Case Title: State ex rel. Royal v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 2002-Ohio-1935

Docket Number: 20002317

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Royal v. Indus. Comm., 95 Ohio St.3d 97, 2002-Ohio-1935.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. ROYAL, APPELLEE, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET 
AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Royal v. Indus. Comm. (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 97.] 
Workers’ compensation — Prerequisites necessary to the proper exercise of 
continuing jurisdiction by Industrial Commission — State ex rel. Nicholls v. 
Indus. Comm. and State ex rel. Foster v. Indus. Comm., applied. 
(No. 00-2317 — Submitted January 29, 2002 — Decided April 24, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 00AP-89. 
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Per Curiam.  All agree that appellee-claimant Gerald Royal’s two industrial 
injuries have left his right arm barely functional.  In 1996, he moved appellant 
Industrial Commission of Ohio for compensation for permanent total disability 
(“PTD”).  A year later, a staff hearing officer (“SHO”) granted that application. 
 
Appellant-employer Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation timely sought 
reconsideration, alleging that the SHO had (1) misread certain medical and vocational 
reports and (2) equated loss of use in one arm with statutory PTD.  Reconsideration 
was denied on October 28, 1997, because the request did not meet the criteria of 
commission resolution No. R95-1-09. 
 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh responded with a motion for reconsideration of the 
denial of the first motion for reconsideration.  Restating its earlier position, 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh claimed that its first motion satisfied R95-1-09(D)(1)(a). 
 
On December 8, 1997, the commission granted reconsideration “based on the 
possibility of an error in the previous Industrial Commission order.”  It vacated the 
earlier denial of reconsideration and set the matter for hearing on the merits of the 
PTD claim.  Claimant, in turn, moved to vacate the grant of reconsideration. 
 
A bifurcated hearing on March 3, 1998, addressed both the propriety of 
reconsideration and the merits of the PTD claim.  Two identically dated orders 
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emerged from those proceedings.  In the first order, the commission affirmed the 
grant of reconsideration based on the presence of a mistake of law or fact, citing R95-
1-09(D)(1)(d).  It identified the mistakes as (1) the SHO’s misrepresentation of a 
particular vocational report and (2) the absence of an analysis of nonmedical 
disability factors. 
 
That decision was not unanimous.  A dissenting commissioner felt that the 
December 8, 1997 reconsideration order did not satisfy State ex rel. Nicholls v. Indus. 
Comm. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 454, 692 N.E.2d 188, or State ex rel. Foster v. Indus. 
Comm. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 320, 707 N.E.2d 1122.  He criticized the order’s 
reliance on the mere “possibility of an error,” objecting that “[t]here was no 
indication what the error was or even which Commission order contained an error, 
the 10/28/97 order or the 9/24/97 order.” 
 
The denial of PTD and a declaration of overpayment in the second order 
prompted claimant to file a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County.  The magistrate found that reconsideration had been proper, but the 
appeals court disagreed.  The former recommended a holding that Wheeling-
Pittsburgh’s motions had adequately apprised claimant of the issues on which 
reconsideration was sought.  The court of appeals, on the other hand, focused on the 
Nicholls/Foster prohibition against such vague language as “possibility of an error.”  
It found no “clear error” within the employer’s motions so as to permit the 
commission to later rehabilitate its original deficient order.  Mandamus was 
accordingly granted.  This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
Reconsideration jurisdiction derives from the commission’s general grant of 
continuing jurisdiction under R.C. 4123.52.  Because neither R.C. 4123.52 nor 
commission resolution R95-1-09 prohibits multiple requests for reconsideration, 
controversy hinges on the justification for its exercise—here, the nebulous 
“possibility of an error.” 
 
Continuing jurisdiction cannot be exercised indiscriminately.  We have 
previously enumerated several acceptable bases for its exercise.  We have also 
January Term, 2002 
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expressly ruled that “possibility of error” is not one of them.  Nicholls; Foster, supra.  
Appellants concede this, but offer two responses:  (1) identification of the error in a 
later order cures the defect, and (2) even if not, Wheeling-Pittsburgh’s motions 
adequately apprised the claimant of the bases on which reconsideration was sought.  
Both arguments fail. 
 
Nicholls and Foster recognized that a reference to the possibility of 
unspecified error was meaningless and prevented both effective rebuttal and judicial 
review.  As we observed in Nicholls: 
 
“Continuing jurisdiction is not unlimited.  Its prerequisites are (1) new and 
changed circumstances, (2) fraud, (3) clear mistake of fact, (4) clear mistake of law, 
or (5) error by inferior tribunal. 
 
“None of these prerequisites exists here.  Again, there has been no allegation 
of new and changed circumstances or fraud.  There is also no clear error of any kind.  
The reconsideration order cites only the possibility of error, and an unspecified error 
at that. 
 
“Our approval of the staff hearing officers’ order on reconsideration would 
effectively give the commission unrestricted jurisdiction.  Error is always possible, 
and its existence cannot be refuted when the commission is not made to reveal what 
the perceived error is.  We find, therefore, that the mere possibility of unspecified 
error cannot sustain the invocation of continuing jurisdiction.”  (Emphasis sic; 
citations omitted.)  Nicholls, supra, 81 Ohio St.3d at 458-459, 692 N.E.2d 188. 
 
Foster went further: 
 
“In this case, the commission abandoned conjecture and found that there was 
error.  But, again, it does not identify the error.  Thus, despite any ‘improvement’ in 
the order’s language, it still defies the spirit of Nicholls.  Nicholls recognized that the 
propriety of continuing jurisdiction cannot be evaluated if the commission does not 
reveal, in a meaningful way, why it was exercised.  In this instance, as in Nicholls, 
claimant cannot refute the allegation of error without knowing what the alleged 
mistake is.  Saying that an error is ‘real’ as opposed to ‘possible’ is equally hollow if 
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there is no way to test the legitimacy of the assertion.”  Foster, supra, 85 Ohio St.3d 
at 322, 707 N.E.2d 1122. 
 
Identification of error after reconsideration does allow a reviewing court to 
adjudicate the propriety of the commission’s invocation of continuing jurisdiction.  It 
does little to help the party opposing the motion, since it comes too late to allow a 
meaningful challenge to reconsideration at the administrative level.  Accordingly, 
appellants’ rehabilitation theory is rejected. 
 
Appellants next argue that given the notification intent of Foster and 
Nicholls, so long as the nonmovant is timely advised of the basis on which 
reconsideration is sought—or, as here, a specific error is alleged—it does not matter 
whether notice is provided through the movant’s motion or by commission order.  
Appellants maintain that Wheeling-Pittsburgh’s detailed narrative motion adequately 
apprised claimant of the alleged errors on which Wheeling-Pittsburgh hoped to obtain 
reconsideration. 
 
The instant facts render this argument tenuous.  Wheeling-Pittsburgh alleged 
two main errors—one of fact and one of law.  The error of law found by the 
commission, however, was unrelated to the one alleged by Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 
which means that claimant lacked an opportunity to prepare a defense in advance. 
 
The reliance on “mistake of fact” is equally untenable.  When the initial PTD 
order and disputed reports are read closely, the perceived error is not so much 
mistake as a difference in evidentiary interpretation.  The report of vocational 
consultant Roger Livingston is confusing and can be interpreted several ways.  The 
commission and appellant-employer took the narrow interpretation, looking 
exclusively at the academic and vocational conclusions.  The SHO, on the other hand, 
read these things in conjunction with the unfavorable medical prognosis that 
Livingston repeatedly stressed, and concluded that regardless of an affirmative 
vocational profile, claimant could not overcome the obstacles imposed by the loss of 
his right arm. 
January Term, 2002 
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This is significant because a legitimate disagreement as to the evidentiary 
interpretation does not mean that one of the interpretations is wrong.  Thus, any 
assertion of a clear error of fact is questionable.  Moreover, one must again remember 
that this “error,” too, was before the commission when reconsideration was initially 
denied.  This also renders debatable the prerequisite of clarity, as apparently no one 
felt that a clear error existed the first time around based on the same material. 
 
We find, therefore, that the prerequisites necessary to the proper exercise of 
continuing jurisdiction—either as a general grant or as reconsideration—were not 
met. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
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Ward, Kaps, Bainbridge, Maurer & Melvin and Thomas H. Bainbridge, for 
appellee. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Stephen D. Plymale, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellant Industrial Commission of Ohio. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Bradley K. Sinnott and Corrine S. 
Carman, for appellant Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation. 
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