Case Title: Freeman v. State

Citation: 204 So. 2d 842

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1967-12-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
204 So. 2d 842 (1967) David Edward FREEMAN v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 44518. Supreme Court of Mississippi. December 4, 1967. Rex K. Jones, Hattiesburg, for appellant. Joe T. Patterson, Atty. Gen., by Guy N. Rogers, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. PATTERSON, Justice: Appellant, David Edward Freeman, was indicted and tried for murder in the Circuit Court of Forrest County. He was found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to serve twenty years in the state penitentiary. He appeals here, assigning as error that the court erred in excluding evidence *843 offered by the defendant as to the character and reputation of the deceased and in excluding evidence offered to show the record of convictions of the deceased. Appellant and deceased, George McSwain, Jr., were acquainted only slightly, if at all. Appellant drove to Hattiesburg from Bogalusa, Louisiana with his mother, girl friend and other members of his family on Labor Day 1966. They went by to see a friend, Olean Faulkner, who lived in a rooming house next door to the Star Cafe in Hattiesburg. Appellant testified that he went into the rooming house and told Olean that his mother wanted to speak to her and that he then went into the cafe. According to the testimony of a witness for the State, the defendant used profanity upon entering the cafe and was told by the proprietor that no cursing was allowed within the premises and that the defendant must leave. Appellant left the cafe, according to his testimony, and returned to his car which was parked in front of the rooming house. As he went out the door of the cafe he looked back and saw McSwain and the proprietor go out the back door of the cafe. The defendant, who admitted carrying a pistol under his shirt, further testified that he and his family were getting into the car and that he was standing beside it when McSwain kicked open the door of the rooming house and fired at him, whereupon he whirled and "went to shooting right directly where the shot was fired" killing McSwain. Appellant's mother corroborated his version of the shooting and added that when McSwain, holding a rifle in his hands, came to the door of the rooming house and kicked it open, appellant's girl friend, who was in the car, called to McSwain and pled with him not to shoot into the car because her children were there. The proprietor of the cafe testified that Olean was with the appellant when he came into the cafe and that he directed the appellant to leave due to his profane language. Anticipating trouble, he then went next door to the rooming house to get his rifle and while there heard three or four shots from the front of the building. Immediately after hearing the shots he ran down the hallway to the front of the rooming house and found McSwain, unarmed, lying in the doorway. He lifted McSwain, observed his condition, and laid him back down. In this process his hands became covered with blood and some of the blood was transferred to the rifle, which, according to his testimony, he returned to his room to get. He said that it was he, rather than McSwain, who brought the rifle to the front of the building, and that the rifle was never fired. The testimony of other witnesses was in conflict as to whether there were three or four shots fired, although it is undisputed that appellant fired three times. There is no testimony, other than that of the proprietor, as to whether or not the rifle had been recently fired, though there is testimony that it was fully loaded. No cartridge hulls from it were observed at the scene; however, no search was made therefor. The testimony is in hopeless conflict as to whether the deceased fired at all, and if so, who fired the first shot. The evidence does disclose, however, that sometime prior to this incident appellant had lived with Olean Faulkner and that at the time of the shooting Olean and deceased were living in the same rooming house. The evidence also establishes that there were no words spoken between appellant and the deceased, with the possible exception of appellant's words immediately prior to the shooting to the deceased, "Man, yes, don't shoot in this car. I got my families in there." The assignment of error pertaining to the police record of the deceased is not well taken for the reason that it does not disclose any trait or characteristic of violence and, as such, is irrelevant and the court was correct in excluding the same. The assignment of error relative to evidence of the decedent's reputation for peace and violence in the community in which he lived, in our opinion, is well *844 taken. The principal question upon which there was conflicting evidence is "who was the aggressor?" This is the heart and soul of the case as the defendant admitted the shooting, but proclaimed that he did so in his necessary self-defense. The general rule is that the decedent's reputation for peace or violence is not admissible in evidence unless the trait of violence is known to the person pleading self-defense. However, there is an exception to this rule which is as broad as the rule itself that where the question of "who was the aggressor" is before the court, then this type of evidence is admissible. In 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 272 at 1223 (1944), the rule is stated: 1 Wigmore, Evidence section 63 at 467, 470-471 (3d ed. 1940), explains why such evidence is relevant to the issue of whether the deceased or the accused was the aggressor: In 26 Am.Jur. Homicide section 346 (1940), we find a similar explanation: Further authority for this position may be found in 1 A.L.R.3d 571, 601 (1965): Moreover, the authorities in our own state are in accord with the general rules announced above. In Shinall v. State, 199 So. 2d 251, 257 (Miss. 1967), we said: See also Smith v. State, 75 Miss. 542, 23 So. 260 (1898), where we said: Compare Pinter v. State, 203 Miss. 344, 348, 34 So. 2d 723, 724 (1948), where we said: The case of Cole v. State, 193 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla.Ct.App. 1966), is peculiarly applicable to the instant case. There the appellant contended: *846 The court agreed with the appellant's contention and reversed the conviction, saying: The State does not question the preservation by the defendant of the foregoing question of evidence, but rather defends the position of the trial court in excluding this evidence by citing the cases of Pinter v. State, supra, and Newsome v. State, 197 Miss. 797, 20 So. 2d 708 (1945). An examination of Pinter indicates that the general reputation of a decedent could in no event be relevant unless upon the issue of aggression, thus lending itself to the support of the position of the defendant. Newsome is clearly distinguishable from this case as the basis thereof is that the desperate and dangerous character of a person killed cannot be proved by antecedent acts of violence, the distinguishing feature being precisely that here the general reputation of the decedent was sought to be introduced into evidence rather than specific and antecedent acts of violence. It is our opinion that the authorities cited by the State are insufficient to overcome the rule set out above which permits the introduction of evidence as to the general reputation of the decedent for peace or violence when one of the issues to be decided by the jury in reaching its verdict is that of determining "who was the aggressor." We cannot conjecture as to what effect the testimony offered by the defendant and excluded would have had upon the jury, but we have no hesitancy in holding that he had the inviolate right under the circumstances to offer it, the exclusion of which constitutes reversible error. Though not argued by the State, the question has arisen within the Court whether the evidence was properly presented to the trial court and properly preserved for consideration on appeal. The record reveals the following proceedings relating to the reputation of the deceased: It will be noted that the jury was excluded at the conclusion of the prefatory questions, whereupon the witness was asked by his attorney "Did you know his reputation for peace and violence?" This, of course, does not refer to his general reputation in the community which we have many times held to be essential in determining a trait or characteristic of a person. The proffer made by the defendant, however, correctly states the rule, as the defendant's attorney stated that if permitted by the court, he would prove the general reputation of the deceased for peace or violence in the community in which he lived. The response, "I don't know what you means 'bout dat," in reply to a question relating to the deceased's reputation was evidently misunderstood or misinterpreted by the district attorney to mean that the witness had no knowledge of decedent's reputation, whereas an examination of it signifies that the witness meant merely that he did not understand the question and negates the construction put upon his answer by the district attorney. The court was doubtless under the same mistaken impression as it sustained the district attorney's objection. It is the opinion of the majority of the Court that the right of appeal was properly preserved by the defense in its proffer of evidence and the defendant should not be deprived of a review of his position by the omission of the word "general" in regard to the deceased's reputation in the absence of the jury or that he be deprived thereof by a construction of the words "I don't know what you means 'bout dat," that the witness was without knowledge of the deceased's reputation, thus foreclosing to the defendant the right to prove the same. Reversed and remanded. RODGERS, JONES, BRADY and INZER, JJ., concur. ETHRIDGE, Chief Justice (dissenting): The controlling opinion correctly states the rule: Decedent's general reputation for peace or violence is not admissible in evidence unless the trait of violence is known to the person pleading self-defense, but a broad "exception" permits such evidence where an issue is whether deceased was the aggressor. Our difference is in application of the rule to the evidence in this case, and in particular to the offer of proof made by appellant's counsel. In perspective, this was a lengthy trial with a large number of witnesses testifying for both sides. The jury found defendant guilty. The trial court committed no reversible error, unless it arose through the testimony of defendant's witness R.T. Holmes, quoted in the controlling opinion. Where an objection has been sustained to a question, an offer of proof is appropriate The rejection of evidence not apparently admissible is not error, in the absence of an offer or sufficient statement of the purpose of its introduction, by which the court may determine its relevancy or admissibility. Accordingly, it is proper for the trial court *848 to overrule an offer of proof where the language of the offer is general, vague, and not sufficiently specific. An offer should clearly inform the court as to what is intended to be proved, and the language should be such as to enable the court to determine whether the evidence sought to be offered is admissible. Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 279, 310 (1963); 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1029 (1961); 53 Am.Jur. Trial § 102 (1945); 88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 73-80 (1955). This Court has consistently followed this rule requiring definiteness and sufficiency of an offer of proof. McArdle's Estate v. City of Jackson, 215 Miss. 571, 586, 61 So. 2d 400, 405, 63 So. 2d 101 (1952); Stone v. State, 210 Miss. 218, 49 So. 2d 263 (1950); Boyd v. State, 202 Miss. 509, 32 So. 2d 452 (1947). In short, the offer must clearly state what the party making it intends to prove. Counsel must not leave the offer in an indefinite or doubtful shape. The offer must be so full and specific that its exclusion would be erroneous from any point of view. 53 Am.Jur. Trial § 102 (1945). As a practical matter, therefore, a trial court should not be put in error by ruling on an indefinite and inconclusive offer of proof. With deference, it seems to me that, with this evidentiary question placed in the perspective of a lengthy trial with no other errors, the testimony of the witness Holmes and the offer of proof by appellant's counsel are insufficient to warrant reversal of this conviction. Holmes was asked whether he knew the deceased's "reputation for peace and violence," omitting the requirement of general reputation in the community in which he lived for peace or violence. To which the witness replied, "I don't know what you means 'bout dat." That statement could be interpreted in one of two ways: The witness was either saying he did not understand the question, or he did not know such general reputation. If the latter, of course, there was no error. If the former, it was the duty of appellant's counsel to elicit further answers from this witness, or request the court's permission for that purpose. He did not do so. Hence the trial court, in the midst of a lengthy trial, sustained the State's objection. At that point, the offer of evidence was insufficient; certainly it could not be said that the trial court abused its discretion. Appellant's counsel then stated that if the witness had been allowed to testify he would have proved by him deceased's general reputation for "peace or violence." However, he did not state whether that witness would have testified that such general reputation was bad or good. That is left wholly to surmise or conjecture. The offer of proof was general, vague, and not sufficiently specific. Moreover, if the case is reversed, exactly what this witness will testify on this particular issue has not been established. Hence I cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the objection to this offer of proof. GILLESPIE, P.J., and SMITH and ROBERTSON, JJ., join in this dissent.