Case Title: State v. Pollard

Citation: 163 Vt 199, 657 A.2d 185

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1995-01-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_POLLARD.92-592; 163 Vt 199; 657 A.2d 185

[Filed 20-Jan-1995]

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 


                                 No. 92-592


State of Vermont                                  Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
          v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                                  Unit No. 2, Franklin Circuit

Minoca Pollard, a/k/a                             January Term, 1994
Monica Pollard


George T. Costes, J.

Jo-Ann L. Gross, Franklin County Deputy State's Attorney, St. Albans, for
  plaintiff-appellee

T. Lamar Enzor, Rutland, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



     JOHNSON, J.   Defendant Monica Pollard, who pled guilty to second-degree
murder and was sentenced to a term of fifty years to life imprisonment,
appeals his conviction and sentence.  We are called upon to review the trial
court's rulings that defendant was competent to plead guilty and to waive
counsel.  Upon review of the record, we conclude that there was insufficient
support for the court's competency determinations; accordingly, we reverse. 

                                     I.

     On July 9, 1985, defendant fatally stabbed a man in a department store
in St. Albans, apparently, because the victim accused him of shoplifting a
pair of shoes.  Defendant admitted 

 

the stabbing at the crime scene, first to the store manager and then to
police.  Counsel was appointed, and defendant appeared the next day with two
public defenders for arraignment on charges of second-degree murder. 

     Although the offense had occurred only the day before the arraignment,
defendant insisted on entering a plea of guilty, contrary to the advice of
his attorneys, who had urged him at least to wait twenty-four hours.  After
making the following observations, which it noted would not be revealed by
the transcript, the court, sua sponte, ordered a competency evaluation. 

      The defendant appeared anxious and upset over the proceedings.
     He appeared eager to plead guilty and get the matter over with in
     a hurry.  His eyes appeared to roll back on occasion as he talked.
     He smiled and grinned frequently when it was inappropriate to the
     occasion or to his situation.  At other times,  he appeared angry
     and hostile.  He spoke in terms which suggested an intelligent
     vocabulary, but with words which did not always make sense in
     the context they were used.  His conversation rambled at times.
     He appeared eager to talk, but unwilling to listen to either his
     attorneys or the Court.  He frequently crossed his arms, and
     appeared to be holding his breath as though trying to control
     something inside himself or to restrain himself.  His responses to
     questions from the Court were frequently inappropriate in context
     or unintelligible.  While he insisted he understood the nature of the
     proceedings and his procedural and constitutional rights, it was
     apparent to the Court that he did not.  He appeared defiant against
     the judicial system.  He insisted he was not going to the State
     Hospital.  He indicated that he did not mix well with people and
     demanded that he be held in "quarantine" at the correctional
     center.

     The examination was undertaken by Dr. John O. Ives, who testified at a
competency hearing on September 5, 1985, before a different judge.  Based on
his forty-five-minute examination of defendant, Dr. Ives testified that
defendant was competent to stand trial.  The doctor's direct testimony
covered only eight pages of transcript.  Dr. Ives noted that defendant had an
unusual pattern of speech, particularly in his lengthy responses to questions
about legal 

 

matters.  From each such response, Dr. Ives stated, he was able to "extract
from each paragraph a sentence" showing comprehension of the question.  Dr.
Ives did not believe that defendant's unusual speech pattern was a feature of
any known psychiatric illness. 

     The doctor testified that he asked defendant "the usual questions
regarding the offense . . . and the functions of the court and its officers."
 When he was asked if he had talked to defendant about defendant's ability to
communicate with his counsel, Dr. Ives replied that defendant said he would
not cooperate with counsel regarding an insanity defense or a reduced charge
because he considered himself sane and because he considered murder, not
manslaughter, to be the appropriate charge.  Dr. Ives also testified that
defendant's desire to plead guilty may be explained by the fact that he was
"institutionalized" -- that he felt comfortable and secure in an
institutional environment.  On cross-examination, the doctor stated that he
neither paid attention to, nor relied on, the interaction between defendant
and his counsel during the interview.  He indicated that his understanding of
the competence evaluation was that the defendant must comprehend the offense
with which he is charged and the functions of a court and its officers. 

     A curious event occurred following Dr. Ives's testimony.  Apparently,
defendant insisted to his counsel that he wanted to take the stand.  Counsel
informed the court that defendant was taking the stand against his advice. 
When defendant took the stand, his lawyer asked him to state his name, which
he did.  Counsel then stated he had no further questions.  There were no
questions on cross-examination.  Defendant was told to retake his seat, and
he did so without incident.  The trial court issued written findings and
conclusions of law, which tracked the limited testimony of Dr. Ives, with
this additional finding: 

 

     The Defendant took the stand, with the consent of his Guardian Ad
     Litem, and responded to a question by his lawyer in a forthright
     manner.  After he was excused, he took his seat without objecting
     or becoming unmanageable.

(Emphasis supplied.)

     Based on Dr. Ives' testimony, the court concluded that defendant was
competent to enter a guilty plea to the charges.  The guardian ad litem who
had been appointed prior to the competency hearing was discharged.  At a
second arraignment hearing on September 12, 1985, defendant pled guilty to
second-degree murder.  The court accepted the plea and ordered a presentence
investigation report for the sentencing hearing. 

     The day before the October 25 sentencing hearing, defendant's appointed
counsel moved to withdraw from the case.  At the hearing, the court initially
denied the attorneys' motion, but granted the request after defendant
indicated during the following colloquy that he wanted to proceed pro se: 

The Court:  Now, if I do permit these two attorneys to withdraw
and if you want to go ahead and represent yourself; is that what
you want?

     Defendant:  Pro se, like you.
 
     The Court:  You want to represent yourself pro se?

     Defendant:  Most certainly, exactly.

     The Court:  Any doubts in your mind about that?

     Defendant:  No doubt whatsoever.  I think we've already reiterated
     that.

     The Court:  Now, let me ask you this:  If you do represent
     yourself,. . . you understand that you cannot afterwards claim any
     inadequacy of representation?

 

     Defendant:  I most certainly cannot.  I assume a matter of an
     individual entering their plea of guilty to adverse effects, that they
     waive all their rights.
          Like I say, waive all their rights to trial and anything
     adamant to stand on the grounds that preview -- like I said, would
     follow the previews and the entrance of fact of a post-conviction
     sentencing, and the withdrawal of plea, appeal, and the matter of
     collateral attack.

                                   . . . .

     The Court:  Are you aware of the dangers of self-representation?

                                   . . . .

     Defendant:  Exactly.  Like I say, I practiced law in California
     before.  You know, you individuals don't really have all the scoop
     on my past.  You have a little there.  It's basically primarily
     excerpts, but I've got an epilogue that is precise and concise on
     my own; you see what I'm saying?
          Like I say, you've very few.  And I practiced law in
     California myself before, and I'm very aware of the matter of pro
     person and a pro se and all things of that nature, and we are
     definitely aware of the 5th, the 6th, and the 14th Amendment to
     the Constitution regarding due process of law.
          Just say, in this particular instance, due process of law in
     the 14th amendment, we're aware of the constitutionality.

     The Court:  How old were you when you first starting studying
     law?

     Defendant:  Excuse me?  Oh, 19 years old.  Six years ago.

                                   . . . .

     The Court:  And have you acquainted yourself with the statutes of
     what states?

     Defendant:  Excuse me?  What states?  California.  California.
     Well, actually, that's the only state in which I've really been in for
     the past five years prior to my coming out to the -- out to the State
     of New York to do some novelist work.

                                   . . . .

 

     The Court:  You understand that if I . . .  allow you to represent
     yourself and discharge your attorneys, . . . you understand that
     you must follow all the technical laws here of substantive law, the
     criminal procedure and the evidence?

     Defendant:  Most certainly.

                                   . . . .

     The Court:  Right, and you understand you're going to be up
     against someone who's a member of the bar?

     Defendant:  I understand that individual is a member of the bar,
     right.

     The Court:  And is the attorney of this county and is the
     prosecutor of this county?

     Defendant:  I'm aware of the disposition.  I'm aware of the
     disposition, exactly.

     Although the court permitted defendant to proceed pre se, it instructed
defendant's attorneys to remain at his side during the remainder of the
hearing to answer any questions that defendant might have.  Defendant offered
no mitigating evidence before he was sentenced.  In fact, he offered
aggravating evidence, agreeing with the State that he was dangerous, and
stating that, under the same circumstances, he would act in the same manner
as he had before. 

     On appeal, defendant makes two claims.  First, he contends that the
court erred in finding him competent to plead guilty and in failing to advise
him of his rights before accepting the plea.  Second, defendant asserts that
the court denied him his constitutional right to counsel at the sentencing
hearing by allowing him to represent himself. 

                                     II.
     Defendant argues that the court erroneously found him competent to enter
a guilty plea, and that because he lacked the competence to enter the plea,
he could not, in pleading guilty, 

 

knowingly and voluntarily waive his rights to trial, to confrontation of
witnesses, and against self-incrimination.  We conclude that the minimum due
process standard for competency was not satisfied by the evidence presented
at the competency hearing. 

     As a matter of due process, only a mentally competent criminal defendant
can be tried or permitted to plead guilty.  Godinez v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 2685-86 (1993).  Competence to enter a guilty plea depends on "whether
the defendant has 'sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with
a reasonable degree of rational understanding' and has 'a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'"  Id. (quoting Dusky
v. United States,