Case Title: Lovett v. Pietlock, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 269, 2011

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2011-11-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CHARLES LOVETT, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 269, 2011 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  The Superior Court 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
§ 
for Kent County, 
 
 
§ 
ANDREW PIETLOCK,  
§ 
C.A. No. 09C-12-031 
Individually and as agent for the  
§ 
DELAWARE STATE POLICE and  
§ 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
 
Defendants Below- 
§ 
 
Appellees. 
§ 
 
Submitted:  September 27, 2011 
   Decided:  November 8, 2011 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
O R D E R 
This 8th day of November 2011, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
Plaintiff-Below/Appellant, Charles Lovett, appeals from 1) a Superior 
Court order granting a motion for reargument by Defendants-Below/Appellees 
Andrew Pietlock, individually and as agent for the Delaware State Police and the 
State of Delaware, and denying Lovett’s motion for leave to amend his complaint; 
2) an order denying Lovett’s motion for relief and/or reargument; and 3) an order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants Delaware State Police and 
State of Delaware.  We find no merit to the appeal and affirm. 
 
2
(2) 
On December 17, 2007, Delaware State Police obtained a search 
warrant for a resident of 118 Unity Lane in Greenwood, Delaware.  Three days 
later, members of the Delaware State Police executed the search warrant on 162 
Unity Lane, Charles Lovett’s residence, instead of 118 Unity Lane.   
(3) 
On December 17, 2009, Lovett filed a complaint against the Delaware 
State Police and Corporal Andrew Pietlock. Lovett alleged that the police officers 
“handcuffed him, pointed loaded weapons in his direction, used racial epithets and 
assaulted him during the execution of the search warrant.” Pietlock and the 
Delaware State Police were served with copies of the summons and complaint on 
February 5, 2010. Four days later, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) entered an 
appearance on behalf of the defendants and forwarded the relevant police reports to 
Lovett. On April 23, 2010, 127 days after filing the complaint, Lovett moved for 
leave to amend the complaint under Rule 15(c) to name as defendants three State 
employees who executed the search warrant: Michael Berry, Charles Condon, and 
Brian Fitzpatrick.  But unless the proposed amendment related back to the date the 
original complaint was filed, any action against these proposed additional 
defendants would be barred by the two year statute of limitations.1 
(4) 
Lovett contends that he intended to file a motion to amend the 
complaint on April 16, the 120-day time limit for service of the summons and 
                                          
 
1 10 Del. C. § 8119. 
 
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complaint,2 but that due to e-filing issues the motion was not accepted until April 
23.  A motion to extend time for service on the three additional defendants was e-
filed on April 16.  Lovett also states that he e-mailed a copy of the motion to 
amend to Deputy Attorney General Michael Tupman, who represented Pietlock, on 
April 16.  
(5) 
A Superior Court Commissioner granted Lovett leave to amend on 
August 25, 2010.  Five days later, the defendants moved for reargument, arguing 
that there was no evidence that the three additional defendants had notice of the 
institution of the action within the 120-day period provided for service of the 
summons and complaint, as required by Rule 15(c)(3)(A).  
(6) 
The Superior Court granted the defendants’ motion for reargument 
and denied Lovett’s motion for leave to amend the complaint.  The Superior Court 
also denied Lovett’s motion for relief from and/or reargument of that motion.  One 
month later, the Superior Court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor 
of defendants.  This appeal followed. 
(7) 
Lovett first contends that the Superior Court improperly denied his 
motion for leave to amend the complaint to add the three additional defendants.  
Superior Court Rule 15(c) contains three requirements for an amended complaint 
to relate back to the date of the original complaint: 
                                          
 
2 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 4(j). 
 
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First, the claim asserted by the amendment must arise out of the 
same conduct, transaction or occurrence asserted in the original 
pleading. Second, within the time provided by the rules, the 
party to be added must have received notice of the institution of 
the action, so that the party will not be prejudiced. Third, within 
the time provided by the rules, the party to be added must have 
known or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning 
the identity of the proper party, the action would have been 
brought against the party to be added by the amendment.3 
“Rule 15, subsection (c)(3) includes no discretionary powers for the Superior Court 
to exercise.”4  Thus, Lovett’s amended complaint must meet all three requirements 
to relate back to the date of the original complaint and avoid the statute of 
limitations.5   
(8) 
The parties do not dispute that Lovett satisfied the first requirement 
because the claim arose out of the same occurrence.  As for the second 
requirement, deposition testimony indicates that Fitzpatrick had notice of the 
institution of the action within 120 days of the filing of the complaint because he 
gathered paperwork relating to the lawsuit.  Lovett relied on two federal law 
theories—the shared attorney theory and identity of interest theory—to argue that 
Berry and Condon received constructive notice during the 120-day period.   
(9) 
We have found the federal courts’ interpretation of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 15 persuasive in our interpretation of Superior Court Civil Rule 
                                          
 
3 Taylor v. Champion, 693 A.2d 1072, 1074. (Del. 1997).   
4 Id. 
5 Id.; Chaplake Holdings Ltd. v. Chrysler Corp., 766 A.2d 1, 6 (Del. 2001). 
 
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15.6  Under the shared attorney theory, which has been used to impute notice to 
other governmental officials, the Third Circuit has required “[that] there was ‘some 
communication or relationship’ between the shared attorney and the John Doe 
defendant prior to the expiration of the 120-day period[.]”7  Here, there was no 
evidence of communication or a relationship between the Deputy Attorney 
Generals representing Pietlock and Berry and Condon that would have allowed for 
communication of notice.  
(10) Nor can the identity of interest theory establish the requisite notice 
here.  The Third Circuit has explained: “[i]dentity of interest generally means that 
the parties are so closely related in their business operations or other activities that 
the institution of an action against one serves to provide notice of the litigation to 
the other.”8  The identity of interest theory, typically used to impute notice between 
a parent and subsidiary, 9 does not provide for notice here.  Accordingly, Lovett 
failed to meet the second requirement as to Berry and Condon.   
(11) The third requirement speaks of “a mistake concerning the identity of 
the proper party[.]”  The Superior Court found Lovett failed to meet this 
requirement, stating: “where the plaintiff cannot demonstrate an intent to include 
                                          
 
6 See Chaplake Holdings, LTD. v. Chrysler Corp., 766 A.2d 1, 6 n.3 (Del. 2001). 
7 Garvin v. City of Philadelphia, 354 F.3d 215, 225 (3rd Cir. 2003) (citing Singletary v. 
Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrs., 266 F.3d 186, 196-97 (3d Cir. 2001)).    
8 Singletary, 266 F.3d at 197 (internal citations omitted).  
9 Johnson v. Geico Cas. Co., 673 F.Supp.2d 244, 249 (D. Del. 2009). 
 
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the unnamed party before the limitations period expired, the court will hold that 
this element is not satisfied.”  The Superior Court also found that Lovett’s failure 
to e-file the amendment properly within the 120-day timeline was not the kind of 
“mistake” contemplated by Rule 15(c).10  Relying in part on the recent United 
States Supreme Court decision Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A, Lovett contends 
that the Superior Court misconstrued the word “mistake.” 11 
(12) This Court has recognized that a Rule 15(c) “mistake” is not limited to 
cases of misnomer or identity of interest between a named defendant and the party 
to be added.  “[T]he reach of Rule 15(a) may extend to bring in separate entities, 
not originally named as defendants, and to permit such amendment after the statute 
of limitations has expired if the requirements of Rule 15(c) are satisfied.”12   The 
United States Supreme Court construed the equivalent federal rule in Krupski to 
“resolve tension among the Circuits” over the rule’s breadth.13  The Supreme Court 
held that “relation back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) depends on what the party to be 
added knew or should have known, not on the amending party’s knowledge or its 
timeliness in seeking to amend the pleading.”14  Even so, Lovett has not satisfied 
the third requirement for the reasons explained below. 
                                          
 
10 Id.  
11 130 S.Ct. 2485, 2492, 177 L.Ed.2d 48 (June 7, 2010). 
12Mullen v. Alarmguard of Delmarva, Inc., 625 A.2d 258, 263 (Del. 1993) (internal citations 
omitted).   
13 130 S.Ct. 2485, 2492, 177 L.Ed.2d 48 (June 7, 2010). 
14 Id. (emphasis added). 
 
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(13) The third requirement of Rule 15(c) demands that the additional 
parties “knew or should have known” that, but for the mistake, they would have 
been named in the complaint.  In Mullen v. Alarmguard of Delmarva, Inc.,15 we 
construed this provision of Rule 15(c) to find a motion to amend proper.   In 
Mullen, the plaintiff had conducted a deposition of the company president, one of 
the named defendants, prior to the running of the statute of limitations. 16  At the 
deposition, which the president’s wife attended, the plaintiff stated that the purpose 
of the questioning was to determine whether to add other parties as defendants. 17  
During the deposition, the president provided misleading answers regarding his 
wife’s role in the company. 18   In this situation, we “concluded that the wife knew 
or should have known that but for a mistake concerning the identity of the party, 
she would have been named as a defendant.” 19   
(14) Here, deposition testimony indicates that Fitzpatrick assisted Pietlock 
in gathering documents for the lawsuit, such as the search warrant, during the 120-
day period.  And under Krupski, Lovett’s mere failure to add Fitzpatrick prior to 
April 23 does not, on its own, allow Fitzpatrick to argue that he believed Lovett 
“had made a deliberate and informed decision not to sue [the three additional 
                                          
 
15 625 A.2d 258, 264 (1993) 
16 Id. at 261. 
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
19 Taylor, 693 A.2d at 1076 n.3 (citing Mullen, 625 A.2d at 264).  
 
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defendants] in the first instance.”20  But, Lovett failed to show any particular 
reason why Fitzpatrick should have known prior to April 16 that he would have 
been named as a defendant in the original complaint but for a mistake of identity.  
Unlike the wife in Mullen, Fitzpatrick had no reason to know of any mistake on 
Lovett’s part.  Lovett’s claim that he faxed a motion to amend the complaint to the 
Attorney General’s Office on April 16—the 120-day deadline—does not require a 
different result. Fitzpatrick testified that Deputy Attorney General McTaggert, 
Pietlock’s prior attorney, had asked him for information regarding the lawsuit—
presumably before the substitution of counsel in February.  But there is no 
evidence of communications between Fitzpatrick and Deputy Attorney General 
Tupman regarding the April 16 fax.  Similarly, there is no evidence that Berry or 
Condon had reason to know they would have been named in the original complaint 
but for a mistake.  Tupman also represented to the Superior Court that he did not 
have any contact with Fitzpatrick, Berry or Condon after the complaint was filed.  
(15) Chaplake Holdings Ltd. v. Chrysler Corp., 21  cited by Lovett, is 
distinguishable on its facts.  In Chaplake, the party to be added under Rule 15(c) 
had been part of the action initially and thus knew it potentially faced claims for 
                                          
 
20 See Krupski, 130 S.Ct. 2485, 2497–98. 
21 766 A.2d 1 (Del. 2001). 
 
9
the conduct alleged in the complaint.22  In that circumstance, we found that the 
amended complaint satisfied the requirements of Rule 15(c).23 
(16) Lovett failed to show under the third requirement of Rule 15(c) that 
Fitzpatrick, Berry, and Condon knew or should have known that, but for a mistake 
concerning identity, they would have been named in the original suit.  The 
Superior Court did not err in denying Lovett’s motion to amend the complaint. 
(17) Lovett next contends that the Superior Court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion for relief from the January 5, 2011 order.  Lovett initially filed 
a motion for relief from the order on grounds that, had Lovett known the Superior 
Court would reconsider the Commissioner’s ruling, Lovett “would have brought to 
the Court’s attention the untrue assertion that the Department of Justice had not 
made contact with the officers who were attempted to be added and they were not 
aware of the lawsuit within 120 days after filing.”  On appeal, Lovett presents the 
motion as one for reargument and one for relief under Rule 60(b). 
(18) To the extent that Lovett’s motion could be construed as a motion for 
reargument, the motion was not timely filed under Rule 59(e).  Rule 59(e) requires 
that the motion be filed within five days of the decision.  Here, Lovett did not file 
the motion until January 20, 2011, fifteen days after the ruling. 
                                          
 
22 Id. at 6 & n.5. 
23 Id. at 7, 8. 
 
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(19) The motion also fails under Rule 60(b). We review the denial of a 
Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion.24  Here, Lovett does not specify the 
subsection of 60(b) under which he seeks relief, but appears to allege mistake and 
misrepresentation by the DOJ so as to implicate subsections (1), (3) or (6).  “Relief 
under Rule 60(b) is an extraordinary remedy and requires a showing of 
‘extraordinary circumstances.’”25 Here, the record does not support a finding of 
such extraordinary circumstances.  Accordingly, the Superior Court did not err in 
denying Lovett’s motion for reargument and/or relief. 
(20) Finally, Lovett’s notice of appeal cited the Superior Court’s Opinion 
and Order dated April 26, 2011 which granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Delaware State Police and State of Delaware after Lovett’s concession that 
Pietlock should be dismissed from the action.  Because Lovett has not argued the 
merits of that decision in his open brief, any argument of error by the Superior 
Court in granting that summary judgment in favor of defendants has been 
waived.26 
 
 
                                          
 
24 State v. Skinner, 632 A.2d 82, 84 (Del. 1993). 
25 Walls v. Cooper, 645 A.2d 569, 1994 WL 175604, at *1 (Del. 1994) (TABLE) (citing Dixon v. 
Delaware Olds, Inc., 405 A.2d 117, 119 (Del. 1979)). 
26 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 14(b)(vi)(3). 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice