Case Title: Lake Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities v. Professional Assn. for the Teaching of the Mentally Retarded.

Citation: 1994-Ohio-87

Docket Number: 19931670

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1994-11-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Lake County Board of Mental Retardation & Developmental                          
Disabilities et al., Appellees, v. Professional Association for                  
the Teaching of the Mentally Retarded et al., Appellants.                        
[Cite as Lake Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Dev.                              
Disabilities v. Professional Assn. for the Teaching of the                       
Mentally Retarded (1994),     Ohio St.3d    .]                                   
Courts -- Arbitration -- Common pleas court does not have                        
     authority under R.C. 2711.11(C) to review and modify                        
     opinion accompanying arbitration award, when.                               
A court of common pleas does not have authority under R.C.                       
     2711.11(C) to review and modify the opinion accompanying                    
     an arbitration award when the award itself is not appealed                  
     from or alleged to be unlawful.                                             
     (No. 93-1670 -- Submitted September 20, 1994 -- Decided                     
November 23, 1994.)                                                              
     Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Lake County, No.                       
92-L-128.                                                                        
     Appellee, Lake County Board of Mental Retardation and                       
Developmental Disabilities ("board"), operates an adult                          
residence center for the rehabilitation of the mentally                          
retarded and developmentally disabled.  Appellant, Professional                  
Association for the Teaching of the Mentally Retarded                            
("association"), is the union which represents the board's                       
employees.  The board is a "public employer" as defined in R.C.                  
4117.01(B), and is, therefore, subject to the provisions of the                  
Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act, R.C. 4117.01 et.                     
seq.  Pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4117, the board is required to                    
bargain with the association over the terms and conditions of                    
employment.  Under this mandate, the board negotiated a                          
collective bargaining agreement which provides that all                          
grievances must be submitted to binding arbitration.                             
     This case arose during the arbitration of an otherwise                      
unrelated grievance between the board and the association.  In                   
that grievance, the association claimed that a particular                        
client at the adult residence center was creating an unsafe                      
condition and requested that additional staff be assigned to                     
the client.  The association alleged over fifty incidents which                  
involved the patient.  The board wanted verification of the                      
number of incidents which had occurred in order to determine                     
whether the association's complaint was justified and a                          
resolution of the grievance was possible.                                        
     While the grievance hearing continued, the association                      
gathered documentation from members of the bargaining unit to                    
show incidents involving the client in question.  These                          
documents, which contained confidential client information,                      
were submitted for consideration.  Thereafter, the matter was                    
settled.                                                                         
     Following the settlement, the board demanded the                            
documents.  The association refused the board's order.  Paul R.                  
Hecker, the association representative who had presented the                     
records, was disciplined for insubordination for failing to                      
surrender the records and for allegedly violating certain state                  
and federal laws as well as board policy which require that the                  
files of the board's clients be accorded strict                                  
confidentiality.  He received a suspension from work.                            
     As a result of this discipline, Hecker filed a grievance                    
that proceeded to arbitration.  This grievance is the basis of                   
this case. In his award, the arbitrator reversed the suspension                  
and directed that Hecker be made whole for his losses in wages                   
and benefits and that all records of the suspension be removed                   
from his file.  In his opinion accompanying the award, the                       
arbitrator determined that association members needed access to                  
what would otherwise be confidential information in order to                     
process grievances.  The arbitrator also found that Hecker was                   
not bound to obey the board member who demanded the documents.                   
     Pursuant to R.C. 2711.11, the board filed a motion with                     
the Court of Common Pleas of Lake County seeking to modify the                   
opinion supporting the award and a complaint for declaratory                     
judgment.  Specifically, the board sought to modify that                         
portion of the arbitrator's opinion which allowed association                    
members access to confidential information in order to process                   
grievances.                                                                      
     The common pleas court determined that the arbitrator's                     
finding was contrary to state and federal confidentiality                        
laws.  Accordingly, the court modified the opinion to eliminate                  
this finding.  The court did not disturb the actual award.                       
Declaratory judgment was also granted in the board's favor.                      
     The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that it was                           
permissible to modify the opinion of an arbitration award,                       
without modifying the actual award itself.  The court also                       
affirmed the declaratory judgment.1                                              
     This matter is now before this court upon an allowance of                   
a motion to certify the record.                                                  
                                                                                 
     Duvin, Cahn, Barnard & Messerman, Kenneth B. Stark, Robert                  
M. Wolff and Mark A. Duvin; and Robert J. Pietrykowski, for                      
appellees.                                                                       
     Green, Haines, Sgambati, Murphy & Macala Co., L.P.A.,                       
Ronald G. Macala and Anthony M. DioGuardi II, for appellants.                    
                                                                                 
     Francis E. Sweeney, Sr., J.   The issue before us is                        
whether the court of common pleas has the authority under R.C.                   
2711.11 to review and modify the underlying rationale                            
supporting an arbitration award, even though the award itself                    
was not appealed or alleged to be unlawful.  For the following                   
reasons, we answer in the negative and reverse the judgment of                   
the court of appeals.                                                            
     Arbitration has long been the preferred means of resolving                  
disputes between labor and management.  We have consistently                     
emphasized that "'"[i]t is the policy of the law to favor and                    
encourage arbitration and every reasonable intendment will be                    
indulged to give effect to such proceedings and to favor the                     
regularity and integrity of the arbitrator's acts."'"  Findlay                   
City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Findlay Edn. Assn. (1990), 49                   
Ohio St.3d 129, 131, 551 N.E.2d 186, 189, citing Mahoning Cty.                   
Bd. of Mental Retardation v. Mahoning Cty. TMR Edn. Assn.                        
(1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 80, 84, 22 OBR 95, 98, 488 N.E.2d 872,                     
875.                                                                             
     In order to uphold the strong public policy favoring                        
private settlement of grievances, the General Assembly has                       
limited the role of judicial review.  R.C. Chapter 2711                          
describes the circumstances under which the common pleas court                   
may vacate (R.C. 2711.10) or modify (R.C. 2711.11) an                            
arbitration award.  See Lynch v. Halcomb (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d                  
223, 16 OBR 238, 475 N.E.2d 181.                                                 
     In seeking to modify the arbitrator's opinion, the board                    
relies on R.C. 2711.11(C).  The board contends that the                          
arbitrator went beyond his mandate and interpreted the                           
collective bargaining agreement to require the disclosure of                     
confidential client documents in order to process grievances.                    
The board argues that a common pleas court may modify this                       
award because it violates public policy and express state and                    
federal rights guaranteed to the board's clients.  The board                     
relies on State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Wells (1985),                   
18 Ohio St.3d 382, 18 OBR 437, 481 N.E.2d 632, Mahoning Cty.                     
Bd. of Mental Retardation v. Mahoning Cty. TMR Edn. Assn.                        
(1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 80, 22 OBR 95, 488 N.E.2d 872, and Ohio                    
Office of Collective Bargaining v. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emp. Assn.                    
(1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 177, 572 N.E.2d 71, for this                               
proposition.  While this contention may be true, the fallacy of                  
the board's argument comes from its interpretation of the word                   
"award."                                                                         
     The issue before the arbitrator was whether Hecker's                        
actions were subject to discipline.  The arbitrator concluded,                   
based upon his interpretation of the parties' agreement, that                    
they were not.  In his award, the arbitrator reversed the                        
suspension and directed that Hecker be made whole for his                        
losses and that all records of the suspension be removed from                    
his file.  The board does not seek reinstatement of the                          
discipline imposed against Hecker, i.e., the award. Instead,                     
the board challenges the arbitrator's reasoning which he stated                  
to justify his award.  R.C. 2711.11 does not provide the                         
statutory authority for such a challenge.                                        
     R.C. 2711.11 provides as follows:                                           
     "In any of the following cases, the court of common pleas                   
in the county wherein an award was made in an arbitration                        
proceeding shall make an order modifying or correcting an award                  
upon the application of any party to the arbitration if:                         
     "* * *                                                                      
     "(C) The award is imperfect in matter of form not                           
affecting the merits of the controversy.                                         
     "The order shall modify and correct the award, so as to                     
effect the intent thereof and promote justice between the                        
parties."  (Emphasis added.)                                                     
     By its very terms, the statute allows the court of common                   
pleas to modify or correct an award that is unlawful, but does                   
not provide a statutory basis for modifying the arbitrator's                     
opinion alone, where the award is not even appealed from or                      
alleged to be unlawful.                                                          
     Our interpretation of the statute is consistent with our                    
previous holding that, if an award is not unlawful, a reviewing                  
court can make no further inquiry into the substantive merits                    
of the arbitrator's decision.  Findlay, supra, at 132, 551                       
N.E.2d at 189.  Although Findlay dealt with reviewing a court's                  
authority under R.C. 2711.10, its reasoning applies with equal                   
force here.  The premise of Findlay is that an arbitrator's                      
award which draws its essence from the collective bargaining                     
agreement and which is not unlawful, arbitrary or capricious                     
will be upheld.  This is so because, in the absence of such                      
restrictions, the integrity and purposes of the arbitration                      
system of dispute resolution would be seriously undermined.                      
Findlay, supra.                                                                  
     Thus, since R.C. Chapter 2711 allows only a limited appeal                  
of an award, the court of common pleas had no basis under R.C.                   
2711.11 to review and clarify the reasoning behind it.                           
Accordingly, we hold a court of common pleas does not have                       
authority under R.C. 2711.11(C) to review and modify the                         
opinion accompanying an arbitration award when the award itself                  
is not appealed from or alleged to be unlawful.  The judgment                    
of the court of appeals is reversed.                                             
                                    Judgment reversed.                           
     A.W. Sweeney, Douglas, Resnick and Pfeifer, JJ., concur.                    
     Wright, J., concurs separately.                                             
     Moyer, C.J., dissents.                                                      
Footnote:                                                                        
     1  The ruling on the declaratory judgment was not                           
appealed.  Therefore, we express no opinion as to its merits.                    
     Wright, J., concurring.    The majority quite properly                      
reverses the judgment of the court of appeals concerning the                     
trial court's improper modification of the underlying rationale                  
of the arbitration award.  However, I would not rely on the                      
majority's narrow interpretation of the word "award" found in                    
R.C. 2711.11.  I believe that the board has not succeeded in                     
its attempt to have the arbitration opinion corrected, because                   
the board sought to modify the arbitration opinion under R.C.                    
2711.11 instead of seeking to vacate the arbitration award                       
under R.C. 2711.10.                                                              
     It is well settled in Ohio that a reviewing court may                       
vacate an arbitration award that is contrary to the law.  R.C.                   
2711.10 provides:                                                                
     "*** the court of common pleas shall make an order                          
vacating the award upon the application of any party to the                      
arbitration if:                                                                  
     "***                                                                        
     "(D) The arbitrators exceeded their powers ***."                            
     This court has determined that an arbitrator exceeds his                    
or her powers, thus justifying a reviewing court to vacate the                   
arbitration award, when an arbitration award violates the law.                   
See Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Shuff (1981), 67 Ohio                     
St.2d 172, 174, 21 O.O.3d 108, 109, 423 N.E.2d 417, 418;                         
Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation v. Mahoning Cty. TMR                     
Edn. Assn. (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 80, 22 OBR 95, 488 N.E.2d 872,                  
paragraph one of syllabus; Hillsboro v. Fraternal Order of                       
Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 174, 556                  
N.E.2d 1186; Findlay Bd. of Edn. v. Findlay Edn. Assn. (1990),                   
49 Ohio St.3d 129, 551 N.E.2d 186.                                               
     This court has concluded that R.C. 2711.11 provides the                     
exclusive circumstances under which a reviewing court may                        
modify an arbitration award.  See Warren Edn. Assn. v. Warren                    
City Bd. of Edn. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 170, 173, 18 OBR 225,                     
227, 480 N.E.2d 456, 459.  Unlike R.C. 2711.10, R.C. 2711.11                     
does not allow a reviewing court to modify an arbitration award                  
for the reason that the award violates the law.  R.C.                            
2711.11(C), which is the specific statutory subsection at issue                  
in this case, authorizes a reviewing court to modify an                          
arbitration award if "[t]he award is imperfect in matter of                      
form not affecting the merits of the controversy."  This                         
language makes it clear that a reviewing court may modify only                   
the form of an arbitration award; a court may not review the                     
merits or modify the substance of an arbitration decision, even                  
if the decision contains errors of law.                                          
     In this case, the trial court improperly reviewed the                       
merits of and modified the substance of the arbitration                          
opinion.  If the board had sought to vacate the arbitration                      
award because the award violated state and federal                               
confidentiality laws, which is not the case here, the trial                      
court properly could have vacated the award pursuant to R.C.                     
2711.10.  However, the trial court had no authority under R.C.                   
2711.11 to modify either the arbitration award or its                            
reasoning, even if the arbitrator's opinion violated the law.                    
Therefore, the court of appeals erred in affirming the judgment                  
of the trial court.                                                              
     For the foregoing reasons, I concur.