Case Title: BIRT v. WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INC.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-124

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-08-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
BIRT v. WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INC.2003 WY 10275 P.3d 640Case Number: 02-124Decided: 08/27/2003

 APRIL TERM, A.D. 2003

                                                                                                                                   

DAVID 
and KIMBERLY BIRT,

Appellants(Plaintiffs),

 

v.

 

WELLS 
FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INC.,

f/k/a 
NORWEST MORTGAGE, INC.,

Appellee(Defendant).

 

Representing 
Appellants:

            
Curtis B. Buchhammer and Loretta R. Green of Buchhammer & Kehl, P.C., 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
            
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Robert T. McCue and Amanda Hunkins of Speight, McCue & Associates, 
P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
           
  

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 
 
        

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      David and 
Kimberly Birt (the Birts) appeal from the district court's Order Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment.  Because there are 
no genuine issues of material fact and Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. (Wells 
Fargo) is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we affirm.

 
    
            
           

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The parties' 
separate renditions of the numerous issues raised in this appeal are lengthy and 
somewhat argumentative.  
Consequently, we will restate the issues as follows, all of which arise 
in summary judgment context:

 
            
   

1.         
Did the parties enter into an express contract?

2.         
Did the parties enter into an implied contract?

3.         
Are the contract claims barred by the statute of 
frauds?

4.         
Did Wells Fargo breach the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing?

5.         
Does the doctrine of promissory estoppel apply?

6.         
Does the doctrine of equitable estoppel apply?

7.         
Did Wells Fargo intentionally interfere with a contract between the Birts 
and their construction company?

8.         
Did Wells Fargo breach a duty to the Birts for the purposes of a 
negligence claim?

9.         
Did Wells Fargo breach a fiduciary duty owed to the 
Birts?

10.       Was Wells Fargo 
guilty of negligent misrepresentation?

 
  
    

FACTS1

 

[¶3]      The Birts 
intended to construct a house on property they owned in Laramie County.  In April 2000, the Birts met with 
Richard Gibbs (Gibbs), a Wells Fargo loan officer.  After reviewing the Birts' financial 
documents, Gibbs advised them that they would be eligible for a loan of 
$180,000.00.  Gibbs did not disclose 
to the Birts that, based on their credit report, sub-prime financing at a higher 
interest rate would be necessary.  
The Birts had not built a home before, and they relied on Gibbs for 
guidance in completing the loan process.  
Gibbs advised the Birts to contact a building contractor, to develop 
design plans, and to keep him updated.  
The Birts updated Gibbs frequently, and Gibbs 
continued to assure the Birts that a loan would be forthcoming.

 
           
      

[¶4]      In July 2000, the 
Birts advised Gibbs that Mr. Birt was no longer self-employed, but had obtained 
full-time employment with guaranteed overtime.  After reviewing additional financial 
information supplied by the Birts, Gibbs advised them that the new employment 
put them in a better position, and stated that they might be eligible for an 
even larger amount.  Gibbs advised 
the Birts to go forward with their plans because obtaining a loan would not be a 
problem.  An architect completed 
design plans, and in August 2000, the Birts gave the plans to their proposed 
building contractor, Carter Brothers, to initiate the house's construction.  Carter Brothers supplied the Birts with 
an estimated construction cost of $234,744.40.  In mid-August 2000, 
Carter Brothers arranged for an appraisal of the house plans.

 
     
       

[¶5]      On September 4, 
2000, Gibbs advised the Birts to sign a construction contract with Carter 
Brothers, even though he knew, from a second credit report pulled in early 
August, that the Birts' credit rating had slipped and that they would not be 
able to borrow as much as previously anticipated.  That afternoon, the Birts signed the 
construction contract for the earlier estimated amount.  On September 12, 2000, the Birts 
received a letter welcoming them to Wells Fargo Mortgage Resources.  Accompanying the letter were various 
loan disclosure documents required by the Federal Truth in Lending Act, which 
provided estimates of the loan amount, interest rate, and number of payments.2  The letter 
concluded by stating, "We look forward to serving you."

 
      
    

[¶6]      During August and 
September 2000, representatives of Carter Brothers contacted Wells Fargo and 
inquired when the loan commitment letter would be completed so that construction 
could begin.  Carter Brothers also 
hired a surveyor to survey the land.  
On October 2, 2000, Carter Brothers contacted the Birts and told them 
that they had not yet received the loan commitment letter.  A few days later, Mrs. Birt contacted 
Gibbs' supervisor to inquire as to the status of the loan.  The supervisor reviewed the file, and 
later that day informed the Birts that the loan had been denied.  The 
Birts then terminated the construction contract.

 
     
 

[¶7]      Summary judgment 
motions are governed by W.R.C.P. 56(c):
  
     

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law.

 
 
          
          
               
              

[¶8]      Our standard for 
the appellate review of a summary judgment was recently reiterated in Rino v. 
Mead, 2002 WY 144, ¶ 12, 55 P.3d 13, 17-18 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Hasvold v. Park County School 
Dist. No. 6, 2002 WY 65, ¶ 11, 45 P.3d 635, 637-38 (Wyo. 2002)):

 

            
"Summary judgment is proper only when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  . . .  We review a summary judgment in the same 
light as the district court, using the same materials and following the same 
standards.  We examine the record 
from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we 
give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be 
drawn from the record.'  . . .  Summary judgment serves the purpose of 
eliminating formal trials where only questions of law are involved.  . . .  We review a grant of summary judgment by 
deciding a question of law de novo and afford no deference to the district 
court's ruling on that question.  . 
. .

            
. . .  A 
material fact is any fact that, if proved, would have the effect of establishing 
or refuting an essential element of a claim or defense asserted by a party . . 
.."

 
     
             
             

DISCUSSION

 

[¶9]      The Birts' 
complaint against Wells Fargo alleged ten causes of action:  breach of an express contract, breach of 
an implied contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, breach of an agreement to lend money, equitable estoppel, promissory 
estoppel, intentional interference with a contractual relationship, negligence, 
negligent misrepresentation, and breach of a fiduciary duty.  Wells Fargo obtained summary judgment on 
all counts.  We will separately 
discuss each cause of action, as well as Wells Fargo's statute of frauds 
defense.  Many of the above-related 
facts are significant to the discussion of more than one issue.  We will 
not repeat all the facts for each issue, but each issue will be considered in 
the context of all the facts.

 
        
              

            
Express 
Contract

 

[¶10]   The basic elements of a contract 
are offer, acceptance, and consideration.  
McLean v. Hyland Enterprises, Inc., 2001 WY 111, ¶ 42, 34 P.3d 1262, 1272 (Wyo. 2001).  In order for a contract to exist, there 
must be mutual assent to the same terms.  
Roussalis v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 231 (Wyo. 
2000).  Whether a contract exists, its terms and 
conditions and the intent of the parties generally are questions of fact to be 
resolved by the fact-finder.  
Ewing v. Hladky Const., Inc., 2002 WY 95, ¶ 11, 48 P.3d 1086, 1088 
(Wyo. 2002) (quoting Roussalis, 4 P.3d at 250).  An express contract is one in which the 
terms are declared by the parties either in writing or orally at the time the 
contract is formed.  Boone v. 
Frontier Refining, Inc., 987 P.2d 681, 685 (Wyo. 1999); 
Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 216 (Wyo. 
1994).  An express oral contract may be 
interpreted as a matter of law if the terms are shown without conflict in the 
evidence.  Anderson v. South 
Lincoln Special Cemetery Dist. ex rel. Bd. of Trustees of South Lincoln Special 
Cemetery Dist., 972 P.2d 136, 139 (Wyo. 1999).

 

[¶11]   One specific question in determining 
the parties' intent is whether their contract was meant to be formed only upon 
the signing of written documents or was meant to be formed upon an oral 
understanding.

 
    
             
               
 

"An 
agreement to make a written contract where the terms are mutually understood and 
agreed on in all respects is as binding as the written contract would be if it 
had been executed.'  Robert W. 
Anderson House[w]recking and Excavating, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, School 
District No. 25, Fremont County, Wyoming, 681 P.2d 1326, 1331 
(1984).

"In 
general, the principle is well settled that where the parties to a contract 
intend that it shall be closed and consummated prior to the formal signing of a 
written draft, the terms having been mutually understood and agreed upon, the 
parties will be bound by the contract actually made, although it be not reduced 
to writing; but, on the other hand, if the parties do not intend to close the 
contract until it shall be fully expressed in a written instrument properly 
attested, then there will be no complete contract until the agreement shall be 
put into writing and signed.'  
Summers v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 12 Wyo. 369, 75 P. 937, 943 (1904)."

 
  

Frost 
Const. Co. v. Lobo, Inc., 951 P.2d 390, 394 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. 
Morris, 756 P.2d 774, 776 (Wyo. 1988)).

 

[¶12]   The Birts contend that, from the 
beginning, it was "understood" that they were seeking a mortgage loan from Wells 
Fargo for an amount between $180,000 and $185,000, with terms "within industry 
standards," and with the newly constructed home to serve as collateral.  It is their 
position that the loan agreement was consummated when Wells Fargo sent them the 
Federal Truth in Lending disclosures:

 
       
            
 

The 
disclosure statements provided to the Birts dated September 12, 2000, included 
the exact amount of the loan, the dates for repayment, the collateral offered, 
the parties involved, and an estimated interest rate.  . . .  Upon receiving these documents, Mrs. 
Birt contacted Gibbs on . . . she and her husband's behalf and expressed their 
willingness to sign the documents.  
. . .  Gibbs' 
instruction to wait until closing was all that prevented the Birts from signing 
the documents contained in the disclosure packet dated September 12, 
2000.

 
   
             
        

[¶13]   We cannot agree with the Birts' 
assessment of this situation.  If anything, Gibbs' instruction not to sign 
the disclosure documents but to wait until closing evinces Wells Fargo's intent 
that those documents were not a contract.  Furthermore, it would certainly create havoc 
in the consumer lending industry were courts to declare the existence of a 
contract whenever a lender fulfilled its federal obligation of complete 
disclosure.  
Indeed, if an express contract was formed in such instance, the lender 
also could enforce it, leaving the borrower with no final opportunity to accept 
or reject the terms.  
That, of course, would destroy the purpose of disclosure.  Furthermore, there 
is simply nothing in the record that suggests that the relationship between the 
Birts and Wells Fargo ever advanced beyond the loan application stage.  Gibbs' assertions 
on behalf of Wells Fargo simply did not evidence an intention that an agreement 
had been finalized.  
At most, Gibbs' statements to the Birts can be characterized as 
assurances that the loan would be approved.

 
           
      

[¶14]   There are no genuine issues of material 
fact in regard to the Birts' express contract cause of action and Wells Fargo is 
entitled to judgment.  
The district court's ruling on this issue is affirmed.3

 

            
Implied Contract

 

[¶15]   Although no express contract may have 
been formed, negotiating parties may reach an "implied-in-fact" contract.  An implied-in-fact 
contract is distinguishable from a contract "implied in law."  The former may be 
found to exist as a matter of fact and is dependent upon the parties' 
intent.  Shaw v. Smith, 964 P.2d 428, 435-36 (Wyo. 
1998).  The latter is imposed as a matter of law, as 
an equitable remedy.  
Amoco Production Co. v. EM Nominee Partnership 
Co., 2 P.3d 534, 541 (Wyo. 
2000); Clark v. Gable, 966 P.2d 431, 438 (Wyo. 
1998).  For an implied-in-fact contract to have been 
created by the parties' conduct, ""the conduct from which that inference is 
drawn must be sufficient to support the conclusion that the parties expressed a 
mutual manifestation of an intent to enter into an agreement."'"  Shaw, 964 P.2d at 435-36 (quoting Lavoie v. 
Safecare Health Service, Inc., 840 P.2d 239, 248 (Wyo. 1992)).

 

[¶16]   In determining whether an implied 
contract was formed, we look not to the subjective intent of the parties, but to 
"the outward manifestations of a party's assent sufficient to create reasonable 
reliance by the other party.'"  Givens v. Fowler, 
984 P.2d 1092, 1095 (Wyo. 
1999) (quoting McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, 
Inc., 820 P.2d 986, 990 (Wyo. 
1991)).  The question is "whether a reasonable man in 
the position of the offeree would have believed that the other party intended to 
make an offer."  
Boone, 987 P.2d  at 687.  In 1991, we adopted Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 19 (1979) for guidance in determining whether an 
implied-in-fact contract exists:

 

"(1) The manifestation of assent may be made wholly or 
partly by written or spoken words or by other acts or by failure to act.

(2) The conduct of a party is not effective as a 
manifestation of his assent unless he intends to engage in the conduct and knows 
or has reason to know that the other party may infer from his conduct that he 
assents.

(3) The conduct of a party may manifest assent even though 
he does not in fact assent.  In such cases a resulting contract may be 
voidable because of fraud, duress, mistake, or other invalidating 
cause."

 

McDonald, 820 P.2d  at 990.  In essence, an implied-in-fact contract may 
arise where "parties act in a manner conveying mutual agreement and an intent to 
promise . . .."  
Worley v. Wyoming Bottling Co., Inc., 1 P.3d 615, 620 (Wyo. 
2000).  Interpretation of an unambiguous 
implied-in-fact contract is a question of law.  Garcia v. UniWyo 
Federal Credit Union, 920 P.2d 642, 645 (Wyo. 1996).

 

[¶17]   In support of their claim that an 
implied-in-fact contract existed in this case, the Birts rely on their numerous 
contacts with Gibbs from April through September 2000, Gibbs' assurances that he 
was an expert in loan processing, their own financial naivet©, and Gibbs' 
repeated assurances that the loan would be approved.  As with their 
express contract claim, they also emphasize their receipt from Wells Fargo of 
the disclosure documents:

 

            
Considering the constant assurances of Gibbs, the Birts' lack of 
sophistication with the process, and the receipt of the documents that appeared 
to be mortgage papers more than five months into the process, it was not 
unreasonable for the Birts to rely on the terms and conditions of Gibbs' 
statements and the disclosure documents received.  The Birts mirrored their assent to Gibbs' 
statements by incurring the services of an architect, entering into a 
construction contract, and obtaining both an appraisal and survey to move 
forward with the construction of their home.  It can be clearly inferred by the conduct of 
the Gibbs and the Birts that there was a mutual agreement for the provisions of 
the mortgage and a manifested intent to promise based upon Gibbs['] statements 
to both the Birts and the Carter Bros.

 

[¶18]   In response to this argument, Wells 
Fargo contends that the discussions between Gibbs and the Birts never advanced 
beyond the pre-qualification and application phases of the financing process, 
and that the Birts simply cannot identify a point in time where Wells Fargo gave 
approval for a mortgage loan.  Further, Wells Fargo notes that the Birts' 
subjective beliefs did not create a contract where Wells Fargo had not 
manifested an intent that a contract be formed.

 

[¶19]   We conclude that summary judgment in 
favor of Wells Fargo was appropriate on this issue.  There are no 
genuine issues of material fact from which a fact-finder could conclude that an 
implied-in-fact contract arose.  Even Mrs. Birt acknowledged in her deposition 
testimony that at the time she and her husband deeded their land over to Carter 
Brothers for construction purposes, they knew that Wells Fargo had not produced 
a commitment letter.  
That, in effect, is an admission that the Birts knew that no loan 
agreement had yet been reached.  Mrs. Birt also testified that she knew the 
figures in the disclosure documents were "just numbers plugged in," and that the 
"actual numbers" would be provided at closing.  Furthermore, Mrs. Birt knew that the loan was 
not meant to be consummated until the signing of final papers at 
closing:

 

Q.        Did he 
say why they were just numbers plugged in and not the actual numbers?

A.        No.

Q.        
Okay.  
Did you ask him?

A.        No, I 
didn't.  I just 
told him  I did ask him if we should sign it and he says, no, don't sign it because we'll have new papers drawn 
up at the time of closing, that this is just an example of what the loan would 
look like.

 

(Emphasis added.)

 

[¶20]   Clearly, the Birts were aware that 
Wells Fargo did not intend to create a contract, through Gibbs' conduct or 
otherwise, in advance of the execution of final loan documents at closing.  While the Birts 
certainly appear fully to have expected that closing to occur, it cannot be said 
that any identified conduct of Gibbs or Wells Fargo manifested an intent to 
enter into an oral contract or for the Birts to sign the disclosure documents as 
a contract.  We 
affirm the district court's ruling on this issue.

 

            
Good Faith and Fair Dealing

 

[¶21]   Our conclusion that neither an express 
contract nor an implied-in-fact contract existed in this case leads inexorably 
to the further conclusion that Wells Fargo was entitled to summary judgment on 
the issue of its alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.  
Without a contract, there is no basis for imposition of the implied 
covenant, whether in contract or in tort, because either cause of action arises 
out of the contractual relationship.  Scherer Const., LLC 
v. Hedquist Const., Inc., 2001 WY 
23, ¶¶ 20, 23 n.3, 18 P.3d 645, 654-55 n.3 (Wyo. 2001); Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 
221; 86 C.J.S. Torts §§ 4 and 5 
(1997); 74 Am.Jur.2d Torts § 19 
(2001).  The duty of good faith and fair dealing does 
not come into play until the parties have reached an agreement and does not bind 
them during their earlier negotiations.  Husman, Inc. v. 
Triton Coal Co., 809 P.2d 796, 801-02 (Wyo. 1991).

 

            
Statute of 
Frauds

 

[¶22]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-23-105 (LexisNexis 
2003) provides, in pertinent part:

 

            
(a)       In the 
following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or some 
note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be 
charged therewith:

(i)         
Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one (1) 
year from the making thereof[.]

 

[¶23]   Where loan payments extend beyond a 
year, the underlying contract, to be found enforceable, must be in writing and 
signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought.  Giacchino v. Estate of Stalkup, 908 P.2d 983, 986 (Wyo. 
1995).  It is uncontested that the proposed loan in 
the instant case was to be for thirty years.  That key fact is the gist of Wells Fargo's 
statute of frauds argumentbecause the loan agreement could not be performed 
within one year, any contract had to be in writing.  In their Reply 
Brief, the Birts propound two counter-arguments.  First, they assert that Wells Fargo is 
precluded from raising the statute of frauds on appeal because it did not appeal 
from the district court's order denying the motion to dismiss and granting the 
motion for summary judgment.  Second, the Birts contend that, even if the 
statute of frauds applies to their contract claims, it does not apply to their 
equitable claims.

 

[¶24]   In the district court, Wells Fargo 
raised the statute of frauds as part of its summary judgment argument, not as a 
basis for its motion to dismiss.  Consequently, the district court's denial of 
the motion to dismiss did not implicate the statute of frauds.4  In granting summary 
judgment to Wells Fargo, the district court made no mention of the statute of 
frauds.  
Instead, the district court ruled that the uncontested facts simply could 
not sustain any of the causes of action.  Under these circumstances, it would not seem 
appropriate to expect that Wells Fargo would have appealed from a decision in 
its favor, and we are inclined to consider the statute of frauds defense as 
having been properly raised on appeal.

 

[¶25]   Like the district court, we have 
concluded that neither an express contract nor an implied-in-fact contract 
existed between Wells Fargo and the Birts.  Consequently, the statute of frauds issue is 
moot to that extent.  
Furthermore, inasmuch as Wells Fargo did not raise the defense of the 
statute of frauds, either here or below, in regard to the Birts' equitable 
claims, we need not consider that issue.5

 

            
Promissory Estoppel

 

[¶26]   "Promissory estoppel is a doctrine 
incorporated in the law of contracts."  B & W Glass, Inc. 
v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 829 P.2d 809, 813 (Wyo. 1992).  Its general theory is that, "[i]f an 
unambiguous promise is made in circumstances calculated to induce reliance, and 
it does so, the promisee if hurt as a result can recover damages.'"  Id. (quoting Goldstick v. ICM 
Realty, 788 F.2d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 1986)).  Promissory estoppel applies, however, only if 
no contract exists.  
Sowerwine v. Keith, 997 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Wyo. 
2000).  The elements of promissory estoppel 
are:

 

"(1) the existence of a clear and definite promise which 
the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action by the promisee; (2) 
proof that the promisee acted to its detriment in reasonable reliance on the 
promise; and (3) a finding that injustice can be avoided only if the court 
enforces the promise."

 

City of Powell v. Busboom, 2002 WY 
58, ¶ 8, 44 P.3d 63, 66 (Wyo. 
2002) (quoting Roussalis, 
4 P.3d at 253).  The party asserting promissory estoppel has 
the burden of establishing each element under a burden of strict proof.  Busboom, 2002 WY 
58, ¶ 8, 44 P.3d  at 66.  The first two elements are questions of fact 
for the fact-finder; the third element is a question of law for the court.  Id.; Loya v. Wyoming Partners 
of Jackson Hole, Inc., 2001 WY 
124, ¶ 22, 35 P.3d 1246, 1254 (Wyo. 
2001).

 

[¶27]   For purposes of the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel, a promise is a "manifestation of intention to act or to 
refrain from acting in a specified way made so as to justify a promisee in 
understanding that a commitment has been made."  Busboom, 2002 WY 58, ¶ 10, 44 P.3d  
at 66.  A promise may arise through words or conduct, 
but conduct must be specifically demonstrative of an intention respecting future 
conduct before it can serve as the foundation for a clear and definite 
promise.  Id., 2002 WY 
58, ¶ 10, 44 P.3d  at 66-67.

[¶28]   In addition to establishing the 
existence of a clear and definite promise, a plaintiff must also show "action 
or forbearance of a definite and substantial character'" to satisfy the second 
element of the doctrine.  Loya, 2001 WY 124, ¶ 22, 35 P.3d  
at 1254 (quoting Worley, 1 P.3d at 624).  Further, such action or forbearance must be 
the result of "reasonable reliance."  Davis v. Davis, 
855 P.2d 342, 348 (Wyo. 
1993).  We have described reasonable reliance as 
follows:

 

            
In Provence [v. 
Hilltop National Bank, 780 P.2d 990 (Wyo. 1989)], we explained that detriment in reasonable reliance is 
closely tied to the existence of a clear and definite agreement.  A reasonable person 
does not rely to his or her detriment on an oral agreement unless it is 
sufficiently clear and definite as to induce him or her to act.  Provence.  "There can be no estoppel as a matter of law 
when the asserted reliance is not justifiable or reasonable under the 
circumstances of the case considered as a whole."  Roth [v. First Security Bank of Rock Springs, Wyoming], 684 P.2d [93,] 97 [(Wyo. 1984)] (citing Matter of Simineo v. Kelling, 199 Colo. 225, 607 P.2d 1289 
(1980)).  The 
representation that induces the reliance also must be the immediate or proximate 
cause of the act in reliance.  Roth.  The knowledge and 
sophistication of the relying party is to be considered in determining 
reasonableness (Roth) and consistent with the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90, we also consider the reasonable 
foreseeability by the promisor that the promisee would rely on the statement or 
representation.  
[Inter-Mountain Threading, Inc. v.] Baker Hughes [Tubular Service, 
Inc., 812 P.2d 555 (Wyo. 
1991)].

 

Davis, 855 P.2d  at 348.

 

[¶29]   The third element of promissory 
estoppel is a finding by the court that "the equities" support enforcement of 
the promise.  
This means that promissory estoppel is only invoked when it is necessary 
to avoid injustice, which is a policy determination that embraces an element of 
discretion.  Id. at 349.

 

[¶30]   "The standard of appellate review of 
matters in equity varies widely by jurisdiction."  27A Am.Jur.2d Equity § 262 at 746 (1996).  Some courts hold that an appeal in an 
equitable matter opens the entire case for review as if no decision had been 
rendered below, whereas some courts limit review to a determination of whether 
substantial evidence supports the judgment, the judgment is against the great 
weight of the evidence, or there were errors of law.  5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 696 at 366-67(1995).  We have previously held that, in a bench 
trial situation, our review is for an abuse of discretion, the questions being 
whether the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any part 
of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious.  Thompson v. Board of 
County Com'rs of the County of Sublette, 2001 WY 108, ¶ 7, 34 P.3d 278, 280-81 (Wyo. 
2001).  The instant case, however, does not involve a 
bench trial, but comes to this Court by way of summary judgment.  Recently, we noted 
that "we have approved the use of summary judgment in actions which were 
historically equitable in nature," and we quoted from an Oklahoma case in 
describing appellate review in such cases:

 

            
"The underlying action, being one to foreclose a mortgage lien, is 
equitable in nature.  
Ordinarily, in reviewing a case of equitable cognizance a judgment will 
be sustained on appeal unless it is found to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence or is contrary to law or established principles of equity.  But because this 
comes to us from an order granting summary judgment the appellate standard of 
review is de novo."

 

McNeill Family Trust v. Centura Bank, 2003 WY 
2, ¶¶ 9-10, 60 P.3d 1277, 1282 (Wyo. 
2003) (quoting Abboud v. 
Abboud, 2000 Ok Civ App 116, ¶ 4, 14 P.3d 569, ¶ 4 
(Okla.Civ.App. 2000)).6  We apply our traditional standards for review 
of a summary judgment.  See Hulse v. First Interstate Bank of CommerceGillette, 994 P.2d 957, 958-59 (Wyo. 
2000).

 

[¶31]   The district court in the instant case 
did not grant summary judgment to Wells Fargo on the promissory estoppel claim 
because "the equities" demanded it.  Rather, the district court found neither a 
clear and definite promise nor reasonable detrimental reliance.  In that regard, we 
find the undisputed material facts of this case indistinguishable from those of 
Hulse.  Simply stated, statements made during the 
loan application process preparatory to the signing of long-term financing 
agreements do not constitute a clear and definite promise where the terms of the 
proposed agreement are not to be finally determined until a formal closing.  "[T]he oral promise 
of a bank representative is not sufficient to support a claim of promissory 
estoppel where the statement did not specify the loan amount, interest rate, 
repayment schedule, or collateral."  Id. at 959.7  The court may not supply the missing terms to 
create an agreement.  
Id. (quoting Doud v. First Interstate Bank of Gillette, 769 P.2d 927, 928-29 (Wyo. 
1989)).

 

[¶32]   Our conclusion that the district court 
correctly found that the Birts had failed to establish the first element of 
promissory estoppel obviates any need to analyze the second element.  We will, however, 
briefly note our holding in Davis, 855 P.2d  at 
348, that "detriment in reasonable reliance is closely tied to 
the existence of a clear and definite agreement.  A reasonable person does not rely to his or 
her detriment on an oral agreement unless it is sufficiently clear and definite 
as to induce him or her to act."  Here, not only did the Birts know that the 
final terms of the proposed loan had not been determined, they also knew that no 
loan commitment letter had been issued by Wells Fargo.  Reliance on an 
indefinite promise is unreasonable for the same reason that courts cannot 
enforce such a promisethe terms remain to be determined.

 

[¶33]   The district court's grant of summary 
judgment to Wells Fargo on the Birts' claim of promissory estoppel is 
affirmed.

 

            
Equitable Estoppel

 

[¶34]   "Equitable estoppel is the effect of 
the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded from 
asserting rights which might otherwise have existed as against another person 
who has in good faith relied upon such conduct and has been led thereby to 
change his position for the worse.'"  Snake River Brewing 
Co., Inc. v. Town of Jackson, 2002 WY 
11, ¶ 28, 39 P.3d 397, 407-08 (Wyo. 
2002) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Petsch, 261 F.2d 331, 335 (10th Cir. 
1958)).  "Equitable estoppel arises only when a party, 
by acts, conduct, or acquiescence causes another to change his position."  Roth v. First Sec. Bank of Rock Springs, Wyo., 684 P.2d 93, 96 (Wyo. 
1984).  The elements of equitable estoppel are a lack 
of knowledge, reliance in good faith, and action or inaction that results in an 
injury.  Id.  Equitable estoppel is similar to promissory 
estoppel, but equitable estoppel is a tort doctrine that requires proof of 
misrepresentation.  
B & W Glass, Inc., 829 P.2d  at 
813.  In Davis, 855 P.2d  at 348, we expanded upon the similarities between these two 
doctrines:

 

            
The doctrines of promissory estoppel and equitable estoppel are closely 
related and, as we impliedly recognized in [Inter-Mountain Threading, Inc. v.] Baker Hughes [Tubular Serv., Inc., 812 P.2d 555 (Wyo.1991)], 
they often have been invoked together and interchangeably, without the benefit 
of clear distinction.  
Baker Hughes.  See also Roth v. First Sec. Bank of Rock 
Springs, Wyo., 684 P.2d 93 (Wyo.1984).  
Reasonable reliance is an element common to both of these doctrines.  Baker Hughes.  Thus, we find that equitable estoppel cases 
are cited in promissory estoppel cases with respect to this common element.  In Wyoming, these 
doctrines most often have been presented in the context of preliminary 
negotiations for commercial agreements.

 

[¶35]   Several pages of the Birts' appellate 
brief are dedicated to a detailed expostulation of the conduct of Gibbs that 
they feel substantiates their equitable estoppel claim:  Gibbs claimed to be 
an expert in processing loans, so the Birts, lacking sophistication in such 
matters, placed their faith and trust in him; Gibbs recognized problems with the 
Birts' credit history as early as April 2000, yet he informed the Birts that 
their credit record was not a problem; Gibbs failed to tell the Birts that their 
pre-qualification was valid for only thirty days; Gibbs told the Birts that Mr. 
Birt's employment change would allow for an even higher loan amount; Gibbs did 
not inform the Birts when in August 2000 he identified additional credit 
problems that would necessitate a higher interest rate; despite these mounting 
problems, Gibbs continued to encourage the Birts to move forward with their 
project, including bidding plans, a construction loan, a survey and an 
appraisal; Gibbs represented both to the Birts and to Carter Brothers, as late 
as mid-September 2000, that a loan commitment letter imminently would follow; 
Gibbs constantly reassured the Birts that their loan would be approved even 
though he had numerous opportunities to correct this misrepresentation; and 
Gibbs failed to inform the Birts that plans, specifications and an appraisal had 
to be supplied to Wells Fargo.  The Birts feel particularly aggrieved by this 
last-mentioned omission because it was their supposed failure to deliver those 
items to Wells Fargo that became the basis for Wells Fargo's primary contract 
defense.  As a 
result of Gibbs' alleged misconduct, the Birts claim they were damaged by 
incurring fees for an architect, an appraisal, and a survey.

 

[¶36]   Wells Fargo contends in response that 
any reliance by the Birts was unreasonable because:  Gibbs made numerous 
requests of the Birts for the plans and specifications so an appraisal could be 
ordered; no loan amount was ever established; the Birts were experienced, having 
been through two previous house purchases; the Birts were aware of their 
negative credit history and the likelihood of the need for sub-prime financing 
with a higher interest rate; it was the Birts' own conduct after the first 
credit report that caused the negative entries in the second credit report; and 
most of the Birts' "reliance damages" were incurred before they received the 
disclosure documents.

 

[¶37]   The district court granted summary 
judgment to Wells Fargo on the Birts' equitable estoppel claim on two 
bases.  First, 
citing Crosby v. Strahan's Estate, 78 Wyo. 302, 324 P.2d 492 (1958), the district court found that the Birts had not alleged, 
and the record did not support, a finding of the fraud estoppel is meant to 
prevent.  And 
second, citing to McCarty v. Piedmont Mut. Ins. Co., 
81 S.C. 152, 62 S.E. 1 (1908), the district court held that "a mere declaration of 
intention to do something in the future with respect to a contract not in 
existence cannot be the basis of an estoppel to assert a condition of the 
subsequently executed contract."

 

[¶38]   In regard to the district court's 
conclusion that sufficient evidence of fraud did not exist in the record, it is 
true that we have identified the purpose of equitable estoppel as being "to 
prevent fraud, actual or constructive . . .."  Squaw Mountain Cattle 
Co. v. Bowen, 804 P.2d 1292, 1297 (Wyo. 1991).  We have also said that the doctrine is to be 
applied to prevent injury arising from actions or declarations acted on in good 
faith and to promote the end of justice, where it would be inequitable not to do 
so, which is a standard less than actual fraud.  Id.; Garlach v. Tuttle, 705 P.2d 828, 829 (Wyo. 
1985).  Equitable estoppel may apply whether the 
actor "intentionally or through culpable negligence induces another to believe 
that certain facts exist . . .."  Thompson, 2001 WY 108, ¶ 11, 34 P.3d  
at 281.  In addition, it is immaterial whether the 
conduct falsely misrepresented the situation or fraudulently concealed the 
truth.  Bauer v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 
695 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Wyo. 
1985).  While both "intentionally" and "through 
culpable negligence" suggest a state of mind beyond mere negligence, neither 
suggests the level of specific intent required to prove actual fraud.8  Instead, equitable estoppel is designed to 
combat not just actual fraud, but also constructive fraud, which "consist[s] of 
all acts, omissions, and concealments involving breaches of a legal or equitable 
duty resulting in damage to another, and exists where such conduct, although not 
actually fraudulent, ought to be so treated when it has the same consequence and 
legal effects."  
In re Borton's Estate, 393 P.2d 808, 812 (Wyo. 
1964).

 

[¶39]   As to the district court's second 
rationale for granting summary judgment to Wells Fargo on this issue, we 
conclude that the principles enunciated in McCarty 
do apply indirectly to the facts of the instant case.  In McCarty, a homeowner, prior to purchasing insurance, 
told the insurer's agent that he intended to place a small mortgage on the 
premises.  The 
agent assured the homeowner that this would make no difference under the 
policy.  Some 
months after purchasing the insurance, the homeowner, without further consent 
from the insurer, did grant such a mortgage.  Later, when the premises were destroyed by 
fire, the insurer refused to indemnify the homeowner for his loss because the 
policy forbade mortgaging the property without the insurer's consent.  McCarty, 62 S.E.  at 1.  The specific holding of McCarty was that the agent's prior representations to 
the contrary did not estop the insurer from raising the policy term as a defense 
to the homeowner's claim.  Id. at 2.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the South Carolina Supreme Court emphasized two principles:  (1) "estoppel by 
misrepresentation" must involve misrepresentation of a past or existing fact and 
"cannot arise from a promise as to future action with respect to a right to be 
acquired upon an agreement not yet made;'" and (2) the insurance policy dictated 
the terms of the parties' contract.  Id. (quoting Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mowry, 96 U.S. 544, 546, 24 L. Ed. 674 (1877)).  In other words, once the written contract of 
insurance was executed, its terms prevailed over prior representations of the 
agent.  Stated 
in the reverse, the agent's prior representations did not estop the insurer from 
enforcing the policy term.9

 

[¶40]   McCarty 
cannot be applied directly to the case at hand because Wells Fargo and the Birts 
never reached final agreement.  Therefore, Wells Fargo is not arguing to 
enforce a contract term in the face of the Birts' argument that it should be 
estopped from doing so.  Rather, and we assume that this is the 
context in which the district court applied McCarty, 
Gibbs' alleged representations to the contrary notwithstanding, Wells Fargo is 
not estopped from asserting its right not to contract with the Birts unless and 
until the Birts had met all of Wells Fargo's requirements, including production 
of plans and specifications for an appraisal.

 

[¶41]   We will affirm the summary judgment 
granted to Wells Fargo on the equitable estoppel claim because the essence of 
the district court's decision is correct.  Wells Fargo's conduct, even if true as 
alleged, did not perpetuate a "fraud" or create the level of injustice that the 
doctrine is meant to remedy.  That is because, even without Gibbs' 
allegedly poor advice, the loan application would not have been approved under 
the contemplated terms.  The failure of the loan application in that 
respect resulted primarily from the Birts' poor credit rating, which rating 
continued to deteriorate during the application process due to the Birts' 
continued poor debt management.10  It is well established that he who seeks 
equity must do so with "clean hands."  Dewey v. Wentland, 
2002 WY 2, ¶ 37, 38 P.3d 402, 416 (Wyo. 
2002); Hammond v. Hammond, 14 P.3d 199, 203 (Wyo. 
2000).  In other words, the Birts may not rely upon 
equitable estoppel to compel Wells Fargo to consummate a loan where, first, the 
Birts cannot be said to have relied reasonably on Gibbs' assurances that the 
loan would be forthcoming, and second, failure of the loan application was 
largely due to the Birts' own financial difficulties.

 

            
Negligent Misrepresentation

 

[¶42]   In their complaint, the Birts allege 
that, from April to October 2000, Wells Fargo negligently misrepresented to them 
that their loan application would be approved.11  Perhaps the best 
way to discuss the tort of negligent misrepresentation is first to compare it to 
fraud:

 

            
Intentional misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation share 
common elements.  
Intentional misrepresentation (fraud) is established when the following 
elements are proven:  
"(1) the defendant made a false representation intended to induce action 
by the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff reasonably believed the representation to be 
true; and (3) the plaintiff relied on the false representation and suffered 
damages."  Sundown, Inc. v. Pearson Real Estate Company, Inc., 8 P.3d 324, 330 (Wyo.2000).  Intentional misrepresentation must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence.  Id.  Quite similarly, a 
plaintiff in a claim for negligent misrepresentation must show:

"One who, in the course of his business, profession or 
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, 
supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business 
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their 
justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable 
care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information."

Hulse v. First American Title Company of Crook County, 
2001 WY 
95, ¶ 52, 33 P.3d 122, ¶ 52 (Wyo.2001) (quoting Richey v. Patrick, 
904 P.2d 798, 802 
(Wyo.1995)).  A 
fundamental difference between the two causes of action is, a plaintiff need 
only prove negligent misrepresentation by a preponderance of the evidence, not 
unlike any other plaintiff in any other action sounding in negligence, while a 
plaintiff must prove intentional misrepresentation by clear and convincing 
evidence.  Verschoor v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance 
Company, 907 P.2d 1293, 1299 
(Wyo.1995).

 

Dewey, 2002 WY 
2, ¶ 10, 38 P.3d  at 409-10.

 

[¶43]   Similarly, negligent misrepresentation 
must be distinguished from the tort of nondisclosure, as described by 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551 (1977).12  "A nondisclosure of information cannot 
support a claim for misrepresentation; since nothing has been represented, an 
essential element of the claim is missing."  Richey v. 
Patrick, 904 P.2d 798, 802 (Wyo. 
1995).  This distinction is important in the instant 
case because, although the Birts briefed and argued non-disclosure in their 
appeal, they did not allege it in their complaint nor was it ruled upon by the 
district court.  
Consequently, non-disclosure as a separate tort is not properly before 
this Court.

 

[¶44]   Analysis of the negligent 
misrepresentation cause of action is made difficult by the fact that the Birts' 
argument focuses almost entirely on non-disclosure.  We can, however, 
glean from their arguments several points properly within the realm of alleged 
negligent misrepresentation.  Those include allegations that:  Gibbs told the 
Birts they could afford an architect; Gibbs told the Birts that Mr. Birt's 
employment change would not negatively affect the loan application; Gibbs 
instructed the Birts to "forge on" with the construction contract; Gibbs advised 
the Birts to deed their property over to Carter Brothers for construction 
purposes; and Gibbs informed the Birts that there should be no trouble acquiring 
a loan in a sufficient amount.

 

[¶45]   Wells Fargo's response to these 
contentions is first and foremost that the Birts cannot identify any false 
information supplied by Wells Fargo that would rise to the level of negligent 
misrepresentation.  
Secondarily, Wells Fargo contends that, had the Birts provided the plans 
and specifications as requested, a loan amount may have been determined and the 
loan may have been made.  In other words, any loss suffered by the 
Birts was caused by their own inaction.

 

[¶46]   The district court granted summary 
judgment to Wells Fargo on the issue of negligent misrepresentation, with the 
following explanation:

 

            
The Birts use this theory as a back up to their contention that the bank 
promised to lend money.  A failed promise cannot be converted into a 
viable theory by virtue of the doctrine of negligent misrepresentation.  Negligent 
misrepresentation requires that the wrongdoer have a pecuniary interest in the 
matter and supply false information for the guidance of others in their business 
transactions.  
It involves situations in which one enterprise provides information to 
another enterprise that in turn predicates a decision upon the information.  None of the 
examples in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 embody the reach for which the 
Birts argue.  
Moreover, a good faith mistake doesn't trigger this tort.  This record provides 
no basis to allow negligent misrepresentation to go forward.

 

[¶47]   We will affirm the summary judgment 
entered in favor of Wells Fargo.  The gist of the district court's reasoning, 
which is correct, is that negligent misrepresentation does not apply to 
misrepresentations of future intent or to statements of opinion.  The tort of 
negligent misrepresentation, as defined by Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 552, applies only to misrepresentations of facts.  Sain v. Cedar Rapids Community School Dist., 626 N.W.2d 115, 127 (Iowa 2001); Bittel v. Farm Credit Services of 
Cent. Kansas, 265 Kan. 651, 962 P.2d 491, 500-01 (1998).  Indeed, the extension of negligent 
misrepresentation to situations involving future intentions would "endow every 
breach of contract with a potential tort claim for negligent promise.'"  Wilkinson v. Shoney's, Inc., 269 Kan. 194, 4 P.3d 1149, 1167 (2000) (quoting Eckholt v. 
American Business Information, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 521, 532 (D.Kan. 
1994)).  The question of whether the alleged 
misrepresentation was one of present fact or of opinion or of future intention 
is a question of law.  
Wilkinson, 4 P.3d  at 1165; Bittel, 962 P.2d  at 
501.13

 

[¶48]   The undisputed facts of this case do 
not support a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation because Gibbs' 
alleged misrepresentations may all be characterized as statements of his opinion 
as to the progress of the loan or statements as to his expectation that the loan 
would be made.  
The gravamen of the Birts' claim is an allegation of just the sort of 
"negligent promise" to which the cause of action should not be 
extended.

 

            
Negligence

 

[¶49]   There are four elements to a negligence 
cause of action:  
(1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to conform to a specified 
standard of care; (2) the defendant breached the duty of care; (3) the 
defendant's breach of the duty of care proximately caused injury to the 
plaintiff; and (4) the injury sustained by the plaintiff is compensable by money 
damages.  Valance v. VI-Doug, Inc., 2002 WY 113, ¶ 8, 50 P.3d 697, 701 (Wyo. 
2002).  Whether a duty exists is a question of law 
for the court.  
Id.  However, when the question of duty depends 
upon the initial determination of certain basic facts, that initial 
determination is a question of fact for the fact-finder.  Id.

 

[¶50]   Professor Burman has identified four 
types of negligence claims in lender liability cases:  negligent 
misrepresentation, negligent advising, negligent lending, and negligent breach 
of contract.  
John M. Burman, Lender Liability in Wyoming, 
XXVI Land & Water L. Rev. 707, 742 (1991).  We have already concluded that there was no 
contract between Wells Fargo and the Birts, so the fourth-listed claim is not 
available.  
Likewise, we have also concluded that a cause of action for negligent 
misrepresentation does not lie under the circumstances of this case.  Negligent lending, 
which presupposes a consummated loan, has not been alleged by the Birts nor has 
it yet been adopted in Wyoming.  See Burman, supra, XXVI Land & Water L. Rev. at 745.  The remaining claim, for negligent advising, 
has been described as follows:

 

            
One of the more recent developments in lender liability has been the 
recognition of a cause of action for negligent advising.  As with all 
negligence actions, a claim for negligent advising is dependent upon the 
lender's having a duty to advise.

            
A lender's duty to advise a borrower may arise in two situations.  First, under 
traditional negligence principles, a lender that gratuitously renders advice 
assumes an obligation to provide sound advice.  Second, the existence of a special 
relationship between the lender and the borrower may give rise to an obligation 
to proffer advice; that advice, of course, must be sound.  Unless the lender 
has or assumes a duty to give sound advice, the failure to render sound advice, 
or the failure to give any advice, is not actionable, provided the lender acts 
in good faith.

 

Id. at 743-44 (footnotes omitted).  In addition to the 
two above-described situations, the duty to proffer sound advice may arise where 
the lender participates in a specialized field of lending, such as agricultural 
lending, and the standard of care in that field expects such lenders to render 
sound advice to borrowers.  Id.  Aside from these 
specialized situations, the relationship between a lender and borrower is simply 
that of creditor and debtor.  Martinez v. 
Associates Financial Services Co. of Colorado, Inc., 891 P.2d 785, 788 (Wyo. 
1995).

 

[¶51]   As with negligent misrepresentation, 
analysis of the negligence claim is made more difficult by the varying arguments 
presented by the Birts.  In their complaint, they stated Wells Fargo's 
duty as "the duty to exercise the care and competence which the lender professes 
to have simply by engaging in the business of lending money."  In their appellate 
brief, they cited Cappello and Komoroske, Lender 
Liability § 18.02 at 18-2 (Lexis 3d ed. 1999), for the similar proposition that "lenders are expected to 
exercise ordinary care in handling business."  The Birts also characterize this duty as "the 
duty to exercise due care, in processing the Birts' loan application."14

 

[¶52]   The Birts alleged in their complaint 
that Wells Fargo breached its duty to them by:

 

(a)  negligently inducing a false sense of 
security in a relationship with [Wells Fargo];

(b)  negligently failing to advise and consult 
with [the Birts] concerning the status of their loan;

(c)  negligently impairing [the Birts'] credit 
rating with excessively frequent credit inquiries;

(d)  . . . failing to use and provide common loan 
knowledge concerning the consequences of a change of employment;

(e)  negligently inducing confidence of [the 
Birts] in the lender's intentions to extend financing to [the Birts] beyond 
[Wells Fargo's] apparent knowledge.

 

[¶53]   In the section of their appellate brief 
dealing with negligence, the Birts contend that Wells Fargo breached its duty in 
the following particulars:

1.         
Repetitive assurances that there were no problems with the loan 
application.

2.         
Voluntary and undisclosed conduct as a mortgage broker rather than a 
mortgage lender.

3.         The 
haphazard pulling of credit reports.

 

[¶54]   Wells Fargo contests the negligence 
claim by asserting that it owed no duty to the Birts upon which such a claim 
could be based.  
The district court granted summary judgment to Wells Fargo on the 
negligence claim on just that basis:  "[t]o the extent that the negligence claim 
refers to deviation from banking standards, the claim must fail because of lack 
of duty owed to the Birts."

 

[¶55]   We affirm the summary judgment granted 
to Wells Fargo on the negligence cause of action.  Absent special circumstances, a lending 
institution and its customer are simply creditor and debtor.  Martinez, 891 P.2d  at 788.  We have not to date recognized or adopted a 
general non-contractual duty that might be characterized as the duty of "a 
reasonably competent banker."  See Schuler v. 
Community First Nat. Bank, 999 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Wyo. 2000).  Furthermore, where the gravamen of a 
plaintiff's negligence claim is actually negligent misrepresentation, no 
separate cause of action sounding in negligence should lie.  See Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, 190 
Ariz. 6, 945 P.2d 317, 340-42 (1996) (auditor negligence claim was simply a 
negligent misrepresentation claim).

 

[¶56]   The instant case simply does not 
provide the appropriate avenue for extending liability to a lending institution 
in its relationship with a potential customer.  Distinctions between the negligent advising 
cause of action Professor Burman describes and the instant case can readily be 
discerned.  
First, the instant case in no way represents the specialized type of 
lending that would impose additional duties on a lender.  Burman, supra, XXVI Land & Water L. Rev. at 744-47.  The loan process 
represented in this case was no more than the common mortgage-lending situation 
undertaken by lending institutions.  In fact, the parties had not yet even entered 
into a debtor and creditor relationship.  The Birts were simply prospective borrowers 
and Wells Fargo a prospective lender.

 

[¶57]   Second, Professor Burman's article 
suggests that negligent advising on the part of a lender indicates that the 
lender has undertaken to offer the borrower advice on financial or business 
matters other than the loan 
itself.  Id. at 743-45 
(emphasis added).  
In the instant case, Gibbs did not undertake to offer financial or 
business advice to a borrower, he was merely trying to make a loan.  Gibbs did nothing 
more than tell the Birts to continue to prepare for the prospective closing of a 
loan.  The 
negligent advising cause of action described by Professor Burman applies when 
the lender voluntarily undertakes to offer financial or business advice.  Here, the parties 
were in the negotiation phase of an arms-length business transaction, and Gibbs 
merely made suggestions to further the purpose of those negotiations.

 

[¶58]   Furthermore, a closer look at the case 
Professor Burman cites for the negligent advising cause of action suggests facts 
quite different from the ones now before us.  In that case, the lending institution 
provided the borrower with a specific business plan to follow.  Production Credit Ass'n of West Cent. Wisconsin v. Vodak, 
150 Wis.2d 294, 441 N.W.2d 338, 342-43 (1989).  In effect, the 
lender inserted itself into the borrower's business.  As the Vodaks' 
creditor, the lending institution used its position essentially to dictate and 
control the Vodaks' business decisions.  In that sense, the lender took on a role 
similar to that of a managing partner.  The lender gave advice on the borrower's 
financial and business decisions and, by doing so, assumed an obligation to 
render sound advice.  
In Vodak, the lender acted as a financial 
advisor to a subservient borrower, and the borrower relied on the lender's 
advice.  The 
negligent advising cause of action recognized in that case resulted from the 
lender inserting itself into the borrower's business, not from the lender's 
conduct in the loan application process.

 

[¶59]   The instant case presents a much 
different scenario.  
The Birts were in the process of applying for a loan.  Wells Fargo 
undertook no duty to advise the Birts outside of that process.  At no time did 
Wells Fargo cross the line between a lender and an operating partner or general 
financial advisor.  
The cause of action for negligent advising is simply not appropriate in 
this case.  
Liability to a borrower for negligent advising should only arise when the 
lender actively participates in the financed enterprise beyond the usual domain 
of the money lender.  
Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 35, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521 (1980).  Otherwise, we will have abandoned the rule 
that lenders and their customers merely have a creditor and debtor relationship, 
and we will have subjected lenders to potential liability for negligent advising 
whenever a potential loan does not materialize.

 

            
Breach of Fiduciary Duty

 

[¶60]   Count Ten of the Birts' complaint 
alleged that Wells Fargo had created a fiduciary duty to the Birts in the 
following manner:

 

Due to their lack of experience in obtaining a home loan 
the [Birts] sought the guidance and advice of [Wells Fargo].  [Wells Fargo] 
directed the conduct of the [Birts] and encouraged them throughout the entire 
process of securing a loan and contracting for the construction of a house.  [Wells Fargo], 
therefore created a fiduciary duty between itself and the [Birts].

 

The complaint then alleged that Wells Fargo breached its 
fiduciary duty by:

 

(a)  Improperly inducing reliance by making 
promises of a forthcoming of a loan;

(b)  Stating that Mr. Birt's overtime and bonus 
pay could be considered for purposes of acquiring a loan;

(c)  Stating Mr. Birt's change in employment would 
not adversely affect the [Birts'] chances at acquiring a loan;

(d)  Encouraging [the Birts] to employ the service 
of an architect; and

(e)  Improperly encouraging the [Birts] to enter 
into a contract with Carter Bros. when it had knowledge that no loan funds would 
be disbursed.

 

[¶61]   In their appellate brief, the Birts 
emphasized two inter-related factors in support of this argument.  First, Gibbs, who 
was the sophisticated party in their dealings, held himself out as an expert and 
voluntarily invited them to rely on his advice. Second, the Birts, who lacked 
financial sophistication, "placed their full trust and reliance in . . . Gibbs, 
to guide and direct them through the process . . .."  The Birts contend 
that the resultant "unique relationship" created in Well Fargo a fiduciary duty 
to them.

 

[¶62]   Wells Fargo countered this argument 
largely by asserting that the type of special relationship necessary to support 
a fiduciary duty in these circumstances is extraordinary, is not easily created, 
and must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.  See Martinez, 891 P.2d  at 789.  Relying on Martinez, the district court agreed and determined that 
"the mere existence of a course of dealings" in which the Birts negotiated with 
Wells Fargo to obtain a loan did not create a fiduciary duty.

 

[¶63]   Martinez 
is, indeed, guiding precedent on this issue.  In that case, as we have noted previously 
herein, we held that the lender/borrower relationship, without more, is 
fundamentally a creditor/debtor relationship.  Id. at 788.  We also held, 
however, that "lenders may incur extra-contractual duties to customers 
through conduct which creates a special or fiduciary relationship."  Id. at 789 (emphasis in original).  We further 
described this relationship as one "implied in law due to the factual situation 
surrounding the involved transactions and the relationship of the parties to 
each other and to the questioned transactions.'"  Id. (quoting Denison State Bank v. Madeira, 230 Kan. 684, 640 P.2d 1235, 1241 (1982)).

 

[¶64]   Professor Burman suggests that a 
fiduciary relationship may be created between a lender and a borrower when the 
lender "goes beyond simply providing money to the borrower and offers advice and 
consultation."  
Burman, supra, XXVI Land & Water L. Rev. 
at 713-14.  Other factors that may play a role in 
creating fiduciary duties on the part of the lender include the lender's 
involvement in the operation of the borrower's business, the borrower's lack of 
sophistication, and the borrower's involvement in a business with a special 
nature.  Id. at 718.

 

[¶65]   We will affirm the summary judgment 
granted to Wells Fargo on this issue because we conclude that the facts of this 
case do not establish the existence of a special or fiduciary relationship 
between Wells Fargo and the Birts sufficient to create a separate cause of 
action.  A 
borrower's burden in establishing a duty on the part of a lender to provide 
sound advice, under a negligent advising theory, is less than the burden in 
establishing the type of special relationship that will support a cause of 
action for breach of fiduciary duty.  In the latter situation, something akin to an 
extended course of dealings, in a long-term business setting, with a history of 
the borrower's reasonable reliance upon the lender, must be shown.  Id. at 714.  The facts of the instant case simply do not 
resemble that unique situation.  Were we to find the existence of a special or 
fiduciary relationship in this case, we would be abandoning the principle that 
the lender/borrower relationship, without more, is a creditor/debtor 
relationship, and we would be subjecting potential lenders to fiduciary duties 
in most loan applications.

 

            
Intentional Interference with Contractual 
Relationship

 

[¶66]   The Birts' final claim against Wells 
Fargo is an allegation of intentional interference with the contractual 
relationship between the Birts and Carter Brothers.  This tort is 
actually a collection of torts, and it requires some pleading specificity.  Before we discuss 
the allegations of the instant case, it will be helpful to review the current 
status of Wyoming's "intentional interference" law.

 

[¶67]   In Wartensleben 
v. Willey, 415 P.2d 613, 614 (Wyo. 
1966), we adopted Restatement of Torts § 766 (1939), which provided as follows:

 

Except as stated in Section 698, one who, without a 
privilege to do so, induces or otherwise purposely causes a third person not 
to

(a)   perform a contract with another, or

(b)   enter into or continue a business relation with another

is liable to the other for the harm caused 
thereby.

 

[¶68]   The central issue in Wartensleben, which involved a landowner's attempt to 
prevent establishment of a feedlot on neighboring property, was whether the 
landowner's conduct was justified.  We decided that issue under Restatement of 
Torts § 773 (1939), which reads as follows:

 

One is privileged purposely to cause another not to perform 
a contract, or enter into or continue a business relation, with a third person 
by in good faith asserting or threatening to protect properly a legally 
protected interest of his own which he believes may otherwise be impaired or 
destroyed by the performance of the contract or transaction.

 

[¶69]   A dozen years after Wartensleben, in the case of Board of Trustees of Weston County School Dist. No. 1, 
Weston County v. Holso, 584 P.2d 1009, 1016-17 (Wyo. 1978), we noted that Restatement of Torts § 766 
(1939) dealt with two situations:  inducement of a 
third person to breach a contract with another and inducement of a third person 
not to enter into a contract with another.  We identified the elements of the tort 
as:

 

"(1)  the existence of a valid contractual 
relationship or business expectancy;

(2)  knowledge of the relationship or expectancy 
on the part of the interferor;

(3)  intentional interference inducing or causing 
a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy; and

(4)  resultant damage to the party whose 
relationship or expectancy has been disrupted."

 

Holso, 584 P.2d  at 1016-17 (quoting 
Olson v. Scholes, 17 Wash. App. 383, 563 P.2d 1275, 1279-80 
(1977))  After 
noting that the controversy in that employer-employee contest was the employer's 
alleged interference with the employee's future employment prospects, we held 
that Restatement of Torts, supra, § 766 did not apply because that tort does not lie 
against one of the parties to the contractual relationship, but only against 
interfering "outsiders."15  Holso, 584 P.2d  
at 1017; see also Kvenild v. Taylor, 594 P.2d 972, 976-77 (Wyo. 
1979) (vendor and her real estate agent could not be 
liable for tortious interference with a contract to which vendor was a 
party.).

 

[¶70]   In Holso, 
584 P.2d  at 1016, we noted that the separate causes of action"interference 
with contractual relations" and "interference with prospective advantage""tend 
to merge."  We 
again discussed that tendency in Martin v. Wing, 667 P.2d 1159, 1161 (Wyo. 1983), where we concluded that "a valid contract is not always 
necessary," and that liability may arise under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
766B (1979), where the relationship is prospective only.  Martin, 667 P.2d  at 1162; see 
also Doud, 769 P.2d  at 930-31.

 

[¶71]   The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 
at 7, 17, 20 (1979)  now clearly distinguishes the separate causes 
of action identified as "intentional interference with contract":

 

§ 766  Intentional Interference with Performance of 
Contract by Third Person

One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the 
performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a 
third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform 
the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss 
resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to perform the 
contract.

            
. . .

§ 766A  Intentional Interference with Another's 
Performance of His Own Contract

One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the 
performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a 
third person, by preventing the other from performing the contract or causing 
his performance to be more expensive or burdensome, is subject to liability to 
the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to him.

            
. . .

§ 766B Intentional Interference with Prospective 
Contractual Relation

One who intentionally and improperly interferes with 
another's prospective contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is 
subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of 
the benefits of the relation, whether the interference consists of

(a)       inducing or 
otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or continue the prospective 
relation or

(b)       preventing the 
other from acquiring or continuing the prospective relation.

 

[¶72]   Analytically, Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, supra, § 766 deals with the situation where A may be liable 
to B for causing C not to perform a contract between B and C; § 766A deals with 
the situation where A may be liable to B for preventing B from performing a 
contract between B and C; and § 766B deals with the situation where A may be 
liable to B for causing C not to enter into or continue a prospective 
contractual relationship with B or for preventing B from entering into or 
continuing a prospective contractual relationship with C.16

 

[¶73]   Wyoming has adopted both Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, supra, §§ 766 and 
766B.  Lever v. Community 
First Bancshares, Inc., 989 P.2d 634, 639 (Wyo. 1999).  On the other hand, we have declined to adopt 
§ 766A.  Price v. Sorrell, 784 P.2d 614, 615 (Wyo. 
1989).  Consequently, under the current state of 
Wyoming law, the Birts could have alleged a cause of action against Wells Fargo 
for:  (1) 
improperly inducing or otherwise causing Carter Brothers to breach its contract 
with the Birts; or (2) improperly inducing or otherwise causing Carter Brothers 
not to enter into or continue a prospective contractual relation with the Birts; 
or (3) improperly preventing the Birts from acquiring or continuing a 
prospective contractual relation with Carter Brothers.17

 

[¶74]   It is in this legal context that we 
must attempt to determine whether the district court was correct in granting 
summary judgment to Wells Fargo on the issue of intentional interference with 
contract.  The 
specific allegations in the complaint are found in the following 
paragraphs:

 

14.       . . .  The [Birts] both 
signed the construction contract with Carter Bros. that afternoon, which 
contract was in the amount of $234,744.00.

            
. . .

            
47.       [Wells Fargo] 
intentionally interfered with the contractual relationship  between the [Birts] 
and Carter Bros.

            
48.       [Wells Fargo] 
knew, or should have known, that a denial of the loan funds would cause an 
immediate breach in the contract between [the Birts] and Carter Bros.

 

[¶75]   These paragraphs from the complaint 
clearly set forth an allegation that Wells Fargo interfered with an existing 
contract between the Birts and Carter Brothers.  That is an allegation under either 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 766 or § 
766A, and not an allegation under § 766B.  What is not clear 
from the complaint is whether the allegation is an improper inducement of Carter 
Brothers not to perform, as under § 766, or an improper prevention of the Birts' 
performance, as under § 766A.  That question is answered in favor of § 766A, 
despite the fact that no reference is made to any particular section, by the 
fact that the Birts present no evidence suggesting that Wells Fargo induced or 
caused Carter Brothers to breach the contract, and by the following arguments 
made by the Birts, the first to the district court in opposing summary judgment, 
and the second to this Court in an appellate brief:

 

[Wells Fargo] has provided no law or argument that a 
contract did not exist between [the Birts] and Carter Brothers Construction, no 
evidence that it was somehow unaware of that contract, or that its actions did not impact 
upon the ability of [the Birts] to fulfill the contract.

 

(Emphasis added.)

 

Wells Fargo was reasonably certain that failure to provide 
the promised commitment letter and financing would force the Birts to breach the contract with Carter 
Bros.

 

(Emphasis added.)

 

[¶76]   Wells Fargo did not defend against this 
claim by pointing out that Wyoming has not adopted Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, supra, § 766A.  Instead, Wells Fargo presented three 
arguments:  (1) 
the Birts could identify no "affirmative inducement, compulsion or pressure'" 
that resulted in breach of the contract; (2) Wells Fargo was merely asserting a 
bona fide claim in good faith; and (3) there was no contract between the Birts 
and Carter Brothers because any such contract was subject to the condition 
precedent that the Birts obtain financing.  In granting summary judgment to Wells Fargo, 
the district court adopted the reasoning of the third argument:

 

            
The contract with Carter Brothers to build the house was subject to a 
take out loan.  
The Birts had not obtained such a loan.  So, there was no binding agreement.  Absent a binding 
agreement, there can be no interference.

 

[¶77]   We may affirm a summary judgment on any 
legal basis supported by the record.  Grose v. Sauvageau, 
942 P.2d 398, 402 (Wyo. 
1997).  In the instant case, we cannot accept the 
circular reasoning of Wells Fargo's third argument and the district court's 
conclusion based on that argument.  It is hardly sufficient to say that Wells 
Fargo did not cause a breach of the construction contract by failing to make the 
construction loan because obtaining a construction loan was a condition 
precedent to the contract's existence!  Beyond that, the contract had been signed by 
both parties.  
While Carter Brothers' duty to begin construction may have been 
conditioned upon receipt of the loan commitment letter, it cannot be said that a 
contractual relationship had not been formed between the Birts and Carter 
Brothers.

 

[¶78]   We will affirm the summary judgment, 
however, because the record clearly establishes that the claim of intentional 
interference with a contract was based on Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 766A, which tort has been expressly rejected in this 
jurisdiction.  
Since there was no effort to convince this Court to abandon that 
precedent, and because the issue is so significant in the context of lender 
liability, we are not inclined to pursue such a course in the absence of 
thorough briefing and argument.18  Resolution of the issue on this basis makes 
it unnecessary to consider whether Wells Fargo's conduct was done in good faith 
to assert a legally protected interest.19

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶79]   We affirm the Order Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment because there are no genuine issues of material fact and Wells Fargo is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  
1Pursuant to our standard of review of summary 
judgments, we present the facts from the vantage point most favorable to the 
Birts, awarding them all favorable inferences that may be drawn from those 
facts.  S & G Investors, LLC v. Blackley, 994 P.2d 941, 943 (Wyo. 
2000).

  
2Congress enacted the Truth in Lending Act to 
ensure meaningful disclosure.  15 U.S.C. § 1601(a).  The Act was meant 
to "aid unsophisticated consumers and to prevent creditors from misleading 
consumers as to the actual cost of financing."  Morris v. Lomas and 
Nettleton Co., 708 F. Supp. 1198, 1203 (D.Kan. 1989).  When mandated disclosures are not made, 
strict liability applies in favor of the consumer.  15 U.S.C. § 
1640(a).  Morris, 708 F. Supp.  at 1203.

  
3In their complaint, the Birts set forth breach 
of contract and breach of agreement to lend money as separate causes of 
action.  In 
their appellate brief, however, they discussed express contract and agreement to 
lend money as "and/or" alternatives in one argument.  While an agreement 
to lend money may be enforceable in Wyoming, we will not deal independently with 
that issue because we have concluded that no agreement was reached.  See Doud v. First Interstate Bank of Gillette, 769 P.2d 927, 929 (Wyo. 
1989) and John M. Burman, Lender Liability in Wyoming, XXVI Land & Water L. 
Rev. 707, 722 (1991).

  
4The motion to dismiss raised jurisdictional 
issues.

  
5Long ago, this Court held that "[w]ith some 
exceptions, equity as well as the law is bound by the statute of frauds."  Crosby v. Strahan's Estate, 78 Wyo. 302, 324 P.2d 492, 496 
(1958).  In more recent years, we have further held 
that these exceptions should be restricted, rather than expanded, even when 
hardship may result.  
Fowler v. Fowler, 933 P.2d 502, 504 (Wyo. 
1997); Empfield v. Kimbrough, 900 P.2d 1153, 1155 (Wyo. 1995); Turner v. Floyd C. Reno & 
Sons, Inc., 696 P.2d 76, 79 (Wyo. 
1985).  At the same time, however, we have held that 
promissory estoppel may avoid application of the statute of frauds.  Davis v. Davis, 855 P.2d 342, 348 (Wyo. 
1993); Ames v. Sundance State Bank, 
850 P.2d 607, 610 (Wyo. 
1993); B & W Glass, Inc. v. Weather 
Shield Mfg., Inc., 829 P.2d 809, 815 (Wyo. 1992).

6

Although it is sometimes said that appellate review of 
proceedings in equity is de novo, in this context "de novo" generally refers to 
the absence of deference to the factual findings of the lower court rather than 
to trial de novo; the reviewing court may not try the case anew, but rather is 
limited to the record transmitted from the trial court.

5 Am.Jur.2d, supra, § 696 at 
367.

  
7As discussed earlier herein, it is true that the 
September 12, 2000, Truth-in-Lending disclosure documents did contain the 
details of the proposed loan.  But it is also true that the Birts knew these 
were "just numbers plugged in" and that a formal closing would be required to 
consummate the loan.  
Just as these governmentally required disclosures do not form the basis 
of an express or implied contract, neither do they constitute the promise 
necessary to establish promissory estoppel.

  
8Although not in this context, we have defined 
"intentionally" as meaning "purposefully."  Cullin v. State, 
565 P.2d 445, 451 (Wyo. 
1977).  In the worker's compensation context, we have 
defined "culpable negligence" as "willful and serious misconduct."  Brebaugh v. Hales, 788 P.2d 1128, 1136 (Wyo. 
1990).  The distinguishing feature of fraud is that 
it requires that the party made false representations with intent to induce 
action by another.  
Richey v. Patrick, 904 P.2d 798, 801-02 (Wyo. 
1995).

  
9See Verschoor v. 
Mountain West Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 907 P.2d 1293, 1298 (Wyo. 
1995), for the proposition that estoppel "will not operate to 
create additional coverage in an existing contract of insurance."

  
10The Birts' credit rating was lower in August 
2000 than it had been in April 2000.  The poor credit rating was the result of the 
number of unpaid and delinquent accounts, the length of time delinquencies 
existed, the proportion of balance to limit on revolving accounts, and amounts 
past due.

  
11Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 at 126-27 
(1977) reads as follows:

(1)        One who, 
in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other 
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for 
the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability 
for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the 
information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining 
or communicating the information.

(2)        Except as 
stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited to 
loss suffered

(a)        by the 
person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance he 
intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply 
it; and

(b)        through 
reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to influence 
or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar 
transaction.

(3)        The 
liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information extends to 
loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty is 
created, in any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect them.

  
12Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 551 at 119 reads as follows:

(1)        One who 
fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably induce the 
other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is subject to the 
same liability to the other as though he had represented the nonexistence of the 
matter that he has failed to disclose, if, but only if, he is under a duty to 
the other to exercise reasonable care to disclose the matter in question.

(2)        One party 
to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to 
disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated,

(a)        matters 
known to him that the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other 
similar relation of trust and confidence between them; and

(b)        matters 
known to him that he knows to be necessary to prevent his partial or ambiguous 
statement of the facts from being misleading; and

(c)        
subsequently acquired information that he knows will make untrue or 
misleading a previous representation that when made was true or believed to be 
so; and

(d)        the 
falsity of a representation not made with the expectation that it would be acted 
upon, if he subsequently learns that the other is about to act in reliance upon 
it in a transaction with him; and

(e)        facts 
basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about to enter into it 
under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of the relationship 
between them, the customs of the trade or other objective circumstances, would 
reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts.

  
13In an appropriate case, and where adopted, 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 530 at 64 
describes the tort of "misrepresentation of intention":

(1)        A 
representation of the maker's own intention to do or not to do a particular 
thing is fraudulent if he does not have that intention.

(2)        A 
representation of the intention of a third person is fraudulent under the 
conditions stated in § 526.

It seems logically impossible for a cause of action under 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 530 to be 
based upon a negligent misrepresentation.  One either has a certain intent or one does 
not.  See Wilkinson, 4 P.3d  at 1166 and Bittel, 962 P.2d  at 499.  At any rate, Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
supra, § 530 and misrepresentation of intention has 
not been pled or argued in the present case.

  
14Some courts have recognized a particular claim 
for negligence in processing loan applications.  See High v. McLean Financial Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1561, 1570 
(D.D.C. 1987); First Federal Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n of Hamilton v. Caudle, 425 So. 2d 1050, 1052 (Ala. 1982); Jacques v. First Nat. Bank of 
Maryland, 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756, 762 (1986), cert. denied, 309 Md. 456, 524 A.2d 1234 
(1987); and Burman, supra, XXVI Land 
and Water L. Rev. at 745 n.298.

  
15There may be some question as to whether this 
principle was appropriately applied to the facts in Holso.  Holso, a school teacher, alleged that the 
Board attempted to carry out the school superintendent's "threat" that, "[w]hen 
I get through with you there won't be a school in the country that will offer 
you a teaching job."  
Holso, 584 P.2d  at 1016.  Clearly, this is 
not an allegation that the Board was improperly interfering with Hoslo's 
employment by that Board, but was improperly interfering with Hoslo's prospects 
for future employment in other school districts.

  
16There is also Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 766C, which limits A's potential liability where his conduct in 
such situations has only been negligent, as opposed to intentional.

  
17It does not appear to be logically consistent 
for this Court to have adopted all of Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 766B, while rejecting § 766A.  Subsection (a) of § 766B applies the concept 
of § 766A causing C to breach a contract with Bto the prospective contract 
setting.  
Inasmuch as we have adopted § 766, it was consistent to adopt subsection 
(a) of § 766B.  
Subsection (b) of § 766B applies the concept of § 766AA preventing B 
from performing a contract with Cto the prospective contract setting.  Inasmuch as we have 
rejected § 766A, it was inconsistent to adopt subsection (b) of § 766B.  Nevertheless, that 
is now the law in Wyoming, and neither party in the instant case has addressed 
this seeming inconsistency or asked that it be corrected.

  
18See Burman, supra, XXVI Land & Water L. Rev. at 
740-42, for a dissection of the rejection of Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, supra, § 766A in Price, and 
Professor Burman's prediction that "[t]here is little likelihood, therefore, 
that a borrower will succeed in recovering from a lender under section 
766A."  In Ames, 850 P.2d 607 at 611, we affirmed a judgment NOV in favor of a lender, where 
one of the borrower's allegations was that the lender's failure to renew a loan 
interfered with the borrower's ability to make payments under a different 
contract.  The 
question of the adoption or rejection of § 766A did not arise in that case, 
which was resolved on other grounds.

  
19See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 773 (1979); Examination Management Services, 
Inc. v. Kirschbaum, 927 P.2d 686, 697-99 (Wyo. 1996); Century Redi-Mix Co. v. Campbell 
County School Dist., 816 P.2d 795, 800 (Wyo. 1991); and Basin Elec. Power 
Co-op.-Missouri Basin Power Project v. Howton, 603 P.2d 402, 404-05 (Wyo. 
1979).