Case Title: Charles v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 041919

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
ATIF CHARLES 
 
v.  Record No. 041919     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
June 9, 2005 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether participation in the 
Detention Center Incarceration Program (the Program), Code 
§ 19.2-316.2, is incarceration and whether a probationer is 
entitled to credit for time served in the Program when his 
probation is later revoked. 
Facts 
 
On October 16, 1997, Atif A. Charles was sentenced to 
five years imprisonment with four years suspended following 
his conviction for possession of heroin with the intent to 
distribute, under Code § 18.2-248.  After serving his one-year 
active sentence, Charles was placed on probation.  When he 
violated conditions of probation, the trial court revoked the 
suspended sentence, resuspended the sentence and placed 
Charles on probation.  One condition of Charles' second 
probation was that he enter and complete the Program.  Charles 
completed the Program in five months but then violated other 
conditions of his probation.  The trial court revoked his 
second probation and imposed the unserved four years of his 
original five-year sentence. 
 
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Charles appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, 
arguing that his four-year sentence should have been reduced 
by the five months he served in the Program.  Conceding that 
he had not raised this issue in the trial court as required by 
the contemporaneous objection rule, Rule 5A:18, Charles argued 
that the matter should be considered by the Court of Appeals 
under the ends of justice exception to that Rule.  The Court 
of Appeals declined to apply the ends of justice exception, 
finding that participation in the Program was a condition of 
probation, not incarceration.  Charles v. Commonwealth, No. 
0616-03-1, slip op. at 5-6 (Va. Ct. App. July 20, 2004).  
Furthermore, construing Code § 19.2-316.2, the Court of 
Appeals determined that whether participation in the Program 
should be credited against an outstanding sentence was a 
matter within the trial court's discretion.  Id., slip op. 
at 7.  We awarded Charles an appeal. 
Discussion 
Charles argues that the Court of Appeals erred in 
refusing to apply the ends of justice exception because his 
participation in the Program was incarceration and, by failing 
to provide credit for that period of incarceration, the trial 
 
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court effectively altered the sentence imposed in his October 
16, 1997 sentencing order, a final order under Rule 1:1.* 
Rule 5A:18, like our Rule 5:25, allows an appellate court 
to consider a matter not preserved by objection in the trial 
court "to attain the ends of justice."  Application of the 
ends of justice exception is appropriate when the judgment of 
the trial court was error and application of the exception is 
necessary to avoid a grave injustice or the denial of 
essential rights.  Cooper v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 883, 889, 
140 S.E.2d 688, 693 (1965).  In reviewing the Court of 
Appeal's judgment, we begin by determining whether that Court 
was correct in holding that there was no error in the trial 
court's judgment.  Tucker v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 490, 493, 
604 S.E.2d 66, 67-68 (2004). 
A. Trial Court Error 
Participation in the Program as Incarceration 
The Commonwealth argues, and the Court of Appeals held, 
that, pursuant to Code § 19.2-316.2, participation in the 
Program is a condition of probation and therefore such 
participation is not incarceration.  Designating an activity 
as an authorized condition of probation, however, is not a 
description of the nature of the activity.  Indeed, the 
                     
* Unless otherwise provided by statute, see e.g., Code 
§ 8.01-428, Rule 1:1 prohibits the modification of a final 
 
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Commonwealth acknowledges this fact by suggesting that 
additional evidence is necessary in this case to determine 
whether conditions of the Program "are strongly similar to 
traditional incarceration or whether they more closely 
resemble some lesser form of restraint."  Additional evidence 
is not required, as the Commonwealth suggests, because the 
statutes addressing the Program are dispositive of the issue 
in this case. 
Code § 53.1–67.8 authorizes the Department of Corrections 
to "maintain a system of residential detention centers to 
provide a highly structured, short-term period of 
incarceration for individuals committed to the Department 
under the provisions of § 19.2-316.2" (emphasis added).  Code 
§ 19.2-316.2 specifically labels the program as an 
"incarceration" program; it refers to "facilities available 
for confinement," release from "confinement," and a "detention 
center incarceration program" that required "more security or 
supervision" than other programs.  We do not consider these 
references to "incarceration" to be inadvertent; by describing 
the Program in this manner, the General Assembly has 
determined that participation in the Program is incarceration. 
Accordingly, we hold that Charles was incarcerated when 
he participated in the Program.  Therefore, when Charles' 
                                                                
order more than 21 days after the date of entry. 
 
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second probation was revoked, he had been incarcerated for one 
year and five months.  By sentencing him to four years 
imprisonment, the trial court added five months incarceration 
to Charles' original five-year sentence. 
Credit for Time Served in the Program 
We now consider whether the Court of Appeals' correctly 
held that the decision to grant Charles credit for the period 
of time he served in the Program was a matter of trial court 
discretion.  The Court based this holding on its construction 
of Code § 19.2-316.2.  Subsection (B)(3) of that section 
specifically directs the trial court not to credit time spent 
in the Program to parolees, but the statute is silent with 
regard to the treatment of such time for probationers.  The 
Court of Appeals construed the General Assembly's silence in 
this regard as an affirmative election to place the crediting 
decision in the discretion of the trial court and concluded 
that, in this case, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to grant Charles credit for the time he 
served in the Program.  Charles, slip op. at 9, 11. 
We disagree with the Court of Appeals' construction of 
the statute and its conclusion.  Rule 1:1 and long standing 
case law applying that rule preclude a trial court from 
entering a second sentencing order altering an original 
sentencing order that has become final.  Robertson v. 
 
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Superintendent of the Wise Correctional Unit, 248 Va. 232, 
236, 445 S.E.2d 116, 118 (1994); Conner v. Commonwealth, 207 
Va. 455, 457, 150 S.E.2d 478, 479 (1966).  The policy of 
finality contained in Rule 1:1 is not absolute, however.  The 
General Assembly has enacted various exceptions to this 
policy.  See, e.g., Code § 19.2-303 (court may modify unserved 
portion of sentence at any time before defendant is 
transferred to Department of Corrections); Code § 8.01-428 
(court may modify final order in certain listed 
circumstances). 
Code § 19.2-612(B)(3) provides an exception to Rule 1:1.  
By denying a parolee credit for time incarcerated during the 
Program, the General Assembly has authorized a trial court to 
enter a second sentencing order upon revocation of parole that 
extends the length of incarceration imposed by the original 
sentencing order.  The absence of such a provision for 
probationers indicates that the General Assembly knew that the 
trial court could not enter a second sentencing order that 
altered a sentencing order that had become final under Rule 
1:1 and did not intend to alter the application of that Rule.  
Waterman v. Halverson, 261 Va. 203, 207, 540 S.E.2d 867, 869 
(2001) (legislature presumed to be familiar with existing 
rules and case law when enacting legislation). 
 
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In the absence of any legislative exception to Rule 1:1, 
the trial court did not have the authority or the discretion 
to enter a second sentencing order that extended the period of 
incarceration beyond that imposed in Charles' October 1999 
final sentencing order.  See Robertson, 248 Va. at 236, 445 
S.E.2d at 118.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in 
holding that Code § 19.2-316.2 vested the trial court with the 
discretion to grant or deny Charles credit for the time he 
served in the Program. 
B.  Grave Injustice 
Invoking the ends of justice exception to the 
contemporaneous objection rule requires a determination not 
only that there was error in the judgment of the trial court 
but also that application of the exception is necessary to 
avoid a grave injustice.  The latter predicate is also met in 
this case. 
In Deagle v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 304, 199 S.E.2d 509 
(1973), this Court considered whether a trial judge could 
shorten the sentence suggested by the jury because the jury's 
sentence exceeded that allowed by law.  We stated: 
Where the sentence imposed is in excess of that 
prescribed by law, that part of the sentence which 
is excessive is invalid.  Crutchfield v. 
Commonwealth, 187 Va. 291, 46 S.E.2d 340 (1948).  A 
sentence in excess of one prescribed by law is not 
void ab initio because of the excess, but is good 
insofar as the power of the court extends, and is 
 
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invalid only as to the excess.  Royster v. Smith, 
195 Va. 228, 77 S.E.2d 855 (1953). 
 
Id. at 305, 199 S.E.2d at 510-11.  Therefore, that portion of 
Charles' sentence beyond the five years imposed in the final 
sentencing order is void.  Denying Charles his liberty on the 
basis of a void sentence would impose a grave injustice upon 
him.  The application of the ends of justice exception is, 
therefore, fully justified in this case. 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, we hold that participation in the 
Detention Center Incarceration Program is incarceration.  Even 
though such incarceration is served as a condition of 
probation, it cannot be used upon revocation of probation to 
enlarge the sentence imposed in a sentencing order that has 
become final under Rule 1:1.  Therefore, to achieve the ends 
of justice, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remand this case with instructions to remand the 
case to the trial court for entry of an order consistent with 
this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded.