Case Title: In re Scott

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2003-01-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 1/27/03 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
In re JAMES ROBERT SCOTT 
) 
 
 
) 
 
on Habeas Corpus. 
) 
S059739 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Petitioner James Robert Scott seeks relief on habeas corpus from the 
judgment of death entered against him in Los Angeles County Superior Court, 
Case No. A747321.  We affirmed that judgment on direct appeal.  (People v. Scott 
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188 (Scott).)  In this matter, we issued an order to show cause 
based on allegations that (1) trial counsel failed to investigate and to adequately 
present a mental defense at the guilt phase, (2) trial counsel failed to investigate 
and to adequately present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, and (3) these 
failures rendered counsel’s advice to waive a jury uninformed and hence 
ineffective.  We appointed the Honorable Howard J. Schwab, Judge of the Los 
Angeles Superior Court, as our referee, and directed him to take evidence and 
make findings of fact on specified questions.  Judge Schwab has done so and has 
issued a report responding to the questions. 
We adopt the referee’s factual findings.  In accordance with those findings, 
we also conclude petitioner has failed to carry his burden of establishing 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Accordingly, we discharge the order to show 
cause and, in a separate order, deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
 
 
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I.  FACTS 
A.  The Underlying Judgment 
Petitioner assaulted and raped Wanda Jensen in her home, then set her on 
fire.  In 1986, before she died, he pleaded guilty to her rape and attempted murder.  
In 1988, after she died, he was charged with her murder.  He waived a jury trial.  
After a court trial in 1989, the court convicted him of first degree murder, found 
true special circumstance allegations of rape and burglary murder, and found that 
he intended to kill Jensen and used a deadly weapon.  It then imposed the death 
penalty. 
We described the underlying facts in our opinion in the direct appeal.  
(Scott, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1199-1200.)  Around 2:00 a.m., on April 22, 1986, 
petitioner entered Jensen’s apartment in Palmdale, placed a screwdriver against 
her side, threatened to harm her five-year-old daughter, hit her with a baseball bat, 
raped her, beat and choked her into unconsciousness, set her on fire, and left.  
Jensen’s daughter rescued her, but she died of her burns on February 25, 1987.  
Petitioner confessed to the crimes in two statements to separate investigators.  
Glenn “Rerun” Johnson, Jr., testified that petitioner came to his home shortly 
before the crime.  He gave petitioner some socks and the two smoked cocaine.  
Johnson denied it at trial, but he had previously said that petitioner had asked him 
for a screwdriver and gloves, and he gave him a screwdriver but had no gloves.  
Petitioner told the police that before the crime, he purchased some cocaine and 
“did a couple lines of coke.” 
At times during his two confessions, petitioner claimed the persona of 
“Tony.”  At one point in the first confession, petitioner “glared at the investigator 
and said ‘he was now Tony and that Tony had taken charge of James’ body, and 
he said he had to destroy the girl because she was a shit bomb . . . .’  Before the 
 
 
3
second confession, [petitioner] signed the waiver card with the name, ‘Tony 
Adman.’  When questioned about the signature, he changed it to his true name.  
He told both investigators that he was ‘Tony’ and that ‘James was a wimp.’ ”  
(Scott, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1199.) 
Petitioner presented a defense that Jensen had received negligent medical 
treatment and would not have died had the treatment been competent. 
At the penalty phase, the prosecution presented evidence that in 1983, 
petitioner assaulted Paula H. with a knife in her house and said he was going to 
rape and kill her.  A struggle ensued in which petitioner cut and bit her, after 
which she escaped.  For this incident, he pleaded guilty to assault with a deadly 
weapon.  Three weeks before the assault on Jensen, petitioner assaulted Violet H. 
in her home with a knife and his fists, raped her, and choked her into 
unconsciousness.  For this incident, at the same time that he pleaded guilty to 
Jensen’s rape and attempted murder, he pleaded guilty to rape with use of a knife 
and infliction of great bodily injury. 
“The defense presented some of Paula H.’s testimony at the 1983 
preliminary hearing of that prosecution and a psychological evaluation of 
[petitioner] prepared in conjunction with that prosecution.” (Scott, supra, 15 
Cal.4th at p. 1200.)  It presented no other mitigating evidence, although trial 
counsel argued in mitigation the medical malpractice evidence he presented at the 
guilt phase. 
B.  The Reference Hearing 
1.  Background 
We asked the referee to take evidence and make findings of fact on these 
questions. 
 
 
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“1.  What actions did petitioner’s trial counsel take to investigate a possible 
mental defense at the guilt phase?  What were the results of that investigation?  
What additional evidence supporting a mental defense, if any, could petitioner 
have presented at the guilt phase?  What investigative steps, if any, would have led 
to this additional evidence?  How credible was this additional evidence?  What 
circumstances, if any, weighed against the investigation or presentation of this 
additional evidence?  What evidence rebutting this additional evidence reasonably 
would have been available to the prosecution? 
“2.  What actions did petitioner’s trial counsel take to investigate potential 
evidence in mitigation at the penalty phase?  What were the results of that 
investigation?  What additional mitigating evidence, if any, could petitioner have 
presented at the penalty phase?  What investigative steps, if any, would have led to 
this additional evidence?  How credible was this additional evidence?  What 
circumstances, if any, weighed against the investigation or presentation of this 
additional evidence?  What evidence rebutting this additional evidence reasonably 
would have been available to the prosecution? 
“3.  Did petitioner himself request the curtailment of or do anything to 
hinder or prevent the investigation or presentation of evidence supporting a mental 
defense at the guilt phase or in mitigation at the penalty phase?  If so, what did he 
do or request? 
“4.  Why did trial counsel advise petitioner to waive a jury?  Did any failure 
by trial counsel to investigate a mental defense or mitigating evidence render 
counsel’s advice to waive a jury uninformed?  Would any additional investigation 
have affected the advice to waive a jury and, if so, what and how?” 
At the evidentiary hearing, petitioner presented the testimony of his trial 
counsel, William Clark; three mental health experts; several friends and family 
members; Richard Vargas, who had been with petitioner the evening of the crime; 
 
 
5
and an attorney.  The prosecution presented the testimony of one mental health 
expert and Burrell Ford, who had lived with petitioner’s mother for three years.  
After receiving briefing, the referee issued a detailed report.  At the beginning, he 
summarized his findings:  “The referee will find that petitioner’s trial counsel’s 
investigation of potential mental defenses and mitigating penalty phase evidence 
was minimal.  However, the referee also will find that petitioner in the habeas 
corpus evidentiary hearing did not proffer any significant credible evidence that 
would have been discovered if there had been a more thorough investigation by 
trial counsel.  Further, the referee will find that petitioner himself requested the 
curtailment of the investigation and presentation of evidence by requesting not to 
have his family involved.  The referee also will find that trial counsel’s advice to 
petitioner to waive jury was based upon his concerns about the nature of the jury 
panels in the Antelope Valley (where the case would be tried), his desire to try the 
case before a certain highly-skilled jurist, and his belief that a defense of 
intervening medical malpractice would be best presented before that particular 
judge rather than before a jury.” 
The referee then went into detail.  He discussed each witness’s testimony 
and made credibility determinations, then answered our specific questions.  
Because we find the report reliable and helpful and, as discussed below, we adopt 
its credibility determinations, we review it in detail, especially the testimony the 
referee found credible.1 
                                             
 
1  
The referee provided record citations for his factual discussion, which we 
have deleted.  Except as otherwise indicated, footnotes are also deleted.  The 
substance of some of the footnotes is stated in brackets. 
 
 
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2.  The Witnesses’ Testimony and Their Credibility 
a.  Trial Counsel 
The referee found trial counsel, Clark, to be “totally credible.”  Clark was 
first appointed to represent petitioner in 1986, before Jensen died, regarding the 
Jensen case and the crimes involving Violet H.  “He read the felony complaints, 
the initial police reports and petitioner’s record.  [¶]  The initial reports stated that 
petitioner had taken on the persona of an individual named ‘Tony.’  Mr. Clark had 
his client checked for competency to stand trial.  He was evaluated by Dr. Kaushal 
Sharma and Dr. Michael Maloney who found him competent.  Based upon the 
doctors’ reports, Mr. Clark ‘largely’ determined he would not raise a mental 
competency issue.  As Ms. Jensen at the time was taking a ‘very bad turn,’ Mr. 
Clark decided it would be best to waive a preliminary hearing and petitioner pled 
guilty to the attempted murder and rape of Ms. Jensen and the rape of [Violet H.] 
in hopes that this might deter the district attorney from seeking capital charges if 
Ms. Jensen should die. 
“In 1986, petitioner never seemed to be physically agitated.  He changed 
his demeanor upon his return from the competency hearing and would giggle 
when the name ‘Tony’ was mentioned.  This was corroborated also by trial 
counsel’s investigator’s report.  Mr. Clark was aware that petitioner’s mother had 
talked to him after he was in custody and told the police that he needed 
‘psychological help.’  However, he did not request funding for an expert at that 
time. 
“When petitioner was returned to stand trial on the capital charges, Mr. 
Clark had several discussions with him.  Petitioner . . . was not talkative and there 
were no lengthy discussions.  Petitioner did not offer or indicate anything to his 
lawyer about childhood physical abuse from any members of his family or any 
people with whom he was living and mentioned nothing remarkable about his 
 
 
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childhood.  Mr. Clark was familiar with the comment by petitioner in Dr. 
Maloney’s report that up to the age of five, his childhood was not ‘all that shabby.’  
[Dr. Maloney’s report also stated, “Mr. Scott denies any physical abuse in the 
early family home.  He states that he was never placed out of the home and 
suffered no significant traumas during his early years.”]  Mr. Clark questioned 
petitioner about his early childhood and did not recall him offering any 
information about any childhood physical abuse.  There was nothing ‘remarkable’ 
about petitioner’s childhood based upon those interviews.  Mr. Clark did not recall 
being told by petitioner that he was molested by Mr. Douglas or Mr. Ford or 
physically beaten by his mother.  Although Mr. Clark read in Dr. Michael 
Maloney’s report about petitioner being sexually molested when he was five years 
old by a stranger, petitioner did not dwell on that issue. 
“In addition, petitioner told his lawyer that he had committed the crimes 
with which he was charged.  He told Mr. Clark that he had engaged in forcible 
intercourse with Ms. Jensen, lit the fire (including how he had done it and where it 
started), and had a bat with him at the time of the assault.  He also admitted raping 
[Violet H.], while having a knife and a bat with him at the time.  Petitioner never 
blamed the crimes on anyone else but ‘Tony,’ and later, petitioner told Mr. Clark 
that Tony was a ‘con.’  [¶]  Mr. Clark remembered inquiring of petitioner about 
contacting his family members.  It was discussed at some length on more than one 
occasion.  Mr. Clark’s recollection was that petitioner was adamant that he did not 
wish trial counsel to involve his family in any way.  This was petitioner’s attitude 
in both 1986 and 1988. 
“Trial counsel had spoken to petitioner’s mother, Ora Thornton, around the 
time of the ‘preliminary hearing of the trial phase of the case.’  She did not 
indicate that she had anything to offer.  Although petitioner had told Mr. Clark not 
to get involved with family, trial counsel attempted to contact the mother for the 
 
 
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penalty phase in order to test petitioner’s position of whether or not he wanted his 
family involved.  However, Mr. Clark was not sure he would have called 
petitioner’s mother to the stand, but he was not in a position to follow up with her 
if there was anything to be followed up on as he could not find her.  Mr. Clark also 
spoke to one of petitioner’s sisters who tried to offer an alibi inconsistent with 
what petitioner had told him.  Trial counsel did not remember meeting any other 
family members.  Mr. Clark had never told anyone they could not attend any of 
the court proceedings in the homicide case. 
“Mr. Clark believed there was an absence of any presence of overwhelming 
psychiatric factors.  Petitioner had told him there ‘ . . . was no Tony and he was a 
con.’  [¶]  Mr. Clark had hired his father-in-law, Walter D. Hill, a former Los 
Angeles Sheriff’s officer, as an investigator.  In a report prepared by Mr. Hill, 
dated November 30, 1988, it was noted that petitioner had told the investigator 
that he had taken various drugs the night of the crimes and did not remember 
anything when they took place.  Mr. Clark also knew that petitioner had taken 
Mellaril, researched it, and believed it was something he could not ‘muster’ in 
terms of a defense.  He did not remember subpoenaing petitioner’s California 
Department of Corrections records during the capital trial because he had seen 
some in the hands of the prosecution. 
“Petitioner did not display any symptoms or signs of drug abuse to Mr. 
Clark.  A 1986 probation report indicated that petitioner was not a habitual drinker 
or user of marijuana.  This was consistent with what petitioner had told him in 
1986.  He was also aware of Dr. Sharma’s 1986 report relative to a history of drug 
abuse including PCP, marijuana and cocaine.  Mr. Clark believed that Dr. 
Maloney’s report contraindicated a mental defense in the matter.  In light of the 
reports of Dr. Sharma and Dr. Maloney, Mr. Clark believed it was in his best 
tactical interest to take the avenue of the defense of medical malpractice. 
 
 
9
“As to the general investigation of the offenses, Mr. Clark recalled in his 
1988-1989 investigation that he talked to various Los Angeles Sheriff officers he 
knew regarding the case.  He did not contact any psychiatrists and had only a 
‘nominal’ consideration of mitigating evidence other than intervening medical 
malpractice at the penalty phase.  Mr. Clark planned to use the medical 
malpractice defense at both the guilt phase and the penalty phase.  Mr. Clark 
believed that petitioner was not responsible for the death by reason of the medical 
malpractice.  Counsel did not want to present a ‘cafeteria defense’ . . . . 
“Mr. Clark had difficulty in locating Glenn ‘Rerun’ Johnson and did not 
interview him before the trial.  When Mr. Johnson testified, Mr. Clark utilized his 
testimony as a basis of ‘diminished actuality’ although he did not remember such 
at the time of the evidentiary hearing.  [(See Scott, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1216.)]  
[¶]  No individual, including family members, offered any information which Mr. 
Clark could utilize in the penalty phase. 
“Trial counsel had several reasons why he wanted to waive jury in this 
matter.  His practice was primarily in the Antelope Valley where he had tried 
many cases.  He knew that the jurors there were conservative, and he was familiar 
with the attitude of the local populace.  Mr. Clark was concerned about putting 
evidence of at least two or three rapes in front of a  jury by reason of their ‘cross-
racial’ nature.  Mr. Clark had discussed the subject of the jury waiver with 
petitioner on multiple occasions and gave petitioner an opportunity to think about 
it for weeks.  Trial counsel explained to his client the defense of intervening 
medical malpractice.  The jury waiver was as to only one particular jurist, Los 
Angeles Superior Court Judge Margaret Grignon [now an Associate Justice of the 
Court of Appeal].  She had experience as a judicial officer both in municipal court 
and superior court.  Mr. Clark had been in front of Judge Grignon numerous times.  
The judge appeared to be a very smart individual, a ‘ . . . skyrocket in the legal 
 
 
10
community.’  In addition, Judge Grignon was married to a physician and her 
father-in-law was a physician who practiced in the Lancaster/Antelope Valley area 
for a number of years.  Counsel believed that she was better able to grasp 
intricacies of a medical malpractice defense than a jury.” 
Trial counsel said he did nothing to investigate a possible mental defense in 
1989, but “in 1986, he had a ‘general survey’ which was part of the reason that 
reports had been requested.  He believed that once the 1986 proceeding was 
concluded, the possibility of a psychiatric defense had been ruled out, based upon 
the findings of the two doctors and based upon the settlement of petitioner’s 
symptoms.  Mr. Clark noted that ‘ . . . each of these reports has come back and 
indicated that the defendant had manifested certain symptomology in front of them 
which they did not believe to be real, that they believed to be feigned.’  Mr. Clark 
further noted that the problems did not seem to rise to the level of being ‘clinically 
significant.’  He did not believe that the use of any experts was warranted by 
reason of the two reports that he had in his possession.  He believed issues about 
‘Tony’ were ‘not a viable place to go . . . .’  When petitioner returned for trial, Mr. 
Clark did not further investigate a mental defense because of ‘[petitioner’s] initial 
comments that did not seem to be at all warranted, or criminal.’ ” 
When asked what he did to investigate potential mitigating evidence, Clark 
said “that the mitigation as to petitioner was the fact that he was not ‘. . . 
responsible for what happened to Ms. Jensen.’ ”  Clark said that he did not 
investigate other possible evidence because he believed “it did not seem to be 
where the case ‘needed to go.’  Although Mr. Clark believed he argued issues of 
mental impairment at trial, he did not mount a full-blown investigation in that 
direction.  [¶]  He believed that such would be inconsistent with ‘ . . . where the 
case had gone in chief.’  Nothing in the experience of petitioner seemed to make 
those viable alternatives that could be established with any degree of certainty to 
 
 
11
the trier of fact.  [¶]  Mr. Clark had not gone into petitioner’s background because 
he had discussed that issue in the framework of Dr. Maloney’s report and 
petitioner had not ‘ . . . complained about them.’  Petitioner did not want to 
involve his family in the case at all.” 
When asked why he had advised petitioner to waive a jury, “Mr. Clark said 
that he felt that the nature of the arguments that were going to be raised in the trial 
and their complexity would not be well received by a jury ‘tactically’ and would 
be seen as an ‘excuse.’  He believed that such ‘ . . . would be better situated with 
someone like Judge Grignon.’  When asked if Mr. Clark would have changed his 
mind, in advising his client to waive jury, if he had investigated ‘the mental 
defense or other mitigating evidence,’ he responded ‘ . . . no, I felt that the tenor of 
the medical malpractice case was such that it warranted the jury waiver.’ ” 
b.  Petitioner’s Family and Friends 
The referee found the testimony of petitioner’s family and friends generally 
had “very little credible value.  The testimony on the whole of these individuals 
appeared to be exaggerated, histrionic and recently fabricated.  It should be noted 
in this regard that Carrie MacMurray, petitioner’s sister, and Cynthia Ford Geiggar 
and Candius Ford, petitioner’s half sisters, when they testified at the evidentiary 
hearing, all gave an alibi as to petitioner’s whereabouts on the night of the crimes 
against Ms. Jensen.  In contrast, petitioner admitted to the authorities and to his 
trial counsel his involvement with the rape and fire at the Jensen residence.  In this 
regard, petitioner’s mother, Ora Thornton, also believed that her son was innocent 
of the rape and murder of Ms. Jensen.”  The referee also noted that “[n]ot only did 
Ms. MacMurray, Ms. Geiggar and Ms. Ford proffer an alibi at the evidentiary 
hearing on behalf of petitioner, their versions thereof were inconsistent.”  The 
report recounted these witnesses’ testimony.  In general, they painted a grim 
 
 
12
picture of petitioner’s unloved childhood, replete with abuse by his parents and 
others, including Burrell Ford, and abuse of drugs and alcohol.  Some reported that 
petitioner, when young, had attempted suicide. 
The referee found that Natalie S., “who had been made pregnant by 
petitioner when he was 22 and she was 14, had no credibility.”  Natalie S. was the 
daughter of Violet H., the victim of the rape petitioner committed shortly before 
the capital crime.  “Her claim that petitioner had a consensual affair with her 
mother . . . was belied by petitioner’s admissions to the crime to his counsel and 
the blood found at the scene after the incident by [Ms. S.] herself.  [Ms. S.’s] 
accusations that Mr. Clark told her that she was not going to testify because 
petitioner (using an offensive racial epithet) was going to ‘fry’ is nothing less than 
ludicrous.” 
The referee found some of these witnesses credible.  “Of all the family 
members, Leander Thornton appeared to be the most credible.  He had married 
petitioner’s mother.  He testified that the mother smoked marijuana in petitioner’s 
presence, that petitioner intervened [in] a fight between Mr. Thornton and the 
mother on the mother’s behalf, that petitioner and the mother smoked marijuana 
together, that petitioner loved his sisters and protected them in any way he could, 
and that the mother disciplined petitioner by striking him in the face with her 
hand, but that he did not remember ever seeing her abuse him.”   
“Richard Vargas . . . did appear to have credibility with the referee.  
Richard Vargas testified that on the night of the Jensen crimes, petitioner had 
asked Mr. Vargas for a ride to purchase some rock cocaine and that petitioner 
appeared to be ‘under the influence.’  In Mr. Vargas’ opinion, petitioner appeared 
to he ‘high on cocaine’ as he was ‘real twitchy,’ ‘antsy-like’ and ‘hyper.’ ” 
The referee also found to “have some credibility,” a witness the People 
called, Burrell Ford, who had lived with petitioner’s mother for three years.  “He 
 
 
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testified that he neither physically nor sexually abused petitioner, and that he never 
saw the mother use drugs in petitioner’s presence.  He also denied giving 
petitioner narcotics or alcohol.  He noted that the mother would ‘take off’ and 
leave the family at times and that he never saw the mother do anything sexually 
‘improper’ towards petitioner.  He also testified that he never saw the mother beat 
petitioner [in the ways that some of the other witnesses testified] and in fact never 
saw the mother punish petitioner.  Mr. Ford had punished petitioner once when he 
and Cynthia Ford set the trash can on fire [by spanking him with his belt].” 
“In summary, the referee finds that the testimony of family and friends was 
in large part unbelievable and inferentially recently fabricated after the sentence of 
death had been imposed.” 
c.  The Experts 
Three mental health experts, Dr. Dale Watson, Dr. Roderick Pettis and Dr. 
Julie Kriegler, testified for petitioner and one, Dr. Kaushal Sharma, testified for 
the People.  The referee found the testimony of Drs. Watson, Pettis, and Kriegler 
had “very little weight,” as their opinions “were based in large part on the 
statements and declarations of petitioner’s family, and further, were based upon 
examinations done years after the crimes of which petitioner had been convicted.” 
“Dale Watson, a clinical psychologist, had performed a neuropsychological 
evaluation in June or August of 1996 and met with petitioner for approximately 11 
hours, giving him a battery of tests.  Dr. Watson gave the opinion that petitioner 
operated in the low average to borderline range of intellectual ability, that there 
was ‘evidence’ that petitioner suffered from mental illness and posttraumatic stress 
disorder although he made no such specific findings, that petitioner had a history 
of substance dependence, that he had been a victim of physical and sexual abuse 
that had left ‘substantial signs of psychological damage,’ that he lived a chaotic 
 
 
14
life in early childhood, that he had suffered episodes of depression and attempted 
suicide and was an individual who experienced a great deal of trauma.  However, 
much of Dr. Watson’s opinion was based upon what petitioner had told him, 
which was not admitted for the truth asserted but merely as a basis of Dr. 
Watson’s opinion.  Dr. Watson testified that all the information he received about 
petitioner’s life was derived from petitioner himself and he did not verify the 
accuracy of that information.  Dr. Watson testified that if the information that 
petitioner told him was not accurate, such would certainly affect his report. 
“Dr. Roderick Pettis, a psychiatrist, . . . first examined petitioner 11 years 
after the crimes and obtained information derived from petitioner, family 
members, experts hired by petitioner and various records.  He never personally 
interviewed petitioner’s family members; rather, he learned information from 
petitioner’s family through declarations. 
“Dr. Pettis interviewed petitioner for approximately three hours in 1997.  In 
2001 he interviewed petitioner twice, once for approximately four hours and the 
second time for ‘about’ two and a half hours.  Dr. Pettis opined that petitioner was 
vulnerable to mental illness and substance abuse by reason of family history of the 
same.  He further felt there was a very compelling history of universal trauma and 
very little opportunity to develop a healthy sense of ‘self.’  He believed that 
petitioner suffered from ‘hyper-arousal’ and longstanding mental health symptoms 
which included depression, substance abuse, disorganized thinking, psychosis and 
borderline cognitive functioning.  He opined that petitioner suffered a combination 
of posttraumatic stress disorder plus psychosis based upon both genetics and an 
environment of sexual and physical abuse and the utilization of drugs, and further, 
had difficulty in abstract thought.  Dr. Pettis believed that his opinions were 
corroborated by the fact that when petitioner was taken to County Jail he was 
placed on Mellaril, an antipsychotic drug, and placed in four-point security 
 
 
15
restraints.  There was no indication that petitioner suffered from multiple-
personality disorder, and further petitioner never mentioned ‘Tony.’  Dr. Pettis’ 
diagnosis was that on the night of the murder, petitioner was in a disorganized and 
dissociative state and that events on his mind were not going in a normal linear 
fashion but rather ‘things are popping up and down’ and going out of order.  He 
therefore saw ‘ . . . things in terms of a motion picture which is not running on 
track.’  Petitioner was not capable of deciding whether or not he would satisfy his 
lust, whether or not to beat Ms. Jensen, or deciding whether or not to light the 
match. 
“The problem with Dr. Pettis’ diagnosis of dissociative disorganized state is 
that it is not borne out by the evidence.  The crimes of rape and the burning were 
committed in a logical sequence.  In addition, Mr. Scott admitted committing the 
crimes to two Deputy Sheriffs and also to his attorney Mr. Clark.  Dr. Pettis 
opined that either (1) the confessions were suggested by the authorities, or (2) the 
defendant filled in the gaps unconsciously, even if it harmed himself and even 
though he did not actually remember the facts, or (3) the confessions were true.  
Dr. Pettis conceded, however, that if the confessions were true, it might be 
inconsistent with being dissociative at the time.  However, he stated that by reason 
of his state of intoxication petitioner’s weighing of the pros and cons or his ability 
to make a moral choice might have been impaired. 
“The theory of Dr. Pettis is belied by the ‘Tony’ defense when petitioner 
confessed to the Sheriff’s office and used the word ‘Tony’ in [an] attempt to create 
a false mental defense of a multiple personality.  Petitioner later admitted to his 
trial counsel that ‘Tony’ did not exist and was a ‘con.’  As such, the referee finds 
that the statements of culpability made by petitioner were true and that when he 
spoke to the Sheriff’s office, he deliberately tried to fabricate a multiple 
personality defense by the use of ‘Tony.’  It is believed that petitioner had 
 
 
16
knowledge that what he did was wrong by trying to falsify a ‘Tony’ defense when 
he confessed to the authorities.  Dr. Pettis’ suggestion that the statements to the 
authorities were false by reason of their being suggested or unconsciously 
manufactured is belied by petitioner intentionally mixing the statements in a 
devious, well-thought-out manner with the ‘Tony defense.’  Even Dr. Pettis found 
no evidence of multiple personality disorder, a diagnosis rejected as well by Dr. 
Sharma. 
“Dr. Julie Kriegler, a licensed psychologist, . . . had created a psychological 
social history.  This history had encompassed the time up to early 1986.  Dr. 
Kriegler interviewed petitioner on July 14, August 4, and October 16, 2000.  The 
interviews each lasted up to three hours.  Dr. Kriegler also interviewed the mother, 
Ora Mae Thornton, and the sister, Carrie MacMurray.  She also referred to 
declarations of other individuals.  Dr. Kriegler held the opinion that there was a 
pattern of significant mental disorders that had spanned through his great-
grandparents’ generation and that petitioner was emotionally, medically, 
nutritionally and educationally neglected by an array of inconsistent caretakers 
who were not capable of appropriate parenting.  Dr. Kriegler believed that 
petitioner suffered severe, protracted physical and psychological abuse and had 
few opportunities to develop outside systems of support.  Dr. Kriegler also had the 
opinion that petitioner suffered ‘severe protracted sexual abuse,’ was raised in 
communities of violence, and experienced ‘high levels’ of violence in the home.  
She believed that petitioner had borderline intellectual functioning and impaired 
cognitive abilities which restricted his ability to cope.  [¶]  Based upon her 
evaluation, she found that petitioner suffered from substance abuse and was 
exposed to a significant amount of negative risks and a lack of positive factors.  
She believed that the cumulation of these factors contributed to a severe 
 
 
17
psychological decomposition.  Her diagnosis of petitioner included posttraumatic 
stress disorder, multiple mood disorders and a chemical dependency. 
“However, Dr. Kriegler’s investigation was based in large part upon family 
interviews and discussions with petitioner himself.  As already noted, the referee 
finds that the family members’ testimony in large part was not credible.  While 
petitioner himself gave details to Dr. Kriegler, he was very parsimonious in his 
discussions with Mr. Clark and gave no such information during trial counsel’s 
representation.  Since the bulk of Dr. Kriegler’s opinion was based on information 
which the referee finds to be unbelievable, her opinions carry very little weight. 
“Dr. Kaushal Sharma, a psychiatrist, . . . is the only mental health 
professional who testified who had examined petitioner shortly after the crimes.[2]  
He believed that petitioner was presenting himself as more mentally impaired than 
suggested by authentic mental illness.  He noted that petitioner feigned both 
confusion whenever the doctor asked questions about the charged crimes and a 
headache whenever the doctor questioned him regarding the facts of the case.  He 
opined that petitioner did not appear to suffer from dissociative identity disorder.  
Dr. Sharma was not too concerned about the administration of Mellaril to 
petitioner while in custody in 1986.  At that time the drug was used as a chemical 
restraint in institutional jail settings and Dr. Sharma noted that petitioner had been 
given the drug only after being involved in a jailhouse physical altercation.  He 
also believed that there was no sign of psychosis or posttraumatic stress disorder.  
                                             
 
2  
In a footnote, the referee noted that “[t]he reports of Dr. Sharma and Dr. 
Michael Maloney are very relevant to explain the nature of trial counsels’ actions 
and decision making and what may or may not have been discovered upon further 
investigation.  However, neither Dr. Sharma nor Dr. Maloney could have been 
called in rebuttal at trial by the prosecution by reason of People v. Arcega (1982) 
32 Cal.3d 504, 522-523, as they had been appointed relative to the issue of 
competency to stand trial.” 
 
 
18
In this regard there was no evidence that petitioner had posttraumatic stress 
disorder flashbacks while in court, and he had not been diagnosed with the 
syndrome until the late 1990’s.  Dr. Sharma had reviewed the declarations 
prepared by petitioner’s family members and friends and found that they lacked 
credibility, were inconsistent and based upon multiple hearsay . . . .  Dr. Sharma 
rejected the reports prepared by Dr. Watson, Dr. Pettis and Dr. Kriegler as he 
believed the information relied upon [by] those professionals was lacking in 
credibility.” 
The referee summarized his credibility findings regarding the mental health 
experts.  “Since the testimony of the medical experts proffered by petitioner were 
based primarily on statements by family and friends and petitioner himself, they 
also carry little weight.  This is especially true since petitioner’s statements to the 
health experts conflicted with what he told defense counsel whose testimony the 
referee finds to be credible in recounting their discussions.” 
Petitioner also called Edward Rucker, an attorney, who “had great 
credibility in the referee’s eyes.  He testified that social histories were in vogue 
with regard to penalty phases of capital cases in 1989.  However, he also explained 
that in the late 1980’s information for a social history was gathered by an 
investigator and not amassed by health professionals and sociologists.” 
3.  Referee’s Answers to Questions 
a.  Whether Petitioner Hindered the Investigation or Presentation 
of Evidence 
The referee first answered the question whether petitioner had himself 
requested curtailment or done anything to hinder or prevent the investigation or 
presentation of evidence supporting a mental defense or in mitigation, “because it 
affects the answers to all further questions.”  He found petitioner did so in two 
respects. 
 
 
19
First, “In 1986 and 1988, petitioner did not want to discuss or involve his 
family.  Mr. Clark wanted to get into that area on more than one occasion, but it 
was not a place that petitioner ‘ . . . wanted to go.’ ”  Clark could not remember 
specifically what petitioner had said in this regard in 1986, but he had the 
“impression” that petitioner did not want to involve his family, and his attitude 
was always consistent in 1988.  In 1988, “petitioner was ‘adamant about not 
wanting to involve his family in any way.’  [¶]  It was Mr. Clark’s normal practice 
to discuss with the defendant and advise that client of the importance of having 
family members who are involved cooperate and testify. . . .  Mr. Clark abided by 
petitioner’s wishes in not contacting any family because ‘those were his wishes, 
those were the bounds of my representation.’ ”3 
Second, “petitioner was not very talkative to trial counsel in their 
discussions relative to giving Mr. Clark information to be used at trial.  [¶]  
Petitioner did not offer or indicate any information about childhood physical abuse 
and said nothing remarkable related thereto.” 
b.  Investigation into a Possible Mental Defense 
The referee found that trial counsel’s investigation “as to possible mental 
defenses at the guilt phase was minimal.”  Counsel “requested a report on 
petitioner’s competency to stand trial.”  Based on the resulting reports of Drs. 
Sharma and Maloney, and their beliefs that petitioner had “feigned” certain 
symptomology, counsel did not believe that hiring other mental health experts was 
                                             
 
3  
In a footnote, the referee noted, “Although the investigative report of Mr. 
Hill mentioned that petitioner gave the investigator an address where he believed 
his sister, Carrie ‘Scott’ lived, it was in the context of his alleged whereabouts on 
the night of the Jensen crimes and not a request as to where to find his sister.  Such 
is therefore not in conflict with trial counsel’s assertions that petitioner did not 
want his family involved.” 
 
 
20
warranted.  “Although counsel spoke to petitioner about ‘Tony’ in 1986, his client 
was vague and would ‘giggle’ whenever ‘Tony’ was mentioned.  [¶]  In 1988 
when trial counsel was reappointed, he attempted to accumulate the information 
initially gathered in 1986 and again interview his client.  Trial counsel did not 
conduct any formal investigation as to mental defenses when petitioner was 
brought back for trial.  However, he did have informal conversations with 
Sheriff’s deputies whom he saw at the courthouse.  Also, Mr. Clark spoke again 
with petitioner about ‘Tony’ and his client told him ‘ . . . that Tony was a con and 
there was no Tony.’  In addition, trial counsel in 1988 hired an investigator, . . . 
who interviewed petitioner.  Counsel had interviewed petitioner on several 
occasions and investigated the use of Mellaril.” 
“The results of the investigation by trial counsel were findings by two 
court-appointed mental health experts, Dr. Kaushal Sharma and Dr. Michael 
Maloney, on the issue of competency to stand trial.  Their findings did not support 
a mental defense.  Rather these reports reflected an absence of evidence of mental 
illness with the opinion that petitioner was a malingerer.  Dr. Sharma’s report 
noted that petitioner had a tendency to express symptoms which ‘may not be’ 
based on ‘authentic’ mental illness.  This was corroborated by the seeming 
feigning of a headache by petitioner when questioned about the facts of the case 
and the lack of exhibition of any signs of multiple personality disorder.  Dr. 
Maloney’s report was corroborative of the findings of Dr. Sharma in his report.  
Although Dr. Sharma’s report indicated that petitioner had no conscious 
knowledge of the facts of the ‘instant crimes,’ petitioner had admitted to his 
lawyer committing the crimes against Ms. Jensen and confessed to the authorities 
as well. 
“. . .  The report of Mr. Hill [the defense investigator] noted that petitioner 
said he had drunk ‘Southern Comfort’ and had taken certain drugs with a Derrick 
 
 
21
Tibbs and a woman called ‘Mater’ until at least 11:30 p.m. and could not 
remember any events between the hours of 11:30 p.m. and the time he knocked on 
his sister’s door the following morning.  However, this was contradicted . . . by 
petitioner’s recounting to his lawyer and to the authorities the events of the crimes 
against Ms. Jensen.  [¶]  Based upon the conversations petitioner had with his 
lawyer, Mr. Clark did not see any signs his client suffered from any short or long-
term substance abuse as he did not exhibit lapses of memory or recollection and 
was able to account for his activities.  Further, Mr. Clark had the opinion that his 
client did not appear to be an individual who did not know where he had been, 
what he had done and what he had been doing.” 
Regarding what additional evidence supporting a mental defense petitioner 
could have presented at the guilt phase, the referee noted, “a great deal of 
information [was] presented at the evidentiary hearing by family, friends and 
mental health experts relative to [petitioner’s] upbringing and mental state.  
Family members and friends testified as to childhood deprivation, drug and 
alcohol use, physical and sexual abuse, neglect, discrimination, repeated suicide 
attempts, and petitioner’s continuing efforts to protect and feed his siblings.  This 
information, along with statements made by petitioner to the defense mental health 
experts and the mental health experts’ opinions themselves, formed the crux of the 
evidence presented at the habeas corpus hearing.  However, the referee finds that 
petitioner would not have been able to present any such appreciable evidence at 
the guilt phase because it believes that the bulk of the matters testified to by family 
and friends was not credible in that they were recently fabricated and/or greatly 
exaggerated and that petitioner’s mental health expert opinions proffered at the 
hearing were based in large part upon this apocryphal material.  The referee finds 
that trial counsel would have been unable to accumulate the great bulk of the 
materials presented by his able appellate and habeas corpus counsel. 
 
 
22
“The fact that trial counsel would have been unable to glean information 
from petitioner’s family and friends is bolstered by petitioner being ‘adamant’ 
about his attorney not involving family.  In fact, counsel for petitioner had 
attempted to contact the mother for purposes of the penalty phase to see if his 
client would change his mind in that regard but was unable to locate her.  
Furthermore, counsel for petitioner had spoken to his mother around the time of 
the preliminary hearing and she had nothing to offer.  One of the sisters of 
petitioner who contacted trial counsel merely gave an alibi, which of course was 
contradicted by his client’s own admissions.  Mr. Clark questioned the credibility 
of this sister.  In addition, Mr. Clark did not remember meeting the other family 
members.  In fact, most of the family members only attended the trial sporadically 
or not at all.”  At this point, the report goes into detail about how often the various 
witnesses attended the trial. 
“While petitioner was seemingly loquacious about his alleged past 
activities and alleged drug use to the health providers, especially after he had been 
sentenced to death, he was not talkative or informative to his trial counsel when he 
was being represented by him.  As such, the referee finds that it was very doubtful, 
if not impossible, for trial counsel to have discovered the ‘plethora’ of material 
presented at the habeas corpus hearing, which formed the vast majority of the 
basis for the mental health expert opinions presented by petitioner at the 
evidentiary hearing. 
“However, two issues may have been presented based upon further 
investigation.”  First, “trial counsel was aware that his mother had suffered 
psychiatric difficulties.”  Second was Richard Vargas’s testimony regarding 
petitioner’s condition the night of the crimes.   
“Although the mother had a psychiatric background, counsel for petitioner 
was hampered by his client’s desire that he not involve family, and further, it is 
 
 
23
questionable as to what could have been discovered as to a possible mental 
defense by reason of psychiatric problems in the family.  The same would apply as 
to any other alleged history of psychological disorder in petitioner’s family.” 
Regarding what investigative steps would have led to this additional 
evidence, the referee found that “the bulk of [the] matters presented at the 
evidentiary hearing on behalf of petitioner would never have been discovered no 
matter what additional investigative steps [were] taken.  As to the mother’s 
psychiatric history, it would have been difficult to obtain such information by 
reasons of petitioner’s request that family not be involved.  Further, there is no 
showing that such would have led to any fruitful material absent what the referee 
finds to be recently fabricated material by family and friends.  [¶]  Relative to Mr. 
Vargas, petitioner’s trial counsel could possibly have been more aggressive in 
attempting to contact him or persons who had seen petitioner on the night in issue.  
Such investigation may or may not have resulted in the information testified [to] 
by Mr. Vargas at the evidentiary hearing.” 
Regarding the credibility of this additional evidence, the referee reiterated 
that he found the bulk of the evidence petitioner presented at the evidentiary 
hearing not credible.  He found Vargas credible but noted that his testimony 
“would have been in large part duplicative of the testimony of Glenn ‘Rerun’ 
Johnson, Jr., who testified on behalf of the prosecution at the trial.  Mr. Johnson 
testified that on the night in issue, he was sharing cocaine with petitioner and that 
‘we were getting high.’ ” 
Regarding what circumstances weighed against investigating or presenting 
this additional evidence, the referee reiterated much of his previous findings 
regarding the circumstances confronting trial counsel and noted that counsel 
wanted to maintain his credibility and not present a “cafeteria” defense.  The 
referee also noted that “the various probation and prison records, investigative 
 
 
24
reports and other materials were contradictory and in conflict with the issues of 
drug use and psychiatric background.” 
Regarding what rebuttal evidence would have been available to the 
prosecution, the referee found that “[c]ertain records had information contrary to a 
mental defense.  However, since the referee finds that trial counsel would not have 
been able to retrieve the bulk of the evidence presented at the habeas corpus 
hearing, it is questionable what rebuttal evidence, if any, would even have been 
needed.” 
c.  Investigation into Potential Mitigating Evidence 
The referee found that counsel’s investigation into potential mitigating 
evidence for the penalty phase “was minimal except for the utilization of 
intervening medical malpractice as both a frontal attack in the guilt phase and 
again in the penalty phase.  Furthermore, Mr. Clark had attempted to speak to 
petitioner about his family and about his childhood . . . [and] attempted but was 
unable to locate the mother for the penalty phase in order to determine from 
petitioner if he would be allowed to use her. 
“As to consideration of issues of mental impairment which did not reach a 
level of a defense at the guilt phase, Mr. Clark believed he argued those to some 
degree but did not mount a full-blown investigation in that direction.  Mr. Clark 
did not go into any other issue of mental impairment because he felt it would be 
inconsistent.  There was nothing in Mr. Clark’s experience with petitioner that 
seemed to make those viable alternative defenses that could be presented with any 
degree of certainty to the trier of fact.  Mr. Clark also had not investigated too 
deeply into petitioner’s background or youth because he had discussed those 
issues with petitioner as raised within the framework of Dr. Maloney’s report.  
 
 
25
Petitioner did not complain about those issues and he had not wanted to involve 
the family in the case at all.” 
Regarding the results of this investigation, the referee noted that counsel 
obtained “Dr. Marvin Ginsburg, a cardiopulmonary specialist, who testified on the 
issue of intervening medical malpractice at the trial.”  Clark also spoke to 
petitioner’s mother, who had nothing to offer, to a sister of petitioner, who wished 
to give an alibi that was contrary to what petitioner had told his lawyer, and to “a 
young 14-year-old teenager claiming to be pregnant (thought to be Natalie [S.]) 
who offered no information . . . .  Discussions with petitioner were not particularly 
fruitful as he was not talkative.  He did not offer or indicate anything about 
childhood physical abuse, and never mentioned being molested.  Mr. Clark was 
aware that petitioner had told Dr. Maloney that up to the age of five, his life was 
not ‘all that shabby.’  Although counsel was aware of a molestation by a stranger 
of petitioner when he was five years old by reason of Dr. Maloney’s report, it was 
not something that petitioner seemed to dwell upon as far as their conversation 
was concerned.  The results of the investigation relative to petitioner’s mental 
defenses has been discussed in answer to the questions regarding mental defenses 
at the guilt phase.” 
Regarding what additional mitigating evidence petitioner could have 
presented, the referee reiterated that the “great bulk of the evidence presented at 
the evidentiary hearing by petitioner’s family and friends was recently fabricated 
and would not have been available to trial counsel at the time of the investigation 
or for use at the penalty phase.  [¶]  Relative to the mental defenses, the referee 
believes that the family and friends’ discussions of physical abuse, familial sexual 
abuse, use of drugs and alcohol, maltreatment, and other related matters were 
either nonexistent or so greatly embellished that one would never be able to ferret 
out the truth.” 
 
 
26
“While the referee believes that petitioner was raised in a family which was 
not entirely stable and in which illicit drugs were no stranger, the extent of the 
alleged chaos of petitioner’s upbringing is greatly in question in light of 
petitioner’s own statements to his attorney relative to his youth.  In this regard, the 
referee does not accept as true the allegations of physical abuse or sexual abuse 
within the family and friends, but rather believes them to be a belated attempt by 
the family and friends to aid petitioner in the habeas corpus proceedings.  There 
are certain issues which may have possibly been raised by investigation, and while 
the referee has doubts as to their viability, they will be mentioned in this report. 
“As discussed earlier, petitioner’s family testified that they loved him and 
the sisters had testified that petitioner was their protector.  This is supported by the 
testimony of Leander Thornton, the most credible of petitioner’s family . . . .  
When Mr. Thornton and petitioner’s mother were having a fight, petitioner hit 
him.  There possibly could have been information gleaned that petitioner 
supported his family and they in turn loved him.  However, such is contraindicated 
by the fact that petitioner’s family, except for Candius Ford, rarely attended the 
court proceedings.  Again, petitioner’s trial counsel was hampered by his client’s 
wish that he not get family involved. 
“Another possible area of investigation would have been Natalie [S.], as 
she had testified of petitioner’s kindness to her and helping her with her algebra.  
However, such testimony would have been fraught with danger since Ms. [S.] was 
14 years old at the time she was impregnated by the adult 22-year-old petitioner 
who knew her to be underaged.  It is questionable what further investigation would 
have brought up regarding the alleged child molestation of petitioner when he was 
five years old by a stranger as set forth in Dr. Maloney’s report.  Whether it was 
true or not is made questionable in light of the fact that it was not a subject which 
petitioner seemed to dwell upon. . . . [T]rial counsel may have been able to obtain 
 
 
27
information from Mr. Vargas relative to a possible drug intoxication on the night 
of the murder which, while not being a legal defense, would go to an apparent 
state of mind.  However, whether such evidence would have been obtainable is not 
certain and was in many ways duplicative of the testimony of Glenn ‘Rerun’ 
Johnson, Jr., at trial.” 
Regarding what investigative steps would have led to this additional 
evidence, the referee reiterated that the bulk of the evidence presented at the 
evidentiary hearing was recently fabricated and thus could not have been 
discovered before trial.  “However, petitioner’s counsel could have inquired more 
as to the relationship of petitioner and his family relative to love and loyalty 
except for the fact that petitioner had told his lawyer that he did not want the 
family involved.  He could also have made more inquiries of Natalie [S.] and 
attempted to investigate the knowledge of Mr. Vargas as to petitioner’s condition 
on the night of the murders.” 
Regarding the credibility of the additional evidence, the referee largely 
reiterated his earlier findings.   He added, “Natalie [S.]’s testimony would have 
been highly questionable in light of the fact that she had been impregnated at the 
age of 14 by petitioner when he was 22.  The utilization of mental impairment not 
equivalent to mental defense would have had the same problems as the utilization 
of the mental defense itself in the guilt phase because of its basis primarily on 
fabrications, exaggerations, and embellishments of family and friends.” 
Regarding what circumstances weighed against investigating and 
presenting this additional evidence, the referee reiterated previous relevant 
findings.  “Furthermore, mental impairment relative to a mental defense might be 
questionable if voluntary use of drugs or alcohol was a primary cause of such 
alleged impairment.  The same reasons why petitioner’s trial counsel did not raise 
 
 
28
a mental defense except to briefly mention the diminished actuality in argument 
would apply to this issue as well.” 
Regarding what rebuttal evidence might have been available to the 
prosecution, the referee found it possible the prosecution would have presented 
evidence that “petitioner had been a member of the Raymond Crips Gang and, 
further, that he had sold marijuana in the past if family members had been called 
to testify.”  If Natalie S. had testified, the prosecution might have presented 
evidence that petitioner had “impregnat[ed] a 14-year-old schoolgirl.”  “Burrell 
Ford could have also been called in rebuttal relative to the lack of physical or 
sexual abuse by family and friends when he had been present.” 
d.  Reasons for Waiving a Jury 
The referee credited Clark’s testimony as to why he advised petitioner to 
waive a jury.  He summarized, “Thus, a primary motivation for the jury waiver 
was [to be] able to have the case decided by a particular jurist, Judge Grignon, 
because of the nature of the defense preferred and because of concern about the 
jurors in the area.”  He also found “nothing relative to the investigation that would 
have changed the dimension of the trial. . . .  The decision to waive jury was in no 
way compromised by any failure of trial counsel’s investigation. . . .  [¶]  Mr. 
Clark testified that he still would have waived jury even if he had investigated a 
mental defense or other mitigating evidence . . . .”  The referee concluded, “In 
light of the nature of the jury pool, the ability to get a highly skilled jurist to hear 
the matter, and the desire to proffer a defense of intervening medical malpractice 
in a case involving horrific facts, the referee believes that no additional 
investigation would have affected the advice to waive a jury.” 
 
 
29
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  General Legal Principles 
“Petitioner had the right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial, and 
thus was ‘entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as 
his diligent and conscientious advocate.’  [Citation.]  A defendant claiming 
ineffective representation bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence both (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., that the 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result would have been more favorable to defendant, i.e., a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.  [Citations.]”  (In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 
184, 201; see also Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 
(Strickland).) 
The United States Supreme Court has recently reemphasized that, in 
applying these principles, “a court must indulge a ‘strong presumption’ that 
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance 
because it is all too easy to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel 
was unreasonable in the harsh light of hindsight.”  (Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 
___, ___ [122 S.Ct. 1843, 1854].)  Accordingly, a court must “view and assess the 
reasonableness of counsel’s acts or omissions . . . under the circumstances as they 
stood at the time that counsel acted or failed to act.”  (People v. Ledesma (1987) 
43 Cal.3d 171, 216; also quoted in Scott, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1212.) 
“Any conclusions of law, or of mixed questions of law and fact, are subject 
to independent review.  Mixed questions include whether counsel’s performance 
was deficient and whether the deficiency prejudiced the defense.  Because the 
referee can observe the demeanor of the witnesses and their manner of testifying, 
 
 
30
findings of fact, though not binding, are entitled to great weight when supported 
by substantial evidence.”  (In re Ross, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 201.) 
B.  Preliminary Matters 
Before the evidentiary hearing was held, petitioner moved this court to 
vacate certain rulings of the referee.  We granted the motion in part and denied it 
in part without prejudice to the parties’ rearguing it, if they chose, when the matter 
came before us on the merits.  The parties have not reargued any part of that 
motion.  “Nevertheless, because our minute orders did not set out the reasoning of 
the court, and cannot serve as precedent to guide future decisions, we believe it 
appropriate to explain the basis for our decisions.”  (California Assn. of 
Psychology Providers v. Rank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1, 9.) 
1.  Ruling on Scope of Discovery 
The Attorney General moved the referee to obtain the following discovery 
from petitioner: 
“1.  All discovery allowed under Penal Code section 1054.3, including 
reports, handwritten notes, and test data from experts petitioner intends to call at 
the hearing. 
“2.  All written or recorded statements by petitioner or reports of 
petitioner’s statements relevant to his three claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
“3.  All real evidence petitioner intends to offer in evidence at the hearing.” 
In response, petitioner, through current counsel, agreed to provide “all non-
privileged reports or statements of experts made in connection with the case, 
including the results of physical or mental examinations, scientific tests, 
experiments, or comparisons which either side intends to offer in evidence at the 
hearing,” and all “real evidence” that he intended to use.  He also agreed he had 
 
 
31
waived the attorney-client privilege regarding communications with trial counsel 
to the extent they were relevant to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims, but 
he asserted the privilege as to communications with current counsel. 
At the hearing, the referee ruled that petitioner must provide discovery of 
the kind allowed in Penal Code section 1054.34 and, generally, of statements 
petitioner made to persons other than current counsel and investigators.  The 
referee agreed that communications with current counsel, “as well as any 
statement [petitioner] may have made to any expert that will not be called,” are 
privileged.  “However,” the referee ruled, “all other statements by Mr. Scott 
relevant to these issues are discoverable, as well as any statements made to any 
expert that was called or any expert that the original [trial counsel] may have 
utilized but decided not to call himself, because that will be an issue in this case.  
So far as the expert that [current counsel] called that he may use for investigative 
purposes but he will not call, those are not discoverable.  That’s attorney-client 
privilege.” 
Petitioner challenged this ruling in this court.  He argued, primarily, that 
Penal Code section 1054.3, part of the reciprocal discovery provisions of 
Proposition 115, enacted in 1990, does not apply to a habeas corpus proceeding.  
                                             
 
4  
Penal Code section 1054.3 provides:  “The defendant and his or her 
attorney shall disclose to the prosecuting attorney: 
 
“(a)  The names and addresses of persons, other than the defendant, he or 
she intends to call as witnesses at trial, together with any relevant written or 
recorded statements of those persons, or reports of the statements of those persons, 
including any reports or statements of experts made in connection with the case, 
and including the results of physical or mental examinations, scientific tests, 
experiments, or comparisons which the defendant intends to offer in evidence at 
the trial. 
 
“(b)  Any real evidence which the defendant intends to offer in evidence at 
the trial.”  (See generally Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356.) 
 
 
32
We concluded the referee’s ruling came within his discretion and denied 
petitioner’s motion to vacate this portion of the ruling.  Petitioner is correct that 
Penal Code section 1054.3 does not apply to habeas corpus proceedings.  It applies 
instead to the underlying criminal proceeding.  (See Izazaga v. Superior Court, 
supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 364.)  But it appears the referee merely cited that section as 
a shorthand way to describe and limit the discovery he was ordering. 
The nature and scope of discovery in habeas corpus proceedings has 
generally been resolved on a case-by-case basis.  (See Comparet-Cassani, 
Evidentiary Hearings in California Capital Habeas Proceedings:  What Are the 
Rules of Discovery? (1999) 39 Santa Clara L.Rev. 409, 425-426.)  We have 
indicated that discovery is available once we have issued an order to show cause, 
but we have not discussed the question further.  (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 
Cal.3d 1179, 1258-1261; In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 730.) 
If, as Proposition 115 provided, discovery is reciprocal at the criminal trial 
itself—where the defendant is presumed innocent and has no burden of proof—it 
certainly should be so on habeas corpus, where guilt has been established and the 
petitioner bears the burden of proof.  (See People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 
474.)  (Petitioner received discovery from the People relevant to the issues before 
the referee.)  Penal Code section 1054.3 was a logical place for the referee to look 
to fashion a fair discovery rule.  It requires the defendant to provide the names, 
addresses, and statements of witnesses, expert reports, and real evidence the 
defendant intends to offer.  This requirement is not onerous and could greatly 
facilitate the reference hearing.  Additionally, by claiming trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance, petitioner waived the attorney-client privilege to the extent 
relevant to the claim.  (Evid. Code, § 958; In re Gray (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 614, 
616.)  Accordingly, the referee also properly ordered discovery of petitioner’s 
relevant statements to his trial attorney.  The referee agreed that petitioner’s 
 
 
33
statements to current counsel and current experts who petitioner did not intend to 
call as witnesses were not discoverable, and he therefore excluded those 
statements from the discovery order.  We find the referee acted within his 
discretion in ordering this limited discovery. 
2.  Ruling on Petitioner’s Testimony 
The Attorney General also requested, and the referee made, two related 
orders regarding calling petitioner as a witness:  (1) the prosecution may call 
petitioner as a witness, although petitioner may assert the right against self-
incrimination as to specific questions; and (2) if petitioner does exercise the right 
against self-incrimination, the referee will “make findings of fact adverse to 
petitioner as to each question that he is ordered to answer but declines to answer 
on the grounds of self-incrimination.”  The referee based both parts of this ruling 
on orders we had issued several years earlier in another case in which we had 
ordered a reference hearing.  The referee recognized that those orders were not 
binding on him, but he found them persuasive and followed them.5  Petitioner 
challenged the order in this court, and we agreed it was erroneous in one respect. 
The first part of the order was correct.  Californians have both a 
constitutional and a statutory right not to be called as a witness against themselves 
in a criminal case.  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15 [“Persons may not . . . be compelled in 
a criminal cause to be a witness against themselves”]; Evid. Code, § 930 [“a 
defendant in a criminal case has a privilege not to be called as a witness and not to 
testify”].)  This privilege extends to proceedings that are “criminal in nature,” such 
                                             
 
5  
We caution that our minute orders apply only to the specific case and do 
not establish binding precedent for other cases.  (Thompson v. Department of 
Corrections (2001) 25 Cal.4th 117, 125; California Assn. of Psychology Providers 
v. Rank, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 9.) 
 
 
34
as a civil contempt proceeding.  (In re Witherspoon (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1000, 
1001.)  But it does not extend to proceedings that are essentially civil in nature.  
Thus, in Cramer v. Tyars (1979) 23 Cal.3d 131, 137-138, we held the privilege did 
not apply in commitment hearings of mentally retarded persons.  (See also People 
v. Whelchel (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 455, 460-461 [narcotics rehabilitation 
program]; Conservatorship of Bones (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1010, 1015-1016 
[involuntary postcertification treatment].) 
We believe a habeas corpus proceeding like this one is civil in nature for 
these purposes.6  The Legislature has labeled it a “Special Proceeding[] of a 
Criminal Nature” (Pen. Code, pt. 2, tit. 12, ch. 1, before §§ 1473-1508), but the 
label is not dispositive.  (In re Head, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 226; see Pen. Code, 
§ 10004.)   It is not itself a criminal case, and it cannot result in added punishment 
for the petitioner.  Rather, it is an independent action the defendant in the earlier 
criminal case institutes to challenge the results of that case.  (France v. Superior 
Court (1927) 201 Cal. 122, 126-127.)  Accordingly, the petitioner does not have 
the privilege not to be called as a witness.  However, if called as a witness, the 
petitioner does have the right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination as to 
individual questions, as does any witness in any proceeding.  (Evid. Code, §  940; 
see Cramer v. Tyars, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 137-138.) 
We vacated the second part of this ruling, however, and directed the referee 
“not to draw any inference if petitioner properly asserts the privilege against self-
incrimination.”  Evidence Code section 913, subdivision (a), provides as relevant:  
                                             
 
6  
We need not, and do not, decide whether a habeas corpus proceeding is 
civil or criminal for other purposes.  (See In re Head (1986) 42 Cal.3d 223, 226, 
fn. 4.)  It is a special proceeding and not entirely analogous to either category.  
(People v. Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 477-478, fn. 4.) 
 
 
35
“If in the instant proceeding . . . a privilege is or was exercised not to testify with 
respect to any matter, . . . neither the presiding officer nor counsel may comment 
thereon, no presumption shall arise because of the exercise of the privilege, and 
the trier of fact may not draw any inference therefrom as to the credibility of the 
witness or as to any matter at issue in the proceeding.”  (Italics added.)  The 
comments of the Assembly Committee on Judiciary about this statute states that it 
“eliminates any remaining basis for applying a different rule in civil cases”; it 
makes “clear that, in civil cases as well as criminal cases, inferences may be drawn 
only from the evidence in the case, not from the claim of privilege.”  (Assem. 
Com. on Judiciary com., 29B pt. 3 West’s Ann. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 913, 
p. 168.)  The Evidence Code “applies in every action before the Supreme Court 
. . . including proceedings in such actions conducted by a referee . . . .”  (Evid. 
Code, §  300.)  Accordingly, it applies to this action.  In a reference hearing, as in 
other hearings, the trier of fact may not draw adverse inferences from any 
witness’s invocation of the right against self-incrimination.7 
C.  Exceptions to the Referee’s Report 
The parties have filed numerous exceptions to the report.  The Attorney 
General’s only exception is to the referee’s description of trial counsel’s 
investigation into a possible mental defense and potential mitigating evidence as 
“minimal.”  He argues the investigation was adequate under the circumstances.  
We need not resolve this question as an exception to the report, for we will 
consider it in resolving the legal issues. 
                                             
 
7  
Because petitioner ultimately did not testify at the reference hearing, we do 
not consider any other issues that might arise regarding a testifying petitioner’s 
possible invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination. 
 
 
36
As might be expected, because the referee’s report was generally 
unfavorable to him, petitioner states many exceptions.  All lack merit. 
1.  Petitioner argues that Judge Schwab was ineligible to act as our referee.  
After we appointed him, Judge Schwab informed the parties that he had been the 
trial judge in an earlier capital trial.  (See People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585.)  
Petitioner’s trial counsel had been the defense attorney in that case also, and the 
defendant, like petitioner, later claimed the attorney had represented him 
ineffectively.  (In re Cudjo (1999) 20 Cal.4th 673, 679.)  Based on this 
circumstance, petitioner asked this court to appoint a new referee, which we 
declined to do.  Petitioner argues that Judge Schwab was disqualified under Code 
of Civil Procedure section 170.1.  He does not contend that any of the specific 
grounds for disqualification under that section exist.  Instead, he relies on the 
general provision requiring disqualification whenever “a person aware of the facts 
might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial.”  
(Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1, subd. (a)(6)(C).)  He argues, “Because Judge Schwab 
had an extensive prior relationship with trial counsel and the opportunity to 
observe [trial counsel] defending Mr. Cudjo in a capital proceeding, which led to 
unsuccessful challenges both directly and collaterally, a person aware of the fact 
that Judge Schwab presided at the Cudjo case might reasonably entertain a doubt 
that Judge Schwab would be able to be impartial as these evidentiary proceedings 
unfolded.”  We disagree. 
It appears the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1 apply to 
a judge we have appointed to act as our referee.  That section applies to any 
“judge,” which Code of Civil Procedure section 170.5 defines as “judges of the 
municipal and superior courts, and court commissioners and referees.”  (Italics 
added; see People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1247-1248, fn. 44.)  The 
standard for disqualification under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, 
 
 
37
subdivision (a)(6)(C), is objective, but potential bias and prejudice must clearly be 
established.  Courts must apply with restraint statutes authorizing disqualification 
of a judge due to bias.  (Roitz v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co. 
(1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 716, 723-724.) 
No one could reasonably doubt the ability of a judge to impartially 
determine facts regarding the performance of an attorney solely because that 
attorney had previously appeared before the judge.  Judges are routinely called on 
to determine a variety of questions involving attorneys who appear before them, 
including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Indeed, in People 
v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, we held that criminal defendants may raise 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a new trial motion, to be decided by 
the trial judge.  “It is undeniable that trial judges are particularly well suited to 
observe courtroom performance and to rule on the adequacy of counsel in criminal 
cases tried before them.”  (Id. at p. 582.)  Here the basis for the disqualification 
motion is not Judge Schwab’s observation of the attorney in this case, but in a 
different case.  That circumstance does not make him any less able to act as a 
referee than a trial judge who decides a new trial motion claiming counsel acted 
ineffectively in the same action. 
2.  Petitioner contends that the referee’s actions at the hearing showed he 
“lacked the neutrality required” of a referee.  The contention is based in part on 
petitioner’s evidentiary arguments discussed below.  In addition, he complains that 
the referee “took an active role in questioning witnesses.”  The referee did, in fact, 
question many of the witnesses, but doing so was proper.  In general, judges are 
entitled to question witnesses as long as they are temperate, nonargumentative, 
and scrupulously fair.  (People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 947-948; see 
Evid. Code, § 775.)  When the judge is acting as a referee seeking answers to 
factual questions a reviewing court has posed, and thus no jury is involved, 
 
 
38
questioning witnesses is especially appropriate.  We encourage our referees to take 
an active role in asking whatever questions they believe will assist in fully and 
accurately determining the facts.  Referees should permit the parties fully to 
present, and examine and cross-examine, witnesses, as this referee did.  But 
referees should also feel free to ask additional questions, as this referee also did.  
Petitioner asserts that the referee’s questioning was aimed at obtaining agreement 
with the referee’s own views.  We disagree.  All questioning was fair and designed 
to determine the facts, not reach a predetermined result. 
Petitioner also claims the referee misunderstood his role.  At one point the 
referee stated, “I may ask questions myself since this case is quasi-inquisitorial.”  
Later, he clarified that he did not mean the case was an “inquisition,” but rather it 
was “almost like a European procedure where you have one court that is given 
questions by another court, and makes findings, and the other court makes the 
final decision.”  This description was correct.  We ask our referees only to make 
findings on disputed factual questions; we then resolve the legal issues ourselves.  
(In re Ross, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 205.)  The record demonstrates that the referee 
correctly understood his role and acted as an impartial fact finder for this court. 
3.  Petitioner challenges certain evidentiary rulings.  First, he complains 
that, except for the limited purpose of impeaching trial counsel’s testimony, the 
referee refused to permit him to present expert legal testimony concerning the 
standard of care for capital trial counsel.  The referee acted correctly.  The 
questions we asked him were factual only and do not involve the standard of care 
or whether trial counsel’s performance was deficient.  We reserved those questions 
for ourselves.  (See In re Ross, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 205.)  The referee was not 
required to consider expert testimony irrelevant to the specific questions.  (See id. 
at pp. 214-215.)  It is true that referees have sometimes heard and considered 
expert legal testimony, but in those cases the testimony came within the scope of 
 
 
39
our questions.  (E.g., In re Avena, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 720 [whether counsel’s 
investigation was “inadequate”]; In re Neely (1993) 6 Cal.4th 901, 908 [what 
“should” counsel have done, and “should” counsel have taken certain steps]; 
People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 198, fn. 9 [“should” counsel have 
discovered potential defense witnesses]; In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 584 
[whether counsel “failed to provide adequate representation”]; In re Fields (1990) 
51 Cal.3d 1063, 1068 [whether defendant was “deprived of his right to effective 
assistance of counsel”].)  Because of the nature of the contentions, we do not 
require, and did not ask for, such testimony in this case.  Instead, having received 
and considered the referee’s factual report, this court will make the ultimate legal 
determination whether petitioner received effective assistance of counsel based on 
our judgment and experience in reviewing criminal matters. 
Petitioner also complains that the referee did not permit him to present 
evidence that he did not commit the crime.  The question arose when petitioner, 
through current counsel, cross-examined trial counsel regarding the exact facts of 
the crime.  The referee expressed doubt about the relevance of this cross-
examination.  Petitioner responded it was relevant to show whether his confession 
“might have been attacked.”  The referee noted that the evidence showed 
petitioner had twice confessed to the police and, later, also to trial counsel.  He 
stated that petitioner could cross-examine trial counsel regarding petitioner’s 
statements, but otherwise, he said, “I don’t see any issue as being relevant as to 
looking for third party culpability in this case.  [¶]  It is not a question asked to me 
by the California Supreme Court.  I don’t see how it applies herein, especially in 
light of the fact that there were two confessions to the police and he confessed to” 
trial counsel. 
The proffered cross-examination was not directly relevant to the questions 
we asked the referee to decide, although factual innocence, if established, could be 
 
 
40
considered mitigating.  But in this case, the trial testimony established that 
petitioner fully confessed to the crime, not once but twice to separate investigators.  
The evidence at the reference hearing, which the referee credited, additionally 
established that petitioner also told trial counsel he committed the crimes and 
supplied details.  So far as the record of the trial and this proceeding shows 
petitioner has never repudiated those confessions.  In stating his exceptions to the 
report, petitioner repeatedly refers to his “alleged” or “purported” confessions.  
But we are not dealing with mere allegations, but confessions proven at trial and at 
the reference hearing.  The referee allowed petitioner to fully litigate whether his 
statements to trial counsel actually occurred and their precise nature, and to 
challenge counsel’s testimony in this regard.  Petitioner could have testified and 
contradicted trial counsel’s testimony, but he did not do so.  Trial counsel’s 
uncontroverted testimony fully supports the referee’s finding that petitioner did, in 
fact, confess yet again to trial counsel.  This confession confirmed the confessions 
to the two investigators. 
Petitioner claims that confessions are sometimes false and suggests they 
might have been false here.  Dr. Pettis testified that the confessions to the 
investigators may either have been suggested by the investigators or confabulated 
by petitioner.  What is missing, however, is any suggestion from petitioner himself 
that these confessions—or his later confession to trial counsel—are false, or that 
he is, in fact, innocent.  Under the circumstances, the referee acted within his 
discretion in limiting petitioner’s cross-examination of trial counsel regarding the 
truth of the confession.  (In re Johnson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 447, 459.) 
Petitioner argues the refusal to permit evidence of factual innocence was 
especially unfair because the referee found some of the family members’ 
testimony incredible due to their proffering an alibi inconsistent with petitioner’s 
confessions, and the referee also noted that petitioner’s mother believed he was 
 
 
41
innocent.  The referee based his disbelief in the proffered alibis both on the fact 
they were inconsistent with petitioner’s repeated confessions and that they were 
inconsistent with each other.  Moreover, as he made clear when the parties argued 
the matter after the evidentiary hearing, the referee based his credibility 
determinations largely on the witnesses’ demeanor when testifying:  “I looked at 
the witnesses carefully.  Based upon my examination of their demeanor, I just 
believed that the testimony of the family and friends was exaggerated, was 
histrionic, and was recently fabricated.  That just seemed to permeate this 
courtroom.”  Under these circumstances, and especially absent any claim by 
petitioner himself that his repeated confessions, including those to trial counsel, 
were in fact false, we see no unfairness in the referee’s fact finding. 
Petitioner claims the “referee had an erroneously narrow view of the scope 
of mitigating and mental health evidence, and, as a result, improperly excluded 
and/or refused to consider important mitigating and mental-health-related 
evidence.”  Throughout the hearing, the referee limited mitigating evidence to 
matters involving petitioner himself, and not merely his family or others.  Early in 
the hearing, the referee ruled, “In a death penalty case, what is admissible in the 
penalty phase are the facts of the crime and the special circumstances and anything 
dealing with the background and character of the defendant, including sympathy 
for the defendant. . . .  [¶]  We cannot go beyond that to sociological aspects that 
have nothing to do with the defendant personally.  You can link things to the 
defendant personally, of course.  Then they are admissible.  But things of general 
social ills in and of themselves cannot be the basis of mitigating factors.  They 
have to be related in some way specifically, and fact-specifically, to Mr. Scott.”  In 
accordance with this general ruling, the referee refused to admit certain evidence 
regarding petitioner’s family and conditions at home that were not linked to 
petitioner.  These rulings were correct.  “[T]he background of the defendant’s 
 
 
42
family is of no consequence in and of itself.  That is because under both California 
law [citation] and the United States Constitution [citation], the determination of 
punishment in a capital case turns on the defendant’s personal moral culpability.  
It is the ‘defendant’s character or record’ that ‘the sentencer . . . [may] not be 
precluded from considering’—not his family’s.  [Citations.]  [¶]  To be sure, the 
background of the defendant’s family is material if, and to the extent that, it relates 
to the background of defendant himself.”  (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 
238, 279.)  The referee admitted evidence linked to petitioner personally.  For 
example, he admitted and discussed in his report evidence that trial counsel knew 
that petitioner’s mother had had “psychiatric difficulties.”  He merely excluded 
evidence not linked to petitioner at all.  We see no abuse of discretion. 
Finally, petitioner argues the referee erred in excluding expert testimony 
regarding the impact of petitioner’s “mental state upon his purported Miranda 
waivers [(Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436)], and upon the reliability of 
any statements he may have made.”  During the direct examination of Dr. Pettis, 
the referee stated they were not “going to get into the issues of Miranda waivers,” 
because “the issues, as I said before, will be those raised by the California 
Supreme Court.  Nothing further.”  Accordingly, although petitioner presented 
extensive evidence regarding his mental state at the time of the crimes and as 
mitigating evidence, he did not present evidence specifically relating to how his 
mental state impacted his Miranda waivers.  The referee did not err.  He did not 
exclude evidence regarding the reliability of petitioner’s confessions.  His ruling 
was limited to issues involving his Miranda waiver.  Although the question of how 
petitioner’s mental state related to his waiver was closely intertwined with his 
mental state as a possible guilt phase defense, our order to show cause, and 
resultant reference order, did not include this question.  The referee correctly 
limited himself to taking evidence relevant to, and issuing a report answering, the 
 
 
43
specific questions we asked, not other questions.  In any event, the referee found 
Dr. Pettis’s testimony not credible for reasons that would have applied to any 
testimony regarding the Miranda waivers.  We see no basis on which even to 
speculate that testimony from Dr. Pettis that petitioner was unable to, or did not, 
validly waive his Miranda rights, if he would have so testified, would have been 
any more credible than the extensive testimony he did give regarding petitioner’s 
mental state at the time of the crime. 
4.  Petitioner urges us to reject the referee’s credibility determinations.  As 
a general matter, he complains that he “had no notice and no opportunity to be 
heard on the theory of ‘recent fabrication’ introduced in the referee’s findings and 
report.”  On the contrary, he had full notice that all aspects of the witnesses’ 
credibility were at issue in this matter.  He could have presented any admissible 
evidence supporting (or negating) any witness’s credibility.  No requirement exists 
that a fact finder somehow tell a party in advance every basis on which it might 
disbelieve a witness.  Moreover, at the beginning of oral argument after the 
hearing, the referee did give notice of his tentative findings, including that he 
found much of the testimony recently fabricated.  Petitioner had full opportunity to 
argue the point.  He cannot complain of lack of notice. 
Petitioner claims that in making his credibility determinations, “the referee 
erroneously applied a purely personal, subjective standard, rather than addressing 
the relevant question, i.e., whether jurors were reasonably likely to have accorded 
weight to, and been moved by, the evidence.”  He argues, in essence, that a jury 
might have found credible the witnesses the referee found incredible.  We see no 
error.  The referee’s conclusion that the lay witnesses’ testimony was incredible 
and recently fabricated is certainly relevant to whether counsel could have 
discovered that evidence before trial.  But assuming counsel could have, and 
should have, presented the evidence, whether petitioner has shown prejudice is a 
 
 
44
legal question for this court to determine, not a factual question for the referee.  (In 
re Ross, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 205.)  We asked the referee to determine how 
credible the evidence was, and he has done so.  Petitioner is correct that the 
question of prejudice hinges on whether it is reasonably probable the jury or, if, as 
here, a jury was waived, the trial court would have reached a different verdict, not 
whether the reviewing court (or the referee) would have reached a different 
verdict.  (See, e.g., Smith v. Stewart (9th Cir. 1998) 140 F.3d 1263, 1270.)  But the 
referee’s credibility findings help us make that determination.  Although the 
weight to be given credible mitigating evidence is for the jury (or trial court) to 
decide, it is highly unlikely that a reasonable juror would credit evidence that the 
referee finds incredible.  But such a possibility is for this court, which makes the 
ultimate legal determination, to consider, not the referee answering factual 
questions that we have posed. 
Petitioner also contends the “referee improperly disregarded a large 
quantity of documentary evidence, which independently proved facts in support of 
petitioner’s claims, provided necessary foundation for the expert opinions, and 
corroborated the testimony of lay witnesses.”  We disagree.  The referee admitted 
into evidence all of the documentary exhibits, although he did not consider 
hearsay declarations of persons who did not testify for the truth of the matters 
asserted.  Ultimately, he based his credibility determinations on the witnesses 
themselves and their testimony, which was proper.  “A reference hearing 
following issuance of an order to show cause is subject to the rules of evidence as 
codified in the Evidence Code.  (See Evid. Code, § 300.)  Under those rules, an 
out-of-court declaration is hearsay, and unless subject to some exception 
permitting it to be admitted, should be excluded upon timely and proper objection.  
(See Evid. Code, § 1200.)   . . .  An expert witness, however, may base an opinion 
on reliable hearsay, including out-of-court declarations of other persons.  
 
 
45
[Citations.]”  (In re Fields, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1070, fn. omitted.)  The referee 
allowed the expert witnesses to rely on any document or other source they 
believed proper in forming their opinions.   
Petitioner also argues the “referee improperly disregarded the ability of 
experts to evaluate the consistency and reliability of evidence underlying their 
professional opinions.”  We see no error.  The fact finder determines the facts, not 
the experts.  Indeed, the fact finder may reject even “a unanimity of expert 
opinion.  ‘To hold otherwise would be in effect to substitute a trial by “experts” 
for a trial by jury . . . .’  (People v. Wolff (1964) 61 Cal.2d 795, 811.)  ‘The chief 
value of an expert’s testimony . . . rests upon the material from which his opinion 
is fashioned and the reasoning by which he progresses from his material to his 
conclusion.’  [Citation.]”  (People v. Samuel (1981) 29 Cal.3d 489, 498.)  
Although experts may testify about their opinions, the fact finder decides what 
weight to give those opinions.  This is especially important when the witnesses are 
not neutral court-appointed experts but experts hired by a party specifically 
seeking evidence supporting that party’s position.  (See People v. Kelly (1992) 1 
Cal.4th 495, 543-544.)  Here, because the referee heard testimony from many 
witnesses, and thus did not have to rely on their hearsay statements, he was 
particularly well situated to evaluate the reliability of the materials on which the 
experts relied.  He was entitled to do so independently.  Moreover, his findings 
were generally consistent with, and supported by, the testimony of one expert—
Dr. Sharma—the only one who was originally court appointed and who had 
examined petitioner shortly after the crimes. 
Petitioner challenges as illogical the referee’s rejection of much of the 
evidence provided by lay witnesses.  We disagree.  The referee did credit the 
testimony of some of the lay witnesses, including two—Leander Thornton and 
Burrell Ford—who contradicted some of the disbelieved testimony.  Petitioner 
 
 
46
claims the referee failed to “understand and give due weight to the natural 
hesitancy of capital defendants and their families to disclose embarrassing details 
of their personal histories and the efforts customarily made by capital defense 
counsel to gain the trust needed to permit disclosure of such information.”  
Whether any such “natural hesitancy” exists is for the fact finder to consider, not 
for an appellate court to judicially notice.  The significance of the witnesses’ 
failure to speak before trial and their willingness to speak after the death verdict 
was for the referee to consider in conjunction with all other relevant factors, 
including the witnesses’ demeanor and contradictory testimony of other witnesses. 
Petitioner discusses the testimony of each witness in detail and asks us to 
overturn each of the referee’s credibility determinations that are adverse to him.  
“Deference to the referee is called for on factual questions, especially those 
requiring resolution of testimonial conflicts and assessment of witnesses’ 
credibility, as the referee has the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor 
and manner of testifying.”  (In re Johnson, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 461.)  Indeed, 
the reason we require habeas corpus petitioners to prove their disputed allegations 
at an evidentiary hearing, rather than merely decide the merits of the case on 
declarations, is to obtain credibility determinations.  We have compared the 
referee’s report to the transcript of the evidentiary hearing.  The factual discussion 
and record citations are accurate and reliable.  The report, including its credibility 
discussion, is thorough and convincing, and fully responsive to our questions.  We 
see no reason to overturn the referee’s credibility determinations.  Accordingly, 
we adopt his factual findings.  The significance of those findings to the legal 
issues is for us to determine, which we now proceed to do. 
 
 
47
D.  The Claims on Which We Issued an Order to Show Cause 
1.  Whether Trial Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance by Failing to 
Investigate and Present a Mental Defense at Trial 
On direct appeal, we rejected various guilt phase claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  We noted that “[w]hile judging counsel’s performance, we 
must keep in mind the circumstances he faced, and particularly the fact that his 
client had already confessed fully to a hideous crime.  [Citation.]  These 
circumstances did not bode well for a successful defense and may have justified 
tactical decisions that might seem unreasonable under other circumstances.”  
(Scott, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1212.)  We also noted that it is particularly difficult 
to establish ineffective assistance on appeal.  (Ibid.)  Accordingly, petitioner has 
raised other claims in this habeas corpus petition.  We have now had a lengthy 
evidentiary hearing.  Having reviewed the transcript of that hearing and the 
referee’s report, we see no reason the result should be different. 
The referee found that counsel had requested a report on petitioner’s 
competency to stand trial, which resulted in examinations and reports by Drs. 
Sharma and Maloney that found petitioner competent and that did not support a 
mental defense.  The doctors believed that petitioner had feigned certain 
symptomology.  Counsel also knew that during his confessions, petitioner had 
occasionally assumed the persona of an alter ego, “Tony,” but petitioner had told 
counsel that Tony was a “con.”  Counsel interviewed petitioner, observed nothing 
suggesting a mental defense, and investigated the use of Mellaril as a possible 
defense.  Counsel did nothing further to investigate a mental defense. 
Under these circumstances, it is a close question whether competent 
counsel was required to investigate further.  “Criminal trial counsel have no 
blanket obligation to investigate possible ‘mental’ defenses, even in a capital 
case.”  (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1244.)  There was evidence 
 
 
48
petitioner used drugs the night of the crime—evidence that was presented at trial 
(Scott, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1216)—and he invoked the persona of “Tony” 
during his confessions.  Both of these circumstances suggested a possible mental 
defense.  But other evidence available to counsel, including the reports of Drs. 
Sharma and Maloney, contraindicated a mental defense.  Drs. Sharma and 
Maloney investigated and reported on petitioner’s competency to stand trial, not 
possible mental defenses, but the two questions were closely intertwined, and the 
reports were relevant to both questions.  They issued their reports within two 
months of the crime.  Moreover, counsel had information, including statements 
from petitioner himself, that petitioner had feigned a mental defense when he 
assumed the persona “Tony.”  Evidence that petitioner had feigned one mental 
defense would undercut an attempt to present a different mental defense.  
Moreover, petitioner described the crimes to counsel—as well as the 
investigators—in detail, which also undercuts a mental defense. 
But, as the referee noted, counsel’s investigation was “minimal,” and some 
indication did exist of a potential mental defense.  We need not decide whether 
competent counsel should have investigated further, for we find no prejudice in 
the failure to do so.  (In re Ross, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 204.)  The only possible 
mental defenses would have been (1) insanity, i.e., that at the time of the crime, 
petitioner either could not know or understand the nature and quality of the act, or 
could not distinguish right from wrong (Pen. Code, §  25, subd. (b); People v. 
Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765); or (2) that petitioner did not intend to kill Wanda 
Jensen (Scott, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1216).  As discussed in the referee’s report, 
petitioner has produced no credible evidence showing either insanity or absence of 
intent to kill.  Intent to kill is not a difficult mental state to achieve.  We find the 
referee’s reasons for rejecting Dr. Pettis’s opinion that petitioner was in a 
“disorganized and dissociative state” the night of the crime convincing, and 
 
 
49
believe a jury or trial court would also reject that opinion for those reasons.  That 
opinion was the strongest evidence of a mental defense petitioner presented at the 
hearing.  Moreover, at the trial, the trial court heard the evidence of drug usage, 
and counsel argued the prosecution had not established intent to kill.  (Scott, 
supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1216.)  Nevertheless, the court found petitioner intended to 
kill.  We see no reasonable probability the outcome would have been different had 
counsel further investigated a possible mental defense. 
2.  Whether Trial Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance by Failing to 
Investigate and Present Mitigating Evidence at the Penalty Phase 
On appeal, in rejecting different penalty phase ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims, we described the case that counsel actually made against a death 
verdict.  “He argued that the happenstance of medical malpractice that made this a 
murder case rather than attempted murder mitigated against the death penalty; he 
portrayed the crimes against Paula H. as less serious than her trial testimony 
suggested; he portrayed [petitioner] as an ‘angry young man’ who committed rash 
acts rather than a merely evil person who committed calculated crimes; he argued 
that the crimes against women were not the type to be repeated in prison; he 
argued that [petitioner] admitted his wrongdoing at an early stage; he cited 
[petitioner’s] ‘split personality’ as evidenced by the references to ‘Tony’; and he 
urged that [petitioner’s] conduct was not the type for which the death penalty was 
designed.”  (Scott, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1225.)  We said that “[o]n this record, 
we cannot say that some other approach was so clearly superior that counsel’s 
representation was incompetent.”  (Ibid.)  Now that there has been an evidentiary 
hearing, we see no basis on which to conclude otherwise. 
The referee found that counsel’s investigation of potential mitigating 
evidence was “minimal.”  Counsel utilized the medical malpractice defense at the 
penalty phase as well as at the guilt phase, attempted to speak to petitioner about 
 
 
50
his family and childhood, attempted to speak with his mother for purposes of the 
penalty phase, and argued mental impairment.  The referee also found that 
petitioner hindered the investigation in two respects:  he was “adamant” about not 
wanting to involve his family, and he was not talkative to counsel and did not 
provide any useful information for the penalty phase. 
Under the circumstances, it is also a close question whether competent 
counsel was required to further investigate potential mitigating evidence.  “As we 
have repeatedly explained, an attorney representing a defendant at the penalty 
phase of a capital case is not required to present potentially mitigating evidence 
over the defendant’s objections.”  (People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 
1013; also quoted in In re Andrews (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1234, 1254.)  Petitioner did 
not object to all mitigating evidence, but he did not want his family involved, 
which precluded mitigating evidence that only the family can provide.  
“Moreover, ‘[t]he reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or 
substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions.  Counsel’s 
actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by 
the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant.  In particular, what 
investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such information.’  
(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 691; Burger v. Kemp [(1987) 483 U.S. 776, 
795].)”  (In re Andrews, supra, at p. 1255.)  In this case, petitioner “did not inform 
[counsel] of the conditions he endured thereby alerting [him] to the need for 
further investigation of possible mitigation.”  (Ibid.)  Our reasonableness inquiry 
must also assess “the decision to forgo further investigation in light of the defense 
strategy counsel ultimately adopted.”  (Ibid.)  Here, counsel knew that two experts 
believed that petitioner was feigning mental symptoms, and he knew from 
petitioner’s own mouth that petitioner had feigned the “Tony” defense.  
Nevertheless, he made the “split personality” argument based on the guilt phase 
 
 
51
evidence.  By simply arguing the point rather than attempting to present additional 
evidence of mental impairment, counsel was able to make the “split personality” 
argument without risking expert testimony that “Tony” was feigned.  An attempt 
to present a different mental impairment defense could have been undercut by 
evidence that petitioner had already feigned one mental condition, which in turn 
would have undercut counsel’s penalty phase argument that petitioner had 
admitted his wrongdoing at an early stage by confessing. 
On the other hand, counsel could well have conducted a more thorough 
investigation than he did.  It appears he made little effort to elicit any mitigating 
evidence from petitioner or anyone else.  As with the failure to investigate a 
possible mental defense, we find no prejudice even assuming counsel should have 
investigated further.  Counsel was able to argue petitioner’s supposed “split 
personality,” and he had argued petitioner’s cocaine usage at the guilt phase.  
Presenting additional evidence of mental impairment that, as the referee found, 
lacked credibility and that differed substantially from the “split personality” 
defense that petitioner presented in his confession would not have aided the 
defense cause.  In addition, the referee found that additional investigation would 
not have discovered the bulk of the proffered mitigating evidence of petitioner’s 
alleged harsh childhood because most of the evidence was recently fabricated.  
Even if we assume it could have been discovered earlier, and counsel could have 
presented this evidence, the circumstance remains that the referee found most of it 
incredible.  This credibility determination is especially significant here because 
petitioner waived a jury and the case was tried to a court.  We see no reason to 
suspect the court would have found these witnesses any more credible than did the 
referee.  Moreover, this evidence could have been weakened still further by the 
testimony of one witness the referee found credible—Burrell Ford—who, the 
 
 
52
referee found, “could have also been called in rebuttal relative to the lack of 
physical or sexual abuse by family and friends when he had been present.” 
In sum, the evidence showed, and the court or a jury may well have 
believed, that petitioner had a difficult childhood and a troubled family history, 
although not as harsh as he claimed at the evidentiary hearing.  But the 
circumstances of this crime were particularly egregious, and petitioner had a 
history of brutal sexual violence.  We see no reasonable probability the outcome 
would have been different had counsel introduced the new evidence that petitioner 
has now presented instead of taking the approach he actually took at trial. 
3.  Whether Trial Counsel’s Advice to Waive a Jury Was Uninformed 
and Hence Ineffective 
On appeal, we rejected petitioner’s claim that counsel was ineffective in 
advising him to waive a jury trial.  We did “ ‘not assume inadequacy of 
representation unless counsel had no conceivable legitimate tactical purpose’ for 
waiving a jury.”  (Scott, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1213, quoting People v. Diaz 
(1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 558.)  We noted a number of possible valid tactical reasons 
for waiving a jury in this case.  (Scott, supra, at pp. 1213-1214.)  Petitioner claims, 
however, that counsel’s alleged failings in not investigating a possible mental 
defense and potential mitigating evidence rendered the advice to waive a jury 
uninformed and hence ineffective. 
After reviewing the evidentiary hearing and the referee’s report, it is 
apparent that counsel did indeed have valid tactical reasons for advising petitioner 
to waive a jury:  the desire to have a particular highly regarded judge decide the 
case, the nature of the particular jury pool from which a jury would have been 
selected, the nature of the proffered medical malpractice defense, and the horrific 
facts of the crime.  The referee also found that the “decision to waive jury was in 
no way compromised by any failure of trial counsel’s investigation.”  
 
 
53
Accordingly, the referee found that “no additional investigation would have 
affected the advice to waive a jury.”  We agree.  The evidentiary hearing does not 
negate but bolsters the reasons we rejected this claim on appeal.  The record shows 
“that further investigation would not reasonably have influenced that decision.”  
(In re Andrews, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1266.) 
The decision to waive a jury was unusual, but so too was one of the tactical 
decisions upheld against a similar ineffective assistance challenge in Bell v. Cone, 
supra, 535 U.S. at page ___ [122 S.Ct. at p. 1848]—to waive argument at the 
penalty phase.  As with deciding whether to waive argument, whether to waive a 
jury under the circumstances was “a tactical decision about which competent 
lawyers might disagree.”  (Id. at p. ___ [122 S.Ct. at p. 1854].)  Accordingly, 
making that decision was not ineffective.  (Ibid.) 
III.  OTHER CLAIMS 
Because our order to show cause and subsequent reference hearing were 
limited to specific claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we do not discuss 
the other claims stated in the petition.  As is our usual practice, we will resolve the 
petition for writ of habeas corpus by a separate order.  (In re Andrews, supra, 28 
Cal.4th at p. 1266.) 
 
 
54
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The order to show cause is discharged. 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
I concur in the decision discharging the alternative writ and rejecting the 
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but I do not join fully in the 
majority opinion. 
At issue here is whether petitioner’s trial attorney provided constitutionally 
ineffective assistance by not adequately investigating and presenting a mental state 
defense at the guilt phase, by not adequately investigating and presenting 
potentially mitigating evidence about his mental condition and personal history at 
the penalty phase, and by advising petitioner to waive trial by jury. 
“To establish a violation of the constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel, a defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient when 
measured against the standard of a reasonably competent attorney, and that 
counsel’s performance was prejudicial in the sense that it ‘so undermined the 
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result.’  (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 
686 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692-693, 104 S.Ct. 2052]; id. at pp. 686-694 [80 L.Ed.2d at 
pp. 692-698]; see also People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 636 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 
788, 854 P.2d 80].)  If a defendant has failed to show that the challenged actions 
of counsel were prejudicial, a reviewing court may reject the claim on that ground 
without determining whether counsel’s performance was deficient.  (Strickland v. 
 
2 
Washington, supra, at p. 697 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 699-700].)”  (People v. 
Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1008.) 
On the question whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in not 
adequately investigating a mental state defense to guilt, the majority states that “it 
is a close question whether competent counsel was required to investigate further” 
(maj. opn., ante, at p. 47), but the majority finds “no prejudice in the failure to do 
so” (id. at p. 48).  For the reasons stated by the majority, I agree that petitioner has 
not shown he was prejudiced by his trial attorney’s failure to fully investigate a 
mental state defense to guilt.  But I do not agree that the adequacy of counsel’s 
investigation presents a close question. 
Petitioner’s trial attorney knew or should have known that before the crime 
petitioner had ingested alcohol and drugs, including cocaine and PCP; that on the 
day after the crime petitioner went with his mother and his sister to surrender to 
the sheriff’s department; that petitioner became so agitated during his interview by 
sheriff’s deputies that his mother was brought in to calm him; that his mother told 
the deputies petitioner needed psychiatric help; and that after being transported to 
jail petitioner was placed in four-point restraints and given Mellaril, an 
antipsychotic medication. 
With this knowledge, competent counsel should have retained a qualified 
mental health professional to evaluate petitioner’s mental condition at the time of 
the crime.  Counsel should not have relied on his own impression of petitioner’s 
mental state during his interviews with petitioner or on the reports prepared to 
determine petitioner’s competence to stand trial.  When counsel interviewed 
petitioner and when he was evaluated for competency, petitioner was no longer 
under the influence of illicit drugs or alcohol, and he was taking antipsychotic 
medication.  The doctors who performed the competency examination offered no 
opinion on petitioner’s mental state at the time of the crime, and his competency at 
 
3 
a later time, while on antipsychotic medication, has little or no relevance to his 
mental condition during the crime while possibly under the influence of alcohol 
and illicit drugs. 
On the question whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at the 
penalty phase in not adequately investigating potentially mitigating evidence about 
petitioner’s mental condition and personal history, the majority states that “it is 
also a close question whether competent counsel was required to further 
investigate potential mitigating evidence” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 50), but the 
majority finds petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to do so (id. at pp. 
51-52).  For the reasons that the majority has stated, I agree that petitioner has not 
shown he was prejudiced by his trial attorney’s failure to fully investigate 
potentially mitigating evidence about his mental condition and personal history.  
But I do not agree that the adequacy of counsel’s investigation presents a close 
question. 
As explained above, competent counsel should have retained a mental 
health expert to examine petitioner to determine his mental state at the time of the 
crime.  The results of such an examination potentially could have been useful in 
mitigation at the penalty phase even if they did not provide a defense to guilt.  
Moreover, a reasonably thorough life history investigation is an essential 
component of defense preparation in any death penalty case.  As the majority 
concedes, petitioner’s attorney “made little effort to elicit any mitigating evidence 
from petitioner or anyone else.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 51.) 
On the question whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in 
advising petitioner to waive a trial by jury, the majority states that “counsel did 
indeed have valid tactical reasons for advising petitioner to waive a jury:  the 
desire to have a particular highly regarded judge decide the case, the nature of the 
particular jury pool from which a jury would have been selected, the nature of the 
 
4 
proffered medical malpractice defense, and the horrific facts of the crime.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 52.) 
The soundness of these tactical considerations depends, in large measure, 
on whether trial counsel was justified in relying almost entirely on the medical 
malpractice defense, a decision this court has consistently refused to evaluate.  
(See People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1215.)  Even if we assume this 
decision was with the broad range of reasonable tactical decisions, it is still 
questionable whether these tactical considerations outweighed the inherent 
advantages of jury trial, in which verdicts for guilt and penalty require the 
unanimous agreement of 12 individual jurors rather than the opinion of a single 
judge. 
I would not decide the close and difficult issue of whether counsel 
performed deficiently when he advised defendant to waive jury trial.  Rather, I 
would reject this effective assistance claim on the ground that petitioner has not 
shown he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s decision to have the case tried to the 
court without a jury.  In other words, I conclude that petitioner has not shown a 
reasonable probability that he would have obtained a more favorable guilt or 
penalty verdict had the case been tried to a jury with the additional evidence that 
petitioner presented at the reference hearing. 
Because petitioner has not demonstrated prejudice, I agree with the 
majority that he has not demonstrated denial of the constitutional right to the 
effective assistance of counsel at trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
1 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Scott 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S059739 
Date Filed: January 27, 2003 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Howard J. Schwab, Referee 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
John W. Clark, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner James Robert Scott. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, Carol Wendelin Pollack and Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorneys General, Steven D. 
Matthews, Susan Lee Frierson, Sharlene A. Honnaka and Brad D. Levenson, Deputy Attorneys General, 
for Respondent State of California. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
John W. Clark 
375 Forest Avenue 
Palo Alto, CA  94301 
(650) 473-0550 
 
Brad D. Levenson 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 620-6449