Case Title: Kopicko v. State et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 458, 2003

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
H. DIANA KOPICKO, 
 
Appellant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES 
FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH AND 
THEIR FAMILIES, 
 
Appellee Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 458, 2003 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  C.A. No. 02A-19-004 
§  
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: January 16, 2004 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: March 25, 2004 
 
Before BERGER, STEELE, and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 25th day of March 2004, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and 
the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Diana Kopicko, filed this appeal from an order of the 
Superior Court dated August 15, 2003 affirming the Merit Employee Relations 
Board’s denial of Kopicko’s grievance regarding her termination from employment 
with the State of Delaware Department of Services for Children, Youth and their 
 
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Families (DSCYF).1  We find no merit to Kopicko’s appeal.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
(2) 
The record reflects that DSCYF hired Kopicko in July 1997 as a full 
time Senior Family Service Specialist.  At that time, Kopicko began a six-month 
probationary period of employment as was then provided for in the Rules for the 
State of Delaware Merit System of Personnel Administration (Merit Rules).2  
Kopicko was required to undergo mandatory training, which was conducted by 
Roxanne Ford.  During the six-week training period, Ford communicated with 
Kopicko’s immediate supervisor, Rick Thomas, about Kopicko’s resistance to 
training, her insensitivity to others, her inattentiveness during training, and her 
obtuse comments.  Thomas followed up with Kopicko about Ford’s concerns over 
Kopicko’s attitude. 
 
(3) 
In September 1997, after completing the training program, Kopicko 
received a performance plan, which she signed, outlining the responsibilities of her 
position and the bases upon which she would later be evaluated.  Evidence 
presented at the MERB hearing reflected the on-going concerns expressed by 
                                                 
1 Kopicko has another appeal pending, No. 521, 2000, which this Court stayed in order to 
give Kopicko the opportunity to pursue her administrative remedies under the Merit System of 
Personnel Administration.  See Kopicko v. State, 805 A.2d 877 (Del. 2002).  Having opted to 
pursue her claims administratively, it appears that the appeal in No. 521, 2000 is now moot.  The 
Clerk of the Court will issue a notice to Kopicko to show cause why that appeal should not be 
dismissed on the ground that it is moot. 
2 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5922; Merit Rule 11.0200.  
 
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Kopicko’s superiors about Kopicko’s attitude and the quality of her work.  In 
October 1997, she received a performance review reflecting that her job 
performance needed improvement.  In November 1997, Thomas wrote to his 
supervisors documenting his concerns about Kopicko with regard to her inadequate 
documentation, poor risk assessment, resistance to supervision, and failure to meet 
deadlines.  Kopicko was informed that she had failed to successfully complete her 
probationary term of employment.  She was terminated from employment in 
December 1997. 
 
(4) 
In her appeal to the MERB, Kopicko asserted that her termination was 
the result of discrimination based on non-merit factors.  According to Kopicko her 
efficiency and competency as a case-worker was a “threat to the status quo” in the 
agency.  After a two-day hearing, the MERB concluded that Kopicko had not 
established by a preponderance of the evidence that her termination was based on 
impermissible non-merit factors.  The MERB found clear and convincing evidence 
that DSCYF’s decision not to retain Kopicko was for valid, merit-based reasons. 
 
(5) 
In her appeal to the Superior Court, Kopicko argued that the MERB’s 
decision should be reversed for the following reasons: (a) the MERB relied on 
perjured testimony; (b) the MERB abused its discretion by denying Kopicko’s 
request to recall a DSCYF witness during the second day of the hearing after the 
witness had been excused following her testimony on the first day of the hearing; 
 
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(c) there was a possible conflict of interest created by permitting one deputy 
attorney general to represent DSCYF and another deputy attorney general to advise 
the MERB; and (d) the MERB abused its discretion by refusing to reopen the 
record to allow Kopicko to submit additional documentation after the hearing was 
completed but before the MERB issued its written decision. 
 
(6) 
The Superior Court conducted a thorough review of the MERB record 
and concluded that there was substantial evidence to support the MERB’s factual 
findings.  The Superior Court also concluded that the MERB did not err or abuse 
its discretion in refusing to postpone the second day of the hearing to allow 
Kopicko to recall a witness whom she had the opportunity to cross-examine on the 
first day of the hearing or in refusing to accept additional documentation from 
Kopicko after the hearing was concluded.  Finally, the Superior Court rejected 
Kopicko’s assertion of a “possible” conflict of interest as grounds for reversal 
because Kopicko had failed to assert any facts to support a claim that an actual 
conflict existed. 
(7) 
On appeal, this Court’s standard of review is the same as the Superior 
Court.  We must determine whether the MERB’s decision is supported by 
substantial evidence and free from legal error.3  Having carefully considered the 
parties= briefs and the record below, we conclude that the MERB’s decision is 
                                                 
3 Stoltz Mgmt. v. Consumer Affairs Bd., 616 A.2d 1205, 1208 (Del. 1992). 
 
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supported by substantial evidence and is free from legal error.  We find it manifest 
that the judgment of the Superior Court should be affirmed on the basis of, and for 
the reasons set forth in, the Superior Court=s well-reasoned decision dated August 
15, 2003.   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice