Case Title: In re E.C.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 413A19

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2020-11-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 413A19  
Filed 20 November 2020 
IN THE MATTER OF: E.C., C.C., N.C. 
 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 8 
August 2019 by Judge David H. Strickland in District Court, Mecklenburg County. 
This matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 7 October 2020 
but determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) 
of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.  
 
Keith S. Smith, Senior Associate County Attorney, for petitioner-appellee 
Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services, Youth and Family Services 
Division.  
 
Ward and Smith, P.A., by Mary V. Cavanagh, for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
J. Thomas Diepenbrock for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
 
HUDSON, Justice. 
 
Respondent, the mother of minor children E.C. (Ellen)1, C.C. (Cathy), and N.C. 
(Nancy), appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights. Because 
we hold that the unchallenged findings of fact support the trial court’s conclusion that 
grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(2) for willfully leaving her children in foster care or a placement outside of 
                                            
1 Pseudonyms are used to protect the juveniles’ identities and for ease of reading.  
IN RE E.C., C.C., N.C. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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the home for more than twelve months without making reasonable progress to correct 
the conditions that led to their removal, we affirm. 
 
On 29 October 2015, the Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services, 
Youth and Family Services Division (YFS), obtained nonsecure custody of Ellen, and 
Cathy and filed a juvenile petition alleging that they were dependent juveniles.2 The 
juvenile petition alleged that respondent was incarcerated in August 2015 and had a 
scheduled release date of February or March 2016. At the time of respondent’s 
incarceration, respondent requested that her adult daughter stay with the juveniles 
and provide care for them. The adult daughter did not make enough money to 
continue providing care for the juveniles or to maintain the home. Also at the time of 
her incarceration, respondent was behind on several bills, including electricity, gas, 
and rent. In early October 2015, the electricity in the family’s home was turned off, 
and an eviction notice was served on the family demanding that they vacate the home 
by 30 October 2015. In December 2015, while respondent was incarcerated, she gave 
birth to Nancy. YFS obtained nonsecure custody of Nancy on 7 December 2015 and 
filed a juvenile petition alleging that she was a dependent juvenile.  
 
Following a hearing on 22 February 2016, the trial court entered an 
adjudication and disposition order on 8 April 2016. The trial court concluded that 
                                            
2 The juvenile petition and nonsecure custody order also concerned four of 
respondent’s other children, but they are not the subjects of this appeal. 
IN RE E.C., C.C., N.C. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Ellen, Cathy, and Nancy (collectively, the children) were dependent juveniles and 
continued custody with YFS.   
 
Following her release from prison in March 2016, respondent entered into a 
Family Services Agreement (FSA) with YFS on 15 March 2016. The FSA required 
respondent to: (1) complete a Families in Recovery to Stay Together (FIRST) 
assessment; (2) complete a Love and Logic Parenting course; (3) obtain employment; 
and (4) obtain safe and stable housing. Respondent had already completed a FIRST 
assessment on 14 March 2016 and it was recommended that she undergo a mental 
health assessment at Amara Wellness. She started the parenting course on 9 April 
2016. Respondent completed a mental health assessment and the Love and Logic 
Parenting course in May 2016.  
 
Following a hearing on 25 October 2016, the trial court entered a permanency 
planning order on 15 November 2016 finding that respondent was making limited 
progress on her case plan. She was taking temporary work assignments through a 
labor agency and was living with the children’s father in a motel room. The trial court 
set the primary permanent plan as reunification and the secondary permanent plan 
as adoption and guardianship.  
 
Following a hearing on 27 January 2017, the trial court entered a subsequent 
permanency planning order finding that respondent needed to participate in mental 
health services on a consistent basis. Although it was recommended that she 
IN RE E.C., C.C., N.C. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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participate in outpatient therapy two times per week, respondent had last seen her 
therapist on 6 January 2017.  
The trial court held a hearing on 14 June 2017 and entered a subsequent 
permanency planning order on 15 August 2017 finding that respondent was not 
making adequate progress on her case plan within a reasonable time. She continued 
to live in a motel room with the children’s father and acknowledged that it did not 
provide sufficient space to house her, the children’s father, and all of her children. 
Respondent had last seen her therapist in May 2017. She had reported that she was 
working full time at Jack in the Box, but YFS was not able to confirm her 
employment. The trial court changed the primary permanent plan to adoption and 
the secondary permanent plan to reunification, guardianship, or custody with a 
relative or other suitable person.  
Following a hearing on 1 November 2017, the trial court entered a subsequent 
permanency planning order on 9 November 2017 finding that respondent failed to 
attend therapy sessions. Respondent had not seen her therapist at Amara Wellness 
since May 2017. She claimed to be receiving therapy at a different agency but could 
not provide confirmation. Respondent had failed to attend several medical 
appointments for the children. 
The trial court held a permanency planning hearing that began on 22 March 
2018 but was continued to 3 May 2018 and then again to 13 July 2018. The trial court 
entered an order on 29 August 2018 finding that respondent had last participated in 
IN RE E.C., C.C., N.C. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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therapy in March 2018 and still lived in a motel room with the children’s father. 
Respondent had left her employment at Jack in the Box and was working at 
McDonald’s. The trial court concluded that termination of respondent’s parental 
rights was in the best interests of the children and ordered YFS to file a petition to 
terminate respondent’s parental rights within sixty days.  
On 27 November 2018, YFS filed petitions to terminate respondent’s parental 
rights to the children. YFS alleged grounds of neglect, willfully leaving the children 
in foster care or placement outside the home for more than twelve months without 
making reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to their removal, and 
dependency. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), (6) (2019).  
A hearing on YFS’s petition for termination took place on 22 May 2019, 23 May 
2019, and 11 June 2019. On 8 August 2019, the trial court entered an order 
terminating respondent’s parental rights. The trial court concluded that grounds 
existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights and that it was in the children’s 
best interests that respondent’s parental rights be terminated. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1110(a) (2019). Respondent appealed.  
Respondent contends that the trial court erred by adjudicating grounds for 
termination of her parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (6). 
Because only one ground is needed to terminate parental rights, we only address 
respondent’s arguments regarding the ground of willfully leaving the children in 
foster care or a placement outside of the home for more than twelve months without 
IN RE E.C., C.C., N.C. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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making reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to their removal. See In 
re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404 (1982) (“[T]he trial court is authorized to terminate 
parental rights ‘upon a finding of one or more’ of the six grounds . . . .”). 
We review a trial court’s adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109 “to determine 
whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the 
findings support the conclusions of law.” In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111 (1984). 
Here, respondent does not challenge any findings of fact, and thus, they are binding 
on appeal. In re D.W.P., 373 N.C. 327, 330 (2020). “The trial court’s conclusions of law 
are reviewable de novo on appeal.” In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19 (2019) (citing In re 
S.N., 194 N.C. App. 142, 146 (2008), aff’d per curiam, 363 N.C. 368 (2009)). 
Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), a trial court may terminate parental 
rights if “[t]he parent has willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement outside 
the home for more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the court 
that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting those 
conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). “[T]he 
willfulness of a parent’s failure to make reasonable progress toward correcting the 
conditions that led to a child’s removal from the family home ‘is established when the 
[parent] had the ability to show reasonable progress, but was unwilling to make the 
effort.’ ” In re L.E.W., 846 S.E.2d 460, 469 (N.C. 2020) (second alteration in original) 
(quoting In re Fletcher, 148 N.C. App. 228, 235 (2002)). 
IN RE E.C., C.C., N.C. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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 “[P]arental compliance with a judicially adopted case plan is relevant in 
determining whether grounds for termination exist pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(2) . . . .” In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 384 (2019). A trial court should refrain 
from finding that a parent has failed to make reasonable progress in correcting the 
conditions that led to the children’s removal “simply because of his or her ‘failure to 
fully satisfy all elements of the case plan goals.” Id. at 385 (citation omitted). 
However, “a trial court has ample authority to determine that a parent’s ‘extremely 
limited progress’ in correcting the conditions leading to removal adequately supports 
a determination that a parent’s parental rights in a particular child are subject to 
termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).” Id. (citation omitted). 
Respondent argues that the trial court’s findings of fact do not support its 
conclusion that she failed to correct the removal conditions by the time of the 
termination hearing. She argues that the conditions that must be corrected “are 
limited to those set forth in the underlying petition” and that “[i]ssues which arise 
after the child’s removal are irrelevant to the analysis.” Respondent asserts that by 
the time of the termination hearing, she had addressed the single issue that led to 
the removal of her children—“the need for stable and appropriate housing.” Her 
argument is without merit. 
In In re B.O.A., this Court rejected a similar argument, stating that 
 
nothing in the relevant statutory language suggests that 
the only ‘conditions of removal’ that are relevant to a 
determination of whether a particular parent’s parental 
IN RE E.C., C.C., N.C. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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rights in a particular child are subject to termination 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) are limited to those 
which are explicitly set out in a petition seeking the entry 
of a nonsecure custody order or a determination that a 
particular child is an abused, neglected, or dependent 
juvenile. 
 
372 N.C. at 381. The trial court in an abuse, neglect, and dependency proceeding “has 
the authority to order a parent to take any step reasonably required to alleviate any 
condition that directly or indirectly contributed to causing the juvenile’s removal from 
the parental home.” Id. This Court concluded that: 
as long as a particular case plan provision addresses an 
issue that, directly or indirectly, contributed to causing the 
juvenile’s removal from the parental home, the extent to 
which a parent has reasonably complied with that case 
plan 
provision 
is, 
at 
minimum, 
relevant 
to 
the 
determination of whether that parent’s parental rights in 
his or her child are subject to termination for failure to 
make reasonable progress pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(2). 
 
Id. at 385. 
  
 
In the initial adjudication and disposition order, the trial court found that the 
children were placed in YFS custody due to respondent’s incarceration, “which led to 
financial disruption and the eviction of the family[,]” and because no relative or 
caretaker could provide for them. In addition, the trial court made unchallenged 
findings of fact in its termination order that respondent’s issues “revolve and have 
revolved around parenting, mental health concerns, and housing instability.” These 
findings of fact establish the necessary “nexus” between the components of 
IN RE E.C., C.C., N.C. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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respondent’s court-approved case plan with which she failed to comply and the 
conditions which led to the children’s removal. See In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. at 385. 
 Respondent next argues that the trial court’s findings of fact fail to support its 
conclusion that she willfully left the children in foster care. She contends that the 
findings fail to reflect her efforts to make a “positive and sustained response toward 
achieving reunification with her children.” We disagree. 
 
In its termination order, the trial court found that a case plan was developed 
for respondent in February 2016 to “address issues of parenting concerns, mental 
health concerns[,] and housing instability.” Respondent only addressed the housing 
component of her case plan by moving into a four-bedroom house, and she did not 
address that component until April 2019.  
 
Regarding parenting concerns, the trial court found that respondent adopted 
some stray cats and refused to get rid of them after Ellen and Cathy experienced 
allergic reactions during visitations. The trial court found that respondent had shown 
up for very few of the children’s medical, dental, and therapy appointments, that 
respondent lacked the ability to understand and meet the needs of her children, and 
that respondent lacked a plan to understand and meet the children’s needs. The trial 
court also found that on or about 29 August 2018, another child (Amy) of respondent 
who was also in YFS custody, had been placed with respondent for several months. 
Respondent became upset in response to a hearing during which the trial court 
ordered YFS to proceed with terminating respondent’s parental rights to the children 
IN RE E.C., C.C., N.C. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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and demanded that YFS pick up Amy and place her back into foster care because she 
did not want to take care of her.  
With respect to the mental health component of respondent’s case plan, the 
trial court found that respondent was diagnosed, inter alia, with unspecified 
personality disorder with narcissistic, antisocial, and borderline traits, bipolar I 
disorder, and unspecified anxiety disorder. In March 2016, it was recommended that 
respondent engage in mental health services with Amara Wellness. Respondent 
attended sessions at Amara Wellness from March 2016 until spring 2017, but was 
inconsistent with attending her appointments. She began receiving mental health 
services again in the spring of 2018 until October 2018, but she had not received any 
mental health treatment from October 2018 until the date of the termination hearing 
in May and June of 2019.   
 
These unchallenged findings of fact establish that respondent failed to comply 
with the components of her case plan addressing her parenting and mental health 
concerns. While respondent addressed the housing component of her case plan by 
moving from a motel room into a house, she did so only a month before the 
termination hearing. This limited and delayed progress does not amount to 
reasonable progress in light of the fact that the children had been in YFS custody for 
over three years. See, e.g., In re B.S.D.S., 163 N.C. App. 540, 546 (2004) (holding that 
when the respondent had not followed through on her obligation to seek therapy, only 
IN RE E.C., C.C., N.C. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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seeing a counselor three weeks prior to the termination hearing, such a delayed effort 
was deemed to be insufficient progress.).  
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court’s findings of fact support 
its conclusion that grounds exist to terminate respondent’s parental rights to the 
children under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). The trial court’s conclusion on this ground 
is “sufficient in and of itself to support termination of respondent’s parental rights.” 
In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 413 (2019). Respondent does not challenge the trial court’s 
conclusion that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interests. 
See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating 
respondent’s parental rights to the children. 
AFFIRMED.