Case Title: RONALD L. SNELLING v. ANDY ROMAN, d/b/a ALPINE EXCAVATION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-91

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-03-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
RONALD L. SNELLING v. ANDY ROMAN, d/b/a ALPINE EXCAVATION2007 WY 49154 P.3d 341Case Number: No. 06-91Decided: 03/20/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
                                                                                                            

RONALD 
L. SNELLING, 

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 
 
ANDY 
ROMAN, d/b/a ALPINE EXCAVATION,                 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

 
 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofJohnsonCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Ronald 
L. Snelling, pro 
se

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Virgil 
G. Kinnaird and Sheryl Smith Bunting of Kinnaird Law Office, P.C., Sheridan, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Ronald Snelling 
bought land near Story, 
Wyoming, on which to build a 
home.  He hired Andy Roman to do 
dirt work at the home site.  
Snelling was living in Minnesota when 
most of Roman's work was completed but periodically visited the home site in 
Wyoming to 
inspect the progress of the construction.  
Snelling paid a portion of Roman's bill but, in the end, Snelling decided 
he was dissatisfied with the excavation work done by Roman and refused to pay 
the outstanding balance on Roman's bill.  
Snelling eventually initiated the current action against Roman, generally 
alleging breach of contract and fraud.  
Roman counterclaimed, seeking payment for his completed services and 
material costs.  After a bench 
trial, the trial judge dismissed all of Snelling's claims and granted judgment 
for Roman on his counterclaims.  We 
affirm.

 
 
 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Snelling 
designates multiple issues for this Court's consideration:

 
 
1.         
Was it reversible error to dismiss counts I, II and III of plaintiff's 
complaint all of which were based on defendant's representations that the road 
to be constructed for plaintiff was to be approximately one-half mile in length 
when the actual road constructed was 1150 feet long?

 
 
2.         
Was it reversible error to find as fact that the plaintiff had the same 
information as did defendant as to the length of the road to be built for 
$35,000.00 where the contract between the parties specified a road to be 
approximately one-half mile long and where the evidence showed that plaintiff 
[w]as not in Wyoming when the road was staked and buil[t] by 
defendant?

 
 
3.         
Was it reversible error for the trial court to award defendant the full 
amount of his invoice for certain excavation work when the invoice included work 
done after the plaintiff instructed the defendant to do no further 
work?

 
 
4.         
Was it reversible error for the Trial Court to award defendant the full 
amount of his excavation invoice based on the Trial Court's determination that 
such amount was reasonable when the Trial Court excluded plaintiff's offered 
expert testimony as to reasonableness?

 
 
5.         
Was it reversible error for the Trial Court to permit a non-disclosed 
expert witness to testify over objection that 15 to 24 rocks provided by 
defendant to plaintiff were worth $12,000.00 when the witness had stated he 
would have to look more closely at the rocks to value 
them?

 
 
6.         
Was it reversible error for the Trial Court to find that the amount of 
plaintiff's black dirt taken by defendant was "insignificant" when there was no 
testimony or evidence to the amount of black dirt defendant was entitled to in 
trade for 15 to 24 rocks?

 
 
 
 
FACTS1

 
 
[¶3]      Snelling is a 
semi-retired attorney originally from Minnesota.  He bought property near Story, Wyoming, in 1999 with the purpose of building 
a home thereon.  Snelling and Roman 
met for the first time on July 13, 2001, at the property site, before any 
construction had begun.  Within a 
few weeks Snelling and Roman had agreed that Roman would do the dirt work 
associated with the construction project.  
A letter agreement written by Snelling, dated August 13, 2001, stated 
Roman could begin trenching utilities and building a road on Snelling's property 
from the public road to the area of the proposed home site.  Snelling agreed to pay $35,000 for this 
work.  All future dirt work was to 
be done at Roman's normal work rates.  
Roman accepted this agreement and began work. 

 
 
[¶4]      Roman completed 
the trenching and the road.  The 
ultimate length of the road was slightly less than a quarter-mile.  In mid-May 2002, Snelling paid Roman the 
agreed upon $35,000.  Roman then 
commenced the second phase of the dirt work, including excavating the house 
site, installing a septic system, and constructing a circular driveway in front 
of the house.  Roman billed Snelling 
as work was completed. Snelling paid $5,000 as an advance on the work, but then, 
in May 2003, Snelling refused to pay the remainder of Roman's bill. 

 
 
[¶5]      Roman also 
supplied Snelling with approximately 20 to 25 feature rocks for landscaping 
purposes.  The initial agreement was 
to exchange the feature rocks for black dirt on Snelling's property.  Roman took about two dump truck loads of 
black dirt from Snelling's property before the billing dispute arose and 
Snelling told Roman he could not have any more black dirt.  Roman then billed Snelling $12,000 for 
the feature rocks.  Snelling did not 
pay this invoice.

 
 
[¶6]      Eventually, 
Snelling filed the instant action.  
Though separated into several different claims, the gist of Snelling's 
allegations was that Roman misrepresented the length of the road and therefore 
he overpaid for the road, and that other work performed by Roman was substandard 
and he incurred expenses hiring another contractor to fix the resulting 
problems.  Roman counterclaimed for 
payment on his outstanding invoices, including work performed, materials and the 
feature rocks.  After a bench trial, 
the district court ruled against Snelling on all counts and awarded Roman 
$30,137.90 on his counterclaims.  
Snelling appeals.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶7]      After a bench 
trial, we review the trial court's factual findings under a clearly erroneous 
standard and its legal conclusions de novo.  Hansuld v. Lariat Diesel Corp., 2003 WY 
165, ¶ 13, 81 P.3d 215, 218 (Wyo. 2003) (citing Rennard v. Vollmar, 977 P.2d 1277, 1279 
(Wyo. 
1999)).  We do not substitute 
ourselves for the trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we defer to the 
trial court's findings unless they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as 
a matter of law.  Deroche v. R.L. Manning Co., 737 P.2d 332, 336 (Wyo. 
1987).  Although the factual 
findings of a trial court are not entitled to the limited review afforded a jury 
verdict, the findings are presumptively correct.  Piroschak v. Whelan, 2005 WY 26, ¶ 7, 
106 P.3d 887, 890 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶8]      This Court may 
examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record, but we do not 
reweigh the evidence.  Forshee, et ux. v. Delaney, et ux., 2005 
WY 103, ¶ 6, 118 P.3d 445, 448 (Wyo. 2005).  Due regard is given to the opportunity 
of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses.  We accept the prevailing party's 
evidence as true and give to that evidence every favorable inference which may 
fairly and reasonably be drawn from it.  
Harber v. Jensen, 2004 WY 104, 
¶ 7, 97 P.3d 57, 60 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Life Care Centers of America, Inc. v. 
Dexter, 2003 WY 38, ¶ 7, 65 P.3d 385, 389 (Wyo. 2003)).  Findings may not be set aside because we 
would have reached a different result.  
Harber, ¶ 7, 97 P.3d  at 60 
(citing Double Eagle Petroleum & 
Mining Corp. v. Questar Exploration & Production Co., 2003 WY 139, ¶ 6, 
78 P.3d 679, 681 (Wyo. 2003)).  A 
finding will only be set aside if, although there is evidence to support it, 
this Court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed.  
Mullinnix LLC v. HKB Royalty 
Trust, 2006 WY 14, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 909, 916 (Wyo. 2006).   

 
 
[¶9]      In reviewing a 
trial court's construction of a contract, the initial question of whether the 
contract is ambiguous is a question of law for this Court.  Piroschak, ¶ 9, 106 P.3d  at 891.  When the terms of the agreement are 
unambiguous, the construction of the contract is also a question of law.  Seherr-Thoss v. Seherr-Thoss, 2006 WY 
111, ¶ 11, 141 P.3d 705, 712 (Wyo. 2006).  
We review questions of law de novo.  
Y-O Investments, Inc. v. 
Emken, 2006 WY 112, ¶ 8, 142 P.3d 1127, 1130 (Wyo. 
2006).

 
 
 
 
Length 
of the Road

 
 
[¶10]   Snelling alleges that he only 
agreed to pay Roman $35,000 for the initial road construction and trenching 
because Roman represented that the road to be constructed was to be 
approximately one-half mile in length.  
Snelling complains he was overcharged since the finished length of the 
road was not a half-mile but rather slightly less than a quarter-mile.  Roman, on the other hand, claims he 
never estimated the length of the road because the road was bid as a flat fee, 
with the finished length being immaterial. 

 
 
[¶11]   The parties concur that their 
agreement on terms for the construction of the road is embodied in the August 
13, 2001, letter from Snelling to Roman.  
Both parties characterize this letter as a contract.  Our primary objective in construing 
contracts is to discern the intent of the parties:  

 
 
An 
ambiguous contract contains language that conveys a double meaning.  McNeiley v. Ayres Jewelry Co., 855 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Wyo. 1993).  Disagreement between parties regarding 
the meaning of a contract does not establish an ambiguity.  Moncrief v. LouisianaLand and Exploration Co., 861 P.2d 516, 524 
(Wyo. 
1993).  Whether a contract contains 
an ambiguity is a question of law for the reviewing court.  Prudential Preferred Properties [v. J and J Ventures, Inc.], 859 P.2d 
[1267,] at 1271 [(Wyo. 1993)].

 
 
Contract 
interpretation is the process of ascertaining the meaning of the words used by 
the parties to express their intent.  Doctors' Co. v. Insurance Corp. of 
America, 864 P.2d 1018, 
1023 (Wyo. 
1993).  We generally look to the 
"four corners" of an instrument to determine the intent of the parties.  Id. 
at 1024.   

 
 

Idaho 
Migrant Council, Inc. v. Warila, 890 P.2d 39, 40-41 (Wyo. 1995).  We begin by looking at the words of the 
contract and the surrounding circumstances at the time of the making of the 
contract.  Wells Fargo Bank Wyoming, N.A. v. Hodder, 2006 WY 128, ¶ 16, 144 P.3d 401, 408 (Wyo. 2006); Hickman v. 
Groves, 2003 
WY 76, ¶ 11, 71 P.3d 256, 259 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶12]   In the August 2001 letter, Snelling 
stated he wanted to clear up any potential misunderstandings before work 
began.  The pertinent part of the 
letter states:

Here is 
what I understand.

 
 
1.         
For a total of $35,000.00 you will do the 
following:

 
 
(a)       Complete a 
road to the home site on the second plateau of the property.  You have described the road to me as 
having several switchbacks and being somewhere in the neighborhood of one half 
mile long.  You will use culverts, 
ditching and geomat as necessary to properly construct the road.  The road will be guaranteed for five 
years from the date of completion.

 
 
(b)       Trench in 
the electrical to the home site. . . .

 
 
(c)        You 
will trench in the phone line and will pay for the wire to be placed in the 
trench. . . .

 
 
(d)       You will 
trench in below the frost line a water line from the well on the property of the 
house site and provide the water line.

 
 
2.         
In addition to paying $35,000.00 for the described work, I agree to use 
Alpine Excavation for the dirt work which will be involved in building a 
house.  This is based on the 
assumption that you will be charging your normal rates for that 
work.

 
 
Snelling 
also wrote:

 
 
Of 
course, it will be your responsibility to make certain the road gets built 
entirely within my property lines.  
I have given you a copy of the plat and I am sending you a copy of the 
legal description of the property with this letter. 

 
 
Snelling 
finished the letter by stating: "let me know whether I have correctly stated our 
understanding in this letter.  If I 
have not, obviously do not begin the work until we have squared things away." 

 
 
[¶13]   The parties agree that there was no 
further communication regarding any potential misunderstanding and both parties 
proceeded under the terms of this letter contract.  Snelling alleges that the length of the 
road  "somewhere in the neighborhood of one half mile"  was a material term of 
the contract.  Accordingly, Snelling 
based the first three counts of his complaint on the premise that Roman 
misrepresented the length of the road.  
After the bench trial, the district court expressly found that Roman "did 
not misrepresent the length of the road, as the contract was not based upon 
length and [Snelling] had the same information as [Roman]."  The district court accordingly dismissed 
all three counts.

 
 
[¶14]   Looking at the language of the 
contract and the surrounding circumstances, we agree with the district court's 
ruling.  The contract contains no 
indication that the cost of the road was based upon its length.  The contract does not calculate the cost 
of the road, or the trenching, in terms of linear feet or like measurement.  The contract unambiguously proposes a 
flat fee in exchange for Roman: completing a road to the home site on the second 
plateau of the property; trenching the electrical; trenching the phone line; and 
trenching the water line.  

 
 
[¶15]   Snelling suggests the length of the 
road was material to his agreement to offer a flat fee of $35,000.  He alleges he would have offered less if 
he had known the road would not be a half-mile in length but rather slightly 
less than a quarter-mile.  Several 
facts belie this allegation.  First, 
we think Snelling's terms "somewhere in the neighborhood of" are too ambiguous 
to suggest that Snelling was materially focused on the length of the road.  

 
 
[¶16]   Second, the district court was 
correct in determining that Snelling had the same information regarding the 
potential difficulty in constructing a road to his home site as did Roman.  It is undisputed that Snelling had met 
with Roman at the property roughly a month before he drafted the August letter 
agreement.  Snelling was intimately 
familiar with the geography and terrain of his property.  Snelling knew where the public road was 
in relation to his proposed home site and the grade of the land in between the 
two locations.  Snelling was in as 
good a position as Roman in estimating the potential length of a road to his 
home site and the difficulty involved in constructing such a road on a suitable 
grade.  

 
 
[¶17]   Lastly, Snelling himself indicates 
that he knew the road was not finally staked at the time he wrote the contract 
since he states in the letter that it will be Roman's responsibility to ensure 
that the road is built entirely within Snelling's property lines.  To that end, Snelling was sending Roman 
a copy of the legal description of the property.  Even had a road been staked, it would 
potentially have to be restaked given this new information.  Thus, any information allegedly given by 
Roman to Snelling prior to the writing of this contract could only have been a 
rough estimate, inadequate to provide a material term.  For these reasons, we find Snelling's 
first two issues on appeal to be without merit.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Invoice 
for work completed after Snelling instructed Roman to do no further 
work

 
 
[¶18]   Roman came home from working at 
Snelling's property one day to find a message from Snelling on his answering 
machine.  In the message, Snelling 
instructed Roman to do no further work.  
Roman complied with the instruction.  Roman did, however, submit a bill for 
gravel he had used in that one day's work.  
It is this bill that Snelling alleges he should not be obligated to 
pay.

 
 
[¶19]   Snelling's objection is 
disingenuous.  Snelling does not 
dispute that Roman did not get his message until Roman had completed work for 
the day.  Therefore Roman's bill 
pertained solely to work completed before Roman received the instruction to 
cease work.  Under the 
circumstances, we find no error in the district court's determination that Roman 
was entitled to the challenged amount, especially since Roman did not bill for 
his labor but only for materials he supplied and that were accepted by 
Snelling.

 
 
 
 
Evidentiary 
Issues

 
 
[¶20]   In issues four and five, Snelling 
complains about the trial court's rulings on select evidentiary issues, namely 
the inclusion and exclusion of certain expert testimony.  We review a trial court's evidentiary 
rulings under an abuse of discretion standard.  A trial court abuses its discretion if 
it acts outside the bounds of reason under the circumstances or commits an error 
of law.  Parrish v. Groathouse Const., Inc., 2006 
WY 33, ¶ 14, 130 P.3d 502, 506-07 (Wyo. 2006).  All relevant evidence is 
admissible.  W.R.E. 402.  Relevant evidence, however, may be 
excluded if it constitutes a "needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 
 W.R.E. 403.  Furthermore, rulings admitting or 
excluding evidence are subject to harmless error analysis.  W.R.E. 103; Armstrong v. Hrabal, 2004 WY 39, ¶ 11, 
87 P.3d 1226, 1230 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶21]   Snelling first complains that his 
proffered expert witness testimony regarding the reasonableness of Roman's 
excavation invoice was excluded improperly.  Snelling's expert was allowed to testify 
to the reasonableness of Roman's invoice on direct examination.  Snelling's expert testified to the 
general cost of running certain equipment that would be involved in particular 
dirt work and the reasonableness of Roman's rates.  Snelling's objection is that the trial 
court refused to allow Snelling to recall his expert on rebuttal.  Snelling's offer of proof was that his 
expert would testify more specifically as to the running costs of particular 
pieces of equipment.  The trial 
court ruled that such testimony would be cumulative.  We do not find that the trial court 
abused its discretion in so ruling.  
The trial court allowed Snelling to admit evidence as to the 
reasonableness of Roman's invoice and simply refused to hear further evidence on 
the same topic, from the same person.2

 
 
[¶22]   Snelling's second complaint is that 
Roman was allowed to elicit expert testimony from a witness who was designated 
only as a fact witness in Roman's pretrial disclosure statement.  The witness, who had been in the 
business of selling feature rocks for approximately five years, testified that 
he had seen some of the feature rocks Roman used at the original quarry 
site.  He had seen the same feature 
rocks again on Snelling's property, albeit at a distance of about fifty 
yards.  The witness testified as to 
the general value of the feature rocks he had seen on Snelling's property.  He expressly testified that Roman's 
invoice of $12,000 for those feature rocks was reasonable.  

 
 
[¶23]   We need not discuss whether this 
testimony constituted inadmissible expert testimony because Snelling was not 
prejudiced by such testimony.  There 
is no indication that the trial court relied on the questioned testimony, nor 
was it necessary for the trial court to do so.  Roman testified extensively as to how he 
determined the price for the feature rocks and the reasonableness of such 
price.  Roman's testimony is 
sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the feature rocks were 
worth $12,000 without reference to the testimony provided by Roman's challenged 
witness.  

 
 
 
 
Black 
dirt

 
 
[¶24]   The initial agreement entered into 
between Snelling and Roman with regard to the feature rocks was that Roman would 
trade the feature rocks to Snelling in exchange for black dirt that was being 
excavated from Snelling's property.  
Snelling is correct in stating that there was no detailed testimony 
regarding a specific amount of black dirt that would be involved in the 
trade.  Roman testified that the 
agreement was that he would be allowed to take as much black dirt as he 
wanted.  Roman took approximately 
two truckloads of dirt from Snelling's property at about the same time he 
delivered the feature rocks but then waited to make sure there was enough black 
dirt for Snelling's purposes before he took any more.  Before Roman could claim any more black 
dirt, the payment dispute developed with Snelling, a part of which was 
Snelling's refusal to allow Roman to take any more black dirt from the 
property.  

 
 
[¶25]   The trial court found that the two 
truckloads of black dirt taken by Roman was insignificant and did not factor the 
amount into the valuation of the feature rocks.  This finding is not clearly 
erroneous.  Roman billed Snelling 
for the feature rocks only after Snelling had stopped Roman from taking any more 
black dirt.  The invoice was for 
$12,000.  Although he only billed 
$12,000, Roman testified that he believes the value of the feature rocks is 
$12,000 plus the cost of two days of hauling.  It is a reasonable inference that Roman 
accounted for whatever value the black dirt he took may have had when preparing 
the invoice.  The value of the black 
dirt Roman took could therefore have been considered inconsequential to the 
amount charged in the final invoice.

 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶26]   We find no reversible error.  The record supports that the length of 
the road was not a material term in the contract for the initial dirt work.  Roman adequately proved that he was 
entitled to judgment as entered.  
Affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1In 
accordance with our standard of review, we accept the facts most favorable to 
Roman.  

 
 

2We also question the 
relevance of such testimony in general because the contract between the parties 
called for Roman's additional work to be charged at Roman's normal rates.  There is no reference to what an outside 
party might consider reasonable.