Case Title: Summers v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 417, 2003

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-01-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WILLIAM GREGORY SUMMERS, 
§ 
§ 
No.  417, 2003 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
Appellant, 
 
 
 
§ 
Court Below–Superior Court 
§ 
of the State of Delaware, in and 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for Kent County, in Cr.A. No.  
§ 
IK97-10-0448 - 0451. 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
§ 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
Def.  ID No.  9704012286 
 
Submitted: 
November 19, 2003 
Decided: 
January 27, 2004 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 27th day of January 2004, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 
25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, William Gregory Summers, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s order denying his third motion for postconviction relief pursuant 
to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The appellee, State of Delaware, has moved 
to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on 
the face of Summers’ opening brief that the appeal is without merit.  We agree and 
AFFIRM. 
 
 
2 
(2) 
In 1999, Summers was convicted after a bench trial of Robbery in 
the First Degree, Assault in the Third Degree and Misdemeanor Theft.   He was 
declared a habitual offender and sentenced to life in prison.  On direct appeal, 
Summers’ convictions and sentences were affirmed with the exception of the theft 
conviction, which was reversed by the Supreme Court and later stricken by the 
Superior Court.1   
(3) 
Summers filed his first motion for postconviction relief in May 2001. 
 In that motion, Summers asserted, in part, that both his trial and appellate counsel 
were ineffective.  The Superior Court summarily denied the motion, and this Court 
affirmed the judgment.2  In February 2003, Summers filed his second motion for 
postconviction relief.  He again contended that his trial counsel and appellate 
counsel were ineffective.  The Superior Court summarily dismissed Summers’ 
second motion as procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(2) and (3), and this Court 
affirmed.3   
                                                 
1Summers v.  State, 2000 WL 1508771 (Del.  Supr.). 
2Summers v.  State, 2002 WL 31300028 (Del.  Supr.). 
3Summers v.  State, 2003 WL 21456669 (Del.  Supr.). 
 
 
3 
(4) 
In July 2003, Summers filed his third motion for postconviction 
relief.  Again, Summers alleged that both his trial and appellate counsel were 
ineffective, and again the Superior Court summarily dismissed the motion as 
procedurally barred, this time finding it untimely pursuant to Rule 61(i)(1), 
repetitive pursuant to Rule 61(i)(2), and defaulted pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3).  This 
appeal followed. 
(5) 
As a preliminary matter, we note that Summers’ convictions became 
final in October 2000 when this Court issued the mandate following his direct 
appeal.4  Thus, Summers’ third postconviction motion that was filed in July 2003 
was not time-barred under Rule 61(i)(1), as was held by the Superior Court.5  
Nonetheless, it is clear that Summers’ motion was subject to the procedural bars of 
Rule 61(i)(2) and Rule 61(i)(3), as the Superior Court determined.  Moreover, we 
conclude that Summers has not demonstrated why the procedural bars should be 
                                                 
4See Jackson v.  State, 654 A.2d 829, 833 (1995). 
5Rule 61(i)(1) bars postconviction motions that are filed more than three years after the 
judgment of conviction is final. 
 
 
4 
excused in the interest of justice,6 for a miscarriage of justice or due to a lack of 
jurisdiction.7 
                                                 
6Super.  Ct.  Crim.  R.  61(i)(2). 
7Super.  Ct.  Crim.  R.  61(i)(5). 
 
 
5 
(6) 
It is also clear that Summers’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
are barred as formerly adjudicated, pursuant to Rule 61(i)(4).  Summers has 
previously complained about, and received a ruling on, the effectiveness of his 
attorneys.  Summers is not free to litigate that issue again even though he may 
have added new factual allegations.8  Moreover, he has not demonstrated that 
reconsideration of his claims is warranted in the interest of justice.9  
(7) 
It is manifest on the face of Summers’ opening brief that his appeal is 
without merit.  The issues on appeal are controlled by settled Delaware law.  To 
the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, clearly there was no abuse of 
discretion. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The 
judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Randy J.  Holland 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
8Riley v.  State, 585 A.2d 719, 721 (1990) (holding that the Court is not required to 
reconsider a claim simply because it has been “refined or restated”). 
9Super.  Ct.  Crim.  R.  61(i)(4).