Case Title: STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION V. RICHARD A. JOHNSON

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0106

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION V. RICHARD A. JOHNSON2008 WY 59185 P.3d 16Case Number: S-07-0106Decided: 06/02/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY 
AND COMPENSATION 
DIVISION,Appellant(Respondent/Objector),v.RICHARD A. 
JOHNSON,Appellee(Petitioner/Claimant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLincolnCounty

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; 
Steven R. Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kristi M. Radosevich, 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

George 
Santini of Ross, Ross & Santini, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Division (the Division) appeals the district court Order 
Reversing the Decision of the Hearing Officer in a workers' compensation 
case.  The district court reversed 
an Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) decision upholding the Division's 
denial of permanent total disability (PTD) benefits to Appellee Richard 
Johnson.  We affirm the district 
court's reversal and remand to the district court for remand to the Division for 
further consideration.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]     Did the hearing officer 
err when he determined that the Division could take household income 
attributable to Appellee's wife into account when considering Appellee's 
petition for permanent disability benefits?1

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The facts of this 
case are not in dispute.  Appellee 
was injured on the job in 1984 and was determined to be permanently and totally 
disabled in 1993.  Appellee applied 
for extended PTD benefits and received those benefits through August of 2005, 
when the Division denied his application for extended PTD benefits on the basis 
that his "combined household income exceeded [his] combined household 
expenses[.]"  The OAH held an 
evidentiary hearing on June 1, 2006, and upheld the Division's denial in an 
order dated July 3, 2006.  Appellee 
petitioned for judicial review and the district court issued an order reversing 
the OAH decision on April 5, 2007.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶4]      We review an 
agency action directly, without deference to the district court's 
determination.  Atchison v. Career Servs. Council of Wyo., 664 P.2d 18, 20 (Wyo. 1983).  We are governed by the same rules of 
review as the district court.  
Id.  W.R.A.P. 12.09(a) limits our 
consideration to the issues set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) 
(LexisNexis 2007).  The statute 
states:

 
 
(c)    To the extent necessary to 
make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all 
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, 
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action.  In making the following 
determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it 
cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court shall: 

(i)      Compel agency 
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

(ii)     Hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

(A)     Arbitrary, capricious, 
an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

(B)     Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

(C)    In excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority or limitation or lacking statutory 
right;

(D)    Without observance of 
procedure required by law; or

(E)     Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

 
 
[¶5]      The parties agree 
that the only contested issue in this case is the interpretation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-403(g)(i)(C) (Michie 1987 replacement pamphlet), as it existed in 
1993.  The 1993 statute, the law in 
effect at the time Appellee was determined to be permanently and totally 
disabled, is the applicable law in this case.  DeLauter v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. 
Div., 994 P.2d 934, 937 (Wyo. 2000).  Interpretation of a statute is an issue 
of law, and our review on such issues is de novo.  Chavez v. Mem'l Hosp. of SweetwaterCounty, 2006 WY 82, ¶ 6, 138 P.3d 185, 188 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶6]      The hearing 
examiner in this case quite clearly considered Appellee's wife's income when he 
determined Appellee's eligibility for benefits.  The examiner 
stated:

 
 
If 
[Appellee's wife]'s income is not included, there is no question that [Appellee] 
would be entitled to the maximum amount of extended PTD benefits.  However, case law is quite clear the law 
in effect at the time a person becomes PTD applies and the law in effect in 1993 
required this Office to include all household income.  Extended PTD benefits should therefore 
be denied.

 
 
[¶7]      The law on 
extended PTD benefits at the time read, in relevant part, as 
follows:

 
 
(g)   Following payment in full of any 
award, or if a lump sum settlement was made under subsection (f) of this section 
when the award would have been fully paid but for the lump sum settlement, to an 
employee for permanent total disability or to a surviving spouse for death of an 
employee, an additional award may be granted:

(i)     In the case of an 
employee subject to the following requirements and limitations which shall be 
met:

. . . 
.

(C)    The hearing examiner in 
determining  entitlement under this 
paragraph shall consider income of the employee from all sources including 
active or passive income, household income and any monthly amount from any other 
governmental agency[.]

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-403(g)(i)(C) (Michie 1987 replacement 
pamphlet).

 
 
[¶8]      At issue in this 
case is the meaning of section (C) above.  
The Division contends that "household income" necessarily includes the 
income of all household members.  
Appellee responds that the phrase "income of the employee" necessarily 
restricts the subsequent types of income listed, including household 
income.

 
 
[¶9]      We agree with the 
district court that Appellee's interpretation of the statute is correct.  The plain language of the statute as 
well as subsequent legislative action support that conclusion.  "In interpreting statutes, our primary 
consideration is to determine the legislature's intent. . . .  We begin by making an inquiry respecting 
the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their 
arrangement and connection."  Sponsel v. ParkCounty, 2006 WY 6, ¶ 9, 126 P.3d 105, 
108 (Wyo. 2006).  The disagreement 
here lies in that each party contends that the words "household income" attach 
to a different phrase in the sentence.  
Appellee reads the sentence to be a list of all types of "income of the 
employee" that must be considered, and suggests that "household income" can only 
refer to household income "of the employee."  The Division, on the other hand, would 
have us read the entire sentence as one list requiring consideration of the 
"income of the employee from all sources" and "household income" 
separately.  

 
 
[¶10]   We find that Appellee's 
interpretation better reflects the plain meaning of the sentence.  It is instructive to examine what 
happens to the rest of this sentence if it is not modified by the words "income 
of the employee."  If "income of the 
employee" does not modify the phrase "any monthly amount from any other 
governmental agency," the phrase becomes nonsensical.  Without the words "income of the 
employee" we cannot determine to what the "monthly amount" refers, nor can we 
glean to whom that amount might be directed in order to come into consideration 
by the hearing examiner.  We will 
not interpret a statute in a way that renders any part of it meaningless or 
nonsensical.  Jones v. State, 2006 WY 40, ¶ 12, 132 P.3d 162, 166 (Wyo. 2006).  The 
phrase only makes sense if modified by the preceding words of the sentence to 
read, in essence "any monthly amount [of income of the employee] from any other 
governmental agency."  The words 
"household income" must also then be modified, which would make sense of that 
phrase "household income [of the employee]."  It was therefore improper for the 
Division to consider any household income, including spousal, not attributable 
to the Appellee.  

 
 
[¶11]   In addition, the legislature has 
made clear that Appellee's interpretation accurately reflects the intent of the 
law.  In 1998 the legislature 
amended § 27-14-403(g)(i)(C) to read as follows:

 
 
(C)    The division in determining 
entitlement under this paragraph shall consider the amount of the monthly award 
made to an injured worker pursuant to W.S. 27-14-403(a)(iv), 
all earned income of the injured worker, all employment based retirement income 
of the injured worker, all income derived by the injured worker as a result of 
the injury, excluding mortgage or any other loan credit insurance, or any 
supplemental income insurance purchased by or on behalf of the employee and any 
periodic payments from any other governmental entity to the 
injured worker.  The division shall 
not consider any other income received by the injured worker or members of the 
injured worker's household[.]

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-403(g)(i)(C) (Michie Supp. 1998).  This amendment clearly excludes 
household income that was not "income of the employee" from consideration.  The preamble to the session law in which 
the legislature adopted those changes specified the law's purpose as "clarifying 
which household income may and may not be used in calculating extended 
benefits."  1998 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Ch. 117.  "While a preamble to a statute is not 
binding, it is worthy of consideration by the court in discerning the 
legislature's intention in adopting a statute."  Rawlinson v. Greer, 2003 WY 28, ¶ 20, 64 P.3d 120, 124 (Wyo. 2003).  The 
legislature denoted the change as a clarification of existing law regarding 
household income under this statute rather than a change in the status quo.  The necessary inference is that the 
income of other household members has always been excluded from 
consideration.  

 
 
[¶12]   The district court also acted 
properly when it remanded this case to the Division for a new decision, as the 
law requires further proceedings.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-403(g) (Michie 1987 replacement pamphlet) states 
that the Division "may" grant an award of extended PTD benefits.  The word "may" indicates that the 
Division has discretion in such matters.  
Duncan v. LaramieCounty Cmty. Coll., 768 P.2d 593, 594 
(Wyo. 
1989).  Since the Division erred as 
a matter of law when it determined what information to consider, it never 
properly applied its discretion.  
We, therefore, correct the Division's error of law and remand this case 
for a new decision.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶13]   The Division erred when it 
considered Appellee's wife's income as part of "household income" attributable 
to an employee under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-403(g) (Michie 1987 replacement 
pamphlet).  We affirm the district 
court's Order Reversing the Decision of the Hearing Officer and remand the 
matter to the district court for remand to the Division for a decision 
consistent with this opinion.  

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Appellee 
also raises the sub-issue of the constitutionality of the Division's 
interpretation.  However, since we 
find for the Appellee based on the plain meaning of the statute, we do not reach 
that question here.