Case Title: People v. Hendrix

Citation: 

Docket Number: S265668

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2022-08-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE,  
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ISAIAH HENDRIX, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S265668 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Six 
B298952 
 
Ventura County Superior Court 
2017025915, 2018037331 
 
 
August 22, 2022 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Groban, Jenkins, and Guerrero concurred. 
 
1  
PEOPLE v. HENDRIX 
S265668 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
Early one October morning, defendant Isaiah Hendrix 
walked up to a house in Oxnard, knocked on the door, and rang 
the doorbell.  Hearing no response, Hendrix walked around the 
house to the backyard, opened a screen door, and attempted to 
open the locked glass door behind it.  Then, failing that, Hendrix 
sat down on a bench and stayed there.  Hendrix was sitting on 
the bench when police arrived.  Hendrix told police he was there 
to visit his cousin, but Hendrix’s cousin did not, in fact, live in 
the house.  Hendrix was charged with burglary.   
At trial, the court gave the jury a standard mistake of fact 
instruction, which informed jurors that they should not convict 
Hendrix if they determined he lacked criminal intent because he 
mistakenly believed a relevant fact — namely, that the house 
belonged to his cousin and not to a stranger.  But the instruction 
specified that the mistake in question had to be a reasonable 
one.  All parties now acknowledge this was error:  To negate the 
specific criminal intent required for burglary, a defendant’s 
mistaken belief need not be reasonable, just genuinely held.  The 
question before us is whether the instructional error was 
prejudicial and thus requires reversal.  The Court of Appeal, 
concluding Hendrix’s claim of mistake was not credible in any 
event, answered no.  We reach a different conclusion.  The 
instructional error effectively precluded the jury from giving full 
consideration to a mistake of fact claim that was supported by 
substantial evidence, where resolution of the issue was central 
PEOPLE v. HENDRIX 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
2 
to the question whether Hendrix possessed the criminal intent 
necessary for conviction.  Whether that claim is credible is a 
matter for a jury to decide.  We reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal and remand for further proceedings.  
I. 
A. 
The case before the jury turned on a single question:  what 
was Isaiah Hendrix doing at the house in Oxnard? 
Surveillance video captured Hendrix there around 7:00 
a.m.  The video showed Hendrix pacing back and forth in front 
of the house, then walking up to the front door, where he 
knocked and pressed the video doorbell.  He then walked around 
the house and opened a side gate into the yard.  He pushed open 
the backyard screen door, then attempted to open the glass 
sliding door behind it.   
Artrose Tuano, who lived in the house, was home at the 
time.  Tuano testified that he had never seen Hendrix before; 
that the screen door into the house was locked; and that he 
called the police when Hendrix tried to “jimmy” it open.  When 
police arrived, they found Hendrix sitting on a bench in the 
backyard.  Officer Christian Aldrete of the Oxnard Police 
Department testified that when he confronted Hendrix in the 
backyard, Hendrix was sitting calmly and looked “surprised” to 
see him.  Officer Randi Vines testified that a search of Hendrix 
revealed no burglary tools; Hendrix was carrying only a water 
bottle.   
Hendrix immediately offered an explanation for his 
presence at the Oxnard house:  He claimed to be looking for his 
cousin Trevor at the house, and asserted that a friend told him 
Trevor had moved there.  Trevor did not, in fact, live at the 
PEOPLE v. HENDRIX 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
3 
address.  Officer Vines, who, as a matter of chance, knew cousin 
Trevor from high school, testified at trial that Trevor lived 
several blocks away.  Hendrix was arrested and charged with 
first degree burglary.  (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460.)1 
At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence to cast doubt 
on Hendrix’s explanation for his presence at the Oxnard house.  
It played a recording of a call from Ventura County Jail in which 
Hendrix asked his mother to come up with somebody who could 
testify they had given him the wrong address.  She responded:  
“Oh.  No.  You need to do — one of your friends [to] do that crap.  
I ain’t getting nobody caught up or doing any type of drama or 
lying.”  The conversation moved on from there.  On another 
recorded call, Hendrix’s uncle stated that Hendrix had been 
doing some “crazy shit,” including “breaking in people’s houses,” 
and asked “what were you doing?”  Hendrix responded by 
muttering “I don’t know,” then laughing and chiding his uncle 
for “talking smack.”  Nicole Rodriguez, a supervisor at the 
Oxnard Costco, testified that Hendrix had previously stolen 
from the store by deploying an excuse that he was looking for a 
relative.  Hendrix, she explained, had appeared at the Costco 
 
1 
First degree burglary is defined as entry into an inhabited 
dwelling with the intent to commit a felony.  (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 
460.)  “ ‘[A] burglary is complete upon the slightest partial entry 
of any kind, with the requisite intent.’ ”  (People v. Valencia 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 1, 8, disapproved on other grounds by People 
v. Yarbrough (2012) 54 Cal.4th 889, 894.)  In this case Hendrix 
concedes he committed an entry — albeit a very slight one — 
when he briefly extended his hand past the open screen door; he 
notes that People v. McEntire (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 484, 491–
493, found the entry requirement satisfied based on a similar 
breach of screen-door space.  Hendrix’s arguments instead focus 
on whether he committed the entry with the requisite criminal 
intent. 
PEOPLE v. HENDRIX 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
4 
without a membership card, claiming to be looking for his 
mother.  Rodriguez agreed to accompany Hendrix while he 
searched for her.  But upon arriving at the alcohol section, 
Hendrix grabbed a bottle of tequila and left the store without 
paying.   
The defense rested without presenting witnesses or 
evidence.  In closing, the defense’s central argument to the jury 
was that Hendrix had made a crucial mistake of fact about who 
lived at the house, which explained why, after knocking on the 
front door and trying to open the back door, Hendrix simply sat 
down in the backyard and waited for Trevor to arrive.  The 
prosecution disputed there had been any mistake.   
B. 
Before it retired to deliberate, the jury was instructed on 
the elements of burglary according to CALCRIM No. 1700:  “The 
defendant is charged with burglary.  To prove the defendant is 
guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:  One, the 
defendant entered a structure; and two, when the defendant 
entered a structure he intended to commit theft.  To decide 
whether the defendant intended to commit theft, please refer to 
the separate instructions I give you on the crime.”2   
To guide the jury’s consideration of the intent element, the 
defense requested CALCRIM No. 3406, concerning mistake of 
 
2  
The trial court instructed on theft with CALCRIM 
No. 1800 that “[t]o prove the defendant is guilty of this crime, 
the People must prove that the defendant was in possession of 
property of someone else,” that “[h]e took the property without 
the owner’s consent,” and that “he took the property and he 
moved the property even a small distance and kept it for any 
period of time, however brief.” 
PEOPLE v. HENDRIX 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
5 
fact.  That instruction provides that the defendant is not guilty 
of the charged crime if he lacked the mental state required to 
commit the crime because of a mistaken belief or lack of 
knowledge.  As the bench notes indicate, the instruction can be 
given in two ways, depending on whether the crime is one of 
general intent — in which case the defendant’s belief must be 
both actual and reasonable — or specific intent, in which case 
the defendant need hold only an actual but mistaken belief in 
the relevant fact.  (Judicial Council of Cal., Crim. Jury Instns. 
(2021) Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3406; see generally, e.g., 
People v. Lawson (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 108, 115 (Lawson).)  
Although the prosecutor here did not object to the defense’s 
request to give the mistake of fact instruction, he asked that the 
court give the version of the instruction applicable to general 
intent crimes, which requires proof of an actual and reasonable 
mistaken belief.  The court agreed to do so.  The jury was thus 
instructed on mistake of fact as follows: 
“The defendant is not guilty of burglary if he did not have 
the intent or mental state required to commit the crime because 
he reasonably did not know a fact or reasonably and mistakenly 
believed a fact.  [¶]  If the defendant’s conduct would have been 
lawful under the facts as he reasonably believed them to be, he 
did not commit burglary.  [¶]  If you find the defendant believed 
that the defendant’s cousin Trevor resided at the home and if 
you find that belief was reasonable, the defendant did not have 
a specific intent or mental state required for burglary.  [¶]  If 
you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant had 
the specific intent or mental state required for burglary, you 
must find him not guilty of that crime.”  (Italics added.) 
PEOPLE v. HENDRIX 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
6 
As the parties now agree, the inclusion of the italicized 
language was error.3  Burglary is a specific intent crime.  (People 
v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 313.)  It requires not only 
that a defendant enter a structure, but that he do so with a 
particular objective in mind:  larceny (or any other felony).  (Pen. 
Code, § 459; People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1077; see 
People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 457 [specific intent refers to 
“defendant’s intent to do some further act or achieve some 
additional consequence” besides commission of a proscribed 
act].)  As the criminal jury instructions themselves make clear, 
an unreasonable but honest mistaken belief in a fact can negate 
the required showing of intent.  (Judicial Council of Cal., Crim. 
Jury Instns., supra, Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3406.)   
Following 
a 
series 
of 
otherwise 
unremarkable 
instructions, the case went to the jury.  It found Hendrix guilty 
of first degree burglary and the court sentenced him to a term of 
10 years. 
On appeal, the People conceded the mistake of fact 
instruction was erroneous but argued the error was harmless.  
A divided Court of Appeal agreed.  Applying the harmless error 
standard for state law error set out in People v. Watson (1956) 
46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson), the majority concluded there was “no 
reasonable probability [Hendrix] would have obtained a more 
favorable result” in the absence of the instructional error.  
(People v. Hendrix (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1097 (Hendrix).)  
 
3 
The defense did not object to the prosecutor’s request to 
use the general-intent version of the instruction.  The Attorney 
General does not, however, dispute that Hendrix’s challenge to 
the instruction is cognizable on appeal.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1011–1012 (Hudson).) 
PEOPLE v. HENDRIX 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
7 
The court took the view that Hendrix’s purported belief that he 
was at Trevor’s house was a “fabrication” that “did not make 
sense to the jury” and “does not cohere on appeal either.”  (Id. at 
pp. 1098, 1097.) 
In dissent, Justice Tangeman viewed the erroneous 
mistake of fact instruction as tantamount to “misinstruction on 
an element of the offense.”  (Hendrix, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 1100 (dis. opn. of Tangeman, J.).)  Justice Tangeman would 
consequently have applied a more demanding standard of 
harmless error review — the federal “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” standard set out in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 
U.S. 18, applicable to errors under the federal Constitution.  
Applying that standard, Justice Tangeman would have 
reversed. 
We granted review, limited to two questions:  (1) What 
standard of prejudice applies to the trial court’s error in 
instructing on mistake of fact, and (2) whether the Court of 
Appeal erred in holding the error harmless.   
II. 
The type of mistake of fact claim Hendrix raised in this 
case is often described as a “defense” to the charge.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Hanna (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 455, 462.)  But the term 
is somewhat misleading, because mistake of fact is, generally 
speaking, “not a true affirmative defense.”  (Lawson, supra, 215 
Cal.App.4th at p. 118.)4  It is, rather, an assertion by the 
 
4  
There is a recognized exception for certain public welfare 
offenses where the prosecution is not required to prove 
knowledge or intent of a particular fact, such as the age of a 
would-be purchaser of alcohol, but where we nonetheless allow 
 
PEOPLE v. HENDRIX 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
8 
defendant that a particular factual error in his perception of the 
world led him to lack the mens rea required for the crime.  (See 
Pen. Code, § 26, paragraph [3] [persons are not capable of 
committing crimes if they “committed the act . . . under an 
ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal 
intent”]; Lawson, at p. 111 [“The mistake-of-fact defense 
operates to negate the requisite criminal intent or mens rea 
element of the crime”]; People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 
996–998 [same conclusion with respect to similar “defense” of 
accident]; see also, e.g., State v. Sexton (N.J. 1999) 733 A.2d 
1125, 1128–1130 [discussing the relationship between mistake 
of fact and mens rea].)  
Say a defendant is charged for theft of a box of oranges.  
(People v. Photo (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 345, 346.)  He claims he 
mistakenly thought the oranges were his. If the defendant 
indeed believed the oranges were his, it is necessarily true that 
he did not intend to steal them from someone else.  His mistake 
of fact claim, then, is simply one particular way of saying he 
lacked the mens rea required for theft.  (Id. at p. 353.)  In this 
way mistake of fact operates as a kind of failure-of-proof defense, 
reflecting a defendant’s attempt to suggest the prosecution 
failed in its burden to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant acted with the criminal intent required for the 
offense.  (1 Wharton’s Criminal Law (16th ed. 2021) Mistake of 
Fact, § 13.2, pp. 384–387.)  “ ‘If the defendant’s ignorance or 
mistake makes proof of a required culpability element 
impossible, the prosecution will necessarily fail in its proof of the 
offense.’ ”  (State v. Sexton, supra, 733 A.2d at pp. 1128–1129, 
 
the defendant to raise mistake as an affirmative defense.  (See 
In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 280–281.) 
PEOPLE v. HENDRIX 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
9 
quoting Robinson & Grall, Element Analysis in Defining 
Criminal Liability:  The Model Penal Code and Beyond (1983) 
35 Stan. L.Rev. 681, 726–727.) 
In this case, Hendrix’s mistake of fact claim was raised in 
connection with the question whether he intended to commit 
theft once inside the Oxnard house.  Whether the jury credited 
the claim would determine whether he possessed the requisite 
criminal intent:  that is, whether he was innocently intending to 
look for his cousin Trevor or culpably intending to carry out a 
burglary.5  The prosecutor’s theory of Hendrix’s intent was 
captured in the positive phrasing of the substantive mens rea 
instruction:  Hendrix intended to burglarize the home.  
Hendrix’s theory of intent was captured in the negative 
phrasing of the mistake of fact instruction:  He intended to visit 
Trevor, not carry out a burglary.  Because they ultimately help 
the jury answer the same question — Hendrix’s state of mind at 
the time he entered the home — the two instructions should 
have been aligned:  The jury was instructed, if not in so many 
words, that burglary is a specific intent crime, so it should have 
received a specific intent mistake of fact instruction that 
 
5  
There is one explanation of Hendrix’s actions that would 
break this mirror-image connection between mistake of fact and 
mens rea:  if Hendrix indeed believed that the house was 
Trevor’s, but intended to burglarize his own cousin’s house.  The 
People argue that, by not acknowledging this possibility, the 
mistake of fact instruction was misleading in a way that actually 
favored Hendrix, rather than the People.  As a theoretical 
matter, the People might have a point.  But the theoretical 
possibility that Hendrix intended to burglarize his cousin Trevor 
was raised and rejected at trial:  The parties briefly wrangled 
over the burglarizing-Trevor’s-house theory while crafting the 
jury instructions, but the judge dismissed the idea as “a little bit 
far fetched” and that theory was never presented to the jury.  
PEOPLE v. HENDRIX 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
10 
recognized the possibility that a genuine, if unreasonable, belief 
would negate a finding of criminal intent.  (People v. Givan 
(2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 335, 350; Lawson, supra, 215 
Cal.App.4th at p. 115.)  The jury instead received a more limited 
mistake of fact instruction geared toward general intent crimes, 
generating the problem in this case. 
III. 
It is undisputed that the trial court’s instruction on 
mistake of fact was erroneous.  But not every error at trial 
requires reversal; the law requires us to affirm a jury verdict 
despite instructional error if the error was harmless.  Indeed, in 
California, harmless-error review is a matter of constitutional 
mandate:  “The California Constitution imposes upon this court 
an obligation to conduct ‘an examination of the entire cause’ and 
reverse a judgment below for error only upon determining that 
a ‘miscarriage of justice’ has occurred.”  (People v. Sivongxxay 
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 178, quoting Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)  As 
the high court has explained, the harmless-error doctrine 
“recognizes the principle that the central purpose of a criminal 
trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or 
innocence, [citation], and promotes public respect for the 
criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the 
trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of 
immaterial error.”  (Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 
673, 681, citing R. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error (1970) 
p. 50.)   
The central question before us is whether the instructional 
error at issue was prejudicial and thus requires reversal of the 
resulting conviction.  We conclude it was. 
PEOPLE v. HENDRIX 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
11 
A. 
At the outset, we address the threshold question of the 
standard for evaluating prejudice.  The “generally applicable 
California test for harmless error” is set forth in Watson, supra, 
46 Cal.2d 818.  (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 176.)  
Under the Watson test, we deem an error harmless unless it is 
“reasonably probable” the outcome would have been different in 
the absence of the error.  (Watson, at p. 836.)  As a general 
matter, this test applies to “ ‘ “incorrect, ambiguous, conflicting, 
or wrongly omitted instructions that do not amount to federal 
constitutional error.” ’ ”  (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 
935, 955.) 
“In contrast, we evaluate the harmlessness of violations of 
the federal Constitution under the standard set forth in 
Chapman v. California[, supra,] 386 U.S. 18.”  (People v. 
Gonzalez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 195.)  This “stricter” standard of 
review requires reversal unless the error is “harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  (People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 
1141, 1160.)  Among the constitutional errors subject to 
Chapman review is misinstruction of the jury on one or more 
elements of the offense.  (People v. Wilkins (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 
351 (Wilkins); Hudson, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1013.)  This is 
because the federal Constitution requires “criminal convictions 
to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of 
every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  (United States v. Gaudin (1995) 515 U.S. 
506, 510; accord, Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 5; 
Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 277–278.)  A jury 
misinstruction that relieves the prosecution of its burden to 
prove an element of the crime — by either misdescribing the 
element or omitting it entirely — violates this requirement.  
PEOPLE v. HENDRIX 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
12 
(See Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 10 [“In both 
cases — misdescriptions and omissions — the erroneous 
instruction precludes the jury from making a finding on the 
actual element of the offense”].)  
Here, the Attorney General defends the Court of Appeal’s 
decision to apply the ordinary Watson test for state law error.  
Hendrix, by contrast, urges us to adopt the view of Justice 
Tangeman’s dissent below:  that the trial court’s misinstruction 
on mistake of fact was tantamount to a misinstruction on the 
mental, or mens rea, element of the offense, requiring the 
application of Chapman review.  (Hendrix, supra, 55 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1100 (dis. opn. of Tangeman, J.).)   
We recently considered a similar issue in People v. Molano 
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 620, 670, in which we addressed a criminal 
defendant’s claim that a trial judge erroneously failed to modify 
a reasonable-mistake-of-fact instruction on rape in a manner 
that would have informed the jury that an unreasonable belief 
in the victim’s consent, if genuinely held, would also negate the 
specific intent to commit rape.  After first finding the claim of 
error forfeited, and only assuming without deciding the validity 
of the theory, we concluded any error in failing to instruct on an 
unreasonable-mistake defense was harmless.  We treated the 
error as one of state law, citing Court of Appeal precedent for 
the proposition that “ ‘[e]rror in failing to instruct on the 
mistake-of-fact defense is subject to the harmless error test set 
forth in People v. Watson.’ ”  (Molano, at p. 670.) 
Molano cited several Court of Appeal cases, including 
People v. Givan, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th 335, which involved a 
mistake of fact claim based on the defendant’s voluntary 
intoxication (id. at pp. 339, 347–349).  Voluntary intoxication, 
PEOPLE v. HENDRIX 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
13 
like mistake of fact, is an issue that “bears on the question of 
whether the defendant actually had the requisite specific 
mental state.”  (People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119.)  
We have reviewed instructional errors regarding a defense of 
voluntary intoxication under Watson.  (See People v. Pearson 
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 306, 325; People v. Jackson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 
1170, 1195.)   
Hendrix contends that, in order to prove he harbored the 
requisite criminal intent to steal, the prosecution in his case was 
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not 
make a mistake about Trevor’s residence.  (See People v. 
Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 157; People v. Frye (1992) 7 
Cal.App.4th 1148, 1159; People v. Bolden (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 
1591, 1600–1601; People v. Howard (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1526, 
1533, disapproved on another ground by People v. Fuhrman 
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 947, fn. 11.)  The error here, in Hendrix’s 
view, lessened the prosecution’s burden of proof on that point.   
Hendrix compares the result to the error in the escape rule 
instruction at issue in Wilkins, supra, 56 Cal.4th 333, to which 
we applied Chapman, not Watson, on review.  In that case, the 
defendant stole a set of kitchen appliances from a home and fled 
down the 91 freeway in a pickup truck.  (Id. at p. 338.)  Some 62 
miles later, a stove fell off the back of the truck and killed 
another motorist.  (Id. at pp. 338–339.)  Wilkins was convicted 
of felony murder on the theory that the death of the motorist 
occurred during the commission of a burglary.  (Id. at p. 340.)  
But the trial court erroneously declined to give an instruction on 
the “escape rule” — the rule that “ ‘[t]he crime of burglary 
continues until the perpetrator has actually reached a 
temporary place of safety.’ ”  (Id. at p. 341.)  The People argued 
Watson applied on review for harmless error (id. at p. 348), but 
PEOPLE v. HENDRIX 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
14 
we disagreed and instead evaluated the error under Chapman, 
concluding the error “amounted to misinstruction on an element 
of the offense.”  (Id. at p. 350.)  Hendrix argues the same result 
ought to obtain here, notwithstanding Molano. 
The Attorney General disputes Hendrix’s characterization 
of the error, as well as the analogy to the escape rule at issue in 
Wilkins.  Ultimately, however, we need not resolve this dispute 
about the proper characterization of the error for purposes of 
applying Chapman or Watson, because the erroneous mistake of 
fact instruction was prejudicial even under the less stringent 
standard set out in Watson.   
B. 
Under Watson, a reviewing court must reverse if “it is 
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the 
appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the 
error.”  (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)  “ ‘ “We have made 
clear that a ‘probability’ in this context does not mean more 
likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an 
abstract possibility.” ’ ”  (Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 1040, 1050, italics omitted.)   
The mistake of fact instruction at Hendrix’s trial told the 
jury that Hendrix lacked the requisite mens rea if his mistaken 
belief that he was visiting Trevor’s house was reasonable — 
implying, of course, the same was not true if his belief was 
unreasonable.  But Hendrix’s mistake did not need to be 
reasonable; it was enough if it was genuinely held.  At least as 
the case was presented to the jury, if Hendrix believed he was 
visiting Trevor’s house, then Hendrix necessarily lacked the 
mens rea for the crime.  The misinstruction at Hendrix’s trial 
effectively operated to impose an unwarranted reasonableness 
PEOPLE v. HENDRIX 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
15 
requirement on Hendrix’s mistake of fact claim.  Nor was that 
error cured, as the Attorney General urges, by the presence of a 
correct instruction on burglary.  Although the mens rea 
instruction did correctly tell the jury that the intent to commit 
theft was required for a conviction, the mistake of fact 
instruction incorrectly implied that an unreasonable mistake 
would be insufficient to negate that intent.  (See People v. Speck 
(2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 784, 793 [failure to give mistake of fact 
instruction was not cured by correct instruction on mens rea 
element of the crime where “intent was the primary issue in 
dispute”]; see id. at pp. 790–795.) 
The potential effect of the error was considerable in this 
case, where Hendrix’s mistake of fact claim was the central 
disputed issue at trial.  Competing assessments of Hendrix’s 
mental state occupied the vast majority of closing argument.  
The prosecutor admitted that the mens rea element was where 
“the most dispute is going to be in this case,” since “there was a 
significant amount of evidence directed towards this element 
during the trial.”  After arguing that the jury should interpret 
Hendrix’s actions on the surveillance video as an attempt to 
burgle Tuano’s home, the prosecutor emphasized facts casting 
doubt on Hendrix’s alternative explanation for his arrival at the 
house.  According to the prosecutor, Hendrix could not possibly 
have believed Trevor lived at the house.  “The cousin’s house is 
in the same general area, a few blocks away, but it’s not in a 
similar relationship to any of the nearby landmarks.  It’s on the 
other side of Gonzales Road.  It’s on the other side of a high 
school.”  There was “no evidence that Trevor lives there,” even 
though “that’s the story that the defendant supplied.”  “He’s not 
in the right neighborhood, he’s not on the right side of Gonzales 
Road.  There’s no evidence of another explanation other than a 
PEOPLE v. HENDRIX 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
16 
theft that fits all the evidence in this case.”  Rather, “common 
sense says when someone is trying to get into a house that they 
think is empty that they have no connection to, that they don’t 
have any reason to be there, then the rational common sense 
explanation, the thing that everyone knows is that it’s to steal.”  
Ultimately, the prosecutor told the jury, “you’re presented with 
this conflict between the direct evidence of the defendant’s 
statement of his intent and all of the circumstantial evidence in 
the case.  And you have to say, okay, what explains everything?  
What fits with everything?”  And the answer was simple:  
“there’s only one reasonable interpretation of all the evidence in 
this case . . . the defendant is guilty of Count 1, residential 
burglary.”  According to the prosecutor, Hendrix’s alternative 
theory — that he had made a mistake of fact and intended to 
visit his cousin Trevor — was utterly incredible:  there was “not 
any credible evidence of an alternative intent” and “we know” 
Hendrix’s mistake of fact story was “a pack of lies.”  
The defense argued just the opposite:  Hendrix “went [to 
the house] with the intent to find his cousin, not to break in.”  
Defense counsel added:  “From the very beginning, when the 
officers had their guns drawn he told them, ‘I’m here looking for 
Trevor.’ ”  Defense counsel emphasized that Hendrix had been 
sitting on the backyard bench for seven minutes before officers 
arrived.  “Is that the act of a burglar or is that the act of someone 
waiting and trying to find their cousin?”  “[W]hen Mr. Hendrix 
is knocking at the door, is it reasonable that he’s looking for his 
cousin?  Yes.  How do we know it’s reasonable?  His cousin lives 
two blocks away.”  And the defense repeatedly emphasized its 
reliance on the mistake of fact theory:  “If you find that the 
defendant believed that his cousin Trevor resided at the home 
PEOPLE v. HENDRIX 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
17 
and if you find that belief is reasonable, you must find him not 
guilty.  You must.”   
The jurors’ attention was thus directed to deciding which 
narrative was correct:  an opportunistic burglary of a stranger, 
or a social visit to a house Hendrix believed was Trevor’s.  On 
this crucial point the erroneous mistake of fact instruction was 
highly relevant — and also highly likely to mislead the jury.  At 
least one juror could easily have considered Hendrix’s purported 
belief unreasonable — for example, because the Tuano home (as 
the prosecutor emphasized) was not sufficiently close to Trevor’s 
actual address — and applied the erroneous reasonableness 
requirement to rule out Hendrix’s mistake-of-fact theory from 
consideration.   
Certainly, as the Court of Appeal emphasized, the 
evidence supporting Hendrix’s mistake of fact defense was not 
overwhelming.  (Hendrix, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 1097.)  
And there was evidence pointing in the other direction.  The 
prosecution introduced evidence suggesting that Hendrix did 
not in fact believe that Trevor lived at the house, including 
evidence that Hendrix had previously told a similar family-
related story when stealing from the Oxnard Costco; that he 
failed to deny his uncle’s statement over the telephone that he 
had been “breaking in people’s houses”; and that his recorded 
conversation with his mother, in which he asked her to find 
“somebody” who could be a witness for him at trial and did not 
respond to her statement that this task could involve her in 
“drama or lying,” indicated that, at a minimum, Hendrix did not 
recall who had told him Trevor lived at the house — and perhaps 
that no one had done so, and Hendrix may have been trying to 
procure someone to lie on his behalf.  The prosecution relied 
extensively on this evidence at closing argument to rebut 
PEOPLE v. HENDRIX 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
18 
Hendrix’s contention that he was mistaken about who lived in 
the house and intended not to steal, but to visit his cousin. 
Ultimately, however, the question is not whether the 
jurors could have concluded that Hendrix was intentionally 
lying — certainly they could — but instead whether the nature 
of the evidence leaves us “ ‘in serious doubt as to whether the 
error affected the result.’ ”  (People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 
457, 484.)  And there are reasons for serious doubt in this case, 
including evidence of conduct difficult to explain as part of an 
intended burglary:  Why, if Hendrix was attempting to break 
into a stranger’s home, did he choose to remain seated in the 
backyard, where police found him several minutes later?  And 
why, if his intent was to commit burglary, did he have no 
burglary tools?  A jury could reasonably understand the security 
footage of Hendrix’s meandering approach to the house as casing 
the home in preparation for burglary — but a jury could also see 
the footage as capturing a bumbling and disjointed attempt to 
locate Trevor, capped by a frustrated decision to sit down on the 
backyard bench and wait.  
Although the main issue at trial was whether Hendrix 
genuinely believed that Trevor lived at the house — and not 
specifically whether Hendrix’s belief was reasonable — a juror 
viewing all the evidence would naturally have considered the 
possibility that Hendrix was neither intentionally lying nor 
harboring a reasonable belief, but was instead unreasonably 
(though honestly) mistaken about where his cousin really lived.  
Indeed, defense counsel expressly noted the possibility of 
confusion at closing argument:  “[W]hat the D.A. wants you to 
do is believe that every single act that someone makes always 
can lead to a logical explanation.  And people don’t always do 
things that make sense.  Sometimes people are on drugs.  
PEOPLE v. HENDRIX 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
19 
Sometimes people are not on their drugs.  And sometimes the 
things people do don’t make sense.”  A jury considering the 
evidence in this case would have had considerable reason to 
believe that Hendrix’s actions fell into that last category. 
Given the evidence before the jury, there is “ ‘ “more than 
an abstract possibility” ’ ” (Richardson v. Superior Court, supra, 
43 Cal.4th at p. 1050, italics omitted) that at least one juror 
thought Hendrix genuinely believed the house belonged to a 
relative and that this juror or jurors were influenced by the 
erroneous mistake of fact instruction to discount that belief as 
unreasonable under the circumstances.6  As Hendrix points out, 
the circumstances surrounding the deliberations are at least 
consistent with this conclusion.  It appears the jury did not find 
 
6  
We have not previously decided whether a hung jury, as 
opposed to an acquittal, is a “more favorable” (Watson, supra, 46 
Cal.2d at p. 836) outcome for purposes of harmless error review 
under Watson.  (See People v. Soojian (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 
491, 518–521.)  But several Court of Appeal cases have 
answered that question in the affirmative.  (See People v. Doane 
(2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 965, 984 [“Here, the question is whether 
it is reasonably probable that, absent the errors, at least one 
juror would have voted to acquit Doane of gross vehicular 
manslaughter”]; People v. Dryden (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1007, 
1025 [“we consider whether it is reasonably probable that one or 
more jurors would conclude that the prosecution failed to meet 
its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 
did not act in lawful self-defense if this case were tried without 
the erroneous admission of the prior acts evidence”]; People v. 
Zaheer (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 326, 341 [“there is a reasonable 
chance that at least one juror relied on the prospect of a different 
car to reconcile his or her doubts about the reliability of 
Martha’s testimony”]; cf. People v. Winkler (2020) 56 
Cal.App.5th 1102, 1171 [finding error harmless because there 
was no reasonable probability that “even a hung jury would have 
been achieved”].)  We do the same today. 
PEOPLE v. HENDRIX 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
20 
this to be an open-and-shut case, despite the fact that Hendrix’s 
actions at the Oxnard house were recorded on video for the jury’s 
review.  The jury reported a deadlock midway through 
deliberations and requested a transcript or readback of 
Hendrix’s jailhouse phone calls, suggesting a particular concern 
with what those calls could reveal about Hendrix’s intentions at 
the house.   
The Attorney General rightly notes that the jurors were 
entitled to consider the reasonableness of Hendrix’s purported 
belief as one factor in answering the ultimate question in the 
case:  whether Hendrix intended to steal or actually and in good 
faith believed that the house he entered belonged to Trevor.  It 
is generally true that a person is less likely to hold an 
unreasonable belief than a reasonable one, and the jurors were 
entitled to consider unreasonableness as a factor in this case.  
(See People v. Watt (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1218; People v. 
Navarro (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 11.)  The jurors were not, 
however, instructed to consider the reasonableness of Hendrix’s 
belief merely as proof of its genuineness.  They were instead 
instructed that Hendrix should not be found guilty if his belief 
was both reasonable and genuine — leaving the distinct, and 
incorrect, impression that Hendrix’s mistake of fact argument 
would have no purchase if his mistake was unreasonable.   
In concluding otherwise, the Court of Appeal appeared to 
ask the wrong question, and for that reason arrived at the wrong 
answer.  Watson instructs a reviewing court to ask whether 
there is a reasonable probability the jury might have reached a 
different result had it been instructed correctly.  (Watson, supra, 
46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)  In other words, Watson asks the court to 
imagine what the jury would have done in the counterfactual 
world in which it received correct instructions.  While the court 
PEOPLE v. HENDRIX 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
21 
should undertake that task in light of the “ ‘entire cause, 
including the evidence’ ” (ibid.), the reviewing court should focus 
solely on whether “the error affected the outcome” (People v. 
Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 165), not on whether the 
court personally believes that outcome was correct.  The 
distinction is vitally important.  An appellate court may, of 
course, consider the strength of the evidence against the 
defendant in determining whether the absence of a single, 
discrete error at trial would have made a difference to the trial’s 
overall outcome.  (See id. at p. 177 [in conducting harmless error 
analysis, “an appellate court may consider, among other things, 
whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so 
relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different 
outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable 
probability the error of which the defendant complains affected 
the result”].)  The court may not, however, rest a harmless error 
ruling on its own reweighing or reinterpretation of the evidence.  
These are questions solely for the jury, and a reviewing court 
must, at bottom, ground its analysis in what the “jury is likely 
to have done,” not how the court believes the jury should have 
analyzed the evidence before it.  (Ibid., italics omitted.) 
In finding the instructional error at Hendrix’s trial 
harmless, the Court of Appeal leaned heavily on its own view of 
the facts, rather than focusing its analysis on the error’s likely 
effect on the jury’s consideration of those facts.  The majority 
opined that “the story [Hendrix] told the police was a 
fabrication.”  (Hendrix, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 1098.)  In 
reaching that conclusion, the majority stepped into the role of 
the jury, weighing competing evidence before coming to its own 
conclusions about disputed facts in the case.  The majority 
correctly recognized, for example, that “[t]here is no evidence of 
PEOPLE v. HENDRIX 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
22 
what [Hendrix] was thinking while sitting in the backyard”; 
remarked that Hendrix “obviously” has “some mental 
impairment” that could have affected his state of mind; and 
observed that while sitting in the backyard, Hendrix could have 
been either “pondering on the whereabouts of cousin Trevor” or 
“pondering on his next attempted point of entry.”  (Id. at p. 1098, 
fn. 3.)  These were all, of course, central questions for the jury — 
questions the majority proceeded to answer itself.  “[W]e do not 
believe,” the majority concluded on this point, “that a friend told 
him that cousin Trevor had moved to the victim’s house.  It 
seems much more likely, consistent with the prosecutor’s theory, 
that appellant made up this excuse to avoid arrest.”  (Ibid.)   
The majority also appears to have offered its own 
interpretation of the security footage — concluding that 
Hendrix’s conduct in approaching the house constituted the 
“method of operation for a residential burglar,” opining that the 
evidence revealed “multiple forcible attempts to enter the house 
and a garage,” and asking:  “Would a person who subjectively 
believes that a cousin lives at a residence also think that the 
cousin would allow forcible entry for a social visit?”  (Hendrix, 
supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 1098.)  The court then “emphasized 
that [Hendrix] did not testify that he subjectively believed 
cousin Trevor lived at the scene of the burglary.”  (Ibid.)  (In 
point of fact, Hendrix did not testify at all, as was his Fifth 
Amendment right.)  And the court came to a firm conclusion 
about the meaning of Hendrix’s mumbled “I don’t know” 
response to his uncle on the jailhouse recording:  “This is not the 
comment of a person who subjectively believed that cousin 
Trevor lived in the house.”  (Hendrix, at p. 1098.) 
The Court of Appeal’s analysis amounted, in sum, to a 
determination that Hendrix’s story was false because it was 
PEOPLE v. HENDRIX 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
23 
unreasonable, convenient, and because the limited evidence 
supporting it was outweighed by other evidence.  But the law 
recognizes unreasonable mistakes as negating the specific 
intent required for burglary; a defendant’s factual claim is not 
false merely because it helps his case; and although the proof of 
Hendrix’s belief may have been limited, it was nonetheless 
sufficiently substantial to raise a genuinely contested issue.  The 
overall effect of the Court of Appeal’s approach was to substitute 
the court’s judgment for that of Hendrix’s jury regarding the 
central question in the case:  what Hendrix really believed when 
he approached the Oxnard house.  It may well be that a properly 
instructed jury would have agreed with the Court of Appeal’s 
assessment of the evidence.  But it was the jury’s assessment, 
not the Court of Appeal’s, to make.  
In sum, there is “ ‘ “a reasonable chance, more than an 
abstract possibility” ’ ” that Hendrix’s jury would have come to 
a different verdict had it been correctly told that it should not 
find Hendrix guilty if it believed Hendrix made an honest, but 
unreasonable, mistake.  (Richardson v. Superior Court, supra, 
43 Cal.4th at p. 1050, italics omitted.)  The law recognizes even 
an unreasonable mistake as grounds for acquittal under the 
circumstances.  And there was substantial evidence — not 
overwhelming evidence, but realistic evidence — to support the 
conclusion that Hendrix made an unreasonable mistake.  
Because there is at least a reasonable probability a jury making 
that assessment would have given a different answer had it 
received correct instructions in this case, we conclude the 
instructional error was prejudicial and requires reversal.  The 
Court of Appeal erred in concluding otherwise. 
 
 
PEOPLE v. HENDRIX 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
24 
IV. 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    KRUGER, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
GUERRERO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Hendrix 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 55 Cal.App.5th 1092 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S265668 
Date Filed:  August 22, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Ventura 
Judge:  Paul W. Baelly 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Adrian Dresel-Velasquez, under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 
Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen, Idan Ivri and John Yang, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Adrian Dresel-Velasquez 
P.O. Box 3443 
Santa Barbara, CA 93130 
(916) 215-3519 
 
John Yang 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 269-6105