Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. O'Neill

Citation: 2004-Ohio-4704

Docket Number: 20040809

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-09-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. O'Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704.] 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. O’NEILL. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704.] 
Attorneys at law — Judicial misconduct — Two-year suspension with one year 
stayed. 
(No. 2004-0809 – Submitted August 17, 2004 – Decided September 7, 2004.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 02-34. 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Deborah P. O’Neill of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0007128, a judge of the Common Pleas Court of Franklin 
County, was admitted to the practice of law in 1980.  In a complaint filed on June 
17, 2002, amended on November 19, 2002, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged 
respondent with six counts of misconduct involving numerous violations of the 
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct. 
{¶ 2} Relator’s allegations implicated incidents from 1997 through 2002.  
Count I of the complaint charged that during this period, respondent had 
repeatedly held improper ex parte conversations, failed to appropriately exercise 
judicial discretion, and failed to follow the law in a variety of ways, including 
unwarranted bond revocation.  Count II charged that respondent had improperly 
refused to allow attorneys to preserve their objections on the record.  Count III 
charged that respondent had improperly denied continuances without exercising 
judicial discretion.  Count IV charged that respondent had repeatedly made 
misrepresentations to lawyers, other judges, and court personnel in the course of 
her duties.  Count V charged respondent with acts of judicial intemperance on 
numerous occasions, including rudeness to judges, other court personnel, counsel, 
litigants, and members of the public.  Finally, Count VI charged that respondent 
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had improperly used county resources and personnel to promote her unsuccessful 
campaign in 2002 for a seat on the Franklin County Court of Appeals. 
{¶ 3} A three-member panel of the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline heard the cause, conducting 19 days of proceedings 
during May, August, September, October, and November 2003, and February 
2004.  From the testimony of 99 witnesses, the parties’ factual stipulations, 529 
stipulated exhibits, and numerous other exhibits, a majority of the panel made 
findings of misconduct with respect to Counts I, II, IV, V, and VI of the 
complaint and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of 
law for two years.  The dissenting panel member found misconduct only with 
respect to Count V and recommended a one-year suspension, conditionally 
stayed, and a probation period with mandatory professional counseling and 
mentoring.  The board adopted the panel majority’s findings of misconduct as to 
Counts I, IV, V, and VI, as well as the finding of no misconduct as to Count III, 
and further found no misconduct in connection with Count II.  The board 
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two 
years.   
Count I 
{¶ 4} The most serious misconduct established in support of Count I was 
that respondent has used a variety of coercive tactics to expedite dispositions in 
criminal cases, usually as a means to manage her docket.  In three cases during 
the relevant time period, respondent forced pleas from defendants by threatening 
to revoke or actually revoking their bonds -- not for acceptable reasons such as 
that the defendants posed flight risks or safety concerns or had failed to appear -- 
but because the defendants wanted to exercise their rights to refuse an offered 
plea and go to trial.  Similarly, respondent improperly revoked the defendant’s 
bond in a fourth case because his counsel was not prepared for trial on the trial 
date.  In a fifth case, respondent, after rejecting a misdemeanor plea offered by the 
January Term, 2004 
3 
parties, threatened to impose the maximum sentence if the defendant did not plead 
guilty as charged in the indictment and chose to exercise his right to a trial.   
{¶ 5} The effect of this type of misconduct was discussed in People v. 
Ali (2000),  277 A.D.2d 138, 139, 717 N.Y.S.2d 114, reversed on other grounds 
(2001), 96 N.Y.2d 840, 729 N.Y.S.2d 434, 754 N.E.2d 193: 
{¶ 6} “It is impermissibly coercive for a trial court to tell a criminal 
defendant that it will impose the maximum sentence if he is convicted after a trial.  
* * * When a court announces a blanket policy of imposing the maximum 
sentence for a certain type of crime, regardless of any mitigating evidence that 
may develop at trial, a defendant may feel he has no choice but to plead guilty.  
‘The inescapable effect of the court’s statement, under the circumstances in which 
the plea was taken, was to coerce defendant into pleading guilty, and we find, 
therefore, that the plea was not a voluntary one.’  (People v. Wilson[(1997), 245 
A.D .2d 161, 163, 666 N.Y.S.2d 164]).” 
{¶ 7} Judges must routinely exercise their discretion in a myriad of ways 
while executing their duties in the administration of justice, and the abuse of that 
discretion typically generates an appeal, not disciplinary proceedings.  But as the 
board found, judicial discretion does not extend to these strong-arm measures that 
respondent used to compromise defendants’ right to trial.  Thus, rather than 
classifying respondent’s actions as an abuse of legitimate discretion, we agree that 
respondent’s repeated use of the bond process and jail as leverage fell “outside 
any permissible discretion” and was “totally improper.”  For such an egregious 
departure from the bounds of judicial discretion, professional discipline is 
warranted. 
{¶ 8} In another grave example of misconduct, respondent in another 
case failed to act as an impartial arbiter, refused to follow a court of appeals 
mandate, and interfered as an advocate, all in violation of the duties incumbent on 
a judge.  In this sixth incident, a criminal defendant who had been charged with 
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felony sex offenses and kidnapping entered an Alford plea1 to a non-sex-offense 
misdemeanor, simple assault.  As a term of his probation, respondent ordered the 
defendant into sex-offender counseling, which, unknown to counsel in the case, 
would require respondent to admit that he had committed a sexual assault on a 
victim.  The defendant refused to make this admission, and he was therefore 
discharged from counseling programs. 
{¶ 9} Respondent revoked the defendant’s probation for noncompliance.  
On appeal, the court of appeals invalidated the sex-offender-counseling condition 
of the defendant’s probation.  Despite this order and the plea she had accepted, 
respondent persistently attempted on remand to enforce the condition and to treat 
the defendant as a sex offender.  Respondent also threatened on the record that if 
the defendant did not comply with the ordered counseling, the prosecution would 
file a motion for withdrawal of the guilty plea and that she would then set the 
matter for trial as a sexual offense. 
{¶ 10} By refusing to comply with the mandate of an appellate court, 
respondent violated another basic judicial duty.  Moreover, because the right to 
withdraw a plea belongs to the defendant alone, respondent’s threat of withdrawal 
on the state’s motion was, as the board found, “legally impossible” to fulfill.  The 
threat was also highly coercive, so much so that the defendant decided to forgo 
his granted probation and serve the remainder of his jail term. 
{¶ 11} In 
addition, 
respondent 
engaged 
in 
improper 
ex 
parte 
communications and violated her duties to remain impartial and avoid advocacy.  
In a seventh case, respondent refused to accept two codefendants’ pleas of no 
contest to misdemeanors because the pleas were offered on the date of trial, and 
respondent had a policy that after pretrial, defendants could only plead guilty to 
                                                 
1.  An Alford plea is one that permits a defendant, with appropriate constitutional safeguards, to 
plead guilty to a charge while maintaining his or her innocence.  N. Carolina v. Alford (1970), 400 
U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162.  See, also, In re Kirby, 101 Ohio St.3d 312, 2004-Ohio-
970, 804 N.E.2d 476, ¶ 3. 
January Term, 2004 
5 
the charges in the indictment or go to trial.  Respondent enforced her policy in this 
instance so vigorously that the codefendants pled guilty to the indicted felony 
offense, notwithstanding that both stood to be deported for their crimes.  After 
their convictions were reversed on appeal because of the coercion, respondent, in 
a blatant act of advocacy, contacted the prosecutor in the underlying case and 
encouraged her to appeal the reversal, saying, “We’re going to have to fight this.” 
{¶ 12} Similarly, in an eighth case, respondent accepted a defendant’s 
plea to corruption of a minor, a fourth-degree felony, and immediately afterward 
directed defense counsel to solicit “a better deal” from a supervising prosecutor in 
the case.  When the prosecutor refused, respondent attempted to prevail upon the 
prosecutor herself. 
{¶ 13} “The responsibility of a judge is to decide matters that have been 
submitted to the court by the parties. The judge may not, having decided a case, 
advocate for or, as in this case, materially assist one party at the expense of the 
other. Such advocacy creates the appearance, and perhaps the reality, of partiality 
on the part of the judge. This, in turn, erodes public confidence in the fairness of 
the judiciary and undermines the faith in the judicial process that is a necessary 
component of republican democracy.”  In re Complaint Against White (2002), 
264 Neb. 740, 752, 651 N.W.2d 551.  Judicial advocacy through ex parte 
communications therefore also warrants discipline.  Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Ferreri (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 456, 727 N.E.2d 908.   
{¶ 14} Three other examples of respondent’s failure to comply with the 
law and act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judiciary were also 
established in support of Count I.  In addition to her advocacy in the eighth case, 
respondent further refused the parties’ request for a presentencing investigation 
that might have justified a community-control sanction instead of prison for the 
defendant — an 18-year-old nearly homebound because of a liver transplant.  
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Instead, respondent sentenced the defendant to prison and thereafter 
misrepresented her reasons for doing so. 
{¶ 15} In a subsequent discussion with a supervising prosecutor in the 
case, respondent initially blamed the harsh sentence on the assistant  prosecutor 
who had appeared, claiming that by refusing to waive the presentence 
investigation, the assistant prosecutor had somehow forced respondent under 
sentencing statutes to send the defendant to jail.  That explanation was false.  To 
avoid the necessity of a prison term, which respondent herself had said was not 
warranted, respondent had only to order a presentence report as requested.  See 
R.C. 2951.03, requiring a presentence investigation before a community-control 
sanction may be considered.  Moreover, during the disciplinary proceedings, 
respondent initially explained that she had already known what a presentence 
investigation would have revealed.  And later she testified before the panel that 
she had wanted to employ a “scared straight” approach with this defendant and 
would not have considered probation.    These facts confirm for us the board’s 
finding that, for whatever purpose, respondent misrepresented her reasoning for 
sentencing this defendant.   
{¶ 16} In a ninth case, a defendant accepted a plea bargain.  On the day 
before sentencing, his counsel asked respondent (with the prosecution’s consent 
to the ex parte communication) to order a presentence investigation and to 
continue the defendant’s bond pending the investigation.  Respondent agreed.  
The next day, defense counsel appeared for the 9:00 a.m. hearing, but the 
defendant was two hours late, explaining that he had been unable to get 
transportation.  Summoning them to the bench, respondent lost her composure, 
slamming books and desk drawers and screaming about how the defendant had 
interfered with her intention to leave at 11:00 a.m. that day. 
{¶ 17} Respondent 
then 
proceeded 
to 
sentence 
the 
defendant, 
notwithstanding her consent to a presentence investigation on the day before.  His 
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counsel was therefore not prepared to speak on sentencing or mitigation.  
Respondent sentenced the defendant to six months with jail credit.  Respondent 
testified before the panel that she did not remember speaking with defense 
counsel but also insisted that she would not have had a conversation of that kind 
under the circumstances of that case.  The board credited defense counsel’s 
testimony and found respondent’s sentencing of his client to be retaliatory, a 
finding that we now adopt. 
{¶ 18} Similarly, in a tenth case, a defendant charged with bank robbery 
made an unexpected plea of guilty to the full indictment at a first pretrial, and the 
prosecutor requested a continuance until a bank teller was able to be present to 
make a victim-impact statement, a privilege guaranteed by the Ohio Rights of 
Victims of Crimes Act, R.C. 2930.14.  Respondent refused, saying, “I want to get 
this case off my docket.”  A debate ensued in which the prosecutor repeatedly 
refused to proceed until she was permitted to explain on the record why the victim 
had not been allowed to testify, and respondent repeatedly refused to allow a 
record to be made.  None of these discussions appeared on the record, and 
respondent did not grant a continuance until the Franklin County Prosecuting 
Attorney himself gave respondent a copy of the victims’ rights statute.  
Respondent later falsely told the court reporter that the prosecutor was 
considering disciplinary action against the reporter for the reporter’s failure to 
make the requested record. 
{¶ 19} Respondent insisted that she had adequate justification for her 
actions in these cases and that she had not attempted to force the defendants to 
plead to charges against their wishes.  Respondent’s explanations and denials, 
however, were contradicted by virtually all of the witnesses to these events and, at 
times, by the records she prepared to document them.  We therefore accept the 
board’s credibility determinations on these facts and also find respondent’s 
accounts to be implausible. 
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{¶ 20} Upon review of the board’s factual findings relative to Count I, we 
agree that respondent engaged in a series of transgressions that violated the 
following provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of 
Professional Responsibility:  Canon 1 (a judge shall uphold the integrity and 
independence of the judiciary), Canon 2 (a judge shall respect and comply with 
the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in 
the judiciary), Canon 3 (a judge shall perform the duties of judicial office 
impartially and diligently), Canon 3(B)(2) (a judge shall be faithful to the law and 
maintain professional competence in it), Canon 3(B)(4) (a judge shall be patient, 
dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with 
whom the judge deals in an official capacity), Canon 3(B)(7) (a judge shall not 
initiate, receive, permit, or consider communications made to the judge outside 
the presence of the parties or their representatives concerning a pending or 
impending proceeding), Canon 3(E)(1) (a judge shall disqualify herself in a 
proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned), 
Canon 4 (a judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all 
of the judge’s activities),  DR 1-102(A)(4) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and DR 1-102(A)(5) (a 
lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice). 
Count II 
{¶ 21} Count II alleged that respondent refused to allow attorneys to go 
on the record to preserve their objections to respondent’s rulings.  Upon review of 
the board’s factual findings on Count II, we agree that the evidence presented to 
establish the violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Disciplinary 
Rules charged in that count was not clear and convincing. 
Count III 
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9 
{¶ 22} Upon review of the board’s factual findings for Count III, we agree 
that relator has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that respondent 
violated the Code of Judicial Conduct or the Disciplinary Rules by denying 
continuances.  Granting or denying a request for a continuance is within the “ 
‘broad, sound discretion of the trial judge.’ ”  State v. Ahmed, 103 Ohio St.3d 27, 
2004-Ohio-4190, 813 N.E.2d 637, ¶ 44, quoting State v. Jones (2001), 91 Ohio 
St.3d 335, 342, 744 N.E.2d 1163.  “The need for a principled approach to 
determining the limits of judicial power or discretion is important because of the 
danger of compromising judicial independence through the random or arbitrary 
application of ethical norms.”  Shaman, Lubet & Alfini, Judicial Conduct and 
Ethics (3 Ed.2000) 35, Section 2.01.  Even an abuse of discretion is not 
necessarily tantamount to a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  See, e.g., 
W. Virginia Judicial Inquiry Comm. v. Dostert (.1980), 165 W.Va. 233, 271 
S.E.2d 427, 433; Oberholzer v. Comm. on Judicial Performance (1999), 20 
Cal.4th 371, 398, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 975 P.2d 663. 
Count IV 
{¶ 23} In Count IV, the evidence established that respondent engaged in a 
pattern of misrepresentation in her interactions with judges, litigants, attorneys, 
and court personnel.  In two cases during the pertinent period, respondent 
misrepresented to  common pleas court judges that actions had either occurred or 
not occurred during court proceedings.  In the first of these cases, which the board 
determined to be “the most troublesome” of the incidents, respondent 
misrepresented in a memorandum to the administrative judge, which she 
distributed to all of the common pleas court judges, that she had ruled on a 
petition for an emergency protective order, that she had found that the petitioner 
had not met her burden of proof, that she had advised the petitioner that she would 
grant the protection order if the petitioner could not obtain one from the municipal 
court, and that the petitioner’s nonattorney advocate had not answered her 
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questions.  In the second case, respondent falsely advised other judges at a 
meeting that she had never denied anyone the opportunity to make a record, 
although she had done so on at least two occasions.   
{¶ 24} In a third case, respondent told a criminal defendant and her 
counsel during sentencing that they had not timely appeared for trial at 9:00 a.m. 
and that respondent had appeared before 9:00 a.m.  But court parking garage 
records proved that respondent had not arrived until 9:30 a.m. that day.    
{¶ 25} Moreover, in one remaining case, respondent misrepresented to 
court personnel that a court reporter was leaving work early without respondent’s 
permission.   
{¶ 26} As the board concluded, these multiple misrepresentations, when 
considered with the additional misrepresentations found to violate DR 1-
102(A)(4) in Counts I and V, represent “the most serious charges” against 
respondent.  Respondent’s continued denials of this misconduct were contradicted 
by the evidence, and the board properly concluded that her testimony was not 
credible.  And these misrepresentations were not innocuous.  For example, she 
sought to have the court reporter disciplined for supposedly leaving early without 
permission.   
{¶ 27} By misrepresenting events that occurred in court proceedings and 
in the court itself, respondent failed to treat other judges, litigants, attorneys, and 
court personnel with courtesy, respect, and honesty and thus undermined public 
confidence in the integrity of the judicial system.  As the Supreme Court of Iowa 
recently observed, “a judge who misrepresents the truth tarnishes the dignity and 
honor of his or her office” because “[t]ruth and honesty lie at the heart of the 
judicial system, and judges who conduct themselves in an untruthful manner 
contradict this most basic ideal.”  In re Inquiry Concerning McCormick (Iowa 
2002), 639 N.W.2d 12, 16.  And by engaging in conduct “that would appear to an 
objective observer to be unjudicial and prejudicial to the public esteem for the 
January Term, 2004 
11 
judicial office,” respondent acted in a manner prejudicial to the administration of 
justice, as prohibited by DR 1-102(A)(5).  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Cleary (2001), 
93 Ohio St.3d 191, 206, 754 N.E.2d 235.   
{¶ 28} Upon review of the board’s factual findings relative to Count IV, 
we agree that respondent engaged in a series of deliberate misrepresentations and 
thereby committed additional violations of Canons 1, 2, 3, 3(B)(2), 3(B)(4), and 4, 
and DR 1-102(A)(4) and (5). 
Count V 
{¶ 29} Count V involves a series of incidents in which respondent, 
between October 1997 and July 2000, acted in an unbecoming, unprofessional, 
and discourteous fashion towards her staff, other court personnel, visiting judges, 
law enforcement personnel, attorneys, probation officials, and members of the 
public.  In July 2000, respondent attended a personnel committee meeting and 
admitted that she had problems dealing with her employees and pledged to do 
better.  In early 2001, Judge Michael H. Watson, who was then serving as the 
administrative judge of the Franklin County Common Pleas Court, met privately 
with respondent in an attempt to address these concerns.  Judge Watson had 
previously offered to assist respondent in any way he could, and at the 2001 
meeting he offered constructive suggestions on how to deal with people whom 
she perceived to be challenging her authority.  Judge Watson testified that 
respondent was initially receptive to his advice but that she quickly became 
defensive, stating that she was tired of people “f’ing with her.”  As the record 
demonstrates, respondent’s behavior and demeanor did not improve after these 
meetings.  
{¶ 30} The record shows a pattern of rude, undignified, and 
unprofessional conduct that included abusive verbal outbursts, unjustified 
expulsions from the courtroom, and berating or humiliating persons in the 
presence of others.  Respondent also lodged numerous verbal and written 
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complaints about court or court-affiliated personnel that were not factually 
accurate.  These outbursts and complaints were often accompanied by threats of 
discipline or termination.   
{¶ 31} Witness testimony painted a hostile work and courtroom 
environment in which court staff were constantly on edge and persons appearing 
before respondent were frightened and intimidated because of her volatile and 
unpredictable personality.  Personnel issues and simple differences of opinion and 
interpretation could not be resolved because of respondent’s inaccessibility and 
her steadfast refusal to engage in two-sided dialogue.  Testimony persistently 
describes respondent as a person who would not listen to the concerns of others 
and dismissed any view other than her own.   
{¶ 32} Much of the testimony as to this count went unrebutted at the 
hearing.  In other instances, respondent asserted that she had sufficient 
justification for her action.  On still other occasions, respondent offered a version 
of the facts diametrically opposed to that of the witness.  As in the previous 
counts, the witnesses to these events steadily contradict respondent’s explanations 
and denials.  We once again, therefore, accept the board’s determination as to the 
veracity of these allegations and reject as unpersuasive respondent’s version of 
the facts. 
{¶ 33} An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice 
in our society.  Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  The primary purpose of 
judicial discipline is to protect the public, guarantee the evenhanded 
administration of justice, and maintain and enhance public confidence in the 
integrity of this institution.  Kloepfer v. Comm. on Judicial Performance (1989), 
49 Cal.3d 826, 864-865, 264 Cal.Rptr. 100, 782 P.2d 239.  Judicial misconduct 
undermines these goals and, in so doing, demeans the judicial system itself.  See 
In re Probert (1981), 411 Mich. 210, 225, 308 N.W.2d 773. 
January Term, 2004 
13 
{¶ 34} Respondent’s actions were not random, isolated incidents but 
instead reflect a pattern of discourteous, impatient, and undignified behavior that 
not only poisoned the immediate environment but extended far beyond as well.  
The hostile work environment created by respondent unquestionably 
compromised the ability of court personnel to perform their important functions to 
the best of their ability, which directly affects the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the judicial process.  Other jurisdictions have held that rude and abusive treatment 
of court staff constitutes a violation of judicial canons.  Kloepfer; In re Inquiry 
Concerning Holien (Iowa 2000), 612 N.W.2d 789. 
{¶ 35} Respondent’s conduct in the courtroom certainly had the same 
deleterious effect on the attorneys, law enforcement officers, and other individuals 
indispensable to the administration of justice.  See Holien.  Additionally, in at 
least one instance, respondent’s intemperance threatened the physical well-being 
of others.  Respondent’s decision on November 30, 1999, to leave the bench and 
confront a deputy sheriff while the deputy was escorting an agitated criminal 
defendant to lock-up directly compromised the safety of every person in the 
courtroom. 
{¶ 36} Respondent’s rebuttal testimony convinces us that she has no 
appreciation of the gravity of her actions or their effect on the integrity and 
operation of both her courtroom and the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 
as a whole.  Equally important, respondent was completely indifferent to the 
effect of her actions on the public’s perception of the integrity, impartiality, and 
fairness of the justice system.  As aptly stated by the Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court in In re Kellam (Me.1986), 503 A.2d 1308, 1312: 
{¶ 37} “Although discourtesy does not constitute an error or violation of 
law in the decision-making process, such conduct on the part of a judge is 
particularly egregious because it undermines respect for the law in a most 
insidious manner.  Our appellate process effectively corrects judicial error and the 
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mere occurrence of such error does not usually inflict lasting damage upon our 
system of laws.  On the other hand, a litigant who is subjected to rude and 
insensitive treatment is left without recourse.  Whether the litigant wins or loses, 
the end result is an irreparable loss of respect for the system that tolerates such 
behavior.” 
{¶ 38} This was certainly true for a victim of a brutal attempted murder 
who was ejected from the courtroom by respondent for whispering to a 
companion.  As a result, the distraught victim was absent from both the 
defendant’s plea and sentence.  And surely it was also true for anyone who 
observed respondent’s courtroom outbursts.  Judicial intemperance “invariably 
conveys the message of a closed mind,” and witnesses to such displays rarely 
accept that the decision of a hostile and combative judge is fair.  In re O’Dea 
(1993), 159 Vt. 590, 605, 622 A.2d 507. 
{¶ 39} We recognize that judges differ in both style and personality and 
that these qualities, in and of themselves, are not matters for discipline.  But 
whatever a judge’s style, “[p]atience, dignity and common courtesy are essential 
parts of judging, whatever the personality of the judge,” and “a pattern of judicial 
discourtesy represents a profound threat to the institution of the law and requires a 
strong response.”  Id. at 604 and 605, 622 A.2d 507. 
{¶ 40} Upon review of the board’s findings as to Count V, we agree that 
respondent repeatedly acted in an unbecoming, unprofessional, and discourteous 
manner towards many with whom she interacted as both judge and 
judge/employer.  We find that this conduct violates Canons 1, 2, 3, 3(B)(4), 
3(C)(1) (a judge shall diligently discharge the judge’s administrative 
responsibilities without bias or prejudice and maintain professional competence in 
judicial administration, and should cooperate with other judges and court officials 
in the administration of court business) and 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, as 
well as DR 1-102(A)(5) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
January Term, 2004 
15 
Count VI 
{¶ 41} Finally, upon review of the factual findings of the board relative to 
Count VI, we agree that the respondent engaged in misconduct that violated the 
following provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct: Canon 4, Canon 7(C)(1) (a 
judicial candidate shall prohibit public employees subject to his or her direction or 
control from soliciting or receiving campaign fund contributions), and Canon 
7(C)(2)(a) (a judicial candidate personally shall not solicit or receive campaign 
funds). 
{¶ 42} The misconduct established by the evidence in support of Count VI 
was that respondent personally solicited campaign contributions through a staff 
attorney, from both the staff attorney’s future employer and her husband’s law 
firm, while the staff attorney remained a public employee under respondent’s 
control.  Respondent engaged in the campaign solicitation as a meagerly attended 
campaign fundraiser in her honor drew to a close.  Respondent approached the 
staff attorney and demanded that both her future law firm and her husband’s law 
firm “needed to step up to the plate and contribute to her campaign” in the 
maximum allowed PAC amount.  Testimony also supported that the respondent’s 
solicitation of campaign funds from the husband’s firm implicated one of the 
firm’s cases that had recently been before respondent, in that respondent stated 
that the firm “owed her” for the favorable verdict.  Respondent’s campaign 
solicitation occurred in the presence of an additional two attorneys, who the board 
determined were credible witnesses and whose testimony solidly supported the 
board’s findings of misconduct as to Count VI.    
{¶ 43} Respondent insisted that she never inappropriately solicited 
campaign contributions from anyone and that she had only inquired as to whether 
the staff attorney’s husband was coming to the fundraiser that evening.  
Respondent also insisted that she did not disclose the favorable verdict that 
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evening.  The board did not find respondent’s testimony credible, and, deferring 
to the board’s determinations on these facts, we agree. 
{¶ 44} Canon 4(A) prohibits judges from using the prestige of judicial 
office to advance their private interests.  One example of this is represented by the 
admonition in Canon 7(C)(1) against judges’ soliciting campaign contributions 
through public employees.  Canon 7 guards against actual or apparent bias by 
restricting the political and fund-raising activity of judges, shielding judicial 
candidates and the public alike from dangers inherent in the direct solicitation of 
campaign funds.  See In re Disqualification of Ney (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 1271, 
1272, 657 N.E.2d 1367.  The breach of these restrictions warrants discipline. 
Sanction 
{¶ 45} In determining the appropriate sanction to impose on respondent 
for her violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Disciplinary Rules in 
Counts I, IV, V, and VI, “ ‘we consider the duties violated, respondent’s mental 
state, the injury caused, the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, 
and applicable precedent.’ ”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Kaup, 102 Ohio St.3d 29, 
2004-Ohio-1525, 806 N.E.2d 513, ¶ 11, quoting Disciplinary Counsel v. Evans 
(2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 497, 501, 733 N.E.2d 609. 
{¶ 46} Respondent violated duties owed under the Code of Judicial 
Conduct and Disciplinary Rules, including duties to the public, DR 1-102(A)(4) 
and (5), and the judiciary, see, e.g., Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  See 
Portage Cty. Bar Assn. v. Mitchell, 101 Ohio St.3d 1, 2003-Ohio-6449, 800 
N.E.2d 1106, ¶ 12; Disciplinary Counsel v. Shramek, 98 Ohio St.3d 441, 2003-
Ohio-1636, 786 N.E.2d 869, ¶ 9. 
{¶ 47} Respondent’s misconduct also resulted in harm ─ most notably to 
criminal defendants who were subjected to respondent’s threats and revocation of 
bond if they chose to go to trial ─ as detailed in Count I.  In addition, 
January Term, 2004 
17 
respondent’s misconduct demeaned judges, lawyers, litigants, and court 
employees and caused a loss of respect for the judicial system. 
{¶ 48} Regarding aggravating circumstances, respondent’s misconduct 
evidenced a selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, the 
submission of false statements in the disciplinary process, a refusal to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct, and harm to vulnerable persons, 
e.g., criminal defendants and court personnel.  See Section 10(B)(1)(b), (c), (d), 
(f), (g), and (h) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints 
and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
(“BCGD Proc.Reg.”). 
{¶ 49} In mitigation, the court has never disciplined respondent in over 20 
years of practice, including over 10 years as a judge.  Kaup, 102 Ohio St.3d 29, 
2004-Ohio-1525, 806 N.E.2d 513, ¶ 8; BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a).  In addition, 
since 1993, respondent has been actively involved in educating middle school and 
high school students about the legal system, visiting over 400 classes in 63 
schools in Franklin and surrounding counties.  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Briggs 
(2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 74, 75, 728 N.E.2d 1049 (mitigating evidence in attorney-
discipline proceeding included political, cultural, and charitable events). 
{¶ 50} In analyzing these and other pertinent factors, we first note that this 
is an extraordinary case that is “complex and hotly contested” and unprecedented; 
as the board determined, “there is no Ohio case similar in size and scope to the 
charges against Respondent.”  This case involves countercharges that this 
proceeding was politically motivated and has been highly publicized.   
{¶ 51} “The political context and highly publicized nature of these 
charges cannot distract us from the seriousness of the underlying conduct * * *.”  
In re Kroger (1997), 167 Vt. 1, 15, 702 A.2d 64.  Respondent’s continued pattern 
of misrepresentation, threats, and intemperate behavior to judges, lawyers, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
litigants, and court personnel is both inexcusable and detrimental to the integrity 
of the judiciary. 
{¶ 52} Because the depth and scope of the charges in this case are so 
unusual, the fashioning of an appropriate sanction for this misconduct is not an 
easy task; however, respondent’s pervasive conduct of misrepresentation in 
violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) by itself warrants an actual suspension from the 
practice of law for an appropriate period of time.  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Hutchins, 102 Ohio St.3d 97, 2004-Ohio-1805, 807 N.E.2d 303, ¶ 32-33; 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 658 N.E.2d 237, 
syllabus.  The sanction  of an actual suspension does not in any way limit the 
exercise of discretion that judges routinely and necessarily exercise in the 
performance of their duties.  It merely reinforces what should already be manifest:  
judges should not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation. 
{¶ 53} But in determining the appropriate length of the suspension and 
any attendant conditions, we must recognize that the primary purpose of 
disciplinary sanctions is not to punish the offender, but to protect the public.  See 
Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Weaver (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 97, 100, 70 O.O.2d 175, 
322 N.E.2d 665; Hickey v. N. Dakota Dept. of Health & Consol. Laboratories 
(N.D.1995), 536 N.W.2d 370, 372. 
{¶ 54} We are persuaded here that respondent’s repeated volatile 
outbursts and unprovoked intemperate actions evidence a potential behavioral 
cause for her misconduct that would be best addressed by a mental health 
professional.  While this possibility does not diminish the effects of respondent’s 
misconduct, it perhaps explains what the board had “struggled throughout these 
hearings to understand.”   
{¶ 55} Taking all the foregoing facts and considerations into account, we 
find the board’s recommendation of a two-year suspension to be inappropriate 
January Term, 2004 
19 
under the circumstances of this case and find a two-year suspension with one year 
stayed on conditions to be in order.  Accordingly, respondent is hereby suspended 
from the practice of law for two years; however, the second year of this 
suspension is stayed on the following conditions:  respondent shall (1) submit to a 
mental health evaluation, to be performed by a mental health professional of her 
choice, for a complete emotional, behavioral, and if necessary physical 
assessment; (2) fully cooperate in the mental health evaluation and comply with 
the recommended course of treatment, if any; and (3) if reinstated to the practice 
of law, submit to the supervision of a mentor to be appointed by relator upon 
reinstatement.  Further, in addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(10), 
respondent shall, upon any application for reinstatement, provide a report from 
the evaluating mental health professional as to her current medical condition, 
including any reason for which she should not be readmitted to the practice of 
law. 
{¶ 56} In so holding, we recognize the important role that judges play in 
society and their concomitant duty to act in an ethical manner: 
{¶ 57} “Because they are so important to our society, judges must be 
competent and ethical, and their actions must foster respect for their decisions as 
well as for the judiciary as a whole.  Given that they hold positions of 
considerable authority and are entrusted with a great deal of power and discretion, 
judges are expected to conduct themselves according to high standards of 
professional conduct.  Indeed, it is often said that judges are subject to the highest 
standards of professional behavior.  Judges are held to higher standards of 
integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys or other persons not invested with the 
public trust.  * * * 
{¶ 58} “Judges should exercise their judicial functions with integrity, 
impartiality, and independence.  They should perform their work with a high 
degree of competence, and should treat litigants, witnesses, attorneys, and others 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
who appear before them with courtesy and respect.  * * *  In sum, they should 
inspire trust and confidence, and should bring honor to the judiciary.”  See 
Shaman, Lubet &  Alfini, Judicial Conduct and Ethics, supra, at 1-2.   
{¶ 59} With the foregoing sanction, we hope that respondent can learn to 
accord judges, lawyers, litigants, court employees, and the public the service, 
honesty, courtesy, and respect to which they are entitled and thereby once again 
earn the public trust that the judiciary should command.   
{¶ 60} Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, WINKLER, O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., 
concur. 
 
RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
 
RALPH WINKLER, J., of the First Appellate District, sitting for Lundberg 
Stratton, J. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 61} I reluctantly concur in judgment only.  Like the panel member who 
dissented from the panel’s opinion, I view the allegations of Count V as the heart 
of this case.  I believe that not all of the incidents detailed in the majority 
opinion’s discussion of the other counts have been proven by clear and 
convincing evidence to constitute violations in their own right.  However, unlike 
the dissenting panel member, I am unable to totally overlook all of the evidence 
supporting the other counts, particularly Count I, on which the majority has found 
disciplinary violations.  I find, however, that Counts II and III have not been 
proven by clear and convincing evidence. 
{¶ 62} The majority opinion has, except for a very brief mention, ignored 
the significant political aspects underlying the grievances that were filed against 
respondent.  As the panel dissenter recognized, respondent’s viewpoint that the 
January Term, 2004 
21 
complaints against her were politically motivated is supported by “substantial 
evidence” in the record.  To a certain extent, some of the actions of respondent 
discussed in the majority opinion seem sufficiently open to question that some 
amount of piling on appears to be occurring, in that specific alleged instances of 
misconduct that would not normally themselves be the basis for charges are being 
used to bolster unrelated charges based on other events to further the overall case 
against respondent. 
{¶ 63} Furthermore, as the panel dissenter recognized, some of the 
witnesses who testified against respondent, particularly as to Count IV and her 
interaction with other court personnel, appear to have “had their own agendas 
which compromised their credibility.”  It is evident that political and personal 
considerations that cannot be entirely disregarded permeate this case.  Moreover, 
these charges should have been brought in a timelier manner.  Some of the alleged 
behavior occurred as far back as 1997. 
{¶ 64} Nevertheless, the record contains enough evidence of disciplinary 
violations beyond Count V that I believe an actual suspension from the practice of 
law is warranted.  Like the majority, I believe that the board’s recommendation of 
a full two-year suspension is inappropriate, based on a consideration of the entire 
record.  Consistent with that view, relator’s vigorous advocacy that respondent 
should be disbarred strikes me as so disproportionate to the magnitude of 
respondent’s actions that it is unjustifiable. 
{¶ 65} I believe that after all factors are weighed, a lesser sanction than 
that imposed by the majority opinion would be supportable, such as a two-year 
suspension with 18 months stayed.  That sanction would not take away 
respondent’s ability to earn a livelihood but would still provide her an opportunity 
to obtain counseling and to further develop the qualities that would allow her to 
continue to be an asset to the judiciary and bar.  Respondent has been twice 
elected to the common pleas bench by the voters of Franklin County.  It seems 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
strange to me that we often show more compassion to attorneys and judges who 
break the law than we seem to be showing here. 
{¶ 66} However, particularly because I believe that Count V is a serious 
infraction, I believe that respondent should be suspended for two years with the 
second year stayed upon conditions.  I am hopeful that, with the satisfaction of 
those conditions, respondent can return as a valued member of the legal 
profession after serving the first year of her suspension. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 67} I concur in judgment only because I have several concerns about 
this case.  Judge Puffenberger’s dissent from the report and recommendation of 
the board so well articulates my concerns that I herein incorporate his entire 
dissent, except for his recommended sanction.2 
{¶ 68} “The extensive allegations presented in this complaint are far 
reaching in substance and, in many instances, require Respondent to justify 
judicial determinations made many years before.  This Board must be cautious not 
to infringe upon areas of our legal system wherein our judiciary has traditionally 
been 
granted 
extensive 
discretion 
in 
making 
judicial 
determinations.  
Inappropriate actions of one member of the judiciary must not be sanctioned in a 
manner that would have a ‘chilling effect’ on judges who may sometimes utilize 
methods which may be perceived as ‘unconventional’.  Judges are constantly 
making split second decisions in the courtroom and sometimes their motives for 
making these determinations can be placed in question.  Our legal system has 
acknowledged this and provides proper avenues of recourse outside the 
disciplinary process.  To require our judges to be placed under oath in a 
disciplinary setting and explain why a judicial determination was made is foreign 
                                                 
2.  I am attaching a copy of the full report of the board as an appendix to my opinion. 
January Term, 2004 
23 
to our legal system.  In situations where the judicial determination was made 
years earlier, that task of explaining why the decision was made can be nearly 
impossible. 
{¶ 69} “While it is not my intention to review the panel report case by 
case, I will generally address each of the counts in the Amended Complaint and 
conclude by formulating a more generalized dissent to both the findings and the 
recommendation. 
{¶ 70} “In reviewing each of the Counts in the Amended Complaint, the 
Board must apply the standard of whether the violations have been proven by 
clear and convincing evidence.  This is a high standard to meet and is more than a 
simple preponderance of the evidence. 
{¶ 71} “In Count I, the panel report finds that Respondent engaged in ex 
parte communications.  In Nezvalova, Disciplinary Counsel clearly failed to 
establish that the conversations were ex parte in nature.  No one gained a 
procedural or tactical advantage as a result of the conversation which was 
administrative in nature.  Two distinguished judges, Judge Corzine and Judge 
Parrott, testified that this was not an ex parte conversation.  Likewise, the 
conversation in Smiley was administrative in nature and Judges Corzine, Parrott 
and former Judge Tracey testified that conversations such as this are not 
uncommon.  Certainly the clear and convincing standard was not met to establish 
that any ex parte communications even occurred unless one were to totally 
disbelieve the testimony of not only Judge O’Neill, but also the testimony of 
Judge Corzine, Judge Parrot[t] and former Judge Tracey.  Moreover, the Smiley 
case was not a pending case and the conversation did not involve the merits of the 
case.  Absolutely no one was prejudiced by these conversations and they do not 
fall within the realm of sanctionable conversations.  That portion of Count I 
relating to ex parte communications is without merit and must be dismissed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
{¶ 72} “Count II alleges that Respondent refused to allow attorneys to go 
on the record.  In 1998, the local rules of the Franklin County Common Pleas 
Court did not require pretrials to be on the record.  The allegation that Attorney 
Swartz was denied the opportunity to go on the record during a pretrial was 
readily admitted by Respondent in her letter to the Chief Justice on September 10, 
1998.  (Ex. ON 01507)  Respondent explained to the Chief Justice that she, 
‘denied Mr. Swartz’ request to put the bench conference on the record as I did not 
find it necessary to record my denial of his request for a continuance.’  This denial 
was not even found to be sufficient for the granting of an Affidavit of 
Disqualification by the Chief Justice, much less a disciplinary violation.  In both 
Dennis and Lane the allegations of failure to allow a record occurred in pretrial 
settings.  Both Judge Parrot[t] and former Judge and now Professor Tracey 
testified that the preferred method of making a record is not to disrupt the 
schedule in order to make a record whenever one is demanded, but to wait until 
such time as there is an actual court hearing.  In fact, Attorney Swartz testified 
that a written motion would have been the proper way to make a record for the 
motion for continuance.  The allegations in Count II have not been established by 
clear and convincing evidence and must be dismissed.   
{¶ 73} “Count III consists of allegations that Respondent denied 
continuances without exercising judicial discretion.  The granting or denial of 
requests for continuance should not be the subject of disciplinary actions.  The 
law adequately provides recourse to the parties in these situations. 
{¶ 74} “Count IV relates to alleged misrepresentations Respondent made 
in her interactions with lawyers, judges and court personnel.  While there is 
certainly variation in the recollection of parties to the same incidents, it must be 
remembered that these incidents occurred years ago and it is common for people 
to have different perceptions of an incident after the passage of time.  The panel 
report takes great umbrage to the fact that Respondent denied the allegations 
January Term, 2004 
25 
against her and her recollection of incidents was often times different from those 
of other witnesses.  This does not mean that Respondent was necessarily lying or 
being deceitful.  It means that she had a different perception of certain encounters.  
In addition, her answer to the complaint seems to contain responses in conflict 
with her own testimony at hearing.  The panel was made aware that the answer 
was prepared prior to any formal discovery and that Respondent answered the 
complaint utilizing her best recollection at the time.  Those familiar with legal 
proceedings are quite aware that recollection can be refreshed once the witness is 
afforded an opportunity to review documents relative to an incident.  This is 
especially true when the incident occurred years prior.  The finding of a violation 
for merely denying the allegations and having a different perception of what 
transpired from that of her accusers is totally unfair.  In addition, it is not difficult 
to find that a number of witnesses who testified as to Count IV had their own 
agendas which compromised their credibility.  Once again, the burden of clear 
and convincing evidence has not been met in these allegations. 
{¶ 75} “While Disciplinary Counsel has attempted to demonstrate a 
‘pattern’ of inappropriate behavior by Respondent, the allegation of a violation in 
Count VI is totally unrelated to any other count in that it concerns activity that 
occurred outside the courthouse setting.  The Panel report finds a solitary 
violation related to a campaign conversation Respondent had with an individual 
who was still technically her employee even though the individual had already 
tendered her employment resignation.  It is exactly this type of remote violation 
that the Preamble to the Code of Judicial Conduct envisioned when it states:  ‘It is 
not intended, however, that every transgression will result in disciplinary action.’  
This single technical violation of the campaign solicitation canon by a judge who 
has been involved in several contested elections does not demonstrate a ‘pattern’ 
of campaign violations and should be dismissed in conformity with the spirit of 
the Preamble. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
{¶ 76} “Counts I, II and III generally relate to matters within the 
discretion of the trial judge which this Board should not allow the disciplinary 
procedure to substitute for the Courts of appeals and Counts IV and VI have been 
addressed above.  However, Count V of the Amended Complaint is much more 
problematic for Respondent.  In fact, it goes to the very crux of this dissent.  
Count V relates to Respondent’s interaction with lawyers, judges and court staff.  
Herein lies the one true, glaring basis for the entire Amended Complaint:  the 
judicial temperament of Respondent.  This is the underlying theme of the entire 
complaint.  All of the allegations, with the exception of the alleged campaign 
violation, relate in one way or another to the judicial temperament of Respondent.  
Judicial temperament includes common sense, compassion, humility, open-
mindedness, patience, tact and understanding.  It is a quality that can best be 
identified when it is absent.  The absence of judicial temperament generally 
exhibits itself in many ways including arrogance, impatience, pomposity, 
loquacity, irascibility, arbitrariness or tyranny.  Unfortunately, the absence of 
judicial temperament by Respondent exhibited itself far too often during the 
hearing of this matter.  While all judges have ‛bad days’ even this dissenter 
believes that Disciplinary Counsel has established a pattern of behavior by 
Respondent that exceeds the acceptable bounds of what must be demanded of the 
judiciary.  I therefore agree that, in Count V, Disciplinary Counsel has established 
a violation of Canon 1 and Canon 3(B)(4) of the Code of Judicial Conduct which 
must be sanctioned. 
{¶ 77} “The panel report regarding aggravation, mitigation and 
recommended sanction underscores the temptation to be swept up in the sheer 
magnitude of the evidence presented.  Every possible aggravating circumstance is 
mentioned and testimony was molded to justify the severe sanction 
recommended.  The panel heard many witnesses, reviewed many exhibits and 
considered an incredible number of incidents alleging numerous violations.  The 
January Term, 2004 
27 
volume of evidence should not be used as a justification to take drastic action.  A 
reasoned approach to this matter is consistent with the above argument.  This is a 
case about a judge who lacks judicial temperament, nothing more, nothing less.  
After all of the detailed analysis of each specific case and every shred of evidence 
that could be solicited over a number of years, we are left with the ultimate 
conclusion:  this is a judge who has a number of good qualities but judicial 
temperament is not one of them.  Her behavior warrants action. 
{¶ 78} “In considering a recommended sanction, the panel report discards 
each of Respondent’s defenses.  One of Respondent’s defenses was that the 
complaints were politically motivated.  Certainly, politics did not force 
Respondent to behave the way she did at times.  However, to totally discard this 
factor one would have to ignore substantial evidence to the contrary.  One 
witness, Sherry Mitchell, [a] former employee of the Franklin County Court of 
Common Pleas, who left for a better employment opportunity, seemed to be one 
of the few impartial witnesses on this topic.  She described the Court as a 
‘political, back-biting environment’ and that decisions by court administration 
were ‘rarely based on fact’ but rather were ‘made on personal agenda, who knew 
who and politics.’  She testified as to the ‘self-serving, malicious environment.’  
One judge openly made derogatory comments about Respondent to courthouse 
staff.  (TR 17/22)  Having served on a multi-judge court, I do not discard this 
issue as easily as the other panel members.  The atmosphere which seems to 
pervade this Court has Respondent at the center, but there are other parties who 
seem to relish throwing gasoline on the fire.  The scene of one of the complainant 
judges on her hands and knees writing an antagonistic remark with chalk on 
Respondent’s parking spot would be comical if not so tragic.  Some who claim 
that Respondent brings disrespect to that Court should consider the atmosphere 
they have helped foster.  It must be clearly stated once again that Respondent 
cannot utilize this atmosphere as justification for her actions, but to ignore it is to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
provide only a partial picture of reality.  The panel report’s reference to a prior 
disciplinary action that was dismissed is prejudicial and should be removed. 
{¶ 79} “The panel report reference to Respondent’s refusal to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct as a significant aggravating 
factor is not born[e] out by her testimony.  Respondent did testify that in some 
instances she should have handled things differently.  She acknowledged that 
some mistakes were made.  The fact that she denies the allegations is not evidence 
of anything.  To chastise her for denying the allegations and mounting a vigorous 
defense should not be an aggravating factor since many of the counts are without 
basis. 
{¶ 80} “The panel report further considers the criminal litigants to be 
victims of Respondent’s actions.   All of these individuals had recourse in the law 
for perceived violations of their due process rights.  These individuals do not have 
a ‘right’ to probation or a presentence investigation if the judge determines that 
probation is not going to be granted.  Competent counsel protects your due 
process rights within the law.  That is their function.  These criminal defendants 
were not denied their right to go to trial.  These instances cannot stand alone on 
their merits as violations and certainly cannot be considered as a pattern of how 
Respondent handles criminal cases.  Since 1992, she has presided over hundreds, 
if not thousands, of criminal cases and to allege that these several cases 
demonstrate a ‘pattern’ is stretching beyond the limits of reasonableness. 
{¶ 81} “The panel report finding that Respondent was motivated by a 
selfish motive lacks justification.  Respondent did not personally gain from her 
actions in any way.  To insinuate that her personal motive was to have a 
manageable caseload is to ignore pressures put on trial judges to keep the docket 
current.  The Supreme Court initiated the case reporting requirements to insure 
the timely resolution of cases.  Once again, the few cases mentioned in the 
Amended Complaint certainly do not establish a pattern that docket control was 
January Term, 2004 
29 
more important to respondent than the rights of the parties.  The testimony 
established the Respondent did grant continuance requests when she felt they 
were merited.  A clear and convincing pattern is not established by such a 
min[u]scule percentage of cases handled. 
{¶ 82} “In conclusion, the bases for the panel report sanction 
recommendation have not been established by clear and convincing evidence.  It 
has not been established that Respondent acted with dishonesty.  A pattern of 
conduct was not established except as it relates to intemperate behavior.  Any 
resulting harm from Respondent[’]s decisions was minimal and could have been 
reviewed by a higher court.  Respondent was responsible for her part in the effect 
on the public esteem for the integrity of the judiciary.  Others are also to blame. 
{¶ 83} “At the end of the day, the question is what to do with a judge who 
lacks judicial temperament.  Should she effectively be removed from office even 
though the citizens of Franklin County want her to be their judge?  Should the 
citizens of Franklin County have the right to a judge who lacks judicial 
temperament if they want one? 
{¶ 84} “Respondent has a problem that is affecting her ability to be a 
better judge.  For some time the legal profession has sought to render assistance to 
members who experience problems.  The OLAP program of the Ohio S[t]ate Bar 
Association is one example of a profession striving to assist colleagues who are 
experiencing personal problems.  I believe that the panel unanimously agrees that 
Respondent is in need of professional assistance in helping her attain a better 
judicial temperament on a more consistent basis.  Her situation is not hopeless.  
The testimony regarding her temperament was not all one-sided.  A number of 
witnesses, including a former Board member, testified as to very positive 
experiences in her courtroom.  Unfortunately, her past behavior toward others in 
the legal system has contributed to the dislike some individuals seem to have for 
her.  Sometimes she is not an easy person to like.  She is demanding.  She is 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
strong-willed.  She can and has displayed some very negative emotions in the 
courthouse.  It is my belief that the Board has several responsibilities in this 
matter.  The Board must not get caught up in the negative media frenzy that has 
followed Respondent for some time.  The Board must not look at the sheer 
volume of the evidence presented and think that severe punishment must be 
justified.  Above all, the Board has a responsibility to try to assist this individual 
in dealing with her imperfections at the same time that she is sanctioned.  Any 
sanction by this Board is a severe sanction for Respondent.  The publicity of a 
sanction against a sitting judge for lack of proper judicial temperament will be a 
severe punishment in itself.  The cost of her defense in this matter will be 
astronomical.  The mitigating factors contained in the panel report are substantial 
and aggravating factors are minimal at best.  This Board should strive to fashion a 
sanction that is not overly punitive, but addresses the true violation of 
Respondent:  her temperament.”   
{¶ 85} One additional note: I am concerned that Disciplinary Counsel in 
this case developed a strong animus against Judge O’Neill.  During oral argument, 
counsel repeatedly called Judge O’Neill a liar.  As with the rest of her problems, 
much of this one was her own doing; many of her explanations do not bear up 
under scrutiny.  Many other “lies,” however, are simply disputes about events that 
occurred in the past, sometimes years in the past.  Disciplinary Counsel appears in 
this case not to differentiate among legitimate differences of recollection, 
inadvertent misrepresentations, and deliberate misrepresentations. 
{¶ 86} Disciplinary Counsel sought disbarment of Judge O’Neill, a 
remarkable instance of overcharging – to the best of my knowledge, no sitting 
judge has ever been disbarred in this country.  He continued to seek this sanction 
despite the recommendation of the panel that heard the case and against the 
recommendation of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline.     
January Term, 2004 
31 
{¶ 87} Finally, because of the multitude of minor charges that counsel 
chose to present to the panel, the hearing in this case took 19 days, a period of 
time that maximally taxed our volunteer hearing panel and the financial resources 
of Judge O’Neill.  A sharper focus on the significant charges would have led to a 
more timely and economic resolution of this case. 
 
RESNICK, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
32 
APPENDIX to concurring opinion of Pfeifer, J. 
 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
ON 
GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE 
OF 
THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
In Re:                                                       : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   : 
Complaint against 
 
 
   : 
Case No. 02-34 
 
 
 
 
 
   : 
Judge Deborah P. O’Neill 
 
   : 
Findings of Fact, 
 
 
Attorney Reg. No. 0007128  
   : 
Conclusions of Law and 
   
 
 
 
 
   : 
Recommendation of the 
Respondent,  
 
   : 
Board of Commissioners on 
 
 
 
 
   : 
Grievances and Discipline of 
 
 
 
 
   : 
the Supreme Court of Ohio 
 
 
 
 
   : 
 
Disciplinary Counsel  
 
   : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   : 
 
 
Relator. 
 
 
   : 
 
1. This matter came on for final hearing before panel members Judge Jack 
Puffenberger of Toledo, Ohio, Attorney Stanley C. Bender of Portsmouth, Ohio and 
Attorney Jean M. McQuillan of Rocky River, Ohio, Chair, on May 19, 20 and 21, 
August 5, 6 and 7,  September 29 and 30, October 1, November 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 
January Term, 2004 
33 
24, 25 and 26, 2003 and February 2 and 3, 2004. None of the panel members was a 
member of the probable cause panel that heard this Complaint, or resides in the 
district from which this Complaint arose.  
2. The panel heard testimony from ninety-nine different witnesses and 
received and considered the Stipulations of Fact and Stipulated Exhibits as to each 
Count. (Numbered Exhibits 1-529) The panel also considered Exhibits from each 
party as to each Count of the Amended Complaint. (Relator’s Exhibits A-XXX and 
Respondent’s Exhibits A-V) 
3. This complaint originated from a group of grievances filed with the 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel in January 2001 signed by 8 Franklin County 
Common Pleas judges: Judges Watson, McGrath, Cain, Crawford, Miller, Bessey, 
Sadler and Hogan.  Judge O’Neill received a first letter of inquiry relating to these 
grievances from Disciplinary Counsel dated January 19, 2001.   Respondent 
submitted a reply dated March 6, 2001. A second letter of inquiry to respondent 
regarding additional matters was dated June 14, 2001 and Respondent replied to the 
second letter of inquiry on July 25, 2001.  Within one year of the first letter of 
inquiry, on January 7, 2002,  Relator provided to Respondent notice that the 
investigation had terminated and Relator intended to file a complaint.  A draft 
complaint was submitted to Respondent on March 9, 2002.  Respondent requested 
additional time to respond.  On June 6, 2002 a Probable Cause Panel of the Board 
considered the complaint and on June 17, 2002 the complaint, as approved by 
Probable Cause, was filed.   
4. Respondent’s Answer was filed on July 8, 2002 and a panel was 
assigned on July 10, 2002.  On July 23, 2002 Relator sent Respondent a third letter 
of Inquiry.  With the agreement of the parties, the filing of an amended complaint 
was delayed until November 19, 2002, adding Count VI and other factual matters to 
the already existing counts. Respondent’s Answer to the Amended Complaint was 
filed on January 15, 2003.  Respondent filed a Motion for Judgment on the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
34 
Pleadings or, in the Alternative Summary Judgment on February 20, 2003.  Briefing 
of these Motions was completed on March 28, 2003. An entry denying the Motions 
was filed April 5, 2003.   Final hearing dates were set based on the jointly proposed 
dates from counsel for the parties and the final hearing commenced on May 19, 
2003.  Additional hearing dates were added in August 2003 and February 2004 
based upon the progress of hearings and with the consent of the parties. 
5. Because of the factual complexity of the Amended Complaint, the 
number of different incidents alleged and witnesses involved, the panel chair ordered 
that the final hearing not proceed in the traditional manner but rather proceed Count 
by Count. The purpose was to hear all the testimony relating to each factual incident 
in as close proximity as possible.   As nearly as practicable, Relator and Respondent 
both presented their evidence on each separate Count before proceeding to present 
evidence on the next Count. The parties proposed and the hearings proceeded on 
Count 1, then Counts 2-4, then Count 5 and then Count 6.  When the Relator rested 
on each Count or group of Counts, Respondent made Motions for Dismissal which 
were opposed by Relator and denied by the Panel. The Respondent then proceeded 
with her evidence on the Count being heard.  Evidence relating generally to 
mitigation was taken throughout the final hearings.  The parties submitted final 
arguments in written briefs. 
6. Despite the complex and hotly contested nature of these proceedings the 
Panel notes with appreciation and gratitude that counsel for Relator and counsel for 
Respondent presented this matter in an extremely civil and professional matter.  
7. The six count Amended Complaint alleges violations of the Disciplinary 
Rules and Canons of Judicial Conduct.  The factual incidents involved date from 
1997 through 2002. This report will cover each Count of the Complaint separately 
making findings of fact and conclusions of law as appropriate to each Count. This 
report, for consistency, will use the descriptive labels that appear in the Amended 
January Term, 2004 
35 
Complaint and/or the name of the primary party involved to organize findings of 
fact. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
8. COUNT 1 alleged that Judge O’Neill held ex parte conversations, failed 
to exercise judicial discretion and failed to follow the law. The panel heard evidence 
relating to 11 factual incidents, detailed below and identified by the names of the 
parties involved. 
9. BIRCHLER: Testimony taken on behalf of Relator from Kenneth 
Birchler, (defendant) (Transcript Vol. I  - 115-150), Barry Littrell (defense attorney) 
(Transcript Vol. I  - 27-112), Angela Canepa, (Director of Sex Offender’s Unit, 
Franklin County Prosecutor) (Transcript Vol. I  - 153-195) Professor Lewis Katz 
(Transcript Vol. IV – 8-80), Judge O’Neill, (Transcript Vol. V  - 6-59, Vol. VI – 
185- 197, Vol. VII, 159) and on behalf of Respondent from Rachel Ginsburg 
(Franklin County Probation Department, Sex Offenders Unit Supervisor) (Transcript 
Vol. IV  - 81-119) Judge William J. Corzine (Transcript Vol. XI – 155-183), Judge 
Richard E. Parrott (Transcript Vol. XI – 183-212), former Judge Lewis E. Williams, 
Jr. (Transcript Vol.  VII – 73-194), former Judge Gary Tyack (Transcript Vol. VI – 
37-71), former Judge Ann Marie Tracey (Transcript Vol. XII – 35-87) and Judge 
O’Neill, (Transcript Vol. VI – 185- 197, Vol. VII, 159), Stipulated Exhibits 1-45, 
(Relator’s Exhibits A, B), (Respondent’s Exhibits A, D). 
10. Kenneth Birchler was charged with multiple counts of rape, sexual 
assault and kidnapping relating to an incident, which occurred in 1997 while he was 
working as a maintenance man in an apartment complex.  The victim alleged that he 
had sexually assaulted her while he was in her apartment to perform maintenance. 
11. Barry Littrell represented Birchler.  Littrell was admitted to practice in 
1983 and has a general practice in central Ohio.   Birchler admitted to being in the 
victim’s apartment but adamantly denied that a sexual assault took place or any 
sexual conduct took place.  The case was called for trial on November 10, 1997 and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
36 
the jury was selected. Angela Canepa, who was the Director of the Sex Crimes Unit 
of the Franklin County prosecutor’s office, took over the case on the day of trial.  
She learned that day that there was no physical evidence and there were serious 
issues with the victim’s credibility, which compromised the prosecution’s case. 
(Transcript Vol. I  - 157-159) 
12. Seeking to salvage this prosecution Canepa offered Birchler a plea to 
simple assault (a non-sex offense misdemeanor).  Birchler accepted and counsel 
discussed with Judge O’Neill a sentence of six months with 60 days work release jail 
time, the rest suspended and five years probation. In the transcript, (Exhibit 35) the 
plea is described as an Alford plea, albeit somewhat tardily.  Although considerable 
testimony was taken as to the nature of the plea, all participating parties who 
testified herein agreed this was an Alford plea.  In an Alford plea the defendant 
pleads guilty to a charge while protesting his innocence. 
13. In the sentencing transcript, Judge O’Neill for the first time told the 
parties that one of the conditions of probation would be Birchler’s participation in 
sex offender counseling.  Neither Birchler, Littrell nor Canepa were aware that sex-
offender counseling required participants to admit they committed a sexual assault 
on a victim. (Transcript Vol. I  - 23,163,187).  Over the next 2 years Birchler 
complied with all conditions of his probation except the sexual offender counseling.  
He was discharged from the 2 programs offered in Franklin County, because he 
refused to admit he committed a sexual assault and that he had a victim.  
14. In 2000, a Request for Revocation of Probation was filed. Littrell and 
Canepa entered into and submitted to Judge O’Neill an entry that removed 
Birchler’s sex offender counseling condition of his probation to resolve the matter. 
(Exhibit 1, Relator’s Exhibit A) Judge O’Neill rejected the entry and a revocation 
hearing was held February 28, 2000. (Transcript Vol.  I – 168,169) 
15. At the revocation hearing it was established that Birchler had not 
completed the sex-offender counseling programs because he would not admit to 
January Term, 2004 
37 
committing a sexual assault and having a victim.  He would only admit he had been 
convicted of simple assault out of a plea bargain. (Exhibit 35, p.38)  Littrell argued 
that the sexual assault requirement was inconsistent with his client’s Alford plea.  
(Exhibit 35, p. 43-46) Judge O’Neill revoked Birchler’s probation for failure to meet 
the sexual offender counseling condition stating she was “infuriated” that Birchler 
denied he had a victim and stated in the transcript “it doesn’t take a rocket scientist 
to figure out that if you are on probation from a sex offense and the Judge tells you 
that you are to successfully complete sex offender counseling that you either go with 
the program or you are going to be revoked,” “ I don’t care what you call it, this was 
a sexual assault and he did plead guilty,” and “he has been convicted of an assault 
that arose out of a sexual attack”(Exhibit  35, pp.48, 57)   
16. Littrell appealed the probation revocation and the Tenth District Court of 
Appeals reversed, stating “We cannot reconcile appellant’s Alford plea and the 
requirement as a part of his counseling session that he admit he had a victim.... 
Requiring appellant to admit that there was a victim or to specific criminal conduct 
would be in contradiction to his maintenance of factual innocence pursuant to 
Alford.” (Exhibit 5, p.4)  The appellate court further held that “because appellant did 
not have notice of this term of his probation, which was significant due to his Alford 
plea, he could not have been expected to file a direct appeal of his probation 
requirements. The trial court abused its discretion in revoking appellant’s probation 
based upon that reasoning.” (Exhibit 5, p.6)   Littrell also argued that the trial court 
had failed to serve as a neutral and detached hearing officer in the revocation hearing 
but that assignment of error was held moot. (Exhibit 5, p.6-7)  
17. In anticipation of the remand hearing, Littrell and Canepa prepared 
another agreed entry for Judge O’Neill amending the probation to remove the sex 
offender counseling requirement. Judge O’Neill did not accept the proffered entry 
and refused to meet with counsel. (Transcript Vol. 1  - 51-52, Vol. V – 36, Exhibit 5, 
P.7, Relator’s Exhibit B)   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
38 
18. On November 7, 2000 Judge O’Neill held a remand hearing.  Littrell 
testified that in this hearing Judge O’Neill had an air of prejudice and hostility.   
Birchler testified that the judge was not happy with him. (Transcript Vol.  I – 46-47, 
120)  Respondent began the hearing by stating, “I have read the decision. I 
respectfully disagree.  The Court can assess those terms, especially since the 
underlying offense was a sex offense.” (Exhibit 34, p.2-3)  
19. Judge O’Neill then stated: “This is where it stands.  It stands that either 
he is going to comply with the terms and conditions of his probation, or the State is 
going to withdraw – file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea and the Court will set 
it for trial on the rape charge.”  Twice more in the hearing Judge O’Neill represented 
that the state would move to withdraw Birchler’s plea if Birchler would not comply 
with terms and conditions of probation as originally ordered. (Exhibit 34, p. 4, 6)  
Canepa testified that the state had no intention nor any desire to vacate the plea and 
that she had never discussed that topic with Judge O’Neill before the hearing. 
(Transcript Vol.  I – 170-171) Canepa was asked:  Q.   Have you ever heard of a 
judge saying to a prosecutor,  "You will be making a motion to withdraw the 
defendant's guilty plea" other than this instance? A.   No.  Judges don't usually tell 
the state what they should or should not do.” (Transcript Vol. 1 – 17) 
20. In the hearing record, Judge O’Neill characterized Birchler’s behavior as 
absolutely despicable and entering into an Alford plea to try to take advantage of the 
system.  When Littrell objected that only the defendant has the right to ask for a 
withdrawal of the plea and asked Judge O’Neill to reimpose probation without the 
obligation for counseling as set forth by the Court of Appeals order, Judge O’Neill 
stated, “Well, Barry, you don’t do a lot of criminal work down here and I don’t 
know if you’ve ever done one before this case.” (Exhibit 34 p.5) 
21. Judge O’Neill concluded the hearing stating:  “I’m going to set this back 
in the original terms and conditions of probation...If he fails to cooperate, he’ll be set 
for revocation and at that time I’m sure the State will file its motion to withdraw the 
January Term, 2004 
39 
guilty plea. Of course you know what the Court’s thinking was all along in the 
matter.  We’ll just set the matter for trial.” (Exhibit 34 p. 7) 
22. Birchler described his impression from that hearing:  “And she just 
basically said that it was her courtroom, she was going to do what she wanted, and, 
you know, that's the way it was.  And she told me if I didn't like it to appeal it.  I was 
-- just kind of made me lose faith in the judicial system.   It was just like, what did I 
go to appeals court for, what was I paying $17,000 for if I'm going to win an appeal, 
and then they’re just going to deny it?” (Transcript Vol. 1  - 146) 
23. Birchler attempted another sex offender counseling program that refused 
to admit him until  he admitted to a sexual assault.  “I just decided to go ahead and 
do the three months in jail, because I didn't want to take the chance of Judge O’Neill 
-- she'd already threatened me with the fact that she was going to take me back up on 
the original charges if I didn't comply with the sentencing that she'd sentenced me on 
I said, "I'll just go ahead and do the three months and get it over with."  I didn't want 
to, but I did. “ (Transcript Vol.  I - 147) 
24. Professor Lewis Katz is the Hutchins Professor of Law at Case Western 
Reserve University and he has taught Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure for 37 
years. Regarding Birchler he testified that the withdrawal of a plea under Ohio law is 
the right of a defendant only.   An Alford plea is a plea of guilty to the charge with 
protestations of innocence.  Given the mandate from the Court of Appeals, the Court 
should have amended the conditions of probation in some fashion to eliminate the 
need for sexual offender counseling, either by removing the requirement of 
admitting a victim or substituting other counseling. (Transcript Vol. IV  - 23-25)  
25. Judge O’Neill’s testimony was that at the remand hearing she just 
wanted to get Birchler back to square one given that there had been a lack of 
understanding.  She maintained in her Answer and in testimony that Canepa had told 
her before the remand hearing that the State felt defrauded by the “ruse” of 
Birchler’s Alford plea.   She admitted that that position was clearly inconsistent with 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
40 
Canepa’s testimony at this hearing and Canepa’s willingness to consent to amend 
Birchler’s probation requirements at the time of the revocation and at the time of the 
remand.  Judge O’Neill believed that this inconsistency was due to the State feeling 
“stuck”.  (Transcript Vol. V  - 46-49) 
26. NEZVALOVA: Testimony taken on behalf of Relator from Joseph 
Edwards (defense attorney)(Transcript Vol.  I – 197-228), Renee Amblin 
(prosecutor)(Transcript Vol.  I – 228-257), Corrina Vaughn (supervising 
prosecutor)(Transcript Vol.  257-287) and Judge O’Neill, (Transcript Vol. V  - 60- 
91, VI - 197-202), (Exhibits 46-75) 
27. Three non-U.S. citizens, Lenka Nezvalova, Peter Janik and Marcel 
Stasko were arrested by Columbus police in the act of using cocaine.  They were 
charged with F-5 drug offenses.  They were at first all represented by W. Joseph 
Edwards, admitted to practice in 1985 with a criminal defense and personal injury 
practice in Columbus.  Prior to indictment Edwards had approached Cindy Taylor, 
the head of the Narcotics Unit of the Franklin County prosecutors office to discuss a 
deal in which his clients would cooperate, give information and make introductions 
for the police in return for these first-time charges being dropped against the clients.  
Since the defendants were not citizens, even a plea to a first-degree misdemeanor 
was a deportable offense.   
28. At the time of the first pretrial in September 13, 2000, the prosecution, 
represented by Corinna Vaughan would not consider dismissal until the defendants 
actually met with the police and were “debriefed”.  Vaughan and Edwards appeared 
at the pretrial and asked Judge O’Neill for a 2-4 week continuance of the trial to 
accomplish that debriefing session.  Judge O’Neill refused a continuance and 
reminded the parties of her procedure that she will entertain pleas only at the pretrial 
and after the pretrial she will only accept a plea to the indictment.  Counsel were 
unsuccessful at persuading Judge O’Neill to alter her policy or grant a continuance.  
In conversations at the sidebar, Judge O’Neill became frustrated and angry with 
January Term, 2004 
41 
counsel.  Edwards’s clients overheard the discussions and were disturbed and 
expressed concern about the Judge’s anger and their status.  Edwards and Vaughan 
were unsuccessful at scheduling the debriefing and several days before trial Edwards 
was informed that Nezvalova and Stasko had retained their own counsel who 
entered appearances and requested continuances of the trial date of November 28, 
3000.  
29. On the scheduled trial date the defendants appeared each with their own 
lawyers, Edwards, Dennis Belli and David Rieser. Renee Amblin, a new prosecutor 
was assigned on rotation to the trial and appeared  with Vaughan available in the 
courtroom as backup.  In a series of discussions at the sidebar and on the record 
among counsel and Judge O’Neill the unopposed Motions for Continuance made by 
new counsel were denied by Judge O’Neill who mentioned concerns about 
controlling her criminal docket.  Prosecutor Amblin’s attempts to offer misdemeanor 
or no-contest pleas were denied by Judge O’Neill.  (Transcript Vol. V  - 79-81) 
(Exhibit 47, p.12)  Counsel were told by Judge O’Neill that only guilty pleas to the 
indictment would be considered.  Judge O’Neill’s demeanor was described by 
Amblin as, “I felt like we were being yelled at...I was about to cry, because I didn’t 
know what to do.  I felt as if she were upset about things that shouldn’t be the cause 
of being so upset.” Her demeanor was described by Edwards as, ”very tense” and by 
Vaughan as “very angry, very loud, very demeaning to the defense counsel, very 
frustrated with the prosecutor’s office...It was a very hostile courtroom.” (Transcript 
Vol. I – 216, 240-242, 268-269) All three defendants plead to the indictment.  Judge 
O’Neill denied being angry, loud, frustrated or demeaning to defense counsel. 
(Transcript Vol. V  - 72-79)  
30. Nezvalova and Stasko appealed and their convictions were reversed by 
the Tenth District Court of Appeals on grounds that the trial court’s refusal to accept 
no contest pleas was an abuse of discretion, which prejudiced appellants’ rights.  
“Appellants sought to enter no contest pleas to preserve the appealability of pretrial 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
42 
evidentiary decisions.  The trial court repeatedly advised appellants’ new defense 
counsel that appellants either had to plead guilty to the indictment or proceed 
forward with trial.  In addition, the court suggested that a failure to enter pleas would 
result in an abbreviated period of time in which the court’s staff could have lunch.  
As a result, appellants plead guilty.  Therefore, the trial court, by injecting itself into 
the plea bargain process, affected the voluntariness of appellants’ decision to plead 
guilty.” (Exhibit 52 p. 9) 
31. The Court of Appeals opinion was filed on May 21, 2002. (Exhibit 52)  
On May 24, 2002, a Friday afternoon, Corrina Vaughan received a phone call at her 
office from Judge O’Neill about the Nezvalova case.  She testified that Judge 
O’Neill was agitated and angry and stated:   "You're not going to believe this.  They 
overturned that Russian case.  We're going to have to do something about this.  
We're going to have to fight this.  We're going to have to do something about this.  I 
think we did everything right.  I don't think we did anything wrong.” (Transcript 
Vol. I  - 273-274) 
32. Vaughan testified that she said very little in response and was horribly 
uncomfortable with Judge O’Neill’s  statements “as if we were on the same team, 
meaning me and Judge O’Neill, is how she kept phrasing these discussions or these 
comments.”  Judge O’Neill did not discuss scheduling or procedural matters in this 
call. (Transcript Vol. I – 274-275) Judge O’Neill admitted that she made a single 
phone call to Vaughan but maintained that it only concerned scheduling matters and 
nothing else.   Judge O’Neill testified that she made the phone call because her 
bailiff was out that day and she was concerned that the matter be scheduled as 
quickly as possible although Judge O’Neill’s bailiff did not enter such an order until 
more than a month later on June 27, 2000. (Exhibit 65) (Transcript Vol. V  - 87-91) 
Vaughan testified that several days later she did receive a voicemail message from 
Judge O’Neill, which did ask what the prosecutors’ office intended to do with the 
case and whether it should be scheduled back on the docket.  Vaughan deliberately 
January Term, 2004 
43 
did not return the call to Judge O’Neill based on her discomfort with the first phone 
call.   Instead, after consulting others in her office she left a message with the bailiff 
directing the inquiry to attorneys in the appellate division of the office, which had 
handled the appeal. (Transcript Vol. I  - 275-276).  
33. MONTOYA: Testimony was taken from Rebecca Pokorski (Franklin 
County Public Defender)(Transcript Vol.  I – 287, II – 8-41), Kevin Mulrane (Head 
of the Common Pleas Unit, Franklin County Public Defender)(Transcript Vol. 41-
91), Michael Jakubow (Assistant Franklin County Prosecutor)(Transcript Vol.  II – 
91-125), Professor Lewis Katz (Transcript Vol. IV – 8-80), Judge William J. 
Corzine (Transcript Vol. XI – 155-183), Judge Richard E. Parrott (Transcript Vol. 
XI – 183-212), former Judge Ann Marie Tracey (Transcript Vol. XII – 35-87) Judge 
O’Neill (Transcript Vol. V – 91-113, VI 202-210, VII – 7-8,117,134-135)   (Exhibits 
76 – 102). 
34. Lozaro Montoya was charged with multiple felony counts related to 
witness intimidation.  He did not speak English.  At arraignment he was unable to 
make the bail set of $20,000 and was in jail when the case was assigned to Judge 
O’Neill.  The Franklin County Public Defender was assigned to represent him on 
October 13, 2000.  The public defender assigned, Rebecca Pokorski (a staff attorney 
with the office since 1991), requested discovery from the prosecution.  The case was 
set for a pre-trial on October 24, 2000.  Pokorski, who had not received discovery, 
met with her client in the holding cell for the first time that day and spoke with him 
through an interpreter.  Pokorski met with Michael Jakubow, the assigned prosecutor 
who consented to a continuance of trial.  The defense orally requested and presented 
an agreed entry to Judge O’Neill allowing a continuance of the trial date then set for 
November 15, 2000. Pokorski explained that she had not received any discovery 
from the prosecution and that all the witnesses and her client were Spanish speakers 
and that complicated contact with them.  Judge O’Neill denied the continuance.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
44 
35. After the October 24, 2000 pretrial, Pokorski filed a written Motion for 
Continuance, a Motion for Recusal of Judge O’Neill and a Motion to Substitute 
Counsel, which were all denied.  On the trial date of November 15, 2000 Jakubow 
had not been able to locate his witnesses.  As a result of discussion between Judge 
O’Neill and counsel it was agreed that Montoya would waive speedy trial time and 
in return he would be released on a personal recognizance bond with house arrest 
and orders not to contact the complaining witnesses.  Judge O’Neill told the parties 
that the trial was rescheduled in two weeks on November 28, 2000.  Pokorski 
advised the Court that two weeks was insufficient time to prepare: the prosecution 
witnesses still had to be found and made available for interview, the Thanksgiving 
holiday and a two-day death penalty seminar and other previously scheduled cases 
would not allow preparation within that time.  Judge O’Neill declined to adjust the 
date any further stating that counsel would be prepared and trial would proceed on 
that date. 
36. On the November 28, 2000, Pokorski was not prepared to try the 
Montoya case.  She had discussed the options available if trial commenced to 
preserve Montoya’s rights with her supervisor, Kevin Mulrane, and planned to 
refuse to participate in the trial should Judge O’Neill begin the trial.  She had 3 other 
cases set for jury trials that day. That morning she checked the availability of the 
other judges set for jury trials and learned the Judge Johnson was available on a case 
older than Montoya.  She told Judge O’Neill’s bailiff that she was starting a jury trial 
with Judge Johnson and went to clear her last case, a revocation hearing before 
Judge McGrath.  Returning to the ninth floor she was told that Judge Johnson had 
decided to start another jury trial.  At that point she went into Judge O’Neill’s 
courtroom and spoke to Judge O’Neill informing her if  the Montoya trial 
commenced Pokorski would not participate in the trial.  She recalls a brief, nervous 
but respectful exchange.  She left to do a bond revocation hearing elsewhere  
January Term, 2004 
45 
(Transcript Vol. I – 306-310) Montoya was present sitting in Judge O’Neill’s 
courtroom with some family members and the interpreter. 
37. Completing her work, Pokorski returned to Judge O’Neill’s courtroom 
and was met by the interpreter who told her that after she left, the judge revoked 
Montoya’s bond and had him arrested. (Transcript Vol.  I – 311)   In a transcript 
recorded outside the presence of counsel, Judge O’Neill stated, “The Court has been 
informed by defense counsel that she will not participate in the trial.  I gave the 
defendant a bond last week over the objection of the prosecutor under the condition 
that she knew it would go to trial today or be nollied.  The bond is therefore revoked.  
This is a witness intimidation case and it will be either tried today or it won’t; but in 
any event the Court did not intend for this person to be out on bond any longer than 
today, so the bond is revoked.” (Exhibit 94, p. 1)   Judge O’Neill also completed a 
case-processing sheet that noted “Bond revoked.   Ct only gave short bond b/c 
defendant would not waive time at the last trial date, defendant and counsel knew 
this was a definite trial date.” (Exhibit 78)    
38. At the time Judge O’Neill revoked Montoya’s bond and had him arrested 
in the courtroom no request for revocation had been made.  Judge O’Neill admitted 
that no conditions of Montoya’s bond had been violated.  Judge O’Neill admitted 
that she did not record in any document when the bond was issued that this was a 
“short bond”, only good until the trial date.  Neither Jakubow nor Pokorski recall 
any discussion about a time limitation on the bond when it was issued.  Neither had 
ever heard of a “short bond” in name or concept.  The only thing that had changed, 
as stated by Judge O’Neill on the record was Pokorski’s refusal to participate in the 
trial because she had not had the opportunity to prepare. Judge O’Neill denied that 
she never saw or spoke to Pokorski before going on the record that morning. 
(Transcript Vol.  V – 99-111) 
39. Montoya was held in the courtroom lockup until noon when the 
prosecution “nollied” the case because of defects in the indictment. At that time he 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
46 
was ordered released after he was processed through the jail.  Pokorski characterized 
the incident as frightening for him, being Spanish-speaking and not understanding 
why he was being arrested.  (Transcript Vol. II  - 31)  Pokorski’s supervisor, Kevin 
Mulrane was present in the courtroom at the conclusion of this matter. Later that day 
Mulrane was called to meet with Judge O’Neill who complained that Pokorski 
treated the judge with disrespect and shadily.  Mulrane discussed problems created 
for the Public Defender by Judge O’Neill’s practice of holding very early pretrials 
and only accepting pleas at the pretrial.  According to Mulrane, Judge O’Neill’s 
courtroom is the only courtroom he could recall in which public defenders have 
refused to participate on the trial date. He testified that the office takes a very 
conservative position on continuance requests and rarely has any difficulty. He 
believed that Pokorski had done what she had to do to preserve her client’s right to 
effective assistance of counsel in the circumstances.   (Transcript Vol. II  - 80-81)   
40. Professor Katz testified that the purposes of bond are to set an amount of 
and with conditions that will assure the defendant’s presence at a later time.  Bond is 
typically set at the first court appearance and continues until the disposition of the 
case by plea or verdict.  It was his opinion that Montoya’s bond was revoked 
because the defendant’s attorney was not willing to proceed to trial and that was 
inappropriate. He was unaware of any citations to the concept of a short bond in 
Ohio or anywhere covered by the Westlaw database.  (Transcript Vol. IV  - 29-34)  
41. Respondent called Judges Corzine and Parrott and former Judge Tracey.  
They testified that factors regarding setting bond involve what is necessary to secure 
the appearance of the defendant.  Bond revocation occurs primarily when a 
defendant fails to appear and usually any other factors causing revocation are 
brought up by the prosecution. Depending on the particular case revocation can 
occur as a result of specific acting out or threats made by the defendant or 
complaints of harassment made by victims or witnesses. The actions of counsel do 
January Term, 2004 
47 
not affect bond revocation.  (Transcript Vol.  XI – 168, 178 197, 199-200, XII – 50-
51) 
42. RIGHTER: Testimony taken on behalf of the Relator from Sean 
Dominy (defense attorney)(Transcript Vol.  II – 173-193), Douglas Righter 
(defendant)(Transcript Vol.  II – 193-211), Trent Turner (prosecutor)(Transcript 
Vol.  II – 211-237), Sandy Grego (court reporter) (Transcript Vol. IV  - 162-166) 
Judge O’Neill (Transcript Vol. V – 113-133, VI – 176-186) and Carolyn Bostic. 
(deputy sheriff)(Transcript Vol. XVIII  - 7-13) (Exhibits 103 – 114) 
43. Douglas Righter was indicted on multiple felony counts related to a 
drive-by shooting.  Earle “Duke” Frost and Shawn Dominy represented him.  His 
case was set for trial before Judge O’Neill on Monday, March 20, 2000.  Several 
sidebar conferences occurred that morning among Frost, Dominy, Trent Turner, 
the prosecutor,  and Judge O’Neill.  Righter was also present in the courtroom 
with family members.  The prosecutor offered a plea to the indictment dropping 
the gun specification but Righter wanted to go to trial.  Judge O’Neill told counsel 
that the case must be submitted to the jury by Wednesday because she was going 
on vacation.  Judge O’Neill admonished counsel to have their witnesses ready at 
the courthouse and stated that they would work till midnight each day if 
necessary.    Judge O’Neill then stated to Dominy in the presence of Turner “if 
he’s going to trial today, I am going to – I am going to revoke his bond.” 
(Transcript Vol. II  - 221, 179-180)   Turner recalled Dominy stated that his client 
was on bail and had appeared both times as required and asking how his client 
would be able to assist him in trial preparation if he is in jail.  Judge O’Neill 
stated that Dominy can speak to his client “in the back,” the courtroom lockup, 
and repeated, “Well, I’m going to revoke him.”  Turner testified that the judge’s 
statements about bond revocation surprised him since he did not request it and he 
was not aware of any reason for a bond revocation. (Transcript Vol. II – 221, 223-
224) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
48 
44. Righter was in the courtroom and observed the sidebars and partially 
heard Judge O’Neill say something about a vacation. Righter’s counsel then 
conveyed to him that Judge O’Neill would revoke his bond if trial started. Shortly 
thereafter Righter, Turner and Dominy noticed a group of deputies enter the 
courtroom and after asking about the reason for their presence were told that the 
deputies were called to take someone into custody for a bond revocation. (Transcript 
Vol. II – 186, 197, 223)  Righter overheard part of another sidebar discussing the 
prosecution witnesses and then Judge O’Neill said directly to Righter “ you get your 
witnesses down here today.” (Transcript Vol. II - 208-209).  Dominy described his 
client as “probably anxious” that morning.  (Transcript Vol. II -189) Further plea 
negotiation occurred between counsel as voir dire began and the prosecution offered 
a plea with reduced charges and a sentence of 18 months.  Righter accepted. “Based 
on the advice from my counsel, and the fact that I couldn't have my witnesses there 
and I was going to be sitting in jail regardless until the case was over until she got 
back from vacation which could have been, I didn't know when, but I had to do 
something or I was going to do 12 years in prison for something that wasn't my fault.  
I couldn't prepare a defense.” (Transcript Vol. II  - 203)  
45. Turner believed the plea was reasonable and fair but was concerned that 
it was coerced by Judge O’Neill’s threats to revoke the defendant’s bond during 
trial. (Transcript Vol.  II - 234-235) Turner was contacted and interviewed by private 
counsel for Righter’s family investigating the circumstances of the plea several 
months later but the matter was not appealed. (Transcript Vol. II – 227, 234-235) 
46. Judge O’Neill testified that she had noticed that Righter exhibited a lot of 
“agitation or tension” and “in and out activity” in the courtroom the morning of 
March 20, 2000.  She maintained that she stated her concerns about his conduct and 
behavior to Dominy, Frost and Turner (Transcript Vol. VI-180) but did not ask his 
lawyers to calm him down. (Transcript Vol. V – 123)  She testified that she said: “If 
he wants to go to trial, we're going today.  And that basically if he continues to act 
January Term, 2004 
49 
that way, or I continue to have concerns about that, then, yes, that is a possibility.  I 
could revoke his bond, not would revoke his bond if he went to trial.” (Transcript 
Vol. VI – 128)  She acknowledged that she did not make any note of the behavior 
she described.  She testified that Courtroom Deputy Carolyn Bostic told her that she 
called for additional deputies that morning due to Righter’s behavior. (Transcript 
Vol. V-122)   Carolyn Bostic testified that she was on a medical leave of absence 
from January 25 through April 25, 2000 and could not have been present for these 
events. (Transcript Vol. XVIII  - 3-5) 
47. COX: Testimony taken on behalf of Relator from Allison Cox 
(defendant)(Transcript Vol. II – 237-266), Ronald Welch (prosecutor)(Transcript 
Vol. II  - 266-276), Judge O’Neill (Transcript Vol.  V – 14 – 14) and on behalf of the 
Respondent from Ronald Janes (defense attorney)(Transcript Vol. VII – 247- 289) 
and Judge O’Neill (Transcript Vol. VI  - 168-177) (Exhibits 115 – 128). 
48. Allison Cox, a registered nurse, was charged with one count of burglary 
and one count of domestic violence against one of her adult daughters in September 
1999.  Mrs. Cox had a three-month old nursing baby and two other children at home 
at the time.  Cox had a previous criminal conviction from 1990 relating to this 
daughter who had a behavioral history of ADHD, explosive temper and depression. 
Cox had spoken to the victim the evening before trial and was not sure she would 
appear and testify.  Cox arrived at 7:30 am with nursing infant and husband.  
Waiting in the courtroom, she observed Judge O’Neill’s demeanor as varied, from 
just facts and business and then screaming and yelling at persons appearing before 
her.  Cox informed her lawyer, Ronald Janes that she won’t accept the plea, which 
had been previously offered.  This was a disposition day in Courtroom 9A.  When 
her case was called Cox observed Janes and the prosecutor approach the bench. Cox 
saw Judge O’Neill become irate, and she heard something about  “dispo day”. The 
court transcript records that Judge O’Neill chastised counsel for appearing on a 
disposition case with a case that Janes had assured the court would be a plea. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
50 
(Exhibit 116 p. 1-5) In a later sidebar conference Cox heard Judge O’Neill say in a 
loud and harsh tone that if trial started Cox would sit until jail until every witness 
was called. (Transcript Vol. II  - 244) 
49. Cox had later discussions with Janes and was told her options were to 
plea to original felony offer or sit in jail during trial and possibly the judge’s 
vacation and face more jail time if she was convicted.  Cox felt she had no choice 
with a baby at home she was nursing. She plead to the indictment and was sentenced 
to probation. (Transcript Vol. II  - 244-246) (Cox visibly lost her composure while 
testifying to these events at this disciplinary hearing).  Four days after her plea she 
filed a written grievance with the Columbus Bar which stated “Judge O’Neill 
became enraged and said that we would go to trial today and that I could sit in jail 
until all witnesses were contacted if we had to do the trial one hour a day.  I would 
have my bond revoked and I would stay in jail until the trial was complete if I did 
not accept a plea bargain.” (Exhibit 115)  The grievance was considered to be filed 
against Janes since Cox listed him as “the respondent” on the grievance form. 
50. Prosecutor Ronald Welch (admitted in 1998, with the Franklin County 
Prosecutor since 1999) appeared that morning as a last minute substitute for assigned 
prosecutor, also believed it would be a plea.  When Cox rejected the plea, Welch 
told Judge O’Neill he was not prepared for trial and he asked for a continuance.  
Judge O’Neill told Welch, “in no uncertain terms that it was my file. I was going to 
try the case.” (Transcript Vol. II - 270)  Welch then offered a misdemeanor plea and 
Cox refused. At the next sidebar Welch testified Judge O’Neill became more 
belligerent and screaming.  Judge O’Neill stated “we were going to proceed to trial, 
that if Mr. Janes' client chose to go forward with the trial that she would revoke her 
bail, that she would then be taken into custody and that there would be no one to 
take care of her child.” (Transcript Vol. II  - 272-273)   
51. Judge O’Neill testified that while the Cox case was scheduled on a 
disposition day, she was not upset or angry when Cox didn’t want to accept a plea 
January Term, 2004 
51 
and go to trial.  The docket was free for the afternoon, a trial was no problem at all 
and she advised the parties to notify her bailiff to request a jury for after lunch. 
(Transcript Vol. VI – 171-172)  As to the testimony that she would revoke Cox’s 
bond, she maintained that was incorrect.  She testified that she observed Cox in the 
courtroom that morning and that she was “agitated” and “disruptive” with “a lot of 
in and out activity”.  She believed despite Cox’s family status she was a flight risk.  
She also recalled “vividly” that Janes at a sidebar conference disclosed that Cox and 
another daughter were putting significant and inappropriate pressure on the victim to 
drop her charges and that Cox was requesting a continuance of the trial. (Transcript 
Vol. VI – 172-173)  As to any statement about revoking bond she testified, “I said to 
Mr. Janes and Mr. Welch, on maybe their third time up, because it was after the 
misdemeanor was rejected, which was the second side-bar, they came back at a later 
time that morning, and said, "Judge, she won't take the misdemeanor, and she's still 
wanting a continuance, but I'm ready to go.  I'm ready to do whatever you want to 
do."  I recall saying to Mr. Janes and Mr. Welch, "Look, if she keeps that type of 
conduct up, I've been watching her all morning, the court can revoke her bond and 
put her in jail while we're trying this case."...”It's going to be a situation where -- that 
has happened with other judges and other courtrooms.  I mean, there is a lot of case 
law on that when you're dealing with a difficult defendant, you do whatever you can 
to make sure you keep control of the courtroom. And if -- I pretty much -- it was just 
more of a warning.  It certainly was not a threat.” (Transcript Vol. VII – 175-176 and 
Vol. V – 147-149) 
52. Janes (admitted in 1969, in private criminal practice) was called to testify 
by Respondent.  He related discussions with Cox in which it was his suggestion to 
Cox that persuading the victim to appear in court and request that the charges be 
dropped would be the most effective way for Cox to get rid of these charges.  
(Transcript Vol. VII   - 263-266)  He had expected Cox to accept a plea and testified 
that Cox’s choice to reject a plea on June 26 was contrary to his advice.  He testified 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
52 
that he heard Judge O’Neill state that Cox’s bond would be revoked if she went to 
trial. Although Cox had been agitated in private conversations with him Janes had 
not observed any agitated behavior in the courtroom and was aware of no reason 
why Cox bond should be revoked that day.  He corroborated that Judge O’Neill was 
angry and upset, adding that everyone was upset that morning.  (Transcript Vol. VII 
- 266-267) Janes was concerned that the threat by Judge O’Neill to revoke Cox bond 
when trial began was not appropriate and had influenced his client to accept the 
guilty plea.  (Transcript Vol. VII - 270, 278-282) 
53. NASH: Testimony taken from Timothy Pritchard (prosecutor) 
(Transcript Vol. II – 158- 172), James Tullis Rogers (defense attorney)(Transcript 
Vol. II  – 125-158) and Judge O’Neill (Transcript Vol. V  - 151-158) (Exhibits 129-
146). 
54. Ronald Nash was indicted in 1996 on a F–5 possession of a trace amount 
of heroin.  The case was assigned to Judge O’Neill but Nash never appeared for a 
pretrial scheduled in 1996.  He was represented by James Tullis Rogers (admitted in 
1968, served as Ohio’s first Public Defender 1975-82, since then in private criminal 
practice in Columbus).   A bond forfeiture and capias were issued.  In November 
2000, Nash was arrested on the capias. Rogers moved to withdraw as counsel 
(Exhibit 137) but remained counsel when he learned that Nash’s non-appearance in 
1997 resulted from extradition to and imprisonment in New York.  After serving his 
sentence in New York, Nash had returned to Ohio.  Rogers met with the prosecutor 
and his client agreed to accept a misdemeanor plea with a maximum 6 months 
sentence less time served. (Exhibit 130).   
55. On January 9, 2001 Timothy Pritchard, the assigned prosecutor, Rogers 
and Nash appeared before Judge O’Neill to present the plea.  Rogers testified that at 
the sidebar conference Judge O’Neill stated she would not accept the plea. “He’ll eat 
the indictment or go to trial today.   I’m bored today anyway.” Rogers testified that 
he explained the reason for Nash’s absence in 1996 but Judge O’Neill said if he 
January Term, 2004 
53 
doesn’t plea to indictment she would sentence him to the maximum after trial, which 
was 18 months. Rogers testified that the judge spoke loudly enough that Nash heard 
the comments.  Nash was very alarmed and suspicious of Rogers but agreed to plea 
to the indictment.  (Transcript Vol. II – 133-135)  Judge O’Neill denied that  she said 
anything about being bored: “I’m never bored.” (Transcript Vol.  V - 154) 
56. Pritchard, (admitted in 1992, with the Franklin County Prosecutor til 
2002, now with the Ohio Attorney General) testified that the harsh tone and content 
of Judge O’Neill’s rejection of the plea was striking particularly because Rogers had 
a reputation as extremely respectful and professional lawyer (Transcript Vol. II – 
162-163). Rogers discussed the two choices with Nash: plea to the indictment or 
trial. Nash was very alarmed and suspicious of Rogers but agreed to plea to the 
indictment.  (Transcript Vol. II – 133-135) (Exhibit 135)   
57. Judge O’Neill sentenced Nash to 12 months and concluded by stating; 
“He will be doing less than five months, which is less than he would have gotten if 
we had done the misdemeanor.”  (Exhibit 146 p. 9)    Rogers testified that this was 
wrong since jail time credit would have reduced a six-month sentence on the 
misdemeanor to less than 3 months.  Rogers was disturbed that Judge O’Neill made 
that comment in front of his client who then wanted to complain.  Rogers testified 
that while he wrote letters defending Judge O’Neill from criticism in earlier years 
now he testified, “I would prefer to avoid that courtroom.... It’s an uncomfortable 
courtroom.... And it’s very volatile.” “I fear that something will be said to scare my 
clients or embarrass me.” (Transcript Vol. II  - 140-141, 152-153) 
58. BURTON V. NICHOLSON: Testimony taken from John Waddy 
(plaintiff’s attorney) (Transcript Vol. III- 68-117), Shelia Vitale (Judge O’Neill staff 
attorney) (Transcript Vol. III – 117-149), Judge O’Neill, (Transcript Vol. V  - 159-
177), (Exhibits 147-166) 
59. John Waddy represented Laura Burton in a civil case regarding an auto 
accident claim.  He had received a policy limits offer from the defendant’s insurer 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
54 
but could not accept it and dismiss the pending case until he received consent from 
the plaintiff’s underinsurance carrier.  At a final pretrial with Shelia Vitale, Judge 
O’Neill’s staff attorney, he explained the situation and Vitale made a note on the file 
that it was resolved but cannot be dismissed yet.  The case file went through normal 
processing and a dismissal entry was posted.  Waddy tried unsuccessfully with 
phone calls to Vitale and the bailiff and a written motion to vacate the dismissal 
entry.  He filed an appeal and the Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed the 
dismissal.  Judge O’Neill testified that this matter “fell through the cracks” and that 
there were some communication problems due to a death penalty case and other 
events occurring in this time period.  Upon remand the case was stayed until 
completely resolved. Waddy testified that the appeal delayed resolution of the case 
since the underinsurance insurance carrier would not negotiate until the appeal about 
the dismissal entry was resolved.  
60. BIVENS: Testimony taken from David DeVillers (prosecutor) 
(Transcript Vol. III – 8-35), Timothy Pierce (public defender)(Transcript Vol. III – 
35- 68), Sandy Grego (Court reporter) (Transcript Vol. III – 19-35) and Judge 
O’Neill (Transcript Vol. V – 177-187 and VII – 9 – 13), (Exhibits 169-179) 
61. Brandon Bivens, 19 years old, was indicted on two drug possession 
charges (F-4 and F-5).  Trial was scheduled for June 3, 1999 before Judge O’Neill.  
Bivens was represented by Public Defender Timothy Pierce (admitted 1989, with 
Franklin County Public Defender since 1990).  Prosecutor David DeVillers 
(admitted 1992, Franklin County Prosecutor’s Gang Unit  1997-2001, US.Attorney’s 
Office, Criminal Division since 2002) was assigned to the case since Bivens was 
identified as a gang member (“The choke and kill bloods”). Pierce contacted 
DeVillers the day before trial and conveyed that Bivens would accept the plea offer 
of an F-5 and an M-1 but Pierce wanted to have a Presentence Investigation or “PSI” 
to determine if the sentence could be probation. Pierce sought and received 
DeVillers’ consent to a PSI as well as to Pierce approaching Judge O’Neill ex parte 
January Term, 2004 
55 
to seek her approval to order a PSI.  Pierce went to Judge O’Neill’s courtroom on 
June 2, 1999. Pierce met with Judge O’Neill as she was leaving the bench, explained 
his request for a PSI for Bivens who was scheduled for the next morning and asked 
if Judge O’Neill would continue bond for Bivens during the PSI.  Pierce testified 
that it was not a passing conversation; “she had my attention and I had hers.”  Judge 
O’Neill said ‘that’s fine’. (Transcript Vol. III - 48) Pierce called Bivens and told him 
about the judge’s response and that the next day he should not expect sentencing; his 
plea would be entered and the PSI would be ordered. 
62. .  On June 3, 1999 Bivens was two hours late for the 9:00 am court 
hearing. DeVillers was in trial and sent Jeff Reichel to cover, understanding that this 
was just a plea and it had been arranged to order a PSI.  Neither Pierce nor Devillers 
had Bivens’ juvenile record, however, a juvenile record would not exclude ordering 
a PSI.  Pierce was in and out of Judge O’Neill’s courtroom that morning waiting on 
Bivens who arrived at 11:00 am.   Pierce was in the courtroom, when he saw Bivens 
arrive and he walked back toward him.  He heard behind him tumultuous noises, a 
book slamming down, and loud voices not understandable. (Transcript Vol. III – 40-
41)  Sandy Grego, the court reporter testified at that time Judge O’Neill was 
throwing her keys and a book down on the bench, slamming drawers and screaming. 
(Transcript Vol. III – 22-23)  Bivens told Pierce he had transportation problems as 
Pierce realized that Judge O’Neill was demanding they approach the bench.  Pierce 
described Judge O’Neill’s demeanor as “very, very loud, very, very, very ugly and 
very intimidating.” Pierce was demeaned.  Pierce unexpectedly lost his composure at 
this disciplinary hearing describing this situation, stating, “This was not the only 
time that this kind of thing had happened.” (Transcript Vol. III - 42).  Grego testified 
that Judge O’Neill “wanted an explanation as to why he (Bivens) was two hours late, 
that she wanted to leave at 11:00 and she would be really late for whatever she had 
to do.”  Grego described Judge O’Neill as “clearly irate and definitely screaming.” 
(Transcript Vol. III – 22-23) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
56 
63. Pierce stood respectfully during the plea and when Judge O’Neill 
proceeded to sentencing he tried several times to request a PSI and to refer to his 
conversation with Judge O’Neill the day before.  Judge O’Neill refused to order a 
PSI and ordered Pierce to speak in mitigation on sentencing. (Exhibit 167 p.10, 
11,13)   Pierce testified he was not prepared to address sentencing or speak in 
mitigation.  Bivens was sentenced to 6 months with jail time credit.  Pierce never 
before had a judge agree to order a PSI and then renege on the agreement without 
any notice to the lawyer or client. (Transcript Vol. III – 47,55,65) Pierce went to 
visit Bivens the next day in the jail highly concerned that Bivens would file a 
grievance against him.  Pierce offered to file a motion to withdraw the plea or appeal 
but Bivens declined.  By the time such a motion or appeal would have been decided, 
Bivens would have served his sentence. (Transcript Vol. III – 58-59)  
64. Judge O’Neill testified that she had no recollection of any conversation 
with Pierce a day earlier about ordering a PSI for Bivens.  In addition to a lack of 
recollection she testified that it was not a conversation that she would participate in 
since she believed that by ordering a PSI a judge indicated that they would be 
willing to consider probation for an offender.  She would not give that kind of 
indication unless and until she had reviewed the Court’s file.  She would not have 
had seen the Bivens file at the time Pierce testified he spoke to her.  She testified that 
after review of Bivens prior juvenile and adult record she concluded this case was in 
a category in which she would not have considered probation as part of a sentence 
and a PSI was unnecessary.  (Transcript Vol. V – 179-181, VII – 9 - 13) 
65. LANE: 
Testimony 
taken 
from 
Sue 
Ann 
Reulbach, 
(prosecutor)(Transcript 
Vol. 
III 
– 
149-176), 
Jeffrey 
Bobbitt 
(public 
defender)(Transcript Vol. III – 176-206), Sandy Grego (Court reporter)(Transcript 
Vol. III – 189-206), Sheryl Pritchard (prosecutor)(Transcript Vol. III – 206- 214), 
Dan Cable (prosecutor)(Transcript Vol. III – 216-219) and Judge O’Neill (Transcript 
Vol. V  - 186-199, VI – VII – 13-19, 137, 169-172, 175-176). (Exhibits 180-188) 
January Term, 2004 
57 
66. In February 1999, William Lane was indicted for multiple felonies 
relating to a bank robbery in Columbus.  Because of his habit of committing 
robberies in nightwear, he had gained notoriety as the “pajama bank robber.”  At the 
first pretrial before Judge O’Neill on March 25, 1999 Lane unexpectedly offered to 
plea to the indictment.  Jeffrey Bobbitt (admitted 1982, Franklin County Public 
Defender, Staff Attorney since 1982) was defense counsel and Sue Ann Reulbach 
(admitted 1985, Franklin County Prosecutor’s Office since 1991, Senior Trial Staff) 
was the assigned prosecutor.  Around 9:30 am counsel approached and informed 
Judge O’Neill there would be a plea.  When Judge O’Neill wanted to proceed to 
sentencing, Reulbach explained that the victim, a bank teller, requested to be present 
and to make a statement at sentencing as required under the Ohio Victims Rights 
Act. (O.R.C. 2930.14) Reulbach requested that the matter be continued to that 
afternoon or the next day to secure the attendance of the victim.  Judge O’Neill 
asked Reulbach why the victim was not subpoenaed that morning.  Reulbach 
explained that the plea was not expected and victims are not usually present at the 
first pretrial.  Reulbach testified that Judge O’Neill denied the request to reschedule 
and stated, “Absolutely not, we are going to proceed.  I’m going to get this case off 
my docket.” (Transcript Vol. III – 154-156)  Reulbach called the victim who was at 
work at the bank but  she could not leave her job at that time.   
67. When Judge O’Neill requested that counsel take their places to do the 
plea and sentencing, Reulbach refused to proceed until she put on the record that she 
was not able to comply with the victim’s rights statute.  Reulbach and Bobbitt 
testified that a back and forth banter ensued between Judge O’Neill and Reulbach.  
Reulbach requested to make a record on the victim issue and Judge O’Neill refused 
to go on the record.  As this back and forth continues, Bobbitt observed that the 
court reporter Grego looked like a marionette with her hands going on and off on the 
stenotype machine as Reulbach requested a record and Judge O’Neill ordered the 
record not be taken.  Reulbach respectfully but insistently refused to proceed with 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
58 
plea and sentencing until the victim’s presence was arranged or she made a record 
on the absence of the victim.  Both counsel testified that Judge O’Neill, not the court 
reporter, determined that no record would be made. None of these conversations 
appeared in the transcript. (Transcript Vol. III  - 182-185, 156-158) (Exhibit 186)  
Judge O’Neill stated in her Answer to the Amended Complaint at Para. 207 that 
“Ms. Reulbach could proffer anything at any time with the court reporter.  She 
additionally avers that the court reporter, Sandy Grego, refused Ms. Reulbach an 
opportunity to proffer.”  Grego testified that she did not take a record that day 
because Judge O’Neill “said no” and at that time, “you couldn’t make a proffer 
unless Judge O’Neill agreed.”   If Reulbach had asked for a proffer, Grego would 
have had to ask Judge O’Neill for permission. (Transcript Vol. III – 25, 194, 203)   
68. Reulbach left the courtroom and returned with Ron O’Brien, the Franklin 
County Prosecutor.  O’Brien gave Judge O’Neill a copy of the victims’ rights statute 
and requested that Lane’s plea be postponed until 3:00 pm when the victim could be 
present.   Judge O’Neill agreed to postpone the plea but offered Bobbitt the 
opportunity to withdraw Lane’s plea based on the morning’s events. Bobbitt refused 
this offer at Lane’s insistence and the plea and sentencing take place that afternoon, 
including testimony from the victim. (Exhibit 186) Judge O’Neill testified that 
Reulbach was posturing and delaying to allow time for the news media to arrive for 
the sentencing. (Transcript Vol. V  - 193-195). Reulbach denied calling any media, 
believed they were already in the building that morning and when the plea did take 
place, no media were present. (Transcript Vol. III  - 168-173)   
69. The following morning Judge O’Neill observed Reulbach and Grego 
conversing briefly.  Judge O’Neill then told Grego that Reulbach was considering 
charges against Grego for her failure to take a record in the Lane case.  Grego asked 
Reulbach about this a couple days later and Reulbach stated she had no intention of 
making any charges against Grego.  (Transcript Vol. III – 198) (Exhibit 197) 
January Term, 2004 
59 
70. WOERNER: Testimony taken from Michael Siewert (defense 
attorney)(Transcript Vol.  IV – 80-139), Christian Domis (prosecutor)(Transcript 
Vol.  IV – 139-155), Brenda Judy (Courtroom Deputy)(Transcript Vol.  IV – 181-
202), Sandy Grego (Court reporter)(Transcript Vol. IV – 156-163, 175-178), Judge 
O’Neill (Transcript Vol. V – 199-229, VI – 163-167) (Exhibits 189-214). 
71. Roger Woerner was originally charged with a misdemeanor domestic 
violence charge and arraigned in Franklin County Municipal Court.  He attended 
two court dates in Municipal Court.  The misdemeanor indictment was then 
dismissed in favor of a two felonies filed in Franklin County Common Pleas Court, 
which is located in the same courts complex, but in a different building.  Woerner’s 
first appearance on the felony charges was in the Municipal Court building. Woerner 
was released on a $5000 personal recognizance bond.  The felony case was assigned 
to Judge O’Neill and set for a pretrial on March 2, 2000.  The pretrial was scheduled 
for 9:30 am.  The defense attorney was Michael Siewert (admitted in 1984, private 
practice criminal defense and traffic).  Siewert arrived that morning before 9:30 am, 
checked in and left his associate, Gary Dicker in the courtroom while he checked on 
other cases he had that morning. Siewert had learned from Christian Domis, the 
assigned prosecutor (admitted 1998, Franklin County Prosecutor since 1998, then 
assigned to the abuse unit) that the plea offer was an F-5. 
72. Woerner arrived at 9:55 am, 25 minutes late. His explanation was that he 
had gone to the Municipal Court building.  Siewert conveyed the plea offer, which 
his client rejected. The case was called for the pretrial around 11:00 am.  In the 
transcript Judge O’Neill learned that the plea had been rejected and consistent with 
her policy that there would now either be a plea to the indictment or a trial, Judge 
O’Neill then stated: “Okay. March twenty-second is the trial date, and bond is 
revoked and the deputy is ordered to take him in.  I need a deputy here.” Woerner 
asked what that meant and Siewert told him he was being arrested.  Judge O’Neill 
then volunteered, “Because you are late.  You should have been here at nine-thirty.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
60 
(Exhibit 200, p. 3)  Siewert and Woerner explained to Judge O’Neill that Woerner 
went to the Municipal Court building and Judge O’Neill stated, “His notice was for 
this building.  I’m getting tired of this.” Grego, the court reporter, made a 
contemporaneous record in her diary of these events and testified that when Woerner 
refused to take the plea the judge revoked his bond and put him in jail.  Grego was 
not surprised because “she had made remarks like that before to other defendants, 
that if they didn't take the plea, that she would revoke their bond.”  (Transcript Vol.  
IV – 159)(Exhibit 250)    
73. On the criminal case processing sheet Judge O’Neill entered a capias and 
bond forfeiture order and but also noted: “Defendant appeared at 9:55.’ (Exhibit 
209)  On March 9, 2000 Judge O’Neill signed an order of forfeiture that falsely 
stated that Woerner had not appeared on  March 2, 2000.  (Exhibit 210)    
74. Siewert testified he was ‘stunned’.  He testified that the appearance of 
these events and his belief was and is that his client had his bond revoked for 
rejecting the plea bargain. (Transcript Vol. IV – 99,130-131)  There were no other 
explanations given to the parties at any time that day by Judge O’Neill for the 
revocation other than lateness. Siewert had never had a defendant’s bond revoked 
for less than half-hour tardiness anywhere.  He testified that the rule of thumb in 
Common Pleas and Municipal Court was that if a client was more than a half-hour 
late there could be problems. Christian Domis was surprised when Judge O’Neill 
revoked bond, he had never seen it before or since; the victim was not concerned for 
her safety and he knew of no reason for revocation from the prosecution’s position. 
(Transcript Vol. IV – 142)  
75. Siewert had smelled alcohol on Woerner when he arrived that morning 
and said the judge’s bailiff, Karen Moore, had remarked on it. When Siewart first 
spoke to his client he was agitated because he was late and “it took a second to calm 
him down” but Siewert didn’t see any other notable behavior after that. (Transcript 
Vol. IV  - 126-127)  Siewert never thought that Woerner was intoxicated or not 
January Term, 2004 
61 
capable of making decisions that morning. Siewert testified that his client was never 
closer to Judge O’Neill than 20 feet away and Woerner was silent and respectful in 
the courtroom. (Transcript Vol. IV  - 105) 
76. Deputy Brenda Judy took Woerner into custody and was with him in the 
lockup about one-half hour.  She didn’t smell alcohol and had no issues with 
Woerner’s behavior.  Siewert spoke to his client in the lockup once. He sought out 
Judge O’Neill’s bailiff, Karen Moore, and asked that Woerner be returned the next 
day to the court in hopes that he might do something regarding the bond revocation 
to help Woerner’s situation.  Siewert believed that Woerner’s situation couldn’t get 
any worse than it was at that point. (Transcript Vol. IV – 97-98, 124) Deputy Judy 
testified that after Siewert left Karen Moore returned to the lockup 3 times and each 
time asked Mr. Woerner about accepting a plea to avoid jail.   Judy believed this was 
being done at the direction of Judge O’Neill. These visits all took place before 11:35 
am, the time on the U-10 form the Deputy filled out just before the Woerner was 
taken to the jail. (Transcript Vol. IV – 199-200)  Grego testified per her diary that 
Judge O’Neill left that day for lunch at 11:35 am (Exhibit 250) Judge O’Neill 
testified that she had no knowledge of Moore’s visits which would have been 
inappropriate and believed  Judy’s testimony about both Moore’s visits and about 
Woerner’s general condition was incorrect. (Transcript Vol. V  - 215-216) 
77. The next day, March 3, 2000, Woerner was returned to Courtroom 9A. 
Domis recalled being paged around lunchtime.  In an off the record conversation 
Siewert and Domis testified that Judge O’Neill suggested that the prosecution offer a 
misdemeanor plea and stated that the sentence would be the same as if he plead to 
the F-5.  Domis offered a misdemeanor, which was accepted and Woerner was 
sentenced by Judge O’Neill to probation and released that day. (Transcript Vol. IV – 
100-101,144-146) (Exhibit 201)  
78. The Answer to the Amended Complaint about the Woerner case stated,” 
The defendant was obviously intoxicated”  (¶ 216)  “Even if the defendant wanted to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
62 
plea she (Judge O’Neill) would be unable to accept the plea, since the defendant was 
under the influence.” (¶ 217)  “Woerner was immediately taken into custody, out of 
concern for the victim’s safety. (¶ 218)  “Judge O’Neill did not revoke his bond 
solely because he was late for Court; rather the bond was revoked after she had an 
opportunity to observe his demeanor and after affording the defendant an 
opportunity to provide just cause for his actions.” (¶ 218)  “Mr. Woerner was 
indignant, refusing efforts to resolve the case between the State and his counsel.” (¶ 
218) 
79. Judge O’Neill was asked: “What about his conduct and demeanor said to 
you he was intoxicated? A.  Agitated, agitated just -- I guess I use the words earlier 
under Righter, kind of gave the impression like he was there to take issue with 
everything, pick a fight, kind of just not happy he was there, and, quite frankly, what 
was going through my thought process is this individual is going to leave here, and 
he's going to go home and take it out on the person who caused this complaint to be 
filed.  That's the kind of air that I felt.” (Transcript Vol. V  - 205)  
80. Judge O’Neill testified that her bailiff slipped her a post-it note that said 
she smelled alcohol on Woerner, (Transcript Vol.  VI – 164-165) Judge O’Neill 
testified that the reasons the bond was revoked, “were not as much the lateness issue, 
although that certainly is a grounds to revoke a bond, but also his conduct, his 
demeanor, the whole circumstances of his appearance on that day.” (Transcript Vol. 
VII  - 128) Judge O’Neill acknowledged that none of her concerns about his 
demeanor or appearances were stated to counsel or put in the record and that it was 
only after the grievance was filed that she learned the Siewert had smelled alcohol 
on his client. (Transcript Vol. V – 113, 219) 
81. On April 17, 2000 Judge O’Neill’s signed an Entry of Judgment for 
$5,000.00 against Woerner for the bond forfeiture. That judgment remained on the 
record at the time of this hearing. Judge O’Neill testified that this was an error and 
January Term, 2004 
63 
should not have happened.  While testifying about this situation she asked this 
hearing panel’s approval to enter an order vacating the judgment against Woerner. 
 
82. SMILEY: Testimony taken from Angela Bolognone (prosecutor) 
(Transcript Vol. IV – 202-243), Ralph Kerns (defense attorney)(Transcript Vol. IV – 
243-278), Angela Canepa (Supervising prosecuting attorney, Abuse Unit)(Transcript 
Vol. IV – 278-305), Judge O’Neill (Transcript Vol. V – 232-248, VII – 19-32, 139, 
176-182)  (Exhibits 227-249). 
83. James Smiley was an 18 year old indicted on two counts of corruption of 
a minor, fourth degree felonies.   Smiley had had a liver transplant in 1995 and was 
basically homebound and home-schooled. (Transcript Vol. IV – 244)    The case was 
scheduled for trial on October 5, 2000.  Ralph Kerns (admitted 1981, general private 
practice since then) represented Smiley.  At the pretrial Judge O’Neill granted leave 
for Smiley to consider a plea offered to a single felony count through the trial date. 
(Exhibit 235) Smiley agreed to accept the plea and Kerns told the assigned 
prosecutor, Angela Bolognone (admitted 1997, Franklin County Prosecutor’s office 
from 1997-October 2001, abuse unit, now inactive status for family reasons). Parties 
and counsel appeared on the day of trial at 9:00 am to enter the plea.  Bolognone 
advised the victim’s family that because both parties have requested a PSI and HB 
180 a sexual predator status hearing was required and that sentencing would not take 
place that day.  Under the Ohio Sexual Predator law (R.C. 2950.09) when a 
defendant pleads guilty to a felony sexual offense, the statute proscribes that a 
hearing be held to determine the defendant’s sexual offender classification. Notice is 
required to the parties and counsel of the date and time of the hearing and the State 
has the burden of proof. (Transcript Vol. IV  - 209-211, 213-214, 272, 280-281)  
84. Judge O’Neill was not present at 11:30 am and Bolognone told the 
victim’s family they could go home and they could be heard at the HB 
180/sentencing hearing, which would be scheduled another day.  Judge O’Neill took 
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64 
the bench at 1:40 pm and appeared to Kerns and Bolognone to be agitated and 
angry.  (Transcript Vol. IV – 215, 249)  Bolognone specifically requested a PSI and 
an HB 180 hearing, stating that there has to be formal notice given.  Judge O’Neill 
stated, “We’re going to do that now – at the time of sentencing, which is now.  The 
parents want jail time, or are they interested in probation, or what is their position?” 
(Exhibit 22, p.14)  Bolognone apologized for the parents’ absence and again 
requested a PSI and that an HB 180 hearing be set.  Judge O’Neill then stated “The 
statute makes it very clear that the House Bill 180 is at the time of sentencing and 
nobody should count on a presentence investigation.  So I take it you are in favor of 
jail time, because you are not waiving a PSI?”  Bolognone stated: “I was hoping to 
find out more about this individual from the PSI, Judge.  I know very little about this 
individual.” Bolognone repeated her request for the HB 180 hearing and Judge 
O’Neill replied: “No, you have the House Bill 180 hearing at the time of sentence.  
If you’ve said all you’re going to say, I need to fill out these forms before I 
proceed.” Bolognone apologized again and testified she sensed the judge was angry 
and the hearing was “starting to spin out of control.”  (Transcript Vol. IV - 215-216)  
When asked again, Bolognone declined to say anything about sentencing.  Judge 
O’Neill went on to sentence Smiley to six months in prison finding that a prison 
term was consistent with the purposes of R.C. 2929.11, Smiley was not amenable to 
community control and “because of the nature of the case involving intercourse with 
a 13-year-old child, that it would demean the seriousness of the offense by giving 
him probation.” (Exhibit 277 p.17, 18)  Judge O’Neill then proceeded in a soliloquy 
to enumerate the factors for the sexual offender classifications and make findings 
without asking for any evidence from the prosecutor. (Exhibit 227 pp. 18-22)  
85. Kerns went with Smiley into the lockup to discuss with him what had 
happened.  When he returned to the courtroom, Kerns saw Judge O’Neill talking to 
two women near the bench and he heard Judge O’Neill state at a volume, “fully 
sufficient for my client's mother to hear that had I taken the matter to trial and this 
January Term, 2004 
65 
girl taken the stand and testified that my client wouldn't have been convicted. ...And 
then I approach the judge, I’m stunned that she's made that statement.  I'm stunned at 
everything that has taken place.  And she says, "You should have been offered a 
better deal.  Go up and talk to Angie Canepa and if you can get a better deal or a 
misdemeanor in this case, I'll let you withdraw your plea and come back." 
(Transcript Vol. IV – 254)  Kerns did speak to Canepa who refused to change the 
plea.   
86. Kerns then returned and asked to talk to Judge O’Neill. Kerns was 
concerned because dispensing the medications Smiley required due to his 
transplanted liver had been a problem when Smiley was briefly in jail when he was 
originally arrested on these charges. Kerns testified,“...By that time, the only thing 
that was left was to remind her of my client's issues medically. Q. Did you do that?  
A. Yes, I did. ...Her initial reaction to me was to look me dead in the eye and tell me 
that he should not have had sex with a 13-year-old if he didn't intend to go to jail, 
and that it wasn't her issue, that she guessed the sheriffs would have to handle it. 
Then she indicated that she would dash off some kind of entry that would be sure 
and enforce the Franklin County Sheriffs to make sure that they gave him seven pills 
a day.” (Transcript Vol. IV – 256)  Kerns, along with Smiley’s mother, took the 
seven medications Smiley took every day to the jail and Judge O’Neill did enter a 
special order regarding Smiley’s medications (Ex. 241).  
87. Judge O’Neill requested to speak later that afternoon with Canepa, who 
was Bolognone’s supervisor.  Canepa testified: “she was indicating to me that on 
this particular case, she was upset with (Bolognone) for a number of reasons.  The 
fact that she had let the victims leave, the fact that she would not waive her right to 
the pre-sentence investigation, and the fact that she did not offer her -- this particular 
defendant a better deal, that she (Bolognone) should have offered him a nonsex 
misdemeanor because this kid was not the type of kid that should have spent a day in 
jail for this offense. ... She (Judge O’Neill) wanted for us to change the plea post- -- 
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66 
you know, to change even though it had already been entered. She wanted me to 
have her do that.” ...”Her indication to me was that because Angela wouldn't waive 
the pre-sentence investigation that she was compelled to do the only thing she could 
do, which was to impose a prison term; and that was upsetting to her.” (Transcript 
Vol. IV – 282-283)  Canepa did not believe that Judge O’Neill was forced to impose 
a prison sentence: “it is true that she could not have imposed community control on 
that date, but she certainly could have simply ordered the pre-sentence investigation, 
set it down for sentencing on another date, and done whatever she felt was 
appropriate at that time.”(Transcript Vol. IV – 285) 
88. Judge O’Neill’s Answer to the Amended Complaint states: “Judge 
O’Neill orders a PSI if it is requested.” (¶ 250)  “Her conversation with Ms. Canepa 
had nothing to do with the merits of the case.” (¶ 254)   “At the time of Mr. Smiley’s 
sentencing, Judge O’Neill had been informed of all facts concerning Mr. Smiley and 
the offense.  In her judicial experience, a PSI in such a case would not yield any 
additional findings...Because Ms. Bolognone would not waive the PSI, the 
sentencing statutes would not permit Judge O’Neill to sentence the defendant to 
probation and she therefore sentenced him to the minimum prison term.” (¶ 256)  
The answer does not mention any other justification for the sentence.   
89. Canepa discussed Smiley’s case with Bolognone. Bolognone was not 
disciplined or sanctioned – Canepa advised her for the future that Judge O’Neill did 
refuse to do PSI’s. Canepa explained that because of Judge O’Neill’s concern about 
her docket she will want a case off her docket that day, she will not want a PSI and 
she will sentence the day of the plea. Bolognone should never allow victims to go 
home on trial dates in Judge O’Neill’s courtroom. (Transcript Vol. IV – 288-291, 
298) Bolognone was “floored” when Canepa told her that Judge O’Neill blamed the 
prison sentence on Bolognone’s refusal to waive a PSI: “It was hard for me to 
believe that instead of ordering a pre-sentence investigation, instead of having a 
hearing, instead of following the law and doing the hearing the way the legislature 
January Term, 2004 
67 
said we should do, instead of doing that, she would send this person to prison who 
she thought deserved a misdemeanor.” (Transcript Vol. IV – 219) 
90. In her testimony at this hearing Judge O’Neill stated that she knew 
Smiley’s medical condition and history before sentencing (Transcript Vol. VII – 21-
22) She believed the problem in this case was the inexperience of the prosecutor. 
(Transcript Vol. V –139)   She testified that her reason for sentencing Smiley to 
prison was to utilize a “scared straight” approach and that was why she had ordered 
a post-sentence investigation. (Transcript Vol. VII – 25) “ I ordered a PSI, which is 
the post-sentencing investigation, but I didn't have any intentions at the time that I 
sentenced him to give him probation.” (Transcript Vol. V – 247)  
91. Judge O’Neill denied making the statement Kerns heard that Smiley 
would have won at a jury trial.  She admitted that she was at the bench having a 
conversation that she shouldn’t have been having but she believed one of the others 
may have made the statement. (Transcript Vol. V – 238-239) Judge O’Neill did tell 
Kerns to ask Canepa about a misdemeanor plea and suggested that she would 
entertain a motion to withdraw his plea as allowed by Criminal Rule 32. (Transcript 
Vol. V - 239-240) She admitted saying to Kerns that Smiley should have considered 
the consequences of having sex with a 13 year old. She differed with Canepa on her 
recollection of meeting the afternoon of October 5th. It was much shorter, more 
general and policy oriented.  She denied that she said Smiley should never have been 
incarcerated. (Transcript Vol.  V- 242-244) She denied she advised Canepa to offer a 
misdemeanor.  (Transcript Vol. V – 247)  
92. Smiley’s medications were not given by jail personnel as ordered and 
within a couple days he had a medical emergency at the jail and was admitted to 
Grant Medical Center. (Transcript Vol. IV – 256-258)  Kerns was contacted by 
Judge O’Neill’s courtroom and attended on October 11, 2000 a hearing before Judge 
O’Neill. (Exhibit 228)  Judge O’Neill stated that the hearing was on the Court’s own 
motion in light of Smiley’s medical emergency, reviewing that the prosecution did 
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not waive the PSI but had no objection to probation but now the prosecution had 
indicated it would waive the PSI so Smiley could receive immediate probation. 
(Exhibit 288 p.3)  Ken Mitchell who appeared on behalf of the prosecution had been 
contacted by Judge O’Neill and asked to handle the hearing for the state.  Bolognone 
testified that she was notified of the hearing by a page that day and only when she 
reached the courtroom did she learn that Judge O’Neill had contacted Mitchell who 
had already agreed to waive the PSI. (Transcript Vol. IV – 221-224)  
93. VIOLATIONS CHARGED ON COUNT 1: 
a) 
Canon 1 – A judge shall uphold the integrity  and independence of 
the judiciary; 
b) 
Canon 2 – A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall 
act at all times in a manner which promotes public confidence in the 
judiciary; 
c) 
Canon 3 – A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office 
impartially and diligently; 
d) 
Canon 3(B)(2) – A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain 
professional competence in it; 
e) 
Canon 3(B)(4) – A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to 
litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and other with whom the judge 
deals in an official capacity; 
f) 
Canon 3(B)(7) – A judge shall not initiate, receive, permit or 
consider communications made to the judge outside the presence of 
the parties or their representatives concerning a pending or 
impending proceeding. 
g) 
Canon 3(E)(1) – A judge shall disqualify herself in a proceeding in 
which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned; 
h) 
Canon 4 – A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of 
impropriety in all of the judge’s activities; 
January Term, 2004 
69 
i) 
DR 1-102(A)(4) – Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud 
deceit or misrepresentation; 
j) 
DR 1-102(A)(5) – Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice. 
 
94. In considering the violations alleged in Count 1 the Relator argues that 
these incidents comprise a pattern of misconduct and that each individual incident on 
its own may not be a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct or the Disciplinary 
Rules. There are no Ohio cases brought to the panel’s attention, which have used this 
approach, however, the Preamble to Code of Judicial Conduct provides the 
following guidance to the panel.  “It is not intended, however, that every 
transgression will result in disciplinary action.  Whether disciplinary action is 
appropriate, and the degree of discipline to be imposed should be determined 
through a reasonable and reasoned application of the text and should depend on such 
factors as the seriousness of the transgressions, whether there is a pattern of 
improper activity and the effect of the improper activity on others or on the judicial 
system and for the protection of the public.” As detailed below , the panel majority 
concludes that each incident which is found to violate the Canons or Disciplinary 
Rules will stand on its own merits. 
95. Respondent has argued that throughout the Amended Complaint any 
conduct which involves the exercise of judicial discretion by Respondent cannot be 
the subject of disciplinary action and that an appellate reversal of any judicial 
decision by Respondent for an abuse of discretion cannot be the basis for 
disciplinary action. In considering Respondent’s actions throughout this Amended 
Complaint while the panel majority has considered the existence and effect of 
judicial discretion where it is relevant, it does not find that such discretion is an 
absolute bar to examining Respondent’s conduct under the Canons of Judicial 
Conduct or the Disciplinary Rules.  The panel majority likewise does not find that an 
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70 
appellate court reversal of Respondent’s decisions mandates the existence of 
misconduct.  The panel majority concludes that judicial discretion and appellate 
court reversals are but two of many factors to be considered in judging each incident 
alleged in the Amended Complaint on the specific facts presented.  
96. The panel majority concludes in multiple incidents in Count 1 that in 
criminal cases Judge O’Neill used improper means to coerce pleas or to retaliate for 
the actions of counsel. The panel finds these actions to be some of the most serious 
charges in the Amended Complaint.   In Righter, Cox, and Woerner, the panel 
majority finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent coerced pleas 
from criminal defendants by threatening to or actually revoking their bond if they 
chose to refuse pleas and go to trial. In Montoya, the panel majority finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that the defendant’s bond was revoked to retaliate for his 
counsel’s refusal to proceed with trial without an opportunity to prepare. The panel 
majority makes these findings based on an assessment of the credibility of all of the 
witnesses who testified, their appearance and demeanor at hearing as well as the 
extant records of proceedings in these cases.  The panel majority acknowledges that 
Judge O’Neill in each instance either outright denied having made such threats or 
testified that she had facially justifiable reasons for revoking a defendant’s bond. 
The only non-party fact witness called by Respondent in this matter, defense 
attorney Ronald Janes, corroborated the testimony of Relator’s witnesses that Judge 
O’Neill had threatened to revoke bond when his client, Cox, wanted to go to trial.  
The panel majority did not find Respondent’s testimony credible in Righter, Cox, 
Woerner and Montoya.  
97. The panel majority concludes that the justifications Respondent 
proffered for to justify her actions in Righter, Cox Woerner and Montoya were not 
genuine but rather pretexts for her improper activity.  The defendants’ behavior 
described by Respondent in Cox, Righter and Woerner to justify bond revocation 
were strikingly vague and similar for example, “lots of in and out activity” and 
January Term, 2004 
71 
“stress or agitation.” Although Judge O’Neill claimed she had serious concerns with 
the behavior of each defendant, the record of each proceeding contains no reference 
to any concerns much less a specific threat, even though in each instance there was 
ample opportunity for Respondent to state those concerns if they truly existed 
because all proceedings were taking place in the courtroom with a court reporter on 
duty.  The panel majority does not believe any of the concerns actually existed on 
the day of these hearings.   A decision on bond is committed to the discretion of a 
judge and testimony offered that flight risk and safety are considerations.  However, 
every witness who testified on this subject in this hearing agreed that it is improper 
for a judge to threaten to revoke bond to affect or coerce a plea or because a 
defendant chooses trial and the panel majority concludes by clear and convincing 
evidence that it was Respondent’s reason for these bond threats and revocations.    
98. After revoking Montoya’s bond, Respondent fabricated the concept of a 
“short bond” in court entries to justify her actions.  In Woerner, Respondent 
misrepresented on the record that the bond revocation was for “being late” and 
signed an order that falsely stated Woerner did not appear on March 3, 2000.  The 
panel majority concludes by clear and convincing evidence that these two acts 
violate DR 1-102(A)(4). 
99. In these incidents the panel majority does not find that Judge O’Neill 
abused her judicial discretion but rather that her conduct was outside any permissible 
discretion and totally improper.  The panel majority concludes that Respondent’s 
conduct in Cox, Righter, Woerner and Montoya violated Canons 1, 2, 3, 3(B)(2), 
3(B)(4), 4 and DR 1-102(A)(5).  
100. 
In Nash, the panel majority finds by clear and convincing evidence 
that the Respondent used a threat to coerce the Defendant’s plea.  After refusing the 
misdemeanor plea offered by the parties and only allowing a plea to the indictment 
Respondent threatened that if the defendant chose trial he would receive the 
maximum sentence.  The panel majority finds by clear and convincing evidence that 
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72 
Respondent made such threat and coerced defendant’s plea with said threat. 
Respondent’s conduct in Nash interfered with the defendant’s rights in the plea 
process, destroyed the voluntariness of the plea so obtained, adversely affected the 
administration of justice, was contrary to law and was improper.  The panel majority 
find by clear and convincing evidence such conduct in Nash by Respondent violated 
Canons 1, 2, 3(B)(2), 3(B)(7) and 4 and DR 1-102(A)(5).   See, In the Matter of Cox, 
680 N.E.2d 528 (Indiana, 1997)  
101. 
In Nezvalova and Smiley, the panel majority finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that the Respondent engaged in improper ex-parte 
conversations and abandoned the ethical obligation of impartiality, advocating for 
action on behalf of one party over the other.  In Nezvalova, when the case was 
reversed and remanded to her from the Tenth District Court of Appeals, Respondent 
discussed the merits of the case with Prosecutor Vaughan and encouraged the 
pursuit of an appeal by the state. In Smiley, immediately following the felony plea 
the Respondent directed defense counsel to seek a reduction in the plea offer from 
Canepa, the supervising prosecutor. Then Respondent advocated with Canepa 
herself to have the plea changed from a felony to a misdemeanor. Respondent 
misrepresented to Canepa that she was “forced” to sentence Smiley to prison 
because of Bolognone’s refusal to waive a PSI. Judging the credibility of the 
witnesses and their demeanor at hearing the panel majority finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that Judge O’Neill’s testimony regarding these incidents was 
not credible. The respondent’s actions in Nezvalova and Smiley violated Canons 1, 
2, 3, 3(B)(7), 3(E)(1) and 4 and DR 1-102(A)(5) and in Smiley, the statement to 
Canepa that the Respondent was forced to sentence Smiley to prison was a 
misrepresentation and violated DR 1-102(A)(4).   Such advocacy by a judge was 
sanctioned in Disciplinary Counsel v. Ferreri, 88 Ohio St.3d 456 (2000). See also, 
In re Complaint against White, 651 N.W. 2d 551 (Nebraska, 2002), Ryan v. Comm. 
on Judicial Performance, 754 P. 2d 724 (California, 1988).  
January Term, 2004 
73 
102. 
In Smiley, Respondent also refused the parties the PSI they 
requested, then proceeded without statutory notice or opportunity to prepare and 
made findings under HB 180 without allowing the state to present any evidence.  
The panel majority finds by clear and convincing evidence that such conduct 
violates Canon 2 and 3(B)(2).  
103. 
In Birchler, another of the more serious incidents in this Complaint, 
the panel majority finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent 
abandoned impartiality, failed to follow the law and interfered as an advocate in 
proceedings that deprived a defendant of his rights. The Respondent had a mandate 
from the Court of Appeals that the sex offender counseling condition of Birchler’s 
probation was not enforceable. Nevertheless, in the remand hearing she labeled the 
defendant a rapist despite the non-sex offense Alford plea she had accepted and 
stated on the record that the state would file a motion to withdraw his plea which 
was not only false and legally impossible but also highly threatening and coercive to 
the defendant. Her lack of impartiality is apparent on the record and corroborated by 
the testimony of witnesses. Respondent’s lack of impartiality in this matter should 
have resulted in her recusal from the case. Respondent’s improper actions resulted in 
Birchler abandoning his right to probation and serving the remainder of his prison 
term.  The Respondent’s conduct in this matter violated Canons 1, 2, 3, 3(B)(2), 
3(B)(4), 3(E)(1), 4 and DR 1-102(A)(4) and DR 1-102(A)(5). See, Roberts v. Comm. 
on Judicial Performance [33 Cal.3d 739, 190 Cal.Rptr. 910], 661 P2d 1064 
(California, 1983), In the Matter Of David M. Cox, 553 A.2d 1255 ( Maine, 1989), 
In re Hammermaster [39 Wash.2d 211], 985 P.2d 924 (Washington, 1999) 
104. 
In Bivens, the panel majority finds by clear and convincing evidence 
that Pierce did obtain Judge O’Neill’s agreement to order a PSI a day earlier. On the 
day of the plea while Bivens was late that fact could not justify Respondent denying 
a PSI with no notice to Bivens’ counsel, Pierce. Respondent’s unexpected action 
was retaliatory, and deprived Bivens’ counsel Pierce of preparation to adequately 
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74 
represent his client. The panel majority concludes that Respondent’s conduct in 
Bivens violates Canons 2, 3, 3(B)(2) and 3(B)(4).    
105. 
In Lane, the Respondent’s conduct was abusive to litigants, lawyers 
and court employees, was contrary to law, prejudiced the rights of the defendant and, 
but for the stubborn insistence of the prosecutor, would have prejudiced the rights of 
the victim as well.  The panel majority finds by clear and convincing evidence that 
the Respondent’s conduct violated Canons 3, 3(B)(2), 3(B)(4), 4 and DR 1-
102(A)(5).  
106. 
In Burton v. Nicholson, the panel majority finds that Relator failed to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated any Canons or 
Disciplinary Rules.  Respondent admitted that communication problems caused this 
case to fall through the cracks and that she had changed her office policies and 
procedures to prevent another such misadventure. 
107. 
COUNT 2 alleged that Judge O’Neill refused to allow attorneys to 
go on the record to preserve their objections to Respondent’s rulings. 
108. 
DENNIS: testimony taken from Myron Shwartz, (defense 
attorney)(Transcript Vol. VII – 197-211), Sandy Grego (court reporter)(Transcript 
Vol. III – 25, VIII – 205, 215) and Judge O’Neill (Transcript Vol. X- 219-
223)(Exhibits 253A-275) 
109. 
Arica Dennis was indicted on three counts of receiving stolen 
property, all F-5’s.  She was represented by Myron Shwartz (admitted 1967, Public 
Defender, private practice since 1969). 
110. 
On August 20, 1998 at a pretrial, the prosecutor offered a plea to a 
single F-5.  Dennis refused the plea..  The trial was set for September 14, 1998 and 
Shwartz orally requested a continuance that Judge O’Neill denied. Shwartz then 
requested that the court reporter, Sandy Grego make a record and Judge O’Neill told 
Grego she could not take it. (Transcript Vol. VII – 198)  As Shwartz was leaving the 
courtroom  he testified that Judge O’Neill remarked that if Shwartz wasn’t prepared 
January Term, 2004 
75 
for trial maybe she (Dennis) should get another attorney.  Dennis’ family discussed 
getting another attorney because they didn’t feel Dennis was being treated fairly in 
Judge O’Neill’s courtroom. (Transcript Vol.  VII – 198-199) 
111. 
Shwartz filed an Affidavit of Prejudice less than a week later with 
supporting affidavits.(Exhibit 262)  On September 10, 1998 in her written response 
to the Supreme Court about Shwartz’s Affidavit of Prejudice, Judge O’Neill stated 
“I denied Mr. Schwartz’s request to put the bench conference on the record as I did 
not find it necessary to record my denial of his request for a continuance... I refused 
to allow him to argue with me by demanding that the conversation be recorded.”  
(Exhibit 254 p. 2)  Grego, the court reporter testified that  Judge O’Neill did refuse 
to allow Shwartz to make a record saying that there was nothing to put on the record.  
At that time Grego testified that parties could not make a proffer for the record 
unless Judge O’Neill gave permission. (Transcript Vol.  III – 25, VIII – 205-206)  
The Affidavit of Prejudice was denied. Dennis’ case was transferred to Judge Fais 
who had prior charges pending against Dennis and was resolved. (Transcript Vol. 
VII – 200-201)(Exhibit 261)  Schwartz testified that he did not file a written motion 
for continuance because it was not the custom to do so. (Transcript Vol. VII – 205-
207) 
112. 
In her Answer to the Amended Complaint Judge O’Neill, “denied 
that she ordered the court reporter, Sandy Grego, not to make a record when Mr. 
Shwartz asked her (the court reporter) to go on the record after Judge O’Neill denied 
his request for a continuance.” (¶ 274)  At hearing she was asked “Q.  Do you stand 
by your assertion in your answer? A.  Yes.  I did not deny him a record.” (Transcript 
Vol.  X – 221) 
113. 
O.R.C. 2301.20 provides that upon trial of a civil or criminal action 
the trial judge shall grant any party’s request for a reporter.  Crim. Rule 22 provides 
that all proceedings in felonies shall be recorded and in misdemeanors proceedings 
shall be recorded at the request of a party. 
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76 
114. 
Testimony regarding the practices of Common Pleas judges as to 
making a written record described some variation in how it is to be accomplished but 
affirmed a litigant’s rights to have a court’s decisions evidenced in the written 
record.   Judge Corzine testified that while some judges allow it at any time, others 
are more strict. It was never his practice or experience to deny an attorney the 
opportunity to make a record. (Transcript Vol. XI –165,178-179)  Judge Parrott  
testified that  attorneys have a right to make a record but a judge has the right to 
manage when the record is made. For example in criminal cases, he allows attorneys 
to make whatever record they desire before trial begins, “That’s their protection., 
and mine, and everyone’s there.” (Transcript Vol.  XI -196) Former Judge  Tracey  
testified a record should be made of what a judge decides, however, the judge can 
control when that occurs so as not to disrupt ongoing proceedings.  (Transcript Vol. 
XII – 46) 
115. 
LANE:  “Pajama bank robber case” reported at ¶s 65-69 above 
regarding prosecutor Reulbach’s attempt to make a record at sentencing about 
compliance with the victim’s rights statute. 
116. 
CRUTCHER, FOSTER, TRIPLETT: Testimony taken from Jeffrey 
Scott Weisman (Transcript Vol.  VII – 212-246) Judge O’Neill (Transcript Vol.  X – 
223-254) (Exhibits 276-346). 
117. 
Michael Crutcher was represented by Jeffrey Scott Weisman 
(admitted 1990, Franklin County Public Defender) regarding a probation violation.  
On March 1, 2000 Weisman filed a Motion for a Recognizance Bond to get Crutcher 
out of jail.  The first motion was set for hearing before Judge O’Neill on March 7, 
2000 at 9:30 am and Weisman was in trial on March 7th in another courtroom.  He 
checked in with Judge O’Neill’s bailiff during breaks in his trial but later learned the 
motion was dismissed when he was not present when the motion was called..  He 
refiled the Motion for Crutcher and it was set for hearing at 9:00 am on March 13, 
2000.  At the same time he had another client, William Foster, who was also in jail 
January Term, 2004 
77 
and had a Motion for a Bond Reduction scheduled in front of Judge O’Neill for 9:30 
am on March 13, 2000. (Exhibits 280, 285, 304)  Weisman checked in at Courtroom 
9A with the bailiff at 9:00 am and learned Judge O’Neill was not present. 
(Transcript Vol. VII – 217-223)   At 10:20 am Judge O’Neill was present and on the 
bench.  Weisman requested that the bond hearings be held for his two clients and 
Judge O’Neill stated that his hearings could not proceed that day because a jury trial 
was starting.  Judge O’Neill denied Weisman’s request to take the motions to the 
duty judge and told Weisman to re-file or re-set the Motions.(Transcript Vol.  VII – 
223-225) At the same time Regina Grenauer, another public defender (who was 
medically unavailable to testify) had a bond hearing before Judge O’Neill 
postponed.  Weisman asked to make a record of these matters and Judge O’Neill 
refused and had the jury brought into the courtroom. (Exhibit 276 p.6)  
118. 
Weisman, Grenauer and Trent Turner, the prosecutor, proceeded to 
Judge Michael Watson who was the duty judge.  Judge Watson notified Judge David 
Cain who was the administrative judge.  Counsel made a record before Judge Cain 
regarding their efforts to have these bond hearings held that morning. Judge Cain 
determined that Wesiman had to obtain hearing dates from Judge O’Neill as the 
assigned judge. (Exhibit 276 p.11)   Weisman returned to Judge O’Neill’s courtroom 
and received hearing times for the next day. On March 14, 2000 the Crutcher and 
Foster matters were resolved.(Transcript Vol.  VII – 231-235) 
119. 
Judge O’Neill completed criminal case processing sheets for the 
Crutcher and Foster motions on March 13, 2000.  For Crutcher she recorded:” Pass 
on bond until defendant gets verification of address and employment information.” 
(Exhibit 284 p.2)  Weisman testified he never agreed to “pass on bond” or said 
anything about address or employment information to Judge O’Neill on March 13, 
2000.  For Foster Judge O’Neill recorded “Pass on bond until 3-14-00.  For plea.” 
(Exhibit 306)   Weisman testified he never agreed to pass on bond for Mr. Foster on 
March 13, 2000. (Transcript Vol.  VII - 229-230) Judge O’Neill testified she 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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completed the forms after she knew the hearings had been rescheduled for March 
14, 2000. (Transcript Vol.  X – 247-250) 
120. 
Judge O’Neill testified at hearing when asked about Weisman’s 
testimony that she had refused him the right to make a record: “I  think that there is 
some misunderstanding that that  means I denied him a bond hearing or I denied him 
an opportunity to go on the record to record that he was denied a bond hearing. And 
that's not the case.”  Judge O’Neill testified that these motions were “add-ons” and 
the day’s schedule could not accommodate them but they were heard the next day. 
(Transcript Vol.  X – 240)  
121. 
VIOLATIONS CHARGED ON COUNT 2: 
a) 
Canon 1 – A judge shall uphold the integrity  and independence of 
the judiciary; 
b) 
Canon 2 – A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall 
act at all times in a manner which promotes public confidence in the 
judiciary; 
c) 
Canon 3 – A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office 
impartially and diligently; 
d) 
Canon 3(B)(2) – A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain 
professional competence in it; 
e) 
Canon 3(B)(4) – A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to 
litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and other with whom the judge 
deals in an official capacity; 
f) 
Canon 3(E)(1) – A judge shall disqualify herself in a proceeding in 
which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned; 
g) 
Canon 4 – A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of 
impropriety in all of the judge’s activities; 
h) 
DR 1-102(A)(4) – Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation; 
January Term, 2004 
79 
i) 
DR 1-102(A)(5) – Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice. 
122. 
As to the Dennis and Lane cases, the panel majority finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that Respondent’s conduct violated  Canons 1,2,3,3(B)(2), 
3(B)(4) and 4 and DR 1-102(A)(5).  A Court must allow a party the means to 
preserve the Court’s decisions.  When Judge O’Neill ruled on Shwartz’s oral motion 
to continue the trial he had a right to create a record of that ruling.  Simply because 
Shwartz could resubmit the Motion in written form didn’t abrogate the Respondent’s 
obligation to follow the law.  In Lane, Respondent also clearly denied a party a 
record.  The stand-off between Judge O’Neill and Reulbach vividly described as the 
court reporter being a marionette taking and not taking down their words is not 
excused or diminished by the “circular” justification that a record can be postponed 
until a case is called. As long as Reulbach insisted on recording the victim’s 
absence, Judge O’Neill was not going to call the case.  The fact that the standoff was 
resolved does not diminish the impropriety and the prejudicial appearance of such 
actions in open court.  Since Respondent’s practice at that time prohibited proffers 
without her permission her denial of a record to Dennis and Lane could not be 
solved by those means.  
123. 
The panel majority finds by clear and convincing evidence that Judge 
O’Neill misrepresented her actions in Dennis and Lane. In her Answer regarding 
Lane Respondent placed the blame on the lack of a record on her court reporter 
Grego who “refused to take a proffer.”.  This directly contradicted Grego’s 
testimony that Grego could not take a proffer without Judge O’Neill’s permission 
and Grego’s actions in the courtroom in response to Respondent’s orders.  
Respondent’s false statements to Grego regarding a claim by Reulbach are covered 
in Count 4, below, in this Panel Report.   In Dennis, a letter to the Supreme Court in 
1998 Judge O’Neill admitted she refused Shwartz a record.  In her answer and in 
testimony herein she adamantly denied that she refused to allow Shwartz to make a 
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80 
record.  Both statements cannot be true, one is clearly a misrepresentation, either to 
the Supreme Court or to this Panel.   
124. 
As to Crutcher,  Foster and Triplett, the panel finds that the Relator 
did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent denied the litigants 
a record. While it was clear that Wesiman was frustrated by the postponement of his 
motion hearings and sought assistance from the court’s administrative judges, it is 
not clear that creating a record of his efforts to hold the hearings was the real issue. It 
was not clear that in these circumstances there was a ruling or decision to record 
rather than rescheduling  a hearing on a pending motion.  
125. 
The panel does not find a violation of Canon 3(E)(1) or DR 1-
102(A)(4) in Count 2. 
126. 
COUNT 3 alleged that Respondent denied requests for Continuances 
without exercising her judicial discretion.  
127. 
FIFTH THIRD BANK V. MARGOLIS: Testimony taken from 
James Leickly (defendant’s counsel)(Transcript Vol.  VIII – 115-159), Michael M. 
Schaeffer, (plaintiff’s counsel)(Transcript Vol.  VIII – 168-189), Judge O’Neill 
(Transcript Vol.  X – 264-297, XI – 67-69) 
128. 
This civil case involved the collection on cognovit notes with 
allegations that the Margolises had made fraudulent conveyances. There were 
contested issues involving the valuation of the property allegedly fraudulently 
conveyed by the Margolises.  Michael Schaeffer (admitted 1975, private practice 
commercial litigation) represented Fifth Bank and James Leickly (admitted 1986, 
private practice, commercial litigation) represented the Margolises. 
129. 
Judge O’Neill scheduled the case for trial on March 10, 1997.  
Parties and counsel appeared and were ready to proceed on that date, however, 
Judge O’Neill was involved in a criminal trial.  The parties were kept on standby for 
3 days and then released and told that they would receive a new trial date.  Counsel 
January Term, 2004 
81 
were not consulted about their availability for a rescheduled date. (Transcript Vol.  
VIII – 119-120) 
130. 
The Court sent notice dated March 14, 1997 that the trial was reset 
for April 22, 1997.  Leickly sent the notice to his clients who promptly told him that 
April 22 was the first day of Passover and their religious practice would not allow 
them to attend.  On March 24, 1997 Leickly filed a Motion for Continuance 
explaining his clients’ religious obligations. On April 7, on Leickly’s suggested 
entry granting the continuance Judge O’Neill writes:” Denied, at time case was 
continued on 3/10/97 and new date given, counsel did not notify the court of any 
conflicts.  The case is overage by 2 months and burgeoning dockets do not allow for 
short continuances.” (Exhibit 354, 355)  
131. 
Leickly discussed the ruling with his clients and was instructed to 
appear at the trial date to repeat the request for a continuance but not to defend the 
Margolises if the trial proceeded.  On April 22, 1997 Leickly appeared and renewed 
his request for a continuance which was denied.  Schaeffer, plaintiff’s counsel, stated 
on the record that he had no objection to the continuance.  Judge O’Neill proceeded 
to trial and granted judgment to the plaintiffs for approximately 2 million dollars and 
ordered Schaeffer to prepare an entry.  
132. 
Shortly thereafter Judge O’Neill and counsel received phone calls 
from a reporter from the Columbus newspaper “The Other Paper” which lead to a 
story published on April  24, 1997 with the headline “Debbie Doesn’t Do Passover” 
reporting these events. (Relator’s Exhibit K)  
133. 
On April 30, 1997 Judge O’Neill filed a five page “Entry” in the 
Margolis case which related in detail the progress of the litigation and stated in 
pertinent part: “the defendant’s counsel failed to zealously defend his clients as 
required by Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, especially in light 
of the Court’s willingness to excuse the defendants from the trial and instruct the 
jury that their absence was in observance of their religious holiday and use their 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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deposition in lieu of live appearance which is permitted by Civ. Rule 32, the court 
had not other evidence before it and therefore rendered judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff.”.  Both Leickly and Schaeffer testified that Judge O’Neill never discussed 
talking to the jury or excusing defendant’s absence on the day of trial (Transcript 
Vol. VIII – 136,173).  The entry further stated, “The Court’s denial was based upon 
defendant’s failure to comply with Sup. R. 7 and Loc. R. 45.01 and the Court’s 
belief that the request was based on delay and dilatory tactics.  With the burgeoning 
civil docket, the Court is unwilling to grant continuances due to a party’s failure to 
be prepared to proceed.”  Neither Leickly nor Schaeffer ever heard Judge O’Neill 
mention compliance with the Local Rules as the reason the continuance was denied 
nor is that stated in the transcript from the trial date (Transcript Vol. III)(Exhibit 
356)  Judge O’Neill concluded this “Entry” by directing plaintiff’s counsel to once 
again prepare the judgment entry and submit it to the Court. (Exhibit 357) 
134. 
Leickly appealed the judgment to the Tenth District Court of Appeals 
which reversed the judgment as an abuse of discretion and remanded the matter. 
(Exhibit 362) The case was settled.  
135. 
NEZVALOVA: Reported at ¶26 -¶32, above. 
136. 
SMILEY: Reported at ¶82 - ¶92, above. 
137. 
MONTOYA: Reported at ¶33 - ¶41 above. 
138. 
GOSNELL V. KIRKBRIDE (Attorney Dan More) Testimony 
taken from James Gilbert (plaintiff’s counsel), Jeanine Amid, (plaintiff’s counsel), 
Christina Corl (defendant’s counsel) and Judge O’Neill (XI – 248-256 X – 252-264) 
139. 
Attorney Dan More represented the City of Upper Arlington in this 
civil litigation which involved an off-duty officer who shot 2 civilians after a car 
chase.  The officer, Kirkbride, faced criminal charges for this same incident.  Both 
the criminal and civil case were assigned to Judge O’Neill.  James Gilbert (admitted 
1975,Private practice, partner at Crabbe, Brown) and Christina Corl (admitted 1985, 
January Term, 2004 
83 
associate, now partner at Crabbe, Brown) represented the plaintiffs who had filed the 
civil suit in 1998.  
140. 
In mid-November 1999 Dan More began having health problems 
which started as severe back aches which had affected his ability to work.  He 
handled all of the labor negotiations and civil litigation for the City of Upper 
Arlington.  He was the only counsel assigned to the Gosnell case with total 
responsibility for the case. Janine Amid (admitted 1985, private practice, Staff with 
the City Attorney of Upper Arlington, now City Attorney) was the staff attorney 
who handled their criminal prosecutions and served as civil backup when needed.  
The City Attorney, Sharon Pfancuff, handled city council and managed the office.  
141. 
In November 1999 Dan More was also involved in negotiations with 
the Teamsters for a new  city contract in a situation in which there had already been 
a strike. On November 24, 1999 the Gosnell parties filed  a Joint Motion to Continue 
Trial Date which  was then scheduled for February 2, 2000.  The motion did not 
mention More’s health but cited timing issues related to More’s involvement in labor 
negotiation. (Exhibit 374)  Shortly after the November 24th motion was filed 
Attorney More learned that his illness was a rare and lethal form of cancer.  Plans 
were made for aggressive intervention and treatment which was predicted to disable 
More for 3-6 months. (Transcript Vol. VIII – 25-29)  
142. 
The assistant city attorney, Janine Amid filed on December 1, 1999 a 
Motion to Extend the existing case schedule, asking that discovery and motion 
deadlines be delayed. Amid sent a copy of the motion directly to Judge O’Neill 
accompanied by a letter which stated that Attorney More had “an unexpected and 
serious illness” and this was “an unusual request based on extraordinary 
circumstances.” (Relator’s Exhibit I)  Judge O’Neill granted the Motion Extending 
the Case Schedule on December 7, 1999 (Exhibits 375, 376).  On December 8, 
1999, counsel for both parties learned that Judge O’Neill had granted a 30 day 
continuance of trial to March 6, 2000. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
84 
143. 
Amid realized that with More’s grave prognosis and the situation at 
the Upper Arlington City Attorney’s office transferring More’s caseload that they 
could not be ready for trial on March 6, 2000.   Counsel consulted and a second joint 
Motion for Stay or to Continue the Trial was filed on December 8, 1999.(Exhibit 
378)  The second motion specifically referred to Attorney More’s serious and life-
threatening illness and asked for a 6 month stay or six month extension on the case 
schedule and trial date. (Exhibit  367) 
144. 
Attorney More was married to a Columbus Municipal Court judge, 
Janet Grubb.  She had taken a leave of absence from Municipal Court and More’s 
grave prognosis was freely disclosed in the legal community by early December. 
(Transcript Vol.  VIII – 21,75) Judge O’Neill testified that Judge Grubb was  a 
friend and colleague of hers and she had met Dan More through her. (Transcript 
Vol.  XI – 255)   Christina Corl  testified she hand-delivered the Joint Motion for 
Stay or Continuance to Judge O’Neill’s staff attorney, Shelia Vitale.  Corl testified 
she called Vitale afterwards to insure that Judge O’Neill was told just how serious 
More’s condition was.  Vitale assured Corl that Judge O’Neill knew and Vitale 
would convey the message. (Transcript Vol.  VIII – 160)  
145. 
Christina Corl contacted Judge O’Neill’s courtroom and obtained an 
appointment for Gilbert and Amid to speak to Judge O’Neill regarding the Motion to 
Continue. (Transcript Vol. VIII – 28)  Amid has the appointment  recorded in their 
office court calendar as 12/8/99 at 10:00 am. (Transcript Vol.  VIII - 78-79) Gilbert 
arrived early.  He recalled that he waited in the bailiff/secretary’s area in the back 
and was  later joined by Amid. (Transcript Vol. VIII - 31-32) Gilbert testified “I 
heard conversation between the bailiff and what I would have to believe was Judge 
O'Neill in chambers, yes.  Q.   And what was that conversation?   A.   Just that 
conversation was that there wasn't going to be any continuance granted on this case.  
The City of Upper Arlington's problem, the fact that someone is dying is not my 
January Term, 2004 
85 
problem.  And that they need to address this case.  This has been scheduled.  It got a 
continuance.  It needs to go.”(Transcript Vol.  VIII – 34) 
146. 
Amid testified that when she arrived and was waiting she observed 
the bailiff twice call to Judge O’Neill and state that they were waiting, explaining 
that was about Dan More “and you know how sick he is.” (Transcript Vol.  VIII – 
109-110) Amid and Gilbert are present for 45 minutes to an hour. According to 
Gilbert: “The bailiff came back into the secretary's office where Jeanine and I was 
standing and said, "No, we're not going to -- The case is not going to be continued.  
You're going to have to figure out what to do with it."  (Transcript Vol.  VIII – 34) 
Gilbert and Amid walked out into the courtroom.  Amid expressed concern over the 
City’s position and Gilbert assured her that as plaintiff, he would dismiss the case 
without prejudice if that was necessary. 
147. 
Judge O’Neill’s written order denying the continuance was filed on 
January 11, 2000. (Exhibit 379)  When Corl learned of entry she called Shelia Vitale 
to question what information had gotten to Judge O’Neill.  Vitale confirmed she had 
told Judge O’Neill about More’s condition and Judge O’Neill’s reply was that no 
one can tell me that Dan More could try this case in 6 months therefore they don’t 
need a continuance. (Transcript Vol.  VIII – 162) 
148. 
Judge O’Neill testified that she arrived at court late that morning. 
“And I know specifically I did three pleas, one at 11:00 o'clock, or 11:30, 12:00 
o'clock, and 12:40.”  (Transcript Vol.  X – 258) She had absolutely no idea anyone 
was there to see her that day and never spoke to her float bailiff, Pam Boughner, that 
day . (Transcript Vol.  X – 259)   “I know Sheila Vitale didn't say anything to me 
about this either.  And I know at that time I did not know about Mr. More's medical 
condition as well.” (Transcript Vol.  X – 254)  “What I recall is the critical dates that 
are  involved in this are December 8th, and I've just  addressed that.  I do not know 
of any motion for stay that was dropped off.  I don't have any communication from a 
staff attorney. (Transcript Vol.  X – 262-263)  Shelia Vitale testified that she did 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
86 
recall there was period of time in which Christina Corl was calling and speaking 
with her about Dan More’s condition after a motion had been filed.  She testified she 
knew she spoke with Judge O’Neill about Dan More’s condition but she did not 
have a specific recollection of the dates. (Transcript Vol. XVIII – 100-102) 
149. 
Gilbert dismissed the Gosnell v. Kirkbride case without prejudice on 
January 13, 2000 and refiled the case less than 2 weeks later.  The case was settled 
after arbitration and before a trial.  Dan More died in August 2000.  Amid testified 
that  Judge O’Neill was the only judge who would not accommodate Attorney 
More’s illness with a stay or continuance.  The Teamsters even gave consideration in 
the ongoing labor negotiations which were taken over by Attorney Amid. 
(Transcript Vol.  VIII – 110-111)  
150. 
Practices of Common Pleas Court judges in Ohio vary widely on the 
granting and denial of continuances of trial dates.  They range from courts in which 
trial dates are strictly enforced to courts in which judges are far more flexible.  What 
constitutes the “good cause” required in civil and criminal rules to justify a 
continuance varies depending on the facts and the practice of each individual judge.  
(Testimony of Judges Corzine and Parrott, former Judges Tracy, Tyack and 
Williams) 
151. 
VIOLATIONS CHARGED ON COUNT 3: 
a) 
Canon 1 – A judge shall uphold the integrity  and independence of 
the judiciary; 
b) 
Canon 2 – A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall 
act at all times in a manner which promotes public confidence in the 
judiciary; 
c) 
Canon 3 – A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office 
impartially and diligently; 
d) 
Canon 3(B)(2) – A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain 
professional competence in it; 
January Term, 2004 
87 
e) 
Canon 3(B)(4) – A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to 
litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and other with whom the judge 
deals in an official capacity; 
f) 
Canon 3(B)(8) – A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters 
promptly, efficiently and fairly; 
g) 
Canon 4 – A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of 
impropriety in all of the judge’s activities; 
h) 
DR 1-102(A)(5) – Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice. 
 
152. 
The panel finds that Respondent has not proven by clear and 
convincing evidence that Respondent’s denial of continuances in Count 3 violated 
the Canons or Disciplinary Rule as alleged.  Judges are granted wide discretion to 
determine whether good cause exists to grant a continuance.  The panel is disturbed 
by the contradictions between the testimony of Judge O’Neill and all other witnesses 
about the events surrounding these continuances, however, Respondent has not been 
charged with  any violations of DR 1-102(A)(4) in this Count.  While the 
respondent’s statements and actions as described by the witnesses evidence errors of 
judgment and insensitivity by the Respondent, the panel finds they do not rise to the 
level of an ethical violation in an area where judges are granted such wide discretion.  
 
153. 
COUNT IV: Respondent has repeatedly made misrepresentations in 
her interactions with lawyers, other judges and court personnel. 
154. 
FREEMAN V. HOPKINS: Testimony taken from Stacy 
Simendinger (victim advocate)(Transcript Vol. VIII – 239-255), Sandy Grego 
(Transcript Vol.  VIII – 212), Judge David Cain (Transcript Vol. X – 79-89, 167-
170), Judge O’Neill (Transcript Vol.  X - 297- 319, XI – 54 –57, 65-68, 69-72, 85-
96) (Exhibits 409-423) 
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88 
155. 
On January 24, 2000, Sarah Freeman filed a petition for an ex-parte 
emergency civil protection order per O.R.C. 2903.213(B), a “CPO” against Matthew 
Hopkins, an ex-boyfriend.  At the time the petition was filed in Franklin County 
Common Pleas Court, the procedure was that these emergency petitions were to be 
handled by the duty judge assigned on the day they were filed.  
156. 
Stacy Simendinger was a non-lawyer victim’s advocate  with the 
Stalking Unit of the prosecutor’s office.  She was assigned to assist Freeman with 
this petition as permitted by O.R.C. 2903.214(L). Simendinger accompanied 
Freeman to the Clerk’s Office to file the petition. (Transcript Vol.  VIII – 250-252)   
There were criminal trespass charges against Hopkins.  Hopkins had been arrested 
but refused at the jail for medical reasons, was transported to a hospital and then 
released.  At the time Freeman filed for a CPO, Hopkins had not been re-arrested or 
arraigned.  While Freeman could have obtained a stay-away order as a condition of 
bond on the criminal charges, Hopkins had still not been arrested and arraigned on 
those charges.  A stay-away order connected with criminal charges is in effect only 
as a condition of bond.  If a criminal defendant violates a stay-away order, the 
prosecution can make a motion to revoke bond.  A stay-away order ends with the 
resolution of the criminal case.  In contrast,  a CPO gives police authority to make an 
immediate arrest of a defendant when they violate the terms of the CPO.  After an 
evidentiary hearing, a CPO can be effective for up to 5 years.  (Transcript Vol.  245-
247) 
157. 
That Monday afternoon, January 25, 2000, the matter was assigned 
to Judge O’Neill as the duty judge.  Freeman’s petition stated “the respondent is 
responsible for many unwanted phone calls and unwanted visits to the petitioner’s 
home and workplace and well as written correspondence.” (Exhibit 410) 
158. 
In the hearing transcript Judge O’Neill asks Freeman ‘why are you 
filing this?’ and she relates “I continue to have unwanted phone calls, unwanted 
visits to my home.”(Exhibit 421 p.2)  Judge O’Neill asks when the last incident 
January Term, 2004 
89 
occurs and Freeman discloses the last incident had occurred “just this past 
Wednesday” and that Freeman  had called the police and Hopkins had been arrested.  
Judge O’Neill asks for no other information about the ex-boyfriend’s harassment.  
Instead, the remainder of the hearing involved Judge O’Neill taking issue with the 
ex-boyfriend’s arrest on the criminal trespass charge and questioning why the ex-
boyfirend had still not been arrested by Columbus Police. Judge O’Neill advised 
“Well I think you need to work with the Columbus Police.   How are you going to 
serve him with notice of this? .... You have far greater power if you just do your job 
right, that is to contact the police, they go out, arrest him, they bring him to jail, 
arraign him and they issue a no-contact order as a condition of his bond.  It makes all 
of this unnecessary because this is not going to be any good if I sign it because you 
have no way of serving it on him if you don’t think he lives at this address.” (Exhibit 
421 p.5)   When Simendinger stated that they knew where Hopkins lived, Judge 
O’Neill again asked “Why don’t you call the police?”    Simendinger then explained 
that her supervisor, Leslie Ashworth of the Domestic Violence Unit advised 
Simendinger to obtain a CPO because a criminal stay-away order doesn’t give the 
police power to arrest on the spot like a CPO.  Judge O’Neill agreed but again 
advised Freeman to file a criminal complaint stating, “It’s much stronger if you have 
criminal charges pending.”  She finally advised them “Get the police to arrest him, 
sign a complaint with a warrant for his arrest, and then put on the file to the police 
that the victim insists on having no contact with him, a Stay-Away order. Okay.” 
(Exhibit 421 pp. 6-8) With that comment, the hearing ended.   
159. 
Simendinger testified that Judge O’Neill never invited them back and 
did not say “if you can’t get what you need in criminal court come back and see 
me.” (Transcript Vol.  VIII – 248 – 250) Sandy Grego, the court reporter, likewise 
recalled no off-the-record conversations or invitations for Freeman to return. 
(Transcript Vol.  VIII – 212) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
90 
160. 
On the following day, January 26, 2000, Freeman, accompanied by 
Simendinger, returned to Court and had another hearing on her CPO petition before 
Judge David Cain, the administrative judge.  This hearing was arranged by Leslie 
Ashworth.   Judge Cain granted an ex parte CPO.  (Transcript Vol.  VIII – 248)  
161. 
Judge David Cain testified that the Freeman matter was brought to 
his attention as administrative judge.  He was told by Freeman and Simendinger that 
Judge O’Neill had not given Freeman a chance to explain why she wanted this CPO 
and  had told her to go back to Municipal Court and get  a stay-away order in the 
criminal case. (Transcript Vol. IX – 82).  Judge Cain testified that the last time Judge 
O’Neill had been duty judge in October 1999 a problem had occurred with Judge 
O’Neill’s handling of another CPO. The previous incident  involved float Bailiff, 
Wanda Karns and her efforts with Judge O’Neill to obtain a hearing for a man who 
had petitioned for a CPO.  (Transcript Vol.  IX – 84-85) (See Panel Report ¶ 232-¶ 
236, below for details)    
162. 
Judge Cain wrote a memo to Judge O’Neill about the Freeman case 
and copied it to all the judges. (Exhibit 419) In the memo he stated, “Yesterday I 
handled a petition for a Stalking Civil Protection Order necessary only because you 
refused to do so the day before despite the fact that the petitioner and witness 
assistants were in your courtroom with the properly completed forms.” ...“Your 
refusal to properly address the matter caused a woman to go another day without her 
right to protection...A problem arose out of a similar matter the last time you were 
duty judge.  When you are duty judge in the future, please give these people the 
attention they deserve and the law demands.” 
163. 
Judge O’Neill wrote a memo in response to Judge Cain on January 
26, 2000 which began, “Again I have to respond to a memorandum from you that 
inaccurately accuses me of failing to perform my duties.” Judge O’Neill stated:  
“The record, under oath by the complainant reflects that she had not been contacted 
in any manner by the alleged stalker (her ex-boyfriend) in a week, the last contact 
January Term, 2004 
91 
was a call to her place of employment, that menacing by stalking criminal charges 
had been properly filed but not served because the police had not located him yet, 
that she didn’t know she could get a stay away order or Temporary Protection Order 
through the Municipal court case etc ,etc.” The  hearing record Judge O’Neill 
specifically invoked states that the last contact had been 5 days before, that the 
charges were criminal trespass and that an arrest had been made but the defendant 
was mistakenly released from the hospital and that the victim knew about criminal 
case orders.  (Exhibit 420) 
164. 
The memo goes on: “I did not refuse her or any other petitioner a 
hearing.  I held the hearing.  I did not find that she met the burden, but I told her to 
come back to me, that I would be here, if she couldn’t obtain a stay away.” “In this 
case I clearly told her the petition was denied but I would issue one if a stay-away or 
temporary protection order  could not be obtained through the municipal case”... At 
no time did I refer her to you nor did she lead me to believe she would ‘judge shop.’  
I left the courtroom under the impression that she would come back that afternoon or 
the next morning if she could not obtain the above-mentioned relief.” (Exhibit 420)  
The hearing record does not contain any ruling on  the petition, any reference to the 
burden of proof much less any invitation to Freeman to return to Judge O’Neill for 
further proceedings. (Exhibit 421) There was likewise no written order entered by 
Judge O’Neill denying or granting this CPO. 
165. 
Judge O’Neill’s memo concluded with a pointed criticism of 
Simendinger.  ”The City Attorney’s Victim Assistant (not a lawyer) did not ask a 
single question of the complainant and could not answer any of my questions other 
that to say her supervisor told her to come down here.  She didn’t know what the 
procedures were or the facts of the case.”  (Exhibit 420)  The actual hearing record 
indicates that Simendinger answered all of Judge O’Neill’s questions and clearly 
knew the procedures.(Exhibit 421) 
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166. 
Judge Cain testified Judge O’Neill’s written response “made no 
sense.”  “...one of the reasons why Miss Freeman was so upset, she didn't want to 
miss another day of work.  And if she (Judge O’Neill) wasn't going to give it to her 
in the first incident, I don't know why she's (Judge O’Neill) saying, "I told her she 
could come back and I'd give it to you tomorrow". ...” (Transcript Vol.  IX – 86-87) 
167. 
Judge O’Neill was asked about the contradictions between the actual 
record of the hearing and what she wrote about the record in her memorandum to 
Judge Cain. She stated had not seen the actual transcript of the Freeman hearing until 
discovery in this disciplinary proceeding and the memo was based on what she 
remembered when she wrote the memorandum. (Transcript Vol.  X – 304-305)  
168. 
BIGGS: 
Testimony 
taken 
from 
Robert 
Schopis 
(defense 
attorney)(Transcript Vol.  IX – 8-70)), Judge O’Neill (Transcript Vol. XI – 9-29) 
(Exhibits 424-453) 
169. 
Tracy Lee Biggs was indicted on one count of possession of Cocaine, 
an F-5.  She was represented by Robert Schopis (admitted 1982, Franklin County 
public defender).  Biggs refused the plea offered at the pretrial and the case was set 
for trial on Judge O’Neill’s docket on August 7, 2000.  Schopis had a one-month 
vacation set which conflicted with that date, therefore Judge O’Neill granted a 
continuance until September 4, 2000, the day Schopis was scheduled to return to his 
office.  Schopis asked that the trial be reset to September 5 and Judge O’Neill 
refused.  During Schopis’ vacation a series of entries are sent on July 26, August 3, 
August 16 by the Franklin County Common Pleas Court Assignment office 
rescheduling either the trial or a motion in the Biggs case for September 4 or 5, 
2000. (Exhibits 428, 431, 432, 434 and 435)  
170. 
Schopis returned from his vacation and was in his office on Sunday 
and learned that  the Biggs trial was set for September 5th but he appeared in Judge 
O’Neill’s courtroom on September 4, 2000 to be certain.  Schopis met Marla 
January Term, 2004 
93 
Farbacher, the prosecutor who was handling the trial who confirmed that she had 
subpoenaed witnesses for trial on September 5, 2000. (Exhibit 433).   
171. 
On the morning of September 4, 2000 Schopis testified that  Judge 
O’Neill took the bench and announced that the trial would start that day.  Judge 
O’Neill threatened to issue a capias and bond forfeiture for Biggs if she did not 
appear that day.  Schopis called Biggs who made the 2 hour drive from Ray, Ohio to 
Columbus and arrived at court around 1:00 pm.  At that time Judge O’Neill was in 
another proceeding, so Biggs sat with Schopis in the front seat of the gallery.   After 
some time Judge O’Neill’s bailiff sent back to Schopis an entry signed by Judge 
O’Neill that stated that “on the motion of the defendant. because the defendant was 
late and by the time she arrived the Court  was in a 2 co-defendant criminal trial,  the 
trial is continued to September 25.” (Exhibit 436)  
172. 
On September 25, 2000 the suppression hearing and trial began for 
Biggs. (Exhibit 450) At close of trial that day Judge O’Neill warned the jury that 
there was a large docket the next morning and that there would be frequent 
interruptions in the morning.  On September 26, Schopis checked in at 9:00 am, 
Judge O’Neill was not present and Biggs was not present and the courtroom was full 
of people for the criminal docket.  Schopis left to do other assignments, checked 
back in before noon and Judge O’Neill was on the bench doing the criminal docket. 
Schopis met Biggs outside the courtroom who advised him Judge O’Neill was 
“madder than hell.”  Biggs explained that because of a car breakdown and bus 
schedules she had arrived about 10:00 am.  Biggs’ trial concluded the next day with 
a guilty verdict. Judge O’Neill proceeded to sentencing. (Exhibit 448 p.268)  In 
sentencing Judge O’Neill stated that Biggs was an hour late for trial on September 
26 without just cause or apology and that Biggs had been engaging in disruptive 
behavior throughout the trial. When challenged by Schopis about Biggs’ lateness 
Judge O’Neill stated in the record, “...That’s not exactly what was said, and you 
weren’t here, and I was here before 9 o’clock yesterday, and when she walked in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
94 
here, you were not here.” (Exhibit 452 p.273)   The parties stipulated that the court 
parking garage records show that Judge O’Neill arrived at 9:30 am on the morning 
in question. Schopis also took exception on the record with Judge O’Neill’s 
characterization of Biggs behavior as disruptive and testified that Biggs was no more 
disruptive or reactive than any other unsophisticated client sitting at a trial table. 
(Transcript Vol.  IX – 33-37) (Exhibit 452 p.272-273)  
173. 
July 22, 1999 Judges Meeting: Testimony taken from Judge David 
E. Cain (Transcript Vol.  187), Judge Nodine Miller (Transcript Vol. IX - X - 94-
107,142-144),  Judge Patrick McGrath (Transcript Vol. X – 175-161,194-197), 
(Exhibits 454-457) 
174. 
On the agenda for the Franklin County Common Pleas Court 
monthly judges meeting on July 20, 1999, was a motion by the Rules Committee to 
amend Local Rule 81 concerning a litigant’s right to make a record.  Judge Nodine 
Miller, chair of the Rules Committee had prepared a memorandum about the 
proposed rule change dated July 12, 1999 which was distributed to all Common 
Pleas Court judges in advance of the July 22, 1999 meeting. (Exhibit 457)  The 
memo stated that “Within the last several months there have been at least three 
serious incidents involving a trial judge’s dictatorial control over the official court 
record which has resulted in prejudice to the rights of the parties.  In two instances, 
prosecutors demanded the right to include judicial action on the court’s record.  In 
one instance a defense attorney made the same demand.”  The proposed amendment 
to the Local Rule expressly granted parties the right to memorialize for the record 
any action taken in a criminal or civil case and also provided guidance for a court 
reporter if the reporter was instructed by the trial judge not to record any action 
taken or request made.  Judge Miller testified that she was aware of complaints from 
Myron Shwartz (see Dennis, Panel Report at ¶ 108 - ¶ 114), Sue Ann Reulbach and 
Dan Cable (See “pajama bank robber”/Lane, Panel Report at ¶ 65-¶ 69) and Joe 
Landusky about Judge O’Neill’s control of the record. (Transcript Vol. IX – 199) 
January Term, 2004 
95 
175. 
At the July 22, 1999 meeting Judge O’Neill asked if the proposed 
amendment was in response to something Judge Sheward had done. (Transcript Vol. 
IX – 73-74,206-207) Judge Miller stated in response, “No, the complaints we’ve 
gotten concern you.” (Transcript Vol. IX – 74, 206-207, X – 159-160)  Judge Miller, 
Judge Cain and Judge McGrath testified that in reply Judge O’Neill stated that she 
had never denied anyone the opportunity to make a record. (Transcript Vol.  IX – 
74,207, X – 161)  Judge Miller challenged Judge O’Neill’s assertions and Judge 
O’Neill asked, “Are you calling me a liar?” (Transcript Vol. IX – 74)  Judge Miller 
responded , “Well, you’re lying right now.” (Transcript Vol. IX – 206,  X –157)  
Proposed Local Rule 81 was passed by a vote of 10-2 with one abstention. 
176. 
March 26, 1999 : Statements made by Judge O’Neill to Sandy 
Grego about Sue Ann Reulbach bringing charges against Grego for Grego’s failure 
to make a record in Lane, reported in detail at Panel Report ¶s 65- 69, above. 
177. 
March 29, 1999: Testimony taken from Joan Richards (court 
administrator)(Transcript Vol.  VIII – 185-195, 198-200), Sandy Grego, court 
reporter (Transcript Vol. VIII – 208-212), Judge O’Neill (Transcript Vol. XI – 259-
260) 
178. 
When Sandy Grego was assigned as Judge O’Neill’s court reporter 
in January 1996 she testified that she informed Judge O’Neill that on Thursdays she 
had a hair appointment at 5:30 pm and needed to complete her work on Thursday at 
the usual end of the  workday at 5:00 pm. Judge O’Neill indicated at that time that 
she understood and it was not a problem. (Transcript Vol.  VIII – 209-210) 
179. 
In March, 1999, Joan Richards was the Franklin Common Pleas 
Court Director of Court Services and was Sandy Grego’s supervisor. She received a 
phone call  from Judge O’Neill who complained that Sandy left every Thursday at 
4:30pm for a 5:00pm hair appointment.  Richards testified that Judge O’Neill was 
upset  and said “she was tired of having to run my courtroom around Sandy’s 
schedule” (Transcript Vol. VIII -  191-194). 
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180. 
Joan Richards spoke to Sandy Grego on March 29, 1999 and learned 
from Sandy that she had to leave at 5:00 pm, not 4:30 pm and that she had an earlier 
agreement with Judge O’Neill about this appointment.  Richards believed Grego and 
took no action on the complaints made by Judge O’Neill.  Richards testified that 
Judge O’Neill had a history of making complaints to Richards regarding employees 
which were not true. (Transcript Vol.  VIII –194)  Judge O’Neill testified that she 
did speak to Joan Richards about the hair appointments and a particular case in 
which there was a child witness at the end of the day.  Judge O’Neill testified that it 
was an “end-of-the-day” issue rather than any particular time. Grego would be 
cleaning up her office at 4:40pm if they were not in trial and the time she stated may 
have come from that practice. (Transcript Vol.  XI – 259-260) 
181. 
VIOLATIONS CHARGED ON COUNT IV: 
a) 
Canon 1 – A judge shall uphold the integrity  and independence of 
the judiciary; 
b) 
Canon 2 – A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall 
act at all times in a manner which promotes public confidence in the 
judiciary; 
c) 
Canon 3 – A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office 
impartially and diligently; 
d) 
Canon 3(B)(2) – A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain 
professional competence in it; 
e) 
Canon 3(B)(4) – A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to 
litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and other with whom the judge 
deals in an official capacity; 
f) 
Canon 4 – A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of 
impropriety in all of the judge’s activities; 
g) 
DR 1-102(A)(4) – Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation; 
January Term, 2004 
97 
h) 
DR 1-102(A)(5) – Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice. 
182. 
The panel majority finds by clear and convincing evidence that in 
each incident in Count 4 the Respondent made misrepresentations.  The panel 
majority considers the incident involving Freeman v. Hopkins to be the most 
troublesome of these incidents. Respondent made detailed representations of what 
the court record contained the day after the events occurred because she maintained 
that Judge Cain had inaccurately accused her of failing to perform her duties.  She 
copied those representations to every judge to defend her actions.  Every 
representation she made was contradicted by the actual court record and established 
that she had not performed her duties – she had neither granted nor denied the CPO, 
leaving the victim in limbo. Although the tone of Judge Cain’s memo was not 
particularly collegial, that tone in no way justified Respondent’s misrepresentation 
of the events of the previous day to make it appear that she had in fact, heard and 
ruled on an ex-parte petition assigned to her as the duty judge. 
183. 
In Biggs, the Respondent’s misrepresentation of the time of her 
arrival at court may seem trivial but Respondent relied on it to find that the 
defendant was tardy as a sentencing consideration.  In the same way the time of 
Grego’s hair appointment may seem totally irrelevant until it became the basis for 
Respondent seeking employee discipline for a court employee whose regular 
working hours end at 5:00 pm.  Maintaining that Grego left once a week at 4:30 pm 
was not only false but accused a court employee of shorting her hours every week,.  
Respondent’s statements to Grego regarding charges being brought against her by 
Reulbach for failing to take a record in the “pajama bank robber” case were doubly 
false because they not only accused Grego of being the person who failed to take a 
record but also represented that Reulbach blamed Grego for the lack of that record. 
184. 
Respondent’s statement in the July 20, 1999 judges’ meeting that she 
never denied any person a record is contradicted by her written statements in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
98 
September 1998 to the Supreme Court responding to Myron Shwartz’s Affidavit of 
Prejudice in Dennis admitting that she had denied him a record as well as her 
conduct in the Lane matter in March 1999, when Judge O’Neill refused to allow the 
prosecutor to make a record about the victim’s absence at sentencing. 
185. 
These 
multiple 
misrepresentations, 
along 
with 
other 
misrepresentations found to violate DR 1-102(A)(4) in  Counts 1 and 5 of this 
Complaint are considered by the panel majority to be the most serious charges 
against the Respondent.  Dishonesty and misrepresentation are antithetical to the 
integrity of the judiciary and prejudicial to the administration of justice. By clear and 
convincing evidence the panel majority concludes that Respondent’s conduct in 
every incident in Count IV has violated Canons 1, 2, 3, 3(B)(2), 3(B)(4) and 4  and 
Disciplinary Rules DR 1-102(A)(4) and DR 1-102(A)(5).  
 
186. 
COUNT V  alleged that Respondent has consistently displayed rude 
behavior toward her own staff, other court personnel, attorneys, litigants as well as 
members of the public.  This includes undignified and discourteous statements to or 
about deputy sheriffs, probation officials, jury commission staff and other judges. 
187. 
CARRINGTON: Testimony taken from Denise Schwaigert (deputy 
sheriff) (Transcript Vol. XII – 87-135), Michael Herrell (deputy sheriff) (Transcript 
Vol. XII – 135-160), Charles Austin (deputy sheriff)(Transcript Vol. XII – 160-175), 
Judge O’Neill (Transcript Vol.  XVI – 184-193), and on behalf of Respondent, 
Sheriff James A. Karnes (Transcript Vol.  XVII – 40-46), (Exhibits 471-473), 
(Relator’s Exhibits U – X) 
188. 
On October 27, 1999, Ricky Carrington had a scheduled court 
appearance in Judge O’Neill’s courtroom.  He faced charges of theft, an F-5.  
Deputy Sue McCoy was assigned to Judge O’Neill’s courtroom.  Deputy Denise 
Schwaigert (17 years deputy sheriff, retired 2003) arrived at Judge O’Neill’s 
courtroom that morning to assist. 
January Term, 2004 
99 
189. 
At the time of her arrival Schwaigert testified that Judge O’Neill was 
upset and angry. Schwaigert tried to whisper to McCoy to sort out what was 
happening and Judge O’Neill yelled at them, slamming files down on the bench. 
(Transcript Vol.  XII – 91-92) Judge O’Neill was starting a trial and the defendant, 
Ricky Carrington, was not dressed in street clothes.  According to a policy adopted 
with the Common Pleas Court Judges a month earlier, (Exhibit 473) the deputies had 
a record from the jail that Carrington had refused to dress. (Exhibit 471 p. 8) McCoy 
tried to tell Judge O’Neill that Carrington had refused to dress out at the jail. 
According to Schwaigert, Judge O’Neill again yelled in a loud voice at McCoy, 
whipped around in her chair, pulled open a file drawer to get a copy of memo from 
the month before and ordered her bailiff to make copies for the deputies. Judge 
O’Neill stated that she wanted someone reprimanded about this incident. (Transcript 
Vol.  XII – 97 – 98) (Exhibit 471 p. 8, U p.2) McCoy then called for her supervisor, 
Lieutenant Michael Herrell (22 years sheriff, now a Major, Lieutenant in charge of 
Court Services in 1999). Herrell arrived and investigated, obtained the “refuse to 
dress” record from their office and gave a copy to Judge O’Neill’s bailiff. (Exhibit 
W p.3) Sgt. Charles Austin testified that he arrived at the courtroom and found that 
“Deputy McCoy was still upset so I relieved her and stayed in the courtroom” 
(Transcript Vol.  XII – 165)(Exhibit X). McCoy, Schwaigert, Herrell and Austin all 
wrote up incident reports reporting these events. (Exhibits U, V, W X) 
190. 
Herrell concluded in his report that policy was followed by the 
deputies and staff involved. (Exhibit W p.3) No reprimands were issued. Herrell has 
never had an incident with a judge he had to write up in this way.  (Transcript Vol.  
XII – 155) 
191. 
Judge O’Neill testified that she did not yell and did not behave in an 
unprofessional manner with the deputies or attorneys that morning.  She testified she 
was upset that Carrington was not dressed and did not learn until ‘substantially later’ 
why he was not dressed.   She did not demand that someone be reprimanded. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
100 
(Transcript Vol.  XVI – 185 – 188) In her Answer at ¶451 she plead that “Sgt Austin 
has indicated to me that the events as alleged are inaccurate and if he relieved 
Deputy McCoy it was for a break as is customary.”  Judge O’Neill testified she 
“specifically recalled talking to Austin either later that day, the next day or shortly 
thereafter where he indicated to me exactly what I had alleged in my response.” 
(Transcript Vol.  XVI – 191) As to the statements attributed to him in the Answer, 
Sgt Austin testified that “I don’t think I said anything in that verbiage like that.... 
there’s a chance I might have said something like don’t worry about it...” (Transcript 
Vol.  XII – 165) 
192. 
NOVEMBER 30, 1999: Testimony taken from Denise Schwaigert 
(Transcript Vol.  XII – 101-122), Judge O’Neill (Transcript Vol.  XVI – 193-197)   
193. 
On November 30, 1999, Schwaigert was assigned to Judge O’Neill’s 
courtroom. Jury selection in a criminal trial was going on. Schwaigert had observed 
the defendant’s interaction with Judge O’Neill as getting hostile.  The defendant kept 
talking over Judge O’Neill.  An attorney from an earlier plea walked up rapidly and 
asked as he passed Schwaigert if he could enter the lockup. Schwaigert nodded 
“yes” and from bench Judge O’Neill shook her head “no.” Schwaigert recognized 
that she should not have allowed this and arranged for the attorney to leave the 
lockup through the adjoining courtroom. Judge O’Neill had her bailiff go over to 
remind Schwaigert that no one is to go into the lockup when a jury was present.   
194. 
When break in the trial was taken, Judge O’Neill came off the bench 
as Schwaigert had the defendant unrestrained walking back to the lockup.  Judge 
O’Neill walked toward Schwaigert with the defendant between them. The defendant 
was within arms length of Judge O’Neill with Schwaigert behind him. Judge O’Neill 
yelled at Schwaigert about allowing the attorney into lockup while the jury was 
present.  Schwaigert was shocked and alarmed, as Judge O’Neill had compromised 
Schwaigert and her ability to control the defendant for the purpose of yelling at her 
about the earlier incident.  The defendant was free and unrestrained and he was a 
January Term, 2004 
101 
defendant who had just had words with the judge.  Schwaigert pushed the defendant 
through the door to lockup as quickly as she could as Judge O’Neill continued to 
walk toward her and yell her comments. She was embarrassed by Judge O’Neill 
yelling at her and she felt like a kid in school but she was far more concerned that 
Judge O’Neill had compromised courtroom security by her actions. (Transcript Vol.  
XII – 101-122) Schwaigert waited several days but made an incident report 
expressing her security concerns. (Exhibit Y) 
195. 
Judge O’Neill testified that she was not upset with Schwaigert but 
was upset with the attorney.  She did not yell or say that Schwaigert was rude to her.  
She was never in the immediate vicinity of the defendant and had no reason to be 
concerned that the defendant was angry with her – he was angry with his attorney. 
(Transcript Vol.  XVI – 193-194) 
196. 
James A. Karnes (sheriff of Franklin County since 1992) testified 
that their department policy regarding inmates brought to court is that they are 
brought in jail clothes unless there is a request to dress them for trial.  He was aware 
of no standard policy regarding attorneys being allowed in a courtroom lockup 
during a trial.  He became involved in problems between his deputies and Common 
Pleas Court judges only if their immediate supervisors couldn’t handle the problems.  
He was personally unaware of any issues between deputies and Judge O’Neill 
(Transcript Vol.  XVII – 40-46). 
197. 
ZAZWORSKY V. PETRELLA: Testimony taken from Mary Jane 
McFadden (defense attorney)(Transcript Vol.  XIII - 85 –175), Robert Cohen 
(plaintiff’s 
counsel)(Transcript 
Vol. 
 
177-216), 
Mary 
Jane 
Martin 
(prosecutor)(Transcript Vol.  217-229), Judge O’Neill (Transcript Vol.  XVI – 212-
224, XVII – 175-177) (Exhibits 474-497) 
198. 
This was a civil case which involved a reverse stock split relating to 
the buyout of a bank. It presented issues regarding Delaware law and conflicts of 
law and battling expert testimony relating to the valuation of bank stock.  At the time 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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of the scheduled trial date before Judge O’Neill on December 14, 1998 counsel 
testified there were three Motions in Limine pending. (Transcript Vol.  XIII – 100)  
199. 
On Monday morning December 14, 1998, counsel checked in at 
Judge O’Neill’s courtroom and were told that the case would be heard by Visiting 
Judge Paul Martin.  Judge Martin was a retired judge, having served 22 years on the 
Franklin County Common Pleas Court.   
200. 
Counsel met with Judge Martin who reviewed the court’s case file 
with the parties.  Judge Martin declined to hear the trial and advised them to go back 
to Judge O’Neill.  The reasons he stated were pending undecided Motions in Limine, 
the estimated length of case (counsel predicted 2 weeks) given Judge Martin’s 
limited availability for only that week due to a previously scheduled vacation and his 
lack of resources such as access to staff attorney or law library to address the out of 
state legal issues presented. (Transcript Vol.  XIII – 107-108) Parties and counsel 
returned to Judge O’Neill courtroom and met with Judge O’Neill and advised her of 
Judge Martin’s position and reasons.  Judge O’Neill ordered them to go back to 
Judge Martin and deliver the message that he had to hear the case.  McFadden 
delivered the message and Judge Martin declined to hear the trial again. (Transcript 
Vol. XIII – 112-114) 
201. 
The parties returned once more to Judge O’Neill.  Judge O’Neill was 
angry, placed a call to Judge Cain, spoke to both attorneys and then had them take 
places in her courtroom.  Judge O’Neill made a record of the events of the morning.  
She stated that all the motions were ruled on, that after checking with Judge Cain she 
was told that Judge Martin did not have vacation until the following Wednesday and 
that the parties assured her trial would be complete by Friday, and asserted that even 
if Judge Martin was leaving Friday that “what we routinely do in the court because 
we are busy” is to break the trial  over the holidays and come back in February to 
complete the trial. She went on to state that Judge Martin refused to accept case 
because “he did not feel qualified or competent to handle a case of this magnitude.”  
January Term, 2004 
103 
She related that she had spoken to Judge Cain and that “I’m going to move that he 
(Judge Martin) be terminated from the visiting judge program for refusing to take 
the case that he does not have authority to refuse to take.” (Exhibit 478 pp. 4-5)  
Judge O’Neill testified at hearing that all motions “filed in accordance with the 
pretrial order” had been ruled on by the morning of trial.  She admitted that there 
was no entry filed, however, she recalled she and her staff attorney working on them 
and printing them off when all of “the confusion” occurred as to whether the case 
was going to be heard or be continued. (Transcript Vol.  XVI – 214-215). 
202. 
McFadden and Cohen described Judge O’Neill’s demeanor while she 
made these statements as harsh and angry.  Judge Martin’s daughter, Mary Jane 
Martin was sitting in the “very crowded” courtroom waiting for a criminal case she 
was assigned as an assistant county prosecutor.  Mary Jane Martin described Judge 
O’Neill’s tone as castigating and chastising and when Judge O’Neill stated the 
reason that her father had refused the case her tone changed to “pitying this poor, 
old, doddering fool who is not competent.” (Transcript Vol.  XIII – 221-223).  Mary 
Jane Martin got up and left the courtroom, and asked a colleague to handle her case 
before Judge O’Neill that day because she “was going to say something and I didn’t 
think that prudent in my professional career.”  (Transcript Vol.  XIII – 223)  
203. 
STATE V. CRIBB: Testimony taken from Marielle Dimitrew 
(victim 
assistant)(Transcript 
Vol. 
XII 
– 
175-207) 
David 
Zeyen 
(prosecutor)(Transcript Vol. XII – 207-238), Judge O’Neill (Transcript Vol. XVI – 
197-212, XVII – 126-128) (Exhibits 498-504) (Relator’s Exhibit AA) 
204. 
Andre Cribb was indicted on multiple counts of attempted murder, 
felonious assault and abduction. His victims were a mother, Leslie Seals and her 
daughter, Laura Seals. Cribb was the boyfriend of the daughter. Cribb beat the 
daughter and mother in one incident. Leslie Seals had clumps of her hair torn out 
then Cribb broke a toilet top over her head and cut her neck with shards of broken 
porcelain.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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205. 
Leslie Seals was present for the trial accompanied by a victim 
assistant, Marielle Dimitrew (Franklin County prosecutor’s office, victim witness 
assistant since 1999, M.S. in Social Work) as well as her daughter Laura Seals and 
her (new) boyfriend.  On the morning of trial David Zeyen, the assigned prosecutor 
(admitted 1997, Franklin County prosecutor since 1997) offered a plea to Cribb and 
discussed it with Seals and Dimitrew. (Transcript Vol.  XII –196-197, 211-212)  
206. 
Leslie and Laura Seals and the boyfriend were sitting in the 
courtroom waiting for the plea to occur.  Dimitrew sat directly behind them in the 
courtroom for 10 to 15 minutes. Dimitrew saw them whisper to each other but could 
not hear what they said.  As Zeyen stood up to begin to read the plea, Judge O’Neill, 
on the bench, screamed in an angry, explosive voice that there is no talking in her 
courtroom and that they are to leave.  Zeyen turned and saw the boyfriend leaning 
over covering his mouth to whisper and realized “they” were the Seals party. Zeyen 
and Dimitrew quietly walked out of the courtroom with the Seals party to the 
witness conference room. (Transcript Vol.  XII – 180-185,212-215) 
207. 
Zeyen returned to the courtroom with Leslie, asking the daughter and 
boyfriend to wait in the conference room.  He believed that Judge O’Neill was 
yelling at the boyfriend and that Leslie, as the victim had the right to be present. 
208. 
The plea transcript (Ex. 498) reflected that as the plea began Judge 
O’Neill stated, “I said out of the courtroom” and Zeyen said, “Judge, this is the 
victim”. At sidebar, Judge O’Neill told Zeyen “I don’t blame you but there was an 
incident earlier and I ordered them out of the courtroom.” Zeyen asked that the 
victim be allowed to be present and Judge O’Neill refused. (Transcript Vol.  XII – 
220) Zeyen completed the plea without Leslie Seals’ presence. (Transcript Vol.  XII 
– 224) Zeyen wrote on his case file that day “Judge O’Neill screamed at victim for 
‘talking’ in courtroom and wouldn’t allow her in courtroom for plea.” (Exhibit AA) 
209. 
When Zeyen returned to the conference room he described Leslie 
Seals as “completely broken down.” Dimitrew and Zeyen arranged and transported 
January Term, 2004 
105 
Laura Seals for emergency consultation at Healthnet, a local mental health facility.  
Laura Seals did not appear at the subsequent sentencing of Cribb.  Neither Zeyen nor 
Dimitrew had ever observed a crime victim treated in this fashion in a courtroom, 
nor had they ever had to arrange mental health treatment for a victim after a court 
appearance.  (Transcript Vol. 191-193, 203, 221-224) 
210. 
Judge O’Neill testified that over the course of the morning between 
9:00 am and 11:00 am when Zeyen and Dimitrew were not in the courtroom she had 
to ask for quiet repeatedly.  She believed she had asked the Seals party to leave more 
than once.  She denied that she ever yelled or screamed. (Transcript Vol.  XVI – 
202-203) In her Answer she plead at ¶ 479 that “the victim at one point did re-enter 
the courtroom and was present for the plea.”  At hearing she testified that Seals was 
not present for the entire plea colloquy. (Transcript Vol.  XVI - 204-207) 
211. 
HUDSON/JASON YOUNGER: Testimony taken from Jason 
Younger (probation officer)(Transcript Vol. XII – 238-269), Scot Weisman (defense 
attorney)(Transcript Vol.VII-212-246), Jessica Flaherty (Transcript Vol.  XIII – 6-
43), Sandra Hicks, (Transcript Vol.  XIII – 43-65) Dane Chavers (Transcript Vol.  
XIII – 65-84), Judge O’Neill (Transcript Vol.  XVI – 225-236, XVII – 125-126) 
(Exhibits 459-470), (Relator’s Exhibit R) 
212. 
On January 31, 2000 Jason Younger (Franklin County Probation 
Officer since 1994, BA in Criminal Justice, working on a master’s degree) appeared 
at a probation revocation hearing for Hudson.  At the hearing Hudson was 
represented by Scot Weisman. (Exhibit 460).   
213. 
Judge O’Neill revoked Hudson’s probation and ordered him to serve 
his one-year sentence less 199 days of jail time credit. Weisman appealed Hudson’s 
revocation.  In December of 2000 the Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed the 
revocation and remanded the case for further proceedings. (Exhibit 459)  At that 
point Hudson had served 517 days of jail time credit, in excess of his original 
sentence. (Transcript Vol.  XII – 243-244)  
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214. 
The case was set for a miscellaneous hearing before Judge O’Neill 
on December 15, 2000. Younger and Weisman had a discussion with Judge O’Neill 
at sidebar.  Weisman, with Younger’s consent, explained that Hudson had surpassed 
his jail time credit and asked for a dismissal.  Younger testified that Judge O’Neill 
stated that this was another example of the probation department ‘cowering down’ to 
the public defender and she wanted to make a record. (Transcript Vol.  XII – 244). 
Judge O’Neill asked if Younger had more evidence and witnesses to present relating 
to the grounds for revocation.  Younger said that nothing had changed since the 
previous revocation hearing in January and he had no new witnesses. Judge O’Neill 
then suggested to Younger, “If you have no new evidence then you should just 
withdraw the statement of violations.” Younger “had a strong feeling that I should 
do this” and “that I had to make a decision right there.” (Transcript Vol.  XII – 249-
250, 265) 
215. 
In the transcript of the record Judge O’Neill stated “It’s my 
understanding the Probation Department is caving into the Public Defender’s office 
as usual, Jason.  So, you’re going to withdraw your request for revocation and we’re 
going to release this guy for time served; is that right?” Younger agrees and Judge 
O’Neill continued: “I’ll make sure that your supervisor knows about this one as well. 
This is adding to the growing list of cases in which – never mind.” (Exhibit 460 p.2)  
Younger testified that Judge O’Neill appeared flustered and upset and that he was 
embarrassed by her statements. (Transcript Vol.  XII – 248) Younger testified that 
he was unaware of any list of cases or problems with his work for Judge O’Neill.  
Dane Chavers (admitted 1981, Franklin County Public Defender’s office) was in the 
courtroom at the time and described Judge O’Neill’s demeanor as disrespectful and 
unprofessional.  
216. 
Jessica Flaherty and Sandra Hicks were summoned to Judge O’Neill 
office that afternoon, Hicks was the 9th floor supervisor and Flaherty was Younger’s 
direct supervisor.  Both testified that Judge O’Neill closed the door to her office and 
January Term, 2004 
107 
said: “this will not be pleasant.” Judge O’Neill expressed in an upset and loud tone 
that she was angry about Jason Younger “cowering down” to the public defender’s 
office.  She told them both unequivocally that she wanted Jason terminated from the 
probation department and that he was barred from her courtroom.  There was no 
discussion or back and forth. (Transcript Vol.  XIII – 9-12, 17, 51-52, 61-62) 
Flaherty felt as if they were being disciplined as if they were children. (Transcript 
Vol.  XIII - 27-28) When Judge O’Neill was done they just got up and left.  
(Transcript Vol.  XIII – 48-50).  Flaherty prepared a report of the meeting as an 
incident expressing concern about the unprofessional way that Judge O’Neill 
conducted the meeting and their lack of participation or input to resolve any issue. 
(Relator’s Exhibit R)  Department policy about supervisory approval to withdraw a 
Statement of Violations was not discussed with Judge O’Neill.  (Transcript Vol.  
XIII – 19, 33)(Relator’s Exhibit R) 
217. 
Hicks and Flaherty discussed this matter with Younger but he was 
not suspended or terminated.  He was orally reminded of department policy to get a 
supervisor’s approval before withdrawing a statement of violations on a probationer. 
Hicks felt Younger had appropriately exercised his discretion and did nothing 
wrong. (Transcript Vol. XII – 263, XIII – 16, 50-51) 
218. 
In the Answer, Judge O’Neill plead at ¶ 492 that Wesiman and 
Younger had a conversation before they went on the record but “...she was not aware 
of the substance of the conversation.   Had Mr. Weisman or Mr. Younger asked to 
approach the bench to discuss the proposed resolution before the case was called, 
this matter would not have occurred.”  In ¶493 she plead” After review of the one 
page transcript she recalls that Mr. Younger surprised and embarrassed the Court 
with his request to withdraw the Statement of Violations, without prior consultation 
and direction from the Court.”  
219. 
At ¶498 of the Answer Judge O’Neill plead “She additionally denies 
that she told them (Hicks and Flaherty) that he needed to be terminated or suspended 
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because he withdrew a statement of violations on Hudson and “cowers down” to 
public defenders.  She averred it is possible that she requested that he no longer be 
assigned to her caseload because of several instances that reflected poorly on his 
performance and work ethic.” 
220. 
At this hearing Judge O’Neill testified regarding the sidebar 
conference: ”Q. But you did have a side bar conference and there was a discussion 
off the record about the withdrawal of the violation?  A.   Right.  I recall them telling 
to me, Mr. Weisman starting it off with, I believe Mr. Younger wants to inform the 
court that he's going to withdrawn the request to revoke or statement of violations, 
something, and then there was a side bar discussion.  We had a discussion as to 
whether they were able to proceed, was he able to proceed with his evidence, did he 
have his witnesses available, that kind of thing and then we went on the record and – 
and resolved the case.” (Transcript Vol.  XVI – 226)  “Did you say to that them at 
that time "if you have nothing more than what was presented at the first hearing, 
then you should just withdraw the statement of violations"?  A.   Yeah.  Certainly.  
He said to me, "I don't have my witnesses, Judge".  And I said, "Well, then, what are 
we going to do?  You're going withdraw the statement of violations". (Transcript 
Vol.  XVI – 234)  “Q.   And you also denied in that Answer that you told them that 
he (Younger) needed to be terminated or suspended?  A.   I indicated to them that I 
felt that he needed to be disciplined for it because he clearly violated the rules.  The 
rules are that he should not have withdrawn a statement of violations without 
express approval of his supervisor and, at the very least, should have at least brought 
it to my attention.” (Transcript Vol.  XVI – 228)  
221. 
RUDENESS TO STAFF: 
222. 
Elizabeth Peterman:  After 20 years as a private legal secretary, 
Libby Peterman became the secretary for Judges Johnson and O’Neill in January 
1994 and Peterman became Judge O’Neill’s bailiff in July 1995.  
January Term, 2004 
109 
223. 
Describing the general atmosphere of the courtroom Peterman 
testified: “I mean, she could come in and say good morning and five minutes later 
she would come out and she would just be all over you.  You never knew what to 
expect.  And so, consequently, not only myself, but the other staff members were on 
edge all of the time, all the time she was there because you didn't know what was 
going to come next.” (Transcript Vol. XIII –252) 
224. 
In December 1996 Peterman had an uncontrollable nosebleed at 
work and was taken to the emergency room by Judge O’Neill’s secretary Karen 
Tomacelli.  She was released after medication to control high blood pressure.  She 
called and told Judge O’Neill what had happened and spent the rest of the week at 
home.  
225. 
In 1997 Peterman decided to resign. She testified it was a hard 
decision because she loved the job but hated the atmosphere. She submitted a letter 
of resignation dated March 25, 1997. (Exhibit 505) Peterman had interviewed but 
had no offers when she turned in her resignation.  Her last day was April 4, 1997.  
On that day in the late morning, the new bailiff, Karen Moore arrived.  Peterman 
showed her where everything was kept and the pad on which all courtroom 
procedures were written for use by float bailiffs.  Peterman then took lunch 
expecting Moore would be present in the afternoon but she never returned. She 
received one phone call at home from Karen Moore with a question Peterman 
answered. (Transcript Vol.  XIII – 268-270) 
226. 
Peterman had interviewed with Judge Nodine Miller after she had 
submitted her resignation to Judge O’Neill.  She was offered the position with Judge 
Miller while at home after her last day with Judge O’Neill. (Transcript Vol.  XIII – 
270-271) Peterman began work as Judge Miller’s bailiff on April 14, 1997 and 
remains in that position at present. 
227. 
Peterman received from Joan Richards a copy of a letter dated April 
14, 1997 that Judge O’Neill requested be put in Peterman’s personnel file. Peterman 
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testified the letter is incorrect when it stated that Peterman refused to train the new 
bailiff or provide transition materials.  Peterman also testified that the accusation 
made that Peterman tried to take court property or court manuals is false. (Transcript 
Vol.  XIII – 265-270) 
228. 
Dorothy Gass: Gass worked as Judge O’Neill’s staff attorney from 
May 1996 until September 1997.  Near Gass’ one-year anniversary in the position 
Judge O’Neill told Gass that while the staff attorney position usually lasted one year, 
Judge O’Neill was happy with Gass and she could continue for another year.  
229. 
In August of 1997 Gass was approached by an attorney who told her 
she had interviewed with Judge O’Neill for Gass’ position. (Transcript Vol.  XIII – 
300-302) Gass then asked Judge O’Neill what was happening. Judge O’Neill told 
her that she was just checking out the applicant pool in anticipation of being in a re-
election campaign when Gass would be leaving. A month later, September 16, 1997, 
Gass got a letter from Judge O’Neill stating that Gass’ replacement had been hired 
effective October 14, 1997 and stating that Judge O’Neill had told her in May 1997 
she should start looking for another position. (Exhibit 508) Gass was very upset and 
after consulting with Joan Richards, who was deputy court administrator, she wrote 
a response to Judge O’Neill detailing the inaccuracies in Judge O’Neill’s letter. 
(Exhibit 509) 
230. 
Gass found a new job, requiring that she start right away. She told 
Judge O’Neill but offered to stay as long as Judge O’Neill needed her.  Judge 
O’Neill said that it was fine if Gass left the following Monday. Judge O’Neill later 
told Gass that the new attorney could start earlier and Gass could leave that 
Thursday, September 26, 1997.  Gass drafted a letter of resignation for the day she 
left. (Exhibit 512)  After Gass left she learned from Joan Richards that Judge O’Neill 
had put a memo in her personnel file on the day they agreed about her departure 
which stated that “she quit without sufficient notice” which was “wholly insufficient 
and unprofessional.”  The memo concluded that Gass had been warned, “to take 
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111 
only her personal property and nothing else.” (Exhibit 511)  Gass found the memo 
contradicted the arrangements which Judge O’Neill herself had proposed. Gass was 
not surprised by the memo finding it in keeping with her assessment of Judge 
O’Neill’s character and testified that “she believes that every – believes the worst in 
everybody, but I think it’s just a reflection of herself.” (Transcript Vol.  XIII – 310-
313) 
231. 
Wanda Karn:  In October 1999 Karn was a “float bailiff” with the 
Franklin County Common Pleas Court.  She had worked at the Court since 1991 
beginning in the assignment office and had been a float bailiff since 1995.  Float 
bailiffs provide temporary coverage in all the courtrooms.  
232. 
Beginning Monday, October 18, 1999 Karn started working a week 
for Judge O’Neill while her regular bailiff was on vacation. Judge O’Neill was the 
duty judge that week. Around 3:00 pm a woman from the prosecutor’s office 
brought over a man with a civil protection stalking order. (Exhibit QQ)  Karn 
received the pleadings and informed Judge O’Neill and asked what she would like to 
do. Judge O’Neill replied, “I don’t have to do that now. I have ten days.” (Transcript 
Vol.  XIV – 19-20).  Karn stated that she thought that they had ten days to get it to a 
magistrate after the judge granted the CPO.  Judge O’Neill became very angry, 
challenged Karn that she was telling her how to do her job and screaming that she 
knew how to do her job, had done several in the past and ‘didn’t need me telling her 
what to do’.  With those statements, Judge O’Neill returned to her office and shut the 
door. (Transcript Vol.  XIV – 19-20)  
233. 
Karn then took the petitioner with her to the prosecutor’s office to 
check her understanding of the timing of the process. Karn  was told and given 
memos that the judge must hear the petition ex-parte within 24 hours. Karn  returned 
to Judge O’Neill, asking the petitioner to wait in the courtroom. Karn attempted to 
tell Judge O’Neill what she had learned about the CPO timing or give her the memo. 
She testified that Judge O’Neill reacted “very angry that I was trying to tell her how 
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112 
to do her job or trying to help her at all and really pretty much was throwing a huge 
fit.” There was no discussion about what would happen to the petitioner; Judge 
O’Neill returned to her office and slammed the door. (Transcript Vol.  XIV – 24-25) 
Karn returned to the courtroom and told the petitioner to hold on that she was 
working on things.  She returned to the bailiff’s office to think about what else to do 
and next heard Judge O’Neill from the bench asking ‘where is a court reporter?’ As 
the court reporter arrived Judge O’Neill stated to Karn “and you can get out of here.” 
(Transcript Vol.  XIV – 27-29) 
234. 
Karn called Joan Richards her supervisor to come to the courtroom.  
When Richards arrived Judge O’Neill stopped the CPO hearing and demanded to 
speak with Richards without Karn’s presence.  Judge O’Neill took Richards into her 
office and slammed the door in Karn’s face.  Karn stood outside the office as she 
told Judge O’Neill she would and heard some of Judge O’Neill’s statements: that 
Karn did not work all day, was rude and insubordinate and refused to do what she 
was asked. Karn challenged Judge O’Neill about these lies when she and Richards 
left the office. Richards asked that Karn get her things and accompany her to see the 
Administrative Judge. (Transcript Vol.  XIV – 32-33).  Karn and Richards met with 
Judge Cain and Judge Cain told Karn that she would not have to work in that 
courtroom again.   That evening Karn wrote a memo to Judge Cain, which recorded 
the events of the day. (Exhibit PP)  
235. 
Joan Richards, Director of Court Services and Karn’s supervisor 
testified to being called by Karn in October 1999 to come to Judge O’Neill’s 
courtroom.  She stated that Judge O’Neill came off the bench shouting and wanted 
to speak to her alone without Karn’s presence. When Karn tried to join them Judge 
O’Neill slammed the door in her face.  Judge O’Neill screamed and shouted that 
Karn  doesn’t tell the judge what to do and no one tells the judge what to do.  Judge 
O’Neill wanted Karn out of there and complained that Karn was lazy and wasn’t 
doing work.. When Richards tried to say something, Judge O’Neill shouted over her. 
January Term, 2004 
113 
Richards told Karn to get her things because she didn’t think it right that employees 
be abused like that.(Transcript Vol.  XV – 78-80)  Richards testified that Karn was 
an excellent employee, “someone you wish all your employees would be like.  She 
was always willing to help out.”  (Transcript Vol.  XV – 81-82) 
236. 
In her Answer, Judge O’Neill plead that she did not know about the 
CPO until 3:50 pm (¶ 543). Karn testified that the motion was at the courtroom by 
3:00 pm.  In ¶ 546 Judge O’Neill plead that Karn refused to ask the petitioner if he 
could return for hearing the following morning and that “it is insubordination for a 
float bailiff with a history of disrespect towards her to go over her head in an effort 
to embarrass Judge O’Neill in the presence of the petitioner and court personnel.”  
Karn testified she was never told to ask the petitioner for another hearing date, she 
was totally unaware of any history with Judge O’Neill and none of her conversations 
with Judge O’Neill took place in front of the petitioner.  ¶ 546 also stated “She 
(Karn) created a scene by melodramatically claiming in the petitioner’s presence, 
‘He needs you.”  Karn testified that this was ‘absolutely ludicrous’ because she 
never said anything like that and never spoke to the petitioner in Judge O’Neill’s 
presence. (Transcript Vol. XIV – 40-42) 
237. 
Pam Boughner: Boughner had been employed by the Franklin 
County Common Pleas Court since 1985.  She became a float bailiff in 1991.  She 
had served in Judge O’Neill’s courtroom numerous times and she trained four of 
Judge O’Neill’s bailiffs.  
238. 
According to Boughner, Judge O’Neill was exceptionally difficult to 
work with and “she demands respect, yet she doesn’t give respect to people. She’s 
rude. She’s controlling. It’s always, always about her and her agenda.” Boughner 
described Judge O’Neill as changing rapidly.  She can be “semi-tolerable at one 
point and the next minute she’s seemingly out of control and you may or may not 
know why she feels that way or why she’s doing that.”(Transcript Vol.  XIV – 90-
93)  
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239. 
Boughner had spoken about her concerns in working with Judge 
O’Neill to Joan Richards.  When she heard in October 1999 that Karn did not have 
to cover that courtroom she considered making the same request but decided against 
it because that would leave Karen Moore, Judge O’Neill’s regular bailiff, with no 
coverage.  Six months later in March 2000, after seeing more instances of “forcing 
people to dismiss cases or intimidating them or trying to intimidate them into taking 
plea offers” Boughner asked to be relieved from Judge O’Neill’s courtroom in a 
general letter to Judge Cain.  (Transcript Vol.  XIV – 97-101)(Exhibit 516)  
240. 
Boughner discussed her request with Judge Cain. Boughner was 
asked to prepare a more detailed request. She submitted the letter and Judge Cain 
told her she was relieved of duty with Judge O’Neill. (Transcript Vol.  XIV – 104-
106)(Exhibit 517))   
241. 
In October 2000 Judge Cain informed Boughner that she would be 
re-assigned to Judge O’Neill’s courtroom.  Boughner talked with Judge O’Neill 
about the concerns she had including mutual respect and returned to work as a float 
bailiff.  In October 2001 Boughner discovered that Judge O’Neill had memoranda 
placed in her personnel file criticizing and inaccurately reporting her performance 
while serving as a float bailiff. (Exhibits 519 and 520) 
242. 
Sandy Grego: Sandy Grego accepted a position as Judge O’Neill’s 
court reporter in 1996.  At that time Peterman was Judge O’Neill’s bailiff.  Grego 
testified that Judge O’Neill’s treatment of Peterman was deplorable including 
screaming and yelling.  
243. 
Grego testified between 1996 and 2000 she developed physical 
problems she attributed to the stress of working for hours with five-minute or no 
breaks under Judge O’Neill. In January 1999 she began keeping a private diary 
about her working conditions.  The diary recorded an incident in 1999 in which 
Grego asked for a break to use the restroom and Judge O’Neill argued with her 
January Term, 2004 
115 
about it in front of the jury: “I was embarrassed. I felt like I was five years old 
asking for permission to have a hall pass.” (Transcript Vol.  XIV – 187-188) 
244. 
After unsuccessfully trying to resolve break and lunch issues with 
Judge O’Neill, Grego consulted with Joan Richards about her problems, especially 
having to work extended periods without a break.  Richards told her that there was 
nothing further she could do and Grego went to Judge Cain as the Administrative 
Judge. In December, 1999, Grego submitted a letter to Judge Cain from her doctors 
which requested that she be given regular breaks and lunch times (Relator’s Exhibit 
HH). Judge Cain sent a memo to Judge O’Neill regarding this letter and requesting 
that Grego be given the breaks recommended by her doctor.  Judge O’Neill 
responded to Judge Cain in a memo which stated “Sandy has never been denied a 
lunch break or regular breaks during trials, pleas and hearings.”  The memo went on 
to assert that Grego was insubordinate, had a poor attitude, regularly took 2 hour 
lunches, enjoyed  a minimal schedule of work and that she made the most money of 
any reporter because of her longevity and the high volume of transcript orders. 
(Relator’s Exhibit O) Grego testified that all of these statements were inaccurate and 
that it was Judge O’Neill’s habit of making inaccurate statements that caused Grego 
to begin keeping a diary in the first place.  After these memos there was no change 
in Judge O’Neill’s practices in regard to breaks or lunch. Grego testified to multiple 
incidents involving lack of breaks or lunch recorded in her diary (Transcript Vol.  
XIV – 193-212) 
245. 
Judge O’Neill testified that Grego’s attitude and behavior began to 
deteriorate in August or September 1998 when Grego had a falling out with the 
bailiff Moore over opinions on raising children.  After that things were very tense 
and Grego would not participate in lunches, birthdays and other celebrations.  Judge 
O’Neill did not investigate Grego’s medical concerns after the first doctor’s letter 
but after that whenever Grego wanted a break, she got a break. (Transcript Vol.  XVI 
– 244-252) 
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246. 
In June, 2000, Grego submitted a second letter from her doctor 
stating there had been no improvement in her condition and again requesting 15 
minute breaks and lunch and suggesting she should seek another position in the 
Court if these requests cannot be met. (Relator’s Exhibit II) Judge Cain sent another 
memo to Judge O’Neill, describing the doctor’s letter and informing Judge O’Neill 
that effective July 10, 2000 her courtroom would be covered by float court reporters 
and Grego was thus relieved of her assignment with Judge O’Neill.  Grego received 
a voicemail message from Judge O’Neill that she recorded and was played at the 
hearing and transcribed in the record.  Judge O’Neill’s tone was curt and nasty and 
she stated in part: “you have again gone behind my back”; “how am I supposed to be 
a mind-reader that you need a break every five minutes?”; “I expect you to have 
your office cleared out by Friday, otherwise I’ll have maintenance clear it out.” 
(Transcript Vol.  XIV – 215-216) 
247. 
After consulting with Karen Casey, the Court Director, Grego 
learned that her furniture could not be moved until a week later. On that Friday, 
Grego removed her personal items and what she could carry then turned her key into 
Karen Casey, Court Administrator per court policy the next day she was at work, 
Tuesday July 10.  Grego never returned to the office in Courtroom 9A. 
248. 
Grego testified that in 27 years as court reporter she had worked for 
virtually every judge in Franklin County.  She had never been treated like that by 
any judge, had never seen staff, counsel and litigants treated by any judge like that.  
Judge O’Neill was not accessible, and she ran her criminal docket only concerned 
about having the lowest numbers. “It’s like a different world.” (Transcript Vol.  XIV 
– 223-226) 
249. 
Sheryl Nyce: Nyce has 34 years experience as a court reporter and 
has been with the Franklin County Common Pleas Court since 1977.  She became 
Judge O’Neill’s reporter in the summer of 2000.   Before beginning to work for 
Judge O’Neill, Nyce met with Judge O’Neill and Karen Casey, the Court Director.  
January Term, 2004 
117 
Nyce stated three concerns: her longstanding commitment teaching court reporting 
school 3 evenings a week which required her to leave at 5:00 pm; her known 
medical issues that could require her to take sick leave; and her five weeks of 
vacation that Nyce did take every year.  Judge O’Neill stated at the meeting that 
none of those situations would be a problem and Nyce began working in Judge 
O’Neill’s courtroom (Transcript Vol.  XIV – 243-250).  
250. 
Within weeks of starting with Judge O’Neill on a day she had a class 
to teach, Judge O'Neill assured Nyce at an afternoon break that trial would not last 
until 5:00 pm. Nyce did not arrange for float coverage.  The afternoon break lasted 
an hour because of Judge O’Neill’s extended conversation in Nyce’s presence about 
a shopping trip. At 5:00 pm Judge O’Neill instructed the defense to call their next 
witness.  Nyce approached the bench and stated directly to Judge O’Neill that Nyce 
had a teaching commitment. Judge O’Neill ignored Nyce and Nyce sat down and 
took the witness which lasted 10 minutes.  Judge O’Neill again asked for the next 
witness and Nyce stood up and said, “I cannot stay.  I have to go.”   Judge O’Neill 
only looked at Nyce, “It was kind of like a stand-off at that time.”  The defense then 
rested and Judge O’Neill asked them “Well, what about that last witness? I thought 
you had one more witness?” and the defense again rested.  The next morning Nyce 
saw Karen Casey and wanted to tell her what happened the previous afternoon. 
Casey told her that Judge O’Neill had already called asking that Nyce be 
reprimanded because Nyce had walked out on her in trial the previous afternoon. 
(Transcript Vol.  XIV – 250 -257) 
251. 
Judge O’Neill testified that she likes Nyce personally and she is a 
team player but there are problems with her timeliness. (Transcript Vol.  XVI – 
251,258) 
252. 
Nyce testified to an incident in 2003 with Myron Shwartz in which 
Judge O’Neill had to go home and asked if Shwartz could do his client’s plea 
tomorrow.   Shwartz agreed and with the other lawyer picked a time. After Shwartz 
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left Judge O’Neill had Shwartz’s client brought out and  on the record told the client 
that Mr. Shwartz had left and it was his idea to do the plea tomorrow.  Nyce now 
keeps notes on her docket sheets regarding off the record agreements and 
conversations “because there’s always so much controversy in that courtroom ...to 
have a second pair of eyes and ears paying attention to what’s been said between the 
court and the attorneys.” (Transcript Vol.  XV – 15-19)  Nyce testified that during 
pleas and  sentencing Judge O’Neill doesn’t look at a defendant or give them the 
respect and attention she had seen given by every other judge she worked with in the 
past.  Nyce observed that Judge O’Neill yelled at her bailiff, Karen Moore all the 
time and is  continually unpleasant. Nyce testified that her blood pressure medication 
has been doubled in the last six months and she attributed it to the stress of her 
position with Judge O’Neill. (Transcript Vol.  XV – 20- 23) 
253. 
Jennifer Goodman:  Goodman is the Finance and Purchasing 
Director of Franklin County Common Pleas Court since 1995.  The Court had a 
three-year plan to replace all the judges’ furniture which Goodman directed.  
Goodman testified that all the judges except Judge O’Neill were cooperative with 
and appreciative of the program.  The judges were afforded a certain range of 
choices within a furniture line which had been selected for the whole court.  On 
December 13, 2000 Goodman and a vendor representative met with Judge O’Neill 
to discuss her choices. Goodman testified that Judge O’Neill had many complaints 
and used an angry tone throughout the meeting.  Judge O’Neill asked why she was 
always the last judge to get anything and was upset that she could not keep or match 
her existing furniture. Goodman brought  Judge O’Neill to the fourth floor and 
Goodman’s office to look at other samples and options.  Judge O’Neill stated that 
she wanted the side chairs in  Goodman’s office (which were 30 years old) or 
something similar.  When Goodman concluded the meeting with promises to try to 
talk to Casey and the administrative judge about making special provisions for her 
but Judge O’Neill was still “very upset.” (Transcript Vol.  XV – 39-50) 
January Term, 2004 
119 
254. 
Goodman reported on her meeting with Judge O’Neill to Karen 
Casey as she had after every meeting with a judge.  Goodman conveyed Judge 
O’Neill’s dissatisfaction and relayed the special provisions she wanted.  Goodman 
and Judge O’Neill exchanged several voicemails and on December 20 had a 
conversation in which Judge O’Neill remained very upset about her choices and 
asked to have Goodman’s furniture. Goodman agreed but Judge O’Neill only 
became more upset and demanded that Goodman come to her chambers 
immediately with a catalog.  Goodman did not report to chambers but consulted with 
Casey.  She was advised not to go to Judge O’Neill’s courtroom.  After those 
conversations Judge Cain sent Judge O’Neill a memo explaining that all judges have 
a limited choice and if those choices are not satisfactory  to advise Judge Cain and 
furniture will not be ordered. (Transcript Vol.  XV –52-55)(Exhibit 526) 
255. 
Goodman received a subsequent voicemail from Judge O’Neill 
which began very upset and accusing Goodman of going over her head and then 
ended by asking to meet after the first of the year to work things out.  The meeting 
was scheduled for January 10, 2001.  Goodman attended the meeting accompanied 
by Judge Michael Watson who was the new Administrative Judge. Goodman 
testified Judge O’Neill’s demeanor was completely different and there seemed to be 
no problems whatsoever. When Goodman finished her business she left and Judge 
Watson stayed to talk to Judge O’Neill (Transcript Vol.  XV – 52-57).  
256. 
Joan Richards: Richards retired in 2002 after 30 years with Franklin 
County Common Pleas Court.  She was Director of Court Services who supervised 
float bailiffs, court reporters, float court reporters, secretaries, grand jury, visiting 
judges, arbitration and jury commissioners. As Director of Court Services she 
received complaints from Judge O’Neill about Karn, Boughner, Nyce and Grego 
and Moore. Richards sent a memo to Karen Casey in January 2001 detailing all of 
Judge O’Neill’s complaints about Judge O’Neill’s court reporter, Nyce. (Relator’s 
Exhibit OO) Richards testified that in her experience with past incidents that what 
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Judge O’Neill  said was not really accurate. Richards had concerns about the 
potential of a hostile work environment in connection with Judge O’Neill’s 
courtroom. In six years as Director of Court Services Richards did not  have the 
same or similar issues arise with court reporters or bailiffs in any courtroom except 
Judge O’Neill’s. Richards did not discipline or sanction any employee she 
supervised who was the subject of complaints from Judge O’Neill. (Transcript Vol.  
XV –79, 82-83, 96-97,104-105) 
257. 
Gretchen Roberts:  Roberts has served as Jury Manager, Franklin 
County Common Pleas Court for eight years. On the morning of July 11, 2001 Judge 
O’Neill’s bailiff called about 10:00 am for a jury.  It had been a busy morning, the 
jury pool was in great demand and all panels had been taken.  Judge O’Neill then 
called Gretchen very upset and demanding to know why didn’t she get a jury panel 
and where had they all gone?  Roberts tried to explain the first-come, first served 
policy but Judge O’Neill wanted to know why visiting judges were included. 
Roberts tried to explain but was not sure Judge O’Neill was listening to her.  Judge 
O’Neill told Roberts she was not to go anywhere or take a lunch until Judge O’Neill 
had a jury.  Roberts reported to Joan Richards and then to Karen Casey and found 
Casey on the phone with Judge O’Neill. Roberts reported what happened and Casey 
advised her to do the best she can.  
258. 
Roberts returned to her office and was called again by Judge O’Neill 
who was a little calmer asking if anything has changed.  By 12:33 pm there was a 
panel sent up to Judge O’Neill’s courtroom.  
259. 
Karen Casey: Casey is presently Court Director of the Franklin 
County Domestic and Juvenile Court.  Through September 2003, she served eight 
years as Court Director of the Franklin County Common Pleas Court and preceding 
that for four years as its Assistant Court Director.  Before coming to the Court she 
had fifteen years experience in community mental health. Casey holds a nursing 
degree, law degree and a masters in public administration.  Casey was responsible 
January Term, 2004 
121 
for all non-judicial functions of the Common Pleas Court and supervised 
approximately 240 employees with another 100 employees under the direct 
supervision of the judges. She had served with Administrative Judges Johnson, 
McGrath, Cain, Sheward and Watson. 
260. 
Casey described her working relationship with Judge O’Neill as 
variable “just the erratic nature of not knowing what to expect in terms of Judge 
O’Neill’s behavior and her expectations of administration.”  Casey had experienced 
difficulties working with Judge O’Neill and testified that her behavior relating to 
employees created problems for the Court. She testified that the Administrative 
Judges were “very frustrated in knowing how to respond to numerous complaints 
that were coming in from court employees and knowing how to adequately respond 
to them.”  (Transcript Vol.  XV – 144-145)   
261. 
As a result of her involvement with the situations involving float 
bailiffs Karn and Boughner and court reporter Sandy Grego and court secretary Elsa 
Cunbow she was concerned regarding Judge O’Neill’s behavior because, “I felt that 
at some point it had almost reached sort of a hostile environment situation.  And I 
was concerned about what that meant for the court in terms of the court's own 
liability because so many of -- I had had frequent complaints from employees about 
their interactions with Judge O'Neill.”  “... it was a very difficult situation for the 
administrative judge and maybe the -- the court as a whole in trying to work through 
some of these issues to make sure that coverage is available.  The court is very busy 
and, frankly, this was just one of those problems that kept cropping up that was 
creating a difficult situation in trying to manage coverage.” Casey had never seen the 
kind of friction which occurred between Judge O’Neill and her staff with any other 
judge. (Transcript Vol.  XV – 145,151, 210-211) 
262. 
Casey testified that it was difficult to communicate her concerns to 
Judge O’Neill because “too many times it wasn’t a dialog.” (Transcript Vol.  XV – 
146) Asked about Judge O’Neill’s credibility she testified: “Q. Based on your 
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122 
numerous dealings with Judge O'Neill, had you developed some concerns regarding 
her credibility? A.   I had in the sense that I was reluctant to have conversations 
where it was just me being present or having employees have conversations on their 
own because oftentimes the information that came back was not exactly as I had 
remembered it.     Q.   And you would instruct your employees to have people 
present when speaking with Judge O'Neill?     A.   That's correct.” ...“She doesn't 
exactly have the best track record with me in terms of her veracity because, again, 
I've experienced situations where one thing is said and then something else is 
conveyed later on.” (Transcript Vol.  XV – 160) 
263. 
Casey believed that problems with Judge O’Neill were very 
significant in 2000 to 2001, however, the behavior she spoke about occurred from 
the time that Judge O’Neill came on the bench. (Transcript Vol.  XV - 192) “... if 
you look at sort of a time frame of June of 2000 through the end of that year, you see 
a number of incidents, some of which we've talked about, that occurred.  It was 
rather unsettling because obviously we're all -- we're very busy in that court and it 
seemed as if, you know, it was just another added stress for everybody who had to 
deal with the outbursts and the issues that seemed to keep cropping up.”  (Transcript 
Vol.  XV – 171)  
264. 
Casey testified regarding a phone call she received from Judge 
O’Neill on Sunday July 2, 2000 regarding float bailiff coverage.  Several months 
before there had been verbal and memo exchanges with Judge Cain regarding Judge 
O’Neill’s behavior towards the float bailiffs and the current issue was whether there 
would be coverage for Karen Moore on her July vacation.(Transcript Vol.  XV – 
148) After talking about how unfair it was that Moore would not have coverage for 
her vacation, Judge O’Neill stated that “even though the courthouse rumor had it that 
she was prompting Karen to file some sort of legal action, that, in fact, she hadn't – 
was not.  But she went on to say that if, in fact, Karen did file an action and she was 
January Term, 2004 
123 
talking about filing it in Federal Court, that I would be a named party in that action.”  
Casey took this as “a bit of a threat.” (Transcript Vol.  XV – 148-149)   
265. 
Casey described the phone call as lengthy, nearly an hour and rapid 
fire and non-stop on Judge O’Neill’s part. Casey said no more than a few sentences.  
Judge O’Neill asked her to call a meeting of the personnel committee and Casey 
stated she had no authority to do so. Judge O’Neill claimed that the only reason that 
there was a problem with float bailiff coverage was that Judge Cain was still angry 
with her for  his defeat in the 1992 election.  At the end of the call, Judge O’Neill 
suddenly shifted her demeanor and was very apologetic and sorry that she called at 
home and ended the call.  Casey had experienced this sudden shift before: “She can 
be very engaging and pleasant and then all of a sudden ..almost within the blink of 
an eye her personality changes and she can be very angry, very loud.” (Transcript 
Vol.  XV –150)  
266. 
In July 2000 Casey approached Sherry Nyce about becoming Judge 
O’Neill’s court reporter.  She attended the meeting between Nyce and Judge O’Neill 
and corroborated Nyce’s stated concerns about her teaching, medical problems and 
vacation and Judge O’Neill’s statement that there was no problem with these 
issues.(Transcript Vol.  XV – 156)  Shortly after Nyce started Casey received a call 
from Judge O’Neill displeased with Nyce’s performance specifically because she 
had to leave at 5:00 pm and she wanted Nyce disciplined. (Transcript Vol.  XV - 
157-158) Casey was not surprised by these calls. “ What I had  found particularly 
predictable is that over time new employees coming in to work for Judge O'Neill, 
she's always had a very high opinion ... as the months go by, there's a complete 
change of heart about their capabilities, how they relate to her and just their overall 
effectiveness.  It goes from being very positive to being very negative.” (Transcript 
Vol.  XV – 159) 
267. 
When Sandy Grego moved out of Judge O’Neill’s courtroom, Casey 
arranged for the move.  She made arrangements with the county’s Public Facilities 
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124 
Management department. By court policy Casey handled all communication 
between the Court and other County departments. Judge O’Neill was notified of the 
date and time of the move which was a Saturday.  Casey received a call from Mary 
Ann Barnhardt in Public Facilities Management on July 11, 2000 about a memo sent 
by Judge O’Neill to her demanding that the move take place that day. (Exhibit 514) 
Casey notified Judge Cain who sent a memo to Judge O’Neill on July 12, 2000 
asking her not to communicate directly with another branch of county government.  
(Relator’s Exhibit N)  On the following day, July 13, 2000 Casey was attending a 40 
person meeting with a vendor about a new computer system in an adjacent building. 
She was alerted that Judge O’Neill had been to her office upset and agitated about 
the furniture move and was on her way over to meet with Casey.  Casey asked Judge 
Bessey to accompany her when Judge O’Neill arrived because of her discomfort at 
having one-on-one conversations with Judge O’Neill. Casey and Judge Bessey left 
the meeting.  Judge O’Neill was very upset and angry, demanded the key to Grego’s 
office and stated that nobody is going to tell her who she can call.  Casey did a lot of 
listening and in the end told Judge O’Neill that she would retain Grego’s key as per 
standard policy and the move would take place as scheduled. (Transcript Vol.  XV – 
162-171) 
268. 
In July 2001, Casey also was involved in phone calls regarding 
Gretchen Roberts and jury panel availability with Judge O’Neill.  She took a call 
from Judge O’Neill, who was angry and upset about the situation that morning 
regarding jury panels. Casey could only listen, and couldn’t participate in the 
conversation. Judge O’Neill made the same call that morning to Casey, Roberts and 
Joan Richards.  In Casey’s experience it was not uncommon for Judge O’Neill to 
make multiple phone calls about an issue, repeating the same subjects in each call. 
(Transcript Vol.  XV -171- 174) 
269. 
Casey worked closely with Jennifer Goodman regarding the furniture 
replacement project.  She was aware of the issues regarding Judge O’Neill’s 
January Term, 2004 
125 
furniture that had come up at Judge O’Neill’s meeting with Goodman on December 
13, 2000.  On December 20, 2000 she received a voicemail message from Judge 
O’Neill about the furniture issues.  Casey recorded the voicemail message and it was 
played at the hearing.  In the message Judge O’Neill stated: “I’ve had it with 
Jennifer. I – I don’t want that crap, that new desk..... I don't understand why she's got 
better furniture than I do, and she's basically telling me that I have to either take 
what she's offering or do without. And then basically telling me that I'm the last one 
on a three-year phase-in plan. .... I really resent the fact that she has better furniture 
than I do and I'm a judge. ....I didn't pick out this -- this carpeting. Whoever picked 
out this carpeting obviously, you know, picked it out without all of the other judges 
in mind. ....Could you call me and please explain that to me?  I'd like to know why 
I'm the only one with the crap furniture.” (Transcript Vol.  XV – 179-181) 
270. 
Casey testified that county records indicated that Judge O’Neill had 
approved the carpet color she complained about. (Relator’s XX) Casey advised 
Goodman not to attend any other meetings with Judge O’Neill alone. (Transcript 
Vol.  XV – 182-186) 
271. 
As part of her duties, Casey attended and kept minutes for the court’s 
personnel committee meetings.  She attended the July 26, 2000 meeting. The 
personnel committee laid out concerns regarding the float bailiff situation and the 
fact that it was becoming increasingly more difficult to make sure Judge O’Neill had 
adequate coverage. Judge O’Neill spoke at that meeting and acknowledged that 
there were problems with her employees and acknowledged that she was really 
going to try to do a better job and work with the court to limit those issues 
(Transcript Vol.  XV – 152-154) 
272. 
On June 6, 2001 Casey attended and prepared minutes of a court 
personnel committee meeting.  Two issues related to Judge O’Neill.  First the judges 
discussed the situation which existed with Elsa Cunbow, the secretary Judge O’Neill 
shared with Judge Johnson.  Elsa had been undergoing chemotherapy for breast 
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126 
cancer and had missed some work.  Judge O’Neill was very upset and felt that not 
only was Elsa taking long lunches and missing work but that her work product was 
inferior.  There had been instances in which Judge O’Neill asked that she be 
removed from her position or terminated.  Judge Johnson did not share Judge 
O’Neill’s feelings about Elsa’s performance. Both judges had to agree to take any 
action against Elsa.  Casey testified she was aware of Judge O’Neill’s complaints 
about Elsa but that Judge O’Neill and Judge Johnson were Elsa’s supervisors. 
(Transcript Vol.  XV – 197)  After considerable discussion about the situation, 
Judges Pfeifer and Connor moved and Committee unanimously approved that Elsa’s 
office would be moved from the ninth floor to the fourth floor, “fearing the 
ramifications of being unresponsive to what could be considered a hostile work 
environment and therefore potentially subjecting the Court to liability for failure to 
address the same.”  Elsa’s office was to be in the Court’s Administrative offices 
where “the Administrative Director could intercede on behalf of Cunbow, when 
appropriate in both interacting with and performing her secretarial duties for Judge 
O’Neill. (Relator’s Exhibit QQQ) 
273. 
The second motion, made by Judges Pfeifer and Connor and 
approved unanimously was that the Administrative Judge Watson contact Chief 
Justice Moyer “with respect to the power of the Administrative Judge...to address 
the erratic and non-judicious conduct of Judge O’Neill or to ask Chief Justice Moyer 
to appoint a visiting judge to take over Judge O’Neill’s docket to enable her to seek 
the assistance of a mental health professional.” (Exhibit QQQ) 
274. 
In January 2001 after expressing concerns to Judge Watson as 
Administrative Judge about all of the complaints about Judge O’Neill as related to 
the employees, Casey attended a meeting with Judges Miller, Cain and McGrath in 
which she learned for the first time that grievances were to be filed with Disciplinary 
Counsel about Judge O’Neill. 
January Term, 2004 
127 
275. 
Judge John A. Connor (Transcript Vol.  XV – 227-266) (admitted 
1966, private practice until 1992, elected to Franklin County Common Pleas Court 
in 1992, a Democrat) testified he was a member of the court personnel committee.  
In summer 2000 Judge O’Neill attended a meeting and stated she knew she was 
having problems and that she would do better with her employees and staff. 
(Transcript Vol.  XV –229)  
276. 
In June 2001 Judge Connor also attended a personnel committee 
meeting in which personnel issues relating to Judge O’Neill were discussed.  He 
testified that the reason for the discussions, “was that the court, at least the personnel 
committee, was concerned about civil lawsuits being filed against us. As a court for, 
you know -- you know, constructive discharge of some type of employment cases is 
what we were worried about.  And then we were worried that some of these 
individuals, if we didn't address the situation somehow, would -- would retain 
counsel and we would be the subject of lawsuits.” (Transcript Vol.  XV – 232-233) 
Judge Connor seconded and voted for the first Motion made in regards to moving 
the office of Elsa Cunbow. (Transcript Vol.  XV – 231)  
277. 
Judge Connor recalled that Judge Watson wanted to go over and talk 
to the Chief Justice about the situation with Judge O’Neill and see if he had 
suggestions. Judge Connor made the second motion , it was seconded by Judge 
Pfeifer and unanimously passed to have Judge Watson contact the Chief Justice.  
Judge Connor did not recall that the Motion included anything suggesting that Judge 
O’Neill was not judicially competent, including a visiting judge or asking for the 
assistance of a mental health professional.  He testified: “it was getting serious 
enough that we felt that there should be some maybe -- maybe that some outside, 
you know, help. And -- and, yet, we didn't feel that if we suggested it, you know, 
that it would -- that it would necessarily be taken in a positive way.  So I think that's 
why we said to Judge Watson, well, see what the Chief Justice thinks.” (Transcript 
Vol.  XV – 263-264) “Q.  ...Motion 2 was directed more toward counseling in the 
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128 
sense of having Judge O'Neill be counseled as to how to deal with staff and with 
people, it was more directed toward her people skills as opposed to some sort of 
mental issue?   A.   Yeah.  I don't --   Q.   Is that a fair way to say that?   A.   Yeah.  I 
think that's a fair way to say it.” (Transcript Vol.  XV - 263)   “Q. So the idea of 
approaching the Chief Justice, you agreed with.  The exact language of what you 
were asking him to help you with is a little bit different in your recollection than 
what the notes are?  A.   I think that's fair.  Q.   But it was clear to everybody, it 
sounds like, that something had to be done? A.  Yeah, I think that's fair.” (Transcript 
Vol.  XV – 264)  
278. 
Judge Connor testified that while Judge O’Neill had a good 
reputation with civil attorneys,“her reputation as -- and the way she handles her 
criminal docket is – I would say, is not favorable,   ...I don't hear that many bad 
reports as to how she tries her criminal cases either, it's just how the docket is 
handled.     Q.   That she runs a tight ship?     A.   That she -- Well, that and she 
forces pleas they say that shouldn't be forced.  I mean, you know, that comes up a 
lot.” (Transcript Vol.  XV – 246-247)  Judge Connor was asked if he had counseled 
or helped Judge O’Neill and responded: “...if Judge O'Neill and I were talking and, 
let's say, as an incident would come up, Judge O'Neill would always have an 
explanation of what happened.  And the facts that were presented by the employee 
or whatever would not be the same.  In other words, Judge O'Neill would say, no, 
that's not exactly what happened, here is what happened and here is why I did this or 
took this action.    So -- so she would -- she would always have a -- an explanation or 
a reason or why the assumed facts were wrong.  And -- and to tell you the truth, a lot 
of times I didn't -- you know, I wasn't sure which facts were right.” (Transcript Vol.  
XV – 264-265) 
279. 
Judge Michael H. Watson (Transcript Vol. XVI – 11-156) 
(admitted 1988, private practice, Department of Commerce Counsel, Counsel to 
Governor, Appointed and elected to Franklin County Common Pleas Court 1995-
January Term, 2004 
129 
2003, Tenth District Court of Appeals, 2003-present) served as Administrative 
Judge of the Franklin County Common Pleas Court from January 2001  to April 
2003.  
280. 
In 2000, Judge Watson was chair of the court personnel committee. 
Judge O’Neill requested to attend a personnel committee meeting in July 2000 and 
admitted there were problems with her employees and she pledged to try to do 
better.  When Judge Watson became administrative judge in January of 2001 he 
accompanied Goodman to a meeting with Judge O’Neill about court furniture 
choices. He remained to have further discussion privately with Judge O’Neill.  He 
was concerned about the belligerent way that she was treating certain members of 
her staff, the way she was treating lawyers, the way she was treating litigants and 
wanted to see it come to an end. Judge Watson wanted to try to resolve what he 
could resolve. (Transcript Vol. XVI – 24-27) 
281. 
In their private meeting Judge Watson offered to assist Judge O’Neill 
in any way he could.  He thought at first that Judge O’Neill was receptive but almost 
immediately she became defensive stating that she was tired of people “f’ing with 
her”.  She brought up Judge Cain and maintained that he had a vendetta against her 
dating back to the 1992 election. (Transcript Vol.  XVI – 29-31) Judge Watson 
discussed how to deal with people Judge O’Neill perceived to be challenging her 
authority as a judge.  Watson recommended that Judge O’Neill get off the bench and 
vent frustration and anger in private and speak with the individual out of the public 
eye or even scream into a pillow in private. (Transcript Vol.  XVI - 32-33)  He 
suggested that it may be helpful to take some time off and get her head cleared and 
deal with whatever she needed to deal with. (Transcript Vol.  XVI – 29) During the 
conversation Judge Watson told Judge O’Neill that he had told court administrative 
staff that in the future if Judge O’Neill had complaints and called or summoned 
people to her chambers he was to be called and he would be present.  He said this 
was  due to “The repetitive nature of the behavior.  The frequency that it was 
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happening.  The fact that employees were beside themselves with having to deal 
with it.  It was interrupting their regular work flow.” (Transcript Vol.  XVI – 34)  
They discussed problems with Judge O’Neill’s bailiff Karen Moore and Judge 
Watson told her it was up to her to take care of those problems.  Judge Watson 
dictated a synopsis of the meeting on that day. (Relator’s Exhibit SSS) Judge 
Watson said nothing to Judge O’Neill about the grievances about to be filed against 
her because they related to Judge O’Neill’s past conduct, which he could not change 
– his concern was with going forward. (Transcript Vol.  XVI – 48-49) 
282. 
In her Answer regarding this meeting Judge O’Neill plead at ¶603 
Judge Watson “proceeded to tell her to fire her bailiff, Karen Moore” and that “It is 
believed that he (Watson) was retaliating against Ms. Moore because she had filed a 
grievance against Judge Cain as Administrative Judge in 2000...the grievance was 
filed with Judge Watson.” At ¶ 604 Judge O’Neill “avers that the conversation with 
Judge Watson was brief and the conversation mainly concerned the furniture, her 
bailiff and her mother. To the best of her recollection, Judge O’Neill recalls that 
Judge Watson told her that because her docket was so low she could afford to take 
some time off to visit her mother.”  In ¶605,  Judge O’Neill “denies that she 
apologized, recognized that at times she lost her composure and asked Judge Watson 
for help.” In ¶609,  Judge O’Neill “avers that the meeting was brief, but unusual and 
Judge Watson left visibly agitated.”  Judge Watson testified Judge O’Neill brought 
up problems with her bailiff and that the statements regarding a grievance from 
Moore were “absolute fiction”(Transcript Vol.  XVI – 41) Judge Watson’s 
testimony and his contemporaneous dictation about the meeting contradict the other 
assertions. (Relator’s Exhibit SSS)  Judge O’Neill testified at the hearing that she 
stood by the denials in her answer regarding the January 2001 meeting.  She did 
recall that Judge Watson said something about punching a pillow or calling him. 
(Transcript Vol. XVII – 259- 264)  
January Term, 2004 
131 
283. 
Judge Watson had continuing issues with Judge O’Neill and court 
employees, which occurred after their January 2001 meeting. He received constant 
phone calls and “venomous memos” about Elsa Cunbow, the secretary Judge 
O’Neill hired jointly with Judge Johnson. Cunbow was a neighbor and a friend of 
Judge O’Neill.  The thrust of Judge O’Neill’s complaints was that Elsa was 
somehow “gaming” the court system with requests for leave connected with her 
diagnosis and treatment for breast cancer. On March 23, 2001 Judge Watson wrote a 
memo to Judge O’Neill responding to three memos and a voicemail from Judge 
O’Neill in the previous ten days about difficulties with Cunbow advising Judge 
O’Neill that she had to come to a cooperative decision with Judge Johnson and to 
advise Judge Watson if they were unable to reach a resolution about Elsa. (Relator’s 
Exhibit TTT, Respondent’s Exhibit V)  
284. 
At the June 6, 2001 meeting of the court personnel committee issues 
about Judge O’Neill and her staff were discussed. A motion was made to move Elsa 
off the 9th floor and for Judge Watson to write to the Chief Justice regarding the 
Court’s advice for dealing with the problems they encountered with Judge O’Neill. 
A letter was sent on July 13, 2001. (Relator’s Exhibit RRR) Justice Moyer 
responded to Judge Watson that without a doctor’s diagnosis of mental illness there 
was no basis to act. (Transcript Vol.  XVI – 59) 
285. 
Judge Watson testified to his concerns about Judge O’Neill’s honesty 
“She can look you in the eye and tell you something and believe it absolutely in her 
own mind and it’s not the same truth that I think you and I deal with on a regular 
basis...she’s very good at re-creating history.  I think I’ve never met another person 
like her.  She’s the most effective prevaricator I have ever seen.” (Transcript Vol.  
XVI – 60-61)  
286. 
Regarding the effect that the collection of complaints regarding 
Judge O’Neill by the judges had on collegiality at the Court Judge Watson testified: 
“We had come to the conclusion that in our prior dealings with Judge O'Neill, she 
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132 
never admitted she was wrong and it was always somebody else's fault, therefore, 
our ability to have a collegial relationship was probably not going to exist.  And -- 
and we determined that regardless of our desire for a collegial relationship, these 
events had happened and there was a duty to report them and people were not 
reporting them because they were concerned about retribution.  And we determined 
that we would lead and ask them then to follow.” (Transcript Vol.  XVI - 107-108)   
“People agonized over this and people sought counsel over this.  And, you know, I – 
I don't think that people willy-nilly came forward and gladly did any of this.  We're 
well aware of the consequences.  And the folks that -- the 80-some folks who, I 
believe, have come forward, have done so out of a concern for the institution and for 
the quality of justice in Franklin County.” (Transcript Vol.  XVI – 109)   
287. 
VIOLATIONS CHARGED ON COUNT V: 
a) 
Canon 1 – A judge shall uphold the integrity  and independence of 
the judiciary; 
b) 
Canon 2 – A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall 
act at all times in a manner which promotes public confidence in the 
judiciary; 
c) 
Canon 3 – A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office 
impartially and diligently; 
d) 
Canon 3(B)(4) – A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to 
litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and other with whom the judge 
deals in an official capacity; 
e) 
Canon 3(C)(1) – A judge shall diligently discharge the judge’s 
administrative responsibilities without bias or prejudice and maintain 
professional competence in judicial administration, and should 
cooperate with other judges and court officials in the administration 
of court business; 
January Term, 2004 
133 
f) 
Canon 4 – A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of 
impropriety in all of the judge’s activities; 
g) 
DR 1-102(A)(5) – Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice. 
288. 
In these series of incidents the panel majority concludes that Judge 
O’Neill’s behavior towards all with whom she dealt in an official capacity was 
neither patient, dignified nor courteous. In considering the violations in this Count 
the panel majority was mindful of the interpersonal nature of these complaints and 
that personality conflicts are not in and of themselves grounds for discipline. These 
multiple events are not isolated incidents of a person having a bad day or being 
disturbed by an episode of neglect or incompetence.  
289. 
The panel majority is also mindful of Judge O’Neill’s additional 
intemperate behaviors described in the testimony given about incidents involved in 
Counts 1 through 4 of this Complaint.   By mid-2000 these repeated intemperate 
behaviors had resulted in Judge O’Neill losing float bailiff coverage as well as an 
assigned court reporter.  After meeting with the Court’s Personnel Committee in 
2000, acknowledging a problem and promising improvement, Judge O’Neill’s 
intemperate behavior with court employees continued resulting in the extraordinary 
personnel committee meeting in July 2001 in which Judges Connor and Pfeiffer 
moved that the secretary, Elsa Cunbow, be removed from Judge O’Neill’s chambers 
and that the Chief Justice be consulted for assistance regarding the situation with 
Judge O’Neill.   
290. 
The testimony of court administrative staff, Casey, Goodman, 
Richards and Roberts and court employees Grego, Nyce, Boughner and Karn 
confirm the  personnel committee’s concerns that they were risking a hostile work 
environment claim from an employee relating to Judge O’Neill’s intemperate 
behavior.  The testimony from Judges Cain  and Watson as well as Court Director 
Casey describe how much of the Court’s administrative resources were used 
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134 
managing and trying to resolve personnel issues created by Judge O’Neill’s 
behavior.   
291. 
The panel majority concludes that these multiple episodes of 
intemperate behavior with litigants, lawyers and court employees were clearly not 
the diligent discharge of Respondent’s administrative responsibilities and they rose 
to the level of interfering with the administration of justice. The panel majority 
concludes by clear and convincing evidence that Judge O’Neill’s behavior in all of 
the incidents described in Count 5 violated Canons 1, 2, 3, 3(B)(4), 3(C)(1) and 4 
and DR 1-102(A)(5).  See, Inquiry Concerning Van Voorhis, (Cal. Comm. On Jud. 
Performance, 2003) 
292. 
COUNT VI alleged Respondent repeatedly violated the Code of 
Judicial Conduct during her political campaign by utilizing county resources and 
personnel to promote her campaign, by instructing those under her direction and 
control to solicit campaign contributions and by personally handling campaign 
contributions. 
293. 
Campaign Activities performed during business hours - Judge 
O’Neill was a candidate for a seat on the Tenth District Court of Appeals in the 
November, 2002 election.  Shelia Vitale, Judge O’Neill’s staff attorney testified that 
she performed work for the campaign during regular court hours at Judge O’Neill’s 
direction prior to Vitale’s resignation on May 10, 2002. Vitale picked up campaign 
tee-shirts twice and made 2 or 3 trips to a downtown Columbus printing company to 
obtain car signs.  Vitale and a law student, Matt Kunsman, folded and stuffed 
campaign flyers twice in Judge O’Neill’s chambers. Vitale accompanied Judge 
O’Neill at her request on lunch-time trips to the office of her campaign treasurer, 
Michael Ambrose and to the Board of Elections. (Transcript Vol.  XVIII – 17-52) 
294. 
Ciera Woodford was a high school student volunteering in Judge 
O’Neill’s chambers whom Vitale observed doing copying and phone number 
lookups that Vitale believed was related to the campaign.  Matt Kunsman was an 
January Term, 2004 
135 
extern working one day a week for Capital Law School credit.  He assisted on the 
campaign and spent one day of work stamping and labeling campaign flyers in 
Judge O’Neill’s chambers. (Transcript Vol. XVIII - 185-188) 
295. 
Judge O’Neill testified that Vitale was a professional salaried 
employee and that she provided at least 40 hours of work each week to the Court 
during the time she assisted in the campaign because Vitale worked late on occasion.  
Judge O’Neill did not keep records of days when Vitale worked late. (Transcript 
Vol.  XIX – 50-51)  
296. 
Campaign Solicitation: On April 18, 2002 Judge O’Neill’s 
campaign held a fundraiser at the River Club.  Vitale attended the event. She was 
still working for Judge O’Neill but was scheduled to start a new position with the 
law firm of Cooper & Elliott on May 10, 2002. There was a sparse turnout.  At the 
end of the event Judge O’Neill spoke to Vitale, who was standing in a small group 
with Michael Courtney (Judge O’Neill’s new staff attorney) and Matt Kunsman.  
Vitale testified: “It was at the end of the fund-raiser, it was actually when the fund-
raiser had ended, Judge O'Neill had come over to me, and I was standing with Mike 
Courtney and Matt Kunsman.  And she was very upset.  She was red faced and she 
began yelling at me as to where my husband was, his law -- him and his law firm 
needed to step up to the plate and contribute to her campaign. And then she 
proceeded to yell at me to order both my husband's firm and the firm I was going to  
to give the full PAC contribution to her and she proceeded to say that the firm I was 
going to (Cooper & Elliott) had owed her.”.... “There was no doubt in my mind that 
I was being ordered to get that contribution for her.”  (Transcript Vol.  XVIII – 63-
65)  
297. 
Michael Courtney testified: “A.   Well, I remember a conversation 
about a recent case Cooper & Elliott had with Judge O'Neill in her courtroom.  I did 
hear her say a phrase, "stepping up to the plate," that Cooper & Elliott needs to step 
up to the plate.  And I assumed that that meant in regards to supporting the 
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campaign, financially or in other ways.   Q.   And were you aware at that time when 
you were hearing the judge make those comments that Sheila Vitale was going to be 
working for Cooper & Elliott?        A.   I think I first learned that she was going to be 
working with Cooper & Elliott during the interview process   Q.   And who was the 
judge addressing when she was making these comments at the fund-raiser about 
Cooper & Elliott?      A.   She was addressing Sheila.” (Transcript Vol.  XVIII – 
170-171) 
298. 
Matt Kunsman testified: “The one that I remember the most was 
when she was talking to Sheila about her husband.  Q.   And who was her husband?     
A.   I think her husband, Frank, he worked at another law firm.  I don't remember the 
name of the firm, but Sheila and I had talked about it in the past. He was at a 
Workers' Compensation firm.  Q.   What did the judge say about Sheila's husband, 
Frank?      A.   It was right after the comment about the attendance not being high at 
the fund-raiser, not making enough money to cover the expenses, saying, "Hey, you 
got to get Frank to go to bat for us." (Transcript Vol.  XVIII – 191) 
299. 
Vitale testified she was disturbed by these requests from Judge 
O’Neill and that several days later she consulted with Judge Michael Watson as the 
Administrative Judge. Judge Watson advised Vitale not to do anything she was not 
comfortable doing and that she may need to speak to someone about it. (Transcript 
Vol.  XVI – 65,66, XVIII – 69, 110-111,155)  
300. 
Eileen Paley (Judge O’Neill’s campaign manager), Michael 
Ambrose (campaign treasurer) and Attorneys Stan Stein and Gary Jones attended the 
fundraiser and did not observe or participate in any conversation between Judge 
O’Neill and Vitale that evening and did not notice either Judge O’Neill or Vitale 
being upset or speaking in a loud voice. (Transcript Vol.  XVIII – 230-238, 277-295,  
Vol. XIX – 20-21) 
301. 
Judge O’Neill testified that she never directly solicited anyone for 
contributions to her campaign. She had no recollection of any conversation with 
January Term, 2004 
137 
Vitale about her husband’s firm or a contribution from the firm of Cooper & Elliott. 
(Transcript Vol.  XIX – 72) A verdict by Cooper and Elliott in her courtroom was 
not discussed that evening. (Transcript Vol.  XIX - 86-87)  She recalled only asking 
Shelia where her husband was and if he was coming that evening.(Transcript Vol.  
XIX - 85-86)  Judge O’Neill testified that she was not a sports person in terms of 
analogies and would never say “step up to the plate.” (Transcript Vol.  XIX – 86)  
Judge O’Neill had a good relationship with Vitale, thought she was a good employee 
and could not explain the differences between their testimony. (Transcript Vol.  XIX 
– 80-89)  
302. 
Vitale testified she appeared at this hearing pursuant to subpoena and 
she had hired counsel in regard to her testimony in this matter. One reason was a 
conversation she had in January or February of 2002 with Judge O’Neill about these 
grievances. Judge O’Neill discussed suing the courthouse for discrimination and sex 
discrimination and stated “that anyone that had been a part of this letter of inquiry or 
were going to testify against her, she was going to consider possibly suing.” 
(Transcript Vol.  XVIII - 95, 155-156) 
303. 
Campaign Contributions: Vitale testified that on a number of her 
trips with Judge O’Neill to her campaign treasurer’s office she observed Judge 
O’Neill taking campaign contribution checks to the bank for deposit.  At the end of a 
campaign fundraising event, Vitale observed Judge O’Neill take possession of the 
lockbox which contained the checks collected at the fundraiser. (Transcript Vol.  
XVIII – 53-55, 58-59, 146-147) Judge O’Neill, Ambrose and Eileen Paley, (Judge 
O’Neill’s campaign manager) also testified these events occurred. (Transcript Vol. 
257,302-303, Vol. XIX – 34-35, 53-54)  Ambrose and Donald McTigue (campaign 
counsel) testified that once checks were given to a campaign staffer they were 
“received” by the campaign and there was no prohibition on who could deposit or 
handle the checks as a purely ministerial function. (Transcript Vol.  XVIII – 14-15, 
243-244)  
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304. 
VIOLATIONS CHARGED ON COUNT VI: 
a) 
Canon 1 – A judge shall uphold the integrity  and independence of 
the judiciary; 
b) 
Canon 2 – A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall 
act at all times in a manner which promotes public confidence in the 
judiciary; 
c) 
Canon 3 – A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office 
impartially and diligently; 
d) 
Canon 3(A) –The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all 
the judge’s other activities; 
e) 
Canon 4 – A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of 
impropriety in all of the judge’s activities; 
f) 
Canon 7(B)(1) – A judge or judicial candidate shall maintain the 
dignity appropriate to judicial office; 
g) 
Canon 7(C)(1) – A judicial candidate shall prohibit public employees 
subject to his or her direction or control from soliciting or receiving 
campaign fund contributions; 
h) 
Canon 7(C)(2)(a) – A judicial candidate personally shall not solicit or 
receive campaign funds. 
305. 
After considering the testimony, exhibits and evidence submitted, the 
panel majority finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent did violate 
Canon 4, 7(C)(1) and Canon 7 (C)(2)(a) during her conversations with Shelia Vitale.  
The panel majority finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
personally solicited and directed Vitale to obtain campaign contributions from her 
husband’s firm and her future employer while Vitale was a public employee under 
Judge O’Neill’s control. The panel majority did not find Respondent’s testimony 
credible as opposed to the testimony of the three other participants in the 
conversation who had no reason or motive to be untruthful.  
January Term, 2004 
139 
306. 
The panel finds that Respondent’s handling of campaign funds after 
contributions had been received by her campaign committee did not violate any 
provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct.   
307. 
The panel finds that Relator did not  prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the activities performed by Vitale, Kunsman or Woodford rose to the 
level of a violation of any Canon. First, the panel did not have clear and convincing 
evidence that some of  the activities in question, particularly by Woodford, were 
campaign activities at all.  With respect to those activities clearly connected to the 
campaign such as processing campaign literature, while the use of Respondent’s 
chambers by volunteers for those campaign activities should not have occurred, the 
panel did not find evidence sufficient to prove that such use was habitual or more 
than minimal.  As to campaign work performed by Vitale outside the courthouse, the 
panel did not find clear and convincing evidence that such activities were in fact use 
of public resources due to her status as a salaried professional with flexible work 
hours. 
308. 
The panel did not find clear and convincing evidence to support 
violations of  Canon 1, Canon 2, Canon 3,  3(A) or Canon 7(B)(1). 
309. 
General Defenses: Respondent asserts a number of defenses, which 
challenge the amended complaint as a whole.   
310. 
First, Respondent argues that Counts I – V and all allegations of the 
Amended Complaint should be dismissed on grounds of unreasonable delay which 
violated the provisions of Gov. Bar Rule V §4(D) since the Relator did not seek to 
extend the usual time for the investigation of grievances from the Secretary of the 
Board.  Extensions of up one year from the date of the filing of the grievance are 
permitted for “unusually complex investigations, including the investigation of 
multiple grievances.” The Rule further provides that time limits are not 
jurisdictional.  Respondent further argues that the doctrine of laches bars some of the 
incidents as they occurred in 1997 and 1998 (Dennis, Margolis, Zazworsky v. 
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Petrella, Peterman and Gass).  The panel denies the defense of unreasonable delay 
given the unusually complex and large nature of this investigation, given the non-
jurisdictional nature of the time limits and given Respondent’s failure to produce 
evidence of prejudice to her ability to defend.  The panel further finds no present rule 
or precedent, which imposes a time limit for a person to submit a grievance for 
investigation.  As to the Amended Complaint the panel finds that the investigation of 
the new matters contained therein was completed timely and that reasonable 
operation of the rule does not require new matters submitted be completed within a 
time limit established by the submission of the first grievance in an investigation that 
involves multiple grievances. 
311. 
Second, Respondent argued that Counts I – IV and part of Count V 
should be dismissed on the grounds of res judicata, collateral estoppel or precedent.  
Respondent submits that since allegations regarding timeliness and reversals for 
abuse of discretion were dismissed in the Respondent’s prior disciplinary case in 
1996 or did not survive probable cause in the instant complaint that all such 
remaining allegations should be dismissed.  Further, when other Franklin County 
Common Pleas judges have had similar grievances dismissed against them, 
precedent bars the instant grievances.  The panel concludes it has insufficient 
evidence to support that res judicata, collateral estoppel or precedent bar the present 
allegations regarding timeliness and reversals for abuse of discretion. 
312. 
Third, Respondent argues that Disciplinary Counsel has not 
complied with procedural rules relating to notice and opportunity to be heard prior to 
a complaint, the Respondent’s right to confidentiality and lack of a finding of 
probable cause for the amended Complaint.  The panel finds that the Respondent 
was provided with an opportunity to respond to the allegations of the Complaint 
before it was filed and there is no evidence that Disciplinary Counsel breached 
Respondent’s rights of confidentiality and that the applicable rules do not provide 
for probable cause review of amendments to complaints. 
January Term, 2004 
141 
313. 
Fourth, Respondent argues that the Amended Complaint should be 
dismissed because the applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and 
Disciplinary Rules under the Ohio Constitution and the United States Constitution 
are void for vagueness; violate equal protection and substantive due process.  
Existing precedent of the Ohio Supreme Court, In Re Harper (1996), 77 Ohio St 3d 
211 [673 N.E.2d 1253] found provisions of the Code constitutional.  Thus, this 
defense is not well-taken.   
314. 
Aggravation, Mitigation and Recommended Sanction: The 
parties’ positions on the issues of sanction in this case were diametrically opposed:  
The Relator argued only factors in aggravation and recommended a sanction of 
permanent disbarment.  The Respondent recommended the dismissal of all charges 
and did not identify any factors as aggravation or mitigation.  The panel majority, 
considering all the evidence submitted, identifies the following factors in mitigation 
and aggravation. 
 
 
315. 
Mitigation:  Judge O’Neill received her law degree from the 
University of Dayton and was admitted to practice in 1980.  She practiced as an 
Assistant Ohio Attorney General From 1980-1992, serving as Chief of the Mental 
Health Unit 1980-1985 and as General Counsel for the Ohio State Highway Patrol 
from 1985-1992.  In 1992, she was elected to the Franklin County Common Pleas 
Court and in 1998 she was re-elected to that position.  She is not seeking re-election 
to the position in November 2004.  She ran unsuccessfully for a position on the 
Tenth District Court of Appeals in November 2002 and she is a candidate for a seat 
on the Tenth District Court of Appeals in the November 2004 election.   
316. 
As a member of the Franklin County Common Pleas bench Judge 
O’Neill has actively pursued educating middle and high school students about the 
legal system.  In 1993 she created the “Judge in the Classroom” program. On Friday 
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mornings she gives presentations at schools and on other weekdays she hosts groups 
of students for observation in her courtroom.  Since 1993 she has made over 400 
presentations in 63 different schools. Janet Newlon, a seventh grade social studies 
teacher in Grove City testified that Judge O’Neill’s presentations in her classes 
helped a lot and really added to their study of government.  
317. 
Judge O’Neill testified that the efficient management of her docket is 
very important to her.  In statistics submitted for the Franklin County Common Pleas 
Court for the years 1992- August 2003 (Respondent’s Exhibit E) Judge O’Neill 
consistently ranks first in lowest number of criminal cases pending and often second 
in the lowest number of civil cases.  Respondent maintained approximately 70 to 
145 fewer criminal cases than the average criminal caseload for the Court.  In 
August 2003 Judge O’Neill had 72 criminal cases pending while the court average 
was 217. 
318. 
The panel heard character testimony from court employees Greg 
Mounts, Brian Stein and Sherry Mitchell.  Mounts and Stein are Judge O’Neill’s 
assigned probation officers and both testified they had good working relationships 
with Judge O’Neill and found her courteous and professional.  Mitchell served as the 
Court’s IT Manager for seven years through 2003.  Mitchell testified that her 
contacts with Judge O’Neill were not regular but were always professional and 
appropriate and that Judge O’Neill had once mediated a dispute between Mitchell 
and court reporter Nyce.  Mitchell was delegated to arrange special training for Elsa 
Cunbow in word processing and testified Elsa had trouble with basic word 
processing functions such as saving over auto-text or forgetting where a document 
was saved. 
319. 
 Character testimony was submitted from lawyers who had practiced 
before Judge O’Neill.  James Arnold testified to a civil trial Judge O’Neill recently 
presided over that he believed had been professionally handled and Dale Perdue 
testified his experience with Judge O’Neill in civil pretrial conferences was 
January Term, 2004 
143 
appropriate.  Regarding criminal cases lawyers Lewis E. Williams Jr. (also a former 
judge), Todd Barstow, Beverly Farlow, Jeff Berndt, Mark Hunt, David Young, and 
Christopher M. Cooper testified to having cases before Judge O’Neill ranging from 
‘time to time’ to 5-6 times a year.  None of them had observed Judge O’Neill act in 
an unprofessional manner and believed she was a fair and hard-working judge. 
320. 
Kelly Green (present staff attorney), Margaret Meckling (present 
bailiff) testified about their good working relationships with Judge O’Neill and their 
observations of her preparation and competence on the bench.  
321. 
Respondent has maintained throughout these proceedings that the 
charges made in the Amended Complaint were not brought out of any real concern 
about any individual case but as part of a political agenda. The panel has endeavored 
throughout the hearing to determine from the evidence submitted and the sworn 
testimony of witnesses whether there is any validity or relevance to this claim. 
Respondent testified that three Republican judges, Judge Cain, Judge Miller and 
Judge Watson solicited these complaints and gathered this information and that “the 
whole collection over a period of time smacks of partisan politics.” (Transcript Vol.  
VII – 141-142)   
322. 
Respondent defeated Judge Cain in the 1992 election and has 
testified that it is that defeat that motivated his actions in this matter.  Judge Cain 
testified that as administrative judge since 1998 his motivation to take action was the 
volume of complaints he received about Judge O’Neill, which exceeded complaints 
he received about any other judge. Judge Cain testified that although complaining 
individuals were advised to file individual grievances no one individual would do so 
for fear of reprisals and because one incident would not be enough get anyone’s 
attention. (Transcript Vol.  IX -103-106) 
323. 
Judge Cain discussed the complaints about Judge O’Neill with Judge 
Watson as Chair of the Personnel Committee and Judge Miller as Chair of the Rules 
Committee.  In late 1999 after Judge O’Neill was re-elected the complaints seemed 
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144 
to increase and the judges decided they would tell people to write them down and 
Judge Miller would collect them.  They consulted Disciplinary Counsel and were 
advised “to collect the information, and the individuals who had firsthand 
knowledge of what transpired, give them to us; and we'll investigate."  The 
collection of information was submitted to Disciplinary Counsel in January 2001 
and these judges had no further participation in the investigation or prosecution of 
this Amended Complaint. 
324. 
The panel majority found that Respondent’s claim that this action 
arose out of partisan politics was belied by the evidence that in July 2002 Judges 
John Connor and Beverly Pfeiffer, other Democratic judges on the Franklin County 
Common Pleas Court, made and seconded the motions to seek assistance from the 
Chief Justice about Judge O’Neill’s conduct and take action on the issue with Judge 
O’Neill secretary, Elsa Cunbow.  Part of Respondent’s evidence of a political 
conspiracy against her was also her exclusion from administrative committee 
appointments at the Court.  However, Respondent testified that the three other 
Democratic judges on the bench have not been excluded from participation in court 
administration. (Transcript Vol. VII -163-165)  Respondent later expanded her 
definition of political motivation: “When you have referred to these proceedings as, 
quote, politically motivated, closed quote, what did you mean by that phrase?      A.  
Politically motivated, I mean that there is a group of people who have an agenda and 
who have the power and have abused that power in an effort to remove me from my 
employment, to take my position away from me.  And in my opinion, have 
intentionally interfered with my ability to do my job and are seeking to deprive me 
of earning a livelihood.” (Transcript Vol.  XVII -150) 
325. 
When asked to identify the persons who were seeking to deprive her 
of her livelihood Respondent testified: “...those people are the eight judges who 
signed the grievance but no one else, because anybody else that's certainly been 
involved in this has certainly been part of the tensions rising, certainly were working 
January Term, 2004 
145 
at the direction of or the request of those that were the ones that were the signators.  
So I would look to the judges.” (Transcript Vol. XVII – 166-167) 
326. 
Rather than a political motivation, the panel majority finds there is 
clear and convincing evidence that the motivation for this process has been the 
persistent and accelerating pattern of improper activity by Judge O’Neill. The 
evidence upon which this panel must decide this matter is not what the signatory 
judges have said happened but rather the sworn testimony of the 76 litigants, 
lawyers, employees and staff who testified about their first-hand personal knowledge 
of Judge O’Neill’s behavior over the past seven years.  Those witnesses do not 
conform to any definition of conspirators: they are all ages, both sexes, all races, all 
political persuasions (Republicans,  Democrats and everything in between), 
prosecutors, public defenders and private defense attorneys, civil plaintiff’s counsel, 
civil defense counsel, convicted criminals, courtroom observers, law enforcement 
officials, law students, court employees, county employees and Judge O’Neill’s  
former employees.  The eight judges who signed this collection of grievances did not 
create these complaints.   They provided a structure, a form in which the complaints 
that existed could be collected to investigate what was happening.   The panel 
majority concludes by clear and convincing evidence that this Amended Complaint 
is about each individual case and is not about a political agenda. 
327. 
Another factor in mitigation is absence of a prior disciplinary record.  
While the Respondent has never been sanctioned in a disciplinary proceeding, she 
testified that in 1996 charges against her were dismissed after a hearing under Gov. 
Jud. R. III by a five-judge commission.  
328. 
The testimony about respondent’s volatile and intemperate behavior 
raised the issue of a mental disability with the panel.  However, the parties agreed 
and Judge O’Neill submitted to an examination by a psychiatrist chosen by Relator 
in May 2003.  The examiner found no evidence of a mental illness as defined by 
R.C.5122.01. Neither Relator nor Respondent chose to submit the report to the panel 
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146 
or use in evidence any of the findings made in that report.   The parties represented 
that they had fully explored the issue of mental illness and it was a non-issue in this 
proceeding.  At the request of the panel chair confirmation of these facts appear in 
the Transcript at Vol. XVI – 152-154. 
329. 
Aggravation: For the panel majority, the most troubling aspect of 
this entire case affecting aggravation was the Respondent’s lack of credibility and 
outright dishonesty. Beyond the identified misrepresentations found as violations of 
DR 1-102(A)(4), the panel majority concluded that Judge O’Neill’s Answer to the 
Amended Complaint and her testimony throughout this proceeding was false and 
self-serving.  On only two occasions – in Burton v. Nicholson and regarding 
Woerner’s bond forfeiture judgment - did she admit in testimony that anything she 
did was an error or was not appropriate.  While she was technically cooperative in 
these proceedings and certainly her counsel conducted these hearings in a civil and 
professional manner, this final hearing took as long as it did because in every factual 
incident Judge O’Neill’s version of the events, either plead in her Answer or in her 
final hearing testimony, contradicted the testimony of every other witness to those 
events.  At times there were three versions of events: Respondent’s pleading in the 
Answer, Respondent’s testimony at final hearing and the testimony of the other 
factual witnesses. While Respondent generally claimed difficulty remembering 
events that had occurred years before, when it served to justify her actions her 
memory of events became detailed and vivid.  The stipulations filed in this matter 
related solely to uncontested matters of dates, assignments, times, places and matters 
already of record (although even “the record” was contested in some incidents). 
Respondent called a single fact witness (Ronald Janes) and he corroborated 
Respondent’s threat to revoke the bond of a defendant who chose trial!  The 
testimony of the experience of court staff and judges with Respondent established 
that Respondent’s reputation for being truthful left much to be desired.  The panel 
majority finds Respondent’s dishonesty, false statements and her refusal to 
January Term, 2004 
147 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of any of her conduct in the Amended Complaint 
throughout these proceedings to be significant aggravating factors. 
330. 
The panel struggled throughout these hearings to understand 
Respondent’s abusive and volatile behavior.  Her intemperate behavior was directed 
at friends and foe alike.  Respondent did testify that she believed that lawyers who 
appeared before her and court staff challenged her authority.  “There is a lot of 
attorneys that can be pretty challenging, and in your face.  And it's probably more so 
with me than anybody else, because of the tense atmosphere down there.  And it has 
been down there for the entire time that I've been on the bench.”  Respondent also 
included her bailiff, court reporter; float bailiffs and Judge Watson as persons who 
challenged her authority. (Transcript Vol.  XI 46, 47-52) The panel majority found 
no evidence to corroborate Respondent’s belief that persons she identified or who 
otherwise appeared before her as described in the incidents that comprise the 
Amended Complaint were challenging her authority. 
331. 
Respondent testified that after receiving the first letter of inquiry in 
January 2001 she has sought counseling with several psychologists, not on a regular 
basis, to deal with employment-dynamics, human-resource-type issues and to assist 
her in dealing with the allegations in the letter of inquiry, which she said, were “just 
absolutely outrageous and outstanding.”  (Transcript Vol.  XVII – 152)  The 
counseling sessions have helped her put things in perspective.  At one point in her 
testimony it seemed that she was acknowledging some responsibility for over-
reacting in situations.  Respondent was asked by the Panel: “Q. You think now 
having consulted on this that there was a problem before with having your buttons 
pushed?     A.  Well, obviously, there must have because these allegations just hit me 
like a ton of bricks.  So I felt that I needed to go talk to somebody about that. 
(Transcript Vol.  XVII – 162-163) Asked about the atmosphere in the courtroom by 
the Panel:” Looking back now, do you think you were responsible for causing any of 
those frictions?  A.  I think that I was -- that I am to blame and I share the blame for 
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148 
everything that how I reacted to them, so yes.  I think that it takes two to have -- 
have a relationship and it takes two to either resolve that as best as possible or let it 
escalate into something worse.  And I think that you're always going to have 
conflicts, but I think in hindsight, I knew then and I know it even better now that if -- 
maybe if I had not reacted so quickly or had I not overreacted or maybe if I could 
have just reached out and grabbed those words back, certainly could have taken the 
tone and tenor down.”  (Transcript Vol.  XVII – 163)  
332. 
However, when Respondent was asked by the Panel specifically 
about her behavior as testified to by the witnesses she adamantly maintained that it 
did not happen and her behavior was appropriate. “Q. My question is, however, the 
characterizations that have been put upon your actions by the witnesses that 
appeared of yelling or screaming or basically losing control in a situation, you have 
maintained to this point, I believe, that that kind of loss of control did not happen.  
A.  Correct.  Q.  My question is:  As we sit here today, have you ever lost control in 
the courtroom?  A.  No.  Q.  Have you ever had difficulty controlling your anger 
when a courtroom situation --   A.  No.  Q. -- arose?  A.  Not lost control in the 
courtroom, to the extent that it's been related here.  Never lost control of the 
courtroom.  May not have done the best in taking back control of the courtroom, or 
managing a situation, but I -- No.  I've never yelled.  I certainly have raised my 
voice.  I certainly have been stern.  I certainly have been less than empathetic or 
proactive in dealing with staff and situations like that; but never yelling and 
screaming.  I don't know what the rest of the adjectives are that were used.    Q.  
Throwing things, slamming things.      A.  Nothing thrown.  Nothing slammed.  
Those -- those -- Those are not me.  ...Q.  Do you think that there may have been 
times in some -- given the testimony that we've heard today, in your courtroom 
where you have not been patient, dignified, and courteous to people who appear in 
front of you?      A.  No.” (Transcript Vol.  XVII – 169-170)  The panel majority 
concludes that Respondent has not and will not admit or take responsibility for her 
January Term, 2004 
149 
abusive and intemperate actions and does not acknowledge the wrongful nature of 
the conduct described in the Amended Complaint. 
333. 
The panel majority finds that the victims of Respondent’s 
misconduct were vulnerable and did suffer resulting harm.  Certainly the criminal 
litigants who were the subjects of bond threats were harmed by loss of rights to 
freely and voluntarily make decisions and those who were jailed lost their freedom 
without cause.  Birchler was deprived of the benefit of his appeal and of his right to 
probation.  The litigants, lawyers and staff who were the subject of Respondent’s 
explosions and tirades were embarrassed, frightened and demeaned.  Respondent 
publicly criticized visiting judge Martin in a crowded courtroom. For court staff 
such explosions also jeopardized their employment and/or made their jobs more 
difficult.   Staff who worked regularly with Respondent for example, Grego and 
Nyce, suffered medical consequences from the constant stress and unpredictability 
of working with Respondent. 
334. 
The panel majority concludes that considering all the factual 
incidents found proven in this Amended Complaint a pattern of misconduct has been 
established and that pattern is motivated by a selfish motive. Absent from 
Respondent’s pattern of conduct in these matters is any recognition of the 
importance of the public perception of the integrity of the judiciary. Respondent 
displayed no appreciation for the effect her conduct had on those she dealt with in 
her official capacity or the appearance created by her public behavior in her 
courtroom.  Her actions whether abusive of litigant’s legal rights (to trials, voluntary 
pleas, bonds and records) or abusive of the right to be treated with impartiality and 
dignity by a judge (not demeaning and abusive behavior) were clearly injudicial and 
prejudicial to public esteem for judicial office. As long as Respondent’s caseload 
statistics remained the lowest in the Court it didn’t matter what Respondent did or 
how she behaved to accomplish that goal.  Ironically it was Respondent’s witness 
former Judge Tracey who best described the need for a judge to recognize problems 
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150 
they may cause in the courtroom: “You know, we're elected officials or I was an 
elected official and you want to be liked.  I mean, judges want to be liked.  And so I 
think I would -- I would believe that judges would --would become involved even if 
it wasn't that big of a deal because little things are big deals to people...There's no 
really small problems, you know, when  
you're in the courtroom.” (Transcript Vol.  XII – 77-78) 
335. 
Recommended Sanction: At the outset, the panel majority must 
acknowledge that there is no Ohio case similar in size and scope to the charges 
against Respondent.  Disciplinary Counsel has recommended disbarment, however, 
barring proof of theft or a felony conviction, that sanction has not been applied in 
any judicial misconduct case in this state.  The parties have cited numerous out-of 
state cases that at best provide guidance on one aspect or another of the different 
violations found in this case.  
336. 
The preamble to the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that the 
degree of discipline imposed should depend on the seriousness of the transgressions, 
whether there is a pattern of improper activity and the effect of the improper activity 
on others or on the judicial system and for the protection of the public.  The panel 
majority as detailed above does find multiple serious transgressions, a pattern of 
improper activity that has had a significant deleterious effect on the public’s 
perception of the integrity of the judicial system. (See also, other factors affecting 
judicial discipline described in: In Re Deming [108 Wash.2d 82] 736 P.2d 639 
(Washington 1987) and In re Brown [464 Mich.135], 626 N.W. 2d  403 (Michigan 
2001) 
337. 
In reaching a recommendation the panel majority considered the 
sanctions ordered in Ohio cases involving similar violations. For what the panel 
majority considers the most serious violations, those involving DR 1-102(A)(4), 
under Ohio case law such violations, absent exceptional circumstances, mandate 
actual suspension. Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 74 Ohio St. 3d 187 [658 
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151 
N.E.2d 237] (1995). The only recent case involving a judge who violated DR 1-
102(A)(4) was Cleveland Bar Assn v. Katalinas, 90 Ohio St.3d 140, 2000-Ohio-37, 
[735 N.E.2d 432], a default case with no mitigation involving theft of client funds 
which resulted in disbarment.  For attorneys who violate DR 1-102(A)(4) sanctions 
range from 6 months for a single act to disbarment for multiple acts.  In Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Ferreri, 88 Ohio St.3d 456, 2000-Ohio-382 [710 N.E.2d 1107], a single 
incident involving an ex-parte conversation by a judge resulted in a six-month 
suspension. In an earlier case, Disciplinary Counsel v. Ferreri, 85 Ohio St.3d 649, 
1999-Ohio-330, Judge Ferreri received an eighteen month suspension with twelve 
months stayed for three incidents of false and intemperate comments made to news 
media criticizing other judges. In Cleveland Bar Association v. Cleary, 93 Ohio St. 
3d 191, 2001-Ohio-1326 [754 N.E.2d 235], a single incident regarding an improper 
quid pro quo in criminal sentencing which was found to be prejudicial to public 
esteem for judicial office also resulted in a six month suspension.  In Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Campbell, 68 Ohio St. 3d 7, 1993-Ohio-8 [623 N.E.2d 24], multiple 
incidents of intemperate behavior involving sexual harassment resulted in a one-year 
suspension after the judge resigned his post.  In Disciplinary Counsel v. Karto, 94 
Ohio St. 3d 109, 2002-Ohio-61 [760 N.E.2d 412], several incidents involving a 
judge’s abuse of contempt power with litigants resulted in a six month suspension.  
Finally this Board in Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley (Case No. 02-79) recently 
recommended to the Supreme Court a sanction of 18 months, 6 months stayed in a 
multiple count complaint regarding injudicious behavior in which the panel majority 
found the judge had testified dishonestly to the panel. 
338. 
This case is unique and unprecedented.  It combines multiple 
incidents of  different types of improper activity when 6 to 12 month suspensions 
have been ordered for far fewer acts of one type of improper activity.  The panel 
majority balances against these violations Respondent’s length of service as a judge 
and the volume of matters she handled.  The mitigation testimony included those 
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who found Respondent to be a fair and efficient judge and did not experience 
problems with her behavior. Although the sheer number and variety of incidents, in 
a disciplinary context in which actual grievance complaints against judges are 
uncommon, establishes a serious problem regarding Respondent, the panel majority 
also considers that these incidents arose out of five years of judicial service pre-
dating the Complaint filed in 2002.  The panel majority recognizes that most of the 
violations found address Respondent’s lack of judicial temperament and lack of 
compliance with the particular obligations of judicial office. The majority of the 
violations do not impinge on the Respondent’s underlying qualifications necessary 
for the practice of law.  As a result, the panel majority concludes rather than 
warranting disbarment from the practice of law as recommended by the Relator, the 
sanction should be a significant actual suspension which recognizes the multiple 
serious violations relating to judicial service but does not ultimately deprive 
Respondent of the right to practice law. 
339. 
Balancing the multiple violations found with aggravation by 
dishonesty, pattern of conduct, resulting harm, effect on public esteem for and 
integrity of the judiciary with mitigation of service to the profession, contribution to 
the community and absence of a prior disciplinary record, the majority of the panel 
recommends that the Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two 
years. 
 
 
Judge Jack Puffenberger, dissenting: 
 
      
For the reasons listed below, I hereby dissent from the report and 
recommendation of the other two panel members. 
 
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153 
The extensive allegations presented in this complaint are far reaching in 
substance and, in many instances, require Respondent to justify judicial 
determinations made many years before. This Board must be cautious not to 
infringe upon areas of our legal system wherein our judiciary has traditionally 
been granted extensive discretion in making judicial determinations. Inappropriate 
actions of one member of the judiciary must not be sanctioned in a manner that 
would have a “chilling effect” on judges who may sometimes utilize methods 
which may be perceived as “unconventional”. Judges are constantly making split 
second decisions in the courtroom and sometimes their motives for making these 
determinations can be placed in question. Our legal system has acknowledged this 
and provides proper avenues of recourse outside the disciplinary process. To 
require our judges to be placed under oath in a disciplinary setting and explain 
why a judicial determination was made is foreign to our legal system. In situations 
where the judicial determination was made years earlier, that task of explaining 
why the decision was made can be nearly impossible. 
 
While it is not my intention to review the panel report case by case, I will 
generally address each of the counts in the Amended Complaint and conclude by 
formulating a more generalized dissent to both the findings and the 
recommendation. 
In reviewing each of the Counts in the Amended Complaint, the Board 
must apply the standard of whether the violations have been proven by clear and 
convincing evidence. This is a high standard to meet and is more than a simple 
preponderance of the evidence.  
 
In Count I, the panel report finds that Respondent engaged in ex-parte 
communications. In Nezvalova, Disciplinary Counsel clearly failed to establish 
that the conversations were ex-parte in nature. No one gained a procedural or 
tactical advantage as a result of the conversation which was administrative in 
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nature. Two distinguished judges, Judge Corzine and Judge Parrott, testified that 
this was not an ex-parte conversation. Likewise, the conversation in Smiley was 
administrative in nature and Judges Corzine, Parrott and former Judge Tracey 
testified that conversations such as this are not uncommon. Certainly the clear and 
convincing standard was not met to establish that any ex-parte communications 
even occurred unless one were to totally disbelieve the testimony of not only 
Judge O’Neill, but also the testimony of Judge Corzine, Judge Parrot and former 
Judge Tracey.  Moreover, the Smiley case was not a pending case and the 
conversation did not involve the merits of the case. Absolutely no one was 
prejudiced by these conversations and they do not fall within the realm of 
sanctionable conversations. That portion of Count I relating to ex-parte 
communications is without merit and must be dismissed. 
Count II alleges that Respondent refused to allow attorneys to go on the 
record. In 1998, the local rules of the Franklin County Common Pleas Court did 
not require pretrials to be on the record. The allegation that Attorney Shwartz was 
denied the opportunity to go on the record during a pretrial was readily admitted 
by Respondent in her letter to the Chief Justice on September 10, 1998. (Ex. ON 
01507)  Respondent explained to the Chief Justice that she, “denied Mr. 
Shwartz’s request to put the bench conference on the record as I did not find it 
necessary to record my denial of his request for a continuance.” This denial was 
not even found to be sufficient for the granting of an Affidavit of Disqualification 
by the Chief Justice, much less a disciplinary violation. In both Dennis and Lane 
the allegations of failure to allow a record occurred in pretrial settings. Both Judge 
Parrot and former Judge and now Professor Tracey testified that the preferred 
method of making a record is not to disrupt the schedule in order to make a record 
whenever one is demanded, but to wait until such time as there is an actual court 
hearing. In fact, Attorney Shwartz testified that a written motion would have been 
the proper way to make a record for the motion for continuance. The allegations 
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155 
in Count II have not been established by clear and convincing evidence and must 
be dismissed. 
Count III consists of allegations that Respondent denied continuances 
without exercising judicial discretion. The granting or denial of requests for 
continuance should not be the subject of disciplinary actions. The law adequately 
provides recourse to the parties in these situations. 
Count IV relates to alleged misrepresentations Respondent made in her 
interactions with lawyers, judges and court personnel. While there is certainly 
variation in the recollection of parties to the same incidents, it must be 
remembered that these incidents occurred years ago and it is common for people 
to have different perceptions of an incident after the passage of time. The panel 
report takes great umbrage to the fact that Respondent denied the allegations 
against her and her recollection of incidents was often times different from those 
of other witnesses. This does not mean that Respondent was necessarily lying or 
being deceitful. It means that she had a different perception of certain encounters. 
In addition, her answer to the complaint seems to contain responses in conflict 
with her own testimony at hearing. The panel was made aware that the answer 
was prepared prior to any formal discovery and that Respondent answered the 
complaint utilizing her best recollection at the time. Those familiar with legal 
proceedings are quite aware that recollection can be refreshed once the witness is 
afforded an opportunity to review documents relative to an incident. This is 
especially true when the incident occurred years prior. The finding of a violation 
for merely denying the allegations and having a different perception of what 
transpired from that of her accusers is totally unfair. In addition, it is not difficult 
to find that a number of witnesses who testified as to Count IV had their own 
agendas which compromised their credibility. Once again, the burden of clear and 
convincing evidence has not been met in these allegations.   
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While Disciplinary Counsel has attempted to demonstrate a “pattern” of 
inappropriate behavior by Respondent, the allegation of a violation in Count VI is 
totally unrelated to any other count in that it concerns activity that occurred 
outside the courthouse setting. The Panel report finds a solitary violation related 
to a campaign conversation Respondent had with an individual who was still 
technically her employee even though the individual had already tendered her 
employment resignation. It is exactly this type of remote violation that the 
Preamble to the Code of Judicial Conduct envisioned when it states: “It is not 
intended, however, that every transgression will result in disciplinary action.” 
This single technical violation of the campaign solicitation canon by a judge who 
has been involved in several contested elections does not demonstrate a “pattern” 
of campaign violations and should be dismissed in conformity with the spirit of 
the Preamble. 
 
Counts I, II and III generally relate to matters within the discretion of the 
trial judge and this Board should not allow the disciplinary procedure to substitute 
for the Courts of Appeals and Counts IV and VI have been addressed above. 
However, Count V of the Amended Complaint is much more problematic for 
Respondent. In fact, it goes to the very crux of this dissent. Count V relates to 
Respondent’s interaction with lawyers, judges and court staff. Herein lies the one 
true, glaring basis for the entire Amended Complaint: the judicial temperament of 
Respondent. This is the underlying theme of the entire complaint. All of the 
allegations, with the exception of the alleged campaign violation, relate in one 
way or another to the judicial temperament of Respondent. Judicial temperament 
includes common sense, compassion, humility, open-mindedness, patience, tact 
and understanding. It is a quality that can best be identified when it is absent. The 
absence of judicial temperament generally exhibits itself in many ways including 
arrogance, impatience, pomposity, loquacity, irascibility, arbitrariness or tyranny. 
Unfortunately, the absence of judicial temperament by Respondent exhibited itself 
January Term, 2004 
157 
far too often during the hearing of this matter. While all judges have “bad days” 
even this dissenter believes that Disciplinary Counsel has established a pattern of 
behavior by Respondent that exceeds the acceptable bounds of what must be 
demanded of the judiciary. I therefore agree that, in Count V, Disciplinary 
Counsel has established a violation of Canon 1 and Canon 3(B)(4) of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct which must be sanctioned. (The majority of the panel agrees 
with and adopts Judge Puffenberger’s definition above of judicial temperament.) 
The panel report regarding aggravation, mitigation and recommended 
sanction underscores the temptation to be swept up in the sheer magnitude of the 
evidence presented. Every possible aggravating circumstance is mentioned and 
testimony was molded to justify the severe sanction recommended. The panel 
heard many witnesses, reviewed many exhibits and considered an incredible 
number of incidents alleging numerous violations. The volume of evidence should 
not be used as a justification to take drastic action. A reasoned approach to this 
matter is consistent with the above argument. This is a case about a judge who 
lacks judicial temperament, nothing more, nothing less. After all of the detailed 
analysis of each specific case and every shred of evidence that could be solicited 
over a number of years, we are left with the ultimate conclusion: this is a judge 
who has a number of good qualities but judicial temperament is not one of them. 
Her behavior warrants action. 
In considering a recommended sanction, the panel report discards each of 
Respondent’s defenses. One of Respondent’s defenses was that the complaints 
were politically motivated. Certainly, politics did not force Respondent to behave 
the way she did at times. However, to totally discard this factor one would have to 
ignore substantial evidence to the contrary. One witness, Sherry Mitchell, a 
former employee of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, who left for a 
better employment opportunity, seemed to be one of the few impartial witnesses 
on this topic. She described the Court as a “political, back-biting environment” 
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158 
and that decisions by court administration were “rarely based on fact” but rather 
were “made on personal agenda, who knew who and politics”. She testified as to 
the “self-serving, malicious environment.” One judge openly made derogatory 
comments about Respondent to courthouse  
staff. (TR 17/22) Having served on a multi-judge court, I do not discard this issue 
as easily as the other panel members. The atmosphere which seems to pervade 
this Court has Respondent at the center, but there are other parties who seem to 
relish throwing gasoline on the fire. The scene of one of the complainant judges 
on her hands and knees writing an antagonistic remark with chalk on 
Respondent’s parking spot would be comical if not so tragic. Some who claim 
that Respondent brings disrespect to that Court should consider the atmosphere 
they have helped foster. It must be clearly stated once again that Respondent 
cannot utilize this atmosphere as justification for her actions, but to ignore it is to 
provide only a partial picture of reality. The panel report’s reference to a prior 
disciplinary action that was dismissed is prejudicial and should be removed. 
The panel report reference to Respondent’s refusal to acknowledge the 
wrongful nature of her conduct as a significant aggravating factor is not borne out 
by her testimony. Respondent did testify that in some instances she should have 
handled things differently. She acknowledged that some mistakes were made. The 
fact that she denies the allegations is not evidence of anything. To chastise her for 
denying the allegations and mounting a vigorous defense should not be an 
aggravating factor since many of the counts are without basis. 
 
The panel report further considers the criminal litigants to be victims of 
Respondent’s actions. All of these individuals had recourse in the law for 
perceived violations of their due process rights. These individuals do not have a 
“right” to probation or a presentence investigation if the judge determines that 
probation is not going to be granted. Competent counsel protects your due process 
January Term, 2004 
159 
rights within the law. That is their function. These criminal defendants were not 
denied their right to go to trial. These instances cannot stand alone on their merits 
as violations and certainly cannot be considered as a pattern of how Respondent 
handles criminal cases. Since 1992, she has presided over hundreds, if not 
thousands, of criminal cases and to allege that these several cases demonstrate a 
“pattern” is stretching beyond the limits of reasonableness. 
The panel report finding that Respondent was motivated by a selfish 
motive lacks justification. Respondent did not personally gain from her actions in 
any way. To insinuate that her personal motive was to have a manageable 
caseload is to ignore pressures put on trial judges to keep the docket current. The 
Supreme Court initiated the case reporting requirements to insure the timely 
resolution of cases. Once again, the few cases mentioned in the Amended 
Complaint certainly do not establish a pattern that docket control was more 
important to Respondent that the rights of the parties. The testimony established 
the Respondent did grant continuance requests when she felt they were merited. A 
clear and convincing pattern is not established by such a miniscule percentage of 
cases handled. 
In conclusion, the bases for the panel report sanction recommendation 
have not been established by clear and convincing evidence. It has not been 
established that Respondent acted with dishonesty.  A pattern of conduct was not 
established except as it relates to intemperate behavior. Any resulting harm from 
Respondent’s decisions was minimal and could have been reviewed by a higher 
court. Respondent was responsible for her part in the effect on the public esteem 
for the integrity of the judiciary. Others are also to blame.  
 
At the end of the day, the question is what to do with a judge who lacks 
judicial temperament. Should she effectively be removed from office even though 
the citizens of Franklin County want her to be their judge? Should the citizens of 
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160 
Franklin County have the right to a judge who lacks judicial temperament if they 
want one?   
Respondent has a problem that is affecting her ability to be a better judge. 
For some time the legal profession has sought to render assistance to members 
who experience problems. The OLAP program of the Ohio Sate Bar Association 
is one example of a profession striving to assist colleagues who are experiencing 
personal problems. I believe that the panel unanimously agrees that Respondent is 
in need of professional assistance in helping her attain a better judicial 
temperament on a more consistent basis. Her situation is not hopeless. The 
testimony regarding her temperament was not all one-sided. A number of 
witnesses, including a former Board member, testified as to very positive 
experiences in her courtroom. Unfortunately, her past behavior toward others in 
the legal system has contributed to the dislike some individuals seem to have for 
her. Sometimes she is not an easy person to like. She is demanding. She is strong-
willed. She can and has displayed some very negative emotions in the courthouse. 
It is my belief that the Board has several responsibilities in this matter. The Board 
must not get caught up in the negative media frenzy that has followed Respondent 
for some time. The Board must not look at the sheer volume of the evidence 
presented and think that severe punishment must be justified. Above all, the 
Board has a responsibility to try to assist this individual in dealing with her 
imperfections at the same time that she is sanctioned. Any sanction by this Board 
is a severe sanction for Respondent. The publicity of a sanction against a sitting 
judge for lack of proper judicial temperament will be a severe punishment in 
itself. The cost of her defense in this matter will be astronomical. The mitigating 
factors contained in the panel report are substantial and aggravating factors are 
minimal at best. This Board should strive to fashion a sanction that is not overly 
punitive, but addresses the true violation of Respondent: her temperament. It is 
my opinion that an appropriate sanction under the circumstances is a one year 
January Term, 2004 
161 
suspension with the suspension stayed and Respondent placed on probation for 
the one year period. Her probation should include: 1) verification of receipt of 
professional counseling to assist her in dealing with judicial temperament issues; 
and 2) cooperation with a judicial mentor who will monitor her progress and 
report regularly to the Supreme Court.  
 
BOARD RECOMMENDATION 
 
 
Pursuant to Gov. Bar Rule V(6)(L), The Board of Commissioners On 
Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio considered this matter 
on April 16, 2004.  The Board adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law of the panel majority except that it concludes that the Respondent’s actions 
did not violate the Code of Judicial Conduct or the Disciplinary Rules in Count II.  
After full discussion and debate, the Board agreed with the views of the panel 
majority and recommends that the Respondent, Deborah O’Neill, be suspended 
from the practice of law in the State of Ohio for two years.  The Board further 
recommends that the cost of these proceedings be taxed to the Respondent in any 
disciplinary matter entered, so that execution may issue. 
 
Pursuant to the order of the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline of The Supreme Court of Ohio, 
 
I hereby certify the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
Of Law, and Recommendations as those of the Board. 
 
 
 
“/s/ Jonathan W. Marshall” 
 
 
JONATHAN W. MARSHALL, Secretary 
 
 
Board of Commissioners on 
 
 
Grievances and Discipline of 
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162 
 
 
The Supreme Court of Ohio 
End of Appendix to J. Pfeifer’s opinion 
 
________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Joseph M. Caligiuri, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Bieser, Greer & Landis, L.L.P., David C. Greer and Gretchen M. 
Treherne, for respondent. 
David M. McTigue, urging dismissal for amici curiae International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 683, Plumbers and Pipefitters Local 
189, Fraternal Order of Police Buckeye Troopers Lodge 146, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 413, and Central Ohio Labor Council, AFL-CIO. 
Wolman & Associates and Benson A. Wolman, urging dismissal for amici curiae 
Ohio Democratic Party and Franklin County Democratic Party. 
__________________