Case Title: Janet M. Johnson v. Allan M. Chapin

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-05-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 65  
Janet M. Johnson,
            Respondent-Appellant,
        v. 
Allan M. Chapin,
            Appellant-Respondent.
Daniel N. Jocelyn, for appellant-respondent.
Allan E. Mayefsky, for respondent-appellant.
PIGOTT, J.:
Husband and wife were married in January 1991 and have
one child.  Husband has four children from a previous marriage
and is required to pay both maintenance and child support. 
At the time the parties married, both were working
attorneys.  Wife stopped working outside the home when the
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parties' son was three years old.  Husband was a partner at a law
firm from 1968 until 1999, and thereafter became a managing
director at a major investment banking firm until 2001.  Husband
also earned additional income by serving on the Board of
Directors of several publicly-traded companies.
Prior to the marriage, husband owned a home on
approximately 160 acres of land in Claverack, New York.  During
the marriage the parties spent approximately $2 million to
renovate and improve the property.  While husband played a larger
role in these improvements, wife also participated in some of the
project's details.
In November 2001, wife commenced this action for
divorce after discovering husband was having an extramarital
affair.  Prior to trial, she made an application for interim
maintenance and child support.  Supreme Court imputed an average
annual income of $2,273,680 to husband and ordered him to pay
$18,465 monthly maintenance to wife and child support of $10,625
per month.  Husband was also ordered to pay the wife interim
counsel fees of $100,000.
 Wife was awarded a judgment of divorce on the grounds
of cruel and inhuman treatment.  A fourteen-day trial ensued on
the issues of equitable distribution, maintenance and child
support.  
As relevant to this appeal, the court recognized that
the Claverack property was the husband's separate property, but
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held the funds spent on the renovations to be marital property
subject to equitable distribution.  The court awarded 50% of the
appreciation of the Claverack estate to wife.
The court also credited wife with 50% of the marital
property husband used to pay the maintenance and child support
obligations to his first wife.  
After considering that wife had not worked outside the
home for nine years and that it would take six years to develop
her career, the court awarded wife durational maintenance of
$6,000 per month for six years.
Finally, the court awarded wife legal fees and expert
fees to be determined by a referee due in part to the fact that
wife and her son "have suffered day to day crises resulting from
the [husband's] harassment of them." 
The Appellate Division modified the judgment of Supreme
Court on both the law and the facts by, among other things,
reducing the wife's share of the enhanced value of the Claverack
property to 25% and by crediting husband for his pendente lite
maintenance obligations (49 AD3d 348).  Two Justices dissented.  
The majority noted that husband had consistently been
less than forthcoming regarding his income and that Supreme Court
had found him incredible in the reporting of his income and
assets (id. at 360-361).  The majority therefore upheld the
imposition of legal and expert fees on husband, noting that he
"engaged in a pattern of obstructionist conduct which
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unnecessarily delayed and increased the legal fees incurred in
the litigation" (id. at 361).
Husband appealed as of right based on the two Justice
dissent and the Appellate Division granted wife leave to cross-
appeal.
Pendente Lite Support
 Domestic Relations Law provides: "[i]n determining an
equitable disposition of property . . . , the court shall
consider: any award of maintenance" (DRL 236 [B] [5] [d] [5].
When a pendente lite award of maintenance is found at trial to be
excessive or inequitable, the Court may make an appropriate
adjustment in the equitable distribution award (see Gad v Gad,
283 AD2d 200[1st Dept 2001]; Galvano v Galvano, 303 AD2d 206 [2d
Dept 2003]; Fox v Fox, 306 AD2d 583 [3d Dept 2003]).  Supreme
Court did not abuse its discretion in giving husband a credit
representing the amount of the pendent lite maintenance he paid
that exceeded what he was required to pay under the final
maintenance award.  In determining the temporary maintenance
award, Supreme Court imputed an average salary in excess of $2
million to husband.  However, at trial, it was established that
his income was significantly lower.  Given the disparity in the
maintenance amounts, under the circumstances of this case, it was
appropriate for husband to receive a credit.
Interim Child Support
As it pertains to husband's claim that he should be
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entitled to a credit for excess child support payments, we reject
that claim.  It has long been held that there is a "strong public
policy against restitution or recoupment of support overpayments"
(Baraby v Baraby, 250 AD2d 201 [3d Dept 1998]; Rosenberg v
Rosenberg, 42 AD2d 590, 590 [2d Dept 1973]); and nothing in this
record shows it was error to deny that relief.
Valuing separate property
Under the equitable distribution statute, separate
property is defined to include an increase in value of separate
property, except to the extent that such appreciation is due in
part to the contributions or efforts of the other spouse (DRL 236
[B][1][d][3]).  Thus, any appreciation in the value of separate
property due to the contributions or efforts of the nontitled
spouse will be considered marital property (Price v Price, 69
NY2d 8 [1986]).  This includes any direct contributions to the
appreciation, such as when the nontitled spouse makes financial
contributions towards the property, as well as when the nontitled
spouse makes direct nonfinancial contributions, such as by
personally maintaining, making improvements to, or renovating a
marital residence (see generally Price v Price 69 NY2d at 17-18).
Here, Supreme Court properly held that the improvements
were marital, since the increase in the property was a result of
both parties' efforts.  We find that the Appellate Division did
not abuse its discretion in reducing the award to wife from 50%
to 25% of the property appreciation.  Husband's income was the
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sole source of the funds expended on the property and, as
admitted by wife, husband's involvements in the renovations were
far more extensive.   
Attorney's Fees
Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237 (a), a court
in a divorce action may award counsel fees to a spouse "to enable
that spouse to carry on or defend the action or proceedings as,
in the court's discretion, justice requires, having regard to the
circumstances of the case and of the respective parties."  We
have held that when "exercising its discretionary power to award
counsel fees, a court should review the financial circumstances
of both parties together with all the other circumstances of the
case, which may include the relative merit of the parties'
positions" (DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879 [1987]).  
Here, when awarding the fees, the court considered the
parties' financial positions as well as the delay incurred as a
result of husband's obstructionist tactics.  Thus, we decline to
disturb those awards.
Prior Maintenance
Finally, we hold that wife was not entitled to the 50%
credit representing the money paid during the marriage towards
husband's pre-marital obligations to pay his first wife
maintenance and child support (see Mahoney-Buntzman v Buntzman, 
NY3d [decided today]). 
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
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be modified, without costs, by remitting to Supreme Court for
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion and, as so
modified, affirmed.  The certified question should be not
answered upon the ground that it is unnecessary.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   * 
Order modified, without costs, by remitting to Supreme Court, New
York County, for further proceedings in accordance with the
opinion herein and, as so modified, affirmed.  Certified question
not answered upon the ground that it is unnecessary.  Opinion by
Judge Pigott.  Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith and Jones 
concur.  Chief Judge Lippman took no part.
Decided May 7, 2009