Case Title: Alexander L. Jacobus v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1994AP002995

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1997-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-2995 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Alexander L. Jacobus, 
 
 
 
 
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Repsondent-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
________________________________________ 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  198 Wis. 2d 783, 544 N.W.2d 234 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
February 28, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
December 5, 1996 
Oral Argument:  
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Monroe 
 
JUDGE: 
 
MICHAEL J. MC ALPINE 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS: For the respondent-respondent-petitioner there were 
briefs by William C. Wolford, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the petitioner-appellant there were briefs by Alexander 
L. Jacobus. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by John Allan Pray, Debra Kvalheim 
and Legal Assistance Program, University of Wisconsin Law School, 
in support of Alexander L. Jacobus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This 
opinion 
is 
subject 
to 
further 
editing 
and 
modification. 
 
The 
final 
version 
will 
appear 
in 
the 
bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 94-2995 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Alexander L. 
Jacobus, 
 
  
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 28, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  The State of Wisconsin 
("State") seeks review of a published decision of the court of 
appeals,1 which reversed and remanded a judgment of conviction of 
the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Michael J. McAlpine, Judge. 
 The court of appeals held that Wis. Stat. § 51.45(1) (1991-92)2 
prohibits the State from criminally prosecuting an individual 
under Wis. Stat. § 946.493 for bail jumping due to consumption of 
                     
1  State ex rel. Jacobus v. State, 198 Wis. 2d 783, 544 N.W.2d 
234 (Ct. App. 1995). 
2  Section 51.45(1) provides:  "It is the policy of this state 
that alcoholics and intoxicated persons may not be subjected to 
criminal prosecution because of their consumption of alcohol 
beverages but rather should be afforded a continuum of treatment 
in order that they may lead normal lives as productive members 
of society." 
All further references are to the 1991-92 Statutes unless 
otherwise indicated. 
3  Section 946.49 provides:   
(1) Whoever, having been released from custody under 
ch. 969, intentionally fails to comply with the terms 
of his or her bond is:  
No. 94-2995 
 
2
alcohol in violation of a condition of a bond.  We conclude that 
§ 51.45(1) does not prohibit the criminal prosecution of an 
individual for bail jumping under these circumstances, and 
therefore we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.     
I. 
¶2 
The pertinent facts are not in dispute.  Over a three 
month period in 1992, the State charged Alexander L. Jacobus 
("Jacobus") with one count of disorderly conduct, two counts of 
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated ("OMVWI"), and five 
counts of misdemeanor bail jumping.  Three of these five counts 
of bail jumping were based upon Jacobus' consumption of alcohol 
in violation of a condition of his release bond.4  Pursuant to a 
plea agreement with the State, Jacobus entered Alford pleas5 to 
three counts of bail jumping, only one of which was based solely 
upon his consumption of alcohol.  Jacobus also entered Alford 
pleas to the count of disorderly conduct and two counts of 
OMVWI.  The State dismissed the remaining two counts of bail 
jumping as part of this negotiated plea.  
                                                                  
(a) If the offense with which the person is 
charged is a misdemeanor, guilty of a Class A 
misdemeanor.  
(b) If the offense with which the person is 
charged is a felony, guilty of a Class D felony. 
(2) A witness for whom bail has been required under s. 
969.01(3) is guilty of a Class E felony for failure to 
appear as provided.    
4  The cases corresponding to these counts are: 92CM256 (three 
counts of misdemeanor bail jumping based upon consumption of 
alcohol); 92CM127 and 92CM140 (two additional counts of bail 
jumping)' 92CT95 and 92CT148 (OMVWI); and 92CM99 (disorderly 
conduct). 
5  See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).  An Alford 
plea is a guilty or no contest plea in which the defendant 
either maintains his or her innocence or does not admit that he 
or she committed the crime.  State v. Smith, 202 Wis. 2d 21, 23 
n.1, 549 N.W.2d 232 (1996); State v. Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845, 
956, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995). 
No. 94-2995 
 
3
¶3 
On 
August 
18, 
1992, 
the 
circuit 
court 
entered 
judgments of conviction for the three counts of bail jumping, 
one count of disorderly conduct, and two counts of OMVWI.  The 
circuit court placed Jacobus on three years of probation, and 
ordered him to a ninety day alcohol commitment.  The circuit 
court also imposed and stayed multiple jail sentences, on the 
condition that Jacobus successfully complete his probation.     
¶4 
On October 3, 1994, pursuant to a request from the 
Department of Corrections, the Monroe County Police took Jacobus 
into custody on a probation hold, based on several reported 
violations of his probation.  Subsequently, the Department of 
Corrections served Jacobus with a formal notice of revocation.  
After Jacobus waived his right to a hearing, the Department of 
Corrections revoked his probation, and his stayed jail sentences 
went into effect. 
¶5 
On October 7, 1994, while in the Monroe County jail, 
Jacobus filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
circuit court.  Jacobus then filed a motion on October 11, 1994, 
in which 
he 
contended that 
he should be 
released 
from 
incarceration because Wis. Stat. § 51.45(1) prohibited the State 
from criminally prosecuting him in 1992 for bail jumping based 
upon his consumption of alcohol in violation of a condition of 
his release bond.  At a habeas corpus hearing on November 4, 
1994, the circuit court determined that § 51.45(1) did not 
prohibit the State from criminally prosecuting Jacobus for bail 
jumping, and therefore denied Jacobus' petition. 
¶6 
The court of appeals reversed, because it concluded 
that Wis. Stat. § 51.45(1) clearly prohibited the State from 
criminally prosecuting Jacobus for bail jumping based upon his 
No. 94-2995 
 
4
consumption of alcohol in violation of a condition of his 
release bond.6  Jacobus, 198 Wis. 2d at 789.  The court of 
appeals further determined that although the State may prohibit 
alcohol 
consumption 
as 
a 
condition 
of 
bail, 
parole, 
or 
probation, the only available penalty is revocation of the 
applicable status.  Id. at 790.7      
II. 
¶7 
The right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus is 
guaranteed by the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions.8  
State ex rel. Dowe v. Circuit Court for Waukesha County, 184 
Wis. 2d 724, 728, 516 N.W.2d 714 (1994).  "Habeas corpus is 
confined to situations in which there is a pressing need for 
relief or where the process or judgment upon which a prisoner is 
held is void."  Id. at 728-29; accord J.V. v. Barron, 112 Wis. 
2d 256, 261, 332 N.W.2d 796 (1983).  Therefore, a court will not 
grant a writ of habeas corpus when other adequate remedies at 
law exist. Dowe, 184 Wis. 2d at 728-29. 
                     
6  The court of appeals initially concluded that Jacobus had not 
waived his right to contest his incarceration by entering the 
Alford pleas.  The parties have not raised the waiver issue on 
review before this court; therefore, we do not consider it. 
7  Jacobus has proceeded pro se throughout the habeas corpus 
proceedings.  However, this court invited the Legal Assistance 
to Institutionalized Persons Project ("LAIP") of the University 
of Wisconsin Law School to file a nonparty brief under Wis. 
Stat. § 809.19(7) in support of Jacobus.  LAIP accepted this 
invitation.  We have carefully considered all arguments made by 
LAIP, as well as the parties, in their respective briefs.  The 
court did not hear oral arguments in this case.    
8  Specifically, article I, section 8(4) of the Wisconsin 
Constitution provides:  "The privilege of the writ of habeas 
corpus shall not be suspended unless, in cases of rebellion or 
invasion, the public safety requires it."  Similarly, article I, 
section 9 of the United States Constitution states in pertinent 
part: "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the 
public safety may require it."  
No. 94-2995 
 
5
¶8 
In the present case, Jacobus essentially is contending 
that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
convict him of bail jumping in 1992, because Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.45(1) prohibits the State from criminally prosecuting an 
individual for bail jumping due to consumption of alcohol in 
violation of a condition of a bond.  Therefore, if Jacobus' 
interpretation of § 51.45(1) is correct, he is entitled to 
habeas corpus relief. 
¶9 
Accordingly, this case requires us to interpret Wis. 
Stat. § 51.45(1).  Statutory interpretation presents a question 
of law which this court reviews de novo, without deference to 
the decisions of the lower courts.  E.g., State v. Petty, 201 
Wis. 2d 337, 354-55, 548 N.W.2d 817 (1996); State v. Williams, 
198 Wis. 2d 516, 525, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996).  The goal of 
statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the 
legislature's intent.  E.g., State v. Sostre, 198 Wis. 2d 409, 
414, 542 N.W.2d 774 (1996); Williams, 198 Wis. at 527.  To 
accomplish this goal, a court first resorts to the plain 
language of a statute.  E.g., Sostre, 198 Wis. at 414; State v. 
Speer, 176 Wis. 2d 1101, 1121, 501 N.W.2d 429 (1993).  If the 
intent of the legislature is clear from a statute's language, a 
court must give effect to this intent and look no further.  
E.g., Williams, 198 Wis. 2d at 525; Speer, 176 Wis. 2d at 1121. 
¶10 However, if a statute is ambiguous,9 a court must 
examine the scope, history, context, subject matter, and object 
of the statute in order to determine the legislature's intent.  
E.g., Williams, 198 Wis. 2d at 525; Speer, 176 Wis. 2d at 1121. 
 A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by 
                     
9  Both LAIP and the State argue that the statute is ambiguous. 
No. 94-2995 
 
6
reasonably well-informed persons in more than one way.  E.g.,  
Williams, 198 Wis. 2d at 526; Speer, 176 Wis. 2d at 1121.  In 
addition, "[t]he interaction of two statutes can create an 
ambiguity, as can the interaction of words in the statute."  
Village of Shorewood v. Steinberg, 174 Wis. 2d 191, 201, 496 
N.W.2d 57 (1993); accord State ex rel. Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Showers, 135 Wis. 2d 77, 87, 398 N.W.2d 154 (1987); State v. 
Kenyon, 85 Wis. 2d 36, 49, 270 N.W.2d 160 (1978).  
¶11 We therefore must initially determine whether the 
legislature's intent is clear from the plain language of Wis. 
Stat. § 51.45(1).  Section 51.45(1) provides:  "It is the policy 
of this state that alcoholics and intoxicated persons may not be 
subjected to criminal prosecution because of their consumption 
of alcohol beverages but rather should be afforded a continuum 
of treatment in order that they may lead normal lives as 
productive members of society."  It is arguable that this 
language, on its face, prohibits the State from criminally 
prosecuting an individual for bail jumping due to consumption of 
alcohol in violation of a condition of a bond.  However, 
§ 51.45(17)(a) provides:   "Nothing in this section affects any 
law, ordinance or rule the violation of which is punishable by 
fine, forfeiture or imprisonment."  It is arguable that the 
plain language of this section allows for the prosecution of 
bail jumping due to the consumption of alcohol in violation of a 
condition of a bond, since this offense is punishable by fine or 
imprisonment under Wis. Stat. § 946.49.  Accordingly, reasonably 
well-informed persons could interpret § 51.45(1), as it relates 
to § 946.49, differently due to the interaction of § 51.45(1) 
with § 51.45(17)(a).  Since an ambiguity exists, we must 
No. 94-2995 
 
7
consider the scope, history, context, and object of these 
statutes to ascertain the legislature's intent. 
¶12 Wis. Stat. § 51.45 was created by Chapter 198, Laws of 
1973 ("Ch. 198").  Ch. 198 originated as 1973 Assembly Bill 589. 
According to an analysis of 1973 Assembly Bill 589 by the 
Legislative Reference Bureau ("LRB"):10  
 
This 
bill 
adapts 
the 
Uniform 
Alcoholism 
and 
Intoxication 
Treatment 
Act 
to 
Wisconsin 
law.  
Administered by the department of health and social 
services, the proposal changes the present policy of 
making public drunkenness a criminal offense and 
attempts 
to 
coordinate 
a 
comprehensive 
treatment 
program.  (Emphasis added).  
 
. . . . 
 
The bill does not affect present laws against drunken 
driving 
and 
other 
offenses 
committed 
under 
the 
influence of alcohol. (Emphasis added).  
This analysis indicates that the legislature intended to 
establish treatment programs for alcoholics and intoxicated 
persons rather than to allow prosecution of them for public 
drunkenness.11  However, it also indicates that the legislature 
did not intend to change any additional criminal statutes other 
than those making public drunkenness a criminal offense.  
¶13 The Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act 
("Uniform 
Act") 
provides 
additional 
insight 
into 
the 
legislature's intent, since Wis. Stat. § 51.45 was substantially 
based on this act.  See LRB analysis to 1973 Assembly Bill 589. 
                     
10  This court has indicated that analysis by the LRB is 
significant in determining legislative intent.  Stockbridge 
School Dist. v. Department of Pub. Instruction Sch. Dist. 
Boundary Appeal Bd., 202 Wis. 2d 214, 225, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996); 
City of Milwaukee v. Kilgore, 193 Wis. 2d 168, 184, 532 N.W.2d 
690 (1995). 
11  This conclusion is also supported by a fiscal note found in 
the drafting file of 1979 Assembly Bill 589, which states: "This 
bill eliminates the criminal statutes relating to public 
drunkenness and substitutes treatment programs." 
No. 94-2995 
 
8
 In fact, § 51.45(1) was taken directly from § 1 of the Uniform 
Act.  The comment to § 1 of the Uniform Act states: 
 
This section is intended to preclude the handling of 
drunkenness under any wide variety of petty criminal 
offense 
statutes, 
such 
as 
loitering, 
vagrancy, 
disturbing the peace, and so forth.  As the Crime 
Commissions pointed out, drunkenness by itself does 
not 
constitute 
disorderly 
conduct. 
 
The 
normal 
manifestations of intoxicationstaggering, lying down, 
sleeping on a park bench, lying unconscious in the 
gutter, begging, singing, etc.will therefore be 
handled under the civil provisions of this Act and not 
under the criminal law.  
Uniform Act, § 1, comment (citing District of Columbia v. 
Greenwell, 96 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 2133 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. 
December 31, 1968)) (emphasis added).  In addition, the Uniform 
Act indicates that states adopting similar acts are "expected to 
repeal all the relevant portions of their criminal statutes 
under which drunkenness is the gravamen of the offense  .  .  . 
 ."  Uniform Act, § 19, comment.12  In Wisconsin, the legislature 
repealed Wis. Stat. § 947.03 (1971-72), which made public 
drunkenness a crime,13 and Wis. Stat. § 974.04(1)(a) (1971-72), 
which made it a crime to enter a common carrier while 
intoxicated for purposes other than transportation within a 
single urban area.14  The legislature did not repeal any other 
relevant criminal statutes.  Accordingly, the comment to § 1 of 
the Uniform Act, and the legislature's repeal of §§ 947.03 and 
947.04(1)(a), further indicate that the legislature intended to 
prohibit the prosecution of alcoholics and intoxicated persons 
only for public drunkenness under petty criminal offense 
                     
12  This comment is especially persuasive here because Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.45(17)(a) (initially numbered § 51.45(18)(a) in 1979 
Assembly Bill 589) was nearly identical to § 19(c) of the 
Uniform act in the original bill. 
13  See § 32 of Ch. 198; Wis. Stat. § 947.03 (1971-72).  
14  See § 33 of Ch. 198; Wis. Stat. § 947.04(1)(a) (1971-72).  
No. 94-2995 
 
9
statutes.15  We therefore must consider the purpose of the bail 
jumping statute, to determine whether public drunkenness is the 
gravamen of the offenses with which Jacobus was charged.   
¶14 "The plain purpose of a bail jumping law is to deter 
those who have been released pending disposition of criminal 
charges from violating the conditions of their bond."  State v. 
Nelson, 146 Wis. 2d 442, 451, 432 N.W.2d 115 (Ct. App.), review 
denied, 147 Wis. 2d 890, 436 N.W.2d 30 (1988).  As further 
explained by the Nelson court: 
 
Bail jumpingviolation of the conditions of a bondis 
a 'violation of the law, a public wrong which is 
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.'  Because 
the offense 'diminishes the power of a court to 
control those properly within its jurisdiction and 
afflicts the court with detrimental effects,' it is 
itself made a crime. 
Id. (citations omitted).16 Therefore, bail jumping laws are 
intended not only to deter bail jumping, but also to enhance the 
effective administration of justice in the courts.  Id.  
Specifically, courts impose bond conditions with the intent to 
protect members of the community from serious bodily harm, 
prevent intimidation of witnesses, assure a defendant's future 
appearance in court, and prevent a defendant from violating the 
law.  See Wis. Const. art. I., § 8, cl. 2; Wis. Stats. 
§§ 969.01(1), 969.02(3)(d) & (4), 969.03(1)(e) & (2); see also 
State v. Braun, 152 Wis. 2d 500, 511-12, 449 N.W.2d 851 (Ct. 
                     
15  However, note that the bail jumping statute did not 
specifically list alcohol consumption as a possible condition of 
a bond.  See  Wis. Stat. § 946.49 (1971-72).  Therefore, the  
fact that the legislature did not repeal § 946.49 does not 
conclusively indicate that the legislature intended this statute 
to remain in force.   
16  The court similarly indicated that bail jumping has been 
characterized as an affront to the power and dignity of the 
court, and therefore is considered a serious offense.  State v. 
Nelson, 146 Wis. 2d 442, 451, 432 N.W.2d 115 (Ct. App.), review 
denied, 147 Wis. 2d 890, 436 N.W.2d 30 (1988).     
No. 94-2995 
 
10
App. 1989); State v. Dennis, 138 Wis. 2d 99, 103, 405 N.W.2d 711 
(Ct. App.), review denied, 139 Wis. 2d 860, 415 N.W.2d 162 
(1987).  Prohibiting a defendant from consuming alcohol as a 
condition of his or her release bond certainly is in accord with 
these purposes.        
¶15 We also consider it significant that the court of 
appeals has determined that bail jumping constitutes a separate 
offense 
for 
purposes 
of 
the 
Double 
Jeopardy 
Clause.  
Specifically, in Nelson, the defendant contended he could not be 
convicted of bail jumping and sexual assault, because the bail 
jumping charge was based entirely on the sexual assault; 
therefore, 
conviction 
of 
both 
offenses 
would 
constitute 
"multiple punishment" in violation of double jeopardy.  Id. at 
446.  The court of appeals rejected this argument, because it 
determined that bail jumping and the conduct underlying a bail 
jumping charge are "distinct and separate offenses."  Id. at 
449; see also State v. Harris, 190 Wis. 2d 718, 724, 528 N.W.2d 
7 (Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 531 N.W.2d 328 (1995) (bail 
jumping and underlying offense are separate offenses for 
purposes of double jeopardy). 
¶16 Where the State prosecutes an individual under Wis. 
Stat. § 946.49 for bail jumping, the focus of the prosecution is 
on the fact that the individual has violated a condition of his 
or her bond.  The focus is not on the underlying act.  This is 
illustrated by the fact that in order to convict an individual 
under § 946.49, the State need only prove: (1) the individual 
has been released from custody on bail; and (2) the individual 
has intentionally failed to comply with the terms of his or her 
bond.  Nelson, 146 Wis. 2d at 449.   
No. 94-2995 
 
11
¶17 Applying this rationale to the present case, when the 
State 
prosecutes 
an 
individual 
for 
bail 
jumping 
due 
to 
consumption of alcohol in violation of a condition of a bond, 
the State is prosecuting the individual for failing to comply 
with the bond condition.  The State is not prosecuting the 
individual for public drunkenness or the consumption of alcohol. 
 Accordingly, public drunkenness is not the gravamen of the 
offense.  See Uniform Act, § 19, comment.  Since the State is 
not subjecting the individual to criminal prosecution for his or 
her consumption of alcohol, Wis. Stat. § 51.45(1) does not 
prohibit such prosecution. 
¶18 In conclusion, we hold that Wis. Stat. § 51.45(1) does 
not prohibit the State from criminally prosecuting an individual 
under Wis. Stat. § 946.49 for bail jumping due to consumption of 
alcohol in violation of a condition of a bond.  Moreover, the 
legislative history of §§ 51.45(1) and (17)(a) supports our 
holding, since it indicates that the legislature intended to 
prohibit 
only 
the 
prosecution 
of 
individuals 
for 
public 
drunkenness, not for other offenses. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.