Case Title: Branch v. Carter

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-11-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Betty Sue Carter BRANCH v. Kyle Dean CARTER

96-754                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered November 25, 1996


1.   Limitation of actions -- child support -- power of legislature
     over statute of limitations. -- The legislature may amend the
     statute of limitation for a cause of action that is not yet
     barred; however, the legislature cannot retroactively revive
     a cause of action that is already barred at the time the act
     is enacted. 

2.   Limitation of actions -- power of legislature to enlarge -- 
     retroactivity determined by legislative intent. -- No one has
     any vested right in a statute of limitations until the bar of
     the statute has become effective; the General Assembly may
     validly enlarge the period of limitations and make the new
     statute, rather than the old, apply to any cause of action
     that has not been barred at the time the new statute becomes
     effective; the critical question is one of legislative intent;
     the amendatory act does not extend the statutory period unless
     the legislative intention that it do so is expressly stated.

3.   Parent & child -- act clearly intended to be retroactive --
     causes of action already barred on act's effective date could
     not be revived. -- The General Assembly clearly mandated that
     the enlarged limitations period in Act 870 of 1991 would apply
     retroactively to all child-support orders then existing;
     however, the legislature only had the power to amend statutes
     of limitation affecting causes of action that were not yet
     barred; because the effective date of Act 870 was March 29,
     1991, any cause of action by the appellant for arrearages
     accruing prior to March 29, 1986 was barred and could not be
     revived by its passage.  

4.   Parent & child -- appellant entitled to recover additional
     support due to retroactive expansion of statue of limitations
     -- holding of court of appeals affirmed. -- Where appellant's
     cause of action for child-support payments due on July 19,
     1986, and thereafter was in existence at the time the statute
     of limitations was retroactively expanded on March 29, 1991,
     the chancellor erred in concluding that appellant's specific
     claim against appellee was barred by the five-year statute;
     appellant was entitled to recover additional support for the
     period of July 19, 1986, to July 19, 1989, plus the statutory
     attorneys fees and interest provided under Ark. Code Ann.  9-
     14-223 on the total arrearages owed; the holding of the court
     of appeals was affirmed. 


     Appeal from Logan Chancery Court, Northern District; Van
Taylor, Chancellor; affirmed.
     Dunham & Faught, P.A., by:  James S. Dunham, for appellant.
     Buddy Hixson, for appellee.

     Andree Layton Roaf, Justice.
     Appellant Betty Carter Branch appealed an order of the Logan
County Chancery Court holding that appellee Kyle Dean Carter was
not liable for child-support arrearages which accrued prior to July
20, 1989, because they were barred by the five-year statute of
limitations in Ark. Code Ann.  16-56-115 (1987).  The Arkansas
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the chancellor and held
that Act 870 of 1991, codified as Ark. Code Ann.  9-14-236 (Repl.
1993), applied retroactively to expand the statute of limitations
for causes of action for delinquent child-support payments not
barred on the date of its enactment.  Branch v. Carter, 54 Ark.
App. 70, 923 S.W.2d 874 (1996).  We granted Mr. Carter's request
for review of the Court of Appeals' decision pursuant to Ark. S.
Ct. R. 1-2(f).  We affirm the Court of Appeals.
     On July 19, 1983, Ms. Branch and Mr. Carter were divorced by
a decree in which Carter was ordered to pay child support at the
rate of $52 per week.  On May 18, 1994, Branch filed a petition for
citation and alleged that Carter was delinquent in his support
payments.  At a hearing on October 26, 1994, the parties stipulated
that Carter owed arrearages of $7,404 for the period of July 19,
1989 to the date of the hearing, and Branch was granted judgment
for this amount.  The order further provided that the parties would
stipulate as to the amount of arrearages that accrued prior to July
19, 1989, and would brief the court on the issue of the statute of
limitations as it applied to those arrearages.
     On March 2, 1995, the chancellor entered a final order which
stated that the parties had stipulated that child-support
arrearages had accrued between July 19, 1984 and July 19, 1989 in
the amount of $12,251.50.  The parties further stipulated that, of
this amount, $5,562 had accrued between July 19, 1986 and July 19,
1989.  The chancellor ruled that the action for arrearages accruing
prior to July 20, 1989 was barred by the statute of limitations.  
     On appeal, Branch argues in essence that Act 870 of 1991, now
codified as Ark. Code Ann.  9-14-236 (Repl. 1993), applies
retroactively so that all causes of action still in existence on
the date the Act became effective would benefit from an enlarged
statute of limitations.  She contends that the five-year statute of
limitations relied upon by the trial court only bars the recovery
of support payments due prior to July 19, 1986.  Although the
effective date of Act 870 was March 29, 1991, we agree that the Act
applies retroactively to all causes of action not barred on the
date of its enactment.  Branch made claim to the sum of $5,562
which accrued between July 19, 1986 and July 19, 1989, and we agree
that she is entitled to recover this amount.
     Because the legislature has in recent years twice changed the
statute of limitations with regard to collection of delinquent
child support, we must review these legislative enactments and the
cases in which we have recently considered the issue of the
limitations period applicable to actions for child-support
arrearages.
     In Sullivan v. Edens, 304 Ark. 133,