Case Title: Brown v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC19-704, SC19-1419

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2020-08-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC19-704 
____________ 
 
TINA LASONYA BROWN, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC19-1419 
____________ 
 
TINA LASONYA BROWN, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
MARK S. INCH, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
August 27, 2020 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Tina Lasonya Brown appeals the circuit court’s order denying her motion to 
vacate her conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, and she also petitions this Court for a 
 
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writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  
For the reasons below, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of postconviction relief 
and deny Brown’s habeas petition. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
The facts of this case, including the overwhelming evidence of Brown’s 
guilt, were set out in this Court’s opinion on direct appeal.  See Brown v. State, 143 
So. 3d 392, 395-402 (Fla. 2014).  There, we explained that the evidence presented 
at trial established that Brown; her daughter, Britnee Miller; and her neighbor 
Heather Lee lived in the same mobile home park as the victim, Audreanna 
Zimmerman.  Id. at 395.  In March 2010, Miller and the victim had an altercation 
during which Miller attempted to strike the victim and the victim defended herself 
with a stun gun.  Id.  Thereafter,  
on March 24, 2010, Brown invited Zimmerman to her home under the 
guise of rekindling their friendship.  Before Zimmerman arrived, 
Brown, Miller, Lee, and Miller’s thirteen-year-old friend, [M.A.,] 
were inside the trailer.  Brown and Lee were in the kitchen, where Lee 
instructed Brown on the proper use of a stun gun.  Miller then pulled 
her friend aside and told her, “[W]e’re fixing to kill Audreanna 
[Zimmerman].”  Shortly after 9 p.m., Zimmerman entered the trailer.  
Brown waited several minutes and then used the stun gun on 
Zimmerman multiple times.  When Zimmerman lost muscular control 
and fell to the floor, Brown continued to use the stun gun on 
Zimmerman, who was screaming and crying for help.  Eventually, 
Brown pulled Zimmerman across the trailer into the bathroom.  
Zimmerman continued to scream and cry for help, so Miller struck 
Zimmerman in the face and Lee stuffed a sock into Zimmerman’s 
mouth.  Zimmerman was then forcibly escorted outside and forced 
 
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into the trunk of Brown’s vehicle.[n.2]  Brown, Miller, and Lee then 
entered the vehicle and drove away. 
 
[N.2]. During trial, Lee disputed this summation of what 
occurred in the trailer after Brown began to attack 
Zimmerman.  The veracity of Lee’s testimony 
concerning her involvement in this crime, however, was 
significantly challenged during trial, particularly because 
Lee, who claimed that she was a victim and was not 
involved in Zimmerman’s murder, pled guilty to second-
degree murder based on her involvement in 
Zimmerman’s death. 
 
Id. at 395-96. 
 
The record shows that when M.A. was asked at trial why she did not 
intervene as Zimmerman was being attacked at Brown’s trailer, M.A. testified that 
she was afraid that “[i]f all three of them [were] going to do it, they could do the 
same thing to [her].”  M.A. further testified that Brown was the primary aggressor 
based on her observations at the trailer, although she said that Lee participated by 
putting a sock in the victim’s mouth.  According to M.A.’s trial testimony, Brown 
used the stun gun on the victim, held the victim’s hands behind her back, led the 
victim to Brown’s car, and forced the victim into the trunk.  M.A. also testified that 
as Brown was attacking the victim with a stun gun, Brown screamed, “Did you call 
Crime Stoppers on me?” 
Leaving M.A. behind at the trailer, Brown drove her car, with Miller and 
Lee inside and the victim in the trunk, “to a clearing in the woods about a mile and 
a half from the trailer park.”  Brown, 143 So. 3d at 396.  According to Lee’s trial 
 
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testimony, the following events occurred once the women arrived at the clearing in 
the woods: 
Brown exited the car and pulled Zimmerman out of the trunk.  
Zimmerman attempted to flee, but stumbled in the darkness and was 
caught by Brown and Miller.  The two women wrestled Zimmerman 
to the ground and simultaneously attacked her.  Brown used the stun 
gun again on Zimmerman as Miller beat her with a crowbar.  Brown 
and Miller then switched weapons and continued to torture and beat 
Zimmerman.  Miller eventually dropped the stun gun and repeatedly 
punched Zimmerman.  Brown returned to the car, retrieved a can of 
gasoline from the trunk, and walked back toward the beaten and 
prone, but still conscious, Zimmerman.  Brown poured gasoline on 
Zimmerman, retrieved a lighter from her pocket, set Zimmerman on 
fire, and stood nearby to watch the screaming Zimmerman burn.  Lee 
testified that she was standing beside Miller, who exuberantly jumped 
up and down and screamed, “Burn, bitch! Burn!”  After a few 
minutes, the three women returned to the car and drove away.  During 
the ride home, Miller said, “Mom, you’ve got to turn around.  I left 
my shoes and the taser.”  Brown, however, refused to return to the 
location of the event. 
 
Id. 
 
 
After Brown, Lee, and Miller left the scene of the burning, they returned to 
Brown’s trailer.  Id. at 397.  There, 
Brown and Miller removed their bloodstained clothing and placed it in 
a garbage bag.  Lee removed her shoes, which were also stained with 
blood, and placed them in the bag.  Miller informed her friend, 
[M.A.], who had remained at the trailer during the attack, that she had 
injured her hand striking Zimmerman, and that the three women had 
set Zimmerman on fire.  Miller and [M.A.] then used Brown’s car to 
drive to the hospital to get medical care for Miller.   
 
Id. 
 
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Meanwhile, Zimmerman, who had not immediately succumbed to her 
wounds, walked about one-third of a mile to a neighboring home and asked for 
assistance.  Id. at 396.   
At 9:24 p.m., an emergency medical technician (EMT) arrived 
at the scene.  When the EMT approached Zimmerman, he observed 
her sitting on the porch, rocking back and forth with her arms straight 
out.  Due to the extensive nature of Zimmerman’s burns, the EMT 
testified that he could not initially identify whether she was wearing 
clothing.  The EMT noticed that Zimmerman’s skin was falling off 
her body, and he believed that over ninety percent of her body was 
burned.  She had severe head trauma, and her jaw was either broken 
or severely dislocated.  The EMT explained that the extent and 
severity of the burns prevented him from providing Zimmerman 
medical assistance.  He testified that while he generally placed sterile 
gauze and oxygen on burns, he did not have enough gauze to cover 
her entire body.  He attempted to stabilize her neck, but her skin was 
charred to such an extent that he could not touch Zimmerman without 
her skin rubbing off onto his gloves. 
 
Despite her injuries, Zimmerman was conscious and alert.  She 
identified Brown and Lee as her attackers and told the EMT that she 
was “drug out of the house, tased, beaten in the head with a crowbar, 
and then set on fire.”  She also provided her address as well as the 
addresses of her attackers, and asked the EMT to protect her children.  
The ambulance arrived within a few minutes and transported 
Zimmerman to the hospital.  Inside the ambulance, Zimmerman 
repeatedly asked if she was going to recover.  She told the paramedic 
that Brown, Miller, and Lee poured gasoline on her and set her on fire.  
She also stated that she “thought they had made up.”  Zimmerman 
was stabilized at a local hospital and then transferred to the Burn 
Center at the University of South Alabama Hospital in Mobile, 
Alabama, where she died sixteen days later. 
 
Id. at 396-97. 
 
 
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Based on the information provided by Zimmerman, Brown and Lee were 
arrested the night of attack, and Miller was arrested when she returned home from 
the hospital the next day.  Id. at 397.  However, all three were released while 
Zimmerman was still in the hospital.  Id. 
During that time, Brown informed her friend Pamela Valley that she, 
Miller, and Lee had beaten Zimmerman, forced her into a car, driven 
her to an open field and “lit her on fire and didn’t look back.”  A few 
days later, Brown informed Valley that Zimmerman was still alive 
and requested Valley to finish her off.  Valley declined and later 
reported the conversation to law enforcement.  
 
Id. 
 
 
On April 9, 2010, the day that Zimmerman died as a result of multiple 
thermal injuries, Brown, Miller, and Lee were rearrested.  Id.  The State charged 
Brown with first-degree murder under both theories of premeditated and felony 
murder with kidnapping as the underlying felony.1   
At trial, Brown’s jury heard that, while Brown was awaiting trial in jail, she 
made statements to a fellow inmate, Corie Doyle, that were indicative of her state 
of mind following the altercation between her daughter and Zimmerman.  Id. at 
395 n.1.  Specifically, Doyle testified at trial that Brown told her Zimmerman had 
used a stun gun on her daughter, Miller, and that when Brown had heard about it, 
 
1.  Brown was also indicted for kidnapping, but for reasons not explained in 
the record, the State entered a nolle prosequi as to the kidnapping charge as trial 
began.  
 
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she “informed Miller, ‘[D]on’t worry, I’ll take care of it.’ ”  Id.  Doyle also 
testified that she and Brown had a conversation early one morning during which 
Brown confessed her involvement in the murder.  According to Doyle, at that time, 
Brown admitted that “they picked up the victim and beat her up and tazed her and 
set her on fire.”  When asked who “they” were, Doyle testified that it was 
“[Brown] and her daughter [Miller]” and that Heather Lee was there but that “she 
didn’t have anything to do with it.”  When asked if she knew who Lee was at the 
time of this conversation, Doyle answered, “No.  I have never laid eyes on her.”  
Doyle further testified that she was eventually transferred and ended up housed 
with Lee.   
In addition, Brown’s jury heard that law enforcement had discovered 
physical evidence at the scene of the burning, “including a pair of white shoes; a 
stun gun with blood on the handle; paper stained with blood; an orange, gold, and 
black hairweave [that matched a large section missing from the back of Brown’s 
hair]; a crowbar; and a pool of blood.”  Id. at 397 (footnote omitted).  The jury also 
heard that blood discovered on the passenger seat headrest of Brown’s vehicle 
matched Zimmerman’s DNA profile, and that the blood on the stun gun matched 
Brown’s DNA profile.  Id. 
Based on the evidence presented at trial, Brown’s jury found her guilty of 
first-degree murder as charged.  See id. at 397.   
 
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The case then proceeded to the penalty phase, where Brown presented 
evidence of mitigating circumstances through several family members and her 
mental health expert, Dr. Elaine Bailey.  Id. at 397-400.  Brown’s penalty-phase 
presentation focused on how her traumatic background affected her and shaped her 
actions on the night of the murder.  See id.  This evidence included that Brown had 
suffered a deprived childhood; physical and sexual abuse, including being raped by 
her father and prostituted by her stepmother; parental and other familial 
abandonment; drug addiction; and exposure to her father’s drug-related, violent 
criminal lifestyle as a child.  See id.  It also included evidence that, as an adult, 
Brown had experienced physically and sexually abusive relationships, including 
domestic abuse; and that she had struggled with addiction, particularly to crack 
cocaine, to the point that she lost custody of two of her children.  See id. at 399. 
Additionally, evidence regarding Lee’s role in the crime factored into 
Brown’s penalty-phase argument.  For example, during the guilt phase, in addition 
to challenging Lee’s denial of her role in the murder through cross-examination, 
trial counsel called Wendy Moye, a fellow inmate of Lee’s, who testified that Lee 
admitted to her that she was the one who lit the victim on fire, that the group had 
gotten the victim into the car by telling her that they were going to the grocery 
store, and that the beating started in the car.  Although Brown relied on this and 
other evidence to argue that Lee may have been more culpable and yet was 
 
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allowed to plead guilty to second-degree murder, the jury heard from Dr. Bailey 
that “Brown did not deny her involvement in the murder, and that Brown felt 
remorseful for her actions.”  Id. at 400.  More specifically, the penalty-phase 
record reveals that Dr. Bailey testified that Brown had described Lee as “the 
escalator” and further testified about “the impact of social mediation,” telling the 
jury that if they “believe[d] that [Lee] was more involved in [the crime]” than she 
claimed, then “[t]here was social mediation going [o]n, social influence, and 
group-mediated emotion” that “makes more extreme behavior.”  However, Dr. 
Bailey said that it was not her opinion that Brown “acted under extreme duress 
under Heather Lee” and testified that Brown did “not deny being an aggressor, 
being involved, . . . [or] what she did” and that Brown “was very frank about her 
role” in the victim’s murder during her evaluations. 
The State’s expert, Dr. John Bingham, also evaluated Brown and “found no 
evidence that Brown lacked the capacity to conform her conduct to the 
requirements of the law[] or that she exhibited diminished capacity in 
understanding the criminality of her conduct.”  Brown, 143 So. 3d at 400.  He also 
opined that Brown “was not under extreme duress or experiencing an emotional 
disturbance at the time of the offense.”  Id.  Dr. Bingham testified that “there was 
no indication” Brown’s feelings of anger and rage “inhibited her ability to think 
clearly or to recognize right from wrong,” that “Brown’s actions on the night of the 
 
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attack demonstrated preplanning, direction, and were goal[-]oriented,” and that 
“while there was substantial trauma in Brown’s life, there was no cause and effect 
relationship connecting Brown’s past to her actions in murdering Zimmerman.”  
Id.  
Following the penalty-phase presentation, the jury unanimously 
recommended a sentence of death.  Id.  During the Spencer2 hearing, records and 
letters, including a letter from one of Brown’s friends, were introduced into 
evidence.  Id.  Brown “apologized to the victim’s family,” stated that the victim 
“died a horrific death,” admitted that she “was one of the ones who participated in 
taking [the victim’s] life,” and said that the victim “didn’t deserve it at all.”  Id.  
Thereafter, the trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced 
Brown to death, finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the 
mitigating circumstances.  Id. at 400-02. 
In so doing, the trial court found that the State had proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt the existence of the following aggravating factors and assigned 
them the noted weight: “(1) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and 
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP) 
(great weight); (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) 
 
 
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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(great weight); and (3) the murder was committed while Brown was engaged in the 
commission of a kidnapping (significant weight).”  Id. at 401.  
The trial court found one statutory mitigating circumstance, “that Brown had 
no significant history of prior criminal activity,” and assigned it minimal weight.  
Id.  The trial court considered but rejected the following four statutory mitigating 
circumstances: “(1) the crime was committed while Brown was experiencing an 
extreme emotional disturbance; (2) Brown was an accomplice in the crime and her 
participation was relatively minor; (3) Brown acted under extreme duress; and (4) 
the capacity of Brown to appreciate the criminality of her conduct or to conform 
her conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired.”  Id. at 401 n.7. 
The trial court also found twenty-seven nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances and assigned them the noted weight:  
Specifically, the [trial] court found that Brown: (1) was the child of a 
teenage mother (minimal weight); (2) was neglected by both parents 
(some weight); (3) lost her childhood due to parental neglect (some 
weight); (4) was abandoned by her mother (some weight); (5) had a 
history of family violence (some weight); (6) was exposed to drugs 
during her adolescence (some weight); (7) suffered developmental 
damage due to her parents’ use of and dependence on drugs (some 
weight); (8) was subjected to sexual violence inflicted by her father; 
(some weight); (9) was betrayed by a trusted family member (i.e., her 
grandmother) (some weight); (10) experienced corruptive community 
influences and exposure to a criminal lifestyle (some weight); (11) 
experienced chaotic moves and transitions (little weight); (12) was a 
victim of domestic violence during her adult life (some weight); (13) 
witnessed a violent homicide and served as a State witness in a 
murder trial (little weight); (14) lost her family (her parental rights 
were terminated for her two sons, and she has no relationship with her 
 
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mother or father) (little weight); (15) suffered repeated trauma 
throughout her life (little weight); (16) suffered from drug addiction 
(little weight); (17) suffered from the long term effects of chronic 
cocaine use on her brain (some weight); (18) was a productive citizen 
during periods of sobriety (little weight); (19) was living in poverty at 
the time of the crime (minimal weight); (20) behaved well in jail (little 
weight); (21) conducted a [B]ible study program (little weight); (22) 
exhibited good courtroom behavior (little weight); (23) has no 
possibility of parole (little weight); (24) showed remorse (some 
weight); (25) received a different sentence than that of her co-
defendants (some weight)[n.8]; (26) had no history of prior criminal 
violence (moderate weight); and (27) was using cocaine on the day of 
the crime (moderate weight). 
 
[N.8] In finding th[e] mitigating circumstance [that 
Brown received a different sentence than that of her co-
defendants], the trial court noted that: 
 
the three people involved in the murder of 
Zimmerman are not similarly situated.  
Despite her involvement in Zimmerman’s 
murder, Britnee Miller cannot legally be 
sentenced to death as she was less than 18 
years of age when the murder was 
committed.  Heather Lee was convicted, 
pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement with 
the State, of second[-]degree murder.  
Heather Lee cannot legally be sentenced to 
death. 
 
(Citation omitted.) 
 
Id. at 401 & n.8. 
 
 
In sentencing Brown to death, the trial court “noted that this case, 
‘particularly because of the heinous, atrocious, [or] cruel nature of the murder of 
 
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Audreanna Zimmerman, falls into the class of murders for which the death penalty 
is reserved.’ ”  Id. at 402.   
On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Brown’s conviction and sentence of 
death.  Id. at 408.3  Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court denied Brown’s 
petition for a writ of certiorari.  Brown v. Florida, 574 U.S. 1034 (2014). 
 
In 2015, Brown filed an initial motion for postconviction relief, which was 
amended several times after being stricken for noncompliance with rule 3.851, and, 
in 2017, ultimately filed the third amended motion at issue in this appeal.4  
Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied relief on all of Brown’s 
claims.  Brown appeals the circuit court’s denial of several of her claims, and she 
also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  
 
 
3.  In her direct appeal, Brown raised the following claims: (1) the trial court 
erred in finding the CCP aggravating circumstance; (2) her death sentence was 
disproportionate; and (3) Florida’s death penalty statute violates the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  Brown, 143 
So. 3d at 402-08.  Although Brown did not contest her guilt, this Court found the 
evidence sufficient to support her conviction.  Id. at 407. 
 
 
4.  During this period, Brown filed three petitions in this Court: a petition 
seeking review of a nonfinal order denying Brown’s motion to reconsider the order 
striking her initial postconviction motion (with leave to amend) for noncompliance 
with rule 3.851(e)(1), which this Court denied without prejudice, Brown v. State, 
No. SC16-358, 2016 WL 3474843, at *1 (Fla. June 24, 2016); and two petitions for 
writ of prohibition seeking to prohibit the trial judge from further participation in 
her case, both of which this Court denied, Brown v. State, No. SC16-397, 2016 WL 
3459727, at *1 (Fla. June 24, 2016), and Brown v. State, No. SC17-2166,  2017 
WL 6493249, at *1 (Fla. Dec. 19, 2017). 
 
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II. POSTCONVICTION APPEAL 
A. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 
 
Brown argues that trial counsel was ineffective in numerous respects during 
the jury selection, guilt, and penalty phases of her trial.  Specifically, first, she 
argues that trial counsel was ineffective during jury selection for failing to strike 
juror Taylor for cause.  Second, she claims that trial counsel was ineffective during 
the guilt phase (a) for failing to adequately challenge the State’s evidence through 
cross-examination of witnesses Heather Lee and Corie Doyle and (b) for failing to 
present witnesses Darren Lee, Terrance Woods, and Nicole Henderson for 
purposes of impeachment.  Third, she argues that trial counsel was ineffective 
during the penalty phase (a) for failing to conduct a reasonably competent 
mitigation investigation and present adequate mitigation and (b) for failing to 
consult and present additional mental health experts.  Fourth, and last, she contends 
that the circuit court erred by denying her claim that, cumulatively, trial counsel’s 
deficient performance during the guilt and penalty phases deprived her of a 
fundamentally fair trial.   
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim following the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), 
a defendant must satisfy two requirements:  
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
 
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competent performance under prevailing professional standards.  
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. 
 
Bolin v. State, 41 So. 3d 151, 155 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 
So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986)).  
Regarding Strickland’s deficiency prong, there is a “strong presumption” 
that trial counsel’s performance “falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  Moreover, “[a] fair 
assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate 
the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s 
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the 
time.”  Id.  The defendant bears the burden to “overcome the presumption that, 
under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial 
strategy.’ ”  Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). 
Regarding the prejudice prong, “Strickland requires defendants to show 
‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. . . .  [A] ‘reasonable 
probability’ is a ‘probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ”  
Henry v. State, 948 So. 2d 609, 621 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694). 
 
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Because both prongs of Strickland present mixed questions of law and fact, 
this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit court’s 
factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence but 
reviewing the circuit court’s legal conclusions de novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 
So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004).  “[W]hen a defendant fails to make a showing as to 
one prong, it is not necessary to delve into whether he has made a showing as to 
the other prong.”  Zakrzewski v. State, 866 So. 2d 688, 692 (Fla. 2003) (quoting 
Waterhouse v. State, 792 So. 2d 1176, 1182 (Fla. 2001)).  “Where trial counsel is 
deficient in more than one area, however, we must ‘consider the impact of these 
errors cumulatively to determine whether [the defendant] has established 
prejudice.’ ”  Sparre v. State, 289 So. 3d 839, 847 (Fla. 2019) (quoting Parker v. 
State, 89 So. 3d 844, 867 (Fla. 2011)). 
For the reasons below, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of postconviction 
relief.   
(1) Jury Selection 
 
Brown argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to strike juror 
Taylor for cause because juror Taylor’s voir dire responses indicate that he would 
automatically vote for the death penalty if Brown was convicted of first-degree 
murder.  We disagree.   
 
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To establish the prejudice required by Strickland, “where a postconviction 
motion alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise or preserve a 
cause challenge, the defendant must demonstrate that a juror was actually biased.”  
Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312, 324 (Fla. 2007).  “Under the actual bias 
standard, the defendant must demonstrate that the juror in question was not 
impartial—i.e., that the juror was biased against the defendant, and the evidence of 
bias must be plain on the face of the record.”  Id.  Moreover, to establish actual 
bias, the record must show “something more than mere doubt about [the] juror’s 
impartiality.”  Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 1265 (Fla. 2016).   
When the record in this case is viewed as a whole, Brown cannot make the 
requisite showing of actual bias.  Juror Taylor initially stated that he had an open 
mind as to the appropriate penalty.  Subsequently, juror Taylor was asked if his 
response to defense counsel’s question as to whether he could put aside his 
personal feelings, follow the judge’s instructions, and consider the evidence before 
imposing the death penalty was “the same” as that of another prospective juror 
who had answered, “I could do that.”  Juror Taylor responded, “No,” and then he 
explained his answer by stating that whether he would vote to impose the death 
penalty would “depend[] on the evidence” and that “[i]f it’s proven without a 
shadow of a doubt, [he] would go with the death penalty.”   
 
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Although that response arguably supports Brown’s claim, the remainder of 
the record is to the contrary.  For example, juror Taylor did not voice disagreement 
when trial counsel later asked the entire panel, “Do each of you agree that it’s not 
automatic that [Brown] get the death penalty . . . if [Brown] would be found guilty 
of first-degree murder. . . .  It’s not automatic that she get the death penalty?”  
Similarly, juror Taylor did not voice disagreement with trial counsel’s subsequent 
follow-up question to the entire panel as to whether there was anyone on the panel 
who would not be able to “consider the personal circumstances and background of 
the Defendant when you’re making the decision as to whether to recommend life 
or death.”  Moreover, when trial counsel specifically questioned juror Taylor 
regarding his opinion of mental health professionals and the validity of the 
profession, juror Taylor was not dismissive of this type of mitigation and instead 
stated, “I would assume it’s pretty valid.” 
 
On this record, at best, one of juror Taylor’s voir dire responses raised some 
doubt as to his impartiality—doubt that is not enough to establish the requisite 
prejudice, see Mosley, 209 So. 3d at 1265, and that, in any event, is dispelled when 
the voir dire record is considered as a whole.  Accordingly, because Brown cannot 
establish the actual bias required to prove that she was prejudiced by trial counsel’s 
failure to challenge juror Taylor for cause, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of 
relief.  See Carratelli, 961 So. 2d at 324. 
 
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(2) Guilt Phase 
 
Brown next argues that trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase 
(a) for failing to adequately challenge the State’s evidence through cross-
examination of witnesses Heather Lee and Corie Doyle and (b) for failing to 
present witnesses Terrance Woods, Darren Lee, and Nicole Henderson for 
purposes of impeachment.   
(A) Cross-Examination of Witnesses 
Heather Lee 
 
Brown first argues that trial counsel’s cross-examination of Heather Lee was 
ineffective because trial counsel failed to impeach Lee in several respects. 
Prior Convictions 
 
First, Brown argues that trial counsel was ineffective in cross-examining Lee 
because he failed to impeach Lee with her prior convictions for two petit thefts and 
two felony failures to appear.  Brown argues that if Lee had opened the door when 
questioned as to the existence and number of her prior convictions, trial counsel 
could have inquired further into the details underlying those convictions and used 
that information to argue that the jury should not believe Lee’s testimony and 
should instead believe that Lee was more culpable than Brown for the victim’s 
murder due to Lee’s violent history.   
 
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As an initial matter, the record refutes Brown’s argument that impeaching 
Lee with her prior convictions would have opened the door to further inquiry about 
the underlying details of those convictions.  Lee was questioned about her prior 
convictions at the evidentiary hearing, and postconviction counsel did not attempt 
to make such a record based on Lee’s responses.  Moreover, at best, Lee’s 
responses would have resulted in the records of her convictions being introduced 
into evidence.  See Tilus v. State, 121 So. 3d 1145, 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) 
(“The proper method to impeach a witness who provides inaccurate or misleading 
information regarding prior convictions is to admit certified copies of the 
convictions.”).   
Nevertheless, although Lee’s prior convictions could not have been used to 
the extent Brown argues, they constitute available impeachment evidence that went 
unused by trial counsel.  See § 90.610(1), Fla. Stat. (2019).  However, we need not 
“delve into” whether Brown has made a showing as to the deficiency prong 
because there is no prejudice for the reasons explained below in our cumulative 
prejudice analysis.  Zakrzewski, 866 So. 2d at 692.   
Prior Inconsistent Statements 
 
Second, Brown argues that trial counsel was ineffective in cross-examining 
Lee because he failed to impeach Lee with four alleged prior inconsistent 
statements.  First, she argues that trial counsel should have impeached Lee’s trial 
 
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testimony regarding her whereabouts on the day of the crime, namely that she went 
to Brown’s trailer at approximately 9 p.m., with Lee’s prior statements that she 
was around Brown’s trailer between 3:15 and 3:45 p.m., but then went home to 
cook and visit with multiple family members.  Second, Brown argues that trial 
counsel should have impeached Lee’s trial testimony about who was present in the 
vehicle used to transport the victim and in the area where the victim was lit on 
fire—herself, Miller, and Brown—with her prior statement that M.A. was also 
present and that M.A. and Miller held her at the back of the vehicle while Brown 
pulled the victim out of the trunk.  Third, Brown claims that trial counsel should 
have impeached Lee’s trial testimony that she had not previously been to the area 
where the victim was lit on fire, but she could see the entrance to the area and the 
chains blocking it off, with her prior statement that she knew the area but it is 
usually blocked with strings to prevent people from entering.  Fourth, and finally, 
Brown argues that trial counsel should have impeached Lee’s trial testimony that 
she “guess[ed]” her shoes were bloody because she stepped in some blood while 
running with her prior statement that she “guess[ed]” blood flew on her when the 
victim was being attacked, although she was not taking part in it.  Brown contends 
that trial counsel’s deficient cross-examination prejudiced her because her jury did 
not hear additional evidence that it could have used to conclude that Lee was a liar.    
 
- 22 - 
However, Lee was not questioned at the postconviction evidentiary hearing 
about her alleged prior inconsistent statements on any of these subjects.  Therefore, 
“what [she] would have said if questioned about [them] . . . is speculative and, 
thus, cannot support postconviction relief.”  Calhoun v. State, Nos. SC18-340 & 
SC18-1174, 2019 WL 6204937, at *9 (Fla. Nov. 21, 2019).  Accordingly, we 
affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief with respect to all of these claims. 
Bias 
 
Brown next argues that trial counsel was ineffective during her cross-
examination of Lee by failing to impeach Lee through evidence of bias.  See 
§ 90.608(2).  Specifically, Brown argues Lee’s husband, Darren Lee, admitted 
during his pretrial deposition that he was sleeping with both the victim and Brown.  
She further argues that Terrance Woods testified during his pretrial deposition that 
Darren Lee was having an affair with the victim and that Heather Lee found out 
about it and got into a physical fight with the victim about it two days before the 
victim’s murder.  Brown argues that eliciting Lee’s knowledge of her husband’s 
affairs with both the victim and Brown during cross-examination would have 
established bias, namely Lee’s motive to kill the victim and blame Brown.  We 
affirm the denial of relief because Brown failed to present any evidence that would 
support this claim.  Heather Lee denied knowledge of her husband’s affairs when 
questioned about them at the postconviction evidentiary hearing.  Trial counsel 
 
- 23 - 
cannot be ineffective for failing to elicit information from Lee on cross-
examination that Lee denies exists.  However, we recognize that in addition to 
challenging trial counsel’s cross-examination of Heather Lee, Brown argues that 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Darren Lee and Terrance Woods to 
impeach Lee about this and other subjects, and we address those claims below. 
Lee’s Failure to Open the Door for Police 
Brown further argues that trial counsel was ineffective in cross-examining 
Lee by failing to use Darren Lee’s pretrial deposition testimony to discredit Lee’s 
trial testimony that she did not open the door for the police because Brown told her 
not to.  In his pretrial deposition, Darren Lee testified that no one opened the door 
because he was high.  However, Brown cites no authority for her argument that 
trial counsel could have admitted Darren Lee’s deposition testimony to impeach 
Heather Lee’s trial testimony about why she did not open the door for police.  To 
the extent Brown argues that trial counsel should have called Darren Lee as a 
witness to attack Lee’s credibility by showing that the facts as to why Lee failed to 
open the door were not as Lee testified, see § 90.608(5), we address the argument 
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Darren Lee as a witness to 
impeach Lee on this and other subjects below.   
 
- 24 - 
Corie Doyle 
 
Brown next argues that trial counsel was ineffective during his cross-
examination of Corie Doyle because he failed to impeach Doyle with her prior 
convictions, jail records, and deposition statements.5  However, Brown’s argument 
regarding Doyle’s prior convictions was not included in her postconviction motion 
and is therefore procedurally barred.  See Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 667 
n.12 (Fla. 2000) (holding claim “procedurally barred because it was not alleged in 
the postconviction motion filed in the trial court”).  Regarding the jail records, 
Brown claims that trial counsel could have used them to impeach Doyle’s 
testimony that Brown confessed to her before she had ever seen Lee.  Brown 
explains that the records would show that Doyle was housed with Lee before she 
was housed with Brown and that this information undermines Doyle’s claim never 
to have seen Lee before when this information is considered along with (a) Doyle’s 
testimony that she approached Brown because Brown’s jumpsuit was an eye-
 
5.  Brown also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
discover and use the testimony of another inmate, Nicole Henderson, that, in 
Henderson’s observation, Brown was not an early riser.  She argues that 
Henderson’s testimony would impeach Doyle’s trial testimony that Brown 
confessed to her early one morning.  As explained below, Brown raises other 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to Henderson, which, like this 
claim, turn on whether trial counsel should have discovered the information 
available from Henderson prior to trial.  Therefore, we address all of Brown’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to trial counsel’s failure to call 
Henderson as a witness below. 
 
- 25 - 
catching color and (b) other evidence that Lee’s jumpsuit was the same color as 
Brown’s.  Regarding Doyle’s pretrial deposition, Brown claims that trial counsel 
failed to impeach Doyle with statements that would have shown Doyle learned 
about the murder from the news and embellished the details on her own, including 
Doyle’s deposition testimony that Brown told her Miller caught herself on fire.  
However, because Doyle did not testify at the evidentiary hearing, “what [Doyle] 
would have said if questioned” about the jail records and statements made in her 
pretrial deposition “is speculative and, thus, cannot support postconviction relief.”  
Calhoun, 2019 WL 6204937, at *9.  Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction 
court’s denials with respect to these claims. 
(B) Failure to Present Impeachment Witnesses 
Terrance Woods 
 
Brown next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call 
Terrance Woods.  Specifically, she argues that by calling Woods to impeach 
Heather Lee’s trial testimony, trial counsel would have been able to lessen 
Brown’s culpability, show that Heather Lee was the ringleader, and corroborate 
similar powerful impeachment evidence available from Darren Lee.  We agree that 
trial counsel was deficient for failing to call Woods.   
At his pretrial deposition, Woods testified that Heather Lee told him she had 
discovered that her husband, Darren Lee, was having an affair with the victim, and 
 
- 26 - 
that she had gotten into a fight with the victim about it two days prior to the 
murder.  On the day of the fight, Woods heard Heather Lee say, “I’m going to kill 
the bitch.”  On a separate occasion, after the victim’s murder, Woods stated that 
Heather Lee admitted to him and Darren Lee that “all three of them”—referring to 
herself, Brown, and Miller—“got the girl, we took her, we beat her up, set her on 
fire.”  Woods further stated that Lee admitted to pouring gas on the victim and to 
setting her on fire.   
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Woods testified consistently with 
his deposition.6  Although trial counsel generally testified that his strategy was to 
blame Heather Lee as much as possible without losing credibility with the jury by 
saying that Brown was not involved, trial counsel would not take a position as to 
whether calling Woods as a witness would have been helpful to Brown’s case.  
When pressed, trial counsel stated, “Unless I didn’t believe him,” but he did not 
testify that he had actual knowledge that Woods was lying, or even that he actually 
did not believe Woods.  Like many of the witnesses in this case, Woods was 
subject to impeachment with prior felony convictions, and the record shows that he 
was in prison at the time of Brown’s trial and hoped to benefit from his testimony.  
However, because the record shows that Woods’ testimony was consistent with 
 
6.  Prior to trial, Woods also wrote six letters to the State Attorney consistent 
with his pretrial deposition and evidentiary hearing testimony. 
 
- 27 - 
trial counsel’s stated strategy, and when pressed on the issue, trial counsel could 
not articulate a reasonable strategy for failing to call Woods, we hold that trial 
counsel was deficient for failing to do so.  See Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 
535, 554 (Fla. 2010) (“Reasonable decisions regarding trial strategy, made after 
deliberation by a claimant’s trial attorneys in which available alternatives have 
been considered and rejected, do not constitute deficient performance under 
Strickland.”).   
Because, as explained below, we find trial counsel deficient in an additional 
respect, we address prejudice cumulatively. 
Darren Lee 
Brown next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Darren 
Lee.  Specifically, Brown argues that, after Terrance Woods testified at his pretrial 
deposition about incriminating statements Heather Lee made to himself and Darren 
Lee before and after the murder, no reasonable trial counsel would have failed to 
re-depose Darren Lee and call him as a witness at trial to impeach Heather Lee.  
Brown also argues that Darren Lee could have impeached Heather Lee’s testimony 
as to why she did not open the door for the police, further discrediting Lee’s 
attempts to paint Brown as the ringleader.  We agree that trial counsel was 
deficient for failing to call Darren Lee. 
 
- 28 - 
Trial counsel testified at the postconviction evidentiary hearing that he could 
not see Darren Lee providing any useful information.  However, when Darren Lee 
testified at the evidentiary hearing, he admitted to having affairs with both Brown 
and the victim, and he also testified to the statements that Heather Lee made to him 
in the presence of Terrance Woods.  Darren Lee’s testimony was consistent with 
that of Terrance Woods.  Specifically, Darren Lee testified that before the victim’s 
murder, after Heather Lee came home following a fight with the victim, she told 
him that he “won’t be sleeping with that bitch.”  After the victim’s murder, 
according to Darren’s testimony, Heather Lee described how the victim begged for 
her life and claimed to have been the one who poured gas on the victim and lit her 
on fire.  Finally, although Heather Lee testified during trial that she did not open 
the door for police following the victim’s murder because Brown told her not to, 
during his pretrial deposition, Darren Lee stated that no one opened the door for 
the police because he was high. 
Trial counsel testified at the postconviction evidentiary hearing that he did 
not think it would have been helpful to Brown’s case or to the impeachment of 
Heather Lee to have Darren Lee testify, as Darren Lee had spoken to the police 
three times and never told them that Heather Lee confessed.  Generally, “counsel is 
not ineffective for deciding not to call a witness whose testimony will be harmful 
to the defendant.”  Diaz v. State, 132 So. 3d 93, 109 (Fla. 2013).  
 
- 29 - 
However, we fail to see—and the record is silent regarding—how calling 
Darren Lee to testify at trial would have been inconsistent with trial counsel’s 
stated strategy to place as much blame on Heather Lee as possible without having 
the jury think he was trying to “scam” them by saying that Brown was not involved 
in the victim’s murder.  To the contrary, as Brown argues, Darren Lee’s testimony 
about Heather Lee’s statements would have impeached her trial testimony that she 
and the victim were “real close friends” and other testimony in which she 
attempted to minimize her role in the victim’s murder and described Brown as the 
ringleader.  Further, Darren Lee’s admissions to having affairs with both Brown 
and the victim could have been used to explain Heather Lee’s motive for 
participating in the murder and her bias for testifying and attempting to minimize 
her role in comparison to Brown’s.  Moreover, most of the available impeachment 
testimony from Darren Lee would have been corroborated by the available 
impeachment testimony from Terrance Woods, which we have already held that 
trial counsel was deficient for failing to present.  Cf. State v. Morrison, 236 So. 3d 
204, 220 (Fla. 2017) (ruling that there were sufficient facts to place trial counsel 
“on notice” that further investigation of the defendant’s mental health and social 
background was required and that counsel’s failure to investigate such defenses 
were “not reasonable under prevailing professional norms”).  We similarly hold 
that trial counsel was deficient for failing to call Darren Lee, and in light of our 
 
- 30 - 
holding that trial counsel was also deficient for failing to call Terrance Woods, we 
address prejudice cumulatively below.  
Nicole Henderson 
 
In her last claim regarding trial counsel’s guilt-phase representation, Brown 
argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and call Lee’s 
fellow inmate Nicole Henderson as a witness at trial.  At the postconviction 
evidentiary hearing, Henderson testified that while she was in jail with Lee, she 
overheard Lee talking to a third inmate about the victim’s murder.  According to 
Henderson, Lee told the other inmate that the murder happened because Lee’s 
boyfriend had impregnated another lady and that Lee planned to “get off” by 
blaming the murder on Brown and Miller with the help of two juveniles who were 
being housed with Miller.  On cross-examination, Henderson testified that it 
sounded like Lee was bragging and that Lee had not said how she planned to 
contact the two juveniles.  Henderson also testified that Lee had gotten into a fight 
with Henderson’s sister because Lee’s boyfriend wanted to have sex with her.  
Finally, Henderson testified to her observations of Brown in jail, including that she 
did not see Brown awake or out of her cell early in the mornings.   
Brown argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to discover and 
use Henderson’s testimony about the conversation Henderson overheard to 
impeach Lee, for failing to use Henderson’s testimony regarding the fight as 
 
- 31 - 
reverse Williams7 rule evidence, and for failing to use Henderson’s observations of 
Brown while they were in jail together to refute Corie Doyle’s trial testimony that 
Brown confessed to her early one morning.  We affirm the circuit court’s denial of 
relief.   
As an initial matter, Brown failed to establish a fact critical to all three of her 
arguments, namely that trial counsel should have discovered the information 
available from Henderson before trial.  To the contrary, at the postconviction 
evidentiary hearing, trial counsel denied having knowledge that Lee had confessed 
to any inmate while in jail, except Wendy Moye.  Also, Henderson testified at the 
evidentiary hearing that she did not tell anyone about Lee’s confession when it 
occurred, and Henderson was not asked whether she told anyone about Lee’s fight 
with her sister or about her observations of Brown.  
However, even assuming that trial counsel should have discovered this 
information from Henderson, trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that 
he generally does not like to use “jailhouse snitches and rats” because “[t]hey lie” 
and that he did not feel that having multiple witnesses testify that Lee had 
confessed would have been helpful for Brown’s case.  In light of the testimony 
about Lee’s confession that the jury heard through Moye, the judgment call 
 
 
7.  Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959); see also State v. Savino, 
567 So. 2d 892, 894 (Fla. 1990). 
 
- 32 - 
associated with presenting any witness, particularly one who is incarcerated, and 
trial counsel’s strategy not to present testimony from multiple witnesses on the 
same topic, we cannot say that the record is devoid of competent, substantial 
evidence supporting the circuit court’s finding that trial counsel was not deficient 
for failing to call Henderson to testify regarding Lee’s statements to her.  Cf. 
Whitfield v. State, 923 So. 2d 375, 380 (Fla. 2005) (explaining that “trial counsel 
have significant leeway in determining how to present [cumulative] evidence,” in 
the context of addressing the claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
call additional witnesses to corroborate the defendant’s voluntary intoxication 
defense). 
Moreover, Henderson’s testimony that Lee had gotten into a fight with 
Henderson’s sister because Lee’s boyfriend wanted to have sex with Henderson’s 
sister would not have been admissible as reverse Williams rule evidence, even 
assuming that Brown preserved this argument, which she did not.8  The 
circumstances of Lee’s fight with Henderson’s sister are not sufficiently similar to 
the circumstances of the victim’s murder to constitute reverse Williams rule 
evidence.  See State v. Savino, 567 So. 2d 892, 894 (Fla. 1990) (explaining that 
under the reverse Williams rule, a defendant may introduce evidence that another 
 
8.  This argument is not preserved because Brown raised it for the first time 
in her initial brief.  See Thompson, 759 So. 2d at 667 n.12.  Below, Brown claimed 
the same evidence showed Lee’s reputation for violence. 
 
- 33 - 
person has committed a similar crime if the evidence shows “a close similarity of 
facts, a unique or ‘fingerprint’ type of information”).   
Finally, competent, substantial evidence supports the circuit court’s finding 
that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to present Henderson’s testimony 
about her observations of Brown because it did not refute Doyle’s trial testimony 
that Brown confessed to her early one morning.  Although, at the postconviction 
evidentiary hearing, Henderson testified that based on her observations of Brown 
while they were in jail together, Brown was not an early riser, Henderson admitted 
on cross-examination that it was possible Brown got up early at times.   
 
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial. 
(3) Penalty Phase 
 
In her final claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Brown argues that 
trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase in two respects, namely (a) 
for failing to conduct a reasonably competent investigation and present adequate 
mitigation and (b) for failing to consult and present additional mental health 
experts.  
(A) Mitigation  
Brown first argues that trial counsel rendered deficient performance in 
investigating and presenting mitigation.  After providing the necessary background 
about Brown’s postconviction motion and the circuit court’s rulings, we explain 
 
- 34 - 
the procedural bar that applies to Brown’s appeal of the denial of this claim and 
why, even without the procedural bar, we would nevertheless affirm. 
Following the postconviction evidentiary hearing, the circuit court ruled that 
portions of Brown’s claim were facially insufficient.  Specifically, the circuit court 
found that the “blanket and non-detailed allegation” that trial counsel “failed to 
speak with any of [Brown’s] cousins, friends, ex-boyfriends, or ex-husbands” was 
“facially insufficient” and denied it “with prejudice,” “to the extent [it] can be 
considered a subclaim.”  In so ruling, the circuit court explained that Brown’s 
motion “fails to identify with particularity the identity of these purported 
witnesses, the content of their testimony, if [Brown] told counsel about these 
people, if they were available to testify, and most importantly, how their testimony 
would have made a difference in [Brown’s] sentence.” 
Similarly, Brown’s motion alleged that trial counsel failed to fully explain 
Brown’s background “including but not limited to: her extensive history of drug 
abuse, her extensive history of physical and sexual abuse, her mental illness, her 
family’s background, and how that background affected Ms. Brown and her 
conduct during the commission of the crime.”  However, without attributing any of 
the information to a specific source, Brown’s motion devoted approximately four-
and-a-half pages to discussing the “wealth of mitigation” that she claimed would 
have been available had trial counsel “properly prepared and investigated.”  In 
 
- 35 - 
finding that this portion of Brown’s claim was also “facially insufficient,” the 
circuit court ruled that Brown “goes on for pages, giving details of [her] life, but 
she does not link this information to any particular witness or indicate through 
which witnesses penalty-phase counsel should have presented this information” 
and further “does not explain specifically how any of this information would have 
made a difference in [her] trial.”  The circuit court also gave two other reasons for 
denying this portion of Brown’s claim.  First, the circuit court alternatively ruled 
that even if this portion of Brown’s claim were facially sufficient, “the information 
alleged is cumulative to the lengthy mitigation already presented by penalty-phase 
counsel.”  Second, the circuit court ruled that Brown “failed to demonstrate how 
penalty-phase counsel did not ‘link’ [Brown’s] background to its effect on [Brown] 
during the crime,” crediting trial counsel’s evidentiary hearing testimony that she 
“thought” that Brown’s mental health expert, Dr. Elaine Bailey, “covered 
[Brown’s] life history from the beginning to the time of the crime, and linked 
[Brown’s] life history to the crime itself,” and finding that the record “supports this 
conclusion.”9    
 
9.  Indeed, it does.  For example, Dr. Bailey testified during the penalty 
phase to the “stressors” that would have affected Brown at the time of the crime, 
including “repeated traumas, addictions, abusive relationships, exposure to 
violence, a lot of sexual victimization, both in childhood being prostituted and 
adulthood[,] [and a] lot of community negative influence and crime, and [she 
explained that] all of those things c[a]me together.”  Dr. Bailey also testified that 
Brown’s childhood experiences would have affected her into adulthood, that 
 
- 36 - 
In addition to the above rulings, the circuit court ruled that Brown failed to 
substantiate the remaining portions of her claim that related to named individuals.  
Specifically, Brown’s motion named three family members she claimed trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and prepare for the 
penalty phase: (1) her mother Lily Ramos; (2) her brother Willie Coleman, Jr.; and 
(3) her paternal uncle Gerald Coleman.  The circuit court denied relief, finding that 
Brown “failed to present any evidence to support her allegations that the witnesses 
were ill-prepared.”  In so ruling, the circuit court cited trial counsel’s explanation 
at the evidentiary hearing regarding why Brown’s mother was not called as a 
penalty-phase witness, which included that Brown’s mother “actually told [trial 
counsel] she believed [Brown] should get the death penalty.”  With respect to 
Willie Coleman, Jr., and Gerald Coleman, the circuit court found that although the 
documentary evidence showed defense counsel’s trip to visit Brown’s family 
occurred weeks before the trial, Brown “failed to present any testimonial evidence 
to show that penalty-phase counsel did not adequately prepare the witnesses who 
testified.” 
Brown’s motion also identified three other individuals she claimed trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to discover and present as penalty-phase 
 
trauma affects brain development, and that “[t]he bottom line is trauma is 
cumulative.”   
 
- 37 - 
witnesses: (1) her cousin Trina Bell; (2) one of her ex-husbands and the father of 
her three children, Gregory Miller, Sr.; and (3) her friend Jennifer Malone.  
Brown’s motion alleged that Bell “could have provided evidence of [her] history of 
sexual abuse, drug use, and physical abuse by her boyfriends,” that Miller “had 
firsthand knowledge of [her] daily cocaine and heroin use, physical abuse from her 
father, and episodes of domestic violence,” and that Malone had sent a letter to the 
trial judge and had offered to be of assistance but that trial counsel failed to follow 
up.  None of these individuals testified at the postconviction evidentiary hearing.  
Just as it ruled regarding the other named individuals, the circuit court ruled that 
Brown failed to substantiate these claims (in addition to providing alternate bases 
for denying relief with respect to Miller and Malone). 
More specifically, regarding Bell, the circuit court denied relief because, 
despite being granted an evidentiary hearing on this claim, Brown “failed to 
present Ms. Bell’s testimony or any evidence to substantiate her allegations 
regarding Trina Bell.”   
Regarding both Miller and Malone, the circuit court ruled that their failures 
to testify at the evidentiary hearing precluded it from assessing their credibility and 
determining whether their testimony would have made a difference in Brown’s 
sentence.  Alternatively, the circuit court ruled that even if they had testified 
consistently with what Brown’s postconviction expert, Dr. Faye Sultan, testified at 
 
- 38 - 
the evidentiary hearing that they had told her, the information was cumulative to 
that presented during the penalty phase.10 
Brown now appeals the circuit court’s denial, arguing that “the evidence 
presented at the evidentiary hearing was far from cumulative.”  As explained 
above, the circuit court found that the entirety of Brown’s claim was either facially 
insufficient or unsubstantiated, and Brown fails to challenge those rulings on 
appeal.  Instead, she challenges only the circuit court’s alternative ruling that even 
if her claim were facially sufficient, the mitigation alleged in her postconviction 
motion was cumulative to the mitigation already presented at the penalty phase.  In 
failing to challenge the circuit court’s primary bases for denying relief, Brown has 
waived the argument that they are in error.  See Shelly v. State, No. SC16-1195, 
2019 WL 102481, at *1 (Fla. Jan. 4, 2019) (“[A]n argument not raised in an initial 
 
10.  In its alternative ruling about the cumulative nature of the mitigation, 
the circuit court identified one exception regarding Malone.  Specifically, the judge 
who presided over Brown’s trial received an email from Jennifer Malone on the 
morning of the Spencer hearing that stated Brown “did A LOT for [Malone] when 
[she] had no one else” and that “the Tina [Malone] knew was a wonderful friend 
and person that would do anything to help anyone.”  Although the circuit court 
ruled that Dr. Sultan’s testimony about her interview with Malone revealed 
“additional details regarding [Brown’s] influence in Ms. Malone’s life,” it found 
that the information “would not have changed [Brown’s] sentence.”  Moreover, the 
circuit court ruled that Brown provided no evidence to support her claim that 
penalty phase counsel should have known of Malone’s existence in time to present 
her testimony to the penalty phase jury, and that “[c]ounsel cannot be found 
deficient for failing to investigate a person she did not know existed.” 
 
- 39 - 
brief is waived.”) (quoting Tillery v. Fla. Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, 104 So. 3d 
1253, 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)). 
But, even if she had not, we would still affirm.  The circuit court correctly 
ruled that the portions of Brown’s motion that failed to identify the witnesses trial 
counsel was supposedly deficient for failing to discover, the specific mitigation 
each would have provided, or how its absence prejudiced her are facially 
insufficient.  See State v. Lucas, 183 So. 3d 1027, 1032 (Fla. 2016) (“There is no 
question that when the ineffective assistance claim alleges trial counsel should 
have presented a fact witness, such witness must be named and his or her 
availability attested to.”); see also Booker v. State, 969 So. 2d 186, 196 (Fla. 2007) 
(“To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to call 
certain witnesses, a defendant must allege in the motion ‘what testimony defense 
counsel could have elicited from [the] witnesses and how defense counsel’s failure 
to call, interview, or present the witnesses who would have so testified prejudiced 
the case.’ ” (quoting Nelson v. State, 875 So. 2d 579, 583 (Fla. 2004))).11  
 
11.  We note that Brown’s noncompliance with rule 3.851 was a recurring 
theme below that delayed this case for years.  Brown amended her postconviction 
motion multiple times after the circuit court struck the prior version for failing to 
comply with rule 3.851.  The order on appeal constitutes the denial of Brown’s 
third amended motion.  Even still, the circuit court’s order notes the “disorganized” 
nature of the motion and finds that “to the extent that this court may have failed to 
address any claims, this Court considers those claims, subclaims, and/or arguments 
waived based on [Brown’s] failure to comply with the pleading requirements of 
rule 3.851.”  Brown does not appeal this ruling. 
 
- 40 - 
Regarding the remaining portions of Brown’s claim related to the six named 
individuals, because the record supports the circuit court’s finding that Brown 
failed to substantiate those portions of her claim, we would affirm.   
Moreover, although as explained above, the procedural bar and affirmance 
on the alternate bases of facial insufficiency and failure to substantiate make it 
unnecessary to address the circuit court’s alternative ruling regarding the 
cumulative nature of the mitigation, we agree with the circuit court’s conclusion.12   
 
 
12.  Brown’s focus in the penalty phase was on how her traumatic 
background affected her and shaped her actions on the night of the murder.  The 
background information presented at the penalty phase included Brown’s (1) 
suffering physical and sexual abuse (namely being raped by her father and 
prostituted by her stepmother), parental and other familial abandonment, drug 
addiction, and exposure to her father’s drug-related, violent criminal lifestyle as a 
child and (2) experiencing domestic abuse and struggles with addiction as an adult, 
to the point that she lost custody of two of her children.  Along with presenting this 
evidence, Brown argued that Heather Lee may have been more culpable and yet 
was allowed to plead guilty to second-degree murder.  Indeed, of the twenty-seven 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances found by the trial court, nineteen relate to 
Brown’s traumatic experiences and struggles with addiction.  See Brown, 143 So. 
3d at 401 (nonstatutory mitigating circumstances 1-17, 19, and 27).   
Similarly, Brown’s postconviction motion describes her deprived childhood; 
her struggles with drug addiction that began in childhood, particularly to crack 
cocaine; and her traumatic experiences, including that her childhood home was 
filled with violence and used in a drug operation, that she was neglected and 
emotionally, physically, and sexually abused (including being raped by her father 
and prostituted for drugs and money by her stepmother with her father’s approval) 
as a child, and that she was abused by ex-husbands and ex-boyfriends as an adult.  
Although Brown’s initial brief improperly references additional mitigation that was 
not included in her postconviction motion and that was obtained from sources who 
were not identified in her motion and who did not testify at the evidentiary hearing, 
 
- 41 - 
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief. 
(B) Mental Health Experts 
Brown next argues that the circuit court erred in denying her claim that trial 
counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase for failing to consult and present 
additional mental health experts to explain the combined effects of polysubstance 
abuse, childhood trauma, and mental illness on her brain.  The circuit court ruled 
that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to hire additional mental health 
experts based on trial counsel’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing that Brown’s 
penalty-phase mental health expert, Dr. Bailey, did not recommend doing so.  
Brown argues that “regardless of the court’s finding that trial counsel was not 
deficient for relying upon Dr. Bailey, trial counsel was . . . deficient for failing to 
recognize the[] red flags” of Brown’s longtime struggles with drug addiction and 
her lifelong traumas.  She contends that these red flags would have led reasonable 
trial counsel to investigate further and to retain and present the testimony of an 
addiction specialist and a neuropsychologist.  We affirm because competent, 
substantial evidence supports the circuit court’s finding that trial counsel was not 
deficient. 
 
even that mitigation falls within the scope of trial counsel’s penalty phase 
presentation. 
 
- 42 - 
This Court has long held that “defense counsel is entitled to rely on the 
evaluations conducted by qualified mental health experts, even if, in retrospect, 
those evaluations may not have been as complete as others may desire.”  Darling v. 
State, 966 So. 2d 366, 377 (Fla. 2007) (finding no deficiency where “[t]he 
testimony presented during the postconviction evidentiary hearing may generally 
be described as only a more detailed presentation of the mitigation that was 
actually presented during the penalty phase”).   
Although Brown argues her case is similar to Ellerbee v. State, 232 So. 3d 
909 (Fla. 2017), where this Court held that trial counsel was ineffective in the 
presentation of mental health mitigation, it is not.  In Ellerbee, the penalty-phase 
jury heard “conflicting evidence and unsubstantiated claims that [the defendant] 
suffered from various mental disorders,” id. at 928, and the penalty-phase mental 
health expert “did not provide a detailed explanation of the effect that abuse and 
drug use can have on cognitive development.”  Id. at 931.  Instead, pursuant to trial 
counsel’s direction, Ellerbee’s penalty-phase mental health expert “focus[ed] on 
fetal alcohol syndrome while simultaneously presenting testimony directly 
contradicting its existence.”  Id.  Unlike Ellerbee, where the “contradictory 
evidence would have confused the jury at best and, at worst, raised suspicions of 
defense counsel’s honesty,” id. at 932, the theme of Brown’s penalty phase was 
that her lifelong traumatic experiences (including childhood physical and sexual 
 
- 43 - 
abuse) and her longtime struggles with addiction (including multiple relapses and 
use of crack on the day of the crime) affected her up through the time of the crime.   
Indeed, as explained above, the circuit court denied Brown’s separate claim 
that trial counsel was ineffective with respect to the mitigation investigation and 
presentation, in part, because Brown “failed to demonstrate how penalty-phase 
counsel did not ‘link’ [Brown’s] background to its effect on [her] during the 
crime.”  In so ruling, the circuit court found that the record supports trial counsel’s 
testimony at the evidentiary hearing that “she thought [the defense expert] Dr. 
Bailey covered [Brown’s] life history from the beginning to the time of the crime, 
and linked [Brown’s] life history to the crime itself.”  Competent, substantial 
evidence supports the circuit court’s findings.  For example, Dr. Bailey testified 
during the penalty phase to the “stressors” that would have affected Brown at the 
time of the crime, including “repeated traumas, addictions, abusive relationships, 
exposure to violence, a lot of sexual victimization, both in childhood being 
prostituted and adulthood[,] [and a] lot of community negative influence and 
crime, and [she explained that] all of those things c[a]me together.”  Dr. Bailey 
also testified that Brown’s childhood experiences would have affected her into 
adulthood, that trauma affects brain development, and that “[t]he bottom line is 
trauma is cumulative.”  Moreover, as demonstrated in this Court’s decision in 
Brown’s direct appeal, trial counsel’s penalty-phase presentation resulted in the 
 
- 44 - 
trial court’s finding of numerous mitigating circumstances related to Brown’s 
traumatic experiences and struggles with addiction, including the long-term effects 
of chronic cocaine use on her brain and that she was using cocaine on the day of 
the crime.  See Brown, 143 So. 3d at 401.   
That new experts retained for postconviction would render more favorable 
opinions based on essentially the same information presented during the penalty 
phase does not render trial counsel deficient for relying on the opinions of Dr. 
Bailey.  See Darling, 966 So. 2d at 377. 
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial. 
(4) Cumulative Prejudice 
 
Brown next argues that the circuit court erred in denying her cumulative 
error claim because, cumulatively, trial counsel’s deficient performance in the guilt 
and penalty phases deprived her of a fundamentally fair trial.  As explained above, 
we conclude that the available impeachment evidence of Heather Lee’s prior 
convictions went unused by trial counsel, and we agree with Brown that trial 
counsel was deficient for failing to present Terrance Woods and Darren Lee to 
impeach Heather Lee’s trial testimony and implicate her as the ringleader.  
Assuming counsel was deficient for failing to impeach Lee with her prior 
convictions and taking into account counsel’s deficiencies in failing to call Woods 
and Darren Lee as witnesses, we must “consider the impact of these errors 
 
- 45 - 
cumulatively to determine whether [the defendant] has established prejudice.”  
Sparre, 289 So. 3d at 847 (quoting Parker, 89 So. 3d at 867).   
They do not.  All of trial counsel’s deficiencies center around the failure to 
discredit Lee and her version of events.  The likelihood that the jury placed high 
value on Lee’s testimony is suspect, at best, because the jury knew that, despite 
describing herself as a victim and minimizing her role in the victim’s murder, Lee 
had pleaded guilty to the victim’s second-degree murder in exchange for testifying 
against Brown.  Nevertheless, it is true that but for trial counsel’s deficiencies, the 
jury could have relied on Heather Lee’s prior convictions and testimony from 
Terrance Woods and Darren Lee to further discount Lee’s testimony and conclude 
that her role in the crime was more substantial than she admitted during the guilt 
phase.  However, there is no reasonable probability that but for trial counsel’s 
deficiencies, individually or cumulatively, the outcome would have been different. 
Regarding the guilt phase, the evidence of Brown’s involvement and 
culpability in the victim’s murder under both theories of premeditated and felony 
murder is overwhelming.  For example, the victim named “Tina [Brown], Heather 
[Lee], and Britnee [Miller]” as her attackers and told a paramedic that “they poured 
gas on her and set her on fire.”  Although the paramedic acknowledged on cross-
examination by trial counsel that the victim “didn’t actually breakdown what each 
one of these people did to her,” the victim’s statement that “they” did it, at a 
 
- 46 - 
minimum, indicates that in her experience her attackers were acting in concert.  
Moreover, M.A. testified that Brown was the primary aggressor based on her 
observations at the trailer where the attack began.  According to M.A., Brown 
attacked the victim with a stun gun, held the victim’s hands behind her back, 
forced the victim into the trunk, and screamed at the victim about calling Crime 
Stoppers.  Consistent with M.A.’s testimony, Brown’s DNA was on the stun gun, 
Brown’s trailer and vehicle were used in the crime, and Brown drove the victim to 
the area where she was lit on fire.  Additionally, both Brown and her daughter, 
Miller, made incriminating statements: Miller told M.A. that they were going to 
kill the victim right before the attack began, and, within days of the crime, while 
the victim was still alive in the hospital, Brown told Pamela Valley that she wanted 
the victim “finish[ed] off.”  Accordingly, there is no reasonable probability of a 
different verdict. 
Regarding the penalty phase, impeaching Lee with her prior convictions and 
calling Terrance Woods and Darren Lee to impeach Lee’s testimony and implicate 
her as the ringleader during the guilt phase would not eliminate the overwhelming 
evidence of Brown’s involvement and culpability in the victim’s murder from the 
sources other than Lee, such as those discussed above.  Moreover, during the 
penalty phase, the jury heard even more evidence negating that Brown’s role in the 
crime was minor, including testimony from Brown’s own mental health expert 
 
- 47 - 
that, despite describing Heather Lee as “the escalator,” Brown “was very frank 
about her role” in the victim’s murder, and “[did] not deny being an aggressor, 
being involved, . . . [or] what she did.”  Nor would counsel’s deficiencies with 
respect to Lee change the application of the weighty evidence in aggravation to 
Brown.  Accordingly, there is no reasonable probability of a different sentence. 
Because Brown has failed to show that trial counsel’s deficiencies, 
individually or cumulatively, establish the prejudice required by Strickland, we 
affirm the circuit court’s denials of relief with respect to each of the individual 
claims at issue and with respect to Brown’s cumulative error claim. 
B. Newly Discovered Evidence 
 
Brown next argues that the circuit court erred in denying her claim of newly 
discovered evidence related to Heather Lee’s credibility as a witness and Lee’s role 
in the murder.  Specifically, Brown points to an email from Lee’s trial attorney, 
which was disclosed to Brown’s counsel without authorization; posttrial 
confessions by Lee to fellow inmates; and evidence of Lee’s pattern of violence 
against individuals, like the victim, who engaged in affairs with her significant 
others.  Brown argues that she is entitled to a new trial because this evidence 
would probably result in her acquittal or a reduced sentence.  However, as 
explained below, portions of Brown’s claim involve evidence that is inadmissible 
and allegations that are procedurally barred.  Although portions of Brown’s 
 
- 48 - 
allegations do involve newly discovered evidence, it is not of such a nature that it 
would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit 
court’s denial of relief. 
(1) The email from Heather Lee’s attorney is inadmissible. 
Brown argues that the circuit court erred in ruling inadmissible an email 
from Heather Lee’s trial attorney to Lee’s mitigation specialist.  We disagree. 
 
Below, Lee’s trial attorney joined a motion filed by the State to exclude the 
email under section 90.502(2), Florida Statutes (2019).  Section 90.502(2) provides 
that “[a] client has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any other person 
from disclosing, the contents of confidential communications when such other 
person learned of the communications because they were made in the rendition of 
legal services to the client.”  This privilege may be asserted by a lawyer on behalf 
of the client.  § 90.502(3)(e).   
 
The circuit court found that section 90.502(2) applies to require exclusion of 
the email, further finding that the attorney-client privilege had not been waived and 
noting that Brown had presented no evidence that Lee sought or obtained her 
attorney’s services to enable her to commit a crime or fraud so as to establish an 
exception to this rule under section 90.502(4)(a).  Indeed, Brown has not identified 
any such evidence or identified any other authority that would nevertheless allow 
 
- 49 - 
the email to be admitted.  Consequently, she has failed to show error in the circuit 
court’s ruling.   
 
Although Brown asks us to disregard section 90.502(2) in the interests of 
due process and justice, her general arguments to this effect—unsupported by any 
case law addressing similar or analogous circumstances—are insufficient to 
overcome this well-established evidentiary rule, adopted in the broader interests of 
justice and in furtherance of the crucial relationship of client and counsel.  See 
Horning-Keating v. State, 777 So. 2d 438, 445 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (“[One of t]he 
oldest and most revered principles of Anglo[-]American law is the attorney-client 
privilege . . . .  The purpose of the privilege is to encourage broad communication 
between a lawyer and the client and thus promote the broader public interest in the 
proper administration of justice.” (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 
(1981)); see also R.L.R. v. State, 116 So. 3d 570, 573 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) 
(noting that the attorney-client privilege “is an interest traditionally deemed worthy 
of maximum legal protection”).  Even if Brown could overcome this evidentiary 
rule, the email is inadmissible for an additional reason, which was raised by the 
 
- 50 - 
state below and has not been addressed by Brown on appeal: the email is 
inadmissible hearsay.  See §§ 90.801-.802, Fla. Stat. (2019).13   
 
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s order excluding the email. 
(2) The circuit court properly refused to consider Tajiri Jabali’s testimony as 
newly discovered evidence. 
 
 
Brown relies on testimony provided by Tajiri Jabali at the postconviction 
evidentiary hearing as newly discovered evidence of (1) Heather Lee’s motive for 
and role in the victim’s murder and (2) Heather Lee’s pattern of violent conduct 
against those with whom Lee’s significant others “cheat.”  However, the circuit 
court refused to consider Jabali’s testimony as newly discovered evidence on the 
ground that “there is no claim regarding Tajiri Jabali alleged in [Brown’s] motion.”  
Because Brown waited until her reply brief to challenge the circuit court’s ruling 
on this issue, Brown has waived any challenge to it.  See Hoskins v. State, 75 So. 
3d 250, 257 (Fla. 2011).   
Moreover, even without the waiver, we would still affirm on the record 
before us.  By its plain language, rule 3.851(e)(1) provides that “[e]ach claim or 
subclaim shall be separately pled” in the initial postconviction motion.  (Emphasis 
added).  A defendant cannot plead a claim of newly discovered evidence without 
 
 
13.  An appellate court may affirm a correct result reached by a lower court 
for any reason that is supported by the record, even if it is not the reason the lower 
court articulated for its ruling.  Robertson v. State, 829 So. 2d 901, 906 (Fla. 2002). 
 
- 51 - 
alleging that the specific evidence at issue could not have been discovered at trial 
with due diligence and that the specific evidence at issue is of such a nature that it 
would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.  See Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 
521 (Fla. 1998).  Brown’s motion did not plead a claim of newly discovered 
evidence regarding Jabali, and there was no argument raised below as to why the 
circuit court should have nevertheless considered Jabali’s testimony newly 
discovered evidence.  Accordingly, we would not reverse the circuit court’s ruling 
on this issue, even if it were properly before us.  
(3) The evidence properly before the Court does not warrant relief. 
 
The evidence properly before the Court as alleged newly discovered 
evidence is the following: (1) Jessica Swindle’s testimony that, while in prison, 
Heather Lee told her, without remorse, that she personally set the victim on fire 
because the victim was sleeping with her “baby’s dad” and that Brown and Miller 
“didn’t do anything”; (2) Shayla Edmonson’s testimony that, while in prison, 
Heather Lee told her that she “killed someone and she would do it again because 
the people that were involved in the case . . . were sleeping with her husband . . . 
and she set the girl on fire”; and (3) Nicole Henderson’s testimony that Heather 
Lee would fight the women her prison girlfriend cheated on her with.  When 
subjected to cross-examination, Swindle and Edmonson agreed that it seemed like 
Lee was trying to be tough.   
 
- 52 - 
As we explained in Jones, 709 So. 2d at 521, a claim of newly discovered 
evidence is governed by the following two-part test:  
First, in order to be considered newly discovered, the evidence “must 
have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at 
the time of trial, and it must appear that defendant or his counsel could 
not have known [of it] by the use of diligence.”  Torres-Arboleda v. 
Dugger, 636 So. 2d 1321, 1324-25 (Fla. 1994). 
 
Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature 
that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.  Jones, 591 So. 
2d . . . 911, 915 [(Fla. 1991)].  To reach this conclusion the trial court 
is required to “consider all newly discovered evidence which would 
be admissible” at trial and then evaluate the “weight of both the newly 
discovered evidence and the evidence which was introduced at the 
trial.”  Id. at 916. 
 
This test applies not only to the guilt phase of a first-degree murder trial, but also 
to the penalty phase; when the penalty phase is at issue, the second prong requires 
a determination of whether the newly discovered evidence “would probably yield a 
less severe sentence” on resentencing.  Swafford v. State, 125 So. 3d 760, 767 (Fla. 
2013). 
First Prong of Jones 
Brown argues that the circuit court erred in denying relief based on its 
conclusion that the testimony provided by Swindle, Edmonson, and Henderson 
fails the first prong of the Jones test.  We agree with Brown with respect to the 
testimony of Swindle and Edmonson.  Lee’s confessions to these women could not 
have been discovered with due diligence at the time of trial because they did not 
 
- 53 - 
yet exist.14  Although Brown and her counsel knew that Lee had made a similar 
statement to another person, Wendy Moye, and if Lee’s confessions are true, 
Brown would have known that fact, the defense’s knowledge of the substance of 
these statements does not disqualify them from being considered newly discovered 
evidence.  See Archer v. State, 934 So. 2d 1187, 1194 (Fla. 2006) (explaining that a 
defendant’s knowledge at the time of trial of the facts that would be presented by a 
witness as newly discovered evidence does not invalidate a claim of newly 
discovered evidence, as the “appropriate question” is whether the defendant “was 
or should have been aware of the existence of” the evidence offered to prove those 
facts).  They are additional pieces of evidence that have been discovered since trial 
and relate to the circumstances that existed at the time of trial and, as such, 
constitute newly discovered evidence.  See id.  Also, they add information not 
contained in Moye’s testimony: that the reason Lee participated was that the victim 
was sleeping with Lee’s husband, that Brown and Miller “didn’t do anything,” that 
Lee was not remorseful and in fact said she would do it again, and that Brown and 
Miller were sleeping with her husband.  Therefore, because Lee’s confessions to 
 
 
14.  The circuit court ruled that none of this evidence was newly discovered 
precisely because it did not exist at the time of trial.  This ruling is rooted in 
language we used in Porter v. State, 653 So. 2d 374, 380 (Fla. 1995), from which 
we have since receded, Wyatt v. State, 71 So. 3d 86, 100 (Fla. 2011). 
 
 
- 54 - 
Swindle and Edmonson satisfy the first prong of Jones, the circuit court should 
have analyzed them under the second prong. 
The testimony of Nicole Henderson, however, is of a different nature and 
does not satisfy the first prong of Jones.  This testimony pertains to distinct 
criminal acts committed by Lee after trial that do not relate to the circumstances 
existing at the time of trial and, contrary to Brown’s argument, would not satisfy 
the reverse Williams rule.  We have previously held that unrelated posttrial events 
do not qualify as newly discovered evidence.  See Kearse v. State, 969 So. 2d 976, 
987 (Fla. 2007) (affirming the denial of a newly discovered evidence claim where 
Kearse alleged that an expert’s conduct in a subsequent, unrelated case 
demonstrated that expert’s testimony in the Kearse’s case was biased); Porter v. 
State, 653 So. 2d 374, 379-80 (Fla. 1995) (holding that Porter’s good conduct in 
prison was not newly discovered evidence), receded from on other grounds by 
Wyatt v. State, 71 So. 3d 86, 99-100, 100 n.13 (Fla. 2011).  Notably, contrary to the 
allegations of Brown’s motion, Henderson’s testimony does not include statements 
made by Lee comparing a woman she attacked or threatened in prison to the victim 
or admitting a larger role in the victim’s murder than Lee claimed at trial.  
Therefore, Henderson’s testimony about Lee’s conduct in prison is simply 
evidence of unrelated posttrial events and does not satisfy the first prong of Jones. 
 
- 55 - 
 
Accordingly, only the testimony of Swindle and Edmonson is the newly 
discovered evidence that must be considered under the second prong of Jones. 
Second Prong of Jones 
 
An assessment of the second prong of Jones includes consideration of 
“whether the evidence goes to the merits of the case or whether it constitutes 
impeachment evidence,” “whether the evidence is cumulative to other evidence in 
the case,” and “the materiality and relevance of the evidence and any 
inconsistencies in the newly discovered evidence.”  Jones, 709 So. 2d at 521.  
When evaluating these factors to determine whether the newly discovered evidence 
would probably result in an acquittal or a lesser sentence on retrial, see id.; 
Swafford, 125 So. 3d at 767, this Court considers it in conjunction with not only 
the evidence already presented at trial but also any new evidence the movant has 
developed in postconviction proceedings that could be introduced at a new trial, 
including evidence that has not been considered on its own because it was the 
subject of a procedurally barred claim.  See Hildwin v. State, 141 So. 3d 1178, 
1181, 1184 (Fla. 2014).  In other words, this Court examines the newly discovered 
evidence at issue in light of a “total picture” of the case that could be presented at a 
new trial.  See id. at 1184. 
 
Brown argues that the testimony of Swindle and Edmonson constitutes 
valuable impeachment evidence that would probably result in an acquittal of first-
 
- 56 - 
degree murder or a life sentence for Brown.  More specifically, Brown contends 
that Lee’s statements to Swindle and Edmonson would impeach Lee because they 
are inconsistent with her trial testimony and reveal her motive for the murder.  We 
agree with Brown that Swindle’s and Edmonson’s testimony of Lee’s statements 
regarding her motive for, role in, and feelings about the murder is materially 
inconsistent with Lee’s trial testimony.  Specifically, it is inconsistent with Lee’s 
portrayal of herself as an innocent bystander who tried to warn Zimmerman—her 
“good friend[]” whom she would never harm—of the impending attack as it began 
and who tried to run away herself but was nevertheless forced to go to the scene of 
the brutal beating and murder, where she encouraged her friend to run and 
contemplated escaping herself but was too afraid to make an attempt.  Because 
Swindle’s and Edmonson’s testimony of Lee’s posttrial statements is materially 
inconsistent with this account, it would be admissible as impeachment evidence 
under section 90.608(1).  Cf. Izquierdo v. State, 890 So. 2d 1263, 1265-67 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2005) (affirming a trial court’s decision to admit testimony as to previous 
statements of a witness that the defendant had been violent toward her and others 
where she testified at trial that she had a good relationship with him, that he was 
“lovable and tender” and “nice,” that he had never been controlling, and that she 
had never been afraid of him); see also Pearce v. State, 880 So. 2d 561, 569 (Fla. 
2004) (explaining that impeachment material under section 90.608(1) does not 
 
- 57 - 
have to “directly contradict” the witness’s testimony as long as it is “materially 
different” from it). 
 
In addition, we agree with Brown that the testimony that Brown and Miller 
were sleeping with Lee’s husband would be admissible for impeachment purposes.  
Specifically, it would be admissible under section 90.608(2) to impeach Lee 
concerning her motive to place the blame on them.  Cf. Green v. State, 691 So. 2d 
49, 50 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (holding that the defendant in a sexual battery case 
should have been allowed to elicit testimony that the alleged victim, a witness in 
the case, had asked the defendant’s wife if she could think of a way to “get rid of” 
the defendant so that the victim could move in with the wife); see also Gibson v. 
State, 661 So. 2d 288, 291 (Fla. 1995) (“Our evidence code liberally permits the 
introduction of evidence to show the bias or motive of a witness [in testifying].”)15   
 
At a retrial, the testimony of Edmonson and Swindle would combine with 
the impeachment evidence already presented at trial through the cross-examination 
of Lee and the testimony of Wendy Moye.  Moye’s trial testimony revealed 
statements Lee made in jail that are substantively similar to the statements she later 
made to Edmonson and Swindle regarding the actions she took in furtherance of 
 
 
15.  To the extent Brown is suggesting that the testimony of Swindle and 
Edmonson could be admitted as substantive evidence of Lee’s motive to kill the 
victim, she has not explained why the testimony would not constitute inadmissible 
hearsay if offered for that purpose.   
 
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the murder.  As noted in our analysis of the first prong of the Jones test, however, 
the new evidence would also go further than Moye’s testimony.  This new 
evidence would challenge Lee’s credibility as to her relationship with the victim 
and role in the events by providing her stated reason for the dominant role she 
denied at trial but subsequently claimed; indicate not only that she was dominant 
but that, in her words, Brown and Miller “didn’t do anything”; show her lack of 
remorse for her participation in the brutal beating, burning, and killing of 
Zimmerman, contrary to her trial claim that she would not “harm a hair on 
[Zimmerman’s] head”; and suggest an additional reason that she may want to 
blame Brown and Miller.   
 
The efficacy of the testimony of Swindle and Edmonson would be enhanced 
by the testimony that could be presented from Darren Lee and Terrance Woods 
that Lee has made inconsistent statements about her involvement in the murder and 
indeed stated a couple of days before the murder that she intended to kill the victim 
for having an affair with her husband—evidence Brown now relies on as 
substantive proof of Lee’s role and motive.  Furthermore, Brown would be able to 
present impeachment evidence similar to that of Swindle and Edmonson from 
Jabali, including a confession by Lee that she was the “ringleader”; comments by 
Lee, which Jabali read in Lee’s journal, that she forced Brown and Miller, who 
were scared, “[j]ust to do simple things,” and bribed Brown with drugs, along with 
 
- 59 - 
a statement that the victim “got what she deserved”; and a threat by Lee to do to 
other inmates what she had done to her “baby daddy’s mistress” if they became 
involved with Jabali, who was in a relationship with Lee at the time.   
 
We recognize that, although the new evidence presented through Swindle 
and Edmonson would be somewhat cumulative to the impeachment evidence 
presented through Moye, cf. Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So. 2d 84, 89 (Fla. 1994), 
it would likely have some effect, given the importance of the issue on which Lee 
would be impeached and the number and diversity of additional witnesses—not 
only those who met Lee in prison but also those who knew her before the crime—
who could come forward on the matter at a retrial.  Thus, at a new trial where 
Swindle and Edmonson’s testimony was presented, Lee would have even less 
credibility than she had at Brown’s original trial, and it would be more difficult for 
the State to rely on the position it took at trial that Brown was the one with motive 
and the one who poured gasoline on the victim and lit her on fire, while Lee’s 
involvement was comparatively minimal. 
 
Nevertheless, the newly discovered evidence must be considered in light of 
the other evidence presented at trial and available for any retrial bearing on 
Brown’s involvement and culpability in the victim’s murder.   
 
When the victim first emerged from scene of the burning, she named two 
people as the perpetrators—Tina Brown and “Heather”—and said that they 
 
- 60 - 
dragged her out of the house, “tased” her, beat her in the head with a crowbar, and 
then set her on fire.  She repeated those two names several times and told where 
those individuals lived.  Similarly, the victim told a paramedic that “Tina, Heather, 
and Britnee” poured gasoline on her and set her on fire.  The victim did not 
distinguish among the perpetrators in terms of who did what, which suggests that 
in her experience, they were all acting in concert. 
 
M.A., on the other hand, testified that from her observations at the trailer, 
Brown was the primary aggressor, although Lee also participated by putting a sock 
in the victim’s mouth.  Brown is the one whose trailer and vehicle were used in the 
crime, and she is the one M.A. heard screaming at the victim about calling Crime 
Stoppers.  She is the one who, according to M.A., operated the stun gun, held the 
victim’s hands behind her back, and forced the victim into the trunk.  Consistent 
with M.A.’s testimony, Brown’s DNA was on the stun gun.   
 
In addition to M.A.’s testimony and the forensic evidence, there were 
incriminating statements by Brown and her daughter.  Just before the crime started, 
Brown’s daughter, Miller, told M.A. that they were going to kill the victim.  And 
Pamela Valley testified, albeit not without impeachment, that, days after the crime 
was complete, Brown wanted the victim “finish[ed] off.”  Further, in any retrial, 
Brown’s new jury would hear compelling evidence against her that her original 
jury did not: Brown admitted at the Spencer hearing that she “was one of the ones 
 
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who participated in taking [Zimmerman’s] life” and commented that 
“[Zimmerman] didn’t deserve it at all.” 
 
In consideration of the foregoing evidence that is independent of Lee’s 
testimony, when considered cumulatively with all of the evidence that would be 
admissible in a new trial, the newly discovered evidence from Edmonson and 
Swindle fails the second Jones prong as to the guilt phase, as the evidence is not of 
such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.  In fact, the 
impeachment of Lee would do little, if anything, to disturb the evidence of felony 
murder.  While Swindle did testify that Lee said that the other two codefendants 
“didn’t do anything,” significant evidence belies that claim. 
 
The newly discovered evidence fails the second Jones prong as to the 
sentencing question as well.  In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that the 
testimony of Swindle and Edmonson, along with corroborating evidence, would 
impeach Lee on a major point the State relied on in support of the death penalty: 
that Brown was the “main aggressor” and the one who lit the fire.  Indeed, the trial 
court relied on this point in its sentencing order, concluding in its discussion of the 
HAC aggravator that, “[o]f all [Brown’s] flagitious acts, . . . the cruelest were her 
actions in dousing Audreanna Zimmerman with gasoline and setting her on fire.”  
The trial court also reiterated this point in its discussion of whether Brown was a 
minor participant in the crime, stating, “The evidence introduced at trial proves 
 
- 62 - 
[Brown] was the leader of the efforts to murder Audreanna Zimmerman.  It is clear 
[Brown] poured gasoline on Zimmerman and set [her] on fire.”  Notably, Lee’s 
testimony was the only evidence that unambiguously singled out Brown as the 
person who lit the victim on fire, but not the only evidence that she was a, if not 
the, primary aggressor, at least at the trailer. 
 
Considering the attention given to the facts that Brown was the one who lit 
the victim on fire and was the main aggressor—both as points supporting the death 
penalty and as an explanation for the different treatment of Lee—we believe the 
additional impeachment of Lee might result in a lesser sentence at a retrial.  
However, it cannot be said that it would probably result in a lesser sentence.  In 
delivering that additional impeachment testimony, Swindle and Edmonson would 
also testify that Lee seemed to be trying to act tough, as would Jabali in delivering 
her corroborating impeachment testimony concerning Lee’s verbal statements to 
her.  At the same time, Lee’s posttrial claim that Brown and Miller “didn’t do 
anything” would be obliterated by the forensic evidence, the victim’s dying 
declaration, and the eyewitness testimony of M.A. concerning Brown’s role in the 
events at her trailer.  Although there would be a more substantial question as to 
whether Brown actually lit the fire and acted as the primary aggressor, especially 
once the testimony of Darren Lee and Terrance Woods was added, all the evidence 
that the murder itself was heinous, atrocious, or cruel—a weighty aggravating 
 
- 63 - 
factor—would still stand, and the new evidence would not carry any significant 
probability of showing Brown to have been a minor participant.  The subjective 
assessment of the jurors, and perhaps the trial court, as to whether Brown should 
receive a death sentence might change, but the possibility that it would change 
does not meet the standard required for a new trial, which is a showing that it 
would probably change.  See Swafford, 125 So. 3d at 767.   
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief. 
C. Hurst 
 
In the final issue raised on appeal, Brown argues that the circuit court erred 
in summarily denying her claim that she is entitled to relief from her death 
sentence under Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 
3d 40 (Fla. 2016).  After the circuit court denied relief, we “recede[d] from Hurst 
v. State except to the extent it requires a jury unanimously to find the existence of a 
statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Poole, 45 
Fla. L. Weekly S41, S48 (Fla. Jan. 23, 2020), clarified, 45 Fla. L. Weekly S121 
(Fla. Apr. 2, 2020).  Although the required jury finding does not exist in Brown’s 
case, we agree with the circuit court that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.16   
 
 
16.  In Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 1283 (Fla. 2016), we held that 
Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State retroactively apply to sentences of death that 
became final after the United States Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, 536 
 
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At trial, the State argued that Brown was guilty of first-degree murder under 
both premeditated and felony murder theories and presented uncontroverted 
evidence that the capital felony was committed while Brown was engaged, or was 
an accomplice, in the commission of a kidnapping.  Any jury that found, based on 
the State’s presentation, that Brown was guilty of first-degree murder could not 
have logically concluded that Brown was not also guilty of kidnapping, whether as 
the primary aggressor or an accomplice.  Accordingly, we hold that, under the 
circumstances of this case, there is no reasonable doubt that a “rational jury,” 
properly instructed, would have found beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of 
the statutory aggravating circumstance that the capital murder was committed 
while Brown was engaged in the commission of a kidnapping.  Galindez v. State, 
955 So. 2d 517, 522 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 19 
(1999)); see also State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986).  Because 
the existence of a single statutory aggravating circumstance would render Brown 
eligible for imposition of the death penalty, see Poole, 45 Fla. L. Weekly at 545-
46, it is unnecessary to address any of the other statutory aggravators found by the 
 
U.S. 584 (2002).  In a footnote in its answer brief, the State takes issue with 
Mosley, which applies to Brown because her sentence of death became final after 
Ring.  However, we decline to revisit precedent based on assertions in a footnote.  
Cf. Simkins Indus., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 714 So. 2d 1092, 1093 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1998) (explaining that referencing a matter in a footnote “does not elevate the 
matter to a point on appeal”).     
 
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trial court to conclude that the sentencing error in Brown’s case is harmless.  
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial. 
III. HABEAS PETITION 
 
In her habeas petition, Brown argues that appellate counsel was ineffective 
on direct appeal for failing to raise claims of fundamental error based on several 
statements made by the prosecutor during the State’s rebuttal closing argument at 
trial that Brown now contends amount to prosecutorial misconduct.  Because we 
disagree with Brown that these statements individually or cumulatively amount to 
fundamental error, we deny her habeas petition. 
In general, claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are properly 
presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, Baker v. State, 214 So. 3d 530, 
536 (Fla. 2017); Wickham v. State, 124 So. 3d 841, 863 (Fla. 2013), and this Court 
has explained the applicable standard of review as follows: 
“The standard of review for ineffective appellate counsel claims 
mirrors the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel.”  [Wickham, 124 So. 3d at 863].  Specifically, to be entitled 
to habeas relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel, the defendant must establish 
 
[first, that] the alleged omissions are of such magnitude 
as to constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency 
falling measurably outside the range of professionally 
acceptable performance and, second, [that] the deficiency 
in performance compromised the appellate process to 
such a degree as to undermine confidence in the 
correctness of the result.   
 
 
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Bradley v. State, 33 So. 3d 664, 684 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Pope v. 
Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986)). 
 
England v. State, 151 So. 3d 1132, 1140 (Fla. 2014).  Further, appellate counsel is 
not ineffective for failing to raise meritless claims or issues on appeal that were not 
properly raised in the trial court and are not fundamental error.  Valle v. Moore, 
837 So. 2d 905, 907-08 (Fla. 2002).  
 
An error is considered fundamental if it “reaches down into the validity of 
the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained 
without the assistance of the alleged error.”  Boyd v. State, 200 So. 3d 685, 708 
(Fla. 2015) (plurality opinion) (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252, 1282 
(Fla. 2005)); see Doty v. State, 170 So. 3d 731, 743 (Fla. 2015) (explaining that the 
standard for fundamental error with respect to the sentence is “one that ‘reaches 
down into the validity of the trial itself’ and that a sentence of death ‘could not 
have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error’ ” (quoting 
Snelgrove v. State, 107 So. 3d 242, 257 (Fla. 2012))); see also Chandler v. State, 
702 So. 2d 186, 191 n.5 (Fla. 1997) (describing fundamental error as error that is 
“so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial”). 
 
Brown’s habeas petition references two statements by the prosecutor that 
were arguably improper.  First, the prosecutor likely crossed the line in referring to 
Brown, once, as a “cold-blooded murderer.”  See Morris v. State, 233 So. 3d 438, 
447, 449 (Fla. 2018) (holding that the prosecutor’s statements referring to the 
 
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defendant as “cold-blooded,” “stone cold,” and “ruthless” may have crossed the 
line).  However, this statement was a single occurrence, and we have declined to 
find fundamental error based on comparable statements.  See id.; see also Davis v. 
State, 928 So. 2d 1089, 1127 (Fla. 2005) (holding prosecutor’s references to the 
defendant as “a cagey little murderer” and a “[l]ittle robber, cagey little thief” did 
not constitute fundamental error).   
Second, and presenting a closer call as to whether the statement is even 
improper, is the prosecutor’s rhetorical question asking how Doyle, who was the 
State’s witness, would have learned information about the victim’s murder apart 
from gaining it from Brown.  On the one hand, this argument could be viewed as 
improper because the jury did not know Doyle had stated in a pretrial deposition—
at which the prosecutor was present—that she had heard on the news that “there 
was a girl that was lit on fire and that she was taken by helicopter and that before 
she died she said the . . . names [of her killers].”  See Craig v. State, 685 So. 2d 
1224, 1229-30 (Fla. 1996) (recognizing that prosecutors have a duty not to present 
false or misleading arguments to the judge or jury); Thompson v. State, 273 So. 3d 
1069, 1077 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (“Improper prosecutorial ‘vouching’ for the 
credibility of a witness occurs where a prosecutor suggests that she has reasons to 
believe a witness that were not presented to the jury, or, stated differently, where 
the prosecutor implicitly refers to information outside the record.” (quoting 
 
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Jackson v. State, 89 So. 3d 1011, 1018 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012))).  On the other hand, 
this argument could be viewed as properly directed at the specific information 
about the murder Doyle testified at trial to having learned from Brown, including 
the names of the individuals involved and details of the crime, such as that the 
victim was beaten and attacked with a stun gun.  Regardless, the record establishes 
that Doyle’s testimony contained details of the victim’s murder that were not 
among the general information that Doyle attributed to the news report during her 
deposition.  Specifically, Doyle testified in her pretrial deposition that all she heard 
on the news was that a “girl” was lit on fire and that before she died she said “the 
girls’ names,” noting that the news report did not release the names.  At trial, 
Doyle testified that Brown told her about details of the victim’s murder, namely 
that Brown and her daughter beat the victim with a tire iron, “tazed” the victim, 
and caught the victim on fire, and that Miller accidentally set herself on fire during 
the crime.  Although there is no indication in the record that Miller caught herself 
on fire during the crime, the other details Doyle testified to regarding the victim’s 
murder indicate that Doyle learned of the details of the murder from Brown and 
not the news.  Accordingly, even if improper, the prosecutor’s statement was not 
so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial.  See Chandler, 702 So. 2d at 191 n.5. 
Moreover, even assuming that both of the prosecutor’s statements were 
improper, when “viewed cumulatively in light of the record in this case,” they do 
 
- 69 - 
not “reach[] the critical mass of fundamental error” that is so prejudicial as to 
vitiate the entire trial.  Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879, 899 (Fla. 2000) (quoting 
Cochran v. State, 711 So. 2d 1159, 1163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)); Chandler, 702 So. 
2d at 191 n.5.  
Accordingly, because appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
challenge on direct appeal unpreserved issues that do not amount to fundamental 
error, see Valle, 837 So. 2d at 908, we deny Brown’s habeas petition.17 
 
17.  The other statements that Brown references in her habeas petition were 
not improper and therefore could not have supported a claim of fundamental error.  
Specifically, first, the prosecutor’s statement that Brown “baited” the victim “into 
the lion’s den by telling her things were okay” does not cross the line into an 
improper inflammatory argument on the facts of this case.  Rather, the prosecutor 
asked the jury to make a permissible inference based on the evidence that Brown 
“lured [the victim] into her home under false pretenses.”  Brown, 143 So. 3d at 
407.  Second, the prosecutor did not improperly belittle defense counsel by 
disparaging his argument that Brown was not guilty of first-degree murder.  
Rather, the prosecutor permissibly explained why defense counsel’s arguments 
seeking a conviction of second-degree murder were not supported by the evidence 
adduced at trial.  Third, the prosecutor did not improperly vouch for the credibility 
of State witnesses Valley and Doyle by asking what motive Valley had to make up 
her testimony and what Doyle had to gain by testifying.  Rather, the prosecutor’s 
arguments were proper responses to defense counsel’s credibility attacks on these 
witnesses in light of the evidence presented at trial.  Finally, the prosecutor did not 
improperly demand justice for the victim or the victim’s family.  Rather, the 
prosecutor’s reference to “justice” is fairly read as a response to defense counsel’s 
explanation of the jury’s role, and it was made in the context of addressing the 
verdict that is required when the State meets its burden to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s order denying 
postconviction relief and deny Brown’s habeas petition. 
 
It is so ordered. 
POLSTON, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, and COURIEL, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, C.J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
LABARGA, J., concurs in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
CANADY, C.J., concurring in result. 
 
I agree with the per curiam opinion except for the analysis of the Hurst 
issue.  Although I agree that the Hurst error here is harmless, I also adhere to the 
view that “[t]he new rule articulated in Hurst v. Florida—which simply requires 
that the jury find an aggravator—is an evolutionary refinement in the law that does 
not cast doubt on the veracity or integrity of penalty phase proceedings resulting in 
death sentences that are now final” and that the new rule therefore should not be 
given retroactive effect.  Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 1291 (Fla. 2016) 
(Canady, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Poole—which corrected this Court’s misinterpretation of Hurst v. Florida—
dismantled the foundation for the majority’s analysis in Mosley.  After Poole, 
Mosley is the ghost of a precedent.  The retroactivity issue presented by this case 
therefore should be determined in light of Poole.  And Poole makes clear that 
 
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Hurst v. Florida was an evolutionary refinement in the law that should not be 
applied retroactively. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Escambia County, 
Gary L. Bergosh, Judge - Case No. 172010CF001608XXXAXX 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Robert Friedman, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Dawn B. Macready and 
Stacy R. Biggart, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Northern Region, 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Michael T. Kennett, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Appellee/Respondent