Case Title: STATE v. ONE 1965 RED CHEVROLET PICKUP

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93354

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2001-10-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE v. ONE 1965 RED CHEVROLET PICKUP  STATE v. ONE 1965 RED CHEVROLET PICKUP 2001 OK 82 37 P.3d 815 72 OBJ 2929 Case Number: 93354 Decided: 10/09/2001 Mandate Issued: 11/09/2001 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Petitioner-Appellant v. ONE 1965 RED CHEVROLET PICKUP, VIN/C1445S172380 BEARING OKLAHOMA LICENSE 019CUT, Respondent-Appellee ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIV. II ¶0 Invoking the terms of 21 O.S. Supp.1993 § 1738, the general seizure-and-forfeiture statute, the State of Oklahoma sought forfeiture of a pickup truck that was used in the commission of a burglary. The owner interposed an objection rested on the homestead-and-exemption statute, 31 O.S. Supp.1998 § 1. The District Court, Custer County, Jill Weedon, trial judge, refused to decree forfeiture, ruling the pickup truck exempt by the terms of § 1. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial judge's order. On certiorari previously granted upon the State's petition, THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION AND THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER ARE VACATED AND THE CAUSE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS TO BE CONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT. Richard L. Dugger, District Attorney, Second Judicial District, Ricky A. McPhearson, Assistant District Attorney, Arapaho, Oklahoma for Appellant1 Randolph S. Meacham, Clinton, Oklahoma for Appellee OPALA, J. ¶1 The dispositive issue presented on certiorari is whether the legislative exemption of certain automobiles from forced sale (upon execution or other court-issued process) for satisfaction of a debt bars the State from invoking in this case the statute that authorizes the forfeiture of property used in the commission of a crime. We answer in the negative. I THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION ¶2 By invoking the provisions of 21 O.S. Supp.1993 §1738(A),2 the State of Oklahoma [State] sought on 28 January 1999 forfeiture of a 1965 red Chevrolet pickup truck, VIN/C1445S172380. Notice was sent to the registered owner Jerry Johnson [owner or Johnson]. He interposed an objection to the forfeiture. It is rested on the claimed protection conferred on an owner by the homestead-and-exemption statute, 31 O.S. Supp.1998 §1(A)(13).3 According to the parties' stipulation, (1) Johnson is the registered owner of the pickup truck in suit; (2) the fair market value of the vehicle is less than three thousand dollars; (3) there are no liens against the pickup truck; and (4) the owner used the vehicle to transport property stolen in two burglaries. The trial court refused to decree forfeiture, ruling the vehicle exempt by the terms of 31 O.S. Supp.1998 § 1(A)(13). The Court of Civil Appeals [COCA] affirmed the order. The State's certiorari paperwork brings to our attention an unpublished opinion by another COCA division4 which appears to hold that the last cited statute does not exempt from forfeiture a rifle seized under the authority of 63 O.S.1991 § 2-503(A)(9),5 a part of the Oklahoma Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Act.6 We granted certiorari to settle an interdivisional conflict on an important first-impression question. II ARGUMENTS ON CERTIORARI A. Owner's Theory for Defeating Forfeiture ¶3 Owner argues that the State's attempt to forfeit his vehicle is defeasible by the homestead-and-exemption statute that protects from "attachment or execution and every other species of forced sale" one motor vehicle, the value of which is $3,000.00 or less.7 He relies specifically on State ex rel. Means v. Ten (10) Acres of Land,8 which teaches that the protection of a homestead from forced sale shields that character of property from forfeiture in proceedings brought under the provisions of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Act.9 According to the owner's argument, if the homestead-and-exemption statute protects a homestead from forfeiture (allowed by the terms of 63 O.S.1991 §2-503(A)(8)),10 it should likewise shield his motor vehicle from forfeiture that is pressed under the general seizure-and-forfeiture statute.11 B. The State's Theory for Declaring Forfeiture ¶4 According to the State, a motor vehicle used in the commission of a felony is not exempt from forfeiture by the homestead-and-exemption statute. When in State v. Ten Acres12 the court extended homestead protection to forfeitable land, its opinion was addressing a constitutionally exempt family interest in one's home, not that which was asserted in one's personal property. The provisions of Art. XII § 2, Okl. Const.13 protect the family homestead from forced sale for the payment of debts. The terms of 31 O.S. Supp.1998 § 1 implement that fundamental-law provision.14 Although the text of § 1 also protects from forced sale certain personal-property articles, the shield it provides for personalty does not vitalize any constitutional text. III NO SOURCE OF LAW - CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY OR COMMON LAW - SHIELDS PERSONAL PROPERTY FROM A § 1738 FORFEITURE ¶5 No constitutional protection of homesteads is invocable to shield personalty from forfeiture.15 The sole issue here is whether the statutory exemption in 31 O.S.Supp.1998 § 116 frees the vehicle now in forfeiture from the mandatory provisions of 21 O.S.Supp.1993 § 1738;17 if not, whether the common law will afford to the owner a shield of protection from the forfeiture sought by the State.18 There is neither ambiguity in, nor conflict between, the terms of § 1 and the provisions of § 1738. Legislative intent can easily be ascertained from the plain language of the homestead-and-exemption statute.19 A. Homestead Exemptions Are Not Implicated By This Case ¶6 This court's analysis of Oklahoma's constitutional-and-statutory-homestead provisions has emerged from a variety of contexts.20 Their settled meaning is that the constitution, Art. XII §2, Okl.Const.,21 and its implementing statute, 31 O.S. Supp.1998 § 1,22 are designed to secure the family home.23 Oklahoma jurisprudence is replete with reaffirmance of this cherished security in one's family abode.24 The protection from forfeiture, which the law affords to homesteads, is firmly rested on a recognized interest of the entire family. Although our pronouncement in State v. Ten Acres25 makes no reference to the precise fundamental-law underpinnings of 31 O.S. Supp.1998 § 1, the court's decision in that case is firmly anchored in the constitutional homestead protection.26 ¶7 In short, homestead exemptions are in a class by themselves. They are derived from a constitutional grant. B. The Personal-Property Exemptions of ¶8 The personal-property exemptions of § 1 are intended to protect debtors (or other kindred obligors) against forced sales to satisfy unpaid debts. Unpaid debts are one's individual obligation. While the statute's unambiguous terms provide a personal-property exemption when a debtor's individual liability is sought to be enforced, they do not extend so far as to relieve one of the § 1738 forfeiture's consequences. Forfeiture proceedings are neither explicitly addressed nor implicated by the text of the homestead-and-exemption statute.28 ¶9 Personal property that is to be forfeited in consequence of its use in criminal activity must be viewed as entirely different from that which is subjected to a "forced sale" to satisfy the payment of debt. Forfeiture is a government's expropriation of the owner who used the subject property in the commission of certain crimes. It is effected, upon seizure, by a judicial proceeding, which divests one of property without compensation but does not require that it be sold.29 Unlike in the application of § 1 exemptions, seizure (cum severance of title) rather than "forced sale" is the gravamen of forfeiture statutes. ¶10 In contrast to scenarios affected by § 1 exemptions, no personal liability is imposable in § 1738 forfeitures. It is only the object (or the res) to be forfeited which stands liable for unconditional delivery to the State.30 A forfeiture proceeding is one in rem.31 It is predicated upon the property's illegal use.32 In short, the § 1738 liability of a res may not be exonerated, either in whole or in part, by any personal-property exemption extended by § 1. ¶11 The reference in § 1 to a forced sale in payment of a debt presupposes the existence of a levying judgment creditor. When a personal-property-exemption statute is invoked, a levying party's status as creditor is determinative.33 Because a forfeiture proceeding lacks the characteristics attributable to a forced sale for the satisfaction of one's debt, the government - in pressing its claim for personal-property's forfeiture - is entirely free from the restraints of the homestead-and-exemption provisions that serve to limit the remedies of a creditor. ¶12 In sum, Oklahoma law provides no protection from legislatively authorized civil forfeiture of personal property used in the commission of a crime. Nor does § 1738 spell out any exceptions to personal property that may be subject to forfeiture.34 In the face of constitutional and legislative silence, this court is powerless to create an exception unless one be recognized by some norm of unabrogated common law. C. There Is No Rule of Common Law That Protects Personal Property From a § 1738 Forfeiture ¶13 Absent any legislative exemption that frees the vehicle in suit from a § 1738 forfeiture, we turn to the common law for guidance in deciding whether any exceptions are affordable by that legal corpus. The common law remains in full force unless some enactment explicitly provides to the contrary.35 A presumption favors the preservation of common-law rights.36 ¶14 At the time of ratification of the Bill of Rights, the English law recognized three kinds of forfeiture: (1) of deodands, D. There Are No Compelling Public-Policy Considerations For Departing From The Beaten Path Of The Common Law ¶15 In the face of clear historical antecedents, only a valid public-policy exception would militate in favor of departing from a long-standing tradition that recognizes no exceptions to personal property eligible for forfeiture as an instrumentality of the crime. We are mindful that forfeiture is a primary weapon against crime. Two main purposes are served by this institution: deterrence and punishment. ¶16 Public policy dictates that exemption laws be liberally construed to comport with their beneficent spirit of protecting the family home. ¶17 In sum, there are no constitutional, statutory or common-law grounds for concluding that State seizure of any personal property listed as exempt by the provisions of § 1 is protected from a § 1738 forfeiture. IV SUMMARY ¶18 The homestead provisions of Art. XII §2, Okl.Const., ¶19 The homestead-and-exemption statute, ¶20 The common law does not recognize any personal immunity of the kind the owner interposes to save his res from forfeiture. There are no compelling public-policy considerations for departing from that norm of unwritten English law. Today's pronouncement is in keeping with the public policy intended to be served by both the homestead-and-exemption as well as by the forfeiture statute. In short, the § 1 exemption from forced sales for payment of debt provides no relief from a § 1738 forfeiture claim pressed against a vehicle used in the commission of a crime. ¶21 On certiorari previously granted upon the State's petition, the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion and the trial court's order are vacated; the cause is remanded for further proceedings to be consistent with today's pronouncement. ¶22 ALL JUSTICES CONCUR. FOOT