Case Title: ROY T. LEWIS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2006-SC-000900-MR

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 2007-09-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76 .28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT . OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION. ,,SuprPmg Courf of ~;lt 2006-SC-000900-MR RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 20, 2007 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ON APPEAL FROM EDMONSON CIRCUIT COURT V . HONORABLE RONNIE C. DORTCH, JUDGE NO . 04-CR-000084 ROY T . LEWIS APPELLANT COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART Appellant, Roy Thomas Lewis, was convicted of ten counts of rape, two counts of sodomy, and eleven counts of incest . Appellant now appeals his convictions and 350-year sentence as a matter of right . Ky . Const . § 110(2)(b) . Appellant raises three issues on appeal : (1) that his 350-year sentence is unlawful because it exceeds the 70-year statutory maximum set forth in KRS § 532.110, (2) that his convictions for eleven counts of incest be set aside on the basis that his marriage to the victim's mother was void under KRS § 402 .010, and (3) that the trial court abused its discretion in barring certain testimony relating to the victim's sexual history under KRE 412 . For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse Appellant's convictions on eleven counts of incest, affirm the remainder of the convictions, vacate his sentence, and remand for re-sentencing in accordance with KRS § 532.110 . 1. FACTS In 1994, Appellant purported to marry Katherine Lewis, his first cousin . Katherine had three children at that time, one of whom is Appellant's first cousin once removed A .K . Thereafter, Appellant and the then 8-year-old A.K . lived together . When A.K . was 18, she reported that Appellant had sexually abused her . Appellant was subsequently charged in the Edmonson Circuit Court . At trial, Appellant admitted that he had sexual contact with A .K . but claimed it was consensual . The Commonwealth instead argued that Appellant had forced himself upon A.K . on multiple occasions . At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of ten counts of first-degree rape, two counts of first- degree sodomy, and eleven counts of incest, and recommended that the sentences run consecutively for a total of 350 years . The trial court entered an order accordingly, and this appeal followed . sentence . We agree . 11. ANALYSIS A. Appellant's 350-year sentence violates the 70-year limitation on consecutive sentences found in KRS § 532.110 Appellant first claims that the trial court erred in imposing a 350-year Kentucky's seventy year cap on consecutive sentences went into effect on July 15, 1998 . KRS § 532 .110 provides, in relevant part : (1) When multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant for more than one (1) crime . . . the multiple sentences shall run concurrently or consecutively as the court shall determine at the time of sentence, except that : . . . (c) The aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms shall not exceed in maximum length the longest extended term which would be authorized by KRS 532.080 for the highest class of crime for which any of the sentences is imposed . In no event shall the aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms exceed seventy (70) years . (Emphasis added) . Appellant concedes that this issue is unpreserved . However, sentencing issues may be raised for the first time on appeal. Cummings v. Commonwealth , 226 S .W.3d 62, 66 (Ky . 2007) . Here, Appellant was sentenced to twenty years on each of the ten counts of rape, twenty years on each of the two counts of sodomy, and ten years on each of the eleven counts of incest. All sentences were to run consecutively for a total of 350 years, clearly exceeding the 70-year sentencing cap . See Ratliff v. Commonwealth , 194 S.W.3d 258, 277 (Ky . 2006) (vacating the judgment of the trial court insofar as it imposes a maximum aggregate sentence in excess of seventy years) . Therefore, Appellant's sentence violates KRS § 532.110 and must be vacated and remanded to the trial court for re-sentencing . See Gibbs v . Commonwealth , 208 S .W.3d 848 (Ky . 2006) (vacating the defendant's 105-year sentence and remanding for re-sentencing) . B. Appellant's convictions for incest were unsupported by the evidence because sexual intercourse between Appellant and the victim was not prohibited by KRS § 530.020 Appellant's next allegation of error is that his convictions for incest were unsupported by the evidence because his purported marriage to the victim's mother was void for illegality . According to Appellant, since the marriage was void, the victim was not his stepdaughter and therefore sexual intercourse with her cannot be incest . Again, we agree with Appellant . In the present case, Appellant purported to marry Katherine Lewis, his first cousin, in 1994 . Prior to trial, Appellant moved to dismiss the incest counts on the ground that his marriage to Katherine was void . The trial court indicated it would rule on the motion at the conclusion of the evidence . At trial, Katherine testified that she and Appellant are first cousins, and the Commonwealth does not dispute this fact. A marriage between first cousins is prohibited and void from the beginning . KRS § 402.010 ; Ex carte Bowen, 247 S.W.2d 379 (Ky . 1952) (holding that incestuous marriages are void from the beginning) . Nevertheless, at the close of the Commonwealth's case, the trial court denied Appellant's motion . The Commonwealth argues that an incestuous marriage is valid unless one of the parties requests the circuit court to declare the marriage invalid within one year after that party first knew that the marriage was incestuous . KRS § 403.120 provides, in relevant part : "The Circuit Court shall enter its decree declaring the invalidity of a marriage entered into" under the circumstance that the "marriage is prohibited" and that a "declaration of invalidity" may be sought by either party and must be commenced "no later than one (1) year after the petitioner obtained knowledge of the described condition ." We have recognized that an incestuous marriage, however, is absolutely void as against the public policy of Kentucky . See Robinson v. Commonwealth , 212 S.W.3d 100, 105 (Ky . 2006) ("KRS 402.010 expressly declares void incestuous marriages.") . A marriage between first cousins is invalid from the beginning, as if it never took place . Ex parte Bowen , 247 S.W.2d at 379. Thus, Appellant and Katherine were never legally married and the marriage is not recognized under Kentucky law even though neither Appellant nor Katherine sought a declaration of invalidity . A stepparent is guilty of incest if he or she has sexual intercourse with a person whom he or she knows to be a stepchild . KRS § 530 .020 . At trial, Appellant admitted to having sex with A.K . during his marriage to Katherine . The jury subsequently convicted Appellant on eleven counts of incest . However, because Appellant's marriage to Katherine was void from the beginning, A.K. was never Appellant's stepdaughter-she was instead his first cousin once removed . Appellant is therefore not guilty of incest since KRS § 530.020 does not criminalize sexual intercourse between first cousins once removed . Accordingly, we reverse Appellant's convictions on eleven counts of incest . C. The trial court properly excluded evidence of the victim's sexual history under KRE 412 Finally, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in not permitting him to present certain impeachment evidence during the trial . As a result, Appellant believes he was denied the right to present a defense and, consequently, a fair trial . We disagree . At trial, the Commonwealth asked A .K . on direct examination if she had ever consented to having sex with Appellant . In response, A.K . stated : "I never wanted to! He took my virginity! I hate him!" Appellant then sought to impeach A.K.'s testimony . Appellant's daughter, Teresa Ray Lewis, testified by avowal that A.K . had said that losing her virginity had "happened with a boy," and that she had "made a mistake by doing it." The trial court barred introduction of this evidence under Kentucky's rape shield law as set forth in KRE 412 . The standard of review for admission of evidence is whether there has been an abuse of that discretion . Commonwealth v. English , 993 S.W .2d 941, 945 (Ky . 1999) . The purpose behind the rape shield law is to prevent the victim in a sexually related crime from becoming the defendant at trial . Smith v. Commonwealth , 566 S .W.2d 181, 183 (Ky . App . 1978) . KRE 412 excludes evidence of an alleged victim's "sexual behavior" and "sexual predisposition" unless such evidence falls into one of three exceptions. The first exception allows evidence of specific sexual acts of an alleged victim to be admitted to prove that a third person "was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence." KRE 412(b)(1)(A) . KRE 412(b)(1)(B) authorizes the use of evidence of past sexual behavior between the accused and alleged victim to prove consent . Finally, the residual exception in KRE 412(b)(1)(C) allows the introduction of "any other evidence directly pertaining to the offense charged ." We have noted that KRE 412's exceptions are to be used "sparingly and carefully." Violett v. Commonwealth, 907 S .W.2d 773, 776 (Ky . 1995). According to Appellant, evidence of AX's sexual behavior was properly admissible under the residual exception to the rape shield law. Appellant argues that the Commonwealth made A.K.'s virginity part of its case through A.K.'s testimony . Hence, evidence of the state of A.K.'s virginity was essential to defend against the accusation that Appellant took her virginity by showing 1) that Appellant-who was born in 1943-did not take A.K.'s virginity, but rather a younger "boy" did, and 2) that A.K . lost her virginity through consensual sex . In support of its argument, Appellant cites Barnett v . Commonwealth, 828 S.W.2d 361 (Ky. 1992) . In Barnett , the Commonwealth offered the expert testimony of an examining physician who found "chronic sexual contact" and identified Barnett as the perpetrator . Id . at 362 . Under the rape shield law, the trial court excluded evidence of a sexual relationship between the victim and her brother, which Barnett offered to prove that someone else was the cause of the victim's physical condition as reported by the examining physician . This Court relied on the residual exception in finding that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence . We stressed that, "in the case of a female child who is presumed not to be sexually active, and with whom any sexual contact is prohibited, a medical finding of frequent sexual activity establishes the relevance of evidence that the perpetrator is one other than the person charged." id . at 363. Appellant additionally cites State v. Budis , 593 A.2d 784 (N .J . 1991), for the proposition that evidence of a victim's sexual history is relevant to the issue of consent, when the victim is under the age of consent. We find Appellant's argument unpersuasive . At trial, Appellant admitted to having sex with A.K . Testimony that A.K . may have had a sexual encounter prior to the admitted sexual relationship with Appellant does nothing to refute A . K.'s claim that Appellant raped her . Thus, the evidence does not fall under any exception to the rape shield law because the state of A.K.'s virginity is not relevant to the offenses for which Appellant was convicted . See Woodard v . Commonwealth , 219 S.W.3d 723, 730 (Ky . 2007) (concluding that the victim's virginity was not relevant to prove her claims of abuse by defendant) . Appellant's reliance on Barnett is misplaced because the present case is distinguishable on the facts . In Barnett , the excluded evidence of sexual behavior challenged the medical proof. In the instant case, however, there was no medical testimony presented, and the identity of the perpetrator is not at issue because Appellant admitted to having sex with A.K . on multiple occasions . Accordingly, Barnett is not controlling here. We thus conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of A .K.'s sexual history under KRE 412. 1111 . CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Appellant's convictions on eleven counts of incest, but affirm his convictions in all other respects . Furthermore, we vacate Appellant's 350-year sentence and remand to the Edmonson Circuit Court for re-sentencing not to exceed the 70-year limitation in KRS § 532.110 . Lambert, CJ ; Cunningham, Minton, Noble, Schroder and Scott, JJ., concur . Abramson, J., not sitting . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT : Susan Jackson Balliet Assistant Public Advocate 100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302 Frankfort, KY 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE : Gregory D. Stumbo Attorney General George G . Seelig Assistant Attorney General Office of Criminal Appeals Office of the Attorney General 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, Kentucky 40601