Case Title: Upstream Watch v. City of Belfast

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2023 ME 43

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2023-08-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
vdecMAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 
2023 ME 43 
Docket: 
Wal-22-298 
Argued: 
May 10, 2023 
Decided: 
August 3, 2023 
Panel: 
STANFILL, C.J., and JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, and DOUGLAS, JJ. 
UPSTREAM WATCH 
v. 
CITY OF BELFAST et al. 
JABAR, J. 
[¶1]  Upstream Watch (Upstream) appeals from a judgment of the 
Superior Court (Waldo County, R. Murray, J.) affirming the Belfast Zoning Board 
of Appeals’ (ZBA) decision dismissing Upstream’s appeal on the grounds that 
Upstream did not have standing to appeal the Belfast Planning Board’s
(Planning Board) decision issuing five permits to Nordic Aquafarms (Nordic).  
We conclude that the ZBA erred as a matter of law when it determined that 
Upstream did not have standing to appeal.  We vacate the judgment and remand 
the case to the Superior Court with instructions to remand the case to the ZBA.1
1  We note that although this case is closely related to our recent decision in Mabee v. Nordic 
Aquafarms Inc., 2023 ME 15, 290 A.3d 79, the permits at issue here are distinct from those at issue in 
Mabee.  While our decision in Mabee may have an effect on the ultimate viability of the permits at 
issue here, our ruling today relates only to a threshold standing issue.  We remand the matter to the 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The following facts are drawn from the administrative record before 
the ZBA, the municipal body that issued the decision we now review.  See 
Friends of Lamoine v. Town of Lamoine, 2020 ME 70, ¶ 2, 234 A.3d 214.   
[¶3]  Upstream is a not-for-profit corporation registered to transact 
business in Maine, with its principal place of business in Belfast, that is 
dedicated to the restoration of Maine mid-coast rivers and streams, including 
the Little River in Belfast, to their natural habitats.  Nordic is a Delaware 
corporation that has proposed a land-based salmon aquaculture project in 
Belfast at a site where U.S. Route 1 crosses the Little River.  On June 11, 2019, 
in furtherance of the project, Nordic submitted applications to the Planning 
Board for (1) a site plan permit, (2) a zoning use permit, (3) a shoreland zoning 
permit, (4) a significant groundwater wells permit, and (5) a significant water 
intake and significant water discharge/outfall pipes permit.   
[¶4]  After Nordic submitted its permit applications, the Planning Board 
issued a procedural order requiring any person or entity who wanted to be
included as a “Party-in-Interest” to file a written statement with the Planning 
ZBA to address the merits of the permits, and we leave it to the ZBA to address the impact of our 
decision in Mabee. 
3 
Board on or before July 30, 2019.  The procedural order required the written 
statement to demonstrate, inter alia, that the person or entity owned land 
directly or indirectly affected by the project and would suffer a “particular 
injury” distinct from the public because of the project.  Upstream filed a written 
statement which demonstrated how it was affected by the project by explaining 
its purpose, listing its members whose property abutted the project, and
describing the conservation easement over the intertidal land owned by other 
Upstream members that would be directly affected by the project.2  Based on 
this written statement, the Planning Board granted Upstream party-in-interest 
status.   
[¶5]  Between June 2019 and December 2020, the Planning Board held 
twenty-two public hearings and thirty-nine public meetings on the project.  
Upstream participated in approximately twenty-two of these proceedings, 
expressing its opposition to the project.  At the Planning Board proceedings, a 
representative for Upstream and several of Upstream’s members testified,
expressing concerns about the impact of emissions from the project, the odors
and sounds from the project, the visual impact of the project on members’ 
2  We adjudicated the issues surrounding the conservation easement and the ownership of the 
intertidal lands in Mabee, 2023 ME 15, 290 A.3d 79. 
 
4 
enjoyment of the environment, the project’s impact on the environment itself,
the project’s impact on traffic, and the project’s impact on groundwater and 
freshwater supplies.  On December 22, 2020, the Planning Board voted to 
approve Nordic’s permit applications.  On January 20, 2021, Upstream timely 
appealed the Planning Board’s decision to the ZBA.  See Belfast, Me., Code 
§ 102-134(a) (Dec. 7, 2004).
[¶6]  As required by the Belfast Code of Ordinances Land Use Regulations 
Ordinance 
(Ordinance), 
Upstream 
completed 
the 
two-page 
application-to-appeal form to the ZBA.  Id.  A small space is provided on the first 
page for the applicant to describe the decision being appealed, the name and 
mailing address of the appealing party, and the type of review the party is 
requesting from the ZBA.  The second page provides a list of prompts to 
describe the nature of the appeal and includes a few lines of blank space 
underneath each prompt.  The first prompt reads, “Describe why you believe 
you have ‘standing’ to file an appeal.”  Upstream answered:  
Upstream Watch was qualified by the planning board as an 
“interested party” and participated fully in the planning board 
proceedings.  Upstream Watch was formed to restore the Little
River that abuts the project.  Volunteers use the trails, the bay and 
the river. 
5 
[¶7]  At the ZBA’s first hearing on Upstream’s appeal, a ZBA board 
member questioned whether Upstream had standing to appeal.  Upstream’s 
attorney explained to the ZBA the process the Planning Board used to 
determine who qualified as parties-in-interest, referencing the Planning 
Board’s procedural order.  Upstream’s attorney further explained that Good 
Karma Farm, owned by two Upstream members, is located about 600 feet from
the project and may suffer potential injuries associated with monitoring its
private wells and being forced to respond to any negative impacts to 
groundwater quality resulting from the project.  The ZBA requested that 
Upstream and Nordic submit briefs on the issue.   
[¶8]  Both parties submitted briefs, and Upstream included affidavits 
from three of its members describing the potential injuries they may 
experience due to the project.  Upstream’s brief and affidavits were dated 
February 25, 2021, more than thirty days after the appeals period, see Belfast, 
Me., Code § 102-134(a),3 which had ended January 21, 2021.  The ZBA heard 
arguments from both parties.   
3  Belfast, Me., Code § 102-134(a) (Dec. 7, 2004) provides that “[a]n administrative appeal shall be 
taken within 30 calendar days from the vote taken by the board from which a party is aggrieved or 
the written decision of the code enforcement officer.”   
 
6 
[¶9]  After the arguments, the same member of the ZBA who raised the 
initial concern about Upstream’s standing to appeal asked whether the ZBA 
could consider information submitted after the thirty-day filing deadline.  
While the affidavits submitted with the brief had been timely filed with the 
supplemental brief in accordance with the ZBA’s request, they did fall outside 
the original thirty-day window to file an appeal. Id. The ZBA determined it 
should confine its review, and did confine its review, to Upstream’s 
application-to-appeal form to determine whether Upstream had standing.  The
ZBA ultimately determined that Upstream had not demonstrated a 
particularized injury sufficient to establish standing and dismissed Upstream’s
appeal.   
[¶10]  Following the dismissal of its appeal, Upstream filed with the 
Superior Court a complaint for judicial review pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure 80B.  The court dismissed Upstream’s complaint, holding that the 
ZBA did not err when it determined that Upstream had failed to demonstrate 
administrative standing and therefore, Upstream failed to exhaust its 
administrative remedies because it did not file a cognizable appeal with the 
ZBA.  Upstream timely appealed.  M.R. App. P. 2B(a), (c)(1). 
7 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶11]  We are faced with two issues: (1) whether the ZBA erred when it 
confined its review of whether Upstream had standing to the information 
contained on the application-to-appeal form and (2) whether, reviewing the 
entire record from the Planning Board, Upstream had standing to appeal the 
Planning Board’s decision.4
A. 
Standard of Review 
[¶12]  “When the Superior Court acts as an intermediate court of appeals, 
we review directly the decision of the tribunal of original jurisdiction.”  
Nergaard v. Town of Westport Island, 2009 ME 56, ¶ 11, 973 A.2d 735.  Because
the question of whether a party has standing to bring an administrative appeal 
depends on the language of the governing ordinance, we must interpret and 
apply the relevant sections of the Ordinance.  Id. ¶ 12. 
[¶13]  We review the interpretation of an ordinance de novo, id., but will 
“accord substantial deference to the [tribunal of original jurisdiction’s]
characterizations and fact-findings as to what meets ordinance standards,” 
4  Upstream also contends that it was denied due process by the ZBA’s proceedings and that the 
ZBA failed to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Because we conclude that the ZBA 
erred as a matter of law due to its confined review, we need not reach Upstream’s additional 
arguments.  See State v. Boilard, 488 A.2d 1380, 1386 (Me. 1985) (declining to reach additional claims 
after reaching a dispositive conclusion on different grounds). 
 
8 
Bizier v. Town of Turner, 2011 ME 116, ¶ 8, 32 A.3d 1048 (quotation marks 
omitted).  We examine “the plain meaning of the language of the ordinance, and 
we construe its terms reasonably in light of the purposes and objectives of the 
ordinance and its general structure,” Stewart v. Town of Sedgwick, 2002 ME 81, 
¶ 6, 797 A.2d 27, “to avoid absurd or illogical results,” Olson v. Town of 
Yarmouth, 2018 ME 27, ¶ 16, 179 A.3d 920.   
B. 
ZBA Appeals Process 
[¶14]  “The [ZBA] shall review administrative appeals from final written 
decisions of . . . the Planning Board.”  Belfast, Me., Code § 102-132(a) (Oct. 21, 
2008).  The ZBA accepts appeals filed within thirty calendar days from the vote 
“taken by the board from which a party is aggrieved.”  Id. § 102-134(a).  “Forms 
for appeal shall be those approved by the [ZBA], and the aggrieved person shall 
set forth on said forms the grounds for the appeal.”  Id.  “All appeals shall be 
considered filed at the time of delivery to the City department of planning and 
community development . . . .”  Id.  Additionally, “[i]n all administrative appeals,
. . . the [ZBA] shall act as an appellate board which shall entertain all evidence 
of record submitted in the underlying hearing, including any transcripts, 
findings of facts, and decisions made by the board of original fact-finding 
jurisdiction.”  Id. § 102-134(f). 
9 
[¶15]  The Ordinance permits the ZBA to determine standing as an 
operative decisionmaker; however, the determination must be made “by a vote 
of a majority of a quorum of the [ZBA] members as a preliminary matter to the 
extent that any party’s standing is challenged.”  Id. § 102-134(b).  Only parties 
with standing are permitted to participate in ZBA hearings.  Id. 
C.
Administrative Standing
[¶16]  Under the Ordinance, an “aggrieved party” who may bring a case
before the ZBA is “[a] person whose land is directly or indirectly affected by the 
granting or denial of a permit or variance . . . or a person whose land abuts land 
for which a permit or variance has been granted.”  Belfast, Me., Code § 66-1(c)
(Apr. 6, 2010).   
[¶17]  The Ordinance does not define “abuts” or “abutter.”  See id.  We
have ruled that in the absence of ordinance language to the contrary, “abutter” 
means a person who possesses land in close proximity to an affected piece of 
land, and thus is not limited to a direct abutter or adjoiner.  See Sahl v. Town of 
York, 2000 ME 180, ¶ 9, 760 A.2d 266; Brooks v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 1997 
ME 203, ¶¶ 2, 9-10, 703 A.2d 844; see also Nergaard, 2009 ME 56, ¶ 18, 973 
A.2d 735 (“[S]tanding has been liberally granted to people who own property 
 
10 
in the same neighborhood as the property that is subject to a permit or 
variance.”). 
[¶18]  The Ordinance defines a “person,” and thus someone who may be 
an aggrieved party, see § 102-134(a), as including “an association” or
“organization” as well as “an individual,” § 66-1(b)(5).  We have concluded, in 
the absence of contradictory language in an ordinance, that a group may show
standing if at least one member has standing.  Friends of Lincoln Lakes v. Town 
of Lincoln, 2010 ME 78, ¶ 15, 2 A.3d 284.  Therefore, to establish standing under 
the Ordinance, Upstream had the burden of demonstrating that at least one of 
its members is an aggrieved person in the member’s own right.5 
1. 
The ZBA’s Confined Review 
[¶19]  We consider de novo the ZBA’s decision to confine its review of the 
facts contained in the application-to-appeal form because it involves a legal 
interpretation of the Ordinance.  See Nergaard, 2009 ME 56, ¶ 12, 973 A.2d 735.  
The ZBA erred when it confined its review of Upstream’s standing argument to 
5  Generally, associational standing includes three elements.  “An association has standing to bring 
suit on behalf of its members when [1] its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their 
own right, [2] the interests at stake are germane to the organization’s purpose, and [3] neither the 
claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the 
lawsuit.”  Black v. Bureau of Parks & Lands, 2022 ME 58, ¶ 29, 288 A.3d 346 (quotation marks 
omitted).  Because we determine that Upstream meets all three prongs, we need not decide whether 
only the first prong applies, or all three prongs apply, when determining whether an entity has 
associational standing in the administrative law context. 
11 
Upstream’s written response on the application-to-appeal form because (1) the 
Ordinance does not contain such a restriction and (2) the Ordinance mandates 
that, when acting in an appellate capacity, the ZBA consider all evidence of 
record submitted in the underlying hearing.  See § 102-134(f). 
[¶20]  While the Ordinance does include two provisions governing the 
scope of the ZBA’s review, neither provision expressly restricts the ZBA from
considering the administrative record, including the Planning Board record.  
See § 102-134(f), (g).  To the contrary, the Ordinance mandates that when the 
ZBA acts in its appellate capacity, it “shall entertain all evidence of record 
submitted in the underlying hearing, including any transcripts, findings of fact, 
and decisions made by the board of original fact-finding jurisdiction.”  
§ 102-134(f); cf. M.R. Civ. P. 80B(e)-(f) (limiting the contents of, and the court’s 
review of, the record).  Although the ZBA was making a standing determination 
in the first instance, it was considering this appeal from the Planning Board in 
its appellate capacity, and the ZBA should have used the administrative record, 
including the Planning Board record, to determine whether Upstream had 
standing.  See § 102-134(f); Norris Fam. Assocs., LLC v. Town of Phippsburg, 2005 
ME 102, ¶ 20, 879 A.2d 1007 (determining party’s standing from Planning 
Board record); Witham Fam. Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Bar Harbor, 2011 ME 104, 
 
12 
¶¶ 12-13, 30 A.3d 811 (same).  Therefore, the ZBA should not have confined
itself to a review of the application-to-appeal form because the Ordinance does 
not contain such a restriction and mandates the ZBA to consider the entire 
record when acting in an appellate capacity. 
2. 
Upstream’s Standing 
[¶21] We normally review with deference a municipal board’s factual
determinations, see Bizier, 2011 ME 116, ¶ 8, 32 A.3d 1048, but the facts 
contained in the administrative record here clearly establish Upstream’s status 
as an aggrieved person as a matter of law.  See Black v. Bureau of Parks & Lands, 
2022 ME 58, ¶ 26, 288 A.3d 346 (“We review standing de novo as a question of 
law and may raise the issue sua sponte; therefore, we are not bound by the trial 
court’s conclusion.”). 
[¶22]  The parties and the ZBA agree that to have standing, Upstream had 
to demonstrate that it was an aggrieved person under the Ordinance.  See 
§§ 66-1(c), 102-134(a).  In determining that Upstream did not have standing, 
the ZBA applied both the aggrieved person standard contained in the Ordinance
and a particularized injury standard.   
[¶23]  We look first to the plain language of the Ordinance.  While it does 
mention standing generally, it does not explicitly require that a party show a 
13 
particularized injury to qualify as an aggrieved party.  See §§ 66-1(c), 102-134; 
Stewart, 2002 ME 81, ¶ 6, 797 A.2d 27; Nelson v. Bayroot, LLC, 2008 ME 91, ¶ 9, 
953 A.2d 378 (“Whether a party has standing depends on the wording of the 
specific statute involved.”).  In Nergaard, the town’s ordinance did not contain 
the same language present in the Ordinance.  2009 ME 56, ¶ 13, 973 A.2d 735.  
In
Nergaard, we
analyzed a particularized injury requirement
when 
determining whether the plaintiffs had standing because the ordinance at issue
defined “aggrieved party” as  
an owner of land whose property is directly or indirectly affected 
by the granting or denial of a permit or variance under [the 
applicable] Ordinance; a person whose land abuts land for which a 
permit or variance has been granted; or any other person or group 
of persons who have suffered particularized injury as a result of 
granting or denial of such a permit or variance.  
Id. (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted).  The plaintiffs in Nergaard 
could not argue that they were abutters nor that they had land affected, which 
meant they could demonstrate that they were aggrieved parties only if they 
suffered a particularized injury.  Id. ¶ 16.  The Ordinance does not define
“aggrieved party” as any person who has a particularized injury.  See § 66-1(c).  
Unlike the ordinance at issue in Nergaard, the term “particularized injury” does 
not appear anywhere in the Ordinance.  See §§ 66-1(c), 102-134 (containing no 
particularized injury requirement); Nergaard, 2009 ME 56, ¶¶ 13, 17-22, 973 
 
14 
A.2d 735 (analyzing the particularized injury requirement in the ordinance at 
issue). 
[¶24]  We require particularized injury for judicial standing, but a 
municipality can set its own more liberal rules for administrative standing.  Cf.
Rockland Plaza Realty Corp. v. City of Rockland, 2001 ME 81, ¶ 6, 772 A.2d 256
(discussing an ordinance provision that allowed for administrative review
prior to an agency taking a final action).  Any confusion in the case law arises 
from the fact that most ordinances incorporate a particularized injury
requirement.  For example, in Nergaard, the relevant ordinance expressly 
incorporated a particularized injury requirement into its definition of an 
“aggrieved party” where a party, like the plaintiffs in Nergaard, did not possess 
land that was affected by or abutted a permit or variance.  2009 ME 56, ¶ 13, 
973 A.2d 735.  This conclusion is reinforced by language in Friends of Lincoln 
Lakes, which states that in Nergaard, “a recent decision interpreting an 
ordinance containing identical language, we held that to establish standing the 
plaintiff ‘must demonstrate not only that he or she had party status at the 
administrative proceedings, but, in addition, that he or she has suffered a 
particularized injury or harm.’”  Friends of Lincoln Lakes, 2010 ME 78, ¶ 11, 2 
A.3d 284 (quoting Nergaard, 2009 ME 56, ¶ 16, 973 A.2d 735).  We viewed the
15 
particularized injury requirement as incorporated in the specific language of 
that ordinance.  It would make no sense for us to impose a particularized injury
requirement for administrative standing when an ordinance itself does not 
include such a requirement, because nothing in any statute requires it.   
[¶25]  Another source of confusion may be the fact that we can, and do,
impose a particularized injury standard for a plaintiff to seek redress in court.
See Dubois v. Town of Arundel, 2019 ME 21, ¶ 6, 202 A.3d 524 (“In order to have
standing to file a Rule 80B complaint, the complainant must show (1) that it 
was a party at the administrative proceeding, and (2) that it suffered a 
particularized injury as a result of the agency’s decision.” (quotation marks 
omitted)).  This judicial restriction effectively limits judicial review under 
Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 80B to those aggrieved persons, however defined 
by an ordinance, who have a particularized injury.  But here, that judicial 
standing restriction is immaterial because no one is arguing that Upstream
does not have a particularized injury “as a result of the agency’s decision” to 
appeal in court.  Dubois, 2019 ME 21, ¶ 6, 202 A.3d 524. 
[¶26]  Here, upon examining the entire administrative record, we 
conclude, as a matter of law, that Upstream satisfies the definition of “aggrieved 
party” under the Ordinance.  See § 66-1(c); Black, 2022 ME 58, ¶¶ 28-30, 288 
 
16 
A.3d 346.  The proceedings from the Planning Board, contained in the 
administrative record available to the ZBA, demonstrate that at least one of 
Upstream’s members was an aggrieved person, either as an abutter or as a 
possessor of land directly affected by the project.  A number of Upstream’s 
members owned property next to or near enough to the project to qualify as 
abutters, making them aggrieved parties under the Ordinance. § 66-1(c); see
Nergaard, 2009 ME 56, ¶ 18, 973 A.2d 735.  Additionally, the administrative 
record reflects that Upstream presented a number of concerns at Planning 
Board hearings sufficient to demonstrate that at least one of its members was 
an aggrieved person due to owning land that would be directly affected by the 
project, such as the potential impact that the project’s drawing large amounts 
of water from a local aquifer could have on members’ wells that draw water 
from that aquifer, see Norris Fam. Assocs., LLC, 2005 ME 102, ¶¶ 19-20, 879 A.2d 
1007 (determining that abutters had standing to challenge potential 
construction that might displace water and redirect it onto other properties), 
the potential impact of the project on members’ actual enjoyment of the local 
environment, see Fitzgerald v. Baxter State Park Auth., 385 A.2d 189, 196-97 
(Me. 1978) (holding that users of public land had standing to challenge an 
agency’s action), and the potential impact of the project on local traffic, see Sahl, 
17 
2000 ME 180, ¶ 10, 760 A.2d 266 (conferring standing to appellants claiming 
that a motel expansion would obstruct their view and create additional traffic).  
See § 66-1(c).   
[¶27]  Our review establishes that the administrative record clearly 
demonstrates as a matter of law that at least one of Upstream’s members was 
an aggrieved person. Accordingly, Upstream had standing to appeal to the ZBA
and the ZBA erred in dismissing Upstream’s appeal for lack for standing.     
III.  CONCLUSION 
[¶28]  We conclude that the ZBA erred when it dismissed Upstream’s 
appeal for lack of standing because it should not have confined its review to 
Upstream’s application-to-appeal form.  We further conclude that, as a matter 
of law, the administrative record sufficiently demonstrates that Upstream had 
standing to appeal to the ZBA.  We vacate the decision of ZBA and remand to 
the Superior Court with instructions to remand to the ZBA for consideration on 
the merits of Upstream’s appeal from the Planning Board decision.  
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated.  Remanded to the Superior 
Court with instructions to remand to the ZBA for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
18 
David B. Losee, Esq., David B. Losee LLC, Camden; and David J. Perkins, Esq.
(orally), and Robert J. Papazian, Esq., Curtis Thaxter LLC, Portland, for appellant 
Upstream Watch 
Kristin M. Collins, Esq. (orally), Preti Flaherty Beliveau & Pachios LLP, Augusta, 
for appellee City of Belfast 
David M. Kallin, Esq. (orally), and Grady R. Burns, Esq., Drummond Woodsum, 
Portland, for appellee Nordic Aquafarms Inc.  
Waldo County Superior Court docket number AP-2021-03 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY