Case Title: Hamrick v. Oklahoma ex rel. Office of the Medical Examiner

Citation: 

Docket Number: 109249

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
HAMRICK v. STATE ex rel. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF MEDICAL EXAMINER2011 OK 60Case Number: 109249Decided: 06/21/2011THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN 
THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 

MATTHEW V. HAMRICK, Plaintiff,v.STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex 
rel., OFFICE OF THE CHIEF MEDICAL EXAMINER, Defendant.
FEDERAL CERTIFIED QUESTION
¶0 Invoking Oklahoma's Revised Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 

REFORMULATED CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED.
Charles C. Vaught, Kevin S. Merritt, Armstrong & Lowe, P.C., Tulsa, 
Oklahoma, for Plaintiff,Kindanne C. Jones, Sandra J. Balzer, Susan K. 
Noland, Assistant Attorneys General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 
Defendant.
REIF, J.:
¶1 Plaintiff, Matthew V. Hamrick, sued the State of Oklahoma ex rel., 
Office of the Chief Medical Examiner in the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Oklahoma. He seeks recovery for wrongs he allegedly 
suffered during his employment with the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner. 
Plaintiff initially asserted seven claims against the State, grounded on both 
federal and state law. Plaintiff later dismissed all of the state law claims 
except his claim for unpaid wages under the Protection of Labor Act, 

¶2 The State contested plaintiff's right to rely on section 165.9 as a basis 
to recover such relief. The State noted that the State is not included in the 
statutory definition of "employer" as used in sections 165.1 through 165.11. In 
response, plaintiff contended that the statutory definition of "employer" as 
used in sections 165.1 through 165.11 is broad enough to include the State and 
should be so construed to afford unclassified state employees, like plaintiff, a 
state law remedy to collect unpaid wages. Plaintiff pointed out that 
unclassified employees cannot pursue wage claims through the Merit Protection 
grievance process and will have no state law remedy to pursue a wage claim if 
the State is not treated as an employer under sections 165.1 through 165.11.
¶3 Citing the absence of precedential authority on the rights of unclassified 
state employees to pursue a claim for unpaid wages, the plaintiff and State 
jointly requested the federal court to certify a question of law to determine 
the applicability of section 165.9 to such a wage claim. The federal court 
granted the parties' request and inquired: "Does an unclassified state employee 
who alleges his employer failed to pay him wages have a private right of action 
under 
¶4 The federal certification order set forth the following facts relevant to 
the certified question:
Mr. Hamrick was employed by the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) 
as an investigator in its Tulsa office from September 1, 2006, through February 
10, 2010. Throughout his service as an investigator, Mr. Hamrick's employment 
status was that of a full time "unclassified" state employee. There is no 
dispute that during Mr. Hamrick's tenure with OCME, the agency's scheduling 
required that its investigators work day shifts in the office, overnight "on 
call" shifts, and weekend "on call" shifts on a rotating basis. During the time 
in question, a Tulsa investigator's scheduled office hours, combined with the 
hours the investigator was scheduled to be "on call," commonly exceeded forty 
(40) hours in a week.
OCME compensate Mr. Hamrick and continues to compensate its investigators for 
the hours for which they are engaged to work and which time is recorded on their 
time sheets and/or daily activity logs. However, OCME does not pay investigators 
for the entire period during which they are "on call."
Mr. Hamrick's responsibilities as an investigator OCME required him to drive 
a state vehicle to death scenes over which the agency exercised jurisdiction. 
OCME had in place a personnel policy and practice provision that provided that 
"[a]ny employee violating the provisions of this section (operation of state 
vehicle) may be subject to disciplinary action and/or termination and may be 
subject to fine or imprisonment in accordance with State Law." Employee 
Handbook, p. 39.
Mr. Hamrick contends that OCME's "on-call" system is onerous that it has 
created an "engaged to wait" system and that he should be compensated for all 
time he was "on-call." Mr. Hamrick contends that OCME's practice of conducting 
performance reviews concerning an investigator's ability to respond to death 
calls within 15 minutes of receipt 95% of the time is evidence which supports 
this contention. OCME disputes that it created such a system and contends that 
the employees were "waiting to be engaged."
Prior to initiating this action, Mr. Hamrick submitted a claim to OCME in 
which he contended that he had not been fully compensated by OCME for wages 
earned. Among the issues raised by Mr. Hamrick was his contention that he should 
be compensated for all hours he was "on call" as opposed to the hours he was 
actually engaged to work while on call. Upon receipt of his (and other) 
allegations, OCME unilaterally contacted the United States Department of Labor 
(USDOL) regarding the allegations. USDOL investigated Mr. Hamrick's allegations 
and as a result, OCME paid the gross amount of $727.19 for wages owed. Mr. 
Hamrick contends, however, that this amount is insufficient and that the amount 
owed to him is far greater that $727.19. Mr. Hamrick further contends that he 
was not given any opportunity to be heard before the USDOL, and has not ever 
been afforded the opportunity to be heard regarding his claim.
In addition and prior to initiating this action, Mr. Hamrick submitted a 
complaint to the Oklahoma Merit Protection Commission (OMPC) regarding the type 
of leave he was required to take as a result of a family member's death. OCME 
and Mr. Hamrick engaged in mediation through OMPC and resolved Mr. Hamrick's 
complaint. There is no dispute, however, that OCME has no formal grievance 
procedure within the employee handbook.
Mr. Hamrick has initiated an action against OCME alleging, inter alia, 
that OCME's failure to compensate him for every hour he is scheduled to be 
on-call is a violation of OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 165.1 et seq. Mr. 
Hamrick claims that denying a private right of action to "unclassified" state 
employees would violate the Oklahoma Constitution. OCME denies that it has 
failed to pay Mr. Hamrick wages and asserts that he does not have a private 
right of action under §§ 165.1 et seq. In particular, OCME argues that 
state agencies are excluded from the definition of "employer" in the 
administrative regulations implementing OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 165.1 et 
seq.

Upon review of all the provisions of sections 165.1 through 165.11, we 
reformulate the question within the confines of the foregoing statement of facts 
to read: Can an unclassified state employee maintain a private right of action 
under 
¶5 We recast the question because section 165.9 cannot be construed in 
isolation, but must be interpreted in context of the Protection of Labor Act as 
a whole. In this way, the full scope of a state employee's rights under these 
statutes can be addressed. This approach leads us to answer the reformulated 
question in the affirmative, except as to the recovery of liquidated 
damages.
¶6 As previously noted, the plaintiff asserts that the State Merit Protection 
grievance process is not available to him and other unclassified state employees 
to resolve a dispute with the State concerning unpaid wages for overtime. As a 
consequence, plaintiff contends that section 165.9 provides the only remedy for 
an unclassified state employee to pursue a claim for overtime allegedly worked, 
but not compensated. Plaintiff points out that section 165.9 provides, in 
pertinent part, that an action may be maintained by "an employee to 
recover unpaid wages and liquidated damages . . . for and in behalf of himself 
and . . . other employees similarly situated . . . ." In addition, section 
165.1(4) defines wages to include "overtime pay." Furthermore, the term 
"employee" as used in sections 165.1 through 165.11 is defined to mean 
"any person permitted to work by an employer," § 165.1(2). 
¶7 In response, the State notes that the State is not included in the 
definition of an "employer" as used in sections 165.1 through 165.11.

¶8 In review of sections 165.1 through 165.11, it is readily apparent that 
the Legislature intended to allocate certain rights and duties under the Act to 
parties that meet the special statutory definitions of "employer" and 
"employee." It is equally clear, however, that the Legislature imposed certain 
obligations on the State and granted certain rights to "state employees" apart 
from the special statutory definitions. As discussed more fully below, the 
Legislature made the State and state employees subject to section 165.2 which, 
in turn, allows state employees to enforce the provisions of section 165.2 as 
provided in sections 165.7(G) and 165.9. 
¶9 Intent to make the State subject to section 165.2 is found in the 
statute's opening sentence: "Every employer in this State shall pay all wages 
due the employees . . . on regular paydays designated in advance." Rather than 
make section 165.2 applicable to "an employer," which would indicate an employer 
as defined by section 165.1(1), the Legislature declared that "Every employer in 
this State" was subject to the command for payment of all wages due on regular 
paydays. Use of "every" means "any" and "all," and conveys a broad expansive 
meaning indicating inclusion is intended. Coffee v. Henry, 

¶10 In addition to requiring regular paydays, section 165.2 further provides 
(1) "[t]he amount due such employee, shall be paid in lawful money," and 
(2) "[w]ith each payment of wages earned by such employee, the employer 
shall issue to such employee a brief itemized statement of any and all 
deductions therefrom." (Emphasis added.) The modifier "such" in this context 
means "being the same as what has been mentioned." 1284 Black's Law Dictionary 
(5th ed. 1979). Modifying the term "employee" with the word "such" indicates 
that these provisions refer to all employees previously mentioned, 
including "state employees."
¶11 In summary, the rights given State employees under section 165.2 are (1) 
payment of all wages due, (2) in lawful money, (3) at least once a month, (4) on 
a regular payday, and (5) receipt of an itemized statement of deductions. State 
employees who are aggrieved by the State's violation of such rights may bring an 
action to enforce these rights as provided in section 165.7(G): "[I]ndividuals 
who are aggrieved by violation of any provision of Sections 165.1 through 165.11 
of [the Act] shall be entitled to bring an action . . . to enforce the 
provisions of such sections."
¶12 In addition, section 165.7(G) makes it clear that "[t]he remedies 
provided by sections 165.1 through 165.11 of [the Act] shall be in addition to 
and not in substitution for and in no manner impair other remedies." Both this 
Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals have concluded that unpaid wages are a 
debt arising out of contract. Reynolds v. Advance Alarms, Inc., 

¶13 The contractual obligations of the State involving the payment of money 
may be enforced against the State in an ordinary action at law. U.C. Leasing, 
Inc. v. State Board of Public Affairs, 
¶14 The terms of the State's obligation to pay overtime worked by both 
classified and unclassified employees are set forth in 70 O.S. Supp. 2010, § 
840-2.15. Subsection (A) of this statute adopts "the minimum overtime 
entitlement provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act and regulations 
promulgated thereunder except as [otherwise] provided [in subsections (B) 
through (E)]." For purposes of answering the certified question, we deem it 
unnecessary to determine whether any of the exceptions set forth in subsections 
(B) through (E) apply to plaintiff's claim. We also deem it is unnecessary to 
identify the specific provisions set forth in the Fair Labor Standards Act and 
implementing regulations that bear on the merits of plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff 
bears the burden in further proceedings to demonstrate how the facts of this 
case bring him within the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
¶15 While it is clear that an unclassified state employee can bring an action 
to recover all the wages due on regular paydays as provided in section 165.2, 
and can bring such action in a court of competent jurisdiction as provided in 
section 165.9, it is equally clear the Legislature did not include either the 
State or state employees within the liquidated damages provision of section 
165.3. This statute states:
A. Whenever an employee's employment terminates, the employer 
shall pay the employee's wages in full, less offsets and less any amount 
over which a bona fide disagreement exists, as defined by Section 165.1 of this 
title, at the next regular designated payday established for the pay period in 
which the work was performed either through the regular pay channels or by 
certified mail postmarked within the deadlines herein specified if requested by 
the employee, unless provided otherwise by a collective bargaining 
agreement that covers the employee.

B. If an employer fails to pay an employee wages as required 
under subsection A of this section, such employer shall be additionally 
liable to the employee for liquidated damages in the amount of two 
percent (2%) of the unpaid wages for each day upon which such failure shall 
continue after the day the wages were earned and due if the employer 
willfully withheld wages over which there was no bona fide disagreement; or in 
an amount equal to the unpaid wages, whichever is smaller; provided, however, 
that for the purpose of such liquidated damages such failure shall not be deemed 
to continue after the date of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy with 
respect to the employer if he thereafter shall have been adjudicated 
bankrupt upon such petition. (Emphasis added.)
¶16 With one exception, the references to "employer" and "employee" in 
section 165.3 are modified only by the articles "an" and "the." This choice of 
language indicates that the Legislature was using the terms employer and 
employee as specially defined in section 165.1. The Legislature has also 
generally provided that "[w]henever the meaning of a word or phrase is defined 
by any statute, such definition is applicable to the same word or phrase 
whenever it occurs, except where a contrary intention plainly appears." 

¶17 Finding no intent to make either the State or state employees subject to 
section 165.3, we must conclude that an unclassified state employee cannot 
recover liquidated damages in connection with a claim for unpaid wages. The 
language in section 165.9 authorizing an "[a]ction to recover unpaid wages and 
liquidated damages" does not make liquidated damages a remedy generally 
available in an action brought under section 165.9, but allows the recovery of 
liquidated damages, only if such are otherwise provided by section 165.3. 
¶18 In conclusion and in answer to the reformulated certified question, we 
hold an unclassified state employee can bring an action under sections 165.7(G) 
and 165.9 of the Protection of Labor Act to recover all wages, including 
overtime, that were due but not paid, on one or more regular paydays as provided 
by section 165.2. We further hold that an unclassified state employee cannot 
recover liquidated damages as provided in section 165.3 based on any such unpaid 
wages, and therefore the language in section 165.9 allowing recovery of 
liquidated damages does not apply to an action brought by an unclassified state 
employee.
REFORMULATED FEDERAL CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED.
¶19 TAYLOR, C.J., COLBERT, V.C.J., WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, REIF, COMBS, and 
GURICH., JJ., concur.

¶20 KAUGER and WATT, JJ., concur in part; dissent in part. 
FOOTNOTES

1 The State of Oklahoma 
also points out that the Commissioner of Labor expressly excluded the State of 
Oklahoma from the definition of an "employer" subject to the Commissioner's 
administrative process for collecting unpaid wages. See Okla. Admin. Code 
380:30-1-1. Pursuant to 40 O.S.2001, § 165.7, the Commissioner 
"may provide, for an administrative proceeding" in any case "where a 
civil action may be brought for the collection of a wage claim." (Emphasis 
added). The Commissioner's exclusion of wage claims involving particular 
employers, such as the State, from the administrative process is a matter of 
discretion, and has no bearing on whether such employer is otherwise liable for 
an action at law under §§ 165.7(G) or 165.9.

WATT, J., with whom Kauger, J. joins, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part:
¶1 I agree with the majority's determination that an unclassified employee 
can maintain an action pursuant to the Protection of Labor Act (Labor Protection 
Act), 40 O.S. 2001 
§165.1 et seq. I express no opinion on whether the same employee may be 
entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to 40 O.S. 2001 §165.91 allowing an employee to recover both unpaid wages and 
liquidated damages. I dissent on two grounds. First, the majority has not merely 
"reformulated" the question but has gone outside of the question certified to 
promulgate an advisory opinion on the issue of liquidated damages. Second, the 
majority's opinion appears internally inconsistent in its treatment of the terms 
"employee" and "employer" within the confines of the Labor Protection Act, 
ignoring long-established rules of statutory construction.

¶2 1) The majority's pronouncement on the liquidateddamages 
issue amounts to nothing more thana prohibited advisory opinion.
¶3 It is not this Court's province to intrude upon the certifying court's 
decision making process.2 Although we are given the authority to reformulate 
questions certified by 20 O.S. 2001 §1602.1,3 we should not utilize 
this tool in the guise of issuing an advisory opinion or to address a 
hypothetical question4 especially in light of our well-established rule 
prohibiting such pronouncements.5 This rule against promulgating advisory opinions does 
not change merely because the cause arises out of a federal certified 
question.6 Furthermore, we have found unconvincing arguments 
that such questions should be answered simply because they will settle an 
undetermined area of state law that will affect the cause and all others with 
similar issues.7

¶4 The majority ignores rules of statutoryconstruction by 
its treatment of "employer" and"employee" differently in different sections 
ofthe Labor Protection Act producing aninternally inconsistent 
document.
¶5 The majority treats the defined terms "employer" and "employee" in one 
manner for determining the issue as to whether the unclassified employee may 
maintain an action under the Labor Protection Act and in a different manner 
altogether in relation to whether the same employee may recover liquidated 
damages for violation of the Act. As early as 1921, the Court recognized the 
general rule that where the same word is used in different parts of a statute, 
it will be presumed to be used in the same sense throughout; and where its 
meaning is clear, this meaning will be attached to it elsewhere.8 Some nineteen years 
later, the Court stated that where a word is defined in a statute, "it will be 
presumed that it was used in that same sense throughout the section."9

CONCLUSION
¶6 No basis exists for the majority's gratuitous answer on the liquidated 
damages issue. It can be considered nothing more than a prohibited advisory 
opinion on an issue this Court was not asked to address. Furthermore, in 
promulgating the advisory opinion, it is likely that this Court has ended the 
federal litigation. Finally, the majority ignores long-established rules of 
statutory construction by treating the same defined words within the Labor 
Protection Act differently in various sections of the Act. 
¶7 I concur to the extent that the majority determinates that an unclassified 
employee can maintain an action pursuant to the Protection of Labor Act (Labor 
Protection Act), 40 O.S. 2001 
§165.1 et seq. I concur in this portion of the opinion because it 
addresses the question asked and properly states the current state of the law in 
Oklahoma. I dissent from the portion of the opinion which addresses the issue of 
liquidated damages because it unnecessarily goes outside the parameters of the 
question certified rendering an advisory opinion on an issue of first impression 
in our jurisdiction. 

FOOTNOTES

1 Title 40 O.S. 2001 §165.9 providing in pertinent 
part:

"A. Action by an employee to recover unpaid wages and liquidated damages may 
be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more 
employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees 
similarly situated, or such employee or employees may designate an agent or 
representative to maintain such action for and on behalf of all employees 
similarly situated for such wages. . . ." 

2 Ball v. Wilshire Ins. Co., 
2009 OK 38, ¶9, 221 P.3d 717. 

3 Title 20 O.S. 2001 §1602.1 providing:

"Power to Reformulate Question. The Supreme Court of this state may 
reformulate a question of law certified to it." 

4 Comment to Uniform Certification of Questions of Law 
Act, §4 (2008) providing in pertinent part:

"This section is new and authorizes the receiving court to 'reformulate' the 
certified question. Requiring a question to be answered precisely as it is 
certified imposes a counterproductive rigidity that could decrease the utility 
of the answer received. Permitting the receiving court to amend the certified 
question freely may also adversely affect the utility of the answer and result 
in the issuance of an advisory opinion. . . ." [Emphasis supplied.]
At least one Court limits its answers to federal certified questions 
confining them strictly to the questions certified. See, Western 
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. CFS 
Portales Ethanol I, Ltd., 107 N.M. 143, 
754 P.2d 520 (1988). 

5 Matter of Adoption of 
Baby G., 2008 OK 92, ¶7, 195 P.3d 377 [Authored by Reif, J. and recognizing that 
this Court does not sit to decide hypothetical issues or to give advisory 
opinions about issues not yet in controversy.]; Knight v. Miller, 
2008 OK 81, ¶8, 195 P.3d 372; Scott v. Peterson, 
2005 OK 84 ¶27, 126 P.3d 1232; Thomas v. E-Z Mart 
Stores, Inc., 2004 OK 82, n. 3, 102 P.3d 133; City of Midwest 
City v. House of Realty, Inc., 
2004 OK 56, n. 14, 100 P.3d 678; Tulsa County Budget 
Bd. v. Tulsa County Excise Bd., 
2003 OK 103, n. 31, 81 P.3d 662. 

6 Ball v. Wilshire Ins. Co., 
see note 2, supra [Reif, J. concurring in the majority opinion.]. 

7 Id. 

8 Walton v. Donnelly, Com'r 
of Finance and Accounting, 1921 OK 258, ¶0, 201 P. 367. 

9 Roberts v. Newell, 1940 OK 15, ¶5 101 P.2d 824.