Case Title: Ex parte Donna McKinney and Marlin McKinney. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Gilberto Sanchez v. Donna McKinney and Marlin McKinney)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1090904

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2011-05-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:05/26/2011
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
_________________________
1090904
_________________________
Ex parte Donna McKinney and Marlin McKinney
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Gilberto Sanchez
v.
Donna McKinney and Marlin McKinney)
(Elmore Circuit Court, CV-09-900268)
PER CURIAM.
Marlin McKinney and Donna McKinney, the defendants below,
filed this petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an order
directing the Elmore Circuit Court to dismiss the ejectment
1090904
2
and 
unlawful-detainer 
claims of Gilberto Sanchez, the
respondent here and the plaintiff below, and to grant the
McKinneys' motion to vacate the trial court's pretrial order
on the ground that Sanchez lacked standing.  The McKinneys
further seek the return of moneys paid by them to Sanchez
pursuant to the allegedly void pretrial order.  We grant the
petition and issue the writ.
Facts and Procedural History
This case arises from a complex factual scenario
contrived by the parties in an attempt to circumvent Alabama's
homebuilders licensure statute.  See § 34-14A-1 et seq., Ala.
Code 1975.  According to their petition, on January 15, 2005,
the McKinneys entered into an oral contract with Sanchez
relating to the purchase by Sanchez of a parcel of real
property located in Elmore County.  Sanchez, an unlicensed
contractor, was to construct a residence on the property for
the McKinneys.  Also according to the petition, on or around
April 21, 2005, Sanchez, the McKinneys' former long-term
personal physician, purchased property located in Titus on
behalf of the McKinneys, who had selected that particular
parcel of property as the site for the planned construction of
1090904
Another paragraph in the real-estate-sales agreement
1
specified that the transaction was to be closed within 30 days
of the execution of the agreement unless extended by separate
agreement.
3
a primary residence.  In October 2005, pending completion of
their planned primary residence on the parcel purchased by
Sanchez, the McKinneys "took possession" of the property when
they moved into a guest house that had been constructed on the
property.
On March 1, 2006, the parties entered into a real-estate-
sales agreement pursuant to which Sanchez agreed to sell the
McKinneys the Titus property for a purchase price of $168,000.
The agreement reflected that the McKinneys had previously paid
$32,000 of the contract price and that the remaining balance
of $136,000 was due at closing, which, the contract specified,
was to occur within three weeks of the execution date of the
agreement.  The transaction was never completed, and the
1
closing never occurred.  The McKinneys contend that the
planned closing never occurred because, they allege, Sanchez
discontinued construction of the residence and has refused to
resume construction because he has been unable to obtain a
higher purchase price for the property from the McKinneys.
They further assert that, as a result of Sanchez's alleged
1090904
4
lack of skill and knowledge of homebuilding, "approximately
one-half of the main residence had to be demolished and
rebuilt by a competent construction company."  (Petition, at
p. 3.)
Sanchez's brief in response to the McKinneys' petition
does indicate that he purchased the property and that he
subsequently entered into a real-estate-sales agreement with
the McKinneys pursuant to which the McKinneys would purchase
the property from him.  Sanchez, however, contends that there
is nothing to indicate that the McKinneys ever fulfilled the
terms of that agreement. In fact, Sanchez identifies in his
brief a second real-estate-sales agreement, which he says the
parties executed on June 14, 2006, and which was contingent
upon, as was the first agreement, the McKinneys' obtaining the
necessary financing to cover the  purchase price, which had
been raised to $220,000, and upon closing "as soon as
possible."  Sanchez maintains that there is also nothing in
the materials before us to indicate that the second scheduled
closing ever occurred.  In fact, he contends that the
McKinneys 
failed 
to 
close on 
either real-estate-sales
agreement.
1090904
"'A bond for title is a conditional
2
contract for the sale of land whereby the
vendor covenants to make title to the
vendee upon payment of the purchase price.'
J. Thaddeus Salmon, Comment, Bonds for
Title in Alabama, 3 Ala.L.Rev. 327, 327
(1951). A bond for title is an executory
contract for the sale of land which creates
an equitable mortgage on the land. Id. at
328."
Hicks v. Dunn, 622 So. 2d 914, 915 n.1 (Ala. 1993).
The McKinneys in their petition maintain that the
3
purported signature of Donna McKinney on the bond-for-title
agreement is an obvious forgery despite an accompanying notary
acknowledgment.  The McKinneys also contend that, as a result
of his incapacity from grief and medication taken in an
attempt to cope with the murder of the McKinneys' daughter in
June 2007, Marlin McKinney has no recollection of either
seeing or signing the bond-for-title agreement. 
5
Both parties acknowledge that, in July 2007, Sanchez
executed a $268,000 note secured by a mortgage on the property
in favor of Regions Bank d/b/a Regions Mortgage ("Regions").
Thereafter, on September 14, 2007, Sanchez and the McKinneys
entered in a bond-for-title  agreement whereby Sanchez once
2
again agreed to sell the property to the McKinneys –- this
time for a purchase price of $240,000.   According to Sanchez,
3
at the time of this third agreement, he disclosed to the
McKinneys "that the property was or [might] be subject to a
mortgage."  (Sanchez's response, at p. 3.)  In fact, the bond-
1090904
6
for-title agreement specifically provided that the McKinneys,
as purchasers, granted Sanchez "the express authority to
mortgage, finance, etc. the property subject hereto in any
amount not exceeding $300,000.00."  The bond-for-title
agreement also stated that it was not to be recorded and that,
if a mortgage holder were to become aware of Sanchez's
agreement with the McKinneys and, as a result, any mortgage
balance was accelerated, the McKinneys would be liable for the
outstanding mortgage indebtedness.  
With regard to the McKinneys' interest in the property,
the bond-for-title agreement states, in part, as follows:
"[The McKinneys] understand[] that in the event
that [the McKinneys] do[] not comply with the
provisions in this Bond for Title, [Sanchez] has the
option to declare [the McKinneys] in violation of
this Bond for Title and, in such case, any right
[the McKinneys] may have under this Bond for Title
will terminate and end.
"The parties hereto agree and understand that
the execution of this agreement and the performance
of the provisions herein by the respective parties
does not create in the [McKinneys] any legal or
beneficial interest in the property and [the
McKinneys] shall not have any such interest until a
deed is executed by [Sanchez] or [Sanchez's] assigns
and is delivered to [the McKinneys]."
The bond-for-title agreement also specifically provides that,
if the McKinneys fail to timely pay any of the installment
1090904
7
payments due under the bond for title or to comply with any
other term of that agreement, 
"[Sanchez] shall have the right to annul [the]
agreement, and ... the [McKinneys] shall then become
the tenant[s] of [Sanchez], and [Sanchez] shall be
entitled to the immediate possession of said
property described herein, and may take possession
thereof, and may eject the [McKinneys] by an action
of unlawful detainer or any other legal proceeding,
and shall retain all the monies paid under this
agreement by the [McKinneys] as rent of the premises
...." 
On September 1, 2009, Sanchez commenced the underlying
action in the Elmore Circuit Court alleging a claim of
unlawful detainer and seeking ejectment.  In his complaint,
Sanchez contended that the McKinneys had defaulted under the
payment terms of the bond-for-title agreement; that they were
in arrears in the amount of $42,264.72; and that Sanchez had
terminated the McKinneys' right to possession by written
notice. 
 
The 
McKinneys 
answered, 
asserting 
numerous
affirmative defenses and also asserting that Sanchez lacked
standing.  Additionally, the McKinneys asserted counterclaims
alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, fraud,
negligence or wantonness, breach of fiduciary duty, and abuse
1090904
The McKinneys' counterclaim also includes a claim of
4
respondeat superior related to the notarization of the alleged
forged signature of Donna McKinney on the bond-for-title
agreement by Farley Pugh, allegedly an employee of Sanchez's.
See supra note 3.  
8
of 
a 
confidential 
relationship 
and 
seeking 
specific
performance.   
4
On November 18, 2009, following a hearing regarding
Sanchez's emergency motion to determine the McKinneys' right
to continued possession of the property, the trial court
entered an order allowing the McKinneys to remain in
possession of the property but ordering that they make the
monthly mortgage payments on Sanchez's mortgage in the amount
of $2,616.45.  Specifically, the trial court ordered that the
McKinneys were to make mortgage payments for the following
months:  November 2009, December 2009, January 2010, and
February 2010.  The trial court's order scheduled trial for
February 18, 2010.  
On January 7, 2010, Sanchez's counsel moved that the
trial setting be continued, alleging scheduling conflicts and
the need for additional discovery/preparation.  The trial
court rescheduled the trial for April 2010.  On March 1, 2010,
Sanchez filed a motion seeking to extend the trial court's
1090904
9
November 2009 order, in which he asserted that the McKinneys
remained in possession of the property and requested that the
trial court order the McKinneys to continue making the monthly
mortgage payments on the property until the rescheduled trial
date in April 2010.  In their response, the McKinneys argued,
among other things, that "principles of equity" required that
Sanchez's request be denied because the trial date was
continued at his sole request and because Sanchez was not
using the remitted moneys to satisfy the monthly mortgage
payments. The McKinneys further argued that the original
pretrial order in which they were first ordered to make the
mortgage payments was void for want of subject-matter
jurisdiction and thus could not be extended.  
On March 2, 2010, the trial court entered an order
requiring the McKinneys "to continue satisfying the $2,616.45
monthly mortgage payment on the subject property pending
further Order of [the] Court." On that same date, the
McKinneys filed their first motion seeking to dismiss
Sanchez's 
action 
based 
on 
a 
lack 
of 
subject-matter
jurisdiction.  Thereafter, the McKinneys filed both an
emergency motion to stay and a separate motion requesting that
1090904
10
the trial court vacate its March 2, 2010, order. Specifically,
in their motion to vacate, the McKinneys noted that, in his
motion seeking a continuance, Sanchez failed to request that
the trial court extend its previous pretrial order requiring
that the McKinneys make the mortgage payments.  The trial
court denied the motion to vacate; however, nothing in the
materials before us suggests that the trial court ever ruled
on the McKinneys' dismissal motion.
On March 30, 2010, the McKinneys filed a second motion
requesting that the trial court dismiss Sanchez's ejectment
and unlawful-detainer claims.  In their renewed motion and
accompanying brief, the McKinneys again argued that, because
Sanchez purportedly lacked standing, the trial court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims.  The McKinneys'
assertions regarding Sanchez's alleged lack of standing were
based on the McKinneys' contentions that Sanchez did not hold
either legal or equitable title to the subject property,
which, under Alabama law, is required to pursue an ejectment
action, or have the necessary possessory interest in the
property to maintain an action for unlawful detainer.  As a
final matter, the McKinneys argued that the district court,
1090904
See Ex parte Flint Constr. Co., 775 So. 2d 805, 808 (Ala.
5
2000) ("[A] lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised
at any time, and ... the question of subject-matter
jurisdiction is reviewable by a petition for a writ of
mandamus."). 
11
not the circuit court, was vested with original jurisdiction
of 
all 
actions 
asserting 
an 
unlawful-detainer 
claim.
According to the case-action summary, the trial court has
taken "no action" on the McKinneys' renewed motion to dismiss.
The McKinneys subsequently filed this petition for a writ
of mandamus,  and this Court entered an order staying all
5
proceedings 
in 
the 
Elmore 
Circuit 
Court 
pending 
our
disposition of the petition. 
Standard of Review
"A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy,
and is appropriate when the petitioner can show (1)
a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court."
Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001).
Discussion
I.
The substantive question presented by the McKinneys'
petition is whether the trial court lacks subject-matter
1090904
"Ejectment may be maintained on proof of title carrying,
6
as an element of ownership, a right to possession and
enjoyment. Unlawful detainer is a penal action, summary in
character, specifically designed to oust a hold-over tenant."
Lane v. Henderson, 232 Ala. 122, 124, 167 So. 270, 271 (1936).
12
jurisdiction over Sanchez's complaint seeking ejectment and
asserting an unlawful-detainer claim. Specifically, the
McKinneys contend that Sanchez lacked the necessary standing
to commence the action seeking ejectment, thereby depriving
the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction.  They further
argue that original jurisdiction of an action claiming
unlawful detainer lies in district court and not in the
circuit court.
Initially, we note that Sanchez's abbreviated complaint
does not set out individual counts asserting separate
ejectment and unlawful-detainer claims,  and, because of our
6
resolution of this matter, we do not pass on the potential
merits of either purported claim.  Instead, we conclude, for
the reasons discussed below, that the trial court erred in
refusing to dismiss the action. 
A.  Ejectment Action
The McKinneys initially argue that Sanchez does not own
legal title to the subject property and is not in possession
1090904
13
of the property.  Either title or possession, they contend, is
essential to possess the requisite standing to maintain an
ejectment action.  They further argue that, as a result of
Sanchez's mortgage of the property to Regions, Sanchez is the
holder of equitable title to the property while Regions holds
legal title and that Regions is, thus, the sole party capable
of pursuing a claim for ejectment.  In support of this claim,
the McKinneys cite Shannon v. Long, 180 Ala. 128, 60 So. 273
(1912), in which this Court stated: "When the holder of an
equitable title, only, to land, is out of possession, he
cannot maintain an action of ejectment to oust the actual
possessor of the land ...."  180 Ala. at 135, 60 So. at 276.
In his answer in opposition to the McKinneys' petition,
and as evidence that he possesses the requisite standing to
pursue the underlying civil action, Sanchez relies on the
April 21, 2005, deed transferring title of the subject
property to him and on the real-estate mortgage, which he
executed on the subject property in favor of Regions.  Sanchez
also responds by citing the circuit court's jurisdictional
requirements pertaining to the amount in controversy in civil
actions.  See § 12-11-30(1).  Sanchez further cites the two
1090904
14
real-estate-sales agreements mentioned above and contends
that, as a result of the subsequent bond-for-title agreement,
his complaint is governed by the Alabama Uniform Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act.  See § 35-9A-101 et seq., Ala. Code
1975.  
It is well established that, 
"[i]n order to maintain an action for ejectment, a
plaintiff must allege either possession or legal
title, and the 'action must be commenced in the name
of the real owner of the land or in the name of the
person 
entitled 
to 
possession 
thereof....' 
§
6-6-280, Ala. Code 1975; see Morris v. Yancey, 267
Ala. 657, 659, 104 So. 2d 553, 555 (1958)('to
authorize the recovery by the plaintiff, it must be
made to appear by the evidence that plaintiff, at
the commencement of the suit, had the legal title to
the land sued for'); Douglass v. Jones, 628 So. 2d
940, 941 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993)(beneficiary of will
lacked standing to maintain ejectment because title
of property remained with estate)."
Cadle Co. v. Shabani, 950 So. 2d 277, 279 (Ala. 2006)
(emphasis added).  See also McCary v. Crumpton, 267 Ala. 484,
487, 103 So. 2d 714, 716 (1958) ("[T]he plaintiff, to recover
in ejectment, must have title when he files his suit, and also
at the time of trial ....").
Sanchez does not allege in his ejectment complaint that
he holds title to the subject property or that he is in actual
possession of the property.  See § 6-6-280, Ala. Code 1975
1090904
15
("[T]he complaint [in an ejectment action] is sufficient if it
alleges that the plaintiff was possessed of the premises or
has the legal title thereto ... and that the defendant entered
thereupon and unlawfully withholds and detains the same.");
Atlas Subsidiaries of Fla., Inc. v. Kornegay, 288 Ala. 599,
601, 264 So. 2d 158, 161 (1972) (noting that a statutory
action 
in 
the 
nature 
of 
ejectment 
exists 
under 
two
alternatives: "The first such alternative is where the
complaint alleges that the plaintiff was possessed of the
premises and the defendant entered thereupon and unlawfully
withholds and detains the same. The other alternative is where
the complaint alleges that the plaintiff has the legal title
to the lands and the defendant entered thereupon and
unlawfully withholds and detains the same.").  Instead, in
that pleading, Sanchez merely "demands the right to possession
from the [McKinneys]."  Although the deed attached to
Sanchez's brief does, in fact, indicate that Sanchez holds
record title to the property, the property is indisputably
subject to a mortgage in favor of Regions.  Such mortgage
deprives Sanchez of legal title to the property.
"This Court generally defined the property
interests created by a mortgage in Trauner v.
1090904
16
Lowrey, 369 So. 2d 531, 534 (Ala. 1979), stating:
'Alabama classifies itself as a "title" state with
regard to mortgages. Execution of a mortgage passes
legal title to the mortgagee.' See Foster v. Hudson,
437 So. 2d 528 (Ala. 1983); First Nat'l Bank of
Mobile v. Gilbert Imported Hardwoods, Inc., 398 So.
2d 258 (Ala. 1981); Jones v. Butler, 286 Ala. 69,
237 So. 2d 460 (1970); McCary v. Crumpton, 267 Ala.
484, 103 So. 2d 714 (1958); Garst v. Johnson, 251
Ala. 291, 37 So. 2d 183 (1948); and Mallory v. Agee,
226 Ala. 596, 147 So. 881 (1932). See also §
35-10-26, Ala. Code 1975."
Bolte v. Robertson, 941 So. 2d 920, 925 (Ala. 2006).  See also
Jones v. Butler, 286 Ala. 69, 71, 237 So. 2d 460, 462 (1970)
("The execution and delivery by appellee of her note and
mortgage to Burchwell & Company conveyed to said mortgagee
appellee's legal title to the property subject to the
conditions of said mortgage."); McCary, 267 Ala. at 487, 103
So. 2d at 716 ("A mortgage on real estate passes to the
mortgagee a fee-simple title, unless otherwise expressly
limited.").
By executing a mortgage on the subject property, Sanchez,
the mortgagor, conveyed legal title to Regions, the mortgagee.
Because the loan had not been repaid in full at the time this
petition was filed, Regions retained the right, title, and
interest to the property.  See  § 35-10-26, Ala. Code 1975
(stating both that "[t]he payment or satisfaction of the real
1090904
Sanchez does not argue that Cadle was wrongly decided or
7
that it is due to be overruled.  We have previously recognized
that our appellate courts were occasionally guilty of
"'blurr[ing]'" the lines between the distinct concepts of
standing and real party in interest.  Ex parte Sterilite Corp.
of Alabama, 837 So. 2d 815, 819 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Battle v.
Alpha Chem. & Paper Co., 770 So. 2d 626, 634 (Ala. Civ. App.
2000), citing in turn Cooks v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 695 So.
2d 19 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996), overruled by Ex parte Moore, 793
So. 2d 762 (Ala. 2000)).  See also Hamm v. Norfolk Southern
Ry., 52 So. 3d 484, 499 (Ala. 2010) (Lyons, J., concurring
specially) ("condemn[ing] loose usage of the term 'standing'"
where the issue should be whether the action is being
prosecuted by the real party in interest).  However, this
17
property mortgage debt divests the title passing by the
mortgage" and that "'[p]ayment or satisfaction of the real
property mortgage debt' shall not occur until there is no
outstanding indebtedness").  We further note that it is
undisputed that, following their move onto the subject
property in October 2005, the McKinneys have remained in
possession of the  property.  In fact, as the McKinneys note
in their petition, there is nothing to suggest that Sanchez
has ever actually physically possessed the property in any
respect.  Because Sanchez is unable to demonstrate that, at
the time he filed the underlying ejectment action, he had
either legal title to or actual possession of the subject
property, under the authority of Cadle he lacks the standing
necessary to prosecute his ejectment claim.  
7
1090904
Court has long recognized a disinclination to overrule
existing caselaw in the absence of either a specific request
to do so or an adequate argument asking that we do so.  Clay
Kilgore Constr., Inc. v. Buchalter/Grant, L.L.C., 949 So. 2d
893, 898 (Ala. 2006) (noting the absence of a specific request
by the appellant to overrule existing authority and stating
that, "[e]ven if we would be amenable to such a request, we
are not inclined to abandon precedent without a specific
invitation to do so").  Although our cases indicate that we
may, ex mero motu, address "jurisdictional issues," see, e.g.,
Crutcher v. Williams, 12 So. 3d 631, 635 (Ala. 2008), we
generally do so in cases involving the lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Id.  See also Blevins v. Hillwood Office Ctr.
Owners' Ass'n, 51 So. 3d 317, 322 (Ala. 2010) (holding that
"just because the Court is duty bound to notice the absence of
subject-matter jurisdiction, it does not follow that it is so
bound to construct theories and search the record for facts to
support the existence of jurisdiction for plaintiffs who
choose to stand mute in the face of a serious jurisdictional
challenge").     
18
B.  Unlawful-Detainer Claim
With regard to the unlawful-detainer claim asserted by
Sanchez, as set out above, the McKinneys argue in their
petition that original jurisdiction over an unlawful-detainer
action lies exclusively in the district court of the county in
which the property lies.  
"By 
statute, 
original 
jurisdiction 
over
unlawful-detainer actions lies in the district
courts. § 6-6-330, Ala. Code 1975 ('The forcible
entry upon and detainer, or the unlawful detainer,
of lands, tenements and hereditaments is cognizable
before the district court of the county in which the
offense is committed.'). A circuit court may not
exercise jurisdiction over an unlawful-detainer
action until the district court has adjudicated the
1090904
19
unlawful-detainer action and one of the parties has
appealed to the circuit court. See § 6-6-350, Ala.
Code 1975 ('Any party may appeal from a judgment
entered against him or her [in an unlawful-detainer
action] by a district court to the circuit court at
any time within seven days after the entry thereof,
and [the] appeal and the proceedings thereon shall
in all respects, except as provided in this article,
be governed by this code relating to appeal from
district courts.')."
Darby v. Schley, 8 So. 3d 1011, 1013 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008). 
The limited materials before us indicate that Sanchez
initiated the underlying civil action in the Elmore Circuit
Court.  There is nothing in the case-action summary indicating
that the Elmore District Court had previously adjudicated
Sanchez's unlawful-detainer claim or that Sanchez's filing in
the circuit court represented the permitted appeal from such
an adjudication. Further, there is no challenge to the
correctness of Darby, and the trial court had no discretion in
the instant case not to comply with its dictates.  Therefore,
because the Elmore District Court had not adjudicated
Sanchez's unlawful-detainer claim, the Elmore Circuit Court
lacked jurisdiction over that claim, and any purported order
it entered in the underlying unlawful-detainer action is void.
Id.  
II.
1090904
20
The McKinneys further assert in their petition that,
because the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, it
is incapable of enforcing its pretrial order requiring the
McKinneys to continue making Sanchez's mortgage payments and
that the payments they have made pursuant to that order must
be returned.
"Standing is '"'[t]he requisite personal interest
that 
must 
exist 
at 
the 
commencement 
of 
the
litigation.'"' Pharmacia Corp. v. Suggs, 932 So. 2d
95, 98 (Ala. 2005)(quoting In re Allison G., 276
Conn. 146, 156, 883 A.2d 1226, 1231 (2005), quoting
in turn H. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication:
The Who and When, 82 Yale L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973)).
'When a party without standing purports to commence
an 
action, 
the 
trial 
court 
acquires 
no
subject-matter jurisdiction.' State v. Property at
2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Ala.
1999). ... 
"When 
the 
absence 
of 
subject-matter 
jurisdiction
is noticed by, or pointed out to, the trial court,
that court has no jurisdiction to entertain further
motions or pleadings in the case. It can do nothing
but dismiss the action forthwith. '"Any other action
taken by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction
is null and void."'  Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d at
1029 (quoting Beach v. Director of Revenue, 934
S.W.2d 315, 318 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996))."
Cadle Co., 4 So. 3d at 462-63.  See also Crutcher v. Williams,
12 So. 3d 631, 635 (Ala. 2008) ("A court is obligated to
vigilantly protect against deciding cases over which it has no
jurisdiction ....").  According to the precedents cited by the
1090904
21
McKinneys, Sanchez lacked possession of, or legal title to,
the subject property; he had no standing to pursue the
ejectment action; and the trial court had no subject-matter
jurisdiction.  See State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive,
740 So. 2d 1025, 1029 (Ala. 1999) ("Because the City had no
standing, the trial court had no subject-matter jurisdiction,
and, consequently, no alternative but to dismiss the action.
See Beach v. Director of Revenue, 934 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1996) ('Lacking subject matter jurisdiction [a court] may
take no action other than to exercise its power to dismiss the
action.... Any other action taken by a court lacking subject
matter jurisdiction is null and void.').").  Thus, all actions
taken and every order entered in this matter are void, and the
trial court must dismiss Sanchez's action and the McKinney's
counterclaims.  2018 Rainbow Drive, supra.  
Finally, the McKinneys cite no authority showing that the
trial court--which lacks subject-matter jurisdiction--has the
power to order the return of the payments; therefore, the
McKinneys have not met their burden of establishing a clear
legal right to that particular relief, and we deny their
petition in that respect.    
1090904
22
Conclusion
We grant the McKinneys' petition in part and direct the
trial court to dismiss the action.
PETITION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; WRIT ISSUED.
Woodall, Stuart, Parker, Main, and Wise, JJ., concur.  
Shaw and Bolin, JJ., concur specially.  
Cobb, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
Murdock, J., dissents.  
1090904
23
SHAW, Justice (concurring specially).
Donna McKinney and Marlin McKinney argued to the trial
court that under Cadle Co. v. Shabani, 950 So. 2d 277, 279
(Ala. 2006), the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain
Gilberto Sanchez's ejectment action and that, under Darby v.
Schley, 8 So. 3d 1011, 1013 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008), it had no
jurisdiction to entertain the unlawful-detainer action.  These
two cases stand for those two propositions.  The trial court
had no discretion to deviate from those precedents.  
In their petition for a writ of mandamus, the McKinneys
again argue that these precedents deny the trial court
jurisdiction.  Sanchez does not argue that Cadle or Darby were
wrongly decided, and he does not argue that they should be
overruled.  As the main opinion notes, in Blevins v. Hillwood
Office Center Owners' Ass'n, 51 So. 3d 317, 323 (Ala. 2010),
this Court held that when a party "'choose[]s to stand mute
in the face of a serious jurisdictional challenge'" we will
not "'construct theories and search the record for facts to
support the existence of jurisdiction.'"      So. 3d at     n.
7.  This maxim of judicial restraint is well founded:
"'[W]hen the parties have not provided sufficient
legal or factual justification for this Court's
1090904
24
jurisdiction, this Court is not obligated to embark
on its own expedition beyond the parties' arguments
in pursuit of a reason to exercise jurisdiction. The
burden of establishing the existence of subject-
matter jurisdiction falls on the party invoking that
jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Ex parte HealthSouth
Corp., 974 So. 2d 288 (Ala. 2007) (setting forth the
plaintiff's burden of demonstrating standing to
bring 
an 
action, 
an 
issue 
of 
subject-matter
jurisdiction); ... Ex parte Ray-El, 911 So. 2d 1100,
1104 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (placing the burden to
"'justify the jurisdiction of this court'" on the
person bringing a habeas petition as a "next friend"
(quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 164,
110 S. Ct. 1717, 109 L. Ed. 2d 135 (1990))); cf.
Bush v. Laggo Props., L.L.C., 784 So. 2d 1063, 1065
(Ala. Civ. App. 2000) ("Once a party challenges the
trial 
court's 
jurisdiction, 
pursuant 
to 
Rule
12(b)(1), 
[Ala. 
R. 
Civ. 
P.,] 
the 
burden 
of
establishing jurisdiction is on the plaintiff."
(citing Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d
507 (5th Cir. 1980))).'"
Blevins, 51 So. 3d at 322 (quoting Crutcher v. Williams, 12
So. 3d 631, 635-36 (Ala. 2008)).
The McKinneys cite caselaw that clearly holds that the
trial court had no jurisdiction.  Sanchez's response does not
refute the applicability of those decisions and certainly does
not argue that those decisions should be overruled.  We need
not cast aside the doctrine of stare decisis, the rule stated
in Blevins and Crutcher, or the countless other decisions that
hold that this Court will not overrule precedents unless asked
to do so, especially when there has been no argument for such
1090904
25
a result.  The philosophy of judicial restraint and the
doctrine of stare decisis strongly counsel against this
Court's overruling those precedents in the absence of a proper
challenge and thorough briefing of the issues presented.
Bolin, J., concurs.
1090904
26
COBB, Chief Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
When this Court decided Cadle Co. v. Shabani, 4 So. 3d
460 (Ala. 2008), Justice Murdock wrote a powerful
dissent.  See Cadle, 4 So. 3d at 463 (Murdock, J.,
dissenting).  I concurred in the result in Cadle, with the
following special writing:
"Under other circumstances, I would find
Justice Murdock's dissent persuasive, particularly
with respect to the savings in judicial resources
that 
would 
be 
effected 
if 
the 
filing 
and
prosecution of an entirely new legal action could
be avoided. However, under the circumstances of
this case, it does not appear to me that the
jurisdictional impediment first noted in Cadle Co.
v. Shabani, 950 So. 2d 277 (Ala. 2006), was ever
removed. Accordingly, I concur in the result."
4 So. 3d at 463 (Cobb, C.J., concurring in the result).
I cannot concur with the Court's decision to continue
to unnecessarily curtail the jurisdiction of the courts of
this State by continuing to rely on Cadle, which was wrongly
decided, merely because we did not receive an invitation to
overrule the case.  Why should this Court perpetuate the
confusion that it caused?  We should remedy the "blurring"
noted in note 7 of the main opinion and overrule Cadle ex
meru motu.
1090904
27
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the Court's
holding that Gilberto Sanchez lacks standing to prosecute
his claim for ejectment. In all other respects, I concur. 
1090904
28
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
I.
Our courts too often have treated as a matter of
subject-matter jurisdiction that which does not go to the
fundamental authority of the courts to decide a case.  I
believe 
this 
Court 
should, 
today, 
"clear 
up" 
the
"'"blur[ring]"' [of] the lines" between such "distinct
concepts" as "standing and real party in interest" of which
the main opinion acknowledges our appellate courts have been
"occasionally guilty."  ___ So. 3d at ____ n.7.  We should
not perpetuate in yet another case the confusion as to the
issue of standing and, in turn, subject-matter jurisdiction
that this Court has created in recent years in cases such as
Cadle Co. v. Shabani, 950 So. 2d 277, 279 (Ala. 2006)
("Cadle I"), upon which the main opinion relies, and Cadle
Co. v.  Shabani, 4 So.  3d 460, 463 (Ala.  2008) ("Cadle
II").  See generally Hamm v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 52 So. 3d
484, 499 (Ala.  2010) (Lyons, J., concurring specially "to
condemn loose usage of the term 'standing'" in our cases and
observing 
that 
because 
"[s]tanding 
implicates 
subject-matter
jurisdiction," 
"[i]mprecision 
in 
labeling 
a 
party's
1090904
29
inability to proceed as a standing problem unnecessarily
expands the universe of cases lacking in subject-matter
jurisdiction"); Ex parte Green, [Ms. 1071195, April 9, 2010]
___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2010) (Murdock, J., writing
specially) ("[O]ur courts have on occasion referred in
jurisdictional terms to that which does not in fact go to
the fundamental authority of the court to decide a case."
(citing 13A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward
H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure:  Jurisdiction §
3531 (3d ed. 2008)).
There are actually three distinct categories of issues
that can arise in a case such as this and that our appellate
courts too often have confused:
(1)
Standing; 
(2)
Real party in interest;
(3)
An alleged cause of action not recognized in our law or
a failure of the plaintiff to satisfy one of the
elements of a cognizable cause of action.
The first issue, standing, goes to whether a party has
a sufficient "personal stake" in the outcome and whether
there is sufficient "adverseness" that we can say there is
a "case or controversy." 
1090904
30
"Standing goes to the existence of sufficient
adversariness 
to 
satisfy 
both 
Article 
III
case-or-controversy requirements and prudential
concerns.  In determining standing, the nature of
the injury asserted is relevant to determine the
existence of the required personal stake and
concrete adverseness."
13A Federal Practice & Procedure § 3531.6.  
Although the Alabama Constitution does not have the same
Article 
III 
language 
as 
is 
found 
in 
the 
Federal
Constitution, this Court has held that Section 139(a) of the
Alabama Constitution limits the judicial power of our courts
to "cases and controversies" and to "concrete controversies
between adverse parties."  As Justice Lyons has stated:  
"Standing is properly limited to circumstances
stemming from lack of justiciability.  A plaintiff
must be so situated that he or she will bring the
requisite adverseness to the proceeding.  A
plaintiff must also have a direct stake in the
outcome so as to prevent litigation, initiated by
an interested bystander with an agenda, having an
adverse impact on those whose rights are directly
implicated.  See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54,
61-62, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986).
"Much of the precedent in the area of standing
comes 
from 
federal 
courts 
subject 
to 
the
case-or-controversy requirement of Article III of
the United States Constitution. Of course, we do
not have a case-or-controversy requirement in the
Alabama Constitution of 1901, but our concepts of
justiciability are not substantially dissimilar.
See Pharmacia Corp. v. Suggs, 932 So. 2d 95 (Ala.
2005), where this Court, after noting the absence
1090904
31
of 
a 
case-or-controversy 
requirement 
in 
our
Constitution, observed:
"'We have construed Art. VI, § 139,
Ala. Const. of 1901 (as amended by amend.
no. 328, § 6.01, vesting the judicial
power in the Unified Judicial System), to
vest this Court "with a limited judicial
power that entails the special competence
to 
decide 
discrete 
cases 
and
controversies 
involving 
particular
parties and specific facts."  Alabama
Power Co. v. Citizens of Alabama, 740 So.
2d 
371, 
381 
(Ala. 
1999). 
See 
also
Copeland v. Jefferson County, 284 Ala.
558, 226 So. 2d 385 (1969) (courts decide
only 
concrete 
controversies 
between
adverse parties).'"
Hamm, 52 So. 3d at 500 (Lyons, J., concurring specially).
Clearly, even under the majority's view of the elements of
an ejectment action, see discussion, infra, Gilbert Sanchez
has a personal stake in the outcome of this case and the
requisite adverseness to make this a "case or controversy."
A second issue that can arise is whether the plaintiff
is the "real party in interest."  See Rule 17(a), Ala. R.
Civ. P.  A party may be sufficiently adverse and in a
position to be affected by the outcome of the litigation,
and thus have standing, but not be the real party in
interest.  See, e.g., Hamm, supra.  See also Ex parte
Regions Fin. Corp., [Ms. 1090425, Sept. 30, 2010] ___ So. 3d
1090904
32
___, 
___, 
(Ala. 
2010) 
(Murdock, 
J., 
dissenting 
and
juxtaposing a real-party-in-interest issue with a standing
issue).  
"The 
confusion 
of 
standing 
with
real-party-in-interest 
concepts 
may 
have
unfortunate consequences.  A focus on standing may
lead 
a 
court 
to 
refuse 
application 
of 
the
ameliorating rules that enable substitution of the
real party in interest when the wrong plaintiff
filed the action." 
13A Federal Practice & Procedure § 3531.
The author of this Court's opinion in Cadle I was
Justice Lyons.  As already noted, Justice Lyons more
recently concluded that there has been, and recently wrote
specially in a case "to condemn[,] loose usage of the term
'standing' in our cases."  Hamm, 52 So. 3d at 499 (Lyons,
J., concurring specially).  Justice Lyons aptly observed in
Hamm:
"Rule 17(a) allows an action to proceed after
an objection is made based on the absence of the
real party in interest if curative steps are taken.
Obviously, an absence of a real party in interest
does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction or
the sole remedy would be dismissal, as opposed to
countenancing curative measures.  If we allow
instances of the want of a real party in interest
to be swallowed up by an erroneously expansive
definition 
of 
standing, 
we 
will 
effectively
eliminate 
any 
field 
of 
operation 
for 
the
1090904
33
aforementioned feature of Rule 17(a) allowing the
defect to be cured.
"....
"If 
we 
limit 
standing 
to 
issues 
of
justiciability 
as 
defined 
above, 
thereby
significantly reducing the occasion for concerns
over subject-matter jurisdiction, the problem in
this case is properly viewed as an issue of real
party in interest for which Rule 17(a), Ala. R.
Civ. P., offers a remedy.  In this proceeding we
have no concerns over adverseness nor do we have a
meddlesome bystander at the helm as of the
commencement of the action. Viewed from this
perspective, 
no 
problem 
of 
absence 
of
subject-matter jurisdiction is presented."
52 So. 3d at 500 (Lyons, J., concurring specially).
The 
third 
category 
of 
potential 
issues 
includes
situations in which the plaintiff has attempted to allege a
cause of action that the law of Alabama does not recognize
or has failed to satisfy one of the elements of a cause of
action that is cognizable under our law.  As this Court
recently observed:  "[O]ur courts too often have fallen into
the trap of treating as an issue of 'standing' that which is
merely a failure to state a cognizable cause of action or
legal theory, or a failure to satisfy the injury element of
a cause of action."  Wyeth, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Alabama, 42 So.3d 1216, 1219 (Ala. 2010).  Compare Steele
1090904
34
v. Federal Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, [Ms. 1091441, Dec. 3, 2010]
___ So. 3d ___, ___ n.2 (Ala. 2010) (citing Wyeth as
authority for rejecting the appellant's suggestion that a
plaintiff's failure to have made a demand for possession
before bringing an ejectment action presented an issue of
standing).
"The question whether the law recognizes the
cause of action stated by a plaintiff is frequently
transformed into inappropriate standing terms. The
[United States] Supreme Court has stated succinctly
that the cause-of-action question is not a question
of standing."
13A Federal Practice & Procedure § 3531 (noting, however,
that the United States Supreme Court, itself, has on
occasion "succumbed to the temptation to mingle these
questions").
In an analysis that appears to me to govern the present
case, this Court observed in Wyeth:
"In the present case, Wyeth appears to argue that
the plaintiff, BCBSAL, lacks standing because,
Wyeth says, BCBSAL's allegations, even if true,
would not entitle it to a recovery.  In responding
to a similar argument, the court in Angleton v.
Pierce, 574 F. Supp. 719, 726 (D.N.J. 1983),
articulated 
a 
correct 
understanding 
of 
the
aforestated difference between the issue of a
plaintiff's standing and the issue of the viability
of a plaintiff's cause of action:
1090904
Although referred to in the statute as "an action in the
8
nature of an action of ejectment," see § 6-6-280(a), Ala. Code
1975, "[t]he alternate form of action prescribed in subsection
(b) [of § 6-6-280] is, in effect, an action of ejectment as at
common law, only stripped of the cumbersome forms and fictions
which are characteristic of that form of action."  MacMillan
Bloedell, Inc. v. Ezell, 475 So. 2d 493, 496 (Ala. 1985).
35
"'Associates 
appears 
to 
argue 
that
plaintiffs lack standing because they
have no legal right to the relief they
seek. Associates has confused standing
with failure to state a claim.  The two
are conceptually distinct:  when standing
is at issue, the court asks whether the
plaintiffs are the proper parties to
bring the action, whereas failure to
state a claim focuses not on the parties
but on the existence of a cause of action
(i.e., 
on 
the 
merits). 
 
Kirby 
v.
Department of HUD, 675 F.2d 60, 63-64 (3d
Cir. 1982); Bowman v. Wilson, 672 F.2d
1145, 1151 n. 10 (3d Cir. 1982).'
"Thus, the focus of an inquiry into standing
is not on the viability of the legal theory
asserted; rather, the focus is on whether the
plaintiff is the 'proper part[y] to bring the
action.'  If the legal theory itself is not a
viable one under applicable law, that is a
different question.  The question whether the right
asserted by BCBSAL is an enforceable one in the
first place, i.e., whether BCBSAL has seized upon
a 
legal 
theory 
our 
law 
accepts, 
is 
a
cause-of-action issue, not a standing issue."
42 So. 3d at 1220 (emphasis omitted).
By the same token, the question whether the action in
the nature of an action of ejectment  asserted by Sanchez is
8
1090904
36
a viable one under our law if it is based merely on a claim
to the right to possession (rather than current physical
possession), i.e., whether the legal theory upon which the
trial court based its judgment in favor of Sanchez is a
legal theory our law accepts, is "a cause-of-action issue,
not a standing issue."  Id.  Regardless of the resolution of
this cause-of-action issue, Sanchez has the necessary
"personal stake and concrete adverseness" to bring this
action.  In other words, the issue before us is one that
falls in the third of the three aforesaid categories; it is
not a standing issue. 
Sanchez purchased and received fee-simple title to the
property at issue.  He thereby acquired legal and equitable
title to the property.  He mortgaged the property,
transferring legal title to Regions Bank.  He alleges,
however, that he retained an equitable interest in the
property.  In this context, Sanchez clearly is sufficiently
adverse to the parties in actual physical possession of the
property to give him standing to assert a right to receive
rents and/or possession of the property.  It seems equally
clear that he is the real party in interest to assert the
1090904
As I explain later, see discussion, infra, I disagree
9
that the elements of an ejectment claim are as stated in the
main opinion; therefore, I would disagree with a holding that
Sanchez's claim should fail on this basis.
37
rights he asserts.  Under the view of the elements of
ejectment embraced in the main opinion, however, because
Sanchez is not in current actual possession of the property,
his claim for ejectment would fail for lack of one of the
elements of an ejectment action.  Compare Ex parte Green,
___ So. 3d at ___ (Murdock, J., writing specially and
expressing disagreement with the conclusion in the main
opinion that a failure to prove the peaceable possession
required under § 6-6-560, Ala. Code 1975, deprives the
circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction, suggesting
instead that "such a failure simply means that a plaintiff
has failed to prove a necessary element for recovery under
that statute").    
9
This Court has the authority to address ex mero motu,
and routinely has addressed ex mero motu, the issue of
subject-matter jurisdiction.  The main opinion declines to
address the question whether this case truly falls in the
category of cases in which the plaintiff lacks standing and
in which, therefore, the court has no subject-matter
1090904
38
jurisdiction.  It does so on the ground that Sanchez has not
asked this Court to overrule this Court's holding in Cadle
I, see ___ So. 3d at ___ n.7, in which this Court held
(wrongly in my view) that the plaintiff lacked standing.  As
I indicated at the outset, however, I believe there are
compelling reasons for this Court to alleviate in this case
the confusion over standing and subject-matter jurisdiction,
on the one hand, and real-party-in-interest issues and
failure to satisfy cause-of-action elements, on the other
hand.  As Chief Justice Cobb notes in her special writing,
this Court created the confusion that exists as to this
issue.  This Court should clear it up at its earliest
opportunity.
Also, although Sanchez has not specifically requested
that this Court overrule Cadle I, Sanchez does take the
position in his brief to this Court that he has standing, a
position that would necessarily require an overruling of
Cadle I in the view of the main opinion.  It is difficult
for me to fault Sanchez, who, after all, was the prevailing
party in the trial court, for not making a more specific
argument in this regard in light of this Court's own
1090904
To the extent that the impediment to this Court's
10
correctly addressing the issue of its own jurisdiction in the
present case might be viewed as a lack of adequate briefing,
I believe it would be preferable to ask for supplemental
briefs on this issue rather than to perpetuate what I believe
to be an error of our own making concerning an issue of
subject-matter jurisdiction. 
39
erroneous and indiscriminate references to standing over the
years.
 
10
Moreover, it is important to observe that it is the
McKinneys, not this Court, who have raised the issue of
subject-matter jurisdiction for our consideration.  The
McKinneys, as petitioners, specifically invoke this Court's
decision in Cadle II as their first stated ground for relief
from the trial court's judgment.  By refusing to grant the
petitioners the relief they request in this regard, we would
merely be refusing to apply our own wrongly decided
precedent 
concerning 
an 
issue 
of 
subject-matter
jurisdiction. Recognizing that precedent as having been
wrongly decided would be consistent not only with the fact
that 
we 
deal 
here 
with 
an 
issue 
of 
subject-matter
jurisdiction, but also with the principle that we generally
uphold the decision of a trial court if we may do so on any
valid legal ground, even one not presented to us by an
1090904
40
appellee or, in this case, a "respondent."  Although, as a
general rule, there may be some degree of difference in the
compulsion we feel to address an issue of subject-matter
jurisdiction when the result is a finding of the presence of
jurisdiction rather than the absence of jurisdiction, see
Blevins v. Hillwood Office Center Owners' Ass'n, 51 So. 3d
317 (Ala. 2010), relied upon in note 7 of the main opinion,
___ So.  3d at ___, the main opinion does not dispute that
we have the "inherent power" and discretion to address the
issue of subject-matter jurisdiction in either situation.
In light of the confusion this Court has generated as to the
issue of standing and subject-matter jurisdiction in cases
such as the one the petitioner requests that we apply today
in order to overturn a trial court's judgment, and in light
of the fact that the doctrine of stare decisis is a
principle of policy designed to ensure stability in the law
and not an inexorable  command, I believe we have an added
measure of responsibility to reject that request.  
The confusion caused by this Court on the issues of
standing and subject-matter jurisdiction has in large
measure been caused in cases where this Court raised these
1090904
I further question whether the Court today acts
11
consistently with its own approach to the issue of the trial
court's jurisdiction.  Specifically, I refer to the holding in
the penultimate paragraph of the main opinion that the trial
court lacks the power to order the return of certain payments
made by the McKinneys to Sanchez.  The payments in question
were made only because they were ordered by the trial court in
the first place, the same trial court that is today held not
to have had jurisdiction of this case.  I question the
suggestion in the main opinion that the trial court (and this
Court) would not have the authority to remedy the effects of
a void order and require the return of payments the trial
court is today held not to have had authority to order in the
first place.  There may be other considerations that would
make such an order impractical or contrary to equitable
considerations, but those are not the basis upon which the
main opinion decides this issue.
41
issues on its own motion.  Accordingly, I think it entirely
fitting for this Court to act on its own motion to alleviate
this confusion at its earliest opportunity, which is now
this case.  I would reject the invitation of the petitioners
to overturn a trial court's judgment based upon a subject-
matter-jurisdiction precedent that I believe would not hold
up under further scrutiny by this Court.
 
11
II.
Even if the view of standing embraced in the main
opinion was correct, the application of that view in the
main opinion is dependent upon an expression of the elements
of an action for ejectment that I believe is incorrect.  I
1090904
42
therefore conclude that the holding of the main opinion
today is based upon an error within an error.
Although some cases speak of an action for ejectment
requiring a showing that the plaintiff has legal title or
"possession," the reference to possession can only be
understood as either loose language or language that is
convenient in a given case because the plaintiff happens to
have actual possession.  In Cadle I itself, although this
Court stated that, "[i]n order to maintain an action for
ejectment, a plaintiff must allege either possession or
legal title," the Court correctly quoted § 6-6-280 as
providing that an action must be commenced "'in the name of
the real owner of the land or in the name of the person
entitled to possession thereof.'"  950 So. 2d at 279
(emphasis added).  As this Court explained in MacMillan
Bloedell, Inc. v. Ezell, 475 So. 2d 493, 496-97 (Ala. 1985):
"[I]t remains incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove a right
to possession at the time of the commencement of the
action."  (Emphasis added.)  See also Gholson v. Watson, 495
So. 2d 593, 597 (Ala. 1986) (noting "that plaintiffs did not
1090904
Indeed, is it not oxymoronic to posit that a claimant
12
seeking to recover possession of land from another must allege
43
have the right of immediate possession, which is the
gravamen of an ejectment action"  (emphasis added)).
The main opinion itself quotes Lane v. Henderson, 232
Ala. 122, 124, 167 So. 270, 271 (1936), for the principle
that "'[e]jectment may be maintained on proof of title
carrying, as an element of ownership, a right to possession
and enjoyment. Unlawful detainer is a penal action, summary
in character, specifically designed to oust a hold-over
tenant.'"  ___ So. 3d at ___ n.6 (emphasis added).  Under
the expression of the elements of an action in the nature of
ejectment embraced by the main opinion, however, the
thousands of landowners in this State who have purchased
property, transferred by way of a mortgage deed the legal
title to the property to a bank or other lender, given
current, physical possession of the property to a tenant,
and retained for themselves only a nonpossessory, equitable
interest in the property would have no right to bring an
action for ejectment against the tenant if the tenant
refuses to surrender actual possession of the property
following the expiration or termination of a lease.
 
12
1090904
and prove that he or she already has possession of the land?
Consistent with an affirmative answer to this rhetorical
question, in MacMillan Bloedell, Inc., supra, this Court
further noted that "[t]he plaintiff may allege and prove that
he either has the legal title to, or was possessed of, the
land and that the defendant entered thereupon and unlawfully
withholds and detains it."  475 So. 2d at 497 (emphasis
added).   
44
Sanchez purchased the property and acquired legal and
equitable title to it before mortgaging the property and
transferring legal title to Regions Bank.  He still claims
an equitable interest in the property and, accordingly,
claims a right to immediate possession of the land as
against someone who, as he alleges here, "unlawfully
withholds and detains the same."  Accordingly, even if one
were to treat the issue presented as one of standing, a
proper recognition of the elements of the cause of action
asserted by Sanchez would lead to the conclusion that he did
have standing to assert that cause.
III.
I also am compelled to dissent from the holding of the
Court today  -— the first ever holding by this Court to this
effect -— that a circuit court does not have original
jurisdiction over an unlawful-detainer action.  The only
authority relied upon by the main opinion for the aforesaid
1090904
Section 6-6-330 states in its entirety:
13
45
conclusion is Darby v. Schley, 8 So. 3d 1011, 1013 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2008).  As a decision of the Court of Civil
Appeals, the decision in Darby does not constitute a
precedent that binds this Court for purposes of the doctrine
of stare decisis. 
 
Moreover, the question presented in Darby was different
than the question presented here.  In Darby, the question
presented was whether the district court in that case had
erred in transferring an unlawful-detainer action to the
circuit court "'under the mandate of Alabama Code [1975],
§ 12-11-9.'"  8 So. 3d at 1013 (quoting the district court's
order).  Section 12-11-9, Ala.  Code 1975, provides that a
judge of the district court where a case is filed must
transfer that case to the circuit court if that case is
"within the exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit court."
(Emphasis added.)
The Court of Civil Appeals in Darby correctly cited
§ 6-6-330, Ala.  Code 1975, for the proposition that an
unlawful-detainer action "'is cognizable before the district
court,'"
 and § 6-6-350, Ala.  Code 1975, for the
13
1090904
"The forcible entry upon and detainer, or the
unlawful 
detainer, 
of 
lands, 
tenements 
and
hereditaments is cognizable before the district
court of the county in which the offense is
committed."
Section 6-6-350 merely authorizes appeals from the
14
district court to the circuit court.  In pertinent part,
§ 6-6-350 states:
"Any party may appeal from a judgment entered
against him or her by a district court to the
circuit court at any time within seven days after
the entry thereof, and appeal and the proceedings
thereon shall in all respects, except as provided in
this article, be governed by this code relating to
appeal from district courts."
This provision is, of course, a reiteration of the general
rule, see  § 12-11-30(3), Ala. Code 1975 ("The circuit court
shall have appellate jurisdiction of civil, criminal, and
juvenile cases in district court and prosecutions for
ordinance violations in municipal courts, except in cases in
which direct appeal to the Courts of Civil or Criminal Appeals
is provided by law or rule."), and § 12-12-71, Ala. Code 1975
("Except as provided in Section 12-12-72 and in subsection (e)
of Section 12-15-120, all appeals from final judgments of the
district court shall be to the circuit court for trial de
novo."), except with respect to the seven-day time limit for
appeals, compare § 12-12-70 (providing for a general 14-day
period to appeal to a circuit court from the judgment of a
district court).
46
proposition that a party may appeal to the appropriate
circuit court from a judgment entered against him or her in
an unlawful-detainer action by a district court.
  8 So. 3d
14
at 1013.  From these two statutes, the Court of Civil
Appeals reached the conclusion that the transfer was
1090904
47
improper.  In so doing, however, that court did not limit
its reasoning to the fact that an unlawful-detainer action
is not exclusively within the original jurisdiction of the
circuit court (as is obvious from § 6-6-330).  The court
went further and asserted that an unlawful-detainer action
is not within the original jurisdiction of a circuit court
at all.  Without citing any authority, the court asserted
that "a circuit court may not exercise jurisdiction over an
unlawful-detainer action until the district court has
adjudicated the unlawful-detainer action and one of the
parties has appealed to the circuit court."  8 So. 3d at
1013.  I question this conclusion in two respects.  
First, the conclusion of the Court of Civil Appeals in
Darby does not follow from the two statutory provisions
cited by that court as its only authority for that
conclusion.  It is true that § 6-6-330 does give the
district court original jurisdiction over unlawful-detainer
actions.  Nothing in the language of that statute, however,
gives the district court exclusive original jurisdiction
over unlawful-detainer actions.  The district courts and the
circuit courts generally have concurrent jurisdiction
1090904
Section 12-11-30(1), Ala. Code 1975, provides that
15
"[t]he 
circuit 
court 
shall 
have 
exclusive 
original
jurisdiction of all civil actions in which the matter in
controversy exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000), exclusive
of 
interest 
and 
costs, 
and 
shall 
exercise 
original
jurisdiction concurrent with the district court in all civil
actions in which the matter in controversy exceeds three
thousand dollars ($3,000), exclusive of interest and costs."
(Emphasis added.)  Section 12-11-30(3) provides as a general
rule 
that 
"[t]he 
circuit 
court 
shall 
have 
appellate
jurisdiction of civil, criminal, and juvenile cases in
district court ...."  
The Alabama Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act,
Ala. Code 1975, § 35-9A-101 et seq., confirms the concurrent
jurisdiction of the district and circuit courts as to eviction
actions brought under its provisions:  "District courts and
circuit courts, according to their respective established
jurisdictions, shall have jurisdiction over eviction actions,
and venue shall lie in the county in which the leased property
is located."  Ala. Code 1975, § 35-9A-461(b).  
 
48
(subject 
to 
restrictions 
relating 
to 
the 
amount 
in
controversy) as to many forms of civil actions, with there
being a right of appeal to the circuit court from a judgment
of a district court in such actions.
 
15
By constitutional provision, the circuit courts are the
courts of general jurisdiction in this State with original
jurisdiction over all cases (even if in some instances that
jurisdiction is concurrent with some other court) except as
otherwise specifically provided by law.  The district
1090904
49
courts, 
on 
the 
other 
hand, 
are 
courts 
of 
"limited
jurisdiction," meaning that a specific constitutional or
statutory 
grant 
is 
necessary 
to 
give 
such 
courts
jurisdiction over a particular type of case.  Section 139 of
the Alabama Constitution of 1901 ("Judicial Power") states,
in pertinent part:
"(a) Except as otherwise provided by this
Constitution, the judicial power of the state shall
be vested exclusively in a unified judicial system
which shall consist of a supreme court, a court of
criminal appeals, a court of civil appeals, a trial
court of general jurisdiction known as the circuit
court, a trial court of limited jurisdiction known
as the district court, a probate court and such
municipal courts as may be provided by law." 
(Emphasis added.)  Moreover, § 142(b) of the Alabama
Constitution of 1901 provides, in pertinent part, that
"[t]he circuit court shall exercise general jurisdiction in
all cases except as may otherwise be provided by law."
(Emphasis added.)  See also § 12-11-30(a), Ala. Code 1975
(providing that the circuit courts of this State are the
courts of general jurisdiction).  In the absence of a
statutory provision that relegates an unlawful-detainer
action exclusively to the jurisdiction of a district court,
I see no basis for the Court of Civil Appeals to have
1090904
50
concluded in Darby, or for this Court to conclude today,
that the legislature has removed such actions from the
general, original jurisdiction of the circuit courts.  See
Brown v. Arnold, 125 W. Va. 824, 835, 26 S.E.2d 238, 243
(1943) ("Jurisdiction in the lower court to entertain the
eviction proceeding in its inception is not questioned, and
rightfully so. General jurisdiction of all matters at law
where the controversy, exclusive of interest, exceeds $50,
accorded circuit courts in this jurisdiction by Constitution
of West Virginia, Article VIII, Section 12, and Code,
51-2-2, includes the right to hear and determine actions of
unlawful entry and detainer.").
Furthermore, the conclusion by the Court of Civil
Appeals in Darby that a circuit court does not have
concurrent, original jurisdiction over an unlawful-detainer
action was not a question squarely presented to that court
and was not even necessary to the result reached by that
court.  Specifically, the district court in Darby had
transferred the case to the circuit court under the
authority of § 12-11-9, which mandated such a transfer only
when the case was "within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
1090904
51
circuit court."  Thus, in order to decide the validity of
the district court's transfer of the unlawful-detainer
action in Darby, all that was necessary for the Court of
Civil Appeals to decide was whether the district court had
been given original jurisdiction over unlawful-detainer
actions under § 6-6-330, which it obviously had been, thus
meaning that the circuit court did not have exclusive,
original jurisdiction.  It was not necessary for the Court
of Civil Appeals to go further and address whether the
original jurisdiction of the district court was exclusive.
As a consequence, the Court of Civil Appeals' holding in
this respect can only be considered dictum. 
IV. 
On the basis of foregoing, I respectfully dissent.