Case Title: Bell v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC20-472

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2022-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC20-472 
____________ 
 
JESSE BELL, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
February 3, 2022 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
 
Jesse Bell appeals his judgment of conviction for first-degree 
murder and sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 
3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons explained below, we affirm in all 
respects. 
BACKGROUND 
In May 2019, Bell and his codefendant Barry A. Noetzel—
cellmates at Mayo Correctional Institution—formulated a 12-step 
plan, entitled “Countdown to [E]xtention” [sic] (Plan), to murder 
 
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Mayo Correctional Officer James Newman as well as a fellow 
inmate.1  The Plan read as follows: 
1. Get on vegan diet 
2. Get multiple tools 
3. Get diagram of area 
4. Find a gofer. 
5. Baby powder? 
6. Patience!!!! 
7. Pick a dick sucker 
8. Background check on dick sucker. 
9. Pick a date 
10. Commence dry runs-rehearsals. 
11. Exicute [sic]! 
12. Work on spelling!! 
 
Over the next month, Bell and Noetzel carried their plan into 
effect.  They switched to a vegan diet to gain greater access to the 
area of the kitchen where Officer Newman worked.  They recruited 
other inmates to scout out the layout of the kitchen where they 
intended to carry out Officer Newman’s murder.  They obtained 
pieces of fence and metal, which they fashioned into sharp objects 
resembling ice picks.  As for the inmate to be killed, Bell and 
Noetzel selected Donald H. Eastwood Jr.—whom they believed to be 
homosexual and a child molester. 
 
1.  Bell later confessed that he and Noetzel intended to murder 
the inmate as practice for murdering Officer Newman. 
 
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Bell and Noetzel selected a date for carrying out the murders 
and, consistent with their plan, invited Eastwood to their cell for a 
cup of coffee.  Once Eastwood arrived, Noetzel—who was sitting on 
the toilet pretending to play a game on his tablet—invited him to 
look at his tablet screen.  When Eastwood leaned over to look at the 
screen, Bell placed him in a chokehold while Noetzel retrieved a 
makeshift knife and stabbed Eastwood in the left eye. 
Eastwood passed out from the attack.  Leaving the knife in 
Eastwood’s eye, Noetzel hung up a curtain to prevent others from 
seeing into the cell.  Eastwood regained consciousness, attempted 
to stand, and asked Bell and Noetzel what he had done to provoke 
the attack.  Bell choked Eastwood again, causing him to again lose 
consciousness.  At that point, either Bell or Noetzel pulled the knife 
out of Eastwood’s left eye and stabbed him in his right eye. 
Eastwood attempted to sit up.  However, Bell “cranked down” 
on Eastwood’s neck and held him down.  When Bell heard 
Eastwood make another noise, he choked him a third time until 
Eastwood’s face turned purple.  Finally, Bell pushed Eastwood’s 
face into a pool of his own blood to ensure he was dead. 
After confirming Eastwood to be dead, Bell and Noetzel  
 
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shoved his body between their bunks, covered it with a blanket, 
cleaned up the blood, and removed the curtain.  They then hung up 
a sign in their cell, which read, “GOD HATES FAGS.  FAGS HATE 
GOD! KILL ALL FAGS AND CHO-MOES!  (And Any C.O.’s Who F*ck 
with You!).2 
As planned, Bell and Noetzel then made their way to the 
cafeteria and stabbed Officer Newman with another homemade 
knife.  Other officers intervened and thwarted the attack.  Officer 
Newman survived the assault. 
Thereafter, Bell confessed—on multiple occasions—to 
murdering Eastwood and stabbing Officer Newman.  These 
interviews were recorded. 
Ultimately, a grand jury indicted Bell and Noetzel jointly for 
five offenses—one count of first-degree murder, attempted murder 
of a correctional officer with a deadly weapon, conspiracy to commit 
first-degree murder, and two counts of possession of contraband in 
a prison.  On the first-degree murder count, the State sought the 
death penalty. 
 
2.  “C.O.” means correctional officer. 
 
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Following the indictment, Bell expressed his desire to proceed 
pro se.  The trial court conducted a detailed Faretta3 inquiry and 
found Bell competent to represent himself in the proceedings. 
At a later hearing, Bell announced his intent to enter a no 
contest plea to the charges.  The State gave a factual basis for Bell’s 
first-degree murder charge as well as for each of the additional 
charged offenses.  Bell did not object to the factual basis.  The trial 
court then accepted Bell’s plea and adjudicated him guilty of the 
charged offenses.  After accepting the plea, the trial court engaged 
Bell in the following dialogue: 
THE COURT: All right.  Before we proceed to 
sentencing, which will be at another day, do you 
understand at that proceeding it will be either be 
before a jury or before the Court and the [S]tate will 
be required to present evidence sufficient as 
indicated to you that there are aggravating factors 
to support the imposition of the death penalty.  You 
understand that? 
BELL: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: You have the right to call 
witnesses at that proceeding in mitigation.  Do you 
understand that? 
BELL: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you have witnesses that you 
wish to call? 
BELL: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you wish to testify at that 
 
3.  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
 
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proceeding? 
BELL: Yes, sir. 
 
Bell ultimately waived his right to a penalty-phase jury.  
Following the completion of a competency evaluation, the court 
conducted a consolidated penalty phase and Spencer4 hearing.  At 
the hearing, the State sought to prove five aggravating 
circumstances, including that Bell was previously convicted of a 
felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person, that the 
capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful 
exercise of a government function or the enforcement of laws, and 
that the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. 
To prove these aggravators, the State called several witnesses.  
First, the State called Captain Colin Woodall, who responded to the 
attack on Officer Newman.  According to Captain Woodall, Officer 
Newman was slumped over and bleeding from several stab wounds.  
Captain Woodall also spoke to Bell, who informed him that 
Eastwood’s body could be found in the cell.  Captain Woodall 
proceeded to the cell and found Eastwood’s body. 
 
4.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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Next, the State called the law enforcement officers to whom 
Bell and Noetzel confessed.  Through these witnesses, the State 
introduced the recorded confessions. 
In addition, the State called the medical examiner who 
testified that Eastwood’s cause of death was homicide brought 
about by “sharp force trauma to the left eye and brain with neck 
compression.”  He further explained that the stab wound to 
Eastwood’s left eye was deep—penetrating into the frontal lobe of 
the brain—and very painful.  According to the medical examiner, 
given the amount of blood on Eastwood’s face and chest, his “heart 
was pumping vigorously” during the attack.  Thus, it was 
“possib[le]” Eastwood was alive to experience the manual 
strangulation. 
Once the State rested its case, Bell took the stand.  He offered 
the following testimony in mitigation: 
I had a pretty good childhood, really no abuse, 
nothing to speak of. 
I’ve been in prison a long time.  My behavior 
hasn’t been really good in prison, but I’ve never 
assaulted any officers besides Newman, which was 
brought up.  I had my reasons for that.  He knows 
what they are. 
 
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Well, I suffer from depression and I would like 
the competency doctor’s diagnosis to be put into 
evidence. 
. . . . 
I came forward.  I pled guilty.  I’ve had good 
behavior in court.  My family loves me.  I’ve had 
good prison behavior since this incident.  I haven’t 
had any DRs[5] or any kind of problems with the 
officers. 
. . . . 
I’ve never been a good person, but I’ve 
always been an honest person. 
 
Bell then entered his competency report into evidence and 
presented a closing argument in which he objected to the 
heinous, atrocious, and cruel aggravator, arguing that it was 
“too vague.”  He further posited that it would be 
“unconstitutional” and “cruel and unusual punishment” to 
execute him by lethal injection since he would know of his 
impending death for 20 or 30 seconds beforehand. 
Bell also argued that the State failed to prove that he 
disrupted a lawful exercise of law enforcement.  Finally, Bell argued 
that Officer Newman’s attack could not support the prior violent 
felony aggravator, because it was a “doubling of aggravators” used 
to “inflame” the court. 
 
5.  The term “DRs” likely refers to prison disciplinary reports. 
 
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At the end of the consolidated hearing, the trial court took the 
issue of sentencing under advisement, scheduled a sentencing 
hearing, and ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation 
(PSI) “[o]ut of the abundance of caution[.]”  Citing Muhammad,6 Bell 
objected to the PSI, arguing it was unnecessary since he did not 
waive mitigation.  Overruling that objection, the trial court adhered 
to its initial decision on the PSI.7 
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court announced its 
decision to impose the death penalty for the murder of Eastwood.  
In its detailed sentencing order, the court found that the State 
proved the existence of the following aggravators beyond a 
reasonable doubt, with the noted weight: (1) the capital felony was 
committed by a person previously convicted of a felony and under 
 
6.  Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2001). 
 
7.  The PSI detailed Bell’s criminal, educational, work, and 
family history.  It further explained that Bell was in good health but 
had been “treated for depression.”  It also contained a statement 
from Bell that he had never used illegal drugs.  Though the PSI was 
not particularly thorough, it included the type of information a 
comprehensive PSI requires.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.710(b) 
(explaining that a comprehensive PSI describes a defendant’s 
“previous mental health problems (including hospitalizations), 
school records, and relevant family background”). 
 
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sentence of imprisonment (great weight); (2) the defendant was 
previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving 
the use or threat of violence to the person (great weight); (3) the 
capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) (very 
great weight); and (4) the capital felony was committed in a cold, 
calculated, and premeditated manner (CCP) without any pretense of 
moral or legal justification (very great weight).  However, the court 
found that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful 
exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws, 
and accordingly assigned that aggravator no weight. 
As for mitigation, the trial court observed: 
[Bell] admitted his Competency Evaluation and 
stated that he suffered from depression.  He 
also indicated that he had come forward, pled 
guilty, exhibited good courtroom behavior, had 
satisfactory prison behavior since the murder 
and attack, and that his family loves him.  He 
also explained that he has never been “a good 
person” but that he is an “honest person” and 
believes in taking responsibility for his action. 
 
The court then analyzed each statutory mitigator outlined in 
section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (2019), and ultimately found 
that none applied.  Nevertheless, the court found the following 
 
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nonstatutory mitigators applicable and assigned each the indicated 
weight: (1) Bell took responsibility for his conduct and cooperated 
during the investigation of and prosecution for the killing of 
Eastwood (little weight); (2) Bell exhibited appropriate courtroom 
behavior (little weight); (3) Bell had never assaulted any corrections 
officers until the attack on Officer Newman (no weight); (4) Bell’s 
family loves him (slight weight); and (5) Bell had been previously 
diagnosed with and treated for depression (little weight). 
The court then weighed the aggravating factors against the 
mitigating circumstances, concluding that “the aggravating factors 
clearly, convincingly, and beyond a reasonable doubt outweigh[ed] 
the mitigating factors.”  Accordingly, the trial court sentenced Bell 
to death. 
Bell now appeals. 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
Bell raises two issues for our review.  First, he argues that 
given the limited mitigation presented in this case, the trial court 
abused its discretion by failing to order the preparation of a 
comprehensive PSI, by not requiring the State to present all 
mitigating evidence in its possession, and by failing to appoint 
 
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counsel to further investigate his potentially mitigating 
circumstances.  Second, Bell asserts that the trial court committed 
fundamental error by failing to determine beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the aggravating factors in his case were sufficient to 
impose a death sentence and that those factors outweighed the 
mitigating circumstances.  Though he has not raised this issue, we 
also address whether Bell intelligently and voluntarily entered his 
no-contest plea.  
Mitigation 
As to his first point, Bell argues that, given the minimal 
mitigation presented at his consolidated hearing, the trial court 
erred in failing to employ the mitigation-investigation procedures 
this Court established in Muhammad and modified in Marquardt,8 
thereby depriving him of an “individualized” sentencing 
determination.9  We disagree.  
 
8.  Marquardt v. State, 156 So. 3d 490 (Fla. 2015) (modifying 
Muhammad’s procedures to require trial courts to appoint 
independent, special counsel to represent the public interest in 
bringing forth all available mitigation). 
 
9.  The United States Supreme Court’s precedent regarding 
mitigation “confer[s] upon defendants the right to present 
sentencers with information relevant to the sentencing decision and 
 
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As a threshold matter, this Court reviews a trial court’s 
consideration of mitigation evidence for abuse of discretion.  Foster 
v. State, 679 So. 2d 747, 755 (Fla. 1996).  And, where a defendant 
fails to preserve—by specific objection—the trial court’s alleged 
errors, this Court will only reverse where there is a showing of 
fundamental error.  See Hopkins v. State, 632 So. 2d 1372, 1374 
(Fla. 1994). 
Additionally, this Court affords competent capital defendants 
“great control over the objectives and content of [their] mitigation.”  
Boyd v. State, 910 So. 2d 167, 189 (2005).  Thus, regardless of 
“[w]hether [the] defendant is represented by counsel or is 
proceeding pro se, the defendant has the right to choose what 
evidence, if any, the defense will present during the penalty phase.”  
Id. at 189-90. 
A capital defendant may waive the right to present evidence, 
but such a waiver does not eliminate the court’s responsibility to 
consider mitigating evidence in the record.  See Sparre v. State, 164 
 
oblige[s] sentencers to consider that information in determining the 
appropriate sentence.  [And] [t]he thrust of [the Supreme Court’s] 
mitigation jurisprudence ends [t]here.”  Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 
163, 173-74 (2006). 
 
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So. 3d 1183, 1196 (Fla. 2015).  Specifically, when a capital 
defendant waives the right to present any mitigating evidence and 
invites a death sentence, the trial court must order the preparation 
of a comprehensive PSI and require the State to put into the record 
any mitigating evidence in its possession.  See Muhammad, 782 So. 
2d at 343. 
However, where a defendant does not waive the right to 
present mitigation, Muhammad’s investigative procedures do not 
apply.  See Eaglin v. State, 19 So. 3d 935, 945-46 (Fla. 2009) 
(noting that Muhammad’s procedures “only [apply] to cases in which 
there is a complete waiver of all mitigation”); Boyd, 910 So. 2d at 
189 (finding Muhammad inapplicable where the defendant “did not 
waive all mitigation but only limited the matters presented on 
mitigation”); McCray v. State, 71 So. 3d 848, 880 (Fla. 2011) 
(holding Muhammad did not apply where the defendant “did not 
waive all mitigation”); see also Craft v. State, 312 So. 3d 45, 53-54 
(Fla. 2020) (declining to apply Muhammad where the defendant did 
not waive the presentation of mitigation evidence). 
Here, Bell did not waive the right to present mitigation.  In 
fact, he offered several items of mitigation into evidence during his 
 
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penalty-phase testimony, including his history of depression, his 
good courtroom behavior, his good behavior in prison since the 
incident, the fact that aside from Officer Newman, he had not 
assaulted any other officers at Mayo, and the fact that he had 
voluntarily entered his no contest plea.  Bell also testified that his 
family loved him and that he had always been an honest person.  
Furthermore, Bell offered into evidence his competency evaluation—
which detailed his history of and treatment for chronic recurrent 
major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and 
antisocial personality disorder. 
Thus, Bell did not waive his right to present mitigation and 
Muhammad does not apply.  Accordingly, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion by not employing all the procedures required in 
Muhammad. 
Sufficiency of Findings 
 
Next, Bell argues that the trial court committed fundamental 
error by failing to find beyond a reasonable doubt that sufficient 
aggravating factors existed to warrant a death sentence and that 
those factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances.  According 
to Bell, the weighing determinations in section 921.141 are subject 
 
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to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.  Our recent case law 
forecloses this argument, and we see no reason to depart from this 
precedent.  See Rogers v. State, 285 So. 3d 872, 885 (Fla. 2019) 
(rejecting the argument “that the trial court erred in failing to 
instruct the jury that it must determine beyond a reasonable doubt 
whether the aggravating factors were sufficient to justify the death 
penalty and whether those factors outweighed the mitigating 
circumstances”); Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544, 552 n.8 (Fla. 
2020) (finding this fundamental-error claim “equally meritless” 
where a defendant waived the right to a penalty-phase jury); Craft, 
312 So. 3d at 57; Santiago-Gonzalez v. State, 301 So. 3d 157, 177 
(Fla. 2020); Bright v. State, 299 So. 3d 985, 998 (Fla. 2020); 
Davidson v. State, 323 So. 3d 1241, 1247-48 (Fla. 2021). 
Voluntariness of No Contest Plea 
 
Finally, in death penalty cases, this Court has a “mandatory 
obligation” to review Bell’s conviction for first-degree murder even 
where he has entered a no contest plea.  Doty v. State, 170 So. 3d 
731, 738 (Fla. 2015).  In conducting this review, we “scrutinize the 
plea to ensure that the defendant was made aware of the 
consequences of his plea, was apprised of the constitutional rights 
 
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he was waiving, and pled [no contest] voluntarily.”  Ocha v. State, 
826 So. 2d 956, 965 (Fla. 2002).  We also review the relevant 
factual basis for the plea.  Doty, 170 So. 3d at 739. 
Here, Bell indicated he understood the constitutional rights he 
was giving up by pleading no contest.  The plea form—which Bell 
stated he read and understood—expressly stated that he 
understood that by pleading, he gave up the right against self-
incrimination. 
The trial court explained to Bell the seriousness of the charges 
he faced as well as the fact that his first-degree-murder charge 
carried a possible sentence of death.  Bell stated he understood.  
When asked whether anyone threatened, coerced, or promised him 
anything in exchange for entering his plea, Bell answered no. 
Finally, the State provided a factual basis for each charge 
underlying Bell’s no contest plea—including the first-degree murder 
charge—and Bell did not object to any portion of the factual basis. 
Therefore, we find that Bell voluntarily and knowingly entered 
his no contest plea.  See Covington v. State, 228 So. 3d 49, 67 (Fla. 
2017). 
 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, we affirm Bell’s first-degree murder conviction 
and sentence of death. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and 
GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.  
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LABARGA, J., concurring in result. 
 
For the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinion in 
Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020) (receding from 
proportionality review requirement in death penalty direct appeal 
cases), I can only concur in the result. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Lafayette County, 
David W. Fina, Judge – Case No. 342019CF000055CFBXMX 
 
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Barbara J. Busharis, 
Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
for Appellant 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Jason W. Rodriguez, Assistant 
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Appellee