Case Title: CHRISTINE WITHERSPOON V. TETON LASER CENTER, LLC, a Wyoming Limited Liability Company; and MAURO LOFARO, M.D.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-11

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-01-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
CHRISTINE WITHERSPOON V. TETON LASER CENTER, LLC, a Wyoming Limited Liability Company; and MAURO LOFARO, M.D.2007 WY 3149 P.3d 715Case Number: 06-11Decided: 01/10/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
CHRISTINE 
WITHERSPOON,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 

TETON 
LASERCENTER, LLC, a 
Wyoming Limited Liability Company; and MAURO LOFARO, M.D.,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofTetonCounty

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

David F. 
DeFazio of DeFazio Law Office, Jackson, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

W. Henry 
Combs III and Kathleen Swanson of Murane & Bostwick, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.  
Argument by Ms. Swanson.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, BURKE, JJ., and KALOKATHIS, 
D.J.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Christine 
Witherspoon (Witherspoon) filed an action alleging that Dr. Maura Lofaro and 
TetonLaserCenter, LLC (collectively the Defendants) 
had negligently administered an intense pulsed light (IPL) hair removal 
treatment causing her to suffer burning and scarring.  The parties entered into a stipulation 
allowing Witherspoon's designated expert witness to testify by telephone.  After the expert's testimony at trial, 
the Defendants alleged that Witherspoon had violated the terms of the 
stipulation and requested that the expert's testimony be stricken.  The district court agreed and instructed 
the jury to disregard the testimony.  After Witherspoon rested her case, the 
Defendants moved for a judgment as a matter of law pursuant to W.R.C.P. 50(a) 
(LexisNexis 2006) on the grounds that there was no evidence produced 
establishing that the Defendants had breached a duty to Witherspoon.  The court granted the motion.  On appeal, Witherspoon challenges the 
district court's ruling striking the testimony of her expert witness and the 
grant of the Rule 50 motion.  We 
conclude that the district court abused its discretion in striking the expert's 
testimony, that the error was prejudicial and, therefore, reverse and remand for 
a new trial.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Witherspoon's 
brief fails to contain a statement of the issues presented for review in 
violation of W.R.A.P. 7.01(d) (LexisNexis 2006).  Pursuant to W.R.A.P. 1.03 (LexisNexis 
2006) we would be justified in refusing to consider the claims raised by 
Witherspoon.  37 Gambling Devices (Cheyenne Elks Club and Cheyenne Music and Vending, Inc.) v. State, 694 P.2d 711, 713 (Wyo. 
1985).  While tempted to do so, we 
have decided to address the contentions raised by Witherspoon given that the 
issues she has raised are meritorious and readily identifiable from her brief. 
 Id.; see also Montoya v. Navarette-Montoya, 2005 WY 
161, ¶ 4, 125 P.3d 265, 268 (Wyo. 2005).  The Bar should keep in mind, however, 
that we will not always be so tolerant about such violations of our Rules of 
Appellate Procedure.  Id.; see also 
Cline v. Safeco Ins. Companies, 614 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Wyo. 1980).

 
 
[¶3]      For purposes of 
our review, we accept the issues as framed by the 
Defendants:

 
 
A.  Whether 
the District Court properly excluded the testimony of Lorenzo Kunze based upon 
[Witherspoon's] violation of the parties' stipulation for such 
testimony?

 
 
B.  Whether 
the District Court properly entered Rule 50 Judgment as a Matter of Law when no 
evidence existed to support a reasonable jury's determination of a breach of 
duty and causation of damages?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      Witherspoon filed 
an action against the Defendants alleging that Dr. Lofaro had negligently 
administered an IPL hair removal treatment resulting in burns and permanent 
scarring on Witherspoon's stomach.  Witherspoon designated Lorenzo Kunze as 
an expert witness.  Kunze is the 
owner of RockyMountainLaserCollege 
in Denver, Colorado, where he teaches laser hair removal. 
 After taking Kunze's deposition, 
the Defendants moved to strike his testimony and for summary judgment on the 
grounds that Kunze was not a licensed medical practitioner.  The district court denied the motion 
concluding that since a person could perform IPL hair removal without a medical 
license, Witherspoon's claim was not based on medical 
malpractice.

 
 
[¶5]      Just prior to 
trial, Witherspoon filed a stipulated motion on behalf of the parties wherein it 
was agreed that Kunze could testify by telephone:

 
 
Lorenzo 
Kunze is Plaintiff's expert witness.  Mr. Kunze lives and works in Denver.  He runs an active laser hair removal 
business and training college.  Flight schedules between Jackson and Denver are such that it would be unlikely that 
Mr. Kunze could travel and testify in one day.

 
 
The 
morning of the trial, the district court approved the stipulation after 
inquiring into the reasons for the telephonic testimony.  During cross-examination of Kunze, the 
following exchange took place between Kunze and counsel for the 
Defendants:

 
 
                        
Q:  Were you asked to come to Wyoming?

 
 
A:  Was 
I asked to come there?

 
 
Q:  Yes.

 
 
A:  I'm 
assuming I was asked sometime.  I 
think it was because of my time frame I couldn't make it.

 
 
Q:  The 
question is: Were you asked to come to Wyoming?  I believe that that's a yes or no answer. 
 Were you?

 
 
A:  Yes.

 
 
Q:  When 
were you asked?

 
 
A:  When 
you were in my office.

 
 
Q:  And 
you haven't been asked to come to Wyoming since then?

 
 
A:  Yes. 
I was asked a couple [of] days ago. I was asked.

 
 
Q:  What 
were you asked, specifically?

 
 
A:  Would 
there be any way for me to come down, and I said no.

 
 
[Defense 
counsel]:  I move that the entire testimony be stricken on that answer 
alone, Your Honor.

 
 
[Plaintiff 
counsel]:  Your Honor, he stipulated to this.

 
 
[Defense 
counsel]:  I stipulated to this based on your representations to 
me.

 
 
The 
court excused the jury and the following colloquy took 
place:

 
 
[The 
court]:  Okay.  The jury's 
out.  Oh, counsel. [Defense 
counsel], first of all, I guess I was surprised that this, you know, were in 
agreement that  that Mr. Kunze could testify by telephone because it's been 
very awkward, as has been noted for the last hour.  But, [defense counsel], you did stipulate 
that Mr. Kunze could testify by telephone?

 
 
[Defense 
counsel]:  My stipulation was based upon [plaintiff counsel's] 
representation to me that an airline ticket had been purchased but Mr. Kunze did 
not want to come, he would, but he didn't want to come because he was going to 
have to be out of the office not one day but two days, and would I please 
stipulate to it so that they could cancel the airline ticket and not make him be 
out of the office for two days.  And 
that was a complete misrepresentation, and had I known the truth I would have 
never stipulated to this, Your Honor.

 
 
This is 
a fraud on me, it's a fraud on the Court, and this testimony needs to be 
stricken from the record in its entirety.

 
 
[The 
court]:  Okay, wait a minute. [Plaintiff counsel], did you represent 
that to [defense counsel]?

 
 
[Plaintiff 
counsel]:  I represented that we had a reservation and I did have a 
reservation on Delta Airlines, and I can get you the specific flight numbers and 
times, but I did not represent that we had represented we had purchased the 
ticket.  And in exchange for this 
stipulation, Mr. Kunze [sic -- defense counsel] has been allowed to introduce 
evidence of this tanning bed treatment which is based on discovery he conducted 
well passed [sic] the discovery cutoff time, so [defense counsel] got something 
in exchange for that.  And I never 
said that it was impossible or that Mr. Kunze was unavailable.  I said that it was inconvenient for him 
because there was no way for him to come up here and do it in one 
day.

 
 
From 
Denver to  actually, it's United Airlines, they 
[have] one flight that leaves at 9:30, and the last one departs Jackson Hole at 4:30.  So he would have had to have stayed over 
night and it would have been difficult for him in his practice to be gone 
overnight and to miss two days of work.  And that's exactly what I told [defense 
counsel]. 

 
 
And I 
also told him about Kellie Allen.  And Kellie is  anyhow, we're not talking 
about her now, but I was very honest and straight-forward with [defense 
counsel].  I feel like I'm being 
sandbagged right now, and it's just not appropriate.

 
 
I was 
very clear, straight forward and honest with him, and there is no fraud being 
committed here.  There was no 
misrepresentation.  I sent a letter 
to [defense counsel] confirming the fact that he had stipulated to it.1  I was very honest, forthright and 
straight-forward with him.  And it 
was at a time when, if he had said otherwise, I could have brought Mr. Kunze up 
here.  I had a reservation on Delta 
 or on United Airlines.

 
 
But the 
problem is that he wouldn't have gotten here until 11:00.  The earliest he could get here on a 
morning flight is 11:00 or even somewhere in that time, and then the last flight 
out is at 4:30.  So that doesn't 
give him enough time to testify and be here in one day.  So I thought this way [defense counsel] 
would have an opportunity to cross-examine him for as long as he 
wants.

 
 
And I 
talked to Mr. Kunze last week about whether or not he could come up here.  Mr. Kunze was  he actually informed me 
that he was gone, he was out of town for a few days last week, and he was just 
getting back into town this Monday back in the office.  So, yes, this was a matter of convenience 
and I made no representation to [defense counsel] that he was otherwise 
unavailable.  I said it was 
inconvenient.

 
 
[Defense 
counsel]:  You let me know when it's my turn, Your 
Honor.

 
 
[The 
court]:  Are you done, [plaintiff counsel]?

 
 
[Plaintiff 
counsel]:  Your Honor, I mean I did speak to [defense counsel] about 
this.  And [defense counsel], you 
know, I did stipulate to allow him to read deposition testimony for a deposition 
that I wasn't even allowed to attend.  I didn't even get a chance to 
cross-examine the witness.  So, you 
know, I 

 
 
. . . 
.

                        

And if 
you look at my letter where I confirmed that [defense counsel] had stipulated, 
he then sent me a fax back saying, yes, and you stipulated to that testimony by 
deposition.  And, yes, I 
did.

 
 
And I do 
think that I could have objected to that testimony that was done well passed 
[sic] the discovery deadline two weeks ago.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
[Defense 
counsel]:  [Plaintiff counsel] asked me if I would stipulate to 
Kunze's testimony by telephone.  I 
said I'm not inclined to do that. Is he going to come to trial?  The answer was:  Yes, he's going to come but it's 
inconvenient for him.

 
 
He just 
answered the question, Your Honor:  Did you tell him you would come?  And the answer was no.  And my stipulation to allow him to 
testify by telephone was based on that representation that he was going to be 
here.

 
 
And he 
just told you and the jury and that he was not coming.

 
 
[The 
court]:  He said he was asked to come a couple [of] days 
ago.

 
 
[Plaintiff 
counsel]:  Your Honor, he was out of town a couple of days ago so it 
was before that.  I spoke to Mr. 
Kunze about it.  Mr. Kunze, I think, 
was in New 
York for a few days, so I spoke to him last week about 
coming here.  I had a reservation 
made for him and we had spoken about it months previously.  And so it was  yes, I went [to defense 
counsel]. I said, hey, look.  We've 
made these reservations, but I'm afraid that he's not going to be able to get 
all his testimony in in one day in the time frame that he's allowed to travel 
here.

 
 
[The 
court]:  Mr. Kunze, let me ask you something.

 
 
[Mr. 
Kunze]:  Yes.

 
 
[The 
court]:  You testified that you were asked to come to Wyoming once when 
[defense counsel] was in your office?

 
 
[Mr. 
Kunze]:  Right.

 
 
[The 
court]:  And that you were asked just a couple days ago to come; is 
that correct?

 
 
[Mr. 
Kunze]:  It was probably Thursday or Friday because I was in 
New York when 
he called.

 
 
[The 
court]:  Okay.

 
 
[Mr. 
Kunze]:  And I didn't get back to my office until 
Tuesday.

 
 
[The 
court]:  Yesterday?

 
 
[Mr. 
Kunze]:  Yes.

 
 
[The 
court]:  Okay.

 
 
[Mr. 
Kunze]:  And there was no way I could come.  I wouldn't have been able to come at all. 
 I have seven kids and I can't take 
off whenever I feel like it.  I have 
to have something known in advance to 

 
 
[The 
court]:  Please stop.

 
 
[Defense 
counsel]:  That's a misrepresentation, Your Honor. My stipulation was 
based on him coming to trial.  And 
he just said again that he wasn't coming.  I would have never stipulated to this had 
I known he wasn't coming.  That was 
represented to me that  that was the meat of the representation, that was the 
meat of my agreement.  He was coming 
if I said no.

 
 
[Plaintiff 
counsel]:  Your Honor, I did not make that misrepresentation.  I was very forthright with [defense 
counsel] from the outset.  The 
situation where I traded off allowing testimony.  If you'll look at the letters he sent 
back.

 
 
[The 
court]:  I'm going to strike Mr. Kunze's testimony.  We're going to be in recess for a few 
minutes.  Thank you, Mr. 
Kunze.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
[The 
court]:  You may be seated.  Court is in session.  [Plaintiff counsel] and [defense counsel] 
and the litigants are present, the jury is not present.  I am going to call the jury back and I'm 
going to instruct them, counsel:

 
 
"Ladies 
and gentlemen: you are hereby instructed that you are to disregard the testimony 
of Lorenzo Kunze in its entirety."

 
 
[Plaintiff 
counsel]:  Your Honor, may I address the Court on this matter, 
please?

 
 
[The 
court]:  You can put it on the record, [plaintiff counsel], but I've 
made up my mind.

 
 
[Plaintiff 
counsel]:  Well, may I say just one thing, please? Because it's a very 
serious thing when somebody thinks that I misrepresented something to the Court 
or to [defense counsel], and I think that if Mr. Kunze were given an opportunity 
to talk about our conversation that we had, it will mirror exactly what I said 
to [defense counsel].

 
 
And I 
think that  he was in the process of cross-examination. You've seen that he has 
difficulty knowing when to answer yes, when to explain, when to give an 
explanation.  So I think if you give 
him an opportunity to ask him whether it's possible for him to be here today as 
opposed to, you know, and really give him a chance to describe that, he will say 
that, yes, it was possible if absolutely necessary, but it would have been 
extremely inconvenient.  And those, 
I think, Your Honor, are the exact words that I told [defense counsel].  But I don't think that Mr. Kunze was 
given an opportunity to explain that.

 
 
[The 
court]:  Boy, that's not what he said.

 
 
[Defense 
counsel]:  Let me know when it's my turn, Your 
Honor.

 
 
[Plaintiff 
counsel]:  Please give him an opportunity --

 
 
[The 
court]:  Okay.  Wait.

 
 
[Plaintiff 
counsel]:  Can we have him call back?

 
 
[The 
court]:  [Defense counsel]?

 
 
[Defense 
counsel]:  Mr. Kunze said twice that he could not come.  And this was important enough for me that 
I called Bret King and I asked him if he had talked with [plaintiff counsel] 
about the testimony of Kunze.  And I 
said, "Bret, did [plaintiff counsel] tell you that Kunze was going to come if I 
did not stipulate to this?"  And 
Bret said to me, "[plaintiff counsel] told me that Kunze was definitely coming." 
 And based upon that, I made my 
stipulation.

 
 
[Plaintiff 
counsel]:  Your Honor 

 
 
[The 
court]:  Okay.  You can 
put something else on the record.  [Plaintiff counsel], I'm going to 
instruct the ladies and gentlemen of the jury that they are to disregard the 
testimony of Lorenzo Kunze in its entirety.

 
 
[Plaintiff 
counsel]:  Can't we get him on the phone for a few minutes and let 
[defense counsel] ask him those same questions with an opportunity to explain as 
opposed to  he was previously instructed to answer yes or no.  I would think if he was given an 
opportunity to explain himself  I would like to present evidence regarding the 
reservation [that] was made.  I had 
a confirmation number, I had a price, he was ready to go.  And Mr. Kunze said that he could be here 
if absolutely necessary but it would be extremely 
inconvenient.

 
 
[The 
court]:  That was not the testimony.

 
 
[Plaintiff 
counsel]:  But 

 
 
[The 
court]:  [Plaintiff's counsel], I've 
made my ruling.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
[Plaintiff 
counsel]:  Your Honor, could I just make an offer of proof like in the 
morning with regards to this issue where we can have a conversation with Mr. 
Kunze, and I can show you the E-mail that I sent to Mr. Kunze and the 
confirmation regarding that?

 
 
[The 
court]:  Would you get to your next 
witness on the telephone, please?

 
 
The 
court instructed the jury to disregard Kunze's testimony "in its entirety."  The parties briefly revisited the issue 
at the end of the trial when the district court had determined to grant a 
defense motion for a judgment as a matter of law:

 
 
[Plaintiff 
counsel]:  And maybe we could do that and also a motion on the striking of Mr. 
Kunze's testimony at the same time because, Your Honor, I can present Mr. 
Kunze's affidavit and testimony that will confirm that he had informed me that 
he could be here if absolutely necessary.

 
 
So 
you're kind of cutting my legs off from under me without an opportunity for me 
to present the evidence the fact we had a reservation for Mr. Kunze.  That we did have a conversation.  I can provide an affidavit or we can get 
Mr. Kunze back on the phone that in fact he could have been here today if 
absolutely necessary, but it was extremely inconvenient.  He did not have an opportunity to explain 
that.  

 
 
[Defense 
counsel]:   I asked Lorenzo Kunze if he could  if he was asked to 
come. His answer was yes. I asked him if he was going to come.  His answer was no.  Then after the argument and the blowup in 
court, for which I am very embarrassed, Your Honor, and I apologize, Lorenzo 
Kunze volunteered  and I don't know whether Mr. Jones was reporting it, I hope 
he was reporting it, but Mr. Kunze's volunteered statement was: I was in 
New York. 
 I was coming home.  There was no way I could come to 
Jackson. Now 

 
 
[The 
court]:  Because I have seven children or 
something.

 
 
[Defense 
counsel]:  Yes. Now, [plaintiff counsel] wants to have a chance to 
talk to him and get him back on the phone and get him to change that testimony. 
 

 
 
[Plaintiff 
counsel]:  Your Honor, I need to respond to 
that.

 
 
[The 
court]:  [Plaintiff counsel], I'm not going to  you can put something 
on the record.  I'm granting the 
judgment as a matter of law, and I'm going to get the jury in here and advise 
them.

 
 
I'm 
going to read them  it used to be a directed verdict and now it's a judgment as 
a matter of law, Rule 50(a)(1), and I'm going to grant it.

 
 
Would 
you have Deputy Harnish bring the jury in?

 
 
[Plaintiff's 
counsel]:  Your Honor, I have been accused of fraud on the court and a 
number of, you know, making misrepresentations to the court.  I don't think that we've been given an 
opportunity to clarify that and to characterize Mr. Kunze's statement when he 
wasn't given an opportunity to explain himself.  And I think if he were given an 
opportunity 

 
 
[The 
court]:  [Plaintiff counsel], the Court very clearly heard the 
testimony of Mr. Kunze.

 
 
[Plaintiff's 
counsel]:  Mr. Kunze didn't understand what he was being 
asked.

 
 
[The 
court]:  [Plaintiff counsel], please don't argue with me. I've made my 
ruling and you've made your record.

 
 
[Plaintiff's 
counsel]:  May I make an additional record with regard to 

 
 
[The 
court]:  The jury's going to be coming in.

 
 
[Whereupon 
the jury entered the courtroom and the court granted the motion for judgment as 
a matter of law and dismissed the jury.]

 
 
[¶6]      After Kunze's 
testimony was stricken, Witherspoon presented testimony from one additional 
witness before resting her case.  The Defendants immediately moved for a 
judgment as a matter of law pursuant to W.R.C.P. 50(a)2 arguing that there was no evidence 
or testimony from any witness that Dr. Lofaro breached any standard of care or 
that her treatment of Witherspoon was negligent in any way.  The court granted the motion concluding 
that without the expert testimony from Kunze, Witherspoon failed to establish 
the standard of care or whether there had been a breach.  Witherspoon appeals the striking of 
Kunze's testimony and the granting of the Defendants' Rule 50 motion.3

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      As a general 
matter, questions regarding the evidentiary rulings of the trial court are 
reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion.  Kemper Architects, P.C. v. McFall, Konkel 
& Kimball Consulting Engineers, Inc., 843 P.2d 1178, 1187 (Wyo. 
1992).

 
 
Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. 
 (internal citations 
omitted).

 
 

Fetzer 
v. J.D. Dayley & Sons, Inc., 2004 
WY 64, ¶ 14, 91 P.3d 152, 158 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Winterholler v. Zolessi, 989 P.2d 621, 
624-25 (Wyo. 1999), and Rogers v. State, 971 P.2d 599, 601 
(Wyo. 
1999)).

 
 
[¶8]      A motion for 
judgment as a matter of law pursuant to W.R.C.P. 50 is reviewed de novo:

 
 
"Despite 
the fact that judgment as a matter of law should be granted cautiously and 
sparingly, the district court has an obligation to direct entry of such a 
judgment where there is legally insufficient evidence to support a verdict on a 
particular issue."  Sayer v. Williams, 962 P.2d 165, 167 
(Wyo.1998).  We review the decision 
to grant or deny a motion for a judgment as a matter of law de novo.  Sundown, Inc. [v. Pearson Real Estate Co., Inc.], 8 P.3d 
[324] at 330 [(2000)].  Under our de 
novo standard, we undertake a full review of the record without giving deference 
to the trial court's views.  Wyoming Medical Center, Inc. v. Murray, 
2001 WY 63, ¶ 7, 27 P.3d 266, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2001).  The test is whether the evidence is such 
that, without the witnesses' credibility being weighed or the weight of the 
evidence otherwise being considered, there can be but one conclusion as to the 
verdict that reasonable persons could have reached.  Id. We view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all the 
reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence.  Id. When the facts presented permit the 
drawing of more than one inference, it is for the jury to choose which will be 
used.  Id. "If the 
inferences favorable to the movant are subject to doubt, or if parallel 
inferences can be drawn, the motion appropriately is denied."  Id.

 
 

Worman 
v. Carver, 2004 
WY 38, ¶ 9, 87 P.3d 1246, 1249 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Dewey v. Wentland, 2002 WY 2, ¶ 28, 
38 P.3d 402, 414 (Wyo. 2002)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Striking 
of Expert's Testimony

 
 
[¶9]      Witherspoon 
argues that the district court abused its discretion when it struck the 
testimony of her expert witness and instructed the jury to disregard it.  She complains that there was no 
articulated legal basis for the court's action.  In particular, she insists that the court 
failed to fully ascertain the terms of the stipulation and its failure to allow 
her counsel's offer of proof was an arbitrary and capricious action.  The Defendants counter that striking the 
witness's testimony was the proper remedy once it had been determined that 
Witherspoon's counsel4 had misrepresented the basis upon 
which the stipulation was entered. 

 
 
[¶10]   Our review of the record convinces 
us that the district court abused its discretion when it struck the testimony of 
Witherspoon's expert witness.  In 
response to allegations by the Defendants' counsel that he had misrepresented 
the basis on which the parties had entered into the stipulation, trial counsel 
for Witherspoon flatly denied that he had made any such misrepresentation, and 
multiple times during the colloquy excerpted above asked the district court to 
be allowed to question the expert witness to clarify the matter.  He also asked the court to consider 
emails between himself and the witness, letters relating to the stipulation 
between himself and Defendants' counsel, and offered to produce proof that 
airline reservations had been obtained for the witness.  Witherspoon's counsel's entreaties were 
to no avail.  The district court 
refused to allow him to ask the witness clarifying questions and ignored his 
offers of proof.

 
 
[¶11]   An allegation that a lawyer has 
made misrepresentations  had lied  to opposing counsel and the court is a very 
serious allegation.  See Wyoming Rules of 
Professional Conduct 3.3, 3.4, 8.1, and 8.4 (LexisNexis 2006 Supp.).  We have held that the manner in which the 
examination of a witness is conducted is largely within the discretion of the 
trial court, and that an abuse of that discretion will not be found as long as 
the decision concerning the manner of witness examination is reasonable.  Seaton v. State of Wyoming Highway 
Commission, District No. 1, 784 P.2d 197, 202 (Wyo. 1989); see also Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802, 814 
(Wyo. 1980). 
 Here, Defendants' counsel elicited 
the critical testimony from the witness during cross-examination.  In the usual course of trial, the 
opposing party would have been afforded an opportunity for redirect examination 
of the witness.  Seaton, at id.  ("The usual function of redirect 
examination is to allow a party to explain testimony elicited by an adversary's 
cross-examination of a witness."); see also Sanville v. State, 593 P.2d 1340, 1344 
(Wyo. 
1979).  The district court offered 
no reason for its refusal to allow Witherspoon's counsel to ask clarifying 
questions of the witness regarding the testimony elicited by defense during 
cross-examination.  Given the 
gravity of the claim advanced by Defendants' counsel on the basis of the 
testimony he elicited from the witness, we have a difficult time judging the 
refusal to allow clarification through redirect as 
reasonable.

 
 
[¶12]   Equally troubling was the court's 
refusal to even acknowledge counsel's requests to make an offer of proof.  In Jones v. Clark, 418 P.2d 792 (Wyo. 1966), we discussed 
the nature of an offer of proof.  There, the widow of a deceased vendor of 
real estate sued the purchasers for default on installment payments under a 
purchase agreement.  The purchasers 
sought to question several witnesses about conversations they had had with the 
deceased vendor to establish that the requirement for prompt payment had been 
waived.  The trial court sustained 
objections to the line of questioning and refused to allow the purchasers to 
make an offer of proof regarding the evidence.  We made the following observations 
regarding offers of proof:

 
 
The 
manner in which the proprieties and rights of parties to make legitimate offers 
of proof when objections are sustained to counsel's interrogations were dealt 
with was unfortunate as it raises some doubt if there was a clear understanding 
between court and counsel as to the right of litigants to make offers of proof. 
 There is at least a twofold purpose 
in according to litigants the right to make offers of proof.  It must be borne in mind that the right 
is merely to offer the proof-not the 
right to introduce it.  The right to offer is therefore almost 
absolute which is subject only to the court's discretion to reasonably restrict repetitious effort 
to offer the same or substantially the same type of proof which has been 
previously offered and its reception denied.  The first purpose of such offers is to 
specifically advise the trial court of the nature of the testimony or evidence 
expected to be elicited by the interrogation.  This is to sufficiently advise the court 
of the nature and character of the offered evidence and thereby enable the court 
to be in a better position to correctly rule upon its admissibility.  The second purpose is to ensure that the 
whole matter will be exhibited in the record in order that an appellate or 
reviewing court may be sufficiently advised and enabled to fairly pass upon the 
correctness of the trial court's rulings.

 
 
The 
court's admonitions, although somewhat harshly given, might reasonably be 
interpreted as requiring counsel only to point out the relevancy, materiality, 
and competency of the offered evidence.  This, of itself, was not improper.  In 53 Am.Jur., Trial, § 99, p. 88, it is pointed out 
that:

 
 
 As a 
general rule, a party offering evidence must show its relevancy, materiality, 
and competency, and when he seeks to introduce evidence which does not appear to 
be relevant or competent, or propounds to his witness an interrogatory which 
appears to call for an irrelevant or incompetent answer, he should make a formal 
offer of proof showing what testimony he proposes to adduce, and, when 
necessary, his intention to prove other facts which will render the evidence 
relevant or competent; the purpose for which apparently irrelevant or 
incompetent evidence is offered should be disclosed. '

 
 
However, 
the court's remarks could as reasonably be taken to deny counsel the right to 
advise the court of the nature and character of the evidence offered.  This would be improper as the litigants 
were not only entitled but were required to bring to the court's attention of 
what the offered proof would consist.

 
 
As to 
the need to ask for and receive the court's permission to make an offer of 
proof, the following is found in the same section of Am.Jur., p.89, as that 
referred to above:

 
 
Apparently, 
there is and could be no rule requiring a party first to obtain the court's 
permission to make an offer of proof.  The situation of a litigant invites 
evidence to sustain his position. Neither the court nor opposing counsel can 
know whether evidence which a party desires to present is competent or material 
until it is proffered.  When an 
offer of proof is made, the court should assume that the facts stated can be 
proved by competent evidence, and rule on the offer, leaving objections to the 
manner of proof to be decided later.  The materiality and relevancy of an offer 
of evidence must be apparent when the offer is made, to put the court in error 
in excluding it. '

 
 
This is 
actually for the purpose of informing the court so that it may rule 
intelligently on objections made or to be made to its admissibility as well as 
to preserve such ruling should it become proper to review the same.  Subject to the right of the court to 
refuse undue repetition, the right of a litigant to offer proof is absolute, 
although it is the court's equal prerogative to rule the evidence 
inadmissible.

 
 

Jones, 
418 P.2d 798-99.  See also Hepp v. Hepp, 420 P.2d 118, 118 (Wyo. 
1966) (improper for court to admonish attorney that "if there was one more 
attempt to make such offer" of proof, drastic action would be taken); Vanover v. Vanover, 77 Wyo. 55, 307 P.2d 117, 122 (1957) ("It is not only the absolute right and privilege of a party to 
make an offer of proof when an objection to his interrogation of a witness is 
sustained, but it is also the right of this court to have the record set forth 
the statement of what the offered proof will consist and which the party is 
contending should properly be received."); People v. Camel, 10 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 
295 N.E.2d 270, 275 (1973) (citing Jones as support for the proposition 
that "The right to offer proof is almost absolute, subject only to the court's 
discretion to reasonably restrict repetitious effort to offer the same or 
substantially the same type of proof which has been previously offered and its 
reception denied."); State v. Francis 
D., 815 A.2d 191 (Conn. App. 2003); and Hill v. State, 699 So. 2d 974 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 1997); 89 A.L.R.2d 279 Ruling on 
Offer of Proof as Error, § 5 (Cum. supp.) (collecting cases).  Witherspoon's counsel made an offer of 
proof to refute the allegation that he had made misrepresentations to opposing 
counsel and the court.  The offer 
cited specific evidence  emails, letters, and airline reservations  that was 
not, on its face, repetitious in nature.  Without explanation, the district court 
ignored all of counsel's offers.

 
 
[¶13]   On the basis of testimony he had 
elicited during cross-examination of a plaintiff's witness, counsel for the 
Defendants leveled allegations that carried serious legal and ethical 
ramifications for Witherspoon's counsel and his client.  Nevertheless, without any explanation on 
the record, the district court refused to allow redirect of the witness and 
ignored all offers of proof.  While 
we have always accorded considerable latitude to a district court when an action 
rests within its discretion, we have stressed that this does not "mean that the 
court has unrestrained power to act in an arbitrary manner."  Winterholler v. Zolessi, 989 P.2d 621, 
627-28 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting Waldrop v. Weaver, 702 P.2d 1291, 1294 
(Wyo. 
1985)).

 
 
Fundamental 
to the concept of the rule of law is the principle that reason and justice shall 
prevail over the arbitrary and uncontrolled will of any one person; and that 
this applies to all men in every status: to courts and judges, as well as to 
autocrats or bureaucrats.  The 
meaning of the term discretion' itself imports that the action should be taken 
within reason and good conscience in the interest of protecting the rights of 
both parties and serving the ends of justice.  It 
has always been the policy of our law to resolve doubts in favor of permitting 
parties to have their day in court on the merits of a 
controversy.

 
 

Id. 
(emphasis in Winterholler).  While hesitant to interject ourselves 
into the management of a trial, we must do so here.  Witherspoon's counsel was not allowed to 
present an effective response to the allegations leveled by Defendants' counsel 
with the consequence that his client was denied the opportunity to have her 
claim judged on its merits.  We can 
only characterize the district court's actions in refusing to allow redirect or 
to permit the proffered offer of proof as arbitrary.  Under the circumstances, that was an 
abuse of discretion.

 
 

Judgment 
as a Matter of Law

 
 
[¶14]   The question that remains is 
whether the striking of the expert witness's testimony was harmless error.  An error requires reversal of the lower 
court judgment only if it is prejudicial to a substantial right. "[F]or an error 
to be harmful, there must be a reasonable probability that in the absence of 
error the verdict might have been more favorable [to the losing party]."  Rivermeadows, Inc. v. Zwaanshoek Holding and 
Financiering, B.V., 761 P.2d 662, 671 (Wyo. 
1988) (quoting Herman v. Speed King 
Manufacturing Company, 675 P.2d 1271, 1278 (Wyo. 1984) (rejection of expert's testimony even if 
erroneous was harmless); and ABC 
Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 935 (Wyo. 
1981)).

 
 
[¶15]   After Witherspoon finished her 
case, the Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
50(a).  In granting the motion, the 
district court found that without the testimony of her expert witness, 
Witherspoon could not establish the requisite standard of 
care:

 
 
[A]s far 
as the Court's concerned, [Witherspoon needed] to get passed [sic] this motion, 
[she] needed to have the testimony of expert Mr. Lorenzo Kunze.  The Court, for good cause, struck the 
testimony of Mr. Lorenzo Kunze and, therefore, the Court does agree with the 
defendant saying that there was a failure to show a duty, number one, and a 
breach of that duty through the testimony of  as I said, I think it was 
necessary that Mr. Kunze's testimony be  . . . I am granting the defendant's 
motion.  It used to be called a 
directed verdict. Motion to dismiss.  But I'm going to grant 
it.

 
 
Since 
the absence of Kunze's testimony was the district court's cited basis for 
granting the motion, Witherspoon, of course, contends that striking that 
testimony was not harmless error.5  The Defendants counter that even if 
Kunze's testimony was considered, it was not sufficient to establish a standard 
of care or any breach thereof by Dr. Lofaro.  The Defendants contend that this case 
involved complicated issues of medical causation that are beyond the ken of lay 
persons, and since Kunze was not a medical doctor and did not offer any opinion 
as to whether Dr. Lofaro was negligent or breached the relevant standard of 
care, any error in striking his testimony was harmless.

 
 
[¶16]   We have held in medical malpractice 
actions that the plaintiff must establish through expert testimony: (1) the 
accepted standard of medical care or practice; (2) that the defendant's conduct 
deviated from that standard; and (3) that deviation was the legal cause of the 
plaintiff's injuries.  Oakden v. Roland, 988 P.2d 1057, 1059 
(Wyo. 1999) (quoting Harris v. 
Grizzle, 625 P.2d 747, 751 (Wyo. 1981)); see also Armstrong v. Hrabal, 2004 WY 39, 
¶ 12, 87 P.3d 1226, 1231 (Wyo. 2004); and Mize v. North Big Horn Hospital 
District, 931 P.2d 229, 233, 234 (Wyo. 1997). 

 
 
[¶17]   This, however, is not a medical 
malpractice action.  In a pre-trial 
order denying a motion by the Defendants to strike the testimony of Kunze and 
for summary judgment, the district court ruled:

 
 
1.  The 
question of whether hair removal is the practice of medicine is an issue of law 
to be decided by the Court.

 
 
2.  Any 
person conducting the IPL hair removal procedure is not practicing medicine 
according to the definition of "Practicing Medicine", in W.S. 
§33-26-102(a)(xi)."  The Wyoming 
State Board of Medicine determines what constitutes the practice of medicine. 
 The Board has the duty to pass upon 
the qualifications and determine the fitness of all persons desiring to practice 
medicine in this state.  W.S. 
§33-26-202(a).  The Board does not 
allow a person to practice medicine in this state without a license granted by 
the Board. W.S. §33-26-301(a).  Since a person may perform IPL hair 
removal without a license, it is clearly not the practice of medicine as the 
above statute would be violated.  In 
addition, Defendants have provided no evidence that the Board has elected to 
treat IPL or Laser hair removal as the practice of medicine.  It is noted that physician supervision is 
required by the manufacturers of hair removal equipment.  However, the process of hair removal, in 
itself, does not require a medical degree, license or certification and cannot 
be considered the practice of medicine.

 
 
3.  This 
is not a medical malpractice case.  Lorenzo Kunze, as an IPL hair removal 
specialist, is qualified to testify as an expert witness and his opinions may be 
of aid to a trier of fact.  As such, 
he shall not be stricken as an expert.  The Court has reviewed Mr. Kunze's 
educational background and work experience and determines he is competent to 
testify.

 
 
4.  There 
is a genuine issue of material fact.  The deposition of Lorenzo Kunze contains 
evidence of possible substandard care by Dr. Lofaro.  The weight of such evidence is for a 
trier of fact to determine.

 
 
[¶18]   In her testimony prior to Kunze 
taking the stand, Witherspoon described the procedures utilized by Dr. Lofaro in 
her case, how they differed from prior treatments she had received, and the 
injuries she sustained after the treatment at issue.  In his testimony, Kunze described his 
qualifications related to IPL hair removal treatment, reviewed the proper 
protocol that should be followed when applying the treatment, and described the 
potential injuries a patient could suffer if the protocols were not 
followed.  Contrary to the 
Defendants' representation, Kunze did indeed opine that if Witherspoon's 
depiction of her treatment was accurate, then Dr. Lofaro's care fell below the 
standard of care applicable to IPL hair removal treatment.  If the district court had not 
erroneously struck the testimony of Kunze, that evidence was sufficient for the 
question of whether or not the Defendants' breached the duty of care owed to 
Witherspoon to be submitted for determination by the jury.  Therefore, the error was not 
harmless.

 
 
[¶19]   We reverse the district court's 
judgment and remand for a new trial.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The letter 
is not in the record on appeal.

 
 

2Rule 50. Judgment as a 
matter of law in jury trials; alternative motion for new trial; conditional 
rulings.

 
 
(a) Judgment as a matter of law.  

 
 
(1) If 
during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no 
legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that 
party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and 
may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with 
respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be 
maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that 
issue.

 
 
(2) Motions 
for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time before submission of the 
case to the jury.  Such a motion 
shall specify the judgment sought and the law and the facts on which the moving 
party is entitled to the judgment.

 
 

3Since 
the events relating to the district court's approval of the parties' stipulation 
and Kunze's telephonic testimony were not reported, the Defendants submitted a 
Statement of Proceedings for Record pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03 stating the 
following:

 
 
1.  The 
morning of the start of the trial prior to jury selection, an in-chambers 
conference with Court and counsel occurred, which was not reported or 
recorded.

 
 
2.  During 
this conference, the Court inquired of counsel about why Appellant's expert 
witness, Lorenzo Kunze, would be testifying by telephone and was provided with 
the following information from both counsel.

 
 
3.  The 
Court was informed by both counsel that prior to the trial in the case 
Appellant's attorney contacted the attorney for the Appellee and asked if 
Appellant's expert witness, Lorenzo Kunze, could testify at trial, by 
telephone.  Appellee's attorney 
asked if the expert witness would testify in person, if agreement for telephone 
testimony was not made and was advised by Appellant's attorney that the expert 
witness would appear in person for his testimony without this 
stipulation.

 
 
4.  Appellee's 
attorney responded that he would stipulate to telephone trial testimony of the 
expert witness based upon this representation.

 
 
5.  Appellant's 
attorney then sent to Appellee's attorney a confirmatory letter which stated 
that the parties agreed to allow Lorenzo Kunze to testify by telephone.  Appellee's attorney added a statement to 
that letter referencing the deposition testimony of witness Jennifer Swett and 
returned it to Appellant's attorney.

 
 
6.  The 
Court was informed that Appellee's attorney would never have stipulated to the 
telephone testimony of the expert witness Lorenzo Kunze without assurance from 
Appellant's attorney that Mr. Kunze would be appearing at trial without the 
stipulation.

 
 
7.  During 
cross-examination of Lorenzo Kunze, the transcript then reflects the sequence of 
events regarding Mr. Kunze's intentions for appearing at trial and the basis for 
why his testimony was stricken.

 
 
W.R.A.P. 
3.03 provides:

 
 
If no 
report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a 
transcript is unavailable, appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or 
proceedings from the best available means including appellant's 
recollection.  The statement shall 
be served on appellee, who may serve objections or propose amendments within 15 
days after service.  The statement 
and any objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted to the trial court 
for settlement and approval and as settled and approved shall be included by the 
clerk of the trial court in the record on appeal.

 
 
Witherspoon 
offered no objections to the Defendants' Statement of Proceedings for Record on 
Appeal, and the district court approved it as submitted.  The rule states that the "appellant" may 
prepare a statement which must be served on the "appellee" who may offer 
objections.  We note that the rule 
does not state that the "appellee" may prepare a statement under the rule.  Since there is no objection to the 
statement, we need not determine the scope of the rule today.  Furthermore, our ruling is not affected 
by acceptance of the statement as a valid representation of the proceedings 
before the trial court.

 
 

4Witherspoon 
is represented by different counsel on appeal.

 
 

5Witherspoon 
notes the district court ruled that this was not a medical malpractice case 
because a medical license is not required to perform laser hair removal 
treatments.  She argues that, 
therefore, expert testimony was not necessary and that there was sufficient 
evidence in the form of testimony from lay witnesses, including Witherspoon 
herself, to establish a standard of care and breach thereof by Dr. Lofaro.  In light of our decision regarding the 
exclusion of the expert testimony, it is not necessary for us to address this 
argument.