Case Title: Commonwealth v. Swann

Citation: 

Docket Number: 141387

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2015-08-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
VIRGINIA: 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court 
Building in the City of Richmond, on Friday, the 28th day of 
August, 2015. 
 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
 against   
Record No. 141387 
 
 
 
Court of Appeals No. 0562-13-4 
 
Storme Gary Swann, a/k/a 
 Henry Gary Simpson, a/k/a 
 Gary Simpson, 
 
 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Upon an appeal from a 
judgment rendered by the Court 
of Appeals of Virginia. 
 
 
 
A jury convicted Storme Gary Swann of abduction, robbery and 
statutory burglary.  The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions 
based on Swann's claim that his rights under the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
were violated.  On the Commonwealth's appeal, we affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals in reversing Swann's convictions, 
but on narrower, non-constitutional grounds. 
I. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
The two female victims in this case were in a hotel room in 
Arlington County when an unknown man forced his way into their 
room, tied them up, and robbed them of cash and other personal 
property.  In reviewing hotel surveillance video from the night of 
the robbery as part of his investigation, Detective Don Fortunato 
of the Arlington County Police Department observed a man in the 
video who appeared to match the victims' description of the 
 
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individual who robbed them.  When the victims were shown the video, 
one of them identified the individual on the video as the 
perpetrator, while the other victim did not believe it was him. 
The police department then issued a news release to various 
regional media outlets that described the robbery, provided still 
photographs of the man shown in the hotel surveillance video, and 
asked anyone with information about the robbery or the identity of 
the suspect to call Detective Fortunato.  Shortly thereafter, 
Fortunato received an anonymous tip from Crime Solvers identifying 
Swann as the possible perpetrator of the crime.1  There is no 
indication in the record that the police ever learned the identity 
of this anonymous caller. 
Based on the anonymous tip implicating Swann, along with other 
information the police collected in its investigation, Swann was 
arrested and charged with two counts of abduction (Code § 18.2-48), 
two counts of robbery (Code § 18.2-58), and statutory burglary 
(Code § 18.2-90).  At a pretrial hearing, the parties stipulated 
that Fortunato would not testify at Swann's jury trial to the 
specific content of the anonymous tip implicating Swann, but would 
state only that he received a tip through Crime Solvers that 
"point[ed] to" Swann or "indicat[ed]" that Swann was the 
perpetrator. 
                     
 
1 As Fortunato explained at trial, Crime Solvers is an 
organization independent from, but has a liaison with, the police 
department.  Crime Solvers is designed to receive information from 
the general public regarding criminal activity and forward the 
information to the police investigator or officer who is requesting 
it.  Further, Crime Solvers allows individuals who call the 
organization with information for the police to remain anonymous. 
 
 
3 
During Fortunato's direct examination at trial, the 
Commonwealth asked him: "Did you receive information from Crime 
Solvers?"  Fortunato answered "[y]es."  The Commonwealth then asked 
Fortunato: "Thereafter, did you investigate someone named Storme 
Swann?"  Fortunato again answered "[y]es."  The Commonwealth did 
not ask Fortunato any further questions about this tip during the 
remainder of direct examination. 
 
On cross-examination, defense counsel inquired about two other 
tips Fortunato received during his investigation.  Specifically, 
defense counsel asked: "You got a phone call from someone saying 
that he read the paper and he thinks the [subject hotel] incident 
was Fred Harold?"  Fortunato acknowledged that he did receive such 
a tip, but explained how he subsequently determined that this 
individual was at an area hospital at the time in question.  
Defense counsel also asked whether Fortunato had "received 
information about a similar crime in Fairfax" committed by a 
perpetrator who was still at large when the instant robbery 
occurred.  Fortunato responded affirmatively. 
 
On redirect, the Commonwealth requested a sidebar and argued 
that defense counsel had "opened the door" to questions regarding 
the content of the tip implicating Swann.  The trial court agreed 
and permitted Fortunato, over defense counsel's objection, to 
testify that "[t]he caller had a good deal of information about Mr. 
Swann."  In addition, the court allowed Fortunato to testify that 
"[t]he caller stated that Mr. Swann told her that he had to lay low 
because of something that he did at an unknown hotel." 
 
The jury convicted Swann on all charges and the trial court 
imposed the sentences fixed by the jury.  Swann appealed his 
 
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convictions to the Court of Appeals.  Among other asserted errors, 
Swann argued the trial court erred by allowing Fortunato, on 
redirect examination, to testify as to the specific content of the 
anonymous tip that implicated Swann.  That testimony, Swann 
contended, was admitted in violation of his Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause rights. 
A three judge panel of the Court of Appeals agreed with Swann 
and then held that the error was not harmless.  Swann v. 
Commonwealth, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 282, at *13-21 (August 19, 2014) 
(unpublished).  Specifically, applying the constitutional harmless 
error standard, the Court of Appeals determined there was "'a 
reasonable possibility that the [erroneous admission of the 
anonymous tip] might have contributed to [Swann's] conviction[s],'" 
and thus "conclude[d] that the Commonwealth's violation of [his] 
Confrontation Clause right was not harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  Id. at *20 (quoting Lilly v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 548, 
551, 523 S.E.2d 208, 209 (1999)).  The Court of Appeals therefore 
reversed Swann's convictions and remanded the case for retrial if 
the Commonwealth be so advised.  The Commonwealth timely appealed 
this ruling. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Non-constitutional Adjudication of Appeal 
 
The doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide 
cases "'on the best and narrowest grounds available.'"  McGhee v. 
Commonwealth, 280 Va. 620, 626 n.4, 701 S.E.2d 58, 61 n.4 (2010) 
(quoting Air Courier Conference v. American Postal Workers Union, 
498 U.S. 517, 531 (1991) (Stevens, J., concurring)).  A fundamental 
and longstanding precept of this doctrine is that "unnecessary 
 
5 
adjudication of a constitutional issue" should be avoided.  Bell v. 
Commonwealth, 264 Va. 172, 203, 563 S.E.2d 695, 715 (2002); see 
Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 417 (2002) (noting the 
"obligation of the Judicial Branch to avoid deciding constitutional 
issues needlessly"); Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 
U.S. 175, 193 (1909) (explaining that "[w]here a case in this court 
can be decided without reference to questions arising under the 
Federal Constitution, that course is usually pursued"). 
Accordingly, because we conclude that, under Virginia non-
constitutional evidentiary law, Detective Fortunato's disputed 
testimony on redirect was inadmissible hearsay and the trial 
court's error in admitting it was not harmless, we need not decide 
whether admission of the testimony violated Swann's rights under 
the Sixth Amendment. 
B. Inadmissible Hearsay 
 
In a non-constitutional context, we review a trial court's 
rulings on whether to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse of 
discretion standard.  Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 229, 738 
S.E.2d 847, 871 (2013); Thomas v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 131, 168, 
688 S.E.2d 220, 240 (2010).  "'Only when reasonable jurists could 
not differ can we say an abuse of discretion has occurred.'"  
Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620, 685 S.E.2d 634, 644 
(2009) (quoting Thomas v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 741, 753, 607 
S.E.2d 738, 743 (2005)).  Under this standard, we hold that the 
trial court abused its discretion in admitting Detective 
Fortunato's disputed testimony, as it plainly constituted 
inadmissible hearsay. 
 
6 
 
The common law definition of hearsay evidence is "testimony in 
court . . . of a statement made out of court, the statement being 
offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted 
therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the 
out-of-court asserter."  Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 333, 338, 
492 S.E.2d 131, 134 (1997) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 490, 496, 689 
S.E.2d 748, 752 (2010) (hearsay "includes testimony given by a 
witness who relates what others have told him" (citation omitted)); 
Va. R. Evid. 2:801 (defining hearsay). 
 
Detective Fortunato's disputed redirect testimony was not just 
hearsay, but "double hearsay," because Fortunato testified as to 
the content of what the anonymous caller to Crime Solvers claimed 
Swann had told her – i.e., that "[t]he caller stated that Mr. Swann 
told her that he had to lay low because of something that he did at 
an unknown hotel."  See Service Steel Erectors Co. v. International 
Union of Operating Eng'rs, 219 Va. 227, 236, 247 S.E.2d 370, 376 
(1978) (upholding exclusion of proffered testimony consisting of 
"double hearsay").  As this Court has explained, in order for 
"double hearsay . . . to be admissible, 'both the primary hearsay 
declaration and each hearsay declaration included within it must 
conform to a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.'"  Riner v. 
Commonwealth, 268 Va. 296, 324, 601 S.E.2d 555, 571 (2004) (quoting 
with approval West v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 906, 910, 407 
S.E.2d 22, 24 (1991)).  See also Va. R. Evid. 2:805 (addressing 
"[h]earsay within hearsay"). 
The Commonwealth argues on brief that Fortunato's testimony 
reciting the content of the anonymous tip implicating Swann was not 
 
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offered for the truth of the matter asserted.  Rather, the 
Commonwealth contends, the testimony was appropriately offered 
merely to explain why Fortunato focused the investigation on Swann. 
To be sure, the prosecution may introduce evidence of a tip 
received by the police for the purpose of showing the reason for 
the police officers' conduct in pursuing a particular individual as 
part of a criminal investigation.  That is, such evidence may be 
offered, within limits, to establish the propriety of the 
investigation and not for the truth of the tipster's statement.  
Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 460, 477, 450 S.E.2d 379, 390 
(1994); Upchurch v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 408, 410, 258 S.E.2d 506, 
507-08 (1979).  When that is the case, the evidence does not 
violate the hearsay rule. 
 
The Commonwealth, however, is not in a position to advance 
this argument on appeal, which its counsel tacitly acknowledged to 
this Court during oral argument, in light of the prosecution's 
closing argument in this case.  During closing argument, counsel 
for the Commonwealth argued to the jury: "Finally, and most 
importantly, we have two other pieces of evidence.  First, 
Detective Fortunato told you that the tip he received said that the 
defendant had to lay low because of something that he did at an 
unknown hotel.  That's a statement of the defendant.  You can 
consider that and you should consider that."  This argument belies 
the Commonwealth's contention on brief that the tip was not offered 
for its truth, as the prosecution told the jury that Swann, in 
fact, made this incriminating statement and then indicated that the 
jury should consider the statement as evidence of Swann's guilt. 
 
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Arguing in the alternative, the Commonwealth contends that, 
even if Fortunato's testimony about the content of the anonymous 
tip implicating Swann was otherwise inadmissible hearsay, Swann 
"opened the door" to such testimony by his cross-examination of 
Fortunato. 
Consistent with the above-stated standard of review, "[o]nce  
a party has 'opened the door' to inquiry into a subject, the 
permissible scope of examination on the subject by the opposing 
party is 'a matter for the exercise of discretion by the trial 
court,' and we will not disturb the court's action on appeal unless 
it plainly appears that the court abused its discretion."  Savino 
v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 534, 545, 391 S.E.2d 276, 282 (1990) 
(quoting Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 438, 304 S.E.2d 271, 
279-80 (1983)).  See Linwood Earl Briley v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 
532, 540, 273 S.E.2d 48, 53 (1980) ("Cross-examination on a part of 
a transaction enables the opposing party to elicit evidence on 
redirect examination of the whole transaction at least to the 
extent that it relates to the same subject." (quoting United States 
v. Barrentine, 591 F.2d 1069, 1081 (5th Cir. 1979))). 
The Commonwealth argues that during the cross-examination of 
Fortunato the defense "attack[ed] the reliability and diligence of 
the police investigation" in this case by questioning Fortunato 
about the tips he received regarding two other potential suspects.  
This exchange, according to the Commonwealth, opened the door to 
Fortunato's redirect testimony concerning the tip about Swann, 
which was "aimed at showing the investigation was not deficient."  
The Commonwealth thus concludes that the trial court did not abuse 
 
9 
its discretion in permitting the Commonwealth to offer this limited 
evidence. 
The Commonwealth's argument falls short, however, because 
defense counsel's cross-examination of Fortunato did not open the 
door as wide as the Commonwealth contends.  During this cross-
examination defense counsel asked only limited questions, and 
Fortunato provided very limited responses, about the tips 
concerning two other potential suspects – namely, one Fred Harold 
and some unnamed perpetrator of a similar crime in Fairfax who was 
still at large when the instant crime occurred.  Fortunato merely 
explained that he determined that Harold was at an area hospital at 
the time in question and acknowledged that he had "received 
information" about the similar crime in Fairfax.  We simply cannot 
say, under a principled application of Virginia's evidentiary and 
trial procedure doctrines, that such testimony opened the door to 
the admission of the double hearsay contained in Fortunato's 
subsequent recitation of the actual content of the anonymous tip 
implicating Swann during redirect.  In short, the double hearsay on 
redirect exceeded the scope of cross-examination.   The trial court 
thus abused its discretion in admitting this hearsay into evidence 
over the defense's well-founded objection. 
C. Harmless Error 
Finally, we address the issue of harmless error.  In 
concluding that the trial court's admission of Fortunato's disputed 
testimony violated Swann's Confrontation Clause rights and 
reversing his convictions, the Court of Appeals determined that the 
violation was not harmless error under the applicable 
constitutional standard.  Here, the Commonwealth limits its 
 
10 
challenge to the Court of Appeals' threshold determination as to 
the testimony's admissibility.  Nevertheless, Code § 8.01-678 makes 
"harmless-error review required in all cases."  Ferguson v. 
Commonwealth, 240 Va. ix, ix, 396 S.E.2d 675, 675 (1990) (emphasis 
in original); see Walker v. Commonwealth, 144 Va. 648, 652, 131 
S.E. 230, 231 (1926) (holding that the harmless error statute "puts 
a limitation on the powers of this court to reverse the judgment of 
the trial court — a limitation which we must consider on every 
application for an appeal and on the hearing of every case 
submitted to our judgment").2 
We have thus conducted a harmless error review under the non-
constitutional standard, in keeping with our more narrow review of 
this appeal, and conclude that the erroneous admission of 
Fortunato's double hearsay testimony was not harmless.  Under this 
standard, a non-constitutional error in a criminal case is harmless 
"'[i]f, when all is said and done, . . . the error did not 
influence the jury, or had but slight effect.'"  Anderson v. 
Commonwealth, 282 Va. 457, 467, 717 S.E.2d 623, 628 (2011) (quoting 
Rose v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 3, 12, 613 S.E.2d 454, 458 (2005)).  
However, if we "'cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering 
all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the 
whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the 
                     
2 See also United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509 (1983) 
("[I]t is the duty of a reviewing court to consider the trial 
record as a whole and to ignore errors that are harmless" lest they 
"retreat from their responsibility, becoming instead impregnable 
citadels of technicality." (citations, alteration, and internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 
11 
error," then "the conviction cannot stand.'"  Id. (quoting Rose, 
270 Va. at 12, 613 S.E.2d at 458-59). 
 
Upon our review of the entire record, we cannot say with fair 
assurance that the jury was not substantially influenced by the 
erroneous admission into evidence of the substance of the tip 
implicating Swann through the testimony of Detective Fortunato - 
that is, testimony offered for the truth of the anonymous tipster's 
assertion that Swann said he had to "lay low because of something 
he did at an unknown hotel."  Indeed, in closing argument, the 
Commonwealth made clear the importance of the content of the tip by 
arguing that it was one of the prosecution's "most important[]" 
pieces of evidence for proving Swann's guilt.  Thus, we are 
compelled to conclude that the error in admitting this evidence was 
not harmless. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
The Court of Appeals decided this case on the basis that the 
admission into evidence of Detective Fortunato's disputed testimony 
violated Swann's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights.  We 
need not resolve that issue in light of our limited holding that 
the testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay and its admission 
was not harmless under non-constitutional principles.  Thus, we 
vacate that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding 
that Swann's constitutional rights were violated.  Further, based 
on our limited holding in this case, we affirm that part of the 
Court of Appeals' judgment reversing Swann's convictions and 
remanding the case for retrial if the Commonwealth be so advised. 
 
 
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This order shall be certified to the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia and the Circuit Court of Arlington County and shall be 
published in the Virginia Reports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Copy, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Teste: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk