Case Title: In re Adoption of Yadira

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12113

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-02-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12113 
 
ADOPTION OF YADIRA (and two companion cases).1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 7, 2016. - February 14, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Adoption, Dispensing with parent's consent.  Minor, Adoption.  
Parent and Child, Adoption, Dispensing with parent's 
consent to adoption.  Regulation.  Practice, Civil, 
Adoption, Report. 
 
 
 
 
Petitions filed in the Suffolk Division of the Probate and 
Family Court Department on March 20, 2014. 
 
 
A motion to deny the petitions was heard by Virginia M. 
Ward, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Jeanne M. Kaiser for the mother. 
 
Brian Pariser for Department of Children and Families. 
 
Nena S. Negron for Yadira & others. 
 
Michael F. Kilkelly, for the father, was present but did 
not argue. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Adoption of Sabra; Adoption of Sabrina. 
2 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  We granted an application for direct appellate 
review in this case to determine whether the Code of Federal 
Regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 400.115(c) (1998), allows the 
Department of Children and Families (department) to petition for 
termination of parental rights on behalf of unaccompanied 
refugee minors whose parents also are present in the United 
States.  We hold that the regulations do allow such petitions. 
 
Background.  In December, 2010, four minor siblings arrived 
in Massachusetts from a Nepalese refugee camp through the 
Federal Unaccompanied Refugee Minors Program (minor refugee 
program).  See Custody of Victoria, 473 Mass. 64, 65 n.1 (2015).  
The department placed two of the children in a foster home in 
Fitchburg and the other two in a foster home in Ashby.2  No later 
than April, 2013, the children's mother and father had entered 
the United States and settled in North Dakota and Ohio, 
respectively.  Since coming to the United States, both the 
mother and the father have had "very limited contact" with the 
children. 
 
In March, 2014, the department petitioned the Probate and 
Family Court to free the children for adoption by terminating 
                     
 
2 The oldest child is now over the age of eighteen and is 
not a subject of this case. 
 
3 
 
 
parental rights pursuant to G. L. c. 210, § 3.3  The mother moved 
to deny the department's petition.  The judge denied the 
mother's motion and subsequently reported the matter to the 
Appeals Court.  In her report, the judge framed the following 
question for the court's consideration: 
 
"Is it permissible under the Code of Federal 
Regulations for the [department] to proceed to seek a 
termination of parental rights where the child(ren) are 
present in the United States pursuant to the [minor refugee 
program] and both parents are also believed to be present 
in the United States, i.e., not dead or missing and 
presumed dead?"4 
 
 
Discussion.  a.  Federal regulation.  The Office of Refugee 
Resettlement (resettlement office), the Federal agency within 
the United States Department of Health and Human Services 
responsible for implementing the minor refugee program, has 
promulgated regulations pertaining to this program.  See Custody 
of Victoria, 473 Mass. at 65 n.1.  The regulation pertinent to 
this case, 45 C.F.R. § 400.115(c), provides: 
                     
 
3 According to the Probate and Family Court judge, the 
department has alleged facts in its petition that could "lead 
[that] Court to dispense with Mother and Father's consent to the 
adoption of each of the three minor children." 
 
 
4 "Although a judge may report specific questions of law in 
connection with an interlocutory finding or order, the basic 
issue to be reported is the correctness of [the] finding or 
order.  Reported questions need not be answered in this 
circumstance except to the extent that it is necessary to do so 
in resolving the basic issue."  Maher v. Retirement Bd. of 
Quincy, 452 Mass. 517, 522 n.9 (2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 
1166 (2009), quoting McStowe v. Bornstein, 377 Mass. 804, 805 
n.2 (1979).  See, e.g., Barnes v. Metropolitan Hous. Assistance 
Program, 425 Mass. 79, 83-84 (1997). 
4 
 
 
 
"Unaccompanied minors are not generally eligible for 
adoption since family reunification is the objective of the 
program.  In certain rare cases, adoption may be permitted 
pursuant to adoption laws in the State of resettlement, 
provided a court finds that:  (1) Adoption would be in the 
best interest of the child; and (2) there is termination of 
parental rights (for example, in situations where the 
parents are dead or are missing and presumed dead) as 
determined by the appropriate State court.  When adoption 
occurs, the child's status as an unaccompanied minor 
terminates." 
 
The explicit purpose of the program is "family reunification."  
However, adoption of unaccompanied refugee minors is possible 
"in certain rare cases." 
 
The parents argue5 that the use in the regulation of the 
passive voice in the phrase "there is termination of parental 
rights . . . as determined by the appropriate State court" 
indicates that qualifying terminations must occur through 
nonjudicial means, such as parental death, and that the court is 
to determine only whether such termination occurred, not act to 
terminate rights itself.  They further argue that the use in the 
regulation of the present tense means that the department cannot 
petition for what would be a future termination; that is, the 
termination must already be in effect before the department can 
pursue adoption. 
                     
 
5 Both parents submitted briefs; the father has adopted the 
mother's arguments seeking to dismiss the department's petition 
to terminate parental rights and makes an additional argument 
regarding the Federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 
(adoption act), discussed infra. 
5 
 
 
 
This narrow reading of this regulation is unpersuasive.  
First, under this interpretation, there would be no need to use 
the phrase "for example," because, according to the parents, 
there are only two circumstances in which nonjudicial 
termination occurs:  when parents are dead, or when they are 
missing and presumed dead.  We conclude that the provision of 
examples indicates that there are more applicable situations 
than those listed.  "[I]t is plain from the structure and 
language of the [regulation] that the [agency] did not intend to 
give an exhaustive list."  Harrison v. Loyal Protective Life 
Ins. Co., 379 Mass. 212, 215 (1979). 
 
Second, and more importantly, the parents' interpretation 
would mean that for unaccompanied refugee minors there would be 
no mechanism for a court ever to make a determination of 
parental unfitness and terminate parental rights.  This would 
leave a whole category of children without protection and would 
be in direct conflict with the Federal Adoption and Safe 
Families Act of 1997, discussed infra.  Such an interpretation 
is unreasonable, and "we will not adopt a construction of a 
statute that creates 'absurd or unreasonable' consequences" 
(citation omitted).  Lowery v. Klemm, 446 Mass. 572, 578-579 
(2006). 
 
Because the termination of parental rights is a necessary 
precondition to adoption, the Federal regulation simply directs 
6 
 
 
the court to determine the issue of termination according to its 
own State laws.  Here the department seeks just such a 
determination with its petition.  See Adoption of Nancy, 443 
Mass. 512, 515 (2005) ("the judge must determine whether the 
parent's unfitness is such that it would be in the child's best 
interests to end all legal relations between parent and child"). 
 
Our interpretation of this Federal regulation accords with 
the guidance statement on the adoption of unaccompanied refugee 
minors issued by the resettlement office, which advises that 
adoption cases involving such children "must be decided on their 
own merit, on a case-by-case basis, by local courts empowered to 
make such decisions based on State law and the best evidence 
available."  Office of Refugee Resettlement Statement of Goals, 
Priorities, Standards, and Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. 38147, 38148 
(1987).  See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 
512 (1994) ("We must give substantial deference to an agency's 
interpretation of its own regulations"). 
 
b.  Massachusetts regulation.  The relevant State 
regulation, 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.12(3) (2008), regarding 
implementation of the minor refugee program, is in accord with 
45 C.F.R. § 400.115(c),6 and provides in relevant part: 
                     
 
6 Federal regulations require the department to establish 
legal custody or guardianship for unaccompanied refugee minors 
who settle in the Commonwealth.  45 C.F.R. § 400.115(a) (1998).  
7 
 
 
 
"The [d]epartment operates [a minor refugee program], 
which provides foster care and case management services to 
. . . refugee children who arrive in Massachusetts 
unaccompanied by a parent or immediate relative.  In every 
case the parents of such children are either deceased or of 
parts unknown.  The intent of this program is to reunite 
such children with a member or members of their family . . 
. .  The [minor refugee program] is fully funded by the 
federal government through [resettlement office].  At 
present, a federal regulation requires that such children 
not be freed for adoption by the states.  A proposed 
amendment to the federal regulation, to allow states to 
free such children for adoption awaits enactment.  The 
[d]epartment will adhere to the federal regulation in 
question." 
 
The department asserts that this regulation was promulgated in 
1986.  Notwithstanding the fact that it states, "[a]t present, a 
federal regulation requires that such children not be freed for 
adoption by the states," see id., as previously discussed, in 
our view 45 C.F.R. § 400.115(c) does give the department the 
discretion in rare instances to seek termination of parental 
rights on behalf of unaccompanied refugee minors so that they 
may be adopted. 
 
The last sentence of the 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.12(3) is 
key:  "The [d]epartment will adhere to the federal regulation in 
question."  Thus, ultimately, the department's intention is to 
follow, and be in harmony with, the Federal regulation.  Whether 
the department's interpretation of the Federal statute in 1986 
was correct is moot. 
                                                                  
See Custody of Victoria, 473 Mass. 64, 65 n.1 (2015), citing 8 
U.S.C. § 1521. 
8 
 
 
c.  Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997.  Despite the 
parents' argument to the contrary (and although they have 
different goals), the minor refugee program and the Adoption and 
Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 105th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (amending various provisions of 
title IV of Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq.) 
(adoption act), do not conflict.7 
The purpose of the adoption act is to provide "safety, 
permanency, and . . . well-being" for children who are under 
State guardianship.  65 Fed. Reg. 4020, 4020 (2000).  It directs 
States to petition for the termination of parental rights where 
a child has been in foster care for fifteen of the prior twenty-
two months.8  42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2012).  However, there are 
three exceptions to this general rule, including if there is a 
documented "compelling reason" to refrain from filing a 
                     
 
7 The father also contends that the adoption act does not 
apply to unaccompanied refugee minors because the act has a 
funding source that is different from that of the Unaccompanied 
Refugee Minors Program (minor refugee program).  This argument 
has no merit; by its own terms, the adoption act applies to all 
children under State guardianship.  42 U.S.C. §§ 622(b)(8), 
675(5) (2012). 
 
 
8 There is no question that children in the minor refugee 
program are included in the adoption act:  "Congress developed 
the [termination of parental rights] provision [of the adoption 
act] to be applied to all children in foster care, whatever 
their entry point into the system.  Exempting groups of children 
from the requirements would be contrary to [the adoption act's] 
goal to shorten children's time in foster care."  65 Fed. Reg. 
4020, 4059 (2000). 
 
9 
 
 
petition.  42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(ii).  A compelling reason not 
to file a termination petition could include situations where 
the child is an unaccompanied refugee minor.  See 45 C.F.R. 
§ 1356.21(i)(2)(ii)(C) (2015).  Thus, read together, the 
adoption act is well-aligned with regulations promulgating the 
minor refugee program. 
 
3. Conclusion.   Unaccompanied refugee minors are different 
from other children in foster care because they are separated 
from their parents by war, natural disaster, or other forces 
beyond their parents' control.  Termination of parental rights 
in such circumstances would be a clear due process violation.  
However, although the overarching goal of the minor refugee 
program is the reunification of families so affected,9 where 
parents of unaccompanied refugee minors arrive in the United 
                     
 
9 In cases where the parents of refugee children remain 
overseas, the department must consider factors different from 
those in domestic cases when determining whether reasonable 
efforts were made to reunify the family and whether 
reunification is still reasonably possible. 
 
 
In cases in which parents arrive in the United States after 
their children do, the resettlement office "expects that the 
overwhelming majority" of family reunifications can be achieved 
during a "90-day period during which [the resettlement office] 
would support services to unaccompanied minor refugees following 
arrival of a parent."  Office of Refugee Resettlement Statement 
of Goals, Priorities, Standards, and Guidelines , 52 Fed. Reg. 
38147, 38147 (1987).   However, the resettlement office allows 
that "in a compelling case" the ninety-day period may be 
extended to allow more time for reunification.  Id. at 38148.  
It is for the court with jurisdiction to determine whether the 
department exercised reasonable efforts to reunite the family in 
this case. 
10 
 
 
States but make no attempt to reunite with their children (or 
are otherwise found to be unfit), their children deserve safety 
and permanency just like any other child. 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the judge's interlocutory order 
denying the mother's motion to deny the department's petition, 
and we remand the case to the Probate and Family Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.