Case Title: State v. Werber

Citation: 221 N.W.2d 146

Docket Number: 

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1974-08-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
221 N.W.2d 146 (1974) STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Fred WERBER, Appellant. No. 43922. Supreme Court of Minnesota. August 9, 1974. *147 Henry H. Feikema, Minneapolis, Paul J. Luedtke, Northfield, for appellant. Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Curtis D. Forslund, Sol. Gen., Robert F. Carolan, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, James R. Korman, County Atty., Faribault, for respondent. Heard before KNUTSON, C. J., and OTIS, ROGOSHESKE, and MacLAUGHLIN, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc. OTIS, Justice. This is an appeal from an order denying defendant's motion for a new trial and a conviction for selling hashish, a derivative of marijuana which is a controlled substance, in violation of Minn.St. 152.09, subd. 1(1); 152.02, subd. 2(3); and 152.15, subd. 1(2). Defendant admitted the sale but interposed the defense of entrapment. The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to require the state to disclose the identity of an informant who introduced defendant to narcotics agents of the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension. We hold that the record does not compel a finding that disclosure of the informant's identity would be sufficiently relevant and helpful to the defense or essential to a fair determination of the issues to make the disclosure mandatory. Accordingly, we affirm. In December 1971, while returning to college from his Christmas vacation, one Roy Settgas fell into a conversation with the informant while they were riding on a bus. The informant did not at any time disclose his identity to Settgas but claimed to be a graduate of the same college and was interested in buying drugs. He also professed a desire to meet people on campus who might buy drugs from him. The previous year Settgas had lived on the same dormitory floor with defendant, Fred Werber, and believed that defendant might be interested in buying marijuana which the informant said he had for sale. On January 4, 1972, the informant came to the dormitory room where Settgas resided and told Settgas he had 22 pounds of marijuana for sale and was himself interested in buying chemicals. The informant wanted to be introduced to anyone who would like to sell chemicals or buy marijuana. To that end, Settgas took the informant to defendant's room and introduced him to defendant although he was unaware of the informant's identity. Neither Settgas nor anyone else testified that defendant was known as a seller of drugs. Defendant took the stand in his own defense. He testified that on January 4 Settgas introduced him to the informant, who claimed to be a Vietnam veteran and a graduate of the same college, with a master's degree from Berkeley. The informant further represented himself as a dealer who had friends who wanted hashish and chemicals. The defense of entrapment was based on testimony of defendant in which he claimed, "He [the informant] kind of made me feel it was kind of contingent on the purchase of some marijuana that we sell him some hash and chemicals or find somebody that could." The informant was with defendant from about 8:30 to 11:30 on the evening of January 4, at which time defendant brought together friends who might be interested in purchasing marijuana, which the informant represented as being better than what defendant's friends were smoking and available at a good price. They agreed to meet again in defendant's dormitory at 7 in the evening of January 6. The informant arrived in defendant's room about 8:30 in the evening of January 6 and with defendant and several of his friends proceeded to smoke defendant's hashish and marijuana furnished by the informant. In half or three-quarters of an hour, the informant left the room. Shortly thereafter defendant went out in the hall and found four or five people talking, including the informant and two strangers. *148 At the trial, the strangers were identified as undercover narcotics agents John Gundersen and Pat Shannon. Defendant testified that the informant identified Shannon as his supplier of marijuana. The group then drifted back into defendant's room. Defendant's version of what thereafter transpired is as follows: Gundersen testified that he and Shannon were introduced to defendant by the informant. Gundersen stated that immediately after he and defendant went into defendant's room, and without solicitation, defendant stated he had some hashish for sale. Some 45 minutes later, Gundersen himself brought up the subject, whereupon defendant showed Gundersen a tinfoil packet containing some 8 grams of hashish for which defendant asked a selling price of $50. After some negotiations, defendant was paid $45 for the hashish. Both defendant and Gundersen agree that the informant was not in the room during any of the time when defendant's hashish was discussed or displayed, or when the negotiations concerning the sale and purchase of hashish occurred, or when money changed hands to consummate the transaction. Gundersen denied that the sale of the hashish by defendant was in any way conditioned upon Gundersen's furnishing defendant with a supply of marijuana. From the inception of these proceedings, defendant has continued to seek from the trial court an order directing the state to disclose the identity of the informant. Defendant has insisted that the informant's testimony was essential to an adequate presentation of the defense of entrapment. All of these motions were denied by the trial court on the grounds of privilege. However, the defense of entrapment was submitted to the jury with instructions to which defendant takes no exception. That defense was vigorously argued to the jury on behalf of defendant. Nevertheless, the jury found defendant guilty as charged. Upon appeal, defendant argues that the refusal of the state to identify the informant required defendant to take the stand in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Defendant insists that the informant is the only link between Settgas and Gundersen, that Settgas may have misrepresented defendant to the informant as being a seller, and that the informant's role in introducting defendant to Gundersen and Shannon was participation in the offense which constitutes the informant a material witness. Defendant further argues that the informant initiated an entrapment and his testimony might show either defendant's reluctance or predisposition to commit the offense. In essence, it is defendant's position that he has a right to interview the informant for the purpose of corroborating defendant's contention that the sale of hashish was provoked only as an inducement to secure marijuana from Gundersen and Shannon. He asserts a right to bring the informant before the jury to reveal the informant's character, his record, and his credibility. We are of the opinion and hold that on this record the assistance which defendant claims the informant would give in establishing the defense of entrapment is speculative and that the informant's role was not such as to make him a material witness. It is clear that the informant determined from Settgas which students on the college campus might be selling narcotics. There is no dispute but that the informant met defendant through Settgas and subsequently brought together defendant and the two undercover narcotics agents. However, the informant was not present and took no part in the discussions between defendant and Gundersen which resulted in the sale. He was, therefore, not in a position to corroborate or deny defendant's *150 contention that Gundersen offered inducements which constituted an entrapment. No case has been brought to our attention which requires the disclosure of an informant's identity where his only participation has been to bring together the defendant and the undercover agents. In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59, 77 S. Ct. 623, 627, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639, 644 (1957), the United States Supreme Court held: This court has had occasion to construe the Roviaro rule in State v. Purdy, 278 Minn. 133, 143, 153 N.W.2d 254, 261 (1967); and State v. DeSchoatz, 280 Minn. 3, 10, 157 N.W.2d 517, 522 (1968). In the Purdy case, we held "that when a trustworthy informant is a mere transmitter of information and not a competent witness to the crime itself, and the name of the informant is not essential to the defense, the informant's name need not be disclosed when the information was used as a basis for probable cause to search or arrest." 278 Minn. 145, 153 N.W.2d 262. The DeSchoatz case turned on our determination that unsupported allegations of a speculative nature were not enough to require the disclosure of an informant's identity. This position has been adopted by a number of other courts. Lannom v. United States, 381 F.2d 858, 861 (9 Cir. 1967); United States v. Waters, 461 F.2d 248, 251 (10 Cir. 1972); United States v. Kelly, 449 F.2d 329 (9 Cir. 1971). In the Kelly case, the court held that it would not require the disclosure of an informant's identity simply because he participated in the crime, where he neither witnessed the crime nor transacted business with the defendant. "Mere speculation that an informer may be of some help is not sufficient to overcome the public interest in the protection of the informer." 449 F.2d 330. Cases which have come to our attention holding that active participation by an informant requires disclosure all involved the informant's being an actual witness to the negotiations or the sale. Gilmore v. United States, 256 F.2d 565 (5 Cir. 1958); Roberts v. State, 489 S.W.2d 263 (Tenn.Cr.App.1972); James v. State, 493 S.W.2d 201 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); McLawhorn v. North Carolina, 484 F.2d 1, 6 (4 Cir. 1973). We are of the opinion that Roviaro v. United States, supra, does not require disclosure in the case before us. In Roviaro, the informant had not only been an active participant in the crime and played a material part in getting drugs into the hands of the accused, but he had been present with the accused at the occurrence of the crime and might have been a material witness on the issue of whether the defendant knowingly transported the drugs.[1] The Supreme *151 Court noted that "the Government's informer was the sole participant, other than the accused, in the transaction charged," and his testimony might have tended to show an entrapment. 353 U.S. 64, 77 S. Ct. 630, 1 L. Ed. 2d 647. The instant case is not unlike United States v. Clark, 482 F.2d 103 (5 Cir. 1973), where the informer did not participate in the purchase but merely introduced the defendant to the government agent who later made the purchase. There, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a decision denying the defendant's request to disclose the identity of an informer. The observations were recently made in State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411, 422, 205 N.W.2d 667, 676 (1973), are pertinent: As applied to the facts of this case, we hold that in balancing the defendant's right to have available any testimony "relevant and helpful" to his defense against the need for law-enforcement officers to maintain sources of information with anonymous informants, defendant has failed to support his burden of showing the need for disclosure. Without reference to whether or not the informant may have erroneously described defendant to Gundersen and Shannon as a drug peddler, the fact remains that defendant made the sale to these agents. Since the informant was not present when the negotiations occurred, he could neither corroborate nor refute defendant's claim that the agents initiated the negotiations and induced defendant, who would otherwise have been reluctant to do so, to sell the hashish in order to obtain marijuana from the agents. We fail to perceive what evidence of entrapment the informant could have provided which was not fully presented to the jury. As we have indicated, the informant's participation consisted entirely of obtaining information from Settgas, conveying it to the narcotics agents, and introducing defendant to them. This, we hold, does not constitute the informant a material witness whose identity must be disclosed. Affirmed. SHERAN, C. J., not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. [1] See, McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 309, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 1061, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62, 70 (1967).