Case Title: Com. v. Terry

Citation: 394 A.2d 466, 482 Pa. 564

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1978-11-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
482 Pa. 564 (1978) 394 A.2d 466 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Benjamin TERRY, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted October 16, 1978. Decided November 18, 1978. *565 Austin J. McGreal, Philadelphia, for appellant. Edward G. Rendell, Dist. Atty., Steven H. Goldblatt, Deputy Dist. Atty. for Law, Robert B. Lawler, Chief, Appeals Div., Clifford E. Haines, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for appellee. Before EAGEN, C.J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ. O'BRIEN, Justice. Appellant, Benjamin Terry, was convicted by a judge sitting with a jury of three counts of murder of the first degree and one count of arson for the January 11, 1971 firebombing of a house at 2927 N. Fairhill Street, Philadelphia, in which three people were killed. Post-verdict motions were denied and appellant was sentenced to three concurrent terms of life imprisonment for the murder convictions with a concurrent prison term of ten to twenty years on the arson conviction. A direct appeal was filed in this court in which appellant raised the following issues: We held that sufficient evidence existed to sustain the convictions and that admission into evidence of testimony concerning the fire next door was not prejudicial error. The case was then remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia for a specific finding of whether or not the remaining allegations of error had been considered by the *567 court en banc and preserved for appellate review.[1]Commonwealth v. Terry, 462 Pa. 595, 342 A.2d 92 (1975). On remand, the court below determined that all issues except appellant's Futch claim had been preserved and were cognizable on appeal. We must now determine the correctness of the court's ruling that the Futch claim was waived and further decide the merits of those issues which the court determined to be preserved. Appellant first alleges that his confession was inadmissible because of an unnecessary delay between arrest and arraignment, thus violating our decision in Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972). The court below found this claim to be waived. The facts are as follows. Appellant voluntarily went to police headquarters with members of his family on January 12, 1972, at 5:00 a.m. Following intermittent questioning and a polygraph examination, appellant admitted to throwing the firebomb which caused the fire and the three deaths. Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress his confession, alleging that the confession was involuntary and given without the required Miranda warnings. The suppression motion made no mention of unnecessary delay between arrest and arraignment. Both the suppression hearing and the trial in the instant case predated our decision in Commonwealth v. Futch, supra; however, as we stated in Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 464 Pa. 117, 126, 346 A.2d 48, 53 (1975), where the defendant challenged only the voluntariness of his confession in a pre-Futch motion to suppress: On the basis of Mitchell, we conclude that the court below was correct in holding that this claim has been waived. Appellant next argues that his confession should have been suppressed because of failure to give the required Miranda warnings, thereby rendering the confession involuntary. The facts are as follows. During the investigation into the fire at 2927 N. Fairhill Street, police interviewed various witnesses. Frank Mitchell told police that he had received a phone call from Donald Terry, appellant's brother, telling him to get the kids out of the house because he and his brother were going to "burn the [house] down." Based on this information, police began looking for Donald and Willie Terry (another of appellant's brothers). While searching for the pair, police encountered appellant, who voluntarily accompanied them to headquarters at 5:00 a.m., on January 12. While police were questioning appellant's brothers, other officers interviewed Gwendolyn Harris, a former girlfriend of appellant. She told police that on January 9, she had an argument with appellant at her house at 2927 N. Fairhill and had to call the police. When the police arrived, appellant went out the back door of the Harris house and into the house at 2925 N. Fairhill. Within ten minutes, 2925 N. Fairhill was in flames and two people were burned to death. Based on this information, police began questioning appellant at 6:30 a.m. Prior to questioning, appellant was given his Miranda warnings and told he was being questioned *569 about his involvement in the fire at 2925 N. Fairhill and his brothers' involvement in the fire at 2927 N. Fairhill. Appellant denied any knowledge of either fire. Appellant then agreed to take a polygraph examination, which was administered between 9:30 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. Appellant was then returned to the Homicide Unit. Between 2:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m., police questioned Donald and Willie Terry, who implicated appellant in the fire at 2927 N. Fairhill. Appellant was rewarned of his Miranda rights at 5:00 p.m., and shortly thereafter admitted setting both fires. After being rewarned again at 8:30 p. m., he gave a formal statement which was concluded at 11:20 p.m. Appellant argues that he was never given Miranda warnings as to the fire at 2927 N. Fairhill. However, appellant simply ignores the facts in the instant case. When police first questioned appellant, he was given the required Miranda warnings and was told he was being questioned about his possible involvement in the fire at 2925 N. Fairhill and the involvement of his brothers in the fire at 2927 N. Fairhill. Subsequently, when police learned of appellant's possible involvement in both fires, he was again given his Miranda warnings and was told that he was being questioned about possible involvement in both fires. Appellant's contention is thus without merit. He next claims that a new trial is required because of alleged improper remarks by the district attorney during his closing argument. The district attorney, talking about appellant, stated: The court immediately told the prosecutor to confine his remarks to the evidence in the case. Following the prosecutor's closing, which was recorded, appellant's counsel moved for a mistrial. The motion was refused, but during his charge to the jury, the court stated: As we stated in Commonwealth v. Goosby, 450 Pa. 609, 611, 301 A.2d 673, 674 (1973): In light of the curative instruction, we do not believe counsel's remarks were so prejudicial as to require the granting of a mistrial. Appellant finally argues that the court erred in admitting six police photographs which pictured the inside and outside at 2927 N. Fairhill. We disagree. In Commonwealth v. Petrakovich, 459 Pa. 511, 521, 329 A.2d 844, 849 (1974), we stated: *572 In the instant case, there were no human bodies in the photographs. Rather, they simply showed burned floors, walls, steps, and ceilings. One of appellant's theories was that the fire was not of an incendiary origin. Captain Charles Lewis, Assistant Fire Marshall, testified, however, that the fire had been set. He used the photos to show burn patterns which buttressed his conclusion. As the photographs were not inflammatory and yet were highly relevant, we find no error in their admission. Judgments of sentence affirmed. ROBERTS, J., files a dissenting opinion which MANDERINO, J., joins. ROBERTS, Justice, dissenting. For the reasons set forth in Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 464 Pa. 117, 346 A.2d 48 (1975) (Roberts, J., dissenting opinion joined by Manderino, J.), I dissent from the majority's failure to address the merits. MANDERINO, J., joins in this dissenting opinion. [1] Between the time post-verdict motions were denied and the case was considered by this court, our decision in Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 331 A.2d 213 (1975) was filed.