Case Title: Anderson v. Bommer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-11-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Anderson v. Bommer1996 WY 153926 P.2d 959Case Number: 95-310Decided: 11/22/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
James G. ANDERSON, Jr.,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

Timothy J. 
BOMMER,

 Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Teton County, Nancy J. Guthrie, J.

Peter F. Moyer, 
Jackson, for Appellant.

R. Michael 
Mullikin of Mullikin, Larson & Swift, LLC, Jackson, for Appellee. 

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN* and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

LEHMAN, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellee Timothy 
Bommer sought to enjoin appellant James Anderson, Jr. from violating a 
restrictive covenant in the construction and use of a home located in Jackson. 
Pursuant to a motion for summary judgment hearing, the district court held that 
Bommer had standing to bring the action but denied summary judgment as to 
whether Anderson had violated the restrictive covenant. That issue was resolved 
by a trial without jury wherein the district court ruled that Anderson had 
violated the restrictive covenant and enjoined Anderson from further violation. 
Anderson appeals both rulings.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      We are presented 
with the following issues for review:

I.          
Whether Bommer had standing to sue for injunctive relief.

II.          
Whether Anderson violated the "single family residence" restriction of 
the restrictive covenants of the subdivision.

FACTS

[¶4]      Anderson and 
Bommer own adjacent lots located in the Sage Subdivision (Subdivision) in the 
town of Jackson. The Subdivision was created by way of a plat recorded in 1964, 
which is subject to a "Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions." Bommer 
purchased lot 34 in 1972, and Anderson acquired lot 33 in February of 1992. Both 
parties were aware of the restrictive covenants prior to their 
purchases.

[¶5]      During 
construction of his home, Anderson showed Bommer the construction plans. Those 
plans provided for an integrated single-family dwelling as required by the 
restrictive covenants. During construction, however, Anderson changed the design 
to include two separate living units in addition to the main living area of the 
home. Anderson accomplished this by eliminating a door to what was called the 
"family suite" and finishing a separate living area immediately below, which was 
shown on the original construction plans as an unfinished basement. Each living 
unit is accessed solely by separate outside doors, and each consists of a 
bedroom, bathroom, closet, linen closet and furnishings. In addition, the 
"family suite" contains a wet bar.

[¶6]      Since 1993, 
Anderson has periodically resided in the area originally designated on the plans 
as the "family suite," which he describes as a "motel room," while leasing the 
main living unit to tenants. In 1995, Anderson's son and a friend stayed in the 
basement living unit. Anderson is not related to the tenants, and the portion of 
the home occupied by the tenants is inaccessible to Anderson. Likewise, the 
tenants have access only to their separate living unit.

DISCUSSION

[¶7]      Inasmuch as the 
facts are not in dispute and the issues present questions of law, this court 
conducts a de novo review of the district court's conclusions of law. Samuel v. 
Zwerin, 868 P.2d 265, 266 (Wyo. 1994). In this regard, we treat restrictive 
covenants as contractual in nature, and they are to be interpreted in accordance 
with the principles of contract law. McHuron v. Grand Teton Lodge Co., 899 P.2d 38, 40 (Wyo. 1995); Kindler v. Anderson, 433 P.2d 268, 270-71 (Wyo. 1967). We 
seek to determine and effectuate the intention of the parties, especially the 
grantor(s), as it may appear or be implied from the instrument itself. See 
American Holidays, Inc. v. Foxtail Owners Ass'n, 821 P.2d 577, 579 (Wyo. 1991); 
Bowers Welding & Hotshot, Inc. v. Bromley, 699 P.2d 299, 303 (Wyo. 1985); 
Kindler, at 270-71. Intention of the parties is to be determined from the entire 
context of the instrument, and not from a single clause. American Holidays, at 
579; Bowers Welding & Hotshot, at 303; Kindler, at 270-71. Where the 
language imposing the restriction(s) is clear and unambiguous, we construe it 
according to its plain and ordinary meaning without reference to attendant facts 
and circumstances or extrinsic evidence, and the rule of strict construction 
does not apply. McHuron, at 41; American Holidays, at 579; Kincheloe v. Milatzo, 
678 P.2d 855, 859 (Wyo. 1984); Kindler, at 271.

I. Standing 
to bring suit

[¶8]      Contending that 
Bommer lacks standing to bring this action, Anderson asserts that § 12 of the 
restrictive covenants requires that an action can be brought only by the 
original declarant of the restrictive covenants or by a majority of the current 
subdivision owners:

SECTION 
12. That 
any violation of the covenants, conditions and restrictions contained herein may 
be enjoined in a court of laws [sic] or equity by the undersigned [the original 
declarant] or by a majority of the owners of said property, and any person 
violating said covenants, conditions and restrictions shall be liable for 
damages to the remaining owners.

Section 12, 
however, is just one section out of many contained within the restrictive 
covenants. Pursuant to our standard of interpreting covenants as a whole, we 
must look also to other significant clauses found therein. Such significant and 
key clauses are found in the recitals to the restrictive covenants, which 
state:

WHEREAS, The undersigned 
hereby certify and declare that they do hereby establish the following 
restrictions and covenants expressly for the beneficial development and 
improvement of said property; and

WHEREAS, The power to 
enforce the following restrictions and covenants is to reside in the undersigned 
and all future owners of record of said property;

NOW THEREFORE, The 
undersigned hereby declare that the property described and referred to above is 
and shall be held and conveyed upon and subject to the conditions, covenants, 
restrictions, reservations and charges hereinafter set forth, which are designed 
for the mutual benefits of the owners of said lots and shall inure to and pass 
with each and every lot therein, and which shall apply to and bind the Grantor 
and the Grantee, their heirs, executors, administrators, and 
assigns[.]

These recitals 
are contained at the beginning of the restrictive covenants and are, hence, an 
expression of the intent and purpose for which the covenants were 
formulated.

[¶9]      In resolving 
Anderson's contention that a majority of the owners must join in the suit, we 
are guided by our rule that contract provisions which apparently conflict must 
be reconciled if such can be done by any reasonable interpretation. Morris v. 
Kadrmas, 812 P.2d 549, 553 (Wyo. 1991). As a general rule, a restrictive 
covenant may be enforced by one whose benefit it was made. 21 C.J.S. Covenants § 
34 (1990). Here the recitals state that the covenants are for the beneficial 
development of the land, are for the mutual benefit of the owners and all future 
record owners, and that the power to enforce such covenants resides in all 
record owners. We conclude, therefore, that the recitals clearly and 
unambiguously grant the power to enforce the covenants in each and every record 
property owner. See Morris, at 553 (introductory language to covenants recited 
that the covenants were for the benefit of each and every lot and the owner or 
owners thereof, and an owner had the right to enforce the covenants and the 
legal right to correct any violation).

II. 
Single-family residence restriction

[¶10]   The covenant allowing only 
single-family dwellings provides:

SECTION 1. (a) West 1/2 Lot 11 to 
thirty seven (37) both numbers inclusive shall be used for single family 
residence purposes only and that no building or structures other than one family 
private residence with the customary out buildings (including private garage) 
shall be erected, maintained or permitted on a building site.

Anderson argues 
that he has not violated this covenant because his residence is nothing more 
than a single-family dwelling which contains guest quarters. Claiming the term 
"single-family" is ambiguous, Anderson claims he is not a resident of the 
dwelling, but rather is a guest who infrequently stays at the 
residence.

[¶11]   We find the language "shall be used 
for single family residence purposes only and that no building or structures 
other than one family private residence * * * shall be erected, maintained or 
permitted on a building site" is clear and unambiguous. The plain and ordinary 
meaning of "single family residence" is a residence constructed for the purpose 
of serving as a dwelling place for one family in a single living unit; a 
residence constructed and being used for the purpose of serving as the dwelling 
place of two separate families or two separate living units is outside of this 
meaning. See Knadler v. Adams, 661 P.2d 1052, 1053-54 (Wyo. 1983); accord Dice 
v. Central Natrona County Improvement & Serv. Dist., 684 P.2d 815, 818 (Wyo. 
1984). It is undisputed that Anderson leases the residence to tenants, excluding 
the "motel room" and the separate furnished basement living unit. Thus, the 
tenants do not and cannot have exclusive enjoyment and use of the entire 
residence as one, single-family living unit. It is undisputed that Anderson has 
resided in the "motel room" at different times, and that the separate furnished 
basement unit was used by his son and a friend. Such multi-family use is in 
clear violation of the covenants.

[¶12]   Anderson additionally asserts that 
his use is permitted because the Jackson building inspector issued to him a 
building permit, inspected the construction and approved the residence pursuant 
to the Jackson ordinances. We cannot countenance this contention. As we stated 
in Fox v. Miner, 467 P.2d 595, 597 (Wyo. 1970), it is well settled that zoning 
ordinances cannot override, annul, abrogate, or relieve land from building 
restrictions or covenants placed upon them. Lacking any evidence that the 
restrictive covenants are invalid, illegal or contrary to public policy, we 
follow precedent in holding that the Jackson ordinances cannot relieve Anderson 
of his obligation to uphold the restrictive covenants.

CONCLUSION

[¶13]   We hold that Bommer had standing to 
bring this action; the restrictive covenants are for the mutual benefit of each 
and every lot owner in the subdivision and may be enforced by an owner thereof. 
Anderson violated the clear and unambiguous restriction against use of the 
residence as anything other than a single-family dwelling.

[¶14]   Affirmed.