Case Title: Fawcett v. Reinertsen

Citation: 131 Ill. 2d 380, 546 N.E.2d 558

Docket Number: 

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1989-10-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
131 Ill. 2d 380 (1989)
546 N.E.2d 558
BEN FAWCETT et al., Appellees,
v.
RAOUL REINERTSEN et al. (Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, Contemnor-Appellant).
No. 67059.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
Opinion filed October 25, 1989.
*381 Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria (Roger R. Clayton and Karen L. Kendall, of counsel), appellant pro se.
*382 Littler, Renner, Howard & Wombacher, of Peoria (Franklin L. Renner, of counsel), for appellees.
Judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the court:
Appellees, Ben Fawcett, Gretchen Fawcett, and their daughter, Brooke Fawcett, by her next friends, Ben Fawcett and Gretchen Fawcett, brought a medical negligence action in Fulton County against Dr. Raoul Reinertsen, Dr. Dennis Cappitelli and Graham Hospital Association. Appellees alleged that due to the care and treatment rendered by the defendants, Brooke Fawcett was born prematurely with incompletely developed lungs, resulting in the development of hyaline membrane disease and various other complications.
As part of the pretrial discovery in the case, appellees deposed the defendant-physicians and posed questions concerning the relevant standard of care. On advice of counsel, the physicians refused to answer the questions.
The appellees filed a motion to compel answers to the questions relating to the standard of care. Specifically, the appellees sought answers to the following questions:
After a hearing on the motion to compel, an order was entered directing the defendant-physicians to answer the questions. On advice of counsel, the physicians refused to comply with the court's order. Counsel for the *383 physicians were then found to be in contempt of court and fined $25.
The contemnors appealed the finding of contempt, arguing that a defendant-physician in a medical negligence action cannot be compelled to testify as to the standard of care unless he has been disclosed as an expert witness pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 220 (107 Ill.2d R. 220). The appellate court rejected this argument and affirmed the finding of contempt. (168 Ill. App.3d 1090.) We granted leave to appeal (107 Ill.2d R. 315).
The issue before this court is whether a defendant-physician, who has not been disclosed as an expert witness pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 220, may be compelled to give testimony at a discovery deposition regarding the relevant standard of care. We hold that he may.
We begin with a review of Rule 220. Rule 220 provides, in part:
An expert is defined as:
In Tzystuck v. Chicago Transit Authority (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 226, this court considered the applicability of Rule 220(b)(1) to treating physicians. In holding that treating physicians who testify to a medical opinion at trial are not expert witnesses within the meaning of Rule *384 220(b)(1) and need not be disclosed as expert witnesses (Tzystuck, 124 Ill.2d at 234), this court reasoned:
The appellants contend that this analysis supports their position that a defendant-physician must be disclosed as an expert in order to be required to testify as to standard of care. We disagree.
Applying the reasoning of Tzystuck to the present case, we hold that defendant-physicians need not be disclosed as expert witnesses. It can hardly be said that a defendant-physician has retained himself to "render an *385 opinion at trial"; his involvement in the case is clearly "treatment-related" rather than "litigation-related." Consequently, he is not an expert witness within the meaning of Rule 220(b)(1), and the disclosure provisions of Rule 220(b)(1) do not apply.
This does not mean, however, that defendant-physicians may not render professional opinions; defendant-physicians may give opinion testimony at trial (Tzystuck, 124 Ill.2d at 234), including opinions as to standard of care (Walski v. Tiesenga (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 249, 259; Stevens v. Sadiq (1988), 176 Ill. App.3d 333, 337). The relevant distinction between an expert witness and a defendant-physician, for purposes of this case, is the manner in which discovery must be conducted. Since a defendant-physician is not an expert witness for purposes of Rule 220, he is subject to the discovery provisions which apply to ordinary witnesses. (See Tzystuck, 124 Ill. 2d  at 236.) General discovery procedures are detailed in Supreme Court Rule 201 (107 Ill.2d R. 201). Rule 201 provides, in part:
Such discovery "`presupposes a range of relevance and materiality which includes not only what is admissible at the trial, but also that which leads to what is admissible at the trial.'" Monier v. Chamberlain (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 351, 357, quoting Krupp v. Chicago Transit Authority (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 37, 41.
The standard of care by which the defendant-physician's conduct is to be measured is not only admissible at trial, but is an element of a cause of action for medical negligence. (Walski v. Tiesenga (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 249, 255.) Consequently, any opinion a defendant-physician *386 may have as to standard of care is relevant and is discoverable.
The appellants further contend that allowing the appellees to question defendant-physicians as to standard of care would shift the burden of proving that standard from the plaintiff to the defendant. We find no merit in this argument. The burden of establishing the relevant standard of care in a medical negligence action is on the plaintiff. (Addison v. Whittenberg (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 287, 297; Purtill v. Hess (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 229, 241-42.) The fact that, after obtaining the defendant's opinion as to standard of care, the plaintiff may attempt to establish that standard through the defendant himself by calling him as an adverse witness (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2-1102) in no way shifts the burden to the defendant-physician. The physician is but a witness; the burden of eliciting the relevant testimony and introducing it into evidence remains with the plaintiff.
Finally, appellants argue that to compel a defendant-physician to give opinion testimony regarding the standard of care deprives him of an intellectual property right in his medical opinion and invades his right to dispose of his property as he sees fit. Our review of the record indicates that this argument was not raised before the trial court. Issues not raised in the trial court, including constitutional matters, are generally considered waived on appeal. (People v. Walker (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 306, 314-15; People v. Amerman (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 196, 197.) Accordingly, this argument will not be considered.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the circuit court properly ordered the defendant-physicians to answer the deposition questions relating to standard of care, and affirm the appellate court's judgment which affirmed the circuit court's finding of contempt.
Judgment affirmed.