Case Title: Blevins v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 031022

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2004-01-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, and Lemons, JJ., 
and Compton and Stephenson, S.JJ. 
 
LAWRENCE KEVIN BLEVINS 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 031022 
SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
 
 
 
January 16, 2004 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
The issue in this appeal involves a trial court's refusal 
to declare a mistrial based on alleged juror partiality. 
I 
 
In a jury trial in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Roanoke, Lawrence Kevin Blevins was convicted of object sexual 
penetration, malicious wounding, and abduction with intent to 
defile.  Blevins was sentenced to a total prison term of life, 
plus 40 years. 
 
Thereafter, Blevins appealed his convictions to the Court 
of Appeals.  On April 29, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued an 
opinion affirming the convictions.  Blevins v. Commonwealth, 40 
Va. App. 412, 579 S.E.2d 658 (2003).  We awarded Blevins an 
appeal, limited to the assignment of error as follows:  "The 
trial court erred in overruling the [defendant's] motion for 
mistrial based on juror untruthfulness during voir dire." 
II 
A 
 
A brief summary of the facts relating to the crime will 
suffice.  On the evening of January 16, 2001, the victim had 
finished her work and was walking to her automobile, parked in a 
parking garage in the City of Roanoke.  She was alone, and, as 
she put her key into her car door lock, "all hell broke loose."  
At that moment, the victim came face to face with the accused, 
who began to strike her with his fists.  The accused told the 
victim that, if she would cooperate by performing a sex act with 
him, he would stop hitting her.  The beating stopped, and the 
accused unzipped the victim's pants and inserted a finger into 
her vagina.  He also fondled the victim's breasts. 
 
Several minutes later, and before the accused could rape 
the victim, a car approached the victim's vehicle.  When the 
approaching car stopped, the victim was able to escape to it, 
and the accused fled the scene. 
B 
 
The facts pertaining to the issue in this appeal are as 
follows.  During voir dire, the trial court asked the 
prospective jurors whether "any of you or any members of your 
immediate family [have] ever been the victim of a serious 
offense?"  All members of the venire answered negatively. 
 
Immediately following the conclusion of Blevins' trial, 
Deputy Jessie W. Roberts encountered juror Bonnie Divers in the 
jury room.  Divers told Roberts that she was waiting for someone 
 
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to walk with her to her car, which was parked in a lot several 
blocks away.  Roberts offered to escort Divers to her car.  
Roberts informed Divers that, if she had parked her car in a 
nearby parking garage, she would have been reimbursed for her 
parking expenses.  Divers replied that she did not park in the 
parking garage because, 13 to 15 years previously, she had been 
the victim of an armed robbery in a parking garage. 
 
Thereafter, Roberts informed the Commonwealth's Attorney of 
this conversation, and the Commonwealth's Attorney reported the 
information to defense counsel.  Six days after the trial, 
Blevins filed a motion for a mistrial based upon Divers' failure 
to reveal that she had been the victim of a serious offense. 
 
On September 4, 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing 
on the motion.  At the hearing, the trial court asked Divers why 
she had not answered affirmatively when the court had asked, 
during voir dire, whether any prospective juror had been the 
victim of a serious offense.  The following exchange then 
occurred: 
DIVERS: Obviously, I didn't hear you or I didn't 
understand.  I would have raised both hands up to 
have not been on this trial.  I mean I don't like 
excitement.  I would have let you known, had I 
heard you and understood what you were asking. 
 
THE      So you didn't deliberately withhold that 
COURT:   information? 
DIVERS:  Oh, no, no, definitely not.  This is not my 
thing.  I don't like excitement. 
 
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THE     Now, the next question is:  Because you either  
 
COURT:   didn't hear, or misunderstood, or didn't  
 
 
         understand, having not answered that question, did  
 
 
    the prior bad experience you went through in any  
 
 
    way affect your ability to fairly and impartially  
 
 
    hear Mr. Blevins' case? 
 
DIVERS:  Absolutely not; I did my judgment on the evidence 
and the evidence only.  It was nothing personal 
between nobody, because I don't know anybody here, 
so why would I want to do something like that.  
That would be . . . wrong of me, but it had no 
effect on my decision at all. 
 
 
Divers further stated, in answer to questions by the 
Commonwealth's Attorney, that her verdict "was strictly on the 
evidence, nothing about my personal life."  She also said that 
she was "not bias[ed]." 
III 
A 
 
In the present case, the post-trial hearing that the trial 
court conducted on Blevins' motion for a mistrial was the 
appropriate remedy for allegations of juror partiality.  See 
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982).  Following the 
hearing, the trial court rendered a written opinion, finding, 
inter alia, that Blevins 
has failed to show that the juror failed to answer 
honestly to a material question posed by the court 
during voir dire.  Juror Divers did not give a correct 
answer to the question posed, but she was not 
deliberately evasive.  Either she did not hear the 
question or she did not understand the question.  She 
was not dishonest.  She even wondered why she was not 
asked about the incident during voir dire.  She 
disclosed the incident to the deputy sheriff without 
 
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reservation.  Her actions do not reveal dishonesty but 
mere inattention or a lack of understanding.  The 
Court finds that the defendant has not shown that the 
juror failed to answer honestly to a material question 
during voir dire. 
The trial court also found that "there was no valid basis for a 
challenge for cause because the juror was not biased." 
 
The court further found the following: 
 
Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, 
the Court has determined that Juror Divers was not 
biased against the defendant and decided the case 
based solely on the evidence presented at trial.  She 
testified that the robbery did not affect her ability 
to hear the Blevins case.  She further testified that 
she was not biased against Mr. Blevins and did not 
deliberately deceive the Court.  She based her 
decision strictly on the evidence.  Thus, the Court 
finds that she was not biased and served as an 
impartial juror in the defendant's case.  Therefore, 
Mr. Blevins' constitutional rights to due process and 
an impartial jury were not violated. 
 
Finally, the trial court found "beyond a reasonable doubt 
that [Divers] gave [Blevins] a fair and impartial trial" and 
that, "[b]ased upon the lack of deception by [Divers], combined 
with the overwhelming guilt of [Blevins], . . . Divers' presence 
did not result in actual prejudice to . . . Blevins." 
B 
 
The Court of Appeals, after a meticulous review of the 
evidence and the applicable law, affirmed the trial court's 
ruling.  The Court of Appeals concluded that, "[b]ecause the 
evidence supported the trial court's findings that the juror's 
failure to answer the subject voir dire question was accidental 
 
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rather than intentional and that she stood impartial to the 
cause, its denial of [Blevins'] motion for mistrial was not 
error."  Blevins, 40 Va. App. at 429, 579 S.E.2d at 666. 
IV 
 
Blevins asserts that, if Divers had "honestly reveal[ed]" 
that she had been a robbery victim during jury voir dire, he 
would have had a valid basis to challenge Divers for cause. 
Blevins also asserts that he was denied the opportunity to use a 
peremptory strike in the event a challenge for cause was denied.  
Thus, Blevins contends, he was denied a fair jury trial.∗
 
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States provides, in pertinent part, that, "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . 
trial, by an impartial jury."  The right to an impartial jury is 
applicable to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); Manns v. 
Commonwealth, 213 Va. 322, 323, 191 S.E.2d 810, 811 (1972).  
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of Virginia also 
                     
 
∗ Blevins also contends that the trial court's denial of the 
motion for a mistrial "could weaken public confidence in the 
integrity of criminal trials."  We will not consider this 
contention because it was not raised in the trial court.  Rule 
5:25.  Additionally, Blevins contends that he was denied his 
right to effective assistance of counsel.  This contention, 
however, is not cognizable on direct appeal.  Lenz v. 
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 460, 544 S.E.2d 299, 304, cert. 
denied, 534 U.S. 1003 (2001). 
 
 
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guarantees an accused the right to a trial by an impartial jury, 
and due process requires "a jury capable and willing to decide 
the case solely on the evidence before it."  Smith v. Phillips, 
455 U.S. at 217. 
 
In McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 
556 (1984), the Supreme Court enunciated a two-part test to be 
applied in determining whether a litigant is entitled to a new 
trial in cases alleging juror dishonesty during voir dire.  The 
Supreme Court held that, in order to obtain a new trial in such  
situations, a litigant 
must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer 
honestly a material question on voir dire, and then 
further show that a correct response would have 
provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.  The 
motives for concealing information may vary, but only 
those reasons that affect a juror's impartiality can 
truly be said to affect the fairness of a trial. 
Id.  The Supreme Court also noted that it has long held that a 
litigant is entitled to a fair, but not perfect, trial, as there 
are no perfect trials.  Id. at 553. 
 
In Taylor v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 12, 14, 486 S.E.2d 
108, 109 (1997), aff'd per curiam, 256 Va. 214, 505 S.E.2d 378 
(1998), a juror in a murder-by-use-of-a-firearm case had failed 
to state during voir dire that her husband had been robbed at 
gunpoint earlier in the year.  The Court of Appeals, applying 
the McDonough test, affirmed the trial court's refusal to 
declare a mistrial and, in so doing, observed that "there was no 
 
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dispute at trial that [the juror] stood indifferent to the 
cause."  25 Va. App. at 18, 486 S.E.2d at 111.  The Court 
further stated that, "[b]ecause there was no basis for a 
challenge for cause, [the juror's] presence on the jury did not 
affect the essential fairness of the trial."  Id. 
 
An appellate court must give deference to a trial court's 
factual finding regarding a juror's impartiality because the 
trial court " 'sees and hears the juror.' "  Eaton v. 
Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 246, 397 S.E.2d 385, 391 (1990), 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 824 (1991) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 
469 U.S. 412, 426 (1985)).  Thus, we will reverse a trial 
court's finding with respect to juror impartiality "only upon a 
showing of manifest error."  Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 460, 
475, 450 S.E.2d 379, 389 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 829 
(1995). 
 
In the present case, the findings of the trial court are 
fully supported by the evidence.  Divers did not intentionally 
give a wrong answer on voir dire; she either did not hear or did 
not understand the court's question.  Divers also was not biased 
against Blevins, and she decided the case impartially based upon 
the evidence presented at trial.  Clearly, therefore, Blevins 
failed to establish either part of the two-part McDonough test. 
V 
 
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Blevins, however, asserts not only a claim based upon 
allegations of juror dishonesty, but also a general Sixth 
Amendment claim of juror bias.  In Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 
F.3d 357, 362-63 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 956 (1998), 
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that "[f]ailure 
to satisfy the requirements of McDonough does not end the . . . 
inquiry . . . when the [accused] also asserts a general Sixth 
Amendment claim challenging the partiality of a juror based upon 
additional circumstances occurring outside the voir dire."  
Therefore, regardless of whether a juror's answer is honest, an 
accused has the right to demonstrate that the juror was actually 
biased.  Id. at 363. 
 
In the present case, at the post-trial hearing, Blevins 
failed to show actual bias.  As we have previously noted, the 
trial court's findings are fully supported by the evidence and 
clearly establish that Divers was free of bias and acted 
impartially.  Therefore, the trial court did not err in 
overruling Blevins' motion for a mistrial, and the Court of 
Appeals properly affirmed Blevins' convictions. 
VI 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
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