Case Title: Joseph T. Degregorio v. Williams F. Balkwill

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2003-08-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC02-1161
____________
JOSEPH T. DEGREGORIO,
Petitioner,
vs.
WILLIAM F. BALKWILL, etc.,
Respondent.
[August 21, 2003]
CORRECTED OPINION
CANTERO, J.
We review In re Forfeiture of One 1988 Lincoln Town Car, 826 So. 2d 342 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2002), which certified conflict with In re Forfeiture of One (1) 1994
Honda Prelude, 730 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).  We have jurisdiction.  See
art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  We must determine the effect of the deadlines for
filing forfeiture complaints that sections 932.701(2)(c) and 932.704(4), Florida
Statutes (1999), impose on state agencies that seize property.  As explained below,
we hold that such deadlines are mandatory.  
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I.
The Sheriff’s office of Sarasota County investigated possible criminal
activity involving two vehicles, a grey 1986 Lincoln Town Car and a blue 1988
Lincoln Town Car, located on Petitioner Joseph T. DeGregorio’s business
property.  The investigation revealed that the vehicle identification numbers on the
cars had been altered.  DeGregorio owned title to the 1986 Lincoln, but no record
showed that the 1988 Lincoln was titled or registered in Florida.
In July 1999, the Sheriff seized both vehicles.  Almost four months later, the
Sheriff filed a complaint for forfeiture against the two vehicles under the Florida
Contraband Forfeiture Act, sections 932.701-.707, Florida Statutes (1999) (the
“Act”).  The Sheriff later learned that in 1987, Budget Rent-A-Car of New York
had reported the 1988 Lincoln stolen.  The car never had been recovered.  The
Sheriff notified Budget of the seizure, and Budget released its interest to the Sheriff.
DeGregorio filed a claim to both vehicles in the forfeiture proceeding.  To
show his ownership, DeGregorio produced bills of sale from Tommy G’s Auto
Sales for both cars.  He also produced a Florida vehicle registration for the 1986
Lincoln.  He asserted that he neither knew nor should have known that the 1988
Lincoln was stolen or was contraband and that he was the true owner, as evidenced
by the bill of sale.  The Sheriff filed a motion to strike DeGregorio’s answer for
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lack of standing as to the 1988 Lincoln.  DeGregorio responded that he had
standing because he was a bona fide purchaser for value.  The trial court denied the
Sheriff’s motion to strike.  DeGregorio then moved for summary judgment,
asserting that because the Act required the Sheriff to file the forfeiture complaint
within 45 days after the seizure and the complaint was filed after that deadline, the
forfeiture should be dismissed.  The trial court agreed, relying on One 1994 Honda
Prelude, 730 So. 2d at 334, and granted summary judgment in DeGregorio’s favor.
The Sheriff appealed.  The Second District reversed the summary judgment
as it applied to the 1988 Lincoln because it concluded that DeGregorio lacked
standing to assert a claim to the vehicle.  Id. at 344.  The court also held that the
Act did not bar the Sheriff from initiating a forfeiture action more than 45 days after
seizure.  Id. 
II.
When interpreting statutes and discerning legislative intent, courts must first
look at the actual language of the statute.  Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d
432, 435 (Fla. 2000).  Legislative intent is determined primarily from the statute’s
language.  Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1999).  Moreover, because
forfeiture actions are considered harsh extractions, this Court has long followed a
policy of strictly construing forfeiture statutes.  Byrom v. Gallagher, 609 So. 2d 24,
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26 (Fla. 1992); Dep’t of Law Enforcement v. Real Prop., 588 So. 2d 957, 961 (Fla.
1991).  Therefore, any ambiguity in the statute must be construed against forfeiture.
In deciding this case, we must interpret several provisions of the Act. 
Section 932.704(4) provides:  “The seizing agency shall promptly proceed against
the contraband article by filing a complaint in the circuit court within the jurisdiction
where the seizure or the offense occurred.” (Emphasis added.)  Section
932.701(2)(c) defines “promptly proceed” as “to file the complaint within 45 days
after seizure.”  
A separate provision also refers to this time limitation.  Section 932.703 is
entitled “Forfeiture of contraband article; exceptions.”  Subsection (3) provides:
Neither replevin nor any other action to recover any interest in such
property shall be maintained in any court, except as provided in this
act; however, such action may be maintained if forfeiture proceedings
are not initiated within 45 days after the date of seizure.  However, if
good cause is shown, the court may extend the aforementioned
prohibition to 60 days.  
(Emphasis added.)  This section allows someone with an interest in seized property
to file a replevin action if the seizing agency fails to file a complaint within 45 days
after seizure (unless the court grants an extension to 60 days).
The Second District nevertheless concluded that none of these provisions, or
any other, bars a seizing agency from initiating a forfeiture action more than 45 days
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after seizure.  The court held that the time periods operate only as a temporary
prohibition or limitation on replevin actions and other claims by third parties and
not as a jurisdictional bar.  One 1988 Lincoln Town Car, 826 So. 2d at 344.  The
Fifth District held to the contrary in One 1994 Honda Prelude, 730 So. 2d at 336. 
In that case, the seizing agency waited over ten months after the seizure to even
notify the petitioner of the seizure.  The Fifth District concluded that section
932.703(3) allows the trial court to extend the 45-day filing requirement to 60 days
for good cause, but that this time period runs from the date of seizure.  730 So. 2d
at 336.  The Fifth District held that the agency’s failure to “promptly proceed” in its
forfeiture of the vehicle required the vehicle’s return to its owner.  Id.
Section 932.704(4) plainly states that the seizing agency “shall promptly
proceed against the contraband article by filing a complaint in the circuit court
within the jurisdiction where the seizure or the offense occurred.”  Promptly
proceed is defined in section 932.701(2)(c) as “to file the complaint within 45 days
after seizure.”  Thus, to initiate a forfeiture proceeding against property, the Act
requires the seizing agency to file a complaint within 45 days of seizure.
The only dispute here is whether the 45-day requirement is mandatory.  The
plain language of the statute answers that question.  The statute uses the word
“shall” to describe the seizing agency’s duty to file the complaint.  “Generally,
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where the word ‘shall’ refers to some required action preceding a possible
deprivation of a substantive right, the word is given its literal meaning.”  Stanford v.
State, 706 So. 2d 900, 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (relying on S.R. v. State, 346 So.
2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 1977), and Neal v. Bryant, 149 So. 2d 529, 532 (Fla. 1962)). 
In Neal, we explained that in its normal usage, “shall” has a mandatory connotation. 
Id.  Only when a particular provision relates to some immaterial matter, where
compliance is a matter of convenience rather than substance, or where the statute’s
directions are given merely with a view to the proper, orderly and prompt conduct
of business is the provision generally regarded as directory.  Id. (quoting Reid v.
Southern Dev. Co., 42 So. 206 (Fla. 1906)).  “Most certainly, where the statute
provides for the deprivation of a property right, the procedural requirements . . . in
question cannot be regarded as an ‘immaterial matter’ or a ‘matter of convenience
rather than substance.’”  Id.
Because the statute here provides for the deprivation of a property right, its
procedural requirements cannot be regarded as immaterial or a matter of mere
convenience.  We hold that the requirement in section 932.704(4) to “promptly
proceed” with a forfeiture action is mandatory, and that under section
932.701(2)(c), “promptly proceed” means what it says:  “to file the complaint
within 45 days after seizure.”
1.  The legislature added fourteen requirements to the Act after Real
Property.  For a detailed discussion of these amendments, see Richard A. Purdy,
Contraband Forfeiture:  1993 Survey of Florida Law, 18 Nova L. Rev. 213 (1993). 
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We note that in Real Property, we held the Act constitutional only because
we read into it certain procedures necessary to protect due process rights.  588 So.
2d at 968.  Among other defects, we noted that “the Act does not set out any
procedures for filing the [forfeiture] petition.”  Id. at 966.  In 1992, the Legislature
substantially amended the Act in reaction to Real Property.1  Among other things,
the changes added the current definition of “promptly proceed” as the term is used
in section 932.704(1), which provides that the state attorney “shall promptly
proceed against the contraband article.”  See ch. 92-54, § 1, Laws of Fla.  The
Legislature also amended section 932.703(3), which allowed an action for replevin
if forfeiture proceedings were not initiated within 90 days after seizure, to allow a
replevin action after only 45 days.  See id. § 3.  Therefore, in addition to the plain
language of the statute, because the 1992 amendments were intended to remedy
procedural defects in the Act, and because the amendments provide a more
structured framework for forfeiture actions, we conclude that the Legislature
intended that the seizing agency’s obligation to file a forfeiture complaint within 45
days of seizure is mandatory.
Several states have interpreted their forfeiture statutes in the same manner. 
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For example, in State v. 1978 LTD II, 701 P.2d 1365 (Mont. 1985), the Supreme
Court of Montana interpreted a statutory provision requiring that a "seizing agency
who seizes any property . . . under the provisions of this chapter, shall, within 45
days of the seizures, file a notice of the seizure and intention to institute forfeiture
proceedings with the clerk of the district court of the county in which the seizure
occurs."  Mont. Code § 44-12-201 (1984).  Finding that the "language of this statute
is mandatory," and that there was no provision for an extension of the time limit, the
Montana court concluded that the notice of seizure and intent to initiate forfeiture
proceedings must be served on the owners of the property within 45 days.  1978
LTD II, 701 P.2d at 1365.  The court also noted that because such seizures are ex
parte, the statutory safeguards should be rigidly adhered to.  See id.  
In concluding that the language of the statute is mandatory, the Montana court
relied on State v. Rosen, 240 N.W.2d 168 (Wis. 1976).  In Rosen, the forfeiture
statute at issue required that the "district attorney . . . shall commence the forfeiture
action within 15 days after the seizure of the property."  Wis. Stat. § 161.555(2)(a)
(1973) (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court of Wisconsin concluded that the
"nature and scope of the forfeiture action, as well as consideration of the interests of
the state and the property owner, lead us to conclude that the provisions of [the
forfeiture statute] must be considered mandatory."  Rosen, 240 N.W.2d at 172.  
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Likewise, in Haina v. Commonwealth, 369 S.E.2d 401, 404 (Va. 1988), the
Supreme Court of Virginia interpreted a statutory provision providing for the
forfeiture of all motor vehicles used in connection with the illegal manufacture, sale,
or distribution of controlled substances.  The statute required that within 60 days
after receiving notice of the seizure of any such vehicle, the Commonwealth's
attorney "shall file, in the name of the Commonwealth, an information against the
seized property, in the clerk's office of the circuit court of the county . . . wherein
the seizure was made."  Va. Code § 4-56 (d) (1984) (emphasis added).  Relying on
an earlier case which considered the effect of an untimely information, the court
found that the failure of the Commonwealth's attorney to file within the prescribed
time rendered the information "a nullity . . . the same as if no information had been
filed."  369 S.E. 2d at 404 (quoting Cason v. Commonwealth, 24 S.E.2d 435, 438
(Va. 1943)).  Because the information was untimely filed, the court reversed the
order of forfeiture and remanded to the trial court to restore the seized property to
its owner.  Haina, 369 S.E.2d at 404.  Thus, our holding today is consistent with
that of other states that have considered similar statutes.  
The parties also dispute the remedy available when the seizing agency fails to
file the complaint within 45 days of seizure.  Because the statute must be strictly
construed, it follows that if the seizing agency fails to file the complaint within the
2.  We do not address the issue of Petitioner's standing to challenge the
forfeiture of the vehicles because it is beyond the scope of the certified conflict in
this case.  
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prescribed time, the forfeiture proceeding can be dismissed on the claimant’s
motion.  Where the seizing agency fails to file any action at all, section 932.703(3)
allows a claimant to file a replevin action to recover the property.2  If a potential
claimant could not seek to dismiss a late-filed forfeiture complaint, the statute's
mandate that such complaints be filed "promptly" would be rendered illusory.  
III.
Accordingly, we quash the Second District’s decision, approve the decision
of the Fifth District in One 1994 Honda Prelude, and remand to the district court
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
It is so ordered.  
ANSTEAD, C.J., and PARIENTE and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which LEWIS and BELL, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, J., dissenting.
I dissent because I find that the Second District’s decision in this case is
consistent with our prior case law in respect to sections 932.701-.704, Florida
Statutes (Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act), and that the Fifth District’s decision
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in In re Forfeiture of One 1994 Honda Prelude, 730 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 5th DCA
1999), is in conflict with our case law.  Therefore, I would approve the Second
District and disapprove the Fifth District’s case.
I find Judge Threadgill’s opinion in In re Forfeiture of $7,750.00 in United
States Currency, 546 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), to be very helpful in a
correct understanding of the history of this law.  From that opinion I see that the
issue in this case as to the construction of this statute traces to the amendment of
the Forfeiture Act in 1980 and to the Fifth District’s decision in Lamar v. Universal
Supply Co., 452 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (Lamar I), rev’d, 479 So. 2d 109
(Fla. 1985).
In Lamar I, the Court dealt with the constitutionality of the statute as
amended effective July 1, 1980.  That version of the statute contained, as part of
sections 932.703 and 932.704, two provisions which are pertinent to understanding
the issue in the present case.  Section 932.703 contained the provision:
Neither replevin nor any other action to recover any interest in such
property shall be maintained in any court, except as provided in this
act.
And in section 932.704 was the provision:
[The] state attorney . . . shall promptly proceed against the contraband
. . . .
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The facts of Lamar I were that the Sheriff of Orange County had seized a vehicle
on July 22, 1983.  On July 29, seven days after the seizure, the owner of the vehicle
filed a replevin action against the sheriff, seeking return of the vehicle.  The sheriff
moved to dismiss the replevin action.  The trial court denied the motion to dismiss
on August 29, ordering the sheriff to either file a forfeiture action against the vehicle
before September 3 or return the vehicle to the owner.
The argument of the sheriff was that pursuant to the forfeiture act, a replevin
would not lie and that the return of the vehicle could only be accomplished by
successfully terminating a forfeiture action.  The sheriff declined to file the
forfeiture action and appealed the August 29 order for return of the vehicle.
The Fifth District stated that the situation which called into question the
constitutionality of the forfeiture statute was that (1) the forfeiture statute vests title
to contraband articles in the seizing law enforcement agency upon seizure (now
section 932.703(1)(c), Florida Statutes); (2) the owner from which the vehicle had
been seized asserted a right to a prompt hearing; and (3) the statute prohibited all
actions concerning the seized property except by the State, and there was no time
requirement for the State to bring a forfeiture action.  Because there was no time
limitation for the owner to pursue an action to get the seized property back from the
State, the Fifth District held unconstitutional the sentence which banned replevin or
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any other action to recover such property.  The Fifth District then held:
Where property is seized under the Forfeiture Act without a
warrant, the correct remedy for the claimant prior to filing either a
criminal charge arising in connection with the seizure or a forfeiture
action pursuant to section 932.704 is an action in replevin.
452 So. 2d at 632.  The Fifth District thereby held that the trial court was correct in
denying the motion to dismiss and that the replevin action should proceed.
In Lamar v. University Supply Co., 479 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1985) (Lamar II),
this Court reversed the Fifth District.  We held that the purpose of section
932.703(1) was “to prevent a claimant from precipitating litigation over the seized
property by forcing the state to file an immediate forfeiture action before it has had
adequate opportunity to fully investigate and prepare its case.”  Id. at 110.  We
went on to state, however, there would be a deprivation of due process if the law
did not afford a prompt hearing for the claimant on his assertion that the property
had been wrongfully seized.  Then this Court said:
It is well established that the allowance of a reasonable period of
time following seizure for investigation and processing may
permissibly delay the initiation of forfeiture proceedings.  See, e.g.,
United States v. One Motor Yacht Named Mercury, 527 F.2d 1112
(1st Cir. 1975).  Whether such a delay is reasonable is a question of
fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis.  Sandidge v. State ex
rel. City of Oviedo, 424 So. 2d 152, 153 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).  Lower
courts in this state have held that a delay of six months in Sandidge
and three months in In re Alcoholic Beverages Seized from Saul’s
Elks Club on June 30, 1982, 440 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983),
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between seizure and filing of a forfeiture action were not unreasonable. 
Federal decisions construing similar language in federal forfeiture acts
are in accord.  See United States v. One Motor Yacht Named
Mercury; United States v. One 1978 Cadillac Sedan Deville, 490 F.
Supp. 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. One 1973 Ford LTD,
409 F. Supp. 741 (D. Nev. 1976).
Id. at 110 (emphasis added).  This Court then found that a writ of replevin was
improvidently granted, id. at 111, because the period of time that the owner was
prevented from bringing a replevin action was not unreasonable.
The import of this finding for the purpose of the analysis here is that though
the statute at that time, as now, had the “shall promptly proceed” language, that
language concerned the period of time in which the owner was prevented from
bringing a replevin action.  Plainly, the State could still proceed with the forfeiture,
whether or not the State proceeded promptly.  It must be recognized that title vests
in the State by operation of law upon seizure.  Court proceedings perfect that title. 
The statute was not at the time of this Court’s Lamar decision considered or
contended to have any bar to the State perfecting title, even if the State did not
proceed promptly.  The statute contains no language which suggests such a bar. 
The bar to proceeding in court was as to the person or entity from whom the
property was seized.  For a reasonable period of time that person or entity could
not proceed in court to attempt to recover title to the property.
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Between the time of the Fifth District’s decision and this Court’s decision in
Lamar II, the Legislature amended section 932.703(1) to read:
Neither replevin nor any other action to recover any interest in such
property shall be maintained in any court, except as provided in this
act; however, such action may be maintained if forfeiture proceedings
are not initiated within 90 days after the date of seizure.
§ 932.703(1), Fla. State. (1987) (emphasis added).
Judge Threadgill’s opinion in Forfeiture of $7,750, 546 So. 2d at 1130-31,
explains the history and comes to a correct conclusion about this effect of the
“shall promptly proceed” language in the statute:
Chapter 85-316 was enacted after the Fifth District Court of
Appeal held unconstitutional that part of section 932.703(1) Florida
Statutes (1983), which prohibited any action for recovery of seized
property subject to forfeiture under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture
Act, sections 932.701-932.704.  Lamar v. Universal Supply, Inc., 452
So. 2d 627 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), rev’d, 479 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1985). 
At the time the statute was amended, the fifth district decision was on
appeal and pending before the Florida Supreme Court.  See Staff of
Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary-Crim., CS/SB 658 (1985), Staff Analysis
1 (2d rev. May 27, 1985), (on file in state archives).  Shortly after the
effective date of the amendment, the supreme court rendered its
decision in the Lamar appeal, reversing the fifth district and holding
that due process was satisfied by the requirement in section
932.704(1) that the state attorney “promptly proceed” against the
contraband.  Lamar v. Universal Supply Co., Inc., 479 So. 2d 109,
111 (Fla. 1985).
In Lamar, the property owner had filed a replevin action seven
days after the seizure.  The supreme court found that the state’s failure
to file before that time was not unreasonable and cited cases finding
delays of three and six months to be reasonable.  479 So. 2d at 110. 
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The court did not delineate any specific time period that would satisfy
the requirement that the state “promptly proceed” against the
contraband, nor did it address the 1985 legislative amendment limiting
the bar against actions for recovery to ninety days after the initial
seizure.  We appear to have before us a case of first impression
regarding interpretation of the 1985 amendment.
. . . .
While staff analyses of pending legislation are not determinative
of the legislative intent, they are often relevant to such a determination. 
See, e.g., Ivey v. Chicago Insurance Co., 410 So. 2d 494, 497 (Fla.
1982); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Shatto, 487
So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Florida Medical Center v. Von
Stetina, 436 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).  The revised staff
analysis prepared on the 1985 amendment to section 932.703(1)
expressly states that the provision here at issue “is an attempt to
remedy the [fifth district] Lamar concerns by insuring that due process
protections are extended to the property owner.”  Staff of Fla. S.
Comm. on Judiciary-Crim., CS/SB 658 (1985), Staff Analysis 3, (2d
rev. May 27, 1985), (on file in state archives).
On these bases we think it apparent the intent of the legislature
was to provide sufficient due process safeguards to ensure that the
statute would pass constitutional scrutiny.  While the supreme court, in
addressing these concerns, later held that due process was satisfied by
the language in section 932.704(1) that the state “promptly proceed
against the contraband,” the legislature went further by setting a
specific time limit on “reasonably prompt.”
While the statute does not bar the state from filing for forfeiture
beyond the ninety-day period, if the state has not filed a petition during
that time, the defendant may seek recovery in another court of
competent jurisdiction.  The statute contains no other provision which
would otherwise relieve the criminal court of its original jurisdiction to
issue valid orders in cases pending before it.
(Emphasis added.)  I conclude that Judge Threadgill’s analysis was precisely
correct.
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The statute does not bar the State from filing for forfeiture beyond the time
period in the statute, which has now been reduced from ninety to forty-five days. 
The “shall promptly proceed” language has been in the Act since 1980.  Consistent
with Lamar II, what the statute does is to give the State up to forty-five days to
investigate and prepare a forfeiture action without the claimant of the property
precipitating litigation.  This conclusion is compelled when it is understood that the
forty-five days is the statutory period designated by the Legislature as a reasonable
period of time after the contraband is seized within which the claimant is delayed
from seeking to recover seized property.  In Lamar II, this Court acknowledged
that such delay was contemplated by the Act and met constitutional muster.
This is the way that this Court described the working of the statute in
Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1991):
The process in the Act enables the state to seize
property—whether real or personal—“which has been or is being
used” to commit one of the enumerated offenses, or “in, upon or by
means of which” any enumerated violation “has taken or is taking
place.”  § 932.703(1), Fla. Stat. (1989).  The Act can be read to mean
that seizure immediately ousts property owners or lienholders of any
right or interest they have in the subject property.  Id.  After seizure,
the state must “promptly proceed” against the property “by rule to
show cause in the circuit court,” and may have the property forfeited
“upon producing due proof” that the property was being used in
violation of the Act.  Id. § 932.704(1).  If the state does not initiate
proceedings within ninety days after the seizure, the claimant may
maintain an action to recover the property.  Id. § 932.703(1).
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Id. at 961 (footnotes omitted).
I find no basis in our case law or in the statute to now conclude that if the
State does not “promptly proceed” within the forty-five days, it may not thereafter
proceed in a forfeiture action, as held by the Fifth District in 1994 Honda Prelude,
730 So. 2d at 335.  The only actions which the language of the statute bars are
replevin or any other action to recover the property during the forty-five days
immediately after the seizures.  § 932.703(3), Fla. Stat.  This is clear from the
history of the statute, our case law, and the opinion of the Second District in this
case, which is consistent with our case law and the statutory history.
I would approve the Second District’s opinion and disapprove the Fifth
District’s decision in 1994 Honda Prelude.
LEWIS and BELL, JJ., concur.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Direct Conflict of Decisions
Second District - Case No. 2D01-1249
(Sarasota County)
Susan J. Silverman, Sarasota, Florida,
for Petitioner
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Sarah E. Warren, Sarasota, Florida,
for Respondent