Case Title: State v. Rinke

Citation: 

Docket Number: 122413

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2021-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 122,413 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
KORREY RAINE WHITE RINKE, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
Under the facts of this case, the State did not present substantial competent 
evidence that the defendant committed the crimes of felony murder and aggravated 
kidnapping for the purpose of the defendant's sexual gratification. It thus did not show the 
crimes were sexually motivated or that the defendant committed a sexually violent crime 
that required him to register under the Kansas Offender Registration Act, K.S.A. 2020 
Supp. 22-4901 et seq. 
 
Appeal from Johnson District Court; TIMOTHY MCCARTHY, judge. Opinion filed July 30, 2021. 
Reversed. 
 
Meryl Carver-Allmond, of Capital Appellate Defender Office, was on the brief for appellant.  
 
Shawn E. Minihan, assistant district attorney, Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, and Derek 
Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee. 
 
PER CURIAM:  Korrey Raine White Rinke challenges the district court's finding 
that his crimes of felony murder and aggravated kidnapping were sexually motivated as 
 
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defined by the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA), K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-4901 et 
seq. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-4902(c)(18). He points out that he committed the crimes 
after having sex with the victim, and he argues no evidence shows he committed the 
crimes for the purpose of sexual gratification. The State responds that the felony murder 
and aggravated kidnapping were inextricably intertwined with the sexual encounter and 
were thus committed for sexual gratification.  
 
We hold the district court's finding that Rinke committed the crimes of felony 
murder and aggravated kidnapping for the purpose of sexual gratification is not supported 
by substantial competent evidence. We thus reverse the district court's finding that Rinke 
committed a sex offense for which he had a registration obligation under KORA.  
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The State charged Rinke with the capital murder of J.P. and her rape. Rinke ended 
up pleading guilty to amended charges of felony murder and aggravated kidnapping in 
exchange for the State agreeing not to seek the death penalty. The amended complaint 
charged kidnapping as the inherently dangerous felony underlying the felony murder. At 
the plea hearing Rinke admitted he "confined [J.P.] for the purpose of inflicting bodily 
harm or terrorizing her and he in fact did inflict bodily harm on her which resulted in her 
death." Beyond this stipulation, the plea hearing record includes few facts.  
 
The prosecutor did however remind the judge he had heard evidence during a two-
and-a-half day Jackson v. Denno hearing and at the preliminary hearing. The prosecutor 
then related that Rinke and J.P. were together at a "park consensually, but at some point 
the defendant restrained or kept [J.P.] from leaving the place where she was against her 
will. In the process of that restraint, he caused her injuries which resulted in her death."  
 
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Although Rinke stipulated to the factual basis necessary to prove felony murder 
and aggravated kidnapping, the plea agreement made clear the parties had not reached an 
agreement about whether the felony murder and aggravated kidnapping were sexually 
motivated. At the plea hearing, Rinke's attorney argued the crimes were not sexually 
motivated because "the acts that resulted in [J.P.'s] death occurred after any sexual 
activity occurred." The State asked the court to find that, "based on all of the evidence 
including the defendant's statements that were presented, that it is beyond a reasonable 
doubt that this was a sexually motivated crime." Without elaboration, the district court 
made a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was sexually motivated.  
 
Later, at a sentencing hearing, the judge followed the plea agreement and 
sentenced Rinke to life without possibility of parole for 25 years for the felony murder 
and the mid-box sentence of 176 months for the aggravated kidnapping, to run concurrent 
with the murder sentence. The judge reiterated his prior finding that the crimes were 
sexually motivated, and he accepted the notice of duty to register Rinke had signed. The 
journal entry reflected the finding and Rinke's obligation to register. 
 
With no factual detail being presented at the plea hearing, much of what is known 
about the events comes from Rinke's statements to police that were the subject of the 
Jackson v. Denno hearing. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 
12 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964) (requiring a hearing on the voluntariness of a confession before 
its admission into evidence). Rinke told police officers that he got to know J.P. because 
they were in the same research study. On the day of J.P.'s death, they ran into each other 
at the facility where the study was being conducted. They left together in Rinke's truck. 
After buying liquor, they parked near a hiking trail in a public park to drink. Eventually 
 
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they walked down the trail to relieve themselves in the woods; the two served as lookouts 
for each other. They then engaged in sexual activity.  
 
At the plea hearing, Rinke's counsel asserted the sex was consensual, but Rinke's 
statements to police were inconsistent. Rinke first told police the two had consensual sex. 
But later in the interview a police officer asked Rinke if he had sex with J.P. even though 
she did not want to. Rinke nodded his head in affirmation. The officer then asked, "So, 
she doesn't want to have sex because you don't have a condom, but yet you go ahead and 
have sex with her anyway—and that's when she's pleading with you to stop." Rinke 
responded, "She told me to stop before." The officer replied, "But you proceeded to have 
sex anyway, even though she told you to stop." Rinke said, "Yep, it's considered rape."  
 
Rinke at first told the police that J.P. was upset because she wanted Rinke to use a 
condom, but he did not have one. After the sex, Rinke became overcome with guilt and 
told J.P. that she would have to kill him. When she would not, Rinke beat her with his 
fists. Throughout the several hours of interview, Rinke recited variations of the events in 
which he insisted he did not beat J.P. until after they had sex. At one point, an officer 
asked Rinke if he began punching J.P. when she complained about having sex without a 
condom. Rinke nodded. The officer then asked, "Is this because you're having sex with 
her, and she doesn't want you to?" Rinke again nodded. And at another point, he said the 
victim liked the sex and wanted him to stop only once he started hitting her. 
 
The State relies on these statements by Rinke as evidence that the crimes of felony 
murder and aggravated kidnapping were sexually motivated.  
 
 
 
 
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ANALYSIS 
 
KORA requires certain offenders to register with a law enforcement agency in any 
place where the offender resides, maintains employment, or attends school. See K.S.A. 
2020 Supp. 22-4904; K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-4905. Sex offenders are among those who 
must register. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-4902(a)(1). And the term "sex offenders" includes 
those who commit a sexually violent crime. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-4902(b)(1).  
 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-4902(c) includes a list of sexually violent crimes. The list 
does not include either felony murder or aggravated kidnapping. But the statute also has a 
catch-all provision covering "any act which has been determined beyond a reasonable 
doubt to have been sexually motivated . . . . As used in this paragraph, 'sexually 
motivated' means that one of the purposes for which the defendant committed the crime 
was for the purpose of the defendant's sexual gratification." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-
4902(c)(18). Courts have applied this catch-all provision to various crimes not listed in 
subsection (c). See State v. Coman, 294 Kan. 84, 95-96, 273 P.3d 701 (2012) (collecting 
cases).  
 
In this appeal, the parties disagree about whether the record includes substantial 
competent evidence showing that Rinke committed the crimes of felony murder and 
aggravated kidnapping for the purpose of his sexual gratification. Rinke argues because 
he committed these acts after he had sex with J.P. no evidence shows he committed the 
crimes of conviction for the purpose of his sexual gratification. The State disagrees. It 
argues "the sexual act and murder occurred in lockstep. [Rinke's] purported motive for 
killing [J.P.] was the shame of having sexual intercourse without a condom. . . . [T]he 
sexual act was inextricably intertwined with the murder." The State contends Rinke's 
"rape of the victim fell with[in] K.S.A. 22-4902(c)(18)." The State also argues Rinke 
 
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"would not have committed the aggravated kidnapping and murder but for his rape of the 
victim."  
 
The district court accepted the State's view and found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the felony murder and aggravated kidnapping were sexually motivated. This was a 
finding of fact.  
 
Appellate courts review findings of fact for substantial competent evidence. State 
v. Queen, 313 Kan. 12, 482 P.3d 1117 (2021). The phrase "substantial competent 
evidence" is defined as legal and relevant evidence that a reasonable person might regard 
as sufficient to support a conclusion. 313 Kan. at 20. The appellate court does not 
reweigh conflicting evidence, evaluate witness credibility, or redetermine questions of 
fact and will presume that the district court found all facts necessary to support the 
judgment. 313 Kan. at 20. Here, review of the finding of fact about whether Rinke's 
crimes were sexually motivated also involves interpretation of the statutory meaning of 
the terms sexually motivated and sexual gratification. Appellate courts interpret statutes 
de novo, granting no deference to the district court. 313 Kan. at 17 (citing Jarvis v. 
Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 312 Kan. 156, 159, 473 P.3d 869 [2020]). 
 
In deciding if substantial competent evidence supports the district court's finding, 
it helps to first consider the meaning of sexual gratification. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-
4902(c)(18) does not include a definition. But Kansas courts interpreting statutes often 
look to dictionaries to explain the ordinary meaning of common words. See State v. 
Valdiviezo-Martinez, 313 Kan. 614, 626, 486 P.3d 1256 (2021). Merriam-Webster 
defines "gratification" as a "reward," as "the state of being gratified," or "as a source of 
satisfaction or pleasure." Merriam-Webster Dictionary, available at 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gratification.  
 
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Rinke concedes he engaged in sexual acts with J.P. But he argues the felony 
murder and aggravated kidnapping were not sexually motivated because he had achieved 
sexual gratification before he committed the crimes. For support Rinke cites State v. 
Chambers, 36 Kan. App. 2d 228, 138 P.3d 405, rev. denied 282 Kan. 792 (2006). 
 
In Chambers, the defendant pleaded guilty to breaking into residences and stealing 
women's undergarments. The defendant argued that the crimes were not sexually 
motivated because his future intent to use the stolen items for sexual gratification was 
irrelevant under the statute. The Court of Appeals held that under the Kansas statute, 
crimes committed either for the immediate or future sexual gratification are sexually 
violent. 36 Kan. App. 2d at 240. Chambers relied on State v. Patterson, 25 Kan. App. 2d 
245, 251, 963 P.2d 436, rev. denied 265 Kan. 888 (1998), in which the court held the 
theft of women's undergarments for sexual gratification in the future was a sexually 
motivated crime under the circumstances of that case.  
 
Rinke asks this court to interpret Chambers and Patterson to exclude past sexual 
gratification. But we draw no such bright line. Nor are we willing to draw a bright line 
requested by the State. Citing State v. Castleberry, 301 Kan. 170, 339 P.3d 795 (2014), 
the State asks us to borrow from our multiple acts caselaw and hold that the crimes 
committed after the sex were committed for sexual gratification if no fresh impulse 
intervened between the sex and the other crimes. But this line of cases relates to multiple 
acts of the same crime. Here, the crimes as charged and pled to indicate that Rinke's 
impulse moved from sex to kidnapping and felony murder based on an underlying crime 
of kidnapping. The State does not persuade us that he acted with the same impulse when 
he committed murder and kidnapping given the different potential purposes underlying 
the crimes. 
 
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Rinke's motivation to kidnap and murder J.P. is not abundantly clear. In one 
version of events, he acted out of guilt. In another he became angry because J.P. 
complained about him not using a condom. And other evidence suggests he tried to cover 
up the uncharged crime of rape. Any of these suggests a fresh impulse and motivation 
separate from any sexual gratification.  
 
The plain language of K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-4902(c)(18) defeats the State's other 
argument that crimes following sex need be intertwined only with the sex act to be 
considered crimes performed for sexual gratification. The statutory language does not say 
that an unlisted nonsex crime need only be temporally or otherwise intertwined with an 
act that led to sexual gratification. Instead, it requires that Rinke committed felony 
murder and kidnapping "for the purpose of the defendant's sexual gratification." K.S.A. 
2020 Supp. 22-4902(c)(18). No evidence suggests Rinke murdered and kidnapped J.P. 
for the purpose of a sexual reward, so he would reach the state of being sexually gratified, 
or because those crimes gave him a source of sexual satisfaction or pleasure. See 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, available at https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/gratification. 
 
We hold the State did not present substantial competent evidence establishing 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Rinke committed the crimes of felony murder and 
aggravated kidnapping for the purpose of his sexual gratification. It thus did not show 
that Rinke committed a sexually violent crime or that he must register under KORA as a 
sex offender.  
 
Reversed.  
 
 
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* * * 
 
LUCKERT, C.J., dissenting:  I dissent because substantial competent evidence exists 
to support a finding that Korrey Raine White Rinke's murder of J.P. was sexually 
motivated. The evidence shows he beat her while they were engaged in sex, giving rise to 
a reasonable inference that the violence that led to her death was motivated by his desire 
to obtain sexual gratification. The murder was thus a sex offense under K.S.A. 2020 
Supp. 22-4902(c)(18). 
 
Rinke's statements to police evolved as he rambled through various scenarios. At 
various times, he admitted to beating J.P. during the sex. At one point an officer asked if 
Rinke punched J.P. because she complained about having sex without a condom. Rinke 
affirmed by nodding. The officer then asked, "Is this because you're having sex with her, 
and she doesn't want you to?" Rinke again nodded. While this alone creates an ambiguity 
about whether the punching occurred during sex, at another point Rinke volunteered that 
the victim liked the sex and wanted him to stop only once he started hitting her.  
 
Rinke's statements that he hit her as she started to protest during the sexual acts 
show he began beating her so he could gain sexual gratification. He told the police the 
sex continued until he ejaculated. While the beating and violence may have continued 
even after the sex had ended, the State presented substantial competent evidence showing 
that the murderous acts began for the purpose of Rinke's sexual gratification.  
 
The district court judge watched Rinke's recorded confession and heard the 
forensic evidence about the cause of death and other evidence. While the judge did not 
detail the evidence on which he relied in finding that Rinke committed a sex offense, the 
 
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record includes substantial competent evidence that supports it. I would affirm his 
finding.   
 
STEGALL, J. joins the foregoing dissent.