Case Title: Sacchet v. Blan

Citation: 353 Md. 87

Docket Number: 57/98

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1999-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Sacchet v. Blan, No. 57, September Term, 1998. 
CRIMES—CLASSIFICATION—Manslaughter by automobile, under Article 27, § 388, is
not a “crime of violence” as defined under Article 27, § 643B(a).
PRISONS—INMATES—GOOD CONDUCT CREDITS—The good conduct credits to be
awarded a person imprisoned for committing manslaughter by automobile, in violation of
Article 27, § 388, are to be calculated at the rate of ten days per month, in accordance with
Article 27, § 700(d)(3).
Circuit Court for Washington County
Case # 21-C-97-1964-OC
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 57
September Term, 1998
                                                                            
  
JOSEPH P. SACCHET, WARDEN,
v.
ROBERT BLAN
                                                                            
  
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Raker
Wilner
Cathell,
JJ.
                                                                            
  
Opinion by Raker, J.
                                                                            
Filed: February 22, 1999
  Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references shall be to Maryland
1
Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1998 Supp.) Article 27.  
This case presents a single question of statutory interpretation of a provision within
Article 27 of the Maryland Code:  Is “manslaughter by automobile” under § 388 a “crime of
violence” as defined by § 643B(a) for purposes of determining an inmate’s good conduct
credits pursuant to § 700(d)?  We shall hold that manslaughter by automobile is not such a
crime.
I.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case, gleaned primarily from the
parties’ stipulation in the habeas corpus proceeding which gave rise to Petitioner’s appeal,
are as follows: 
Respondent was convicted of manslaughter by automobile pursuant to Maryland Code
(1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1998 Suppl.) Article 27, § 388.   In September, 1995, the Circuit
1
Court for Frederick County sentenced Respondent to a term of incarceration of ten years,
seven years suspended.  Prior to March, 1997, the Division of Correction (D.O.C. ) had
considered § 388 offenses to be excluded from the list of offenses enumerated as a “crime
of violence” in § 643B(a) and cross-referenced under § 700(d)(2), dealing with “Good
Conduct Deductions” for prison inmates.  In accordance with this interpretation, upon
Respondent’s entry into prison in September, 1995, the D.O.C. awarded him ten “good
conduct credits” per month as prescribed by § 700(d)(3).  This calculation established April
3, 1997 as Respondent’s “mandatory supervision” release date, pursuant to Maryland Code
-2-
(1957, 1997 Repl. Vol., 1998 Supp.) Article 41, §§ 4-501(13) and 4-612, provided he
comply with the requirements of the good conduct award.  There is no dispute that
Respondent maintained himself accordingly; he did nothing during the course of his
incarceration to warrant removal or deduction of his good conduct credits.
In March, 1997 the D.O.C. reconsidered its interpretation of § 643B(a), and from that
time forward has classified § 388 offenses as included within the definition of “crime of
violence,” thus calculating the good conduct credits for § 388 offenders at the rate of only
five days per month of incarceration, pursuant to § 700(d)(2).  Consequently, the D.O.C.
recalculated Respondent’s good conduct award and established his mandatory supervision
release date as September, 1997.
Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus, challenging the D.O.C.’s re-
interpretation of § 643B(a) as it applied to the crime of manslaughter by automobile under
§ 388, and as it affected the calculation of his good conduct credits under § 700(d).  The
Circuit Court for Washington County determined after a hearing that manslaughter by
automobile is not included as a crime of violence under the list of § 643B(a) offenses and,
consequently, that good conduct credits were to be awarded Respondent at the rate of ten
days per month in accordance with § 700(d)(3).  The circuit court further ordered, on April
18, 1997, that Respondent “be released under mandatory supervision forthwith.”  The State
filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals which affirmed the circuit court in a
reported opinion.  See Sacchet v. Blan, 120 Md.App. 154, 706 A.2d 620 (1998).  The State
-3-
  This statute was originally codified as § 436A.  See Laws of Maryland, 1941, Ch.
2
414; Maryland Code (1939, 1947 Cum. Supp.) Article 27, § 436A.  Thereafter, it appeared
as § 455 of Article 27 of the 1951 Code.  Finally, in 1957, the statute was re-codified as §
388 of Article 27.
thereafter filed a timely petition for writ of certiorari which we granted in order to address
the important issue presented.
II.
Manslaughter by automobile is a statutory offense in Maryland. The statute currently
reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
§ 388.  Manslaughter by automobile, vessel, etc. . . .
Every person causing the death of another as the result of
the driving, operation or control of an automobile, motor
vehicle, locomotive, engine, car, streetcar, train, vessel, or other
vehicle in a grossly negligent manner, shall be guilty of a felony
to be known as “manslaughter by automobile, motor vehicle,
locomotive, engine, car, streetcar, train, vessel, or other
vehicle,” and the person so convicted shall be sentenced to jail
or the house of correction for not more than 10 years, or be
fined not more than $5,000 or be both fined and imprisoned.
When the General Assembly originally enacted this legislation in 1941,  a violation
2
of the statute constituted a misdemeanor offense and carried a maximum term of
imprisonment of three years.  Several amendments followed.  In 1982, the Legislature
increased the maximum term of imprisonment to five years, see Laws of Maryland, 1982,
Ch. 92, and then again, in 1989, to ten years, see Laws of Maryland, 1989, Ch. 515.  In 1997,
violation of § 388 was reclassified as a felony.  See Laws of Maryland, 1997, Chs. 372, 373.
-4-
  Section 388 had also been amended prior to 1975, first in 1949, see Laws of
3
Maryland, 1949, Ch. 5, § 436A, and again in 1972, see Laws of Maryland, 1972, Ch.181,
§ 28.  These changes, however, do not affect our analysis of the issues presented in this case.
Importantly, none of these changes had occurred prior to 1975, the year of § 643B’s
enactment.   Manslaughter by automobile had thus comprised a criminal offense under
3
Maryland’s statutory law for thirty-four years when the General Assembly designated certain
offenses as “crimes of violence” under § 643B(a).  That statute provides, in its current form
and in pertinent part, as follows:
  § 643B.  Mandatory sentences for crimes of violence.
(a) Crime of violence defined . . . — As used in this
section, the term “crime of violence” means abduction; arson in
the first degree; kidnapping; manslaughter, except involuntary
manslaughter; mayhem and maiming, as previously proscribed
under §§ 384, 385, and 386 of this article; murder; rape;
robbery; robbery with a deadly weapon; carjacking or armed
carjacking; sexual offense in the first degree; sexual offense in
the second degree; use of a handgun in the commission of a
felony or other crime of violence; an attempt to commit any of
the aforesaid offenses; assault in the first degree; and assault
with intent to murder, assault with intent to rape, assault with
intent to rob, assault with intent to commit a sexual offense in
the first degree, and assault with intent to commit a sexual
offense in the second degree, as these crimes were previously
proscribed under former § 12 of this article. [Emphasis added.]
The calculation rate for the number of good conduct credits an inmate is to receive
during the period of incarceration for a particular crime depends upon whether the crime is
included within § 643B(a)’s definition of “crime of violence.”  The bifurcated classification
system, established by the General Assembly in 1992, provides as follows:
-5-
  Prior to October 1, 1992, § 700 had provided that all inmates be assigned good
4
conduct credits at the rate of five days per month; there was no distinction between “crimes
of violence” and all other crimes.  See Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.) Article 27,
§ 700(d)(1)-(2).
§ 700.  Mandatory sentences for crimes of violence.
*          *          *          *          *          *
(d) Good conduct deduction. — (1) An inmate shall be
allowed a deduction in advance from the inmate's term of
confinement, subject to the inmate's future good conduct.
(2) For an inmate whose term of confinement includes a
consecutive or concurrent sentence for either a crime of violence
as defined in Article 27, § 643B of the Code or a crime of
manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or possessing a
controlled dangerous substance as provided under Article 27, §
286 of the Code, this deduction shall be calculated at the rate of
5 days for each calendar month, and on a prorated basis for any
portion of a calendar month, from the first day of commitment
to the custody of the Commissioner through the last day of the
inmate's maximum term of confinement.
(3) For all other inmates, this deduction shall be
calculated at the rate of 10 days for each calendar month, and on
a prorated basis for any portion of a calendar month, from the
first day of commitment to the custody of the Commissioner
through the last day of the inmate's maximum term of
confinement.[ ]
4
The issue we are called upon to resolve in this case is whether “manslaughter by
automobile” in § 388 is included within the “crime of violence” of “manslaughter” in §
643B(a).  Our answer in turn will determine the rate of good conduct credits under § 700 that
should apply to an inmate convicted of an offense in violation of § 388.
III.
-6-
As this Court has often declared, the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to
ascertain and give effect to the true legislative intent that lies behind the statutory enactment
itself.  See, e.g., Catonsville Nursing v. Loveman, 349 Md. 560, 570, 709 A.2d 749, 753
(1998); Jones v. State, 311 Md. 398, 405, 535 A.2d 471, 474 (1988).  The primary indication
of legislative intent is found in the plain language of the statute, with the words given their
ordinary and natural meanings.  See Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 672, 659 A.2d 1347, 1350
(1995); Parrison v. State, 335 Md. 554, 559, 644 A.2d 537, 539 (1994).  Both parties before
this Court, and indeed before the circuit court and Court of Special Appeals, have argued that
the plain language of the key statutory provision in question, § 643B(a), favors the opposite
interpretation, and outcome, each respectively seeks.
The State asserts that the clear legislative intent embedded in the phrase
“manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter” was to include all forms of manslaughter,
including § 388's manslaughter by automobile, within the enumeration of crimes of violence,
except for common law involuntary manslaughter.  Had the General Assembly intended to
include only common law voluntary manslaughter it would have employed that term alone
rather than use the formulation it did.  Moreover, if the Legislature had desired to except
manslaughter by automobile from the enumerated offenses, it easily could have done so but
purposefully chose not to.  Respondent retorts that “manslaughter, except involuntary
manslaughter” plainly indicates, instead, that only the two common law varieties of
manslaughter were being contemplated by the drafters of § 643B(a): the phrase simply
provides that voluntary manslaughter is included within the list of crimes of violence,
-7-
involuntary manslaughter excluded.  Furthermore, had the General Assembly wanted to
include manslaughter by automobile as a crime of violence, it easily could have done so but
purposefully elected not to.  The plain meaning of § 643B(a) thus appears plainly different
to the two parties at bar.
Respondent similarly propounds that the General Assembly’s failure to modify the
manslaughter phrase in § 643B(a) is proof that manslaughter by automobile is not a crime
of violence thereunder.  This is so, he argues, because the Legislature has several times
revised other phrases within the same subsection in order to add to or clarify the list of
crimes of violence.  Especially instructive is the 1981 amendment to § 643B(a) which
appended to the common law crime of “robbery” the statutory offense of “robbery with a
deadly weapon,” under § 488.  See Laws of Maryland, 1981, Ch. 353.  Moreover, the
Legislature’s inaction with respect to the manslaughter language is particularly revealing, if
§ 388 offenses were originally meant to be included in 1975, in light of the fact that until the
D.O.C.’s re-interpretation of § 643B(a) in 1997, the “prosecutors and the courts . . .[and] the
Division of Correction” had essentially “thwarted” the intent of the General Assembly for
twenty-two years without any legislative correction.  The Court of Special Appeals found
this purported decision by the Legislature not to amend the manslaughter language in §
643B(a) dispositive: 
[Sections 388 and 643B] have been revisited several times by a
legislature that meets at least annually, and at no time has the
legislature included manslaughter by automobile as a crime of
violence.  They could have done so easily but they did not.  The
only interpretation is that the omission was deliberate.
-8-
  According to the State, “automobile manslaughter historically has not been utilized
5
as a predicate conviction for a repeat offender sentence” under § 643B(b)-(d).  Accepting this
assertion to be true, we note that the reason for such practice may not be one of pure
prosecutorial discretion but rather the recognition by the prosecutorial arm of the State that
manslaughter by automobile is excepted from § 643B(a) altogether.  For, certainly, the State
cannot reasonably argue that a § 388 offense is a crime of violence for one or more purposes,
e.g. calculation of good conduct credits, under § 700(d), and enablement of crime victims to
request that a parole hearing be open to the public, under Article 41, § 4-507(c), but not for
another purpose, utilization as a predicate conviction for repeat offender sentencing, under
§ 643B(b)-(d).  Indeed, as discussed in Part I, supra, the D.O.C. itself had for nearly five
years considered § 388 offenses to be excluded from the § 643B(a) enumeration of crimes
of violence for purposes of applying § 700(d).  We presume that the same interpretation  was
used for purposes of applying Article 41, § 4-507(c).
  
Sacchet v. Blan, 120 Md.App. 154, 157, 706 A.2d 620, 621 (1998).
The State might have responded before this Court that the reason for this supposedly
purposeful inaction by the General Assembly was the legislators’ contentment with the “fact”
that manslaughter by automobile was already included within the enumerated offenses,
which contention of fact the State continues to press.  The State’s counter argument is
different, however.  The State insists that “no conclusion can be drawn from [the] historical
application” of § 643B because it is only since the Legislature’s 1992 bifurcation of the
distribution of good conduct credits between crimes of violence and other crimes that the
inclusion vel non of § 388 as a crime of violence has become relevant.5
We conclude that the answer to the question before us lies neither in any supposed
plain meaning of the phrase “manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter” as enacted by
the 1975 General Assembly nor in any purported inaction with respect to the same language
by the successive Legislatures.  Resolution of this case does not require us to rely upon what
-9-
the Legislature could have done or upon what it has not done.  As we have seen, and as is
almost always the case, each of these factors is subject to arguably equally plausible
interpretations, if all we look to is the single, contested phrase as if in a vacuum.  It is for this
reason that viewing statutory language in isolation is a method of construction which this
Court eschews.  See In re Douglas P., 333 Md. 387, 393, 635 A.2d 427, 430 (1994);
Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514-15, 525 A.2d 628, 632-33 (1987).
Instead, we construe the statute as a whole, Blondell v. Baltimore Police, 341 Md. 680, 691,
672 A.2d 639, 645 (1996); examine the language of the statute in the context in which it was
adopted, Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Mohler, 318 Md. 219, 225, 567 A.2d 929, 932 (1990); and
consider  the general purpose, aim, or policy behind the statute, C.S. v. P.G. County Social
Services, 343 Md. 14, 24, 680 A.2d 470, 475 (1996).  Applying these principles of statutory
interpretation, we conclude that the list of crimes expressly included under § 643B(a) makes
clear that the General Assembly intended not to include manslaughter by automobile as a
crime of violence.
A strong factor in leading us to conclude that manslaughter by automobile is excluded
from § 643B(a) is that, unlike all other included offenses, a conviction under § 388 does not
require proof of any criminal intent on the part of the offender but only a showing of gross
negligence.  See Connor v. State, 225 Md. 543, 558, 171 A.2d 699, 707 (1961)(Section 388
“adopted the common-law standard of gross negligence as the minimum requirement to
convict a defendant for an unintentional killing in the course of doing a lawful act in an
unlawful manner . . . .”).  See also Faulcon v. State, 211 Md. 249, 257, 126 A.2d 858, 862
-10-
(1956); Hughes v. State, 198 Md. 424, 431, 84 A.2d 419, 422 (1951).  Moreover, as
Respondent aptly points out, “[t]he only other offense mentioned in § 643B(a) which does
not require intent is involuntary manslaughter,” the singular offense explicitly excluded by
the General Assembly from the listed crimes of violence.  It would be anomalous for the
Legislature to see fit that all enumerated crimes of violence but one, which warrant distinct
treatment of the offender by the courts and prisons of this State, incorporate the requirement
that the offender have acted intentionally, while at the same time expressly excepting a crime
whose conviction necessitates no proof of intent.  It has long been the prerogative and
practice of this Court to avoid interpretation of a statute that effects an unreasonable or
illogical result or one that is inconsistent with common sense.  See, e.g., Condon v. State, 332
Md. 481, 491-92, 632 A.2d 753, 758 (1993); Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 149, 395 A.2d
464, 474 (1978).
Further indicative of § 388's exclusion from the roster of violent crimes under §
643B(a) is another untenable legal inconsistency that would result from adopting the
opposite interpretation.  After setting out the initial list of crimes of violence, in which
appears the crime of “manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter,” § 643B(a) stipulates
that also included is “an attempt to commit any of the aforesaid offenses.”  As this Court
announced in Cox v. State, 311 Md. 326, 534 A.2d 1333 (1988):
There is an exception . . . to the general rule that attempt applies
to all offenses.  Crimes that do not involve intent to do a
criminal act generally fall outside the scope of the crime of
attempt.  If there is no intent to do a wrongful act, then usually
there is no crime of attempt.
-11-
Id. at 331, 534 A.2d at 1335.  In addition, we stated, “[S]o long as the crime of attempt is
deemed to require an intent-type of mental state, there can be no such thing as an attempt to
commit criminal negligence involuntary manslaughter.” Id. at 332, 534 A.2d at 1336 (quoting
2 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.2, at 27 (1986) (brackets in
original)).  By the same token, whereas manslaughter by automobile, like involuntary
manslaughter, requires only proof of gross negligence and not of criminal intent, it would
stand to reason that there does not exist in Maryland the crime of attempt to commit
manslaughter by automobile.  Were a violation of § 388 included as a crime of violence
within § 643B(a), the latter statute arguably would recognize a non-offense and accord
harsher treatment to those who, impossibly, “commit” it.  We could not countenance such
an anomaly.
Another possible interpretation is that the attempt language is simply ineffective as
it relates to the allegedly included offense of manslaughter by automobile.  We have,
however, repeatedly applied the principle of statutory construction that an interpretation of
one provision of a statute that negates another should be avoided.  See In re Wallace W., 333
Md. 186, 192, 634 A.2d 53, 56-57 (1993) (restating the basic rule of statutory construction
that no word, clause, sentence or phrase should be rendered surplusage, superfluous,
meaningless, or nugatory.)  See also Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523-24,
636 A.2d 448, 452 (1994).
The earlier penalty provisions and crime classification of  § 388, in effect at the time
of the Legislature’s enactment of § 643B, also demonstrate the legislative intent not to
-12-
  As originally enacted, § 643B(b) requires that a person convicted for a fourth time
6
of a crime of violence be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole,
so long as that person has served three separate terms of confinement on the three previous
convictions.  The original statute contained only subsections (a) and (b).  See Laws of
Maryland, 1975, Ch. 253.  The Legislature added subsection (c) in 1977, which mandates
that a sentence of at least twenty-five years of imprisonment be imposed for a third
conviction of a crime of violence, so long as the defendant has served at least one term of
confinement as a result of a conviction of a crime of violence.  See Laws of Maryland, 1977,
Ch. 678, § 1.  Current subsection (d), added in 1994, directs that a person convicted of a
crime of violence for a second time, after having been incarcerated for the first offense, be
confined to prison for not less than ten years.  See Laws of Maryland, 1994, Chs. 716, § 1;
717, § 1.
include manslaughter by automobile as a crime of violence.  In 1975, manslaughter by
automobile was classified as a misdemeanor offense and a conviction under § 388 allowed
for a maximum term of imprisonment of three years.  Meanwhile, a conviction of the felony
offense of involuntary manslaughter—again, a crime expressly excluded by the General
Assembly from the category of crimes of violence—provided for a period of incarceration
of up to ten years, in accordance with § 387.  It hardly makes sense that the General
Assembly, within the singular phrase “manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter,”
intended to include manslaughter by automobile within § 643B(a) so as to treat § 388
offenders more harshly than involuntary manslaughter offenders by subjecting them to long-
term mandatory sentencing for subsequent convictions of a crime of violence, yet punish
those same § 388 offenders less severely in terms of potential maximum sentences for a §
388 conviction not subject to repeat offender treatment.   The State’s reliance on this Court’s
6
holding in Forbes v. State, 324 Md. 335, 597 A.2d 427 (1991) is misplaced.  There we held
that the conduct of a person who unintentionally causes a death as a result of grossly
-13-
negligent operation of a motor vehicle cannot be the basis for a conviction of common law
involuntary manslaughter, yet such conduct may support a conviction of statutory
manslaughter by automobile.  See id. at 336, 597 A.2d at 428.  That the two offenses are thus
“separate and distinct crimes,” as the State describes them, does not necessitate that they be
treated differently under § 643B(a) any more than the status of arson and murder as separate
and distinct crimes would require that they be treated differently.  Indeed, arson and murder
are accorded identical treatment under § 643B(a), as each is expressly included as a crime
of violence.
Finally, the State has argued that this Court’s interpretation of the generic term “rape”
in § 643B(a) as embracing both common law and statutory varieties of the offense warrants
a similar interpretation of the word “manslaughter.”  In Blandon v. State, 304 Md. 316, 498
A.2d 1195 (1985), we held that the statutory offense of rape in the second degree is a crime
of violence under § 643B(a) where the General Assembly employed only the term “rape.”
Id. at 322, 498 A.2d at 1198.  The State misapprehends the rationale underlying our decision
in that case.  The reason second degree rape is a crime of violence under § 643B(a), despite
its not being expressly included, is that it shares “virtually identical . . . elements and
potential penalties” with second degree sexual offense, an explicit crime of violence.  Id. at
320, 498 A.2d at 1197 (emphasis added).  As Respondent argues, to the extent that Blandon
stands for the proposition that two crimes virtually identical with respect to their elements
and potential penalties should be treated equally for purposes of interpreting § 643B(a), this
principle favors treating manslaughter by automobile the same as involuntary manslaughter.
-14-
Again, the General Assembly has now equated the potential maximum penalty for § 388
offenses with that allowed for a conviction of voluntary manslaughter or involuntary
manslaughter, under § 387.  Yet manslaughter by automobile is certainly more akin to
involuntary manslaughter by virtue of the two offenses’ shared prerequisite of gross
negligence, than it is to voluntary manslaughter with its requirement of criminal intent.  
Because manslaughter by automobile is not included as a crime of violence under §
643B(a), the circuit court appropriately granted the petition for writ of habeas corpus and
properly ordered that Respondent be awarded good conduct credits at the rate of ten days per
month of his confinement in accordance with § 700(d)(3).
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED.   COSTS TO BE
PAID BY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY 
AND 
CORRECTIONAL
SERVICES.