Case Title: Salley v. Central Arkansas Transit Authority

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-12-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Valerie SALLEY v. CENTRAL ARKANSAS TRANSIT
AUTHORITY

96-630                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered December 9, 1996


1.   Statutes -- construction of acts -- all acts are to be
     reconciled if possible. -- All acts passed upon the same
     subject are in pari materia, and must be taken and construed
     together and made to stand if capable of being reconciled.   

2.   Insurance -- general assembly required common carriers to
     obtain liability insurance -- public transit systems come
     within Arkansas's definition of common carrier. --  When it
     passed the 1981 Public Transit System Act (424), the General
     Assembly was aware of prior Act 347, which created the Motor
     Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act and Act 893, which required
     Uninsured Motorist Liability Insurance for common carriers;
     because common carriers must obtain liability insurance
     prescribed under Acts 347 and 893, the General Assembly
     intended that public-transit systems, like appellee, come
     within those same intendments; there is no language in Act 424
     that exempts a public transit system from the motor vehicle
     and liability insurance requirements in Acts 347 and 893, and
     Act 347, as amended by Ark. Code Ann.  27-19-212 (Repl.
     1994), enlarged the term "person" to include "public transit
     authorities"; the General Assembly fully intended to provide
     public-transit systems with immunity from suit in tort, but
     like other political subdivisions or entities, they must
     obtain prescribed liability insurance or be self-insured.

3.   Insurance -- appellee included in definition of common carrier
     -- summary judgment reversed. -- Appellee's argument that it
     is not a common carrier as defined in Ark. Code Ann.  23-16-
     301 and that it is therefore not subject to the requirements
     of liability under Ark. Code Ann.  23-16-302 and Ark. Code
     Ann.  27-19-605 was without merit; as an entity of a
     municipal corporation, appellee is a "person, firm, or
     corporation" as those terms are employed defining "common
     carrier" in  23-16-301(a);  27-19-212 defines the term
     "person" to include "public transit authorities," and the term
     person in  23-16-301(a) should be read to include public-
     transit systems as well; appellee is a common carrier for
     compensation; the grant of summary judgment was reversed. 


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court; John Ward, Judge; reversed
and remanded.
     Mays & Crutcher, P.A., by:  Richard L. Mays, for appellant.
     J. Chris Bradley, for appellee.
     Tom Glaze, Justice.
     Appellant Valerie Salley was a passenger in appellee Central
Arkansas Transit Authority's (CAT's) bus when it collided with a
car operated by an uninsured motorist.  Salley subsequently filed
suit against CAT, alleging that she had sustained injuries
resulting from the collision and that CAT, as a common carrier, had
a duty to carry uninsured motorist coverage or to be self-insured. 
CAT filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court
granted, holding CAT is a governmental public transit system, and
as such, the General Assembly specifically delimited its liability
for negligence.  Accordingly, the trial court held CAT was not a
common carrier that had a duty to carry uninsured motorist
coverage.  Salley brings this appeal from the trial court's summary
judgment decision.
     Salley, on appeal, restates her argument below that CAT is a
public corporation established by Pulaski County and the
municipalities of Little Rock, North Little Rock, Sherwood, Cammack
Village, and Maumelle, and as a common carrier, CAT is statutorily
required to carry uninsured motorist coverage or to self-insure its
vehicles for collisions with uninsured motorists.  In particular,
Salley argues that CAT is a common carrier as that term is defined
in Ark. Code Ann.  23-16-301(a) (1987).  That statute provides as
follows:
          As used in this subchapter, unless the context
     otherwise requires, "common carrier," means any person,
     firm, or corporation which undertakes, either directly or
     indirectly, to transport members of the general public as
     passengers for compensation whether over regular or
     irregular routes.
     Salley further submits that, in fitting the definition of
common carrier, CAT, under Ark. Code Ann.  23-16-302 (1987), is
required to carry uninsured motorist liability insurance or become
a self-insurer for the protection of its passengers and operators
who are legally entitled to recover damages from uninsured
motorists.  To determine whether the General Assembly intended 
23-16-301--302 to include public transit systems requires our
analysis of other relevant statutes as well.  As this court has
said on many prior occasions, a universal rule in construing
statutes, and a settled maxim of the common law, is that all acts
passed upon the same subject are in pari materia, and must be taken
and construed together and made to stand if capable of being
reconciled.  Vandiver v. Washington County, 274 Ark. 561,