Case Title: Missouri Municipal League v. Missouri

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC95337

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2016-05-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
MISSOURI MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, 
 
) 
 
 
 
CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, and 
 
 
) 
 
RICHARD SHEETS, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Appellants,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC95337 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
  
 
 
)  
   
 
 
) 
Respondent.  
 
 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLE COUNTY 
The Honorable Jon E. Beetem, Judge 
 
Opinion issued May 24, 2016 
 
 
The Missouri Municipal League, the City of Springfield, and Richard Sheets 
(collectively, "plaintiffs") appeal the circuit court's judgment for the State on the plaintiffs' 
challenge to the constitutional validity of two bills passed by the General Assembly.  This 
Court has jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to article V, § 3 of the Missouri Constitution.  
The circuit court's judgment is affirmed. 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
In 2013, the General Assembly passed House Bill 331 and House Bill 345, which 
repealed and enacted in lieu thereof numerous sections dealing with local government 
control over telecommunications infrastructure permitting and public right-of-way.  Later 
that year, a circuit court ruled H.B. 331 and H.B. 345 were enacted in violation of 
procedural requirements of the Missouri Constitution.  The State appealed the circuit court's 
judgment to this Court.  With the State's appeal still pending, the General Assembly passed 
Senate Bill 649 and Senate Bill 650 in early 2014.  S.B. 649 and S.B. 650 repealed and 
enacted in lieu thereof some of the same sections as had H.B. 331 and H.B. 345 and, in 
doing so, set forth the text of H.B. 331 and H.B. 345 as the then-existing law for the relevant 
sections with proposed changes noted.  
Two days before S.B. 649 and S.B. 650 became effective (and two days before this 
Court dismissed the State's appeal in the H.B. 331 and H.B. 345 case1), the Missouri 
Municipal League,2 the City of Springfield, and Richard Sheets brought suit challenging 
S.B. 649 and S.B. 650 under the Missouri Constitution.  The plaintiffs sought a declaratory 
judgment and injunctive relief, claiming: (1) the contents of the bills violated article I, § 13's 
prohibition against retrospective laws; article III, § 40(28)'s prohibition on special laws, and 
article X, § 21's prohibition on unfunded mandates; and (2) the bills were enacted in 
violation of article III, § 28.  The State moved to dismiss the substantive claims, and both 
sides moved for a judgment on the pleadings for the enactment claims.  The circuit court 
sustained the State's motions, and the plaintiffs appealed to this Court. 
Standard of Review 
 
"This Court reviews the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss de novo."  Foster v. 
State, 352 S.W.3d 357, 359 (Mo. banc 2011).  "In determining whether a motion to dismiss 
should have been granted, the appellate court reviews the petition, 'in an almost academic 
manner, to determine if the facts alleged meet the elements of a recognized cause of action, 
                                              
1  City of Liberty v. State, SC93799. 
2  According to the plaintiffs' petition, the Missouri Municipal League "is a membership association 
of Missouri municipalities, including cities, towns, and villages." 
3 
 
or of a cause that might be adopted in that case.'"  Id.  "The position of a party moving for 
judgment on the pleadings is similar to that of a movant on a motion to dismiss; i.e., 
assuming the facts pleaded by the opposite party to be true, these facts are, nevertheless, 
insufficient as a matter of law."  State ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Tobacco Co., 34 S.W.3d 122, 134 
(Mo. banc 2000) (internal quotations omitted).  "A trial court properly grants a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings if, from the face of the pleadings, the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law."  Id. 
Retrospective Law Claim 
 
The plaintiffs argue the circuit court erred in dismissing their retrospective law claim 
based on lack of standing because the City of Springfield and the Missouri Municipal 
League have standing in that they are directly and adversely affected by the laws enacted by 
S.B. 649.  In general, a plaintiff has standing to bring an action for declaratory judgment "if 
the plaintiff is directly and adversely affected by the action in question."  Ste. Genevieve 
Sch. Dist. R-II v. Bd. of Aldermen of City of Ste. Genevieve, 66 S.W.3d 6, 10 (Mo. banc 
2002).  However, even if the City of Springfield and the Missouri Municipal League have 
standing to bring an action for declaratory judgment under the general criteria, see Planned 
Indus. Expansion Auth. of City of St. Louis v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 612 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Mo. 
banc 1981), this does not mean they have a recognized claim pursuant to article I, § 13's 
prohibition against retrospective laws.  Our constitutional prohibition against laws 
retrospective in operation is located in our citizen bill of rights.  "Because the retrospective 
law prohibition was intended to protect citizens and not the state, the legislature may 
constitutionally pass retrospective laws that waive the rights of the state."  Savannah R-III 
4 
 
Sch. Dist. v. Pub. Sch. Ret. Sys. of Mo., 950 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Mo. banc 1997).  By 
extension, the legislature may also waive or impair the vested rights of political 
subdivisions, such as cities, without violating the prohibition on retrospective laws.  Id.; see 
also Barton Cnty. v. Walser, 47 Mo. 189, 205 (Mo. 1871).  Therefore, the petition failed to 
state a permissible claim by a municipality pursuant to article I, §13 and the State was 
entitled to a dismissal of this claim.  
Special Law Claim 
 
The plaintiffs argue the circuit court erred in dismissing their special law claim 
pursuant to article III, § 40(28) of the Missouri Constitution, which prohibits the General 
Assembly from passing any special law "granting to any corporation, association or 
individual any special or exclusive right, privilege or immunity."  "A special law includes 
less than all who are similarly situated . . . but a law is not special if it applies to all of a 
given class alike and the classification is made on a reasonable basis."  Alderson v. State, 
273 S.W.3d 533, 538 (Mo. banc 2009) (internal quotations omitted).  "A law based on open-
ended characteristics is not facially special and is presumed to be constitutional."  Id. 
(internal quotations omitted).  Here, the plaintiffs made a mere conclusory allegation that     
§ 67.1842.1(6), as enacted by S.B. 649, is an unconstitutional special law.  That section 
applies to "any public utility that has legally been granted access to the political 
subdivision's right-of-way."  The petition offered no supporting facts as to how 
§ 67.1842.1(6) "includes less than all who are similarly situated" or is not "based on open-
ended characteristics."  "Missouri rules of civil procedure demand more than mere 
conclusions that the pleader alleges without supporting facts."  Transit Cas. Co. ex rel. 
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Pulitzer Publ'g Co. v. Transit Cas. Co. ex rel. Intervening Emps., 43 S.W.3d 293, 302 (Mo. 
banc 2001); Rule 55.05.  The text of S.B. 649 does not apply to a "closed class," and the 
conclusory allegations in the petition did not state a claim pursuant to article III, § 40(28).  
Therefore, the State was entitled to a dismissal of this claim.   
Unfunded Mandate Claim 
 
The plaintiffs argue the circuit court erred in dismissing their unfunded mandate 
claim under article X, § 21 for lack of standing because Richard Sheets, a resident and 
taxpayer of Cole County, has standing to bring the claim.  Article X, § 23 provides that "any 
taxpayer of the state, county or other political subdivision shall have standing to bring       
suit . . . to enforce the provisions of sections 16 through 22."  While the petition alleged 
Sheets was a taxpayer of Cole County, the petition did not allege that any provisions enacted 
by S.B. 649 or S.B. 650 impose an impermissible unfunded mandate on Cole County.  The 
only allegations were that provisions enacted impose unfunded mandates on the City of 
Springfield and the member-cities of the Missouri Municipal League.  Because Sheets did 
not claim to be a taxpayer of any of the affected political subdivisions, Sheets did not allege 
sufficient facts to establish standing to bring the claim pursuant to article X, § 21.  The State 
was entitled to a dismissal of this claim. 
Enactment Claim 
 
The plaintiffs argue the circuit court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings for 
the State with regard to the plaintiffs' claim that the enactments of S.B. 649 and S.B. 650 
violated article III, § 28.  The plaintiffs argue S.B. 649 and S.B. 650 improperly revived 
H.B. 331 and H.B. 345 because a circuit court had ruled them invalid and S.B. 649 and S.B. 
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650 still set forth the text of H.B. 331 and H.B. 345 as being the then-existing law.  Article 
III, § 28 provides: 
No act shall be revived or reenacted unless it shall be set forth at length as if it 
were an original act.  No act shall be amended by providing that words be 
stricken out or inserted, but the words to be stricken out, or the words to be 
inserted, or the words to be stricken out and those inserted in lieu thereof, 
together with the act or section amended, shall be set forth in full as amended.     
 
This Court will hold legislation to be unconstitutional based on procedural limitations only 
if the legislation "clearly and undoubtedly violates the constitutional limitation."  Mo. 
Roundtable for Life, Inc. v. State, 396 S.W.3d 348, 351 (Mo. banc 2013) (internal quotations 
omitted) (emphasis added).  At the time the General Assembly passed S.B. 649 and S.B. 
650, H.B. 331 and H.B. 345 did not need to be "revived" because a determination of their 
validity was still pending in an appeal before this Court.  See Mo. Const. art. V, § 3.  
Therefore, set forth as they were, S.B. 649 and S.B. 650 did not "clearly and undoubtedly" 
violate article III, § 28 in showing the text of H.B. 331 and H.B. 345 to be the then-existing 
law.  See C.C. Dillon Co. v. City of Eureka, 12 S.W.3d 322, 326 (Mo. banc 2000) (noting 
the purpose of article III, § 28 "is to avoid the confusion, uncertainty, and inconvenience 
that comes from having fragmented statutory amendments").  The State was entitled to 
judgment on the pleadings on this claim. 
Conclusion 
 
The circuit court's judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Breckenridge, C.J., Stith, Draper, Wilson and Russell, JJ.concur;  
Teitelman, J., dissents in part and concurs in part in separate opinion filed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
MISSOURI MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, 
 
) 
 
 
 
CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, and 
 
 
) 
 
RICHARD SHEETS, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Appellants,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC95337 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
  
 
 
)  
   
 
 
) 
Respondent.  
 
 
) 
 
OPINION DISSENTING IN PART AND CONCURRING IN PART 
 
 
I respectfully dissent from the principal opinion only to the extent it holds that the 
city of Springfield and the Missouri Municipal League lack standing to assert a claim 
based on article I, section 13 of the Missouri Constitution.  Article I, section 13 provides 
“ that no ex post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, or retrospective 
in its operation, or making any irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities, can 
be enacted.”  The plain language of article I, section 13 provides that no law 
“retrospective in its operation … can be enacted.”  The plain meaning of this language is 
that the General Assembly is barred, without exception, from enacting any retrospective 
laws.   While the principal opinion notes, correctly, that there is a line of cases holding 
otherwise, these cases are inconsistent with the plain language of article I, section 13 and 
2 
 
were wrongly decided.  Therefore, I would hold that the city and the Municipal League 
have standing to pursue a claim based on article I, section 13.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard B. Teitelman