Case Title: State v. Sneed

Citation: 2002-Ohio-4768

Docket Number: 20020310

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-09-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Sneed, 96 Ohio St.3d 348, 2002-Ohio-4768.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SNEED, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Sneed, 96 Ohio St.3d 348, 2002-Ohio-4768.] 
Appellate procedure — Application to reopen appeal from judgment of 
conviction based on claim of ineffective appellate counsel — Court of 
appeals’ denial of application affirmed, when — Application denied 
when applicant fails to raise a genuine issue as to whether he was 
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on appeal as required by 
App.R. 26(B)(5). 
(No. 2002-0310 — Submitted July 24, 2002 — Decided September 25, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. CA-6976. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Appellant, David Allen Sneed, challenges the denial of his 
application to reopen his direct appeal under App.R. 26(B). 
{¶2} 
Sneed was convicted of the aggravated murder of Herbert M. 
Rowan and sentenced to death.  Upon appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the 
conviction and death sentence.  State v. Sneed (May 22, 1989), Stark App. No. 
CA-6976, 1989 WL 63272.  On February 12, 1992, we also affirmed his 
conviction and sentence.  State v. Sneed (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 3, 584 N.E.2d 
1160. 
{¶3} 
In addition, the trial court denied Sneed’s amended petition for 
postconviction relief, and the court of appeals affirmed that judgment.  State v. 
Sneed (Sept. 29, 2000), Stark App. No. 1999CA00339, 2000 WL 1476140.  We 
declined to accept Sneed’s appeal.  State v. Sneed (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 1428, 
741 N.E.2d 893. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
{¶4} 
On November 8, 2001, appellant filed the instant application for 
reopening with the court of appeals pursuant to App.R. 26(B) and State v. 
Murnahan (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 60, 584 N.E.2d 1204, alleging ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel in his direct appeal. 
{¶5} 
In denying appellant’s application for reopening, the court of 
appeals relied on the reasoning “contained in the State of Ohio’s response in 
opposition.”  State v. Sneed (Jan. 14, 2002), Stark App. No. CA-6976.  The cause 
is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
{¶6} 
We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.  The two-pronged 
analysis found in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674, is the appropriate standard to assess whether Sneed has raised a 
“genuine issue” as to the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel in his request to 
reopen his appeal under App.R. 26(B)(5).  See State v. Spivey (1998), 84 Ohio 
St.3d 24, 25, 701 N.E.2d 696.  To show ineffective assistance, Sneed must prove 
that his counsel were deficient for failing to raise the issues he now presents and 
that there was a reasonable probability of success had they presented those claims 
on appeal.  State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, 
paragraph three of the syllabus. Moreover, to justify reopening his appeal, Sneed 
“bears the burden of establishing that there was a ‘genuine issue’ as to whether he 
has a ‘colorable claim’ of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal.”  State v. 
Spivey, 84 Ohio St.3d at 25, 701 N.E.2d 696. 
{¶7} 
Strickland charges us to “appl[y ] a heavy measure of deference to 
counsel’s judgments,” 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, and to 
“indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range 
of reasonable professional assistance,” id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  
“Moreover, we must bear in mind that appellate counsel need not raise every 
possible issue in order to render constitutionally effective assistance.  See Jones v. 
January Term, 2002 
3 
Barnes (1983), 463 U.S. 745, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987.”  State v. Sanders 
(2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 150, 151-152, 761 N.E.2d 18. 
{¶8} 
We have reviewed appellant’s three propositions of law alleging, 
inter alia, deficient performance by appellate counsel.  In none of the three 
propositions of law has Sneed raised “a genuine issue as to whether [he] was 
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on appeal” before the court of 
appeals, as required under App.R. 26(B)(5). (Emphasis added.)  This decision 
renders moot Sneed’s other issues. 
{¶9} 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Robert D. Horowitz, Stark County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald 
Mark Caldwell, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and Christa M. Hohmann, 
Assistant State Public Defender, for appellant. 
__________________