Case Title: Mellen v. Industrial Commission

Citation: 19 Utah 2d 373, 431 P.2d 798

Docket Number: 

State: utah

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Date: 1967-08-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
19 Utah 2d 373 (1967) 431 P.2d 798 DANIEL R. MELLEN, PLAINTIFF, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, UTAH RICHARDSON ROOFING AND THE STATE INSURANCE FUND, DEFENDANTS. No. 10795. Supreme Court of Utah. August 24, 1967. Rawlings, Wallace, Roberts & Black, John L. Black, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. Robert D. Moore, Salt Lake City, for defendants. HENRIOD, Justice: Review of a denial of award. Affirmed. Mellen, a roofer for 18 years, at age 55, while working alone on a flattop roof, after carrying materials and hammering cement nails for four hours, with a six-pound hammer, suffered severe chest pains about an hour before noon. He rested in the shade for about 15 minutes, ate lunch, resumed work without further incident until after 3:00 p.m., when he left and drove to his shop or office, and then, driving home experienced lesser chest pains. After arriving home he sat in an easy chair for a couple of hours, without incident, after which he sat down to eat dinner, at which time he suffered severe pain, requiring that immediately he be hospitalized for about three and one-half weeks, the first two days of which he remembered little or nothing. He had suffered some minor physical difficulties in the past which have no significance here. However, about three or four days before his chest pain on the roof, he had experienced less pronounced pains both on and off the roof. He filed for compensation. His personal physician advised against further physical roof work. Upon subsequent investigation, he signed a report stating that he was doing the usual work which he had done in the roofing business for many years. Although he had said in his signed statement that he did nothing unusual relating to his work, on formal hearing he testified somewhat inconsistently that, with financial problems, etc., he overexerted himself. The Commission had referred the matter to a three-man panel of medical experts, all of whom concluded (one of whom being subjected to rather extensive cross-examination) that the pain experienced on the roof was a natural and ultimate result of a degenerative heart condition that could have occurred while the man was asleep or otherwise, on or off the job. The plaintiff's personal physician thought, with some qualification, that the onset was due to the extra exertion on the roof, while the three panel doctors admitted it could have been a factor in the pain, in hastening what was inevitable anyway, and which could have occurred at any time, anywhere, even while in bed asleep. The only point made on appeal is that the denial of the award was contrary to the undisputed evidence. Hardly can we agree with this conclusion, since the record does not seem to reflect it. The three-panel experts were solid in saying the roof onset was only symptomatic of a natural degenerative condition, precipitable under any given set of circumstances, including sleep. The Commission is the fact-finder in cases like this and in its conclusion in such a case, we cannot say that it must reject the panel's canvass of the facts in favor of the qualified opinion of plaintiff's personal physician. Plaintiff relies heavily and only on three cases.[1] As to the Baker case, it is inapropos. That case, in italics, said, "We think the critical question here is whether the Commission arbitrarily can discount all competent, uncontradicted evidence. We think it can't, but did so here, calling for a reversal. This is the law of the case here, nothing else." Obviously it is not pertinent, where there was no controversion on the facts adduced by respectable testimony. As to the Jones case, the physical facts are so far afield from those here as to be unworthy of analogy. The facts in the Jones case (a 3-2 decision, with a strong dissenting opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Wolfe, a well-known scholar in the Workmen's Compensation field) do not recommend themselves to fit those in the present case, and in that very close case, where the plaintiff points out that the Commission was overruled, the main opinion pointed out significantly that there was no competent evidence to support the Commission, as was the situation in the Baker case, but not the case here. As to the Purity Biscuit case, it is interesting to note that it was another 3 to 2 decision, which, decided in 1949, 18 years ago, in a long difficult to understand opinion, has never been cited by this court or any other court to support the law of that case. It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Wolfe wrote something entitled a concurring opinion which made sounds almost like a dissenting opinion when he said: Mr. Justice Wolfe concurred on account of conflicting evidence which the Commission resolved in favor of the applicant. The Purity Biscuit case certainly needs a healthy reappraisement. The author prefers to accept the more realistic pronouncement of Carling v. Industrial Commission,[2] where a man having a progressive degenerative functional hearing problem was denied an award as not being precipitated by noise in the nature of an "accident" under the Workmen's Compensation concept of that term, when we said: And further, we refer to the enunciation in Burton v. Industrial Commission,[3] where, when the heirs of a deliverer of beer were denied compensation when, after delivery of heavy cargoes of beer, he suffered a pain diagnosed as coronary thrombosis, on controverted testimony, we said: The most recent pronouncement of our conclusions that because a man happens to work and suffers from a natural, progressive disease, a disability is not compensable if it results from something not the result of an industrial accident incident to his employment, and its industrial hazards is found in the recent case of Garner v. Hecla Mining Company, 431 P.2d 794, this court, where, in a case involving a lung injury allegedly caused by working in uranium mines, we said: Upon familiar principles of appellate review, we cannot say that in the instant case the Commission's ruling was capricious, arbitrary, or based on no competent evidence. The plaintiff's main theme is that the Commission adopted the panel report, which, it is urged, was a misstatement of the law. Counsel says: "The denial of plaintiff's claim by the Medical Panel is based on incorrect interpretations of law by the Panel and is contrary to the undisputed evidence." In the first place, the panel did not nor could not deny the claim, the function of the Commission. The other answer to this contention is that in giving the panel the duty of analyzing this case, the Commission in a letter appointing the panel carefully said: "The Panel has no jurisdiction to make a finding on the occurrence of an accident. Therefore, in the Panel Report just preceding the findings and conclusions, the following language should be used: `Assuming but not deciding that applicant had an accident as alleged the Panel finds, etc.' It is thus obvious that the Commission, in adopting the report, did not adopt any conclusions of law of the Panel if there were any, but only the medical facts and conclusions drawn." CALLISTER, TUCKETT and ELLETT, JJ., concur. CROCKETT, C.J., I concur except I reserve comment on the Purity Biscuit case. [1] Baker v. Ind. Comm., 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965); Jones v. Calif. Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640 (1952); Purity Biscuit Co. v. Ind. Comm., 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949). [2] 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965). [3] 13 Utah 2d 353, 374 P.2d 439 (1962).