Case Title: State v. Bart C. Gruetzmacher

Citation: 2004 WI 55

Docket Number: 2002AP003014-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 55 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-3014-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Bart C. Gruetzmacher,  
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 18, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 9, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waupaca   
 
JUDGE: 
Raymond S. Huber   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: SYKES, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by William 
L. Gansner, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Jennelle 
London Joset and Obernberger & Joset, LLP, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Jennelle London Joset. 
 
2004 WI 55 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-3014-CR  
(L.C. No. 
01 CF 233) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Bart C. Gruetzmacher,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 18, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a September, 2002 judgment and an order of the 
Circuit Court for Waupaca County, Raymond S. Huber, Judge.  
Reversed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This appeal is before the 
court on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2001-02).1  The State appeals an 
order 
of 
the 
circuit 
court, 
which 
resentenced 
Bart 
C. 
Gruetzmacher (Gruetzmacher) to 24 months imprisonment plus 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 2001-02 edition.  Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 
809.61 states, in relevant part, as follows:  "The supreme court 
may take jurisdiction of an appeal or other proceeding in the 
court of appeals upon certification by the court of appeals or 
upon the supreme court's own motion." 
No. 
02-3014-CR   
 
2 
 
probation.  In order to correct a sentencing error, the circuit 
court had previously resentenced Gruetzmacher to 40 months 
imprisonment.  The State appealed the circuit court's final 
judgment and order, and the court of appeals certified the issue 
of whether a Wisconsin circuit court that makes a mistake in 
sentencing may correct obvious errors when the sentencing judge 
made a good faith mistake during sentencing, promptly recognized 
the error, and, although he increased a sentence on one count 
and reduced punishment on another count, achieved what the court 
originally intended. 
¶2 
We conclude that the circuit court acted appropriately 
in notifying the parties and holding another hearing two days 
later and resentencing Gruetzmacher two weeks later, in March, 
2002, in order to correct a sentencing error.  As is evidenced 
by the statements made during sentencing, the circuit court 
clearly intended to sentence Gruetzmacher to 40 months initial 
confinement.  Gruetzmacher did not have an expectation of 
finality at his initial sentencing, because of the prompt 
actions of the court, so the sentence could be modified to 
correct the sentencing error.  However, because the circuit 
court made an error of law in resentencing yet again in 
September, 2002, it erroneously exercised its discretion.  We 
vacate the September resentencing order and reinstate the March 
sentencing structure.  
¶3 
We further decline the invitation of the State to 
overrule State v. North, 91 Wis. 2d 507, 283 N.W.2d 457 (Ct. 
App. 1979).  Nevertheless, we withdraw the per se rule language 
No. 
02-3014-CR   
 
3 
 
in North that states that modification to correct sentencing 
errors is contrary to the double jeopardy provisions when the 
court seeks to increase a sentence already being served.  We 
emphasize that the remainder of North remains intact, and is to 
be read with the factors set forth in State v. Jones, 2002 WI 
App 208, 257 Wis. 2d 163, 650 N.W.2d 844. 
I 
 
¶4 
The facts of this case relevant to this appeal are 
undisputed.  On November 1, 2001, the State filed a criminal 
complaint in Waupaca County Circuit Court charging Gruetzmacher 
with seven crimes.  The charges arose out of a domestic dispute 
Gruetzmacher had with the mother of his children and his ensuing 
altercation with a police officer.  At the time this complaint 
was filed, Gruetzmacher also faced criminal charges in several 
other criminal cases within Waupaca County, so that he faced a 
total of 24 charges. 
 
¶5 
The State and Gruetzmacher entered into a plea 
agreement, and Gruetzmacher's outstanding cases were disposed of 
in the following manner:  In case 01-CF-145, Gruetzmacher 
pleaded guilty to one count of substantial battery, a Class E 
felony.  A second count of misdemeanor battery was dismissed, 
but reserved to be read in at sentencing.  In case 01-CF-164, 
Gruetzmacher pleaded guilty to one count of possession of 
tetrahydrocannabinol 
(THC), 
a 
misdemeanor, 
as 
a 
repeater.  
Charges of possession of drug paraphernalia and felony bail 
jumping were 
dismissed, 
but 
reserved 
to be 
read 
in at 
sentencing.  In case 01-CF-207, Gruetzmacher pleaded guilty to 
No. 
02-3014-CR   
 
4 
 
one count of victim intimidation, a Class D felony, as a 
repeater.  One count was dismissed outright, and four other 
counts were dismissed, but reserved to be read in at sentencing.  
In case 01-CF-233, Gruetzmacher pleaded guilty to bail jumping, 
a Class D felony, as a repeater.  Six remaining counts were 
dismissed in that case, but reserved to be read in at 
sentencing. 
 
¶6 
Although no formal motion was filed by the State, 
Gruetzmacher's outstanding cases were, in effect, consolidated 
at the sentencing hearing on February 19, 2002.  During 
sentencing, the State expressed concern regarding Gruetzmacher's 
potential for violence, particularly when abusing alcohol, and 
recommended 
40 
months 
initial 
confinement. 
 
Conversely, 
Gruetzmacher's 
counsel 
recommended 
that 
Gruetzmacher 
be 
sentenced to two years of initial confinement, varying terms of 
probation, the longest being 10 years, and community service.   
¶7 
Ultimately, the circuit court sentenced Gruetzmacher 
as follows:  In case 01-CF-145, the circuit court sentenced 
Gruetzmacher to 40 months initial confinement and 20 months 
extended supervision for the felony substantial battery charge.  
In ordering this sentence, the circuit court noted that 40 
months was the minimum period that he believed was necessary for 
Gruetzmacher.  In case 01-CF-164, Gruetzmacher was placed on 
four years of probation for misdemeanor possession of THC as a 
repeater. 
 
In 
case 
01-CF-207, 
the 
circuit 
court 
placed 
Gruetzmacher on probation for 12 years and withheld sentence for 
intimidation of a victim.  In case 01-CF-233, Gruetzmacher was 
No. 
02-3014-CR   
 
5 
 
also placed on probation for 12 years and the sentence for 
felony bail jumping was withheld.  
 
¶8 
Later the same day, the circuit court realized that 
substantial battery, the offense charged in 01-CF-145, was a 
Class E felony which carried a maximum initial confinement of 24 
months.  Thus, the 40-month term of initial confinement assigned 
by the circuit court exceeded the maximum amount that could be 
imposed for that offense.  Realizing the error, the court then 
attempted to contact counsel and schedule another hearing.  The 
parties could not reconvene until two days later. 
 
¶9 
At the February 21, 2002 hearing, the circuit court 
stated that it was willing to vacate all of Gruetzmacher's 
sentences and proceed with a new hearing.  Alternatively, the 
circuit court suggested that it could change the probation 
period in case 01-CF-233 to a sentence of 40 months initial 
confinement to run concurrent with the 24-month maximum sentence 
allowable in case 01-CF-145.  The State noted that the sentences 
should be either vacated or stayed so that Gruetzmacher did not 
enter the prison system.  Having already foreseen this issue the 
court noted "I don't want him shipped.  That's why I had the 
sheriff's department notified immediately not to ship him."  The 
court ultimately entered a temporary stay with respect to all 
sentences in the case and set a new sentencing date.   
¶10 The 
court 
conducted 
a 
hearing 
to 
resentence 
Gruetzmacher on March 5, 2002.  During the proceedings, the 
circuit 
court 
commented 
that 
it 
was 
very 
concerned 
by 
Gruetzmacher's violent conduct and had indicated such fact at 
No. 
02-3014-CR   
 
6 
 
the first sentencing.  The court stated:  "I firmly believe that 
40 months is the minimum  period of confinement which is 
appropriate given Mr. Gruetzmacher's lengthy prior history and 
particularly given the violent conduct which was present 
on . . . three of these files . . . ." 
¶11 The circuit court resentenced Gruetzmacher as follows:  
In case 01-CF-145, the circuit court sentenced Gruetzmacher to 
24 months initial confinement, the maximum penalty allowable, 
and three years of extended supervision.  In case 01-CF-164, 
Gruetzmacher was placed on three years of probation on a 
withheld sentence.  In case 01-CF-207, the circuit court placed 
Gruetzmacher on 12 years of probation.  In case 01-CF-233, 
Gruetzmacher was sentenced to a 40-month term of initial 
confinement 
and 
20 
months 
extended 
supervision, 
to 
run 
concurrently with the sentence in 01-CF-145.  The circuit court 
again stated that it believed that 40 months was an appropriate 
term of initial confinement based on Gruetzmacher's actions. 
¶12 Gruetzmacher filed a motion to vacate the modified 
sentence on the bail jumping charge in case 01-CF-233.  Relying 
on North, Gruetzmacher asserted that the court was barred, due 
to double jeopardy concerns, from correcting a sentencing error 
in one case by modifying a legitimately imposed sentence of 
probation in another case to one of confinement. 
¶13 On September 16, 2002, the circuit court granted the 
motion and again resentenced Gruetzmacher.  The circuit court 
stated that it was concerned about its authority to correct what 
it had perceived at the March resentencing to be a clerical 
No. 
02-3014-CR   
 
7 
 
error.  It commented that, because the sentence it imposed for 
01-CF-233 was valid, it was improper at the March resentencing 
to vacate the probation in that case.  Thus, the circuit court 
decided to reimpose the period of probation in 01-CF-233.  In 
effect, Gruetzmacher's actual term of confinement was shortened 
from 40 months to 24 months, as the only applicable sentence of 
confinement arose out of 01-CF-145.  As a result of this 
modification, the court entered a new judgment of conviction and 
order of probation with respect to case 01-CF-233.  The State 
appealed 
from 
this 
judgment 
and 
order 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 974.05(1)(a) and (c).2 
II 
 
¶14 We now decide whether circuit courts should be allowed 
to correct obvious errors in sentencing where it is clear that a 
good 
faith 
mistake 
was 
made 
in 
an 
initial 
sentencing 
pronouncement, where the court promptly recognizes the error, 
and where the court, by reducing an erroneous original sentence 
on one count and increasing the original sentence on another, 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 974.05 states, in relevant part, as 
follows:   
[A]n appeal may be taken by the state from any:   
(a) Final order or judgment adverse to the state, 
whether following a trial or a plea of guilty or no 
contest, if the appeal would not be prohibited by 
constitutional protections against double jeopardy.   
(c) Judgment and sentence or order of probation 
not authorized by law. 
No. 
02-3014-CR   
 
8 
 
seeks to impose a lawfully structured sentence that achieves the 
overall disposition that the court originally intended. 
 
¶15 Whether a defendant's double jeopardy rights have been 
violated is a question of law, which we review de novo.  State 
v. Davison, 2003 WI 89, ¶15, 263 Wis. 2d 145, 666 N.W.2d 1.  See 
also State v. Trawitzki, 2001 WI 77, ¶19, 244 Wis. 2d 523, 628 
N.W.2d 801 
and 
State 
v. 
Anderson, 
219 
Wis. 2d 739, 
580 
N.W.2d 329 (1998). 
 
¶16 The State contends that an increase in the sentence 
upon resentencing does not violate the double jeopardy clause 
when it is done to correct an invalid sentence and achieve a 
sentence originally contemplated by the sentencing court.  The 
State asserts that this court should overrule the North decision 
because subsequent case law has undermined the double jeopardy 
analysis set forth in that opinion.  The State notes that the 
decision in United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980) 
permitted a sentence increase after the defendant would have 
begun serving his already imposed sentence.  The State contends 
that DiFrancesco stood for two principles.  First, there is not 
a per se rule barring sentence increases after a defendant had 
been sentenced.  Second, whether a defendant had an expectation 
of finality is of primary concern to the double jeopardy 
analysis.  In this case, the State contends, Gruetzmacher did 
not have an expectation of finality from his first sentencing in 
February through his final resentencing in September. 
 
¶17 The State further contends that, by applying the 
principles found in DiFrancesco, the decisions of Jones and 
No. 
02-3014-CR   
 
9 
 
State v. Burt, 2000 WI App 126, 237 Wis. 2d 610, 614 N.W.2d 42 
further eroded the underpinnings of the North decision.  Given 
the holding in DiFrancesco, the State asserts that the federal 
cases on which North relies are no longer good law.  Thus, the 
State contends, this court should rely on the factors set forth 
in Jones to determine whether a defendant's double jeopardy 
rights have been violated. 
¶18 Gruetzmacher asserts that the circuit court correctly 
reinstated 
probation 
in 
case 
01-CF-233 
at 
the 
September 
resentencing.  Gruetzmacher contends that the circuit court did 
not have the authority to resentence him for a charge that he 
already had been properly and legally sentenced for, as it 
violated the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and 
Wisconsin Constitutions.  Gruetzmacher points out that the 
circuit court specified its reasons for sentencing him in each 
particular case; thus, this was not a case of global sentencing.  
According to Gruetzmacher, simply because the sentence in one 
case needed to be modified did not give the circuit court the 
right to increase the sentence in another case.  Gruetzmacher 
asserts that he had an expectation of finality when he was 
placed on probation in case 01-CF-233, and the subsequent 
resentencing to include a term of initial confinement violated 
his double jeopardy rights.   
¶19 Gruetzmacher further contends that the North decision 
instructs that increasing a defendant's sentence after he or she 
has 
been 
sentenced 
violates 
the 
double 
jeopardy 
clause.  
Gruetzmacher asserts that the North decision should not be 
No. 
02-3014-CR   
 
10 
 
overturned.  Gruetzmacher contends that North is not a per se 
rule, stating that a judge may never alter a sentence without 
violating the double jeopardy clause, so that it needs to be 
overruled.  Rather, Gruetzmacher asserts that the circumstances 
in this case are nearly identical to those presented in North.  
Gruetzmacher argues that his case involves four separate cases, 
instead of separate counts, which he claims actually strengthens 
his argument.  Gruetzmacher states that none of the cases that 
the 
State 
relied 
on 
support 
overturning 
North. 
 
More 
specifically, Gruetzmacher notes that no deceit was present in 
this case as was present in Jones.  Gruetzmacher further 
contends that the resentencing error in his case cannot be 
likened to a slip of the tongue situation, like that present in 
Burt. 
¶20 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states, in relevant part, "nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb . . . ."  The foundation for the double jeopardy provision 
in the United States Constitution has been described as follows: 
"The constitutional prohibition against 'double 
jeopardy' was designed to protect an individual from 
being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible 
conviction 
more 
than 
once 
for 
an 
alleged 
offense . . . .  The underlying idea, one that is 
deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system 
of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its 
resources and power should not be allowed to make 
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an 
alleged 
offense, 
thereby 
subjecting 
him 
to 
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him 
to 
live 
in 
a 
continuing 
state 
of 
anxiety 
and 
No. 
02-3014-CR   
 
11 
 
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that 
even though innocent he may be found guilty." 
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 127-28 (quoting Green v. United States, 
355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957)). 
¶21 In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969), the 
United States Supreme Court concluded that the double jeopardy 
prohibition included in the Fifth Amendment "represents a 
fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage, and that it 
should apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment."  
The Wisconsin Constitution also contains a double jeopardy 
provision.  Article I, § 8(1) states, in relevant part, "no 
person for the same offense may be put twice in jeopardy of 
punishment . . . ."  Because the protection afforded by these 
provisions is coextensive, Wisconsin courts have traditionally 
treated them as one.  State v. Willett, 2000 WI App 212, ¶4, 238 
Wis. 2d 621, 618 N.W.2d 881, and Burt, 237 Wis. 2d 610, ¶7. 
¶22 Double 
jeopardy 
issues 
can 
arise 
in 
various 
situations, such as reprosecution after acquittal, mistrial, or 
conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense.  We 
have noted that there are various purposes of the double 
jeopardy clause, some of which include: 
to protect the defendant from multiple trials and 
multiple punishments for the same offense; to preserve 
the finality of judgments; to protect the integrity of 
final judgments; to bar the government from a second 
chance to supply evidence which it failed to furnish 
in 
the 
first 
proceeding; 
and 
to 
protect 
the 
defendant's right to have the trial completed by a 
particular tribunal. 
State v. Martin, 121 Wis. 2d 670, 675, 360 N.W.2d 43 (1985). 
No. 
02-3014-CR   
 
12 
 
¶23 Clearly our jurisprudence has placed a premium on 
ensuring finality of judgments and not subjecting defendants to 
endless prosecutions or multiple punishments.  Thus, we analyze 
the issue before us in this case with respect for the 
underpinnings of due process and double jeopardy and the 
purposes to be served in our justice system by adherence to 
these principles. 
¶24 In this case, the State urges us to overrule North and 
conclude that Gruetzmacher's probation could be modified to a 
40-month 
term 
of 
initial 
confinement, 
while 
Gruetzmacher 
contends that North's holding must lead to the conclusion that 
his final resentencing in September must be upheld.  Because 
both of the parties' arguments hinge on North, and our 
interpretation and application of North will affect the outcome 
of this case, we feel it is necessary to discuss that case in 
some detail. 
¶25 In North, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to 
two offenses:  misdemeanor theft and uttering a forged check.  
North, 
91 
Wis. 2d at 
508-09. 
 
The 
maximum 
sentence 
for 
misdemeanor theft was six months confinement in the county jail, 
or a $200 fine, or both.  Id. at 509.  The maximum sentence for 
uttering a forged check was ten years imprisonment or a $5000 
fine, or both.  Id.  In what was an obvious sentencing error, 
the court sentenced the defendant to two and one-half years 
imprisonment on the theft charge and six months imprisonment, to 
run concurrently, on the forgery charge.  Id.  The circuit court 
realized the error three and one-half months after sentencing 
No. 
02-3014-CR   
 
13 
 
and, on its own and without notice to the defendant, switched 
the sentences in keeping with the maximum penalty allowed for 
each charge.  Id.  The defendant moved to have the sentence for 
the forgery charge reduced to the original six-month sentence 
given by the circuit court.  Id. 
¶26 The court of appeals reversed the sentencing order of 
the circuit court, and remanded with instructions that the 
defendant's motion should be granted.  Id. at 511.  The court of 
appeals stated that, in certain circumstances, a court could 
validly modify or correct a defendant's sentence even if he or 
she has already begun to serve the sentence.  Id. at 509.  
Nevertheless, 
the 
court 
concluded 
that 
"(m)odification to 
correct sentencing flaws runs afoul of the double jeopardy 
provisions when the amending court seeks to increase sentences 
already being served."  Id. at 509-10 (citing United States v. 
Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 308 (1931)).  The court of appeals explained 
that increased sentences should be disallowed for the following 
reasons: 
[T]here is a possibility of a judicial abuse which 
would arise if trial courts had discretionary power to 
increase 
sentences 
which 
convicted 
persons 
were 
serving; and, if trial courts are allowed to increase 
a valid sentence to offset an erroneously lenient one, 
a sentenced person's rights to challenge an illegal 
sentence would be materially chilled. 
Id. at 510 (footnotes omitted). 
¶27 One year after the North decision was published, the 
United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in DiFrancesco.  
In DiFrancesco, the United States Supreme Court addressed the 
No. 
02-3014-CR   
 
14 
 
issue of whether the increase of a sentence reviewed under a 
statute,3 allowing the State to appeal a "dangerous special 
offender's" 
sentence, 
constituted 
multiple 
punishment 
that 
violated the double jeopardy clause.  DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 
138.  The United States Supreme Court concluded that the statute 
allowing such an appeal was constitutional, and the cause was 
remanded. 
¶28 In its analysis, the Court noted that the Circuit 
Court of Appeals relied, as constitutionally based, on the 
dictum in United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931) stating 
that a sentence cannot be increased once the defendant has begun 
serving the sentence.  DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 138.  The Court 
noted that this statement was not essential to the holding in 
Benz.  Id.  Moreover, the court noted that the case cited by 
Benz as standing for that proposition, Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 
163 (1874) did not state such a principle.  Id.  Thus, the 
                                                 
3 The statute at issue in this case was 18 U.S.C. § 3576 of 
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.  Section 3576 states, 
in relevant part, as follows:  "With respect to the imposition, 
correction, or reduction of a sentence after proceedings under 
section 3575 of this chapter, a review of the sentence on the 
record of the sentencing court may be taken by the defendant or 
the United States to a court of appeals." 
No. 
02-3014-CR   
 
15 
 
United States Supreme Court confined the Benz holding to the 
specific context presented in Lange.4  Id. at 139.   
¶29 The Court stated that the "Double Jeopardy Clause does 
not provide the defendant with the right to know at any specific 
moment in time what the exact limit of his punishment will turn 
out to be."  Id. at 137.  The Court further stated that double 
jeopardy does not demand that a defendant's sentence be given a 
level of finality such that its later increase would be 
prohibited.  Id.  The DiFrancesco court recognized that the 
level of finality accompanying an acquittal was qualitatively 
different than the level of finality that a defendant had after 
sentencing.  Id.  See also Burt, 237 Wis. 2d 610, ¶9.  Noting 
the decision in Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166-67 
(1947), which held that the district court could recall, in the 
same day, a defendant it only sentenced to imprisonment and add 
a fine, where the applicable statute carried a mandatory minimum 
of a fine and imprisonment, 
the 
Court stated 
that the 
"'Constitution does not require that sentencing should be a game 
in which a wrong move by the judge means immunity for the 
prisoner.'"  DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 135 (quoting Bozza, 330 
U.S. at 166-67).  Moreover, the United States Supreme Court 
                                                 
4 In Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (1874), the defendant was 
sentenced to pay a fine for an offense where either imprisonment 
or a fine could be imposed.  After the defendant paid the fine, 
the court resentenced the defendant to one-year imprisonment.  
Because the defendant had already paid the fine, thus enduring 
one of the two possible punishments prescribed for the offense, 
the court could not then sentence him to a term of imprisonment. 
No. 
02-3014-CR   
 
16 
 
recognized that the defendant in Bozza was not twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense.  Id. 
¶30 The issuance of the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in DiFrancesco changed the landscape of double jeopardy 
law.  Many cases, including the North decision, relied on the 
language in Benz that was subsequently withdrawn by the 
DiFrancesco court.  After DiFrancesco dismissed the notion that 
there was a per se rule, the idea that modification to increase 
sentences already being served ran afoul of the double jeopardy 
clause was no longer sound.  Moreover, courts exercising 
criminal 
jurisdiction 
were 
encouraged 
to 
evaluate 
the 
defendant's expectation of finality in the sentence imposed.   
¶31 Several Wisconsin cases following the DiFrancesco 
decision hinged on the expectation of finality consideration set 
forth in that opinion.  In Burt, the circuit court misspoke at 
the defendant's sentencing and sentenced him to concurrent 
sentences, rather than the consecutive sentences originally 
intended by the court.  Burt, 237 Wis. 2d 610, ¶¶3,4.  Because 
the circuit court took immediate steps to correct the misstated 
sentence the same day it was issued, the court of appeals held 
that the defendant's double jeopardy rights were not violated.  
Id., ¶11.  The court concluded that "a defendant's interest in 
the finality of his or her sentence is not a significant concern 
when the trial court simply corrects an error in speech in its 
pronouncement of the sentence later in the same day."  Id., ¶12.  
The court of appeals noted that the circuit court did not modify 
No. 
02-3014-CR   
 
17 
 
the sentence after reflection, but rather misspoke as to the 
intended sentence.  Id., ¶15. 
¶32 Conversely, in Willett, the court of appeals held that 
the defendant did have a legitimate expectation of finality when 
the court imposed its sentence and the defendant had begun to 
serve it.  Willett, 238 Wis. 2d 621, ¶6.  Simply because the 
court had expressed a desire to have the sentences run 
consecutively, as opposed to concurrently, when it originally 
sentenced the defendant, it did not follow that four months 
after the original sentence, the circuit court could then modify 
the concurrent sentences so that they would run consecutively.  
Id.  The court noted that the defendant had heard the circuit 
court reject the state's suggestion that the sentences should 
run consecutively.  Id.  Moreover, the court of appeals noted 
that the alleged sentencing error resulted due to the circuit 
court's incorrect understanding of the law, not because of a 
slip of the tongue.  Id.  The circuit court imposed a legally 
valid sentence, and the defendant had an expectation of finality 
in such sentence.  Id.  
¶33 In Jones, the court of appeals discussed in some 
detail the effect that DiFrancesco had on double jeopardy law. 
The court of appeals in Jones recognized that DiFrancesco did 
two very important things with respect to sentence increases and 
double jeopardy concerns.  First, DiFrancesco did away with the 
rule that a defendant's sentence could not be increased once the 
defendant 
had 
begun 
serving 
the 
sentence. 
 
Jones, 
257 
Wis. 2d 163, ¶9.  The court in Jones also acknowledged that 
No. 
02-3014-CR   
 
18 
 
DiFrancesco focused on the defendant's expectation of finality 
in his or her sentence, as a factor to be considered as to 
whether a court could subsequently modify the sentence.  Id.  
More specifically, if a defendant has a legitimate expectation 
of finality in his or her sentence, an increase in that sentence 
would violate the defendant's double jeopardy protections.  Id.  
The Jones court further noted that Wisconsin courts have long 
recognized expectation of finality in a sentence as a key 
consideration in determining whether there has been a violation 
of double jeopardy.  Id., ¶10.  The court of appeals in Jones 
stated the following: 
We, therefore, adhere to the tenet that the analytical 
touchstone for double jeopardy is the defendant's 
legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence, 
which may be influenced by many factors, such as the 
completion of the sentence, the passage of time, the 
pendency of an appeal, or the defendant's misconduct 
in obtaining sentence.   
Id. (citation omitted). 
¶34 In Jones, the defendant's misconduct in obtaining 
sentence was the relevant factor to be considered.  At 
sentencing, Jones told the court that he had been a prisoner of 
war in Vietnam, and the circuit court considered this factor 
when revising his sentence.  Id., ¶2.  In fact, Jones had never 
been a prisoner of war.  Id., ¶4.  The court of appeals 
concluded that, because the defendant had perpetrated a fraud 
upon the court at sentencing, he did not have a legitimate 
expectation of finality in his sentence.  Id., ¶14.  The factors 
set forth in Jones belie the fact that there is no immutable 
No. 
02-3014-CR   
 
19 
 
rule prohibiting sentence increases once a defendant has begun 
to serve the sentence.  Instead, the Jones factors must be 
evaluated in the light of the circumstances in each particular 
case. 
¶35 Given the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
DiFrancesco, and subsequent Wisconsin cases that relied on its 
holding, we conclude that the language in North stating that the 
due process clause acts as a bar to increasing sentences must be 
withdrawn.  The Jones decision clearly recognizes that such a 
per se rule no longer exists in Wisconsin.  Id., ¶9.  Thus, we 
conclude that the per se rule language in North, which states 
that "(m)odification to correct sentencing flaws runs afoul of 
the double jeopardy provisions when the amending court seeks to 
increase sentences already being served," must be and it is 
withdrawn.  North, 91 Wis. 2d at 509-10 (citing Benz, 282 U.S. 
at 308).  Nevertheless, we leave the remainder of the North 
decision intact, to be read in light of the factors set forth in 
Jones. 
¶36 In the case at hand, we conclude that the circuit 
court clearly intended to sentence Gruetzmacher to 40 months 
initial confinement.  This intent is plainly demonstrated in the 
record of the February 19 sentencing.  The circuit court made 
the following comments during sentencing: 
I am on 01-CF-145 going to sentence him to five 
years in the state prison system with 40 months of 
that being actual incarceration and the remaining 20 
months being extended supervision.  I believe that's 
the minimum period of incarceration that is necessary 
in a case such as that. 
No. 
02-3014-CR   
 
20 
 
 . . . . 
Take advantage of your period in prison.  I hope 
the 40 months is long enough to get you into the 
intensive alcohol treatment programs in the prison 
system.  My concern, quite frankly, is it may not be.  
That's why I, frankly, was thinking of a longer 
sentence.  Take advantage of your opportunity to 
change your life around. 
¶37 The circuit court again noted its intention at the 
March 
resentencing 
for 
Gruetzmacher 
to 
serve 
40 
months 
imprisonment.  The court stated:  "I firmly believe that 40 
months is the minimum period of confinement which is appropriate 
given Mr. Gruetzmacher's lengthy prior history and particularly 
given the violent conduct that was present on . . . three of 
these files . . . ."  The circuit court clearly expressed its 
feeling, both at sentencing and resentencing, that 40 months was 
the appropriate confinement for Gruetzmacher to serve. 
¶38 Moreover, the circuit court discovered the sentencing 
error the same day, and the parties would have reconvened that 
day if the circuit judge did not have assignments outside of the 
county.  Instead, the court notified the parties and everyone 
was back in court two days later to address the matter.  We also 
find it noteworthy that the circuit court purposely kept 
Gruetzmacher in jail, and did not send him to prison, pending 
the resentencing reset for March.  As previously noted, the 
circuit court stated "I don't want him shipped.  That's why I 
had the sheriff's department notified immediately not to ship 
him."  The circuit court clearly recognized that there had been 
a sentencing error that needed to be corrected, and it did not 
No. 
02-3014-CR   
 
21 
 
want the sheriff or the prison system acting on this erroneous 
sentence.  The fact that the justice system as a whole had not 
yet begun to act upon the circuit court's sentence is an 
important fact that bears emphasis.  Moreover, this was not a 
case where, upon mere reflection, the circuit court decided to 
increase Gruetzmacher's sentence.  Gruetzmacher's sentence was 
not increased, and the circuit court merely corrected its 
mistake, so that Gruetzmacher could serve the intended 40-month 
sentence.  Given the abovementioned considerations, we conclude 
that Gruetzmacher did not have a legitimate expectation of 
finality when sentenced in February, 2002. 
¶39 Nevertheless, we conclude that Gruetzmacher did, in 
fact, have a legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence 
imposed during resentencing in March, 2002.  After the March 
resentencing, Gruetzmacher was sent to prison, and the justice 
system as a whole was acting on the sentence handed down by the 
court.  However, when the circuit court again resentenced 
Gruetzmacher six months later in September, 2002, it made an 
error 
of 
law 
and, 
therefore, 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion.  State v. Meeks, 2003 WI 104, ¶19, 263 Wis. 2d 794, 
666 N.W.2d 859; State v. Hutnik, 39 Wis. 2d 754, 763, 159 
N.W.2d 733 (1968).  At the September resentencing, the court 
incorrectly accepted Gruetzmacher's argument that the March 
sentence had been imposed in violation of his double jeopardy 
rights.  This was an incorrect conclusion, as the sentence 
imposed in March was valid for the reasons noted earlier.  Thus, 
the court made a mistake of law when it applied the wrong legal 
No. 
02-3014-CR   
 
22 
 
test.  Because the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion when it imposed the September sentence, we reverse 
and vacate that judgment and order of the circuit court, and we 
reinstate the sentences imposed at the March resentencing. 
III 
¶40 In summary, we conclude that the circuit court acted 
appropriately in resentencing Gruetzmacher in March, in order to 
correct a sentencing error made in February.  As is evidenced by 
the statements made during sentencing, the circuit court clearly 
intended 
to 
sentence 
Gruetzmacher 
to 
40 
months 
initial 
confinement.  Gruetzmacher did not have an expectation of 
finality in regard to his initial sentencing, and, therefore, 
the sentence could be modified to correct the sentencing error.  
However, because the circuit court made an error of law in 
resentencing yet again in September, 2002, it erroneously 
exercised its discretion.  We reverse and vacate the September 
resentencing 
judgment 
and 
order 
and 
reinstate 
the 
March 
sentences.  
¶41 We further decline the State's invitation to overrule 
North.  Nevertheless, we withdraw the language in North that 
states that modification to correct sentencing errors is 
contrary to the double jeopardy provisions when the court seeks 
to increase a sentence already being served.  We emphasize that 
the remainder of North remains intact and is to be read in 
accord with the factors set forth in Jones. 
No. 
02-3014-CR   
 
23 
 
 
By the Court.—The September, 2002 judgment and order of the 
circuit court are reversed and vacated, and the sentencing 
structure imposed in March, 2002, is reinstated. 
 
¶42 DIANE S. SYKES, J., did not participate. 
 
 
 
 
No. 
02-3014-CR   
 
 
 
1