Case Title: HOLLOMAN v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
HOLLOMAN v. STATE2002 WY 11751 P.3d 214Case Number: 00-202Decided: 07/31/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                            

 

BRIAN 
KEITH HOLLOMAN,  

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Sylvia 
Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Marion Yoder, Senior Assistant Public 
Defender; Diane Courselle, Faculty Director, and Dwight H. Mann, Student Intern, 
of the Defender Aid Program.  
Argument by Mr. Mann. 

Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; T. Alan Elrod, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Elrod.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ. 

GOLDEN, 
Justice. 

[¶1]           
In this 
appeal, the trial court failed to give a requested self-defense instruction to 
the jury during trial for one count of first degree premeditated murder.  Our jurisprudence has established that 
the defenses of self-defense and accident are mutually exclusive when applied to 
the shooting death of a victim.  
However, in this particular case, Appellant Brian Keith Holloman claimed 
that his act of self-defense by striking blows against one victim resulted in 
the accidental falling death of a third party, and he was, therefore, entitled 
to his requested self-defense-against-assault instruction. Our review has 
determined that Holloman's defense theory is recognized by the common law, the 
self-defense elements are supported by his testimony, and are corroborated by 
physical evidence.  We, therefore, 
hold that it was reversible error to fail to instruct the jury on his 
self-defense theory.  This ruling is 
dispositive, and we do not consider Holloman's issues regarding prosecutorial 
misconduct.

 

[¶2]           
Reversed 
and remanded for new trial.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]           
Holloman 
presents these issues for our review:

 

I.  Did the trial court commit reversible 
error by improperly refusing to give a jury instruction on self-defense where 
Mr. Holloman offered an instruction sufficient to apprise the court of his 
theory of the case and there was competent evidence presented to support that 
theory?

 

II.  Was Mr. Holloman deprived of his rights 
to due process and a fair trial by the prosecution's pervasive and varied 
misconduct, including (1) violating discovery rules (one violation constitutes 
independent reversible error), (2) ignoring exclusionary rulings by the court, 
(3) engaging in various forms of improper questioning, (4) eliciting a comment 
on Mr. Holloman's exercise of his right to silence (which constitutes 
independent reversible error), (5) encouraging the jury to convict because of 
community bias and prejudice, and (6) making highly inflammatory and improper 
comments in summation (the combined summation comments constitute independent 
reversible error as well)?

 

The 
State rephrases the issues:

 

I.  Was appellant entitled to a self-defense 
instruction where his defense at trial was that he killed his victim by 
accident?

 

II.  Was there prosecutorial misconduct in 
appellant's trial?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]           
Holloman 
was a transient who arrived in Cheyenne on July 24, 1999, and planned to 
continue to El Paso, Texas.  An 
admitted alcoholic, Holloman spent that day and night drinking with other men, 
and, sometime later that night, Holloman was attacked and slashed across the 
face.  He received medical attention 
for his wound, which required a double row of stitches.  The wound was described as a cut from 
above his right eye that went down his face, through his ear and into his 
neck.  Holloman spent that night at 
a detoxification center.  

 

[¶5]           
The next 
morning, Holloman and another man who had also spent the night at the 
detoxification center joined Herman Thunder Hawk and Douglas Johnson at a liquor 
store and all bought beer and vodka.  
The four then went to Thunder Hawk's apartment at the Idleman Hotel in 
downtown Cheyenne.  The four drank 
all of the alcohol they had bought, drank another half-gallon of vodka they 
bought in mid-afternoon and soon all passed out.   The men awoke sometime that 
evening.  At 7:13 p.m., local police 
were dispatched to the hotel following a report that a man was hanging out of a 
window of the Idleman Hotel.  

 

[¶6]           
Police 
arrived within two minutes and observed a man hanging from the window and, 
within minutes, fall to his death.  
That man was Douglas Johnson.  
Before Johnson fell, the police observed that Johnson's thighs were over 
the sash of the window and the rest of his body was hanging down facing the 
building.  One police officer stated 
that he "fell" out of the window, and that he did not see anybody shove him out 
of the window.  Police entered the 
building as Thunder Hawk and Holloman were attempting to exit it.  Both were placed on the ground and 
handcuffed.  The two began yelling 
at each other, and the officer in charge told the other officers not to ask them 
any questions and to write down everything that the two said to each other.  Thunder Hawk accused Holloman of killing 
his friend, and Holloman made statements that he had killed him.  Holloman's statements were later 
admitted against him at trial.

 

[¶7]           
Holloman 
was tried for first degree murder.  
Under the State's theory of the case, Holloman pushed Johnson out of the 
window and he hung suspended from the window for some minutes with his thighs on 
the window sash and one arm locked onto the window.  Johnson was able to pull himself back in 
to where his waist was on the sash, and then Holloman forcefully ejected him out 
through the window causing him to fall to his death.  Additionally, Thunder Hawk testified 
that he emerged from the bathroom and saw Holloman shoving Johnson out of the 
window.  Thunder Hawk stated that he 
grabbed Johnson by the calves of his legs and held on to him.  Holloman hit Thunder Hawk in the face 
numerous times causing Thunder Hawk to lose his hold.  The State argued that Holloman did not 
lose his grip on Johnson but, instead, sent him out of the window with force to 
his death.  

 

[¶8]           
Several 
witnesses on the street observed Johnson hanging out of the window before he 
fell to his death.  Although all 
agreed that someone was holding onto Johnson as he hung upside down out of the 
window, the stories conflicted as to whether he fell or was shoved out of the 
window.  The time period between 
when Johnson was first sent out of the window and fell to his death was between 
five and ten minutes.

 

[¶9]           
In 
opening arguments, the defense explained its theory of the case.  After Holloman awoke, he was struck in 
the face: 

 

And 
so when he gets attacked, he does what anyone would do under the circumstances; 
he defends himself.  He whips 
around, but you know what, he doesn't see Douglas Johnson.  As soon as he gets to where he can see, 
he sees Herman Thunder Hawk, and that's all he sees.  He does not even know that Douglas 
Johnson had gone out the window.  He 
still thinks it's Herman Thunder Hawk that just attacked 
him.

So 
he does start hitting Herman Thunder Hawk.  
He doesn't even realize that Douglas Johnson is out of the window until 
he hears Herman Thunder Hawk say, "Oh, shit, he fell," and Herman Thunder Hawk 
takes off.

 

            
* * * *

Now 
we're not trying to say that in self-defense, Brian threw Douglas Johnson out a 
window.  We are trying to say that 
he was defending himself, and in the course of defending himself, a tragic 
accident happened, but that's all.  
It was a tragic accident, and not a crime.

 

[¶10]      
During 
trial, Holloman testified that he awoke to loud music on a tape player.  Holloman got up and crossed to the tape 
player and turned it off.  He stated 
that Thunder Hawk was in the room and seated on a couch next to Johnson, and as 
Holloman turned off the tape player, he was struck hard in his face on the wound 
with stitches.  The blow knocked him 
into a wall and the intense pain blinded him for some moments, and he felt as if 
he might lose consciousness.  He 
reacted by spinning around and scuffling and when he was able to focus his 
sight, he saw Thunder Hawk and hit him in the face.  

 

Holloman:  . . . I thought he had been the one that 
hit me.  I was reacting.  It was--

Defense:  Happened fast.

Holloman:  Seemed like just like that 
(indicating).

Defense:  Where was Mr. 
Johnson?

Holloman:  I didn't know.

Defense:  You had no idea?

Holloman:  All I seen was Thunder 
Hawk.

Defense:  You were focused on 
him?

Holloman:  That's all I seen.  At the moment, him and I were the only 
two there.

Defense:  At some point did you realize where Mr. 
Johnson was?

Holloman:  I didn't know that  Thunder Hawk was 
hollering something at me.  He was 
yelling something, but I  with the stereo behind me not quite on station, and 
him hollering, plus me being woozy from being hit so hard, I didn't know what he 
was saying.  I just know that he was 
yelling at me, and I just attacked.

Defense:  When did you realize where Mr. Johnson 
was?

Holloman:  Then he said, " Oh, shit, he fell," and 
I didn't know he was out the window.  
That's  that's when I realized that the boy had fell. 

 

[¶11]      
Photographs 
of Holloman's face and witness testimony that Holloman's face had suffered 
further injury corroborated Holloman's story that he was attacked that day.  The defense requested a self-defense 
instruction, arguing that Holloman was defending himself from a perceived attack 
when Johnson went out of the window.  
The requested instruction stated:

 

YOU ARE 
INSTRUCTED that it is lawful for a person who is being assaulted to defend 
himself from attack if he has reasonable grounds for believing and does believe 
that bodily injury is about to be inflicted upon him.  In doing so he may use all force which 
would appear to a reasonable person, in the same or similar circumstances, to be 
necessary to prevent injury.[1]

            
To justify acting in self-defense, it is not necessary that the danger 
was real, or that the danger was impending and immediate, so long as the 
defendant had a reasonable cause to believe and did believe these facts.  If these two requirements are met, 
acting in self-defense is justified even though there is no intention on the 
part of the other person to do the defendant harm, nor any impending and 
immediate danger, nor the actual necessity for acting in self-defense.[2]  

 

[¶12]      
During 
the jury instruction conference in chambers, defense counsel argued for a 
self-defense instruction:

 

The 
evidence that was presented from Brian Holloman was that he was attacked.  He does not know who did it, but he was 
attacked, and that he did defend himself.  
In the course of defending himself, an accident occurred, and like I 
said, the ultimate theory of the defendant is that this was an accidental 
killing, but the accidental killing was the result of self-defense, and the jury 
needs to be instructed that he does have the right to defend himself from an 
attacker whether he knows who it is or not.

            
He does have the right to defend himself from an 
attacker.

 

The 
Court:  Again,[3] the defendant never said that he was attacked 
by the decedent or that he attacked the decedent in return.  As I understand his testimony, he denied 
doing anything to the decedent.

 

Defense:  No.  Just the fact that he  the way that he 
whipped around, and some of their evidence is that  correct me if I'm wrong  
that he was hitting Thunder Hawk in order to make him drop Mr. Johnson, and he 
was not doing that in order to get an intentional killing here.  He was doing that in self-defense 
because he believed that it was Thunder Hawk who had attacked 
him.

 

The 
Court:  But self-defense only 
applies to what you do to the decedent, not what you do to someone 
else.

 

Defense:  And I do understand that.  There's just that  this is where  you 
have a situation here where that is what he was doing was defending 
himself.  If that is the case, then 
the State should be precluded from arguing that he did not have the right to 
defend himself against Thunder Hawk.

 

The 
Court:  In any event, I didn't see 
sufficient evidence here to raise a self-defense instruction.  

 

[¶13]      
After 
the court refused the self-defense instruction, the defense referred only once 
to an accident instruction:

 

Defense:  Now, do we have any kind of an 
instruction talking about an accident?  
And what I was thinking was that if you did deny the one regarding 
voluntary manslaughter 

 

The 
Court:  Well, the only reference I 
think is in your instruction defining "purposely."[4]

 

The 
defense did not offer any theory of defense instruction relating to accident. 
Although Holloman presented a self-defense/accident theory of defense, the only 
defense-oriented instruction the jury received was an instruction that 
self-induced intoxication could be evidence that no specific intent was 
formed.  In closing argument, the 
defense stated:

 

Douglas 
Johnson's death was an accident.  It 
was a horrible, terrible accident, but it's not a crime  not a crime for which 
Brian Holloman is responsible.  

                                    

            
* * * *

There 
was a big struggle, somebody got hit, man whirled around, man goes out the 
window, turns around and starts punching.

 

[¶14]      
Holloman 
was convicted of first degree murder, sentenced to life imprisonment, and this 
appeal followed.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Theory of the Case Instructions

 

[¶15]      
Due 
process requires the trial court to give a correct instruction to the jury that 
details the defendant's theory of the case.  Blakely v. State, 474 P.2d 127, 
129 (Wyo. 1970).  The instruction 
must sufficiently inform the court of the defendant's theory and must be 
supported by competent evidence. Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486, 490 
(Wyo. 1992).  A theory of the case 
is more than a comment on the evidence that tells the jury how to consider the 
evidence.  Ellifritz v. 
State, 704 P.2d 1300 (Wyo. 1985).  
Fundamentally, the instruction must in the first instance be a proper 
theory of the case, or theory of defense, instruction.  That is, the offered instruction must 
present a defense recognized by statute or case law in this jurisdiction.  Bouwkamp, 833 P.2d  at 
490.  

 

[¶16]      
As 
Bouwkamp explained, "[t]heory of defense instructions are to be derived 
from and address criminal defenses provided for by statute or acknowledged by 
this court."  Id. It further 
noted "common-law defenses are retained unless otherwise provided by this 
act."  Id. (quoting Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-1-102(b)).  
Additionally, this Court has discussed acceptable defenses, notably in 
Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263, 269 (Wyo. 1985).5  
See also 1 Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 21, at 
70 n.1 (1984); 1 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 39 (15th ed. 
1993).   

 

[¶17]      
Any competent 
evidence is sufficient to establish a defense theory even if it consists only of 
testimony of the defendant.  
Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739, 745 (Wyo. 1987).  We view the evidence in a light 
favorable to the accused and the accused's testimony must be taken as entirely 
true to determine if the evidence is competent. Duckett v. State, 966 P.2d 941, 944 (Wyo. 1998).  Even if the court deems the evidence to 
be weak, or unworthy of belief, the instruction must be given if a jury could 
reasonably conclude the evidence supports the defendant's position.  Id.  The refusal to allow an instruction 
requested by the defendant when due process requires the defendant's instruction 
be given is reversible error per se.  
Id.  

 

[¶18]   In this case, the defense presented 
a self-defense-against-assault instruction which was refused by the trial 
court.  In its appellee brief, the 
State urges that the trial court properly refused this instruction, noting the 
following:  (1) Holloman's testimony 
was that he did not intentionally throw Johnson out of the window; (2) defense 
counsel stated that it was not claiming self-defense, but accident; (3) because 
Holloman's theory of defense was accident, Wyoming law states that self-defense 
and accident are incompatible defenses and, therefore, mutually exclusive; and 
finally, (4) no evidence supported a self-defense instruction.  The State primarily relies upon 
Goodman v. State, 573 P. 2 400 (Wyo. 1977), and Mewes v. State, 517 P.2d 487 (Wyo. 1973), for support.  

 

[¶19]   Mewes concerned an appeal 
from a conviction for aggravated assault and battery with a deadly weapon.  There, the victim Cooper began a bar 
fight and attacked Mewes.  Cooper 
was stabbed, and Mewes ran from the bar.  
One witness saw Mewes stab Cooper in the back.  Mewes contended that he had not stabbed 
Cooper or in any manner participated in the stabbing or even had a knife or 
instrument that could have inflicted Cooper's injuries.  Mewes, 517 P.2d  at 488.  On appeal, Mewes claimed it was error 
for the trial court to fail to give a self-defense instruction.  We decided that the obvious nature or 
quality of the plea of self-defense is that of justification or excuse for an 
otherwise unlawful homicide or assault and battery.  Id. at 488-89.  Because the defendant denied that he 
stabbed the victim at all, a jury would not have been able to somehow infer that 
he had stabbed the victim in self-defense.  
Id. at 489.  "When a 
charge of this character is made and there is a denial of the stabbing, the only 
issue presented to the fact finder is whether defendant did in fact stab 
complainant."  Id. at 
490.  We concluded that the trial 
court did not err in failing to give a self-defense instruction because it would 
have prejudiced Mewes and deprived him of his defense.  Id.

 

[¶20]      
Plainly, 
Holloman did not deny that any of his actions caused Johnson's death.  Instead, his testimony established that 
he caused Johnson's death when he defended himself from attack, hit Thunder 
Hawk, and this blow caused Thunder Hawk to lose his grip on Johnson, and it was 
then that Johnson fell to his death.  
We do not find that Mewes is helpful to the State's 
position.6

 

[¶21]      
In 
Goodman, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder for the 
premeditated shooting of his pregnant girlfriend and of killing an unborn 
child.7  We reversed the murder conviction 
because the trial court failed to give a voluntary intoxication instruction 
although both the State and the defense had offered their versions of one.  573 P.2d  at 412.

 

[¶22]   We then considered Goodman's 
contention that the trial court had erred when it denied the defendant his 
requested jury instructions on self-defense.  Goodman claimed that the victim had 
threatened to shoot him and then grabbed for the gun.  We determined that there was evidence 
that would support finding that there had been a struggle, but the primary issue 
was whether it fairly raised the issue of self-defense and whether that defense 
and the defense of accidental killing are legally inconsistent and incompatible 
defenses in these circumstances.  
Id. at 413.  We 
decided that the record revealed no defense contention that the defendant 
intended to kill or even purposely shoot the deceased.  The defendant had claimed that it was an 
accident or he could not remember what had happened.  Id. 

 

This 
means he did not intend to shoot her or--at least--he had no recollection 
of an intention to protect himself by shooting Donna Poole.  Therefore, he is not contending for an 
"unlawful homicide" (Mewes, supra) which, because he sought to 
defend himself, was justified.  Just 
the opposite appears in the record.  
He said he did not need a gun to defend himself against Donna Poole.  He testified through his statement 
that

"she 
grabbed ahold of the gun and I grabbed ahold of it too, and we started scuffling 
over it and that's when it went off.  
That I know for sure.  But 
I don't need a gun.  Not for a 
woman." . . . 

 

On the 
question of self-defense and accident being inconsistent defenses, we said in 
Mewes, supra, at 517 P.2d 489:

 

" . . 
.  Additionally we find persuasive 
the case of State v. Peal, Mo., 463 S.W.2d 840, 841, which holds that 
when the defendant claims the shooting was accidental he is not entitled to an 
instruction on self-defense as that would be inconsistent, Cleghorn v. 
State, 55 Wis.2d 466, 198 N.W.2d 577, 579. . . ."

 

Since 
there was no evidence of self-defense at the time of the shooting, we hold the 
instruction upon that theory to have been properly 
refused.

 

 

We are 
not overlooking the evidence to the effect that Donna made a threatening remark 
and they both reached for the gun.  
Up to this point, a self-defense argument is tenable--but there is 
no evidence that the defendant then intended to discharge the gun against 
Donna Poole in order to protect himself.

 

Id. 

 

[¶23]   Goodman is distinguishable 
on two bases.  First, the defendant 
was claiming self-defense against the homicide victim whereas Holloman is 
claiming that his action of self-defense against one person caused the death of 
a third person.  Second, 
Goodman found theories of self-defense and accident incompatible when the 
defendant denies any intent to shoot the victim.  Holloman, however, testified that 
without realizing that Thunder Hawk was holding onto Johnson, he intentionally 
struck Thunder Hawk.  This action 
caused Thunder Hawk to lose hold of Johnson who then fell to his death.  It is Holloman's contention that his 
intentional act against Thunder Hawk was in self-defense, but caused the 
accidental death of a third person.  
Although Goodman prohibits an accused from claiming that the act 
of shooting a victim is both intentional and accidental, it does not address a 
claim that an intentional blow in self-defense against one victim caused the 
accidental death of a third person.  
In essence, Holloman claims two different defense theories for two 
successive acts.  Wyoming law, 
however, has not addressed the precise situation presented by Holloman's 
testimony, and whether we should recognize this legal defense presents an issue 
of first impression.  

 

[¶24]      
The 
general rule is that if a person acting in necessary self-defense 
unintentionally injures or kills a third person, he is not guilty of homicide or 
assault and battery.  People v. 
Morris, 491 N.Y.S.2d 860, 862-63 (A.D. 4 Dept. 1985); People v. Mathews, 
154 Cal. Rptr. 628, 631-32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Castilla, 
457 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1969); Pittman v. State, 272 P.2d 458, 460 (Okla. 
1954); see also, Ferdinand S. Tino, Annotation, Unintentional Killing 
Of Or Injury To Third Person During Attempted Self-Defense, 55 A.L.R3d 620 
(1974); McCraney v. State, 871 P.2d 922, 925 (Nev. 1994).  The rule is not absolute and may not 
apply if the defendant acted recklessly or negligently.  Morris, 491 N.Y.S.2d  at 
862-63.  People v. Jackson, 
212 N.W.2d 918, 919 (Mich. 1973).  
If evidence supports giving a self-defense instruction, "and if on any 
reasonable view of the evidence the jury might have decided that defendant's 
actions were justified, the failure to charge justification constitutes 
reversible error."  Morris, 
491 N.Y.S.2d  at 863. 

 

[¶25]      
In these 
cases and those cited by authorities collecting cases, the courts refer to a 
"transferred intent" self-defense theory to justify the accidental killing of a 
bystander.  Under this theory, the 
courts reason that if transferred intent "in its principal application, 
establishes that one's criminal intent follows the corresponding criminal act to 
its unintended consequences, . . . [then] the reasoning applies equally to carry 
the lack of criminal intent to the unintended consequences and thus 
preclude criminal responsibility."  
Mathews, 154 Cal. Rptr.  at 631.  Accordingly, if self-defense is 
justified against the intended victim and would excuse the assault or homicide 
of that victim, then the assault or homicide of the unintended victim is excused 
or justified, and no criminal conviction can be obtained. 

 

[¶26]      
Those 
courts then look at the specific facts to determine the jury instruction 
content, but generally, it is a self-defense instruction of the general sort 
offered in Holloman's case.  
However, when a bystander is injured, an accidental homicide instruction 
may also be given if the law of the particular jurisdiction permits it.  The Nevada case of McCraney v. 
State, 871 P.2d 922 (Nev. 1994), offers an example.  In this case the defendant was tried for 
shooting to death two victims.  He 
contended that he had shot and killed one in self-defense while that person was 
seated in a car.  He contended that 
the second victim was accidentally shot and killed while sitting next to the 
victim from whom he was defending himself.  
Id. at 924-25.  
The jury received a self-defense instruction and acquitted the 
defendant of the first degree murder of the one victim.  Id. at 924.  The defendant was convicted of the first 
degree murder of a second victim.  
Id.  On appeal, 
defendant contended that the trial court improperly refused the following 
accidental homicide instruction:

 

All 
persons are liable to punishment except those persons who committed the act 
through misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was no evil 
design, intention or culpable negligence.

 

Finding 
that medical evidence indicated that the second person may have been shot while 
in the car during defendant's act of self-defense, the Nevada Supreme Court 
ruled that sufficient evidence supported giving the instruction, the failure to 
do so was reversible error, and remanded for new trial.  Id. at 925.             

 

[¶27]      
Holloman's 
version of events does not fit well with this type of stray bullet case or 
others that apply the transferred intent self-defense theory discussed 
earlier.  In Holloman's case, a 
fistfight he claims to have engaged in with one person for self-defense reasons 
resulted in the falling death of another.  
Under these alleged facts, we nevertheless believe that his testimony 
required that the jury be instructed on the law of self-defense.  The jury's role is to determine whether 
Holloman's intentional acts were self-defense resulting in a third party's 
accidental death for which he may be acquitted, or were premeditated 
first-degree murder.  Here, the 
failure to provide a self-defense instruction precluded jury review.  

 

[¶28]      
We have 
carefully considered both the State's position that this failure was not 
reversible error and the trial court's rationale for refusing the 
instruction.  That consideration 
notwithstanding, under our well-established law regarding defense theory 
instructions, several factors support giving the instruction.  First, Holloman testified as to a 
version of events that could be believed by the jury and, therefore, is 
sufficient to justify an instruction; second, although slight, corroborating 
physical evidence of an attack upon him existed; third, the fact that his 
claimed self-defense actions caused the death of a third party, a proper common 
law defense, precludes application of our rule that self-defense and accident 
are mutually exclusive, and finally, the State does not claim that Holloman's 
version of events does not satisfy the elements of self-defense from assault, 
and our review finds that the proposed instructions were supported by the 
evidence.  All factors support 
giving the instruction, and we hold that the failure to give the instruction was 
reversible error.

 

[¶29]      
The 
defense did not request an accident instruction; however, if, on remand, the 
defense prefers that the jury be instructed in addition to arguing that theory 
to the jury, then the trial court should determine whether the evidence requires 
an accident instruction.  Coburn 
v. State, 2001 WY 30, ¶¶11, 13, 20 P.3d 518, ¶¶11, 13 (Wyo. 2001).     

 

[¶30]      
In 
Wyoming, our rule on accident was settled many years ago, and provides the basis 
for fashioning an appropriate instruction.

 

"The 
taking of human life by accident, misadventure, or misfortune, while in the 
performance of a lawful act, exercising due care, and without harmful intent, is 
excusable; but all such facts must concur, and the absence of any one of them 
will involve guilt.  The homicide 
must have been committed while the accused was engaged in doing a lawful act, 
and by lawful means, with ordinary and reasonable care, and without any unlawful 
or harmful intent.  Gross 
negligence, even in the performance of a lawful act, may render the defendant 
liable."  Warren on Homicide, 
Permanent Edition, Sec. 164; 30 C.J. 87-88.  And that corresponds with our statute, 
which, in Sec. 32-205, Rev.St.1931, defining manslaughter, states that "whoever 
unlawfully kills any human being without malice expressed or implied, either 
voluntarily upon a sudden heat of passion, or involuntarily, but in the 
commission of some unlawful act, or by any culpable neglect or criminal 
carelessness, is guilty of manslaughter."

. 
. . . Warren on Homicide, supra, section 342, states the rule as follows: 
"Where 
the theory of the defendant is that the killing or assault was the result of 
accident or misfortune, and was unintentional, and such theory finds support in 
the evidence, it is the duty of the court to instruct fully and clearly as to 
the law relating to accident or misfortune.  Such an instruction is, however, 
unnecessary and properly refused in the absence of evidence tending to show 
accident or misfortune."

 

Eagan v. 
State, 128 P.2d 215, 222-23 (Wyo. 1942).  

 

[¶31]      
The 
conviction is reversed and remanded for trial with instructions that the trial 
court provide the jury with appropriate instructions on self-defense and, if 
applicable, accident.

FOOTNOTES

1This paragraph is taken verbatim from 
the Wyoming pattern instruction 8.09 entitled Self-Defense Against 
Assault.

2This paragraph is taken verbatim from 
the Wyoming pattern instruction 8.11 entitled Actual Danger Not Necessary To 
Claim Of Self-Defense.

3The trial court uses the term "again," 
because earlier it had refused the State's request for a lesser included 
instruction on voluntary manslaughter on grounds that the defendant had not 
testified that he knew that it was the victim who had provoked him. 

4Instruction No. 5:  "YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that "purposefully" 
means that the act was done intentionally or deliberately, and not 
accidentally."

5"Many defenses to criminal actions 
are not specifically contained within the specific criminal statute.  

Possible bars to conviction include 
alcoholism, alibi, amnesia, authority to maintain order and safety, 
brainwashing, chromosomal abnormality, consent, convulsion, custodial authority, 
defense of habitation, defense of others, defense of property, de minimis 
infraction, diplomatic immunity, domestic (or special) responsibility, double 
jeopardy, duress, entrapment, executive immunity, extreme emotional disturbance, 
hypnotism, immaturity, impaired consciousness, impossibility, incompetency, 
insanity, intoxication (voluntary and involuntary), involuntary act defenses, 
judicial authority, judicial immunity, justification, law enforcement authority, 
legislative immunity, lesser evils, medical authority, mental illness (apart 
from insanity), military orders (lawful and unlawful), mistake (of law and 
fact), necessity, official misstatement of law, parental authority, plea 
bargained immunity, provocation, public duty or authority, reflex action, 
renunciation, self-defense, somnambulism, the spousal defense to sexual assaults 
and theft, statute of limitations, subnormality, testimonial immunity, the 
unavailable law defense, unconsciousness, and withdrawal.'   1 Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses, 
p. 70, fn. 1 (1984)."

Keser, 706 P.2d  at 269.

6Duran v. State, 990 P.2d 1005 (Wyo. 1999), is 
also inapplicable. Duran held that self-defense is not available as a 
defense against a charge of reckless conduct. Id. at 1009.  Duran was charged with reckless 
aggravated vehicular homicide. She argued on appeal that the trial court erred 
in refusing to give a self-defense instruction. This Court 
said:

While Duran claims that the more 
persuasive approach finds self-defense is relevant to the "reckless" element of 
the offense, this Court is inclined to follow "[t]he majority of jurisdictions 
hold[ing] that self-defense requires intentional conduct." A charge of 
recklessness involves an unintentional act.  The trial court gave proper instructions 
to the jury on the elements of the offense and the definitions of "recklessness" 
and "proximate cause." The jury had the applicable law before it. The trial 
court did not err in refusing to submit an instruction on self-defense to the 
jury."

Id. (citations 
omitted).

 

7Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-71 (1975) stated in 
pertinent part:

"Whoever unlawfully kills an unborn 
child, . . . by any assault or assault and battery willfully committed upon a 
pregnant woman, knowing her condition, is guilty of a felony . . . 
."