Case Title: Snyder v. State

Citation: 262 N.W.2d 574

Docket Number: 

State: iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Date: 1978-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
262 N.W.2d 574 (1978) Dale L. SNYDER, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee. No. 59766. Supreme Court of Iowa. February 22, 1978. *575 Richard T. Heiderscheit, Lansing, for appellant. Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Thomas A. Evans, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and Calvin R. Anderson, County Atty., for appellee. Considered by MOORE, C. J., and MASON, RAWLINGS, REES and UHLENHOPP, JJ. MOORE, Chief Justice. Petitioner appeals denial of his application for postconviction relief following a full and complete evidentiary hearing. He contends he is entitled to postconviction relief because he was deprived of his right to appeal when this court permitted his trial counsel to proceed with his appeal over his objections and subsequently entered a Rule 16 frivolous appeal order. The trial court found he failed to meet his burden of proving this contention by a preponderance of the evidence. We affirm. This appeal is an outgrowth of extended trial and appellate proceedings arising from a shooting incident in May 1973. Petitioner Dale Snyder was originally charged with assault with intent to commit murder in violation of Code section 690.6. Shortly after his arrest Attorney James Mellick was appointed defense counsel. Ultimately petitioner was tried, convicted and sentenced for the crime charged. On appeal we reversed and remanded for new trial because trial court erroneously tendered additional instructions to the jury outside the presence of defendant in contravention of Code section 777.19. See State v. Snyder, Iowa, 223 N.W.2d 217. After the case was remanded to district court, Attorney Mellick was again appointed as defense counsel. Prior to time set for retrial, the county attorney filed a second charge of assault with intent to commit murder arising from the same incident supporting the original charge. At this point, the county attorney, petitioner and his counsel commenced lengthy plea negotiations. By Friday, May 16, 1975 a tentative agreement was reached but Attorney Mellick requested the formal arraignment be delayed over the weekend to permit a full evaluation of the plea bargain package by his client. On May 20, 1975 the arraignment was held before the Honorable C. W. Antes. At a lengthy plea proceeding Judge Antes fully complied with the standards and guidelines set out in Brainard v. State, Iowa, 222 N.W.2d 711 and State v. Sisco, Iowa, 169 N.W.2d 542. The plea bargain was fully explained. Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of assault with intent to commit a felony, namely, manslaughter, in violation of section 694.5 and one count of going armed with intent in violation of section 695.1. The court, consistent with the plea bargain recommendation, thereafter imposed three five year sentences to be served consecutively. Petitioner was subsequently incarcerated in the State Penitentiary at Fort Madison. On May 27, 1975 Attorney Mellick, although he had not been appointed as appellate counsel, filed a notice of appeal. Soon thereafter he sent a letter to petitioner at the penitentiary advising him he was preparing to proceed with a Rule 16 appeal. On July 1, 1975 Mellick made application to withdraw as counsel as contemplated by the rule and submitted a supporting memorandum showing the frivolity of the appeal in compliance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493. Subsequently an affidavit was filed showing these papers had been served on petitioner. On June 20, 1975 Snyder filed a pro se notice of appeal with the district court and moved for appointment of counsel; he specifically requested that James Mellick not be appointed. On July 9 the district court ruled it was without jurisdiction to consider the application. This application and order then were forwarded to this court. On July 15, 1975 petitioner filed a pro se "notice of appeal and request for different counsel" with the Supreme Court clerk. In the application he stated he intended to raise "ineffective assistance of counsel" on the appeal and that the appeal filed by Mellick was completely unauthorized. *576 On August 18, 1975 this court permitted Attorney Mellick to withdraw, found the appeal to be frivolous and dismissed it under Rule 16. Snyder filed a pro se application for postconviction relief on January 20, 1976. Counsel was appointed and the application amended to allege that the original guilty pleas were not voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently entered, that he was deprived of counsel at a critical stage of the criminal proceeding and that the appeal by Attorney Mellick was unauthorized. The State resisted the application. The case proceeded to trial in April 1976. As will be discussed infra the testimony of petitioner Snyder and Attorney Mellick was in conflict in several respects. The court filed well-prepared findings of fact and conclusions of law on July 6, 1976 and entered an order denying the application for postconviction relief. This appeal followed. I. Petitioner has alleged violation of constitutional safeguards and thus we make our own independent evaluation of the whole record under which the postconviction court's ruling was made. Cleesen v. State, Iowa, 258 N.W.2d 330, 331; Long v. Brewer, Iowa, 253 N.W.2d 549, 552. However, the burden of proof is on petitioner to establish the facts asserted by a preponderance of the evidence. Code section 663 A. 7; Cleesen v. State, supra; Watts v. State, Iowa, 257 N.W.2d 70, 71. The thrust of petitioner's assignments of error raised here is essentially that the postconviction court erred in dismissing his application because it held the direct appeal taken by defendant's original trial counsel, which was later dismissed under Rule 16, was an adequate and proper appeal that was binding on him. Attorney Mellick carefully observed the pertinent provisions of our Supreme Court Rule 16 (now R.App.Pro.104) after he arrived at his decision of frivolity. That rule provides: The United States Supreme Court sanctioned this expedient procedure for disposing of frivolous appeals in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493, 498 where it held: Also see Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748, 87 S. Ct. 1402, 18 L. Ed. 2d 501 where the Supreme Court struck down under Anders our "clerk's transcript" procedure for expedited appeals. At the time we previously entered the Rule 16 order we had before us: 1) Attorney Mellinck's application to withdraw together with a copy of his May 28 letter to Snyder, and a brief and argument attached to said application which met the Anders requirements, 2) proof of service on Snyder of the application, 3) petitioner's notice of intent to proceed with his appeal raising as an issue "ineffective assistance of counsel", 4) a copy of defendant's June 20 pro se notice of appeal to Winneshiek District Court and request for appointment of appellate counsel other than James Mellick. In our order permitting Attorney Mellick to withdraw and dismissing the appeal we stated in part: To the extent petitioner seeks to relitigate the issues as to the validity of his guilty pleas and ineffective assistance of counsel, our prior ruling affirming his convictions and dismissing the appeal is final. State v. Loney, Iowa, 222 N.W.2d 474, 476; Carstens v. Rans, Iowa, 210 N.W.2d 663, 664, 665; State v. Wetzel, Iowa, 192 N.W.2d 762, 764. The remedy of postconviction relief was not intended to give a defendant numerous appeals and we have construed chapter 663A in a strict manner consistent with this purpose. Section 663 A. 8; Edwards v. State, Iowa, 249 N.W.2d 851, 852; Carstens v. Rans, supra; Horn v. Haugh, Iowa, 209 N.W.2d 119, 120. II. Even reaching the merits of this argument, we find this position untenable. Although petitioner alleges here he only pled guilty because he believed defense counsel would secure his release on bail and then vigorously pursue an appeal, Attorney Mellick contradicted this testimony. Mellick testified he explained to Snyder that once the guilty pleas were entered to the reduced charges, this was the "end of the line" and there was no further legal recourse available unless error had been committed in the plea proceedings. The record made at the original arraignment which was stipulated and introduced into evidence at the postconviction hearing supports this recollection. After stating that he understood the penalties for pleading guilty to the reduced charges were three consecutive 5-year sentences, the following colloquy took place: Clearly petitioner failed to allege and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his guilty plea was thus rendered involuntary because of ineffective assistance of counsel. This case is like the situation presented in Walker v. Brewer, Iowa, 189 N.W.2d 605 and Toogood v. Brewer, Iowa, 187 N.W.2d 748, where we rejected similar "ineffective assistance of counsel" contentions. III. We now proceed to petitioner's contention that Attorney Mellick had no authority to proceed with the Rule 16 appeal and thus he was deprived of assistance of counsel in his statutorily-protected right of direct appeal in violation of Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S. Ct. 814, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811 and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100 L. Ed. 891. Here he relies on the general rule that absent his consent, Mellick had no authority to institute or maintain an appeal on his behalf. The evidence received at the postconviction hearing is again in conflict. Snyder testified that on the evening of May 21 following the entry of the guilty pleas, he told Mellick "he was through with the case" and he did not want him as appeal counsel. Mellick testified he was never fired after the pleas were taken and that prior to entry of the pleas he had advised Snyder he would file a notice of appeal. Also that "if there was no defect in the plea of guilty proceedings, I would move to have the appeal dismissed as frivolous. Then Dale wanted to know how long that would take. I said a frivolous appeal matter probably would take maybe up to two or three months." Mellick acknowledged that he was never formally appointed counsel on appeal but stated his belief that when you represent an indigent in the trial court "you are to follow through with the representation on appeal" *579 unless application is made to the Supreme Court for permission to withdraw. From the aforementioned evidence we do not believe petitioner established Attorney Mellick was without authority to file an appeal on his behalf. Clearly the fact he was not specially appointed for the appeal is not determinative. While appointed counsel is not obligated to follow a case into the Supreme Court, he may do so if so requested by defendant. Code section 775.5. We further note that under the circumstances here it may well have been a deprivation of due process if Mellick had not filed timely notice of appeal to protect petitioner's appeal rights. Blanchard v. Brewer, S.D.Iowa, 318 F. Supp. 28, aff'd., 429 F.2d 89; Biggles v. Brewer, S.D.Iowa, 384 F. Supp. 1; United States v. Neff, 8 Cir., 525 F.2d 361, 363; Williams v. United States, 8 Cir., 402 F.2d 548, 552. We agree with the trial court's finding that "Attorney Mellick effectively represented the applicant and his handling of the appeal was within the provisions of Rule 16 and was under the circumstances, an effective appeal" and the court's conclusion "that from a review of the entire record, files and proceedings * * * no grounds exist for granting of Postconviction Relief as prayed." AFFIRMED.