Case Title: Commonwealth v. Chatman

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-08921

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-03-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-08921 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DEMOND CHATMAN. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 11, 2015. - March 16, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, New trial, Competency to stand 
trial, Capital case.  Evidence, Competency.  Due Process of 
Law, Competency to stand trial. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 5, 2000. 
 
 
After review by this court, 466 Mass. 327 (2013), a motion 
for a new trial was heard by Barbara J. Rouse, J. 
 
 
 
Edward L. Hayden for the defendant. 
 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney (Mark T. 
Lee, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  On February 10, 2000, police responded to a 
telephone call made by the defendant, Demond Chatman, reporting 
that his mother, the victim, had been shot.  The defendant 
directed officers to the home of the victim's aunt, where the 
2 
 
defendant was living.  The police found the victim's body in the 
aunt's bedroom. 
 
On January 24, 2002, a jury returned a guilty verdict 
against the defendant on the charge of murder in the first 
degree.  The defendant appealed, and, in May, 2008, during the 
pendency of that appeal, the defendant filed a motion for a new 
trial on the ground that he had not been competent to stand 
trial.  The motion judge, who was also the trial judge, denied 
the motion in October, 2011, after a nonevidentiary hearing.  
The defendant appealed. 
 
In September, 2013, we reversed the denial of the motion 
for a new trial and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing 
consistent with a newly established burden of proof on 
defendants who, postverdict, seek a new trial on the basis of 
incompetency when the issue was not raised or considered at the 
time of, or prior to, trial.  See Commonwealth v. Chatman, 466 
Mass. 327, 335-336, 339 (2013).  In November, 2014, after four 
days of evidentiary hearings, the motion judge again denied the 
defendant's motion. 
 
Now before us for the second time, the defendant combines 
his direct appeal from his conviction with his challenge to the 
denial of his motion for a new trial.1  He also requests relief 
                                                          
 
 
1 The defendant's appeal, filed on December 10, 2014, was 
not timely, as it came more than thirty days after the November 
3 
 
pursuant to our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  As we 
explain below, our review of the entire record discloses no 
basis on which to grant relief.  We therefore affirm the 
defendant's conviction and the denial of his motion for a new 
trial. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  The trial.  We summarize the essential 
facts presented at trial, most of which are set forth in our 
decision in Chatman, 466 Mass. at 328-330.  The defendant had a 
hostile relationship with his mother, the victim.  On February 
10, 2000, at 2:30 P.M., the defendant telephoned 911 to report 
that his mother had been shot.  Earlier that day, between 11 
A.M. and noon, the defendant had told the aunt that he was going 
to "work out" at Franklin Park.  He also had asked her where she 
kept the mop and bucket, which he wanted to use to clean his 
room on his return. 
 
The Commonwealth presented a circumstantial case against 
the defendant at trial.  A pathologist testified that, based on 
the rigidity of the victim's body at the time it was found, 
death occurred between 8:30 A.M. and 12:30 P.M.  There was 
evidence that the body had been moved to the aunt's bedroom, 
where the police first viewed it, including deoxyribonucleic 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5, 2014, order denying the motion.  See Mass. R. A. P. 4 (b), as 
amended, 431 Mass. 1601 (2000).  However, we will consider the 
merits of the appeal pursuant to our authority under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E. 
4 
 
acid (DNA) testing that showed bloodstains belonging to the 
victim in the hallway, the bathroom, and the kitchen; in the 
defendant's bedroom, the defendant had left a bloody 
fingerprint.  Further DNA testing indicated that blood found on 
the defendant's clothing and sneakers matched that of the 
victim.  Bloody footprints were found in the bathroom, and the 
evidence indicated that washcloths had been used to soak up some 
of the blood. 
 
The defendant sought to rebut the evidence offered by the 
Commonwealth, and unsuccessfully presented an alibi defense 
tending to show that he was at Franklin Park at the time of the 
victim's death. 
 
b.  The defendant's competency at trial.  The issue of 
competency to stand trial was first raised six years after the 
trial in the defendant's May, 2008, motion for a new trial.  
Chatman, 466 Mass. at 327-328, 335-336. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing in 2014, the defendant called 
ten witnesses in support of his position:  Ray Walden, Dr. Mark 
Hanson,2 and Patricia Hilliard,3 who treated the defendant during 
                                                          
 
 
2 In 1991, Dr. Mark Hanson diagnosed the defendant with a 
paranoid disorder.  The disorder manifested itself in 
misperceived threats everywhere around the defendant, including 
among those people closest to him.  Hanson reported that the 
defendant was pleasant and polite.  Hanson did not offer an 
opinion as to the defendant's competency at the time of trial. 
 
5 
 
his early teens and into his high school years; trial counsel, 
John Bonistalli; Sharon Church, who was co-counsel at the trial; 
and Doctors Marion Smith, Joseph Grillo,4 Charles Drebing, Robert 
H. Joss, and Naomi Leavitt, mental health professionals who were 
responsible for either treating or diagnosing the defendant 
after trial.5 
 
Trial counsel Bonistalli testified that he began 
representing the defendant in 2000, and that he settled on an 
alibi defense based on his meetings with the defendant and his 
review of the police records.  The defendant insisted that he 
did not commit the crime, so Bonistalli's reasonable doubt 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
3 Starting in 1992 and lasting until 1999-2000, Patricia 
Hilliard met with the defendant most days after school as part 
of the Career and Life United in Boston.  While the defendant 
never told Hilliard about his diagnosed mental illness, she 
perceived the mental health issues with which the defendant was 
afflicted.  Hilliard described her relationship with the 
defendant as very warm.  They communicated about his academic 
and career goals, in which she testified he was very much 
invested.  Hilliard did not offer an opinion as to the 
defendant's competency at the time of trial. 
 
 
4 Dr. Joseph Grillo, a clinical psychologist, met with the 
defendant in February or March, 2002, while he was in prison.  
The defendant reported auditory hallucinations, depression, and 
anxiety.  Dr. Grillo noted that the defendant was having trouble 
getting used to the fact that he might be in jail for the rest 
of his life.  Dr. Grillo did not offer an opinion as to the 
defendant's competency at the time of trial. 
 
 
5 The parties stipulated as to the testimony of certain 
individuals associated with the defendant who offered views of 
his mental well-being.  Having reviewed those stipulations, we 
conclude that the information universally does not pertain to 
the trial time period, and is therefore not relevant to our 
analysis. 
6 
 
defense relied on the defendant's statements and his assistance 
in reviewing the facts to establish an alibi.  The defendant did 
not report any of his mental health history to Bonistalli, and 
Bonistalli did not notice anything to suggest that the defendant 
was impaired by some mental illness.  Bonistalli testified that 
he had the impression that he was communicating with the 
defendant, and that the defendant understood what Bonistalli was 
talking about and was aware of the charges pending against him 
and the significance of the trial.  Bonistalli did not recall 
any significant participation from the defendant during the 
trial itself. 
 
Co-counsel Church's testimony related to about a two-week 
period, as she joined the defense team just a week before trial.  
Church testified that, in conversations with Bonistalli, the 
defendant insisted he did not commit the crime, but was instead 
at Franklin Park.  The defendant also went on "tangents."  
During trial, the defendant sat silently and listened.  Church 
concluded that the defendant did not actively assist in the 
preparation of the case, but did not offer an opinion as to the 
defendant's competency to do so.6 
                                                          
 
 
6 The motion judge concluded that Sharon Church's testimony 
was "of little value."  The defendant argues this was an abuse 
of discretion.  We discern no error, given Church's minimal 
involvement with the defendant. 
7 
 
 
Also admitted in evidence were reports written by licensed 
medical health counsellors Darren Sandler, who, on January 25 
and 26, the two days following the defendant's conviction, 
interviewed the defendant at Massachusetts Correctional 
Institution (M.C.I.), Concord; and Carrie Holowecki, who 
evaluated the defendant at M.C.I., Souza-Baranowski on January 
30.  Sandler indicated that the defendant presented as "calm," 
"cooperative," and "euthymic," while Holowecki reported that, 
though "nervous," the defendant was "alert," "oriented," and 
"logical," and had "good eye contact."  Sandler reported that 
the defendant had many legal questions regarding his appeal and 
was in "shock" over his life sentence, remarking that it was 
"unbelievable."  Neither noted any concern over any mental 
health issues until February 13, 2002, when Holowecki, in her 
second evaluation of the defendant, recorded that the defendant 
was experiencing "some paranoia" but remained "alert," 
"oriented," and "cooperative." 
 
Dr. Smith, a psychiatrist, testified that she evaluated the 
defendant on February 20, 2002.  Smith eventually diagnosed the 
defendant with schizoaffective disorder, and she was concerned 
that the symptoms with which the defendant presented existed 
prior to his incarceration.  Smith did not offer an opinion as 
to the defendant's competency at the time of trial. 
8 
 
 
The defendant hired Dr. Joss, a forensic psychologist, in 
connection with the motion for a new trial.  Joss testified that 
he met with the defendant, in connection with his initial 
evaluation, on three occasions, in March and December, 2005, and 
February, 2006, and interviewed the defendant by telephone in 
January, 2006.  He also reviewed records of the case dating back 
to the 1970s.  Aside from the defendant, Joss conducted two 
other telephone interviews:  first with Ray Walden, an 
independent clinical social worker who had diagnosed the 
defendant with paranoid personality disorder at the age of 
twelve or thirteen;7 and second with Dr. Prudence Baxter, a 
forensic psychiatrist with whom Bonistalli had spoken briefly 
about the possibility of a criminal responsibility defense prior 
to trial.8  In addition, Joss consulted with Dr. Drebing, who, at 
Joss's request, had conducted a neuropsychological evaluation of 
the defendant in 2005 and had diagnosed him with a "psychotic 
spectrum disorder, such as possibly a delusional disorder, 
                                                          
 
 
7 Ray Walden testified that the diagnosed paranoia did not 
prevent him from communicating with the defendant.  Walden did 
not offer an opinion as to the defendant's competency at the 
time of trial. 
 
 
8 John Bonistalli, after speaking with Baxter, concluded 
that such a defense was not tenable because, among other things, 
the defendant insisted he had not committed the crime. 
 
9 
 
schizoaffective disorder, or a psychosis not otherwise 
specifi[ed]."9 
 
Dr. Joss, who had submitted an affidavit in 2008 based on 
the foregoing evidence, further testified that his opinion at 
the time of the affidavit and at the time of the hearing, was 
that the defendant "lacked competence to stand trial" at the 
time of trial and had problems "in his ability to rationally 
understand the proceedings and . . . [to] rationally . . . 
assist counsel."  He also admitted that, in reaching this 
conclusion, he had not spoken to Bonistalli or Church.  Joss 
eventually spoke to Bonistalli for fifteen minutes on the 
telephone on March 31, 2014, the day before testifying at the 
evidentiary hearing.  Joss was the only mental health expert to 
offer an opinion regarding whether the defendant was competent 
at the relevant time. 
 
The period between the May, 2008, filing of the motion for 
a new trial and October, 2011, when the motion judge first 
denied the motion without a hearing, is noteworthy in that the 
defendant was evaluated twice, pursuant to court orders, for 
competency to participate in the motion hearing.  Dr. Leavitt 
testified that she conducted both evaluations, the first of 
                                                          
 
 
9 Dr. Drebing also testified that the defendant's 
intelligence quotient (IQ) "falls in the low average to 
borderline retarded range."  Drebing did not offer an opinion as 
to the defendant's competency at the time of trial. 
10 
 
which was prompted by and occurred after the defendant had an 
outburst in court.  Both evaluations focused specifically on 
competency as to the motion (and not the trial) period.  
Leavitt, in her initial evaluation, which was conducted to 
determine whether the defendant was competent to recommence the 
proceedings on the first motion for a new trial, presented an 
equivocal opinion as to the defendant's competency:  the 
defendant had an adequate understanding of the proceedings and 
ability to make reasoned decisions; however, his ability to work 
meaningfully with counsel was compromised due to his lack of 
focus and social impediments.  Specifically, the defendant did 
not trust appellate counsel.  Therefore, Leavitt concluded, the 
defendant was competent to participate in the motion hearing 
only so long as he did not have to testify or appear in court. 
 
Because the first evaluation did not result in a firm 
opinion as to the defendant's competency, Leavitt conducted a 
second evaluation in December, 2010, after the defendant had 
begun taking medication.  In that evaluation, Leavitt opined 
that the defendant was competent to participate in the motion 
hearing.  The defendant's first motion for a new trial was 
denied, and we reversed for an evidentiary hearing.  Chatman, 
466 Mass. at 339. 
 
In denying the defendant's motion for a new trial on 
remand, the judge discredited Dr. Joss's opinion at the 
11 
 
evidentiary hearing as having no factual underpinnings.   
Although the judge acknowledged that the defendant suffered from 
a mental illness, which she concluded "waxed and waned at 
various times throughout his life," she determined that "[a] 
defendant may have a mental illness or condition[ and] still be 
competent to stand trial." 
 
The defendant claims it was an abuse of discretion to deny 
the motion for a new trial and to discredit Joss's testimony.  
We disagree. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The only argument the defendant raises in 
this combined appeal from his conviction and from the denial of 
his motion for a new trial is that the motion for a new trial 
was wrongly denied. 
 
"The trial judge . . . may grant a new trial at any time if 
it appears that justice may not have been done."  Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 30(b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  The burden 
rests on the moving party to prove the facts on which he or she 
relies in support of the motion.  See Chatman, 466 Mass. at 333.  
The judge may rely on her knowledge of the trial in reaching a 
conclusion regarding the motion for a new trial.  Commonwealth 
v. Grace, 370 Mass. 746, 752-753 (1976). 
 
"When this court reviews a defendant's appeal from the 
denial of a motion for a new trial in conjunction with his 
direct appeal from an underlying conviction of murder . . ., we 
12 
 
review both under G. L. c. 278, § 33E" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 471 Mass. 262, 266 (2015).  That is to 
say, "we review the denial of that motion to determine if the 
judge committed an abuse of discretion or other error of law 
and, if so, whether such error created a substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice."  Chatman, 466 Mass. at 333.  An 
abuse of discretion exists when the motion judge made "a clear 
error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the 
decision, . . . such that the decision falls outside the range 
of reasonable alternatives" (citation and quotations omitted).  
L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).  Our 
review "extends special deference to the action of a motion 
judge who was also the trial judge."  Commonwealth v. Waters, 
410 Mass. 224, 231 (1991), quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 
Mass. 303, 307 (1986). 
 
a.  Competency.  Under both the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights, "[i]t has long been accepted that a 
person whose mental condition is such that he [or she] lacks the 
capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings 
against him [or her], to consult with counsel, and to assist in 
preparing his [or her] defense may not be subjected to a trial" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Brown, 449 Mass. 747, 759 
(2007).  See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439 (1992) ("It 
13 
 
is well established that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the criminal prosecution of a 
defendant who is not competent to stand trial"). 
 
With the present case, we have our first opportunity to 
review a motion judge's interpretation of the Chatman test.  
Therein, we articulated a new framework appropriate for 
evaluating a defendant's competency postverdict where the issue 
had not been raised at trial.  Chatman, supra at 335-336.  Like 
the traditional competency test, the hallmark of a postverdict 
competency inquiry is the defendant's "functional abilities," 
Commonwealth v. Goodreau, 442 Mass. 341, 350 (2004), as opposed 
to "the presence or absence of any particular psychiatric 
diagnosis."  Id.  To determine if a criminal defendant is 
competent, we look to (1) whether the defendant has "sufficient 
present ability to consult with his [or her counsel] with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding," and (2) whether he 
or she has "a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Bynum Harris, 
468 Mass. 429, 443 (2014). 
 
The newly articulated test differs from the traditional 
competency proceeding not in substance but in burden of proof.  
If the issue is raised at trial, the Commonwealth would bear the 
burden of establishing competence by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Hilton, 450 Mass. 173, 179 
14 
 
(2007).  The postverdict test, on the other hand, requires that 
the defendant establish "by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the Commonwealth would not have prevailed had the issue been 
raised at trial," Chatman, 466 Mass. at 336, meaning that the 
defendant bears the burden of establishing that, had the issue 
been raised before or during trial, the Commonwealth could not 
have proved either the first or the second prong of the 
competency test.  See id.  See also Bynum Harris, supra at 443.  
The defendant, therefore, need not make a showing that he was 
incompetent; instead, the defendant may satisfy his or her 
burden by showing "that the weight of the evidence of competence 
and the weight of the evidence of incompetence are in 
equipoise."  Chatman, supra at 336, n.7. 
 
Because a postverdict motion requires a retrospective 
determination of the defendant's competency, "the weighing 
process must necessarily place greater emphasis on evidence 
derived from knowledge contemporaneous with the trial."  United 
States v. Makris, 535 F.2d 899, 907 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977).  For that reason, when the 
postverdict motion is heard by the same judge as presided over 
the trial, the "judge's determination of competency is entitled 
to substantial deference 'because the judge had the opportunity 
to . . . evaluate the defendant personally.'"  Brown, 449 Mass. 
at 759, quoting Commonwealth v. Prater, 420 Mass. 569, 574 
15 
 
(1995).  The presence or absence of a mental illness is 
informative on the question of competency, but not dispositive.  
See Commonwealth v. Robbins, 431 Mass. 442, 448 (2000). 
 
i.  Competency -- first prong.  In determining whether the 
defendant had a present ability to consult with his lawyer with 
a degree of rational understanding, we look to whether the 
defendant has the capacity to communicate and cooperate 
effectively.  See Commonwealth v. Crowley, 393 Mass. 393, 399 
(1984).  Specifically, we consider whether a "defendant's mental 
. . . condition . . . prevented counsel from developing a 
defense [and] . . . whether the defendant understood [counsel's] 
explanations of that defense or [counsel's] assessment of the 
risks of trial."  Goodreau, 442 Mass. at 353. 
 
In addition to testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the 
record is replete with evidence regarding the undisputed 
proposition that the defendant has, since childhood, suffered 
from a mental illness.  The testimony, affidavits, assessments, 
and evaluations paint a picture of an individual whose mental 
issues have affected his ability to socialize and acclimate to 
his community. 
 
However, while the defendant's mental illness undisputedly 
has existed since his youth, the symptoms he shows and his 
interactions with people have varied, or, as the motion judge 
put it, "waxed and waned."  At times it is clear to those around 
16 
 
him that the defendant is suffering from a mental illness, while 
at other times he presents as calm, engaged, and communicative.  
Moreover, there is no evidence tending to equate the defendant's 
mental illness with an inability to communicate.  In fact, the 
testimony indicates the opposite:  doctors and mental health 
professionals alike have indicated that, whether or not the 
defendant was on medication at the time, and whether or not the 
defendant disclosed his history of mental illness, he was able 
to communicate and exhibited an understanding of his condition.  
In any event, competency and the defendant's ability to 
communicate and cooperate is a time period-specific inquiry, and 
our analysis must start with what little evidence we have about 
the defendant's mental state around the trial period. 
 
We first consider the testimony of trial counsel, as it 
"may . . . provide relevant evidence as to the defendant's 
ability to understand the nature of the case against him and his 
ability to assist in the defense, as well as how the defendant 
helped shape the defense, if at all."  Chatman, 466 Mass. at 
339.  Because of the time-determinative nature of our inquiry, 
trial counsel's testimony is critical in either substantiating 
or contradicting a postverdict competency challenge. 
 
Bonistalli testified that he had met with the defendant on 
several occasions and had spoken with him about the police 
reports, about what occurred on the day when the defendant's 
17 
 
mother was killed, and about the factual pieces required to 
proffer an alibi defense.10  He saw no indications that the 
defendant's condition resulted in an inability to communicate or 
cooperate with him as trial counsel. 
 
The defendant presents Dr. Joss's testimony to establish 
that the defendant could not communicate with Bonistalli 
rationally.  Joss pointed to several of the defendant's 
statements (made years after the trial period) to establish that 
the defendant did not trust Bonistalli.  For instance, the 
defendant indicated he believed Bonistalli may have been working 
with the prosecutor, and therefore could not be trusted. 
 
This testimony presents several problems.  First, the only 
time-relevant statements tending to show that the defendant's 
paranoia caused him not to trust his trial attorney are those of 
the defendant.  In the past, we have indicated that a motion 
judge is entitled, in the competency context, to discredit a 
                                                          
 
 
10 During his testimony, it became apparent that 
Bonistalli's recollection of his representation of the defendant 
was exhausted as to several important issues.  For instance, he 
did not recall whether he had spoken to the defendant about a 
possible criminal responsibility defense, or the extent to which 
they discussed the forensic evidence against the defendant.  
This reflects another problem with Dr. Joss's decision not to 
speak to Bonistalli until 2014; had he considered evidence of 
trial counsel's representation of the defendant when he began 
his evaluations, it is possible we would have had a more robust 
record as to the defendant's participation before and during 
trial. 
18 
 
defendant's own self-serving statements.  See Goodreau, 442 
Mass. at 351. 
 
Second, and more importantly, other parts of the record 
belie the defendant's assertions, and therefore Dr. Joss's 
testimony.  Dr. Leavitt included in her report that the 
defendant did not have trust issues with his trial attorney, and 
that his trial attorney gave him "the information straight up."  
Joss even noted in his evaluation the defendant's statement that 
"[he] trusted [Bonistalli] to do his job." 
 
Third, the purported link between the defendant's illness 
and his inability to communicate with trial counsel is 
contradicted by the findings of mental health experts before and 
immediately after trial.  Both Walden and Hilliard, who met with 
the defendant in his youth, reported that the defendant's mental 
illness had not impeded their communication or the defendant's 
comprehension of their interactions.  Reports written by 
licensed medical health counselors at M.C.I., Concord and 
M.C.I., Souza-Baranowski days and weeks after the defendant's 
arrest indicated that the defendant was able to understood and 
discuss the ramifications of the guilty verdict against him. 
 
Fourth, Bonistalli's testimony and the judge's viewing of 
the defendant's behavior at trial contradict the defendant's 
statements.  See Commonwealth v. DeMinico, 408 Mass. 230, 236 
(1990), quoting Commonwealth v. Hill, 375 Mass. 50, 58 (1978) 
19 
 
("defendant's demeanor at trial and response to questioning by 
the judge . . . [are] relevant to a decision on the merits of 
the competency issue").  Because the trial judge never raised 
the issue of competency, we can infer that the defendant's 
behavior during trial was not so outside the ordinary as to 
raise a doubt about his competency.11 
 
The defendant contends that a symptom of his mental illness 
was that the illness operated to conceal itself from Bonistalli 
at trial, which alone indicates a lack of competency.  That is, 
the argument goes, that it would have been irrational to conceal 
a history of mental health issues from counsel when facing 
charges of murder in the first degree; therefore, the defendant 
must not rationally have chosen to conceal his mental health 
history but instead did so because of his mental illness. 
 
This argument finds no support in the record.  The 
defendant has, at various times, either disclosed his mental 
health history -- or chosen not to disclose it -- to multiple 
individuals, both those whom he purportedly trusted and those he 
had just met.  For instance, the defendant never told Hilliard 
about his prior mental health issues, but disclosed them to Dr. 
                                                          
 
 
11 If there is a sufficient reason to doubt the defendant's 
competency, the judge must raise it sua sponte and hold a 
hearing.  See Commonwealth v. Hill, 375 Mass. 50, 54 (1978), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Vailes, 360 Mass. 522, 524 (1971). 
20 
 
Leavitt.12  Bonistalli was never made aware of the defendant's 
diagnoses or treatment, but the defendant related them to 
appellate counsel.  We therefore cannot infer from the record 
that the decision not to disclose a history of mental illness to 
his trial counsel was made due to a symptom of such illness as 
opposed to a rational decision by the defendant.  Moreover, the 
fact that a defendant may not advance the most helpful defense 
does not necessarily equate with incompetence to stand trial.  
See Commonwealth v. Blackstone, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 209, 211 
(1985) ("defendant's refusal to admit to his own mental illness 
and to employ it in his defense is not necessarily a 
manifestation of the mental illness itself.  The world is full 
of people who do not own up to their limitations, often with 
remarkable success"). 
 
Even if the motion judge were to have credited Joss's 
testimony that the defendant had a mental illness that was in 
full effect during the trial period, this alone would not be 
sufficient to persuade us that the defendant has met his burden.  
One can both have a mental disease or deficiency and still be 
competent to stand trial; the two are not mutually exclusive.  
See Robbins, 431 Mass. at 448 ("The defendant's argument 
confuses the presence of mental illness with lack of competence 
                                                          
 
 
12 The defendant also told Sandler, Holowecki, and Dr. Smith 
that he had been prescribed an antipsychotic medication as a 
child. 
21 
 
to stand trial").  The same is true about a defendant with a low 
intelligence quotient.  See Prater, 420 Mass. at 574-575.  We 
agree with the motion judge that the evidence tends to show that 
the defendant cooperated and communicated with his attorney, 
highlighted by the fact that, according to Bonistalli, 
testifying as to his contemporaneous interactions with the 
defendant, the defendant "insisted" that he did not kill the 
victim and that Bonistalli pursue an alibi defense.  It was 
therefore not an abuse of discretion for the judge to conclude 
that the defendant did not meet his burden on the first prong of 
the competency test. 
 
ii.  Competency -- second prong.  We are likewise 
unpersuaded by the defendant's assertion that he did not have a 
rational understanding of the proceedings against him.  This 
second prong considers whether the defendant understood the 
crime of which he or she "was accused, who the important people 
[were] in the court room and what their roles [were], [and] what 
[the consequences would be] if he [or she] [was] found guilty."  
Bynum Harris, 468 Mass. at 443, quoting Vuthy Seng v. 
Commonwealth, 445 Mass. 536, 546 (2005), S.C., 456 Mass. 490 
(2010).  The defendant would not sufficiently understand the 
proceedings "if his mental condition preclude[d] him from 
perceiving accurately, interpreting, and/or responding 
appropriately to the world around him."  Lafferty v. Cook, 949 
22 
 
F.2d 1546, 1551 (10th Cir. 1991).  The test is flexible enough 
to accommodate a defendant with a mental illness, as it "is 
satisfied upon a showing that the defendant possesse[d] at least 
a 'modicum' of rational understanding."  Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 27914 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 81 Mass. 
App. Ct. 610, 613, n.4 (2012), quoting Blackstone, 19 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 211. 
 
The only evidence tending to establish the defendant's 
level of understanding of the proceedings at trial, aside from 
Bonistalli's testimony, comes from Dr. Joss's interviews that 
occurred three and four years after the defendant's conviction.  
Joss put a great emphasis on the defendant's purported 
misunderstanding of the key players.  For instance, the 
defendant thought Bonistalli had a "cop look," and may therefore 
have been working with the prosecutor.  The defendant reported 
that he believed that Bonistalli, who is white, would have an 
advantage at trial over the prosecutor, who was Asian.  The 
defendant told Joss that the judge was always on the 
prosecutor's side, and that the judge "was making sad faces."  
The defendant also indicated that the prosecutor had used his 
peremptory strikes to take homosexuals and white women off the 
jury. 
 
However, although purportedly concluding that the 
defendant's illness precluded his having a rational 
23 
 
understanding of the proceedings, Joss's testimony supports the 
opposite conclusion -- that, in fact, the defendant did have a 
rational understanding of the crime for which he was on trial, 
the important people involved in his prosecution and defense, as 
well as the consequences of a verdict against him.  Joss 
admitted on cross-examination that the defendant could follow 
what was going on at the trial in 2002:  he was aware that he 
was on trial for murder; understood his attorney to be working 
on his behalf; appreciated that the prosecutor was working 
against him; knew it was the judge's role to be fair; and 
recognized that the jury would reach the final verdict.  And, 
looking back on the trial, the defendant knew that there had 
been witnesses who testified against him and that he had been 
found guilty.  As to the comments about the ethnicities of 
Bonistalli and the prosecutor, Joss testified that such 
statements were "consistent with [the defendant's] history of 
racism," but not irrational.  In sum, Joss's testimony regarding 
his findings presents a defendant who may have misconceived 
portions of the proceedings due to preexisting prejudicial 
stereotypes, but not one who could not rationally understand 
those proceedings. 
 
Joss's testimony on cross-examination also undermined many 
of his findings.  Dr. Joss either admitted that he had no basis 
to corroborate or substantiate many of the defendant's 
24 
 
purportedly irrational claims because he did not conduct 
independent research, or conceded that the statements could 
indeed have been rational.  For instance, Joss's credibility as 
to the rationality of the defendant's statements is dubious in 
that he could not comment on the prosecution's use of peremptory 
strikes during jury selection because he had not spoken to 
anyone present; he was unable to determine whether there was any 
basis for the defendant's statement that Bonistalli had a "cop 
look" because Joss had only spoken to Bonistalli on the 
telephone and had never met him; and Joss admitted that he has, 
in the past, told defense attorneys that they should not speak 
to the prosecutor in front of the defendant if the defendant has 
shown signs of paranoia, indicating that it is not unusual for a 
defendant to worry about his attorney working with the 
prosecution.  Taken together, these admissions indicate that the 
defendant did indeed have some underlying misperceptions about 
people based on their appearances, but that those misconceptions 
alone were not enough to show that his rational understanding of 
the proceedings was compromised.  It is more important in 
establishing a "modicum" of rational understanding that the 
defendant understands the role and function of the key players 
and court mechanisms than it is that he put aside any lingering 
bigotry. 
25 
 
 
We infer no support for Dr. Joss's opinion about the 
defendant's competency at the time of trial from Dr. Leavitt's 
first evaluation of the defendant for the motion for a new trial 
proceeding.  We acknowledged in Chatman that Leavitt "made a 
diagnosis of long-standing mental illness virtually identical to 
that of Joss."  Chatman, 466 Mass. at 339.  However, we note a 
distinct difference between Leavitt's findings and those of Joss 
that affect our analysis of the defendant's competence at the 
time of trial:  Leavitt was reviewing the defendant's competency 
for a motion for a new trial hearing, and her findings were 
therefore related to appellate counsel, as opposed to trial 
counsel.  In reaching her conclusion that the defendant could 
not contribute to his defense, Leavitt noted that the defendant 
had difficulties believing his appellate attorney.  Leavitt also 
included in her evaluation that the defendant did not report any 
trust difficulties with his trial attorney, and that his trial 
attorney gave him "the information straight up."  We cannot 
conclude from this evaluation that the defendant's issues with 
appellate counsel reflect similar problems during the course of 
trial with trial counsel, or whether any later mental issues 
could be due to the fact that, according to the defendant, his 
"world came to an end" when he was sentenced. 
 
The defendant seems to argue that the Commonwealth's 
failure to proffer evidence at the motion for a new trial 
26 
 
indicates that its position is tenuous.  To be clear, the 
Commonwealth bears no burden to establish that the defendant was 
competent at the time of trial, and may rest on impeachment of 
the defendant's arguments if it so chooses.  However, should the 
Commonwealth eschew the opportunity to present argument or offer 
the opinion of an expert, it does so at its own peril. 
 
We discern no error in the motion judge's conclusion that 
the defendant did not meet his burden, or in her decision to 
discredit Dr. Joss's opinion.  As noted, Joss, prior to reaching 
his conclusion that the defendant was incompetent during the 
critical time period leading up to and encompassing trial, did 
not meet or consult with Bonistalli or Church.  See Goodreau, 
442 Mass. at 354 ("When weighing the adequacy of the materials 
submitted in support of a motion for a new trial, the judge may 
take into account the suspicious failure to provide pertinent 
information from an expected and available source").  It was not 
unreasonable for the motion judge to conclude that, while Joss 
is no doubt qualified to opine regarding the defendant's mental 
illness and about his competence at the time of his interviews, 
it was problematic that he reached the conclusion that the 
defendant was unable meaningfully to consult with his attorney 
or rationally to understand the proceedings at trial without 
speaking to the only people who could offer insight into that 
time period, aside from the defendant. 
27 
 
 
Because we agree that the defendant did not establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the Commonwealth would not 
have been able to meet its burden at a competency proceeding had 
the issue been raised prior to or at trial, we affirm the denial 
of the defendant's motion for a new trial.  As this was the only 
issue raised by the defendant in his appeal from his convictions 
and from the denial of his motion for a new trial, we will 
proceed to our G. L. c. 278, § 33E, review. 
 
b.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have conducted a 
thorough review of the record, in accordance with G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, and have determined that no basis exists which would 
require us to remand the case, order a new trial, or to set 
aside or reduce the jury's verdict of murder in the first 
degree.  We therefore decline to exercise our authority.  The 
judgment and the order denying the motion for a new trial are 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.