Case Title: Commonwealth v. Wimer

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12412

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-06-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12412 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JEFFREY WIMER. 
 
 
 
Franklin.     February 8, 2018. - June 21, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act.  Open 
and Gross Lewdness and Lascivious Behavior.  Practice, 
Criminal, Sentence.  Statute, Construction.  Words, "Second 
and subsequent adjudication or conviction." 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Greenfield Division 
of the District Court Department on July 11, 2012. 
 
 
A motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed on December 
19, 2016, was heard by William F. Mazanec, III, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Timothy St. Lawrence for the defendant. 
 
Cynthia M. Von Flatern, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  The sex offender registration statute requires 
those convicted of committing certain acts to register with the 
Sex Offender Registry Board (board) as sex offenders.  G. L. 
2 
 
c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q.  A "second and subsequent adjudication or 
conviction of open and gross lewdness" in violation of G. L. 
c. 272, § 16,1 requires such registration.  G. L. c. 6, § 178C.  
The defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of this crime and was 
ordered to register as a sex offender.  He appeals from the 
denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing 
that, as the two convictions were adjudicated during the same 
proceeding, he did not have a "second and subsequent" conviction 
as required by § 178C and, thus, he was not required to register 
as a sex offender.  We agree and, accordingly, we reverse. 
 
Background.  1.  Statutory framework.  The sex offender 
registration statute, originally passed in 1996, see St. 1996, 
c. 239, and substantially modified in 1999, see St. 1999, c. 74, 
was enacted to address "the danger of recidivism posed by sex 
offenders, especially sexually violent offenders who commit 
predatory acts characterized by repetitive and compulsive 
behavior."  Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 205614 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 594, 595 (2013), quoting 
St. 1999, c. 74, § 1.  The statute requires a sex offender to 
provide certain personal information, including name and current 
address, to the board.  G. L. c. 6, § 178E. 
                     
1 General Laws c. 272, § 16, provides:  "A man or woman, 
married or unmarried, who is guilty of open and gross lewdness 
and lascivious behavior, shall be punished . . . ." 
3 
 
The board classifies sex offenders within a system of three 
different levels based on risk of reoffense and degree of 
dangerousness, with level one representing the designation for 
offenders presenting the least serious risk of reoffense and 
level of dangerousness and level three for those presenting the 
most serious.2  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2).  A sex offender's 
registration level has consequences for public access to that 
offender's information.  Level one offenders are entitled to 
greater information privacy.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178D.  Level two 
and three sex offenders, by contrast, have their information 
published in an online database available to the public.  Id. 
 
The sex offender registration statute designates a number 
of offenses as sex offenses, including, but not limited to, 
violent and nonviolent unwanted sexual touching, sexual offenses 
against vulnerable victims, and possession or distribution of 
child pornography.  Unlike the offense at issue in this case, 
                     
 
2 "The board begins with a preliminary recommended 
classification.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178L (1); 803 Code Mass Regs. 
§ 1.06(3) (2016).  Any offender who disagrees with the 
recommended classification may request a de novo evidentiary 
hearing conducted by a board member, a panel of three board 
members, or a hearing examiner.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178L (2); 803 
Code Mass. Regs. §§ 1.06(4), 1.08, 1.14 (2016).  If no such 
request is made, the board's recommended classification decision 
becomes its final classification determination.  See G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178L (1). . . .  A sex offender has a right to seek judicial 
review of the final classification decision in accordance with 
G. L. c. 30A, § 14.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178M."  Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 209081 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 478 Mass. 
454, 455 n.4 (2017). 
4 
 
most, but not all, of the offenses require registration after 
one conviction.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178C. 
 
2.  Factual and procedural history.  In 2013, the defendant 
pleaded guilty to two counts of open and gross lewdness, in 
violation of G. L. c. 272, § 16.  The charges arose from two 
incidents in which the defendant masturbated in front of his 
girl friend's nine year old daughter.  The defendant's sentence 
on the second conviction included an order to register as a sex 
offender pursuant to G. L. c. 6, § 178C, which requires such 
registration upon a "second and subsequent adjudication or 
conviction of open and gross lewdness." 
 
Subsequently the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea and a motion for a new trial; both were denied.  See 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  
The defendant appealed, and then filed a motion to correct an 
illegal sentence in the trial court.3  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 
30 (a) ("Any person . . . whose liberty is restrained pursuant 
to a criminal conviction may . . . file a written motion . . 
.").  After a nonevidentiary hearing, the trial judge denied the 
defendant's rule 30 (a) motion.  The Appeals Court consolidated 
                     
 
3 The defendant accepted the condition of registering as a 
sex offender at the time of his change of plea.  However, 
although "the defendant could plead guilty, he could not accept 
a statutorily created sentencing condition that simply did not 
exist under the facts of his case."  Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 
60 Mass. App. Ct. 416, 418 (2004). 
5 
 
the defendant's appeals, and we transferred the case here on our 
own motion.  Before us, the defendant challenges only the denial 
of his rule 30 (a) motion. 
Generally we review denials of rule 30 (a) motions for 
abuse of discretion.  Commonwealth v. Perez, 477 Mass. 677, 681-
682 (2017).  However, as the question is one of statutory 
interpretation, we review the lower court's ruling de 
novo.  Commonwealth v. Ventura, 465 Mass. 202, 208 (2013). 
 
Discussion.  We look to the plain language of a statute to 
ascertain the intent of the Legislature.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Deberry, 441 Mass. 211, 215 (2004).  Open 
and gross lewdness is a sex offense requiring registration with 
the board only upon a "second and subsequent adjudication or 
conviction."  G. L. c. 6, § 178C.  As the statute calls for a 
"second and subsequent" event, two conditions must be met before 
a defendant must register:  (1) there must be two such 
events, and (2) the second must be subsequent to the first.  
See United Church of Religious Science v. Assessors of 
Attleboro, 372 Mass. 280, 284-285 (1977) (use of word "and" 
between two factors required both factors be present for 
provision to apply).  Although the term "subsequent" is not 
defined in the act, the ordinary meaning of the term is 
"following in time:  coming or being later than something else."  
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2278 (2002).  
6 
 
See Modica v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 477 Mass. 102, 104 
(2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Bell, 442 Mass. 118, 124 (2004) 
("When a statute does not define its words we give them their 
usual and accepted meanings [derived] . . . from sources 
presumably known to the statute's enactors, such as their use in 
other legal contexts and dictionary definitions"). 
Moreover, "second and subsequent" modifies "adjudication or 
conviction."  G. L. c. 6, § 178C.  Both "adjudication" and 
"conviction" involve a legal proceeding.  Although the defendant 
committed two separate incidents on two different occasions (one 
subsequent to the other), the resulting two convictions occurred 
in the same judicial proceeding.  Thus, the second conviction 
was not a subsequent conviction. 
It is instructive to compare the language at issue to 
similar language found elsewhere in § 178C.  See Casseus 
v. Eastern Bus Co., 478 Mass. 786, 795 (2018) ("When the meaning 
of any particular section or clause of a statute is questioned, 
it is proper, no doubt, to look into the other parts of the 
statute; otherwise the different sections of the same statute 
might be so construed as to be repugnant . . ." [citation 
omitted]).  For example, human trafficking is also a sex offense 
requiring registration but only upon a "second or 
subsequent violation" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 6, § 178C.  
Notably, there the term "violation" is used rather than the 
7 
 
phrase "adjudication or conviction."  Thus, unlike the two 
incidents of open and gross lewdness at issue here, two or more 
incidents of human trafficking would be considered a sex offense 
under the act regardless of whether they were adjudicated 
together.4  Had the Legislature intended the interpretation the 
Commonwealth would have us adopt, it would have used the term 
"violation" rather than the phrase "adjudication or conviction."  
See Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 439 Mass. 826, 833 (2003) ("Where 
the [L]egislature has carefully employed a term in one place and 
excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded" 
[citation omitted]). 
 
The Commonwealth disagrees, arguing that we should defer to 
the board, which interprets "second and subsequent adjudication 
or conviction" differently.  A regulation promulgated by the 
board defines this phrase as it appears in § 178C as 
"[t]he later of two or more separate convictions pursuant 
to [G. L.] c. 272, § 16.  Multiple convictions resulting 
from a single act shall be treated as a single conviction, 
but arraignments occurring on the same date and resulting 
in multiple convictions shall be presumed to be the result 
of separate acts and treated as separate convictions." 
 
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.03 (2016). 
                     
4 We also note that in the case of human trafficking, the 
statute refers to a "second or subsequent violation" (emphasis 
added).  G. L. c. 6, § 178C.  See Moronta v. Nationstar Mtge., 
LLC, 476 Mass. 1013, 1014 (2016) ("The use of the word 'or' to 
separate the prongs of a statute indicates that the prongs are 
alternatives, that is, that either one would be sufficient on 
its own and that it is not necessary to establish both"). 
8 
 
 
We defer to an agency's statutory interpretation where the 
statute is ambiguous and the interpretation is reasonable.  
See Alves's Case, 451 Mass. 171, 175 (2008).  Here, however, as 
discussed above, the statutory language is unambiguous -- a 
defendant commits a sex offense under § 178C where his or her 
second adjudication or conviction of open and gross lewdness 
occurs after a first adjudication or conviction.  Two violations 
will suffice only if the adjudications or convictions for them 
are not simultaneous.  As the board's interpretation renders the 
word "subsequent" superfluous, we decline to defer to it.  
See Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 537 (2015) ("we 'give effect 
to all words of a statute, assuming none to be superfluous'" 
[citation omitted]).  See also Taylor v. Housing Appeals Comm., 
451 Mass. 149, 154 (2008). 
 
The Legislature's choice of words in a different but 
related statute confirms our conclusion.  See Commonwealth 
v. Escobar, 479 Mass. 225, 231-232 (2018).  The phrase "second 
and subsequent" is also used in a related section that provides 
for additional punishment upon a "second and subsequent 
conviction" for failure to register with the board.  G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178H (a) (2).5  In a case dealing with § 178H (a) (2), the 
                     
5 A first conviction of failure to register with the board 
results in a minimum sentence of six months in a house of 
correction.  G. L. c. 6, § 178H (a) (1).  However, a "second and 
9 
 
Appeals Court noted that, with regard to statutes that call for 
increased punishment with a subsequent conviction, the defendant 
must "[have] previously been convicted of at least one similar 
. . . offense" (emphasis added).  Commonwealth v. Berardi, 88 
Mass. App. Ct. 466, 470 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Miranda, 
441 Mass. 783, 788 (2004).  This view of § 178H (a) (2) accords 
with our interpretation of § 178C. 
 
Thus, we conclude that the phrase "second and subsequent 
adjudication or conviction" requires that a defendant be 
convicted of open and gross lewdness once before a second 
conviction triggers § 178C. 
 
Conclusion.  The decision of the District Court judge 
denying the motion to correct an illegal sentence is reversed, 
and the matter is remanded for entry of an order consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
subsequent conviction" results in a minimum sentence of five 
years in a State prison.  G. L. c. 6, § 178H (a) (2).