Case Title: State v. Phillip Cole

Citation: 2003 WI 112

Docket Number: 2001AP000350-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 112 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-0350-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Phillip Cole,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 15, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON 
BRIEFS: 
 
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 14, 2002 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Maxine A. White   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins Justice Prosser's concurrence.  
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT 
PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs and oral 
argument by Michael K. Gould, assistant state public defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent cause was argued by Jeffrey J. 
Kassel, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2003 WI 112 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-0350-CR  
(L.C. No. 
99 CM 10862) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Phillip Cole,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 15, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County, Maxine A. White, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JON 
P. 
WILCOX, 
J.   This 
case 
involves 
a 
constitutional challenge to Wis. Stat. § 941.23 (1999-2000),1 the 
state law prohibition against carrying a concealed weapon.  The 
challenge is brought by Phillip Cole, who was convicted 
under § 941.23 after police found two concealed weapons within 
the vehicle in which Cole was riding.  Cole challenges the 
constitutionality of the concealed weapons statute in light of 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
2 
 
Article I, Section 25 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which 
guarantees citizens' state constitutional right to bear arms.  
He claims that the statute is unconstitutional on its face and 
as applied to him.   
¶2 
Before trial, Cole pled guilty to the concealed 
weapons charge and a drug charge.  After he was sentenced, Cole 
filed a motion to vacate the concealed weapons conviction on the 
basis that Wis. Stat. § 941.23 violates Article I, Section 25 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  The postconviction motion was 
denied.  Cole appealed and the court of appeals certified the 
matter to this court.  We accepted certification, and we now 
uphold the decision of the circuit court. 
I 
¶3 
The facts of this case are not in dispute.  On the 
evening of November 6, 1999, Milwaukee police officers pulled 
over a vehicle driven by Minko Lewis for an expired registration 
and a defective brake lamp.  Phillip Cole, the defendant in this 
case, was a passenger in the vehicle.  As one of the officers 
approached the vehicle, he saw Cole conceal an item in the glove 
compartment.  Police searched Cole and the vehicle.  Officers 
found marijuana in Cole's left breast pocket.  Police also found 
a loaded .380 caliber pistol in the glove compartment of the 
vehicle and a loaded .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol beneath 
the driver's seat.  Cole told police that the marijuana was for 
personal use and that he carried the .380 in the glove 
compartment for protection. 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
3 
 
¶4 
On May 12, 2000, Cole pled guilty to charges of 
carrying 
a 
concealed 
weapon 
(CCW) 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 941.23 
and 
possession 
of 
tetrahydrocannabinols 
(marijuana) in violation of Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(e).2  The 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court, the Honorable Maxine A. White, 
presiding, sentenced Cole to 60 days on the CCW charge and 15 
days 
(concurrent) 
on 
the 
possession 
charge 
with 
Huber 
privileges. 
¶5 
On September 29, 2000, Cole filed a motion to vacate 
his conviction on the concealed weapons charge, alleging that 
the CCW statute is an unconstitutional infringement of his 
constitutional right to bear arms.  The state constitutional 
right to bear arms is found in Article I, Section 25 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution and provides as follows:  "The people 
have the right to keep and bear arms for security, defense, 
hunting, recreation or any other lawful purpose."  Wis. Const. 
art. I, § 25.  Section 941.23 of the Wisconsin Statutes, which 
Cole claims violates that provision, states:  "Any person except 
a peace officer who goes armed with a concealed and dangerous 
weapon is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor."   
¶6 
The Milwaukee County Circuit Court, the Honorable 
Charles F. Kahn, Jr., presiding, denied the postconviction 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 961.41(3g)(e) provides: 
If 
a 
person 
possesses 
or 
attempts 
to 
possess 
tetrahydrocannabinols included under s. 961.14(4)(t), or a 
controlled substance analog of tetrahydrocannibinols, the 
person may be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for 
not more than 6 months or both. 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
4 
 
motion, finding the statute to be constitutional.  Cole appealed 
and on October 23, 2001, the court of appeals certified the 
matter to this court.  This court then accepted certification on 
November 27, 2001.   
¶7 
This case was originally scheduled to be decided as a 
companion 
case 
to 
State 
v. 
Gonzales, 
2002 
WI 
59, 
253 
Wis. 2d 134, 645 N.W.2d 264.  After oral argument in Gonzales, 
this court decided Gonzales on alternative grounds, finding that 
Gonzales' challenge to Article I, Section 25 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution failed because the amendment was not in effect on 
the day the defendant violated Wis. Stat. § 941.23.  In an order 
dated June 13, 2002, this court then determined that State v. 
Cole would be held and heard with State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. 
II 
¶8 
The Wisconsin Legislature first passed a concealed 
weapons law in 1872.  §1, ch. 7, Laws of 1872; see also State v. 
Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d 654, 671, 594 N.W.2d 780 (1999).  As noted 
in Dundon, the original statute contained several exceptions to 
the prohibition that were then repealed in 1878.3  Dundon, 226 
                                                 
3 In 1878, the statute, then Wis. Stat. § 4397, provided:   
Any person who shall go armed with any concealed and 
dangerous weapon, shall be punished by imprisonment in 
the county jail not more than six months, or by fine 
not exceeding one hundred dollars:  provided, this 
section shall not apply to any policeman or officer 
authorized to serve process. 
 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
5 
 
Wis. 2d at 671-72.  Since 1878, the CCW statute has remained 
substantively the same, including only an exception for peace 
officers.4  Id. at 672. 
¶9 
Article I, Section 25 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
was adopted by the citizens of this state in November 1998.  
Jeffrey Monks, Comment, The End of Gun Control or Protection 
Against Tyranny?: The Impact of the New Wisconsin Constitutional 
Right to Bear Arms on State Gun Control Laws, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 
249, 250.  It became effective on November 30, 1998.  See 
Gonzales, 253 Wis. 2d 134, ¶¶8-9, 15, 29-30.  The amendment was 
                                                                                                                                                             
State v. Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d 654, 672, 594 N.W.2d 780 (1999) 
(quoting Wis. Stat. ch. 181, § 4397 (1878)). 
4 Dundon provides a summary of much of the history of 
Wis. Stat. § 941.23.  There the court noted: 
Section 4397 was renumbered as Wis. Stat. § 340.69 in 
1925.  § 1, ch. 4, Laws of 1925.  In 1953, the 
legislature 
repealed 
§ 340.69 
and 
adopted 
Wis. Stat. § 341.23, a statute very similar to the 
current statute. § 2, ch. 623, Laws of 1953.  In 1955, 
this statute was repealed and renumbered, with minimal 
changes, as the current Wis. Stat. § 941.23.  § 1, ch. 
696, Laws of 1955. 
Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d 654, 672. 
In 1969, Wis. Stat. § 941.23 was split into subsections.  
§§ 1, 2, ch. 272, Laws of 1969.  Subsection 1 was substantially 
the same as what is now the complete statute.  In 1977, the 
legislature amended subsection 1 to change the language from a 
term of imprisonment to a level of offense, stating that a 
person going armed with a concealed weapon is "guilty of a Class 
A misdemeanor."  § 37, ch. 173, Laws of 1977.  In 1979, the 
legislature 
repealed 
subsection 
2 
and 
renumbered 
Wis. Stat. § 941.23(1) to be simply Wis. Stat. § 941.23, the 
present statute.  See §§ 843g, 843j, ch. 221, Laws of 1979. 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
6 
 
approved by a wide margin in the state legislature both times it 
arose for consideration.5  Bulletin of the Proceedings of the 
Wisconsin 
Legislature, 
1995-96 
Assemb. 
Sess., 
at 
394-95; 
Bulletin of the Proceedings of the Wisconsin Legislature, 1997-
98 Assemb. Sess., at 316-17; Monks, The End of Gun Control, 2001 
Wis. L. Rev. at 250 n.10.  When put before the voters, the 
amendment passed with 74% voting in favor of the amendment.  
Monks, The End of Gun Control, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. at 250 n.10.  
That is not to say, however, that this amendment passed into law 
without notice.  In fact, some controversy surrounded the 
proposed measure and its implications.  See, e.g., Monks, The 
End of Gun Control, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 249 (citing numerous news 
articles and editorials with a variety of positions on the 
proposed amendment); Christopher R. McFadden, The Wisconsin Bear 
Arms Amendment and the Case Against an Absolute Prohibition on 
Carrying Concealed Weapons, 19 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 709 (1999). 
                                                 
5 Under 
Article 
XII, 
Section 
1 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
a proposed 
constitutional 
amendment must be 
considered and approved by two successive legislatures before it 
is presented to the public for referendum approval.  Wisconsin 
Briefs, Constitutional Amendments to be Considered by the 
Wisconsin 
Voters, 
November 
3, 
1998, 
LRB-98-WB-10, 
at 
1 
(September 1998).  The proposed right to bear arms amendment 
received "first consideration" during the 1995-96 session of the 
legislature and "second 
consideration" 
during 
the 1997-98 
legislature.  See Bulletin of the Proceedings of the Wisconsin 
Legislature, 1995-96 Assemb. Sess., at 394-95; Bulletin of the 
Proceedings of the Wisconsin Legislature, 1997-98 Assemb. Sess., 
at 316-17.   
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
7 
 
III 
¶10 We first address the standards of review applicable in 
this case.  The constitutionality of a statute presents a 
question of law that this court reviews de novo, without 
deference to the decisions of the circuit court or the court of 
appeals.6  Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶18, 
237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849; State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 
301, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995); Szarzynski v. YMCA, Camp Minikani, 
184 Wis. 2d 875, 883-84, 517 N.W.2d 135 (1994); State v. Fisher, 
211 Wis. 2d 665, 669, 565 N.W.2d 565 (Ct. App. 1997); Prof. 
Guardianships, Inc. v. Ruth E.J., 196 Wis. 2d 794, 801, 540 
N.W.2d 213 (Ct. App. 1995).  This case requires us to interpret 
the constitutional amendment, seeking an indication of the 
framers' intentions.  As we have noted: 
The 
purpose of construction 
of 
a constitutional 
amendment is to give effect to the intent of the 
framers and of the people who adopted it; and it is a 
rule of construction applicable to all constitutions 
that they are to be construed so as to promote the 
objects for which they were framed and adopted. 
Kayden Indus., Inc. v. Murphy, 34 Wis. 2d 718, 729-30, 150 
N.W.2d 447 (1967) (quoting Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 
184, 204 N.W. 803 (1925)) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted).  For these purposes, this court has established that 
we should utilize three sources to determine a provision's 
meaning:   
                                                 
6 Regardless of whether the defendant waived the issue, this 
court 
may, 
in 
its 
discretion, 
address 
the 
important 
constitutional issue raised herein. 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
8 
 
the plain meaning of the words in the context used; 
the 
constitutional debates and the practices in 
existence 
at 
the 
time 
of 
the 
writing 
of 
the 
constitution; and the earliest interpretation of the 
provision by the legislature as manifested in the 
first law passed following adoption. 
Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 680, 546 N.W.2d 123 (1996) 
(citations omitted).   
¶11 Generally, legislative enactments are entitled to a 
presumption of constitutionality.  Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶18; 
Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 680; Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 
520, 480 N.W.2d 460 (1992); State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. 
v. La Plante, 58 Wis. 2d 32, 46, 205 N.W.2d 784 (1973) ("This 
court has often affirmed the well-established presumption of 
constitutionality that 
attaches itself 
to 
all 
legislative 
acts."); Ruth E.J., 196 Wis. 2d at 801.  This court has 
repeatedly held that it "indulges every presumption to sustain 
the law if at all possible, and if any doubt exists about a 
statute's constitutionality, we must resolve that doubt in favor 
of constitutionality."  Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶18 (internal 
citation omitted); see also Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 301.  A 
petitioner seeking to prove a statute unconstitutional faces a 
heavy burden.  State v. Interstate Blood Bank, Inc., 65 
Wis. 2d 482, 488-89, 222 N.W.2d 912 (1974).  In the face of a 
strong presumption, it falls to the party challenging the 
constitutionality of a statute to prove that the statute is 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  Aicher, 237 
Wis. 2d 99, ¶19; Brandmiller v. Arreola, 199 Wis. 2d 528, 536, 
544 N.W.2d 894 (1996); Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 680; Fisher, 211 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
9 
 
Wis. 2d at 669.  This court has noted:  "It is insufficient to 
merely establish doubt as to an act's constitutionality nor is 
it sufficient to establish the act is probably constitutional." 
Quinn 
v. 
Town 
of 
Dodgeville, 
122 
Wis. 2d 570, 
577, 
364 
N.W.2d 149 (1985).  If any doubt remains, this court must uphold 
the statute as constitutional.  Id. 
¶12 Cole argues that the presumption of constitutionality 
is inapplicable in this case because the CCW statute predates 
the constitutional amendment.  We disagree.  The purpose of the 
presumption of constitutionality does not appear to have any 
relation to whether the statute predates or postdates the 
constitutional provision.  As this court has held:  "The 
presumption of statutory constitutionality is the product of our 
recognition that the judiciary is not positioned to make the 
economic, social, and political decisions that fall within the 
province of the legislature."  Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶20. 
Whether a statute predates or postdates a constitutional 
amendment, the legislature is still the more appropriate body 
for those considerations, and the judiciary rightly presumes the 
legislature makes such an assessment. 
¶13 Rare exceptions to the presumption have been found, 
particularly where a statute infringes upon First Amendment 
rights or the process of enactment is suspect.  See State v. 
Weidner, 2000 WI 52, ¶7, 235 Wis. 2d 306, 611 N.W.2d 684; City 
of Oak Creek v. DNR, 185 Wis. 2d 424, 437, 518 N.W.2d 276 (Ct. 
App. 1994) ("Although a statute generally enjoys a strong 
presumption of constitutionality, an exception to the rule 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
10 
 
occurs when the behavior of the legislature allegedly violates a 
law mandating the form in which bills must be enacted."  
(citation omitted)).7  Even in cases such as Davis, though, where 
the court was concerned about the procedures of the legislature, 
the court noted:  "If such legislation is passed after full 
consideration . . . that will be the proper time to engage in 
the presumption of constitutionality."  Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 
524 (internal citation and supplied emphasis omitted).   
¶14 Cole cites to Kayden Industries and Schmeling v. 
Phelps to support his argument that because the amendment came 
into being after the statute, it should not be entitled to a 
presumption of constitutionality.  We find both of these cases 
inapposite on this particular point.  As noted by the State, 
Kayden has to do with the result when a new constitutional 
amendment is inconsistent with prior statutes and common law.  
See Kayden, 34 Wis. 2d at 731.  The effect is to repeal the 
statute.  Id.  This result, however, has nothing to do with 
whether or not a party challenging constitutionality of a 
statute is relieved of the burden of overcoming a presumption of 
constitutionality.  The main issue in this case is whether or 
not 
the 
statute 
is, 
in 
fact, 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
                                                 
7 See also Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 520-21, 480 
N.W.2d 460 (1992), in which this court found a presumption of 
constitutionality 
appropriate 
where 
legislature 
could 
be 
presumed to have "intelligently participate[d] in considering" 
the relevant bill (citations omitted).  In that case, the court 
was concerned about violation of the procedural requirements of 
Wisconsin Constitution Article IV, Section 18.  Id. at 522. 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
11 
 
constitutional amendment.  To accept Cole's interpretation of 
Kayden would be to skip over the process of determining 
inconsistency and actually create the opposite presumption.  
Regarding Cole's employment of Schmeling, we agree with the 
State's assertion that chronology did not dictate the result in 
that case.  In Schmeling v. Phelps, 212 Wis. 2d 898, 909, 569 
N.W.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1997), the court of appeals found that 
where there is a conflict between the language of a statute and 
the 
language 
of 
the 
constitution, 
the 
language 
of 
the 
constitution prevails.  The court of appeals stated:   
The constitution or a constitutional amendment is of 
the highest dignity and prevails over legislative acts 
and court rule to the contrary.  Ordinary acts of the 
legislature, whether adopted before or after the date 
of the constitution, cannot be given effect if to do 
so would contravene a substantive provision in the 
constitution.   
Id. at 908-09 (internal quotations and citations omitted) 
(emphasis added).  The presumption was never an issue in 
Schmeling.  As in Kayden, the issue in Schmeling was the proper 
interpretation when a conflict exists, not the method of 
ascertaining if there is a conflict at all.  Similarly, in La 
Follette v. Board of Supervisors of Milwaukee County, 109 
Wis. 2d 621, 629, 327 N.W.2d 161 (Ct. App. 1982), the court of 
appeals found that where statutes predated a constitutional 
provision 
and 
directly 
conflicted 
with 
the 
constitutional 
provision, the constitution prevailed over the statutes.  If a 
conflict exists, it is clear that the constitutional amendment 
prevails 
over 
the 
inconsistent 
statute, 
but 
before 
that 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
12 
 
determination is made, as in this case, Cole has provided no 
reason to reject the presumption of constitutionality in this 
context.   
¶15 Cole also cites City of Princeton v. Buckner, 377 
S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1988), for the proposition that other states 
have rejected a presumption of constitutionality in similar 
contexts.  In Buckner, 377 S.E.2d at 144, the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of West Virginia held:  "A constitutional amendment will 
supersede any inconsistent portions of antecedent constitutional 
or statutory provisions, as 'the latest expression of the will 
of the people.'" (internal citations omitted).  We find Buckner 
to be similar to Schmeling and Kayden.  Buckner does not discuss 
the presumption of constitutionality; rather, it describes the 
effects if inconsistency exists, a very different question.  The 
application of a presumption of constitutionality does not mean 
a statute will always survive judicial scrutiny.  Even if a 
statute is presumed constitutional, it will fall if found to be 
inconsistent with the mandates of the constitution.  However, 
such a conclusion results from overcoming the presumption of 
constitutionality, not from refusing to apply it. 
¶16 While we have found the cases cited above to be 
unhelpful, at least one other state has dealt with this type of 
situation in the context of gun control laws and applied a 
presumption of constitutionality.  In State v. Comeau, 448 
N.W.2d 595 (Neb. 1989), the Supreme Court of Nebraska recognized 
a presumption of constitutionality even where the statute at 
issue predated the constitutional amendment granting the right 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
13 
 
to bear arms.  Nebraska's "Right to Bear Arms" amendment was 
adopted at the general election in 1988.  Id. at 596.  The gun 
control statutes at issue in the case were all in effect prior 
to that, yet the court stated:  "It is fundamental that a 
statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the burden of 
establishing unconstitutionality is on the party attacking its 
validity." 
 
Id. 
 
That 
court 
went 
on 
to 
uphold 
the 
constitutionality of the statutes.  Id. at 600. 
¶17 This court has consistently used broad language in 
describing the presumption of constitutionality.  Also, we have 
reaffirmed time and again the general rule that a presumption 
exists.  For example, in Hammermill, this court, quoting 
Wisconsin precedent, stated:  "All legislative acts are presumed 
constitutional, and every presumption must be indulged to 
sustain the law if at all possible."  Hammermill, 58 Wis. 2d at 
47 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).  In Ruth 
E.J., 196 Wis. 2d at 801, the court of appeals stated:  "We 
presume 
all 
statutes 
are 
constitutional . . . " 
(internal 
citation omitted) (emphasis added).  Further, this court has 
specifically held:  "All statutes passed and retained by the 
legislature should be held valid unless the earlier statute is 
completely repugnant to the later enactment."  State v. 
Zawistowski, 
95 
Wis. 2d 250, 
264, 
290 
N.W.2d 303 
(1980) 
(emphasis added).  It is doubtful, if not inconceivable, that 
persistent use of such broadly inclusive language has been 
unintentional.  It has been firmly established that "the 
legislature is presumed to act with full knowledge of existing 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
14 
 
laws."  State v. Roling, 191 Wis. 2d 754, 762, 530 N.W.2d 434 
(Ct. App. 1995).  Consequently, we find, as the circuit court 
did, that the legislature here did not act in a vacuum, but with 
knowledge of the many existing gun control laws, including the 
concealed weapons statute.8   
¶18 Given the above analysis demonstrating the general 
rule favoring application of the presumption and, in addition, 
finding no valid reason to reject the presumption in this 
context, we hold that it is appropriate to apply a presumption 
of constitutionality in this case.  As we have noted: 
We as a court are not concerned with the merits of the 
legislation under attack.  We are not concerned with 
the wisdom of what the legislature has done.  We are 
judicially concerned only when the statute clearly 
contravenes some constitutional provision. 
Hammermill, 58 Wis. 2d at 47 (internal quotations omitted).  We 
again noted in Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶20, that the duty of the 
court is only to determine whether a statute "clearly and beyond 
doubt" offends constitutional protections.  The presumption of 
constitutionality 
promotes 
due 
deference 
to 
acts 
of 
the 
legislature. 
¶19 Cole next argues that this court should apply strict 
scrutiny, or at least intermediate scrutiny, in determining the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 941.23, because the right to 
                                                 
8 Actually, many of these laws provided fodder for the 
debate over the proposed amendment.  See Jeffrey Monks, Comment, 
The End of Gun Control or Protection Against Tyranny?:  The 
Impact of the New Wisconsin Constitutional Right to Bear Arms on 
State Gun Control Laws, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 249, 249-50 n.3-6, 8-
9. 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
15 
 
bear arms is a fundamental constitutional right.  The State 
questions whether the right to bear arms is fundamental and 
asserts that because of the compelling public health and safety 
reasons for the CCW statute, a reasonableness standard is 
appropriate.  The State notes the reasonableness standard is 
what most other states have used.   
¶20 We find that the state constitutional right to bear 
arms is fundamental.  It is indeed a rare occurrence for the 
state constitution's Declaration of Rights to be amended.  See 
Monks, The End of Gun Control, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. at 249.  
Article I, Section 25 explicitly grants a right to bear arms.  
Further, there is evidence in the legislative history of the 
amendment 
that 
it 
was 
intended 
to 
grant 
a 
"fundamental 
individual" right.  See Memorandum from Shaun Haas, Senior Staff 
Attorney, Wis. Legislative Council, Analysis of 1995 Assembly 
Joint Resolution 53 and 1995 Senate Joint Resolution 7, Relating 
to the Right to Keep and Bear Arms (First Consideration) to 
Wisconsin State Representative David Travis and Interested 
Legislators, at 6 (Oct. 11, 1995) (hereinafter 1995 LCS 
Memorandum).   
¶21 Nevertheless, we do not agree with Cole's position 
that strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny is required in 
this case.  This court has previously recognized that it need 
not apply strict scrutiny every time a governmental burden upon 
fundamental rights is implicated.  Brandmiller, 199 Wis. 2d at 
541.  In Brandmiller, this court used an intermediate level of 
scrutiny, 
rather 
than 
strict 
scrutiny, 
to 
examine 
the 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
16 
 
constitutionality 
of 
municipal 
ordinances 
that 
prohibited 
"cruising" on certain city streets, despite the possible 
implications upon the fundamental constitution right of travel.  
Id. at 537-42.  We find the precedents of other states, favoring 
a "reasonable" test, to be persuasive in the context of the 
right to bear arms.   
¶22 Generally, when other courts have evaluated challenges 
to 
the 
validity 
of 
gun 
control 
statues 
under 
state 
constitutional provisions, the test has been whether the statute 
constitutes a "reasonable regulation" in light of the state's 
police powers.  See, e.g., People v. Swint, 572 N.W.2d 666 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Ricehill, 415 N.W.2d 481 (N.D. 
1987).  "Police power" is an inherent authority of state 
governments. Reginald D. v. State, 193 Wis. 2d 299, 308, 533 
N.W.2d 181 (1995); Interstate Blood Bank, 65 Wis. 2d at 490; 
Monks, The End of Gun Control, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. at 259 n.69.  
It covers "all matters having a reasonable relation to the 
protection of the public health, safety, or welfare."  Carnation 
Milk Prods. Co. v. Emery, 178 Wis. 147, 153, 189 N.W. 564 
(1922).   
¶23 Even courts that have found such a right to be 
fundamental have used a reasonableness standard.  See, e.g., 
Arnold v. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio 1993).  If this court 
were to utilize a strict scrutiny standard, Wisconsin would be 
the only state to do so.  Monks, The End of Gun Control, 2001 
Wis. L. Rev. at 291.  We decline such an invitation, because we 
agree with the courts of various other states that the proper 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
17 
 
question is whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of 
police power.  As noted by Monks:  "This standard of review is 
relatively deferential and generally distinct from the type of 
review 
that 
challenges 
under 
other 
constitutional 
rights 
receive."  Id. at 259.  We are persuaded that this standard is 
appropriate because the interests of public safety involved here 
are compelling.  See id. at 259 n.69-70 (and cases cited 
therein). 
¶24 Cole acknowledges that the right to bear arms is not 
absolute. 
 
Cole 
has 
conceded 
that 
some 
regulation 
is 
appropriate, but insists that the prohibition of all concealed 
weapons 
extends 
too 
far 
and 
impermissibly 
infringes 
the 
constitutional right.  In the process of drafting Article I, 
Section 25, the legislature was made aware that "no current 
state constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to keep 
and bear arms has been found to create an absolute right."  1995 
LCS Memorandum, at 13.  Further, it has been noted:  "[E]ven in 
the absence of such specific authorization [for legislative 
control], the judiciary has long recognized that the exigencies 
of society require limits on the scope of the arms right.  
Michael D. Ridberg, The Impact of State Constitutional Right to 
Bear Arms Provisions on State Gun Control Legislation, 38 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 185, 187 (1970). 
¶25 There are few, if any, absolute rights.  As this court 
recognized long ago:  "Indeed, most of the legislative acts 
which fill our statute books detract in some measure from the 
absolute freedom of the individual to act wholly at the dictate 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
18 
 
of his will, and yet are of either decided or fully recognized 
constitutionality."  Zillmer v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530, 533, 
90 N.W. 1098 (1902).  Further,  
[t]he very existence of government renders imperative 
a power to restrain the individual to some extent.  
This is called the "police power" . . . .  It may be 
described, though not defined, as the power of the 
government to regulate conduct and property of some 
for safety and property of all. 
Id. at 536-37.  Moreover, this authority to enact legislation 
using police power has been held to "embrace every law or 
statute 
which 
concerns 
the 
whole 
or 
any 
part 
of 
the 
people . . . ."  Id. at 154.  As noted by the court of appeals 
in Fisher, 211 Wis. 2d at 672, even fundamental rights are 
subject to reasonable regulation to protect legitimate public 
interests.  The Nebraska Supreme Court agreed:  "There are very 
few rights which are absolute, and this is of necessity.  In 
every phase of everyday experience, there are extremes beyond 
which some restraint or regulation is necessary for the common 
good."  Comeau, 448 N.W.2d at 597. 
¶26 Although Article I, Section 25 creates a fundamental 
right, as the above analysis shows, such a right is still 
subject to reasonable restriction.  As such, we find the correct 
test to be whether or not the restriction upon the carrying of 
concealed weapons is a reasonable exercise of the State's 
inherent police powers.  Such a test should not be mistaken for 
a rational basis test.  The explicit grant of a fundamental 
right to bear arms clearly requires something more, because the 
right must not be allowed to become illusory.  See State v. 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
19 
 
Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840); Benjamin v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226, 1234 
(Conn. 1995); State v. Ricehill, 415 N.W.2d 481, 483 (N.D. 
1987); State v. McAdams, 714 P.2d 1236, 1237 (Wyo. 1986).  Monks 
has described the difference:   
When a state has a right to bear arms amendment, the 
test generally changes from "Is it a 'reasonable' 
means of promoting the public welfare?" to "Is it a 
'reasonable' limitation on the right to bear arms?"   
Monks, The End of Gun Control, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. at 275 n.147; 
see also Benjamin, 662 A.2d at 1234 ("The constitutional right 
to bear arms would be illusory, of course, if it could be 
abrogated entirely on the basis of a mere rational reason for 
restricting legislation."). 
¶27 As we have noted, numerous other jurisdictions have 
applied a reasonableness test.  See, e.g., People v. Atencio, 
878 P.2d 147, 149-50 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); Rawlings v. Illinois 
Dep't of Law Enforcement, 391 N.E.2d 758, 762-63 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1979); Ricehill, 415 N.W.2d at 483; State v. Boyce, 658 P.2d 
577, 579 (Or. Ct. App. 1983); McAdams, 714 P.2d at 1237.  We 
agree that the reasonableness test is appropriate.  Under 
circumstances such as those in this case, the reasonableness 
test focuses on the balance of the interests at stake, rather 
than merely on whether any conceivable rationale exists under 
which the legislature may have concluded the law could promote 
the public welfare.  See State v. Hamdan, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶¶40-
41, 45 (describing application of the reasonableness standard 
and various other cases applying the standard); Ridberg, Impact 
of Right to Bear Arms Provisions, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 202-03 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
20 
 
("The scope of permissible regulation in states with arms 
provisions is dependent upon a balancing of the public benefit 
to be derived from the regulation against the degree to which it 
frustrates the purpose of the provision.").9   
 
IV 
¶28 Having laid out the appropriate standards for our 
analysis, we move now to application of the test.  We face the 
same task many other state courts have already taken on——to 
determine whether, in balancing the authority of the state to 
enact legislation for the health, safety and welfare of the 
public as implemented here through the CCW statute against the 
right to bear arms, the legislature has gone too far and 
unreasonably impinged the constitutional right to bear arms.  
See, e.g., Dano v. Collins, 802 P.2d  1021 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) 
(concluding that the prohibition of concealed weapons does not 
frustrate that state's constitutional right to bear arms).  We 
conclude that the CCW statute is a reasonable regulation on the 
time, place, and manner in which the right to bear arms may be 
exercised.  It does not unreasonably infringe upon a citizen's 
ability to exercise the right. 
                                                 
9 Michael D. Ridberg, The Impact of State Constitutional 
Right to Bear Arms Provisions on State Gun Control Legislation, 
38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 185, 187-88 (1970), also notes, regarding the 
test to apply, that "[t]he range of legislation permissible 
under the 
police 
power 
is 
restricted 
by 
the 
notion of 
reasonableness; both the goals of legislation and the means 
chosen to achieve those goals must be reasonable in light of the 
public welfare."   
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
21 
 
¶29 First, based on the text of the constitution and the 
legislative history of the amendment, we note our agreement with 
both parties that Article I, Section 25 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution grants an individual, rather than a collective, 
right.10  As already noted, we accept the proposition that the 
right to bear arms amendment recognized a fundamental right. 
                                                 
10 See Memorandum from Shaun Haas, Senior Staff Attorney, 
Explanation of 1997 Assembly Joint Resolution 11, Relating to 
the Right to Keep and Bear Arms (Second Consideration) to 
Interested Legislators, at 2 (January 22, 1997).  The 1997 
Memorandum to legislators explained the importance of a change 
that 
had 
been 
made 
in 
the 
language 
of 
the 
proposed 
constitutional amendment, stating:   
Assembly Substitute Amendment 1 substituted the phrase 
"The people" for the phrase "Every individual" in 
order 
to 
avoid 
a 
possible 
construction 
of 
the 
constitutional 
amendment 
that 
would 
preclude 
the 
Legislature, in the exercise of its inherent police 
power to enact laws that limit or infringe upon the 
right to keep and bear arms, from restricting the 
possession and use of arms by certain individuals 
(e.g., convicted felons) in the interest of protecting 
the health, safety or welfare of the public. 
Id.  Monks provides two additional reasons for this conclusion: 
 . . . [I]n the cases where "the people" was construed 
as meaning only an aggregate, the court also relied on 
other words in the amendment to reach this conclusion, 
such as references to a "militia" or to the "common 
defense."  No such reference is found in the Wisconsin 
amendment.  Rather the enumerated purposes found in 
the amendment, such as "hunting" and "recreation" 
suggest that an individual right was intended. 
Third, and perhaps most important, a right is 
conferred to "the people" in two other places in the 
Declaration 
of 
Rights. 
 
Both 
the 
amendment 
guaranteeing protection against unreasonable searches 
and seizures and the right to assemble and petition 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
22 
 
¶30 A "facial" challenge to the constitutionality of a 
statute means that the "challenger must establish, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that there are no possible applications or 
interpretations of the statute which would be constitutional."  
State v. Wanta, 224 Wis. 2d 679, 690, 592 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
Cole 
asserts 
that 
the 
CCW 
statute 
is 
facially 
unconstitutional for two reasons:  1) because the amendment and 
the statute are incompatible, the amendment effectively repeals 
the statutory restriction; and 2) the statute is too broad and 
not narrowly tailored to serve its purpose and as such is an 
unconstitutional assertion of the state's police power that 
severely infringes citizens' fundamental right to bear arms.  We 
find that both claims fail. 
¶31 In interpreting a constitutional provision, we first 
turn to the plain meaning of the amendment in context.  Cole 
argues that the plain language of the amendment is unambiguous 
and clearly incompatible with the broad prohibition upon 
carrying concealed weapons in Wis. Stat. § 941.23.  As such, he 
argues, the statute is effectively repealed.  However, both 
parties in this case have "read in" exceptions to the text of 
                                                                                                                                                             
use "the people" rather than "person" or "individual."  
As both of these amendments convey individual rights, 
this suggests that the right to bear arms does as 
well. 
Monks, The End of Gun Control, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. at 268-69.  
 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
23 
 
the amendment.11  Again, Cole does not argue that the right to 
bear arms is absolute.  Because the parties agree, as do we, 
that the right is necessarily and appropriately limited to some 
extent by the state's inherent police powers, we cannot agree 
that the plain language of the constitutional amendment and the 
statute are incompatible.  Whether the restriction is too broad 
to be "reasonable" is another question, but we do not find any 
indication in the plain language of the amendment that the CCW 
statute was effectively repealed.   
¶32 Cole points out that the right to bear arms amendments 
in many states explicitly leave open the possibility of 
legislative restriction, some even specifically singling out 
restrictions upon carrying concealed weapons.  See, e.g., Colo. 
Const. art. II, § 13 (2002); Fla. Const. art. I, § 8(a) (2002); 
Ill. Const. art. I, § 22 (2000).  We are not persuaded that the 
absence of such language in Article I, Section 25 prevents such 
restrictions in Wisconsin.  As discussed, police powers are 
inherent in the State's authority.  An early draft of the 
amendment actually contained an explicit reservation of the 
State's right to regulate the manner of bearing arms.  See 1995 
LCS Memorandum, at 3.  As noted at that time, such an explicit 
grant of authority "amounts merely to a recognition of the 
state's inherent police power to protect the health, safety and 
                                                 
11 At oral argument, Chief Justice Abrahamson noted that 
although Cole requests the court to decide based only on the 
plain language of the amendment, both sides actually read the 
text of the amendment to have implied exceptions. 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
24 
 
welfare of the public."  Id. at 7 (emphasis added).  The 
Legislative Council Staff (LCS) concluded that such police 
powers could be exercised regardless of express authority.  Id. 
at 7, 10.  We agree.  As one article stated, these express 
qualifications "may be aptly characterized as manifestations of 
'superabundant caution.'"  Ridberg, Impact of Right to Bear Arms 
Provisions, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 189. 
¶33 Other states have found that CCW statutes can coexist 
with a constitutional right to bear arms, holding the laws to be 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.  In McAdams, 
714 P.2d at 1236-37, for example, a Wyoming defendant raised a 
plain language argument much like the one presented by Cole.  
The Wyoming Constitution, Article I, Section 24 provides:  "The 
right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and of 
the state shall not be denied."  See McAdams, 714 P.2d at 1236 
(quoting Wyo. Const. art. I, § 24).  Section 6-8-104(a) of the 
Wyoming Statutes states, in relevant part, that "[a] person who 
wears or carries a concealed deadly weapon is guilty of a 
misdemeanor." 
 
Id. 
(quoting 
§ 6-8-104(a) 
of 
the 
Wyoming 
Statutes).  McAdams was pulled over and during the course of the 
stop, officers noticed she had a knife in a sheath in the breast 
pocket of her jacket.  Id.  McAdams claimed that the "plain 
language of Article I, Section 24 of the Wyoming Constitution 
leaves no room for restricting the manner of bearing arms."  Id. 
at 1237.  The Supreme Court of Wyoming rejected this argument 
and 
upheld 
the 
regulation 
as 
a 
valid 
time 
and 
manner 
restriction.  Id. at 1238. 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
25 
 
¶34 The McAdams case also supports the conclusion that the 
CCW statute is sufficiently narrow.  As we have discussed, the 
CCW statute must be "reasonable" restriction upon the right to 
bear arms in order to pass constitutional muster.  This requires 
us to balance the interests involved.  In McAdams, the court 
aptly noted:  "The police power cannot . . . be invoked in such 
a manner that amounts to the destruction of the right to bear 
arms." 
 
Id. 
at 
1237. 
 
In 
balancing 
the 
individual's 
constitutional right against the interest of society in enacting 
laws to "ensure some semblance of order," the court found that 
the concealed weapons statute did impose a limitation upon the 
right to bear arms, but that it constituted a reasonable 
restraint in light of the objectives of the statute.  Id. at 
1237-38.  Similarly, in Dano, 802 P.2d at 1022, the Arizona 
Court of Appeals found that the constitutional right to bear 
arms is not unlimited and that "[t]he right to bear arms in 
self-defense is not impaired by requiring individuals to carry 
weapons openly."  Article II, Section 26 of the Arizona 
Constitution provides:  "The right of the individual citizen to 
bear arms in defense of himself or the State shall not be 
impaired, but nothing in this section shall be construed as 
authorizing individuals or corporations to organize, maintain, 
or employ an armed body of men."  Ariz. Const. art. II, § 26 
(2000).  Note that neither the Wyoming nor Arizona Constitution 
has an explicit grant of authority to restrict concealed 
weapons, yet courts in both states found restrictions to be a 
valid exercise of police power. 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
26 
 
¶35 Our examination of the plain language of Article I, 
Section 25 and similar provisions in other states supports our 
conclusion that the CCW statute is not effectively repealed by 
the right to bear arms amendment and that such a prohibition is 
a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction upon the right.   
¶36 We next examine the legislative history of the 
amendment.  The drafting records related to the right to bear 
arms amendment are informative.  The amendment passed first 
consideration of the legislature in 1995.  1995 Enrolled Joint 
Resolution 27.  In 1997, the second consideration was approved 
and the amendment moved to the voters for ratification.  1997 
Assembly Joint Resolution 11.  During this process, the 
Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB) and the Legislative Council 
Staff (LCS) authored several analyses related to the amendment 
to assist the legislature.12  The 1995 LCS Memorandum, written 
                                                 
12 The Legislative Reference Bureau is deeply involved in 
the legislative drafting process, as LRB attorneys draft all 
bills and resolutions that are introduced into the legislature.  
See 
Wisconsin 
Briefs, 
Guide 
to 
Researching 
Wisconsin 
Legislation, LRB-98-WB-8, at 1 (August 1998).  The LRB also 
maintains a library collection with publications and records 
specifically intended to assist with researching legislative 
history.  See id.   
The Legislative Council Staff also assists the legislature.  
LCS is a nonpartisan legislative service agency of the state 
legislature.  See Joint Legislative Council, Legislative Council 
Staff, at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lc/staff_list.htm (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2003).  LCS is responsible for a variety of 
research services, including responding to requests for research 
and information from members of the legislature, legislative 
staff, 
other 
governmental 
agencies, 
and 
other 
state 
legislatures.  Id. 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
27 
 
for 
a 
particular 
representative 
and 
any 
"interested 
legislators," extensively analyzed the proposed constitutional 
amendment, including a summary of amendments and relevant case 
law from other states.  1995 LCS Memorandum.  As we have already 
noted, LCS concluded that an amendment explicitly retaining for 
the legislature the right to regulate the manner of bearing arms 
was redundant.  Id. at 7. The LCS memo stated:  "That is, 
regardless of this express authority to enact laws, the police 
power of the state, which is vested in the Legislature, could be 
exercised to limit both the constitutional right to keep arms 
and the right to bear arms."  Id.  This memo also noted that 
courts in Nebraska, North Dakota, and Ohio had all found the 
right to bear arms to be subject to reasonable regulation 
because important public safety interests were involved.  Id. at 
7-10.  The provision of the amendment regarding "manner" was 
eventually taken out.  Monks, The End of Gun Control, 2001 Wis. 
L. Rev. at 275-76 (describing changes made during the amendment 
process).  The conclusion of the 1995 LCS Memorandum is of 
particular interest:   
                                                                                                                                                             
While 
the 
research 
done 
by 
these 
agencies 
is 
not 
necessarily dispositive in determining legislative intent, their 
analyses at the time of drafting certainly provides the court 
with valuable information about the knowledge available to 
legislators.  Further, the legal expertise of these agencies 
entitles their analysis to some consideration by this court.  In 
this case, for example, both agencies provided extensive 
research to legislators during the drafting process.  They 
examined the laws of other states and explained the potential 
effects of particular language.  See, e.g., 1995 LCS Memorandum. 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
28 
 
Because the inherent authority of the state to 
protect its citizens through the proper exercise of 
its police power, it is unlikely that any of the 
current laws regulating or restricting either the 
possession or carrying of firearms is in serious 
jeopardy of being invalidated as an infringement of 
the proposed constitutional right.  A review of court 
decisions 
in 
other 
states 
with 
constitutional 
provisions securing the right to keep and bear arms 
discloses that courts are very willing to uphold 
reasonable firearms restrictions.   
1995 LCS Memorandum at 13-14.  Clearly, the legislature knew gun 
control laws existed and this memo shows that they also had 
reason to believe the passage of Article I, Section 25 would not 
impact the status of those laws.13 
¶37 A drafting memo by the LRB, authored by Jefren Olsen 
and attached to the 1995 LCS Memorandum, also supports the 
proposition 
that 
the 
legislature 
intended 
gun 
control 
legislation, including the concealed weapons law, to survive the 
new constitutional right to bear arms.  This memo stated:  
"Another example of a restriction that is generally held to be 
reasonable is the prohibition on carrying concealed weapons."  
Drafter's Note, LRB-4287/ldn at 3, reprinted as attachment to 
1995 LCS Memorandum. 
¶38 A 1997 LCS memo reiterates the assertions of these 
previous memos.  Shaun Haas, Wisconsin Legislative Council Staff 
Memorandum, Explanation of 1997 Assembly Joint Resolution 11, 
                                                 
13 Regarding the authority of this document, Monks noted:  
"Because this memorandum (LCS) was read by many legislators and 
is part of the amendment's official drafting record, the 
conclusions in it should be considered a strong indicator of 
legislative intent."  Monks, The End of Gun Control, 2001 Wis. 
L. Rev. at 280 (2001).   
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
29 
 
Relating 
to 
the 
Right 
to 
Keep 
and 
Bear 
Arms 
(Second 
Consideration) (January 22, 1997).  In 1998, the LRB again 
analyzed the proposed amendment shortly before it went before 
the public for a vote.  See Wisconsin Briefs, Constitutional 
Amendments to be Considered by the Wisconsin Voters, November 3, 
1998, 
LRB-98-WB-10 
(September 
1998). 
Interestingly, 
in 
describing the points of view during the debate of the proposal, 
the LRB noted that proponents of the amendment asserted that 
case law from other states showed that the constitutional 
amendment would not hinder gun control.  Id. at 4.  Rather, it 
was opponents of the proposal that asserted that the measure 
would remove all reasonable regulation on guns.  Id.   
¶39 Our established constitutional analysis includes an 
examination of the practices in effect at the time the amendment 
was passed.  Following the lead of the legislature, we have 
looked to the practices and interpretations of other states.  
Like proponents of the amendment, we are now convinced that the 
amendment does not affect the reasonable regulation of guns.  
The legislative history clearly suggests that the legislature 
did not intend to repeal reasonable gun laws such as the CCW 
statute.  In examining the potential effects of the new right to 
bear arms, one article noted that the extensive 1995 LCS 
Memorandum reviewing the law of other states, lacked any 
reference to cases allowing prohibitions upon carrying a 
concealed weapon.  McFadden, Wisconsin Bear Arms Amendment, 19 
N. Ill. U. L. Rev. at 724-25.  The article stated that although 
the 1995 LCS Memorandum concluded that prohibitions such as 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
30 
 
those restricting carrying concealed weapons have been found 
reasonable, it stated no case law to support the assertion.  Id. 
at 725.  While it is true that the 1995 LCS Memorandum dealt 
with case law analyzing other types of restrictions, we find 
LCS's examination of the general applicable standards to be 
correct and applicable to the CCW statute.  Article I, Section 
25 had potential implications on a wide variety of gun control 
laws, not just the CCW statute.  The 1995 LCS Memorandum cites 
specifically to People v. Blue, 544 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1975); 
People v. Brown, 235 N.W. 245 (Mich. 1931); Ricehill, 415 
N.W.2d 481 (N.D. 1987); Comeau, 448 N.W.2d 595 (Neb. 1989); and 
Arnold, 616 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio 1993).  See 1995 LCS Memorandum at 
7-11.  These cases all conclude that "reasonable" restrictions 
upon the right to bear arms may be upheld.  See id.  As another 
article pointed out:  "The principles involved in [right to bear 
arms] cases are often broad enough to transcend specific words."  
Monks, The End of Gun Control, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. at 286. 
¶40 Further, as our discussion has made clear, our own 
review of relevant case law from other states shows that CCW 
statutes 
like 
ours 
have 
been 
upheld 
in 
states 
with 
constitutional protections similar to ours.  See Dano, 802 P.2d 
1021; McAdams, 714 P.2d 1236.  Cole argues that this court 
should follow Buckner, 377 S.E.2d at 140, 144-145, where the 
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals concluded that a 
prohibition on carrying certain types of dangerous weapons 
without a license, violated the state's right to bear arms 
amendment.  Buckner is distinguishable from the case at hand, 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
31 
 
because the statute at issue there was more broad in that it 
prohibited all carrying of a weapon, concealed or unconcealed, 
if one did not have a license.  See id. at 144-145; see also, 
Monks, The End of Gun Control, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. at 286 (noting 
that Buckner involves "a type of statute that Wisconsin does not 
have").  Even in Buckner, however, the court maintained that the 
right to bear arms is not absolute and is subject to reasonable 
regulation.  Id. at 145-46.  We may well differ with the Supreme 
Court of Appeals in West Virginia as to the scope of 
"reasonable" regulation, but our analyses are similar.   
¶41 In contrast to the holding in Buckner, a court of 
appeals in Ohio has recently affirmed the validity of an Ohio 
prohibition on carrying concealed weapons.  See State v. 
Ferguson, No. 14-02-14, 2003 WL 548360 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 27, 
2003).  In rejecting the defendant's claim that the concealed 
weapons statute was unconstitutional, the court noted that the 
Supreme Court of Ohio has upheld Ohio's CCW statute as 
constitutional.  Id. at *2.  The court, citing precedents of the 
Ohio Supreme Court, stated: 
The [CCW] statute does not operate as a prohibition 
against carrying weapons, but as a regulation of the 
manner of carrying them.  This gist of the offense is 
the 
concealment. 
 
The 
constitution 
contains 
no 
prohibition against the legislature making such police 
regulations as may be necessary for the welfare of the 
public at large as to the manner in which arms shall 
be borne. 
Id. (internal quotations omitted).  We find this case to be more 
analogous than the Buckner case to the matter at hand.  We are 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
32 
 
persuaded that the courts upholding concealed weapons statutes 
as reasonable restrictions upon a constitutional right to bear 
arms have properly balanced the interests of the individual and 
society.  Also, given that our legislature was provided in-depth 
analysis of the general practices in other states, we conclude 
the legislative intent in creating Article I, Section 25 was not 
to repeal or invalidate existing gun control legislation, 
including Wis. Stat. § 941.23. 
¶42 The final source this court is to consider in 
construing a constitutional amendment is the first related 
legislation passed after the amendment was ratified.  In this 
case, the main statute of interest was passed long before the 
constitutional amendment was drafted.  However, there is some 
legislative action that is of interest in our inquiry.  As the 
amendment went through the drafting process to the present time, 
efforts have been made to pass laws creating a licensing system 
for the carrying of concealed weapons.  It has been proposed 
that Wis. Stat. § 941.23 be amended.  2001 S.B. 357; 2001 A.B. 
675.  However, such proposals have not yet been successfully 
passed into law.  The attempts, though, suggest that the 
legislature believes the concealed weapons law is still intact.  
Were the right to bear arms intended to repeal the CCW statute, 
as Cole suggests, citizens would already have the right under 
the amendment to carry concealed weapons.   
¶43 This court has not been forced to look far to find 
support for its conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 941.23 is facially 
valid.  As our foregoing discussion makes clear, other states 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
33 
 
have 
shown 
a 
great 
willingness 
to 
uphold 
"reasonable" 
restrictions upon the constitutional right to bear arms.  We 
believe 
the 
reason 
is 
the 
compelling 
state 
interest 
in 
protecting the public from the hazards involved with certain 
types of weapons, such as guns.  One article noted the 
prohibition of carrying concealed weapons is but one of a 
variety of laws restricting the place and manner in which arms 
may be carried, and concluded that such prohibitions "have 
little effect on widespread availability and ownership of 
weapons."  Ridberg, Impact of Right to Bear Arms Provisions, 38 
U. Chi. L. Rev. at 203-04.  As such, the author concluded that 
it is unlikely that such laws would "frustrate the deterrence of 
oppression purpose."  Id. at 204.  The article noted that it may 
be argued, as Cole did here, that such laws impermissibly 
infringe upon the right of self-defense.  However, there is a 
balance of interests that must be done, and in this situation, 
the public safety interests win out.  
[I]t might be argued that these laws impede the 
purpose of self-defense if they deny an individual the 
right to carry a weapon when he is most likely to be 
attacked. 
 
This 
argument 
is 
countered 
by 
two 
considerations:  the danger of widespread presence of 
weapons in public places and police protection against 
attack in these places.  Thus, in view of the benefit 
to be derived from these laws, place and manner 
regulations which do not restrict possession in homes 
or businesses do not seem to subvert unduly the self-
defense purpose. 
Id.  We agree with this analysis.  Many other states have noted 
the important safety interests protected by gun control laws.  
As we have noted, courts have found such laws to be reasonable 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
34 
 
time, place, and manner restrictions upon constitutional rights 
to bear arms.  The CCW statute in particular serves an important 
public safety purpose: 
At common law or by very early statute in England, 
people were prohibited from going armed that they 
might not terrorize the King's subjects.  That was 
never the law in this country, but from an early date, 
with the invention of small arms, statutes were 
enacted condemning the practice of carrying a deadly 
weapon concealed on or about the person.  The reason 
for these statutes, it has been said, is "because 
persons becoming suddenly angered and having such a 
weapon in their pocket, would be likely to use it, 
which in their sober moments they would not have done, 
and which could not have been done had the weapon been 
upon their person." 
Williams v. Commonwealth, 261 S.W.2d 807, 807-08 (Ky. 1953) 
(internal citations omitted).  The Arizona Court of Appeals has 
noted similar reasoning:  "[T]he statute has a reasonable 
purpose——it protects the public by preventing an individual from 
having on hand a deadly weapon of which the public is unaware, 
and which an individual may use in a sudden heat of passion."  
Dano, 802 P.2d at 1023.  The passage of years has not eliminated 
these dangers.  If anything, the advances in weapons technology 
have made such dangers all the more prevalent.   
¶44 Finally, we mention the intent of the Wisconsin 
voters.  While this court cannot read the minds of Wisconsin 
citizens at the time they vote, since it is the voters that 
adopt the language of the constitution, indications of the will 
of the people are valuable.  In the case of the right to bear 
arms amendment, public opinion polls at the time provide some 
interesting insights.  Two statewide polls indicated that almost 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
35 
 
eighty percent of Wisconsinites opposed legalizing carrying of 
concealed weapons.  Monks, The End of Gun Control, 2001 Wis. L. 
Rev. at 284.  Given that the right to bear arms amendment was 
approved by a wide margin, the results of the poll at least 
support our view that Wis. Stat. § 941.23 and Article I, Section 
25 were intended to be compatible.  Such indications, in 
addition to a presumption of constitutionality, suffice to 
solidify 
our 
opinion 
that 
the 
CCW 
statute 
is 
facially 
constitutional. 
V 
¶45 Cole has also claimed that the CCW statute is 
unconstitutional "as applied" to him.  He claims that the 
statute impermissibly abrogates the right of an individual to 
bear arms while riding in a vehicle.  This claim must fail. 
¶46 First, we find that Cole has waived the opportunity to 
challenge 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 941.23 
"as 
applied."  In State v. Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, ¶34 n.15, 253 
Wis. 2d 38, 644 N.W.2d 891, this court held that although a 
"facial" constitutional challenge was a matter of subject matter 
jurisdiction and could not be waived, an "as applied" challenge 
was a non-jurisdictional defect that could be waived.  There, 
the defendant waived an "as applied" constitutional challenge by 
pleading no contest.  Id.  Here, Cole pled guilty to all charges 
against him and did not raise any constitutional challenge until 
his motion for postconviction relief.   
¶47  In addition, Cole argues a hypothetical rather than 
an application of the facts at hand.  Generally, a person cannot 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
36 
 
challenge the constitutionality of a statute on the grounds that 
it may be unconstitutional as applied to others.  See State v. 
Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 505, 520, 515 N.W.2d 847 (1994) (citations 
omitted) (finding an exception to this general rule in the First 
Amendment context).  Cole asserts that the CCW statute renders 
the right to bear arms useless in the context of transporting a 
weapon in a vehicle.  He argues that, according to Wisconsin 
precedent, because weapons must be out of reach in the trunk and 
unloaded, a person is left with no meaningful way to exercise 
the right to bear arms for self-defense in that context.  He 
asserts that such extensive restrictions act to deny a citizen 
any way to exercise the right to security and self-defense while 
riding in an automobile.  However, such claims go far beyond the 
facts of this case.  We see no need to examine the assortment of 
restrictions that may apply to transporting a weapon in a 
vehicle, 
because 
under 
the 
facts 
of 
this 
case, 
the 
constitutional 
right 
to 
bear 
arms 
has 
clearly 
not 
been 
infringed. 
¶48 Cole claims that he was carrying the weapons because 
he had been "the victim of a brutal beating when he was younger 
and he did not feel safe in the neighborhood."  (Pet'r Br. at 
3.)  He did not assert that he had the weapons in the car in 
response to any specific or imminent threat.  We do not dispute 
the legitimacy of Cole's reason for carrying the weapon.  
However interesting the debate about the right to self-defense 
by possession of a weapon in a vehicle may be, such concerns are 
not implicated by the facts of this case.  In State v. Nollie, 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
37 
 
2002 WI 4, 249 Wis. 2d 538, 638 N.W.2d 280, a case arising after 
the passage of the right to bear arms amendment, this court 
confirmed that a person may claim self-defense when charged 
under the CCW statute.  Id., ¶¶18-19, 24, 26.  However, in that 
case, we found that the unsubstantiated threat of four young men 
nearby, being loud and profane in a "high crime" area, was not 
"imminent and specific enough" for the defendant to invoke self-
defense.  Id., ¶¶23-25.  The same problem arises in this case.  
Cole has presented no evidence of any threat at or near the time 
he was arrested. 
¶49 In the case at hand, police seized two loaded weapons 
from the interior of a vehicle, one inside the glove compartment 
and the other stashed under the front seat of the vehicle.  Both 
clearly were, by any definition, concealed. In Dundon, 226 
Wis. 2d at 662, this court defined "concealed" as "hidden from 
ordinary observation," and noted that a weapon need not be 
completely 
hidden 
from 
view 
to 
be 
considered 
concealed.  
Whatever the outer reaches of application of the CCW statute 
might be in light of the new constitutional amendment, this fact 
scenario does not fall within them.  The right to bear arms is 
clearly not rendered illusory by prohibiting an individual from 
keeping a loaded weapon hidden either in the glove compartment 
or under the front seat in a vehicle.  The reasons supporting 
"facial" validity of the statute apply with equal force to the 
specific facts of this case.  Public safety concerns support 
reasonable restrictions.  In West Virginia Division of Natural 
Resources v. Cline, 488 S.E.2d 376, 382-83 (W. Va. 1997), the 
No. 
01-0350-CR   
 
38 
 
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia upheld a restriction 
on the transport of loaded weapons as a reasonable regulation of 
the manner in which weapons could be transported.  There the 
court noted particularly the possibility of accidents.  Id.  
Such dangers certainly support restrictions on loaded weapons.  
Cole had two loaded weapons within reach and completely hidden 
from the view of others.  Under these specific circumstances, 
the 
CCW 
statute 
may 
be 
enforced 
without 
impeding 
the 
constitutional right to bear arms.14   
VI 
¶50 Because we conclude that the CCW statute is a 
reasonable exercise of the state's inherent police powers, we 
find that the CCW statute is not unconstitutional either on its 
face or as applied to Cole. 
By the Court.—The decision of the Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court is affirmed. 
 
 
                                                 
14 While Cole's "as applied" argument fails, we note that 
the scope of the application of the CCW statute has been 
appropriately raised in the companion to this case, also 
released today.  See State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. 
No.  01-0350-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶51 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (concurring).  
I join Justice Prosser's concurrence except that part of his 
concurrence in which he states that he "strongly support[s] much 
of the majority opinion."15  I have reservations about parts of 
the majority opinion. 
¶52 For example, it does not make sense to me that the 
majority opinion gives a statute that predates a constitutional 
amendment the presumption of constitutionality under the later-
enacted 
constitutional 
amendment.16 
 
The 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality is based on the reasonable belief that a 
legislature intends to enact laws that are valid under the 
Constitution at the time they are enacted, not the unreasonable 
assumption 
that 
a 
legislature 
can 
anticipate 
all 
future 
constitutional amendments and draft constitutionally immortal 
statutes.  
¶53 Furthermore, I am not persuaded that there is any 
difference 
between 
rational 
basis 
test 
and 
the 
majority 
opinion's "reasonable exercise of police power" test.17  The 
exercise of police power must always be reasonable, that is 
reasonably and rationally related to a legitimate government 
interest.18  The concealed weapons statute is constitutional if 
                                                 
15 Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶60. 
16 See majority op., ¶¶12, 17. 
17 See majority op., ¶26. 
18 See Noranda Exploration, Inc. v. Ostrom, 113 Wis. 2d 612, 
626, 335 N.W.2d 596 (1983). 
No.  01-0350-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
it represents a reasonable exercise of the State's police power 
and does not eviscerate the constitutional right to keep and 
bear arms.19   
¶54 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
 
 
                                                 
19 See State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶115, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting), for further 
explanation of my views about the appropriate test to be 
applied. 
No.  01-0350-CR.npc 
 
1 
 
 
¶55 N. 
PATRICK 
CROOKS, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
While 
I 
strongly 
disagree 
with 
the 
majority's 
conclusion 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 941.23 is constitutional, for the reasons set forth 
in my dissent in State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
____N.W.2d ___, I agree that Phillip Cole's conviction should be 
upheld.  Because of Cole's waiver of the constitutional claim he 
now makes, I agree with the majority's mandate affirming Cole's 
conviction.   
¶56 On May 12, 2000, Cole entered a plea of guilty to 
charges of carrying a concealed weapon (CCW) in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 941.23 and to possession of THC (marijuana) in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(e).  Judge Maxine A. White 
sentenced Cole to 60 days on the CCW charge and 15 days 
(concurrent) on the possession charge.   
¶57 Four and one-half months later, on September 29, 2000, 
Cole filed a motion to vacate his conviction on the CCW charge.  
For the first time he raised the issue of the constitutionality 
of the CCW statute, claiming that his right to bear arms, found 
in Article I, Section 25 of the Wisconsin Constitution, was 
violated by that statute.  
¶58 He was too late!  His objection was not made prior to 
his guilty plea, and therefore was not in any way preserved for 
subsequent review.  Wisconsin law has long been clear that a 
guilty plea, which is knowingly and voluntarily made, waives all 
non-jurisdictional 
defects 
and 
defenses, 
including 
alleged 
violations of constitutional rights.  See State v. Bangert, 131 
No.  01-0350-CR.npc 
 
2 
 
Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986); State v. Minniecheske, 127 
Wis. 2d 234, 378 N.W.2d 283 (1985); State v. Damaske, 212 
Wis. 2d 169, 567 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1997), review denied 212 
Wis. 2d 689, 569 N.W.2d 590.   
¶59 Since Cole, by his guilty plea, waived his right to 
claim 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 941.23 
(CCW 
statute) 
is 
unconstitutional, his conviction must be affirmed.  Because of 
his waiver, I respectfully concur in the mandate. 
 
No.  01-0350.dtp 
1 
 
 
 
¶60 DAVID 
T. 
PROSSER, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
This 
case 
represents the court's initial effort to interpret Article I, 
Section 25 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  The majority opinion 
holds that the new provision grants a fundamental, individual 
right to keep and bear arms.  The majority states several times 
that the right is "fundamental," majority op., ¶¶20, 26, 29, and 
it expresses agreement with the parties "that Article I, Section 
25 . . . grants an individual, rather than a collective, right."  
Id., ¶29.  Although I strongly support much of the majority 
opinion, I write separately to explain why the amendment 
deserves a more nuanced interpretation. 
¶61 Article 
I, 
Section 
25 
originated 
in 
the 
1995 
legislative session.  The amendment was one of several reactions 
to municipal initiatives to ban handguns.20  For instance, in 
April 1993 voters in Madison narrowly defeated an advisory 
referendum to ban handguns21 championed by Madison Mayor Paul 
Soglin.22  When the referendum failed, the Madison City Council 
began work on several ordinances that were more restrictive on 
                                                 
20 Christopher 
R. 
McFadden, 
The 
Wisconsin 
Bear 
Arms 
Amendment and the Case Against an Absolute Prohibition on 
Carrying Concealed Weapons, 19 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 709, 713-16 
(1999). 
21 James Rowen, Madison Victory at Polls Bolsters Gun 
Supporters, Mil. J., Apr. 8, 1993, at B5. 
All cited newspaper clippings are from the state editions 
of Milwaukee newspapers on file at the Wisconsin Legislative 
Reference Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin. 
22 Id.; Daniel Bice, Fendry Vows War on Gun Ordinances, Mil. 
Sentinel, Dec. 8, 1994, at 6B. 
No.  01-0350.dtp 
2 
 
firearms than state law.23  These ordinances were adopted by the 
Council on December 7, 1994.24  Mayor Soglin cast the tie-
breaking vote on two of the four ordinances.25 
¶62 Milwaukee and Kenosha26 placed gun control referenda on 
the November 1994 election ballot.27  These referenda were not 
advisory; they were mandatory.28  The Milwaukee referendum asked 
voters whether all handguns with barrels less than 10 inches 
should be banned in Milwaukee.29  Commenting on the Milwaukee 
referendum, the Los Angeles Times reported that "no U.S. city 
has ever adopted such a strict gun-control measure.  Chicago and 
Washington, D.C., outlaw the sale of handguns, but neither has 
tried to eliminate the hundreds of thousands of pistols 
residents already own."30  The article went on: 
                                                 
23 Joel Broadway, City Officials Propose Ban on Assault 
Weapons, Wis. State J., Apr. 19, 1994, at 1A; Joel Broadway, 
City Council to Vote Tonight on Gun Control Proposals, Wis. 
State J., Dec. 6, 1994, at 1A. 
24 Joel Broadway, Gun Ban, Wis. State J., Dec. 7, 1994, at 
1A; Bice, Fendry Vows War on Gun Ordinances, Mil. Sentinel, Dec. 
8, 1994, at 6B. 
25 Id. 
26 The 
Kenosha 
referendum 
question 
read: 
"Shall 
the 
possession of handguns be banned in the city subject to certain 
enumerated exceptions?"  Tom Held, Handgun Ban Shot Down, Mil. 
Sentinel, Nov. 9, 1994, at 1A. 
27 Tom Held, NRA Contributed $133,449 to Fight City Handgun 
Ban, Mil. Sentinel, Nov. 1, 1994, at 1A. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Stephen Braun, Vote Puts Milwaukee Under the Gun, Cap. 
Times, Nov. 2, 1994, at 3A. [reprinted from Los Angeles Times 
article]. 
No.  01-0350.dtp 
3 
 
 
Under 
the 
handgun 
ban proposal, 
nearly 300 
federally licensed gun dealers (there are no gun shops 
in Milwaukee——most dealers sell out of their homes) 
would be restricted to selling only shotguns, rifles 
and the few pistols that have barrels longer than 10 
inches. 
 
Residents who own handguns would be urged to turn 
them over to city police, who would catalog and then 
destroy the weapons.  When handguns turn up during 
arrests, traffic stops and other police contacts, 
residents 
could 
face 
misdemeanor 
convictions 
punishable by $100 fines and $200 for repeated 
convictions.  All firearms would be confiscated. 
Stephen Braun, Vote Puts Milwaukee Under the Gun, Cap. Times, 
Nov. 2, 1994, at 3A. 
¶63 Both referenda were defeated.31  However, the effect of 
the initiatives in Madison, Milwaukee, and Kenosha was to spur 
the newly elected legislature to consider legislation preempting 
local firearms ordinances that went beyond state law.32 
¶64 Representative DuWayne Johnsrud announced that he 
would introduce legislation to preempt municipalities from 
enacting gun control ordinances that were stricter than state 
law.  Representative Johnsrud stated: "Cities like Madison are 
creating a patchwork of regulations across the state.  . . .  I 
want to make sure that individuals have the law-given ability to 
own a firearm if they feel it is necessary."33  Johnsrud 
                                                 
31 Tom Held, Handgun Ban Shot Down, Mil. Sentinel, Nov. 9, 
1994, at 1A. 
32 Jack Norman, Pro-gun Forces Aim for State Ban on Bans, 
Mil. J., Nov. 10, 1994, at B1; Daniel Bice, Fendry Vows War on 
Gun Ordinances, Mil. Sentinel, Dec. 8, 1994, at 6B; David 
Callender, City's Gun Laws May Fall, Cap. Times, Dec. 9. 1994, 
at 1A. 
33 Gun Rule Shootout, Cap. Times, Dec. 16, 1994, at 10A. 
No.  01-0350.dtp 
4 
 
introduced 1995 Assembly Bill 69 on January 30, 1995.  After 
intense controversy and debate, it became 1995 Wis. Act. 72 in 
November 1995.  Cf. Wis. Stat. § 66.0409 (2001-02). 
¶65 In the meantime, Senator David Zien introduced a 
constitutional amendment to keep and bear arms.  1995 Senate 
Joint Resolution 7 (introduced February 14, 1995).  Senator Zien 
explained that the measure had been introduced because of 
"pressure on law-abiding gun-owning citizens" by "anti-gun 
forces."34  "People from all over the state have come to me, 
concerned about attempts to limit their right to own a gun," 
Zien said in a statement.35  He added that "law-abiding citizens" 
should not be forced to give up their "ability to defend" 
themselves, their families, and their property.36 
¶66 On September 1, 1995, Assembly Majority Leader Scott 
R. Jensen introduced an identical constitutional amendment in 
the Assembly.  1995 Assembly Joint Resolution 53.  More than 
half of the members of the Assembly co-authored Jensen's 
amendment, and they were joined by 16 senators.  This was the 
joint resolution that ultimately passed. 
¶67 The 
Zien/Jensen 
constitutional 
amendment, 
as 
originally proposed, read as follows: 
Every individual, except an individual restricted in 
accordance with federal law, has the right to keep and 
bear arms for any lawful purpose including for 
security or defense, for hunting and for recreational 
                                                 
34 Steve Walters, Zien Seeks Guarantees on Ownership of 
Guns, Mil. Sentinel, Jan. 20, 1995, at 4A. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
No.  01-0350.dtp 
5 
 
use, but the manner of bearing arms may be regulated 
as authorized by the legislature by law. 
1995 Assembly Joint Resolution 53. 
 
¶68 Representative Jensen's joint resolution was referred 
to the Assembly Committee on Elections and Constitutional Law, 
which conducted a public hearing on it only six days after its 
introduction.37  On October 19, 1995, the Committee introduced 
two amendments to the resolution.38  On November 29 the Committee 
adopted the two amendments and recommended the joint resolution 
for passage.39  Incorporating the two amendments into the text, 
the proposed constitutional amendment at this point read: "Every 
individual has the right to keep and bear arms for any lawful 
purpose, including for security or defense, for hunting and 
recreational use."40 
 
¶69 When the joint resolution came out of the Committee on 
Elections and Constitutional Law, it was referred to a second 
committee, the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice and 
Corrections.41  This was unusual.  Normally a legislative 
proposal that has been recommended for passage and does not 
involve the expenditure of money is put on a calendar for 
debate.  In this case, the Committee on Criminal Justice and 
                                                 
37 Assembly Bulletin of the Proceedings of the Wisconsin 
Legislature, 1995 A.J.R. 53, 1995-96 Sess., 394. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id.; Sharon Thelmer, Gun Legislation Considered, Wis. 
State J., Jan. 22, 1996, at 1A. 
41 Assembly Bulletin of the Proceedings of the Wisconsin 
Legislature, 1995 A.J.R. 53, 1995-96 Sess., 394. 
No.  01-0350.dtp 
6 
 
Corrections received the resolution and held it until February 
15, 1996, when it was given a public hearing.42  At this hearing, 
a representative of the Department of Justice, Andrew Cohn, 
testified against the amendment.43  Cohn echoed the views of 
Attorney General James Doyle who had previously called the 
amendment "an extremely radical proposal."44  Doyle alleged that 
the amendment as worded could nullify laws prohibiting concealed 
weapons and possession of machine guns and sawed-off shotguns.45 
¶70 On March 22, 1996, the Committee on Criminal Justice 
and Corrections approved a substitute amendment,46 which revised 
the proposed text of the constitutional amendment to read as 
follows: "The people have the right to keep and bear arms for 
security, defense, hunting, recreation and any other lawful 
purpose." 
¶71 This text was approved by the Assembly on March 26, 
approved by the Senate on May 8, approved by the legislature at 
its next session, and ultimately ratified by the people of 
                                                 
42 Id. 
43 Record of Committee Proceedings: Public Hearing on A.J.R. 
53 Before the Committee on Criminal Justice and Corrections, 
1995-96 Leg. Sess. (Wis., Feb. 15, 1996) 1. 
44 Sharon Thelmer, Gun Legislation Considered, Wis. State 
J., Jan. 22, 1996, at 1A. 
45 Id. 
46 Assembly Bulletin of the Proceedings of the Wisconsin 
Legislature, 1995 A.J.R. 53, 1995-96 Sess., 394. 
No.  01-0350.dtp 
7 
 
Wisconsin.  During the first debate in the Assembly, the 
amendment was referred to as "the Soglin amendment."47 
¶72 The majority opinion overlooks most of the historical 
background 
as 
well 
as 
the 
legislative 
dynamics 
in 
the 
amendment's approval.  It confines discussion of the critical 
change in text to a footnote.  Majority op., ¶29 n.10.  In fact, 
for the proposition that the amendment "was intended to grant a 
'fundamental individual' right," the majority opinion relies on 
a 1995 memorandum issued by the Legislative Council before any 
amendments to the Assembly Joint Resolution were introduced.  
Majority op., ¶20 (citing Shaun Haas, Senior Staff Attorney, 
Wis. Legislative Council, Analysis of 1995 Assembly Joint 
Resolution 53 and 1995 Senate Joint Resolution 7, Relating to 
the right to Keep and Bear Arms (First Consideration) to 
Wisconsin State Representative David Travis and Interested 
Legislators, at 6 (Oct. 11, 1995)).  In reality, the various 
amendments altering 1995 Assembly Joint Resolution 53 appear to 
be a direct response to concerns raised in the Shaun Haas 
Legislative Council memorandum. 
¶73 Footnote 10 of the majority opinion quotes from a 1997 
Legislative 
Council 
Memorandum 
containing 
Shaun 
Haas's 
explanation of the textual change: 
Assembly Substitute Amendment 1 substituted the phrase 
"The people" for the phrase "Every individual" in 
order 
to 
avoid 
a 
possible 
construction 
of 
the 
constitutional 
amendment 
that 
would 
preclude 
the 
                                                 
47 Daniel Bice, Assembly Backs Amendment Affirming Right to 
Own Guns, Mil. J. Sentinel, Mar. 27, 1996, at 7B; Daniel Bice, 
Assembly Supports Right to Bear Arms, Wis. State J., Mar. 27, 
1996, at 3B. 
No.  01-0350.dtp 
8 
 
Legislature, in the exercise of its inherent police 
power to enact laws that limit or infringe upon the 
right to keep and bear arms, from restricting the 
possession and use of arms by certain individuals 
(e.g., convicted felons) in the interest of protecting 
the health, safety or welfare of the public. 
Majority op., ¶29 n.10 (quoting Memorandum from Shaun Haas, 
Senior Staff Attorney, Explanation of 1997 Assembly Joint 
Resolution 11, Relating to the Right to Keep and Bear Arms 
(Second Consideration) to Interested Legislators, at 2 (January 
22, 1997)).48 
 
¶74 Having quoted this Legislative Council analysis, the 
majority opinion disregards its importance.  If the change in 
constitutional text was intended to permit restriction of the 
possession and use of firearms by certain individuals——actually, 
substantial classifications of individuals——the amendment cannot 
be described as creating a "fundamental" right.  Convicted 
felons are not the only persons restricted or prohibited from 
possessing or using firearms.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 29.304, 941.29, 
948.60(2).  The same 1995 legislature that gave initial approval 
to 
the 
constitutional 
amendment 
also 
passed 
legislation 
prohibiting a person from possessing a firearm if he or she is 
subject to a domestic abuse, child abuse, or harassment 
injunction.49  
                                                 
48 Shaun Haas wrote the exact same words in a March 25, 
1996, memorandum to Representative Robert G. Goetsch and other 
interested legislators, explaining Assembly Substitute Amendment 
1. 
49 See 1995 Wis. Act 71; Wis. Stat. §§ 813.12, 813.122, 
813.125. 
No.  01-0350.dtp 
9 
 
 
¶75 In his law review comment on the right to bear arms 
amendment, Jeffrey Monks recognized and discussed the final 
change in constitutional text.  He wrote: 
 
In right to bear arms amendments, the use of the 
phrase "the people" to describe those to whom the 
right 
has 
been 
conferred 
has 
sometimes 
been 
interpreted as indicating a collective rather than an 
individual 
right 
because 
"people" 
refers 
to 
an 
aggregate of citizens.  Particularly because the 
Second Amendment, which is generally interpreted as 
granting a collective right, also uses the phrase "the 
people" in its language, one could argue this choice 
of language implies a similar interpretation for the 
Wisconsin amendment.  Furthermore, the language of the 
proposed 
amendment 
originally 
included 
"every 
individual" and was changed to "the people" later.  In 
a memorandum commenting on the amendment's original 
language, the [Legislative Council Staff] concluded 
that the purpose of the amendment was to create an 
individual right based partially on the fact that the 
term "individual" had been chosen.  The fact that 
"individual" 
is 
no 
longer 
used 
undercuts 
this 
conclusion.  If interpreted as a collective right, the 
amendment's 
effect 
as 
a 
limit 
on 
gun 
control 
legislation would 
be 
severely curtailed, 
as gun 
control laws are generally directed at individuals. 
Jeffrey Monks, Comment, The End of Gun Control or Protection 
Against Tyranny?: The Impact of the New Wisconsin Constitutional 
Right to Bear Arms on State Gun Control Laws, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 
249, 268.  Curiously, the majority opinion does not report this 
passage.  Instead, it quotes later passages that attempt to 
explain away any significance to the textual change.  Majority 
op., ¶29 n.10 (quoting Monks, supra, at 268-69). 
 
¶76 In retrospect, there are at least two reasons why the 
legislature changed the text of the proposed amendment from 
"Every individual" to "The people." 
No.  01-0350.dtp 
10 
 
 
¶77 First, although the legislature wanted to establish a 
right that would benefit hundreds of thousands of individual gun 
owners, it wanted to deemphasize the "individual" nature of this 
right.  The original amendment provided that "Every individual, 
except an individual restricted in accordance with federal law, 
has the right to keep and bear arms . . . but the manner of 
bearing arms may be regulated . . . ."  (Emphasis added.)  This 
draft could have been read to limit the police power to regulate 
firearms, permitting the legislature to regulate the manner of 
bearing arms but denying it authority to restrict firearms 
ownership or possession, except "in accordance with federal 
law."  By removing this limiting clutter from the draft, the 
legislature removed any impediment to a reasonable exercise of 
the police power.  By shifting the right from "Every individual" 
to "The people," the amendment underlined the fact that the 
police power in Wisconsin may reasonably restrict specific 
individuals and classifications of 
people 
(e.g., domestic 
abusers, minors) in ways that it may not restrict the people as 
a whole.50 
 
¶78 Second, the legislature wanted to underscore that the 
people have a right to reasonably regulated gun ownership that 
cannot be denied to them en masse by state legislation or local 
ordinance. 
                                                 
50 Christopher 
McFadden 
correctly 
concluded 
that 
the 
amendment "evinces a hostility to inflexible, blanket gun 
control laws.  While citizens may have agreed that less 
restrictive limitations on bearing arms were necessary and 
perhaps 
even 
desirable, 
they 
adamantly 
opposed 
total 
prohibitions."  McFadden, supra, at 716. 
No.  01-0350.dtp 
11 
 
 
¶79 The constitutional right to keep and bear arms in 
Wisconsin is an important right and a valuable right, and it 
must be protected.  But it is not a fundamental right in the 
same sense that freedom of speech, freedom of worship, the right 
to remain silent, and the right to jury trial are fundamental 
rights.  The right is subject to reasonable regulation under the 
police power.  Recognizing the limits to this important right up 
front will avoid a deluge of frivolous litigation. 
 
¶80 I am authorized to state that JUSTICE ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
 
 
 
No.  01-0350.dtp 
 
 
1