Case Title: State v. Bolden

Citation: 356 Md. 160

Docket Number: 151/98

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1999-09-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
State of Maryland v. Kevin Lamont Bolden
No. 151, September Term, 1998
EIGHTH AMENDMENT — CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT —
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES IMPOSED PASSED CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
 MARYLAND
No.  151  
September Term, 1998
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
KEVIN LAMONT BOLDEN
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
           Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Karwacki, Robert L. 
 
(Retired, specially assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Karwacki, J.
Bell, C.J., Eldridge, and Raker, JJ., dissent
Filed:   September 23, 1999
 An analogous provision, Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides
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     “That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel or unusual punishments inflicted, by Courts of Law.”
The Eighth Amendment is binding upon the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S. Ct. 1417, 8 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1962).
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The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution mandates:  “Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted.”   In Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3006, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637,
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645 (1983), the Supreme Court held that this protection “prohibits not only barbaric
punishment, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.”  (Emphasis
added.)
In the instant criminal case Kevin Lamont Bolden, the petitioner, claims that the
sentences imposed upon him by the Circuit Court for Caroline County violate the quoted
Eighth Amendment guarantee.
I.
On June 18, 1996, Officer Thomas Coughenour, while working in an undercover
capacity as a member of the Caroline and Queen Anne County Narcotics Task Force, was
approached on Main Street in Federalsburg, Caroline County,  by Bolden who offered to sell
him crack cocaine.  Officer Coughenour purchased a quantity of the cocaine for $20.00.   He
then left the scene,  told Officer Tull of the Federalsburg Police Department of what had
occurred, and described the person who had sold him the controlled dangerous substance.
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Officer Tull determined that the person described was Bolden.  This was confirmed later
when Officer Coughenour selected Bolden’s photograph from a police department file.
Bolden was not arrested at that time.
On July 10, 1996, Officer Coughenour was again working in a covert capacity for the
Narcotics Task Force.  As he was driving through Federalsburg, he was hailed by Bolden
who offered to sell him crack cocaine.  Coughenour purchased a piece of crack cocaine for
$20.00 and then told Bolden that he would be back in another 15 or 20 minutes to make
another purchase of cocaine.  Officer Coughenour returned in 20 minutes and purchased
another piece of crack cocaine from Bolden for $20.00.   Thereafter Bolden was placed
under arrest for distributing crack cocaine.
Subsequently, Bolden was accused in two criminal informations filed in the Circuit
Court for Caroline County.  In Case No. 4557, Bolden was charged with distribution of
cocaine, possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of cocaine on June 18,
1996.  At a jury trial on August 22, 1997, he was convicted of all three crimes charged.  In
Case No.  4558, Bolden was charged with two counts of distribution of cocaine, two counts
of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and two counts of possession of cocaine on
July 10, 1996.  At his trial on September 11, 1997, the jury convicted him of all those
charges.
On September 11, 1997, the court sentenced Bolden in both cases.  The court merged
the lesser included offenses and sentenced Bolden on the three counts of distribution of
cocaine.  Bolden was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment in Case No. 4557 for the sale of
 The maximum sentence for distribution of cocaine is 20 years’ imprisonment.  Maryland
2
Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 286(b).  In addition , Art. 27, § 293 provides in pertinent
part:
“(a)  More severe sentence. — Any person convicted of any offense
under this subheading [which is entitled Health - Controlled
Dangerous Substances and includes Sections 276 through 304 of Art.
27] is, if the offense is a second or subsequent offense, punishable by
a term of imprisonment twice that otherwise authorized, by twice the
fine otherwise authorized, or by both.
(b)  Second or subsequent offense defined. — For purposes of this
section, an offense shall be considered a second or subsequent offense,
if, prior to the conviction of the offense, the offender has at any time
been convicted of any offense or offenses under this subheading or
under any prior law of this State or any law of the United States or of
any other state relating to the other controlled dangerous substances
as defined in this subheading.”
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cocaine on June 18, 1996.  In Case No. 4558, involving the two sales of cocaine which took
place on July 10, 1996, the court sentenced Bolden on Count I to 32 years’ imprisonment,
consecutive to the sentence imposed in Case No. 4557 and on Count IV to 40 years’
imprisonment consecutive to the sentence imposed on Count I.2
 Bolden presented seven questions to the Court of Special Appeals, to wit:
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1.
Was the sentence imposed in this case cruel and unusual
punishment under both the Maryland Declaration of Rights
and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
2.
In Case No. 4558, should the Appellant have been convicted
and sentenced under only one count of distribution?
3.
Could the Appellant be sentenced under Article 27, sec. 293,
when his convictions did not qualify as “second or subsequent
offenses” as that term is defined in subsection (b)?
4.
If Article 27, sec. 293, is interpreted to permit the enhanced
penalties imposed in this case, is that statute unconstitutionally
vague?
5.
Was the imposition of three enhanced sentences under sec.
293 at a single sentencing hearing contrary to the intent of the
statute?
6.
Would it be contrary to the legislative intent to permit a
person convicted of distribution of CDS to receive twice the
penalty otherwise authorized on the basis of prior conviction
of possession of CDS?
7.
Must the sentence in this case be vacated because of the
absence in the record of the [notice] required by Maryland
Rule 4-245?
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Bolden appealed.   The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, vacated
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his sentence on Count IV in Case No. 4558 for which he had received 40 years.  The three
judges of the intermediate appellate court panel agreed that the two sales of cocaine on July
10, 1996, were actually part of one continuing transaction so that only one punishment
should be imposed for these distributions.  Furthermore, over the dissent of the third judge,
two of the panel’s judges held that Bolden’s sentences constituted cruel and unusual
 In so ruling the court responded to the first two questions presented by Bolden.  It declined
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to rule on the other five.
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punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Article 25 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights and vacated the other two sentences imposed.4
The State did not challenge the ruling vacating the 40 year sentence on Count IV in
Case No. 4558, but it did petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court’s decision on the
constitutional issue.  Bolden filed a cross-petition for certiorari.  We granted both petitions.
State v. Bolden, 352 Md. 617, 724 A.2d 20 (1999).
II.
In Solem v. Helm, the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits sentences that are “grossly” or “significantly” disproportionate in
length to the crime being punished.  463 U.S. at 287-88, 103 S. Ct. at 3008, 77 L. Ed. 2d at
648.  The Court stated that “a court’s proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment
should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for the commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions.”  Id. at 292, 103 S. Ct. at 3011, 77 L. Ed.2d at 650.   The Court recognized,
however, that appellate courts in reviewing sentences challenged under the Eighth
Amendment should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures
necessarily possess in determining the limits of prison sentences for crimes and the discretion
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vested in sentencing courts to decide the appropriate length of any prison term imposed upon
convicted criminals.  Id. at 290, 103 S. Ct. at 3009, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 649.
The Court revisited its holding in Solem in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111
S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991).  In that case the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment
of a state court imposing a sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole
upon a person convicted of feloniously possessing 672 grams of cocaine.  The Court in a
plurality decision held that the sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment.  A consensus
of the majority of the justices who upheld the sentence was that “[T]he Eighth Amendment
does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence.  Rather, it forbids only
extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.”  See Kennedy, J.
concurring, 501 U.S. at 1001, 111 S. Ct. at 2705, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 869.”  In that same
concurring opinion Justice Kennedy opined that because impermissible disproportionality
will rarely be found upon threshold comparison of the crime committed to the sentence
imposed, a more detailed comparative analysis within and between jurisdictions will only
be required when the threshold comparison suggests gross disproportionality.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion is consistent with the view we took in an earlier case, State
v. Davis, 310 Md. 611, 530 A.2d 1223 (1987).  We there reasoned that “the substantive issue
of whether Davis’s sentence is constitutionally proportionate also involves a question of
process, namely, the breadth and depth of the required proportionality review in relation to
Davis’s sentence and criminal record.  Id. at 628, 530 A.2d at 1231-32.  Accordingly, we
held that “based on Davis’s current and . . . predicate conviction [under a recidivist statute],
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on the seriousness of the crime, and on comparisons to other sentences adjudicated to be
constitutional” an extensive proportionality review under Solem was not appropriate, and the
sentence of life without parole was not unconstitutional.  Id. at 631-32, 530 A.2d 1233. 
In the later case of Minor v. State, 313 Md. 573, 546 A.2d 1028 (1988), we upheld
without an extensive proportionality review a sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment without
parole under a habitual criminal statute where the defendant had been convicted of daytime
housebreaking.  We stated:
“[A]n extended Helm proportionality analysis is not mandatory
under these facts.  In light of the seriousness of Minor’s past and
present criminal conduct, deference due the legislature in regard
to sentencing directives, and the unique function and particular
requirements for enhanced punishment under § 643B(c), we
hold that Minor’s sentence is within constitutional limits.
Accord State v. Davis, supra.”
Id. at 583-84, 546 A.2d at 1033.
We summarized our conclusions concerning the breadth and depth of the required
proportionality review of a non-capital sentence challenged on Eighth Amendment grounds
in Thomas v. State, 333 Md. 84, 95-96, 634 A.2d 1, 6 (1993), where Judge McAuliffe
speaking for the Court stated:
“In considering a proportionality challenge, a reviewing
court must first determine whether the sentence appears to be
grossly disproportionate.  In so doing, the court should look to
the seriousness of the conduct involved, the seriousness of any
relevant past conduct as in the recidivist cases, any articulated
purpose supporting the sentence, and the importance of
deferring to the legislature and to the sentencing court.  See
Davis, 310 Md. at 631-32, 530 A.2d 1223, and Minor, 313 Md.
at 583-84, 546 A.2d 1028.
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If these considerations do not lead to a suggestion of
gross disproportionality, the review is at an end.  If the sentence
does appear to be grossly disproportionate, the court should
engage in a more detailed Solem-type analysis.  It may conduct
an intra- and inter-jurisdictional analysis as a vehicle for
comparison and as a source of objective standards; it must,
however, remember that under principles of federalism, a state
legislature may choose to impose a more severe penalty than
other states consider appropriate.  In order to be
unconstitutional, a punishment must be more than very harsh; it
must be grossly disproportionate.  This standard will not be
easily met.”
III.
In considering Bolden’s proportionality challenge, we must as a threshold matter
determine whether the sentences appear to be grossly disproportionate.  In this regard we
view the consecutive sentences in question to aggregate 57 years since the 40 year sentence
on Count IV of Case No. 4558 was vacated by the Court of Special Appeals, and no review
has been sought of that judgment.  Cf., Ayers v. State, 335 Md. 602, 641-42, 645 A.2d 22,
41 (1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1130 (1995) (question of merger should be resolved before
rendering a conclusion as to whether the total sentence constituted cruel and unusual
punishment).
Applying the teachings of our prior cases, we hold that the consecutive sentences
imposed upon Bolden of 25 years’ imprisonment for his conduct on June 18, 1996, and 32
years’ imprisonment for his conduct on July 10, 1996, were not grossly disproportionate in
length to the crimes being punished.  Each consecutive sentence was based upon a very
 The pre-sentence report reflects that Bolden, who at the time of his sentencing was thirty-
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seven years of age, had the following prior convictions of provisions of the “Health-Controlled
Dangerous Substances” subtitle of Art. 27 of the Md. Code:
“10/20/84
Unlawful Possession
5/1/85
Caroline County
(3 counts)
Suspended sentence
1 year probation
5/27/88
1)  CDS paraphernalia
9/19/88
Caroline County
possession with intent
1)  Nolle prossed
to use
2)  24 months suspended,
2)  CDS possession
24 months probation
7/15/90
1)  CDS possession
10/10/91
Caroline County
2)  CDS Paraphernalia
1)  1 year
2)  fined
8/9/91
1)  Distribution non-
1/22/92
Caroline County
CDS
1)  5 years, 4 years
2)  Distribution non-
suspended
CDS
2)  Nolle prossed”
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serious crime, the distribution of crack cocaine.  The sentences were imposed upon him as
a recidivist who was guilty of prior violations of our controlled dangerous substance laws.5
In imposing the sentences the trial judge based his decision upon the serious threat to the
community posed by dealers in crack cocaine and Bolden’s escalating pattern of violations
of the laws prohibiting the possession and distribution of controlled dangerous substances.
The sentences imposed were within the maximum terms prescribed by the Legislature for the
criminal conduct of which Bolden had been convicted.  Under these circumstances an
extended proportionality analysis directed by Solem v. Helm, supra is not required.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED;
CASE 
REMANDED 
TO 
THAT
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COURT FOR CONSIDERATION OF
THE 
OTHER 
QUESTIONS
PRESENTED BY BOLDEN WHICH
WERE  NOT ANSWERED.  COSTS
TO ABIDE THE FINAL RESULT.
Dissenting Opinion follows:
Raker, J. dissenting:
The trial court sentenced Bolden in Case No. 4557 for the sale of cocaine to 25 years’
incarceration.  The court sentenced Bolden in Case No. 4558 on Count I, sale of cocaine, to 32 years’
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incarceration, consecutive to the 25 years in No. 4557; on Count IV in No. 4558, sale of cocaine, the
court sentenced Bolden to 40 years’ incarceration, consecutive to the sentence imposed in Count I.
The total sentence imposed was 97 years’ imprisonment, at a single sentencing hearing.
The trial judge expressed the following rationale for the sentences:
COURT: . . . Criminal # 4557 which was the earliest case tried on
August 22nd, the minimum guideline would be twenty four (24) years
so your sentences will be twenty-five (25) years to the division of
corrections and that will be consecutive to any and all outstanding and
unserved sentences.
*     *     *     *     *     *
That is count number one, the distribution of cocaine.  That’s the
flagship count there.  Yes.  In #4558 because these are subsequent to
the other ones, your sentence has to be greater for each of these
events than it was in the proceeding one and while there’s no magic
in sentencing there is some symmetry to what I’m going to do.
Thirty-two (32) years is halfway between twenty-five (25) and
forty(40) roughly.  So thirty-two (32)years to the division of
correction.  Under count number one is #4558 is your sentence for
that distribution.  Yes, consecutive to any and all outstanding
unserved sentences and consecutive to #4557.  Now if you haven’t
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earned the max by this time no one ever will.  So the maximum I can
give under #4558 is forty (40) years under count number four which
is your final distribution count that you’re subject to sentencing on.
That forty (40) year sentence under count number four is consecutive
also to the sentence in count number one in #4558 and consecutive
also to #4557 as well as to all other outstanding and unserved
sentences.  That may well be the better part of your life.  It’s ninety-
seven (97) years or so.  That’s what the public wants.  If you end up
serving most of it or dying in jail you’ve put yourself there.  Better
you should die in jail than other people die of cocaine on the street.
Before the Court of Special Appeals, Bolden argued that the sentence imposed in this case
was cruel and unusual punishment under both the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  That court agreed, and held in an unreported opinion
that the total sentence imposed by the trial court was “‘cruel’ because it is ‘grossly disproportionate
when measured against the offense and relevant surrounding circumstances . . . .” (Quoting Thomas
v. State, 333 Md. 84, 92, 634 A.2d 1, 5 (1993).)  Accordingly, the court vacated the entire 97-year
sentence and remanded the matter for a new sentencing hearing.  In addition, the court vacated the
conviction on Count IV in Case No. 4558 on the ground that the second distribution of drugs, some
twenty minutes after the first and to the same undercover officer, was effectively a continuation of
the initial offense, not warranting additional punishment.  The State did not seek review in this Court
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on that holding; therefore this appeal addressed only the remaining 57 years.  This Court reverses the
Court of Special Appeals, holding that the sentences are not cruel and usual punishment.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand the case to the
circuit court for a new sentencing proceeding, but on different grounds.  I would not reach the
constitutional question, but would decide the case on  non-constitutional grounds.  This Court has
generally followed the principle that “‘we will not reach a constitutional issue when a case can
properly be disposed of on a non-constitutional ground.’”  Secretary, Dep’t of Public Safety &
Correctional Servs. v. Henderson, 351 Md. 438, 451, 718 A.2d 1150, 1156 (quoting Professional
Nurses v. Dimensions, 346 Md. 132, 138, 695 A.2d 158, 161 (1997) (quoting State v. Lancaster, 332
Md. 385, 403-04 n.13, 631 A.2d 453, 463 n.13 (1993))).  We should follow that principle in this case
as well; as there is a valid non-constitutional ground upon which to affirm the Court of Special
Appeals, there is no need for us to rule upon the constitutional issues. 
I would reverse and remand this case to the trial court for a new sentencing proceeding to
permit the judge to reconsider the sentences in light of the fact that the Court of Special Appeals
vacated the 40 year sentence, leaving only the 25-year and 32-year sentences.  The sentencing judge
made it crystal clear that “while there is no magic in sentencing, there is some symmetry to what I am
going to do.  Thirty-two (32) years is halfway between twenty-five (25) and forty (40) roughly.  So
thirty-two (32) years is to the division of correction.”  As quoted above, the judge then explained his
thinking in imposing the remaining sentence.  Without the forty years, the trial court may conclude
that the symmetry he sought to achieve was destroyed.
Chief Judge Bell and Judge Eldridge have authorized me to state that they join in the views
expressed herein.
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