Case Title: Christopher Mount v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement System

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-83-16

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2018-06-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Christopher Mount v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement System  SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) Christopher Mount v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System (A-9-16) (078021) Gerardo Martinez v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System (A-83-16) (078823)Argued November 28, 2017 -- Decided June 5, 2018PATTERSON, J., writing for the Court. In these appeals, the Court reviews two determinations of the Police and Firemen’s Retirement System (PFRS) Board of Trustees (Board), each involving a police officer’s claim that he was “mentally . . . incapacitated” by a traumatic event within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1). Mount v. Board of Trustees, PFRS: Officer Christopher Mount served as a Freehold Township police officer from 1996 until his retirement on May 1, 2010. On January 10, 2007, Mount responded to a serious motor vehicle accident. A group of bystanders were screaming at him, “[d]o something—do something.” A vehicle “exploded into flames right in front of [him].” Mount lacked any firefighting equipment and called for the fire department. When “the smoke and the dust settled,” Mount was able to see that the three teenage victims’ “skin was melted, the clothing was melted on to the skin.” In 2010, Mount was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Following that diagnosis, he left his employment as a police officer and applied for accidental disability benefits. The Board denied that application. The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s decision, finding that the “concededly horrific event” was within Mount’s job description and contemplated by his training. The Court granted certification. 228 N.J. 56 (2016). Martinez v. Board of Trustees, PFRS: Detective Gerardo (“Gerry”) Martinez joined the Hammonton Police Department in 1990. In 2001, Martinez underwent forty hours of training on hostage negotiation. He was designated as a hostage negotiator for the Hammonton Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team and took additional training courses on hostage negotiation at least twice a year. Negotiators are trained to understand that the tactical component of a SWAT team may elect to enter a building without warning to confront a hostage-taker, and that such a confrontation may end with the use of force. On April 25, 2010, a suspect in an armed robbery, Donald Hoffman, fled to his mother’s home and took his mother, his sister, and his mother’s tenant hostage. Initially, Hoffman insisted that he and his hostages were “all going to die.” After spending an hour speaking by cellphone with Martinez, Hoffman released the three hostages. For the next ten hours, Hoffman remained in his mother’s home, refusing to surrender. Without alerting Martinez in advance, the tactical team entered the home. Through the cellphone connection, Martinez heard Hoffman yell “Gerry, Gerry . . . . Help me. Help me, Gerry. They’re going to kill me,” followed by “two pops” and then silence. Martinez saw officers remove Hoffman’s body and place it on the lawn. Martinez returned to work but was diagnosed with PTSD and major depressive disorder. The Board found Martinez ineligible for accidental disability benefits. An Appellate Division panel reversed. The Court granted certification. 230 N.J. 496 (2017).HELD: Mount has proven, under requirements established in case law construing N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1), that he experienced a terrifying or horror-inducing event and that the event was undesigned and unexpected. The Court remands to the Appellate Division panel to decide Mount’s claim that his mental disability was a direct result of that incident. Martinez has not demonstrated that the incident that caused his disability was undesigned and unexpected and therefore is not entitled to accidental disability benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7.1. To be eligible for benefits under the accidental disability provision, a PFRS member must satisfy N.J.S.A. 43:16A- 7(1)’s requirement that “the medical board, after a medical examination of such member, shall certify that the member is permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of the performance of his regular or assigned duties and that such disability was not the result of the member’s willful negligence and that such member is mentally or physically incapacitated for the performance of his usual duty and of any other available duty in the department which his employer is willing to assign to him.” In Richardson v. Board of 1 Trustees, PFRS, 192 N.J. 189, 212-13 (2007), the Court prescribed a five-pronged standard mandating that a PFRS member seeking such benefits prove “(1) that he is permanently and totally disabled; (2) as a direct result of a traumatic event that is (a) identifiable as to time and place, (b) undesigned and unexpected, and (c) caused by a circumstance external to the member . . . ; (3) that the traumatic event occurred during and as a result of the member’s regular or assigned duties; (4) that the disability was not the result of the member’s willful negligence; and (5) that the member is mentally or physically incapacitated from performing his usual or any other duty.” (pp. 21-27)2. In Patterson v. Board of Trustees, SPRS, the Court addressed what standard should govern when a member premises his or her claim for accidental disability benefits on “a permanent mental disability as a result of a mental stressor, without any physical impact.” 194 N.J. 29, 33 (2008). The Court required that a member, seeking to predicate an award of accidental disability benefits on a mental disability due entirely to mental stressors, prove that the disability resulted from a “direct personal experience of a terrifying or horror-inducing event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a similarly serious threat to the physical integrity of the member or another person.” Id. at 34. The Court applied that standard in Russo v. Board of Trustees, PFRS, which arose from the mental disability claim of a police officer—neither trained nor equipped to confront a major fire—who was ordered into a burning house to rescue the residents. 206 N.J. 14, 19 (2011). The officer heard cries but was prevented by the intense flame and heat from reaching a victim. Ibid. The officer’s distress over that victim’s death was compounded by the statements of family members at the scene, who blamed him for failing to rescue the victim. Id. at 20. The officer was diagnosed with PTSD, and was found by the expert for the Board to be permanently and totally disabled as a result of the fire. Id. at 20-21. The Court concluded that the officer met the benchmark of Patterson. Id. at 33-34. (pp. 27-31)3. In sum, jurisprudence construing N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1)’s “traumatic event” language mandates a two-step analysis in cases in which a member claims permanent mental incapacity as a result of an exclusively psychological trauma. The court first determines whether the member directly experienced a “terrifying or horror-inducing event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a similarly serious threat to the physical integrity of the member or another person.” Patterson, 194 N.J. at 50. That event must be “of consequence and objectively capable of causing a reasonable person to suffer a disabling mental injury.” Russo, 206 N.J. at 31. If the event meets the Patterson test, the court then applies the Richardson factors to the member’s application. Id. at 32-33. (pp. 31-32)4. In Mount, the Board determined that the explosion and fire witnessed by Mount was a “terrifying or horror-inducing event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury,” so the Court does not consider the Patterson standard. The Court stresses that to properly apply the Richardson standard, the Board and a reviewing court must carefully consider not only the member’s job responsibilities and training, but all aspects of the event itself. No single factor governs the analysis. In this case, by virtue of extraordinary circumstances, Mount confronted an incident that was undesigned and unexpected, and therefore satisfied that component of the Richardson test. 192 N.J. at 212-13. However, the issue of causation is unresolved, so the Court remands the matter to the Appellate Division panel for its consideration of whether Mount’s disability directly resulted from the January 10, 2007 incident. (pp. 32-35)5. In Martinez, the Appellate Division panel reversed the Board’s determination that Martinez failed to satisfy the Patterson standard. The panel concluded that Martinez had proven that he directly and personally experienced a terrifying or horror-inducing event; the Court concurs. The Court disagrees with the panel, however, with respect to the application of the Richardson factors, finding ample support in the record for the Board’s determination that Hoffman’s shooting was not undesigned and unexpected. Accordingly, the Court reverses the Appellate Division’s determination and reinstates the Board’s finding that Martinez is not entitled to accidental disability benefits. (pp. 35-39)6. As Richardson reflects, the Court views the Legislature’s mandate that a member prove that his or her disability was the direct result of a “traumatic event” to impose a significant limitation on the recovery of enhanced benefits. 192 N.J. at 210. Appeals that involve mental disabilities arising exclusively from mental stressors pose particular challenges in that regard. Additional guidance from the Legislature would assist retirement system members, boards, and counsel as they consider applications for benefits, and our courts as they review these important determinations. (pp. 39-40) In Mount, the judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter REMANDED. In Martinez, the Appellate Division’s determination is REVERSED and the Board’s determination is REINSTATED. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 9 September Term 2016 A- 83 September Term 2016 078021 and 078823CHRISTOPHER MOUNT, Appellant, v.BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN’S RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Respondent.GERARDO MARTINEZ, Respondent, v.BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN’S RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Appellant. Argued November 28, 2017 – Decided June 5, 2018 Christopher Mount v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System (A-9-16): On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Gerardo Martinez v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System (A-83-16): On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. M. Scott Tashjy argued the cause for appellant in Christopher Mount v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System (A-9-16) (The Tashjy Law Firm, attorneys; M. Scott Tashjy, on the briefs). Amy Chung, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent in Christopher Mount v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System (A-9-16) (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Daniel F. Thornton, Deputy Attorney General, on the letter brief). Amy Chung, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant in Gerardo Martinez v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System (A-83-16) (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, and Daniel F. Thornton, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Louis M. Barbone argued the cause for respondent in Gerardo Martinez v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System (A-83-16) (Jacobs & Barbone, attorneys; Louis M. Barbone, on the brief). JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court. A member of the Police and Firemen’s Retirement System(PFRS) who is found to be “mentally or physically incapacitated”from performing his or her usual duty or other available dutymay retire with accidental disability benefits, provided that heor she meets the requirements prescribed by N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1). The statute mandates a medical board certification “thatthe [PFRS] member is permanently and totally disabled as adirect result of a traumatic event occurring during and as aresult of the performance of his regular or assigned duties.” 2 Ibid. When it enacted N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1), the Legislaturedeclined to define a “traumatic event” that warrants an award ofaccidental disability benefits. Ibid. It left thatdetermination to the courts. In Richardson v. Board of Trustees, PFRS, 192 N.J. 189,212-13 (2007), we established a governing standard forretirement system members’ accidental disability benefitapplications under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7. Under the Richardsontest, the member must prove, among other requirements, that thetraumatic event that he or she experienced was “undesigned andunexpected.” Ibid. For cases in which the member claims that he or she suffersfrom a permanent mental incapacity as a result of an exclusivelypsychological trauma, we amended our analysis. Under thestandard established in Patterson v. Board of Trustees, SPRS,194 N.J. 29, 34 (2008), the member must demonstrate that his orher disability results “from direct personal experience of aterrifying or horror-inducing event that involves actual orthreatened death or serious injury, or a similarly seriousthreat to the physical integrity of the member or anotherperson,” and that the event is “not inconsequential but isobjectively capable of causing a reasonable person in similarcircumstances to suffer a disabling mental injury.” If themember meets Patterson’s threshold requirement, the court then 3 applies the Richardson test; if he or she fails to do so, thecourt denies accidental disability benefits without applying theRichardson test. Ibid.; see also Russo v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS,206 N.J. 14, 32 (2011) (explaining that once Patterson’s horror-inducing event standard is satisfied, “Richardson comes intoplay”). In these appeals, the Court reviews two determinations ofthe PFRS Board of Trustees (Board), each involving a policeofficer’s claim that he was “mentally . . . incapacitated” by atraumatic event within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1). InMount v. Board of Trustees, PFRS, the Board and the AppellateDivision panel rejected Officer Christopher Mount’s claim thathe was permanently disabled because he witnessed at close rangethe incineration of three young victims in an explosion after ahigh-speed motor vehicle collision. We hold that Mount hasproven that he experienced a terrifying or horror-inducing eventthat meets the standard of Patterson, and that the event wasundesigned and unexpected within the meaning of Richardson. Wetherefore reverse the Appellate Division panel’s judgment andremand to the panel to decide Mount’s claim that his mentaldisability was a direct result of that incident. In Martinez v. Board of Trustees, PFRS, we review theAppellate Division’s decision reversing the Board’s denial ofaccidental disability benefits to Detective Gerardo Martinez, a 4 municipal police department’s hostage negotiator. Martinezclaimed that his permanent disability resulted frompsychological injuries sustained when a lengthy hostagenegotiation ended with the shooting death of the hostage-taker,as he and Martinez spoke by cellphone. We hold that Martinezhas not demonstrated that the incident that caused hisdisability was undesigned and unexpected under the Richardsontest, and therefore conclude that he is not entitled toaccidental disability benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7. I. A. 1. Mount served as a Freehold Township police officer from1996 until his retirement on May 1, 2010.1 Prior to joining theFreehold Township Police Department, Mount was trained at theMonmouth County Police Academy and served for three years as aMonmouth County Sheriff’s Officer, working in courthousesecurity and serving warrants. Although the New Jersey Civil Service Commission’s jobspecifications for “police officer” state that an officer“[r]emoves (or assists in removing) dead or injured from wrecked1 We summarize the facts based on the record presented to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in each matter. 5 and/or overturned vehicles by manually lifting them,” Mountdenied that he was trained to extract accident victims fromvehicles. According to Mount, he was instructed to respond to amotor vehicle accident by directing traffic, conducting crowdcontrol, and preparing accident reports. He stated that priorto the incident that gave rise to this appeal, he responded toone fatal motor vehicle accident, to other accidents resultingin serious injuries, and to emergency calls involving enginefires. At approximately 2:00 p.m. on January 10, 2007, as Mountdrove his patrol vehicle on his regular shift, he received acall from dispatch about a serious motor vehicle accident.Mount immediately responded to the location of the accident.Following police department protocol, he blocked traffic withhis patrol vehicle and ran to a sport utility vehicle that hadcrossed the median and was facing north in a southbound lane.It was later determined that three teenagers were in thatvehicle. Mount recalled that the vehicle was extensively damaged,with black smoke emerging from the windows, and what “appearedto be the arm of a human being” hanging from the driver’s sidewindow. He heard no sound from the vehicle’s interior. Herecalled that a group of bystanders were screaming at him, “[d]o 6 something -- do something,” and that it was “getting prettychaotic” at the scene. Mount stated that when he was between a foot and a foot anda half from the vehicle, it “immediately engulfed, exploded intoflames right in front of [him], right inside,” and that flameswere “billowing out of the windows of the car.” He testifiedthat although the explosion did not knock him to the ground, itpushed him backward. Mount said that the heat from theexplosion was so intense that he “felt like [his] eyelashes weregoing to burn off.” On cross-examination, Mount conceded thatthe explosion burned only his “[n]ose hairs, that’s about it,”and that he sustained no physical injuries which would haverequired medical treatment. Mount testified that he lacked any firefighting equipmentto combat the explosion and fire. He stated that he had only acrowbar, a small fire extinguisher intended to be used to putout “paper fires,” and a basic medical kit, and that hispolyester uniform would “melt” in extreme heat. Mount called for more police patrols, emergency medicaltechnicians, and the municipal fire department, which hadalready been contacted. When the fire department arrived, Mountsat in his patrol car as firefighters extinguished the fire. When “the smoke and the dust settled,” Mount returned tothe vehicle, and was able to view its interior. From a distance 7 of four to five feet, Mount saw “three human bodies that wereinvolved in that fire.” Characterizing the scene as “the worstI saw,” Mount recalled that the victims’ “skin was melted, theclothing was melted on to the skin.” He stated that“[e]verything was just like a wax,” and that the victims “weremolded into their car, into the vehicle. That’s how theymelted.” Mount testified that “the smell of . . . burnt fleshgot into [his] nose, it got into [his] throat . . . . Everyswallow that [he] took had that smell and that taste from theburning flesh.” Mount did not touch the victims’ remains. He did notrecall whether he witnessed the removal of the victims from thevehicle. He later learned that in addition to the three teenagevictims whom he had observed, the driver of the other car wasalso killed in the accident, and a child in that car wasseriously injured. Mount contends that he began to experience psychologicalproblems after the January 10, 2007 accident. According toMount, “something hit him,” but he “didn’t know what it was.”Nonetheless, he continued to work as a Freehold Township policeofficer for more than two years after the accident, and was nottreated for any psychiatric condition until 2009, when hesuccessfully underwent rehabilitation for alcohol abuse. Mounttestified that he returned to work following rehabilitation, and 8 that he was “working fine” but “[s]till was having problems”which he could not identify. In 2010, Mount was diagnosed with post-traumatic stressdisorder (PTSD). See American Psychiatric Association,Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 271 (5thed. 2013) (identifying diagnostic criteria for PTSD). As Mountexplained the timing of his diagnosis, “[t]he PTSD wasn’tobserved or didn’t come out until 2010.” Following thatdiagnosis, he left his employment as a police officer. 2. On August 31, 2010, Mount applied for accidental disabilitybenefits. He identified the January 10, 2007 incident as thedisabling event, and stated that he was mentally incapacitatedto serve as a police officer due to PTSD and anxiety. The Board determined that Mount was eligible for ordinarydisability benefits, but denied his application for accidentaldisability benefits. The Board agreed that Mount satisfiedseveral of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7’s requirements.2 It found, however,2 The Board found that Mount was permanently and totally disabled from the performance of his regular and assigned duties, and that he was physically or mentally incapacitated from the performance of his usual duties or other duties that his employer was willing to offer. It concluded that the January 10, 2007 incident was identifiable as to time and place, and that it occurred during and as a result of Mount’s regular and assigned duties. The Board deemed Mount’s disability to be caused by a circumstance external to Mount, and determined that 9 that the January 10, 2007 incident was not “objectively capableof causing a reasonable person in similar circumstances tosuffer a disabling mental injury” under Patterson, 194 N.J. at 51, and that the incident was not “undesigned and unexpected” asRichardson requires, 192 N.J. at 212. Although the Boardreconsidered its decision at Mount’s request, it reaffirmed itsdenial of accidental disability benefits. Mount appealed, and the matter was submitted as a contestedcase to an ALJ, who conducted a hearing. As the hearing began,the ALJ noted that based on the agreement of counsel he wouldaddress only two issues: whether the January 10, 2007 accidentwas undesigned and unexpected under Richardson, and whether thataccident was terrifying or horror-inducing in accordance withPatterson. He acknowledged the parties’ agreement that nomedical testimony would be presented. Mount was the solewitness at the hearing. In his decision, the ALJ rejected the Board’s determinationthat Mount had failed to prove that he experienced a “terrifyingor horror-inducing event” under the Patterson test. He notedthat Mount’s “experience involved witnessing a scene in whichthree teenagers burned to death, smelling burning flesh, hearingit was not the result of a preexisting disease, or the result of his willful negligence. 10 concerned bystanders screaming for him to 'do something,’ andhaving inadequate equipment to assist the victims.” The ALJ, however, ruled that Mount had failed to prove thathis disability was “solely and directly related to hisexperience with the incident in question,” in light of hiscontinued work as a police officer immediately following theincident and for two years thereafter. He also found that themotor vehicle accident was not undesigned and unexpected forpurposes of Richardson. The ALJ therefore concluded that Mountwas ineligible for accidental disability benefits under N.J.S.A.43:16A-7. In his exceptions to the ALJ’s decision, Mount contendedthat before the case was presented to the ALJ, the Board hadconceded that Mount’s disability was a direct result of theJanuary 10, 2007 accident, and that the ALJ had improperly ruledagainst him on the causation issue. Counsel for the Boardacknowledged that there was a procedural issue, and stated that“[s]hould the Board find that the issue of direct result wasproperly before the ALJ, it should provide Mount with anadditional opportunity to present medical evidence to supporthis claim.” The Board, however, adopted the ALJ’s findings of fact andconclusions of law as a final agency decision, and did notspecifically comment on the question of whether Mount had been 11 afforded an opportunity to present evidence on the issue ofcausation. Mount appealed the final agency decision to the AppellateDivision. The Appellate Division panel did not address theALJ’s finding, adopted by the Board, that Mount’s disability wasnot a direct result of the “terrifying or horror-inducingevent,” as Patterson requires. It concurred with the ALJ andthe Board that because the “concededly horrific event” waswithin Mount’s job description and contemplated by his training,the event was neither undesigned nor unexpected underRichardson. It affirmed the Board’s decision. We granted certification. 228 N.J. 56 (2016). B. 1. Martinez joined the Hammonton Police Department in 1990.In his fourth year of service, he was promoted to the rank ofdetective. In 2001, Martinez underwent forty hours of trainingon hostage negotiation conducted by the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI). He was designated as a hostage negotiatorfor the Hammonton Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team, andwas eventually appointed to serve as a negotiator for theAtlantic County SWAT team. Following his FBI hostagenegotiation course, Martinez took additional training courses onhostage negotiation at least twice a year. 12 As both parties’ experts on hostage negotiation explainedto the ALJ, negotiators are trained to understand that thetactical component of a SWAT team may elect to enter a buildingwithout warning to confront a hostage-taker, and that such aconfrontation may end with the use of force. Martinez’s experttestified that a tactical team may conduct such an entry withoutnotifying the officer assigned to negotiate with a hostage-takerin order to avoid the risk that a negotiator might inadvertentlyalert the hostage-taker about an imminent tactical operation.In his testimony, Martinez conceded that in his FBI course andperiodic training, he confronted training scenarios in which ahostage standoff could not be peacefully resolved. Martinezknew, in short, that despite all best efforts, hostagenegotiations sometimes fail, and that an incident may end withthe use of lethal force. Although he was designated and trained as a hostagenegotiator for almost a decade, Martinez was never involved inan actual hostage situation prior to the incident that gave riseto this appeal. On April 25, 2010, Martinez was on his way to meet his sonfor batting practice when he noticed police activity in aresidential area in Hammonton. Although he was off-duty,Martinez stopped to offer assistance. Hammonton Police ChiefFrank Ingemi told Martinez that a tactical operation was 13 underway at a nearby home. He explained that a suspect in anarmed robbery committed in Deptford earlier that day -- lateridentified as Donald Hoffman -- had eluded police officers andfled to his mother’s home. Armed with a handgun, Hoffman hadtaken his mother, his sister, and his mother’s tenant hostage. When Martinez arrived, the Atlantic County SWAT team’ssupervisors were in charge of the scene, and snipers from thatteam surrounded the residence. Chief Ingemi had spoken toHoffman by cellphone from outside the home, but he had beenunable to persuade Hoffman to release the three hostages. Martinez was activated to duty and immediately assumed therole of hostage negotiator. He used Chief Ingemi’s cellphone tospeak with Hoffman from a communications van parked near thehome. Although he spoke several times with Chief Ingemi,Martinez was not in direct contact with the SWAT teamsupervisors in charge of the scene or members of the tacticalteam. Initially, Hoffman insisted to Martinez that he and hishostages were “all going to die.” He demanded to speak with thePresident and the Governor. As he was trained to do, Martinezspoke to Hoffman in a calm and reassuring manner. He addressedHoffman by his first name, and encouraged Hoffman to call him“Gerry.” In his conversations with Hoffman, Martinez broached a 14 range of topics, including sports, hobbies, religion, food, andchildren. After spending an hour speaking by cellphone with Martinez,Hoffman released the three hostages, and they escaped from theresidence. For the next ten hours, Hoffman remained in hismother’s home, refusing to surrender to police. First usingChief Ingemi’s cellphone and later his own, Martinez had severalprotracted conversations with Hoffman. In those conversations,Martinez sought to build Hoffman’s trust and to persuade him topeacefully resolve his standoff with the police. At one point, Hoffman stated that he wanted to eat andsleep. He terminated his conversation with Martinez, promisingto call Martinez back. Martinez attempted several times tocontact Hoffman by cellphone, but Hoffman did not respond to thecalls. As hours went by with no resolution, Chief Ingemi and otherofficers were increasingly concerned that the standoff wasongoing with only a few hours remaining until the time whenchildren in the neighborhood would be leaving for school. Theydecided to take affirmative steps to bring the situation to aclose. At approximately 3:00 a.m. on Monday, April 26, 2010, thetactical team began firing tear gas canisters into the home. 15 The team conducted that phase of the operation for about anhour. Martinez, still in the communications van, received a callfrom dispatch stating that Hoffman had called 9-1-1 demanding tospeak with him. When dispatch connected Hoffman to Martinez bycellphone, Hoffman exclaimed, “Gerry, Gerry, what’s going on?They’re going to kill me. You know, what are you doing?”Martinez responded, “No, Don. Come out . . . . We’re going tohelp you out.” At 4:17 a.m., without alerting Martinez in advance, thetactical team entered the home. Chief Ingemi testified that hechose not to inform Martinez of the tactical operation inadvance because he knew that Martinez would be upset about thatdevelopment and would try to persuade the supervising officersto keep the tactical team out of the home. Martinez, still speaking with Hoffman by cellphone, heard acommotion as officers moved through the house. One officerspotted Hoffman in a rear bathroom, holding his cellphone to hisear. Hoffman pointed a handgun at the officer and announcedthat he would shoot the officer. The officer heard Hoffman say“Gerry -- Gerry, like, why.” The officer heard a click asHoffman unsuccessfully attempted to fire his gun, which waslater determined to have malfunctioned. The officer fired twoshots at Hoffman, killing him. Through the cellphone 16 connection, Martinez heard Hoffman yell “Gerry, Gerry . . . .Help me. Help me, Gerry. They’re going to kill me,” followedby “two pops” and then silence. As Martinez left the communications van and walked to thestreet in an effort to compose himself, he saw officers removeHoffman’s body from the house and place it on the lawn. Helater saw Hoffman’s body at the same location, covered in awhite sheet. Following the incident, Martinez returned to work as aHammonton detective but “just couldn’t do the job.” He statedthat as a result of Hoffman’s death, he suffered fromflashbacks, erratic sleep patterns, irritability, irregulardiet, and a sense of isolation. Martinez was diagnosed with PTSD and major depressivedisorder. He was initially placed on administrative leave andcollected workers’ compensation benefits. Martinez brieflyreturned to work, then left the Hammonton Police Department; hislast day of work was July 14, 2011, fourteen months after theincident. He briefly held a management job in a business, butit “didn’t work out.” 2. On October 13, 2011, Martinez applied for accidentaldisability benefits, and requested a retirement date of March 1,2012. He stated that he was incapacitated for further service 17 as a police officer due to his PTSD and depression, and that hewas “re-experiencing” the incident that ended with Hoffman’sdeath. The Board found Martinez to be eligible for ordinarydisability benefits but ineligible for accidental disabilitybenefits. The Board conceded that Martinez had met some of therequirements prescribed by N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1).3 It concluded,however, that the April 25-26 incident was not undesigned andunexpected for purposes of Richardson. The Board found “noevidence that the event was objectively capable of causing areasonable person in similar circumstances to suffer a disablingmental injury” under Patterson, because Martinez did not have a“direct personal experience of a terrifying or horror-inducingevent that involved actual or threatened death or seriousinjury, or a similarly serious threat to the physical integrityof the member or another person.”3 The Board concluded that Martinez was permanently and totally disabled from the performance of his regular and assigned job duties and that he was physically or mentally incapacitated from the performance of his usual duties or other duties that his employer was willing to offer. It further found that the event that caused Martinez’s reported disability was identifiable as to time and place, that it was caused by a circumstance external to Martinez, that it was not the result of a preexisting disease, and that it occurred during and as a result of Martinez’s regular and assigned duties. The Board also found that Martinez’s disability was not the result of his willful negligence. 18 Martinez appealed, and the matter was submitted as acontested case to an ALJ. At the hearing before the ALJ,Martinez, other officers, and both parties’ hostage-negotiationexperts testified. Relying primarily on Martinez’s PTSD diagnosis, the ALJruled that Martinez was entitled to accidental disabilitypension benefits. He found that Martinez “had a direct personalexperience of a terrifying or horror-inducing event” that metthe objective reasonableness standard of Patterson because heconducted protracted hostage negotiations that ended withHoffman’s death. He further concluded that the event wasundesigned and unexpected under Richardson because Hoffman’sshooting was “a complete surprise” to Martinez. In a final agency decision, the Board rejected the ALJ’sdetermination in favor of Martinez. It adopted the ALJ’sfindings of fact with an addition: “there was nothing thatoccurred [during the incident] that [Martinez] should not havebeen prepared for as a trained negotiator.” The Board found theALJ’s conclusions of law, particularly the ALJ’s reliance on thePTSD diagnosis, to be erroneous, and stated that in order to be“undesigned and unexpected,” an event must involve “somethingmore than the mere performance of the regular and assignedduties.” 19 Martinez appealed the Board’s decision. An AppellateDivision panel concluded that Martinez had experienced a“terrifying or horror-inducing event” -- a fatal shooting -- andsatisfied the Patterson test. It further held that the shootingwas undesigned and unexpected for purposes of Richardson. Thepanel reasoned that an incident may be undesigned and unexpectedeven if, in hindsight, the employee could have anticipated thatit could occur, and that an employee’s general training does notconvert an unexpected event into an expected one. The paneltherefore reversed the Board’s determination. We granted the Board’s petition for certification. 230 N.J. 496 (2017). II. A. We review the Board’s decisions in these appeals inaccordance with a deferential standard of review. “Anadministrative agency’s final quasi-judicial decision will besustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary,capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support inthe record.” Russo, 206 N.J. at 27 (quoting In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007)); accord In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007). We are not, however, “'bound by an agency’sinterpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictlylegal issue,’ particularly when 'that interpretation is 20 inaccurate or contrary to legislative objectives.’” Russo, 207 N.J. at 27 (first quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec.,Div. of Consumer Affairs, 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973); then quotingG.S. v. Dep’t of Human Servs., DYFS, 157 N.J. 161, 170 (1999)).Instead, we review de novo the Board’s interpretation ofN.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1) and our case law. Ibid.; Ardan v. Bd. ofReview, 231 N.J. 589, 604 (2018) (“[A]n appellate court is 'inno way bound by the agency’s interpretation of a statute or itsdetermination of a strictly legal issue.’” (quoting U.S. Bank,N.A. v. Hough, 210 N.J. 187, 200 (2012))). B. “Like all of the public retirement systems, the PFRSincludes provisions for the grant of ordinary and accidentaldisability benefits.” Patterson, 194 N.J. at 42 (citingN.J.S.A. 43:16A-6 to -7). “[A] [PFRS] member can qualify forordinary disability benefits if he is disabled for any reason;the disability need not have a work connection.” Russo, 206 N.J. at 28. To be eligible for greater benefits under the accidentaldisability provision, however, a PFRS member must satisfyN.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1)’s more rigorous requirements. Thatprovision authorizes an award of benefits provided that the medical board, after a medical examination of such member, shall certify that the member is permanently and totally disabled as a 21 direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of the performance of his regular or assigned duties and that such disability was not the result of the member’s willful negligence and that such member is mentally or physically incapacitated for the performance of his usual duty and of any other available duty in the department which his employer is willing to assign to him. [N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1).]4 The Legislature did not define the term “traumatic event”for purposes of the PFRS statute or the analogous statutes thatgovern other public employee retirement systems.5 In the absenceof statutory guidance as to the meaning of the term, appellatejudges have long grappled with “the elusive concept of whatconstitutes a 'traumatic event.’” Gable v. Bd. of Trs., PERS,115 N.J. 212, 215 (1989). As we have noted, “the question of4 If a PFRS member applies for accidental disability benefits, and the Board finds that he or she “is not eligible for accidental disability since the incapacity is not a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of the performance of the member’s regular or assigned duties,” the member “will be retired on an ordinary disability retirement allowance.” N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.7.5 The Prison Officers’ Pension Fund, N.J.S.A. 43:7-12; the Public Employees’ Retirement System, N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43; the State Police Retirement System, N.J.S.A. 53:5A-10(a); and the Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund, N.J.S.A. 18A:66-39(c), all offer accidental disability benefits. The requirements for accidental disability benefits under those statutes are substantially similar to the requirements of N.J.S.A. 43:16A- 7(1). None of the statutes includes a definition of the term “traumatic event” in its definition section. See N.J.S.A. 18A:66-2; N.J.S.A. 43:15A-6; N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1; N.J.S.A. 53:5A- 3. 22 what constitutes a 'traumatic event’ . . . has dogged courts forgenerations.” Russo, 206 N.J. at 28. In one of our early decisions interpreting N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1), we observed that a “'traumatic event’ would ordinarilyinvolve a mishap or accident involving the application of somekind of external force to the body or the violent exposure ofthe body to some external force.” Cattani v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS,69 N.J. 578, 586 (1976). Following an amendment to the statute,we adopted a three-part test requiring that a memberdemonstrate: (1) that his injuries were not induced by the stress or strain of the normal work effort; (2) that he met involuntarily with the object or matter that was the source of the harm; and (3) that the source of the injury itself was a great rush of force or uncontrollable power. [Kane v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS, 100 N.J. 651, 663 (1985).] The Kane standard was criticized as impractical andproducing inconsistent results; one Appellate Division panelviewed that standard to provide “no uniformly workable basis” topredict the outcome in a typical case. Caminiti v. Bd. of Trs.,PFRS, 394 N.J. Super. 478, 482 (App. Div. 2007); see alsoRichardson, 192 N.J. at 208-09 (noting inconsistent AppellateDivision cases applying Kane standard). As we acknowledged when 23 we decided Richardson, our jurisprudence was “in need of acourse correction.” 192 N.J. at 210. Richardson arose from a corrections officer’s claim ofaccidental disability benefits predicated on a physicaldisability resulting from the officer’s altercation with aninmate. Id. at 193-94. Noting that N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1)’sexpress terms starkly limit the grant of accidental disabilitybenefits, we prescribed a five-pronged standard mandating that aPFRS member seeking such benefits prove 1. that he is permanently and totally disabled; 2. as a direct result of a traumatic event that is a. identifiable as to time and place, b. undesigned and unexpected, and c. caused by a circumstance external to the member (not the result of pre-existing disease that is aggravated or accelerated by the work); 3. that the traumatic event occurred during and as a result of the member’s regular or assigned duties; 4. that the disability was not the result of the member’s willful negligence; and 5. that the member is mentally or physically incapacitated from performing his usual or any other duty. [Id. at 212-13.] 24 We characterized as “[t]he polestar of the inquiry” thequestion “whether, during the regular performance of his job, anunexpected happening, not the result of pre-existing diseasealone or in combination with the work, has occurred and directlyresulted in the permanent and total disability of the member.”Id. at 214. In Richardson, we set forth several examples of undesignedand unexpected events: “[a] policeman can be shot whilepursuing a suspect; a librarian can be hit by a fallingbookshelf while re-shelving books; a social worker can catch herhand in the car door while transporting a child to court.”Ibid. We also contrasted an officer who has a heart attackwhile chasing a suspect, who has not experienced a “traumaticevent” under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7, with an officer disabled duringa chase due to a fall, who has suffered such a “traumaticevent.” Id. at 213. We explained that a gym teacher whodevelops arthritis from repetitive effects of his work over theyears is not entitled to accidental disability benefits, whereas“the same gym teacher who trips over a riser and is injured hassatisfied the standard.” Ibid. We anticipated that thoseexamples would facilitate application of the statutory“traumatic event” standard in a diverse array of settings. In the wake of Richardson, an Appellate Division panelapplied the “undesigned and unexpected” standard to a 25 firefighter’s claim for accidental disability benefits. SeeMoran v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS, 438 N.J. Super. 346, 353-55 (App.Div. 2014). In Moran, the PFRS member was assigned to a firedepartment’s engine company, and was primarily responsible fortransporting fire equipment into a building and extinguishingfires, not rescuing victims. Id. at 349. The member respondedto a fire at what was thought to be a vacant home before thearrival of his department’s truck company, which was equippedand trained for fire rescues. Id. at 350. After hearing thescreams of people trapped in the home, he used his “shoulder,leg and back” to break down the door and rescued the victims.Ibid. He sustained serious injuries in the process. Id. at347. Reversing the Board’s denial of accidental disabilitybenefits, a decision that the Board had premised on Moran’sconduct of “one of his expected work-related duties, rescuingfire victims,” id. at 353, the Appellate Division panel foundthe incident to be undesigned and unexpected: The undesigned and unexpected event here was the combination of unusual circumstances that led to Moran’s injury: the failure of the truck unit to arrive, and the discovery of victims trapped inside a fully engulfed burning building, at a point when Moran did not have available to him the tools that would ordinarily be used to break down the door. As a result, he was forced to carry out his paramount duty to rescue fire victims, by manually kicking in the door. Had he not 26 responded immediately to break down the door, the victims would have died. That was Moran’s unrebutted, credible testimony. [Id. at 354 (footnote omitted).] The panel recognized the officer’s job responsibilities andtraining to be relevant factors, and carefully analyzed thosefactors along with the circumstances that confronted theofficer, thereby concluding that the event was undesigned andunexpected. 6 Id. at 354-55. In Patterson, we addressed a difficult issue not raised byRichardson: what standard should govern when a member premiseshis or her claim for accidental disability benefits on “apermanent mental disability as a result of a mental stressor,without any physical impact.” Patterson, 194 N.J. at 33. Weobserved that “in the context of psychological injuries, theproofs related to the traumatic nature of an event and thecausal relationship between event and injury may be moreproblematic than in the case of a physical event.” Id. at 48.We acknowledged that “the [retirement system] boards haveexpressed legitimate concerns about becoming bogged down inlitigation over idiosyncratic responses by members toinconsequential mental stressors.” Id. at 48-49.6 We do not consider the application of the “undesigned and unexpected” standard to first responders who have sustained physical injuries. 27 To address those concerns, we limited the recovery ofaccidental disability benefits to situations in which the memberis disabled by “stressors sufficient to inflict a disablinginjury when experienced by a reasonable person in similarcircumstances.” Id. at 50. As examples of retirement systemmembers who “could vault the traumatic event threshold,” wecited “a permanently mentally disabled policeman who sees hispartner shot; a teacher who is held hostage by a student; and agovernment lawyer used as a shield by a defendant.” Ibid. Our decision in Patterson thus gave rise to a thresholdinquiry in a particularly challenging category of applications.We required that a member, seeking to predicate an award ofaccidental disability benefits on a mental disability dueentirely to mental stressors, prove that the disability resultedfrom a “direct personal experience of a terrifying or horror-inducing event that involves actual or threatened death orserious injury, or a similarly serious threat to the physicalintegrity of the member or another person.” Id. at 34. Wereasoned that this requirement would “achieve the importantassurance that the traumatic event posited as the basis for anaccidental disability pension is not inconsequential but isobjectively capable of causing a reasonable person in similarcircumstances to suffer a disabling mental injury.” Ibid. 28 Applying the new standard to the claims of the three lawenforcement officers who pursued the Patterson appeal, we foundthat a member who was mentally disabled because of a superiorofficer’s disparaging comments fell short of that benchmark, andwas not entitled to benefits. Id. at 51. In contrast, anofficer subjected to death threats from other officers and anofficer whose wife and daughter were threatened by gang membersmet the threshold determination prescribed by that decision.Id. at 53. In both of those appeals, the Court remanded for adetermination whether they met the remaining requirements ofN.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1). Id. at 51-53. Following our decision in Patterson, we applied itsstandard in two divergent settings. Russo arose from the mentaldisability claim of a police officer -- neither trained norequipped to confront a major fire -- who was ordered into aburning house to rescue the residents. 206 N.J. at 19. Theofficer heard the cries of a victim, trapped on an upper floor,but was prevented by the intense flame and heat from reachingthat victim. Ibid. The officer’s distress over that victim’sdeath was compounded by the statements of family members at thescene, who blamed him for failing to rescue the victim. Id. at20. The officer was diagnosed with PTSD following that event,and was found by the expert for the Board of Trustees to be 29 permanently and totally disabled as a result of the fire. 7 Id.at 20-21. We concluded in Russo that the officer met the benchmark ofPatterson. Id. at 33-34. Although we cited Russo’s lack offirefighting training and equipment as a relevant factor, ourdecision was also premised on the extraordinary intensity of thefire, Russo’s exposure to the victim’s cries for help, and therelatives’ recriminations in the midst of a family tragedy.Ibid. Those factors collectively gave rise to a terrifying orhorror-inducing event that was objectively capable of causing areasonable person in similar circumstances to suffer a disablingmental injury. Id. at 34. The member’s claim in Thompson v. Board of Trustees, TPAF,449 N.J. Super. 478, 481-83 (App. Div. 2017), aff’d, ___ N.J.___ (2018), presented a stark contrast to the claim that gaverise to Russo. There, a former health and physical educationteacher who taught students with disabilities sought accidentaldisability benefits under N.J.S.A. 18A:66-39(c), a provisionaddressing such claims when they are asserted by members of the7 Although Russo was hospitalized overnight for smoke inhalation, his application for accidental disability benefits was premised exclusively on his mental disability, not a disabling physical injury. Russo, 206 N.J. at 19-20. Thus, Patterson governed. Id. at 18-19; cf. Caminiti v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS, 431 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App. Div. 2013) (“The Patterson standard is inapplicable where [an applicant] suffers both a physical and psychiatric injury.”). 30 Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund. Id. at 483-84. The memberpremised her application on three incidents during physicaleducation classes in the course of a nine-month span: anincident in which a student punched and slapped her; an incidentin which a student pushed and shoved her; and an incident inwhich a student swore at her, briefly restrained her hands, andunsuccessfully attempted to punch her. Id. at 481-82. When allthree incidents occurred, multiple teachers’ aides were presentin the room and able to assist the teacher, and school securitycould readily be summoned. Ibid. Noting the absence of evidence that the teacher’sencounters with the students involved “actual or threateneddeath or serious injury” under Patterson, the Appellate Divisionpanel affirmed the Board’s determination rejecting the teacher’sapplication for benefits. Id. at 481. We affirmed the panel’sfinding that the member’s mental disability claim in Thompsonfailed the Patterson objective reasonableness test. Thompson,___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 1). In sum, our jurisprudence construing N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1)’s“traumatic event” language mandates a two-step analysis in casesin which a member claims permanent mental incapacity as a resultof an exclusively psychological trauma. The court firstdetermines whether the member directly experienced a “terrifyingor horror-inducing event that involves actual or threatened 31 death or serious injury, or a similarly serious threat to thephysical integrity of the member or another person.” Patterson,194 N.J. at 50. That event must be “of consequence andobjectively capable of causing a reasonable person to suffer adisabling mental injury.” Russo, 206 N.J. at 31. If the eventmeets the Patterson test, the court then applies the Richardsonfactors to the member’s application. Id. at 32-33. We apply that standard to these appeals. C. 1. In Mount v. Board of Trustees, PFRS, the Board adopted theALJ’s finding that the explosion and fire witnessed by Mount wasa “terrifying or horror-inducing event that involves actual orthreatened death or serious injury.” Consequently, we need notconsider the Patterson standard in this appeal. The Board alsofound in favor of Mount with respect to all components of theRichardson test, save two: the requirement that the event wasundesigned and unexpected, and the requirement that the memberprove that his or her mental disability was the direct result ofthe “traumatic event,” as N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1) requires. Addressing whether Mount’s accident was undesigned andunexpected under Richardson, the parties dispute thesignificance of Mount’s job description and training. Mountcontends that the Appellate Division panel improperly relied on 32 our observation in Russo that “an employee who experiences ahorrific event which falls within his job description and forwhich he has been trained will be unlikely to pass the'undesigned and unexpected’ test.” 206 N.J. at 33. The Boardmaintains that because the incident fell squarely within Mount’sjob description, he cannot satisfy the “undesigned andunexpected” standard of Richardson. Our comment about training in Russo should not be construedto mean that the inquiry regarding whether an event is“undesigned and unexpected” is resolved merely by reviewing themember’s job description and the scope of his or her training.In a given case, those considerations may weigh strongly for oragainst an award of accidental disability benefits. To properlyapply the Richardson standard, however, the Board and areviewing court must carefully consider not only the member’sjob responsibilities and training, but all aspects of the eventitself. No single factor governs the analysis. In this case, Mount confronted a catastrophic accident atclose range. He initially viewed a victim’s arm hanging fromthe vehicle’s window. Bystanders approached the vehicledemanding that Mount rescue the occupants. With no firefightingequipment except a small fire extinguisher, Mount faced theimminent threat of an explosion. Within moments, the car burstinto flames. As Mount learned minutes later, the explosion 33 “melted” the young victims’ bodies into the interior of thevehicle. By virtue of his job description, training, and priorexperience, Mount could anticipate being called to accidentsthat were serious or even fatal. As his job descriptionsuggests, in some circumstances Mount would be expected toremove victims from a damaged vehicle pending the arrival ofmedical personnel. Mount, however, was not trained to combat,unassisted, an explosion of such magnitude experienced at such aclose range. With no firefighting equipment or protective gear,he was helpless in the face of a terrible tragedy. We conclude that by virtue of those extraordinarycircumstances, Mount confronted an incident that was undesignedand unexpected, and therefore satisfied that component of theRichardson test. 192 N.J. at 212-13. Accordingly, we hold thatthe Board’s determination that Mount did not experience a“traumatic event” for purposes of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1) lackedfair support in the record, and that the Appellate Divisionpanel should have reversed that determination. See Russo, 206 N.J. at 27; Carter, 191 N.J. at 482-83. That holding, however, does not entirely resolve thisappeal. In accordance with N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1)’s language,Patterson and Richardson impose a burden on the member todemonstrate that his or her mental disability directly resulted 34 from the qualifying traumatic event. See N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1)(imposing requirement that member prove he or she “ispermanently and totally disabled as a direct result of atraumatic event”); Patterson, 194 N.J. at 50 (requiring thatmember’s disability “result from direct personal experience” ofqualifying traumatic event); Richardson, 192 N.J. at 213(mandating that member prove disability was “a direct result” ofqualifying traumatic event). For reasons that the record doesnot entirely explain, the ALJ made a causation finding with nomedical proof from either party, the Board did not address thatfinding, and the Appellate Division panel did not reach thequestion whether Mount proved that his mental disabilitydirectly resulted from the January 10, 2007 accident. The issueof causation is thus unresolved. We remand this matter to the Appellate Division panel forits consideration of whether Mount’s disability directlyresulted from the January 10, 2007 incident. If the paneldetermines that the record is inadequate for that determination,it may remand the case so that the parties may supplement therecord on that issue. 2. In Martinez v. Board of Trustees, PFRS, the AppellateDivision panel reversed the Board’s determination that Martinezfailed to satisfy the Patterson standard. The panel concluded 35 that Martinez had proven that he directly and personallyexperienced a terrifying or horror-inducing event. The Board urges that we uphold its finding that Martinezexperienced Hoffman’s death only remotely, not directly andpersonally as our decision in Patterson requires. Martinezcounters that after speaking with Hoffman over a period oftwelve to fourteen hours, and hearing Hoffman’s cries for helpas the shooting occurred, he had a direct personal experience ofa terrifying or horror-inducing event. He contends that theAppellate Division properly found that he satisfied thePatterson test. We concur with the Appellate Division panel that Martinezdirectly and personally experienced a terrifying or horror-inducing event under Patterson and hold that the Board’s findingon that issue lacked fair support in the record. See Russo, 206 N.J. at 27; Carter, 191 N.J. at 482-83. The panel properly observed that although Martinezexperienced no threat to his own safety, the incident involved athreat of death or serious injury “to the physical integrity of. . . another person.” Patterson, 194 N.J. at 50. We share thepanel’s view that Martinez’s experience of Hoffman’s shootingwas direct and personal, given his lengthy conversations withHoffman prior to the shooting, Hoffman’s pleas for help toMartinez as he was killed, and Martinez’s view of Hoffman’s body 36 as it was transported outside. That incident meets Patterson’sobjective reasonableness standard. See ibid. We disagree with the panel, however, with respect to itsreversal of the Board’s ruling as to the application of theRichardson factors. We find ample support in the record for theBoard’s determination that Hoffman’s shooting was not undesignedand unexpected. See Russo, 206 N.J. at 27; Carter, 191 N.J. at 482-83. Martinez’s expert explained why a hostage negotiator intelephone contact with a suspect may not be informed that atactical entry is imminent. The record established that basedon his training, Martinez had reason to anticipate that, withoutprior warning to him, a tactical entry might be made into thehome of Hoffman’s mother. Moreover, the ALJ and the Board did not rely exclusively onMartinez’s training. Instead, they considered evidenceregarding the precise police tactics that were used in thisspecific case and the warning that those tactics gave Martinezthat the hostage standoff might end violently. Police officers testified about the sequence of eventsduring the early morning of April 26, 2010 that led to Hoffman’sshooting. For a full hour before Hoffman was shot, the tacticalteam attempted to flush him from the residence by throwing teargas canisters through various windows. Martinez knew, from the 37 sounds he heard over the telephone, that this phase of thetactical operation was underway. He also knew that tear gasfailed to bring about Hoffman’s peaceful surrender. Martinezhad every reason to expect that the next step would be thetactical team’s entry into the home. Based on Hoffman’sbehavior, it was readily apparent that if SWAT team membersforced their way into the residence, a violent encounter couldoccur. In a time span of only a few hours, Hoffman committed anarmed robbery, eluded police officers, held the SWAT team at baywith a firearm, and threatened his mother, his sister, and athird individual. Hoffman initially told Martinez that thesituation would end with the death of his hostages, policeofficers, and himself. Although Martinez’s skill and ingenuityled to the hostages’ release and defused the situation for manyhours, Hoffman’s statements and conduct portended a violentconfrontation with police. In short, the Board’s conclusion that Hoffman’s shootingwas not undesigned and unexpected was premised on far more thana formulaic review of Martinez’s job description and training.It was also based on the sequence of events that led toHoffman’s death. Although the shooting was clearly devastatingto Martinez -- an officer exemplary for his professionalism andcompassion in highly stressful circumstances -- it was not“undesigned and unexpected” under Richardson. 38 Accordingly, we reverse the Appellate Division’sdetermination and reinstate the Board’s finding that Martinez isnot entitled to accidental disability benefits under N.J.S.A.43:16A-7(1). III. In our applications of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1) and analogousprovisions regarding accidental disability benefits, we haveendeavored to discern and advance the Legislature’s intent, asexpressed in its statutory language. See Russo, 206 N.J. at 27;Patterson, 194 N.J. at 47; Richardson, 192 N.J. at 210-12; Kane,100 N.J. at 662-63. When we construe those statutes, we aremindful of the Legislature’s intent to assist certain firstresponders and other retirement system members disabled underextraordinary circumstances while conserving the limitedresources of the retirement funds. As Richardson reflects, weview the Legislature’s mandate that a member prove that his orher disability was the direct result of a “traumatic event” toimpose a significant limitation on the recovery of enhancedbenefits. 192 N.J. at 210. Appeals such as Patterson and thetwo matters now before the Court, which involve mentaldisabilities arising exclusively from mental stressors, poseparticular challenges in that regard. The Legislature has the authority to refine the statutorylanguage to clarify its intent regarding the term “traumatic 39 event” as it applies in future cases. It may consider astatutory provision governing claims for accidental disabilitybenefits based on physical injuries sustained by firstresponders. It may also decide to enact a provision separatelyaddressing cases arising from mental disabilities attributedexclusively to mental stressors. Additional guidance from theLegislature would assist retirement system members, boards, andcounsel as they consider applications for benefits, and ourcourts as they review these important determinations. IV. In Mount, we reverse the Appellate Division panel’sjudgment and remand the matter to the panel for its review ofthe Board’s determination that Mount’s disability was not the“direct result” of the event that he experienced on January 10,2007. In Martinez, we reverse the Appellate Division panel’sdetermination and reinstate the Board’s determination. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion. 40