Case Title: Talas v. Correct Piping Co., Inc.

Citation: 426 N.E.2d 26

Docket Number: 

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1981-09-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
426 N.E.2d 26 (1981)
Woodrow TALAS, Appellant (Plaintiff below),
v.
CORRECT PIPING COMPANY, Inc., Appellee (Defendant below).
No. 381S52.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
September 28, 1981.
Michael R. Morow, Munster, for appellant; Leonard M. Ring & Associates, Chicago, Ill., of counsel.
Samuel J. Furlin, Spangler, Jennings, Spangler & Dougherty, P.C., Merrillville, for appellee.
HUNTER, Justice.
This cause was brought before this Court on the petition of Woodrow Talas, who sought review of the Court of Appeals' opinion found at Talas v. Correct Piping Co., Inc., (1980) Ind. App., 409 N.E.2d 1223. We have previously granted Talas's petition, vacated the opinion of the Court of Appeals, and remanded this cause to the Industrial Board of Indiana with the directive that the Board enter the "specific" findings of fact upon which its decision is based. Talas v. Correct Piping Co., Inc., (1981) Ind., 416 N.E.2d 845.
On remand, the Board has filed a document which it characterizes as "its specific Findings of Fact." We conclude that the statements therein are insufficient to satisfy the letter and purposes of Ind. Code § 22-3-4-7 (Burns 1974) for those same reasons fully discussed and explained in our companion decision today entitled Perez v. United States Steel Corporation, Ind., 426 N.E.2d 29 (1981). We again remand the *27 cause to the Industrial Board for specific findings of fact.
The facts relevant to Talas's claim were previously explained by this Court as follows:
The crucial and ultimate factual issue raised by Talas's petition for emergency care is whether continuing medical treatment in the form of nursing care will serve to "limit or reduce the amount and extent" of Talas's impairment, as per the requirements established by the legislature in Ind. Code § 22-3-3-4 (Burns 1980 Supp.).
The Industrial Board's "Findings of Fact," as submitted on remand, read in relevant part:
The bulk of the Industrial Board's statements constitute either a summary of the evidence submitted to the Board or a recitation of the medical care received by Talas prior to the date he filed the petition at issue. While these statements lend perspective to our task of judicial review, nothing is revealed therein regarding the rationale and factual basis for the Board's finding of ultimate fact that the medical care sought would neither limit nor reduce Talas's impairment and its conclusion of law that he "take nothing." Consequently, these statements satisfy neither the letter nor purposes of the requirement that the Board enter specific findings of basic fact. Perez v. United States Steel Corporation, supra; Kunz v. Waterman, (1972) 258 Ind. 573, 283 N.E.2d 371; Uhlir v. Ritz, (1970) 255 Ind. 342, 264 N.E.2d 312; Yunker v. Porter County Sheriff's Merit Bd., (1978) Ind. App., 382 N.E.2d 977; Whispering Pines Home for Senior Citizens v. Nicalek, (1975) Ind. App., 333 N.E.2d 324.
Similarly, the Board's finding that "improvement by reducing and limiting the extent of impairment has been determined by a majority of the Full Board not to be possible" does not satisfy the requirement. It is but an abstract statement of the Board's finding of ultimate fact couched in the statutory terms at issue. Perez v. United States Steel Corporation, supra; Whispering Pines Home for Senior Citizens v. Nicalek, supra; Rivera v. Simmons Co., (1973) 157 Ind. App. 10, 298 N.E.2d 477.
Neither is the Board's statement beneath the caption "Order" that "Petitioner has been determined to be permanent and quiescent" sufficient to satisfy the Board's duty to make specific findings. The question before the Board was not purely the state of Talas's injury, but rather whether continuing medical treatment would "limit" or "reduce" his "impairment," as those terms are employed in the Workmen's Compensation Act. Ind. Code § 22-3-3-4, supra. To simply recognize the permanent and quiescent nature of his quadriplegia is to ignore the essence of his claim: whether continuing care would "reduce" or "limit" his "impairment" within the meaning of those statutory terms.
The question may be a difficult one, hinging both on medical testimony and the letter and spirit of the terms contained in Ind. Code § 22-3-3-4, supra. That is exactly the reason we are loath to indulge in appellate review of the Board's disposition without specific findings of basic fact, for it is the Industrial Board's expertise and analysis of the evidence which, by statute, must guide and constrain our review. Ind. Code § 22-3-4-8 (Burns 1974). Perez v. United States Steel Corporation, supra; Kunz v. Waterman, supra; Rivera v. Simmons Co., supra.
This cause is again remanded to the Full Industrial Board with the directive that it enter the specific findings of basic fact upon which its decision is based. In discharging *29 that task, the Board should be guided by the general precepts laid down today in Perez v. United States Steel Corporation, supra. Our consideration of other issues is again postponed pending the Board's further action consistent with this opinion.
The cause is remanded.
GIVAN, C.J., and DeBRULER and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.
PIVARNIK, J., dissents and would deny transfer.