Case Title: O'Connell v. Montclair State University

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-93-00

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2002-05-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Zazzali, J., writing for a majority of the Court. In this appeal, the Court determines whether Montclair State University (Montclair), a nonprofit, public educational institution, is entitled to immunity under the Charitable Immunity Act (CIA), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 to -11. In October 1995, O'Connell was a full-time student at Montclair. He was injured when he fell down a staircase in a campus amphitheater. O'Connell brought suit against Montclair and the State of New Jersey seeking damages for his injuries. Montclair filed an answer raising as affirmative defenses the New Jersey Torts Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 59:12-3, and immunity from suit under the CIA. Montclair moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted the motion. The court found that O'Connell was a beneficiary under the CIA and, therefore, Montclair was entitled to charitable immunity. The court did not reach the issue of the TCA defense. The Appellate Division reversed, 335 N.J. Super. 427, 437 (App. Div. 2000), holding that Montclair was not entitled to charitable immunity because the university's judgments are paid from public funds pursuant to the TCA and not from the funds of the educational institution. In so holding, the court expressly disagreed with Graber v. Richard Stockton College of New Jersey, 313 N.J. Super. 476 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 409 (1998). HELD: The plain language of the CIA supports the conclusion that Montclair--a nonprofit corporation organized exclusively for educational purposes--is entitled to charitable immunity. The Court expressly adopts the Graber court's determination that application of the statute turns on satisfaction of each of the elements plainly set forth within it. 1. As a general rule, statutory interpretation begins with an examination of the plain language of the statute. Where a statute is clear and unambiguous on its face and admits of only one interpretation, a court must infer the Legislature's intent from the statute's plain meaning. (Pp. 4-5). 2. Charitable immunity was a common law doctrine of this State until this Court abolished it in 1958. In response, the Legislature adopted the CIA, reinstating the common law doctrine as it had been judicially defined by the courts of this State. The CIA provides that an entity qualifies for charitable immunity if it (1) was formed for nonprofit purposes; (2) is organized exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes; and (3) was promoting such objectives and purposes at the time of the injury to plaintiff who was then a beneficiary of the charitable works. (Pp. 5 to 9). 3. Because the language of the CIA is plain, courts need not look to extrinsic aids to determine the meaning of the words. Although the Appellate Division in this matter concluded that the CIA applies only to private nonprofit entities, the statute begins with the phrase no nonprofit corporation ... shall [ ] ... be liable. N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7, and it does not distinguish between private and public entities. (Pp. 9 to 10). 4. Statements contained in the legislative history of the CIA and the court opinions on which the Appellate Division relied do not deprive Montclair of the protections of the CIA. Nor does the fact that Montclair is a public entity whose liability judgments are paid by public funds affect its status under the CIA. Indeed, there is a valid concern here that resources dedicated to charitable use by Montclair would be diverted or diminished through the costs associated with litigation. Therefore, application of the charitable immunity defense is warranted to protect the charitable fund. (Pp. 10 to 18). 6. As a matter of public policy, State and private colleges should be treated in a like manner for purposes of entitlement to the charitable immunity defense. Both State and private colleges receive public funding, a portion of which may be used within the wide discretion of the institution for various purposes including the payment of tort judgments. It would be paradoxical and inconsistent to hold that the public policy for the protection of nonprofit corporations organized for educational purposes does not apply to public universities. (Pp. 21-22). The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the Law Division's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants is REINSTATED. JUSTICE STEIN, dissenting, is of the view that relying on the express language of the CIA results in a misapplication of the legislative intent. Justice Stein believes that the Court's opinion rewrites the TCA as applied to nonprofit state colleges by superimposing on it the provisions of the Charitable Immunity Act that the Legislature intended to apply only to private nonprofit entities. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES COLEMAN, VERNIERO, and LaVECCHIA join in JUSTICE ZAZZALI's opinion. JUSTICE STEIN has filed a separate dissenting opinion. JUSTICE LONG did not participate. BRENDAN O'CONNELL, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, a body corporate and politic, and MONTCLAIR STATE, a university of the State of New Jersey, Defendants-Appellants, and JOHN DOE CORP. 1-5 and RICHARD ROE 1-5, Defendants. Argued November 5, 2001 -- Decided May 6, 2002 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 335 N.J. Super. 427 (2000). Patrick DeAlmeida, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellants (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Joanne Stipick, Deputy Attorney General, on the briefs). James Koblin argued the cause for respondent (Horn Shechtman, attorneys; Ricky E. Bagolie, of counsel). Marianne Bryant submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae, Association of Trial Lawyers of America - New Jersey Chapter (Friedman, Bafundo, Porter & Borbi, attorneys). The opinion of the Court was delivered by ZAZZALI, J. In this appeal we must determine whether Montclair State University (Montclair), a nonprofit, public educational institution, is entitled to immunity under the Charitable Immunity Act (CIA), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 to -11. According to the CIA, an entity is entitled to immunity from suit by a beneficiary if the entity is a nonprofit corporation, society or association organized exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes. N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7a. Plaintiff Brendan O'Connell (O'Connell) alleges that because Montclair is a State college and receives public funding, it is not entitled to charitable immunity under the CIA, which O'Connell contends covers only private entities. After the doctrine fell into disfavor as a matter of public policy, Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark, 95 N.J. 530, 536 (1984), this Court abolished it in 1958. Benton v. Y.M.C.A., 27 N.J. 67, 69 (1958); Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 39 (1958); Dalton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church, 27 N.J. 22, 24 (1958). In response, the Legislature adopted the CIA, reinstating the common law doctrine as it had been judicially defined by the courts of this State. Wiklund v. Presbyterian Church of Clifton, 90 N.J. Super. 335, 338 (Cty. Ct. 1966) (citing Anasiewicz v. Sacred Heart Church, 74 N.J. Super. 532, 535 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 38 N.J. 305 (1962)). According to the CIA: No nonprofit corporation, society or association organized exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes or its trustees, directors, officers, employees, agents, servants or volunteers shall, except as is hereinafter set forth, be liable to respond in damages to any person who shall suffer damage from the negligence of any agent or servant of such corporation, society or association, where such person is a beneficiary, to whatever degree, of the works of such nonprofit corporation, society or association; provided, however, that such immunity from liability shall not extend to any person who shall suffer damage from the negligence of such corporation, society, or association or of its agents or servants where such person is one unconcerned in and unrelated to and outside of the benefactions of such corporation, society or association . . . . [N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7a.] Thus, an entity qualifies for charitable immunity when it (1) was formed for nonprofit purposes; (2) is organized exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes; and (3) was promoting such objectives and purposes at the time of the injury to plaintiff who was then a beneficiary of the charitable works. Hamel v. State, 321 N.J. Super. 67, 72 (App. Div. 1999); see also Loder v. St. Thomas Greek Orthodox Church, 295 N.J. Super. 297, 301 (App. Div. 1996) ( [I]n litigation concerning the [CIA], the focus is on whether the organization is a charitable association, and whether the injured plaintiff is a 'beneficiary' of its charitable works. ). Montclair contends that it is entitled to charitable immunity and that its receipt of public funds does not affect its status as a qualifying institution under the CIA. In support of its argument, Montclair relies primarily on the Appellate Division decision in Graber, where a student who sustained injury after fainting during a physiology laboratory class instituted a negligence suit against Richard Stockton College, a State college, and her professor. Graber, supra, 313 N.J. Super. at 478-79. The defendants asserted various affirmative defenses, including immunity under the TCA and charitable immunity under the CIA. Id. at 479. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint, concluding that the college satisfied the CIA's requirements and therefore was entitled to charitable immunity. Id. at 483-85. The court observed that the college was a nonprofit entity and was organized exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes. Id. at 482-83, 487. Further, because the plaintiff was a student of the college, the plaintiff clearly was a beneficiary of the college. Id. at 484. The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that because the college enjoyed the protection of the TCA it did not 'need' the additional protection of the [CIA]. Id. at 485. Rather, the college's concurrent status as a public entity whose liability is controlled by the [TCA] does not alter its entitlement to immunity provided by [the CIA]. Ibid. In that respect, the court pointed out that [t]he [TCA] incorporates into its provisions and affords to public entities 'any defenses that would be available to the public entity if it were a private person.' Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 59:2-1b). The court also noted that the comment to N.J.S.A. 59:2-1b directs courts to 'realistically interpret both the statutory and common law immunities in order to effectuate their intended scope.' Id. at 486 (quoting comment to N.J.S.A. 59:2-1b). Accordingly, the court concluded that the CIA was a defense[] . . . available to a public entity if it were a private person. Ibid. Thus, because the plain meaning of the statute supports the conclusion that Montclair is entitled to charitable immunity, the inquiry should end here. Butler, supra, 89 N.J. at 226. Accordingly, we expressly adopt the Graber court's determination that [a]pplication of the statute turns on satisfaction of each of the elements plainly set forth within it. Graber, supra, 313 N.J. Super. at 481. Notably, the comment to N.J.S.A. 59:2-1b emphasized that [s]ubsection (b) is intended to insure that any immunity provisions in the act or by common law will prevail over the liability provisions. It is anticipated that the Courts will realistically interpret both the statutory and common law immunities in order to effectuate their intended scope. The comment illustrates the Legislature's intent to incorporate into the TCA for the benefit of public entities all defenses available to their private counterparts. Civalier by Civalier v. Estate of Tranucci, 138 N.J. 52, 67 (1994) (characterizing such comments as having something close to binding effect ); Rochinsky v. State, Dep't of Transp., 110 N.J. 399, 407 n.4 (1988) (noting that such comments carry precedential weight and value of legislative history ). As noted by the court in Graber, supra, the CIA is one such available defense. 313 N.J. Super. at 485. colleges should be treated in a like manner for purposes of entitlement to the charitable immunity defense. We note that the Higher Education Restructuring Act of 1994, N.J.S.A. 18A:3B-1 to -36, was intended to place the operations of State colleges on a par with private colleges. N.J.S.A. 18A:3B-2. Both State and private colleges receive public funding, a portion of which may be used within the wide discretion of the institution for various purposes including the payment of tort judgments. It would be paradoxical, and inconsistent, to hold that the public policy for the protection of nonprofit corporations . . . organized for . . . educational . . . purposes does not apply to public universities. N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-10. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 93 September Term 2000 BRENDAN O'CONNELL, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, a body corporate and politic, and MONTCLAIR STATE, a university of the State of New Jersey, Defendants-Appellants, and JOHN DOE CORP. 1-5 and RICHARD ROE 1-5, Defendants. STEIN, J., dissenting. The issue is whether Montclair State University (Montclair State), a nonprofit state college, is entitled to immunity under the Charitable Immunity Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 to _11. The Court concludes that it is, relying heavily on the Act's plain meaning. I emphatically disagree. The Court's reliance on the Act's plain meaning collides with the principle that statutes often must be read sensibly rather than literally to avoid misapplication of the legislative intent. See State v. State Troopers Fraternal Ass'n. 134 N.J. 393, 417-18 (1993) ( Despite the literal applicability of the discipline amendment to all public employers whose employees are unprotected by Civil Service . . . we are thoroughly convinced that the Legislature did not intend the discipline amendment to apply to the State Police and we now so hold. ). Because I cannot improve on Judge Havey's comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion for the Appellate Division, O'Connell v. State, 335 N.J. Super. 427 (App. Div. 2000), I rely on it completely to support my firm belief that the Act never was intended to apply to nonprofit state colleges. I add only these observations that echo significant aspects of Judge Havey's analysis. Although enacted in 1958, apparently the Act rarely, if ever, was relied on by a state college defending a tort claim prior to Graber v. Richard Stockton College of New Jersey, 313 N.J. Super. 476 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 409 (1998). Judge Havey cites cases as far back as 1975 to support his observation that for the past three decades the Attorney General has relied only on the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 59:12-3 to defend such cases. O'Connell, supra, 335 N.J. Super. at 435. That the Attorney General has assumed these past thirty years that the TCA and not the Charitable Immunity Act governs the tort liability of nonprofit state colleges might give the Court cause for concern about its holding. Even more troublesome is that simultaneous application of the two statutes is discordant and incongruous. The Charitable Immunity Act provides total immunity for tort claims by beneficiaries, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7, but permits liability of up to $250,000 for claims against hospitals by beneficiaries; the Act permits unlimited liability for claims by non-beneficiaries, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-8. In all other respects, claims by beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are governed by the same legal principles that apply to tort actions involving private citizens. In contrast, under the TCA, even if no statutory or common-law immunity applies, the statute imposes specific conditions on a public entity's liability. As the Appellate Division cogently observed: For example, [the TCA]: (1) imposes strict notice requirements, N.J.S.A. 59:8-8; (2) requires proof that the public entity's conduct was palpably unreasonable, see e.g., N.J.S.A. 59:4-2; and (3) limits recovery for pain and suffering, N.J.S.A. 59:9-2d. Coupling the "beneficiary" defense (N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7) and the limit to recovery (N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-8) under the Act with the immunities and conditions of liability imposed by the TCA may present an insurmountable burden for an injured litigant to overcome, and provides the public entity with an imbalanced array of defenses merely because it may be, for example, a nonprofit entity created exclusively for educational purposes. [O'Connell, supra, 335 N.J. Super. at 436.] The point is that in the TCA the Legislature comprehensively addressed the conditions under which public entities like Montclair State should be liable in tort, and in doing so expressed not one word suggestive of a legislative intent to supplement those carefully crafted conditions with the immunity provisions of the Charitable Immunity Act passed fourteen years earlier. Moreover, the Legislature afforded Montclair State the opportunity for indemnification for adverse tort judgments out of the fund created by the TCA. See N.J.S.A. 59:12-1. The Court errs grievously when it, in effect, rewrites the TCA as applied to nonprofit state colleges by superimposing on it the provisions of the Charitable Immunity Act that the Legislature intended to apply only to private nonprofit entities. I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division. NO. A-93 BRENDAN O'CONNELL, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, a body corporate and politic, and MONTCLAIR STATE, a university of the State of New Jersey, Defendants-Appellants. DECIDED May 6, 2002 Chief Justice Poritz