Case Title: State v. Thomas S. Mayo

Citation: 2007 WI 78

Docket Number: 2004AP001592-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 78 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP1592-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Thomas S. Mayo, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 292 Wis. 2d 485, 713 N.W.2d 191 
(Ct. App. 2006—Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 26, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 13, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Racine   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Kreul 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BUTLER, Jr., J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Keith A. Findley and University of Wisconsin Law School, 
Madison, and oral argument by Keith A. Findley. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by James 
M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2007 WI 78
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP1592-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2002CF1235) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Thomas S. Mayo, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 26, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished, per curiam decision of the court of appeals1, 
affirming the decision of the Circuit Court for Racine County, 
Judge Richard J. Kreul presiding, which entered a judgment of 
conviction against Thomas S. Mayo (Mayo) and denied Mayo's 
postconviction motion for a new trial. 
¶2 
In his petition for review, Mayo asks this court to 
determine whether the prosecutor's alleged improper comments 
                                                 
1 State v. Mayo, No. 2004AP1592-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. March 29, 2006). 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
2 
 
during Mayo's trial warrant a new trial, either as plain error 
or in the interest of justice, despite the fact that defense 
counsel failed to object to such comments.  Mayo further asks 
this court to determine whether a new trial is warranted, 
because of hearsay testimony given by the State of Wisconsin's 
(State's) witnesses concerning out-of-court statements of the 
complaining witness, Clarence Price (Price).  Additionally, Mayo 
asks this court to determine whether his trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance by, among other things, failing to 
conduct an independent investigation, and by failing to obtain 
and use the transcript of Price's sworn testimony at the 
preliminary hearing.  Mayo's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel overlaps with his other claims before this court. 
¶3 
We 
hold 
that, 
although 
there 
was 
improper 
prosecutorial argument in the case, such misconduct did not so 
infect the trial with unfairness as to constitute a denial of 
Mayo's due process rights, thus warranting a new trial, either 
as plain error or in the interest of justice.  He has not shown 
that the real controversy was not fully tried, nor has he 
established that there was a miscarriage of justice.  There is 
not a substantial probability of a different result, even if a 
new trial were held.  We further hold that the circuit court 
properly admitted testimony concerning Price's out-of-court 
statements to the police, under the excited utterance exception 
to the hearsay rule.  See Wis. Stat. § 908.03(2)(2003-04)2.  
                                                 
2 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
3 
 
Finally, we hold that, although defense counsel rendered 
deficient performance by failing to conduct an independent 
investigation, Mayo has not established that there was a 
reasonable probability that the result would have been different.  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).  Mayo was not 
prejudiced by such deficient performance.  On balance, we are 
satisfied, viewing the deficiencies of defense counsel and the 
incidents of prosecutorial misconduct for their cumulative 
effect, that Mayo is not entitled to a new trial and, therefore, 
the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
I 
¶4 
This case involves events that occurred between Mayo 
and Price on November 15, 16, and 17, 2002.  Mayo and Price both 
have criminal records, and both testified about the incidents 
that occurred on the dates at issue, but their accounts are 
substantially different. 
¶5 
According to Price, Mayo robbed him of 35 dollars at 
gunpoint in Racine, Wisconsin on November 16, 2002.  Price 
testified that he was walking to the home of a friend when a man 
approached him, and asked him for a dollar.  Price stated that 
he had seen the man before, and that the man had been introduced 
to him on the prior evening, November 15, as a friend of Price's 
uncle.  Price said that the man's name was Thomas and identified 
him at trial as Thomas Mayo. 
¶6 
Price testified that, when Mayo asked him for a dollar 
on the evening of November 16, Price reached into his pocket to 
get a dollar.  Price testified that Mayo pointed a gun at him, 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
4 
 
robbed him of the 35 dollars he was carrying, and struck him on 
the back of the head.  Price said that Mayo then ran behind some 
bushes and told Price to walk in the opposite direction.  Price 
testified that the robbery occurred in the driveway of his 
friend Jarrell, and that Price went into Jarrell's house and 
called his mother to inform her of the incident.  Price 
testified that he then walked two blocks to another friend's 
house 
and 
called 
911. 
 
Officer 
Dan 
Langendorf 
(Officer 
Langendorf) promptly responded to the call, at which time Price 
informed him of the encounter with Mayo. 
¶7 
Mayo testified that he was introduced to Price on the 
evening of November 15, 2002, by Price's uncle.  Mayo stated 
that he encountered Price on the street the next evening, 
November 16, and purchased cocaine from Price.  Mayo said that 
he was shorted on the amount of cocaine by Price, and he wanted 
to reclaim the 35 dollars he paid for the cocaine.  Mayo 
testified that he struck Price in the jaw, then kicked and 
stomped Price’s stomach and head while getting his 35 dollars 
back.  Mayo stated that Price sought revenge by concocting a 
robbery story and reporting it to the police. 
¶8 
Price testified that on November 17, 2002, Mayo 
confronted him outside a Racine taco restaurant.  Price said 
that Mayo told him that the robbery was an accident, and that he 
intended to repay Price.  Conversely, according to Mayo's 
testimony, Price and a companion confronted him outside of the 
restaurant, and attacked him with a tire iron, cutting his 
wrist.  At trial, Mayo pointed out stains on the neck of the 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
5 
 
shirt he had been wearing on November 17, 2002, and claimed that 
they were blood stains from the cut on his wrist. 
¶9 
On November 17, 2002, Price called 911 to report that 
he was in the presence of the man who had robbed him the 
previous night.  Sergeant Michael Ackley (Sergeant Ackley) and 
Officer Daniel Small (Officer Small) arrived at the restaurant 
soon after the call.  Officer Small testified that Mayo was 
already running before the police arrived, and that he was 
unsure if Mayo was running because he saw the squad car or for 
another reason.  Sergeant Ackley testified that Mayo began 
running when they stopped their squad car at the scene. 
¶10 Officer Small and Sergeant Ackley gave chase.  Mayo 
ran and entered a nearby brick house that was not Mayo’s 
residence.  Sergeant Ackley testified that he rapped on the door 
three different times over the course of twenty to forty 
seconds, announcing that he was a police officer.  Mayo finally 
opened the door. 
¶11 Sergeant Ackley testified that he was halfway finished 
with 
patting 
down 
Mayo 
when 
Price 
arrived 
and, 
without 
questioning, pointed at Mayo and explained that he was the man 
who robbed him.  Mayo testified that the police took him back to 
the restaurant, where Price identified him.  According to both 
Sergeant Ackley and Officer Small, Mayo did not respond to 
Price's accusation.  Both officers said that Mayo did not 
exhibit 
any 
apparent 
injuries. 
 
Mayo 
was 
arrested 
for 
obstructing an officer and was informed that he had been 
identified as having been involved in an armed robbery. 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
6 
 
¶12 According to Sergeant Ackley's testimony, Mayo told 
him that he ran from the officers because he had a crack pipe on 
his person and did not want to get arrested for possession of 
drug paraphernalia.  Mayo testified that, before opening the 
door for the police, he hid the crack pipe under the linoleum in 
the front hallway of the house to which he had fled. 
¶13 At Mayo's trial in Racine County Circuit Court, Judge 
Richard J. Kreul presiding, Mayo and Price were the only two 
witnesses to testify, specifically, about the confrontation 
between them.  Officer Langendorf testified about responding to 
the robbery call on November 16, 2002, and about his interview 
with Price.  Sergeant Ackley and Officer Small testified about 
the arrest of Mayo on November 17, 2002. 
¶14 During her opening statement and also during the 
presentation of trial testimony, the prosecutor remarked, and 
elicited testimony, regarding Mayo’s silence concerning Price’s 
accusation that he was the man who robbed him on November 16, 
2002.  During her closing arguments, the prosecutor made the 
following comments about her role as a prosecutor: 
The way a criminal case works is police reports 
are forwarded into the District Attorney's Office, we 
review them, we determine whether there should be a 
charge or there shouldn't be a charge.  We have the 
discretion to do that.  The case then is charged, and 
we have an open file policy, meaning that the 
defendant and defense attorney can have access to all 
of the police reports, so the defendant has had access 
and seen what all the evidence is against him and what 
the victim has said and what the police have said.  
He's had almost five months to come up with something 
to attempt to explain his actions away, and you have 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
7 
 
now heard what he has come up with, which is something 
new. 
¶15 The prosecutor also made the following statement in 
her closing arguments: 
Let's 
look 
at 
some 
of 
the 
statements 
the 
defendant made while on the stand as opposed to the 
facts as we know them or things he previously 
stated. . . .  
Well, he [Price] identified him [Mayo] and said that's 
the guy that robbed me.  This was within the earshot 
of 
the 
defendant. . . . when 
Clarence 
Price 
said 
that's the guy that robbed me, that Thomas Mayo said 
nothing. . . .   
Prior to him being arrested, if he was an 
innocent man, why would he say nothing at that point 
when he has been accused? . . .  
My opinion would be that this was a crime of 
opportunity.  The opportunity presented itself to the 
defendant and he took it. 
¶16 Then, during her rebuttal argument, the prosecutor 
further stated: 
Defense counsel has indicated that it's my job to put 
a spin on the evidence to convict the defendant.  I 
described briefly what my job is in the first part of 
my closing.  I look up police reports. . . . I 
determine whether I believe a person is guilty and 
whether I 
think it's just.  I also have the 
discretion . . .  to dismiss the charges if I think 
they're unjust, if they didn't happen, if it's not 
provable. 
¶17 The prosecutor then made comments concerning the role 
of defense counsel, stating that defense counsel's job is to 
"get his client off the hook.  That's his only job here, not to 
see 
justice 
is 
done 
but 
to 
see 
that 
his 
client 
is 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
8 
 
acquitted. . . ."  Mayo's counsel did not object to any of these 
comments. 
¶18 When giving the jury instructions, the circuit court 
made no specific comment on the arguments of the prosecutor, but 
the court did give the standard instructions that opening 
statements and closing arguments of counsel are not evidence.  
See Wis JI——Criminal 50, 160. 
¶19 On April 9, 2003, a Racine County jury found Mayo 
guilty of the three crimes with which he was charged: armed 
robbery with use of force, obstructing an officer, and battery 
while armed.  Mayo was sentenced to serve seven years of initial 
confinement and eight years of extended supervision.   
¶20 Mayo filed a postconviction motion seeking a new 
trial.  In his postconviction motion, Mayo claimed that the 
prosecutor made numerous improper remarks in her opening 
statement, during trial, and in her closing arguments, and that 
such remarks warranted a new trial either as plain error or in 
the interest of justice.  Mayo argued that defense counsel's 
failure to object to such remarks constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Mayo also alleged that his trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to object to the hearsay within 
Officer Langendorf's and Price's testimony concerning the 
conversation that took place between Officer Langendorf and 
Price on November 16, 2002.  Mayo further alleged that his trial 
counsel 
was 
ineffective 
for 
failing 
to 
conduct 
any 
investigation, for failing to object when Mayo's right to remain 
silent was infringed upon, and for failing to obtain a copy of 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
9 
 
the preliminary hearing transcript, so that he could impeach 
Price with inconsistent preliminary hearing testimony. 
¶21 The circuit court agreed that the prosecutor’s closing 
arguments were improper.  However, the circuit court found that 
the closing arguments, when viewed in context of the entire 
trial and the court’s jury instructions that opening statements 
and closing arguments are not evidence, did not undermine the 
fairness of the trial.  The court concluded that Mayo's 
attorney’s failure to object to the prosecutor's closing 
arguments was permissible, considering the broad range of 
deference accorded to attorneys in their closing arguments.  The 
circuit court also stated that the defense attorney's failure to 
object to the hearsay by Officer Langendorf and Price did not 
amount to ineffective assistance of counsel, since the testimony 
would have been admissible as an excited utterance.  The court 
stated that the question of admissibility of the hearsay 
testimony was a close call, but that if there was any error on 
the issue, it was harmless. 
¶22 In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court's decision on the postconviction 
motion.  The court of appeals concluded that the prosecutor's 
remarks in her opening statement, during trial, and in her 
closing arguments did not prejudice the defendant, and that the 
defense attorney was not ineffective for failing to object to 
the remarks.  The court of appeals held that the prosecutor’s 
remarks regarding the operation of the district attorney’s 
office 
were 
common 
knowledge. 
 
The 
court 
reasoned 
that 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
10 
 
references to "the facts as we know them" and the "crime of 
opportunity" 
referenced 
facts 
before 
the 
jury, 
not 
the 
prosecutor’s personal opinion.  The court of appeals stated 
that, although the references to a defense attorney’s role were 
improper 
and 
"deserving 
of 
condemnation," 
Mayo 
was 
not 
prejudiced by the remarks, because they did not infect the trial 
with unfairness. 
¶23 The court of appeals also held that the prosecutor's 
repeated commentary on Mayo’s pre-Miranda3 silence did not 
prejudice the defendant, and that the defense attorney was not 
ineffective for failing to object to such remarks.  Mayo 
testified that he denied robbing Price immediately after Price 
accused him of being the robber.  Thus, the court of appeals 
found that the prosecutor’s reference to the alleged silence, 
and the testimony elicited on that issue, was proper impeachment 
of Mayo's testimony. 
¶24 Concerning the hearsay issue, the court of appeals 
found that the hearsay testimony from Officer Langendorf, as 
well as Price's own testimony, was admissible under the excited 
utterance exception to hearsay.  Wis. Stat. § 908.03(2).  
Because the court of appeals found that the hearsay was 
admissible evidence, the court concluded that defense counsel 
was not ineffective for failing to object to such evidence. 
¶25 Mayo also argued before the court of appeals that his 
counsel was ineffective, because he failed to corroborate Mayo’s 
                                                 
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
11 
 
testimony with the testimony of Argo McMorris (McMorris).  
Allegedly, McMorris was going to testify that she saw Mayo 
running and bloodied on November 17, 2002, and that Mayo told 
her that Price attacked him with a tire iron.  Defense counsel 
testified at the postconviction motion hearing that he chose not 
to use this testimony in an effort to minimize the November 17 
encounter, in favor of emphasizing the November 16 encounter.  
The court of appeals held that an attorney is not ineffective 
merely because a sound trial strategy fails.  Mayo further 
argued that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to 
impeach 
Price’s 
testimony. 
 
Although 
Price 
did 
present 
conflicting testimony regarding whether he was with a companion 
on November 17, the court of appeals held that the failure to 
impeach did not prejudice the defendant. 
¶26 After the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court, 
Mayo then filed a petition for review, which this court granted. 
II 
¶27 This case presents several issues for our review.  We 
must determine whether Mayo is entitled to a new trial due to 
plain error or in the interest of justice, including his claim 
that there were improper comments by the prosecutor during 
Mayo's trial, to which defense counsel failed to object.  We 
also must determine whether the circuit court properly admitted 
Price's out-of-court statements under the excited utterance 
exception to the hearsay rule.  Finally, we must determine 
whether Mayo's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
12 
 
counsel.  To resolve these issues, the following standards of 
review are applicable. 
¶28 In order to evaluate Mayo's claim that he is entitled 
to a new trial, it is necessary for this court to review the 
record to determine if a new trial is warranted in the interest 
of justice or due to plain error.  See State v. Davidson, 2000 
WI 91, ¶87 n.16, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 606.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 901.03(4)(2005-06), which recognizes the doctrine of 
plain error, states in relevant part, "Nothing in this rule 
precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial 
rights although they were not brought to the attention of the 
judge." 
¶29 Under the doctrine of plain error, an appellate court 
may review error that was otherwise waived by a party’s failure 
to object properly or preserve the error for review as a matter 
of right.  This court has not articulated a bright-line rule for 
what constitutes plain error, acknowledging that there is no 
"hard and fast classification" relative to its application.  
Virgil v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 166, 190-91, 267 N.W.2d 852 (1978).  
Rather, the existence of plain error will turn on the facts of 
the particular case.  Id.  Of particular importance is the 
quantum of evidence properly admitted and the seriousness of the 
error involved.  Id.  The burden is on the State to prove that 
the plain error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. 
King, 205 Wis. 2d 81, 93, 555 N.W.2d 189 (1996). 
¶30 Wisconsin courts may also grant a new trial in the 
interest of justice.  Wis. Stat. § 751.06 (2005-06).  In Vollmer 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
13 
 
v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 19, 456 N.W.2d 797 (1990), we explained 
the reach and purpose of reversal in the interest of justice: 
In 
reviewing 
the 
cases 
in 
which 
we 
have 
interpreted the scope of our discretionary power to 
reverse judgments under sec. 751.06, stats., we 
conclude that the court of appeals, like this court, 
has broad power of discretionary reversal.  This broad 
statutory authority provides the court of appeals with 
power to achieve justice in its discretion in the 
individual case.  The first category of cases arises 
when the real controversy has not been fully tried.  
Under this first category, it is unnecessary for an 
appellate court to first conclude that the outcome 
would be different on retrial.  The second class of 
cases is where for any reason the court concludes that 
there has been a miscarriage of justice. Under this 
second category . . . an appellate court must first 
make a finding of substantial probability of a 
different result on retrial. 
¶31 Regarding the admissibility of the alleged hearsay 
statements, 
this 
court 
reviews 
evidentiary 
rulings 
with 
deference to the circuit court as to whether it properly 
exercised its discretion, in accordance with the facts and 
accepted legal standards.  State v. Tucker, 2003 WI 12, ¶28, 259 
Wis. 2d 484, 657 N.W.2d 374.  As with other discretionary 
determinations, this court will uphold a circuit court's 
decision to admit or exclude evidence if the circuit court 
examined the relevant facts, applied a proper legal standard, 
and reached a reasonable conclusion using a demonstrated 
rational process.  State v. Muckerheide, 2007 WI 5, ¶17, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 725 N.W.2d 930. 
¶32 This case also requires us to determine whether Mayo's 
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.  The issue of 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
14 
 
whether a person was deprived of the constitutional right to the 
effective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law 
and fact.  State v. Trawitzki, 2001 WI 77, ¶19, 244 Wis. 2d 523, 
628 N.W.2d 801.  The circuit court's findings of fact, that is, 
"the underlying findings of what happened," will be upheld 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 
628, 634, 369 N.W.2d 711 (1985). Whether counsel's performance 
was deficient and prejudicial to his or her client's defense is 
a question of law that we review de novo.  Trawitzki, 244 Wis. 
2d 523, ¶19. 
¶33 In Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, the United States 
Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for determining whether 
counsel's actions constitute ineffective assistance.  First, the 
defendant 
must 
demonstrate that counsel's performance was 
deficient.  Id.; State v. McDowell, 2004 WI 70, ¶49, 272 Wis. 2d 
488, 681 N.W.2d 500.  Second, the defendant must demonstrate 
that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial to his or 
her defense.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  This requires a 
showing that counsel's errors were "so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."  
Id. 
III 
¶34 Mayo argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct 
during her opening statement, closing arguments, and elicitation 
of testimony, and that such misconduct constituted a denial of his 
due process rights, warranting a new trial.  Mayo asserts that the 
prosecutor improperly commented on Mayo's pre-Miranda silence 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
15 
 
during the State's opening statement and in its case-in-chief.  
Mayo further asserts that the prosecutor's closing arguments did 
not stem from evidence, and that they were prejudicial. 
¶35 Mayo argues that it is improper for parties to comment 
on facts not in evidence.  State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 663, 676, 
298 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1980).  He further argues that the 
prosecutor stated her personal opinion4 in closing arguments, and 
that such opinion was improper under Wis. SCR 20:3.4(e)(2004)5 and 
State v. Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d 121, 133 n.11, 449 N.W.2d 845 
(1990)(stating that it is "unprofessional 'for the prosecutor to 
express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the truth or 
falsity of any testimony or evidence of the guilt of the 
defendant.'"(citation omitted)).  Mayo also alleges that the 
prosecutor improperly disparaged defense counsel by stating that 
it was defense counsel's role "not to see justice is done but to 
see that his client is acquitted. . . ." 
¶36 Mayo also asserts that it was improper for the 
prosecutor to comment on and elicit testimony concerning Mayo’s 
pre-Miranda silence on the day of his arrest.  Mayo asserts that, 
by referring to Mayo's pre-Miranda silence in its opening 
statement and case-in-chief, the State violated Mayo's rights 
                                                 
4  During closing argument, the prosecutor stated, "My 
opinion would be that this was a crime of opportunity."  
5 Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 20:3.4(e)(2004) states, in 
relevant part, that a lawyer shall not "assert a personal 
knowledge of facts in issue . . . or state a personal opinion as 
to the justness of a cause,  . . . or the guilt or innocence of an 
accused. . . ."   
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
16 
 
under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and 
under Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  The 
prosecutor also made references to Mayo's pre-Miranda silence 
during closing arguments and during the cross-examination of 
Mayo.  Mayo acknowledges that those references were permissible.  
However, Mayo argues that the prosecutor's references to Mayo's 
pre-Miranda silence during her opening statement and during the 
direct examination of Price, Sergeant Ackley, and Officer Small 
were 
improper 
and 
violated 
Mayo's 
right 
against 
self-
incrimination.  See State v. Adams, 221 Wis. 2d 1, 584 N.W.2d 
695 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Brecht, 143 Wis. 2d 297, 311, 421 
N.W.2d 96 (1988). 
¶37 The State agrees with Mayo that the prosecutor's 
comments 
about 
Mayo's 
pre-Miranda 
silence 
during 
closing 
arguments and during the cross-examination of Mayo were not 
improper.  The State argues that a prosecutor may comment on the 
evidence, argue from it to a conclusion, and state that the 
evidence convinces him or her and should convince the jury.  
Adams, 221 Wis. 2d at 19.  The State argues further that the 
prosecutor did not state her opinion in her closing argument 
when she stated that "this was crime of opportunity" and that 
Mayo’s testimony was contrary to the "facts as we know them."  
Rather, the State asserts that these were comments on the 
evidence before the jury, as is allowed.  It is the State's 
position that the prosecutor used references to Mayo's pre-
Miranda 
silence 
during 
Mayo's 
cross-examination 
for 
the 
permissible purpose of impeachment. 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
17 
 
¶38 Regarding the prosecutor's comments during closing 
arguments about the roles of the district attorney and defense 
counsel, the State argues that the prosecutor merely presented 
information that is common knowledge concerning what the 
prosecution and defense do.  The State argues that such common 
knowledge, combined with the circuit court's instructions that 
statements and arguments of counsel are not evidence, clarified 
for the jury that the prosecutor's statements and arguments were 
clearly not to be regarded as evidence. 
¶39 The State argues that, even if the prosecutor's 
statements and arguments were improper, they were insufficient 
to warrant a new trial, because statements and arguments must be 
looked at in the context of the entire trial and that, on 
balance, Mayo was not prejudiced.  See State v. Wolff, 171 Wis. 
2d 161, 168, 491 N.W.2d 498 (Ct. App. 1992).  The State points 
out that defense counsel also made improper assertions in his 
closing argument, stating that it was the prosecutor's job to 
"spin[] the evidence into the way the prosecutor wants you to 
see it" and analogizing the prosecutor to Saddam Hussein. 
¶40 At oral argument before this court, the State conceded 
that the prosecutor's remarks regarding Mayo's pre-Miranda 
silence 
during 
her 
opening 
statement, 
and 
during 
direct 
examination of the State's witnesses, were improper.  However, 
the State argues that even if there was a Fifth Amendment 
violation of Mayo’s right to silence, it was harmless error.  
Brecht, 143 Wis. 2d at 317.  The State asserts that Mayo's 
decision whether or not to testify was not affected by the 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
18 
 
State’s use of the pre-Miranda silence because, on April 8, 
2003, the first day of trial, defense counsel told the judge, 
prior to jury selection, that the only witness to testify for 
the defense would be Mayo.  In his opening statement, the 
defense attorney again explained to the court, and also this 
time to the jury, that Mayo would be the only witness testifying 
for the defense. 
¶41 The State also conceded in its brief that the 
prosecutor improperly commented on materials not in evidence, 
when she stated during closing argument that her job was to 
examine police reports, to decide whether to file charges, and 
to decide whether to dismiss charges.  However, the State argues 
that Mayo's counsel did not object to the prosecutor's comments, 
and that the comments were not so objectionable as to have 
offended Mayo's right to due process. 
¶42 While we are satisfied that, although some of the 
arguments of both the prosecutor and defense counsel were 
improper, the remarks did not reach a level warranting a new trial 
based either on plain error or in the interest of justice.  
Specifically, the prosecutor's statements that the role of defense 
counsel was to "get his client off the hook" and "not to see 
justice done but to see that his client was acquitted" were 
improper, even though they may have been invited by defense 
counsel's remarks about the prosecutor's role.  Defense counsel's 
remarks in his closing argument analogizing the prosecutor to 
Saddam Hussein and accusing the prosecutor of "spinning the 
evidence" were also improper and disparaging.  Such disparaging 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
19 
 
remarks, made by both the prosecutor and defense counsel in this 
case, did not comport with the rules of ethics and civility that 
members of the bar are expected to, and required to, follow.  Such 
remarks demean the judicial process and are not acceptable in 
Wisconsin courts.  Under Supreme Court Rule 62.02(1)(c)(2002), 
lawyers are to "[a]bstain from making disparaging, demeaning or 
sarcastic remarks or comments about one another." 
¶43 Although the prosecutor's disparaging remarks were 
improper, when looked at in context of the entire trial, they 
did not prejudice Mayo.  See Wolff, 171 Wis. 2d at 168.  When a 
defendant alleges that a prosecutor’s statements and arguments 
constituted 
misconduct, 
the 
test 
applied 
is 
whether 
the 
statements "'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make 
the resulting conviction a denial of due process.'"  Davidson, 
236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶88 (citation omitted).  It is improper for 
parties to comment on facts not in evidence.  Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 
at 676.  However, a prosecutor may comment on the evidence, argue 
to a conclusion from the evidence, and may state that the 
evidence convinces him or her and should convince the jury.  
Adams, 221 Wis. 2d at 19.  There is a fine distinction between 
what is and is not permitted concerning the lawyer's personal 
opinion.  Even if there are improper statements by a prosecutor, 
the statements alone will not be cause to overturn a conviction.  
Rather, the statements must be looked at in context of the 
entire trial.  Wolff, 171 Wis. 2d at 168. 
¶44 The fact that defense counsel’s role is to advocate 
for his client is common knowledge, shared by jurors.  Under 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
20 
 
such circumstances, it is quite unlikely that the prosecutor’s 
remarks about the role of defense counsel, and vice versa, had 
any significant influence over the jury's decision here.  
Furthermore, the circuit court instructed the jury that opening 
statements and closing arguments are not evidence and are not to 
be considered by the jurors as evidence.  We are satisfied, 
therefore, that the jury was not improperly influenced by the 
prosecutor's 
comments 
and 
that 
the 
comments 
did 
not 
so 
"'infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting 
conviction a denial of due process.'"  Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 
537, ¶88 (citation omitted). 
¶45 The prosecutor's comment during her closing arguments 
that Mayo committed a "crime of opportunity" was not purely 
opinion, but was based on evidence before the jury.  The 
prosecutor explained that there were discrepancies between the 
police 
reports 
and 
Mayo’s 
statements, 
as 
well 
as 
the 
discrepancies between Mayo’s story of a drug deal gone bad and 
Price’s story of a robbery.  The prosecutor argued to a 
conclusion from the evidence, as is permitted under Adams, 221 
Wis. 2d at 19.  The prosecutor also explained the process by which 
she reviews a file, and decides whether to charge a person with a 
crime, and she explained that the prosecutor’s office has an open 
file policy. 
 
These comments provided general information 
regarding the prosecutorial process, and did not, in this case, 
give the jury any information that would unfairly influence its 
decision 
and 
"'infect[] 
the 
trial 
with 
unfairness. . . ."  
Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶88 (citation omitted). 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
21 
 
¶46 We agree with Mayo's position, and the State's 
concession at oral argument, that the prosecutor's remarks on 
Mayo's pre-Miranda silence, and the testimony she elicited in 
that regard, during the State's opening statement and case-in-
chief, violated Mayo's right to remain silent under the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article I, 
Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  We have held that it 
is a "violation of the right to remain silent for the State to 
present testimony in its case-in-chief on the defendant's 
election to remain silent during a custodial investigation, 
after arrest."  Brecht, 143 Wis. 2d at 310-11 (citation 
omitted).  When a defendant testifies, "references by the State 
during cross examination, on redirect and in closing arguments 
to 
defendant's 
pre-Miranda 
silence 
do 
not 
violate 
the 
defendant's right to remain silent."  Adams, 221 Wis. 2d at 8 
(citation omitted).  However, the prosecutor's references to 
Mayo's 
pre-Miranda 
silence 
in 
her 
opening 
statement 
and 
examination of the State's witnesses, prior to Mayo's testimony, 
were a violation of Mayo's constitutional right to remain 
silent. 
¶47 In determining whether a constitutional error is 
harmless, the inquiry is as follows: "'Is it clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the 
defendant guilty absent the error?'"  State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 
93, ¶46, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 (quoting Neder v. 
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)).  This court also has 
formulated the test for harmless error in alternative wording.  
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
22 
 
Under Chapman v. California, the error is harmless if the 
beneficiary of the error proves "'beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained.'"  State v. Anderson, 2006 WI 77, ¶114, 291 Wis. 2d 
673, 717 N.W.2d 74 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 
24 (1967), reh'g denied, 386 U.S. 987 (1967)).6  While we 
recognize that this court recently has formulated the harmless 
error test in a variety of ways, whichever formulation is 
applied, we are satisfied that the error here was harmless for 
the reasons hereafter set forth.  Anderson, 291 Wis. 2d 673, 
¶114. 
¶48 This court has articulated several factors to aid in 
harmless error analysis. These factors include the frequency of 
the error, the importance of the erroneously admitted evidence, 
the 
presence 
or 
absence 
of 
evidence 
corroborating 
or 
contradicting the erroneously admitted evidence, whether the 
erroneously admitted evidence duplicates untainted evidence, the 
nature of the defense, the nature of the State's case, and the 
                                                 
6 Recently, in Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. ___ (2007), the 
United States Supreme Court revisited the issue of harmless 
error, holding that in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceedings, a federal 
court must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error 
in a state court criminal trial under the "substantial and 
injurious effect" standard set forth in State v. Brecht, 143 
Wis. 2d 297, 307, 421 N.W.2d 96 (1988), whether or not the state 
appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for 
harmlessness under the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" 
standard set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 
(1967), reh’g denied, 386 U.S. 987 (1967). 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
23 
 
overall strength of the State's case.  State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, 
¶61, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 691 N.W.2d 637. 
¶49 In the present case, the improper references in the 
State's opening statement and case-in-chief to Mayo's pre-
Miranda silence were infrequent.  The prosecutor's references to 
Mayo's pre-Miranda silence in her opening statement and during 
the State's case-in-chief comprise only 7 sentences out of 177 
pages of the trial transcript.  The infrequency of the 
references in the context of the entire trial mitigated any 
possible prejudicial effect on the jury.  Brecht, 143 Wis. 2d at 
318.  Examining the importance of the erroneously admitted 
evidence and the defense's case, Hale, 277 Wis. 2d 593, ¶61, we 
are convinced further that the remarks concerning Mayo's pre-
Miranda silence were not prejudicial to Mayo for several other 
reasons. 
¶50 Mayo’s decision to testify was not affected by the 
State’s use of his pre-Miranda silence.  Before jury selection, 
defense counsel explained to the court that the only witness to 
testify for the defense would be Mayo.  Then, in his opening 
statement, defense counsel told the jury that Mayo would be 
testifying. 
¶51 Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's 
statements concerning Mayo's pre-Miranda silence during the 
State's opening statement and direct examination of the State's 
witnesses.  Furthermore, Mayo testified at trial that he was not 
silent when Price identified him to police as the alleged 
robber.  It is clear that the defense presented evidence that 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
24 
 
contradicted the State's comments and its line of questioning 
regarding Mayo's pre-Miranda silence.  Under the circumstances, 
we conclude that it is "'clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the 
error'" and that reversal is not required.  State v. Harvey, 254 
Wis. 2d 442, ¶46 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 18); see also 
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. 
¶52 The prosecutor also commented on Mayo's pre-Miranda 
silence during closing arguments and on cross-examination of 
Mayo.  As noted previously, the prosecutor’s use of Mayo’s pre-
Miranda silence was not improper on these occasions.  Pre-Miranda 
silence may be used (1) to impeach a defendant when he or she 
testifies or (2) substantively to suggest guilt.  Adams, 221 
Wis. 2d at 9.  Once the defendant testifies, his or her pre-
Miranda silence may be used by the prosecutor.  By the time of the 
State’s closing arguments, Mayo had testified, and his testimony 
differed substantially from the testimony of other witnesses.  The 
prosecutor used Mayo's pre-Miranda silence in cross-examining Mayo 
to impeach him, and in the State's closing argument to suggest 
guilt, which Adams explains is permissible.  Id. 
¶53 Mayo also argues that the circuit court erred in 
allowing Officer Langendorf and Price to testify regarding 
Price's statements to Officer Langendorf.  He argues that such 
testimony was inadmissible hearsay and that, because it was 
admitted, the jury was able to hear repeatedly Price's disputed 
testimony.  The State argues that the testimony was properly 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
25 
 
admitted under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay 
rule.   Wis. Stat. § 908.03(2).7 
¶54 We agree with the State's position that Price's out-
of-court statements were properly admitted under the excited 
utterance exception to the hearsay rule.  Id.   In talking to 
Officer Langendorf, Price was describing a startling event——his 
encounter with Mayo, during which he claimed that he was robbed 
and battered.  Price testified that he spoke with Officer 
Langendorf only a few minutes after the event occurred.  
According to Officer Langendorf, Price was visibly upset and 
bleeding.  Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that Price 
made the statement while "under the stress of excitement caused 
by the event. . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 908.03(2). 
¶55 As noted previously, we review evidentiary rulings 
with deference, to determine whether the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretion in accordance with the facts and 
accepted legal standards.  Tucker, 259 Wis. 2d 484, ¶28.  We are 
satisfied here that the circuit court properly exercised its 
discretion when it admitted Price's out-of-court statements 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 908.03 states in relevant part: 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, 
even though the declarant is available as a witness: 
. . . . 
(2) Excited utterance.  A statement relating to a 
startling event or condition made while the declarant 
was under the stress of excitement caused by the event 
or condition. 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
26 
 
under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.  
Wis. Stat. § 908.03(2). 
¶56 Mayo argues that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel in several respects, which sometimes overlap with other 
claims of error, including the fact that his attorney did not 
object to the improper remarks of the prosecutor in her opening 
statement, and in her closing and rebuttal arguments.  Mayo also 
argues that defense counsel was ineffective because he did not 
object to the hearsay testimony of Officer Langendorf or Price, 
and because he did not know the law regarding pre-Miranda 
silence.  Mayo further asserts that he is entitled to a new 
trial in the interest of justice under Wis. Stat. § 751.06 
(2005-06).  Mayo argues that defense counsel's failure to object 
to the prosecutor's comments in her opening statement, and in 
her 
closing 
and 
rebuttal 
arguments, 
prevented 
the 
real 
controversy from being fully tried.  State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 
150, 160, 549 N.W.2d 435 (1996).  He also argues that, under the 
circumstances of this case, there has been a miscarriage of 
justice. 
¶57 Mayo argues that defense counsel was unprepared, as 
demonstrated by the fact that he did not corroborate Mayo’s 
testimony even though he had the possibility to do so through 
McMorris, that he did not impeach Price’s testimony because he 
never ordered a copy of Price's testimony at the preliminary 
hearing, 
that 
he 
admitted 
that 
he 
did 
no 
independent 
investigation, that he relied completely upon police reports, 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
27 
 
that he did not hire an investigator, and that he spoke to no 
potential witnesses other than Mayo. 
¶58 The 
State 
argues 
that 
defense 
counsel 
was 
not 
ineffective, and that any failures to object were strategic 
decisions.  Regarding defense counsel's failure to corroborate 
Mayo's testimony with the testimony of McMorris, the State argues 
that defense counsel, consistent with his testimony at the 
postconviction motion hearing, chose not to use this testimony in 
an effort to minimize the November 17, 2002 encounter between 
Mayo and Price, in favor of emphasizing their November 16, 2002 
encounter.  The State also argues that defense counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to impeach Price's testimony.  The State 
asserts that, although Price did give conflicting testimony 
regarding whether he was with a companion on November 17, the 
failure to impeach did not prejudice Mayo because the jurors 
still had good reason from the evidence presented to believe 
Price and to disbelieve Mayo. 
¶59 However, we are satisfied that defense counsel's 
failure to conduct any independent investigation amounted to 
deficient performance under the circumstances, but Mayo failed to 
show that there was a reasonable probability that the result of 
the proceeding would have been different.  Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 694.  There has been no showing of prejudice here.  Lawyers 
have a duty "'to conduct a prompt investigation of the 
circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues leading to 
facts relevant to the merits. . . .'"  Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d at 638 
(citation omitted).  Defense counsel should have asked Mayo if 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
28 
 
there were any possible witnesses to the encounters between Mayo 
and Price, and should have interviewed any potential witnesses. 
¶60 The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
guarantees effective assistance of counsel.  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687.  Mayo argues that he is entitled to a new trial 
because his counsel's deficiencies prevented the real controversy 
from being fully tried.  Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 160.  However, the 
Strickland test is the proper test to apply in the context of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  There are two elements 
that underlie every claim of ineffective assistance of counsel: 
first, the person making the claim must demonstrate that his or 
her counsel's performance was deficient; and second, he or she 
must 
demonstrate 
that 
this 
deficient 
performance 
was 
prejudicial.  McDowell, 272 Wis. 2d 488, ¶49; Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687.  We give "great deference to counsel's performance, 
and, therefore, a defendant must overcome a strong presumption 
that counsel acted reasonably within the professional norms."  
Trawitzki, 244 Wis. 2d 523, ¶40. 
¶61 Under the two-pronged test that underlies the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, we need not address both the 
performance and the prejudice elements, if the defendant cannot 
make a sufficient showing as to one or the other element.  State 
v. Tomlinson, 2001 WI App 212, ¶40, 247 Wis. 2d 682, 635 N.W.2d 
201.  See also State v. Roberson, 2006 WI 80, ¶28, 292 Wis. 2d 
280, 717 N.W.2d 111 (citation omitted)("[C]ourts may decide 
ineffective 
assistance 
claims 
based 
on 
prejudice 
without 
considering whether the counsel's performance was deficient").  
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
29 
 
In State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶59, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 
305, we stated that "prejudice should be assessed based on the 
cumulative effect of counsel's deficiencies." 
 
As noted, we are satisfied that, in failing to conduct 
any independent investigation, defense counsel was deficient.  
As an example, if defense counsel had fully investigated the 
case, the defense could have been in a position to present 
possible corroboration testimony from an additional potential 
witness, McMorris.  McMorris testified at the postconviction 
motion hearing on April 29, 2004, that she saw Mayo after the 
alleged altercation between Mayo and Price on November 17, 2002.  
She testified that Mayo had blood on the palm of his hand, and 
that Mayo told her that Price had tried to "jump" him and tried 
to hit him with a tire iron.  However, it is important to note 
that McMorris was not an eyewitness to the altercation between 
Mayo and Price and, therefore, could not have provided testimony 
on what actually occurred during such altercation.  We cannot 
speculate as to whether there were other potential witnesses 
that may have been discovered through an investigation by 
defense counsel, and what they would have said, since such 
potential testimony was not presented to the court. 
¶63 Defense counsel was not deficient, however, for 
failing to object to the prosecutor's improper remarks during 
closing arguments, the use of pre-Miranda silence, or the 
hearsay evidence properly admitted as an excited utterance.  
Defense counsel's lack of objections on these matters was found 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
30 
 
by the circuit court to involve defense strategy, which this 
court will not now second-guess.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
¶64 On balance, we are satisfied, viewing the deficiencies 
of defense counsel and the incidents of prosecutorial misconduct 
individually and for the cumulative effect,8 that Mayo has not 
established that there was a reasonable probability that the 
result would have been different.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  
In order to show prejudice under Strickland, the defendant must 
show "that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."  
Id. at 687.  See also State v. Gordon, 2003 WI 69, ¶22, 262 Wis. 
2d 380, 663 N.W.2d 765.  Looking at the entire trial in light of 
the Strickland formulation of prejudice, Mayo's trial was not so 
infected with error as to amount to a deprivation of his right to 
a fair trial.  The result reached by the jury was reliable.  The 
jurors had the opportunity to listen to the testimony of Price 
and Mayo, and to determine the credibility of each of them.  
Certainly, the focus in this case was on the testimony of those 
two witnesses and, obviously, the jury believed Price and 
rejected the testimony of Mayo.  We hold, therefore, that Mayo 
                                                 
8 Federal cases have not limited the cumulative error test 
to the errors of defense counsel; rather, they have applied or 
expressed a willingness to apply the cumulative error test to 
all types of errors.  See, e.g., Alvarez v. Boyd, 225 F.3d 820, 
824 (7th Cir. 2000); U.S. v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th 
Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1472 (9th Cir. 1988).  
This court relied on federal cases in adopting the cumulative 
error analysis in State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶¶59, 60, 62, 81, 
264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305.  
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
31 
 
has not shown that defense counsel's deficient performance was 
prejudicial, so as to warrant a new trial.  McDowell, 272 Wis. 
2d 488, ¶49. 
IV 
¶65 We 
hold 
that, 
although 
there 
was 
improper 
prosecutorial argument in this case, such misconduct did not so 
infect the trial with unfairness as to constitute a denial of 
Mayo's due process rights, thus warranting a new trial, either 
due to plain error or in the interest of justice.  He has not 
shown that the real controversy was not fully tried, nor has he 
established that there was a miscarriage of justice.  There is 
not a substantial probability of a different result, even if a 
new trial were held. 
¶66 We further hold that the circuit court properly 
admitted testimony concerning Price's out-of-court statements to 
the police, under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay 
rule.  Wis. Stat. § 908.03(2).  Finally, we hold that, although 
defense counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to 
conduct an independent investigation, Mayo has not established 
that there was a reasonable probability that the result would 
have been different.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  Mayo was not 
prejudiced by such deficient performance.  On balance, we are 
satisfied, viewing the deficiencies of defense counsel and the 
incidents of prosecutorial misconduct for their cumulative 
effect, that Mayo is not entitled to a new trial and, therefore, 
the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
No. 
2004AP1592-CR   
 
32 
 
¶67 By the Court.— The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2004AP1592-CR.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
¶68 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring).  A unanimous 
court concludes that defense counsel's failure to conduct any 
independent investigation amounted to deficient performance 
under the circumstances.  Majority op., ¶¶3, 59, 62, 66.  See 
also Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶¶89, 91, 95, 106.  At 
issue is whether the defendant has shown that counsel's 
deficiency prejudiced the defense.  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 
510, 521 (2003).  "The defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  
A 
reasonable 
probability 
is 
a 
probability 
sufficient 
to 
undermine confidence in the outcome."  Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). 
¶69 Because the defendant has failed to show that a 
reasonable probability exists that the result of the proceeding 
would have been different,1 I join the majority opinion.  That 
does not mean that I agree that defendant has not been 
prejudiced here; he has.  His attorney admitted that he did no 
independent investigation.  Potential witnesses have thus been 
forever lost.  Absent any additional witnesses, defendant has 
consequently failed to meet his requisite burden of showing the 
level of prejudice needed to overturn the conviction.  I write 
separately because this case illustrates the difficulties this 
court has in determining whether the defendant can ever show the 
requisite amount of prejudice necessary to overturn a conviction 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶59. 
No.  2004AP1592-CR.lbb 
 
2 
 
when a defense attorney fails to investigate the case, and 
potential evidence favorable to the defense is forever lost. 
¶70 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice 
regarding a lawyer's duty to investigate provide as follows: 
It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt 
investigation of the circumstances of the case and to 
explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the 
merits of the case and the penalty in the event of 
conviction.  The investigation should always include 
efforts to secure information in the possession of the 
prosecution and law enforcement authorities.  The duty 
to investigate exists regardless of the accused's 
admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts 
constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire to 
plead guilty. 
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005) (quoting 1 ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 (2d ed. 1982 Supp.)).  See 
also State v. Love, 2005 WI 116, ¶40, 284 Wis. 2d 111, 700 
N.W.2d 62.  Appling that standard, the United States Supreme 
Court has held counsel's performance in a capital sentencing 
proceeding to be deficient where counsel failed to examine a 
defendant's prior conviction file or transcript of the victim's 
testimony.  Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 389-90.  Similarly, the Court 
has held counsel's performance to be deficient in a capital 
sentencing proceeding where counsel, without a strategic basis 
for the decision, failed to look beyond the presentence 
investigation report and Department of Social Service records 
for mitigating evidence.  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527-28, 532-34. 
 
¶71 In both cases, the United States Supreme Court held 
that counsel's deficient performance was also prejudicial.  
Critical to the majority's determination of prejudice in this 
No.  2004AP1592-CR.lbb 
 
3 
 
case is why the United States Supreme Court reached that 
conclusion. 
¶72 In Wiggins, the mitigating evidence that counsel 
failed to investigate was described by the Court as "powerful."  
539 U.S. at 534.  Defendant presented postconviction testimony 
concerning an elaborate social history report a licensed social 
worker had prepared containing evidence of physical torment, 
sexual molestation and repeated rape defendant suffered at the 
hands of his mother and while in the care of a series of foster 
parents.  Id. at 516, 535.  The report also documented that he 
was homeless for a period, and had diminished mental capacities.  
Id. at 535.  The Court concluded that had the jury been able to 
place 
the 
defendant's 
"excruciating 
life 
history 
on 
the 
mitigating side of the scale, there is a reasonable probability 
that at least one juror would have struck a different balance."  
Id. at 537. 
¶73 Similarly, in Rompilla, defense counsel at trial 
failed to investigate "pretty obvious signs" that defendant had 
a troubled childhood and suffered from mental illness and 
alcoholism, relying instead on defendant's own description of an 
unexceptional background.  545 U.S. at 379.  Postconviction 
counsel pointed out that trial counsel never examined school 
records, juvenile and adult incarceration records, or evidence 
of a history of alcohol dependence, and failed to examine the 
court file of defendant's prior conviction, which included the 
transcript of the victim's testimony.  Id. at 382-83.  This 
latter point the court found dispositive.  Id. 
No.  2004AP1592-CR.lbb 
 
4 
 
¶74 The Court concluded that had defense counsel looked at 
the prior conviction file, "it is uncontested they would have 
found a range of mitigation leads that no other source had 
opened up."  Id. at 390.  The files contained an evaluation that 
showed defendant had a history of alcohol abuse, showed 
indications of schizophrenia and other mental disorders, and was 
tested at a third-grade level of cognition after nine years of 
schooling.  Id. at 390-91.  The file further showed that 
defendant's parents were both chronic alcoholics; that his 
father had a vicious temper and frequently beat defendant's 
mother; that his parents fought violently, his mother once 
stabbing his father; and that his father beat him when he was 
young with leather straps, belts and sticks.  Id. at 391-92.  
The file further showed that the defendant and his brother were 
locked in a small wire mesh dog pen that was filthy and 
excrement filled, and that the defendant was not allowed to 
visit other children or talk to anyone on the phone.  Id. at 
392. 
¶75 The 
jury 
never 
heard 
this 
evidence. 
 
Id.  
Postconviction counsel, on the other hand, used this information 
never seen by trial counsel to do further testing of the 
defendant.  Id.  The Court concluded that the undiscovered 
mitigating evidence might well have influenced the jury's 
appraisal of defendant's culpability.  Id. at 393. 
¶76 In both Wiggins and Rompilla, postconviction counsel 
presented the evidence that would have made a difference in the 
outcome of the earlier proceeding that was not discovered 
No.  2004AP1592-CR.lbb 
 
5 
 
because 
trial 
counsel 
failed 
to 
conduct 
an 
adequate 
investigation.  Thus, the Court did not have to speculate as to 
what the undiscovered evidence might have shown in assessing the 
prejudice prong of Strickland. 
¶77 We have similarly held that a postconviction motion in 
an ineffective assistance of counsel setting must allege 
material facts that allow a reviewing court to meaningfully 
assess defendant's claims.  Love, 284 Wis. 2d 111, ¶27.  A 
postconviction motion will be sufficient if it alleges within 
the four corners of the motion "the five 'w's' and one 'h'; that 
is, who, what, where, when, why, and how."  Id. (quoting State 
v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶23, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433).  
Applying that standard, we concluded that where defense counsel 
failed to investigate a phone call from the county jail to 
defendant's mother from an identified individual claiming to 
have knowledge of the robbery defendant was convicted of, those 
alleged facts, if true, would entitle defendant to relief.  Id., 
¶¶22, 39-42.  Our approach is therefore consistent with that 
which was taken in Wiggins and Rompilla.  Postconviction counsel 
presented the missing evidence that trial counsel failed to 
investigate, giving the appellate court the ability to assess 
the damage done by trial counsel's deficient performance.  We 
are simply not in a position to speculate about the existence of 
witnesses that have not been identified, and what these 
witnesses might have said if defense counsel had discovered 
these witnesses by conducting a proper investigation prior to 
trial.  See majority op., ¶62. 
No.  2004AP1592-CR.lbb 
 
6 
 
¶78 So what does that leave us with here?  As the Chief 
Justice points out, we have a "he-said-he-said" case.  Chief 
Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶99.  The victim testified that he 
was robbed of 35 dollars at gunpoint by defendant Mayo.  Mayo, 
on the other hand, testified that the victim shorted him in a 
drug deal gone bad, and that when the victim refused to return 
Mayo's 35-dollar purchase price, Mayo struck, kicked and stomped 
the victim while getting his money back.  Price and Mayo also 
gave conflicting stories about what had occurred the next day 
outside a taco restaurant concerning whether the victim and a 
companion had attacked Mayo with a tire iron.  No one other than 
these two testified.  The testimony of additional witnesses who 
may have seen either of the altercations between Mayo and Price 
may well have affected the outcome in this "he-said-he-said" 
case. 
¶79 Unfortunately, trial counsel did not speak to the 
victim's friend named Jarrell or Jarrell's mother, even though 
the victim went to Jarrell's house just after the robbery, as 
the robbery occurred nearby.  Trial counsel never interviewed 
anyone that might have been at the restaurant the next night 
when the tire iron incident occurred.  Trial counsel admitted 
that he conducted no independent investigation, did not hire an 
investigator, and spoke to no potential witnesses other than 
Mayo. 
¶80 Appellate counsel was unable to produce any witnesses 
at the postconviction hearing who could testify about the events 
surrounding the robbery.  While appellate counsel did produce a 
No.  2004AP1592-CR.lbb 
 
7 
 
potential witness, McMorris, concerning the altercation that 
occurred the night after the robbery, McMorris did not see that 
altercation, and merely had information provided to her by Mayo 
as to what he told her that night.  Thus, unlike the situations 
presented in Love, Wiggins and Rompilla, we are left to 
speculate about whether potential witnesses to the robbery exist 
and what they might say. 
¶81 The 
net 
effect 
of 
trial 
counsel's 
failure 
to 
investigate is that Mayo was ultimately deprived of any 
opportunity to mount a credible defense.  In my view, that 
amounts to prejudice.  Yet I agree with the majority that the 
prejudice incurred does not meet the standard required for a new 
trial under Strickland.  The result in this case, while legally 
correct, should disturb us all. 
 
 
No.  2004AP1592-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶82 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  This 
trial was a contest of the credibility of the only two witnesses 
to the street encounter: the defendant and the complaining 
witness.  This was a classic instance of "he-said-he-said."    
¶83 As the prosecutor correctly argued to the jury, 
"Basically what this case comes down to is credibility.  Is 
Clarence Price [the complaining witness] more credible or is 
Thomas Mayo [the defendant] more credible?" 
¶84 The 
defendant 
and 
the 
complaining 
witness 
both 
testified.  They agreed that there was an altercation.  They 
disagreed, however, about what happened during the encounter.  
The defendant asserted that it was a drug deal gone bad.  The 
complaining witness asserted that it was an unprovoked robbery.  
Each man had a felony record.  The jury had no independent 
confirmation of either man's competing account of the encounter. 
¶85 Credibility determinations are for the jury.  The 
problem is that the credibility determinations in the present 
case were made in a trial awash with errors and improper conduct 
by the defense counsel and by the prosecuting attorney, as the 
majority opinion carefully explains. 
¶86 I agree with the majority opinion that the multiple 
errors of both the defense counsel and the prosecutor must be 
viewed cumulatively, that is in the aggregate, to determine 
No.  2004AP1592-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
whether the errors were "so serious as to deprive the defendant 
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."1 
¶87 The majority opinion and the State conclude that the 
errors and improper conduct were not sufficient to warrant a new 
trial under any of the three doctrines that protect a fair trial 
against trial errors: plain error (Wis. Stat. § 901.03(4)), 
interest of justice (Wis. Stat. § 751.06), or prejudicial error 
(Wis. Stat. § 805.18).  I disagree with the majority opinion and 
conclude 
that 
the 
cumulative 
errors 
affected 
the 
entire 
evidentiary picture and directly and substantially affected the 
credibility contest. 
¶88 The errors the defendant and majority opinion identify 
can 
be 
grouped 
into 
three 
overlapping 
and 
interrelated 
categories: (I) ineffective assistance of defense counsel; (II) 
improper statements by the prosecutor; and (III) improper 
admission of hearsay testimony. 
¶89 The 
majority 
opinion 
concludes 
that 
there 
was 
deficient 
defense 
counsel 
performance 
and 
erroneous 
prosecutorial conduct.  Although I might have concluded that the 
defense counsel and prosecutor erred in more ways than the 
majority opinion identifies, for purposes of this dissent, I 
accept the majority opinion's conclusions about what conduct was 
erroneous.  The majority opinion also concludes that the hearsay 
testimony was admissible under the excited utterance exception 
to the hearsay rule.  Majority op., ¶54.  I accept this 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶33 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687 (1984), ¶64.   
No.  2004AP1592-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
conclusion for purposes of this dissent.  In light of the other 
errors the majority opinion identifies, the hearsay ruling and 
other instances in which the majority opinion finds no error are 
ultimately irrelevant in my analysis. 
¶90 In contrast to the majority opinion, I conclude that 
the cumulative, interrelated errors (as identified by the 
majority opinion) were pervasive and so infected the jury's 
credibility determination that the aggregate errors undermine 
confidence in the verdict.  A new trial is warranted regardless 
of which test is used and regardless of whether the State or the 
defendant has the burden of proof of prejudicial error.2 
I 
¶91 The majority opinion concludes that various aspects of 
defense 
counsel's 
conduct 
fell 
below 
the 
objective 
constitutional standard for effective assistance of counsel in 
several respects, all of which amount to defense counsel's 
complete failure to conduct any independent investigation (but 
were not prejudicial).  Defense counsel's deficient performance 
as acknowledged by the majority opinion is as follows: 
(1) Defense counsel failed to conduct any independent 
investigation 
and 
failed 
to 
interview 
any 
potential 
witnesses, relying completely and solely on the police 
                                                 
2 For discussions of alternative ways of stating harmless 
error tests and of different tests for different errors,  see, 
e.g., State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, ¶60, n.9, ¶¶79-85, 277 
Wis. 2d 593, 691 N.W.2d 637 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); id., 
¶¶85-90 (Wilcox, J. concurring); id., ¶¶100-18 (Butler, J., 
concurring); 
State 
v. 
Harvey, 
2002 
WI 
93, 
¶¶50-54, 
254 
Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 (Crooks, J., concurring); id., ¶¶55-
77 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).  
No.  2004AP1592-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
reports and defense counsel's conversations with the 
defendant.  Majority op., ¶¶3, 57, 59, 62. 
(2) 
Subsumed under defense counsel's failure to 
investigate is the defense counsel's failure to obtain the 
complaining witness's sworn testimony at the preliminary 
hearing, which might have been used to impeach the 
complaining witness. 
(3) Had defense counsel investigated he would have 
been in a position to present possible corroboration 
testimony from an additional witness, McMorris.  Majority 
op., ¶62. 
¶92 The Sixth Amendment right "to have the Assistance of 
Counsel" is the right to effective assistance of counsel.3  
Effective 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
requires 
"an 
adequate 
investigation of the facts of the case, consideration of viable 
theories, 
and 
development 
of 
evidence 
to 
support 
those 
theories."4  Since Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), 
the seminal case on ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
United States Supreme Court has become more exacting in 
analyzing investigatory failures.5 
                                                 
3 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) 
(quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)). 
4 Henderson v. Sargent, 926 F.2d 706, 711 (8th Cir. 1991). 
5 Jenny 
Roberts, 
Too 
Little, 
Too 
Late: 
Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel, The Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial 
Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 Fordham Urb. L. J. 1097, 1110-
11, 1114-15 (2004).  
No.  2004AP1592-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶93 The type and intensity of the investigation defense 
counsel conducts varies from case to case, and the court 
generally defers to counsel's judgment.6  Nevertheless, this 
court has held that defense "counsel's lack of any significant 
independent investigation falls outside of this wide spectrum" 
of representation and preparation.7  The United States Supreme 
Court has similarly declared that "if counsel entirely fails to 
subject 
the 
prosecution's 
case 
to 
meaningful 
adversarial 
testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights 
that 
makes 
the 
adversary 
process 
itself 
presumptively 
unreliable."  United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984). 
¶94 This court has approved of and adhered to Standard 4-
4.1 of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, The Defense 
Function (approved draft 1971, 2d ed. 1982, 3d ed. 1993), which 
imposes an unequivocal duty on defense counsel to conduct "a 
prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and 
explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of 
the case . . . ."  This duty to investigate exists "regardless 
of the accused's admission or statements to defense counsel of 
facts constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire to plead 
guilty."  For cases referring to the duty-to-investigate 
                                                 
6 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-91 (1984) 
(recognizing the "wide latitude counsel must have in making 
tactical decisions" and that "strategic choices made after less 
than complete investigation" may be reasonable if "reasonable 
professional 
judgments 
support 
the 
limitations 
on 
investigation"). 
7 State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶45, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 
N.W.2d 305. 
No.  2004AP1592-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
standard with approval, see, e.g., State v. Love, 2005 WI 116, 
¶40, 284 Wis. 2d 111, 700 N.W.2d 62; State v. Pitsch, 124 
Wis. 2d 628, 638, 369 N.W.2d 711 (1985); State v. Felton, 110 
Wis. 2d 485, 501, 329 N.W.2d 161 (1983); Roe v. State, 95 
Wis. 2d 226, 238-39, 290 N.W.2d 291 (1980); State v. Bowie, 92 
Wis. 2d 192, 206, 284 N.W.2d 613 (1979); State v. Harper, 57 
Wis. 2d 543, 552-53, 205 N.W.2d 1 (1973). 
¶95 The record in the present case is clear:  There was 
absolutely no investigation on behalf of the defendant.  Defense 
counsel conceded this point.  Majority op., ¶57.  The majority 
opinion acknowledges this point.  Majority op., ¶¶3, 57, 59, 62.  
This deficiency, however, was not a matter of trial strategy.  A 
lawyer cannot make a rational decision about a defense without 
first investigating.  All of defense counsel's errors in failing 
to investigate were clear error. 
¶96 We now turn to the question whether the defense 
counsel's numerous errors in failing to investigate the case 
require a new trial.  The majority opinion subjected the claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel to a cumulative error 
analysis, examining whether, when taken as a whole, defense 
counsel's deficiencies prejudiced the defendant.  Majority op., 
¶64.  I agree with the cumulative error approach; I disagree 
with the majority's conclusion that the defendant was not 
prejudiced. 
¶97 In the present case, defense counsel's total failure 
to investigate may be viewed as effectively denying the 
defendant assistance of counsel.  Under this analysis, no 
No.  2004AP1592-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
prejudice need be shown, and no harmless error test need be 
applied.8  The defendant should get the relief sought: a new 
trial. 
¶98 If, however, the Strickland prejudicial error standard 
is applied to defense counsel's failure to investigate in the 
present case, the focus of the inquiry regarding whether 
counsel's constitutionally deficient performance is prejudicial 
is not on the outcome of the trial, but on "the reliability of 
the proceedings."9 
¶99 The State's "he-said-he-said" case was weak.  Defense 
counsel's failure to investigate affected the entire evidentiary 
picture and directly and substantially affected the credibility 
contest between the defendant and the complaining witness.  
Under the total circumstances of this case, defense counsel's 
deficient 
performance 
undermined 
the 
reliability 
of 
the 
proceedings.  Defense counsel's failure to investigate therefore 
constitutes prejudicial error in the present case. 
II 
¶100 Although the defendant is, in my opinion, entitled to 
a new trial on the basis of the errors of defense counsel alone, 
I turn next to discuss the other errors that infected the trial. 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., King v. State, 810 P.2d 119, 123 (Wyo. 1991) 
(presuming prejudice when defense counsel failed to secure trial 
testimony of two potential eyewitnesses). 
9 State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 642, 369 N.W.2d 711 
(1985), quoted with approval in State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, 
¶20, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305.  See also majority op., 
¶64.  
No.  2004AP1592-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶101 In addition to the errors of the defense counsel, the 
majority opinion concludes that the prosecutor also committed 
errors.  The prosecutor's errors are described in the majority 
opinion as follows: 
(1) In her opening statement the prosecutor infringed 
upon the defendant's federal (Fifth Amendment) and state 
(Art. I, § 8) constitutional right to remain silent by 
calling attention to the fact that the defendant remained 
silent after being accused of robbery.  Majority op., ¶¶3, 
46.10  
(2) In questioning the State's witnesses during the 
case-in-chief, the prosecutor repeatedly infringed upon the 
defendant's federal (Fifth Amendment) and state (Art. I, 
§ 8) constitutional right to remain silent by calling 
attention to the fact that the defendant remained silent 
after being accused of robbery.  Majority op., ¶¶3, 46.11 
(3) During closing argument, the prosecutor made 
improper comments regarding the role of defense counsel 
                                                 
10 At oral argument the State conceded that the prosecutor's 
remarks regarding the defendant's pre-Miranda silence during her 
opening statement were improper.  Majority op., ¶40. 
The majority opinion concludes that defense counsel's 
failure to object to the improper comments of the prosecutor 
during closing argument and the prosecutor's use of pre-Miranda 
silence was acceptable defense trial strategy.  Majority op., 
¶63. 
11 At oral argument the State conceded that the prosecutor's 
remarks regarding the defendant's pre-Miranda silence during 
direct examination of the State's witnesses were improper.  
Majority op., ¶40. 
No.  2004AP1592-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
when she said that it was defense counsel's job to "get his 
client off the hook," and "not to see justice done but to 
see that his client was acquitted."  Majority op., ¶¶3, 42, 
43. 
(4) During closing argument, the prosecutor improperly 
told jurors that her job was to examine police reports, to 
decide whether to file charges, and to decide whether to 
dismiss charges if she thought the charges were unjust or 
untrue.  The prosecutor's comments can be found at majority 
op., ¶16.  The prosecutor's reference to her quasi-judicial 
task of filing charges amounted to the improper discussion 
by counsel of materials not in evidence and therefore 
exceeded the scope of proper argument.  Majority op., ¶41. 
¶102 These prosecutorial errors affected the jury's view of 
the defendant and his version of the incident.  By stressing the 
defendant's silence in the face of accusations, the prosecutor 
wanted the jury to infer that the defendant is guilty: an 
innocent person would have denied the charge. 
¶103 In her closing statement the prosecutor painted an 
ugly portrait of defense counsel relentlessly focused on 
procuring a "not guilty" verdict at all costs.  The logical 
implication of the prosecutor's remarks was don't trust defense 
counsel, don't trust the evidence defense counsel offered, and 
don't trust the defendant. 
¶104 In contrast, the prosecutor presented herself as 
prosecuting only cases in which the complaining witness offered 
a reliable rendition of events.  The prosecutor wanted the jury 
No.  2004AP1592-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
to infer that she would not have brought this case if she didn't 
believe the complaining witness and that because the prosecutor 
believes the complaining witness, the jury should as well. 
¶105 In short, 
the prosecutor's improper conduct was 
designed to and did attack the credibility of the defendant and 
underscored the complaining witness's credibility.  In a case 
like the instant one, where the credibility of the defendant and 
the complaining witness determines guilt, the prosecutor's 
errors were grave indeed. 
¶106 The prosecutor's improper conduct was exacerbated by 
the defense counsel's deficient performance in failing to 
investigate, in failing to present a corroborating witness, in 
failing to procure the testimony of the complaining witness at 
the preliminary examination to use for impeachment purposes, and 
in failing to object when the prosecutor erred. 
¶107 When I consider the centrality of the credibility 
contest and the defense counsel's and the prosecutor's errors in 
the aggregate, I am troubled, as was the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in a similar case, by the possible cumulative effect of 
those errors which go to the credibility of the defendant and 
the complaining witness.  In the context of the present case and 
considering the entire record, I cannot conclude "that a 
balkanized, issue-by-issue harmless error review would be very 
enlightening 
in 
determining 
whether 
the 
[defendant 
was] 
prejudiced by the errors."  United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 
1464, 1476 (9th Cir. 1988). 
No.  2004AP1592-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶108 I conclude that under the proper application of the 
cumulative error test, the multiple errors of the defense 
counsel and the prosecutor undermine confidence in the outcome 
of the trial and denied the defendant of his right to a fair 
trial. 
¶109 For the reasons set forth, I conclude that a new trial 
is warranted, and therefore I dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  2004AP1592-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1