Case Title: Union Pacific R. Co. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization1990 WY 137802 P.2d 856Case Number: 90-103Decided: 12/10/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, 

Appellant 
(Petitioner),

v.

The WYOMING STATE BOARD 
OF EQUALIZATION and Ann Strand, Sweetwater County Assessor, 

Appellees 
(Respondents).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.,

James D. 
Douglass, Broomfield, Colorado, for appellant; argument by Mr. 
Douglass.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., and Michael L. Hubbard, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee State 
Bd. of Equalization; argument presented by Mr. Hubbard.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

CARDINE, Justice.

[¶1]      Union Pacific 
Railroad Company (Union Pacific) challenges the Sweetwater county assessor's 
(assessor) 1987 tax assessment of seventeen mobile homes. The Sweetwater County 
Board of Equalization found in favor of Union Pacific. The State Board of 
Equalization reversed, and the district court affirmed the state board. Union 
Pacific appeals the decision of the district court.

[¶2]      We affirm the 
decision of the district court.

[¶3]      Union Pacific 
raises a single issue on review:

"Whether the two 
intermediate reviewing tribunals, i.e., the State Board of Equalization and the 
district court, erroneously substituted their judgment for that of the trier of 
facts in the first instance, the Sweetwater County Board of 
Equalization."

[¶4]      Sometime before 
the 1987 tax assessment, Union Pacific purchased a number of mobile homes for 
track crew temporary living quarters. Seventeen of these mobile homes were 
situated in Sweetwater County. During April 1987, Union Pacific offered the 
homes for sale, advertised, and sent out invitations to bid to at least one 
hundred mobile home dealers. The homes were offered for sale individually. The 
sale was made to a single buyer who bought all seventeen mobile homes involved 
in this appeal.

[¶5]      The seventeen 
mobile homes were assessed by the Sweetwater county assessor in late 1987 as 
omitted property pursuant to W.S. 39-2-403(c), which provides:

[¶6]      "Property omitted 
from prior year tax lists discovered by the county assessor shall be added to 
the assessment roll and taxes computed and collected for the period the property 
was omitted not exceeding five (5) prior years or since the last change in 
ownership, whichever is less."  The 
assessor was unaware that the mobile homes had been sold by Union Pacific at the 
time of the assessment. She followed the state regulations for valuing mobile 
homes and valued the homes at 25% of their 1967 replacement cost.

[¶7]      The sale price of 
the homes differed drastically from the assessor's estimated fair value, as 
illustrated by the chart below:

Tax                                          
            
            
Estimated Assessor's Actual 

Acc't 
No. 
                    
Location                                 
Fair Value                  
Sale Price

17188                                     
Riner                                       
$19,139                      
$2,000 

17189                                     
Riner                                       
$19,139                      
$2,000 

17190                                     
Creston Jct.                           
$19,583                      
$2,000 

17191                                     
Creston Jct.                           
$19,583                      
$2,000 

17192                                     
Creston Jct.                           
$20,017                      
$3,100 

17193                                     
Wamsutter                             
$19,139                      
$ 500 

17194                                     
Wamsutter                             
$19,583                      
$2,000 

17195                                     
Bitter Creek                           
$17,383                      
$ 500 

17196                                     
Bitter Creek                           
$17,817                      
$ 500 

17197                                     
Pt. of Rocks                           
$19,139                      
$ 500 

17198                                     
Pt. of Rocks                           
$15,739                      
$ 500 

17199                                     
Pt. of Rocks                           
$17,817                      
$ 500 

17200                                     
Pt. of Rocks                           
$17,817                      
$ 500 

17201                                     
Bryan                                      
$16,939                      
$ 500 

17202                                     
Bryan                                      
$16,939                      
$ 500 

17203                                     
West Vaco                             
$19,139                      
$ 500 

17204                                     
West Vaco                             
$19,139                      
$ 500

[¶8]      Union Pacific 
paid the tax due on the value assigned by the assessor but filed a protest with 
the Sweetwater County Board of Equalization. A hearing was held before the 
board, and both parties provided testimony and exhibits.

[¶9]      The county board, 
on October 5, 1988, issued "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order" in 
which it held that the sale by Union Pacific was an arms-length, bona fide 
transaction, and that the sale price of the homes was their "fair value" for tax 
purposes. It ordered the assessor to adjust the taxable value to match the sale 
price of the units.

[¶10]   The county assessor timely appealed 
the county board's decision to the State Board of Equalization. The state board 
reviewed the evidence on file and briefs submitted by the parties and issued its 
findings, conclusions, and order on August 31, 1989. The state board concluded 
that the price received by Union Pacific in its sale of the mobile homes was not 
their "fair value" because the sale was not a "market place transaction" under 
Wyoming State Tax Commission/State Board of Equalization rules. The state board 
reversed the decision of the county board and remanded the case to the county 
board for reassessment, taking into account the actual condition of the homes 
and providing an adequate allowance for depreciation.

[¶11]   Union Pacific then petitioned the 
district court for judicial review of the state board's decision. The district 
court issued a decision letter on February 14, 1990, upholding the decision of 
the state board. The district court found that the question of "[w]hether the 
pricing decision of the market can be accepted as `fair market value'" presented 
a question of law for which it was not required to accept the findings of the 
county board. The court found that the sale at issue was in the nature of a 
wholesale transaction, and that valuation should be determined by reference to 
the price to be paid by the ultimate consumer. It upheld the state board's 
remand of the case to the county board.

[¶12]   The scope of our review of agency 
decisions is limited to the extent specified in W.R.A.P. 12.09 and W.S. 
16-3-114(c) (July 1990 Repl.). Wyoming Statute 16-3-114(c) states:

"(c) To the extent 
necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall 
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole 
record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of 
the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

"(i) Compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

"(ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

"(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

"(B) Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

"(C) In excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

"(D) Without observance 
of procedure required by law; or

"(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute."

[¶13]   In considering an appeal from a 
district court's review of agency action, we are not bound by, nor must we 
accord any special deference to, the district court's decisions on questions of 
law. Matter of North Laramie Land Co., 605 P.2d 367, 373 (Wyo. 1980). The 
deference we accord to the fact finder's determination of fact belongs to the 
administrative agency, not the district court. Wyoming Public Service Comm'n v. 
Hopkins, 602 P.2d 374, 377 (Wyo. 1979).

"[U]sing the same 
evidentiary materials and the same review standards as the district court, we 
conduct an independent inquiry into the matter, just as if it had proceeded 
directly to us from the agency." Southwest Wyoming Rehab. Center v. Employment 
Sec. Comm'n, 781 P.2d 918, 920 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶14]   Since in this case the county board 
was the finder of the fact and the state board heard no additional testimony, we 
will treat the state board as an intermediate level of review and accord 
deference only to the county board's findings of fact. Thus, the primary focus 
of our review will be whether the county board's decision was lawful and 
supported by substantial evidence.

[¶15]   The Sweetwater county board found 
that it had jurisdiction over Union Pacific's protest and appeal; that the 
mobile homes were sold pursuant to an invitation to bid and purchased by one 
buyer; that they were assessed in late 1987 as omitted property; that the county 
assessor had followed state direction for valuing mobile homes at 25% of their 
1967 fair market value; and that, at the time of the sale, the county assessor 
was unaware of the sale price or the nature of the sale transaction. It further 
found that the value of the mobile homes as assessed far exceeded the value for 
which they were sold; that the homes had not been inspected by the county 
assessor; and that the deputy county assessor, Marvin Applequist, had admitted 
that the sale met all of the elements of a fair value sale. Finally, the board 
found that the information and data regarding the sale were within the 
definition of information or data that the county assessor should consider in 
determining fair value.

[¶16]   We find these material facts are 
supported by substantial evidence and will not seek to substitute our judgment 
for that of the agency. It is the agency's conclusions of law which are 
primarily in dispute in this appeal.

[¶17]   The board made the following 
conclusions of law in this case:

"1. That the sale made by 
the Union Pacific Corporation to Ponderosa Village of Cheyenne, Wyoming, was an 
armslength, bona fide commercial transaction.

"2. That the terms of the 
above-referenced sale did and do constitute the best information available to 
the County Assessor with respect to value.

"3. That the amount 
received by Union Pacific Corporation with respect to said mobile homes is the 
fair value of said mobile homes in accordance with the rules and regulations of 
the Wyoming State Tax Commission, Chapter 22, Section 4(a)."

[¶18]   Proper analysis of the board's 
conclusions requires that we clarify a threshold question of administrative 
procedure. The district court questioned whether the county board's conclusions 
of law were legal conclusions or were actually agency findings of fact in 
disguise. We determine that the county board's conclusions were neither wholly 
conclusions of law nor findings of fact, but were rather findings of ultimate 
fact or of mixed questions of law and fact. We will take this 
opportunity to clarify the rules applicable to judicial review of mixed 
questions of law and fact.

[¶19]   The federal third circuit has 
articulated the difference between findings of basic fact and ultimate facts as 
follows:

"Basic facts are 
the historical and narrative events elicited from the evidence presented at 
trial, admitted by stipulation, or not denied, where required, in responsive 
pleadings. Inferred factual conclusions are drawn from basic facts and are 
permitted only when, and to the extent that, logic and human experience indicate 
a probability that certain consequences can and do follow from the basic facts. 
* * * No legal precept is implicated in drawing permissible factual inferences. 
But an inferred fact must be distinguished from a concept described in a 
term of art as an `ultimate fact.' So conceived, an ultimate fact is a 
mixture of fact and legal precept[.]" Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes 
& Co., 669 F.2d 98, 102 (3rd Cir. 1981) (emphasis added).

[¶20]   Davis gives examples of such 
ultimate facts, or mixed questions of law and fact, in his Administrative Law 
Treatise:

"Mixed questions of law 
and fact are common throughout the law. Some easy samples: Is X the owner? Is 
the book obscene? Is the foreman an employee? Is the reorganization plan fair 
and equitable? Was the defendant negligent?" 5 Davis, Administrative Law 
Treatise § 29:9 at 367 (2nd ed. 1984).

[¶21]   The distinction in our standard of 
review of agency findings of fact and conclusions of law is well established. 
When reviewing an agency's findings of fact, we look to see if we can find from 
the evidence preserved in the record a rational view for the findings of fact 
made by the agency. If so, we then say the findings are supported by substantial 
evidence, and our review of them is complete. Holding's Little America v. Board 
of County Comm'rs, 670 P.2d 699, 704 (Wyo. 1983).

[¶22]   Our standard of review for agency 
determinations of questions of law requires us to examine three distinct 
possibilities:

"The agency may correctly 
apply their findings of fact to the correct rule of law. In such case, the 
agency's conclusions are affirmed. But the agency could apply their findings of 
fact to the wrong rule of law or they could incorrectly apply their findings of 
fact to a correct rule of law. In either case, we correct an agency conclusion 
to ensure accordance with law. Our standard of review for any conclusion of law 
is straightforward. If the conclusion of law is in accordance with law, it is 
affirmed; if it is not, it is to be corrected." Employment Security Comm'n v. 
Western Gas Processors, Ltd., 786 P.2d 866, 871 (Wyo. 1990) (citations 
omitted).

[¶23]   When an agency's determinations 
contain elements of law and fact, we will not treat them as findings of fact. We 
extend deference only to agency findings of "basic fact." When reviewing a 
finding of "ultimate fact," we divide the factual and legal aspects of the 
finding to determine whether the correct rule of law has been properly applied 
to the facts. If the correct rule of law has not been properly applied, we do 
not defer to the agency's finding but correct the agency's error in either 
stating or applying the law. See, Cooley v. Hollister, 38 Wn. App. 447, 687 P.2d 230, 233 (1984); Mill Street Church of Christ v. Hogan, 785 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Ky. 
App. 1990); Cf. Forbes v. Poudre School Dist. R-1, 791 P.2d 675, 679 (Colo. 
1990) (agency appellate level had responsibility to make own ultimate findings 
of fact, which could differ from those of ALJ); and see generally, 2 Am.Jur.2d 
Administrative Law §§ 618, 670 (1962) and cases cited therein. But see, 
Comptroller of Treasury v. World Book Childcraft International, Inc., 67 Md. 
App. 424, 508 A.2d 148, 156 (1986) (great deference to agency application of law 
to facts).

[¶24]   We now address the county board's 
conclusions of law to determine whether the agency properly applied the correct 
law to facts supported by substantial evidence. The board's conclusion that 
Union Pacific's sale price was the fair value of the mobile homes for tax 
purposes rests on its conclusions that the sale was an "arms-length, bona fide 
transaction" whose terms "constituted the best available information" with 
respect to value. Our ultimate concern is whether the agency properly 
determined, by a permissible application of authority to the facts, that the 
sale price constituted "fair value."

[¶25]   Wyoming Statute 39-2-102 (May 1985 
Repl.), in effect at the time, provided:

"All taxable property 
shall be valued at a fair value in conformity with the values and procedures 
prescribed by the board as provided by this act."

[¶26]   The Rules and Regulations of the 
Wyoming State Tax Commission, ch. XXII, § 4(a) described "fair value" as 
follows:

"`Fair value' is defined 
as the amount in cash, or terms reasonably equivalent to cash, that a well 
informed buyer is justified in paying for a property and a well informed seller 
is justified in accepting, assuming that neither of the parties thereto are 
acting under undue compulsion and assuming further that the property has been 
offered in the marketplace for a reasonable length of time."

[¶27]   There is a split in authority on 
the question of whether the price paid in a fair sale is conclusive evidence of 
a property's value for tax assessment purposes. See generally, Annotation, Sale 
Price of Real Property as Evidence in Determining Value for Tax Assessment 
Purposes, 89 A.L.R.3d 1126 (1979). Our previous cases have not directly 
addressed this question, and we do not need to resolve it in this appeal. The 
real question is whether Union Pacific's sale of the trailers was for "fair 
value" under the requirements of the tax commission rule.

[¶28]   The major point of contention 
concerning the sale is whether the trailers were "offered in the market place 
for a reasonable length of time." We find that they were not.

[¶29]   At the county board hearing, Janet 
Culp, a Union Pacific agent, testified as follows:

"In late April of 1987, 
Union Pacific advertised and sent out bid requests to one hundred mobile home 
dealers. Bids were on an individual basis on twenty-nine mobile homes, 
seventeen of which were located in [Sweetwater] County. Bids ranged from five 
hundred dollars to three thousand one hundred dollars [per unit]." (emphasis 
added)

The invitation 
to bid sent by Union Pacific instructed bidders to "submit your written 
quotation by utilizing pre-addressed envelope."

[¶30]   In Guild Wineries and Distilleries 
v. Fresno County, 51 Cal. App. 3d 182, 124 Cal. Rptr. 96, 98 (1975), the California 
Court of Appeals defined an "open market transaction" for tax purposes as 
follows:

"An `open market' 
transaction is one where the sale price is negotiated between the buyer and 
seller as distinguished from a sale resulting from the submission of bids where 
the seller sells to the highest bidder or the buyer buys from the lowest 
bidder."

[¶31]   In Miller v. Corporation Comm'n, 
635 P.2d 1006 (Okla. 1981), the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated, in a case 
involving the fair market value of forcibly pooled minerals, that a sale on the 
open market contemplates face-to-face negotiations at arms length. "By its very 
nature, the sealed-bid process is incompatible with an open market sale." 
Miller, at 1008.

[¶32]   In this case, the submission of bid 
letters to one hundred mobile home dealers and the receipt of sealed bids did 
not provide the give and take between buyer and seller that constitutes an open 
market sale. We are unwilling to say that no auction of a property could ever 
provide its fair value for tax assessment purposes. But where a property is only 
offered to dealers using sealed bids and the value paid by the successful bidder 
is grossly disproportionate to the assessed value (accounting for depreciation), 
we hold that fair value is not established by the sale, and the assessor may 
disregard the sale price in favor of other proper criteria used to determine 
fair value.

[¶33]   The county board of equalization's 
conclusion in this case that the amount received by Union Pacific was fair value 
is erroneous as a matter of law. We affirm the district court's order. 
Reassessment should be accomplished under the guidelines set forth in this 
opinion and that of the state board.

[¶34]   Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, 
C.J., 
filed a specially concurring opinion.

THOMAS, 
J., 
filed a dissenting opinion.

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, 
concurring.

[¶35]   I agree with the majority in 
determining that the reassessment ordered by the State Board of Equalization 
after affirmation by the district court should now be affirmed by this court. 
There is, alternatively, a more basic reason for my decision founded within a 
fundamental precept of assessment for taxation which should also be recognized. 
I write this concurrence for the same reason and with the same constitutional 
perspective utilized in the concurrence in Teton Valley Ranch v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 735 P.2d 107 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶36]   Empirical market value to the 
extent determinable, by whatever process, for an individual piece of property or 
parcel of land, for condemnation or estate valuation, is different from the 
requirement of taxation which addresses the class and not the individual parcel. 
In assessment for taxation, it is the rational method equally applied which is 
the search and not the contemporary sale price or appraiser's estimate of 
value.

[¶37]   The constitutional provision in 
effect until adoption of the November 1988 amendment provided:

     All property, except 
as in this constitution otherwise provided, shall be uniformly assessed for 
taxation, and the legislature shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a 
just valuation for taxation of all property, real and personal.

Wyo. Const. of 
1890, art. 15, § 11.

[¶38]   The 1988 constitutional amendment 
provided:

     (a) All property, 
except as in this constitution otherwise provided, shall be uniformly valued at 
its full value as defined by the legislature, in three (3) classes as 
follows:

     (i) Gross production 
of minerals and mine products in lieu of taxes on the land where 
produced;

     (ii) Property used for 
industrial purposes as defined by the legislature; and

     (iii) All other 
property, real and personal.

    (b) The legislature shall 
prescribe the percentage of value which shall be assessed within each designated 
class. All taxable property shall be valued at its full value as defined by the 
legislature except agricultural and grazing lands which shall be valued 
according to the capability of the land to produce agricultural products under 
normal conditions. The percentage of value prescribed for industrial property 
shall not be more than forty percent (40%) higher nor more than four (4) 
percentage points more than the percentage prescribed for property other than 
minerals.

     (c) The legislature 
shall not create new classes or subclasses or authorize any property to be 
assessed at a rate other than the rates set for authorized classes.

     (d) All taxation shall 
be equal and uniform within each class of property. The legislature shall 
prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all 
property, real and personal.

Wyo. Const. art. 
15, § 11 (1890, amended 1988).

[¶39]   This constitutional requirement, as 
more specifically addressed in the concurrence in Teton Valley Ranch, is 
equality and uniformity. Those criteria address a method to fairly impress the 
responsibility of taxation upon similar items of property without individually 
differentiating because of claimed conflicts with "market value." Bunten v. Rock 
Springs Grazing Ass'n, 29 Wyo. 461, 215 P. 244 (1923). "Exact justice in matters 
of taxation is not possible * * * [v]aluation being largely a matter of 
opinion." Id. at 476, 215 P. 244.

[¶40]   The point to be made is that these 
mobile homes cannot be assessed for taxation at a value below comparable 
properties owned by individual homeowners situated in Sweetwater County or, for 
that matter, of valuation anywhere in the state of Wyoming. Specifically, 
geographical location cannot be used to tax a unit at 2.8063% of what the normal 
taxpayer in Rock Springs could be expected to pay for an equivalent unit. This 
record provides absolutely no documentary evidence that the condition of the tax 
no. 17196 mobile home once situated at Bitter Creek1 with a normally assessed valuation 
of $17,817 was only worth 2.8063% of what a similar unit might have been for 
comparable taxation purposes when used by a homeowner in Rock Springs or Green 
River or in Cheyenne, Laramie County, where the purchaser was located.2 

[¶41]   My challenge to the challenge of 
Union Pacific is lack of proof that the statewide valuation system for mobile 
homes is improper or that, even if proper, the process used in this particular 
case was infirm; for example, because of lack of inspection or denial of 
evidence of extremely depreciated condition. The only thing that the sales price 
material demonstrates to me is that Union Pacific wanted to get rid of the units 
and eliminate possible property taxation costs. Mobile home dealers, at that 
time and place and in consideration of the Wyoming economy, were not 
exceptionally eager to pick up the geographically scattered units.3

[¶42]   It would appear from the sketchy 
record available that the units were sold in 1987 to Ponderosa Village, a mobile 
home park operator and wholesaler in the Cheyenne, Wyoming area. It would be 
interesting to compare (to the extent that units were actually moved to the 
Cheyenne area following sale) what tax assessment value came to be applied on 
these units in Laramie County as compared to other units owned by the purchaser 
or otherwise situated and assessed for value in Laramie County. It does not 
appear that anyone has addressed this subject of what Ponderosa Village did with 
the units after acquisition. Whatever may have occurred after incurring the 
moving expenses from the rural locations where the units had been used by the 
former owner, tax assessments cannot operate on a geographically distinguished 
standard so that every separate piece of new property in Wyoming is valued at 
miles from somewhere and particular location.

[¶43]   We cannot expect more and should 
not accept less than that the taxation system provides a formula realistically 
directed towards a value determination uniformly applied to all kinds of 
property of an equal and similar character. Hillard v. Big Horn Coal Co., 549 P.2d 293 (Wyo. 1976); State ex rel. Greenwood v. Pearson, 46 Wyo. 307, 26 P.2d 641 (1933); Bunten, 29 Wyo. 461, 215 P. 244. If we reduce valuations for these 
seventeen units, then each mobile home owner in Wyoming is entitled to 
equivalent treatment for his property by application of the constitutional 
requirement of equality and uniformity within each class of property. Wyo. 
Const. art. 15, § 11(d). See the cases listed in the concurrence in Teton Valley 
Ranch, 735 P.2d  at 115 and I J. Bonbright, The Valuation of Property Ch. XVIII, 
Valuation for Tax Purposes: The General Property Tax 
(1937).

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶44]   I would reverse the order of the 
district court that affirmed the decision of the Wyoming State Board of 
Equalization, and I would reinstate the decision of the Sweetwater County Board 
of Equalization. The rules relating to review of administrative agency 
decisions, which are clearly and ably recounted in the majority opinion, lead 
ineluctably to the conclusion that the determination by the Sweetwater County 
Board of Equalization, the finder of fact in this case, should be 
sustained.

[¶45]   As the majority opinion 
states:

"The major point of 
contention concerning the sale is whether the trailers were `offered in the 
market place for a reasonable length of time.'" At 861.

The majority 
opinion then invokes the verb "find," that usually connotes factual matters, and 
rules that they were not so offered. The State Board of Equalization, whose 
decision the majority upholds, is bound to the facts found by the Sweetwater 
County Board of Equalization in the same way that the district court, or this 
court, is bound to those facts, and the State Board failed to afford the 
deference that was due to the findings of the Sweetwater County Board of 
Equalization.

[¶46]   The question, as captured by the 
quoted language from the majority opinion, is not a mixed question of law and 
fact. It is a pure question of fact. The cited cases that define an "open market 
transaction" are of no help in determining whether the house trailers were 
offered in the market place for a reasonable time.

[¶47]   Section 39-2-102, W.S. 1977 (July 
1990 Repl.) does not require an "open market transaction," but instead delegates 
to the Wyoming State Board of Equalization the authority to "prescribe the 
appraisal methods and systems for determining fair market value using generally 
accepted appraisal standards." The definition of "fair value" found in Chapter 
XXII, § 4(a), Rules and Regulations of the Wyoming State Tax Commission (1989), 
does not demand an "open market transaction" either. It simply says:

"`Fair value' is defined 
as the amount in cash, or terms reasonably equivalent to cash, that a well 
informed buyer is justified in paying for a property and a well informed seller 
is justified in accepting, assuming that neither of the parties thereto are 
acting under undue compulsion and assuming further that the property has been 
offered in the marketplace for a reasonable length of time."

It is this 
standard that the Sweetwater County Board of Equalization found was met by the 
sale conducted in this instance. That board had no occasion to be concerned with 
an "open market transaction," and neither does this court.

[¶48]   I have more sympathy with the 
constitutional premise advanced in the concurring opinion of the Chief Justice. 
The definition of "fair market value" set forth in the Rules and Regulations of 
the Wyoming State Board of Equalization may not meet the mandate of Wyo. Const. 
Art. 15, § 11(d) that "[a]ll taxation shall be equal and uniform within each 
class of property." However, that is not an argument that has been advanced or 
briefed by the parties in this case and, in my judgment, it would not be 
appropriate to resolve the case in a constitutional context without briefing and 
argument and without the issue being raised by the parties.

[¶49]   I can see nothing in this case 
other than a straightforward question of whether there was evidence to sustain 
the facts found by the Sweetwater County Board of Equalization. It is my 
conclusion that there was sufficient evidence. I would reverse the district 
court and the Wyoming State Board of Equalization and would reinstate the 
decision of the Sweetwater County Board of Equalization on the basis of the 
authority correctly cited and analyzed in the majority opinion.

 FOOTNOTES 

1 The unit is a 1973 24' X 
60' Gentry mobile home unit computed by the assessor for assessment purposes on 
an eighty-one percent depreciation basis resulting in a $2,049 assessment 
valuation upon which the levy of .073994 resulted in a tax obligation of 
$151.61. The assessor's ad valorem tax bill for the entire seventeen units 
totaled $2,789.76. The Bitter Creek unit reassessment by the Board of 
Equalization resulted in a "fair" value of $500 with an assessed value of $58 
and a tax of $4.29 to result in a Sweetwater County refund to Union Pacific of 
$143.62. Refund amounts under the County Board of Equalization for the seventeen 
units totaled $2,625.52.

To reach the present 
stage of Supreme Court decision, the Bitter Creek unit, tax no. 17196, was 
appraised by the Sweetwater County assessor, contested in hearing and reversed 
by the Sweetwater County Board of Equalization, reversed by the State Board of 
Equalization, affirmed by the district court and now subject to this decision. 
Not yet ended by return for reappraisement to the assessor of Sweetwater County 
the novelette or parable of tax no. 17196, wherever it may now be, would make 
interesting reading.

2 I would not particularly 
subscribe to repetition in anything but dissent or special concurrence, but the 
county assessor's brief filed before the State Board of Equalization, in 
introduction, provided:

PARABLE OF THE AMICABLE 
DIVORCE

     A not so very long 
time ago in a galaxy known as San Francisco, it is reputed that a married couple 
- each in his and her own realm a young urban professional - made a 
determination that marital bliss was not theirs to have. It was agreed that, 
given the intellect, sophistication, maturity and stability of Mr. and Mrs. 
Yuppie, an amicable division and disposition of their rather substantial marital 
estate would be appropriate and could be achieved.

     The real property of 
the parties - a town home and a country estate - were set over to Mrs. Yuppie. 
The Yachts, the Maserati sports car, the Cessna airplane and the computer 
equipment were set over to Mr. Yuppie. Shortly after the divorce - but before 
Mr. Yuppie could take possession of his portion of the property - his transfer 
to New York was approved, along with that of Miss Interloper, his secretary. Mr. 
Yuppie asked his ex-wife if she would store his toys for him and forward them to 
him as he requested. Being mature, sophisticated and of an even unvengeful 
temperament, Mrs. Yuppie was only too glad, she said, to accommodate her ex. 
Over the next eighteen months, Mrs. Yuppie shipped several computers, two yachts 
and untold other luxury items to Mr. Yuppie. She ferried the Cessna airplane to 
him upon his request - which is when she learned about his relationship with 
Miss Interloper.

     Soon after learning 
about Miss Interloper, Mrs. Yuppie received an urgent request from her 
ex-husband: "Business reversal - need quick cash - sell Maserati and send money 
to me. Mr. Y." The following ad appeared in the paper the following 
morning:

     "FOR SALE: 1988 
Maserati, immaculate condition; still on warranty; low mileage; appraised at 
$60,000.00. Will sacrifice for 50.00"

3 From the listed 
locations, these seventeen units were scattered along the Union Pacific railroad 
track at places from the first to the last more than 100 miles 
apart.