Case Title: Hanson v. Belveal

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0130

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-07-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
JOSHUA JORGEN HANSON v. MELANIE SMITH BELVEAL, f/n/a MELANIE ANN HANSON 2012 WY 98Case Number: S-11-0130, S-11-0131This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
JOSHUA 
JORGEN 
HANSON,Appellant(Petitioner/Plaintiff),v.MELANIE 
SMITH BELVEAL, f/n/a MELANIE ANN 
HANSON,Appellee(Respondent/Defendant).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sublette County
The 
Honorable Marvin L. Tyler, Judge 
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Elizabeth 
Greenwood and Inga L. Parsons, Attorneys at Law, Pinedale, 
Wyoming
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Sky 
D. Phifer of Phifer Law Office, Lander, Wyoming
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
GOLDEN, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      These combined 
appeals arise out of post-divorce proceedings.  In No. S-11-0130, Father appeals the 
district court’s order denying his petition to modify the parties’ divorce 
decree, which granted mother primary physical custody of their minor child, and 
to grant him primary physical custody of their child.  In No. S-11-0131, Father appeals the 
district court’s order that he pay Mother $4,680 for attorney’s fees and costs 
she incurred in defending Father’s petition to modify custody.  We affirm both 
orders.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      Father presents 
five issues for our review, which we have rephrased for the sake of simplicity 
as follows:
 
I.          
Whether the district court erred in finding unconstitutional a clause in 
the Stipulated Divorce Decree which provided that a move out of state by either 
party constituted a material change of circumstances sufficient to seek a 
modification of custody.
 
II.         
Whether the district court erred in finding there had not been a material 
change in circumstances to justify a change in custody.
 
III.        
Whether the district court erred in finding that a modification of 
custody would not be in the best interests of the child.
 
IV.       Whether the 
district court reversibly erred in admitting hearsay statements of the child’s 
treating physician and excluding certified copies of the criminal convictions of 
Mother's brother and her current spouse.
 
V.        
Whether the district court erred in awarding Mother reasonable attorney 
fees.
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS
 
[¶3]      The parties were 
married in September 2006 in Pinedale, Wyoming, and lived in that area at the 
time of their divorce in March 2009.  
Mother brought into the marriage a child from a previous relationship, 
and the parties’ marriage produced one son, CJH, who was born in April 
2007.  The parties divorced in March 
2009, and, pursuant to a Stipulated Decree of Divorce entered by the district 
court, the parties had joint legal custody of CJH, with Mother being the primary 
residential custodial parent subject to reasonable liberal visitation by 
Father.  The decree included a 
relocation provision, which stated:
 
It 
is agreed that if one or the other parties move out of the state of Wyoming then 
for purposes of this agreement, the parties agree that such a move constitutes a 
material change of circumstance sufficient to seek a modification of this 
agreement.
 
[¶4]      In October 2009, 
Mother, who was remarried and pregnant with her third child, informed Father of 
her intention to move with CJH to Driggs, Idaho.  Father was residing in Daniel, Wyoming, 
as he had been for several years.  
On October 14, 2009, Father filed a petition requesting, among other 
relief, an order for custody modification granting him residential and physical 
custody of the parties’ minor child, CJH.  
In the petition, Father alleged Mother’s intention to move with CJH to 
Idaho and, referencing the relocation provision contained in their divorce 
decree, alleged that the move constituted a material change of circumstance 
warranting modification of custody.  
Father also alleged the occurrence of additional changes of circumstance 
and that those changes of circumstance warranted modification of custody.  
 
[¶5]      Mother timely 
responded to Father’s petition, alleging, among other matters, that the 
relocation provision contained in their divorce decree was void and 
unenforceable; denying the occurrence of additional material changes of 
circumstance; and asserting a counterclaim which sought, among other relief, 
modification of Father’s visitation and attorney’s fees and costs.  
 
[¶6]      Mother and CJH 
moved to Driggs, Idaho, in November 2009, but moved back to Wyoming a few months 
later, in January 2010.  In between 
Mother’s move to Idaho and return to Wyoming, the district court held a hearing 
concerning temporary custody of CJH and determined that physical custody of the 
child should remain with Mother pending resolution of Father’s petition.  At that hearing, the district court 
expressed concern about the divorce decree’s relocation provision and directed 
the parties to brief the issue whether that provision affected the court’s 
subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Father’s petition.  
 
[¶7]      In its decision 
letter issued on August 5, 2010, the district court ruled that it had 
jurisdiction to consider the merits of Father’s petition.  In particular, referencing the divorce 
decree’s relocation provision, the court stated that it 
 
is 
bound to make an independent determination, after a hearing, as to whether 
[Father] has carried his burden of proving the existence of “a material change 
in circumstances” since entry of the Decree and whether “the modification 
. . . would be in the best interests of the children [sic] pursuant to W.S. 
20-2-201(a).” [Emphasis in original.]
 
[¶8]      On January 26 and 
27, 2011, the district court conducted the hearing on Father’s petition, 
receiving testimony and other evidence from both parties.   As previously noted, although 
Mother had moved from the Pinedale area to Idaho in November 2009, which 
relocation was one of the changes of circumstance Father alleged warranted a 
custody modification, Mother had moved back to Wyoming a few months later in 
January 2010 and was living in Lander, Wyoming, at the time of the hearing.  Also as previously noted, Father had 
lived in Daniel, Wyoming, for several years before filing his modification 
petition and was still living there at the time of the hearing. In addition to 
this circumstance, the parties presented testimony and evidence concerning 
Father’s allegations of changed circumstances including Mother’s instability for 
having moved several times within Wyoming, and having changed employment; 
Mother’s keeping cats and dogs in her home despite CJH’s allergies; Mother’s 
husband having a criminal history and a diagnosed mental condition; Mother’s 
having once exposed CJH to her former boyfriend who allegedly abused the child; 
and Mother’s having occasionally left CJH at her parents’ home where her 
brother, a registered sex offender, resided.  
 
[¶9]      In a lengthy 
decision letter dated February 9, 2011, and filed February 11, 2011, the 
district court issued its decision denying Father’s petition for 
modification.  On March 2, 2011, the 
court entered its order.  

 
[¶10]   Earlier, while the custody 
modification action was pending, Mother had filed a motion for an allowance of 
money to defend the action.  The 
court denied that motion, as it explained in its decision letter filed January 
18, 2011.  Later, Mother renewed her 
motion for allowance of money to defend the action, supported by her attorney’s 
affidavit.  On February 22, 2011, 
the court filed its decision letter explaining its decision to award Mother the 
sum of $4,680.00 for costs and attorney’s fees.  On March 21, 2011, the court entered its 
order awarding that sum.  

 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶11]               
            
The appellate process reduces itself to only three types of review:  review of the sufficiency of the 
evidence to meet the required burden of persuasion at the trial level; review of 
the exercise of discretion; and plenary review of the choice, interpretation and 
application of the controlling legal precepts.
 
Ruggero 
J. Aldisert, Opinion Writing 53 (West 
Publishing Co. 1990).  

 
[¶12]   In this appeal, all three types of 
review may be applied, depending on the specific issue under discussion.  With respect to Father’s challenge to 
the district court’s ruling that the divorce decree’s relocation provision is 
unconstitutional, such an issue would normally receive plenary or de novo 
review.  Hageman v. Goshen Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
2011 WY 91, ¶ 5, 256 P.3d 487, 491 (Wyo. 2011).  We have recognized, however, that a 
fundamental rule of judicial restraint requires us to forgo addressing a 
constitutional issue if we can resolve the case on other grounds.  Wilson v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Cty. of 
Teton, 2007 WY 42, ¶ 14, 153 P.3d 917, 922 (Wyo. 2007); see also In re LePage, 2001 WY 26, ¶ 18, 18 P.3d 1177, 1181 (Wyo. 2001); Pisano v. 
Shillinger, 835 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Wyo. 1992); Wheeler v. Parker Drilling Co., 803 P.2d 1379, 1383 n.1 (Wyo. 1991); K N Energy, 
Inc. v. City of Casper, 755 P.2d 207, 210 (Wyo. 1988) (citing cases); and Schoeller v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Park 
Cty., 568 P.2d 869, 879 (Wyo. 1977).
 
[¶13]   With respect to the modification 
issues, we shall apply our usual standards for reviewing district court findings 
relating to the required material change of circumstances and the best interests 
of the children.  Regarding the 
material change of circumstances, this Court has said:
 
“A 
district court’s finding 
concerning a material change in circumstances is principally a factual 
determination to which we accord 
great deference.” [In re TLJ, 2006 WY 
28, ¶ 11, 129 P.3d 874, 877 (Wyo. 2006)], citing Yates 
v. Yates, 
702 P.2d 1252, 1256-57 (Wyo. 1985). 
Our task is simply to determine 
whether, examining the record in the light most favorable to the successful 
party, the district court could 
have reasonably concluded as it did. Id.
 
Morris 
v. Morris, 
2007 WY 174, ¶ 7, 170 P.3d 86, 89 (Wyo. 2007).
 
[¶14]   Our standard for reviewing the 
district court’s findings relating to the best interests of the children is 
likewise a deferential review.
 
Decisions 
pertaining to child custody are within the sound 
discretion of the district court 
and will not be disturbed on appeal absent procedural error or a clear abuse of 
discretion. Selvey 
v. Selvey, 
2004 WY 166, ¶ 15, 102 P.3d 210, 214 (Wyo. 2004). 
“Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions 
drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment with regard to 
what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily and 
capriciously.” Id. 
(quoting Fergusson 
v. Fergusson, 
2002 WY 66, ¶ 9, 45 P.3d 641, 644 (Wyo. 2002)). 
In determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred, our core inquiry is the 
reasonableness of the district court’s decision. Selvey, 
¶ 15, 102 P.3d  at 214 
(citing Metz 
v. Metz, 
2003 WY 3, ¶ 6, 61 P.3d 383, 385 (Wyo. 2003)). 
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s 
determination, affording to the prevailing party every favorable inference and 
omitting from our consideration conflicting evidence. Selvey, 
¶ 15, 102 P.3d  at 214 
(citing GGV 
v. JLR, 
2002 WY 19, ¶ 14, 39 P.3d 1066, 1074 (Wyo. 2002)).
 
In 
 re TLJ, 
2006 WY 28, ¶ 6, 129 P.3d 874, 876 (Wyo. 2006).
 
[¶15]   A district court’s evidentiary 
rulings are discretionary, and we review them as follows:
 
A 
trial court’s decision on the admissibility of evidence is entitled to 
considerable deference, and will not be reversed on appeal unless the appellant 
demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion. As long as there exists a legitimate 
basis for the trial court’s ruling, that ruling will not be disturbed on 
appeal.
 
Even 
if the district court admitted evidence in error, we must consider whether the 
error was prejudicial or harmless. Error is prejudicial if there is a reasonable 
possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant if 
the error had not been made. Prejudicial error requires reversal, while harmless 
error does not.
 
Nelson 
v. State, 
2010 WY 159, ¶ 29, 245 P.3d 282, 289 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting Reay v. State, 2008 WY 13, ¶ 8, 176 P.3d 647, 650 (Wyo. 2008)).
 
[¶16]   Finally, with respect to the 
district court’s decision to award attorney’s fees, such decisions rest within the sound discretion of the district court, and 
this Court will not overturn the decision absent a clear abuse of that 
discretion.  Black v. De Black, 1 P.3d 1244, 1252 
(Wyo. 2000); Rocha 
v. Rocha, 
925 P.2d 231, 234 (Wyo.1996).
 
DISCUSSION
 
A.        
Custody Modification
 
[¶17]   A court has “'only that 
authority to act which is conferred by the subject statute.’”  Weiss v. Weiss, 2009 WY 124, ¶ 13, 217 P.3d 408, 411 (Wyo. 2009) (quoting Bush 
v. State, 
2003 WY 156, ¶ 9, 79 P.3d 1178, 1183 (Wyo. 2003)).  In that regard, we have said that 
“[i]t is well settled that divorce is purely a 
statutory process, with courts having no authority in such proceedings other 
than that provided by statute.”  Weiss, ¶ 13, 217 P.3d  at 412 (citing 
Urbach 
v. Urbach, 
52 Wyo. 207, 73 P.2d 953, 956 (1937); 
24 
Am.Jur.2d Divorce 
and Separation 
§ 7 (2008)).  By statute, a custody order may be modified under certain defined 
circumstances:  

 
            
A court having 
jurisdiction may modify an order 
concerning the care, custody and 
visitation of the children if 
there is a showing by either parent of a material change in circumstances since the entry of the 
order in question and that the modification would be in the best 
interests of the children 
pursuant to W.S. 
20-2-201(a).  In any proceeding in which a parent 
seeks to modify an order concerning child custody or visitation, proof of 
repeated, unreasonable failure by the custodial parent to allow visitation to 
the other parent in violation of an order may be considered as evidence of a 
material change of circumstances.  

 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) (LexisNexis 2009) (amended 2011).
 
[¶18]   As noted above, this Court has 
recognized the jurisdictional limits this statute places on the authority of a 
district court to modify a custody order.  

 
This 
Court has construed this 
provision to require a two-step approach to custody modification actions. See 
KES 
v. CAT, 
2005 WY 29, ¶ 10, 107 P.3d 779, 782 (Wyo. 2005); 
Jackson 
v. Jackson, 
2004 WY 99, ¶ 8, 96 P.3d 21, 24 (Wyo. 2004); 
JRS 
v. GMS, 
2004 WY 60, ¶ 10, 90 P.3d 718, 723 (Wyo. 2004); 
Cobb 
v. Cobb, 
2 P.3d 578, 579-80 (Wyo. 2000). 
The first step requires a showing that there has been “a material change in 
circumstances since the entry of the order in question.” § 
20-2-204(c). 
Because of the res judicata effect afforded custody orders, such a finding is a 
threshold requirement. Hertzler 
v. Hertzler, 
908 P.2d 946, 949-50 (Wyo. 1995). 
The district court does not properly acquire jurisdiction to reopen an existing 
custody order until there has been a showing of “a substantial or material 
change of circumstances which outweigh society’s interest in applying the 
doctrine of res judicata” to a custody order. Kreuter 
v. Kreuter, 
728 P.2d 1129, 1130 (Wyo. 1986). 
See generally Harshberger 
v. Harshberger, 
2005 WY 99, ¶¶ 12-13, 117 P.3d 1244, 1250-51 (Wyo. 2005); 
Watt 
v. Watt, 
971 P.2d 608, 613 (Wyo. 1999); 
Hertzler, 
908 P.2d at 949-50; 
Gurney 
v. Gurney, 
899 P.2d 52, 54 (Wyo. 1995). 
In short, unless the district court finds a material change in circumstances, it cannot proceed to 
the second step –  determining whether a modification would be in the best 
interests of the child.
 
TLJ, 
¶ 8, 129 P.3d  at 876.
 
[¶19]   
The party seeking modification of a custody order carries the burden 
of meeting the statutory requirements.
 
Under 
the statute, the party seeking modification of the child custody provisions of a decree has the 
burden of establishing that a material change in circumstances which affects the children’s welfare has occurred since 
the decree was entered, the change justifies modification of the decree and modification would be in the children’s best 
interests.
 
Morris, 
¶ 6, 170 P.3d  at 89 (citing Jackson 
v. Jackson, 
2004 WY 99, ¶ 8, 96 P.3d 21, 24 (Wyo. 2004); 
Fergusson 
v. Fergusson, 
2002 WY 66, ¶ 9, 45 P.3d 641, 644 
(Wyo. 2002)). 
 
1.         
Constitutionality of Relocation 
Provision
 
[¶20]   In his first argument, Father 
challenges the district court’s ruling that the divorce decree’s relocation 
provision, which stipulated that a move outside Wyoming by either parent would 
constitute a material change in circumstances, could not alone serve as a basis 
to modify the decree’s custody provision.  
The district court found the relocation provision to be unconstitutional 
and ruled that the court itself was required to make an independent 
determination of whether there had been a material change in circumstances that 
would support a custody modification.  
On appeal, Father argues that the relocation provision is distinguishable 
from those this Court has held unconstitutional and does not infringe on either 
party’s constitutional right to travel or relocate.  In the alternative, Father contends that 
constitutional rights may be waived and that the parties knowingly and 
voluntarily waived their constitutional right to travel or relocate when they 
stipulated to the decree’s relocation provision.
 
[¶21]   This Court has recognized the 
constitutional right of a parent to travel or relocate, and we have held that a 
custodial determination may not infringe on that right.
 
The 
right of travel enjoyed by a citizen carries with it the right of a custodial 
parent to have the children move with that parent. This right is not to be 
denied, impaired, or disparaged unless clear evidence before the court 
demonstrates another substantial and material change of circumstance and 
establishes the detrimental effect of the move upon the 
children.
 
Testerman 
v. Testerman, 
2008 WY 112, ¶ 18, 193 P.3d 1141, 1146 (Wyo. 2008) (quoting Watt 
v. Watt, 
971 P.2d 608, 615-16 (Wyo. 1999)); 
see also Harshberger v. Harshberger, 2005 WY 99, 
¶ 12, 117 P.3d 1244, 1250-51 (Wyo. 2005); Resor v. Resor, 987 P.2d 146, 151 (Wyo. 
1999). 
 
[¶22]   We have also held that, even 
independent of any constitutional concerns, a parent’s relocation, by itself, is 
not a material change in circumstances warranting modification of a custody 
order.  Morris, ¶ 18, 170 P.3d  at 92; Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 55 (Wyo. 
1995); Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 
1286-89 (Wyo. 1993); Martin v. 
Martin, 798 P.2d 321, 323 (Wyo. 1990).  
Our precedent limits the use of a parent’s relocation as a factor in determining whether there has been 
a material change in circumstances.
 
Love 
and 
Gurney 
together capture a rule that a relocation by a custodial parent, where the 
motivation for the relocation is legitimate, sincere, in good faith, and still 
permits reasonable visitation by the non-custodial parent, is not a substantial 
and material change in circumstances. A trial court abuses its discretion in 
making a contrary ruling that such a move amounts to a substantial and material 
change in circumstances.
 
Testerman, 
¶ 19, 193 P.3d  at 1146 (quoting Watt, 
971 P.2d at 614).
 
[¶23]   In reaching our decision in Love, that relocation alone is not a 
material change in circumstances warranting a custody modification, this Court 
looked to the manner in which other states addressed the issue and 
reasoned:
 
In 
this context, we agree with a Michigan court which stated:
 
“'We 
live in a transient society. With respect to the best interests of a child, 
state boundaries are artificial and meaningless; there is no presumption that 
bringing up a child in Michigan has any advantage (or disadvantage) over 
Missouri or Georgia, or any other state. To conclude otherwise would be a 
meaningless generalization. Restrictions upon where a custodial parent may live, 
in terms of geography, are not realistic. In every state there are good and bad 
places to bring up a child.’”
 
DeGrow 
v. DeGrow, 
112 Mich.App. 260, 315 N.W.2d 915, 918 (1982) 
(quoting Hutchins 
v. Hutchins, 
84 Mich.App. 236, 269 N.W.2d 539, 540 (1978) 
(Beasley, J., concurring).
 
* 
* * *
 
To 
this discussion we add the consideration of whether an “established custodial 
environment continues to exist despite a change in the children’s domicile.” 
DeGrow, 
315 N.W.2d  at 917. 
This situation has been defined as one that
 
emphasizes 
the continuity and strength of an established relationship between a custodian 
and a child. The custodial environment is the family unit which cannot be 
destroyed by a simple change in geographic location. The family unit still will 
be preserved in the new domicile.
 
 DeGrow, 
315 N.W.2d  at 918.
 
            
As the district court recognized, despite a change in residence, there is 
no reason to suggest that mother will not continue to provide a caring, 
nurturing environment for her children.
 
Love, 
851 P.2d  at 1288-89.
 
[¶24]   It is unrealistic to expect 
divorced parents to remain forever in the same location, Testerman, ¶ 18, 193 P.3d  at 1146, and whether a parent’s relocation is a material change in 
circumstance is a fact sensitive analysis that requires consideration of more 
than just the relocation itself.  Love, 851 P.2d  at 1287; Martin, 798 P.2d  at 323.  Decree provisions that purport to define 
an event that will constitute a material change of circumstance or affect a 
child’s best interest at some future undefined time are therefore particularly 
problematic.  As we explained in Martin, where the decree provided for an 
automatic change of custody if either parent moved from 
Laramie:
 
The 
district court’s anticipatory conclusion that the best interests of the children 
will be served by a nine-month/three-month split in favor of the parent 
remaining in Laramie is an abuse of discretion. As noted above, the test for 
child custody is the best interests of the children, and such a decision cannot 
be made without the district court having before it all facts necessary to make 
such a determination. What those facts may be, if and when one or the other 
parent leaves Laramie, can only be pure speculation at this point in time. Such 
speculation is not a substitute for complete analysis of all existing 
circumstances when and if a change in the established child custody arrangement 
becomes necessary.
 
Martin, 
798 P.2d  at 323; see also Testerman, ¶ 19, 193 P.3d  at 1146 
(holding district court abused its discretion by including a provision in the 
decree that either parent’s relocation “may be considered by the Court as a 
change of circumstances sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction to consider a 
custody modification”); Harshberger, 
¶ 8, 117 P.3d  at 1249 (noting that Court has rejected such a scheme because it 
circumvents the district court’s duty to evaluate custody 
decisions).
 
[¶25]   This Court’s precedent is clear 
that a custodial determination may not infringe on a parent’s constitutional 
right to travel or relocate.  As 
important, however, given our adherence to principles of res judicata, and the 
interests of finality in custody orders, is our precedent that a parent’s 
relocation, by itself, cannot be considered a material change of circumstance 
that would warrant modification of a custody order.  It was pursuant to all of these 
principles that the district court ruled that it must independently evaluate all 
of the facts and determine whether there had been a material change of 
circumstances.  The question Father 
presents is essentially whether the parties’ relocation stipulation deprived the 
district court of its discretion to make that determination.  We hold that the parties’ agreement did 
not and could not have stripped the court of its authority and obligation to 
independently determine whether there had been a material change in 
circumstances.
 
[¶26]   The parties’ agreement suffers from 
the same defect this Court found in the decrees at issue in Martin and Testerman.  The relocation stipulation was an 
“anticipatory conclusion” that a move outside Wyoming by either parent would 
result in a material change to the detriment of the parties’ child.  See Martin, 798 P.2d  at 
323.  In fact, the parties did not 
and could not know that a move by either parent outside Wyoming would result in 
a material change of circumstances.  
The conclusion was purely speculative and made without consideration of 
the surrounding facts, and the district court thus would have abused its 
discretion had it accepted the parties’ prior agreement as grounds to find a 
material change of circumstances.  
See Martin, 798 P.2d  at 
323; Testerman, ¶ 19, 193 P.3d  at 
1146.
 
[¶27]   An agreement by the parties to a 
modification proceeding that there has been a material change of circumstances 
is not and cannot be a substitute for the district court’s evaluation of the 
surrounding facts and its independent determination that there has been the 
required change in circumstances.  
As noted above, a district court’s authority to modify a divorce decree 
is statutorily confined to those instances where there has been a material 
change in circumstances and in the absence of such a finding, the court is 
without subject matter jurisdiction to modify custody.  Weiss, ¶ 13, 217 P.3d  
at 412; TLJ, ¶ 8, 129 P.3d  at 
876.  We have long held that parties 
may not waive jurisdictional defects or consent to subject matter jurisdiction 
where it otherwise does not exist, and the parties’ stipulation that there has 
been a material change in circumstances thus cannot be the controlling 
consideration.  See Weller v. Weller, 960 P.2d 493, 496 
(Wyo. 1998) (“A lack of subject matter jurisdiction constitutes a fundamental 
defect in a proceeding which cannot be cured by waiver or consent by the parties.”); White v. Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 595 P.2d 76, 79 (Wyo. 1979) (“Parties cannot confer jurisdiction by 
consent.”).  

 
[¶28]   Our decision in this case does not 
conflict with and should not be construed to undermine our decisions in Gurney, 899 P.2d  at 55, and Gaines v. Doby, 794 P.2d 566, 571 (Wyo. 
1990).  In Gurney, the divorce decree granted the 
parents joint custody of their child, but within fifty days after the decree was 
entered, the parties agreed the arrangement was not working and each parent 
sought primary custody.  Gurney, 899 P.2d  at 53.  We found no abuse of discretion in the 
district court’s reopening of the custody order.  
 
      A second 
distinctive feature suggests a joint custody order should be more readily 
opened. The premise of the joint custody order is the parents’ ability to 
resolve between themselves the custodial details. There can be little question 
that joint custody requires sincere dedication on the part of each parent to 
safeguard the security and stability vital to a child’s best interest. When the 
parents are unable to make this cooperative arrangement work, a change of 
circumstances justifying judicial reexamination of the original joint custody 
order is demonstrated. See [Moody 
v. Moody, 
715 P.2d 507, 510 
(Utah 1985)].
 
            
Here, both parties asserted joint custody was not working. Logically, 
such assertions end the judicial inquiry. Gaines 
v. Doby, 
794 P.2d 566 (Wyo.1990). 

 
Gurney, 
899 P.2d  at 55.
 
[¶29]   In Gaines, the district court modified the 
child visitation provisions of a divorce decree after both parents requested 
that the decree be reopened and upon finding a material change in circumstances 
in the mother’s repeated unilateral changes to and interference with the 
father’s visitation.  Gaines, 794 P.2d  at 570-71.  We upheld the district court’s 
modification, explaining:
      Keeping in mind 
the foregoing evidence, as well as the other testimony adduced at hearing, we 
are convinced that the district court neither erred nor abused its discretion in 
its disposition of the parties’ motions. We find that the parties willingly 
presented and tried to the court the modification issues relating to visitation 
and medical insurance. Since the parties induced the district court to act by 
their motions to modify these provisions of the original divorce decree and by 
their litigation posture at the hearing on the motions, neither of them can be 
heard on appeal to argue error based upon that action. Thatcher 
& Sons, Inc. v. Norwest Bank Casper, N.A., 
750 P.2d 1324, 1328 (Wyo. 1988); 
Appeal 
of Williams, 
626 P.2d 564, 571 (Wyo. 1981), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 896, 102 S. Ct. 394, 70 L. Ed. 2d 211; 
and Weber 
v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., 
519 P.2d 972, 978 (Wyo. 1974).
 
            
We determine that the district court could reasonably conclude from the 
evidence that the parties wanted it to exercise its revisory powers with respect 
to the visitation provisions and the medical insurance provision, that changes 
in circumstances had occurred, that these changes together with the parties’ 
invitations to revise the original decree warranted modification of the decree, 
and that the modification would be in the best interests of the parties’ minor 
child.  
 
Gaines, 
794 P.2d  at 571.
 
[¶30]   While in both Gaines and Gurney, this Court found it significant 
that both parents had asked the district court to modify custody or visitation 
and held that neither party could claim error based upon that invitation, the 
crucial consideration was not the parties’ agreement to reopen.  In Gaines, the district court found a 
material change of circumstances aside from the parties’ invitations to reopen 
the decree.  Gaines, 794 P.2d  at 571.  In Gurney, the critical finding was the 
parties’ agreement that the originally-ordered custody arrangement simply was 
not working.  Gurney, 899 P.2d  at 55.  It is not a bare agreement to reopen the 
decree that represents a material change in circumstances, but rather the 
parents’ agreement that the custodial arrangement is not at present working or 
serving the child’s best interests.  
Id.; see also Roemmich v. Roemmich, 2010 WY 115, ¶ 12, 
238 P.3d 89, 93 (Wyo. 2010) (“when both parents 
inform the court that a joint physical custody arrangement is not working, a 
sufficient change in circumstances justifying the reopening of the custody order 
has been presented”).
 
[¶31]   In this case, the parents do not 
agree that the present custodial arrangement is not working, and Father did not 
present any other agreement between the parties, as to the current 
circumstances, that could support a conclusive finding of a material change in 
circumstances.  This case is 
therefore distinguishable from our holdings in Roemmich, Gurney, and Gaines.  
 
[¶32]   Because we have found that the 
parties’ relocation stipulation was speculative and unenforceable, the 
provision’s constitutionality need not be resolved.  We thus will not address whether the 
provision was constitutional or whether the parties could waive their 
constitutional rights to travel and relocate.  See Wilson, ¶ 14, 153 P.3d  at 922 (judicial 
restraint requires us to forgo addressing a constitutional issue if we can 
resolve the case on other grounds).
 
2.         
District Court’s Finding of No Material Change of 
Circumstances
 
[¶33]   In his amended petition and at 
trial, Father presented a litany of alleged factors on which he based his 
argument that there had been a material change of circumstances that would 
justify modifying custody of the parties’ child.  On appeal, Father has presented argument 
on the following factors: 1) Mother’s relocation outside Wyoming; 2) the 
criminal record and mental condition of Mother’s current husband; 3) Mother’s 
three to five moves since entry of the divorce decree; 4) Mother’s keeping of 
cats and dogs in the home despite CJH’s allergies and the need to keep CJH on 
allergy medications; 4) the possible abuse of CJH by Mother’s former boyfriend; 
and 5) that Mother’s brother is a registered sex offender and lives with 
Mother’s parents who sometimes take care of CJH.  Because these are the factors which 
Father cites in the portion of his argument devoted to the material change of 
circumstances standard, they are the only factors we will include in our review 
of the district court’s determination that Father did not show a material change 
of circumstances.
 
[¶34]   As we begin our analysis, we 
reiterate that the petitioning party carries the burden of establishing that “a material change in circumstances which affects the children’s welfare has occurred since 
the decree was entered.”  Morris, ¶ 6, 170 P.3d  at 89.  The district court’s determination as to 
a change of material circumstances is “'principally a 
factual determination to which 
we accord great deference.’ Our task is simply to determine whether, examining the 
record in the light most favorable to the successful party, the district court could have reasonably concluded 
as it did.”  Morris, ¶ 7, 170 P.3d  at 89 (quoting TLJ, ¶ 
11, 129 P.3d at 877) (citations omitted).
 
a.         
Mother’s Relocation Outside Wyoming
 
[¶35]   By the time Father’s petition was 
heard, Mother had moved back to Wyoming and was living in Lander.  Father, on the other hand, had accepted 
a position in Minot, North Dakota.  
He testified that while he was spending a substantial amount of time in 
Minot and intended to move there, he had not finalized his plans to 
relocate.  Father did not seek to 
amend his petition to add his own potential relocation as a factor for the court 
to consider in determining whether there was a material change in circumstances, 
or seek a modification other than changing primary custody.  
 
[¶36]   Given that Mother had returned to 
Wyoming by the time of trial and that Father did not request consideration of 
his own relocation, the parties’ respective relocations outside Wyoming were not 
factors for the district court’s consideration in determining whether there had 
been a material change in circumstances.  
We therefore do not give the relocations any further 
consideration.
 
b.         
Criminal Record and Mental Condition of Mother’s Current 
Husband
 
[¶37]   With respect to the alleged mental 
condition of Mother’s current husband, Father cites Mother’s testimony that her 
current husband “cracked” under pressure.  
Mother testified this occurred when her current husband learned she was 
pregnant with his child.  According 
to Mother’s testimony, he left her for a period of several weeks and then 
returned.  Father also cites the 
following testimony by Mother:
 
Q.        
Okay.  And he has also been 
diagnosed as bipolar; isn’t that correct?
 
A.        He 
has been diagnosed bipolar by a doctor who has also diagnosed five other people 
that we know bipolar and he’s actually in the process of getting a second 
opinion.
 
Q.        But 
he has been diagnosed as bipolar, correct?
 
A.        From 
a doctor that we don’t trust.
 
Q.        And 
this is new since we took your deposition in December; is that correct?  At that time you admitted that he was on 
medication, correct?
 
A.        
Yes.
 
Q.        What 
medication is he taking?
 
A.        
Lamotrigine.
 
Q.        Do 
you know how to spell that?
 
A.        
No.
 
[¶38]   Aside from this testimony, the 
record contains no evidence, medical or otherwise, concerning the alleged mental 
condition of Mother’s current husband and how that has or may affect his ability 
to care for or be in the company of CJH.  
Looking at the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing 
party, we find no clear error in the district court’s conclusion that 
insufficient evidence was presented to show that Mother’s current spouse has 
ever jeopardized the safety and wellbeing of CJH.    
 
[¶39]   With respect to the criminal record 
of Mother’s current husband, the evidence showed a DUI conviction, speeding 
violations, and an arrest or conviction for an open container and possession of 
Class B drug paraphernalia, all of which occurred before Mother met him.  The record contains no evidence of 
criminal conduct since Mother and her current husband were married, and Mother 
testified she has never seen her husband intoxicated and that he is subject to 
random drug testing in his position as a volunteer fireman.  Moreover, during closing argument, 
Father’s attorney argued:
 
An 
example of what I’m saying, your Honor, is her disregard in even exploring why 
her fiancé of short duration, who she left to watch both of her children, was on 
supervised probation.  It’s not the 
fact that he necessarily had a DUI or drug paraphernalia history or numerous 
speeding tickets, etcetera, that may not in and of itself mean he is a bad 
influence on [CJH], but especially when one considers he was 19 when she moved 
him into her house, but it shows a complete lack of judgment in leaving my 
client’s child with a man who she doesn’t really even know and why – and doesn’t 
inquire why he is on supervised probation.
 
[¶40]   Looking at the record in the light 
most favorable to the prevailing party, we again find no clear error in the 
district court’s conclusion that insufficient evidence was presented to show 
that Mother’s current spouse has ever jeopardized the safety and wellbeing of 
CJH.  The record contains no 
evidence of improper or illegal behavior in CJH’s presence, and it is certainly 
difficult to find a material lack of judgment in Mother’s failure to inquire 
into a misdemeanor history that Father concedes has no effect on the 
child.
 
c.         
Living Conditions that Affect Child’s 
Allergies
 
[¶41]   Father next contends that the 
district court erred in not finding a material change of circumstances in 
Mother’s keeping of two dogs and a cat despite CJH’s allergies and the need to 
keep him on allergy medications.  In 
particular, Father takes issue with the district court’s finding that the 
allergy specialists have approved the presence of the pets so long as CJH is not 
unduly exposed to the cat.  He 
argues this conclusion is against the great weight of the evidence and 
improperly relies on hearsay evidence of the allergist’s medical 
opinion.
 
[¶42]   Even if we exclude from our 
consideration Mother’s testimony concerning the allergist’s medical opinion, the 
admission of which we will discuss below, we can find no clear error in the 
district court’s rejection of CJH’s allergies and Mother’s keeping of pets as a 
material change of circumstances.  
Father carried the burden of showing a material change of circumstance 
detrimental to the child, and he presented no evidence concerning the precise 
nature of CJH’s allergies, the impact of living with pets, if any, the side 
effects of the allergy medications on CJH, if any, or evidence that Mother is 
acting contrary to medical advice in the living conditions she is providing or 
the manner in which she is medicating CJH.  
All we know from the record, which we again must review in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party, is what we learned from Mother’s 
testimony:  that CJH suffers from 
allergies, that Mother keeps a cat and two dogs in the home, that CJH’s 
allergies are controlled with allergy medications, and that Mother has not 
researched the side effects of those medications.  Father did not meet his burden of 
showing that CJH’s allergies and related living conditions presented a material 
change of circumstances.
 
d.         
Possible Abuse of CJH by Mother’s Former 
Boyfriend
 
[¶43]   Father cites but does not elaborate 
on this factor.  Mother testified 
that in April of 2009, she allowed her former boyfriend and father of her first 
child to watch CJH.  Mother 
thereafter discovered marks on CJH and reported the incident to the Department 
of Family Services and law enforcement.  
Mother also “kicked [the former boyfriend] out” of her life and obtained 
a restraining order against him.  
The district court rejected the incident as a material change of 
circumstances, finding that it was remote and not a current problem warranting 
modification of custody.  Father 
presented no evidence to the contrary, and we find no clear error in the court’s 
determination.
 
e.         
Mother’s Three to Five Moves Since Entry of 
Decree
 
[¶44]   The district court found that 
Mother had moved with CJH three to five times since the decree was entered, but 
it further found that Father had not presented evidence that Mother’s moves 
adversely affected CJH or that Mother’s moves were made in bad faith.  The district court thus rejected 
Mother’s moves as a material change of circumstances.  On appeal, Father cites Mother’s moves 
as an alleged change of circumstances but does not elaborate or challenge the 
district court’s findings relating to the Mother’s moves.  We can find no clear error in the 
court’s determination that Mother’s moves were not a material change of 
circumstances.
 
f.          
CJH Exposure to Registered Sex Offender
 
[¶45]   Father cites as a material change 
of circumstance that Mother’s parents sometimes babysit CJH, and Mother’s 
brother, who is a registered sex offender, lives with her parents.  The district court rejected this as a 
material change of circumstance based on its finding that Mother’s brother is 
not permitted to be in the presence of CJH without an adult present.  Father does not challenge the district 
court’s finding and again cites this factor without elaboration.  We find no clear error in the district 
court’s rejection of the status of Mother’s brother as a material change in 
circumstance.  

 
[¶46]   Father cites to our decision in JRS v. GMS, 2004 WY 60, 90 P.3d 718 
(Wyo. 2004), and argues that as in that case, the list of changed circumstances 
he has presented should be viewed in combination and when so viewed, it shows a 
material change of circumstances.  
In JRS, we found a material 
change of circumstances described as follows:
 
            
We are unable to agree with the district court that there was not a 
material change in circumstances in this case. Mother’s relocation to South 
Dakota might well have been viewed as a material change. The testimony the 
district court heard was that the unusual custody arrangements to which these 
parents agreed (it was not fashioned by the district court), worked only so long 
as the parents both resided in Crook County and were close enough to each other 
to make it functional. It did not work once Mother was in South Dakota, 
sometimes without a car to transport the children, and Father was not free, nor 
was he always able, to travel to South Dakota to facilitate visitation. That 
Mother’s fiancé, and her brother, were accused of sexually assaulting the 
parties’ youngest daughter also might well have been viewed as a material change 
of circumstances. There was another potential material change when the youngest 
children were uprooted from Mother’s home, and sent to live in Sheridan County 
with Father’s new wife, the parties’ two other children, and Stepmother’s three 
children. There was likely a material change of circumstance when all four 
children were taken from their home and placed in DFS custody (in a group home) 
as a result of Stepmother’s abusive acts against the children. There were 
potential material changes of circumstance when the children were placed in the 
custody of Father’s mother and stepfather, and when Father was finally accorded 
full custody again, with his mother and stepfather providing a backup for 
Father.
 
JRS, 
¶ 12, 90 P.3d  at 723-24.
 
[¶47]   JRS is distinguishable from the present 
case.  In JRS, the changes, such as the children’s 
exposure to abusive persons, were not isolated and remote, but were continuing 
concerns.  JRS, ¶ 12, 90 P.3d  at 723-24.  Moreover, the parties had a shared 
custody arrangement that had become unworkable with the mother’s 
relocation.  Id.
 
[¶48]   Father’s request for a custody 
modification in this case, on the other hand, more closely resembles the request 
we reviewed in Morris, presenting 
more of a generalized attack on Mother’s judgment and quality as a parent than a 
genuine material change of circumstances.  
In Morris, the father 
petitioned for a modification of custody citing grounds such as the mother’s 
frequent moves, the mother’s numerous romantic relationships, the mother’s 
inattention to the children’s hygiene, and the mother’s leaving of the children 
in the care of others too often.  Morris, ¶¶ 17-24, 170 P.3d  at 
91-93.  We upheld the district 
court’s denial of a custody modification, observing:
 
Much 
of Father’s case focused on proving he was a better parent than Mother. His 
arguments would have been appropriate in an initial custody determination. 
However, the standard is different in a modification proceeding because changes 
in custody are not favored and should not be granted except in clear cases. 
See, e.g., Leitner 
v. Lonabaugh, 
402 P.2d 713, 718-19 (Wyo. 1965). 
As we said in CLH, 
¶ 9, 129 P.3d at 877: 
“Under the principles of res judicata, a court does not have the discretion to 
reopen a custody order simply because, looking at the best interests of the 
child, it believes it can make a better decision than was made in the prior 
custody order.” Father, thus, had the burden of establishing a material change 
of circumstances before the best interest analysis was appropriate. Id., 
¶ 11, 129 P.3d  at 877. 
See also, Selvey 
v. Selvey, 
2004 WY 166, ¶ 16, 102 P.3d 210, 214-15 (Wyo. 2004). 
On this record, we hold the district court could have reasonably concluded 
Father failed to establish a material change of circumstances. Consequently, it 
did not abuse its discretion by denying Father’s request for a change of 
custody.
 
Morris, 
¶ 27, 170 P.3d  at 93.
 
[¶49]   The Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) 
appointed in this case advised the district court that she found CJH to be a 
happy, content, well cared for, and intelligent child who understands the 
relationships between and among CJH, CJH’s mother, CJH’s father, CJH’s siblings 
and CJH’s stepfather.  She also 
testified that both Mother and Father are good parents and she was not alarmed 
by anything in the parenting of either party.  A concern repeatedly cited by the GAL 
was the impact of splitting CJH from his half-siblings, that is Mother’s two 
children from separate fathers.  She 
advised the district court:
 
I 
weigh very heavily and I think all courts weigh heavily the relationship between 
the child in question today, [CJH], and his half-brothers. . . . [CJH], for his 
three almost four years has lived with J., his almost five-year-old brother, and 
for almost a year now little [CJH] has lived with his almost one-year-old 
brother K. 
 
* 
* * *
 
. 
. . I just haven’t heard anything alone that worries me, troubles me as much as 
what do we do about half-siblings living 14 hours apart. 
 
[¶50]   The district court found that 
Father had failed to prove a material change of circumstances since entry of the 
parties’ divorce decree.  With 
respect to changing CJH’s family unit, the district court more particularly 
found that Father “failed to prove factors sufficient to justify 'splitting’ 
custody with [CJH]’s older (half-blood) sibling and [CJH]’s younger (half-blood) 
sibling.”  
 
[¶51]   We find no clear error in the 
district court’s determination that Father did not prove a material change in 
circumstances that would justify a custody modification.  Because Father did not prove a material 
change of circumstances, we need not consider whether a modification would be in 
the child’s best interest.  See TLJ, ¶ 8, 129 P.3d  at 876 (court will 
not address the best interests test unless and until a material change of 
circumstances is shown).
 
B.        
Alleged Errors in Evidentiary Rulings
 
1.         
Mother’s Testimony as to Statements by 
Allergist
 
[¶52]   Mother testified that the allergist 
recommended that cats not be permitted to sleep in CJH’s room, but otherwise he 
was not concerned with removing pets from the home.  The district court admitted this 
testimony over Father’s objection, ruling that it was excepted from the hearsay 
rule under W.R.E. 803(4) as a statement made for the purpose of medical 
diagnosis or treatment.  Father 
appeals the evidentiary ruling.
 
[¶53]   We agree that the district court 
erred in admitting Mother’s testimony concerning the allergist’s 
statements.  W.R.E. 803(4) applies 
only to statements made by the person seeking medical treatment and not to 
statements made by the person providing medical care.  Field v. Trigg County Hosp., Inc., 386 F.3d 729, 735-36 (6th Cir. 2004); Bombard 
v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 1996).  Nonetheless, as we noted above, Father 
did not meet his burden of showing that Mother’s keeping of pets in the home and 
giving CJH allergy medications was a material change of circumstances 
detrimental to CJH.  Father 
questioned Mother’s actions, but he presented no evidence concerning CJH’s 
allergies or any consequences to CJH as a result of Mother’s decisions.  Thus, even if the statements attributed 
to the allergist are excluded, the record supports the district court’s 
decision, and the admission of the testimony was harmless.
 
2.         
Exclusion of Criminal Record of Mother’s Current 
Husband
 
[¶54]   The district court allowed 
testimony concerning the criminal history of Mother’s current husband, but 
excluded certain of the records.  
Father’s attorney argued to the district court for the admission of these 
records on the following ground:
 
[M]y 
purpose for offering them is that the witness had a total disregard of what her 
boyfriend, then fiancé, then husband’s criminal background was even up to the 
point of last December, although she was leaving my client’s young son in the 
care of this man.  That’s my 
purpose, your Honor.
 
[¶55] 
  In response, the district court 
explained its decision to exclude the criminal records:
 
            
Here’s where I see the disconnect and this is specific to the admission 
of these documents as exhibits.  The 
disconnect is that a witness, the Respondent, has testified to the extent of her 
knowledge of her husband’s back – criminal background.  She has told us she knows about speeding 
tickets, she told us she knows about a conviction or an arrest for drug 
paraphernalia, she has told us about open container, she has told us she knows 
something about a drunk driving and a conviction where he was on supervised 
probation. 
 
[¶56]   The record thus shows that when 
Father offered the documented criminal record of Mother’s current husband into 
evidence, there had already been testimony concerning much of that husband’s 
criminal conduct and history.  
Moreover, Mother testified, “I knew of a criminal record, but I didn’t 
exactly know the details of it.”  
Father’s attorney argued for the admission of the record to show what 
Mother had failed to properly consider and understand her husband’s criminal 
history before leaving CJH in his care.  
Father’s attorney repeated this in closing argument, stating that it was 
not necessarily the nature of the husband’s criminal conduct that was important, 
but Mother’s poor judgment in not inquiring into the details of that 
history.  Given that Father was 
permitted to establish that Mother’s husband had a criminal history and that 
Mother had not questioned or looked into that history, we can see no possible 
harm to Father’s case in the exclusion of the written record itself.  
 
[¶57]   Father was permitted the 
opportunity to submit the evidence he needed to support his argument that the 
current husband’s criminal background and Mother’s failure to research that 
background was a material change in circumstances.  Where the district court found that 
Father had failed in his proof was in presenting any evidence that Mother’s 
“current spouse has ever jeopardized the safety and well-being of [CJH] when the 
child is left in his care.”  Father 
has not shown that having the current spouse’s documented criminal record would 
have altered the district court’s ultimate finding, and the exclusion of the 
evidence was thus harmless, if indeed it was error.
 
C.        
Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs to 
Mother
 
[¶58]   The district court awarded Mother 
$4,680.00 in attorney fees and costs.  
On appeal, Father does not challenge the reasonableness of this award, 
but instead argues the award was improper because: 1) Mother was in the wrong 
and was responsible for circumstances that “literally shock the conscience as to 
their impact on the safety of a three year old child;” and 2) the award was 
necessarily arbitrary because there are no statutory or common law factors 
guiding a district court’s discretion in determining whether an award of fees 
and costs is necessary to enable the defending party to carry on or defend the 
action.  
 
[¶59]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-111 
(LexisNexis 2011) authorizes a court in this type of proceeding to “require 
either party to pay any sum necessary to enable the other to carry on or defend 
the action[.]”  This Court has 
interpreted this provision, and in particular the term “necessary,” as 
follows:
 
The 
award of attorney’s fees in cases such as this is not designed to punish one 
party or the other, it is only designed to allow for the payment of such 
attorney’s fees, within the sound discretion of the district court, in those 
circumstances where the expenditures become “necessary” for a party because that 
party has no choice but to incur the expenses in defending against, or pursuing, 
a complaint for divorce. In such cases a party does not act voluntarily to incur 
rather large attorney’s fees such as those at issue here, but rather because 
such expenditures are made essential given the 
circumstances.
 
McMurry 
v. McMurry, 
2010 WY 163, ¶ 19, 245 P.3d 316, 322 (Wyo. 2010).
 
[¶60]   As also noted in our decision in McMurry, our definition of judicial 
discretion is longstanding and provides the standard against which we will 
measure a district court’s exercise of its discretion.
 
Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.
 
McMurry, 
¶ 19, 245 P.3d  at 322 (quoting Vaughn v. 
State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998)).
 
[¶61]   With respect to Father’s first 
argument against the district court’s award of fees and costs, Father did not 
prove a material change of circumstances detrimental to the interests of 
CJH.  The GAL found no behavior on 
the part of Mother that would shock the court’s conscience, and the district 
court likewise found no such behavior.  
We have upheld the district court’s determination, and we thus reject 
Father’s first argument that the award was unjustified because the modification 
proceeding was Mother’s fault.
 
[¶62]   With respect to the district 
court’s exercise of discretion in awarding fees, we believe our precedent is 
clear and provides sufficient guidance to determine whether a court has abused 
its discretion with an award of fees.  
In this case, Father made the decision to file a petition to modify 
custody, and Mother was required to defend against that petition.  The district court awarded only those 
costs it determined were necessarily incurred in defending against the petition, 
and we find no abuse of discretion in the award.1
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶63]   
The clause in the parties’ divorce decree providing that either 
parties’ relocation outside Wyoming would constitute a material change of 
circumstances justifying consideration of custody modification was invalid as 
speculative, and the district court properly disregarded the provision.  We further find Father was not 
prejudiced by the appealed evidentiary rulings, and we find no clear error in 
the court’s determination that Father had not proven a material change of 
circumstances warranting a custody modification.  Finally, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in its award of attorney’s fees and costs.  Affirmed.
 
FOOTNOTES
1We are not persuaded by Father’s argument that the parties’ relocation 
stipulation should preclude an award of fees in this case.  Father continued with his petition after 
the district court found the relocation stipulation alone was not sufficient for 
the court to find a material change of circumstance, after Mother disputed the 
validity of the relocation provision, and after Mother returned to Wyoming.  It is simply untenable that Father 
continued pursuit of his petition based on a perceived agreement between the 
parties that modification was in order.