Case Title: Waters v. Cochran

Citation: 285 So. 2d 474

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1973-11-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
285 So. 2d 474 (1973)
Forrest E. WATERS, Jr.
v.
Shirley H. COCHRAN, Jr.
SC 180, 180-X.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 30, 1973.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing November 8, 1973.
*476 Williamson & Taber, Greenville, for appellant.
Vickers, Riis, Murray & Curran, Mobile, Poole & Poole, Greenville, for appellee.
COLEMAN, Justice.
Respondent, Waters, appeals from adverse decree in suit for partnership accounting and settlement. Complainant, Cochran, has made cross-assignments of error.
In the bill of complaint, complainant avers that in the fall of 1958, he and respondent entered into a partnership agreement for the purpose of real estate development and sales; that the partners were to share equally in profits and losses; that the business resulted in a loss of more than $60,000.00; that complainant executed a deed of trust for benefit of creditors on September 1, 1961; that complainant has subsequently made payments to creditors through the trustee, and respondent has subsequently made payments to one or more creditors in partial satisfaction of partnership debts; and that complainant has made demand on respondent to pay his share of the partnership debts but he has failed and refused to do so.
Complainant prays for an accounting, that the account of each partner with the partnership be stated, that respondent be ordered to pay his share of the debts, and for general relief.
The original bill was filed in Mobile County. Respondent's plea in abatement to the venue was held sufficient and the cause was transferred to Lowndes County.
Respondent filed his answer denying that the parties entered into a partnership and other matters averred in the bill.
The court entered an order on pretrial conference held under Equity Rule 38. As here pertinent, the order states in effect that
1. The parties agree that trial is to be based on original bill and answer, respondent's defense being the general issue and statute of limitations or laches.
2. On the merits, two principal issues are to be decided: (a) Whether a partnership existed, and, if so, what percentage each partner owned; (b) If partnership existed, what partnership debts have been paid by complainant to which respondent should contribute.
3. Complainant claims there existed an equal partnership between the parties. Respondent denies that partnership existed and contends that he was an employee of complainant and had no responsibility for debts incurred in operation of complainant's business.
4. On the question of the debts of the business organization, whether or not a *477 partnership, the parties stipulated that a certain paper, entitled "Computation of Amounts Claimed on Cochran-Waters Debts," is a true and correct statement of the debts of the organization as of the time it went out of business, all of which have now been paid by complainant except one item which is not here material.
Evidence was heard ore tenus by the court. In outline, the evidence shows that complainant and respondent were fraternity brothers and roommates at college. Complainant, after leaving college, returned to Mobile. Respondent transferred to another school, and complainant visited respondent there in the spring of 1958. They discussed respondent's coming to Mobile and engaging in business with complainant. After graduation, respondent and his family moved to the Mobile area and he was employed at S. H. Cochran Furniture Company, owned by the Cochran family, as a salesman on a salary of $100 per week and a commission on sales.
In the fall of 1958, respondent went into business with complainant and two others in an insurance and real estate operation. This arrangement lasted about two months. Complainant and respondent then engaged in business under the name: "Cochran-Waters Real Estate Company." Complainant obtained a real estate broker's license and respondent obtained a real estate salesman's license. This business continued until June, 1960. It was a general real estate business engaged in sale of real estate and construction of houses. Complainant was primarily in the sales activity and respondent in the construction activity.
In June, 1960, two corporations were formed. Complainant, respondent, and another were the original stockholders. One corporation was to construct houses and the other was to sell real estate and insurance. Respondent subscribed to twenty per cent of the stock. Complainant and the third party each subscribed to forty per cent. The personal property of the alleged partnership was transferred to the corporations. Respondent contends that complainant received credit for the partnership personal property in satisfaction of his subscription for stock in the corporations. Respondent gave a note for his subscription and later paid the note. Complainant testified as follows:
"A No, that's not my testimony.
"Q What is your testimony?
"A Yes."
Respondent testified as follows:
"A Yes I did.
"A I did not.
". . .
"A Yes.
"A No."
Certain other evidence is summarized in briefs as next set out. Respondent states in brief:
Complainant states in brief:
Other evidence is hereafter referred to in consideration of the errors assigned.
Two or three months after formation of the two corporations, complainant sold his stock and went into business on his own account. He undertook to sell and did sell the properties of Cochran-Waters Real Estate Company which had not been disposed of, respondent joining in execution of the deeds, the last of which bears date of November 9, 1961.
Respondent left the Mobile area in July, 1961, and returned to Fort Deposit.
The court rendered final decree finding as follows:
1. Beginning in 1958, complainant and respondent formed a partnership and each was obligated to divide equally the profits and losses, and said partnership existed at all material times and has never been dissolved.
2. The partnership business was unsuccessful having no assets and a large indebtedness in the fall of 1961 when the partnership went out of business except for winding up its affairs.
3. The last remaining assets of the partnership were two lots which were conveyed back to the sellers in consideration for the cancellation of the unpaid purchase price.
4. All debts of the partnership were debts to third parties as stipulated in the pretrial order.
5. Complainant ascertained the amount of the partnership debts in August, 1961, and requested respondent to sign note evidencing his obligation to pay his share, but *479 he refused to do so. On September 1, 1961, complainant established a trust for creditors through which he paid all debts of partnership. Last payment was made August 14, 1969.
6. Respondent is obligated to pay to complainant one half of partnership debts paid by complainant, together with interest from date of this decree. Interest on respondent's half of the debts paid prior to the decree by complainant amounts to $12,870.53, but complainant is not entitled to recover this interest.
7. Complainant deducted, for income tax purposes, the entire losses of the partnership on his individual income tax returns, resulting in a benefit to complainant in diminished federal income taxes, which the court is of opinion should be credited against the liability of respondent to complainant.
The court decreed that the partnership be dissolved, and that respondent is indebted to complainant in sum of $41,857.19, for which judgment is rendered in favor of complainant, and, except as hereafter limited, execution on the judgment may issue.
The court further decreed that respondent may pay the judgment, with interest thereon, in thirty monthly installments and that execution be suspended for such time as respondent shall promptly make the monthly payments.
Respondent asserts that the trial court erred in allowing complainant to recover on a claim that was barred by the six-year statute of limitations.
Respondent says that a bill for accounting and settlement of a dissolved partnership must be brought within six years after the time when the partnership ceased doing business, citing Title 7, § 21, Code 1940; Bradford v. Spyker, 32 Ala. 134; Cary v. Simmons, 87 Ala. 524, 6 So. 416; Stovall v. Clay, 108 Ala. 105, 20 So. 387; and Brody v. Maril, 208 Ala. 464, 94 So. 764. Complainant agrees in brief that the governing statute is six years.
This suit was commenced by the filing of the bill of complaint on August 31, 1967. Respondent contends that there was no "partnership transaction" subsequent to August 30, 1961. The question for decision is whether under the evidence the trial court erred in finding that the suit was not barred by the six-year statute. The difficult point is deciding when the statute of limitations begins to run.
In 60 Am.Jur.2d, page 178; Partnership, § 275, the following statements appear:
In Stovall v. Clay, supra, this court affirmed a decree sustaining demurrer to a bill brought by the administrators of a deceased partner against the surviving partner *480 and heir of deceased partner. The bill was filed for the purpose, among other things, of settling the accounts of the prior existing mercantile partnership. This court said:
Thus, in Stovall, the length of time which has elapsed after "the last known co-partnership transaction" is an element to be considered in determining whether a suit for partnership accounting is barred by the six-year statute.
In Cannon v. Copeland, 43 Ala. 201, the surviving partner brought suit to recover from the estate of his deceased partner one half of the money ($45,092.52) the surviving partner had paid to extinguish the debts owed by the partnership at the time of deceased partner's death. The trial court dismissed the bill on the ground that the complainant's demand was barred by the statute of non-claim. This court reversed, saying, inter alia, to wit:
Thus, in Cannon, the "last item of the account" was considered material in determining when the statute began to run where the surviving partner was winding up the business by collecting the assets and paying the debts of the partnership.
See Riddle v. Whitehill, 135 U.S. 621, 10 S. Ct. 924, 34 L. Ed. 282, where the court said:
The court, in Riddle, cites and comments on Causler v. Wharton, 62 Ala. 358.
In brief, respondent argues to the effect that the last partnership transaction in the instant case occurred on August 27, 1961, when respondent joined in the execution of three deeds which were forwarded to him at Fort Deposit, Alabama. The deeds conveyed property which was an asset of Cochran-Waters Real Estate Company.
*481 The date of these deeds (August 27, 1961) is more than six years prior to filing of the bill on August 31, 1967.
On the other hand, copies of two deeds (dated November 9, 1961, and signed by complainant and respondent and their wives) were introduced in evidence. These two deeds describe the grantors as "S. H. COCHRAN, JR., and FORREST WATERS, JR., doing business as COCHRAN-WATERS REAL ESTATE COMPANY, a partnership, joined by their wives, ALICE K. COCHRAN and JO ANNE F. WATERS, respectively . . ."
Respondent testified that the two deeds were executed by respondent and his wife before they left Mobile and were left "strictly for the convenience of" complainant doing business.
Respondent testified that when he left Mobile he left certain documents that bore his signature, with the understanding that they would be filled out and delivered at some later date to whomever they were made out to; and that was done with his authority and consent. He testified that they were going to be delivered to "some Grantor" (sic) at a date subsequent to when he left Mobile.
An exhibit to the pre-trial order, entitled "COMPUTATION OF AMOUNTS CLAIMED ON COCHRAN-WATERS DEBTS," shows payments made by complainant on the business debts on the following dates: March 12, 1962; October 12, 1962; February 27, 1963; and August 14, 1969.
On the evidence mentioned, we are of opinion that the evidence supports a finding that "partnership transactions" did occur within six years next preceding the filing of the bill of complaint on August 31, 1967, and that "the last item of the account" is within six years next preceding the filing of the bill of complaint.
Assignment No. 11 is not sustained.
Respondent assigns as error the ruling of the trial court that at all times material hereto an equal partnership existed between complainant and respondent.
Respondent cites Watson v. Hamilton, 180 Ala. 3, 60 So. 63, wherein this court made the following statements:
Respondent contends, as we understand his argument, that the evidence will not support a finding that a partnership agreement *482 existed between complainant and respondent because there is no evidence of an express agreement that the parties would share in the losses arising out of the partnership business.
Complainant testified that he and respondent formed a partnership under the name, Cochran-Waters Real Estate Company; that the percentage of ownership was "Fifty-fifty"; that profits were to be split equally; that the partnership made construction loans; that both partners signed notes; that mortgages were executed as Shirley Cochran and Forrest Waters doing business as Cochran & Waters Construction Company; that they never discussed losses ". . . really, we didn't anticipate losses"; that the business suffered losses and never made any profits; that each partner drew a salary and expenses; that each partner had credit cards in the business name and the cards were used by both partners; they opened a checking account in the name of Cochran-Waters Real Estate Co., both partners signed the signature card; both partners signed a paper addressed to the bank and entitled "AUTHORITY OF PARTNERSHIP To Open Deposit Account And To Procure Loans"; the paper contains the following recital:
Complainant further testified that both partners signed an agreement whereby they agreed to employ one Jack E. Windham as sales manager. The agreement in pertinent part recites:
Complainant testified that he and respondent executed numerous notes and mortgages jointly as partners. A number of such instruments were introduced in evidence.
Complainant testified that he discussed with respondent the losses which had been incurred by the partnership; that they concluded that they would try to expand operations and make profits to overcome the loss; that after the partnership ceased to build houses he arrived at a figure for the total debts owed by the partnership and discussed with respondent as to how complainant would pay these debts; that complainant and respondent met in the office of an attorney; that complainant showed respondent what they owed; that respondent didn't have any money and was going to give a note for the money; that the attorney prepared the note and respondent said "`Let me think about it'" and "`I want to let my Attorney look at it,'" and "we never saw him anymore."
Respondent testified that his relation to the business known as Cochran-Waters Real Estate Company was that he was a salesman for Cochran-Waters, he was to be paid a weekly salary, and was to participate in the profits. He testified that he never had an agreement or understanding with complainant ". . . where the losses were to be divided . . .," and they never had a partnership agreement. Respondent testified that he was supposed to get one half of the profits and that was the understanding between the parties. Respondent testified that he remembered a meeting "last year" with complainant and complainant's attorneys, that respondent was asked to sign a note for a portion of the losses of Cochran-Waters but he never signed the note.
Complainant contends that evidence of an express agreement to share in the losses of the partnership is not required and that an agreement to share in losses *483 may be implied by virtue of Title 43, § 30, Code 1940, which recites:
§ 30, Title 43, Code 1940, first appeared as § 9372 of the Code of 1923. In deciding that a bill to dissolve and settle a partnership was not defective when challenged by demurrer this court said:
In Fred Gray Cotton & Gin Co. v. Smith, 214 Ala. 606, 108 So. 532, this court held that the trial court erred to reversal in refusing certain requested written charges, two of which recite as follows:
Among other things, this court said:
Both complainant and respondent testified that each was to share equally in the profits. Under Title 43, § 30, Code 1940, the Fred Gray case, supra, and the Copeland case, supra, the trial court was authorized to find an implied agreement to share in the losses. The court heard and saw the witnesses testify. Any conflict in the evidence as to the existence of a partnership presented an issue for determination *484 by the court, and the court's finding will not be disturbed unless plainly and palpably wrong. We are of opinion that the finding that a partnership existed is not due to be disturbed.
Respondent cites a numer of cases to support his argument that Title 43, § 30, Code 1940, is "merely a legislative statement of a rule of evidence, and nothing more," and does not authorize the finding of an implied agreement to share in the losses. All cases thus cited were decided prior to the effective date of § 9372, Code 1923, except the three cases next discussed and numbered (1), (2), and (3).
(1) In Woodson v. Bumpers, 224 Ala. 390, 140 So. 766, this court held that the trial court did not err in refusing the following charge:
"`. . .'" (224 Ala. at 390, 140 So. at 767)
This court said:
§ 9372 (Title 43, § 30) creates a rebuttable presumption that an agreement to share profits implies an agreement to share losses. Charge 2 in Woodson does not state that the presumption created by the statute is rebuttable. If charge 2 in Woodson be taken literally, the jury is thereby instructed that a partnership was formed even though the presumption were rebutted. In that respect charge 2 in Woodson differs from the charges in the Fred Gray case, supra, and was properly refused. The Fred Gray case is one of the citations which is cited in the opinion in Woodson but omitted in the quotation from Woodson in the instant opinion. In the first paragraph of the opinion in Woodson, in holding that affirmative charges with hypothesis were refused without error, this court said:
(2) In Ard v. Abele, 226 Ala. 611, 148 So. 318, this court affirmed a decree overruling a demurrer to a bill for dissolution of a partnership and an "accounting. Apparently, appellant had argued that the bill failed to aver facts which showed that a partnership existed in that the bill failed to show an agreement to share losses as well as profits. This court said:
(3) In Crum v. Crum, 253 Ala. 163, 43 So. 2d 392, this court affirmed a decree dismissing appellant's bill for accounting and settlement of a partnership. This court said among other things:
The three cases last discussed are not in conflict with the conclusion in the instant case that the court is not to be reversed for the asserted error in finding that a partnership existed between complainant and respondent. Assignment No. 5 is not sustained.
On the appeal the decree is due to be and is affirmed.
Complainant asserts that the trial court erred in holding that complainant is not entitled to recover interest on one half of the amount he paid on the debts of the partnership prior to the final decree. Complainant contends that the interest should begin to run from the respective dates when he made the payments and not merely from the date of the final decree.
In 66 A.L.R. at pages 22 and 23, the general rule is stated as follows:
In 60 Am.Jur.2d, page 187, the writer states:
In the instant case no fiduciary breach or improper use of funds is charged or shown.
In Grand Bay Land Co. v. Simpson, 207 Ala. 303, 92 So. 789, this court reversed for allowance of interest in a suit for accounting. One of the reasons for not allowing interest prior to the final decree is stated as follows:
In a suit for accounting between joint adventurers, this court again reversed for allowance of interest prior to final decree. The court said:
The same rule was followed in Clayton v. Monte, 248 Ala. 93, 26 So. 2d 255, where the court said:
Again in King v. Langham, 272 Ala. 662, 133 So. 2d 669, the court reversed for allowing interest prior to final decree, saying:
The trial court, in the instant case, did not err in following the authorities, supra, and not allowing interest prior to final decree.
Complainant cites Reynolds v. Mardis, 17 Ala. 32, and Turnipseed v. Goodwin, 9 Ala. 372, where the court held a partner entitled to interest on money advanced in excess of the amount other partners had contributed. In each of the two cases, there was an express agreement that each partner would contribute an equal share of the money to buy land. In the instant case there is no such agreement.
Complainant cites also Daniel v. Klein, 149 Miss. 135, 115 So. 193, wherein the court held a partner entitled to interest on one half of the money he had advanced to pay the liabilities of the partnership. The opinion does not disclose the circumstances of the case in detail, and no authority is cited to support the holding with respect to interest. That holding in Daniel v. Klein, supra, may be contrary to the holding in the instant case, but, if that be true, we are of opinion that we would not be justified in departing from the rule laid down and followed in the decisions of this court which we have cited and on which we have relied. Cross Assignments 1 and 2 are not sustained.
Complainant asserts that the court erred in finding that the deduction by complainant, on his income tax return, of the entire losses of the partnership resulted in a benefit to complainant which should be credited against the liability of respondent to complainant.
The parties have not cited nor have we found any case dealing with or similar to the question here presented.
Respondent testified that he never took any losses on his income tax return. Complainant states the facts relating to his deduction of the loss on his tax returns as follows:
The Supreme Court of Mississippi has said:
In the final decree in the instant case, the trial court found:
The deduction of the loss on complainant's tax return was not an item of debit or credit between complainant and respondent. The deduction by complainant did not deprive respondent of any right or any property. Respondent could have taken one half of the deduction on his return. Except for the passage of time, no reason appears why respondent cannot now file an amended return and claim his share of the loss if he reimburses complainant for his share of the loss. The deduction made by complainant is a matter between complainant and the United States. As to respondent, the deduction taken by complainant is res inter alios acta and had no effect on the rights of respondent. The deduction was not a partnership transaction. It is not an item of the partnership account. The court found there were no debts due from one partner to another.
According to the record, complainant has paid all debts of the partnership. He has paid the entire loss claimed on his return. As of submission of this cause respondent has not paid his half of the loss to complainant. Complainant has actually sustained the entire loss claimed on his tax return.
No sound reason suggests itself to sustain the proposition that complainant is indebted to respondent, or ought to make payment to respondent for the tax saving which accrued to complainant as the result of his claiming the loss which he actually sustained.
We are of opinion that the decree is in error in ordering that respondent be given credit, and his liability to complainant be reduced, by the amount of the tax saving to complainant which resulted from his taking the deduction for partnership loss on his tax return. On the cross appeal, the decree is due to be and is reversed. Judgment will be here rendered in such *488 proper amount as to eliminate from the account the credit allowed to respondent in the amount of $3,585.67.
The date of the decree appealed from is June 30, 1972. Complainant assigns as error the ruling of the court in staying execution of the judgment. The decree of the court here pertinent recites as follows:
". . . it is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED:
". . . . . . . . . .
In considering § 508, supra, and § 119, Title 13, Code 1940, this court said:
This court has said:
In Moore v. Esslinger, 232 Ala. 251, 167 So. 328, this court considered a cause wherein the trial court had rendered a decree with judgment for money against an administrator of an estate on final settlement. In the decree, the trial judge had ordered that execution on the judgment be stayed until further orders. This court eliminated the stay provision from the decree, saying among other things:
". . .
". . .
It appears that the administrator had deposited funds belonging to the estate in the Tennessee Valley Bank which had closed its doors on March 5, 1933, had never reopened, and was in the hands of the superintendent of banks for liquidation. It may be inferred that the purpose of the stay was to save the administrator and his surety from the hardship of paying the judgment pending payments to depositors by the liquidator of the bank. This court appears to have held that such purpose was not a lawful ground to authorize the stay of execution.
In Lockhart v. McElroy, 4 Ala. 572, this court considered a petition that a judgment be superseded. The ground for supersedeas was that subsequent to issue of execution the judgment, except for ten per cent penalty, had been paid. This court said:
In Gravett v. Malone, 54 Ala. 19, this court held that a judgment quashing execution was erroneous and reversed. With respect to the grounds on which execution may be superseded, this court said:
To like effect, see Merrill v. Travis, 248 Ala. 42, 26 So. 2d 258, and authorities there cited.
The only ground on which the stay can be based in the instant case, so far as appears in the record, are the statements in the decree that financial hardship would accrue to respondent if he be required to pay in cash and the statement that complainant has paid the partnership debts in installments. We have not found in the record any averments that respondent would suffer financial hardship if required to pay in cash nor any prayer that execution be stayed.
It may be conceded that almost all judgment debtors experience hardship in paying judgments in the amount of $41,857.19.
*491 Undoubtedly, the judgment debtor in Moore v. Esslinger, supra, experienced financial hardship in paying the judgment of $4,860.34 in the years 1933 to 1936 when the entire United States suffered the financial hardship of the depression. Most natural persons undergo financial hardship in paying substantial judgments which are recovered against them.
Consider the position of the complainant in the instant case. The partnership debt as shown by the record was $90,885.72; and complainant has paid all of it, not merely that part which he himself owed but also that part owed by respondent. Is the hardship sustained by complainant of less consequence than the hardship sustained by respondent? The court has determined that respondent is indebted to complainant for respondent's share of the debt and that the debt is due.
The statute requires that execution issue. There is no insistence that the judgment has been satisfied, no allegation of fraud in procurement of the decree or otherwise, no allegation of lack of jurisdiction in the court, no undecided issue which requires that the judgment be stayed until such issue may be litigated. We do not find in the record any valid ground why execution of the judgment should be denied or delayed beyond the time fixed by law.
We are of opinion that the court erred in staying execution as ordered in the decree. The decree is corrected by elimination of the words, "except as limited hereafter," from paragraph d of the decree, and by elimination of the entire paragraph e of the decree.
Affirmed on the appeal.
HEFLIN, C. J., and MERRILL, HARWOOD, BLOODWORTH, MADDOX, McCALL and JONES, JJ., concur.
FAULKNER, J., dissents.
Reversed and rendered on the cross appeal.
HEFLIN, C. J., and MERRILL, HARWOOD, BLOODWORTH, MADDOX and McCALL, JJ., concur.
FAULKNER and JONES, JJ., dissent.
FAULKNER, Justice (dissenting).
I must respectfully dissent.
Section 701 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that a partnership as such shall not be subject to income tax. Persons carrying on a business as partners shall be liable for income tax only in their separate or individual capacities. However, while partnerships are not subject to income taxes they are nevertheless required to render an annual return on Form 1065, Internal Revenue Service. This is in the nature of an information return. The return must be signed by one of the partners and must include the gross income and deductions allowed the partnership, and also the names and addresses of the individual partners. Furthermore, partnership remuneration is not wages subject to income tax withholding. Revenue Ruling 69-184, 1969-1, p. 256.
From the facts in this case it appears that no partnership returns were ever filed; that Waters was paid a salary. He filed withholding tax forms. There was withheld income and social security taxes from his salary. And, his salary was a deduction on Schedule C (Income from Business and Profession) of Cochran's individual 1040 return. When a deduction taken on Cochran's individual return for business losses is added to the above facts, the result appears to be that Cochran did not consider himself a partner of Waters.
I further find from the facts that Cochran acted on the advice of a C.P.A. on his tax matters. There may be exceptions, but generally a C.P.A. is presumed to know which tax returns must be filed for his client. It is therefore logical to assume that if a valid partnership existed between Cochran and Waters, he would have filed the proper returns for the partnership. And, it can be further assumed that no C. P.A. would have reported gross income or *492 loss from a partnership on Schedule C of an individual return, Form 1040.
There do not appear to be any books of original entry setting up the alleged partnership; no balance sheets; no profit and loss statements for the years of the partnership. There doesn't appear any statement or entry showing what the net worth beginning and endingof each partner was. These are gross omissions of evidence to hold that a valid partnership existed.
I assume that under the majority opinion as to both parties, any sum paid by Waters to Cochran should be a deduction for state and federal tax purposes to him, and should be ordinary income to Cochran.
I would hold that no valid partnership ever existed and therefore pretermit discussion of the other issues of this case.
JONES, Justice (dissenting as to the cross appeal).
I would affirm as to the direct appeal and the cross appeal. I concur with the majority opinion on the issues presented on direct appeal since I believe that there was sufficient evidence from which the trial court could find the existence of a partnership. I must respectfully dissent, however, with respect to the cross appeal since I am also of the opinion that there was sufficient evidence justifying the trial court's holding allowing credit to the respondent in the amount of $3,585.67. It seems to me that the equitable principle of unjust enrichment would suffice to sustain the trial court's finding and order in this respect.
Application for rehearing denied.
Decree corrected.
Opinion modified.
HEFLIN, C. J., and MERRILL, HARWOOD, BLOODWORTH, MADDOX and McCALL, JJ., concur.