Case Title: Edwards v. Ford

Citation: 279 So. 2d 851

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1973-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
279 So. 2d 851 (1973)
Donald C. EDWARDS and Daisy I. Edwards, Petitioners,
v.
Edwin I. FORD et al., Respondents.
No. 42609.

Supreme Court of Florida.
June 6, 1973.
Rehearing Denied July 31, 1973.
Robert F. Nunez, St. Petersburg, for petitioners.
Malcolm V. McKay, of Trenam, Simmons, Kemker, Scharf & Barkin, Tampa, and Harold S. Wilson, Clearwater, for respondents.
McCAIN, Justice.
By petition for certiorari we review an opinion by the Second District Court of Appeal reported at 263 So. 2d 654 which is in conflict with Downing v. Vaine, Fla. App. 1969, 228 So. 2d 622, thereby vesting jurisdiction with us pursuant to Fla. Const., Article V, § 3(b)(3), F.S.A. Oral argument has been dispensed with.
The facts are relatively simple. Respondents are a firm of attorneys practicing law in Florida. Petitioners at one time were their clients. It was out of the attorney-client relationship that the instant lawsuit arose. On November 6, 1962, petitioners and one Baseline Manufacturing Corporation entered into an "Agreement for Purchase, LeaseBack and Repurchase" prepared for the parties by respondent Ford. In March, 1963, petitioners were advised by attorneys for Baseline that the agreement was probably usurious. At this point, petitioners allege, Wilson, another member of respondent firm, agreed to take whatever steps might be necessary to correct the injurious effect of the documents, free of charge. Certainly by October, 1963, petitioners knew and/or realized the usurious nature of their contracts. Next, Baseline brought suit against petitioners seeking to have the deed from Baseline to petitioners vacated, to have the deed declared a mortgage and to assess penalties for usury. Evantually, the ensuing litigation was terminated by a trial in which petitioners prevailed. *852 An appeal followed but it was dismissed after a compromise settlement in 1967. (The same usury dispute was raised as a result of two other contracts written by Ford between petitioners and two other parties. Lawsuits followed in both cases. In one the contract was ultimately determined, by the DCA-2, to be usurious.) Petitioners alleged that due to compromise agreements in all cases necessitated by the lawsuits, they sustained a loss in all three cases.
Subsequently, attorney Wilson, on behalf of respondent law firm, submitted to petitioners a bill for the legal services rendered in defending the usury suits. When petitioners failed to pay, respondents, on March 4, 1968, filed suit against petitioners for attorneys fees. On June 5, 1968, petitioners answered, asserting numerous affirmative defenses relating to respondents' negligence in preparing the original contracts, and a counterclaim alleging malpractice on the part of respondent firm.
By order dated November 6, 1969, the trial judge dismissed the counterclaim for malpractice, stating:
The DCA-2 affirmed per curiam without opinion, which in effect adopted the theory of the trial judge.
Therefore, we are concerned with whether the statute of limitations involving an action for malpractice against an attorney commences to run "at the time the services are rendered."
A more palatable solution to this vexatious issue comes to us through the very fine and analytical opinion written by Judge Wigginton of the First District Court of Appeal in Downing, supra, which reads in pertinent part, as follows:
Accordingly, the rationale of Downing is adopted by this Court and to the extent that the quoted portion of the trial judge's judgment is in conflict therewith, said conflicting language is hereby expunged from the record. See also State v. Pierce, Fla. 1967, 201 So. 2d 886.
However, it sufficiently and clearly appears from the record that petitioners had knowledge of the fact that a cause of action had accrued in their favor during 1963, with accompanying damages (even though perhaps minimal at that point). Suit could have then been filed, but petitioners chose to wait until 1968 at which time they filed their counterclaim for malpractice. Unfortunately, for petitioners, the statute of limitations had run.
Thus, the ultimate conclusion and judgment of the trial judge to dismiss the disputed counterclaim was correct.
*854 Petitioners' remaining points are without merit.
Certiorari is granted and the per curiam affirmance by the District Court of Appeal is affirmed for the foregoing reasons.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C.J., and ROBERTS, ERVIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.