Case Title: Tatem v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 416, 2001

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
WILLIAM J. TATEM,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 416, 2001
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for New Castle County
§  Cr.A. No. 84-10-1805
§
§
Submitted: November 9, 2001
  Decided:   December 17, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED.
William J. Tatem, pro se.
Loren C. Meyers, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington,
Delaware, for appellant.
HOLLAND, Justice:
2
3
The defendant-appellant, William J. Tatem, filed an appeal from the
August 22, 2001 order of the Superior Court denying his motion for
correction of sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a).
In this appeal, Tatem claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to challenge the jury instruction on kidnaping, object
to certain trial testimony relating to the kidnaping charge and object to the
sentence imposed.  In essence, Tatem contends that there was insufficient
evidence to sustain his conviction of Kidnaping in the First Degree.
We have carefully considered this matter.  We have concluded that
Tatem’s appeal is without merit.  Accordingly, the judgment of the
Superior Court is affirmed.
Prior Direct Appeal
In 1984 a Superior Court jury found Tatem guilty of Rape in the
First Degree, Kidnaping in the First Degree,1 Possession of a Deadly
Weapon During the Commission of a Felony and Possession of a Deadly
Weapon by a Person Prohibited.  Tatem was given life sentences on each
of the rape and kidnapping convictions, five years incarceration at Level V
on the first weapon conviction and one year incarceration at Level V on the
                                                          
111 Del. C. § 783A (4).
4
second weapon conviction.  Tatem’s convictions and sentences were
affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.2
Rule 35’s Limited Relief
Rule 35(a) permits the Superior Court to correct an illegal sentence
“at any time.”  “The ‘narrow function of Rule 35 is to permit correction of
an illegal sentence, not to re-examine errors occurring at the trial or other
proceedings prior to the imposition of sentence.’”3 “Relief under Rule
35(a) is available ‘when the sentence imposed exceeds the statutorily-
imposed limits, [or] violates the Double Jeopardy Clause . . . .’”4  “A
sentence is also illegal if it ‘is ambiguous with respect to the time and
manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term
required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to the substance of the
sentence, or is a sentence which the judgment of conviction did not
authorize.’”5
                                                          
2Tatem v. State, Del. Supr., No. 131, 1985, Walsh, J., 1986 WL 16306 (Feb. 5, 1986)
(ORDER).
3Brittingham v. State, Del. Supr., 705 A.2d 577, 578 (1998) (quoting Hill v. United
States, 368 U.S. 424, 430 (1962)).
4Id. (quoting United States v. Pavlico, 961 F.2d 440, 443 (4th Cir. 1992)).
5Id. (quoting United States v. Dougherty, 106 F.3d 1514, 1515 (10th Cir. 1997)).
5
Tatem does not contend that his sentence was outside the statutory
authorization, constituted double jeopardy, or was ambiguous or
contradictory.  The only claim asserted in his Rule 35(a) motion involves
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel relating to his kidnapping
conviction and sentence.  Because that claim would require an examination
of the proceedings leading up to the imposition of sentence, no relief is
available to Tatem under Rule 35(a).6
Rule 61’s Bars
Even if deemed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, Tatem’s motion is still unavailing.  Not
only is such a postconviction motion time-barred,7 it is procedurally barred
as repetitive to the extent it alleges ineffective assistance of counsel.8  It is
                                                          
6Id. (citing Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. at 430).
7Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (1).  Tatem’s motion was filed more than 3 years after the
judgment of conviction became final.  Jackson v. State, Del. Supr., 654 A.2d 829, 832
(1995).
8Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (2).  As of 1992, Tatem had filed 4 previous postconviction
motions.  It does not appear that any of those motions included a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.  Tatem v. State, Del. Supr., No. 26, 1992, Holland, J. (Mar. 5,
1992) (ORDER).
6
also procedurally barred as formerly adjudicated to the extent it alleges
there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for kidnapping.9
Conclusion
The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.
                                                          
9Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4).  This issue was previously litigated and decided against
Tatem.  Tatem v. State, Del. Supr., No. 131, 1985, Walsh, J., 1986 WL 16306 (Feb.
5, 1986) (ORDER).  Tatem’s contention that the Superior Court’s kidnapping charge
was improper is not supported by Weber v. State, Del. Supr., 547 A.2d 948, 959-60
(1988) , since the rulings in that case apply prospectively only.  Coleman v. State, Del.
Supr., 562 A.2d 1171, 1179 (1989).