Case Title: Hunter v. Virginia State Bar

Citation: 

Docket Number: 121472

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2013-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
HORACE FRAZIER HUNTER 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. Record No. 121472 
JUSTICE CLEO E. POWELL 
 
 
 
February 28, 2013 
VIRGINIA STATE BAR,  
EX REL. THIRD DISTRICT COMMITTEE 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Kenneth R. Melvin, Alfred D. Swersky, 
and Von L. Piersall, Jr., Judges Designate 
 
 
In this appeal of right by an attorney from a Virginia 
State Bar (“VSB”) disciplinary proceeding before a three judge 
panel appointed pursuant to Code § 54.1-3935, we consider 
whether an attorney’s blog posts are commercial speech, whether 
an attorney may discuss public information related to a client 
without the client’s consent, and whether the panel ordered the 
attorney to post a disclaimer that is insufficient under Rule 
7.2(a)(3) of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
Horace Frazier Hunter, an attorney with the law firm of 
Hunter & Lipton, PC, authors a trademarked blog1 titled “This 
Week in Richmond Criminal Defense,” which is accessible from his 
law firm’s website, www.hunterlipton.com.  This blog, which is 
                                                 
 
1 A “blog” is a shortened, colloquial reference for the term 
“weblog,” and is defined as “ ‘a Web site that contains an 
online personal journal with reflections, comments, and often 
hyperlinks provided by the writer; also: the contents of such a 
site.’ ”  White v. Baker, 696 F.Supp.2d 1289, 1310 (N.D. Ga. 
2010) (quoting Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/blog (last visited 
January 31, 2013)). 
 
2 
 
not interactive, contains posts discussing a myriad of legal 
issues and cases, although the overwhelming majority are posts 
about cases in which Hunter obtained favorable results for his 
clients.  Nowhere in these posts or on his website did Hunter 
include disclaimers. 
 
As a result of Hunter’s blog posts on his website, the VSB 
launched an investigation.  During discussions with the VSB 
about whether his blog constituted legal advertising, Hunter 
wrote a letter to the VSB offering to post a disclaimer on one 
page of his website: 
“This Week in Richmond Criminal Defense is not an 
advertisement[;] it is a blog.  The views and 
opinions expressed on this blog are solely those 
of attorney Horace F. Hunter.  The purpose of 
these articles is to inform the public regarding 
various issues involving the criminal justice 
system and should not be construed to suggest a 
similar outcome in any other case.” 
 
However, the negotiations stalled and no disclaimers were posted 
at that time.   
 
On March 24, 2011, the VSB charged Hunter with violating 
Rules 7.1, 7.2, 7.5,2 and 1.6 by his posts on this blog.  
Specifically, the VSB argued that he violated rules 7.1 and 7.2 
because his blog posts discussing his criminal cases were 
                                                 
 
2 The District Committee ultimately did not find by clear 
and convincing evidence that Hunter violated Rule 7.5 and 
dismissed that charge. 
 
3 
 
inherently misleading as they lacked disclaimers.3  The VSB also 
asserted that Hunter violated Rule 1.6 by revealing information 
that could embarrass or likely be detrimental to his former 
clients by discussing their cases on his blog without their 
consent. 
 
In a hearing on October 18, 2011, the VSB presented 
evidence of Hunter’s alleged violations.  The VSB presented a 
former client who testified that he did not consent to 
information about his cases being posted on Hunter’s blog and 
believed that the information posted was embarrassing or 
detrimental to him, despite the fact that all such information 
had previously been revealed in court.  The VSB investigator 
testified that other former clients felt similarly.  The VSB 
also entered all of the blog posts Hunter had posted on his blog 
to date.  At that time, none of the posts entered contained 
disclaimers.  Of these thirty unique posts, only five discussed 
legal, policy issues.  The remaining twenty-five discussed 
cases.  Hunter represented the defendant in twenty-two of these 
cases and identified that fact in the posts.  In nineteen of 
these twenty-two posts, Hunter also specifically named his law 
firm.  One of these posts described a case where a family hired 
                                                 
 
3 Although some of Hunter’s blog posts now contain 
disclaimers, not all do and the disclaimers that are present 
were not added until after the VSB brought disciplinary charges 
against Hunter. 
 
4 
 
Hunter to represent them in a wrongful death suit and the 
remaining twenty-one of these posts described criminal cases.  
In every criminal case described, Hunter’s clients were either 
found not guilty, plea bargained to an agreed upon disposition, 
or had their charges reduced or dismissed. 
 
At the hearing, Hunter testified that he has many reasons 
for writing his blog - including marketing, creation of a 
community presence for his firm, combatting any public 
perception that defendants charged with crimes are guilty until 
proven innocent, and showing commitment to criminal law.  Hunter 
stated that he had offered to post a disclaimer on his blog, but 
the offered disclaimer was not satisfactory to the VSB.  Hunter 
admitted that he only blogged about his cases that he won.  He 
also told the VSB that he believed that using the client’s name 
is important to give an accurate description of what happened.  
Hunter told the VSB that he did not obtain consent from his 
clients to discuss their cases on his blog because all the 
information that he posted was public information. 
 
Following the hearing, the VSB held that Hunter violated 
Rule 1.6 by “disseminating client confidences” obtained in the 
course of representation without consent to post.  Specifically, 
the VSB found that the information in Hunter’s blog posts “would 
be embarrassing or be likely to be detrimental” to clients and 
he did not receive consent from his clients to post such 
 
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information.  The VSB further held that Hunter violated Rule 
7.1.  The VSB’s conclusion that Hunter’s website contained legal 
advertising was based on its factual finding that “[t]he 
postings of [Hunter’s] case wins on his webpage advertise[d] 
cumulative case results.”  Moreover, the VSB found that at least 
one purpose of the website was commercial.  The VSB further held 
that he violated Rule 7.2 by “disseminating case results in 
advertising without the required disclaimer” because the one 
that he proposed to the VSB was insufficient.  The VSB imposed a 
public admonition with terms including a requirement that he 
remove case specific content for which he has not received 
consent and post a disclaimer that complies with Rule 7.2(a)(3) 
on all case-related posts. 
 
Hunter appealed to a three judge panel of the circuit court 
and the court heard argument.  The court disagreed with Hunter 
that de novo was the proper standard of review and instead 
applied the following standard: “whether the decision is 
contrary to the law or whether there is substantial evidence in 
the record upon which the district committee could reasonably 
have found as it did.”  The court further ruled that the VSB’s 
interpretation of Rule 1.6 violated the First Amendment and 
dismissed that charge.  The court held VSB’s interpretation of 
Rules 7.1 and 7.2 do not violate the First Amendment and that 
the record contained substantial evidence to support the VSB’s 
 
6 
 
determination that Hunter had violated those rules.  The court 
imposed a public admonition and required Hunter to post the 
following disclaimer: “Case results depend upon a variety of 
factors unique to each case.  Case results do not guarantee or 
predict a similar result in any future case.”  This appeal 
followed. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Whether “[t]he Ruling of the Circuit Court finding a 
violation of Rules 7.1(a)(4) and 7.2(a)(3) conflicts with the 
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” 
 
 
Rule 7.1(a)(4), which is the specific portion of the Rule 
that the VSB argued that Hunter violated, states: 
 
(a) A lawyer shall not, on behalf of the lawyer 
or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or 
the firm, use or participate in the use of any 
form of public communication if such 
communication contains a false, fraudulent, 
misleading, or deceptive statement or claim.  For 
example, a communication violates this Rule if 
it: 
 
. . . . 
 
(4) is likely to create an unjustified 
expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, 
or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve 
results by means that violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct or other law. 
 
The VSB also argues that Hunter violated the following 
subsection of Rule 7.2(a)(3): 
 
(a) Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 
7.3, a lawyer may advertise services through 
 
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written, recorded, or electronic communications, 
including public media.  In the determination of 
whether an advertisement violates this Rule, the 
advertisement shall be considered in its 
entirety, including any qualifying statements or 
disclaimers contained therein.  Notwithstanding 
the requirements of Rule 7.1, an advertisement 
violates this Rule if it: 
 
. . . . 
 
(3) advertises specific or cumulative case 
results, without a disclaimer that (i) puts the 
case results in a context that is not misleading; 
(ii) states that case results depend upon a 
variety of factors unique to each case; and (iii) 
further states that case results do not guarantee 
or predict a similar result in any future case 
undertaken by the lawyer.  The disclaimer shall 
precede the communication of the case results.  
When the communication is in writing, the 
disclaimer shall be in bold type face and 
uppercase letters in a font size that is at least 
as large as the largest text used to advertise 
the specific or cumulative case results and in 
the same color and against the same colored 
background as the text used to advertise the 
specific or cumulative case results. 
 
In response to these allegations, Hunter contends that 
speech concerning the judicial system is “quintessentially 
‘political speech’” which is within the marketplace of ideas.  
Hunter asserts that the Supreme Court of the United States has 
twice declined to answer whether political speech is transformed 
into commercial speech simply because one of multiple motives is 
commercial.  Specifically, he argues that his blog posts are not 
commercial because  
(1) the [Supreme Court of the United States’] 
formal commercial speech definitions focus 
 
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heavily on whether the speech does no more than 
propose a commercial transaction; (2) the 
[Supreme Court of the United States’] commercial 
speech decisions, to the extent that they discuss 
motivation at all, have focused on whether the 
speech is solely driven by commercial interest; 
(3) the [Supreme Court of the United States] has 
repeatedly insisted that the existence of a 
commercial motivation does not disqualify speech 
from the heightened scrutiny protection it would 
otherwise deserve; (4) the [Supreme Court of the 
United States] has warned that when commercial 
and political elements of speech are inextricably 
intertwined, the heightened protection applicable 
to the political speech should be applied, lest 
the political speech be chilled; and (5) the 
constitutional policy arguments that undergird 
the reduction of protection for commercial speech 
have no persuasive force when the content of the 
speech is political. 
 
The VSB responds that Hunter’s blog posts are inherently 
misleading commercial speech.   
 
“Whether the inherent character of a statement places it 
beyond the protection of the First Amendment is a question of 
law over which . . . this Court . . . exercise[s] de novo 
review.”  Peel v. Atty. Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 
U.S. 91, 108 (1990).  An appellate Court must independently 
examine the entire record in First Amendment cases to ensure 
that “ ‘a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression’ ” 
has not occurred.  Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United 
States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (quoting New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964)). 
 
Turning to Hunter’s argument that his blog posts are 
 
9 
 
political, rather than commercial, speech, we note that “[t]he 
existence of ‘commercial activity, in itself, is no 
justification for narrowing the protection of expression secured 
by the First Amendment.’ ”  Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 
818 (1975) (quoting Ginsburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 
(1966)).  However, when speech that is both commercial and 
political is combined, the resulting speech is not automatically 
entitled to the level of protections afforded political speech.  
Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, 
492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989). 
 
While it is settled that attorney advertising is commercial 
speech, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 363-64 
(1977), Bates and its progeny were decided in the era of 
traditional media.  In recent years, however, advertising has 
taken to new forms such as websites, blogs, and other social 
media forums, like Facebook and Twitter.  See generally Spirit 
Airlines, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 687 F.3d 403 
(D.C. Cir. 2012); QVC Inc. v. Your Vitamins Inc., 439 Fed. Appx. 
165 (3d Cir. 2011); Athleta, Inc. v. Pitbull Clothing Co., 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6867 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2013).   
 
Thus, we must examine Hunter’s speech to determine whether 
it is commercial speech, specifically, lawyer advertising. 
Advertising, like all public expression, may be 
subject to reasonable regulation that serves a 
legitimate public interest.  To the extent that 
 
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commercial activity is subject to regulation, the 
relationship of speech to that activity may be 
one factor, among others, to be considered in 
weighing the First Amendment interest against the 
governmental interest alleged.  Advertising is 
not thereby stripped of all First Amendment 
protection.  The relationship of speech to the 
marketplace of products or of services does not 
make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas. 
 
Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 826 (internal citations omitted).  Simply 
because the speech is an advertisement, references a specific 
product, or is economically motivated does not necessarily mean 
that it is commercial speech.  Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products 
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 (1983).  “The combination of all these 
characteristics, however, provides strong support for the . . . 
conclusion that [some blog posts] are properly characterized as 
commercial speech” even though they also discuss issues 
important to the public.  Id. at 67-68 (emphasis in original). 
 
Certainly, not all advertising is necessarily commercial, 
e.g., public service announcements.  See id. at 66 (holding 
“[t]he mere fact that these pamphlets are conceded to be 
advertisements clearly does not compel the conclusion that they 
are commercial speech”).  However, all commercial speech is 
necessarily advertising.  See Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 31 (1993) (defining “advertisement” as “a calling 
attention to or making known[;]an informing or notifying[;] a 
calling to public attention[;] a statement calling attention to 
something[;] a public notice; esp[ecially] a paid notice or 
 
11 
 
announcement published in some public print (as a newspaper, 
periodical, poster, or handbill) or broadcast over radio or 
television”).  Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States 
has said that “[t]he diverse motives, means, and messages of 
advertising may make speech ‘commercial’ in widely varying 
degrees.”  Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 826. 
 
Here, Hunter’s blog posts, while containing some political 
commentary, are commercial speech.  Hunter has admitted that his 
motivation for the blog is at least in part economic.  The posts 
are an advertisement in that they predominately describe cases 
where he has received a favorable result for his client.  He 
unquestionably references a specific product, i.e., his 
lawyering skills as twenty-two of his twenty-five case related 
posts describe cases that he has successfully handled.  Indeed, 
in nineteen of these posts, he specifically named his law firm 
in addition to naming himself as counsel. 
 
Moreover, the blog is on his law firm’s commercial website 
rather than an independent site dedicated to the blog.  See 
Howard J. Bashman, How Appealing Blog (Feb. 11, 2013, 9:40 AM), 
http://howappealing.law.com (an independent blog by a 
Pennsylvania appellate attorney that is accessible through 
Law.com at http://legalblogwatch.typepad.com/).  The website 
 
12 
 
uses the same frame4 for the pages openly soliciting clients as 
it does for the blog, including the firm name, a photograph of 
Hunter and his law partner, and a “contact us” form.  The 
homepage of the website on which Hunter posted his blog states 
only: 
Do you need Richmond attorneys? 
 
Hunter & Lipton, CP [sic] is a law practice in 
Richmond, Virginia specializing in litigation 
matters from administrative agency hearings to 
serious criminal cases. As experienced Richmond 
attorneys, we bring a genuine desire to help 
those who find themselves in difficult 
situations. Our partnership was founded on the 
idea that everyone, no matter what the 
circumstance, deserves a zealous advocate to 
fight on his or her behalf.  
 
People make mistakes, and may even find 
themselves in situations not of their own making. 
And for these people, the system can be 
extraordinarily unforgiving and unjust—but you do 
not have to face this system alone.  
 
If you find yourself in a difficult legal 
situation, the Richmond attorneys of Hunter & 
Lipton, LLP would consider it a privilege to 
represent you.  Please contact our office with 
any questions or to schedule a consultation.  
 
This non-interactive blog does not allow for discourse about the 
cases, as non-commercial commentary often would by allowing 
readers to post comments.  See, e.g., Law.com Legal Blog Watch, 
                                                 
 
4 See Joan M. Reitz, Online Dictionary for Library and 
Information Science, http://www.abc-
clio.com/ODLIS/odlis_F.aspx?#frame (last visited February 25, 
2013) (defining frame as "[a] separately scrollable area in the 
window of a computer application or in a Web page that has been 
divided into more than one scrollable area"). 
 
13 
 
http://legalblogwatch.typepad.com/; Above the Law, 
http://abovethelaw.com/.  See also June Lester & Wallace C. 
Koehler, Jr., Fundamentals of Information Studies 102 (2d ed. 
2007) (observing that “[i]n contrast to the interaction possible 
in some other forms of web-published information, blog readers 
are most frequently permitted to leave comments and create 
threads of discussion”).  Instead, in furtherance of his 
commercial pursuit, Hunter invites the reader to “contact us” 
the same way one seeking legal representation would contact the 
firm through the website. 
 
Thus, the inclusion of five generalized, legal posts and 
three discussions about cases that he did not handle on his non-
interactive blog, no more transform Hunter’s otherwise self-
promotional blog posts into political speech, “than opening 
sales presentations with a prayer or a Pledge of Allegiance 
would convert them into religious or political speech.”  Fox, 
492 U.S. at 474-75.  Indeed, unlike situations and topics where 
the subject matter is inherently, inextricably intertwined, 
Hunter chose to comingle sporadic political statements within 
his self-promoting blog posts in an attempt to camouflage the 
true commercial nature of his blog.  “Advertisers should not be 
permitted to immunize false or misleading product information 
from government regulation simply by including references to 
public issues.”  Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68.  When considered as a 
 
14 
 
whole, the economically motivated blog overtly proposes a 
commercial transaction that is an advertisement of a specific 
product.  
 
Having determined that Hunter’s blog posts discussing his 
cases are commercial speech, 
we must determine whether the expression is 
protected by the First Amendment.  For commercial 
speech to come within that provision, it at least 
must concern lawful activity and not be 
misleading.  Next, we ask whether the asserted 
governmental interest is substantial.  If both 
inquiries yield positive answers, we must 
determine whether the regulation directly 
advances the governmental interest asserted, and 
whether it is not more extensive than is 
necessary to serve that interest.  
 
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 
U.S. 557, 566 (1980); Adams Outdoor Advertising v. City of 
Newport News, 236 Va. 370, 383, 373 S.E.2d 917, 923 (1988).   
 
The VSB does not contend, nor does the record indicate, 
that Hunter’s posts do not concern lawful activity; rather, the 
VSB argues that the posts are inherently misleading.  While we 
do not hold that the blog posts are inherently misleading, we do 
conclude that they have the potential to be misleading.  
“[B]ecause the public lacks sophistication concerning legal 
services, misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed 
unimportant in other advertising may be found quite 
inappropriate in legal advertising.”  Bates, 433 U.S. at 383.  
Of the thirty posts that were on his blog at the time of the VSB 
 
15 
 
hearing, twenty-two posts named himself as counsel and discussed 
cases that he handled.  With one exception, in all of these 
posts, he described the successful results that he obtained for 
his clients.5  While the States may place an absolute prohibition 
on inherently misleading advertising, “the States may not place 
an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially 
misleading information, . . . if the information also may be 
presented in a way that is not deceptive.”  In re R.M.J., 455 
U.S. 191, 203 (1982).  Here, the VSB’s own remedy of requiring 
Hunter to post disclaimers on his blog posts demonstrates that 
the information could be presented in a way that is not 
misleading or deceptive.   
 
Thus, we must examine whether the VSB has a substantial 
governmental interest in regulating these blog posts.  Central 
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.  The Supreme Court of the United States 
has recognized that “ ‘[i]f the naiveté of the public will cause 
advertising by attorneys to be misleading, then it is the bar’s 
role to assure that the populace is sufficiently informed as to 
enable it to place advertising in its proper perspective.’ ”  
Peel, 496 U.S. at 110 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 375).  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court of the United States expressed concern that 
                                                 
 
5 In the one case that he does not describe favorable 
results he has received, he discusses how he has been retained 
by a family in a wrongful death lawsuit against a police 
department.   
 
16 
 
the public may lack the sophistication to discern misstatements 
as to the quality of a lawyer’s services.  Bates, 433 U.S. at 
383.  Therefore, the VSB has a substantial governmental interest 
in protecting the public from an attorney’s self-promoting 
representations that could lead the public to mistakenly believe 
that they are guaranteed to obtain the same positive results if 
they were to hire Hunter. 
 
Because the VSB’s governmental interest is substantial, we 
must now determine “whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted.”  Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 
566.  The VSB’s regulations permit blog posts that discuss 
specific or cumulative case results but require a disclaimer to 
explain to the public that no results are guaranteed.  Rules 7.1 
and 7.2.  This requirement directly advances the VSB’s 
governmental interest. 
 
Finally, we must determine whether the VSB’s regulations 
are no more restrictive than necessary.  Central Hudson, 447 
U.S. at 566.  The Supreme Court of the United States has 
approved the use of disclaimers or explanations.  Zauderer v. 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 
U.S. 626, 651 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203; Bates, 433 
U.S. at 384.  The disclaimers mandated by the VSB  
shall precede the communication of the case 
results.  When the communication is in writing, 
the disclaimer shall be in bold type face and 
 
17 
 
uppercase letters in a font size that is at least 
as large as the largest text used to advertise 
the specific or cumulative case results and in 
the same color and against the same colored 
background as the text used to advertise the 
specific or cumulative case results. 
 
Rule 7.2(a)(3).  This requirement ensures that the disclaimer is 
noticeable and would be connected to each post so that any 
member of the public who may use the website addresses to 
directly access Hunter’s posts would be in a position to see the 
disclaimer.  Therefore, we hold that the disclaimers required by 
the VSB are “not more extensive than is necessary to serve that 
interest.”  Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.   
 
Hunter’s blog posts discuss lawful activity and are not 
inherently misleading, but the VSB has asserted a substantial 
governmental interest to protect the public from potentially 
misleading lawyer advertising.  See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 
566.  These regulations directly advance this interest and are 
not more restrictive than necessary, unlike outright bans on 
advertising.  Id.  We thus conclude that the VSB’s Rules 7.1 and 
7.2 do not violate the First Amendment.  As applied to Hunter’s 
blog posts, they are constitutional and the panel did not err. 
B. Whether the circuit court erred in holding that 
 the VSB’s application of Rule 1.6 to Hunter’s blog 
 violated his First Amendment rights. 
 
 
Rule 1.6(a) states, that with limited exceptions,  
[a] lawyer shall not reveal information protected 
by the attorney-client privilege under applicable 
 
18 
 
law or other information gained in the 
professional relationship that the client has 
requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of 
which would be embarrassing or would be likely to 
be detrimental to the client unless the client 
consents after consultation, except for 
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in 
order to carry out the representation . . . . 
 
The VSB argues that the circuit court erred in holding that its 
interpretation of Rule 1.6 violates the First Amendment and that 
Hunter violated that rule by disclosing potentially embarrassing 
information about his clients on his blog “in order to advance 
his personal economic interests.”  VSB argues that lawyers, as 
officers of the Court, are prohibited from engaging in speech 
that might otherwise be constitutionally protected.  Thus, the 
VSB’s interpretation of Rule 1.6 involves two types of 
information: 1) that which is protected by the attorney-client 
privilege, and 2) that which is public information but is 
embarrassing or likely to be detrimental to the client.  Hunter 
is charged with disseminating the later type of information.  In 
response to these allegations, Hunter argues that the VSB’s 
interpretation of Rule 1.6 is unconstitutional because the 
matters discussed in his blogs had previously been revealed in 
public judicial proceedings and, therefore, as concluded 
matters, were protected by the First Amendment.  Thus, we are 
called upon to answer whether the state may prohibit an attorney 
from discussing information about a client or former client that 
 
19 
 
is not protected by attorney-client privilege without express 
consent from that client.  We agree with Hunter that it may not. 
 
The cases cited by VSB in support of its position differ 
from this case in a substantial way; the cases relied upon by 
VSB involve pending proceedings.  It is settled that attorney 
speech about public information from cases is protected by the 
First Amendment, but it may be regulated if it poses a 
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing a pending case.  
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1076 (1991). 
 
“[A] presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of 
a criminal trial under our system of justice.”  Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980).   
Moreover,  
[a] trial is a public event.  What transpires in 
the court room is public property.  If a 
transcript of the court proceedings had been 
published, we suppose none would claim that the 
judge could punish the publisher for contempt.  
And we can see no difference though the conduct 
of the attorneys, of the jury or even of the 
judge himself, may have reflected on the court.  
Those who see and hear what transpired can report 
it with impunity.  There is no special perquisite 
of the judiciary which enables it, as 
distinguished from other institutions of 
democratic government, to suppress, edit, or 
censor events which transpire in proceedings 
before it. 
 
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).  All of Hunter’s blog 
posts involved cases that had been concluded.  Moreover, the VSB 
concedes that all of the information that was contained within 
 
20 
 
Hunter’s blog was public information and would have been 
protected speech had the news media or others disseminated it.  
In deciding whether the circuit court erred, we are required to 
make our “own inquiry into the imminence and magnitude of the 
danger said to flow from the particular utterance and then to 
balance the character of the evil, as well as its likelihood, 
against the need for free and unfettered expression.”  Landmark 
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978).  “At 
the very least, [the] cases recognize that disciplinary rules 
governing the legal profession cannot punish activity protected 
by the First Amendment, and that First Amendment protection 
survives even when the attorney violates a disciplinary rule he 
swore to obey when admitted to the practice of law.”  Gentile, 
501 U.S. at 1054.  The VSB’s interpretation of Rule 1.6 fails 
these standards even when we 
balance “whether the ‘practice in question 
[furthers] an important or substantial 
governmental interest unrelated to the 
suppression of expression' and whether 'the 
limitation of First Amendment freedoms is no 
greater than is necessary or essential to the 
protection of the particular governmental 
interest involved,’ ” 
 
Id. (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 
(1984)).  State action that punishes the publication of truthful 
information can rarely survive constitutional scrutiny.  Smith 
v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979). 
 
21 
 
The VSB argues that it can prohibit an attorney from repeating 
truthful information made in a public judicial proceeding even 
though others can disseminate this information because an 
attorney repeating it could inhibit clients from freely 
communicating with their attorneys or because it would undermine 
public confidence in the legal profession.  Such concerns, 
however, are unsupported by the evidence.  To the extent that 
the information is aired in a public forum, privacy 
considerations must yield to First Amendment protections.  In 
that respect, a lawyer is no more prohibited than any other 
citizen from reporting what transpired in the courtroom.  Thus, 
the circuit court did not err in concluding that the VSB’s 
interpretation of Rule 1.6 violated the First Amendment. 
C. Whether the circuit court erred in requiring Hunter 
to post a disclaimer on his website that does not comply 
with the requirements of Rule 7.2(3) and therefore does 
not eliminate the misleading nature of his blog posts. 
 
 
The VSB argues that the single disclaimer that the circuit 
court ordered Hunter to post on his blog was insufficient to 
comport with Rule 7.2(a)(3) because it did not eliminate the 
misleading nature of the posts.   
 
As we have already concluded, Hunter's blogs are commercial 
speech and, thus, constitute lawyer advertising.  When 
advertising cumulative or specific case results, Rule 7.2 
requires that a disclaimer  
 
22 
 
shall be in bold type face and uppercase letters 
in a font size that is at least as large as the 
largest text used to advertise the specific or 
cumulative case results and in the same color and 
against the same colored background as the text 
used to advertise the specific or cumulative case 
results. 
 
Rule 7.2(a)(3). 
 
Here, the VSB required Hunter to post a disclaimer that 
complies with Rule 7.2(a)(3) on all case-related posts.  This 
means that Hunter’s disclaimers “shall be in bold type face and 
uppercase letters in a font size that is at least as large as 
the largest text used to advertise the specific or cumulative 
case results and in the same color and against the same colored 
background as the text used to advertise the specific or 
cumulative case results.”  Rule 7.2(a)(3).  The circuit court, 
however, imposed the following disclaimer to be posted once: 
“Case results depend upon a variety of factors unique to each 
case.  Case results do not guarantee or predict a similar result 
in any future case.” 
 
While the substantive meaning of the imposed disclaimer may 
conform to the requirements stated in Rule 7.2(a)(3)(i) through 
(iii), it nevertheless is less than what the rule requires.  In 
contrast to the committee’s determination, there is no provision 
in the circuit court’s order requiring that the disclaimer be 
formatted and presented in the manner required by Rule 
7.2(a)(3), and the text of the disclaimer prescribed by the 
 
23 
 
circuit court is not itself formatted and presented in that 
manner.  Even so, Hunter does not argue that the disclaimer 
required by the circuit court is an appropriate, less 
restrictive means of regulating his speech and, therefore, we 
decline to so hold.  Based on the arguments presented to it, the 
circuit court erred by imposing a disclaimer that conflicted 
with the rule.  See, e.g., Rosillo v. Winters, 235 Va. 268, 272, 
367 S.E.2d 717, 719 (1988) (concluding that a circuit court 
abuses its discretion by “enter[ing an] order . . . dispens[ing] 
with the requirements of [a] Rule”); Zaug v. Virginia State Bar, 
285 Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2013) (this day decided) 
(“The Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct are Rules of this 
Court.”). 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Hunter’s blog posts 
are potentially misleading commercial speech that the VSB may 
regulate.  We further hold that circuit court did not err in 
determining that the VSB’s interpretation of Rule 1.6 violated 
the First Amendment.  Finally, we hold that because the circuit 
court erred in imposing one disclaimer did not fully comply with 
Rule 7.2(a)(3), we reverse and remand for imposition of 
disclaimers that fully comply with that Rule. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
and remanded. 
 
24 
 
 
 
 
JUSTICE LEMONS, with whom JUSTICE McCLANAHAN joins, dissenting 
in part. 
 
I agree with the majority's resolution of the Rule 1.6 
issue.  However, I dissent from the majority's determination 
that Hunter is guilty of violating Rules 7.1(a)(4) and 7.2(a)(3) 
and that Hunter must post a disclaimer that complies with Rule 
7.2(a)(3). 
 
Rule 7.1 governs communications concerning a lawyer's 
services.  Rule 7.1(a)(4) states: 
(a) A lawyer shall not, on behalf of the lawyer 
or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or 
the firm, use or participate in the use of any 
form of public communication if such 
communication contains a false, fraudulent, 
misleading, or deceptive statement or claim.  For 
example, a communication violates this Rule if 
it: 
 
. . . . 
 
(4) is likely to create an unjustified 
expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, 
or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve 
results by means that violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct or other law. 
 
Rule 7.2 is only applicable to advertisements.  Rule 
7.2(a)(3) states: 
(a) Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 
7.3, a lawyer may advertise services through 
written, recorded, or electronic communications, 
including public media.  In the determination of 
whether an advertisement violates this Rule, the 
advertisement shall be considered in its 
 
 
25 
entirety, including any qualifying statements or 
disclaimers contained therein.  Notwithstanding 
the requirements of Rule 7.1, an advertisement 
violates this Rule if it: 
 
. . . . 
 
(3) advertises specific or cumulative case 
results, without a disclaimer that (i) puts the 
case results in a context that is not misleading; 
(ii) states that case results depend upon a 
variety of factors unique to each case; and (iii) 
further states that case results do not guarantee 
or predict a similar result in any future case 
undertaken by the lawyer.  The disclaimer shall 
precede the communication of the case results.  
When the communication is in writing, the 
disclaimer shall be in bold type face and 
uppercase letters in a font size that is at least 
as large as the largest text used to advertise 
the specific or cumulative case results and in 
the same color and against the same colored 
background as the text used to advertise the 
specific or cumulative case results. 
 
Hunter's blog contains articles about legal and policy 
issues in the news, as well as detailed descriptions of criminal 
trials, the majority of which are cases where Hunter was the 
defense attorney.  The articles also contain Hunter's commentary 
and critique of the criminal justice system.  He uses the case 
descriptions to illustrate his views. 
The First Amendment 
I believe that the articles on Hunter's blog are political 
speech that is protected by the First Amendment.  The Bar 
concedes that if Hunter's blog is political speech, the First 
 
 
26 
Amendment protects him and the Bar cannot force Hunter to post 
an advertising disclaimer on his blog. 
Speech concerning the criminal justice system has always 
been viewed as political speech.  "[I]t would be difficult to 
single out any aspect of government of higher concern and 
importance to the people than the manner in which criminal 
trials are conducted."  Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 
448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980).  As political speech, Hunter uses his 
blog to give detailed descriptions of how criminal trials in 
Virginia are conducted. He notes how the acquittal of some of 
his clients has exposed flaws in the criminal justice system. 
The majority asserts that because Hunter only discusses his 
victories, his blog is commercial.  The majority does not give 
sufficient credit to the fact that Hunter uses the outcome of 
his cases to illustrate his views of the system.  Hunter 
testified that one of the reasons he maintained the blog was to 
combat "the public perception that is clearly on the side that 
people are guilty until they're proven innocent."  For example, 
when discussing one of the cases where his client was found not 
guilty, he concludes the post by explaining that this case is an 
"example of how innocent people are often accused of committing 
some of the most serious crimes.  That is why it is important 
not to judge the guilt of an individual until all the evidence 
has been presented both for and against him." 
 
 
27 
The majority compares Hunter's detailed discussion of 
criminal trials and how these outcomes illustrate the need to 
hold government to its burden of proof, with "opening [a] sales 
presentation[] with a prayer or a Pledge of Allegiance." The 
majority proposes that his blog is not transformed into 
political speech simply because he included eight posts about 
legal issues and cases he was not involved in.  However, the 
twenty-two posts discussing criminal trials in Virginia are 
political speech in their own right, and are not dependent upon 
the content of the other eight posts. 
The majority also focuses on the location of Hunter's blog, 
and asserts that because the blog is accessed through the law 
firm's website and is not interactive, that demonstrates the 
blog is commercial in nature.  While going through the law 
firm's website is one way to access the blog, it is also 
possible to go directly to the blog without navigating through 
the firm's website.  Further, the fact that the blog is not 
interactive in no way commercializes the speech. 
Many businesses have websites.  It is not uncommon for 
websites to include links to related news articles or 
editorials.  Merely because an article may be accessed through a 
commercial portal does not change the content of the article.  
It is the content of speech and the motivation of the speaker 
 
 
28 
that determines the level of protection to which speech is 
entitled. 
 
Hunter conceded that one of the purposes of the blog was 
marketing.  Although the United States Supreme Court has never 
clearly decided whether political speech is transformed into 
commercial speech because one of the multiple motivations of the 
speaker is marketing and self-promotion, its jurisprudence leads 
to the conclusion that Hunter's speech is not commercial. 
The traditional test for determining whether speech is 
commercial is if the speech "[does] no more than propose a 
commercial transaction." Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh 
Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)(emphasis 
added); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976); Board of Trustees of 
the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1989).  
Hunter's articles clearly do more than propose a commercial 
transaction.  They contain detailed discussions of criminal 
trials in this Commonwealth, and Hunter's commentary and 
critique of the criminal justice system. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that commercial 
speech is "expression related solely to the economic interests 
of the speaker and its audience."  Central Hudson Gas & Elec. 
Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n. of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 
(1980) (emphasis added).  Marketing is not Hunter's sole 
 
 
29 
motivation for maintaining this blog.  As discussed above, one 
of Hunter's motivations in maintaining the blog is to 
disseminate information about "the criminal justice system, the 
criminal trials and the manner in which the government 
prosecutes its citizens." 
Even if marketing was Hunter's sole motivation, economic 
motivation cannot be the basis for determining whether otherwise 
political speech is protected.  The United States Supreme Court 
recognized in Pittsburgh Press Co. that merely having some 
economic motivation does not create a basis for regulation.  "If 
a newspaper's profit motive were determinative, all aspects of 
its operations – from the selection of news stories to the 
choice of editorial position – would be subject to regulation if 
it could be established that they were conducted with a view 
toward increased sales.  Such a basis for regulation clearly 
would be incompatible with the First Amendment."  413 U.S. at 
385. 
 
The mere existence of some commercial motivation does not 
change otherwise political speech into commercial speech.  
"[S]peech does not lose its First Amendment protection because 
money is spent to project it, as in a paid advertisement of one 
form or another."  Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761.  In 
discussing the economic motivations at issue in Sorrell v. IMS 
Health, Inc., 564 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 2653 (2011), the United 
 
 
30 
States Supreme Court recognized that "[w]hile the burdened 
speech results from an economic motive, so too does a great deal 
of vital expression."  Id. at 2665. 
Even if there is some commercial content to Hunter's 
speech, any commercial content is intertwined with political 
speech.  When commercial and political elements are intertwined 
in speech, the heightened scrutiny test must apply to all of the 
speech.  
It is not clear that a professional’s speech is 
necessarily commercial whenever it relates to that 
person’s financial motivation for speaking. But even 
assuming, without deciding, that such speech in the 
abstract is indeed merely “commercial,” we do not 
believe that the speech retains its commercial 
character when it is inextricably intertwined with 
otherwise fully protected speech.  Our lodestars in 
deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to a 
compelled statement must be the nature of the speech 
taken as a whole and the effect of the compelled 
statement thereon. 
 
Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 
U.S. 781, 795-96 (1988) (internal citation omitted). 
In this case, the policies the Bar advances have no 
persuasive force when applied to Hunter's blog.  The purposes of 
Rules 7.1 and 7.2 are to protect the public from misleading 
communications and advertisements concerning a lawyer's 
services.  Hunter's articles contain detailed descriptions of 
the trials, along with his commentary on the criminal justice 
system.  The Bar produced no evidence that anyone has found 
 
 
31 
Hunter's articles to be misleading.  There appears to be little 
benefit, if any, to the public by requiring Hunter to post a 
disclaimer that concedes his articles are advertisements.  
Hunter disagrees that his articles are advertisements, and 
claims they are political speech.  He objects to cheapening his 
political speech by denominating it as advertisement material. 
Accordingly, I would hold that Hunter's speech is 
political, is entitled to the heightened scrutiny test, and that 
he cannot be forced to include the advertising disclaimer under 
Rule 7.2 that the Bar seeks to force upon his writings.