Case Title: County of Dane v. Public Service Commission of Wisconsin

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2021AP001325, 2021AP001321-LV

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2022-07-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
2022 WI 61 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
County of Dane, County of Iowa, Town of Wyoming 
and Village of Montfort, 
          Petitioners-Respondents, 
     v. 
Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, 
          Respondent-Respondent, 
Driftless Area Land Conservancy, Wisconsin 
Wildlife Federation, Chris Klopp, LeRoy Belken, 
Gloria Belken, S.O.U.L. of Wisconsin, Clean 
Energy Organizations, Dairyland Power 
Cooperation, I.T.C. Midwest, LLC, American  
Transmission Company, Midcontinent Independent 
System Operator, Inc. and WEC Energy Group 
Wisconsin, 
          Intervenors-Respondents, 
Michael Huebsch, 
          Other Party-Petitioner-Petitioner. 
 
 
County of Dane, Iowa County, Town of Wyoming 
and Village of Montfort, 
          Petitioners-Respondents, 
     v. 
Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, 
          Respondent-Respondent-Respondent, 
Driftless Area Land Conservancy, 
          Intervenor-Petitioner-Respondent, 
Wisconsin Wildlife Federation, Chris Klopp, 
LeRoy Belken, Gloria Belken, S.O.U.L. 
Wisconsin, Clean Energy Organizations, 
Dairyland Power Cooperative, ITC Midwest  
LLC, American Transmission Company, LLC, 
Midcontinent Independent System Operator, 
Inc., ATC, LLC and WEC Energy  
Group, Inc., 
          Intervenors-Respondents, 
Michael Huebsch, 
          Other Party-Appellant-Petitioner, 
Robert M. Garvin, 
          Other Party. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 28, 2022    
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Jacob B. frost   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ROGGENSACK, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with 
respect to ¶4, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, 
and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, and an opinion, in which ZIEGLER, 
C.J., REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed 
a concurring opinion.  KAROFSKY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined.  
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the other party-petitioner-petitioner in 2021AP1321-LV 
and other party-appellant-petitioner in 2021AP1325, there were 
briefs by Ryan J. Walsh, John K. Adams, John D. Tripoli and 
Eimer Stahl LLP, Madison. There was an oral argument by Ryan J. 
Walsh.  
 
For the intervenor-respondent Clean Energy Organizations, 
there was a brief filed by Amelia Vohs, Sean Brady, Kevin M. St. 
John, John N. Giftos, Roisin H. Bell and Minnesota Center for 
Environmental Advocacy, Saint Paul, Clean Grid Alliance, Saint 
Paul, and Bell Giftos St. John LLC, Madison. There was an oral 
argument by Barret Van Sicklen.  
 
For the petitioners-respondents County of Dane, Iowa 
County, Town of Wyoming and Village of Montfort, intervenor 
respondent in 2021AP1321-LV and intervenor-petitioner-respondent 
in 2021AP1325, Driftless Area Land Conservancy, and for the 
 
 
3 
intervenors-respondents, Wisconsin Wildlife Federation, S.O.U.L. 
of Wisconsin, Gloria Belken, and Chris Klopp, there was a brief 
filed by Catherine E. White, Howard A. Learner, Bradley D. 
Klein, Ann Jaworski and Hurley Burish S.C., Madison, and 
Environmental Law & Policy Center, Chicago. For the intervenors-
respondents, there was an oral argument by Barret Van Sicklen.  
 
For intervenor-respondent, Midcontinent Independent System 
Operator, there was a brief filed by Jeffrey L. Small, Warren J. 
Day, Amanda James and Midcontinent Independent System Operator, 
Inc., Carmel, Law Office of Warren J. Day, Oregon, and Sullivan 
& Ward, P.C., West Des Moines. There was an oral argument by 
Barret Van Sicklen.  
 
For 
intervenors-respondents, 
American 
Transmmission 
Company, Dairlyand Power Cooperative, and ITC Midwest, there was 
a brief filed by Brian H. Potts, Valerie T. Herring, Justin W. 
Chasco, and Perkins Coie LLP, Madison, Taft Stettinius & 
Hollister, Minneapolis, and Wheeler, Van Sickle & Anderson, 
S.C., Madison. There was an oral argument by Barret Van Sicklen.  
 
For the respondent-respondent in 2021AP1321-LV and the 
respondent-respondent-respondent in 2021AP1325, there was a 
brief filed by Cynthia E. Smith, Zachary Peters, Christiane A.R. 
Whiting and Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, Madison. 
There was an oral argument by Christiane A.R. Whiting.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Evan Feinauer and Katie 
Nekola for Clean Wisconsin, Inc.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Matthew M. Fernholz and 
Cramer, 
Multhauf 
& 
Hammes, 
LLP, 
Waukesha, 
for 
Wisconsin 
Manufacturers and Commerce.  
 
 
 
4 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Benjamin B. Sloan, 
Matthew M. Fernholz, and Organization of MISO States, Madison, 
and Cramer, Multhauf & Hammes, LLP, Waukesha, for Organization 
of MISO States, Inc.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert S. Driscoll and 
Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren S.C., Milwaukee, for American Clean 
Power Association.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Scott E. Rosenow and 
WMC Litigation Center, Madison, for Wisconsin Manufacturers and 
Commerce, Inc., Wisconsin Utilities Association, Inc., and 
Edison Electric Institute.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James Bradford Ramsay, 
Lane E.B. Ruhland, and National Association of Regulatory 
Utility Commissioners, Washington, D.C., and Ruhland Law and 
Strategy, Waunakee, for National Association of Regulatory 
Utility Commissioners.  
 
 
 
2022 WI 61 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.  2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325 
(L.C. No. 
2019CV3418) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
County of Dane, County of Iowa, Town of Wyoming 
and Village of Montfort, 
 
          Petitioners-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent, 
 
Driftless Area Land Conservancy, Wisconsin 
Wildlife Federation, Chris Klopp, LeRoy Belken, 
Gloria Belken, S.O.U.L. of Wisconsin, Clean 
Energy Organizations, Dairyland Power 
Cooperation, I.T.C. Midwest, LLC, American 
Transmission Company, Midcontinent Independent 
System Operator, Inc. and WEC Energy Group 
Wisconsin, 
 
          Intervenors-Respondents, 
 
Michael Huebsch, 
 
          Other Party-Petitioner-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
County of Dane, Iowa County, Town of Wyoming 
and Village of Montfort, 
 
          Petitioners-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
2 
 
          Respondent-Respondent-Respondent, 
 
Driftless Area Land Conservancy, 
 
          Intervenor-Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
Wisconsin Wildlife Federation, Chris Klopp, 
LeRoy Belken, Gloria Belken, S.O.U.L. 
Wisconsin, Clean Energy Organizations, 
Dairyland Power Cooperative, ITC Midwest LLC, 
American Transmission Company, LLC, 
Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc., 
ATC, LLC and WEC Energy Group, Inc., 
 
          Intervenors-Respondents, 
 
Michael Huebsch, 
 
          Other Party-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
Robert M. Garvin, 
 
          Other Party. 
 
 
 
 
ROGGENSACK, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with 
respect to ¶4, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, 
and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, and an opinion, in which ZIEGLER, 
C.J., REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed 
a concurring opinion.  KAROFSKY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined.  
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Dane County. 
Reversed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   Dane County filed this 
Wis. Stat. ch. 227 (2019-20)1 action in Dane County Circuit Court 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
3 
 
to contest the merits of the Public Service Commission's (PSC)2 
approval of the 
Cardinal-Hickory Creek Transmission Line.  
Driftless 
Area 
Land 
Conservancy 
and 
other 
Intervenors-
Respondents (hereinafter Driftless) intervened3 in the action 
that remains pending in Dane County Circuit Court.  Therefore, 
the merits of the PSC's approval of Cardinal-Hickory are not 
addressed in this opinion.    
¶2 
We conclude that in pretrial decisions the circuit 
court erroneously interpreted Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1), which 
interpretation formed the basis for its expansion of the record 
created by the PSC and permitted discovery subpoenas of Michael 
Huebsch.  We so conclude because Driftless failed, as a matter 
of law, to satisfy the statutory criteria, or due process 
requirements, necessary to expand the record created by the PSC 
during the Cardinal-Hickory proceedings.  
¶3 
In regard to the discovery subpoenas issued to 
Huebsch, we conclude that the circuit court erred when it denied 
Huebsch's motion to quash.  The circuit court's error is 
grounded 
in 
its 
erroneous 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.57(1) wherein it approved discovery subpoenas. 
¶4 
Although four justices do not agree on how to address 
the procedural posture of this case, a majority of the court 
                                                 
2 The PSC is a three-member Commission, which was composed 
of Rebecca Valcq, Ellen Nowak and Michael Huebsch when the 
Cardinal-Hickory line was approved.   
3 The Intervener-Respondents aligned with Driftless are the 
Wisconsin Wildlife Federation, S.O.U.L. of Wisconsin, LeRoy 
Belken, Gloria Belken and Chris Klopp.  
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
4 
 
agrees that the circuit court improperly denied Huebsch's motion 
to quash the discovery subpoena he received.  Driftless' 
allegations of bias do not come close to the level of alleging a 
cognizable due process claim under Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal 
Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009) and Miller v. Carroll, 2020 
WI 56, ¶24, 392 Wis. 2d 49, 944 N.W.2d 542.   
¶5 
We further conclude that the circuit court did not 
clearly apply the correct legal standard when evaluating whether 
a due process violation had been stated; we reverse the circuit 
court's July 30, 2021 order denying Huebsch's motion to quash 
discovery 
subpoenas; 
and 
we 
conclude 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously denied Huebsch's request for a stay pending appeal.  
Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶6 
This lawsuit, filed by Dane County, challenges the 
PSC's approval of construction of the Cardinal-Hickory line.4  As 
the lawsuit moved forward and added intervening parties, 
Driftless sought to expand the record produced before the PSC 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1) in order to produce grounds 
to overturn the merits of the Cardinal-Hickory decision.  
¶7 
The record of the proceedings reflects that Cardinal-
Hickory 
enjoyed 
widespread 
support 
from 
labor, 
industry, 
business groups, environmentalists, Republicans and Democrats.  
                                                 
4 The Cardinal-Hickory docket opened in April 2018 when 
American Transmission Company LLC, ITC Midwest LLC and Dairyland 
Power Cooperative petitioned the PSC for a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity (CPCN) for construction and operation 
of the transmission line. 
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
5 
 
Its proponents provided testimony that Cardinal-Hickory would 
improve 
energy 
reliability 
and 
create 
clean-energy 
infrastructure for Wisconsin by enabling greater usage of 
renewable energy sources across the Midwest.5  More than 60 
persons participated as parties in the proceedings, including 
Driftless.  
¶8 
The 
chairman 
of 
the 
Federal 
Energy 
Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) made strengthening interstate transmission a 
principal goal, which he presented to the PSC.6  The PSC held 
highly technical fact-based hearings, supported by expert 
testimony, during June of 2019.   
¶9 
On August 20, 2019 in an open meeting, the PSC voted 
unanimously to grant the Certificate of Public Convenience and 
Necessity (CPCN) for construction of Cardinal-Hickory.  On 
September 26, 2019, the PSC issued a 112 page written order 
finalizing CPCN approval.   
¶10 After it lost before the PSC, Driftless moved to 
disqualify two of the three commissioners, alleging their 
participation created an unconstitutional "appearance of bias 
and lack of impartiality."7  It alleged that Chairperson Rebecca 
                                                 
5 Clean Grid Alliance, Fresh Energy, and Minnesota Center 
for Environmental Advocacy's Request to Intervene and Notice of 
Appearance, 
PSC 
REF# 
353628 
at 
3 
(Nov. 
20, 
2018), 
https://tinyurl.com/hc4xvy68.   
6 Energy Policy Institute, Revitalizing the Grid to Achieve 
a Clean-Powered Economy:  A Conversation with FERC Chair Richard 
Glick (June 30, 2021) https://tinyurl.com/f2znuja8.   
7 PSC Order, September 26, 2019, 80. 
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
6 
 
Valcq's past work for We Energies "created an appearance of 
bias" and Michael Huebsch's work with a federal regulator, 
Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO), precluded his 
participation 
because 
he 
could 
have 
received 
ex 
parte 
communications about Cardinal-Hickory while at MISO events, 
again raising the "appearance of bias."   
¶11 In its written decision approving construction of 
Cardinal-Hickory, the PSC unanimously rejected Driftless' bias 
claims because they were "not timely filed and did not comply 
with applicable legal standards."8  The PSC explained that 
Huebsch was a PSC "Commissioner at the time of [Driftless'] 
intervention and it was publicly known that Commissioner Huebsch 
was the Commission's OMS representative," as was his work with 
MISO, which had been on-going for more than four years.9  The PSC 
explained that "[i]t is clear that the information [Driftless] 
cited to support its Motion was available to it months (if not 
years) before the party hearing and the Commission's discussion 
of the record at the open meeting of August 20, 2019."10   
¶12 The PSC noted that Driftless did not support its 
allegations 
with 
a 
verified 
affidavit 
based 
on 
personal 
knowledge of the facts alleged in its motion, nor did it name a 
single witness who would have such knowledge.11  Accordingly, the 
                                                 
8 Id., 81; see also Driftless Area Land Conservancy v. Valcq 
(Driftless II), 16 F.4th 508, 517 (7th Cir. 2021). 
9 PSC Order, September 26, 2019, 81.  
10 Id., 82.   
11 Id., 83. 
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
7 
 
PSC found that Driftless' motion "lacks a legitimate factual 
basis to support recusal or disqualification."12  The order 
further explained, "There is a presumption of honesty and 
integrity 
in 
those 
serving 
as 
adjudicators 
in 
state 
administrative proceedings."13  The PSC found that Valcq's and 
Huebsch's "participation complied with all applicable ethical 
and legal standards and [Driftless'] Motion lack[ed] any merit 
and [was] therefore denied."14  Driftless did not appeal the 
factual findings or legal conclusions of the PSC decision.    
¶13 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.57 challenges to PSC action 
usually are limited to contending that the evidence did not 
support the merits of the PSC's decision.  However, here, 
Driftless 
mounted 
a 
sustained 
personal 
attack 
against 
Commissioner Huebsch in an effort to expand the PSC record 
through the use of § 227.57(1).  In general statements, 
Driftless contended that at some point Huebsch could have done 
something that might appear to show bias in favor of Cardinal-
Hickory, which Driftless asserts would violate the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and require vacation of 
approval of Cardinal-Hickory.15    
                                                 
12 Id., 84. 
13 Id., 85 (citing State ex rel. DeLuca v. Common Council, 
72 Wis. 2d 672, 684, 242 N.W.2d 689 (1976)).  
14 Id., 86.  
15 Driftless dropped its initial contention that Valcq's 
past work created "the appearance of bias" and proceeded solely 
against Huebsch.    
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
8 
 
¶14 The circuit court concluded that Driftless' general 
statements "presented enough information to allow discovery 
regarding whether Commissioner Huebsch acted impartially."16  
Driftless then subpoenaed Huebsch to sit for a deposition.  It 
also subpoenaed his phone and phone password for Driftless' 
search of his communications.  Huebsch moved to protect himself 
from Driftless' subpoenas.   
¶15 Before the Dane County Circuit Court, where its Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.57 
action 
is 
pending, 
Driftless 
mounted 
a 
directionless search for "appearance of bias."17  The circuit 
court has permitted Driftless to expand the record of the 
Cardinal-Hickory proceedings by concluding that an allegation of 
the "appearance of bias," if proved, was a due process violation 
sufficient to invalidate the PSC's decision.  It also concluded 
that general "allegations" were all that were needed to satisfy 
§ 227.57(1).18  Many depositions were taken and thousands of 
pages of documents were produced.   
¶16 Huebsch moved to quash the subpoenas in circuit court.  
The circuit court refused protection, saying that the difference 
between "serious risk of actual bias" and "appearance of bias" 
was just "semantics."19  While acknowledging our recent decision 
                                                 
16 Circuit Ct. Decision and Order, May 25, 2021, 1.   
17 There were occasions when Driftless also used the phrase 
"serious risk of actual bias"; however, as the circuit court 
repeated later, "appearance of bias" was the common phraseology.   
18 Circuit Ct. Decision and Order, May 25, 2021, 3.    
19 Circuit Ct. Mot. Hr'g Tr., July 30, 2021, 15.  On August 
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
9 
 
in Miller v. Carroll20 that employs serious risk of actual bias 
as the due process standard, the circuit court re-characterized 
the standard as the "'appearance' [of bias standard] because 
that really is what it is."21   
¶17 Huebsch moved the court of appeals for interlocutory 
review and stay of the discovery subpoenas.  The court of 
appeals granted interlocutory review and stayed the subpoenas 
while the court studied the legal issues presented.  Driftless 
then withdrew its subpoenas and moved the court of appeals to 
dismiss, claiming the action was moot.  Based on the withdrawal 
of the subpoenas, the court of appeals vacated its stay and the 
interlocutory review it had granted, concluding that the issue 
for which it had granted review was moot.22   
¶18 Then, two business days after the court of appeals 
determined 
that 
the 
appeal 
was 
moot 
and 
vacated 
its 
interlocutory review, Driftless subpoenaed Huebsch to testify at 
trial.  Although Huebsch did not move the circuit court to quash 
the subpoena for trial testimony, he sought an emergency 
                                                                                                                                                             
20, 2021, at Driftless' request, the circuit court vacated its 
order denying Huebsch's motion to quash:  "IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that the order denying Michael Huebsch's motion to quash issued 
on August 3, 2021, Dkt. 422, and the August 5, 2021 order on 
phone protocol, Dkt. 432, are hereby VACATED."    
20 Miller v. Carroll, 2020 WI 56, 392 Wis. 2d 49, 944 N.W.2d 
542. 
21 Id., 16. 
22 County of Dane v. PSC of Wis., No. 2021AP1321-LV, 
unpublished order at 5 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2021).  
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
10 
 
petition for supreme court review and stay of the proceedings in 
circuit court.  We granted review and stayed further action in 
the circuit court, which included Huebsch's trial testimony.    
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶19 When the discovery subpoenas directed to Huebsch were 
withdrawn by Driftless, the court of appeals dismissed this 
matter as moot.  County of Dane v. PSC of Wis., No. 2021AP1321-
LV, unpublished order at 5 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2021).  We 
independently review whether an issue is moot as a question of 
law.  Tavern League of Wis., Inc. v. Palm, 2021 WI 33, ¶13, 396 
Wis. 2d 434, 957 N.W.2d 261 (citing Portage Cnty. v. J.W.K., 
2019 WI 54, ¶10, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509).   
¶20 This matter arises in the context of a Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.57 judicial review of the merits of the PSC's approval of 
Cardinal-Hickory.  Generally, such reviews are confined to the 
record that was created before the agency.  However, Driftless 
seeks to expand the record that was presented to the PSC during 
the Cardinal-Hickory proceedings.  It does so pursuant to 
§ 227.57(1) that permits record expansion due to "irregularities 
in procedure before the agency" . . . "if proper cause is shown 
therefor."   
¶21 As we review the discovery subpoenas issued to Huebsch 
after the circuit court determined that Driftless' general 
allegations of bias were sufficient to satisfy Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.57(1) thereby permitting expansion of the PSC record 
through discovery, we also interpret § 227.57(1).  We do so to 
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
11 
 
determine 
whether 
Driftless' 
non-specific 
allegations 
come 
within "irregularities in procedure" of the PSC for which 
"proper cause is shown therefor" as those terms are used in 
§ 227.57(1).  Driftless' contention and the circuit court's 
decision present questions of statutory interpretation and 
application that we independently review.  Tavern League, 396 
Wis. 2d 434, ¶13.  
¶22 In addition, Driftless claims that the irregularity in 
the procedure was Huebsch's "appearance of bias" that denied it 
due process of law.  Whether constitutional due process has been 
afforded in an administrative proceeding is a question of law 
that we independently review.  Marder v. Bd. of Regents of the 
Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶19, 286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 
N.W.2d 110 (citing State v. Sorenson, 2002 WI 78, ¶25, 254 
Wis. 2d 54, 646 N.W.2d 354).   
¶23 And finally, we review whether the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it denied Huebsch's 
motion to quash the subpoenas for his deposition, his cell phone 
and cell phone password.  Lane v. Sharp Packaging Sys., Inc., 
2002 WI 28, ¶19, 251 Wis. 2d 68, 640 N.W.2d 788.  Whether the 
circuit court applied the correct legal standard as it exercised 
its discretion is a question of law that we independently 
review.  Id.  
B.  Mootness 
¶24 "Mootness is a doctrine of judicial restraint."  
Marathon Cnty. v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶19, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 
N.W.2d 901.  "An issue is moot when its resolution will have no 
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
12 
 
practical effect on the underlying controversy."  J.W.K., 386 
Wis. 2d 672, ¶11.  Although we usually do not address issues 
that are moot, we have developed exceptions where we agree to 
review issues that may be moot when:  "(1) 'the issues are of 
great public importance;' (2) 'the constitutionality of a 
statute is involved;' (3) the situation arises so often 'a 
definitive decision is essential to guide the trial courts;' 
(4) 'the issue is likely to arise again and should be resolved 
by the court to avoid uncertainty;' or (5) the issue is 'capable 
and likely of repetition and yet evades review.'"  Id., ¶12.   
¶25 We need not decide whether issues raised herein are 
moot because even if they were, exceptions to the mootness 
doctrine provide for our review.  For example, the only 
conceivable basis for mootness here is Driftless' voluntarily 
withdrawing its July subpoenas through which it sought to expand 
the record created in the PSC proceedings.   
¶26 An issue is likely to arise again and evade review 
when an actor voluntarily ceases challenged conduct but retains 
the power to resume that conduct.  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Env't Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (explaining 
that the obligation to persuade a court that the challenged 
conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up again lies 
with the party asserting mootness).  In the matter before us, 
not only did Driftless have the power to issue additional 
subpoenas to Huebsch, it did so in August, a few days after the 
court of appeals vacated its stay and withdrew the interlocutory 
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
13 
 
review it had granted.  Accordingly, we choose to address the 
issues presented for our review.   
C.  Wisconsin Stat. § 227.57 Review 
1.  Statutory Interpretation 
¶27 Dane County filed this case as a Wis. Stat. § 227.57 
judicial review to test the merits of the PSC's approval of 
Cardinal-Hickory.  A determination on the merits of that 
decision remains pending a hearing in Dane County Circuit Court.  
The scope of the Dane County judicial review will be "confined 
to the record" unless the criteria to expand the record set out 
in § 227.57(1) are met.  Section 227.57(1) provides:  
The review shall be conducted by the court without a 
jury and shall be confined to the record, except that 
in cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before 
the agency, testimony thereon may be taken in the 
court and, if leave is granted to take such testimony, 
depositions and written interrogatories may be taken 
prior to the date set for hearing as provided in ch. 
804 if proper cause is shown therefor.    
§ 227.57(1). 
¶28 It is important to note that our review focuses on 
allegations about Huebsch, which the circuit court has concluded 
are sufficient to satisfy Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1)'s criteria to 
expand the PSC record through discovery.  Our review does not 
address the merits of the PSC's approval of Cardinal-Hickory.23  
Rather, we address Driftless' allegation, and the circuit 
                                                 
23 Here, we conclude that Huebsch, as a subpoena recipient, 
can challenge whether a reasonable jurist would understand 
Driftless' allegations as raising a cognizable Caperton due 
process claim in the context of the attempt to expand the PSC 
record pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1).   
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
14 
 
court's conclusion, that Huebsch's "appearance of bias" was an 
irregularity in the PSC procedure during the Cardinal-Hickory 
proceeding 
under 
the 
provisions 
of 
§ 227.57(1). 
 
Stated 
otherwise, Driftless contends that the circuit court's statutory 
interpretation permits Driftless to expand the record created in 
the PSC proceedings.24  Driftless asserts it can do so through 
testimony in court and by taking depositions and written 
interrogatories prior to the court hearing based on Huebsch's 
"appearance of bias" that impaired its right to due process 
during the PSC proceedings.   
¶29 In order to assess the statutory argument Driftless 
makes, and on which the circuit court permitted discovery, we 
interpret Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1).  We begin with the language of 
the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  If the words 
are 
commonly 
used 
words 
without 
specific 
or 
technical 
definitions, we apply common definitions.  Id.  If words chosen 
are technical terms or specially defined, we apply definitions 
consistent with that legislative choice.  Id.  Context also is 
important to meaning, as is the structure of the statute itself.  
Id., ¶46.   
¶30 In order to expand the record that was created before 
the PSC, a plain reading of Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1) requires that 
                                                 
24 Driftless argued, "Petitioners propose to identify a set 
of specific, relevant documents that the parties can easily and 
quickly 'produce' again in state court.  This approach is 
[grounded] in this Court's authority under Section 227.57(1)."  
R. 297 at 4.   
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
15 
 
Driftless first show "proper cause."  "[I]f proper cause is 
shown" of an irregularity in procedure of the PSC, § 227.57(1) 
provides that the court may grant leave to take testimony in 
court and to take depositions and written interrogatories prior 
to the date set for a hearing on the merits of the agency 
decision.  Although "proper cause" is not defined in the 
statute, § 227.57(1) nevertheless requires that the moving party 
provide evidence of procedural irregularities such that the 
circuit court may conclude that there is proper cause to grant 
leave to expand the PSC record.   
¶31 In Marris v. City of Cedarburg, 176 Wis. 2d 14, 498 
N.W.2d 
842 
(1993), 
we 
considered 
alleged 
bias 
of 
an 
administrative decision-maker.  We held that a prima facie 
showing of wrongdoing by a decision-maker is necessary in order 
to evaluate a claim of bias in an administrative decision.  Id. 
at 29-30.  Alleged wrongdoing must be based on factual evidence.  
Id.  As we explained, a prima facie showing of wrongdoing by a 
decision-maker requires specific statements of objective facts 
that are sufficient to show bias of the decision-maker.  Id. at 
24.   
¶32 In Marris, neighbors challenged the continued legality 
of Marris's use of one of the buildings on her property for 
which 
she 
had 
been 
granted 
a 
nonconforming 
use. 
 
An 
administrative hearing was held to determine whether Marris's 
repairs 
of 
her 
property 
caused 
it 
to 
lose 
its 
legal 
nonconforming use.   
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
16 
 
¶33 After a decision contrary to Marris, she challenged a 
member of the review committee, alleging bias.  Id. at 23.  In 
our discussion, we detailed specific factual statements of the 
decision-maker that were necessary to making the prima facie 
case of wrongdoing.  That is, we examined whether the 
chairperson's statements showed that he had prejudged whether 
Marris's repairs of her property were sufficient to cause loss 
of its legal nonconforming use.   
¶34 As we explained, the chairperson's statements, which 
were part of the record of the committee's discussion, related 
to his characterization of the merits of Marris's claim.  For 
example, "the chairperson referred to Marris's legal position as 
a 'loophole' in need of 'closing.'"  Id. at 27.  He expressed a 
desire "to 'get her [Marris] on the Leona Helmsley rule,'" id., 
and he questioned the claimant's credibility.25  Id. at 27-28.  
We concluded that taken together his "statements overc[ame] the 
presumption of honesty and integrity that would ordinarily be 
applied."  Id. at 29-30.  We concluded that his statements 
"clearly indicated that he had prejudged Marris's case, thus 
creating an impermissibly high risk of bias" in his committee 
decision.  Id. at 31.  We then remanded the matter for a new 
hearing in which the chairperson could not participate.  Id.   
                                                 
25 In analyzing expenditures, he questioned how could the 
Board know "whether Marris 'bought a door for that building or 
for another building she built.'"  Marris v. City of Cedarburg, 
176 Wis. 2d 14, 28, 498 N.W.2d 842 (1993).   
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
17 
 
¶35 In a similar way, the court of appeals discussed the 
requirement that is necessary in order to expand a record 
created during common law certiorari review of an administrative 
proceeding when it considered irregularities in procedure in 
Sills v. Walworth Cnty. Land Mgmt. Comm'n, 2002 WI App. 111, 254 
Wis. 2d 538, 648 N.W.2d 878.  Sills explained that when the 
allegation 
is 
bias 
of 
an 
administrative 
decision-maker, 
expansion of the record created by the agency requires a "prima 
facie showing of wrongdoing" by the decision-maker.  Id., ¶42.  
¶36 It is important to note that general allegations about 
the adjudicator that were made in Sills were in sharp contrast 
with the specific statements made by the adjudicator in Marris.  
In Sills, the objectors alleged that a lobbyist retained by 
Peterson to garner public support for the Conditional Use Permit 
(CUP) application "may have had" ex parte communications with 
the adjudicating committee "which may have led to bias in the 
proceedings."  Id., ¶34.   
¶37 In evaluating whether "help[ing] to gather public 
support" for the CUP was sufficient to open discovery, the court 
of appeals noted that nothing was presented to show the lobbyist 
"directly contacted Committee members."  Id., ¶43.  There also 
was no showing that "members were influenced by something more 
than 
the 
application 
of 
the 
evidence 
to 
the 
ordinance 
standards."  Id.  In concluding that general allegations were 
insufficient to open discovery and thereby permit expansion of 
the record, the court of appeals said:  
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
18 
 
The sole and limited purpose for the requested 
discovery 
is 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
lobbyist . . . contacted any Committee members . . . . 
This transparent attempt to use the discovery process 
as a fishing expedition to uncover evidence of bias is 
precluded by the presumption of honesty and integrity 
that we accord the Committee's decision.   
Id.   
¶38 As Sills explained, a prima facie showing cannot rest 
solely on general allegations.  Sills denied the attempt to 
expand the record of the Committee proceedings because "an 
allegation of ex parte contacts without more is not sufficient 
to show the impermissibly high risk of bias that concerned the 
court in Marris."  Id., ¶44.  
¶39 We agree with the reasoning of Sills, and conclude 
that the phrase, "if proper cause is shown therefor," as it is 
employed in Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1), requires a prima facie 
showing of wrongdoing by an administrative decision-maker.  We 
further conclude that "proper cause is shown therefor" by 
providing specific factual statements by the adjudicator that 
show wrongdoing, i.e., objective factual evidence of the 
adjudicator prejudging the merits of the matter before the 
committee.  Id., ¶¶42, 43.   
¶40 General allegations that the challenger characterizes 
as implying improper acts of an administrative decision-maker 
are insufficient.  Id.  Our interpretation also is consistent 
with Marris.  There, we evaluated how to approach allegations of 
bias by a decision-maker.  We did so by reviewing the decision-
maker's specific factual statements that bore on the merits of 
the claim before the committee.  Marris, 176 Wis. 2d at 24, 31.   
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
19 
 
¶41 Driftless has provided no factual statements by or to 
Huebsch on the merits of the Cardinal-Hickory line.26  Its 
general allegations of concern are legally insufficient to 
permit expansion of the record created before the PSC pursuant 
to the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1).  The circuit 
court erred when it interpreted Driftless' general allegations 
as sufficient to satisfy § 227.57(1) and thereby permitted 
Driftless to employ discovery subpoenas.27  The circuit court 
ignored 
the 
statutory 
phrase 
"if 
proper 
cause 
is 
shown 
therefore" stated in § 227.57(1), giving it no meaning at all.  
Accordingly, the circuit court erred in its interpretation of 
§ 227.57(1).  We now move to consider what due process requires.  
2.  Due Process 
¶42 Due 
process 
applies 
to 
proceedings 
before 
administrative entities.  Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 
(1975).  A basic element of due process is the right to a fair 
hearing conducted before a fair tribunal.  Miller, 392 Wis. 2d 
49, ¶24; Marder, 286 Wis. 2d 252, ¶27.   
¶43 In order to show a due process violation, the claimant 
must show a "serious risk of actual bias."  Caperton, 556 U.S. 
                                                 
26 Attorney 
Rachael 
Granneman, 
counsel 
for 
Driftless, 
provided a "Declaration" made after her review of meeting 
minutes and other documents created by various organizations.  
She adds her opinion of what those copied documents mean.  None 
of the minutes and documents attached to her Declaration are 
based on her personal knowledge of what occurred at various 
meetings.   
27 Circuit Ct. Decision and Order, May 25, 2021, 3.  
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
20 
 
at 884; Miller, 392 Wis. 2d 49, ¶24.  The burden of making that 
proof is on the party challenging the impartiality of the 
adjudicator.  Marder, 286 Wis. 2d 252, ¶32 (relying on Withrow, 
421 U.S. at 47).   
¶44 In Marder, a tenured faculty member complained that ex 
parte contacts with members of the Board of Regents on the 
merits of his case must have occurred because of continuing 
interactions of Board members with others.  Marder, 286 Wis. 2d 
252, ¶2.  Marder's claim of bias failed because:  
Marder has not presented any facts that would overcome 
the presumption that the chancellor and Marcovich 
acted appropriately when they traveled together.  They 
were not prohibited from talking to one another and 
the legal presumption that administrative adjudicators 
are able to maintain their professional and ethical 
responsibility to remain impartial and to conduct 
themselves appropriately applies.   
Id., ¶34.  
¶45 As we explained in Marder while relying on the United 
States Supreme Court's discussion in Withrow, administrative 
decision-makers are entitled to the presumption of "honesty and 
integrity" when serving as adjudicators.  Withrow, 421 U.S. at 
47.  As the concurrence carefully explained in Herrmann, "[I]t 
is not reasonable to question a judge's impartiality unless one 
can prove by objective evidence that actual bias or the 
probability of a serious risk of actual bias exists."  State v. 
Herrmann, 2015 WI 84, ¶113, 364 Wis. 2d 336, 867 N.W.2d 772 
(Ziegler, J., concurring).  To overcome the presumption of 
honesty 
and 
integrity, 
the 
party 
asserting 
bias 
of 
an 
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
21 
 
administrative adjudicator must show a "serious risk of actual 
bias——based on objective and reasonable perceptions."  Caperton, 
556 U.S. at 884.   
¶46 Before us, Driftless makes three types of general 
allegations 
on 
which 
it 
claims 
a 
due 
process 
violation:  (1) Huebsch's 
activities 
with 
MISO 
provided 
opportunities for improper conversations; (2) Huebsch's life-
time friendships with those who work in the provision or 
distribution 
of 
energy 
could 
have 
included 
improper 
conversations; and (3) Huebsch's application for employment by 
Dairyland Power Cooperative after he resigned from the PSC 
implies a connection between his decision in Cardinal-Hickory 
and future employment. 
a.  MISO 
¶47 MISO is controlled by federal law.  A brief review of 
MISO's functions and its support by state and federal statutes 
as a regional energy regulator will be helpful to our 
discussion.   
¶48 More than ten years ago, Wisconsin decided to require 
certain 
utilities 
to 
join 
MISO. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 196.485(3m)(a)1.d.; §§ 196.485(2)(a) and (4)(a).  MISO is the 
operator of the regional transmission system of which Wisconsin 
is a part.28  It administers a FERC-approved tariff to which MISO 
must respond.  Performing this task requires MISO to oversee 
                                                 
28 MISO 
Region 
Engagement 
available 
at:  
https://www.misoenergy.org/stakeholder-engagement/miso-
engagement. 
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
22 
 
various energy-related functions for which it needs input from 
state energy regulators, such as the PSC, on matters that affect 
bulk electric power systems.  18 C.F.R. § 35.34(k); see also 
Ill. Commerce Comm'n v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 721 F.3d 764, 
769-71 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining background for MISO).    
¶49 As FERC has explained, "We recognize that state 
utility regulators play an important and unique role in 
transmission planning processes, given that the states often 
have authority over transmission, permitting, siting, and 
construction, and that many state regulatory commissions require 
utilities to engage in integrated resource planning."29  The FERC 
requires 
"[e]ach 
public 
utility 
transmission 
provider," 
including the PSC, "[t]o participate" in these "regional 
transmission planning process[es]."30   
¶50 To assist in FERC's informational process, the PSC 
delegates authority to one of its commissioners to represent 
Wisconsin's interests at Organization of MISO States (OMS)31 and 
before MISO.  This delegation became a part of Huebsch's service 
as a commissioner on the PSC in 2015.  Therefore, he was the 
PSC's delegate when he participated in the MISO and OMS 
                                                 
29 FERC Order No. 1000-A, 139 FERC ¶ 61,132, ¶291 (May 17, 
2012).    
30 Order No. 1000 Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation, 
https://tinyurl.com/x8k6uve5.   
31 OMS is separate from MISO.  Huebsch was an OMS 
representative to the MISO Advisory Committee under the OMS 
Bylaws.  See OMS, Organization of MISO States Bylaws at Articles 
V.3, X (revised Sept. 13, 2002).   
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
23 
 
activities of which Driftless complains.  Huebsch's interactions 
in regard to MISO and OMS were publically known long before the 
proceedings on Cardinal-Hickory began.32   
¶51 Driftless alleges that Huebsch's activities with MISO 
and OMS support its allegation that he engaged in ex parte 
communications 
that 
are 
prohibited 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.50(1)(a).  Driftless makes this allegation without one 
single example of Huebsch engaging in conversations with anyone 
from MISO or OMS about the merits of the Cardinal-Hickory line.33   
¶52 Ex parte communication on the merits of a contested 
matter is the focus of Wis. Stat. § 227.50(1)(a).  It regulates 
ex parte communications on the merits as follows:   
[I]n a contested case, no ex parte communication 
relative to the merits or a threat or offer of reward 
shall be made, before a decision is rendered, to the 
hearing examiner or any other official or employee of 
the agency who is involved in the decision-making 
process, by any of the following: 
1m.  An official of the agency or any other 
public employee or official engaged in prosecution or 
advocacy 
in 
connection 
with 
the 
matter 
under 
consideration or a factually related matter . . . . 
2.  A party to the proceeding, or any person who 
directly or indirectly would have a substantial 
interest 
in 
the 
proposed 
agency 
action 
or 
an 
authorized representative or counsel.   
§ 227.50(1)(a). 
                                                 
32 PSC Order Sept. 26, 2019, 81.   
33 Huebsch did receive a communication regarding Cardinal-
Hickory, but it came from a member of another state regulatory 
commission.  Huebsch publically disclosed this communication, as 
required by Wisconsin law.   
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
24 
 
¶53 According to Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.50(1)(a), not all 
communications with those involved in the decision-making 
process are prohibited.  Only those communications "relative to 
the merits" of a pending matter are proscribed.  Driftless has 
identified no communications between Huebsch and MISO or OMS, or 
anyone else, relative to the merits of the Cardinal-Hickory 
line.  Rather, Driftless implies there must have been such 
communications because of Huebsch's attendance at MISO and OMS 
events.  General allegations such as Driftless asserts are 
legally insufficient to contravene the terms of § 227.50(1)(a) 
because they do not show a communication "relative to the 
merits" of the Cardinal-Hickory line.   
¶54 In 
addition, 
Driftless 
does 
not 
recognize 
the 
necessary connections among MISO, OMS, FERC and the PSC.  
However, the required connections among the PSC, MISO, OMS and 
the FERC under state and federal statutes were apparent years 
before 
Driftless 
intervened 
in 
this 
action.34 
 
Huebsch's 
participation in MISO and OMS as the PSC's delegate also was 
publically available years before Driftless intervened in this 
action.35  Given the public nature of this information, 
Driftless' general allegations about Huebsch's participation in 
MISO and OMS activities as somehow showing an appearance of bias 
borders on frivolous pleading.   
                                                 
34 Id., 82.   
35 Id., 83.   
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
25 
 
¶55 Driftless also ignores the presumption of honesty and 
integrity that is accorded to decisions of administrative 
decision-makers.  Sills, 254 Wis. 2d 538, ¶43; Withrow, 421 U.S. 
at 47.  In order to overcome the presumption of honesty and 
integrity, Driftless was required to prove a "serious risk of 
actual bias——based on objective and reasonable perceptions."  
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884.  As we explained in Miller, "[t]o 
assess whether the probability of actual bias rises to the level 
of a due process violation, we apply, verbatim, the standard 
from Caperton.  We ask whether there is 'a serious risk of 
actual bias——based on objective and reasonable perceptions.'" 
Miller, 392 Wis. 2d 49, ¶24.   
¶56 Before 
us, 
Driftless 
ignores 
the 
foundational 
presumption of honesty and integrity of administrative decision-
makers, and makes no showing of actual communications on the 
merits of Cardinal-Hickory that could evidence a serious risk of 
actual bias.  Driftless had the burden of proof in its challenge 
to Huebsch's impartiality.  Marder, 286 Wis. 2d 252, ¶24; 
Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47.  Because it did not provide factual 
evidence of wrongdoing by Huebsch, it failed to meet that 
burden.   
¶57 In 
regard 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.57(1), 
by 
which 
Driftless asserts its due process claim as an "irregularity in 
the procedure" before the PSC, judicial review under § 227.57(1) 
"shall be confined to the record."  The record may be expanded 
only "if proper cause is shown" of an irregularity in procedure 
before the PSC.  Therefore, the potential to expand the record 
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
26 
 
is conditional.  We conclude that first, a prima facie showing 
that Huebsch engaged in wrongdoing must be made.  Sills, 254 
Wis. 2d 538, ¶42.  Driftless has not identified one example of 
wrongdoing by Huebsch in regard to his interactions with MISO or 
OMS.   
¶58 Accordingly, we conclude that Driftless' allegations 
in regard to Huebsch's activities with MISO and OMS are 
insufficient as a matter of law to pose a serious risk of actual 
bias, such that he was required to recuse himself from the 
Cardinal-Hickey proceedings based on a due process violation.  
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884; Miller, 392 Wis. 2d 49, ¶22.  They 
also are insufficient to support expanding the Cardinal-Hickory 
record created in proceedings before the PSC pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 227.57(1) because they show no factual evidence of 
wrongdoing by Huebsch.   
b.  Friendships 
¶59 Although Driftless argues to us that Huebsch's many 
friendships within the energy community could be a basis for 
bias, this contention was not made until briefing in this 
review.  As with its allegation in regard to MISO, Driftless' 
allegations are general associational concerns for which it 
provides no factual incidents of communication about the merits 
of the Cardinal-Hickory line.   
¶60 Caperton and Miller require that the decision-maker 
evidence a serious risk of actual bias before due process 
requires recusal.  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884; Miller, 392 
Wis. 2d 49, ¶24.  Without evidence of factual communications 
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
27 
 
that show wrongdoing by Huebsch, "proper cause" to expand the 
record under Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1) based on bias of a decision-
maker 
does 
not 
exist. 
 
Accordingly, 
Driftless' 
general 
allegations of concern provide no basis from which we could 
conclude that there is a serious risk of actual bias that would 
require disqualification of Huebsch according to Caperton and 
our decision in Miller or that "proper cause has been shown" of 
wrongdoing by Huebsch according to § 227.57(1) based on personal 
friendships.  We agree with the PSC that Driftless' allegation 
"lacks a legitimate factual basis to support recusal or 
disqualification."36   
c.  Job Application37 
¶61 Before us, Driftless implies that, because Huebsch 
applied for the position of CEO of Dairyland Power Cooperative 
months after he resigned from the PSC, there was some kind of a 
quid pro quo going on where Huebsch would approve Cardinal-
Hickory and then be hired by Dairyland.  Once again, there is 
absolutely no factual evidence to support this theory.  This is 
simply another attempt by Driftless to create the view that 
Huebsch was biased, which is based on nothing factual except its 
aggressive litigation posture.   
¶62 What the facts show is that after the PSC's September 
26, 2019 decision on Cardinal-Hickory, Huebsch resigned.  He had 
                                                 
36 PSC Order, Sept. 26, 2019, 84.   
37 Once 
again, 
this 
concern 
was 
not 
presented 
until 
briefing.   
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
28 
 
served on the PSC since 2015.  In January of 2020, the previous 
CEO of Dairyland Power, Barbara Nick, announced that she was 
retiring.  On April 23, 2020, Huebsch submitted an application 
to a search firm for the position of Dairyland Power CEO.  He 
was not hired; he did not get even an interview for the 
position.   
¶63 Driftless provided no factual evidence that Huebsch 
presented a serious risk of actual bias in favor of approval of 
Cardinal-Hickory. 
 
There 
is 
no 
factual 
evidence 
of 
any 
wrongdoing by Huebsch.  Unsubstantiated allegations are all that 
Driftless provided.  Therefore, there is no "proper cause," as 
required under Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1), to expand the record 
created before the PSC on the Cardinal-Hickory line.   
D.  Circuit Court Decision 
¶64 Because the Wis. Stat. § 227.57 review of the merits 
of the PSC's approval of Cardinal-Hickory is pending in circuit 
court, this matter will return to the circuit court upon our 
remand.  Accordingly, we address previous statements and 
decisions made by the circuit court relative to the PSC approval 
of Cardinal-Hickory.  
1.  Due process violation 
¶65 In a written order, the circuit court declared "if 
Comm. Huebsch was improperly biased or his participation creates 
an improper appearance of bias, I must vacate the PSC decision 
and remand to the PSC for further proceedings."38  In a 
                                                 
38 Circuit Ct. Decision and Order, May 25, 2021, 9.   
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
29 
 
transcript of the motion hearing held July 30, 2021, the circuit 
court also said, "I'm going to call it 'appearance' because that 
really is what it is saying:  When we can't say that there's 
actually bias, but there's such a high risk of bias that we're 
going to call it a due process violation anyway."39  The circuit 
court may have recognized our decision in Miller, where we 
clearly stated that a due process violation requires a showing 
of the serious risk of actual bias based on objective factual 
representations.  Miller, 392 Wis. 2d 49, ¶24.  We conclude that 
although the circuit court may have understood the law, its 
repeated statements grounded in "the appearance of bias," when 
combined with the lack of factual evidence of communications to 
or from Huebsch on the merits of Cardinal-Hickory, are not 
sufficient to support a due process claim based on a "serious 
risk of actual bias."  Stated otherwise, no serious risk of 
actual bias was shown here.  
¶66 It was in part based on this error of what is required 
to state a due process violation that the circuit court 
interpreted Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1) as being satisfied by 
generalized allegations.  As explained above, the circuit court 
interpreted § 227.57(1) as permitting expansion of the record, 
which 
resulted 
in 
the 
subpoenas 
to 
Huebsch 
among 
other 
discovery.  In so concluding, the circuit court erred as a 
matter of law.  Miller, 392 Wis. 2d 49, ¶24.    
2.  Subpoenas protection 
                                                 
39 Circuit Ct. Mot. Hr'g Tr., July 30, 2021, 16. 
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
30 
 
¶67 We review the circuit court's decision that denied 
Huebsch's motion to quash Driftless' discovery subpoenas and its 
refusal to stay its discovery order.  The purpose of all 
subpoenas was to obtain evidence that would permit Driftless to 
expand the record pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1).   
¶68 The 
discovery 
subpoenas 
are 
prohibited 
by 
our 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1).  They are not grounded 
in a legally cognizable due process claim.  The circuit court 
refused the protection sought by Huebsch's motion to quash the 
discovery subpoenas.  We review its order to determine whether 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion.  Lane, 
251 Wis. 2d 68, ¶19.  When doing so, we examine whether the 
circuit court applied the correct legal standard.  Id. 
¶69 For the reasons explained above relative to Driftless' 
allegations, the circuit court herein erroneously interpreted 
Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1) and it did not clearly apply the correct 
standard by which to measure whether a due process violation had 
been stated.  It also refused to apply the standard we require 
when a circuit court is meeting a request for a stay of its 
order pending appeal.  See Waity v. LaMahieu, 2022 WI 6, ¶50, 
400 Wis. 2d 356, 969 N.W.2d 263.   
¶70 As we have explained above in our interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1), in order to expand the record created 
before the PSC, Driftless must show "proper cause" by prima 
facie proof of wrongdoing by Huebsch.40  Such proof must be based 
                                                 
40 Supra, ¶28.   
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
31 
 
on facts that show "irregularities in procedure" before the PSC 
in order to satisfy § 227.57(1).41  A prima facie showing 
requires objective facts; general allegations of concern are 
insufficient to satisfy the statutory possibility of expanding 
the record beyond that which was created before the PSC.42   
¶71 Huebsch's application for employment with Dairyland 
Power was an event that concerned the circuit court.  The record 
shows that he submitted an application on April 23, 2020, months 
after he left the PSC.  This event was raised by the affidavit 
of Driftless' attorney alleging that his application evidenced 
"irregularities in procedure before the agency" pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 227.57(1).  The circuit court agreed and said: 
I do think there was a prima facie case made as it 
relates to Commissioner Huebsch and the way that it 
was 
demonstrated 
was 
through 
a 
variety 
of 
circumstances that started what I call immediately 
after the decision. . . .  What actions happened that 
were documented showing him exchanging communications 
with one of the owners involved in this decision, it 
looked like if not the very first, one of the earliest 
communications was talking about having a meeting with 
the head of that company, and then it went from there 
with 
another 
series 
of 
events 
that 
ultimately 
culminated in his applying for her job. . . . 
I'm saying that is enough to raise a reasonable 
question whether a commissioner, who was taking those 
kind of actions so quickly after rendering a decision, 
was truly acting impartial or if they had other 
considerations outside of the record in front of them 
on their mind when rendering the decision. . . . 
                                                 
41 Supra, ¶29 (citing Marris, 176 Wis. 2d at 29-30). 
42 Supra, ¶36. 
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
32 
 
So enough has been shown to allow further exploration 
under [Wis. Stat. § ] 227.57(1) of exactly what 
happened with Commissioner Huebsch.[43]   
¶72 The circuit court permitted discovery into whether 
Huebsch acted lawfully in his decision on Cardinal-Hickory by 
ignoring repetitive court decisions that uniformly hold that 
adjudicators in agency proceedings are presumed to act with 
honor and integrity.  Marder, 286 Wis. 2d 252, ¶34; Withrow, 421 
U.S. at 47.  The circuit court did not acknowledge that 
presumption in the law.   
¶73 Rather, 
instead 
of 
applying 
that 
longstanding 
presumption, the circuit court presumed that applying for 
employment with Dairyland Power after the Cardinal-Hickory 
proceedings 
had 
concluded 
created 
a 
prima 
facie 
showing 
sufficient to permit discovery of Huebsch's decision-making 
during the Cardinal-Hickory proceedings.44    
¶74 As we explained above, Driftless had the burden of 
proving wrongful conduct through specific factual statements of 
Huebsch.45  However, Driftless provided no specific factual 
statements by Huebsch and only general allegations about actions 
that 
occurred 
after 
the 
Cardinal-Hickory 
proceedings 
had 
concluded.  These generalized concerns are insufficient to make 
a prima facie showing of "irregularities in procedure before the 
                                                 
43 Circuit Ct. Oral Arg. Tr., Jan. 21, 2021, 77-79. 
44 Id.   
45 Supra, ¶38 (citing Marder v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. 
of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶32, 286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 
110).   
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
33 
 
agency."  Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1); see also Sills, 254 Wis. 2d 
538, ¶¶42, 43.  Stated otherwise, Driftless had the burden to 
show factual statements evidencing wrongdoing by Huebsch.  
Marder, 286 Wis. 2d 252, ¶24; Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47.  However, 
in its ruling, the circuit court actually removed that burden of 
proof from Driftless.  Instead, the circuit court authorized 
discovery by which Huebsch was questioned to determine if he 
could prove that he did not act unlawfully.   
¶75 The circuit court erred in interpreting Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.57(1) to permit discovery, thereby expanding the PSC 
record before § 227.57(1)'s requirement of proper cause was 
satisfied.  The circuit court also did not apply the presumption 
of honesty and integrity to Huebsch's service on the PSC.  It 
did so based largely on the affidavit of Driftless' attorney, 
who offered no factual statements to or from Huebsch that showed 
he had prejudged the merits of Cardinal-Hickory.  The inference 
the circuit court accepted was that Huebsch's application for 
employment with Dairyland Power in April of 2020 could show that 
he had a pre-decision arrangement worked out with Dairyland 
Power.46  
¶76 Furthermore, the presumption of honesty and integrity 
is consistent with the precise conditions the legislature 
established in Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1), that, when met, would 
permit expanding the record that was developed before the 
agency.  As we explained above, "irregularities in procedure 
                                                 
46 Circuit Ct. Decision and Order, May 25, 2021, 11.   
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
34 
 
before the agency" are permitted to be explored "if proper cause 
is shown therefor."  § 227.57(1).  Proper cause requires 
specific factual statements by the decision-maker on the merits 
of the matter being decided by the agency.  Driftless presented 
not one example of objectively factual proof that the law 
requires; and the circuit court erred when it required none.   
3.  Stay pending appeal 
¶77 After deciding against Huebsch on his motion to quash, 
the circuit court heard Huebsch's motion for a stay pending 
appeal.  A circuit court's decision to grant or to deny a stay 
pending 
appeal 
is 
a 
discretionary 
decision. 
 
State 
v. 
Gudenschwager, 191 Wis. 2d 431, 439, 529 N.W.2d 225 (1995).  A 
stay 
pending 
appeal 
should 
be 
granted 
where 
the 
moving 
party:  "(1) makes a strong showing that it is likely to succeed 
on the merits of the appeal; (2) shows that, unless a stay is 
granted, it will suffer irreparable injury; (3) shows that no 
substantial harm will come to other interested parties; and 
(4) shows that a stay will do no harm to the public interest."  
Id. at 440.   
¶78 Here, the circuit court listed the four Gudenschwager 
factors, but did not apply them.  In regard to the first factor, 
the circuit relied on its prior decisions to conclude that there 
was "not a strong showing of likelihood to succeed on the 
merits.  In fact, I disagreed with Mr. Huebsch as to the 
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
35 
 
arguments on the merits; so I can't find that that factor favors 
a stay pending appeal."47   
¶79 The court concluded that because it had disagreed with 
Huebsch's 
position 
in 
the 
pending 
case, 
Huebsch 
had 
no 
likelihood of success on the merits when the matter proceeded on 
appeal.  This is the same error we described in Waity where a 
stay was requested and the circuit court simply referred to its 
own legal reasoning earlier in the pending case as its decision 
on the motion for a stay.  We held it was error to do so.  
Waity, 400 Wis. 2d 356, ¶52 (explaining that "a circuit court 
cannot simply input its own judgment on the merits of the case 
and conclude that a stay is not warranted.").   
¶80 Here, the circuit court did not reexamine the legal 
issues presented and it did not consider the standard of review 
that the court of appeals would apply to its decisions on 
relevant legal issues.  For example, it did not seem to 
understand that its interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1) 
would be reviewed de novo by the court of appeals.    
¶81 Its decision on the remaining Gudenschwager factors is 
equally deficient in applying the law to the facts presented.  
In regard to irreparable injury, the court said, "I simply don't 
see that here.  I mean, there's certainly some burden that 
Mr. Huebsch is going to be put to because he's going to have to 
sit for a deposition . . . but that's not an irreparable 
                                                 
47 Circuit Ct. Mot. Hr'g Tr., July 30, 2021, 63. 
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
36 
 
injury."48  The court went on, "If I grant this stay, I'm 
essentially handcuffing the petitioners from getting some of –– 
what may be some of the most relevant information for that 
hearing."49 
¶82 The court did not consider whether the harm done by 
deposing an administrative decision-maker about the substance of 
his decision could be undone on appeal.  Yet, that is a type of 
irreparable injury that we gave as an example in Waity.  Waity, 
400 Wis. 2d 356, ¶58.  We do not dwell on the circuit court's 
reasoning on the other Gudenschwager factors because application 
of the law relative to a stay pending appeal was completely 
absent from the circuit court's reasoning.  Not only did the 
circuit court err in subjecting Huebsch to discovery, it erred 
in not staying its decision pending appeal.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶83 We conclude that in pretrial decisions the circuit 
court erroneously interpreted Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1), which 
interpretation formed the basis for its expansion of the record 
created by the PSC and permitted discovery subpoenas of Huebsch.  
We so conclude because Driftless failed, as a matter of law, to 
satisfy the statutory criteria or due process requirements 
necessary to expand the record created by the PSC during the 
Cardinal-Hickory proceedings.   
                                                 
48 Id.   
49 Id., 65.   
Nos. 2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325   
 
37 
 
¶84 In regard to the discovery subpoenas issued to 
Huebsch, we conclude that the circuit court erred when it denied 
Huebsch's motion to quash.  The circuit court's error is 
grounded 
in 
its 
erroneous 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.57(1) wherein it approved discovery subpoenas.   
¶85 We further conclude that the circuit court did not 
clearly apply the correct legal standard when evaluating whether 
a due process violation had been stated; we reverse the circuit 
court's July 30, 2021 order denying Huebsch's motion to quash 
discovery 
subpoenas; 
and 
we 
conclude 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously denied Huebsch's request for a stay pending appeal.  
Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court.  
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed. 
 
 
Nos.  2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325.bh 
 
1 
 
¶86 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring).  I agree with much 
of the majority/lead opinion.1  It methodically goes through the 
allegations against Michael Huebsch, former commissioner of the 
Public Service Commission (PSC), and demonstrates why they are 
meritless 
and 
borderline 
frivolous. 
 
It 
explains 
that 
generalized allegations of bias come nowhere close to the 
constitutional due process standard:  actual bias or "a serious 
risk of actual bias."  See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 
U.S. 868, 884 (2009); Miller v. Carroll, 2020 WI 56, ¶24, 392 
Wis. 2d 49, 944 N.W.2d 542. 
¶87 Although I concur in the court's mandate, I arrive at 
substantially the same destination via a different route.  The 
majority/lead opinion reverses the circuit court's decision not 
to quash a subpoena for documents, but it gets there by 
overturning a separate, months-earlier, unappealed decision from 
the circuit court to expand the agency record under Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.57(1).  I focus instead on the order appealed to us——the 
circuit court's decision not to quash a subpoena for documents 
under Wis. Stat. § 805.07(3).  I agree with the majority/lead 
opinion that the allegations against Commissioner Huebsch do not 
support the circuit court's actions and the subpoena should have 
been quashed.  It appears that the procedural paths taken in 
this writing and in the majority/lead opinion very likely will 
have the same practical effect for Commissioner Huebsch on 
remand.  I write separately to explain my analysis and to stress 
why it was important for us to take this case. 
                                                 
1 I join ¶4 of the majority/lead opinion. 
Nos.  2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325.bh 
 
2 
 
I 
¶88 While the majority/lead opinion correctly explains why 
Driftless' 
fishing 
expedition 
must 
be 
rejected, 
it 
is 
insufficiently attentive to the procedural posture of this 
appeal.2  To be sure, this case is a procedural anomaly.  The 
opinion centers its analysis on the circuit court's decision to 
expand 
the 
record 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.57(1). 
 
But 
Commissioner Huebsch, the petitioner here, was not a party to 
the case when that decision was made, and no party has sought 
leave to appeal that decision.  See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.62(1g)(a), (1m)(a)1. (noting that parties may petition for 
review of decisions that are adverse to the "party seeking 
review").  The opinion nonetheless analyzes § 227.57(1) and 
concludes the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
in rendering a decision that is not before us.  While 
§ 227.57(1) is relevant to our inquiry, I do not believe it is 
appropriate to reach down and formally reverse this decision, 
even if the legal rationale proceeds on a parallel path. 
¶89 Commissioner Huebsch recognized this in his briefing.  
He does not ask us to formally reverse the circuit court's 
decision under Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1), even as he attacks its 
reasoning which served as part of the circuit court's basis for 
denying the motion to quash.  In his reply brief, Huebsch 
explained, "His interest in the soundness (or not) of the 
circuit court's earlier reasoning permitting discovery is merely 
                                                 
2 "Driftless" here refers to Driftless Area Land Conservancy 
and the Wisconsin Wildlife Federation.  Both parties issued the 
discovery subpoena which Commissioner Huebsch seeks to quash. 
Nos.  2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325.bh 
 
3 
 
indirect and contingent."  Indeed, "it is not as if Huebsch 
somehow obtains a retroactive right to appeal the old orders."  
Huebsch's quarrel, he explained, formally "lies only with orders 
directed to him."  Therefore, even though I largely agree with 
the majority/lead opinion's critique of the circuit court, I do 
not join its procedural choice to overrule the decision to 
expand the record under § 227.57(1). 
¶90 Only the circuit court's order denying Commissioner 
Huebsch's motion to quash the discovery subpoena is properly 
before us.  That order was vacated, and as the court of appeals 
identified, 
it 
is 
now 
moot. 
 
However, 
long-established 
exceptions to the mootness doctrine exist for just such a time 
as this.  Among the relevant considerations, mootness may be 
overlooked if "the issue is of great public importance."  
Marathon County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶19, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 
N.W.2d 901.  This case is.  The dissent disagrees.  It wonders 
what all the fuss is about, portraying this as a humdrum case 
getting suspicious and undeserved special treatment.  Not so.  
Imagine an ordinary civil case where, months after the decision, 
the losing litigant files a motion alleging a Caperton due 
process claim and asking for the private cell phone records of 
the judge——and a new judge ordered the records be produced.  
That would set an extraordinary precedent, worthy of close and 
careful scrutiny.  There would certainly be cause to look twice 
if the subpoena was rooted in mere speculation rather than firm 
evidence, especially given the exceptionally high standard 
needed to establish a Caperton due process claim.  Against this 
Nos.  2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325.bh 
 
4 
 
backdrop, we would not think twice of applying a mootness 
exception. 
¶91 A "that's not this case" argument doesn't work here 
because that is this case.  The due process claim advanced turns 
on the same standard for adjudicatory bodies like the PSC as it 
does for courts.  Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-47 (1975) 
(applying judicial bias rules "to administrative agencies which 
adjudicate").  We have seen bias and recusal allegations 
increase greatly in recent years, turning the obligation of 
adjudicator impartiality into a litigation weapon.  That only 
heightens the importance of these issues to the functioning of 
adjudicatory bodies like the PSC.  The dissent's nonchalant view 
is misplaced.  There is nothing ordinary about this case; it 
warrants our attention even though the order appealed from is 
moot.3 
II 
¶92 This leads us to the motion to quash.  We review a 
motion to quash a subpoena for documents for an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  Lane v. Sharp Packaging Sys., Inc., 
2002 WI 28, ¶¶19-20, 251 Wis. 2d 68, 640 N.W.2d 788.  "A 
discretionary decision will be sustained if the circuit court 
                                                 
3 Commissioner Huebsch also seeks review of the circuit 
court's decision to deny a motion for stay pending appeal.  That 
issue is moot as well.  But in my view, no mootness exception 
merits 
reaching 
that 
question. 
 
We 
granted 
Commissioner 
Huebsch's requested stay when we accepted this case, and we 
recently issued a decision clarifying the proper analysis.  See 
Waity v. LeMahieu, 2022 WI 6, ¶¶48-54, 400 Wis. 2d 356, 969 
N.W.2d 263. 
Nos.  2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325.bh 
 
5 
 
has examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of 
law, and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a 
conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach."  Indus. Roofing 
Servs., Inc. v. Marquardt, 2007 WI 19, ¶41, 299 Wis. 2d 81, 726 
N.W.2d 898 (quoting another source). 
¶93 By statute, a circuit court may "quash or modify" a 
subpoena for documents if the subpoena "is unreasonable and 
oppressive."  Wis. Stat. § 805.07(3); State v. Gilbert, 109 
Wis. 2d 501, 509-10, 326 N.W.2d 744 (1982).  And a subpoena, 
like 
any 
other 
discovery 
request, 
is 
limited 
to 
"any 
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or 
defense."  Wis. Stat. § 804.01(2)(a).  Here, the scope of review 
is even further limited.  The proceeding before the circuit 
court is not a case in the normal course, but a review of an 
agency decision under Wis. Stat. ch. 227.  Typically, such 
review is "confined to the record" created by the agency.  Wis. 
Stat. § 227.57(1).  However, "in cases of alleged irregularities 
in procedure before the agency . . . depositions and written 
interrogatories may be taken . . . if proper cause is shown 
therefor."  Id.  Driftless argues that its Caperton due process 
claim focused on Commissioner Huebsch constitutes an alleged 
irregularity in procedure. 
¶94 Commissioner Huebsch does not disagree that a Caperton 
due process violation would constitute a procedural irregularity 
under Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1).  Rather, he contends that 
Driftless failed to state an even remotely cognizable claim.  I 
agree.  As the majority/lead opinion explains well, the 
Nos.  2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325.bh 
 
6 
 
generalized accusations, innuendo, and wholesale speculation 
underlying the bias claims come nowhere close to alleging a 
Caperton due process violation.  Accordingly, the records 
demanded 
by 
the 
subpoena——including 
Commissioner 
Huebsch's 
cellphone, his communications with a number of individuals both 
in the course of his work as a commissioner and in his private 
life, and documents about his decision to seek employment 
elsewhere——are not relevant.  And a subpoena demanding wholly 
irrelevant documents is unreasonable and oppressive.  See State 
v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 844, 266 N.W.2d 597 (1978) 
(noting that whether a "subpoena may be attacked" turns in part 
on "the question of relevancy"); AF Holdings, LLC v. Does 1-
1058, 752 F.3d 990 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("If a subpoena compels 
disclosure of information that is not properly discoverable, 
then the burden it imposes, however slight, is necessarily 
undue:  why require a party to produce information the 
requesting party has no right to obtain?"); Compaq Comput. Corp. 
v. Packard Bell Elecs., Inc., 163 F.R.D. 329, 335-36 (N.D. Cal. 
1995) ("Obviously, if the sought-after documents are not 
relevant nor calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence, 
then 
any 
burden 
whatsoever 
imposed 
upon 
[the 
subpoenaed non-party] would be by definition 'undue.'"). 
¶95 Wisconsin law authorizes the quashing of unreasonable 
and oppressive subpoenas.  Wis. Stat. § 805.07(3) ("the court 
may . . . quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable and 
oppressive").  As the majority/lead opinion details, it appears 
the circuit court applied a far more relaxed "appearance of 
Nos.  2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325.bh 
 
7 
 
bias" standard rather than the strict, narrow, and rarely-met 
"serious risk of actual bias" standard that governs.  This was 
the wrong legal test.  I conclude that a reasonable judge 
examining the facts and applying the proper legal standards to 
both the motion to quash the subpoena and the underlying 
constitutional bias claim could only conclude that the subpoena 
for documents must be quashed. 
¶96 As 
previously 
explained, 
the 
unusual 
procedural 
posture of this case means the subpoena for documents is the 
only issue we can or should formally decide.  That said, the 
implications for further investigation regarding Driftless' 
alleged 
bias 
claim 
against 
Commissioner 
Huebsch 
as 
the 
proceedings continue below should be quite clear. 
III 
¶97 I close with some observations about the importance of 
this case for our system of adjudication.  The constitutional 
standard 
underlying 
a 
Caperton 
due 
process 
claim 
is 
extraordinarily high.  It is not whether some impartial 
observers would think there's an appearance of bias.  The 
question is whether actual bias was present, or a serious risk 
of bias so extreme and unusual that it occurs only in only the 
rarest of circumstances.  See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 887-88; 
id. at 899-900 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  Any claim of bias 
"must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those 
serving 
as 
adjudicators." 
 
Withrow, 
421 
U.S. at 
47.  
Unfortunately, this "presumption that judges will follow the law 
Nos.  2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325.bh 
 
8 
 
regardless of their personal views and regardless of their 
associations is quickly being replaced by the presumption that 
judges are frail, impressionable, and not to be trusted."  
Miller, 392 Wis. 2d 49, ¶126 (Hagedorn, J., dissenting). 
¶98 While citizens have a right to expect judges and other 
adjudicators to decide cases impartially, this concern does not 
justify weaponizing bias allegations and recusal to achieve 
litigation ends.  Legitimate claims have their place, but we 
cannot validate and routinize a litigation tactic that aims its 
fire at the decision-maker rather than the decision.  Recusal 
and bias claims must not become another missile to be deployed 
anytime a litigant does not like an adjudicator's decision.  Id.  
The constitutional due process guarantee announced in Caperton 
will rarely be met, and therefore should rarely be invoked.  At 
the end of the day, the Constitution simply does not countenance 
the vague, generalized, and speculative accusations that served 
as the basis for Driftless' attacks against Commissioner 
Huebsch.  The discovery subpoena against him should have been 
quashed.  I respectfully concur. 
Nos.  2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325.jjk 
 
1 
¶99 JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   (dissenting).  It is sometimes 
said that bad facts make bad law.  Today, bad procedure makes 
bad law.  Plain and simple, this appeal is moot.  Nevertheless, 
four members of this court transform a "procedural anomaly"1 into 
a procedural tragedy.  These four Justices springboard off an 
appeal about mootness to overreach into matters not before this 
court.  Strikingly, this unbounded exercise of judicial power 
comes with no explanation, leaving all to speculate as to why 
this case and this subpoena recipient receive such special 
treatment.  Whatever the reason, my colleagues' indulgence in 
the excesses of judicial power is not grounded in law and serves 
only to deepen inequalities in our system of justice.  For these 
reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶100 At the center of this interlocutory appeal is Michael 
Huebsch.  During the relevant time frame, Huebsch served as 
Commissioner on the Public Service Commission (PSC) when that 
agency approved the Cardinal-Hickory Creek Transmission Line 
project. 
 
Several 
local 
governments 
and 
conservation 
organizations, including the Driftless Area Land Conservancy 
("Driftless"), petitioned for judicial review of the PSC's 
approval decision. 
¶101 Along with legal challenges to the merits of the PSC's 
approval, Driftless alleges Huebsch violated its members' due 
process rights.  Driftless argues that Huebsch's contacts with 
                                                 
1 See County of Dane v. PSC, Nos. 2021AP1321-LV, 2021AP1325 
& 
2021AP1495-W, 
unpublished 
order 
(Wis. 
Sept. 
21, 
2021) 
(Karofsky, J., dissenting). 
Nos.  2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325.jjk 
 
2 
organizations and persons who appeared before him during the 
PSC's consideration of the Cardinal-Hickory Creek project show 
at least a serious risk of actual bias.  Evidence of those 
contacts, however, was not in the record created before the PSC.  
This absence is significant; typically, judicial review is 
limited to the agency record.  The exception to that general 
rule is set forth in Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1), which allows for 
additional discovery in cases of "alleged irregularities in 
procedure before the agency," such as a biased adjudicator.  
Pursuant to that exception, the circuit court here determined 
that Driftless's allegations of bias met the "irregularities in 
procedure before the agency" standard and were, therefore, 
sufficient 
to 
grant 
Driftless 
leave 
to 
take 
additional 
discovery. 
¶102 At the time the circuit court rendered its decision 
permitting extra-record discovery, Huebsch was not a party to 
the circuit court's review proceeding (he had since left his PSC 
Commissioner post for the private sector).  He first became 
involved in that proceeding when Driftless subpoenaed him to be 
a non-party witness.  The subpoena——a subpoena duces tecum——
sought both Huebsch's deposition testimony and his personal 
phone for "imaging" of data relevant to his potential bias.  For 
ease of reference, I refer to this as the "Phone Subpoena." 
¶103 Huebsch filed a motion to quash the Phone Subpoena 
and, alternatively, stay the Phone Subpoena pending appeal if 
the circuit court ruled against him.  The circuit court denied 
both motions.  Huebsch then appealed the circuit court's 
decisions to the court of appeals.  While the appeal was 
Nos.  2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325.jjk 
 
3 
pending, Driftless withdrew the Phone Subpoena.  The subpoena's 
withdrawal prompted the court of appeals to conclude that 
Huebsch's appeal of the now-defunct Phone Subpoena was moot.  
See County of Dane v. PSC, 2021AP1321-LV, unpublished order 
(Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2021). 
¶104 Shortly 
thereafter, 
Driftless 
issued 
Huebsch 
a 
subpoena ad testificandum to secure his testimony at the 
upcoming trial scheduled to occur one month later.  For 
simplicity, I refer to this later subpoena as the "Trial 
Subpoena."  Upon receipt of the Trial Subpoena, rather than 
asking the circuit court to quash it, Huebsch came directly to 
this court.  He presented us three options for resolving his 
qualms with the ongoing discovery efforts related to him.  The 
first was the "extraordinary and drastic" request for a 
supervisory writ.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶17, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  In the 
same petition, Huebsch alternatively asked that we exercise our 
similarly "extraordinary" superintending authority over the 
circuit court to micromanage its discovery decisions.  See State 
v. Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, ¶83, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d 
110 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (quoting State v. Helms, 136 
Wis. 
432, 
464-65, 
118 
N.W. 
158 
(1908) 
(Winslow, 
C.J., 
concurring)).  Finally, he filed a more traditional petition for 
review. 
¶105 The petition for review challenged the court of 
appeals' decision that Huebsch's appeal over the Phone Subpoena 
was moot.  In an apparent attempt to add a law-developing issue 
Nos.  2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325.jjk 
 
4 
to a petition otherwise seeking error correction,2 Huebsch 
suggested that his case presented a good vehicle for integrating 
the "voluntary cessation" mootness exception recognized by 
federal courts into Wisconsin law.  Behind that mootness 
question, however, were additional, purely "error correcting" 
issues.  These include:  (1) how a court is to apply the 
standard for a stay pending appeal——an issue for which we had 
already accepted review in a different case;3 (2) the correct 
standard for adjudicator bias under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment——an issue that simply asked us to 
repeat the legal standard we had articulated only 14 months 
prior;4 and (3) how Driftless's specific allegations fit within 
the settled "serious risk of actual bias" standard——issues 
calling for "merely the application of well-settled principles 
to the factual situation" stemming from the earlier (and never-
appealed) order to expand the record.5  A bare majority of this 
court granted Huebsch's petition for review over my dissent 
explaining how an interlocutory appeal over a decision declining 
to quash a subpoena presented a "procedural anomaly" for 
                                                 
2 "The supreme court's primary function is that of law 
defining and law development," while the court of appeals' 
"primary function is error correcting."  Cook v. Cook, 208 
Wis. 2d 166, 188–89, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997). 
3 That identical issue had already be accepted for review a 
month 
earlier. 
 
See 
Waity 
v. 
LeMahieu, 
No. 
2021AP802, 
unpublished order (Wis. July 15, 2021). 
4 See Miller v. Carroll, 2020 WI 56, 392 Wis. 2d 49, 944 
N.W.2d 542. 
5 Our 
review 
criteria, 
however, 
disfavor 
"merely 
the 
application 
of 
well-settled 
principles 
to 
the 
factual 
situation."  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r)(c)1. 
Nos.  2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325.jjk 
 
5 
addressing the more substantive adjudicator-bias standard.  See 
County of Dane v. PSC, Nos. 2021AP1321-LV, 2021AP1325 & 
2021AP1495-W, unpublished order (Wis. Sep. 21, 2021).  We were 
unanimous, however, in denying Huebsch's two "extraordinary" 
requests for either a supervisory writ or an exercise of our 
superintending authority.  Id. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
¶106 Four of my colleagues err in two fundamental respects.  
First, this case is moot and no mootness exception applies.  
That should be the end of this case.  Unfortunately, it's not.  
The majority/lead and concurring opinions overreach into matters 
not 
properly 
before 
us 
in 
a 
manner 
that 
can 
only 
be 
characterized as an exercise of superintending authority——
despite our unanimous decision not to exercise that authority in 
this case.  That is the second error.  I address each error in 
turn. 
A.  This Case is Moot 
¶107 Shortly after the court of appeals dismissed as moot 
the matter concerning the Phone Subpoena, Driftless served 
Huebsch with the Trial Subpoena.  Huebsch claims the voluntary 
withdrawal of the Phone Subpoena followed by the issuance of the 
later Trial Subpoena proves his appeal should not have been 
dismissed.  Huebsch posits this series of events falls within 
the "voluntary cessation" exception to mootness recognized under 
federal law but not under Wisconsin state law.  The voluntary 
cessation mootness exception holds that when a party voluntarily 
ends challenged conduct, that cessation may not render a case 
Nos.  2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325.jjk 
 
6 
moot if the challenged conduct may be reasonably expected to 
recur following dismissal of the action.  See Friends of the 
Earth, 
Inc. 
v. 
Laidlaw 
Env't 
Servs. 
(TOC), 
Inc., 
528 
U.S. 167, 189 (2000). 
¶108 While this "voluntary cessation" argument served as 
Huebsch's law-developing hook, neither the majority/lead opinion 
nor the concurrence develop the law.  The majority/lead opinion 
mushes the distinct "voluntary cessation" exception into one of 
our 
existing 
mootness 
exceptions:  capable 
and 
likely 
of 
repetition 
and 
yet 
evades 
review. 
 
See 
majority/lead 
op., ¶¶25-26.  Regardless of which exception to mootness the 
majority/lead opinion is actually applying——voluntary cessation 
or capable and likely of repetition yet evades review——neither 
theory works here.  That is because the conduct and legal issues 
here are not capable and likely of repetition; the two subpoenas 
materially differ. 
¶109 The "capable and likely of repetition and yet evades 
review" mootness exception, as we recently emphasized, is 
"limited to situations involving 'a reasonable expectation that 
the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action 
again.'"  Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶30, 386 
Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509 (quoting State ex rel. Clarke v. 
Carballo, 83 Wis. 2d 349, 357, 265 N.W.2d 285 (1978)).  
Likewise, the "voluntary cessation" exception applies only when 
an action "sufficiently similar" to the challenged conduct is 
reasonably expected to recur.  See Ne. Fla. Chapter of 
Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 
U.S. 656, 662 n.3 (1993). 
Nos.  2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325.jjk 
 
7 
¶110 Here, Huebsch supposes that the Phone Subpoena and the 
Trial Subpoena establish "repetition."  But the two subpoenas 
differ substantially both as a matter of fact and as a matter of 
law.  Factually, the subpoenas differ in scope.  The Phone 
Subpoena would have permitted Driftless to probe relevant 
aspects of Huebsch's phone and required Huebsch to sit for a 
deposition.  By contrast, the Trial Subpoena demands much less 
of Huebsch, requiring only that he appear at trial to offer 
truthful testimony. 
¶111 As a matter of law, different legal standards govern 
quashing the two subpoenas.  Our decision in State v. Gilbert, 
109 Wis. 2d 501, 326 N.W.2d 744 (1982) delineates this legal 
distinction.  Gilbert involved a ten-year-old girl who was 
served with a subpoena ad testificandum requiring her to appear 
in court and testify about her mother's abuse of her and her 
sister.  The circuit court quashed the subpoena, reasoning that 
the child's best interest was better served by not appearing in 
the same courtroom as her abuser, which could trigger severe 
psychological harm and re-traumatize her.  The defendant 
appealed.  On appeal, the victim claimed the circuit court had 
the 
authority 
to 
quash 
her 
subpoena 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 805.07(3), which permits a court to quash or modify a subpoena 
"if it is unreasonable and oppressive." 
¶112 This court reinstated the subpoena, concluding that 
§ 805.07(3) applied only to a subpoena duces tecum; a subpoena 
ad testificandum, by contrast, could not be quashed on the 
grounds that it was unreasonable and oppressive or contrary to 
the child's best interest.  Gilbert, 109 Wis. 2d at 508-17.  
Nos.  2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325.jjk 
 
8 
Though 
seemingly 
harsh, 
the 
court 
underscored 
just 
how 
fundamental a subpoena ad testificandum is to our legal system.  
It explained that "a fundamental tenet of our modern legal 
system[] is that the public has a right to every person's 
evidence," including the President of the United States.  Id. 
at 505 (citing, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 
(1974)).  The court highlighted the maxims that "each person has 
a duty to testify" and that the "integrity of the [adversarial] 
legal system depends on the court's ability to compel full 
disclosure of all relevant facts under the rules of evidence."  
Id.  Thus, the court concluded a ten year old's physiological 
harm and re-traumatization was not enough for a court to quash a 
subpoena ad testificandum. 
¶113 These factual and legal distinctions control the 
analysis.  Huebsch's appeal challenged only the decision not to 
quash the Phone Subpoena——a subpoena duces tecum.  On that 
issue, 
the 
legal 
standard 
was 
whether 
the 
subpoena 
was 
"unreasonable and oppressive."  But under Gilbert, a different 
standard would apply to Huebsch's Trial Subpoena——a subpoena ad 
testificandum.  These factual and legal differences means the 
two subpoenas are not the "same action" nor "sufficiently 
similar."  See J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶30; Ne. Fla. Chapter of 
Associated Gen. Contractors, 508 U.S. at 662 n.3. 
¶114 These differences also mean the challenged Phone 
Subpoena is not reasonably likely to recur.  See Laidlaw Env't 
Servs., 528 U.S. at 189.  Driftless averred that it would not 
issue another subpoena duces tecum to Huebsch.  The court of 
appeals relied on that averment, meaning Driftless is now 
Nos.  2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325.jjk 
 
9 
judicially estopped from serving Huebsch with another subpoena 
duces tecum.  See State v. Ryan, 2012 WI 16, ¶¶32-33, 338 
Wis. 2d 695, 809 N.W.2d 37.  The majority/lead opinion's 
contrary assertion rests on a failure to appreciate the factual 
and legal differences between these two subpoenas.  And because 
the Phone Subpoena and the Trial Subpoena are materially 
different, the cited mootness exceptions do not apply. 
¶115 The concurrence takes a slightly different tack that 
fares no better.  In the concurrence's view, the adjudicator-
bias standard is an issue of "great public importance."  
Concurrence, ¶90 
(quoting 
Marathon 
County 
v. 
D.K., 
2020 
WI 8, ¶19, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901).  Perhaps, but this 
court recently published a comprehensive opinion setting out the 
proper adjudicator-bias standard making it unnecessary to 
revisit the issue here.  See Miller v. Carroll, 2020 WI 56, 392 
Wis. 2d 49, 944 N.W.2d 542. 
¶116 Putting the issue's perceived importance aside, I fail 
to see why we needed to intervene through a moot interlocutory 
appeal.  Had the trial been allowed to proceed without this 
court's meddling and had the final judgment deemed Huebsch 
unconstitutionally biased, then a traditional appeal would 
squarely raise the very same adjudicator-bias issue.  The bottom 
line is that the adjudicator-bias issue serves as no excuse to 
overlook mootness in this interlocutory appeal.  The appeal is 
moot without exception. 
B.  An Inappropriate Exercise of Superintending Authority 
Nos.  2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325.jjk 
 
10 
¶117 Four members of this court barrel past this appeal's 
mootness with analyses that can only be explained as expansive 
exercises of our superintending authority.  To explain, even if 
this court could overlook mootness here, then the only discovery 
issue properly before us would be whether the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it declined to quash 
the Phone Subpoena.  In resolving that issue, the legal question 
we ask is whether the circuit court applied the "proper legal 
standard."  See, e.g., State v. Dobbs, 2020 WI 64, ¶32, 392 
Wis. 2d 505, 945 N.W.2d 609.  The proper legal standard 
governing a subpoena such as the Phone Subpoena is the 
"unreasonable 
and 
oppressive" 
standard 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 805.07(3).  See Gilbert, 109 Wis. 2d at 509-10.  That would be 
the extent of our inquiry. 
¶118 Not interested in limiting themselves to the Phone 
Subpoena and the narrow legal issue it raises, four of my 
colleagues 
instead 
exercise 
this 
court's 
extraordinary 
superintending authority to reach an issue not before this 
court, the adjudicator-bias standard.  The adjudicator-bias 
issue arises solely out of the circuit court's decision to 
expand the record.  But the decision to expand the record was 
never part of this appeal; the deadline to appeal that ruling 
expired before Huebsch filed this appeal.  Tellingly, not even 
Huebsch was so bold as to ask that we reverse a decision that 
occurred 
before 
he 
was 
involved 
in 
the 
circuit 
court 
proceedings.  See Opening Br. Pet'r at 51; Reply Br. Pet'r 
at 18.  Undeterred, four member of this court micromanage the 
circuit court's application of the adjudicator-bias standard.  
Nos.  2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325.jjk 
 
11 
Because that issue belongs to the record-expansion decision not 
before us, such micromanagement is clearly an exercise of 
superintending authority. 
¶119 Not willing to admit as much, both the majority/lead 
opinion and concurrence attempt to conceal their use of 
extraordinary power behind a novel legal theory that a subpoena 
must be grounded in a "cognizable" claim.  But the veil is thin.  
Neither Huebsch nor my colleagues cite a single case from any 
jurisdiction that actually supports their theory.  Indeed, the 
theory's novelty lays bare my colleagues' procedural mischief.  
Had this interlocutory appeal challenged the circuit court's 
decision to expand the record, I would agree that the issue 
before us is the "proper legal standard" for showing adjudicator 
bias under Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1).  But again, that decision was 
not appealed.  Huebsch instead appealed the later decision not 
to quash the Phone Subpoena.  As such, this appeal presents only 
the issue of whether the circuit court applied the "proper legal 
standard" 
for 
showing 
a 
subpoena 
is 
"unreasonable 
and 
oppressive" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 805.07(3). 
 
This 
novel 
"cognizable" claim theory conflates the adjudicator-bias issue, 
which is not before us, with the narrower Phone-Subpoena issue, 
which is the only matter before us.  In short, this novel 
theory——found no where in the law——operates to obscure what is 
otherwise an exercise of superintending authority to reach 
matters not before the court. 
¶120 In my colleagues' fervor to reach issues beyond this 
appeal's procedural posture, they fail to appreciate the dire 
consequences of the "cognizable" claim theory.  This theory 
Nos.  2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325.jjk 
 
12 
allows a subpoenaed witness to raise what amounts to a motion to 
dismiss the claim underlying the subpoena.  In allowing a 
subpoenaed witness to question the merits of the underlying 
claim, a majority of this court creates an entirely new class of 
persons within a case who now have the right to reach back to 
challenge earlier merits decisions on which their subpoenas are 
predicated.  And if a circuit court does not amend its earlier 
merits decision, then this new class of subpoenaed witnesses can 
request 
an 
interlocutory 
appeal 
challenging 
that 
earlier 
decision's legal merits and demand that proceedings be stayed 
pending that appeal.6  In the end, this novel "cognizable" claim 
theory provides for a disruptive new tool in a subpoena 
recipient's toolbox——at least for those select witnesses with 
the means to advance it. 
¶121 Though four members of this court engage in a blatant 
exercise of superintending authority, they stay largely silent 
on why Huebsch's non-party appeal deserves such extraordinary 
treatment.  That's problematic.  Our superintending power "is 
not to be exercised upon light occasion, but only upon some 
grave exigency" and "extraordinary hardship."  State v. Cir. Ct. 
of Milwaukee Cnty., 143 Wis. 282, 285, 127 N.W. 998 (1910).  
What's the "grave exigency"?  Where's the "extraordinary 
hardship" here?  Certainly it cannot be the mere fact that 
Huebsch would have to give truthful testimony about his 
conversations with friends and contacts who appeared as parties 
before him.  Not even a ten-year-old abuse victim who faces 
                                                 
6 Stunningly, Huebsch claims such an interlocutory appeal 
would be as of right for non-party witnesses like him. 
Nos.  2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325.jjk 
 
13 
psychological harm and re-traumatization by having to appear 
before her abuser to detail her abuse has received the 
extraordinary relief granted to Huebsch.  See Gilbert, 109 
Wis. 2d 501.  Inconvenience and the discomfort that comes with 
having private relationships exposed to public view simply are 
not enough to excuse a subpoenaed witness from his "duty to 
testify."  Id. at 505. 
¶122 While the concurrence is more forthcoming with it's 
reasoning, it still falls prey to Huebsch's not-so-subtle scare 
tactic repeated throughout his filings and at oral argument that 
if this could happen to him, then it could happen to a Justice 
as well.  True enough.  But if our government is truly one of 
laws and not men and women, then we cannot use extraordinary 
constitutional powers to carve out special treatment for 
ourselves and only person's like us.  Everyday Wisconsin 
citizens respect their civic duty and testify in court despite 
the hardships that testifying may bring.  That remains true even 
when their subpoenas ultimately prove to be the result of legal 
error.  Neither Huebsch nor any Justice of this court is 
absolved from this duty to testify.  See Gilbert, 109 Wis. 2d at 
505 (holding that "each person has a duty to testify" because 
the public's "right to every person's evidence . . . applies to 
all of us——even the President of the United States" (citing 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683)).  We are not above other witnesses and the 
procedures we adhere to should reflect that. 
¶123 To that end, I conclude by observing that consistency 
across 
cases 
is 
integral 
to 
this 
court's 
institutional 
legitimacy.  Like cases should be treated alike.  Here, we are 
Nos.  2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325.jjk 
 
14 
left with a vexing question:  what distinguishes Huebsch from 
the ten-year-old abuse victim in Gilbert?  My colleagues offer 
no satisfying answer. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶124 In this moot appeal, a bad procedural posture makes 
bad law.  
Though we unanimously voted not to exercise 
superintending authority in this appeal, four members of this 
court make an about face by indulging in that extraordinary 
power to reach matters not before us.  My colleagues provide no 
acceptable principle or explanation for why this case called for 
such a blunt exercise of judicial power.  For these reasons, I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶125 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and REBECCA FRANK DALLET join this dissent. 
Nos.  2021AP1321-LV & 2021AP1325.jjk 
 
1