Case Title: White v. Fisher

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-10-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
White v. Fisher1984 WY 103689 P.2d 102Case Number: 83-106Decided: 10/02/1984THERESA WHITE AND CRAWFORD WHITE, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

ALAN M. FISHER, M.D.; PHILLIP GILBERTSON, M.D.; AND LUTHERAN HOSPITAL AND HOMES SOCIETY OF AMERICA, INC., D/B/A BISHOP RANDALL HOSPITAL OF LANDER, WYOMING, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
THERESA WHITE AND 
CRAWFORD WHITE, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

ALAN M. FISHER, M.D.; 
PHILLIP GILBERTSON, M.D.; AND LUTHERAN HOSPITAL AND HOMES SOCIETY OF AMERICA, 
INC., D/B/A BISHOP RANDALL HOSPITAL OF LANDER, WYOMING, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, FremontCounty, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

 
 
Charles E. 
Hamilton, Western Law Associates, P.C., Riverton, for appellants.

Robert Shively 
of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, for appellee BishopRandallHospital.

Mark W. Gifford 
of Brown, Drew, Apostolos, Massey & Sullivan, Casper, for appellees Fisher and 
Gilbertson.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN, and CARDINE, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The question which we 
shall address in this opinion is that of the constitutional propriety of the 
enactment of a statute by the legislature prescribing a rule of procedure in 
civil actions. In a civil action seeking money damages for medical malpractice 
the district court applied the provisions of § 1-1-114, W.S. 1977, which 
prohibit any allegation of the dollar amount of damages in "the ad damnum clause 
or prayer for damages incorporated in a pleading." The plaintiffs (appellants in 
this court) had alleged the dollar amount of their damages, and the district 
court dismissed their complaint. We hold the statute to be an invasion of the 
constitutional powers of the judicial branch of government, and we reverse the 
district court.

[¶2.]     The briefs of the 
parties in this case focus upon two questions to be resolved by the court. The 
first of these is whether § 1-1-114, W.S. 1977, prohibits an allegation of the 
dollar amount of damages in the body of a complaint. The second question to be 
resolved is whether the district court should dismiss a complaint if it contains 
allegations that violate the statute.1 We shall not resolve these issues 
because of our treatment of the question of constitutional 
powers.

[¶3.]     In the complaint which 
was filed in this case the appellant Theresa White twice alleged general damages 
in the amount of $500,000, and in one paragraph she alleged special damages in 
the amount of $10,000. In the count of the complaint setting forth the claim of 
appellant Crawford White he alleged that he had suffered a loss and injury in 
the amount of $200,000. The appellees Alan M. Fisher and Phillip Gilbertson did 
not attack the allegation of monetary damages in their answer. In the separate 
answer of LutheranHospital and Homes Society 
of America, Inc., a motion to dismiss the complaint "on the ground and for the 
reason that same fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" was 
incorporated. Another paragraph of the motion described the failure to comply 
with § 1-1-114, W.S. 1977, because dollar amounts were alleged in the ad damnum 
clause of the complaint. Thereafter the appellants moved to amend the pleadings 
by deleting the dollar amount allegations, and after the motion to dismiss had 
been set for hearing the appellees Fisher and Gilbertson filed a motion to 
dismiss simply stating that they joined in the motion previously submitted by 
the hospital.

[¶4.]     At the hearing on the 
motion to dismiss the attorney for the appellants stated to the court that the 
complaint was prepared hurriedly because the statute of limitations was about to 
run with respect to the claims of the appellants. The attention of the court was 
called to the motion to amend the complaint, and a suggestion also was made that 
perhaps the appropriate remedy was a motion to strike under Rule 12(f), 
W.R.C.P., because a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P., did not 
appear to be appropriate. The district judge, in comments from the bench, 
referred to a history of violations of the statute in that district, and, noting 
that the statute was silent as to a remedy, concluded that the purpose of the 
statute was to prohibit what was done in this instance. The court then ruled 
that the motion to dismiss would be granted, and a consistent order was entered 
on May 10, 1983. The appellants have taken their appeal from that 
order.

[¶5.]     Section 1-1-114, W.S. 
1977, provides as follows:

"The ad damnum clause or 
prayer for damages incorporated in a pleading which sets forth a claim for 
relief based upon personal injury or wrongful death shall not state any dollar 
amount as alleged damages or demand a sum as judgment other than an allegation 
that the damages are of an amount necessary to establish jurisdiction of the 
court. Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent any party from arguing to 
the court or jury the amount of his claim in money. In all cases the court shall 
inform the jury of the consequences of its verdict."

[¶6.]     We could address the 
issues posed by the parties by a construction of this statute leading to the 
conclusion that in this instance it was not violated because the allegation of 
any dollar amount was not in the concluding prayer for relief, which some 
authorities would specify as the ad damnum clause or prayer for damages. Jones v. Clark, Wyo., 418 P.2d 792 (1966); Bentley v. Jenne, 33 
Wyo. 1, 236 P. 509 (1925); United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Company v. Nash, 20 Wyo. 65, 124 P. 269 (1912). Alternatively the 
issues could be addressed by examining the issues in the light of the 
appropriate functions of Rules 12(b)(6) and (f) and 41(b) of the Wyoming Rules 
of Civil Procedure. We then could hold dismissal in an instance such as this is 
too drastic a remedy, and the court should have ordered the offending 
allegations stricken and afforded the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend. We 
perceive those solutions, however, as simply inviting the legislature to make 
some appropriate adjustment in the language of the statute. Because of the 
premise on which we dispose of this case that would be a futile 
exercise.

[¶7.]     Even though these 
parties have not raised the question of constitutionality, this court has the 
power to dispose of that question:

"We are not a bit 
concerned that the matter of judicial estoppel was not raised in the lower court 
or argued by either of the parties. This court has superintending control over 
all the courts of the state [citing § 2, Art. 5, Wyoming Constitution] and the 
Wyoming 
judicial system in general. It is our duty to protect its integrity and prohibit 
dealing lightly with its proceedings. We are at liberty to decide a case upon 
any point which in our opinion the ends of justice require [State Highway Commission v. Triangle 
Development Company, Wyo., 369 P.2d 864 (1962), on rehearing 371 P.2d 408], particularly on a point so fundamental that we must take cognizance 
of it. [Oedekoven v. Oedekoven, Wyo., 
538 P.2d 1292, 1295 (1975)]." Allen v. Allen, Wyo., 
550 P.2d 1137, 1142 (1976).

[¶8.]     We recognize the 
principle articulated in Washakie County 
School District Number One v. Herschler, Wyo., 606 P.2d 310 (1980), cert. 
denied 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1980):

"Courts have a duty to 
uphold the constitutionality of statutes which the legislature has enacted if 
that is at all possible, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of 
constitutionality. Witzenburger v. 
State, Wyo. 1978, 575 P.2d 1100, 1112; 
Lund v. Schrader, Wyo. 1971, 492 P.2d 202, 
206. Though the supreme court has the duty to give great deference to 
legislative pronouncements and to uphold constitutionality when possible, it is 
the court's equally imperative duty to declare a legislative enactment invalid 
if it transgresses the state constitution. Witzenburger, supra, 575 P.2d  at 1114. 
In our consideration of this case, we have consistently kept these basic 
principles in mind to avoid a declaration of unconstitutionality - but doubt is 
not present."

We also are 
cognizant of our duty in any case in which the constitutionality of a statute is 
in issue:

"It is this court's 
obligation to make sense out of a statute and give full force and effect to the 
legislative product. Yeik v. Department 
of Revenue and Taxation, Wyo., 595 P.2d 965 (1979). In construing 
statutes the intention of the law-making body must be ascertained from the 
language of the statute as nearly as possible. Wyoming State Treasurer v. City of Casper, Wyo. 1976, 551 P.2d 687. We must not give a 
statute a meaning that will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of 
another interpretation." McGuire v. 
McGuire, Wyo., 
608 P.2d 1278, 1283 (1980).

Even with these 
concepts before us we are compelled to consider the constitutionality of the 
statute in this instance because of its apparent infringement upon the doctrine 
of separation of powers.

[¶9.]     The procedural tenor of 
the statute is perhaps best recognized by treating with the manner in which it 
conflicts with several rules of this court. Rule 8(a), W.R.C.P., requires a 
pleading which sets forth a claim to contain a short and plain statement of the 
claim, demonstrating that the parties are entitled to relief, and a demand for 
judgment for the relief claimed. The general rule is that in order to allege 
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action a pleading normally must set 
out the amount of damages sustained in either a definite amount or afford a 
basis on which they may be estimated. See 25 C.J.S. Damages § 130(a), p. 1175, 
and cases cited therein. Rule 54(c), W.R.C.P., dealing with default judgments, 
provides for the entry of default but it shall not be different in kind from or 
exceed in amount that prayed for, and in order to apply that rule the allegation 
of money damages is required. Rule 9(g), W.R.C.P., requires the specific 
statement of items of special damages claimed. See Hein v. Marcante, 57 Wyo. 81, 113 P.2d 940 (1941); Henderson v. Coleman, 19 Wyo. 183, 115 P. 439 
(1911). We also note that the official forms which accompany the Wyoming Rules 
of Civil Procedure reflect that specific money amounts for damages are to be 
included.

[¶10.]  Article V, § 2 of the Constitution of the 
State of Wyoming, provides:

"The supreme court shall 
have general appellate jurisdiction, co-extensive with the state, in both civil 
and criminal causes, and shall have a general superintending control over all 
inferior courts, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by 
law."

The general 
superintending control over all inferior courts granted to the supreme court by 
that provision encompasses the authority to prescribe rules of practice and 
procedure in those courts. More than fifty years ago this court, relying upon 
previous decisions, concluded "that the power of this court to control the 
course of litigation in the trial courts of this state is quite plenary." State ex rel. Jones v. District Court of 
Ninth Judicial Dist., 37 Wyo. 516, 263 P. 700, 703 (1928). In Petersen v. State, Wyo., 594 P.2d 978, 981 
(1979), this position was reiterated, and we also said:

"The Wyoming Constitution 
provides in Article V, Section 2, that the supreme court `shall have a general 
superintending control over all inferior courts under such rules and regulations 
as may be prescribed by law.' It is well recognized that in this jurisdiction 
the courts have inherent rights to prescribe rules, being limited only by their 
reasonableness and conformity to constitutional and legislative enactments. State ex rel. Frederick v. District Court, Wyo., 399 P.2d 583, 584 
(1965), and cases cited. The legislative enactments referred to include those 
that deal with the substantive rights of persons or the jurisdiction of the 
court. Matters dealing with procedure, particularly in the minor courts, are 
entirely within the province of this court."

Even more 
recently we reaffirmed the inherent right of courts to prescribe rules. Barnes v. State, Wyo., 642 P.2d 1263, 1266 
(1982).

[¶11.]  Both this constitutional provision 
affording full authority to this court over rules of practice and the inherent 
power of courts to prescribe rules are recognized by statute in Wyoming. Section 5-2-114, 
W.S. 1977, provides:

"The supreme court of 
Wyoming may 
from time to time adopt, modify and repeal general rules and forms governing 
pleading, practice and procedure, in all courts of this state, for the purpose 
of promoting the speedy and efficient determination of litigation upon its 
merits."

We have made it 
clear that this statute only supplements the constitution and does not 
constitute a delegation of rule-making authority from the 
legislature:

"The State suggests, 
however, that this court issues rules of practice and procedure through 
authority delegated by the legislature and, therefore, in the case of conflict 
between our rules and the statutes, the statutes control, citing a portion of 2 
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 36.06 (1973). In a more pertinent portion 
of the same section the editor observes:

"`Where there is 
constitutional authority for the judicial department of government to issue 
rules of practice and procedure or if, in the absence of a constitutional 
provision, such authority is assumed to be an inherent part of the judicial 
power, then courts which exercise such authority may be regarded as the 
legislative authority of the state having jurisdiction to "enact" law on that 
subject, just as the legislature makes law on the subjects entrusted to its 
jurisdiction. The rules issued under those circumstances have stature in the 
hierarchy of law comparable to that of statutes enacted by the legislature, and 
acts of the legislature on the subject of judicial practice and procedures in 
such states are invalid for lack of constitutional jurisdiction in the 
legislature to make such laws on that subject.'" Petersen v. State, Wyo., 594 P.2d 978, 
981-982 (1979).

[¶12.]  Section 5-2-115, W.S. 1977, clearly 
limits the rule-making power of the court to procedural matters. That statute 
provides:

"(a) Such rules may 
govern:

"(i) The forms of 
process, writs, pleadings and motions and the subjects of parties, depositions, 
discovery, trials, evidence, judgments, new trials, provisional and final 
remedies and all other matters of pleading, practice and procedure; 
and

"(ii) Any review of or 
other supervisory proceedings from the judgment or decision of any court, board, 
officer, or commission when such review is authorized by 
law.

"(b) Such rules shall 
neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any person nor the 
jurisdiction of any of the courts nor change the provisions of any statute of 
limitations."

With respect to 
this provision, the court has earlier said:

"We are empowered to make 
rules that are procedural in nature. * * * We cannot by rule in any way change 
substantive rights or enlarge the jurisdiction of any 
court."

and:

"To do so would be to 
usurp a power clearly vested in the legislature. This court cannot legislate by 
repealing that section." McGuire v. 
McGuire, Wyo., 
608 P.2d 1278, 1290 (1980).

[¶13.]  As noted earlier in connection with the 
conflict with other rules, the prescription of the form and content of pleadings 
which are to be filed in Wyoming courts is a procedural, not a 
substantive, matter. The form and content of pleadings is a function which the 
constitution ascribes to the Supreme Court of Wyoming. Article II, § 1 of the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming provides:

"The powers of the 
government of this state are divided into three distinct departments: The 
legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons 
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the 
others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or 
permitted."

The legislature 
is thus effectively prohibited from enacting statutes specifying the content of 
or foreclosing material from pleadings.

[¶14.]  It is our conclusion that § 1-1-114, W.S. 
1977, is unconstitutional in the present form. Further we perceive that in any 
form it would constitute an attempt to prescribe the content of pleadings, a 
procedural function. The statute is a clear infringement upon the constitutional 
and inherent power of this court to make rules. We hold that so much of § 
1-1-114, W.S. 1977, as provides:

"The ad damnum clause or 
prayer for damages incorporated in a pleading which sets forth a claim for 
relief based upon personal injury or wrongful death shall not state any dollar 
amount as alleged damages or demand a sum as judgment other than an allegation 
that the damages are of an amount necessary to establish jurisdiction of the 
court. Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent any party from arguing to 
the court or jury the amount of his claim in money. * * 
*."

is 
unconstitutional. This holding leaves unaffected the last sentence of the 
statute, which says:

"In all cases the court 
shall inform the jury of the consequences of its verdict."

[¶15.]  The judgment of the district court is 
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with 
this opinion.

1 In the appellants' brief 
the issues are stated as follows:

"The issues on appeal are 
relatively simple:

"A. Does W.S. 1-1-114 
prohibit the mention of a dollar amount of damage in the body of the Complaint; 
and

"B. If so, is dismissal 
the appropriate remedy for a violation of the statute?"

In the brief of 
the appellee LutheranHospital and Homes Society of America, 
Inc., those issues are articulated in this way:

"* * * Two issues are 
presented by this appeal:

"1. Whether the 
Appellants in their Complaint violated Wyoming Statute § 1-1-114 (1977) by 
mentioning a dollar amount in the body of the Complaint; 
and

"2. Assuming that a 
violation of the statute occurred, does the District Court have the power to 
dismiss Appellants' Complaint?"

In the brief of 
the appellees Alan M. Fisher and Phillip Gilbertson the issue is stated in this 
way:

"The issue presented for 
review by this Court is:

"WHETHER THE DISTRICT 
COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN DISMISSING APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY 
WITH W.S. § 1-1-114."