Case Title: Seymour v. Collins

Citation: 2015 IL 118432

Docket Number: 118432

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2015-09-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
2015 IL 118432 
 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 
(Docket No. 118432) 
TERRY L. SEYMOUR et al., Appellants, v. BRADLEY A. COLLINS et al., 
Appellees. 
 
 
Opinion filed September 24, 2015. 
 
 
JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
 
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Burke, and 
Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
The overarching issue presented in this appeal is whether the circuit court erred 
in granting defendants summary judgment, dismissing plaintiffs’ personal injury 
action, pursuant to the court’s application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. A 
divided panel of the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. 2014 
IL App (2d) 140100, ¶ 50. We granted plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. 
Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013)), and now reverse the judgments of the appellate court 
and circuit court. 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
Plaintiffs, Terry L. Seymour and Monica Seymour, filed this personal injury 
action in the circuit court of Winnebago County on May 20, 2011, alleging 
negligence and loss of consortium, and seeking money damages, initially from two 
defendants, Bradley A. Collins and Rockford Country Club (Rockford). Terry’s 
alleged injuries were said to have been sustained in a June 3, 2010, automobile 
accident. Plaintiffs alleged, on that date, Terry was being transported in an 
ambulance owned by ATS Medical Services, Inc. (ATS), and driven by Shaun P. 
Branney—and in which Terry was attended by Leo Verzani—when the ambulance 
collided with a vehicle driven by Bradley A. Collins, who was allegedly operating 
his vehicle within the scope of his employment with Rockford. Plaintiffs 
subsequently amended their complaint to claim that defendants, ATS, Branney, and 
Verzani were also legally responsible for Terry’s alleged injuries.  
¶ 4 
 
Also pertinent to the issue before us is the bankruptcy proceeding the Seymours 
had previously commenced on April 24, 2008, with the filing of a petition for 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy (11 U.S.C. § 1301 (2006)) in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The record indicates that a Chapter 13 
plan was confirmed on September 19, 2008, though the plan itself does not appear 
in this record. Docket entries from the bankruptcy proceeding were submitted as 
evidence in this case and show multiple motions filed by the Seymours to modify 
the plan. The motions have not been made a part of the record.  
¶ 5 
 
The first motion was filed on January 7, 2009. A docket entry indicates that the 
motion was granted on January 30, 2009. On that same date, an entry evinces an 
“Order Withdrawing Motion to Dismiss Case for Failure to Make Plan Payments.” 
On August 8, 2009, another motion was filed to modify the plan. That motion was 
accompanied by the Seymours’ filing of amended bankruptcy schedules. An order 
was entered on August 28, 2009, granting the motion to modify.  
¶ 6 
 
The third motion to modify was filed on February 25, 2010. Docket entries 
indicate that a response was filed on March 3, 2010, on behalf of the Chapter 13 
trustee, Lydia Myer, and the motion to modify was granted on March 19, 2010. In 
their brief before this court, plaintiffs state: “The March 19, 2010 plan modification 
entailed a reduction in the monthly payment amount as TERRY L. SEYMOUR had 
sustained an unrelated work injury in May, 2009, and was only receiving temporary 
total disability benefits.” Plaintiffs’ brief cites to an affidavit subsequently filed in 
 
 
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this case by their bankruptcy attorney. That affidavit does not specifically link the 
March 2010 modification to the alleged injury and reduction in income; however, it 
does reference a May 2009 injury and a related workers’ compensation claim 
“subsequent to the date of filing of [the] Chapter 13 proceeding.” Moreover, an 
affidavit filed in this case by Myer references a motion to modify wherein it is 
stated “that the Debtor was injured at work and unable to work and receiving only 
worker’s compensation benefits since May of 2009.” In any event, the parties 
apparently do not dispute that the Seymours sought modification via the February 
25 motion, alleging that Terry was unable to work and was only receiving workers’ 
compensation payments, and the bankruptcy plan was modified on March 19, 
2010.1 
¶ 7 
 
Apparently, it is also undisputed that Terry had not advised the bankruptcy 
court that he was again working when, on June 3, 2010, he was allegedly injured, 
twice. The first injury was said to have occurred while he was working for a new 
employer. As a result of that injury, he was being transported by ambulance when 
the ambulance collided with a vehicle driven by Collins, allegedly resulting in 
additional injuries to Terry, and this lawsuit against the various defendants.  
¶ 8 
 
Prior to the notice of completion of the payment plan filed by the bankruptcy 
trustee on June 29, 2012, and the order of discharge in bankruptcy granted the 
Seymours on July 17, 2012, they filed two change of address forms with the 
bankruptcy court. However, it is apparently undisputed that they never apprised the 
bankruptcy court that their circumstances had changed subsequent to the March 19, 
2010 modification. Specifically, they never informed the bankruptcy court: (1) that 
Terry had returned to work for a new employer; (2) that he was injured on June 3, 
2010; (3) that Terry had, on June 8, 2010, filed another workers’ compensation 
                                                 
 
1As we may take judicial notice of public documents which are included in the records of other 
courts (May Department Stores Co. v. Teamsters Union Local No. 743, 64 Ill. 2d 153, 159 
(1976))—and the defendants’ subsequently filed motion for summary judgment in this case urged 
the circuit court to take judicial notice of the bankruptcy court’s records—we note that the motion in 
fact alleged that Terry was injured and had “been unable to work and receiving only workmen’s 
compensation benefits since May 2009.” The Seymours stated that they had fallen behind in 
payment of their monthly living expenses and they sought to retain the entirety of their tax refunds 
for the year 2009. They suggested if that relief were granted, “they would be able to make future 
payments to the Trustee and complete their Chapter 13 Plan within the time allowed by law.” An 
order, modifying the plan, appears in the bankruptcy court’s records. It is dated March 19, 2010, and 
allows only for retention of the 2009 income tax refunds, specifying that “all other provisions of the 
Debtors’ Chapter 13 Plan shall remain in full force and effect.” Based on the records we have 
reviewed, the discrepancy, and the court’s and parties’ position on this matter, is perplexing.  
 
 
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claim, this one related to the June 3 injuries; (4) that Terry believed he had viable 
personal injury claims against multiple defendants, as a result of the June 3, 2010, 
accident; and (5) that he had in fact filed suit in state court against those defendants 
on May 20, 2011, asserting his legal claims.  
¶ 9 
 
On July 18, 2013, defendants in this action moved for summary judgment, 
contending that plaintiffs should be judicially estopped from proceeding with their 
claims because they failed to disclose their personal injury action in the bankruptcy 
proceeding.  
¶ 10 
 
Plaintiffs responded that judicial estoppel does not apply because they did not 
assert, under oath, in the bankruptcy proceeding that they did not have a personal 
injury case. They did not intentionally fail to disclose the claims, and they did not 
obtain a benefit in the bankruptcy proceeding by reason of the omission. In support 
of their response, plaintiffs submitted their own affidavits as well as the affidavits 
of Chapter 13 trustee, Lydia Myer, and their bankruptcy attorney, Jeffrey Dahlberg.  
¶ 11 
 
In their affidavits, plaintiffs stated, inter alia, that Myer had told them “at the 
[section] 341 meeting” that they were “required to report to [their] attorney and to 
the Trustee, any lump sum funds received in excess of $2,000.00 during the 
pendency of the Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding.” Plaintiffs averred that they 
did not receive any lump sum funds in excess of $2,000.00 during the pendency of 
the Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding, as a result of the personal injury action or 
otherwise.2  
¶ 12 
 
In her affidavit, Lydia Myer stated that she had been the Chapter 13 trustee of 
the District Court of the Northern District of Illinois since 1995. She served in that 
capacity in the Seymours’ bankruptcy case. Myer attested that the plan for the 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy was confirmed on September 19, 2008, and was modified 
multiple times thereafter. She indicated that Terry Seymour had filed a motion to 
modify on March 19, 2010,3 stating that he had been injured at his job and was 
unable to work. As a consequence, he had been receiving only workers’ 
compensation benefits since May of 2009. In a separately numbered paragraph, 
without correlative reference, Myer stated that workers’ compensation proceeds, 
“pursuant to Illinois Compiled Statutes, are specifically exempt from bankruptcy.” 
                                                 
 
2They did receive a tax refund in excess of $2,000, but they reported it and were granted leave 
to keep it.  
 
3The bankruptcy docket entry indicates that the order granting the motion was entered on that 
date. The order filed in the bankruptcy court also bears that date. 
 
 
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¶ 13 
 
Myer represented:  
“That as the Chapter 13 Trustee *** all debtors are required by and through 
their attorneys, to report to me, as trustee, any and all cash or monies received 
during the Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding other than the income listed on 
the debtor’s Schedule I. 
 
That neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Bankruptcy Rules require a 
Chapter 13 debtor to disclose the acquisition of any property interest after 
confirmation of his Chapter 13 plan except if the debtor acquires or becomes 
entitled to acquire within 180 days after the date of the filing of the petition, 
property by bequest, device [sic], or inheritance, or property received as the 
result of a property settlement agreement with the debtor’s spouse or of an 
interlocutory or final divorce decree; or funds received as a beneficiary of life 
insurance policy or of a death benefit plan. (11 U.S.C. § 541 and Bankruptcy 
Rule 1007(h)).”  
Myer concluded with her observation that “11 U.S.C. 1322(d)(1) provides that a 
Chapter 13 plan may not provide for payments over a period that is longer than 5 
years.”  
¶ 14 
 
In his affidavit, the Seymours’ bankruptcy attorney, Jeffrey Dahlberg, first 
attested to his experience in Chapter 13 bankruptcies, and confirmed relevant filing 
dates in the bankruptcy proceeding. Dahlberg recited his file notation that Terry 
had been injured, resulting in a workers’ compensation claim around May of 2009, 
a date subsequent to the date of filing his Chapter 13 proceeding. His personal 
injury claim, arising from an automobile accident, was also subsequent to the 
commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding. Dahlberg noted that Meyer advises 
debtors at the section 341 meeting that they are required to report any lump sum 
funds received in excess of $2,000.00 during the pendency of the bankruptcy 
proceeding. Dahlberg stated that nothing in the Bankruptcy Code would prohibit 
this case from going forward as the personal injury and workers’ compensation 
claims were unliquidated. Dahlberg concluded “because Mr. Seymour’s claims *** 
arose subsequent to the filing of his Chapter 13 and because he did not receive any 
lump sum funds as a result of the claims during the pendency of the Chapter 13, the 
Chapter 13 Trustee will make no claim on future funds which may be generated by 
resolution of those claims as the case has closed with discharge.”  
 
 
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¶ 15 
 
On November 15, 2013, the circuit court entertained oral argument on 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In the course of that hearing, counsel 
for Rockford asserted the following: 
“[O]n March 19, 2010, the Chapter 13 bankruptcy was modified. It was to 
advise the bankruptcy court that the plaintiff had a workers’ comp. injury and 
possible assets from the May 2009 injury. 
 
 
 
 
 
* * * 
 
So what happened was this discharge was pending during the time that this 
litigation was pending and the plaintiff knew he had to advise the bankruptcy 
court of a workers’ comp. claim because he had previously modified his plan to 
advise them, and yet after this injury, there’s no similar notification to the 
bankruptcy court that there’s now yet another injury and potential lawsuit, 
another asset that has become a part of the bankruptcy estate. 
 
And that’s where the judicial estoppel is coming in. We’re telling the Court 
that the plaintiff knew. This wasn’t a mistake or mere inadvertence. The 
plaintiff knew that he had a duty to disclose, which is why he filed to modify the 
plan after the first workers’ comp. injury.” 
¶ 16 
 
After hearing argument on the motion for summary judgment, the court took 
the matter under advisement, and ultimately issued a written order granting 
defendants summary judgment. In that order, the circuit court observed, inter alia, 
that: (1) plaintiffs filed for modifications of the plan after its confirmation, and 
before discharge, but never disclosed the “work injury and/or the motor vehicle 
accident that occurred on June 3, 2010”; (2) “[p]laintiffs’ counsel sent a letter to all 
parties in the instant case seeking to mediate and settle the case [during the 
pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding]”; and (3) during the pendency of the 
bankruptcy case, plaintiffs never made any amendments to their schedules or 
statement of financial affairs disclosing the existence of this action.  
¶ 17 
 
The court then spoke to applicable legal standards. The court noted that 
summary judgment is properly entered only where there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The 
court acknowledged that summary judgment is not appropriate where “reasonable 
persons might draw different inferences from the undisputed facts.” The court 
observed that “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate when judicial estoppel applies,” 
 
 
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and judicial estoppel “is an equitable doctrine invoked by the court at its 
discretion.” The court recited the prerequisites generally required for the invocation 
of judicial estoppel, and concluded with this seemingly inflexible rule: 
“ ‘In [the] bankruptcy context, a party is judicially estopped from asserting a 
cause of action not raised in a reorganization plan or otherwise mentioned in the 
debtor’s schedules or disclosure statements.’ Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 783; see 
also Dailey, 684 N.E.2d at 995-96.”  
¶ 18 
 
The court then stated, unequivocally, in the first sentence of its “Analysis and 
Decision,” “the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ failure to disclose this case as a potential 
asset in their Bankruptcy case judicially estops them from seeking a monetary 
judgment against the Defendants.” The court cited federal case law requiring 
disclosure of this type of action in a bankruptcy proceeding, noted that plaintiffs 
became aware of their “potential cause of action” while their bankruptcy was 
pending, and observed that they had filed amendments to their bankruptcy 
schedules, but “never alerted the bankruptcy court to the instant action.” Based 
upon those undisputed facts, the court stated: “The Court can only conclude that 
Plaintiffs were attempting to hide this asset from their bankruptcy creditors.”  
¶ 19 
 
Addressing the affidavit of the bankruptcy trustee, Lydia Myer, the court stated: 
“With due respect to Ms. Myer, the Court completely disagrees with the argument 
posited by Plaintiffs that because they believed their personal injury cause of action 
was an exempt asset, they had no duty to disclose it in their bankruptcy case. 
[D]ebtors have an absolute duty to report whatever interests they hold in property, 
even if they believe their assets are worthless or are unavailable to the bankruptcy 
estate.” The court inferred that the 2010 modifications sought by plaintiffs in the 
bankruptcy proceeding “establish[ed] that the Plaintiffs were aware that the 
Bankruptcy Court had to be advised that the Plaintiff, Terry Seymour, had suffered 
personal injuries in May, 2009, and therefore the estate had an interest in property 
relating to that occurrence.” The court continued: “This awareness is evidenced 
[sic] by the March 19, 2010, motion to modify the plan already put in place, which 
would allow Plaintiffs to claim an exemption, would give the bankruptcy trustee 
time to review the claim for exemptions, and would allow creditors time to object to 
the modification and the ensuing possible exemptions of any monies received 
pursuant to that occurrence.” According to the court, plaintiffs “knew they needed 
to include all of the estate’s assets in their plan, including the after-acquired 
property interest, which is why they filed a motion to modify the plan on March 19, 
 
 
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2010.” The court concluded its order with this statement: “Because [plaintiffs] 
failed to disclose their personal injury claims in their bankruptcy case, as they were 
legally required to do, the Court finds that they are judicially estopped from 
proceeding on their claims against defendants.”  
¶ 20 
 
A divided panel of the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit 
court. 2014 IL App (2d) 140100, ¶ 50. The court, initially, recited the five elements 
generally required for application of judicial estoppel, as we enumerated them in 
People v. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d 68, 132 (2009) (2014 IL App (2d) 140100, ¶ 25), and 
noted that plaintiffs contended defendants failed to establish three of them: that 
plaintiffs took factually inconsistent positions in the two proceedings, that they 
intended for the bankruptcy court to accept the truth of the facts alleged, and that 
they obtained a benefit in the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. ¶ 26.  
¶ 21 
 
The court first found, summarily, that the plaintiffs took inconsistent positions 
insofar as they “failed to disclose, in the bankruptcy proceeding, the existence of 
their personal injury claims,” while, contemporaneously, “relying on the existence 
of those claims, they prosecuted their personal injury action in the trial court.” Id. 
¶ 27.  
¶ 22 
 
The court next addressed the question of whether plaintiffs intended that the 
bankruptcy court accept the fact that they did not have such claims. The appellate 
majority agreed with plaintiffs that the documents submitted to the bankruptcy 
court did not require them, therein, to disclose their postconfirmation cause of 
action, and that “[p]laintiffs’ failure to include such information on those forms 
thus did not evince that they intended to deceive the bankruptcy court regarding the 
existence of their personal injury claims.” (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 28. However, 
the court concluded: “That does not mean *** that defendants did not establish that 
element of judicial estoppel.” Id. 
¶ 23 
 
The majority went on to cite federal authority imposing a continuing duty of 
disclosure, in a bankruptcy proceeding, of all property acquired postpetition, 
including legal claims. Id. ¶ 29. The appellate court noted that plaintiffs did not 
disclose the existence of their personal injury claims, despite a clear duty to do so. 
The court stated:  
“Moreover, when it inured to their benefit, they promptly notified the 
bankruptcy court of their changed financial condition due to Terry’s May 2009 
work-related injury and loss of income and sought a lower payment schedule 
 
 
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via a modification of the plan. Those facts show that plaintiffs knew that they 
had a continuing duty to disclose any changed financial conditions that might 
affect the plan. Yet, when Terry went back to work and was injured again, only 
a few months after receiving the plan modification, they never notified the 
bankruptcy trustee or the court. Plaintiffs cannot now claim that they were 
oblivious to their continuing duty to disclose all assets acquired during the 
pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding.” Id. ¶ 30.  
“Absent some affirmative statement by the trustee that they did not need to 
disclose such an asset, their reliance on the [trustee’s] information regarding 
any cash assets exceeding $2,000 did not justify their failure to disclose their 
personal injury claims.” Id. ¶ 31.  
The court concluded, in light of plaintiffs’ “clear duty to disclose their personal 
injury claims, their failure to do so evinced their intent that the bankruptcy court 
accept the fact that no such claims existed. Therefore, defendants established that 
element of judicial estoppel.” Id. ¶ 32.  
¶ 24 
 
The appellate majority next considered the question of whether defendants 
established the element that plaintiffs received some benefit in the bankruptcy 
proceeding from their failure to disclose their personal injury claims. Citing an 
unreported federal district court decision, the majority stated that ongoing 
disclosure is required in a Chapter 13 proceeding so that creditors can object to, or 
seek modification of, a confirmed plan. Id. ¶ 34 (citing Woodard v. Taco Bueno 
Restaurants, Inc., No. 4:05-CV-804-Y, 2006 WL 3542693, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 
8, 2006)). The court cited an Illinois appellate panel’s decision in Shoup v. Gore, 
2014 IL App (4th) 130911, for the proposition that the “benefit-received 
requirement of judicial estoppel” is satisfied where a plaintiff fails to disclose a 
postconfirmation personal injury suit insofar as such a plaintiff has “ ‘his 
repayment plan established and performed without giving his creditors any 
knowledge of his potential to recover damages in his personal-injury action’ ” 
(2014 IL App (2d) 140100, ¶ 34 (quoting Shoup, 2014 IL App (4th) 130911, ¶ 17)), 
thus denying creditors the opportunity to “object to, or seek modification of, the 
plan.” Id. Moreover, the court observed, as in Shoup, the failure to disclose left 
plaintiffs with the ability to permanently avoid their debts (via discharge) and yet 
receive a judgment against the defendants in the personal injury case. Id. ¶ 35.  
 
 
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¶ 25 
 
The majority rejected plaintiffs’ contention that the trial court abused its 
discretion—or failed to exercise it at all—insofar as the circuit court did not 
demonstrate any analysis of the elements of judicial estoppel, and in effect made a 
“blanket finding” that, because they failed to disclose their personal injury action in 
the bankruptcy court, they were judicially estopped from maintaining that action. 
The majority found it sufficient that the circuit court had allowed argument at a 
hearing of the matter and stated, in its written order, that it had reviewed the 
“ ‘[m]otion, briefs, affidavits, exhibits, relevant case law, and *** arguments.’ ” Id. 
¶¶ 37-39. The appellate majority also found it significant that the circuit court, 
citing Runge, identified the five elements of judicial estoppel. Id. ¶ 40.  
¶ 26 
 
The majority then directly addressed the primary points made by the dissent. 
The court, first, rejected the dissent’s contention that a false statement under oath 
was required for judicial estoppel to apply, noting that this court in Runge did not 
expressly require that the factual position be taken under oath; rather, this court 
“phrased the element more broadly to include any factual assertion that a party 
intends for the court to accept as true.” Id. ¶ 42. Second, the appellate court found 
“ample evidence” for the trial court to have found “that plaintiffs intended to 
deceive the bankruptcy court by not disclosing the lawsuit.” Id. ¶ 43.The appellate 
court emphasized “the critical fact that plaintiffs promptly disclosed the existence 
of Terry’s first workers’ compensation case when it advantaged them but failed to 
disclose the second such case when it appeared likely that it would disadvantage 
them.” Id. The appellate court considered that a “key piece of evidence,” with 
respect to what the appellate majority saw as an intent to deceive the bankruptcy 
court. Id. Finally, the majority found no injustice in applying judicial estoppel here. 
Observing, in “virtually all cases in which judicial estoppel is applied, the result 
will seem harsh to the party against whom the doctrine is invoked,” the appellate 
majority reiterated that the purpose of judicial estoppel, i.e., to protect the integrity 
of the court in question, and prevent manipulation of the judicial system, and found 
the doctrine’s “laudable purpose is served” in this case. Id. ¶ 45.  
¶ 27 
 
The majority concluded that plaintiffs knowingly took inconsistent positions in 
the bankruptcy court and the circuit court regarding the existence of their personal 
injury claims, and they did so in a way that benefited them. Thus, the appellate 
majority found no abuse of discretion insofar as it determined the trial court’s 
decision “was anything but arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable” (id. ¶¶ 46-47)—the 
applicable standard for abuse of discretion where a circuit court has exercised 
discretion in the first instance.  
 
 
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¶ 28 
 
The dissenting justice, for her part, first noted the equitable nature of judicial 
estoppel, observing that it is meant to be “ ‘flexible and not reducible to a pat 
formula,’ ” that it should be invoked only to prevent an injustice (id. ¶ 52 
(Schostok, J., dissenting) (quoting Ceres Terminals, Inc. v. Chicago City Bank & 
Trust Co., 259 Ill. App. 3d 836, 850-51 (1994))), and that it is intended to prevent a 
litigant from “playing ‘fast and loose’ ” with the court by “intentionally taking 
contrary positions in order to obtain an unfair advantage.” (Internal quotation 
marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 52 (citing Holland v. Schwan’s Home Service, Inc., 2013 IL 
App (5th) 110560, ¶ 113). Though the majority had determined that the Fifth 
District’s opinion in Holland was distinguishable, the dissent found it instructive.  
¶ 29 
 
The dissent observed that the facts of Holland were similar to those in this case. 
In Holland, the plaintiff, Holland, had filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in 
August 2008 and the repayment plan was confirmed in November 2008. Six 
months later, in May 2009, Holland was terminated from his employment and a 
claim arose against the defendant-employer, Schwan’s, for retaliatory discharge. 
Holland never declared his claim against Schwan’s as an asset of his bankruptcy 
estate and Schwan’s argued that Holland should be estopped from asserting his 
claim. Holland, 2013 IL App (5th) 110560, ¶ 115.  
¶ 30 
 
The Holland court disagreed, noting that judicial estoppel did not apply 
because Holland’s failure to declare his claim against Schwan’s as an asset of his 
bankruptcy estate did not constitute an inconsistent position under oath. Id. ¶ 118. 
Although the Holland court held that an inconsistent statement “under oath” was 
still a requirement for application of judicial estoppel (id. ¶ 119), the court noted 
that the absence of the oath requirement would not change its determination, 
because there was no evidence that Holland intended to omit his claim against 
Schwan’s from the bankruptcy estate. Id. ¶ 120. In short, there was no intent to 
deceive.  
¶ 31 
 
Though the dissenting justice in this case argued for the preservation of an 
“under oath” requirement in this context, noting, inter alia, that Runge itself cites 
People v. Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d 65, 80 (2002), wherein “the sanctity of the oath” 
(internal quotation marks omitted) is mentioned, the dissenter would have found, 
“regardless of the oath requirement judicial estoppel should not have been applied 
here, because there was no evidence that the plaintiffs intended to omit this cause of 
action from the bankruptcy estate. Rather, the evidence in this case indicates that 
 
 
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the failure to disclose was unintentional.” 2014 IL App (2d) 140100, ¶ 59 
(Schostok, J., dissenting).  
¶ 32 
 
The dissent observed that the majority, in its analysis, limited the inferential 
impact upon the plaintiffs of Myer’s admonition regarding the need to disclose 
lump sum amounts received over $2,000 during the pendency of the bankruptcy 
proceeding, when “it could equally have been inferred by the plaintiffs [under the 
principle we refer to as expressio unius est exclusion alterius (the expression of one 
thing is the exclusion of another)] that it was not necessary to disclose any 
unliquidated assets.” Id. The dissent also pointed out that there were no bankruptcy 
pleadings required to be filed after the cause of action arose. Id.  
¶ 33 
 
Moreover, the dissent took issue with the majority’s determination that the fact 
the plaintiffs disclosed their first workers’ compensation case evinced knowledge 
of the need to disclose the pendency of the present suit. The dissenter observed that 
reduced income in the former instance necessitated a return to bankruptcy court; 
whereas, plaintiffs had received nothing—they might as laymen consider 
reportable—as a result of the personal injury action during the pendency of the 
bankruptcy proceeding. Id. ¶ 60. The dissent also made the following observations: 
“[T]he trustee *** did not believe that disclosure of this suit would have 
changed the outcome of the bankruptcy proceeding since no funds were 
received during the five years when payments were required. *** Attached to 
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment were letters from plaintiffs’ 
counsel seeking to settle this cause of action prior to the discharge of the 
bankruptcy proceeding. If the plaintiffs were trying to avoid creditors, they 
would have waited until after the discharge in bankruptcy to attempt to settle 
this suit.” Id. ¶ 61.  
¶ 34 
 
The dissent concluded that the majority—by automatically finding that 
plaintiffs’ failure to disclose the suit evinced the intent to deceive—had applied “a 
rigid formula [that] fails to consider the specific circumstances of each case.” Id. 
¶ 62. The dissent found the decisions in Dailey, Berge, and Shoup distinguishable 
from the present case because, inter alia, they all involved subsequent bankruptcy 
filings made where disclosure was specifically required and the plaintiff failed to 
make the required disclosure. Id. (citing Shoup v. Gore, 2014 IL App (4th) 130911, 
¶ 10, Berge v. Mader, 2011 IL App (1st) 103778, ¶ 17, and Dailey v. Smith, 292 Ill. 
App. 3d 22, 28 (1997)).  
 
 
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¶ 35 
 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 36 
 
Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked by the court at its discretion. 
New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001); People v. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d 
68, 132 (2009); People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 598 (2006); People v. Caballero, 
206 Ill. 2d 65, 80 (2002). As the Supreme Court has observed, the uniformly 
recognized purpose of the doctrine is to protect the integrity of the judicial process 
by prohibiting parties from “deliberately changing positions” according to the 
exigencies of the moment. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New Hampshire, 
532 U.S. at 749-50. Judicial estoppel applies in a judicial proceeding when litigants 
take a position, benefit from that position, and then seek to take a contrary position 
in a later proceeding. Barack Ferrazzano Kirshbaum Perlman & Nagelberg v. 
Loffredi, 342 Ill. App. 3d 453, 460 (2003).  
¶ 37 
 
This court has identified five prerequisites as “generally required” before a 
court may invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The party to be estopped must 
have (1) taken two positions, (2) that are factually inconsistent, (3) in separate 
judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings, (4) intending for the trier of 
fact to accept the truth of the facts alleged, and (5) have succeeded in the first 
proceeding and received some benefit from it. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d at 132; Jones, 223 
Ill. 2d at 598; Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d at 80. 
¶ 38 
 
Notably, a statement “under oath” has not been listed among those 
requirements. Indeed, although this court in Caballero mentioned “ ‘the sanctity of 
the oath’ ” in its discussion of judicial estoppel (Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d at 80 
(quoting Bidani v. Lewis, 285 Ill. App. 3d 545, 549 (1996))), the court did not 
subsequently list an oath requirement among the requisites for application of the 
doctrine (see Barack Ferrazzano Kirshbaum Perlman & Nagelberg v. Loffredi, 342 
Ill. App. 3d 453, 464 (2003) (noting the absence of an oath requirement among the 
elements listed in Caballero)), and this court has not mentioned it since. See Runge, 
234 Ill. 2d at 132; Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 598. The core concern is, and it seems should 
be, that a party takes factually inconsistent positions, in separate proceedings, 
intending that the trier of fact accept the truth of the facts alleged. As the appellate 
majority in this case aptly observed, “there might well be situations in which a party 
could intend a court to accept the truth of its factual position even without a 
statement under oath.” 2014 IL App (2d) 140100, ¶ 42; see also Department of 
 
 
- 14 - 
 
Transportation v. Coe, 112 Ill. App. 3d 506, 510 (1983) (relaxing the oath 
requirement but holding that the record must “clearly reflect that the party intended 
the trier to accept the truth of the party’s position”). We now expressly hold that a 
statement under oath is not required for the doctrine of judicial estoppel to apply. 
Application of the five factors enumerated in Cabellero, Runge, and Jones 
addresses, without undue restriction, the problem of a party acting in bad faith, 
playing “ ‘fast and loose’ ” with the court. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d at 133.  
¶ 39 
 
We also agree with the appellate majority’s statement that, “[j]udicial estoppel, 
like all estoppels, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.” 2014 IL App 
(2d) 140100, ¶ 25 (citing Smeilis v. Lipkis, 2012 IL App (1st) 103385, ¶ 20 (judicial 
estoppel), and Boelkes v. Harlem Consolidated School District No. 122, 363 Ill. 
App. 3d 551, 554 (2006) (collateral, equitable and judicial estoppel) (citing Geddes 
v. Mill Creek Country Club, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 302, 314 (2001) (equitable estoppel))). 
We believe that evidentiary standard properly accounts for a degree of caution with 
which this doctrine should be considered and applied. See Construction Systems, 
Inc. v. FagelHaber, LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 141700, ¶ 38 (noting that courts have 
warned the doctrine is “an extraordinary one which should be applied with caution 
(internal quotation marks omitted)”).  
¶ 40 
 
We turn now to the appropriate standard of review. The parties dispute the 
applicable standard of review: the defendants arguing for abuse of discretion; the 
plaintiffs urging us to apply de novo review.  
¶ 41 
 
Since we have said that judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked by the 
court at its discretion (Runge, 234 Ill. 2d at 132; Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 598; 
Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d at 80), it would seem to follow that we review a court’s 
invocation of the doctrine under the abuse-of-discretion standard (see Highmark 
Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc., 572 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 
1744, 1748 (2014) (noting that, “[t]raditionally,” decisions on matters of discretion 
are reviewable for abuse of discretion)), irrespective of the procedural mechanism 
that culminated in the court’s ruling. An abuse of discretion occurs only when the 
trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or where no reasonable 
person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Holland, 2013 IL App (5th) 
110560, ¶ 114.  
 
 
- 15 - 
 
¶ 42 
 
On the other hand, defendants raised this issue via a motion for summary 
judgment, seeking dismissal pursuant to the doctrine.4 An appeal following a grant 
of summary judgment, like an appeal from a section 2-619 dismissal, is subject to 
de novo review. Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove, 209 Ill. 2d 248, 254 
(2004). Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Nationwide Financial, LP v. Pobuda, 2014 IL 116717, ¶ 25. Summary judgment is 
a drastic measure and should only be granted if the movant’s right to judgment is 
clear and free from doubt. Bagent v. Blessing Care Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 154, 163 
(2007). Where a reasonable person could draw divergent inferences from 
undisputed facts, summary judgment should be denied. Pielet v. Pielet, 2012 IL 
112064, ¶ 53. On a motion for summary judgment, the trial court has a duty to 
construe the record strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the 
nonmoving party. Williams v. Manchester, 228 Ill. 2d 404, 417 (2008). As a result, 
summary judgment is not appropriate: (1) if “there is a dispute as to a material fact” 
(Jackson v. TLC Associates, Inc., 185 Ill. 2d 418, 424 (1998)); (2) if “reasonable 
persons could draw divergent inferences from the undisputed material facts” (id.); 
or (3) if “reasonable persons could differ on the weight to be given the relevant 
factors” of a legal standard (Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 247, 269 
(2007)).  
¶ 43 
 
Where the prospect of judicial estoppel is raised via a motion for summary 
judgment, Illinois appellate decisions are in conflict over the applicable standard of 
review. As the appellate court noted in this case, some courts have applied an 
abuse-of-discretion standard (Berge, 2011 IL App (1st) 103778, ¶ 9; Bidani, 285 
Ill. App. 3d at 550), while others have ultimately applied a de novo standard to 
dismissal, reasoning that the underlying motion, for summary judgment or under 
section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2012)), is 
                                                 
 
4We note that one appellate panel addressing judicial estoppel in this context, and the 
appropriate standard of review, has observed that, though raised in a motion for summary judgment, 
a motion seeking dismissal essentially raises an affirmative matter that seeks to defeat the claim, and 
is more appropriate for a motion to dismiss under section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure 
(735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2008)). Berge v. Mader, 2011 IL App (1st) 103778, ¶ 9. Some 
federal courts take a similar view. See Barley v. Fox Chase Cancer Center, 54 F. Supp. 3d 396, 404 
(E.D. Pa. 2014) (“Judicial estoppel is properly classified as an affirmative defense, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 
8(c)(1); see also 18B Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 4477 (2d ed.2014), and, like all affirmative defenses, it is the defendant’s burden to properly plead 
and prove.”).  
 
 
 
- 16 - 
 
“inseparable” from the decision to apply judicial estoppel (Smeilis, 2012 IL App 
(1st) 103385, ¶¶ 22-23 (citing Barack, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 459 (stating that the court 
applied an abuse-of-discretion standard to application of judicial estoppel, but 
applied de novo review to the grant of summary judgment)). 2014 IL App (2d) 
140100, ¶ 19. Divergent opinions as to the appropriate standard of review are not 
limited to Illinois jurisprudence. 
¶ 44 
 
We note that federal courts are split as to whether dismissal on grounds of 
judicial estoppel should be reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion when a 
ruling was rendered on a motion for summary judgment—which is normally 
subject to de novo review—though the clear majority favor the abuse-of-discretion 
standard. See Uzdavines v. Weeks Marine, Inc., 418 F.3d 138, 142 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(applying de novo standard of review); Solomon v. Vilsack, 628 F.3d 555, 561 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (same); Mirando v. United States Department of Treasury, 766 
F.3d 540, 545 (6th Cir. 2014) (same); Queen v. TA Operating, LLC, 734 F.3d 1081, 
1086-87 (10th Cir. 2013) (reviewing for abuse of discretion); Ah Quin v. County of 
Kauai Department of Transportation, 733 F.3d 267, 270-71 (9th Cir. 2013) (same); 
Grochocinski v. Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw, LLP, 719 F.3d 785, 795 (7th Cir. 
2013) (same); Rockwood v. SKF USA Inc., 687 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2012) (same); 
In re Oparaji, 698 F.3d 231, 235 (5th Cir. 2012) (same); Capella University, Inc. v. 
Executive Risk Specialty Insurance Co., 617 F.3d 1040, 1051 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(same); In re Kane, 628 F.3d 631, 636 (3d Cir. 2010) (same); Stephens v. Tolbert, 
471 F.3d 1173, 1175 (11th Cir. 2006) (same).  
¶ 45 
 
Although we have not conducted comprehensive research on the subject, we 
note that some other jurisdictions have opted for de novo review. See Tarver v. City 
of Sheridan Board of Adjustments, 2014 WY 71, ¶ 10, 327 P.3d 76 (Wyo. 2014) 
(application of the principles of judicial estoppel, collateral estoppel and/or the law 
of the case are matters of law; consequently, our review is de novo); NOLM, LLC v. 
County of Clark, 100 P.3d 658, 663 (Nev. 2004) (“Whether judicial estoppel 
applies is a question of law subject to de novo review.”); State v. Petty, 548 N.W.2d 
817, 820 (Wis. 1996) (“Determining the elements and considerations involved 
before invoking the doctrine of judicial estoppel are questions of law which we 
decide independently [of the circuit court or court of appeals].”); Spohn v. Van 
Dyke Public Schools, 822 N.W.2d 239, 246 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (Michigan court 
of appeals noted that judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine and, when reviewing 
equitable actions, that court reviews the trial court’s decision de novo); Atkins v. 
4940 Wisconsin, LLC, 93 A.3d 1286, 1289 (D.C. 2014) (de novo review); compare 
 
 
- 17 - 
 
Regents of the University of California v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 166, 
186 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (“The determination of whether judicial estoppel can 
apply to the facts is a question of law reviewed de novo, i.e., independently 
[citations], but the findings of fact upon which the application of judicial estoppel is 
based are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard of review. [Citations.] 
Even if the necessary elements of judicial estoppel are found, because judicial 
estoppel is an equitable doctrine [citations], whether it should be applied is a matter 
within the discretion of the trial court. [Citations.] The exercise of discretion for an 
equitable determination is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” 
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)). 
¶ 46 
 
The appellate court in this case stated the standard of review thusly:  
 
“In the context of this appeal, both standards apply. In applying the 
summary-judgment standard, we must decide first whether there were any 
issues of material fact related to the applicability of judicial estoppel. If there 
were, then summary judgment would be improper. If not, then we must decide 
whether defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. To answer that 
latter question, we necessarily must decide whether the court abused its 
discretion in applying judicial estoppel under the undisputed facts. If it did, then 
defendants would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If it did not, 
then they would be.” 2014 IL App (2d) 140100, ¶ 22.  
¶ 47 
 
We believe the procedural and analytical sequence should proceed as follows.5 
First, the trial court must determine whether the prerequisites for application of 
judicial estoppel are met. In this respect, the party to be estopped must have (1) 
taken two positions, (2) that are factually inconsistent, (3) in separate judicial or 
quasi-judicial administrative proceedings, (4) intending for the trier of fact to 
accept the truth of the facts alleged, and (5) have succeeded in the first proceeding 
                                                 
 
5As will appear hereafter, in this case we would not need to engage in the full analysis we 
outline, i.e., review of the ruling on summary judgment, and could perhaps decline to settle the 
matter of standards of review in that respect (see The Venture—Newberg-Perini, Stone & Webster v. 
Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2013 IL 115728, ¶ 14 (refraining from deciding the 
applicable standard of review as the result would be the same under either standard); People v. 
Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 30 (same); see also Hoffler v. Bezio, 726 F.3d 144, 151-52 (2d Cir. 
2013) (stating that a court need not determine standard of review when the result would be the same 
under either standard), we nonetheless address the issue in order to provide guidance in future cases; 
however, we provide the discussion here to guide future courts confronted with this question. See 
Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217, 236 (2010) (“judicial dictum is entitled to 
much weight, and should be followed unless found to be erroneous” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
 
 
- 18 - 
 
and received some benefit from it. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d at 132; Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 
598; Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d at 80. We note, even if all factors are found, intent to 
deceive or mislead is not necessarily present, as inadvertence or mistake may 
account for positions taken and facts asserted. Second, if all prerequisites have been 
established, the trial court must determine whether to apply judicial estoppel—an 
action requiring the exercise of discretion. Multiple factors may inform the court’s 
decision, among them the significance or impact of the party’s action in the first 
proceeding, and, as noted, whether there was an intent to deceive or mislead, as 
opposed to the prior position having been the result of inadvertence or mistake. 
New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 753 (acknowledging that it may be appropriate to 
resist application of judicial estoppel when a party’s prior position was based on 
inadvertence or mistake); accord Holland, 2013 IL App (5th) 110560, ¶ 120 
(“ ‘The Courts have been reluctant to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel in the 
bankruptcy context where the nondisclosure of a claim was inadvertent.’ ” (quoting 
Jaeger v. Clear Wing Productions, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 2d 879, 882 (S.D. Ill. 2006)); 
see also Jaeger, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 882 (suggesting—in what may, perhaps, be a 
minority view in federal bankruptcy jurisprudence—that judicial estoppel should 
apply only where there is “deliberate,” “cold manipulation,” or a “scheme to 
mislead the court,” not where there is “inadvertent oversight,” a “confused 
blunder,” or a “good-faith mistake”).  
¶ 48 
 
With respect to the applicable standard of review, we believe it logically 
follows that we review a trial court’s exercise of discretion for abuse of discretion. 
That standard also appears to be consistent with the approach commonly taken by 
other courts where an exercise of discretion is concerned. Highmark Inc., 572 U.S. 
at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 1748 (“[t]raditionally,” decisions on matters of discretion are 
reviewable for abuse of discretion). Therefore, where a trial court has exercised its 
discretion in the application of judicial estoppel, we review for abuse of discretion.  
¶ 49 
 
However, where the exercise of that discretion results in the termination of the 
litigation, and that result is brought about via the procedural mechanism of a 
motion for summary judgment, it follows, as well, that we review that ruling 
de novo. As the authorities previously cited indicate, the necessary representations 
in a successful motion for summary judgment are that: there are no genuine issues 
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
(Nationwide Financial, LP, 2014 IL 116717, ¶ 25), as reasonable persons could not 
draw divergent inferences from the undisputed facts (Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 53), 
and the movant’s right to judgment is clear and free from doubt (Bagent, 224 Ill. 2d 
 
 
- 19 - 
 
at 163). The record must be strictly construed against the movant and liberally in 
favor of the nonmoving party. Williams, 228 Ill. 2d at 417. There can be no room 
for reasonable persons to “differ on the weight to be given the relevant factors” of a 
legal standard. Calles, 224 Ill. 2d at 269.  
¶ 50 
 
In this case, our review is necessarily truncated by circumstances. When a court 
is required by law to exercise its discretion, the failure to do so may itself constitute 
an abuse of discretion, precluding deferential consideration on appeal. People v. 
Newborn, 379 Ill. App. 3d 240, 248 (2008); People v. Whirl, 351 Ill. App. 3d 464, 
467 (2004); see also Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 510 n.28 (1978) (“If the 
record reveals that the trial judge has failed to exercise the ‘sound discretion’ 
entrusted to him, the reason for such deference by an appellate court disappears.”). 
We find that principle applicable in this case. Although the circuit court, at the 
outset in its written order, recited the proposition that judicial estoppel “is an 
equitable doctrine invoked by the court at its discretion,” it does not otherwise 
appear from this record—as we will elaborate hereafter—that the court exercised 
discretion in its application of the doctrine, finding, rather, that the presence of 
certain facts, i.e., the mere failure to disclose the personal injury cause of action in 
the bankruptcy proceeding, mandated dismissal. 6 Because no discretion was 
exercised—or if arguably exercised, clearly abused by reason of erroneous 
assessment of the evidence—no deferential review would be warranted in any 
event. We find hereafter, pursuant to independent consideration, judicial estoppel 
was inequitably applied. 
¶ 51 
 
We note, at the outset, there are some relevant bankruptcy questions upon 
which the federal courts are not in agreement. Because we find the dispositive issue 
in this case to be whether the plaintiffs “deliberately” changed positions according 
to the exigencies of the moment, whether they used “intentional self-contradiction 
*** as a means of obtaining unfair advantage” (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750-51) we deem it unnecessary to weigh in on those 
federal questions.  
                                                 
 
6The circuit court’s inaccurate references to the content of the Seymours’ February 2010 
motion to modify the bankruptcy plan, as indicative of their knowledge of the need to disclose, and 
their intent, does not convince us otherwise. In any event, the Supreme Court’s recent statement in 
Highmark Inc. would seem applicable here: “The abuse-of-discretion standard does not preclude an 
appellate court’s correction of a district court’s legal or factual error: ‘A district court would 
necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly 
erroneous assessment of the evidence.’ Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 
(1990).” Highmark Inc., 572 U.S. at ___ n.2, 134 S. Ct. at 1748 n.2. 
 
 
- 20 - 
 
¶ 52 
 
Though trustee Myer’s affidavit suggests otherwise, and the statute and rule 
she cited (11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006) and Bankruptcy Rule 1007(h) (Fed. R. Bankr. P. 
1007(h))) may well support her position,7 we will assume, for purposes of our 
analysis, that the Seymours were under a continuing duty to disclose their personal 
injury cause of action during the pendency of their Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
proceeding. There appears to be general agreement with the position taken by the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d 
1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2010):  
“A debtor seeking shelter under the bankruptcy laws has a statutory duty to 
disclose all assets, or potential assets to the bankruptcy court. 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 521(1), 541(a)(7). ‘The duty to disclose is a continuing one that does not end 
once the forms are submitted to the bankruptcy court; rather the debtor must 
amend [her] financial statements if circumstances change.’ Burnes, 291 F.3d at 
1286. This duty applies to proceedings under Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 alike 
because ‘any distinction between the types of bankruptcies available is not 
sufficient enough to affect the applicability of judicial estoppel because the 
need for complete and honest disclosure exists in all types of bankruptcies.’ 
De Leon v. Comcar Industries, Inc., 321 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir.2003).”  
Accord In re Flugence, 738 F.3d 126, 128-31 (5th Cir. 2013).8 Specifically, it has 
been said that federal courts have uniformly held that Chapter 13 debtors are 
                                                 
 
7See In re Padula, No. 11-12985-BFK, 2015 WL 1931977, at *4 n.6 (E.D. Va. Apr. 28, 2015): 
“Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(h). The Rule is limited by its terms to the kinds of property described in 
Bankruptcy Code Section 541(a)(5). It does not apply to post-petition property covered by Section 
1306, that is, to the kind of property at issue in Carroll v. Logan and in this case. In re Kemp, 
Adversary No. 11–5002, 2011 WL 3664497, at *3 (W.D.La. Aug. 19, 2011) (Rule 1007(h) ‘does 
not, however, cover the property brought into the estate under section 1306, including post-petition 
causes of action. Nevertheless, courts have uniformly held that a Chapter 13 debtor is obligated to 
disclose post-petition causes of action.’)” 
 
8We note, for purposes of applying judicial estoppel, federal authority holds that a debtor’s 
failure to disclose an asset is generally deemed inadvertent only when the debtor either lacks 
knowledge of the undisclosed claims or has no motive for their concealment (Eastman v. Union 
Pacific R.R. Co., 493 F.3d 1151, 1157 (10th Cir. 2007) (“courts routinely, albeit at times sub 
silentio, infer deliberate manipulation”)), neither of which—lack of knowledge or motive—is often 
the case. See also Flugence, 738 F.3d at 130-31 (the controlling inquiry with respect to inadvertence 
is whether the debtor knew of the facts giving rise to her claim and had a motive to conceal; “[A] 
lack of awareness of a statutory disclosure duty for [ ] legal claims is not relevant.” (Internal 
quotation marks omitted.)). 
 
 
- 21 - 
 
obligated to disclose postpetition causes of action. In re Padula, No. 
11-12985-BFK, 2015 WL 1931977 (E.D. Va. Apr. 28, 2015).9  
¶ 53 
 
So we begin with the assumption that the Seymours were under a legal duty to 
disclose their personal injury cause of action as an asset in the bankruptcy 
proceeding, and the undisputed fact that they failed to do so. We assume further, for 
purposes of this analysis, that the prerequisites generally required for the 
application of judicial estoppel are established, i.e., that the parties to be estopped 
have (1) taken two positions, (2) that are factually inconsistent, (3) in separate 
judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings, (4) intending for the trier of 
fact to accept the truth of the facts alleged, and (5) have succeeded in the first 
proceeding and received some benefit from it. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d at 132; Jones, 223 
Ill. 2d at 598; Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d at 80. 
¶ 54 
 
We may well say that the Seymours intended for the bankruptcy court to accept 
the truth of the fact, or their position, that they had no “assets”—as they understood 
the term—other than those disclosed; however, there is no evidence that they 
intended to deceive or mislead the court—a critical factor in the application of 
judicial estoppel. The one factor cited by the circuit court as evincing the 
Seymours’ knowledge of the need to disclose their personal injury claim, i.e., that 
they had recognized the need to disclose Terry’s workers’ compensation claim as 
an asset in their 2010 motion to modify the bankruptcy plan, simply does not exist. 
¶ 55 
 
The inference that plaintiffs knew they had to disclose the June 3, 2010, injuries 
and derivative claims because they had disclosed similar “assets” or sought 
“exemptions” previously in their motion to modify the bankruptcy plan, finds no 
basis in the bankruptcy court’s records or the affidavits before the circuit court. We 
                                                 
 
9While our primary focus here is on the knowledge and intent of the debtors, we consider the 
value of the personal injury claim to the creditors a relevant consideration under the circumstances 
of this case. One might well ask what a postpetition, postconfirmation, unliquidated cause of action 
is worth to debtors’ creditors in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, which is, as trustee Myer attested, to be 
completed within a five-year period. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d)(1) (2006). Surprisingly, though many 
decisions speak to the need for disclosure, far fewer address valuation of the claim, which is the only 
issue that should be of practical interest to the debtors’ creditors. Those that do—usually in the 
context of claimed exemptions—concede that a cause of action is an asset that is not easily valued, 
insofar as, prior to judgment, a cause of action’s value is unliquidated and contingent. Wissman v. 
Pittsburgh National Bank, 942 F.2d 867, 871 (4th Cir. 1991) (adding that “claiming a specific dollar 
exemption” for a cause of action “is, at best, speculation”); accord In re Ball, 201 B.R. 210, 214 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996).  
 
 
 
- 22 - 
 
quote here the pertinent allegations and representations of the motion to modify the 
Chapter 13 plan filed in the bankruptcy court on February 25, 2010:  
 
“That the Debtor, TERRY L. SEYMOUR, was injured at work and has 
been unable to work and receiving only workmen’s compensation benefits 
since May, 2009. He anticipates being released to work within the next few 
weeks. 
 
That the Debtors’ combined gross income during 2009 was approximately 
$8800.00 less than their gross income at the time of the filing of their petition. 
Because of reduced income, the Debtors have fallen behind in payment of their 
monthly living expenses. 
 
The Debtors received tax refunds for the year 2009 in the amount of 
approximately $7805.00. They need said refunds to supplement their living 
expenses. 
 
That if their Chapter 13 Plan were modified as hereinafter provided, the 
Debtors believe they would be able to make future payments to the Trustee and 
complete their Chapter 13 Plan within the time allowed by law.” 
The Debtors thereafter prayed only that they be allowed to retain the entirety of 
their 2009 income tax refunds—an amount in excess of $2000—“to supplement 
their living expenses” and that “all other provisions of their Chapter 13 Plan remain 
in full force and effect.”  
¶ 56 
 
The order that was entered on March 19, 2010, modifying the plan, provided 
only: 
 
“That the Chapter 13 Plan of the Debtors is hereby modified to provide that 
the Debtors are hereby allowed to retain all of their 2009 income tax refunds to 
supplement their living expenses. 
 
That all other provisions of the Debtors’ Chapter 13 Plan shall remain in full 
force and effect.” 
¶ 57 
 
The workers’ compensation benefit was not asserted as an asset; it was, as the 
dissenting appellate justice observed in this case (2014 IL App (2d) 140100, ¶ 60 
(Schostok, J., dissenting)), referenced only as a cause of reduced income. 
Obviously, there was no claim of an exemption.  
 
 
- 23 - 
 
¶ 58 
 
 Moreover, the circuit court was not justified in extrapolating its inference from 
Myer’s affidavit. As we have noted, Myer indicated that Terry Seymour had filed a 
motion to modify, stating that he had been injured at his job and was unable to 
work. As a consequence, he had been receiving only workers’ compensation 
benefits since May of 2009. In a separately numbered paragraph, without 
correlative reference, Myer stated that workers’ compensation proceeds, “pursuant 
to Illinois Compiled Statutes, are specifically exempt from bankruptcy.” She never 
said that the Seymours claimed the workers’ compensation proceeds as an 
exemption, nor did any other affidavits filed on behalf of the plaintiffs. The filing of 
the motion to modify does not evince knowledge, on the part of the plaintiffs, of the 
need to disclose their personal injury claim in the bankruptcy proceeding. As the 
dissenting appellate court justice in this case aptly observed, the 2009 injury and 
workers’ compensation claim were relevant, and submitted, in the motion to 
modify only because they explained the Seymours’ decrease in income. Id. 
¶ 59 
 
Moreover, as the dissenter noted, citing letters the Seymours’ personal injury 
counsel sent to defendants seeking to settle the case during the pendency of the 
bankruptcy case, “If the plaintiffs were trying to avoid creditors, they would have 
waited until after the discharge in bankruptcy to attempt to settle this suit.” Id. ¶ 61.  
¶ 60 
 
It is also clear from Myer’s affidavit that, had she been apprised of the personal 
injury claim, she, at least, would not have taken action with respect thereto. It is, as 
we have suggested, and federal case law indicates (see Wissman, 942 F.2d at 871) 
difficult to discern how this asset might have been valued so as to benefit the 
Seymours’ creditors within the applicable period of Chapter 13 bankruptcy. 
¶ 61 
 
Further, the uncontroverted affidavits of the Seymours and their bankruptcy 
attorney confirm that Myer advised them that they had to report any lump sum 
funds received in excess of $2,000 during the pendency of the bankruptcy. It is 
understandable that laymen might infer, in the absence of advice to the contrary 
from their bankruptcy attorney—which appears not to have been forthcoming in 
this case—that smaller sums—and certainly unliquidated claims for money—did 
not have to be disclosed.  
¶ 62 
 
We are not willing, as appears to be the case in prevailing federal authority 
given these circumstances (see Eastman, 493 F.3d at 1157; Flugence, 738 F.3d at 
130-31), to presume that the debtors’ failure to disclose was deliberate 
 
 
- 24 - 
 
manipulation. We do not find that inference or presumption controlling in Illinois, 
much less given the facts of this case.  
¶ 63 
 
Where there is affirmative, uncontroverted evidence, that debtors did not 
deliberately change positions according to the exigencies of the moment, that they 
did not employ “intentional self-contradiction *** as a means of obtaining unfair 
advantage,” we believe the purpose of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is not 
furthered by application of the doctrine in this case. We are not so ready, as the 
federal courts appear to be, to penalize, via presumption, the truly inadvertent 
omissions of good-faith debtors in order to protect the dubious, practical interests 
of bankruptcy creditors. Compare Flugence, 738 F.3d at 130-31 (“the controlling 
inquiry, with respect to inadvertence, is the knowing of facts giving rise to 
inconsistent positions”; a “lack of awareness of a statutory disclosure duty for [ ] 
legal claims is not relevant”; expressing concern that a different rule would “land 
another blow on the victims of bankruptcy fraud” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Payne v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 2d 613, 616 (E.D. 
Va. 2008) (federal authority holds that a debtor’s failure to disclose an asset is 
deemed inadvertent only when the debtor either lacks knowledge of the 
undisclosed claims or has no motive for their concealment). In this case, given 
these uncontested facts, we find the failure to disclose the personal injury action 
insufficient, in itself, to warrant the application of judicial estoppel.  
¶ 64 
 
In sum, we agree with the dissent’s summary in this matter. The fact that the 
plaintiffs had a legal duty to disclose this suit, and failed to do so, does not, given 
the facts of this case, establish the intent to deceive and/or manipulate the 
bankruptcy court. “[T]his reasoning diminishes the application of judicial estoppel 
to a rigid formula and fails to consider the specific circumstances of each case.” 
2014 IL App (2d) 140100, ¶ 62 (Schostok, J., dissenting). Moreover, the filing of 
the Seymours’ 2010 motion to modify the bankruptcy plan does not evince their 
awareness of the need to disclose this personal injury cause of action. Any 
inference otherwise is based on a wholesale misconstruction of the motion to 
modify and the pertinent affidavits submitted in this case. We find that the 
application of judicial estoppel was not warranted here. We, therefore, reverse the 
judgments of the circuit and appellate courts, and remand for further proceedings.  
 
¶ 65 
 
Reversed and remanded.