Case Title: BRUNS v. TW SERVICES, INC.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
BRUNS v. TW SERVICES, INC.2001 WY 12736 P.3d 608Case Number: 00-292Decided: 12/14/2001

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

                                                                                                
     

IN THE 
MATTER OF THE WORKER'S

COMPENSATION 
CLAIM OF:

RICHARD 
W. BRUNS, 

Appellant(Petitioner),

v.

TW 
SERVICES, INC., n/k/a

AMFAC 
PARKS AND RESORTS, 

Appellee(Employer/Respondent),

                                                                                    

and 

STATE OF 
WYOMING ex rel.

WYOMING 
WORKERS' SAFETY AND

COMPENSATION 
DIVISION, 

Appellee(Respondent).

W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b) Certification from the District Court of Park 
County

The 
Honorable Hunter Patrick, Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

George 
Lemich and Richard Beckwith of Greenhalgh, Beckwith, Lemich & Stith P.C., 
Rock Springs, Wyoming  

 Representing 
Appellee TW Services, Inc.:

            
Dick L. Kahl of Kahl Law Office, Powell, Wyoming  

 Representing 
Appellee State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Division:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald 
L. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and David L. Delicath, Assistant 
Attorney General  

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

  

            
KITE, Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant Richard 
Bruns applied for worker's compensation benefits alleging he suffered a heart 
attack caused by his work as a middle porter at Mammoth Hot Springs in 
Yellowstone National Park.1 The Division of Workers' Safety and 
Compensation (division) denied the claim.  
On appeal, the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) denied the claim 
on two grounds: (1) the claimant failed to establish his heart condition met the 
statutory requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(b) (LexisNexis 2001),2 and (2) the claimant failed to 
establish a compensable work-related injury.  The district court certified the 
petition for review to this court.  
We affirm the OAH's denial of benefits.

[¶2]      Mr. Bruns 
presents these issues:

            
I.  Whether, 
despite the law of the case, the Office of Administrative Hearings committed an 
error of law in concluding that the Workers' Compensation Division had not 
waived its objections to the compensability of Appellant's coronary condition 
under Wyo. Stat. §27-14-603(b) by its failure to state this objection in its 
Final Determination of his claim.

            
II.  Whether the conclusion of the Office of Administrative 
Hearings that the Appellant's myocardial infarction was the result of a 
pre-existing condition was supported by substantial 
evidence.

Appellee 
TW Services, Inc. frames the issues in the following 
manner:

            
1.  Was 
the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings, in applying the 
provisions of W.S. § 27-14-603(b) proper under the circumstances of this 
case?

            
2.  Irrespective of the application of W.S. § 27-14-603(b), was 
the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings in denying benefits to 
Appellant supported by substantial evidence?

Appellee 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division restates the 
issues:

            
I.  Did 
the Hearing Examiner correctly conclude that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(b) is 
applicable to Appellant's case?

            
II.  Did the Hearing Examiner correctly conclude, pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(b), that Appellant failed to prove every element of 
his claim?

            
III.  Was the Hearing Examiner's finding that Appellant's 
myocardial infarction was the result of a pre-existing condition supported by 
substantial evidence?

[¶3]      During the winter 
season of 1995-96, Mr. Bruns was employed by TW Services as a middle porter at 
its Mammoth Hot Springs facility in Yellowstone National Park.  Part of his duties included cleaning 
four outdoor hot tubs once an hour when the tubs had been used during the 
preceding hour.  This cleaning 
entailed reaching over the edge of the hot tub to the inside tub edge with the 
arm extended at approximately shoulder level and lightly scrubbing or wiping the 
scum line with a sponge.  The 
evening temperatures at this time of year averaged around zero degrees 
Fahrenheit, and the tub water temperatures were approximately 102 degrees 
Fahrenheit.

[¶4]      On the night of 
January 5, 1996, at about eleven o'clock in the evening, Mr. Bruns, who was 
fifty-one years of age, was cleaning the hot tubs when he experienced roughly 
six minutes of pain in his chest, wrist, and the right side of his jaw.  After the pain subsided, he completed 
his work shift and went home.

  

[¶5]      At six o'clock 
the next morning, Mr. Bruns was awakened by chest and jaw pain similar to the 
pain he had experienced the night before.  
He called an ambulance for transport to Livingston Memorial Hospital, 
where the emergency room physician, Dennis Noteboom, M.D., diagnosed an acute 
anterior myocardial infarction.  
In the history-and-physical-exam documentation, Dr. Noteboom noted 
Mr. Bruns was a periodic smoker and had a brother who died at the age of fifty 
due to a massive heart attack.  Mr. 
Bruns was transferred to Deaconess Medical Center in Billings, Montana, for 
further evaluation by two cardiologists.  
These physicians conducted a cardiac catheterization with bilateral 
coronary angiography and placement of stents.  Through this process, it was determined 
that Mr. Bruns had an eighty percent occlusion or blockage of the right coronary 
artery and a ninety-eight percent occlusion of the left anterior descending 
coronary artery.

[¶6]      On January 25, 
1996, Mr. Bruns filed a report of injury with the division.  In this report, he described his 
injury in the following manner:  "I 
WAS DOING HOT TUB LATE AT NIGHT AND THE TEMPERATURE WAS VERY LOW.  I WENT INTO THE ROOM & PAINS WENT 
THROUGH THE ARMS & CHEST."  In 
the employer section of the form, TW Services described the injury 
as:  "Employee experienced a 
heart attack 1/6/96 (off duty).  He 
was experiencing pains while working here and feels the cold temperature 
contributed."  In the same report, 
TW Services objected to the claim stating, "1) No injury occurred while 
working.  2) No causal connection 
between the condition under which work was performed and [Mr. Bruns'] cardiac 
condition.  3) Stress claimed is not 
clearly unusual to or abnormal for employees in this position [middle porter]  
No causative exertion."

[¶7]      The division 
issued a final determination denying the claim for benefits on February 28, 
1996.  The stated reasons were, "The 
employer has objected to this injury for the reason that the injury did not 
occur at work.  The Division is also 
objecting to this claim due to the fact that your coronary condition is 
hereditary and pre-existing."  
Objections to the determination were required to be filed by "affected 
parties" before March 25, 1996.  Mr. 
Bruns timely filed an objection, but TW Services did 
not.

[¶8]      The appeal was 
referred to the medical commission for hearing.  The certified record filed with this 
court does not contain any of the medical commission's documentation.  However, based on their briefs, the 
parties are in agreement that the medical commission heard the appeal and 
benefits were again denied.  Mr. 
Bruns appealed the medical commission's denial, and the district court 
ultimately3 held:

1.  The 
Medical Commission Hearing Panel did not have subject matter jurisdiction over 
this claim; consequently, its decision was void ab initio; 

2.  The 
procedure followed in this case pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-616 resulted in 
unconstitutional violations of due process rights by depriving the 
Employee-Claimant of his fundamental substantive right to a fair and impartial 
hearing; and, 

3.  The 
Division of Workers' Safety and Compensation waived any objection to the 
compensability of the Employee-Claimant's coronary condition pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. § 27-14-603(b) by failing to state this objection in its Final 
Determination Letter.  

The 
district court's order remanded the claim for a rehearing by the OAH on the 
objections stated in the notice of final determination.  No appeal was taken from this final 
January 11, 2000, order.

[¶9]      In April 2000, TW 
Services filed both an entry of appearance and a separate objection to the award 
of benefits with the OAH.  As the 
employer, TW Services objected to the award of benefits specifically contending 
Mr. Bruns' injury failed to meet the statutory requirements of § 
27-14-603(b).  Mr. Bruns filed a 
traverse to the objection maintaining TW Services waived its right to 
participate in the appeal by having failed to object to the final determination 
letter by March 25, 1996.  He 
further asserted the district court's order, by either the "law of the case" 
doctrine or the related theory of collateral estoppel, precluded the 
applicability of § 27-14-603(b) from being relitigated. 

[¶10]   Prior to the June 19, 2000, OAH 
rehearing, the parties stipulated to the admission of the evidence, including 
testimony in the form of written deposition.  For this reason, all the evidence was 
admitted at the commencement of the rehearing.  Mr. Bruns was excused from appearing and 
did not testify in any manner, nor were any other live witnesses called to 
testify.  Therefore, the hearing 
consisted of only oral argument by counsel as to the relevance and weight of the 
evidence, the effect of the district court's unappealed order, and, 
specifically, whether the standard of § 27-14-603(b) could be applied in light 
of that order.

[¶11]   On July 20, 2000, the 
OAH issued an Order Denying Benefits holding that, despite the district court's 
order, § 27-14-603(b) was applicable and Mr. Bruns had failed to prove his 
coronary condition met the statutory requirements.  The OAH further concluded, although the 
evidence demonstrated Mr. Bruns' underlying coronary condition predisposed him 
to an acute event, it did not establish the hot tub cleaning activity caused his 
myocardial infarction.  Therefore, 
even if § 27-14-603(b) was not applied, Mr. Bruns did not meet his burden to 
prove the injury was work related.  
Mr. Bruns filed a petition for review of the administrative decision 
which the district court certified to this court.  

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶12]   An employee-claimant in a worker's 
compensation case has the burden to prove all the statutory elements which 
comprise a compensable injury by a preponderance of the evidence.  Hanks v. City of Casper, 2001 WY 
4, ¶6, 16 P.3d 710, ¶6 (Wyo. 2001); Sherwin-Williams Company v. Borchert, 
994 P.2d 959, 963 (Wyo. 2000); Thornberg v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division, 913 P.2d 863, 866 (Wyo. 1996).  This includes establishing the cause of 
the condition for which compensation is claimed and proving that the injury 
arose out of and in the course of employment.  Wesaw v. Quality Maintenance, 
2001 WY 17, ¶10, 19 P.3d 500, ¶10 (Wyo. 2001); Hanks, ¶6; State ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division v. Espinoza, 924 P.2d 979, 981 
(Wyo. 1996).  Put another way, the 
claimant has the burden of following procedures and rules contained within the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act in order to establish entitlement to worker's 
compensation benefits.  
Sherwin-Williams Company, 994 P.2d  at 963; Pittman v. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 917 P.2d 614, 617 (Wyo. 
1996).  

[¶13]   To meet the preponderance standard, 
the claimant must present evidence which leads the trier of fact to find that 
the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its 
non-existence.  Sherwin-Williams 
Company, 994 P.2d  at 963.  The 
evidence is not to be liberally construed in a claimant's favor when determining 
whether an injured worker has met that burden of proof.  Johnson v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 2001 WY 48, ¶9, 23 P.3d 32, ¶9 
(Wyo. 2001);  Ikenberry v. State 
ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 5 P.3d 799, 809 (Wyo. 
2000).

[¶14]   We review a hearing examiner's 
decision that a claimant has failed to meet the burden of proof under the 
"[a]rbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law" standard mandated in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A) (LexisNexis 
2001).  Hamilton v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 2001 WY 20, ¶9, 18 P.3d 637, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001).  The appealing 
complainant has the burden to prove arbitrary administrative action.  Id.  The agency, as fact finder, is charged 
with weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of witnesses.  Id.  Hence, the deference normally accorded 
to the trial court's findings of fact is extended to the administrative agency, 
and the agency's decision as to the facts will not be overturned unless it is 
clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.  Id.  To the extent this case presents 
determinations of questions of law, it is well settled that such rulings are 
reviewed de novo.  Sheth v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division, 11 P.3d 375, 378 (Wyo. 2000); State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Division v. Wright, 983 P.2d 1227, 1231 (Wyo. 1999); Pohl v. 
Bailey Company, 980 P.2d 816, 819 (Wyo. 1999).

DISCUSSION

A.        
Application of § 27-14-603(b)

[¶15]   Mr. Bruns asserts that the OAH 
erred on rehearing by applying the coronary condition provisions of § 
27-14-603(b) to evaluate his injury because the district court's order  precluded consideration of the statutory 
standard pursuant to the "law of the case" and collateral estoppel.  Although the propriety of the district 
court's order is not at issue herein, its effect on the subsequent rehearing is 
relevant.  

[¶16]   Of significance, the district court 
concluded the medical commission hearing panel did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction over Mr. Bruns' claim.  
Subject matter jurisdiction is the authority to hear and decide cases of 
the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.  Amoco Production Company v. Wyoming 
State Board of Equalization, 7 P.3d 900, 904 (Wyo. 2000); see also 
Weller v. Weller, 960 P.2d 493, 495 (Wyo. 1998); Lacey v. Lacey, 
925 P.2d 237, 238 (Wyo. 1996); Fuller v. State, 568 P.2d 900, 902-03 
(Wyo. 1977).  The 
subject-matter-jurisdiction requirement is equally applicable to courts and 
administrative agencies.  Amoco 
Production Company, 7 P.3d  at 904; see also Wright, 983 P.2d  at 
1231.  Consequently, the district 
court found the medical commission did not have the proper authority to hear and 
decide Mr. Bruns' claim. 

[¶17]   The district court's order further 
provided the medical commission's decision was void ab initio due to the 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  
The expression "ab initio" is defined as meaning: "From the 
beginning; from the first act; from the inception."  Black's Law Dictionary 6 (6th ed. 1990).  The effect of the district court's 
ruling was that the medical commission's decision was void from its 
inception.  We have previously 
acknowledged:

"A void 
judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to, and is attended by none of 
the consequences of, a valid adjudication.  
Indeed, a void judgment need not be recognized by anyone, but may be 
entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is 
sought to be given to it.  It has no 
legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose . . . ." 46 
Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 31 (1994).

Thomas 
v. Thomas, 983 P.2d 717, 720 (Wyo. 1999).  "All 
orders arising from a void judgment are invalid."  Ruwart v. Wagner, 880 P.2d 586, 
591 (Wyo. 1994); see also Wunnicke v. Leith, 61 Wyo. 191, 157 P.2d 274, 278 (1945).  Further, a void 
judgment is not res judicata.  
Ferriter v. Estate of Blaney, 607 P.2d 354, 357 (Wyo. 
1980).

[¶18]   "Where the judgment below was 
rendered without jurisdiction, an appellate court must ordinarily reverse and 
remand for dismissal.  Indeed, such 
a judgment cannot be reversed on the merits, because the decision below is 
void."  5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate 
Review § 814 at 473 (1995).  
Further, the appellate court must dismiss an appeal of a void decision 
because, through attribution, the appellate court also lacks jurisdiction.  Id. at § 
864.

[¶19]   The district court's order left the 
parties in the same positions they held prior to the proceeding before the 
medical commission.  KAC v. SR 
(Paternal Rights of TLB), 771 P.2d 811, 813 (Wyo. 1989).  Whether or not this decision was correct 
is not at issue here as it was never appealed.  Rather, we simply recognize its 
conclusive result.  Due to the nullifying effect of this 
holding, the district court's further determinations4 can only be viewed as advisory, not 
binding, in nature, including the conclusion that the division waived objection 
to the compensability of Mr. Bruns' coronary condition pursuant to § 
27-14-603(b) by failing to state this objection in its final determination 
letter.  This holding could not 
control the parties' actions on rehearing.  
The district court, having determined the medical commission lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction, likewise lacked jurisdiction to issue decisions as 
to the merits of the underlying claim.  
Accordingly, the parties were returned to the positions they held prior 
to the medical commission proceedings.  

[¶20]   Mr. Bruns has vigorously argued 
that the "law of the case" and/or the related theories of collateral estoppel 
and res judicata precluded consideration of § 27-14-603(b) on 
rehearing.

The "law 
of the case" doctrine stands for the proposition that a court's decision on an 
issue of law made at one stage of a case becomes a binding precedent to be 
followed in successive stages of the same litigation.  This doctrine is designed to avoid 
repetitious litigation and to promote consistent decision making; thus, it is 
related to res judicata, collateral estoppel and stare 
decisis.  Usually the "law of 
the case" doctrine requires a district court to adhere to its prior rulings, 
adhere to the rulings of an appellate court, or adhere to another judge's 
rulings in the same case or a closely related case.  

Lyden By 
and Through Lyden v. Winer, 913 P.2d 451, 454 (Wyo. 1996) (citations omitted); see also Triton Coal 
Company v. Husman, Inc., 846 P.2d 664, 667 (Wyo. 1993).  In this matter, the definitive "law of 
the case" was the district court's determinations that the medical commission 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction and its decision was void ab 
initio.  This result is 
inescapable.  The district court's 
ruling eclipsed its own jurisdiction to further consider the merits of the 
appeal, and, as stated before, a void judgment is not res judicata.  Am. Jur. 2d, supra at § 864; 
Ferriter, 607 P.2d  at 357.  Neither the district court's advisory 
pronouncements nor the "law of the case" and related doctrines precluded 
application of § 27-14-603(b) on rehearing.  Due to the manner of the remand, the 
parties were returned to their original positions as of the February 28, 1996, 
final determination notice.

[¶21]   In light of these circumstances, we 
must determine whether the OAH properly considered § 27-14-603(b) on rehearing. 

We have 
previously held that issues not given in the Division's "Final Determination" 
letter can be raised in pleadings such as disclosure statements. In Matter of 
Workers' Compensation Claim of Ireland v. State ex[] rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Comp. Div., 998 P.2d 398, 401 (Wyo. 2000).  Ireland also ruled that 
"[p]leadings are used to give parties notice of the nature of claims and 
defenses, to narrow the issues, and to guide the parties and the court in the 
conduct of the case.  If the 
pleadings and notice of hearing are to mean anything in a contested case 
hearing, the hearing examiner must be limited to considering only those issues 
presented in the notice and pleadings."  
Id. (citation omitted).

Wesaw, 
¶20.  The issue we must decide is 
whether § 27-14-603(b) was raised in any of the pleadings filed subsequent to 
the remand order.  To do so, we have 
to resolve an initial issue regarding TW Services' participation in the remand 
proceedings.  

[¶22]   Mr. Bruns has asserted that TW 
Services failed to file an objection to the final determination notice by the 
original deadline of March 25, 1996, and, therefore, was prevented from 
participating in the hearing on remand.  
This contention lacks merit.  
TW Services did object to the award on the original claim form and 
prevailed to the extent benefits were denied.  It was not thereafter compelled to file 
an objection to the final determination denying benefits.  Mr. Bruns seems to suggest, when 
employers object to an award and the benefits are denied, to remain a proper 
party, they must file further "objections"5 to the final determination even 
though they agree with the end result.  
Such a requirement encourages the filing of needless "objections" to all 
final determinations to ensure employers have a place at the table if, through 
complex proceedings or otherwise, they ultimately find they need one.  It could also be interpreted to mean 
claimants must file "objections" to all final determinations even when benefits 
are granted consistent with their applications in order to retain party 
status.  Such a requirement would 
inevitably waste considerable resources and produce little, if any, benefit to 
the process of determining proper compensation for injured 
workers.

[¶23]   TW Services appropriately filed an 
objection to Mr. Bruns' application for benefits alleging the claimed injury 
failed to meet the coronary condition requirements of § 27-14-603(b).  This objection, duly served on Mr. 
Bruns' attorney, constituted a pleading as contemplated by Ireland v. State 
ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 998 P.2d 398 (Wyo. 
2000).  Subsequently, Mr. Bruns 
filed a traverse to the objection demonstrating 
actual notice that TW Services intended to litigate the issue.  These pleadings gave the parties 
manifest notice of the nature of claims and defenses, permitted the issues to be 
narrowed, and guided all concerned in the conduct of the case.  Wesaw, ¶20.  Mr. Bruns received adequate notice of 
the § 27-14-603(b) objection to permit his informed response at the 
rehearing.  Therefore, we conclude 
the OAH appropriately applied § 27-14-603(b) on rehearing.  In so holding, we do not imply the final 
determination provided insufficient notice to Mr. Bruns that § 27-14-603(b) was 
at issue.  Rather, it is unnecessary 
to address this question because Mr. Bruns had actual notice through the 
pleadings filed by TW Services.

B.        
Burden of Proof

[¶24]   There is no dispute that Mr. Bruns 
experienced a myocardial infarction.  
The only remaining questions are whether Mr. Bruns met his burden under § 
27-14-603(b) and whether the OAH's decision to deny benefits was arbitrary and 
capricious.  The statutory standard 
for employment-related coronary conditions6 requires the employee establish by 
competent medical authority that 

(i)  There 
is a direct causal connection between the condition under which the work was 
performed and the cardiac condition; 
and

(ii)  The 
causative exertion occurs during the actual period of employment stress clearly 
unusual to or abnormal for employees in that particular employment, irrespective 
of whether the employment stress is unusual to or abnormal for the individual 
employee; and

(iii)  The 
acute symptoms of the cardiac condition are clearly manifested not later than 
four (4) hours after the alleged causative exertion.

Section 
27-14-603(b) (emphasis added).  The 
statute unequivocally requires the claimant prove the injury meets all three 
elements in order to qualify for benefits.  The evidence in the case was distinctly 
sparse.  Mr. Bruns did not testify, 
and the record contains no explanation for his absence.  His only statements are found in his 
original claim form and his letter requesting a hearing.  The only testimony received was in the 
form of depositions of two witnessesDr. Noteboom, the emergency room physician 
who treated Mr. Bruns on the morning of his heart attack; and Mr. Bruns' 
supervisor, who testified regarding the normal work duties of a middle 
porter.  In addition, there were 
medical records from both Livingston Memorial Hospital and Deaconess Medical 
Center.  

[¶25]   Upon review of both the hearing 
examiner's numerous and detailed findings and the record, it is evident that the 
OAH's Order Denying Benefits provides a thorough and accurate appraisal of the 
evidence as submitted.  The order 
succinctly summarizes the key findings and conclusions which sustain the 
principal determination that the requirements of § 27-14-603(b) were not 
met as follows:

30.  Bruns 
has failed to meet his burden as imposed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(b) (LEXIS 
1995).  There is no evidence that 
Bruns experienced an actual period of employment stress clearly unusual 
to, or abnormal for middle porters.  
In fact all the evidence establishes that he was doing the same work in 
the same conditions as all other porters.  
Bruns has failed to establish there was a causative exertion which 
resulted in the acute event.  Dr. 
Noteboom opined that Bruns' work effort while scrubbing the hot tubs was the 
causative effort which caused the acute event.  However, Dr. Noteboom did not know or 
could not quantify the work effort exerted while cleaning hot tubs.  Bruns' supervisor was familiar with the 
work effort required in cleaning the hot tubs and she indicated it was a wiping 
motion while using a sponge.  Lastly 
Bruns has failed to establish the acute symptoms of the coronary condition 
manifested within four hours of the work effort.  There is evidence that Bruns experienced 
pain while working about 11:00 p.m.  
However, this pain lasted about six minutes, went away and Bruns went 
home.  Some seven hours later, about 
6:00 a.m., Bruns awoke experiencing severe chest pains which went away, returned 
and were then unrelenting.  When 
treated at the emergency room around 8:30 a.m. he was experiencing a myocardial 
infarction.

This is 
a fair appraisal of the evidence which was provided to the OAH.  The findings are not clearly contrary to 
the overwhelming weight of the evidence and therefore are accorded due 
deference.  Hamilton, 
¶9.  

[¶26]   Dr. Noteboom's letter dated March 
14, 1996, to the division was the only evidence which even arguably supported 
Mr. Bruns' request for benefits.  
Dr. Noteboom summarily concluded that the work Mr. Bruns had undertaken 
that night caused the heart attack without a full understanding of the physical 
requirements of the work activity.  
The hearing examiner, as the trier of fact, had the authority to weigh 
that opinion against the remaining evidence and to conclude it was not 
adequately supported by facts.  
Everheart v. S & L Industrial, 957 P.2d 847, 852 (Wyo. 1998); 
see also Krause v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division, 803 P.2d 81, 83 (Wyo. 1990).  
Clearly, this is what occurred.  
We cannot conclude on the basis of the record that the hearing examiner 
abused his discretion in determining Mr. Bruns' injury failed to qualify for 
benefits.

[¶27]   We note with approval that the 
OAH's decision went further to evaluate whether Mr. Bruns met his burden of 
proof on the general issue of compensability.  Evidently, this was done in the event it 
was found on appeal § 27-14-603(b) was not applicable.  Analysis of this portion of the OAH's 
decision is unnecessary, but we commend the thoroughness and the substantial 
judicial economy the approach promotes.

[¶28]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1The duties of the middle porter included 
the indoor and outdoor activities of cleaning the public restrooms, the hot tub 
cabins, and the hot tubs, vacuuming hallways, and dusting.  The position is also referred to at 
various points of the record as a "mid-porter."

2Section 27-14-603(b) 
provides:

(b)  Benefits for 
employment-related coronary conditions except those directly and solely caused 
by an injury, are not payable unless the employee establishes by competent 
medical authority that:

(i)  There is a direct causal 
connection between the condition under which the work was performed and the 
cardiac condition; and

(ii)  The causative exertion 
occurs during the actual period of employment stress clearly unusual to or 
abnormal for employees in that particular employment, irrespective of whether 
the employment stress is unusual to or abnormal for the individual employee; 
and

(iii)  The acute symptoms of 
the cardiac condition are clearly manifested not later than four (4) hours after 
the alleged causative exertion.

            

3Prior to issuing its decision, the 
district court certified two questions of law to this court. We declined to 
answer, concluding an initial determination by the district court was 
appropriate.  The questions, as 
framed in the district court's order of certification, are set out 
below:

1.  Whether the enabling 
statute creating the Medical Commission, Wyoming Statute § 27-14-616 (1991 
& Supp. 1996), and the Regular Rules of the Medical Commission result in 
unconstitutional violations of substantive due process rights by depriving the 
Employee-Claimant of his fundamental liberty interest to a fa[i]r and impartial 
hearing.

2.  Whether the Division 
of Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation waived any objection to the 
compensability of the Employee-Claimant's coronary condition under Wyoming 
Statute § 27-14-603(b) (1977) by its failure to state this objection in its 
notice to the Employee-Claimant of the Final Determination of his 
claim.

See Wyoming Supreme Court Docket No. 
97-366, Notice of Declination to Answer Certified Questions, filed January 7, 
1998. 

4Although somewhat redundant, we restate 
the district court's further conclusions to facilitate the reading of this 
opinion:

2.  The procedure followed 
in this case pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-616 resulted in unconstitutional 
violations of due process rights by depriving the Employee-Claimant of his 
fundamental substantive right to a fair and impartial hearing; and, 

3.  The Division of 
Workers' Safety and Compensation waived any objection to the compensability of 
the Employee-Claimant's coronary condition pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-603(b) 
by failing to state this objection in its Final Determination Letter.  

5We note the term "objection" is 
something of an oxymoron in this circumstance where what actually would be filed 
is more along the line of an "affirmative-objection."  This observation merely underlines the 
futile character of such an artificial requirement.

6Employment-related coronary conditions 
directly and solely caused by an injury are excepted from these provisions.  Section 
27-14-603(b).