Case Title: Bush v. Duff

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Bush v. Duff1988 WY 60754 P.2d 159Case Number: 86-319Decided: 04/20/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
ROBERT L. BUSH, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

MARTIN L. DUFF AND MAXINE 
E. DUFF, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS AND THIRD-PARTY 
PLAINTIFFS),

v.

FRANCIS H. McVAY AND 
KAREN A. McVAY, (THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District Court,PlatteCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

Fred W. Phifer, 
Wheatland, for 
appellant.

Frank J. Jones, 
Jones & Weaver, P.C., Wheatland, for 
appellees.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The primary issue 
presented by this case is whether a way of necessity, created over lands subject 
to a mortgage by the conveyance of unmortgaged, landlocked adjacent lands by the 
mortgagor, survives the foreclosure of the mortgage on the servient estate. A 
corollary issue relates to the authority of the district court to award an 
easement in lieu of the way of necessity conditioned upon compensation for the 
lands committed to the easement. A third issue, collateral to the case involving 
the way of necessity, relates to a redemption from an execution sale of lands 
previously acquired by the judgment creditor and executed upon by mistake, or, 
alternatively, the right to recover the money paid to redeem the land. The 
district court ruled that the way of necessity did not survive the foreclosure 
of the mortgage on the servient estate; ordered the establishment of an easement 
upon payment of compensation; and denied a motion by the redemptioner to amend 
his pleading to assert a claim for monies paid for the land improperly subjected 
to execution. We hold that the district court correctly ruled that the way of 
necessity did not survive the foreclosure of the mortgage on the servient 
estate; the district court lacked authority to impose the easement which it 
ordered; and the district court did abuse its discretion in refusing to permit 
the amendment of the redemptioner's pleadings to claim the amount paid to redeem 
lands not lawfully subject to execution. We affirm in part; reverse in part; and 
remand this case for further proceedings.

[¶2.]     The appellant, Robert 
L. Bush (Bush), sets forth these issues in his brief:

"1. Was the Appellant 
entitled to a way of necessity across the property of Appellees without having 
to purchase an easement as granted by the Court?

"2. Did the Court err in 
quieting title in Appellees to that portion of the SW 1/4 S.E. 1/4 of Section 
20, Township 30 North, Range 68 West of the 6th P.M., except the westerly 250 
feet thereof, lying easterly of and adjacent to the re-located U.S. Highway 
26/87, Platte County, Wyoming?

"3. If the Court did not 
err in quieting title to the foregoing property in Appellees, did the Court err 
in not allowing Appellant to amend his Complaint in order to recover the money 
paid to Appellees for said property on redemption?"

The appellees, 
Martin L. Duff and Maxine E. Duff (Duffs), restate the issues and articulate 
them as follows:

"1. Is Appellant entitled 
to a way of necessity across the property of Appellees?

"2. Was the entry of 
summary judgment quieting title in favor of Appellees 
proper?

"3. Did the court err in 
denying Appellant's motion to amend his complaint?"

[¶3.]     On April 23, 1979, the 
Duffs, as sellers, entered into an Agreement for Warranty Deed with Francis H. 
McVay and Karen A. McVay (McVays), as purchasers, pursuant to which the Duffs 
agreed to sell to the McVays approximately 700 acres of agricultural land in 
PlatteCounty. The transaction was 
consummated the same day, and the Duffs conveyed the property to the McVays by 
warranty deed. Simultaneously, the McVays executed and delivered to the Duffs a 
purchase money mortgage to secure a promissory note given by the McVays to the 
Duffs, which represented a substantial part of the purchase price. Three parcels 
of the property which was sold were not included in the mortgage, and the McVays 
held clear title to that part of the property. This arrangement satisfied the 
intent of the McVays and Duffs that the $85,000 cash down payment would provide 
the McVays with clear title to land having a value of approximately that amount. 
There also was a clause in the Agreement for warranty Deed which provided that 
the Duffs would execute partial mortgage releases as payments were received, 
subject to certain conditions. 

[¶4.]     All the land is located 
in Township 30 North, Range 68 West of the 6th P.M., in PlatteCounty. Included in the sale was the SE 
1/4 S.E. 1/4, and that part of the SW 1/4 S.E. 1/4, except the westerly 250 feet 
thereof lying easterly of and adjacent to U.S. Highway 26 and 87 (now designated 
as State Highway 319), in Section 20; the E 1/2, SW 1/4 of Section 21; and the W 
1/2 W 1/2 of Section 22. The transaction also encompassed lands in Section 28, 
which are not involved in this case. Of the lands conveyed, that part of the SW 
1/4 S.E. 1/4 lying east of and adjacent to U.S. Highway 26/87, except the 
westerly 250 feet thereof, in Section 20; the NE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 21; and 
the W 1/2 W 1/2 of Section 22 were excluded from the 
mortgage.

[¶5.]     Several months after 
the conveyance by warranty deed and the delivery of the mortgage, the McVays 
conveyed their unencumbered interest in the NE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 21 by 
warranty deed to Robert Bush, who is Karen McVay's father. Then, a little more 
than a year after acquiring the lands, the McVays executed a mortgage in favor 
of the First Wyoming Bank of Wheatland (Bank) to secure an additional loan. That 
mortgage included the remaining lands purchased from the Duffs to which the 
McVays had a clear title. The lands which are involved in this proceeding are 
shown by the following diagram which depicts the location of the property owned, 
or the ownership which was disputed, by the parties at the inception of this 
litigation.

Bush had no 
access to a public road from his lands, but he did travel across the lands owned 
by the McVays in Section 21 and Section 20 to State Highway 
319.

[¶6.]     The McVays failed to 
make payments when due on their obligations to both the Duffs and the Bank. 
Foreclosure proceedings were commenced on both mortgages in 1981. After 
obtaining a judgment of foreclosure against the McVays, the Bank purchased the 
property subject to its mortgage at the sheriff's sale. After the redemption 
period, the Bank deeded this property to the Duffs on May 29, 1982. That 
warranty deed covered that portion of the SW 1/4 S.E. 1/4 of Section 20 
reflected as the "disputed parcel" on the foregoing diagram. 

[¶7.]     The Duffs also obtained 
a judgment of foreclosure against the McVays. At the sheriff's sale which 
followed the foreclosure of the Duffs' mortgage, they purchased the property. 
That foreclosure and the subsequent purchase at the sheriff's sale did not 
include the east thirty acres of the NW 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 21, and title to 
that parcel remained in the McVays. Since the foreclosure sale did not satisfy 
the amount of the promissory note given to the Duffs, they then obtained a 
deficiency judgment against the McVays. In 1983, they executed upon that 
judgment, and the return on the writ of execution showed that the sheriff had 
levied execution on the east thirty acres of the NW 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 21 and 
that part of the SW 1/4 S.E. 1/4 lying easterly of and adjacent to U.S. Highway 
26/87, except the westerly 250 feet thereof in Section 20. The return reflected 
that the Duffs were executing against property which they already owned by 
virtue of the purchase from the Bank in 1982. The execution proceeded, and the 
Duffs purchased both of these parcels at the sheriff's execution sale. The 
McVays then assigned, for value, their rights of redemption in both parcels to 
Bush who subsequently redeemed them, receiving a certificate of redemption from 
the Duffs.

[¶8.]     Bush's land in Section 
21 still remained landlocked. It was necessary that he be able to traverse the 
Duffs' property in Section 21 to reach Wyoming State Highway 319. The Duffs, 
however, notified Bush that he no longer could cross their land to reach that 
highway. The land owned by Bush in Section 21 is bordered on the north and on 
the west by federal and state lands. Although he would not be required to do so 
in order to establish an easement by way of necessity, the record does reflect 
that both Bush and the McVays explored, without success, the possibility of 
gaining an easement over the lands owned by the federal and state 
governments.

[¶9.]     In an effort to resolve 
his need for access, Bush filed an action in the district court, seeking in his 
complaint an easement by way of necessity across the Duffs' land to his property 
in Section 21. In addition, Bush sought to recover damages for trespass in 
relation to the parcel in Section 20, alleging that the Duffs had been farming 
that land. In their answer, the Duffs denied that Bush was entitled to a way of 
necessity across their property in Section 21, and, by a counterclaim, they 
requested the court to quiet title in them to the parcel in Section 20.1

[¶10.]  The district court granted a partial 
summary judgment to the Duffs which quieted their title to the disputed parcel 
of land in Section 20. After that, Bush filed a motion to amend his complaint to 
seek recovery of the money he had paid the Duffs to redeem that parcel from the 
execution. This motion was denied. After trial on Bush's remaining claims, the 
district court entered an order granting Bush the easement which he had 
requested, running from his land southerly along the section line between 
Sections 21 and 22 to the southeast corner of Section 21 and thence westerly 
along the section line to State Highway 319, but requiring Bush to compensate 
the Duffs in the amount of $1,083.84 for this easement. Bush then took this 
appeal from the judgment and orders.

[¶11.]  In support of his initial claim of error, 
Bush argues that he was entitled to a way of necessity across the Duffs' land 
without having to purchase an easement. The district court denied the way of 
necessity but granted, in effect, a private road to Bush. We are satisfied that, 
under the law, Bush was not entitled to a way of necessity, and we affirm the 
district court's holding on that question. We conclude, however, that the 
legislature has assigned the function of establishing private roads to the 
executive department of government, and the only jurisdiction enjoyed by the 
judicial department is the review of the decisions of the respective boards of 
county commissioners. Consequently, we must reverse that aspect of the district 
court's order which granted a private road.

[¶12.]  In 3 R. Powell, The Law of Real Property 
Ch. 34, ¶ 410 at 61-66 (1985), the author explains a common-law way of necessity 
or, as it is sometimes called, an easement by necessity:

"A transfer of an 
interest in land sometimes gives rise to circumstances which justify the 
implication that an easement must necessarily have been granted or reserved by 
the grantor. * * * When an owner of land conveys to another an inner portion 
thereof, which is entirely surrounded by lands owned by the conveyor, or by the 
conveyor plus strangers, a right of access across the retained land of the 
conveyor is normally found. * * * Thus, unless a contrary intent is inescapably 
manifested, the conveyee is found to have a right-of-way across the retained 
land of the conveyor for ingress to, and egress from, the landlocked 
parcel."

Such a 
common-law way of necessity does not constitute a taking subject to constitutional 
restraints found in Art. 1, §§ 32 and 33 of the Constitution of the State of 
Wyoming2 because the common law presumes 
that the grant of ingress and egress from land conveyed by the owner of the 
servient estate was intended by the parties. Snell v. Ruppert, Wyo., 541 P.2d 1042 (1975); 3 R. Powell, The 
Law of Real Property, supra, Ch. 34, ¶ 410 at 61-68. The rule of the common law 
is that a way of necessity goes with the land constituting the dominant estate, 
and no payment of additional compensation is contemplated.

[¶13.]  The common-law way of necessity has been 
recognized in Wyoming jurisprudence for a number of years. 
McIlquham v. Anthony Wilkinson Live Stock Company, 18 Wyo. 53, 104 P. 20 
(1909). Sections 24-9-101 through 24-9-103, W.S. 1977, afford the owner of a 
landlocked tract complete relief in a particular style of eminent domain 
proceeding, but the common-law way of necessity also is available to the owner 
of a landlocked tract, if it is appropriate. Snell v. Ruppert, supra. This 
proposition was explained in McGuire v. McGuire, Wyo., 
608 P.2d 1278, 1288 (1980), in which we said with reference to the statutory 
proceeding:

"* * * In McIlquham v. 
Anthony Wilkinson Live Stock Co., 1909, 18 Wyo. 53, 104 P. 20, this court 
implicitly found that the statute was an alternative remedy and it was not 
intended to supplant the common-law right of a grantee to a means of access to 
his land over the lands of his grantor."

See also Walton 
v. Dana, Wyo., 609 P.2d 461 (1980).3

[¶14.]  The availability of a common-law way of 
necessity to the owner of a landlocked tract in Wyoming does not solve the problem in this 
case. We find no prior Wyoming authority which involved the granting 
of a mortgage; followed by the establishment of a way of necessity over a 
servient estate consisting of lands previously mortgaged; and followed by the 
foreclosure of the mortgage. The Duffs position is that the foreclosure of the 
mortgage extinguished the way of necessity in this instance. We conclude that 
the Duffs' position is correct; the foreclosure prevented the establishment of a 
way of necessity in this instance.

[¶15.]  The general rule is that easements 
created subsequent to the execution of a mortgage are eradicated by foreclosure 
of the mortgage. Kling v. Ghilarducci, 3 Ill. 2d 454, 121 N.Ed.2d 752, 46 
A.L.R.2d 1189 (1954); Camp Clearwater, Inc. v. Plock, 52 N.J. Super. 583, 146 A.2d 527 (1958), 
aff'd 59 N.J. Super. 1, 157 A.2d 15 (1959); Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company 
v. Nelson, 170 Or. 248, 132 P.2d 979 (1943). See also 3 R. Powell, The Law of 
Real Property, supra, Ch. 34, ¶ 426; Annotation, Foreclosure of Mortgage or 
Trust Deed as Affecting Easement Claimed in, over, or under Property, 46 
A.L.R.2d 1197 (1956); 47 Cornell Law Quarterly 293 (1962); 25 Am.Jur.2d 
Easements and Licenses § 112 (1966). A mortgagor is not permitted to create an 
easement in mortgaged land paramount to the rights of the mortgagee. Kling v. 
Ghilarducci, supra; 9 G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real 
Property § 4777 (1958 Repl.). In this case, the mortgage to the Duffs antedated 
the conveyance to Bush, and the easement of necessity did not arise until the 
severance of the dominant estate from the servient estate by virtue of that 
conveyance because the law does not recognize an easement in one's own property. 
Kling v. Ghilarducci, supra; 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses, supra, § 34. 
The product of these concepts is that to protect the interest of the mortgagee, 
upon foreclosure of a mortgage and after the redemption period, title to the 
mortgaged property vests in the purchaser at the foreclosure sale and relates 
back to the date of the mortgage, extinguishing intervening rights and claims. 
Kling v. Ghilarducci, supra; 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 520 at 850 
(1949).

[¶16.]  The application of this rule to 
extinguish the after-acquired easement does require, however, that the holder of 
the easement be joined as a party to the foreclosure if the mortgagee has actual 
or constructive knowledge of the easement. Camp Clearwater, Inc. v. Plock, supra. The rule is 
expressed in this way by the Illinois Supreme Court:

"On foreclosure by suit 
in equity, the mortgagee should search for intervening transfers or liens and 
should join the record owners as 
parties defendant, praying foreclosure against them. But when this is done, 
subsequent grantees and junior encumbrancers are cut off as effectively as one 
would desire, for the purchaser at the foreclosure sale acquires the title as it 
stood at the date of the mortgage." (Emphasis added.) Kling v. Ghilarducci, 
supra, 121 N.Ed.2d at 757.

[¶17.]  Bush was not joined in the foreclosure 
action by the Duffs. His easement, the common-law way of necessity, was an 
interest created by implication, however, and was not a matter of record so as 
to furnish constructive knowledge to the Duffs. Nor does the record disclose 
that the Duffs had actual knowledge of Bush's easement at the time of the 
foreclosure action. In these circumstances, the foreclosure does have the effect 
of extinguishing the easement. The Supreme Court of Oregon, in a case involving 
similar facts, said:

"* * * If [grantee] 
became entitled to a way of necessity over the mortgaged premises when the 
defendants conveyed to her the west parcel, such easement was cut off by the 
decree in the foreclosure proceedings. She was not made a party defendant but 
that was not necessary since the plaintiff had no notice, either actual or 
constructive, of any claim of easement on her part. 42 C.J., Mortgages, 167 § 
1777." Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Nelson, supra, 132 P.2d  at 
981.

We conclude that 
the common-law way of necessity did not exist in favor of Bush over the Duffs' 
lands. The sequence of mortgage, conveyance of the landlocked parcel and 
foreclosure resulted in the foreclosure of his common-law way of 
necessity.

[¶18.]  Having recognized the efficacy of the 
foregoing principles, the district court attempted to solve the problem by 
creating an easement in favor of Bush but requiring him to pay compensation. The 
court, in effect, invoked the statutory procedure for the establishment of 
private roads. Sections 24-9-101 through 24-9-103, W.S. 1977. The statute, 
however, grants the power and authority to establish a private road to the 
county commissioners in the respective counties.4 Those proceedings are 
administrative in nature and a function of the executive department of 
government. McGuire v. McGuire, supra. The court usurped the function of the 
executive department of government, the county commissioners, in contravention 
of the separation of powers mandated by Art. 2, § 1 of the Constitution of the 
State of Wyoming. The district court did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction to create the easement under these circumstances. We 
must reverse the Order Granting Easement.

[¶19.]  We turn then to the summary judgment by 
which the trial court quieted title in the Duffs to "that part of the SW 1/4 
S.E. 1/4, lying east of and adjacent to U.S. Highway 26/87, except the westerly 250 
feet thereof" in Section 20. Bush urges that the district court should not have 
quieted title to this disputed parcel in the Duffs. If the judgment is 
sustained, however, Bush contends that he was entitled to have his motion to 
amend his complaint granted to seek recovery of the money he paid to redeem that 
land from the execution sale.

[¶20.]  The summary judgment was appropriate in 
this instance according to our rules by which we review a summary judgment. The 
Duffs have assumed their burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue 
of material fact; the undisputed facts are clear. The material facts are those 
which, if proved, operate to establish or refute an essential element of a cause 
of action or intent asserted by the parties. Samuel Mares Post No. 8, American 
Legion, Department of Wyoming v. Board of County Commissioners of Converse 
County, Wyo., 697 P.2d 1040 (1985); Schepps v. Howe, Wyo., 665 P.2d 504 (1983); 
Johnson v. Soulis, Wyo., 542 P.2d 867 (1975). We have reviewed the entire record 
in the light most favorable to Bush and have given him all favorable inferences 
which may be drawn from the facts. White v. L.L. Smith Trucking, Wyo., 742 P.2d 1286 
(1987); Schepps v. Howe, supra. Samuel Mares Post No. 8, American Legion, 
Department of Wyoming v. Board of County Commissioners of Converse County, 
supra. In this instance, there exists no genuine issue of material fact, and the 
Duffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P.; 
Bettencourt v. Pride Well Service, Inc., Wyo., 735 P.2d 722 
(1987).

[¶21.]  With respect to the title to the parcel 
in Section 20, this record does not disclose a factual dispute. The Bank had a 
mortgage, and this tract was included in the mortgage which the Bank foreclosed. 
The Duffs received a valid warranty deed to this tract from the Bank after the 
Bank had purchased at the foreclosure sale. The warranty deed from the Bank to 
the Duffs is a matter of record in the office of the county clerk. It is equally 
clear that the Duffs levied execution on this parcel of land in endeavoring to 
satisfy their deficiency judgment against the McVays. The record also discloses 
that the parcel was offered at the execution sale; the Duffs purchased it; and 
Bush, after receiving an assignment of the right of redemption from the McVays, 
redeemed the parcel of land from the execution sale. At that time, Bush received 
a certificate of redemption from the Duffs which had been prepared by the Duffs' 
attorney. Since there is no dispute about any issue of material fact, the 
question with respect to the validity of the summary judgment becomes one of 
law. Given these facts, the Duffs were entitled to have title quieted in them 
under the law, and we are in accord with the trial court.

[¶22.]  Execution may be pursued in three ways in 
Wyoming. 
Section 1-17-101, W.S. 1977. In this instance, the Duffs proceeded, as described 
in § 1-17-101(b)(i), W.S. 1977, "[a]gainst the property of the judgment debtor, 
including orders of sale." (Emphasis added.) The statute does not authorize 
execution against a property in which the judgment debtor has no interest. If 
the circumstances disclose that the judgment debtor is not the owner of the 
property sold, the sale upon execution is void, and the purchaser acquires no 
title as a result of the sale. 30 Am.Jur.2d Executions § 103 (1967). The rule as 
stated in 5B G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property § 2756 
at 466 (1978 Repl.) is that: "The purchaser at an execution sale acquires such 
title as the judgment defendant had, and no more."

[¶23.]  The hypothesis described in the above 
rule is the fact in this case. The peculiar facts disclose that the Duffs had a 
prior valid title to the disputed tract which, like the title of any other 
stranger, would not be affected by the void execution sale. The sheriff levied 
upon and sold property which the McVays did not own. The execution sale was 
void, and the Duffs acquired no title as a result of that 
sale.

[¶24.]  The statutory right of redemption in 
Wyoming as 
found in § 1-18-103, W.S. 1977, does not adjust the foregoing conclusion. The 
general provisions found in § 1-18-103(a), as modified with respect to 
agricultural land in subparagraphs (b) and (c),5 provide in pertinent 
part:

"* * * [I]t is lawful for 
any person, his heirs, executors, administrators, assigns or guarantors whose real property has been sold by 
virtue of an execution * * * to redeem the real estate by paying to the 
purchaser * * * the amount of the purchase price or the amount given or bid if 
purchased by the execution creditor * * *." (Emphasis 
added.)

It is clear that 
the McVays had no interest in this parcel of land, and the statutory language 
would not afford to them, or to Bush as their assignee, any right of redemption. 
Even if this were not true, Bush could succeed only to the interest of the Duffs 
obtained at the execution sale. 5B Powell, The Law of Real Property, supra, § 
2756 at 471. The Duffs, as already noted, acquired no interest as purchasers at 
the execution sale, and, consequently, Bush acquired no interest by exercising a 
nonexistent right of redemption.

[¶25.]  The net effect of this mistake in levying 
execution on the disputed parcel, in this case, is a nullity. The Duffs acquired 
nothing, and Bush redeemed nothing. The Duffs had title to this parcel by virtue 
of the prior recorded warranty deed from the Bank. Their ownership interest was 
not affected by the execution proceeding, and we hold that, as a matter of law, 
the entry of partial summary judgment by the district court which quieted title 
in this disputed parcel in Section 20 in the Duffs was 
correct.

[¶26.]  Bush contends, however, that, if the 
district court correctly quieted title to the parcel in Section 20 in the Duffs, 
then the court should have permitted Bush to amend his complaint to seek a 
refund of a proportionate amount of the redemption payment. We agree with Bush's 
contention. Rule 15(a), W.R.C.P., provides, in pertinent part, that, after a 
responsive pleading has been served, a party may amend his pleading only by 
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party. The rule goes on to 
provide that leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires. The 
allowance or disallowance of an amended complaint is within the sound discretion 
of the district court and can be reversed on appeal only when an abuse of 
discretion is perceived. Robertson v. TWP, Inc., Wyo., 656 P.2d 547 (1983); 
Johnson v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company of Hartford, Connecticut, Wyo., 608 P.2d 1299 (1980), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1118, 102 S. Ct. 961, 71 L. Ed. 2d 105 
(1981), reh. denied 455 U.S. 1039, 102 S. Ct. 1743, 72 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1982). It is an abuse of discretion to refuse to permit the amendment of a 
complaint which should be allowed in the furtherance of justice. Cases cited in 
71 C.J.S. Pleading § 281 (1951).

[¶27.]  In levying execution on behalf of the 
Duffs to satisfy their deficiency judgment against the McVays, the sheriff sold 
two parcels of land, the parcel in Section 20 and the east thirty acres of the 
NW 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 21. Bush paid $4,603.13 to the Duffs to redeem both 
parcels, as shown by the certificate of redemption which the Duffs' counsel 
prepared. As we have noted, Bush did not obtain any right to the parcel in 
Section 20, but the record does not disclose how the values were apportioned 
between the two parcels of land. We do know that Bush paid something to redeem 
the land as to which he had no right of redemption and to which the court 
subsequently quieted title in the Duffs. Under the circumstances, to refuse to 
permit the complaint to be amended so that Bush could claim the amount paid for 
the parcel which he did not receive constitutes an abuse of discretion. Bush is 
entitled to recover that portion of his payment properly allocated to the parcel 
in Section 20. "The purchaser at an execution sale may not have the redemption 
of property set aside in equity on the ground of fraud while still retaining the 
redemption money." 30 Am.Jur.2d Execution § 548 at 757 (1967), and cases cited 
therein. In this instance, the redemption was set aside on the ground of a 
mistaken execution rather than fraud, but the rule should apply with equal or 
greater force. We hold that Bush's motion to amend his complaint should have 
been granted in the furtherance of justice, and its denial was an abuse of 
discretion. The Order which denied Bush's motion to amend his complaint must be 
reversed.

[¶28.]  To summarize, we reverse the Order of the 
district court which granted Bush an easement, leaving to Bush the opportunity 
to pursue his remedy before the county commissioners. We affirm the summary 
judgment quieting title in the parcel of land in Section 20 in the Duffs. We 
reverse the Order of the district court denying Bush's motion to amend his 
complaint, and we remand the case for a determination by appropriate proceedings 
of the proportionate amount paid to redeem the parcel of land in Section 20 and 
the entry of judgment in favor of Bush in that amount.

[¶29.]  Affirmed in part, reversed in part and 
remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 The Duffs filed a 
third-party complaint against the McVays seeking reformation of the instruments 
in the transaction between the Duffs and the McVays and alleging that the 
mortgage given by the Duffs to the McVays was intended to encompass the disputed 
parcel in Section 20. That third-party action was not resolved, apparently 
because it was precluded by the McVays' filing of a petition under Chapter 7 of 
the Federal Bankruptcy Code.

2 The Constitution of the 
State of Wyoming, Art. 1 § 32, 
provides:

"Private property shall 
not be taken for private use unless by consent of the owner, except for private 
ways of necessity, and for reservoirs, drains, flumes or ditches on or across 
the lands of others for agricultural, mining, milling, domestic or sanitary 
purposes, nor in any case without due compensation."

The Constitution 
of the State of Wyoming, Art. 1 § 33, 
provides:

"Private property shall 
not be taken or damaged for public or private use without just 
compensation."

3 We cannot explain the 
comment of the Supreme Court of the United States, with respect to Snell v. 
Ruppert, Wyo., 541 P.2d 1042 (1975), in Leo Sheep Company v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 680, 99 S. Ct. 1403, 1410, 59 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1979), to the 
effect:

"* * * [T]he State of 
Wyoming no 
longer recognizes the common-law easement by necessity in cases involving 
landlocked estates."

This is an 
incorrect interpretation of Snell v. Ruppert, supra, and certainly does not 
comport with the later decisions of McGuire v. McGuire, Wyo., 608 P.2d 1278 
(1980), and Walton v. Dana, Wyo., 609 P.2d 461 (1980).

4 Section 24-9-101 
provides, in pertinent part:

"Any person whose land 
has no outlet to, nor connection with a public road, may apply in writing to the 
board of county commissioners of his county for a private road * * 
*."

Section 24-9-103 
then provides, in pertinent part:

"The viewers and 
appraisers so appointed * * * shall make a report to the county commissioners * 
* * and if the commissioners are satisfied that such report is just, and after 
payment by the applicant of all costs of locating such road, and the damages 
assessed by the viewers, the commissioners shall order such report to be 
confirmed and declare such road to be a private road, and the same shall be 
recorded as such."

5 The amendment to § 
1-18-103(b), W.S. 1977 (1986 Cum.Supp.), which extended the period of redemption 
for agricultural real estate from nine months to twelve months has no impact on 
any issue in this case.