Case Title: State v. Logsdon

Citation: 

Docket Number: 110415

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2016-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 110,415 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
CHARLES C. LOGSDON, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
An appellate court reviews a sufficiency of the evidence challenge by looking at 
all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determining whether a 
rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
2. 
 
An appellate court does not reweigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of 
witnesses, as these functions are left to the jury. 
 
3. 
 
 
A conviction of even the gravest offense may be sustained by circumstantial 
evidence. Circumstantial evidence, in order to be sufficient, need not rise to that degree 
of certainty which will exclude any and every other reasonable conclusion. Instead, 
circumstantial evidence affords a basis for a reasonable inference by the jury regarding a 
fact at issue. 
 
 
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4. 
A district court may order a mistrial at any time if it is necessary as contemplated 
by K.S.A. 22-3423, including if there is prejudicial conduct, in or outside the courtroom, 
making it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to either the defendant or 
the prosecution. In making this determination, the district court must engage in a two-step 
process:  first, it must determine if there is a fundamental failure in the proceeding; if so, 
second, the district court must determine whether it is possible to continue the trial 
without an injustice. In the mistrial context, an appellate court asks whether the district 
court abused its discretion at either of these two steps. 
 
5. 
An appellate court reviews a district court's decision denying a motion for mistrial 
for abuse of discretion. In general, a district court abuses its discretion by issuing an order 
that is (1) arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) based on an error of law; or (3) based 
on an error of fact.  
 
6. 
Evidentiary errors will not be reviewed on appeal unless a party has lodged a 
timely and specific objection to the alleged error at trial. 
 
7. 
Under Kansas Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 41), an 
appellant's brief must include pinpoint citations to the record on appeal where an issue 
was raised and ruled on in the district court. Alternatively, there must be an explanation 
why the issue is properly before the court despite not having been raised in the district 
court proceedings. 
 
 
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8. 
A failure to adequately brief an issue results in abandonment or waiver of the 
issue.  
 
9. 
In the context of an issue about a jury instruction, the invited error doctrine does 
not apply to a party who objected at trial to the instruction. Unless the error is structural, 
the invited error doctrine applies only when the party both fails to object and invites the 
error. 
 
10. 
Even if the declarant of an out-of-court statement is present at an evidentiary 
hearing and expected to testify, K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-460(a) does not exclude the 
declarant's statements from the general definition of hearsay if the declarant is still 
protected by his or her privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. 
 
11. 
In order for the coconspirator hearsay exception of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-
460(i)(2) to apply:  (1) the person testifying must be a third party; (2) the out-of-court 
statement must have been made by one of the coconspirators; (3) the statement of the 
coconspirator must have been made while the conspiracy was in progress; and (4) the 
statement must be relevant to the plan or its subject matter. 
 
12. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that, in all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the 
 
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witnesses against him or her. This right is violated if an unavailable declarant's 
testimonial statements are brought into evidence against the accused without a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine that declarant. 
 
13. 
The threshold question in determining if the admission of evidence violates an 
accused's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses is whether a hearsay statement is 
testimonial.  
 
14. 
Informal statements to friends and acquaintances are generally not testimonial for 
purposes of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
 
15. 
Generally, hearsay statements of an accused's coconspirators are not testimonial. 
 
16. 
In considering a motion for mistrial, the degree of certainty by which a court must 
be persuaded that the error did not affect the outcome will vary depending on whether the 
fundamental failure infringes upon a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 
If it does not, the district court should apply K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-
2105 to determine if there is a reasonable probability that the error will or did affect the 
outcome of the trial in light of the entire record. If the fundamental failure does infringe 
upon a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution, the district court should apply 
the constitutional harmless error analysis defined in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 
87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 (1967), in which case the error 
may be declared harmless where the party benefitting from the error proves beyond a 
 
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reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the 
trial in light of the entire record, i.e., proves there is no reasonable possibility that the 
error affected the verdict.  
 
17. 
Regardless of whether an error is constitutional, one factor to be considered in 
ruling on a motion for mistrial is whether any damage caused by the error can be or was 
removed or mitigated by admonition, instruction, or other curative action.  
 
18. 
An appellate court reviewing the second step of a mistrial analysis by examining 
whether an injustice has occurred will review the entire record and use the same analysis, 
applying K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105 or else Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 (1967), depending 
on the nature of the right allegedly affected. 
 
19.  
An appellate court presumes that a jury followed the district court's instructions. 
 
20. 
Kansas' sentencing scheme for imposing a hard 50 life sentence in effect in this 
case, under which the factual findings necessary to impose the enhanced minimum 
sentence were made by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence rather than by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt, violated defendant's right to a jury trial under the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
 
Appeal from Reno District Court; TRISH ROSE, judge. Opinion filed April 1, 2016. Convictions 
affirmed, sentence vacated, and remanded with directions. 
 
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Shanon S. Crane, of Hutchinson, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.  
 
Keith E. Schroeder, district attorney, argued the cause, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, was 
with him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
LUCKERT, J.:  A jury convicted Charles Logsdon on seven counts stemming from 
the death of Jennifer Heckel:  intentional first-degree murder, felony murder, conspiracy 
to commit first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, aggravated 
burglary, criminal possession of a firearm, and aggravated intimidation of a witness. The 
district court imposed a life sentence with a minimum term of 50 years (hard 50 life 
sentence) for the intentional first-degree murder conviction. Logsdon now appeals, asking 
us to reverse his convictions and vacate his hard 50 life sentence. 
 
For reasons we will more fully explain, we uphold Logsdon's convictions because 
his arguments on appeal are ultimately nonmeritorious. First, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the State and deferring to the jury's credibility conclusions—as we 
must do on appeal—there is sufficient evidence supporting his convictions. Second, the 
district court did not err in denying Logsdon's motions for a mistrial (which were based 
on the admission of certain hearsay evidence). The court took effective remedial action to 
prevent the jury from considering some hearsay. And the remaining hearsay was either 
not objected to or was admissible under at least one hearsay exception. None of the 
hearsay statements violated Logsdon's constitutional right to confront witnesses. Third, 
we reject Logsdon's argument regarding a jury instruction on aiding and abetting liability 
because, even assuming the instruction was erroneous, he invited any error by requesting 
it.  
 
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Although we affirm Logsdon's convictions, we must vacate Logsdon's hard 50 life 
sentence and remand for resentencing. As the State concedes, Logsdon's hard 50 life 
sentence was improperly imposed in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision 
in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013), and 
our application of that decision in State v. Soto, 299 Kan. 102, Syl. ¶ 9, 322 P.3d 334 
(2014), and State v. Warren, 302 Kan. 601, 622-23, 356 P.3d 396 (2015). 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Logsdon's lengthy trial involved numerous witnesses and thousands of pages of 
transcript. We offer a condensed version of the facts, as they were established at trial, but 
still must discuss the evidence in some detail because of Logsdon's sufficiency of the 
evidence challenge.  
 
A. The crime and initial investigation 
 
Trial testimony established that Heckel was shot in her home around 7:00 p.m. on 
June 14, 2011. Her 5-year old son, T.H., was home at the time and ran to his neighbors 
for help. Emergency responders found Heckel slumped on the floor in her kitchen and, 
after lifesaving measures were attempted, declared her dead at the scene.  
 
At trial, T.H. testified he was sitting in his playroom watching television. During a 
commercial, he went to the window and saw someone come up to the house. He heard 
someone else in the house with his mother and heard several loud bangs, but he did not 
see anything because he stayed in his playroom until he heard the kitchen screen door 
shut. Although T.H. could not recall any additional details at trial, law enforcement 
 
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officers testified that right after the shooting T.H. had told them he saw a red car pull into 
the driveway with possibly two people in it and he saw a man run out of the house. 
 
A total of four shots were fired inside the Heckel home:  one shot went through a 
food container in the kitchen, through a window, and outside (and was never recovered); 
one grazed Heckel's side and was found imbedded in a kitchen wall; one was found under 
her body and probably caused her chest wound; and one was fired at the back of Heckel's 
head and found near her neck. Heckel's wounds were caused by medium-caliber bullets. 
Expert witnesses opined that the shots were probably fired from relatively close range, 
but no one was able to conclusively determine their sequence. 
 
Neither the Kansas Bureau of Investigation (KBI) nor the Hutchinson Police 
Department found any relevant fingerprint, DNA, or trace evidence. Of note, 
investigators found two cigarette butts outside the house, but the cigarettes yielded no 
DNA match to any suspect. Nor did investigators initially discover any evidence of 
motive. Further, as members of the Hutchinson Police Department testified at trial, every 
person of interest among Heckel's family, friends, and acquaintances had an alibi. As a 
result, the police began to investigate whether someone other than Heckel was the 
intended target. 
 
To this end, police began canvassing the streets and questioning people known to 
be involved in home invasions, daytime burglaries, and drugs. The first break in the case 
came on June 30, 2011, when Detective Dean Harcrow interviewed Billy Craig. 
According to Detective Harcrow's trial testimony, Craig told him he had heard "someone 
had been shot in the head." This same statement was also introduced through the 
testimony of Lieutenant Martin Robertson, who was not present during the exchange but 
recounted what Craig had told Detective Harcrow. This particular statement was 
 
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important to the investigation. As both Lieutenant Robertson and Detective Harcrow 
explained, Craig's comment told them they were on the right track because that particular 
detail of the shooting had not been released to the public. 
 
Logsdon timely made a hearsay objection to both witnesses' testimony about 
Craig's statements. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-460 (A statement constitutes hearsay 
evidence if it "is made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing [and is] 
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated . . . ."). Hearsay evidence is generally 
inadmissible unless a specific exception applies or the evidence is otherwise excluded 
from this general definition. As relevant to the rulings, the State argued Craig's 
statements were excluded from the definition of hearsay because the State planned to 
have Craig, who was in custody, testify. The State pointed to K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-
460(a), which allows admission of "[a] statement previously made by a person who is 
present at the hearing and available for cross-examination with respect to the statement 
and its subject matter." The district court overruled Logsdon's objection.  
 
Later in the trial, however, Craig refused to testify, leading the district court to 
admonish the jury to "disregard the testimony regarding the statements of Billy Craig that 
were specifically made during the testimony of . . . Detective Dean Harcrow, regarding a 
meeting on June 30 with Billy Craig only." The instruction did not mention Lieutenant 
Robertson's testimony about Craig's statement.  
 
After Craig revealed information that would only have been known by someone 
involved in the crime or an investigator, police began interviewing people with whom 
Craig was associated. Eventually law enforcement concluded that warring groups of drug 
users, who often robbed each other and did not report the robberies to the police, were 
linked to Heckel's death. 
 
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B. Testimony from witnesses associated with Craig or Logsdon 
 
Most of the evidence admitted at trial against Logsdon came from various 
members of Craig's circle. There were credibility concerns. Many, if not most, of these 
witnesses received some sort of benefit in exchange for their testimony against Logsdon. 
Almost all of them had unrelated criminal cases pending or were in jail on unrelated 
criminal charges. Several admitted they were reluctant to testify, and some witnesses 
were held in contempt of court before eventually agreeing to take the stand. A handful of 
the other witnesses called to testify against Logsdon were alleged, by other witnesses, to 
have somehow been involved in Heckel's death. Indeed, at the time of Logsdon's trial, 
Craig was charged with the first-degree murder of Heckel and conspiracy to commit first-
degree murder. See generally State v. Craig, No. 110,466, 2014 WL 2871395 (Kan. 
App.) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 300 Kan. 1105 (2014).  
 
Logsdon called these witnesses' credibility into question at trial. We will discuss 
these credibility issues more thoroughly later in our opinion, but we mention them here 
because they provide context for understanding the State's case against Logsdon. 
 
1. Conspiracy to rob Kayla Rodriguez 
 
Once investigators began to focus on Craig's circle of friends, they learned of a 
conspiracy to rob someone other than Heckel—Kayla Rodriguez, a woman involved in 
the drug trade who sold drugs to Craig and others.  
 
Several witnesses testified at trial regarding Logsdon's involvement in a couple of 
different plans to rob Rodriguez. Kara Kylie Branton admitted at trial that 3 to 4 weeks 
 
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before Heckel's death, she, Craig, and Logsdon were involved in the original plan. 
Branton testified she became afraid when Logsdon proposed using guns, and she sent 
word of the plan to Rodriguez. Afterwards, according to Branton, Logsdon called her 
cussing and screaming because she had ruined the plan. 
 
Rodriguez testified at trial that after she learned of the plan to rob her, she was 
reluctant to go to Craig's house if Logsdon was there. When she asked Craig about the 
plan to rob her, Craig assured her that as long as he was around nothing bad would 
happen to her. Logsdon lodged a hearsay objection, which was overruled.  
 
There was also evidence of a second plan to rob Rodriguez. According to law 
enforcement testimony, Leonard Hill told the KBI that he too was involved with a 
planned grab-and-go robbery of Rodriguez—and this plan was between himself, 
Logsdon, and Craig.  
 
Other testimony described a plan without mention of Hill's involvement, 
suggesting there was at least a third plan, and it is this plan the State believed led to 
Heckel's death. The State introduced evidence of this last plan through a variety of 
witnesses, including one who had been incarcerated with yet another woman in Craig's 
circle, Kylie Hartman. Hartman told her fellow prisoner that the final plan involved 
herself, Logsdon, Craig, and two others—Matt Barnes and Jason Casanova. 
 
In addition to evidence about Logsdon being involved in plans to rob Rodriguez, 
other evidence implicated Logsdon in efforts to obtain a gun. One witness testified at trial 
that sometime prior to Heckel's murder (the timeline is not clear from testimony, but the 
evidence suggests it was in the spring of 2011), Logsdon asked him if he knew where he 
could get a gun. A second witness testified that before Heckel's murder on June 14, 2011, 
 
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Logsdon and Branton came to his house and Branton asked about purchasing a firearm, 
as she and Logsdon needed it for a robbery they were trying to commit against someone 
named "Kayla" or "Kayley"—which would fit with evidence of a plan to rob Kayla 
Rodriguez. This second witness then denied Branton gave him any specific reason for 
needing a gun, but he stated Branton tried to sell him a gun after Heckel's murder. He 
never saw the gun but thought it might have been a .22 caliber rifle.  
 
2.  Heckel's murder 
 
Trial testimony was in conflict as to why anyone—whether it be Logsdon, Craig, 
Branton, Hartman, Hill, Barnes, or Casanova—wanted to rob Rodriguez. A few witnesses 
suggested it was because she owed money to Craig or a Wichita drug cartel. Rodriguez, 
however, stated it was Craig who owed her money. Another witness floated a theory 
involving Social Security fraud. Logsdon told KBI agents that the plan was part of a paid 
hit. Of relevance to Logsdon's appeal, Hartman testified at trial, over Logsdon's hearsay 
objection, that she had heard Craig mention Rodriguez' debt a few times, and Craig 
would occasionally rant and rave about it, like he did about a lot of things. 
 
Regardless of the motive for the robbery, several witnesses testified they had 
heard Heckel's shooting was a mistake. Logsdon also told KBI agents after his arrest that 
Craig had told him the wrong person was killed. At least two theories about such a 
mistake emerged at trial.  
 
First, investigators considered whether Heckel's death was a case of mistaken 
identity. A law enforcement officer testified Heckel "could have been mistaken for 
Rodriguez" but only if a person did not know either woman. This theory was somewhat 
undermined at trial, as Rodriguez and others testified Logsdon, Hartman, and Craig knew 
 
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what Rodriguez looked like; Hartman even had a Christmas card photograph of 
Rodriguez. Logsdon initially denied knowing Rodriguez, but he later told police he had 
seen her at Craig's house. 
 
Second, some evidence suggested the shooter knew who to look for but went to 
the wrong house. At least one witness briefly mentioned having heard that Heckel and 
Rodriguez had similar house numbers but lived on different streets. Other witnesses 
mentioned this theory in a little more detail. For example, a witness who had been 
incarcerated alongside Hartman testified that Hartman told her she, Craig, Logsdon, 
Barnes, and Casanova met one evening to talk about going over to Rodriguez' house. 
This witness testified Hartman had said Craig then drove the men to the house and 
Logsdon and Barnes committed the actual murder. Hartman also told the witness she was 
not involved in the murder and was "freaking out" when she learned the men had gone to 
the wrong house and shot the wrong woman. Yet another witness testified Hartman told 
her Logsdon shot Heckel and they had "got the wrong house." Logsdon stated in a letter 
from jail, however, that Craig both knew what Rodriguez looked like and where she 
lived. 
 
3. After Heckel's death 
 
After Heckel's murder, Branton—who was, as we mentioned above, involved in 
the first plan to rob Rodriguez—testified Logsdon left town. Logsdon called Branton and 
asked her what she was hearing about the shooting. He specifically asked whether Craig 
was "telling stuff about him." According to Branton, Craig also made a comment along 
the lines of "everyone was turning bitch on him." When she asked Logsdon if he was 
involved in Heckel's murder, Logsdon told Branton he "stayed up eight days too many 
and that he shot her." 
 
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Hartman testified that she too left the state after Heckel's murder to care for her 
injured child. She spoke with police via phone in July 2011. In her testimony, she 
admitted that after speaking with the police she called Casanova and told him to remove 
any bullets that might be around her house; she explained this had nothing to do with 
Heckel's murder but was because she was a convicted felon. Casanova testified he 
remembered Hartman calling to do a clean sweep of her house, but he told the jury he 
thought he was just cleaning the house because it was a mess. Casanova implied at trial 
that he found a gun outside Hartman's house. When the State asked if he threw it away, 
he said he was going to "plead the Fifth." Despite Casanova's cleaning, the police 
recovered bullets from Hartman's house. 
 
Hartman acknowledged hearing from someone on the street that Casanova had 
made a smart aleck remark about getting "rid of that handgun that killed that girl." But 
Hartman denied hearing this statement directly. She explained that all she knew about 
Heckel's death she had learned on the street—and those stories changed a lot; she had 
heard probably 50 theories about the murder. Hartman repeatedly denied having anything 
to do with Heckel's murder. 
 
Yet another witness offered testimony about conversations she had with Hartman 
and Branton. According to this witness, Hartman once made a comment—knowing she 
was a suspect in the case—that she got her hair cut so that it looked less like a 
"murderess' haircut." This witness also testified that Hartman did not think Craig would 
give her up to the police and that Craig was protecting her. This witness further stated 
that Branton called her several days after Heckel's death to say Logsdon had left the state 
and had told her he had shot and killed Heckel. According to this witness, Branton gave 
no other specifics about Heckel's death other than that Logsdon was scared. 
 
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A different witness testified Hill came to her house about a week after Heckel's 
murder and let slip that Logsdon shot Heckel in the face—information she passed on to 
the police. Hill, who also testified, denied making this statement. Another witness 
testified he told the police both Logsdon and Hill paid him a visit the day after Heckel's 
murder and Hill was acting "real crazy" and said Logsdon shot Heckel in the back of the 
head. 
 
Another witness, David Crothers, testified that the day after the murder he ran into 
Craig; he later told Detective Bryan Rodriguez about what he had heard. Crothers 
testified Craig said, "[I]f he had anything to do with it he'd make sure that everybody was 
killed." Detective Rodriguez corroborated that Crothers had told him about Craig's 
statements involving Heckel. Detective Rodriguez further testified that Crothers told him 
Craig said he knew who shot Heckel and it was Logsdon. The district court initially 
overruled Logsdon's hearsay objections to Crothers' and Detective Rodriguez' testimony 
on the grounds that Craig would be available as a witness. But when Craig refused to 
testify and the district court admonished the jury to disregard some testimony about 
Craig's statements, the district court specifically directed the jury to disregard the 
testimony of both these witnesses. 
 
As for Logsdon, he left Hutchinson for Nebraska approximately 2 weeks after 
Heckel's death. He told people, however, including Detective Harcrow in a July 11, 2011, 
telephone conversation initiated by Logsdon, that he was in Texas. A police officer 
testified Logsdon was arrested without incident on August 5, 2011. Police recovered 
several firearms from a locked gun cabinet in a bedroom in the Nebraska house. The gun 
cabinet was not in Logsdon's bedroom and the homeowner, not Logsdon, unlocked the 
 
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cabinet for the police. Investigators focused on two firearms—a Smith and Wesson .357 
handgun and a Colt .38 revolver with the serial number removed.  
 
Through later testing and comparison to the bullets found in Heckel's house, KBI 
investigators were able to exclude the Smith and Wesson .357 handgun. They were 
unable to exclude the Colt .38 revolver. A KBI forensic examiner testified this meant it 
was equally likely that the Colt .38 revolver fired the bullets as that it did not. The parties 
stipulated Logsdon was a felon and was prohibited from possessing a firearm. 
 
C. Logsdon's statements to police 
 
Logsdon's own statements to the police were also admitted at trial through various 
law enforcement officers. One statement came in when Detective Harcrow testified about 
the July 11 phone conversation Logsdon had initiated. During this call, Logsdon 
mentioned several people who might have been involved in the crime, including Craig, 
Branton, Barnes, and Casanova. He also mentioned rumors he had heard about a 
conspiracy to rob Rodriguez. 
 
On August 6, 2011, the day after Logsdon was arrested in Nebraska, he began his 
interview with officers by stating he did not know anything about the Heckel case. 
Nevertheless, Logsdon told the officers certain things that had not been released to the 
media. For example, Logsdon threw out the idea, unprompted, that a red car might have 
been involved; he later told police that Craig drove to the Heckels' house in a red 
Cadillac. When a KBI officer said Craig did not own a red Cadillac on the day of the 
murder, Logsdon disagreed. Further investigation revealed that Craig indeed had owned 
two red cars. One was a red or maroon Cadillac that he owned for only a week. And 
during that week, a witness testified he had repeatedly asked Craig if Craig would sell the 
 
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Cadillac. Craig refused. But a few days after Heckel's murder, Craig said he was willing 
to sell. 
 
Logsdon also suggested someone went to the wrong house, and he listed several 
people as possible suspects—including Craig, Hartman, Branton, Barnes, and Casanova. 
The police were not yet investigating some of these people. Logsdon denied knowing 
Barnes but then kept giving little bits of information about him (and later stating that he 
had heard Barnes was "the trigger man"); Logsdon also, in later interviews, said he had 
never been with Casanova in his life, which differed from his statements in earlier 
interviews. Finally, Logsdon told police Heckel was shot in the head—a detail that had 
still not been publically released—and Logsdon also said he knew for a fact that Craig 
knew who shot Heckel. Originally Logsdon claimed only to have heard of Craig's 
involvement; in later interviews Logsdon asserted Craig told him he was the driver and 
once said Craig had gone inside the Heckels' house. 
 
Logsdon mentioned firearms several times in his postarrest interviews with police. 
He varyingly stated:  Craig was supposed to give him a rifle but never did, he actually 
was in possession of a rifle and tried to trade it for a pistol or other handgun, Craig gave 
him a rifle, and either Branton or Hartman gave him a rifle. 
 
Of note, Logsdon always adamantly denied shooting Heckel. But during one 
interview, when a KBI agent suggested Heckel was killed because someone panicked, 
Logsdon responded that he did not panic. Logsdon also told the agent he had provided 85 
percent of the truth, and, when asked for the rest of it, said the remaining 15 percent 
would incriminate him. 
 
 
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D. Logsdon's statements to other inmates 
 
The State also called witnesses who were housed with Logsdon in jail. The trial 
transcript does not always make clear when the various alleged exchanges between 
Logsdon and these witnesses actually took place. But the evidence suggests some of 
Logsdon's alleged statements to these inmates may have been made after he had access to 
the charging documents, other preliminary filings, and evidence—as opposed to these 
statements coming from personal knowledge alone. 
 
One witness testified that Logsdon denied killing Heckel but then went on to 
explain how the crime supposedly happened— Heckel was shot "execution style," two 
people were involved, and a child was present. Another witness testified he and Logsdon 
discussed the case and Logsdon asked him legal questions; according to this witness, 
Logsdon wanted to know how long it took to get results from DNA testing but was not 
concerned about any DNA evidence specific to him. At some point this witness and 
Logsdon were involved in a jailhouse fight where, at least according to the witness' 
subsequent interview with the police, Logsdon said, "I'm going to kill you like I killed 
that bitch." However, the witness testified at trial he was untruthful with the police and 
Logsdon never actually made this statement. 
 
The State also presented a video from the jail depicting a conversation between 
Logsdon and two inmates. One of these inmates testified at trial that Logsdon asked him 
about various legal issues involving DNA evidence from cigarette butts and discussed 
different aspects of Heckel's case. According to this inmate, Logsdon demonstrated how 
Heckel was shot by getting down on his knees and "put[ting] his hands behind execution 
style and kind of point[ing] somewhere to the back." This inmate testified Logsdon said a 
handgun was used in the crime but explained he and Logsdon "didn't touch a lot on the 
 
19 
 
 
 
gun issue" because Logsdon "was assured that the gun used wasn't going to be found so 
he wasn't worried about it." This inmate further testified that Logsdon told him Heckel 
was murdered by mistake and the plan was to rob someone—"Kylie" or "Kaylee"—who 
was supposed to have drugs and guns.  
 
A second inmate in the jailhouse video testified that Logsdon discussed a cigarette 
butt with him but changed his story several times—sometimes Logsdon said he left a 
cigarette behind. According to this second inmate, Logsdon was particularly concerned 
he might have left a cigarette butt inside the house by Heckel's body. This second inmate 
testified Logsdon told him that after the murder Craig learned the wrong woman had been 
shot; he further testified that Logsdon gave him the names of Craig, Hartman, Casanova, 
and Barnes and said Craig was the driver, Hartman knocked on the door, and a total of 
three people went inside the Heckels' house. 
 
A third inmate testified at trial that he had conversations with Logsdon while they 
were in jail together. The inmate stated that Logsdon claimed he had never seen Heckel 
or been to her house. Yet, when Logsdon later saw a picture of Heckel on television, he 
said she was not that nice or good-looking, she was overweight, and her house was 
messy. According to this inmate, Logsdon explained they entered the Heckel home by 
going through the garage. Logsdon also mentioned something about a gun that was torn 
apart. Although not entirely clear, it appears this particular conversation occurred during 
a recess of Logsdon's preliminary hearing. During the preliminary hearing, a video of the 
inside of Heckel's home was shown. Thus, Logsdon's descriptions of Heckel and her 
home might have been based on evidence he saw during the hearing. A KBI agent 
testified this inmate also told him Logsdon had said he was worried his DNA might be 
found on a cigarette butt at the scene. 
 
 
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A fourth inmate testified Logsdon was upset about facing a robbery charge 
because nothing was missing from Heckel's home. Specifically, this inmate testified 
Logsdon had said, "[W]hen I shot that bitch her purse was sitting right there." Indeed, 
several witnesses testified Heckel's purse was found not far from her body. 
 
E. Other evidence 
 
Not all the evidence at trial came from the testimony of witnesses associated with 
either Craig or Logsdon. Police uncovered text messages between Craig and Logsdon on 
July 1, 2011, a couple of weeks after Heckel's murder and right after Logsdon left 
Hutchinson for Nebraska. Logsdon sent one message to Craig reading, "[T]hey 
questioned you about a murder? You better talk 2 me" (Logsdon would later tell 
investigators he did not know what this conversation was about). Police testimony 
established there had been no murders in Hutchinson for months before Heckel's, there 
were no other murders in Hutchinson between hers and July 1, and Heckel's murder was 
the only pending murder investigation with the Hutchinson Police Department at that 
time. 
 
Logsdon also sent several messages to one of his cousins. One, sent hours after 
Heckel's death, stated, "I'm goin to prison anyhow." Another, sent on the evening of June 
14, 2011, read, "That's how I pay my bills you punk hoe I'm a end up hurtin one of shot 
one your hoes with this new piece . . . ." A law enforcement officer explained there had 
been no other shootings in Hutchinson that day or that week that could have been the 
subject of the message. A few minutes later, Logsdon sent another message that read, "I 
ain't readin your bullshit you drunk coke head bitch ah kill one of you clowns real talk 
bitch you fuck with Billy I'm steelin something from you every time you do it watch ya 
ain't got no love."  
 
21 
 
 
 
 
Also, Logsdon mentioned the Heckel murder in several letters from jail. In one, he 
denied having anything to do with Heckel's death and wondered why Craig was speaking 
out against him. He identified Craig as the driver, Barnes as the shooter, and Hartman and 
Casanova as the ones who "tore up the gun" afterwards. In another letter, Logsdon again 
denied involvement and wondered why Craig was lying; he asked the recipient to tell 
Craig to stop lying or else he would go to the police with his own information. He later 
did just that:  Logsdon wrote to a detective and, while again denying any role in Heckel's 
murder, stated he wanted to help and would do so if the police could get him out of jail. 
Specifically, Logsdon wrote that he could help put Craig away and wanted a deal. 
 
F. Billy Craig's refusal to testify and Logsdon's motion for mistrial 
 
As is apparent from these facts, Craig's initial statement about having heard 
someone was shot in the head turned out to be critical to the investigation because that 
information, unreleased to the public, led to investigators questioning those associated 
with Craig. Several of these individuals testified at trial about statements Craig made 
regarding Rodriguez or the Heckel murder. Again, Logsdon objected to this testimony as 
hearsay, but the district court overruled the objections because the State planned to call 
Craig as a witness, making him available for cross-examination. As previously noted, 
under Kansas law, the other witnesses' testimony about Craig's previous out-of-court 
statements would be admissible under a hearsay exception if Craig testified. See K.S.A. 
2015 Supp. 60-460(a).  
 
Toward the end of trial, however, when the State attempted to call Craig to the 
stand, the State's plan hit a snag. The State had charged Craig with offenses arising from 
Heckel's murder, and his attorney notified the district court that he expected Craig to 
 
22 
 
 
 
assert his right under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution to not 
incriminate himself. In light of his refusal to testify, the State provided Craig with 
derivative testimonial use immunity for his testimony, at which point Craig's attorney 
advised Craig (despite acknowledging caselaw to the contrary) that the federal 
government might still prosecute him. The district court informed Craig he could be held 
in contempt for refusing to testify despite his immunity. Still, Craig refused to testify—he 
went so far as to explain why a contempt sentence would not make much difference to 
him or his sentence.  
 
The district court granted Craig's attorney extra time to speak with Craig. The 
State supported the extra time because of the potential impact on the trial if Craig 
continued to refuse to testify—for example, the jury would need to be instructed to 
disregard what it had already heard regarding Craig's prior, out-of-court statements. The 
district court let Craig think about his situation overnight and, the next day, informed him 
that in light of his immunity he did not have a Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to 
testify. Craig refused to testify, and the district court held Craig in criminal contempt. 
 
Logsdon then moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the admission of Craig's 
out-of-court statements through other witnesses, when Craig himself did not testify, 
violated Logsdon's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. The State insisted it believed 
in good faith that Craig would testify and that a mistrial was not called for, especially 
since a limiting instruction could cure any prejudice. The district court denied Logsdon's 
motion for a mistrial and set the parties to the task of crafting an appropriate admonition 
for the jury. The court then instructed the jury to disregard all testimony of Crothers and 
Detective Rodriguez regarding statements Craig had made and to disregard the testimony 
of Detective Harcrow regarding Craig's June 30 statement. The instruction did not detail 
 
23 
 
 
 
what the June 30 statement was, but the transcript reveals that Craig told Detective 
Harcrow he had heard about Heckel being shot in the head.   
 
G. Verdict, posttrial motions, and sentence 
 
After deliberating over 3 days, the jury found Logsdon guilty of all counts against 
him:  first-degree murder, felony murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, 
conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, criminal possession of a 
firearm, and aggravated intimidation of a witness. 
 
Logsdon again moved for a mistrial, and he also moved for judgment of acquittal 
and a new trial. As relevant on appeal, he argued that several witnesses were permitted to 
testify about Craig's out-of-court statements even though Craig himself never testified. 
Without Craig's testimony or other witnesses' testimony about what Craig had said to 
them, there was insufficient evidence of Logsdon's guilt, according to him. Additionally, 
he argued the testimony violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. Further, 
Logsdon disputed whether the State honestly had a good faith belief that Craig would 
testify.  
 
The district court held a hearing on Logsdon's posttrial motions and eventually 
denied them. It ruled the State had a good faith basis for believing Craig would testify, 
and it also held that the curative instruction issued to the jury adequately dealt with 
testimony about Craig's out-of-court statements. Also, the court concluded a reasonable 
factfinder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Logsdon was guilty even excluding 
the evidence subject to the limiting instruction. 
 
 
24 
 
 
 
Logsdon elected not to participate at the sentencing stage. At the State's request, 
the district court imposed a hard 50 life sentence, pursuant to K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-
6620. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
Our review is limited to the issues raised by Logsdon, which we have reordered 
for purposes of our analysis, as follows:  (1) Does sufficient evidence support Logsdon's 
convictions? (2) Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Logsdon's motion 
for mistrial, which asserted Logsdon had been prejudiced by the erroneous introduction 
of out-of-court statements by Craig? (3) Did the district court err in instructing the jury 
on an aiding and abetting theory? and (4) Must Logsdon's hard 50 life sentence be 
vacated because it is based on judicial factfinding? We discuss each of these issues in 
turn below. 
 
ISSUE 1:  Sufficient evidence supports Logsdon's convictions. 
 
First, we consider Logsdon's argument that no rational factfinder could have found 
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We note that Logsdon's sufficiency argument is a 
general one. He does not pinpoint which elements of which crimes he believes the 
evidence does not support; instead he points to various evidentiary issues which, he 
contends, show that no reasonable jury could have found him guilty of any of his 
convictions.  
 
A criminal defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence amounts to a 
posttrial claim that the State failed to meet its burden of proving each essential element of 
one or more charges against the defendant. An appellate court reviews a sufficiency of 
 
25 
 
 
 
the evidence challenge "by looking at all the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution and determining whether a rational factfinder could have found the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Frye, 294 Kan. 364, 374-75, 277 P.3d 1091 
(2012). In arguing the State cannot meet this standard, Logsdon focuses on discrete 
evidence. We will first examine the specific evidence discussed by Logsdon and then 
refocus the analysis on the ultimate standard of looking at all the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the State.  
 
Logsdon first questions the value of the testimony of T.H.—Heckel's 5-year-old 
son. In particular, Logsdon argues statements by T.H. about seeing a red car during the 
crime were not credible, considering his age and his initial inconsistent statements about 
what he saw. Logsdon seems to be arguing that if T.H.'s statements about seeing a red car 
were taken out of the mix, he would not have been tied to the crime and no reasonable 
jury would have convicted him. In essence, Logsdon asks us to reweigh T.H.'s testimony. 
But that is not our role. 
 
Rather, an appellate court "do[es] not reweigh the evidence or evaluate the 
credibility of witnesses," as these functions are left to the jury. State v. Hall, 292 Kan. 
841, 859, 257 P.3d 272 (2011); see also State v. Van Winkle, 254 Kan. 214, 225, 864 P.2d 
729 (1993) ("On appellate review . . . all questions of credibility are resolved in favor of 
the State."). The jury was in the best position to evaluate T.H.'s credibility, especially 
since Logsdon was able to point out T.H.'s inconsistent statements during cross-
examination. See State v. Peoples, 227 Kan. 127, 135, 605 P.2d 135 (1980) (pointing out 
the defendant had "an opportunity in closing argument to impress the jury with the 
circumstantial nature of most of the evidence"). 
 
 
26 
 
 
 
In addition, T.H.'s testimony was not the only circumstantial evidence linking 
Logsdon to the murder through a red car:  Logsdon himself, in his postarrest police 
interviews, indicated that a red car, driven by Craig, was involved. In fact, when an 
investigator told him Craig did not own a red Cadillac on the day of the murder, 
Logsdon's protest led to further investigation that confirmed Logsdon's statement—Craig 
owned two red or maroon cars at the time, and after the murder he quickly attempted to 
sell the red Cadillac despite recently expressing a reluctance to part with it. Thus, any 
issue with T.H.'s testimony does not undermine the evidence about a red car and, more 
importantly, the sufficiency of the evidence for any of Logsdon's convictions. 
 
Logsdon next argues all the evidence of his involvement in a conspiracy to rob 
Rodriguez consisted of testimony about what someone told someone else, i.e., hearsay 
evidence. He contends that, due to witness credibility issues, this evidence was 
insufficient to show his guilt. We recognize much of this testimony was called into some 
question on cross-examination and most of the State's witnesses had potential credibility 
issues:  almost all were involved in other criminal cases, several had prior crimes of 
dishonesty, many hoped to receive some sort of benefit in exchange for their testimony, 
some were evasive on the stand, and a few were extremely reluctant to testify at all. But 
Logsdon was able to highlight and address these issues during cross-examination. Despite 
Logsdon's efforts, the jury believed at least some of these witnesses. Again, we will not 
supplant the jury's conclusions with our own credibility determinations. See Hall, 292 
Kan. at 859. The credibility issues Logsdon raises do not show that no reasonable jury 
would have convicted him. 
 
Logsdon's next argument relating to the sufficiency of the evidence involves his 
text messages which were presented to the jury, most notably one reading, "I'm a end up 
hurtin one of shot one your hoes with this new piece." He contends we can only speculate 
 
27 
 
 
 
about what this and the other text messages meant, as at most they tended to show he said 
he might shoot someone in the future. We disagree.  
 
Granted, Logsdon's text messages are not definitive evidence of his guilt and are 
certainly subject to interpretation. Regardless, a rational jury could have concluded that 
Logsdon's messages were meant to convey he had already shot someone and, since there 
were no other shootings in Hutchinson that week, that this someone was Heckel. The jury 
also did not consider each message in isolation. In addition to the one referring to 
shooting a "hoe," there were others reading, "I'm goin to prison anyhow," and "ah kill one 
of you clowns real talk bitch you fuck with Billy I'm steelin something from you every 
time you do it." The jury considered these messages in the context of Logsdon's 
conflicting statements during his interviews with the police, other inmates' testimony 
about his behavior and statements while in jail, and many witnesses' testimony about his 
involvement in the Rodriguez conspiracy. Again, we will not reweigh the evidence. 
Considering all the evidence in the case, we conclude a reasonable jury could infer some 
evidence of Logsdon's guilt from the messages. 
 
Logsdon also addresses the firearms evidence in the case. This argument relates to 
most of the charges brought against Logsdon but, in particular, to his charge of being a 
felon in possession of a firearm. The parties stipulated Logsdon was a felon and 
prohibited from possessing a firearm at the time of the murder, and there is no dispute 
that two relevant firearms were found in the Nebraska home where Logsdon was arrested. 
We acknowledge these firearms were locked away in someone else's room and testimony 
established the key was not even in Logsdon's possession. Logsdon highlights these facts 
in an apparent attempt to call into question his "possession" of these firearms in 
Nebraska. 
 
 
28 
 
 
 
Logsdon fails to recognize, however, that the State did not charge him for 
possessing a firearm in Nebraska. Instead, the State charged him for possessing a firearm 
on the day of Heckel's death. Nevertheless, the firearms seized at the time of his arrest are 
a part of the relevant evidence of his possession on the day of the murder because one of 
the firearms recovered in Nebraska—the Colt .38—could not be excluded as the murder 
weapon. This meant, according to the State's expert witness, there was a fifty-fifty chance 
that the Colt .38 was used to shoot Heckel. Thus, some circumstantial evidence supported 
a finding that Logsdon wielded the .38, which police found in Nebraska, on the day of 
Heckel's murder.  
 
Had this been the only evidence regarding firearms presented to the jury, we 
would have strong reservations about whether it was sufficient to support his criminal 
possession of a firearm conviction. But Logsdon told police investigators that Craig gave 
him a rifle and he tried to trade it for a pistol; a fellow inmate testified Logsdon said he 
traded a rifle for a revolver; and another inmate testified he and Logsdon had some 
discussion about one gun being traded for another. This last inmate also testified Logsdon 
was sure the gun used in the murder would not be found. Yet another witness testified 
Logsdon was looking to procure a gun prior to Heckel's death. Also, Logsdon's text 
message sent hours after the shooting referred to a shooting with "this new piece." 
Further, as we will discuss next in more detail, there is sufficient evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could conclude that Logsdon shot Heckel. Accordingly, a rational 
factfinder could have found Logsdon guilty of criminal possession of a firearm beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
This brings us to our overarching consideration of all the evidence against 
Logsdon and his final argument that all the evidence against him was circumstantial. 
Logsdon's argument initially rests on shaky ground because "[a] conviction of even the 
 
29 
 
 
 
gravest offense may be sustained by circumstantial evidence." State v. Graham, 247 Kan. 
388, 398, 799 P.2d 1003 (1990); see State v. Scott, 271 Kan. 103, 107, 21 P.3d 516 
(2001) (as long as there is substantial evidence, we will not disturb a guilty verdict "even 
though the evidence is entirely circumstantial" [emphasis added]). Circumstantial 
evidence, in order to be sufficient, "need not rise to that degree of certainty which will 
exclude any and every other reasonable conclusion." Casey v. Phillips Pipeline Co., 199 
Kan. 538, 551, 431 P.2d 518 (1967). Instead, circumstantial evidence "affords a basis for 
a reasonable inference by the jury" regarding a fact at issue. 199 Kan. at 550 (explaining 
circumstantial evidence "tends to prove a fact in issue by proving other events or 
circumstances which, according to the common experience of mankind, are usually or 
always attended by the fact in issue"). Further, Logsdon took full advantage of his 
opportunity to impress upon the jury the circumstantial nature of the evidence. See 
Peoples, 227 Kan. at 135 (noting defendant's opportunity to discuss weaknesses in State's 
case).  
 
More specifically, as we look to the evidence in this case, the State presented 
sufficient evidence supporting Logsdon's convictions, despite its largely circumstantial 
and hearsay nature or the questions of witnesses' credibility. Many witnesses implicated 
Logsdon in the Rodriguez conspiracy. Several of the State's witnesses testified about 
what Logsdon himself said. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-460(g) (excepting party 
admissions from the general rule prohibiting hearsay). For example, Branton testified she 
and Logsdon conspired to rob Rodriguez and that it was Logsdon's idea to involve guns; 
she also testified Logsdon called her after he left the state, asked about Heckel's murder 
and what Craig was saying, and said he had "stayed up eight days too many and . . . shot 
her." Hill testified that he told police Logsdon asked him to participate in a robbery. Two 
inmates testified Logsdon showed them how Heckel was shot. Another inmate testified 
Logsdon said Heckel did not look nice in person and was a messy housekeeper. And yet 
 
30 
 
 
 
another inmate testified Logsdon was indignant about being charged with robbery 
because "when I shot that bitch her purse was sitting right there."  
 
Furthermore, Logsdon sent the text messages and made some key statements to 
the police. Logsdon himself brought up a conspiracy to rob Rodriguez when he called 
Detective Harcrow from Nebraska and gave the names of several other people who might 
be involved—some of whom then testified against him at trial. In his postarrest 
interviews, he brought up several details of the crime unknown to the public, including 
the color of the car, the fact Craig owned a red Cadillac on the day of the murder, and the 
idea that the shooter went to the wrong house. He also informed a KBI agent that he had 
given 85 percent of the truth but would not divulge the remaining 15 percent because it 
would incriminate him. The jurors heard portions of these interviews and could judge for 
themselves Logsdon's demeanor.  
 
In addition to witness testimony, the jury examined hundreds of exhibits—
including audio and DVD tapes of police interviews with Logsdon. And the jury heard 
the forensic evidence about the gun found in the house where Logsdon was arrested. 
 
As the State points out in summarizing the evidence, even after excluding the 
hearsay evidence mentioned in the limiting instruction:  nine witnesses testified Logsdon 
provided unknown details of Heckel's murder, six witnesses testified they were told by 
someone other than Craig that Logsdon killed Heckel, two witnesses testified Logsdon 
confessed to the murder, Logsdon sent incriminating text messages shortly after Heckel's 
murder, Logsdon fled to Nebraska upon learning investigators might be looking for him, 
a gun that could not be eliminated as the murder weapon was found at the house where 
Logsdon was arrested, and the State introduced a video of Logsdon recreating the murder 
for other inmates.  
 
31 
 
 
 
 
We do not find, as the State argues, that the evidence against Logsdon was 
overwhelming. There are troubling aspects about the evidence and the trial. Nevertheless, 
we must view all the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, and we 
conclude a rational factfinder could have found Logsdon guilty of all charges beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See Frye, 294 Kan. at 374-75; Scott, 271 Kan. at 107; Casey, 199 Kan. 
at 550-51.  
 
ISSUE 2:  The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Logsdon's two motions 
for a mistrial. 
 
Logsdon also argues the district court should have declared a mistrial due to the 
erroneous admission of witness testimony about Craig's out-of-court statements. Craig's 
refusal to testify is at the root of Logsdon's argument because it upset the district court's 
professed basis for admitting testimony about Craig's out-of-court statements. Logsdon 
makes two separate but related arguments about the denial of his motions for mistrial:  
(1) an evidentiary argument that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay and (2) a 
constitutional argument that the witness testimony violated his Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause rights.  
 
 
2.1. Standard of Review  
 
A district court may order a mistrial if there is "[p]rejudicial conduct, in or outside 
the courtroom, [that] makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to 
either the defendant or the prosecution." K.S.A. 22-3423(1)(c). In making this 
determination, the district court must engage in a two-step process:  (1) it must determine 
if there is a "fundamental failure" in the proceeding; if so, (2) the district court must 
 
32 
 
 
 
determine "whether it is possible to continue the trial without an 'injustice.'" State v. 
Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012).  
 
In Ward, we explained that whether a fundamental error resulted in an injustice 
depends on whether the error affected substantial rights—meaning whether it affected the 
outcome of the proceedings. See 292 Kan. at 565. On appeal, we review the district 
court's ruling at each step for an abuse of discretion. In general, a district court abuses its 
discretion by issuing an order that is (1) arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) based on 
an error of law; or (3) based on an error of fact. 292 Kan. at 551. 
 
2.2. Scope of Issue:  Preservation and Waiver 
 
Several preliminary considerations potentially limit the evidentiary issues 
requiring full analysis on appeal.  
 
First, although Logsdon broadly claims the district court erred in admitting any 
testimony regarding statements made by Billy Craig to others, the State argues we cannot 
consider many of these instances. Two prudential considerations are implicated. 
Specifically, Logsdon failed to preserve some instances with a timely trial objection, and, 
in two different ways, he waived his argument as to others by failing to follow our 
appellate rules.   
 
As to Logsdon's failure to make a timely trial objection, K.S.A. 60-404 provides 
that a verdict will not be set aside "by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence 
unless there appears of record objection to the evidence timely interposed and so stated as 
to make clear the specific ground of objection." In other words, "evidentiary errors shall 
not be reviewed on appeal unless a party has lodged a timely and specific objection to the 
 
33 
 
 
 
alleged error at trial." State v. King, 288 Kan. 333, 349, 204 P.3d 585 (2009). This court 
has consistently refused to "review an evidentiary issue without a timely and specific 
objection even if the issue involves a fundamental right." State v. Dukes, 290 Kan. 485, 
488-89, 231 P.3d 558 (2010) (requiring defendants to raise contemporaneous 
Confrontation Clause objections); see also State v. Godfrey, 301 Kan. 1041, 1043, 350 
P.3d 1068 (2015) ("Without a contemporaneous objection, [defendant's] claim is being 
asserted for the first time on appeal and is subject to the general rule that alleged 
constitutional violations cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.").  
 
Applying 60-404 means that not all testimony regarding Craig's statements are 
preserved for appeal. According to the State's count, it asked questions about Craig's 
statements "[a]t least a dozen times" over the 3-week trial, but "Logsdon made 
contemporaneous objections [only] seven times." We have not verified the State's count 
but do know Logsdon did not object to all of the testimony he discusses in his brief. For 
example, Logsdon complains on appeal about Hartman's testimony that Craig denied 
killing "that girl" and then started crying. But Logsdon elicited this testimony himself on 
cross-examination and obviously did not object. As a result, he cannot now claim it was 
admitted in error. See K.S.A. 60-404. 
 
Second, Kansas Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 41), 
requires an appellate brief to include "a pinpoint reference to the location in the record on 
appeal where the issue was raised and ruled on. If the issue was not raised below, there 
must be an explanation why the issue is properly before the court." In State v. Williams, 
298 Kan. 1075, 1085, 319 P.3d 528 (2014), we warned litigants that Rule 6.02(a)(5) 
means what it says and is ignored at a litigant's own peril. Then, in State v. Godfrey, 301 
Kan. 1041, 1044, 350 P.3d 1068 (2015), we held:  "We are now sufficiently post-
Williams that litigants have no excuse for noncompliance with Rule 6.02(a)(5)." Yet, 
 
34 
 
 
 
Logsdon's appellate brief contains a very limited number of pincites to specific trial 
objections. Consequently, he has failed to preserve any statement about which he 
complains that is not accompanied by a timely trial objection and a pincite in his brief. 
 
Third, a failure to adequately brief an issue results in abandonment or waiver. See 
State v. Rojas–Marceleno, 295 Kan. 525, 543, 285 P.3d 361 (2012). In at least one 
instance, Logsdon cites a trial objection in his brief to a questions asked of Lieutenant 
Robertson but does not mention the witness by name or explain why his answer made 
any difference in the proceedings. Thus, we specifically hold Logsdon has waived any 
argument regarding Lieutenant Robertson's testimony about what Craig told Detective 
Harcrow.  
 
As a result of the application of these various rules, we find Logsdon failed to 
preserve or has abandoned an evidentiary or constitutional objection to any witness 
testimony beyond the following six specific instances. Each of these instances were the 
subject of a timely trial objection and have been argued by Logsdon with a supporting 
citation to the record: 
 
1. David Crother's testimony that the day after Heckel's murder Craig told him 
Logsdon shot Heckel;  
 
2. Detective Rodriguez' testimony that Crothers told him about Craig's statement 
that Logsdon shot Heckel;  
 
3. Detective Harcrow's testimony that, on June 30, Craig told him he had heard 
someone was shot in the head;  
 
 
35 
 
 
 
4. Leonard Hill's testimony that Craig told him about a plan to do a grab-and-go 
robbery of Kayla Rodriguez;  
 
5. Kayla Rodriguez' testimony that Craig told her she knew he would not let 
anything happen to her; and 
 
6. Kylie Hartman's testimony that she had heard Craig ranting and raving about 
Rodriguez owing him money.  
 
According to the State, an additional consideration curtails the need for a full 
discussion of the merits of Logsdon's argument as to these statements. Specifically, the 
State argues Logsdon invited any error by not including all of these statements in a 
limiting instruction in which the district court told the jury to disregard some of Craig's 
statements.  
 
2.3. Scope of Issue:  Limiting Instruction and Invited Error 
 
 
Some additional facts help explain the State's argument. As we mentioned above, 
Logsdon moved for a mistrial as soon as Craig refused to testify. The district court denied 
the motion and instead asked the parties to draft a limiting instruction to reduce the 
impact of the erroneously admitted testimony on the verdict. They did so. The State 
presented a proposed instruction, and Logsdon agreed with the State that they had 
"finally narrowed it down" to a specific list of witnesses—Crothers, Detective Rodriguez, 
and Detective Harcrow. Logsdon's attorney specifically agreed he had no other names to 
add to the list. Nevertheless, he objected to the proposed instruction "to be consistent."  
 
 
36 
 
 
 
 
Ultimately, the district court informed the jury that during trial the parties believed 
Craig would be a witness but, when called, he refused to testify. The instruction stated 
Craig was unavailable as a witness and the jury was instructed to 
 
"disregard the testimony regarding the statements of Billy Craig that were specifically 
made during the testimony of the following witnesses: 
 
1. 
David Crothers 
2. 
Detective Bryan Rodriguez 
3. 
Detective Dean Harcrow, regarding a meeting on June 30 with   
 
 
Billy Craig only 
 
This instruction applies only to the witnesses named and not to the other statements you 
may have heard regarding Billy Craig in this trial."  
 
Despite this instruction and his participation in its drafting, Logsdon filed a 
posttrial motion for mistrial in which he argued Craig's out-of-court statements were so 
prejudicial that the error could not be cured by the limiting instruction. The district court 
denied his motion. 
 
The State argues Logsdon should not be allowed to claim error arising from any 
statement other than those mentioned in the limiting instruction because he helped draft 
the limiting instruction and failed to include the testimony. The State also points out that 
Logsdon's attorney explicitly told the court "that was the list that I had."  
 
If that were the end of the issue before the district court, then we would agree with 
the State's argument. But that was not the end. Logsdon's attorney continued by objecting 
to the instruction, and the objection precludes application of the invited error doctrine. 
The invited error doctrine applies only when the party fails to object and invites the error, 
 
37 
 
 
 
unless the error is structural. See State v. Verser, 299 Kan. 776, 784, 326 P.3d 1046 
(2014) (holding that, if a party has not merely failed to object to a jury instruction but has 
instead invited error, we will not review the party's argument regarding that issue on 
appeal unless the error is structural); see also K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3414(3) ("No party 
may assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction . . . unless the party objects 
thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict stating distinctly the matter to which 
the party objects and the grounds of the objection unless the instruction or the failure to 
give an instruction is clearly erroneous."); State v. Williams, 295 Kan. 506, 511, 286 P.3d 
195 (2012); State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, 163, 283 P.3d 202 (2012).  
 
We therefore conclude that the limiting instruction does not preclude Logsdon's 
ability to raise his present arguments as to the six witnesses and statements listed above. 
Yet, our consideration of the instruction does not end here because the State presents a 
second argument as to the three witnesses listed in the limiting instruction—Crothers, 
Detective Rodriguez, and Detective Harcrow. Specifically, the State argues the district 
court correctly determined the instruction cured any prejudice caused by the admission of 
Craig's out-of-court statements into evidence. Essentially, the State argues harmless error, 
which we will return to after a discussion of whether there was error.  
 
2.4. Hearsay Not Admissible Under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-460(a)  
 
We turn first to Logsdon's arguments about hearsay. At trial, the State argued 
these six statements were not hearsay because Craig would be present and available for 
cross-examination. As we have previously noted, Kansas law allows the admission of an 
out-of-court statement if the person who made the statement—that is, the declarant—
actually testifies during the trial. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-460(a). The district court, 
 
38 
 
 
 
relying on this exception to the hearsay rule, permitted witnesses to testify about what 
Craig told them out of court. 
 
Clearly, 60-460(a) did not apply once Craig refused to testify. But it also did not 
apply even at the time the statements were introduced into evidence:  Craig had not yet 
been given immunity, and our prior cases hold 60-460(a) cannot be used to admit an out-
of-court statement if the declarant is still protected by his or her privilege against self-
incrimination. See State v. King, 221 Kan. 69, 71-72, 557 P.2d 1262 (1976) (defense 
sought to admit recording of conversation between witness and defendant; we held 
defendant was not, at that point, "available" for cross-examination because she was still 
protected by her Fifth Amendment privilege; when defendant later took the stand, court 
did not abuse discretion in refusing to admit the self-serving tape because defendant's in-
court testimony was best evidence); State v. Oliphant, 210 Kan. 451, 453, 502 P.2d 626 
(1972) (witnesses who had claimed privilege against self-incrimination in previous 
proceedings were not available for cross-examination and 60-460[a] did not apply); see 
also State v. Fisher, 222 Kan. 76, 78, 563 P.2d 1012 (1977) (emphasizing that judges 
should use restraint in allowing admission of evidence under 60-460[a] and quoting S. 
Gard, Kansas Code of Civil Procedure 465 [1963] for proposition that the exception 
"could be subject to abuse" if judges allow reliance on its use when "better evidence is 
available and no good purpose is served by receiving" the out-of-court statement).  
 
Here, Craig had been charged with crimes arising from the murder of Heckel, his 
Fifth Amendment privilege still applied, and he was not available for cross-examination 
when his various out-of-court statements were admitted. There is thus no question that 
60-404(a) did not permit Hill, Rodriguez, Hartman, Crothers, Detective Harcrow, or 
Detective Rodriguez to testify about what Craig told them. Consequently, this testimony 
was inadmissible hearsay—unless another hearsay exception applied.  
 
39 
 
 
 
 
2.5. The Coconspirator Hearsay Exception Applies 
 
The State argued to the district court, after Craig refused to testify, that Craig's 
statements were admissible under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-460(i)(2) as statements of a 
coconspirator. The district court did not rule on this alternative basis for admission and 
instead gave the limiting instruction. On appeal, the State once again argues this 
alternative ground; it also argues it had a good faith reason for believing Craig would 
agree to testify. Briefly, as to this second argument, good faith does not make evidence 
admissible. But the State makes a valid argument regarding coconspirators' statements 
because K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-460(i)(2) permits 
 
"[a]s against a party, a statement which would be admissible if made by the declarant at the 
hearing if . . . the party and the declarant were participating in a plan to commit a crime or a 
civil wrong and the statement was relevant to the plan or its subject matter and was made 
while the plan was in existence and before its complete execution or other 
termination . . . ." K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-460(i)(2).  
 
In order for this so-called "coconspirator exception" to apply: 
 
"(1) the person testifying must be a third party; (2) the out-of-court statement . . . must have 
been made by one of the coconspirators; (3) the statement of the coconspirator must have 
been made while the conspiracy was in progress; and (4) the statement must be relevant to 
the plan or its subject matter." State v. Betancourt, 301 Kan. 282, 298, 342 P.3d 916 (2015). 
 
As we noted above, the district court never ruled on this exception but instead 
decided to instruct the jury to disregard at least some evidence. Under some 
circumstances, this might preclude our consideration of this alternative exception. But 
here, Logsdon's statements that the limiting instruction covered all the witnesses on his 
 
40 
 
 
 
list would have reasonably led the district court and the State to believe no further rulings 
were necessary. And while Logsdon objected to the instruction, he did not state a specific 
objection that would alert the district judge or the State to the necessity for additional 
findings. Nor does he argue the State should be prohibited from making the argument on 
appeal. Under these unique circumstances, we will consider the State's argument that the 
coconspirator exception would apply; we also note Logsdon does not attempt to refute 
this argument.  
 
Furthermore, the record allows us to apply the exception because Craig was charged 
as a coconspirator, and ample evidence supports his involvement, including the testimony 
of Logsdon and other coconspirators. Also, the content of Craig's statements to Kayla 
Rodriguez, Hartman, and Hill reflect that the statements were about the conspiracy while 
it was ongoing. See Betancourt, 301 Kan. at 298. The district court thus did not err in 
admitting this testimony—although it was hearsay, it qualified for an exception and was 
admissible. See State v. May, 293 Kan. 858, 870, 269 P.3d 1260 (2012) (appellate court 
can affirm even if reasoning differs from district court). 
 
Moreover, to the extent Logsdon argues any testimony of these three witnesses 
regarding Craig's statements was so prejudicial that the district court erred in allowing 
them into evidence, we disagree. First, Logsdon fails to cite a legal basis for arguing that 
prejudice precludes the admission of a coconspirator's statements. Second, we find no 
basis to conclude the district court abused its discretion in this regard because the 
statements were not unduly prejudicial. See State v. Lowrance, 298 Kan. 274, 291, 312 
P.3d 328 (2013) (Even if evidence is relevant, a trial court has discretion to exclude it 
where the court finds its probative value is outweighed by its potential for producing 
undue prejudice. See K.S.A. 60-445. An appellate court reviews any such determination 
for an abuse of discretion.). A review of the evidence explains our conclusion.  
 
41 
 
 
 
 
With regard to Craig's statements to Kayla Rodriguez, Logsdon asserts this 
testimony tied him to the plan to rob Rodriguez and supported the State's theory of 
mistaken identity. But Rodriguez' testimony about Craig's statement did not implicate 
Logsdon. Plus, there was plenty of other, unobjected-to evidence tying Logsdon to the 
conspiracy involving Rodriguez, and there was also quite a bit of other evidence 
suggesting nobody ever intended to kill Heckel, including Logsdon's own statements to 
police.  
 
As for Hartman's alleged hearsay testimony, the State correctly points out that 
Logsdon only objected when she said that Craig ranted and raved about Rodriguez' debt. 
Any error in admitting that statement was harmless in light of Logsdon's own statements 
to police about a debt "the girl" owed Craig and multiple, conflicting statements about 
who owed whom and how much—all of which was presented at trial.  
 
Then, regarding Hill's testimony that Craig said the murder was not Logsdon's plan 
and the robbery was supposed to be a nonviolent grab-and-go, the same sort of testimony 
was admitted through other witnesses who were involved in the planning of the 
robbery—such as Branton's testimony that the original plan was nonviolent and involved 
counterfeit money.  
 
Accordingly, we hold the district court did not err in overruling Logsdon's hearsay 
objections relating to these three witnesses.  
 
This leaves Crothers' testimony that Craig told him Logsdon was the shooter, 
Detective Rodriguez' testimony that Crothers' repeated what Logsdon had told him, and 
Detective Harcrow's testimony that Craig had told him of the rumor that the victim had 
 
42 
 
 
 
been shot in the head. The State concedes Detective Rodriguez' testimony was 
inadmissible, and this concession carries over to Crothers' testimony, which Detective 
Rodriguez was essentially repeating. In light of this concession, we will, without analysis, 
assume error. However, as to the final claim of hearsay error, the State argues Detective 
Harcrow's testimony was not hearsay because the statement was not admitted for the truth 
of the matter asserted—that is, it was not admitted to prove Heckel had been shot in the 
head. Rather, the argument goes, it was admitted to explain why detectives began to 
investigate Craig and his associates.  
 
Had the detective simply said that Craig provided information that had not yet been 
made public, the State's point would have persuaded us. But the State wanted the jury to 
understand the truth of the statement—that Heckel had indeed been shot in the head and 
Craig knew it. The detail of Craig's statement and its truth made it more believable that 
Craig (and, in turn, his associates) were tied to the crime. Although the State proved the 
nature of Heckel's injuries in other ways, it still presented this testimony for the truth of 
the matter it asserted. The State does not argue this testimony falls under any hearsay 
exception. 
 
This means we either assume or find that the district court erred in overruling 
Logsdon's hearsay objection to Detective Harcrow's, Detective Rodriguez', and Crothers' 
statements about comments made by Craig. Before discussing whether these errors 
resulted in an injustice, we will discuss Logsdon's claim that these errors were also a 
violation of his constitutional right to confront witnesses.  
 
 
43 
 
 
 
2.6. Confrontation Clause 
 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that "[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him." See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. 
Ed. 2d 923 (1965) (applying the Confrontation Clause to state prosecutions). This right is 
violated if an unavailable declarant's testimonial statements are brought into evidence 
against a person without a prior opportunity to cross-examine that declarant; whether the 
statements are "testimonial" is the threshold question. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36, 68, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004); State v. Bennington, 293 Kan. 503, 
508, 264 P.3d 440 (2011). Neither party claims Craig was previously available for cross-
examination. Thus, if Craig made testimonial out-of-court statements to a witness who 
then testified about those statements, a fundamental error occurred.  
 
 
We have established four factors to be considered in determining when evidence is 
testimonial: 
 
"(1) Would an objective witness reasonably believe such a statement would later be 
available for use in the prosecution of a crime? (2) Was the statement made to a law 
enforcement officer or to another government official? (3) Was proof of facts potentially 
relevant to a later prosecution of a crime the primary purpose of the interview when 
viewed from an objective totality of the circumstances, including circumstances of 
whether (a) the declarant was speaking about events as they were actually happening, 
instead of describing past events; (b) the statement was made while the declarant was in 
immediate danger, i.e., during an ongoing emergency; (c) the statement was made in 
order to resolve an emergency or simply to learn what had happened in the past; and (d) 
the interview was part of a government investigation?; and (4) was the level of formality 
of the statement sufficient to make it inherently testimonial; e.g., was the statement made 
in response to questions, was the statement recorded, was the declarant removed from 
 
44 
 
 
 
third parties, or was the interview conducted in a formal setting such as in a governmental 
building?" State v. Brown, 285 Kan. 261, Syl. ¶ 15, 173 P.3d 612 (2007). 
 
See also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (leaving "for another day any effort to spell out a 
comprehensive definition of 'testimonial,'" though stating the term at least covers, inter 
alia, statements made during police interrogations").  
 
 
None of those four factors apply to Craig's statements to his own friends or 
acquaintances, including four of the six statements subject to our review—that is, those 
of Kayla Rodriguez, Hartman, Hill, and Crothers. See Brown, 285 Kan. 261, Syl. ¶ 15. 
An objective witness would not have reasonably believed the statements would later be 
available for use in the prosecution of a crime; the statements were not made to a 
government official; the primary purposes of the conversations were not for proof to be 
used in prosecuting a crime; and the statements occurred in informal conversations 
between friends and acquaintances. See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 ("An accuser who 
makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person 
who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not."); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 
(explaining that an "off-hand, overheard remark" might be excluded under hearsay rules 
but "bears little resemblance to the . . . abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted); 
Bennington, 293 Kan. at 510, 513 (stating, in the context of domestic violence, that a 
declarant's statements to friends and neighbors would be excluded at trial, if at all, by 
hearsay rules alone, not because they were testimonial); Brown, 285 Kan. at 288 
(recognizing "indications that the court intended to exclude private or casual 
conversations from the definition of testimonial statements"). 
 
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has stated that among those 
statements "that by their nature [are] not testimonial [are] for example, business records 
or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy." (Emphasis added.) Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
 
45 
 
 
 
56; see also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 83, 91 S. Ct. 210, 27 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1970) 
("We cannot say that the [coconspirator] evidentiary rule applied by Georgia violates the 
[Sixth Amendment to the United States] Constitution merely because it does not exactly 
coincide with the hearsay exception applicable in the decidedly different context of a 
federal prosecution for the substantive offense of conspiracy."); Betancourt, 301 Kan. at 
300. In this case, Craig's statements to Hill and Hartman clearly furthered the alleged 
conspiracy to rob Kayla Rodriguez and, arguably, so did his statement to Rodriguez.  
 
Thus, although Kayla Rodriguez, Hartman, Hill, and Crothers (and Detective 
Rodriguez by repeating Crothers' statements) offered hearsay evidence at trial, their 
testimony did not implicate the Confrontation Clause given that all statements arose in 
the context of informal conversations among friends and acquaintances. 
 
This leaves a possible Confrontation Clause violation in the testimony of 
Detective Harcrow (about Craig's statement he heard someone had been shot in the head). 
 
 The State fails to address why this statement by Craig was not testimonial and 
why the detective's testimony about these statements did not violate the Confrontation 
Clause—in fact, the State makes no mention of the Confrontation Clause during its 
discussion of this testimony. At most, the State relies on its argument the statement was 
not hearsay and that it acted in good faith. Yet, the Sixth Amendment prohibits 
testimonial statements without prior opportunity for cross-examination, even if those 
statements would be admissible under hearsay rules, and there is no good faith exception 
to Confrontation Clause requirements. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 55 (holding a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine was a necessary, not merely sufficient, condition for 
admitting testimonial statements at the time the Confrontation Clause was created); 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (ruling the Sixth Amendment's protections should not be left to 
 
46 
 
 
 
"the vagaries of the rules of evidence"). Because Logsdon makes at least a colorable 
argument that statements to a detective are testimonial and, considering the State's silence 
on the matter, we assume, again without analysis, there was a Confrontation Clause error 
in the admission of Detective Harcrow's testimony about Craig's statement. See Brown, 
285 Kan. 261 Syl. ¶ 15. 
 
2.7. Impact on Logsdon's substantial rights  
 
Assuming that error occurred in denying Logsdon's hearsay objection to the 
testimony of Crothers, Detective Rodriguez, and Detective Harcrow regarding Craig's 
statements and that Detective Harcrow's statement also violated Logsdon's right to 
confront a witness, we must next consider whether the district court erred in concluding 
the trial could proceed without an injustice. In making this assessment, a district court 
must determine whether the error "affect[ed] the outcome of the trial in light of the entire 
record." State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 569, 256 P.3d 801 (2011).  
 
In Ward, we explained that in considering a motion for mistrial: 
 
"[t]he degree of certainty by which the court must be persuaded that the error did not 
affect the outcome will vary depending on whether the fundamental failure infringes 
upon a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution. If it does not, the trial court 
should apply K.S.A. 60-261 and determine if there is a reasonable probability that the 
error will or did affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record. If the 
fundamental failure does infringe upon a right guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution, the trial court should apply the constitutional harmless error analysis 
defined in Chapman v. California 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, reh. 
denied 386 U.S. 987 (1967), in which case the error may be declared harmless where the 
party benefitting from the error proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire 
 
47 
 
 
 
record, i.e., proves there is no reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict. . . . 
An appellate court reviewing the second step for an injustice will review the entire record 
and use the same analysis, applying K.S.A. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105 or else Chapman, 
depending on the nature of the right allegedly affected. (Emphasis added.) Ward, 292 
Kan. at 569-70. 
 
We also instructed the district courts to consider "whether any damage caused by 
the error can be or was removed or mitigated by admonition, instruction, or other curative 
action." 292 Kan. at 569-70. Generally, we presume juries follow the court's instructions. 
See State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 509, 560, 324 P.3d 1078 (2014).  
 
Here, the district judge instructed the jury to disregard the testimony of Crothers 
and Detective Rodriguez relating to any of Craig's statements and to disregard the 
testimony of Detective Harcrow regarding Craig's June 30 statement. On appeal, Logsdon 
fails to present any reason to suspect this particular jury improperly considered the listed 
statements despite being instructed not to do so. And our own review of the record leaves 
us with no reason to suspect the jury disregarded the instruction. The instruction removed 
any damage caused by admitting the error. Moreover, Crothers' statements (repeated by 
Detective Rodriguez) were essentially cumulative of other evidence about the crime and 
Logsdon's involvement. And while Craig's statement to Detective Harcrow was 
particularly incriminating as to Craig, it did not in any way incriminate Logsdon.  
 
In light of these considerations we are persuaded the State has met its burden 
under both K.S.A. 60-261 and the constitutional harmless error standard. See Ward, 292 
Kan. at 565; see also State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1111, 299 P.3d 292 (2013) 
("[W]here both the constitutional and nonconstitutional error clearly arise from the very 
same acts and omissions, we will logically begin with our harmlessness analysis of the 
constitutional error. This is because if we conclude the constitutional error is not harmless 
 
48 
 
 
 
and reverse the convictions, there is no point in analyzing whether the State met the lower 
standard for harmlessness under K.S.A. 60-261."). 
 
Accordingly, we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Logsdon's motions for mistrial to the extent the motions were based on a violation of the 
Sixth Amendment. 
 
ISSUE 3:  The district court did not err in instructing the jury on aiding and abetting 
liability. 
 
Logsdon next argues the district court's use of an aiding and abetting instruction 
misled the jury about what was needed to return a guilty verdict for first-degree murder. 
According to Logsdon, the State's theory of the case was that Craig drove Logsdon to 
Heckel's house and then Logsdon shot her—in other words, the State never pursued an 
aiding and abetting theory and so an aiding and abetting instruction should not have been 
issued. Further, Logsdon contends, the aiding and abetting instruction impermissibly 
allowed the jury to find Logsdon guilty of premeditated and felony murder based solely 
on discussions Logsdon may have had with Craig about a mere plan to rob Kayla 
Rodriguez. 
 
Here, both parties requested the jury be instructed on aiding and abetting liability. 
Logsdon specifically requested a jury instruction stating that a person who intentionally 
aids another in committing a crime is criminally responsible for that crime regardless of 
the extent of his participation. The State requested a similar instruction, and the district 
court provided the pattern instruction on aiding and abetting. 
 
 
49 
 
 
 
 
 
When examining jury instruction issues, we follow a three-step process:  
 
"'(1) determining whether the appellate court can or should review the issue, i.e. whether 
there is a lack of appellate jurisdiction or a failure to preserve the issue for appeal; 
(2) considering the merits of the claim to determine whether error occurred below; and 
(3) assessing whether the error requires reversal, i.e., whether the error can be deemed 
harmless.'" State v. Bolze-Sann, 302 Kan. 198, 209, 352 P.3d 511 (2015) (quoting State v. 
Williams, 295 Kan. 506, 510, 286 P.3d 195 [2012]). 
 
The "first and third step are interrelated in that whether a party has preserved a 
jury instruction issue will affect [the court's] reversibility inquiry at the third step." 
Bolze-Sann, 302 Kan. at 209; see also K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3414(3) ("No party may 
assign as error the giving or failure to given an instruction . . . unless the party objects 
thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict stating distinctly the matter to which 
the party objects and the grounds of the objection unless the instruction or the failure to 
given an instruction is clearly erroneous."). 
 
Our analysis ends at the first step—if a party has not merely failed to object to a 
jury instruction but has instead invited error, we will not review the party's argument 
regarding that issue on appeal unless the error is structural. See State v. Verser, 299 Kan. 
776, 784, 326 P.3d 1046 (2014); State v. Hargrove, 48 Kan. App. 2d 522, 531, 293 P.3d 
787 (2013). 
 
We decline to review Logsdon's argument regarding the aiding and abetting jury 
instruction because he specifically requested the instruction—thereby inviting any error 
that occurred. State v. Devine, 291 Kan. 738, 742, 246 P.3d 692 (2001) (explaining a 
party may not invite error and then complain of the error on appeal). Logsdon does not 
 
50 
 
 
 
raise any constitutional argument regarding this instruction, nor does he explain why his 
explicit request for the aiding and abetting instruction does not preclude our review. See 
Hargrove, 48 Kan. App. 2d at 531-33. 
 
ISSUE 4:  Logsdon's hard 50 sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution. 
 
Although we affirm Logsdon's convictions, we must, as he urges, vacate his hard 
50 life sentence. Logsdon was sentenced pursuant to K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-6620, which 
imposed a mandatory 50-year sentence, without the possibility of parole, for a defendant 
convicted of premeditated first-degree murder if the district court concluded that certain 
statutory aggravating circumstances were present and were not outweighed by any 
mitigating circumstances. We have previously held this hard 50 sentencing scheme was 
unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment because the factual findings necessary to 
impose the enhanced minimum sentence were made by a judge by a preponderance of the 
evidence rather than by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See Alleyne v. United States, 
570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2160-63, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013); State v. Warren, 302 
Kan. 601, 621-24, 356 P.3d 396 (2015); State v. Soto, 299 Kan. 102, 103-04, 322 P.3d 
334 (2014). 
 
The State concedes Logsdon's hard 50 life sentence must be vacated and he should 
be resentenced, which leaves us only to decide how resentencing should be 
accomplished. We decline the State's suggestion (which was unaccompanied by any 
citation to legal authority) to order the preparation of a nunc pro tunc or amended journal 
entry of sentencing because, in our view, Logsdon's sentence accurately reflects the 
judgment rendered at the time. See State v. Mebane, 278 Kan. 131, 136, 91 P.3d 1175 
(2004) (explaining nunc pro tunc orders are appropriate to correct clerical errors arising 
from oversight or omission); State v. Lyon, 207 Kan. 378, 380, 485 P.2d 332 (1971). We 
 
51 
 
 
 
acknowledge the State's assertion that it does not wish to pursue a hard 50 life sentence 
on remand, but we are not inclined to choose which sentence would be appropriate in its 
place. Instead, we simply remand for resentencing so as to permit the parties to present 
their sentencing arguments to the district court. 
 
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm Logsdon's convictions but 
vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.