Case Title: Ex Parte JAP

Citation: 853 So. 2d 280

Docket Number: 1010263

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2002-09-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
853 So. 2d 280 (2002)
Ex parte J.A.P., a minor child.
(In re J.A.P. v. STATE of Alabama).
1010263.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 6, 2002.
Rehearing Denied November 27, 2002.
*281 Joe W. Morgan III, Birmingham, for petitioner.
William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and Andy S. Poole and Kristi L. Deason, asst. attys. gen., for respondent.
WOODALL, Justice.
A delinquency petition was filed in the Jefferson Juvenile Court, charging J.A.P., a 14-year-old male, with the attempted first-degree rape of his 9-year-old half sister, L.P. The charge was based on allegations that J.A.P. attempted to commit the offense of first-degree rape, as that offense is defined in § 13A-6-61(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975. See also § 13A-4-2, Ala.Code 1975. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found the charge to be true and adjudicated J.A.P. delinquent.
J.A.P. appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See J.A.P. v. State, 853 So. 2d 264 (Ala.Crim.App.2001). After the Court of Criminal Appeals overruled J.A.P.'s application for rehearing, this Court granted J.A.P.'s petition for certiorari review. We reverse and remand.
In its opinion, the Court of Criminal Appeals adequately stated the relevant facts, and the repetition of those facts is not necessary. The delinquency petition alleged, in pertinent part, that "[J.A.P.], a male, did, with the intent to commit the crime of rape in the first degree (Section 13A-6-61 of the Alabama Criminal Code), attempt to engage in sexual intercourse with [L.P.], a female, by forcible compulsion." (Emphasis added.) Section 13A-6-61(a)(1) provides: "A person commits the crime of rape in the first degree if: (1) He or she engages in sexual intercourse with a member of the opposite sex by forcible compulsion." (Emphasis added.) Section 13A-6-60(8), Ala.Code 1975, defines "forcible compulsion" as: "Physical force that overcomes earnest resistance or a threat, express or implied, that places a person in fear of immediate death or serious physical injury to himself or another person."
On appeal, J.A.P. argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that he had used forcible compulsion in an attempt to engage in sexual intercourse with L.P. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to allow the trial court to infer the element of forcible compulsion, and it affirmed the trial court's judgment based upon B.E. v. State, 778 So. 2d 863 (Ala.Crim.App.2000). Before this Court, J.A.P. argues that the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals conflicts with its prior holding in Rider v. State, 544 So. 2d 994 (Ala.Crim.App.1989).
In Rider, the Court of Criminal Appeals considered whether a 27-year-old defendant had used forcible compulsion when he sexually abused and sodomized his 9-year-old stepdaughter. The court stated the following relevant facts:
"The defendant is the 27-year-old stepfather of the victim. The victim testified that, when she and the defendant were sitting on the sofa alone, the defendant would put a movie on the VCR showing `people have sex.' She testified that as they watched the movie, the defendant "would force [her] hand on one of his private spots ... [b]etween his *282 legs.' (Emphasis added [in Rider].) After the movie, the defendant `took [her by the hand] back to the bedroom and touched [her] private part[s] ... [b]etween [her] legs and on [her] chest.' When this touching occurred, both the defendant and the victim were undressed. The victim testified that the defendant touched her private part with his mouth and that the defendant `asked' or `made' her touch his private part with her mouth.
"`Q. Okay. The things that Robin did to you, why did you let him do those things to you? Why didn't you scream and yell and scratch him and claw him and all of that? Why did you, you know, just why did you let him do those things to you?
"`A. Because I thought if I would stop, that he wouldn't treat me the way he did.'
Rider, 544 So. 2d  at 994-95 (footnote omitted). Regarding forcible compulsion, an element of the offenses of sexual abuse in the first degree and sodomy in the first degree, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated in Rider:
544 So. 2d  at 996. Although the court found evidence indicating that physical force was involved, it found no evidence of any earnest resistance. Also, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that "it [was] clear that there [was] absolutely no evidence to support [the] second type [of forcible compulsion]." Id.
In Powe v. State, 597 So. 2d 721 (Ala.1991), the defendant had been convicted of first-degree rape of his 11-year-old daughter. The sole issue was whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the defendant had had sexual intercourse with his daughter through the use of forcible compulsion. The Court summarized the facts relevant to that issue:
Powe, 597 So. 2d  at 722-23. According to this Court, the record in that case "reveal[ed] no evidence that physical force was used on the victim or that the victim was expressly threatened." 597 So. 2d  at 726.
In Powe, the parties cited Rider, which this Court described as involving "neither a threat of any kind nor the use of any physical force. Furthermore, there was nothing in the record [in Rider] to show that the sex acts were anything other than voluntary." 597 So. 2d  at 726. This Court then distinguished Rider, stating:
597 So. 2d  at 726.
After reviewing cases from other jurisdictions, this Court concluded that the evidence *284 was sufficient to support a finding of forcible compulsion, because "a jury could reasonably infer that Powe held a position of authority and domination with regard to his daughter sufficient to allow the inference of an implied threat to her if she refused to comply with his demands." 597 So. 2d  at 728. That holding was extremely narrow, as this Court clearly emphasized:
"....
Id. at 728-29 (emphasis added). This Court made it quite clear that its holding would apply only to cases involving the sexual assault of children by adults who exercised positions of domination and control over the children.
In B.E. v. State, supra, the Court of Criminal Appeals, contrary to the limitations of the Powe holding, extended Powe's forcible-compulsion analysis and affirmed an adjudication of delinquency based upon the juvenile court's finding that B.E., a 14-year-old male, had committed first-degree sexual abuse and first-degree sodomy of his half sister, who was 5 years old at the time of the incident. Specifically, the Court of Criminal Appeals failed to acknowledge "that [this Court's] holding in [Powe] is limited to cases concerning the sexual assault of children by adults with whom the children are in a relationship of trust." Powe, 597 So. 2d  at 728. Therefore, to the extent it conflicts with Powe, we overrule B.E.
The Court of Criminal Appeals' affirmance of the judgment of the trial court adjudicating J.A.P. to be delinquent was based solely upon its decision in B.E. Because we are overruling B.E., we must reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case for an order consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, JOHNSTONE, and HARWOOD, JJ., concur.
BROWN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part as to the rationale and concurs in the result.
MOORE, C.J., and STUART, J., dissent.
*285 BROWN, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part as to the rationale and concurring in the result).
I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion, which reverses the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court adjudicating J.A.P. delinquent because I do not believe the evidence before us is sufficient to establish the element of forcible compulsion.
I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority's overruling of B.E. v. State, 778 So. 2d 863 (Ala.Crim.App.2000). I agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals' statement in B.E.:
778 So. 2d  at 866.
I believe this statement is a logical extension of Powe v. State, 597 So. 2d 721 (Ala.1991), which, as the majority opinion notes, states:
597 So. 2d  at 728-29 (emphasis added).
Thus, I do not believe B.E. should be overruled.
STUART, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, which reverses the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming the juvenile court's adjudication of J.A.P. as delinquent and which overrules B.E. v. State, 778 So. 2d 863 (Ala.Crim.App.2000). The Court of Criminal Appeals' affirmance is based on a well-reasoned application of established law to the facts of this case. As the Court of Criminal Appeals stated in J.A.P. v. State, 853 So. 2d 264, 269 (Ala.Crim.App.2001):