Case Title: In re K.R.C.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 389A19

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2020-07-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 389A19  
Filed 17 July 2020 
 
IN THE MATTER OF: K.R.C. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 6 May 
2019 by Judge Paul A. Hardison in District Court, Pitt County. This matter was 
calendared in the Supreme Court on 19 June 2020 and determined without oral 
argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.  
 
Miller & Audino, LLP, by Jay Anthony Audino, for petitioner-appellant mother. 
 
Matthew D. Wunsche, GAL Appellate Counsel, for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
W. Gregory Duke for respondent-appellee father. 
 
 
MORGAN, Justice. 
 
 
Petitioner, the mother of the minor child K.R.C. (Katie)1, appeals from the trial 
court’s order denying her petition to terminate the parental rights of respondent, 
Katie’s biological father. Because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of 
fact and conclusions of law to allow for meaningful appellate review, we vacate the 
trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings. 
 
                                            
1 A pseudonym chosen by the parties. 
IN RE K.R.C. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Factual Background and Procedural History 
Katie was born in April 2014. Petitioner mother and respondent father were 
not married to each other, and after Katie’s birth, the child resided with petitioner in 
Pitt County. Soon after Katie was born, the District Court, Pitt County, entered a 
temporary custody order granting sole custody of Katie to petitioner due to 
respondent’s mental health issues—respondent was hospitalized for three days with 
suicidal ideations in late January 2014—and his threatening conduct. Petitioner 
obtained an ex parte domestic violence protective order (DVPO) against respondent 
on 13 June 2014. On 12 July 2014, respondent was charged with assault on a female, 
interference with emergency communications, and second-degree trespass after he 
went to petitioner’s residence, took petitioner’s telephone from her when she tried to 
call 911 for help, and choked petitioner when she refused to allow him to see Katie.  
During the summer of 2014, Katie was the subject of a series of child protective 
services (CPS) reports received by the Pitt and Beaufort County Departments of 
Social Services (DSS). The report received on 16 June 2014 alleged that respondent 
was experiencing suicidal thoughts again and had made indirect threats, such as 
advising petitioner to take out a life insurance policy on Katie. On 12 July 2014, a 
report alleged that petitioner had been contacting respondent and asking to see him, 
and that Katie had been severely sunburned during a beach trip with petitioner. It 
was further reported on 18 August 2014 that petitioner was unstable and possibly 
suffering from post-partum depression, and that petitioner’s stepmother had mental 
IN RE K.R.C. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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health issues. Respondent later acknowledged that he had made the latter two of 
these CPS reports. 
Due to petitioner’s employment with Pitt County DSS, the CPS reports were 
investigated by Lenoir County DSS, which arranged for Beaufort County DSS 
(BCDSS) to provide services to the family. On 12 September 2014, petitioner 
contacted BCDSS and admitted to having ongoing contact with respondent. 
Petitioner acknowledged that she had allowed respondent to spend the night in her 
residence with Katie present on at least two occasions, had sexual relations with 
respondent while Katie was in the home on two other occasions, and had otherwise 
allowed respondent to visit with Katie.  
Following these disclosures from petitioner, Katie was placed in kinship care 
with the child’s maternal grandparents. Respondent objected to the placement, 
however, and threatened to remove Katie from the grandparents’ home. On 15 
September 2014, BCDSS obtained nonsecure custody of Katie and filed a juvenile 
petition alleging that Katie was a neglected juvenile. 
Respondent submitted to a psychological evaluation by Dr. Anne L. Mauldin. 
In her report issued in November 2014, Dr. Mauldin noted that respondent was under 
a psychiatrist’s care for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and mood 
disorder related to his hospitalization. Based on her examination of respondent, Dr. 
Mauldin found “a high degree of fit with the diagnostic criteria for ADHD as well as 
Cluster B personality disorders, specifically Antisocial personality disorder and 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Borderline personality disorder.” She described these personality disorders as 
characterized by “intense, shifting moods and . . . problems with impulse control” as 
well as rigid but shifting attitudes about other people and “problems maintaining 
relationships.” Because of the negative implications of these diagnoses for parenting, 
Dr. Mauldin deemed it “critical that [respondent] . . . be under the care of a 
psychiatrist and be in treatment with a skilled psychotherapist . . . who utilizes 
Dialectical Behavioral Therapy (DBT.)”  
The trial court adjudicated Katie to be a neglected juvenile on 3 December 
2014, finding that she lived in an environment injurious to her welfare “in light of the 
substantial amount of domestic violence, aggression, and mental issues displayed by 
[respondent.]” See N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2019). Although petitioner “ha[d] not 
actively done anything to injure [Katie],” the trial court found that petitioner had 
“continued to allow [respondent] to have access to the child in spite of seeking 
criminal charges, a [DVPO,] and a temporary custody order to prevent him from 
having such access.”  
The trial court entered its initial disposition order on 31 December 2014, 
maintaining Katie in the legal custody of BCDSS and authorizing her continued 
placement with her maternal grandparents. Although BCDSS had developed out-of-
home family services agreements (OHFSA) for both parents, the trial court found as 
a fact that respondent had not signed his OHFSA and had “informed BCDSS that he 
is not going to complete services in order to work a plan of reunification.” As a result, 
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the trial court ceased reunification efforts toward respondent and established a 
permanent plan for Katie of reunification with petitioner. To achieve reunification, 
petitioner was ordered to comply with the conditions of her OHFSA.  
The trial court ordered that respondent comply with the requirements of his 
OHFSA, which included anger management treatment and DBT. The trial court also 
ordered respondent to abstain from using marijuana and from posting material on 
social media about the case. Although respondent was attending supervised 
visitations with Katie and behaving appropriately toward his daughter during those 
visits, the trial court found that his ongoing hostility and aggression toward BCDSS 
staff required the relocation of his visits to the Family Violence Center (FVC) in 
Greenville. The trial court granted respondent two hours of biweekly supervised 
visitation with Katie but required him to contact the FVC to arrange the visits.  
An initial permanency planning hearing was conducted by the trial court on 6 
March 2015. That court entered an order on 24 March 2015 awarding petitioner sole 
legal and physical custody of Katie in fulfillment of the permanent plan. The trial 
court made findings that respondent had not visited Katie since the time that 
respondent’s visits were moved to FVC, that respondent had “done nothing to 
eliminate the safety risks that led to this juvenile coming into care,” that respondent 
was “unfit to raise a minor child or to be in the presence of a minor child 
unsupervised,” and that respondent had mental health issues “prevent[ing] him from 
appreciating the risks he poses[] to a minor child.” Based upon these findings, 
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respondent was ordered by the trial court to have no further visitation with Katie. 
The order also forbade petitioner and respondent to have any contact with one 
another, whether “direct or indirect.” In its 24 March 2015 order, the trial court 
waived further review hearings and relieved the parties and counsel from further 
responsibility in the case. The trial court retained jurisdiction in the case, however, 
concluding that respondent’s “general noncompliance” and “mental health warrant a 
continued need for state intervention and jurisdiction for this minor child.” See 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-201(a) (2019).  
On 18 August 2017, more than twenty-six months after regaining custody of 
Katie, petitioner filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Petitioner 
alleged the following statutory grounds for termination: (1) neglect; (2) leaving Katie 
in a placement outside the home for more than twelve months without making 
reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to her removal; (3) failure to 
pay a reasonable portion of the cost of Katie’s care; (4) dependency; and (5) 
abandonment. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(3), (6)–(7) (2019). Respondent filed an 
answer to the petition denying each of these alleged termination grounds.  
The trial court held an adjudicatory hearing on 6 and 9 November 2018. On 
the second day of the hearing, petitioner voluntarily dismissed her claim under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3) (failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of the 
juvenile’s care), conceding that the application of the ground only arose when a 
juvenile is in DSS custody. At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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respondent moved to dismiss petitioner’s remaining claims on the basis of insufficient 
evidence. With regard to his alleged failure to make reasonable progress under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), respondent argued that this ground for termination was 
also inapplicable because Katie was removed from petitioner’s care for only six 
months between September 2014 and March 2015 and thus was not in a “placement 
outside the home for more than [twelve] months” as required by the governing 
statute. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). After hearing from each party, the trial court took 
the matter under advisement, deferring the dispositional hearing pending its ruling 
on adjudication.  
In a ruling captioned “Termination Order” which was entered on 6 May 2019, 
the trial court denied the petition, concluding that “[p]etitioner ha[d] failed her 
burden to prove by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that the necessary grounds 
exist to terminate the [r]espondent’s parental rights.” Petitioner filed timely notice of 
appeal after she was served with the order on 19 June 2019. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1001(b) (2019).  
Analysis 
Petitioner begins with two related arguments which we consider together.  She 
first challenges the trial court’s conclusion of law that she failed to prove that “the 
necessary grounds exist” to support the termination of respondent’s parental rights. 
(Emphasis added). Petitioner claims that the pluralization of the term “ground” 
illustrates that the trial court mistakenly believed that petitioner was obliged to 
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prove multiple “necessary grounds” for termination under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a). 
Petitioner also contends that this sole conclusion of law of the trial court fails to 
disclose the specific deficiencies in petitioner’s evidence regarding her burden of 
proof. In her second argument, petitioner asserts that the trial court failed to make 
sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion regarding the lack of statutory 
grounds upon which to terminate respondent’s parental rights. 
In addressing the trial court’s use of the term “necessary grounds” in its 
conclusion of law, we first recognize that at the adjudicatory stage of a termination 
of parental rights proceeding, the petitioner has the burden to prove the existence of 
at least one statutory ground for termination by clear, cogent, and convincing 
evidence. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (2019). It is well-established that proof of any single 
statutory ground for termination is sufficient to meet the petitioner’s burden. See, 
e.g., In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404, 293 S.E.2d 127, 133 (1982). Accordingly, “[a]fter 
an adjudication that one or more grounds for terminating a parent’s rights exist,” the 
trial court must proceed to disposition and “determine whether terminating the 
parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019) 
(emphasis added). 
While this Court agrees with petitioner that proof of multiple grounds for 
termination is not necessary for an adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e), we are 
not persuaded that, by itself, the trial court’s use of the phrase “necessary grounds” 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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which pluralizes the term “ground” connotes the commission of error by the trial 
court.  
Among the common meanings of “grounds” is the “[b]asis or justification for 
something, as in ‘grounds for divorce.’ ” https://www.yourdictionary.com/grounds (last 
visited June 30, 2020).2 In addition, as shown by the following passage from our Rules 
of Civil Procedure which are codified in the North Carolina General Statutes, legal 
references often use the terms “ground” and “grounds” interchangeably to denote a 
single basis or reason: 
It is not ground for objection that the information sought 
will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought 
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence nor is it grounds for objection that the 
examining party has knowledge of the information as to 
which discovery is sought. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, 26(b)(1) (2019) (emphasis added). This same tendency appears in 
our case law. Compare In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 391, 831 S.E.2d 49, 52 (2019) (“At 
the adjudication stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by clear, cogent, 
and convincing evidence that grounds exist for termination pursuant to section 7B-
1111 of the General Statutes.” (emphasis added)), with id. at 395, 831 S.E.2d at 53 
(“As previously noted, an adjudication of any single ground in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) 
is sufficient to support a termination of parental rights.” (emphasis added)). Likewise, 
                                            
2 See also https://www.merriam-webster.com (search “DICTIONARY” for “grounds”) 
(“4 a: a basis for belief, action, or argument // ground for complaint —often used in plural // 
sufficient grounds for divorce”) 
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in case citations, the phrase “rev’d on other grounds” may refer to a single alternative 
rationale for reversing a lower court’s decision. See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM 
SYSTEM OF CITATION 501 tbl.T.8 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 20th ed. 
2015). In light of this frequent interchangeable usage of the terms “ground” and 
“grounds” in legal authorities to refer to a singular basis for a decision, we are 
unwilling to conclude, without more than the trial court’s facial reference to “grounds” 
in the order here, that the trial court harbored a mistaken belief that multiple 
statutory grounds for termination were necessary in order to terminate respondent’s 
parental rights.  
We do agree, however, with petitioner that the limited findings of fact and the 
single conclusion of law included in the trial court’s “Termination Order” do not 
permit meaningful appellate review, and therefore they are insufficient to support 
the trial court’s decision denying her petition. The pertinent statute governing 
adjudications, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109, provides that the trial court “shall take evidence, 
find the facts, and shall adjudicate the existence or nonexistence of any of the 
circumstances set forth in G.S. 7B-1111 which authorize the termination of parental 
rights of the respondent.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e) (2019). In addition to placing the 
burden of proof on the petitioner, the statute specifies that “all [adjudicatory] findings 
of fact shall be based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) 
(2019).  
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Here, the trial court concluded that petitioner had failed to prove any of her 
alleged grounds for terminating respondent’s parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a). In such circumstances, when the court “determine[s] that circumstances 
authorizing termination of parental rights do not exist,” the dispositional statute 
provides that “the court shall dismiss the petition or deny the motion,[3] making 
appropriate findings of fact and conclusions.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(c) (2019) (emphasis 
added). 
We have previously held that N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e) “places a duty on the trial 
court as the adjudicator of the evidence”4 which is equivalent to the duty imposed by 
Rule 52(a)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 
403, 407, 831 S.E.2d 54, 59 (2019) (citing N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(1) (2019)). Rule 
52(a)(1) mandates that, “[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . . , the 
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law 
                                            
3 When a juvenile is the subject of a pending abuse, neglect, or dependency proceeding, 
a party seeking termination of parental rights may file a motion in the cause in lieu of a 
petition. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1102 (2019). As a technical matter, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(c) directs 
the trial court to dismiss a petition and to deny a motion. However, we shall refer to the trial 
court’s disposition in this case as denying petitioner’s petition, as that wording is used in the 
“Termination Order.”  
 
4 The fact-finding requirement which is essential to support the trial court’s 
dispositional determination of a child’s best interests is governed by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) 
(2019), which provides that the court “shall consider the following [six] criteria and make 
written findings regarding the following that are relevant[.]” Id. (emphasis added); see also In 
re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190, 199, 835 S.E.2d 417, 424 (2019) (“[A] factor is ‘relevant’ if there is 
‘conflicting evidence concerning’ the factor, such that it is ‘placed in issue by virtue of the 
evidence presented before the [district] court[.]’ ” (second and third alterations in original) 
(quoting In re H.D., 239 N.C. App. 318, 327, 768 S.E.2d 860, 866 (2015))).  
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thereon[.]” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(1). In explaining the trial court’s obligation 
arising under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e), we quoted a prior decision of this Court which 
applied Rule 52(a)(1): 
[W]hile Rule 52(a) does not require a 
recitation of the evidentiary and subsidiary 
facts required to prove the ultimate facts, it 
does require specific findings of the ultimate 
facts established by the evidence, admissions 
and stipulations which are determinative of 
the questions involved in the action and 
essential to support the conclusions of law 
reached. 
 
In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 407–08, 831 S.E.2d at 59 (quoting Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 
446, 451–52, 290 S.E.2d 653, 658 (1982) (emphasis and alteration in original)). “The 
purpose of the requirement that the court make findings of those specific facts which 
support its ultimate disposition of the case is to allow a reviewing court to determine 
from the record whether the judgment—and the legal conclusions which underlie it—
represent a correct application of the law.” Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. 708, 712, 268 
S.E.2d 185, 189 (1980). 
 
By its own terms, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e) applies equally to instances in which 
the trial court “adjudicate[s] the existence or nonexistence of any of the circumstances 
set forth in G.S. 7B-1111[.]” Id. (emphasis added). Subsection 7B-1110(c) expressly 
requires the trial court to “mak[e] appropriate findings of fact and conclusions” when 
denying relief based on the absence of statutory grounds for termination. 
Consequently, we interpret N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e) as placing the same duty on the 
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trial court to “find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon,” regardless of whether the court is granting or denying a petition to 
terminate parental rights. N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(1); see also In re T.N.H., 372 
N.C. at 407, 831 S.E.2d at 59. 
 
In its “Termination Order,” the trial court found dozens of evidentiary facts 
recounting the parties’ respective actions during the course of the underlying juvenile 
proceeding and describing respondent’s current employment, mental health 
diagnosis, and family life. Nonetheless, the trial court found none of the ultimate facts 
required to support an adjudication of “the existence or nonexistence of any of the 
circumstances set forth in G.S. 7B-1111 . . . .” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e) (emphasis added). 
Combined with the trial court’s bare conclusion of law5 that petitioner failed to prove 
that “the necessary grounds exist to terminate the [r]espondent’s parental rights[,]” 
these evidentiary findings do not meet the requirements of Rule 52(a)(1) as applied 
to adjudicatory orders under N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109(e) and -1110(c).  
 
 “Ultimate facts are the final facts required to establish the plaintiff’s cause of 
action or the defendant’s defense; and evidentiary facts are those subsidiary facts 
required to prove the ultimate facts.” Woodard v. Mordecai, 234 N.C. 463, 470, 67 
S.E.2d 639, 644 (1951). We have recognized that 
                                            
5 We note the trial court also concluded that it “ha[d] jurisdiction over the matter 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101 [(2019),]” and that respondent’s parental rights “should not 
be terminated.” Neither of these additional conclusions alters our view that the court’s 
adjudicatory findings are inadequate.  
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the line of demarcation between ultimate facts and legal 
conclusions is not easily drawn. An ultimate fact is the final 
resulting effect which is reached by processes of logical 
reasoning from the evidentiary facts. Whether a statement 
is an ultimate fact or a conclusion of law depends upon 
whether it is reached by natural reasoning or by an 
application of fixed rules of law. 
 
Id. at 472, 67 S.E.2d at 645 (citations omitted); see also In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 76, 
833 S.E.2d 768, 772–73 (2019) (defining “an ‘ultimate finding [a]s a conclusion of law 
or at least a determination of a mixed question of law and fact’ [which] should ‘be 
distinguished from the findings of primary, evidentiary, or circumstantial facts.’ ” 
(quoting Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481, 491, 57 S. Ct. 569, 574, 81 L. 
Ed. 755, 762 (1937)). 
 
Compliance with the fact-finding requirements of N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109(e) 
and -1110(c) is critical because    
[e]ffective appellate review of an order entered by a trial 
court sitting without a jury is largely dependent upon the 
specificity by which the order’s rationale is articulated. 
Evidence must support findings; findings must support 
conclusions; conclusions must support the judgment. Each 
step of the progression must be taken by the trial judge, in 
logical sequence; each link in the chain of reasoning must 
appear in the order itself. Where there is a gap, it cannot 
be determined on appeal whether the trial court correctly 
exercised its function to find the facts and apply the law 
thereto. 
 
Quick, 305 N.C. at 458, 290 S.E.2d at 661 (quoting Coble, 300 N.C. at 714, 268 S.E.2d 
at 190).  
 
Here, petitioner presented the trial court with four potential grounds for the 
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termination of respondent’s parental rights: neglect under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1); 
lack of reasonable progress under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3); dependency under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6); and abandonment under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). The trial 
court neglected to find the ultimate facts which would be dispositive of any of these 
grounds. Moreover, the trial court’s general conclusion of law singly offers no analysis 
of the legal standards applied to petitioner’s claims. 
 
Subdivision 7B-1111(a)(1) authorizes the trial court to terminate one’s 
parental rights upon proof that “[t]he parent has . . . neglected the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1111(a)(1). The trial court found that Katie had been adjudicated as neglected 
on 3 December 2014, but made no findings on the dispositive question of whether 
respondent was neglecting Katie at the time of the termination hearing within the 
meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2019). See, e.g., In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 248, 
485 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1997) (“A finding of neglect sufficient to terminate parental 
rights must be based on evidence showing neglect at the time of the termination 
proceeding.”). 
 
Similarly, with regard to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), the trial court’s findings do 
not address whether respondent “willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement 
outside the home for more than 12 months”6 and, if so, whether “reasonable progress 
                                            
6 We do not reach the merits of respondent’s contention that N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) 
would seem inapplicable to the facts of this case inasmuch as Katie was in her mother’s 
custody at the time that the petition was filed. See generally In re A.C.F., 176 N.C. App. 520, 
526, 626 S.E.2d 729, 734 (2006) (measuring the period of “more than twelve months” under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) as “beginning when the child was ‘left’ in foster care or placement 
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under the circumstances has been made [by respondent] in correcting those 
conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile.” Id.; see also In re O.C., 171 N.C. 
App. 457, 464, 615 S.E.2d 391, 396 (articulating “two[-]part analysis” for 
adjudications under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2)), disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 64, 623 
S.E.2d 587 (2005); In re C.C., 173 N.C. App. 375, 384, 618 S.E.2d 813, 819 (2005) 
(reversing termination of parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) where “the 
trial court’s order does not contain adequate findings of fact that respondent acted 
‘willfully’ or . . . adequate findings on respondent’s progress”). 
 
An adjudication of dependency under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) requires a 
showing that (1) “the parent is incapable of providing for the proper care and 
supervision of the juvenile, such that the juvenile is a dependent juvenile within the 
meaning of G.S. 7B-101, and . . . there is a reasonable probability that such 
incapability will continue for the foreseeable future[,]” and (2) “the parent lacks an 
appropriate alternative child care arrangement.” Id. “Thus, the trial court’s findings 
regarding this ground ‘must address both (1) the parent’s ability to provide care or 
supervision, and (2) the availability to the parent of alternative child care 
arrangements.’ ” In re L.R.S., 237 N.C. App. 16, 19, 764 S.E.2d 908, 910 (2014) 
                                            
outside the home pursuant to a court order, and ending when the motion or petition for 
termination of parental rights was filed”); see also N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(18b) (2019) (defining 
“[r]eturn home or reunification” as “[p]lacement of the juvenile in the home of either parent 
or placement of the juvenile in the home of a guardian or custodian from whose home the 
child was removed by court order” (emphasis added)). 
 
 
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(quoting In re P.M., 169 N.C. App. 423, 427, 610 S.E.2d 403, 406 (2005)).  
Because proof of both the parent’s incapability to provide proper care and 
supervision and the parent’s lack of an alternative child care arrangement is required 
to terminate parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6), a trial court may 
adjudicate the nonexistence of this ground by finding the absence of either element, 
or by finding the petitioner’s failure to prove either element by clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(c); see also N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109(e), -1110(c). 
In the instant case, the trial court made neither of these potential findings. 
We note that petitioner does not argue on appeal that the evidence supported 
the termination of respondent’s parental rights for dependency. Although petitioner 
does not expressly abandon this termination ground, nonetheless its omission from 
the pertinent arguments of her appellate brief implies that she recognizes that the 
circumstances contemplated by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) do not exist in this case. As 
discussed, the statutory provision requires proof here that respondent’s inability to 
provide for Katie’s care and supervision rendered her “a dependent juvenile within 
the meaning of G.S. 7B-101[.]” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6). Section 7B-101 defines a 
“[d]ependent juvenile” as 
in need of assistance or placement because (i) the juvenile 
has no parent, guardian, or custodian responsible for the 
juvenile’s care or supervision or (ii) the juvenile’s parent, 
guardian, or custodian is unable to provide for the 
juvenile’s care or supervision and lacks an appropriate 
alternative child care arrangement.  
       
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N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(9) (2019). Regardless of respondent’s abilities, Katie was not “in 
need of assistance or placement” at the time that the petition was filed because she 
was in the legal and physical custody of her mother. Id. Accordingly, Katie was not 
“a dependent juvenile within the meaning of G.S. 7B-101” as required to terminate 
respondent’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6). 
 
 
Finally, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) authorizes the termination of parental rights 
if “[t]he parent has willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six consecutive 
months immediately preceding the filing of the petition . . . .” Id. Although not defined 
by North Carolina’s Juvenile Code, “abandonment imports any wil[l]ful or intentional 
conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental 
duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 
501, 126 S.E.2d 597, 608 (1962). This Court has specifically held that the issue of the 
willfulness of a parent’s conduct is “a question of fact to be determined from the 
evidence.” Id. 
 
The trial court’s findings in the present case offer no assessment regarding the 
willfulness of respondent’s conduct toward Katie on the matter of abandonment 
during the six months at issue under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). See In re I.R.L., 263 
N.C. App. 481, 484, 823 S.E.2d 902, 905 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019) (remanding for further 
findings where “[t]he trial court’s order fails to address the willfulness of Father’s 
conduct, a required element under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(4) and (7)”). The 
inadequacy of the trial court’s findings is further displayed by its failure to identify 
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“the determinative six-month period” governing its abandonment inquiry. In re 
C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 23, 832 S.E.2d 692, 697 (2019). 
 
In urging this Court to affirm the “Termination Order,” both respondent and 
the guardian ad litem (GAL) emphasize the large number of evidentiary findings 
made by the trial court. They cite the Court of Appeals decision of In re B.C.T., 828 
S.E.2d 50 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019) as disclaiming the need for particular “magic words” 
in the trial court’s findings of fact.7 Id. at 58. However, the sufficiency of the trial 
court’s order is not measured merely by the quantity of findings or the trial court’s 
parlance. We are simply unable to undertake meaningful appellate review of the trial 
court’s decision based upon a series of evidentiary findings which are untethered to 
any ultimate facts which undergird an adjudication pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a) or to any particularized conclusions of law which would otherwise explain the 
                                            
7 We announced a similar principle in affirming an order that ceased reunification 
efforts toward a respondent-parent under the statutory predecessor to N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(b) 
(2019), which required the court to make certain findings of fact before ceasing such efforts: 
While [the trial court’s] findings of fact do not quote the precise 
language of [former N.C.G.S. §] 7B-507(b), the order embraces 
the substance of the statutory provisions requiring findings of 
fact that further reunification efforts “would be futile” or “would 
be inconsistent with the juvenile’s health, safety, and need for a 
safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time.” 
In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. 165, 169, 752 S.E.2d 453, 456 (2013). In In re L.M.T., we opined that 
“[t]he trial court’s written findings must address the statute’s concerns, but need not quote 
its exact language.” Id. at 168, 752 S.E.2d at 455. Because the order sub judice lacks any 
ultimate findings addressing the gravamen of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a), we need not consider 
the degree to which our holding in In re L.M.T. applies to an adjudicatory order entered 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109(e) and -1110(c).   
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trial court’s reasoning.8 
 
The Court of Appeals faced a different, though instructively relevant, issue in 
In re B.C.T., where the trial court’s dispositional order included a finding, 
unsupported by evidence, that a certain party was “a fit and proper person to have 
the care, custody, and control of the [j]uvenile.” In re B.C.T., 828 S.E.2d at 58. The 
order also included a conclusion of law “[t]hat it is in the best interests of the [j]uvenile 
for [the party] to be granted the care, custody, and control of the [j]uvenile.” Id. In 
reversing and remanding for a new hearing, the Court of Appeals “noted that the trial 
court need not use ‘magic words’ in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, if the 
evidence and findings overall make the trial court’s basis for its order clear.” Id. 
However, just as the use of specific terminology was not necessary in In re B.C.T. to 
sustain the custody award, conversely the trial court’s use of such terms in the 
present case as “fit and proper person” and “best interests of the [j]uvenile” was 
insufficient to substantiate its order. Id. (“Here, we have disposition orders with 
‘magic words’ but no evidence to support some of the crucial findings of fact and thus 
no support for the related conclusions of law.”).  
                                            
8 We must decline to speculate about how the evidentiary facts led the trial court to 
conclude that petitioner had failed to prove the existence of any of her alleged grounds for 
termination. To indulge in such conjecture would exceed the proper scope of appellate review, 
thus undermining the purpose of Rule 52(a)(1) and the coordinate requirements of N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1109(e) “to allow a reviewing court to determine from the record whether the 
judgment—and the legal conclusions which underlie it—represent a correct application of the 
law.” Coble, 300 N.C. at 712, 268 S.E.2d at 189; see also Godfrey v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment 
of Union Cty., 317 N.C. 51, 63, 344 S.E.2d 272, 279 (1986) (“Fact finding is not a function of 
our appellate courts.”). 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Because the ‘Termination Order” under review here does not contain any of 
the “magic words” associated with an adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a), we 
find the holding of In re B.C.T. to be inapplicable, even though the analysis employed 
in that decision aids our examination. The issue before the Court in this case is not 
the lack of supporting evidence for the trial court’s findings and conclusions, but a 
lack of adequate findings and conclusions which would “make the trial court’s basis 
for its order clear.” Id.  
 
Respondent and the GAL also reference the Court of Appeals opinion of In re 
S.R.G., 200 N.C. App. 594, 684 S.E.2d 902 (2009), disc. review and cert. denied, 363 
N.C. 804, 691 S.E.2d 19 (2010) (S.R.G. II), for the principle that a trial court’s failure 
to address an alleged ground for termination in its order amounts to a tacit “non-
adjudication of that ground.” They appear to argue, by way of extension of this 
holding from In re S.R.G., that a trial court’s order does not need to address any of 
the specific grounds for termination alleged by a petitioner when the trial court 
concludes that none of the alleged grounds exist. To hold otherwise, the GAL 
contends, would require all future orders terminating parental rights “to list all of 
the grounds that [the trial court] had not adjudicated,” thereby imposing “an 
unnecessary new requirement” on trial courts and creating “a potential pitfall for 
other petitioners.” 
 
Respondent and the GAL, in their respective positions, misconstrue S.R.G. II, 
which involved an appeal which was lodged after remand of the Court of Appeals’ 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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prior decision in In re S.R.G., 195 N.C. App. 79, 671 S.E.2d 47 (2009) (S.R.G. I). The 
petitioner in S.R.G. I alleged four grounds for terminating the respondent’s parental 
rights, including neglect and abandonment under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (7). 
Id. at 81, 671 S.E.2d at 49. The trial court originally entered an order terminating 
the respondent’s parental rights, finding “as its sole basis for termination” that the 
respondent had willfully abandoned the child. Id. at 82, 671 S.E.2d at 50. In the 
respondent’s appeal in S.R.G. I, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court had 
erred in adjudicating abandonment based on the respondent’s “actions during the 
relevant six[-]month period[.]” Id. at 87, 671 S.E.2d at 53. The cause was remanded 
to the trial court “for further action consistent with this opinion.” Id. at 88, 671 S.E.2d 
at 53. 
 
On remand, the trial court entered a new order terminating the respondent’s 
parental rights on the grounds of neglect under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). S.R.G. II, 
200 N.C. App. at 597, 684 S.E.2d at 904. In S.R.G. II, the Court of Appeals held that 
the “law of the case” doctrine barred the trial court from adjudicating a new ground 
for termination on remand which had not been found in its original order. Id. at 597–
98, 684 S.E.2d at 904–05. The Court of Appeals reasoned that N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e) 
provides that the trial court “shall adjudicate the existence or nonexistence of any of 
the circumstances set forth in G.S. 7B–1111” at the adjudicatory hearing. Id. at 598, 
684 S.E.2d at 905. This statutory language required the trial court to address all of 
the petitioner’s alleged grounds at the initial termination hearing. Therefore, the 
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Court of Appeals concluded, the “consequence” of the trial court’s original order 
adjudicating the existence of abandonment under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) was “the 
nonexistence of the other two grounds alleged by [the petitioner.]” Id.  
At first glance, S.R.G. II might appear to support the joint position of 
respondent and the GAL that a trial court’s failure to address an alleged ground for 
termination amounts to a proper adjudication of the nonexistence of the alleged 
ground. While a trial court’s failure to address an alleged ground can imply that the 
trial court was not persuaded it existed, it tells a reviewing court nothing about how 
or why the trial court reached such a conclusion. The Court of Appeals did not affirm 
the reasoning of the trial court’s original termination order or otherwise imply that 
the trial court’s silence was sufficient to comply with the requirement that courts 
“find the facts” under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e). The opinion in S.R.G. II instead noted 
that the petitioner had “failed in S.R.G. [I] to cross-assign error” to the trial court’s 
non-adjudication of the two grounds in its original order. S.R.G. II, 200 N.C. App. at 
599, 684 S.E.2d at 905; see also N.C. R. App. P. 10(c), 28(c) (allowing appellee to 
“present issues on appeal based on any action or omission of the trial court that 
deprived the appellee of an alternative basis in law for supporting the judgment”). 
Because the petitioner “did not preserve this issue” by raising it on appeal in S.R.G. 
I, the law of the case doctrine barred the Court of Appeals from addressing any new 
potential errors in the original termination order in S.R.G. II. Id. 
Furthermore, both S.R.G. I and S.R.G. II involved a trial court’s order 
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terminating parental rights. The trial court’s order in the current case denied 
petitioner’s termination petition pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(c). This distinction 
makes a difference, for as previously discussed, an adjudication of any statutory 
ground for termination under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) triggers the trial court’s duty to 
proceed to disposition in order to “determine whether terminating the parent’s rights 
is in the juvenile’s best interest.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). In the context of a 
termination order, therefore, the trial court’s failure to address more than the single 
ground needed to terminate parental rights will often be harmless, albeit erroneous, 
under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e).  
By contrast, when the trial court denies a petition at the adjudicatory stage 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(c), the order must allow for appellate review of the 
trial court’s evaluation of each and every ground for termination alleged by the 
petitioner. In this circumstance, the implementation of a principle that a trial court’s 
silence on an alleged ground amounts to a proper adjudication of its nonexistence 
would hinder appellate review and effectually nullify the statutory requirement that 
the trial court “mak[e] appropriate findings of fact and conclusions.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1110(c). 
Contrary to the GAL’s assertion, our conclusion that a trial court must comply 
with N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109(e) and -1110(c) in denying a petition for the termination of 
parental rights is neither novel nor contrary to existing case law. Rather than placing 
an “unnecessary new” burden on the trial courts of the state, our holding merely 
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reiterates that the trial courts must make findings of “those material and ultimate 
facts from which it can be determined whether the findings are supported by the 
evidence and whether they support the conclusions of law reached.” Quick, 305 N.C. 
at 451, 290 S.E.2d at 657. This requirement is consistent with the trial court’s duty 
regarding the entry of judgments following civil bench trials under N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, 
Rule 52(a)(1), see id. at 450–51, 290 S.E.2d at 657, and reinforced by this Court in our 
decision in In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 407–08, 831 S.E.2d at 59. 
Conclusion 
We hold that the trial court erred in its failure to enter sufficient findings of 
ultimate fact and conclusions of law to support its dismissal of the petitioner’s 
termination of parental rights petition pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(c). Therefore, 
we vacate the “Termination Order” and remand this matter to the trial court for the 
entry of additional findings and conclusions. See Coble, 300 N.C. at 714, 268 S.E.2d 
at 190; In re I.R.L., 823 S.E.2d at 906. On remand, we leave to the discretion of the 
trial court whether to hear additional evidence. See, e.g., In re I.R.L., 823 S.E.2d at 
906. In light of our determination, we do not address petitioner’s remaining 
arguments on appeal. 
VACATED AND REMANDED.