Case Title: People v. Rosenberg

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96834

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 96834-Agenda 5-September 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ADAM
							ROSENBERG, Appellee.
Opinion filed November 18, 2004.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of La Salle County,
defendant Adam Rosenberg was convicted of one count of controlled
substance trafficking (720 ILCS 570/401.1(a) (West 1998)), involving
30 or more grams of a substance containing ketamine. He was
sentenced to a term of 18 years' imprisonment.
	Defendant, a resident of Massachusetts, was arrested based upon
a traffic stop of his alleged accomplice, David Belmonte, and a
subsequent search of the car Belmonte was driving. The search
revealed several boxes of ketamine in the trunk of the car. Defendant
was not present in the car or in the State of Illinois when the stop took
place. Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and
suppress evidence. He alleged that on February 22, 2000, a police
officer stopped Belmonte, also a resident of Massachusetts, for a
traffic violation. Belmonte was driving a rental car and presented the
officer with a valid driver's license and rental agreement for the car.
The officer issued a warning to Belmonte for following too closely
and then asked for consent to search the car. Belmonte consented and
a search was conducted. Nothing incriminating was found in the
passenger compartment of the car. Belmonte did not give officers a
key to the trunk. They gained access to the trunk through the
backseat. An officer reached into the trunk and felt several boxes. He
opened one of the boxes and removed a small bottle containing a clear
liquid. Belmonte was arrested for possession of a controlled
substance. Belmonte gave a statement implicating defendant and
claimed that the boxes in the trunk belonged to defendant. Based on
this information, police arrested defendant. Defendant's motion
further alleged that neither he nor Belmonte consented to a seizure of
the boxes in the trunk of the rental car and that the conduct of the
officers constituted an illegal seizure. Defendant asked the court to
quash his arrest and suppress all evidence obtained through the illegal
search and seizure.
	Belmonte was called by the prosecution under a grant of use
immunity to testify at the grand jury proceeding that resulted in
defendant's indictment. He later testified at defendant's trial under a
grant of use immunity. Defendant was permitted to subpoena
Belmonte from Massachusetts to appear in Illinois at the hearing on
defendant's motion to suppress. That hearing was held on June 14,
2001. Initially, defense counsel advised the circuit court that defendant
was not contesting the search of the rental car or Belmonte's apparent
authority to consent to that search. Counsel advised the court that
defendant intended to establish that the police seized the boxes
illegally because they lacked probable cause to believe the boxes
contained a controlled substance. Counsel argued that while Belmonte
gave consent to search the car, he did not give consent to seize the
boxes. In response to questions from the court as to whether his
motion established any ownership or possessory interest in the items
seized, counsel stated that he intended to call Belmonte to testify as
to those matters. However, Belmonte's retained counsel informed the
court that he had advised his client to assert his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination because a charge was pending
against Belmonte in connection with his transportation of the
ketamine. Defendant's counsel then asked the court to compel the
prosecution to grant use immunity to Belmonte so that he could testify
at the suppression hearing. Counsel argued that it was a violation of
defendant's due process rights to allow the prosecution to choose the
hearings at which Belmonte would receive use immunity. The
prosecutor responded that Belmonte had been given no special
consideration for his grand jury testimony and that he had given no
indication that he would plead guilty to the charges against him. The
prosecutor also claimed that Belmonte could be facing federal
charges, as well as charges in other Illinois counties. The circuit court
denied defendant's request to force the prosecution to grant Belmonte
use immunity, saying that it lacked the authority to do so. The court
indicated, however, that if Belmonte testified at trial, defendant could
ask for a reconsideration of the court's ruling.
	Defense counsel called Belmonte to testify at the suppression
hearing and Belmonte asserted his fifth amendment privilege. Counsel
then called Illinois State Police trooper Keith Chestnut to testify.
Chestnut, a trooper since 1998, stopped Belmonte for a traffic
violation. When asked if Chestnut could search his car, Belmonte gave
consent. Chestnut denied that Belmonte told him the boxes in the
trunk belonged to defendant. Belmonte gave that information to task
force agents and Chestnut was not present for that conversation.
According to secondhand information provided to him, Chestnut
learned that Belmonte said defendant gave him the boxes found in the
trunk in San Diego and that Belmonte was to transport the boxes
cross-country to Boston, where defendant would retrieve them. Other
officers arrived on the scene. After Belmonte gave consent to the
search, Chestnut asked for the key to the trunk, as the trunk release
on the dashboard of the car, as well as the release on the key fob, did
not work. Belmonte stated that was the way the car was given to him
by the rental agency. After officers accessed the trunk through the
backseat and found the drugs, Chestnut arrested Belmonte and
Belmonte gave him a key to the trunk. The vials removed from the
trunk were labeled ketamine. Chestnut recognized ketamine from his
prior experience as a local police officer with the Freeport, Illinois,
police department, where he heard about burglaries of veterinary
clinics from which ketamine was stolen. He also took classes on
controlled substances, but those took place subsequent to Belmonte's
arrest.
	At the conclusion of defendant's evidence, the circuit court
granted the State's motion for a directed finding, on the ground that
defendant had failed to establish a sufficient privacy interest to contest
the search of the rental car or the seizure of the boxes containing the
ketamine. The court also ruled that the police had probable cause to
seize the ketamine.
	Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the court's ruling on the
probable cause issue based upon alleged misstatements by Chestnut as
to his prior experience with ketamine. At a hearing held on that
motion, Robert Smith, deputy chief of police with the Freeport police
department, testified that he performed a computer database search of
the department's records of veterinary clinic burglaries from 1990 to
1998. He found just one burglary from 1996. The only thing stolen
was United States currency. Jeff Downing, a Freeport police officer
who investigated the 1996 burglary, testified that checks and cash
were taken from the clinic and that no medicines were taken.
Although there were a couple of burglaries at the Freeport Animal
Hospital, which is within the jurisdiction of the Stephenson County
sheriff's department, Downing did not receive any information as to
what was taken. Based upon this testimony, the circuit court vacated
its order granting the State's motion for directed finding.
	The court conducted a further hearing on defendant's motion to
suppress evidence. The prosecution called Richard Roodhouse, deputy
sheriff of the Stephenson County sheriff's department. He testified
that he investigated a burglary at the Freeport Animal Hospital in
April 1997. Several bottles of ketamine were taken. From 1992 to
1998, there were 13 burglaries to veterinary clinics in Freeport or
Stephenson County. Roodhouse shared information on those
burglaries with the Freeport police department. Only during the April
1997 burglary was ketamine taken.
	Sergeant Robert Cessna of the Illinois State Police testified that
he assisted Chestnut in the search of the rental car Belmonte was
driving. Belmonte told them he did not have a key to the trunk. They
gained access through the backseat. Cessna reached into the trunk and
felt some cardboard boxes. Because of the angle, he was not able to
open any of the boxes, so he cut into the side of one of the boxes to
see what was inside. He felt glass and cut a larger hole so he could
remove it from the box. It was a 10 milliliter vial of a clear liquid. On
the vial was a label stating that it was ketamine. The label also
contained the word "caution" and stated that "federal law restricts this
drug to use by or on the order of a licensed veterinarian." Cessna
showed the bottle to Chestnut.
	Chestnut testified that when he looked at the label on the vial
Cessna handed him, he recalled from his academy training that
ketamine is a controlled substance. When he was a police officer in
Freeport, Chestnut was aware that ketamine was not a controlled
substance at that time. At the close of the hearing, the circuit court
found that the cautionary label on the vial of ketamine gave the
officers probable cause to seize it and conduct a further investigation
to see whether the clear liquid inside the vials was in fact ketamine.
	Defendant filed a motion to preclude Belmonte from testifying at
the trial, alleging that, by refusing to offer immunity to Belmonte at
the suppression hearing and by not insisting on trying Belmonte, the
prosecution improperly manipulated the criminal process to protect
Belmonte and to prevent him from providing testimony helpful to the
defense. Defendant claimed that he was prejudiced at the suppression
hearing because he was unable to challenge the legality of the stop and
search of the rental car, as well as the nature of Belmonte's role in the
crime. The circuit court denied the motion, noting that defendant
would be able to cross-examine Belmonte at trial.
	At trial, Belmonte testified that he had known defendant since
high school. Belmonte borrowed some money from defendant and, a
few days later, defendant asked Belmonte to transport the ketamine,
in return for which defendant would forgive Belmonte's debt. The two
men flew from Boston to San Diego, where defendant rented a car
using the driver's license and credit card of his brother, Jon
Rosenberg. Defendant placed boxes in the trunk. He disengaged the
automatic trunk release button inside the car and he and Belmonte
each took a key to the trunk in case the car was stopped. Defendant
told Belmonte what route to take to get to Boston and advised him to
avoid a certain checkpoint in San Diego. While Belmonte was driving,
he and defendant kept in touch via their cell phones. After Chestnut
stopped him for the traffic violation, Belmonte gave consent to search
the car. He told the officers he did not have a trunk key. However,
after watching the officers access the trunk through the backseat,
Belmonte gave his key to one of the officers. Belmonte testified that
he was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent
to deliver and that, due to his cooperation with the State, he was not
charged with drug trafficking. Defendant did not testify at trial.
	Following the trial, defendant filed posttrial motions. In none of
the motions did defendant argue that the circuit court's refusal to
force the prosecution to grant Belmonte use immunity at the
suppression hearing deprived defendant of due process. Instead,
defendant argued that Belmonte should have been precluded from
testifying at the trial. The circuit court denied all motions.
	On appeal, defendant argued that (1) the prosecution deprived
him of due process by refusing to grant Belmonte use immunity at the
suppression hearing, (2) the circuit court erred in denying his motion
to suppress, (3) his conduct did not constitute trafficking within the
meaning of the statute, and (4) the penalty for controlled substance
trafficking is unconstitutionally disproportionate. The appellate court
vacated the circuit court's order denying the motion to suppress and
remanded for a new hearing on the motion, finding that the
prosecution had deprived defendant of due process by refusing to
grant use immunity to Belmonte at the suppression hearing. The court
retained jurisdiction over the remaining issues should it become
necessary to address them at a later time. 341 Ill. App. 3d 893. We
granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
Because we conclude that Belmonte's testimony at the suppression
hearing was not necessary to establish any legitimate expectation of
privacy in the search of the boxes and seizure of the ketamine that
defendant may have had, we reverse the judgment of the appellate
court and remand to that court to address the issues over which it
retained jurisdiction.
	The question of whether a defendant has established a legitimate
expectation of privacy sufficient to permit him to contest a search or
seizure is a question of law and our review is de novo. People v.
Bower, 291 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 1079 (1997).
	The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects
the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const.,
amend. IV. Similarly, article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution
of 1970 provides that the "people shall have the right to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against
unreasonable searches [and] seizures." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6. The
fourth amendment protects people, not places. Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 357, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 585, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967).
Accordingly, fourth amendment rights are "personal rights, and ***
they may be enforced by exclusion of evidence only at the instance of
one whose own protection was infringed by the search and seizure."
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247,
1256, 88 S. Ct. 967, 974 (1968). Therefore, to claim the protection
of the fourth amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he or she
personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched and that
his or her expectation is reasonable, that is, an expectation of privacy
that has " 'a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by
reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to
understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.' "
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373, 379, 119 S. Ct. 469, 472 (1998), quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143
n.12, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 401 n.12, 99 S. Ct. 421, 430 n.12 (1978).
Whether one has a legitimate expectation of privacy in an area
searched is measured by an objective standard drawn from common
experience. People v. Kidd, 178 Ill. 2d 92, 135 (1997). In Rakas, the
United States Supreme Court abandoned the concept of "standing" to
describe whether an accused could assert a fourth amendment
violation, finding that this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of
substantive fourth amendment doctrine. Thus, the question is whether
the disputed search and seizure has "infringed an interest of the
defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect."
Rakas, 439 U.S.  at 140, 58 L. Ed. 2d  at 399, 99 S. Ct.  at 429.
	This court has identified several factors to be considered in
determining whether a defendant has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the place searched or the property seized: (1) property
ownership, (2) whether the defendant was legitimately present in the
area searched, (3) the defendant's possessory interest in the area
searched or the property seized, (4) prior use of the area searched or
property seized, (5) ability to control or exclude others' use of the
property, and (6) a subjective expectation of privacy in the property.
People v. Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d 170, 191-92 (1986). The question of
whether one has a legitimate expectation of privacy such that he can
claim the protection of the fourth amendment is to be answered in
light of the totality of the circumstances of the particular case. Kidd,
178 Ill. 2d  at 136. It is the defendant's burden to establish that he had
a legitimate expectation of privacy that was violated by the challenged
search. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633,
641, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2561 (1980).
	Defendant insists that he needed Belmonte's testimony at the
suppression hearing to establish the circumstances under which
Belmonte allegedly consented to the search of the vehicle. Defendant
argues that Belmonte's testimony would have established that he
intentionally lied to the officers so they would not search the trunk of
the rental car and that defendant and Belmonte planned to disable the
trunk mechanism to prevent discovery of the contents of the trunk.
Finally, defendant alleges that Belmonte could have established
defendant's ownership of the boxes of ketamine. Defendant notes that
while there was some testimony at the trial concerning Belmonte's
hiding of the trunk key and the disabling of the remote trunk release,
this testimony occurred before the jury and at a time when defendant
did not want to admit that it was his idea to take these precautions.
	The State argues, and we agree, that it was not necessary for
Belmonte to testify at the suppression hearing to establish defendant's
ability to claim a fourth amendment violation in this case. We first
note that defendant disavowed in the circuit court any intent to
challenge the search of the rental car. His counsel acknowledged that
defendant lacked "standing" to do so, acknowledging that Belmonte
had authority to consent to the search of the car. Accordingly,
defendant has waived any argument concerning that search. People v.
McClellan, 232 Ill. App. 3d 990, 1004 (1992).
	Regarding the search of the boxes of ketamine and their
subsequent seizure, we note that in Simmons the Supreme Court held
that where a defendant testifies at a hearing on a motion to suppress
evidence on fourth amendment grounds, his testimony may not be
admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt, unless the defendant
fails to object. Simmons, 390 U.S.  at 394, 19 L. Ed. 2d  at 1259, 88 S. Ct.  at 976. Thus, defendant here could have testified at the
suppression hearing on the issue of his expectation of privacy in the
contents of the boxes without fear that his testimony would later be
used to convict him. Belmonte's testimony was not essential to this
issue. Defendant acknowledges that while it is true that he could have
testified at the suppression hearing to establish a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the boxes, he complains that his testimony
could be used to impeach him if he testified at the trial and denied
ownership of the ketamine. In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1, 91 S. Ct. 643 (1971), the Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether the prosecution could impeach a defendant with
statements given by him that were inadmissable under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). The
defendant gave testimony that differed significantly from statements
made by him to the police. He did not argue that the statements were
coerced or involuntary. In rejecting the defendant's argument that his
statements could not be used to impeach his credibility, the Court
stated:
			"Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his
own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot
be construed to include the right to commit perjury.
[Citations.] Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was
under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and
the prosecution here did no more than utilize the traditional
truth-testing devices of the adversary process. Had
inconsistent statements been made by the accused to some
third person, it could hardly be contended that the conflict
could not be laid before the jury by way of cross-examination
and impeachment.
			The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into
a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the
risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances."
Harris, 401 U.S.  at 225-26, 28 L. Ed. 2d  at 4-5, 91 S. Ct.  at
645-46.
	Similarly, in People v. Sturgis, 58 Ill. 2d 211, 216 (1974), this
court held that, while the testimony of a defendant or documents
voluntarily attested to by him in conjunction with a motion to suppress
evidence may not be introduced by the prosecution in its case in chief,
the testimony or documents may be used to impeach the defendant's
testimony at trial. Thus, defendant here is correct that had he testified
at trial, any testimony he may have given at the suppression hearing
that was inconsistent with his trial testimony could have been used to
impeach his credibility. Nonetheless, this fact, however inconvenient
defendant may find it, does not by itself provide a sufficient basis upon
which to insist that the prosecution should have granted Belmonte use
immunity at the suppression hearing so that he could have established
defendant's ability to claim a fourth amendment violation. Defendants
are often faced with difficult decisions when weighing the pros and
cons of testifying at trial. The necessity of making those decisions
does not inevitably deprive defendants of any constitutional right. See,
e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83, 26 L. Ed. 2d 446, 450-51,
90 S. Ct. 1893, 1896-97 (1970) ( rule requiring notice to the State of
an alibi defense and to disclose alibi witnesses does not violate a
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination). Likewise, a
defendant's testimony may be impeached with his prior convictions in
appropriate cases. That a defendant may decide not to testify in a
given case due to such considerations does not give rise to a
constitutional violation. Defendant here could have, but chose not to,
establish his right to contest the search of the boxes and seizure of the
ketamine through his own testimony. Accordingly, contrary to his
contention, Belmonte's testimony was not the sole means by which
this could have been accomplished.
	Significantly, we further note that defendant could have requested
that the circuit court reopen the hearing on the motion to suppress
after Belmonte testified at the trial. The court's ruling on that motion
remained subject to change until final judgment. See People v. Brooks,
187 Ill. 2d 91, 128 (1999). Defendant made no such request.
	Because defendant had available to him other options through
which to establish his right to claim a fourth amendment violation in
this case, it is unnecessary for us to address the questions of whether
the prosecution deprived defendant of due process by refusing to
grant Belmonte use immunity at the suppression hearing or whether
the prosecution could have been forced to grant Belmonte use
immunity at that hearing. See People ex rel. Waller v. 1990 Ford
Bronco, 158 Ill. 2d 460, 464 (1994) (this court will not consider
constitutional questions if the cause can be resolved on other
grounds). We therefore reverse the judgment of the appellate court
and remand to that court to address the remaining issues raised by
defendant in his appeal.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
cause remanded.