Case Title: PAVUK v. ROGERS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-08-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
PAVUK v. ROGERS2001 WY 7530 P.3d 19Case Number: 00-260Decided: 08/17/2001

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                                                   
                                        

 

KURT 
PAVUK and CORY PAVUK, 

Appellants(Plaintiffs),

 

v.

 

ILA 
ROGERS and JOHN DOE ROGERS,

Wife and 
Husband; MARY ANN  
SHAFFER

and JOHN 
DOE SHAFFER, Wife and Husband, 

Appellees(Defendants).

 

 

Representing 
Appellants: 

            
James K. Lubing of James K. Lubing Law Office, Jackson, Wyoming; and 
Robert L. Murray, Tucson, Arizona.

 Representing 
Appellees: 

            
David B. Hooper and Tom A. Glassberg of Hooper Law Offices, P.C., 
Riverton, Wyoming.

 

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE and VOIGT, JJ.

  

VOIGT, 
Justice.

 [¶1]      Kurt Pavuk 
(appellant), a social guest of the tenant, was injured when he fell down a 
stairway on premises leased from Ila Rogers and Mary Ann Shaffer 
(appellees).  In the ensuing 
personal injury action, the district court granted summary judgment to 
appellees, citing common law landlord immunity.  Appellant asks this Court to reject that 
common law immunity, thereby recognizing recent legislative intent to the 
contrary.  Finding that summary 
judgment in favor of appellees was proper under the circumstances of this case, 
we affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The only issue 
raised by appellant is whether this Court should abandon its adherence to the 
common law doctrine of landlord immunity for injuries to a tenant or third-party 
guest of the tenant.

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      In December, 
1996, appellant suffered severe injuries, resulting in paraplegia, when he fell 
down the outside back stairs of a townhouse owned by appellees and rented to 
appellant's acquaintance.  Appellant 
brought the instant civil action on January 18, 2000, alleging that appellees 
maintained the premises in a dangerous condition.  The district court granted summary 
judgment to appellees, finding (1) there were no issues of material fact; (2) 
appellees had not retained control over the premises; (3) there were no latent 
defects; and (4) appellees were protected by common law landlord immunity from 
negligence claims brought by a social guest of their 
tenant.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶4]      Summary judgment 
motions are determined under the following language from W.R.C.P. 
56(c):

 

The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.

 

Since 
the parties have not suggested any disagreement as to the material facts in this 
case, we "have only to determine whether the district court properly granted 
summary judgment as a matter of law."  
Cooper v. Town of Pinedale, 1 P.3d 1197, 1200 (Wyo. 
2000).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶5]      In recent years, 
this Court has had several occasions to reiterate Wyoming's long-standing 
adherence to the common law doctrine of landlord immunity.  Under that doctrine, landlords have no 
duty to tenants or to tenants' guests for the condition of the premises, with 
the following exceptions:

 

1.         
Undisclosed conditions known to lessor and unknown to the lessee which 
were hidden or latently dangerous and caused an injury.  * * *

 

2.         
The premises were leased for public use and a member of the public was 
injured.

 

3.         
Part of the premises was retained under the lessor's control, but was 
open to the use of the lessee.  * * 
*

 

4.         
Lessor had contracted to repair the premises.  * * *

 

5.         
Negligence by lessor in making repairs.

 

Taylor 
v. Schukei Family Trust ex rel. Schukei, 
996 P.2d 13, 16 (Wyo. 2000).  See 
also 
Flores 
v. Simmons, 
999 P.2d 1310, 1312-13 (Wyo. 2000); 
Selby v. 
Conquistador Apartments, Ltd., 
990 P.2d 491, 496 (Wyo. 1999); 
and Roberts 
v. Klinkosh, 
986 P.2d 153, 156 (Wyo. 1999).

 

[¶6]      While continuing 
to apply the common law rule, this Court has been cognizant of the fact that 
many states have abrogated landlord immunity in the face of changing times.  Finding the social policies involved in 
such a decision to be a matter for the legislature, we declined judicially to 
follow suit.  Ortega 
v. Flaim, 
902 P.2d 199, 202-04 (Wyo. 1995).  In that regard, in 1999 the legislature 
passed certain "residential rental property" statutes, the effect of which is to 
"alter the existing law which governs the landlord and tenant 
relationship."  Flores, 
999 P.2d  at 1313 n.1; 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-21-1201 through 1-21-1211 (LexisNexis 2001).  Those statutes took effect on July 1, 
1999.

 

[¶7]      With the state of 
the law being relatively clear on this issue in Wyoming, one might wonder what 
room remains for appellant's arguments.  
He finds support for his position in two places.  First, although we opined in Ortega 
that the issue was a legislative one, we also hinted that "a proper record and 
insightful analysis of whether conditions in Wyoming warrant a change" were 
lacking in that case.  Ortega, 
902 P.2d  at 204.  Second, appellant suggests that we 
should find clear legislative intent in the new legislation that landlords have 
a duty to maintain safe premises.

 

[¶8]      We decline to 
take the path laid out for us by appellant.  Leases are contractual in nature and are 
governed by contract law.  Wolin v. 
Walker, 
830 P.2d 429, 431 (Wyo. 1992); 
Automatic 
Gas Distributors, Inc. v. State Bank of Green River, 
817 P.2d 441, 442 (Wyo. 1991).  Contracts are written in light of 
existing law, including common law, and statutes ought not be applied 
retroactively so as to deprive contracting parties of their rights.  Application 
of Hagood, 
356 P.2d 135, 138 (Wyo. 1960); 
Mull v. 
Wienbarg, 
66 Wyo. 410, 212 P.2d 380, 389 (1949).  This is consistent with the 
constitutional mandate that no law shall be made impairing the obligation of 
contracts.  Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
35.  The effect of a retroactive 
judicial abrogation of landlord immunity could be drastic.  Superimposition of a legal duty upon an 
existing landlord-tenant relationship would add to the landlord's burdens 
without a balancing increase in the benefits, and would deprive him of a fair 
opportunity to shoulder that additional burden.1  Furthermore, by passage of the 
residential rental property statutes, the legislature has addressed the policies 
and factors mentioned in Ortega.  We are not now inclined to duplicate 
that effort, both because we still consider it to be a legislative function and 
because we want to avoid the creation of potentially conflicting 
duties.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶9]      There were no 
issues of material fact and the district court correctly applied the existing 
law of the State of Wyoming in granting summary judgment to appellees.  The common law doctrine of landlord 
immunity was in effect in 1996 when this incident occurred and we are not 
inclined to abrogate it retroactively.  
The decision of the district court is affirmed.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1If a landlord knows he has an 
obligation to maintain the premises to some measurable standard, he can perform 
the necessary repairs and maintenance and charge sufficient rent to pay the 
costs.  Likewise, if he knows he may 
be liable for negligence in that regard, he can obtain insurance covering the 
risk.  These things cannot be done 
"after the fact."