Case Title: Stewart v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1982-11-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Stewart v. State1986 WY 165724 P.2d 439Case Number: 86-40Decided: 08/26/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Tim 
STEWART, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE ofWyoming, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofParkCounty, John T. Dixon, 
J.

Wyoming Public Defender Program: 
Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender; and Julie D. Naylor, Appellate 
Counsel, Cheyenne, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., John Renneisen, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Mike French, Student Intern, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant, Tim Stewart, 
age 26, was convicted of taking indecent liberties with a fifth-grade child, age 
12, in violation of § 14-3-105, W.S. 1977 (December 1978 Replacement). He was 
sentenced to imprisonment and appeals his conviction. Appellant urges a single 
issue on appeal:

"Whether or not the 
Information filed against Appellant was so vague and indefinite as to deny 
Appellant the opportunity to prepare his defense."

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant and JF (the 
victim) lived next door to each other in a trailer court. Some time after March 
1, 1985, appellant asked JF to come inside his trailer and have sex with him. JF 
testified that she and appellant could have had sex between ten and twenty 
times.

Appellant 
entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of taking indecent liberties with a 
minor in violation of § 14-3-105, W.S. 1977, which states:

"Any person knowingly 
taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child or knowingly 
causing or encouraging any child to cause or to encourage another child to 
commit with him any immoral or indecent act is guilty of a felony * * 
*."

[¶4.]     Appellant asserted that 
JF's allegations were untrue and offered an alibi to prove his innocence. 
However, he admitted that JF came into his trailer once, but could not remember 
the date.

[¶5.]     Appellant filed a 
motion for a bill of particulars asking the state to set out the specific dates 
of the alleged offenses. The trial court granted this motion. After receiving 
the bill of particulars appellant made a motion to dismiss, contending the bill 
of particulars was too general, vague and indefinite to allow him to adequately 
prepare his defense, and that Rule 9, Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, had 
not been complied with. The trial court denied the motion, and appellant was 
tried before a jury and found guilty.

[¶6.]     Appellant claims on 
appeal that the trial court erred in ruling that the information supplemented by 
the bill of particulars was sufficient, and that this ruling violated his sixth 
amendment right to prepare a defense. He quotes the Sixth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution which states in part:

"In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him. * * *"

Appellant also 
quotes the Wyoming Constitution, Art. 1, § 10:

"In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right * * * to demand the nature and 
cause of the accusation. * *"

[¶7.]     This court defined the 
purpose of an information in Crouse v. State, Wyo., 384 P.2d 321, 325 
(1963):

"[A]s stated in 42 C.J.S. 
Indictments and Informations § 90a, pp. 959-960, `[T]he purpose of an 
information [is to] * * * protect the accused from being twice put in jeopardy 
for the same offense, enable accused to prepare for trial, and enable the court, 
on conviction, to pronounce sentence according to the right of the case.' * * 
*"

[¶8.]     The question of 
sufficiency of an indictment was resolved in Hovee v. State, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1127 
(1979). The requirements are that an indictment is sufficient if it contains, 1) 
the elements of the offense charged, 2) if it fairly informs a defendant of the 
charge against which he must defend, and 3) if it enables the defendant to plead 
an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense. 
These standards were also applied in Ostrowski v. State, Wyo., 665 P.2d 471 (1983); State v. Faltynowicz, Wyo., 660 P.2d 368 (1983); and Nimmo v. State, Wyo., 603 P.2d 386 (1979). In Faltynowicz we 
said:

"* * * The same 
standards, [of Hovee, supra] of course, would apply in judging the sufficiency 
of an information." Id., at 371.

[¶9.]     The first requirement 
according to Hovee is that the information contain the elements of the offense. 
In the present case, the information, supplemented by a bill of particulars, 
stated appellant was accused of taking indecent liberties with a child in 
violation of § 14-3-105. The documents stated that appellant knowingly had sex 
with the victim, and that he knew she was a child. Also, since the statute only 
requires there be a knowing act with a minor to constitute a violation, the 
elements of the offense were sufficiently set out. Appellant claims, however, 
that the second and third requirements of Hovee were not met, that is, the 
information was insufficient to fairly inform him of the charge against which he 
must defend and enable him to plead acquittal or conviction in bar of future 
prosecutions for the same offense.

[¶10.]  The bill of particulars alleged sexual 
acts on five or more occasions between March 1, 1985, and April 9, 1985, and 
that one of the alleged acts occurred in appellant's bathtub. More specifically, 
it stated that "on or about April 9, 1985, the defendant had sexual relations 
with JF." Appellant argues that because his defense was alibi he was entitled to 
be advised of the exact date the alleged offense occurred. At trial there was 
only fleeting testimony regarding sexual acts at a time other than "on or about 
April 9th." The state's evidence focused on a sexual encounter during the Easter 
vacation. Easter was April 7, and the victim associated the time of the sexual 
act with being out of school during the Easter recess. She further testified 
that an act took place in the bathtub in appellant's 
trailer.

[¶11.]  We have said that where the specific date 
is not a requirement of the crime, alleging a general time period in lieu of a 
specific date is sufficient to give a defendant notice and allow him to 
adequately prepare a defense.

"* * * [W]here 
the charge follows the statutory language and such language contains all that is 
essential to constitute the crime, the indictment is sufficient. * * *" Boyd v. 
State, Wyo., 
528 P.2d 287, 289 (1974), cert. denied 423 U.S. 871, 96 S. Ct. 137, 46 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1975).

A specific date 
is not essential to the commission of indecent liberties under § 14-3-105; 
therefore, the information supplemented by the bill of particulars was 
sufficient, and complied with the requirements of Hovee v. State, 
supra.

Also, Rule 9(a), 
W.R.Cr.P. states:

`* * * The indictment or 
information shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the 
essential facts constituting the offense charged * * *. * * Error in the 
citation or its omission or any other defect or imperfection which does not tend 
to prejudice any substantial right of the defendant upon the merits or to 
mislead the defendant to his prejudice shall not be grounds for dismissal of the 
indictment or information or for reversal of a conviction. * * 
*"

[¶12.]  Appellant had no problem presenting his 
alibi defense, and presented testimony from three witnesses and himself covering 
the Easter vacation period. He has never claimed that he was in any way 
inhibited from presenting evidence for this time period. Apparently, he was 
ready to present this evidence at the conclusion of the state's case in chief, 
and did not ask for a continuance to try to find additional alibi 
evidence.

"* * * We have stated 
repeatedly that in the interests of justice and recognizing that young children 
cannot be expected to be exact regarding times and dates, a child's uncertainty 
as to time or date upon which the offense charged was committed goes to the 
weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence. State v. Effler, 309 N.C. 
742, 309 S.E.2d 203 (1983); State v. King, 256 N.C. 236, 123 S.E.2d 486 (1962). 
See: State v. Sills, 311 N.C. 370, 317 S.E.2d 379 (1984). Nonsuit may not be 
allowed on the ground that the State's evidence fails to fix any definite time 
for the offense where there is sufficient evidence that defendant committed each 
essential act of the offense. * * *" State v. Wood, 311 N.C. 739, 319 S.E.2d 247 
(1984).

[¶13.]  The Nevada Supreme Court, quoting the 
Idaho Supreme Court said:

"`It would be a very weak 
rule of law that would permit a man to ravish a fifteen year old girl and then 
say in effect: "You cannot convict me of this crime, as you did not guess the 
right date." SeeState v. Rogers, 48 
Idaho 567, 283 P. 44, 45 (1929).'" Cunningham v. State, 100 Nev. 396, 683 P.2d 500, cert. denied sub nom. Cunningham 
v. Nevada, 469 U.S. 935, 105 S. Ct. 336, 83 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1984).

[¶14.]  The lack of a specific date neither 
prejudices a defendant nor hinders his ability to present a defense of alibi. In 
State v. Koch, 64 Wyo. 175, 189 P.2d 162 (1948), where the 
defendant asserted an alibi defense for the crime of having carnal knowledge of 
a child, age 10, we said: 

"* * * Ordinarily a 
charge that the crime was committed at or about the time alleged in the 
information or within a given period before the filing of the indictment or 
information is sufficient. * * *" See also State v. Slane, 48 Wyo. 1, 41 P.2d 269 
(1935).

[¶15.]  Our decision in State v. Koch, supra, was 
reaffirmed in a later case where the defendant was accused of having carnal 
knowledge of a minor and asserted a defense of alibi. There, we 
said:

"* * * [A]lthough she 
specified no date, our holding in State v. Koch, 64 Wyo. 175, 189 P.2d 162, 166, 
makes it clear that the time of the occurrence as testified by the witness is 
not subject to challenge." Rhodes v. State, Wyo., 462 P.2d 722, 724 
(1969).

[¶16.]  In Esquibel v. State, Wyo., 399 P.2d 395 
(1965), the prosecution produced evidence that an act of sexual intercourse took 
place on the evening of February 14, 1963. The victim testified that she did not 
go out with defendant on the night of February 15, 1963, and in fact, had no 
sexual relations with the defendant between the act of February 14, and a 
subsequent act performed on February 17. Defendant by way of alibi testified 
that on the evening of February 14, he was at home attending a birthday party. 
His alibi testimony was corroborated by seven other witnesses. After the defense 
rested, the prosecutrix was recalled and testified that she had sexual 
intercourse with defendant on the night of February 15, as well as February 
14.

[¶17.]  This court ruled in Esquibel that the 
prosecution had effectively elected to prosecute the defendant for an act 
committed February 14, 1963, and that it was error for the trial court to 
instruct the jury that the state elected to prosecute the defendant for an act 
committed "on or about" February 15, 1963.

[¶18.]  Esquibel is distinguishable from the case 
before us. In the present case an election as to the exact date of the offense 
was never made. The bill of particulars stated the act of sexual intercourse 
took place on or about April 9, 1985, and the evidence showed that it took place 
during the Easter vacation. Easter was April 7; defendant's alibi evidence 
covered the Easter vacation.

[¶19.]  We think it clear, that where the 
statutory definition of the offense does not require a specific date, such a 
date need not be given in the information. Likewise, alleging a general time 
period is sufficient to give notice to a defendant and allow him to prepare an 
alibi defense.

"The election should be 
such as to fix definitely the transaction relied on, but its sufficiency to some 
extent at least is discretionary with the trial court. It is enough that it be 
as definite as is possible from the evidence where, from the information, the 
evidence, and the election, accused is informed as to the transaction, or the 
jury could not be misled as to the particular charge submitted to them * * *." 
23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1044, p. 1189 (1961). See also, State v. Koch, 
supra.

[¶20.]  Here, appellant was given sufficient 
notice to prepare a defense, and the information fairly informed him of the 
charges filed against him, meeting the second requirement of Hovee v. State, 
supra.

[¶21.]  As for the third requirement of Hovee, 
appellant would have us find that the absence of specific dates in both the 
information and subsequent bill of particulars could subject him to a future 
prosecution for the same offense. Appellant's concern is more imaginary than 
real.

[¶22.]  In dealing with the sufficiency of an 
information in bar of future prosecutions, the United States Court of Appeals 
has said:

"[An information is 
sufficient if] the nature of the offense, the place where it is alleged offenses 
were committed, the period of time covered thereby, as well as the specific 
statutes which it was claimed appellant violated, are specifically set out. * * 
*" Butler v. United States, 
197 F.2d 561, 562 (10th Cir. 1952).

And,

"* * * [w]here the time 
is not an essential element of the offense, it is sufficient to charge facts 
which show that the offense was committed. * * *" Id., at 
562.

[¶23.]  The victim is usually the only witness in 
crimes of indecent liberties; therefore, credibility is vital to a conviction. 
JF's testimony about the occurrences was corroborated by two inmates, Mr. 
Anderson and Mr. Alberdeen, who were confined in the same jail as appellant at 
the time of appellant's trial. Mr. Anderson stated that during his conversation 
with appellant, appellant told him he did not rape her, but he did have sex with 
her. Appellant told Anderson "once in his bed and once in the 
bathroom." Mr. Alberdeen stated that while he was listening to the conversation 
between Mr. Anderson and appellant, appellant had said "Yeah, why not," in 
answer to Mr. Anderson's question did appellant sleep with 
JF.

[¶24.]  A jury is charged with determining the 
credibility of the witnesses and it is its duty to weigh the evidence and render 
a verdict. Jahnke v. State, Wyo., 692 P.2d 911 (1984). The jury obviously 
found appellant's story not credible.

[¶25.]  In this case appellant knew almost two 
full months before the date of his trial that he was being charged with taking 
indecent liberties in violation of § 14-3-105; that he was being accused by the 
victim, JF; that the alleged events occurred on or about April 9, 1985; and that 
all events were to have taken place in his trailer with at least one occurring 
in his bathtub. We think this was sufficient to give the appellant notice of the 
charges filed against him, allow him to prepare a defense of alibi, and protect 
him from the possibility of future prosecutions for the same offense. The 
crucial factor in appellant's defense was the credibility of each witness's 
testimony, not the specific date of the alleged events; and two witnesses 
corroborated JF's testimony. We find no reversible error in this 
case.

[¶26.]  Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶27.]  I do not accept the premise that 
reasonable notice to the defendant of a claimed criminal offense is not an 
absolute predicate of the constitutional right to defend, and consequently 
dissent.

[¶28.]  Prosecutorial willingness to expand the 
rules of prosecution and diminish the constitutional rights of the charged 
defendant are coterminous with inattention of the judiciary, and this case 
constitutes an undesired example.

[¶29.]  My concern is that the avalanche of these 
sexual-abuse cases can serve to subtly and singularly erode the entire body of 
constitutional rights, which erosion cannot rationally be restricted to the 
specific genie now released.

[¶30.]  Factually in this case the following 
occurred.

1. A specific charge was 
filed against Stewart involving a claimed date of occurrence of March 10, and 
was later dismissed for invalidity when a verified alibi was afforded at the 
preliminary hearing.

2. Not to be swayed, the 
prosecutor then filed a multiple-incident charge, without date specificity, 
encompassing incidents which allegedly occurred "sometime between March 1 and 
April 9, 1985."

3. A motion for a bill of 
particulars was filed by the defendant to which the response given was "between 
March 1 and April 9" and "on or about April 9."

4. At the preliminary 
hearing, the complainant testified as to events contended to have occurred on 
April 9.

5. At trial no proof was 
afforded about events on April 9, and to the contrary a reasonable alibi defense 
was afforded, but conviction was accomplished based on other alleged episodes of 
sexual intercourse which occurred at some other indefinite time between March 1 
and April 9.

6. Although the defendant 
moved to dismiss for inadequacy of the bill of particulars, the motion was 
denied.

[¶31.]  The charge in this case, a sex offense in 
a societal atmosphere where most people are inclined to believe the worst is 
most seriously impacted by lack of specificity to afford the defendant an 
opportunity to present exculpatory evidence. Given the generalized allegations 
as to dates of occurrences, conviction in this case became a foregone 
conclusion. While the complainant must be allowed reasonable parameters within 
which to recall the dates of the events, the court in this case condones neglect 
of the prosecutor's obligation to define his case within constitutional 
constraints.

[¶32.]  The issue, of course, is notice to allow 
the defendant to adequately prepare his defense. The court's decision to allow 
such leverage in defining dates of occurrences in a criminal charge favors the 
prosecution. Requiring trial upon the unclarified bill of particulars defies 
justice in violation not only of Art. 1, §§ 6 and 10 of the Wyoming 
Constitution, but also the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.

[¶33.]  In reviewing the authorities used to 
justify this new posture of this court, I note that Crouse v. State, Wyo., 384 P.2d 321 (1963) did not involve a bill of particulars as is currently provided 
in Wyoming law by Rule 9(d), W.R.Cr.P.:

"(d) Bill of particulars. - The court for 
cause may direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A motion for bill of 
particulars may be made only within ten (10) days after arraignment or at such 
other time before or after arraignment as may be prescribed by rule or order. 
The bill of particulars may be amended at any time subject to such conditions as 
justice requires."

[¶34.]  Likewise, no date of the specific event 
was implicated in that case of hiding stolen property, which is dissimilar in 
circumstantial and practical proof from the charge in this case of what we used 
to call statutory rape and which is now called indecent liberties with a minor. 
The Hovee embezzlement case, Hovee v. State, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1127 (1979) is likewise clearly 
different as encompassing a bill of particulars sufficient to "fully [apprise] 
the appellant of the charges against him with a reasonable degree of certainty," 
including one television set and specific checks. 596 P.2d  at 1132. The rule 
advanced in Hovee is not in issue. Rather the issue in this case is the "when" 
question, and how broadly these specific dates may be presented so that, in 
violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, the defendant does not know what he 
must defend.

[¶35.]  It is recalled again that the charges in 
this case started with a day and went to a month, and I would ask whether a year 
or a decade would also neither prejudice a defendant nor hinder the availability 
of a defense of alibi. Grady v. State, 24 Md. App. 85, 329 A.2d 726 (1974). No human 
being can prove where he was for one month unless in jail or on an extended 
vacation abroad.

[¶36.]  State v. Koch, 64 Wyo. 175, 189 P.2d 162 
(1948) also lacks credence as authority. In that case, the discrepancy was 
within one day, and not somewhere within a month and a week as is the case here. 
"On or about June 28" was only stretched out to include the alleged date of June 
27. The difference is vividly illustrated by a quote from the instruction given 
in Koch:

"`* * * The State has 
elected to prosecute this defendant for an act committed on or about the 28th 
day of June, 1944, in the Hockett Apartment in the town of Pinedale, Wyoming. 
The defendant has introduced evidence that neither he nor the prosecutrix was in 
the Hockett Apartment on or about the 28th day of June, 1944. If after 
considering all of the evidence you have a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the rape on or about the 28th day of June, 1944, then, even if you 
believe that the defendant committed the act at some other time or place, you 
must acquit the defendant, and return a verdict of not guilty.'" 189 P.2d  at 
166.

[¶37.]  Ostrowski v. State, Wyo., 665 P.2d 471 (1983) 
involved the amendment of an information to correct a statutory citation. State 
v. Faltynowicz, Wyo., 660 P.2d 368 (1983) was a bill of 
exceptions relating to the omission of the year as a typographical error. Nimmo 
v. State, Wyo., 603 P.2d 386 (1979) involved the 
question of alleging criminal intent in addition to "unlawfully and feloniously" 
in the indictment.

[¶38.]  Consequently, I would not find relevant 
similarities in any of these authorities to support the unspecified-date 
insufficiencies of the present charge. Rhodes v. State, Wyo., 462 P.2d 722 (1969) 
also is not supporting authority for this decision. In that case, specific dates 
charged were included in the information, and the court said, in evaluating an 
objectionable leading and suggestive question:

"* * * We can agree that 
it was indeed unfortunate for such a question to be asked, but we do not view 
the matter under the circumstances here present as constituting the serious 
error ascribed to it by counsel, who overlooks the significance of our implied 
limitation in Esquibel v. State, Wyo., 399 P.2d 395, 399 [(1965)], that, where a 
defense of alibi is interposed, the time of the act of sexual intercourse upon 
which the State relies for conviction becomes material." 462 P.2d  at 
724.

[¶39.]  The only straight-up authority invoking a 
sexual-offense complaint is Esquibel v. State, Wyo., 399 P.2d 395 (1965), which 
is directly contrary to the decision of this court here and personifies the 
statutory, common-law and constitutional issues of notice involved in the right 
to defend. In Esquibel this court said:

"* * * It was incumbent 
upon the court at the time of the motion to require the State clearly and 
specifically to identify the act relied upon the conviction. * * 
*

* * * * * 
*

"* * * Unfortunately the 
early view taken by the State and accepted by the trial court that the time of 
the offense was wholly immaterial continued to prevail. The injustice of that 
view is readily apparent. * * *

"To hold otherwise would 
be to deprive the defendant of his defense of alibi. There is abundant authority 
holding that where a defense of alibi is interposed the time of the act of 
sexual intercourse upon which the State relies for conviction does become 
material. State v. Coss, 53 Or. 462, 101 P. 193, 195; State v. Severns, 13 Wn.2d 542, 125 P.2d 659, 667; People v. Waits, 18 Cal. App. 2d 20, 62 P.2d 1054; State 
v. Chittim, Mo., 261 S.W.2d 79, 80; State v. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 67 P.2d 647, 
649, 650, 651; Cambron v. State, 86 Okla. Cr. 437, 193 P.2d 888, 893-894. * * * 
The State, of course, argues to the contrary and predicates its argument on 
statements made in State v. Koch [supra] and State v. Slane [48 Wyo. 1, 41 P.2d 269 (1939)]. However, those cases are not apropos here because the issue of 
alibi was not present in either of them." 399 P.2d  at 
398-399.

[¶40.]  This court said in Borrego v. State, 
Wyo., 423 P.2d 393, 395 (1967):

"* * * We indicated in 
the Wilson case [State v. Wilson, 76 Wyo. 297, 301 P.2d 1056 (1956)] that 
although ordinarily the appellate court will not review or revise a trial 
court's refusal to grant a bill of particulars, such rule is tempered 
considerably under constitutional provisions which grant accused the right to be 
fully informed of the nature of his accusation."

[¶41.]  The only thing that is factually certain 
from reviewing the record in this case is that the complainant does not say 
anything occurred on April 9, 1985, and to the contrary:

"Q. Did you have any 
relations with him on April the 9th?

"A. Not that I 
remember.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. It wasn't April 9th 
like you testified previously?

"A. I don't 
know.

"Q. Was it at 4:00 
o'clock?

"A. I don't 
remember."

[¶42.]  Actually, the witness had previously said 
that it specifically occurred on April 10 in the original discussion with the 
police officer, and then at the preliminary hearing that it occurred on April 9, 
and at trial was uncertain since defendant had excellent alibi evidence 
demonstrating the invalidity of the April 9 charge. With the exclusion of the 
one stated date, the prosecutor then moved within the parameters of possible 
occurrence to encompass a span of 39 days.1

[¶43.]  A charge of indecent liberties is 
obviously a date-event circumstance as determined and discussed in Esquibel, and 
also considered in the other cited cases which review the use of an alibi 
defense. See also State v. Graves, Mo., 588 S.W.2d 495 (1979). Not to be 
repetitive, but it is contention without logical substance to say that there is 
no problem of proving an alibi defense for the 960 hours related in the bill of 
particulars. Counsel for either the defense or the prosecution would be 
similarly challenged to prove, based on a neighbor's allegations, where they 
were for 960 hours, if charged with separate limited time events in the criminal 
complaint. Sadly I contemplate that through misrecognition, and in seeking to 
affirm this particular conviction, we eliminate the criterion of reasonable 
notice. The destruction of constitutional rights inculcated in the text of the 
decision is far broader than a first casual review might 
reveal.

[¶44.]  Not only is the case bad within the 
context presented, but the rule, broader than the case itself, is disingenuous 
to guarantees which are less than casually provided by the Constitution of the 
State of Wyoming and the Constitution of the United States. Even if called to 
ignore constitutional prerequisites in this case, compliance with Rule 9(a), 
W.R.Cr.P., cannot be found:

"* * * The indictment or 
information shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the 
essential facts constituting the offense charged * * *."

[¶45.]  Prosecutorial leverage by indefiniteness 
of complaint conflicts with constitutional rights of defense. It is significant 
in this case that the proof at trial was different than the time stated by 
information or the testimony afforded at the preliminary hearing. Authorities 
cited by the court or by the State in its brief do not relate to a comparable 
situation as an authoritative basis for the decision now made. The "when" of the 
charge has been eliminated as a requirement of our Rule 9 or of the 
constitutional directive. Esquibel v. State, supra.

"In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation * * *." Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.

"In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation * * *." Article 1, § 
10, Wyoming Constitution.

United States v. 
Mills, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 138, 142, 8 L. Ed. 636 (1833); United States v. 
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 542, 558, 23 L. Ed. 588 
(1875):

"* * * A crime is made up 
of acts and intent; and these must be set forth in the indictment with 
reasonable particularity of time, place, and 
circumstances."

[¶46.]  Directly relating to the principle 
requiring an adequate response to a bill of exceptions is the comprehensive and 
thoughtful discussion of Justice Parker in State v. Wilson, 76 Wyo. 297, 301 P.2d 1056, 1064 (1956), wherein he stated:

"It has been said that 
ordinarily the appellate court will not review or revise a trial court's refusal 
to grant a bill of particulars. * * * However, this rule has been tempered 
considerably under constitutional provisions granting accused the right to be 
fully informed of the nature of his accusation. * * * Moreover, the trial 
court's exercise of discretion must be most carefully examined in a situation 
like the one at bar where there has, in fact, been a metamorphosis of the 
information.

"This defendant said he 
was misled. We do not know whether he was or not, nor do we think it was 
possible for the trial court to be certain. If defendant had been given the 
benefit of the doubt, as we think he should have been, the motion for the bill 
of particulars would have been granted."

The source of 
the adequate-defense rule can, in part, be traced to the discussion of 
"information sufficient to afford him a fair and reasonable opportunity to meet 
it and defend himself," Neusbaum v. State, 156 Md. 149, 143 A. 872, 876 
(1928).

[¶47.]  See also Esquibel v. State, supra, and 
cases therein cited; Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 82 S. Ct. 1038, 8 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1962); United States v. Conlon, 202 A.D.C. 150, 628 F.2d 150 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980); United States v. Chase, 372 F.2d 453, 461 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 
387 U.S. 907, 87 S. Ct. 1688, 18 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1967); Flying Eagle Publications, 
Inc. v. United States, 273 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1960); and United States v. 
Tellier, 19 F.R.D. 164 (1956).

"This constitutional 
protection is implemented by the requirement of Rule 7(c)(1) that an indictment 
or information must be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the 
essential facts constituting the offense charged." Wright, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Criminal 2d § 125, 1986 pocket part.

See also Note, 
Indictment Sufficiency, 70 Colum.L.Rev. 876, 884 (1970); Scott, Fairness in 
Accusation of Crime, 41 Minn.L. Rev. 509, 514 (1957).

[¶48.]  The conviction should be reversed and the 
case remanded for a new trial.

FOOTNOTES

1 Unfortunately, final 
argument was not transcribed, if a record was made. Defense counsel should be 
called to recognize the primacy and recency factors in psychological behavior 
and decision and always have a record of both opening and closing arguments for 
jury trials at least. One can frequently look at argument to understand counsel 
planning and jury behavior in trial verdicts. The "why" is reflective of the 
"what" that they were told.