong, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that “Mann 
was prejudiced because he did not receive the benefit of [an] alibi [jury] instruction as a 
result of his [trial] counsel[ not] request[ing] it.”  Id. at 606, 207 A.3d at 661.  The Court 
of Special Appeals reasoned: 
[T]here exists a strong concern that a jury will assume that a criminal 
defendant bears some burden of proof by introducing alibi evidence, even if 
the word “alibi” is never uttered in the courtroom. . . . By providing an alibi 
[jury] instruction, [a] trial court sufficiently relieves these concerns.  Here, 
where an alibi [jury] instruction was not given because [Mann’s] trial counsel 
[did not] request it, there is a substantial or significant possibility that the 
verdict[s were] affected. 
 
Id. at 605-06, 207 A.3d at 661 (cleaned up). 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
On May 29, 2019, the State petitioned for a writ of certiorari, raising the following 
issue: “Did the Court of Special Appeals err when it held that [Mann’s trial] counsel[ not] 
request[ing] an alibi jury instruction was prejudicial . . . when the presence of [an alibi jury] 
instruction would not have presented a likelihood of a different outcome of the trial?”  On 
July 12, 2019, this Court granted the petition.  See State v. Mann, 464 Md. 588, 212 A.3d 
396 (2019). 
DISCUSSION 
The Parties’ Contentions 
The State contends that an alibi jury instruction would not have significantly 
 
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affected the jury’s verdict, as it would have simply reminded the jury that it had heard 
testimony that Mann was not at the murder scene, that the jury should consider that 
testimony along with the rest of the evidence, and that the jury should not find Mann guilty 
unless the State proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  The State asserts that, contrary to 
the circuit court’s reasoning, Mann’s trial counsel pursued multiple defenses in addition to 
an alibi—specifically, Mann’s trial counsel indicated that the forensic work was 
insufficient; that Prince could have been murdered in a robbery gone wrong; that Mr. 
Harper could have murdered Prince; and that people other than Mann had a motive to 
murder Prince for being a witness against Bazemore.   
Mann responds that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel not requesting an alibi 
jury instruction.  Mann contends that, if his trial counsel had requested an alibi jury 
instruction, the circuit court almost certainly would have given it, and, if not, the circuit 
court not giving an alibi jury instruction would have been reversible error.  Mann argues 
that it is reasonably possible that, in the absence of an alibi jury instruction, the jury 
believed that he had the burden to prove the alibi or did not consider the testimony of the 
purported alibi witnesses at all.   
Standard of Review 
In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a petition for postconviction relief, an appellate 
court reviews for clear error the trial court’s findings of fact, and reviews without deference 
the trial court’s conclusions of law, including a conclusion as to whether the petitioner 
received ineffective assistance of counsel.  See Newton v. State, 455 Md. 341, 351-52, 168 
A.3d 1, 7 (2017), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 665 (2018). 
 
- 17 - 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Generally 
In Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, the Supreme Court set forth a two-prong test for 
resolving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  “The first prong is known as ‘the 
performance prong,’ and the second prong is known as ‘the prejudice prong.’”  Ramirez v. 
State, 464 Md. 532, 560, 212 A.3d 363, 380 (2019) (cleaned up).  “Generally, where a 
petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, the burden rests on him or her to satisfy 
both the performance prong and the prejudice prong.”  Id. at 562, 212 A.3d at 381 (cleaned 
up). 
To satisfy the prejudice prong, a petitioner “must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense.  This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so 
serious as to deprive the [petitioner] of a fair trial, [i.e.,] a trial whose result is reliable.”  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  More specifically, a petitioner “must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability [that is] 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id. at 694.  In State v. Syed, 463 Md. 
60, 86-87, 204 A.3d 139, 154 (2019), cert. denied, No. 19-227, ___ S. Ct. ___ (Nov. 25, 
2019), this Court stated: “We have interpreted [‘]reasonable probability[’] to mean ‘there 
was a substantial or significant possibility that the verdict . . . would have been affected.’” 
(Quoting Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 426, 578 A.2d 734, 739 (1990)) (emphasis 
omitted).  In Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96, the Supreme Court explained how to assess 
prejudice as follows: 
[A] court [that is] hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality 
 
- 18 - 
of the evidence [that was] before the . . . jury.  Some of the factual findings 
will have been unaffected by the errors, and factual findings that were 
affected will have been affected in different ways.  Some errors will have had 
a pervasive effect on the inferences [that were] to be drawn from the 
evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an 
isolated, trivial effect.  Moreover, a verdict [that is] only weakly supported 
by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with 
overwhelming record support.  Taking the unaffected findings as a given, 
and taking due account of the effect of the errors on the remaining findings, 
a court [that is] making the prejudice inquiry must ask [whether] the 
[petitioner] has met the burden of showing that the decision [that was] 
reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors. 
 
In Syed, 463 Md. at 104-05, 204 A.3d at 165, this Court held that, although a 
petitioner’s trial counsel’s performance was deficient for not investigating an alibi witness, 
trial counsel’s deficient performance did not prejudice the petitioner.  In that case, the 
petitioner, who was a high school student at the time of the crime, was convicted of 
murdering a fellow student, his former girlfriend who had recently broken off the 
relationship and begun dating another person.  See id. at 89, 67, 204 A.3d at 156, 143.  On 
the date of the murder, at 2:15 p.m., the school day ended.  See id. at 92, 204 A.3d at 157.  
A witness for the State testified that, on that date, while he and the petitioner were in a 
parking lot, the petitioner showed him the victim’s body.  See id. at 89, 204 A.3d at 155-
56.  The State’s witness testified that, later on that date, at approximately 7 p.m., he saw 
the petitioner bury the victim’s body at a certain park, where her body was ultimately 
found.  See id. at 88, 204 A.3d at 155.  Consistently, the State offered evidence that, at 7:09 
p.m. and 7:16 p.m., the petitioner’s cell phone received calls while it was in the area of the 
park.  See id. at 88, 204 A.3d at 155. 
After being convicted and pursuing an unsuccessful direct appeal, the petitioner 
 
- 19 - 
petitioned for postconviction relief.  See id. at 68, 204 A.3d at 143.  The petitioner 
contended that, among other things, his trial counsel was ineffective in not investigating a 
certain alibi witness or calling her at trial.  See id. at 68-69, 204 A.3d at 144.  In an affidavit, 
the alibi witness averred that, on the date of the murder, from 2:30 p.m. to 2:40 p.m., she 
was with the petitioner at a public library.  See id. at 91, 204 A.3d at 157.  A trial court 
vacated the petitioner’s convictions and ordered a new trial, concluding that, although the 
petitioner’s trial counsel’s conduct in not investigating the alibi witness or calling her at 
trial did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner’s trial counsel had 
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to another matter.  See id. at 70, 204 
A.3d at 144-45.  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the order for a new trial, reasoning 
that, although the petitioner waived his contention that his trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel with regard to the other matter, the petitioner’s trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel in not investigating the alibi witness or calling her at trial.  
See id. at 70-72, 204 A.3d at 145-46. 
This Court reversed the Court of Special Appeals’s judgment with instruction to 
reverse the trial court’s order for a new trial.  See id. at 105, 204 A.3d at 165.  This Court 
concluded that, although the petitioner’s counsel was deficient in not investigating the alibi 
witness, the lack of investigation did not prejudice the petitioner.  See id. at 104-05, 204 
A.3d at 165.  Addressing the prejudice prong, this Court determined that, even if the alibi 
witness was truthful in stating that, from 2:30 p.m. to 2:40 p.m., she was with the petitioner 
at a public library, that circumstance did “little more than to call into question the time that 
the State claimed [that the victim] was killed[,] and [did] nothing to rebut the evidence 
 
- 20 - 
establishing [the petitioner]’s motive and opportunity to kill” the victim.  Id. at 91, 204 
A.3d at 157.  This Court explained that, in other words, even if the petitioner’s trial counsel 
had called the alibi witness at trial, and even if the jury had found her credible, “the jury 
could have disbelieved that [the petitioner] killed [the victim] by 2:36 p.m., as the State’s 
timeline suggested, yet still believed that [the petitioner] had the opportunity to kill [the 
victim] after 2:40 p.m.”  Id. at 91-92, 204 A.3d at 157.  This Court noted that the alibi 
witness’s testimony could not have led to an acquittal because it would not have negated 
the petitioner’s guilt, given that the alibi witness did not account for the petitioner’s 
whereabouts after 2:40 p.m.  See id. at 92, 204 A.3d at 157. 
Alibi Jury Instructions Generally 
Maryland Rule 4-325(c) states in pertinent part: 
[A trial] court may, and at the request of any party shall, instruct the jury as 
to the applicable law and the extent to which the instructions are binding. . . 
. The [trial] court need not grant a request[ for a jury] instruction if the matter 
is fairly covered by [the jury] instructions [that are] actually given. 
 
This Court has explained that Maryland Rule 4-325(c) 
requires [a] trial court to give a requested [jury] instruction under the 
following circumstances: (1) the requested [jury] instruction is a correct 
statement of the law; (2) the requested [jury] instruction is applicable under 
the facts of the case; and (3) the content of the requested [jury] instruction 
was not fairly covered [by] the jury instruction[s that were] actually given. 
 
McMillan v. State, 428 Md. 333, 354, 51 A.3d 623, 635 (2012) (cleaned up). 
In Pulley v. State, 38 Md. App. 682, 690-91, 382 A.2d 621, 626 (1978), the Court 
of Special Appeals held that a trial court erred in denying a defendant’s request for an alibi 
jury instruction.  In that case, the defendant, his cousin, and his cousin’s wife testified that, 
 
- 21 - 
on the date of the crime, the defendant spent the evening at his cousin’s and his cousin’s 
wife’s house.  See id. at 686, 382 A.2d at 624.  The trial court instructed the jury regarding 
the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof.  See id. at 690, 382 A.2d at 626. 
The defendant was convicted, and the Court of Special Appeals reversed and 
remanded for a new trial.  See id. at 684, 382 A.2d at 622.  The Court of Special Appeals 
concluded that the trial court should have granted the defendant’s request to give an alibi 
jury instruction because the defense witnesses’ testimony, “if believed, would have been 
sufficient to establish an alibi for the entire period during which the sequence of events 
[that was] related by the State’s witness[] unfolded.”  Id. at 688, 382 A.2d at 625.  The 
Court of Special Appeals rejected “the State’s contention . . . that the requested alibi [jury] 
instruction was ‘fairly covered’ by the [jury] instructions with respect to the presumption 
of innocence and the burden of proving the [defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
Id. at 690, 382 A.2d at 626. 
In Smith, 302 Md. at 177, 486 A.2d at 196, this Court held that a trial court erred in 
denying a defendant’s request for an alibi jury instruction.  In that case, the defendant 
testified that he was in Texas when the crimes were being committed in Maryland.  See id. 
at 177, 486 A.2d at 196.  The defendant was convicted, and the Court of Special Appeals 
affirmed, reasoning that, “for a defendant to be entitled to an alibi [jury] instruction, his [or 
her] alibi testimony must be corroborated.”  Id. at 178, 486 A.2d at 197. 
This Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.  See id. at 183-84, 486 A.2d at 
200.  This Court concluded that a “defendant’s uncorroborated testimony[] that he [or she] 
was at some other place at the time of the crime[] is sufficient to generate” an alibi jury 
 
- 22 - 
instruction.  Id. at 180-81, 486 A.2d at 198-99.  This Court “agree[d] with the holding of 
the Court of Special Appeals in” Pulley, 38 Md. App. at 690, 382 A.2d at 626, that, 
when the evidence in a criminal case generates the issue of alibi, and when 
the defendant requests an instruction specifically addressed to the matter of 
alibi, the defendant is entitled to a[n] alibi [jury] instruction, and [] the [jury] 
instructions concerning the [] burden of proof, etc., are not deemed to “fairly 
cover” the matter of alibi. 
 
Smith, 302 Md. at 180, 486 A.2d at 198 (citations omitted). 
In Robertson v. State, 112 Md. App. 366, 370, 685 A.2d 805, 807 (1996), the Court 
of Special Appeals held that a trial court erred in denying a defendant’s request for an alibi 
jury instruction.  In that case, the defendant “premised his alibi [] on a [State’s] witness 
who testified as to exculpatory statements” that the defendant made to him.  Id. at 378, 685 
A.2d at 811.  The defendant was convicted, and the Court of Special Appeals reversed and 
remanded for a new trial.  See id. at 388, 685 A.2d at 816.  The Court of Special Appeals 
observed that Robertson was “readily distinguishable from” Pulley, 38 Md. App. 682, 382 
A.2d 621, and Smith, 302 Md. 175, 486 A.2d 196, because, in Robertson, the defendant 
“did not offer any evidence of alibi[,] either in the form of an alibi witness or with his own 
testimony.”  Robertson, 112 Md. App. at 378, 685 A.2d at 811.  The Court of Special 
Appeals, however, determined that, on request, a trial “court must give [an] alibi [jury] 
instruction . . . where there is some evidence . . . to support the position that the defendant 
was elsewhere when the crime occurred. . . . [T]he defendant, him[- or her]self, need not 
introduce alibi evidence . . . to generate . . . an [alibi jury] instruction[.]”  Id. at 381-82, 685 
A.2d at 813.  The Court of Special Appeals explained that, in Robertson, the defendant was 
entitled to an alibi jury instruction on request because “there was some evidence . . . from 
 
- 23 - 
which a jury could have inferred that [the defendant] was not at the murder scene at” the 
time of the crime.  Id. at 385, 685 A.2d at 814. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Alibi Jury Instructions 
In State v. Matthews, 58 Md. App. 243, 248, 472 A.2d 1044, 1046 (1984), the Court 
of Special Appeals held that a petitioner’s trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance 
of counsel by not pursuing an alibi or requesting an alibi jury instruction.  In that case, the 
victim testified that, at approximately 12 a.m., in Annapolis, a masked man attacked her; 
afterward, he forced her to drive to a remote location in Anne Arundel County, raped her, 
and then fled on foot.  See id. at 245, 472 A.2d at 1044-45.  The evidence showed that the 
abduction occurred near the petitioner’s workplace, and that the rape occurred near his 
home.  See id. at 245-46, 472 A.2d at 1045.  After law enforcement officers made multiple 
unsuccessful attempts for the victim to identify the rapist, she identified the petitioner in a 
lineup after the men therein took off their shirts; although the victim did not see the rapist’s 
face on the night of the crime, she identified the petitioner by his body.  See id. at 245-46, 
472 A.2d at 1045. 
The petitioner testified that, on the night of the rape, at 9 p.m., he left his workplace.  
See id. at 246, 472 A.2d at 1045.  According to the petitioner, afterward, he went home, 
borrowed a vehicle from someone, and drove to Baltimore City, where he visited his 
girlfriend of several months, who was a prostitute who worked on Baltimore Street.  See 
id. at 246, 472 A.2d at 1045.  The petitioner, however, did not know his girlfriend’s last 
name or address, and law enforcement officers were unable to locate her.  See id. at 246, 
472 A.2d at 1045.  Officers interviewed the person who had allegedly loaned a vehicle to 
 
- 24 - 
the petitioner, and that person did not say anything that was relevant to the case.  See id. at 
246, 472 A.2d at 1045.  No evidence corroborated the petitioner’s alibi testimony.  See id. 
at 246-47, 472 A.2d at 1045. 
After being convicted and pursuing an unsuccessful direct appeal, the petitioner 
petitioned for postconviction relief.  See id. at 244, 472 A.2d at 1044.  A trial court ordered 
a new trial on the ground that the petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective in not requesting 
an alibi jury instruction.  See id. at 244-45, 472 A.2d at 1044.  The State applied for leave 
to appeal.  See id. at 245, 472 A.2d at 1044. 
The Court of Special Appeals granted the application and vacated the trial court’s 
order for a new trial.  See id. at 248, 472 A.2d at 1046.  The Court of Special Appeals 
determined that, as a matter of trial strategy, it was reasonable for the petitioner’s trial 
counsel not to pursue the alibi, and instead exclusively focus on the victim’s identification 
of the petitioner by his body.  See id. at 247-48, 472 A.2d at 1046.  The Court of Special 
Appeals pointed out that the person who had allegedly loaned a vehicle to the petitioner 
essentially denied doing so, and that the petitioner’s “scanty knowledge of his ‘girlfriend’ 
must have raised a doubt as to whether she existed.”  Id. at 247, 472 A.2d at 1045-46.  The 
Court of Special Appeals explained that it was “possible that[,] rather than helping the 
defense, the very questionable alibi [] may have actually weakened the [petitioner]’s case.”  
Id. at 248, 472 A.2d at 1046.  The Court of Special Appeals noted that, by exclusively 
focusing on the victim’s identification of the petitioner by his body, the petitioner’s trial 
counsel “may have succeeded in diverting the jury from thinking about how weak the alibi 
[] was.”  Id. at 247-48, 472 A.2d at 1046. 
 
- 25 - 
In Schmitt v. State, 140 Md. App. 1, 37, 779 A.2d 1004, 1024, cert. denied, 367 Md. 
88, 785 A.2d 1291 (2001), the Court of Special Appeals held that a petitioner’s trial counsel 
did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by not requesting an alibi jury instruction.  
In that case, the State’s evidence showed that, between 1:45 a.m. and 2 a.m., the victim 
was fatally shot across the street from a motel.  See id. at 32, 779 A.2d at 1022.  A purported 
alibi witness testified that, between 1:30 a.m. and 2 a.m., he and the petitioner checked into 
the motel; the witness went into their motel room’s bathroom and closed the door; while 
he was in the bathroom, he heard gunshots; and, when he came out of the bathroom, the 
petitioner was in their motel room.  See id. at 32-33, 779 A.2d at 1022.  The witness, 
however, did not specify how much time had passed between him hearing the gunshots and 
him coming out of the bathroom.  See id. at 33, 779 A.2d at 1022. 
After being convicted and pursuing an unsuccessful direct appeal, the petitioner 
petitioned for postconviction relief.  See id. at 6-7, 779 A.2d at 1006.  A trial court granted 
the petitioner’s request for a belated appeal as to certain issues but denied his request for a 
new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.  See id. at 6, 779 A.2d at 1006-
07.  The petitioner noted the belated appeal, and separately appealed from the trial court’s 
denial of his request for a new trial.  See id. at 6-7, 779 A.2d at 1007. 
In both appeals, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed.  See id. at 6, 48, 779 A.2d 
at 1007, 1031.  In the appeal that pertained to ineffective assistance of counsel, writing for 
the Court of Special Appeals, the Honorable Charles E. Moylan, Jr. addressed the 
performance prong as follows: “Was an alibi defense generated in this case?  It is a close 
call, but technically it may have been.  It was not, however, so unmistakably identifiable 
 
- 26 - 
as an alibi defense from way down the glen as to brand the failure to recognize it as a mark 
of lawyerly incompetence.”  Id. at 33, 779 A.2d at 1022.  Judge Moylan pointed out that 
the petitioner’s trial counsel testified that he did not request an alibi jury instruction because 
it would have simply directed the jury “to consider and apply the evidence along with any 
other evidence in the case.  To me that tells the jurors absolutely nothing.”  Id. at 34, 779 
A.2d at 1023 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Judge Moylan emphasized the need to 
defer to the petitioner’s trial counsel’s strategic choice, explaining: 
The entitlement to an instruction if you want one does not imply that 
you are derelict for not wanting one.  By analogy, a defendant is 
constitutionally entitled to an instruction that his failure to take the stand will 
not be held against him.  It is perfectly sound trial strategy, however, to wish 
to forego such an instruction so as not to draw the jury’s attention to the 
inevitably suspicious failure to take the stand.  In this case, counsel may not 
have wanted to raise any specter possibly suggested by the word “alibi.” 
Alternatively, he may not have wanted to clutter the minds of the 
jurors with a lot of legal gobbledygook that he deemed meaningless.  Some 
attorneys, of course, like the scattershot approach: spray the jury with every 
bit of verbal grapeshot you have in your arsenal.  Other equally good 
attorneys prefer to keep the attack simple and to hammer at one or two of the 
enemy’s perceived weak points.  It is quintessentially a matter of strategic 
choice.  It is George B. McClellan versus Ulysses S. Grant and who will 
presume to post-mortem the battle? 
Counsel had available to him Pulley v. State and Smith v. State but he 
chose not to use them.  They are, of course, opinions worthy of precedential 
respect.  In terms of what they accomplish in a courtroom, however, they are 
not necessarily five-star decisions that inspire trial advocates to snap to 
attention and salute.  Counsel did not think they would help him.  Who are 
judges to second-guess such an on-the-spot assessment by a combatant on 
the field? 
 
Schmitt, 140 Md. App. at 34-35, 779 A.2d at 1023 (cleaned up).  Judge Moylan addressed 
the prejudice prong as follows: “Having found no deficiency in the performance 
component, it follows that there can be no prejudice flowing from a deficient performance.”  
 
- 27 - 
Id. at 37, 779 A.2d at 1024. 
Analysis 
Here, we conclude that Mann has failed to satisfy the burden to prove that there is a 
reasonable probability, or a substantial or significant possibility, that the jury would have 
acquitted him if his trial counsel had requested, and the circuit court had given, an alibi 
jury instruction.  The circumstance that Mann’s trial counsel did not request an alibi jury 
instruction did not prejudice Mann because none of the four purported alibi witnesses’ 
testimony led to the conclusion that Mann could not have been at the murder scene when 
Whetstone shot Prince.  Additionally, the trial court twice instructed the jury that the 
burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt remains on the State 
throughout the trial, thereby undermining Mann’s claim of prejudice with respect to trial 
counsel’s failure to request an alibi jury instruction.9   
The question of whether prejudice resulted from Mann’s trial counsel’s failure to 
request an alibi instruction involves a fact-specific analysis.  In this case, Mann premised 
his alibi on the testimony of four witnesses— Johnson, Jenkins, Peay, and Ms. Harper—
who purported to account for his whereabouts from 7:30 p.m. or 7:45 p.m. through the 
                                              
9As the Supreme Court explained in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, “a court need not 
determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice 
[that was] suffered by the [petitioner] as a result of the alleged deficiencies.”  Consistently, 
in each of multiple cases, this Court concluded that a petitioner had failed to prove 
prejudice, and thus did not address the performance prong.  See Newton, 455 Md. at 366, 
168 A.3d at 15; Gross v. State, 371 Md. 334, 355, 809 A.2d 627, 639 (2002); Yoswick v. 
State, 347 Md. 228, 246, 700 A.2d 251, 259 (1997).  We do the same here because the 
State did not include a question presented as to the performance prong in the petition for a 
writ of certiorari, and because, in its brief, the State indicates that it “does not challenge 
the [performance] prong before” us. 
 
- 28 - 
night of April 22, 2003.  Even if the purported alibi witnesses’ testimony was deemed to 
be credible and the circuit court had given an alibi jury instruction, that would have done 
nothing to rebut the circumstance that Mann’s whereabouts from approximately 6:45 p.m. 
or 7 p.m. on the evening of April 22—the time that he left McDonald’s with Whetstone 
and Prince—to 7:30 p.m. or 7:45 p.m.—the time that he allegedly arrived at Johnson’s 
house—was unaccounted for.  Similarly, Mann’s whereabouts from 8:45 p.m.—the time 
that Johnson left Mann at Mann’s mother’s house—to 9:30 p.m.—the time that Jenkins 
picked him up from his mother’s house—was unknown.  In other words, even if the circuit 
court had given an alibi jury instruction and the jury had believed the purported alibi 
witnesses, the jury could still have believed that Mann had the opportunity to participate in 
the kidnapping and killing of Prince, and found Mann guilty.   
In evaluating whether Mann was prejudiced by the omission of the alibi instruction, 
we must consider the totality of the evidence before the jury.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
695.  The giving of an alibi jury instruction would not have contradicted the evidence that 
Mann had a heated exchange with Prince at the McDonald’s restaurant about Prince having 
been a “snitch” and left the premises before 7 p.m.10 together with Prince and Whetstone, 
the person who was responsible for shooting Prince, and was not seen again until 7:30 p.m. 
or 7:45 p.m. that evening, or that Mann’s whereabouts between 8:45 p.m. and 9:30 p.m. 
                                              
10Davis, Prince’s mother, testified that, at approximately 6:45 p.m., he telephoned 
her and said that he had encountered Mann, and that someone had stolen her Corolla, which 
Prince had borrowed.  Davis testified that she telephoned 911 and reported the Corolla’s 
theft.  Officer Gardner testified that, at 7:03 p.m., he heard about the report of the Corolla’s 
theft.  
 
- 29 - 
were unknown.  Nor would an alibi jury instruction have undercut Mr. Harper’s written 
statement that Mann told him he was present when Whetstone shot Prince.  Nor would an 
alibi jury instruction have changed the medical examiner’s testimony that the time of death 
was during the evening of April 22, 2003, and that that was only an approximation as to 
the time of death because there were too many factors to identify the exact hour.  In sum, 
the purported alibi witnesses’ testimony did little to harm the State’s case and the failure 
to give an alibi jury instruction was not prejudicial.  
Notably, the evidence includes inconsistent accounts of what Mann did immediately 
after Fleet stole the Corolla.  Detective D’Angelo testified that Mann said that he told 
Prince that he would get the Corolla back for him, and that he and Whetstone went to 
Mann’s father’s house, and then returned to the McDonald’s.  But, Detective D’Angelo 
also testified that, in his written statement, Mann wrote that he told Prince that all he knew 
was that “Kane” was the name of the person who had gotten into the Corolla and driven 
away, and that Mann and Whetstone went to Mann’s father’s house, and then to Johnson’s 
house.11  And, Mr. Harper wrote that Mann said that Whetstone told Prince that he would 
take Prince to the Corolla.  According to Mr. Harper, Mann said that he, Whetstone, and 
Prince got into the Caprice, which Whetstone drove away; and, at some later point, 
                                              
11It is worth observing that no evidence corroborated the two inconsistent statements 
that Mann provided to Detective D’Angelo, given that neither Mann, his father, nor 
Whetstone testified.  And, unlike the defendant in Smith, 302 Md. at 177, 486 A.2d at 196, 
who testified that he was in another state when the crime occurred, Mann gave no testimony 
at all at trial, and his handwritten statement and Detective D’Angelo’s testimony 
concerning his statements were not offered for the purpose of establishing an alibi for 
Mann, but rather were offered by the State to demonstrate that Mann had been untruthful.  
 
- 30 - 
Whetstone shot Prince.  
But most importantly, none of the purported alibi witnesses, including Johnson, 
provided an alibi—i.e., none of them showed “the physical impossibility of [Mann]’s guilt 
by placing [him] in a location other than the [murder] scene [] at the relevant time.”  Alibi, 
Black’s Law Dictionary.  Simply put, the jury could have found all of the purported alibi 
witnesses credible, and still found Mann guilty.  Given this circumstance, the absence of 
an alibi jury instruction did not prejudice Mann. 
This case is on all fours with Syed, 463 Md. at 104-05, 92, 204 A.3d at 165, 157, in 
which this Court held that a petitioner was not prejudiced by his trial counsel not 
investigating an alibi witness; this Court explained that the alibi witness’s testimony could 
not have led to an acquittal because it would not have negated the petitioner’s guilt, given 
that the alibi witness did not account for the petitioner’s whereabouts for the entire time 
frame in which he had the opportunity to murder the victim.  Similarly, here, none of the 
purported alibi witnesses accounted for Mann’s whereabouts immediately after Fleet stole 
the Corolla, but before Mann allegedly arrived at Johnson’s house in the evening; and, in 
the interim, Mann had the opportunity to go with Whetstone and Prince, and be present 
when Whetstone shot Prince. And, none of the purported alibi witnesses accounted for 
Mann’s whereabouts between 8:45 p.m. and 9:30 pm. on the evening of the murder. Just 
as there was no prejudice in Syed, there was no prejudice here. 
Our conclusion is also supported by Matthews, 58 Md. App. at 248, 472 A.2d at 
1046, and Schmitt, 140 Md. App. at 37, 779 A.2d at 1024, in each of which the Court of 
Special Appeals held that a petitioner’s trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance 
 
- 31 - 
of counsel by not requesting an alibi jury instruction.  In each case, there was purported 
evidence of an alibi, and, accordingly, the petitioner was arguably entitled to an alibi jury 
instruction on request.  See Matthews, 58 Md. App. at 246-47, 472 A.2d at 1045; Schmitt, 
140 Md. App. at 33, 779 A.2d at 1022.  But, as Judge Moylan aptly explained, “[t]he 
entitlement to an instruction if you want one does not imply that you are derelict for not 
wanting one.”  Schmitt, 140 Md. App. at 34, 779 A.2d at 1023.  In each case, the Court of 
Special Appeals determined that an alibi jury instruction had the potential to be ineffectual, 
or even prejudicial.  See Matthews, 58 Md. App. at 247-48, 472 A.2d at 1046; Schmitt, 
140 Md. App. at 35, 779 A.2d at 1023.  Similarly, here, an alibi jury instruction would have 
been of little effect, given that none of the four purported alibi witnesses’ testimony 
precluded guilt.  
We are aware that during closing arguments Mann’s trial counsel proceeded on the 
assumption that Whetstone would not have taken the beltway to reach the area behind 
Fantasies and thus there was not enough time for Mann to be present at the murder and 
return to Johnson’s house by 7:30 p.m. or 7:45 p.m.  Detective Laslett testified that Mr. 
Harper told him that the Caprice’s hood was defective, and would pop up when it reached 
highway speed.  During closing argument, Mann’s trial counsel pointed out that Mr. Harper 
had told the detective that the Caprice could not go on the highway.  Mann’s trial counsel 
argued that, if one does not drive on the beltway, the trip from the McDonald’s to Fantasies 
takes approximately an hour to an hour-and-a-half, and contended that Mann would not 
have had time to go with Whetstone and Prince to the area behind Fantasies, and then arrive 
at Johnson’s house by approximately 7:30 p.m. or 7:45 p.m.  In any event, the jury was not 
 
- 32 - 
bound to proceed on the assumption that Whetstone would not have taken the beltway to 
reach the area behind Fantasies.  Indeed, the only evidence that Whetstone would not have 
taken the beltway was Detective Laslett’s testimony that Mr. Harper told him that the 
Caprice’s hood would pop up when it reached highway speed.  Mr. Harper’s statement did 
not establish that it was impossible for Whetstone to take the Caprice onto the beltway or 
that Whetstone did not take the Caprice on the beltway.   
Tellingly, the record demonstrates that Mann’s trial counsel pursued defenses other 
than an alibi defense at trial.  During Mann’s closing argument, among other things, his 
trial counsel pointed out that there was no forensic evidence, such as DNA, that linked 
Mann to Prince’s murder.  Mann’s trial counsel also raised the possibility that Prince had 
been murdered in a robbery gone wrong, given that, when his body was found, he had no 
cash on him, he did not have the paycheck that he had told his mother that he was going to 
get that day, and he was not wearing anything from the waist up.  Alternatively, Mann’s 
trial counsel suggested that Mr. Harper had murdered Prince, given that Mr. Harper knew 
“Curtis Bay like the back of his hand,” that officers arrested Mr. Harper after encountering 
him while he was driving the Caprice, and that one of Mr. Harper’s statements to the 
officers was “suspicious.”  Finally, in addition to Mr. Harper, Mann’s trial counsel 
indicated that other individuals could have murdered Prince, stating: 
How about . . . the names that are affiliated with [Sharp]’s group, as the 
prosecutor said? . . . How about [Sharp’s brother] wanting to kill [] Prince 
because [] Prince supplied the gun that was used to kill [Sharp]?  Or Chase 
Williams who was going to have his head busted open by [] Prince and [] 
Bazemore and others?  Or Kurt Hamlet or Tavon Labertto?  How about these 
people wanting to get [] Prince?  Madam Prosecutor, just as plausible a 
motive as the one you suggest to this jury.  
 
- 33 - 
 
That Mann’s trial counsel pursued additional defenses undermines the impact of his not 
requesting an alibi jury instruction. 
Finally, the circumstance that the circuit court instructed the jury on the burden of 
proof twice—once preliminarily at the start of the trial, and once at the conclusion of the 
trial—undermines Mann’s claim of having satisfied his burden to prove prejudice under 
Strickland.  To be sure, jury instructions regarding the burden of proof and similar matters 
“are not deemed to ‘fairly cover’ the matter of alibi.”  Smith, 302 Md. at 180, 486 A.2d at 
198 (quoting Pulley, 38 Md. App. at 690-91, 382 A.2d at 626).  That said, in a direct appeal, 
a trial court’s alleged error is reversible unless the State proves that it is harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt; by contrast, in a postconviction proceeding involving a claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the petitioner has the burden of proving that there is 
a reasonable probability, or a substantial or significant possibility, that the petitioner’s trial 
counsel’s alleged error would have resulted in an acquittal.  Even were we to determine 
that an error occurred that would have required automatic reversal on direct appeal, that 
does not release Mann from the requirement to prove prejudice when raising an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.  See Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1912 (2017); 
Newton, 455 Md. at 356-57, 168 A.3d at 9-10.  Here, the jury instructions regarding the 
State’s burden of proof militate in favor of a determination that there was no reasonable 
probability, or substantial or significant possibility, that the omission of an alibi jury 
instruction, containing essentially the same information, affected the outcome of the trial. 
For all of the above reasons, Mann has failed to satisfy the burden to prove that there 
 
- 34 - 
is a reasonable probability, or a substantial or significant possibility, that the jury would 
have acquitted him if his trial counsel had requested an alibi jury instruction.  Mann’s trial 
counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by not requesting an alibi jury 
instruction. 
 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL 
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED TO 
THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO 
REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT 
COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AND REMAND 
WITH 
INSTRUCTION 
TO 
DENY 
THE 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
PETITION 
FOR 
POSTCONVICTION RELIEF.  RESPONDENT 
TO PAY COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE 
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS. 
 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case Nos. 104002009 to 104002014  
Argued: October 31, 2019 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 29 
 
September Term, 2019 
 
__________________________________ 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
 
v.   
 
CHRISTOPHER MANN 
__________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Booth, 
Harrell, Glenn T., Jr. (Senior Judge, 
Specially Assigned), 
Greene, Clayton, Jr. (Senior Judge, 
Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
__________________________________ 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Hotten, J., which 
Barbera, C.J., joins 
__________________________________ 
 
Filed:  December 19, 2019 
 
Respectfully, I dissent.  The failure to request an alibi instruction, in light of the 
testimony from four possible alibi witnesses, constituted deficient performance under 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984), in the absence or 
acknowledgement on the record that the failure was rooted in trial strategy.  I am persuaded 
that the deficiency was prejudicial against Mr. Mann and his defense.  Additionally, I am 
persuaded that a general jury instruction regarding the burden of proof in a criminal case 
is insufficient to ensure the jury does not improperly place the burden on the defense to 
prove its alibi when an alibi defense is presented. 
Trial Counsel’s Failure to Request an Alibi Instruction was Deficient and Prejudicial 
 
In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court outlined a two-prong test for 
determining whether a criminal defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  466 U.S. at 687, 104 
S.Ct. at 2064.  The defendant must initially demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance 
was deficient.  Id.  If established, the defendant must then demonstrate that the deficiency 
resulted in prejudice to the defendant.  Id.  Under the prejudice prong of Strickland, a 
reviewing court must ascertain whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 
Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.  A “reasonable probability” is one that is “sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id.  This Court has further interpreted the 
“reasonable probability” standard to mean that there existed “a substantial or significant 
possibility that the verdict of the trier of fact would have been affected.”  Bowers v. State, 
320 Md. 416, 426, 578 A.2d 734, 739 (1990).  While the Strickland standard for proving 
 
2 
 
prejudice is high, and decidedly deferential to trial counsel’s performance, it clearly 
requires the showing of merely “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”  466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. 
I agree with the majority that we do not have to dissect the deficiency prong in the 
instant case.  However, I am not persuaded that Mr. Mann was not prejudiced by trial 
counsel’s failure to request an alibi jury instruction.  I agree with the Court of Special 
Appeals that “the record here is devoid of any strategic reason for not requesting an alibi 
instruction.” State v. Mann, 240 Md. App. 592, 601, 207 A.3d 653, 658 (2019).  In reaching 
the conclusion that there was a Sixth Amendment violation, the Court of Special Appeals 
stated  
there exists a strong concern that a jury will assume that a criminal defendant 
bears some burden of proof by introducing alibi evidence, even if the word 
“alibi” is never uttered in the courtroom. . . . By providing an alibi [jury] 
instruction, [a] trial court sufficiently relieves these concerns.  Here, where 
an alibi [jury] instruction was not given because trial counsel [did not] 
request it, there is a ‘substantial or significant possibility that the verdict . . . 
[was] affected.’”   
 
Id. at 605–06, 207 A.3d at 661 (internal citations omitted).  At trial, the State was unable 
to pinpoint the time of Mr. Prince’s death.  The defense presented four alibi witnesses that 
were able to account for some of Mr. Mann’s whereabouts on the evening in question.  
Guided by an alibi instruction, and weighing the credibility of the witnesses and the 
evidence presented, a jury could have determined that Mr. Prince was killed during the 
times accounted for by the alibi witnesses.  Because the jury did not receive the alibi 
instruction and at least one juror could have incorrectly shifted the burden to the defense 
 
3 
 
to prove said alibi, there exists a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been 
affected.  As such, Mr. Mann was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to request an 
alibi jury instruction. 
An Alibi Jury Instruction is not Fairly Covered by a Court’s General Jury Instructions 
Regarding the assertion that providing the reasonable doubt instruction covers the 
matter of alibi, I disagree.  You should not conflate an alibi instruction with an independent 
instruction addressing the burden of proof such as the reasonable doubt instruction. 
[W]hen the evidence in a criminal case generates the issue of alibi, and when 
the defendant requests an instruction specifically addressed to the matter of 
alibi, the defendant is entitled to a specific alibi instruction, and that the trial 
court’s general instructions concerning the prosecution’s burden of proof, 
etc., are not deemed to “fairly cover” the matter of alibi. 
 
Smith v. State, 302 Md. 175, 180, 486 A.2d 196, 198 (1985); see also Pulley v. State, 38 
Md. App. 682, 382 A.2d 621 (1978).  Although the defense offers an alibi to “prove that it 
was impossible or highly improbable that the defendant was at the scene of the crime when 
it was alleged to have occurred[,]” the State still bears the burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was actually at the scene of the crime when it occurred 
and that the defendant committed the crime.  State v. Syed, 463 Md. 60, 77, 204 A.3d 139, 
148 (2019).  In other words, the State must disprove the defense’s assertion of an alibi 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Ultimately, the purpose of an alibi jury instruction is to avoid confusing the jury and 
prevent the jury from shifting the burden of persuasion in a criminal case.  Regardless of 
whether the jury received information from other general instructions, the jury must 
 
4 
 
consider a separate alibi instruction if the circumstances warrant the instruction.  Receiving 
this instruction clarifies the burden of proof when the defense presents alibi evidence.  In 
this case, the absence of an alibi instruction prejudiced Mr. Mann because there is a 
reasonable probability that the jurors incorrectly placed the burden of persuasion on the 
defense rather than the State, which could have affected the verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special 
Appeals. 
Chief Judge Barbera has authorized me to state that she joins in this opinion.