Case Title: Fountain v. Mitros

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97-126

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-12-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Fountain v. Mitros1998 WY 148968 P.2d 934Case Number: 97-126Decided: 12/08/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

Douglas Wayne FOUNTAIN, Appellant 
(Defendant-Petitioner),

v.

Eleanore Sarah MITROS, Appellee 
(Plaintiff-Respondent).

 

Appeal from the District Court, 
Albany County, Arthur T. Hanscum, J.

 

Philip White Jr., Laramie, 
WY, for Appellant.

Mary Elizabeth Galvan, 
Laramie, WY, for Appellee.

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
TAYLOR,* JJ.

 * Chief Justice at time of expedited case conference; 
retired November 2, 1998.

 

LEHMAN, 
Chief Justice.

 [¶1] Appellant Douglas Wayne Fountain (Father) 
appeals the district court's final order of child support payments to Eleanore 
Mitros (Mother) for the support of their daughter. Father claims the district 
court abused its discretion in calculating his annual income and in failing to 
apply the "shared physical custody" provision. W.S. 20-6-304(d) (1997). Finding 
sufficient evidence was presented to support the district court's decision, we 
affirm.

 

                                             
ISSUES

 

[¶2] Father presents three 
issues for review:

 

I. 
Did the trial court erroneously calculate both parents' net incomes and thereby 
erroneously calculate the presumptive child support 
figure?

 

II. Did the trial court err by refusing to apply the 
"shared physical custody" statute (W.S. § 20-6-304(d)) "to apportion the child 
support obligation between the parents in proportion to the amount of time the 
children spend with each parent," Cranston v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 349 (Wyo. 
1994)?

 

III. Did the trial court err in ordering Mr. Fountain 
to pay $1,150 or $1,250 in arrears for the period July, 1996, to March, 1997, 
when no evidence was ever introduced or received as to how much Mr. Fountain 
paid during that time and how much he was in arrears?

 

[¶3] Mother states the 
issues as:

 

I. 
Whether the district court erred by denying appellant's petition to relieve him 
of his child support obligation based on the shared custody provisions of Wyo. 
Stat. § 20-6-304(d).

 

II. Whether the district court's computation of the 
parties' respective net incomes for purposes of calculating appellant's 
presumptive child support obligation is unsupported by the weight of the 
evidence.

 

III. Whether the district court erred in making 
appellant's increased child support obligation retroactive to July 1, 1996, 
pursuant to the conditions of an order staying execution of its order modifying 
appellant's child support obligation.

 

                                              
FACTS

 

[¶4] Father and Mother, 
divorced on May 11, 1988, had one child during their marriage. The Decree of 
Divorce, incorporating the parties' stipulation and agreement, gave Mother 
primary custody subject to Father's liberal visitation rights. In addition to 
alternating weekend and holiday visitation and six weeks summer visitation, the 
agreement gave Father three weekdays and nights per week so long as Mother 
worked at night. In the event Mother worked during the day, Father would have 
visitation no less than two days during the week. Father was to pay $75.00 per 
month in child support, increasing to $150.00 per month when the child reached 
the age of 6 years. In addition, Father 
agreed to pay for the child's medical insurance.

 

[¶5] On February 1, 1996, 
Father filed a Petition for Review and Adjustment Pursuant to W.S. 20-6-306 
(Rpl. 1994) alleging that application of the presumptive child support 
calculations would result in a decrease of 20% or more per month in child 
support.  Mother counterclaimed for 
increased support.

 

[¶6] Trial to the court was 
heard on May 13, 1996. The heart of the controversy was the actual amount of 
Father's income and whether payment from the Harvest Foursquare Church (Harvest) 
was included on his federal income tax return. The parties also disagreed 
whether a $650.00 per month payment for the use of the first floor of Father's 
house as a residence for the poor should be considered income. Finally, there 
was conflicting testimony as to the level of Father's contribution to the 
child's needs over and above the child support he paid.

 

[¶7] On June 18, 1996, the 
district court issued its decision letter, finding that Father failed to show a 
20% reduction in his child support obligation. The court also found that Mother 
paid "the lion's share" of the child's expenses and, therefore, denied Father's 
petition for modification. The district court found that Father's annual net 
income amounted to $27,688.00, adding together his income from Harvest, the 
$650.00 monthly mortgage contribution, and the total net income claimed on his 
business tax form. As a result, the court increased Father's child support 
obligation to $430.38 per month.

 

[¶8] The district court's 
decision spawned several post-trial motions from Father, including a motion for 
reconsideration, a motion for new trial and, in the alternative, a motion to 
alter or amend the judgment. Father claimed that the district court erroneously 
included his income from Harvest twice in the support calculations and also 
contended that, if the mortgage contribution was to be considered as income, he 
should be allowed to deduct half as his wife's income and the legitimate 
business expenses therefrom. Finally, Father claimed that the court's determination that his 
contribution was not sufficient to warrant modification was contrary to Cranston 
v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345 (Wyo. 1994) and W.S. 20-6-304(d). Father also 
requested a new trial on the basis of "surprise," claiming that "[b]ecause the 
Petitioner's income tax returns were prepared by an accountant and were signed 
and filed under penalty of perjury, Petitioner's counsel could not have 
reasonably anticipated that the Court would expect Petitioner to present 
evidence to support" the preparation of the return.

 

[¶9] According to the 
parties' briefs, the district court heard oral argument on the post-hearing 
motions. On January 24, 1997, a second decision letter issued, which stated in 
relevant part:

 

Based on all of the factors in this case the Court 
concludes that a modification in the amount of child support in this case is 
warranted. Upon reconsideration of this matter the Court has redetermined that a 
partial modification will be granted.

 

Making the calculation, the Court is persuaded that 
Petitioner does provide for "addition[al] contributions" but that the legal 
custody of the child is "primary" custody, not joint custody so as to bring the 
calculations under the lesser schedule for all purposes; this notwithstanding 
the considerable percentage of actual physical custody in the "non-custodial" 
parent. In all other respects, except for the provision of "additional 
contributions," modification will be denied and the original decree stands as 
res judicata.

 

[¶10] Based on the 
considerations in W.S. 20-6-304(b), the district court concluded that Father's 
obligation should be set at $300.00 per month. An order incorporating the second 
decision letter was signed by the district court on May 22, 1997. This timely 
appeal followed.

 

                                       
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶11] Review of a district 
court's decision on a modification of child support is limited to whether the 
district court abused its discretion.  
Cranston v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 348 (Wyo. 1994). "Abuse of discretion 
occurs when a court exceeds the bounds of reason or commits an error of law." 
Id. (quoting Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 55 (Wyo. 1993)). As we have 
often stated:

 

Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, 
among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound 
judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and 
without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.

 

Nowotny v. L & B 
Contract Industries, Inc., 933 P.2d 452, 460 (Wyo. 1997); see also Basolo v. 
Basolo, 907 P.2d 348, 353 (Wyo. 1995); Mintle v. Mintle, 764 P.2d 255, 257 (Wyo. 
1988).

 

                                           
DISCUSSION

 

I. Calculation of Income

 

[¶12] We must first 
determine whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the 
district court's calculation of Father's income for purposes of the child 
support guidelines. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, 
we accept the evidence of the successful party as true and give all favorable 
inferences to that evidence, leaving out of consideration entirely the 
conflicting evidence of the unsuccessful party. Cranston, 879 P.2d  at 
351.

 

Income is defined in W.S. 20-6-301(a)(i) (Rpl. 1994) 
in pertinent part as any form of payment or return in money or in kind to an 
individual, regardless of source. Income includes, but is not limited to wages, 
earnings, salary, commission, compensation as an independent contractor,. . . 
unemployment compensation, disability, annuity and retirement benefits, and any 
other payments made by any payor, but 
shall not include any earnings derived from overtime work. . . 
.

 

The income used to calculate 
the child support obligation is "net income," defined as "income" less personal 
income taxes, social security deductions, and other specific expenses enumerated 
in § 20-6-301(a)(ii).

 

[¶13] Father contends that 
his income from Harvest was counted twice in the calculation of his gross 
income. At trial, Father testified that his income was derived primarily from 
two sources: his general contractor business and his position as assistant 
pastor at Harvest Church. He stated that the total in 1995 from both sources was 
$11,777, after deducting social security and health insurance. In support of his 
testimony, Father submitted his federal income tax form (which he characterizes 
as solely the product of his accountant) and his "business 
ledger."

 

[¶14] The determination of 
Father's true income is indeed frustrating from the record he provided, and we 
appreciate the difficult position of the district court. To begin, the federal 
income tax form includes a Schedule C, in which the profit or loss from Father's 
contracting business is reported. Under the section "other income," father 
reported a total of $11,400.00. An attachment to the Schedule C states that this 
income is from Harvest Church. The attachment does not, however, indicate that 
this amount was income received for his pastoral duties. Instead, the parties 
agree that, if properly reported, this amount would indicate money paid to 
Father's contracting business. Father 
denied that his business received this amount but, claiming ignorance of the 
reporting requirements, stated his accountant is provided supporting 
documentation and determines how his income is reported. However, Father failed 
to provide any supporting documentation as to his income from Harvest, even 
though he stated that every year the church "sends me a signed and stamped 
document that records all the amounts that were given to me over the year." 
Father did not call his accountant as a witness.

 

[¶15] Review of Father's 
handwritten "business ledger" only stirs already murky waters. Expenses noted 
are without explanation, job references, or even check numbers. Although one 
reference is made to Harvest Church in 1994, the payment appears to be followed 
by expenses for materials used for a job. In addition, child support payments 
written on the business checks were submitted to the district court, but there 
were no corresponding references in the business ledger. No supporting 
documentation was provided to assist in interpreting the sketchy accounting of 
profit and losses.

 

[¶16] During 
cross-examination, it was discovered that Father failed to report additional 
income. Father testified that he receives at least $650.00 per month as a 
contribution toward his house payment. Father's explanation for the omission of 
this income is that:

 

The house is a Resurrection House, is a nonprofit 
organization, and we own the house, literally, but we - the house was given over 
for the purpose of nonprofit organization, so it is in, like I said, the house 
is in our name, but all of the  any kind of finances that are put into it go 
simply for the purpose of the ministry, and I'm not exactly sure how - it is not 
like a direct income benefit to me, and it pays the house, the bills there, but 
the house is simply for the ministry benefit.

 

Again, without any 
documentary support, Father attempts to dispel the notion that payments which 
cover the bills and part of the mortgage of the home he is purchasing are not 
income. Neither did he provide any testimony regarding what portion of that 
money should be considered income to his wife. These payments were nowhere to be 
found on his joint income tax return.

 

[¶17] Based on this record, 
Father now asserts that the district court abused its discretion in disregarding 
his unsubstantiated testimony. Indeed, Father claims unfair surprise that the 
district court would not rely solely on his tax returns. Wyoming Statute 
20-6-302(e) (Rpl. 1994) prescribes the evidence required to substantiate 
income:

 

(e) Financial affidavits of the parties shall be 
supported with documentation of both current and past earnings. Suitable 
documentation of current earnings includes but is not limited to pay stubs, 
employer statements, or receipts and expenses if selfemployed. 
Documentation of current earnings shall be supplemented with copies of 
the most recent tax return to provide verification of earnings over a longer 
period.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶18] The trial court enjoys 
a wide latitude in determining income when the obligor has not provided the 
records necessary to make findings in strict conformity with the statute. See 
County of Ramsey v. Shir, 403 N.W.2d 714, 717 (Minn.App. 1987) review denied 
(refusing to consider complaint about the calculation of net income because 
obligor failed to provide adequate documentation). Given the total lack of 
adequate proof along with Father's treatment of income, both reported and 
unreported, which reflects squarely upon his credibility, and affording all 
inferences favorable to the prevailing party, we are unable to find that the 
district court abused its discretion by 
finding his income higher than that which he reported on his income tax 
returns.

 

[¶19] Father also claims 
that the district court abused its discretion in failing to deduct Father's 
social security and medical insurance expenses, allowing a deduction for 
Mother's voluntary pension payments, and failing to add to Mother's income the 
$50.00 per month paid by Father for the child's insurance. The modified order 
was issued after argument to the district court. Father did not provide a record 
of that hearing. However, the district court presumably took into account these 
alleged errors when it decreased Father's support obligation from $430.38 per 
month, as set by the court's initial determination, to $300.00 per month. We 
find no abuse of discretion warranting 
reversal.

 

II. Application of Shared Physical Custody 
Provision

 

[¶20] Father contends that 
the district court erred in refusing to reduce his child support obligation 
pursuant to the shared physical custody provision of the child support 
guidelines. Section 20-6-304(d) provides:

 

(d) When each parent keeps the children overnight for 
more than forty percent (40%) of the year and both parents contribute 
substantially to the expenses of the children in addition to the payment of 
child support, a joint presumptive support obligation shall be determined by use 
of the tables. After the joint presumptive child support obligation is derived 
from column three of the tables, that amount shall be divided between the 
parents in proportion to the net income of each. The proportionate share of the 
total obligation of each parent shall then be multiplied by the percentage of 
time the children spend with the other parent to determine the theoretical 
support obligation owed to the other parent.  The parent owing the greater amount of 
child support shall pay the difference between the two (2) amounts as the net 
child support obligation.

 

There is no dispute that 
Father meets the overnight requirement found in the statute. However, Father 
must also show that he contributes to the expenses of the child in a substantial 
manner. Cranston, 879 P.2d  at 350. Father contends that overwhelming evidence 
established his substantial contribution, and that the district court so found 
in its decision letter modifying Father's support payment from $430.38 to 
$300.00 per month. Father posits that the district court failed to apply the 
provision only because Father did not have joint legal custody of his daughter. 
He relies on the language in the decision letter on reconsideration which 
stated:

 

[T]he Court is persuaded that Petitioner does provide 
for "addition[al] contributions" but that the legal custody of the child is 
"primary" custody not joint custody so as to bring the calculations under the 
lesser schedule for all purposes; this notwithstanding the considerable 
percentage of actual physical custody in the "non-custodial" 
parent.

 

[¶21] Father is correct that 
the shared custody provision is not limited to situations involving a joint 
custody order. However, our reading of the district court's decision letter 
yields an interpretation which differs from Father's. We believe that the 
district court was referring to the language in Cranston where we 
stated:

 

A 
parent who keeps the children overnight the required percentage of the year and 
pays a child support obligation has not satisfied the three requirements of Wyo. 
Stat. § 20-6-304(d). Evidence must also support a finding that both parents 
substantially contributed to the expenses of the children. The legislative 
intent to encourage both parents' involvement in the financial maintenance of 
their children requires this degree of participation. Otherwise, a potentially 
onerous burden would be imposed on one parent. It must be remembered that 
many expenses of maintaining the children's primary residence, including 
mortgage or rent, continue unabated during visitation periods with the other 
parent.  Compart v. Compart, 417 N.W.2d 658, 662 (Minn.App. 1988).

 

Cranston, 879 P.2d  at 350 
(emphasis added). It is appropriate for the court to consider expenses inherent 
in the primary custodianship of the child. Moreover, the district court's 
determination that Father provided additional contribution does not necessarily 
equate to the "substantial" contribution required by the statute. We must, 
therefore, determine whether the evidence of Father's contributions mandates the 
application of the shared physical custody statute or whether the factors 
enumerated in W.S. 20-6-302(b)1 were available to reach a just and 
equitable result.

 

[¶22] As evidence of his 
"substantial contribution," Father points to his testimony stating he provides 
and pays for all of the child's needs while at his house, providing her with her 
own room, piano lessons at $20.00 per month, educational supplies, clothing, 
numerous outdoor trips and outdoor clothing for their activities together, and 
an expensive bicycle for her birthday. Father submitted several canceled checks, 
but stated he was unable to substantiate many of these expenses because cash was 
used to purchase the items.

 

[¶23] On the other hand, 
Mother testified that because the child was older and needed more privacy, she 
had given up rental income to provide her with her own room. (Vol II, p. 99). 
Mother testified that Father did not contribute to her school clothes and 
intimate apparel, although Father purchased five or six items of used clothing 
during the last school year. Mother stated that Father refused to contribute 
toward the school supplies required at the beginning of the school year and that 
Mother paid for all school lunches, all medication, and had covered the total 
medical bill on two or three occasions. Mother also testified that her 
daughter's growth required several new pairs of shoes each year and that she 
needed child support to provide the basic items needed. Extras provided by 
Mother included swimming lessons, choir supplies, flute lessons, a bicycle for 
home and one for Father's house, which was sold to help pay for the new bicycle 
purchased by Father.

 

[¶24] Given Mother's 
evidence, we do not find an abuse of discretion in the determination that Father 
failed to show a "substantial" contribution and that Father should continue 
payment of child support. It is clear that the district court considered the 
contributions made by Father and the time his daughter spent at his home, 
concluding that a $130.00 decrease from the presumptive support amount was 
appropriate. This determination was certainly not beyond the bounds of reason, 
and we see no reason to disturb the district court's 
order.

 

III. Payment of Arrearages

 

[¶25] Father's final 
complaint is that the district court ordered payment of arrearages to Mother 
without evidence that Father had failed to pay support as ordered. However, the 
record reveals there was an order, requested by Father, staying payment of his 
increased obligation during the pendency of his motion for reconsideration. We 
therefore find this claim without merit.

 

                                           
CONCLUSION

 

[¶26] Father cannot rely on 
his own failure to provide required documentation of his income to support a 
claim that the district court abused its discretion when calculating Father's 
income. Neither does Father demonstrate that the district court erred in 
refusing to apply the shared physical custody provision. We find that the 
evidence presented was carefully considered by the trial court and provided a 
sound basis for its decision.

 

[¶27] 
Affirmed.

 

          

FOOTNOTES

1 Wyoming 
Statute 20-6-302(b) provides in part:

 

(b) A 
court may deviate from the presumptive child support . . . upon a specific 
finding that the application of the presumptive child support would be unjust or 
inappropriate in that particular case. In any case where the court has deviated 
from the presumptive child support, the reasons therefor shall be specifically 
set forth fully in the order or decree. In determining whether to deviate from 
the presumptive child support established by W.S. 20-6-304, the court shall 
consider the following factors:

           
(i) The age of the child;

           
* * * * *

           
(iii) Any special health care and educational needs of the 
child;

           
* * * * *

           
(v) The value of services contributed by either 
parent;

           
* * * * *

           
(xiii) Other factors deemed relevant by the court.

 

The 
Order on Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration listed each of the above 
statutory considerations as the bases for a deviation from the presumptive 
support of $430.38 to $300.00 per month.