Case Title: Teton v. Teton

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96-96

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-03-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Teton v. Teton1997 WY 46933 P.2d 1130Case Number: 96-96Decided: 03/19/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming
 

DENNY TETON,  

Appellant(Plaintiff), 

 

v. 

 

SHERENE W. TETON,  

Appellee(Defendant).

 

Appeal 
from District Court of Lincoln County 

The 
Honorable John D. Troughton, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Vonde M. Smith, Robert W. Horn of Robert W. Horn, 
P.C., Jackson Hole.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

Ted C. Frome, Afton.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice. 

[¶1]      The trial court 
scheduled an Order to Show Cause hearing on the same day as a previously 
scheduled divorce trial. Appellant, Denny Teton (Husband), asserts he was 
deprived of due process because he was prepared only to respond to the Order to 
Show Cause, was without counsel, and was not prepared for the trial which 
proceeded as scheduled.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

ISSUE

 

[¶3]      Appellant phrases 
the issue as follows:

Where a party is provided specific notice of a "show 
cause" hearing, but not specific notice of a trial, is that party deprived of 
due process if the court subsequently litigates a divorce and custody proceeding 
at the show cause hearing, especially when the party is without 
representation[?]

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      Husband filed for 
divorce against appellee, Sherene W. Teton (Wife), on July 13, 1995 and, 
following Wife's answer, requested a setting for an uncontested divorce. The 
hearing was scheduled for October 16, 1995; but, because of conflicts of Wife's 
counsel, the hearing was continued. Upon notice of the continuance, Husband 
immediately changed attorneys.

 

[¶5]      Wife then filed a 
Motion for Trial Setting, and a hearing was scheduled by the court. The Notice 
of Setting stated that the hearing would occur on January 23, 1996, and was sent 
to the parties' attorneys on December 11, 1995. Six days later, Husband notified 
his second attorney that he had decided to file for the divorce in the 
Shoshone-Bannock Tribal Court and that he no longer needed his services. On 
January 3, 1996, Husband's second attorney was allowed to 
withdraw.

 

[¶6]      When Wife learned 
of Husband's decision to change courts, she filed a Motion for Injunction. In 
her motion, she requested that the court enjoin Husband from proceeding in the 
tribal court, having subjected himself to the state court's jurisdiction, and 
she further requested that the trial proceed as scheduled. The court scheduled a 
hearing on the Motion for Injunction naming the same date and hour previously 
scheduled for the trial, January 23, 1996, at 9:30 a.m. The court's order was 
personally served on Husband on January 9, 1996.

 

[¶7]      The record is 
unclear when it was presented to the court, but within four days of the 
scheduled trial and hearing, Husband signed a Motion for Continuance of Hearing. 
In that motion, Husband asserted he was without counsel and unavailable to 
attend the hearing. However, Husband did in fact appear at the appointed hour. 
The court established that jurisdiction was proper, denied the untimely motion 
for continuance and proceeded to trial on the issues of divorce. Husband now 
appeals from the Judgment and Decree of Divorce, claiming lack of notice and a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶8]      It is well 
established that the right to due process, established by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article 1 § 6 of the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming, extends to and is required in divorce 
actions. Loghry v. Loghry, 920 P.2d 664, 667 (Wyo. 1996). Due process includes notice and a meaningful opportunity 
to be heard. Id.

 

[¶9]      Husband does not 
dispute that notice was provided, rather he asserts that the notice he received 
was defective. Husband claims the second notice received from the court in 
response to Wife's Motion for Injunction advised him that he was required to 
appear and "show cause" why an order should not be made temporarily enjoining 
him from proceeding with a hearing for divorce in the tribal court. He claims 
that the notice conveyed the distinct impression that the court would conduct a 
hearing to determine which court was appropriate, not a trial on the merits. The 
record does not support Husband's claims.

 

[¶10]   Rule 5(b), W.R.C.P., allows for 
service to be made upon a party's attorney unless otherwise ordered by the 
court. Within three days after it was filed, and in direct response to Wife's 
Motion for Trial Setting, the court served the Notice of Setting on Husband's 
attorney in compliance with the rule. Husband was again reminded of the trial 
setting by Wife's Affidavit in Support of Motion for Injunction in which she 
stated:

7. That this matter has been set for trial on January 
23, 1996 at 9:30 A.M. before this Court setting at Kemmerer, Wyoming. My 
attorney and I are ready to proceed to trial at that time and 
place.

Husband then received by 
personal service not only Wife's motion and affidavit but the court's order 
setting the motion for hearing at the same time as the previously scheduled 
divorce hearing. Neither party requested that the court change its previous 
order, nor did the court indicate it had changed the time of the trial. Husband 
was, therefore, provided proper notice.

 

[¶11]   Husband further asserts that the 
court erred in not granting his continuance so he could retain yet a third 
attorney. The decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance is committed to 
the sound discretion of the trial court. Jones v. Jones, 903 P.2d 545, 547 (Wyo. 
1995). Husband's motion for continuance was signed four days before trial but 
not filed until two days after trial. The record provides no explanation for the 
time lapse, however the record is clear that the court considered the motion, 
despite the fact that it was not filed, and equally clear that the motion was 
untimely. Accord, Jones, at 547. In sum, the court knew: 1) Husband chose to 
initiate the divorce action in the state district court, not tribal court, 
nearly six months earlier; 2) notice setting the trial was properly served on 
Husband's attorney six weeks prior to trial; 3) Husband retained, and 
subsequently dismissed, two different attorneys to represent him in the divorce, 
both of whom were conversant in the case; and 4) Husband dismissed his second 
attorney three weeks before trial, stating he wanted to proceed in tribal court. 
Although Husband was notified two weeks before trial that he was temporarily 
enjoined from proceeding in tribal court, he chose not to retain substitute 
counsel for the January 23 hearing. Under the circumstances, we conclude the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Husband's last-minute motion 
to continue.

 

[¶12]   Finally, we conclude Husband had a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard. We have already determined that he had 
notice of the matters to be considered. The court allowed Husband to represent 
himself and diligently advised him of his rights throughout the trial. Husband 
was permitted to present evidence, to confront and cross-examine all witnesses 
and to rebut all evidence presented. Although Husband may not have handled the 
proceedings as skillfully as would have an attorney, we find nothing in the 
record to indicate that Husband was denied the opportunity to fully present his 
case.

 

[¶13]   Affirmed.