Case Title: Hickman v. Boomers, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 50543

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2024-08-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 50543-2023 
 
SAMUEL HICKMAN and EMMA 
HICKMAN, Husband and Wife, 
 
     Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
and 
 
JASON ROLFE, an individual, 
 
     Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
BOOMERS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; BOOMERS CRANE AND 
TRANSPORT, INC., an Idaho corporation; 
MICHAEL LANDON, an individual; and 
COLTER JAMES JOHNSON, an individual, 
 
     Defendants-Respondents. 
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Pocatello, June 2024 Term 
 
Opinion filed:  August 14, 2024 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Bonneville County. Michael J. Whyte, District Judge.   
 
The decisions of the district court are reversed and remanded. 
 
Hopkins Roden Crockett, Hansen & Hoopes, PLLC, Idaho Falls, for Appellants 
Samuel Hickman and Emma Hickman.  Jedediah A. Bigelow argued.   
 
Kirton McConkie, St. George, Utah, for Respondents Boomers, LLC, Michael 
Landon, and Colter James Johnson. David P. Gardner argued.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ZAHN, Justice. 
 
This case concerns the “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” exception to the 
exclusive remedy rule of Idaho’s Worker’s Compensation Law. On April 29, 2019, Samuel 
Hickman was electrocuted when a boom crane contacted overhead power lines. Samuel Hickman 
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and his wife brought a personal injury suit against the owner of the boom truck, Boomers, LLC, 
and its owner Michael Landon, and Colter James Johnson, the employee who was operating the 
boom crane at the time of the accident (collectively, “Boomers”). 
 
Boomers moved for summary judgment, arguing they were immune from tort liability 
pursuant to the exclusive remedy rule. Hickman responded that the accident fell within the “willful 
or unprovoked physical aggression” exception to the rule. The district court granted summary 
judgment and dismissed Hickman’s claims. Hickman then filed a motion for reconsideration, 
which the district court also denied.  
 
On appeal, Hickman argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment 
because it failed to properly apply the standard for the willful or unprovoked physical aggression 
exception articulated in Gomez v. Crookham Co., 166 Idaho 249, 457 P.3d 901 (2020), and that it 
erred in denying a motion for reconsideration. We reverse the district court’s denial of the motion 
for reconsideration and the granting of the motion for summary judgment. We hold that the district 
court failed to properly apply our holding from Gomez and that, based on the evidence submitted 
in connection with the motion for reconsideration, there are genuine issues of material fact that 
preclude summary judgment.  
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On the day of the accident at issue in this appeal, Samuel Hickman was employed by King 
Builders, LLC. King Builders is a framing contractor and had been hired to frame a house. Richard 
King is the owner of King Builders. King Builders subcontracted with Boomers, LLC, a crane 
company, to set trusses on the home construction site. Michael Landon is the owner of Boomers, 
LLC. King called Landon to discuss the job and informed Landon that the trusses were located 
underneath power lines and would need to be removed from beneath the power lines before they 
could be set into place.  
 
On April 29, 2019, Colter James Johnson, an employee of Boomers, LLC, arrived at the 
worksite to move the trusses. Johnson was licensed to operate a boom truck with a hydraulic crane. 
By the time Johnson arrived on site, employees of King Builders had moved all but one of the 
trusses out from under the power lines by hand. The remaining truss was too heavy for the 
employees to move by hand. The parties dispute whether, following Johnson’s arrival on site, they 
discussed a plan to move the remaining truss. Regardless, Johnson began operating the boom crane 
to move the truss from under the power lines. Hickman’s role was to connect a metal cable from 
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the boom to the truss. Johnson would then use the boom crane to move the truss from under the 
power lines and raise it to set the truss on the house frame.  
 
King was on site watching Johnson move the truss. The parties dispute whether Johnson 
asked King to be a spotter for him. While Johnson was moving the boom crane into place to remove 
the truss from under the power lines, King walked away to take a phone call. The parties dispute 
what happened next. Hickman stated that Johnson continued to operate the boom crane, while 
Johnson maintained that he stopped moving the boom crane and Hickman grabbed the cable to 
guide it to the truss. The parties agree that, while Hickman was holding the cable, the boom crane 
either contacted the overhead power lines or came close enough that electricity arced from the 
power lines to the boom crane and then to the metal cable, electrocuting Hickman. Hickman 
sustained severe injuries and received worker’s compensation benefits as a result of the accident. 
 
Hickman and his wife brought a personal injury claim against Boomers, LLC, Boomers 
Crane and Transport, Inc., Landon, and Johnson, alleging that their negligent and reckless actions 
resulted in Hickman’s electrocution. Hickman alleged he suffered severe physical injuries, 
emotional injuries, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of household services, and loss of consortium. 
The parties later stipulated to dismiss Boomers Crane and Transport, Inc., from the lawsuit and it 
is not a party to this appeal. 
 
Boomers, Landon, and Johnson (collectively “Boomers”) thereafter moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that, as statutory co-employees of Hickman, they were immune from liability 
under the exclusive remedy rule of Idaho’s worker’s compensation laws. In support, Boomers 
submitted Hickman’s deposition in which he admitted that he received worker’s compensation 
benefits as a result of his accident.  
Hickman opposed the motion and argued that the exclusive remedy rule did not apply 
because the circumstances fell within the “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” exception 
contained in Idaho Code section 72-209(3). Hickman argued that this Court’s decision in Gomez 
v. Crookham Co., 166 Idaho 249, 457 P.3d 901 (2020), interpreted the “willful or unprovoked 
physical aggression” exception to include instances when an employer consciously disregarded 
knowledge that an injury would result to an employee. Hickman argues that this standard also 
applies to Boomers as statutory co-employees. Hickman argued that, when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, the evidence established at least a genuine issue of material 
fact that Landon and Johnson had knowledge of the danger the power lines presented and Johnson 
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“consciously disregarded” this knowledge and operated the boom crane too close to the power 
lines—resulting in Hickman being electrocuted.  
 
In support of his opposition, Hickman submitted the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (“OSHA”) report completed following the accident, which generally described the 
accident, its cause, and future safety precautions to prevent a similar accident from reoccurring. 
Hickman also submitted deposition excerpts in which Johnson described the accident, and 
deposition excerpts in which Landon described his conversation with King about the power lines 
and the safety rules for his crane operators. Finally, Hickman submitted a deposition in which he 
described the accident and his subsequent injuries.  
 
In their reply, Boomers argued that Gomez did not articulate the correct standard because 
section 72-209(3) was amended in 2020 in response to the Gomez decision. The amendments 
added language indicating that, to establish the applicability of the physical aggression exception, 
a party must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the employer or its employees 
specifically intended to harm the employee or that they engaged in conduct knowing that injury or 
death to the employee was substantially likely to occur. Boomers argued that the 2020 amendments 
to section 72-209(3) demonstrated that the legislature did not intend for the “willful or unprovoked 
physical aggression” exception to encompass acts of simple negligence. Boomers argued that, at 
most, Johnson’s conduct was simply negligent because it was possible to safely move the truss 
and Johnson had a plan for doing so.  
 
The district court granted Boomers’ motion for summary judgment. It applied the 2020 
version of section 72-209(3) that included the amendments enacted in response to this Court’s 
decision in Gomez. The district court concluded that King and Johnson had a plan to move the 
truss safely, but that the plan was implemented negligently. There was no evidence that Boomers 
intended to injure Hickman or that they had actual knowledge that Hickman’s injury was 
substantially likely to occur. The district court therefore concluded that the willful or unprovoked 
physical aggression exception in section 72-209(3) did not apply. The court explicitly declined to 
apply the “consciously disregarded knowledge” standard from Gomez, reasoning that the 
legislature never intended the standard to be applied to the willful or unprovoked physical 
aggression exception in section 72-209(3).  
 
Hickman filed a motion for reconsideration along with four new declarations and the 
complete transcripts of depositions taken earlier in the case. Hickman argued that the district court 
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erred by applying the 2020 amended version of section 72-209(3) because the amendment did not 
become effective until after Hickman’s accident. Applying the version of section 72-209(3) in 
effect at the time of Hickman’s accident, Hickman argued that the district court was bound by this 
Court’s interpretation of the willful and unprovoked physical aggression exception in Gomez and 
that, under the “consciously disregarded knowledge” standard, there were genuine issues of 
material fact concerning whether Boomers’ conduct satisfied that exception. Hickman asserted 
that the new declarations he submitted showed that the facts relied on by the district court in 
granting summary judgment were disputed by the parties. Specifically, Hickman contended that 
the new evidence submitted showed that Johnson ignored industry safety standards, including 
failing to call the power company to determine the voltage of the power lines, failing to have a 
spotter, and failing to maintain the correct distance away from the power lines. Hickman argued 
that the new evidence showed that no safety plan or briefing took place prior to the accident. 
Hickman argued that, considering this new evidence, there existed a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether Johnson consciously disregarded knowledge that Hickman would be injured by 
Johnson’s actions.  
 
Boomers responded that the district court should not consider Hickman’s new evidence 
and that the district court properly interpreted section 72-209(3) in light of the 2020 amendments. 
Boomers argued that the 2020 amendments clarified the legislature’s intent in passing section 72-
209(3), which established that this Court’s decision in Gomez was incorrect. Boomers argued that, 
even if Gomez was applicable, it was still entitled to summary judgment.  
 
The district court decided that it would consider Hickman’s new evidence, but ultimately 
denied Hickman’s motion for reconsideration. The district court reaffirmed its prior conclusion 
that the 2020 amendments clarified the legislative intent underlying section 72-209(3) and should  
control over this Court’s decision in Gomez. Applying that standard to the newly submitted 
evidence, the district court again concluded that Hickman failed to establish a genuine issue of 
material fact concerning the applicability of the willful or unprovoked physical aggression 
exception. The district court then concluded that, even if it applied the standard articulated in 
Gomez, Hickman still failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact and Boomers was entitled 
to summary judgment. Hickman timely appealed.  
 
 
6 
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred in deciding Boomers’ summary judgment motion under 
the 2020 amendments to section 72-209(3) rather than the statute in effect at the time of 
Hickman’s accident.  
2. Whether the district court erred in concluding that Hickman failed to establish a genuine 
issue of material fact concerning the applicability of the willful or unprovoked physical 
aggression exception to the exclusive remedy rule.  
III. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
“The standard of review on appeal from an order granting summary judgment is the same 
standard that is used by the district court in ruling on the summary judgment motion.” Berglund v. 
Dix, 170 Idaho 378, 384, 511 P.3d 260, 266 (2022) (quoting Hoke v. Neyada, Inc., 161 Idaho 450, 
453, 387 P.3d 118, 121 (2016)). The trial court “must grant summary judgment if the movant 
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(a). “All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the 
non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn 
in favor of the non-moving party.” Smith v. Excel Fabrication, LLC, 172 Idaho 725, ___, 535 P.3d 
1098, 1101 (2023) (quoting Manning v. Micron Tech., Inc., 170 Idaho 8, 12, 506 P.3d 244, 248 
(2022)). “A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create 
a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of summary judgment.” Finholt v. Cresto, 143 
Idaho 894, 897, 155 P.3d 695, 698 (2007) (quoting Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 
233, 238, 108 P.3d 380, 385 (2005)). “If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, 
then only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review.” Arambarri v. 
Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734, 738, 274 P.3d 1249, 1253 (2012) (quoting Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 
500, 504, 112 P.3d 788, 792 (2005)). 
“This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration 
using the same standard of review as the lower court in ruling on the motion.” Ciccarello v. Davies, 
166 Idaho 153, 159, 456 P.3d 519, 525 (2019). “[W]hen reviewing the grant or denial of a motion 
for reconsideration following the grant of summary judgment, this Court must determine whether 
the evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment.” Fragnella 
v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). 
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IV. 
ANALYSIS 
A. The district court erred in applying the 2020 amended version of section 72-209(3) but 
did not err in initially granting summary judgment because Hickman failed to establish 
a genuine issue of material fact under the pre-amendment version of the statute.  
1. The pre-2020 amendment statute applies to Hickman’s case.  
 
Hickman’s overarching argument on appeal is that the district court erred in applying the 
wrong version of section 72-209(3) and disregarding our holding in Gomez. Hickman contends 
that applying the correct version of the statute and this Court’s interpretation of that statute in 
Gomez establishes that the circumstances of this case fall within the willful or unprovoked physical 
aggression exception. Boomers asserts that the district court properly considered the 2020 
amendments to the statute when determining that Hickman’s evidence did not create a genuine 
issue of material fact concerning the applicability of the exception.  
 
There is no question that the district court’s summary judgment decision applied the 2020 
amendments version of section 72-209(3). Its decision specifically quotes the language of that 
amended statute and then applies it to grant summary judgment. Hickman argues that the district 
court erred in doing so because his accident occurred on April 29, 2019, and the 2020 amendments 
to section 72-209(3) did not take effect until July 1, 2020. We agree with Hickman. The version 
of the statute in effect at the time of Hickman’s accident governs his claim. See Barringer v. State, 
111 Idaho 794, 800, 727 P.2d 1222, 1228 (1986) (applying the version of statute in effect at the 
time of the accident); Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 113 Idaho 609, 610, 747 P.2d 18, 19 (1987) 
(same). We therefore hold that the district court erred by applying the 2020 amended version of 
section 72-209(3).  
 
This error, however, does not automatically result in the reversal of the district court’s order 
and the vacating of its judgment. We are constrained to “disregard all errors and defects that do 
not affect any party’s substantial rights.” I.R.C.P. 61. Hickman argues that the district court erred 
because had the district court applied the correct version of the statute and our decision in Gomez, 
summary judgment would not have been proper. We therefore turn to the applicability of Gomez 
and whether summary judgment was properly granted when the correct version of the statute is 
applied to the evidence. 
 
 
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2. This Court’s decision in Gomez applies to the interpretation of section 72-209(3) as it 
existed on the date of Hickman’s accident.  
 
Hickman argues that the district court erred by failing to apply the “consciously 
disregarded” standard from Gomez when evaluating the applicability of the willful or unprovoked 
physical aggression exception. In a footnote in its decision, the district court recognized the 
“consciously disregarded” standard articulated in Gomez but concluded that “the legislature never 
intended the ‘consciously disregarded’ standard to be applied to these analyses” because it 
amended section 72-209(3) in direct response to Gomez.  
 
We hold that the district court erred when it declined to apply the holding in Gomez. Gomez 
interpreted the willful and unprovoked physical aggression exception of section 72-209(3) as it 
existed prior to the 2020 amendments. See Gomez v. Crookham Co., 166 Idaho 249, 256–60, 457 
P.3d 901, 908–12 (2020), superseded by statute, I.C. § 72-209(3) (2020), as stated in Fulfer v. 
Sorrento Lactalis, Inc., 171 Idaho 296, 298 n.1, 520 P.3d 708, 710 n.1 (2022). As discussed above, 
we hold that this same version of the statute also applies to Hickman’s claims. As such, our 
interpretation of that language in Gomez likewise applies to Hickman’s claims. 
 
In ignoring this Court’s holding in Gomez because the 2020 statutory amendment indicated 
that “the legislature never intended the ‘consciously disregarded’ standard to be applied to these 
analyses,” the district court effectively gave a retroactive application to the 2020 amendments. 
This was error. “[A] statute is not applied retroactively unless there is ‘clear legislative intent to 
that effect.’” Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 937–38, 318 P.3d 918, 927–28 (2014) (quoting 
Gailey v. Jerome County, 113 Idaho 430, 432, 745 P.2d 1051, 1053 (1987)). There is no indication 
in the legislation that it was intended to apply retroactively. Both Hickman and Boomers agree that 
the amendment to section 72-209(3) does not apply retroactively. The district court erred in 
refusing to apply controlling precedent to interpret section 72-209(3) as it existed on the date of 
Hickman’s accident. 
 
The district court cited no caselaw in support of its decision to disregard Gomez. This 
Court’s interpretation of statutory language governs the interpretation of a statute until it is either 
overturned by a subsequent decision of this Court or amended by the legislature. State v. Grant, 
154 Idaho 281, 287, 297 P.3d 244, 250 (2013) (“When there is controlling precedent on questions 
of Idaho law ‘the rule of stare decisis dictates that [lower courts] follow it . . . .” (quoting 
Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 592, 130 P.3d 1127, 1130 
(2006))). When the legislature amends a statute in response to a decision of this Court, our 
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interpretation continues to control the interpretation of the statutory language as it existed prior to 
the amendment. In other words, statutory amendments enacted in response to decisions of this 
Court do not retroactively rewrite the statute to nullify this Court’s interpretation of the statutory 
language as it existed prior to the effective date of the amendment. The district court erred when 
it failed to apply our holding in Gomez to interpret the language of section 72-209(3) as it existed 
on the date of Hickman’s accident. 
3. The willful or unprovoked physical aggression exception to the exclusive remedy rule 
applies to statutory co-employees.  
Boomers argues that, even if the Gomez standard applies, it only applies against an 
employer, and the parties agree that Boomers is a statutory co-employee of Hickman. Hickman 
responds that the plain language of Idaho Code section 72-209(3) applies with equal force to 
statutory co-employees.  
We agree with Hickman that the plain language of section 72-209(3) applies to co-
employees like Boomers. I.C. § 72-209(3) (2017) (exemption does not apply when the injury is 
caused by the “unprovoked physical aggression of the employer, its officers, agents, servants or 
employees” (emphasis added)). Boomers argues that we should interpret the use of “employee” in 
section 72-209(3) as only applying to direct employees and not to statutory co-employees like 
Boomers. We recently rejected a nearly identical argument urging us to interpret the use of 
“employers” in section 72-209(3) as only applying to direct employers and not to statutory 
employers. See Fulfer, 171 Idaho at 303–05, 520 P.3d at 715–17. We decline Boomers’ argument 
here for the same reasons we rejected the employer argument in Fulfer. Boomers has offered “no 
compelling reasons why only a statutory employ[ee] should be afforded complete immunity when 
[they] . . . engage in ‘willful or unprovoked physical aggression.’ The short answer is [they] should 
not.” Id. at 305, 520 P.3d at 717 (quoting I.C. § 72-209(3)). We therefore hold that section 72-
209(3) applies to both employees and statutory co-employees. 
 
4. The district court did not err in initially granting Boomers’ motion for summary judgment.  
 
We now turn to the merits of the district court’s initial summary judgment decision. 
“Generally, the Idaho worker’s compensation law provides the exclusive remedy for injuries 
arising out of and in the course of employment.” Kearney v. Denker, 114 Idaho 755, 757, 760 P.2d 
1171, 1173 (1988). This exclusive remedy rule “limits an injured worker’s remedy to worker’s 
compensation benefits when the worker sustains an injury that arises out of and is in the course of 
employment.” Smith v. Excel Fabrication, LLC, 172 Idaho 725, ___, 535 P.3d 1098, 1102 (2023). 
10 
However, the law provides an exception to this rule for “willful or unprovoked physical 
aggression” pursuant to Idaho Code section 72-209(3). Kearney, 114 Idaho at 757, 760 P.2d at 
1173. At the time of Hickman’s accident, the statute described the exception generally but 
provided no specifics about the type of conduct that would invoke the exception:  
The exemption from liability given an employer by this section shall also extend to 
the employer’s surety and to all officers, agents, servants and employees of the 
employer or surety, provided that such exemptions from liability shall not apply in 
any case where the injury or death is proximately caused by the willful or 
unprovoked physical aggression of the employer, its officers, agents, servants or 
employees, the loss of such exemption applying applies only to the aggressor and 
shall not be imputable to the employer unless provoked or authorized by the 
employer, or the employer was a party thereto.  
I.C. § 72-209(3) (2017) (emphasis added). 
 
In Marek v. Hecla, Ltd., this Court discussed the differences between willful physical 
aggression and unprovoked physical aggression. 161 Idaho 211, 216, 384 P.3d 975, 980 (2016). 
Hickman does not allege that the conduct in this case constituted willful physical aggression. 
Instead, he contends that the actions constituted unprovoked physical aggression for purposes of 
the statute. In Marek, we defined an act of “unprovoked physical aggression” as one where 
“physical aggression is committed without a deliberate or specific purpose in effectuating the act.” 
Id. We held that “unprovoked physical aggression” is an act “lacking in motive, deliberation, or 
specific purpose.” Id. at 217, 384 P.3d at 981. “Under such a standard, . . . the employee must only 
show the employer actually knew or consciously disregarded knowledge that employee injury 
would result from the employer’s action.” Id. (emphasis added).  
In Gomez, we “fleshed out” the “consciously disregarded” standard. We described the 
standard as “a narrow, yet alternate, pathway to recovery for employees in extreme cases where it 
would be unreasonable to assume the employer was completely unaware of an obvious and grave 
risk to an employee’s life and limb.” 166 Idaho at 258, 457 P.3d at 910. We described the point of 
the consciously disregarded knowledge exception as applying to cases where an employer was 
aware of the danger or known risk, but consciously decided to ignore it or failed to act 
appropriately. Id.  
 
We recognize that, at different points, we have articulated the consciously disregarded 
standard differently. We first articulated the standard as whether one “actually knew or consciously 
disregarded knowledge that employee injury would result from the employer’s action.” Marek, 
161 Idaho at 217, 384 P.3d at 981 (emphasis added). In Gomez, we described the standard in two 
11 
different ways. We first described the standard as “consciously disregarding knowledge that an 
injury would result.” 166 Idaho at 256, 457 P.3d at 908 (emphasis added). We later described the 
standard as when “the employer consciously disregarded the risk of injury.” Id. at 258, 457 P.3d 
at 910 (emphasis added). And later still, we described it as when the employer “consciously 
disregarded knowledge that an injury would occur to its employee.” Gomez, 166 Idaho at 259, 457 
P.3d at 911 (emphasis added).  
 
We now take this opportunity to reconcile these slight differences in language. We hold 
that the best articulation of the “consciously disregarded” standard is the one first used in our 
decision in Gomez: unprovoked physical aggression is established by evidence indicating an 
employer, its officers, agents, servants or employees “consciously disregard[ed] knowledge that 
an injury would result.”  See id. at 256, 457 P.3d at 908. The conscious disregard standard is 
implicated when there is knowledge of an “obvious and grave risk,” “grave danger,” “serious risk,” 
or a “hazardous situation.” Id. at 260, 457 P.3d at 912; Marek, 161 Idaho at 217, 384 P.3d at 981; 
Fulfer, 171 Idaho at 298, 520 P.3d at 710.  
 
  Returning to the district court’s decision in this case, Boomers moved for summary 
judgment on the basis that, as statutory co-employees of Hickman, they were immune from 
liability under the exclusive remedy rule. In support of their motion, Boomers submitted 
Hickman’s deposition testimony that he received worker’s compensation benefits as a result of his 
accident. Hickman opposed Boomers’ motion for summary judgment, arguing that Landon and 
Johnson had knowledge of the danger of the power lines, but that Johnson “consciously 
disregarded” this knowledge and operated the boom crane too close to the power lines—resulting 
in Hickman being electrocuted. In support of this argument, Hickman submitted the following 
evidence: the OSHA accident report, excerpts of Johnson’s deposition describing the accident, 
excerpts of Landon’s deposition describing his conversation with King about the power lines and 
the safety rules Landon had for his crane operators, and excerpts of Hickman’s own deposition 
describing the accident and his injuries. Boomers responded that Johnson could have moved the 
truss safely and King agreed to that plan, and that Johnson’s negligence in moving too close to the 
power lines was not enough to fall within the Gomez exception.1  
 
1 For the first time at oral argument, Boomers argued that Gomez should be overruled. However, “[a]dditional issues 
raised for the first time on appeal at oral argument are not properly before this Court.” State v. Clapp, 170 Idaho 314, 
326, 510 P.3d 667, 679 (2022) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598–99, 301 P.3d 
242, 256–57 (2013)). We therefore decline to address this argument. 
12 
 
Boomers met its initial burden of demonstrating that there was no genuine issue of material 
fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The evidence established that Hickman 
received worker’s compensation benefits because of his accident. Hickman did not dispute that 
Boomers was his statutory co-employee. The exclusive remedy rule “limits an injured worker’s 
remedy to worker’s compensation benefits when the worker sustains an injury that arises out of 
and is in the course of employment.” Smith, 172 Idaho at ___, 535 P.3d at 1102; see I.C. §§ 72-
209(1), 72-211. Idaho Code section 72-209 extends the protection of the exclusive remedy rule to 
statutory co-employees. I.C. § 72-209(3); Richardson v. Z & H Constr., LLC, 167 Idaho 345, 350, 
470 P.3d 1154, 1159 (2020). Accordingly, Boomers is entitled to summary judgment unless 
Hickman can establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Boomers’ actions fell within 
the “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” exception to the exclusive remedy rule.  
 
Construing all disputed facts in favor of Hickman and applying the Gomez standard, we 
hold that the district court did not err in initially granting Boomers’ motion for summary judgment. 
Under Gomez, Hickman must show a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Boomers 
consciously disregarded knowledge that an injury would result. Even when viewed in the light 
most favorable to Hickman, the non-moving party, the evidence presented at summary judgment 
established that King and Johnson were aware of the danger the power lines presented and they 
agreed upon a plan to safely move the truss. The OSHA accident report indicated that King 
acquiesced to Johnson’s plan to move the truss with the boom crane instead of by hand and that 
they had a plan in place to safely move the truss without coming near the power line. The report 
indicated that the accident occurred when Johnson focused on Hickman attaching the cable to the 
truss and accidentally raised the boom crane directly into the power line. Johnson’s deposition 
testimony was that the entire work crew had a safety meeting to discuss how to safely move the 
truss from under the power lines with the boom crane. The evidence did not establish a genuine 
issue of material fact whether Boomers consciously disregarded knowledge that an injury would 
result.  
While the evidence suggests that it was Johnson’s negligence that resulted in the boom 
crane being raised into the power line, “negligence—no matter how gross—is insufficient to 
trigger the exclusivity exception under section 72-209(3).” Marek, 161 Idaho at 220, 384 P.3d at 
984. Missing from the record at the summary judgment stage was evidence that Johnson 
consciously disregarded the “obvious and grave risk,” “grave danger,” “serious risk,” or a 
13 
“hazardous situation” that the power lines would injure Hickman. Accordingly, the district court 
did not err in granting Boomers’ motion for summary judgment.  
Because there was no error in the district court’s decision, Hickman has failed to establish 
that the district court’s erroneous application of the wrong version of the statute affected his 
substantial rights. We therefore affirm the district court’s initial decision granting summary 
judgment, but now turn to the merits of Hickman’s motion for reconsideration. See I.R.C.P. 61.  
B. The district court erred in denying Hickman’s motion for reconsideration because his 
supporting declarations established a genuine issue of material fact.  
1. The district court did not err in considering the additional evidence that Hickman 
submitted in support of his motion for reconsideration.  
Following the district court’s issuance of the order granting summary judgment, Hickman 
filed a motion for reconsideration along with four new declarations and the complete transcripts 
of depositions of three witnesses to the accident. The new evidence presented was (1) a declaration 
by Richard King recounting his eyewitness account of the accident; (2) an affidavit by Justin Allen, 
a local power company official, concerning the voltage in the power lines; (3) a declaration by 
Thomas Sickelsteel, CEO of the National Commission for the Certification of Crane Operators, 
concerning the 2018 American Society of Mechanical Engineers safety standards for cranes; and 
(4) a declaration by Hickman’s attorney that included several additional deposition excerpts. 
Hickman argued that the new declarations and transcripts created a genuine issue of material fact 
concerning the applicability of the unprovoked physical aggression exception. The district court 
determined that it would consider the new evidence in evaluating Hickman’s motion for 
reconsideration.  
Boomers contends that the district court erred when it considered the four new declarations 
that Hickman submitted in support of his motion for reconsideration. Boomers argues that the 
declarations include evidence that was available to Hickman at the time of the summary judgment 
motion and therefore Hickman should have submitted it with his opposition to Boomers’ motion 
for summary judgment. Hickman responds that we should not consider the argument because it 
was not properly raised as an additional issue on appeal or otherwise cross-appealed. Hickman 
further asserts that Boomers fails to explain how the district court abused its discretion in 
considering the additional evidence. 
The district court’s decision on the motion for reconsideration also addressed Boomers’ 
objection to the new declarations. In its order, the district court recognized that determining 
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whether it would consider the new evidence was a discretionary call. The district court then 
weighed the parties’ arguments and decided that it would consider Hickman’s additional evidence.  
Initially, we reject Hickman’s argument that we should not consider this issue because it 
was not raised as an additional issue on appeal and Boomers did not file a cross-appeal. Pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(b)(4), “the respondent may list additional issues presented on 
appeal . . . .” I.A.R. 35(b)(4). “Generally, a party must file a cross-appeal if it seeks to change or 
add to relief the district court provided; however, a cross-appeal is not required when the party 
asks us to sustain a judgment on grounds presented to, but not relied on by, the district court.” 
Beebe v. N. Idaho Day Surgery, LLC, 171 Idaho 779, 792, 526 P.3d 650, 663 (2023). “If no 
affirmative relief is sought by way of reversal, vacation or modification of the judgment or order, 
an issue may be presented by the respondent as an additional issue on appeal under Rule 35(b)(4) 
without filing a cross-appeal.” I.A.R. 15(a).   
Hickman is correct that Boomers did not file a cross-appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
Rule 15(a). However, Boomers is not asking this Court for a “affirmative relief . . . by way of 
reversal, vacation or modification of the judgment or order . . . .” I.A.R. 15(a). Boomers 
successfully defeated Hickman’s motion for reconsideration, so Boomers has not asked for this 
Court to modify the district court’s order. Instead, Boomers is arguing that the district court erred 
in considering Hickman’s additional evidence and therefore this Court should decline to consider 
that evidence when reviewing the district court’s order. Because Boomers is not seeking to change 
the relief granted below, we hold that it was not required to file a cross-appeal to preserve its 
challenge to the district court’s consideration of the additional evidence Hickman submitted in 
support of his motion for reconsideration. 
Further, while Boomers should have listed the issue as an additional issue on appeal, we 
hold that its failure to do so is not fatal to its argument. I.A.R. 15(a), 35(b)(4). Although we have 
held that the failure to list an additional issue on appeal eliminates consideration of the issue in the 
appeal, we have also held that “the rule may be relaxed where . . . the issue is addressed by 
arguments contained in the body of the brief.” Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 180 n.1, 219 
P.3d 1192, 1196 n.1 (2009). Boomers provided substantial argument and authority to support the 
issue on appeal. Accordingly, we will consider Boomers’ arguments.  
We hold that the district court did not err in considering the additional evidence. “[A] 
motion to reconsider can be properly raised to timely present the trial court with additional 
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evidence or a relevant legal theory that was not initially considered by the trial court . . . .” 
BrunoBuilt, Inc. v. Erstad Architects, PA, 171 Idaho 928, ___, 528 P.3d 531, 542 (2023). “We 
review a district court’s decision on whether to accept an untimely filed affidavit in connection 
with summary judgment for an abuse of discretion.” Ciccarello v. Davies, 166 Idaho 153, 162, 456 
P.3d 519, 528 (2019). When reviewing an alleged abuse of discretion, this Court asks “[w]hether 
the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” Lunneborg 
v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).  
The district court recognized that Hickman’s new declarations contained additional facts 
and information and that it was within its discretion whether to consider them. The district court 
evaluated the parties’ arguments and decided that it would consider the declarations. Boomers fails 
to articulate how the district court abused its discretion. Instead, it makes the same arguments that 
it made below and asks this Court to reach a different conclusion. The district court did not abuse 
its discretion and we therefore affirm its decision to consider the additional evidence that Hickman 
submitted in support of his motion for reconsideration.  
We also decline Boomers’ request to ignore the additional evidence on appeal. When 
reviewing the propriety of the district court’s decision denying the motion, we will consider the 
same evidence that it considered.  
2. Hickman’s additional evidence created a genuine issue of material fact concerning 
whether Johnson disregarded knowledge that the power lines would injure Hickman.  
After considering the additional evidence, the district court denied Hickman’s motion for 
reconsideration. The district court first applied the 2020 amendments to section 72-209(3) and 
concluded that the additional evidence did not create a genuine issue of material fact. The district 
court then applied the pre-amendment version of the statute and this Court’s holding in Gomez and 
reached the same result—that Boomers was entitled to summary judgment. We conclude that the 
district court erred in declining to grant the motion for reconsideration and reverse its summary 
judgment decision because Hickman’s additional evidence established the existence of a genuine 
issue of material fact concerning the applicability of the unprovoked physical aggression 
exception.  
Viewed in the light most favorable to Hickman, the additional evidence established that 
Johnson was aware that the power lines were likely to injure Hickman but did nothing to mitigate 
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the danger. King testified in his declaration that he and Landon discussed that the truss needed to 
be at least fifteen feet away from the power line. During his deposition, Johnson testified that he 
had been trained to operate the boom crane and that, at the time of Hickman’s accident, he had 
been certified as a crane operator by the National Commission for the Certification of Crane 
Operators (“NCCCO”). Attached to Sickelsteel’s declaration were the NCCCO standards, which 
established that crane operators should maintain a minimum specified clearance from power lines 
depending on the voltage of the power lines because operating a crane near power lines is an 
extremely hazardous practice. Allen testified to the voltage of the power lines in his declaration. 
Based on the voltage of the power lines, NCCCO standards required that Johnson maintain a 
twenty-foot distance from the power line.  
Johnson testified in his deposition that he was aware of the power lines but did not know 
the voltage of the power lines and did not call the local power company to find out. Instead, 
Johnson employed a personal rule of thumb to stay somewhere between ten and twenty-five feet 
away from the power line. King testified in his declaration that Johnson refused King’s repeated 
requests to help King and his crew drag the truss from under the power lines by hand. King testified 
that Johnson insisted he could move the truss with the boom crane, that Johnson did not hold a 
safety meeting, that Johnson did not ask King to be his spotter, and that Johnson failed to use a 
flagged line to mark the clearance of the power lines or use any other device to limit the range of 
the boom crane. Instead, according to Hickman’s deposition, Johnson told Hickman he was 
worried about the power line, but instead of taking any additional precautions, threw Hickman the 
metal cable and began operating the boom crane. Johnson then maneuvered the boom crane into 
the power line, electrocuting Hickman.  
 
Boomers did not submit any new evidence to oppose Hickman’s motion for 
reconsideration. Instead, Boomers argued that the additional evidence did not create a genuine 
issue of material fact.  
 
When the district court decided Hickman’s motion for reconsideration, the evidence in the 
record, when viewed in the light most favorable to Hickman, established that (1) all parties 
involved were aware of the dangers the power lines presented to the workers on site and that 
moving too close to the power lines could result in serious injury or death; (2) Johnson refused 
King’s requests to help drag the truss out from the power lines by hand; (3) Johnson did not hold 
a safety meeting with the workers on site prior to operating the boom crane; (4) Johnson did not 
17 
develop a plan with King, Hickman, and other employees on site for moving the truss with the 
boom crane; (5) Johnson disregarded multiple NCCCO safety standards, including not checking 
the voltage of the power line, using any recommended safety equipment like a flagged line or using 
a device to limit the range of the boom crane, and failed to stay the appropriate distance away from 
the power lines; and (6) Johnson never asked King or anyone else to be his spotter. This evidence 
establishes a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Johnson consciously disregarded 
a known risk that the power lines presented a serious risk of injury or death to others on site, 
including Hickman. The district court erred in concluding otherwise and denying the motion for 
reconsideration. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s decision denying Hickman’s motion for 
reconsideration is reversed and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. As the prevailing party on appeal, Hickman is awarded costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 40. 
Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices BRODY, MOELLER, and MEYER CONCUR.