Case Title: Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Doe.

Citation: 109 Haw. 240

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2005-12-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Law

 

ISRARY

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T

 

00"

Oe

CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, STATE OF HAWAI',
Plaintiff-Appellee

 

JOHN DOE, Defendant-Appellant

 

and

60:2 Hd 42930 c0N

JANE DOE, Defendant-Appellee

ee

wo, 24457

APPEAL FROM THE FAMILY COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(FC-P NO. 00-1-0581)

DECEMBER 27, 2005
MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, AND NAKAYAMA, JJ.
INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS JUDGE LIM,
IN PLACE OF ACOBA, J., UNAVAILABLE,
AND CIRCUIT JUDGE NAKAMURA, ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCY

OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.

Defendant-appellant John Doe (hereinafter “the father”)
appeals from the July 6, 2001 order, findings of fact, and
conclusions of law of the Family Court of the First Circuit, the
Honorable John C. Bryant, Jr. presiding, establishing John Doe as
the father of the child in question, ordering the father to pay

child support, arrearages, and birth-related expenses, and
1 expenses

 

allocating expenses for the child’s future medi

equally between the parents.
on appeal, the father argues that (1) the Hawai'i

(HUPA), Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS)

Uniform Parentage Act
 

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FOR PUBLICATION 988

 

chapter 564, is unconstitutional because it violates the father’s
rights to privacy and equal protection under the Hawai'i
constitution and the United States Constitution (a) by violating
the father's right to procreational autonomy and (b) by creating
an improper gender-based classification; and (2) insofar as the
father is an unemployed student, the family court violated the
father’s right to be free from compulsory service when it ordered
him to pay child support in the amount of fifty dollars per
month, because the father would be forced to get a part-time job.
Each of the father’s argunents is manifestly and
palpebly without merit, First, the father failed to raise the
question of equal protection at trial or in his pretrial legal
memoranda; consequently, the issue is waived. Second, the father
is entitled only to a “rational basis” review of HUPA because:
(1) BUPA does not implicate the father’s fundamental privacy
right to procreational autonomy, but rather his economic interest
in not supporting his child; and (2) even if the father hada’t
waived his equal protection argument, his standing to raise the

challenge would be based on a non-suspect classification, iseu

 

the biological relationship of fathers to their children.
Recause HUPA bears a rational relation to the public welfare, it
survives our rational-basis review, and the father’s
procreational autonomy arguments (as well as his waived equal
protection argunents) fail. Finally, an obligation to
financially support one’s child and to become employed if
necessary to meet the obligation is in no way comparable to

peonage or slavery. It is well-settled that child support is an
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obligation that may be compelled, even by imprisonment, without
violating the right to be free from involuntary servitude; ipso
facto, the family court did not exceed its authority by ordering
the father to pay the minimum amount of child support allowed by
the then-applicable guidelines.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the family
court's order, findings of fact, and conclusions of law. We also
notify the parties that the appeal was frivolous and request
briefing with regard to damages and costs to be awarded to CSEA
as authorized by Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule
38.

A. Factual Background!

‘The mother and father met while they were both in high
school; they dated intermittently for approximately fourteen
months. During the course of their relationship, the couple
agreed to always engage in “safe sex” and did not intend to
procreate. The trial court found that it was reasonably
foreseeable by both parties that an unwanted pregnancy could
occur if the parties relied on the use of condoms as a method of
birth control.

The mother became pregnant due to a failure in either
the construction or use of a condom; this pregnancy was not

planned. After the mother became pregnant, the prospective

 

: ‘The mother and father stipulated to facts for the April 4, 2001
trial precedent ‘to the order from which this appeal ie taken. sxcept ds
Otherwise indicates, the factual background ie drawn directly from the
Stipulated facts, a9 modified and expandad by the trial court’s findings of
fact in the order from which this appeal is raken.

 

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parents discussed and considered the possibility that the mother
might undergo an abortion or seek an adoptive placement for the
child with the father’s consent and cooperation. However, the
trial court found that the parties never entered into an express
agreement that the mother would have an abortion or place the
child up for adoption. Ultimately, after discussing the
pregnancy with her family and despite the child’s father’s
objection, the mother decided to raise the child with her
family’s help. The father strongly opposed the mother’s decision
to keep the child because he believed that he and the mother were
unable to support @ child emotionally or financially and because
he believed that they were too young to care for a child. The
parents! sexual relationship continued through the sixth month of
the pregnancy,

‘The mother gave birth to the child at issue in these
proceedings (hereinafter “child”) on March 22, 2000. The
Department of Human Services (DHS) paid $878.13 for medical
expenses related to the birth of the child. At the time of the
trial, DHS had paid $6,203 in cash assistance to the mother for
the benefit of the child.

B. Procedural History

On July 10, 2000, the Child Support Enforcement Agency
(CSEA) filed an amended complaint for establishment of paternity
pursuant to HRS § 584-6, In connection with that complaint, the

mother and father stipulated to genetic testing. The test

HRS § 584-6 (1993) provides in relevant part: “(T]he child support
enforcement agency may bring an action for declaring the existence oF
Ronexistence of the father and child relationship... -”

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results indicated a 99.99% probability that the party referred to
here as “the father” is the biological father of the child. In
light of the test results, the father did not contest that he is
the biological father of the child, but nevertheless objected to
being named as the child’s legal father and to being ordered to
provide any past or future support for the minor child

Pursuant to HRS § 346-37.1,? OHS, through CSEA, sought, inter
alia, reimbursement of certain public assistance monies paid for
the benefit of the child and such other relief as might be
appropriate. Specifically, CSEA sought ongoing child support
payments, child support arrearages, and $439.07 for birth-related
expenses from the father.‘

On December 21, 2000, 2 pretrial conference was held
before the Honorable John C. Bryant. Following this conference,
a judgment of paternity was entered. Sole physical and legal
custody of the child was awarded to the mother. The court

reserved judgment with respect to allocation of birth expe!

 

child support, and arrearages. A hearing on the reserved issues
was set for February 7, 2001. On February 5, 2001, the father
filed a pre-hearing legal menorandum in which he alleged that the
mother had promised he would not be subject to financial

responsibility for the child and asserted that his fundamental

* as § 346-37.1 (Supp. 2000) provides in relevant part: “Any
payment of public assistance meney made to or for the benefit of any dependent
Child creates a debt due and owing to (OHS) by the natural or adoptive parent
or parents so”

 

«Because the father was ¢ student at the tine these proceedings
were initiated, no incone was inputed to him in calculating his child support
Obligation. Consequently, his obligaticn amounted to 550 per month under the
Guidelines then in effect
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right to decide whether to have a child would be violated if he
were required to accept financial responsibility for the child:

‘The Boe case, of course, specifically dealt with
moman’2 Fight co procreate. However, the Supreme Court in
Hig slo recognized that the state has an interest in
Fegulating decisions (such as abortion) if such an interest
is compelling.” “Eoelz. Hagel, 410 0.3. at 155, if the
State has such an interest, surely the natural father also
has an interest

‘simply put, ££ 2 woman hag @ Constitutional right to
procreater #0 should s man.” Te Ae completely unfair and
Enjust for a woman €o force a nan to nave a child against
his will and then force him to provide financial and other
Support for that child. That is exactly what happened in
the instant case.

 

 

Gotidusly, [the father] could not force [the mother)
co have an abortion or give the child up for adoption. That
mould siclete her Constitutional rights. However, (the
Rother! should sot be allowed to force [the father] to take
Upa role and responsibilities he clearly did not want and
hich she promised him he would not have to bear, That,
Gould vioiste is conseitutionat Fights.

‘The father also asserted that, because he was a full-
time university student, he “simply [couldn’t) afford to take
care of a child.” Consequently, any imposition of 2 financial
obligation to support his child would be tantamount to slavery
and unconstitutional:

‘The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States
constitution provides that involuntary servitude shall not
Grist in the United States and gives Congress the power to
Enforce the article by appropriate legisiation. In 1867,
Congress enacted the Antipeonage Acts ss

fa Interpreting this Act, the United States supra
court has held that “congress has put it beyond debate that
he indebtedness werranta a right te be free from suspension
Of compulsory service.” Imposing even a minimun financial
Pequirenent on [the father] in this case would be violative
of his rignt to be free from compulsory service and
therefore tantanount to involuntary. servitude.

ewes [ehe mothe:’s] choice to nave this child. She
chose to do so over [the father's) objections and wniie
assuring him that she (and her parents) would raise the
Child themselves with no help of any kind from him. [The
mother] broke ner agreenent with [the father) and, as @
Tesult, the State of Hawai'i is now attempting to require
{the father] to accept financial responsibility for the
child, This is Unfair, unjust, and unconstitutional

  

 

   

 

 

 

 

 

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At the February 7, 2001 hearing, Judge Bryant scheduled
a short trial for April 4, 2001 and ordered the parties to
prepare a list of stipulated facts. Following the trial, the
court granted the relief requested by CSEA’s amended complaint.
In the trial court’s findings of facts and conclusions of law, in
addition to the stipulated facts, the court found, inter alia,
that “[i]t was reasonably foreseeable by both parties that an
unwanted pregnancy could occur through the use of a condom,” and

that the parties never had a

 

abortion and adoption and therefore there was no explicit
agreement that [the mother] would have an abortion or place the
child up for adoption.” The court concluded, inter alia: (1)
that the father had no inherent or constitutional right of
privacy to denounce, repudiate, or rescind his duties as the
natural father of the child; (2) that Roe v, Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152 (1973), does not apply to a father’s right to choose whether
or not to procreate; and (3) that fathers have a right to be free
from procreation when they choose not to engage in sexual
intercourse. In the July 6, 2001 order from which this appeal is
taken, the trial court determined, inter alia, that the father
was the natural father of the subject child, that the father was
Liable for child support in the amount of $50 per month, that the
father was liable for child support arrearages in the amount of
$600, that the father was liable for birth-related expenses in
the amount of $439.07, that medical expenses for the child would
be shared equally by the mother and father on an ongoing basis,

that all prior orders not inconsistent with the final order would
   

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remain in full force and effect, and that there would be no stay

of the order pending appeal.
‘The father timely appealed. The father also moved for

a stay of the trial court's order and findings of fact and

conclusions of law pending appeal, on the grounds that:

(the father had) raised an issue of first impression
An Hawai'i, For this reason, it is difficult to predict the
Lfkelinood of his success om the merits (although [che
Esther] firnly believes that he will be successful on
appeal). However, it dg clear that irreparable injury to
(the father! will result if he is forces te mest his court
Grdered obiigations. (The father) is a student at the
University of Hawai'i at Manoa majoring in sauaiian studies
and minoring in Business. when (the father) is not in
School or studying, ne ageists community organizations on
Several conmunity service projects.

 

    

 

isacaute] “no indebtedness warrancs a suspension of
the right to be free from compulsory servicel,]" [i]mposing
| minimum financial requiresent on. (the father] would be
Gsolative of his right to be free from compulsory service.
Ig the stay is not granted and. (the father] prevails on
appeal, the State would have already violated [the father's)
Gonatitutional rights by forcing him to enter the work force
in srder to meet his support obsigations «=

Moreover, a stay doesn’t inpose a hardship on [the
mother]. Corrently, [the father's) child support obligation
for the subject child is $50.00 per month, secause this
Amount ig nominel the ispacton the subject child's standard
Of Living will not be affected. In fact, (the mother] is
enployed and earns $502.00 per month. .

Sowever, if a stay 1s not granted and [the father)
prevails on appeal, he gill suffer a great hardship. As
Roted above, [the mother] and the Stave would have forced
(the father] to enter the work force in order to mest his
Support obligations fo the subject child thereby vislating
his constitutional right to be free from compulsory service
Tn addition, forcing (the father! to enter the work force
will inpede his educational gosis and delay his career. As
Such, [the father] will suffer unnecessary and irreparable
harm

 

   

 

 

In an order dated October 8, 2001, we denied the motion
and ordered counsel for the father to show cause as to why he

should not be sanctioned for filing a frivolous motion.
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During the spring of 2003, the mother and father agreed
to various settlement terms, contingent upon the dismissal of the
instant appeal. Among other things, the father agreed to pay the
mother $25,000 upon the adoption of the child by the mother’s
present husband. On April 16, 2003, the father filed a motion to
dismiss the instant appeal. In an affidavit filed with the
motion, father's counsel noted, anong other things, that “(t]he
Litigation over the Minor Child has drained both parties
financially, emotionally, and psychologically. While the effect

fon the Minor Child has been difficult to m

 

sure, to be sure, it
had [sic] not been positive.”

The motion to dismiss was supported by the mother but
‘opposed by CSEA, the Plaintiff-Appellee. CSEA noted that its
reasons for opposing dismissal included the agency’s “strong and
vested interest” in resolving a constitutional challenge to the
HUPA, In the instant case, in which briefing had been complete
for nearly a year when the father filed the motion to dismiss,
CSEA asserted that its attorney’s fees and costs in defending the
appeal exceeded the money due CSER under the order from which
this appeal was taken; if the challenge to the HUPA was not
resolved in this appeal, CSEA would be forced to duplicate its
efforts in a subsequent case. Further, CSEA asserted that “to
dismiss this appeal would be rewarding Mr. Doe for misleading
this court and the appellees, by the filing of an apparently
frivolous appeal and subjecting both appellees to usage of time
and resources without allowing the case to cone to its natural

conclusion.”
 

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In an order dated May 19, 2003, we denied the motion to
dismiss.*

IX, STANDARD OF REVIEW

‘The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law
that we review under the right/wrong standard. State v. Lee, 75
Haw. 80, 90, 856 P.2d 1246, 1253 (1993). “(W]e have long held
that: (1) legislative enactments are ‘presumptively

constitutional;’ (2) ‘a party challenging a statutory scheme has

 

the burden of showing uncongtitutionality beyond a reasonable

 

doubt:’ and (3) the constitutional defect must be ‘clear,
manifest, and unmistakable.’” Convention Ctr, Auth, v. Anzai, 78
Hawai'i 157, 162, 890 P.2d 1197, 1202 (1995) (quoting Bray ye
Judicial Selection Comm'n, 75 Haw. 333, 340, 861 P.24 723, 727
(1993) (quoting av. tru a loves

Retirement Sys., 74 Haw. 181, 191, 840 P.2d 367, 371 (1992)

 

(quoting Blair vs Cavetano, 73 Haw. 536, 542, 836 P.2d 1066,
1069) (brackets in original and citations omitted))). However,
this presumption of statutory constitutionality does not apply to
laws which classify on the basis of suspect categories or impinge
on fundamental rights expressly or impliedly granted by the
constitution. Nelson v. Mima, 56 Haw. 601, 605, 546 P.2d 1005,

 

ie note that our decision ie not advisory; rather, it pertains to
an actual, justicisble controversy. The father did not argue that. settlenent
ited disputes between the defendantwappellant father and defendant
jee nother would Fender the instant appeal moct, nor did he subsequently
Geidence regarding payment of the contemplated settlenent amount to
for, successful adoption of the child by the mother’s present husband,
Gr paysent of the past-due child support and cther amounts payable to CSER
Under the fansly court's order. Nevertheless, we discuss the motion to
Gionies ane related circumstances in sone Getsil because they factor into eur
Shalysis with respect to whether the instant appeal was frivolous.

 

   

 

10
 

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1008, n.4 (1976). Such laws are presumed to be unconstitutional
unless the state shows compelling state interests which justify
such classifications, and that the laws are narrowly drawn to
avoid unnecessary abridgments of constitutional rights. Bashy vw.
Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 571-72, 852 P.2d 44, 63-64 (1993). See also
san 2 ich, Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 60-61
(1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).

III, DIscussrow
a the father did not raise the issue of equal protection

at trial or in his pre-hearing legal memorandum; the
issue is therefore not preserved for appeal.

 

the father did not raise the issue of equal protection
at trial or in his pre-hearing legai memorandum, An issue which
was not raised in the lower court will not be considered on
appeal. Kernan vs Tanaka, 75 Haw. 1, 35, 856 P.2d 1207, 1224
(1993), cert, denied, 510 0.8. 1119 (1994).

‘The father argues that he preserved the question of
equal protection by stating, in the context of a hearing in which
he argued that HUPA violated the father’s rights to procreational
autonomy and to be free from involuntary servitude, “[fJirst, I'd
Like to say with respect to the laws and statutes of the State of
Hawai‘i cited by [counsel for CSEA] we concede that those are the
existing statutes, but our argument and position is that they are
fundamentally unfair and unconstitutional if you will.” This
argument is palpably without merit. The father’s general
assertion is not sufficient to preserve the father’s equal
protection arguments. here a litigant changes to a new theory

on appeal that falls under the same general category as an

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argument presented at trial or presents a theory that was raised
in a vague and ambiguous way, the theory will not be considered.
lwons_v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 721-22 (10th Cir.
1993).

‘There are sound reasons for the rule. Tt {s unfair to the
trial court to reverse on @ ground that no one even
Suggested aight be error, “It 1s unfair to the opposing
Party, who might have et the argunent not made below.
Finaliys it dees not comport with the concept of an orderly
Gnd efficient method of adzinistration of justice,

   

Ki Farms v. United A , 86 Hawai'i 214, 248, 948
P.2d 1055, 1089 (1997) (quoting Ellis v. State, 821 S.W.2d 56, 57

(ark.App. 1991).

‘Although We have held that we will not hear a question
regarding the constitutionality of a statute unless it is raised
in the trial court, we have made exceptions in cases where the
constitutionality of the statute raised a question of great
public import and justice required that we consider the issue.
State v. Ildefonso, 72 Haw. 573, 584-85, 827 P.2d 648, 655
(1992).

In the instant case, the analysis is similar to the due
process analysis this court must perform in conjunction with the
procreational autonomy claim, the issues have been fully briefed,
disposition of the issue may lessen the burden imposed on
families, taxpayers, and the courts by future frivolous
constitutional challenges to chapter 584, and, though the answer
is so obvious as to suggest bad faith on the part of the pleader,
the question is of substantial public importance. Consequently,

we offer our equal protection analysis in section III.8.2, infra.

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FOR PUBLICATION 997

HUPA does not violate the father’s rights to privacy
and equal protection.

 

he father argues that HRS chapter 584 is
unconstitutional because it violates the father’s rights to
privacy and equal protection under article I, sections S* and 6”
of the Hawai'i Constitution and the fourteenth amendment to the
United states Constitution’ by violating the father’s right to
procreational autonomy and by creating an improper gender-based
classification. The father’s arguments are manifestly without
merit. The father is entitled only to a “rational basis” review
of HUPA because: (1) HUPA does not implicate the father’s
fundamental privacy right to procreational autonomy, but rather
his economic interest in not supporting his childs and (2)
although the father has standing to raise an equal protection
challenge to HUPA, that standing is based on a non-suspect
classification, ise., the biological relationship of fathers to

 

© Article 1, section § of the Hawai'i Constitution provides that
{alo person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
seesee SE lau nor be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied
Ele enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the
Ghareiae thereot because of race, religion, sex or ancestry.”

Agticle I, section 6 of the Hawal's Constitution provides that
sityhe right cf the people to privacy is recognized and shail not be infringed
hdthoue the showing of a compelling state interest. The legislature shall take
Uegirmscive stepe co implement this right.”

+ The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution

provides in pertinent part:
(elo State’ shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or inmunities of citizens of the United
States; nor anall any State deprive any person of life,
Uiberty, "or property, witheut due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its Juriedietion the equal protection
of the Is

 

 

 

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their children. Because HUPA bears a rational relation to the
public welfare, the statute survives our rational-basis review,

‘and the father’s privacy and equal protection arguments fail.

1. The father's fundamental right to procreational
support his child.

the father argues that HUPA violates his right to avoid
procreation, which is an elenent of his fundamental right to
privacy, However, no state action impaired the father’s exercise
of his right net to beget a child. Rather, the state, under the
authority of HUPA, verified the empirical fact that the father
failed to exercise his right not to begets having verified the
father’s relationship to the child, the state, acting under
authority of HUPA, imposed certain legal obligations resulting
from that relationship. Because the father’s alleged injury is
not to his fundamental right to privacy but rather to his
economic interests, he is entitled only to @ rational-basis
review of HUPA.

qo state a claim under the fourteenth amendment, @

Litigant must assert that some state action has deprived the

litigant of a constitutionally protected “liberty” or “property”

interest, See, €.d., State vs Guidry, 105 Hawai'i 222, 227, 96
p.3d 242, 247 (2004); State vs Bowe, 77 Hawai'i 51, 59, 681 P.2d

538, 546 (1994). “In determining whether a statute conflicts
with the Due Process Clause, we have applied two tests. If 6
fundamental right is implicated, the statute is subject to strict

scrutiny, If, however, @ fundamental right is not implicated,

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the statute is subject to the rational basis test.” State wv.
Mallan, 86 Hawai‘ 440, 451, 950 P.24 178, 189 (1998).

under rational-basis review, a statute must “rationally
further @ legitimate state interest.” Id, A state interest is
“iegitimate” if it involves the public health, safety, or
welfare. Mallan, 86 Hawai'i at 451-52, 950 P.2d at 189-90. In
other words, under minimun-rationality due process analysis, a
statute must be rationally related to the public health, safety,
or welfare. Mallan, 86 Hawai'i at 452, 950 P.2d at 190. In
applying the raticnal-basis test, courts in modern times have
given great deference to legislative enactments, Id, Statutes
are subject to a presumption of constitutionality and the burden
of denonstrating that the statute lacks any rational basis lies
with the challenger. Ide

he father complains that state actions teken under the
statutes thet permit the establishnent of paternity and the
imposition and enforcement of child support obligations violated
his fundamental constitutional right to avoid procreation.
However, he fails to identify any state action that impacted in
any way his choice to father a child. He does not argue that the
state required him to engage in the sexual activity that resulted
in the conception of his child, Nor has he identified any means
by which the state interfered in any way with his choice to use
or not to use adequate contraceptive methods during sexual
activity to avoid his sexual partner’s resulting pregnancy.

wwhile it is true that after conception a woman has

more control than @ man over the decision whether to bear a child

1s
 

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‘and may unilaterally refuse to obtain an abortion, those facts
were known to the father at the time of conception.” Ince ¥.
fates, 55€ P.2¢ 1253, 1254 (Or.App. 1977) (noting that the choice
yests in the wonan because she must carry the child and undergo
the risks attendant to childbirth or abortion, and holding that a
child support obligation could constitutionally be imposed on @

father who requested that the mother obtain an abortion or place

the child up for adoption) (citing Planned Parentheod v, Danforth,
426 v.S. 52 (1976)), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 434 U.S.
806 (2977). The father elected a course of conduct inconsistent

with the exercise of his right not to beget @ child. The
reproductive consequences of his actions were imposed by the
operation of nature, not statute.

insofar as HUPA does not implicate the father’s right
to procreationa! sutonomy, the sole “liberty” or “property”
interest at issue implicating state action 1s his de minimis
child support obligation. A “putative father has no legitimate
right and certainly no liberty interest in avoiding financial
obligations to his natural child that are validly imposed by
state law.” Rivera vs Minnich, 483 U.S. $74, 580 (1967). In
other words, HUPA does not implicate the father’s fundamental
rights, but rather the father’s economic interest. Where
economic interests are concerned, the rational basis test is the
proper standard. Maeda v. Anemiva, 60 Haw. 662, 669, S94 P.24
136, 141 (1979).

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FOR PUBLICATION P78

2. The rts onl le eau: te
shallense-to-cheater sit 1s bee Dicleaical

The father argues that HUPA deprives him of his right
to equal protection by creating an improper gender-based
classification.’ The father cites some language from chapter S84
in support of his argument, but when the chapter is read as a
whole, it is clear that the cited language statute makes no
improper distinction between men and women, ‘To the extent that
the father receives disparate treatment under the statute, it is
on the basis of his relationship to his child legal
classifications based on the biological relationship of fathers
to their children are not subject to an elevated level of
scrutiny.

As we explained in State v. Miller:

the guarantee of equel protection of the laws under

Howai'l and thited States Constitutions requires that

Hovadns similarly situated with respect to the legitimate

Perpore of the law receive like trestment. However, equal

peeeCetion does not Eequire that ail persons be dealt with

Peeheisarly, tut it dees require that'a distinction made

have sone relevance to the porpose for which the
Efuseifieation ss made.

 

 

Miller, 64 Hawai'i 269, 276, 933 P.2d 606, 613 (1997) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
“Whenever a denial of equal protection of the laws is

been whether the

 

alleged, as a rule our initial inquiry hi
legislation in question should be subjected to ‘strict scrutiny’
or to a ‘rational basis’ test.” Bach v. Lewin, 74 Haw. $30,

+ as noted above, this argument Ls deoned to be waived.

vv
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571, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (1993) (quotations and citations omitted) .
ie have applied strict scrutiny analysis to laws classifying on
the basis of suspect categories or impinging upon fundamental
rights expressly or impliedly granted by the constitution, in
which case the laws are presumed to be unconstitutional unless
the state shows compelling state interests which justify such
classifications, and that the laws are narrowly drawn to avoid
unnecessary abridgnents of constitutional rights. Baehr, 74 Haw.
at 571-72, 852 P.2d at 63-64 (internal citations and quotetion
marks omitted)

By contrast, where suspect classifications or
fundamental rights are not at issue, this court has traditionally
employed the rational basis test. Baehr, 74 Haw. at $72, 982
P.2d at 64 ("Under the rational basis test, we inguire as to
whether a statute rationally furthers a legitimate state
interest. Our inguiry seeks only to determine whether any
reasonable justification can be found for the legislative
enactment.” (Citations and quotation marks omitted.))

WAS chapter 584, Hawai'i’s Uniform Parentage Act,
provides for a variety of procedures relating to the
establishment of the parent-child relationship and the
enforcement of duties resulting from that relationship. Chapter
584 applies to both mothers and fathers but recognizes that
different procedures may be required to establish fatherhood than

are required to establish motherhood." Certain sections of

 

 

as § 584-3, in its entirety, reads
How porent and child relationship establishes.

 

 

(continued,

 

ae
   

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FOR PUBLICATION 977
chapter $64 differentiate between mothers and fathers. To the
extent that these differences are related to fundamental
differences in the way fathers and mothers are situated with
respect to proof of parenthood, it is beyond doubt that these
sections pass constitutional muster. As the United States

supreme Court observed in Tuan Anh Nowven v. 1.N.S.#

sin the cese of the mother, the relation is verifiable
from the birth itself, The mother's status is docurented in
bce instances by the birth certificate or hospital records
Gna the witnesses who attest to her having given birth.

Tn'the case of the father, the uncontestable fact is
that he need net be present at the birth. If he is present,
furthermore, that circumstance is not incontrovertible proot
oe fatherhood: Fathers and mothers are not similarly
Steuated with regard to the proof of biological parenthood,
fae Imposition cf 2 difterent set of rules for making that
[oe Geterninetion with respect to fathers and mothers is
Aefther surprising nor troublesome from a constitutional
perspective.”

‘Quan Anh Nouven v. L.N.S., $33 U.S. 53, 62-63 (2001) (rejecting

an equal protection challenge to @ statute providing different

 

procedures for establishing @ father-child relationship than for
the mother-child relationship); see also Miller v. Albricht, 523
U.S. 420 (1998) (same).

However, the father directs our attention to various

 

clauses in § 584-15(c) and (d) that specifically pertain to

fathers, yet bear no apparent relationship to any biological

(,- continued?
‘Phe parent and child relationship between 2 child and:
{iy The natural nother may be established by proof of her
Aatang given bireh to the child, or under this chapters
(2) The natural father say be established under this
chapters
(Sivan adoptive parent may be established by proof of
adoption.

19
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difference between mothers and fathers." The cited language, if

 

read in isolation from the remainder of chapter 584, suggests 4
gender-based classification; classifications on the basis of
gender are suspect, and therefore subject to strict scrutiny.
Bachr, 74 Haw. at 580, 852 P.2d at 67.

we may not read statutory language out of context. As

this court explained in State v. Savitz:

When construing 4 statute, our forencst obligation is
to ascertain aad give effect to the intention of the
[Sglsiscure, amich is to be obtained primarily from the
[Sagasge conteined in the statute itself. And we must read
Rinkussey language in the context of the entire statute and

SSaserue st in a manner consistent with its purpose
97 Hawai'i 440, 443, 39 P34 567, 570 (2002).

HRS § 564-15 4s one of a series of sections (§ 584-6
through § 584-20) that provide procedures to be followed in an

RS _§ 984-15 provides in relevant part:
$'S04-15 Dudgnent or order.

 

[é) The judgaent or order may contain any other
provision directed agsinet the appropriate party to the
ErSteeding, concerning the duty of suppert, the custody and
Eosralaneeip of the enild, visitation privileges with the
EniTG, the furnishing of Sond or ther security for the
Eayment of the juagment, or any other matter in the best
Gnkerest of the child. Upon neglect or refusal to give this
fecurity, or upon default of she father or the fasher's
SSec5Ys Chap!ionce with the terms of the judgment, eRe
Eohrt may order the forfeiture of any such security

 

Fonte and profits of
appoint a receiver thereof, and may cau
Petgonal estave, including any salaries, wages, commissions,
eerSther eoneys’ owed to han and the rents and profits of big
feal estate, to be applied toward the meeting Of the terms
Sethe judgment, to the extent that the court, from tine to
fine, deene Just snd reasonable.

(a) Support judgment oF orders Ordinarily shall be for
periodic payments whieh may vary in amount... . The court
Rey lime the ather's Liability for past support of the
Calia to the proportion of the expenses already incurred
Ghat the court deems Sust.

 

20
   

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FOR PUBLICATION *7"
action to determine the father and child relationship. The
section immediately following this series, § 584-21, titled
vaction to declare mother and child relationship,” provides that:
wany interested party may bring an action to determine the
existence or nonexistence of a mother and child relationship.
tnsofar as practicable, the provisions of this chapter applicable
to the father and child relationship shall apply.”

when thus understood in the context of the broader
statutory scheme, the language cited by the father does not
create an improper gender-based classification. Rather, the
legislature has ensured that mothers will be subject to the sane
enforcement procedures and statutory privileges applied to
fathers, The equal protection clause requires no more than that
“[ilneofar as practicable, the provisions . . . applicable to” a
man apply when the same kind of action is brought against

To the extent that the father has alleged an equal
protection injury, it flows not from any gender-based
distinction, but rather from the statute’s classification of
parties as fathers based on their biological relationship to

their children.” Insofar as “{cJourts have never found that

Ag the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted
in NB. y. Nedagg, In unich the court addressed siniler procreational autonomy

and equal protection arguments:
Trinere are ne judiciel decisions recogaizing a constitutional
right Sf aman to terminate his cuties of support under state lew for @
Enid chet he has fathered, no metter how removed he may be enotionslly
Slon the child. chile support has long been a tex ave had eo
Hyun tiestern civilization: For reasons of child welfare and social
Eelaltyr if act for moral reasons, the biological relationship between
father snd his offepring--even if unwanted and unacknowledged--renains
Veontinued...)

 

 

 

 

ar
 

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FOR PUBLICATION °° ____
jegal classifications based on (the) biological relationship of
fathers and their children were subject to a high level of
scrutiny,” NB. vs Hedges, 391 F.3d 632, 635 (6th Cir
2004) (citing Parham vs Hushes, 441 U.S. 347, 355-57 (19791),
cert, denied, __ U.S. __ (Oct. 17, 2005) (emphasis added), our
equal protection inquiry seeks only to determine whether any
reasonable justification can be found for chapter 584.
3 ter 504 rationally furthers srinate
interest.
We have described the task faced by a litigant whose
claim is subject to a rational-basis review:
onder this {roticnal-bseis] standard, to prevail, = party
Oneiienging the constitutionality of « statutory
CHUSTI2E8 Shon cgual protection grounds has the burden of
CRETE Sep convincing! clarity. that the classification is
snoreng, tally relaced vo tne svatucory purpose, oF that the
Bebaienged classification does net rest Upon some ground of
SUELSIREE Gating a teir and substantiel Feletion fo the

Soject of the legislation, and is therefore not arbitrary
Sed capricious.

 

 

ndy Be: a v 1 70 Haw. 362, 380, 773
p.2d 250, 262 (1989) (citations omitted). The father concedes
that “Hawai'i certainly has an interest in protecting the welfare
of a minor and the conservation of the State’s public assistance
fund.” The father has not demonstrated that HUPA’s
classification of parties as fathers bears no rational
relationship to this objective or to some other legitimate state

interest. Rather, it is beyond doubt that child support laws,

8(...continved)
BGGEIEELERSTly sugeicient to support paternity tests and chiié support

Cequirenents. « « . Reproduction and child support requirenents occur
see eee egard to the Rale's wishes of his emotional attachment to his
offepring

391 F.5d 852, 836 (2004) (Anternal citations omitted)

22
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FOR PUBLICATION *7*
imposed by all fifty states and supported by a variety of federal
enactments, are rationally related to the public welfare and that
the imposition of support obligations on fathers rather than non-
fathers is not arbitrary or capricious. Our due process and
equal protection inguiries are therefore concluded. Chapter 884
is constitutional.

c. the family court did not violate the father’s right to
be free from compulsory service.

he father argues that the family court violated the
father's fundamental right to be free from compulsory service
when it ordered him to pay monthly child support for the subject
child. In other words, he argues that the statute violates the
prohibition against slavery or the prohibition against peonage:
Specifically, the father argues that “the Family Court does not
have the authority to force @ natural father to interrupt his
educational pursuits to obtain employment in order to satisty
monetary obligations imposed on him without his consent.”"? The
father’s arguments are so palpably lacking in merit as to suggest
bad faith on the part of the pleader. The court may, without
running afoul of either the thirteenth amendment or the
prohibition against imprisonment for failure to pay @ debt,
imprison a party for failure to pay child support. See, @.d.,
nited States v. Ballek, 170 F.3d 871 (9th. Cir. 1999), certs
denied, 528 U.S. 583 (1999). Ipso facto, it is certainly within

> tm the instant case, the cbligation alleged to be the moral
equivalent of hunen Bondage amounts to 850 per sonth

23
 

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the court's power to impose the de minimis support obligations at
issue in this case, despite the father's preference not to pay.
‘the thirteenth amendment abolished slavery and
involuntary servitude, except as punishment for 2 crime, and gave
congress the authority to enforce the amendment by appropriate

‘The Antipeonage Act of 1867, 42 United States

 

legislation.
code (USC) § 1994, was enacted under this authority. Under
some circumstances, the amendent and the aforementioned act
prohibit imprisonment for failure to pay a debt. See, au,
Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944).

In Ballek, the Ninth Circuit addressed @ thirteenth
amendnent challenge to the Child Support Recovery Act, noting
that not all forced employment is constitutionally prohibited and
concluding that enforcement of child-support awards, which had

been enforced by imprisonment prior to the adoption of the

Mae thirteenth amendnent to the United States Constitution reads,
sn ite entirety:

Sekiion 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
BSc Punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been

Ship Ecnvicted, shall exist within the United States, oF any
place subject to their jurisdiction.

Bittion 2) Congress shall have power to enforce this article

by eppropriate lesisiation.

 

42 USC § 1996 reads, in its entirety:
He notding of any person to service or labor under the
Tystes known as peohage is abelished and forever prohibited
ik gny Testitory or State of the United States; and all
acto, Laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of
sy derritory or state, which Adve heretofore esteblisned,
falntsines, or enforces, of by virtue of which any attempt
Ghali hereafter be mace to establish, maintain, or enforce,
SNtecely cr indirectiy, the voluntery or involuntary service
Sr'isbok Sf any persons ae peans, in Liquidation of any debt
SE obligation, of otherwise, are Geclared null and void.

 

 

24
 

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FOR PUBLICATION W77

thirteenth amendnent, ig constitutionally permissible." 170
F.3d at 871, 874. This analysis is in accord with that of the

M The BaLlek court offered further analysis:
Hiatkonclude that chile-cupport awards 211 within that

narrow class of obligation® that may be enforced by means of
URprisonnent without violating the constitutional
AREEiEltion againet slavery. He start with the self-evident
Bbeervation that the relationship between parent and child
$e omach nore than the ordinary relationship between debtor
isatitediter. The perent io responsible for bringing the
AnSus"ineo the world and in so doing assumes a poral
Sbligacion to provide the child with the necessities of
SEze*ea"ee ensure the chile’ s welfare until it is
Ghancipated and able to provide for itself, When parents
SOgNecE ther chi laren, this Yaises more than « private
[efeivcispute. Ie is a’matter of vital importance to the
Aegeinicys and every state now enforces, by means of
EGiEina!’ Senctiens, the parent's obligation to support
Children within hie custody.

UMrperience teaches that the natural bonds, which
nornabiy ensure thet children are cared for, are sonetines
Beenened when the aifinsty between the parents comes to an
Mea The cupervisien--and coercive power--of the court is
SBeen Wavoked to proape the non-custodial parent to continue
eeeSlaing support: The non-custodial parent's obligation to
Bay child support is thus derivative of the obligation to
pee ide supeert in s custodial setting, and such awerds are
Poocinely enforced by iaprisonnent. The state also has an
yetereseYan’proeecting the public fise by ensuring thet the
Ghildren not become wards of the state, Cf. Butleriz,
Fersyls 240 Urs. (228,).333 ((1916)] (Utne Thirteenth
FizERkeat] certainly wae not intended to interdict
Bhrorcenent of s+. duties whieh individuals owe £0 the
Staten") At ioast one state Suprene Court hes rejected
the azgunent that. inprisonent for failure to work in order
[oreds encugh money to make child support payments violates

 

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

State and federal prohibitions against slavery. See Moss te
Shestadectsee, 17%car. den 396, 71 Cal.aptr. 2d 219, 227,
950 P.24 58, 66 (1998)

tere ve to hold. . . that enforcing child support

obligetions by threat of saprisonment violates the
Ghireeenth Anendnent, we would undermine the
Uelitestapitened practices in the state courts for policing
Compliance with child support obligations» Me vould,
Sffbceively; pur children on the same footing as unsecured
Exeditors. we decline to interpret the Thirteenth Anendnent
ins wey that would ao drastically interfere with one of the
bet Important and seneitive exercises of the police power
setnauring that persons too young to take care of thenselves can
Count en beth their parents for material suppor

allek, 170 F.3d at 674-75. (some citations onitted) «

25
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California Supreme Court. See Mose vs Superior Court, 950 P.2d
59 (Cal. 1998).

In Moss, the court noted that “[t]he obligation of a
parent to support a child . . . is among the most fundamental
obligations recognized by modern society” and “to become
employed if that is necessary to meet the obligation, is in no
way comparable or akin to peonage or slavery.” Id. at 67, The
court distinguished the child support obligation from involuntary
servitude on the grounds that the oblige is free to choose his

‘employment and employer:

hen, as here, however, the person claiming
Anvoluntary servitude is simply expected to seek and accept
ecploynent, if available, and is free to choose the type of
smbiGyment’ and the enployer, end is also free to resign that
Exbloyment if the conditions are unsatisfactory of to acest
Sther employment, none of the aspects of “involuntary
Servieade” which invoke the need to apply 2 contextual
Spproach to Thirteenth Anendnent analysis are present. There
{ehh Sservitude” since the worker is not bound te any
particular employer and hae no restrictions on his freedom
Ether than the need to comply with a lawful order to support
S*thlid. Working £0 eszn money to support 2 child is not
Involuntary servitude any nore than working in order to pay
tines, Failure to do either may subject one to civil and
Eximinal penalties, bot that compulsion or incentive to
{Eber does net create a condition of involuntary servitude,

 

 

   

 

Id, at 72. The court held that the obligation to comply with a
child support order and to work if necessary to do so does not

constitute involuntary servitude. Moss, 950 P.2d at 73.

 

Ina footnote, the court emphasized the overarching neture of the
ebligation

The state's interest in and public policy mandating
perental support of children ie so. strong that jurisdictions
Paced with che question held that it extends even to
javenile fathers who were the victins of statutory rape by

Adult women. See m a

P.2d 1273 (Kan. 1993); Tp Ze JGa, 580 N-P.2¢ 257 (111 Bop

1390); 3 Sate Nee. 24 1155 (Mase. 1983) aa
es bebe #42 NaW.20 273 (Wis. 1369)

Mose, 980 Pad et 61 nO
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FOR PUBLICATION 887

Other courts that have addressed thirt

 

nth amendment
challenges to court-imposed family support obligations have
reached the same conclusion. See, S.da, McKenna v. Steen, 422
s0.2d 615 (ba-App. 1982) (allegations that child support order
imposed on a law student amounted to an imposition of involuntary
servitude by forcing him to continue in his previous occupation
‘go ludicrous that they hardly dignify a response”); Hicks ve
Hicks, 387 So.2d 207 (Ala.Civ.App. 1980) (holding that an alimony
order does not impose involuntary servitude); and Freeman v
Freeman, 397 A.2d 554 (D.C. 1979) (party’s contention that child
support order directing him to

thirteenth amendment held to be without merit). In light of the

 

k gainful employment violated

unanimous weight of well-settled precedent contrary to the
father’s contention, we conclude that the father has not
demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that HUPA suffers from 2
clear, manifest, and unmistakable constitutional defect. The
family court did not violate the father’s right to be free from
involuntary servitude by ordering him to pay $50 per month to
support his child, despite the father’s preference to remain
unemployed.

Insofar as the father has not demonstrated beyond a
reasonable doubt that HUPA is unconstitutional, and insofar as
the father’s rights to privacy, equal protection, and involuntary
servitude have not been violated, we affirm the family court’s

order, findings of fact, and conclusions of law.

20
 

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c tthe appeal is entirely frivolous.

Pursuant to HRAP Rule 38 (2004), “[i]f a Hawai't
appellate court determines that an appeal decided by it was
frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from
the appellate court and reasonable opportunity to respond, award
damages, including reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, to the

appellee.” This court has explained that:

(ulnder HRAP Rule 26, the court may award sanctions in
cone of two ways, The court can, soa sponte, determine an
BBheb! to'ee Frivolous; give nctice to the parties and allow
ZPin the cpportunity to respond; and if the court decides is
Soetoprieces award yanctions, Alternatively, « party may
ete For senctions by way of @ separately filed motion,
Jiving the opposing side the opportunity to respond. The
Setee! Gpen reviewing the arguments of the parties, ‘can then
Gecide the issue cf frivelousness and award sanctions

Stcoraingly
Rhoads v. Okamura, 98 Hawai" 407, 413, 49 P.3d 373, 379 (2002).

In Rhoads, we articulated the standard by which we
determine whether an appeal is frivolous:

For an assignment of error to be frivolous it must be
manifestly and palpably without merit. This court has
Betines c frivoteve clzin 98 one so manifestly and palpably,
SfEneue merit aa to indicate bad faith on the pleader's part
EEN hat areutent. to the court was not required. RAP Rule
Se tancticne have been imposed in past cases where the
Rpeliane hes engaged in'a pattern of frivolous and
‘Hkaticus litigation or where appellant has continued to
Einowledge controlling authority contrary to her

 

  

Rhoads, 98 Hawai'i at 414, 49 P.3d at 380 (citations, quotation
marks, and ellipsis omitted). In determining whether en appeal
is frivolous, this court may consider whether other state courts
have determined similar claims to be frivolous. See Rhoads, 98
Hawai'l at 415, 49 P.3d at 361, This court may also look to the

28
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FOR PUBLICATION "98
federal courts’ application of their equivalent Rule 38 for
guidance. See Rhoads, 98 Hawai'i at 414, 49 P.3d at 380.

The father argued that HUPA is unconstitutional because
it violates his rights to privacy, equal protection, and his
right to be free from compulsory service. Each of these
contentions has been demonstrated to be palpably without merit
and long ago put to rest by well-settled precedent. Furthermore,
each of these contentions has been determined to be frivolous oF
manifestly without merit by other courts, See, Ssds, Hedges, 391
F.3d at 836! (upholding an award of attorney's fees for
frivolous ‘procreational autonomy’ and equal protection challenge
to child support order); Steen, 422 So.2d at 618 (allegation that
child support order amounts to involuntary servitude “so
Knight v.

 

ludicrous that [it) hardly dignif[ies] a response”)
Mercer Island, 70 Fed.Appx. 413, 415 (9th. Cir. 2003)
(unpublished; on appeal from an unsuccessful involuntary
servitude challenge to @ child support order, affirming the

district court’s entry of a litigation bar preventing appellant

tn an equel protection and ‘procrestional autonomy’ challenge to @
child support orders the Sixth Circuit upheld an award of fees for frivolous
the plaintif£ presents simply a novel legal theory, @

theory that would invalidate the paternity and child support
Inve of the Fifty states and the federal acts on child
Eupport. ‘The theory is that unwed fathers, as a matter of
Feciprocity, should aiso be given the choice to
financial responaibility for the child's existence:
theory 20 foreign to our legal tradition that it hes no
Mfoundaticn,”" no chance of success. We cannot imagine that
any federe! court mould agree mith plaintiff's principle
thle the concept of "procreative privacy” should be
Stretched to include the constitutional right for a father
fo receive the constitutional equivalent of the termination
Of the mother's pregnancy by allowing him the right to deny
paternity and deny the duty of financiel support,

disdaee, 381 Fe3dat 636

 

   

  

 

29
 

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from filing any further frivolous filings); Exeeman, 397 A.2d at
57 (involuntary servitude challenge to child support order so
jacking in merit as to be addressed in a conclusory fashion in a
footnote). The father also attempted to advance arguments on
appeal that were not raised in the trial court, without providing
any nonfrivolous basis as to why this court should nevertheless
consider them.

This court is not obliged to “suffer in silence the
filing of baseless, insupportable appeals presenting no colorable
claims of error and designed only to delay, obstruct, oF
Ancapacitate the operations of the courts or any other
governmental authority. . . . The government should not have
been put to the trouble of responding to such spurious argunents,
nor this court to the trouble of ‘adjudicating’ this meritless
appeal.” Rhoads, 9@ Hawai'i at 414, 49 P.3d at 380 (quoting
Crain ve C.I.R,, 737 F.2d 1417, 1418 (Sth Cir. 1984)). The
father's arguments are “manifestly and palpably without merit”
and thus his appeal is “frivolous” in the context of HRAP 38.

‘This court has articulated the policies behind awarding
attorney's fees:

wards of ettorneyt, (S*duarender"as not burden the

{hnocent They also protect the courts--and gerivatively

porties in other cases--fron impositions on their tine,

thas on interest in the orderly conduct of
Fan interest independent of the (opposing

 

  

   

 

Rhoads, 98 Hawai'i at 414, 49 P.3d at 380 (quoting Abastillas v,
Kekona, 87 Hawai'i 446, 449, 958 P.2d 1136, 1139 (1998) (citation
omitted). ‘The allegedly penurious father, unable to afford $50

30
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FOR PUBLICATION P97
per month to support his child, conmanded his attorney to
doggedly pursue an appeal with no chance of success, file
numerous pointless motions, and force the state to expend large
amounts of taxpayers’ money to defend the child support regime
from meritless attacks. An award of fees as provided for by HRAP
Rule 38 may be justified in this case.
IV, CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the family court's
order, findings of fact, and conclusions of law. We hereby give
notice to the parties that the appeal was frivolous and request
briefing with regard to damages end costs to be awarded to CSEA
as authorized by HRAP Rule 38. Briefs by appellees shall be
submitted within 15 days of the date of this opinion and
appellant’s responses thereto shall be submitted within 15 days

thereafter.

on the brief:
Steven L. Hartley and GY
Jen-L. W. Lyman of .

Stirling « Kleintop Whole ace —

for defendant-appellant
John Doe

 

 

Seosetes 6 awe) are

Huilin Dong for

defendant-appellee

Jane Doe

Rosemary McShane and hie (

‘Trina Yamada, Deputies
Corporation Counsel,

for plaintiff-appellee
Child Support Enforcement
Agency, State of Hawai'i