Case Title: Essex Regional Retirement Board v. Swallow

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12458; SJC 12511

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-01-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12458 
SJC-12511 
 
ESSEX REGIONAL RETIREMENT BOARD  vs.  JOHN SWALLOW & others.1 
STATE BOARD OF RETIREMENT  vs.  BRIAN O'HARE & others.2 
 
 
 
Essex.  Suffolk.     October 1, 2018. - January 18, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Retirement.  Pension.  Public Employment, Retirement, Forfeiture 
of pension, Police.  Police, Retirement, Regulations.  
State Police. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
July 14, 2015. 
 
 
The case was heard by James F. Lang, J., on motions for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
January 29, 2015. 
 
 
The case was heard by Peter M. Lauriat, J., on motions for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
                     
 
1 Justices of the Salem Division of the District Court 
Department of the Trial Court. 
 
 
2 Justices of the Cambridge Division of the District Court 
Department of the Trial Court. 
2 
 
 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Thomas C. Fallon for John Swallow. 
 
Eric B. Tennen for Brian O'Hare. 
 
Michael Sacco for Essex Regional Retirement Board. 
 
David R. Marks, Assistant Attorney General, for State Board 
of Retirement. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  These two cases present closely related 
questions concerning the scope of G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4) 
(§ 15 [4]), which provides that no member of a public employee 
retirement system shall be entitled to a retirement allowance 
after conviction of a criminal offense involving a violation of 
the laws applicable to his or her office or position.3 
 
John Swallow was a police sergeant for the town of 
Manchester-by-the-Sea on administrative leave when he was 
charged with several crimes related to the discharge of his 
personal firearm, charges to which he admitted to sufficient 
facts to convict.  Brian O'Hare was a police sergeant for the 
State police when he was charged with the Federal crime of using 
the Internet to entice a person under eighteen years of age to 
engage in unlawful sexual activity, a charge to which he 
subsequently pleaded guilty. 
                     
 
3 These cases were paired for oral argument and combined for 
purposes of this opinion because they raise essentially 
identical questions of law.  Our analysis and decision apply 
equally to both. 
3 
 
 
 
In these cases, there are neither factual connections 
between the criminal activity and the officers' respective 
positions nor apparent violations of any laws expressly 
applicable to their positions.  Notwithstanding, the Essex 
Regional Retirement Board (Essex board) and the State Board of 
Retirement (State board) each concluded that the officers' 
respective convictions violated the fundamental tenets of their 
positions as trusted law enforcement officials and denied the 
officers a retirement allowance under § 15 (4) as a result. 
 
We conclude that, while the officers' conduct was entirely 
reprehensible, in view of the narrow interpretation that we have 
given to § 15 (4), requiring the forfeiture of their pension 
allowances was in error.  Consequently, we affirm the decisions 
of the Superior Court judges allowing the officers' respective 
motions for judgment on the pleadings and vacating the boards' 
decisions otherwise. 
 
Background.  The facts are undisputed in both cases. 
 
1.  Swallow.  Swallow was a police sergeant for the town of 
Manchester-by-the-Sea from March 1, 1989, until his termination 
on January 4, 2013.  Following a string of personal tragedies in 
2011 and 2012, Swallow began drinking heavily and struggled with 
significant depression.  In June 2012, Swallow was placed on 
administrative leave pending investigation of an abuse 
allegation unrelated to this matter.  He was required to return 
4 
 
 
his badge and service weapon at that time but retained his 
license to carry a firearm. 
 
The incident that gave rise to Swallow's convictions took 
place in October 2012.  Swallow and his wife, Lauren Noonan, 
were at their home; Swallow was drinking heavily and acting 
erratically.  The couple argued, initially because Noonan was 
concerned that Swallow might drive his car while under the 
influence of alcohol, and the argument escalated.  At one point, 
Noonan stated that she wanted Swallow to leave the home.  
Swallow refused, and Noonan indicated that if he did not leave 
she would testify against him regarding the abuse allegation.  
Swallow grabbed Noonan by the shirt, yelled at her, and waved a 
handgun in her face.  Noonan left the home and began to walk to 
a neighbor's home.  While in the neighbor's driveway, she heard 
a single gunshot. 
 
Swallow, apparently contemplating suicide, had fired what 
he called a "brave shot," i.e., a shot meant to determine 
whether he had the courage to commit suicide.  The bullet grazed 
his hand.  Swallow was arrested by the Beverly police that 
evening and ultimately pleaded guilty to (1) assault and 
battery, (2) discharge of a firearm within 500 feet of a 
building, (3) assault by means of a dangerous weapon, (4) 
5 
 
 
multiple counts of improper storage of a firearm,4 and (5) 
intimidation of a witness. 
 
Swallow committed his crimes while on administrative leave 
and with a personal firearm.  He did not use his position as an 
officer or police resources to facilitate his crime.  
Nonetheless, the Essex board determined that Swallow's 
convictions required forfeiture of his pension under § 15 (4) 
because his offenses "strike at the heart of the duties of a 
police officer and simply cannot be separated from his position 
as a law enforcement officer," and his actions "were a violation 
of the public's trust as well as a repudiation of his official 
duties." 
 
Swallow sought review in the District Court, arguing that 
forfeiture was unjustified where there was no reference to 
public employment in the criminal statute under which he was 
convicted, no direct factual link between his conduct and his 
position as a police officer, and no violation of any 
identifiable law app1icable to that position.  Swallow also 
argued that forfeiture violated the excessive fines clause of 
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  On 
                     
 
4 A search of the house revealed a considerable collection 
of firearms and ammunition in the home, including hundreds of 
weapons that Swallow was storing for a friend who was on a 
military deployment.  The police determined that three of the 
firearms observed in the house were not properly secured. 
6 
 
 
cross motions for judgment on the pleadings, a judge in the 
District Court vacated the Essex board's decision, concluding 
that Swallow's conduct and subsequent convictions were not 
connected sufficiently to his position to warrant forfeiture.  
That decision was subsequently affirmed by a judge of the 
Superior Court.  Thereafter, the Appeals Court concluded that 
Swallow's use of a gun to threaten another's life violated the 
public's trust and was a repudiation of his official duties.  
Essex Regional Retirement Bd. v. Justices of the Salem Div. of 
the Dist. Court Dep't of the Trial Court, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 755, 
760 (2017).  Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the 
matter to the District Court for consideration of the Eighth 
Amendment issue.  Id. at 761. 
 
2.  O'Hare.  O'Hare served as a trooper for the State 
police from 1986 until his resignation in October 2006.  For 
several months in 2005 and 2006, O'Hare communicated online 
with, and eventually arranged to meet with, an individual whom 
he believed to be a fourteen year old boy but was actually an 
undercover agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  
The FBI arrested O'Hare in February 2006.  O'Hare subsequently 
resigned from his position and pleaded guilty to a charge of 
using the Internet to attempt to coerce and entice a child under 
the age of eighteen years to engage in unlawful sexual activity. 
7 
 
 
 
O'Hare did not use his position or State police resources 
to facilitate his crime; he used his personal computer and did 
not communicate with the undercover agent while on duty.  The 
foregoing notwithstanding, the State board determined that 
Swallow's conviction required forfeiture of his pension under 
§ 15 (4) because it constituted a violation of the core tenets 
of his position and went "directly to the heart" of his 
responsibilities and obligations as a State police trooper. 
 
O'Hare sought review in the District Court, arguing that 
forfeiture was not warranted where his conviction was not 
related to his position as a State police trooper.  The State 
board argued that his misconduct, although private, went to the 
heart of his obligation to enforce the criminal laws and, as a 
result, forfeiture was required.  On cross motions for judgment 
on the pleadings, a judge in the District Court vacated the 
State board's decision, concluding that O'Hare's criminal 
conduct did not warrant forfeiture because it was wholly 
independent of his job as a State police trooper.  That decision 
was subsequently affirmed by a judge in the Superior Court.  
Thereafter, the Appeals Court reversed, concluding that 
forfeiture was required because O'Hare's conduct violated the 
fundamental tenets of his role as a State police trooper, where 
the protection of the vulnerable, including children, is at the 
heart of a police officer's role, and this repudiation of his 
8 
 
 
official duties violated the public's trust and the integrity of 
the State police.  State Bd. of Retirement v. O'Hare, 92 Mass. 
App. Ct. 555, 559 (2017). 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  General Laws c. 249, 
§ 4, "provides for limited judicial review in the nature of 
certiorari to correct errors of law in administrative 
proceedings where judicial review is otherwise unavailable."  
State Bd. of Retirement v. Bulger, 446 Mass. 169, 173 (2006).  
We may correct "only a substantial error of law, evidenced by 
the record, which adversely affects a material right of the 
plaintiff" and "rectify only those errors of law which have 
resulted in manifest injustice to the plaintiff or which have 
adversely affected the real interests of the general public" 
(citation omitted).  Garney v. Massachusetts Teachers' 
Retirement Sys., 469 Mass. 384, 388 (2014). 
 
2.  Pension forfeiture pursuant to G. L. c. 32, § 15.  a.  
Origins of § 15 (4).  General Laws c. 32, § 15, contains four 
subsections that generally govern the consequences that result 
from the commission of certain criminal offenses to retirement 
rights of public employees.  Subsection (1) applies to those 
situations in which a member of the retirement system "has been 
charged with the misappropriation of funds or property of any 
governmental unit" in which he or she was employed.  Three other 
9 
 
 
subsections establish the consequences of convictions of certain 
criminal offenses. 
Subsections (3) and (3A) are both entitled "Forfeiture of 
rights upon conviction."  Subsection (3) denies a retirement 
allowance after final conviction of such member "of an offense 
involving the funds or property of a governmental unit or system 
referred to in subdivision (1) of this section," and does not 
permit the return of retirement contributions "unless and until 
full restitution for any such misappropriation has been made."  
Subsection (3A) applies only in circumstances where a member has 
been convicted of certain specified offenses, i.e., those set 
forth in either G. L. c. 268A, § 2 ("Corrupt gifts, offers or 
promises to influence official acts; corruption of witnesses"), 
or G. L. c. 265, § 25 ("Attempted extortion; punishment"). 
 
Subsection (4), inserted by St. 1987, c. 697, § 47, and 
entitled "Forfeiture of pension upon misconduct," provides that 
"in no event" shall any member of the State retirement system be 
entitled to a retirement allowance "after final conviction of a 
criminal offense involving violation of the laws applicable to 
his office or position."5  This subsection was enacted in 
reaction to this court's decision in Collatos v. Boston 
Retirement Bd., 396 Mass. 684 (1986).  See Gaffney v. 
                     
 
5 Retirement contributions are returned to the member.  
G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4) (§ 15 [4]). 
10 
 
 
Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 423 Mass. 1, 3 (1996).  In 
Collatos, we determined that the Legislature intended subsection 
(3A) to result in forfeiture only if the employee was convicted 
of two specific State crimes.  Collatos, supra at 687.  As a 
result, a Federal conviction under the Hobbs Act, although 
arguably equivalent to a State offense enumerated in the 
statute, did not compel forfeiture.  Id. at 687-688.  Shortly 
after that decision, the Legislature inserted § 15 (4) 
"providing for an intermediate level of pension forfeiture in a 
broader array of circumstances."  Gaffney, supra. 
 
b.  Application of § 15 (4).  Our first substantive 
decision considering the applicability of § 15 (4) was Gaffney, 
423 Mass. 1.  In that case, the superintendent of the Shrewsbury 
water and sewer department pleaded guilty to stealing money and 
property from the town over the course of several years.  Id. at 
2.  We reiterated our position in Collatos that pension 
forfeiture provisions are penal in character and must be 
construed narrowly.  Gaffney, supra at 3.  We considered this in 
tandem with the Legislature's apparent intention to expand the 
circumstances leading to pension forfeiture.  Id. at 3-4 ("In 
using a broad phrase to describe the condition precedent to 
forfeiture, the intent clearly is to avoid having the precise 
form of the criminal enforcement action make a difference with 
respect to the pension forfeiture issue.  Further evidence of 
11 
 
 
this stems from the title of § 15 [4] -- 'Forfeiture of pension 
upon misconduct'").  In that case we rejected an approach that 
would have § 15 (4) operate "only in cases of violations of 
highly specialized crimes addressing official actions, while not 
providing the same when officials engage in criminal activities 
in the course of their duties."  Id. at 4.  We reasoned that the 
Legislature did not intend for forfeiture to necessarily follow 
"any and all criminal convictions" and that the "substantive 
touchstone" is "criminal activity connected with the office or 
position" (emphasis added).  Id. at 4-5 (emphasizing that 
§ 15 [4] targets "[o]nly those violations related to the 
member's official capacity").  In sum, we concluded that 
"[l]ooking to the facts of each case for a direct link between 
the criminal offense and the member's office or position best 
effectuates the legislative intent of § 15 (4)."  Id. at 5. 
 
Massachusetts appellate decisions over the next decade 
reflect consistent application of § 15 (4) where members had 
engaged in criminal activities in the course of their duties, 
often resulting in at least one violation of a statute expressly 
applicable to public employees or officials.  See, e.g., MacLean 
v. State Bd. of Retirement, 432 Mass. 339, 340 (2000) (member of 
Legislature convicted of violating State conflict of interest 
law); Robinson v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 62 Mass. 
App. Ct. 935, 936 (2005) (police officer convicted of, inter 
12 
 
 
alia, conspiring with his partner to embezzle, steal, or obtain 
by fraud or otherwise significant sums of money that were under 
care and custody of their department); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of 
Md. v. Sproules, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 93, 94 (2003) (police chief 
convicted of larceny of controlled substance; attempting to 
procure perjury; intimidation of witness; and fraud or 
embezzlement by city, town, or county officer). 
 
The opinion of Bulger, 446 Mass. at 179, which appears to 
rest on a broader interpretation of the statute, presented a 
novel set of facts.  In that case, a clerk-magistrate was 
convicted of perjury and obstruction of justice in the context 
of an arguably personal matter.  The convictions were 
unconnected factually to his position, and neither conviction 
expressly applied to public officials or employees.  However, 
this court reasoned that "laws" applicable to clerk-magistrates 
included the Code of Professional Responsibility for Clerks of 
the Courts (code), S.J.C. Rule 3:12, as amended, 427 Mass. 1322 
(1998).  Bulger, supra at 177-178.  Because the clerk-
magistrate's perjury and obstruction of justice convictions 
clearly violated the code, a law applicable to his position, 
they resulted in forfeiture of his pension.  Id. at 179. 
 
Notably, we recognized that not every code violation would 
compel forfeiture:  "the language of the code enunciating the 
high standards to which clerks are held is broad, whereas the 
13 
 
 
language of . . . § 15 (4) . . . is narrower, no doubt due to 
the severity of pension forfeiture as a sanction for dereliction 
of duty by a member."6  Id. at 178.  "Depending on the misconduct 
at issue, there may be instances when removal of a clerk-
magistrate from office is mandated by G. L. c. 211, § 4, because 
it serves the public good, but pension benefits are not 
concomitantly terminated because the misconduct at issue does 
not fall within the purview of G. L. c. 32, § 15.  For example, 
a member may be convicted of a criminal offense that does not 
involve any violation of the laws applicable to his office or 
position."  Id. at 179.  We emphasized that in that case the 
clerk-magistrate's commission of perjury and obstruction of 
justice "violated the fundamental tenets of the code."  Id.  
Therefore, forfeiture was required.  See Retirement Bd. of 
Somerville v. Buonomo, 467 Mass. 662, 671 (2014) (forfeiture 
required where register of probate's convictions violated code 
                     
 
6 We also rejected the argument that we should consider 
whether the clerk-magistrate's convictions, had they occurred 
while he was still employed as a clerk-magistrate, would have 
resulted in removal:  "such an analysis is too broad, and it 
fails to recognize that the standards for a member's removal 
from office and for a member's forfeiture of a retirement 
allowance are different."  State Bd. of Retirement v. Bulger, 
446 Mass. 169, 178 (2006).  "[The] parameters for entering or 
remaining in the profession are not the same as the standard for 
forfeiting a pension to which an employee has contributed and 
that he or she earned over the course of many years of public 
service."  Garney v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement Sys., 
469 Mass. 384, 391 (2014). 
14 
 
 
as well as at least one law plainly applicable to public 
officers). 
 
After Bulger, Massachusetts appellate courts continued to 
uphold pension forfeitures in a narrow set of circumstances:  
those where a member had either (1) engaged in criminal activity 
factually connected to his or her position or (2) violated a law 
expressly applicable to public employees or officials.  See 
State Bd. of Retirement v. Finneran, 476 Mass. 714, 722-723 
(2017) (forfeiture required where Speaker of House's conviction 
of felony obstruction of justice resulted from false testimony 
he provided concerning his participation as Speaker in 
redistricting planning process); Buonomo, 467 Mass. at 672 
(forfeiture required where register of probate convicted on 
multiple counts of breaking into depository [workplace cash 
vending machine]; larceny; and embezzlement by public officer); 
Dell'Isola v. State Bd. of Retirement, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 547, 
553-554 (2017) (forfeiture required where correction officer's 
conviction of possession of cocaine resulted from officer's on-
duty communications with inmate in custody); Durkin v. Boston 
Retirement Bd., 83 Mass. App. Ct. 116, 119 (2013) (forfeiture 
required where police officer used department-issued firearm to 
shoot fellow officer while intoxicated and off duty); Maher v. 
Justices of the Quincy Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 67 Mass. 
App. Ct. 612, 616-617, 621 (2006) (forfeiture required where 
15 
 
 
chief plumbing and gas inspector broke into city's personnel 
office, destroyed city property, and stole documents from his 
own personnel file with aim of removing documents criticizing 
his performance as chief inspector to improve his chances of 
reappointment). 
 
By contrast, our appellate courts declined to uphold 
forfeitures where there were neither factual connections nor 
violations of laws expressly applicable to public employees or 
officials.7  See Garney, 469 Mass. at 387 n.7, 394-395 
(forfeiture not required as result of teacher's convictions of 
purchase and possession of child pornography where teacher 
committed his crimes outside of school, without using school 
resources or otherwise using his position to facilitate his 
crimes, and without involving students in his illicit 
activities); Retirement Bd. of Maynard v. Tyler, 83 Mass. App. 
Ct. 109, 109, 112-113 (2013) (firefighter's sexual abuse 
convictions did not support forfeiture where acts occurred off 
                     
 
7 We also have declined to require forfeiture pursuant to 
§ 15 (4) where total forfeiture would violate the excessive 
fines clause of the Eighth Amendment.  See Public Employee 
Retirement Admin. Comm'n v. Bettencourt, 474 Mass. 60, 78–79 
(2016) (§ 15 [4] could not be enforced against police officer 
who violated laws applicable to his position by illegally 
accessing personnel files of fellow officers while on duty in 
his official capacity as watch commander, on department 
premises, and while using department computer, because complete 
forfeiture of retirement benefits was not proportional to 
gravity of underlying offenses of which he was convicted). 
16 
 
 
duty outside fire house and firefighter did not use "his 
position, uniform, or equipment for the purposes of his indecent 
acts"); Scully v. Retirement Bd. of Beverly, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 
538, 543 (2011) (forfeiture not required as consequence of 
library employee's convictions of possession of child 
pornography where there was no evidence that employee used his 
position or library resources to facilitate crime); Herrick v. 
Essex Regional Retirement Bd., 77 Mass. App. Ct. 645, 653-655 
(2010) (forfeiture not required where housing authority 
custodian committed indecent assault and battery on daughter 
because offense was not committed on housing authority property 
or against any residents there, and offense did not bear other 
connection to custodian's position). 
 
In short, our precedent requires a "direct link" between 
the criminal offense and the member's office or position, either 
"factual" or "legal."  Finneran, 476 Mass. at 720.  In cases 
involving factual links, a public employee's pension is subject 
to forfeiture only "where there is a direct factual connection 
between the public employee's crime and position."  Id. at 720-
721, and cases cited.  In cases involving legal links, a public 
employee's pension is subject to forfeiture only "when a public 
employee commits a crime directly implicating a statute that is 
specifically applicable to the employee's position."  Id. at 
721, citing Buonomo, 467 Mass. at 664-666, and Bulger, 446 Mass. 
17 
 
 
at 177-180.  The requisite legal link is shown "where the crime 
committed is 'contrary to a central function of the position as 
articulated in applicable laws.'"  Finneran, supra, quoting 
Garney, 469 Mass. at 391. 
 
3.  Analysis.  Neither Swallow's nor O'Hare's conduct was 
factually connected to his position as a police officer.  In 
addition, none of their convictions expressly applied to public 
officials or employees.  The question then is whether the 
convictions nevertheless constituted violations of "the laws 
applicable" to their positions.  G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4). 
 
The boards argue that the officers' convictions violated 
the fundamental tenets of their positions such that there are 
sufficient legal links to merit forfeiture.  In reaching this 
conclusion, they emphasize that police officers voluntarily 
undertake to adhere to a higher standard of conduct than do 
ordinary citizens, that as law enforcement officials they hold a 
position of special public trust, and that each officer's 
conduct blatantly violated that trust.  Specifically, the Essex 
board argues that this case is analogous to Durkin in that 
Swallow's convictions are inconsistent with his position's 
obligations and the requirement that he "behave in a manner that 
brings honor and respect for rather than public distrust of law 
enforcement."  In a similar vein, the State board argues that 
O'Hare's convictions undermined the central role of a State 
18 
 
 
police trooper as articulated in the rules and regulations of 
the State police and undercut public confidence in the integrity 
of the State police. 
 
a.  Violation of special public trust.  The Essex board 
argues that under Durkin forfeiture is required where a police 
officer's violation of the law demonstrates a "violation of the 
public's trust" and a "repudiation of his official duties."  
Durkin, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 119.  Indeed, both boards posit 
that the special position of trust police officers occupy in our 
society must factor into the determination whether an officer 
has violated a law applicable to his or her position.  The State 
board goes so far as to suggest that the commission of any crime 
is contrary to the central functions of a law enforcement 
official's position as a result of their "special position" in 
our society and thus might result in forfeiture.  We disagree. 
 
First, the Essex board's reliance on Durkin for the 
proposition that where a police officer violates the public 
trust and shirks his or her official duties forfeiture is 
mandatory is misplaced.  In that case, forfeiture was required 
where a police officer was convicted of assault and battery by 
means of a dangerous weapon for shooting another officer with 
his department-issued firearm.  Id. at 117.  Although the court 
discussed the fundamental nature of the police officer's 
position and noted that the officer had violated the public 
19 
 
 
trust by "engag[ing] in the very type of criminal behavior he 
was required by law to prevent," forfeiture was ultimately 
grounded on the factual connections between the officer's 
position and the criminal activity.  Id. at 118-119.  Cf. Tyler, 
83 Mass. App. Ct. at 112-113 (forfeiture not required where 
firefighter's offenses lacked any factual connection to his 
position).  In short, Durkin is not a "legal link" case.  Accord 
Finneran, 476 Mass. at 720. 
 
Second, we are not persuaded by the State board's argument 
that law enforcement officials are an exception to the 
proposition that pension forfeiture should not follow "as a 
consequence of any and all criminal convictions" because of 
their "special position" in our society.  See Gaffney, 423 Mass. 
at 5.  Indeed, the State board posits that "given the nature of 
the positions that troopers hold, the commission of any crime is 
contrary to the central functions of their positions to enforce 
the law and protect the public."  This is precisely the kind of 
unfettered breadth that we have consistently avoided.  See id. 
("Yet it is also apparent that the General Court did not intend 
pension forfeiture to follow as a sequelae of any and all 
criminal convictions"); Durkin, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 119 n.5 
("Notwithstanding the high standards placed on firefighters and 
police officers, not every off-duty illegal act qualifies as a 
violation of the laws applicable to his office or position" 
20 
 
 
[quotation and citation omitted]); Tyler, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 
112 (§ 15 [4] as currently written is "not so broad" as to 
"engulf nearly every public official, especially police officers 
and firefighters, convicted of any crime").  Regardless of the 
high standards placed on police officers, "not every off-duty 
illegal act qualifies as a violation of the laws applicable to 
his office or position" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Durkin, supra.  Accord Tyler, supra.  Indeed, § 15 (4) "requires 
something more specific than a violation of a special public 
trust in the particular public position."  Garney, 469 Mass. at 
393 (criminal conduct insufficient to justify forfeiture where 
it is "merely inconsistent with a concept of special public 
trust placed in the position or defiant of a general 
professional norm applicable to the position, but not violative 
of a fundamental precept of the position embodied in a law 
applicable to it").  Were we to adopt the State board's 
position, we would "expand the parameters" of § 15 (4) "well 
beyond what the Legislature intended for it to encompass."  Id.  
Every legal link must be "embodied in a law."  Finneran, 476 
Mass. at 721, quoting Garney, supra. 
 
b.  Applicable "laws" under § 15 (4).  Section 15 (4) is 
clear and unambiguous:  the Legislature intended that pension 
forfeiture result only where criminal conduct underlying a 
particular conviction involved a violation of the "laws" 
21 
 
 
applicable to the member's office or position.  In determining 
what this limitation means, we must give the language effect 
consistent with its plain meaning and refrain from reading into 
the statute "a provision which the Legislature did not see fit 
to put there" or "words that the Legislature had an option to, 
but chose not to include" (citation omitted).  Canton v. 
Commissioner of the Mass. Highway Dep't, 455 Mass. 783, 789, 794 
(2010) (statutory language should not be "enlarged or limited by 
construction unless its object and plain meaning require it" 
[citation omitted]).  Moreover, because § 15 (4) is penal in 
nature, its language must be construed narrowly, "not stretched 
to accomplish an unexpressed result."  Finneran, 476 Mass. at 
719–720, quoting Bulger, 446 Mass. at 174-175. 
 
The State board urges us to conclude that the "laws" 
applicable to the office or position of State police trooper 
include the State police rules and regulations, issued by the 
colonel of the State police pursuant to G. L. c. 22C, §§ 3 and 
10, which function as a code of conduct.  These regulations 
require, among other things, that troopers avoid conduct that 
brings the State police into disrepute and obey all of the laws 
of the United States and of the local jurisdiction in which the 
trooper is present.  We decline to do so. 
 
First, there is no indication that the Legislature intended 
§ 15 (4) to be triggered by a violation of a rule, regulation, 
22 
 
 
professional oath, code of conduct, or other internal practice 
or policy that does not have the force of law.  Had the 
Legislature so intended, it certainly could have included 
language to that effect, as it did in a preceding section.  See 
G. L. c. 32, § 10 (2) (c) ("Any member who is removed or 
discharged for violation of the laws, rules and regulations 
applicable to his office or position . . . shall not be entitled 
to the termination retirement allowance provided for in this 
subdivision").  We will not conclude that such language is 
implied where the Legislature has excluded it.  See Canton, 455 
Mass. at 789 ("where the Legislature has carefully employed a 
term in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be 
implied where excluded" [citation omitted]); State Bd. of 
Retirement v. Woodward, 446 Mass. 698, 706 (2006) (language 
appearing in one section of statute should not be read into 
another section where it does not appear). 
 
Second, the State board's reliance on Bulger and Buonomo 
for the proposition that codes of conduct might serve as the 
applicable "law" because they establish the standards governing 
the norms of conduct and practice is misplaced.  In Bulger, we 
concluded that the "laws" applicable to the office or position 
of clerk-magistrate include the code because "it establishes the 
very standards governing the norms of conduct and practice 
associated with such office," and the code has "the force of 
23 
 
 
law," i.e., it is just as binding on the court and the parties 
as would be a statute.  See Bulger, 446 Mass. at 177–178; 
Buonomo, 467 Mass. at 671.  See also Opinion of the Justices, 
375 Mass. 795, 813 (1978) (Supreme Judicial Court has "the 
authority by rule to establish standards of conduct for judicial 
employees and officials"); Empire Apartments, Inc. v. Gray, 353 
Mass. 333, 337 (1967) ("Rules of court have the force of law 
. . ."); Berkwitz, petitioner, 323 Mass. 41, 47 (1948) (rules of 
court "have the force of law and are just as binding on the 
court and the parties as would be a statute").  The code of 
conduct relied on by the State board is neither a court rule nor 
a statute.  Cf. G. L. c. 22C (applicable to State police).  In 
short, it is not a "law" for purposes of § 15 (4). 
 
While the officers' actions were clear and serious 
violations of the law, it does not automatically follow that 
they are subject to loss of their retirement allowance by virtue 
of either their heightened obligation to uphold the law or their 
special position of trust in our society.  Our case law is 
consistent on this point -- a legal link requires in the first 
instance a violation of an expressly applicable "law."  See 
Finneran, 476 Mass. at 721 (criminal conduct must directly 
implicate statute that is specifically applicable to employee's 
position); Garney, 469 Mass. at 391 (criminal conduct must be 
contrary to central function of position as articulated in 
24 
 
 
applicable laws).  See also Buonomo, 467 Mass. at 670-671 
(sufficient legal link between convictions and office where 
public official's criminal conduct violated fundamental tenets 
of code); Bulger, 446 Mass. at 179 (same).  In this case, 
neither board has identified a law expressly applicable to 
police officers that either Swallow or O'Hare can be said to 
have violated.  Thus, "[t]he critical alignment of crime and 
office through an applicable law, as required by this narrow 
statute, is simply not present."  Garney, supra at 395.  We 
conclude that in these cases, where there are neither factual 
links nor legal links between the officers' positions and their 
convictions, forfeiture of their pension allowances is not 
legally tenable. 
 
Conclusion.  We affirm the decisions of the Superior Court 
judges affirming the District Court judges' decisions and 
vacating the boards' decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.