Case Title: SINCOCK v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-09-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
SINCOCK v. STATE2003 WY 11576 P.3d 323Case Number: 02-4Decided: 09/12/2003
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

JUSTIN 
SINCOCK,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel  

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Georgia L. Tibbetts, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General  

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

            
KITE, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Justin Sincock 
appeals from convictions for first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree 
felony murder, aggravated robbery, forgery, and escape.  He claims (1) his right not to be twice 
placed in jeopardy was violated when he was sentenced to life for first-degree 
murder and twenty-two to twenty-five years for aggravated robbery, (2) error in 
the admission of a cellmate's testimony concerning statements he made while in 
jail, (3) abuse of discretion in the denial of his motion for continuance, and 
(4) ineffective assistance of counsel.  
We find no error warranting reversal under the particular facts of this 
case and affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Mr. Sincock 
raises the following issues:

 

ISSUE 
I

 

            
Whether Mr. Sincock's right to be free from double jeopardy was violated 
when the trial court sentenced Mr. Sincock to life for first degree murder and 
twenty-two to twenty-five years for aggravated robbery?

 

ISSUE 
II

 

            
Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed Mr. Burke 
to testify regarding statements made to him by Mr. Sincock after Mr. Burke was 
placed in Mr. Sincock's jail cell for the specific purpose of obtaining 
incriminating statements?

 

ISSUE 
III

 

            
Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to grant a 
continuance of the trial after the lead counsel had to withdraw because of a 
conflict?

 

ISSUE 
IV

 

            
Whether Mr. Sincock received ineffective assistance of counsel when his 
counsel was unprepared to go to trial and when counsel conceded 
guilt?

 

The 
state presents substantially the same issues.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      In the summer of 
1998, Mr. Sincock was a transitional resident inmate at Community Alternatives 
of Casper (CAC).  As a condition of 
his admission to CAC, Mr. Sincock was required to maintain employment and, in 
late June of 1998, was hired by Dan Horkan to work as a laborer for his floor 
covering business.  On July 28, 
1998, Mr. Horkan was scheduled to work out of town and told Mr. Sincock he would 
not be needed.  Before heading out 
of town that morning, Mr. Horkan stopped by his house where he found Mr. 
Sincock.  Mr. Horkan's wife, Becky, 
told her husband she had some painting Mr. Sincock could do at the house.  Mr. Horkan left at approximately 10:00 
a.m., leaving Mr. Sincock, Becky, and the Horkans' two children at the 
house.  

 

[¶4]      At approximately 
11:00 that same morning, Becky dropped the children off at her mother's house 
while she went to deliver lunch to Mr. Sincock.  She planned to return to her mother's 
house before noon.  When Becky did 
not return as planned, her mother, Jennie Litke, called the Horkans' house but 
received no answer. When nothing was heard from Becky by mid-afternoon, Mrs. 
Litke called Carmen Horkan, Becky's mother-in-law, and asked her to go over and 
check the house.  Mrs. Horkan went 
to the house about 3:00 p.m., stepped inside, called for Becky and, hearing no 
response, picked up the telephone to call Mrs. Litke.  There was no dial tone, so she drove to 
Mrs. Litke's home to tell her she did not find Becky.  Mrs. Horkan then returned to the Horkan 
residence with Mrs. Litke's daughter-in-law.  By this time, Mr. Horkan had arrived 
home.  They told him Becky was 
missing, and the three of them searched the house for some clue as to Becky's 
whereabouts.  Mr. Horkan discovered 
the telephone had been dismantled.  
They found a bloodstained towel on the dining room floor.  Mrs. Horkan went into the upstairs 
bathroom, pulled back the shower curtain, and found Becky's body lying face down 
in the bathtub.  She had been shot 
in the head at close range.

 

[¶5]      Several items 
were missing from the home, including Becky's purse containing keys, cash, 
checkbook, and credit cards, a 1995 Saturn station wagon, and a .22 caliber 
revolver.   A note left on the 
front door stated, "Dan, went to Mountain View, Justin."  On July 31, 1998, members of Mr. 
Sincock's family notified police in Columbia, Missouri, where they resided, that 
Mr. Sincock had checked into a hotel in town.  Police arrested him and recovered the 
stolen car, along with the stolen credit cards and checks.  

 

[¶6]      Mr. Sincock was 
charged with first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder, 
aggravated robbery, forgery, and escape.  
The latter two charges were based upon allegations that Mr. Sincock 
forged a check taken from Becky's purse on the day of the murder and violated 
the terms of his placement at CAC.  
After a jury trial, he was convicted on all counts.  He was sentenced to a term of life 
imprisonment on the first-degree murder conviction and consecutive terms of 
twenty-two (22) to twenty-five (25) years imprisonment on the aggravated robbery 
conviction, nine (9) to ten (10) years on the forgery conviction, and nine (9) 
to ten (10) years on the escape conviction.  

 

 

 

 

[¶7]      Mr. Sincock 
claims his right against double jeopardy was violated when he was sentenced to 
life imprisonment for first-degree murder and a term of years for aggravated 
robbery.  Citing Bilderback v. 
State, 13 P.3d 249, 254 (Wyo. 2000), he contends these two convictions 
should have merged for sentencing purposes because the facts necessary to prove 
aggravated robbery describe the only possible way in which he could have 
committed felony murder (for which aggravated robbery was the underlying felony) 
and so sentencing him for both violated his constitutional rights against double 
jeopardy.  To support his claim, Mr. 
Sincock relies upon cases in which we held the imposition of multiple 
punishments for felony murder and the underlying felony violated the Double 
Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Wyoming Constitutions.  Mares v. State, 939 P.2d 724 
(Wyo. 1997); Roderick v. State, 858 P.2d 538 (Wyo. 1993); Cook v. 
State, 841 P.2d 1345, 1352-53 (Wyo. 1992).

 

[¶8]      In Cook, 
the jury convicted the defendant of felony murder and the underlying felony and 
the trial court imposed separate sentences for each conviction.  We reversed, holding the sentences must 
merge because the Wyoming legislature did not intend to allow punishment for 
both the murder and the underlying felony and, applying Blockburger v. United 
States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), proof of aggravated robbery under the Wyoming 
statute required proof of no additional element which proof of felony murder did 
not require.  Mr. Sincock's 
convictions differ from those in Cook or any other case this Court has 
considered because the first-degree murder count was based on the alternate 
theories of premeditated murder and felony murder.  In light of the jury's finding of guilt 
on both of those theories, the question of whether the aggravated robbery 
conviction violated Mr. Sincock's right to be free from a second punishment for 
the same offense is a question of first impression in 
Wyoming.

  

[¶9]      We have said the 
Double Jeopardy Clause protects an accused by prohibiting (1) a second 
prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal, (2) a second prosecution 
for the same offense after a conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the 
same offense.  DeLoge v. State, 2002 WY 155, ¶7, 55 P.3d 1233, ¶7 (Wyo. 
2002).  In this case, we are 
concerned with the third protectionmultiple punishments for the same 
offenseand whether the convictions for first-degree murder and aggravated 
robbery should have merged for sentencing purposes.  When we analyze the protection against 
double jeopardy in terms of multiple punishments, we apply the statutory 
elements test set forth in Blockburger, 284 U.S. 299.  Succinctly stated, that test is as 
follows:  "[W]here the same act or 
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the 
test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is 
whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does 
not."  Pope v. State, 2002 WY 9, ¶15, 38 P.3d 1069, ¶15 (Wyo. 
2002); Lee v. State, 2001 WY 129, ¶20, 36 P.3d 1133, ¶20 (Wyo. 
2001).

 

[¶10]   Initially, application of the 
statutory elements test in order to resolve the issue of merger would appear to 
be a pure question of law calling for de novo review of the trial court's 
conclusions.  Bilderback, 13 P.3d  at 253-54.  Such an analysis 
may indeed suffice when the question of merger concerns the entitlement of the 
state to charge a defendant with separate crimes and have each charge 
submitted to the jury.  
Id.  The question of 
merger as a bar to multiple sentences after conviction of charges arising 
from the same act, however, summons a more complex appellate standard of 
review.  Id.  

 

[¶11]   As a practical matter, in appeals 
alleging imposition of multiple sentences for a single act, the focus is on 
those facts proven at trial.  Chapman v. State, 2001 WY 25, ¶25, 18 P.3d 1164, ¶25 (Wyo. 
2001).  The ultimate question 
is whether those facts reveal a single criminal act or multiple distinct 
offenses against the victim.  
Id.  Where the acts 
required for the commission of one offense are a necessary and indispensable 
precursor to commission of a second offense, the offenses merge for purposes of 
sentencing.  Id.  Such merger is mandatory where the 
second offense cannot be committed absent commission of the first offense.  Id.  If the statutory elements test reveals 
disparate component parts to the two charged offenses, it may be presumed that 
the legislature intended separate or cumulative punishments upon convictions of 
both.  Bilderback, 13 P.3d  
at 253.  With these 
principles in mind, we turn to the specifics of the charges on which Mr. Sincock 
was convicted and sentenced.  

 

[¶12]   Mr. Sincock was charged with one 
count of first-degree murder under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101 (Lexis 1999) 
(amended 2001), which provided in part as follows:

 

            
(a)  Whoever purposely and with premeditated malice, or in the 
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any . . . robbery 
. . . kills any human being is guilty of murder in the first 
degree.

 

            
(b)  A person convicted of murder in the first degree shall be 
punished by death or life imprisonment according to law 
. . . .

 

The 
information filed against Mr. Sincock alleged one count of first-degree murder 
under § 6-2-101, based alternatively upon premeditation or murder 
committed in the course of a felony:  

COUNT 
I

 

That 
JUSTIN WALKER SINCOCK, late of the county aforesaid, on or about the 
28th day of July, 1998, in the County of Natrona, in the State of 
Wyoming, did unlawfully, purposely and with premeditated malice, or 
in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate a robbery 
did kill a human being, to-wit:  
REBECCA HORKAN, in violation of W.S. 1977, as amended, § 
6-2-101.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  Mr. Sincock was also 
charged with aggravated robbery under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-401(a) and (c) 
(LexisNexis 2003): 

 

(a)  A 
person is guilty of robbery if in the course of committing a crime defined by 
W.S. 6-3-402 he:

 

(i)  Inflicts 
bodily injury upon another; or

 

. 
 .  . 

 

(c)  Aggravated 
robbery is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not less than five (5) years 
nor more than twenty-five (25) years if in the course of committing the crime of 
robbery the person:

 

(i)  Intentionally 
inflicts or attempts to inflict 

serious 
bodily injury; or . . . . 

 

The 
information alleged one count of aggravated robbery as 
follows:

 

COUNT 
II

 

That 
JUSTIN WALKER SINCOCK, late of the County aforesaid, on or about the 28th day of July, 1998, in the County of 
Natrona, in the State of Wyoming, did unlawfully in the course of committing the 
crime of larceny, did inflict bodily injury upon another, to-wit:  REBECCA HORKAN; or did threaten another, 
to-wit:  REBECCA HORKAN, with or 
intentionally put her in fear of immediate bodily injury, and did in the course 
of committing the crime of robbery intentionally inflict serious bodily injury; 
or did use or exhibit a deadly weapon, in violation of W.S. 1977, as amended, § 
6-2-401(a)(c). 

 

[¶13]   At the close of the evidence, the 
trial court instructed the jury on the elements of the charges and, with respect 
to the murder charge, quoted the statutory language defining first-degree murder 
alternatively as either premeditated murder or felony murder.  The verdict form provided to the jury, 
however, separated first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree felony 
murder and required the jury to make a separate finding of guilty or not guilty 
for each alternative.  In advocating 
for this particular verdict form, the state specifically argued the desirability 
of having the jury reach a separate verdict on each alternative so that, in the 
event of an appeal, it would be clear which alternative theory formed the basis 
for any first-degree murder conviction.  
Thus, this is not a case like others we have reviewed recently in which 
the basis for the conviction is unclear.  
Urbigkit v. 
State, 2003 WY 57, 67 P.3d 1207, (Wyo. 2003); May v. State, 2003 WY 14, 62 P.3d 574 (Wyo. 
2003); Tanner v. State, 2002 WY 170, 
57 P.3d 1242 (Wyo. 2002).  
Here, the state offered, and the trial court gave, a special 
interrogatory verdict form requiring the jury to indicate which theory formed 
the basis for the conviction.  

 

[¶14]   After its deliberations, the jury 
found Mr. Sincock guilty of both first-degree premeditated murder and 
first-degree felony murder.  The 
jury also found him guilty of aggravated robbery.  The trial court then imposed one 
sentence of life imprisonment for first-degree murder and a sentence to a term 
of years for aggravated robbery.  
Under the Blockburger analysis, first-degree premeditated murder 
requires proof of premeditated malice; aggravated robbery does not require proof 
of malice; the jury expressly found Mr. Sincock guilty of first-degree 
premeditated murder; therefore, we hold that merger of the sentence to life 
imprisonment on the first-degree murder conviction and the sentence to a term of 
years on the aggravated robbery conviction was not required.  

 

 

[¶15]   Byron Burke was a resident at CAC 
in June and July of 1998 and was acquainted with Mr. Sincock.  On July 28, 1998, the day Becky was 
murdered, Mr. Burke was at the Horkan residence briefly at Mr. Sincock's 
request.  He provided a statement to 
law enforcement concerning his contact with Mr. Sincock at CAC and on the day of 
the murder.  That statement is not 
at issue here.

 

[¶16]   In addition to his contact with Mr. 
Sincock when both men resided at CAC, Mr. Burke was also an inmate at the 
detention center at the same time Mr. Sincock was incarcerated and awaiting 
trial for Becky's murder.  In August 
of 1998, because of disciplinary problems, Mr. Burke was transferred to the part 
of the detention center where Mr. Sincock was being held.  When Mr. Sincock saw Mr. Burke on the 
day he was transferred, he told Mr. Burke he needed to talk to him about what 
happened on July 28, 1998 because they needed to get their stories 
straight.  Mr. Burke contacted a 
police detective who then came to the jail and met with him.  Mr. Burke told the detective that if he 
were moved to Mr. Sincock's cell, he could try to get information from him about 
the murder.  The detective informed 
Mr. Burke that would make him an informant and an agent of the state and, as 
such, he would be required to advise Mr. Sincock of his rights before attempting 
to get information from him.  The 
detective did not seem interested in having Mr. Burke act as an informant nor 
did he  ask Mr. Burke to be an 
informant, do anything to get information from Mr. Sincock or move into Mr. 
Sincock's cell.  Mr. Burke then 
filled out a written request asking to be placed in Mr. Sincock's cell.  He stated in the request:  "I was supposed to testify against him 
in court about that murder, and the detectives want me in there to find out as 
much as possible since we still get along."  In fact, no one from the police 
department asked Mr. Burke to move into Mr. Sincock's cell.  Mr. Burke testified that he made the 
request because he thought if he obtained information from Mr. Sincock helpful 
to the police, he might not have to go to prison.  Some time after the written request, Mr. 
Burke was moved into Mr. Sincock's cell and Mr. Sincock made incriminating 
statements to him.  Mr. Sincock 
argues the testimony of Mr. Burke concerning the statements he made to him 
should have been suppressed.  In 
support of his claim, he cites cases holding the right to counsel is violated 
when the state creates a situation likely to induce a defendant to make 
incriminating statements without counsel present.

 

[¶17]   The testimony from Mr. Burke to 
which Mr. Sincock takes exception was:

 

            
Q  Okay.  What did 
Mr. Sincock tell you had happened?

 

A  He 
told me -- one day I was sitting on my bed, and he told me that it was a rush 
and  out of the blue, and I said, "What was?"  And he said, "shooting her."  And I had said that  I just sat there, 
and he just went on and said he wanted to see my newspaper clippings about the 
shootings.

 

And 
they had said that she was shot in the back of the head, and he said that was a 
lie, that she was shot in the side of the head and that he had freaked out after 
he did it and threw her body in the bathtub over some toys, because he was too 
impatient to remove them.  And he 
freaked out, took her car, took her check and cashed it and went to CY Taco Bell 
and tried getting another C.A.C. resident to go with him.

 

Q  Okay.  During the time that he's telling you 
what he did and how that went, what was his demeanor then in this 
cell?

 

A  He 
was laughing.

 

Q  Okay.  Did he show any 
remorse?

 

A  No.

 

Q  Did 
he seem upset?

 

            
A  No.

 

            
Q  Okay.  When Mr. 
Sincock talked about the murder of Rebecca Horkan, did he say anything about 
what his plans were regarding the rest of the Horkan 
family?

 

            
A  Yes, he did.

 

            
Q  What did he say?

 

            
A  He planned on killing the boss to begin with, but the boss 
was out at Alcova or wherever.  And 
the kids were supposed to come back with her, and he was going to kill her and 
then kill the boss and kill the kids.  
He was going to kill the family.

 

According 
to Mr. Burke's testimony, Mr. Sincock offered these statements voluntarily, 
without any solicitation on his part.  
After Mr. Burke was transferred out of Mr. Sincock's cell, he contacted 
his attorney and asked him to let law enforcement know he had information for 
them.  Law enforcement officers 
contacted him and he gave a statement to the same effect as the testimony quoted 
above.

 

[¶18]   Prior to trial, Mr. Sincock moved 
for suppression of Mr. Burke's testimony, arguing that admission of the 
testimony would violate his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  After a hearing, the trial court denied 
the motion, concluding there were no constitutional violations because the 
undisputed evidence showed Mr. Burke was not acting as an agent of the state 
when Mr. Sincock made the incriminating statements to him and Mr. Sincock's 
statements to Mr. Burke were voluntary and not the result of interrogation or 
questioning by law enforcement.   

 

[¶19]   We apply a de novo standard of 
review to claims of constitutional violations.  We also review de novo trial 
court rulings on a defendant's motion to suppress statements on grounds of 
involuntariness.  Edwards v. 
State, 973 P.2d 41, 48 (Wyo. 1999).  
We defer to the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous, and, because the trial court is in the best position to hear the 
evidence and assess the witnesses' credibility, we view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to its ruling.  
Hadden v. State, 2002 WY 41, ¶17, 42 P.3d 495, ¶17 (Wyo. 
2002).

 

[¶20]   In claiming his statements to Mr. 
Burke were improperly admitted, Mr. Sincock relies primarily on United States 
v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), in which the United States Supreme Court held 
that incriminating statements made by the defendant to a paid informant while 
they were confined in the same cellblock were improperly admitted.  In Henry, government agents 
contacted a cellmate of the defendant who had also been a paid government 
informant for over a year and, while telling him not to initiate conversation 
with the defendant, told him to be alert to anything the defendant said.  In deciding that a government agent 
deliberately elicited incriminating statements from the defendant in violation 
of the protections of the Sixth Amendment, the court found three factors to be 
important:  (1) the informant was 
acting under instructions as a paid informant of the government, (2) the agent 
was ostensibly no more than a fellow inmate of the defendant, and (3) the 
defendant was in custody and under indictment at the time of the 
statements.  Henry, 447 U.S. 
at 270.  The court 
said:

 

By 
intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating 
statements without the assistance of counsel, the Government violated Henry's 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  
This is not a case where, in Justice Cardozo's words, "the constable . . 
. blundered," People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 
(1926); rather, it is one where the "constable" planned an impermissible 
interference with the right to the assistance of counsel.

 

Id. 
at 274-75 (footnote omitted).

 

[¶21]   Unlike the situation in 
Henry, the evidence in the present case was that Mr. Burke was not acting 
under instructions from government officials and was not a government informant, 
paid or unpaid, at the time Mr. Sincock made the statements.  Rather, the evidence was that Mr. Burke 
was acting on his own and in direct contravention of what police detectives told 
him.

 

[¶22]   Moreover, in cases subsequent to 
Henry, the United States Supreme Court has further clarified a Sixth 
Amendment violation does not occur in this context if the incriminating 
statements made by a defendant to an informant are voluntary.  In Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986), the defendant was placed in a cell with a prisoner who, 
unbeknownst to him, was a police informant who had agreed to listen to his 
conversations and report his remarks back to detectives.  The informant was instructed not to ask 
the defendant any questions but only to listen.  The defendant thereafter made 
incriminating statements, which the informant reported back to detectives.  The court considered the question, left 
open in Henry, whether the Sixth Amendment forbids the admission into 
evidence of an accused's statements to a jailhouse informant who was placed in 
close proximity but made no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime 
charged.  The court concluded the 
answer was "no":

 

[A] 
defendant does not make out a violation of [the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel] simply by showing that an informant, either through prior arrangement 
or voluntarily, reported his incriminating statements to the police.  Rather, the defendant must demonstrate 
that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, 
that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating 
remarks.

 

Id. 
at 459.  Here, there was no evidence 
the police or Mr. Burke took any action designed deliberately to elicit 
incriminating remarks from Mr. Sincock.  
We conclude, therefore, the trial court did not error in admitting Mr. 
Burke's testimony.    

 

[¶23]   Having reached that conclusion, we 
note our concern that Mr. Burke was ever allowed to become Mr. Sincock's 
cellmate.  The suggestion that Mr. 
Burke's transfer into Mr. Sincock's cell was not known to the police and that 
detention center personnel did not know of Mr. Burke's request to be moved to 
that location in order to get information for the government stretches the 
bounds of belief.  However, case law 
from other jurisdictions overwhelmingly holds that an informant becomes a 
government agent so as to implicate the government in a right to counsel 
violation only when the government gives explicit directions or otherwise 
encourages the informant to obtain information.  Given the undisputed evidence presented 
here that the government attempted to discourage Mr. Burke's offer to obtain 
information, our concern about Mr. Burke's placement in Mr. Sincock's cell does 
not warrant reversal of the trial court's ruling.  

 

C.        
Motion for Continuance

 

[¶24]   Mr. Sincock claims error occurred 
when the trial court denied his motion for continuance filed after lead defense 
counsel withdrew due to a conflict.  
Apparently, lead counsel became involved in representation of another 
jail inmate who had knowledge of evidence the state intended to present at Mr. 
Sincock's trial.  He withdrew 
leaving two lawyers to defend Mr. Sincock at trialone with only three years 
experience and a second who intended to be involved only if the case entered the 
penalty phase.  At the time lead 
counsel withdrew, less than two weeks remained to prepare for 
trial.

 

[¶25]   The grant or denial of a motion for 
continuance is a discretionary ruling.  
Clearwater v. State, 2 P.3d 548, 553 (Wyo. 2000).  We, therefore, review the trial court's 
ruling on Mr. Sincock's motion for continuance for abuse of discretion.  The ultimate question in determining 
whether an abuse of discretion has occurred is whether the trial court 
reasonably could have concluded as it did.  
Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998).  Review of a court's discretionary ruling 
on a continuance motion is highly dependent upon individual facts and 
circumstances.  Cardenas v. 
State, 811 P.2d 989, 994 (Wyo. 1991).  
The party attacking the court's ruling bears the burden of establishing 
the abuse of discretion.  
Id.  Where a trial 
court refuses to grant a continuance requested on the basis of insufficient time 
to prepare for trial, an abuse of discretion will not be found unless there is a 
clear showing of manifest injustice.  
Mapp v. State, 953 P.2d 140, 143 (Wyo. 1998). 

 

[¶26]   The record reveals that defense 
counsel filed a motion for continuance on September 16, 1999, in which he 
presented three reasons for extending the trial date, including the fact that 
lead defense counsel was withdrawing from representation of Mr. Sincock.  Mr. Sincock's claim of error on appeal 
relates exclusively to the withdrawal of counsel and not to the other reasons 
originally advanced as grounds for a continuance.  At the time the motion was filed, the 
trial was scheduled to begin on September 27, 1999, less than two weeks 
away.   A hearing was held on 
the motion the following day, September 17, 1999, at which time defense counsel 
argued that the only attorney really prepared to try the case was about to 
withdraw from representation of Mr. Sincock.  While noting its concern about the 
events giving rise to lead defense counsel's withdrawal, the trial court denied 
the motion, stating:

 

Balancing 
out and considering everything, though, it seems to me the State is also 
entitled to a trial and an ability to go on with this case.  The expense and the effort in 
administering these trials is unbelievable to my perception.  And the Clerk of District Court's 
Office, the District Judges' Office have gone through tremendous efforts to have 
this case scheduled up for trial beginning September 27, 
1999.

 

And 
to just continue it at no fault of the Court, no fault of the State, perhaps 
some fault directed to the defendant and maybe to defense counsel, to me, just 
doesn't pan out.  It seems to me 
that we do need to leave the trial 
on. . . .

 

The 
next thing I would note is, while the defense may want to set this case in 
January, our trial schedule is such that, once again, we would have to take 
drastic efforts to schedule it at a time convenient to the 
defense.

 

We 
have people, for example, in civil trials that have been waiting for, I'm 
guessing, ten months.  Their civil 
trials in January are set ten months ago.  
And to say, okay, we'll just throw them another ten months down the road 
 or will the court be unable to address speedy trial concerns in other criminal 
cases  it just doesn't sit with me.

 

And 
given the fact that there's been a previous continuance granted based upon the 
defense's desire to change the plea to not guilty by reason of mental illness 
and deficiency, I just can't justify another continuance in this case.  So I'll stand by the 
ruling.

 

[¶27]   On September 23, 1999, four days 
before trial, defense counsel filed a motion asking the trial court to 
reconsider, on different grounds, its denial of the September 16 motion for 
continuance.  In this third motion 
for continuance, defense counsel did not raise the issue of lead trial counsel's 
withdrawal as grounds for continuing the trial.  After a hearing, the trial court again 
denied the motion.  

 

 [¶28]  Mr. Sincock argues in essence that it was 
error for the trial court to deny his motion because it denied him the right to 
a fair trial with competent, adequately prepared counsel.  He claims that after lead counsel 
withdrew, he was left to be represented by an inexperienced attorney whose 
function up to then had been to assist lead counsel, and an attorney, who 
although experienced, had focused up to that point on the penalty phase of the 
trial.  Given the seriousness of the 
charges against him and the potential death sentence, he argues, a continuance 
was warranted in order to give the two remaining attorneys time to adequately 
prepare.

 

[¶29]   There is no question the charges 
against Mr. Sincock were serious.  
However, the seriousness of the charges or the penalty is not the 
determining factor in deciding whether the denial of a continuance can be 
upheld.  Rather, we look to whether 
the denial resulted in a serious miscarriage of justice.  Mapp, 953 P.2d  at 143.  Under the circumstances present in this 
case, we find no such miscarriage of justice.  

 

[¶30]   Although the attorney Mr. Sincock 
characterizes as "lead" counsel did not appear at the trial and handle Mr. 
Sincock's defense, the attorneys left with the defense after his withdrawal had 
the benefit of his work gathering evidence and witnesses and preparing a defense 
from the time he entered his appearance at the arraignment on September 22, 
1998, a full year before trial, until he withdrew two weeks before trial.  All of the information he gathered and 
all of his preparations for trial were available to the two remaining attorneys 
after his withdrawal.  

 

[¶31]   Moreover, this is not a situation 
where two unseasoned attorneys were thrust suddenly into defending Mr. Sincock 
with no previous involvement in or knowledge of the case.  Both attorneys became involved in the 
case early on in the proceedings.1  Although one of them was fairly new to 
the practice of law, she was intimately involved from the beginning, filing many 
of the pretrial defense motions and arguing them before the court.  Her general knowledge of the case is 
apparent from a review of the filings and hearing transcripts.  The other attorney was an experienced 
lawyer and former judge with thirty years of experience in the legal 
profession.  It appears from the 
record that he also was actively involved in the defense from the beginning and 
appeared at hearings, argued motions, and was well versed in the facts and law 
of the case.  Although his focus may 
have been the sentencing phase of the proceedings, it appears from the record 
that he also was involved in other aspects of the defense, including estimating 
the number of days necessary for trial, discovery issues, jury questionnaires, 
issues concerning Mr. Sincock's mental competency, adding an additional plea of 
not guilty by reason of mental deficiency and the motion to suppress the 
statements and testimony of Mr. Burke.  
Additionally, he was present at and participated in many of the hearings 
leading up to the trial.  

 

[¶32]   Despite these facts, Mr. Sincock 
argues he did not receive a fair trial because defense trial counsel was 
unprepared for the state's cross-examination of the defense expert witness using 
a chronology prepared by the defense summarizing records, including jail 
disciplinary reports involving Mr. Sincock.  Dr. Jakob Camp, a clinical forensic 
psychiatrist retained by the defense, performed a mental capacity evaluation of 
Mr. Sincock.  Dr. Camp testified, 
based upon his examination of Mr. Sincock and review of his records and history, 
that in his opinion Mr. Sincock suffered from a severely abnormal mental 
condition resulting from Hashimoto's disease exacerbated by methamphetamine use, 
which grossly impaired his understanding of reality and made it impossible for 
him to conform his conduct to the requirements of law on July 28, 1998.  One of the points the defense attempted 
to make during the trial was that Mr. Sincock did not have a violent nature or a 
history of violent behavior, a fact inconsistent, in the opinion of Dr. Camp, 
with the crime he was alleged to have committed.  In an attempt to defuse this idea, the 
state on cross-examination of Dr. Camp used the chronology, which made reference 
to various disciplinary reports and alleged outbursts involving Mr. Sincock, 
conflicts with other inmates and confiscation of items found in his possession 
that could potentially be used as weapons.  
Defense counsel objected on the basis that the reports concerned 
allegations that were never proven and the state knew they were never proven and 
was misleading the jury.  The trial 
court allowed the examination to continue and the state asked Dr. Camp about 
actual disciplinary action taken against Mr. Sincock while in jail.  Defense counsel asked to approach the 
bench and told the trial court he did not know where the information in the 
chronology came from and his lack of knowledge was one of the problems with lead 
counsel withdrawing and the trial going forward as scheduled.  He asked for a break to consult with 
co-counsel, which the court denied, saying defense counsel could make inquiry of 
the witness on redirect and if he still needed a break at that point, the court 
would consider it.  The state 
concluded its cross-examination, and on redirect, defense counsel inquired of 
Dr. Camp whether any of the information he reviewed, including the reports of 
disciplinary problems in jail, demonstrated to him that Mr. Sincock was a 
violent individual.  Dr. Camp 
testified that it did not.  Defense 
counsel completed his re-direct examination and did not renew his request for a 
recess in order to review the chronology or discuss it with Dr. Camp or the 
defense team.  In light of the 
totality of Dr. Camp's testimony, as well as the other evidence presented at 
trial, we are not persuaded defense counsel's apparent lack of knowledge of the 
chronology caused a serious miscarriage of justice resulting in the denial of 
Mr. Sincock's right to a fair trial.  
Mr. Sincock points to no other specific facts demonstrating a serious 
miscarriage of justice resulting from the denial of his motion for 
continuance.  We hold, therefore, he 
has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.  

 

 

[¶33]   Mr. Sincock argues defense counsel 
was ineffective in two respects: being unprepared for trial and conceding his 
guilt in remarks made to the jury.  
The first claim is based upon the same facts as those alleged in his 
claim that a continuance of the trial was wrongly deniedtrial counsel was not 
prepared to defend his case after lead counsel withdrew.  The second claim is based upon two 
statements by defense counsel, one in opening statement to the effect that Mr. 
Sincock denied the charges but the defense expert would testify Mr. Sincock was 
suffering from a medical condition that affected his memory, and another in 
closing argument conceding that Mr. Sincock probably committed the crime.  We address these two claims separately 
in the order they were raised.  

 

1.         
Preparedness for trial

 

(a)       Standard of 
review 

 

[¶34]   In reviewing claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, our paramount consideration is whether, in light of all 
the circumstances, trial counsels' acts or omissions were outside the wide range 
of professionally competent assistance.  
Gleason v. 
State, 2002 WY 161, ¶44, 57 P.3d 332, ¶44 (Wyo. 2002).  
An appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate 
on the record that counsel's performance was deficient.  Id. (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).  
Ordinarily, he must also demonstrate that prejudice resulted.  Under this test, the inquiry is whether 
or not counsel rendered the assistance a reasonably competent attorney would 
have offered and, if not, whether his failure to do so prejudiced the defense of 
the case.  Id.  This two-part test, the 
Strickland test, is the test we normally apply in reviewing 
ineffectiveness claims, and it is this test that applies to Mr. Sincock's first 
claim of ineffectiveness.

 

[¶35]   We examine the conduct of defense 
counsel in light of all the circumstances in determining whether the identified 
acts or omissions fall outside the ambit of professionally competent assistance, 
bearing in mind the function of counsel is to make the adversarial testing 
process work in every case.  
Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 609 (Wyo. 1992).  The benchmark for judging any claim of 
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as 
having produced a just result.  
Gleason, 2002 WY 161.  We do not evaluate the efforts of 
counsel from a perspective of hindsight but endeavor to reconstruct the 
circumstances surrounding the challenged conduct and evaluate the professional 
efforts from the perspective of counsel at the time.  Dickeson, 843 P.2d  at 
609.  We invoke a strong 
presumption that counsel rendered adequate and reasonable assistance making all 
decisions within the bounds of reasonable professional judgment.  Id.  The burden is on the defendant to 
overcome this presumption that, in light of the circumstances, the challenged 
action or failure of the attorney might be considered sound trial strategy.  Id.  With these standards in mind, we apply 
the two-part Strickland test to Mr. Sincock's claim that counsel was not 
prepared for trial.

 

(b)       Part one of 
Strickland  deficient performance

 

[¶36]   Mr. Sincock claims broadly that 
counsel's performance was deficient because he was unprepared for trial.  The only specific example he 
cites is counsel's unfamiliarity with the chronology the state used in 
cross-examining Dr. Camp. Just as we concluded this occurrence was insufficient 
to demonstrate manifest injustice denying Mr. Sincock a fair trial, we conclude 
counsel's unfamiliarity with the chronology does not show deficient 
performance.  Despite his 
uncertainty about the source of the information contained in the chronology, 
counsel made his point through Dr. Camp that there was no evidence Mr. Sincock 
had violent tendencies and the state was misleading the jury by suggesting 
disciplinary action was taken against Mr. Sincock while he was in jail.  In light of all the other circumstances 
and counsel's overall performance at trial, this limited event is far from 
sufficient to show counsel was unprepared for trial.  

 

[¶37]   As pointed out, Mr. Sincock offers 
no other specifics as to counsel's alleged lack of preparedness.  We have said that a defendant does not 
meet his burden of showing his counsel's performance was deficient by mere 
speculation or equivocal inferences.  
Barkell v. 
State, 2002 WY 153, ¶13, 55 P.3d 1239, ¶13 (Wyo. 2002).  
A broad assertion of ineffective assistance, without more, is 
insufficient to overcome the presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate 
assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment.  Id.  Contrary to Mr. Sincock's contention, we 
find from the totality of the circumstances that counsel was adequately prepared 
and performed within the bounds of reasonable professional judgment.  Having reached this conclusion with 
respect to the first part of the Strickland test, we do not reach the 
second part of the test, the question of prejudice.

  

2.         
Concessions of guilt

 

(a)       Standard of 
review

 

[¶38]   Although we ordinarily adhere to 
the Strickland test in reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel and require a showing of deficient performance coupled with prejudice, 
there is a narrow class of cases where the "circumstances . . . are so 
likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a 
particular case is unjustified."  
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984); see also 
Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.  
The complete denial of counsel is one such circumstance.  Cronic, 466 U.S.  at 659.  Another exists where "counsel entirely 
fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing."  Id.  Still another exists where counsel is 
appointed so close to trial that it amounts to a denial of effective 
assistance.  Id.  Where such circumstances are shown to 
exist, prejudice will be presumed without inquiry into the actual performance at 
trial.  Id.  Wyoming recognizes this narrow line of 
cases in which prejudice is presumed.  
Olsen v. 
State, 2003 WY 46, ¶75, 67 P.3d 536, ¶75 (Wyo. 2003) (citing Herdt v. State, 816 P.2d 1299, 
1301-02 (Wyo. 1991)).

 

[¶39]   Among the many jurisdictions that 
have applied the Cronic test, a number, including Wyoming, have done so 
in cases involving a concession of guilt by the defendant's counsel.  Olsen, 2003 WY 46.  Such a concession, it is reasoned, 
constitutes a failure on the part of defense counsel to subject the 
prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, the second circumstance 
described in Cronic in which prejudice may be presumed.  Mr. Sincock asserts this line of cases 
applies in his case because defense counsel conceded his guilt in statements to 
the jury without his consent.  If 
the statements about which he complains can be accurately described as 
concessions of guilt without consent, the Cronic standard applies.  Otherwise, the Strickland test 
governs his ineffectiveness claim.  
Mr. Sincock points to two statements of counsel, set forth below in the 
context in which they were made.  
The particular portion about which he complains appears in italics.  

 

[¶40]   During opening statement, defense 
counsel made the following remarks:

 

[I]t's 
our burden to prove to you that this mental condition took place.  We have to show you by a  the evidence 
of not beyond a reasonable doubt, but we have to show you that there was a 
mental illness. . . .

. 
. . 

 

Even 
if you find that the defendant did commit this event  And I have to say  
because he has still said that he didn't do it  he denies that he did 
it.  The doctor will tell you 
that's because it's  kind of an 
amnesia thing.  He can't accept 
it.

  

And 
as his lawyer, I have to tell you he says he didn't do it.

 

(Emphasis 
added).  Defense counsel stated as 
follows in closing argument:

 

There 
are a few things that we know for sure about this case or that we can be certain 
of.  We know that Justin Sincock 
will not or cannot tell us what happened.  
We know no  Because you will see it. It's in evidence.  You have Dr. Merrell's report, and you 
know what Justin Sincock told him and told the police and 
others.

 

And 
basically what he said is that there was a third person that actually fired the 
shot that killed Mrs. Horkan.  And 
he refuses to identify that man, because he fears that his family will be 
next.

 

And 
he has told a psychologist, who has taken the statement for Dr. Merrell  and 
it's in his report  that withholding that name he knows will probably result in 
his conviction for murder.

 

And 
although, I have to tell you, that we just don't know for sure what happened 
that day, because there wasn't anybody there besides, you know, Mr. Sincock and 
Mrs. Horkan, I must admit and I will concede that it is most likely that it was 
Justin Sincock who probably committed this crime, whatever that crime might 
be.

 

It's 
not my place, however, to say that the State has proven that beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  I just can't tell you 
that.  I mean, I am  I'm 
representing him, and he has not pled guilty to that.  Whether or not that has been proven, you 
have to decide beyond a reasonable doubt.

 

But 
I want to talk to you about what I think this case is really about, even if you 
do come to that conclusion that it was Justine Sincock who fired that fatal shot 
that killed Mrs. Horkan.  Because 
there's a lot more to this case than just that.  

 

(Emphasis 
added).  We address these comments 
of counsel separately.

 

(b)       Opening 
statement  

 

[¶41]   Considering counsel's remark in 
opening statement in the context in which it was made, we do not find it to be 
subject to the Cronic standard of prejudice per se.  Under the circumstances as they existed, 
defense counsel's statement to the effect that Mr. Sincock denied killing Becky, 
but in the event the jury did not believe him there was evidence from which a 
doctor concluded he was mentally ill and did not remember what occurred, is not 
the equivalent of a concession of guilt.  
Moreover, the statement was not made without Mr. Sincock's consent.  

 

[¶42]   Mr. Sincock initially entered a 
plea of not guilty.  However, on 
April 23, 1999, just prior to the original trial date, he moved to enter an 
additional plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency pursuant 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-304(c) (LexisNexis 2003).  At the hearing on his motion, Mr. 
Sincock was asked by the court whether he understood the motion and the court's 
ruling on the motion and desired to enter the plea.  He responded affirmatively.  From that point on, the defense 
strategy, with Mr. Sincock's express consent, was to hold the state to its 
burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt while at the same time, in 
recognition of the overwhelming evidence against him, attempting to convince the 
jury in the event it believed he killed Becky that he was not mentally 
responsible for the act.  

 

[¶43]   The presentation of two different 
theories of defense, particularly where a man's life is at stake, is not unusual 
and does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.  Brown v. Rice, 693 F. Supp. 381, 
398 (W.D.N.C. 1988).  The key factor 
is whether or not the client has given his consent to such a strategy.  Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618, 623 (Fla. 2000); Haynes v. Cain, 272 F.3d 757 (5th Cir. 
2001).  Mr. Sincock expressed his 
desire to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency, 
thus giving his consent to the presentation of alternate theories.  Additionally, as a practical matter, 
defense counsel's remarks in opening statement were not the equivalent of an 
attorney stating directly to a jury that his client is guilty of the crime 
charged. Therefore, the Cronic standard of prejudice per se does not 
apply.  

 

[¶44]   Under the Strickland 
analysis, given Mr. Sincock's plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness, 
defense counsel had no choice but to present the alternative theories consistent 
with his client's alternate pleas.  
That is precisely what he did in his opening remarks and his conduct in 
doing so did not fall below the range of reasonable competence.  We, therefore, reject Mr. Sincock's 
claim of ineffectiveness as to the remarks made in opening 
statement.

 

(c)       Closing 
argument  

 

[¶45]   A careful review of the cases 
addressing concessions of guilt by counsel is necessary to resolve Mr. Sincock's 
claim that defense counsel's statements in closing argument were per se 
prejudicial.  We look first at the 
most recent case from this jurisdiction addressing the 
issue.

 

[¶46]   In Olsen, we considered 
whether defense counsel's strategic decision to admit that the defendant shot 
the victims and then use an intoxication defense to establish that he could not 
have formed the requisite intent for first-degree murder constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  We held the 
concession was tactically a reasonable attempt to avoid a first-degree murder 
conviction in light of Olsen's several confessions that he shot the 
victims.  Olsen, 2003 WY 46, ¶76.  In reaching this result, we cited 
Nielson v. Hopkins, 58 F.3d 1331, 1335 (8th Cir. 1995), in which the court "concluded that 
admitting the act but denying the requisite mental state by an intoxication 
defense to first degree murder charges is not the functional equivalent of a 
guilty plea."  
Id.

 

[¶47]   Our holding in Olsen is not 
particularly helpful in resolving Mr. Sincock's claim because it was based in 
large part on Mr. Olsen's several confessions to having shot the victims.  Unlike the facts before us in 
Olsen, Mr. Sincock denied shooting Becky.  Nielson likewise offers little 
guidance because it did not involve an attorney stating directly to the jury 
that his client committed the acts alleged.  On that basis, the Nielson court 
distinguished it from the line of cases upon which Mr. Sincock relies.  We turn, therefore, to consideration of 
those cases.  

 

[¶48]   In State v. Harbison, 337 S.E.2d 504, 507 (N.C. 1985), the defendant was charged with first-degree 
murder.  He pleaded not guilty and 
claimed throughout the proceedings that he shot the victim in self-defense.  In closing argument, defense counsel 
told the jury he had his own opinion of what happened and did not feel his 
client should be found innocent.  
Id.  at 506.  He said he thought his client should "do 
some time to think about what he has done" and the jury should find him guilty 
of manslaughter.  
Id.

 

[¶49]   Applying Cronic, the court 
in Harbison held the defendant did not have to show any specific 
prejudice in order to establish his claim for ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  The court said:  "[W]hen counsel to the surprise of his 
client admits his client's guilt, the harm is so likely and so apparent that the 
issue of prejudice need not be addressed." Id. at 507.  The court concluded:  "[I]neffective assistance of counsel, 
per se in violation of the Sixth Amendment, has been established in every 
criminal case in which the defendant's counsel admits the defendant's guilt to 
the jury without the defendant's consent."  
Id.

 

[¶50]   In People v. Hattery, 488 N.E.2d 513 (Ill. 1985), the defendant was charged with murder and pleaded not 
guilty.  During opening statement, 
defense counsel stated:  

 

"[H]e 
did it.  He did everything the 
prosecution just told you. 

. 
. .  

 

We 
are not asking you to find [the defendant] not guilty.  At the end of your deliberations, you 
will find him guilty of murder. . . .  
Once you have found him guilty, we will proceed and you will find him 
eligible for the death penalty.  The 
question, and the only question facing you, will be whether to impose the death 
penalty on [the defendant] for trying to save the life of his 
family."

 

Id. 
at 516.  In addition to these 
remarks, defense counsel also presented no evidence and made no closing 
argument.  The defense was limited 
to attempting to show the defendant was compelled to kill the victim, a 
mitigating factor in death penalty cases in Illinois.  

 

[¶51]   In reviewing the defendant's claim 
for ineffective assistance of counsel, the court quoted Cronic as saying 
where "counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful 
adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that 
makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable."  Id. at 517.  The court concluded:  

 

Counsel 
may not concede his client's guilt in the hope of obtaining a more lenient 
sentence where a plea of not guilty has been entered, unless the record 
adequately shows that defendant knowingly and intelligently consented to his 
counsels' strategy.  We therefore 
hold that defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel in violation 
of the sixth amendment.  

 

Id. 
at 
519.  

 

[¶52]   In Brown, another murder 
case in which the defendant maintained his innocence, defense counsel made the 
following statements to the jury during sentencing:

 

            
We are talking about what is going to happen to the man who did it, and 
that's all we're talking about.

  

            
We are debating a man's  whether a man shall live or die, and regardless 
of what [he] has done, he is a human being.

 

            
He may have committed a horrible crime and he did commit two horrible 
crimes, but he is still a human being with a soul despite the blackness of the 
crime that this man has committed.

 

693 F. Supp.  at 395.  In holding that 
counsel provided ineffective assistance, the court stated:

 

Our 
system counts on the adversarial process to produce just results.  Petitioner's counsel acted less like an 
adversary and more like an advocate for the state when he made his unsolicited 
and unassented to declaration of petitioner's guilt during the sentencing 
proceeding.  By effectively 
assisting the state in convincing the jury that death was the appropriate 
sentence, counsel caused a breakdown in the adversarial process that rendered 
the outcome of the sentencing proceeding unreliable and thereby violated 
petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of 
counsel.

 

Id. 
at 397.

 

[¶53]   In Nixon, 758 So. 2d 618, 
State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138 (Kan. 2000), and Haynes, 272 F.2d 757, the courts similarly concluded that a concession of guilt by defense 
counsel without the defendant's consent was prejudicial per se and deprived the 
defendant of effective assistance of counsel.  In all of the above cases, the defendant 
entered a straight not guilty plea.  
In Carter and Haynes, believing the evidence against their 
clients would result in a conviction, defense counsels' strategy was to attempt 
to direct the jurors away from a first-degree premeditated murder 
conviction.  The defendants were not 
consulted about the strategy and unequivocally asserted their opposition when 
the strategy became apparent at trial.  
In Nixon, the court said:  

 

We 
recognize that in certain unique situations, counsel for the defense may make a 
tactical decision to admit guilt during the guilt phase in an effort to persuade 
the jury to spare the defendant's life during the penalty phase.  Of course, in such cases, the dividing 
line between a sound defense strategy and ineffective assistance of counsel is 
whether or not the client has given his or her consent to such a 
strategy.

 

758 So. 2d  at 623.  

 

[¶54]   Mr. Sincock's situation is 
distinguishable from the above cases in terms of the statements defense counsel 
made to the jury.  In 
Harbison, 337 S.E.2d 504, defense counsel told the jury he thought his 
client should be found guilty of manslaughter and serve some time, thereby 
pursuing a strategy directly contrary to the position taken by the defendant 
that he was not guilty and shot the victim in self-defense.  Similarly, in Hattery, 488 N.E.2d 513, defense counsel informed the jury the defendant "did it" and at the end of 
deliberations would be found guilty of murder, remarks that were totally 
inconsistent with the defendant's not guilty plea.  Defense counsel also presented no 
evidence and made no closing argument in Hattery, factors which the court 
considered in concluding counsel entirely failed to subject the prosecution's 
case to meaningful adversarial testing.  
In Brown, 693 F. Supp. 381, counsel stated his client "did commit 
two horrible crimes."  In 
Nixon, counsel conceded his client caused the victim's death and that 
"fact will be proved to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt."  Nixon, 758 So. 2d  at 620.  In each of these cases, there is no 
question counsel conceded the defendant's guilt without consent and failed to 
put the state to its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.

 

[¶55]   In contrast to the cases cited, Mr. 
Sincock's counsel did not tell the jury that his client "did it," should "serve 
some time" for what he did, would be found guilty, or committed a horrible crime 
or that the state met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Rather, Mr. Sincock's counsel told the 
jury that his client denied killing Becky and pleaded not guilty to the charges, 
evidence would be presented refuting many of the state's claims and showing the 
state simply stopped looking for other suspects once it learned Mr. Sincock was 
at the Horkan residence on the day of the murder, Mr. Sincock said there was a 
third person present who fired the shot that killed Becky, the state had to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Sincock killed Becky, and it was up to 
the jury to decide whether the state met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  In addition to these 
statements, defense counsel told the jury that the defense would present 
evidence showing Mr. Sincock did not have a history of violent behavior and, if 
it believed the state's evidence that he killed Becky, it was an event atypical 
of Mr. Sincock brought on by a period of psychosis resulting from thyroid 
disease compounded by use of methamphetamine the combined effect of which was 
that he could not conform his conduct to the requirements of law.  In addition to all these 
statements, defense counsel told the jury it was Mr. Sincock "who most probably 
committed this crime, whatever that crime might be."  

 

[¶56]   Under the Cronic analysis, 
concessions of guilt by counsel are deemed per se prejudicial where such 
concessions amount to a failure on the part of defense counsel to subject the 
prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing.  In the words of the Brown court, 
it is only where the record as a whole demonstrates that counsel acted less like 
an adversary and more like an advocate for the state that a breakdown in the 
adversarial process occurs rendering the outcome of the proceeding unreliable 
and violating the right to effective assistance of counsel.  Brown, 693 F. Supp. 381.  In each of the cases cited by Mr. 
Sincock and the others discussed above, the statements of counsel fairly can be 
said to constitute a failure to test the prosecution's case rendering the 
outcome unreliable.  Considering the 
remark Mr. Sincock's counsel made in closing in the context in which it was made 
and in light of the totality of the defense he provided, we are not able to 
conclude that counsel failed to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful 
adversarial testing.  In context, it 
is clear that, when counsel stated it was likely his client committed "the 
crime," he meant "the act."  That 
meaning is obvious from the next sentence in his statement"whatever that crime 
may be." Viewing the record as a whole, the statement simply does not 
demonstrate a breakdown in the adversarial process rendering the outcome of the 
proceeding unreliable.  We hold, 
therefore, that the Cronic test does not apply to these facts and 
prejudice will not be presumed.  

  

[¶57]   With that conclusion, we are left 
to consider Mr. Sincock's claim under the Strickland analysis; that is, 
by making the remark that Mr. Sincock most likely committed the crime, did 
defense counsel fail to render the assistance a reasonably competent attorney 
would have provided and so undermine the proper functioning of the adversarial 
process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just 
result?  Barkell, 2002 WY 
153, ¶9.  We reiterate that the 
reasonableness of counsel's actions is evaluated from the perspective of counsel 
at the time and in light of all the circumstances of the case.  Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, 
¶57, 43 P.3d 80, ¶58 (Wyo. 2002).  
We further reiterate the strong presumption that counsel rendered 
adequate and reasonable assistance making all decisions within the bounds of 
reasonable professional judgment.  
Dickeson, 843 P.2d 606. 

 

[¶58]   Based upon the totality of the 
circumstances appearing in the record before us, we are unable to conclude 
defense counsel's remarks to the jury so undermined the proper functioning of 
the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced 
a just result.  An objective 
assessment of counsel's performance reveals that he functioned as a reasonably 
competent advocate on behalf of Mr. Sincock in a very difficult case.  Unlike the other cases involving 
comments by counsel about the defendants' guilt, defense counsel in this case 
had the task, with Mr. Sincock's express approval, of explaining alternative 
pleasnot guilty and not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency.  This necessarily meant telling the jury 
that Mr. Sincock denied killing Becky, but if the jury did not believe his 
denial, there was evidence demonstrating he did not have the mental capacity to 
conform his conduct to the law.  
This is never an easy task for defense counsel, and while we do not 
condone counsel's choice of words here that Mr. Sincock most probably "committed 
the crime," under these particular facts we cannot conclude this isolated 
misstatement fell below standards of reasonable competency.  

 

[¶59]   Even if we were to conclude 
counsel's statement brought his conduct below that of a reasonably competent 
attorney, we could not conclude a reasonable probability exists that, but for 
counsel's error, the outcome of the trial would have been different.  Lancaster, 2002 WY 45, ¶59.  The evidence against Mr. Sincock was 
overwhelming.  In addition to his 
undisputed presence at the Horkan residence on the day of the murder, testimony 
from a witness that he saw Mr. Sincock search for and find the .22 pistol in the 
Horkan's closet, and Mr. Sincock's arrest in the same state where the Horkan 
vehicle was located, the state also presented three witnesses who testified Mr. 
Sincock told them he was going to kill Mr. Horkan or the Horkan family and one 
witness who testified Mr. Sincock came to CAC on the afternoon of the murder in 
Becky's car, with a .22 pistol and said Becky was in the bathtub.  Reviewing the whole record under the 
totality of the circumstances as they existed at the time of the trial, we find 
Mr. Sincock was provided with effective assistance of 
counsel.

 

[¶60]   Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1Kerri Johnson entered an appearance on behalf of Mr. Sincock on November 
12, 1998.  Although we are unable to 
locate an entry of appearance for him, James Wolfe appeared at the December 7, 
1998, scheduling conference on Mr. Sincock's behalf and from that point on was 
actively involved in the defense.