Case Title: Lee v. Cline

Citation: 384 Md. 245

Docket Number: 8/03

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 8
September Term, 2003
_________________________________________
KEITH A. LEE
v.
GARY CLINE
__________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
        *Eldridge 
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
                  JJ.
__________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
_________________________________________
Filed:    December 13, 2004
* Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant
to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
The issues in this case are (1) whether the Maryland Tort Claims Act, Maryland
Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.), §§ 12-101 et seq. of the State Government Article,
provides qualified immunity to state personnel for tort actions based upon violations
of the Maryland Constitution, (2) whether the Maryland Tort Claims Act provides
qualified immunity to state personnel for tort actions based upon certain common law
“intentional” torts, and (3), if the Act does grant such qualified immunity, whether the
plaintiff’s evidence of malice was sufficient to generate a triable issue as to whether
the immunity was defeated.
I.
As this case was resolved by a grant of the defendant Cline’s motion for
summary judgment, “[w]e review the record in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party [here the plaintiff] and construe any reasonable inferences which may be
drawn from the facts against the movant.”  Walk v. Hartford Casualty, 382 Md. 1, 14,
852 A.2d 98, 106 (2004).  See, e.g., Jurgensen v. New Phoenix, 380 Md. 106, 114, 843
A.2d 865, 869 (2004); Sadler v. Dimensions Healthcare Corp., 378 Md. 509, 533, 836
A.2d 655, 669 (2003); Remsburg v. Montgomery, 376 Md. 568, 579-580, 831 A.2d 18,
24 (2003); Rite Aid v. Hagley, 374 Md. 665, 684, 824 A.2d 107, 118 (2003); Lovelace
v. Anderson, 366 Md. 690, 695, 785 A.2d 726, 728 (2001), and cases there cited.
Keith Lee is an African-American Maryland resident.  He left his home on the
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outskirts of Frederick, Maryland, on the morning of Saturday, March 12, 1994, to run
various errands in his BMW automobile.  Lee made several stops, one of which was at
a car wash at a gas station. Sometime later he noticed that his car’s front license plate
was missing.  He correctly surmised that the plate had come off at the car wash, and he
returned to the gas station to retrieve it.  Lee found that the license plate was mangled
so that he was unable to re-attach it to his car.  He placed the plate on the rear floor of
the automobile behind the driver’s seat, and resumed his errands.
At about 3:00 p.m. on March 12th, while Lee was still running errands, he
observed a police car, with overhead lights activated, following his car.  When he
pulled over, Frederick County Deputy Sheriff Gary Cline approached Lee’s car and
asked Lee to present his driver’s license and automobile registration card.  Lee did so,
and asked Cline the reason for the stop.  When Cline responded that the front license
plate was not on Lee’s automobile, Lee explained that the plate had fallen off at the car
wash and showed Cline the mangled plate.  
Deputy Sheriff Cline then asked Lee if he would consent to Cline searching the
vehicle for illegal narcotics and weapons.  Lee refused to consent to the search, and
Cline retorted:
 “I don’t need your permission to search the car.  I can get
dogs in here and search it without your permission.”
Lee still refused to consent to the search.  
Next, Cline took Lee’s driver’s license and registration card, returned to his
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police car, and contacted by radio the Frederick County Emergency Communications
Center.  Cline provided the radio dispatcher with Lee’s license plate number in order
to check its status.  According to the radio dispatch tape of the incident, this initial call
from Cline to the dispatcher was at 3:11 p.m.  About two minutes later, the dispatcher
called Cline and informed Cline that the license plate was valid and would not expire
until later in the year.  
About a minute after being told that the license plate was valid, Cline again
called the dispatcher and requested that the dispatcher “locate a canine [unit] and start
him my way.”  The dispatcher replied that no canine units were available to send to that
location.  Two minutes later, however, at 3:16 p.m., the dispatcher contacted Cline and
informed the deputy sheriff that a State Police canine unit was nearby and available.
Cline requested that the canine unit be sent to his location, stating (emphasis supplied):
 “I’ve got a suspect not being too cooperative.  Already told me
there’s no way he’s going to give me consent to search.  Go ahead
and start this way please.”
Cline also asked the dispatcher about Lee’s driving record and arrest warrant status.
At 3:17 p.m., the dispatcher informed Cline that Lee’s driver’s license was valid, that
Lee had no points, that Lee was not wanted by the police, and that he had never been
involved with the criminal justice system.  
The radio dispatch tape discloses that, at 3:22 p.m., a second deputy sheriff,
Officer Henry, reported to the dispatcher  “that he was on the scene as backup.”
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Shortly thereafter, while Officers Cline and Henry were engaged in a conversation at
the side of Cline’s police car, Lee got out of his vehicle and stood by the front of his
vehicle.  According to Lee’s deposition, he “had been sitting there [in the vehicle] for
a good while.  [His] legs were getting . . . tired.”  Lee continued: “Then, after about 30
seconds, Officer Cline yelled, get back in your car,” and Lee got back into the car.
A Maryland State Police trooper arrived on the scene at 3:30 p.m., with a dog.
The trooper asked Lee if he had any drugs in the car, and Lee replied that he did not.
The State trooper then circled Lee’s car with the trooper’s dog and indicated that there
was no sign of drugs. The trooper then put the dog back in the State police vehicle and
left.  Following the departure of the State trooper, Cline gave Lee two warning tickets,
which Lee signed.  Cline returned Lee’s driver’s license and registration card, and Lee
left the scene.
The radio dispatch tape shows that Cline reported the stop “cleared” at 3:42 p.m.
II.
Lee filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Frederick County against Deputy
Sheriff Gary Cline, Frederick County Sheriff James W. Hagy, the Maryland State
Police, Maryland State Police trooper Eric Fogle, and the County Commissioners of
Frederick County.  Lee alleged “that he was detained and searched because of a
Frederick County Sheriff’s Department practice which targets African-American males
driving expensive cars.  Such drivers allegedly fit the Department’s drug courier
‘profile.’”  The complaint went on to state that “[a]t no time did defendants . . . Cline
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or . . . Fogle have probable cause, reasonable . . . suspicion or any ground, to believe
that a crime had been committed or that the Plaintiff was carrying drugs [of] any kind.”
Lee claimed that Cline and Fogle were guilty of an unreasonable search and seizure,
that the police officers unlawfu lly detained and imprisoned him, and that the officers
“intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of race and failed to afford
him equal protection of the law.”  Lee asserted that the Frederick County
Commissioners were 
“aware of the Frederick County Sheriff’s Department policy of
utilizing a race-based drug courier profile and a policy of stereo-
typing African-American males in late model luxury automobiles
as ‘suspicious’ and criminal and these Defendants provide
manpower and other resources in support of the Frederick County
Sheriff’s race-based policy.”
Lee further alleged that the violations of his rights were knowing and “intentional,
extreme, outrageous, and intolerable and offend[ed] generally accepted standards of
decency, morality and fairness, and . . . caused Plaintiff to suffer embarrassment,
mental anguish and emotional distress.”  
Count I of Lee’s original complaint charged a violation of his civil rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1983; he asserted that the stop violated his rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  In the next count, Lee
alleged that the defendants’ actions violated his rights under the Maryland Declaration
of Rights.  The remaining counts in the original complaint were non-constitutional
common law claims of false imprisonm ent, invasion of privacy, and intentional
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infliction of emotional distress.
Lee filed in the Circuit Court two amended complaints, adding a count sounding
in negligence and a count charging a “Violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,” 42 U.S.C . § 2000d and 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2).  He also asserted that the
“Defendants’ acts were done with malice [and] deliberate indifference to and in
knowing violation of Plaintiffs’ legal and constitutional rights . . . .”  In addition, Lee
alleged that the Maryland State Police officer’s canine was a “large ferocious looking
canine [which] caused Plaintiff to believe that he was not free to leave.”
Following a ruling by the Circuit Court that, for several reasons, there was no
basis for the asserted causes of action against Maryland State Police trooper Fogle and
the Maryland State Police, Lee’s second amended complaint abandoned his claims
against those two defendants.  Finally, Lee sought compensatory and punitive damages,
as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.
Next, the remaining defendants removed the case from the Circuit Court for
Frederick County to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.
Following discovery, various motions, other pleadings, and memoranda, the United
States District Court dismissed the state law claims against Sheriff Hagy and the
Frederick County Commissioners, granted the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on the counts based upon federal law (i.e., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964), and declined to hear the counts against Cline based upon
the Maryland Declaration of Rights and Maryland common law.  The case was returned
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to the Circuit Court for Frederick County.
The defendant Cline then filed in the Circuit Court a motion for summary
judgment which the court granted.  The Circuit Court held that there had been no
violation of Lee’s state constitutional rights, that Cline had qualified immunity under
the Maryland Tort Claims Act with regard to the non-constitutional tort claims, and that
the plaintiff had presented no evidence of malice to overcome Cline’s qualified
immunity.
Lee appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, although the
intermediate appellate court’s reasoning differed somewhat from that of the Circuit
Court.  Lee v. Cline, 149 Md. App. 38, 814 A.2d 86 (2002).  The Court of Special
Appeals held that the Circuit Court erred in deciding that there was no triable issue
with regard to the claimed violation of Lee’s state constitutional rights.  Lee v. Cline,
supra, 149 Md. App. at 50-63, 814 A.2d at 93-101.  The intermediate appellate court
summarized (149 Md. App. at 63, 814 A.2d at 101):
“We hold that there were material disputes regarding whether Cline
prolonged Lee’s traffic stop while awaiting the arrival of the
canine unit.  In concluding that there was no evidence of a
constitutional violation,  the circuit court disregarded Lee’s version
of events and accepted Cline’s, even though Cline could not
remember anything about this particular traffic stop.  That was
error.”
Nevertheless, the Court of Special Appeals held that the qualified immunity
granted to state personnel, including deputy sheriffs, by the Maryland Tort Claims Act,
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1
The Maryland Tort Claims Act, § 12-101 et seq. of the State Government Article, provides in
§ 12-105 as follows:
“§ 12-105.  Immunity of State personnel.
State personnel shall have the immunity from liability described
under § 5-522(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.”
Section 5-522(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article states:
“(b) Same – State personnel. – State personnel, as defined in 12-
101 of the State Government Article, are immune from suit in courts
of the State and from liability in tort for a tortious act or omission that
is within the scope of the public duties of the State personnel and is
made without malice or gross negligence, and for which the State or
its units have waived immunity under Title 12, Subtitle 1 of the State
Government Article, even if the damages exceed the limits of that
waiver.”
“grant[ed] qualified immunity to State personnel on all types of tort claims,” including
“state constitutional torts” and intentional torts.  149 Md. App. at 65, 814 A.2d at 102.
See Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.), § 12-105 of the State Government Article, and Code
(1974, 2002 Repl. Vol., 2004 Supp.), § 5-522(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article.1  The Court of Special Appeals went on to hold that “[w]e find no error in the
circuit court’s holding that Lee failed to proffer sufficient evidence of malice to
overcome Cline’s qualified immunity.”  149 Md. App. at 89, 814 A.2d at 116.
Lee filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari which presented the
following three questions:
“I.  Whether the Court of Special Appeals err[ed] in holding
that [, under the Maryland Tort Claims Act,] Officer Cline had
qualified immunity against state constitutional violations.
“II.  Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that
[, under the Maryland Tort claims Act,] Officer Cline had qualified
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immunity against state common law intentional torts.
“III.  Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding
that there was insufficient evidence of malice to overcome any
qualified immunity possessed by Officer Cline.”
Cline did not file a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the Court of
Special Appeals’ holding that Lee had presented sufficient evidence of a violation of
his state constitutional rights to generate a triable issue.  This Court granted Lee’s
petition for a writ of certiorari, Lee v. Cline, 374 Md. 82, 821 A.2d 370 (2003).  Our
order granting the petition neither limited the issues nor added any issues.
Accordingly, the only issues before us are the three questions presented by Lee’s
certiorari petition.  Maryland Rule 8-131(b)(1);  Ponte v. Investors Alert, 382 Md. 689,
694 n.3, 857 A.2d 1, 3-4 n.3 (2004); Edwards v. Corbin, 379 Md. 278, 287 n.5, 841
A.2d 845, 850 n.5 (2004), and cases there cited.
III.
We shall consider Lee’s first two questions together, namely whether the
Maryland Tort Claims Act grants qualified immunity to state personnel for tortious acts
or omissions, within the scope of the state employees’ public duties, when those acts
or omissions involve violations of state constitutional rights or constitute so-called
“intentional” torts.  
A.
With one major exception not involved in the present case, the immunity granted
to state personnel by the Maryland Tort Claims Act is generally co-extensive with the
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coverage of the statute.  See § 5-522(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
If this case had involved the language of the Maryland Tort Claims Act as it existed
prior to July 1, 1985, Lee’s argument would have considerab le merit.  His argumen t,
however, finds no support in the present statutory language.  
The General Assemb ly originally enacted the Maryland Tort Claims Act by
Ch. 298 of the Acts of 1981, waiving the State’s governmental immunity with respect
to six categories of claims.  These six categories were limited to specific types of
negligence actions such as the negligent operation or maintenance of a motor vehicle,
negligence by a state health care employee, defective conditions in state structures or
property, and negligent actions by state employees in state parks or recreation facilities.
These six categories would not have encompassed intentional torts or tort actions based
upon constitutional violations.
Nevertheless, by Ch. 538 of the Acts of 1985, effective July 1, 1985, the
coverage of the Tort Claims Act was broadened to include tort actions generally, with
certain specified exceptions and limitations.  Section 12-104(a)(1) of the State
Government Article now provides that “the immunity of the State and of its units is
waived as to a tort action, in a court of the State . . . .”  Neither intentional torts (in the
absence of malice), nor torts based upon constitutional violations, are excluded.  In
fact, a 1989 bill (House Bill 364), which would have excluded constitutional torts, did
not pass.  This history was summarized in Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 374 n.14,
597 A.2d 432, 447 n.14 (1991), as follows:
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“As a result of 1985 amendm ents to the Maryland Tort Claims
Act, the statute does not exclude specified categories of torts
except claims arising ‘from the combatant activities of the State
Militia during a state of emergency,’ § 5-399.2(a)(3) of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article. Otherwise, ‘tort actions
generally’ are encompassed, Simpson v. Moore, 323 Md. 215, 219,
592 A.2d 1090, 1092 (1991), as long as the state employee’s
actions were not malicious, grossly negligent, or outside the scope
of employment, Boyer v. State, supra, 323 Md. at 579, n.14, 594
A.2d at 131, n.14; Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. 247, 253, 587
A.2d 467, 470 (1991).  House Bill 364 of the 1989 Session of the
General Assemb ly would have provided that ‘[i]mmun ity is not
waived’ under the Maryland Tort Claims Act for ‘any state . . .
constitutional claim.’   In the course of the bill’s legislative
process, this provision was amended out.  Ultimately House Bill
364 did not pass.”
See also, e.g., Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143, 156-158, 725 A.2d 549, 556-557
(1999); Condon v. State of Maryland, 332 Md. 481, 492-493, 632 A.2d 753, 758-759
(1993); Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. 247, 253-254, 587 A.2d 467-470 (1991); Rucker
v. Harford County, 316 Md. 275, 297-302, 558 A.2d 399, 409-412 (1989); Clea v. City
of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662, 671, 541 A.2d 1303, 1307 (1988).
The current language of the Maryland Tort Claims Act plainly appears to cover
intentional torts and constitutional torts as long as they were committed within the
scope of state employment and without malice or gross negligence.  There are no
exceptions in the statute for intentional torts or torts based upon violations of the
Maryland Constitution.  This Court has been most reluctant to recognize exceptions in
a statute when there is no basis for the exceptions in the statutory language.  See, e.g.,
O’Connor v. Baltimore County, 382 Md. 102, 113, 854 A.2d 1191, 1198 (2004) (“When
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interpreting a statute, we assign the words their ordinary and natural meaning. * * * We
will not . . . ‘judicially insert language to impose exceptions, limitations or restrictions
not set forth by the legislature’”); Nesbit v. Geico, 382 Md. 65, 75, 854 A.2d 879, 885
(2004); Melton v. State, 379 Md. 471, 477, 842 A.2d 743, 746 (2004); Salamon v.
Progressive Classic Insurance Company, 379 Md. 301, 311-316, 841 A.2d 858, 865-
868 (2004); Piscatelli v. Board of Liquor License Commissioners, 378 Md. 623, 630-
633, 837 A.2d 931, 936 (2003); Blind Industries v. D. G. S., 371 Md. 221, 231, 808
A.2d 782, 788 (2002);  Western Correctional Institution v. Geiger, 371 Md. 121, 142,
807 A.2d 32, 42 (2002). 
While this Court has not, until today, directly decided whether intentional torts
and constitutional torts are covered by the Maryland Tort Claims Act, thereby granting
state personnel qualified immunity for such torts, our prior opinions do support such
coverage.  See Larsen v. Chinwuba, 377 Md. 92, 99, 107-109, 832 A.2d 193, 196, 201-
202 (2003) (A tort action against the Insurance Commissioner setting forth causes of
action for defamation, invasion of privacy, abuse of process, and violation of rights
guaranteed by the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and this Court held that the
Commissioner was entitled to immunity under the Maryland Tort Claims Act, although
the issue before the Court concerned scope of employment rather than the basic
coverage of the statute); Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 757 A.2d 118 (2000) (A tort
action against state governmental officials based upon allegations of various common
law intentional torts, violations of the federal constitution, and violations of the state
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constitution, and the issues included (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to show malice,
thereby defeating Maryland Tort Claims Act immunity, (2) liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, and (3) the inapplicability of the public official immunity doctrine to state
constitutional torts; the Court held, inter alia, that there was sufficient evidence of
malice to defeat Maryland Tort Claims Act immunity, although no other issue was
raised regarding the coverage of the Act); DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 49-56, 729
A.2d 354, 370-374 (1999) (Holding that there was coverage under the Local
Government Tort Claims Act for certain intentional and constitutional torts): Ashton
v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 107-108, 123-124, 660 A.2d 447, 465-466, 473-474 (1995)
(same); Ritchie v. Donnelly, supra, 324 Md. at 374-375 n.14, 597 A.2d at 446-447 n.14
(Suggests that the statutory immunity under the Maryland Tort Claims Act applies to
non-malicious constitutional and intentional torts); Sawyer v. Humphries, supra, 322
Md. at 252-262, 587 A.2d at 469-474 (Held that intentional torts may be covered by the
Maryland Tort Claims Act, although the issues raised concerned scope of employment
and malice).
  
B.
Despite the statutory language and the above-cited cases, Lee argues that the
immunity granted by the Maryland Tort Claims Act should have no application to state
constitutional torts or intentional torts.  Lee chiefly relies upon opinions dealing with
common law public official qualified immunity for discretionary acts. 
As Lee correctly points out, this Court has consistently held that Maryland
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2
The common law public official immunity doctrine has to some extent been codified in Code
(1974, 2002 Repl. Vol., 2004 Supp.), §§ 5-507(b)(1) and 5-511(b) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article.  This Court has “pointed out that the purpose of these provisions ‘was to codify
existing public official immunity, and not to extend the scope of qualified immunity beyond its
Maryland common law boundaries.’” Lovelace v. Anderson, 366 Md. 690, 704, 785 A.2d 726, 734
(2001), quoting Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 116 n.23, 660 A.2d 447, 470 n.23 (1995).
common law qualified immunity in tort suits, for public officials performing
discretionary acts, has no application in tort actions based upon alleged violations of
state constitutional rights or tort actions based upon most so-called “intentional torts.”
The Maryland public official immunity doctrine is quite limited and is generally
applicable only in negligence actions or defamation actions based on allegedly
negligent conduct. 2  See e. g., Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County, 370 Md. 447,
478-481, 805 A.2d 372, 390-392 (2002) (discussing the public official immunity
doctrine); Lovelace v. Anderson, supra, 366 Md. at 705-706, 785 A.2d at 734 (“[T]he
defense of public official immunity generally applies only to negligent acts. * * * The
defense is not applicable ‘in an action based on rights protected by the State
Constitution.’” It is also inapplicable where “a special relationship exists between the
[official] and the injured person”); Okwa v. Harper, supra, 360 Md. at 201, 757 A.2d
at 140 (“A state public official alleged to have violated Article 24, or any article of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights, is not entitled to” public official immunity); Williams
v. Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 134-139, 753 A.2d 41, 58-61 (2000) (reviewing both the
history and the scope of the common law public official immunity doctrine); DePino
v. Davis, supra, 354 Md. at 49, 51, 729 A.2d at 370, 371 (Public official immunity
“[p]rinciples apply to negligent conduct, not to intentional conduct. * * *  [There is no
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public official] immunity in an action based on rights protected by the State
Constitution”); Ashton v. Brown, supra, 339 Md. at 117, 660 A.2d at 470 (“[T]he
plaintiffs’ nonconstitutional tort claims are not limited to negligence, but include
several so-called intentional torts.  Public official immunity is not a defense to these
intentional torts”); Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 285, 653 A.2d 436, 443 (1995)
(contrasting limited public official immunity with the much broader judicial immunity
under Maryland law); Ritchie v. Donnelly, supra, 324 Md. at 370, 597 A.2d at 445
(reviewing the public official immunity doctrine and holding “that a public official who
violates the plaintiff’s rights under the Maryland Constitution is personally liable for
compensatory damages”); Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. at 680, 541 A.2d
at 1311 (refusing “to extend [public official] immunity to damage actions against
public officials who violate Maryland constitutional rights”); Ashburn v. Anne Arundel
County, 306 Md. 617, 621-624, 510 A.2d 1078, 1080-1081 (1986) (Public official
immunity is limited to negligent acts arising “from the performance of [the official’s]
job in a manner which involved judgment and discretion”); Cox v. Prince George’s
County, 296 Md. 162, 169, 460 A.2d 1038, 1041 (1983) (“[A] police officer does not
enjoy [public official] immunity if he commits an intentional tort or acts with malice”);
James v. Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 315, 323, 418 A.2d 1173, 1178 (1980)
(Public official immunity applies only to an official’s “negligent acts”); Carr v.
Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 583-586, 177 A.2d 841, 843-845 (1962) (Distinguishing, for
purposes of defamation actions, the broad immunity enjoyed by federal officials under
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federal law, from the limited immunity granted to Maryland officials under Maryland
law); Mason v. Wrightson, 205 Md. 481, 487, 109 A.2d 128, 131 (1954) (“When a
peace officer goes beyond the scope of the law [, here an unlawful search and arrest,]
he may become liable civilly and is not shielded by the immunity of the law”); Heinze
v. Murphy, 180 Md. 423, 434, 24 A.2d 917, 922 (1942) (“[T]he law tolerates no abuse
of power,” and thus a police officer making an unlawful arrest was held liable for
compensatory damages); Dunne v. State, 162 Md. 274, 284-288, 159 A. 751, 755,
appeal dismissed, 287 U.S. 564, 53 S.Ct. 23, 77 L.Ed. 497 (1932) (Public officials do
not have the immunity of the State when they enforce an unconstitutional act); Weyler
v. Gibson, 110 Md. 636, 653-654, 73 A. 261, 263 (1909) (refusing to extend immunity
to a public official violating the plaintiff’s constitutional rights).
There are, however, major differences between the policy underlying public
official immunity and the policy underlying the immunity under the Maryland Tort
Claims Act.  There are sound reasons for the strict limitations upon the doctrine of
public official immunity, and those reasons have little or no applicability to the
statutory immunity granted by the Tort Claims Act.  Consequently, judicial opinions
dealing with the well-established limitations upon public official immunity furnish no
authority for judicially creating  similar limitations  upon the broad statutory immunity
granted by the Tort Claims Act.
The purpose of the Maryland public official immunity principle is to insure that
a public official (and not just any government employee), in the performance of “an
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important public duty,” “‘has the freedom and authority to make decisions and
choices.’” James v. Prince George’s County, supra, 288 Md. at 324, 326, 418 A.2d at
1178, 1179, in part quoting Clark v. Ferling, 220 Md. 109, 113, 151 A.2d 137, 139
(1959).  The principle is aimed at permitting a public official to “‘act according to
one’s judgment in the absence of a hard and fast rule.’” James, 288 Md. at 326, 418
A.2d at 1179, quoting Schneider v. Hawkins, 179 Md. 21, 25, 16 A.2d 861, 864 (1940).
Thus, the situation where public official immunity is applicable involves a tort claim
based upon alleged mis-judgment or a negligent exercise of judgment by a public
official.  The doctrine is intended to be a defense against claims that a “better choice”
could have been made by an official.  This defense is inherently related to actions based
on negligence.  Most alleged “intentional torts,” on the other hand, do not involve
legitimate public policy choices or actions “‘in the absence of a hard and fast rule.’”
James, 288 Md. at 326, 418 A.2d at 1179.  
The immunity under the Maryland Tort Claims Act, however, is not inherently
related to negligence actions in contrast to intentional tort actions.  The purpose of the
Tort Claims Act’s immunity is not simply to protect judgmental decisions by officials.
Instead, the purpose of the Tort Claims Act’s immunity is to insulate state employees
generally from tort liability if their actions are within the scope of employment and
without malice or gross negligence.  This broader purpose fully applies to non-
malicious intentional torts and constitutional torts.  
There is another reason, justifying the strict limitations upon public official
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3
Article 19 of the Declaration of Rights provides as follows:
“Article 19.  Remedy for injury to person or property.
“That every man, for any injury done to him in his person or property, ought
to have remedy by the course of the Law of the land, and ought to have justice and
right, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay,
according to the Law of the land.”
immunity, which is inapplicable to statutory immunity under the Maryland Tort Claims
Act.  The principle of public official immunity is not, and has never been, tied to a
waiver of sovereign or governmental immunity.  Under circumstances where sovereign
or governmental immunity is applicable, and where public official immunity is also
applicable, the person injured by governmental tortious conduct will have no remedy.
For this reason, any significant expansion of public official immunity might well
present serious constitutional problems under Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights.3  
Nevertheless, with regard to torts encompassed by the Maryland Tort Claims
Act, the statute generally waives sovereign or governmental immunity and substitutes
the liability of the State for the liability of the state employee committing the tort.
Accordingly, where the immunity of the Tort Claims Act is applicable, the injured party
will ordinarily be able to recover against the State as long as he or she complies with
the procedural requirements of the Tort Claims Act.
The above-discussed distinction between public official immunity and Tort
Claims Act immunity is particularly significant with regard to constitutional torts.  This
Court’s holdings, that public official immunity is inapplicable in actions against public
-19-
officials for violations of plaintiffs’ rights guaranteed by the state constitution, is based
squarely upon Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  In Clea v. City of
Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. at 680-681, 541 A.2d at 1312, we reviewed the seminal
Maryland case concerning this issue:
“The matter of a public official’s immunity from damages for
a constitutional violation was apparently first ruled upon by the
Court in Weyler v. Gibson, supra, 110 Md. 636, 73 A. 261.  In that
case, an enlargement of the Maryland Penitentiary encroached
upon the plaintiffs’ land, and the plaintiffs brought an action for
damages against, among others, the Warden of the Maryland
Penitentiary.  With regard to the Warden’s argument that he was
entitled to the immunity of the State (110 Md. at 653, 73 A. 261),
this Court responded as follows (id. at 653-654, 73 A. 261):
‘JUDGE DILLON, in his work on the Laws and
Jurisprudence of Eng. & Am., 207, said: “That all of the
original States in their first Constitutions and Charters
provided for the security of private property, as well as life
and liberty.  This they did either by adopting, in terms, the
famous thirty-ninth article of Magna Charta which secures
the people from arbitrary imprisonment and arbitrary
spoliation, or by claiming for themselves, compendiously,
all of the liberties and rights set forth in the great Charter.”
‘Our Declaration of Rights (Article 19) declares that
every man for any injury done to him in his person or his
property ought to have remedy by the course of the law of
the land, and (Article 23) [now Article 24] that no man
ought to be deprived of his property, but by the judgment of
his peers, or by the law of the land, and section 40, Article 3
of the Constitution prohibits the passing of any law
authorizing private property to be taken for public use,
without just compensation as agreed between the parties, or
awarded by a jury, being first paid or tendered to the party
entitled to such compensation.’
“After pointing out that the ‘immunity of the State from suit . . .
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[is] firmly fixed in our law,’ this Court continued (id. at 654):
‘But it would be strange indeed, in the face of the solemn
constitutional guarantees, which place private property
among the fundamental and indestructible rights of the
citizen, if this principle could be extended and applied so as
to preclude him from prosecuting an action . . . against a
State Official unjustly and wrongfully withholding property
. . . .’
“Thus, the Court in Weyler flatly refused to extend the State’s
governmental immunity to a public official violating the plaintiffs’
constitutional rights, including those under Article 24 of the
Declaration of Rights.”
The Court in Ashton v. Brown, supra, 339 Md. at 105, 660 A.2d at 464-465, after
reviewing numerous earlier cases, concluded:
“Thus, the principle that individual state officials should not be
immune from suit for state constitutional violations is bound up
with the basic tenet, expressed in Article 19 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights, that a plaintiff injured by unconstitutional
state action should have a remedy to redress the wrong.”
See also Piselli v. 75th Street Medical, 371 Md. 188, 205, 808 A.2d 508, 518 (2002);
Dua v. Comcast Cable, 370 Md. 604, 644, 805 A.2d 1061, 1084 (2002); Robinson v.
Bunch, 367 Md. 432, 444, 788 A.2d 636, 644 (2002); Doe v. Doe, 358 Md. 113, 127-
128, 747 A.2d 617, 624 (2000); Ritchie v. Donnelly, supra, 324 Md. at 370-374, 597
A.2d at 445-446.
While Article 19 generally prohibits a grant of immunity to both the
governmental official and the governmental entity which tortiously violates a plaintiff’s
-21-
state constitutional rights, the effect of Article 19 upon non-constitutional torts is
somewhat more fluid.  The test is one of reasonableness.  We recently summarized the
applicable principle as follows (Dua v. Comcast Cable, supra, 370 Md. at 644, 805
A.2d at 1084-1085):
“This Court’s opinions have also made it clear that Article 19
provides a measure of constitutional protection even for causes of
action which are not based on constitutional rights . . . .  See, e.g.,
Robinson v. Bunch, supra, 367 Md. at 444, 788 A.2d at 644; Doe
v. Doe, 358 Md. 113, 128, 747 A.2d 617, 624 (2000); State v.
Board of Education, supra, 346 Md. at 647, 697 A.2d at 1341;
Renko v. McLean, 346 Md. 464, 484, 697 A.2d 468, 478 (1997);
Johnson v. Maryland State Police, supra, 331 Md. at 297, 628 A.2d
at 168; Murphy v. Edmonds, supra, 325 Md. at 365, 601 A.2d at
113.  ‘A statutory restriction upon access to the courts [in such
cases] violates Article 19 . . . if the restriction is unreasonable.’
Murphy, 325 Md. at 365, 601 A.2d at 113.”
And in Piselli v. 75th Street Medical, supra, 371 Md. at 205-206, 808 A.2d at 518, the
Court stated (footnote and some internal quotation marks omitted):
“We have held that ‘[i]t is a basic tenet, expressed in Article 19 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights, that a plaintiff injured by
unconstitutional state action should have a remedy to redress the
wrong.’
* * *
“Apart from these types of specific holdings with respect to
Article 19, the constitutional provision generally prohibits
unreasonable restrictions upon traditional remedies or access to the
courts but allows the Legislature, pursuant to its authority to
change the common law or statutory provisions, to enact
reasonable restrictions upon traditional remedies or access to the
courts.  Johnson v. Maryland State Police, 331 Md. 285, 297, 628
-22-
A.2d 162, 168 (1993) . . . .”
Nevertheless, with regard to both constitutional and non-constitutional torts, we
have
“held that ‘the Legislature may ordinarily substitute a statutory
remedy, including a statutory administrative and judicial review
remedy, for a common law remedy without violating Article 19 of
the Declaration of Rights,’ Robinson v. Bunch, supra, 367 Md. at
446-447, 788 A.2d at 645.”  Piselli, 371 Md. at 207, 808 A.2d at
519.
Earlier, in Ritchie v. Donnelly, supra, 324 Md. at 374 n.14, 597 A.2d at 446-447 n.14,
the Court explained:
“The General Assembly, however, could provide that the State
will be liable for damages resulting from state constitutional torts
such as those alleged by the plaintiff in this case, and that the
individual employee will be immune.  In other words, the
Legislature may substitute state liability for individual employee
liability.  The Legislature has done precisely this, under certain
circumstances, in the Maryland Tort Claims Act, Code (1984, 1991
Cum. Supp.), §§ 12-101 through 12-110 of the State Government
Article; Code (1974, 1989 Repl. Vol., 1991 Cum. Supp.), § 5-399.2
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.  Moreover, the
sheriff of a county is a state employee within the meaning of the
statute, § 12-101(6) of the State Government Article; Boyer v.
State, 323 Md. 558, 572, 594 A.2d 121 (1991); Rucker v. Harford
County, 316 Md. 275, 281, 558 A.2d 399, 402 (1989).”
Consequently, because of Article 19 of the Declaration of Rights, there is a
substantial difference between public official immunity and the immunity granted by
the Maryland Tort Claims Act.  Article 19 precludes the application of public official
-23-
4
There is one issue regarding the impact of Article 19 upon Maryland Tort Claims Act immunity
which has not been raised in this case, which is not likely presented by the facts of the case, and upon
which we intimate no opinion.  The Tort Claims Act, in § 12-104(a)(2) of the State Government
Article, caps the State’s liability at $200,000, but the Act, in § 5-522(b) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article, grants total immunity to state personnel for torts “for which the State or its units
have waived immunity . . . even if the damages exceed the [monetary] limits of that waiver.”
Whether Article 19 of the Declaration of Rights precludes the grant of immunity to state personnel,
to the extent that damages exceed $200,000, is an issue which has not previously been decided by
the Court.  As indicated above, we express no opinion on the issue.
immunity to constitutional torts.  The same constitutional provision may operate to
restrict an expansion of public official immunity with respect to non-constitutional torts
if the restriction is held to be unreasonable.  Article 19, however, does allow
substitution of governmental liability in place of the liability of government-employed
tortfeasors.  Therefore, at least to the extent that the Maryland Tort Claims Act
substitutes the liability of the State for the liability of the state employee committing
a tort, the requirements of Article 19 are satisfied.  This distinction between public
official immunity and Tort Claims Act immunity fully justifies the difference in scope
between the former and the latter.4
For all of the above-discussed reasons, we hold that the immunity under the
Maryland Tort Claims Act, if otherwise applicable, encompasses constitutional torts
and intentional torts.
IV.
Although we agree with the Court of Special Appeals’ holding regarding the type
of torts covered by the Tort Claims Act’s immunity provisions, we disagree with the
intermediate appellate court’s holding that there was insufficient evidence of malice
to generate a triable issue.  Viewing the evidence and the inferences therefrom in a
-24-
light most favorable to the plaintiff Lee, we believe that there was sufficient evidence
of malice.
One of the earliest cases that examined the issue of malice in the contest of
qualified immunity granted by the Maryland Tort Claims Act was Sawyer v.
Humphries, supra, 322 Md. 247, 587 A.2d 467.  In that case, the plaintiffs claimed that
the defendant, a state police officer, while off-duty, threw rocks at their car, and
attacked one of the occupants.  The trial court held that the officer was immune from
suit under the Maryland Tort Claims Act, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed.
This Court reversed that judgment, Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. at 261, 587 A.2d at
474, pointing out that
“[w]hen someone, without provocation or cause, throws rocks at
two other persons, he is obviously demonstrating ill will towards
those persons.  Wrestling another to the ground, pulling his hair,
and hitting him on the face, again without cause or provocation, is
certainly malicious conduct.”
A comprehensive discussion of malice, in the context of the Maryland Tort
Claims Act, is found in Shoemaker v. Smith, supra, 353 Md. 143, 725 A.2d 549.  In
Shoemaker, two St. Mary’s County sheriff’s deputies were sued by a family after the
deputies had forcibly removed the family’s two minor sons from their home during an
investigation by the St. Mary’s County Department of Social Services of allegations of
child abuse.  Judge Wilner, writing for the Court, explained (353 Md. at 161, 163-164,
725 A.2d at 558-559, 560):
-25-
“[T]he General Assembly . . . clearly and expressly retained a
subjective element for immunity purposes. * * *  The Legislature
had decided that, when State personnel act maliciously, they, and
not the State, must bear the risk.  The predominant and laudable
public policy is to discourage State personnel from acting with
malice in the performance of their public duties.
* * *
“The Court of Special Appeals has long applied . . . some  . .
standard of ‘actual malice’ in defining ‘malice’ for the purposes of
. . . immunity under . . . State and local tort claims laws.
* * *
“This, we believe is the appropriate test – the one the
Legislature intended to be applied.”
“Actual malice,” in Maryland law, normally refers “to conduct ‘characterized by
evil or wrongful motive, intent to injure, knowing and deliberate wrongdoing, ill-will
or fraud . . . .’”  Shoemaker v. Smith, supra, 353 Md. at 163, 725 A.2d at 559, quoting
Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 728-729 n.5, 664 A.2d 916, 929 n.5 (1995).
The motive can exist even when “the conduct is objectively reasonable.”  Shoemaker,
353 Md. at 164, 725 A.2d at 560.  This definition of malice was applied by this Court
in Okwa v. Harper, supra, 360 Md. at 181-182, 757 A.2d at 129, where Judge Harrell,
writing for the Court, said (emphasis supplied):
“Based on Appellees’ version of the story, a fact finder, if given
the opportunity, could conclude that Appellees acted without
malice and did not commit the act of battery while arresting
Mr. Okwa.  The fact finder could find that any injuries suffered by
Mr. Okwa were the product of his own resistive and combative
-26-
efforts.  Apparently this is the version of events that the trial judge
opted to believe.  The trial judge necessarily determined Appellees’
accounts of the alteration to be more credible and based his ruling
on them.  This was an error.  The summary judgment process is not
properly an opportunity for the trial court to give credence to
certain facts and refuse to credit others.  See Pittman v. Atlantic
Realty Co., 359 Md. 513, 537, 754 A.2d 1030, 1042-1043 (2000)
(citations omitted) (the trial judge is not permitted to weigh
evidence in deciding a motion for summary judgment); Sheets v.
Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 342 Md. at 638, 679 A.2d at 542 (“[i]n
granting a motion for summary judgment, the trial court does not
resolve factual disputes, but instead is limited to ruling as a matter
of law”); Dobbins v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 338
Md. 341, 345, 658 A.2d 675, 677 (1995) (“the trial court does not
determine facts, but instead rules on the motion [for summary
judgment] as a matter of law”).
“If a fact finder believed Mr. Okwa’s rendition of the incident,
however, it could infer reasonably that Appellees were motivated
by an improper motive or that they had an affirmative intent to
bring harm to Mr. Okwa.  See Shoemaker, 353 Md. at 164, 725
A.2d at 560.  It would not be unreasonable for a fact finder to infer
that Appellees were motivated by an extreme and overzealous
desire to punish Mr. Okwa for failing to obey immediately their
instructions to walk away from the ticket counter and exit the
terminal.  The alleged fact, if believed, that police officers beat a
citizen about his head and neck while they twisted his thumbs,
could support an inference that Appellees were inspired with
malicious intention.  Such behavior fits the type of conduct which
would strip the actor’s immunity otherwise provided under the
MTC A.”
Thus, intent and motive are critical to the question of malice.  In the instant case,
the question raised for the purposes of immunity under the Maryland Tort Claims Act
is whether a jury could reasonably find that Cline’s conduct, given all the
circumstances, was “motivated by ill will” or “by an improper motive.”  Shoemaker,
353 Md. at 164, 725 A.2d at 560.  The case at bar is somewhat similar to the Okwa case
-27-
with regard to the inferences which a jury might properly draw.
Lee’s claim of malice is based on the following facts and inferences which are
to be drawn in his favor.  The traffic stop took far longer than warranted.  Both parties’
experts testified that the stop should have taken no more than fifteen minutes.  There
is evidence in the record that Cline had completed similar stops in a shorter period of
time, of between four and ten minutes.  The record indicates that Cline had the
information he needed to write the tickets within six minutes of the stop.  Nonetheless,
the stop took approxim ately forty minutes.  During that time, Lee was clearly under
arrest; Cline’s order that Lee “get back” in the car reinforces this.
Cline requested the canine “search” after Lee declined to consent to the search
of his vehicle, when there was utterly no evidence in the record justifying such a
“search” of the vehicle.  Lee was driving with a valid license; he had no points or
restrictions on his license, and was not wanted by the police.  Lee had a reasonable and
valid explanation for driving without a license plate, which was the initial justification
for the stop.  Nonetheless, Cline referred to Lee as a “suspect,” without any reason to
label him as such.  Cline told the dispatcher that Lee was not “cooperative.”  A jury
might reasonably infer that the only factors which motivated Cline’s calling Lee an
uncooperative “suspect” were that Lee was an African-American male driving a luxury
car who refused to consent to a search.
Lee argues, and we agree, that a “jury could infer . . . that Deputy Cline
deliberately prolonged the stop because . . . Lee refused to consent to a search of his
-28-
car.”  (Petitioner’s brief at 16).  Cline’s request to search Lee’s automobile when there
was no basis for such a search, Cline’s retort that he could search the vehicle without
Lee’s permission, Cline’s insistence on obtaining a canine unit, Cline’s “yelling” at Lee
to get back into the car, the length of the stop, and Cline’s reference to Lee as an
uncooperative suspect, taken together, could support an inference of ill-will on the part
of Cline.  A jury issue with regard to malice was generated.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIA L
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED
TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
WITH DIRECTIONS TO REVERSE THE
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCU IT COURT FOR
FREDERICK COUNTY AND REMAND THE
CASE TO THE CIRCU IT COURT FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT
WITH THIS OPINION.  COSTS IN THIS
COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY 
THE
RESPONDENT CLINE.