Case Title: Storseth v. Brown, Raymond & Rissler

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89-98

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Storseth v. Brown, Raymond & Rissler1991 WY 11805 P.2d 284Case Number: 89-98Decided: 01/30/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
 
Donna Mae 
STORSETH,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

 

v.

 

BROWN, 
RAYMOND & RISSLER, a professional corporation,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal from 
the District Court, Natrona 
County, Dan 
Spangler, J. 

 

Mary T. 
Kloeckner, Cheyenne, for appellant.

 

H. Steven 
Brown of Brown, Raymond & Rissler, P.C., Casper, for appellee.

 

Before 
CARDINE, C.J.,* and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

 

* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 

PER 
CURIAM.

 

[¶1]  This appeal involves attorney fees 
charged in an especially unpleasant divorce proceeding.1 Appellees (law firm), sued their 
ex-client, Donna Mae Storseth (Storseth), for unpaid legal fees incurred through 
trial. It is from the summary judgment granted in favor of the law firm on that 
ancillary suit that this present appeal is pursued. Storseth states as her 
issues whether:

 

I.

 

* * * the 
contents of appellant's pro se pre-summary judgment motions were sufficient to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to appellant's liability or the amount 
thereof which should have precluded summary judgment [sic].

 

II.

 

* * * 
appellant's pro se status while she was endevoring [sic] to obtain competent 
counsel should entitle her to less stringent standards of legal competency as a 
matter of law.

 

III.

 

* * * the 
garnishment statute as applied to appellant, or on its face, is unconstitutional 
to the extent that AFDC and general assistance funds are exempt while court 
ordered child support and alimony are not.

 

[¶2]  The law firm responds:

 

I.

 

The 
district court did not commit an error of law by granting appellee's motion for 
summary judgment[.]

 

II.

 

A pro se 
litigant is not entitled to greater rights than other litigants[.]

 

III.

 

The 
garnishment statute [sic] constitutionality is not relevant in this 
case.

 

[¶3]  This appeal will chronicle the 
adversities to be encountered in the lands of summary judgment, Cordova v. 
Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 1986), prematurely entered upon contended default of 
appearance, McGinnis v. Beatty, 28 Wyo. 328, 204 P. 340 (1922), without any 
notice of any default hearing, Spitzer v. Spitzer, 777 P.2d 587 (Wyo. 1989). 
Those issues when extrapolated from the litigants' arguments make sense only by 
retracing the procedural history of this fee litigation. 

 

[¶4]  Storseth was engaged in a very 
disharmonious marital dissolution conflict and, in October 1987, retained the 
law firm for legal representation. A deal of some kind was struck, obviously not 
in writing, regarding fees. The representation then started and continued until 
an apparently unpleasant conference on August 22, 
1988, followed 
by two letters of withdrawal of August 23 and 24 and a motion to formally 
withdraw filed August 24.

 

[¶5]  On December 5, the law firm filed suit 
for legal fees with interest. By happenstance and pure accident on exactly the 
same day, Storseth instituted a petition for arbitration of fee dispute before 
the Committee on Resolution of Fee Disputes of the Wyoming State Bar. The 
petition was dated December 2 and mailed to the office of the Wyoming State Bar 
and consequently docketed on December 5.2

 
[¶6]  Storseth responded to the district court 
complaint for legal fees by a motion to dismiss filed December 13 stating that 
"Defendant moves this Court for an Order dismissing the above entitled action on 
the grounds that it has been turned over to the FEE ARBITRATION 
BOARD."

 

[¶7]  The law firm, following notice of a 
January 26, 
1989 fee 
arbitration dismissal, filed a motion for summary judgment on February 6, 
1989 and 
obtained a hearing date of February 22.

 

[¶8]  On February 21, Storseth, in handwritten 
form, filed a Motion for Order for Continuance Hearing On Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Apparently, a "conference" was held with the district judge on 
February 22, although nothing reflects that occurrence and no document was filed 
resetting a date for the summary judgment motion hearing. On March 2, Storseth 
filed a typewritten document captioned Emergency Motion for Enlargement of Time 
to Provide Competent Counsel for Purposes of Present Hearing.

 

[¶9]  On March 6, the law firm filed a 
traverse to the emergency motion denying all allegations and 
contending:

 

Defendant's 
continued resistance to pay Plaintiff is frivolous and without merit. 
Defendant's accusations are libelous and unsubstantiated. This case has already 
been heard by fee arbitration and Plaintiff is therefore entitled to costs and 
attorney's fees as provided under Wyoming Statute § 1-14-128; Baseless 
Pleadings.

 

[¶10]  On March 6, a decision letter was 
rendered by the district court without hearing, which stated:

 

The above 
matter having come before the Court upon a motion for summary judgment by 
plaintiff, the defendant having been allowed an additional ten (10) days to file 
affidavits or other material in opposition to the motion, and the defendant 
having failed to file such material within the time allowed, the motion of the 
plaintiff is granted. [Counsel] is requested to prepare a judgment 
accordingly.

 

The next 
day, March 7, also without appearance or notice, an order of summary judgment 
was entered, from which this appeal is pursued, stating:3

 
THIS MATTER 
having come before the Court, upon Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
a hearing having been set February 22, 1989 at 8:30 a.m.; and the Plaintiff 
appearing * * * and the Defendant, Donna Mae Storseth, appearing pro se; and the 
Defendant having made representations to the Court that she is without counsel 
and in need of legal assistance, the Court FINDS as 
follows:

1. That 
Plaintiff filed a Complaint on December 5, 
1988, and 
service of process was duly made upon Defendant.

2. That on 
or about December 
13, 1988, Defendant 
submitted an Attorney Fee Dispute to the Fee Arbitration Committee of the 
Wyoming State Bar. 

3. That at 
the time Defendant submitted her fee dispute to Fee Arbitration, Defendant filed 
a Motion to Dismiss dated December 
13, 1988. Defendant 
did not set her Motion to Dismiss for motion hearing and more than sixty (60) 
days has transpired and therefore Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is deemed 
denied.

4. On or 
about January 26, 
1988 the Fee 
Arbitration Committee of the Wyoming State Bar dismissed the fee arbitration 
filed by Donna Mae Storseth, for lack of jurisdiction. A copy of that decision 
is filed herein. This Court therefore has jurisdiction to decide the 
matter.

5. That the 
Defendant has not filed an Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint and that the 
Defendant has therefore failed to provide the court with a meritorious 
defense.

6. In an 
attempt not to prejudice the Defendant, this Court allowed the Plaintiff an additional ten (10) days from February 22, 
1989 to procure counsel in order to present necessary pleadings to the 
Court.

7. Ten (10) days has 
elapsed as of March 4, 
1989 and 
pursuant to the rules of procedure, the Defendant's 10th day to comply with the 
Court Order would be Monday, 
March 6, 1989.

8. The 
Defendant filed another Motion for Enlargement of Time to Provide Competent 
Counsel on March 2, 
1989. The Court 
finds that said motion does not comply with the court's instructions of 
February 
22, 1989. Said 
motion does not offer a meritorious defense nor does it respond to Plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment.

9. The 
Defendant has failed to comply with the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure in that 
Plaintiff's complaint remains unanswered, and affidavits have not been filed in 
response to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

10. 
Plaintiff is being prejudiced by the continuation of this lawsuit, and that the 
Plaintiff is entitled to protection from the continued diminishment of 
Defendant's estate.

 

WHEREFORE, 
the Court orders as follows:

 

1. That 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss dated December 
13, 1988 is deemed 
denied.

2. That 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment dated February 6, 
1989 is hereby 
granted and Plaintiff is awarded Judgment in the amount of Seven Thousand Three 
and 46/100 Dollars $7,003.46.

DONE 
IN OPEN 
COURT this 7th 
day of March, 1989.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶11]  On the same day that the order of 
summary judgment was issued, the law firm had the clerk of court issue a notice 
of right to hearing on execution and garnishment and followed with three 
executions, which included garnishment of bank accounts of Storseth on March 10, 
1989 at Hilltop National Bank, the Wyoming National Bank and the Mountain Plaza 
Bank as well as execution on the Storseth family motor vehicle which was 
"expeditiously" seized by the sheriff for execution sale. Proceeds at least 
alleged to have been child support were obtained at the Mountain Plaza Bank in 
the net amount credited of $745.05, after deduction of costs and judgment 
interest, and gross sale price of $5,083.45 for the family vehicle, against 
which were charged $93.09 as expenses, for a net credit of $4,990.36.

 

[¶12]  This litigation was not yet to end. 
Immediately after Storseth discovered that a summary judgment had been entered, 
she filed a comprehensively detailed motion for reconsideration or, in the 
alternative, a motion for relief from the district court's order of summary 
judgment pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b) and a motion to stay judgment pending 
reconsideration and/or motion to vacate pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b). On the same 
day, March 10, Storseth filed a request for hearing on rights to exemption which 
related specifically to the family motor vehicle which had then been picked up. 
A hearing on exemptions was scheduled for March 17. On March 13, Storseth filed 
a further document as a motion to stay execution of judgment pending review. The 
law firm filed a traverse to the W.R.C.P. 60(b) motion and motions for stay by 
substantive attack, which documents included the following statement:

 

Furthermore, 
Defendant has already submitted her case to fee arbitration pursuant to 
guidelines and rules of the Wyoming State Bar. At the time of submission, the 
Defendant stated that the decision of the arbitration committee would be 
binding. As previously stated, the Fee Arbitration Committee of the Wyoming 
State Bar dismissed Defendant's fee arbitration for lack of jurisdiction, meaning that an arguable fee dispute did not 
exist. Therefore, Defendant has failed to demonstrate any other reason for 
setting aside default.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶13]  The district court never entered a 
ruling on the W.R.C.P. 60(b) motion and it was deemed denied pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 59.

 

[¶14]  On March 22, Storseth filed a notice of 
appeal pro se stating:

 

NOTICE IS 
HEREBY GIVEN that Donna Storseth Defendant above named, hereby appeals to the 
Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming from the "Order Summary JUDGMENT" and 
"EMERGENCY MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME TO PROVIDE COMPETENT COUNSEL FOR 
PURPOSES OF PRESENT HEARING" and "MOTION TO STAY THE JUDGMENT PENDING 
RECONSIDERATION and/or MOTION TO VACATE TO RULE 60-(b)" and the order granting 
Plaintiff[']s "MOTION FOR ORDER DIRECTING DEFENDANT TO TURN OVER PROPERTY TO 
PLAINTIFF" ENTERED THIS 22 day of MARCH 1989.

 

[¶15]  By the issues thus defined, we reverse 
and set aside the summary judgment and remand to provide an opportunity for 
Storseth to obtain a determination on the merits for the issues 
presented.

 

[¶16]  Discussion will be confined for reversal 
to the scheduling and process used by the district court for entry of the 
summary judgment. For this purpose, we accept the validity of the statement in 
the March 7, 1989 summary judgment document as a fact otherwise undocumented in 
this record that the originally scheduled February 22, 1989 hearing convened in 
some fashion and was then continued for ten days to permit the unrepresented 
litigant to obtain counsel. That order granting summary judgment from which this 
appeal was premised stated first, "[i]n an attempt not to prejudice the 
Defendant, this Court allowed the Plaintiff an additional ten (10) days from 
February 22, 1989 to procure counsel in order to present necessary pleadings to 
the Court;" and then "[t]en (10) days has elapsed as of March 4, 1989 and 
pursuant to the rules of procedure, the Defendant's 10th day to comply with the 
Court Order would be Monday, March 6, 1989."

 

[¶17]  W.R.C.P. 6(a) on computation of time 
then (and now) provides:

 

In 
computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by order of 
court, or by any applicable statutes, the day of the act, event, or default from 
which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The 
last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a 
Sunday, or a legal holiday, or, when the act to be done is the filing of a 
paper, a day on which weather or other conditions have made the office of the 
clerk of the court inaccessible, in which event the period runs until the end of 
the next day which is not one of the aforementioned days. When the period of 
time prescribed or allowed is less than eleven (11) days, intermediate 
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation. As 
used in this rule, "legal holiday" includes any day officially recognized as a 
legal holiday in the state by designation of the legislature or appointment as a 
holiday by the governor.

 

[¶18]  Whether orally done or if an order had 
been entered resetting the case after ten days from the February 22, 1989 
hearing date scheduled, the decision was written on Monday, March 6, 1989, which 
was the eighth day (four weekend days intervening) and the summary judgment was 
entered on March 7, 1989, which was the ninth day, or one day before expiration 
of the hearing date, if in fact any hearing date had been validly set. Midway 
Oil Corp. v. Guess, 714 P.2d 339 (Wyo. 1986); 
Emery v. Emery, 404 P.2d 745 (Wyo. 1965); 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil 2d, § 1162 
(1987).

 

[¶19]  If it is considered that counsel and the 
district court were not confined in time to further plead by W.R.C.P. 6, there 
remains another dispositive scheduling problem. Storseth had entered an 
appearance and the record reflected, albeit in pro se form, that she was 
contesting the legal fees. The Wyoming rule on 
entry of default, W.R.C.P. 55(b)(2), requires a written notice three days prior 
to the application for judgment. No compliance with this requirement was 
provided. Lawrence-Allison and Associates West, Inc. v. Archer, 767 P.2d 989 
(Wyo. 1989); 
Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v. Smith, 785 P.2d 682 
(Idaho App. 
1990).

 

[¶20]  Consequently, we have an undocumented 
continuance without a specific future date stated for hearing, decision entered 
before a stated ten days had expired, and no compliance with the three day 
notice provision required to obtain a default judgment. A motion then made to 
set aside the default and default summary judgment was denied by the expiration 
of the time provided by W.R.C.P. 59(f) of sixty days without ruling.4 The summary judgment was 
prematurely entered and will be reversed to afford Storseth and present counsel 
an opportunity to respond within the time provided by a properly scheduled 
summary judgment hearing.

 

[¶21]  This court has previously examined the 
effect of a premature entry of a default judgment before answer time has 
expired. If the district court properly reset the hearing for this case with an 
additional ten day extension, those ten days are covered by W.R.C.P. 6 and would 
not include weekend days within the period. Consequently, entry of the order 
occurred before the hearing date and was improper. In the early 
Wyoming case of 
McGinnis, 204 P. 340, a motion to dismiss was denied and the answer then filed 
was struck as out of time when a rule date had not been formally fixed. This 
court held that striking the answer was improper and a default would be vacated 
without any requirement to address a meritorious defense.

 

As it was 
not proper to strike the answer from the files, it follows that the defendant 
was not really in default. The respondent contends, however, that the case came 
on regularly for trial, the defendant failing to appear; that evidence was 
taken, as recited by the judgment, in proof of plaintiff's case; and we should 
presume that the result would have been no different if the answer had been 
allowed to stand. In other words, it is claimed that no prejudice to defendant 
resulted from the action of the court. We do not so view the case. There is no 
provision of the Code which authorizes a default of a defendant who merely fails 
to appear at the time of trial.

 

Id. at 343. 
See also McDaniel v. Hoblit, 34 Wyo. 509, 515, 
245 P. 295 (1926). Direct relevance is supplied by English v. Smith, 71 
Wyo. 1, 17, 253 P.2d 857, 862, reh'g denied 71 Wyo. 28, 257 P.2d 365 (1953), which contains procedural similarities where "[t]he defendant 
was not properly in default and it appear[ed] that the judgment was prematurely 
entered." The court found that the judgment "was at least voidable." 
Id. 253 P.2d  
at 862. This court further discussed void judgments in Wunnicke v. 
Leith, 61 
Wyo. 191, 157 P.2d 274 (1945) and Kimbel v. Osborn, 61 Wyo. 89, 156 P.2d 279 (1945), where entry by default was made by the clerk of court. As such, 
it was not merely irregular or erroneous, "but absolutely void and a nullity." 
Wunnicke, 157 P.2d  at 277. The adherence to the schedule of the court that is 
binding on the litigant, Rim Group v. Mountain Mesa Uranium Corp., 78 Wyo. 204, 
321 P.2d 229, reh'g denied 78 Wyo. 204, 323 P.2d 939 (1958), is likewise binding 
upon the court as a question of due process. In particular, the notice 
requirement of W.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) justifies litigant reliance. Lawrence-Allison 
and Associates West, Inc., 767 P.2d 989; Sanford v. Arjay 
Oil Co., 686 P.2d 566 (Wyo. 1984). A 
similar rule appertains to the ten day notice of W.R.C.P. 56(c). Torrey v. 
Twiford, 713 P.2d 1160 (Wyo. 1986); 
Alghanim v. Boeing Co., 477 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1973).

 

[¶22]  Lawrence-Allison and Associates West, 
Inc., 767 P.2d  at 998, Thomas, Justice, specially concurring, has factual 
similarities where counsel withdrew and a W.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) notice was not 
given. As a result, there was an erroneous judgment. The same issue was created 
and the identical result followed in Spitzer, 777 P.2d 587, where a default was 
entered for neglect or refusal to comply with discovery and a default decree was 
entered as a complex divorce settlement decision without any hearing. Accord 
Lovato v. Santa 
Fe Intern. 
Corp., 151 Cal. App. 3d 549, 198 Cal. Rptr. 838 
(1984). Another recent Wyoming case, 
Midway Oil Corp., 714 P.2d 339, is directly applicable where a default judgment 
was also entered. The court in Midway Oil Corp., 714 P.2d  at 345 (footnote 
omitted) said:

 

Since the 
answer date had not expired at the date that the default was entered or the date 
when the judgment was rendered, the judgment as entered is void or at least 
voidable. No denial discretion remained when the motion to vacate the default 
judgment was seasonably made. Vanover v. Vanover, supra [77 
Wyo. 55, 307 P.2d 117 (1957)]. See also Emery v. Emery, Wyo., 404 P.2d 745 (Wyo. 1965), and 
National Supply Co. v. Chittim, supra [387 P.2d 1010 
(Wyo. 
1964)].

 

[¶23]  This present case is remanded to set 
aside the default judgment and afford reasonable opportunity for Storseth to 
pursue her contest to the claimed legal fees by a response to the motion for 
summary judgment and, if any appropriate issue of fact is developed, for a trial 
on the merits.

 

[¶24]  Reversed and remanded.

 

URBIGKIT, C.J., 
filed a specially concurring opinion.

 

THOMAS, J., filed 
a specially concurring opinion, with whom CARDINE, J., joined.

 

CARDINE, J., filed 
a specially concurring opinion, with whom THOMAS, J., joined.

 

URBIGKIT, Chief 
Justice, specially concurring.

 

[¶25]  I concur with this court's decision, but 
write further to address issues and events which are either of importance in 
decision or require resolution. Those issues include: (a) fee arbitration; (b) 
garnishment; and (c) void or voidable status of the vacated judgment.

 

[¶26]  In this attorney fee litigation, 
collection activity by the law firm which represented Storseth is almost 
unparalleled in demonstration of developed hostility, while Storseth 
reciprocated by the harshness of her language which was included in voluminous 
pleadings. The evidentiary hearing for the divorce trial ended August 4, 
1988.1 The law firm immediately prepared a 
billing through that date as a general billing of fees due. On August 16, 
1988, a 
decision letter was entered and followed on September 6 by entry of the divorce 
decree after approval as to form in behalf of Storseth by the law firm. Of 
significance in the present proceeding, the divorce decree provided that 
"Defendant [husband] shall pay the sum of $3500 to assist Plaintiff [wife] with 
her attorney's fees. Plaintiff shall be responsible for any fees greater than 
$3500.00." One of the issues of this appeal, in proper perspective, is derived 
from this provision since the law firm made no effort before or after withdrawal 
on August 24 to collect the fees which had been granted for their benefit in the 
divorce decree. Instead, they chose to sue their client.2

 

[¶27]  Active fee collection was expeditiously 
pursued. On October 12, 
1988, or about 
two months after the trial had been completed and one month after the divorce 
decree was entered, a "legal lien" was filed in the office of the 
County 
Clerk in 
Natrona 
County, 
Wyoming. The lien 
statement referenced filing authorization to W.S. 29-1-102, described indexing 
pursuant to W.S. 29-1-301, and included a description of Storseth's residence by 
legal description.3 The referencing relationship in the 
legal fee lien statement to the mechanic's lien provision of the 
Wyoming statutes 
is unclear. See Gaughan v. Gaughan, 450 N.W.2d 338 (Minn.App. 1990), which 
requires an election of remedies. The law firm's indicated purpose was to 
encumber real property by filing an attorney's lien statement. If it were to be 
considered that the mechanic's lien statutory provisions can be applied to the 
legal retaining and charging lien provision, then the law firm failed to comply 
with W.S. 29-2-107, requiring a notice of intention to file lien. There is no 
demonstration in this record that compliance with the notice of filing required 
by W.S. 29-1-301(c) by certified mail was given since the record only reflects a 
regular mail letter of October 25, 1988 addressed to Storseth. This letter 
related:

 

Enclosed is 
a copy of a filed lien statement which we filed with the 
County 
Clerk in order 
to perfect our Attorneys Lien as provided in Wyoming Statutes. You already have 
received one copy but the first copy was not recorded. The recording of this 
document only serves to protect our priority in case other creditors attempt to 
collect.

I 
understand you are attempting to file your own appeal and I felt it best to 
protect our interests.

 

Storseth 
pursued her divorce decision appeal initially pro se, then through other 
counsel, and is finally before this court pro se.

 

[¶28]  Storseth responded to the claimed legal 
fees by filing a petition with the Committee on Resolution of Fee Disputes of 
the Wyoming State Bar which was constituted by a rule of this court (at that 
time included in the Disciplinary Code as Rule XXIII, Resolution of Fee 
Disputes).

 

[¶29]  The record shows that a copy of Storseth's 
filed petition for arbitration of fee disputes was mailed by the Wyoming State 
Bar on December 13, 1988 to a committee representative in Douglas, Wyoming, a 
copy to the chairman of the committee, and a copy to the attorney who was the 
member of the law firm submitting the billing claim. The following inclusion was 
significant in the petition adopting the form provided by the 
committee:

 

6. By filing this Petition, I acknowledge that the panel 
may, in its discretion, for cause shown or on its own motion, assign an attorney at 
law to represent me in these proceedings.

7. I agree that this fee dispute shall be heard and decided 
by the Committee on Resolution of Fee Disputes of the Wyoming State Bar or by a 
panel of members thereof, in accordance with the Committee's Rules and 
prescribed procedures. I agree that the Rules of the Committee on Resolution of 
Fee Disputes of the Wyoming State Bar and any rules of procedure adopted by the 
Committee shall supersede the provisions of the Uniform Arbitration Act (W.S. 
1-36-101 et seq.) in the event of conflict therewith. I acknowledge that I have 
received a copy of the Rules of the Committee on Resolution of Fee Disputes of 
the Wyoming State Bar.

8. I further agree that the arbitration decision and award 
of the Committee on Resolution of Fee Disputes or panel of members thereof shall 
be final and binding upon me. I acknowledge that the effect of this agreement is 
the relinquishment of my right to bring an action in a court of law to settle 
this fee dispute.

9. I further agree that the Court having jurisdiction may 
enter a judgment upon the award.

 

(Emphasis in original.) Storseth did not receive a copy of 
the letter which was sent to the committee member in Douglas. Apparently, her next communication was dated 
January 26, 1989, signed by the Executive Secretary of the Wyoming State 
Bar with copies to the law firm, the assigned member of the committee and 
members of the executive council of the committee. This communication 
stated:

 

Please be advised that the fee arbitration filed by you in 
the above-captioned matter has been dismissed by the Committee for lack of 
jurisdiction. The file has been closed.

If I can be of further assistance to you, please do not 
hesitate to contact me.

 

[¶30]  So ended Storseth's efforts for fee 
arbitration without any contact with her by a member of the committee and 
without any hearing of any kind. There is no evidence provided in either record 
that consideration was ever given to the divorce decree and its provisions for 
an award of attorney's fees against the husband. What we do find, since it 
appears later in the record, is that on December 13, 1988, the Executive 
Secretary for the Wyoming State Bar wrote the law firm attorney ex parte 
advising of the filing of the petition and its assignment to the Douglas member 
for "investigation." On December 19, 1988, the law firm responsively wrote to the Douglas member ex parte explaining that there was no written 
retainer agreement describing a basis for the fee billing and arguing generally 
the substantive merits of fee entitlement. Apparently, the next thing that 
happened was the letter of notified dismissal for "lack of jurisdiction," since 
a letter of February 24, 1989 from the Wyoming State Bar to Storseth stated:

 

This follows your telephone request of the above date to 
forward to you the information we have on the fee arbitration file except for 
the enclosures mentioned in [counsel's] letter of December 19, 1988.

If you desire the enclosures with the December 19, 1988 letter, please advise because I assume you have 
them.

 

A copy of this letter was sent carbon copy blind 
to the law firm. Nothing in this record reflects that Storseth had ever been 
furnished the December 19, 1988 law firm letter or any of the enclosures by either the 
Wyoming State Bar or the law firm. She was provided no apparent opportunity to 
respond or otherwise pursue her contended objections to the claimed fees. A 
history of these proceedings cannot create a res judicata basis for resolution 
of the lawsuit which was also being pursued by the law firm since no hearing, 
real or pro forma, had been provided before the "jurisdiction" dismissal. 
Matthews v. Fetzner, 768 P.2d 590 (Wyo. 1989).4 Storseth had also, during the processing of the 
fee dispute, filed her motion to dismiss with the district court in this 
litigation.

 

[¶31]  Following the fee arbitration dismissal and 
expeditiously pursued motion by the law firm for summary judgment, events become 
murky in procedure. On February 21, 1989, Storseth, in handwritten form, filed a Motion for Order 
for Continuance Hearing On Motion for Summary Judgement by stating in 
part:

 

COMES NOW DEFENDANT in the above entitled matter asking for 
a continuance. Defendant having been told by attorney [Mr. X's] mother * * * 
that her attorney [Mr. X] will not be able to represent her in this case. 
Defendant having been told on February 21, 1989 a.m. Defendant was told that [counsel] is acting attorney 
for [Mr. X] and it would create a conflict of interest.

* * * * * *

Defendant telephoned [counsel] on February 21, 1989 a.m. and ask[ed] for the written agreement of a contract 
with said attorney concerning fee agreement. Defendant having been told by 
[counsel] that no contract was signed. Defendant signed no such agreement or 
contract. Attorney firm is threatening defendant because fee is pending release 
of Canadian funds that are still seized in Canada.

Defendant was misrepresented.

Defendant requests that a continuance be set to allow her 
time to prepare for the hearing.

 

[¶32]  Following an apparent undocumented conference 
on February 22, 1989, Storseth filed a typewritten document captioned Emergency 
Motion for Enlargement of Time to Provide Competent Counsel for Purposes of 
Present Hearing on March 2, which included in detailed statement of 
reasons:

 

Defendant Donna Storseth hereby requests an additional 15 
days up to and including March 16[,] 1989 to obtain competant [sic] counsel for 
the purposes of representation of her in these proceedings. The plaintiff will 
receive no harm by the Court granting this motion, but the defendant, Donna 
Storseth will suffer irreparable harm and injury due to the Court denying this 
motion.

Defendant Donna Storseth believes that she is entitled to 
the relief she seeks and the request for the extension of time is not for 
purposes of delay and she respectfully requests the Court grant this motion in 
the interests of justice.

 

[¶33]  On March 6, 1989, the law firm filed a 
traverse and, on the same day, obtained a favorable decision letter which was 
followed by entry of the summary judgment on the next day, March 7, 1989, as 
quoted in the per curiam opinion.

 

[¶34]  Entry of the summary judgment against 
Storseth was followed by her filing for reconsideration.5 She also filed 
a motion to stay the judgment.6 With the hearing for exemptions scheduled for 
March 17, 1989, Storseth filed another document as a motion to stay 
execution pending review.7

 
[¶35]  In addition to the traverse which the law 
firm made based on the fee arbitration action, they also claimed estoppel based 
on the documentation used by the law firm in the divorce case to support fee 
payment request as an effort to secure inclusion of all billed fees in the 
divorce decree. No explanation is given why the law firm did not at least 
attempt to collect the amount of fees that were ordered to be paid by the 
husband. It is in this documentation filed with the law firm's resistance to the 
W.R.C.P. 60(b) motion where the ex parte correspondence between a representative 
of the Fee Arbitration Committee and the law firm first came into this record. 
The district court never entered a ruling on the W.R.C.P. 60(b) motion and it 
was deemed denied pursuant to W.R.C.P. 59, but litigation was not yet to end 
with a hearing remaining on the exemption request scheduled for Friday, March 
17, 1989, at 2:00 p.m. Sometime before the scheduled hearing date, Storseth 
filed another motion for continuance, stating:

 

COMES NOW Donna Mae Storseth by leave of the Court pro per 
and moves this Court for a motion for a continuance in the matter of the hearing 
of property exemption for payment of debt for the following reason.

Defendant was unexpectedly called out of town on a medical 
emergency and is unable to get back for the hearing set for March 17, 1989 at 2:00 PM at the Natrona County Courthouse.

Defendant, Donna Mae Storseth, hereby requests a new date 
for hearing following March 24th 1989[.] 

Defendant believes Plaintiff will suffer no harm by the 
Court granting this motion but defendant will suffer irreparable harm and unjury 
[sic] due to the Court denying this motion.

Defendant, Donna Mae Storseth believes she's entitled to 
the relief she seeks and the request for the continuance is not for the purposes 
of delay and she respectfully requests the court grant this motion in the 
interests of justice.

 

Service was made by leaving a copy in the law firm's file 
box at the courthouse.

[¶36]  The hearing was held without regard for the 
motion for continuance and its text was brief:

 

THE COURT: Please be seated. I don't see Mrs. Storseth 
here.

She has filed a Motion for Continuance.

[Counsel], did you get a copy of that?

[COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What is your position on that?

[COUNSEL]: Judge, it is our position that the burden of 
proof on exemption lays on the person who is claiming the exemption. I don't 
believe that any of the exemptions allowed under Wyoming law, I don't know that they apply in this case, and have 
no proof to the contrary.

We would ask the Court deny the motion.

THE COURT: What is your position on the Motion for 
Continuance?

[COUNSEL]: Judge, we have had one Motion for Continuance 
that was granted for ten days. No attorney has made his presence known to our 
office. I would ask that the motion be denied.

THE COURT: Well, considering that earlier Motion for 
Continuance was granted on condition that the Defendant would be obtaining an 
attorney, and she has not obtained an attorney at that time, and further that 
there is no detailed reason set forth in this particular motion as to why a 
continuance is to be granted, I will deny the Motion for Continuance.

As far as exemptions are concerned, I believe, you are 
correct, [counsel]. The burden is upon the Defendant to show any exemptions she 
is entitled to. Since she has not done that, it appears to me she does not have 
any.

If you will prepare an order to that effect, [counsel], I 
will sign that.

 

[¶37]  Immediately thereafter, an order denying 
claim of exemption was prepared by counsel and signed by the district court 
judge, which stated:

 

THIS MATTER having come before the Court for hearing on 
March 17, 1989 at 2:00 p.m. upon Defendant's Claim of Exemption; and the 
Plaintiff having appeared by and through counsel, [counsel], and the Defendant 
having appeared not; the Court FINDS as follows:

1. That the Defendant made a claim of exemption pursuant to 
Wyoming Statute.

2. That Defendant received proper notice, and the hearing was 
set within five (5) days.

3. That Defendant failed to appear or contact the 
Court.

4. That Plaintiff appeared as directed;

5. That Defenda[]nt thereby failed to establish her claim 
for exemptions.[8]

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's claims of 
exemption are hereby denied.

[Dated March 20, 1989].

 

(Emphasis added.)

 

[¶38]  An execution sale on April 7, 1989 was 
conducted and the family car plus a refrigerator, television and power converter 
were sold by the sheriff to apply to the attorney's fees which was supplemented 
by garnishment of bank accounts containing claimed child support payments - 
modest in amount.

 

[¶39]  On March 22, 1989, Storseth filed a notice of 
appeal pro se, but the pleadings do not then end since the law firm, on April 
26, 1989, filed an application for writ of post-judgment garnishment to collect 
the claimed remaining balance of $1,268.05 plus post-judgment interest for which 
another writ of garnishment was issued.

 

[¶40]  Although specifically concurring in remand 
for trial, I go further to reject any res judicata validity attributable to the 
jurisdictional dismissal of Storseth's petition for fee arbitration. The 
validity of rejection of any execution exemption is also questioned in this 
record. Remaining issues which can be observed will not be pursued even in 
special concurrence since they were not briefed. These issues include 
characterization and effect after execution and sheriff's sale of the car, 
whether the entered judgment was void or voidable9 and what now 
happens to the decree provision for the husband's attorney fee payment of 
$3,500.

 

[¶41]  Any divorce case is tragic. Here, for 
whatever combination of circumstances and personalities, that tragedy has been 
infinitely expanded. In this case, as in many, it is from heightened parental 
disaffinity and consequent system failure that the children, unfortunately, 
become the real victims. Even the family car becomes a pawn in the 
proceedings.

 

THOMAS, Justice, specially concurring, with whom CARDINE, Justice, 
joins.

 

[¶42]  "Per curiam" is defined as:

 

"By the court. A phrase used to distinguish an opinion of 
the whole court from an opinion written by any one judge. Sometimes it denotes 
an opinion written by the chief justice or presiding judge, * * *." Black's Law 
Dictionary 1023 (5th ed. 1979).

 

The majority opinion in this case is not the opinion of the 
whole court. It seems that its true function is to introduce the special 
concurring opinion of the chief justice.

 

[¶43]  Like Justice Cardine, in whose specially 
concurring opinion I join, I concur in the result. Because my perception of the 
opinion of the court is that it is far too broad, I do not join in the per 
curiam. I agree with it to the extent that it reaches a result of reversal 
because the summary judgment was entered prematurely. It was entered prior to 
the expiration of the time that Donna Mae Storseth was granted to "file 
affidavits or other material in opposition to the motion." That ten-day period 
did not expire until March 8, 1989. I agree with Justice Cardine that the provisions for 
default found in Rule 55(b)(2), W.R.C.P., have no application, but I note that 
the appellee endeavors to justify the summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, 
W.R.C.P., and, in the absence of compliance with the three-day notice 
requirement as set forth in Rule 55(b)(2), that effort must fail. 

 

[¶44]  The only material facts then are the granting 
of the ten-day period to "file affidavits or other material in opposition to the 
motion," and the entry of the summary judgment within that ten-day period. No 
issue exists about fee arbitration that justifies the inclusion of any facts 
relating to that effort by Storseth. Those facts apparently are introduced as a 
predicate to the concurring opinion of the chief justice. There is no occasion 
to address the garnishment and, consequently, the inclusion of those facts in 
the per curiam opinion is surplusage. Again, the purpose seems to be to set the 
stage for the specially concurring opinion.

 

[¶45]  I continue briefly lest the concurring 
opinion of the chief justice somehow be perceived as the only advice that is 
pertinent with respect to those matters that are discussed but are not part of 
this appeal. The thrust of that specially concurring opinion seems to be that 
somehow or other the law firm took undue, or improper, advantage of Storseth. I 
do not think that information has been developed in this file, and it is not 
fair to the appellee to cast it in that light. Storseth has the opportunity to 
develop a record about whatever matters might be available to inhibit the 
collection of this legal fee by the appellee, and there seems to be no occasion 
in this case to jump to any conclusions about what might, or might not, have 
been done differently.

 

[¶46]  I am nonplussed by fascination with what 
apparently is perceived to be a duty on the part of the appellee to seek 
recovery of $3,500 of its fee from the husband in the divorce case. In my view, 
this represents an assumption, which is not correct, that somehow a law firm 
that is not a party to a case in which it is providing representation can obtain 
affirmative relief in a decree or judgment entered in the case. The award of 
attorney fees against the husband was in favor of Storseth. I do not think that 
it would be possible for the law firm to assert an interest in that part of the 
judgment entered for Storseth, and I am sure that this court would have 
dismissed summarily any attempt by the law firm to appeal from the attorney fees 
awarded to the wife in the divorce case. The effort to collect the amount that 
was awarded must be the effort of the wife, and it appears that the relationship 
between the wife and the law firm was ended before that effort could be 
pursued.

 

[¶47]  I have no question that, pursuant to § 
29-1-102(a)(ii), W.S. 1977, the appellee was entitled to a lien upon "money due 
his client and in the possession of an adverse party," which would include the 
$3,500 owed by the husband to Mrs. Storseth. That remedy is only ancillary, 
however, and it does not foreclose the right of the attorney to collect the fee 
from the client. The suggestion that the appellee should first look to the 
husband in order to collect its fee is antithetical to the law.

 

[¶48]  It may be that the law firm was unnecessarily 
cautious in accommodating to § 29-1-301, W.S. 1977. On the other hand, that 
statute does provide, in pertinent part:

 

"(a) In order to have a perfected lien pursuant to this 
title, lien claimant shall file with the county clerk a lien statement sworn 
to before a notary public. The county clerk shall file the statement and index 
by date, name of claimant and property owner, and legal description." § 
29-1-301(a), W.S. 1977. (Emphasis added.)

 

Certainly, the lien of an attorney provided in § 29-1-102, 
W.S. 1977, is a lien pursuant to Title 29, Liens. I can understand why an 
attorney might choose to perfect it according to § 29-1-301, W.S. 1977. By way 
of contrast, § 29-2-107, W.S. 1977, refers to "filing a lien pursuant to this 
chapter," and the chapter is limited to liens of contractors and materialmen. 
There would be no need for one pursuing an attorney's lien to follow the 
provisions of that chapter.

 

[¶49]  In sum, the dissertation of facts about the 
effort to seek fee arbitration is not warranted in this instance. The court has 
no justification, collectively or individually, to criticize the lawyers in its 
opinions. If there has been some impropriety or overreaching on the part of the 
law firm, that information should be developed in an appropriate proceeding and 
not fashioned in some way by the inferences of this court or any member thereof. 
There is no duty on the part of the firm to attempt to realize the $3,500 from 
the husband before it seeks collection from its client. The reversal of the 
summary judgment and the remand of the case for the procedural impropriety is 
all that should be addressed.

 

CARDINE, Justice, specially concurring, with whom THOMAS, Justice, 
joins.

 

[¶50]  I concur in the result and note that judgment 
entered in this case is not a default judgment but rather summary judgment. As 
such, provisions for default found in W.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) have no application. I 
note also that a fair reading of this record might easily lead one to conclude 
that this pro se appellant was playing fast and loose with the trial court. An 
individual who elects self representation by pro se appearance is held to the 
same standard as an attorney. Annis v. Beebe & Runyan Furniture Co., 685 P.2d 678, 680 (Wyo. 1984). Nevertheless, with reversal and remand, appellant 
has a second chance in this case should she choose to appear and present her 
claim and defense at the regularly scheduled hearing. 

 

 Footnotes

 

1 Storseth v. Storseth, 792 P.2d 243 (Wyo. 1990). Appellant's counsel withdrew from that appeal and 
counsel for the husband has been disbarred for events that occurred in another 
divorce case. Bad winds blow upon the Storseth divorce 
litigation.

 

2 The fee arbitration 
effort of the client did not succeed. The details are related in the attached 
special concurrence authored by Chief Justice Urbigkit.

 

3 There was no approval as 
to form by the pro se litigant. Rule 404, Uniform Rules for the District 
Courts.

 

4 Cf. Jaxon v. Circle K 
Corp., 773 F.2d 1138 (10th Cir. 1985), summary judgment granted against pro se 
litigant after request for time was made. The court in Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 1940) stated:

Summary judgment 
procedure is not a catch penny contrivance to take unwary litigants into its 
toils and deprive them of a trial, it is a liberal measure, liberally designed 
for arriving at the truth. Its purpose is not to cut litigants off from their 
right of trial by jury if they really have evidence which they will offer on a 
trial, it is to carefully test this out, in advance of trial by inquiring and 
determining whether such evidence exists.

See Greenberg v. Food and Drug Admin., 803 F.2d 1213 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986); Alghanim v. Boeing Co., 477 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1973); Toebelman v. 
Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 130 F.2d 1016 (3rd Cir. 1942); and Cunningham v. 
Lanier, 555 So. 2d 685 (Miss. 1989). See also Deutz-Allis Credit Corp., 785 P.2d  at 684 
(footnote omitted), which states:

However, a court's usual discretionary authority to grant 
or deny such a motion [I.R.C.P. 60(b)] may be greatly narrowed where certain 
procedural safeguards were not strictly complied with in obtaining the judgment. 
In cases where a party has appeared in the action, default judgment must be 
taken pursuant to I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2). Radioear Corp. v. Crouse, 97 
Idaho 501, 547 P.2d 546 (1976). Under this rule, "the party 
against whom judgment by default is sought . . . shall be served with written 
notice of the application for judgment at least three (3) days prior to the 
hearing on such application." Entry of a default judgment without the requisite 
three-day notice of application for the judgment renders the judgment 
voidable.

 

Footnotes for the Concurrence

 

1 The record reflects a statement by the law firm in various 
file documents that the representation ended on that date. The record reflects, 
however, that withdrawal came on August 24, 1988 following post-trial disputes between Storseth and the law 
firm.

 

2 The justification for 
this approach as a practical matter is unclear since obviously the husband had 
greater resources, and enforcement would likely have been possible without any 
litigation activity. This provision also raises the question as to the amount 
due from Storseth where a resource was available to the law firm by district 
court decree as partial compensation. The law firm had received initial retainer 
payments of $1,500 for the divorce case representation and stated additional 
amounts were due of $7,003.46 which balance, without credit for the district 
court award, became the subject matter of this proceeding.

 

3 The Wyoming attorney fees lien provision is both a retaining and 
charging lien statute. Morfeld v. Andrews, 579 P.2d 426 (Wyo. 1978).

The statute states:

(a) For professional 
services performed on behalf of a client, an attorney shall have a lien for 
compensation due him from the time of giving notice of the lien. The attorney's 
lien attaches upon:

(i) Any papers or money 
of his client which have come into his possession;

(ii) Money due his client 
and in the possession of an adverse party.

(b) Notice as required by 
subsection (a) of this section to be given to any person against whom the lien 
is asserted shall be given by certified mail, return receipt requested.

W.S. 
29-1-102.

 

4 The only possible 
comfort that this court can take in the proceeding in this case involving the 
Fee Arbitration Committee is that the rule has since been completely rewritten 
and the procedure effectively changed for present application. Absolutely 
nothing of record indicates that any fair hearing rights were afforded to 
Storseth or substantive consideration given to her contentions. Dismissal on the 
basis of lack of "jurisdiction" is unfathomable. Apparently, the committee did 
not know the difference between the existence of jurisdiction, which clearly 
existed, and the exercise of jurisdiction and discretion to consider the case on 
the merits. Essentially, a member of the committee considered the law firm's 
presentation and apparently concluded without further documentation from 
Storseth that no meritorious defense to the fee existed. Consequently, a 
decision was made after this one-sided review to dismiss for lack of 
"jurisdiction." If jurisdiction did not exist, perhaps the $25 filing fee should 
have been refunded. Rule XXIII, Resolution of Fee Disputes, Disciplinary Code 
for the Wyoming State Bar, renumbered and effective April 19, 1988, and then 
rewritten is now superceded by an order adopting the Rules for Resolution of Fee 
Disputes dated May 11, 1989 and effective August 1, 1989.

 

5 Storseth 
stated:

 

COMES NOW DONNA MAE 
STORSETH, defendant, by leave of the court pro per and moves this court for a 
motion for reconsideration or alternatively a motion for relief from the 
Court[']s order of Summary Judgment pursuant to rule 60-(b) W.R.C.P. which says 
in pertinent part:

On motion and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons. . . .

3. fraud, whether 
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic, misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party.

4. The judgment is 
void.

6. Any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgement.

Defendant believes the 
judgement was entered in error. Plaintiff wasn't entitled to Summary judgement 
as a matter of law for the following reasons:

1. Defendant had filed a 
pleading Mar 2 1989 for an enlargement of time due to the sudden withdrawal of 
her last attorney before any action was taken in regard to plaintiff[']s motions 
and forcing her in the last moments to file documents herself since she had been 
unable to find counsel.

2. Plaintiff used as a 
reason for said judgment that defendant had not stated to the court the names of 
any attorney she has retained or contacted and believes she is misrepresenting 
to the court her attempts to retain counsel, attacking her truthfulness. 
Defendant was not aware the rule said one had to provide such names. Defendant 
has contacted the following 3 law firms:

(1) Louis Cutner of Chicago Illinois.

(2) Professional Legal Services of Cushing Okla.

(3) Roger Elletson Cheyenne Wyo.

* * * * * *

[Through ten numbered 
paragraphs, and then concluding:]

Wherefore, for the above 
stated reasons, defendant Donna Mae Storseth petitions this court to reconsider 
motions presently before it and grant relief from the Court[']s Order of Summary 
Judgment pending final adjudication of this matter. Defendant is seeking justice 
for her children and herself and is not bringing actions for purposes of 
delay.

 

6 This motion read:

COMES NOW Donna Storseth, 
Defendant, by leave of the Court pro per and moves this Court for a motion to 
Stay the Judgment pending reconsideration and/or vacation pursuant to rule 
60-(b) in pertinent part rule 3, 4, and 6. Plaintiff wasn't entitled to Summary 
judgment as a matter of law for the following reasons:

1. Defendant filed a 
pleading on March 2nd, 1989 for an enlargement of time due to the sudden 
withdrawal of her last attorney before any action was taken in regard to 
plaintiff[']s motions and forcing her at the last moment to file documants [sic] 
in total ignorance of court rules and hopelessly prejudicing the outcome 
thereby. Defendant still has not been able to retain new counsel.

2. Plaintiff used as a reason for said judgment, that 
defendant is misrepresenting to the court her efforts to retain an attorney. 
Defendant did not know she was supposed to provide such information. It would 
appear that plaintiff suspects defendant of the same deceit he practices in his 
dealings with the court. Defendant has contacted Louis Cutner of 
Chicago, Illinois who is president of an international civil rights 
organization. Defendant has also been in communication with Professional Legal 
Services in Cushing Oklahoma, and negotiations are now in progress with Roger Elletson 
of Cheyenne Wyoming. It is hoped that this disclosure will demonstrate to the 
Court the good faith effort of the defendant to obtain Competant [sic] 
representation in the matter at hand.

3. Defendant has filed a 
Propria Personam motion and it is her understanding that the term means in her 
own person and not acting as her own attorney and should not be held to the same 
standard as a trained experienced lawyer. Defendant was not aware that the term 
pro se meant differently.

4. The plaintiff lawfirm 
[sic] has deliberately made misrepresentation to the Court about not having a 
conflict of interest in this matter. Defendant was informed of this conflict by 
her last attorney, [Mr. X] who informed her he could not defend her in this 
matter because three members of Plaintiff[']s firm were defending him in an 
undisclosed action.

5. Plaintiff has 
deliberately misrepresented to the Court as to his fee agreement with the 
defendant. On the strength of Plaintiff[']s inference that he was an "expert" in 
the field of divorce and that he would pursue the case to a final conclusion, 
defendant agreed to retain plaintiff.

Before the retainer was 
paid, the plaintiff told her it would not cost over $3,000.00 and that she would 
pay the retainer up front and the balance would not be charged until the case 
was finished and that he would represent her as far as necessary to achieve the 
realization of moneys she was entitled to. He told her fees would be assessed 
against any final outcome that she'd receive in the case from the portion based 
upon the fact that plaintiff could get her an equitable claim to half of what 
the husband had. Plaintiff did not live up to what he said he'd do, or could 
do.

Plaintiff later led the 
defendant to believe that because of a family protection order, the husband 
would have to pay all fees as well. Plaintiff also led defendant to believe that 
her receipt for retainer was all that was required as a contract, and has no 
other written agreement. Defendant has learned in hindsight, that a written 
contract is customary and believes plaintiff did not require one so he could 
take advantage of defendant[']s ignorance of the law and trust to manipulate 
terms to suit his own enrichment in his presentments to the court.

* * * * * *

10. Plaintiff has deliberately misrepresented to the Court 
that defendant has access and control of moneys in Canada. That is totally untrue. Plaintiff can only gain access to 
said moneys by surrenduring [sic] valid legal rights imposed by various 
means.

Wherefore, for the above 
stated reasons, defendant Donna Mae Storseth petitions this Court to reconsider 
motions presently before it and grant this stay and/or vacation of order for 
Summary Judgement pending final ajudication [sic] of the matter.

Defendant is seeking 
justice for her children and herself, for protection from incompetant [sic] 
representation by her attorney and is not bringing action for purposes of 
delay.

 

7 That document stated in 
part:

 

COMES NOW DONNA MAE 
STORSETH, defendant, by leave of the court pro per and moves the court to grant 
MOTION TO STAY EXECUTION of JUDGEMENT PENDING REVIEW[.]

In support of this motion 
the defendant Donna Mae Storseth states as follows:

1. That Donna Mae 
Storseth has filed the following motions.

(a) Motion to Dismiss

Filed: December 13, 1988

(b) Motion for 
Continuance

Filed: February 21, 1989

(c) Emergency Motion for 
Enlargement of Time To Provide Competent Counsel for Purposes of Present 
Hearing.

Filed: March 2, 1989

(d) Motion for 
Reconsideration or In The Alternative Motion for Relief From The Courts Order of 
Summary Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60-(b).

Filed: March 10, 1989

(e) Motion To Stay The 
Judgment Pending Reconsideration and/or Motion to Vacate Pursuant To Rule 
60-(b).

Filed: March 10, 1989

(f) Request For Hearing 
On Exemptions To Summary Judgment,

Filed: March 10[,] 
1989

* * * * * *

5. [Her] [a]ttorney * * * 
withdrew from the case in violation of the code of professional responsibility. 
Failing to avoid foreseeable prejudice to his client by withdrawing before she 
was able to obtain replacement counsel.

* * * * * *

7. The Wyoming Statute allowing attorneys to lien files, 
records and documents does not grant authority to withhold said files, records 
and documents in absents [sic] of final payment. Plaintiff effectively 
prejudiced her ability to appeal and that of any attorney she might hire. This 
law is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States and is therefore Unconstitutional and is void.

* * * * * *

Wherefore for the above 
stated reasons Petitioner Donna Storseth hereby moves this Court to grant this 
Motion To Stay Execution of Judgment Pending Review.

 

8 The hearing on the 
exemption was not scheduled in five days, it was scheduled in seven days, and 
Storseth had obviously contacted both counsel and the district court in advance 
of the hearing to request the continuance which was denied by proceeding in her 
absence.

 

9 It is not at all clear 
that the dogmatic rule once stated in 3 Freeman on Judgments, § 1289 (5th ed. 
1925) (footnotes omitted) is presently the law:

A judgment by default 
prematurely taken is undoubtedly erroneous and subject to reversal, or to motion 
to vacate on that ground. There are authorities which speak of the judgment as 
being void; but they are doubtless inaccurate in expression, since the court has 
jurisdiction from the time service, whether personal or constructive, is 
complete, and are probably not intended to assert anything except that the court 
proceeding prematurely will, if applied to within a reasonable time, set aside 
the judgment and give the defendant the hearing to which he was entitled.

The scope of complexity 
of definition is most persuasively illustrated by the difference found from 
Restatement (First) of Judgments ch. 2, § 8 (1942), "[a] judgment is void if 
there is a failure to comply with such requirements as are necessary for the 
exercise of power by the court," and then followed in Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments by the following discussion:

A void "judgment" is 
often said to include one rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction of subject 
matter of the action or lacking jurisdiction with respect to the party against 
whom it is purported to be rendered. However, the term has also been used to 
describe a judgment procured by fraud of one kind or another. A "voidable" 
judgment is often said to include one based on mistake or "intrinsic" fraud [on 
procured, e.g., by perjured testimony]. But the term is also sometime used to 
include judgments procured by fraud that prevented a party from having a fair 
opportunity to contest an action. More fundamentally, the distinction even in 
its core meaning is untenable under modern decisional law * * *. To characterize 
a judgment as void before it has been so declared is therefore to make a 
predictive statement about how the judgment should be treated but does not 
provide a description of the attributes of the judgment that would justify 
denying it legal effect. In the interest of clarity, the terms "void" and 
"voidable" are not employed in the rules in this chapter.