Case Title: Elmore v. Elmore

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1992-09-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 91-507


 Anna K. Elmore                               Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Chittenden Family Court

 Bruce E. Elmore                              September Term, 1992



 Joseph J. Wolchik, J.

 Vincent A. Paradis and Norman C. Smith of Bergeron, Paradis, Coombs &
    Fitzpatrick, Burlington, for plaintiff-appellant

 Helen V. Torino, Colchester, for defendant-appellee



 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      MORSE, J.   Plaintiff wife appeals from the family court's refusal to
 award her $9,000 pursuant to a stipulated settlement provision embodied in a
 court order requiring defendant husband to pay a $3,000 penalty fee each
 time biannual maintenance payments were not made by a date certain.  We are
 called upon to decide the enforceability of a stipulated provision in a
 divorce judgment imposing a penalty for untimely compliance with court
 ordered payments.  We reverse, in part.
      The wife filed a complaint for divorce in September 1987.  On February
 1, 1988, the court issued a temporary order requiring the husband to pay
 $2,500 per month in maintenance and $1500 per month in child support.
 Defendant failed to make the payments, and in April of 1988, in response to
 a contempt motion, the court ruled that a $100-per-day penalty would be
 added for each day the payments were not made after the first day of each
 month.  Following renewed contempt motions grounded on defendant's failure
 to abide by court orders, the court ruled on the merits of the divorce on
 September 13, 1988, awarding the wife $1,300 per month in child support and
 $2,200 per month in maintenance for five years.
      Then began a further series of motions and orders aimed at getting
 defendant to abide by the terms of the divorce order.  Finally, with an
 appeal of the divorce order and at least two contempt motions pending, the
 parties stipulated to an agreement that was incorporated into an order of
 final settlement on May 11, 1989.  In lieu of the maintenance provision of
 the divorce order, the consent order required defendant to pay plaintiff
 $60,000, with payments of $15,000 to be made semiannually on January 1,
 1990, July 1, 1990, January 1, 1991, and July 1, 1991.  The order further
 provided that, unless delay in payment were caused by sickness or dis-
 ability, defendant would be required to pay an additional $3,000 should he
 be over ten days delinquent in making any of the payments.  The first
 payment was made on time.  The second payment was made in two installments,
 with $2,500 paid on time, and $12,500 paid on July 30, 1990, within a day or
 two of plaintiff's return from out of town.  The third payment was made one
 day late, on January 11, 1991.  The fourth payment was made in two install-
 ments, with $5,000 paid on July 18, 1991, and the remaining $10,000 paid on
 August 13, 1991, approximately three weeks after plaintiff filed a contempt
 motion.
      At the hearing on the wife's motion to enforce and for contempt, the
 court refused to award any of the three requested $3,000 payments, stating
 that the payments were "only slightly late" compared to "what we see often
 in this court system."  The court's "overall feeling" was that "to assess a
 $3,000 penalty on any one of these particular late payments would be confis-
 catory rather than a penalty."  The court did award plaintiff approximately
 $500 to cover attorney fees expended to bring the contempt action.
      On appeal, plaintiff argues that the court erred by refusing to enforce
 the consent judgment.  Defendant insists that the court's refusal to enforce
 the consent order must be sustained because the late-penalty provision is an
 unenforceable liquidated damages clause that imposes penalty payments far
 in excess of any reasonable estimate of likely damages.  Defendant also
 argues that plaintiff waived any claims with respect to all but the final
 payment by failing to invoke the penalty clause in a timely fashion.  We
 uphold the family court's decision as to the first two late payments, but we
 reverse as to the final payment.
      Defendant's liquidated-damages analysis, raised for the first time on
 appeal, is misplaced, given the facts of this case and the nature of the
 consent judgment.  At the time the parties signed the stipulated settlement,
 defendant had demonstrated repeated blatant disregard for prior court
 orders.  Pending before the court were at least three contempt motions
 requesting that the court require defendant to abide by earlier orders,
 including the requirement that defendant pay plaintiff $2200 per month in
 maintenance.  Rather than merely approve payments agreed upon by the
 parties, the court adopted the parties' agreement as its own determination
 of their respective rights and obligations by incorporating the agreement's
 provisions into the prior divorce order.  With respect to the provision
 relevant to this appeal, the court deleted the maintenance provision of the
 divorce order and replaced it with the parties' provision requiring
 defendant to make four periodic lump-sum maintenance payments.  Thus, the
 consent order was a judgment of the court, and not merely a contract between
 the parties.  See White v. White, 296 N.C. 661, 665-66,