Case Title: Rosenberg v. Village Shopping Center, Inc.

Citation: 238 N.E.2d 642, 251 Ind. 1

Docket Number: 31,085

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1968-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
251 Ind. 1 (1968)
238 N.E.2d 642
ROSENBERG ET AL.
v.
VILLAGE SHOPPING CENTER, INC., ET AL.
No. 31,085.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed July 18, 1968.
*2 Arch N. Bobbitt, of Indianapolis, Harry A. Psimos, of Gary, Ruckelshaus, Bobbitt & O'Connor, of counsel, of Indianapolis, for appellants.
Gavit and Gavit, of Gary, for appellee, Hudsons In The Village, Inc., Sackett, Pyatt and Waitkus, of Gary, for the remaining appellees.
JACKSON, J.
The action below was instituted by appellants as plaintiffs seeking a temporary injunction against the appellees as defendants. Plaintiffs predicated their action on the alleged violation of one of the provisions of a written lease held by them, the terms of which they claimed were breached by the landlord by the denial of an alleged first right in the appellants to the space now occupied by appellee, Hudson's In The Village, Inc., (hereinafter called Hudson's).
The question below was whether or not a temporary injunction should issue.
After the hearing on appellants' complaint, the trial court made and entered its findings of facts and conclusions of law, *3 thereafter it entered an interlocutory order denying the temporary injunction.
Appellants contend the issues before this Court in this appeal are:
In order that the issues presented below may be clearly delineated we are setting out portions of appellants' complaint and the pertinent portion of the lease on which appellants predicate their right of action.
The pertinent paragraphs of the complaint are numbered and read as follows:
Appellants asked and were granted leave to amend the complaint by interlineation of paragraph 3a, which amendment reads as follows:
Appellants asked and were granted leave to amend the complaint as to the appellee, which amendment reads as follows:
The pertinent part of the lease by which appellants claim the right of first refusal is found on page six of the lease as part of Article VIII between pages 213 and 214 of the transcript and reads as follows:
Appellant introduced into evidence plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 being a copy of the lease entered into in 1955; as Exhibit No. 2 letter of March 19, 1964, extending term of original lease for an additional five year period from the end of the first lease; as Exhibit No. 3 an assignment of the Rosenberg lease to appellees, Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust from Village Shopping Center, Inc.; as Exhibit No. 4 lease dated September 15, 1966, between Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust and L.I. Combs as agent therefor as lessor *8 and defendant Hudson's as lessee; as Exhibits Nos. 5 to 12 inclusive photographs of the premises involved; as plaintiff's Exhibit 13 a newspaper advertisement showing the exterior of Hudson's and an announcement that it would be open November 14, 1966; as Exhibit No. 14 its affirmed complaint which was admitted into evidence.
Defendants Village Shopping Center, Inc. introduced into evidence Exhibit A, an addendum to the original Rosenberg lease showing the expansion made to the shopping center; and Exhibit B, an aerial photograph of the Village Shopping Center.
A condensed recital of the evidence adduced is as follows:
On July 12, 1955, defendant, Village Shopping Center, Inc., an Indiana corporation, entered into a written lease as landlord for a period of ten years beginning November 1, 1955, with Hecht's Bonnie Shop, Sol P. Rosenberg and Evelyn Hecht Rosenberg, partners, for a store room in the Village Shopping Center in Gary, Indiana. Marshall's Inc., took possession of the premises although there was never, so far as disclosed by the record here, any assignment of the lease from Hecht's Bonnie Shop or the Rosenberg's to it.
There is conflict in the evidence as to whether or not the Rosenbergs sought or were promised an exclusive option for a ladies' ready to wear store in the price lines indicated and described as about the line of Three Sisters.
The lease was amended in 1957 by substituting the plat plan attached to the original lease and in its place was installed a new plat plan as a part of the lease.
Thereafter the lease was extended for an additional five year term by letter from Melvin J. Cole, attorney for Marshall's, Inc.
Since 1955 to the date of trial there had been two extensions or expansions of the shopping center totaling 140,000 or 150,000 square feet. Sometime in March 1965, the Village Shopping Center, Inc. sold the real estate known as Village *9 Shopping Center to the Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust. Thereafter, or concurrently therewith the Rosenbergs' and other leases were assigned to the new owner. The space now occupied by Hudson's is in the original construction, in what was formerly Hannah's and not in the expanded area. Plaintiff's store has a 25 foot frontage, Hudson's has a 50 foot frontage.
In August, 1966, Mr. Leslie I. Combs, Jr., former owner of the shopping center, and thereafter and now of the firm having the management contract to manage the center for the present owner, had a conversation with Bill Egherman, one of the stockholders of Marshall's Inc., in which Mr. Egherman indicated his brother Marshall would like to have the space in the shopping center vacated by Hannah's Hardware Store for the Ladies Shop, a store operated in downtown Gary by Marshall Egherman. No mention was made by either party that a ladies apparel shop was going in the space formerly occupied by Hannah's, nor did Mr. Combs advise Mr. Egherman of any negotiations pending between Hudson's and the present owners of the shopping center. There was, according to Combs' testimony, no specific request on the part of Marshall's Inc. or Sol Rosenberg for the space formerly occupied by Hannah's, nor did he offer that space to plaintiff. Mr. Egherman testified he saw the Hudson sign on September 6th, 1966.
There is conflict in the evidence on the question of additional space being requested by plaintiff. Marshal Egherman testified he had conversations regarding additional space in the center as long ago as seven or eight years, but that since the inception of the lease there was never any space made available to them nor were they ever approached or asked to take Hudson's space.
Marshall Egherman also testified Marshall's, Inc., is a corporation. He owns 51% of the stock and his brother William Egherman owns 49% of the stock and has been manager of *10 the store for the past three years. He stated that he did not know of the execution of the lease between the Village Shopping Center or the Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust and Hudson's. He was advised of the sign (Hudson's) by his employees.
There was testimony on behalf of plaintiff that it would suffer immeasurable damages in loss of business and in reputation, and that there was no way of determining in money the extent of the damages. Plaintiff's evidence was to the effect that its gross business had increased from a figure of $180,000 in 1956 to a gross volume of $380,000.00 at present. That during the past eleven years plaintiff paid as rental for their space the sum of $160,000.00.
It further appears from the record that defendant Hudson's had no knowledge of the provisions of the lease between Rosenberg, et al., and Village Shopping Center, Inc.; that Hudson's was a ladies apparel shop and that they had, in conjunction with the landlord, spent approximately $80,000.00 in remodeling and refurbishing the quarters now leased by them, and formerly occupied by Hannah's Hardware; that of said $80,000.00 the landlord, Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust, paid the sum of $30,000.00 and Hudson's the balance. It further appears that on September 6, 1966, a sign was placed in the window of the establishment now occupied by Hudson's announcing that Hudson's was to occupy that space; that the lease between Hudson's and the landlord bears date of September 15, 1966, is for a ten year period beginning February 15, 1967, and ending February 14, 1977; that on November 13, 1966, there appeared in the Sunday Post-Tribune an ad announcing the opening of Hudson's in the Village on November 14, 1966. The complaint herein was filed November 12, 1966.
At the conclusion of all the evidence the court directed counsel to prepare and submit Special Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. Thereafter, on December 1, 1966, the *11 court entered its Special Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, which, omitting formal parts, reads as follows, to-wit:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
On the foregoing facts the Court concludes:
Thereafter, on December 21, 1966, appellants tendered their Bill of Exceptions containing the evidence, which was signed by the Judge and filed with the clerk, which filing is evidenced by order book entry.
On December 29, 1966, appellants' Assignment of Errors was filed, the same omitting formal parts thereof, reads in pertinent part as follows:
Appellant contends the issues before this Court are as follows:
Appellees say "For purposes of this appeal, this was a proceeding for a temporary injunction by appellants, a tenant in Village Shopping Center in Gary, Indiana, against its landlord and against Hudson's (a subsequent tenant), to oust Hudson's (by injunction) for an alleged breach by the landlord of an alleged right in appellants as to the space occupied by Hudson's."
In arriving at a determination of the issues before us we are confronted with the general rule that on appeals of this character this Court will consider only the evidence "which tends to support the finding, together with reasonable, natural and logical inferences which may be drawn therefrom." Southport Board of Zoning Appeals et al. v. Southside Ready Mix Concrete, Inc., et al. (1961), 242 Ind. 133, 176 N.E.2d 112; DeSchamps v. Board of Zoning Appeals etc. (1961), 241 Ind. 615, 174 N.E.2d 581; Koss v. Continental Oil Co. (1944), 222 Ind. 224, 52 N.E.2d 614.
Moreover, where the evidence is in conflict we will not determine either the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. Kraus v. Kraus (1956), 235 Ind. 325, 132 N.E.2d 608.
*15 It is well settled that the granting of a temporary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court judge and the "exercise of this discretion will not be interfered with by this Court unless it is shown that the action of the trial court was arbitrary or constituted a clear abuse of discretion." Koss v. Continental Oil Co., supra; The Indiana Annual Conference Corp. et al. v. Lemon, etc. (1956), 235 Ind. 163, 131 N.E.2d 780.
In McFarlan v. Fowler Bank City Trust Co. (1938), 214 Ind. 10, 12 N.E.2d 752, the Court said:
We do not feel the decision of the trial court judge in refusing to grant the temporary injunction was such an "erroneous conclusion and judgment," and was so "clearly against the logic and effect of the facts" as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
We think it may be conceded that Marshall's Inc., is a tenant now in possession of the premises occupied by it. Whether this status came about by some arrangement with the Rosenbergs, or by acquiescence on the part of Village Shopping Center, Inc., and thereafter by Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust is unknown. There is in the record no assignment of the lease to Marshall's, Inc., and no testimony as to any present interest in the lease by the original lessees, the Rosenbergs. These are matters peculiarly within the knowledge of the plaintiff-appellant. As to the rights of appellants Rosenberg there is a total failure of any evidence that would authorize or permit the granting of the relief sought. There is similarly sufficient doubt surrounding the right of Marshall's, Inc., to insist on the "right of first refusal," to justify denying the requested relief.
*16 Assuming, arguendo, that Marshall's, Inc., did lawfully succeed to all the interests of the original lessees in the lease, including the "right of first refusal," there remains the question of enforcing the provision because of its vagueness. The provision of the lease is silent both as to term and rental.[1] There is also conflicting evidence as to the construction to be given it. However, we are not here in a position to add clarity to the provision.
Further, the evidence is undisputed that notice of the leasing of the premises occupied by Hudson's was given by the posting of a sign in the window of said premises, and that Marshall's, Inc., was aware of the sign and advised of it not later than two weeks thereafter. At no time did appellants, or any of them, advise Hudson's of their desire to occupy these or other quarters. Instead, appellants stood idly by without advising Hudson's of any alleged claim or right to the premises and permitted the expenditure of approximately $80,000.00 in improvements on said premises without complaint to any of the appellees. It is also undisputed that the lease between Hudson's and Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust was executed on September 15, 1966, and that this action was not instituted until November 12, 1966, which was two days before the scheduled opening of Hudson's in the Village.
Considering all the facts and circumstances before us, we are of the opinion the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the denial of the writ nor did it act arbitrarily.
The judgment is affirmed.
Lewis, C.J. and Hunter, J., concur in result; Arterburn, J., concurs; Mote, J., not participating.
NOTE.  Reported in 238 N.E.2d 642.
[1]  Puetz v. Cozmos (1958), 237 Ind. 500, 147 N.E.2d 227; State v. Jordan (1966), 247 Ind. 361, 215 N.E.2d 32.