Case Title: Teigen v. Wisconsin Elections Commission

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2022AP000091

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2022-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
2022 WI 64 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2022AP91 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Richard Teigen and Richard Thom, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, 
          Defendant-Co-Appellant, 
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 
          Intervenor-Defendant-Co-Appellant, 
Disability Rights Wisconsin,  
Wisconsin Faith Voices for Justice and  
League of Women Voters of Wisconsin, 
          Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 8, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 13, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael O. Bohren   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court with respect to ¶¶4–10, 12–13, 52–63, and 73–85, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, and 
an opinion with respect to ¶¶1–3, 11, 14–51, 64–72, 86, n.29, 
and 87, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., joined.  
ROGGENSACK, J., filed a concurring opinion.  REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., 
and ROGGENSACK, J., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring 
opinion.  ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which DALLET and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-co-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Steven C. Kilpatrick, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
 
 
2 
the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an 
oral argument by Steven C. Kilpatrick.  
 
For 
the 
intervenor-defendant-co-appellant, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Charles G. Curtis, Jr., Michelle M. (Umberger) 
Kemp, Will M. Conley, John M. Devaney, Elisabeth C. Frost, and 
Perkins COie, LLP, Madison and Washington, D.C., and Elias Law 
Group LLP, Washington, D.C. There was an oral argument by 
Charles G. Curtis.  
 
For 
the 
intervenors-defendants-appellants, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Jeffrey A. Mandell, Douglas M. Poland, Rachel E. 
Snyder, Carly Gerads, Scott B. Thompson, Mel Barnes, and 
Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, Madison, and Law Forward, Inc., Madison. 
There was an oral argument by Jeffrey A. Mandell.  
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners, there was a 
brief filed by Richard M. Esenberg, Brian W. McGrath, Luke N. 
Berg, Katherine D. Spitz, and Wisconsin Institute for Law & 
Liberty, Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Richard M. 
Esenberg. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James R. Troupis, 
Joseph W. Voiland, and Troupis Law Office, Cross Plains, and 
Veterans Liberty Law, Cedarburg, for Senator Ron Johnson. There 
was an oral argument by James R. Troupis.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James Bopp, Jr., 
Michael D. Dean, and James Madison Center for Free Speech, Terre 
Haute, and First Freedoms Foundation, Brookfield, for True the 
Vote, Inc.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Cameron T. Norris, 
James P. McGlone, Matthew M. Fernholz, and Consovoy McCarthy 
 
 
3 
PLLC, Arlington, and Gramer, Multhauf & Hammes, LLP, Racine, for 
Honest Elections Project.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Kurt A. Goehre and 
Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry S.C., Green Bay, for the Republican 
National 
Committee, 
the 
National 
Republican 
Senatorial 
Committee, and the Republican Party of Wisconsin. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Claire Silverman and 
Maria Davis for the League of Wisconsin Municipalities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 64 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2022AP91 
(L.C. No. 
2021CV958) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Richard Teigen and Richard Thom, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, 
 
          Defendant-Co-Appellant, 
 
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 
 
          Intervenor-Defendant-Co-Appellant, 
 
Disability Rights Wisconsin, Wisconsin Faith 
Voices for Justice and League of Women Voters 
of Wisconsin, 
 
          Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court with respect to ¶¶4–10, 12–13, 52–63, and 73–85, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, and 
an opinion with respect to ¶¶1–3, 11, 14–51, 64–72, 86, n.29, 
and 87, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., joined.  
ROGGENSACK, J., filed a concurring opinion.  REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., 
and ROGGENSACK, J., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring 
opinion.  ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which DALLET and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
 
 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
2 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court 
for Waukesha County, Michael O. Bohren, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   This case concerns two 
documents created by employees of the Wisconsin Elections 
Commission ("WEC").  These documents authorize municipal clerks 
and local election officials to establish ballot drop boxes.  
According to one of the documents: 
A drop box is a secure, locked structure operated by 
local election officials.  Voters may deposit their 
ballot in a drop box at any time after they receive it 
in the mail up to the time of the last ballot 
collection Election Day.  Ballot drop boxes can be 
staffed or unstaffed, temporary or permanent. 
The other document adds, "[a] family member or another person 
may . . . return the ballot on behalf of the voter," i.e., an 
agent of the voter may place the voter's absentee ballot in a 
drop box. 
¶2 
Two Wisconsin voters filed this case under Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.40 
(2019–20),1 
challenging 
the 
validity 
of 
these 
documents.2  They advanced two arguments:  (1) the documents are 
unpromulgated administrative rules; and (2) under Wisconsin 
statutes, drop boxes are illegal because a voter must personally 
mail or deliver in person the voter's absentee ballot to the 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019–20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 The Wisconsin voters also sought relief under the Uniform 
Declaratory Judgment Act, Wis. Stat. § 806.04.  We do not 
address whether relief would be proper had the Wisconsin voters 
sought relief only under § 806.04. 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
3 
 
municipal clerk, not to an inanimate object.  The Democratic 
Senatorial Campaign Committee ("DSCC") and Disability Rights 
Wisconsin et al. ("DRW") intervened to defend WEC's documents.   
¶3 
The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the Wisconsin voters.3  The court declared the documents were 
administrative rules, which had not been properly promulgated, 
and, among other things, "the use of [ballot] drop boxes, as 
described in the [documents], is not permitted under Wisconsin 
law unless the drop box is staffed by the [municipal] clerk and 
located at the office of the clerk or a properly designated 
alternate site under Wis. Stat. § 6.855."  The circuit court 
also issued a permanent injunction, requiring WEC to rescind the 
documents and enjoining WEC from issuing further interpretations 
of law in conflict with the court's order.  An appeal followed, 
and we granted the Wisconsin voters' petition to bypass the 
court of appeals.4   
 
¶4 
We hold the documents are invalid because ballot drop 
boxes are illegal under Wisconsin statutes.  An absentee ballot 
must be returned by mail or the voter must personally deliver it 
                                                 
3 The Honorable Michael O. Bohren, Waukesha County Circuit 
Court, presided. 
4 "Elections are the foundation of American government and 
their integrity is of such monumental importance that any threat 
to their validity should trigger not only our concern but our 
prompt action."  Trump v. Biden, 2020 WI 91, ¶152, 394 
Wis. 2d 629, 
951 
N.W.2d 568 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting) (quoting State ex rel. Zignego v. Wis. Elec. Comm'n, 
2020AP123-W, unpublished order (Wis. June 1, 2020) (Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting)). 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
4 
 
to the municipal clerk at the clerk's office or a designated 
alternate site.  We do not address whether the documents 
constitute 
unpromulgated 
administrative 
rules 
because 
the 
documents are invalid regardless.     
 
¶5 
The circuit court declared:  (1) "an elector must 
personally mail . . . his or her own absentee ballot"; and 
(2) only two lawful methods for casting an absentee ballot 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. exist, one of which is 
"for the elector to place the envelope containing the ballot in 
the mail[.]"  The documents do not address whether voters who 
mail an absentee ballot must personally place the ballot into a 
mailbox or if a voter's agent may do so.  We therefore do not 
decide at this time whether the law permits a voter's agent to 
place an absentee ballot in the mail on the voter's behalf.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶6 
In spring 2020, many people wanted to minimize their 
time spent in public spaces due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  For 
this reason, more voters wanted to vote absentee for the spring 
2020 election than had voted absentee in past elections.  In 
response, WEC Administrator Meagan Wolfe issued the first 
document ("Memo one"), which was directed to municipal clerks 
and other local election officials.  The memo states:  "[Ballot] 
drop boxes can be used for voters to return ballots but clerks 
should ensure they are secure, can be monitored for security 
purposes, and should be regularly emptied."  It also says, "[a] 
family member or another person may . . . return the [absentee] 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
5 
 
ballot on behalf of a voter."  WEC's commissioners never voted 
to adopt this memo. 
¶7 
A few months later, Administrator Wolfe and the 
assistant administrator issued the second document ("Memo two") 
ahead of the fall 2020 election.  It encourages "creative 
solutions" 
to 
facilitate 
the 
use 
of 
ballot 
drop 
boxes.  
Specifically, Memo two informs municipal clerks that drop boxes 
can be "unstaffed," and states "[a]t a minimum, you should have 
a drop box at your primary municipal building, such as the 
village hall."  WEC commissioners never voted on Memo two 
either. 
¶8 
Municipal clerks acted on these memos.  Administrator 
Wolfe avers she is aware of 528 ballot drop boxes utilized for 
the fall 2020 election.  By the spring 2021 election, 
Administrator Wolfe says municipal clerks and local election 
officials reported 570 drop boxes, spanning 66 of Wisconsin's 72 
counties.     
¶9 
The Wisconsin voters filed a lawsuit challenging the 
validity of these memos.  In resolving the suit, the circuit 
court declared, "WEC's Memos are administrative rules under 
Chapter 
227 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
statutes 
and 
are 
invalid . . . because they should have been, but were not, 
promulgated as rules."  It also declared: 
WEC's interpretation of state statutes in the Memos is 
inconsistent with state law, to the extent they 
conflict with the following:  (1) an elector must 
personally mail or deliver his or her own absentee 
ballot, except where the law explicitly authorizes an 
agent to act on an elector's behalf, (2) the only 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
6 
 
lawful methods for casting an absentee ballot pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. are for the elector to 
place the envelope containing the ballot in the mail 
or for the elector to deliver the ballot in person to 
the municipal clerk, (3) the use of drop boxes, as 
described in the Memos, is not permitted under 
Wisconsin law unless the drop box is staffed by the 
clerk and located at the office of the clerk or a 
properly designated alternate site under Wis. Stat. 
§ 6.855. 
The circuit court permanently enjoined WEC and ordered it to 
"withdraw the Memos and issue a statement to clerks notifying 
them that WEC's interpretation of Wis. Stat. §§ 6.87 and 6.855 
in the Memos has been declared invalid by this Court[.]"  The 
injunction 
also 
ordered 
WEC 
not 
to 
"issue 
any 
further 
interpretations . . . that 
conflict[] 
with . . . §§ 6.87 
and 
6.855, as described above."  The defendants appealed.  The 
Wisconsin voters filed a petition to bypass the court of 
appeals, which we granted. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶10 Two threshold arguments have been raised.  First, DSCC 
argues the Wisconsin voters lack standing.  The existence of 
standing 
presents 
a 
question 
of 
law, 
which 
we 
review 
independently, although we benefit from the circuit court's 
analysis.  Friends of the Black River Forest v. DNR, 2022 WI 52, 
¶10, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ (quoting City of Mayville v. 
DOA, 2021 WI 57, ¶15, 397 Wis. 2d 496, 960 N.W.2d 416); see also 
T.L.E.-C. v. S.E., 2021 WI 56, ¶13, 397 Wis. 2d 462, 960 N.W.2d 
391 
(citing 
State 
v. 
Stephenson, 
2020 
WI 92, 
¶18, 
394 
Wis. 2d 703, 951 N.W.2d 819). 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
7 
 
 
¶11 Second, DRW argues Wisconsin law bars this suit 
because the Wisconsin voters did not first file their complaint 
with WEC, which DRW claims Wis. Stat. § 5.06 requires.  DRW 
offers two independent bases for this argument:  (1) sovereign 
immunity and (2) competence.5  Whether sovereign immunity bars 
this lawsuit is a question of law.  Aesthetic & Cosmetic Plastic 
Surgery Ctr., LLC v. Wis. Dep't of Trans., 2014 WI App 88, ¶12, 
356 Wis. 2d 197, 853 N.W.2d 607 (quoting Canadian Nat'l R.R. v. 
Noel, 
2007 
WI App 179, 
¶5, 
304 
Wis. 2d 218, 
222–23, 
736 
N.W.2d 900).  Likewise, whether the circuit court was competent 
to adjudicate this case is a question of law.  City of Cedarburg 
v. Hansen, 2020 WI 11, ¶13, 390 Wis. 2d 109, 938 N.W.2d 463, 
modified on reconsideration, 2020 WI 45, 391 Wis. 2d 671, 943 
N.W.2d 544 (citing City of Eau Claire v. Booth, 2016 WI 65, ¶6, 
370 Wis. 2d 595, 882 N.W.2d 738). 
 
¶12 On the merits, we must interpret Wisconsin statutes to 
determine 
whether 
the 
memos 
correctly 
describe 
the 
law.  
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law.  See 
T.L.E.-C., 397 Wis. 2d 462, ¶13 (citing Stephenson, 394 
Wis. 2d 703, ¶18). 
 
¶13 Lastly, DRW raises a federal preemption argument.  
Preemption presents a question of law.  Town of Delafield v. 
Cent. Transp. Kriewaldt, 2020 WI 61, ¶4, 392 Wis. 2d 427, 944 
                                                 
5 DRW conflated these two bases, but we resolve them 
independently.   
No. 
2022AP91   
 
8 
 
N.W.2d 819 (citing Partenfelder v. Rohde, 2014 WI 80, ¶25, 356 
Wis. 2d 492, 850 N.W.2d 896). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Threshold Issues 
1.  The Wisconsin Voters Have Standing 
 
¶14 DSCC argues the Wisconsin voters lack standing, 
asserting they "have not demonstrated 'a personal stake in the 
outcome of the controversy' separate and apart from the public 
at large, nor have they shown they have 'suffered or [are] 
threatened with an injury to an interest that is legally 
protectable.'"6  We reject this argument because the Wisconsin 
voters do have a "stake in the outcome" and are "affected by the 
issues in controversy."  Wis. Legislature v. Palm, 2020 WI 42, 
¶12, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900.  WEC's memos "interfere[] 
with or impair," or at the very least, "threaten[] to interfere 
with or impair," the Wisconsin voters' "legal rights and 
privileges"——specifically, 
their 
rights 
and 
privileges 
as 
registered voters.  See Wis. Stat. § 227.40(1).  For this 
reason, the Wisconsin voters have standing under Wisconsin's 
permissive, policy-oriented approach toward standing. 
 
¶15 DSCC's 
argument 
appears 
to 
be 
grounded 
in 
the 
inaccurate assumption that Wisconsin courts follow federal law 
on standing.  For example, DSCC cites a Fifth Circuit case from 
2021 
rejecting 
claims 
"that 
drive-thru 
voting 
hurt 
the 
                                                 
6 Quoting Marx v. Morris, 2019 WI 34, ¶35, 386 Wis. 2d 122, 
925 N.W.2d 112 (emphasis added). 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
9 
 
'integrity' of the election process," in violation of the United 
States 
Constitution, 
because 
the 
claims 
were 
"far 
too 
generalized to warrant standing."  See Hotze v. Hudspeth, 16 
F.4th 1121, 1124 (5th Cir. 2021).   
 
¶16 While standing in federal court is constitutionally 
confined, in Wisconsin it is limited only by prudential 
considerations.  The United States Constitution extends "[t]he 
judicial power" only to "cases" and "controversies."  U.S. 
Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  No similar language exists in the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Const. 
art. 
VII, 
§ 8 
(creating, as a general rule, "original jurisdiction" in the 
circuit courts over "all matters civil and criminal within this 
state"). 
 
"Because 
our 
state 
constitution 
lacks 
the 
jurisdiction-limiting 
language 
of 
its 
federal 
counterpart, 
'standing in Wisconsin is not a matter of jurisdiction, but of 
sound judicial policy.'"  Friends of the Black River Forest, __ 
Wis. 2d __, ¶17 (quoting McConkey v. Van Hollen, 2010 WI 57, 
¶15, 326 Wis. 2d 1, 783 N.W.2d 855).7 
 
¶17 Judicial 
policy 
favors 
hearing 
cases 
presenting 
"carefully developed and zealously argued" issues.  McConkey, 
                                                 
7 Although Justice Brian Hagedorn now criticizes this 
court's well-established consideration of judicial policy in 
determining standing, Justice Hagedorn's Concurrence, ¶160, he 
just joined the majority's expression of the test in Friends of 
the Black River Forest v. DNR, 2022 WI 52, ¶17, __ Wis. 2d __, 
__ N.W.2d __ (quoting McConkey v. Van Hollen, 2010 WI 57, ¶15, 
326 Wis. 2d 1, 783 N.W.2d 855).  Perhaps the court should 
reconsider its jurisprudence on standing but no party has asked 
us to do so in this case. 
 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
10 
 
326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶16.  To ensure a full vetting of the issues, we 
typically require plaintiffs to possess some personal stake in 
the 
case: 
"the 
gist 
of 
the 
requirements 
relating 
to 
standing . . . is to assure that the party seeking relief has 
alleged a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to 
give 
rise 
to 
that 
adverseness 
necessary 
to 
sharpen 
the 
presentation 
of 
issues[.]" 
 
Moedern 
v. 
McGinnis, 
70 
Wis. 2d 1056, 1064, 236 N.W.2d 240 (1975).  This standard is 
quite liberal; even "'a trifling interest' may suffice" provided 
the asserted interest generates sufficient adversity.  See 
McConkey, 
326 
Wis. 2d 1, 
¶15 
(quoting 
Fox 
v. 
DHSS, 
112 
Wis. 2d 514, 524, 334 N.W.2d 532 (1983)). 
 
¶18 In resolving standing challenges, Wisconsin courts may 
also consider judicial efficiency.  Id., ¶¶17–18.  The judiciary 
has "inherent power to protect itself against any action that 
would . . . materially impair its efficiency."  State v. Holmes, 
106 Wis. 2d 31, 40, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982) (quoting In re Court 
Room, 148 Wis. 109, 121, 134 N.W. 490 (1912)).  As a practical 
matter, 
courts 
should 
not 
devote 
time 
or 
resources 
to 
adjudicating disputes only to ultimately conclude a party is not 
entitled to any relief.8 
                                                 
8 While courts should consider whether relief may be 
granted, they should not turn an issue of standing into a full 
adjudication on the merits.  See Wis. Voters Alliance v. Wis. 
Elec. Comm'n, No. 2020AP1930-OA, unpublished order, at 4 (Wis. 
Dec. 4, 2020) (Roggensack C.J., dissenting) ("We grant petitions 
to exercise our jurisdiction based on whether the legal issues 
presented are of state wide concern, not based on the remedies 
requested." (citation omitted)). 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
11 
 
 
¶19 Against the backdrop of these policies, we have 
developed a two-prong test for standing to challenge an agency 
action under chapter 227 of the Wisconsin statutes.  See Friends 
of 
the 
Black 
River 
Forest, 
__ 
Wis. 2d __, 
¶18 
(quoting 
Wisconsin's Env't Decade, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis. 
(WED), 69 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 230 N.W.2d 243 (1975)).  In WED, this 
court described the elements of the inquiry as follows:  
"(1) Does the challenged action cause the petitioner injury in 
fact?  and (2) is the interest allegedly injured arguably within 
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the 
statute or constitutional guarantee in question?"  Id. (citing 
Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 
150, 153 (1970)).   
 
¶20 Under the first prong, "injury in fact," "we ask 
'whether the petition alleges injuries that are a direct result 
of the agency action.'"  Friends of the Black River Forest, __ 
Wis. 2d __, ¶21 (quoting WED, 69 Wis. 2d at 13).  This prong 
presents a low bar.  "[A]n '[i]njury alleged, which is remote in 
time or which will only occur as an end result of a sequence of 
events set in motion by the agency action challenged, can be a 
sufficiently direct result of the agency's decision to serve as 
a basis for standing.'"  Id. (quoting WED, 69 Wis. 2d at 14 
(second modification in the original)).  Under the second prong, 
"we ask whether 'the injury is to an interest which the law 
recognizes or seeks to regulate or protect.'"  Id., ¶23 (quoting 
Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 144 Wis. 2d 499, 505, 424 
N.W.2d 685 (1988)).  Recently, in Friends of the Black River 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
12 
 
Forest, we recognized "the 'zone of interests' terminology [for 
the second prong] is untethered to the text of Wis. Stat. 
ch. 227[.]"9  Id., ¶25.  We explained, "determination of whether 
a statute protects, recognizes, or regulates the asserted 
interest 
is 
a 
purely 
statutory 
inquiry, 
from 
which 
the 
judicially subjective consideration of the 'zone of interests' 
is properly omitted."  Id. 
 
¶21 The Wisconsin voters allege they have suffered an 
injury in fact to their right to vote.  See Wis. Stat. § 6.84(1) 
("The legislature finds that voting is a constitutional right, 
the vigorous exercise of which should be strongly encouraged.").  
As the Wisconsin voters argue, "voters[] are entitled to have 
the elections in which they participate administered properly 
under the law.  Allowing WEC to administer the 2022 elections in 
a manner other than that required by law causes doubts about the 
fairness of the elections and erodes voter confidence in the 
electoral 
process." 
 
Similarly, 
the 
Republican 
National 
Committee et al., an amicus curiae, emphasizes, "[e]lections are 
one of the most important features of our Republic, and 
upholding the rules and procedures prescribed for elections, 
                                                 
9 Friends of the Black River Forest involved a challenge to 
an agency action under Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 and 227.53.  With 
respect to standing, the case is analogous to this dispute.  
Many of the cases on which we relied in Friends of the Black 
River Forest discuss standing under chapter 227 of the Wisconsin 
statutes generally.  See Foley-Ciccantelli v. Bishop's Grove 
Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 2011 WI 36, ¶¶43–44, 333 Wis. 2d 402, 
797 N.W.2d 789 (lead op.) (suggesting the same framework applies 
for "an administrative rule or decision"). 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
13 
 
according to the laws enacted by the Legislature, reinforces the 
sanctity of the rule of law and reassures all Americans of the 
integrity of our elections."  We agree.    
 
¶22 If the right to vote is to have any meaning at all, 
elections must be conducted according to law.  Throughout 
history, tyrants have claimed electoral victory via elections 
conducted in violation of governing law.  For example, Saddam 
Hussein was reportedly elected in 2002 by a unanimous vote of 
all eligible voters in Iraq (11,445,638 people).10  Examples of 
such corruption are replete in history.  In the 21st century, 
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un was elected in 2014 with 100% of 
the vote while his father, Kim Jong-il, previously won 99.9% of 
the vote.11  Former President of Cuba, Raul Castro, won 99.4% of 
the vote in 2008 while Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was 
elected with 97.6% of the vote in 2007.  Even if citizens of 
such nations are allowed to check a box on a ballot, they 
possess only a hollow right.12  Their rulers derive their power 
from force and fraud, not the people's consent.  By contrast, in 
                                                 
 
10 Saddam Scores 100% in Leadership Ballot, The Guardian 
(Oct. 
16, 
2002), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/oct/16/iraq. 
 
11 The World of 100% Election Victories, BBC (Mar. 11, 
2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-magazine-monitor-26527422.   
12 Justice Hagedorn seems to disagree, indicating the right 
to vote encompasses nothing more than the mere ability to cast a 
ballot.  He fails to recognize that a lawful vote loses its 
operative effect if the election is not conducted in accordance 
with the rule of law. 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
14 
 
Wisconsin elected officials "deriv[e] their just powers from the 
consent of the governed."  See Wis. Const. art. I, § 1. 
 
¶23 The right to vote presupposes the rule of law governs 
elections.  If elections are conducted outside of the law, the 
people have not conferred their consent on the government.  Such 
elections are unlawful and their results are illegitimate.  "If 
an election . . . can be procured by a party through artifice or 
corruption, the Government may be the choice of a party for its 
own ends, not of the nation for the national good."  John Adams, 
Inaugural Address in the City of Philadelphia (Mar. 4, 1797), 
reprinted in Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United 
States at 10 (1989). 
 
¶24 The Wisconsin voters' injury in fact is substantially 
more concrete than the "remote" injuries we have recognized as 
sufficient in the past.  Friends of the Black River Forest, __ 
Wis. 2d __, ¶21 (quoting WED, 69 Wis. 2d at 14).  The record 
indicates hundreds of ballot drop boxes have been set up in past 
elections, prompted by the memos, and thousands of votes have 
been cast via this unlawful method, thereby directly harming the 
Wisconsin voters.  The illegality of these drop boxes weakens 
the people's faith that the election produced an outcome 
reflective of their will.  The Wisconsin voters, and all lawful 
voters, 
are 
injured 
when 
the 
institution 
charged 
with 
administering Wisconsin elections does not follow the law, 
leaving the results in question. 
 
¶25 DSCC misunderstands the nature of the Wisconsin 
voters' injury in fact.  It argues the Wisconsin voters cannot 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
15 
 
show their votes were diluted by unlawful votes.  It states, "it 
is equally likely that any such [unlawful] voters may vote for 
the same candidates who[m] [the Wisconsin voters] support, which 
would seem to benefit, not harm them."  The Wisconsin voters' 
injury, however, is more nuanced than DSCC suggests.  DSCC's 
claim about "equal" likelihood is pure speculation.  In 
contrast, the failure to follow election laws is a fact which 
forces everyone——even DSCC——to question the legitimacy of 
election results.  Electoral outcomes obtained by unlawful 
procedures corrupt the institution of voting, degrading the very 
foundation of free government.  Unlawful votes do not dilute 
lawful votes so much as they pollute them, which in turn 
pollutes the integrity of the results.  See Clark v. Quick, 36 
N.E.2d 563, 566 (Ill. 1941) ("There is nothing in the record 
before us to indicate that any of [the absentee ballots] were 
actually tampered with by any unauthorized person, but it is 
entirely obvious that the opportunity to do so was present.").  
When the level of pollution is high enough, the fog creates 
obscurity, and the institution of voting loses its credibility 
as a method of ensuring the people's continued consent to be 
governed.  See State ex rel. Bell v. Conness, 106 Wis. 425, 428, 
82 N.W. 288 (1900) ("He failed to show that he received a 
majority of the votes cast at the election, but he succeeded in 
showing a condition of affairs that taints the whole proceeding 
and calls for careful consideration.  The purity and integrity 
of elections is a matter of such prime importance, and affects 
so many important interests, that the courts ought never to 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
16 
 
hesitate, when the opportunity is offered, to test them by the 
strictest legal standards.").  A man with an obscured vote may 
as well be "a man without a vote," and without the opportunity 
for judicial review, such a man "is without protection; he is 
virtually helpless."  See 106 Cong. Rec. 5082, 5117 (1960) 
(statement of Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson). 
 
¶26 DSCC quotes this court's statement in McConkey that it 
was "troubled" by "broad general voter standing[.]"  326 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶17.  For context, that case involved a voter 
challenge to a process by which the people of Wisconsin adopted 
the following constitutional amendment in 2006: 
Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be 
valid or recognized as a marriage in this state.  A 
legal status identical or substantially similar to 
that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not 
be valid or recognized in this state. 
Wis. Const. art. XIII, § 13, superseded by Obergefell v. Hodges, 
576 U.S. 644 (2015).  "McConkey claimed that the two sentences 
of the marriage amendment constituted two amendments, not one, 
and that because voters were not able to vote for or against 
each sentence, the marriage amendment was not validly adopted."  
McConkey, 326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶2.  McConkey conceded if he would have 
been able to vote on each individual sentence, he would have 
voted "no" on both.  Id., ¶14.  On this basis, the attorney 
general challenged McConkey's standing, claiming, "he suffered 
no actual injury to a legally protectable interest."  Id.  
McConkey 
maintained 
his 
"basic 
voting . . . rights" 
were 
violated.  Id. 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
17 
 
 
¶27 McConkey does not support DSCC's argument.  While this 
court was "troubled," it nonetheless proceeded to decide the 
case:  "whether as a matter of judicial policy, or because 
McConkey has at least a trifling interest in his voting rights, 
we believe the unique circumstances of this case render the 
merits of McConkey's claim fit for adjudication."  Id., ¶17.  
The injury in fact McConkey claimed to suffer is analogous to 
the injury in fact suffered by the Wisconsin voters; both 
plaintiffs claim proper voting procedures were not followed. 
 
¶28 DSCC also argues "[t]heir voting rights are in no 
sense 'diluted' by other voters' reliance on carefully monitored 
secure [ballot] drop boxes under local municipal clerks' 
jurisdiction, custody, and control."  The memos, however, 
purport to authorize unstaffed drop boxes as lawful means of 
returning ballots.  Even if secured and monitored, a drop box 
falls short of the statutorily-recognized security surrounding a 
polling place.  See Wis. Stat. § 6.84(1) ("[V]oting by absentee 
ballot is a privilege exercised wholly outside the traditional 
safeguards of the polling place."). 
 
¶29 The Wisconsin voters satisfy the second standing prong 
as well.  "[T]he law recognizes" and "seeks to . . . protect" 
the Wisconsin voters' right to vote.  See Friends of the Black 
River Forest, __ Wis. 2d __, ¶23 (quoting Waste Mgmt., 144 
Wis. 2d at 505).  Wisconsin Stat. § 227.40(1) affords them 
relief because the memos "interfere[] with or impair[]," or at 
the very least, "threaten[] to interfere with or impair," their 
"legal rights and privileges[.]" 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
18 
 
 
¶30 A broader review of judicial policy supports our 
application of the two-prong test.  Like McConkey, this case has 
been "zealously argued," demonstrating the Wisconsin voters' 
interest 
in 
their 
right 
to 
vote 
is 
more 
than 
merely 
"trifling[.]"  See 326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶18.  We can discern no 
negative impact on "judicial efficiency" stemming from our 
decision to resolve it.  Id.   
 
¶31 Lastly, "as a law development court," we owe the 
public an answer to the important questions of law this case 
raises.13  Id.  "The right of voting for representatives is the 
primary right by which other rights are protected."  Thomas 
Paine, Dissertation on First Principles of Government (1795), 
reprinted in Thomas Paine:  Rights of Man, Common Sense and 
Other Political Writings 398 (2008).  As the United States 
Supreme Court has recognized, "[n]o right is more precious in a 
free country than that of having a voice in the election of 
those who make laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.  
Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to 
vote is undermined."  Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 
(1964).  Unlawfully conducted elections threaten to diminish or 
even eliminate some voices, destabilizing the very foundation of 
                                                 
13 "Since the 2020 presidential election, many Wisconsin 
voters have raised serious concerns about the conduct of 
elections because of directives given by the Wisconsin Elections 
Commission (WEC) to the municipal clerks who run the elections.  
We have been petitioned repeatedly to accept cases that address 
very similar concerns."  Kleefisch v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 
No. 2021AP1976-OA, unpublished order, at 1–2 (Wis. Feb. 4, 2022) 
(Roggensack, J., dissenting). 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
19 
 
free government.  The Wisconsin voters have standing to ensure 
they retain their electoral voices.  See generally Trump v. 
Evers, No. 2020AP1971-OA, unpublished order, at 6 (Wis. Dec. 3, 
2020) (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) ("[T]he integrity 
of every election will be tarnished by the public's mistrust 
until the Wisconsin Supreme Court accepts its responsibility to 
declare what the election laws say."). 
 
¶32 Justice Brian Hagedorn disagrees with our standing 
analysis, proffering an alternative basis for standing divined 
from searching the penumbra of Wis. Stat. § 5.06.14  Although 
§ 5.06 appears nowhere in the complaint15 and sets forth specific 
procedures that were never invoked, Justice Hagedorn concludes 
it nevertheless confers standing on the Wisconsin voters.16  It 
can't. 
                                                 
14 Justice Hagedorn's Concurrence, ¶164. 
15 Pointing out that § 5.06 appears nowhere in the complaint 
isn't a "complaint"; it's just a fact.  Id., ¶164 n.3. 
 
16 Justice Hagedorn asserts the Wis. Stat. § 5.06 standing 
argument is "in their brief[.]"  Id.  He continues, "[they] 
unquestionably" "raise[d]" this argument.  Id. 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
20 
 
 
¶33 Wisconsin Stat. § 5.06(1) allows "any elector" to file 
"a written sworn complaint" with WEC if the elector "believes 
that a decision or action" of "an election official" related to 
the "conduct of elections is contrary to law[.]"  "The 
commission may conduct a hearing on the matter in the manner 
prescribed for treatment of contested cases under ch. 227 if it 
believes such action to be appropriate."  § 5.06(1).  The 
Wisconsin voters, however, have not brought a case against any 
local election official but only against WEC—-in circuit court.  
As we explain in greater detail below, it would be nonsensical 
to have WEC adjudicate a claim against itself under Wis. Stat. 
§ 5.06(1).   
¶34 If Wis. Stat. § 5.06(1) is the only source of the 
Wisconsin voters' legal right to sue, their failure to first 
file the complaint with WEC is no minor matter.  Section 5.06(2) 
declares, "[n]o person who is authorized to file a complaint 
                                                                                                                                                             
The portion of the Wisconsin voters' response brief dealing 
with standing is about two pages.  Those two pages have two 
sentences on Wis. Stat. § 5.06:  (1) "Wis. Stat. § 5.06 
recognizes that 'any elector' has an interest in raising 
violations of the election laws"; and (2) "The § 5.06 process 
does not apply here, for reasons explained below, infra Part 
IV.B, but § 5.06 shows that electors have a 'right' and interest 
in elections conducted in accordance with state law."  § 5.06 
"recognizes" or "shows" that the electors have a "right" to 
ensure local election officials comply with the law, but on its 
face the statute simply does not confer a right relevant to the 
claims brought in this case.  In contrast, Wis. Stat. § 6.84(1) 
includes 
a 
legislative 
"find[ing]" 
that 
"voting 
is 
a 
constitutional right[.]"  Justice Hagedorn dismisses this 
language as merely an expression of policy, with apparently no 
operative effect.  A right that lacks a vehicle for vindication 
is a hollow one. 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
21 
 
under sub. (1), other than the attorney general or a district 
attorney, may commence an action or proceeding to test the 
validity of any decision, action or failure to act on the part 
of any election official with respect to any matter specified in 
sub. (1) without first filing a complaint under sub. (1), nor 
prior to disposition of the complaint by the commission."  No 
one 
suggests 
the 
Wisconsin 
voters 
are 
not 
"person[s] . . . authorized to file a complaint under sub. (1)."  
§ 5.06(2).  As Justice Hagedorn acknowledges, "§ 5.06 gives 
[Wisconsin voters] a statutory right to have local election 
officials in the area[s] where [they] live[] comply with 
election laws."17  That statute says "the elector may file a 
written sworn complaint with the commission requesting that the 
official be required to conform his or her conduct to the law, 
be restrained from taking any action inconsistent with the law 
or be required to correct any action or decision inconsistent 
with the law or any abuse of the discretion vested in him or her 
by law."  § 5.06 (emphasis added).  But § 5.06 says nothing 
about filing a complaint in order to force WEC to correct any 
action it make take or any decision it may make, which are 
inconsistent with the law.  If § 5.06 does not apply to the 
Wisconsin voters' complaint against WEC, then how could it 
confer standing?  Justice Hagedorn does not explain.  
 
¶35 Justice Hagedorn's cognitively dissonant criticisms of 
our standing analysis apply equally to his own.  He says our 
                                                 
17 Justice Hagedorn's Concurrence, ¶164. 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
22 
 
standing analysis "suggests [we] create[] broad voter standing 
against any election official or WEC by any elector for nearly 
any purported violation of any election law."18  But Justice 
Hagedorn articulates an indistinguishably broad basis for 
standing, concluding the Wisconsin voters have "a legal right 
protected by Wis. Stat. § 5.06 to have local election officials 
in [their] area comply with the law."19  He complains our 
standing 
analysis is 
not 
"tether[ed] . . . to 
an 
on-point 
text[.]"20  But our analysis is "tethered" to Wis. Stat. 
§ 6.84(1), which incontrovertibly applies to the Wisconsin 
voters, while Justice Hagedorn's analysis is tethered only to a 
concededly inapplicable statute.  Unlike our standing analysis, 
Justice Hagedorn's penumbra standing is not limited to election 
disputes but logically extends across the Wisconsin statutes.21   
¶36 Even under the stricter standing test federal courts 
apply, impairment of the right to vote has been deemed 
sufficient to confer standing.  While so-called "generalized 
grievances" "do not normally constitute a particularized injury 
necessary to establish standing," "the fact that 'a harm is 
                                                 
18 Id., ¶167. 
 
19 Id., ¶165. 
20 Id., ¶167. 
21 Justice Hagedorn insists his "standing analysis applies 
only to challenges under Wis. Stat. § 227.40(1) to WEC rules and 
guidance documents when that guidance threatens to cause local 
election officials to behave illegally[.]"  Id., ¶167 n.8.  His 
reasoning 
logically 
extends 
further, 
notwithstanding 
his 
artificial narrowing in a footnote. 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
23 
 
widely shared does not necessarily render it a generalized 
grievance.'"  Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Bullock, 
491 F. Supp. 3d 814, 828 (D. Mont. 2020) (quoting Novak v. 
United States, 795 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2015)).  "In fact, 
the [United States] Supreme Court has been clear that 'where a 
large number of voters suffer interference with voting rights' 
the interests related to that are sufficiently concrete to 
obtain the standing necessary to seek redress in an Article III 
Court."  Id. (quoting F.E.C. v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998)); 
see also id. ("Because the alleged injuries to the members' 
voting rights at issue in this case could conceivably be 
asserted by any Montanan does not eradicate the standing 
necessary to assert these claims.  On the contrary, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly enumerated the principle that claims 
alleging a violation of the right to vote can constitute an 
injury in fact despite the widespread reach of the conduct at 
issue.").  Wisconsin voters have alleged an injury to their 
right to vote sufficient to confer standing. 
2.  The Law Does Not Require Wisconsin Voters to File Their 
Complaint Against WEC with WEC 
 
¶37 Article IV, Section 27 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides:  "The legislature shall direct by law in what manner 
and in what courts suits may be brought against the state."  
"From this provision the rule developed that the state cannot be 
sued without its consent."  Lister v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of 
Wis. Sys., 72 Wis. 2d 282, 291, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976).  DRW, 
quoting part of this sentence from Lister, argues sovereign 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
24 
 
immunity bars this lawsuit because the Wisconsin voters did not 
first file their complaint with WEC, which DRW asserts is a 
jurisdictional prerequisite under Wis. Stat. § 5.06(1). 
 
¶38 Importantly, the only party that could claim to 
represent the sovereign in this case——WEC——has abandoned any 
sovereign immunity argument.  In its answer, WEC asserted, 
"[s]ome of [the Wisconsin voters'] claims are barred by 
sovereign immunity," but it did not say which ones.  WEC did not 
discuss sovereign immunity at all in its briefing.  When asked 
for WEC's position on this issue during oral argument before 
this court, WEC's attorney responded: 
Counsel: 
Well, to be consistent we did not take a 
position on it one way or the other in 
briefing, and I'm not going to take a position 
on behalf of the Commission in oral argument 
either, so it's a "no position" type of 
response, for standing and for sovereign 
immunity, because although we raised it, we're 
content with the other parties pushing that 
forward.  We chose for strategic purposes to 
focus our briefs on other things. 
Court: 
That leaves me perplexed.  Do you agree with 
their 
standing 
and 
sovereign 
immunity 
arguments, even though you are not advancing 
them?  I don't want to necessarily pin you 
down, but I do want clarity.  Revisit that 
answer, if you will. 
Counsel: 
I understand you don't like the non-answer 
that I provided.  But the position of the 
Commission is, yes, we raised them in the 
answer, but we chose not to put them forward 
in our brief.  We did not choose to adopt by 
incorporation or by reference those arguments; 
we did not say we are in disagreement with 
them either. 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
25 
 
DRW's argument fails because a private party cannot raise and 
maintain an affirmative defense that belongs to the State.   
 
¶39 "Sovereign immunity is a defense which can be raised 
by the state alone and does not go to the merits or primary 
object of the action.  For this reason, sovereign immunity is a 
defense to personal jurisdiction which can be waived."  City of 
Kenosha v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 317, 328, 151 N.W.2d 36 (1967) 
(emphasis added); Cords v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 42, 46, 214 
Wis. 2d 405 (1974) ("The general rule in Wisconsin . . . is that 
sovereign immunity is a defense to the personal jurisdiction of 
the court which can be waived.  Objection to personal 
jurisdiction must be raised specifically or be deemed waived.  
It is not sufficient to make a general demurrer that the 
complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause 
of action."). 
 
¶40 DRW does not address City of Kenosha or Cords, instead 
claiming in conclusory fashion, "because sovereign immunity is a 
jurisdictional bar to the court's jurisdiction, it is properly 
raised at any juncture, and, once raised, must be adjudicated 
before the merits."  The two cases DRW cites in support of this 
proposition have nothing to do with sovereign immunity (the 
phrase does not even appear in the opinions), and the cases are 
actually 
about 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction, 
not 
personal 
jurisdiction.   
 
¶41 The first case DRW cites, Bartus v. DHSS, states: 
Jurisdictional 
challenges 
may 
be 
raised 
at 
any 
juncture during a court proceeding.  In the instant 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
26 
 
case, the circuit court was reviewing the propriety of 
a Department decision to revoke a probationer's term 
for 
failure 
to 
pay 
restitution. 
 
Bartus's 
jurisdictional challenge to the 1988 sentence which 
imposed the restitution, was therefore central to the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the court on review. 
176 Wis. 2d 1063, 1082–83, 501 N.W.2d 419 (1993) (emphasis 
added).  Bartus merely recites a well-known rule, repeated in 
many cases, that arguments against subject matter jurisdiction 
cannot be forfeited or waived.  See City of Cedarburg, 390 
Wis. 2d 109, ¶49 (citing Booth, 370 Wis. 2d 595, ¶1); see also 
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) ("[S]ubject-
matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court's power to hear 
a case, can never be forfeited or waived.").  Equally well 
established is the rule that personal jurisdiction can be 
forfeited or waived.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.06(8)(a).   
 
¶42 The only other case DRW cites in support of its claim 
that sovereign immunity can raised at any juncture similarly 
demonstrates DRW's failure to distinguish between subject matter 
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.  See Harrigan v. 
Gilchrist, 121 Wis. 127, 224, 99 N.W. 909 (1904) ("A challenge 
to the jurisdiction of the trial court of the subject matter of 
the action is proper at any time[.]"  (Emphasis added)). 
 
¶43 DRW is not a state agency, so it cannot assert 
sovereign immunity.  Although WEC asserted in its answer that 
sovereign immunity barred "some" of the Wisconsin voters' 
claims, it did not say which ones.  No reasonable judge could 
view WEC's briefing and answers at oral argument as maintaining 
a sovereign immunity defense.  WEC's attorney even said at oral 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
27 
 
argument that WEC takes "no position" on the matter.  Although 
DRW argued sovereign immunity in its brief, WEC's attorney 
demurred at oral argument:  "We did not choose to adopt by 
incorporation or by reference those arguments."  Such statements 
conflict with any claimed refusal to submit to a court's 
jurisdiction. 
 
We 
conclude 
WEC 
knowingly 
abandoned, 
and 
therefore waived, sovereign immunity.   
 
¶44 At best, DRW's objection implicates the court's 
competency, 
which 
lacks 
any 
constitutional 
importance.  
"[S]ubject matter jurisdiction and competence are related but 
distinct concepts."  City of Cedarburg, 390 Wis. 2d 109, ¶49.  
"Subject matter jurisdiction . . . refers 'to the power of 
a . . . court to decide certain types of actions.'"  Booth, 370 
Wis. 2d 595, ¶7 (quoting State v. Smith, 2005 WI 104, ¶18, 283 
Wis. 2d 57, 699 N.W.2d 508).  "In other words, subject matter 
jurisdiction is about the type or category of case brought."  
City 
of 
Cedarburg, 
390 
Wis. 2d 109, 
¶49. 
 
In 
contrast, 
"[c]ompetence . . . is about a court's ability to exercise its 
jurisdiction in an individual case."  Id.  With few exceptions, 
"a circuit court is never without subject matter jurisdiction;" 
however, "[a] circuit court's ability to exercise its subject 
matter jurisdiction in individual cases . . . may be affected by 
noncompliance with statutory requirements pertaining to the 
invocation of that jurisdiction."  See Booth, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 
¶12 (quoting Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶¶1–
2, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190).  Noncompliance with a 
required statutory procedure can trigger a competence question, 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
28 
 
but a lack of competence is not jurisdictional.  City of 
Cedarburg, 390 Wis. 2d 109, ¶47 (citing Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 
¶¶12, 34). 
 
¶45 DRW's argument is underdeveloped, perhaps because it 
spent large swaths of its briefing trying to create a 
constitutional issue when one does not exist.  We need not 
address underdeveloped arguments.  Papa v. Wis. Dep't of Health 
Servs., 2020 WI 66, ¶42 n.15, 393 Wis. 2d 1, 946 N.W.2d 17.  We 
nonetheless choose to resolve this one because of the issue's 
importance in the context of election law. 
 
¶46 DRW cites Wis. Stat. § 5.06, which states, in relevant 
part: 
(1) 
Whenever any elector of a jurisdiction or district 
served by an election official believes that a 
decision or action of the official or the failure 
of the official to act with respect to any matter 
concerning . . . election administration or conduct 
of elections is contrary to law, or the official 
has abused the discretion vested in him or her by 
law with respect to any such matter, the elector 
may file a written sworn complaint with the 
commission requesting that the official be required 
to conform his or her conduct to the law, be 
restrained from taking any action inconsistent with 
the law or be required to correct any action or 
decision inconsistent with the law or any abuse of 
the discretion vested in him or her by law. 
(2) 
No person who is authorized to file a complaint 
under sub. (1), other than the attorney general or 
a district attorney, may commence an action or 
proceeding to test the validity of any decision, 
action or failure to act on the part of any 
election official with respect to any matter 
specified in sub. (1) without first filing a 
complaint under sub. (1), nor prior to disposition 
of the complaint by the commission. . . .  
No. 
2022AP91   
 
29 
 
According to DRW, the law bars the Wisconsin voters' complaint 
against WEC because they did not first file it with WEC.  
Section 5.06, read in context, does not mean what DRW claims.  
See Brey v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 2022 WI 7, ¶11, 400 
Wis. 2d 417, 970 N.W.2d 1 (explaining statutes are read in 
context). 
 
¶47 First, Wis. Stat. § 5.06(1) applies only to complaints 
against 
"election 
official[s]." 
 "Election 
officials" 
are 
specific "individuals" (not "person[s]")22 who are "charged with 
any duties relating to the conduct of an election."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 5.02(4e).  The Wisconsin voters brought this lawsuit against 
WEC, not any individual, alleging WEC's memos do not comport 
with the law.  "In chs. 5 to 10 and 12 [of the Wisconsin 
statutes]," the word "commission" is used to refer to WEC.  Wis. 
Stat. § 5.025.  Section 5.06 does not require voters to complain 
to the "commission" when they believe WEC has violated the law——
only when they believe an "election official" has.  Intuitively, 
this distinction makes sense:  "No man is allowed to be a judge 
in his own cause; because his interest will certainly bias his 
judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity."  The 
Federalist No. 10, at 107 (James Madison) (John C. Hamilton ed., 
1882); see also The Code of Justinian 3.5.1 (Valens, et al. 378) 
("[N]o one shall act as judge in his own case, or interpret the 
law for himself, as it would be very unjust to give anyone the 
                                                 
22 See Wis. Stat. § 990.01(26) ("'Person' includes all 
partnerships, associations and bodies politic or corporate."). 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
30 
 
right to render a decision in an affair which is his own.").  
DRW's reliance on cases involving claims against election 
officials——not WEC——is misplaced.  See Kuechmann v. Sch. Dist. 
of La Crosse, 170 Wis. 2d 218, 487 N.W.2d 639 (Ct. App. 1992). 
 
¶48 Second, the remedies WEC can impose under Wis. Stat. 
§ 5.06(6) would be senseless if they were applied by WEC against 
itself.  Is WEC supposed to "order" itself to "conform" its (not 
"his or her") "conduct to the law"?  § 5.06(1).  Can WEC order 
itself "restrain[ed]" or "require[]" itself to "correct any 
action or decision" it has taken that is "inconsistent with the 
law"?  Id.  The plain language of § 5.06(6) does not contemplate 
giving 
an 
election 
official 
a 
chance 
to 
reconsider 
the 
official's 
position; 
it 
contemplates 
WEC 
issuing 
binding 
directives to such officials. 
 
¶49 Third, the legislature knows how to write a statute 
accomplishing the work DRW would have Wis. Stat. § 5.06 perform.  
See State v. Yakich, 2022 WI 8, ¶24, 400 Wis. 2d 549, 970 
N.W.2d 12 (explaining plain meaning may be derived by looking at 
differences between two statutes and noting "the legislature 
knew how to draft [different] language" (quoting Milwaukee J. 
Sentinel v. City of Milwaukee, 2012 WI 65, ¶¶36–37, 341 
Wis. 2d 607, 815 N.W.2d 367) (modification in the original)).  
For example, Wis. Stat. § 68.09(2), which governs municipal 
administrative review, states, "[a] review under this section 
may be made by the officer, employee, agent, agency, committee, 
board, commission or body who made the initial determination."  
No 
similar 
explicit 
language 
appears 
in 
§ 5.06. 
 
The 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
31 
 
commissioners of WEC guard elections; if the legislature wanted 
the guards to guard themselves, it would have drafted § 5.06 to 
mirror § 68.09(2).23 
 
¶50 Fourth, the Wisconsin voters filed this case under 
Wis. Stat. § 227.40.  Subsection (1) of that statute states, 
"[a] declaratory judgment may be rendered whether or not the 
plaintiff has first requested the agency to pass upon the 
validity of the rule or guidance document in question."  
Although Wis. Stat. § 5.06 could be construed to conflict with 
§ 227.40(1), such a reading would be erroneous.  When reasonably 
possible, we read statutes in harmony, and a harmonious reading 
is quite reasonable in this case.  
See T.L.E.-C., 397 
Wis. 2d 462, ¶30 ("The statutory provisions we construe exist in 
harmony."); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 180 (2012) ("The provisions of a 
text should be interpreted in a way that renders them 
compatible, not contradictory.").  Accordingly, we need not 
consider DRW's argument that § 5.06 is a more specific statute 
that trumps § 227.40.24  See Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. 
                                                 
23 The 
Wisconsin 
voters 
ask, 
"quis 
custodiet 
ipsos 
custodes?"  Translated to English, "who will be guarding the 
guards?"  See The Satires of Juvenal 78 (Rolfe Humphries trans., 
1958) (emphasis removed). 
24 If we were to address the specific-general canon on which 
defendants rely, which statute should govern is unclear.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 5.06 is more specific in the sense that it 
references election disputes, but Wis. Stat. § 227.40 is more 
specific in governing judicial review of administrative rules 
and guidance documents. 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
32 
 
Milwaukee County, 2019 WI 24, ¶11, 385 Wis. 2d 748, 924 
N.W.2d 153 ("Therefore, statutory language is interpreted in the 
context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a 
whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related 
statutes; 
and 
reasonably, 
to 
avoid 
absurd 
or 
unreasonable results."  (quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. 
for 
Dane 
Cnty., 
2004 
WI 58, 
¶46, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
681 
N.W.2d 110)); Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 183 (explaining 
the general-specific canon applies "when conflicting provisions 
simply cannot be reconciled"). 
 
¶51 For each of these reasons, we reject DRW's argument.  
Whether framed in terms of sovereign immunity or competency, it 
fails.  Neither the statutes nor judicial policy precludes this 
court from resolving the Wisconsin voters' claims against WEC. 
B.  The Merits  
¶52 WEC's staff may have been trying to make voting as 
easy as possible during the pandemic, but whatever their 
motivations, 
WEC 
must 
follow 
Wisconsin 
statutes. 
 
Good 
intentions never override the law.25   
                                                 
25 
Justice 
Ann 
Walsh 
Bradley 
accuses 
the 
court 
of 
"erect[ing] yet another barrier for voters," dissent, ¶205, but 
to the extent any "barriers" to voting exist, they are of the 
legislature's making.  Establishing rules governing the casting 
of ballots outside of election day rests solely within the power 
of the people's representatives because such regulations affect 
only the privilege of absentee voting and not the right to vote 
itself.  Justice Ann Walsh Bradley says "[a] ballot drop box is 
a simple and perfectly legal solution to make voting easier[.]"  
Id., ¶207.  While they might be a simple solution, the decision 
to devise solutions to make voting easier belongs to the 
legislature, not WEC and certainly not the judiciary.  While the 
dissenters would permit ballot drop boxes, the court must 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
33 
 
1.  Legislative Policy Directs Us to Take a Skeptical View of 
Absentee Voting 
¶53 Subchapter IV of chapter 6 of the Wisconsin statutes 
begins with a statement of legislative policy that cannot be 
reconciled with the statements of policy contained in WEC's 
memos: 
LEGISLATIVE POLICY.  The legislature finds that voting is 
a constitutional right, the vigorous exercise of which 
should be strongly encouraged.  In contrast, voting by 
absentee ballot is a 
privilege exercised wholly 
outside the traditional safeguards of the polling 
place.  The legislature finds that the privilege of 
voting by absentee ballot must be carefully regulated 
to prevent the potential for fraud or abuse; to 
prevent overzealous solicitation of absent electors 
who may prefer not to participate in an election; to 
prevent undue influence on an absent elector to vote 
for or against a candidate or to cast a particular 
vote in a referendum; or other similar abuses. 
Wis. Stat. § 6.84(1); see also Mays v. LaRose, 951 F.3d 775, 792 
(6th Cir. 2020) ("[T]here is no constitutional right to an 
absentee ballot."  (citing McDonald v. Bd. of Elections Comm'rs 
of 
Chi., 
394 
U.S. 802, 
807–09 
(1969)). 
 
The 
statutory 
requirements governing absentee voting 
must be completely 
satisfied or ballots may not be counted: 
INTERPRETATION.  Notwithstanding s. 5.01 (1), with 
respect to matters relating to the absentee ballot 
process, ss. 6.86, 6.87 (3) to (7) and 9.01 (1) (b) 2. 
and 4. shall be construed as mandatory.  Ballots cast 
in contravention of the procedures specified in those 
provisions may not be counted.  Ballots counted in 
contravention of the procedures specified in those 
provisions may not be included in the certified result 
of any election. 
                                                                                                                                                             
respect the constitutional restraints on our power and refuse to 
act as a super-legislature.  It poses a grave threat to 
democracy to mislead the people into believing we are one. 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
34 
 
§ 6.84(2). 
 
"[M]andatory" 
election 
requirements 
"must 
be 
strictly adhered to" and "strictly observed."  State ex rel. 
Ahlgrimm v. State Elections Bd., 82 Wis. 2d 585, 592–93, 263 
N.W.2d 152 (1978).   
 
¶54 Despite these provisions, no defendant can point to 
any 
statute 
authorizing 
ballot 
drop 
boxes; 
instead, 
the 
defendants argue no statute expressly prohibits them.  The 
absence of an express prohibition, however, does not mean drop 
boxes comport with "the procedures specified" in the election 
laws.  Wis. Stat. § 6.84(2).  Nothing in the statutory language 
detailing the procedures by which absentee ballots may be cast 
mentions drop boxes or anything like them.   
2.  Ballot Drop Boxes Are Unauthorized by Law  
 
¶55 Wisconsin Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. provides, in relevant 
part, that absentee ballots "shall be mailed by the elector, or 
delivered in person, to the municipal clerk issuing the ballot 
or ballots."  The prepositional phrase "to the municipal clerk" 
is key and must be given effect.  Wisconsin Stat. § 5.02(10) 
defines "municipal clerk" as "the city clerk, town clerk, 
village clerk and the executive director of the city election 
commission 
and 
their 
authorized 
representatives. 
 
Where 
applicable, 'municipal clerk' also includes the clerk of a school 
district."  An inanimate object, such as a ballot drop box, 
cannot be the municipal clerk.  At a minimum, accordingly, 
dropping a ballot into an unattended drop box is not delivery 
"to the municipal clerk[.]" 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
35 
 
 
¶56 Wisconsin Stat. § 6.855 further shows the unlawfulness 
of ballot drop boxes.  Subsection (1) of that statute states: 
The governing body of a municipality may elect to 
designate a site other than the office of the 
municipal clerk or board of election commissioners as 
the location from which electors of the municipality 
may request and vote absentee ballots and to which 
voted absentee ballots shall be returned by electors 
for any election.  The designated site shall be 
located as near as practicable to the office of the 
municipal clerk or board of election commissioners and 
no site may be designated that affords an advantage to 
any political party.  An election by a governing body 
to designate an alternate site under this section 
shall be made no fewer than 14 days prior to the time 
that absentee ballots are available for the primary 
under s. 7.15 (1) (cm), if a primary is scheduled to 
be held, or at least 14 days prior to the time that 
absentee ballots are available for the election under 
s. 7.15 (1) (cm), if a primary is not scheduled to be 
held, and shall remain in effect until at least the 
day after the election.  If the governing body of a 
municipality makes an election under this section, no 
function related to voting and return of absentee 
ballots that is to be conducted at the alternate site 
may be conducted in the office of the municipal clerk 
or board of election commissioners. 
Subsection (3) declares an alternate absentee ballot site must 
be "staffed by the municipal clerk or the executive director of 
the board of election commissioners, or employees of the clerk 
or the board of election commissioners."  Subsection (5) allows 
the establishment of multiple alternate sites. 
 
¶57 Ballot drop boxes are not alternate absentee ballot 
sites under Wis. Stat. § 6.855 because a voter can only return 
the voter's absentee ballot to a drop box, while an alternate 
site must also allow voters to request and vote absentee at the 
site.  If a drop box were an alternate ballot site, by the plain 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
36 
 
language of the statute, "no function related to voting and 
return of absentee ballots that is to be conducted at the 
alternate site may be conducted in the office of the municipal 
clerk or board of election commissioners."  § 6.855(1).  The 
defendants do not advance this construction of the statutes. 
 
¶58 If ballot drop boxes are not alternate absentee ballot 
sites, "what [are] they?"  Trump v. Biden, 2020 WI 91, ¶101, 394 
Wis. 2d 629, 951 N.W.2d 568 (Roggensack, C.J., dissenting).  
Existing outside the statutory parameters for voting, drop boxes 
are a novel creation of executive branch officials, not the 
legislature.  The legislature enacted a detailed statutory 
construct for alternate sites.  In contrast, the details of the 
drop box scheme are found nowhere in the statutes, but only in 
memos prepared by WEC staff, who did not cite any statutes 
whatsoever to support their invention. 
 
¶59 Wisconsin Stat. § 6.855 identifies the sites at which 
in person absentee voting may be accomplished——either "the 
office of the municipal clerk" or "an alternate site" but not 
both.  "An alternate site" serves as a replacement for "the 
office of the municipal clerk" rather than an additional site 
for absentee voting.  Wisconsin Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. requires 
the elector to mail the absentee ballot or deliver it in person, 
"to 
the 
municipal 
clerk," 
which 
is 
defined 
to 
include 
"authorized representatives."  This subparagraph contemplates 
only two ways to vote absentee:  by mail and at "the office of 
the municipal clerk" or "an alternate site" as statutorily 
described.  No third option exists. 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
37 
 
¶60 Other election statutes are similarly silent on any 
other method of voting absentee other than by mail or at the 
office of the municipal clerk.  Wisconsin Stat. § 5.81(3) 
provides, in relevant part:  "If a municipality utilizes an 
electronic voting system in which ballots distributed to 
electors are employed, absentee ballots may consist of ballots 
utilized with the system or paper ballots and envelopes voted in 
person in the office of the municipal clerk or voted by mail."  
The statute states, "absentee ballots may consist of" and then 
describes ballots cast "in person in the office of the municipal 
clerk" and ballots "voted by mail."  § 5.81(3).  The legislature 
did not contemplate absentee ballots "consist[ing]" of ballots 
cast via a drop box.   
 
¶61 In Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. the prepositional phrase, 
"to the municipal clerk," modifies both the clause "mailed by 
the elector," i.e., absentee ballots "shall be mailed by the 
elector . . . to the municipal clerk" as well as "delivered in 
person."  The defendants contend "to the municipal clerk" 
encompasses unstaffed drop boxes maintained by the municipal 
clerk.  A hyper-literal interpretation of this prepositional 
phrase, taken out of context, would permit voters to mail or 
personally deliver absentee ballots to the personal residence of 
the municipal clerk or even hand the municipal clerk absentee 
ballots at the grocery store.  "Municipal clerk," however, 
denotes a public office, held by a public official acting in an 
official capacity when performing statutory duties such as 
accepting ballots.  The statutes do not authorize the municipal 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
38 
 
clerk to perform any official duties related to the acceptance 
of ballots at any location beyond those statutorily prescribed. 
¶62  The fairest interpretation of the phrase "to the 
municipal clerk" means mailing or delivering the absentee ballot 
to the municipal clerk at her office or, if designated under 
Wis. Stat. § 6.855, an alternate site.  "Properly applied, the 
plain-meaning approach is not 'literalistic'; rather, the 
ascertainment of meaning involves a 'process of analysis' 
focused on deriving the fair meaning of the text itself."  Brey, 
400 Wis. 2d 417, ¶11 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶46, 52).  
Adopting a literalistic interpretation instead of applying the 
fair meaning of "to the municipal clerk" would similarly subject 
any "authorized representative" of the municipal clerk to the 
same intrusions of accepting ballots wherever a voter may find 
the municipal clerk's representative.  Wis. Stat. § 5.02(10).  
Interpreting Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. to permit such methods of 
casting an absentee ballot would contravene the legislative 
policy expressed in Wis. Stat. § 6.84(1) and border on the 
absurd.  See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 217 ("A preamble, 
purpose clause, or recital is a permissible indicator of 
meaning."). 
 
¶63 Notwithstanding the detailed and unambiguous language 
of Wis. Stat. §§ 6.84 and 6.855, WEC asks this court to conclude 
the legislature "hid[] [an] elephant[] in [a] mousehole[.]"  See 
Whitman v. Amer. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) 
(citations omitted).  Coined by Justice Antonin Scalia, this 
turn of phrase means the legislature "does not alter the 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
39 
 
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or 
ancillary provisions[.]"  Id.; see also Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 
¶¶53–56.  WEC would have us believe, hiding within four words, 
"to the municipal clerk," is an expansive conception of voting 
methods never before recognized.  We decline to read into the 
statutes a monumentally different voting mechanism not specified 
by the legislature.  See E.P.A. v. EME Homer City Generation, 
L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 528 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It 
would be extraordinary for Congress, by use of the single word 
'significantly,' 
to 
transmogrify 
a 
statute 
that 
assigns 
responsibility on the basis of amounts of pollutants emitted 
into a statute authorizing EPA to reduce interstate pollution in 
the manner that it believes most efficient."). 
 
¶64 WEC and DRW argue the drop box "elephant" is, in fact, 
no elephant at all.  WEC claims "the Commission did not create 
[ballot] drop boxes.  The March 2020 memorandum provided 
guidance in response to clerks' inquiries about their use, and 
there is testamentary evidence that drop boxes were used in 
Wisconsin before the August 2020 memorandum."  Of course "there 
is . . . evidence" drop boxes were used before the issuance of 
Memo two because WEC issued Memo one in March, which comes 
before August.   
 
¶65 The record evidence WEC cited does not support its 
argument that ballot drop boxes have been in common and 
longstanding use in this state.  First, WEC cites Memo one, 
which says, "clerks have inquired about options for ensuring 
that the maximum number of ballots are returned to be counted 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
40 
 
for the April 7, 2020 election."  This statement suggests a 
state of uncertainty surrounding the legality of drop boxes, 
rather than documenting their ostensibly extensive use.   
 
¶66 Second, WEC cites a third memo prepared by WEC's 
staff, responding to a recent study by the Legislative Audit 
Bureau (LAB), a non-partisan institution.  In this report, LAB 
concluded 
WEC 
had 
overstepped 
its 
lawful 
authority 
by 
authorizing ballot drop boxes.26  Citing no evidence, this third 
memo proclaims "[t]he use of ballot drop boxes at the local 
level in Wisconsin, and elsewhere in the country, predates the 
Wisconsin 
Election 
Commission's . . . August 
19, 
2020, 
memorandum on the topic[.]"  For support, WEC noted, "no 
Wisconsin court has foreclosed the idea of lawfully using 
absentee ballot drop boxes," expressly referencing this very 
case and adding, "[t]he case is ongoing and no resolution has 
been reached at this time."  For this third memo to be given any 
weight would require us to hold a government agency can be sued 
and then issue what amounts to a press release that it can cite 
as support for its interpretation of law. 
                                                 
26 Legislative 
Audit 
Bureau, 
Elections 
Administration 
(2021), 
https://legis.wisconsin.gov/lab/media/3288/21-
19full.pdf; see also Off. of the Special Couns., Second Interim 
Investigative Report on the Apparatus & Procedures of the 
Wisconsin 
Elections 
System 
78 
(Mar. 
1, 
2022), 
https://legis.wisconsin.gov/assembly/22/brandtjen/media/1552/osc
-second-interim-report.pdf ("In Wisconsin, election officials' 
unprecedented use of absentee ballot drop boxes facially 
violated Wisconsin law."). 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
41 
 
 
¶67 Third, WEC cites its own website, which has a page 
that is not significantly different than the third memo.  The 
page bears the heading "[w]hy did WEC allow clerks to use drop 
boxes 
for 
absentee 
ballots?" 
 
WEC 
offers 
the 
following 
conclusory statement:  "some clerks have used them prior to 
2020" but supplies no evidence. 
¶68 Lastly, WEC (along with DRW) cites an affidavit from 
Administrator Wolfe as evidence of the supposedly "extensive 
history" of ballot drop boxes in Wisconsin.  The affidavit 
merely says, "[t]he use of absentee ballot drop boxes in the 
United States predates the [COVID-19] pandemic."  Again, 
Administrator 
Wolfe 
offers 
no 
evidence 
to 
support 
this 
statement.  Even if the assertions regarding the historical use 
of ballot boxes were true, they are irrelevant.  Longstanding 
noncompliance with the law does not cure its illegality. 
 
¶69 Perhaps 
realizing 
"delivery 
in 
person[] 
to 
the 
municipal clerk" does not mean nor has it been historically 
understood to mean delivery to an unattended ballot drop box, 
the defendants analogize these boxes to a mailbox.  Of course, 
the law expressly allows a voter to place an absentee ballot in 
a mailbox.  Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. ("shall be mailed by the 
elector . . . ."). 
 
Ballot 
drop 
boxes, 
however, 
are 
not 
mailboxes. 
 
¶70 The ordinary meaning of "mailed by the elector" in 
Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. contemplates involvement by a third-
party mail carrier.  The very next sentence of the statute 
declares, "[i]f the envelope is mailed from a location outside 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
42 
 
the United States, the elector shall affix sufficient postage 
unless the ballot qualifies for delivery free of postage under 
federal law."  § 6.87(4)(b)1.  To affix postage to an absentee 
ballot placed in a ballot drop box would be a waste of a 
perfectly good stamp.  Similarly, § 6.87(3)(a) directs, in 
relevant part, "the municipal clerk shall mail the absentee 
ballot to the elector's residence . . . .  If the ballot is 
mailed, and the ballot qualifies for mailing free of postage 
under federal free postage laws, the clerk shall affix the 
appropriate 
legend 
required 
by 
U.S. 
postal 
regulation.  
Otherwise, the clerk shall pay the postage required[.]"  In 
common parlance, "mail" may encompass delivery services by 
private businesses such as FedEx or UPS, in addition to the 
United States Postal Service.27 
 
¶71 If there were any lingering doubt about the difference 
between drop boxes and mailing, drop boxes trigger the very 
concerns the legislature expressly seeks to avoid.  "[V]oting by 
absentee ballot is a privilege exercised wholly outside the 
traditional safeguards of the polling place.  The legislature 
finds that the privilege of voting by absentee ballot must be 
carefully regulated to prevent the potential for fraud or 
abuse[.]"  Wis. Stat. § 6.84(1).  As the Wisconsin voters argue, 
"a drop box contains only ballots, and lots of them in one place 
                                                 
27 The plain meaning of "mail" supports this conclusion.  
See Mail, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 1083 (3d ed. 1992) ("To send by mail;" "Materials, such 
as letters and packages, handled in a postal system."). 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
43 
 
at the same time, making it a prime target for would-be 
tamperers, whereas mailboxes may or may not contain ballots at 
any given time."  While the legislature has recognized absentee 
voting has many benefits for voters, the legislature has also 
enacted safeguards designed to minimize the possibility of 
fraud. 
 
"Voting 
fraud 
is 
a 
serious 
problem 
in 
U.S. 
elections[,] . . . and it is facilitated by absentee voting.  In 
this respect absentee voting is to voting in person as a take-
home exam is to a proctored one."  Griffin v. Roupas, 385 
F.3d 1128, 1130–31 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). 
 
¶72 We conclude WEC's staff erred by authorizing a voting 
mechanism not authorized by law.  The memos created a ballot 
drop box scheme entirely absent from Wisconsin's election code.  
The legislature's "carefully regulated" procedures for absentee 
voting do not permit voting via ballot drop boxes. 
3.  "[I]n Person" Absentee Voting Requires the Voter to 
Personally Deliver the Ballot to the Municipal Clerk 
 
¶73 WEC's staff also erred in Memo one by stating "[a] 
family member or another person may . . . return the ballot on 
behalf of the voter," i.e., an agent of the voter may place the 
voter's absentee ballot in a drop box.  The law does not permit 
this.  Wisconsin Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. states, in relevant part, 
"[t]he envelope shall be mailed by the elector, or delivered in 
person, to the municipal clerk issuing the ballot or ballots."  
(Emphasis added.)  The key phrase is "in person" and it must be 
assigned its natural meaning. 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
44 
 
 
¶74 "[I]n person" denotes "bodily presence" and the 
concept of doing something personally.  in person, The Oxford 
English Dictionary 598 (2d. ed. 1989) (defining "in person" as 
"with or by one's own action or bodily presence; personally; 
oneself"); Person, Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
1686 (2002) ("bodily presence —— usu. used in the phrase in 
person"); in person, The Random House Dictionary of the English 
Language 1445 (2d ed. 1987) ("in one's own bodily presence; 
personally; Applicants are requested to apply in person."). 
 
¶75 As used throughout Wisconsin's election code, the 
phrase "in person" refers to a voter acting directly, not 
through an agent.  See 5 Wis. Att'y Gen. 591, 592 (1916) ("The 
statute says:  'Application for such ballot shall be made in 
person.'  (Sec. 11.56.)  The ordinary meaning of the phrase 'in 
person' is that the request must come directly from the elector 
who was corporally present before the clerk.").  For example, 
Wis. Stat. § 6.86(1)(a) states, in relevant part: 
(a) 
Any elector of a municipality who is registered to 
vote whenever required and who qualifies under ss. 
6.20 and 6.85 as an absent elector may make written 
application 
to 
the 
municipal 
clerk 
of 
that 
municipality for an official ballot by one of the 
following methods: 
1. 
By mail. 
2. 
In person at the office of the municipal clerk 
or at an alternate site under s. 6.855, if 
applicable. 
 . . . . 
4. 
By agent as provided in sub. (3). 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
45 
 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Section 
6.86(1)(a) 
unequivocally 
distinguishes between "in person" and "by agent."  Subsection 
(3) then begins by stating, "[a]ny elector who is registered and 
who is hospitalized, may apply for and obtain an official ballot 
by agent."  § 6.86(3)(a)1. (Emphasis added.)  It then describes 
the process of receiving a ballot by agent.  The legislature 
obviously knows how to authorize a voter to act through an 
agent; it used such language in § 6.86 but not Wis. Stat. 
§ 6.87.  See Yakich, 400 Wis. 2d 549, ¶24 (quoting Milwaukee J. 
Sentinel, 341 Wis. 2d 607, ¶¶36–37). 
 
¶76 Other election statutes also explicitly describe an 
agency relationship.  For example, the phrase "municipal clerk" 
includes "authorized representatives." Wis. Stat. § 5.02(10) 
("'Municipal clerk' means the city clerk, town clerk, village 
clerk and the executive director of the city election commission 
and 
their 
authorized 
representatives. 
 
Where 
applicable, 
'municipal 
clerk' 
also 
includes 
the 
clerk 
of 
a 
school 
district."); see also § 5.02(2) ("'County clerk' includes the 
executive director of the county board of election commissioners 
and their authorized representatives."). 
 
¶77 Unlike "municipal clerk," the definition of "elector" 
does not encompass an agency relationship.  Wis. Stat. § 6.02(1) 
("Every U.S. citizen age 18 or older who has resided in an 
election district or ward for 28 consecutive days before any 
election where the citizen offers to vote is an eligible 
elector."); see also Wis. Stat. § 6.85(1) ("An absent elector is 
any otherwise qualified elector who for any reason is unable or 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
46 
 
unwilling to appear at the polling place in his or her ward or 
election 
district."); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 5.02(12n) 
("'Overseas 
elector' means a U.S. citizen who is residing outside of the 
United States, who is not disqualified from voting under s. 
6.03, who has attained or will attain the age of 18 by the date 
of an election at which the citizen proposes to vote, who was 
last domiciled in this state or whose parent was last domiciled 
in this state immediately prior to the parent's departure from 
the United States, and who is not registered to vote or voting 
in any other state, territory, or possession."). 
 
¶78 WEC does not address this dispositive statutory 
distinction 
between 
"in 
person" 
and 
"by 
agent," 
instead 
primarily emphasizing the presence of the passive voice in Wis. 
Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1.:  "The envelope shall be . . . delivered in 
person[.]"  In support of its argument, WEC quotes a Seventh 
Circuit decision as stating:  "a legislature's use of the 
passive voice sometimes reflects indifference to the actor."  
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 479 (7th Cir. 
2016), aff’d, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018).  The paragraph from which 
WEC selectively seized that sentence defeats WEC's position: 
It's true that a legislature's use of the passive 
voice sometimes reflects indifference to the actor.  
See Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572, 129 
S.Ct. 1849, 173 L.Ed.2d 785 (2009) ("The passive voice 
focuses on an event that occurs without respect to a 
specific actor. . . .").  But attributing indifference 
to Congress in this instance would be inconsistent 
with the FSIA's statutory declaration of purpose, 
which 
explicitly 
invokes 
the 
international 
law 
understanding of foreign sovereign immunity:  "Under 
international law, states are not immune from the 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
47 
 
jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their 
commercial 
activities 
are 
concerned, 
and 
their 
commercial property may be levied upon for the 
satisfaction of judgments rendered against them in 
connection with their commercial activities."  28 
U.S.C. § 1602[.] 
Id. 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
Rubin 
suggests 
the 
statement 
of 
legislative policy in Wis. Stat. § 6.84 is a better indicator of 
statutory meaning than the passive voice used in § 6.87(4)(b)1.   
 
¶79 A case cited by DRW is likewise unpersuasive because 
it pre-dates Wis. Stat. § 6.84.  In Sommerfeld v. Board of 
Canvassers of the City of St. Francis, 18 absentee "voters did 
not return . . . absentee ballots in the envelopes by mail, or 
deliver[] the same in person, as provided by [a predecessor 
statute], but caused the same to be returned to the Clerk of the 
City of St. Francis by a third person, who returned the sealed 
envelopes to the said Clerk."  269 Wis. 299, 301, 69 N.W.2d 235 
(1955).  A majority of this court concluded:   
If our statute is construed to mean that the voter 
shall himself mail the ballot or personally deliver it 
to the clerk, then the statute would defeat itself in 
the case of those who are sick or physically disabled.  
They would be unable to mail ballots except through an 
agent.  Having made provision that these unfortunate 
people 
can 
vote, 
we 
cannot 
believe 
that 
the 
legislature meant to disenfranchise them by providing 
a condition that they could not possibly perform. 
Id. at 303.  To the extent Sommerfeld has any relevance, it too 
undercuts the defendants' arguments. 
 
¶80 First, 
the 
legislature 
superseded 
Sommerfeld's 
conclusion in 1986 by adopting Wis. Stat. § 6.84.  1985 Wis. Act 
304, § 68n.  Section 6.84(2) provides that "with respect to 
matters relating to the absentee ballot process," several 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
48 
 
statutes, including § 6.87(4), "shall be construed as mandatory.  
Ballots cast in contravention of the procedures specified in 
those provisions may not be counted.  Ballots counted in 
contravention of the procedures specified in those provisions 
may not be included in the certified result of any election."  
The adoption of § 6.84 renders Sommerfeld a nullity.  The 
majority in that case relied on a different statutory provision:  
"Section 5.011 provides that Title II shall be construed so as 
to give effect to the will of the electors, if that can be 
ascertained, notwithstanding informality or failure to comply 
with some of its provisions."28  Sommerfeld, 269 Wis. at 302. 
 
¶81 The Sommerfeld majority deemed the in person delivery 
requirement "directory only," so it reasoned "a delivery of 
ballots by agent is a substantial compliance" permitting the 
counting of the ballots.  Id. at 304.  In election law, "[t]he 
difference 
between 
mandatory 
and 
directory 
provisions 
of 
election statutes lies in the consequence of nonobservance:  an 
act done in violation of a mandatory provision is void, whereas 
an act done in violation of a directory provision, while 
improper, may nevertheless be valid."  Id. at 303 (quoting 29 
C.J.S. § 214).  Much of the majority opinion in Sommerfeld is 
spent explaining why the majority deemed the relevant statute 
merely directory and describing the "complaint" as "purely 
                                                 
28 See Wis. Stat. § 5.01(1) ("Except as otherwise provided, 
chs. 5 to 12 shall be construed to give effect to the will of 
the electors, if that can be ascertained from the proceedings, 
notwithstanding informality or failure to fully comply with some 
of their provisions."). 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
49 
 
technical."  Id. at 304.  This entire discussion of how to 
classify a statute——mandatory or directory——seemed to rest on 
the assumption that the statute was not followed; if the statute 
were followed, the majority would not have needed to declare the 
law merely directory. 
 
¶82 Three 
justices 
dissented, 
offering 
a 
statutory 
interpretation consistent with our reading of Wis. Stat. 
§ 6.87(4)(b)1.  The dissent defined "in person" as "[b]y one's 
self; with bodily presence."  Id. at 304 (Gehl, J., dissenting) 
(quoting in person, Webster's New International Dictionary (2d 
ed. 1934)).  It then noted, "[h]ad the legislature intended that 
the ballot might be delivered by a representative, it might 
easily have so declared."  Id.  "Nothing is found in the 
statutes concerning absentee voting that indicates legislative 
disposition to permit the absentee ballot to be delivered by 
agent."  Id. at 305. 
 
¶83 Reading the election statutes in context and as a 
whole, we conclude an absentee ballot delivered in person under 
Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. must be delivered personally by the 
voter.  Unlike Wis. Stat. § 6.86, which allows the receipt of an 
absentee ballot through an agent under particular circumstances 
and 
subject 
to 
detailed 
procedures, 
no 
similar 
language 
authorizes voters not meeting the exceptions outlined under 
§ 6.86 to cast a ballot through delivery by an agent.   
IV.  FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
 
¶84 DRW argues federal law preempts the circuit court's 
interpretation 
of 
Wisconsin 
statutes. 
 
It 
cites 
52 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
50 
 
U.S.C. § 10508 (2018), which provides, "[a]ny voter who requires 
assistance to vote by reason of blindness, disability, or 
inability to read or write may be given assistance by a person 
of the voter's choice[.]"  DRW claims "[t]he assistance 
addressed [in this statute] . . . extends to returning that 
ballot so it may be counted."  DRW's discussion of § 10508 is 
limited to one paragraph in its opening brief.  It cites nothing 
more than a single source of legislative history for support.  
DRW selectively quotes from this report, omitting the first 
sentence of the paragraph on which it relies, which states:  
"STATE PROVISIONS WOULD BE PREEMPTED ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT 
THEY UNDULY BURDEN THE RIGHT RECOGNIZED IN THIS SECTION, WITH 
THAT DETERMINATION BEING A PRACTICAL ONE DEPENDENT UPON THE 
FACTS."  See S. Rep. No. 97-417 (1982), 97th Cong., 2d Sess. at 
63.  Additionally, DRW does not address Wis. Stat. § 6.87(5), 
which states: 
If the absent elector declares that he or she is 
unable to read, has difficulty in reading, writing or 
understanding English or due to disability is unable 
to mark his or her ballot, the elector may select any 
individual, except the elector's employer or an agent 
of that employer or an officer or agent of a labor 
organization which represents the elector, to assist 
in marking the ballot, and the assistant shall then 
sign his or her name to a certification on the back of 
the ballot, as provided under s. 5.55. 
The language of this subsection is similar to § 10508.  
 
¶85 DRW also cites the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), but, similarly, its discussion of the ADA is limited to a 
single paragraph in its opening brief.  DRW does not cite any 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
51 
 
binding cases supporting its preemption argument, nor does DRW 
discuss preemption in its reply brief, even though the Wisconsin 
voters complained the argument was underdeveloped.   
 
¶86 As far as we can discern, DRW's argument largely rests 
on the practical impact of the circuit court's declarations on 
disabled voters who may be physically unable to vote if someone 
cannot place an absentee ballot in the mail on a voter's behalf.  
We agree with the Wisconsin voters that DRW's argument is 
underdeveloped.  See State v. Gracia, 2013 WI 15, ¶28 n.13, 345 
Wis. 2d 488, 826 N.W.2d 87 (explaining we do not have to address 
underdeveloped arguments (cited source omitted)); see also In re 
Disciplinary 
Proc. 
Against 
Johns, 
2014 
WI 
32, 
¶45, 
353 
Wis. 2d 746, 847 N.W.2d 179 (per curiam) ("The OLR ignores the 
topic in its reply brief. . . .  We take this lack of reply by 
the OLR as a concession[.]" (cited source omitted)).  Because 
"[p]reemption . . . is disfavored 'in the absence of persuasive 
reasons,'" the shallowness of the argument undermines it.  See 
Town of Delafield, 392 Wis. 2d 427, ¶6 (quoting Chi. & N.W. 
Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981)).  
Whatever 
accommodations 
federal 
law 
requires, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 6.87(5) 
seems 
to 
permit 
them. 
 
See 
also 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 6.87(4)(b)1. ("The elector may receive assistance under sub. 
(5).").  We address the argument no further. 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
52 
 
V.  CONCLUSION29 
 
¶87 Only the legislature may permit absentee voting via 
ballot drop boxes.  WEC cannot.  Ballot drop boxes appear 
nowhere in the detailed statutory system for absentee voting.  
WEC's authorization of ballot drop boxes was unlawful, and we 
therefore affirm the circuit court's declarations and permanent 
injunction of WEC's erroneous interpretations of law except to 
the extent its remedies required absentee voters to personally 
mail their ballots, an issue we do not decide at this time, and 
we decline to decide at this time whether the memos are also 
invalid as unpromulgated administrative rules.  
By the Court.——The judgment and order of the Circuit Court 
is affirmed. 
                                                 
29 "Finally, and most importantly, the dissent's resort to 
[ad hominem attacks on the majority] is a poor substitute for 
legal argument.  Such personal aspersions have no place in a 
judicial opinion. . . .  [It] do[es] real damage to the public's 
perception of this court's work.  We must aspire to be better 
models 
of 
respectful 
dialogue 
to 
preserve 
the 
public's 
confidence on which this court's legitimacy relies."  Becker v. 
Dane County, 2022 WI __, ¶44, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ 
(Karofsky, J.).  Although Justice Jill J. Karofsky recently 
complained about the tone of a dissent she deemed too harsh 
(joined by Justice Hagedorn, who does not join this footnote), 
she nevertheless joins a dissent that accuses her colleagues of 
"blithely and erroneously seek[ing] to sow distrust in the 
administration of our elections and through its faulty analysis 
erect[ing] yet another barrier for voters[.]"  Dissent, ¶205.  
The dissent continues, "[s]uch a result, although lamentable, is 
not a surprise from this court.  It has seemingly taken the 
opportunity to make it harder to vote or to inject confusion 
into the process whenever it has been presented with the 
opportunity. . . .  [W]ithout justification [the majority] fans 
the flames of electoral doubt that threaten our democracy."  
Id., ¶¶206, 208.  Political talking points are no substitute for 
legal analysis. 
No. 
2022AP91   
 
53 
 
 
 
 
No.  2022AP991.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶88 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   (concurring).  The 
majority 
opinion 
concludes 
that 
the 
Wisconsin 
Elections 
Commission's (WEC) documents (hereinafter memos) are invalid 
because ballot drop boxes are not legal in Wisconsin and because 
absentee ballots must be personally delivered by the voter to 
the municipal clerk at the clerk's office.  I agree, and join 
the majority opinion.  I write further to explain that, under 
Wisconsin statutes, it is the elector who shall mail the 
absentee ballot to the municipal clerk.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully concur.   
I.  BACKGROUND1 
¶89 During the COVID-19 pandemic, citizens of Wisconsin 
were advised to avoid large crowds and to socially distance from 
each other.  This advice changed the way that many citizens 
participated in personal tasks.  For example, during the 2020 
Spring election, many voters opted to vote absentee and absentee 
voting increased.   
¶90 The WEC issued multiple memos, which were directed at 
municipal clerks and election officials.  Relevant to our 
discussion, the first memo stated, among other things, that "[a] 
family member or another person may . . . return the ballot on 
behalf of a voter."  The "return" that was described referred to 
returns to drop boxes.  Both memos focused on drop boxes, 
describing their appearance, their locations and that they may 
be used by voters "without having to mail [ballots] back."  Drop 
                                                 
1 The majority opinion capably sets out the background 
underlying this controversy.  Therefore, I describe here only 
that which is necessary to understand my writing below. 
No.  2022AP991.pdr 
 
2 
 
boxes were suggested as an alternative to mailing ballots for 
"voters [] motivated by lack of trust in the postal process, 
fear that their ballot could be tampered with, or concern that 
their information will be exposed.  Voters may also be concerned 
about ensuring that their ballot is returned in time to be 
counted."2   
¶91 Based on the WEC memos, Richard Teigen and Richard 
Thom (collectively Teigen), filed suit seeking, in part, 
declaratory judgment under Wis. Stat. § 806.04, which provides 
that any person "whose rights, status or other legal relations 
are affected by a statute . . . may have determined any question 
of 
construction 
or 
validity 
arising 
under 
the . . . statute . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, 
status or other legal relations thereunder."  § 806.04(2).  
Teigen asserted that the WEC's memos violated the provisions of 
Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. and Wis. Stat. § 6.855(1); that his 
voting rights were affected by these statutes; and Teigen sought 
to 
have 
a 
court 
declare 
the 
correct 
construction 
of 
§ 6.87(4)(b)1.   
¶92 After 
intervention 
by 
the 
Democratic 
Senatorial 
Campaign 
Committee 
(DSCC), 
as 
well 
as 
Disability 
Rights 
Wisconsin, Wisconsin Faith Voices for Justice, and the League of 
Women Voters of Wisconsin (collectively DRW), Teigen moved for 
summary judgment, setting out what Teigen alleged was the proper 
construction of Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1.  The circuit court 
held a hearing in which it orally granted Teigen's motion in 
                                                 
2 WEC memo August 19, 2020.  
No.  2022AP991.pdr 
 
3 
 
full.  The court explained that, unlike voting in person, voting 
by absentee ballot is "a privilege exercised wholly outside the 
traditional safeguards of the polling place."  It further 
concluded that the legislature required that absentee voting 
must be carefully regulated to "prevent the potential for fraud 
or abuse, to prevent overzealous solicitation of absent electors 
who may prefer not to participate in an election, to prevent 
undue influence on the absent elector to vote for or against a 
candidate, or to cast a particular vote in a referendum or other 
similar abuses."   
¶93 In regard to whom may return an absentee ballot, the 
circuit court explained that "[it did not] see any language in 
the statute that provides a basis for having agents, somebody 
other than the elector, actually deliver the ballot."  Further, 
in quoting the portion of the memo that purported to allow 
family members or other persons to return a ballot on behalf of 
the voter, the court concluded that it did not "see anything in 
the statute that says that.  In reading the statute, the statute 
is clear.  It's not ambiguous.  It's not necessary to go to 
outside sources to determine how . . . return of the ballot is 
addressed."  In its judgment, the court was satisfied that the 
"portions of the [memo] that address that other people may bring 
the ballot in, it doesn't have to be the elector, are contrary 
to the statute."   
¶94 The 
court 
declared 
that 
the 
WEC's 
memos 
were 
inconsistent with state statutes and specifically concluded that 
an elector must personally mail or deliver his or her own 
No.  2022AP991.pdr 
 
4 
 
absentee ballot, except when otherwise specifically authorized 
by law.  The defendants appealed this ruling to the court of 
appeals.  Teigen filed a petition to bypass the court of 
appeals, which we granted.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Standard of Review  
¶95 I review Teigen's claim for declaratory relief under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.04 and I apply Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. in 
regard to mailing absentee ballots.  Therefore, I interpret the 
statutes at issue.  We interpret and apply statutes as questions 
of 
law 
subject 
to 
our 
independent 
determination, 
while 
benefitting from the decision of the circuit court.  Townsend v. 
ChartSwap, LLC, 2021 WI 86, ¶11, 399 Wis. 2d 599, 967 N.W.2d 21.  
B. Statutory Interpretation 
¶96 "[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
determine what the statute means . . . ."  State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  Judicial deference to the policy choices 
enacted into law by the legislature requires that statutory 
interpretation focus primarily on the language of the statute.  
We assume that the legislature's intent is expressed in the 
statutory language.  Id.  Therefore, statutory interpretation 
begins with the words that the legislature chose.  If the 
meanings of the words are plain and unambiguous, the court's 
inquiry ends and there is no need to consult extrinsic sources 
of interpretation, such as legislative history.  Id., ¶¶45, 46.   
No.  2022AP991.pdr 
 
5 
 
¶97 In addition to examining the plain words of the text, 
context is part of a plain meaning interpretation.  "So, too, is 
the structure of the statute in which the operative language 
appears."  Id., ¶46.  Therefore, rather than in isolation, 
"statutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is 
used; . . . in relation to the language of surrounding or 
closely-related statutes; . . . to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results; [and] read, where possible to give effect to every 
word, in order to avoid surplusage."  Id.   
¶98 It is consistent with the plain-meaning rule "to 
consider the intrinsic context in which statutory language is 
used; 
a 
plain-meaning 
interpretation 
cannot 
contravene 
a 
textually or contextually manifest statutory purpose."  Id., 
¶49.  However, in "construing or interpreting a statute the 
court is not at liberty to disregard the plain, clear words of 
[a] statute."  Id., ¶46.  Nor are courts permitted to read words 
into a statute that the legislature did not insert itself.  
Dawson v. Town of Jackson, 2011 WI 77, ¶42, 336 Wis. 2d 318, 801 
N.W.2d 316.   
1. Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act  
¶99 The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act is contained in 
Wis. Stat. § 806.04, which provides: 
(1) Scope.  Courts 
of 
record 
within 
their 
respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare 
rights, status, and other legal relations whether or 
not further relief is or could be claimed . . . .  The 
declaration may be either affirmative or negative in 
form and effect; and such declarations shall have the 
force and effect of a final judgment or decree, except 
that finality for purposes of filing an appeal as of 
No.  2022AP991.pdr 
 
6 
 
right 
shall 
be 
determined 
in 
accordance 
with 
s. 808.03(1). 
(2) Power 
to 
construe, 
etc.  Any 
person 
interested under a deed, will, written contract or 
other writings constituting a contract, or whose 
rights, status or other legal relations are affected 
by 
a 
statute, 
municipal 
ordinance, 
contract 
or 
franchise, 
may 
have 
determined 
any 
question 
of 
construction or validity arising under the instrument, 
statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a 
declaration of rights, status or other legal relations 
thereunder. 
¶100 In order to obtain declaratory judgment, there must be 
a justiciable controversy.  See Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 
400, 410, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982).  A controversy is justiciable 
when the following factors are present:   
(1) A controversy in which a claim of right is 
asserted against one who has an interest in contesting 
it.   
(2) The controversy must be between persons whose 
interests are adverse.   
(3) The party seeking declaratory relief must have a 
legal interest in the controversy——that is to say, a 
legally protectible interest.   
(4) The issue involved in the controversy must be ripe 
for judicial determination. 
Putnam v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis., Ltd. P'ship, 2002 WI 
108, ¶41, 255 Wis. 2d 447, 649 N.W.2d 626 (citing Loy, 107 
Wis. 2d at 410).  If all four factors are met, the controversy 
is justiciable and a court may entertain an action for 
declaratory judgment.  Miller Brands-Milwaukee, Inc. v. Case, 
162 Wis. 2d 684, 694, 470 N.W.2d 290 (1991).   
¶101 Here, I conclude that all four factors are met.  
First, Teigen's suit is a controversy that opposes the WEC's 
No.  2022AP991.pdr 
 
7 
 
memos and intervenors' positions, each of whom have an interest 
in contesting Teigen's position.  Second, Teigen and the WEC 
have adverse interests regarding the legality of the current 
memos and the WEC's authority to continue issuing similar memos 
in the future.  Third, as the majority concludes, Teigen has a 
legally protectable interest in making sure that his vote is not 
"pollute[d]" and that proper election procedures are followed.3  
And finally, Teigen's suit against the WEC is ripe for judicial 
determination.  The circuit court decided that the elector was 
required to personally mail his or her own completed ballot to 
the clerk's office.4  Affirming the circuit court's decision is 
expressed in several briefs, as is the need for uniform 
guidance.5  The WEC has issued memos that encourage drop boxes 
over mail-in ballot returns, and municipal clerks and election 
officials have acted on those memos.  Teigen is a Wisconsin 
voter who is affected by the WEC's memos.  Because the 
controversy is justiciable, I proceed to the merits of Teigen's 
statutory interpretation claim with regard to mailing absentee 
ballots, and conclude that the memos encourage drop boxes over 
mailing completed ballots and are inconsistent with Wis. Stat. 
§ 6.87(4)(b)1.  Therefore, they are contrary to law.   
2. Wisconsin Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. 
                                                 
3 Majority op., ¶25.  
4 Teigen v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, No. 2022AP91, Order at 2 
(Jan. 20. 2022).   
5 See 
e.g., 
Briefs:  League 
of 
Wis. 
Municipalities, 
Republican National Committee and Honest Elections Project.  
No.  2022AP991.pdr 
 
8 
 
¶102 As a foundational matter, we construe closely related 
statutes in the context in which the legislature placed them.  
City of Janesville v. CC Midwest, Inc., 2007 WI 93, ¶24, 302 
Wis. 2d 599, 734 N.W.2d 428.  "[W]e examine the language of 
surrounding or closely related statutes in order to interpret a 
statute in the context in which it is used."  Id.  Accordingly, 
we do not interpret Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. in isolation.  
Rather, we interpret it with the assistance of closely related 
statutes.  
¶103 As we begin, it is important to note that the 
legislature has supplied the lens through which absentee voting 
statutes are to be viewed.  Wisconsin Stat. § 6.84 provides:  
[V]oting by absentee ballot is a privilege exercised 
wholly outside the traditional safeguards of the 
polling place.  The legislature finds that the 
privilege of voting by absentee ballot must be 
carefully regulated to prevent the potential for fraud 
or abuse; to prevent overzealous solicitation of 
absent electors who may prefer not to participate in 
an election; to prevent undue influence on an absent 
elector to vote for or against a candidate or to cast 
a particular vote in a referendum; or other similar 
abuses. 
§ 6.84.  Furthermore, regarding interpretation of the absentee 
voting statutes, the legislature has mandated that:  
[W]ith respect to matters relating to the absentee 
ballot 
process, 
ss. 6.86, 
6.87(3) 
to 
(7) 
and 
9.01(1)(b)2. and 4. shall be construed as mandatory. 
Ballots cast in contravention of the procedures 
specified in those provisions may not be counted. 
Ballots counted in contravention of the procedures 
specified in those provisions may not be included in 
the certified result of any election.  
§ 6.84(2). 
No.  2022AP991.pdr 
 
9 
 
¶104 We 
have 
construed 
statutes 
relating 
to 
voting 
procedures and have strictly enforced them.  In State ex. rel. 
Stearns, we concluded that the Secretary of State correctly 
prohibited a candidate who turned in his nomination papers two 
minutes after the statutory deadline from appearing on the 
ballot.  State ex. rel. Stearns v. Zimmerman, 257 Wis. 443, 444-
46, 43 N.W.2d 681 (1950).  We reasoned that, by setting the 5 
p.m. deadline within the statute, "no fact or situation 
appear[ed] except those contemplated and provided for by the 
legislature."  Id. at 446.  However, if we had decided to 
enlarge the time which the legislature has designated for the 
filing of nomination papers, we would be "amend[ing] the 
statute, not [construing] it."  Id.   
¶105 Again, in State ex. rel. Ahlgrimm, we concluded that a 
candidate who filed his nomination papers in the wrong office 
was barred from appearing on the ballot by the terms of the 
statute.  State ex rel. Ahlgrimm v. State Elections Bd., 82 
Wis. 2d 585, 595-96, 263 N.W.2d 152 (1978).  The candidate 
argued that, because the statute that outlined the place of 
filing nomination papers did not specify that noncompliance was 
fatal, we should have concluded that its prescriptions were 
directory rather than mandatory.  Id. at 593.  We concluded that 
this argument was "without merit" and, as with the time for 
filing, the statute's instruction governing the place of filing 
nomination papers was mandatory.  Id. at 595.   
¶106 Turning 
to 
the 
statute 
at 
issue, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 6.87(4)(b)1., it determines required procedures for absentee 
No.  2022AP991.pdr 
 
10 
 
voting when specially identified circumstances do not exist.6  
Section 6.87(4)(b)1. provides in regard to mailing that absentee 
ballots "shall be mailed by the elector . . . to the municipal 
clerk."  Electors are statutorily defined as "[e]very U.S. 
citizen age 18 or older who has resided in an election district 
or ward for 28 consecutive days before any election where the 
citizen offers to vote[.]"  Wis. Stat. § 6.02.  Accordingly, 
when § 6.87(4)(b)1. says "the elector[,]" it means, the voter.   
¶107 The plain statutory text, provides that if a ballot is 
returned by mail, it is the "elector" who does the mailing.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)(1). requires that absentee ballots 
"shall be mailed by the elector . . . to the municipal clerk."  
The legislature could have said "may be mailed by the elector" 
if it were not mandatory that the elector do the mailing.  As 
the circuit court correctly concluded, "the statute is clear.  
It's not ambiguous.  It's not necessary to go to outside sources 
to determine how . . . return of the ballot is addressed."  
Indeed, DRW concedes this point in its briefing.   
¶108 DRW argues that, in spite of the unambiguous text, the 
statutes allow an agent of an elector to mail the absentee 
ballot on an elector's behalf.  This argument is based on a 1955 
case, Sommerfeld v. Bd. of Canvassers of the City of St. 
Francis.  In Sommerfeld, we concluded that "in order to fulfill 
the spirit of our election laws the last sentence of section 
11.59 [which required delivery by the elector] is directory 
only, and that a delivery of ballots by agent is a substantial 
                                                 
6 See ¶¶109-111 below.   
No.  2022AP991.pdr 
 
11 
 
compliance therewith."  Sommerfeld v. Bd. of Canvassers of the 
City of St. Francis, 269 Wis. 299, 304, 69 N.W.2d 235 (1955).  
However, as the majority points out, Sommerfeld pre-dates Wis. 
Stat. § 6.84.7  Its conclusion, that absentee voting procedures 
were directory, contradicts § 6.84, which requires that absentee 
voting 
procedures 
are 
"mandatory[,]" 
i.e., 
they 
must 
be 
followed.  Accordingly, to the extent that it described voting 
procedures 
as 
directory 
and 
substantial 
compliance 
being 
sufficient to satisfy § 6.84, Sommerfeld is no longer good law.8 
¶109 Without Sommerfeld, DRW's argument falls apart.  The 
statutory definition of "elector" does not include agents; 
rather, it defines a person who is eligible to vote.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 6.02.  Wisconsin Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. requires that absentee 
ballots be mailed by the elector; who, as I note, is statutorily 
defined in § 6.02(1).  In accord with the circuit court, I 
conclude 
that 
the 
plain 
meaning 
of 
text 
is 
clear 
and 
unambiguous; § 6.87(4)(b)1. does not permit an agent to mail an 
absentee ballot for a voter.   
¶110 That agents are not permitted by the terms of Wis. 
Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. to mail absentee ballots is further 
supported by comparing the language in § 6.87(4)(b)1. with other 
statutes in which the legislature has explicitly allowed an 
agent or non-elector to participate in the absentee voting 
process.  Those statutes, in keeping with the policy in Wis. 
                                                 
7 Majority op., ¶80. 
8 Id. 
No.  2022AP991.pdr 
 
12 
 
Stat. 
§ 
6.84(1), 
have 
formalistic, 
regulated 
conditions 
attached.   
¶111 For example, when a voter is a member of a sequestered 
jury, the legislature has provided very detailed instructions 
about voting and returning the ballot where a non-voter 
participates.  Wisconsin Stat. § 6.86(1)(b) provides in relevant 
part: 
If the application indicates that the reason for 
requesting an absentee ballot is that the elector is a 
sequestered juror, the application shall be received 
no later than 5 p.m. on election day.  If the 
application is received after 5 p.m. on the Friday 
immediately preceding the election, the municipal 
clerk or the clerk's agent shall immediately take the 
ballot to the court in which the elector is serving as 
a juror and deposit it with the judge.  The judge 
shall recess court, as soon as convenient, and give 
the elector the ballot.  The judge shall then witness 
the voting procedure as provided in s. 6.87 and shall 
deliver the ballot to the clerk or agent of the clerk 
who shall deliver it to the polling place or, in 
municipalities where absentee ballots are canvassed 
under s. 7.52, to the municipal clerk as required in 
s. 6.88. 
§ 6.86(1)(b).  Simply stated, voter assistance in voting and in 
return of the ballot is clearly set out in § 6.86(1)(b).  When 
an agent is employed, the agent is identified.   
¶112 Another example of the legislature's recognition of 
agents involved in voting or ballot return is found in Wis. 
Stat. § 6.86(3)(a) for hospitalized electors.  It provides: 
1.  Any elector who is registered and who is 
hospitalized, may apply for and obtain an official 
ballot by agent. . . . 
2.  If a hospitalized elector is not registered, 
the 
elector 
may 
register 
by 
agent 
under 
this 
No.  2022AP991.pdr 
 
13 
 
subdivision at the same time that the elector applies 
for an official ballot by agent under subd. 1. . . . . 
§ 6.86(3)(a)1. and 2.  Once again, when an agent is permitted to 
be involved in absentee voting, the legislature has clearly 
defined the factual circumstances that permit it, has identified 
who may function as an agent and has specified a procedure to 
follow.  
¶113 Wisconsin Stat. § 6.87(5) also permits the use of an 
agent when the elector is disabled.  It provides: 
If the absent elector declares that he or she is 
unable to read, has difficulty in reading, writing or 
understanding English or due to disability is unable 
to mark his or her ballot, the elector may select any 
individual, except the elector's employer or an agent 
of that employer or an officer or agent of a labor 
organization which represents the elector, to assist 
in marking the ballot . . . . 
Once again, when the legislature decided that use of an agent in 
voting was permissible, it specified the circumstances under 
which an agent could be employed and defined criteria for 
performing as an agent in regard to absentee ballots.  I do not 
review the entirety of the statutes that provide for the use of 
an agent in voting because no party has raised them. 
¶114 However, those examples cited above and others I do 
not cite differ significantly from Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. 
because § 6.87(4)(b)1. carries none of the factual criteria for 
permitting the use of an agent and none of the factual 
safeguards for who may function as an agent.  Accordingly, 
because the text and context of § 6.87(4)(b)1. instruct me to do 
so, I conclude that no one but the elector may mail an absentee 
ballot unless the elector and his or her designated agent fit 
No.  2022AP991.pdr 
 
14 
 
within a different statutory circumstance that explicitly 
permits it.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶115 The majority opinion concludes that the WEC's memos 
are invalid because ballot drop boxes are not legal under 
Wisconsin statutes and because an absentee ballot must be 
personally delivered by the voter to the municipal clerk at the 
clerk's office.  I agree, and I join the majority opinion.  I 
have written further to explain that, under Wisconsin statutes, 
it is the elector who shall mail the absentee ballot to the 
municipal clerk.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur.   
 
No.  2022AP91.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶116 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).    
There should be a third Branch which . . . you may 
call a Governor whom I would invest . . . the whole 
Executive Power, after divesting it of most of those 
Badges of Domination called prerogatives. 
John Adams, Thoughts on Government (1776), in 11 The State 
Records of North Carolina 325 (1895). 
 
¶117 This court's binding precedent allows WEC——a creature 
of the legislature authorized only to implement Wisconsin's 
election laws——to make law by executive fiat, thereby granting 
it a potent "Badge[] of Domination[.]"  In Trump v. Biden, a 
majority of this court gave WEC's "advice" the force of law.  
2020 WI 91, ¶¶31–32, 394 Wis. 2d 629, 951 N.W.2d 568.  It 
declared this "advice" is "the rulebook" for elections——never 
mind what the statutes enacted by the legislature say.  See id. 
(emphasis added). 
 
¶118 The Trump majority's conversion of WEC's mere "advice" 
into "the rulebook" flouts the rule of law.  Consistent with 
constitutional principles, the legislature explicitly declared 
that "[a] guidance document does not have the force of law."  
Wis. Stat. § 227.112(3) (2019–20).1  Despite the constitutional 
vesting of lawmaking power in the legislature,2 Trump requires us 
to uphold documents produced by executive-branch employees, 
notwithstanding their inconsistency with the plain meaning of 
the statutes WEC employees purportedly interpreted.  Trump, 394 
Wis. 2d 629, ¶83 (Roggensack, C.J., dissenting); see also Tetra 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019–20 version. 
 
2 Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1. 
No.  2022AP91.rgb 
 
2 
 
Tech EC, Inc. v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 2018 WI 75, ¶3, 382 
Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21 (lead op.) (rejecting the "practice 
of deferring to administrative agencies' conclusions of law").  
Even properly promulgated administrative rules do not have this 
kind of weight; in the hierarchy of laws, rules fall beneath 
statutes (if rules may even be called law).  I would overrule 
Trump, but it remains binding precedent under which the memos 
have the force of law.  Because a majority of this court accords 
them this effect, they must be rules.  Because they were not 
promulgated according to statutorily prescribed procedures, they 
are invalid for this additional reason.    
 
¶119 This court's decision in Trump exists in tension with 
Service Employees International Union, Local 1 v. Vos (SEIU), 
2020 WI 67, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35 (Kelly, J., majority 
op.).  SEIU struck down statutes prescribing pre-issuance 
procedures for guidance documents as facially unconstitutional.  
Id., ¶88.  We described guidance documents as "nothing but the 
written 
manifestations 
of 
the 
executive 
branch's 
thought 
processes[.]"  Id., ¶122.  Under the separation of powers, we 
denied the legislature a role in policing the executive's 
thoughts 
or 
preventing 
the 
executive 
from 
sharing 
its 
interpretations of law with the public.  Id., ¶96 (explaining 
"[h]e who is to execute the laws must first judge for himself of 
their 
meaning" 
 
(quoting 
Alexander 
Hamilton, 
Letters 
of 
Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 4 The Works of 
Alexander 
Hamilton 
438 
(Henry 
Cabot 
Lodge 
ed. 
1904) 
(modification in the original)).   
No.  2022AP91.rgb 
 
3 
 
 
¶120 Because this court's later decision in Trump gave mere 
guidance documents the force of law, the legislature necessarily 
has an interest in regulating them to ensure the executive 
branch enforces the laws as written.  Additionally, the 
legislature has an interest in the courts upholding the laws the 
legislature enacts, not elevating guidance written by executive 
branch employees above the law.   
 
¶121 This court's decision in Trump gave WEC the power to 
materially alter how elections in this state are conducted—— 
without a single procedural check.  Trump should be overruled, 
but if the court continues to hold the memos need not be 
promulgated as administrative rules, they should at least be 
subject to the statutory procedures we struck down in SEIU.  As 
the law stands, WEC's staff have absolute prerogative power.  
The constitution does not permit such corruption of the 
carefully calibrated powers among the branches of government. 
I.  The Definition of "Rule" 
¶122 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.01(13) states, in relevant part: 
"Rule" means a regulation, standard, statement of 
policy, or general order of general application that 
has the force of law and that is issued by an agency 
to implement, interpret, or make specific legislation 
enforced or administered by the agency or to govern 
the organization or procedure of the agency. 
Under this definition, a rule must meet five elements:  "(1) a 
regulation, standard, statement of policy or general order; 
(2) of general application; (3) having the [force] of law; 
(4) issued by an agency; (5) to implement, interpret or make 
specific legislation enforced or administered by such agency as 
No.  2022AP91.rgb 
 
4 
 
to govern the interpretation or procedure of such agency."3  Wis. 
Legislature v. Palm, 2020 WI 42, ¶22, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 
N.W.2d 900 (quoting Citizens for Sensible Zoning, Inc. v. Dep't 
of Nat. Res., 90 Wis. 2d 804, 814, 280 N.W.2d 702 (1979)). 
 
¶123 In this case, no one has argued the memos are not 
"statements of policy," of "general application," issued by the 
WEC to "interpret" statutes "enforced or administrated" by the 
WEC.  The parties dispute only the third element, whether the 
memos have the "force of law."   
II.  The Majority's Error in Trump 
 
¶124 Although the memos should not have the force of law, 
the majority erroneously concluded otherwise in Trump.  In that 
case, Donald Trump, the incumbent President, and his campaign 
appealed the results of a recount in two Wisconsin counties.  
394 Wis. 2d 629, ¶¶5–6 (majority op.).  The ballots President 
Trump sought to strike fell into four categories; two are most 
relevant in this case.  First, he argued "that a form used for 
in-person absentee voting [wa]s not a 'written application' and 
therefore all in-person absentee ballots should be struck."  
Id., ¶2.  Second, President Trump argued "that municipal 
officials improperly added witness information on absentee 
ballot certifications, and that these ballots [wer]e therefore 
invalid."  Id. 
 
¶125 As the majority acknowledged, "Wisconsin law provides 
that a 'written application' is required before a voter can 
                                                 
3 In 2017, the legislature changed "effect of law" to "force 
of law," which is reflected in the modification of the quote.  
2017 Wis. Act 369, § 32. 
No.  2022AP91.rgb 
 
5 
 
receive an absentee ballot, and that any absentee ballot issued 
without an application cannot be counted."  Id., ¶14 (citing 
Wis. Stat. §§ 6.84(2), 6.86(1)(ar)).  A majority of this court 
refused to consider whether the form utilized for in-person 
absentee voting, EL-122, constituted a written application.  It 
noted, "both counties did use an application form created, 
approved, and disseminated by the chief Wisconsin elections 
agency."  Id., ¶15.  The majority emphasized "local election 
officials used form EL-122 in reliance on longstanding guidance 
from WEC."  Id., ¶25.  Therefore, it concluded, "[p]enalizing 
the voters election officials serve and the other candidates who 
relied on this longstanding guidance is beyond unfair."  Id.  
"To strike ballots cast in reliance on the guidance now, and to 
do so in only two counties, would violate every notion of equity 
that undergirds our electoral system."  Id.  In Trump, a 
majority of this court allowed its notions of "equity" and 
"unfair[ness]" to trump the law. 
 
¶126 Invoking 
the 
same 
rationalizations, 
the 
majority 
declined to examine whether election officials violated a 
statute by adding missing witness information to absentee ballot 
certifications.  Wisconsin Stat. § 6.87(6d) provides, "[i]f a 
certificate is missing the address of a witness, the ballot may 
not be counted."  The majority defied this clear textual command 
because it was concerned that "election officials followed 
guidance 
that 
WEC 
created, 
approved, 
and 
disseminated to 
counties in October 2016."  Id., ¶18.  It continued, "the 
No.  2022AP91.rgb 
 
6 
 
election officials relied on this statewide advice and had no 
reason to question it."4  Id., ¶26. 
 
¶127 Overall, the majority compared voting——the foundation 
of free government——to a football game: 
[E]lection officials in Dane and Milwaukee Counties 
followed the advice of WEC where given. . . .  
Our laws allow the challenge flag to be thrown 
regarding various aspects of election administration.  
The challenges raised by the Campaign in this case, 
however, come long after the last play or even the 
last game; the Campaign is challenging the rulebook 
adopted before the season began.  Election claims of 
this type must be brought expeditiously.  The Campaign 
waited until after the election to raise selective 
challenges that could have been raised long before the 
election. . . .  The Campaign is not entitled to 
relief, and therefore does not succeed in its effort 
to strike votes and alter the certified winner of the 
2020 presidential election. 
Id., ¶¶31–32 (emphasis added); see also id., ¶34 (Dallet & 
Karofsky, JJ., concurring) ("The evidence does show that, 
despite a global pandemic, more than 3.2 million Wisconsinites 
performed their civic duty.  More importantly as it relates to 
this lawsuit, these voters followed the rules that were in place 
at the time.  To borrow Justice Hagedorn's metaphor, Wisconsin 
voters complied with the election rulebook.  No penalties were 
                                                 
4 The majority also gave statements from Dane County 
officials the status of supreme law based on the majority's 
subjective conception of fairness.  Trump v. Biden, 2020 WI 91, 
¶27, 394 Wis. 2d 629, 951 N.W.2d 568 (explaining voters in Dane 
County were "encouraged to utilize" "Democracy in the Park" 
events 
and 
that 
"17,000 
voters 
did 
so 
in 
reliance 
on 
representations that the process they were using complied with 
the law").  
No.  2022AP91.rgb 
 
7 
 
committed and the final score was the result of a free and fair 
election."  (emphasis added)). 
¶128 Under 
Trump, 
statements 
from 
WEC's 
staff 
were 
transformed into super-statutes, trumping the 
actual law.  
"Rather than fulfilling its duty to say what the law is, a 
majority of this court unconstitutionally converts the Wisconsin 
Elections Commission's mere advice into governing 'law,' thereby 
supplanting the actual election laws enacted by the people's 
elected representatives in the legislature and defying the will 
of Wisconsin's citizens.  When the state's highest court refuses 
to uphold the law, and stands by while an unelected body of six 
commissioners 
rewrites 
it, 
our 
system 
of 
representative 
government is subverted."  Id., ¶140 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, 
J., dissenting).   
¶129 The holding in Trump requires a vote cast in reliance 
on a document produced by the WEC's staff to be counted even if 
the vote's counting is unlawful under the statute the staff 
purportedly interpreted.  The majority did not ground its 
decision in constitutional law but in equity.5  Equitable powers 
may be broad, but they must always be lawfully exercised.  Just 
                                                 
5 Id., ¶73 (Roggensack, C.J., dissenting) ("If WEC has been 
giving advice contrary to statute, those acts do not make the 
advice lawful.  WEC must follow the law.  We, as the law 
declaring court, owe it to the public to declare whether WEC's 
advice is incorrect.  However, doing so does not necessarily 
lead to striking absentee ballots that were cast by following 
incorrect WEC advice.  The remedy Petitioners seek may be out of 
reach for a number of reasons."  (quoting Trump v. Evers, No. 
2020AP1917-OA, 
unpublished 
order 
(Wis. 
Dec. 
3, 
2020) 
(Roggensack, C.J., dissenting from the denial of the petition 
for leave to commence an original action)).  
No.  2022AP91.rgb 
 
8 
 
this term, we held this court lacks the equitable power to 
rewrite statutes to enforce a subjective conception of fairness.  
See Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2021 WI 87, ¶¶62, 67, 72, 
399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469.  The Trump majority abandoned 
this fundamental constraint on the judicial power. 
¶130 At 
the 
same 
time 
the 
majority 
aggrandized 
its 
"equitable" powers, it ceded its law declaring function to 
unelected bureaucrats.  According to the Trump majority, the 
judiciary may not even opine on the validity of purported 
guidance once voters have relied on it.  In so ruling, the 
majority neglected its constitutional duty to declare the 
meaning of law, instead elevating "guidance[] given by an 
unelected committee" to the status of supreme law, which must be 
followed in derogation of enacted statutes.  Trump, 394 
Wis. 2d 629, ¶108 (Ziegler, J., dissenting); see also State ex 
rel. Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 436, 424 
N.W.2d 385 (1988) ("[I]t is this court's function to develop and 
clarify the law."  (citations omitted)).   
¶131 The majority achieved these results by declaring WEC's 
guidance to be "the rulebook."  Trump, 394 Wis. 2d 629, ¶32 
(majority op.) (emphasis added).  "How astonishing that four 
justices of the Wisconsin Supreme Court must be reminded that it 
is THE LAW that constitutes 'the rulebook' for any election——not 
WEC guidance——and election officials are bound to follow the 
law, if we are to be governed by the rule of law, and not of 
men."  Id., ¶147 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting).  
Notwithstanding SEIU's characterization of guidance as nothing 
No.  2022AP91.rgb 
 
9 
 
more than executive branch "thought processes," the majority 
permitted "WEC . . . [to] treat their guidance as if it were 
law"——and a form of supreme law capable of overriding statutory 
language.  See id., ¶86 (Roggensack, C.J., dissenting) (citing 
SEIU, 
393 
Wis. 2d 38, 
¶143 
(Roggensack, 
C.J., 
concurring/dissenting)).  The majority's reinvention of guidance 
as something on par with the constitution is antithetical to the 
constitutional separation of powers and deprives the people of 
power over their own government. 
¶132 Without offering any explanation, WEC has changed its 
position on the status of its so-called guidance.  WEC did not 
file a brief in Trump, but in the case's precursor, Trump v. 
Evers,6 WEC argued in its brief, "[t]hese challenges come too 
late and would unconstitutionally punish voters who relied in 
good faith on election officials' guidance."  Not only did WEC 
argue its guidance was the law, it argued that following the 
actual law instead of WEC's erroneous interpretations would be 
unconstitutional.  In Trump v. Biden, the majority avoided the 
constitutional issue, but it nonetheless adopted the thrust of 
the WEC's argument about fairness by abusing this court's 
equitable powers.  In contrast with its previous position, WEC 
now 
characterizes 
its 
memos 
as 
inert, 
merely 
providing 
information to local officials who are free to ignore them as 
they please.  WEC cannot have it both ways.  Either disregarding 
these documents offends the constitution or they are mere 
                                                 
 
6 Trump v. Evers was an original action raising the same 
arguments, which a majority of this court declined to hear just 
days before Trump v. Biden.   
No.  2022AP91.rgb 
 
10 
 
"thoughts" of executive-branch employees.  This court chose the 
former in Trump, which means these documents must be properly 
promulgated, with checks and balances. 
¶133 With no convincing response to Trump, WEC primarily 
argues the memos lack the force of law because they do not 
require municipal clerks to establish ballot drop boxes.  But 
see Off. of the Special Couns., Second Interim Investigative 
Report on the Apparatus & Procedures of the Wisconsin Elections 
System 116 (Mar. 1, 2022) ("Surprisingly, many clerks have 
expressed to the OSC that they are under the impression that WEC 
guidance is binding, even when they believe such guidance (say, 
on drop boxes) is unlawful.").  Nonetheless, these memos purport 
to authorize drop boxes.  Under Trump, once a vote is placed in 
a drop box in reliance on a WEC document that has not been 
rescinded, it must be counted regardless of whether any statute 
actually authorizes drop boxes.  At least during and after an 
election, a majority of this court will not consider whether a 
statute authorizes drop boxes, effectively establishing the 
memos as the authorizing device. 
¶134 As the Wisconsin voters accurately argue, "there are 
different kinds of laws——some impose duties, others prohibit 
conduct, and still others authorize conduct.  WEC's memos fall 
into the latter category[.]"  Since the time of Sir Edward Coke, 
"unlawful prerogative legislation" has included both legislation 
constraining the public and the "alteration" of "legally binding 
duties" 
"more 
generally," 
including 
their 
"relax[ation.]"  
Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? 84 (2014).  At 
No.  2022AP91.rgb 
 
11 
 
a minimum, the Trump decision allowed WEC to relax legal duties.  
Specifically, the Trump decision endorsed WEC's elimination of 
duties prescribed by law by counting ballots unlawfully cast in 
accordance with WEC's extra-legal directions.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 6.84(2) ("Notwithstanding s. 5.01 (1), with respect to matters 
relating to the absentee ballot process, ss. 6.86, 6.87 (3) to 
(7) and 9.01 (1) (b) 2. and 4. shall be construed as mandatory.  
Ballots cast in contravention of the procedures specified in 
those provisions may not be counted.  Ballots counted in 
contravention of the procedures specified in those provisions 
may not be included in the certified result of any election.").  
To erase by executive fiat the legislature's duly enacted law is 
no less an alteration of law merely because it authorizes the 
unlawful rather than prohibits that which is lawful.  See 
generally Case of Proclamations, [1610] EWHC KB J22, (1611) 12 
Co Rep 74, 75, 77 ER 1352 ("[T]he King cannot change any part of 
the common law, nor create any offence by his proclamation, 
which 
was 
not 
an 
offence 
before, 
without 
Parliament. . . .  [T]he King by his proclamation of other ways 
cannot change any part of the common law, or statute law, or the 
customs of the realm[.]"  (citations omitted)). 
¶135 WEC also misses another critical point.  While the 
memos may not require municipal clerks to set up ballot drop 
boxes, if they do so, Memo two regulates their use with clear, 
unambiguous, and mandatory language.  For example, WEC says:  
"Ballot drop boxes must be secured and locked at all times" and 
"[c]hain of custody logs must be completed every time ballots 
No.  2022AP91.rgb 
 
12 
 
are collected."7  The fact that these requirements attach only if 
a municipal clerk decides to set up drop boxes makes no 
difference.  Laws often take the form of "if/then" statements.  
A person may choose not to drive, but if the person chooses to 
drive, the person is bound to wear a seat belt by a statute with 
the force of law.  Wis. Stat. § 347.48(2m)(b). 
¶136 The two propositions resulting from the Trump decision 
cannot both be true: 
1. Documents produced by WEC's staff——not the Wisconsin 
statutes——comprise "the rulebook" for elections; and 
2. WEC's memos are not administrative rules because they do 
not have the force of law. 
No other agency's guidance——or even its properly promulgated 
rules, 
for 
that 
matter——has 
been 
given 
such 
pseudo-
constitutional force.  The Trump decision glorified WEC's 
purported guidance with a supremacy over real law.  This court 
should overrule its erroneous holding in Trump, restoring WEC's 
documents to their proper, and quite limited, role.   
 
¶137 The way we described guidance documents in SEIU in 
2020 simply cannot be reconciled with the Trump decision of 
2021.  In SEIU, we correctly concluded guidance documents "are 
not law, they do not have the force or effect of law, and they 
provide no authority for implementing standards or conditions."  
393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶102 (Kelly, J., majority op.).  "They impose no 
obligations, set no standards, and bind no one."  
Id.  
"Functionally, and as a matter of law, they are entirely inert.  
                                                 
7 Emphasis added. 
No.  2022AP91.rgb 
 
13 
 
That is to say, they represent nothing more than the knowledge 
and intentions of their authors.  It is readily apparent, 
therefore, that the executive need not borrow any legislative 
authority, nor seek the legislature's permission, to create 
guidance documents."  Id. (emphasis added).   
 
¶138 Trump transformed purported guidance from "entirely 
inert" to imperviously potent.  See id.  Ironically, the 
legislature 
enacted 
pre-issuance 
procedures 
for 
guidance 
documents precisely because the nature of guidance documents is 
often misunderstood.  "Guidance documents can have a practical 
effect 
similar 
to 
an 
unpromulgated 
rule." 
 
Id., 
¶142 
(Roggensack, 
C.J., 
concurring/dissenting). 
 
Lawmakers 
have 
"frequently heard from constituents, small businesses [and] 
local government" about "how guidance documents have been abused 
as a vehicle to actually change the law."  Id., ¶143 (quoting 
Floor Speech by Andre Jacque, Floor Session on 2017 Assembly 
Bill 
1072 
(2017 
Wis. 
Act 
369), 
at 
3:25, 
https://wiseye.org/2018/12/05/assembly-floor-session-part-2-8/ 
(last visited June 25, 2020)).  The Trump majority contradicted 
the SEIU court's treatment of executive agency communications.  
In SEIU, the court said, "should an administrative agency 
employee treat a guidance document as a source of authority, 
that employee would be making a mistake, not defining the nature 
of a guidance document."  Id., ¶134 (Kelly, J., majority op.) 
(emphasis added).  The court itself made a consequential mistake 
by declaring WEC's guidance not only a source of authority, but 
the supreme statement of election law. 
No.  2022AP91.rgb 
 
14 
 
 
¶139 In his concurrence, Justice Brian Hagedorn attempts to 
backtrack from the majority opinion he authored in Trump.  
Whether 
expressed 
metaphorically 
or 
otherwise, 
the 
Trump 
majority not only labeled WEC's guidance the "rulebook"——it 
treated it as such, elevating it over statutory law.  See supra 
¶¶124–26.  This concurrence does not advance a new legal 
analysis; the dissent in Trump explained the upshot of the 
majority's treatment of WEC's pronouncements on the law, which 
the majority never disavowed:  "the majority commits grave error 
by according WEC guidance the force of law . . . .  How 
astonishing that four justices of the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
must be reminded that it is THE LAW that constitutes 'the 
rulebook' for any election——not WEC guidance——and election 
officials are bound to follow the law, if we are to be governed 
by the rule of law, and not of men."  Trump, 394 Wis. 2d 629, 
¶¶141, 147 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting).  Regardless 
of what WEC's pronouncements on the law are called, if this 
court is going to allow them to control an election, they should 
be promulgated as rules.  It was a "serious legal argument" then 
and remains so now.  The majority grievously injured the rule of 
law in Trump, which the court should acknowledge and correct.8   
                                                 
8 Justice Hagedorn now seems to minimize portions of his 
Trump opinion as dicta.  Justice Hagedorn's Concurrence, ¶202 
("the court used the word 'rulebook' in a metaphor regarding 
challenge flags in football.").  Our court does not recognize 
the concept of dicta, however.  "Wisconsin does not consider 
statements germane to a controversy as dicta."  Brandenburg v. 
Briarwood Forestry Servs., LLC, 2014 WI 37, ¶66 n.2, 354 
Wis. 2d  413, 447, 847 N.W.2d 395, 413 (citing Zarder v. Humana 
Ins. 
Co., 
2010 
WI 
35, 
¶52 
n.19, 
324 
Wis. 2d 325, 
782 
N.W.2d 682).  Metaphors can be a powerful tool in legal writing, 
but they should be used with care. 
No.  2022AP91.rgb 
 
15 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
¶140 "In Wisconsin, we have a constitution, and it reigns 
supreme in this state.  'By section 1 of article 4 the power of 
the state to deal with elections except as limited by the 
Constitution is vested in the senate and assembly to be 
exercised under the provisions of the Constitution; therefore 
the power to prescribe the manner of conducting elections is 
clearly within the province of the Legislature.'"  Trump, 394 
Wis. 2d 629, ¶141 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) 
(quoting State v. Kohler, 200 Wis. 518, 228 N.W. 895, 906 
(1930)).  In contravention of the Wisconsin Constitution, the 
majority's decision in Trump suppresses the power of the 
people's representatives in a manner reminiscent of a scene from 
William Shakespeare's Henry VI: 
Dick: 
I have a suit unto your lordship. 
Cade: 
Be it a lordship, thou shalt have it for that 
word. 
Dick: 
Only that the laws of England may come out of 
your mouth. 
Holland: 
[to Smith] Mass, 'twill be sore law, then; for 
he was thrust in the mouth with a spear, and 
'tis not whole yet. 
Smith: 
[to Holland] Nay, . . . it will be stinking 
law for his breath stinks with eating toasted 
cheese. 
Cade: 
I have thought upon it, it shall be so.  Away, 
burn all the records of the realm:  my mouth 
shall be the parliament of England. 
Holland: 
[to himself] Then we are like to have biting 
statutes, unless his teeth be pulled out. 
William Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part II, act. 4, sc. 7, ll. 3–16. 
No.  2022AP91.rgb 
 
16 
 
 
¶141 When the "mouth" of an employee at the WEC supplants 
the legislature of Wisconsin, we are left with "sore" or 
"stinking" laws, irredeemably infected by their promulgation in 
violation of the constitution by an executive branch agency, and 
impervious to correction by our constitutional lawmakers.  
"Bicameralism and presentment are the crucible bills must 
overcome to become law.  By design, it is much more difficult 
than rule by dictatorship."  In re Amending Wis. Stat. §§ 48.299 
& 938.299 Regulating the Use of Restraints on Child. in Juv. 
Ct., 2022 WI 26, ¶55 n.11,  __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ (Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 
¶142 A majority of this court permits Administrator Megan 
Wolfe's unilateral declarations regarding election procedures to 
have the force of law, subject only to judicial review (if the 
court even bothers to take the case).  "No one man should have 
all that power."  Kanye West, Power (2010).  "It is not the 
province [or the prerogative] of a state executive official to 
re-write the state's election code[.]"  See Carson v. Simon, 978 
F.3d 1051, 1060 (8th Cir. 2020) (cited sources omitted).  WEC's 
"rulebook" should be subject to formal rulemaking under ch. 227.   
 
¶143 "The 
Founders 
designed 
our 
'republic 
to 
be 
a 
government of laws, and not of men . . . bound by fixed laws, 
which the people have a voice in making, and a right to 
defend.'" Trump, 394 Wis. 2d 629, ¶149 (quoting John Adams, 
Novanglus:  A History of the Dispute with America, from Its 
Origin, in 1754, to the Present Time, in Revolutionary Writings 
of John Adams (C. Bradley Thompson ed. 2000)).  A majority of 
No.  2022AP91.rgb 
 
17 
 
this court defenestrated the people's ability to defend their 
laws.  Trump should be overruled to restore the people's 
supremacy over their public servants.  I respectfully concur.   
 
¶144 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join 
this concurrence. 
 
 
 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
1 
 
¶145 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring).  The principal 
issue in this case involves the lawfulness of ballot drop boxes.  
This case is not about the risk of fraudulent votes being cast 
or inspiring confidence in elections.  This is not about 
ensuring everyone who wants to vote can, nor should we be 
concerned with making absentee voting more convenient and 
secure.  Those are policy concerns, and where the law does not 
speak, they are the business of the other branches, not the 
judicial branch.  This case is about applying the law as 
written; that's it.  To find out what the law is, we read it and 
give the words of the statutes the meaning they had when they 
were written. 
¶146 The occasion for us to visit this question now is the 
issuance of two memos by the Wisconsin Elections Commission 
(WEC) in 2020.  Those memos were prepared in response to 
questions from local clerks administering elections.  In the 
beginning stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, many wondered whether 
the mail system would be able to return absentee ballots on 
time.  The memos reflect that clerks asked for guidance, 
including whether ballot drop boxes could be established to 
receive completed ballots.  WEC said yes, and offered detailed 
best practices on security and logistics and other such 
administrative questions.  The 2020 spring and fall elections 
came and went; no significant legal challenges to the memos were 
raised at the time. 
¶147 This lawsuit was filed in June 2021.  It is a 
declaratory judgment action under Wis. Stat. § 227.40, which 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
2 
 
authorizes "judicial review of the validity of a rule or 
guidance document" issued by a state agency.  § 227.40(1).  The 
focus is therefore on what the memos say, and whether their 
prescriptions are consistent with the law. 
¶148 The law says this:  absentee ballots can be mailed by 
the elector or "delivered in person, to the municipal clerk."  
Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1.  A careful study of the text, 
including its history, along with the supporting statutory 
context, reveals that unstaffed drop boxes for absentee ballot 
return are not permitted.  Rather, this statute specifies return 
of absentee ballots through two and only two means:  mailing by 
the voter to the municipal clerk, or personal delivery by the 
voter to the municipal clerk.  And personal delivery to the 
clerk contemplates a person-to-person exchange between the voter 
and the clerk or the clerk's authorized representative at either 
the clerk's office or a designated alternate site.  Wis. Stat. 
§§ 5.02(10), 6.855, 6.87(4)(b)1., 6.88(1).  The two memos 
advising otherwise therefore conflict with the law and are 
properly void. 
¶149 In Part II of this concurrence, I address the 
important procedural questions before us regarding standing and 
exhaustion of administrative remedies.  While I agree that 
Teigen may bring this claim, I do so on different grounds than 
those proffered by the majority/lead opinion.  In Part III, I 
provide additional insight into the statutory context and 
history of the relevant statutes governing where and how 
absentee ballots may be returned.  Finally, in Part IV, I 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
3 
 
address whether WEC's memos in this case are unpromulgated 
administrative rules.  I conclude they are not because they do 
not have what the statute requires:  the "force of law."  See 
Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13).1 
¶150 Before diving into the law, I offer two observations. 
First, the election law statutes we are asked to consider are by 
no means a model of clarity.  Many of the controlling provisions 
were originally enacted over 100 years ago and have been layered 
over with numerous amendments since.  Reasonable minds might 
read them differently.  Significant questions remain despite our 
decision in this case, especially as absentee voting has become 
increasingly common.  Although our adjudication of this case 
will provide some assistance, the public is better served by 
clear statutes than by clear judicial opinions interpreting 
unclear statutes.  The legislature and governor may wish to 
consider resolving some of the open questions these statutes 
present. 
¶151 Second, some citizens will cheer this result; others 
will lament.  But the people of Wisconsin must remember that 
judicial decision-making and politics are different under our 
constitutional order.  Our obligation is to follow the law, 
which may mean the policy result is undesirable or unpopular.  
Even so, we must follow the law anyway.  To the extent the 
citizens of Wisconsin wish the law were different, the main 
                                                 
1 I join ¶¶4-10, 12-13, 52-63, 73-85 of the majority/lead 
opinion. 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
4 
 
remedy is to vote and persuade elected officials to enact 
different laws.  This is the hard work of democracy. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶152 Weeks before Wisconsin voters went to the polls in 
April 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic upended much of the world.  
Election administration was no exception.  Due to the risk posed 
by the virus, exponentially more voters opted to vote by 
absentee ballot.  Complicating things further, the pandemic 
strained the United States Postal Service, causing fear that it 
would not be able to deliver absentee ballots on a timely basis.  
Faced with these constraints, local election officials reached 
out to WEC for guidance on how they could ensure all absentee 
ballots would be received in time to be counted.  In response to 
these questions, WEC issued a memo on March 31, 2020, entitled, 
"FAQs:  Absentee Ballot Return Options:  USPS Coordination and 
Drop Boxes."  The memo advised in relevant part that "drop boxes 
can be used for voters to return ballots but clerks should 
ensure they are secure."  It also noted its view that a "family 
member or another person may also return the ballot on behalf of 
the voter."  The April election proceeded without apparent legal 
controversy over these matters. 
¶153 As preparations began for the November 2020 election, 
WEC issued another memo.  Dated August 19, 2020, it was 
entitled, "Absentee Ballot Drop Box Information."  The document 
was "intended to provide information and guidance on drop box 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
5 
 
options for secure absentee ballot return for voters."  The memo 
explained: 
A ballot drop box provides a secure and convenient 
means for voters to return their by mail absentee 
ballot.  A drop box is a secure, locked structure 
operated by local election officials.  Voters may 
deposit their ballot in a drop box at any time after 
they receive it in the mail up to the time of the last 
ballot collection Election Day.  Ballot drop boxes can 
be staffed or unstaffed, temporary or permanent. 
¶154 In June 2021, Waukesha County voters Richard Teigen 
and Richard Thom (collectively "Teigen") sued WEC "seeking a 
declaratory judgment regarding the proper construction of state 
statutes that set forth the legal methods for Wisconsin voters 
to cast absentee ballots."  In his complaint, Teigen contended:  
"The March 2020 and August 2020 Memos are invalid because they 
exceed the statutory authority of WEC and because they were 
promulgated 
without 
compliance 
with 
statutory 
procedures."  
Several parties intervened to defend the memos, including the 
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) and Disability 
Rights Wisconsin, Wisconsin Faith Voices for Justice, and the 
League of Women Voters for Wisconsin (collectively "DRW"). 
¶155 Teigen moved for summary judgment, and the circuit 
court granted his motion.  The circuit court declared the memos 
invalid because they conflicted with three principles it drew 
from the statutes:  (1) "an elector must personally mail or 
deliver his or her own absentee ballot, except where the law 
explicitly authorizes an agent to act on an elector's behalf"; 
(2) the only ways to cast an absentee ballot under Wis. Stat. 
§ 6.87(4)(b)1. "are for the elector to place the envelope 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
6 
 
containing the ballot in the mail or for the elector to deliver 
the ballot in person to the municipal clerk"; and (3) the use of 
drop boxes "is not permitted under Wisconsin law unless the drop 
box is staffed by the clerk and located at the office of the 
clerk or a properly designated alternate site under Wis. Stat. 
§ 6.855."  The circuit court also held that the memos were 
unpromulgated 
administrative 
rules, 
and 
therefore 
invalid.  
Finally, 
the 
court 
enjoined 
WEC 
from 
issuing 
further 
interpretations that conflict with Wisconsin law and ordered WEC 
to withdraw the two memos. 
¶156 After the circuit court's ruling, WEC, DRW, and DSCC 
appealed to the court of appeals.  Teigen petitioned this court 
for bypass.  We granted Teigen's petition and received briefing 
on three issues:  (1) whether Teigen's case is procedurally 
proper, (2) whether WEC's memos are inconsistent with Wisconsin 
election law, and (3) whether WEC's memos are unpromulgated 
administrative rules. 
II.  PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
¶157 The 
intervening 
parties 
raise 
two 
procedural 
challenges they contend forbid Teigen from bringing this suit.  
DSCC asserts Teigen lacks standing to seek declaratory relief.  
And DRW argues Teigen's claim must be dismissed because he 
failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies.  Both 
challenges fall short. 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
7 
 
A.  Standing 
¶158 Teigen seeks declaratory relief under Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.40.  That statute permits "judicial review of the validity 
of a rule or guidance document" issued by a state agency.  
§ 227.40(1).  Under such review, the court "shall declare" a 
rule 
or 
guidance 
document 
invalid 
if 
it 
violates 
a 
constitutional 
provision, 
exceeds 
the 
agency's 
statutory 
authority, or was not issued in compliance with the relevant 
statutory procedures.  § 227.40(4)(a). 
¶159 Chapter 227's broad right to declaratory relief is not 
without limits.  In particular, the statute requires that the 
challenged rule or guidance document have some practical and 
adverse effect on the party seeking relief: 
The court shall render a declaratory judgment in the 
action only when it appears from the complaint and the 
supporting evidence that the rule or guidance document 
or its threatened application interferes with or 
impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the 
legal rights and privileges of the plaintiff. 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.40(1). 
 
In 
legal 
parlance, 
this 
harm 
requirement is called standing. 
¶160 Standing is the foundational principle that those who 
seek to invoke the court's power to remedy a wrong must face a 
harm which can be remedied by the exercise of judicial power.  
Krier v. Vilione, 2009 WI 45, ¶20, 317 Wis. 2d 288, 766 
N.W.2d 517.  Some of my colleagues have begun to describe 
standing in far looser terms.  It is a really nice thing to have 
in a case, they seem to say, but not important at the end of the 
day.  I disagree.  We have said standing is not jurisdictional 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
8 
 
in the same sense as in federal courts and that its parameters 
are a matter of sound judicial policy.  But as Justice Prosser 
put it, "Judicial policy is not, and has not been, carte blanche 
for the courts of Wisconsin to weigh in on issues whenever the 
respective members of the bench find it desirable."  Foley-
Ciccantelli v. Bishop's Grove Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 2011 WI 36, 
¶131, 333 Wis. 2d 402, 797 N.W.2d 789 (Prosser, J., concurring).  
The judiciary does not serve as a roving legal advisor, 
answering any questions about the law that may arise.  The power 
we have is "judicial."  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 2.  The judicial 
power is the power decide disputes between parties about the law 
where there is harm to a party that can be remedied through the 
judicial process.  Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2017 
WI 67, ¶37, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 N.W.2d 384.  In this sense, the 
judicial policy buttressing our standing doctrine must stem from 
our constitutional role.  Standing is not a historical relic 
that should be dispensed with in an age of judicial supremacy.  
It serves as a vital check on unbounded judicial power.  A 
judiciary that understands its limited and modest role in 
constitutional governance will take it seriously.  Doing so 
brings our judgment to bear when necessary to resolve legal 
disputes between parties, but allows many legal debates to take 
place where the constitution places them:  in the court of 
public opinion and by and between the other branches of 
government. 
¶161 It is also important to give careful attention to 
standing because the legislature has, in many instances, 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
9 
 
prescribed the ground rules for judicial review.  The rule of 
law requires that we pay heed to the procedural law enacted by 
the legislature no less than other laws.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 227.40(1) is one such statute that imposes a statutory 
standing requirement.  Ordinarily and at common law, citizens 
could not simply request and obtain a judicial declaration of 
what the law is in a given scenario.  Miller v. Currie, 208 
Wis. 199, 203, 242 N.W. 570 (1932) ("Declaratory relief is a 
creation of the statute and was unknown to the common law.").  
Section 227.40(1) permits a declaration of rights, but only when 
a "rule or guidance document or its threatened application 
interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or 
impair, the legal rights and privileges of the plaintiff." 
¶162 Thus, the question is whether WEC's memos harm or 
threaten harm to any of Teigen's "legal rights and privileges."  
Teigen 
proffers 
two 
legal 
rights 
which 
he 
contends 
are 
implicated by the memos:  his right as a taxpayer to challenge 
unlawful expenditures, and his right as a voter to have election 
officials comply with election laws. 
¶163 We have held that taxpayers have a legal right "to 
contest governmental actions leading to an illegal expenditure 
of taxpayer funds."  Fabick v. Evers, 2021 WI 28, ¶10, 396 
Wis. 2d 231, 956 N.W.2d 856.  Teigen maintains he has taxpayer 
standing because tax dollars supported distribution of the memos 
and the salaries of WEC staff who prepared them.  Taxpayer 
standing, however, does not extend as broadly as Teigen 
suggests.  This argument, if accepted, would mark a radical 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
10 
 
departure in the law.  It would mean any taxpayer could 
challenge almost any government action——as long as a government 
employee devoted some time and attention to the matter.  Since 
that is nearly always true, this would practically eliminate 
standing as a consideration in most challenges to government 
action.  It is true that the functional distance between an 
illegal government expenditure and staff time spent drafting a 
legally erroneous memo may be fuzzy, but it is meaningful and 
clear from our cases.2  We have never described taxpayer standing 
as broadly as Teigen asserts, and we should not grant Teigen's 
entreaty now. 
¶164 Teigen's second argument, however, is more compelling.  
Teigen argues that Wis. Stat. § 5.06 gives voters like him a 
                                                 
2 Our taxpayer standing cases have always involved an 
alleged illegal expenditure distinct from staff time.  See Hart 
v. Ament, 176 Wis. 2d 694, 698-99, 500 N.W.2d 312 (1993) 
(challenging the transfer of management of a county museum); 
Tooley v. O'Connell, 77 Wis. 2d 422, 439, 253 N.W.2d 335 (1977) 
(challenging the constitutionality of a taxing provision); Buse 
v. 
Smith, 
74 
Wis. 2d 550, 
563, 
247 
N.W.2d 141 
(1976) 
(challenging a negative-aid provision); Thompson v. Kenosha 
County, 
64 
Wis. 2d 673, 
679-80, 
221 
N.W.2d 845 
(1974) 
(challenging the adoption of a countywide assessor system); S.D. 
Realty Co. v. Sewerage Comm'n of City of Milwaukee, 15 
Wis. 2d 15, 
21-22, 
112 
N.W.2d 177 
(1961) 
(challenging 
construction of a tunnel); Federal Paving Corp. v. Prudisch, 235 
Wis. 527, 
538, 
293 
N.W. 156 
(1940) 
(challenging 
a 
city 
resolution 
directing 
that 
payment 
be 
made 
to 
a 
paving 
contractor); Chippewa Bridge Co. v. City of Durand, 122 Wis. 85, 
107-08, 99 N.W. 603 (1904) (challenging building of a bridge); 
J.F. Ahern Co. v. Wis. State Bldg. Comm'n, 114 Wis. 2d 69, 84, 
336 
N.W.2d 679 
(Ct. 
App. 
1983) 
(challenging 
the 
constitutionality of a statue resulting in public expenditures). 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
11 
 
statutory right to have local election officials in the area 
where he lives comply with election laws.3  That statute says: 
Whenever any elector of a jurisdiction or district 
served by an election official believes that a 
decision or action of the official or the failure of 
the official to act with respect to any matter 
concerning . . . election administration or conduct of 
elections is contrary to law . . . the elector may 
file a written sworn complaint with [WEC] requesting 
that the official be required to conform his or her 
conduct to the law, be restrained from taking any 
action inconsistent with the law or be required to 
correct any action or decision inconsistent with the 
law or any abuse of the discretion vested in him or 
her by law. 
§ 5.06(1).  According to this statute, if local election 
officials in the area where a voter lives violate election laws, 
the voter is empowered to have that conduct abated.4  This 
establishes not only a process to compel compliance with the 
law, but also a legal right held by the voter to have their 
local election officials follow the law.5  Other provisions of 
Chapter 5 work in similar ways.6 
                                                 
3 The majority/lead opinion complains Wis. Stat. § 5.06 is 
not in the petitioner's complaint.  But it is in their briefing, 
which is usually where we look for legal arguments.  This was 
unquestionably an argument Teigen raised. 
4 Additional recourse to a court is available if WEC does 
not take action on the voter's complaint.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 5.06(2). 
5 The majority/lead opinion misses this distinction, stating 
that this legal right may only be vindicated by following the 
procedures set forth in Wis. Stat. § 5.06.  But Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.40 provides an additional avenue to vindicate rights 
conferred 
in 
other 
statutes——including 
§ 5.06——that 
are 
threatened by unlawful guidance documents and rules. 
6 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 5.08 (empowering voters who 
believe "that an election official has failed or is failing to 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
12 
 
¶165 Returning to the standing question here, Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.40(1) first requires the challenge be to a "rule or 
guidance document."  Teigen challenges two memos issued by WEC 
which all agree are either guidance documents or rules.  The 
statute then inquires whether the memos or their "threatened 
application interfere[] with or impair[], or threaten[] to 
interfere with or impair, the legal rights and privileges of the 
plaintiff."  § 227.40(1).  As I have explained, Teigen has a 
legal right protected by Wis. Stat. § 5.06 to have local 
election officials in his area comply with the law.  The only 
question, then, is whether the memos at least threaten to 
interfere with or impair Teigen's right to have local election 
officials comply with the law.  I conclude they do. 
¶166 The two memos challenged in this case provide local 
election officials advice on absentee ballot return——advice 
Teigen contends is unlawful.  Regardless of whether the memos 
are themselves binding on local election officials (a question 
explored further below), they no doubt carry persuasive force 
with those administering elections.  Many local election 
officials will follow advice offered by WEC, even when that 
advice is not legally binding.  Indeed, the record in this case 
                                                                                                                                                             
comply with any law regulating the conduct of elections or 
election campaigns" to petition the district attorney with 
jurisdiction to prosecute the election official's failure); Wis. 
Stat. § 5.061 (directing voters to file a complaint if they 
observe a violation of the Help America Vote Act in a national 
election); Wis. Stat. § 5.081 (authorizing voters to contest 
perceived violations of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act by 
petitioning the attorney general, who then is directed to bring 
a lawsuit on the voters' behalf). 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
13 
 
reveals that many local election officials employed drop boxes 
consistent with WEC's advice after the memos issued.  If that 
advice is contrary to law, it stands to reason that many local 
election officials, including those in Teigen's area, are likely 
to rely on and implement erroneous advice.  Applying the plain 
terms of Wis. Stat. § 227.40(1), the memos Teigen challenges at 
the very least threaten to interfere with or impair his right to 
have local election officials comply with the law.  In other 
words, unlawful WEC guidance can threaten harm to the legal 
rights and privileges Wis. Stat. § 5.06 provides to voters like 
Teigen.  In this case, the question is whether WEC issued an 
allegedly unlawful rule or guidance document that makes it 
likely local election officials will not follow election laws.  
And on that question, Teigen has sufficiently alleged standing 
for purposes of § 227.40(1).7 
¶167 The 
majority/lead 
opinion 
concludes 
Teigen 
has 
standing, but for a different reason.  It says Teigen alleged an 
injury to his constitutional right to vote as recognized in Wis. 
Stat. § 6.84(1).  Majority/lead op., ¶21.  That subsection is a 
statement of legislative policy.  It provides in part, "The 
legislature finds that voting is a constitutional right, the 
vigorous exercise of which should be strongly encouraged."  
                                                 
7 Significantly, the challenge to Teigen's standing in this 
case was brought by one of the intervenors, DSCC.  WEC——the 
agency that issued the challenged guidance——expressly declined 
to join DSCC's standing challenge, even when questioned about 
the challenge at oral argument.  If there is a clear bar to 
voters challenging allegedly unlawful WEC guidance, WEC itself 
did not think it worth raising. 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
14 
 
§ 6.84(1).  This statute acknowledges the right to vote 
protected 
in 
Article 
III, 
Section 
1 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution:  "Every United States citizen age 18 or older who 
is a resident of an election district in this state is a 
qualified elector of that district."  The majority/lead does not 
explain why the text of § 6.84(1)——or Article III, Section 1 for 
that matter——should be read to encompass a right for a voter to 
challenge any and all election practices.  Section 6.84 sets 
forth rules of construction in a subchapter governing absentee 
voting.  Yet the majority/lead opinion suggests it creates broad 
voter standing against any election official or WEC by any 
elector for nearly any purported violation of any election law.8  
Without tethering the analysis to an on-point text, this 
analysis is unpersuasive and does not garner the support of four 
members of this court. 
B.  Exhaustion 
¶168 One procedural matter remains.  DRW argues Teigen 
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he did not 
first 
challenge 
the 
guidance 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 5.06.  
Specifically, DRW points to subsec. (2) of that statute, which 
says:  "No person who is authorized to file a complaint under 
                                                 
8 The majority/lead opinion does not disagree with this 
characterization of the import of its argument.  But it wrongly 
suggests my analysis under Wis. Stat. § 5.06 does the same.  My 
standing analysis applies only to challenges under Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.40(1) to WEC rules and guidance documents when that 
guidance threatens to cause local election officials to behave 
illegally——a legal right protected by § 5.06.  The majority/lead 
opinion brings heat, but little light, to the analysis. 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
15 
 
[this section] . . . may commence an action or proceeding to 
test the validity of any decision, action or failure to act on 
the part of any election official . . . without first filing a 
complaint under [this section.]"  § 5.06(2).  DRW also relies on 
Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m), which says WEC's "power to initiate civil 
actions . . . for the enforcement of chs. 5 to 10 or 12 shall be 
the exclusive remedy for alleged civil violations of chs. 5 to 
10 or 12."  § 5.05(2m)(k). 
¶169 DRW 
makes 
reasonable 
arguments 
supporting 
the 
proposition that these statutes apply to claimed failures of WEC 
as well.  But on balance, I conclude that these statutes do not 
apply here.  Wisconsin Stat. § 5.06 gives WEC an adjudicatory 
role when an "election official" violates the law.  An "election 
official" in the elections statutes is "an individual who is 
charged with any duties relating to the conduct of an election."  
Wis. Stat. § 5.02(4e).  However, WEC is separately defined 
immediately following this as "the elections commission."  Wis. 
Stat. § 5.025.  WEC's powers and duties are outlined in § 5.05 
and include a direction to "investigate violations of laws 
administered by the commission" and "prosecute alleged civil 
violations of those laws."  § 5.05(2m)(a).  Similarly, § 5.06(4) 
authorizes WEC to "investigate and determine whether any 
election official . . . has failed to comply with the law."  
With respect to both §§ 5.05(2m) and 5.06, DRW's reading would 
mean WEC is directed to investigate and prosecute itself, which 
makes little sense.  That, along with the statutory distinction 
between an "election official" and the "commission" lead me to 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
16 
 
conclude the better reading is that the § 5.06 complaint process 
does not apply to complaints against acts of WEC as a body.9 
¶170 In addition, Wis. Stat. § 227.40(1) expressly opens 
the courthouse doors to those challenging administrative rules 
or guidance documents:  "A declaratory judgment may be rendered 
whether or not the plaintiff has first requested the agency to 
pass upon the validity of the rule or guidance document in 
question."  This seems to carve out a particular kind of legal 
claim——a challenge to rules and guidance documents——and relieves 
the petitioner of pleading one's case with the agency first.10  
Applying this as written, and in the absence of other contrary 
arguments, I conclude Teigen was not required to take his case 
to WEC before seeking judicial relief under § 227.40(1).  Thus, 
Teigen has not failed to exhaust his administrative remedies 
before bringing this claim.  I therefore proceed to the merits. 
III.  BALLOT DELIVERY & DROP BOXES 
¶171 In the two memos at issue here, WEC advised clerks 
that absentee voters could cast their ballots via staffed or 
unstaffed drop boxes, that drop boxes may be placed at clerk's 
                                                 
9 See also Note, Wis. Admin. Code ch. EL 20 (June 2016) 
(referring to "complaints alleging a violation of election laws 
by a local election official under s. 5.06, Wis. Stat." 
(emphasis added)). 
10 The availability of relief under Wis. Stat. § 227.40(1) 
also means the State has waived its sovereign immunity from this 
type of claim——i.e., it has consented to suits of this type.  
See Wis. Const. art. IV, § 27; Lister v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. 
Wis. 
Sys., 
72 
Wis. 2d 282, 
291, 
240 
N.W.2d 610 
(1976) 
(explaining "the state cannot be sued without its consent"). 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
17 
 
office or elsewhere, and that individuals other than the voter 
may deliver the voter's absentee ballot to the clerk.  These 
three positions are inconsistent with Wisconsin's election 
statutes.  The law requires that to return an absentee ballot in 
person, voters must personally deliver their ballot to the clerk 
or the clerk's authorized representative at either the clerk's 
office or a designated alternate site.  Wis. Stat. §§ 5.02(10), 
6.855, 6.87(4)(b)1., 6.88(1).  Because WEC's memos conflict with 
these statutory directives, they are invalid. 
A.  Statutory Framework 
¶172 Our interpretive task centers on three statutes that 
together provide the framework for how absentee ballots may be 
returned and how clerks are to receive them.   
¶173 The first one, Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1., details how 
an absentee voter should complete a ballot, and then directs how 
it should be returned:  "The envelope shall be mailed by the 
elector, or delivered in person, to the municipal clerk issuing 
the ballot or ballots."  § 6.87(4)(b)1.  A "municipal clerk" 
includes "authorized representatives" of the clerk.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 5.02(10). 
¶174 Wisconsin Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. was originally enacted 
as part of Wisconsin's earliest comprehensive absentee voting 
law in 1915.  § 1, ch. 461, Laws of 1915.  Regarding return of a 
ballot, the law provided:  "Said envelope shall be mailed by 
such voter, by registered mail, postage prepaid, to the officer 
issuing the ballot, or if more convenient it may be delivered in 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
18 
 
person."  Id.  This wording, plainly read, suggests both the 
mailing and the delivery must be done by the voter, and directed 
to the ballot-issuing officer. 
¶175 When we construe statutes, we must read the words to 
mean what they were understood to mean at the time they were 
enacted, lest we find ourselves rewriting the law.  Fortunately, 
we have clear evidence of how this language was originally read.  
Less than a year after enactment, the attorney general opined on 
the precise interpretive question before us today:  "'Delivery 
in person' must mean handed directly by an elector to the 
officer; it means manual transmission by the one to the other."  
5 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 591, 593 (1916).  When enacted, the text 
we are considering today was understood to require a person-to-
person interaction between the voter and the clerk.  So far as I 
can tell, this reading went unchallenged for 40 years. 
¶176 In 1955, this court had occasion to examine the 
statute in an election dispute.  In Sommerfeld v. Board of 
Canvassers of the City of St. Francis, 18 absentee ballots were 
returned to the clerk by a third person, and not by the voter.  
269 Wis. 299, 300-01, 69 N.W.2d 235 (1955), abrogated in part by 
Wis. Stat. § 6.84(2).  The question in that case concerned 
whether those ballots should be counted.  Id. at 300.  All seven 
justices took it as a given that the law had been violated; the 
statute required delivery from the voter to the clerk, not 
through a third person.  Id. at 301; id. at 304-05 (Gehl, J., 
dissenting).  The four-justice majority, however, concluded 
those votes should nonetheless be counted because the statute, 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
19 
 
though violated, was directory, not mandatory.  Id. at 304.  
Although legally binding, failure to comply with a directory 
statute may not produce the same consequence as a failure to 
comply with a mandatory statute.  See State v. Rosen, 72 
Wis. 2d 200, 207, 240 N.W.2d 168 (1976).  The Sommerfeld 
majority concluded that construing the in-person delivery 
requirement as mandatory for votes to count could disenfranchise 
some disabled voters——a result it did not think the legislature 
meant to produce.  269 Wis. at 303-04.  Speaking for three 
justices, Justice Gehl wrote in dissent that "in person" means 
"[b]y one's self; with bodily presence," quoting a dictionary.  
Id. at 304 (Gehl, J., dissenting).  Voting by agent was not 
permitted by this statute, the dissent explained, and votes cast 
out of compliance with the law should not be counted.  Id. at 
305 (Gehl, J., dissenting).  Sommerfeld's holding that the in-
person 
delivery 
requirement 
is 
directory 
has 
since 
been 
abrogated.  Section 6.84(2) now provides that the requirement 
"shall be construed as mandatory."  What remains is what no 
justice doubted——that the "in person" delivery requirement means 
personal delivery, in the flesh, by the voter, to the municipal 
clerk. 
¶177 The legislature has instructed that a "revised statute 
is to be understood in the same sense as the original unless the 
change in language indicates a different meaning so clearly as 
to preclude judicial construction."  Wis. Stat. § 990.001(7).  
There have been three significant iterations of the in-person 
delivery requirement; none convey a clear change in meaning from 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
20 
 
the original.11  No statutory amendments, cases, or Attorney 
General opinions since give cause to reconsider the long-held 
view 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 6.87(4)(b)1.'s 
delivery 
provision 
requires a person-to-person interaction between the voter and 
the clerk. 
¶178 WEC and DRW counter that because the statute is 
written in the passive voice, the actor is indeterminate.  While 
that can be true at times, it is not the case here.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. is not agnostic as to the actor.  It must 
be the voter who delivers the ballot.  The history confirms this 
plain reading.  WEC also argues that delivery in person does not 
foreclose delivery by an agent.  But statutory history shows 
this is incorrect as well.  In the same comprehensive 1915 law, 
just two sections after the in-person-delivery requirement, the 
law speaks of delivery of ballots from clerks to election 
inspectors "in person or by duly deputized agent."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 44m——8 (1915).  At the very least, this shows that the 
legislature knew how to allow delivery by agent, but it chose 
not to provide for that form of delivery when it enacted this 
                                                 
11 The three versions are as follows: 
 1915:  "Said envelope shall be mailed by such voter, by 
registered mail, postage prepaid, to the officer issuing 
the ballot, or if more convenient it may be delivered in 
person."  Wis. Stat. § 44m——6 (1915). 
 1965:  "The envelope shall be mailed by the elector, 
postage prepaid, or delivered in person, to the municipal 
clerk issuing the ballot."  Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4) (1967-68). 
 Present:  "The envelope shall be mailed by the elector, or 
delivered in person, to the municipal clerk issuing the 
ballot or ballots."  Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
21 
 
law.  Our decision in Sommerfeld is in accord.  I see no 
evidence supporting a different reading in the current text 
either.12 
¶179 In the end, there are two ways to return an absentee 
ballot under Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1.  A ballot may be "mailed 
by the elector," or the voter may deliver it "in person" to the 
clerk that issued it.  § 6.87(4)(b)1.  The elector is required——
the statute uses the word "shall"——to utilize one of these two 
options.  This contemplates an in-person interaction between the 
voter 
and 
either 
the 
municipal 
clerk 
or 
an 
authorized 
representative of the clerk. 
¶180 We turn next to two statutes that inform where clerks 
may receive absentee ballots.  Wisconsin Stat. § 6.88(1) 
prescribes what happens after an absentee ballot is received by 
the clerk: 
When an absentee ballot arrives at the office of the 
municipal clerk, or at an alternate site under s. 
6.855, if applicable, the clerk shall enclose it, 
unopened, in a carrier envelope which shall be 
securely sealed and endorsed with the name and 
official 
title 
of 
the 
clerk, 
and 
[a 
statement 
                                                 
12 The dissent suggests that the use of the phrase "ballot 
or ballots" means that one voter may return other voters' 
ballots.  Dissent, ¶240 n.14.  This phrasing, however, appears 
to be holdover from an earlier time when a single voter would 
cast separate ballots for separate races.  The original absentee 
voting law enacted in 1915 routinely discussed a single voter 
receiving and casting multiple ballots.  See Wis. Stat. § 44m—4 
(1915) (providing that the municipal clerk "shall deliver said 
ballot or ballots to the applicant personally"); Wis. Stat. 
§ 44m—6 (1915) (directing the voter to "mark such ballot or 
ballots" and that "such ballot or ballots shall then in the 
presence of such officer be folded by such voter so that each 
ballot will be separate and so as to conceal the marking"). 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
22 
 
regarding the contents of the envelope]. . . .  The 
clerk shall keep the ballot in the clerk's office or 
at the alternate site, if applicable until delivered 
[to the appropriate election officials]. 
This statute ensures a strict chain of custody for ballots.  
Once a ballot is delivered by the voter, the clerk must take 
steps to secure it until the time comes to deliver it to the 
appropriate election officials.  The next subsection, § 6.88(2), 
provides detailed instructions regarding the secure transfer of 
ballots from clerks to the proper election officials, ensuring 
there is no opportunity to tamper with the ballots.  Although 
neither Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. nor § 6.88(1) expressly state 
where the voter may deliver his or her ballot, reading the two 
sections together suggests that delivery must occur either at 
the clerk's office or an alternate site, if applicable.  Given 
the detailed ballot custody regulations once the ballot arrives 
at the clerk's office or an alternate site, legislative silence 
with respect to ballots delivered anywhere else strongly 
indicates delivery is not permitted anywhere else.  See Alberte 
v. Anew Health Care Servs., Inc., 2000 WI 7, ¶17, 232 
Wis. 2d 587, 605 N.W.2d 515 (noting that statutory silence "is 
strong 
evidence" 
that 
the 
legislature 
"simply 
did 
not 
contemplate" a particular option). 
¶181 Finally, 
we 
consider 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 6.855, 
which 
authorizes 
the 
aforementioned 
"alternate 
sites"——i.e., 
designated locations besides the clerk's office where elections 
may be administered.  It provides: 
The governing body of a municipality may elect to 
designate a site other than the office of the 
municipal clerk or board of election commissioners as 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
23 
 
the location from which electors of the municipality 
may request and vote absentee ballots and to which 
voted absentee ballots shall be returned by electors 
for any election. . . .  If the governing body of a 
municipality makes an election under this section, no 
function related to voting and return of absentee 
ballots that is to be conducted at the alternate site 
may be conducted in the office of the municipal clerk 
or board of election commissioners. 
§ 6.855(1).13 
 
The 
strict 
regulation 
of 
alternate 
sites 
reinforces the interpretation that ballots must be returned to 
either the clerk's office or a designated alternate site.  Just 
as the statutes are not agnostic about who delivers ballots, a 
holistic reading indicates they are not agnostic about where 
those ballots are delivered either.  Ballot custody is carefully 
regulated at both clerks' offices and at alternate sites.  The 
absence of any careful regulation governing ballot custody 
elsewhere leads me to conclude that clerks may not take custody 
of ballots at other locations unless otherwise specified.14 
                                                 
13 Governing bodies "may designate more than one alternate 
site."  Wis. Stat. § 6.855(5). 
14 In Trump v. Biden, among other issues, we were asked 
whether ballots delivered to certified election inspectors at 
temporary events in Madison parks were valid.  2020 WI 91, ¶¶9, 
19-21, 394 Wis. 2d 629, 951 N.W.2d 568.  The court concluded 
this claim was barred by the doctrine of laches and rejected it 
on that basis.  Id., ¶¶10, 29-31.  I authored a concurrence 
offering a preliminary review of the merits of the three claims 
rejected on the basis of laches, while recognizing that a 
"comprehensive analysis is not possible or appropriate in light 
of the abbreviated nature of this review and the limited factual 
record" in that case.  Id., ¶36 (Hagedorn, J., concurring).  
Regarding the so-called "Democracy at the Park" events, I 
concluded those events were lawful "based on the record before 
the court and the arguments presented."  Id., ¶57 (Hagedorn, J., 
concurring).  With the benefit of more comprehensive briefing 
and careful study, I now conclude that the better reading of the 
statutory scheme is that ballots may only be returned to the 
clerk's office or a designated alternate site.  To be clear, 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
24 
 
¶182 The respondents argue that the directive to deliver 
ballots "to the municipal clerk" in Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. 
does not restrict how the municipal clerk may receive the 
ballots.  If the municipal clerk wishes to receive the ballots 
in a drop box, the argument goes, that is sufficient.  Moreover, 
other statutes speak of delivery to the office of the municipal 
clerk, and this one does not.  This is perhaps the best argument 
in the respondents' favor, but it is unpersuasive given the 
additional statutes that give great care to ballot security and 
custody.  While § 6.87(4)(b)1. says how ballots must be 
delivered and by whom, Wis. Stat. §§ 6.88(1) and 6.855(1) are 
best read as limiting and defining where these ballots must be 
delivered.  Section 6.87(4)(b)1. requires in-person delivery by 
the voter to the municipal clerk.  And §§ 6.88(1) and 6.855(1) 
specify where the municipal clerk can receive those ballots.15 
¶183 Read together, these statutes direct that when voters 
choose to return an absentee ballot in person, they must 
personally deliver their ballot to the clerk or the clerk's 
authorized representative at either the clerk's office or a 
designated alternate site.  With this interpretation in hand, 
the next task is to hold WEC's memos up against the statutes. 
                                                                                                                                                             
this conclusion would not have changed the court's decision in 
Trump. 
15 As previously noted, these statutes are far from obvious.  
While I conclude WEC's interpretation is incorrect, reasonable 
arguments can be made otherwise, especially with respect to the 
locations where ballots may be received.  This lack of precision 
and certainty should serve as a call for our political branches 
to give clearer guidance to voters and those they have asked to 
administer elections. 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
25 
 
B.  Application 
¶184 Teigen focuses his challenge to the March 2020 memo on 
the following sentence:  "A family member or another person may 
also return the ballot on behalf of the voter."  Teigen argues, 
correctly, 
that 
this 
advice 
was 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 6.87(4)(b)1.  WEC's interpretation would permit an agent of 
the voter to return a ballot on the voter's behalf, contrary to 
§ 6.87(4)(b)1.'s requirement that there be a voter-to-clerk 
interaction.  And although Wis. Stat. § 5.02(10) permits an 
agent to stand in for the clerk, no statute allows an agent to 
stand in for the voter in this context.16  WEC's March 2020 memo 
is invalid. 
¶185 Teigen also seeks a declaration that Wis. Stat. 
§ 6.87(4)(b)1. requires voters to personally place their own 
ballots in the mail——a declaration the circuit court granted.  
However, neither WEC's March 2020 memo nor its August 2020 memo 
offer any advice about how a ballot may be "mailed by the 
elector."  Therefore, there simply is no guidance or rule for us 
to review under Wis. Stat. § 227.40(1).  Accordingly, the court 
should not and does not make any declaration on that question.17 
                                                 
16 Other more specific laws that are not at issue here do 
permit agents to complete certain tasks on a voter's behalf.  
See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 6.875 (absentee voting in certain 
residential care facilities); Wis. Stat. § 6.86(3) (hospitalized 
voters). 
17 Justice Roggensack's concurring opinion contends we 
should decide this question pursuant to our authority under the 
general 
Declaratory 
Judgments 
Act, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.04.  
However, unlike Teigen's other claims, he presents no evidence 
that WEC has or will violate Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1.'s 
directives on returning ballots by mail.  Teigen therefore does 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
26 
 
¶186 Finally, we turn to WEC's August 2020 memo, which 
provides guidance on drop boxes.  Teigen correctly contends the 
August 2020 memo improperly advises clerks on how to administer 
unstaffed drop boxes and drop boxes at locations other than the 
clerk's office or alternate sites.  WEC's guidance is contrary 
to statute for two reasons.  First, unstaffed drop boxes do not 
satisfy Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1.'s requirement that the voter 
deliver his or her ballot to the municipal clerk or an 
authorized representative of the clerk.  The "in person" 
interaction the statutes require is absent when a ballot is 
delivered to an unstaffed drop box.  Second, the August memo 
offers incorrect guidance regarding drop boxes at locations 
other than the municipal clerk's office or alternate sites.  
Because Wis. Stat. §§ 6.88(1) and 6.855(1) contemplate delivery 
occurring at the clerk's office or an alternate site, but not 
elsewhere, this guidance is contrary to law.  Accordingly, WEC's 
August 2020 memo is also invalid. 
¶187 Both WEC's March 2020 and August 2020 memos provide 
advice that is inconsistent with Wisconsin's election statutes.  
The court therefore rightly affirms the circuit court's order 
declaring the memos invalid pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 227.40(1). 
IV.  UNPROMULGATED RULE CHALLENGE 
¶188 The foregoing analysis is sufficient to resolve the 
appeal before us.  I write further to address Teigen's argument 
that WEC's memos were unpromulgated administrative rules. 
                                                                                                                                                             
not face any threatened harm which a declaration would remedy. 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
27 
 
¶189 Not all statements that come from a state agency are 
created 
equal. 
 
Wisconsin's 
Administrative 
Procedure 
Act 
recognizes this and draws a distinction between what it terms 
"guidance documents" on the one hand and administrative "rules" 
on the other.  Wis. Stat. § 227.01(3m) & (13). 
¶190 A guidance document is just what it sounds like.  It 
is a "formal or official document or communication issued by an 
agency"——such 
as 
"a 
manual, 
handbook, 
directive, 
or 
informational bulletin"——that explains how a rule will be 
implemented or advises the public on how the agency is likely to 
apply a statute or rule to a class of similarly affected 
persons.  Wis. Stat. § 227.01(3m)(a).  "A guidance document does 
not have the force of law and does not provide the authority for 
implementing 
or 
enforcing 
a 
standard, 
requirement, 
or 
threshold."  Wis. Stat. § 227.112(3).  Agency guidance has 
existed informally for some time.  In 2018, the legislature 
formalized guidance documents into law as a category of agency 
communication and added procedures for challenging them.  See 
2017 Wis. Act 369, §§ 31, 65-71.  The legislature also required 
guidance documents to go through various processes to ensure 
public input and legislative oversight.  Id., § 38.  However, a 
majority of the court concluded several of these statutes were 
facially unconstitutional——incorrectly so in my view.  Serv. 
Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶¶90-91, 393 
Wis. 2d 38, 
946 
N.W.2d 35; 
id., 
¶¶190-212 
(Hagedorn, 
J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part).  Accordingly, agencies 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
28 
 
may 
issue 
guidance 
documents 
without 
going 
through 
the 
procedures described in Wis. Stat. ch. 227. 
¶191 "Rules" are different.  The statutory definition of a 
rule has five elements:  a "rule" is (1) "a regulation, 
standard, statement of policy, or general order," (2) "of 
general application," that (3) "has the force of law," and (4) 
"is issued by an agency," to (5) "implement, interpret, or make 
specific legislation enforced or administered by the agency or 
to govern the organization or procedure of the agency."  Wis. 
Stat. § 227.01(13).  If all five of these elements are 
satisfied, 
the 
rule 
is 
subject 
to 
numerous 
promulgation 
requirements, most notably those described in subchapter II of 
Wis. Stat. ch. 227.  Any rule "promulgated or adopted without 
compliance with statutory rule-making or adoption procedures" is 
invalid.  Wis. Stat. § 227.40(4)(a). 
¶192 Teigen contends that both of WEC's memos were rules 
under the five-part definition just articulated, and that they 
are invalid because WEC did not go through the steps required to 
promulgate a rule.  The dispute revolves around whether these 
memos have the force of law; rules by definition do, guidance 
documents by definition do not. 
¶193 Few cases interpret whether a directive has the force 
of law.  The court of appeals has observed that "[m]aterials 
developed by an agency as a reference aid for its staff that are 
couched in terms of advice and guidelines rather than setting 
forth law-like pronouncements" do not have the force of law and 
are not rules.  County of Dane v. Winsand, 2004 WI App 86, ¶11, 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
29 
 
271 Wis. 2d 786, 679 N.W.2d 885 (cleaned up).  By contrast, 
materials "using express mandatory language are more than 
informational."  Milwaukee Area Joint Plumbing Apprenticeship 
Comm. v. DILHR, 172 Wis. 2d 299, 321 n.12, 493 N.W.2d 744 (Ct. 
App. 1992).  In such documents, "the agency speaks with an 
official voice intended to have the effect of law."  Id.  How an 
agency uses a document can also indicate whether it has the 
force of law.  See Barry Lab'ys, Inc. v. Wis. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy, 
26 
Wis. 2d 505, 
516, 
132 
N.W.2d 833 
(1965).  
Additional instances where agency materials have been held to 
have the force of law include "where criminal or civil sanctions 
can result" or "where the interest of individuals in a class can 
be legally affected through enforcement of the agency action."  
Cholvin v. DHSF, 2008 WI App 127, ¶26, 313 Wis. 2d 749, 758 
N.W.2d 118 (collecting cases). 
¶194 While these cases are helpful, a more fundamental 
question should be asked:  what is a law?  To be a law means to 
be binding and enforceable.  Durkee v. City of Janesville, 28 
Wis. 464, 471 (1871) (laws are "binding"); State ex rel. Mayer 
v. Schuffenhauer, 213 Wis. 29, 32, 250 N.W. 767 (1933) (laws 
"must be followed").  A law orders and forbids and governs and 
establishes in an authoritative way.  See U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. 
v. Guenther, 281 U.S. 34, 37 (1930) (defining "law" as "the 
rules of action or conduct duly prescribed by controlling 
authority, and having binding legal force").  Here, the statutes 
specify that a rule must have the "force of law."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.01(13).  And "force" means to "compel by physical means or 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
30 
 
by legal requirement."  Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  
This suggests something has the force of law if it compels 
compliance in the same manner as other laws——like a statute or 
constitutional 
provision. 
 
Administrative 
rules, 
once 
promulgated, bind agencies and regulated entities alike.  But 
guidance documents do not; they inform and compel nothing. 
¶195 Also important to our inquiry is the agency we are 
talking about.  Most agencies in state government operate with a 
wide range of powers and have broad areas of regulatory 
authority.  WEC is different.  Wisconsin's method for conducting 
elections is unlike that of most other states in the union.  Our 
election administration system is highly decentralized.  State 
ex rel. Zignego v. WEC, 2021 WI 32, ¶13, 396 Wis. 2d 391, 957 
N.W.2d 208.  "Rather than a top-down arrangement with a central 
state entity or official controlling local actors, Wisconsin 
gives some power to its state election agency ([WEC]) and places 
significant responsibility on a small army of local election 
officials."  Id.  It is local clerks who have the "primary role 
in running Wisconsin elections."  Id., ¶15.  WEC is therefore 
given authority and oversight over some things, and not others.  
It may speak authoritatively at times, but not at all times. 
¶196 Consistent with this structure, the statutes specific 
to WEC establish a process by which WEC can adopt formal or 
informal advisory opinions that "have legal force and effect."  
Wis. Stat. § 5.05(6a)(a)2.  This necessarily means some of WEC's 
opinions and advice do not have legal force and effect, and 
therefore, cannot be administrative rules.  Statutes must be 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
31 
 
read together where possible, which means we must interpret the 
rulemaking "force of law" requirement consistent with the 
particular circumstances where WEC can issue advisory opinions 
that "have legal force and effect."  See § 5.05(6a)(a)1. 
¶197 Considering all of this, the two memos in this case do 
not have the force of law.  The memos are self-labeled guidance 
documents.  They do not purport to be advisory opinions with 
legal force issued pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 5.05(6a)(a)2.  And 
again, the legislature has specifically stated that WEC's 
opinions have legal force and effect only under certain 
circumstances; this is not one of them. 
¶198 The language of the memos supports this view.  The 
March 2020 memo is structured as an FAQ document addressed to 
local election officials.  It begins by observing, "Due to the 
increase in by-mail absentee ballots, clerks have inquired about 
options for ensuring that the maximum number of ballots are 
returned to be counted for the April 7, 2020 election."  It 
proceeds to advise clerks on how "to make ballot return more 
accessible and efficient," and says that it is "recommended" 
that clerks take various actions to inform voters how their 
ballots may be returned.  The memo then shifts to question-and-
answer format, providing advice to clerks regarding drop boxes 
and how to coordinate ballot return with the U.S. Postal 
Service. 
 
Nothing 
in 
the 
documents 
suggests 
there 
are 
consequences for noncompliance.  No legal interests are altered 
by the March 2020 memo. 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
32 
 
¶199 The August 2020 memo is similarly entitled "Absentee 
Ballot Drop Box Information" and is addressed to Wisconsin's 
election officials.  The very first line of the memo reveals its 
limited purpose:  "This document is intended to provide 
information and guidance on drop box options for secure absentee 
ballot return for voters."  It indicates the information in the 
memo was adapted from an advisory resource developed by the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.  It advises 
election officials regarding various types of drop boxes, where 
to place them, and how to keep the ballots collected in drop 
boxes secure.  Again, reading the August 2020 memo in full 
reveals that it is an informational document, designed to 
educate election officials regarding best practices.  It was 
never legally binding. 
¶200 Teigen disagrees.  He argues that when the state 
entity responsible for administering Wisconsin election law says 
something is permissible——like drop boxes——WEC's imprimatur 
gives its statement the force of law.  But widely-followed 
advice can still simply be advice.  Even general acceptance does 
not make guidance legally binding or otherwise give it the force 
of law.  Wisconsin's local election officials who lead the 
charge 
in 
election 
administration 
have 
an 
independent 
responsibility to read and follow the law.  WEC's memos provided 
advice and best practices which election officials could weigh 
and consider.  Many surely followed that advice.  But the memos 
did not themselves "authorize" drop boxes or any other election 
practice in a legally binding way. 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
33 
 
¶201 Justice Rebecca Grassl's Bradley concurrence concludes 
the memos are administrative rules, a position premised on a 
confused interpretation of Trump v. Biden, 2020 WI 91, 394 
Wis. 2d 629, 951 N.W.2d 568.  In that case, the court used the 
word "rulebook" in a metaphor regarding challenge flags in 
football.  Id., ¶32.  The logic of Justice Bradley's concurrence 
goes like this:  The court said WEC's memos were a rulebook, so 
the court held that WEC memos have the force of law and are 
administrative rules under Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13). 
¶202 To state the obvious, a metaphor is "a figure of 
speech in which a term or phrase is applied to something to 
which it is not literally applicable."18  The challenge flag 
metaphor came in the concluding paragraph to reinforce the 
importance of challenging election practices in a timely manner.  
Yet the concurrence reasons that using the coincidentally 
similar word "rulebook" means the court determined that all WEC 
memos are "rules" within the statutory definition.  Except the 
court's decision in Trump did not involve administrative 
rulemaking at all.  It did not cite Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13).  
And no part of the analysis ascribed the force of law to WEC 
guidance.  Rather, the court's decision addressed whether the 
Trump campaign was entitled to the relief it sought——the 
striking of ballots cast in Dane and Milwaukee Counties.  Trump, 
                                                 
18 https://www.dictionary.com/browse/metaphor 
(emphasis 
added); see, e.g., Thurl Ravenscroft, You're a Mean One, Mr. 
Grinch, on How the Grinch Stole Christmas (Mercury Records 1966) 
(referring to Mr. Grinch as a "bad banana" and to his heart as 
an "empty hole"). 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
34 
 
394 Wis. 2d 629, ¶32.  The court expressly withheld judgment on 
whether the widely followed WEC guidance was correct or not.  
Id., ¶30 n.11 ("Our decision that the Campaign is not entitled 
to the relief it seeks does not mean the legal issues presented 
are foreclosed from further judicial scrutiny.").  Simply put, 
neither the court's reasoning nor its concluding metaphor 
suggested all such guidance has the force of law and must be 
followed.  It never even hinted this.  The idea that we should 
ascribe legal force to the two challenged memos in this case 
because this was somehow settled by a one-sentence metaphor in 
Trump v. Biden is not a serious legal argument. 
¶203 In the end, neither the March 2020 memo nor the August 
2020 memo are unpromulgated administrative rules because neither 
have the force of law.  The memos here are guidance documents.  
They are not subject to Wis. Stat. ch. 227's promulgation 
requirements and cannot be invalidated on that basis.  They can, 
however, be invalidated for being inconsistent with statute, as 
we hold today.19 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶204 The majority/lead opinion correctly concludes that 
WEC's March 2020 and August 2020 memos are invalid because they 
are inconsistent with Wisconsin law.  Wisconsin's election 
statutes require that to return an absentee ballot in person, 
                                                 
19 Of course, if unstaffed drop boxes are not permitted by 
statute, as a majority of this court holds today, then no 
rulemaking authorizing drop boxes would be permissible.  An 
administrative rule cannot make lawful what the statutes forbid. 
No.  2022AP91.bh 
 
35 
 
voters must personally deliver their ballot to the clerk or the 
clerk's authorized representative at either the clerk's office 
or a designated alternate site.  Wis. Stat. §§ 5.02(10), 6.855, 
6.87(4)(b)1., 
6.88(1). 
 
WEC's 
memos 
conflict 
with 
these 
statutory requirements by advising that individuals other than 
the voter may return the voter's ballot to the municipal clerk, 
that unstaffed drop boxes are permissible, and that drop boxes 
may be located at places other than the municipal clerk's office 
or alternate sites.  I respectfully concur. 
No.  2022AP91.awb 
 
1 
 
¶205 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The right to 
vote is a "sacred right of the highest character."  State ex 
rel. McGrael v. Phelps, 144 Wis. 1, 15, 128 N.W. 1041 (1910).  
Yet the majority/lead opinion1 blithely and erroneously seeks to 
sow distrust in the administration of our elections and through 
its faulty analysis erects yet another barrier for voters to 
exercise this "sacred right."   
¶206 Although it pays lip service to the import of the 
right to vote, the majority/lead opinion has the practical 
effect of making it more difficult to exercise it.  Such a 
result, although lamentable, is not a surprise from this court.  
It has seemingly taken the opportunity to make it harder to vote 
or to inject confusion into the process whenever it has been 
presented with the opportunity.2 
¶207 A ballot drop box is a simple and perfectly legal 
solution to make voting easier, especially in the midst of a 
                                                 
1 I refer to Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's opinion as the 
"majority/lead opinion" because not all of the opinion has been 
joined by a majority of the court.  Justice Brian Hagedorn does 
not join the following paragraphs:  1-3, 11, 14-51, 64-72, 86, 
n.29, 87.  Justice Hagedorn's concurrence, ¶149 n.1.  Thus, 
those paragraphs do not constitute precedential authority.  For 
further discussion of our procedure regarding lead opinions, see 
Koss Corp. v. Park Bank, 2019 WI 7, ¶76 n.1, 385 Wis. 2d 261, 
922 N.W.2d 20 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., concurring). 
2 See, e.g., Teigen v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, No. 2022AP91, 
unpublished order (Wis. S. Ct. Feb. 11, 2022); League of Women 
Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 97, 357 
Wis. 2d 360, 851 N.W.2d 302; Milwaukee Branch of NAACP v. 
Walker, 2014 WI 98, 357 Wis. 2d 469, 851 N.W.2d 262.  Each 
opinion had vigorous dissents. 
No.  2022AP91.awb 
 
2 
 
global pandemic.3  But it is apparently a bridge too far for a 
majority of this court, which once again rejects a practice that 
would expand voter participation.   
¶208 The majority/lead opinion's analysis is flawed in 
three main ways.  It expands the doctrine of standing beyond 
recognition, is premised on a faulty statutory interpretation, 
and without justification fans the flames of electoral doubt 
that threaten our democracy.   
¶209 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶210 At the outset, the majority/lead opinion makes a 
significant misstep.  It begins with a lengthy discussion of 
                                                 
3 A justice of the United States Supreme Court recently 
cited the existence of drop boxes in support of the assertion 
that 
"[r]eturning 
an 
absentee 
ballot 
in 
Wisconsin 
is . . . easy." 
 
Democratic 
Nat'l 
Comm. 
v. 
Wis. 
State 
Legislature, 
141 
S. 
Ct. 
28, 
36 
(2020) 
(Kavanaugh, 
J., 
concurring); see also id. at 29 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) 
("Never mind that voters may return their ballots not only by 
mail but also by bringing them to a county clerk's office, or 
various 'no touch' drop boxes staged locally, or certain polling 
places on election day.").  After the result in this case, the 
idea that returning a ballot is so "easy" becomes less 
defensible. 
No.  2022AP91.awb 
 
3 
 
standing,4 and in the process extends the doctrine beyond 
recognition. 
¶211 In the majority/lead opinion's view, Teigen5 has 
standing "under Wisconsin's permissive, policy-oriented approach 
toward standing" because he has a "stake in the outcome" and is 
"affected by the issues in controversy."  Majority/lead op., 
¶14.  Teigen has suffered an "injury in fact" to his 
constitutional right to vote, the majority/lead opinion says, 
merely because he alleges that election law was not followed.  
In accepting Teigen's standing to bring this suit, it further 
states:  "the failure to follow election laws is a fact which 
forces everyone . . . to question the legitimacy of election 
results."  Id., ¶25. 
                                                 
4 The majority/lead opinion additionally devotes a great 
deal of ink to analyzing whether Teigen needed to file a 
complaint with WEC under Wis. Stat. § 5.06 before commencing 
this suit.  See majority/lead op., ¶¶37-51.  It determines that 
this statute does not require a complaint to be filed against 
WEC, in part because such a procedure would cause WEC to "be a 
judge in [its] own cause."  Id., ¶47.  Rather than engage with 
each point the majority/lead opinion makes in its discussion, I 
simply observe that an agency reviewing its own decision at the 
beginning of an appeal process is a common occurrence and does 
not present the anomaly that the majority/lead opinion paints.  
See Wis. Stat. § 283.63 (providing for review by the Department 
of 
Natural 
Resources 
of 
a 
permit 
denial, 
modification, 
termination, or revocation decision made by the Department) 
5 The majority/lead opinion refers to Teigen and Thom as the 
"Wisconsin voters" throughout its opinion.  This could be 
misleading to the reader.  True enough, Teigen and Thom are 
voters who live in Wisconsin.  But the use of the term could 
lead the reader to believe that the plaintiffs here represent a 
wider swath of people than they actually do.  Thus, I refer to 
the two plaintiffs collectively as "Teigen." 
No.  2022AP91.awb 
 
4 
 
¶212 The majority/lead opinion attempts to create a free-
for-all.  It delineates no bounds whatsoever on who may 
challenge 
election 
laws. 
 
Instead, 
it 
relies 
on 
broad 
pronouncements regarding the import of our election laws and 
their general effect on all people.  But just because all people 
are subject to a law does not mean that any and all people are 
entitled to challenge it. 
¶213 Indeed, "Courts are not the proper forum to air 
generalized 
grievances 
about 
the 
administration 
of 
a 
governmental agency."  Cornwell Personnel Assocs., Ltd. v. 
DILHR, 92 Wis. 2d 53, 62, 284 N.W.2d 706 (Ct. App. 1979) 
(citations omitted); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992) ("We have consistently held that a 
plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about 
government——claiming only harm to his and every citizen's 
interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and 
seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him 
than it does the public at large——does not state an Article III 
case or controversy."). 
¶214 Yet a "generalized grievance" is just what Teigen 
brings to this court.  The majority/lead opinion says that 
Teigen's "rights and privileges as [a] registered voter[]" give 
him standing to bring this action challenging the statewide 
administration of elections.  Majority/lead op., ¶14.  Taken to 
its logical conclusion, the majority/lead opinion indicates that 
any registered voter would seemingly have standing to challenge 
any election law.  The impact of such a broad conception of 
No.  2022AP91.awb 
 
5 
 
voter standing is breathtaking and especially acute at a time of 
increasing, 
unfounded 
challenges 
to 
election 
results 
and 
election administrators.6   
¶215 Rather than opening wide the barn doors, the doctrine 
of standing is important "because it reins in unbridled attempts 
to go beyond the circumscribed boundaries that define the proper 
role of courts."  Fabick v. Evers, 2021 WI 28, ¶92, 396 
Wis. 2d 231, 956 N.W.2d 856 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., dissenting).7  
"Unbridled" certainly describes the majority/lead opinion's 
approach to standing in this case.  It follows a standard 
untethered to any limiting principle, which in effect renders 
the concept of standing merely illusory.   
II 
¶216 I turn next to the substance of the majority/lead 
opinion's statutory interpretation.8  Even assuming Teigen has 
standing to bring this claim, the majority/lead opinion falters 
in its examination of the relevant statutes. 
                                                 
6 See Election Officials Under Attack: How to Protect 
Administrators and Safeguard Democracy, Brennan Center for 
Justice 
and 
the 
Bipartisan 
Policy 
Center, 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-
solutions/election-officials-under-attack (June 16, 2021). 
7 Justice Hagedorn's concurrence likewise recognizes that 
the doctrine of standing "serves as a vital check on unbounded 
judicial power."  Justice Hagedorn's concurrence, ¶160. 
8 Although I address the majority/lead opinion's statutory 
analysis, my critique also largely applies to Justice Hagedorn's 
concurrence, which reaches the same conclusion. 
No.  2022AP91.awb 
 
6 
 
A 
¶217 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 6.87 
addresses 
absentee 
voting 
procedure.  Subd. (4)(b)1., specifically at issue here, provides 
in relevant part:  "The envelope shall be mailed by the elector, 
or delivered in person, to the municipal clerk issuing the 
ballot or ballots." 
¶218 In the majority/lead opinion's view, "[n]othing in the 
statutory language detailing the procedures by which absentee 
ballots may be cast mentions drop boxes or anything like them."  
Majority/lead op., ¶54.  Further, it interprets the phrase "to 
the municipal clerk" to mean "mailing or delivering the absentee 
ballot to the municipal clerk at her office" or an alternate 
site under Wis. Stat. § 6.855.  Id., ¶62. 
¶219 The majority/lead opinion's interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. ignores an important distinction.  Section 
6.87(4)(b)1. uses the phrase "municipal clerk."  It does not say 
"municipal clerk's office."   
¶220 This is important because elsewhere the Wisconsin 
Statutes are replete with references to the "office of the 
municipal clerk," the "office of the clerk," or the "clerk's 
office."  Not only is such an "office" referenced, but it is 
specified as a place where a delivery or an action takes place.  
See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 5.81(3) (discussing ballots and 
envelopes "voted in person in the office of the municipal 
clerk"); 6.18 (requiring that a form "shall be returned to the 
municipal clerk's office"); 6.32(2) (setting forth that an 
elector "appear at the clerk's office"); 6.855(2) (addressing 
No.  2022AP91.awb 
 
7 
 
the display of a notice "in the office of the clerk"); 
12.035(3)(d) (discussing a "building containing the office of 
the municipal clerk").9   
¶221 From these statutes we can take the principle that the 
office of the municipal clerk is a location.  Indeed, a person 
"appear[s]" at a location.  See Wis. Stat. § 6.32(2).  That the 
"office of the municipal clerk" refers to a location is 
confirmed by the fact that the statutes refer to it as 
"contain[ed]" 
within 
a 
"building." 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 12.035(3)(d). 
¶222 We also know that a "municipal clerk" under the 
statutes is distinct from the "office of the municipal clerk," 
because "municipal clerk" is specifically defined as "the city 
clerk, town clerk, village clerk and the executive director of 
the 
city 
election 
commission 
and 
their 
authorized 
representatives."  Wis. Stat. § 5.02(10).  In other words, the 
"municipal clerk" is a person, and the "office of the municipal 
clerk" is a location.   
¶223 "If a word or words are used in one subsection but are 
not used in another subsection, we must conclude that the 
legislature 
specifically 
intended 
a 
different 
meaning."  
Responsible Use of Rural and Agr. Land v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 
2000 WI 129, ¶39, 239 Wis. 2d 660, 619 N.W.2d 888.  If the 
                                                 
9 Further examples abound.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 6.15(2)(bm), 
6.28(1)(b), 6.29(2)(a), 6.30(4), 6.32(3), 6.35(3), 6.45(1m), 
6.47(2), 
6.50(1), 
6.55(2)(cm), 
6.56(4), 
6.86(1)(a)2., 
6.86(3)(c), 
6.87(3)(a), 
6.87(4)(b)4., 
6.88(1), 
6.97(3)(b), 
7.41(1), 
7.53(1)(b), 
7.53(2)(d), 
8.10(6)(c), 
12.03(1), 
12.03(2)(a)2., 12.035(3)(c).  
No.  2022AP91.awb 
 
8 
 
legislature wanted to require return of a ballot to the clerk's 
office, it certainly could have done so, as it did in the litany 
of provisions using such language.  See, e.g., Southport 
Commons, LLC v. DOT, 2021 WI 52, ¶31, 397 Wis. 2d 362, 960 
N.W.2d 17 (indicating that when the legislature wants to 
accomplish an object in a manner used in other areas of the 
statutes, "it knows how to do so").   
¶224 But the legislature did not do that.  Instead, it 
indicated that the ballot be delivered "to the municipal clerk," 
not to the clerk's office.  Conflating "municipal clerk" with 
"office of the municipal clerk" is not——as the majority/lead 
opinion claims——the "fairest interpretation" of the statute.  
See majority/lead op., ¶62.  Instead, it is a rank distortion of 
the statutory text. 
¶225  Can delivery to a drop box constitute delivery "to 
the municipal clerk?"  Absolutely.  A drop box is set up by the 
municipal clerk, maintained by the municipal clerk, and emptied 
by the municipal clerk.  This is true even if the drop box is 
located somewhere other than within the municipal clerk's 
office.  As stated, the "municipal clerk" in the statutes is a 
person, and the "office of the municipal clerk" is a location.  
Applying this principle, there is nothing in the statute that 
even hints that unstaffed drop boxes are impermissible.  Rather, 
a drop box, which the clerk or the clerk's designee10 sets up, 
                                                 
10 As stated, "municipal clerk" is statutorily defined as 
"the city clerk, town clerk, village clerk and the executive 
director of the city election commission and their authorized 
representatives."  Wis. Stat. § 5.02(10) (emphasis added).  
Thus, this job need not be accomplished by a single person. 
No.  2022AP91.awb 
 
9 
 
maintains, and empties, is simply another way to deliver a 
ballot "to the municipal clerk."11  The majority/lead opinion's 
attempt to avoid the statute's plain language fails. 
¶226 The majority/lead opinion additionally invokes Wis. 
Stat. § 6.855 in an attempt to "show[] the unlawfulness of 
ballot drop boxes."  Id., ¶56.  Again, the majority/lead opinion 
flounders.  This statute simply does not apply to drop boxes and 
tells us nothing about whether their use is permissible.12 
¶227 To 
explain, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 6.855 
establishes 
the 
procedures by which municipal clerks can set up "alternate 
absentee ballot sites."  These are commonly referred to as early 
                                                 
11 The circuit court in this case drew a distinction between 
staffed and unstaffed drop boxes, determining that drop boxes 
are not permitted "unless the drop box is staffed by the clerk 
and located at the office of the clerk or a properly designated 
alternate site."  
See majority/lead op., ¶9.  Yet the 
majority/lead opinion does not address this distinction, raising 
more questions than it answers.  Does this distinction retain 
vitality?  If so, does a drop box located directly outside the 
front door to a clerk's office count as a "staffed" drop box?  
Must a staff member from the clerk's office be standing outside 
next to the drop box?  Or is it sufficient if the clerk can see 
the box from a window while inside the office?  Once again, the 
majority/lead 
opinion 
leaves 
municipal 
clerks 
and 
voters 
guessing. 
12 Justice Hagedorn's concurrence also brings Wis. Stat. 
§ 6.88 into the analysis.  Justice Hagedorn's concurrence, ¶180.  
That statute likewise has no bearing on how ballots may be 
"delivered" to the municipal clerk.  Rather, § 6.88(1) addresses 
what occurs when an absentee ballot "arrives at the office of 
the municipal clerk" (emphasis added), and subsec. (2) concerns 
what a clerk does with ballots after they are "received" by the 
clerk.  In other words, § 6.88 speaks only of what happens to a 
ballot after it has been delivered to the municipal clerk, not 
how it gets there. 
No.  2022AP91.awb 
 
10 
 
in person absentee voting, or simply "early voting."  Section 
6.855(1) provides:   
The governing body of a municipality may elect to 
designate a site other than the office of the 
municipal clerk or board of election commissioners as 
the location from which electors of the municipality 
may request and vote absentee ballots and to which 
voted absentee ballots shall be returned by electors 
for any election."  
(Emphasis added).  
¶228 On its face, Wis. Stat. § 6.855 sets forth that 
alternate voting sites "must be a location not only where voters 
may return absentee ballots, but also a location where voters 
'may request and vote absentee ballots.'"  Trump v. Biden, 2020 
WI 91, ¶56, 394 Wis. 2d 629, 951 N.W.2d 568 (Hagedorn, J., 
concurring).  Thus, as the majority/lead opinion acknowledges, 
"[b]allot drop boxes are not alternate absentee ballot sites 
under Wis. Stat. § 6.855 because a voter can only return the 
voter's absentee ballot to a drop box, while an alternate site 
must also allow voters to request and vote absentee at the 
site."  Majority/lead op., ¶57. 
¶229 The majority/lead opinion reads into 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 6.855 an implication beyond the statute's language.  Although 
the majority/lead opinion correctly acknowledges that § 6.855 
does not describe drop boxes, it seeks support for its result in 
the assertion that "[t]he legislature enacted a detailed 
statutory construct for alternate sites" while at the same time 
"the details of the drop box scheme are found nowhere in the 
statutes."  Id., ¶58.  This argument falls flat for the same 
reason the majority/lead opinion's statutory analysis of Wis. 
No.  2022AP91.awb 
 
11 
 
Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. fails:  the legislature did not include a 
detailed scheme for drop boxes in the statutes because it did 
not need to do so.  As analyzed above, § 6.87(4)(b)1. already 
authorizes them. 
¶230 Election administration in Wisconsin is decentralized.  
State ex rel. Zignego v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2021 WI 32, ¶13, 
396 Wis. 2d 391, 957 N.W.2d 208.  "Rather than a top-down 
arrangement with a central state entity or official controlling 
local actors, Wisconsin gives some power to its state election 
agency (the Commission) and places significant responsibility on 
a small army of local election officials."  Id.  Indeed, 
"Municipal clerks are the officials primarily responsible for 
election administration in Wisconsin."  Id., ¶15. 
¶231 This significant responsibility is codified in the 
statutes.  Wisconsin Stat. § 7.15(1) specifically provides:  
"Each municipal clerk has charge and supervision of elections 
and registration in the municipality.  The clerk shall perform 
the following duties and any others which may be necessary to 
properly conduct elections or registration . . . ."  See also 
Wis. Stat. § 60.33(4)(a) ("The town clerk shall . . . [p]erform 
the duties required by chs. 5 to 12 relating to elections.").  
¶232 Instead of an inexorable command that unstaffed drop 
boxes 
are 
banned, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 6.87(4)(b)1. 
gives 
some 
discretion to municipal clerks to determine how best to run 
elections in their respective jurisdictions.  By using the 
"municipal clerk" language rather than the "office of the 
municipal clerk" verbiage, the legislature necessarily entrusts 
No.  2022AP91.awb 
 
12 
 
some discretion to the municipal clerk in a manner consistent 
with the entirety of the statutory scheme.  See DeWitt v. 
Ferries, 2018 WI 117, ¶26, 385 Wis. 2d 1, 921 N.W.2d 188 
(indicating that statutes are to be read in context, not in 
isolation but as part of a whole, and in relation to the 
language of closely-related statutes).   
¶233 The circuit court here allowed the use of staffed drop 
boxes in the office of a municipal clerk.  But what good is this 
for a clerk in a rural area who may work only a few hours a 
week?  In this context, it certainly makes sense for those 
clerks to have at least the discretion to place a drop box 
outside the office or in another location so voters can drop off 
absentee ballots outside of the limited hours the clerk's office 
is actually open.   
¶234 Instead 
of 
this 
common 
sense 
reading 
that 
is 
consistent with the decentralized manner in which Wisconsin 
elections are run, the majority/lead opinion severely limits the 
return of absentee ballots in all municipalities regardless of 
their circumstances.  Some voters will be unlucky enough to live 
in a jurisdiction without a full-time clerk, and others will be 
forced to go to only a single location to return their ballots 
where 
they 
previously 
had 
numerous 
options. 
 
Does 
the 
majority/lead think everyone in this state lives in urban areas 
with full-time clerks and standard office hours?  If so, it 
ignores reality and puts rural voters at a disadvantage.   
¶235 Our statutes and case law indicate that election 
administration in Wisconsin is not one-size-fits-all.  See 
No.  2022AP91.awb 
 
13 
 
Zignego, 396 Wis. 2d 391, ¶13.  Yet the majority/lead opinion 
fails to recognize this, making election administration more 
onerous for local clerks and the exercise of the franchise more 
difficult for voters. 
B 
¶236 Contravening the plain language of the statute to 
prohibit ballot drop boxes is bad enough.  But the majority/lead 
opinion further erroneously determines that a voter cannot have 
a family member or friend return their ballot to the municipal 
clerk for them.  Majority/lead op., ¶83.   
¶237 The brunt of this holding will fall on those who are 
homebound.  If a voter is disabled or sick, and someone the 
voter lives with is taking their own absentee ballot to the 
clerk's office, that roommate, spouse, or family member can't, 
under the majority/lead opinion's analysis, simply pick up 
another validly voted ballot from the kitchen table and take it 
with them. 
¶238 As 
absurd 
as 
that 
sounds 
in 
practice,13 
the 
majority/lead opinion's statutory interpretation to reach that 
result 
fares 
no 
better. 
 
Although 
at 
first 
blush 
the 
majority/lead opinion's interpretation may seem reasonable, a 
closer examination of the text reveals otherwise.  Section 
                                                 
13 Not 
to 
mention 
that 
the 
majority/lead 
opinion's 
conclusion arguably violates federal law related to voters with 
disabilities.  See 52 U.S.C. § 10508 ("Any voter who requires 
assistance to vote by reason of blindness, disability, or 
inability to read or write may be given assistance by a person 
of the voter's choice, other than the voter's employer or agent 
of that employer or officer or agent of the voter's union."). 
No.  2022AP91.awb 
 
14 
 
6.87(4)(b)1. addresses only the manner for returning a ballot 
("in person") and not who may return it. 
¶239 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 6.87(4)(b)1., 
as 
stated 
above, 
provides:  "The envelope shall be mailed by the elector, or 
delivered in person, to the municipal clerk issuing the ballot 
or ballots."  As relevant to this issue, we focus on the 
placement of the words within the statute.   
¶240 Section 6.87(4)(b)1. does not say "delivered in person 
by the elector."  It says "delivered in person."14  The 
majority/lead opinion transposes the phrase "by the elector," 
placing it not where the legislature placed it (after "mailed"), 
but instead writing it into the statute where the majority/lead 
opinion prefers it to be placed in order to bolster its 
erroneous conclusion.  Yet, the statute says nothing at all 
about who may return a ballot to the municipal clerk.  Rather, 
the statute is written in the passive voice and does not 
indicate who the actor is who must deliver the ballot "in 
person."  See Juneau Cnty. Star-Times v. Juneau County, 2011 WI 
App 150, ¶15, 337 Wis. 2d 710, 807 N.W.2d 655. 
¶241 The majority/lead opinion violates a cardinal rule of 
statutory interpretation by writing words into the statute the 
legislature did not write.  See Dawson v. Town of Jackson, 2011 
                                                 
14 Further bolstering this interpretation of the statute is 
the fact that the legislature used the plural in indicating that 
a completed ballot must be "delivered in person, to the 
municipal clerk issuing the ballot or ballots."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 6.87(4)(b)1. (emphasis added).  Why would the legislature use 
the plural if it did not contemplate that one person could 
return an additional ballot?   
No.  2022AP91.awb 
 
15 
 
WI 77, ¶42, 336 Wis. 2d 318, 801 N.W.2d 316.  A voter's spouse, 
child, or roommate can deliver a ballot "in person" just as the 
voter can, and the statute draws no distinction.  Yet the 
majority/lead opinion manufactures one, going outside the words 
the legislature wrote to place yet another obstacle in the way 
of voters simply seeking to exercise their cherished right to 
vote.15  
                                                 
15 As I end my discussion of this issue, I emphasize the 
limited nature of the court's determination.  It applies to 
absentee ballots delivered in person to the municipal clerk, not 
to a family member or a friend placing a ballot in the mail on 
behalf of a voter.  See majority/lead op., ¶5; Justice 
Hagedorn's concurrence, ¶185.  
However, despite its insistence that it is not addressing 
the issue, the majority/lead opinion proceeds to go on at length 
about Disability Rights Wisconsin's argument regarding federal 
law on ballot assistance and criticizes the argument as 
"undeveloped."  See majority/lead op., ¶¶84-86.  As the 
majority/lead opinion acknowledges, this argument is directed at 
the "impact of the circuit court's declarations on disabled 
voters who may be physically unable to vote if someone cannot 
place an absentee ballot in the mail on a voter's behalf."  Id., 
¶86.  Accordingly, this sojourn is completely unnecessary to 
both the majority/lead opinion's holding and its analysis.  I 
highlight, however, the majority/lead opinion's own statement 
that we do not decide "whether the law permits a voter's agent 
to place an absentee ballot in the mail on the voter's behalf."  
Id., 
¶5; 
see 
also 
Justice 
Hagedorn's 
concurrence, 
¶185 
(explaining that "the court should not and does not make any 
declaration on [this] question"). 
Undeterred by the majority/lead opinion's statement that 
the WEC memos at issue "do not address" the issue, Justice 
Roggensack's concurrence forges ahead with that analysis anyway.  
Rather than engage on an issue that is not properly before the 
court in the first place, I simply observe that Justice 
Roggensack's concurrence is not the law, and that the issue of 
whether a family member or other person may place an absentee 
ballot in a mailbox on behalf of a voter is not resolved by this 
opinion.   
No.  2022AP91.awb 
 
16 
 
III 
¶242 As 
a 
final 
point, 
I 
address 
the 
majority/lead 
opinion's language casting doubt on the results of past 
elections conducted with drop boxes.  The majority/lead opinion 
claims that "[t]he illegality of these drop boxes weakens the 
people's faith that the election produced an outcome reflective 
of their will."  Majority/lead op., ¶24; see also id., ¶25 
("[T]he failure to follow election laws is a fact which forces 
everyone . . . to 
question 
the 
legitimacy 
of 
election 
results.").  It suggests that the use of drop boxes leaves 
electoral results "in question."  Id., ¶24. 
¶243 Nonsense. 
 
First, 
accepting 
the 
majority/lead 
opinion's assertion requires either willful ignorance to the 
origin of the WEC August 19, 2020 memo or a lack of trust in its 
source.  The August 19, 2020 memo was "adapted from a resource 
developed as part of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security 
Agency 
(CISA) 
Elections 
Infrastructure 
Government 
Coordinating Council and Sector Coordinating Council's Joint 
COVID Working Group."  CISA is operated under the auspices of 
the Department of Homeland Security.  Drop boxes were apparently 
secure enough for the federal Department of Homeland Security, 
yet the majority/lead opinion still contends that they cause 
people to lose faith in our elections.  
¶244 There is no evidence at all in this record that the 
use of drop boxes fosters voter fraud of any kind.  None.  And 
there certainly is no evidence that voters who used drop boxes 
No.  2022AP91.awb 
 
17 
 
voted for one candidate or party or another, tilting elections 
either direction. 
¶245 It is true that the legislature has referred to 
absentee voting as a "privilege exercised wholly outside the 
traditional safeguards of the polling place" that must be 
"carefully regulated to prevent the potential for fraud or 
abuse."  Wis. Stat. § 6.84(1).  But despite the majority/lead 
opinion's bald assertion that voter fraud is actually a "serious 
problem," majority/lead op., ¶71, studies have demonstrated 
extremely low rates of voter fraud in United States elections.16  
¶246 The majority/lead opinion's sky-is-falling rhetoric 
not only defies the facts, but also is downright dangerous to 
our democracy.  Absent evidence that supports its statements, 
the majority/lead opinion still lends its imprimatur to efforts 
to destabilize and delegitimize recent elections.     
¶247 But concerns about drop boxes alone don't fuel the 
fires questioning election integrity.  Rather, the kindling is 
primarily provided by voter suppression efforts and the constant 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., Andrew C. Eggers, Haritz Garro, and Justin 
Grimmer, No evidence for systematic voter fraud:  A guide to 
statistical claims about the 2020 election, Proc. of the Nat'l 
Acad. of Sci., https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2103619118 
(Nov. 2, 2021); Justin Levitt, The Truth About Voter Fraud, 
Brennan Center for Justice, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-
work/research-reports/truth-about-voter-fraud (Nov. 9, 2007); 
see also Trump v. Biden, 2020 WI 91, ¶59, 394 Wis. 2d 629, 951 
N.W.2d 568 (Hagedorn, J., concurring) ("At the end of the day, 
nothing in this case casts any legitimate doubt that the people 
of Wisconsin lawfully chose Vice President Biden and Senator 
Harris to be the next leaders of our great country."). 
No.  2022AP91.awb 
 
18 
 
drumbeat of unsubstantiated rhetoric in opinions like this one, 
not actual voter fraud.17 
¶248 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶249 I am authorized to state that Justices REBECCA FRANK 
DALLET and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this dissent. 
 
 
                                                 
17 As should be clear by now, this dissent's analysis is 
neither an "ad hominem attack" nor "political talking points" as 
the majority/lead opinion claims.  See majority/lead op., ¶86 
n.29.  This court's poor track record on voting rights is well-
established and the flaws in the majority/lead opinion's 
analysis that lead to an additional "barrier" to voting are set 
forth in this opinion.   
Nevertheless, footnote 29 of the majority/lead opinion 
takes this dissent to task and ridicules Justice Jill Karofsky 
for joining it, while at the same time partaking in the very 
conduct about which it is complaining. 
What 
comes 
to 
mind 
is 
the 
adage 
of 
psychological 
projection——"the pot calling the kettle black."    Rather than 
detailing 
in 
response 
the 
several 
and 
recent 
examples 
illustrating the adage (and risking the undesirable escalation 
of hyperbole), I observe only that there is an obvious 
difference between attacking a public servant as a "tyrant" for 
merely 
doing 
her 
job, 
which 
elicited 
Justice 
Karofsky's 
objection in Becker, and simply pointing out this court's poor 
recent track record when it comes to protecting voting rights, 
as does this dissent.  See Becker v. Dane County, 2022 WI __, 
¶44, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __.   
No.  2022AP91.awb 
 
 
 
1