Case Title: People v. Gonzalez

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92305

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 92305-Agenda 8-May 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
 								JOHN A. GONZALEZ, Appellee.
Opinion filed April 17, 2003.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	The issue we consider is whether, during the course of a
routine traffic stop, a police officer's mere request for
identification from a passenger runs afoul of the federal and state
constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable seizures. See U.S.
Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6. We hold that such
a request passes constitutional muster.

BACKGROUND
	The salient facts in this case are not in dispute. On December
9, 1998, Officers McCarthy and Lee of the Naperville police
department were on routine patrol. Both officers were in plain
clothes in an unmarked vehicle. At approximately 4 p.m., while
patrolling Route 59, they stopped a vehicle, in which defendant
was the passenger, for not having a front license plate. Lee
approached the car on the driver's side; McCarthy approached the
car on the passenger's side. McCarthy, who observed no criminal
conduct by defendant either before or immediately after the stop,
asked him for identification. Defendant complied, producing a
traffic ticket, in lieu of other identification. Thereafter, McCarthy
ran a criminal history of defendant. The ensuing encounter
between McCarthy and defendant resulted in a search of
defendant's person, revealing a packet of cocaine. Defendant was
subsequently arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a
controlled substance (less than 15 grams of a substance containing
cocaine). See 720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 1998).
	Defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress
evidence, arguing that his arrest constituted an unreasonable
seizure under the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution.
See U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6. Defendant
maintained that Officer McCarthy had no lawful basis to ask him
for identification, thus tainting the subsequent search. The trial
court agreed, concluding that, absent any suspicion of criminal
conduct by defendant, Officer McCarthy's request for
identification was unreasonable. The trial court, therefore, granted
defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The
State appealed.
	The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the
trial court's judgment. 324 Ill. App. 3d 15. We allowed the State's
petition for leave to appeal (see 177 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now
reverse the judgment of the appellate court.

ANALYSIS
I
	Preliminarily, we note that defendant has not filed an
appellee's brief in this case. Nonetheless, we will decide the merits
of the appeal under the principles set forth in First Capitol
Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128,
133 (1976) ("if the record is simple and the claimed errors are
such that the court can easily decide them without the aid of an
appellee's brief, the court of review should decide the merits of the
appeal").
	Before proceeding to the merits, we consider the appropriate
standard of review. When a trial court's ruling on a motion to
suppress involves factual determinations or credibility
assessments, the court's ruling will not be disturbed on review
unless it is manifestly erroneous. People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 200-01 (2001); People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 430-31
(2001); see also People v. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d 165, 175 (2003).
Where, however, the facts are not in dispute, the ultimate question
posed by the legal challenge to the trial court's ruling is reviewed
de novo. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d  at 175; Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d  at 201.
As already indicated, the facts relevant to this appeal are not in
dispute. We, therefore, review de novo the State's legal challenge
to the suppression order.

II
	At the outset, we reject the State's contention that the fourth
amendment is not implicated in this case because Officer
McCarthy's request for identification qualified as "community
caretaking."
	"Community caretaking" is a label used to describe
consensual police-citizen encounters that typically involve the
safety of the public. People v. Murray, 137 Ill. 2d 382, 387 (1990);
see also 324 Ill. App. 3d at 22 (collecting cases). This type of
encounter involves no coercion or detention and thus requires no
legal justification. Murray, 137 Ill. 2d  at 387. The State fails to
explain in what way the request for identification from defendant
served a public-safety function, and we glean no facts from the
record which would warrant using the community-caretaking label
in this case. Accordingly, we turn to an examination of the fourth
amendment in the context of this traffic stop.

III
	The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees the "right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures." U.S. Const., amend. IV; see Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669, 1675, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 1442
(1960) (fourth amendment prohibition is applicable to state
officials through the fourteenth amendment). Similarly, article I,
section 6, of our state constitution guarantees that the "people shall
have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
other possessions against unreasonable searches, [and] seizures."
Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6. We have construed the search and
seizure language found in section 6 in a manner consistent with
the Supreme Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence. Fink v.
Ryan, 174 Ill. 2d 302, 314 (1996).
	The fourth amendment's imposition of a reasonableness
standard is intended to safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials,
including law enforcement agents. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 667, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396 (1979).
A particular law enforcement practice is thus judged by "balancing
its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests."
Prouse, 440 U.S.  at 654, 59 L. Ed. 2d  at 667-68, 99 S. Ct.  at 1396;
see also Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331, 148 L. Ed. 2d 838, 848, 121 S. Ct. 946, 950 (2001) ("we balance the privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to determine if the
intrusion was reasonable").
	The Supreme Court has characterized the temporary detention
of "individuals" during a vehicle stop by police, even if only for
a brief period and for a limited purpose, as a "seizure" of
"persons" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 95, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996), citing Prouse, 440 U.S.  at 653, 59 L. Ed. 2d  at 667, 99 S. Ct.  at 1396; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 1127, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3082
(1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607, 614, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2578 (1975). Although the Court
has not expressly held that a "passenger," as distinguished from
the "driver," is seized at the moment the vehicle is stopped, the
Court has recognized that, as a practical matter, any passengers are
stopped by virtue of the stop of the vehicle. Maryland v. Wilson,
519 U.S. 408, 413-14, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41, 47, 117 S. Ct. 882, 886
(1997); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 332, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3148 (1984) (acknowledging
that a traffic stop "significantly curtails the 'freedom of action' of
the driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle"). The
Court has also referred to the driver and any passengers
collectively as the "occupants" of the vehicle, holding that all are
seized. See, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604, 610, 105 S. Ct. 675, 679 (1985) ("stopping a car
and detaining its occupants constitute a seizure within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment"); Prouse, 440 U.S.  at 653, 59 L. Ed. 2d 
at 667, 99 S. Ct.  at 1396 ("stopping an automobile and detaining
its occupants constitute a 'seizure' within the meaning of [the
fourth and fourteenth] Amendments"); see also United States v.
Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1994) ("When a police officer
effects an investigatory stop of a vehicle, all occupants of that
vehicle are subjected to a seizure, as defined by the Fourth
Amendment" (emphasis in original)); United States v. Roberson,
6 F.3d 1088, 1091 (5th Cir. 1993) ("a stop results in the seizure of
the passenger and driver alike"). Accordingly, we conclude that
defendant here, as a passenger/occupant in the vehicle stopped by
police, was "seized" within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
	Because a vehicle stop constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's
occupants, a vehicle stop is subject to the fourth amendment's
requirement of reasonableness. Whren, 517 U.S.  at 809-10, 135 L. Ed. 2d  at 95, 116 S. Ct.  at 1772. In determining the reasonableness
of a traffic stop, courts are guided by the Supreme Court's
observation that the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a Terry
investigative stop (see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889,
88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)) than to a formal arrest. Berkemer, 468 U.S. 
at 439, 82 L. Ed. 2d  at 334, 104 S. Ct.  at 3150. Therefore, as a
general rule, a fourth amendment challenge to the reasonableness
of a traffic stop is analyzed under Terry principles. See United
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 613, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1573 (1985); People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501, 518-21 (1999); see also People v. White, 331 Ill. App. 3d 22, 27
(2002); People v. Robinson, 322 Ill. App. 3d 169, 175 (2001);
People v. Ross, 289 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 1016 (1997); United States
v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 397-98 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Walden, 146 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Jones,
269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Botero-Ospina,
71 F.3d 783, 786 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001); Wilson v. Indiana, 745 N.E.2d 789, 791-92 (Ind. 2001); State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468, 476, 706 A.2d 180, 184 (1998); McGaughey v. Oklahoma, 37 P.3d 130, 136
(Okla. 2001); Freeman v. Texas, 62 S.W.3d 883, 886 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2001). Under Terry, a law enforcement officer may, within
the strictures of the fourth amendment, conduct a brief,
investigative stop of individuals, absent probable cause to arrest,
provided the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of
criminal activity. Terry, 392 U.S.  at 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 906, 88 S. Ct.  at 1880.(1)
	We observe that traffic stops are frequently supported by
"probable cause" to believe that a traffic violation has occurred,
rather than the less exacting Terry standard of a "reasonable,
articulable suspicion." See People v. Orsby, 286 Ill. App. 3d 142,
146-47 (1996) (officers' observation of minor traffic law
violations provided probable cause to effect a traffic stop); People
v. Shepherd, 242 Ill. App. 3d 24, 29 (1993) (same); United States
v. Barahona, 990 F.2d 412, 416 (8th Cir. 1993) (observing that it
is well established that a traffic violation-however minor-creates
probable cause for a vehicle stop). In the present case, for
example, the officers observed that the vehicle in which defendant
was a passenger was missing the front license plate, a clear
violation of our vehicle code. See 625 ILCS 5/3-413 (West 1998)
(governing display of vehicle registration plates); 625 ILCS
5/3-701 (West 1998) (prohibiting operation of vehicle without
proper evidence of registration); 625 ILCS 5/3-833 (West 1998)
(making it unlawful for any person to own or operate a vehicle on
the public highways of this state without complying with the
Illinois Vehicle Code). Thus, the officers' stop of the vehicle was
supported by probable cause.
	Courts, however, generally do not distinguish between those
cases in which the traffic stop is based on Terry's "articulable
suspicion" and those cases in which the traffic stop is supported by
probable cause. That is, Terry principles apply even in the
presence of probable cause. See United States v. Wellman, 185 F.3d 651, 655-56 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Morris, 910 F. Supp. 1428, 1440 (N.D. Iowa 1995); Mitchell v. United States, 746 A.2d 877, 887 (D.C. 2000); Dickey, 152 N.J. at 476, 706 A.2d  at
184; see also United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 434-35 (5th
Cir. 1993). Accordingly, the reasonableness of the vehicle stop in
the present case is subject to a Terry analysis, irrespective of the
fact that the stop was supported by probable cause.(2)
	A Terry analysis includes a dual inquiry. We must consider
(1) "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception," and
(2) "whether it was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."
Terry, 392 U.S.  at 19-20, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 905, 88 S. Ct.  at 1879.
With respect to the first inquiry, as already noted, the vehicle stop
in this case was supported by probable cause and was thus
"justified at its inception." With respect to the second inquiry, on
which defendant's challenge was based, we must consider whether
the officer's request for identification from defendant was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the stop in the first place.
	There is a divergence of opinion among the federal and state
courts as to the parameters of the Terry "scope" requirement when
determining the propriety of police questioning during a traffic
stop. See generally T. Fusco, Annotation, Permissibility Under
Fourth Amendment of Detention of Motorist by Police, Following
Lawful Stop for Traffic Offense, to Investigate Matters Not Related
to Offense, 118 A.L.R. Fed. 567 (1994). A comparison of United
States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1993), and United States
v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2001), best illustrates this point.
	In Shabazz, police officers stopped a vehicle driven by
defendant, Mateen Shabazz, for speeding. Codefendant Keith
Parker was a passenger in the vehicle and represented himself as
the owner of the car. While running a computer check of
Shabazz's license, the officers separately questioned the
defendants about their recent whereabouts. Based on their
conflicting stories, and the officers' belief that Parker seemed
nervous, the officers requested consent from Parker to search the
vehicle. Parker agreed. At the time of Parker's consent, the
officers were awaiting the results of the computer check on
Shabazz's license. A search of the car revealed over 400 grams of
crack and powder cocaine. The defendants were arrested and
subsequently convicted on drug possession charges. Prior to trial,
the defendants moved to suppress the evidence found in the
vehicle as the fruits of a fourth amendment violation. The
defendants argued that the officers' questions exceeded the
reasonable scope of the stop's original purpose, i.e., the officers'
questions regarding their recent whereabouts were wholly
unrelated to the initial justification for the stop-speeding. Thus,
the defendants claimed the officers' conduct violated the second
prong of the Terry analysis. The federal district court denied the
suppression motion; the court of appeals affirmed. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431.
	Relying on the proposition that "mere police questioning does
not constitute a seizure" (Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434,
115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 398, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991)), the court
of appeals rejected any notion that a police officer's questioning,
even on a subject unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop, is
itself a fourth amendment violation. Shabazz, 993 F.2d  at 436. The
court determined that "detention, not questioning, is the evil at
which Terry's second prong is aimed." Shabazz, 993 F.2d  at 436.
Because the questioning of Shabazz and Parker took place while
the officers were legitimately waiting for the results of the
computer check of Shabazz's license, the questioning did nothing
to extend the duration of the initial, valid seizure. Accordingly, the
detention-to the point of Parker's consent-continued to be
supported by the facts that justified its initiation. Shabazz, 993 F.2d  at 437. The court of appeals concluded that while defendants
"were under no obligation to answer the questions, the
Constitution does not forbid law enforcement officers from
asking." Shabazz, 993 F.2d  at 437. See also United States v.
Childs, 277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2002) (where police stopped
vehicle for cracked windshield and observed seatbelt violation by
passenger, officer's question to passenger as to whether he was
carrying marijuana did not turn reasonable detention into
unreasonable detention where the question was asked while the
driver was being processed and passenger could have protected
himself by declining to answer); State v. Amaya, 176 Or. App. 35,
29 P.3d 1177 (2001) (where police stopped vehicle for burned-out
license plate light and illegal turn, questioning regarding contents
of passenger's bag did not violate the fourth amendment where it
did not have the effect of further detaining the passenger); State v.
Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 17 P.3d 301 (App. 2000) (where police
stopped vehicle for cracked windshield, brief and general
questioning of driver about the presence of drugs and open
containers of alcohol did not impermissibly extend the scope of
the stop).
	In contrast to the Shabazz opinion, which considered only the
permissible duration of the detention, the federal court of appeals
in Holt held that the reasonableness of a traffic stop "must be
judged by examining both the length of the detention and the
manner in which it is carried out." (Emphasis added.) Holt, 264 F.3d  at 1230. In that case, the defendant, Dennis Holt, was stopped
at a driver's license checkpoint. The officer observed a seatbelt
violation and instructed Holt to exit his vehicle and join the officer
in his patrol car. During the course of writing a warning for the
seatbelt violation, the officer asked Holt if there was anything in
Holt's vehicle, such as loaded weapons, of which the officer
should be aware. Holt stated that there was a loaded pistol behind
the passenger seat. Additional questioning revealed that Holt had
previously used drugs. The officer requested and obtained Holt's
consent to search the vehicle. At that point, the officer had not yet
issued the warning to Holt for the seatbelt violation and still had
Holt's driver's license in his possession. The search revealed a
loaded pistol, drug paraphernalia, and a white powder later
identified as methamphetamine. Prior to trial on drug and firearm
possession charges, Holt moved to suppress the evidence seized
from his vehicle. The federal district court granted the motion, and
a divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed the suppression
order. United States v. Holt, 229 F.3d 931 (10th Cir. 2000). On
rehearing en banc, the court of appeals reversed. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215.
	The court of appeals ultimately held that "the government's
interest in officer safety outweighs a motorist's interest in not
being asked about the presence of loaded weapons." Holt, 264 F.3d  at 1226. The court noted that nothing, however, compels a
motorist to answer. Holt, 264 F.3d  at 1224. Significantly, the court
of appeals rejected the government's position that "as long as the
officer's interrogation does not unreasonably extend the length of
the stop, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated." Holt, 264 F.3d 
at 1228. The court also expressly rejected the holding in Shabazz
and concluded that Terry contemplates a limitation both on the
length of a detention and the breadth or manner of the detention.
Holt, 264 F.3d  at 1229-30. See also United States v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 1999) (where police stopped vehicle for
speeding, additional irrelevant questions put to driver prior to
completion of traffic ticket constituted a violation of Terry).
	Our appellate court also has not been uniform in its approach
when determining the permissible scope of police questioning
during a traffic stop. In some cases, the court has applied the Terry
framework in a manner similar to the approach adopted in Holt.
See White, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 35 ("police are not entitled to go on
fishing expeditions to satisfy their curiosity or their hunches while
waiting for the results of the computer check" of the driver's
license); People v. Branch, 295 Ill. App. 3d 110, 114 (1998)
(police officer's request for identification from backseat passenger
of lawfully stopped vehicle was unreasonable absent any suspicion
of criminal activity). In other cases, the appellate court has been
more aligned with the approach adopted in Shabazz, concluding
that the fourth amendment is not implicated where an officer
approaches a person and asks questions, including requests for
identification, provided compliance is not required. See People v.
Smith, 266 Ill. App. 3d 362, 366-67 (1994) (officer's request for
identification from passenger in lawfully stopped vehicle was not
a coercive demand and thus did not constitute even a minimal
seizure); People v. Harris, 325 Ill. App. 3d 262, 265-66 (2001)
(following Smith and holding that passenger's compliance with
officer's request for identification was not voluntary), appeal
allowed, 198 Ill. 2d 600 (2002).
	We conclude that neither approach strikes the proper balance
between the government's interest in effective law enforcement
and the individual's interest in being free from arbitrary
governmental intrusions, which lies at the core of the concept of
"reasonableness." See Prouse, 440 U.S.  at 654, 59 L. Ed. 2d  at
667-68, 99 S. Ct.  at 1396.
	First and foremost, we disagree with Shabazz and similar
cases which have concluded that length is the only constraint
under Terry's scope inquiry, and that an officer may therefore ask
any questions during the course of a routine traffic stop so long as
such questions do not prolong the detention. Allowing police to
pose any question to the occupants of a stopped vehicle, even if
such question is totally divorced from the purpose of the stop,
effectively does away with any balancing of the competing
interests involved. Such an approach is also inconsistent with our
reading of Supreme Court precedent, indicating that there is a
limitation on the manner in which a detention is carried out, in
addition to a temporal limitation. In this regard the Court has
stated:
		"The scope of the intrusion permitted will vary to some
extent with the particular facts and circumstances of each
case. This much, however, is clear: an investigative
detention must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly,
the investigative methods employed should be the least
intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel
the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325-26 (1983) (plurality op.).
See also Hensley, 469 U.S.  at 235, 83 L. Ed. 2d  at 616, 105 S. Ct. 
at 683 (where the Court held that the "length and intrusiveness" of
a particular vehicle stop and detention were justified).
	Second, we do not believe that unfettered police questioning
of drivers and passengers can be justified by relying on the
principle that " 'mere police questioning does not constitute a
seizure.' " Shabazz, 993 F.2d  at 436, quoting Bostick, 501 U.S.  at
434, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 398, 111 S. Ct.  at 2386. Where there is an
articulable suspicion or probable cause to support a vehicle stop,
our concern is not whether police questioning constitutes a
seizure-all of the occupants of the vehicle are already seized at the
moment of the stop. See Whren, 517 U.S.  at 809-10, 135 L. Ed. 2d 
at 95, 116 S. Ct.  at 1772. Rather, our concern is whether the
detention, lawful at its inception, became an unreasonable seizure
based upon subsequent police conduct.
	Additionally, we cannot agree with the approach, employed
in Holt and similar cases, which suggests that any inquiry police
may put to a driver or passenger in a stopped vehicle must be
directly tied to the purpose of the stop in order to satisfy Terry's
scope requirement. In our view, such a restrictive approach would
prevent police from posing even the most benign questions to
occupants of the vehicle, thus effectively giving no weight to the
government's side of the balance and stripping any notion of
common sense out of the "reasonableness" equation. Although our
legal system is steeped with rules, standards, and formulas, logic
and common sense should be no less a part of it.
	As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, a rule governing
the application of Terry's scope requirement to vehicle stops
cannot be so permissive as to give police complete discretion in
questioning the occupants of a stopped vehicle, nor can it be so
limiting that any meaningful law enforcement activities are
quashed. We believe the better approach, the one that strikes the
proper balance, is that expressed by Judge Murphy in his partial
concurrence and partial dissent in Holt:
		"Terry's scope requirement is a common sense limitation
on the power of law enforcement officers. It prevents law
enforcement officials from fundamentally altering the
nature of the stop by converting it into a general
inquisition about past, present and future wrongdoing,
absent an independent basis for reasonable articulable
suspicion or probable cause. The scope doctrine does not,
however, prevent officers from engaging in facially
innocuous dialog which a detained motorist would not
reasonably perceive as altering the fundamental nature of
the stop." Holt, 264 F.3d  at 1240 (Murphy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
	Thus, in determining whether police questioning during the
course of a traffic stop satisfies Terry's scope requirement, we
must consider, as an initial matter, whether the question is related
to the initial justification for the stop. If the question is reasonably
related to the purpose of the stop, no fourth amendment violation
occurs. If the question is not reasonably related to the purpose of
the stop, we must consider whether the law enforcement officer
had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that would justify the
question. If the question is so justified, no fourth amendment
violation occurs. In the absence of a reasonable connection to the
purpose of the stop or a reasonable, articulable suspicion, we must
consider whether, in light of all the circumstances and common
sense, the question impermissibly prolonged the detention or
changed the fundamental nature of the stop.
	Application of these principles to the present case leads us to
conclude that Officer McCarthy's mere request for identification
from defendant did not render defendant's otherwise lawful
detention unreasonable. As noted previously, the stop of the
vehicle in which defendant was riding was based on the officers'
observation that the front license plate was missing-a violation of
our vehicle code. Defendant, however, was simply the front-seat
passenger-a passive occupant-who was not implicated in the code
violation, and who was not suspected of any other wrongdoing.
Thus, the request for identification was not directly related to the
initial justification for the stop and was not otherwise supported by
a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
Nonetheless, the officer's question did not run afoul of the fourth
amendment. The request for identification was made during the
course of the stop while the driver was being questioned by the
other officer and did not impermissibly prolong defendant's
detention. Further, we cannot say that the question changed the
fundamental nature of the stop. A simple request for identification
is facially innocuous. It does not suggest official interrogation and
is not the type of question or request that would increase the
confrontational nature of the encounter. We note, too, that
defendant was under no obligation to answer or comply. In this
regard, we reject the appellate court's conclusion that the trial
court implicitly and properly determined that defendant did not
feel free to decline Officer McCarthy's request. 324 Ill. App. 3d at
22-23. There is nothing in the trial court's oral or written ruling to
that effect.

CONCLUSION
	In sum, we hold that the officer's request for identification
from defendant, who was lawfully detained, did not render his
detention unreasonable under the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. IV) or article I, section 6,
of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6). The
judgments of the appellate and circuit courts to the contrary are
reversed and this cause is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings. We express no opinion as to the lawfulness of
Officer McCarthy's conduct after the request for identification.
Defendant is free to raise any additional issues on remand.
Reversed and remanded.



	JUSTICE THOMAS, specially concurring:


	I agree with the majority's conclusion that the police did not
violate defendant's fourth amendment rights when they asked to
see his identification. I write separately, however, because I
disagree with the majority's decision to apply the same standard
to both the driver and the passenger of a lawfully stopped vehicle.
The majority improperly applies the Terry rules to a person not
suspected of any wrongdoing, and I cannot join in this analysis.
	The majority is correct that all of the occupants of a car are in
one sense seized when the police stop the driver for a traffic
violation. A person is seized "when, by means of physical force or
a show of authority," that person's freedom of movement is
restrained. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980). Where the majority
errs is in asserting that the driver and occupants are in the same
position after the car has been pulled over. The majority implies
that because the driver and passenger were both "seized" at the
moment that the car was pulled over, they were both thereafter
subjected to a full-blown fourth amendment seizure for the entire
duration of the stop. No authority is cited for this proposition. The
driver had been pulled over because the police observed a traffic
violation. The stopping of the passenger was merely incidental to
that of the driver. A traffic violation does not afford probable
cause to stop a passenger, as it does for the driver. Maryland v.
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41, 47, 117 S. Ct. 882,
886 (1997).
	The driver was required to submit to the officers' lawful
authority while they conducted the traffic stop and related
investigation. People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501, 520 (1999).
This court has not held that passengers may be required to remain
for the entire time that the police conduct their investigation of the
driver. In People v. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402, 416-18 (1998), this
court held that, with respect to passengers of a lawfully stopped
vehicle, the police may order the passengers out of the car (Wilson,
519 U.S. 408, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41, 117 S. Ct. 882) and may also
order a passenger who attempts to exit the car to remain briefly at
the vehicle. These procedures are allowed because the public
interest in officer safety outweighs the potential intrusion to the
passenger's liberty interests. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d  at 418. This
court specifically declined to hold, however, that the police could
detain a passenger for the entire duration of the stop. Gonzalez,
184 Ill. 2d  at 418. The United States Supreme Court has likewise
left this question open. Wilson, 519 U.S.  at 415 n.3, 137 L. Ed. 2d 
at 48 n.3, 117 S. Ct.  at 886 n.3. Obviously, if the driver and
passenger were both seized for the entire duration of the stop, as
the majority asserts, this would not be an open question. Further,
in reaching its holding in Wilson, the United States Supreme Court
specifically stated that the passenger's situation is different from
that of the driver: "While there is not the same basis for ordering
the passengers out of the car as there is for ordering the driver
out, the additional intrusion on the passenger is minimal."
(Emphasis added.) Wilson, 519 U.S.  at 414-15, 137 L. Ed. 2d  at
48, 117 S. Ct.  at 886.
	The usual test for determining whether a fourth amendment
seizure has occurred is whether "if, in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
at 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d  at 509, 100 S. Ct.  at 1877. This obviously
applies to the driver, who was not free to leave until the police had
finished processing the traffic stop. As noted above, however,
defendant was not suspected of any wrongdoing. His freedom to
leave was restricted not because the police were investigating him
for violating the vehicle code but because he was a passenger in a
car that had not yet reached its destination. The Supreme Court has
held that there is a different test for situations in which the
person's freedom of movement is restricted by a factor
independent of police conduct. In these situations, the appropriate
test is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the
officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 400, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2387 (1991).
	In Bostick, the defendant was a passenger on a bus. Two
uniformed officers boarded the bus and requested to see the
defendant's ticket and identification. After these items were
returned to defendant, the officers asked to search his luggage. The
defendant complied, and drugs were found. The United States
Supreme Court held that whether defendant was "free to leave"
was not the appropriate test:
		"When police attempt to question a person who is
walking down the street or through an airport lobby, it
makes sense to inquire whether a reasonable person
would feel free to continue walking. But when the person
is seated on a bus and has no desire to leave, the degree to
which a reasonable person would feel that he or she could
leave is not an accurate measure of the coercive effect of
the encounter." Bostick, 501 U.S.  at 435-36, 115 L. Ed. 2d 
at 399, 111 S. Ct.  at 2387.
See also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. __, __,153 L. Ed. 2d 242, 252, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2111 (2002).
	The Seventh Circuit recently summarized this line of cases as
follows:
			"Under the fourth amendment, every search or seizure
must be 'reasonable,' which normally entails some
person-specific basis for suspicion. See Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 121 S. Ct. 447, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333
(2000). But the Supreme Court has held repeatedly that
police may approach persons and ask questions or seek
their permission to search, provided that the officers do
not imply that answers or consent are obligatory. See, e.g.,
Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-6, 105 S. Ct. 308, 83 L. Ed. 2d 165 (1984); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1984); Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 501, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229
(1983) (plurality opinion); United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 552-58, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497
(1980). These requests are proper without regard to the
absence of reasonable suspicion, the Court made clear in
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S. Ct. 2382,
115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991), because 'mere police
questioning does not constitute a seizure.' As a result,
'law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth
Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the
street or in another public place, by asking him if he is
willing to answer some questions, [or] by putting
questions to him if the person is willing to listen.' Ibid.,
quoting from Royer, 460 U.S.  at 497, 103 S. Ct. 1319. See
also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991) (defining 'seizure' as
'taking possession,' a category that does not comprise
questioning); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10,
109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989) ('A "seizure"
triggering the Fourth Amendment's protections occurs
only when government actors have, "by means of physical
force or show of authority, ... in some way restrained the
liberty of a citizen" ') (quoting from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)).
			Most of these decisions concern questions asked of
persons not under arrest (though often as a practical
matter not free to walk away, see Bostick and Delgado)."
United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 950 (7th Cir.
2002).
	I would hold that the rule stated in the above cases applies to
a passenger in a car that has been stopped because of a traffic
violation. Thus, the proper test is whether a reasonable person
would have felt free to decline the officer's request or otherwise
terminate the encounter. Here, the majority properly notes that the
officer's request for defendant's identification was facially
innocuous and was done in a nonthreatening manner. The officer
did not demand to see the identification or convey the impression
that defendant was required to comply. The encounter remained
consensual and therefore defendant's fourth amendment rights
were not violated.
	Curiously, this seems to be the same test that the majority
follows, although it initially purports to be doing something else.
First, as noted above, the majority gets off on the wrong foot by
assuming that the initial "seizure" by the police thereafter
subjected both the driver and the passenger to a fourth amendment
seizure for the entire duration of the traffic stop. Then, instead of
applying the Bostick test, the majority holds that the proper test for
questioning a passenger is found in the partial concurrence and
partial dissent to a Tenth Circuit opinion that involved questioning
of a driver. See United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1239-40
(10th Cir. 2001) (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). This test looks first to whether the question was related to
the initial purpose for the stop or whether there was a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. If the questioning is not related to
the initial purpose of the stop and there is no suspicion of criminal
activity, the next inquiry is whether the question prolonged the
duration of the stop or changed the fundamental nature of the stop.
	Once it comes time to apply this test, however, the majority
seems to rely on the consensual nature of the encounter. The
majority notes that the questioning was nonthreatening and that
defendant would have felt free to decline the request. Thus, it
appears that the majority is actually applying Bostick rather than
the Holt partial concurrence and partial dissent. The lower courts
and the police will find the majority's rule difficult to follow
because the majority does not explain what type of questioning
would change the fundamental nature of the stop. All we know
from the majority opinion is that interrogating a passenger about
his identity does not change the fundamental nature of an
investigation of a driver for a license plate violation. More
explanation is required here. Because in this case the passenger's
identity was in no way relevant to defendant's violation of the
vehicle code, in future cases it will be difficult for the lower courts
to determine what does and does not change the fundamental
nature of a stop. The majority has created this problem by
improperly holding that questioning of the passenger must be
viewed as part of the investigation of the driver.
	In sum, I agree that the police did not violate defendant's
fourth amendment rights by asking him for his identification. I
would reach that result, however, by applying the test set forth in
Bostick. The majority improperly holds that the questioning of the
passenger was restricted by the rules governing the stop of the
driver, and thus I cannot join its opinion.
	JUSTICE GARMAN joins in this special concurrence.
	 
	 
1.      1This aspect of the Terry standard has been codified in our Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963. 725 ILCS 5/107-14 (West 2000); People
v. Wardlow, 183 Ill. 2d 306, 310 (1998). 

2.      2The fact that most traffic stops proceed like "Terry stops," and are
thus analyzed under Terry principles, does not mean that where a stop
is based on probable cause, an arrest of the driver or passenger is
necessarily prohibited under the fourth amendment. See Atwater v. City
of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549, 121 S. Ct. 1536 (2001)
(holding that if an officer has probable cause to believe that an
individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his
presence-such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by
a fine-the officer may, without violating the fourth amendment, arrest
the offender).