Case Title: Shute v. Shute

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1990-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
 that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 89-449


 Karen L.C. Shute                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Lamoille Superior Court

 C. Denny Shute                               December Term, 1990


 Linda Levitt, J.

 Robert Halpert and C. James Mathis, Law Offices of Kurrle and Halpert,
   Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

 Leslie E. Black and Graham Hayes Govoni, Law Clerk (On the Brief), Johnson,
   for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      JOHNSON, J.   We decide today that the jurisdictional requirements of
 the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. { 1738A, preempt
 the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, (UCCJA), 15 V.S.A. {{ 1031-1051,
 when these acts are in conflict.  Therefore, unless a child custody decree
 is in compliance with the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, the trial
 court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to modify or enforce its original
 decree.
      This case arose out of a motion for contempt of a Lamoille Superior
 Court order granting a divorce to the parties and awarding custody of the
 minor son to the wife.  The motion was filed by the former husband on
 February 18, 1986, alleging that his former wife had denied him visitation
 and telephone contact with their son since October 1985.  This began two
 and one-half years of litigation that involved visitation and, eventually,
 subject matter jurisdiction issues.  On May 27, 1988, the husband filed a
 second motion for contempt and enforcement.  On July 22, 1988, the wife
 filed a motion to dismiss, claiming a lack of subject matter jurisdiction
 under the UCCJA, 15 V.S.A. { 1032, or, alternatively, that the trial court
 should decline to exercise jurisdiction because Vermont was an inconvenient
 forum under 15 V.S.A. { 1036.  On August 4, 1989, the Lamoille Superior
 Court relinquished jurisdiction to the State of Connecticut.  The superior
 court found that Vermont was an inconvenient forum because Connecticut had
 been the child's home state since 1982 and that Connecticut had closer
 connections to the child than Vermont.  The husband appealed.  We affirm the
 trial court's relinquishment of jurisdiction, but do so on a different
 ground.
      Some history of the original divorce action and later events is
 necessary.  The husband and wife were married in Vermont in 1978.  One son
 was born to the parties in December 1980.  The family lived together in
 Vermont until April 1982.  In May 1982, the wife and son moved to
 Connecticut.  The wife filed for divorce in Lamoille Superior Court on
 February 22, 1983.  On March 8, 1984, the trial court issued a Final Order
 and Decree.  At the time the original decree was issued, the trial court
 made no findings as to subject matter jurisdiction over child custody.  The
 wife's complaint for divorce stated that her residence had been Connecticut
 since May 1982.  The complaint did not state the residence of the child.
      The court incorporated the parties' final stipulation, dated March 8,
 1984, into the Final Order and Decree.  Under the terms of the final
 stipulation, the parties agreed that the care, custody and control of the
 minor child would be awarded to the wife, subject to the right of reasonable
 visitation by the husband.  In addition, the parties agreed that the Vermont
 courts would have continuing jurisdiction of all issues, including custody,
 support and visitation rights.
       On appeal, the husband claims that the trial court violated his
 constitutional right to due process when it failed to provide him with
 reasonable or adequate notice and no opportunity to be heard before
 relinquishing jurisdiction, (FN1) and that the court abused its discretion when
 it failed to consider all relevant factors before deciding that Vermont was
 an inconvenient forum.  In light of our holding that the trial court did not
 have subject matter jurisdiction to modify its original custody decree, we
 do not reach the precise issues raised by the husband.
      This case reflects the jurisdictional complications that can occur when
 parents, living in different states, seek to modify an original child
 custody decree by using the courts of two states.  Historically, divorce
 and child custody judgments have not been subject to the full faith and
 credit mandate in Article IV, { 1, of the United States Constitution and the
 codification of that mandate in 28 U.S.C. { 1738.  By necessity, these
 judgments have been set apart because they must be modifiable in the
 rendering state when the best interests of the child require a change.
 Kovacs v. Brewer,