Case Title: State v. Rogers

Citation: 

Docket Number: S49361

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2002-10-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  October 3, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

THE STATE OF OREGON,
	Plaintiff-Adverse Party,
	v.
DAYTON LEROY ROGERS,
	Defendant-Relator.
(CC 88-00355, 88-00356, 88-00357, 88-00358,
88-00359, 88-00360; SC S49361)

	En Banc
	Original proceeding in mandamus.*
	Argued and submitted July 30, 2002.
	Laura Graser, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief
for defendant-relator.
	Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for plaintiff-adverse party.  With her on the brief
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.
	DE MUNIZ, J.
	Peremptory writ to issue.
	*On petition for writ of mandamus from a pretrial order of  
Clackamas County Circuit Court, Raymond R. Bagley, Jr.
		DE MUNIZ, J.
		In this original mandamus proceeding, relator
challenges a trial court order denying his motions to examine
certain master jury lists and other jury records.  For the
reasons that follow, a peremptory writ to issue.
		The underlying proceedings concern the penalty phase of
a capital murder case in which relator is the defendant.  The
court previously has recited the relevant procedural history:
		"Over a period of time in 1987, police discovered
the bodies of seven women in the Mollala Forest.  The
State Medical Examiner determined that each of the
women had been stabbed or cut with a sharp object. 
When the bodies were discovered, defendant was in
police custody as a suspect in the killing of another
woman, Smith.  Smith had died from multiple stab
wounds.  Smith and the seven women buried in the
Mollala Forest were prostitutes.  The facts surrounding
the Mollala Forest killings shared other similarities
with those surrounding the Smith killing.  During the
investigation of the Mollala Forest killings, defendant
was convicted of aggravated murder for killing Smith,
but he was not sentenced to death.
		"In May 1989, defendant was found guilty of 13
counts of aggravated murder arising out of six of the
Molalla Forest killings.  In June 1989, the court
sentenced defendant to death.  On automatic review,
this court vacated the death sentence and remanded the
case to the trial court for a new penalty-phase
proceeding that would include the so-called 'fourth
question,' [i.e., whether the death penalty is
appropriate for this defendant, considering all aspects
of his life and crimes]."
State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282, 284, 4 P3d 1261 (2000) (Citations
and footnote omitted).  After a new penalty-phase proceeding
before a jury, the trial court again sentenced relator to death. 
On automatic review, this court vacated the sentence of death and
remanded the case, because the trial court had erred, inter alia,
in refusing to permit the jury to consider the option of
sentencing relator to life in prison without the possibility of
parole.  Id. at 285-92.
		On remand, pending the penalty-phase hearing, relator
moved to obtain the Clackamas County master jury lists and other
jury records for the past five years.  Shortly after he filed
that motion, but before the trial court had ruled, the
legislature amended ORS 10.215, ORS 10.275, and ORS 136.005, to
provide procedures for criminal defendants to obtain jury lists. 
In response, relator filed a renewed "motion to produce the jury
lists" (1) and a "motion challenging jury panel & to produce source
lists, etc."  Relator also tendered an affidavit in support of
the motions. 
		In the motions, relator contended that the process for
selecting the jury pool (2) violates the "fair cross-section" of the
community requirement of both the state (3) and federal
constitutions, asserting, inter alia, that
	"* * *cognizable groups are underrepresented therein,
contrary to said constitutional provisions as well as
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and Article I, § 20 of the Oregon Constitution."
In support of those assertions, relator contended:
	"Specifically, but not exclusively, [relator] believes
and submits that non-caucasians, particularly
Hispanics, are under-represented." 
		The affidavit that relator's counsel tendered in
support of the motions stated: 
		"I believe that there have been material
departures from the requirements of law regarding the
summoning and selection of jurors, in the particulars
and for reasons set forth in the foregoing motion, and
in other respects, most of which cannot be determined,
in my opinion based on review of expert testimony,
without the relief requested in the foregoing motion."
		At a subsequent hearing on the motions, relator
introduced nine exhibits that included reports, studies and
surveys conducted in other counties regarding jury selection and
service. (4)  We include the state's description of the exhibits as
illustrative of the purpose for which relator offered them.  
		"The state disagrees with [relator's]
representation in his brief that the exhibits showed
that 'task forces in Multnomah and Marion counties had
studied the process and had concluded there was a
state-wide problem with the accuracy of the cross-section of the venire.'  Although some of those
exhibits showed that certain categories of people were
statistically underrepresented on jury venires, they
did not show that there was any underrepresentation
that rose to the level of a constitutional violation. 
Moreover, the only study that referred to any sort of
state-wide issue was the Oregon Supreme Court Task
Force report, which stated only that it 'believes' that
the results of studies in other counties would be
similar to those in Multnomah County.  At most, the
exhibits tend to show that the names from the master
and source lists could be used to discover some of the
information (the race, ethnic, and other cognizable
characteristics of individual jurors; the reasons they
proffered for excusal from jury service) that could be
used to support a fair-cross-section challenge.
		"Exhibit 102 is an excerpt of the 1994 report of
the Oregon Supreme Court Task Force on Racial/Ethnic
Issues in the Judicial System.  The Task Force report
is based on 'opinions based on actual experience,' and
'repeated testimony that jury pools in Oregon do not
adequately represent the racial and ethnic diversity of
courts' districts.'  The Task Force stated that those
perceptions are 'confirmed' by a study of the Multnomah
County jury system, and that it 'believes that similar
results would be obtained if the same study were
conducted in other areas of the state.'
		"Exhibit 103 is an excerpt from the 1993 Multnomah
County study.  The study was done by Portland State
University students and was based on surveys of a
scientific sample of jurors and those subpoenaed but
who did not serve.  The study compared the
representation in those two groups to 'the general
population in the community as reflected by the 1990
census.'
		"Exhibit 104 is an analysis of juror satisfaction
done by the Office of the State Court Administrator in
1999.  The study found a disparity between the
percentage of Hispanic and Latino residents in the
county and those who were summoned for jury service
during a 1-year period in 1997 and 1998.  However, the
study noted, because a significant percentage of
Hispanics (52.9% according to the United States Census
Bureau in 1996) may not be citizens -- and thus
ineligible to serve as jurors -- 'it is expected that
the percentage of Hispanic jurors summoned * * *  will
be substantially less than the percentage of Hispanics
in Marion County.'
		"The remaining exhibits consist primarily of
correspondence to trial court administrators and by the
State Court Administrator relating to composition of
master lists.  Exhibits 107 and 108 are reports
published by the American Judicature Society regarding
improving citizen response to jury summonses and
enhancing the jury system.  Finally, exhibit 109 is a
transcript of testimony in another criminal case by [a
witness] relating to studies that could be done based
on master and source lists."
		After the hearing, the trial court denied the motions
and refused to consider release of the jury records, concluding
that relator was required to "establish a material departure from
the requirements of law as a preliminary step to obtain the
information sought by his motions."  Relator then filed a
petition for an alternative writ of mandamus which this court
issued.
		This matter involves the interplay between ORS 136.005,
a statute authorizing either party in a criminal case to
challenge the lawfulness of the selection of a jury panel on
statutory or constitutional grounds, and ORS 10.215, which
establishes the confidentiality of certain jury records, (5) and ORS
10.275, which governs the release of those records in connection
with a jury panel selection challenge.
		To construe those statutes and the relationship between
them, we use the methodology established in PGE v. Bureau of
Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  At the
first level of analysis, we examine the text and context of each
statute, giving words of common usage their plain, natural, and
ordinary meaning.  Id. at 610-11.  If that examination reveals
the clear intent of the legislature, then our inquiry is
complete.  Id. at 611.
		We begin with ORS 136.005, which provides:
		"(1) The district attorney or the defendant in a
criminal action may challenge the jury panel on the
ground that there has been a material departure from
the requirements of the law governing selection of
jurors by filing a motion with the court supported by
an affidavit alleging facts that, if true, constitute a
material departure from the requirements of the law
governing the selection of jurors.  The party making
the motion shall serve the motion and supporting
affidavit on the other party, the trial court
administrator and the State Court Administrator.
		"(2) A challenge to the panel shall be made before
the voir dire examination of the jury.
		"(3) If the court determines that there has been a
material departure from the requirements of the law
governing selection of jurors, the court shall:
		"(a) Stay the proceedings pending the selection of
a jury panel in conformity with the applicable
provisions of law; and 
		"(b) Grant such other relief as may be
appropriate.
		"(4) The procedures prescribed by this section are
the exclusive means by which a district attorney or
defendant may challenge a jury panel."
Clearly, that statute authorizes a district attorney or a
criminal defendant to challenge the jury panel by filing a motion
"supported by an affidavit alleging facts that, if true,
constitute a material departure from the requirements of the law
governing the selection of jurors."  (Emphases added.)
		However, ORS 136.005 does not define the words
"material" and "departure."  Consistent with the PGE methodology,
we give those words of common usage their plain, natural, and
ordinary meaning.  The word "material" has a number of meanings,
which include:  "being of real importance or great consequence:
SUBSTANTIAL * * * : ESSENTIAL * * * : RELEVANT, PERTINENT." 
Webster's Third Int'l Dictionary 1392 (unabridged ed 1993). 
"Departure" is defined as "deviation or divergence esp. from a
rule, course of action, plan, or purpose ."  Id. at 604.  Thus, as a textual matter, "material
departure," under ORS 136.005(1), means that the affidavit must
allege facts that, if true, constitute a "deviation" of "great
consequence" from constitutional or statutory procedures that
govern the selection of jurors.
		The state and relator assert, and we agree, that a
legally cognizable challenge must be alleged under ORS 136.005(1)
to trigger the provisions of ORS 10.275, which govern the release
of confidential jury records.  That prerequisite does not mean,
however, that the party challenging the selection of the jury
panel under ORS 136.005(1) must prove, or that the trial court
must find, that the facts alleged in the affidavit are true to
trigger the provisions of ORS 10.275(1).  Instead, initially the
trial court must determine only whether the facts alleged in the
affidavit, if true, allege a "material departure" from statutory
or constitutional requirements governing the selection of jurors.
		We turn next to ORS 10.275(1), which provides:
		"A person challenging a jury panel under ORS
136.005 or ORCP 57 A who seeks jury records that are
confidential under ORS 10.215 must include a request
for access to the confidential records in the motion
challenging the jury panel.  The motion and supporting
affidavit must be served on the trial court
administrator and the State Court Administrator.  The
request must:
		"(a) Specify the purpose for which the jury
records are sought; and
		"(b) Identify with particularity the relevant jury
records sought to be released including the type and
time period of the records."
That statute requires that a party seeking access to confidential
jury records in connection with a motion challenging the
selection of the jury panel include a request for access to those
records.  The request must specify the purpose for which the
records are sought and identify with particularity the relevant
jury records sought to be released, including the type and time
period of the records.
		When a legally sufficient challenge has been alleged
under ORS 136.005(1), ORS 10.275(2) (6) then authorizes the trial
court to order release of jury records that the moving party may 
use to prove the merits of the asserted challenge.  A trial
court's decision to order release of the records must be premised
on findings that the records are "likely to produce evidence
relevant to the motion" and that the production of the "jury
records is not unduly burdensome."  ORS 10.275(2). (7)  We now turn
to the specific issues of this case.
		In this case, the trial court did not apply the
provisions of ORS 10.275 because it concluded that ORS 136.005(1)
required relator to "establish a material departure from the
requirements of the law as a preliminary step to obtain the
information sought by his motions."  However, ORS 136.005(1)
requires only that relator allege facts that, if true, constitute
a material departure from the requirements of law.  The trial
court impermissibly required relator to prove that his motion
would succeed to trigger the statutory provisions governing
release of the jury records that may support the motion.
		The state argues that, even if the trial court used the
wrong standard in deciding relator's motions, the trial court's
error is of no consequence because the legal sufficiency of
relator's allegations is a question of law, which this court may
now may decide under the correct statutory standards.  In other
words, the state contends that relator's motions, affidavit, and
exhibits do not, as a matter of law, allege facts that, if true,
constitute a material departure from statutory or constitutional
requirements.
		In support of that argument, the state asserts that, at
most, "the affidavit and motion[s] allege as fact that Hispanics
are 'underrepresented,' and that the procedures [summoning and
excusal of jurors] permit excusal of potential jurors who are
'not entitled' to excusal from jury service."  The state argues
that, as a matter of law, those facts, if true, would not
constitute a violation of relator's rights under the
constitutional provisions on which he relies.  
		According to the state, the elements of a prima facie
case, with regard to the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section
requirement, require a criminal defendant to show:  (1) that the
group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the
community; (2) that the representation of that group in venires
from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in
relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3)
that the underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of
the group in the jury-selection process.  See Duren v. Missouri,
439 US 357, 358, 99 S Ct 664, 58 L Ed 2d 579 (1979) (identifying
factors necessary to prove Sixth Amendment fair cross-section
violation). (8)  It is the state's position that, even assuming that
people of Hispanic origin are a cognizable group (9) within the
meaning of the fair cross-section requirement, relator's
assertion in his motion that Hispanics are "underrepresented"
does not identify at what stage of the jury selection process
that group is underrepresented and thus does not demonstrate that
they are "systematically" excluded from being part of the pool of
available jurors. (10)  Therefore, according to the state, relator's
assertion that people of Hispanic origin are "underrepresented"
in the jury panel does not allege any material departure from the
Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement.  
		Relator does not contest the state's characterization
of the elements necessary to demonstrate a violation of the Sixth
Amendment fair cross-section requirement.  Instead, relator
simply asserts that the motions and affidavit, as supplemented by
the findings, conclusions, and assertions contained in the
various exhibits, are sufficient to allege a Sixth Amendment jury
selection challenge under ORS 136.005(1).  We agree with relator.
		The motions and affidavit filed in this case are of the
"bare bones" variety.  They assert as fact that "Hispanics are
underrepresented in the jury panel." (11)  And, as noted, the record
contains a number of exhibits that include studies and reports
supporting relator's assertion that, on a state-wide basis, 
distinctive groups, including Hispanics, are underrepresented in
Oregon jury pools.  
		The question at this stage of the proceedings is
whether those assertions are sufficient under ORS 136.005(1) to
require the trial court to consider release of the jury records
under the requirements specified in ORS 10.275(1).  We conclude
that relator's assertion that "Hispanics are underrepresented" in
the jury panel, as supplemented by the other exhibits introduced
at the hearing, are sufficient, though barely so, to allege a
"material departure" from the requirements of law governing
selection of jurors.  
		Because relator has alleged sufficiently a jury
selection challenge under ORS 136.005(1), we direct the trial
court to vacate its order denying the renewed "motion challenging
jury panel & to produce source lists" and "motion to produce jury
lists." (12)  The trial court must consider release of the jury
records that relator seeks, in accordance with the requirements
of ORS 10.275. (13)
		Peremptory writ to issue.



1. 	Specifically, relator sought the "[c]urrent Clackamas
County Master Jury List, and those from 1996 to the present";
"[c]urrent Clackamas County source lists, and those from 1996 to
present"; and "[l]ists of all Clackamas County jurors who
received and returned summons from the 1996 term through the
present term."

2. 	Relator's jury pool challenge addresses "the source
list, master list, the term list and the process that brings
prospective jurors into the courtroom."

3. 	Relator's motions cite to Article I, section 11, of the
Oregon Constitution as the source of a "fair cross-section"
requirement in the Oregon Constitution.  Further, relator has not
suggested different analyses under the federal and state
constitutions.  Thus, we assume the "fair cross-section" analyses
under both constitutions are the same.  See State v. Compton, 333
Or 274, 289, 39 P3d 833 (2002) (so stating).

4. 	We express no opinion on the correctness of that
procedure or other procedures that the parties used in this case.

5. 	ORS 10.215(1) provides, in part:
	"Except as specifically provided by law, the State
Court Administrator and circuit courts may not disclose
source lists obtained from private or public entities,
and jury lists containing names selected from a source
list, to any other person or public entity."


6. 	ORS 10.275(2) provides:
		"The court may order release of the jury records
if the court finds that:
		"(a) The jury records sought are likely to produce
evidence relevant to the motion; and
		"(b) Production of the jury records is not unduly
burdensome."


7. 	However, under ORS 10.275(3) a trial court that orders
release of jury information may circumscribe the use of that
information:
		"An order under subsection (2) of this section may
include, but need not be limited to:
		"(a) A requirement that the moving party provide
advance payment to the trial court administrator and,
if applicable, the State Court Administrator for the
reasonable costs of providing copies of the jury
records; and
		"(b) Restrictions on further disclosure of the
jury records including, but not limited to:
		"(A) A requirement that the moving party return
all originals and copies to the court at the conclusion
of the proceeding;
		"(B) A requirement that the jury records may be
used only for the purpose of supporting the jury panel
challenge made in the motion;
		"(C) A prohibition against distributing the jury
records to a person who is not an agent or
representative of the moving party; and
		"(D) A prohibition against contacting or
attempting to contact the persons whose names appear on
the jury records without specific authorization of the
court."


8. 	Although we discuss only relator's Sixth Amendment jury
challenge, we note that relator also asserts a Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection challenge to the selection of the jury
panel.  In Castaneda v. Partida, 430 US 482, 494, 97 S Ct 1272,
51 L Ed 2d 498 (1977), the Supreme Court summarized the
requirements for proving an equal protection violation: 
	"The first step is to establish that the group is one
that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for
different treatment under the laws, as written or as
applied.  Next, the degree of underrepresentation must
be proved, by comparing the proportion of the group in
the total population to the proportion called to serve
as grand jurors, over a significant period of time.  *
* *  Finally, * * * a selection procedure that is
susceptible of abuse or is not racially neutral
supports the presumption of discrimination raised by
the statistical showing."
(Citations omitted.)
		Under a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge
the exclusion of a cognizable group must be "purposeful."  
However, the moving party may prove that requirement by
circumstantial evidence establishing a "clear pattern,
unexplainable on grounds other than race, [that] emerges from the
effect of the state's action even when the governing legislation
appears neutral on its face."  430 US at 493 (quoting Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 US 252, 264-65, 97 S
Ct 555, 50 L Ed 2d 450 (1977)).

9. 	The state points out that the term "Hispanic," for
purposes of the jury challenge that relator has framed, is not
easily defined.  However, the state has not challenged, at this
stage of the proceedings, relator's assertion that Hispanics are
a cognizable group for purposes of a jury selection challenge
based on the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

10. 	The state appears to concede that "systematic
exclusion" under the Sixth Amendment does not mean "intentional
exclusion," but, instead, means exclusion that results from
something inherent in the particular jury-selection process
utilized.

11. 	It appears that relator intended to incorporate the
assertions in the motions regarding underrepresentation of
Hispanics into the assertions made in the affidavit.  We treat
the motions and affidavits in that manner for purposes of this
opinion.

12. 	Having concluded that the trial court's order is infirm
on statutory grounds, we need not reach relator's argument that
he is entitled to the records as a matter of constitutional
right.  See Crocker and Crocker, 332 Or 42, 46, 22 P3d 759 (2001)
(court ordinarily will not decide constitutional questions when
adequate subconstitutional basis for decision exists).

13. 	We decline to order the release of the jury information
at this stage of the proceedings because the provisions of ORS
10.275(2) and (3) contemplate that a trial court will exercise
discretion in devising and overseeing the release and use of the
jury records.