Case Title: Commonwealth v. Karen K.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13170

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2023-01-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13170 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KAREN K., a juvenile. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 2, 2022. - January 4, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Firearms.  Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, 
Motion to suppress, Findings by judge.  Threshold Police 
Inquiry.  Constitutional Law, Stop and frisk, Reasonable 
suspicion, Investigatory stop.  Search and Seizure, 
Protective frisk, Reasonable suspicion, Threshold police 
inquiry. 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Suffolk County 
Division of the Juvenile Court Department on November 2, 2018. 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Joseph 
F. Johnston, J., and conditional pleas of delinquent were 
accepted by him. 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
Eva G. Jellison for the juvenile. 
Kathryn Sherman, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
William D. Dalsen for Committee for Public Counsel Services 
& others. 
2 
 
 
 
Erik Lampmann & Rachel Stuckey, of the District of 
Columbia, Daniel Donadio, of New Hampshire, Sara E. Silva, 
Thomas J. Carey, Jr., & Radha Natarajan for New England 
Innocence Project. 
Katharine Naples-Mitchell for Families for Justice as 
Healing & another. 
 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  Following a patfrisk, Boston police officers 
found a loaded firearm in the waistband of the juvenile 
defendant, who subsequently was charged with four firearms-
related offenses.1  The juvenile moved to suppress the evidence 
of the seized firearm on the grounds that police did not have 
reasonable suspicion to stop her, and did not have reasonable 
suspicion that she was armed and dangerous so as to permit the 
patfrisk.  After a hearing, a Juvenile Court judge determined 
that police had had reasonable suspicion that the juvenile had 
been carrying a firearm in her waistband, which permitted them 
to undertake a brief investigatory stop, and denied her motion 
to suppress.  The juvenile entered a conditional guilty plea to 
the four offenses, conditioned on the right to appeal from the 
denial of her motion to suppress.  Concluding that there had 
been reasonable suspicion to support the stop, an extended panel 
of the Appeals Court affirmed the denial; two justices dissented 
 
 
1 The juvenile was charged with possession of a firearm 
without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); possession of 
ammunition without a firearm identification card, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (h) (1); carrying a loaded firearm without a license, G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (n); and possession of a large-capacity feeding 
device, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m). 
3 
 
 
 
because they concluded that the circumstances did not give rise 
to reasonable suspicion.  See Commonwealth v. Karen K., 99 Mass. 
App. Ct. 216 (2021).  We allowed the juvenile's application for 
further appellate review and now affirm the judge's decision.2 
 
1.  Background.  The facts are derived from the motion 
judge's findings of fact, and from undisputed testimony at the 
hearing, with certain facts reserved for later discussion.  See 
Commonwealth v. Matta, 483 Mass. 357, 358 (2019) ("For the 
purposes of the motion to suppress, we present the facts found 
by the motion judge supplemented by uncontroverted facts from 
the record"); Commonwealth v. Manha, 479 Mass. 44, 45 (2018) 
("In our review of the denial of the defendant's motion to 
suppress, we accept the motion judge's factual findings unless 
clearly erroneous, and independently apply the law to those 
findings to determine whether actions of the police were 
constitutionally justified"). 
 
At roll call at around 4 or 5 P.M. on November 1, 2018, 
Officer Samora Lopes of the Boston police department's youth 
violence strike force was informed by his sergeant of a 
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services, the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Citizens for Juvenile Justice, 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and 
Lawyers for Civil Rights; by New England Innocence Project; and 
by Families for Justice as Healing and Charles Hamilton Houston 
Institute for Race and Justice. 
4 
 
 
 
telephone call that the sergeant had received earlier that day.  
The sergeant told Lopes that a "concerned citizen" who lived in 
the area of a local housing complex had called the sergeant 
directly to report that "multiple kids" were "hanging around, 
displaying a firearm" outside the complex.  Lopes also testified 
that if he was "not mistaken" there had been "shots fire[d]" at 
the housing complex "a day before," and that police had 
responded to "multiple shots fired" there that week. 
 
As a result of this call, Lopes and his three partners for 
the shift, among them Officer Norman Teixeira, were dispatched 
to the housing complex.  When they reached the housing complex 
at around 8 P.M., Lopes and his partners parked their police 
vehicle on a side street that runs perpendicular to Heath 
Street, a street that abuts one side of the multibuilding 
housing complex.  It was dark outside when the officers arrived, 
but Lopes testified that the area of the housing complex where 
he and the other officers were located was "[v]ery well" lit 
with streetlights, and that he had a clear view of the relevant 
events "[a]t all times" while he was sitting in the vehicle.  
After receiving a call from other officers regarding a group of 
juveniles in the area, Lopes began driving toward the housing 
complex.  From inside the vehicle, Lopes could see a group of 
5 
 
 
 
seven police officers3 and, some distance away, the juvenile and 
a companion.  He observed the officers crossing over to Heath 
Street in the direction of the housing complex, as the juvenile 
and her companion were walking along Heath Street on the 
sidewalk abutting the housing complex.  The group of officers 
was further up the street, such that the juvenile and her 
companion were walking behind the officers. 
 
Lopes testified that, from his position seated in the 
police vehicle, he noticed that when the juvenile "observed the 
officers crossing the street, she immediately broke right with 
the other individual" with whom she had been walking and made an 
abrupt right turn onto a sidewalk leading into one of the 
courtyards of the housing complex.  Upon noting this rapid 
change in direction, Lopes parked on Heath Street, directly 
beside the entrance to one of the courtyards.  From this 
position, Lopes was able to observe the juvenile and her 
companion as they began to move through the courtyard.  He 
estimated that his cruiser was approximately sixty feet from the 
juvenile at that point. 
 
Lopes also observed that the juvenile "kept looking back 
over [her] shoulder" at the other officers, "and adjusting the 
 
 
3 The group of officers apparently was present at the 
housing complex also in response to the call that had been made 
to the sergeant.  The sergeant was also present at the housing 
complex at this time. 
6 
 
 
 
waistband" of her pants.  He testified that this continuous 
behavior, combined with the juvenile's abrupt turn away from 
police, considered in the context of the tip from the concerned 
caller, raised his suspicion that the juvenile was carrying a 
firearm in her waistband. 
 
Lopes and Teixeira then got out of the vehicle and began to 
walk through the courtyard in the direction in which the 
juvenile and her companion were walking.  Lopes watched as the 
juvenile "took a left turn" "towards where the other officers 
were, and [then] immediately came back around" to where she had 
been moments earlier, once again turning abruptly away from the 
group of officers.  In turning away from the other officers, the 
juvenile broke from her companion, turned around entirely, and 
began to walk, by herself, more quickly than she had been. 
 
Having reversed direction, the juvenile was then headed 
directly toward Lopes and Teixeira.  When the three converged in 
the courtyard, the juvenile attempted to walk quickly around 
Lopes, but he obstructed her path and grabbed her arms to 
prevent her from getting past him.  When Lopes stopped her, the 
juvenile told him that, because she was female, he was not 
allowed to search her.  Lopes found a female colleague to 
conduct a patfrisk; during the frisk, the officer found a loaded 
firearm in the juvenile's waistband. 
7 
 
 
 
 
At the hearing on the juvenile's motion to suppress, Lopes 
testified to his nine years of experience as an officer of the 
Boston police department, his four years as a member of the 
youth violence strike force, his multiple ("[o]ver forty") 
arrests for firearms offenses, his familiarity with the housing 
complex, and the course on characteristics of individuals 
carrying illegal firearms, conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), that he had twice 
attended.  Among other things, the course was intended to teach 
officers the types of "gestures" exhibited by individuals who 
are carrying illegal firearms in their waistbands.  Information 
Lopes received during that training led him to suspect that 
certain of the juvenile's actions indicated she was carrying a 
firearm in her waistband. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The juvenile argues that two of the motion 
judge's findings were not supported by the testimony at the 
hearing and therefore were clearly erroneous and should not have 
factored into the analysis whether the officer had reasonable 
suspicion to stop her.  The juvenile also maintains that her 
actions did not establish reasonable suspicion that she was 
carrying a firearm in her waistband at the time that the 
officers stopped her and that nothing subsequent to the stop, 
prior to the patfrisk, gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that 
she was armed and dangerous.  Accordingly, the juvenile argues, 
8 
 
 
 
the patfrisk was unconstitutional and the gun seized from her 
person should have been suppressed. 
 
a.  Whether any of the motion judge's findings were clearly 
erroneous.  The juvenile argues that the motion judge "made two 
clearly erroneous factual findings."  She contends that it was 
clearly erroneous for the motion judge to find that she 
"adjusted her waistband" and also to find that she "bladed" her 
body "so as to conceal something on her person."  Both of the 
juvenile's claims pertain to the same portion of the motion 
judge's decision denying the motion to suppress: 
"As the [j]uvenile was walking, she continuously looked 
over her shoulder and adjusted her waistband.  The 
[j]uvenile turned her body away, referred to by . . . Lopes 
as 'bladed' her body, so as to conceal something on her 
person.  She also repeatedly looked back and forth at 
officers before changing directions." 
 
 
"A finding is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence 
to support it, or when, 'although there is evidence to support 
it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed'" 
(citation omitted).  Custody of Eleanor, 414 Mass. 795, 799 
(1993).  The juvenile argues that the motion judge committed 
clear error when he found that, "[a]s the [j]uvenile was 
walking, she continuously looked over her shoulder and adjusted 
her waistband."  Specifically, the juvenile contends that 
Lopes's testimony supports a finding only that the juvenile made 
9 
 
 
 
"a hand movement on her waist," not that she "adjusted" her 
waistband. 
 
We disagree.  While Lopes indeed did use a number of other 
terms to describe the juvenile's actions, among them that the 
juvenile was "holding" her waistband, he also repeatedly 
described the juvenile's actions as "adjusting" her waistband.  
Lopes testified that, while walking, the juvenile "kept looking 
back over [her] shoulder and adjusting the waistband" of her 
pants, and, at another point, described the juvenile as "looking 
[back] at the officers" while "adjusting the waist" of her 
pants.  Lopes also physically demonstrated for the motion judge, 
in response to the prosecutor's request, what he saw the 
juvenile do in the area of her waistband.  Immediately before 
the demonstration, Lopes described the action of adjusting the 
waistband as something that the juvenile had "continued doing."  
The judge allowed the prosecutor's request that "the record may 
reflect that the witness . . . has stood and demonstrated for 
the Court a reaching towards his waistband area motion and 
looking back over his shoulder as he was walking."  When the 
defendant objected that Lopes could not have seen the motion of 
reaching toward the waistband, given that he was behind the 
juvenile and observing from the back, the judge allowed the 
defendant to examine Lopes on that point, and Lopes reiterated 
that he had seen those motions from his police vehicle while it 
10 
 
 
 
had been parked on Heath Street, approximately sixty feet away 
from the juvenile. 
 
As the juvenile notes in her challenge to the judge's 
finding that she "adjusted" her waistband, immediately following 
Lopes's demonstration, the prosecutor characterized it as 
"reaching towards" the waistband, and did not use the word 
"adjust."  Lopes also later agreed on cross-examination with the 
characterization by defense counsel that "[a]ll [Lopes] did was" 
see the juvenile "from behind making a hand movement on her 
waist."  "Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, 
[however,] the factfinder's choice between them cannot be 
clearly erroneous" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Carr, 
458 Mass. 295, 303 (2010).  In this case, given that Lopes 
testified multiple times that he saw the juvenile "adjusting" 
her waistband, it was not clearly erroneous for the motion judge 
to find that the juvenile "adjusted" her waistband. 
 
The juvenile also argues that the motion judge erred in 
finding that she "bladed" her body "so as to conceal something 
on her person."  We consider this assertion as comprising two 
distinct but related arguments:  that the juvenile never 
"bladed" her body, and that she did not move "so as to conceal 
something on her person."  Moreover, even if Lopes had seen such 
behavior, the juvenile contends, it was clear error to label it 
"blad[ing]," and to treat it as separate and distinct from her 
11 
 
 
 
adjustment of her waistband and her repeated looking back at the 
group of officers.  The juvenile argues that, rather than two 
distinct actions, "[t]here was one sequence of behavior that 
Lopes observed and described." 
 
We do not agree.  Three separate exchanges during the 
testimony at the suppression hearing support the judge's finding 
that the juvenile "turned her body away . . . so as to conceal 
something on her person," in addition to the other findings he 
made regarding the juvenile's movements.  First, during cross-
examination, Lopes was asked about his ATF training: 
Q.:  "They spoke about blading [at the ATF training], 
didn't they?" 
 
A.:  "They did." 
 
Q.:  "Okay.  And they also spoke about stiff arm running?" 
 
A.:  "Yes." 
 
Q.:  "Right.  None of that occurred with my client?" 
 
A.:  "Yeah, if she['s] holding her waist and turn --" 
 
Q.:  "I asked you -- 
 
A.:  "-- that's blading."  
 
 
Given that reasonable suspicion may be grounded in 
"reasonable inferences [drawn]" from "specific, articulable 
facts" (citation omitted), see Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 
Mass. 367, 371 (2007), it was not clear error for the motion 
judge to conclude that, during this exchange, Lopes had 
12 
 
 
 
described observing the juvenile move her body so as to conceal 
a firearm on her person.  More specifically, Lopes was asked on 
cross-examination whether "blading" had been discussed at his 
ATF training.  He responded that it had been and said that if 
someone was "holding her waist and turn[ing]," as the juvenile 
had been doing, "that's blading."  It was not unreasonable for 
the motion judge to infer from this exchange that Lopes's ATF 
training had taught him that the series of movements exhibited 
by the juvenile indicated that she was attempting to conceal a 
firearm. 
 
On redirect, moreover, the prosecutor asked Lopes to 
describe the "blading that [the juvenile] was exhibiting."  
Lopes's response indicated that the juvenile's act of "holding 
her waist and turn[ing]" was separate and distinct from her 
repeatedly looking back at the group of officers.  Lopes 
testified that, "[a]s she's walking, she turns to her left side 
and [is] looking back at the officer[s] several times, back and 
forth while she's walking on the pathway."  He clarified on 
cross-examination that she did this "back and forth, . . . 
multiple times, while adjusting the waist."  This description 
aligns roughly with a definition in Commonwealth v. Resende, 474 
Mass. 455, 459 n.8 (2016), in which "blading away" was described 
as "the action of creating a thin profile of oneself with 
respect to another viewpoint, effectively hiding one side of the 
13 
 
 
 
body from the other person's view."  Moreover, Lopes then 
physically demonstrated the movements he had seen.  Finally, as 
discussed infra, Lopes clearly testified that his observations 
of the juvenile's adjustment of her waistband, in conjunction 
with his training on methods of attempting to conceal illegal 
weapons, suggested the attempt to conceal a firearm. 
 
Viewed in its entirety, the record adequately supports the 
judge's factual findings, and there was no clear error in the 
judge's determination that the juvenile "adjusted" her waistband 
and engaged in the separate and distinct actions that Lopes 
characterized as "blading."  Thus, even if, as the juvenile 
argues, "[t]here was one sequence of behavior that Lopes 
observed and described," it was not clearly erroneous for the 
motion judge to have found that this sequence of behavior 
involved three different actions on the part of the juvenile:  
"look[ing] over her shoulder and adjust[ing] her waistband," 
"turn[ing] her body away . . . so as to conceal something on her 
person," and "repeatedly look[ing] back and forth at officers 
before changing directions." 
Lopes observed a sequence of behavior on the part of the 
juvenile and suspected, based on that sequence, that the 
juvenile was concealing a firearm in her waistband.  The 
question is whether it was reasonable for Lopes to suspect that 
the juvenile was carrying a firearm based on the way she was 
14 
 
 
 
manipulating her waistband, given his prior knowledge and 
specialized training about what the juvenile's sequence of 
gestures indicated.  It is precisely the otherwise innocuous 
nature of adjusting one's waistband that makes Lopes's testimony 
concerning this behavior so crucial to the analysis of 
reasonable suspicion.  Lopes testified about the basis for this 
inference both on direct and cross-examination, and the judge 
found his testimony credible in its entirety.  The juvenile did 
not challenge Lopes's testimony concerning his prior, repeated 
Federal trainings on detecting concealed, illegal firearms, 
either at the suppression hearing or in her brief to this court.  
She did not question the nature or extent of the training, how 
long ago it had been undertaken, or how many Boston police 
officers have had such training.  Nor did she challenge the 
extent to which the judge could consider that training in 
determining whether Lopes had had a reasonable suspicion that 
the juvenile was armed and dangerous when he decided to pat 
frisk her. 
 
While the term "blading" in this case did result in some 
confusion, the officer's descriptions and demonstration of the 
juvenile's actions allow us to conclude that none of the motion 
judge's findings was clearly erroneous, and that the juvenile's 
described behavior properly could be considered in the analysis 
of reasonable suspicion.  We note, however, that the word 
15 
 
 
 
"blading" has become both unwieldy, lacking precision or a 
single definition, and tinged with loaded connotations.  While 
"blading" has been described as indicative of an attempt to 
"hid[e] one side of the body," see Resende, 474 Mass. at 459 
n.8, we also have accepted a witness's assertion that "a bladed 
stance" suggested that a physical "attack" potentially was 
imminent, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sweeting-Bailey, 488 Mass. 
741, 743–744 (2021), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 135 (2022).4  
Observations that a person appeared to be concealing one side of 
his or her body or seemed ready to fight can be relayed more 
clearly by a straightforward description of the behavior.  
Henceforth, judges should instruct witnesses simply to describe 
the behavior they observed in as much detail as possible, rather 
than merely labeling that behavior "blading." 
 
b.  Reasonable suspicion.  The juvenile argues that Lopes 
did not have reasonable suspicion to stop her, and that 
 
 
4 Federal appellate courts increasingly also have used the 
term to describe a wide range of behavior.  See, e.g., Crabbs v. 
Pitts, 817 Fed. Appx. 208, 210 (6th Cir. 2020) (describing 
"blading" as "touching or looking at the area where [one's] 
weapon was on [one's] body to make sure it was there"); 
Maldonado Pinedo v. United States, 814 Fed. Appx. 338, 341 (10th 
Cir. 2020) (taking "bladed stance" described as "standing with 
[one's] feet angled out at [ninety] degrees"); United States v. 
Quarterman, 877 F.3d 794, 796 (8th Cir. 2017) (describing 
"blading" as "standing as a boxer does, flat-footed with a 
shoulder pointed toward an individual").  See also United States 
v. Braddy, 11 F.4th 1298, 1305 (11th Cir. 2021) (crediting 
testimony that drug-sniffing dog had "body bladed towards the 
car, front paws pushed forward"). 
16 
 
 
 
therefore the seizure was unconstitutional and her motion to 
suppress the firearm discovered as a result of the stop should 
have been allowed.5  The juvenile maintains that Lopes's 
observations of her actions did not themselves give rise to 
reasonable suspicion that she was carrying a gun in her 
waistband.  In addition, she argues that the tip was not 
reliable and should have been given little weight, because it 
was stale and anonymous and described very general, generic 
behavior. 
 
While, as discussed, we credit a motion judge's factual 
findings absent clear error, "[w]e review independently the 
 
 
5 To determine whether reasonable suspicion existed at the 
time of the stop, we first must determine when, precisely, the 
stop took place.  See Commonwealth v. Franklin, 456 Mass. 818, 
820-821 (2010).  The juvenile argues that there is some question 
with respect to when she was seized.  She contends that the stop 
"likely" occurred moments before Lopes grabbed her arms, when he 
blocked her path with his body to prevent her from moving past 
him. 
 
 
In determining whether a seizure has occurred, the 
"question is whether an officer has, through words or conduct, 
objectively communicated that the officer would use his or her 
police power to coerce that person to stay."  Commonwealth v. 
Matta, 483 Mass. 357, 362 (2019).  Clearly, the juvenile was 
seized when Lopes grabbed her arms.  The juvenile concedes that 
Lopes blocked her path and grabbed her arms at essentially the 
same time, and that, for the purposes of the reasonable 
suspicion analysis, all of the relevant events occurred before 
either of these actions.  Thus, as the juvenile also concedes, 
the difference in time between these two actions is "immaterial" 
for purposes of determining whether Lopes had reasonable 
suspicion to stop her. 
17 
 
 
 
application of constitutional principles to the facts found."  
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 441 Mass. 390, 393 (2004). 
 
Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
provides that "[e]very subject has a right to be secure from all 
unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his person, his houses, 
his papers, and all his possessions."  For an investigatory stop 
to be constitutional under art. 14, officers must have been 
acting with "reasonable suspicion, based on specific and 
articulable facts, that the defendant had committed, was 
committing, or was about to commit a crime" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Henley, 488 Mass. 95, 102 (2021). 
 
"Reasonable suspicion is measured by an objective standard, 
and the totality of the facts on which the seizure is based must 
establish an individualized suspicion that the person seized by 
the police is the perpetrator of the crime under investigation" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Meneus, 476 
Mass. 231, 235 (2017).  Reasonable suspicion "must be grounded 
in specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences [drawn] 
therefrom rather than on a 'hunch'" (quotations and citation 
omitted).  DePeiza, 449 Mass. at 371.  "The facts and inferences 
underlying the officer's suspicion must be viewed as a whole 
when assessing the reasonableness of [the officer's] acts."  
Commonwealth v. Sykes, 449 Mass. 308, 314 (2007), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Thibeau, 384 Mass. 762, 764 (1981).  Thus, "a 
18 
 
 
 
combination of factors that are each innocent of themselves may, 
when taken together, amount to the requisite reasonable belief" 
that a person has, is, or will commit a particular crime.  
Commonwealth v. Feyenord, 445 Mass. 72, 77 (2005), cert. denied, 
546 U.S. 1187 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Fraser, 410 Mass. 
541, 545 (1991).  While conduct that, standing alone, may appear 
innocent can, considered together with other factors, constitute 
reasonable suspicion, cf. DePeiza, supra at 372-373, "[a]dding 
up eight innocuous observations –- eight zeros –- does not 
produce a sum of" reasonable suspicion.  Commonwealth v. 
Barreto, 483 Mass. 716, 723 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 161 (1997). 
 
Reasonable suspicion for a stop is not sufficient to permit 
a patfrisk of a stopped individual; to conduct a patfrisk 
requires more.  In order to frisk a person stopped on grounds of 
reasonable suspicion, police must have a reasonable suspicion, 
based on specific, articulable facts, that the individual is 
"armed and dangerous" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Torres-Pagan, 484 Mass. 34, 38 (2020).  "Evidence obtained as 
the result of an unlawful seizure is inadmissible."  
Commonwealth v. Franklin, 456 Mass. 818, 820 (2010). 
 
Here, Lopes testified to a combination of factors that he 
believed gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the juvenile 
was carrying an illegal firearm in her waistband.  He cited, 
19 
 
 
 
most significantly, her gestures in the area of her waistband, 
the movements and angling of her body, her repeatedly looking 
back over her shoulder toward the officers behind her, and her 
multiple and sudden changes in direction in an apparent effort 
to avoid encountering a group of police officers as 
characteristic of an individual who is carrying an illegal 
firearm.  Certainly, none of the juvenile's actions, taken in 
isolation, would be enough to establish reasonable suspicion.  
See, e.g., Matta, 483 Mass. at 366 ("the defendant's adjustment 
of his waistband alone did not create reasonable suspicion for a 
seizure.  It is not uncommon for anyone to adjust his or her 
clothing upon getting out of a motor vehicle"); DePeiza, 449 
Mass. at 372 ("nervous or furtive movements do not supply 
reasonable suspicion when considered in isolation").  Taken 
together, however, and in conjunction with the other factors 
present here, such as the juvenile's apparently repeated efforts 
to avoid police, Lopes's specialized training and experience, 
and, to some minimal extent, the (stale) tip by the concerned 
caller, the juvenile's actions gave rise to reasonable suspicion 
that she was carrying a firearm. 
 
i.  Suspected concealment of a firearm in the juvenile's 
waistband.  The juvenile contends that Lopes did not 
sufficiently establish a connection between his training and 
experience and his suspicion that the juvenile was carrying a 
20 
 
 
 
firearm in her waistband, and thus that Lopes's testimony about 
his training and experience should have been given little weight 
in the analysis of reasonable suspicion. 
 
Lopes testified that, while sitting in his police vehicle, 
he saw the juvenile exhibit behavior that, based on his 
training, appeared consistent with that of someone who was 
carrying an unholstered firearm in her waistband.  He estimated 
that the distance between himself and the juvenile at that point 
was approximately sixty feet.  Lopes explained that he had been 
taught to discern this behavior at trainings on the common 
characteristics of armed gunmen that was conducted by the ATF, 
and that he had attended such trainings on multiple occasions.  
Specifically, Lopes observed that the juvenile "kept looking 
back over [her] shoulder" at the other officers "and adjusting 
the waistband" of her pants.  Lopes testified that this 
behavior, which was consistent with his training regarding the 
characteristics of someone who is carrying an illegal firearm, 
in conjunction with the juvenile's abrupt turn away from police 
and her repeated looks back at the group of officers, considered 
in the context of the call from the concerned caller, raised his 
suspicion that the juvenile was carrying a firearm in her 
waistband. 
 
"[O]rdinarily, when an officer relies on his or her 
training and experience to draw an inference or conclusion about 
21 
 
 
 
an observation made, the officer must explain the specific 
training and experience that he or she relied on and how that 
correlates to the observations made."  See Matta, 483 Mass. 
at 366 n.8.  In Matta, we concluded that the officer had acted 
with reasonable suspicion, even though he "did not testify 
specifically that, in his training and experience, the 
adjustment of one's waistband in the way described indicates 
that the person may be carrying an unlicensed firearm" (emphasis 
added).  Id. 
 
Here, by contrast, Lopes testified that the juvenile's 
repeated "adjusting [of] the waistband" and turning of her body 
so as to avoid the officers were consistent with behavior that 
had been taught in his ATF trainings as exemplifying the 
carrying of an unholstered firearm in the waistband.6  See 
 
 
6 Federal appellate courts have given weight to testimony 
about "training and experience" that was less specific than what 
Lopes provided at the suppression hearing.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Bontemps, 977 F.3d 909, 912, 916–917 (9th Cir. 2020), 
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2874 (2021) (officer testified that 
based on "training and experience as a police officer," bulges 
in clothing were identifiable as "consistent with carrying a 
firearm in public"); United States v. Briggs, 720 F.3d 1281, 
1283 (10th Cir. 2013) (officer testified that "in his training 
and experience, people who illegally carry weapons often keep 
them at their waistline and touch or grab at the weapon when 
they encounter police"). 
 
 
State courts in other jurisdictions have reached similar 
conclusions.  For example, in State v. Murray, 213 A.3d 571, 
578–579 (Del. 2019), the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that 
officers had acted with reasonable suspicion on facts somewhat 
similar to those presented here.  There, the court asserted that 
22 
 
 
 
Resende, 474 Mass. at 461 (officer testified that "the defendant 
[was] holding his hand at his waist in a manner that [the 
officer] believed from his training and experience was 
consistent with someone holding a gun in the waistband of his 
pants").  See also Commonwealth v. Dasilva, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 
556, 558 (2006). 
 
As the juvenile points out, people routinely adjust their 
waistbands for various legitimate reasons.  That "there may be 
innocent explanations for [certain behavior, however,] does not 
remove it from consideration in the reasonable suspicion 
analysis."  DePeiza, 449 Mass. at 373.  As in DePeiza, Lopes's 
suspicion that the juvenile had a firearm in her waistband was 
"not a mere hunch, but was the result of the application of 
[his] experience and [ATF] training . . . to [his] detailed 
observations of the defendant."  Id. 
 
"[i]n determining whether there was reasonable suspicion to 
justify a detention, the court defers to the experience and 
training of law enforcement officers."  Id. at 579.  In that 
case, as in this one, officers had stopped one of two 
pedestrians who were walking together, and the court noted 
favorably that the officer "did not simply stop two people 
walking late at night in a high crime area indiscriminately" 
but, "instead . . . focused his attention specifically on one of 
them who engaged in behavior that was indicative of the 
possession of a deadly weapon."  Id.  See People v. Brannon, 16 
N.Y.3d 596, 602 (2011) (relying on officer's "experience" 
regarding how "gravity knives" are "commonly carried in a 
person's pocket"). 
23 
 
 
 
 
In Matta, 483 Mass. at 359, officers were acting on a tip 
from an "unknown" source that someone had placed a firearm under 
the seat of a motor vehicle.  When officers arrived at the area 
and parked behind the defendant's vehicle, he got out of the 
vehicle while "adjust[ing] his waistband" and walked away from 
the officers, taking an unusual path.  Id.  After the officers 
called out to him, the defendant ran away while "[holding] onto 
his waistband."  Id.  We concluded that, in those circumstances, 
the officers had sufficient grounds for reasonable suspicion, 
notwithstanding that the defendant's vehicle (dark green, with 
two occupants) did not precisely match the tipster's description 
of the suspect black vehicle with four occupants, and that, as 
discussed, the officer's testimony regarding the defendant's 
manipulation of his waistband and the officer's training 
concerning that type of gesture apparently was more conclusory 
than Lopes's testimony concerning the juvenile's similar 
actions. 
 
Our decision in Resende, 474 Mass. at 460-461, also 
provides a useful point of comparison.  In that case, we 
concluded that an officer acted with reasonable suspicion prior 
to initiating a stop based on the following facts:  the officer 
observed the adult defendant in a long jacket, which was 
noticeable to the officer "because it was not a particularly 
cold night," see id. at 458; the officer saw the "defendant move 
24 
 
 
 
his hand under the jacket and into the waistband area underneath 
his shirt, and became suspicious that the defendant was carrying 
a gun," see id.; and the officer, upon engaging the defendant in 
conversation, "remembered that he had encountered the defendant 
in connection with a search of a residence pursuant to a 
warrant -- a search that had resulted in the discovery of two 
guns."  Id.  In Resende, there was no tip, no attempt by the 
defendant to avoid contact with the officer, and less of a nexus 
between the defendant's behavior and the officer's training 
regarding concealed weapons. 
 
The fact of carrying a firearm in a waistband of course is 
not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion that a suspect 
is committing or is about to commit a crime.  Although "carrying 
a concealed firearm, by itself, is not a crime," Matta, 483 
Mass. at 366, see G. L. c. 140, § 131L (a), possession of a 
firearm without the requisite license is, and those under 
twenty-one years of age are not eligible to obtain such a 
license.  See G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d) (iv).  In Matta, supra, 
where the defendant was an adult, we concluded that "the 
caller's tip, suggesting a concealed firearm, with nothing more, 
[did] not provide reasonable suspicion for a stop" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  Here, however, the juvenile was five 
years younger than the age at which she could have obtained a 
license to carry a firearm. 
25 
 
 
 
 
At the time of the stop in this case, Lopes had been a 
member of the Boston police department's youth violence strike 
force for four years and had, in that role, spent significant 
time interacting with young people.  On this particular evening, 
Lopes and his colleagues were responding to a tip about 
"multiple kids hanging around, displaying a firearm," in a 
particular area where Lopes knew young people congregated.  
Prior to initiating the stop, moreover, Lopes came essentially 
face to face with the juvenile, who was then sixteen years old.  
He therefore could have observed that she likely was too young 
to be licensed to carry a firearm in the Commonwealth.  These 
factors further supported the view that the juvenile did not 
legally possess the firearm that Lopes suspected her to be 
carrying.  Accordingly, they also contributed significantly to 
the analysis whether there was reasonable suspicion that the 
juvenile was armed and dangerous, and thus that a patfrisk would 
be consistent with constitutional protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
 
ii.  Efforts to evade police.  The juvenile contends that 
her repeated looking over her shoulder and her attempts to avoid 
police officers "should not be factored into the reasonable 
suspicion analysis" because, "[g]iven the 'long history of race-
based policing' in Boston, it is reasonable to believe that a 
26 
 
 
 
group of seven police officers would have aroused fear of 
indignity or worse in" a "young Black person" such as herself. 
 
Lopes testified that, in addition to the juvenile's actions 
with her waistband, and her movements while walking, he viewed 
the juvenile's repeated evasion of police as a critical factor 
in his determination that there was reasonable suspicion to 
conduct an investigatory stop of the juvenile.  "Although 
nervous or furtive movements do not supply reasonable suspicion 
when considered in isolation, they are properly considered 
together with other details to find reasonable suspicion."  
DePeiza, 449 Mass. at 372.  See Sykes, 449 Mass. at 315; 
Commonwealth v. Grandison, 433 Mass. 135, 139-140 (2001). 
 
We have recognized that, in some instances, the fact that 
members of certain groups –- such as "[B]lack males in Boston" -
- have been "disproportionately and repeatedly targeted for 
[police] encounters suggests a reason for flight totally 
unrelated to consciousness of guilt."  See Commonwealth v. 
Warren, 475 Mass. 530, 540 (2016).  We also have noted that 
"evasive conduct," without more, is insufficient to establish 
reasonable suspicion because, "[w]ere the rule otherwise, the 
police could turn a hunch into a reasonable suspicion by 
inducing the [flight] justifying the suspicion" (citation 
omitted).  Id. at 538.  Even in such instances, however, we 
27 
 
 
 
explicitly did "not eliminate flight as a factor in the 
reasonable suspicion analysis."  Id. at 540. 
 
Here, there is no indication that the juvenile was aware of 
Lopes's presence until shortly before his path converged with 
hers in the courtyard of the housing complex.  Rather, Lopes 
observed the juvenile attempting to avoid other officers, who 
were walking purposefully but were not acting in a manner that 
indicated they were attempting to approach or apprehend her.  
Taken in conjunction with the other factors present here, 
Lopes's observations of the juvenile twice attempting to avoid 
encountering the other group of officers –- and, the second 
time, abruptly breaking off from her companion to do so –- were 
valid factors to consider for purposes of determining whether 
there was reasonable suspicion to stop the juvenile.  Moreover, 
when Lopes stood in the path in an effort to stop her, the 
juvenile made a third effort at evading him by attempting to 
quickly walk around him.  Together, these acts of evasion, 
combined with the other circumstances, supported a determination 
that there was reasonable suspicion that the juvenile was 
carrying an illegal firearm. 
 
iii.  The anonymous tip.  The juvenile argues that the tip, 
which was stale, anonymous, and lacking in any detail about the 
individuals observed or their behavior, was not reliable and 
28 
 
 
 
should play no role in the analysis whether there was reasonable 
suspicion for the stop. 
 
As stated, Lopes was at the housing complex because his 
sergeant had informed him at around 5 P.M. that a woman who 
lived in the "area of" the complex had called the sergeant 
earlier that day and reported that there were "multiple kids 
hanging around, displaying a firearm"; the sergeant explained 
that the call had been placed directly to his telephone number 
(and thus it was not through emergency services or a call to the 
general police station number). 
 
By 8 P.M., when Lopes reached the location where he 
arrested the juvenile, the tip was at least three hours old.7  
When an officer is acting in response to a tip, the "proximity 
of the stop to the time and location of the crime is a relevant 
factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis," and "[p]roximity 
is accorded greater probative value . . . when the distance is 
short and the timing is close."  Warren, 475 Mass. at 536.  
"Because of the highly fact-intensive nature of the inquiry, it 
is not possible to formulate a bright-line test for staleness."  
Commonwealth v. Guastucci, 486 Mass. 22, 27 (2020).  "We 
typically measure the timeliness of information supporting" a 
 
 
7 Lopes testified that his sergeant did not inform him as to 
the time that the sergeant received the call from the concerned 
resident, or whether the sergeant had, earlier in the day, 
dispatched other officers in response to the call. 
29 
 
 
 
tip "by considering two factors:  (1) the nature of the criminal 
activity under investigation; and (2) the nature of the item to 
be seized."  Id., citing Commonwealth v. Matias, 440 Mass. 787, 
792-793 (2004). 
 
Here, when Lopes saw the two young people together, and the 
juvenile walking and gesturing in a specific manner that his 
training and experience informed him likely was an illegal gun, 
Lopes had had four years of experience working in the area the 
caller described, was familiar with the locations within the 
complex where firearms were stored by some residents outside 
their own apartments, and previously had made numerous arrests 
for firearms offenses in that area.  See Commonwealth v. Costa, 
448 Mass. 510, 515-518 (2007), and cases cited.  The reported 
conduct indicated that the individuals who possessed the firearm 
were "hanging around"; this was not a situation of someone 
fleeing from the scene of a crime, or of an observation in 
traffic of a gun on the seat of a moving passenger vehicle.  
Thus, while the tip undoubtedly was stale, the value of the 
stale tip was not as greatly diminished as it was, for instance, 
in Warren, 475 Mass. at 531, 536, where an officer was alerted 
to suspects "fleeing the scene" after a breaking and entering.  
Approximately one-half hour after a telephone call from the 
victim reporting the crime, an officer stopped the defendant 
roughly one mile from the scene.  Id. at 536-537.  We concluded 
30 
 
 
 
that the facts of that case "weigh[ed] against proximity as a 
factor."  Id. at 536. 
 
The tip from the "concerned citizen" here also differs to 
some extent from a fully "anonymous" tip.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 423 Mass. 266, 267 (1996); 
Commonwealth v. Lyons, 409 Mass. 16, 17 (1990).  The concerned 
caller not only contacted Lopes's sergeant directly, but also 
was identified by the sergeant as someone who lived in the area 
of the housing complex.  Although the record is silent as to how 
the caller knew the sergeant's direct telephone number, and how 
the sergeant knew that the caller lived in or near the housing 
complex, the information the officers had concerning the caller 
gave this tip more weight than that of a wholly anonymous caller 
contacting police through a general emergency number.  See, 
e.g., Costa, 448 Mass. at 515 ("We have . . . suggested that the 
reliability of citizen informants who are identifiable, but may 
not have been identified, is deserving of greater consideration 
than that of truly anonymous sources").8  Moreover, "[e]ven where 
a 911 telephone call is anonymous, the Commonwealth can still 
 
 
8 In Commonwealth v. Costa, 448 Mass. 510, 516 (2007), we 
noted that "we agree with Justice Kennedy's observation" in his 
concurrence in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 275 (2000), that 
"a tip might be anonymous in some sense yet have certain other 
features, either supporting reliability or narrowing the likely 
class of informants, so that the tip does provide the lawful 
basis for some police action." 
31 
 
 
 
establish a caller's reliability 'through independent 
corroboration by police observation or investigation of the 
details of the information provided by the caller' prior to the 
stop being initiated."  Manha, 479 Mass. at 47, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 461 Mass. 616, 623, cert. denied, 568 
U.S. 946 (2012).  See Anderson, supra; Commonwealth v. Mubdi, 
456 Mass. 385, 398–399 (2010).  In sum, while adding little to 
the calculus, the tip here was not so stale as to be entirely 
excluded from the analysis of reasonable suspicion. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  While certainly a close case, the 
combination of factors here afforded Lopes reasonable suspicion 
that the juvenile was carrying an illegal firearm in her 
waistband such that the stop and patfrisk of the juvenile 
comported with constitutional requirements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  suppress affirmed. 
BUDD, C.J. (concurring, with whom Wendlandt, J., joins).  I 
agree that affirming the motion judge's decision is appropriate 
here.  I write separately to emphasize that the judge's finding 
that the juvenile "bladed her body, so as to conceal something" 
was pivotal to the conclusion that reasonable suspicion for the 
stop existed.  Without that particular finding, Officer Samora 
Lopes's other observations, including that the juvenile made 
attempts to avoid contact with the officers walking toward her, 
glanced over her shoulder multiple times as she walked away, and 
repeatedly adjusted her waistband as she did so, as well as the 
tip that brought the officers to the area in the first place, 
would have been insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion in 
this very close case. 
As we have stated previously, exhibiting nervousness around 
law enforcement officers is not uncommon for law-abiding 
persons.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Martin, 457 Mass. 14, 21 
(2010).  And Black youth especially may have valid reasons 
unrelated to consciousness of guilt to avoid contact with the 
police.  See Commonwealth v. Warren, 475 Mass. 530, 540 (2016).  
Seeking to avoid a large group of officers converging on the 
scene is not, in itself, suspicious. 
Similarly, because the gesture is a fairly typical one, 
adjusting one's waistband, in and of itself, cannot support a 
seizure.  See Commonwealth v. Matta, 483 Mass. 357, 366 (2019).  
2 
 
 
 
See also Maye v. United States, 260 A.3d 638, 645 (D.C. 2021), 
quoting Duhart v. United States, 589 A.2d 895, 899 (D.C. 1991) 
("There is nothing particularly suspicious about adjusting or 
manipulating one's waistband . . . , an action perfectly 
consistent with 'too many innocent explanations,'" such as 
"hiking up [one's] pants, resetting [one's] underwear, or 
adjusting [one's] belt").  For this reason, I disagree with the 
court that Lopes's training regarding waistband adjustments is 
the key to the reasonable suspicion analysis.  See ante at    .  
To be sure, an officer's training is an important part of the 
reasonable suspicion calculus.  See Matta, 483 Mass. at 366 & 
n.8.  However, even where an officer has been trained that 
waistband adjustments may indicate that a suspect is carrying a 
concealed firearm, more than that observation alone is required 
for reasonable suspicion.1 
Even combined, behaviors as common and innocuous as 
behaving nervously around police and adjusting one's waistband 
cannot provide reasonable suspicion.  See Commonwealth v. 
Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 161 (1997) ("Adding up eight innocuous 
 
1 It is a fallacy to assume that because a person carrying 
an unlicensed firearm is likely to adjust his or her waistband, 
a person adjusting his or her waistband is likely to be carrying 
an unlicensed firearm.  See, e.g., McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 
120, 127-128 (2010) (discussing prosecutor's fallacy); Meester, 
Collins, Gill, & van Lambalgen, On the (Ab)Use of Statistics in 
the Legal Case against the Nurse Lucia de B., 5 L. Probability & 
Risk 233, 240-241 (2006) (same). 
3 
 
 
 
observations -- eight zeros -- does not produce a sum of 
suspicion that justifies" seizure).  See also People v. Moore, 
176 A.D.2d 297, 299 (N.Y. 1991) (reasonable suspicion lacking 
where defendant "look[ed] over his shoulder several times and 
plac[ed] his hand on his waistband as though he were adjusting 
something," for such behavior "is readily susceptible of an 
innocent as well as a guilty interpretation"). 
Further, as the court acknowledges, the concerned citizen's 
tip that resulted in the officers responding to the area 
contributes little to the reasonable suspicion calculus due to 
its staleness and lack of detail.  See ante at    .  Because the 
juvenile was considered potentially to have been one of the 
children mentioned in the tip based only on her apparent age and 
presence near the housing development, the tip contributed 
barely anything to a particularized suspicion that she had a 
firearm.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Meneus, 476 Mass. 231, 236-
237 (2017) (victim's description of alleged shooters as "group 
of young [B]lack males" who just had run into courtyard of 
nearby housing complex "added nothing of value" to officer's 
suspicion that group of young Black males near entrance to 
complex had been involved in shooting).  This especially is so 
given that the tip here was hours old by the time the officers 
arrived at the housing complex.  That a young person is walking 
in the general area where nondescript "kids" were seen hours ago 
4 
 
 
 
"hanging around" with a gun contributes essentially nothing to a 
suspicion that the juvenile who was stopped was armed. 
Nevertheless, behavior that is otherwise innocuous may 
provide reasonable suspicion in light of the totality of the 
circumstances.  See Meneus, 476 Mass. at 236-237.  For example, 
in Resende, we affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress where 
the defendant wore a long jacket that covered his pants pockets 
despite the fact that "it was not a particularly cold night," at 
one point held one hand in his pocket "close to his body at the 
waistband area" and "bladed away" from the officer, and later 
made multiple gestures at his waistband that appeared to the 
officer to be "retention check[s]."  Commonwealth v. Resende, 
474 Mass. 455, 456-461 (2016).  Similarly in DePeiza, we 
concluded that officers had reasonable suspicion to stop a 
suspect who displayed a distinctive "straight arm" gait and 
repeatedly shielded the right side of his body from the officers 
and whose right pocket appeared to hold a heavy object.  
Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 Mass. 367, 368-369, 371-372 (2007).  
And more recently, in Matta, we upheld a finding of reasonable 
suspicion where the defendant adjusted the right side of his 
waistband using both hands and exhibited the unusual conduct of 
getting out of a vehicle and walking towards bushes away from 
the sidewalk, and where the officers had received a tip 
regarding a concealed firearm in a motor vehicle before stopping 
5 
 
 
 
the defendant.  Matta, 483 Mass. at 365.  See Maye, 260 A.3d at 
645-646 (more is required to "fill the 'logical gap'" between 
innocuous behavior and reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct 
[citation omitted]).  Given the innocuous nature of the 
juvenile's behavior, the circumstances here present a much 
closer case than those in Resende, DePeiza or Matta.  Without 
the judge's finding that the juvenile turned her body so as to 
conceal something on her person, the remaining circumstances 
combined would not have added up to reasonable suspicion. 
Importantly, we never have held, and do not hold today, 
that an individual may be stopped based on commonplace and 
ordinarily innocuous behavior such as behaving nervously, 
avoiding police officers, and adjusting one's waistband.  In 
other words, our holding today is in line with our search and 
seizure jurisprudence and does not lower the constitutional 
threshold for warrantless stops.