Case Title: State v. Duggan

Citation: 215 Or. 151, 333 P.2d 907

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1958-12-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Affirmed December 31, 1958.
*153 Thomas W. Hansen, Deputy District Attorney, Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Hattie J. Bratzel, District Attorney, Salem.
Charles D. Burt, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Robin D. Day, Salem.
Before PERRY, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, McALLISTER and O'CONNELL, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
ROSSMAN, J.
This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the circuit court, based upon a verdict, which found the defendant guilty of the crime of assault and robbery not being armed with a dangerous weapon. ORS 163.290. The defendant submits ten assignments of error, some of which are repetitive in nature. The general overtone of their contentions is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant a finding of guilt.
Evidence showed that November 12, 1956, at about 9:00 p.m., two men, through the use of threats, forced one Kenneth Melton, manager of a store in Salem known as Erickson's Super Market, to open the store's safe, whereupon they robbed him and the store of $9,000 consisting of money and bank checks. The state contends that the defendant was one of the two men. The defendant pleaded not guilty. One Irvin Fitzgerald, who also was charged by indictment with commission of the crime, pleaded guilty and at the time of the trial was serving a sentence of five years. He *154 gave testimony for the state. The defendant's brief declares:
Mention at this point of the evidence which tends to show whether or not the defendant was identified as one of the two robbers will facilitate a disposition of the assignments of error.
Kenneth Melton, aforementioned, testified that he was held up and forced to open the safe of the store by two men, one of whom he identified at Irvin Fitzgerald. He swore that the two men, after forcing him to take four to five thousand dollars in cash and four to five thousand dollars in checks from the safe, took the booty with them. The other man, according to this witness, was about six feet tall, but, since the light in the store was dim, Melton could not, so he swore, discern that individual's features except to note that "he had a hat, overcoat and glasses and a mustache."
Irvin Fitzgerald, who, the state claimed, was an unwilling witness, testified:
Fitzgerald was not asked by either the state or the defendant whether the other man with whom he robbed the store was Duggan. The state, of course, had the burden of proof. The reluctance of the state to ask the question may perhaps be explained by the following statement made by Fitzgerald, out of the presence of the jury, after he had claimed that he was testifying under duress:
*156 Most of the cross-examination and redirect examination was directed at the contention of Fitzgerald that the deputy district attorney would speak to the parole board if the witness did not tell the truth. The state, faced with the fact that a critical witness was reluctant to testify, apparently did not wish to push him further than absolutely necessary. The defense makes no claim that Fitzgerald would have named a person other than the defendant if asked the question. In this exigency we do not think the state's failure to ask the question, though not commendable, can be condemned, for to do so would probably unduly hamper the handling of such a recalcitrant witness. It was not fatal to the case, according to our belief, for the state not to have asked Fitzgerald the crucial question, provided that some other connection of the defendant with the crime was established.
In order to determine whether or not the evidence established that the defendant participated in the commission of the alleged crime, we go to the testimony of the next witness for the state, the woman Fitzgerald admitted meeting in Portland after the robbery (Mrs. Folsom). After stating that she had known the defendant for a year, she testified that she met him on the night of the robbery in the company of Fitzgerald. The following testimony was then given:
After some colloquy the state obtained permission to show the witness a paper "to refresh her memory." *159 She identified the paper shown to her as a statement she had made and signed in the Rocky Butte jail on January 24, 1957. She was then asked:
Mrs. Folsom then testified that the next day she and Duggan pulled his car into the car lot of one Dick Harris. The defendant's car, according to the witness, was a Mercury "probably in the '40s" and its "rods" were burned out. Following that incident, Duggan "bought some new clothes and got a haircut," so the witness stated. That night, according to her further testimony, she and Duggan went to Tualatin where he picked up something which he put in a sack and, in the presence of the witness, carried to her house. There she saw that silver money was in the sack. She then testified:
In the remainder of her testimony she (1) described a later visit to Tualatin in the company of a police officer where they picked up more money; (2) swore that the defendant did not generally wear a mustache; and (3) related details about what Fitzgerald did after the money was divided between the two alleged joint principals.
*161 D.M. Harris, a dealer in used cars, testified that October 16, 1956, he sold the defendant a used Mercury automobile and that on November 13, 1956, he accepted the Mercury in a transaction in which he sold the defendant a used Cadillac. The witness swore that the Mercury was a 1949 model and that its "bearings were burned out" November 13, 1956, when the transaction concerning the Cadillac occurred.
The sheriff of Marion county told of going to Salinas, California, in August, 1957, to return the defendant to Salem after California police had apprehended him. While in California the defendant used an assumed name. According to the sheriff, the defendant told him that he "was glad he had finally been picked up, he had been dodging and looking for somebody to tap him on the shoulder for some months." Other police officers described the unavailing search that had been made for the defendant in Oregon, including calls at the home where he had resided.
The foregoing is the substance of the evidence produced to connect the defendant with the robbery. The defendant did not testify and produced no witnesses.
1. The first assignment of error is based on the following question to and answer given by Melton:
This was objected to as leading and conveying the impression that the witness could identify the defendant as the man who robbed him. However, it does not stand alone in the sequence of questions, as the following also was brought out:
And, on cross-examination, the witness stated:
In view of the foregoing testimony, we fail to see how the jury could have been misled as to the basis on which the defendant was picked out of the line-up. The first assignment of error is without merit.
2. The second assignment of error is based on a contention that Fitzgerald was allowed to testify about a crime with which the defendant had not been connected and that admission of evidence of crimes committed by third parties, for which the defendant is not *163 shown to be responsible, is error. The defendant cites State v. Fong, 211 Or 1, 314 P2d 243. The order of proof is in the discretion of the trial court. ORS 17.215. The defendant was later connected with the crime with which he was charged; that is, the one in which Fitzgerald participated. This is not a case in which testimony was received about a crime with which the defendant was neither charged nor connected, as was true in the Fong case, where extensive testimony about the activities of a narcotics ring was put in evidence, although the defendant was not charged with anything relating directly thereto and was not even shown to know some of the persons whose activities were described by the state's witnesses. The second assignment of error is without merit.
3. Neglecting for the moment the third assignment of error, we will consider the fourth, which is based on a ruling that permitted Mrs. Folsom to refresh her memory by reading from a prior statement which she had made. Our previous quotation from Mrs. Folsom's testimony has indicated the nature of the defendant's contentions. This assignment is based on an objection that the state tried to impeach its own witness, but we fail to see any merit in that argument since no contradiction exists in her testimony. The defendant urges that such outside statements cannot be introduced in evidence, and this may be so, but no attempt to do anything of that nature was made. The witness said she was testifying from present memory. State v. Merlo, 92 Or 678, 173 P 317, 182 P 153, cited by the defense, contains an excellent review of the problems in this area, but the course that was taken at the trial was consistent with that case. ORS 45.580 provides:
From Susewind v. Lever, 37 Or 365, 61 P 644, we take the following:
Where nothing more is done than for a witness to remind himself of facts which he actually knows, and no attempt is made to introduce a statement made at another time, we fail to see how any contention can be made that the provisions of the above statute have been violated or in what way this defendant has been prejudiced. The fourth assignment of error is without merit.
4. We will next consider the seventh assignment of error. It is based on a contention that error was committed when an instruction on "flight" was given to the jury. The defendant argues that the record is devoid of evidence of flight. Since the defendant was located in California, using an assumed name, and was not in Portland at his reported address where his wife lived, this instruction was justified, particularly in view of the fact that the instructions in clear language told the jury to determine whether the evidence showed flight and the use by the defendant of a false name. This assignment has no merit.
*165 5. We will now consider the third and fifth assignments of error, which are based on the alleged coercion of the witnesses Fitzgerald and Folsom. Both of those witnesses had apparently been told by the state that their failure to testify might have an adverse effect on their possible future paroles. Much of the transcript of evidence is taken up with a discussion of what promises, if any, were made, and it seems to us that the circumstances could not have escaped the understanding of the jury which was instructed that it should take into consideration in determining the credibility of the witnesses any motives they may have had. The defendant cites Lane v. First National Bank, 131 Or 350, 270 P 476, 281 P 172, 283 P 17, wherein the court held that a witness was not credible because of the manner in which he answered questions and his evident self-interest. Without pointing out the differences in the interest involved, we feel it is only necessary to say that that case was tried in equity and the court was reviewing a conflict in the evidence. In such a case, the question of credibility is for the court. In the instant case, the question of credibility was for the jury which tried this case.
In Anderson ex rel Poe v. Gladden, 205 Or 538, 288 P2d 823, where the testimony of a co-indictee was challenged on the ground that a promise of leniency had been given to him, the court said:
In State v. Magone, 32 Or 206, 51 P 453, cited in the Anderson case, the witness had been promised that he would not be prosecuted, would "be out of it before very long," and stated that he would not have testified unless he had been made such promises. That promise of leniency was far stronger than any alleged promises which were made in this case. On this problem, the court said:
The reference to corroboration pertains, not to the fact that he was promised leniency, but to the fact that he was an accomplice. The jury in the present case apparently concluded that the witnesses told the truth. The third and fifth assignments of error lack merit.
6, 7. The eight and ninth assignments of error will *167 be considered together since they are almost identical. They are based upon objections to the refusal to give two requested instructions which are largely the equivalent of each other. The two requested instructions concerned the needed corroboration of accomplices. As a matter of fact, they were given for the most part in the exact language requested except the following was omitted:
The sentence just quoted assumes that both witnesses were accomplices. The following was a part of each of the requested instructions:
Defendant's argument in support of these exceptions contends that Irvin Fitzgerald and Hazel Folsom were accomplices. It further contends that the instructions should have defined the word "accomplice" and should have permitted the jury to determine whether Mrs. Folsom was an accomplice; in fact, the jury was so instructed. The instructions upon the law governing accomplices and their testimony was complete and well expressed. A person cannot be convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice (ORS 136.550). The record contains no testimony that Mrs. Folsom had any prior knowledge of this crime. Receipt of stolen property does not in itself render the receiver an accomplice even if he knew of the theft. State v. Moxley, 54 Or 409, 103 P 655, 20 Ann Cas 593. The instructions that were given to the jury permitted *168 it to determine whether or not Mrs. Folsom was an accomplice. She was not, as a matter of law, an accomplice, and since the requested instructions assumed that she was, they were properly refused. The eighth and ninth assignments of error are without merit.
We now reach the last two assignments which we will consider  the sixth which objects to the refusal to direct a verdict, and the tenth which objects to a refusal to grant a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, for a new trial. Both of these motions were grounded essentially on the claim that there was not sufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty. In addition, (1) the motion for a directed verdict argued that the testimony of Fitzgerald and Folsom lacked corroboration, and (2) the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict raised again the questions of bias and favors, misconduct of the deputy district attorney and a few other matters which are so lacking in merit that they will not be set forth herein.
In connection with the alleged misconduct, a hearing was held after the trial in connection with the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, at the conclusion of which the trial judge found as a fact that there had been no misconduct on the part of the deputy district attorney. We have examined the transcript and find no reason whatever to question the finding.
8-11. Upon the defendant's contentions of need for corroboration, we take the following from State v. Long, 113 Or 309, 231 P 963:
With this rule in mind, we should next consider the method by which we should review the evidence to see if there was an issue to have gone to the jury. The following is taken from State v. Rosser, 162 Or 293, 86 P2d 441, 87 P2d 783, 91 P2d 295:
*170 [Now, in essence, ORS 136.550 provides: "A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless he be corroborated by such other evidence as tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely show the commission of the crime, or the circumstances of the commission."]
We are unable, as is obvious from the foregoing recital of the testimony, to say that there is no evidence tending to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice or accomplices. Therefore, there is no merit in this basis of the motion for a directed verdict.
12, 13. This brings us to the final problem, the general sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, *171 raised in both the motion for a directed verdict and in the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. Since there was no eyewitness to the robbery who identified the defendant, the case of the state rests largely on circumstantial evidence. However, this in itself is not determinative of the question, since such evidence may be sufficient to support a verdict and in fact, under our constitution, we may not set aside the decision of the jury where it hinges on a question of fact, such as whether the defendant did commit the acts charged, unless we can affirmatively say there was no evidence to support the verdict. Oregon Constitution, Art VII, § 3; State v. Caputo, 202 Or 456, 274 P2d 798.
To set out the rules regarding circumstantial evidence and the function of this court in reviewing it, we can do no better than to quote the words of Justice BRAND in State v. Dennis, 177 Or 73, 159 P2d 838, 161 P2d 670, where he said:
14. We have already set forth the major part of the testimony tending to connect the defendant with the crime with which he was charged. No other reasonable explanation has been offered by the defendant either here, or, as far as the record shows, at the trial, though he did suggest on oral argument that the defendant might have committed another robbery in Salem on the evening of November 12, 1956. We do not think the testimony is consistent with such a theory. The jury was properly and clearly instructed by the judge as to the way they should treat the circumstantial evidence, and there is sufficient evidence to support their verdict. The sixth and tenth assignments of error are without merit.
We have found no error. The challenged judgment is affirmed.