Case Title: STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION; and FMC CORPORATION V. LAWRENCE FAULKNER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-22

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION; and FMC CORPORATION V. LAWRENCE FAULKNER2007 WY 31152 P.3d 394Case Number: 06-22Decided: 02/22/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION 
DIVISION; and FMC CORPORATION,

 
 
Appellants

(Petitioner/Employer),

 
 
v.

 
 

LAWRENCE FAULKNER,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofSweetwaterCounty

The Honorable Nena James, 
Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; John W. 
Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Steven Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; Brandon W. Snyder and Thomas A. Thompson, of MacPherson, Kelly & 
Thompson, LLC, Rawlins, Wyoming; George Lemich, of Lemich Law Center, Rock 
Springs, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing Appellee:

Michael D. Newman, Rock Springs, Wyoming.

                                    

Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division ("Division") and FMC Corporation ("Employer") 
challenge the Medical Commission's permanent partial impairment rating awarded 
to Mr. Faulkner.  We 
affirm.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      The issue on 
appeal is:  

 
 
Whether the Medical 
Commission erred as a matter of law in failing to allow apportionment of the 
employee-claimant's impairment award between his non-work related condition and 
his compensable work related injury.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The underlying 
facts of this case are not in dispute.  
Mr. Faulkner began his employment with FMC Corporation in 1988 as an 
instrument and electrical technician.  
In May of 1995, Mr. Faulkner sought medical treatment for non-work 
related back pain.  Surgery was 
performed in July and Mr. Faulkner returned to his regular duty employment in 
December 1995.  

 
 
[¶4]      In 1999, Mr. 
Faulkner suffered a work-related low back injury, which required additional 
surgery.  He applied for, and 
received, worker's compensation benefits.  
Mr. Faulkner did not receive a worker's compensation impairment rating 
for this injury.  He again returned 
to his employment without restrictions. 

 
 
[¶5]      On December 28, 
2000, Mr. Faulkner sustained the work-related injury at issue in this case.  On that day, Mr. Faulkner was driving a 
golf cart while at work.  The golf 
cart had been modified by the installation of a rail.  It was necessary for Mr. Faulkner to 
lift his legs over the rail each time he mounted and dismounted from the 
cart.  The injury occurred when, 
after lifting his legs over the rail, Mr. Faulkner felt a "pop" in his lower 
back.  As he walked across the shop 
floor, he developed "excruciating pain" in his lower back and down his right 
leg.  As a result of this incident, 
Mr. Faulkner was diagnosed with a work-related disc herniation.  Two surgeries were performed.  Mr. Faulkner's condition did not improve 
with the surgical intervention.  He 
has been unable to work since the date of the incident. 

 
 
[¶6]      Mr. Faulkner 
filed a claim seeking permanent partial impairment worker's compensation 
benefits.  As a result of this 
claim, Mr. Faulkner underwent two independent medical examinations ("IME").  Dr. Ruttle performed the first IME and 
rated Mr. Faulkner's whole person impairment at twenty-three percent (23%).  Dr. Ruttle qualified the rating by 
noting that "[a]pproximately 95% of [Mr. Faulkner's] current disability appears 
related to prior back injuries and surgeries that preceded alleged injury on 
December 28, 2000.  The patient's 
total percent impairment secondary to injury December 28, 2000, is approximately 
1%."  Mr. Faulkner objected to Dr. 
Ruttle's one-percent impairment rating.  

 
 
[¶7]      A second 
evaluation was performed by Dr. Dall and his conclusions paralleled those of Dr. 
Ruttle:

 
 
In discussing causation 
and apportionment, I think it is necessary to look at the patient's rating 
hypothetically at various points in time.  
Following his first surgery in 1995, based on our current rating 
criteria, he would have already qualified for a DRE lumbar category IV 
impairment (20-23%).  Therefore, the 
second, third and fourth surgeries, while contributing to the patient's current 
state of disability, would not contribute significantly to his impairment 
rating.  Given that he was doing 
well and was able to return to heavy duty work, I would have certainly placed 
him in the lower end of the category (20%) at that time.  At most, therefore, the incidents that 
have occurred between then (1995 and now) would add three percent whole person 
impairment.

 
 
. . . I, therefore, 
[concur] with Dr. [Ruttle] that the vast majority of the above impairment award 
is causally related to his pre-existing conditions of 1995 and 1999.  I do not have sufficient medical records 
between 1995 and 1999 to better apportion between those two but, as indicated 
above, if the decision were to be made upon ratings at previous points in time, 
the vast majority would be apportioned to the 1995 
incident.

 
 
Dr. Dall ultimately rated 
Mr. Faulkner's impairment at three percent (3%).  After receiving the results of the two 
exams, the Division issued its final determination awarding Mr. Faulkner a three 
percent (3%) impairment rating.  

 
 
[¶8]      Mr. Faulkner 
timely requested a hearing claiming apportionment of the rating was 
improper.  The matter was referred 
to the Medical Commission pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(m).1  After receiving evidence, the Medical 
Commission determined that Mr. Faulkner's injury was a material aggravation of a 
preexisting condition and rated his impairment at twenty-three percent 
(23%).  The Medical Commission did 
not apportion the rating between Mr. Faulkner's pre-existing condition and the 
work-related injury, concluding that apportionment was not authorized under 
Wyoming 
law.  

 
 
[¶9]      Following the 
Medical Commission's final determination, the Division filed a timely Petition 
for Judicial Review with the district court.  The district court affirmed the Medical 
Commission's decision.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶10]   When reviewing administrative 
decisions, we are limited to a determination of the factors specified in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2005), which 
provides:

 
 
(c)        To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

(i)         
Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

(ii)        Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A)       Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

(B)       Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

(C)       In excess 
of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

(D)       Without 
observance of procedure required by law; or

(E)       Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

 
 
We have also 
stated:

 
 
"The interpretation and 
correct application of the provisions of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act 
are questions of law over which our review authority is plenary.  Conclusions of law made by an 
administrative agency are affirmed only if they are in accord with the law.  We do not afford any deference to the 
agency's determination, and we will correct any error made by the agency in 
either interpreting or applying the law."

 
 

Bailey v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Div., 2002 WY 145, ¶ 9, 55 P.3d 23, 26 (Wyo. 2002) (internal citations omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Div. v. Garl, 2001 WY 59, ¶ 9, 26 P.3d 1029, 1032 (Wyo. 
2001)).  We review this case as if 
it had come directly to this Court from the agency and do not afford any 
deference to the district court's decision.  Bailey, ¶ 6, 55 P.3d  at 
25.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶11]   Mr. Faulkner applied for permanent 
partial impairment benefits in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(f) 
(LexisNexis 2005), which provides that "[a]n injured employee suffering an 
ascertainable loss may apply for a permanent partial impairment award. . . 
."  An "ascertainable loss" is 
defined as "that point in time which it is apparent that permanent physical 
impairment has resulted from a compensable injury, the extent of the physical 
impairment due to the injury can be determined and the physical impairment will 
not substantially improve or deteriorate because of the injury."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2005).  In determining 
whether an employee has suffered a compensable injury, we have recognized that a 
preexisting injury may present a compensable claim "if the employment 
aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce 
the . . . disability for which compensation is sought."  Lindbloom v. Teton International, 684 P.2d 1388, 1390 (Wyo. 1984) (citing 1 Larson's Workmen's 
Compensation Law, § 12.20, p. 3-276).  
See also Romero v. Davy McKee Corp., 854 P.2d 59, 61 (Wyo. 1993); State ex rel. 
Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Fisher, 914 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Wyo. 
1996); Haynes v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Div., 962 P.2d 876, 878 (Wyo. 1998); Wyo. ex. rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & 
Comp. Div. v. Parrish, 2004 WY 144, ¶ 27, 100 P.3d 1244, 1254 (Wyo. 
2004).  

 
 
[¶12]   It is undisputed that Mr. Faulkner 
was injured in the course of his employment and that the injury materially 
aggravated a pre-existing condition.  
Although Mr. Faulkner had prior surgery involving his lower back, at the 
time of the incident giving rise to this claim Mr. Faulkner was employed on a 
full-time basis with no medical or physical restriction impacting his 
employment.  He had previously 
received worker's compensation benefits for injuries involving his lower back; 
however, there is no indication in the record that he had received an impairment 
rating or a permanent disability award.  
The Division and the Employer do not dispute that Mr. Faulkner's two back 
surgeries following the December 28, 2000, injury were causally related to the 
injury, nor do they dispute that Mr. Faulkner has been unable to return to work 
since the injury.  They contend, 
however, that Mr. Faulkner's impairment rating should be reduced by the 
percentage of impairment attributable to his pre-existing back condition.   

 
 
[¶13]   The Medical Commission declined to 
reduce the impairment rating and explained:

 
 

10.             
. . . Mr. Faulkner had a 
two level lumbar fusion in 1995 which was unrelated to his employment.  As a result of that injury and surgery 
he had an identifiable and ascertainable whole person impairment.  Based on the Guides at Table 15-3, Mr. 
Faulkner had a 20% whole person impairment under DRE Lumbar Category IV as a 
result of his 1995 injury and surgery.  
Thereafter Mr. Faulkner sustained two work injuries to his low back which 
required further surgery.  Mr. 
Faulkner received worker's compensation benefits for these work injuries.  As a result of his 1999 and 2000 work 
injuries and surgeries to his low back, his whole body impairment has increased 
to 23% again based on Table 15-3 of the Guides.  However, it does not seem probable that 
the legislature intended employers to pay for pre-existing permanent partial 
impairments which are clearly identifiable and quantifiable and which are wholly 
unrelated to the employee's employment.  
Furthermore, the work injuries and subsequent surgeries did not 
significantly change the nature or extent of that pre-existing permanent partial 
impairment as determined under Guides.

 
 

11.             
However, notwithstanding 
these arguments, the Panel believes that absent clear legislative or Supreme 
Court guidance, that it must find that Mr. Faulkner is entitled to a 23% whole 
body impairment based upon the current state of the law.  When presented with the issue of 
physical conditions pre-existing an employee's employment, such conditions are 
compensable "if the employment aggravated, accelerated or combined with the 
disease or infirmity to produce the disability for which compensation is 
sought."  Matter of Fisher, 914 P.2d 1224, 1226 
(Wyo. 1996) 
(cite omitted).  As stated in Haynes, supra, benefits are proper if 
the "work effort contributed to a material degree to the precipitation, 
aggravation, or acceleration of the pre-existing condition of the 
employee."  Here, despite an existing impairment and 
pre-existing condition, there was a material aggravation of that pre-existing 
condition and an increase in the existing impairment due to work 
injuries.  The current state of 
the law appears to require an "all or nothing" approach in such 
cases.

 
 
This rule regarding 
pre-existing conditions has long been a part of Wyoming's body of worker's compensation 
law.  This rule requires that an 
employer must take the employee as he finds him.  The right to compensation does not 
depend on an employee's condition of health or upon his freedom from 
susceptibility to injury whether due to a pre-existing disease, weakness, or 
condition existing from birth.  Exploration Drilling Company v. Guthrie, 
370 P.2d 362 (Wyo. 1962).  If a condition makes an employee more 
susceptible to a particular injury than a typical employee, the employee is 
entitled to benefits if he is injured on the job.  Fortier v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 910 P.2d 1356 
(Wyo. 
1996).  See also, State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division v. Garl, 26 P.3d 1029 (Wyo. 2001); Frontier Refining, Inc. v. Payne, 23 P.3d 38 (Wyo. 2001); Division v. 
Waggener, 946 P.2d 808 (Wyo. 1997); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. 
Carpenter, 736 P.2d 311 (Wyo. 1987); Associated Seed Growers, Inc. v. Scrogham, 
73 P.2d 300 (Wyo. 1937).  This 
approach is also recognized in Larson, 
Worker's Compensation, § 59 et. 
seq. 

 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
(Footnotes and some internal citations omitted.)  

 
 
[¶14]   The conclusion of the Medical 
Commission provides context and focus for our analysis.  As indicated by the Commission, the 
specific issue presented by the Division and the Employer appears to be one of 
first impression for this Court.  As 
we understand the decision of the Medical Commission, it determined that Mr. 
Faulkner suffered from "a clearly identifiable and quantifiable" pre-existing 
permanent partial impairment of 20% prior to the December 2000 injury.  That injury materially aggravated the 
pre-existing condition and caused an increase of 3% in the existing 
impairment.  The Commission 
determined that apportionment was not authorized by statute or our case law and 
held that Mr. Faulkner was entitled to the full 23% impairment 
rating.

 
 
[¶15]   Although the issue is presented to 
us for the first time, it has been addressed by courts in other states.  The general consensus reached by those 
courts is that "the employer becomes liable for the entire disability resulting 
from a compensable accident," unless statutory authority exists to the 
contrary.  5 Arthur Larson & Lex 
K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation 
Law § 90.01, at 90-2 (1997) (and cases cited therein).  This general rule is known as the 
"full-responsibility" rule.  
Id.  
States wishing to combat any perceived inequities in application of 
the general rule have taken two approaches.  Id.  The first approach is to enact 
apportionment statutes, "under which the employer pays only for the single 
member lost in its employment."2  Id.   Under the second approach, states 
statutorily create second injury funds, "which ensure that the employee receives 
the full disability benefits but reimburses the employee for the difference 
between this sum and what the employer would pay under an apportionment 
statute."  Id.  
See, e.g., City and County of Denver v. Industrial Comm'n, 690 P.2d 199, 202 (Colo. 1984) (explaining that the purpose of 
establishing its subsequent injury fund was to avoid the harsh result of the 
"full responsibility" rule).

 
 
[¶16]   Our statutes do not contain an 
express provision requiring apportionment.  
Nevertheless, the Division and the Employer claim that apportionment is 
proper under Wyoming law because of the language contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-405(g), which provides:   

An 
injured employee's impairment shall be 
rated by a licensed physician using the most recent edition of the American 
Medical Association's guide to the evaluation of permanent impairment. The 
award shall be paid as provided by W.S. 27-14-403 for the number of months 
determined by multiplying the percentage of impairment by forty-four (44) 
months.

 
 
(Emphasis added.)  They reason that apportionment is 
required because this statutory language requires use of the AMA Guides and the 
AMA Guides provide for apportionment.  
We disagree.  Apportionment 
is not required by the AMA Guides.  
 

 
 
[¶17]   In support of their position, the 
Division and the Employer rely upon language from Section 1.6b of the AMA Guides 
which states: "Apportionment analysis in workers' compensation represents a 
distribution or allocation of causation among multiple factors that caused or 
significantly contributed to the injury or disease and resulting 
impairment.  The factor could be 
preexisting injury, illness, or impairment."  Linda Cocchiarella and Gunnar B.J. 
Andersson, Guides to the Evaluation of 
Permanent Impairment § 1.6b, at 11 (5th ed. 2001).  There is nothing in the language of the 
AMA Guides cited by the Appellants that would lead us to the conclusion that 
apportionment is mandated by the AMA Guides.  Other provisions of the AMA Guides make 
it clear that the decision to require or allow apportionment is one that must be 
made by each state.  According to 
the AMA Guides: "Most states have their own customized methods for calculating 
apportionment.  Generally, the most 
recent permanent impairment rating is calculated, and then the prior impairment 
rating is calculated and deducted.  
The remaining impairment rating would be attributed or apportioned to the 
current injury or condition."  Linda 
Cocchiarella and Gunnar B.J. Andersson, Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent 
Impairment § 1.6b, at 12 (5th ed. 2001); see also § 1.8, at 13 (recognizing that 
worker's compensation benefits are a creature of the individual state's specific 
system and "[d]etermining eligibility of benefits and the extent of disability 
is specified by statute and case law").  

 
 
[¶18]   The Guides provide an example of 
statutory language which would allow for apportionment:

 
 
A common verbal 
formulation of the workers' compensation context might state, "in cases of 
permanent disability less than total, if degree of disability resulting from an 
industrial injury or occupational disease is increased or prolonged because of a 
preexisting physical impairment, the employer shall be liable only for the 
additional disability from the injury or occupational 
disease."

 
 
Linda Cocchiarella and 
Gunnar B.J. Andersson, Guides to the 
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment § 1.6b, at 12 (5th ed. 2001) (footnote omitted).  No similar statutory language exists in 
Wyoming.  We must, therefore, resort to the 
general rule disallowing apportionment.  
5 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 
90.01, at 90-2 (1997).  See also Wallace v. Hanson Silo Co., 235 N.W.2d 363, 396 (Minn. 1975) (holding that apportionment was 
improper in the absence of statutory authority), superseded by statute, Minn. Stat. § 
176.101, Subd. 4a (1984), as recognized 
in Giese v. Green Giant Co., 426 N.W.2d 879, 880-881 (Minn. 1988) 
(explaining that apportionment is now proper due to the enactment of statute 
which authorizes and sets forth the procedure for apportionment between 
injuries); Poehlman v. Leydig, 400 P.2d 724, 729 (Kan. 1965) (explaining that in the absence of a statutory 
provision to the contrary, there is no prorating the extent of the disability 
due to the accident itself on the one hand and the aggravation of employee's 
physical condition on the other); Field 
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 507 A.2d 1209, 1210 (N.J. 1986) (discussing 
that prior to the New Jersey Reform Act, any aggravation, acceleration or 
exacerbation of a pre-existing condition made an employer liable for the whole 
resultant disability).  

 
 
[¶19]   The Division and the Employer claim 
that even if apportionment is not expressly authorized by statute, we must 
nonetheless permit apportionment to give effect to the intent of the Act, which 
allows compensation solely for work-related injuries.  They contend that failing to recognize 
apportionment is contrary to this intent and to existing Wyoming case law.  The Division and the Employer cite to 
our decisions in Haynes v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 962 P.2d 876 (Wyo. 1998) and Taylor v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2003 WY 83, 72 P.3d 799 (Wyo. 2003) as support for their 
position.

 
 
[¶20]   In Haynes, an employee suffered a seizure 
as a result of a fall at work which caused a material aggravation of a 
pre-existing non-symptomatic arteriovenous malformation.  Haynes, 962 P.2d  at 878.  The Division paid the medical bills 
related to the seizure, but denied benefits when the employee sought medical 
treatment to separately repair the pre-existing condition.  Id.  We affirmed the denial of benefits 
finding that the Medical Commission correctly distinguished the work-related 
aggravation of a pre-existing condition from the non-work related repair of that 
condition.  Id., 962 P.2d  at 
879.  We stated that the "fall did 
not change the need for, or the extent of, the treatment. . . ."  Id., 962 P.2d  at 878-879.

 
 
[¶21]   Mr. Faulkner's case is 
distinguishable from the situation addressed in Haynes.3  In Haynes, the employee failed to prove the 
causal connection between the work-related injury and the medical treatment for 
the pre-existing condition.  No such 
absence of proof exists here.  The 
Medical Commission specifically found that Mr. Faulkner's back condition and 
impairment were aggravated by the work injury.

 
 
[¶22]   In Taylor, an employee suffered a serious 
work-related injury at a sawmill resulting in a partial amputation of the 
employee's left foot.  Taylor, ¶ 1, 72 P.3d  at 800.  Doctors initially 
assessed the permanent partial impairment rating at seventy-five percent 
(75%).  Id.  Thereafter, the employee underwent 
surgery to release the left Achilles tendon, resulting in an increased 
impairment rating of eighty-three percent (83%).  Id., ¶ 4, 72 P.3d  at 801.  Because the employee 
already received payment for a seventy-five percent rating, the Division 
deducted that amount from the new impairment rating.  Id.  The employee sought review, claiming the 
deduction was improper.  Id., ¶ 6, 72 P.3d  at 801.  Upon our review, we 
found that the deduction was proper because otherwise, the employee would 
receive a double recovery.  
Id., ¶ 13, 72 P.3d  at 803.

 
 
[¶23]   Mr. Faulkner's situation is also 
distinguishable from that in Taylor.  Prior to the December 2000 work-related 
injury, Mr. Faulkner did not receive an impairment rating, or any benefits for a 
permanent partial impairment.  
Rather, Mr. Faulkner was able to maintain his employment without 
restrictions, despite his pre-existing back condition.  After his December 2000 work-related 
injury materially aggravated his pre-existing condition, Mr. Faulkner was unable 
to continue his employment.  There 
is no evidence suggesting that Mr. Faulkner is receiving a double recovery.4  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶24]   In conclusion, we find no error in 
the Medical Commission's decision.  
The Wyoming legislature has not enacted a statute 
that requires apportionment of an impairment rating due to a pre-existing 
condition.  Our decision is 
consistent with our case law recognizing that material aggravation of a 
pre-existing condition is a compensable injury and is also in accord with the 
general rule disallowing apportionment in the absence of a specific statute 
requiring apportionment.

 
 
[¶25]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-405(m) (LexisNexis 2005) provides that:  ". . . Any objection to a final 
determination pursuant to this subsection shall be referred to the medical 
commission for hearing by a medical hearing panel acting as hearing examiner 
pursuant to W.S. 27-14-616."

  

2Two 
examples of apportionment statutes enacted by other states 
are:

 
 
Minn. 
Stat. § 176.101(2005), which provides:

 
 
Subd. 
4a. Preexisting condition or disability; apportionment. (a) If a personal injury 
results in a disability which is attributable in part to a preexisting 
disability that arises from a congenital condition or is the result of a 
traumatic injury or incident, whether or not compensable under this chapter, the 
compensation payable for the permanent partial disability pursuant to this 
section shall be reduced by the proportion of the disability which is 
attributable only to the preexisting disability. An apportionment of a permanent 
partial disability under this subdivision shall be made only if the preexisting 
disability is clearly evidenced in a medical report or record made prior to the 
current personal injury. Evidence of a copy of the medical report or record upon 
which apportionment is based shall be made available to the employee by the 
employer at the time compensation for the permanent partial disability is 
begun.

 
 
N.J. 
Stat. § 34:15-12(d) (West 2007), which states:

 
 
If previous 
loss of function to the body, head, a member or an organ is established by 
competent evidence, and subsequently an injury or occupational disease arising 
out of and in the course of an employment occurs to that part of the body, head, 
member or organ, where there was a previous loss of function, then the employer 
or the employer's insurance carrier at the time of the subsequent injury or 
occupational disease shall not be liable for any such loss and credit shall be 
given the employer or the employer's insurance carrier for the previous loss of 
function and the burden of proof in such matters shall rest on the 
employer.  

 
 

3The 
Division and the Employer also cite to Bourgoin v. J.P. Levesque & Sons, 
726 A.2d 201 (Me. 1999), for the proposition that 
apportionment is proper even in the absence of an apportionment statute.  In Bourgoin, an employee, who had a 
pre-existing diabetic condition, sought permanent impairment benefits after 
suffering a work-related back injury.  
Id., 726 A.2d  at 
201.  The Workers' Compensation 
Board found that the employee was entitled to a 23% whole person permanent 
impairment rating for his back injury, but did not award benefits for a 30% 
permanent impairment rating related to the pre-existing diabetic condition.  Id.  The employee appealed the decision 
claiming that a "whole body" approach to rating the permanent impairment was 
required.  Id., 726 A.2d  at 202-203.  The Maine Supreme Court looked to its 
statutory definition of "permanent impairment," which defined the term as "any 
anatomic or functional abnormality or loss existing after the date of maximum 
medical improvement that results from the injury," to affirm the denial of 
benefits.  Id.,726 A.2d  at 202 (emphasis 
omitted).  Based on the definition, 
the court concluded that the employee was not entitled to benefits because the 
pre-existing diabetic condition did not result from the work-related back 
injury.  Id.  We find the employee's condition in Bourgoin distinguishable from Mr. 
Faulkner's condition.  In Bourgoin, the employee's diabetic 
condition was not materially aggravated by the work-related back injury.  As a result, no casual connection could 
be made.  In addition, Maine's statutory provision concerning permanent 
impairment benefits is different from Wyoming's statutory 
provision.

 
 

4See, e.g., American Can 
Co. v. Industrial Acci. Com., 196 Cal. App. 2d 445 
(1961) (finding it improper to apportion permanent disability awards if caused 
in part by aggravation of a preexisting condition); Bailey v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 766 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tenn. 1989) (holding that "an employer is liable for disability 
resulting from injuries sustained by an employee arising out of and in the 
course of his employment even though it aggravates a previous condition with 
resulting disability far greater than otherwise would have been the 
case").