Case Title: Baker v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 081715

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2009-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and Millette, 
JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
ERNEST BAKER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
    OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 081715 
 
JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 November 5, 2009 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA  
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Commonwealth is 
required to establish as an element of the offense of 
trespassing that a “no trespassing” sign on private property 
was posted by a person authorized by the statute to exclude 
entry upon the property. 
Ernest Baker was convicted at a bench trial in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Petersburg of trespassing in violation of 
Code § 18.2-119.1  Baker appealed his conviction to the Court of 
Appeals, which affirmed his conviction in an unpublished 
opinion.  Baker v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0220-07-2 (August 
5, 2008).  We awarded Baker this appeal in which he challenges 
the Court of Appeals’ decision to uphold his conviction. 
Baker presents three grounds upon which he contends the 
Court of Appeals erred in its ruling:  (1) the Commonwealth 
failed to prove that the subject property was posted by the 
true owner, (2) the circuit court violated his due process 
                                                 
1 Baker was also convicted of possession of cocaine, in 
violation of Code § 18.2-250, but that conviction was later 
dismissed and is not relevant to this appeal. 
rights by allowing an inference that either the true owner had 
posted the property or the property was posted to shift an 
evidentiary burden to him, and (3) the evidence was 
insufficient to prove that he was legally excluded from the 
property. 
BACKGROUND 
Corporal Buffkin of the City of Petersburg Bureau of 
Police was dispatched to the 700 block of Mount Airy Street in 
Petersburg to investigate a report of gunshots.  Corporal 
Buffkin was providing field training to a recruit officer, John 
H. Vasquez, and both were in uniform with their police badges 
displayed.  The police officers saw Baker walking on Mount Airy 
Street.  As the police officers started getting out of their 
police car in order to talk to Baker, Baker immediately began 
running away from the officers through the yards of houses on 
Mount Airy Street.  When Baker reached a residence at 717 Mount 
Airy Street (the property), he cut through the yard alongside 
the residence and ran through a hole in a wooden fence, where 
Corporal Buffkin tackled him. 
While pursuing Baker, Corporal Buffkin observed a “no 
trespassing” sign posted on the front of the property.  Officer 
Vasquez saw a “no trespassing” sign on the side of the property 
while walking Baker back to the police car.  Following his 
 
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arrest, Baker told the police officers that his cousin owned 
the property. 
Baker entered a plea of not guilty to the trespassing 
charge, which specifically alleged that he “did go upon or 
remain upon the posted property at 717 Mt. Airy Street after 
having been forbidden to do so, in violation of § 18.2-119 of 
the Code of Virginia.”  At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s 
evidence, Baker moved to strike the trespass charge.  Baker 
argued that Code § 18.2-119 requires evidence that he was 
banned from the property or the property was posted by the 
owner and that Baker was a person not allowed to be on the 
property.  Baker contended that there was no proof that he is 
not allowed to be on the property, no proof that the true owner 
posted the property, and no proof that even if it is so posted 
that he is not allowed to be on the property. 
The circuit court acknowledged that there was no evidence 
Baker had been forbidden to be on the property in the past:  
“Certainly there is no evidence as to the latter point he has 
. . . been forbidden to be on that property . . . . The 
indictment charges he has been forbidden to trespass.  There is 
no proof of that.”  However, the Commonwealth responded that 
Baker “is forbidden by the sign.”  The circuit court held that 
there is a presumption that the property was posted by a person 
authorized to do so. 
 
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The circuit court denied Baker’s motion to strike, 
determining:  “I think the State has reached its burden . . . 
and shows the property was in fact proper[l]y posted.  The 
person entered on that property.  I think the burden shifts.”  
Baker presented no evidence and renewed his motion to strike, 
which the circuit court again denied.  The circuit court found 
Baker guilty and sentenced him to twelve months’ incarceration.  
Baker appealed to the Court of Appeals. 
In affirming the circuit court’s judgment, the Court of 
Appeals held that because it was undisputed that Baker went 
upon property owned by another person and the property was 
posted with a “no trespassing” sign, the circuit court made the 
reasonable inference that the owner or someone lawfully in 
charge of the property posted the sign.  The Court of Appeals 
declined to address Baker’s argument that the circuit court 
violated his due process rights by shifting the burden of 
proof, as Baker failed to make this argument to the circuit 
court.2  Baker’s appeal to this Court followed. 
                                                 
2 We likewise decline to address Baker’s due process 
argument, as Baker’s counsel conceded at oral argument that 
this argument was made for the first time on appeal.  Rule 
5:25.  Rule 5:25 is not limited in application to non-
constitutional issues.  Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 
308 n.3, 513 S.E.2d 642, 652 n.3 (1999). 
 
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DISCUSSION 
In order to determine whether the Commonwealth must 
establish as an element of the offense of trespassing that a 
“no trespassing” sign was posted by an authorized person, we 
must interpret Code § 18.2-119.3  The interpretation of a 
statute is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo on 
appeal.  Farrakhan v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 177, 180, 639 
S.E.2d 227, 229 (2007). 
In reviewing the language of Code § 18.2-119, we apply the 
following principles of statutory interpretation: 
[U]nder basic rules of statutory construction, 
we determine the General Assembly’s intent from 
the words contained in the statute.  Alger v. 
Commonwealth, 267 Va. 255, 259, 590 S.E.2d 563, 
565 (2004).  When the language of a statute is 
unambiguous, courts are bound by the plain 
meaning of that language and may not assign a 
construction that amounts to holding that the 
                                                 
3 According to the relevant portion of Code § 18.2-119,  
 
[i]f any person without authority of law goes 
upon or remains upon the lands, buildings or 
premises of another, or any portion or area 
thereof, after having been forbidden to do so, 
either orally or in writing, by the owner, 
lessee, custodian or other person lawfully in 
charge thereof, or after having been forbidden 
to do so by a sign or signs posted by such 
persons or by the holder of any easement or 
other right-of-way authorized by the instrument 
creating such interest to post such signs on 
such lands, structures, premises or portion or 
area thereof at a place or places where it or 
they may be reasonably seen, . . . he shall be 
guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. 
 
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General Assembly did not mean what it actually 
has stated. Id. 
 
Elliott v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 457, 463, 675 S.E.2d 178, 182 
(2009). 
Additionally, 
[i]n accordance with the principles of statutory 
construction of penal statutes, a court must not 
add to the words of the statute nor ignore the 
words of the statute and must strictly construe 
the statute and limit its application to cases 
falling clearly within the statute.  Turner v. 
Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459, 309 S.E.2d 337, 
338 (1983).  Additionally, it is a “settled 
principle of statutory construction that every 
part of a statute is presumed to have some 
effect and no part will be considered 
meaningless unless absolutely necessary.”  
Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. P’ship, 255 Va. 335, 
340, 497 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1998). 
 
Farrakhan, 273 Va. at 181-82, 639 S.E.2d at 230. 
On appeal, Baker argues that although he was present on 
the property, the evidence was insufficient to prove he had 
been banned from the property in the manner set forth in Code 
§ 18.2-119.  Baker maintains that any reasonable interpretation 
of Code § 18.2-119 requires the Commonwealth to present 
evidence that the property was posted by one of the enumerated 
parties in order to make out a prima facie case and to prove 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  According to Baker, such 
evidence is an element of trespass as defined by the statute, 
and the Commonwealth failed to establish this element through 
 
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proof that the property was posted by one of the specifically 
enumerated persons. 
Additionally, Baker asserts that the General Assembly, by 
enacting Code § 18.2-119.1, which makes it a Class 3 
misdemeanor to knowingly and intentionally post a “no 
trespassing” sign on the land of another without permission 
from a person authorized to do so, intended the crime of 
trespass on posted property to be premised upon proof of the 
authority to post the property. 
Baker argues that the only testimony, other than that he 
was on posted property, was Baker’s unchallenged statement that 
his cousin owned the property.  Baker contends that despite the 
presence of the “no trespassing” signs on the property, the 
Commonwealth did not prove he was a person intended to be 
excluded from the property, because the circuit court 
determined there was no evidence that Baker had been forbidden 
to be on the property in the past.  Baker notes that “no 
trespassing” signs often make no distinction between invitees, 
residents, or other persons such as a licensee.  Baker asserts 
that the statute clarifies the need for a witness with 
authority under the statute to exclude others in order to 
establish that the defendant was a trespasser. 
The Commonwealth maintains that the circuit court’s 
statement that the Commonwealth had “reached its burden” was 
 
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simply an observation that Baker’s burden was to produce 
credible evidence to overcome the reasonable inferences that 
arose from the evidence.  The Commonwealth argues that the 
record shows that in convicting Baker of trespass, the circuit 
court drew the reasonable inference that the “no trespassing” 
sign was properly posted by a homeowner or resident of the 
property and that Baker was not authorized to enter the yard.  
According to the Commonwealth, the circuit court also drew the 
reasonable inference that the property owner had the right to 
forbid access to the yard. 
The Commonwealth contends that the trial judge was free to 
disregard Baker’s self-serving assertion to police that the 
property belonged to his cousin.  Furthermore, the Commonwealth 
argues that at the close of its case the burden of going 
forward with credible evidence to overcome the reasonable 
inference of guilt shifted to Baker and he failed to meet that 
burden. 
Applying the principles of statutory construction set 
forth above, we hold that the plain language of Code § 18.2-119 
requires proof, as an element of the crime of trespass, that 
oral or written notice of the proscription against entry be 
given or a “no trespassing” sign be posted by the owner, 
lessee, custodian, or other person lawfully in charge of the 
property, or by the holder of an easement or other right-of-way 
 
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who was authorized to post such a sign by the instrument 
creating that person’s interest in the property. 
Because there was no evidence that any oral or written 
prohibition against entry was given to Baker, the issue in this 
case is whether the “no trespassing” sign on the property was 
properly posted by a person authorized by the statute.  The 
Commonwealth has the burden to prove every essential element of 
the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Hubbard v. 
Commonwealth, 276 Va. 292, 295, 661 S.E.2d 464, 466 (2008); 
Washington v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 619, 623, 643 S.E.2d 485, 
487 (2007).  Therefore, the Commonwealth was required to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the property was posted by one 
of the enumerated parties having authority to do so. 
Having construed Code § 18.2-119 in accordance with its 
plain meaning, we now consider whether the evidence was 
sufficient to support Baker’s conviction for trespass. 
When analyzing a challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence, this Court reviews the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prevailing party 
at trial and considers any reasonable inferences 
from the facts proved.  The judgment of the 
trial court will only be reversed upon a showing 
that it is plainly wrong or without evidence to 
support it. 
 
Wilson v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 19, 27, 630 S.E.2d 326, 330 
(2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  We 
hold that the evidence was insufficient to prove Baker 
 
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committed trespass in violation of the statute.  The 
Commonwealth presented no evidence regarding who posted the “no 
trespassing” signs observed by the police officers.  The record 
therefore contains no indication whether that person or persons 
had authority to post the property under Code § 18.2-119.  
Because we conclude that the Commonwealth has failed to satisfy 
one of the elements of the offense, we need not address Baker’s 
argument that the Commonwealth failed to establish that he was 
a person intended to be excluded by the “no trespassing” signs. 
CONCLUSION 
Proof of the existence of the “no trespassing” signs on 
the property alone is insufficient to satisfy the elements of 
trespass set forth in Code § 18.2-119.  Without evidence that a 
“no trespassing” sign was posted by one of the enumerated 
persons authorized by the statute to prohibit entry upon the 
property, the Commonwealth failed to put on sufficient evidence 
of Baker’s guilt.  For the reasons set forth above, we 
therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate 
Baker’s conviction under Code § 18.2-119, and dismiss the 
indictment. 
Reversed, vacated, and dismissed. 
 
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