Case Title: Zebroski v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 599, 2013

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2014-05-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CRAIG ZEBROSKI, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  No. 599, 2013 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Cr. I.D. 9604017809 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
   Submitted:  May 7, 2014 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  May 14, 2014 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, 
Justices, and NOBLE,1 Vice Chancellor, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 14th day of May 2014, the Court having considered this matter 
on the briefs filed by the parties and after oral argument has determined that:  
1) 
Except for the claims that we next describe, the Superior 
Court’s determination that the claims raised in Craig Zebroski’s third motion 
for postconviction relief were procedurally barred under Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 61(i) should be affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons 
assigned by the Superior Court in its Opinion dated September 30, 2013. 
                                          
 
1 Sitting by designation pursuant to Del. Const. art. IV, § 12 and Supr. Ct. R. 2 and 4. 
 
2 
 
2) 
Zebroski also claims that a presentence investigation report, 
including a “secret sentencing recommendation that Zebroski be executed,” 
was not disclosed to his trial counsel.2  Zebroski argued to the Superior 
Court that the failure to disclose that presentence investigation report and 
sentencing recommendation violated his constitutional right to due process 
under Gardner v. Florida,3 because he was not given the opportunity to deny 
or explain the information and recommendation in the report. 
3) 
Zebroski’s Gardner claim is procedurally barred by Superior 
Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(4), because it was raised in Zebroski’s second 
Rule 61 petition as part of a “layered” Strickland claim challenging the 
effectiveness of the mitigation case presented on his behalf.  Nevertheless, 
we will address the merits of the Gardner claim because the Superior Court 
did not specifically cite the procedural bar of Rule 61(i)(4) but, instead, 
relied upon Rule 61(i)(1) and 61(i)(2). 
4) 
The Superior Court correctly concluded that Zebroski’s motion 
did not plead facts supporting an inference that his trial counsel was unaware 
of, and did not receive, the presentence investigation report. That 
determination was correct, because Zebroski concedes that his trial counsel 
developed information specifically for the purpose of having it included in 
                                          
 
2 See Corrected Motion for Postconviction Relief at 23, Appendix to Opening Br. at A59.   
3 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).   
 
3 
 
that report.  The Superior Court also explained that the presentence 
investigation process used in this case was authorized by Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 32(c).  That Rule requires the Superior Court to allow the 
prosecution and defense counsel to read the presentence investigation report, 
but excludes any final sentencing recommendation made by the presentence 
officer from the information required to be disclosed to the prosecution and 
defense counsel.   
5) 
The Superior Court never reached the question of whether 
Gardner requires the presentence officer’s recommendation to be disclosed 
to defense counsel.  Zebroski argues on appeal that Rule 32(c) is 
unconstitutional to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge to consider 
the recommendation of a presentence officer without disclosing that 
recommendation to the defendant.  
6) 
As this Court explained in Whitaker v. State, Gardner does not 
require the disclosure of a presentence officer’s recommendation, which is a 
privileged internal communication between judicial employees, where “the 
Superior Court did not rely on any factual assertions not disclosed in the 
[presentence investigation] report.”4  Gardner holds that a defendant cannot 
                                          
 
4 Whitaker v. State, 2011 WL 81998, at *2 (TABLE) (Del. Jan. 10, 2011); accord United 
States v. Baldrich, 471 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting a defendant’s claim 
that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(e)(3), which permits district courts to adopt 
 
4 
 
be sentenced to death on the basis of information that he had no opportunity 
to deny or explain.  But Zebroski did not argue that there was any factual 
information, contained in the presentence officer’s one sentence 
recommendation, that he was denied the opportunity to deny or explain.  
Thus, Zebroski’s claims that Rule 32(c) is unconstitutional, and that his 
constitutional right to due process was violated because his trial counsel did 
not see the presentence officer’s recommendation, are without merit.   
7) 
The Superior Court opinion also does not address Zebroski’s 
argument, raised both in his briefs on appeal and at oral argument, that the 
sentencing judge’s review of the presentence report was unconstitutional 
because it included letters from the victim’s family members expressing 
their opinion that Zebroski should be sentenced to death.  Zebroski claims 
the sentencing judge’s review of those letters was improper and unfairly 
prejudicial.  But this argument was not fairly raised in Zebroski’s Motion for 
                                                                                                                             
 
rules that make the sentencing recommendation confidential, violated due process 
because the defendant had received all of the underlying factual information); United 
States v. Kalady, 941 F.2d 1090, 1096 (10th Cir. 1991) (rejecting a defendant’s claim that 
it is unconstitutional under Gardner for a probation officer’s sentencing recommendation 
to remain confidential when the recommendation contained no factual information that 
was not also in the presentence report that had been disclosed); United States v. Heilprin, 
910 F.2d 471, 474 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that where a defendant has reviewed the 
presentence report and had an opportunity to refute its contents he has received what due 
process requires and he has “no constitutional or statutory right to be informed of the 
particular sentencing recommendation made by the probation office to the district 
court.”).      
 
5 
 
Postconviction Relief, or otherwise presented to the Superior Court, and 
therefore it has been waived.5   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice  
 
 
                                          
 
5 Supr. Ct. R. 8.