Case Title: Soffer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC13-139

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2016-03-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
 
No. SC13-139 
____________ 
 
LUCILLE RUTH SOFFER, etc.,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY,  
Respondent. 
 
[March 17, 2016] 
 
PARIENTE, J. 
The issue framed by the certified question in this case is whether individual 
members of the Engle class are entitled to seek punitive damages under theories of 
negligence or strict liability in their individual lawsuits following this Court’s 
decertification of the class action in Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 
1254 (Fla. 2006).  In Soffer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 106 So. 3d 456, 460-61 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2012), the First District Court of Appeal, in a split decision, held 
that individual members of the Engle class action are bound by the procedural 
posture of the Engle class representatives when they pursue their individual 
lawsuits and thus cannot seek punitive damages on the counts for negligence or 
 
 
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strict liability.  Id. at 459-61.  However, because its decision rested on its 
interpretation of this Court’s decision in Engle, the First District certified the 
following question of great public importance for this Court’s review: 
ARE MEMBERS OF THE CLASS IN ENGLE V. LIGGETT 
GROUP, INC., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006), ENTITLED TO 
PURSUE AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER 
THEORIES OF NEGLIGENCE OR STRICT LIABILITY? 
Id. at 461.1  Subsequently, in Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Hallgren, 124 So. 3d 350, 
358 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), the Second District Court of Appeal reached the opposite 
conclusion, certified conflict with the First District’s decision in Soffer, and also 
certified the same question as the First District.  The Third and Fourth District 
Courts of Appeal have adopted the reasoning of Soffer.  See R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co. v. Williams, No. 3D13-2099, 39 Fla. L. Weekly D1863 (Fla. 3d DCA 
Sept. 3, 2014) (summarily adopting the holding in Soffer); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co. v. Ciccone, 123 So. 3d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (adopting Soffer and vacating 
punitive damages award of $50,000).  
To resolve this conflict and to answer the certified question, we hold that the 
individual members of the Engle class action are not prevented from seeking 
punitive damages on all claims properly raised in their subsequent individual 
actions.  We reach this decision for several reasons.   
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, §3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
 
 
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First, the Engle trial court’s denial of the motion to amend the class action 
complaint to include a demand for punitive damages on the counts for negligence 
and strict liability was not based on the merits of the request but instead rested on 
the procedural posture at the time.  The procedural posture of the case changed 
entirely when this Court vacated the entire punitive damages award of $145 billion 
and the related findings on punitive damages, thus wiping the slate clean as it 
relates to punitive damages and requiring each individual plaintiff to prove 
entitlement to punitive damages in his or her individual lawsuit.  See Engle, 945 
So. 2d at 1254.   
Second, a demand for punitive damages is “not a separate and distinct cause 
of action; rather it is auxiliary to, and dependent upon, the existence of an 
underlying claim.”  Liggett Grp., Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434, 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2003), quashed in part by Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1254.  Therefore, neither the statute 
of limitations nor principles of equitable tolling bars a plaintiff from requesting 
punitive damages on all properly pled counts.  In fact, a plaintiff cannot even 
include a demand for punitive damages in the initial complaint and is allowed to 
add a request for punitive damages only if the evidence establishes a right to claim 
punitive damages by a “reasonable showing by evidence in the record,” pursuant to 
section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes.   
 
 
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Third, the legal standard for establishing entitlement to punitive damages—
that is, that the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
conduct causing the damage was either “intentional” or “grossly negligent”—does 
not vary depending on the underlying legal theory.  Even if negligence or strict 
liability constitutes the underlying cause of action, the plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant’s conduct was “so reckless or wanting in care that it constituted a 
conscious disregard or indifference to the life, safety, or rights of persons exposed 
to such conduct.”  In re Std. Jury Instr. In Civ. Cases—Report No. 09-01, 35 So. 3d 
666, 790 (Fla. 2010).  The burden of proof is heightened from the general “more 
likely than not” standard that applies to general liability questions in a civil case to 
a more stringent “clear and convincing” standard, no matter what the theory of 
punitive damages.  The jury is instructed that, based on the allegedly intentional 
misconduct or gross negligence, it must determine whether punitive damages are 
warranted “as punishment” against the defendant and “as a deterrent to others.”  Id.   
Accordingly, for these reasons, we answer the certified question in the 
affirmative, quash the First District’s decision in Soffer, and approve the well-
reasoned decision of the Second District’s opinion in Hallgren as to the issue of 
punitive damages.  We further disapprove R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Williams, 
No. 3D13-2099, 2014 WL 4344369 (Fla. 3d DCA Sept. 3, 2014), as well as the 
 
 
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portion of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Ciccone, 123 So. 3d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2013), which addresses this issue.2 
FACTS AND BACKGROUND  
Maurice Soffer died in May of 1992 from lung cancer caused by smoking.  
After this Court issued its decision in Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1254, requiring class 
members to file their own individual actions within a year, Soffer’s widow, Lucille 
Soffer, brought a wrongful death action against R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company 
pursuant to that decision.  Her complaint asserted four causes of action, all of 
which had been pled in the Engle class litigation: negligence, strict liability, fraud 
by concealment, and conspiracy to commit fraud.     
Approximately a year prior to trial, Soffer filed a motion to amend her 
complaint to add a demand for punitive damages pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil 
Procedure 1.190(f) and section 768.72, Florida Statutes.  Soffer’s request for the 
amendment was not limited to any one count.  R.J. Reynolds objected based on its 
position that the allegations in support of the motion to amend were “conclusory 
assertions that defendants’ conduct was grossly negligent or willful and wanton” 
and without “factual support.”  Further, R.J. Reynolds argued that “[t]o the extent 
                                          
 
 
2.  We granted review in Ciccone on a separate issue regarding a certified 
conflict of when a tobacco-related condition is manifested.  R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co. v. Ciccone, No. SC13-2415 (Fla. order accepting jurisdiction filed June 13, 
2014). 
 
 
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that Plaintiff seeks punitive damages on a theory that defendants were grossly 
negligent, she has not proffered anything to show . . . such conduct or the required 
nexus to Plaintiff’s decedent.”  (Emphasis omitted.)  The trial court granted the 
motion to amend.   
The case proceeded to trial, where evidence of punitive damages was 
introduced without any ruling from the trial court that limited the evidence of 
punitive damages to any specific count.  During the jury charge conference, R.J. 
Reynolds asserted for the first time that the jury should be instructed that punitive 
damages could be considered only on the fraudulent concealment and conspiracy 
counts based on the procedural posture of the original Engle class action.  Despite 
the fact that the trial court had permitted Soffer to amend her complaint to seek 
punitive damages—an amendment that was not limited to any particular count—
the trial court agreed with R.J. Reynolds and instructed the jury that punitive 
damages could be awarded only if the jury found in favor of Soffer on the claims 
for fraudulent concealment or conspiracy and not under the negligence or strict 
liability claims. 
The jury found that R.J. Reynolds was liable based on the strict liability and 
negligence claims, awarding $5,000,000 in compensatory damages, reduced by 
60% comparative negligence.  The jury, however, rejected the claim that R.J. 
Reynolds’ fraudulent concealment or conspiracy was a legal cause of Soffer’s 
 
 
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death and thus did not consider an award of punitive damages.  The jury verdict 
consisted of special interrogatories as follows: 
1.  Was Maurice Benson Soffer addicted to cigarettes containing 
nicotine manufactured by R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, and if so, 
was such addiction a legal cause of his death? 
YES __X____ NO ______ 
(If you answered “NO” to question 1, your verdict is for R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Company and you should proceed no further 
except to date and sign the verdict form and return it to the courtroom.  
If you answered “YES” to question 1, please answer Questions 2 
through 5.) 
2.  Was R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company’s negligence a legal cause 
of Maurice Benson Soffer’s death? 
YES ___X___ NO ______ 
3.  Were the defective and unreasonably dangerous cigarettes placed 
on the market by R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company a legal cause of 
Maurice Benson Soffer’s death? 
YES ___X___ NO ______ 
4.  Was R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company’s concealment or omission 
of material information about the health effects or addictive nature of 
smoking cigarettes or both a legal cause of Maurice Benson Soffer’s 
death?  
YES ______ NO ___X___ 
5.  Was R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company’s agreement with others to 
conceal or omit material information about the health effects or 
addictive nature of smoking cigarettes or both a legal cause of 
Maurice Benson Soffer’s death? 
YES ______ NO ___X___ 
 
 
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The jury was instructed that if it answered “NO” to questions 4 and 5, as it did, it 
should not consider the questions pertaining to punitive damages. 
After reduction for comparative negligence, a judgment was entered for the 
plaintiffs for a total amount of $2,000,000.  Soffer appealed, asserting that the trial 
court erred in instructing the jury that it was prohibited from awarding punitive 
damages on the counts for negligence and strict liability.3   
The First District affirmed the trial court on this issue, noting that Soffer 
chose to bring her individual action pursuant to Engle based on the benefits that 
membership in the Engle class confers, specifically: (1) the res judicata effect of 
certain factual findings made in Engle, which relieved individual progeny plaintiffs 
of the substantial burden, time, cost, and risk of proving the tortious-conduct 
elements of their actions against the defendants; and (2) a lengthy tolling of 
Florida’s statute of limitations, which ordinarily is two years.  Soffer, 106 So. 3d at 
457-58.  Thus, the First District held, “[p]rogeny plaintiffs wear the same shoes, so 
to speak, as the plaintiffs in Engle because they are the plaintiffs from Engle.”  Id. 
at 460 (emphasis omitted).  In reaching this conclusion, the First District relied on 
this Court’s decision in Engle, noting that the opinion did not suggest that progeny 
                                          
 
 
3.  R.J. Reynolds did not cross-appeal the compensatory damages award.  
 
 
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plaintiffs could bring other claims and remedies that had not been timely asserted 
as part of the Engle litigation.  Id.  
Judge Lewis dissented from the First District’s holding in Soffer, reasoning 
that res judicata did not bar a plaintiff from seeking punitive damages on all 
properly pled counts because this Court’s Engle decision never required Engle 
progeny plaintiffs to file identical claims.  In concluding that an Engle progeny 
plaintiff should be able to seek different remedies, Judge Lewis relied on three 
reasons: (1) a claim for punitive damages is “not a separate and distinct cause of 
action but is auxiliary to, and dependent upon, the existence of an underlying 
claim”; (2) the plaintiff’s “reliance on the [Engle] Phase I findings was not relevant 
to her claim for punitive damages, which she had to independently prove”; and (3) 
this Court “retained most of the jury’s Phase I findings,” with the exception of the 
findings on punitive damages.  Id. at 463 (Lewis, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  Judge Lewis asserted that in his view, based on this error, 
Soffer should be entitled to a new trial, limited solely to the issue of punitive 
damages.  Id. at 464.     
 
The Second District, in Hallgren, agreed with Judge Lewis’s concurring-in-
part and dissenting-in-part opinion.  Hallgren, 124 So. 3d at 355.  In that case, 
Claire Hallgren died from lung cancer on November 26, 1995, following her sixty-
year use of tobacco products manufactured by Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds.  Id. 
 
 
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at 351-52.  Theodore Hallgren, as personal representative of her estate, filed a 
complaint based on Engle, asserting four causes of action: (1) strict liability; (2) 
fraudulent concealment; (3) conspiracy to commit fraudulent concealment; and (4) 
negligence.  Id. at 355.  Hallgren also sought punitive damages on all four counts, 
which the trial court permitted.  Id.  The trial was bifurcated into two phases.  In 
Phase I, the jury determined that Hallgren was a member of the Engle class and 
found in favor of Hallgren on all counts, apportioning fifty percent of fault to Mrs. 
Hallgren, twenty-five percent to Philip Morris, and twenty-five percent to R.J. 
Reynolds.  Id.  In addition, the jury determined the amount of compensatory 
damages, which the trial court reduced to approximately $1,000,000 based on 
comparative fault, and found that Hallgren was entitled to punitive damages 
against each defendant.  Id.  In Phase II, the jury awarded Hallgren “$750,000 in 
punitive damages against both Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds.”  Id. 
 
The tobacco companies appealed, asserting that Hallgren was precluded 
from seeking punitive damages on his claims of negligence and strict liability 
because he initiated the action pursuant to Engle and was relying on the res 
judicata effect of the Engle litigation, despite the Engle class plaintiffs having not 
sought punitive damages under all of the same theories of liability.  Id. at 353.  The 
Second District disagreed that an Engle progeny plaintiff is precluded from seeking 
 
 
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punitive damages for strict liability and negligence as a result of the procedural 
posture of Engle.  Id.  
 
While the Second District acknowledged that members of the Engle class 
benefit by the res judicata effect of the Phase I findings, the district court rejected 
the notion that “such benefit precludes an Engle progeny plaintiff from seeking a 
remedy barred as untimely by the Engle trial court for mere procedural 
deficiencies.”  Id. at 354.  In fact, the Second District held that “the unique nature 
of Engle necessitates a finding that progeny plaintiffs are permitted to seek 
punitive damages on their claims for negligence and strict liability.”  Id.  In 
reaching this conclusion, the Second District relied on this Court’s opinion in 
Engle and concluded that the decision “neither expressly nor impliedly expanded 
its Engle res judicata parameters to limit Engle progeny plaintiffs’ ability to pursue 
the remedy of punitive damages.”  Id. at 357.  The Second District recognized that 
the First District reached an opposite conclusion in Soffer and certified conflict.  
Hallgren, 124 So. 3d at 358.   
ANALYSIS 
The certified question asks this Court whether Engle progeny plaintiffs may 
pursue an award of punitive damages under theories of negligence or strict 
liability, or whether they are limited to seeking punitive damages only as to the 
intentional tort counts of fraudulent concealment and conspiracy that were 
 
 
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permitted in the original Engle class action.  In analyzing this question, we begin 
by reviewing Engle, including whether progeny plaintiffs who are part of the Engle 
class are bound by the procedural posture of punitive damages in the Engle class 
action and whether they “stand in the shoes” of the class representatives for all 
purposes.  We conclude that the individual progeny plaintiffs are not bound by the 
prior procedural posture of Engle when pleading punitive damages because the 
findings regarding liability for punitive damages were vacated.   
We then proceed to address the additional argument raised by R.J. Reynolds: 
whether the Engle progeny plaintiffs are precluded from pursuing punitive 
damages on all counts because the Engle class representatives did not cross-appeal 
the denial of their motion to amend.  We also explain why a claim for punitive 
damages is not a separate cause of action that is subject to a separate statute of 
limitations.  Finally, we address whether R.J. Reynolds would be prejudiced in this 
case by allowing Soffer to seek punitive damages on her causes of action for 
negligence and strict liability.  We conclude that there is no legal or principled 
basis for denying Engle progeny plaintiffs the right to pursue punitive damages on 
all properly pled counts. 
I.  The Engle Class Proceedings: Res Judicata & Procedural Posture 
The original Engle class action complaint was filed in May 1994.  Shortly 
thereafter, an amended complaint was filed, raising eight counts: (1) strict liability; 
 
 
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(2) fraud; (3) conspiracy to commit fraud; (4) breach of implied warranty; (5) 
intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) negligence; (7) a request for 
equitable relief; and (8) breach of express warranty.  R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. 
Engle, 672 So. 2d 39, 40 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).  The amended complaint sought 
punitive damages only on the intentional tort counts—fraud, conspiracy to commit 
fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The trial court certified the 
class, and the Third District affirmed the trial court’s certification order, but 
modified it to apply to only Florida citizens and residents.  Id. at 40, 42. 
The trial was divided into three phases.  In Phase I, the jury determined 
whether the defendants were liable and whether the entire class was entitled to 
punitive damages.  Engle, 853 So. 2d at 441.  In Phase II, the jury determined the 
amount of compensatory damages for the named plaintiffs and the amount of 
punitive damages for the entire class.  Id.  In Phase III, new juries were to 
determine the defendants’ liability to the remaining class members and, if liability 
was established, to determine compensatory damages.  Id. at 442. 
Regarding punitive damages, class counsel announced during Phase I their 
intention to seek punitive damages as to all counts, but never filed a motion to 
amend the complaint to seek these damages for any counts other than the 
intentional tort counts originally pled.  At the conclusion of Phase I, the jury found 
the defendants liable to the class members as a whole and also found that the class 
 
 
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members were entitled to punitive damages.  After the jury found entitlement to 
punitive damages, class counsel asked for leave to amend the complaint to seek an 
award of punitive damages for all counts.  The trial court ultimately denied the 
motion as untimely, so the Engle jury considered the amount of punitive damages 
based only on the counts for fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  
The jury found that the class as a whole was entitled to $145 billion in 
punitive damages, to be divided by the class members.  At this point, the 
defendants appealed.4  The Third District reversed the judgment and decertified the 
class.   
This Court approved in part and quashed in part the Third District’s 
decision.  Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1254.  As to the issue of punitive damages, this 
Court held that the trial court prematurely allowed the jury to consider entitlement 
to, and amount of, punitive damages before the jury determined issues of causation 
and damages on the underlying claims.  Id. at 1263.  As this Court reasoned, “a 
finding of liability is required before entitlement to punitive damages can be 
determined, and that liability is more than a breach of duty.  A finding of liability 
necessarily precedes a determination of damages, but does not compel a 
                                          
 
 
4.  Because the defendants appealed after Phase II-B, the action did not 
proceed to Phase III. 
 
 
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compensatory award.”  Id. at 1262-63.5  In other words, before damages can be 
imposed, the factfinder must determine individualized issues, such as legal 
causation and comparative fault—issues not yet determined in Phase I.  Because 
problems with the three-phase trial plan negated the continued viability of the class 
action, this Court decertified the Engle class.  Id. at 1267-69.   
While decertifying the class, this Court indicated that the decertification was 
without prejudice for the class members to file individual claims within one year of 
the issuance of this Court’s mandate, with res judicata effect given to the following 
specific Phase I findings: 
Questions 1 (general causation), 2 (addiction of cigarettes), 3 (strict 
liability), 4(a) (fraud by concealment), 5(a) (civil-conspiracy-
concealment), 6 (breach of implied warranty), 7 (breach of express 
warranty), and 8 (negligence).  
Id. at 1254-55.  In other words, this Court explicitly held that the common liability 
findings from Phase I had res judicata effect for the Engle progeny plaintiffs but 
that none of the findings pertaining to punitive damages could stand.   
The First District in Soffer and the Second District in Hallgren have each 
interpreted this Court’s Engle decision, reaching different conclusions as to the 
effect of Engle on claims for punitive damages.  We now hold that the Second 
                                          
 
 
5.  We also determined that the punitive damages award to the class based 
on the intentional tort theories was clearly excessive because it would practically 
bankrupt some of the defendants.  Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1265 n.8. 
 
 
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District’s interpretation of the effect of our Engle decision is the correct one.  As 
the Second District reasoned:  
We recognize and appreciate the unprecedented significance of 
the Engle decision, and we agree that the Engle class is benefited by 
the res judicata effect of the Phase I findings.  Nonetheless, we cannot 
conclude that such benefit precludes an Engle progeny plaintiff from 
seeking a remedy barred as untimely by the Engle trial court for mere 
procedural deficiencies.  Further, unlike the First District, we 
conclude that the unique nature of Engle necessitates a finding that 
progeny plaintiffs are permitted to seek punitive damages on their 
claims for negligence and strict liability. 
First, as noted by the First District, the supreme court did not 
address this issue in Engle; rather, the supreme court made two 
holdings with regard to punitive damages, neither of which creates a 
bar to individual progeny plaintiffs seeking punitive damages for strict 
liability and negligence claims.  When the supreme court concluded 
that the punitive damages award must be reversed, it decided to 
decertify the class and retain the Phase I findings as to claims for 
negligence, strict liability, fraudulent concealment, and conspiracy to 
commit fraudulent concealment.  Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1269.  The 
court held that “[c]lass members can choose to initiate individual 
damages actions and the Phase I common core findings . . . will have 
res judicata effect in those trials.”  Id.  By specifically stating that the 
Phase I common core findings would have res judicata effect without 
declaring the same for the procedural posture of the litigation, the 
court indicated that the rejected findings (and the issues not passed 
upon) would not have the same res judicata effect as is generally the 
case when litigation is declared res judicata.  Thus, while Mr. 
Hallgren and the Tobacco Companies are clearly bound by the 
findings the supreme court upheld, they are not similarly bound by the 
findings not passed upon. 
 
Hallgren, 124 So. 3d at 354-55 (footnote omitted).  We agree with Hallgren and 
accordingly conclude that the res judicata effect of the Phase I findings addressed 
 
 
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in Engle has no application to claims for punitive damages sought by Engle 
progeny plaintiffs.   
Our decision in Engle specifically set forth those findings to which res 
judicata applies; nothing within our decision expanded the res judicata effect to the 
ability to pursue the remedy of punitive damages.  Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1269 
(“Class members can choose to initiate individual damages actions and the Phase I 
common core findings . . . will have res judicata effect in those trials.”).  In his 
concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part opinion in Soffer, Judge Lewis aptly 
noted that R.J. Reynolds’ argument—that res judicata precludes an Engle progeny 
plaintiff from seeking punitive damages on such claims—is actually an attempt to 
expand the res judicata effect of Engle beyond the parameters set by this Court.  
Soffer, 106 So. 3d at 462 (Lewis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
There is simply no basis to conclude that the procedural posture of Engle 
would bar an Engle progeny plaintiff, such as Soffer, from amending her complaint 
to request punitive damages on all counts that were properly pled in her individual 
action.  As the Second District explained:   
Practically speaking, however, a progeny plaintiff is still required to 
file a new complaint and go through the procedural morass of 
initiating a new cause of action.  And a progeny plaintiff must still 
prove the “individual aspects of the claims specific to each plaintiff,” 
including damages.  [Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 110 So. 3d 
419, 432 (Fla. 2013).]  Because the decision preventing the Engle 
class from amending its complaint to seek punitive damages for 
negligence was merely procedural and was not decided on the merits, 
 
 
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we conclude that the res judicata effect of the Phase I findings does 
not preclude progeny plaintiffs from seeking punitive damages on 
those claims.  See id. at 433 (recognizing “that a ‘purely technical,’ 
non-merits judgment ‘may not be used as a basis for the operation of 
the doctrine of res judicata’ ” (quoting Kent v. Sutker, 40 So. 2d 145, 
147 (Fla. 1949))).  
Hallgren, 124 So. 3d at 357.  In other words, once the punitive damages award was 
vacated by this Court, any individual plaintiff was back to square one on the issue 
of punitive damages:   
But when the Engle trial court’s judgment as to issues of punitive 
damages was reversed, the class members seeking punitive damages 
had to effectively start over in order to plead, prove, and collect 
punitive damages.  If the supreme court had not opted to decertify the 
class and had instead remanded for a new trial, the class would have 
been free to renew its motion to amend the complaint to add the 
remedy of punitive damages to all of its substantive claims.  See 
generally Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190.  Thus, we conclude that Mr. Hallgren 
was entitled to assert a claim for punitive damages on his claims for 
negligence and strict liability because, as the Soffer majority 
recognized, he was in the “same position [class members] would have 
been in had they filed a complaint identical to the Engle class-action 
complaint on the same date the original complaint was filed.”  Soffer, 
106 So. 3d at 460. 
Hallgren, 124 So. 3d at 357 (emphasis added).   
As the Second District recognized, once this Court vacated all of the jury’s 
findings pertaining to punitive damages and required members of the Engle class 
to file individual complaints, the slate was wiped clean as it pertained to punitive 
damages.  Thus, we reject R.J. Reynolds’ argument that res judicata and the 
 
 
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procedural posture of Engle prevent Soffer from seeking punitive damages on all 
properly pled causes of action. 
II.  Waiver by Failure to Cross-Appeal 
 
As an additional aspect of its preclusion argument, R.J. Reynolds points to 
Airvac, Inc. v. Ranger Insurance Co., 330 So. 2d 467, 469 (Fla. 1976), for the 
proposition that a prevailing party must cross-appeal the denial of a motion to 
amend or else the party waives the right to reassert that motion following any 
remand.  In other words, because the Engle class did not cross-appeal the denial of 
the motion to amend, R.J. Reynolds contends, the trial court’s decision to disallow 
the amendment was fixed.   
However, this argument by R.J. Reynolds is itself waived.  When Soffer 
initially moved to amend her complaint, R.J. Reynolds did not argue that the trial 
court should deny the motion because the individual Engle progeny plaintiffs had 
waived the right to amend a complaint to seek punitive damages as to other counts.  
Now, R.J. Reynolds seeks to raise this new basis for why the trial court erred in 
permitting the amendment.  Thus, R.J. Reynolds has waived this argument.  
Although we conclude that this argument was waived, even if it were not, 
Airvac is distinguishable.  Specifically, in Airvac, the Fourth District remanded the 
case on the initial appeal and directed three specific factual determinations: (1) 
whether Airvac had an insurable interest in a lost aircraft, (2) whether the 
 
 
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petitioner in that case held a valid lien, and (3) the amount of the lien.  330 So. 2d 
at 468.  After remand, the defendant requested the trial court to permit it to add a 
new defense, which was intermingled with the liability questions.  Id. at 469.  
However, the defendant had previously sought to amend the complaint to include 
this defense, and the trial court denied that request—a ruling that the defendant 
never challenged.  While the decision in Airvac enunciated the law of the case 
doctrine in concluding that on remand the defendant could not amend its complaint 
to include the new defense, this Court later clarified that it decided Airvac on 
principles of waiver.  See Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d 101, 107 
(Fla. 2001) (recognizing the confusion that the Airvac holding caused).  Because, 
as we have recognized in Juliano, Airvac improperly conflated the doctrines of 
waiver and law of the case, we now clarify that we recede from Airvac to the 
extent that it relies on the law of the case doctrine.   
As to waiver, Airvac is distinguishable because waiver depends significantly 
on the posture of the case.  Unlike Airvac, where the new defense was commingled 
with the issues of liability that were raised on appeal, the issue pertaining to 
punitive damages in this case was completely wiped clean.  In fact, it makes no 
sense to apply the Airvac decision to this procedural scenario.  The Engle trial 
court denied class counsels’ motion to amend to include additional grounds for 
punitive damages based on timeliness because the motion was filed after the jury 
 
 
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found entitlement to punitive damages.  However, the timeliness issue became 
moot when this Court decertified the class and vacated all findings pertaining to 
punitive damages.   
Principles from cases vacating a trial court proceeding and ordering a new 
trial are analogous.  As this Court held in Ed Ricke & Sons, Inc. v. Green, “[a]n 
order directing a new trial has the effect of vacating the proceeding and leaving the 
case as though no trial had been had.”  609 So. 2d 504, 507 (Fla. 1992) (quoting 
Atl. Coastline R.R. v. Boone, 85 So. 2d 834, 839 (Fla. 1956)).  Other district courts 
have likewise permitted a party to bring new claims where the case is remanded for 
a new trial.  See Agate v. Clampitt, 80 So. 3d 450, 452 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); 
Hethcoat v. Chevron Oil Co., 383 So. 2d 931, 933 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).  The 
principles of Ed Ricke—not Airvac—apply.  We therefore reject this argument.   
III.  Statute of Limitations & Equitable Tolling 
We turn next to R.J. Reynolds’ argument that the statute of limitations and 
principles of equitable tolling prohibit Soffer from seeking punitive damages under 
the negligence or strict liability theories.  We reject this argument because a claim 
for punitive damages is not a separate, free-standing cause of action subject to a 
separate statute of limitations, but is rather a remedy that can be sought based on 
any properly pled cause of action.   
 
 
- 22 - 
In Soffer, the First District held that “principles of equitable tolling do not 
revive claims for punitive damages that were not timely presented.”  106 So. 3d at 
459.  R.J. Reynolds argues that, if not for equitable tolling, Soffer’s complaint 
would have been time-barred for over a decade, and equitable tolling does not 
permit a plaintiff to raise a demand for punitive damages unless this relief was 
previously pursued by the class. 
The flaw in this argument is that it merges the distinct concepts of the 
timeliness of filing a complaint against a defendant based on an underlying course 
of conduct that results in harm to an individual, with the later ability to amend a 
pleading to add additional theories of recovery under the applicable rules of 
procedure.  The statute of limitations is a separate and distinct concept from the 
ability of either party to amend their pleadings to add additional requests for relief.  
Statutes of limitations pertain to the time in which a cause of action can be brought 
against a defendant.  As this Court has long recognized, the purpose of the statute 
of limitations is to protect parties from “defending claims which, because of their 
antiquity, would place the defendant at a grave disadvantage.”  Major League 
Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1075 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Nardone v. 
Reynolds, 333 So. 2d 25, 36 (Fla. 1976)).      
In contrast, a claim for punitive damages is not subject to a separate statute 
of limitations, but is actually dependent on the underlying cause of action.  A claim 
 
 
- 23 - 
for punitive damages focuses on ensuring the correct remedy for the underlying 
violation—one that punishes the defendant and deters others from engaging in 
similar conduct.  As Judge Lewis of the First District aptly noted in his concurring-
in-part and dissenting-in-part opinion: 
Engle III does not impose a blanket requirement that Engle 
progeny plaintiffs must file identical claims to the original class.  
Rather, it suggests that in order to take advantage of the Phase I 
findings, progeny plaintiffs must file the same claims.  Here, Mrs. 
Soffer was able to take advantage of the Phase I findings because she, 
in fact, filed the same claims as the original class (strict liability, 
negligence, fraud, and conspiracy to commit fraud).  The only 
difference is the remedy.  The fact that her remedy of punitive 
damages was more extensive than that sought by the Engle class is not 
necessarily fatal.  First, a claim for punitive damages is “not a separate 
and distinct cause of action but is auxiliary to, and dependent upon, 
the existence of an underlying claim.”  See Liggett Grp. Inc. v. Engle, 
853 So. 2d 434, 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“Engle II”), quashed in part 
by Engle III, 945 So. 2d at 1254; see also Country Club of Miami 
Corp. v. McDaniel, 310 So. 2d 436, 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).  
Second, her reliance on the Phase I findings was not relevant to her 
claim for punitive damages, which she had to independently prove.  
See, e.g., [R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Brown, 70 So. 3d 707, 717-
18 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)] (clarifying that the plaintiff must prove legal 
causation and damages).  Third, the supreme court retained most of 
the jury’s Phase I findings, except that it did not retain the finding on 
entitlement to punitive damages, which it found to be premature.  See 
Engle III, 945 So. 2d at 1269. 
Soffer, 106 So. 3d at 463 (Lewis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(emphasis added).  
In fact, although the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure govern most of the 
principles regarding amendments to pleadings, the Legislature has separately 
 
 
- 24 - 
addressed the right to recover punitive damages—not through the enactment of a 
separate statute of limitation, but through a separate statutory scheme in section 
768.72.  Section 768.72(1), titled “Pleading in civil actions; claim for punitive 
damages,” states in pertinent part:  
In any civil action, no claim for punitive damages shall be permitted 
unless there is a reasonable showing by evidence in the record or 
proffered by the claimant which would provide a reasonable basis for 
recovery of such damages.  The claimant may move to amend her or 
his complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages as allowed by the 
rules of civil procedure.  The rules of civil procedure shall be liberally 
construed so as to allow the claimant discovery of evidence which 
appears reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence on the 
issue of punitive damages.  No discovery of financial worth shall 
proceed until after the pleading concerning punitive damages is 
permitted. 
Section 768.72(1) reveals a clear legislative intent for defendants to be free from 
claims for punitive damages until an evidentiary basis exists.  Thus, it is crystal 
clear that the Legislature intended for plaintiffs to conduct discovery prior to 
seeking punitive damages, and to thereafter allow a claim for punitive damages as 
provided by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.   
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190(f) allows a complaint to be amended 
to add a claim for punitive damages only if there is a “reasonable showing, by 
evidence in the record, or evidence to be proffered by the claimant, that provides a 
reasonable basis for the recovery of such damages,” thereby mirroring the statutory 
mandate.  Further, rule 1.190(c) provides for relation back of amendments to 
 
 
- 25 - 
pleadings if the amended claim arises out of the same “conduct, transaction or 
occurrence” set forth in the original pleading.    
Thus, so long as the cause of action is timely filed, a claimant may conduct 
discovery to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to seek punitive damages 
and then request to amend the complaint at a later date.  Because a claim for 
punitive damages cannot be filed until after a cause of action is filed, and because 
it must be based on an existing cause of action and is not a separate cause of 
action, a claim for punitive damages is not subject to a separate statute of 
limitations.  Thus, we reject the assertion that the statute of limitations and 
principles of equitable tolling prohibit a plaintiff from seeking punitive damages 
when the underlying action was timely filed.   
IV.  Prejudice & Application of Law to This Case 
Having concluded that res judicata, waiver, or the relevant statute of 
limitations do not prevent the plaintiff from seeking to amend the complaint to 
include a demand for punitive damages, we examine how these principles apply to 
this case and whether R.J. Reynolds would be prejudiced by allowing Soffer to 
seek punitive damages for these additional counts.  Here, Soffer did not delay in 
bringing her cause of action.  Consistent with this Court’s direction in Engle, 
Soffer brought her own individual complaint, raising four causes of action that 
were all approved in Engle.  After conducting discovery, Soffer sought to amend 
 
 
- 26 - 
her complaint, pursuant to section 768.72(1), to request punitive damages for those 
timely raised causes of action.  The only difference between the causes of action in 
Engle and Soffer is that, in Soffer, a request for punitive damages was made for all 
of the counts pled.  
The procedural posture in Soffer’s individual case was completely different 
at the time that Soffer sought to amend her complaint to request punitive damages 
than that in Engle.  In Engle, class counsel sought to amend the complaint to 
include a request for punitive damages on the non-intentional tort claims after the 
jury already found liability on the causes of action.  Here, however, Soffer sought 
to amend her complaint to request punitive damages over a year prior to trial, and 
the trial court granted leave.  In fact, while R.J. Reynolds objected to the 
amendment, R.J. Reynolds did not contend that Soffer was barred from requesting 
punitive damages on the negligence and strict liability counts until the eve of trial.   
We reject R.J. Reynolds’ argument of prejudice for many reasons.  First, in 
the Engle case itself, entitlement to punitive damages was determined at the same 
time that the liability was decided, and there is no indication that the jury verdict 
on entitlement differentiated based on the underlying cause of action.  As the 
Second District stated: 
[W]e find no surprise or prejudice to the Tobacco Companies in 
allowing Engle progeny plaintiffs to seek punitive damages for 
negligence and strict liability claims.  From the inception, it was no 
secret that the Engle class members were seeking punitive damages as 
 
 
- 27 - 
a remedy on all of their substantive claims.  The Tobacco Companies 
had sufficient notice and ample time to prepare their defense to those 
remedies.  In Engle, however, the trial court precluded the class from 
seeking punitive damages on the non-intentional tort claims merely 
through a procedural defect—timeliness.  Unlike Engle, in this case 
there was no suggestion that Mr. Hallgren’s claim seeking punitive 
damages on all claims was untimely, nor any suggestion that the 
Tobacco Companies experienced any prejudice.  Accordingly, the 
Tobacco Companies should not benefit from an unjustifiable 
expansion of the res judicata effect of Engle, which applies only to the 
substantive claims, to exclude a proper and timely pleaded remedy 
sought under those claims. 
Hallgren, 124 So. 3d at 357-58.   
 
 
Like the plaintiff in Hallgren, when Soffer sought to amend her complaint to 
seek punitive damages as to all counts pled, R.J. Reynolds did not assert either 
surprise or prejudice.  After its initial objection to punitive damages was 
unsuccessful, R.J. Reynolds changed tactics and, after the trial was underway and 
the parties were discussing the appropriate jury instructions, argued for the first 
time that punitive damages for strict liability and negligence should not be 
permitted based on the procedural posture of Engle.  Once again, no assertion of 
surprise or prejudice was made.  Now, R.J. Reynolds asserts that it was surprised 
and prejudiced when the trial court permitted the plaintiffs to amend the complaint 
and allow punitive damages on all claims, instead of a portion of the claims.  
However, R.J. Reynolds fails to show how the differentiation as to the underlying 
legal theory would affect this.    
 
 
- 28 - 
The legal standard for establishing entitlement to punitive damages does not 
vary depending on the underlying legal theory.  The standard jury instructions on 
punitive damages mirror the statutory directive as to proof of punitive damages as 
set forth in section 768.72(2):  
(2)  A defendant may be held liable for punitive damages only 
if the trier of fact, based on clear and convincing evidence, finds that 
the defendant was personally guilty of intentional misconduct or gross 
negligence.  As used in this section, the term: 
(a)  “Intentional misconduct” means that the defendant had 
actual knowledge of the wrongfulness of the conduct and the high 
probability that injury or damage to the claimant would result and, 
despite that knowledge, intentionally pursued that course of conduct, 
resulting in injury or damage. 
(b)  “Gross negligence” means that the defendant’s conduct was 
so reckless or wanting in care that it constituted a conscious disregard 
or indifference to the life, safety, or rights of persons exposed to such 
conduct. 
 
Therefore, the defendant cannot be liable for punitive damages simply on the basis 
of a jury finding that the defendant was strictly liable or negligent.  Absent a 
finding of intentional misconduct, the defendant can be liable for punitive damages 
only if there is a finding by clear and convincing evidence of gross negligence—
the same standard that applies regardless of the underlying cause of action.     
Accordingly, there is no prejudice.  Thus, the trial court did not err when 
allowing Soffer to amend her complaint to add punitive damages for negligence 
and strict liability but did err in disallowing the jury from considering punitive 
damages on those counts.  
 
 
- 29 - 
V.  The Proper Remedy 
Finally, we address whether the proper remedy should be a new trial on all 
issues or a new trial focused solely on punitive damages.  Although there is no 
claim of error in this case pertaining to the liability portion of the trial, where the 
jury found liability based on negligence and strict liability, R.J. Reynolds insists 
that a new trial is warranted because the respective determinations of liability and 
punitive damages are necessarily intertwined. 
 
We disagree.  In fact, in Engle, although we vacated the punitive damages 
award, we upheld the compensatory damages awards as they pertained to class 
representatives Mary Farnan and Angie Della Vecchia and did not require a new 
trial on both compensatory and punitive damages.  Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1255-56.  
Consistent with decisions of other appellate courts, we conclude that where a trial 
court errs in striking a plaintiff’s request for punitive damages before the jury 
considered the issue, the proper remedy is to reverse and remand for a new trial 
limited solely to the issue of punitive damages.  See, e.g., Belle Glade Chevrolet-
Cadillac Buick Pontiac Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Figgie, 54 So. 3d 991, 998 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2010) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in instructing the jury 
on punitive damages, reversing the punitive damages award, and remanding for a 
new trial on punitive damages alone); Estate of Canavan v. Nat’l Healthcare Corp., 
889 So. 2d 825, 827 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that the trial court erred in 
 
 
- 30 - 
excluding certain evidence during the punitive damages portion of the trial and 
remanding for a new trial on the amount of punitive damages only); Stephens v. 
Rohde, 478 So. 2d 862, 863 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (rejecting explicitly the 
defendant’s argument that if the punitive damages demand was reinstated, any new 
trial should be on both compensatory damages and punitive damages because the 
two are so intertwined as to require a new trial on both, and remanding for a new 
trial limited to the issue of whether punitive damages should be imposed and, if so, 
the amount thereof).  
 
Accordingly, because the trial court erred by preventing the jury from 
considering Soffer’s request for punitive damages on all four counts, we remand 
for a new trial limited to the issue of whether punitive damages should be imposed 
for the negligence and strict liability claims and, if so, the amount thereof.  We 
emphasize that Soffer still must satisfy the statutory requirements to demonstrate 
entitlement to punitive damages under these theories, including that the trier of fact 
must find, based on clear and convincing evidence, that R.J. Reynolds was 
“personally guilty of intentional misconduct or gross negligence.”  § 768.72(2), 
Fla. Stat.  This requires a determination that R.J. Reynolds either (1) had actual 
knowledge of the wrongfulness of the conduct and the high probability that injury 
or damage to the decedent would result and, despite that knowledge, intentionally 
pursued that course of conduct, resulting in injury or damage; or (2) engaged in 
 
 
- 31 - 
conduct that was so reckless or wanting in care that it constituted a conscious 
disregard or indifference to the life, safety, or rights of persons exposed to such 
conduct.  Id.  
CONCLUSION 
Writing for the Second District in Hallgren, Judge Sleet summarized the 
conclusion we adopt today:  
Under these circumstances, [the plaintiff] should not be limited 
to the pretrial procedural order on the Engle class’s proposed 
amendment.  Once the class’s punitive damage award was reversed, 
and each class member was required to seek punitive damages anew, 
progeny plaintiffs were free to assert any remedies available under the 
law.  Tacking on the remedy of punitive damages to the negligence 
and strict liability claims does not materially alter the substantive 
claims, and it does not materially differ from the punitive damages 
sought by the Engle class on the intentional tort claims.  Considered in 
light of the supreme court’s decision to allow Engle progeny plaintiffs 
to “initiate individual damages actions,” one simply cannot infer that 
the supreme court intended to place a limitation upon progeny 
plaintiffs’ ability to pursue punitive damages as a remedy.  The Engle 
Phase I findings simply closed the door on any new or additional 
substantive claims and permitted each plaintiff to independently prove 
his or her respective damages, including punitive damages, at separate 
trials. 
Hallgren, 124 So. 3d at 358. 
For the reasons explained in this opinion, we answer the certified question in 
the affirmative, quash the First District’s decision in Soffer, and approve the 
 
 
- 32 - 
Second District’s opinion in Hallgren as to the issue of punitive damages.6  Based 
on our reasoning here, we further disapprove the Third District’s decision in 
Williams, 39 Fla. L. Weekly at D1863, and the Fourth District’s resolution of the 
punitive damages issue in Ciccone, 123 So. 3d at 616-17 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013),  
We remand this case to the First District for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., concurs in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D11-3724 
 
 
(Alachua County) 
 
 
 
                                          
 
 
6.  The Second District’s decision in Hallgren also addresses whether the 
claims were barred by the statute of repose, an issue that we recently addressed in 
Hess v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 175 So. 3d 687, 689 (Fla. 2015), and Philip 
Morris USA, Inc. v. Russo, 175 So. 3d 681, 685 (Fla. 2015).  In Hess, this Court 
held that while the critical date of the statute of repose relating to conspiracy 
claims should be the date of the last act done in furtherance of the conspiracy, 
evidence of reliance need not be established within the fraud statute of repose 
period. 175 So. 3d at 698-99. 
 
 
- 33 - 
John Stewart Mills and Courtney Rebecca Brewer of The Mills Firm, P.A., 
Tallahassee, Florida; Rodney Warren Smith, Mark Alexander Avera, and Dawn 
Marie Vallejos-Nichols of Avera & Smith, LLP, Gainesville, Florida; and James 
William Gustafson, Jr. of Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley, P.A., 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Gregory George Katsas of Jones Day, Washington, District of Columbia; Robert 
Bruce Parrish and Charles M. Trippe, Jr. of Moseley, Prichard, Parrish, Knight & 
Jones, Jacksonville, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent