Case Title: State ex rel. Upper Arlington v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections

Citation: 2008-Ohio-5093

Docket Number: 20081804

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-10-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Upper Arlington v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections, 119 Ohio St.3d 478, 
2008-Ohio-5093.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. CITY OF UPPER ARLINGTON ET AL. v. 
FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Upper Arlington v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
119 Ohio St.3d 478, 2008-Ohio-5093.] 
Prohibition — Elections — Initiative — Protest — Municipal act sought to be 
repealed by proposed ordinance is administrative rather than legislative 
— Administrative actions by municipality not proper subject for initiative 
— Board of elections abused its discretion and clearly disregarded 
applicable law by denying protest and placing initiative on ballot — Writ 
granted. 
(No. 2008-1804─Submitted September 29, 2008─Decided October 2, 2008.) 
IN PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an expedited election action for a writ of prohibition to 
prevent the board of elections from placing an ordinance proposed by an initiative 
petition on the November 4, 2008 election ballot.  In the alternative, relators 
initially requested a writ of mandamus to compel the board of elections to decide 
a protest against the petition filed by two of the three relators, but upon the 
board’s subsequent denial of the protest, they agree that their mandamus claim is 
now moot.  Because the enactment sought to be repealed by the proposed 
ordinance constituted an administrative action and is thus not the proper subject of 
initiative or referendum, we grant the writ of prohibition. 
Council Ordinances 
{¶ 2} On December 10, 2007, the city council of relator city of Upper 
Arlington adopted Ordinance No. 106-2007, the annual appropriation ordinance, 
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which included an appropriation for solid-waste management.  On that same day, 
the city council adopted Ordinance No. 124-2007, which authorized the city 
manager to enter into a contract with Inland Service Corporation for solid-waste 
collection and processing services. 
{¶ 3} Four days later, on December 14, the city council adopted 
Ordinance No. 126-2007, which repealed Ordinance No. 124-2007 and again 
authorized the city manager to enter into a solid-waste services contract with 
Inland Service Corporation, but this time declaring an emergency. 
{¶ 4} On January 28, 2008, intervening respondent, Michael A. Schadek, 
a city elector, filed with the city finance director under R.C. 731.32 a 
precirculation copy of an initiative petition proposing an ordinance to repeal 
Ordinance No. 126-2007.  On that same day, the city council adopted Ordinance 
No. 7-2008, which, inter alia, provides for an annual service fee to be paid for 
trash-collection services. 
Contract for Solid-Waste Services 
{¶ 5} On January 31, Upper Arlington City Manager Virginia L. Barney 
executed a contract for solid-waste services with Inland Service Corporation to 
begin on April 7.  The agreement provided, “The City Manager is duly authorized 
to execute this Agreement pursuant to Ordinance No. 126-2007 and the 
subsequent repeal of said ordinance, by legislative action or by the initiative or 
referendum process, shall not result in the termination or cancellation of this 
Agreement.” 
Initiative Petition 
{¶ 6} On July 25, 2008, Schadek filed with the city finance director a 
signed initiative petition proposing an ordinance to repeal Ordinance No. 126-
2007.  The text of the proposed ordinance provides: 
{¶ 7} “Section I.  That the residents of Upper Arlington do not desire the 
‘privatization’ of trash services and want to continue Upper Arlington’s ‘pay as 
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3 
you throw approach’ requiring solid waster stickers for refuse collection and not 
for recycling with garage-side pickup at their homes by the City’s own employees 
with no annual fee for trash collection. 
{¶ 8} “Section II.  That the residents of Upper Arlington don’t want the 
City’s Administration to enter into any such contract authorized under Upper 
Arlington Ordinance No. 126-2007 with Inland Service Corporation for solid 
waste collection and processing services or any other third party contractor prior 
to a vote on this initiative at the next general election; but in the event that the 
City chooses to ignore this initiative process and enter into a contract with Inland 
Service Corporation such resolution and/or ordinance shall be and hereby is 
repealed and the City shall pay for and be responsible for contract damages to 
Inland Service Corporation. 
{¶ 9} “Section III.  That the ordinance shall take effect and be in force 
from and after the earliest date allowed by law.” 
{¶ 10} The petition did not designate any petitioners as a committee to be 
regarded as filing the petition.  The city finance director transmitted the petition to 
respondent, Franklin County Board of Elections, which determined on August 14 
that the petition contained 1,716 valid signatures.  On August 21, the finance 
director certified the petition to the board of elections, expressly reserving the 
right to challenge the validity of the petition. 
Protest and Board of Elections Hearing on Protest 
{¶ 11} On August 29, 2008, relators city of Upper Arlington and Margaret 
Concilla, a resident elector of the city, filed a protest against the initiative petition, 
specifying 14 different grounds.  On September 8, 2008, the board of elections 
conducted a hearing on the protest, but declined to decide the protest, which had 
the effect of denying the protest and permitting the proposed ordinance to appear 
on the November 4 election ballot.  At the hearing, the board considered the 
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arguments of both the protesters and Schadek, and the protesters submitted 
exhibits, including the affidavit of the city manager. 
Expedited Election Case 
{¶ 12} On September 11, relators, Upper Arlington, Concilla, and David 
A. Varda, another resident-elector of the city, filed this expedited election action 
for a writ of prohibition to prevent the board of elections from placing the 
proposed ordinance on the November 4 general election ballot.  In the alternative, 
relators requested a writ of mandamus ordering the board of elections to decide 
the protest.  We granted Schadek’s motion to intervene as an additional 
respondent.  On September 12, the board voted to deny the protest, thereby 
rendering relators’ mandamus claim moot. 
{¶ 13} The parties filed evidence and briefs pursuant to the accelerated 
schedule in S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9).  The Ohio Municipal League filed an amicus 
curiae brief in support of relators, and various Upper Arlington residents filed an 
amicus curiae brief in support of respondents. 
{¶ 14} This cause is now before the court for our consideration of the 
merits. 
Prohibition 
{¶ 15} Relators request a writ of prohibition to prevent the board of 
elections from placing the ordinance proposed by the initiative petition on the 
November 4, 2008 general election ballot.  To be entitled to the writ, relators must 
establish that (1) the board of elections is about to exercise quasi-judicial power, 
(2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ 
will result in injury for which no adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of 
law.  State ex rel. Stoll v. Logan Cty. Bd. of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-
Ohio-333, 881 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 28. 
{¶ 16} Relators have established the first requirement for the writ.  
Notwithstanding the intervening respondent’s argument to the contrary, the board 
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of elections exercised quasi-judicial authority by effectively denying the protest 
after conducting a hearing that included sworn testimony.  State ex rel. Reese v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 126, 2007-Ohio-4588, 873 
N.E.2d 1251, ¶ 17.  The protesters submitted the sworn testimony of the city 
manager by affidavit at the protest hearing.  In addition, the manager of the 
board’s elections operations testified at the hearing, albeit without being sworn.  
“Quasi-judicial authority is the power to hear and determine controversies 
between the public and individuals that require a hearing resembling a judicial 
trial.”  (Emphasis added.)  State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles 
(1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 184, 186, 718 N.E.2d 908.  Here, R.C. 3501.39(A)(2) 
required that the board of elections conduct a quasi-judicial hearing on relators’ 
protest.  Cf. State ex rel. Baldzicki v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000), 90 
Ohio St.3d 238, 242, 736 N.E.2d 893 (prohibition not available when no statute or 
other law required that the board of elections conduct a hearing resembling a 
quasi-judicial hearing on protest). 
{¶ 17} Relators also established the third requirement for the writ because 
they lack an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law due to the proximity 
of the election.  State ex rel. Columbia Res. Ltd. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
111 Ohio St.3d 167, 2006-Ohio-5019, 855 N.E.2d 815, ¶ 28. 
{¶ 18} For the remaining requirement, the exercise of unauthorized 
power, “we must determine whether the board acted fraudulently or corruptly, 
abused its discretion, or clearly disregarded applicable law.”  State ex rel. Brown 
v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Elections, 109 Ohio St.3d 63, 2006-Ohio-1292, 846 N.E.2d 
8, ¶ 23.  There is no evidence of fraud or corruption here, so relators must 
establish that the board of elections abused its discretion or clearly disregarded 
applicable law by denying their protest and certifying the ordinance proposed by 
the initiative to the election ballot.  “An abuse of discretion implies an 
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable attitude.”  State ex rel. Cooker 
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Restaurant Corp. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 302, 
305, 686 N.E.2d 238. 
Legislative or Administrative Act 
{¶ 19} Section 1f, Article II of the Ohio Constitution authorizes initiative 
and referendum power only on those questions that municipalities “may now or 
hereafter be authorized by law to control by legislative action.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  “The electors of a municipality may by the initiative enact a measure 
conflicting with or repealing legislation previously passed by the municipal 
council, so long as the subject of such initiative ordinance is within the powers of 
the municipality to control by legislative procedure.”  State ex rel. Sharpe v. Hitt 
(1951), 155 Ohio St. 529, 44 O.O. 489, 99 N.E.2d 659, paragraph three of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 20} “Conversely, ‘[p]ursuant to Section 1f, Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution, actions taken by a municipal legislative body, whether by ordinance, 
resolution, or other means, that constitute administrative action, are not subject to 
[initiative or] referendum proceedings.’ (Emphasis added.)”  State ex rel. Oberlin 
Citizens for Responsible Dev. v. Talarico, 106 Ohio St.3d 481, 2005-Ohio-5061, 
836 N.E.2d 529, ¶ 22, quoting Buckeye Community Hope Found. v. Cuyahoga 
Falls (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 539, 697 N.E.2d 181, paragraph two of the syllabus 
(bracketed material from Oberlin Citizens); see also Section III, Upper Arlington 
Charter (“Administrative ordinances, resolutions or decisions shall be subject to 
redress through the judicial system”). 
{¶ 21} “The test for determining whether the action of a legislative body 
is legislative or administrative is whether the action taken is one enacting a law, 
ordinance or regulation, or executing or administering a law, ordinance or 
regulation already in existence.”  Donnelly v. Fairview Park (1968), 13 Ohio 
St.2d 1, 42 O.O.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 500, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
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7 
{¶ 22} In applying this test to the applicable ordinance ─ Ordinance No. 
126-2007 ─ that the initiative petitioners seek to repeal by their proposed 
ordinance, we conclude that Ordinance No. 126-2007 merely executes and 
administers laws already in existence instead of enacting a new law.  Ordinance 
No. 126-2007 authorized the city manager to enter into a contract with Inland 
Service Corporation to provide the city’s solid waste services.  But the ordinance 
was unnecessary because the applicable city ordinances already conferred 
authority on the city manager to enter into the contract. 
{¶ 23} Under Upper Arlington Codified Ordinance 138.09(c), the city 
manager “may enter into contracts for the items set forth in C.O. § 138.06(B)(1) 
without prior City Council approval, provided that sufficient funds have already 
been appropriated.”  One of the contractual subjects set forth in Section 
138.06(B)(1) for which contracts may be awarded without a formal competitive 
bid or procurement process include contracts for solid-waste disposal.  And 
pursuant to Ordinance No. 106-2007, sufficient funds for solid waste disposal had 
already been appropriated. 
{¶ 24} “ ‘[A]n act or resolution which merely carries out the policy or 
purpose already declared by the legislative body’ ” is an administrative action that 
is not subject to initiative.  State ex rel. Citizen Action for a Livable Montgomery 
v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 437, 2007-Ohio-5379, 875 
N.E.2d 902, ¶ 44, quoting 5 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations (3d 
Rev.Ed.2004) 411, Section 16:54.  The Upper Arlington City Council had 
previously expressed in its existing codified ordinances that as long as sufficient 
funds have already been appropriated, the city manager is authorized ─ without 
additional legislative approval ─ to enter into a contract on behalf of the city for 
solid-waste disposal.  Therefore, the city council’s subsequent enactment of 
Ordinance No. 126-2007 did not confer any greater authority in this regard on the 
city manager than she already had.  That is, the mere fact that the city council 
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enacted Ordinance No. 126-2007 did not change what was already an 
administrative action under the applicable ordinances into a legislative one.  
Nothing in the Upper Arlington Codified Ordinances authorizes legislative action 
to veto the city manager’s authority under the existing laws. 
{¶ 25} Therefore, because Ordinance No. 126-2007 merely reiterated 
what had already been authorized by existing laws, “its enactment constitutes an 
administrative action, which is not properly the subject of either referendum or 
initiative seeking its repeal.”  Oberlin Citizens, 106 Ohio St.3d 481, 2005-Ohio-
5061, 836 N.E.2d 529, at ¶ 31; see also Jack Gray Transport, Inc. v. Ervin (1992), 
113 Or.App. 742, 833 P.2d 1349 (government service district’s award of contract 
for hauling solid waste was an administrative action, not a legislative action, and 
thus was not subject to referendum); Solon Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Linton (July 
3, 1980), Cuyahoga App. No. 41507, 1980 WL 355084 (city council resolution 
authorizing and directing mayor and finance director to enter into management 
agreement with landfill company held to be administrative action not subject to 
referendum because council was acting pursuant to existing ordinances 
concerning the use and operation of sanitary landfills). 
{¶ 26} Moreover, insofar as the proposed ordinance included precatory 
language without legal effect that appeared to express the public opinion of the 
city’s electors ─ that the city residents “do not desire” privatization of trash-
collection services, “want” to continue the preexisting trash-collection method, 
and “don’t want” the city to enter into a contract with Inland Service Corporation 
─ its enactment would also not constitute a proper legislative action.  See State ex 
rel. N. Main St. Coalition v. Webb, 106 Ohio St.3d 437, 2005-Ohio-5009, 835 
N.E.2d 1222, ¶ 35, citing State ex rel. Rhodes v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Elections 
(1967), 12 Ohio St.2d 4, 41 O.O.2d 2, 230 N.E.2d 347, and State ex rel. 
Bevington v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections (May 2, 1979), Summit App. No. 9087, 
1979 WL 207624; see, e.g., State ex rel. Gateway Green Alliance v. Welch 
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9 
(Mo.App.2000), 23 S.W.3d 861, 864 (proposed ordinance that merely constituted 
a “public opinion poll” of the city’s electorate on an issue was administrative 
rather than legislative in character and was thus an inappropriate subject for 
initiative). 
{¶ 27} The board of elections thus abused its discretion and clearly 
disregarded applicable law by denying relators’ protest and placing the ordinance 
proposed by the initiative petition on the November 4 election ballot. 
Other Claims 
{¶ 28} Relators also claim that they are entitled to the requested writ of 
prohibition because the initiative petition does not contain the required number of 
signatures of electors and fails to designate a committee.  Because these 
additional claims are rendered moot by our decision, we need not address them.  
See State ex rel. Barletta v. Fersch, 99 Ohio St.3d 295, 2003-Ohio-3629, 791 
N.E.2d 452, ¶ 22 (“we will not issue advisory opinions, and this rule applies 
equally to election cases”). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 29} Relators have established their entitlement to the requested 
extraordinary relief.  The board of elections abused its discretion and clearly 
disregarded applicable law in denying the protest and placing the initiative on the 
general election ballot, and relators lack an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of law.  Therefore, we grant a writ of prohibition to prevent the board of 
elections from placing the initiative on the November 4, 2008 general election 
ballot. 
Writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., not participating. 
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Jeanine A. Hummer and Thomas A. Lindsey; and The McTigue Law 
Group, Donald J. McTigue, and Mark A. McGinnis, for relator city of Upper 
Arlington. 
 
The McTigue Law Group, Donald J. McTigue, and Mark A. McGinnis, 
for relators Margaret Concilla and David A. Varda. 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Patrick J. 
Piccininni and Anthony E. Palmer Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for 
respondent Franklin County Board of Elections. 
 
James C. Becker, for intervening respondent Michael A. Schadek. 
 
Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn Co., L.P.A., Stephen L. Byron, Rebecca K. 
Schaltenbrand, and Stephen J. Smith; and John Gotherman, urging granting of the 
writ for amicus curiae Ohio Municipal League. 
 
Harris & Mazza and Robert H. Willard, urging denial of the writ for amici 
curiae Germaine Hirsch, William D. Kloss Sr., Robert H. Maynard, Daniel 
McCormick, Melanie F. Myers, John E. Ross, and Beverlee A. Tague. 
______________________