Case Title: Adrian T. Hipp v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County

Citation: 2008 WI 67

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
2008 WI 67 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP230-W 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the matter of the John Doe petition: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Adrian T. Hipp, 
          Petitioner, 
     v. 
The Honorable Marshall B. Murray , presiding, 
          Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2007 WI App 202 
Reported at: 305 Wis. 2d 148, 738 N.W.2d 570 
(Ct. App. 2007-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 20, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 10, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Marshall B. Murray   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, C.J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-petitioner the cause was argued by David 
C. Rice, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs was 
J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the petitioner there was a brief filed by Colleen D. 
Ball, Wauwatosa, and oral argument by Colleen D. Ball. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 67
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP0230-W  
L.C. Case No. 2006JD7 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the matter of the John Doe petition: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Adrian T. Hipp, 
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
The Honorable Marshall B. Murray, presiding, 
 
          Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 20, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The Honorable Marshall B. 
Murray seeks review of a published court of appeals decision 
granting a writ of mandamus. The writ directed him upon remand 
to permit the complainant, Adrian Hipp, to have subpoenas issued 
for those persons he listed as witnesses for a John Doe hearing.1 
                                                 
1 See Hipp v. The Honorable Marshall B. Murray, 2007 WI App 
202, 305 Wis. 2d 148, 738 N.W.2d 570; Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.51(1) (2005-06). 
No. 
2007AP0230-W   
 
2 
 
The court of appeals concluded that clerks of court may issue 
subpoenas for John Doe hearings.  
¶2 
Judge Murray maintains that under Wis. Stat. § 968.26, 
a John Doe judge has exclusive authority to subpoena witnesses 
for a John Doe hearing. He argues that the court of appeals 
erred in determining that John Doe complainants may seek to have 
clerks of court subpoena witnesses pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 885.01.2  
¶3 
We determine that a John Doe judge has exclusive 
authority to subpoena witnesses in a John Doe proceeding based 
upon the language of the John Doe statute (§ 968.26), the 
history 
of 
its 
application, 
and 
principles 
of 
statutory 
construction. The case does not present the issue of whether a 
John Doe judge is required to subpoena every witness that a John 
Doe petitioner requests. We save that issue for another day. 
¶4 
Ultimately, however, we agree with the court of 
appeals that a writ of mandamus should be granted and we 
instruct that upon remand the John Doe judge here should issue 
subpoenas. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals, albeit 
with a different rationale.  
I 
¶5 
The basic facts of this case are not in dispute. At 
the times relevant to the case, Hipp has been incarcerated. In 
the fall of 2006 Hipp filed a John Doe petition with the Circuit 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-
06 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2007AP0230-W   
 
3 
 
Court for Milwaukee County. The petition alleges that Hipp was 
arrested and placed into custody in January 2001. After he was 
in custody, Hipp asked friends to retrieve his personal property 
from the apartment he had been sharing with Robert Richter. 
Richter informed one of the friends that Lisa Coleman had 
already removed the property. When Coleman was contacted, she 
refused to hand over any property. 
¶6 
The 
petition 
also 
alleges 
that 
Hipp's 
friends 
contacted the manager of the apartment and provided her with a 
letter from Hipp authorizing her to release Hipp's property to 
the friends. However, the only property left in the apartment 
when the friends arrived was some paperwork and clothing. Hipp 
states in the petition that he did not give Coleman permission 
to take his property. Attached to the petition was a list of the 
property Hipp alleges to have been stolen, affidavits of two of 
Hipp's friends regarding the allegations in the petition, and a 
list of witnesses.  
¶7 
The case was assigned to Judge Murray. The first 
hearing on the matter occurred in November 2006. Hipp, who was a 
prisoner at the Stanley Correctional Institute, was produced for 
the hearing. However, he had not been informed that the hearing 
was to take place. Judge Murray therefore decided that the 
hearing should be rescheduled.  
¶8 
Nevertheless, Judge Murray proceeded to discuss the 
nature of the case. He asked the assistant district attorney, 
John Reddin, for information. Although he produced no witnesses, 
Reddin proceeded to make assertions regarding the facts of the 
No. 
2007AP0230-W   
 
4 
 
case to Judge Murray. He stated that Hipp was convicted of 
credit card fraud against Richter, that Coleman had been 
Richter's guardian, and that Richter was now deceased. Reddin 
speculated that any restitution owed by Hipp to Richter would 
accrue to Richter's estate and that Coleman was a representative 
of the estate. Thus, it was Reddin's view that the matter in the 
John Doe proceeding would be better addressed in a civil case 
rather than in a criminal case. 
It appears to me without knowing the facts——and I 
don't know if this would be a fact——that it appears to 
me that there may be some self-help going on here of 
holding property that was apparently abandoned by Mr. 
Hipp when he was arrested. I don't know if there is an 
issue of back rent or not, but the whole thing strikes 
me as being civil in nature, not a crime—— 
¶9 
Judge Murray questioned Hipp about the case. Hipp 
admitted that he had been ordered to pay restitution to 
Richter's estate and a credit card company. However, he stated 
that he had "no knowledge of the fact that [Coleman] has 
anything to do with the estate" and that he "would like to see 
evidence of that if that's the case. . . ."  Hipp reiterated the 
information in his petition regarding Coleman's actions.  
¶10 Judge Murray emphasized that it fell upon Hipp to 
assure that witnesses were present, stating that "it's your 
responsibility to get your witnesses here. You look at the 
statute." Hipp then inquired as to how he was to produce 
witnesses that were not his friends and perhaps unwilling to 
come. Judge Murray responded: "I'm not the Judge in this case. I 
am just responding to the petition that you wrote. You have to 
No. 
2007AP0230-W   
 
5 
 
bring in information to me. I'm just a police officer trying to 
do an investigation here." 
¶11 The 
hearing 
was 
rescheduled 
for 
December 
2006. 
However, like the November 2006 hearing, the rescheduled hearing 
was derailed. Reddin stated that he had neglected to produce 
Hipp, suggested that the hearing be rescheduled, and assured 
Judge Murray that he would make sure to produce Hipp at a 
rescheduled hearing. Although Hipp was not present, Reddin and 
Judge Murray discussed the substance of the case. Reddin told 
the judge that he had spoken to Coleman. She told Reddin that 
she was executor of Richter's estate, that Hipp was incarcerated 
for theft from Richter, and that Hipp had used Richter's credit 
card for cash such that it was not possible to trace how the 
money had been used.  
¶12 Judge Murray noticed two people sitting in the 
courtroom. They advised the judge that they were witnesses in 
the Hipp proceeding. Judge Murray told them if Hipp used money 
taken to buy the property at issue in the case, he did not 
"think [Hipp] has an argument . . . if this were a repo kind of 
situation, he would have lost it anyway . . . ." In addition, 
Judge Murray addressed the issue of the subpoena: 
Court clerk: They remain under subpoena? 
[Judge Murray]: Yes, were you given a subpoena by Mr. 
Hipp? 
[Witness]: He said he sent them in the mail, but we 
never did get them.  
No. 
2007AP0230-W   
 
6 
 
[Judge Murray]: Well, if you receive them, remember 
that you're under subpoena until the next court date. 
Okay? 
¶13 Reddin then told Judge Murray that Hipp did not have 
subpoena power under the statute, stating that "the way the 
statute is, he does not have subpoena power. . . ." While Hipp 
may ask witnesses to attend, Reddin maintained, he has no 
authority to require attendance. Judge Murray stated his 
agreement with Reddin's view. The hearing was rescheduled for 
January 2007.  
¶14 Hipp requested the clerk of the circuit court for 
Milwaukee County to subpoena witnesses for the January hearing. 
The clerk issued five subpoenas, which listed attorney Jon 
Schuster as the person to contact with questions.  
¶15 Reddin sent a letter to Schuster stating that the 
subpoenas were invalid. He asserted that the January hearing was 
to determine whether there was "reason to believe" a crime had 
been committed, and that no subpoenas could be issued until such 
a determination had been made. Reddin further stated that he had 
told several of the subpoenaed witnesses that the subpoenas had 
no legal effect and that they were therefore not required to 
appear. Further, Reddin represented that he had consulted with 
Judge Murray, and that Judge Murray had agreed that the 
individuals were not required to appear. The letter provides in 
part as follows:  
I have advised the three individuals served that these 
subpoenas have no legal effect and that they are not 
required to appear. I have consulted with Judge Murray 
and he concurs with this advice. He did offer that you 
No. 
2007AP0230-W   
 
7 
 
may appear Monday and make any statements to him that 
you wish. In the event Judge Murray makes a finding 
that there is reason to believe that a crime has been 
committed, and based on that finding orders a John Doe 
Proceeding, the judge, and only the judge, will have 
subpoena power.  
¶16 At 
the 
January 
hearing, 
Judge 
Murray 
began 
by 
questioning Hipp regarding the allegations in Hipp's petition. 
When Judge Murray asked Hipp whether he had any witnesses, Hipp 
responded that he saw only three of the eight witnesses he had 
listed and that some subpoenaed witnesses were not in court. 
Judge Murray responded that Hipp did not have subpoena power:  
Mr. Hipp: Your Honor, I provided you with a copy of 
the proposed witness list, and on the list there were 
eight individuals named. I see three of them here. I 
do not know who else may or may not be here in the 
hallway. . . . I did subpoena them so—— 
Judge Murray: You don't have subpoena power, sir. 
Mr. Hipp: Well, the circuit court issued the subpoenas 
that I have, that I sent you copies of. 
Judge Murray: The clerk of court doesn't have subpoena 
power.  
Mr. Hipp: Understand Your Honor. I have an ability to 
have witnesses on my half to be present on a John Doe. 
Judge Murray: You can ask witnesses to come. You don't 
have a right to subpoena them.  
 . . . . 
Mr. Hipp: Who has subpoena power, Your Honor? 
Judge Murray: If anybody has subpoena power, it's me.  
¶17 Judge Murray then addressed the nature of the hearing. 
He stated that it was his job to determine whether there was 
probable cause. However, Reddin interjected that the proceedings 
No. 
2007AP0230-W   
 
8 
 
had not yet reached the point where witnesses could be 
subpoenaed. He acknowledged that he had explained to several 
witnesses that the subpoenas they had received from the clerk of 
the circuit court were without legal basis and did not require 
attending the hearing:  
I became aware . . . that a number of people . . . had 
been supposedly subpoenaed. I looked. I got copies of 
the subpoenas, and they clearly were without legal 
basis.  
 . . . . 
I 
explained 
to 
them, 
they 
were 
not 
legal 
subpoenas. . . . There is no subpoena power by anyone 
at this point, until the Court makes a finding that 
there is reason to believe a crime was committed, then 
you have subpoena power, not Mr. Hipp. 
¶18 Judge Murray then asked Hipp to call his witnesses. 
The witnesses who had appeared for the hearing testified 
regarding the substance of the case. Hipp also testified. Judge 
Murray denied the petition. At first he stated that Hipp had 
failed 
to 
show 
probable 
cause. 
However, 
Reddin 
again 
interjected, stating that the appropriate standard was whether 
there was reason to believe a crime had been committed. Judge 
Murray agreed and stated that standard had not been met: 
Judge Murray: You have not given me evidence. I'm 
denying your petition for probable cause. I don't find 
there is probable cause a crime is committed by Miss 
Coleman 
or 
anyone 
else 
as 
it 
relates 
to 
your 
property. . . .  
Reddin: I believe the finding that you need to make, 
there is not reason to believe a crime has been 
committed rather than probable cause.  
No. 
2007AP0230-W   
 
9 
 
Judge Murray: I'm sorry. There is reason to believe 
that a crime hasn't been committed and by whom. . . .3  
¶19 Hipp filed a petition for supervisory writ in the 
court of appeals. The court of appeals determined that the 
subpoenas issued by the clerk of court pursuant to § 885.01(1) 
were valid. It therefore granted the writ and remanded with 
instructions that Hipp have subpoenas issued for the persons he 
wants to testify in the proceeding. Hipp v. The Honorable 
Marshall B. Murray, 2007 WI App 242, ¶16, 305 Wis. 2d 148, 738 
N.W.2d 570. Judge Murray petitions for review.  
II 
¶20 This case presents the issue of whether a John Doe 
judge has exclusive authority to subpoena witnesses for a John 
Doe hearing.4 It does not present the issue of whether a John Doe 
                                                 
3 Although the transcript of the hearing reveals some 
uncertainty as to its nature, both Judge Murray and Hipp now are 
in accord that it was a probable cause hearing. A John Doe judge 
is required to conduct a hearing if the John Doe petition meets 
the threshold test of alleging objective, factual assertions 
sufficient to support a reasonable belief that a crime has been 
committed. State ex rel. Reimann v. Circuit Court for Dane 
County, 214 Wis. 2d 605, 623, 571 N.W.2d 385 (1997). As Judge 
Murray acknowledges in his brief, although he "never formally 
determined that Hipp's John Doe petition met the threshold test, 
he implicitly determined that it met the threshold test when he 
proceeded with a hearing on the John Doe petition." 
4 Judge Murray also raised and briefed a second issue of 
whether a John Doe judge is required to subpoena every witness 
that a John Doe petitioner requests and to examine every such 
witness at the John Doe proceeding. In his reply brief and at 
oral argument, however, Judge Murray conceded that the facts of 
this case do not present the issue of a John Doe judge's 
discretion in subpoenaing and examining witnesses because Judge 
Murray never refused to subpoena or examine any of Hipp's 
witnesses.  
No. 
2007AP0230-W   
 
10 
 
judge is required to subpoena every witness that a John Doe 
petitioner requests. We save that issue for another day. Our 
determination requires that we interpret and apply Wis. Stat. 
§§ 968.26 and 885.01. Statutory interpretation and application 
are questions of law that this court reviews independently of 
the determinations rendered by the circuit court and court of 
appeals. Haferman v. St. Clare Healthcare Found., Inc., 2005 WI 
171, ¶15, 286 Wis. 2d 621, 707 N.W.2d 853. 
III 
¶21 We begin our discussion by examining the language of 
Wisconsin's John Doe statute. Wisconsin Stat. § 968.26 provides 
in relevant part: 
If a person complains to a judge that he or she has 
reason to believe that a crime has been committed 
within his or her jurisdiction, the judge shall 
examine the complainant under oath and any witnesses 
produced by him or her and may, and at the request of 
the district attorney shall, subpoena and examine 
other witnesses to ascertain whether a crime has been 
committed and by whom committed. . . .  
¶22 The 
statute 
provides 
that 
the 
complainant, 
the 
district attorney, and the judge each has the ability to bring 
witnesses to the John Doe proceeding. It sets forth three 
distinct ways in which this may happen. Once the judge 
determines that there is reason to believe a crime has been 
committed, the judge (1) shall examine the complainant and 
witnesses "produced by" the complainant; (2) at the district 
attorney's request the judge shall subpoena and examine other 
witnesses; and (3) the judge may choose to subpoena and examine 
No. 
2007AP0230-W   
 
11 
 
"other witnesses," that is, witnesses neither produced by the 
complainant nor requested by the district attorney.  
¶23 The statute explicitly states that two of the groups 
of witnesses are examined upon a subpoena being issued, those 
requested by the district attorney and those the judge chooses 
to subpoena and examine. It does not expressly provide that 
witnesses "produced by" the complainant include those subpoenaed 
at the complainant's request. However, the parties here agree 
that witnesses produced by the complainant include those who 
show up to John Doe proceedings voluntarily as well as those who 
show up under subpoena.  
¶24 The parties' view on this point makes sense, and 
comports with the fundamentals of a fair hearing. A contrary 
view would preclude the very party with enough at stake to file 
a petition from having witnesses subpoenaed to a hearing which 
determines whether there is probable cause to believe that the 
crime alleged had been committed and by whom. 
¶25 The question here is who has authority to issue the 
subpoenas that cause witnesses to be examined in John Doe 
proceedings. The parties do not dispute that judges have the 
authority to subpoena witnesses. The statute is explicit that 
judges "may, and at the request of the district attorney, shall" 
subpoena witness.  In addition, the parties do not dispute that 
a judge has the authority to subpoena witnesses at the request 
of the John Doe complainant such that the witnesses are produced 
by the complainant within the meaning of § 968.26.  
No. 
2007AP0230-W   
 
12 
 
¶26 Hipp maintains that while the judge in a John Doe 
proceeding has the authority to issue subpoenas, the judge does 
not have exclusive authority to issue subpoenas. Rather, he 
argues that under § 968.26, a complainant may produce witnesses 
by requesting the clerk of court to issue subpoenas pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 885.01, which provides general authority to court 
clerks to issue subpoenas in "any action," including John Doe 
proceedings.5 The statute, however, is not explicit as to whether 
the judge's authority to subpoena witnesses is exclusive. In 
order to answer the question, we turn to the history of 
Wisconsin's John Doe statute and its application. 
¶27 There has been a provision for John Doe proceedings in 
Wisconsin since territorial times. State v. Unnamed Defendant, 
150 Wis. 2d 352, 363, 441 N.W.2d 696 (1989). Section 2, chapter 
369 of the Territorial Statutes of Wisconsin (1839) provided:  
Upon complaint made to any such magistrate that a 
criminal offense has been committed, he shall examine 
on oath the complainant and any witnesses produced by 
                                                 
5 Section 885.01 provides in relevant part: 
Subpoenas, who may issue. The subpoena need not be 
sealed, and may be signed and issued as follows: 
(1) By any judge or clerk of a court or court 
commissioner or municipal judge, within the territory 
in which the officer or the court of which he or she 
is the officer has jurisdiction, to require the 
attendance of witnesses and their production of lawful 
instruments of evidence in any action, matter or 
proceeding pending or to be examined into before any 
court, 
magistrate, 
officer, 
arbitrator, 
board, 
committee or other person authorized to take testimony 
in the state. 
No. 
2007AP0230-W   
 
13 
 
him, and shall reduce the complaint to writing, and 
shall 
cause 
the 
same 
to 
be 
subscribed 
by 
the 
complainant; and if it shall appear that any such 
offence has been committed, the court or justice shall 
issue 
a 
warrant 
reciting 
the 
substance 
of 
the 
accusation . . . . 
The provision was in force at statehood, and adopted into the 
state statutes by the first legislature. State v. Unnamed 
Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d at 363; see also Wis. Stat. ch. 145, § 2 
(1849). 
¶28 The John Doe statute has remained largely the same 
since 1839. State v. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d at 364; see 
also In Matter of John Doe Proceeding, 2003 WI 30, ¶21, 260 
Wis. 2d 653, 660 N.W.2d 260. The provision that a John Doe judge 
"may, and at the request of the district attorney shall, 
subpoena and examine other witnesses" was added to the statute 
in 1949. § 33, ch. 631, Laws of 1949.  
¶29 The first case to examine the means by which witnesses 
come to be examined in a John Doe proceeding is State ex rel. 
Long v. Keyes, 75 Wis. 288, 44 N.W. 13 (1889). The complainant 
alleged that a number of persons "wantonly and riotously, in a 
violent 
and 
tumultuous 
manner" 
assaulted, 
beat, 
bruised, 
wounded, and ill-treated a man in the city of Madison. Id. at 
289. The judge in the case examined several witnesses, and based 
upon the evidence presented, subpoenaed other witnesses for more 
information. One of the witnesses refused to testify, arguing 
that the judge had no power to compel the attendance of 
witnesses. Id. at 290.  
No. 
2007AP0230-W   
 
14 
 
¶30 This court determined that the words of the statute 
providing that the judge shall examine "the complainant and any 
witnesses produced by him" allowed that a judge could subpoena 
such witnesses. Id. at 293; Wis. Stat. ch. 195, § 4776 (1889). 
It stated that the judge could examine witnesses other than the 
complainant, and that producing witnesses included providing 
names to the judge, who could then subpoena the witnesses.  
Such witnesses must be produced by the complainant. He 
cannot produce them in any other way than to suggest 
their 
names 
to 
the 
magistrate. 
If 
they 
come 
voluntarily with the complainant, he cannot be said to 
produce them in any other way than to make them known 
to the justice as witnesses who know something about 
the 
case. . . . They may come voluntarily or on 
subpoena, and on attachment if necessary. . . . The 
complainant produces or suggests or names a great many 
witnesses at the time, or at another time, and at 
different 
times 
during 
the 
progress 
of 
the 
examination. They are witnesses, and therefore may be 
subpoenaed. . . .  
If, as in this case, the complainant does not assume 
to know the facts except on information, he produces 
or suggests the names of such witnesses as do know the 
facts, and the magistrate has them brought before him 
for examination. 
Keyes, 75 Wis. at 293-94. (Emphasis in original.) 
¶31 The Keyes court examined the general subpoena statute, 
Wis. Stat. ch. 176, § 4053 (1889), which provided that any 
justice of the peace, municipal judge, or police justice could 
issue subpoenas. Id. at 291. However, it did not determine that 
a John Doe complainant could produce a witness by having the 
witness subpoenaed by an entity other than the John Doe judge. 
No. 
2007AP0230-W   
 
15 
 
Rather, 
the 
court 
tied 
production 
of 
witnesses 
by 
the 
complainant to subpoenas issued by the magistrate.  
¶32 Thus, the formative Wisconsin case regarding the 
production of witnesses by a John Doe complainant ties the 
concept of production to subpoenas issued by the John Doe judge. 
This relationship has been consistent throughout the history of 
the application of Wisconsin's John Doe statutes. See, e.g., 
State v. Noble, 2002 WI 64, ¶5 n.1, 253 Wis. 2d 206, 646 
N.W.2d 38 (judge directing witness that by virtue of judge's 
subpoena issued pursuant to John Doe statute, she was compelled 
to testify); State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 813, 266 
N.W.2d 597 (1978) (judge issued subpoena); State ex rel. 
Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, 42 Wis. 2d 368, 378, 166 N.W.2d 255 
(1969) (noting limitations on witnesses to be subpoenaed and 
examined); Wisconsin Family Counseling Servs. v. State, 95 
Wis. 2d 670, 671, 291 N.W.2d 631 (Ct. App. 1980) (judge issued 
subpoena duces tecum). Hipp does not adduce any cases involving 
subpoenas in John Doe proceedings issued by entities other than 
the judge, and we have discovered none.  
¶33 Hipp's interpretation also runs contrary to the 
treatment of John Doe proceedings in more recent case law. In 
Washington, for example, this court examined the nature of John 
Doe proceedings and the role of judges in conducting them. 83 
Wis. 2d 808. We determined that § 968.26 does not run afoul of 
constitutional separation of powers requirements, despite the 
substantial powers and responsibilities the statute confers upon 
judges. Id. at 825. Such powers and responsibilities include 
No. 
2007AP0230-W   
 
16 
 
issuing subpoenas, presiding over the examination of witnesses, 
considering the testimony, and determining probable cause, all 
while acting as a neutral magistrate. 
It is the responsibility of the John Doe judge to 
utilize his or her training in constitutional and 
criminal law and in courtroom procedure in determining 
the need to subpoena witnesses requested by the 
district attorney, in presiding at the examination of 
witnesses, and in determining probable cause. It is 
the 
judge's 
responsibility 
to 
ensure 
procedural 
fairness. 
Id. at 823 (citing State v. O'Connor, 77 Wis. 2d 261, 284, 252 
N.W.2d 671 (1977)).  
¶34 In O'Connor, this court stated that the "final 
responsibility for the proper conduct of such proceedings rests 
with the presiding judge . . . ." 77 Wis. 2d at 284. More 
recently, we determined that the judge "has final responsibility 
for the proper conduct of John Doe proceedings." State ex rel. 
Unnamed Person No. 1 v. State, 2003 WI 30, ¶52, 260 Wis. 2d 653, 
660 N.W.2d 260. Echoing Washington, we stated that the "John Doe 
judge has authority to issue subpoenas, examine witnesses, 
adjourn the proceedings, take possession of subpoenaed records, 
adjudicate probable cause, and issue and seal warrants."  Id., 
¶54.   
¶35 The cases demonstrate that John Doe proceedings are 
conducted through the authority of the presiding judge. Allowing 
that subpoenas may be issued by the clerk of court would confer 
authority on someone other than the judge, who has historically 
No. 
2007AP0230-W   
 
17 
 
had the authority associated with such proceedings. It would in 
essence dilute the John Doe judge's power.   
¶36 This view also appears to comport with the practice in 
Wisconsin. A treatise on Wisconsin criminal practice and 
procedure notes that John Doe proceedings are advantageous to 
law enforcement officials insofar as they gain access to 
authority via the judge that is otherwise unavailable.  
Invoking a John Doe proceeding is usually advantageous 
to law enforcement officials because, through the 
presiding judge, they may avail themselves of powers 
not otherwise available to them. These include: "the 
power to subpoena witnesses, take testimony under oath 
and to compel the testimony of a reluctant witness." 
9 Christine M. Wiseman, Nicholas L. Chiarkas, & Daniel D. 
Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Criminal Practice and Procedure 
§ 9.11, at 219 (1996)(quoting Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 823 n.9) 
(emphasis added). In other words, the powers conferred in a John 
Doe proceeding——including the power to subpoena witnesses and 
compel testimony——derive from the judge, and are otherwise 
unavailable, including via the subpoena power conferred to 
clerks of court pursuant to § 885.01(1). See Wis. JI——Criminal, 
SM-12 ("Only a judge may conduct a John Doe Proceeding. The 
judge has the power to subpoena and examine witnesses and to 
determine the extent of the examination."); see also 1 Wisconsin 
Judicial Bench Book, CR 48 (2007). 
¶37 Thus, the history and current practice of John Doe 
proceedings 
support 
the 
view 
that 
judges 
have 
exclusive 
authority to issue subpoenas in John Doe proceedings. That 
No. 
2007AP0230-W   
 
18 
 
interpretation is further supported by principles of statutory 
construction.  
¶38 Section 968.26 provides John Doe judges shall examine 
witnesses produced by the complainant and "may, and at the 
request of the district attorney shall, subpoena and examine 
other witnesses." Section 885.01(1) provides judges and clerks 
of court with the authority to issue subpoenas, and § 885.01(2) 
provides district attorneys with subpoena power. However, if 
clerks of court and district attorneys have the power under 
§ 885.01 to subpoena witnesses in John Doe proceedings, then the 
language 
in 
§ 968.26 
regarding 
subpoenas 
is 
superfluous. 
Construction 
of 
statutes 
should 
avoid 
whenever 
possible 
interpretations that render language superfluous. Hutson v. 
State Pers. Comm'n, 2003 WI 97, ¶49, 263 Wis. 2d 612, 665 
N.W.2d 212.  
¶39 Hipp maintains, however, that the John Doe judge's 
power to issue subpoenas derives from § 885.01(1). He cites to 
Wisconsin Family Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, in which the 
court of appeals stated that a judge in a John Doe proceeding 
can exercise his or her authority to issue a subpoena pursuant 
to § 885.01. 95 Wis. 2d at 675. Thus, Hipp maintains that 
§ 885.01(1) subpoena power extends to John Doe proceedings, for 
clerks of court no less than for judges.  
¶40 However, Judge Murray's position is not that the John 
Doe judge's subpoena power derives from § 968.26. Rather, it is 
that § 968.26 provides a limit to the subpoena power conferred 
by § 885.01. Thus, although district attorneys, clerks of court, 
No. 
2007AP0230-W   
 
19 
 
and 
judges 
have 
subpoena 
power 
under 
§ 885.01, 
§ 968.26 
precludes district attorneys and clerks from issuing subpoenas 
in John Doe proceedings. Instead, the statute allows that only 
judges retain their subpoena power.  
¶41 Further, applying the § 885.01 subpoena provisions to 
the proceedings here would require applying a more general 
statute regarding subpoenas where there is a more specific 
statute controlling subpoenas within the context of John Doe 
proceedings. This would be contrary to the principle of 
statutory construction that where two statutes applying to the 
same subject conflict, the more specific statute is controlling. 
Lornson v. Siddiqui, 2007 WI 92, ¶65, 302 Wis. 2d 519, 735 
N.W.2d 55. 
¶42 Hipp also argues that giving judges exclusive subpoena 
power in John Doe proceedings runs contrary to the investigatory 
purpose of the statute. See Reimann v. Circuit Court for Dane 
County, 214 Wis. 2d 605, 621, 571 N.W.2d 385 (1997).6 John Doe 
proceedings provide for investigation of crimes at the behest of 
both district attorneys and private complainants. Hipp maintains 
that disallowing subpoenas to issue from the clerk of court may 
preclude many complainants from the opportunity for meaningful 
review, including those who file John Doe petitions pro se. As 
                                                 
6 The John Doe statute serves two primary purposes. First, 
it is an investigatory tool which allows the judge to determine 
whether a crime has been committed, and if so by whom. Reimann 
v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 214 Wis. 2d 605, 621, 571 
N.W.2d 385 (1997). Second, it protects innocent persons from 
frivolous and groundless prosecutions. Id. 
No. 
2007AP0230-W   
 
20 
 
the court of appeals stated recently, "[f]or some complainants, 
the John Doe procedures . . . provide their only entrance to the 
state courts. . . . [W]e do not here intend to close the doors 
of the courtroom to those persons who may have reason to believe 
a crime has been committed." State ex rel. Williams v. Fiedler, 
2005 WI App 91, ¶25, 282 Wis. 2d 486, 698 N.W.2d 294. 
¶43 While we agree with Hipp that it is important to 
preserve access to the courts for private complainants provided 
by John Doe proceedings, we are not persuaded that such access 
is impeded when the judge has exclusive subpoena power in such 
proceedings. This court has made clear that the John Doe judge's 
responsibility is to act as a neutral magistrate. In Washington, 
we stated that the "John Doe judge should act with a view toward 
issuing a complaint or determining that no crime has occurred. 
To the extent that the judge exceeds this limitation, there is 
an abuse of discretion." 83 Wis. 2d at 823-34. Further, we wrote 
that the judge's behavior "should be such as not to impair his 
or her ability to make an independent determination of probable 
cause. Id. at 824; see also O'Connor, 77 Wis. 2d at 275-76.  
¶44 In addition, while Hipp claims that a judge may simply 
refuse a complainant's request that it subpoena witnesses, that 
issue is not before the court. Both parties agree that there has 
been no such refusal here. Finally, the argument assumes that 
there is no remedy in cases where the John Doe judge fails to 
provide adequate opportunity for the examination of witnesses. 
In such cases complainants have recourse to supervisory writs 
No. 
2007AP0230-W   
 
21 
 
pursuant to § 809.51, as in the present case. See Reimann, 214 
Wis. 2d at 625-26. 
¶45 We agree with Hipp that this is a case in which a John 
Doe petition was not properly investigated. However, the problem 
in this case is not that John Doe judges have exclusive 
authority to issue subpoenas. Rather, the problem here was in 
the execution of the proceeding.  
¶46 Despite the fact that Judge Murray had exclusive 
authority to issue subpoenas in the case, he failed to inform 
Hipp that was the case and failed to apprise Hipp that he could 
request such subpoenas. At the November hearing, Judge Murray 
emphasized that it was Hipp's responsibility to get witnesses to 
the examination. When Hipp asked how he was to produce witnesses 
reluctant to attend, Judge Murray again replied that it was 
Hipp's responsibility. As he now concedes in his brief, Judge 
Murray should have responded that he alone had subpoena 
authority and that Hipp could identify which witnesses he wished 
to have subpoenaed.  
¶47 Judge Murray added to the confusion regarding subpoena 
power at the December hearing. He asked the attending witnesses 
whether they had been subpoenaed by Hipp and informed them that 
they "remain" under subpoena. Judge Murray correctly stated the 
law at the January hearing when he informed Hipp that "[i]f 
anybody has subpoena power, it's me." However, by that time the 
damage had been done. Hipp had sought to produce witnesses by 
requesting that the clerk of circuit court issue subpoenas 
pursuant to § 885.01. His response was appropriate given Judge 
No. 
2007AP0230-W   
 
22 
 
Murray's admonition that it was Hipp's responsibility to produce 
the witnesses and Judge Murray's failure to apprise Hipp of the 
possibility of requesting that he issue the subpoenas.  
¶48 In essence, Judge Murray was correct that he had 
exclusive authority to issue subpoenas in the proceeding. 
However, his actions prevented Hipp from being able to have 
subpoenas issued for the witnesses Hipp wanted.7 Based on this 
error, we agree with the court of appeals that the writ of 
mandamus should be granted. Further, we instruct that upon 
remand subpoenas should be issued. 
¶49 In his initial brief to this court Judge Murray argued 
that this case is moot on the ground that the statute of 
limitations for the alleged crime has expired. See Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.74(1). However, the parties agree that the record here is 
insufficient for a determination of the issue. We agree, and 
                                                 
7 We also note that Reddin's actions in preventing Hipp's 
witnesses from appearing are problematic. Before the January 
hearing, Reddin took it upon himself to advise the subpoenaed 
witnesses that they did not have to appear. Judge Murray 
concedes in his brief that Reddin's actions were inappropriate. 
He states that Reddin should have instead filed a motion 
requesting Judge Murray to quash the subpoenas. We agree. 
The court of appeals expressed concern regarding Reddin 
giving, and Judge Murray's willingness to receive, ex parte 
advice regarding Hipp's ability to have subpoenas issued. It 
reminded "the bench and the bar" of the obligations presented by 
SCR 60.04(1)(g) and SCR 20:3.5(b) and the requirement that the 
behavior of the John Doe judge "should be such as not to impair 
his or her ability to make an independent determination of 
probable cause." State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 824, 266 
N.W.2d 597 (1978). We join with the court of appeals in its 
expression of concern.  
No. 
2007AP0230-W   
 
23 
 
therefore decline to address the statute of limitations issue 
here. If the judge conducting this proceeding on remand 
determines that the crimes alleged in Hipp's John Doe petition 
are beyond the applicable statute of limitations, the judge may 
deny 
the 
petition 
without 
subpoenaing 
and 
examining 
the 
designated witnesses.8 
¶50 In addition to requesting a restoration of the John 
Doe hearing and ruling on the validity of the subpoenas issued, 
Hipp's writ petition contained requests for substitution of the 
John Doe judge and appointment of a new district attorney. We 
have addressed the restoration of the John Doe proceeding and 
the validity of the subpoenas issued by the clerk of circuit 
court.  The court of appeals declined to grant Hipp's requests 
for a new judge and different district attorney, and Hipp has 
not argued that the court of appeals erred in that respect.  305 
Wis. 2d 148, ¶16. We therefore do not address that part of the 
court of appeals decision. 
¶51 Thus, based upon the language of § 968.26, the history 
of the statute, and principles of statutory construction, we 
determine that a John Doe judge has exclusive authority to 
subpoena witnesses for a John Doe hearing. However, Judge 
                                                 
8 Hipp acknowledges that a threshold determination must be 
made regarding the statute of limitations. In determining 
whether the statute of limitations on the alleged crimes has 
expired, the judge on remand must consider the time since the 
alleged crime occurred as well as events, equities, Coleman's 
public residence in the state, and other factors that may have 
tolled the running of the statute of limitations. See Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.74(3).  
No. 
2007AP0230-W   
 
24 
 
Murray's errors prevented Hipp from having subpoenas issued to 
his witnesses. 
IV 
¶52 In sum, we determine that a John Doe judge has 
exclusive authority to subpoena witnesses in a John Doe 
proceeding based upon the language of the John Doe statute 
(§ 968.26), the history of its application, and principles of 
statutory construction. The case does not present the issue of 
whether a John Doe judge is required to subpoena every witness 
that a John Doe petitioner requests. We save that issue for 
another day.  
¶53 Ultimately, however, we agree with the court of 
appeals that a writ of mandamus should be granted and we 
instruct that upon remand the John Doe judge here should issue 
subpoenas. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals, albeit 
with a different rationale. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶54 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. did not participate. 
 
No.  2007AP230-W.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
¶55 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority that complainant Adrian T. Hipp's petition for writ 
of mandamus should be granted.  However, I write separately 
because I would uphold the writ on the same grounds reached by 
the court of appeals:  a judge in a John Doe proceeding does not 
have exclusive authority to issue subpoenas, and John Doe 
complainants are not statutorily precluded from the right to 
obtain subpoenas from a clerk of courts as accorded by Wis. 
Stat. § 885.01.   
¶56 The majority of this court generally concludes that a 
writ should be granted and the court of appeals' decision 
affirmed because Judge Murray failed in executing his "exclusive 
authority to issue subpoenas"1 by giving the complainant and 
witnesses 
inaccurate 
and 
confusing 
information 
about 
the 
subpoena procedure, and by engaging in ex parte communications 
with the assistant district attorney.  See majority op., ¶¶45-48 
& n. 7, ¶52.  Because of these errors, the majority instructs 
that Hipp's subpoena request should be granted.  I agree with 
this result.   
¶57 However, this result should be reached through the 
affirmance of the court of appeals' order pertaining to the 
first and fourth requests of the writ petition, and its 
validation of the clerk of courts' subpoenas as requested by the 
petition and the memorandum in support of the petition.  In 
contrast, while affirming the court of appeals' grant of Hipp's 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶46. 
No.  2007AP230-W.lbb 
 
2 
 
writ petition, the majority does not appear to recognize that 
the court of appeals' mandate it affirms includes a validation 
of the subpoenas already issued by the clerk of courts in direct 
response to the petition's fourth request.  While purporting to 
affirm the court of appeals' order granting the writ, it seems 
clear that the majority would not in fact grant the same writ 
agreed to by the court of appeals, but would require new 
subpoenas to be issued by the John Doe judge rather than by the 
clerk of courts.  It is therefore unclear to me the extent to 
which the majority is actually agreeing with the terms of Hipp's 
petition as granted by the court of appeals.  While I agree with 
the majority that Hipp's petition should be granted, I also 
conclude, unlike the majority, that affirming the court of 
appeals' order granting the petition includes validating the 
subpoenas issued by the clerk of courts prior to the John Doe 
hearing. 
¶58 I strongly disagree with the majority's analysis that 
the judge in a John Doe hearing has exclusive power to issue 
subpoenas.  The majority's ruling fails to take into account the 
plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 968.26, which together with Wis. 
Stat. § 885.01, allows the clerk of courts to issue subpoenas 
for John Doe hearings. 
¶59 This court has held that "the purpose of statutory 
interpretation is to determine what the statute means so that it 
may be given its full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  In order to uphold this 
No.  2007AP230-W.lbb 
 
3 
 
purpose, when interpreting a statute we start "with the language 
of the statute," and "[i]f the meaning of the statute is plain, 
we ordinarily stop the inquiry."  Id., ¶45 (citations omitted).  
"Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning," unless the word is technically or specifically 
defined.  Id.   
¶60 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.26, which sets forth the rules 
for a John Doe proceeding, states in relevant part:  
If a person complains to a judge that he or she has 
reason to believe that a crime has been committed 
within his or her jurisdiction, the judge shall 
examine the complainant under oath and any witnesses 
produced by him or her and may, and at the request of 
the district attorney shall, subpoena and examine 
other witnesses to ascertain whether a crime has been 
committed and by whom committed. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶61 The 
operative 
language 
of 
the 
statute 
is 
"any 
witnesses produced by [the complainant]."  The word "produce" 
has a specific legal meaning in the context of litigation, 
witnesses, and subpoenas, and we therefore examine its legal 
definition.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  
¶62 Black's Law Dictionary defines "produce" as:  "1. To 
bring into existence; to create.  2. To provide (a document, 
witness, etc.) in response to subpoena or discovery request.  3. 
To yield (as revenue).  4. To bring (oil, etc.) to the surface 
of 
the 
earth." 
 
Black's 
Law 
Dictionary 
1245 
(8th 
ed. 
2004)(emphasis added).  The second definition is directly on 
point in this case, illustrating that the term "produce" can 
mean providing a witness by a subpoena. 
No.  2007AP230-W.lbb 
 
4 
 
¶63 It is well established and recognized that witnesses 
are "produced" through subpoenas.  See State v. Schaefer, 2008 
WI 25, ¶44, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 746 N.W.2d 457 ("Considered 
broadly, courts and attorneys of record have the power to compel 
the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence by 
subpoena in any proceeding."). 
 
¶64 The 
ability 
to 
"produce" 
a 
witness 
necessarily 
includes the ability to compel the appearance of the witness 
through a subpoena.  Moreover, the words of the statute could 
not be more clear:  witnesses for the complainant are produced 
"by him or her."  Therefore, the express language in Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.26 recognizing a John Doe complainant's ability to 
"produce" witnesses necessarily entails recognition that the 
complainant has the right to subpoena those witnesses. 
 
¶65 Furthermore, I agree with Hipp's contention that his 
power to subpoena witnesses extends from Wis. Stat. § 885.01, 
which is the overarching statute dealing with subpoenas in all 
legal proceedings.  Subsection 885.01(1) states that a subpoena 
may be issued: 
By any judge or clerk of a court or court commissioner 
or municipal judge, within the territory in which the 
officer or the court of which he or she is the officer 
has 
jurisdiction, 
to 
require 
the 
attendance 
of 
witnesses and their production of lawful instruments 
of evidence in any action, matter or proceeding 
pending or to be examined into before any court, 
magistrate, officer, arbitrator, board, committee or 
other person authorized to take testimony in the 
state. 
(Emphasis added.)   
No.  2007AP230-W.lbb 
 
5 
 
¶66 There is nothing in either Wis. Stat. § 968.26 or Wis. 
Stat. § 885.01 to indicate that John Doe proceedings are exempt 
from the universal application and reach of § 885.01(1).  Not 
only does the plain text of these statutes fail to exclude John 
Doe complainants from basic subpoena rights, but the statutes do 
not conflict with each other.  As such, the majority's 
observation of the general rule that if two statutes conflict 
the court should apply the more specific one has little 
relevance to the issues the case presents.  See majority op., 
¶41.   
¶67 Even if there were some statutory language conflict, 
this court has held that "[i]f the potential for conflict 
between the statutes is present, we will read the statutes to 
avoid such a conflict if a reasonable construction exists."  
Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2007 WI 98, ¶28, 303 
Wis. 2d 258, 735 N.W.2d 93; see also Gerczak v. Estate of 
Gerczak, 2005 WI App 168, ¶10, 285 Wis. 2d 397, 702 N.W.2d 72 
("Conflicts between statutes are disfavored and will be held not 
to exist if the statutes may be otherwise construed.").  Not 
only must we attempt to harmonize statutes if they are seemingly 
in conflict, we must do so "if it is possible, in a way which 
will give each full force and effect."  City of Milwaukee v. 
Kilgore, 193 Wis. 2d 168, 184, 532 N.W.2d 690 (1995).   
¶68 Such harmonization is not difficult in this case.  
While Wis. Stat. § 885.01 grants broad subpoena power, Wis. 
Stat. § 968.26 merely directs the judge as to how to deal with 
subpoenas in John Doe proceedings.  The proper reading of the 
No.  2007AP230-W.lbb 
 
6 
 
term "produced," as discussed above, allows both statutes to 
coexist.  Thus, we should choose this construction, which avoids 
statutory conflict and gives both statutes full force and 
effect. 
¶69 In order to read Wis. Stat. § 968.26 as barring John 
Doe complainants from exercising basic subpoena rights under 
Wis. Stat. § 885.01, the majority essentially reads language 
into the statute that gives the John Doe judge exclusive 
subpoena power.  Yet the majority itself acknowledges that 
§ 968.26 "is not explicit as to whether the [John Doe] judge's 
authority to subpoena witnesses is exclusive."  Majority op., 
¶26. 
¶70 As this court has previously held, we "can only 
construe.  [We] cannot legislate.  Words should not be read into 
or read out of a plain statute.  To adopt the construction asked 
would be to make a new statute.  This we cannot do."  Rogers-
Ruger Co. v. Murray, 115 Wis. 267, 271, 91 N.W. 657 (1902); see 
also Mellen Lumber Co. v. Indus. Comm'n of Wisconsin, 154 Wis. 
114, 120, 142 N.W. 187 (1913) ("Where the language used in a 
statute is plain, the court cannot read words into it that are 
not found therein either expressly or by fair implication, even 
to save its constitutionality, because this would be legislation 
and not construction."). 
¶71 State ex rel. Long v. Keyes, 75 Wis. 288, 44 N.W. 13 
(1889), establishes the applicability of Wis. Stat. § 885.01 to 
John Doe proceedings.  The Keyes opinion, which addresses the 
No.  2007AP230-W.lbb 
 
7 
 
predecessor statutes to both Wis. Stat. §§ 968.26 and 885.01,2 
provides: 
Such witnesses must be produced by the complainant.  
He cannot 'produce' them in any other way than to 
suggest their names to the magistrate.  If they come 
voluntarily with the complainant, he cannot be said to 
produce them in any other way than to make them known 
to the justice as witnesses who know something about 
the case.  They are produced as parties produce their 
witnesses in court.  [Emphasis added.]  They may come 
voluntarily or on subpoena [emphasis added], and on 
attachment 
if 
necessary. . . .  
The 
complainant 
produces or suggests or names a great many witnesses 
at the time, or at another time, and at different 
                                                 
2  For example, State ex rel. Long v. Keyes, 75 Wis. 288, 
290-91, 44 N.W. 13 (1889), cites Wis. Stat. § 4776 (1878) and 
Wis. Stat. § 4053 (1889).  Section 4776 provides: 
Upon complaint made to any such magistrate, that a 
criminal offense has been committed, he shall examine, 
on oath, the complainant, and any witnesses produced 
by him, and shall reduce the complaint to writing, and 
shall 
cause 
the 
same 
to 
be 
subscribed 
by 
the 
complainant; and if it shall appear that any such 
offense has been committed, the magistrate shall issue 
a warrant, reciting the substance of the accusation, 
and requiring the officer to whom it shall be directed 
forthwith to take the person accused, and bring him 
before the said magistrate, or before some other 
magistrate of the county, to be dealt with according 
to law. . . . 
Section 4053 provides that subpoenas may be issued  
[b]y any judge or clerk of a court of record or court 
commissioner, or justice of the peace, municipal judge 
or police justice within the territory in which such 
officer, or the court of which he is such officer, has 
jurisdiction, to require the attendance of witnesses 
and their production of lawful instruments of evidence 
in any action, matter or proceeding pending or to be 
examined into before any court, magistrate, officer, 
arbitrator, 
board, 
committee 
or 
other 
person 
authorized to examine witnesses or hear testimony, in 
the state. 
No.  2007AP230-W.lbb 
 
8 
 
times during the progress of the examination.  They 
are witnesses, and therefore may be subpoenaed.  
Id. at 293. 
¶72 The majority concludes that the court in Keyes "did 
not determine that a John Doe complainant could produce a 
witness by having the witness subpoenaed by an entity other than 
the John Doe judge."  Majority op., ¶31.  However, in order to 
reach this conclusion, the majority omits the most critical 
sentences from the Keyes passage it cites.  Id., ¶30 (citing 
Keyes, 75 Wis. at 293). 
¶73 Specifically, the majority omits the sentence that 
directs that "[t]hey [witnesses] are produced as parties produce 
their witnesses in court," preceding the sentence, "[t]hey may 
come 
voluntarily 
or 
on 
subpoena, 
and 
on 
attachment 
if 
necessary."  Keyes, 75 Wis. at 293 (emphasis added).  The 
omitted sentence from Keyes directly supports Hipp's proposition 
that Wis. Stat. § 885.01 authorizes him to subpoena witnesses 
via the clerk of courts.  A proper reading of Keyes recognizes 
that John Doe complainants may produce witnesses just "as 
parties produce their witnesses in court," which under § 885.01 
includes subpoenas issued by the clerk of courts.  
¶74 Furthermore, the court in Keyes, id. at 296, quoted 
with approval People v. Hicks, 15 Barb. 153 (N.Y. Sup. 1853).  
Hicks, in turn, explained:  
When the statute says that the magistrate shall 
examine any witnesses who may be produced by the 
complainant, it means any witnesses who may be 
produced either voluntarily or by means of such 
process as the law allows to compel the attendance of 
witnesses.  Every party to a suit produces the 
witnesses on his behalf at the trial.  But in doing so 
No.  2007AP230-W.lbb 
 
9 
 
he is not confined to such witnesses as voluntarily 
appear.  If necessary, he resorts to compulsion. 
Hicks, 15 Barb. at 160.  
¶75 The majority goes to great lengths to describe the 
far-reaching power of John Doe judges in order to counter the 
fact that there is nothing explicit or implicit in Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.26 to give the judge exclusive subpoena power, and that 
the court in Keyes indicates that the complainant retains 
statutory subpoena rights.  However, it does not logically 
follow that just because the judge in a John Doe proceeding must 
subpoena and examine witnesses at a district attorney's request 
and 
may 
examine 
other 
witnesses 
produced 
by 
John 
Doe 
complainants, 
the 
judge 
has 
additional 
power(s) 
not 
so 
enumerated, including exclusive subpoena power that preempts a 
John Doe complainant's full Wis. Stat. § 885.01 rights. 
¶76 The majority claims that allowing the clerk of courts 
to issue subpoenas would dilute the power of judges in John Doe 
proceedings.  Majority op., ¶35.  However, the majority neglects 
to point out that the subpoena power John Doe judges possess is 
already not absolute, with the statute imposing a mandate on 
John Doe judges, who "shall" subpoena any witness requested by 
the 
prosecutor. 
 
Furthermore, 
this 
court 
has 
previously 
explained that a John Doe judge has broad, but not unlimited 
powers.  Custodian of Records for the Legislative Tech. Servs. 
Bureau v. State, 2004 WI 65, ¶10, 272 Wis. 2d 208, 680 N.W.2d 
792.  A John Doe judge cannot exceed the powers granted to him 
or her without engaging in an erroneous exercise of discretion.  
Id.; see also State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 824, 266 
No.  2007AP230-W.lbb 
 
10 
 
N.W.2d 597 (1978) ("If the facts show that the judge has 
extended the proceeding in duration or scope beyond the 
reasonable intendment of the statute or has otherwise improperly 
conducted the proceeding and intends to persist, he or she can 
be restrained by writ of prohibition for abuse of discretion.").  
¶77 The power of a John Doe judge is significant only for 
fulfilling the purpose of the proceeding.  See State ex rel. 
Reimann v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 214 Wis. 2d 605, 621, 
571 N.W.2d 385 (1997)(The purpose of John Doe proceedings is 
two-fold:  first, it "is intended as an investigatory tool used 
to ascertain whether a crime has been committed and if so, by 
whom"; and second, it "is designed to protect innocent citizens 
from frivolous and groundless prosecutions."). 
¶78 These ends are not met by taking away a John Doe 
complainant's basic subpoena rights.  As this court noted in 
Reimann: 
For 
some 
complainants, 
the 
John 
Doe 
procedures 
available under Wis. Stat. § 968.26 provide their only 
entrance to the state courts.  Although we believe 
that circuit court judges must perform some gate-
keeping functions under Wis. Stat. § 968.26, we do not 
here intend to close the doors of the courtroom to 
those persons who may have reason to believe a crime 
has been committed.  
Id. at 625.  The majority's interpretation would grant new 
powers to a John Doe judge beyond those the legislature vests in 
judges through § 968.26, while reciprocally denying John Doe 
complainants their legislatively authorized subpoena rights.  
The denial of subpoena rights and judicial creation of exclusive 
subpoena powers in a John Doe judge do not serve § 968.26's 
No.  2007AP230-W.lbb 
 
11 
 
primary purposes of facilitating criminal investigations and 
warding against frivolous prosecutions. 
¶79 For all of the above reasons, I agree with the 
majority's holding that the petition for writ of mandamus be 
granted, but I cannot share in their limitation of complainants' 
rights in John Doe hearings in derogation of the plain language 
and 
meaning 
of 
the 
controlling 
statutes. 
 
I 
therefore 
respectfully concur.  
 
 
No.  2007AP230-W.lbb 
 
 
 
1