Case Title: Kenneth Douglas Painter v. McWane Cast Iron Pipe Company

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1050736

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-12-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:12/14/07
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1050736
_________________________
Kenneth Douglas Painter
v.
McWane Cast Iron Pipe Company
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-04-4723)
BOLIN, Justice.
On January 31, 2004, Kenneth Douglas Painter was working
within the line and scope of his employment as a maintenance
mechanic for his employer, McWane Cast Iron Pipe Company
("McWane Pipe"), when he fell approximately 15 feet and landed
1050736
2
on his head and left shoulder.  It is undisputed that Painter
fractured his left scapula in the fall and that he received
treatment for this injury and was compensated pursuant to the
Workers' Compensation Act, § 25-5-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975.
During the course of his treatment for the shoulder injury,
Painter began to complain of symptoms relating to his lower
back.  McWane Pipe disputed whether Painter's lower-back
symptoms were causally related to the workplace accident
because he did not complain of lower-back symptoms until over
a month after the accident had occurred. Painter was
eventually diagnosed with a herniated disk in his lower back,
and he underwent surgery to repair the injured disk.
Painter's treatment and surgery for the herniated disk were
paid for by his private health-insurance carrier.
Painter returned to his employment with McWane Pipe in
July 2004.  On July 10, 2004, Painter brought a camera to work
to take photographs of the area in which his accident had
occurred.  McWane Pipe had a written policy in effect that
prohibited the use of cameras within  the plant without the
prior approval of management.  Mark Phillips, McWane Pipe's
personnel manager, received an anonymous tip that Painter had
1050736
Painter was a member of United Steel Workers of America,
1
Local Union 1057.
3
been taking photographs inside the plant.  Phillips confronted
Painter and asked him if he had a camera in his possession;
Painter denied that he had a camera. However, Phillips noticed
the top of a camera in Painter's jacket pocket and informed
Painter that he had seen the camera.  At that point Painter
requested to see a union representative, and a union
representative was summoned.1
Phillips explained to Painter and the union representative
that Phillips was entitled to have the camera and film turned
over to him pursuant to McWane Pipe's policy prohibiting
cameras on the premises without prior approval.  Painter
questioned why he should turn over the camera and film,
stating that "he would be terminated anyway."  Phillips
responded 
that 
he 
"would 
consider 
being 
lenient 
or
recommending leniency" if Painter turned the camera and film
over to him. Painter and the union representative then had a
private discussion, after which Painter returned to Phillips;
he showed him the film, which he had removed from the camera
and torn into pieces.  Painter, however, refused to turn the
camera over to Phillips.
1050736
4
Phillips took Painter off the work schedule and sent him
home.  On July 12, 2004, Painter filed a grievance report with
the local union against McWane Pipe, objecting to being sent
home based on his possession of a camera because, he says, the
employee handbook did not state that being in possession of a
camera was a violation of company policy.  Painter also
alleged in the grievance that he was being retaliated against
for having filed a worker's compensation claim and that
"Phillips is looking for any reason to fire me."  On July 15,
2004, Painter was notified by letter that he was being
suspended for five days subject to discharge for violating the
camera policy and for dishonesty.  Painter was eventually
discharged from his employment with McWane Pipe.
Painter sued McWane Pipe on August 5, 2004, seeking to
recover worker's compensation benefits for the lower-back
injury he allegedly sustained in his fall on January 31, 2004.
Painter also asserted a claim of retaliatory discharge
pursuant to § 25-5-11.1, Ala. Code 1975, alleging that he had
been terminated from his employment with McWane Pipe solely
because he had filed a worker's compensation claim. McWane
Pipe answered the complaint and moved the trial court to sever
1050736
5
the worker's compensation claim from the retaliatory-discharge
claim. On March 4, 2005, the trial court entered an order
treating McWane Pipe's motion to sever as a motion to
bifurcate and ordered that the retaliatory-discharge claim be
set 
for 
trial 
after 
the 
disposition 
of 
the 
worker's
compensation claim.
In the meantime, the grievance Painter had filed against
McWane Pipe with the union was submitted to arbitration for
hearing 
on 
January 
31, 
2005, 
in 
accordance 
with 
the
collective-bargaining agreement between the union and McWane
Pipe.  On May 10, 2005, the arbitrator entered an order
denying Painter's grievance and holding that the termination
of Painter's employment was for "just cause."  The arbitrator
made the following  findings:
"There is no evidence to support the allegation
that at the time of concern, [McWane Pipe] treated
workers' compensation claimants differently from
other employees.  During his testimony, [Painter]
acknowledged that his worker's compensation suit
[seeking benefits for his lower-back injury] was
filed after his termination.  There simply are no
facts on which the Arbitrator can base a conclusion
that [Painter's] termination was retaliatory in
nature.
"[Painter] acknowledged that Phillips wanted the
camera as it was, yet refused to give it to him
without destruction of the film first.  The fact that
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6
[Painter] was acting on the advice of another cannot
absolve him of ultimate responsibility for his own
actions.  Taken together, the facts in this case show
that [Painter] violated [McWane Pipe] rules and was
dishonest within the meaning of Section 9.1 of the
collective bargaining agreement."
Painter did not appeal the arbitrator's decision.
On May 19, 2005, McWane Pipe amended its answer to assert
the doctrine of collateral estoppel as a defense to Painter's
retaliatory-discharge claim, stating that the retaliatory-
discharge claim could not be relitigated because it had been
presented to  arbitration and the arbitrator had determined
that Painter's employment was terminated for violating company
policies and for dishonesty, and not because he had filed a
worker's compensation claim. On October 5, 2005, McWane Pipe
moved for a summary judgment as to Painter's retaliatory-
discharge claim, arguing that the claim was barred by the
doctrine of collateral estoppel; that McWane Pipe had
established a separate and independent reason for terminating
Painter's employment, other than the fact that Painter had
filed a worker's compensation claim; and that Painter cannot
establish that the termination of his employment was based
solely on his having filed a worker's compensation claim.
1050736
7
On October 14, 2005, Painter and McWane Pipe executed a
"Petition and Settlement Agreement" to settle Painter's
worker's compensation claim against McWane Pipe for injury to
his lower back arising out of the accident occurring on
January 31, 2004.  The parties agreed to settle for $23,500
the dispute over Painter's alleged lower-back injury; whether
McWane Pipe was responsible for the payment of medical
expenses relating to the lower-back injury; and the degree of
physical impairment, if any, resulting from the lower-back
injury. The settlement agreement expressly provided that
Painter's retaliatory-discharge claim was not subject to the
settlement and release and that it remained subject to further
judicial proceedings. The trial court, on October 14, 2005,
entered an order approving the settlement agreement, thereby
disposing of Painter's worker's compensation claim.  The trial
court's order approving the settlement agreement released
McWane Pipe from all claims arising out of the January 31,
2004, accident and preserved to Painter his retaliatory-
discharge claim.
On November 10, 2005, Painter both moved the trial court
to strike McWane Pipe's summary-judgment motion and responded
1050736
8
to the summary-judgment motion. Painter argued that McWane
Pipe was estopped from relying on the arbitration proceeding
as its basis for the defense of collateral estoppel because,
he says, McWane Pipe violated Rule 4.2, Ala. R. Prof. Cond.,
which provides: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not
communicate about the subject of the representation with a
party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in
the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other
lawyer or is authorized by law to do so."  Specifically,
Painter argued that McWane Pipe's counsel, Sydney Frazier,
questioned him regarding the retaliatory-discharge claim
during the arbitration proceedings when Frazier knew that
Painter was represented by counsel, who was not present during
the arbitration proceedings because he had been advised by
McWane Pipe that he would not need counsel during the
arbitration proceedings.  Painter also argued that McWane Pipe
was estopped from relying on the collateral estoppel defense
because, he argued, he was denied an adequate opportunity to
litigate 
the 
retaliatory-discharge 
claim 
during 
the
arbitration proceedings. McWane Pipe responded on November 16,
2005, to Painter's motion to strike its summary-judgment
1050736
9
motion, contending that a union member's personal attorney is
not permitted to participate in the union's arbitration
proceedings and, further, that Painter was represented during
the arbitration proceedings by a union representative.
On November 29, 2005, Painter amended his complaint to
allege two counts of fraud.  Painter alleged in amended count
III that Phillips fraudulently represented to him that he
would not be discharged for violating the policy against
having a camera on the premises if he turned the camera and
film 
over 
to 
Phillips 
and 
that 
he 
relied 
on 
that
representation when he relinquished the film to Phillips.
Painter alleged in amended count IV that McWane Pipe
fraudulently attempted to violate the Workers' Compensation
Act by attempting to have him accept payments from a
disability-insurance plan instead of benefits under the Act;
by requesting that Painter provide false statements indicating
that his back injury was not work-related; by refusing to
provide worker's compensation benefits and treatment for his
back injury although McWane Pipe knew that the injury was
work-related; and that out of duress and necessity he was
forced to submit the medical expenses associated with the
1050736
10
treatment of his back injury to his private health-insurance
carrier.
On December 12, 2005, McWane Pipe moved to dismiss
Painter's amended complaint, arguing that count III raised an
issue that had been presented to and rejected by the
arbitrator during the arbitration proceedings and was thus
subject to the same collateral estoppel defense argued by
McWane Pipe in its summary-judgment motion.  Further, McWane
Pipe argued that count IV of the amended complaint failed to
state a claim for which relief could be granted and also that
it attempted to assert claims that had been released by the
parties' settlement of Painter's worker's compensation claim.
On December 29, 2005, the trial court granted McWane
Pipe's motion for a summary judgment as to Painter's
retaliatory-discharge claim.  The trial court certified the
judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. The
trial court treated McWane Pipe's motion to dismiss Painter's
amended complaint as a motion for a summary judgment and, on
January 23, 2006, entered an amended summary judgment in favor
of McWane Pipe on Painter's amended fraud counts.  The trial
court made the following findings: 
1050736
11
"Given the findings and award of the Arbitrator,
[Painter's] claim in Count III is barred by the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
[Painter's] claims in Count IV relate to [McWane
Pipe's] denial of workers' compensation benefits
which were expressly resolved in the Workers'
Compensation 
Settlement 
Agreement 
between 
the 
parties
which was approved by a judge of the circuit court
and is in the record.  Moreover, there is no cause of
action for 'attempted fraud.'"
Painter filed his notice of appeal on March 3, 2006.
Standard of Review
In reviewing a ruling on a motion for a summary judgment,
we use the same standard the trial court used in determining
whether the evidence before it presented a genuine issue of
material fact and whether the movant was entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.  Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531
So. 2d 860, 862 (Ala. 1988);  Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.
When the movant makes a prima facie showing that no genuine
issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the
nonmovant to present substantial evidence creating such an
issue.  Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d
794 (Ala. 1989).  Evidence is "substantial" if it is of "such
weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the
fact sought to be proved."  West v. Founders Life Assurance
1050736
12
Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).  This Court
must review the record in a light most favorable to the
nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the
movant.  Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So. 2d 412
(Ala. 1990).
Discussion
Painter has not presented an argument on appeal as to the
fraud claim asserted in count III of the amended complaint.
Because Painter has abandoned the fraud claim asserted in
count III, we affirm the trial court's judgment as to that
count. See Tucker v. Cullman-Jefferson Counties Gas Dist., 864
So. 2d 317 (Ala. 2003).
Painter argues that the trial court erred in entering a
summary judgment as to the fraud claim asserted in count IV of
the amended complaint and cites Lowman v. Piedmont Executive
Shirt Manufacturing Co., 547 So. 2d 90 (Ala. 1989), in support
of that argument.  At the heart of count IV is Painter's claim
that McWane Pipe refused him worker's compensation benefits
for his back injury when it knew that the injury was caused by
the work-related fall and that he was thus required to process
the claim through his private health-insurance carrier.
1050736
13
Painter also claims that McWane Pipe committed fraud by asking
him to collect disability benefits by signing documents
indicating that his lower-back injury was not work-related. 
In Lowman, the employee, Lowman, sued Carol Hart and
Piedmont alleging fraud, conspiracy to defraud, and the tort
of outrage based on the alleged mishandling of her worker's
compensation claim by Hart.  The trial court entered a summary
judgment in favor of Hart and Piedmont.  This Court noted the
following facts on appeal:
"The facts most favorable to Ms. Lowman show
that Ms. Hart was aware that Ms. Lowman had been
injured on the job, having been advised of this by
Ms. Lowman's supervisors and by Ms. Lowman herself on
the day the injury occurred.  Ms. Hart, however,
refused to process Ms. Lowman's claim and, instead,
told Ms. Lowman to fill out another claim form and to
state that she had been injured at home.  Several
days later, Ms. Hart visited a hospitalized Ms.
Lowman and 'threatened' Ms. Lowman with being 'stuck
with a big [medical] bill' if Ms. Lowman did not file
her disability claim as for an off-the-job injury."
547 So. 2d at 92.  Lowman argued on appeal that her tort
claims were not barred by the exclusivity provisions of the
Workers' Compensation Act and that the defendants' handling of
her worker's compensation claim constituted misrepresentation
and the tort of outrage.  This Court held that the exclusivity
provisions of the Act "were not designed to shield an employer
1050736
14
or its insurer from the entire field of tort law" and that
those provisions "apply only to limit the liability of an
employer or its insurer to the statutorily prescribed claims
for job-related injuries." 547 So. 2d at 92.  Thus, Lowman's
fraud, conspiracy, and tort-of-outrage causes of action were
not prohibited by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers'
Compensation Act, because of Piedmont and Hart's actions in
allegedly threatening her if she did not file her claim as a
disability claim for an off-the-job injury, which did not
constitute an "accident" compensable under the Act.  This
Court concluded that the factual allegations, even if true,
did not rise to the level of outrageous conduct and affirmed
the summary judgment as to that claim; however, this Court
concluded that a question of fact existed as to the fraud
claim and reversed the summary judgment as to that claim.  Id.
In Hobbs v. Alabama Power Co., 775 So. 2d 783 (Ala. 2003),
the employee, Hobbs, was injured during the course of her
employment with Alabama Power Company and was diagnosed with
lumbar strain and spinal stenosis, a degenerative disease.
Hobbs's treating physician determined that the spinal stenosis
was not work-related.  Hobbs eventually had surgery to treat
1050736
15
the spinal stenosis, and Alabama Power informed Hobbs that its
workers' compensation insurance carrier would not pay for the
surgery because, it said, the injury did not arise out of
Hobbs's employment with Alabama Power.  Hobbs filed claims for
her back surgery with her private health-insurance carrier.
Hobbs 
sued 
Alabama 
Power, 
alleging 
that 
it 
had
fraudulently required her to seek medical coverage from her
private health-insurance carrier; had represented to her that
her injuries were not covered by workers' compensation and
were covered by her private health-insurance carrier; and had
represented to her that her private health-insurance carrier
should provide care and treatment for injuries she sustained
on the job, when Alabama Power knew or should have known that
the injuries were work-related.
In affirming a summary judgment in favor of Alabama Power,
this Court distinguished Lowman as follows:
"Unlike the employer in Lowman, APCo [Alabama
Power Company] never, with information to the
contrary, insisted that the injury occurred away from
the job.  It never instructed Hobbs to complete a
false claim, and it never preyed upon Hobbs with
threats of financial ruin while she was in a weakened
position.  Even viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to Hobbs, we cannot say that APCo, by
requiring Hobbs to submit her medical expenses
associated with spinal stenosis to her private
1050736
16
health-insurance carrier and by denying her request
for coverage under APCo's workers' compensation plan,
was guilty of conduct 'beyond the bounds of the
employer's proper role.' See Lowman, 547 So. 2d at
95.  In Hobbs's case, APCo offered to pay, and in
fact did pay, her medical expenses associated with
the lumbar strain that resulted from the January 3,
1996, on-the-job accident. This action was within the
realm of APCo's proper role as an employer."
775 So. 2d at 788. 
     
The facts of this case are distinguishable from the facts
set forth in Lowman; they are more akin to those in Hobbs.
Here, McWane Pipe acknowledged that Painter's accident
occurred and admitted that he suffered an injury to his left
scapula as the result of that accident.  McWane Pipe disputed
the compensability of the lower-back injury because it was not
asserted until over a month after the accident had occurred.
We cannot say that under these circumstances the offer to
provide disability and medical benefits rather than worker's
compensation benefits constitutes conduct "beyond the bounds
of the employer's proper role."  Lowman, 547 So. 2d at 95.
In addition to our holding that Painter has failed to
establish a claim of fraud pursuant to Lowman, we further
conclude that Painter's claims asserted in count IV are barred
by the settlement agreement entered into with McWane Pipe to
1050736
17
settle Painter's  worker's compensation claim.  The settlement
agreement stated that it specifically encompassed
"such disputes including, but not limited to, (a)
whether the low back injury being claimed by Painter,
which resulted in a surgical procedure to repair a
herniated disc, was caused by the Accident, (b)
whether McWane is responsible for payment of medical
expenses relating to the low back injury and disc
repair surgery, and (c) the extent of Painter's
physical impairment or disability, or vocational
impairment 
or 
lost 
earning 
capacity, 
if 
any,
resulting from the Accident and the Injuries."
The trial court's order approving the settlement agreement
specifically provides:
"McWane Pipe ... shall be released from any and
all causes of action, rights of or for causes of
action, claims and liabilities of whatsoever kind,
character, and description, of Painter ... including,
but not limited to, claims on account of or arising
out of the January 31, 2004, accident made the basis
of this action and/or Painter's shoulder and alleged
low back injuries and disability, if any, resulting
therefrom."
(Emphasis added.) Painter's claims asserted in count IV are
clearly encompassed by the settlement agreement and the order
approving the settlement agreement and, therefore, are barred
from further litigation.  Accordingly, the summary judgment
entered as to count IV of the amended complaint is due to be
affirmed.
1050736
18
Painter next argues that the trial court erred in entering
a summary judgment on his retaliatory-discharge claim based on
the doctrine of collateral estoppel.  Specifically, he
contends that he was denied an adequate opportunity to
litigate the issue in the arbitration proceeding because, he
says, he was not permitted to have his counsel present,
although McWane Pipe's counsel was present and thoroughly
examined him.
Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P., provides, in part, as
follows:
"(1) Except as otherwise provided herein, in all
cases in which an appeal is permitted by law as of
right to the supreme court or to a court of appeals,
the notice of appeal required by Rule 3[, Ala. R.
App. P.,] shall be filed with the clerk of the trial
court within 42 days (6 weeks) of the date of the
entry of the judgment or order appealed from ...."
The filing of a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional
act.  Lewis v. State, 463 So. 2d 154, 155 (Ala. 1985).  "A
judgment certified by a trial court pursuant to Rule 54(b) is
a final appealable judgment; the certification triggers the
running of the 42-day appeal period." 463 So. 2d at 155.  
In this case the trial court, on December 29, 2005,
entered a summary judgment in favor of McWane Pipe on
1050736
19
Painter's retaliatory-discharge claim and certified that
judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  The
certification triggered the running of the 42-day period in
which to file an appeal.  The amended summary-judgment order
entered by the trial court on January 23, 2006, did not amend
or alter the final judgment on the retaliatory-discharge claim
because the trial court addressed only the amended fraud
claims.  Thus, the amended summary-judgment order did not
extend the 42-day period Painter had to file his notice of
appeal as to the retaliatory-discharge claim, and Painter's
notice of appeal filed on March 3, 2006, was untimely as to
that claim.  Because Painter's notice of appeal was untimely
as to the retaliatory-discharge claim, this Court is without
jurisdiction to consider those issues raised on appeal as to
that claim.  Id.; Greystone Close v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins.
Co., 664 So. 2d 900 (Ala. 1995).  Therefore, we affirm the
summary judgment as to this issue.
AFFIRMED.       
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, and Murdock, JJ., concur.