Case Title: Parks v. Illinois Casualty Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 22S-PL-00008

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2022-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 22S-PL-8 
William Ebert, Michelle Ebert, Cora Ebert, Alexandra 
Ebert, Dan the Man LLC, Daniel Parks, and D&D 
Saloon LLC, 
Appellants/Defendants, 
–v–
Illinois Casualty Company, 
Appellee/Plaintiff. 
Argued: February 24, 2022 | Decided: June 16, 2022 
Appeal from the Howard Superior Court 
No. 34D02-1807-PL-555 
The Honorable Brant J. Parry, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
No. 21A-PL-69 
Opinion by Justice David 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur. 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Jun 16 2022, 1:54 pm
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David, Justice.  
Today, we resolve an appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary 
judgment to Illinois Casualty Company (“Illinois Casualty”) in this 
declaratory judgment action. The underlying dispute between the parties 
arises from a series of unfortunate events involving an intoxicated patron 
and his decision to drive after he was served alcohol at Big Daddy’s Show 
Club in Kokomo, Indiana. For our purposes, we examine whether an 
insurer has a duty to defend and indemnify its insured, such as Big 
Daddy’s, when the policy specifically excludes coverage for bodily injury 
for which an insured may be liable by (1) causing or contributing to a 
person’s intoxication, or (2) furnishing alcoholic beverages to a person 
under the influence of alcohol.  
In doing so, we adopt the efficient and predominant cause analysis 
from our Court of Appeals and conclude that the liquor liability exclusion 
absolves Illinois Casualty of a duty to defend or indemnify its insured 
under its general businessowners policy. Accordingly, we affirm the trial 
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Illinois Casualty.  
Facts and Procedural History  
On July 5, 2015, William Spence (“Spence”) drank alcohol at Big 
Daddy’s Show Club and drove away in his truck.1 Meanwhile, the Eberts 
traveled eastbound on Morgan Street until they approached its 
intersection with Davis Street. They stopped at the flashing red lights 
marking the four-way intersection before proceeding to cross the street.  
Spence traveled northbound on Davis Street; when he reached the 
intersection, he failed to stop at the flashing lights and collided with the 
Eberts’ vehicle. At the time, he had a blood alcohol content of 0.195%.  
 
1 During the relevant timeframe, Dan the Man, LLC owned Big Daddy’s and D&D Saloon, 
LLC owned Little Daddy’s; Appellant Daniel Parks (“Parks”) owned both entities. For 
purposes of clarity, we will refer to the businesses as Big Daddy’s and Little Daddy’s, 
respectively.   
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The designated evidence further elaborates police removed Spence 
from Big Daddy’s earlier in the night because “he got out of hand.” Eberts’ 
App. Vol. III at 176. That same night, Christopher France (“France”) 
stopped by the show club to see if the employees needed any help. France 
ordinarily worked as a bouncer for Little Daddy’s, and occasionally 
worked at Big Daddy’s, but he was not on the clock that night. After 
France noticed Spence lingering in the parking lot, he ordered him to 
leave. Spence grabbed a pipe from his truck and proceeded to step toward 
France with the item in hand.  France threatened him with bodily harm if 
he would not leave the property in his truck. Spence then left and collided 
with the Eberts’ vehicle. 
The Eberts filed their lawsuit against Big Daddy’s, Little Daddy’s, and 
Parks (collectively, “Parks defendants”). In their second amended 
complaint,2 they claimed Big Daddy’s violated Indiana’s Dram Shop Act, 
Indiana Code section 7.1-5-10-15.5, by serving alcohol to Spence when it 
knew, or should have known, of his inebriation. The Eberts also claimed 
the Parks defendants: (a) continued to serve Spence alcohol when they 
knew, or should have known, he was inebriated and impaired; (b) 
allowed Spence to drive his vehicle from Big Daddy’s when they knew, or 
should have known, he was inebriated and impaired; (c) failed to notify 
law enforcement that Spence left Big Daddy’s and operated his vehicle in 
an inebriated state; and (d) failed to obtain alternative transportation for 
Spence to prevent him from operating his vehicle.   
Illinois Casualty had issued separate and identical businessowners and 
liquor liability policies to each show club; each of these four policies were 
in effect on the night of the collision between Spence and the Eberts. 
 
2 On November 4, 2020, the Eberts filed, and the trial court granted, a motion for leave to file a 
third amended complaint. According to our review of the record, it does not appear that any 
of the parties moved to designate the third amended complaint as evidence in the summary 
judgment proceedings. Therefore, our review is limited to the allegations set forth in the 
Eberts’ second amended complaint. See Manley v. Sherer, 992 N.E.2d 670, 673 (Ind. 2013) (“An 
appellate court reviewing a challenged trial court summary judgment ruling is limited to the 
designated evidence before the trial court, see Ind. Trial Rule 56(H)[.]”). 
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Accordingly, Illinois Casualty initially agreed to defend the Parks 
defendants.   
However, on July 19, 2018, the insurance company filed a separate 
declaratory action seeking a judgment that it did not owe a duty to defend 
or indemnify the Parks defendants in the underlying lawsuit. As support, 
Illinois Casualty relied on language in its businessowners policies 
excluding coverage for claims of bodily injury for which an insured may 
be liable by reason of causing or contributing to the intoxication of any 
person or furnishing alcoholic beverages to a person under the influence 
of alcohol. Illinois Casualty argued that the liquor liability policy issued to 
Big Daddy’s was the only potential source of indemnification.   
Illinois Casualty moved for summary judgment, which the trial court 
granted in its favor, finding the insurer did not owe the Parks defendants 
“any duty to defend or duty to indemnify with respect to the underlying 
lawsuit” under the liquor liability policy issued to Little Daddy’s and the 
businessowners policies for both clubs. Parks Defendants’ App. Vol. III at 
63. Nevertheless, the trial court concluded Illinois Casualty did owe a 
duty to defend or indemnify the Parks defendants under the Big Daddy’s 
liquor liability policy.  
The Eberts and Parks defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals 
concluded “the trial court erroneously interpreted the insurance contracts 
at issue,” slip op. at 3, and the businessowners policies imposed a 
contractual duty on Illinois Casualty to defend the show clubs.  
Illinois Casualty sought transfer, which we granted, vacating the Court 
of Appeals’ opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).  
Standard of Review 
Our standard of review for a grant or denial of a motion for summary 
judgment is the same as the trial court. Sheehan Const. Co., Inc. v. 
Continental Cas. Co., 935 N.E.2d 160, 165 (Ind. 2010). In determining 
whether summary judgment is proper, we consider only the evidentiary 
matter the parties specifically designated to the trial court. Reed v. Reid, 
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980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind. 2012) (citing Ind. Trial R. 56(C), (H)). We 
construe all factual and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving 
party. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 842 N.E.2d 1279, 1282 (Ind. 2006) 
(citing Reeder v. Harper, 788 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ind. 2003)). The 
interpretation of an insurance policy is primarily a question of law for the 
court, and therefore well-suited for summary judgment. Wagner v. Yates, 
912 N.E.2d 805, 808 (Ind. 2009). 
Discussion and Decision 
We restate the primary issue on appeal as whether the liquor liability 
exclusion set forth in Illinois Casualty’s businessowners policies absolves 
the insurance company of a duty to defend or indemnify the Parks 
defendants against the claims in the underlying lawsuit. 
First, we determine whether the liquor liability exclusion is ambiguous. 
Second, in concluding that the exclusion is unambiguous, we analyze 
whether it excludes coverage for the claims set forth in the Eberts’ second 
amended complaint. E.g., Prop.-Owners, Ins. Co. v. Ted’s Tavern, Inc., 853 
N.E.2d 973 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).  
A. The liquor liability exclusion in the businessowners 
policies is unambiguous.   
In Indiana, insurance contracts are subject to the same rules of 
interpretation as other contracts. Nuckolls, 682 N.E.2d at 537–38 (citing Eli 
Lilly and Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 482 N.E.2d 467, 470 (Ind. 1985), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 1060 (1987)). Ordinarily, we construe ambiguous policy provisions 
in favor of the insured, especially if the “provisions limiting coverage are 
not clearly and plainly expressed.” Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Auto-Owners 
Ins. Co., 698 N.E.2d 770, 773 (Ind. 1998). In doing so, we further the policy’s 
basic purpose of indemnity and recognize the disparate positions between 
the insurer and insured. Id.; see also Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. Liggett, 426 N.E.2d 
136, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (“The insurance companies write the policies; 
we buy their form or we do not buy insurance.”) 
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On the other hand, we give clear and unambiguous language in a 
policy its plain and ordinary meaning. Meridian Mut., 698 N.E.2d at 773. A 
policy is unambiguous if reasonable persons cannot honestly differ as to 
its meaning. Eli Lilly and Co., 482 N.E.2d at 470, cert. denied. Reasonable 
persons might differ if the language is susceptible to more than one 
interpretation. Meridian Mut., 698 N.E.2d at 773. However, a policy is not 
ambiguous simply because the parties assert contrary interpretations. 
Beam v. Wausau Ins. Co., 765 N.E.2d 524, 528 (Ind. 2002).  
Here, Illinois Casualty issued separate businessowners policies to each 
show club. The policies obligate Illinois Casualty to pay “those sums that 
the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of 
‘bodily injury,’ ‘property damage’, or ‘personal and advertising injury’ to 
which [the] insurance applies.” Parks Defendants’ App. Vol. II at 77, 201.  
The policies “appl[y]: (1) To ‘bodily injury’ and ‘property damage’ only if: 
(a) The ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ is caused by an ‘occurrence’ 
that takes place in the ‘coverage territory’[.]” Id. The policies further 
provide that Illinois Casualty “will have no duty to defend against any 
‘suit’ seeking damages for ‘bodily injury’ . . . to which this insurance does 
not apply,” and excludes coverage for certain circumstances, such as 
liquor liability. Id. The liquor liability exclusion states:  
B.  
Exclusions  
  
1.  
Applicable To Business Liability Coverage 
This insurance does not apply to:  
 
 
 
 
 
* * * 
c.  Liquor Liability  
“Bodily injury” or “property damage” for which any 
insured may be held liable by reason of:  
(1) Causing or contributing to the intoxication of any 
person;  
(2) The furnishing of alcoholic beverages to a person 
under the legal drinking age or under the 
influence of alcohol; or  
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(3) Any statute, ordinance or regulation relating to 
the sale, gift, distribution or use of alcoholic 
beverages.  
This exclusion – c.(1), c.(2), and c.(3), applies even if 
the claims allege negligence or other wrongdoing in:  
(a) The supervision, hiring, employment, 
training, or monitoring of others by an 
insured; or  
(b) Providing or failing to provide 
transportation with respect to any person 
that may be under the influence of alcohol;  
If the “occurrence” which caused the “bodily injury” 
or “property damage” involved that which is 
described in Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) above.  
Id. at 80–81, 204–05. 
During summary judgment proceedings, the Parks defendants argued 
that the trial court should, at minimum, find the policy language is 
ambiguous, requiring that it “be construed strictly against the insurer.” 
Eberts’ App. Vol. III at 127 (citing Am. States Ins. Co. v. Kiger, 662 N.E.2d 
945, 947 (Ind. 1996)). Further, they contended that the exclusion “cannot 
be twisted and contorted to include every possible allegation that could 
occur at a bar,” or such an interpretation would render coverage 
“illusory.” Id.  
We disagree that the language in the exclusion is ambiguous, and we 
do not infer ambiguity simply because it is broad in scope.  Of course, 
insurers have the right to limit their coverage of certain risks and, 
therefore their liability, by imposing exceptions, conditions, and 
exclusions. Sheehan Const. Co., Inc., 935 N.E.2d at 169. In this matter, 
Illinois Casualty clearly did so. Like other courts, we do not find that 
reasonable people would honestly differ as to the meaning of the term 
“intoxication” or the phrase “under the influence.” Ted’s Tavern, Inc., 853 
N.E.2d at 979. Instead, the policy plainly and unambiguously excludes 
coverage for claims of bodily injury for which any insured may be liable 
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by reason of causing or contributing to the intoxication of any person or 
furnishing alcohol to a person under the influence, even if the claims allege 
negligence or other wrongdoing in the supervision or monitoring of 
others by an insured or in failing to provide transportation to a person 
who might be under the influence of alcohol.   
Concluding the exclusion is unambiguous, we turn to whether the 
policy excludes coverage for the claims asserted in the Eberts’ second 
amended complaint. 
B. The unambiguous language of the Big Daddy’s 
businessowner policy excludes coverage for the Eberts’ 
claims.  
An unambiguous insurance policy must be enforced according to its 
terms, even if those terms limit an insurer’s liability. Sheehan Const. Co., 
Inc., 935 N.E.2d at 169. Whether an insurer has a duty to defend a 
particular lawsuit is determined by examining the nature of the 
underlying complaint. Transamerica Ins. Servs. v. Kopko, 570 N.E.2d 1283, 
1285 (Ind. 1991). And an insurer’s duty to defend is broader than its duty 
to indemnify. Seymour Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Com. Union Ins. Co., 665 N.E.2d 891, 
892 (Ind. 1996). Consequently, if an insurer does not have a duty to 
defend, then it does not have a duty to indemnify.  
We find that the unambiguous language of the businessowners policy 
excludes coverage for the claims asserted in the Eberts’ second amended 
complaint. In doing so, we adopt and apply the efficient and predominant 
cause analysis set forth by our Court of Appeals. See Ted’s Tavern, Inc., 853 
N.E.2d at 980; Wright v. Am. States Ins. Co., 765 N.E.2d 690, 697 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2002); Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Wiegand, 808 N.E.2d 180, 189 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2004), trans. denied. 
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1. The businessowners policy expressly excludes 
coverage for claims that Big Daddy’s carelessly and 
negligently served alcohol to and failed to obtain 
alternative transportation for Spence.  
As an initial matter, we examine which theories of negligence set forth 
in the Eberts’ second amended complaint are expressly excluded by the 
terms of the businessowners policy. 
First, in Count III, the Eberts claim Big Daddy’s carelessly and 
negligently violated Indiana’s Dram Shop Act by continuing to serve 
Spence alcohol when it knew, or should have known, he was inebriated, 
resulting in their injuries. However, this claim falls squarely within the 
language of the liquor liability exclusion. Parks Defendants’ App. Vol. II at 
81.  
Second, the Eberts claim Big Daddy’s carelessly and negligently 
continued to serve Spence alcohol and failed to obtain alternative 
transportation for him when they knew, or should have known, of his 
inebriation and impairment. Yet, the policy expressly excludes from its 
coverage bodily injuries for which any insured may be liable by reason of 
“contributing to the intoxication of any person” and “furnishing . . . 
alcoholic beverages to a person . . . under the influence of alcohol . . . even 
if the claims allege negligence or wrongdoing in . . . failing to provide 
transportation with respect to any person that may be under the influence 
of alcohol.” Id. Accordingly, such claims are expressly excluded by the 
businessowners policy issued to Big Daddy’s.  
Therefore, we must determine whether the exclusion applies to the 
Eberts’ remaining claims against the Parks defendants. 
2. The businessowners policies either exclude or do not 
provide coverage for the remaining claims.  
In concluding whether the liquor liability exclusion applies to the 
Eberts’ remaining claims, we apply the efficient and predominant cause 
analysis originally set forth by our Court of Appeals. See Ted’s Tavern, Inc., 
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853 N.E.2d at 980; Wright, 765 N.E.2d at 697; Wiegand, 808 N.E.2d at 189, 
trans. denied. In doing so, we adopt the guidance set forth in Ted’s Tavern.  
The facts giving rise to Ted’s Tavern are as follows: on July 9, 2004, 
Carole Stine filed suit against Big Jim’s, its owner, and two employees. 853 
N.E.2d at 976. Stine alleged two bartenders served Alan Wickliff four 
Long Island Ice Teas, and shortly after Wickliff left Big Jim’s, his vehicle 
collided with her husband’s vehicle, causing fatal injuries. Id. Stine’s 
complaint asserted claims of (1) negligence; (2) negligently hiring, 
training, and supervising employees; (3) violations of Indiana’s Dram 
Shop Act; and (4) nuisance. Id. 
The tavern’s insurer, Property-Owners, filed a declaratory action 
seeking a judgment that it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify Big 
Jim’s because of the liquor liability exclusion set forth in its Commercial 
General Liability Policy. Id. After the insurer and Stine filed cross-motions 
for summary judgment, the trial court granted partial summary judgment 
to each moving party, concluding Property-Owners did not have a duty to 
defend or indemnify Big Jim’s for the negligence and Dram Shop claims, 
but it did owe a duty for the remaining claims of negligently hiring, 
training, and supervising employees and nuisance. Id. at 976–77. Property-
Owners appealed. Id. at 977. 
After determining the policy was unambiguous, the Court of Appeals 
concluded the allegations within the claims of negligently hiring, training, 
and supervising employees and nuisance “are general ‘rephrasings’ of the 
core negligence claim for causing/contributing to Wickliff’s drunk 
driving,” and the claims were “so inextricably intertwined with the 
underlying negligence that there [was] no independent act that would 
avoid [the] exclusion.” Id. at 983. Because “the immediate and efficient 
cause of the injuries was drunk driving precipitated by the negligent 
service of alcohol,” the trial court committed reversible error by 
concluding the policy provided coverage for these counts. Id. at 983–84. 
In resolving the case at bar, we find the efficient and predominant 
cause analysis instructive. Accordingly, like the Court of Appeals in Ted’s 
Tavern, we begin by reviewing the Eberts’ second amended complaint, 
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which starts with an identification of the relevant parties and statement of 
the factual allegations. The Eberts continue to allege:  
9.   On July 5, 2015, Defendant William Spence was drinking 
alcohol at Big Daddy’s Show Club and was visibly intoxicated. 
Defendant Spence drove his automobile from Daddy’s Show 
Club that evening.  
10. On July 5, 2015, the Plaintiffs were traveling eastbound on 
Morgan Street. They approached the intersection with Davis 
Street, stopped at the four-way flashing red light, and then 
proceeded to cross the intersection eastbound on Morgan Street. 
The Defendant, William Spence, was travelling northbound on 
Davis Street approaching the intersection with Morgan Street. 
At such time, the Defendant, William Spence, failed to stop at 
the four-way flashing red light at the intersection of Davis and 
Morgan, striking the Plaintiffs.  
11. At the time of the collision, the Defendant, William Spence, was 
operating his vehicle with a blood alcohol content of 0.195%.  
Eberts’ App. Vol. III at 100.  
In line with the foregoing, we restate the Eberts’ allegations as follows: 
Big Daddy’s served Spence alcohol, and he subsequently drove his vehicle 
from the premises while intoxicated and collided with the Eberts’ vehicle. 
Thus, the efficient and predominant cause of the collision was Spence’s 
drunk driving after he was served alcohol at Big Daddy’s.  
At the trial level, the Parks defendants argued, “The Eberts’ allegations 
are not ‘inextricably intertwined’ with dram shop liability because the 
Parks Defendants could be liable regardless of whether they provided any 
alcohol to Spence.” Id. at 123. As an example, the Parks defendants 
contended they could still be liable for failing to prevent Spence from 
driving or calling the police if he arrived intoxicated from narcotics or 
made violent threats to another patron.   
The Court of Appeals similarly noted that “[t]he critical commonality to 
all the counts in Ted’s Tavern was not just that the patron was intoxicated, 
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but that the bar and its employees had caused the patron to be 
intoxicated.” Slip op. at 19–20. The Court of Appeals distinguished the 
present circumstances from Ted’s Tavern, because while “all of the Eberts’ 
claims relate factually to Spence’s intoxication, some of them do not legally 
rely on the bar causing or contributing to that intoxication,” as required to 
fall within the exclusion. Id. at 20. By contrast, liability could attach under 
the failure to intervene theories if Spence had arrived at Big Daddy’s 
already intoxicated or suffered impairment from “an epileptic seizure, the 
throes of delusion, or a diabetic incident.” Id. 
But the Eberts have not alleged such hypotheticals in their second 
amended complaint. Rather, they alleged, “On July 5, 2015, Defendant 
William Spence was drinking alcohol at Big Daddy’s Show Club and was 
visibly intoxicated,” and “[a]t the time of the collision, the Defendant, 
William Spence, was operating his vehicle with a blood alcohol content of 
0.195%.” Eberts’ App. Vol. III at 100. Thereafter, the Eberts incorporated 
by reference the paragraphs immediately preceding each count. And the 
businessowners policy expressly provides that there is no duty to defend 
or indemnify an insured that may be liable by reason of “[c]ausing or 
contributing” to a person’s intoxication or “furnishing of alcoholic 
beverages to a person . . . under the influence of alcohol.” Parks 
Defendants’ App. Vol. II at 81.  
 Here, the claims that the Parks defendants were negligent in allowing 
Spence to leave Big Daddy’s in his vehicle and failing to call police “are so 
inextricably intertwined with the underlying negligence,” Ted’s Tavern, 
Inc., 853 N.E.2d at 983, and could not have resulted in injury but for 
Spence’s driving while intoxicated after Big Daddy’s served him alcohol. 
See also Wiegand, 808 N.E.2d at 191. Plainly, the Eberts essentially claim the 
Parks defendants were negligent for failing to intervene. But we cannot 
ignore the circumstance necessitating intervention in the first place: the 
service of alcohol to an intoxicated Spence. Therefore, like the trial court, 
we find that Spence’s intoxication was the efficient and predominant 
cause of the Eberts’ injuries. See also Wright, 765 N.E.2d 690. 
Further, in affirming the trial court, we are not persuaded by the Eberts’ 
argument that summary judgment was improper on the issue of coverage 
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under the Little Daddy’s businessowners policy. The Eberts concede the 
Little Daddy’s liquor liability policy does not apply to their claims because 
neither France nor Little Daddy’s served Spence any alcohol. Instead, they 
argue that because material questions of fact exist regarding the scope of 
France’s employment on the night in question, and neither France nor 
Little Daddy’s caused or contributed to Spence’s intoxication or furnished 
any alcohol to him, Illinois Casualty may owe a duty to defend the Parks 
defendants under the businessowners policy issued to Little Daddy’s.  
First, even if France acted as an employee of Little Daddy’s as he 
ordered Spence to leave Big Daddy’s (but for reasons explained infra, he 
did not), its policy would still exclude coverage for the Eberts’ claims—not 
because Big Daddy’s served alcohol to Spence, but because the second 
amended complaint alleges Little Daddy’s contributed to Spence’s 
intoxication and failed to obtain alternative transportation for him. Eberts’ 
App. Vol. III at 110. It is undisputed that such allegations fall squarely 
within the language of the liquor liability exclusion. And the remaining 
allegations against Little Daddy’s—that is, Little Daddy’s allowed Spence 
to leave Big Daddy’s in his vehicle and failed to notify law enforcement—
are inextricably intertwined with the allegations that Little Daddy’s 
caused or contributed to Spence’s intoxication. Because “[t]he duty to 
defend is determined solely by the nature of the complaint,” the Little 
Daddy’s policy clearly excludes coverage for the claims in the second 
amended complaint. Kopko, 570 N.E.2d at 1285. 
But the designated evidence also supports finding that France did not 
act as an employee of Little Daddy’s when he ordered Spence to leave Big 
Daddy’s. For purposes of the businessowners policies, an “employee” is 
an insured “but only for acts within the scope of their employment . . . or 
while performing duties related to the conduct of [the] business.” Parks 
Defendants’ App. Vol. II at 90—91, 214—15. According to the record 
before us, after France left Little Daddy’s, he stopped by Big Daddy’s as a 
“patron” for a “social visit” and to help as necessary. Eberts’ App. Vol. III 
at 175, 206–07. He ordinarily popped into the bar when he was “off duty” 
to see “what[‘s]…going on.” Id. at 205. He also testified he visited Big 
Daddy’s because he was “not scheduled to work” at Little Daddy’s. Id. at 
224. And, significantly, he was not paid any compensation for his 
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presence at Big Daddy’s. Accordingly, France was not an insured for 
purposes of the Little Daddy’s businessowners policy, and this policy 
does not provide coverage for the Eberts’ claims.  
We find additional support for this conclusion by examining the 
definition of a “volunteer worker” under the Big Daddy’s businessowners 
policy. The policy provides that “volunteer workers” qualify as an insured 
“but only while performing duties related to the conduct of [Big 
Daddy’s].” Parks Defendants’ App. Vol. II at 91. A “volunteer worker” is a 
person “who donates his . . . work and acts at the direction of and within 
the scope of duties determined by [Big Daddy’s], and is not paid a fee, 
salary or other compensation by [Big Daddy’s] or anyone else for work 
performed for [Big Daddy’s].” Id. at 99. Under this definition, it appears to 
us that France was a volunteer worker for Big Daddy’s, and thus an 
insured for purposes of its policy. As he testified, he was “an errand boy,” 
there to make sure people did not “tear up the bar” and help the manager 
as necessary. Eberts’ App. Vol. III at 206. Even though he occasionally 
received compensation for his work at Big Daddy’s, he was not paid the 
night of July 5, 2015. For these reasons, France was an insured under the 
Big Daddy’s businessowners policy. And because each of the Eberts’ 
allegations, including those that might implicate France’s actions on the 
night in question, are “inextricably intertwined” to Big Daddy’s causing or 
contributing to Spence’s intoxication, the show club’s liquor liability 
exclusion applies to their claims. 
Though “a valiant effort to procure coverage, the creative pleading of 
the [remaining counts] cannot hide the reality that the immediate and 
efficient cause of the injuries was drunk driving precipitated by the 
negligent service of alcohol.” Ted’s Tavern, Inc., 853 N.E.2d at 983; see also 
Nautilus Ins. Co. v. JDW Inc., 2021 WL 5083716 (N.D. Ind. 2021) 
(concluding an identical liquor liability exclusion applied to “different 
(and broader) theories of negligence,” including, but not limited to, failure 
to provide adequate security to patrons, after a bar ousted an intoxicated 
patron who subsequently injured someone in a motor vehicle accident, 
because the claims were inextricably intertwined with the core negligence 
claim excluded by the policy). 
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In adopting the efficient and predominant cause analysis, we find 
support from the District Courts in our State. See Nautilus Ins. Co., 2021 
WL 5083716; Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. Vandivier Mgmt., Inc., 
2012 WL 4358747 (S.D. Ind. 2012) (setting forth a detailed analysis of Ted’s 
Tavern in assessing a “causing intoxication” exclusion). Cf. Prop.-Owners 
Ins. Co. v. Virk Boyz Liquor Stores, LLC, 219 F.Supp.3d 868, 874 (N.D. Ind. 
2016) (distinguishing Ted’s Tavern by holding that an identical liquor 
liability exclusion did not apply to allegations that the tavern was 
negligent for failing to intervene or call the police when its bartender 
assaulted an intoxicated patron, hiring the assaulting bartender when it 
should have known he was incompetent and unfit for employment, and 
failing to train the assaulting bartender to prevent the assault, because 
such claims were neither “inextricably intertwined” with the negligent 
service of alcohol nor implicated the sale of alcohol at all).  
Finally, it is significant that the liquor liability exclusions in the 
businessowners policies are even broader than the exclusion in Ted’s 
Tavern. For example, the exclusion applies to allegations of negligence or 
other wrongdoing in the monitoring of others by an insured or failing to 
provide transportation for a person who might be under the influence of 
alcohol. While the Court of Appeals remarked, “If Illinois Casualty 
wished to exclude coverage for any and all claims arising from 
intoxication generally or from intoxicated patrons, then it would have 
drafted a contract that said so,” slip op. at 20, we cannot ignore the 
unambiguous language of the exclusion in relation to the allegations pled 
by the Eberts. See Kopko, 570 N.E.2d at 1285; Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Mallon, 
409 N.E.2d 1100, 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (“In other words, it is the 
nature of the claim and not its merits that determines the duty to 
defend.”).  
We find that the efficient and predominant cause of the Eberts’ injuries 
was drunk driving precipitated by the negligent service of alcohol, and 
because the insurance policy excluded coverage for claims of bodily injury 
after causing or contributing to a person’s intoxication or furnishing 
alcohol to a person under the influence of alcohol, the policy excludes the 
Eberts’ claims from its coverage.  
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-PL-8 | June 16, 2022 
Page 16 of 16 
Conclusion  
Consistent with our findings, we conclude that Illinois Casualty does 
not owe a duty to defend or indemnify the Parks defendants under the 
businessowners policies issued to either show club and the liquor liability 
policy issued to Little Daddy’s. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s 
grant of summary judgment in Illinois Casualty’s favor. 
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.  
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LA N T S 
 
Mark S. Fryman, Jr. 
Starr Austen & Miller, LLP 
Logansport, Indiana  
 
Craig R. Karpe  
Karpe Litigation Group  
Indianapolis, Indiana  
 
Anthony R. Jost 
Riley Bennett Egloff LLP  
Indianapolis, Indiana  
 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
 
Thomas J. Costello III  
Eman Z. Senteno  
Best, Vanderlaan & Harrington  
Chicago, Illinois