Case Title: JEFFREY STEITZ V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2008-SC-000108-MR

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 2009-10-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT . OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION . JEFFREY STEITZ ,*ixyrnttr 011jurf -of ~i 2008-SC-000106-MR ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT V. HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGE NO . 07-CR-000277 MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT REVERSING AND REMANDING RENDERED : OCTOBER 29. 2009 I -ND APPELLANT COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE Appellant Jeffrey Steitz appeals as a matter of right from ajudgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court convicting him of use of a minor in a sexual performance and possession of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor. For the reasons set forth, we reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court and remand for a new trial. BACKGROUND In the summer of 2006, R.B. , a twelve-year-old girl, knocked on her neighbors' door and asked to go swimming in their pool. Appellant answered and, according to R.B. , led her to his room in the basement to change her clothes. R.B. testified that Appellant told her to sit on his bed, and when she complied, he began taking pictures of her. R.B . stated that Appellant removed her clothes, continued taking pictures, and eventually raped and sodomized her. On August 18, 2006, police executed a search warrant . on Appellant's room, and recovered a camera with undeveloped film . The film contained three pictures : one of R.B. sitting on a bed, one of R.B . lying on a bed, and one of R.B. on the bed with her shirt lifted and her breasts exposed . On December 20, 2006, Appellant was arrested for entering the home of K.P., another minor, without permission . After his arrest, Detective John Blumenschein questioned Appellant. Subsequently, a Jefferson County grand jury indicted Appellant on charges of second degree rape, sodomy, use of a minor in a sexual performance, and possession of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor. l At the conclusion of his trial in Jefferson Circuit Court, thejury found Appellant not guilty of rape and sodomy, but guilty of use of a minor in a sexual performance and possession of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor. The court entered a sentence of twenty years imprisonment (for use ofa minor in a sexual performance) concurrent with five years imprisonment (for possession of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor), as well as five years conditional discharge upon release (for use ofa The charges relating to K.P. were severed from the charges relating to R.B. Only the charges relating to R.B. are a part of this appeal . minor in a sexual performance) . He appeals these convictions to this Court as a matter of right. ISSIMS Failure to Excuse Juror 179893 for Cause Appellant argues that the circuit court abused its discretion when it failed to excuse Juror 179893 for cause. During voir dire, the juror stated that she was sexually molested as a child by a neighbor. She explained that she had had years of therapy and considered herself a "survivor" and not a "victim." Defense counsel then asked the juror whether that experience would prevent. her from being fair to the defense . She responded, "I don't think so . I think 1, 1 think I could be fair . But I don't, I can't say that for sure. I'd like to think I could." There was no further questioning of this juror on the issue . Appellant challenged Juror 179893 for cause. The court denied Appellant's motion, stating that thejuror was "pretty candid" about her experience, and pointing out that she was one of the only jurors who did not approach the bench to speak. Appellant ultimately used a peremptory challenge to excuse Juror 179893. Appellant used all of his peremptory challenges . Under RCr 9.36, a juror shall be excused for cause "[w]hen there is reasonable ground to believe that a prospective juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence However, the trial court is granted broad discretion, and its decision will not be reversed unless the failure to excuse is an abuse of discretion (for questions of law) or clearly erroneous (for questions of fact) . Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336, 338 (Ky . 2007) ; Commonwealth v. Lewis, 903 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Ky. 1995) . See also Richardson v. Commonwealth, 161 S.W. 3d 327, 330 (Ky. 2005) . In addition, "[i]t is the . probability of bias or prejudice that is determinative in ruling on a challenge for cause ." Pennington v. Commonwealth, 316 S.W.2d 221, 224 (Ky. 1958) . The mere fact, that a potential juror has been the victim of a, similar crime is insufficient to warrant removal for cause . Bowling v. Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d 293, 299 (Ky. 1997) ; Sanders v. Commonwealth, 801 S.W.2d 665, 670 (Ky. 1990) (in murder/robbery trial, no abuse of discretion in not dismissing a juror who had been the victim ofa robbery, when juror stated that "[ylou never know" whether it is possible to be impartial, "you always think you can be objective," and "I think I've come out of the trauma.") . However, in this case, Juror 179893"s statements were far too equivocal to guarantee that she was free of bias or prejudice. While the juror stated that she would "like to think" she could be fair, she never indicated that she in fact could be fair. C.f. Richardson v. Commonwealth, 161 S.W.3d 327, 330-31 (Ky. 2005) (in rape trial, removal for cause not warranted where juror who had been the victim of sexual abuse "unequivocally confirmed that she could fairly and impartially decide the case.") . As this Court has made clear, asking a potential juror whether he or she can put personal feelings aside and decide the case based solely on the evidence presented is not a "magic question," which rehabilitates otherwise disqualified jurors. Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 819 S.W.2d 713, 717-18 (Ky. 1991) . Therefore, the complete lack of any indication that the juror can be fair is a serious cause for concern, Whether a. juror possesses a -mental attitude of appropriate indifference' must be reviewed in the totality of the circumstances ." Id. at 719 (quoting United States v . Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 146 (1936)) . Juror 179893's past history of sexual abuse, combined with her subsequent comments about whether she could be fair, created a strong probability of bias. It makes no difference that the juror was candid with the court about her potential biases . Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to excuse Juror 179893 for cause . Prejudicial error occurs when a trial court erroneously fails to strike a juror for cause, a defendant is forced to use a peremptory challenge to remove that juror, and the defendant uses all available peremptory challenges . Shane, 243 S.W.3d at 341 . That is the exact situation in this case ; therefore, the judgment of the circuit court must be reversed, and Appellant must be granted a new, trial.2 11. Ex Post Facto Arguments In April 2006, the General Assembly amended a number of laws related to sex offenses . 2006 Ky. Acts 182 . These amendments were effective July 12, 2 The Commonwealth argues that this Court should overrule Shane, decided approximately two years ago. We see no reason to do so. 2006 . Appellant asserts several violations of the Ex Post. Facto Clause of the United States and Kentucky constitutions related to these amendments . Appellant's arguments are unpreserved . However, we address them due to their constitutional dimensions, and due to the fact that they- are likely to -recur on remand . Both the United States and Kentucky constitutions prohibit ex post facto laws. U.S. Const. § 10 ; Ky. Const .. § 19(1) . An ex post facto law is any law which makes a previously innocent act criminal, aggregates or increases the punishment for a crime, or alters the rules of evidence to require less or different proof in order to convict. Purvis v. Commonwealth, 14 S.W.3d 21, 23 (Ky. 2000); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (3 Dall. 386) (1798) . For a law to violate the ex post facto clause, It must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it." Weaver v. Graham , 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981) . The key inquiry, however, is "whether a retrospective change results in increased punishment." Martin v. Chandler , 122 S.W.3d 540, 547 (Ky. 2003) . A retroactive increase in time before being eligible for parole, or additional conditions placed on parole eligibility, do not implicate the ex post facto clause, because there is no right to parole, and therefore no increased punishment . Garland v. Commonwealth, 997 S.W.2d 487, 489-90 (Ky.App. 1999). See also Martin, 122 S.W.3d 540. However, a retroactive increase in the length of post-release conditional discharge does create an impermissible ex post facto law, because this results in an increase in the offender's t-ot,al rds, 14S.W.3d at . 24 . With these principles in mind, we now address each ol'Appellant's ex post facto arguments Increase in Period of Conditional Discharge Under KRS 532.043, persons convicted of certain sex offenses (including use of a minor in a sexual performance) were subject . to conditional discharge for a period of 3 years after the completion of their sentence. Effective July 12, 2006, the General Assembly amended KRS 532.043 to increase a sex offender's conditional discharge period from 3 years to 5 years. The circuit court sentenced Appellant to 5 years conditional discharge upon his release from the penitentiary . The indictment alleges that Appellant committed the crime of use of a minor in a sexual performance "between the 2511, day of August, 2005 and the I It" day of August, 2006 ." The majority of this period falls before the effective date of the increase in the period of conditional discharge . Conditional discharge, unlike probation, is an additional punishment that increases the maximum length of a sentence. Purvis, 14 S.W.3d at 24 . Therefore, the retroactive application ofa longer conditional discharge period implicates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States and Kentucky constitutions . Id . On retrial, if thejury again finds Appellant guilty, it must make a finding of fact as to whether the use of a minor in a sexual performance occurred (1) punishment- before July 12, 2006, or (2) on or after that date. The 5-year conditional discharge period (as opposed to the previous 3-year period) may only be applied to Appellant if thejury finds that the crime occurred on or after the effective date of the amendments . Otherwise, a 5-year conditional discharge is an unconstitutional ex post facto punishment . B . Increase from Misdemeanor to Felony The General Assembly also amended KRS 531 .335, increasing the, penalty for possession of matter portraying a minor in a sexual performance from a misdemeanor to a felony (effective July 12, 2006) . The indictment charged that Appellant committed the offense of possession of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor on or about August 12, 2006 (five days before police executed the search warrant) . Therefore, the indictment as written presents no ex post facto issues . However, the jury instructions gave the date range for the offense as "between the 25th day of August, 2005 and the I I th day of August, 2006." As written, thejury instructions could have led the jury to convict Appellant of OL felony for conduct occurring prior to July 12, 2006 . On retrial, the jury instructions should be rewritten to parallel the language of the indictment ("on or about the 12th day of August, 2006") . C . Change in Parole Eligibility The General Assembly also amended KRS 439.340 1, effective July 12, 2006, to add use of a minor in a sexual performance to the list of violent offenses . Under KRS 439.3401(3), a violent offender muss : serve at least 8516 of his sentence before being eligible for parole (as opposed to 20% for other offenses) . Appellant argues this increase in the amount oftime that must. be served amounts to an ex post facto punishment . However, there is no right to parole, and a condition precedent to parole eligibility does not make a sentence more onerous. Garland, 997 S.W.2d at 490 . Unlike longer post-release conditional discharge, there is no increase in Appellant's total sentence . Therefore, the amendment to KRS 439.3401 does not create an impermissible ex post facto law. III . Parole Eligibility Testimony As previously discussed, in 2006, the General Assembly added use of a minor in a sexual to performance to the list of violent offenses, which requires that the offender serve 8596 of his sentence before being eligible for parole . However, during the penalty phase of the trial, the Commonwealth's probation and parole officer testified that Appellant would be eligible for parole after serving 20% of his sentence . The Commonwealth also argued this during its closing argument in the penalty phase. In fact, it appears from the record that all parties assumed Appellant would be eligible for parole after serving 20% of his sentence. Because a change in parole eligibility is not an ex post facto law, Appellant would have been required to serve 85% of his sentence for use of a minor in a sexual performance before being eligible for parole. The jury was not aware of this fact . when it sentenced Appellant . Incorrect information regarding parole eligibility during the sentencing phase of a trial is palpable error. Robinson v. Commonwealth., 181 S.W-3d 30, 37-38 (Ky. 2005) . This is true even if the prosecutor acted in good faith. Id.. at 38 (citing Brady v- Mij~and, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)) . On retrial, if Appellant is again convicted, the jury must be properly informed of Appellant's current parole eligibility during the sentencing phase.3 IV. Appellant's Statements About His Thoughts of Sex Finally, Appellant argues that the circuit. court erred by failing to exclude his statements regarding his thoughts about sex. After police found Appellant in K.P.'s home and arrested him, Detective John Blumenschein questioned him. Most of Appellant's statements to Detective Blumenschein related to the incident with K.P. Detective Blumenschein also asked Appellant if he had ever had unlawful sexual contact with minors. Appellant responded that he had not. Detective Blumenschein then asked Appellant if he had had any problems with regard to sex. Appellant responded that he thought about sex more than he thought was normal. Appellant told Detective Blumenschein that he had shared this at a church retreat, and that the members of his church told him to pray about it. 3 We recognize that, because changes to parole eligibility do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, Appellant's parole eligibility could always change in the future . However, the key question is whether the testimony given during the penalty phase was incorrect of false. Robinson, 181 S.W.3d at 38 (citing NMue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)) . In this case, at the time of trial, the testimony about Appellant's parole eligibility was incorrect . 10 Detective Blumenschein testified about these statements at . trial. There was no testimony regarding the incident with K.P. This Court reviews trial court rulings admitting evidence for an abuse of discretion . Commonwealth v. :English , 993 S.W .2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) . The trial court. abuses its discretion when its action is arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or legally unsound . Id. Admissions by a party are not excluded as hearsay. KRE801A(b)(1.) . Furthermore, this Court cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting these statements as relevant and not unduly prejudicial. KRE 401, 402, 403. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, thejudgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is reversed. The case is hereby remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion. All sitting. Abramson, Noble, Schroder, and Venters, J.J., concur . Minton, C.J. ; and Cunningham, J., concur in result only. Scott, J ., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion. SCOTT, JUSTICE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART: Although I concur with the majority's opinion in regard to all other issues, I must respectfully dissent on the application of Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 2007) . 1 do so for the reason Shane, which reinstated the rule ofThomas v. Commonwealth, 864 S.W.2d 252 (Ky. 1993), manufactures error where none should logically exist .. I say this because the juror complained of in both Thomas and Shane - and by Appellant in this instance - did not, sft on the jury that tried this case. In each case, as well as here, the juror complained ofwas removed by a perenipt.ory strike . See RCr 9.40. Moreover, no allegation were made that there were any otherjurors that the defendants needed to save the peremptory challenge for. Thus, no harm was shown. Prior to Thomas and Shane, Kentucky had a long history of requiring defendants to make a showing of prejudice in order to maintain the claim of error related to jury selection on appeal . See e.g. Gilbert v. Commonwealth, 51 S.W. 590 (Ky. 1899) (random jury selection - a defendant must show that he was forced to accept a partial juror) ; Conley v. Commonwealth, 8 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1928) (an error is harmless when the defendant failed to show that he objected to jurors that decided the case) ; Webb v. Commonwealth, 3 S-W-2d 1080 (Ky. 1928) (even if decisions concerning "for cause" challenges are properly reviewed, the defendant must show that some prejudice resulted); McKinzie v. Commonwealth, 237 S.W . 386 (Ky. 1929) (when the defendant does not show that any of the challenged jurors was finally accepted, there is no error, even if the defendant exhausted all of his peremptory challenges); Ejgsb v. Commonwealth, 495 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Ky. 1973) ("There has been no showing that use of the eleven peremptories to dispose of the suspectjurors resulted in a subsequent inability to challenge additional unacceptable veniremen. Therefore, favorable consideration may not be given to appellants' assertions.") ; Marsch v. Commonwealth, 743 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Ky. 1987) ("Two jurors who were challenged for cause actually served upon the jury because appellant's peremptories had been exhausted and he could not excuse them .") . Because Shane requires no showing-of prejudice to a defendant, but rather presumes it without supporting logic, it should be reversed - reinstating a rule that requires an Appellant to at least identify the harm he or she suffered as a result of ajuror who played no part in the trial. Thus, I dissent and would reverse Shane. COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Thomas More Ransdell Assistant Public Advocate Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt Appeals Branch Manager Department of Public Advocacy 100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 301 Frankfort, KY 40601-1109 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE : Jack Conway Attorney General Heather Michelle Fryman Assistant Attorney General Office of Criminal Appeals Office of the Attorney General 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601