Case Title: BRENT VEENSTRA V WASHTENAW COUNTRY CLUB

Citation: 

Docket Number: 117985

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2002-05-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 29, 2002  
BRENT VEENSTRA,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 117985  
WASHTENAW COUNTRY CLUB,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
YOUNG, J.  
Defendant Washtenaw Country Club declined to renew  
plaintiff’s contract as the club’s golf professional,  
following 
plaintiff’s 
apparently 
notorious 
and 
public  
separation from his wife and cohabitation with another woman.  
The trial court summarily dismissed plaintiff’s breach of  
contract and marital discrimination claims.  The Court of  
Appeals upheld the dismissal of the contract claim, but held  
that, under our decision in McCready v Hoffius, 459 Mich 131;  
 
586 NW2d 723 (1998)(McCready II), vacated in part 459 Mich  
1235 (1999), discrimination on the basis of “unmarried  
cohabitation” violated the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et  
seq.  
We granted leave to appeal to consider whether the Civil  
Rights Act extends to discrimination against an employee on  
the basis of the employee’s conduct, in this case adultery.  
We hold that an employee discharged solely because of conduct  
such as adultery is not protected by the Civil Rights Act; the  
statute prohibits an employer only from making decisions  
because of race, sex, marital status, and the other protected  
statuses enumerated in the statute.  
In 
opposition 
to 
defendant’s 
motion 
for 
summary  
disposition, plaintiff has arguably introduced some evidence  
that defendant considered his marital status in addition to  
his unprotected conduct.  However, because the trial court did  
not explain why this evidence was insufficient to meet  
plaintiff’s burden under MCR 2.116(G)(4), we vacate the  
holding of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the  
trial court for further proceedings consistent with this  
opinion.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
Plaintiff was employed as defendant’s golf professional  
2  
 
from 1991 through 1996.  His employment was based on a yearly  
contract.  
Plaintiff’s then current contract expired on its own  
terms in December 1996. In January 1996, plaintiff, who was  
married, began having an adulterous affair with a married  
woman.  In April 1996, plaintiff moved out of his marital  
home. A few weeks after leaving the marital home, plaintiff  
began cohabitating with his mistress and escorted her to club  
events.  All these activities became well known to members of  
the Washtenaw Country Club and were the subject of discussion.  
In 
June 
1996, 
board member Russo prepared and distributed  
a survey to the general membership of the country club asking  
members 
to 
evaluate 
certain 
key 
personnel, 
including  
plaintiff.  The surveys revealed that a number of members were  
dissatisfied with plaintiff’s performance as the club golf  
professional.  Plaintiff received far more negative reviews  
than the other three personnel who were also the focus of the  
performance survey.  
In September 1996, plaintiff’s wife instituted formal  
divorce proceedings.  Two months later, defendant informed  
plaintiff of its decision not to renew his yearly employment  
contract.  The employment contract expired at the end of 1996.  
Plaintiff’s divorce from his wife became final in May 1997.  
3  
 
 
In December 1997, plaintiff filed suit, alleging marital  
status discrimination and breach of contract. Regarding the  
discrimination claim, plaintiff alleged that his termination  
“was motivated in part if not entirely because of his status  
as a divorced person.”  
The 
trial 
court 
granted 
summary 
disposition 
for 
defendant  
on both counts of the complaint pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).  
Relying on McCready v Hoffius, 222 Mich App 210; 564 NW2d 493  
(1997)(McCready I), the trial court ruled that cohabitation  
was not a protected status under the Civil Rights Act.  
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff,  
the trial court concluded that “if there was discrimination  
against plaintiff, it was not based on his pending divorce but  
on his cohabitation with his mistress.” In granting summary  
disposition to defendant, the trial court did not address an  
affidavit plaintiff submitted that arguably supported a claim  
that his pending divorce was a factor in the decision not to  
renew his contract.  
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and  
reversed in part.1  The panel affirmed the granting of summary  
disposition on the breach of contract claim.2  However, the  
1 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 6, 2000 
(Docket No. 216907).  
2 Plaintiff did not appeal the Court of Appeals ruling on 
the breach of contract claim, so that issue is not before us.  
4  
 
 
 
 
panel reversed the order granting summary disposition  
regarding the marital status discrimination claim. McCready  
I, relied on by the trial court in granting summary  
disposition for defendant, had been reversed by this Court in  
McCready II. Citing the Court’s decision in McCready II, the  
Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff had a valid claim  
for marital discrimination “to the extent that plaintiff  
establishes discrimination on the basis of his unmarried  
cohabitation . . . .”  In concluding that plaintiff presented  
direct evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of  
material fact, the Court of Appeals cited the affidavit of  
defendant’s outside operations manager who stated that three  
of the board’s eight members specifically expressed their  
disapproval of plaintiff’s divorce, stated that the situation  
was “disgusting,” referred to plaintiff as a “slut,” and  
stated that they “had to get rid of him.”  
Defendant sought leave to appeal, which was granted.  464  
Mich 874 (2001).  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
The decision to grant or deny summary disposition is a  
question of law that is reviewed de novo.  Van v Zahorik, 460  
Mich 320; 597 NW2d 15 (1999).  This case also presents the  
issue whether plaintiff’s adulterous behavior is protected  
under the Civil Rights Act. 
The interpretation and  
5  
 
application of a statutory provision is a question of law that  
is reviewed de novo by this Court. People v Webb, 458 Mich  
265, 274; 580 NW2d 884 (1998).  
III. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION  
When interpreting statutory language, our obligation is  
to discern the legislative intent that may reasonably be  
inferred from the words expressed in the statute. Wickens v  
Oakwood Healthcare System, 465 Mich 53; 631 NW2d 686 (2001).  
When the Legislature has unambiguously conveyed its intent in  
a statute, the statute speaks for itself and there is no need  
for judicial construction; the proper role of a court is  
simply to apply the terms of the statute to the circumstances  
in a particular case.  Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 448 Mich  
22; 528 NW2d 681 (1995). In construing a statute, the words  
used by the Legislature must be given their common, ordinary  
meaning. MCL 8.3a.  
IV. ANALYSIS  
A. THE STATUTE  
Plaintiff’s 
claim 
for 
marital 
status 
employment  
discrimination 
is 
premised 
upon 
MCL 
37.2202(1), 
which 
provides  
in relevant part:  
An employer shall not do any of the following:  
(a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, 
discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an 
individual 
with 
respect 
to 
employment, 
compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of  
6  
 
 
 
  
 
employment, because of religion, race, color, 
national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or 
marital status.  
While the term “marital status” is not defined in the  
statute, this Court has historically defined the term as  
“whether a person is married.” Miller v C A Muer Corp, 420  
Mich 355, 363; 362 NW2d 650 (1984); Whirlpool Corp v Civil  
Rights Comm, 425 Mich 527, 530; 390 NW2d 625 (1986); McCready  
II, supra at 137.  
The clear, unambiguous language of the statute protects  
status, not conduct.  As a result, if an employer takes  
adverse 
action 
against an employee for conduct, without regard  
to marital status, the Civil Rights Act simply provides no  
redress. Thus, a discrimination claim premised merely on an  
employer’s consideration of an employee’s adultery would  
provide no basis for recovery under the act.3  
B. THE APPLICABILITY OF MCCREADY II  
In McCready II, defendants, who owned residential rental  
property, 
refused 
to 
rent their property to unmarried couples.  
3 We note that the adultery statute applies equally to 
married 
and 
unmarried 
individuals. 
MCL 
750.29 
defines 
adultery 
as “sexual intercourse of 2 persons, either of whom is married  
to a third person.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, because  
plaintiff’s mistress was married, plaintiff would have been 
engaging in adultery even if he had been unmarried.  This  
language alone demonstrates the irrelevancy in this case of 
the dissent’s observation, slip op at 3, that the Civil Rights 
Act protects persons from discrimination “on the basis of acts 
found immoral solely because of one’s status.”  
7  
In doing so, defendants stated “that the units were available  
only to married couples” and that they usually “did not rent  
to unmarried couples.” 459 Mich 134.  Plaintiffs, two  
unmarried couples who intended to cohabit, brought suit after  
being denied the opportunity to rent the property. Defendants  
maintained that any discrimination was premised upon “their  
perception 
of 
plaintiffs’ 
conduct” 
rather 
than 
the 
plaintiffs’  
marital status. Id at 138.  
The issue to be resolved in McCready II was whether a  
claim for marital status discrimination could be stated where  
the claim was premised on defendant’s rejection of plaintiffs  
because of their unmarried cohabitation.  The statutory  
provision at issue in McCready II, MCL 37.2502(1), states in  
pertinent part:  
A 
person 
engaging 
in 
a 
real 
estate  
transaction, or a real estate broker or salesman, 
shall not on the basis of religion, race, color, 
national origin, age, sex, familial status, or 
marital status of a person or a person residing  
with that person:  
(a) Refuse to engage in a real estate  
transaction with a person. 
[Emphasis added.]  
In determining that the plaintiff had stated a claim for  
marital status discrimination, this Court attempted to  
distinguish 
status 
from 
conduct, 
concluding 
that  
“[p]laintiffs’ 
marital status, and not their conduct in living  
together, is the root of the defendants’ objection to renting  
8  
  
 
the apartment to the plaintiffs.” Id. at 140. 
We further  
noted that the case was “complicated” by a statute forbidding  
lewd and lascivious cohabitation by unmarried couples, MCL  
750.335. Id., 136. However, the opinion held that there was  
“insufficient evidence that the plaintiffs intended to engage  
in lewd and lascivious behavior.” Id., 141.  
In reversing the trial court’s grant of summary  
disposition for defendant in this case, the Court of Appeals  
applied McCready II and concluded that plaintiff had a valid  
claim 
for 
marital 
discrimination “to the extent that plaintiff  
establishes discrimination on the basis of his unmarried  
cohabitation . . . .” Slip op at 4.  However, McCready should  
not be read so expansively as to create a right to cohabit  
under our Civil Rights Act.  Properly read, the plaintiffs in  
McCready II submitted sufficient direct evidence of marital  
status discrimination to survive defendant’s motion for  
summary disposition.  
While stated above, we take this opportunity to  
unequivocally reiterate that the unambiguous language of the  
Civil Rights Act protects only the consideration of a person’s  
marital status.  Adverse action against an individual for  
conduct, without regard to marital status, provides no basis  
for recourse under the act.  It is irrelevant that the conduct  
9  
 
 
 
  
 
at issue does or does not have criminal consequences.4  
In McCready, direct evidence was presented that the  
defendants considered the marital status of the plaintiffs in  
refusing to engage in the desired real estate transaction.  
Our Civil Rights Act requires no more.5  
C. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION UNDER MCR  
2.116(C)(10)  
Defendant brought a motion for summary disposition  
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).  A motion under this section  
tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint.  The movant  
must specifically identify issues to which it believes no  
genuine issue as to any material fact exists. 
MCR  
2.116(G)(4).  In opposition to the motion, the nonmoving party  
may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but must  
proffer evidence of specific facts showing that there is a  
genuine issue for trial. Id.; Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460  
Mich 446; 597 NW2d 28 (1999).  Evidence offered in support of  
or in opposition to the motion can be considered only to the  
4 Although the dissent takes pains to concur in this 
proposition, slip op at 6, it is important to understand that 
our opinion asserts this only because we believe that the Act  
protects status and not conduct.  
5  Contrary to the dissent, slip op at 3, we do not 
suggest that McCready II is about a “right to cohabit.” It is  
the dissent that appears to interpret it in this manner. 
Rather, the majority views McCready II as a case focused upon 
marital status discrimination, one of the express categories 
of statutory protection under the Civil Rights Act.  
10  
extent that it is substantively admissible.  MCR 2.116(G)(6);  
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 121; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).  
In evaluating a motion for summary disposition brought  
under this subsection, a trial court is required to consider  
the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other  
evidence submitted by the parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in the  
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.  Where  
the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue  
regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled to  
judgment as a matter of law. MCR 2.116(C)(10), (G)(4).  Quinto  
v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358; 547 NW2d 314 (1996).  
In the instant case, defendant’s motion for summary  
disposition maintains that its refusal to renew plaintiff’s  
contract did not relate to his marital status. In response,  
plaintiff offered the affidavit of defendant’s outside  
operations manager, Patrick Godfrey.  Mr. Godfrey averred  
that, “[o]n several occasions,” he overheard three board  
members 
“specifically 
express 
their 
disapproval” 
of  
plaintiff’s 
divorce, 
state 
that 
the 
situation 
was  
“disgusting,” refer to plaintiff as a “slut,” and state that  
they “had to get rid of him.”  
Plaintiff argues that sufficient evidence was presented  
that, at a minimum, defendant harbored mixed motives when it  
discharged him.  Evidence of mixed motives, when one motive is  
11  
 
 
 
impermissible under the Civil Rights Act, is sufficient to  
withstand 
summary 
disposition. 
In 
such 
a 
case, 
the  
impermissible factor must be a determining factor. See Matras  
v Amoco Oil Co, 424 Mich 675, 682-683; 385 NW2d 586 (1986).  
When the Court of Appeals evaluated plaintiff’s claim as one  
related to his pending divorce and adultery, it failed to  
evaluate 
whether 
the 
pending divorce was a determining factor.  
Likewise, the trial court did not consider the affidavit  
suggesting that the defendant may have acted on an  
impermissible motive. In granting defendant’s motion, the  
trial court merely concluded that any discrimination was  
motivated by plaintiff’s cohabitation with his mistress and  
did not specifically address the adequacy of the affidavit.  
There is little evidence in the record indicating that the  
trial 
court 
considered the evidence contained in the affidavit  
as required by MCR 2.116(G)(5).  We therefore remand this case  
to the trial court.  On remand, the trial court is to consider  
defendant’s motion for summary disposition, and plaintiff’s  
response thereto, in conformance with MCR 2.116(G)(4)-(6).6  
D. RESPONSE TO THE DISSENT  
The dissent consciously and wilfully chooses to ignore  
6  In so remanding, we form no opinion, implicitly or 
explicitly, 
regarding 
whether 
plaintiff 
has 
submitted  
admissible evidence of specific facts sufficient to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact.  
12  
 
 
 
the holding that has been stated several times throughout this  
opinion—that 
adverse 
action 
against 
an 
individual 
for 
conduct,  
without regard to a protected status, provides no basis for  
recourse under the Civil Rights Act.  This construction is  
required because the act provides that it is unlawful to  
discriminate "because of" one of the enumerated protected  
characteristics.7  Where no direct evidence of discrimination  
based on one of the protected characteristics exists, the  
burden is on the plaintiff to establish a link between the  
conduct and a protected status.  Absent evidence that the  
reason 
offered 
for 
the alleged discriminatory action is merely  
pretextual, the claim fails.  Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich  
456; 628 NW2d 515 (2001). However, where there is sufficient  
evidence of pretext, the claim survives.  
The dissent incorrectly maintains that our holding  
creates a “rule per se excluding conduct . . . .” Slip op  
at 2.  However, as we have made clear, conduct may be the  
subject of protection under the Civil Rights Act if such  
conduct is mere pretext for action based on consideration of  
7 The distinction that this opinion draws between conduct 
and 
status, 
and 
that 
the 
dissent 
characterizes 
as  
“artificial,” slip op at 8, is a direct function of the words 
“because of.” While there are other statutes that limit the  
scope of private and public decision making, the Civil Rights 
Act merely prohibits actions that are taken with regard to 
certain 
types 
of 
statuses, 
“because 
of” 
these 
characteristics.  
It does not prohibit actions that are legitimately taken for 
any other reason.  
13  
 
 
 
 
 
a protected status category.8  In fact, the rule we articulate  
is undeniably consistent with the language of the statute,  
which protects enumerated characteristics, not conduct. This  
rule is also consistent with our jurisprudence under the Civil  
Rights 
Act. 
Like 
any 
other 
prima 
facie 
case 
of  
discrimination, a claim for marital status discrimination  
survives if a plaintiff can establish that adverse action was  
taken because of a protected status notwithstanding that  
conduct is asserted as the basis for the challenged action.  
However, in this case, plaintiff has not needed to posture his  
discrimination action as a prima facie case predicated within  
the McDonnell Douglas9 framework.  Rather, this case is  
premised upon an allegation of direct evidence of marital  
status animus.  
Instead of simply adhering to the plain language of the  
8 Contrary to the suggestions of the dissent, slip op at 
7, we impose no requirement that a plaintiff must offer 
statements on the part of a defendant expressly communicating 
a prejudice toward persons of a protected status.  Rather, “an 
invidious purpose may often be inferred from the totality of 
relevant facts,” Washington v Davis, 426 US 229, 242; 96 S Ct  
2040; 48 L Ed 2d 597 (1976).  Such an assessment “demands a  
sensitive 
inquiry 
into 
such 
circumstantial 
and 
direct 
evidence 
of intent as may be available.”  Arlington Hts v Metro Housing  
Dev Corp, 429 US 252, 266; 97 S Ct 555; 50 L Ed 2d 450 (1977).  
9  McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792, 93 S Ct 
1817, 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973). The McDonnell Douglas approach 
allows a plaintiff to present a rebuttable prima facie case on 
the basis of proofs from which a factfinder could infer that  
the plaintiff was the victim of unlawful discrimination.  
14  
 
  
statute and applying the analytical frameworks that currently  
exist in civil rights jurisprudence, the dissent prefers to  
engage in what it considers a more “thoughtful analysis” of  
marital status discrimination claims–an analysis that ponders  
the “essential conception[s] of human dignity” as well as  
whether adverse actions are “motivated by moral judgments  
about a person’s conduct . . . .” Slip op at 6.  To say the  
least, these philosophical musings are not found within the  
canons of statutory construction.  Accordingly, we simply  
decline to circumvent the language of the statute in favor of  
the sociological and moral inquiry favored by the dissent.10  
V. CONCLUSION  
The clear language of the Civil Rights Act prevents only  
consideration of an employee’s protected status—here, marital  
status.
 We further hold that an employee’s conduct or  
misconduct is not a protected status under the employment  
provisions of the act, and our opinion in McCready II should  
10 Needless to say, we do not agree with the dissent’s 
characterization of this opinion as less than “honest,” slip 
op at 5, or as “shallow,” slip op at 7, because it does not 
reach the results preferred by the dissent.  In this same  
regard, we would view the dissent as far more straightforward 
if it did not pay homage to a “societal interest in 
[]fidelity,” slip op at 5, at the same time that it 
concludes—in our judgment, without legislative warrant—that 
there is civil rights protection for adulterous conduct.  
15  
not be read otherwise.  Because there is no indication that  
the trial court considered plaintiff’s evidence in opposition  
to the motion for summary disposition as required by the court  
rules, we vacate the holding of the Court of Appeals and  
remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings  
consistent with this opinion.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and TAYLOR and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with  
YOUNG, J.  
16  
                         
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
BRENT VEENSTRA,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 117985  
WASHTENAW COUNTRY CLUB,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
WEAVER, J. (concurring).  
I join all but part IV(D) of the opinion.  
___________________________________ 
  
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
BRENT VEENSTRA,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 117985  
WASHTENAW COUNTRY CLUB,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
The majority holds that the Civil Rights Act, MCL  
37.2202(1) et seq., prohibits employment discrimination only  
on the basis of status and not conduct.  This conclusion  
results from an overly simplistic analysis of the statute and  
unnecessarily limits this Court’s holding in McCready v  
Hoffius, 459 Mich 131; 586 NW2d 723 (1998) (McCready II)  
vacated in part 459 Mich 1235 (1999). Conduct and status are  
often inextricably linked, and I find unworkable any rule per  
se attempting to assert otherwise. 
Therefore, I must  
respectfully dissent.  
 
 
Although the term “status” is used in identifying a  
prohibited ground for discrimination, i.e, “marital status,”  
status and conduct are concepts that cannot always be easily  
distinguished.  This is true because much of what the Civil  
Rights Act prohibits is discrimination on the basis of  
assumptions about conduct that stem from, and are often a  
manifestation of, one’s status.  Even so, I agree that actual  
conduct 
may 
be 
relevant 
in 
employment 
and 
housing  
considerations, and certain conduct need not be tolerated  
simply because a connection to status can be made.  But while  
conduct is not always protected by the act, certain conduct  
can be directly linked to status in such a way that adverse  
action based on conduct will result in status-based  
discrimination.
 A rule per se excluding conduct from the  
protections of the act creates an artificial distinction and  
narrows the breadth of the remedial act.  
Though such adverse action is prohibited by McCready II,  
the majority now recasts and diminishes its holding. 
In  
McCready II, this Court held that a lessor could not refuse to  
lease an apartment to an unmarried couple because plaintiffs’  
marital status was “the root of the defendant’s objection to  
renting [the apartment]” and expressly rejected claims that  
conduct, not status, motivated the prohibited action.  Id. at  
140. Instead, this Court adopted the Alaska Supreme Court’s  
2  
 
 
rationale in Swanner v Anchorage Equal Rights Comm, 874 P2d  
274, 278, n 4 (Alas, 1994), which held that a landlord  
“‘cannot reasonably claim that he does not rent or show  
property to cohabitating couples based on their conduct  
(living together outside of marriage) and not their marital  
status when their marital status (unmarried) is what makes  
their 
conduct 
immoral in [the landlord’s] opinion.’” McCready  
II at 139. Similarly, for the purpose of resolving this issue  
of law, we have assumed the defendant in this case terminated  
the plaintiff’s employment because it felt plaintiff’s  
behavior was immoral, an act condemned only because he was  
married.1  Thus, McCready II should control; but the majority  
now recharacterizes McCready II and suggests the McCready II  
defendants 
could 
have prevailed had they proven the plaintiffs  
would, in fact, have engaged in sexual intercourse while  
cohabitating. McCready II is not about “a right to cohabit”  
as the majority suggests, but, instead, makes clear that the  
Civil Rights Act guarantees the right to be free from  
1 The majority asserts that “[a]dverse action against an 
individual for conduct, without regard to marital status, 
provides no basis for recourse under the act.”  Ante at 11.  
As previously stated, the distinction between status and 
conduct is not so clear that it should be enmeshed in  
discrimination 
jurisprudence. 
 
Moreover, 
even 
if 
adopted 
here, 
the circumstances indicate the action taken by the defendant 
was not “without regard to marital status.” 
But for his  
status, I suspect little attention would have been paid to his 
conduct.  
3  
 
 
discrimination on the basis of acts found immoral solely  
because of one’s status.  
The majority might respond that employers should be able  
to make decisions as a result of the type of conduct at issue  
here, especially where it has an effect on the employee’s  
credibility with clients who, assertedly, are known for their  
deference to etiquette standards and social mores. 
Where  
there is an employment at will relationship, some might argue  
that termination must be an option for employers.  However,  
the Legislature arguably prohibited such actions with the  
passage of the Civil Rights Act. The decision to terminate  
plaintiff appears to have been based on the defendant’s  
disapproval of plaintiff’s conduct, conduct that was scorned  
only because of plaintiff’s marital status.  
I concede that few in the Legislature likely anticipated  
that employees would be protected from discrimination  
resulting from what some would claim was socially justified  
condemnation for infidelity when drafting the Civil Rights  
Act.
 However, the statute as written does not create an  
exception for the types of bias that most feel is justified,  
and inserting a “status only” element that results in the  
automatic dismissal of claims where conduct and status are  
linked is not the proper manner in which to determine the  
legislative intent.  
4  
What might be more useful is a thoughtful analysis of  
discrimination claims in light of the social and historical  
context that prompted the Legislature to pass the Civil Rights  
Act and to protect people from discrimination on the basis of  
marital status. Does the different treatment closely relate  
to a personal characteristic of the complainant? Does the  
distinction serve to deny a person of the essential conception  
of human dignity?  Does discrimination resulting from a  
married person’s infidelity exacerbate the prejudices the act  
attempts to curb?  Are discriminatory acts motivated by moral  
judgments about a person’s conduct permissible when the  
motivation is directly tied to a protected status?  The  
answers to these questions are not as clear, but I suspect a  
discussion of this nature would result in a more honest  
attempt to analyze the issues the majority frames as  
mechanical, rote rules of law.  Such an inquiry would also  
diminish the risk that artificial distinctions could be used  
opportunistically to avoid the mandate of the Civil Rights  
Act.  
At the end of the day the plaintiff may not be protected  
by the act, but not because he was not subject to status-based  
discrimination.  Rather, he may be outside the protections of  
the act because the Legislature did not intend to protect a  
societal interest in infidelity.  The majority claims such an  
5  
 
analysis would be Solomonic, but I think it is the only  
reasonable position because it would dispel the illusion that  
the issue is clear and devoid of hidden value assumptions.  
The majority claims such considerations are unnecessary  
because the plaintiff would be guilty of adultery under the  
criminal code whether he was married or single–he had sex with  
a married woman and his conduct would fall under the purview  
of 
the 
statutory 
prohibition regardless of his marital status.  
The majority concludes that this particular type of conduct­
based discrimination has no connection to plaintiff’s marital  
status. I find this distinction dangerous and illusory. As  
the majority correctly notes, “[i]t is irrelevant that the  
conduct at issue does or does not have criminal consequences.”  
Slip op, p 11. 
Moreover, the societal condemnation  
surrounding infidelity is based solely on expectations and  
presumptions associated with marriage and marital status.  If  
the defendant had asserted that it reprimands and terminates  
employees on the basis of their promiscuous behavior, the act  
arguably would not protect such conduct.  The act does not  
prohibit discrimination on the basis of lax sexual mores.  
However, that is not what the defendant claims, nor what this  
Court holds today.  The majority states adultery is not  
protected by the act on the basis of a status/conduct  
distinction that creates an impermissible and arguably  
6  
 
complete 
defense 
to 
direct 
evidence 
of 
status-based  
discrimination when disfavored conduct is shown.  
McCready II did not attempt to make such shallow  
distinctions, and to claim now that it stands only for the  
proposition that an unmarried couple who is denied housing can  
only succeed if they show marital status discrimination  
without 
regard 
to 
their 
intended 
conduct–cohabitation–makes 
no  
sense to me.  A defendant need only show the disfavored action  
was based on conduct to escape liability.  If the majority  
view prevails, I cannot envision how an attorney could bring  
a discrimination claim on behalf of an unmarried couple denied  
housing on the basis of their marital status.  Only if a  
landlord happened to expressly state that her refusal to rent  
was 
based 
on–and 
only on–their marital status would plaintiffs  
prevail.  The act is not meant to prohibit adverse action only  
when randomly made prejudicial comments are aired.  
The majority correctly states that the act requires only  
proof of status-based discrimination. However, how can such  
a claim be made if this Court prohibits plaintiffs from  
illustrating the manner in which status-based discrimination  
is given life, i.e., through conduct-based adverse action? I  
do not assert that all conduct is protected, but only that  
this doctrine is unworkable to the degree that it excludes  
claims where adverse action can be tied to conduct.  
7  
 
 
 
There is no principled reason to import a status/conduct  
distinction where it fails to properly and fully address the  
discriminatory action.  I cannot agree that the Legislature  
intended to permit a “conceptual out” or “conduct defense”  
whenever 
this 
Court 
finds 
the 
discrimination 
morally  
permissible.  Further, the majority opinion could be  
characterized as the first step in the creation of a doctrine  
that 
eviscerates 
the 
prohibition 
of 
status-based  
discrimination, picking up where McCready I left off.  
Contrary to the assertions made by the majority, the holding  
in McCready II would be considerably narrowed by the majority  
here.
 A bright-line rule excluding conduct from the  
protections of the act creates an artificial distinction and  
narrows the breadth of the remedial act.  
Adoption of an artificial distinction between status and  
conduct in this case should not eviscerate the principles in  
McCready II. Such a meager interpretation cannot logically be  
made on the basis of the text of the statute and is  
inconsistent with the Civil Rights Act.  The rationale  
provided 
by 
the 
majority 
inappropriately 
narrows 
our  
understanding of discrimination.  Because the text of the  
Civil Rights Act is not exclusively limited to the prohibition  
of status discrimination where no conduct discrimination is  
8  
present, and because McCready II’s holding is not so narrow,  
I would affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals.  
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
9