Case Title: Frieden Const., Inc. v. Lower & Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87-269

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Frieden Const., Inc. v. Lower & Co.1988 WY 153766 P.2d 527Case Number: 87-269Decided: 12/15/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
FRIEDEN CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), NEOSHO CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. AND THE WESTERN 
RAILROAD PROPERTIES, INC., (DEFENDANTS), AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY AND 
FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, (THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS),

v.

LOWER & COMPANY, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF), WESTERN RAILROAD PROPERTIES, INC., (THIRD-PARTY 
PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, NiobraraCounty, John T. Langdon, 
J.

Douglas G. 
Madison and John E. Masters of Dray, Madison & Thomson, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

Harold E. Meier 
of Schwartz, Bon, McCrary & Walker, Casper, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS and URBIGKIT, 
JJ., and BROWN,* and ROONEY, JJ., 
Retired.

* Retired June 30, 
1988.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal is a 
factually simple controversy involving compensation to appellee on a 1983 
quantities dirt moving sub-contract for construction of a new railroad line for 
Western Railroad Properties, Inc. (Chicago and Northwestern Railroad) in the 
Lusk, Wyoming 
area. Summary judgment in the claimed amount plus interest was granted to the 
dirt contractor, and appeal is taken contesting both the amount allowed in 
judgment and right to accrued interest.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Stripped of the 
complexities of prior parties to the litigation and the panorama of changed 
attorneys, this court is invited to consider a contract entered into by Lower 
& Company (appellee) as an earth moving sub-sub-contractor for work 
completed in 1984 for Frieden Construction, Inc. (appellant), which served as a 
general sub-contractor on the railroad line construction project. Although 
appellant1 presents a somewhat complex 
argument involving defenses to the judgment, the issue, simplistically stated, 
is whether the trial court erred in the grant of summary judgment in a defined 
amount for amounts due on the written contractual services agreement with 
interest. After a course of pleadings which had originally involved the owner, 
the general contractor and the sureties, the case came to the trial court for a 
pretrial pursuant to an order for pretrial conference filed April 17, 1986. The 
pretrial order required pretrial memoranda by the litigants, as well as a joint 
pretrial submission to be filed in advance. Appellee submitted a pretrial 
memorandum in proper detail and appellant failed to favor the trial court with 
any memoranda or other documentation required by the convening order. The file 
to that date indicated a quantities controversy.

[¶4.]     With this state of the 
record, the trial court entered an order in lieu of pretrial conference which 
required appellant to produce contractual documents and a cross-section of the 
final survey so that a determination could be made of dirt quantities moved 
pursuant to the contract. In the event there was no final cross-section 
available, appellant's defense data pertaining to the amounts was requested in 
order for appellant to show errors, if any, in appellee's tally 
sheet.

[¶5.]     Thereafter, pursuant to 
the order, appellant furnished cross-section details as contained within a May 
16, 1986 letter from a surveyor.2 Appellee promptly moved for summary 
judgment based upon the contractual documents and the newly furnished 
cross-section data which established the quantities covered in its roadbed 
construction activities. In support of the motion for summary judgment, an 
affidavit of Harold Lanham, as the treasurer and an officer of Lower & 
Company and who had been designated as a prospective witness in the prior 
pretrial memorandum, was submitted. A brief in support of summary judgment was 
also furnished as supported by an affidavit filed a few days later by another 
company employee. Appellant provided the trial court no affidavits to even 
contest its cross-section analysis, which established the balances due or the 
amount of those balances as had been computed in appellee's affidavits. Lacking 
resistive affidavits, the hearing, as convened on summary judgment for the 
plaintiff as appellee and interest based in computation on the cross-section and 
prior billing for the amount claimed to be due since work completion in 1984.3

[¶6.]     In challenging the 
summary judgment, appellant essentially raises procedural contentions which fail 
by virtue of non-presentation to the trial court.

1. The affidavit of 
Warren Ash as not showing proper service. Our decision in the case of Matter of 
the Estate of Obra, 749 P.2d 272 (Wyo. 1988) is dispositive since the affidavit 
was clearly considered by the trial court without objection and no objection on 
lack of service was made at the regularly convened hearing. Conway v. Guernsey Cable TV, 713 P.2d 786 (Wyo. 1986). The affidavit 
was timely filed and at issue was the lack of mailing certificate or effect of 
an incomplete certificate attached to the accompanying 
brief.

2. Insufficiency in the 
form of the affidavit of treasurer, Harold Lanham. Appellant tries hard, but 
fails to find for us within the affidavit where the witness, who had been 
previously designated as an officer of the company, improperly computed or 
defined a specific amount stated to be due and payable. A minimum attack on the 
affidavit would require notice by hearing date and preferably by contesting 
evidence.4 Conway, 713 P.2d 786.

[¶7.]     A contention is found 
in present argument of appellant that in fact the price per yard should have 
been computed at a rate of .85 cents per cubic yard east of Lusk and .95 cents 
per cubic yard west of Lusk, rather than the charged total of $.85 and $.95. 
This argument is ingenious in that it was apparent from billing computation and 
common reasoning that the parties recognized the latter figure properly 
reflected the agreed compensation base for the earth work involved. The 
difference of one hundred times was significant. Furthermore, if appellant 
desired to raise this issue as a question of fact as indicating a different 
contention from what was contemplated by the pretrial order, the issue properly 
required affidavit support in advance of the pretrial hearing. Logically, such 
support could include comparison with compensation paid to appellant by 
Neosho with whom it had its subcontract. 
Affiant Lanham had provided as evidence of a total amount in his 
affidavit:

3. That your affiant, in 
connection with his duties on behalf of Lower & Co., received the daily time 
tally sheets, calculated the amounts paid on invoices submitted, and calculated 
the balance due under the contract.

4. That subsequent to the 
commencement of this litigation your affiant was furnished with the figures and 
calculations of Mr. Ronald Vogel, engineer and surveyor, who calculated the 
quantities of earth work done, and that accepting Mr. Vogel's calculation as 
true and correct, your affiant has prepared a total amount due under the 
contract, including the items of equipment as shown on the invoice. That the 
total amount due Lower & Co. as of the date of this affidavit, including 
interest, is the sum of $213,106.98.

Attached to the 
affidavit as Exhibit F was the surveyor's letter as the cross-section 
determination from which the computation was made.

[¶8.]     Not only do we find 
that the trial court had a proper basis for the acceptance of the computed total 
based on the evidence furnished without resistance of conflicting fact, but also 
the computation accorded a status for which interest from the date due was 
properly then included in the judgment total. Rissler & McMurry Co. v. 
Atlantic Richfield Co., 559 P.2d 25 (Wyo. 1977). We concur with appellee that the 
case is a simple one not involving complex issues. Without opposing affidavits 
to contest balances due, the trial court was justified in entry of summary 
judgment and properly included interest for the liquidated claim. JonesLand 
and Livestock Co. v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 
733 P.2d 258 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶9.]     The decision of the 
trial court is affirmed. We decline to find no reasonable cause for appeal 
against appellant only because present counsel for appellant did not make the 
record with which they are faced as successor attorneys.

FOOTNOTES

1 Present counsel for 
appellant is not the law firm originally involved.

2 By whom this surveyor, 
Vogel Surveyors, Inc., was employed is undisclosed, but the letter was addressed 
to the attorney for appellant and then delivered to the attorney for appellee 
pursuant to the court order. Undoubtedly, the same detail was used by appellee 
for its billing purposes with Neosho Construction Co., Inc., which had the 
general contract with Chicago and Northwestern Railroad.

3 The motion for summary 
judgment was set for hearing on August 18, 1986. Although original counsel for 
appellant filed a motion thereafter on September 3, 1986 to withdraw for failure 
of cooperation, original counsel approved the judgment as to form as entered on 
October 17, 1986. The subsequent delay in appearance of the case here is 
occasioned by cross-claims by the other parties causing an initially aborted 
appeal, as now reasserted after other matters in litigation had been 
settled.

4 The judgment was 
prepared on October 16, 1986 and approved as to form by attorney for appellant 
and filed October 17, 1986. On October 24, 1986, appellant moved for a new trial 
and that findings of fact and conclusions of law be furnished. First then on 
December 8, 1986, a representative of appellant filed an affidavit contending a 
dispute as to liability and amount of damages. This dispute neither challenged 
the cross-section analysis nor the dollar basis for computation, which was the 
premise of the previously entered judgment. The motion for a new trial was 
promptly denied and its denial is not presently presented as an issue upon which 
appeal is premised.

ROONEY, Retired Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶10.]  I disagree with the majority opinion only 
wherein it fails to hold that the district court had before it a genuine issue 
of material fact concerning the agreed upon price per yard for moving its dirt. 
I would reverse and remand on this aspect.

[¶11.]  The majority opinion notes that the 
valuation of the amount claimed was contained in an affidavit and was computed 
at the rate of $0.85 and $0.95. However, the contract itself was before the 
court, both parties accepted it as the foundation for the action, and it 
provided the rate to be .85 cents. Thus, there was a direct conflict on the 
material fact as to the agreed upon rate. Accordingly, the conclusion by the 
majority of the court that the parties "recognized" or intended the rate to be 
that contended by appellee is not proper on review of a summary 
judgment.

[¶12.]  Additionally, a search for the intent of 
the parties in this case should more properly be a search for grounds upon which 
to reform the contract on the basis of mistake. We have often said that we will 
not rewrite contracts under the guise of interpretation, and that resort to 
interpretation is never to be had where meaning is free of doubt. Arnold v. 
Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., Inc., 707 P.2d 161 (Wyo. 1985); Adobe 
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Getter Trucking, Inc., 676 P.2d 560 (Wyo. 1984); Rainbow 
Oil Co. v. Christmann, 656 P.2d 538 (Wyo. 1982); McCartney v. Malm, 627 P.2d 1014 (Wyo. 1981); Wyoming Machinery Co. v. 
U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty 
Co., 614 P.2d 716 (Wyo. 1980); Quin Blair 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Julien Const. Co., 597 P.2d 945 (Wyo. 1979); Laird v. Laird, 597 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1979); Matter of Kimball's Estate, 583 P.2d 1274 
(Wyo. 1978). 
This contract is not ambiguous but is plain and clear in expressing the rate. An 
ambiguous contract is one which is obscure in its meaning because of 
indefiniteness of expression or because a double meaning is present. Busch 
Development, Inc. v. City of Cheyenne, 645 P.2d 65 (Wyo. 1982); Amoco Production Co. v. 
Stauffer Chemical Co. of Wyoming, 612 P.2d 463 
(Wyo. 1980); Bulis v. Wells, 565 P.2d 487 
(Wyo. 
1977).

[¶13.]  If the rate expressed in the contract is 
inaccurate because of a mistake, the court can be requested to reform it. The 
fact of mistake and the nature of it may result in a reformation of the contract 
upon presentation of the proper evidence to the factfinder. See Restatement 
(Second) of Law of Contracts, Ch. 6, § 151 et seq. (1981); Calamari and Perillo, 
Contracts 3d Ed., § 9-25 et seq (1987). But this issue is not before us on our 
review of the propriety of the summary judgment.