Case Title: WILLIAM PAUL GUNNETT V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-01-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
WILLIAM PAUL GUNNETT V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 8104 P.3d 775Case Number: 03-150Decided: 01/27/2005
 
 
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 
 
                                                                                                
  

 
 
WILLIAM 
PAUL GUNNETT,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant) 
,

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff) 
.

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSheridanCounty

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Ryan 
R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument presented by Mr. 
Roden.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Robin Sessions Cooley, 
Deputy Attorney General.  Argument 
presented by Ms. Cooley.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ, and STEBNER, 
DJ.

 
 
            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, 
William Paul Gunnett (Gunnett), contends that his conviction for aggravated 
assault and battery should be reversed because the district court allowed a 
juror to communicate with his wife, during the course of the jury's final 
deliberations, in order to assess whether that juror was suffering confusion as 
the result of his medical condition.  
We will affirm.

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      Gunnett 
articulates this issue:

 
 
Whether 
the district court erred in the course of action it took in assessing and 
determining whether a juror was confused during deliberations, based upon a 
juror's baseless allegation, when it authorized and directed the alleged 
confused juror's wife to conduct the inquiry, to the prejudice of [Gunnett] and 
in violation of his rights to a fair and impartial jury.

 
 
The 
State reduces its statement of the issue to the query:  "Whether [Gunnett] received a fair trial 
by an impartial jury?"

 
 

 
 
[¶3]      The facts 
underlying Gunnett's crime are of very little significance.  It suffices, for the sake of context, to 
note that Gunnett was involved in a drunken brawl.  Gunnett got into a fight with a fellow 
inebriate and was attacked by him.  
During the fight, Gunnett stabbed him with a knife.  It was a given that the victim was the 
aggressor in the fight, and the central issue was whether Gunnett was justified 
in employing deadly force under the circumstances.  At his first trial, the jury was unable 
to reach a unanimous verdict.  The 
events set out below occurred at his second trial.

 
 
[¶4]      The facts 
pertinent to this appeal arose at 5:50 p.m., on April 3, 2003, at the very end 
of Gunnett's trial.  The jury had 
reached a decision and was called into the courtroom to deliver its 
verdict.  The presiding judge read 
aloud the verdict that the jury had found Gunnett guilty of the charged 
crime.  Defense counsel asked that 
the jury be polled.  The trial judge 
asked the clerk of court to poll the jury.  
When asked if that was her verdict, the first juror answered, "Yes."  However, the second juror (Juror 2)1 answered "No."  Each of the other ten jurors responded 
"Yes."

 
 
[¶5]      The trial court 
then provided the jury this oral instruction:

 
 
            
As explained to you, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, before a Court can 
accept the verdict, it must be unanimous.  
There's indication that it may not be.  I need to excuse you right now and 
confer with counsel about what type of instruction, if any, we may give 
you.  So the Court will be in 
recess.

 
 
A brief 
conference was held between the trial court and counsel, and it was agreed that 
the jury should be instructed that it must be unanimous in its decision and 
should continue its deliberations.  
The oral instruction given the jury was this:

 
 
Ladies 
and Gentlemen of the Jury, as you were previously instructed, jury verdicts in 
Wyoming must 
be unanimous.  You are invited to 
review the jury instructions previously given to you, and we're going to send 
you back into the jury room for further deliberations.

Court 
will be in recess until you've reached your verdict.

 
 
[¶6]      At this point, 
Juror 2 spoke up and said:  "I 
thought we reached a verdict."  A 
fellow juror responded:  "We did, 
but you said no.  When you answered 
no, that's what's doing all of this."  
The jury panel then left the courtroom and returned to its 
deliberations.

 
 
[¶7]      At 6:14 p.m., 
court and counsel met outside the presence of the jury, and this discussion was 
had:

 
 
                        
THE COURT:  We're on the 
record outside the presence of the jury, but in the presence of the Defendant 
and counsel.  The bailiff has 
reported to me2 that [Juror 2] has exhibited some 
nonsensical behavior to the rest of the jury, appears to be confused.  He is a diabetic.  There's some concern as to whether or 
not he needs insulin.

Before 
going on the record, I discussed with counsel the possibility of recalling our 
alternate, who was told to give us a number in case we needed him; however, 
[defense counsel] informed me he struck up a conversation with [the alternate] 
at some length after he was dismissed from the panel.

 
 
[¶8]      The trial court 
decided that it would telephone Juror 2's wife to obtain information.  The court was unable to resolve anything 
over the phone and asked the wife to come to the courthouse.  Once she was en route to the courthouse, 
defense counsel requested a mistrial "on the basis that now we've got at least 
one person coming in to check on the juror while the juror is sick and 
confused."  The prosecutor argued 
against the motion for mistrial and suggested that, since the hour was now late, 
the jury should retire for the night and resume its deliberations the following 
day.  The trial court took the 
mistrial motion and the recommendation that the jury retire for the day under 
advisement, but decided to await the arrival of Juror 2's 
wife.

 
 
[¶9]      At 6:43 p.m., the 
wife of Juror 2 arrived at the courthouse, and the district court gave her these 
directions:

 
 
The 
bailiff indicated to us that your husband was experiencing some mental confusion 
about the process and maybe had said some nonsensical things, so I want to make 
sure that you're here to take care of him; and if he needs medical attention 
give it to him.

To try 
to maintain the integrity of the trial, if we can, I just want to make sure that 
you understand that jurors are not permitted to discuss the case that they are 
deliberating about with anybody, except each other.  So, you know, please don't talk to any 
other jurors or please don't talk to your husband about the case.  But we certainly want you to check up on 
his health concerns.

 
 
[¶10]   Juror 2's wife expressed her 
understanding of the trial court's directions, and she left the courtroom to 
speak with her husband.  Defense 
counsel objected to that arrangement, i.e., the wife going to talk to her 
husband in the jury room.  The 
district court explained that she was not going to be in the jury room, but in 
the hallway, and not in the presence of any other jurors.  Defense counsel renewed his motion for a 
mistrial on the basis that there was no way to assess how long Juror 2 had been 
confused, and he might well have been confused throughout the 
trial.

 
 
[¶11]   At 6:57 p.m., Juror 2's wife 
returned to the courtroom and related that she did not believe her husband was 
having an insulin reaction and that she did not perceive that he was 
confused.  The trial court then made 
a decision to allow the jury to resume its deliberations.  Defense counsel again renewed his motion 
for mistrial, this time on the basis that the remainder of the jury "may be 
putting heat on him and, in effect, twisting his arm to get him to agree with 
the rest of them."  The district 
court again denied the motion for mistrial.

 
 
[¶12]   At 7:10 p.m., the trial court, 
counsel, Gunnett, and the bailiff assembled in the courtroom.  The bailiff reported to the court that 
the jury "should know in about ten minutes if they are going to make any 
headway."  Defense counsel objected 
to "giving the jury ten minutes to make headway."  He renewed his motion for mistrial based 
on all the proceedings that followed the polling of the jury, opining that:  "It's fairly clear that he wasn't 
confused, that he knew what he was doing and that there was an attempt by this 
jury to, in effect, pull a fast one; and I object and ask for a mistrial."  The trial court then made clear on the 
record that the jury was not in any way limited to ten minutes, rather that was 
their request, and the trial court intended to honor it.

 
 
[¶13]   The jury continued its 
deliberations for about 15 minutes and indicated that it had reached a 
verdict.  The verdict was read aloud 
by the court, and it again was a guilty verdict.  The trial court again polled the 
jury.  This time Juror 2 responded 
"Uh-huh  yes."  Defense counsel 
then indicated that it would file a motion for mistrial or a motion for new 
trial.  In response, the district 
court addressed Juror 2:

 
 
[Juror 
2], you indicated at our previous polling that it was not your verdict; and I'm 
sure that counsel is concerned that you received some sort of undue pressure to 
change your mind.  Is  I'm not 
trying to get into a big dialogue, but did you feel like you were pressured to 
reach this verdict?

 
 
Juror 2 
responded, "Oh, heavens no."  Court 
was adjourned and the jury left at 7:38 p.m.  However, proceedings continued in 
chambers immediately thereafter, and defense counsel renewed his mistrial 
motion, as well as a motion for new trial.  
Defense counsel also indicated that he would formally file those motions 
in writing.

 
 
[¶14]   On April 16, 2003, a motion for new 
trial was filed, based on "the best interests of justice and jury 
misconduct."  It was set for hearing 
on May 9, 2003.  At the hearing, 
defense counsel indicated he did not have any additional information for the 
trial court and that the motion had been "investigated," but he had been unable 
"to turn up anything further with respect to it."  The State did not file a written 
response, although the prosecutor did make an oral argument reciting some 
pertinent authority.  By order 
entered on May 28, 2003, the district court denied Gunnett's motion for a new 
trial.

 
 

 
 
[¶15]   The question of whether to grant or 
deny a motion for new trial is a matter addressed to the discretion of the trial 
court.  The trial court's decision 
will not be reversed without a showing of abuse of that discretion.  A trial court abuses its discretion when 
it could not have reasonably concluded as it did.  In this context, "reasonably" means 
sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  Robinson v. State, 2003 WY 32, 
¶18, 64 P.3d 743, ¶18 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶16]   The question posed is answered in 
part by reference to W.R.Cr.P. 31(d):

 
 
Rule 
31.  
Verdict.

 
 
            
(a)  Return. -- The verdict shall be unanimous.  It shall be returned by the jury to the 
judge in open court.

            
(b)  Several defendants. -- If there are two or more 
defendants, the jury at any time during its deliberations may return a verdict 
or verdicts with respect to a defendant or defendants as to whom it has agreed; 
if the jury cannot agree with respect to all, the defendant or defendants as to 
whom it does not agree may be tried again.

            
(c)  Conviction of lesser offense. -- The defendant may 
be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged or of 
an attempt to commit either the offense charged or an offense necessarily 
included therein if the attempt is an offense.

  
 
 
            
(d)  Poll of Jury. -- When a verdict is returned and 
before it is recorded the jury shall be polled at the request of any party or 
upon the court's own motion.  If 
upon the poll there is not unanimous concurrence, the jury may be directed to 
retire for further deliberations or may be discharged.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
[¶17]   W.R.Cr.P. 31(d) is very similar to 
its federal counterpart, F.R.Cr.P. 31(d),3 and it is well known that we often 
look to federal precedents when construing our own identical or similar 
rules.   See, e.g., Hoos v. 
State, 2003 WY 101, ¶10, 75 P.3d 609, ¶10 (Wyo. 2003).  In their treatise on federal practice 
and procedure, Professors Wright, King, and Klein provide this 
guidance:

 
 
            
A verdict is not valid and final until the deliberations are over, the 
result is announced in open court, and no dissent by a juror is registered.  Before the verdict is recorded, the jury 
must be polled at the request of any party or on the court's own motion.  The purpose of this procedure, required 
by Rule 31(d), is to ascertain with certainty that each of the jurors approves 
of the verdict as returned, and that no one has been coerced or induced to agree 
to a verdict to which he has not fully assented.

            

It is 
reversible error to deny the defendant a reasonable opportunity to have the jury 
polled.  The defendant must make a 
seasonable demand, however, or he will be held to have waived a poll.  The court can always poll the jury on 
its own motion.  The procedure for a 
poll applies to not guilty verdicts just as it does to guilty 
verdicts.

 
 
            
Until the rule was amended in 1998, it had been silent on how a jury poll 
was to be conducted and it was thought this was within the discretion of the 
court.  There had been general 
agreement that it is better that the jurors be polled individually rather than 
collectively, and the rule was amended to require this method.4

 
 
            
Although it is not the purpose of polling the jury to invite each juror 
to reconsider his decision, a juror is clearly entitled to change his mind when 
polled about a verdict to which he had agreed in the jury room.  If upon the poll the jury is not 
unanimous it may be directed to retire for further deliberations or it may be 
discharged.  The court may also 
repoll the jury if this seems advisable.  
The court necessarily has much discretion about what to do under these 
circumstances, but it must take great care to avoid any action that may coerce a 
unanimous verdict.

 
 
3 
Charles Alan Wright, Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Criminal 3d § 517, at 52-62 (2004); also see Harris v. State, 
933 P.2d 1114, 1121-22 (Wyo. 1997) (trial court properly may ask for 
clarification of juror's oral response during polling of jury, so long as it is 
not in any way coercive); and see generally 23A C.J.S. Criminal 
Law §§ 1388-1401 (1989), and 50A C.J.S. Juries §§ 508 and 512 
(1997).

 
 
[¶18]   However, once the jury returned to 
the jury room, but before it resumed its deliberations, the trial court received 
a communication from others on the jury, through the bailiff, that Juror 2 
appeared to be confused and saying nonsensical things.  Thus, in this case we are required to 
move beyond that basic procedure because Juror 2 had some communication with his 
wife during the jury's deliberations.  
The law is well settled that it is improper for a juror to have any 
out-of-court communications with witnesses, the court, parties, or counsel 
concerning a case.  However, a mere 
showing of improper communication is not sufficient, prejudice must also be 
shown.  Skinner v. State, 
2001 WY 102, ¶¶12-15, 33 P.3d 758, ¶¶12-15 (Wyo. 2001); also see State v. 
Weisz, 2002 ND 207, ¶11, 654 N.W.2d 416, ¶11, (N.D. 2002) (telephone call 
received by juror during supper break, in which juror was informed his wife had 
been in accident, while being an impermissible communication, did not constitute 
obvious error denying defendant fair trial).

 
 
[¶19]   W.R.E. 606(b) also plays a role in 
this case:

 
 
(b) 
Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. -- Upon an inquiry into 
the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any 
matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or 
to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as 
influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or 
concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, nor may his affidavit 
or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be 
precluded from testifying be received, but a juror may testify on the questions 
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's 
attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon 
any juror.

 
 
[¶20]   This rule greatly limits the 
authority of the district court to make any sort of detailed inquiry with 
respect to jury deliberations in a case such as this.  See 27 Charles Alan Wright & 
Victor James Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 6075 
(1990).

 
 

 
 
[¶21]   In his brief, Gunnett makes a 
wide-ranging argument that his trial, and especially the verdict portion of the 
trial, was unfair and inaccurate because of the events set out more fully 
above.  To some extent, Gunnett's 
assertions of error gain strength from the circumstance that at his first trial 
the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict, and a mistrial was 
declared.

 
 
[¶22]   At the outset, we will eliminate 
one avenue of argument pursued by Gunnett.  
Our cases dealing with the presence of an alternate juror who is present 
in the jury room during jury deliberations, and the presumption of prejudice 
that goes with that situation, is not pertinent to our discussion in this 
case.  See Hoos, 75 P.3d 609; 
and McAdams v. State, 2003 WY 104, 75 P.3d 665 (Wyo. 
2003).

 
 
[¶23]   Because Gunnett's argument is not 
precisely focused, it falls to this Court to isolate the issues that are of 
significance here.  We will rely in 
great part on the allegations contained in the motion for new trial.  That was the document that the trial 
court had to rely upon in deciding the motion.  Gunnett asserted that the jury sent a 
note to the trial judge to the effect that Juror 2 was "hopelessly 
confused."  Of course, the record 
will only support that the bailiff reported to the trial judge that the jury 
informed him they were concerned about Juror 2 because he seemed confused and 
had said some nonsensical things.  
Of course, the record supplies some support for such a concern because it 
appears from the record that Juror 2 did not realize that he answered "No" 
during the jury poll, and further that he did not comprehend that that was the 
reason the jury was being sent back to deliberate.  In addition, it was known to all 
participants that Juror 2 was diabetic and that he routinely took insulin.  The focus of the district court's 
concern at that juncture was the well-being of the juror.  The trial court opted to have Juror 2's 
wife check on him so as to ascertain if he could continue his role as a 
juror.  After hearing the report 
from his wife, the district court was satisfied that Juror 2 was all right and 
could continue to serve as a juror.  
The jury then continued its deliberations and reached a unanimous 
verdict.  The thrust of the motion 
for new trial was summarized like this:  
"The actions by the jury indicate a desire by the jury to get an 
alternate5 placed on the jury and were 
extremely misleading to the Court which believed the juror to be confused based 
upon the jury's assertions to the Court."

 
 
[¶24]   Gunnett's appeal follows a 
different tack from that pursued in the trial court, focusing here on what he 
characterizes as improper contact between Juror 2 and his wife, as well as the 
district court's brief questioning of Juror 2 as to whether he had been coerced 
during the jury's final 15 minutes of deliberations.  In support of these contentions, Gunnett 
relies in significant part on our cases in which an alternate (13th 
juror) is allowed to participate in the jury's 
deliberations.

 
 
[¶25]   The general discussion of issues 
such as those at issue here reveals that the variety of problems that can arise 
in such context are many indeed.  27 
Wright & Gold, supra, § 6075.  In such circumstances, many courts have 
abandoned the "presumption" mechanism in favor of common sense inquiries into 
the likely effect of the information or influences on the average 
juror:

 
 
            
Under all of these standards, the court must attempt to draw inferences 
as to the probable effects of the extraneous information or outside influence in 
light of objectively apparent facts about the context in which those matters 
came to the jury's attention.  Thus, 
probable effect is estimated in light of the importance of the issue to which 
the information or influence related, the nature of the information or 
influence, the strength of the admitted evidence supporting the verdict, the 
number of jurors exposed to the information or influence, when the jury was 
exposed to the information or influence, how long the jury discussed these 
matters during deliberations, the manner in which the court dealt with the 
information at trial, and any other matters which logically might have a bearing 
on the effect of the information or influence on the jury.

 
 
27 
Wright & Gold, supra, § 6075, at 469-71; and see Wiser v. 
People, 732 P.2d 1139, 1142-44 (Colo. 1987).  Although the district court did not 
explicitly engage in such an analysis, it is evident that it tacitly employed a 
"common sense" approach throughout this episode.

 
 
[¶26]   With respect to the allegation that 
Juror 2 was "confused" and saying "nonsensical" things, courts have refused to 
treat allegations of physical or mental incompetence as raising an issue of 
"outside influence." 27 Wright & Gold, supra, § 6075, at 458; and 
see Keller v. State, 651 P.2d 1339, 1342-43 (Okl.Cr. 1982) (Verdict could 
not be impeached by juror's affidavit that she did not think defendant had been 
proven guilty but acceded to guilty verdict because she "was so tired."); and 
United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 78 (2nd Cir. 1974) ("It is well settled that only 
clear evidence of a juror's incompetence to understand the issues and to 
deliberate at the time of his service requires setting aside a verdict.  And only strong evidence that it is 
likely that the juror suffered from such incompetence during jury service will 
justify an inquiry into whether such incompetence in fact did exist.").  Here, the impermissible contact did not 
relate to any issue in the case.  
Indeed, it appears no "extraneous" information of any sort was conveyed 
to Juror 2.  Only Juror 2 was 
affected by the contact, and the record gives us no cause to speculate to the 
contrary.

 
 

 
 
[¶27]   We hold that the trial court did 
not err in its handling of the issues that arose after the initial poll of the 
jury.  The record does not support 
the assertion that there was any improper interaction between the jury and the 
bailiff, the bailiff and the court, or the court and the jury.  The record does not support speculation 
that Juror 2 was not competent to continue his jury service in these 
circumstances.  Likewise, the record 
does not support the very speculative assertion that the jury was attempting to 
unseat Juror 2, in favor of an alternate, because it viewed Juror 2 as 
incompetent and leaning toward acquittal.  
The brief contact between Juror 2 and his wife does not support that the 
wife's inquiry into her husband's well-being prejudiced the defendant in any 
way.  The trial court did not 
improperly inquire into Juror 2's reasoning process by asking him if he had been 
coerced into changing his vote.  
Indeed, the only reasonable view of the record is that Juror 2 misspoke 
during the initial jury poll, saying "No," when he intended to say "Yes."  A reasonable review of the record most 
strongly supports that any perception the other jurors may have had that Juror 2 
was confused and speaking nonsensically arose from his lack of awareness that he 
had said "No," when he intended to say "Yes."

 
 
[¶28]   Finding no basis to hold that the 
district court abused its discretion, or that the defendant's right to a fair 
trial was prejudiced by the proceedings below, the judgment and sentence of the 
district court are affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

   1Earlier in the 
proceedings, the district court and counsel, as well as the other jurors, became 
aware that Juror 2 suffered from diabetes and needed to take his insulin 
regularly.

   2At the outset of 
the trial, the jury was introduced to the bailiff and instructed:  "If it is necessary for a juror to 
request something or if they think they need to contact someone outside the 
proceedings for personal reasons, it's got to be done with the Court's 
permission and through the bailiff.  
So, he's the fellow that you need to tell first.  He's required then to tell me and the 
lawyers for the case so that everyone will know what's going 
on."

 
 
Prior to the trial, in the presence of 
the jury, the bailiff was also given an oath:  "Do you solemnly swear that you will 
take charge of this jury, that you will not communicate with them yourself about 
the case or allow anyone else to communicate with them; and when so directed, 
you will return them into this Court?"

 
 
Just before the jury initially retired 
to deliberate, the trial court asked the jury if there was anyone of them who 
did not feel capable of deliberating for health reasons.  No juror responded to that inquiry, and 
the alternate was excused, but with directions to leave a phone number in case 
he was needed.

 
 
Before the jury retired to deliberate, 
the bailiff was given a second oath:  
"Do you solemnly swear that you will take charge of this jury and keep 
them together, not permit the jurors to communicate with anyone except 
themselves, not converse with them yourself about the case, except to perhaps 
ask them if they have agreed upon a verdict; and that you will not communicate 
the status of their deliberations before the verdict is returned?  Lastly, do you swear when they have 
agreed upon a verdict, you will return them into this 
Court?"

   3The language of 
the federal rule is this:

 
 
            
(d) Jury Poll.  After 
a verdict is returned but before the jury is discharged, the court must on a 
party's request, or may on its own, poll the jurors individually.  If the poll reveals a lack of unanimity, 
the court may direct the jury to deliberate further or may declare a mistrial 
and discharge the jury.

   4Wyoming's version of this 
rule does not reflect the 1998 amendment.  
However, it is our experience that trial courts virtually always conduct 
an individual poll of the jury, and that was done in this 
instance.

   5Of course, at 
this point in the proceedings, an alternate juror was no longer available to be 
substituted for Juror 2 because of defense counsel's contact with 
him.