Case Title: MARTINDALE v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 00-99

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
MARTINDALE v. STATE2001 WY 5224 P.3d 1138Case Number: 00-99Decided: 06/13/2001
 
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2001

                                                                                                            

HOWARD 
LEE MARTINDALE,

Appellant(Defendant),

v.

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Uinta County

The 
Honorable John D. Troughton, Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

Sylvia 
Lee Hackl, State Public Defender and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. Domonkos.

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; and Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Rehurek.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

 *This 
case was originally assigned to Justice Thomas on December 15, 2000, for the 
rendering of a proffered majority opinion.  
This case was reassigned to Justice Hill on February 5, 
2001.

 
            
HILL, Justice.

[¶1]      Howard Lee 
Martindale (Martindale) entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of 
unlawful use of a credit card in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-802(a)(i) 
and (b)(iii) (LEXIS 1999).  On 
appeal, Martindale challenges the district court's denial of a motion to 
suppress evidence discovered after an investigatory stop.  We conclude that the stop of Martindale 
was supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and affirm the 
district court's order.

ISSUE

[¶2]      Martindale 
presents this issue for review:

Whether 
the district court erred when it denied Martindale's motion to suppress evidence 
found after a stop which was not supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity?

The 
State's statement of the issue is substantially similar:

Did the 
district court properly deny appellant's motion to suppress 
evidence?

[¶3]      On October 12, 
1999, Officer Rasmussen of the Evanston Police Department stopped a vehicle 
driven by Travis Kidd after a registration check revealed that the car's license 
plates were listed as lost or stolen.  
Officer Matthews arrived on the scene shortly after Kidd was 
stopped.  The officers sought to 
ascertain why Kidd was driving with license plates that did not belong to his 
vehicle, but Kidd could not offer a reasonable explanation.  The officers noticed that while Kidd had 
been drinking a bottle of soda, another cold bottle of soda and a coat were on 
the passenger seat.  Officer 
Matthews testified that Kidd indicated he was traveling with a Howard 
Martindale, and that he had been driving around the area looking for him.  Officer Rasmussen testified that Kidd 
did not name his companion in his presence, although Kidd did state that he was 
traveling with someone.

[¶4]      While questioning 
Kidd, the officers noted a man who walked past the scene and made eye contact 
with Kidd.  The eye contact 
indicated to Officer Matthews that Kidd and the man knew each other.  The man continued on for a distance and 
then sat down in front of a motel to watch the scene.  This struck both officers as 
unusual.

[¶5]      Meanwhile, Kidd 
had granted the officers permission to search his vehicle.  Inside the trunk, the officers found 
several boxes containing a large collection of coins.  After receiving an inconsistent 
explanation for the presence of the coins, the officers asked police dispatch to 
check for any recent burglaries.  
Dispatch confirmed that Natrona County officials reported a recent 
burglary involving a coin collection.  
Confronted with that information, Kidd blurted out, "It was a 
burglary.  We  we did it in 
Paradise Valley."  Kidd was placed 
under arrest for possession of the stolen coins.

[¶6]      After placing 
Kidd in the back seat of Officer Rasmussen's patrol car, Officer Matthews 
glanced over at the man sitting in front of the motel.  Upon making eye contact with Officer 
Matthews, the man stood up and began to quickly walk away around the corner of 
the motel.  Officer Matthews got 
into his patrol car and intercepted the man.  When asked what he was doing, the man 
replied that he was just curious.  
The man gave his name as Howard Martindale but initially denied knowing a 
Trevor Kidd.  However, when told 
that Kidd had said he knew him, Martindale stated that he did know Kidd and was 
catching a ride with him to Salt Lake City.  When confronted with information that 
Kidd had been arrested for the stolen coins found inside the trunk, Martindale 
stated that he knew the coins were stolen, but that he had nothing to do with 
any burglary.

[¶7]      Martindale was 
carrying a black nylon video camera case, and Officer Matthews asked if he could 
search it.  Martindale nodded 
affirmatively and set the camera case on the hood of the patrol car.  Inside the case were a new video camera, 
several new compact discs, two eight-millimeter tapes, and a receipt from the 
Evanston Wal-Mart.  At that point, 
Martindale was arrested based on his possible ties to the stolen coins.  A search of Martindale's person revealed 
a credit card with a woman's name on it.  
The credit card had been used to purchase the video camera.  At that point, Martindale stated, "I 
used the credit card. I signed the name.  
I'll take the wrap [sic] for that.  But I had nothing to do with the 
burglary."

[¶8]      Martindale was 
charged with one felony count of unlawful use of a credit card in violation of § 
6-3-802(a)(i) and (b)(iii)1.  On November 19, 1999, Martindale filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search on the basis that 
Officer Matthews "had neither probable cause to arrest nor reasonable 
articulable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop."  After a hearing on the motion, the 
district court issued an Order Denying Motion to Suppress on December 20, 
1999.  The district court concluded 
the officers had a reasonable suspicion that Martindale might be Kidd's 
companion and were, therefore, justified in stopping him and asking for 
identification.  Martindale 
subsequently changed his plea to a conditional plea of guilty pursuant to 
W.R.Cr.P. 11, reserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to 
suppress on appeal.  That appeal is 
now before us.

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶9]      We utilize the 
following standard for reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to 
suppress:

We 
generally do not disturb evidentiary rulings made by a trial court unless the 
trial court abused its discretion.  
Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 1994).  In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a 
motion to suppress evidence, we do not interfere with the trial court's findings 
of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous.  Gehnert v. State, 956 P.2d 359, 
361 (Wyo. 1998).  We view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's determination because 
the trial court has an opportunity at the evidentiary hearing to assess "the 
credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary 
inferences, deductions, and conclusions." Id.  The constitutionality of a particular 
search or seizure is, however, a question of law that we review de novo. 
Id.; Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 690 (Wyo. 
1995).

Putnam 
v. State, 995 P.2d 632, 635 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Burgos-Seberos v. State, 969 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Wyo. 1998)).

DISCUSSION

[¶10]   Martindale challenges the validity 
of the investigatory stop under the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution arguing that 
reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop did not exist2.  Martindale prefaces his argument with an 
attack on the district court's factual findings.  Specifically, the district court stated 
in its order denying the motion to suppress that the facts were not in dispute, 
including the finding that Kidd informed the officers that he had been driving 
around looking for Howard Martindale.  
This finding is clearly erroneous, Martindale contends, when contrasted 
with the testimony of Officer Rasmussen who stated that Kidd did not, in fact, 
name his traveling companion.  In 
addition, Martindale argues that his actions were insufficient to raise a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.  He points out that walking by a police 
stop and then watching from a distance is hardly an unusual or suspicious 
activity.  Thus, Martindale 
concludes that the investigatory stop by Officer Matthews was not reasonable as 
it was based on only a hunch.

[¶11]   "The investigatory stop represents 
a seizure which invokes Fourth Amendment safeguards, but, by its less intrusive 
character, requires only the presence of specific and articulable facts and 
rational inferences which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has 
committed or may be committing a crime."  
Wilson, 874 P.2d 220 (citing Lopez v. State, 643 P.2d 682, 
683)); see also Putnam, 995 P.2d  at 637; and McChesney v. State, 
988 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo. 1999).  We 
have a dual inquiry for evaluating the reasonableness of an investigatory stop: 
(1) whether the officer's actions were justified at the inception; and (2) 
whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified 
the interference in the first instance.  
Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 223 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S.  at 20, 88 
S.Ct. at 1879); see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228, 105 S. Ct. 675, 680, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985).  
An officer's conduct is judged by an objective standard which takes into 
account the totality of the circumstances. Putnam, 995 P.2d  at 637; 
Terry, 392 U.S.  at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1879-81; United States v. 
Lang, 81 F.3d 955, 965 (10th Cir. 1996).

[¶12]   After reviewing the record, we 
conclude that Officer Matthews possessed reasonable articulable suspicions that 
justified the investigatory stop of Martindale.  The record discloses the following: (1) 
Kidd was driving a vehicle with plates that did not belong to it; (2) Kidd's 
statements indicated that he was traveling with a person named Howard Martindale 
and was looking for him in the area where he was stopped; (3) the presence of a 
coat and a bottle of soda on the passenger seat corroborated Kidd's statements; 
(4) when Martindale walked past the scene, he made eye contact with Kidd 
indicating that they knew each other; (5) Martindale stopped further up the 
street and sat down to watch the stop;  
(6) a large cache of stolen coins was found inside the trunk of the car; 
and (7) after Kidd was arrested, Martindale got up and started to walk away when 
Officer Matthews looked over at him.  
Considered in isolation, Martindale's actions could be construed as the 
innocent behavior of a curious bystander.  
However, when viewed in light of all of the circumstances, Martindale's 
actions clearly support a reasonable suspicion that he may have had some 
connection to Kidd and the stolen coins.  
Officer Matthews' detention of Martindale was legitimate under the 
circumstances.

[¶13]   Even if we accepted Martindale's 
position and discounted Officer Matthews' testimony that Kidd had named 
Martindale as his companion, we would still find his detention legitimate.  While Officer Rasmussen testified that 
Kidd did not name Martindale, he also testified that Kidd admitted he was 
traveling with someone.  The 
officers did not know whom Martindale was when he walked by the scene, but they 
did know that Kidd had a traveling companion who may have had some involvement 
with the stolen coins.  Martindale's 
actions supported the investigatory stop whether or not Kidd had disclosed any 
name based on the evidence indicating that another person may be connected to 
the crime.

[¶14]   Martindale briefly argues that even 
if there was a reasonable, articulable suspicion to perform the stop, the stop 
went beyond the scope of the permissible seizure when Officer Matthews searched 
the camera case.  While his brief is 
unclear, it appears that Martindale is claiming that the search of the camera 
case was based on only a hunch, as it was clearly unrelated to the investigation 
of the crime for which the stop was originally initiated  the stolen coins in 
the trunk of Kidd's vehicle.  The 
State points out that Officer Matthews had probable cause to arrest Martindale 
once his identity was established, and the camera case would have been subject 
to a search incident to the arrest in any event.  Beyond that, however, we note that 
Martindale gave his consent to search the camera case.  Martindale makes no argument that his 
consent was coerced in any way, and the record shows that the circumstances 
surrounding the consent were not confrontational.  Without any cogent argument by 
Martindale on this issue, we will uphold the search of the camera 
case.

CONCLUSION

[¶15]   We conclude that the investigatory 
stop of Martindale was supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion and, 
therefore, the district court's order denying his motion to suppress is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

  1Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-3-802 (LEXIS 1999) states:

                        
§ 6-3-802. Unlawful use of credit card; 
penalties.

(a)     A person is guilty of unlawful use of a credit card 
if, with the intent to obtain property or services by fraud, 
he:

(i)       
Uses a credit card, or the number 
or description of a credit card, issued to another person without the consent of 
that person[.]

. . . .

(b)     Unlawful use of a credit card 
is:

. . . .

(iii)  A felony punishable by imprisonment for 
not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars 
($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the property or services purchased or 
obtained in violation of this section within any sixty (60) day period in the 
state of Wyoming totals five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more in the 
aggregate.

  
2Martindale does 
not offer an alternative analysis under the Wyoming Constitution, relying 
instead on the analytical framework for reviewing investigatory detentions set 
forth in our decisions in Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215 (Wyo. 1994) and 
Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688 (Wyo. 1993).  Those decisions reviewed the propriety 
of an investigatory detention by law enforcement within the context of the 
standards set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968) and subsequent federal case law.  Wilson, 874 P.2d at 219-220; 
Collins, 854 P.2d  at 692.  
Since Martindale makes no argument that a different standard should be 
applied to ascertain the permissible scope of an investigatory detention under 
the Wyoming Constitution, we will analyze both of his claims pursuant to the 
standards set forth in our precedents in Wilson and Collins.  See also Putnam, 995 P.2d  
at 637.