Case Title: TRENT BREON DEAN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0017

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-10-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
TRENT BREON DEAN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 124194 P.3d 299Case Number: S-08-0017Decided: 10/10/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
TRENT BREON 
DEAN,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The Honorable Peter G. 
Arnold, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane M. Lozano, 
WyomingState Public Defender; Tina 
N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and Kirk A. Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate 
Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Morgan.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. Salzburg, 
Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Jenny L. Craig, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Craig.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Trent 
Breon Dean (Mr. Dean), was convicted of committing a third or subsequent battery 
against a household member, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b) and 
(f)(ii) (LexisNexis 2007).1  This battery was committed upon his wife 
and it was a third or subsequent offense of such a crime by Mr. Dean (although 
the prior offenses included victims other than his wife, Mrs. Dean was subjected 
to at least 5 documented prior domestic violence incidents).  By Judgment and Sentence entered on 
November 9, 2007, and amended on December 4, 2007, Dean was sentenced to serve a 
term of imprisonment of 36 to 50 months.

 
 
[¶2]      Dean contends 
that the district court erred in permitting an expert witness to vouch for the 
credibility and truthfulness (or lack thereof) of witnesses who have been 
victims of domestic violence (and, thus, also Mrs. Dean), as well as in 
permitting that same expert witness to provide improper character evidence 
concerning Mr. Dean.  We will 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      Dean raises these 
issues:

 
 
1.  Did the 
trial court err in allowing the State's expert witness, Carla Thurin, to testify 
to the credibility and truthfulness of witnesses who have been victims of 
domestic violence?

 
 
2.  Did the 
trial court err in allowing the State's expert witness, Carla Thurin, to testify 
to the "cycle of violence" associated with domestic violence as said testimony 
was used by the State as improper character evidence against 
[Dean]?

 
 
The State rephrases 
the issues like this:

 
 
I.          
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed the State's 
expert witness, Carla Thurin, to testify about typical victim behavior in 
domestic violence cases?

 
 
II.         
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed the State's 
expert witness, Carla Thurin, to testify about the "cycle of violence" in 
domestic violence cases?

 
 
FACTS AND 
PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶4]      On February 1, 
2007, a neighbor of Mrs. Dean called 911 to report a disturbance at the Dean 
household.  The neighbor initially 
just heard the disturbance (yelling and screaming), but then went to his front 
door and looked out to see what was going on.  He started to walk over to observe the 
commotion and noted that Mr. Dean had a hold on Mrs. Dean's "hair and she had 
her hands behind her back like this (indicating) on his hands to prevent her 
from being pulled."  The neighbor 
started to go over to say something like, "knock it off," but when he saw two 
men in a car in front of the Dean house, he went back inside and called 
911.  He was motivated to do so 
because he did not think "any man or any woman for that matter has the right to 
physically abuse another human being whether they are married or not."  His perception was that Mr. Dean was 
abusing his wife.  He perceived Mr. 
Dean to be "very angry," and Mrs. Dean appeared to be afraid and was 
crying.

 
 
[¶5]      The police 
arrived at the Dean household after being summoned by the neighbor's call and 
they investigated the incident.  
Cheyenne Police Officer Andy Gutierrez was the principal 
investigator.  Beginning in 2003, 
Officer Gutierrez's area of investigative expertise was domestic violence calls 
(Community Advocacy Response Initiative -- CARI).  He had special training for that 
assignment and did 12 to 13 such calls a week.  Officer Gutierrez was assisted by a 
volunteer "advocate."  Mrs. Dean 
reported having her hair pulled and that she had a knot on the back of her head, 
probably from being thrown up against the wall.2  Mrs. Dean also reported that Mr. Dean 
threw a cordless telephone at her.  
She had picked up the phone to call for help and Mr. Dean took it from 
her and threw it at her as she walked away from him.  Testimony from Officer Gutierrez, as 
well as photographic evidence, documented that the phone had imprinted a 
telltale red mark (in the shape of a phone) on her left side.  A second Cheyenne Police Officer, Dave 
Padilla, was sent out to the Dean household the day of this battery incident 
because Officer Gutierrez forgot to take pictures of the bruising left on Mrs. 
Dean's back by the cordless phone.  
His testimony also tended to corroborate Mrs. Dean's initial report to 
the police.

 
 
[¶6]      We will not set 
out the details of the circumstances that led up to this altercation, other than 
to note that Mr. Dean had sent his wife flowers and a box of chocolates with a 
card that said, "I love you."  Mrs. 
Dean was not at work because she had stayed home sick, so Mr. Dean had to have 
the candy and flowers redirected to her home.  At this particular time, Mr. Dean was 
living with his sister and Mr. and Mrs. Dean had mutually agreed to live apart 
for a while because they were having marital problems.

 
 
[¶7]      Officer Gutierrez 
testified that Mrs. Dean reported that shortly after the delivery (between 10:00 
a.m. and noon), Mr. Dean arrived and an argument ensued almost immediately.  He shoved Mrs. Dean into a chair.  When she got up, he slapped her in the 
head.  The argument moved into the 
kitchen where she was pushed into the kitchen stove.  She grabbed a knife, but he took it away 
from her.  She then grabbed the 
phone to call for help and he took the phone from her and then threw it at her a 
few minutes later.   At this 
point she ran outside the house and was yelling for help, which is about the 
time the neighbor mentioned above came onto the scene.  After Mr. Dean left the scene, the 
neighbor went over to Mrs. Dean's house and he was still there comforting her 
when the police arrived.  Officer 
Gutierrez had Mrs. Dean prepare a written statement and she signed it and it was 
witnessed by the victim advocate who accompanied Officer 
Gutierrez.

 
 
[¶8]      Officer Gutierrez 
looked at the booking log and testified that it indicated that Mr. Dean had no 
injuries when he came to the jail.  
This incident occurred on Thursday, February 1, 2007, and on the 
following Monday, Mrs. Dean called Officer Gutierrez and recanted her story, 
saying that she started the fight.  
The officer further testified that such recantations occur in "darn near 
90 percent" of such cases.  Defense 
counsel followed up on that line of questioning on cross-examination and Officer 
Gutierrez indicated that in his experience such recantations were never 
true.  With respect to such 
recantations, Officer Gutierrez explained that:  "The stories are very inconsistent with 
the initial story that is provided.  
Most of the time they just don't want to lose the relationship.  They know if they recant the story they 
won't be in any trouble."  Upon 
being asked, Officer Gutierrez reported that Mrs. Dean had visited her husband 
in the jail between February 1, 2007, and the day of her 
recantation.

 
 
[¶9]      At trial, Mrs. 
Dean testified and shifted responsibility for the incident from Mr. Dean to 
herself, saying that she had goaded him into an argument (because he was drunk) 
and that she was physically abusive to him, but he was not physically abusive to 
her.  She related that she initially 
told the police what she did because she wanted to get her husband into trouble 
and because she was afraid she might be arrested if she told the truth because 
she had been the aggressor.

 
 
[¶10]   No issue is raised with respect to 
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain Mr. Dean's conviction, but we note 
here that the jury was presented:  
(1) with the testimony of Mrs. Dean's neighbor, (2) Officer 
Gutierrez's description of the scene, (4) the photographs which were taken 
at the scene, and (5) Officer Padilla's corroborative testimony.  All of that evidence was pertinent to 
the finding of guilt the jury made in this case.  Mrs. Dean's recantation of her written 
statement served to exonerate Mr. Dean.  
Per the Court's instructions to the jury, the core of Officer Gutierrez's 
testimony, i.e., what Mrs. Dean told him the day of the incident, could only be 
considered by the jury in judging her credibility.  That was also true of Mrs. Dean's 
written statement which went like this:

 
 
On February 
1st around 12 noon Trent [Mr. Dean] came to my house drunk and rang 
the doorbell.  I opened it and he 
started yelling at me.  He hit me in 
my head and threw several objects at me.  
I picked up a knife to stab him but he took the knife away.  I kept screaming and begging for him to 
leave.  Our 3 yr. old daughter was 
screaming and asking for him to stop and leave.  He grabbed the phone when I tried to get 
it and he broke it.  I tried to run 
to the neighbors to call the police.  
He ran after me and grabbed me by the hair and pulled me back into the 
house.  He threw me into the chair 
and the wall. His cousins ran into the house & grabbed him & 
left.

 
 
[¶11]   The jury was instructed as follows 
with regard to Officer Gutierrez's testimony and Mrs. Dean's written 
statement:

 
 
Prior inconsistent 
statements made by Tricia Dean can be considered only for the limited purpose of 
impeachment of her credibility and may not be considered as substantive evidence 
of the crime.

You must not consider 
this evidence for any purpose except the limited purpose for which it was 
admitted.

 
 
[¶12]   This instruction became the law of 
the case here, but we question whether it is a correct statement of the law that 
should have been applied, i.e., Officer Gutierrez's testimony and Mrs. Dean's 
prior sworn statement could have been considered as substantive evidence of the 
crime charged under these circumstances.

 
 
[¶13]   The only issue raised in this 
appeal is whether or not the district court erred in allowing the admission of 
Carla Thurin's testimony.  She was 
called and was qualified as an expert witness with respect to matters involving 
victims of domestic violence and that they are often motivated to shift blame 
from the abuser to themselves and to recant when the batterer is facing criminal 
prosecution.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶14]   Standard of 
Review

 
 
            
A decision to admit or reject expert testimony rests solely within the 
discretion of the district court and is not disturbed on appeal absent a clear 
showing of an abuse of discretion.  
Williams v. State, 2002 WY 
184, ¶ 5, 60 P.3d 151, 153-154 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
            
When reviewing matters pertaining to the admission of testimony of expert 
witnesses, we look to the standard this Court adopted in Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467 
(Wyo. 
1999).  In that case, this Court 
adopted the reasoning used by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), which has been 
further clarified as follows:

 
 
The trial court must 
have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an expert's reliability, 
and to decide whether or when special briefing or other proceedings are needed 
to investigate reliability, as it enjoys when it decides whether or not that 
expert's relevant testimony is reliable.  
Our opinion in Joiner [General 
Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 118 S. Ct. 512, 139 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1997)] makes clear that a court of appeals is to apply an 
abuse-of-discretion standard when it "review[s] a trial court's decision to 
admit or exclude expert testimony."  
522 U.S.  at 138-39, 118 S. Ct. 512, 139 L. Ed. 2d 508.   That standard 
applies as much to the trial court's decisions about how to determine 
reliability as to its ultimate conclusion.... Thus, whether Daubert's specific factors are, or are 
not, reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case is a matter that 
the law grants the trial judge broad latitude to 
determine.

 
 

Kumho Tire Company, 
Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1176, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1999).  "In determining 
whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or 
not the court could reasonably conclude as it did."  Campbell v. Studer, 970 P.2d 389, 392 
(Wyo. 
1998).

 
 
" [D]ecisions of the 
trial court with respect to the admissibility of evidence are entitled to 
considerable deference and, as long as there exists a legitimate basis for the 
trial court's ruling, that ruling will not be reversed on appeal.' "  It is also well established that a 
district court judgment may be affirmed on any proper legal grounds supported by 
the record.  However, where the law 
imposes a duty on the district court to make findings on the record, we will not 
speculate as to the reasons for the decision.

 
 

Bunting, 984 P.2d  at 470 
(quoting English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 143 (Wyo. 
1999)).

 
 
            
A qualified expert witness may testify about scientific, technical, or 
specialized knowledge if such testimony will help the jury understand the 
case.  W.R.E. 702.  This court has adopted the federal Daubert model imposing gatekeeping 
responsibilities on trial courts deciding whether scientific or technical expert 
testimony is admissible.  See Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467, 471 
(Wyo. 1999) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 
2796, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993)).  In 
doing so, however, we did not "abandon our own precedent regarding the 
admissibility of expert testimony."  
Bunting, 984 P.2d  at 471.  Under the Daubert model, the trial court must 
first determine whether the expert's methodology is reliable; then the court 
must determine whether the proposed testimony "fits" the facts of the particular 
case.  Id. A district 
court's decision to admit or reject expert testimony is a decision solely within 
that court's discretion.  Seivewright v. State, 7 P.3d 24, 29 
(Wyo. 2000); Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435, 438 (Wyo. 1993); Betzle 
v. State, 847 P.2d 1010, 1022 (Wyo. 1993).

 
 

Cooper v. 
State, 2008 WY 5, 
¶¶ 9-10, 174 P.3d 726, 728-29 (Wyo. 2008) (quoting Williams v. State, 2002 WY 184, 
¶ 5, 60 P.3d 151, 153-54 (Wyo. 2002)).

 
 
[¶15]   In addition to this general 
standard of review, we must also consult our long-standing rule that an expert 
may not vouch for the truthfulness or credibility of an alleged victim or of any 
other witness.  Seward v. State, 2003 WY 116, ¶ 19, 
76 P.3d 805, 814 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
Thurin's Testimony Was 
Not Directed at Mrs. Dean's Truthfulness and It Was Not Improper Character 
Evidence against Mr. Dean

 
 
[¶16]   No issue is raised as to whether or 
not Carla Thurin was qualified as an expert in her field or whether or not her 
testimony was based on her specialized knowledge in an area we have long 
recognized as appropriate for expert testimony.  See Kenyon v. State, 2004 WY 100, 
¶¶ 21-23, 96 P.3d 1016, 1025 (Wyo. 2004); Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, 
¶¶ 17-20, 33 P.3d 758, 764-65 (Wyo. 2001); Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 64-66 
(dissenting opinions) (Wyo. 1999); Trujillo v. State, 953 P.2d 1182, 
1186-87 (Wyo. 1998); and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-203 (LexisNexis 2007) (enacted in 
1993) and compare Duran v. State, 990 P.2d 1005, 1009-10 (Wyo. 1999); Buhrle v. 
State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Wyo. 1981); Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741, 746-50 
(Wyo. 1993).

 
 
[¶17]   W.R.E. 702 provides that:  "If scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise."  However, the 
application of that rule must be tempered by W.R.E. 403 ("Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence."), W.R.E. 404(a) ("Evidence of a person's character or a 
trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he 
acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion[.]"), and W.R.E. 404(b) 
("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith.  It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.").

 
 
[¶18]   Thurin's testimony was preceded by 
this admonition from the trial judge:

 
 
            
Ladies and gentlemen, I need to give you a little bit [of information] about expert witness testimony.  There are times in a case when a witness 
who is not an eyewitness to a case is qualified to provide opinions based on her 
experience and training and education providing an opinion that would help 
explain and give you guidance on how to evaluate and receive evidence.  Ms. Thurin has been accepted by me as an 
expert in the area of victims who suffer from domestic 
violence.

 
 
[¶19]   Prior to their deliberations, the 
jury was instructed:

 
 
            
A person is qualified to testify as an expert if that person has special 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify as an 
expert on the subject to which the testimony relates.

            
Duly qualified experts may give their opinions on questions in 
controversy at a trial.  To assist 
you in deciding such questions, you may consider the opinion with the reasons 
given for it, if any, by the expert who gives the opinion.  You may also consider the qualifications 
and credibility of the expert.

            
You are not bound to accept an expert opinion as conclusive, but should 
give to it the weight to which you find it to be entitled.  You may disregard any such opinion if 
you find it to be unreasonable.

 
 
[¶20]   Thurin's testimony was relatively 
brief.  It began with an 
acknowledgement that she did not know Mrs. Dean and that she was not familiar 
with any part of the instant case.  
She opined that victims of domestic abuse frequently suffer from low 
self-esteem and believe they need the abuser to function in their day-to-day 
life.  Many victims who seek help 
from professionals will not necessarily leave the abuser.  Some victims will leave the abuser after 
a single event, but on average they will be abused seven times before they leave 
for good.

 
 
[¶21]   Not all domestic abuse consists of 
beatings and bruising.  Instead, 
many victims are kept isolated and economically deprived and are told that they 
cannot live without the abuser.  
They are sometimes threatened with losing their children or 
finances.  Many victims will not go 
to the police.  They will seek 
social services and they are encouraged to report, but many do not.  Many victims grow up seeing abuse 
between their parents.  Alcohol and 
drugs are often involved in domestic abuse.  Infidelity or suspicion of infidelity 
may be a factor.  Ms. Thurin opined 
that about one in four or five victims will recant a report of abuse.  There are many reasons behind 
recantations (loss of children, finances, a home) but fear is the number one 
reason  i.e., that the abuser will get them somehow even if the abuser is in 
custody.  Often abusers can "guilt" 
the victim into visiting the abuser while he (or she, but usually he) is in 
custody and then convince the victim that the whole thing is really her 
fault.  Victims come to believe that 
if they had not done "x," "y," or "z" (whatever it might be), then none of this 
would have happened  I deserved it.

 
 
[¶22]   Ms. Thurin spoke in generalities 
about the "cycle of violence" but the scenarios she described were not directly 
pertinent to the facts and circumstances of this case and she qualified her 
descriptions with the caveat that "every relationship is 
different."

 
 
[¶23]   Near the end of her testimony, the 
prosecutor asked Ms. Thurin some questions about "truth telling" by victims of 
abuse and over Mr. Dean's objections they were answered.  Thurin opined that once victims get to a 
point where they want out of the relationship they will tell the truth.  If the victim has a good support system 
(family, friends, etc.) they are more likely to tell the truth.  The primary reason for not telling the 
truth is fear, and that fear is heightened when the victim must appear in the 
courtroom with the abuser.  In 
cross-examination, the defense attorney reinforced that the basis for all of Ms. Thurin's 
testimony was the "average" such case and not the instant 
case.

 
 
[¶24]   Much of the pertinent case law is 
summarized by Cynthia Lynn Barnes, Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning 
Domestic-Violence Syndromes to Assist Jury in Evaluating Victim's Testimony or 
Behavior, 57 A.L.R.5th 315 (1998 and Supp.2008).  At its outset, that annotation 
recognizes that the cluster of syndromes associated with domestic violence has 
expanded greatly since it first gained a foothold in the early 1980's.  Id., § 2[a] at 
330.  The annotation also includes 
cases that hold that prior to the admission of such expert testimony, the 
proponent of the evidence must establish that the victim is a battered woman or 
victim of domestic abuse (although generally the expert is not allowed to 
testify before the jury that the subject of the testimony is a battered 
woman).  Id., § 
3[c].  No issue in that regard is 
raised in this appeal.

 
 
[¶25]   In § 7 of the annotation several 
cases are discussed which relate directly to the circumstances at hand.  We intend to quote from those cases 
quite liberally because, although the issues raised in this case are quite 
narrow, they are better understood if those issues are discussed in the broader 
scope of the subject matter at hand.  
Moreover, although not raised in this appeal, many of those "other" 
issues are implicated in this appeal.

 
 
[¶26]   For instance, in the case State v. Yusuf, 800 A.2d 590, 613-21 
(Conn. 2002), 
an expert testified about the battered woman syndrome to aid the jury in 
understanding the victim's behavior:

 
 
Our Supreme Court has 
held that expert testimony concerning battered woman syndrome is relevant "to 
describe the behavior patterns typically ascribed to battered [woman] 
syndrome."  State v. 
Borrelli, 227 Conn. 153, 174, 629 A.2d 1105 (1993).

 
 
In the present case, 
Stark [the expert] testified at length with respect to battered woman syndrome 
on the basis of his experience with battered women and research into domestic 
violence.  Stark defined "woman battering" as 
"involv[ing] a course of conduct that includes, but is not limited to, multiple 
instances of physical abuse or assault and the pattern of isolation, 
intimidation, mental abuse and control."  
He indicated that there is a subgroup of battered women, which, as a 
result of repeated abuse, suffers what he termed a "learned helplessness," which 
is exhibited "after they [experience] frustration in trying to extricate 
themselves from the situation or, for whatever reason, they simply [give] up for 
a period of time, at least, and [believe] that they [cannot] escape from the 
situation even when there [are] opportunities for them to do 
so."

 
 
.

 
 
Stark then described 
the second part of the syndrome, the "cycle of violence," which "feeds into" the 
learned helplessness.  He explained 
that in abusive situations, "there [is] a buildup of tension, which [creates] 
tremendous anxiety and fear on the part of the victim, and then there [is] an 
episode of physical abuse...."  
Thereafter, he continued, there occurs what is called "the honeymoon 
phase" in which the abusive partner apologizes.  Stark indicated that it is during that 
honeymoon phase that a battered woman often is drawn into the relationship 
because she "desperately [wants] to believe things [will] change, [and she 
hopes] they might change during this period where the apology or the promises 
dominate, [and] the battered woman in a sense [gets] sucked into the 
relationship more deeply than she would have otherwise been; common sense should 
have told her to leave, but now she's confused ... [a]nd the result is ... that 
she is there when the second episode occurs and possibly the third."  Stark testified that at that point, the 
abuser "may no longer apologize, he may no longer be promising change, but 
because of the cycle of violence, she's in some sense entrapped in the 
relationship and, because of the ongoing abuse, that entrapment leads to ... 
learn[ed] helplessness and then, at least for a period of time, [she] is unable 
to seek help ... even when it's offered."  
Such women, Stark explained, "shift their focus from escape, from getting 
out of the relationship, to merely surviving in the relationship, and they may 
identify exposing the facts in the relationship to friends or authorities as 
counter to their interest in surviving either because [the abuser] threatened 
them with punishment if they report or because they believe at that point, 
because of the isolation and intimidation, that he has powers which he does not 
have, in her mind."

 
 
During his testimony, 
Stark also was asked a number of hypothetical questions that tracked the facts 
that gave rise to the charges against the defendant.  
Generally, with respect to each hypothetical question, Stark was asked to 
give his expert opinion whether the hypothetical victim's conduct was consistent 
with that of a woman suffering from battered woman syndrome.  In each case, Stark concluded that the 
victim's conduct as set out in the hypothetical question was indeed consistent 
with a woman suffering from battered woman syndrome.

 
 
As previously stated, 
before expert testimony about battered woman syndrome becomes relevant, an 
evidentiary foundation must first be established that the victim is a battered 
woman and that her conduct is such that the jury would be aided by expert 
testimony providing an explanation therefor.  See id.  Here, contrary to the defendant's 
assertions, we conclude that the state presented sufficient evidence of an 
abusive relationship warranting the testimony on battered woman 
syndrome.

 
 
The state presented 
evidence that the defendant battered LeJeune on a number of occasions during the 
course of their relationship.  
Stark's testimony was offered to assist the jury in understanding whether 
LeJeune's conduct was consistent with the pattern and profile of a battered 
woman.  His expert testimony 
provided the jury with a relevant insight into LeJeune's behavior that it might 
not otherwise bring to its evaluation of her credibility.  That insight was made more significant 
in light of the defendant's extensive cross-examination of LeJeune, which 
focused on her failure to escape from the defendant when she had the opportunity 
to do so.

 
 
Moreover, Stark's 
testimony was particularly crucial to the jury's determination because although 
battered woman syndrome has become known to the public more widely than it was 
in the past, much of the subject still remains beyond the ken of the average 
juror.  Indeed, "[c]ommentators have 
noted that the research data indicates that potential jurors may hold beliefs 
and attitudes about abused women at variance with the views of experts who have 
studied or had experience with abused women.  In particular, males are likely to be 
skeptical about the fear the woman feels in an abusive relationship and about 
her inability to leave a setting in which abuse is threatened."  (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
Id., at 167, 629 A.2d 1105.  Reliance, therefore, on 
an expert such as Stark in a case such as this one was well warranted.  See State v. Vega, supra, 259 
Conn. at 393, 
788 A.2d 1221.

 
 
We conclude therefore 
that the court properly determined that Stark's testimony concerning battered 
woman syndrome was relevant to assist the jury in understanding whether 
LeJeune's conduct was consistent with the pattern and profile of a battered 
woman and to the issue of her credibility.

 
 
B

 
 
The defendant also 
claims that the prejudicial effect of Stark's testimony outweighed its probative 
value. We disagree.

 
 

"There are situations 
where the potential prejudicial effect of relevant evidence would suggest its 
exclusion.  These are: (1) where the 
facts offered may unduly arouse the jury's emotions, hostility or sympathy, (2) 
where the proof and answering evidence it provokes may create a side issue that 
will unduly distract the jury from the main issues, (3) where the evidence 
offered and the counterproof will consume an undue amount of time, and (4) where 
the defendant, having no reasonable ground to anticipate the evidence, is 
unfairly surprised and unprepared to meet it."  (Internal quotation marks 
omitted.)  State v. Battista, 
supra, 31 Conn.App. at 515-16, 626 A.2d 769.  "The primary responsibility for 
conducting the prejudicial-probative balancing test rests with the trial court, 
and its conclusion will be disturbed only for a manifest abuse of 
discretion....  We note that 
[b]ecause of the difficulties inherent in this balancing process ... every 
reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the trial court's 
ruling."  (Internal quotation marks 
omitted.)  State v. Servello, 
59 Conn.App. 362, 377, 757 A.2d 36, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 940, 761 A.2d 764 
(2000).

 
 
As we already have 
concluded, Stark's testimony could have assisted the jury substantially in 
understanding whether LeJeune's conduct was consistent with the pattern and 
profile of a battered woman.  The 
court reasonably could have concluded that the probative value of that evidence 
outweighed its prejudicial effect.  
We therefore are not persuaded that the court abused its discretion in 
admitting Stark's testimony, especially in light of the court's limiting 
instruction to the jury.FN13

 
 
FN13.  
In its final charge to the jury, the court instructed in relevant 
part:  "Dr. Stark's testimony 
presented a general description of battered woman syndrome, and he then 
testified as to certain characteristics that are commonly found in relationships 
involving domestic violence and on general or typical behavior patterns of 
victims of domestic violence.  Dr. 
Stark, however, did not testify about whether Carissa LeJeune was in fact 
battered or whether her testimony here in court was truthful and accurate.  His testimony was offered instead to 
help you understand whether Ms. LeJeune's conduct was consistent with the 
pattern and profile of a battered woman to help explain her conduct and thus to 
aid you in evaluating the credibility of her testimony.

 
 
"Expert testimony is 
presented to you to assist you in your deliberations. No such testimony is 
binding upon you, however, and you may disregard such testimony either in whole 
or in part. It's up to you as triers of the facts to determine whether such 
testimony was credible and whether and how it applies to the case.  It's for you to consider the testimony 
with the other circumstances in the case and using your best judgment determine 
whether you will give it any weight and, if so, what weight you will give to 
it."

 
 
C

 
 
The defendant's last 
claim relative to Stark's testimony is that it improperly bolstered LeJeune's 
credibility and, thus, invaded the province of the jury.  We are not 
persuaded.

 
 

There is a "critical 
distinction between admissible expert testimony on general or typical behavior 
patterns of ... victims and inadmissible testimony directly concerning the 
particular victim's credibility."  
State v. Spigarolo, 210 Conn. 359, 379, 556 A.2d 112,cert. denied, 493 U.S. 933, 110 S. Ct. 322, 107 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1989).  Expert testimony properly may be 
admitted to assist the jury in understanding not whether the victim was credible 
on the witness stand, but whether the victim's conduct was consistent with the 
pattern and profile of a battered woman.  
See State v. Borrelli, supra, 227 Conn. at 174, 629 A.2d 1105.  Such explanatory testimony does not 
invade the province of the jury in assessing the credibility of witnesses. 
Id.  Furthermore, it is not impermissible for 
an expert witness to respond to hypothetical questions about the behavior of 
abuse victims for the purpose of establishing that the victim's behavior was 
generally consistent with that of such victims.  SeeState v. Freeney, 228 Conn. 582, 592-93, 637 A.2d 1088 (1994).

 
 
In the present case, 
Stark did not give his opinion as to whether LeJeune testified truthfully or 
whether she in fact suffered from battered woman syndrome.  His expert testimony could have assisted 
the jury substantially in understanding whether LeJeune's conduct was consistent 
with the pattern and profile of a battered woman.  Moreover, Stark provided the jury with a 
framework within which it could place and possibly explain the victim's 
behavior, which is within the accepted role of an expert witness.  See State v. Vega, supra, 259 
Conn. at 396, 
788 A.2d 1221.

 
 
Our review of the 
record leads us to conclude, therefore, that Stark's testimony did not invade 
the province of the jury in assessing LeJeune's credibility, especially in light 
of the court's limiting instruction to the jury.  
Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Stark's 
testimony.  [Some footnotes 
omitted.]

 
 
[¶27]   In the case State v. Borelli, 629 A.2d 1105, 1112-16 
(Conn. 1993), which is cited several times in the case immediately above, the 
appellate court dealt with a case quite similar to the instant 
case:

 
 
In the present case, 
Stark presented a general description of battered woman's syndrome, based on his 
experience with battered women and research and study in the area of domestic 
violence.  Stark defined the term 
"battered woman's syndrome" as referring "to the behavioral and psychological 
consequences that many victims, but by no means all victims, experience as a 
consequence of living in domestic violence situations."

 
 
Stark explained that 
there are certain characteristics that are commonly found in relationships 
involving domestic violence.  First, 
there is the "cycle of violence," in which "there's a period of tension build up 
in the relationship and then there's what we call the abusive episode where the 
batter [er] explodes and there's violence maybe combined with other forms of 
force and harassment ... and it's at that point or soon after that point that 
the battered woman may be quite clear about her danger and quite forthright in 
seeking help.  But the next phase is 
what we call the honeymoon phase or where the batter[er] either says he'll never 
do it again or ... enters some kind of treatment program....  And she doesn't want the relationship to 
end, she wants violence to end.  And 
she believes maybe this time it will be different.  So at that point she's likely to believe 
that, in fact, it won't happen again.  
And she may at that point then either change her story or try to ... do 
what she needs to do ... in order to survive and to feel safe in the 
relationship."

 
 
Stark testified that 
some battered women develop a "learned helplessness" from repeated failures to 
take control of the relationship.  
The result of such learned helplessness is that battered women fail to 
take advantage of subsequent opportunities to seek help and escape the battering 
situation.

 
 
Stark also testified: 
"Now, the battered woman's syndrome includes a lot of behaviors which don't make 
any sense when you understand them as an outsider, but only make sense when you 
understand them from the standpoint of survival and safety."  Stark testified that battered women may 
stay in a relationship with an abuser despite the abuse.  Battered women commonly fail to report 
their problems or delay reporting them to the authorities or others.  Such women, who have suffered 
extraordinary harm, commonly minimize or even deny the harm that they have 
suffered. Finally, there is the "paradoxical situation ... where a woman will 
come in on one occasion and present a very clear and concise picture of danger 
that she's in, either explaining it to her health provider or to a police 
officer, and then a week later completely change her story."  Stark testified that this last pattern 
"is one of the most common things that we see in the 
field."

 
 
Stark's testimony was 
consistent with the theory of battered woman's syndrome as it has been presented 
and discussed in scholarly commentary.  
See L. Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome (1984) pp. 86-94, pp. 95-104; 
R. Schuller & N. Vidmar, "Battered Women Syndrome Evidence in the Courtroom: 
A Review of the Literature,"16 Law & Human Behavior 273, 274-77 (1992); C. 
Ewing, Battered Women Who Kill: Psychological Self-Defense as Legal 
Justification (1987) pp. 7-21; see generally L. Walker, The Battered Woman 
(1979).FN13

 
 
FN13. The defendant also argues that expert 
testimony concerning battered woman's syndrome should not be admitted because 
the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (3d Ed.1987), an important diagnostic treatise in the medical, 
psychiatric, and psychological fields, does not contain any reference to the 
syndrome.  Stark specifically 
disclaimed, however, that the "syndrome" is an illness or mental disorder, but 
instead testified that battered women are "focusing on survival and safety ... 
[which] leads to these paradoxical behaviors and attitudes."  See Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 
7 (Okl.Crim.App.1992) (rejecting a similar argument and stating that the 
syndrome is a mixture of both psychological and physiological symptoms but is 
not a mental disease); Commonwealth v. Craig, 783 S.W.2d 387, 389 
(Ky.1990) (syndrome was not mental condition and expert could qualify to testify 
about it although not a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist); R. Schuller 
& N. Vidmar, "Battered Women Syndrome Evidence in the Courtroom: A Review of 
the Literature,"16 Law & Human Behavior 273, 281 (1992) (despite the label, 
battered woman's syndrome is not a diagnosable mental disorder, but is rather a 
descriptive term that refers to the effects of abuse on a 
woman).

 
 
Moreover, expert 
testimony concerning battered woman's syndrome has been accepted by many courts 
when the testimony was offered by a criminal defendant to bolster a claim of 
self-defense.  See, e.g., People 
v. Minnis, 118 Ill.App.3d 345, 74 Ill.Dec. 179, 455 N.E.2d 209 (1983); 
State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461, 693 P.2d 475 (1985); Commonwealth v. Craig, 783 S.W.2d 387 (Ky.1990); State v. 
Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me.1981); State v. Kelly, supra; Bechtel v. 
State, 840 P.2d 1 (Okl.Crim.App.1992); Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 
521 Pa. 41, 
555 A.2d 772 (1989); Fielder v. State, 756 S.W.2d 309 
(Tex.Crim.App.1988). Such expert testimony has also been accepted if offered by 
the prosecution to explain the recantation of the complaining witness; 
Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 913, 112 S. Ct. 312, 116 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1991); and if offered to explain the 
victim's delay in reporting the abuse and remaining with the defendant after the 
abuse. State v. Frost, 242 N.J.Super. 601, 614, 577 A.2d 1282,cert. 
denied, 127 N.J. 321, 604 A.2d 596 (1990); State v. Ciskie, 110 Wash. 2d 263, 272, 751 P.2d 1165 (1988); see generally J. Schroeder, "Using Battered 
Woman Syndrome Evidence in the Prosecution of a Batterer,"76 Iowa L.Rev. 553 
(1991).FN14  We conclude that the subject of battered 
woman's syndrome is "beyond the ken of the average juror," and therefore meets 
the threshold test for admissibility of expert testimony in this state.  People v. Wilson, 
supra.

 
 
FN14. "[P]rosecuting a batterer poses special 
problems. The battered woman is likely to hide the fact that she is being 
abused, which results in mate abuse remaining largely unreported....  If charges are filed, the battered woman 
may change her mind about prosecuting the batterer and withdraw her complaint, 
refuse to testify as a witness, or recant."  J. Schroeder, "Using Battered Woman 
Syndrome Evidence in the Prosecution of a Batterer,"76 Iowa L.Rev. 553, 559-60 
(1991).

 
 
Finally, Stark's 
expert testimony in this case was helpful to the jury.  The most important issue in this case 
was the credibility of the victim.  
Her written, signed statement alleged that she had been the victim of 
egregious abuse.  Before the jury, 
the victim testified that she had not been abused and that indeed it was she who 
had tied up the defendant and abused him.  
The defendant, through cross-examination of Olofson, questioned the 
credibility of the victim's written statement in view of her eighteen hour delay 
in making the complaint.  The victim 
testified that she had made up the statement in order to get her husband into 
drug treatment.  The state offered a 
different explanation, one beyond the knowledge and understanding of the average 
juror-that the statement was true, and the victim's recantation was a pattern of 
typical behavior consistent with battered woman's 
syndrome.

 
 
In a case directly on 
point, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the admission of expert 
testimony on battered woman's syndrome to impeach an abuse victim's recantation 
at the criminal prosecution of the abuser.  
Arcoren v. United States, supra, 1241.  In Arcoren, a victim of rape and 
assault described the defendant's violent sexual and physical assaults to a 
criminal investigator with the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Id., at 
1237.  The victim also testified as 
to the assaults before a grand jury.  
At trial, however, the victim recanted her prior testimony and denied 
that the defendant had beaten and raped her.  Id., at 1238.  The Circuit Court of Appeals noted that, 
as in the present case, the jury was then "faced with a bizarre situation."  Id., at 1240.  "A jury naturally would be puzzled at 
the complete about-face she made, and would have great difficulty in determining 
which version of [the victim's] testimony it should believe.  If there were some explanation for [the 
victim's] changed statements, such explanation would aid the jury in deciding 
which statements were credible."  
Id.  Like the expert testimony in 
Arcoren, Stark's testimony provided the jury in the present case with an 
explanation for the victim's changed statements.

 
 
On the basis of the 
foregoing, we conclude that Stark was qualified to testify as an expert witness, 
that his testimony focused on a subject not familiar to the average person and 
that his testimony was helpful to the jury. Accordingly, his expert testimony 
was properly admitted.FN15

 
 
FN15. Of course, expert testimony, like all 
other evidence, must be relevant to be admitted.  State v. Wade, 96 Conn. 238, 248, 113 A. 458 (1921).  Expert testimony on the 
subject of battered woman's syndrome is not relevant unless there is some 
evidentiary foundation that a party or witness to the case is a battered woman, 
and that party or witness has behaved in such a manner that the jury would be 
aided by expert testimony providing an explanation for the behavior.  State v. Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d 213, 218, 551 N.E.2d 970 (1990).  In the present 
case, the defendant has not challenged the adequacy of the requisite foundation, 
and therefore we need not reach the issue.

 
 
C

 
 
The defendant's final 
claim is that the expert testimony in this case was actually opinion testimony 
as to the credibility of a witness, and therefore should have been excluded 
because it improperly invaded the province of the jury.  The defendant relies on two recently 
decided cases; United States v. Whitted, 994 F.2d 444 (8th Cir.1993); 
State v. Cheeks, 253 Kan. 93, 853 P.2d 655 (1993); in which convictions 
were reversed because physician experts testified that, in their opinions, the 
child victims were in fact sexually abused by the respective defendants.  In Whitted, the court concluded 
that the expert testimony, which was based on the victim's subjective version of 
events, "significantly enhanced [the victim's] believability and unfairly tilted 
the scales in her favor."  United 
States v. Whitted, supra, 447.  
In Cheeks, the expert witness identified a child's crying and 
defecating as the two forms of behavior most likely to trigger an assault or 
abuse of a child, and then testified that such behavior was present and was a 
likely trigger of the abuse in that case.  
State v. Cheeks, 253 Kan. at 103, 853 P.2d 655.

 
 
Certainly, the jury 
had the right to consider Stark's testimony in determining whether to believe 
the victim's prior statement or her testimony at trial.  Stark did not testify, however, that the 
victim was in fact battered and therefore did not comment, directly or 
indirectly, on her credibility.FN16  
Rather, this case is similar to State v. Spigarolo, supra, 210 
Conn. at 377, 
556 A.2d 112, in which we held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion 
by admitting an expert witness' testimony on the general behavioral 
characteristics of child abuse victims.  
We rejected the defendant's claim that the testimony usurped the jury's 
function of assessing the credibility of witnesses, noting that there is a 
"critical distinction between admissible expert testimony on general or typical 
behavior patterns of ... victims and inadmissible testimony directly concerning 
the particular victim's credibility."  
Id., at 379, 556 A.2d 112.  In the present case, the purpose of 
Stark's testimony was to present to the jury possible explanations for why a 
victim of abuse would completely recant her accusations, explanations that in 
all likelihood were beyond the jury's experience and knowledge.  Stark neither presented opinion 
testimony as to the credibility of any witness nor indicated whether the 
out-of-court statement was credible.  
Like the expert testimony in Spigarolo, Stark's testimony was 
relevant to describe the behavior patterns typically ascribed to battered 
women's syndrome.  The trial court 
also cautioned the jury that expert testimony "is [not] binding upon you and you 
may disregard such testimony either entirely or in part. It is for you the 
triers of the facts to consider the testimony and with the other circumstances 
in this case, use your best judgment to determine whether or not you give any 
weight to the testimony and, if so, what weight you will give to 
it."

 
 
FN16.  
By noting that Stark did not testify that the victim was a battered 
spouse, we do not imply that such testimony would have implicitly commented on 
her credibility.  Rather, in the 
context of this case, we need not decide whether an expert witness may offer his 
or her opinion as to whether a spouse is a battered spouse, nor decide whether 
such an opinion would implicitly comment on the credibility of the 
spouse.

 
 
Under the 
circumstances of this case, Stark's expert testimony was properly admitted "to 
assist the jury in understanding, not whether [the victim] was a credible 
witness on the witness stand, but whether her conduct ... was consistent with 
the pattern and profile of a battered woman."  State v. Frost, supra, 242 
N.J.Super. at 614, 577 A.2d 1282.  
We conclude that the expert testimony did not invade the province of the 
jury in determining the credibility of witnesses.

 
 
[¶28]   In the case Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235, 
1238-43 (8th Cir. 1991), the appellate court 
considered a related issue that again involved a recantation by a 
victim:

 
 
A. As noted, at trial 
Brave Bird recanted her grand jury testimony. She denied Arcoren raped her, 
denied that she had seen Arcoren and Bordeaux have sexual intercourse, and stated 
that the cuts and bruises on her body resulted from an earlier motorbike wreck. 
When the government confronted her with her contradictory grand jury testimony, 
Brave Bird stated that she could not remember making the statements or that, 
where she did recall making them, they were incorrect. She stated that when she 
made the statements on September 17th accusing Arcoren of raping her, she was 
angry with Arcoren because "he was with another woman" and not "because he raped 
[her]."

 
 
The government then 
called an expert witness, Carol Maicky, to testify regarding "battered woman 
syndrome."  She was a psychologist who had worked with battered women for 
10 years and with rape victims for 14 years. The government gave the following 
reasons for offering the evidence:

 
 
Your Honor, there are 
certain facts which the jury has before it from the testimony which we contend 
will go unnoticed by a lay jury unless put into a perspective by an expert. 
We're offering her opinion under Rule 702 to show that these particular facts, 
while [they] may seem insignificant by themselves when put together against a 
battered women syndrome would allow the jury to determine the credibility of her 
in court testimony ... and help them determine which of the two diametrically 
opposed sworn statements of Brenda Brave Bird to believe.

 
 
After hearing Maicky's 
proffered testimony in chambers, the court, over defense counsel's objection, 
admitted the evidence.  The court 
ruled that the evidence was admissible under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence because it was "scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge 
[that] will assist the [jury] to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in issue" and that "the evidence would be more probative than prejudicial."  The court, however, warned that Maicky 
could not "testify as to the ultimate fact that a particular party in this case, 
not the defendant, the party actually suffers from battered women syndrome.  This determination must be left to the 
trier of fact."

 
 
In her testimony 
before the jury, Maicky generally described the battered woman syndrome. 
According to her testimony, which was based on her knowledge of the literature 
dealing with the subject and her professional experience, a "battered woman" is 
one who assumes responsibility for a cycle of violence occurring in a 
relationship, where the abuser (a husband or boyfriend) has told her that the 
first violent episode was her fault.  
Maicky described the syndrome's general characteristics to include (1) 
the belief that violence to the woman is her fault; (2) an inability to place 
responsibility for the violence elsewhere; (3) a fear for her life and the lives 
of her children; and (4) an irrational belief that the abuser is omnipresent and 
omniscient.  According to Ms. 
Maicky, a battered woman develops coping mechanisms to deal with the 
ever-present violence, believing that by doing just one more thing she can stop 
the violence.

 
 
In accordance with the 
court's direction, Maicky expressed no opinion whether Brave Bird suffered from 
or displayed symptoms of the syndrome.

 
 
B.  The district court admitted Maicky's 
testimony pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence which 
provides:

 
 
If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

 
 
Rule 702 reflects an 
attempt to liberalize the rules governing the admission of expert 
testimony.  See J. Weinstein 
& M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, ¶ 702[02] at 702-30 (1988).  The Advisory Notes to the Rule comment 
that "[t]he rule is broadly phrased. The fields of knowledge which may be drawn 
upon are not limited merely to the scientific' and technical' but extend to 
all specialized' knowledge. Similarly, the expert is viewed, not in a narrow 
sense, but as a person qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training or 
education.' "  Fed.R.Evid. 702, 
Advisory Note.

 
 
Rule 702 is one of 
admissibility rather than exclusion.  
See, e.g., Fox v. Dannenberg, 906 F.2d 1253, 1256 (8th Cir.1990) 
("Rule 702 was intended to function as a broad rule of admissibility."); 
Hurst v. United States, 882 F.2d 306, 311 (8th Cir.1989) ("A trial court 
should exclude an expert opinion only if it is so fundamentally unsupported that 
it cannot help the factfinder.").  
"[T]he concept expressed by the Rules is sufficiently broad to embrace 
psychiatric and psychological testimony from those who possess specialized 
knowledge concerning mental aberrations in human behavior, when such knowledge 
will help the jury to understand relevant issues in the case."  United States v. Barta, 
888 F.2d 1220, 1223 (8th Cir.1989).

 
 
The jury in the 
present case was faced with a bizarre situation. Immediately after the rapes and 
assaults, Brave Bird had described them to the police officer whose car she 
flagged down, to the nurse and the doctor at the hospital where she had gone for 
treatment, and to a criminal investigator from the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
Three days later, she described the rapes and assaults in detail in sworn 
testimony before the grand jury.

 
 
Four months later, at 
Arcoren's trial, she recanted her grand jury testimony. There she stated that 
she either did not remember statements to the grand jury or that, if she did 
remember them, the statements were incorrect and that some of them were things 
she had "made up".  At trial, she 
also changed her explanation for the injuries to her leg she had suffered on 
September 18, 1989.  Although she 
told the police officer, the nurse and doctors at the hospital, and the criminal 
investigator that Arcoren had inflicted those injuries when he beat her, at 
trial she testified that the injuries resulted from a motorbike wreck.  She also testified that the reason she 
stopped the police officer after leaving Arcoren's apartment was because she had 
been driving 70 miles per hour.

 
 
A jury naturally would 
be puzzled at the complete about-face she made, and would have great difficulty 
in determining which version of Brave Bird's testimony it should believe. If 
there were some explanation for Brave Bird's changed statements, such 
explanation would aid the jury in deciding which statements were 
credible.

 
 
Maicky's expert 
testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome provided that explanation to the 
jury.  As the witness told the jury, 
the syndrome is a psychological condition, which leads a female victim of 
physical abuse to accept her beatings because she believes that she is 
responsible for them, and hopes that by accepting one more beating, the pattern 
will stop. Maicky's testimony provided the jury with information that would help it to determine which of 
Brave Bird's testimony to credit.  
If the jury concluded that Brave Bird suffered from battered woman 
syndrome, that would explain her change in testimony-her unwillingness to say 
something damaging against her husband.

 
 
Maicky's testimony 
thus met the requirement of Rule 702 that "a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education" may testify with respect to 
"scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge" that "will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."  In permitting Maicky to testify, the 
district court ruled that she was qualified as an expert based on "a degree in 
psychology from the University of Michigan which is judicially noticed as a 
respected university plus the length of time of actual experience that she has 
had in this general field," and that the evidence would be "relevant and 
probative for the fact finders, the jury," to aid the jury in "pass[ing] upon 
the veracity or lack of veracity of the wife."

 
 
.

 
 
Arcoren does not here 
challenge either the reliability or the general admissibility of battered woman 
syndrome evidence.  Instead, he 
urges that introduction of such evidence should be limited to cases in which it 
is offered to bolster a claim of self-defense.  There is no persuasive reason, however, 
for thus limiting it.  The standard 
under Rule 702 for the admissibility of expert testimony is whether the 
"evidence will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine 
a fact in issue."  If the expert 
testimony serves that end, it is immaterial whether the testimony is presented 
by the prosecution or by the defense. As a New Jersey appellate court stated, in 
affirming the admission of battered woman syndrome evidence offered by the 
prosecution, in a case where the wife was the complainant against her husband, 
"It would seem anomalous to allow a battered woman, where she is a criminal 
defendant, to offer this type of expert testimony in order to help the jury 
understand the actions she took, yet deny her that same opportunity when she is 
the complaining witness and/or victim and her abuser is the criminal 
defendant."  See State v. Frost, 242 N.J.Super. 
601, 612, 577 A.2d 1282, 1287 (Ct.App.Div.1990).

 
 
This court has held 
expert testimony admissible under Rule 702 in other circumstances where the 
expert's specialized knowledge would assist the jury to understand the 
evidence.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837, 844 (8th Cir.1979) (bookmaker's statements 
"virtually incomprehensible to the layman, are fraught with meaning to a person 
familiar with gambling enterprises"); United States v. Barletta, 565 F.2d 985, 991-92 (8th Cir.1977) (conversations conducted in the "peculiar argot of 
bookmakers" require expert testimony "to be intelligible to the district 
court"); see also United States v. Brown, 776 F.2d 397, 400 (2d 
Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141, 106 S. Ct. 1793, 90 L. Ed. 2d 339 
(1986) (jury assisted by expert's description of "terms and practices" generally 
used in street narcotics deals); United States v. Dawson, 556 F. Supp. 418, 423 (E.D.Pa.1982), aff'd, 727 F.2d 1101 (3d Cir.1984) ("[E]xpert 
testimony is readily admissible to interpret and explain the use of code words 
and the meaning of certain language used in drug trafficking.").  This principle is equally applicable to 
a situation where a psychologist testifies to "mental aberrations in human 
behavior, when such knowledge will help the jury to understand relevant issues 
in the case."  United 
States v. Barta, 888 F.2d 1220, 1223 
(8th Cir.1989).  In this case, 
Maicky's testimony provided the jury with a basis upon which to understand and 
evaluate the changes in Brave Bird's testimony.

 
 
Arcoren also 
challenges the admission of Maicky's testimony on the ground that "the jury was 
in a better position than the government's expert to judge the credibility of 
Brave Bird."  Maicky, however, 
expressed no opinion on whether Brave Bird suffered from battered woman syndrome 
or which of her conflicting statements were more credible.  Maicky merely provided expert 
information to aid the jury in 
evaluating the evidence.  Maicky's 
testimony did not interfere with or impinge upon the jury's role in determining 
the credibility of witnesses.  
See United 
States v. Provost, 875 F.2d 172, 175-76 
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 859, 110 S. Ct. 170, 107 L. Ed. 2d 127 
(1989).

 
 
The decision whether 
to admit expert testimony ordinarily lies within the discretion of the trial 
court and will not be reversed unless there has been an abuse of 
discretion.  United States v. 
Rose, 731 F.2d 1337, 1345 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 931, 105 S. Ct. 326, 83 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1984).  
In the unusual circumstances of this case, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting Maicky's expert testimony regarding battered 
woman syndrome.

 
 
.

 
 
In her grand jury 
testimony, Brave Bird stated that a year before, on September 22, 1988, Arcoren 
had hit her with a baseball bat and broken her arm.  At trial, she stated that she had not 
been afraid of Arcoren while she was in the bedroom with him and when she 
flagged down the policeman. She was then asked whether Arcoren had beaten her 
with a baseball bat on September 22, 1988.  
The district court overruled Arcoren's objection to the testimony.  When she answered "no," she was 
confronted with her grand jury testimony that "he broke my arm with a bat back 
in September of '88," and acknowledged that she "must have" given "that 
testimony under oath" "if you've got it down."

 
 
Arcoren challenges the 
admission of this evidence as inconsistent with Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence. Rule 404(b) provides that, although "[e]vidence of other crimes, 
wrongs or acts" is inadmissible to prove a person's character to show action in 
conformity therewith, it may be "admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence 
of mistake or accident."

 
 
In this circuit, for 
other act evidence to be admissible under Rule 404(b):

 
 
(1) the evidence of 
the other act must be relevant to a material issue; (2) the other act must be 
similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the crime charged; (3) the 
evidence of the other act must be clear and convincing; and (4) the probative 
value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its 
prejudice.

 
 

United 
States v. 
Estabrook, 774 F.2d 284, 287 
(8th Cir.1985).

 
 
Rule 404(b) is one of 
inclusion rather than exclusion, permitting the admission of other act evidence, 
unless the evidence tends to prove only the defendant's criminal disposition. 
United States v. Gustafson, 728 F.2d 1078, 1083 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 979, 105 S. Ct. 380, 83 L. Ed. 2d 315 (1984); United States 
v. Wagoner, 713 F.2d 1371, 1375 (8th Cir.1983).  The district court has broad discretion 
in determining whether to admit other act evidence, and its determination will 
be upheld unless there is an abuse of discretion. Wagoner, 713 F.2d  at 
1375.

 
 
One of Arcoren's 
defenses to the charges relating to Brave Bird was that she consented to sexual 
intercourse.  Evidence that Arcoren 
hit her with a baseball bat a year before was relevant to that issue, since it 
suggested that any apparent consent by Brave Bird might have resulted from fear 
of bodily injury if she resisted.  
Moreover, since Brave Bird initially denied at trial that Arcoren had hit 
her, but had testified to the contrary before the grand jury, the evidence also 
was relevant to the credibility of her trial testimony generally.  Arcoren has not shown that the evidence 
tended to prove only his criminal disposition.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting the evidence.  
See United States 
v. Marshall, 
683 F.2d 1212, 1215 (8th Cir.1982).

 
 
[¶29]   We have considered these cases in 
the light of the facts and circumstances of the instant case and we conclude 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony 
in controversy. 

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶30]   Because Ms. Thurin's expert 
testimony did not purport to vouch for the credibility of Mrs. Dean, nor did it 
impugn the character of Mr. Dean, we find no error requiring reversal of Mr. 
Dean's conviction.  The judgment and 
sentence is affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1§ 6-2-501.  Simple assault; battery; 
penalties.

            
(a)  A person is guilty of simple assault if, having the 
present ability to do so, he unlawfully attempts to cause bodily injury to 
another.

            
(b)  A person is guilty 
of battery if he unlawfully touches another in a rude, insolent or angry manner 
or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to 
another.

            
(c)  Except as provided by subsection (e) of this section, 
simple assault is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than seven 
hundred fifty dollars ($750.00).

            
(d)  Except as provided by subsection (f) of this section, 
battery is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) 
months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or 
both.  Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, the term of probation imposed by a judge under this subsection 
may exceed the maximum term of imprisonment established for the offense under 
this subsection provided the term of probation, together with any extension 
thereof, shall in no case exceed one (1) year.

            
(e)  A household member as defined by W.S. 35-21-102 who is 
convicted upon a plea of guilty or no contest or found guilty of simple assault 
against any other household member, after having been convicted upon a plea of 
guilty or no contest or found guilty of a violation of W.S. 6-2-501(a), (b), (e) 
or (f), 6-2-502, 6-2-503, 6-2-504 or other substantially similar law of this or 
any other state, tribe or territory against any other household member, is 
guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) 
months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or 
both.

            
(f)  A household member 
as defined by W.S. 35-21-102 who commits a second or subsequent battery against 
any other household member shall be punished as 
follows:

                        
(i)  A person convicted upon a plea of guilty or no contest or 
found guilty of a second offense under this subsection against any other 
household member, after having been convicted upon a plea of guilty or no 
contest or found guilty of a violation of W.S. 6-2-501(a), (b), (e) or (f), 
6-2-502, 6-2-503, 6-2-504 or other substantially similar law of this or any 
other state, tribe or territory against any other household member within the 
previous five (5) years is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment 
for not more than one (1) year, a fine of not more than one thousand dollars 
($1,000.00), or both.  
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the term of probation imposed 
by a court under this paragraph may exceed the maximum term of imprisonment 
established for this offense under this paragraph provided the term of 
probation, together with any extension thereof, shall in no case exceed two (2) 
years;

                        
(ii)  A person 
convicted upon a plea of guilty or no contest or found guilty of a third or 
subsequent offense under this subsection against any other household member, 
after having been convicted upon a plea of guilty or no contest or found guilty 
of a violation of W.S. 6-2-501(a), (b), (e) or (f), 6-2-502, 6-2-503, 6-2-504 or 
other substantially similar law of this or any other state, tribe or territory 
against any other household member within the previous ten (10) years is guilty 
of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, a fine 
of not more than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00), or 
both.

 
 
§ 35-21-102. 
Definitions.

            
(a)  As used in this 
act:

                        
(i)  "Adult" means a person who is sixteen (16) years of age or 
older, or legally married;

                        
(ii)  "Court" means the circuit court or, if the county does 
not have a circuit court, the district court in the county where an alleged 
victim of domestic abuse resides or is found;

                        
(iii)  "Domestic abuse" means the occurrence of one (1) or more 
of the following acts by a household member but does not include acts of self 
defense:

                                    
(A)  Physically abusing, threatening to physically abuse, 
attempting to cause or causing physical harm or acts which unreasonably restrain 
the personal liberty of any household member;

                                    
(B)  Placing a household member in reasonable fear of imminent 
physical harm;  
or

                                    
(C)  Causing a household member to engage involuntarily in 
sexual activity by force, threat of force or 
duress.

                        
(iv)  "Household member" 
includes:

                                    
(A)  Persons married to each 
other;

                                    
(B)  Persons living with each 
other as if married;

                                    
(C)  Persons formerly married to each 
other;

                                    
(D)  Persons formerly living with each other as if 
married;

                                    
(E)  Parents and their adult 
children;

                                    
(F)  Other adults sharing common living 
quarters;

                                    
(G)  Persons who are the parents of a child but who are not 
living with each other; and

                                    
(H)  Persons who are in, or have been in, a dating 
relationship.

            

 
 

2On cross-examination, 
Officer Gutierrez testified that he felt Mrs. Dean's head but did not note a 
bump or any abrasions.