Case Title: OLR v. Christopher S. Carson

Citation: 2015 WI 26

Docket Number: 2014AP002732-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2015-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
2015 WI 26 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP2732-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against  
Christopher S. Carson, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Christopher S. Carson, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST CARSON 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 10, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 26
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP2732-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Christopher S. Carson, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Christopher S. Carson, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 10, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review a stipulation filed pursuant 
to Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 22.12 by the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation (OLR) and Attorney Christopher S. Carson.  In the 
stipulation, Attorney Carson agrees that he engaged in eight 
counts of misconduct involving four clients.  Attorney Carson 
also agrees that a 90-day suspension of his license to practice 
law in Wisconsin is an appropriate sanction for his misconduct.  
No. 
2014AP2732-D   
 
2 
 
The OLR does not request restitution, and it also does not seek 
the imposition of costs against Attorney Carson.  
¶2 
After careful review of the matter, we approve the 
stipulation and agree that a 90-day suspension of Attorney 
Carson's license to practice law is an appropriate sanction.  
Because this matter is being resolved without the appointment of 
a referee, we do not impose any costs on Attorney Carson. 
¶3 
Attorney Carson was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1992.  The most recent address furnished by 
Attorney Carson to the State Bar of Wisconsin is New Berlin, 
Wisconsin.   
¶4 
In 2008, Attorney Carson was privately reprimanded for 
misconduct in two matters.  In one matter, he wrote to a judge 
without copying the other lawyers.  In the second matter, he 
failed to obey a court order.  Private Reprimand 2008-15. 
¶5 
In 2009, Attorney Carson was publicly reprimanded for 
misconduct in a divorce matter.  Public Reprimand of Christopher 
S. Carson, No. 2009-10. 
¶6 
On November 26, 2014, the OLR filed a complaint 
alleging that Attorney Carson engaged in eight counts of 
misconduct involving four separate clients.  The OLR and 
Attorney 
Carson 
contemporaneously 
filed 
a 
stipulation 
incorporating the allegations of the complaint.   
¶7 
The first client matter detailed in the complaint and 
stipulation involved Attorney Carson's representation of N.S.  
In or around April of 2010, N.S. retained Attorney Carson to 
represent her in two operating while intoxicated cases and a 
No. 
2014AP2732-D   
 
3 
 
forthcoming felony drug possession case.  Prior to commencement 
of 
the 
lawyer-client 
relationship, 
no 
consensual 
sexual 
relationship existed between N.S. and Attorney Carson.  
¶8 
N.S.'s initial court appearance in the drug possession 
case occurred in August of 2010.  N.S. and Attorney Carson both 
attended the court appearance.  The court set a signature bail 
bond which provided that N.S. was not to possess or consume any 
alcohol or drugs.  The drug possession case was concluded in 
late May of 2011.  The terms of the August 2010 bail bond 
remained in effect. 
¶9 
In April of 2011, Attorney Carson and N.S. engaged in 
sexual relations on two occasions.   
¶10 The OLR's complaint alleged three counts of misconduct 
with respect to Attorney Carson's relationship with N.S.: 
[COUNT ONE]  By purchasing two alcoholic drinks 
for N.S. on April 23, 2011, when the bail bond that 
N.S. signed on August 11, 2010, in Carson's presence 
prohibited her from consuming alcohol, and while the 
conditions of the bail bond were still in effect, 
Carson violated SCR 20:1.2(d).1 
[COUNT TWO]  By engaging in sexual relations with 
N.S., a current client, on April 23 and 24, 2011, 
while he was representing her on criminal charges, 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:1.2(d) provides: 
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or 
assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is 
criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the 
legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct 
with a client and may counsel or assist a client to 
make a good faith effort to determine the validity, 
scope, meaning or application of the law. 
No. 
2014AP2732-D   
 
4 
 
when a consensual sexual relationship did not exist 
between 
them 
when 
the 
lawyer-client 
relationship 
commenced, Carson violated SCR 20:1.8(j).2 
[COUNT THREE]  By denying to OLR's District 
Committee that he purchased clothing for N.S. during 
their trip on April 23, 2011, and by stating to OLR's 
District Committee that it was impossible for him to 
have looked through a back window at N.S.'s home and 
observe her and her boyfriend in the living room on 
April 24, 2011, because there was no such window, and 
it would have been impossible for him to see into the 
living room from the back porch, when one or both of 
such 
statements 
were 
misrepresentations, 
Carson 
violated SCR 22.03(6)3 and SCR 22.04(1).4 
¶11 The second client matter detailed in the complaint and 
stipulation involved Attorney Carson's representation of M.G.  
In 2005, M.G. was sentenced to 13 years of prison for repeated 
first degree sexual assault of a child.  The judgment of 
conviction ordered M.G. to have no contact with minor children 
unless approved by his offender agent.   
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.8(j) provides, in relevant part, that "[a] lawyer 
shall not have sexual relations with a current client unless a 
consensual sexual relationship existed between them when the 
client-lawyer relationship commenced." 
3 SCR 22.03(6) provides that "[i]n the course of the 
investigation, the respondent's wilful failure to provide 
relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 
are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 
in the grievance." 
4 SCR 22.04(1) provides that "[t]he director may refer a 
matter 
to 
a 
district 
committee 
for 
assistance 
in 
the 
investigation.  A respondent has the duty to cooperate specified 
in SCR 21.15(4) and 22.03(2) in respect to the district 
committee.  The committee may subpoena and compel the production 
of documents specified in SCR 22.03(8) and 22.42." 
No. 
2014AP2732-D   
 
5 
 
¶12 M.G. and his wife wanted M.G. to have visitation with 
their recently born daughter during his incarceration.  They 
sought permission for visits from M.G.'s social worker and 
agent.  Their requests were denied.  They sought review of the 
denial from the warden, who upheld the denial, subject to 
reconsideration 
upon 
successful 
completion 
of 
treatment 
programs.   
¶13 In September of 2005, three weeks before the warden 
sustained the denial of visitation, the circuit court amended 
the judgment of conviction to permit M.G. to have supervised and 
monitored prison visits with his daughter.  However, the amended 
judgment did not strike the pre-existing order prohibiting 
contact with minor children without the approval of M.G.'s 
agent.   
¶14 Visitation was further denied to M.G. by prison 
officials later in 2005 and again in 2006 and 2007.  In each of 
those instances, M.G. and/or his wife were informed of their 
appeal rights.   
¶15 Wisconsin 
Admin. 
Code 
§ 
DOC 
310 
provides 
the 
administrative remedy framework for review of inmate complaints, 
the Inmate Complaint Review System (ICRS).  Under the ICRS, 
inmate complaints are first processed by the institution 
complaint examiner, who makes disposition recommendations to the 
reviewing authority.  An inmate dissatisfied with the reviewing 
authority's decision generally may appeal it.  The appeal is 
initially reviewed by a corrections complaint examiner, who 
recommends a decision to the secretary of the Department of 
No. 
2014AP2732-D   
 
6 
 
Corrections (DOC).  The secretary's decision is final.  M.G. 
never used the ICRS to contest any denials of visitation in 
prison with his daughter.  He never appealed under the ICRS any 
denials of visitation to the secretary of the DOC.  In addition, 
M.G. failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with the DOC 
for each of the denials of visitation. 
¶16 In early 2009, M.G.'s wife retained Attorney Carson to 
take legal action seeking to permit M.G. to have prison 
visitation with his daughter.  M.G.'s wife provided Attorney 
Carson with a copy of M.G.'s prison case notes, which state that 
there is an appeal process.  Attorney Carson never independently 
investigated whether M.G. exhausted his administrative remedies 
regarding prior denials of visitation with his daughter. 
¶17 M.G. filed three separate motions for writ of mandamus 
in the criminal case seeking to compel the DOC to permit 
visitation.  Each of the motions were eventually withdrawn.   
¶18 The OLR's complaint alleged the following count of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Carson's handling of M.G.'s 
case: 
[COUNT FOUR]  After being hired to represent an 
incarcerated man who had unsuccessfully sought prison 
visitation with his minor child, and after being 
provided with "prison case notes" stating that an 
appeals process had been explained to the man and that 
notice of appeal rights had been sent to the man's 
wife, by failing to obtain information about the 
administrative appeal process within the Department of 
Corrections or familiarize himself on the relevant law 
and codes on the appeal process; and/or by thereafter 
seeking visitation rights by filing a series of three 
motions in the client's prior criminal case instead of 
first exhausting the client's administrative remedies 
No. 
2014AP2732-D   
 
7 
 
and by failing to file a motion against the State of 
Wisconsin 
in 
the 
proper 
venue, 
Carson 
violated 
SCR 20:1.1.5 
¶19 The third client matter detailed in the complaint and 
stipulation involved Attorney Carson's representation of L.W., 
who was sentenced in Milwaukee County circuit court to 42 months 
in prison, followed by 42 months of extended supervision, 
following his conviction for possession with intent to deliver 
THC.  On July 20, 2010, while on extended supervision, L.W.'s 
extended supervision was revoked by the DOC for two counts of 
sex with a child and one count of failing to report to his 
agent, all of which occurred in 2009.   
¶20 Two days later, L.W. was convicted in Milwaukee County 
circuit court for two counts of second degree sexual assault of 
a child and one count of child enticement.  The child involved 
was the same child that was the subject of L.W.'s extended 
supervision revocation.  On the new conviction, L.W. was 
sentenced to nine years in prison, followed by seven years of 
extended supervision. 
¶21 In late 2011 or early 2012, L.W. retained Attorney 
Carson to challenge the 2010 revocation of his extended 
supervision from the 2002 drug case, on the basis that L.W. 
received ineffective assistance of counsel at the extended 
supervision revocation hearing.  The time to file a petition for 
                                                 
5 SCR 20:1.1 
provides 
that 
"[a] 
lawyer 
shall 
provide 
competent representation to a client.  Competent representation 
requires 
the 
legal 
knowledge, 
skill, 
thoroughness 
and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." 
No. 
2014AP2732-D   
 
8 
 
writ of certiari from the extended supervision revocation had 
expired in 2010, so Attorney Carson filed a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus in Milwaukee County circuit court.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 801.50(4)(b) requires that a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus be filed in the county "[w]here the liberty of the 
plaintiff is restrained if the action seeks relief concerning 
any other matter relating to a restraint on the liberty of the 
plaintiff."  At the time Attorney Carson filed the habeas 
petition, L.W. was incarcerated at Redgranite Correctional 
Institution (RGCI), which is located in Waushara County.   
¶22 Wisconsin Stat. § 782.04(1) provides that a habeas 
petition must state "the person by whom imprisoned and the place 
where, naming both parties, if their names are known, or 
describing them if they are not."  Attorney Carson failed to 
name the warden at RGCI in the petition.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 782.10 requires that a habeas petition be served upon the 
warden or left with an underofficer at the institution that has 
charge of the inmate.  Attorney Carson only mailed the petition 
to the warden.  Wisconsin Stat. § 782.04 requires that a habeas 
petition be verified.  The petition filed by Attorney Carson was 
not verified. 
¶23 In the conclusion of the habeas petition, Attorney 
Carson requested "the remedy of immediate release."  However, if 
the writ was granted, the remedy would be a new hearing on 
L.W.'s ineffective assistance claim, not release.  In addition, 
at the time the petition was filed, L.W. was less than two years 
into a nine-year prison sentence for the sexual assault of a 
No. 
2014AP2732-D   
 
9 
 
child conviction, so no action of the circuit court on the 
habeas 
petition 
could 
have 
resulted 
in 
release 
from 
incarceration.   
¶24 The assistant legal counsel for the DOC filed a motion 
to dismiss the petition and to declare a "strike" against L.W. 
under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act.  The assistant legal 
counsel filed a separate motion for sanctions against Attorney 
Carson, seeking a finding that the habeas petition was frivolous 
and seeking an award of actual attorneys fees.  Attorney Carson 
voluntarily dismissed the habeas petition, and the DOC's 
assistant legal counsel agreed to dismiss her motions to dismiss 
and for sanctions. 
¶25 In February of 2012, Attorney Carson filed a new 
petition for writ of habeas corpus in Waushara County circuit 
court.  The DOC's assistant legal counsel filed a motion to 
dismiss the second petition and to declare a "strike" against 
L.W. under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act.  The assistant 
legal counsel filed a separate motion for sanctions against 
Attorney Carson, again seeking a finding that the second habeas 
petition was frivolous and seeking an award of actual attorneys 
fees.  
¶26 Attorney Carson thereafter filed his own motion for 
sanctions against the DOC's assistant legal counsel.  The second 
habeas petition and the sanction motions were heard in April of 
2012.  The circuit court denied the second habeas petition and 
set the matter for additional briefing and a continued hearing 
as to the sanctions motions.  In May of 2012, Attorney Carson 
No. 
2014AP2732-D   
 
10 
 
withdrew his motion for sanctions against the DOC's assistant 
legal counsel.  The hearing continued in September of 2012.  At 
the close of the hearing, the circuit court concluded that the 
second habeas petition was frivolous.  The parties exchanged fee 
submissions and at an October 2012 hearing, the circuit court 
ordered Attorney Carson to pay attorneys fees and costs totaling 
$1,788.50.  Attorney Carson appealed, and the court of appeals 
summarily affirmed and remanded for the determination and 
assessment against Attorney Carson of attorneys fees and costs 
reasonably incurred by the State in the appeal. 
¶27 The OLR's complaint alleged the following count of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Carson's handling of L.W.'s 
case: 
[COUNT FIVE]  By making multiple errors in a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus that he filed in 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court on January 3, 2012, 
including filing the petition in the wrong county, 
failing to verify the petition by signing it under 
oath, misstating the number of charges of which his 
client 
had 
been 
convicted, 
and 
seeking 
an 
inappropriate 
remedy, 
eventually 
dismissing 
the 
petition and filing a revised petition in Waushara 
County in which he corrected some, but not all, of his 
previous errors, Carson violated SCR 20:1.1. 
¶28 The final client matter detailed in the complaint and 
stipulation involved Attorney Carson's representation of A.E.  
A.E. met with Attorney Carson in July of 2010 for a consultation 
regarding possible divorce representation.  At the conclusion of 
the consultation, A.E. gave Attorney Carson a $700 advanced fee, 
but instructed him not to use the funds and to take no further 
action on her behalf unless her husband filed for a divorce.  
No. 
2014AP2732-D   
 
11 
 
Attorney Carson did not deposit the $700 into his office trust 
account but rather deposited it into his office business 
account.  Attorney Carson later told an OLR investigator that he 
deposited the $700 advanced fee into his office business account 
because it was a flat fee for representation of A.E. in an 
uncontested divorce.  Attorney Carson never provided A.E. with 
the written notice set forth in SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m). 
¶29 By March of 2011, A.E. began to consider initiating 
the divorce proceedings and met with Attorney Carson for legal 
advice.  She paid Attorney Carson an additional $200, which 
Attorney Carson deposited into his office business account.  On 
March 17, 2011, A.E. wrote to Attorney Carson saying she still 
had not decided when to file for divorce.  On March 31, 2011, 
A.E. sent Attorney Carson a certified letter informing him that 
she and her husband were reconciling and that she would not need 
Attorney Carson's services.  A.E. requested a refund of the $700 
advanced fee she paid in July of 2010.  Attorney Carson did not 
respond to A.E.'s refund request. 
¶30 On June 3, 2011, A.E. sent Attorney Carson a second 
certified letter indicating that the letter was her final 
request for him to return her $700 advanced fee.  Later in June, 
Attorney Carson informed A.E. that she was not entitled to a 
refund of any portion of her advanced fee. 
¶31 A.E. filed a grievance with the OLR against Attorney 
Carson in August of 2011.  Attorney Carson told an OLR intake 
investigator that the $700 constituted a flat fee.  The intake 
investigator directed Attorney Carson to provide A.E. with the 
No. 
2014AP2732-D   
 
12 
 
SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m) written notice regarding fee accounting and 
dispute resolution upon termination of representation.  Attorney 
Carson prepared a letter titled "Termination of Services Letter 
and Accounting of Fees" addressed to A.E., which indicated that 
it was to be sent to her at the email address shown on the 
letter.  Attorney Carson sent the letter to that email address, 
but the address contained a typographical error and consequently 
was not received by A.E.  
¶32 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Carson's representation of 
A.E.: 
[COUNT SIX]  By receiving a $700 advanced fee 
from [A.E.] on or about July 26, 2010, in anticipation 
of possible representation in a divorce and depositing 
those 
funds 
into 
his 
business 
account 
without 
utilizing 
the 
alternative 
fee 
placement 
measures 
permitted under SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m), Carson violated 
SCR 20:1.15(b)(4).6 
[COUNT SEVEN]  Having received a March 31, 2011, 
letter from [A.E.] in which she terminated the legal 
representation and inquired as to the possibility of 
having her advanced fee returned to her, by failing 
until June 2011 (and only after subsequent inquires 
from [A.E.]) to address the matter of the advanced fee 
either by refunding a portion of the advance or by 
promptly 
informing 
[A.E.] 
that 
no 
refund 
was 
                                                 
6 SCR 20:1.15(b)(4) provides that "[e]xcept as provided in 
par. (4m), unearned fees and advanced payments of fees shall be 
held in trust until earned by the lawyer, and withdrawn pursuant 
to sub. (g).  Funds advanced by a client or 3rd party for 
payment of costs shall be held in trust until the costs are 
incurred." 
No. 
2014AP2732-D   
 
13 
 
forthcoming 
in 
light 
of 
work 
performed, 
Carson 
violated SCR 20:1.16(d).7 
[COUNT EIGHT]  In September 2011, by sending a 
"termination of services letter and accounting of 
fees" to [A.E.] (at an incorrect email address) that 
incorrectly stated that a refund of an advanced fee 
was possible only in hourly fee cases, and only 
sending his letter more than five months after 
[A.E.'s] termination of the legal representation in a 
belated effort to comply with the alternative fee 
placement measures permitting deposit of an advanced 
fee 
into 
a 
business 
account, 
Carson 
violated 
SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)b.8 
                                                 
7 SCR 20:1.16(d) provides:  
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee or expense that has not 
been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers 
relating to the client to the extent permitted by 
other law. 
8 SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)b. provides: 
Upon 
termination 
of 
the 
representation, 
the 
lawyer shall deliver to the client in writing all of 
the following: 
1. a final accounting, or an accounting from the 
date of the lawyer's most recent statement to the end 
of the representation, regarding the client's advanced 
fee payment with a refund of any unearned advanced 
fees; 
2. notice that, if the client disputes the amount 
of the fee and wants that dispute to be submitted to 
binding arbitration, the client must provide written 
notice of the dispute to the lawyer within 30 days of 
the mailing of the accounting; and 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP2732-D   
 
14 
 
¶33 In the stipulation, Attorney Carson represents that he 
fully understands the misconduct allegations, fully understands 
the ramifications should the court impose the stipulated level 
of discipline, fully understands his right to contest the 
matter, and fully understands his right to counsel.  The 
stipulation also avers that Attorney Carson's entry into the 
stipulation was made knowing, voluntarily, and without coercion 
by any person or agency, and that his entry into the stipulation 
represents his admission of all misconduct recited and his 
assent to the level and type of discipline sought by the OLR 
director. 
¶34 Upon careful consideration of this matter, we approve 
the stipulation and adopt the stipulated facts and legal 
conclusions of professional misconduct.  We further find that a 
90-day suspension of Attorney Carson's license to practice law 
in Wisconsin is an appropriate sanction for his misconduct.  
Because Attorney Carson entered into a comprehensive stipulation 
under SCR 22.12, thereby obviating the need for the appointment 
of a referee and a full disciplinary proceeding, we do not 
impose any costs in this matter. 
                                                                                                                                                             
3. notice that, if the lawyer is unable to 
resolve the dispute to the satisfaction of the client 
within 30 days after receiving notice of the dispute 
from the client, the lawyer shall submit the dispute 
to binding arbitration. 
No. 
2014AP2732-D   
 
15 
 
¶35 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Christopher S. 
Carson to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 
90 days, effective April 9, 2015. 
¶36 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Christopher S. Carson shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
¶37 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.28(2). 
 
 
No. 
2014AP2732-D   
 
 
 
1