Case Title: Ellsworth v. Baltimore Police Dep’t

Citation: 

Docket Number: 58/13

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2014-04-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Joshua Tripp Ellsworth v. Baltimore Police Department, No. 58, September Term 2013. 
 
PUBLIC SAFETY – LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS’ BILL OF RIGHTS –RIGHT 
TO DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION UNDER SECTION 3-104(n) OF THE PUBLIC 
SAFETY ARTICLE  
 
Section 3-104(n) of the Public Safety Article, Maryland Code (2003, 2011 Repl. Vol.) 
provides that prior to a hearing under the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights, an 
officer under investigation shall be provided with “a copy of the investigatory file and 
any exculpatory information,” but not “nonexculpatory information,” upon certain 
conditions.  The Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded the Legislature did not intend 
to require state and federal agencies to provide information regarding pending 
investigations unrelated to the officer and his or her specific charges, but rather, to 
require disclose of information related to the officer and the charges specified.  
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
 
MARYLAND 
 
No. 58 
 
September Term, 2013 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       JOSHUA TRIPP ELLSWORTH 
 
      v. 
 
BALTIMORE POLICE           
DEPARTMENT 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Barbera, C.J., 
  
Harrell, 
Battaglia, 
  
Greene, 
  
Adkins, 
  
McDonald, 
 
Raker, Irma S. (Retired, specially  
assigned), 
 
  
 
JJ. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Battaglia, J. 
Barbera, C.J., Harrell and Adkins, JJ., 
dissent. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: April 24, 2014
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No. 24-C-11-005397 
Argued: February 10, 2014 
 
In this case we are called upon to interpret the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of 
Rights (“LEOBR”),1 which is triggered when a “law enforcement officer”2 is under 
investigation or subject to interrogation for a reason that may result in “a 
recommendation of demotion, dismissal, transfer, loss of pay, reassignment, or similar 
action that is considered punitive”.  Section 3-107(a).  Under Section 3-104(n)(ii) of the 
LEOBR, a law enforcement officer must be provided with “any exculpatory information” 
upon completion of an investigation, at least ten days before a hearing, upon certain 
conditions not relevant here.3  It is the definition of “exculpatory” with which we  
                                                 
1  The Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights is located at Section 3-101 et seq. of the 
Public Safety Article, Maryland Code (2003, 2011 Repl. Vol.).  Unless otherwise 
indicated, all statutory references hereinafter are to the Public Safety Article, Maryland 
Code (2003, 2011 Repl. Vol.).   
 
2  A “law enforcement officer,” for the purposes of the LEOBR, includes members of the 
Police Department of Baltimore City.  Section 3-101(e)(ii)(2). 
 
3  Section 3-104(n) provides: 
 
(n) Information provided on completion of investigation.—(1) 
On completion of an investigation and at least 10 days before 
a hearing, the law enforcement officer under investigation 
shall be: 
(i) notified of the name of each witness and of each 
charge and specification against the law enforcement 
officer; and 
(ii) provided with a copy of the investigatory file and 
any exculpatory information, if the law enforcement 
officer 
and 
the 
law 
enforcement 
officer’s 
representative agree to: 
1. execute a confidentiality agreement with the law     
enforcement agency not to disclose any material 
contained in the investigatory file and exculpatory 
(continued . . .) 
2 
 
are concerned.4 
In the present case, Joshua Tripp Ellsworth, Petitioner, a homicide detective with 
the Baltimore City Police Department (“Department”), Respondent, was involved in an 
incident with Baltimore City Police Sergeant Jonathan Brickus of the Patrol Division.  
The incident arose during an investigation into a possible abduction, when the victim of 
the abduction was purportedly being held in a house located on the 2700 block of West 
Garrison Boulevard.5  After members of the homicide unit, including Detective 
Ellsworth, arrived, no agreement was reached as to which unit would supervise the scene, 
_____________________________ 
information for any purpose other than to defend the 
law enforcement officer; and 
2. pay a reasonable charge for the cost of 
reproducing the material. 
   (2) The law enforcement agency may exclude from the  
   exculpatory information provided to a law enforcement   
   officer under this subsection: 
(i) the identity of confidential sources; 
(ii) nonexculpatory information; and 
(iii) recommendations as to charges, disposition, or 
punishment. 
 
4  Detective Ellsworth petitioned for certiorari, which we granted, 432 Md. 466, 69 A.3d 
474 (2013), to consider: 
 
Does the statutory requirement for disclosure of “any 
exculpatory evidence” pursuant to the Law Enforcement 
Officers’ Bill of Rights (“LEOBR”), Md. Public Safety § 3-
104(n)(1), 
require 
a 
Police 
Department 
to 
disclose 
impeachment evidence, specifically information that a 
prosecution witness employed as a police officer is actually a 
major narcotics trafficker? 
 
5  The 2700 block of West Garrison Boulevard is located in the northwest region of 
Baltimore 
City. 
Garrison-Hill 
Community 
Association, 
http://www.neighborhoodlink.com/Garrison-Hill/map (last visited April 17, 2014).  
3 
 
but Sergeant Brickus advised Detective Ellsworth not to enter the home in which the 
victim and abductor were allegedly ensconced.  Detective Ellsworth, however, began 
walking toward the house and failed to adhere to Sergeant Brickus’s orders to stop; 
Sergeant Brickus told Detective Ellsworth that he was suspended and seized Detective 
Ellsworth’s gun.  A more heated argument ensued; Detective Ellsworth, without his gun, 
advanced on the house and entered the porch.  Sergeant Brickus, thereafter, removed 
Detective Ellsworth from the porch and attempted to handcuff him and then filed a 
complaint against Detective Ellsworth, which precipitated an investigation by the Internal 
Investigation Division of the Baltimore Police Department.6  The investigator found that 
the allegations against Detective Ellsworth were supported by sufficient evidence,7 and 
he was charged with seven violations of four administrative rules:  
CHARGE 1 
*** 
Rule 1, Conduct:  Any breach of the peace, neglect of duty, 
misconduct or any conduct on the part of any member of the 
department, either within or without the City of Baltimore, 
which tends to undermine the good order, efficiency or 
discipline of the department or which reflects discredit upon 
the department or any member thereof, or which is prejudicial 
                                                 
6  The Baltimore Police Department rules and regulations regarding investigations and 
interrogations of law enforcement officers and resulting disciplinary procedures are 
contained in Baltimore Police Department General Order 48-77, enacted July 1, 1977. 
 
7  Upon completion of an investigation, an investigator classifies a complaint as either 
“sustained,” “not sustained,” “exonerated,” or “unfounded,” with a sustained charge 
being one that is “supported by sufficient evidence.”  Mayor and City Council of 
Baltimore v. Maryland Committee Against the Gun Ban, 329 Md. 78, 85, 617 A.2d 1040, 
1043 (1993).   
4 
 
to the efficiency and discipline of the department, even 
though these offenses may not be specifically enumerated or 
laid down, shall be considered conduct unbecoming a 
member of the Baltimore Police Department, and subject to 
disciplinary action by the Police Commissioner. 
 
Specification 1:  For that, on or about August 7, 2009, 
Detective Joshua Ellsworth undermined the good order, 
efficiency and discipline of the Department by failing to obey 
several lawful commands and/or orders given to him by 
Sergeant Jonathan Brickus, a permanent ranking supervisor, 
not to approach the dwelling located at 2727 W. Garrison 
Avenue, 
thereby, 
conducting 
himself 
in 
a 
manner 
unbecoming a member of the Baltimore Police Department. 
 
Specification 2:  For that, on or about August 7, 2009, 
Detective Joshua Ellsworth undermined the good order, 
efficiency and discipline of the Department by failing to obey 
a lawful command and/or order from Sergeant Jonathan 
Brickus, a permanent ranking supervisor, to not knock on the 
door of the dwelling located at 2727 W. Garrison Avenue, 
thereby, conducting himself in a manner unbecoming a 
member of the Baltimore Police Department. 
 
Specification 3:  For that, on or about August 7, 2009, 
Detective Joshua Ellsworth reflected discredit upon himself 
and the Department, when, while on the scene of a possible 
domestic abduction, Detective Ellsworth entered into a verbal 
confrontation with Sergeant Jonathan Brickus, a permanent 
ranking supervisor, while in plain view of numerous law 
enforcement members and the general public, thereby, 
conducting himself in a manner unbecoming a member of the 
Baltimore Police Department. 
 
CHARGE 2 
 
*** 
 
Section 14:  No member of the Department shall willfully 
disobey any lawful command or order, either verbal or 
written, of any superior or other member designated to 
command. 
 
5 
 
Specification 1:  For that, on or about August 7, 2009, 
Detective Joshua Ellsworth failed to obey several lawful 
commands and/or orders from Sergeant Jonathan Brickus, a 
permanent ranking supervisor, not to approach the dwelling 
located at 2727 W. Garrison Avenue, a home possibly 
harboring an alleged abduction victim. 
 
Specification 2:  For that, on or about August 7, 2009, 
Detective Joshua Ellsworth failed to obey a lawful command 
and/or order from Sergeant Jonathan Brickus, a permanent 
ranking supervisor, to not knock on the door of the dwelling 
located at 2727 W. Garrison Avenue. 
 
CHARGE 3 
 
*** 
 
Cooperation with Other Offices and Agencies 
 
 
Members will cooperate with all legally authorized 
agencies and their representatives in the pursuit of justice. 
 
 
An officer or agency may be one among many 
organizations that provide law enforcement services to a 
jurisdiction.  It is imperative that members assist colleagues 
fully and completely with respect and consideration at all 
times. 
 
Specification:  For that, on or about August 7, 2009, 
Detective Joshua Ellsworth, a detective within the Homicide 
Section entered into a verbal confrontation with Sergeant 
Jonathan Brickus a permanent ranking member of the 
Northwestern District, while at the scene of a possible 
domestic abduction at the dwelling of 2727 W. Garrison 
Avenue, in plain view of numerous law enforcement 
members and the general public. 
 
CHARGE 4 
 
*** 
 
Section 13:  No member of the department at any time shall 
be insubordinate or disrespectful to a superior. 
6 
 
 
Specification:  For that, on or about August 7, 2009, 
Detective Joshua Ellsworth, a detective within the Homicide 
Section behaved in an insubordinate and/or disrespectful 
manner when he entered into a verbal confrontation with 
Sergeant Jonathan Brickus a permanent ranking member of 
the Northwestern District, while at the scene of a possible 
domestic abduction at the dwelling of 2727 W. Garrison 
Avenue, in plain view of numerous law enforcement 
members and the general public. 
 
Detective Ellsworth elected a trial board hearing rather than accept the sanction 
recommended by the Department.8  Prior to the hearing, counsel for Detective Ellsworth 
requested in writing from the City Solicitor,9 representing the Department, “discovery to 
                                                 
8  Section 3-107, in relevant part, provides: 
 
(a) 
Right to hearing.—(1) Except as provided in 
paragraph (2) of this subsection and § 3-111 of this subtitle, if 
the investigation or interrogation of a law enforcement officer 
results in a recommendation of demotion, dismissal, transfer, 
loss of pay, reassignment, or similar action that is considered 
punitive, the law enforcement officer is entitled to a hearing 
on the issues by a hearing board before the law enforcement 
agency takes that action. 
 
“The function of the hearing board is to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
aid of a recommendation to the Chief”.  Boyle v. Maryland-National Capital Park and 
Planning Comm’n, 385 Md. 142, 155, 867 A.2d 1050, 1058 (2005). 
  
9  The Office of Legal Affairs, a branch of the Baltimore City Department of Law, headed 
by the City Solicitor, reviews internal investigations of law enforcement officers and 
presents the Department’s case before the Hearing Board.  Blondell v. Baltimore City 
Police Department, 341 Md. 680, 672 A.2d 639 (1996); Baltimore Police Department; 
General Order 48-77, Annex H (July 1, 1977).  The City Solicitor is the legal 
representative of the City of Baltimore and the Baltimore Police Department.  City of 
Baltimore, Law/Practice Groups, http://www.baltimorecity.gov/Government/Agencies 
Departments/Law/PracticeGroups.aspx (last visited April 17, 2014).  Section 24 of 
(continued . . .) 
7 
 
the fullest extent allowed by law, and to the fullest extent required by the Maryland Law 
Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights, Md. Ann. Code Public Safety § 3-101, et seq.”  In 
relevant part, Detective Ellsworth’s written request stated: 
 
Please provide me with a copy of the investigatory file 
and exculpatory information.  Md. Ann. Code Public Safety § 
3-104(n) (ii). 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
 
 
Please understand that I interpret the phrase 
“exculpatory evidence” to mean any evidence favorable to the 
accused because it tends to prove the accused to be not guilty 
or tends to mitigate punishment.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
_____________________________ 
Article 7 of the Baltimore City Charter (2013) sets forth the responsibilities of the City 
Solicitor, providing, in relevant part: 
 
(a) Legal advisor. 
The City Solicitor shall be the legal adviser and representative 
of the City and its several departments, officers, commissions, 
boards and authorities, and shall have general supervision and 
direction of the legal business of the City.  Except as provided 
in subsection (c), no such agency or officer or any authority 
created in connection with municipal affairs shall have 
authority to employ or retain counsel other than the City 
Solicitor. 
(b) Legal proceedings; opinions and advice; deeds, contracts, 
etc. 
The City Solicitor shall have sole charge and direction of the 
preparation and trial of all suits, actions and proceedings of 
every kind to which the City, or any municipal officer or 
agency, shall be a party. 
 
8 
 
 
At the hearing before a three member board,10 seven law enforcement witnesses 
were called to testify by the Department, including Officer Daniel Redd, who had been 
present during the incident between Detective Ellsworth and Sergeant Brickus.11  
                                                 
10  Section 3-107(c) provides, in relevant part: 
 
 (c) Membership of hearing board.—(1) Except as provided 
in paragraph (4) of this subsection and in § 3-111 of this 
subtitle, the hearing board authorized under this section shall 
consist of at least three members who: 
(i) are appointed by the chief and chosen from law 
enforcement officers within that law enforcement agency, or 
from law enforcement officers of another law enforcement 
agency with the approval of the chief of the other agency; and 
(ii) have had no part in the investigation or interrogation of 
the law enforcement officer. 
(2) At least one member of the hearing board shall be of the 
same rank as the law enforcement officer against whom the 
complaint is filed. 
 
11  The hearing board, in its written findings, summarized the testimony of Lieutenant 
Damien Carter, Police Officer Sharron Mason, Detective Michelle Bolden, Sergeant 
Jonathan Brickus, Major Terrence McLarney, Detective Joshua Ellsworth, and Officer 
Daniel Redd.  The testimony of Officer Redd’s observations regarding the incident 
between Detective Ellsworth and Sergeant Brickus was encapsulated as follows: 
 
Officer Redd testified that he was on the scene and observed 
Det. Ellsworth’s arrival.  Discussion occurred who would be 
handling the situation.  Sgt. Brickus advised Det. Ellsworth 
not to approach the house but Det. Ellsworth did.  Officer 
Redd testified that Sgt. Brickus told Det. Ellsworth not to go 
down the street which he did.  Det. Ellsworth returned and 
headed towards the house again.  Sgt. Brickus went up on the 
porch and advised Det. Ellsworth to turn over his gun and 
badge.  Officer Redd testified that Det. Ellsworth relinquished 
his badge and gun to Lt. Carter who arrived at the scene.  
Later, Ellsworth returned to the house and again started 
knocking on the front door, until he was escorted off the 
porch. 
9 
 
Counsel for Detective Ellsworth cross-examined Officer Redd regarding whether Officer 
Redd had “an attorney in [his] employ protecting [his] interests for an ongoing federal 
criminal investigation” in addition to whether Officer Redd knew he was “the subject, in 
fact the target, of an ongoing federal criminal investigation.”  Officer Redd answered 
both questions in the negative.  Counsel for Detective Ellsworth further queried Officer 
Redd, “Since you were 18 years of age, have you ever distributed a controlled dangerous 
substance?”  Officer Redd again answered “No.” 
The hearing board found Detective Ellsworth guilty of two of the charges, but not 
guilty of five. The guilty findings included:  Charge I, Specification III for conduct “in a 
manner unbecoming a member of the Baltimore Police Department” by entering into a 
verbal confrontation with Sergeant Brickus and Charge IV, Specification I for behaving 
“in an insubordinate and/or disrespectful manner when he entered into a verbal 
confrontation” with Sergeant Brickus. The hearing board found Detective Ellsworth not 
guilty of Charge I, Specification I for conduct “in a manner unbecoming a member of the 
Baltimore Police Department” by approaching the dwelling at 2727 West Garrison 
Avenue; not guilty of Charge I, Specification II for conduct “in a manner unbecoming a 
member of the Baltimore Police Department” by failing to obey Sergeant Brickus to not 
knock on the door of the dwelling at 2727 West Garrison Avenue; not guilty of Charge II, 
Specification I for failing “to obey several lawful commands and/or orders” from 
Sergeant Brickus to not approach the dwelling; not guilty of Charge II, Specification II 
for failing “to obey a lawful command and/or order” from Sergeant Brickus to not knock 
on the door of the dwelling; and not guilty of Charge III, Specification I by entering into 
10 
 
a verbal confrontation with Sergeant Brickus in plain view of law officers and members 
of the public.  The Hearing Board recommended seven days loss of leave and a letter of 
reprimand, which the Police Commissioner imposed by Final Order.12   
Detective Ellsworth filed, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, a “Petition for 
Judicial Review of Decision and Order, and Final Order of Police Commissioner 
Pursuant to the Maryland Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights.”13  During his 
hearing in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Detective Ellsworth, among other 
concerns, asserted that his LEOBR hearing was “fundamentally unfair” because of 
“misconduct on the part of the Department regarding Detective Redd”, specifically, 
by failing to disclose . . . exculpatory evidence, the Board was 
left with the mis-impression that this Detective, Detective 
Redd, was a credible person.  When they should have said; 
we discredit his testimony, because though he calls himself a 
detective of the Baltimore City Police Department, he’s in 
fact, one of the largest distributors of heroin in the City of 
Baltimore.  
 
Detective Ellsworth’s counsel further asserted during the circuit court hearing that he 
inferred that Officer Redd was under investigation because of events occurring before the 
hearing: 
                                                 
12  The Hearing Board also recommended “that he be transferred from Homicide Section 
if the Commanding Officer of the Homicide Section wishes to do so”, which was not 
adopted. 
 
13  Section 3-109(a) provides: 
 
(a) 
By Circuit Court.—An appeal from a decision made 
under § 3-108 of this subtitle shall be taken to the circuit 
court for the county in accordance with Maryland Rule 7-202. 
 
11 
 
I drew an inference from what had transpired prior to the 
Hearing Board.  The FBI contacted my client about Detective 
Redd.  The DEA contacted me about Detective Redd.  Had 
the ATF contacted me, I would have thought it had something 
to do with alcohol or guns.  Because it was the FBI and the 
DEA, I suspected that perhaps the man, Detective Redd, had 
something to do with drugs. 
 
The Department argued that were there to have been an investigation, knowledge 
of it could not be “imputed to the entire Department”; that at the time of the hearing 
“there wasn’t anything substantiated” against Officer Redd and that “people get 
investigated all the time” sometimes turning up “nothing”; and, regardless, “even without 
the testimony of Redd . . . there’s enough evidence in the record” that Detective 
Ellsworth would have been found guilty “[e]ven if we just excluded Redd from the 
record”: 
[W]hat matters is that Ellsworth was involved in this physical 
or verbal altercation out in public, before everybody.  That’s 
the first charge.  And the second one is that he was 
disrespectful. . . .  
 
Those are the two things that he was found guilty of.  I 
don’t see how Redd really plays into that at all.  I mean, other 
than, who was in command.  But that doesn’t really matter.  
He’s not charged with being insubordinate.  He’s charged 
with being disrespectful to a superior officer.  And, he’s 
charged with conduct that’s unbecoming. 
 
I think—Ellsworth’s own testimony admits that, you 
know, he sort of got into this verbal altercation.  It was 
embarrassing to the Police Department.  Everybody was 
watching.  Other police officers. . . .  There’s, you know, 
sixteen witness’s statements of people who, you know, have 
varying degree of watching this episode.  But Redd you can 
throw out Redd, and there’s still plenty of evidence, I think, 
to find that he was disrespectful to Brickus, and that he acted 
and his behavior was unbecoming to a police officer. 
 
12 
 
 
In reversing the Police Commissioner’s Final Order imposing the hearing board’s 
recommended sanction, the judge honed in on the fact that the Department failed to 
disclose any information regarding an investigation of Officer Redd, which, under the 
court’s view, constituted a violation of the LEOBR: 
Petitioner asserts that no exculpatory evidence or 
material was provided specifically concerning Detective 
Redd.[14]  Petitioner further asserts that at the hearing, 
Respondent, Baltimore Police Department, continued to deny 
any knowledge of any exculpatory or impeachment evidence 
relating to Detective Redd.  It is asserted by Petitioner that on 
or about July 19, 2011, sixty-three days after Petitioner’s 
hearing, Detective Redd was arrested and charged with 
federal drug conspiracy and firearm charges. 
 
 
 
 
* * * 
In the instant case, Petitioner’s counsel wrote a 
detailed letter, which is part of the record therein, to the 
Office of Legal Affairs of the Baltimore Police Department 
specifically outlining his requests regarding exculpatory 
evidence.  In response, Petitioner received no evidence 
whatsoever regarding Detective Redd.  On the facts in the 
record herein, the Court finds that the rights of Petitioner 
were prejudiced by the manner in which the Respondent dealt 
with the issues pertaining to Detective Redd.  This Court 
finds that Respondent’s failure to disclose any information 
regarding the investigation of Detective Redd constitutes a 
violation of Petitioner’s rights under the Law Enforcement 
Officers’ Bill of Rights and, therefore, constitutes an unlawful 
procedure. 
 
 
The Department appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, presenting the 
following question for review: 
Did the Circuit Court err in finding that [BPD] violated the 
rights of the Appellee under LEBOR [sic] § 3-104(n)(1) by 
                                                 
14  The Circuit Court referred to Daniel Redd as “Detective Redd.”  We use “Officer 
Redd,” consistent with his title and testimony in front of the hearing board. 
13 
 
failing to disclose any information regarding the FBI’s 
investigation of a witness in the trial board, Daniel Redd, for 
distributing controlled dangerous substances and handgun 
violations? 
 
Baltimore Police Department v. Ellsworth, 211 Md. App. 198, 201, 63 A.3d 1192, 1193 
(2013) (alterations in original).  The intermediate appellate court, in a reported opinion, 
reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court, determining, inter alia, that the information 
regarding Officer Redd would not have tended to exonerate Detective Ellsworth of the 
administrative charges of being disrespectful to a superior officer or engaging in conduct 
unbecoming an officer, “and, therefore, does not fall within the definition of 
‘exculpatory.’”  Id. at 211, 63 A.3d at 1199. 
 
We confront the same issues of whether the precepts of Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and its progeny, should be imported into 
the LEOBR, and if so, whether the Department is thereby obligated to disclose 
information in the administrative setting about an alleged criminal investigation of a 
witness.   
In Brady, the Supreme Court of the United States held that, “the suppression by 
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process 
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good 
faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”  Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97, 10 
L.Ed.2d at 218.  In Brady, the defendant and a companion, Boblit, were found guilty of 
murder in the first degree in separate trials and were sentenced to death.  Id. at 84, 83 
S.Ct. at 1195, 10 L.Ed.2d at 217.  Prior to trial, Brady requested access to extrajudicial 
14 
 
statements that were made by Boblit; although the prosecution disclosed several 
statements, it withheld the statement in which Boblit admitted to committing the 
homicide.  Id.  On appeal from his denial of post-conviction relief, we determined that the 
withholding of the confession was prejudicial to Brady and denied him due process of 
law and remanded the case for retrial on the issue of punishment only.  Brady v. State, 
226 Md. 422, 430-31, 174 A.2d 167, 171 (1961), aff’d, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 
L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).  On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed and held that although 
Boblit’s confession did not exculpate Brady, it was material to the determination of his 
punishment, such that the failure of its disclosure violated due process.  See Brady, 373 
U.S. at 90-91, 83 S.Ct. at 1198, 10 L.Ed.2d at 220.  
Subsequently, in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 151, 92 S.Ct. 763, 764, 31 
L.Ed.2d 104, 106 (1972), the Court confronted the question of whether Brady was 
implicated by the nondisclosure of a promise not to prosecute made by the State to its key 
witness in exchange for his testimony.  The Court determined that because the State 
relied almost entirely on the witness’s testimony as the co-conspirator to substantiate the 
charges against Giglio for passing forged money orders, his credibility was critical, such 
that without his testimony “there could have been no indictment and no evidence to carry 
the case to the jury.”  Id. at 150-51, 154, 92 S.Ct. at 764, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d at 106-07, 109.  
Therefore, the failure to disclose the plea deal entitled the defendant to a new trial.  Id. at 
155, 92 S.Ct. at 766, 31 L.Ed.2d at 109.  In so doing, the Court acknowledged that the 
State’s failure to disclose evidence that could be used for impeachment was not 
automatically a violation of Brady, if the evidence was “not likely to have changed the 
15 
 
verdict.”  Id. at 154, 92 S.Ct. at 766, 31 L.Ed.2d at 108, quoting United States v. Keogh, 
391 F.2d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1968).  
In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 100-03, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2396-97, 49 
L.Ed.2d 342, 347-49 (1976), the Court considered whether the State was required under 
Brady to disclose that the victim in a murder trial had been convicted of assault and two 
charges of carrying a deadly weapon, which could be used by the defendant to show his 
propensity for violence in furtherance of Agurs’s theory of self-defense.  The Court 
concluded that the victim’s convictions were not material to the case because they were 
cumulative of other evidence and were not likely to have changed the verdict.  Id. at 113-
14, 96 S.Ct. at 2402, 49 L.Ed.2d at 355-56.  The Court explained that the prosecutor does 
not have an obligation to disclose all information, because “[i]f everything that might 
influence a jury must be disclosed, the only way a prosecutor could discharge his 
constitutional duty would be to allow complete discovery of his files as a matter of 
routine practice.”  Id. at 109, 96 S.Ct. at 2400, 49 L.Ed.2d at 353.   
Subsequently, in United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 670-74, 105 S.Ct. 3377-
79, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 486-89 (1985), the Court addressed whether the State’s duty to 
disclose under Brady extended to the terms of the agreements reached between two key 
witnesses with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to supply information about 
the defendant’s narcotics and gun dealings in exchange for money.  The conviction was 
reversed and remanded because the prosecutor had misrepresented the lack of 
inducement and there could be a “reasonable probability” that, had the information been 
16 
 
disclosed, the result of the trial would have been different.  Id. at 683-84, 105 S.Ct. at 
3384-85, 87 L.Ed.2d at 495.   
Our Brady jurisprudence began in 1964 with Dyson v. Warden of the Maryland 
Penitentiary, 233 Md. 630, 196 A.2d 455 (1964), and extends to our most recent case of 
Derr v. State, 434 Md. 88, 73 A.3d 254 (2013).  This jurisprudence clearly shows that 
Brady is limited to the criminal context and has never been applied in a civil or 
administrative setting.  The Supreme Court, likewise, has not extended Brady beyond the 
criminal context and has explained that Brady and its progeny are “access-to-evidence 
cases”, specific to criminal prosecutions, imposed to ensure “the integrity of our criminal 
justice system.”  California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2532, 81 
L.Ed.2d 413, 420 (1984). 
We have found violations of Brady in situations in which the State has failed to 
disclose confessions by one other than the defendant, Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 
175, 512 A.2d 1056, 1061 (1986), prior material inconsistencies in statements made by 
key witnesses and in situations in which a witness for the State had received inducements 
to testify, which had not been disclosed by the prosecution.  Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19, 
50, 702 A.2d 699, 714 (1997); Wilson v. State, 363 Md. 333, 356, 768 A.2d 675, 687 
(2001); Conyers v. State, 367 Md. 571, 606-07, 790 A.2d 15, 36 (2002); State v. 
Williams, 392 Md. 194, 228, 896 A.2d 973, 993 (2006); Harris v. State, 407 Md. 503, 
524-26, 966 A.2d 925, 937-38 (2009).  
We have not found Brady violations where the undisclosed evidence was not 
material to the conviction, State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 463, 509 A.2d 1179, 1197 
17 
 
(1986); would have impeached cumulative or non-material witnesses’ testimony, 
Grandison v. State, 390 Md. 412, 434-35, 889 A.2d 366, 379 (2005); or was cumulative 
of other evidence demonstrating the victim’s propensity for violence.  State v. Thomas, 
325 Md. 160, 192, 599 A.2d 1171, 1186 (1992).15  
We, in fact, have declined to apply the discovery requirements of Brady in a civil 
context.  In Wagonheim v. Maryland State Board of Censors, 255 Md. 297, 300, 308-09, 
258 A.2d 240, 241, 245 (1969), aff’d sub nom. Grove Press, Inc. v. Maryland State 
Board of Censors, 401 U.S. 480, 91 S.Ct. 966, 28 L.Ed.2d 205 (1971), an appeal from a 
ruling in which a movie was disapproved for licensing as being obscene, the petitioner 
alleged that the lower court erred by refusing “to order the Attorney General’s office to 
disclose the names of all the experts whom they requested to view the film”, which he 
analogized to the State’s disclosure requirement under Brady.  We declined to apply the 
Brady tenets and opined that even were we to apply them, the Attorney General was not 
required to provide the information requested.  Id. at 309, 258 A.2d at 246  
We have, since Brady, codified the State’s disclosure requirement in Maryland 
Rule 4-263,16 a rule of criminal procedure which, in 1986, provided for disclosure of 
                                                 
15  In Williams v. State, 416 Md. 670, 691-95, 7 A.3d 1038, 1050-52 (2010), we declined 
to determine whether failure to disclose a prior statement made by an eyewitness, that she 
was legally blind, was a material omission in violation of Brady, and remanded on other 
grounds. 
 
16  Maryland Rule 4-263, “Discovery in Circuit Court,” provides, in pertinent part: 
 
(d) Disclosure by the State’s Attorney. 
* * * 
(continued . . .) 
18 
 
_____________________________ 
(5) Exculpatory information. All material or information in 
any form, whether or not admissible, that tends to exculpate 
the defendant or negate or mitigate the defendant's guilt or 
punishment as to the offense charged; 
(6) Impeachment information. All material or information in 
any form, whether or not admissible, that tends to impeach a 
State’s witness, including: 
(A) evidence of prior conduct to show the character of 
the witness for untruthfulness pursuant to Rule 5-608 (b); 
(B) a relationship between the State’s Attorney and the 
witness, including the nature and circumstances of any 
agreement, understanding, or representation that may 
constitute an inducement for the cooperation or testimony of 
the witness; 
(C) prior criminal convictions, pending charges, or 
probationary status that may be used to impeach the witness, 
but the State’s Attorney is not required to investigate the 
criminal record of the witness unless the State’s Attorney 
knows or has reason to believe that the witness has a criminal 
record; 
(D) an oral statement of the witness, not otherwise 
memorialized, that is materially inconsistent with another 
statement made by the witness or with a statement made by 
another witness; 
(E) a medical or psychiatric condition or addiction of 
the witness that may impair the witness’s ability to testify 
truthfully or accurately, but the State’s Attorney is not 
required to inquire into a witness’s medical, psychiatric, or 
addiction history or status unless the State’s Attorney has 
information that reasonably would lead to a belief that an 
inquiry would result in discovering a condition that may 
impair the witness’s ability to testify truthfully or accurately; 
(F) the fact that the witness has taken but did not pass 
a polygraph examination; and 
(G) the failure of the witness to identify the defendant 
or a co-defendant; 
 
The District Court requirements are set forth in Maryland Rule 4-262, 
which provides, in relevant part: 
 
 (c) Obligations of the parties. 
(continued . . .) 
19 
 
“[a]ny material or information tending to negate or mitigate the guilt or punishment of the 
defendant as to the offense charged.”17  In 2008, we conformed Rule 4-263 to our 
jurisprudence to better define the scope of discovery.  Supplement to the One Hundred 
Fifty-Eighth Report of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure at 4 
(March 25, 2008).  At that time, Rule 4-263 was amended to more specifically require 
disclosure by the State of evidence of a relationship or agreement between the witness 
and prosecution; prior criminal convictions; materially inconsistent witness statements 
not otherwise memorialized; medical, psychiatric, or addiction conditions of the witness 
_____________________________ 
(1) Due diligence. The State’s Attorney and defense shall 
exercise due diligence to identify all of the material and 
information that must be disclosed under this Rule. 
(2) Scope of obligations. The obligations of the State’s 
Attorney and the defense extend to material and information 
that must be disclosed under this Rule and that are in the 
possession or control of the attorney, members of the 
attorney’s staff, or any other person who either reports 
regularly to the attorney’s office or has reported to the 
attorney’s office in regard to the particular case. 
Cross references.  For the obligations of the State’s 
Attorney, see State v. Williams, 392 Md. 194 (2006). 
(d) Disclosure by the State’s Attorney. 
(1) Without request. Without the necessity of a request, the 
State’s Attorney shall provide to the defense all material or 
information in any form, whether or not admissible, that tends 
to exculpate the defendant or negate or mitigate the 
defendant’s guilt or punishment as to the offense charged and 
all material or information in any form, whether or not 
admissible, that tends to impeach a State’s witness. 
 
17  Rule 4-263 was derived from Maryland Rule 741, which mandated disclosure of 
“[a]ny material or information within his possession or control which tends to negate the 
guilt of the defendant as to the offense charged or would tend to reduce his punishment 
therefor”.  Rule 741 (1984). 
 
20 
 
that would impair his ability to testify truthfully; the witness’s failure of a polygraph 
examination; the witness’s failure to identify the defendant; and “evidence of prior 
conduct to show the character of the witness for untruthfulness pursuant to Rule 5-608 
(b).”18  Id. at 4-5. 
What is significant is that our Rule does not require disclosure by the State of 
alleged investigations or “bad acts” of witnesses, not having resulted in a conviction and 
not related to a witness’s character for untruthfulness.  In this regard, we have long-held 
that “mere accusations of crime or misconduct may not be used to impeach. . . . 
[A]ccusations of misconduct are still clothed with the presumption of innocence and 
receiving mere accusations for this purpose would be tantamount to accepting someone 
else’s assertion of the witness’ guilt and pure hearsay.”  State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173, 179-
80, 468 A.2d 319, 322 (1983) (citations omitted).  Furthermore, not all acts of 
misconduct are “prior bad acts that are relevant to assessing [the witness’s] credibility 
regardless of whether a conviction resulted”, but only those crimes or bad acts that 
                                                 
18  Maryland Rule 5-608(b), “Evidence of character of witness for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness” provides, in relevant part:  
 
(b) Impeachment by examination regarding witness’s own 
prior conduct not resulting in convictions.  The court may 
permit any witness to be examined regarding the witness’s 
own prior conduct that did not result in a conviction but that 
the court finds probative of a character trait of untruthfulness.  
Upon objection, however, the court may permit the inquiry 
only if the questioner, outside the hearing of the jury, 
establishes a reasonable factual basis for asserting that the 
conduct of the witness occurred.  The conduct may not be 
proved by extrinsic evidence. 
 
21 
 
logically relate to a witness’s character for untruthfulness.  Robinson v. State, 298 Md. 
193, 197, 468 A.2d 328, 331 (1983); see Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 704, 436 A.2d 
906, 907-08 (1981).    
Detective Ellsworth, as he must, concedes that the constitutional protections 
afforded by Brady do not apply in an administrative setting, but, instead, argues that 
“exculpatory” is “a term of art whose meaning may be found in Brady and its progeny,” 
which the Legislature intended to import into the statute by including the term 
“exculpatory” in the 1987 amendment to Section 3-104(n).  He argues that he was 
prejudiced by the Department’s failure to disclose the alleged investigation of Officer 
Redd, because he could not have been found guilty of insubordination, unless the 
“Hearing Board weighed the testimony of Detective Redd against that of three others: 
Lieutenant Carter, Major McLarney and Detective Joshua Ellsworth.”  
 
The Department argues that the language of Section 3-104(n) is not ambiguous 
and the plain meaning of the terms should apply: “exculpatory” meaning “tending to 
clear from a charge of fault or of guilt” and “impeach” meaning “to challenge or discredit 
the credibility, of a witness,” citing Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary 521, 734 
(1913).  Further, the Department argues that the legislative history of the LEOBR does 
not indicate that the Legislature intended “exculpatory” in Section 3-104(n) to include all 
impeachment information, as the statute differentiated between that which is 
“exculpatory information” and that which is “nonexculpatory information.”  Further, the 
Department proffers that Rule 4-263 provides guidance as to the distinct definitions of 
the terms “exculpatory” and “impeachment,” such that the information sought by 
22 
 
Detective Ellsworth was “nonexculpatory”, because it did not tend to negate the guilt of 
Detective Ellsworth.  The Department argues, alternatively, even assuming arguendo, it 
was required to disclose information regarding an investigation by the federal law 
enforcement agencies into Officer Redd’s activities, that failure did not prejudice 
Detective Ellsworth as he was aware of the very information he alleges he was 
wrongfully denied; because mere accusations of illegal conduct cannot be used to 
impeach a witness; extrinsic evidence could not have been introduced to contradict 
Officer Redd’s testimony; and also Officer Redd’s testimony was cumulative of other 
witnesses’ testimony.   
What is clear, however, is that the legislative history of Section 3-104(n) contains 
no reference to Brady and its progeny.  It does, however, reflect a myriad of concerns 
regarding disclosure of information beyond the officer and the conduct with which the 
officer was charged. 
The LEOBR was enacted in Chapter 722 of the Maryland Laws of 1974, “to 
provide procedural safeguards for law enforcement officers during any investigation and 
subsequent hearing that might result in disciplinary action . . . ‘in departmental 
disciplinary matters.’”  Boyle v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 
385 Md. 142, 155, 867 A.2d 1050, 1058 (2005) (emphasis in original), quoting Moats v. 
City of Hagerstown, 324 Md. 519, 526, 597 A.2d 972, 975 (1991).  The investigation of 
charges against a law enforcement officer and a resultant hearing under the LEOBR are 
distinctly administrative.  See Popkin v. Gindlesperger, 426 Md. 1, 4-5, 43 A.3d 347, 
349-50 (2012); Montgomery County Maryland v. Shropshire, 420 Md. 362, 374-75, 23 
23 
 
A.3d 205, 212-13 (2011); Coleman v. Anne Arundel County Police Department, 369 Md. 
108, 122, 797 A.2d 770, 779 (2002) (stating that the LEOBR is a law enforcement 
officer’s “exclusive remedy in matters of departmental discipline”).  
Section 3-104(n) of the LEOBR sets forth the requirements for pre-hearing 
disclosure to an officer under investigation: 
(n) Information provided on completion of investigation.— 
(1) On completion of an investigation and at least 10 days 
before a hearing, the law enforcement officer under 
investigation shall be: 
(i) notified of the name of each witness and of each 
charge and specification against the law enforcement 
officer; and 
(ii) provided with a copy of the investigatory file[19] 
and any exculpatory information, if the law 
enforcement officer and the law enforcement officer’s 
representative agree to: 
1. execute a confidentiality agreement with the law   
enforcement agency not to disclose any material 
contained in the investigatory file and exculpatory 
information for any purpose other than to defend the 
law enforcement officer; and 
   2. pay a reasonable charge for the cost of  
   reproducing the material. 
(2) The law enforcement agency may exclude from 
the exculpatory information provided to a law 
enforcement officer under this subsection: 
   (i) the identity of confidential sources; 
   (ii) nonexculpatory information; and 
                                                 
19  An internal investigation file in the Baltimore City Police Department contains the 
complaint statement, a summary and conclusion of the investigation written by the 
investigator, statements of the accused officer and all witnesses including police 
personnel and civilians, names of all investigating personnel, and all other reports, 
photographs, or documents collected in the course of the investigation.  Baltimore Police 
Department General Order 48-77, Appendix 1 to Annex A at A-1-1 to A-1-3, effective 
July 1, 1977, amended July 1, 1983. 
 
24 
 
   (iii) recommendations as to charges, disposition, or    
   punishment. 
 
Section 3-104(n) (emphasis added).  The LEOBR though, does not define “exculpatory 
information” or “nonexculpatory information”, nor do other provisions of the Maryland 
Code in which the term “exculpatory” is used.20   
 
The precursor of Section 3-104(n) was Section 728(b)(5) of Article 27, Maryland 
Code (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol., 1974 Supp.), which provided an officer under investigation 
with information regarding the “nature of the investigation” and “the names of all 
witnesses.”  The ambiguity of these provisions led to various proposals for revision by 
the General Assembly in 1976 and 1977.  See Letter from Roy W. Rafter, Chairman, 
Governor’s Commission to Review the Law Enforcement Officers Bill of Rights to Hon. 
Steny Hoyer, President of the Senate, and Hon. John Hanson Briscoe, Speaker of the 
House (January 7, 1977).   
By 1984, House Bill 91621 was proposed to provide a police officer under 
investigation with a copy of the investigatory file in addition to the names of any 
                                                 
20  “Exculpatory” also appears in Section 8-201(a)(5)(iii) of the Criminal Procedure 
Article, Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.) (“DNA Evidence—Postconviction 
Review”) and Section 10-905 of the Correctional Services Article (1999, 2008 Repl. 
Vol.) (“State Correctional Officers’ Bill of Rights”), which was adapted from the Law 
Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights.  See Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee Floor 
Report, Senate Bill 887 (2010).  
 
21  House Bill 916 was cross-filed as Senate Bill 954.  Both bills were adopted and House 
Bill 916, which contained modified language to exclude from disclosure of “any 
information which will not be used in the upcoming hearing,” was signed into law by 
Governor Harry Hughes. 
 
25 
 
witnesses and all charges and specifications.22  While House Bill 916 was under 
consideration in the House Judiciary Committee, Bernard D. Crooke, Chief of Police for 
the Montgomery County Department of Police, voiced strong opposition to the bill as 
worded because it would have required disclosure of information beyond the officer’s 
involvement in the specific incident, thereby potentially compromising witnesses’ 
cooperation and more importantly, “other law enforcement investigations”: 
                                                 
22  House Bill 916 as initially introduced in the House Judiciary Committee provided: 
 
FOR the purpose of providing that a law enforcement officer 
under investigation shall be furnished with a copy of the 
investigatory file not less than a certain time before any 
hearing if certain conditions as to confidentiality of the file 
and payment of costs are met. 
* * * 
(5) The law-enforcement officer under investigation 
shall be informed in writing of the nature of the investigation 
prior to any interrogation.  Upon completion of the 
investigation, the law-enforcement officer shall be notified of 
the name of any witness and all charges and specifications 
against the officer not less than ten days prior to any hearing.  
IN ADDITION, THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER 
UNDER INVESTIGATION SHALL BE FURNISHED 
WITH A COPY OF THE INVESTIGATORY FILE NOT 
LESS THAN 10 DAYS BEFORE ANY HEARING IF THE 
OFFICER AND THE OFFICER’S REPRESENTATIVE 
AGREE: 
(I) 
TO 
EXECUTE 
A 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
AGREEMENT 
WITH 
THE 
LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCY TO NOT DISCLOSE ANY OF THE MATERIAL 
CONTAINED IN THE RECORD FOR ANY PURPOSE 
OTHER THAN TO DEFEND THE OFFICER; AND  
(II) TO PAY ANY REASONABLE CHARGE FOR THE 
COST OF REPRODUCING THE MATERIAL INVOLVED. 
 
26 
 
It cannot be stated too strongly the “chilling effect” a 
wholesale release of the entire file would have on 
investigations into alleged police misconduct.  Citizen 
witnesses and fellow police officers are frequently reluctant 
to speak out in these situations as it is, but we are presently 
able to assure them that their statement will be released only 
if they are called upon to testify at the trial board and then, 
only that portion of their comments which is relevant to this 
charge will be released.   
* * * 
Another consideration is that release of the entire file 
could jeopardize other law enforcement investigations.  
Internal affairs officers frequently encounter a situation where 
information on a distinct charge against the same or different 
officers is contained in one statement.  Sometimes this 
information is part of charges that have been completed and 
sometimes the investigation is still ongoing.  Under the 
proposed amendment, this information would be released as 
well and would very likely compromise the progress of those 
ongoing investigations.  
 
Opposition Statement to House Bill 916 (March 8, 1984) (statement of Bernard Crooke, 
Chief of Police for the Montgomery County Department of Police).  Significantly, the 
final version of the bill excluded disclosure of information within the investigatory file 
that was not relevant to the charges for which the officer was under investigation, with 
the provision that:  “the law enforcement officer under investigation shall be furnished 
with a copy of the investigatory file, excluding the identity of confidential sources, any 
information which will not be used in the upcoming hearing, and recommendations as 
to charges, disposition or punishment”.23  1984 Maryland Laws, Chapter 660, codified at 
                                                 
23  House Bill 916, as adopted, provided, in relevant part:  
 
The law-enforcement officer under investigation shall be 
informed in writing of the nature of the investigation prior to 
(continued . . .) 
27 
 
Section 728(b)(5) of the Maryland Code (1957, 1981 Repl. Vol., 1984 Supp.) (emphasis 
added).24   
_____________________________ 
any interrogation. Upon completion of the investigation, the 
law-enforcement officer shall be notified of the name of any 
witness and all charges and specifications against the officer 
not less than ten days prior to any hearing.  IN ADDITION, 
THE 
LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICER 
UNDER 
INVESTIGATION SHALL BE FURNISHED WITH A 
COPY OF THE INVESTIGATORY FILE, EXCLUDING 
THE IDENTITY OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES, ANY 
INFORMATION WHICH WILL NOT BE USED IN THE 
UPCOMING HEARING, AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS 
TO CHARGES, DISPOSITION OR PUNISHMENT, NOT 
LESS THAN 10 DAYS BEFORE ANY HEARING IF THE 
OFFICER AND THE OFFICER’S REPRESENTATIVE 
AGREE: 
(I) 
TO 
EXECUTE 
A 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
AGREEMENT 
WITH 
THE 
LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCY TO NOT DISCLOSE ANY OF THE MATERIAL 
CONTAINED IN THE RECORD FOR ANY PURPOSE 
OTHER THAN TO DEFEND THE OFFICER; AND 
(II) TO PAY ANY REASONABLE CHARGE FOR 
THE COST OF REPRODUCING THE MATERIAL 
INVOLVED. 
 
1984 Md. Laws, Chap. 660, codified at Md. Code (1957, 1981 Repl. Vol., 1984 Supp.), 
Art. 27, § 728(b)(5). 
 
24  In 1985 and 1986 the House Judiciary Committee and Senate Judicial Proceedings 
Committee considered additional modifications to the exclusionary language of Section 
728(b)(5) to further restrict access.  See House Bill 644 and Senate Bill 331 (1985) 
(proposing to exclude any “information that is the subject of a valid and separate internal 
investigation”); Senate Bill 443 (1986) (proposing to exclude “any information that is the 
subject of a valid internal investigation that is unrelated to the charges and specifications 
against the officer”); House Bill 1735 (1986) (proposing to exclude “any information that 
is the subject of any other pending internal investigation unrelated to the charges and 
specifications against the officer”).  
 
28 
 
In 1987, the Legislature adopted House Bill 704, which set forth the current 
disclosure requirements of Section 3-104(n).25  Initially, House Bill 70426 provided that 
the officer under investigation should be given a copy of the investigatory file excluding 
any information that was “the subject of any other pending internal investigation” if that 
information was “irrelevant” to the charges for which the officer was investigated.27  The 
                                                 
25  The LEOBR was adopted without substantive change and recodified as Section 3-101 
et seq., of the Public Safety Article, Maryland Code (2003), when the General Assembly 
added the “Public Safety Article”, recodifying certain statutes previously contained in 
Articles 41 “Executive and Administrative Departments”), 88B (“Department of State 
Police”), and 27 (“Crimes and Punishment”), among others, relating to State fire 
prevention, policies of the Department of State Police and emergency maintenance 
systems.  2003 Md. Laws, Chap. 5.  Section 728(b) of Article 27 was recodified and 
adopted without substantive change in 2003, as Section 3-104(n) of the Public Safety 
Article, Maryland Code (2003).   
 
26  The Legislature also simultaneously considered, but rejected, Senate Bill 600, which 
excluded from disclosure “any information that is the subject of any other pending 
internal investigation which is irrelevant to the charges and specifications against the 
officer” in the investigatory file.   
 
  
27  House Bill 704 as originally introduced in the House Judiciary Committee provided: 
 
(5) The law-enforcement officer under investigation shall be 
informed in writing of the nature of the investigation prior to 
any interrogation.  Upon completion of the investigation, the 
law-enforcement officer shall be notified of the name of any 
witness and all charges and specifications against the officer 
not less than ten days prior to any hearing.  In addition, the 
law-enforcement officer under investigation shall be 
furnished with a copy of the investigatory file, excluding the 
identity of confidential sources, any information . . . THAT IS 
THE SUBJECT OF ANY OTHER PENDING INTERNAL 
INVESTIGATION WHICH IS IRRELEVANT TO THE 
CHARGES AND SPECIFICATIONS AGAINST THE 
OFFICER, and recommendations as to charges, disposition, 
(continued . . .) 
29 
 
Fraternal Order of Police Lodge Numbers 30 and 69 supported the bill in its original 
form, while the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services 
opposed the bill as drafted because it would “put this Agency in a position of revealing 
information that may be to the detriment of the officer involved, or other officers that 
may be involved or other citizens that might be involved.”  Maryland Department of 
Public Safety and Correctional Services, Position on Proposed Legislation House Bill 704 
(February 13, 1987) (statement of Sergeant Don Hoffman of the Maryland State Police).  
Lieutenant Emmit Jones of the Baltimore Police Department also provided written 
testimony against the bill, cautioning against disclosure of information related to pending 
investigations that could be compromised:  
It would provide to the accused officer facing a 
Hearing (Trial Board) not only the investigative file involving 
the pending hearing, but any other pending Internal 
Investigation File which is relevant to the charges and 
specifications against the officer. . . .  
It is conceivable that an officer could be facing a 
Hearing for Excessive Force while he is being investigated 
for possible criminal activity which is relevant to the charge 
of Excessive Force.  To be faced with a legal requirement to 
divulge the second investigation prior to completion of the 
Hearing is not only unjustified but would compromise the 
ongoing investigation. 
_____________________________ 
or punishment, not less than 10 days before any hearing if the 
officer and the officer’s representative agree:  
(i) To execute a confidentiality agreement with the law-
enforcement agency to not disclose any of the material 
contained in the record for any purpose other than to defend 
the officer; and 
(ii) To pay any reasonable charge for the cost of reproducing 
the material involved. 
 
30 
 
 
Statement of Lieutenant Emmit Jones of the Baltimore Police Department Regarding 
House Bill 704 – Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights – Investigatory Files – As 
Prepared for a Hearing Before the House Judiciary Committee (March 16, 1987).  
The House Judiciary Committee recommended language that specified that the 
Department must provide the officer under investigation with the investigatory file and 
information that was “exculpatory” but not information that was “nonexculpatory” to the 
charges for which the officer was under investigation.  House Bill 704 as adopted, 
provided: 
(III) IN ADDITION, THE LAW-ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICER 
UNDER 
INVESTIGATION 
SHALL 
BE 
FURNISHED WITH A COPY OF THE INVESTIGATORY 
FILE AND ANY EXCULPATORY INFORMATION, BUT 
EXCLUDING: 
1. THE IDENTITY OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES; 
2. ANY NONEXCULPATORY INFORMATION; AND 
3. RECOMMENDATIONS 
AS 
TO 
CHARGES, 
DISPOSITION, OR PUNISHMENT. 
(IV) 
THE 
LAW-ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICER 
UNDER INVESTIGATION SHALL BE FURNISHED 
WITH A COPY OF THE INVESTIGATORY FILE AND 
THE EXCULPATORY INFORMATION DESCRIBED 
UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH (III) OF THIS PARAGRAPH 
NOT LESS THAN 10 DAYS BEFORE ANY HEARING IF 
THE 
OFFICER 
AND 
THE 
OFFICER’S 
REPRESENTATIVE AGREE: 
1. to execute a confidentiality agreement with the law-
enforcement agency to not disclose any of the material 
contained in the record for any purpose other than to defend 
the officer; and 
2. to pay any reasonable charge for the cost of 
reproducing the material involved.  
 
31 
 
Maryland Laws 1987, Chapter 499.  What is significant, then, is the fact that if 
exculpatory information were disclosed, it would relate only to the officer investigated 
and the specific incident in which the officer had been involved.  
Not only is there absolutely nothing in the text of Section 3-104(n) or its 
legislative history to indicate, as Detective Ellsworth suggests, that the General Assembly 
considered or intended to use the term “exculpatory” to import Brady and its progeny into 
the administrative LEOBR process, but there is nothing to indicate that the Legislature 
intended to require state and federal agencies to provide information regarding pending 
investigations unrelated to the officer and his or her specific charges.  Rather, the history 
supports only the conclusion that the Legislature only intended to disclose information 
related to the officer and the charges specified rather than the disclosure of information 
regarding an alleged extraneous investigation of a witness, which did not relate to the 
officer and his or her specific charges involved in the hearing.  As a result, we affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO BE 
PAID BY PETITIONER. 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No. 24-C-11-005397 
Argued: February 10, 2014 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
MARYLAND 
 
No. 58 
 
September Term, 2013 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JOSHUA TRIPP ELLSWORTH 
 
v. 
 
BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Barbera, C.J., 
  
Harrell, 
Battaglia, 
  
Greene, 
  
Adkins, 
  
McDonald, 
  
Raker, Irma S. (Retired,  
Specially Assigned), 
 
  
 
JJ. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Harrell, J., 
which Barbera, C.J., and Adkins, J., join. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: April 24, 2014 
 
 
 
 
I dissent.  Although I agree with the Majority opinion’s conclusion that there is no 
indication in the legislative history of H.B. 704 of 1987 that suggests explicitly that  the 
Legislature intended to import broadly Brady and its progeny into the LEOBR by 
inclusion of a requirement that a charged officer be given pre-hearing by the department 
any exculpatory information (Maj. slip op. at 31), I disagree with the Majority opinion’s 
absence of any appreciation that “exculpatory information” should include potential 
impeachment information regarding a departmental material witness to the alleged 
misconduct.  The Majority opinion concludes that “the Legislature only intended to 
disclose information related to the officer and the charges specified rather than the 
disclosure of information regarding an alleged extraneous investigation of a witness, 
which did not relate to the officer and his or her specific charges involved in the hearing.”  
Id.  Neither the language of H.B. 704, as enacted, nor the legislative history pointed to by 
the Majority opinion (Maj. slip op. at 28-29), supports the Majority’s conclusion.  
Moreover, to countenance the police department offering as one of its material witnesses 
an officer that, at the time he was called to testify, was suspected by the department of 
being a distributor of illegal narcotics, and yet suppress that information, is wrong 
manifestly (even in an administrative proceeding). 
 
Lieutenant Jones’s testimony before the Legislature on H.B. 704 (recounted in 
pertinent part by the Majority slip opinion at 29) used as an illustration of what concerned 
him about the original bill the example of an ongoing, parallel investigation of the 
charged officer that could be compromised by premature revelation.  This does not 
-2- 
 
bolster the Majority opinion’s view that the Legislature was concerned with divulging 
impeachment evidence of a departmental witness. 
 
The legislative testimony of Sergeant Hoffman (Maj. slip op. at 29) was directed 
likewise to the unamended version of H.B. 704.  The original bill excluded from 
disclosure “any information that is the subject of any other pending investigation which is 
irrelevant to the charges and specifications against the officer.”  Maj. slip op. at 28 n.26.  
Even then, Sergeant Hoffman’s relevant concern about the original language was about 
“revealing information that may be to the detriment of . . . other officers that may be 
involved . . . .”   Maj. slip op. at 29.  That also is not the circumstance of the present case. 
 
Thus, the change made in the proposed legislation, after hearing these testimonies, 
should be read in the light of the concerns expressed to the Legislature, none of which 
suggested that impeachment information regarding a departmental material witness in the 
trial board proceedings of the pertinent charges against Detective Ellsworth should be 
deemed excluded as “non-exculpatory information.” 
 
I find it reprehensible that a police department may blind a trial board to the 
obvious credibility suspicions that would have arisen surely from the department 
producing a material witness (another police officer) that it has reason to suspect may be 
a drug dealer.  Had Detective Redd been so discredited, the case against Detective 
Ellsworth could have come down essentially to a “he said/he said” contest between 
Detective Ellsworth and Sergeant Brickus.  With the unsullied “eyewitness” 
corroboration by Detective Redd of Sergeant Brickus’s version of what happened on 7 
August 2009 at 2727 W. Garrison Avenue in Baltimore, the scales of the weight of the 
-3- 
 
evidence tipped in the department’s favor.  The proceedings, in my judgment, were 
flawed fatally. 
 
I would hold that § 3-104(n)(1)(ii) of the Public Safety Article of the Maryland 
Code means that “exculpatory information” required to be disclosed includes potential 
impeachment information, known to the department, regarding a witness the department 
intends to call at the trial board proceedings.  As that was not done in the present case and 
the implicated witness was a material eyewitness, Detective Ellsworth is entitled to a new 
trial board hearing.  Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Special 
Appeals and remand the matter to that Court with directions to affirm the judgment of the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City. 
 
Chief Judge Barbera and Judge Adkins authorize me to state that they join in the 
views expressed in this opinion.