Case Title: WHITT v. STATE OF WYOMING ex rel., WRIGHT

Citation: 

Docket Number: 00-306

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
WHITT v. STATE OF WYOMING ex rel., WRIGHT2001 WY 12836 P.3d 617Case Number: 00-306Decided: 12/17/2001
 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

KENNETH 
JUSTIN WHITT, 

Appellant(Respondent),

 

v.

 

STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel.,

KAYCEE 
LYNN WRIGHT and

JUSTIN 
JAMES WRIGHT, minor

children, 

Appellee(Petitioner).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

            
Sky D Phifer, Lander, Wyoming.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

            
Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney 
General; and Sue Chatfield, Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
  

            
VOIGT, Justice. 

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from a judgment for back child support.  
The district court accepted the Department of Family Services' (DFS) 
computations and ordered Kenneth Justin Whitt (appellant) to pay the State 
$21,811.96 for Medicaid reimbursement and back child support.  We reverse and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The appellant 
raises these issues:

 

1.         
Did the State meet its burden of proof that it had an assignment of child 
support benefits?

 

2.         
Did the State meet its burden of proof that the father of the two minor 
children owed back support in the amount of $18,322.65?

 

3.         
Did the State meet its burden of proof that the father of the two minor 
children owed reimbursement to the State in the amount of 
$18,322.65?

 

4.         
Did the State meet its burden of proof that the State was entitled to 
Medicaid reimbursement in the amount of $3,489.31?

 

5.         
Is Appellant entitled to attorney's fees?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      The appellant 
filed a petition to establish paternity and custody on January 30, 1998.  He alleged that he was the biological 
father of two minor children, one born in 1990 and the other in 1992.  The appellant and the natural mother of 
the minor children, Ranae Wright (Wright), were not married at the time the 
children were born, nor did they ever marry; the two were involved in an on and 
off relationship from 1989 to 2000.

 

[¶4]      DFS brought its 
own action to establish paternity and support on March 13, 1998, alleging that 
Wright and the minor children received public assistance and that the right to 
back child support had been assigned to DFS.  The district court consolidated this 
action with the appellant's petition.  
The parties settled matters concerning paternity, custody, and current 
child support in a stipulation dated October 14, 1998.  However, the issue of back child support 
remained.  The trial set for October 
21, 1998, to determine paternity, was vacated, and the matter of back child 
support was assigned to the district court commissioner.  Adopting the district court 
commissioner's findings of fact for lack of objection thereto, the district 
court, on February 15, 2000, found that the appellant owed back child support to 
the State, through August 30, 1998, in the amount of $10,384.00, and assessed 
against the appellant attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $865.00.  The district court set aside this 
judgment on May 23, 2000, and scheduled another hearing to determine the back 
child support issue.1

 

[¶5]      At the next 
hearing, Wright and the appellant entered into a second stipulation in which 
Wright agreed that the appellant did not owe her any back child support.  DFS did not join in the 
stipulation.  The district court 
then took evidence from the appellant and Wright and ordered DFS and the 
appellant to prepare and submit child support calculations.  The district court received DFS's 
calculations with attachments on June 26, 2000, and the appellant's calculations 
and exhibits on July 10, 2000.  A 
final hearing was held on August 10, 2000.  
On September 12, 2000, the district court's oral pronouncement at the 
August hearing, that the appellant owed back child support in the amount of 
$18,322.65 and Medicaid reimbursement in the amount of $3,489.31, was entered as 
a judgment in favor of the State for a total of 
$21,811.96.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶6]      Three of the 
appellant's issues can be dealt with quickly.  First, it is clear that the State met 
its burden of proof concerning the assignment of child support benefits.  Chapter 6 of Title 20 of the Wyoming 
Statutes is known as the "Child Support Enforcement Act."  Under the Act, DFS is obligated to 
"establish a program of enforcement services . . . to aid in enforcing support 
obligations owed by obligors to their children . . . and in obtaining child 
support."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-6-103(a) (Michie 1997).  To 
assist DFS in accomplishing these goals, recipients of public assistance assign 
their rights to child and spousal support to DFS, by operation of law, to the 
extent of any public assistance provided.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-6-106(a) and (d) (Michie 1997); State, Dept. of 
Family Services v. Peterson, 957 P.2d 1307, 1309-11 (Wyo. 1998).

 

[¶7]      In the instant 
case, Wright testified that Medicaid paid for the births of both children, and 
that she received food stamps and aid to families with dependent children 
(AFDC).  She testified that she 
received AFDC for about four and one-half years, specifically from February 1990 
to July 1994 and from July 1995 to June 1996.  Further, upon questioning by the DFS 
attorney, Wright indicated that she had "no disagreement" with an estimated 
$20,000.00 received in AFDC benefits.  
There can be no dispute that Wright, by being a recipient of public 
assistance, assigned her rights by operation of law to the State.2

 

[¶8]      Two related 
issues presented by the appellant are whether the State met its burden of 
proving that it is entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $18,322.65 and 
Medicaid reimbursement in the amount of $3,489.31 as the assignee of 
Wright.  After careful review of the 
record, we conclude that the State proved it is entitled to reimbursement for 
public assistance benefits and Medicaid; however, we find no factual basis or 
evidentiary support for the amounts claimed by the State.  We agree with the appellant that the 
State failed to meet its burden of proving the exact amount to which it is 
entitled as the assignee of Wright.

 

[¶9]      The appellant 
argues that, since the State did not prove the amount it paid out in public 
assistance benefits and Medicaid, he owes no money at all.  Although he accepts the proposition that 
legally a parent is obligated to support his or her children from the date of 
birth, he argues that the measure of recovery is only the amount actually 
expended in the support of the children by DFS.  In support of this argument, the 
appellant points to the following sentence from Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-204(d) 
(Michie 1997):  "The measure of 
recovery from the defendant is the reasonable value of the care or support which 
has been furnished to the child by the petitioner."

 

[¶10]   This Court has consistently held 
that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-204(d) does not refer to expenses actually incurred, 
but rather is much broader.  The 
State brought this case in the name of the children.  Thus, the focus is not on the amount 
assigned to the State, but rather on the amount the appellant owes to his 
children.  In Holtz v. State ex 
rel. Houston, 847 P.2d 972, 977 (Wyo. 1993), we 
stated:

 

            
It seems reasonably clear that the statutes contemplate provisions in the 
judgment for more than recovery of "expenses incurred."  (In this case, AFDC funds.)  . . .  Likewise, there is not a provision that 
limits the state (if it is the petitioner) to expenses 
incurred.

 

Further, 
in Thomas v. Thomas, 983 P.2d 717, 720 (Wyo. 1999), this 
Court stated:

 

The 
language of the statute leads to the clear inference that the legislature 
intended and recognized that child support would be collected retroactively in 
cases where a parent has abandoned a child and refused to participate in the 
support of the child.[3]

 

Thus, 
the appellant owes his children reasonable support from the date of their 
birth.  This brings us to the key 
issue in this case.

 

Back 
Child Support

 

[¶11]   The appellant's primary contention 
is that the State did not meet its burden of proof that he owed back child 
support in the amount of $18,322.65.  
Again, the appellant acknowledges his parental obligations and that they 
relate back to the date of birth of his children.  He argues, however, that the back child 
support amount of $18,322.65 is unsupported by the 
evidence.

 

[¶12]   While the findings of a trial judge 
concerning conclusions of law and disposition of the issues are presumptively 
correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence 
in the record.  Shores v. 
Lindsey, 591 P.2d 895, 899 (Wyo. 1979).  Because this Court does not weigh the 
evidence de novo, findings may not be set aside because we would have 
reached a different result.  
Id.  On appeal, 
findings of fact are not set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  "A finding is "clearly erroneous" when 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.'"  Cross v. Berg 
Lumber Co., 7 P.3d 922, 928 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Hopper v. All Pet Animal 
Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538-39 (Wyo. 1993)).  The appellant bears the burden of 
persuading the appellate court that a finding is erroneous.  Cross, 7 P.3d  at 928 (quoting 
Hopper, 861 P.2d at 538-39).

 

[¶13]   At the end of the June 8, 2000, 
hearing, the DFS attorney informed the district court that he could at that time 
provide to the appellant's attorney "an AFDH which shows the AFDC, what we used 
to call Aid for Dependent Children, paid to the mother."  He was ordered to do so and 
complied.  The district court then 
ordered counsel to prepare and submit their income and child support 
calculations, and a final hearing was scheduled.  DFS's calculations with attachments and 
appellant's calculations and exhibits are both in the 
record.

 

[¶14]   In establishing the amount of back 
child support owed, the State attempted to determine the income of both parents 
for previous years and then applied the current child support guidelines to 
establish the amount of support owed.  
Neither parent could give complete and accurate information regarding 
income for the previous years for which child support was owed.  The State imputed income to the parents 
for the time periods for which they could not supply accurate and complete 
information.

 

[¶15]   Unfortunately, the record does not 
disclose any factual basis for the amount of income imputed by the State.  For instance, while a hearing was held, 
no questions were asked of Wright regarding her prior employment history.  Certain periods of imputed income for 
Wright seem to represent minimum wage for a forty-hour work week.  There simply is no factual basis to 
support that such imputed income was reasonable for Wright over the time periods 
at issue.  Thus, we are compelled to 
remand this case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing so the State 
can establish a factual basis for its computations.

 

            
Amount Owed the 
State

 

[¶16]   As explained above, by operation of 
law, the State is the assignee of Wright to the amount of any public assistance 
benefits plus any Medicaid paid by the State.  We have already determined that the 
State is entitled to reimbursement, but the State failed to prove the amount to 
which it is entitled.  Upon remand, 
as part of the evidentiary hearing, the State must prove the exact amount of its 
assignment.

 

[¶17]   Thus, a two-step process is 
necessary.  First, the district 
court must determine the reasonable amount of back child support owed by the 
appellant to his children.  Second, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-6-106(g) provides:

 

If 
a court orders support to be paid by an obligor, the department shall be 
subrogated to the debt created by the order.  This subrogation interest shall apply to 
all orders of support including temporary spouse support orders, family 
maintenance and alimony orders to the extent of the amounts paid by the 
department in public assistance to or for the benefit of a dependent 
child and the amount of medical support provided by or through another division 
of the department or the department of health or the department of family 
services.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶18]   Therefore, the State must prove the 
full amount of the back child support to which it is entitled as the subrogee of 
the mother.  If the amount of back 
child support owed is less than the total amount the State paid, the State is 
entitled to the back child support owed, plus the amount of any Medicaid 
paid.  If the back child support 
owed is greater than that paid out by the State, the State receives what it paid 
out, and the rest goes to the children.

 

[¶19]   In determining the amount owed the 
State, the district court accepted Wright's stipulation that no back support was 
owed to her by the appellant.  The 
district court stated in its order:

 

3.         
That Ranae Wright has waived any sums due to her.

 

4.         
That any judgment herein shall accrue to the benefit of the State of 
Wyoming.

 

This 
part of the order is erroneous on its face.  Wright cannot legally waive back child 
support.  The support is not due to 
her but to her children.  See 
Erhart v. Evans, 2001 WY 79, ¶ 15, 30 P.3d 542, 546 (Wyo. 2001) ("legal prerequisites for modification 
cannot be extinguished by parental stipulation to reduced payments.  The law precludes parties from 
bargaining away the funds intended for the exclusive benefit of their 
children"); Hurlbut v. Scarbrough, 957 P.2d 839, 842 (Wyo. 
1998) ("because a child support obligation does 
not belong to the custodial parent, that parent does not have the authority to 
bargain it away"); and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-6-106(d) ("[n]o act of the obligee 
shall prejudice these rights of . . . the dependent child").  ""A mother cannot, by contract, bargain 
away the right of her minor child to adequate support from the father, 
regardless of the validity of the agreement as between the parents 
themselves."'"  Hurlbut, 957 P.2d  at 842 (quoting Miesen v. Frank, 361 Pa.Super. 204, 522 A.2d 85, 87, 
appeal discontinued, 516 Pa. 641, 533 A.2d 713 (1987) and Com. ex rel. 
Bortz v. Norris, 184 Pa.Super. 594, 135 A.2d 771, 773 (1957)).  While Wright waived any sums due 
to her, she cannot waive sums due to her children.  Accordingly, we hold that the part of 
the stipulation alleging forgiveness of the appellant's past child support 
obligation is void and unenforceable because it is against public policy.  See Hurlbut, 957 P.2d  at 
842 and Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 54 (Wyo. 
1993).

 

[¶20]   We further note that on the date of 
the stipulation, June 8, 2000, the amount of back child support had not been 
calculated.  Therefore, Wright could 
not have known if she had received an appropriate amount of support for her 
children.  The record indicates that 
the appellant had at times paid rent, bought groceries, and had given Wright 
money.  Obviously, any amount the 
appellant can demonstrate he actually paid to support his children must be 
credited to him.  Wright may also 
testify or present evidence that the appellant gave her money or helped with the 
expenses of raising the children.  
This presents a fact issue for determination by the district court 
regarding credits due to the appellant.  
On remand, the district court is to determine the amount of back child 
support owed, taking into account amounts already paid by the 
appellant.

 

            
Attorney's 
Fees

 

[¶21]   Appellant's final issue regards the 
district court's denial of his request for attorney's fees pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-2-114 (Michie 1997).4  The award of attorney's fees under this 
section is clearly discretionary with the district court.  The appellant argues that the State is 
solely responsible for the complexity of this litigation and therefore should 
pay his attorney's fees.  Many of 
the complexities of this case, however, come from the failure of the appellant 
to supply accurate and complete financial information, his failure to provide 
reasonable support for his children from their respective births, and his 
attempt to manipulate this proceeding to avoid payment of any back child 
support.  Under these facts, we find 
no abuse of discretion in the denial by the district court of appellant's 
request for attorney's fees.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶22]   We conclude that the figures 
utilized in the State's calculations, and relied upon by the district court, 
were not supported by sufficient factual evidence, making the resulting back 
child support figure of $18,322.65 erroneous.  Another deficiency in this case is the 
lack of any justification in the record for the determination that this amount, 
or whatever amount, is owed to the State.  
Judgments entered under the Child Support Enforcement Act should show an 
allocation of the judgment amount between the State and the obligee.  The amount allocated to the State is the 
amount of public assistance provided.  
The amount allocated to the obligee is the balance of the unpaid child 
support.5  While the materials revealing this 
information were utilized during the questioning of witnesses in the hearing, 
they were not entered into evidence nor preserved in the record, making it 
impossible to determine from the record whether the judgment amount is equal to 
the amount of public assistance received.  
A similar difficulty exists with regard to the judgment for Medicaid 
reimbursement in the amount of $3,489.31.  
The State must present evidence and preserve it in the record to support 
this claim.

 

[¶23]   In a situation such as this, 
outright reversal is not this Court's only option.  To prevent a failure of justice, we may 
remand for a new trial or we may remand and order the district court to 
determine and render the proper judgment amount.  Willis v. Asbury Transp. Co., 386 P.2d 934, 938 (Wyo. 1963); 
Masek v. Ostlund, 358 P.2d 100, 104 (Wyo. 1960).  Because the recoupment of public 
assistance benefits is a matter of strong public policy, we will remand to allow 
the State properly to develop and prove its case.  We reverse and remand for additional 
evidentiary hearings for the purpose of correctly calculating back child 
support, establishing the amount of child support assigned to the State, and 
determining Medicaid reimbursement due.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

  1The order 
setting aside the findings of fact does not state a reason for that action.  However, the order followed a hearing on 
the appellant's Motion to Direct Entry of a New Judgment, in which motion the 
appellant alleged under W.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) "[t]hat the verdict, report or 
decision is not sustained by sufficient evidence or is contrary to law," and in 
which the appellant alleged that the State had produced no proof of any benefits 
it had provided.

  
2In addition, the 
record reveals that Wright signed applications containing assignment 
provisions.

  
3Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14-2-204(d) stated, in pertinent part:

 

The measure of recovery from the 
defendant is the reasonable value of the care or support which has been 
furnished to the child by the petitioner. . . .   These remedies are cumulative and 
in addition to other remedies provided by law.

 

The statute was amended for 
clarification effective July 1, 2000, and it now reads, in pertinent 
part:

 

The measure of recovery from the 
defendant is the reasonable value of the care or support, including medical 
support furnished to the child by the petitioner and the child support ordered 
pursuant to W.S. 20-2-303 through 20-2-305, 20-2-307 and 20-2-311. . . .  These remedies are cumulative and in 
addition to other remedies provided by law.

 

  4Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14-2-114 states:

 

The court may order reasonable fees of 
counsel, experts and the child's guardian ad litem, and other costs of the 
action and pretrial proceedings including genetic tests, to be paid by the 
parties in proportions and at times determined by the 
court.

 

  5Indeed, the form 
judgment entered in this case contains a grid for the entry of these 
allocations.  The allocation slots 
for the obligee are filled with zeroes, no doubt because Wright stipulated that 
the appellant owed her no child support.