Case Title: State ex rel. Foor v. Rockwell Internatl.

Citation: 1997-Ohio-200

Docket Number: 19950271

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-05-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
The State ex rel. Foor, Appellant, v. Rockwell International et al., 
Appellees. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Foor v. Rockwell Internatl. (1997), ___ Ohio St.3d 
___.] 
Workers’ compensation -- Application for temporary total disability 
compensation -- Denial of claim by Industrial Commission 
supported by “some evidence,” when. 
 
(No. 95-271 -- Submitted March 4, 1997 -- Decided May 14, 1997.) 
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 
93APD12-1751. 
 
Appellant-claimant, Noel E. Foor, was injured in 1987 in the course 
of and arising from his employment with appellee Rockwell International.  
His workers’ compensation claim was subsequently allowed for “right 
thoracic myositis.”  Sometime in mid-1989, claimant moved appellee 
Industrial Commission of Ohio to additionally allow his claim for “bilateral 
radiculopathy.”  In August 1989, he separately filed a motion with the 
commission for payment of temporary total disability compensation 
commencing January 24, 1989. 
 
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Several medical reports are contained in the record.  The only reports 
that address claimant’s ability to return to his former position of 
employment are a January 24, 1989 narrative from Dr. J. Paul Martz and a 
C84 “Physician’s Report Supplemental” from Dr. G.E. Konold.  Dr. Martz 
certified claimant’s inability to return to his former job, but based his 
opinion on “chronic cervicodorsal and lumbar ligamentous strain; 
degenerative disc disease C5-C6” -- none of which are allowed conditions.  
Dr. Konold attributed claimant’s disability in part to “bilateral upper 
extremity weakness/pain.”  Dr. Robert A. Weisenburger, an orthopedic 
surgeon, specifically concluded however that claimant’s bilateral 
radiculopathy was unrelated to his industrial injury.  Dr. Weinsenburger 
stated in his report: 
 
“* * * [T]he original diagnosis was that of a myositis of the 
musculature of the shoulder.  He was treated conservatively and after a 
period he returned to employment.  His employment was at a lighter level 
than he had been doing previously and after he was  back to work for 
somewhat over a year he then noted radiation of pain into his upper 
extremities.  It should be noted that the radicular pain into his upper 
 
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extremities anatomically would originate from the cervical spine and his 
difficulty was in [the] right thorax which is below the level of the cervical 
spine.  Also, the fact that he did well for over one year and then the 
radiculopathy became apparent leads one to believe that the accident of 
April 29, 1987 was not the cause of his bilateral upper extremity 
radiculopathy.” 
 
A district hearing officer denied claimant’s motions on January 18, 
1990, as follows: 
 
“Claimant’s C-86 for an additional allowance of bilateral 
radiculopathy is denied, and therefore, said condition is specifically denied, 
Dr. Weisenburger’s report of 12-5-89 is found to be persuasive. 
 
“Claimant’s two C-86 motions for temporary total compensation one 
filed 1/4/90 and one filed 8/16/89, are both denied.  Both temporary total 
compensation motions rely on the condition for which the additional 
allowance was requested, and, as is indicated above, the additional 
allowance was denied.  Temporary total compensation is, therefore, 
specifically disallowed for the period from 1/24/89 through 12/18/89.” 
The order was administratively affirmed. 
 
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Claimant appealed the commission’s refusal to recognize bilateral 
radiculopathy to the Court of Common Pleas of Licking County.  Rockwell 
moved for summary judgment.  The court sustained that motion, holding 
that the commissioner’s order was not appealable.  The court reasoned that 
radiculopathy was a symptom of a larger condition and not a condition 
itself.  Because radiculopathy was not a “condition,” the commission’s order 
related to the “extent of disability” and hence was not appealable.  The 
Court of Appeals for Licking County affirmed. 
 
Seizing upon the reasoning that bilateral radiculopathy was not a 
condition, claimant challenged the commission’s denial of his claim for 
temporary total disability compensation by filing this action in mandamus in 
the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.  The court of appeals denied the 
writ, concluding that regardless of whether it was considered a symptom or 
condition, bilateral radiculopathy, according to Dr. Weisenburger, was 
unrelated to claimant’s industrial injury.  Accordingly, the court of appeals 
found that the commission did not abuse its discretion in denying temporary 
total disability compensation and denied the writ. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
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Jurus Law Offices and Michael J. Muldoon, for appellant. 
 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, Diane C. Reichwein and 
Christopher C. Russell, for appellee Rockwell International. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Yolanda V. Vorys, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
 
Per Curiam.  The only allowed condition in this claim is “right 
thoracic myositis.”  Claimant asked the commission to formally recognize 
“bilateral radiculopathy” as an allowed condition.  The commission refused.   
 
Claimant did not prevail on appeal to the courts because they viewed 
the commission’s order as one involving extent of disability -- a 
nonappealable order.  R.C. 4123.512.  They reached that conclusion by 
characterizing bilateral radiculopathy not as a “condition” -- which would 
have made the commission’s order appealable on “right to participate” 
grounds -- but as a “symptom.”  This characterization, according to 
claimant, compels the award of temporary total disability compensation. 
 
Claimant’s reasoning is somewhat unclear.  Perhaps claimant believes 
that in characterizing bilateral radiculopathy as a symptom and not a 
condition, the courts inherently declared that  bilateral radiculopathy was 
 
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causally related to claimant’s industrial injury.  Contrary to claimant’s 
belief, however, neither court addressed the causal-relationship question. 
 
Claimant may also theorize that the invalidation of the commission’s 
disallowance of bilateral radiculopathy as a condition neutralizes the only 
reasoning the commission offered for refusing to award temporary total 
disability compensation, and that this, in turn, compels compensation.  This 
theory lacks merit. 
 
The lack of “some evidence” supporting the denial of temporary total 
disability compensation does not automatically translate into “some 
evidence” supporting its award.  State ex rel. Lampkins v. Dayton 
Malleable, Inc. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 14, 542 N.E.2d 1105.  Claimant 
retains the burden of establishing the necessary prerequisites to eligibility 
for temporary total disability compensation.  Claimant cannot do so here.  
Claimant’s proffered certification of temporary total disability is based on 
his bilateral radiculopathy.  Dr. Weisenburger, on whom the commission 
relied, stated that claimant’s bilateral radiculopathy was not caused by his 
industrial injury.  Thus, regardless of the label applied -- “symptom” or 
 
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“condition” -- a lack of causal relationship disqualifies bilateral 
radiculopathy as a basis for temporary total disability compensation. 
 
Claimant argues that Weisenburger’s report cannot support the 
commission’s denial of  temporary total disability compensation prior to 
April 10, 1989, since Weisenburger did not examine claimant until that date.  
Claimant’s reliance, however, on State ex rel. Case v. Indus. Comm. (1986), 
28 Ohio St.3d 383, 28 OBR 442, 504 N.E.2d 30, is misplaced.  Case 
indicates that a doctor cannot offer an opinion on a claimant’s extent of 
disability for a period that preceded the doctor’s examination of the 
claimant.  Logic supports this principle.  A claimant’s condition can change 
with time, and simply because a claimant was not temporarily totally 
disabled at one point does not mean that claimant could not be so disabled 
later. 
 
In this case, the relevant portion of Dr. Weisenburger’s report 
involved causal relationship, not extent of disability.  This is a critical 
distinction.  The original causal relationship of a symptom/condition to an 
industrial injury -- unlike the extent of disability -- does not change with the 
passage of time.  Dr. Weisenburger’s report, therefore, keeps its evidentiary 
 
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viability and is “some evidence” justifying the commission’s denial of 
temporary total disability compensation. 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK 
and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.