Case Title: Fortier v. Byrnes

Citation: 165 Vt 189, 678 A.2d 890

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1996-03-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Fortier v. Byrnes  (94-298); 165 Vt 189; 678 A.2d 890

[Opinion Filed 15-Mar-1996]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 30-Apr-1996]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                            No. 94-298


Lawrence R. and Kathleen Fortier             Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
    v.                                       Windham Superior Court

Robert J. Byrnes                             January Term, 1996


Richard W. Norton, J.

       William M. McCarty and Richard J. Windish of McCarty Law Offices,
  P.C., Brattleboro, for plaintiffs-appellees

       John Paul Faignant and Christopher J. Whelton of Miller & Faignant,
  P.C., for defendant-appellant

PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       ALLEN, C.J.   Defendant appeals a jury verdict for plaintiff, arguing
  that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss, which was
  based on the statute of limitations, and that the court committed other
  trial errors.  We reverse in part.

       Plaintiff Lawrence Fortier (FN1) signed and dated his complaint on July
  25, 1989.  Plaintiff alleged that he injured his left knee while working on
  February 11, 1986.  After plaintiff's

 

  condition worsened, his employer sent him to a doctor for an evaluation on
  February 21, 1986. The doctor (FN2) ordered x-rays and informed plaintiff that
  he would convey the results to plaintiff's employer.  The doctor informed
  defendant, the supervisor of employee health and safety for plaintiff's
  employer, that plaintiff had fractured his kneecap and that he should
  refrain from working.  Notwithstanding repeated inquiries from plaintiff
  regarding the doctor's report, defendant denied that he had heard from the
  doctor.  Plaintiff continued to work and did not learn of his fractured
  kneecap until March 17, 1986.  Defendant knew or should have known of
  plaintiff's injury and knew or should have known that plaintiff's injury
  would be aggravated if plaintiff continued to work.  Defendant's failure to
  exercise reasonable care towards plaintiff resulted in the aggravation of
  his injury and permanent disability.

       Defendant filed an answer, in which he pled the affirmative defense of
  statute of limitations.  Defendant then filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
  dismiss based on the statute of limitations.  In his response, plaintiff
  argued that the statute was tolled under 12 V.S.A. § 552 (FN3) because
  defendant had resided out of state during the time between plaintiff's
  injury and the  date of the complaint.  Plaintiff also argued that the
  statute was tolled because defendant had "fled the State of Vermont" and
  "attempted to avoid being discovered."

 

       The trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss and
  allowed the parties to submit additional memoranda.  In a supplemental
  memorandum, defendant referred to returns of service and a tracing services
  company letter submitted with plaintiff's earlier motion for enlargement of
  time to effect service.

       Plaintiff had unsuccessfully attempted to serve the complaint on
  defendant in Ohio on August 11, 1989 and in Idaho on September 11, 1989. 
  On October 26, 1989, plaintiff engaged a tracing services company to locate
  defendant.  The tracing services company located defendant in the Bronx,
  New York sometime in early November 1989.  On November 17, plaintiff sent
  the Bronx County Sheriff a request for service upon defendant, as permitted
  under 12 V.S.A. § 913 (FN4) and V.R.C.P. 4(e).(FN5)  Defendant was served in
  New York on December 15, 1989.  On December 29, having not yet received return
  of service, plaintiff moved for enlargement of time to effect service. 
  With his motion, plaintiff submitted the returns of service from Ohio and

 

  Idaho as well as a letter from the tracing services company acknowledging
  engagement.  The court granted the motion for extension of time.

       In his supplemental memorandum, defendant argued that the returns of
  service and the tracing services company letter showed that plaintiff had
  attempted to locate or serve defendant only after the expiration of the
  statute of limitations.  The court did not consider this evidence, however,
  and denied the motion to dismiss, citing 12 V.S.A. § 552.

       Defendant argues that 12 V.S.A. § 552 is inapplicable to this case,
  and we agree.  In Thayer v. Herdt, 155 Vt. 448, 453, 586 A.2d 1122, 1125
  (1990), we held that the Legislature did not make the tolling provisions of
  14 V.S.A. § 1492(a) inoperative when jurisdiction is acquired pursuant to
  12 V.S.A. § 913 and concluded that, where a defendant is amenable to
  service of process pursuant to that statute and V.R.C.P. 4(e), the statute
  of limitations is not tolled.(FN6)  Because the relevant language of 14
  V.S.A. § 1492(a) and 12 V.S.A. § 552 is virtually identical, we hold that
  the Thayer rule extends to 12 V.S.A. § 552.

       Plaintiff contends that 12 V.S.A. § 552 is inoperable only in cases
  where a defendant has an in-state agent for service of process.  As we held
  in Thayer, "The question . . . is whether defendant is amenable to process,
  not whether there is a person within the state that can be served.  Where
  personal jurisdiction can be obtained over the defendant, . . . the tolling
  provisions do not [apply] . . . ."  Id.  The trial court therefore erred
  when, based on 12 V.S.A. § 552, it denied defendant's motion to dismiss.

       Plaintiff also argues that a motion to dismiss is an improper vehicle
  by which to raise the

 

  statute of limitations defense.  As support for this proposition, plaintiff
  cites White Current Corp. v. Vermont Agency of Transp., 140 Vt. 290, 292,