Case Title: In Re Adoption of Baby Boy

Citation: 106 Ariz. 195, 472 P.2d 64

Docket Number: 9762-PR

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1970-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
106 Ariz. 195 (1970) 472 P.2d 64 In the Matter of the ADOPTION OF a BABY BOY. NATURAL MOTHER, Appellant, v. ADOPTING PARENTS, Appellees. No. 9762-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. July 16, 1970. W. Michael Hammer, Phoenix, for appellant. Benton L. Blake, Phoenix, for appellee. McFARLAND, Justice: This case comes before us on a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals reversing an interlocutory order of the Superior Court for the adoption of a baby boy by the adopting parents. 10 Ariz. App. 47, 455 P.2d 997. Decision of the Court of Appeals vacated. The names of the persons involved are not set forth in this opinion and have been deleted from direct quotations from the record. They will be referred to as the baby boy, the adopting parents father or mother, as appropriate and the natural mother. The natural father will be referred to hereinafter as the natural father or the husband. The natural mother at the time of the hearing was twenty-six years of age. She had previously been a resident of Minnesota. She is a graduate of high school, and for three months attended an airline business school at St. Paul, Minnesota. She had previously worked for The West Publishing Company in St. Paul as a typing clerk for about two and a half years. She *196 was married to the natural father August 1, 1963, in South Dakota, at which time she was one month short of twenty-two years of age. The husband had been previously married and was divorced. They moved from Minnesota on August 25, 1963, to Tucson, Arizona. While they were living in Arizona the infant child was born to them on the 19th day of October 1965. Six days later, on the 25th day of October, while the mother was lying on the couch with the infant child, the police came to the door and arrested her. She later pled guilty to two charges of passing checks with insufficient funds, and was given a sentence of one to five years in the Arizona State Prison on each of the charges, to run consecutively. She had previously pled guilty to a charge of "cashing a forged instrument" which instrument had been forged by the husband, in Monroeville, Missouri. She was given a six months suspended sentence and two years probation. Both she and her husband had been arrested on the charge, but she stated that she took the blame for the check. Upon the arrest of the natural mother in Phoenix, the husband took the child to the adopting mother's brother, who called his sister [the adopting mother] and asked her to take care of the child. The adopting mother was a half sister of the natural father. The evidence shows that the adopting parents were responsible people, approximately twenty years older than the natural mother. The ages of their six children ranged from twenty-four to thirteen, the three youngest living with the parents at the time of the hearing. The adopting father had a substantial position, and both were fond of the infant child. The adopting mother was appointed guardian of the person and estate of the baby boy, with the understanding according to the natural mother that they would never seek his adoption. The record shows that the natural mother had never given her consent to the adoption. The adopting parents after approximately a year and a half filed a petition for the adoption of the baby boy, representing that the natural father of the child had abandoned the minor child and wilfully deserted and neglected him, and had completely failed to provide the child with any financial assistance whatsoever that the natural mother was at the time incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison serving two consecutive terms of one to five years. The record shows that after the filing of the petition for adoption the natural father died on May 9, 1967 before the hearing on the adoption. Since his death the adopting parents have received $82.20 a month from the Veterans' Administration and Social Security for the child which they deposited to the child's credit. The testimony of the natural mother was to the effect that the natural father had never held a job since their marriage except for a very short period; that he drank heavily, and that he was an alcoholic. This was corroborated by the social worker's report. The court appointed Inez McLain, court investigator, and Catherine Fernandez, social worker, to investigate the case, who filed a joint report but did not personally appear at the hearing. The petition was set down for hearing, and the natural mother appeared and was ably represented at the time of the petition by a representative of the Legal Aid Society in Pinal County and the present attorney who is also a representative of the Legal Aid Society. She was well represented at both the trial and on appeal. The natural mother's brother also appeared at the trial and testified to his willingness to assist his sister by caring for the child, and that their father would also assist in the child's care. The brother was farming 320 acres of land owned by the parents of the natural mother and her brother. A letter was also filed by the natural mother from her former employer, The West Publishing Company, in which it was stated that the company was perfectly agreeable to re-employing her, based upon her good work during her previous employment, and that if she continued to perform her work in the same manner she could be assured of permanent employment. *197 The court in its interlocutory order for adoption made the following findings: The court further found that the natural mother at the time was in the Arizona State Prison, and would not be eligible for parole before January 1969 [the record shows that she was paroled some two months after that date]. The court further found that the natural mother was promised a job by her former employer, The West Publishing Company, at St. Paul, Minnesota [the record shows that she accepted such employment after her parole]. The court further found that the natural mother's brother and sister-in-law living in Herring Lake, Minnesota, were willing and able to take care of the child; that the natural mother was twenty-six years of age, in good health, without physical defects. The court also found that the adopting father was forty-seven years of age and the adopting mother forty-five years of age; that they had six children, were in good health, and that the adopting father had a good position; that the adopting parents had had the child since he was six days old, and that the adopting parents had given him good care, that they were entitled to an interlocutory order of adoption, which was granted, based upon the findings of fact. The court concluded that the best interests of the child would be promoted by permitting the petitioners to adopt him. It is from this order of the court that the natural mother appeals. One of the questions presented is that § 8-104, A.R.S., is unconstitutional because it deprives the natural mother of her child without due process of law. This contention that there was not due process of law is not well founded. The natural mother was represented by counsel, and the proceedings of the court conform to the requirements in Caruso v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 167, 412 P.2d 463. Counsel for the natural mother also contends that the trial court did not have jurisdiction for two reasons: One, that Judge Tang, the Juvenile Judge, had no authority to transfer the case to Judge Hardy for hearing. Rule 16(a) (2), Uniform Rules of Practice, 17 A.R.S., as amended February 1967, permits such transfers. The next question is a more serious one. It is contended that the natural mother not having consented to the adoption, and there not being a finding by the trial court that the child was dependent, neglected, incorrigible, or delinquent, the court did not have jurisdiction. The applicable sections of Arizona Revised Statutes, as amended, are as follows: In In re Webb's Adoption, 65 Ariz. 176, 177 P.2d 222, this Court, in referring to jurisdiction of adoptions, stated: In Westerlund v. Croaff, 68 Ariz. 36, 198 P.2d 842, we interpreted the question of whether the consent of the parents or guardian was essential to the jurisdiction of the court in an adoption proceeding under the statute that existed at that time. The Court stated: In the case of Anderson v. Pima County Department of Public Welfare, 77 Ariz. *199 339, 271 P.2d 834, in which we held that the State Department of Public Welfare is not authorized to give consent to the adoption of a minor child, we said: In Caruso v. Superior Court in and for the County of Pima, 100 Ariz. 167, 412 P.2d 463, we set forth the conditions required to give jurisdiction in an adoption case where consent was not given by the parents. While in Anderson, supra, we held the public welfare department could not give consent to the adoption, there was no question but what the court had jurisdiction, as the mother had given "written relinquishment" of her rights in the child. He was homeless and destitute, and without support and care, and therefore a dependent child under the statute. The question then was whether the court had jurisdiction to grant the adoption. Section 27-203, A.C.A., 1939, as amended, and the current § 8-104, A.R.S., are identical, permitting the court to grant an adoption without the legal consent of the parent or legally qualified guardian when "the court determines that the interests of the child will be promoted thereby." The court had jurisdiction to make this determination in Anderson, supra, because the facts showed that the child was dependent. When Westerlund v. Croaff was decided, the court did not have such authority, and hence to that extent it was not applicable. The jurisdiction, in such cases, is made plain in Caruso, supra. We are confronted with the question of whether § 8-104 gives a court jurisdiction to hear a case merely on allegations of a petitioner that the best interests of a child will be promoted by the adoption. Such an interpretation would make meaningless § 8-103, subsec. A, which provides: and would be a repeal of that section by implication. In the case of State of Arizona, ex rel. E. Leigh Larson, v. Gordon Farley, Judge, and Shelley, Real Party in Interest, 106 Ariz. 119, 471 P.2d 731 (July 10, 1970), we held: The reasonable construction of § 8-104, A.R.S., is that it was intended to permit the trial court to make its determination on the question of whether "the interests of the child will be promoted" when and after the court has determined it has jurisdiction. Any other interpretation would permit petitioners who merely observed a fine-looking child whose parents were not in good financial circumstances to apply for the adoption of the child on the theory that it would be to the best interests of the child to grant the adoption because they would be able to send him through college, and to give him better training than his natural parents could. We do not believe that such was the intention of the legislature. The question then is whether under this construction the court had jurisdiction in the instant case. Such jurisdiction must be found from the petition, the pleadings of the natural mother, and the evidence in the case. The petitioners allege that: The natural mother filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the father had died on May 9, 1967, and that she was the sole remaining parent of said child and entitled to the care, custody and control of said child, and that she had not given her consent to the adoption. She admitted that she was incarcerated in the Arizona State Penitentiary but stated she expected to be paroled in January 1969, and alleged that she was capable of providing for the interests and support of the minor child. The allegation of the petitioners that the father had abandoned the minor child and wilfully deserted and neglected the child and had failed to provide him with any financial assistance was not denied in the record, and the mother being in the penitentiary no matter how good her intentions toward the child were the fact remains that as far as the natural parents were concerned, neither had given him support or a home home being the natural abode of love and affection which is essential to the well being of a child. We therefore hold that the allegations fall within the holding of Caruso, supra, and the definition of "dependent child" as set forth in A.R.S. § 8-201, subsec. 4, par. b and subsec. 5.[1] The court had jurisdiction to determine the question of the child's adoption. The court made its findings, and, although it failed to set forth a finding of dependency of the child, it did set forth facts which reasonably could have supported such a finding. In *202 In re Holman's Adoption, 80 Ariz. 201, 295 P.2d 372, we held: The court made the finding that the best interests of the child would be promoted by permitting the petitioners to adopt him. We have frequently held that the appellate court will not disturb the findings of a trial court, even where there is a conflict of evidence, and will not reverse a case unless the findings were clearly erroneous. Bohmfalk v. Vaughan, 89 Ariz. 33, 357 P.2d 617; Rossi v. Stewart, 90 Ariz. 207, 367 P.2d 242. Where the evidence is in conflict, the Supreme Court will not substitute its own opinion for that of the trial court. Evidence will be taken in the strongest manner in favor of the findings of the trial court. A.N.S. Properties, Inc. v. Gough Industries, Inc., 102 Ariz. 180, 427 P.2d 131. The fact that this Court might have taken a contrary view of the facts in a case does not authorize a reversal of a judgment. Land-Air, Inc., v. Parker, 103 Ariz. 1, 435 P.2d 838. In the instant case, the child will be five years of age on October 19th of this year, and under the circumstances of the case we do not find any ground for reversing the decision of the trial court, and disturbing the custody of the child who has only known the petitioners as parents, as they have had custody of him since he was six days old. Decision of the Court of Appeals vacated. Judgment of the Superior Court affirmed. LOCKWOOD, C.J., STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and UDALL and HAYS, JJ., concur. [1] § 8-201. * * * * * 4. "Neglected child" includes: * * * * * (b) A child who lacks proper parental control by reason of the fault or habits of the parent, guardian or custodian. * * * * * 5. "Dependent child" includes a child who is homeless or destitute, or without proper support or care through no fault of his parent or guardian, and a child who lacks proper care by reason of the mental or physical condition of his parent, guardian or custodian.