Case Title: Mills v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 484, 2005

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2006-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JASON MILLS, 
  
 
 
§ 
§ 
No. 484, 2005 
Defendant-below,  
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  
Court Below: Superior Court of the 
§ 
State of Delaware in and for 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
§ 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
I.D. No. 0403010565 
§ 
Plaintiff-below, 
 
 
§ 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
   Submitted:  January 18, 2006 
      Decided: April 17, 2006 
 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 17th day of April 2006, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties it 
appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
Defendant-Appellant, Jason Mills appeals his conviction of criminal 
impersonation and possession of a firearm and ammunition by a person prohibited 
in the Superior Court on September 9, 2005.  He was sentenced to five years of 
mandatory incarceration followed by probation.  On appeal Mills makes two 
claims.   First, he claims that the seizure leading to his arrest was unlawful.  
Second, Mills claims that the Superior Court violated his right to speedy trial.  On 
his first claim, Mills has failed to show plain error.  The second claim is much 
 
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closer.  While we express our disapproval of the delay, we find no constitutional 
violation and affirm the convictions in this case.   
(2) 
On March 12, 2004, Mills was a front-seat passenger in a vehicle 
operated by Kathleen Kienle.  New Castle Police stopped the vehicle for speeding.  
Officer Burke approached the vehicle on the passenger side and asked both Kienle 
and Mills for identification.  Mills identified himself as Clinton King and produced 
a Delaware State Identification Card in that name.  Officer Burke noticed several 
handgun brochures on the floorboard at Mills’ feet.  It appeared that Mills was 
trying to kick the brochures under the seat out of view.  A computer check revealed 
that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for Kienle.   Officer Burke arrested 
Kienle and asked Mills to step out of the vehicle.   Officer Burke questioned Mills 
about the handgun brochures, but he denied any knowledge of them.  Kienle told 
the Officer Burke that her bracelet had come lose and asked him to put it in her 
purse in the car.  Officer Burke did so and found packages of crack cocaine in her 
purse.  Mr. Kienle told Officer Burke and testified at trial that the cocaine belonged 
to Mills.  A search of the trunk of the car revealed a handgun and ammunition.  
Kienle told Officer Burke and testified at trial that she had bought the handgun and 
ammunition for Mills.   
(3) 
Mills’ first claim is that his detention and the seizure of the evidence 
were unlawful.  Mills contends that he was illegally detained at the time of the 
 
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motor vehicle stops and that the fruits of the detention should have been 
suppressed.  We review for plain error because Mills failed to raise this claim 
before the Superior Court.  Plain error review is limited to material defects that are 
apparent on the face of the record.  
(4) 
A person only has standing to challenge evidence seized as a result of 
a violation of one’s own constitutional rights.1  A person must demonstrate his own 
“legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place” before he may challenge 
the validity of a search or seizure.2  For Fourth Amendment purposes, automobiles 
are treated differently than houses.3   
(5) 
With respect to the fruits discovered as a result of Kienle’s arrest, 
Mills lacks standing to seek suppression of the evidence.  Here, the vehicle was 
driven by and registered to Kienle.  The search was incident to Kienle’s arrest.  
There is no evidence that Mills owned the vehicle or exercised control over it.  
Mills, as a passenger in the vehicle, had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
car’s trunk where the handgun and ammunition were found.4  Absent other factors 
that are not present here, any reasonable expectation of privacy in the car belongs 
to its owner or driver, but not a mere passenger.  Accordingly, Mills lacks standing 
to suppress evidence obtained from Kienle, a third party.  
                                          
 
1 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980). 
2 Wilson v. State, 812 A.2d 225 (Del. 2002) (citing to Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)).  
3 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).  
4 See Harris v. State, 806 A.2d 119 (Del. 2002).  
 
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(6) 
Mills also contends that he was illegally detained.  Specifically, Mills 
claims that there was no reasonable suspicion to detain him or to require him to 
produce identification.  While Mills has no standing with respect to the stop and 
search of the vehicle, he has standing to object to the circumstances under which 
his person was seized.  Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may order both 
the driver and the passengers of a car to exit it during the course of a valid traffic 
stop.5  During a valid investigatory stop, “the officer may ask the detainee a 
moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain 
information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicion.  But the detainee is 
not obliged to respond.”6  “[Q]uestions concerning a suspect’s identity are a 
routine and accepted part of many Terry stops.  The ability to briefly stop a 
suspect, ask questions, or check identification in the absence of probable cause 
promotes the strong government interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders 
to justice.”7  “[I]t is well established that an officer may ask a suspect to identify 
himself in the course of a Terry stop…”8  Here, the Superior Court did not plainly 
err in allowing evidence of the questions asked by the Officer.   
                                          
 
5 Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037 (Del. 2001)(citing to Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412-
14 (1997)).  
6 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984).  
7 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 186 (U.S. 2004) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
8 Id. 
 
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(7) 
Mills’ second claim is that the two continuances of trial granted to the 
State deprived Mills of his constitutional right to a speedy trial.  The standard and 
scope of review applicable to this issue is de novo because Mills filed a motion for 
a speedy trial which was denied as moot.   
(8) 
As the United States Supreme Court has observed, it is impossible to 
determine with precision when the right to a speedy trial is denied.9  Delaware 
Courts have adopted the four-part test announced in Barker v. Wingo to determine 
whether a defendant’s right to speedy trial has been violated.10   
The Barker Court held that courts should assess four factors in 
determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of the 
right to a speedy trial: (1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for the 
delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and 
(4) prejudice to the defendant.  None of the four factors is “either a 
necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the 
right of speedy trial.”  Rather they “are related factors and must be 
considered together with such other circumstances as may be 
relevant.”  Because “these factors have no talismanic qualities, courts 
must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.”  
Consequently, we will examine each factor in turn.11   
 
If, however, the length of the delay is not presumptively prejudicial, the court will 
not examine the remaining three factors.12  We will apply the test under Barker to 
Mills’ claim. 
                                          
 
9 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972).   
10 Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530).   
11 Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530) 
(citations omitted). 
12 Id. 
 
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(9) 
The first factor, length of delay, weighs in favor of Mills.  The State 
concedes that the length of delay in this case between the arrest and the start of the 
trial raises a presumption of prejudice to Mills.  The right to a speedy trial attaches 
as soon as the defendant is accused of a crime through arrest or indictment, 
whichever occurs first.13  In this uncomplicated case, Mills was arrested in March 
of 2004 but not tried until June of 2005.  Accordingly, the first factor, length of 
delay, weighs in favor of Mills. 
(10) The second factor is the reason for the delay. This Court has explained 
that different weights are assigned to different potential reasons for the delay.14  A 
deliberate attempt by the State to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense 
weighs heavily against the State.  A more benign reason for delay such as 
overcrowded courts weighs less heavily against the State.  This Court further 
explained in Middlebrook that a missing witness may justify appropriate delay and 
will not weigh against the State.15  
(11) Here, the State requested two continuances: the first time because a 
witness was unavailable, and the second because the prosecutor was in another 
trial.  The Superior Court granted both requests.  The trial date of November 
 
                                          
 
13 Id. (citing US v. Marion, 440 U.S. 307, 320 (1971)). 
14 Id. at 274 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531). 
15 Id. at (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531; Key v. State, 463 A.2d 633, 636 (Del. 1983)). 
 
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16, 2004 was postponed until March 8, 2005.  The second continuance resulted in a 
postponement of trial from March 8, 2005 until June 23, 2005. 
(12) The delay due to witness unavailability does not weigh against the 
State in this case.  However, the delay due to the prosecutor’s caseload and the 
Superior Court’s overcrowded docket does.  While the State was responsible for 
part of the delay in bringing this case to trial because of the unavailability of a 
prosecutor and the overcrowded docket, there is no evidence on the record that the 
prosecution intended to hamper the defense through deliberate delay.  On balance, 
this factor does weigh against the State, but more lightly than a deliberate delay. 
(13) The third factor, defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, is 
in equipoise and therefore neutral.  On several occasions Mills asserted his right to 
a speedy trial, but on the two occasions that actually postponed his trial, Mills did 
not assert his right to a speedy trial in opposition to the State’s requests for a 
continuance.   
(14) A defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial is of considerable 
significance in determining whether there has been a speedy trial violation.16  “If 
and when a defendant asserts his rights are factors of considerable significance in 
determining whether there has been a speedy trial violation.  Both factors are 
                                          
 
16 Id. (citing Bailey, 521 A.2d 1069, 1082 (Del. 1987)).   
 
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entitled to strong evidentiary weight.”17  The failure to assert the right will make it 
difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.18  
(15) Mills first asserted his right to speedy trial in May of 2004, two 
months after his arrest on March 13. 19  Mills again asserted his right to speedy trial 
a year later in April of 2005.  The Superior Court denied the April 2005 motion as 
moot because at that time the trial had been scheduled to take place in June of 
200520.  Finally, Mills filed pro se letters with the court requesting a speedy trial.  
Mills asserted his right to a speedy trial on several occasions, but failed to assert in 
on the two occasions when it could have affected the outcome of a scheduling 
decision.  The failure to assert his right to a speedy trial in opposition to a request 
for continuance weighs against Mills.  On balance, this factor favors neither the 
State nor Mills. 
(16) Finally, the fourth factor, prejudice to the defendant from the delay, 
weighs against Mills and tips the balance against him.  The prejudice prong is 
considered in light of the three interests of a defendant that the speedy trial right 
                                          
 
17 Bailey, 521 A.2d at 1082 (citing Whalen v. State, 492 A.2d 552, 568-69 (Del. 1985)).  Note 
that in Bailey, the Defendant was inconsistent in his desire for a speedy trial.  “When we 
examine Bailey's speedy trial motions in the context of the history of this case, i.e., the filing of 
motions, petitions, and interlocutory appeals, we conclude that Bailey made a conscientious 
choice to conduct his defense along alternative lines, some of which were mutually inconsistent 
with his announced desire to have a speedy trial.”  Id. 
18 Id. (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). 
19 Mills’ preliminary hearing was March 19, 2004.  His indictment was filed on May 17, 2004.   
20 We hold this denial to have been erroneous.  The mere fact that a trial date has been set does 
not make the application of Barker factors moot when the delay is presumptively prejudicial. 
 
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was designed to protect: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) 
minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility that 
the defense will be impaired. 21  
(17) Mills was incarcerated before trial for approximately fifteen months 
but he was also being held for other reasons, specifically an Immigration and 
Naturalization Service detainer.  Even if bail had been reduced to unsecured status, 
Mills would have remained in custody.  The delay in this case was significantly 
less than the egregious delay in Middlebrook.   There is no evidence in the record 
before us that Mills suffered undue anxiety or that his defense was in any way 
impaired.  We conclude that the fourth factor not only weighs against Mills, it also 
outweighs the two factors we have found to be in his favor.   
(18) We express our disapproval of the delay in this case and reiterate that 
the provision of a speedy trial is not only in the interest of the accused, it is in the 
public interest.22  Each case is determined on its own facts, however.  After 
engaging in the sensitive balancing process using the Barker factors, we conclude 
that Mills’ was not denied his right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 23   
                                          
 
21 Middlebrook at 276 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).  
22 Middlebrook at 273. 
23 We will not address Mills’ conclusory assertion that he was denied his right to a speedy trial 
under Article I, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution because this claim was not fully and 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                                                                                                        
fairly presented to this Court as an issue on appeal.  Ortiz v. State, 869 A.2d 285, 291 fn. 4 (Del. 
2005).