Case Title: State v. Toahty-Harvey

Citation: 

Docket Number: 105351

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2013-04-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
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 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 105,351 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
ZACHARY TOAHTY-HARVEY, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law over which an appellate court has 
unlimited review. K.S.A. 21-4721(c) does not deprive an appellate court of jurisdiction to 
review those portions of a sentence upon which the State and the defendant have not 
agreed in the district court. 
 
2. 
 
When determining whether a sentence is cruel or unusual punishment under § 9 of 
the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, a district court must make both legal and factual 
determinations. Accordingly, an appellate court applies a bifurcated standard of review: 
All of the evidence is reviewed, but not reweighed, to determine if there is sufficient 
support for the district court's factual findings, and the district court's legal conclusions 
drawn from those facts are reviewed de novo.  
 
3. 
 
Punishment may be constitutionally impermissible under § 9 of the Kansas 
Constitution Bill of Rights even though it is not cruel or unusual in its method, if it is so 
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disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and 
offends fundamental notions of human dignity. 
 
4. 
 
To determine whether the length of a sentence offends the constitutional 
prohibition against cruel punishment, a court should consider three factors:  (1) The 
nature of the offense and the character of the offender should be examined with particular 
regard to the degree of danger present to society; relevant to this inquiry are the facts of 
the crime, the violent or nonviolent nature of the offense, the extent of culpability for the 
injury resulting, and the penological purposes of the prescribed punishment; (2) a 
comparison of the punishment with punishments imposed in this jurisdiction for more 
serious offenses, and if among them are found more serious crimes punished less severely 
than the offense in question the challenged penalty is to that extent suspect; and (3) a 
comparison of the penalty with punishments in other jurisdictions for the same offense. 
No one factor controls and, ultimately, one consideration may weigh so heavy that it 
directs the final conclusion, but consideration should be given to each prong of the test. 
 
5. 
 
Under the facts of this case, a defendant's sentence of lifetime postrelease 
supervision upon conviction for aggravated indecent liberties with a child is not cruel or 
unusual punishment under § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights; in other words, it 
is not so disproportionate to the crime that it shocks the conscience and offends 
fundamental notions of human dignity. 
 
Appeal from Douglas District Court; PEGGY C. KITTEL, judge. Opinion filed April 12, 2013. 
Affirmed. 
 
Lydia Krebs, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the brief for appellant.  
 
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Patrick J. Hurley, assistant district attorney, Jessica Dotter, legal intern, Charles E. Branson, 
district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
JOHNSON, J.:  Zachary C. Toahty-Harvey appeals from the portion of his sentence 
for aggravated indecent liberties with a child that imposed lifetime postrelease 
supervision. He contends that lifetime postrelease supervision is durationally 
disproportional and, therefore, it violates § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. 
We reject Toahty-Harvey's arguments, concluding that the sentence in this case is not 
unconstitutionally disproportionate to the nature of the case and the character of the 
offender; that it is not unconstitutionally disproportionate to the sentences imposed for 
other crimes in Kansas; and that it is not unconstitutionally disproportionate to the 
punishments imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense. Consequently, we 
affirm the sentence.  
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW 
 
Toahty-Harvey pled nolo contendere (no contest) to one count of aggravated 
indecent liberties with a child, and the State offered the following factual basis at the plea 
hearing. In August 2009, 26-year-old Toahty-Harvey was a houseguest of the 12-year-old 
victim's family. Early one morning, he entered the victim's bedroom while she was 
sleeping and placed his hand in the area of her genitalia, making skin-to-skin contact. 
Based on the State's factual proffer and on a finding that the defendant's plea was 
knowingly and voluntarily made, the district court found Toahty-Harvey guilty.  
 
The default sentence for the off-grid version of aggravated indecent liberties under 
these circumstances is a life sentence with a mandatory minimum term of 25 years. See 
K.S.A. 21-4643(a)(1)(C); K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A) and (c). But in return for defendant's 
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plea, the State agreed to join in recommending that the district court depart downward to 
a grid sentence of 60 months. Toahty-Harvey filed a motion for departure, as well as a 
motion to declare Jessica's Law, K.S.A. 21-4643, unconstitutional. At sentencing, the 
district court granted the departure to a 60 months' prison term but stated that defendant 
would be subject to lifetime parole with electronic monitoring. The parties suggested to 
the court that the proper postincarceration supervision after a departure to the guidelines 
grid is postrelease supervision, rather than parole. The court took that matter under 
advisement. 
 
At a subsequent hearing, the district court agreed that, after the departure, Toahty-
Harvey was subject to lifetime postrelease supervision, rather than lifetime parole with 
electronic monitoring. Toahty-Harvey then conceded that his motion to find Jessica's 
Law unconstitutional with respect to his period of imprisonment was moot because of the 
durational departure, but he asserted that the lifetime postrelease supervision was 
unconstitutional. The district court proceeded to hear arguments from the defendant on 
that issue. The prosecutor's response was that "the State does not wish to be heard on this 
issue." 
 
Applying the factors or techniques from State v. Freeman, 223 Kan. 362, 574 P.2d 
950 (1978), the district court determined that lifetime postrelease supervision in this case 
was not unconstitutionally disproportionate, in violation of § 9 of the Kansas Constitution 
Bill of Rights. Toahty-Harvey appealed on that sole issue. The State challenges our 
jurisdiction to consider the appeal. 
 
JURISDICTION 
 
As a threshold matter, the State directs our attention to K.S.A. 21-4721(c), which 
provides that an "appellate court shall not review:  . . . (2) any sentence resulting from an 
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agreement between the state and the defendant which the sentencing court approves on 
the record." The State argues that the parties jointly requested a departure sentence to 60 
months, which the district court accepted, so that we are statutorily denied jurisdiction to 
review Toahty-Harvey's sentence challenge. Cf. State v. Johnson, 286 Kan. 824, 851-52, 
190 P.3d 207 (2008) (K.S.A. 21-4721[c][1] deprives appellate court of jurisdiction to 
consider defendant's challenge to a presumptive gridbox sentence). 
 
 
Standard of Review  
 
Jurisdiction is a question of law over which we have unlimited review. State v. 
Ellmaker, 289 Kan. 1132, 1147, 221 P.3d 1105 (2009), cert. denied 130 S. Ct. 3410 
(2010). 
 
 
Analysis  
 
In connection with the plea in this case, a document entitled Tender of Plea of No 
Contest was executed by Toahty-Harvey and his attorney and was approved by the 
district judge. That document recited that the parties' agreement was that the defendant 
would plead no contest to aggravated indecent liberties with a child and that the State 
would recommend a durational departure to 60 months' imprisonment and further agree 
that departure factors existed to justify the durational departure. The document did not 
recite that Toahty-Harvey agreed to accept a lifetime postrelease period nor did it prohibit 
the defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the postrelease portion of the 
sentence. 
 
Further, the actions of the parties would corroborate that the parties' agreement 
only encompassed the 60-month term of imprisonment and not the period of postrelease 
supervision. The prosecutor did not contend that Toahty-Harvey was breaching the plea 
agreement when the defense argued against the lifetime period of postrelease supervision. 
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Then, the prosecutor did not object when the judge advised Toahty-Harvey:  "And if you 
decide that you want to appeal the case, whether it's the plea, the sentence, what have 
you, and you cannot afford an attorney, one would be appointed to represent you." If the 
State believed at that time that all of the sentence, including the postrelease supervision 
period, had been agreed upon by the parties, then the prosecutor would surely have 
corrected the sentencing court's misinformation about the defendant's right to appeal the 
sentence. 
 
In short, the record does not support the State's argument that K.S.A. 21-4721(c) 
deprives this court of jurisdiction to review the district court's ruling on the 
constitutionality of the lifetime postrelease supervision portion of Toahty-Harvey's 
sentence. 
 
CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
  
In the district court, defense counsel specifically advised the sentencing judge as 
follows:  "And it is Mr. Harvey's argument today that [the lifetime postrelease] 
requirement alone is unconstitutional as a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 
Section 9 of the Kansas Constitution." The defense did not present a separate argument 
based upon the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, neither a case-
specific nor a categorical challenge. Cf. State v. Mossman, 294 Kan. 901, 281 P.3d 153 
(2012) (analyzing the constitutionality of lifetime postrelease supervision under both 
Kansas and federal constitutions). Accordingly, we will limit our review to a 
consideration of the sentence's constitutionality under the Kansas Constitution. 
 
 
Standard of Review 
 
When determining whether a sentence is cruel or unusual punishment under § 9 of 
the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, a district court must make both legal and factual 
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determinations. Accordingly, an appellate court applies a bifurcated standard of review: 
"All of the evidence is reviewed, but not reweighed, to determine if there is sufficient 
support for the district court's factual findings, and the district court's legal conclusions 
drawn from those facts are reviewed de novo." Mossman, 294 Kan. at 906.  
 
 
Analysis 
 
In Mossman, we observed that lifetime postrelease supervision is statutorily 
required upon a conviction for aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and, therefore, a 
constitutional challenge to that part of the sentence "is an indirect attack on the 
constitutionality of the statute as applied." 294 Kan. at 906. Consequently, we followed 
the separation of powers constraint of beginning with a presumption that the statute is 
constitutional and resolving all doubts in favor of constitutionality. 294 Kan. at 906-07. 
But we determined that the issue of the constitutionality of lifetime postrelease 
supervision was ripe for determination under the justiciability doctrine, notwithstanding 
the current uncertainty about some of the future events that could impact the postrelease 
supervision or the revocation of such supervision. 294 Kan. at 907. Those preliminary 
determinations are equally applicable here. 
 
As was the case in Mossman, Toahty-Harvey challenges the length of time he was 
ordered to be on postrelease supervision, rather than complaining that postrelease 
supervision is a cruel or unusual method of punishment. Accordingly, our decision will 
be framed by the holding in Freeman, where this court opined:  "Punishment may be 
constitutionally impermissible, although not cruel or unusual in its method, if it is so 
disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and 
offends fundamental notions of human dignity." Freeman, 223 Kan. at 367; cf. Mossman, 
294 Kan. at 909 (Freeman test not applicable to method of punishment challenge).  
Freeman instructed as follows: 
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"In determining whether the length of a sentence offends the constitutional 
prohibition against cruel punishment three techniques should be considered:   
 
 
"(1) The nature of the offense and the character of the offender should be 
examined with particular regard to the degree of danger present to society; relevant to this 
inquiry are the facts of the crime, the violent or nonviolent nature of the offense, the 
extent of culpability for the injury resulting, and the penological purposes of the 
prescribed punishment; 
 
 
"(2) A comparison of the punishment with punishments imposed in this 
jurisdiction for more serious offenses, and if among them are found more serious crimes 
punished less severely than the offense in question the challenged penalty is to that extent 
suspect; and 
 
 
"(3) A comparison of the penalty with punishments in other jurisdictions for the 
same offense." 223 Kan. at 367. 
 
We now refer to Freeman's techniques as the Freeman factors or as a "three-part 
test." See Mossman, 294 Kan. at 908. We have clarified that "[n]o one factor controls." 
State v. Woodard, 294 Kan. 717, 723, 280 P.3d 203 (2012). "'Ultimately, one 
consideration may weigh so heavy that it directs the final conclusion,' but 'consideration 
should be given to each prong of the test.'" Woodard, 294 Kan. at 723 (quoting State v. 
Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. 157, 161, 194 P.3d 1195 [2008]). Here, the trial court 
analyzed the length of Toahty-Harvey's sentence under the Freeman paradigm. 
 
Regarding the first Freeman factor—the nature of the offense and the character of 
the offender—the district court judge related that Toahty-Harvey committed a sex offense 
against a 12-year-old child; that although there was no physical harm to the child, there is 
always the potential for emotional harm when a child is sexually violated; that the Kansas 
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Legislature has determined that sex violations against children are deserving of more 
severe punishment due to the children's vulnerability and need for protection; that the 
violation occurred in the sanctity of the child's own home; that Toahty-Harvey's 
psychological evaluation and evidence of his mild manner and lower than average IQ 
were submitted for purposes of the motion to depart from the 25-year mandatory 
minimum sentence and not for the present motion; and that the legislature has determined 
the community requires protection against those who victimize children. On appeal, 
Toahty-Harvey continues to argue that he is mild mannered; that he has a low IQ; that he 
is at low risk for posing a continuing danger to society; and that the victim was not 
physically harmed. 
 
In Mossman, this court addressed similar arguments by a defendant challenging 
his lifetime postrelease supervision for an aggravated indecent liberties with a child 
conviction which involved sex acts with a 15-year-old female. In assessing the first 
Freeman factor, Mossman opined: 
 
 
"The judge's conclusion regarding the seriousness of the crime is consistent with 
statements made by other courts that have rejected the argument that a lengthy sentence 
for a sex crime against a minor is cruel and unusual punishment. These courts recognize 
that sex offenses against minors are 'considered particularly heinous crimes.' People v. 
Dash, 104 P.3d 286, 293 (Colo. App. 2004). Further, it is generally recognized that 
society has a penological interest in punishing those who commit sex offenses against 
minors because they 'present a special problem and danger to society' and their actions 
produce '"particularly devastating effects"' on victims, including physical and 
psychological harm. State v. Wade, 757 N.W.2d 618, 626 (Iowa 2008) (quoting In re 
Morrow, 616 N.W.2d 544 [Iowa 2000]). The State's vital interest in protecting minors 
from sex activities explains the legislative decision to treat sex crimes against minors as a  
forcible or violent felony even if no physical force is involved. Wade, 757 N.W.2d at 626. 
Additionally, there are 'grave concerns over the high rate of recidivism among convicted 
sex offenders and their dangerousness as a class. The risk of recidivism posed by sex 
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offenders is "frightening and high."' Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 155 
L. Ed. 2d 164 (2003) (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 153 L. 
Ed. 2d 47 [2002]); see Wade, 757 N.W.2d at 626. These views are consistent with the 
Kansas Legislature's decision to treat sex crimes against minors, including the crime 
committed by Mossman, as 'sexually violent' and deserving of lifetime postrelease 
supervision." 294 Kan. at 909-10. 
 
Here, the district court rejected Toahty-Harvey's argument that the victim was not 
physically harmed. The court not only recognized that a sex act with a 12-year-old girl is 
considered to be intrinsically violent and harmful, but it pointed out that this child was 
violated by the defendant in her own bedroom, exacerbating the potential for 
psychological harm. The district court's finding that lifetime postrelease supervision was 
not disproportionate with the nature of the crime is supported by the evidence. 
 
In Mossman, the defendant attempted to counter the seriousness of the crime in 
part by pointing out his low risk of recidivism score, as Toahty-Harvey has done here. 
The Mossman majority was unpersuaded by such arguments that "focus[ed] solely on 
proportionality from the perspective of punishment or retribution while ignoring other 
legitimate penological goals such as deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation." 294 
Kan. at 911. The court noted that the purposes of postrelease supervision include 
deterring future crime, aiding rehabilitation of sex offenders, and incapacitating sex 
offenders by keeping them under a watchful eye. Mossman found postrelease supervision 
particularly appropriate for sex crimes where the risk of recidivism is high. 294 Kan. at 
911. Similarly, we are unpersuaded that Toahty-Harvey's mild manner and low test 
scores, i.e., the character of the offender, trump the nature of the offense in this case 
when assessing the proportionality of lifetime postrelease supervision.  
 
In conclusion, like the Mossman court, we find that substantial competent 
evidence supports the district court's findings relating to the first Freeman factor; we 
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decline to reweigh that evidence. Accordingly, the first factor supports the imposition of 
the lifetime postrelease supervision. 
 
The second and third Freeman factors are not as fact-sensitive as the first factor. 
Mossman held, under the second factor, that lifetime postrelease supervision is not 
constitutionally disproportionate to the sentences imposed for other, possibly "more 
serious," crimes in Kansas. 294 Kan. at 912, 917. Under the third factor, Mossman found 
that lifetime postrelease supervision for aggravated indecent liberties with a child was not 
disproportionate to the punishments imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense. 
294 Kan. at 920-21; see also State v. Cameron, 294 Kan. 884, Syl. ¶ 1, 281 P.3d 143 
(2012). Toathy-Harvey does not produce any new arguments which would entice this 
court to reconsider those determinations in Mossman. Consequently, what we said in 
Mossman is applicable here, to-wit: 
 
 
"Under the facts of this case, a defendant's sentence of lifetime postrelease 
supervision under K.S.A. 22–3717(d)(1)(G) for the crime of aggravated indecent liberties 
with a child is not cruel or unusual punishment under § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill 
of Rights; in other words, the punishment is not so disproportionate to the crime that it 
shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity. Factors leading 
to this conclusion include: the nature of the offense, which is serious and is a sex crime 
against a minor that historically has been treated as a forcible or violent felony regardless 
of whether there is physical force; the defendant's characteristics; and the penological 
goals of postrelease supervision, which include retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, 
and rehabilitation. These factors outweigh the lack of strict proportionality with other 
sentences in Kansas and other jurisdictions, especially given that the sentence is not 
grossly disproportionate." 294 Kan. 901, Syl. ¶ 5. 
 
 
Affirmed.