Case Title: Thomas J. Morgan v. State Of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC06-2350

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-2350 
____________ 
 
THOMAS J. MORGAN,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[July 10, 2008] 
 
QUINCE, C.J. 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in Morgan v. State, 941 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).  The 
district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decision of the 
Third District Court of Appeal in Gomez v. State, 832 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2002), and Sharpe v. State, 861 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  For the following reasons, we 
approve the result reached by the district court in Morgan but hold that if a legally 
sufficient claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged based on counsel’s 
advice to reject a plea offer, a defendant may be entitled to a postconviction 
evidentiary hearing. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On November 27, 2000, Thomas Morgan was charged with two counts of 
aggravated assault with a weapon.  The State offered Morgan a sentence of five 
years’ imprisonment in exchange for a guilty plea.  Defense counsel told Morgan 
he could win at trial, or at worst be convicted of a lesser offense.  See Morgan, 941 
So. 2d at 1198.  Defense counsel encouraged Morgan to decline the State’s offer 
and proceed with trial.  Morgan followed his counsel’s advice and proceeded to 
trial.  At trial, a jury convicted Morgan of two counts of aggravated assault with a 
weapon.  The trial court adjudicated Morgan guilty and sentenced him as a habitual 
felony offender to two concurrent terms of ten years in prison with five-year 
mandatory minimums as a prison releasee reoffender.  On direct appeal, the Fourth 
District Court of Appeal affirmed Morgan’s convictions and sentences.  See 
Morgan v. State, 818 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).   
 
In August 2003, Morgan filed with the trial court a motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 alleging 
eight claims for relief.  As his fourth claim, Morgan alleged ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel based on counsel’s advice concerning the plea offer.  Morgan 
claimed that his counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense.  More 
 
- 2 -
specifically, Morgan said that based on his counsel’s assurances that she would 
win at trial, he declined the State’s plea offer and proceeded to trial.  He argues 
that had he known that his counsel would not win at trial, he would have accepted 
the State’s offer of five years’ imprisonment.  The trial court summarily denied 
relief on all claims presented, including the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.   
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief 
and certified conflict with the Third District Court of Appeal on the issue of 
whether a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing when claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel based on trial counsel advice to reject a plea offer because 
counsel believed the defendant could win or do better going to trial.  In Morgan 
and Gonzales v. State, 691 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), the Fourth District 
held that the defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on such a claim.  
See Morgan, 941 So. 2d at 1198-99; Gonzales, 691 So. 2d at 604.  In contrast, the 
Third District in Sharpe and Gomez held that a defendant is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on this type of ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  See 
Sharpe, 861 So. 2d at 484; Gomez, 832 So. 2d at 794.   
Morgan petitioned this Court for discretionary review, and we accepted 
review to resolve the conflict which exists between the two district courts of 
appeal.  
ANALYSIS 
 
- 3 -
The District Courts 
Each Florida district court of appeal has addressed in the context of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim the rejection of a plea offer on the advice of 
counsel, and whether the trial court should have granted the defendant an 
evidentiary hearing on such a claim.  In Williams v. State, 924 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2006), the defendant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because his 
counsel failed to convey to him the statutory maximum for the crime charged prior 
to his rejection of the State’s plea offer.  The State offered three years on a charge 
of sale or delivery of cocaine.  After conviction at trial, the defendant was 
sentenced to twelve years, a term within the statutory maximum of fifteen years.  
The district court remanded for an evidentiary hearing after finding there was 
nothing in the trial court’s order that conclusively refuted this claim.  
The Second District Court of Appeal addressed a similar issue in Dines v. 
State, 909 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).  Dines filed a motion for postconviction 
relief alleging six claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  He alleged, inter 
alia, that trial counsel was ineffective for misinforming him about his potential 
prison exposure prior to rejecting the State’s plea offers.  The trial court summarily 
denied the claim.  The Second District affirmed the summary denial finding the 
claim facially deficient because Dines did not allege any deficiency in counsel’s 
performance.  The district court reasoned: 
 
- 4 -
To state a claim under Strickland, the defendant must assert 
more than merely that counsel advised against accepting a plea, that 
the defendant took the advice, and that ultimately a greater sentence 
was imposed.  On its face, such an allegation identifies no failing on 
counsel’s part.  Rather, some specific deficiency must be alleged:  for 
instance, that counsel advised the client to reject the plea without 
preparing or knowing the operative facts of the case, or that counsel 
neglected to identify the material legal issues, or that counsel 
otherwise did not fully perform as a lawyer.  Mr. Dines has made no 
such allegation; thus, his first ground failed to state a facially 
sufficient claim. 
Dines, 909 So. 2d at 523.1 
 
In several cases concerning attorneys advising their clients to reject plea 
offers, the Third District has held that a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing on a claim of ineffective assistance.  See Yanes v. State, 960 So. 2d 834 
(Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Sharpe, 861 So. 2d at 484; Gomez, 832 So. 2d at 794.  The 
defendant in Gomez filed a postconviction motion alleging ineffectiveness of 
counsel because counsel advised the defendant to reject a plea offer from the State 
because counsel assured him that a pending motion to suppress would be granted.  
The trial court summarily denied the claim, but the district court reversed for an 
evidentiary hearing or other appropriate relief.   
                                          
 
 
1.  Later, in Beasley v. State, 964 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), the 
district court, in reversing the denial of postconviction relief, cited to this Court’s 
opinion in Cottle v. State, 733 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1999), which lays out the 
requirements that must be met in order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of 
counsel for advising a defendant to reject a plea offer. 
 
- 5 -
Then, in Sharpe the court cited to its earlier Gomez opinion in addressing the 
issue of whether a defendant can ever state a claim for ineffective assistance of 
counsel based on counsel’s advice to reject a plea offer when counsel has informed 
the defendant of the maximum sentence he faces.  The court indicated that the 
Third District does not take the position espoused in Gonzales that no claim of 
ineffective assistance is viable under these circumstances.  More recently, in 
Yanes, the Third District reiterated its position that these claims require an 
evidentiary hearing in the trial court.   
 
Beginning with Gonzales, the Fourth District has held that claims by 
defendants alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s advice to 
reject a plea offer were not capable of being evaluated under Strickland, and 
therefore the defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the claim.  In 
Gonzales the defendant alleged counsel advised him to reject a favorable plea offer 
from the State because counsel said she would win the case.  In affirming the trial 
court’s summary denial of the claim, the district court said: 
We do not, therefore, believe that the allegation of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in this case is capable of being evaluated by any 
“objective” standard of reasonable as contemplated by Strickland.  It 
was, rather, a tactical or strategic decision, which cannot be the basis 
of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Accordingly, even if 
appellant could prove his allegation, it would not entitle him to relief. 
Gonzales, 691 So. 2d at 604.  
 
 
- 6 -
 
After Gonzales, in Morgan, the case that is now before this Court, Smith v. 
State, 825 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), and Szymanowski v. State, 771 So. 
2d 10 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), the court cited with approval its earlier Gonzales 
opinion.  Specifically, in Smith and Szymanowski, the court cited Gonzales for the 
proposition that a claim involving the rejection of a plea and proceeding to trial is 
tactical or strategic and cannot be the basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.  See Smith, 825 So. 2d at 1013; Szymanowski, 771 So. 2d at 11.  It is 
interesting to note that in Garcia v. State, 736 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), the 
court again cited to Gonzales for the same proposition but ultimately found Garcia 
had stated a valid claim for relief based on our decision in Cottle v. State, 733 So. 
2d 963 (Fla. 1999). 
The Fifth District Court of Appeal in Colon v. State, 909 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 
5th DCA 2005), also addressed an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on 
counsel’s advice to reject a plea offer.  The defendant claimed he relied on trial 
counsel’s assurance of an acquittal at trial in turning down a plea offer.  The trial 
court summarily denied the claim as insufficient and without merit.  The Fifth 
District disagreed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing because the record did 
not conclusively refute the allegation.  See id. at 490.  The court in Young v. State, 
608 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), also remanded the case for an evidentiary 
hearing based on a claim that counsel was ineffective when he failed to convey a 
 
- 7 -
plea offer by the State, an offer that was substantially less than the twenty-five 
years he received after trial. 
This Case 
The Fourth District in Morgan affirmed the trial court’s denial of 
postconviction relief on Morgan’s claim that counsel was ineffective for advising 
him to reject a plea offer based on assurance of a win at trial.  In affirming the 
denial of relief, the court cited to Gonzales.  The court in Gonzales held that claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel based on advice to reject a plea offer could not 
be the basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  We disagree and 
reaffirm the requirements that a defendant must allege and prove in order to be 
entitled to relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel for advising a defendant 
to reject a plea offer.  The defendant must allege and prove that (1) counsel failed 
to convey a plea offer or misinformed the defendant concerning the possible 
sentence he faced, (2) the defendant would have accepted the plea but for counsel’s 
failures, and (3) acceptance of the plea would have resulted in a lesser sentence 
than was ultimately imposed.  See Cottle, 733 So. 2d at 967.   
This Court’s Cottle decision was based on both federal and Florida case law.  
We grounded the opinion on Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),2 and 
                                          
 
 
2.  See Downs v. State, 453 So. 2d 1102, 1106-09 (Fla. 1984), for this 
court’s discussion and agreement with the Strickland analysis. 
 
- 8 -
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).  In Strickland the United States Supreme 
Court said that in ineffective assistance of counsel claims the defendant must 
demonstrate both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that he was 
prejudiced by the deficient performance.  Thereafter in Hill the Court indicated that 
the Strickland standard and analysis should be applied to claims of ineffective 
assistance that arise in the plea context.  We said that the plea process is a critical 
stage of the criminal proceeding, and therefore the defendant is entitled to the 
effective assistance of counsel at that stage also.   
Moreover, we agreed with the many district court of appeal cases that 
recognized ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising from counsel’s failure 
to properly inform a defendant of a plea offer.  Specifically, we quoted with 
approval the language from the Fifth District’s Young opinion in which that court 
outlined the three requirements for a prima facie ineffectiveness claim in this 
context.  We said: 
In its earlier opinion in Young, the Fifth District properly emphasized 
that claimants are held to a strict standard of proof due to the 
incentives for a defendant to bring such a post trial claim.  608 So. 2d 
at 112-13.  Consistent with the prior Florida caselaw we have 
discussed above, the Fifth District instructed:  “Appellant must prove 
his counsel failed to communicate a plea offer . . . , that had he been 
correctly advised he would have accepted the plea offer, and that his 
acceptance of the state’s plea offer would have resulted in a lesser 
sentence.”  Id. at 113.  We agree that these are the required elements a 
defendant must establish in order to be entitled to relief. 
 
- 9 -
Cottle, 733 So. 2d at 969.  In footnote 6 we said that an evidentiary hearing should 
be ordered if the claim is sufficiently alleged. 
Thus, contrary to the language from Gonzales3 and its progeny, a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel can be based on advice from counsel to reject a 
plea offer.  The only question remaining in this case is whether the trial and district 
courts erred in failing to require an evidentiary hearing on this claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  In Hannon v. State, 941 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 2006), we 
provided the following standard for determining whether an evidentiary hearing is 
required.  We said:  
[A] defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction 
relief motion unless (1) the motion, files, and records in the case 
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, or (2) the 
motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient.  The defendant 
bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case based upon a 
legally valid claim.  Mere conclusory allegations are not sufficient to 
meet this burden.  However, in cases where there has been no 
evidentiary hearing, we must accept the factual allegations made by 
the defendant to the extent that they are not refuted by the record. 
                                          
 
 
3.  Although the court in Gonzales was addressing a situation where the 
defendant was alleging his attorney said she could win the case, the language from 
Gonzales has been used in other cases that do not involve the attorney saying he 
could win the case at trial.  See, e.g., Smith v. State, 825 So. 2d at 1012 (where the 
defendant alleged his attorney did not tell him there was no defense to an armed 
trespass charge); Szymanowski v. State, 771 So. 2d at 11 (where the defendant 
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s advice to reject a plea 
offer and counsel’s failure to mount an intoxication defense).  
 
- 10 -
Id. at 1138 (quoting Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 2000)).  Thus, 
for the instant case, we must decide whether the motion, files, and records in the 
case conclusively show that Morgan is entitled to no relief, or whether Morgan’s 
claim is legally insufficient.  Because there has been no evidentiary hearing in this 
case, the Court must accept Morgan’s factual allegations to the extent that they are 
not refuted by the record.  
On this issue we find Morgan has not submitted a facially sufficient claim of 
ineffective assistance based on counsel’s advice to reject a plea offer.  In his 
motion for postconviction relief, Morgan alleged that counsel informed him of a 
plea offer from the State.  He further alleged that counsel advised him that she felt 
she could win at trial or get a reduced offense.  Counsel urged him to reject the 
plea offer, and he did.  Lastly, Morgan alleged that he received a greater sentence 
after trial, and that he would have accepted the plea had he known that counsel 
would not win.  Morgan does not contend that his counsel failed to communicate a 
plea offer or misinformed him concerning the penalties.  Morgan has failed to 
allege any deficient performance on the part of counsel.  The mere fact that 
Morgan did not prevail at trial does not translate into misadvice.  Some specific 
deficiency on the part of counsel must be alleged.  There is no allegation that 
counsel’s assessment of the chances of success at trial was unreasonable under the 
facts and circumstances of this case or that counsel had not investigated or 
 
- 11 -
otherwise was not familiar with the case.  Therefore, Morgan is not entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing because his claim is legally insufficient.  See Hannon, 941 So. 
2d at 1138.  The trial court properly summarily denied postconviction relief.  
While we find affirmance of the trial court’s denial was correct, we do not agree 
with the Fourth District’s implicit reasoning that this type of claim cannot be the 
basis for ineffective assistance of counsel.  
CONCLUSION 
We therefore approve the result, affirmance of the denial of postconviction 
relief, reached by Fourth District but hold that a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel can be based on counsel’s advice to reject a favorable plea offer.  To the 
extent that the court in Morgan holds to the contrary based on Gonzales, we 
disapprove that portion of the opinion.  We also approve the decisions in Gomez 
and Sharpe to the extent they are consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur. 
WELLS, J., concurs in result only with an opinion, in which CANTERO and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
WELLS, J., concurring in result only. 
 
I concur in result only because I conclude that the majority is correct in 
affirming the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief, but I do not agree with 
 
- 12 -
the majority in its failing to approve the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision 
in Gonzales v. State, 691 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).  I would approve 
Gonzales and Dines v. State, 909 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). 
 
Gonzales and Dines deal with the precise issue that is involved in this case, 
whether the allegation that trial counsel advised the defendant that the defendant 
would win the case or receive a lesser sentence if the defendant went to trial is 
sufficient to state a postconviction claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.  The 
courts in both Gonzales and Dines answered that precise issue correctly in holding 
that such an allegation is not sufficient to allege ineffective assistance of counsel 
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  Having answered that 
precise issue, there is no reason for the majority opinion to go any further.  I am 
concerned that by going further and making what are only obiter dictum 
statements, the majority confuses what should be a straightforward answer to the 
issue in this case. 
 
I believe that the correct answer is to approve Gonzales and Dines on the 
precise issue before us and to disapprove Sharpe v. State, 861 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 2003), and Gomez v. State, 832 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), to the extent 
that they are read to be in conflict with Gonzales and Dines on this issue. 
CANTERO and BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
 
 
- 13 -
 
- 14 -
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D04-4448 
 
 
(Broward County) 
 
Bruce S. Rogow and Cynthia E. Gunther of Bruce S. Rogow, P.A., Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Celia Terenzio, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General, Bureau Chief, and Mark J. Hamel, Assistant Attorney 
General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent