Case Title: STATE v WEINBERGER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 82-180(A)

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1983-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 82-180 (A) I N T H E SUPREME COURT O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA 1983 STATE O F I4OTJTAIJA1 P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs- ARROW WEINBERGER, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i f t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Roosevelt, The Honorable P'I. James S o r t e , Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Skedd, Ashley, McCabe, Weingartrier & NcCarter ; J. C. Weingartner argued, Helena, &Tontana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Eel-ena, Montana Chris Tweeten argued, A s s t . Atty. General, Helena, James McCann, County Attorney, Wolf P o i n t , blontana Submitted: January 10, 1983 Decided r June 6 , 1983 F i l e d : 6 1983 Clerk Mr. Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant Arrow Weinberger was c o n v i c t e d of d e l i b e r a t e homicide by a R o o s e v e l t County j u r y f o r t h e s h o o t i n g d e a t h of Floyd " S c o t t y " Azure a t a C u l b e r t s o n s e r v i c e s t a t i o n on December 5, 1982. D e f e n d a n t ' s twenty-year-old son, Adam, was c o n v i c t e d of f e l o n y murder f o r h i s p a r t i n t h e i n c i d e n t . Arrow was s e n t e n c e d t o s e r v e s e v e n t y y e a r s i n t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n and was o r d e r e d t o p a y c e r t a i n e x p e n s e s i n c u r r e d i n t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e c h a r g e s a g a i n s t him. H i s motion f o r a judgment n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e v e r d i c t o r f o r a new t r i a l was d e n i e d . H e a p p e a l s . W e a f f i r m . The c i r c u m s t a n c e s l e a d i n g up t o t h e s h o o t i n g a t a C u l b e r t s o n s e r v i c e s t a t i o n began sometime e a r l i e r . Adam Weinberger, a r e s i d e n t of F o r t Smith, Arkansas, had been l i v i n g i n n o r t h e a s t e r n Montana. Beginning i n J u n e 1981, h e a t t e m p t e d t o e s t a b l i s h a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Luanne Azure, t h e seventeen-year-old d a u g h t e r of S c o t t y and Gloreen Azure. Azures were opposed t o an involvement between Luanne and Adam because he was o l d e r t h a n Luanne and because of Adam's f a i l u r e t o " a c t l i k e a gentleman." D e s p i t e Azures' opposi- t i o n , Adam and Luanne c o n t i n u e d t o s e e each o t h e r . On November 1 0 , 1981, Luanne r a n away from home w i t h t h r e e f r i e n d s and went t o Havre, Montana. Adam d i d n o t accompany Luanne t o Havre, b u t s h e c a l l e d him from t h e r e and made arrangements t o meet him i n W i l l i s t o n , North Dakota. Azures s e a r c h e d t h e P o p l a r a r e a f o r Luanne w i t h o u t s u c c e s s . On November 1 2 , t h e y t r a v e l e d t o W i l l i s t o n t o look f o r h e r . They found Adam Weinberger, who f a l s e l y t o l d them t h a t he had n o t s e e n Luanne and thought s h e was i n Havre. L a t e r t h a t day Azures d i s c o v e r e d Luanne i n W i l l i s t o n and l e a r n e d t h a t s h e had i n f a c t been w i t h Adam. Azures began t o watch Luanne c l o s e l y t o keep h e r away from Adam. They a l s o f i l e c i a complaint i n T r i b a l Court a l l e g i n g t h a t Adam had c o n t r i b u t e d t o Luanne's d e l i n q u e n c y by e n t i c i n g h e r o u t of t h e f a m i l y r e s i d e n c e a g a i n s t h e r p a r e n t s 1 wishes and a f t e r curfew. The complaint asked t h a t Adam be r e s t r a i n e d from f u r t h e r c o n t r i b u t i n g t o h e r d e l i n - quency and t h a t he be k e p t away from Azures' r e s i d e n c e a t a l l t i m e s . Sometime a f t e r t h e complaint was f i l e d , Arrow W e i n b e r g e r came t o t h e P o p l a r a r e a f r o m F o r t S m i t h , Arkansas. On December 1, Luanne a g a i n r a n away from home. Azures were convinced t h a t Luanne was w i t h Adam based upon t h e W i l l i s t o n i n c i d e n t . They immediately e n l i s t e d t h e h e l p of l o c a l law enforcement o f f i c e r s and began t o s e a r c h f o r Luanne and f o r Weinbergers. A t t h e Azuresl r e q u e s t , p o l i c e stopped Arrow W e i n b e r g e r l s C a d i l l a c t o look f o r Luanne. Both Adam and Arrow l a t e r went t o Azuresl home t o r e g i s t e r t h e i r d i s p l e a s u r e a t being stopped. Arrow was a n g r y and t o l d Azures t h a t he d i d n o t l i k e t o g e t u p s e t "because when I g e t u p s e t , I s t a y u p s e t . . ." Azures c o n t i n u e d t o s e a r c h t h e P o p l a r a r e a f o r Luanne. On t h e evening of F r i d a y , December 4 , t h e y c o n t a c t e d Roy T r o t t i e r , a f e d e r a l I n d i a n p o l i c e o f f i c e r , and s o u g h t h i s h e l p . The n e x t morning, Azures d i s c o v e r e d t h a t Luanne had been s e e n with Adam on t h e day s h e d i s a p p e a r e d . They immediately c o n t a c t e d T r o t t i e r and t o l d him t h a t i f t h e y found Adam they would r e p o r t h i s whereabouts t o t h e p o l i c e and t h a t i f t h e y found Luanne t h e y would b r i n g h e r t o t h e p o l i c e . T r o t t i e r approved t h e p l a n . Luanne had, i n f a c t , been i n c o n t a c t w i t h Adam Weinberger and he knew t h a t s h e was i n t h e B i l l i n g s a r e a . She planned t o go t o F o r t Smith, Arkansas, w i t h him. S c o t t y and Gloreen Azure t h e n began t o s e a r c h f o r Adam Weinberger's c a r . They l a t e r e n l i s t e d t h e h e l p of G l o r e e n ' s s i s t e r , C a r o l Lee Azure, and C a r o l Lee's husband, Rodney. Rodney was S c o t t y A z u r e ' s cousin. C a r o l L e e and Rodney Azure found Adam's c a r i n Brockton t h a t a f t e r n o o n and n o t i f i e d t h e p o l i c e . The p o l i c e d i s p a t c h e r s e n t a n o f f i c e r t o Brockton, b u t he a p p a r e n t l y was unable t o l o c a t e t h e c a r . C a r o l Lee and Rodney t h e n attempted t o f i n d S c o t t y and Gloreen Azure. They encountered t h e Azures f o l l o w i n g Adam Weinberger's c a r on t h e F o r t Kipp Road and t u r n e d around t o f o l l o w t h e c a r s toward C u l b e r t s o n . The t h r e e c a r s were t h e n passed by Arrow Weinberger's w h i t e C a d i l l a c . A t a s i g n a l from Adam, Adam and Arrow p u l l e d t h e i r c a r s t o t h e s i d e of t h e road and stopped. The two Azure c a r s proceeded i n t o C u l b e r t s o n and stopped a t t h e S t a n d a r d g a s s t a t i o n . S c o t t y parked a t t h e s i d e of t h e s t a t i o n . Rodney parked s e v e r a l c a r l e n g t h s behind a r e d p i c k u p t h a t was a l s o parked a t t h e s i d e of t h e s t a t i o n . The two Azure women went i n t o t h e s t a t i o n t o ask t h e a t t e n d a n t t o c a l l t h e p o l i c e d i s p a t c h e r . S c o t t y and Rodney remained o u t s i d e . A t t h e t i m e of t h e r o a d s i d e s t o p , each Weinberger v e h i c l e had two occupants. Arrow Weinberger was accompanied by h i s b r o t h e r , Frank. Adam was accompanied by a h i t c h h i k e r named Thomas Hanzlick. When Adam r e t u r n e d t o h i s c a r a t t h a t s t o p a f t e r t a l k i n g w i t h Arrow, he t o l d Hanzlick t h a t Arrow was going t o ''run down1' t h e Azures and t a l k t o them. The Weinberger v e h i c l e s c o n t i n u e d i n t o C u l b e r t s o n and a l s o stopped a t t h e S t a n d a r d s t a t i o n . Arrow parked h i s c a r almost d i r e c t l y behind S c o t t y A z u r e ' s w i t h a b o u t s i x f e e t of s p a c e between t h e v e h i c l e s . Adam parked h i s c a r a n g l i n g i n t o t h e p a s s e n g e r ' s s i d e of S c o t t y ' s c a r w i t h s e v e r a l f e e t of c l e a r a n c e between t h e v e h i c l e s . The r e d pickup t r u c k was parked p a r a l l e l t o t h e d r i v e r ' s s i d e of S c o t t y ' s c a r a t a d i s t a n c e of n i n e and one-half f e e t away. S c o t t y Azure s t o o d between h i s c a r and t h e red p i c k u p n e a r t h e open d r i v e r ' s door of h i s c a r a s Weinbergers p u l l e d i n t o t h e s t a t i o n . Arrow g o t o u t of h i s c a r and t o l d S c o t t y t o l e a v e h i s son a l o n e . Adam c r o s s e d between S c o t t y ' s c a r and Arrow's C a d i l l a c t o t h e back of t h e red pickup, s a y i n g , " g e t your b a t o u t , Azure." H e t h e n began t o d r a g a l o g g i n g c h a i n o u t of t h e p i c k u p which he doubled over and s t a r t e d t o swing a t S c o t t y . Rodney Azure grabbed t h e o t h e r end of t h e eighteen-£ oot-long c h a i n a s Adam threw t h e c h a i n toward S c o t t y . S c o t t y d e f l e c t e d t h e c h a i n w i t h a b a s e b a l l b a t h e had r e t r i e v e d from h i s c a r . Arrow Weinberger t h e n drew a .25 c a l i b e r p i s t o l and s h o t S c o t t y Azure once i n t h e c h e s t , k i l l i n g him i n s t a n t l y . Arrow claimed t h a t he a c t e d i n self- d e f e n s e a f t e r S c o t t y had h i t him w i t h t h e b a t once and t r i e d t o h i t him a g a i n . Other w i t n e s s e s p l a c e d t h e two a t a d i s t a n c e of f i f t e e n - t o - t w e n t y f e e t a p a r t . The j u r y found Arrow Weinberger g u i l t y of d e l i b e r a t e homicide. Arrow Weinberger p r e s e n t s t h i s Court w i t h s i x i s s u e s on a p p e a l : 1. Whether t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s t a k e n a s a whole c o r - r e c t l y d e f i n e d t h e o f f e n s e o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide; 2. Whether c e r t a i n h e a r s a y t e s t i m o n y should have been s u b m i t t e d t o t h e j u r y ; 3 . Whether " o t h e r crimes" e v i d e n c e was e r r o n e o u s l y i n t r o d u c e d a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t ; 4. Whether t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s t r i a l t a c t i c s d e p r i v e d d e f e n d a n t of a f a i r t r i a l ; 5. Whether s e c t i o n 46-18-232, MCA, which a l l o w s i m p o s i t i o n of t r i a l c o s t s a g a i n s t a c o n v i c t e d d e f e n d a n t , is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ; and 6. Whether d e f e n d a n t was p r o p e r l y s e n t e n c e d . Defendant f i r s t a r g u e s t h a t a j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n d e f i n - i n g d e l i b e r a t e homicide o m i t t e d an e s s e n t i a l element of t h e crime. I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 1 provided: "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t o s u s t a i n t h e c h a r g e o f D e l i b e r a t e Homicide a g a i n s t Arrow Weinberger t h e S t a t e must prove t h a t t h e Defendant Arrow Weinberger pur- p o s e l y o r knowingly performed t h e a c t o r a c t s c a u s i n q t h e d e a t h o f Flovd Azure. " I f you f i n d from your c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a l l t h e evidence t h a t t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n h a s b e e n p r o v e d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt, t h e n you should f i n d Defendant Arrow W e i n b e r g e r g u i l t y o f D e l i b e r a t e Homicide." (Emphasis added.) Defendant c h a l l e n g e s t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n a s incomplete on t h e b a s i s t h a t it allowed t h e j u r y t o c o n v i c t him of d e l i b e r a t e homicide i f it found he i n t e n d e d t o perform t h e a c t which caused d e a t h r a t h e r t h a n i n t e n d i n g d e a t h a s t h e r e s u l t of t h e a c t . W e d i s a g r e e f o r s e v e r a l r e a s o n s . F i r s t , t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n , t a k e n i n c o n t e x t w i t h t h e o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s and p l a c e d w i t h i n t h e framework of t h e i s s u e s and arguments p r e s e n t e d throughout t h e t r i a l , d i d n o t a l l o w t h e j u r y t o c o n v i c t Arrow i f it found t h a t he had o n l y i n t e n d e d t o p u l l t h e t r i g g e r . T h i s Court h a s recognized t h a t i n t h e c a s e of d e l i b e r a t e homicide, t h e r e q u i s i t e mental s t a t e a t t a c h e s t o t h e r e s u l t : " I n Montana, a p e r s o n commits t h e o f f e n s e of d e l i b e r a t e homicide i f he p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly c a u s e s t h e d e a t h of a n o t h e r human being . . . The s t a t u t o r i l y d e f i n e d e l e m e n t s of t h e o f f e n s e , each of which t h e S t a t e must prove beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , a r e t h e r e f o r e c a u s i n g t h e d e a t h of a n o t h e r human being w i t h t h e knowledge t h a t you a r e c a u s i n g o r w i t h t h e p u r p o s e t o c a u s e t h e d e a t h of t h a t human being." ( E m p h a s i s a d d e d . ) S t a t e v . McKenzie ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 177 Mont. 280, 327-328, 581 P.2d 1205, 1232, v a c a t e d on o t h e r grounds, 443 U.S. 90$$ 99 S.Ct. 3094, 6 1 L.Ed.2d 871. Here, w e f i n d t h a t t h e j u r y was t h o r o u g h l y i n s t r u c t e d and could n o t have c o n v i c t e d Arrow u n l e s s it found t h a t he had performed t h e a c t o r a c t s c a u s i n g A z u r e ' s d e a t h w i t h t h e knowledge t h a t he was c a u s i n g o r t h e purpose t o c a u s e A z u r e ' s d e a t h . A t t h e o u t s e t of t r i a l , t h e j u r y was informed t h a t t h e s p e c i f i c c h a r g e a g a i n s t Arrow was t h a t : ". . . Arrow Weinberger p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly caused t h e d e a t h of Floyd Azure by s h o o t i n g him i n t h e h e a r t a r e a of t h e c h e s t w i t h a .25 c a l i b r e a u t o m a t i c p i s t o l c a u s i n g Floyd Azure t o d i e a l m o s t i n - s t a n t l y from a s e v e r e d pulmonary a o r t i c a r t e r y . . ." From t h a t p o i n t , t h e f o c u s of t h e t r i a l was on t h e e v e n t s l e a d i n g t o Azure's d e a t h and on whether t h e s h o o t i n g was d e l i b e r a t e , a c c i d e n t a l o r an a c t of s e l f - d e f e n s e . Arrow p r e s e n t e d e x t e n s i v e d i r e c t t e s t i m o n y t h a t c o n f l i c t e d w i t h t h e S t a t e ' s e v i d e n c e and he p r e s e n t e d e v i d e n c e through cross-examination t h a t s u p p o r t e d t h e d e f e n s e t h e o r i e s o f a c c i d e n t o r s e l f d e f e n s e . The j u r y was t h o r o u g h l y i n s t r u c t e d on b o t h t h e o r i e s and b o t h were t h o r o u g h l y argued. I n f a c t , no fewer t h a n twelve i n s t r u c t i o n s o f t h e f i f t y - f i v e g i v e n t o t h e j u r y d e f i n e d s e l f - d e f e n s e , t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n which it may be used, and t h e p e r m i s s i b l e amount of f o r c e which may be used. Where " a l l t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s , reviewed as a whole, f a i r l y and a c c u r a t e l y p r e s e n t t h e case t o t h e j u r y , " w e w i l l n o t o v e r t u r n a c o n v i c t i o n . S t a t e v. R i l e y ( 1 9 8 2 ) , Mon t . , 649 P.2d 1273, 1281, 39 St.Rep. 1491, 1501; S t a t e v. Johnson ( 1 9 8 2 ) , Mont . , 646 P.2d 507, 512, 39 St.Rep. 1014, 1020. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e s e l f - d e f e n s e i n s t r u c t i o n s , t h e j u r o r s were i n s t r u c t e d : t h a t t h e y must c o n s i d e r t h e i n s t r u c - t i o n s a s a whole ( # I ) ; t h a t each m a t e r i a l a l l e g a t i o n and f a c t charged under t h e s p e c i f i c c h a r g e a g a i n s t Arrow must be proved beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t ( # 8 ) ; t h a t t h e r e q u i s i t e mental s t a t e was " p u r p o s e l y " or "knowingly" w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e r e s u l t of t h e conduct d e s c r i b e d by t h e s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g an o f f e n s e ( # 3 1 , # 3 2 ) ; t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n of "pur- p o s e l y " and "knowingly" ( # 3 1 , # 3 2 ) ; t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n of d e l i b e r a t e homicide ( # l o ) ; t h a t b o t h act and m e n t a l s t a t e must be proved beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t ( # 3 9 ) ; t h a t a p e r - son must have t h e r e q u i s i t e mental s t a t e w i t h r e s p e c t t o each e l e m e n t of t h e o f f e n s e ( # 2 4 ) ; t h a t d e a t h o c c u r r i n g from a c c i d e n t o r m i s f o r t u n e is n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n v i c t of d e l i - b e r a t e homicide ( # 1 5 ) ; t h a t t h e f a c t a d e a t h o c c u r r e d is n o t s u f f i c i e n t p r o o f , s t a n d i n g a l o n e , t h a t a crime was committed ( # 1 6 ) . W e r e j e c t t h e t o r t u r e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h e d i s s e n t e r s g i v e t o I n s t r u c t i o n No. 11. They a r g u e t h a t I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 1 is i n c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s . Viewed i n c o n t e x t of t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e , t h e arguments p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l , and a l l of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s charged t o t h e j u r y , w e f i n d t h e i r s t a n c e u n t e n a b l e . W e hold t h a t t h e i n s t r u c - t i o n s t a k e n a s a whole f a i r l y and a c c u r a t e l y p r e s e n t e d t h e case t o t h e j u r y and were s u f f i c i e n t . The second b a s i s on which w e r e j e c t a c h a l l e n g e t o I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 1 is t h a t d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t p r o p e r l y o b j e c t t o it; nor d i d he t a k e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l t o c u r e any d e f i c i e n c y i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n . A s i n s t r u c t i o n s were being s e t t l e d , t h e S t a t e o f f e r e d i t s proposed I n s t r u c t i o n No. 8, which was given a s t h e C o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n No. 11. The f o l l o w i n g exchange took p l a c e : "MR. CHARLES MOSES [Defense Counsel] : W e would o b j e c t t o P l a i n t i f f ' s 8 upon t h e f o l l o w i n g g r o u n d s , upon t h e f o l l o w i n g grounds: t h a t t h i s is an element and i s s u e s i n s t r u c t i o n and it is incomplete; t h e S t a t e is r e q u i r e d t o prove, number 1: t h e S t a t e is implying t h a t it was done knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y ; number 2 , t h a t it was done with i n t e n t t o k i l l , which re- q u i r e s under d e l i b e r a t e homicide a s p e c i - f i c purpose t o k i l l under t h e s t a t u t e ; number 3 , t h a t it h a s t o be committed w i t h i n t h e county; number 4 , t h e d e a t h must be a r e s u l t of d e l i b e r a t i o n . "THE COURT: Do you have i n s t r u c t i o n l i k e t h a t i n yours? "MR. CHARLES MOSES: No I d o n ' t have t h a t . "THE COURT: W e l l i f you w i l l p r e p a r e one c h a t h a s a l l o f t h o s e t h i n q s , w e w i l l - ---------- t a k e a look a t it. "MR. MOSES: Okay, Your Honor. "THE COURT: Otherwise, I b e l i e v e I w i l l g i v e t h i s one. "THE COURT: I w i l l g i v e it unless--I d o n ' t t h i n k we have t o a l l e g e t h a t it was i n Roosevelt County, t h a t is a l e g a l q u e s t i o n . Culbertson is i n Roosevelt County, Montana, and t h e a c t was commit- ted i n Roosevelt County, Montana and i n a d d i t i o n I would t a k e j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of t h e f a c t t h a t C u l b e r t s o n is i n Roosevelt County, Montana. I d o n ' t t h i n k t h a t t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s have t o have a l l t h a t s t u f f i n it. 8 w i l l be g i v e n . A s I u n d e r s t a n d i t y o u ' r e s a y i n g and i t i s ------ ------- - - y o u r p o s i t i o n t h a t y o u h a v e t o p r o v e ......................... s e e c i f i c i n t e n t i n t h e s t a t u t o r y l a n - - --- - - - -- - - - - - g u a g e , p u r p o s e l y , k n o w i n g l y - ---------- u n d e r t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t r u l i n u s ? "MR. CHARLES MOSES: Right. " (Emphasis added. ) W h i l e d e f e n d a n t o b j e c t e d on t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was i n c o m p l e t e , it is a p p a r e n t from t h e d i s c u s - s i o n t h a t t h e n followed t h a t t h e c r u x of t h e o b j e c t i o n was t h a t it d i d n o t r e q u i r e t h a t t h e S t a t e prove a s p e c i f i c i n t e n t t o k i l l b u t t h a t it allowed t h e S t a t e t o imply such a s p e c i f i c i n t e n t w i t h i n t h e s t a t u t o r y mental states of pur- p o s e l y o r knowingly. Defense c o u n s e l argued f i r s t t h a t t h e j u r y be i n s t r u c t e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t must have had a s p e c i f i c purpose t o k i l l and t h a t t h e d e a t h must have been a r e s u l t of d e l i b e r a t i o n . H e a l s o argued t h a t t h e j u r y be i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e crime had t o have been committed w i t h i n t h e county. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t took j u d i c i a l n o t i c e o f venue. The f i r s t argument propounded by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l is n o t t h e law i n Montana. The S t a t e need n o t e s t a b l i s h a s p e c i f i c p u r p o s e t o k i l l . Nor must it show t h a t d e a t h was t h e r e s u l t of d e l i b e r - a t i o n o t h e r t h a n t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n i m p l i c i t w i t h i n t h e s t a t u - t o r y d e f i n i t i o n s of "purposely" and "knowingly." S t a t e v. Sharbono ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 175 Mont. 373, 392, 563 P.2d 61, 72-73. See a l s o , C r i m i n a l Law Commission Comments t o s e c t i o n 45-5- 102, MCA. Where a p e r s o n is aware t h a t it is h i g h l y p r o b a b l e t h a t a c e r t a i n r e s u l t w i l l be caused by h i s conduct, he a c t s knowingly w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e r e s u l t of t h a t conduct. Sec- t i o n 45-2-101(33), MCA. Where it is a p e r s o n ' s c o n s c i o u s o b j e c t t o engage i n c e r t a i n conduct o r t o c a u s e a p a r t i c u l a r r e s u l t he acts p u r p o s e l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h a t conduct o r its r e s u l t . S e c t i o n 45-2-101(58), MCA. The C o m p i l e r ' s Comments to section 45-5-102, MCA, at 123, defining deliberate homi- cide, note that: "'Purposely' . . . is the most culpable mental state and implies an objective or design to engage in certain conduct, al- though not Earticularly toward some ---- ------ --__------_------------ result. 'Knowingly' . . . refers to a state of mind in which a person acts, while not toward a certain objective, at least with full knowledge of relevant ------------- facts and circumstances. Toqether these terms replace the concepts of malice and intent . . . premeditation is no longer an element of homicide . . ." (Emphasis added. ) We agree. We have previously recognized the legislative changes in the requirements of mens rea. State v. Sharbono, supra, 175 Mont. at 392-394, 563 P.2d at 72-73; State v. Coleman (1978), 177 Mont. 1, 30-31, 579 P.2d 732, 750, cert. denied, 448 U.S. 914, 101 S.Ct. 34, 65 L.Ed.2d 1177. Here, defendant's objection to Instruction No. 11 on the ground that it was incomplete is founded upon mens rea requirements that are no longer the law in Montana. Defendant also failed to take the opportunity provided by the District Court to draft an alternative instruction. Instead, after instructions had been read to the jury and the State had presented its initial final argument, defense counsel resubmitted its proposed Instruction No. 35: "You are instructed that with respect to the crime alleged of deliberate homicide, a specific purpose to kill is an ele- ment of such a charge and must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." This proposed instruction was properly refused both times. We conclude that defendant's contention that Instruc- tion No. 11 was incomplete is without merit. Defendant next challenges the introduction of certain hearsay statements into evidence. He raises three separate arguments i n a t t a c k i n g admission of t h e h e a r s a y s t a t e m e n t s . F i r s t , he contends t h a t two p r e s h o o t i n g s t a t e m e n t s were n o t a d m i s s i b l e because t h e y were h e a r s a y o r double h e a r s a y and because t h e y were i r r e l e v a n t . Second, he contends t h a t t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o g i v e n o t i c e of two admissions p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 46-15-303, MCA, and should t h e r e f o r e n o t have been allowed t o i n t r o d u c e t h e s t a t e m e n t s . T h i r d , he c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e admission of f o u r i n c u l p a t o r y s t a t e m e n t s made by Adam, h i s n o n t e s t i f y i n g codefendant, were Bruton i n f r a c t i o n s t h a t v i o l a t e d t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n c l a u s e of t h e S i x t h Amend- ment t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . Bruton v. United S t a t e s ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476. The p r e s h o o t i n g h e a r s a y s t a t e m e n t s t h a t were a d m i t t e d and t h a t d e f e n d a n t c h a l l e n g e s were made by Gloreen and Luanne Azure. Gloreen Azure was q u e s t i o n e d d u r i n g c r o s s - examination on h e r b a s i s f o r b e l i e v i n g t h a t Weinbergers might know of Luanne's whereabouts. The S t a t e was allowed t o d e v e l o p t h o s e r e a s o n s on r e d i r e c t examination and testi- mony on Adam's involvement i n Luanne's t r i p t o W i l l i s t o n was a d m i t t e d . Gloreen was a l s o asked why s h e b e l i e v e d t h a t Arrow could be involved w i t h Luanne's d i s a p p e a r a n c e . She answered : "I was t o l d t h a t he was on h i s way up h e r e , and he d i d n ' t c a r e how much money it c o s t him, and he was b r i n g i n g a lawyer and he was going t o prove t h a t h i s s o n was an a n g e l . . ." Luanne was q u e s t i o n e d on Weinbergers' knowledge o f h e r whereabouts d u r i n g e a r l y December. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e and Adam planned t o go t o Arkansas; t h a t s h e l e f t a n o t e t e l l i n g him s h e was going t o B i l l i n g s ; t h a t he showed t h e n o t e t o Arrow; and t h a t Arrow s a i d it "sounded good" t o him. Both s t a t e m e n t s were o b j e c t e d t o a s h e a r s a y , o r as d o u b l e h e a r s a y , p u r s u a n t t o Rule 805, Mont.R.Evid. The District Court p r o p e r l y allowed t h e f i r s t state- ment i n t o e v i d e n c e w i t h an i n s t r u c t i o n t h a t it was n o t o f f e r e d t o prove t h e t r u t h of t h e m a t t e r a s s e r t e d b u t w a s o f f e r e d o n l y t o show why Gloreen a c t e d and b e l i e v e d a s s h e d i d . The s t a t e m e n t was r e l e v a n t t o t h e i s s u e of d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t e of mind and motive. I n a c a s e where s e l f - d e f e n s e is r a i s e d , t h e s t a t e of mind and i n t e n t of t h e d e f e n d a n t is t h e primary i s s u e . The j u r y is e n t i t l e d t o know, s o f a r as e v i d e n c e is a v a i l a b l e , a l l t h e f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s which tend t o throw l i g h t upon t h e p a r t i e s and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s and f e e l i n g s toward each o t h e r . S t a t e v. Hollowell ( 1 9 2 7 ) , 79 Mont. 343, 356-357, 256 P. 380, 385. The j u r y was e n t i t l e d t o view S c o t t y A z u r e ' s d e a t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e s e p r i o r e v e n t s . S t a t e v. R i l e y , s u p r a , 649 P.2d a t 1280, 39 St.Rep. a t 1499. Most of Luanne's s t a t e m e n t was n o n o b j e c t i o n a b l e and was p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d . Only t h e second p a r t o f t h e s t a t e m e n t ( A r r o w ' s knowledge a n d a p p r o v a l o f L u a n n e ' s t r i p t o B i l l i n g s ) should n o t have been a d m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e . Defendant c o n t e n d s t h a t viewed i n t h e c o n t e x t o f G l o r e e n ' s s t a t e m e n t and t h e r e f e r e n c e made t o t h e t r i b a l c o m p l a i n t f i l e d a g a i n s t Adam, t h e comment was p r e j u d i c i a l . W e w i l l a d d r e s s t h i s c o n t e n t i o n w i t h i n t h e framework of d e f e n d a n t ' s argument on " o t h e r crimes" e v i d e n c e . Defendant a r g u e s t h a t Luanne's s t a t e m e n t c o n s t i t u t e s e v i d e n c e of o t h e r c r i m e s and t h a t it d o e s n o t meet t h e f o u r - prong test of a d m i s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h i s C o u r t s e t f o r t h i n S t a t e v. J u s t ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. , 602 P.2d 957, 36 St.Rep. 1649. We agree that it does not meet the Just test. It need not. We reject defendant's contention that it constitutes evidence of other crimes. Defendant failed to object to admission of the statement at trial on these grounds and may not do so now. State v . Campbell (1981), Mont . , 622 P.2d 200, 202, 38 St.Rep. 19, 22. Nor has Arrow convinced us that the jury would recognize as "another crime" the tenuous connection he attempts to draw between: (1) a complaint filed against Adam in Tribal Court; (2) Adam's plan to take Luanne to Arkansas; (3) Arrow's knowledge that Luanne left a note saying she went to Billings; and, (4) Arrow's statement that "it sound[ed] good to [him] . " The connection appears to be too flimsy to merit serious consideration. In a criminal case where prejudice is alleged, it must be established from the record that a substantial right was denied. State v . Dupre (1982), Mon t . , 650 P.2d 1381, 1386, 39 St.Rep. 1660, 1666; section 46-20-701, MCA. Defendant has failed to demonstrate such prejudice. Defendant next challenges the introduction of several statements which were not included within the "Notice of Confessions and/or Admissions" filed by the State in response to defendant's motion requesting production of such statements. Defendant contends that the District Court erred in ruling that the motion was moot as a result of the notice filed. We agree. Section 46-15-303, MCA, provides: "Motion to produce confession or admis- sion. (1) On motion of a defendant in any criminal case made prior to trial, the court shall order the state to furnish the defendant with a copy of any written confession or admission and a list of the witnesses to its making. If the defendant has made an oral confession or admission, a list of t h e w i t n e s s e s t o i t s making s h a l l be f u r n i s h e d . " ( 2 ) The list o f w i t n e s s e s may, upon n o t i c e and motion, be amended by t h e s t a t e p r i o r t o t r i a l . " ( 3 ) No s u c h c o n f e s s i o n o r a d m i s s i o n s h a l l be r e c e i v e d i n e v i d e n c e w h i c h h a s n o t b e e n f u r n i s h e d i n c o m p l i a n c e w i t h ------------ s u b s e c t i o n (1) u n l e s s t h e c o u r t is s a t i s - f i e d t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r was unaware o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f s u c h c o n f e s s i o n o r ad- m i s s i o n ~ r i o r t o t r i a l and t h a t he c o u l d n o t have become aware of such i n t h e e x e r c i s e of due d i l i g e n c e . " (Emphasis added. ) The r e c o r d d o e s n o t s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g by t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r was unaware of t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e s t a t e m e n t s . The District Court t h e r e f o r e had no d i s c r e - t i o n t o a l l o w t h e s t a t e m e n t s i n t o evidence. The f i r s t s t a t e m e n t was made by Adam i n t h e s e r v i c e s t a t i o n a f t e r t h e s h o o t i n g . H e s a i d , "What do you e x p e c t , t h e y were t a i l g a t i n g us." The p r o s e c u t o r f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e t h i s s t a t e m e n t t o d e f e n d a n t s i n c e he f i r s t became aware of it a f t e r t h e "Notice of C o n f e s s i o n s and/or Admissions" was f i l e d . The D i s t r i c t Court p r o p e r l y provided d e f e n s e c o u n s e l t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o i n t e r v i e w a l l p o s s i b l e w i t n e s s e s t o t h e making of t h e s t a t e m e n t b e f o r e it was allowed i n t o e v i d e n c e . The second s t a t e m e n t was made by Adam t o t h e h i t c h h i k e r , Hanzlick. A s Adam stopped a t t h e s e r v i c e s t a t i o n , he asked: "Are you ready t o f i g h t ? " Defense c o u n s e l o b j e c t e d t o t h e S t a t e ' s a t t e m p t t o i n t r o d u c e t h i s s t a t e m e n t i n its c r o s s - examination of Hanzlick. A f t e r d i s c u s s i o n o u t s i d e t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e j u r y , t h e D i s t r i c t Court s t r u c k t h e s t a t e - ment and used an admonishment framed by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y t o d i s r e g a r d it. No motion f o r m i s t r i a l was made. The e x i s t e n c e of a s i m i l a r s t a t e m e n t ("we might see a f i g h t " ) had been provided i n an a f f i d a v i t s u p p o r t i n g t h e amended complaint and its admission had been argued e a r l i e r i n t h e t r i a l . Defendant h a s f a i l e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e p r e j u d i c e a r i s i n g from t h e f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e n o t i c e of t h e s e s t a t e m e n t s a s d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e s t a t e m e n t s themselves. The purpose of t h e s t a t u t e r e q u i r i n g p r o d u c t i o n of c o n f e s s i o n s and a d m i s s i o n s is t o a l l o w t h e d e f e n d a n t t o p r e p a r e a d e f e n s e t o t h e s t a t e m e n t s . Here, d e f e n d a n t was g i v e n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o i n t e r v i e w any p o s s i b l e w i t n e s s e s t o t h e making of t h e f i r s t s t a t e m e n t b e f o r e it was i n t r o d u c e d . The second s t a t e m e n t was n o t a d m i t t e d , and t h e j u r y was admonished w i t h an i n s t r u c t i o n p r e p a r e d by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l . While t h e s u b s t a n c e of t h e s t a t e m e n t s may have been d e t r i - mental t o d e f e n d a n t , he has n o t demonstrated p r e j u d i c e stemming from t h e S t a t e ' s f a i l u r e t o produce t h e s t a t e m e n t s p r i o r t o t r i a l . Defendant f i n a l l y a r g u e s t h a t f o u r s t a t e m e n t s a t t r i - buted t o h i s n o n t e s t i f y i n g codefendant were a d m i t t e d i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n c l a u s e of t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . The f o u r out-of-court s t a t e m e n t s were i n t r o - duced through f o u r w i t n e s s e s . Gloreen Azure t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r t h e s h o o t i n g Adam s a i d t o h e r , "I hope you a r e s a t i s f i e d , you caused a l l of t h i s t r o u b l e . " Rodney Azure t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r t h e shoot- i n g Adam s a i d t o him, "What d i d you e x p e c t , t h e y were t a i l - g a t i n g us." The t h i r d s t a t e m e n t was i n t r o d u c e d through t h e testimony of Arthur Sarnow, who t r a n s p o r t e d t h e Weinbergers and Tom Hanzlick from t h e s c e n e of t h e s h o o t i n g . H e testi- f i e d t h a t Adam t u r n e d toward Arrow Weinberger, Frank Wein- b e r g e r , and Hanzlick and s a i d , " T h a t ' s one and f o u r t o go." The l a s t of t h e s t a t e m e n t s was H a n z l i c k l s s t r i c k e n state- ment. Adam a s k e d , " [a] re you r e a d y t o f i g h t ? " as t h e y drove i n t o t h e s e r v i c e s t a t i o n . Arrow c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e s e s t a t e m e n t s v i o l a t e t h e r u l e announced i n Bruton. I n Bruton t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court h e l d t h a t "where t h e p o w e r f u l l y i n c r i m i n a t i n g e x t r a j u d i c i a l s t a t e m e n t s of a codefendant who s t a n d s accused side-by-side w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t , a r e d e l i b e r a t e l y s p r e a d b e f o r e t h e j u r y i n a j o i n t t r i a l , " l i m i t i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e j u r y t o d i s r e g a r d t h e s t a t e m e n t s i n c u l p a t i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t a r e i n a d e q u a t e . Bruton, s u p r a , 391 U . S . a t 135-136, 88 S.Ct. a t 1628, 20 L.Ed.2d a t 485. The f a c t s i n Bruton a r e c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h - a b l e from t h e c a s e b e f o r e us. I n Bruton t h e n o n t e s t i f y i n g c o d e f e n d a n t , Evans, con- f e s s e d o r a l l y t h a t h e and Bruton committed a robbery. The c o n f e s s i o n was a d m i t t e d , and t h e j u r y w a s i n s t r u c t e d t h a t it was competent o n l y a g a i n s t Evans. The C o u r t r e v e r s e d based upon, f i r s t , t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t s were " p o w e r f u l l y i n c r i m i n a t i n g " and " d e v a s t a t i n g " t o Bruton and, second, upon t h e recognized m o t i v a t i o n t o s h i f t blame o n t o o t h e r s . I t concluded t h a t : "The u n r e l i a b i l i t y of such e v i d e n c e is i n t o l e r a b l y compounded when t h e a l l e g e d accomplice, a s h e r e , d o e s n o t t e s t i f y and c a n n o t be t e s t e d by cross-examination. I t was a g a i n s t such t h r e a t s t o a f a i r t r i a l t h a t t h e C o n f r o n t a t i o n C l a u s e was d i r e c t e d . " Bruton, s u p r a , 391 U.S. a t 136, 88 S.Ct. a t 1628, 20 L.Ed.2d a t 485. E x t r a j u d i c i a l s t a t e m e n t s o f a n o n t e s t i f y i n g codefen- d a n t d o n o t always r e q u i r e r e v e r s a l . S t a t e v. Powers ( 1 9 8 2 ) , Mon t . , 645 P.2d 1357, 1363, 39 St.Rep. 989, 996; H a r r i n g t o n v. C a l i f o r n i a ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284; Schneble v. F l o r i d a ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 405 U.S. 427, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 3 1 L.,Ed.2d 340. A c r i m i n a l d e f e n d a n t is e n t i t l e d t o a f a i r t r i a l . b u t n o t a p e r f e c t one. S t a t e v. Powers, s u p r a ; Bruton v. United S t a t e s , s u p r a . I n a c c o r d , .i.~r,z.~)< -I&hmirv. United S t a t e s ( 1 9 5 3 ) , 344 U.S. 604, 73 S.Ct. 481, 97 L.Ed. 593; Brown v. U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208; Michigan v. Tucker ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182. Where a s t a t e m e n t h a s been e d i t e d t o remove s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e s t o c o d e f e n d a n t s , it is a d m i s s i b l e i n a j o i n t t r i a l . United S t a t e s v. S t e w a r t ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 7 8 ) , 579 F.2d 356, cert. d e n i e d , 439 U.S. 936, 99 S.Ct. 332, 58 L.Ed.2d 332; United S t a t e s v. Holleman ( 7 t h C i r . 1 9 7 8 ) , 575 F.2d 139; U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Dady ( 6 t h C i r . 1 9 7 6 ) , 536 F.2d 675 ( p e r c u r i a m ) ; United S t a t e s v. Wingate (2nd C i r . 1 9 7 5 ) , 520 F.2d 309, c e r t . d e n i e d , 423 U.S. 1074, 96 S.Ct. 858, 47 L.Ed.2d 84; United S t a t e s v. A l v a r e z ( 3 r d C i r . 1 9 7 5 ) , 519 F.2d 1052, c e r t . d e n i e d , 423 U.S. 914, 96 S.Ct. 221, 46 L.Ed.2d 1 4 3 ; . U n i t e d S t a t e s v. P a n e p i n t o ( 3 r d C i r . 1 9 7 0 ) , 430 F.2d 613, cert. d e n i e d , 400 U.S. 949, 9 1 S.Ct. 258, 27 L.Ed.2d 256; United S t a t e s v. L i p o w i t z ( 3 r d C i r . 1 9 6 9 ) , 407 F.2d 597, cert. d e n i e d , 395 U.S. 946, 89 S.Ct. 2026, 23 S i m i l a r l y , w h e r e a s t a t e m e n t i s n o t p o w e r f u l l y i n c r i m i n a t i n g b u t i m p l i c a t e s t h e complaining d e f e n d a n t " o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e j u r y may make i n f e r e n c e s based on o t h e r c l e a r l y a d m i s s i b l e e v i d e n c e , " it d o e s n o t v i o l a t e t h e B r u t o n r u l e . U n i t e d S t a t e s v. B e l l e ( 3 r d C i r . 1 9 7 9 ) , 593 F.2d 487, 495 ( e n b a n c ) , cert. d e n i e d , 442 U.S. 911, 99 2 7 7 S.Ct. 2825, 61 L.Ed.2d 4343; c f . , U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Winograd ( 7 t h C i r . 1 9 8 1 ) , 656 F.2d 279, 283, c e r t . d e n i e d , 455 U.S. 989; United S t a t e s v. DiGregorio (1st C i r . 1 9 7 9 ) , 605 F.2d 1184, 1190, c e r t . d e n i e d , 444 U.S. 937, 100 S.Ct. 287, 62 L.Ed.2d 197; E n g l i s h v. United S t a t e s ( 7 t h C i r . 1 9 8 0 ) , 620 F.2d 150, 153, cert. d e n i e d , 449 U.S. 859, 1 0 1 S.Ct. 160, 66 L.Ed. 2d 75. Winograd, DiGregorio and E n g l i s h each a n a l y z e d whether t h e s t a t e m e n t was v i t a l l y i m p o r t a n t t o t h e govern- m e n t ' s case or whether it was simply l i n k a g e t e s t i m o n y t h a t was i n c r i m i n a t i n g o n l y i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h o t h e r f a c t s . See a l s o , S t i n s o n v. S t a t e ( A 1 a . C r i m . A ~ ~ . 1 9 8 1 ) , 401 So.2d 257, 261; Commonwealth v. Rawls ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 276 Pa.Super. 89, 419 A.2d 109, 111-112. Here, we must examine t h e f o u r c h a l l e n g e d s t a t e m e n t s i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e e n t i r e t r i a l . Defendant a r g u e s t h a t he was d e n i e d h i s r i g h t t o c o n f r o n t h i s a c c u s o r s a s guaran- t e e u by t h e S i x t h Amendment of t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u - t i o n . W e d i s a g r e e . The f o u r s t a t e m e n t s were i n t r o d u c e d through f o u r of twenty-three w i t n e s s e s p r e s e n t e d by t h e S t a t e . Defendant p r e s e n t e d seven w i t n e s s e s , i n c l u d i n g h i s own testimony. Defense c o u n s e l was a f f o r d e d f u l l o p p o r t u n i t y t o c r o s s - examine a l l of t h e S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s . The s t a t e m e n t s were n o t c r i t i c a l t o t h e S t a t e ' s case a g a i n s t Arrow i n l i g h t o f e y e w i t n e s s t e s t i m o n y d e s c r i b i n g t h e f i n a l c o n f r o n t a t i o n between Arrow and t h e v i c t i m . Nor were t h e y " p o w e r f u l l y i n c r i m i n a t i n g " t o Arrow. None of t h e s t a t e m e n t s d i r e c t l y i m p l i c a t e d Arrow by name. None d i r e c t l y connected him w i t h A z u r e ' s murder. None of t h e f o u r s t a t e m e n t s was c h a l l e n g e d on t h e b a s i s of a d e n i a l of c o n f r o n t a t i o n . W e w i l l examine each s t a t e m e n t and its admission i n t o e v i d e n c e i n t u r n . The f i r s t s t a t e m e n t d e f e n d a n t c h a l l e n g e s was i n t r o - duced through Gloreen Azure on r e d i r e c t examination. The p r o s e c u t o r asked Gloreen: "Q. Do you r e c a l l t a l k i n g t o Adam Wein- b e r g e r , t h e d e f e n d a n t , a t t h a t t i m e , s t a t i n g t o him t h a t 'you had k i l l e d him'? A. H e s a i d I hope you a r e s a t i s f i e d , you caused a l l of t h i s t r o u b l e . " No o b j e c t i o n was r a i s e d a t t r i a l t o t h e admission o f t h i s s t a t e m e n t . On a p p e a l , d e f e n d a n t f a i l s t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t its admission c o n s t i t u t e s p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r . A t most, t h i s s t a t e m e n t can be viewed as l i n k a g e t e s t i m o n y t h a t is i n c r i m i n a t i n g o n l y i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h o t h e r f a c t s . I t d o e s n o t d e m o n s t r a t e a c o d e f e n d a n t ' s " r e c o g n i z e d m o t i v a t i o n t o s h i f t blame o n t o o t h e r s . " Bruton v. United S t a t e s , 391 U.S. a t 136, 88 S.Ct. a t 1628, 20 L.Ed.2d a t 485. I f a n y t h i n g , t h e s t a t e m e n t s e r v e s as a n admission a g a i n s t i n t e r e s t t h a t t e n d s t o i n c r i m i n a t e Adam h i m s e l f . Rule 8 0 1 ( d ) ( 2 ) ( A ) , Mont.R.Evid. T h i s s t a t e m e n t was n o t v i t a l t o t h e S t a t e ' s case a g a i n s t Arrow. W e f i n d no p r e j u d i c e . Nor d o w e f i n d t h a t a d m i s s i o n o f t h e second s t a t e m e n t was p r e j u d i c i a l . I t was i n t r o d u c e d through t h e d i r e c t examination of Rodney Azure. Defense c o u n s e l f i r s t o b j e c t e d t o its i n t r o d u c t i o n on t h e b a s i s t h a t no n o t i c e was p r o v i d e d t o t h e d e f e n d a n t s of t h e s t a t e m e n t . The District C o u r t r e m e d i e d t h a t o m i s s i o n by a l l o w i n g d e f e n s e c o u n s e l t o subpoena and i n t e r v i e w any p o s s i b l e w i t n e s s e s t o t h e making of t h e s t a t e m e n t . Counsel n e x t o b j e c t e d on t h e b a s i s of l a c k of foundation. The w i t n e s s t h e n provided t e s t i m o n y on t h e t i m e , p l a c e and p e o p l e p r e s e n t . F i n a l l y , t h e w i t n e s s , Rodney Azure, t e s t i f i e d a s f o l l o w s : "Q. And d i d you h e a r him make any s t a t e - ments a t t h a t t i m e , Adam Weinberger? A. I heard it yes. "Q. You d i d hear him make a s t a t e m e n t ? A. Y e s . "Q. And t o whom were t h e y d i r e c t e d ? A. I d o n ' t know who t h e y were d i r e c t e d t o , it seems l i k e he was j u s t g l a r i n g . "Q. And what d i d he say? A. H e s a i d 'What do you e x p e c t , t h e y were t a i l g a t i n g u s ' . " No f u r t h e r o b j e c t i o n was r a i s e d . Nor h a s p r e j u d i c e been demonstrated. T h i s s t a t e m e n t a g a i n can s e r v e a t most a s l i n k a g e testimony. Without t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of o t h e r f a c t s , Adam's comment is n o t p o w e r f u l l y i n c r i m i n a t i n g t o Arrow. Nor, i n l i g h t of t h e o t h e r evidence produced a t t r i a l , is it v i t a l t o t h e S t a t e ' s c a s e a g a i n s t Arrow. I t d o e s n o t s h i f t blame from Adam t o Arrow. W e f i n d no Bruton v i o l a t i o n . The t h i r d s t a t e m e n t , t h e most i n c r i m i n a t i n g of t h e f o u r , is s t i l l i n c r i m i n a t i n g o n l y i n l i g h t of o t h e r c l e a r l y a d m i s s i b l e evidence p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l and is t h e r e f o r e mere l i n k a g e testimony. It was i n t r o d u c e d through t h e t e s t i m o n y of Arthur Sarnow, a G.V.W. o f f i c e r f o r t h e Montana Highway Department. Sarnow was asked by a s h e r i f f ' s deputy t o a s s i s t i n moving t h e t h r e e Weinbergers and Tom Hanzlick from t h e scene of t h e s h o o t i n g . The o n l y o b j e c t i o n r a i s e d by defen- d a n t a s t o Sarnow's testimony was t h e f o l l o w i n g o b j e c t i o n on t h e b a s i s of foundation: "Q. Okay, and while you were i n t h e p a t r o l c a r , d i d you h e a r one of t h e s e two d e f e n d a n t s s a y anything t o t h e o t h e r one? A. Y e s s i r I d i d . "Q. And who d i d you hear s a y something? A. The young boy i n t h e pink t h e r e . "Q. And who d i d he s a y it t o ? A. To t h e back s e a t where t h e o t h e r t h r e e peo- p l e were s i t t i n g . "Q. And t h a t is where t h e o t h e r d e f e n d a n t was s e a t e d ? A. Y e s , i n t h e middle i n t h e back, yes. "Q. And do you r e c a l l what he s a i d ? "MR. S. MOSES: Your Honor, I am going t o ask f o r a f u r t h e r f o u n d a t i o n a s t o who was s i t t i n g i n t h e c a r . "MR. RACICOT: W e have a l r e a d y d i d t h a t , Your Honor. "MR. S. MOSES: You o n l y t a l k e d about t h e d e f e n d a n t s though. "THE COURT: Okay, who was t h e d r i v e r and SO on. "A. Duane Rasmussen, Roosevelt County deputy s h e r i f f was d r i v i n g . "Q. And you were s i t t i n g where? A. On t h e passenger s i d e , a g a i n s t t h e window. "Q. And where was t h e d e f e n d a n t Adam Weinberger, t h e young son s i t t i n g ? A. The young one was between Duane and I i n t h e f r o n t s e a t . "Q. And what d i d he s a y when he t u r n e d around t o t h e back s e a t ? A. H e t u r n e d towards m e t o t h e back s e a t and he s a i d ' T h a t ' s one and f o u r t o g o ' . " Again, t h i s testimony i n c r i m i n a t e s Arrow o n l y when l i n k e d w i t h o t h e r f a c t s i n t r o d u c e d a t t r i a l . I t does n o t a t t e m p t t o s h i f t blame from Adam t o Arrow. I t r a t h e r t e n d s t o i n c r i m i n a t e Adam h i m s e l f . No Bruton o b j e c t i o n was r a i s e d . W e f i n d no v i o l a t i o n . The l a s t s t a t e m e n t d e f e n d a n t c h a l l e n g e s was i n t r o d u c e d through t h e following recross-examination of t h e h i t c h h i k e r , Tom Hanzlick: "Q. Do you r e c a l l when you p u l l e d up w i t h Adam W e i n b e r g e r i n t h e c a r a n d t e l l i n g m e t h a t Adam Weinberger s a i d , when you p u l l e d up i n t h e c a r and parked a t t h e C u l b e r t s o n s t a t i o n ? A. Y e s , do I r e c a l l it, y e s s i r . " Q . What d i d he s a y t o you? "MR. S. MOSES: Your Honor, was it what Adam s a i d ? "MR. RACICOT: R i g h t , what Adam Weinberger s a i d . "THE COURT: I t d o e s n ' t r e f e r t o someone e l s e ? "MR. RACICOT: I t d o e s n ' t r e f e r t o anybody e l s e , it is what Adam Weinberger s a i d t o you. H e asked you 'Are you ready t o f i g h t ? ' d i d n ' t he? A. Y e s s i r , h e d i d . " Defense c o u n s e l c l a r i f i e d t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t was made by Adam, p o t e n t i a l l y a n o n t e s t i f y i n g c o d e f e n d a n t , and allowed t h e q u e s t i o n t o be asked and answered w i t h o u t o b j e c t i o n . Then o b j e c t i o n was r a i s e d . I t was d i r e c t e d o n l y t o l a c k o f n o t i c e , however. A f t e r l e n g t h y d i s c u s s i o n and c o n s u l t a t i o n of l e g a l t e x t b o o k s i n chambers, t h e D i s t r i c t Court gave t h e f o l l o w i n g i n s t r u c t i o n , which was formulated by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l : "THE COURT: A l l r i g h t , I am going t o i n s t r u c t t h e J u r y t h a t t h e l a t e s t s t a t e - ment t h a t was t e s t i f i e d t o concerning-- made by Adam Weinberger t o t h i s w i t n e s s should be d i s r e g a r d e d by t h e J u r y . You may proceed." T h i s f o u r t h s t a t e m e n t ("Are you ready t o f i g h t ? " ) d o e s no more t h a n s e r v e t o l i n k Arrow w i t h t h e o t h e r e v i d e n c e , i f t h a t . I t c e r t a i n l y d o e s n o t s h i f t blame from Adam t o Arrow. Nor is it p o w e r f u l l y i n c r i m i n a t i n g . I t is damaging p r i m a r i l y t o Adam h i m s e l f . W e h o l d t h a t d e f e n d a n t h a s f a i l e d t o demon- s t r a t e p r e j u d i c e i n t h e admission of t h e s e f o u r s t a t e m e n t s . I n Dutton v. Evans ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 400 U.S. 7 4 , 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court a d d r e s s e d a t l e n g t h t h e c o n f l i c t between t h e r i g h t of c o n f r o n t a t i o n and evidence admitted under a h e a r s a y e x c e p t i o n . The s a f e g u a r d s t h e Court recognized a s p r e s e n t i n t h e s t a t e m e n t a d m i t t e d i n Evans a r e s i m i l a r t o t h o s e w e see h e r e . The d e f e n d a n t i n Dutton v. Evans, s u p r a , was charged w i t h two o t h e r men, Wade T r u e t t and Venson W i l l i a m s , f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n - s t y l e murder of t h r e e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s . Evans was t r i e d s e p a r a t e l y . T r u e t t t e s t i f i e d a t E v a n s ' t r i a l . W i l l i a m s d i d not. One of t h e twenty p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s e s was an inmate from a f e d e r a l p e n i t e n t i a r y i n A t l a n t a , Georgia. The inmate t e s t i f i e d t h a t he and W i l l i a m s had been f e l l o w p r i s o n e r s a t t h e p e n i t e n t i a r y when W i l l i a m s was t a k e n t o Gwinnett County f o r a r r a i g n m e n t i n t h e murder c h a r g e s . Upon W i l l i a m s 1 r e t u r n , t h e inmate asked: "How d i d you make o u t i n c o u r t ? " W i l l i a m s responded, " I f it h a d n ' t been f o r t h a t d i r t y son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, w e w o u l d n ' t be i n t h i s now." 400 U.S. a t 7 7 , 9 1 S.Ct. a t 214, 27 L.Ed.2d a t 220. Defense c o u n s e l o b j e c t e d t o t h i s s t a t e m e n t on t h e b a s i s t h a t it was h e a r s a y and t h u s v i o l a t e d Evans' r i g h t of c o n f r o n t a - t i o n . The United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t upheld t h e i n t r o d u c - t i o n of t h e s t a t e m e n t on a number of grounds. The C o u r t f i r s t d i s t i n g u i s h e d a l i n e of c a s e s i n which s t a t e c o u r t c o n v i c t i o n s were r e v e r s e d because of a d e n i a l of t h e r i g h t of c o n f r o n t a t i o n . The Court t h e n p a r t i c u l a r l y examined Bruton and e n u n c i a t e d t h e d i f f e r e n c e s between it and t h e Evans case. I n Bruton an e n t i r e c o n f e s s i o n of t h e n o n t e s t i - f y i n g c o d e f e n d a n t was a d m i t t e d w i t h o u t o p p o r t u n i t y t o e f f e c - t i v e l y cross-examine f o r t h e t r u t h o f t h e m a t t e r s c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n t h e c o n f e s s i o n . The C o u r t i n Evans emphasized t h a t t h e r e was no "recognized e x c e p t i o n t o t h e h e a r s a y r u l e " b e f o r e it i n Bruton. 400 U.S. a t 8 6 , 9 1 S.Ct. a t 218, 27 L.Ed.2d a t 225, and t h e n r e f u s e d t o e q u a t e t h e S i x t h Arnend- ment C o n f r o n t a t i o n C l a u s e and t h e e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r s a y r u l e , although it acknowledged t h a t both stem from t h e same r o o t s . I n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g Evans from o t h e r c o n f r o n t a t i o n c l a u s e c a s e s , t h e Court noted t h a t t h e inmate's testimony was not ''crucial" or "devastating1'; it d i d not involve t h e use or misuse of a confession made i n t h e c o e r c i v e atmos- phere of o f f i c i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n ; it d i d n o t involve a sug- g e s t i o n of p r o s e c u t o r i a l misconduct o r negligence; it d i d n o t involve admission of a paper t r a n s c r i p t of proceedings i n which cross-examination was nonexistent or inadequate; and, f i n a l l y , it did not involve wholesale d e n i a l of cross- examination. Evans, 400 U.S. a t 87, 91 S.Ct. a t 219, 27 Evans a l s o d i d not involve a j o i n t t r i a l , a s had Bruton. However, t h e n a t u r e of t h e statement and t h e s a f e - guards recognized a s p r e s e n t i n Evans apply t o Adam Wein- b e r g e r ' s statements. The Court noted t h a t : "Evans was not deprived of any r i g h t of c o n f r o n t a t i o n on t h e i s s u e of whether W i l l i a m s a c t u a l l y made t h e s t a t e m e n t r e l a t e d by Shaw. Neither a hearsay nor a c o n f r o n t a t i o n q u e s t i o n would a r i s e had Shawls testimony been used t o prove mere- l y t h a t t h e statement had been made. The h e a r s a y r u l e d o e s n o t p r e v e n t a w i t n e s s from t e s t i f y i n g a s t o what h e h a s h e a r d ; i t i s r a t h e r a r e s t r i c t i o n on t h e proof of f a c t through e x t r a j u d i c i a l statements. From t h e v i e w p o i n t o f t h e Confrontation Clause, a w i t n e s s , under o a t h , s u b j e c t t o cross-examination, and whose demeanor can be o b s e r v e d by t h e t r i e r of f a c t , is a r e l i a b l e informant n o t only a s t o what he h a s s e e n b u t a l s o a s t o w h a t h e h a s ................................... heard." (Emphasis added.) Evans, 400 U.S. a t 88, 91 S.Ct. a t 219, 27 L.Ed.2d a t 226. S i m i l a r l y , Arrow Weinberger was n o t denied any r i g h t of c o n f r o n t a t i o n on t h e i s s u e of whether o r not t h e s t a t e - ments were made by Adam and overheard by each of t h e four witnesses. While none of t h e s t a t e m e n t s were challenged on t h e b a s i s of Bruton o r a s h e a r s a y , t h e "state-of-mind" ex- c e p t i o n t o t h e h e a r s a y r u l e o r Montana's t r a n s a c t i o n r u l e would have provided t h e "recognized e x c e p t i o n t o t h e h e a r s a y r u l e " t h a t was n o t p r e s e n t i n Bruton. Bruton, n. 3, 391 U.S. a t 128, 88 S.Ct. a t 1623-1624; Rule 8 0 3 ( 3 ) , M0nt.R.Evid.i S t a t e v. C l a r k ( 1 9 3 6 ) , 102 Mont. 432, 58 P.2d 276; I n R e P e t i t i o n of P e t e r s o n ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 155 Mont. 239, 467 P.2d 281. I n Evans, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d t h a t t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n i s s u e a r o s e "because t h e j u r y was b e i n g i n v i t e d t o i n f e r t h a t Williams had i m p l i c i t l y i d e n t i f i e d Evans as t h e p e r p e t r a t o r of t h e murder when he blamed Evans f o r h i s predicament." Evans, 400 U.S. a t 88, 9 1 S.Ct. a t 219, 27 L.Ed.2d a t 227. I n c o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e r e was no d e n i a l of t h e r i g h t of c o n f r o n t a t i o n , t h e Court c o n s i d e r e d s e v e r a l f a c t o r s . I t noted t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t d i d n o t c o n t a i n an e x p r e s s a s s e r t i o n a b o u t p a s t f a c t ; t h a t W i l l i a m s ' p e r s o n a l knowledge of t h e i d e n t i t i e s and r o l e s of t h e o t h e r murder p a r t i c i p a n t s had been a b u n d a n t l y e s t a b l i s h e d by o t h e r e v i d e n c e ; a n d , t h a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y Williams' s t a t e m e n t was founded on f a u l t y r e c o l l e c t i o n was remote i n t h e extreme. F i n a l l y , t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s provided w i d e l y recognized i n - d i c i a of r e l i a b i l i t y where, as h e r e , t h e s t a t e m e n t was spon- t a n e o u s and where it w a s a g a i n s t W i l l i a m s ' p e n a l i n t e r e s t t o make it. Those same f a c t o r s a p p l y h e r e . None o f t h e s t a t e m e n t s c o n t a i n e d a n e x p r e s s a s s e r t i o n a b o u t p a s t f a c t . Adam's knowledge of Arrow's r o l e i n t h e s h o o t i n g was s o l i d l y e s t a b - l i s h e d through o t h e r evidence. The chance t h a t Adam's state- ments were founded upon f a u l t y r e c o l l e c t i o n is remote i n t h e extreme. The s t a t e m e n t s were spontaneous and were made a g a i n s t Adam's p e n a l i n t e r e s t . The Court ended by s t a t i n g : "The d e c i s i o n s of t h i s C o u r t m a k e it c l e a r t h a t t h e m i s s i o n o f t h e Confronta- t i o n C l a u s e is t o advance a p r a c t i c a l concern f o r t h e a c c u r a c y of t h e t r u t h - d e t e r m i n i n g p r o c e s s i n c r i m i n a l t r i a l s by a s s u r i n g t h a t ' t h e t r i e r of f a c t [ h a s ] a s a t i s f a c t o r y b a s i s f o r e v a l u a t i n g t h e t r u t h of t h e p r i o r s t a t e m e n t . ' C a l i f o r n i a v. Green, 399 U.S. a t 1 6 1 . . . "Almost 40 y e a r s ago, i n Snyder v. Massa- c h u s e t t s , 291 U.S. 9 7 , Mr. J u s t i c e Cardozo w r o t e an o p i n i o n f o r t h i s C o u r t r e f u s i n g t o set a s i d e a s t a t e c r i m i n a l c o n v i c t i o n because of t h e claimed d e n i a l o f t h e r i g h t of c o n f r o n t a t i o n . The c l o s - ing words of t h a t o p i n i o n a r e worth re- p e a t i n g h e r e : " ' T h e r e is danger t h a t t h e c r i m i n a l law w i l l be brought i n t o contempt--that d i s - c r e d i t w i l l even touch t h e g r e a t immuni- t i e s a s s u r e d by t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment --if gossamer p o s s i b i l i t i e s of p r e j u d i c e t o a d e f e n d a n t a r e t o n u l l i f y a s e n t e n c e pronounced by a c o u r t of competent j u r i s - d i c t i o n i n o b e d i e n c e t o l o c a l law, and set t h e g u i l t y f r e e . ' [ C i t a t i o n omit- t e d . ] " 400 U.S. a t 89-90, 9 1 S.Ct. a t 220, 27 L.Ed.2d a t 227. W e a g r e e . Arrow Weinberger h a s f a i l e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e p r e j u - d i c e i n t h e admission of t h e s e s t a t e m e n t s . W e h o l d t h a t h i s r i g h t t o c o n f r o n t a t i o n was n o t v i o l a t e d . Defendant a l s o a r g u e s t h a t t h i s C o u r t should r e c o g n i z e as p l a i n e r r o r any a l l e g e d Bruton v i o l a t i o n and s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e c o n s i d e r t h e s e a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n s even where n o t p r e s e r v e d by contemporaneous o b j e c t i o n . W e d e c l i n e t o do s o . The D i s t r i c t Court was never g i v e n an o p p o r t u n i t y t o r u l e on admission of t h e s t a t e m e n t s o r t o c o r r e c t itself if admission w a s n o t p r o p e r . W e w i l l n o t p u t t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n e r r o r where it h a s n o t been g i v e n such a chance. S t a t e v. Walker ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 148 Mont. 216, 223, 419 P.2d 300, 304. Here, d e f e n s e c o u n s e l was f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e Bruton o b j e c t i o n and used it s u c c e s s f u l l y t o p r e v e n t admission o f a n o t h e r s t a t e m e n t . No such o b j e c t i o n was r a i s e d t o t h e s e f o u r s t a t e m e n t s . D e f e n d a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n t o t h e c o n t r a r y n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , w e a l s o n o t e t h a t both d e f e n s e c o u n s e l were p r e s e n t a t t r i a l when t h r e e of t h e f o u r s t a t e m e n t s were a d m i t t e d . W e r e j e c t h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t less e x p e r i e n c e d t r i a l c o u n s e l f a i l e d t o make o b j e c t i o n s which would have been made had b o t h c o u n s e l been p r e s e n t . W e a l s o r e f u s e t o a d o p t a p l a i n e r r o r r u l e t h a t would a l l o w d e f e n d a n t s t o l a y i n t h e g r a s s and c r e a t e Bruton v i o l a t i o n s by f a i l i n g t o o b j e c t and t h e n w i t h h o l d i n g one c o d e f e n d a n t from t h e w i t n e s s s t a n d . Defendant 's f o u r t h argument is t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s t r i a l t a c t i c s d e p r i v e d him of a f a i r t r i a l . He a r g u e s t h a t t h e S t a t e s h o u l d n o t h a v e i n t r o d u c e d e v i d e n c e of t h e v i c t i m ' s good c h a r a c t e r i n its c a s e - i n - c h i e f ; t h a t e v i d e n c e of d e f e n d a n t s ' c h a r a c t e r and t h e i r p l a n t o t a k e Luanne t o Arkansas should n o t have been a d m i t t e d ; t h a t evidence of t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of t h e v i c t i m ' s and h i s f a m i l y ' s a c t i o n s should n o t have been a d m i t t e d ; t h a t t h e S t a t e " c a r e f u l l y t a i l o r e d " its c a s e t o avoid c a l l i n g w i t n e s s e s who would t e s t i f y t h a t t h e v i c t i m was t h e f i r s t a g g r e s s o r ; and t h a t t h e S t a t e improperly e l i c i t e d t e s t i m o n y d u r i n g i t s c a s e on t h e c o n d i t i o n of a d e f e n s e w i t n e s s a t t h e t i m e of t h e s h o o t i n g and improperly sympathized o r agreed w i t h s t a t e - ments made by w i t n e s s e s . W e r e j e c t t h e s e arguments o u t o f hand. No o b j e c t i o n s were r a i s e d a t t r i a l on any of t h e p o i n t s d e f e n d a n t now c h a l l e n g e s . Nor, t a k e n i n t o t o , do t h e s e i n c i d e n t s evidence misconduct t h a t p r e j u d i c e d defen- d a n t . Most of t h e evidence d e f e n d a n t c h a l l e n g e s was p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d t o p r o v i d e t h e j u r y w i t h a l l of t h e f a c t s and cir- cumstances n e c e s s a r y t o shed l i g h t upon t h i s case. C h a r a c t e r e v i d e n c e of a v i c t i m ' s p e a c e f u l n a t u r e may be a d m i t t e d by t h e p r o s e c u t i o n t o r e b u t evidence t h a t t h e v i c t i m was t h e f i r s t a g g r e s s o r . Rule 4 0 4 ( a ) ( 2 ) , Mont.R.Evid. Here, t h e p r o s e c u t i o n i n t r o d u c e d t h e evidence through t h e f i r s t w i t n e s s i n its case-in-chief b e f o r e t h e d e f e n d a n t had i n t r o d u c e d evidence t h a t t h e v i c t i m was t h e f i r s t a g g r e s s o r . Where t h e d e f e n s e r a i s e s t h e i s s u e of s e l f - d e f e n s e through cross-examination t h a t t e n d s t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e v i c t i m was t h e f i r s t a g g r e s s o r , n o t h i n g p r e c l u d e s t h e S t a t e from r e b u t t i n g t h a t argument i n its case-in-chief w i t h e v i d e n c e of t h e v i c t i m ' s p e a c e f u l n a t u r e . However, t h e S t a t e s h o u l d n o t i n t r o d u c e e v i d e n c e of t h e v i c t i m ' s p e a c e f u l n a t u r e i n a n t i c i p a t i o n o f such a n argument. Here, no o b j e c t i o n was r a i s e d a t t r i a l and t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c l a i m of s e l f - d e f e n s e was c l e a r l y a t i s s u e throughout t h e t r i a l . Defendant h a s a g a i n f a i l e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e p r e j u d i c e . I n h i s l a s t two arguments, d e f e n d a n t c h a l l e n g e s im- p o s i t i o n of t r i a l c o s t s and expenses a s p a r t of h i s s e n t e n c e a s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and r e q u e s t s t h a t h i s s e n t e n c e be v a c a t - ed s i n c e it was based upon e r r o n e o u s i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n s . H e a r g u e s , f i r s t , t h a t s e c t i o n 46-18-232, MCA, is p a t e n t l y u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s i n c e it enhances punish- ment i n r e t r i b u t i o n f o r a d e f e n d a n t ' s e x e r c i s e of a funda- mental c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t . W e r e j e c t t h i s c o n t e n t i o n . S e c t i o n 46-18-232, MCA, p r o h i b i t s recoupment a g a i n s t an i n d i g e n t d e f e n d a n t and a l l o w s a d e f e n d a n t t o be r e l i e v e d from payment of such c o s t s upon p e t i t i o n t o t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t " [ i l f it a p p e a r s t o t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h e c o u r t t h a t payment of the amount due will impose manifest hardship on the defendant or his immediate family . . ." Statutes that allow such a discretionary imposition of costs have been upheld against the due process argument marshalled by defen- dant. Fuller v. Oregon (1974), 417 U.S. 40, 51-54, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 2123-2125, 40 L.Ed.2d 647, 653-655; United States v. Glover (2nd Cir. 1978), 588 F.2d 876, 878-879; People v. Estate of Scott (1977), 66 111.2d 522, 363 N.E.2d 823, 825; cf., Olson v. James (10th Cir. 1979), 603 F.2d 150 (invali- dating a Kansas statute imposing obligation to repay costs of appointed counsel regardless of defendant's ability to pay). Montana's statute does no more than deprive "a finan- cially able defendant of available funds which, in fairness, should be remitted to the public coffers." Glover, 588 F.2d at 879, quoting United States v . Bracewell (2nd Cir. 1978), 569 F.2d 1194, 1197. Nor do we accept defendant's argument that his sentence should be vacated based upon inaccurate information in his sentencing report. A defendant's right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate information is protected where he is represented by counsel at sentencing and is given the opportunity to rebut any inaccuracies. State v. Trangsrud (1982), Mont. , 651 P.2d 37, 40, 39 St.Rep. 1765, 1768. He then has an affirmative duty to present evidence to show such inaccuracies. State v. Radi (19791, Mont . , 604 P.2d 318, 320, 36 St.Rep. 2345, 2347. Here, defendant was represented by counsel and was presented with an opportunity to rebut the report. He did not do so. Rather, defense counsel reviewed the report and deemed it "appropriate." Defendant should address any chal- l e n g e t o t h e e q u i t y of t h e s e n t e n c e t o t h e Sentence Review D i v i s i o n . T h i s C o u r t w i l l c o n s i d e r o n l y l e g a l i s s u e s r a i s e d by t h e s e n t e n c e . I n c o n c l u s i o n w e a l s o a d d r e s s t h e d i s s e n t e r s ' concern w i t h a p o t e n t i a l c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t stemming from b o t h d e f e n d a n t s being r e p r e s e n t e d by one law f i r m . W e r e j e c t t h e i r argument. W e n o t e , f i r s t , t h a t b o t h d e f e n d a n t s a g r e e d t o j o i n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and, i n f a c t , h i r e d t h e same l a w f i r m a s p r i v a t e c o u n s e l . Both d e f e n d a n t s waived a s e p a r a t e t r i a l . Both d e f e n d a n t s r e c o n s i d e r e d t h e i r d e c i s i o n t o be j o i n t l y r e p r e s e n t e d d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of t h e t r i a l and r e a f - f i r m e d t h a t d e c i s i o n . N e i t h e r t h e d e f e n d a n t nor t h e d i s s e n t e r s d e m o n s t r a t e an a c t u a l c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t . A d e f e n d a n t h a s t h e burden of e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t such r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n f a c t c r e a t e d a n a c t u a l c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t t h a t p r e j u d i c e d t h e d e f e n d a n t . The law d o e s n o t r e q u i r e an a f f i r m a t i v e i n q u i r y i n t o whether c o d e f e n d a n t s a g r e e t o j o i n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . S t a t e v. Henry ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 177 Mont. 426, 431, 582 P.2d 321, 323-324. A d e f e n - d a n t may waive t h e r i g h t t o demand r e t r i a l on t h e i s s u e of c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t of c o u n s e l . S t a t e v. G a l l a g h e r ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 162 Mont. 155, 161, 509 P.2d 852, 855. Where, as h e r e , t h e d e f e n s e s p u t f o r t h by t h e two d e f e n d a n t s are n o t i n con- f l i c t , a d e f e n d a n t is n o t d e p r i v e d of e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l by j o i n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . S t a t e v. Henry, s u p r a , 177 Mont. a t 431, 582 P.2d a t 324. W e r e j e c t t h e d i s s e n t e r s ' o b j e c t i o n s as mere s p e c u l a t i o n . Affirmed. Chief J u s t i c e We concur: Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissenting: My dissent is a long one, and I do not apologize for the delay. It will be filed when it is ready. Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy concurring with the dissent of Justice Daniel J. Shea, and stating further in dissent: I would reverse the conviction of Arrow Weinberger. The instructions in relation to him were in hopeless conflict. Under section 45-5-101, MCA, a person commits the offense of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, or negligently "causes the death of another human being." A person commits deliberate homicide under section 45-5-102, MCA, if the criminal homicide is committed "purposely" or "knowingly". The District Court, in instructing the jury with respect to deliberate homicide, followed the statutes when it instructed the jury in instruction no. 10: "A person commits the offense of deliberate homicide if: "(1) He purposely or knowingly causes the death of another human being . . ." (Emphasis added.) Under the statutory definition, and the portion of instruction no. 10 which we have quoted, the inquiry for the jury was, who caused the death of Azure? Obviously if Azure caused his own death, as in the case of Arrow Weinberger acting in self defense, then the crime has not been committed. It is the statutory scheme that the jury search for the cause of the death in homicide cases. In this case the District Court elaborated on the statutory definition. In instruction no. 11, it instructed the jury: "You are instructed that to sustain the charge of deliberate homicide against Arrow Weinberger, the State must prove that the defendant Arrow Weinberger purposely or knowingly performed the - act or acts causing the death of Floyd Azure . . ." (Emphasis added.) Thus the District Court, by giving instruction no. 11 changed the nature of the inquiry for the jury. Instead of searching for the cause of Azure's dea-th, the jury was instructed to find who performed the acts causing the death of Azure. Instruction no. 11 created a crime not defined in the Montana statutes, and for Arrow Weinberger, wiped out any self defense. Under instruction no. 11, since Arrow Weinherger performed the acts (even though he may have been acting in self defense) which caused Azure's death, he was guilty of homicide. Under instruction no. 11, the mere performance of the acts causing Azure's death constitutes a forcible felony. Instruction no. 47 then wiped away completely any self defense available to Arrow Weinberger: "You are instructed that the defense of self defense or justifiable use of force is not available to a person who is attempting to commit or committing a forcible felony. A forcible felony is any felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual." The State admits in its brief that court's instruction no. 11 "failed to define completely the crime charged," but the State contends that the failure of definition of court's instruction no. 10 was cured by other instructions given in the case. Our annals are full of cases in which we have said that if an instruction is "not as full as it might have been," but the instructions taken as a whole fairly present the case to a jury, we will not reverse the conviction because of an incomplete instruction. However, this rule applies only to incomplete instructions, not to erroneous instructions or those which are at cross purposes with each other. The cases relied upon by the State and by the majority in this case do not meet the situation here where the court erroneously defined the elements of the crime in instruction no. 11. If there is any single item of instruction that needs to be straight-forwardedly presented in the criminal case, it must be the elements of the crime. We said in State v. Lundblade (19811, Mont . , 625 P.2d 545, 548,38 St.Rep. 441: "At a minimum, the District Court must explain or define the crime -- for the jury, (Citing a case.) In determining whether the instructions did this, we are guided by certain settled principles. First, we must view the instructions as a whole (citing a case) and we will find no error if the instructions as a whole fully and fairly instruct on the law applicable to the case (citing cases) . " Here there is a hopeless conflict in the instructions concerning deliberate homicide in Arrow Weinberger's case. The instructions as a whole do not fully and fairly instruct on the applicable law but confuse the elements of deliberate homicide and strip any meaning from the self defense instructions. I could cite other instructional conflict, but it would serve no purpose here and would only take up space. It is enough to say that court's instructions no. 24, 31, and 32 do not cure the instructional failure, as the majority contends or the State argues, because in each of those instructions, there is a phrase used "described by a statute defining an offense" to inform the jury how to apply purposely or knowingly as a requisite for mental state. Nowhere in the instructions in this case did the court specifically tell the jury a particular statute that defined the offense. In other words, under instructions 24, 31 and 32, the jury was told to look to a statute for the elements, but the statute was not given to them. For t h e s e and t h o s e reasons set f o r t h by J u s t i c e Shea, I d i s s e n t . Q. & J u s t i c e I concur i n t h e foregoing d i s s e n t of M r . J u s t i c e Sheehy.