Case Title: KEARNS v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
KEARNS v. STATE2002 WY 9748 P.3d 1090Case Number: 00-305Decided: 06/26/2002

April Term, A.D. 2002

 

 

JERALD 
DENNIS KEARNS, 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Crook County

The 
Honorable Terrence L. O'Brien, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Ryan 
R. Roden, Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Roden. 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore Lauer, Director, 
Prosecution Assistance Program; and Carrie Dawn Tate-Meyer, Student Intern.  Argument by Ms. 
Tate-Meyer.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

LEHMAN, 
Chief Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant 
Jerald D. Kearns appeals from the judgment and sentence entered after a jury 
found him guilty of aggravated robbery and the judge sentenced him as an 
habitual criminal.  

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Kearns presents 
the following issues for our analysis:

 

I.  Whether the district court made reversible error and 
erred as a matter of law by not discharging and dismissing the jury once it 
realized that it had improperly read count 3, habitual criminal charge including 
appellant's alleged previous felony convictions, to the jury panel.
 

II.  Whether appellant received ineffective assistance of 
counsel when appellant's counsel erroneously advised appellant to waive the 
district court's prejudicial error of informing the jury of count 3 of the 
information, the habitual criminal charge which included appellant's alleged 
prior felony convictions.
 

III.  Whether appellant's state and federal constitutional 
rights not to be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense were violated by 
the enhanced penalties of the habitual criminal act.
 

IV.  Whether appellant's conviction for attempted 
aggravated robbery did not fall within the definition of a violent felony, and 
the trial court therefore erred in sentencing him as an habitual criminal, and 
violated his due process rights.
 

Appellee 
State of Wyoming offers the following issues for our 
review:

 

I.  Did 
appellant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waive his right to request 
that the court discharge the venire and summon a new venire for his 
trial?

 

II.  Did 
appellant receive ineffective assistance of counsel regarding appellant's waiver 
of his right to request that a new venire be summoned for his 
trial?

 

III.  Was 
appellant's right against double jeopardy violated when his prior convictions 
were used to enhance his sentence as an habitual criminal under Wyo. Stat. § 
6-10-201?

 

IV.  Did 
the trial court properly sentence appellant as an habitual criminal, since 
appellant was convicted of the violent felony of aggravated robbery, and not of 
attempted aggravated robbery as appellant contends?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      On August 19, 
1999, Kearns was on parole after serving seventeen years of a twenty to 
twenty-five year sentence for burglary and arson.  In 1998, he had been released from the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary to the Community Alternatives of Casper (CAC).  In August of 1999, Kearns was released 
from CAC.   On the morning of 
August 19, 1999, Kearns decided he wanted to travel to Deadwood, South Dakota, 
to play some blackjack.  He called 
his parole officer and, instead of asking her if he could travel to Deadwood, he 
asked her if he could go to Gillette to visit his brother.  While the parole officer denied granting 
Kearns permission to leave town at all, Kearns testified that he believed that 
she had given her permission as long as he returned to Casper that night.  On his way to Deadwood, Kearns purchased 
a bottle of whiskey to sip on during his trip even though it was a violation of 
his probation to possess and consume alcohol.  

 

[¶5]      Kearns spent the 
day in Deadwood.  On his way back to 
Casper, Kearns spotted a hitchhiker.  
He picked up the hitchhiker, whose name was Millard Lynd, and loaded 
Lynd's belongings into the car.   
As they drove toward Wyoming, the two made small talk.  Kearns described Lynd's claims that he 
had worked undercover for the NYPD, the FBI, and the CIA in Vietnam as 
"nutty."  During this time, Lynd 
helped himself to some of Kearns' cigarettes, which were on the dash of the 
car.  After two or three cigarettes, 
Kearns told Lynd that he should just buy the pack from him.  Kearns testified that Lynd gave him a 
handful of coins for the cigarettes.  

 

[¶6]      Eventually, 
Kearns pulled onto an off ramp to urinate.  
Kearns claims that Lynd was yelling at him to hurry up because they 
needed to get to Gillette before it was too late for him to find a hotel 
room.  According  to Kearns, this pushed his last 
button.  This yelling for Kearns to 
hurry up, the "nutty" talk, and Lynd's taking the cigarettes without permission 
had irritated Kearns to such a degree that he wanted Lynd out of his car.  

 

[¶7]      At this point, 
Kearns' and Lynd's versions of the ensuing struggle conflict substantially.  Kearns claims that when he got back in 
the car, he told Lynd to get out of the car and that when Lynd refused, Kearns 
reached across Lynd, opened the passenger door and began pushing Lynd out of the 
car.  Kearns said that Lynd fought 
him pretty hard and even broke the rearview mirror off and began hitting Kearns 
with it.  Once Kearns got Lynd out 
of the car, he continued toward Gillette.  
By the time Kearns got to Moorcroft, he testified that he had realized 
that he still had Lynd's belongings.  
He said he turned around, intending to return Lynd's things to him.  This plan was thwarted, however, when 
Kearns discovered flashing lights where he had forced Lynd out of the car.  Kearns kept driving and dumped the items 
at an exit near Sundance.  

 

[¶8]      Lynd's version of 
the struggle begins with Kearns approaching the passenger door from the outside 
after he had finished urinating.  
Lynd said Kearns started hitting him through the passenger window and 
that when Kearns opened the door, Lynd fell out of the car.  At some point during the fight, Lynd 
realized that he was covered in blood and was being cut by some sort of sharp 
object.  He testified that he kept 
various coins that he was saving in his wallet, some new American quarters and 
some foreign coins, and that they ended up in Kearns' possession when Kearns 
demanded Lynd's money and Lynd handed over his wallet.  Lynd explained that after Kearns drove 
away, some motorists discovered Lynd and called the sheriff and ambulance.  Lynd was taken to the Campbell County 
Memorial Hospital to be treated for his wounds.  Coincidentally, Kearns had also stopped 
at the Campbell County Memorial Hospital for treatment because he was 
experiencing severe pain due to a chronic kidney stone condition.  

 

[¶9]      Officer Gary 
Spears of the Crook County Sheriff's Department interviewed Lynd at the hospital 
and was given a description of the alleged assailant and his vehicle.  While Officer Spears was at the 
hospital, he noticed Kearns, and he recognized that Kearns fit the description 
of Lynd's assailant.  Officer Spears 
proceeded to the parking lot where he found the car that Lynd described.  He then approached Kearns and asked him 
some questions.  Officer Spears 
confiscated Kearns' clothing, and a search revealed some money, including the 
identifiable coins that belonged to Lynd.  
Officer Spears then sent the clothing to the Wyoming State Crime Lab for 
testing.  

 

[¶10]   On August 20, 1999, Lieutenant 
William Lessner of the Crook County Sheriff's Department impounded Kearns' car 
and retrieved Lynd's dumped belongings.  
Kearns was arrested and charged with attempted first-degree murder, 
aggravated robbery, and with being an habitual criminal.  The jury convicted Kearns of the 
aggravated robbery charge, and the judge sentenced him under the habitual 
criminal statute to a term of life imprisonment in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.  Kearns makes this 
timely appeal.  

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

 

[¶11]   Kearns claims that the trial court 
committed reversible error and erred as a matter of law when it failed to 
discharge the jury panel after the judge mistakenly read the habitual criminal 
charge, which included information regarding his previous felony 
convictions.  He maintains that the 
trial court did not possess the discretion to allow Kearns to waive this 
error.  The State replies that 
Kearns' waiver was valid because the trial court fully informed Kearns of the 
mistake and gave him the option of continuing with the sitting jury panel or 
discharging it and empanelling a new one.  

 

[¶12]   When analyzing whether the waiver 
of a personal right was accomplished effectively, we first inquire into whether 
the right is a waivable right.  
Taylor v. State, 612 P.2d 851, 860-61 (Wyo. 1980).  If the right is one that can be waived, 
then we analyze whether the waiver was done voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently.  Vargas v. 
State, 963 P.2d 984, 990 (Wyo. 1998).  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-203 (LexisNexis 2001) applies in cases that 
involve an habitual criminal charge.  
It provides:

 

(a)  An 
information or indictment which charges a person as an habitual criminal shall 
set forth the charged felony and allege the previous 
convictions.

 

            
(b)  The trial on the charged felony shall proceed as in other 
cases, but the jury shall not be informed of the previous 
convictions.  If the 
defendant is convicted of the charged felony and does not plead guilty to the 
charge of the previous convictions, he shall be tried immediately by the same 
jury or judge on the charge of the previous convictions.

 

            
(c)  In a trial under this article, a duly authenticated copy 
of the record of previous convictions and judgments against the defendant of any 
court of record are prima facie evidence of the previous convictions and may be 
used in evidence against the defendant.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶13]   At the beginning of the voir dire 
process, the trial court read the charging information to the jury panel.  Instead of just reading the first two 
counts, however, the judge mistakenly read the third count as well, which 
included information about Kearns' prior convictions:

 

Count 3 
alleges that on or about the 19th day of 
August, 1999, in Crook County, Wyoming, that Mr. Kearns, having been previously 
convicted of three or more felonies separately brought and tried which arose out 
of separate occurrences, specifically, felony convictions for grand theft and 
aiding escape in the state of Arizona; a felony conviction of escape in November 
1964 in Arizona; and a felony conviction under the federal law in Louisiana; and 
felony convictions for aggravated burglary, first degree arson in the State of 
Wyoming; and that he did commit the crime of attempted murder in the first 
degree as set out in Count 1 above.  

 

And/or 
in the alternative, that having had those prior convictions he did commit the 
crime of aggravated robbery as set out in Count 2 above.

 

The 
judge immediately recognized his mistake and met with the prosecutor, defendant, 
and defense counsel outside the presence of the jury panel to discuss how to 
proceed:  

 

THE 
COURT:  As I was going through the 
Information and I was reading the charges to the jury, I got along to Count 3 
and as soon as I got into it I realized that I wasn't supposed to be advising 
the jury of that.

 

. . .

 

. . . 
I tried to get through it as quickly as I could.  But it's clearly improper, and we need 
to discuss what we want to do here.  
And that may well be that we discharge this jury, the Clerk calls more 
jurors and we start tomorrow morning.

 

. . .

 

I really 
screwed up here.  I should not have 
told the jury that you are being charged as an habitual criminal.  The procedures that we have in place say 
that you go to trial on the underlying offenses with which you're chargedthat 
would be Counts 1 and Count 2and if you were convicted of either of those 
counts, then we move on to the next stage of the trial where if you want the 
jury to determine whether or not you were in fact an habitual criminal, then the 
jury would decide that, but their decision on guilt or innocence on Counts 1 or 
2 would be totally unaffected in that way by the knowledge about whether or not 
you were previously convicted of crimes.

 

So I 
want you to understand thatthat I made an error there andit's a pretty serious 
one, and the remedy for that would be that we could just start with a whole new 
jury that knows nothing about it, but I want you to understand as well that you, 
after consultation with your attorney, may have reasons, whatever they areand 
you don't need to share them with any of us, but you may have reasons that you 
want this jury in spite of the fact that I screwed up and told them about prior 
convictions, and that's entirely up to you after consultation with your 
attorney.

 

But I 
want you to understand unequivocally at this point in time, it's your decision 
to make, not your attorney[']s.  You 
should listen to his advice, but it's your decision to make and if you want to 
start tomorrow with an entirely new jury panel, that's what we'll 
do.

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  I'd rather just go forth 
right now.

 

THE 
COURT:  Have you talked 

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  
Yes.

 

THE 
COURT:  to Mr. 
Wolfe?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes, I 
have.

 

THE 
COURT:  I don't want to know what 
your reasons are, butthat's something probably private between you and your 
attorney, but I'm assuming that you have reasons why you want to proceed with 
this jury panel instead of putting it off until tomorrow.

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Well, it was going to 
come out anyway.

 

THE 
COURT:  Okay.

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  I feel I would have 
preferred that, you know, he bring it out, but it's okay.  They was going to know about it 
anyway.

 

THE 
COURT:  Because you intend to 
testify?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes, 
uh-huh.

 

THE 
COURT:  Well, you understand you 
don't have to testify?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes sir, I 
do.

 

[¶14]   Everyone agreed that the jury 
should be instructed about the information of which they had been mistakenly 
informed, so the judge explained:

 

When I 
was telling you about the charges against Mr. Kearns, I erroneously included in 
there some information about some prior convictions that he may have 
suffered.

 

            
In our system we try cases based upon the facts of this particular case 
and not anything else.  So you're 
notyou're to disregard the fact that he may have been convicted previously of 
any offense, and that's not to be part of your consideration in this case in any 
way.  And if you don't feel like you 
can set that aside and decide based upon the facts and irrespective of that 
information, then you need to tell the attorneys about that.  The error that I made in that respect 
the defendant has waived and wants to go ahead with this 
jury.

 

[¶15]   Throughout the voir dire process, 
defense counsel was afforded the opportunity to inquire into whether the prior 
convictions would affect the potential jurors' ability to be impartial.  At the conclusion of the voir dire 
process, after the jury was chosen, the judge again gave Kearns the opportunity 
to discharge the jury and start with a brand new panel in the morning.  Kearns reiterated his desire to proceed 
with the current jury.  

 

[¶16]   Kearns argues that he should not 
have been allowed to waive this error because Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-203 
contains mandatory language that prohibits the jury from being informed of any 
prior convictions at this stage in the trial proceedings.  We disagree.  Although in early common law an accused 
was not allowed to waive any rights that were intended for his protection, it is 
now generally held that a defendant may waive any rights in which the public 
does not possess an interest or which are not contrary to public policy.  Taylor, 612 P.2d  at 859.  Some examples of a defendant's waiver 
privilege include:  the defense of 
double jeopardy, Hutchins v. State, 483 P.2d 519, 521 (Wyo. 1971); the 
right to refuse to testify on the ground of self-incrimination, Harvey v. 
State, 835 P.2d 1074, 1099 (Wyo. 1992); the right to request counsel, 
Raigosa v. State, 562 P.2d 1009, 1015 (Wyo. 1977); the right to a speedy 
trial, Cosco v. State, 503 P.2d 1403, 1046 (Wyo. 1972); and the right to 
a unanimous jury, Taylor, 612 P.2d  at 861.  This court stated in Taylor, "if 
all of these rights and more can be waived upon what ground can we say that the 
waiver of jury unanimity is so sacred that it cannot be added to the list?  We perceive of none."  Id.  We echo that sentiment regarding the 
right to not have a jury be informed of prior convictions for purposes of the 
habitual criminal statute until the habitual criminal phase of the trial.  

 

[¶17]   Section 6-10-203 does not declare 
that this is a right that cannot be waived, nor does it provide a mandatory 
remedy for situations wherein the jury is prematurely informed of this sort of 
information.  We allow defendants to 
waive other rights even though the governing rules include similar mandatory 
language.  See Wyo. Const. 
art. 1, § 11 (which provides that "[n]o person shall be compelled to testify 
against himself in any criminal case, nor shall any person be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense.")  See also W.R.Cr.P.48 (which 
provides that "[a] criminal charge shall be brought to trial within 120 days 
following arraignment unless continued as provided in this rule.")   Without express language that this 
right is not waivable or that if such an error occurs the jury must be 
dismissed, we are not convinced that this right is "so sacred that it cannot be 
added to the list" of rights that can be waived.

 

[¶18]   While we conclude that this is a 
right that may be relinquished, we emphasize that waiver can occur only when it 
is done voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly in an atmosphere free from 
express or implied punishment or threat of punishment.  To determine whether Kearns voluntarily 
waived this right, we consider the following exchange:

 

THE 
COURT:  What I want to make sure you 
understand is that that's probablythat's probably the kind of an error that you 
can waive, in other words, you can say, well, I have bigger fish to fry and so 
it doesn't matter to me.  But I want 
youI don't want you to feel like there's any pressure

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  No, I don't feel that 
way at all.

 

THE 
COURT:  with this jury because 
we'll get you a new jury if you want that.

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  I don't feel pressured 
at all.  I'd rather go forward with 
this jury right here.

 

THE 
COURT:  Okay.  All right.

 

This 
discussion convinces us that Kearns' decision to waive this right was completely 
voluntary.  Our review of the 
transcript reveals that the judge in no way pressured Kearns to waive his 
right.  On the contrary, the judge 
repeatedly assured Kearns that he was absolutely willing to dismiss this jury 
and start with a new panel in the morning.

 

[¶19]   We look again at the transcript to 
determine whether Kearns' waiver was done knowingly and 
intelligently:

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Well, see, another 
thing, too, because the[the victim] in his testimony is going to say that I 
told him I was in prison for 17 years, see, so it was going to come out that 
way, wasn't it?

 

THE 
COURT:  Maybe.  Maybe not.  I don't know.

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Anyway, I'd rather go 
forward.  I think it's okay, you 
know.

 

THE 
COURT:  Okay.  Do you feel like you've discussed that 
thoroughly with [your attorney]?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes, I have, Your 
Honor.

 

In the 
interest of space, we will not recite every word that was uttered on this 
topic.  The above quoted colloquy is 
representative.  We will say that 
our review of the transcript reveals lengthy exchanges between the judge and 
Kearns, which illustrate the judge's complete willingness to dismiss the jury 
and effort to establish that Kearns was making this decision intelligently and 
voluntarily.  It is clear that 
Kearns wanted to proceed with the jury knowing the drawbacks of such a decision 
and despite assurances that it would be no problem to discharge the current 
jury.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
Kearns' waiver was effective.

 

 

[¶20]   Kearns asserts that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney advised him to waive the 
trial court's error of informing the jury of the prior felony convictions 
underlying the habitual criminal charge.  
The State counters that Kearns has failed to prove that his trial counsel 
provided him with ineffective assistance of counsel.   This court articulated our well 
established law of ineffective assistance of counsel in Jackson v. State, 
902 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Wyo. 1995).  We 
reiterated this standard in Grainey v. State, 997 P.2d 1035, 1038-39 
(Wyo. 2000):

 

            
When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
paramount determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial 
counsel's acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance.  Herdt v. 
State, 891 P.2d 793, 796 (Wyo. 1995); Starr v. State, 888 P.2d 1262, 
1266-67 (Wyo. 1995); Arner v. State, 872 P.2d 100, 104 (Wyo. 1994); 
Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 (Wyo. 1986).  The reviewing court should indulge a 
strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all 
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.  Herdt, at 796; Starr, at 
1266; Arner, at 104; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 
104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  

 

            
Under the two-prong standard articulated in Strickland and 
Frias, an appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must 
demonstrate on the record that counsel's performance was deficient and that 
prejudice resulted.  
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064; Starr, at 
1266;  King v. State, 810 P.2d 119, 125 (Wyo. 1991) (Cardine, J., dissenting); Campbell v. State, 
728 P.2d 628, 629 (Wyo. 1986);  
Frias, 722 P.2d  at 145.   In other words, to warrant 
reversal on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must 
demonstrate that his counsel failed to "render such assistance as would have 
been offered by a reasonably competent attorney" and that "counsel's deficiency 
prejudiced the defense of [the] case."  
Lower v. State, 786 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo. 1990).  "The benchmark for judging any claim of 
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result."  
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 686, 104 S. Ct.  at 
2064.

 

[¶21]   The theory upon which Kearns 
asserts his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is that "[t]here is no 
logical reason why trial counsel, as a matter of strategy, should want a jury 
that had already been poisoned and prejudiced against his client."  We agree with the State that Kearns has 
failed to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland standard by failing 
to demonstrate that his attorney's performance was deficient.  Upon recognizing his error, the judge 
immediately met with the parties and informed them that he had mistakenly read 
the information pertaining to Kearns' prior convictions and that he would be 
happy to dismiss the venire and start fresh the next morning.  The lengthy conversations that appear in 
the record, some of which we reproduced in our discussion on the first issue, 
convince us that Kearns had sound advice in making his decision to keep the 
current panel.  One additional 
comment that Kearns made during the discussion on this issue was that at least 
this way the defense had the opportunity to voir dire the potential jurors on 
this specific topic to see if the fact that he had prior convictions would 
prejudice any of them in this case.  
In our opinion, Kearns made a good point.  Given the facts of this case, it was 
likely a valuable opportunity and good strategy to be able to question the 
potential jurors about whether Kearns' prior convictions would affect their 
ability to remain impartial.  The 
fact that the jury ultimately found Kearns guilty of one of the charged crimes 
does not translate to a conclusion that he should have opted for a new 
jury.   Indeed, the fact that 
the jury found Kearns not guilty of the attempted first degree murder charge is 
a good indication that the jury was not determined to convict Kearns of a crime 
that was not supported by the evidence just because he had prior 
convictions.

 

 

[¶22]   Kearns contends that his state and 
federal constitutional rights not to be placed twice in jeopardy for the same 
offense were violated when the trial court used Kearns' prior convictions to 
enhance his punishment under the habitual criminal statute.  He maintains that because the prior 
crimes were used to enhance his last sentence, they cannot also be used to 
enhance his current sentence.  The 
State replies that enhanced punishment under the habitual criminal statute does 
not result in multiple punishments because being an habitual criminal is a 
status, not a criminal offense.  

 

[¶23]   The double jeopardy clause, found 
in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and at art. 1, § 11 of 
the Wyoming Constitution, protects an accused from multiple punishments for the 
same crime.  Halbleib v. 
State, 7 P.3d 45, 47 (Wyo. 2000).  
The habitual criminal statute, however, does not create new or separate 
crimes nor does it work to convict a defendant of the crime of being an habitual 
criminal.  Evans v. State, 
655 P.2d 1214, 1225 (Wyo. 1982).  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201 (LexisNexis 2001) 
provides:

 

(a)  A 
person is an habitual criminal if:

 

(i)  He 
is convicted of a violent felony; and

 

(ii)  He 
has been convicted of a felony on two (2) or more previous charges separately 
brought and tried which arose out of separate occurrences in this state or 
elsewhere.

 

(b)  An 
habitual criminal shall be punished by imprisonment for:

 

(i)  Not 
less than ten (10) years nor more than fifty (50) years, if he has two (2) 
previous convictions;

 

(ii)  Life, 
if he has three (3) or more previous convictions. 

 

[¶24]   The intent behind Wyoming's 
habitual criminal statute is to provide enhanced punishment to an individual who 
has engaged in a pattern of violent criminal conduct.  For that reason, the fact that some 
prior crimes have already been used to enhance a sentence does not preclude the 
use of the same crimes to enhance a later sentence.  In fact, to say that a defendant has a 
clean slate once the offenses are used to enhance a punishment runs completely 
contrary to the plain language of the statute as well as to what the legislature 
intended this statute to accomplish:

 

Habitual 
criminal statutes, which have been declared to be sound in principle and 
sustained by reason, are based on the concept that the legislature may require 
the courts to take into consideration the persistence of the accused in a 
criminal course.  However, the 
enhanced punishment authorized under statutes of this kind is an incident of the 
subsequent offense, that is, the offense for which the accused is being tried, 
and, on conviction, the defendant is subject to more severe punishment as a 
result of the incorrigible nature of his conduct demonstrated by the previous 
criminal record.  Accordingly, a 
statute authorizing the imposition of enhanced punishment on recidivists does 
not create a separate offense, and one who is indicted as a second or a 
subsequent offender is not accused of any crime other than the one principally 
charged.  A habitual criminal 
statute does not punish a defendant for his previous offenses but for his 
persistence in crime, and it has been said that to be a habitual criminal 
involves a status rather than the commission of a separate offense.   

 

Evans, 655 P.2d  at 1220-21 (quoting 39 Am.Jur.2d, Habitual Criminals and Subsequent 
Offenders, § 2, pp. 308-310 (1968)).

 

[¶25]   Kearns insists that allowing the 
prior crimes to be used a second time to enhance his current sentence is 
tantamount to imposing multiple punishments for the same crime, which was 
proscribed by this court as violating the defendant's right not to be placed 
twice in jeopardy in Cook v. State, 841 P.2d 1345, 1347 (Wyo. 1992).  Kearns' reliance on our Cook 
decision is misplaced.  It is 
the repetition of violent criminal conduct that triggers the statute to provide 
greater penalties for subsequent violent offenses.  Evans, 655 P.2d  at 1225.  Habitual criminality is a status rather 
than a substantive offense, and a finding of such only enhances the punishment 
for the most recent qualifying offense.  
Id.  The trial court 
did not impose multiple punishments for the same crime.  It merely enhanced Kearns' current 
sentence as a result of Kearns' propensity to persist in his violent criminal 
ways. 

 

 

[¶26]   Kearns finally argues that he was 
not convicted of a violent felony pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201(a) and 
that he, therefore, should not have been sentenced as an habitual criminal.  The State insists that the judge 
misspoke during the sentencing proceeding, calling Kearns' conviction one for 
attempted aggravated robbery rather than for aggravated robbery and that this 
error was harmless.  During the 
sentencing proceeding, the judge stated that Kearns had been convicted of 
attempted aggravated robbery, and this erroneous choice of words was carried 
over to, and memorialized in, the judgment and sentence.  This description of the offense with 
which Kearns was convicted as attempted aggravated robbery was obviously a 
mistake because the third amended information charged Kearns with aggravated 
robbery, the jury instructions instructed the jury on the crime of aggravated 
robbery, and the jury convicted Kearns of aggravated robbery.  

 

[¶27]   W.R.Cr.P. 36 applies to clerical 
errors, and it provides:

 

            
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and 
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the 
court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court 
orders.

 

We must, 
therefore, determine whether the judge's error constituted a clerical error or a 
judicial error, the latter of which does not fall within the remedial provisions 
of W.R.Cr.P. 36.  Eddy v. First 
Wyoming Bank N.A.-Lander, 713 P.2d 228, 233 (Wyo. 1986).  This court has previously distinguished 
the two types of errors by explaining that "all errors, mistakes, or omissions 
which are not the result of the exercise of the judicial function" may be called 
clerical errors, while a judicial error is one that is "the deliberate result of 
judicial reasoning and determination."  
Matter of Kimball's Estate, 583 P.2d 1274, 1277-78 (Wyo. 1978) 
(quoting Holmes v. Holmes, 66 Wyo. 317, 211 P.2d 946, 953 (Wyo. 1949)).1   

 

[¶28]   In Holmes, we made the 
following attempt to distinguish the two types of errors:

 

It is 
said in 30 Am.Jurisprudence 876: "The authority of the court in this connection 
does not extend beyond the power to make the journal entry speak the truth, and 
may be exercised only to supply omissions in the exercise of functions which are 
clerical merely.  It is, however, 
often difficult to distinguish between clerical and judicial errors.  The distinction between a clerical error 
and a judicial one is not dependent upon its source.  Clerical errors may include mistakes in 
papers evidencing the judgment of the court made by the court itself."  In 126 A.L.R. 977, it is stated:  "Clerical errors in judgments, orders, 
or decrees are not, by the majority rule, limited to mistakes of the clerk, but 
include also errors made by the judge where of a clerical or ministerial 
nature."  In 126 A.L.R. 978, it is 
stated: "Although an error in a judgment, order, or decree was originally made 
by an attorney when preparing the same for the signature of the judge or clerk, 
it may none the less be a clerical' error."  In Sec. 146, Freeman on Judgments, 5th 
Ed., the author states:  "But 
clerical' is employed in a broad sense as contradistinguished from judicial' 
error and covers all errors, mistakes, or omissions which are not the result of 
the exercise of the judicial function.  
In other words, the distinction does not depend so much upon the person 
making the error as upon whether it was the deliberate result of judicial 
reasoning and determination, regardless of whether it was made by the clerk, by 
counsel or by the judge.  Mistakes 
of the court are not necessarily judicial error.  Thus if the judgment or some provision 
in it was the result of inadvertence, as where the court was laboring under a 
mistake or misapprehension as to the state of the record or as to some extrinsic 
fact, but for which a different judgment would have been rendered, the judgment 
may be vacated or may be corrected to correspond with what it would have been 
but for the inadvertence or mistake."

 

Holmes, 211 P.2d  at 953.

 

[¶29]   We hold that the error in this case 
was a clerical one.  It is clear 
from the record that the judge's use of the word "attempted" to describe the 
aggravated robbery conviction was not the deliberate result of judicial 
reasoning and determination.  
Indeed, the judge could not have applied any judicial reasoning or made 
any judicial determination when he described the crime that Kearns had been 
convicted of as attempted aggravated robbery because he did not have the 
authority to decide of what crimes Kearns was guilty.  The judge's use of the word "attempted" 
was, instead, a clerical error which may be corrected by virtue of W.R.Cr.P. 36 
to accurately reflect the offense of which Kearns was convicted.  

 

[¶30]   Before a defendant can be sentenced 
as an habitual criminal, the crime for which he is currently being sentenced 
must qualify as a violent felony.  
Because this court has recognized aggravated robbery as a violent felony 
for purposes of the habitual criminal statute, we hold that the trial court 
properly sentenced Kearns as an habitual criminal.  Oakley v. State, 715 P.2d 1374, 
1380 (Wyo. 1986).  

 

[¶31]   Affirmed with instructions to the 
trial court to enter a corrected judgment and sentence pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 
36.

 

FOOTNOTES

1Although the cases cited in this 
section are civil, we find them appropriate to this discussion because the 
corresponding rule for criminal proceedings provides for the same remedy in 
clerical error situations.