Case Title: Miklosy v. Regents of U.C.

Citation: 44 Cal. 4th 876 original opinion

Docket Number: S139133

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 7/31/08 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
LES G. MIKLOSY et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
S139133 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/4 A107711 
THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY 
) 
OF CALIFORNIA et al., 
) 
 
) 
Alameda County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. RG04140484 
___________________________________ ) 
 
The California Whistleblower Protection Act (Gov. Code, § 8547 et seq.)1 
(hereafter the Whistleblower Act or the Act) prohibits retaliation against state 
employees who “report waste, fraud, abuse of authority, violation of law, or threat 
to public health” (§ 8547.1).  The Act authorizes “an action for damages” to 
redress acts of retaliation.  (§§ 8547.8, subd. (c), 8547.10, subd. (c), 8547.12, 
subd. (c).)  But in the case of retaliation against a University of California 
employee, the Act provides that “any action for damages shall not be available . . . 
unless the injured party has first filed a complaint with the [designated] university 
officer . . . , and the university has failed to reach a decision regarding that 
complaint within the time limits established for that purpose by the regents.”  
(§ 8547.10, subd. (c), italics added.)  We conclude, as did the Court of Appeal, 
                                              
1  
Unless otherwise noted, all statutory citations are to the Government Code. 
 
 
 
2 
that this statutory language means what it says, precluding a damages action when, 
as here, the University of California has timely decided a retaliation complaint. 
I 
Because this case comes before us on appeal from a judgment sustaining a 
demurrer, we assume the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint and the 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts.  (See, e.g., Fox v. 
Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 810; Coleman v. Gulf 
Insurance Group (1986) 41 Cal.3d 782, 789, fn. 3; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 
Cal.3d 311, 318.) 
Plaintiffs Leo Miklosy and Luciana Messina are computer scientists who, 
in February 2003, were employed by the Regents of the University of California 
(hereafter the University of California or the University), filling positions at the 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (the Laboratory).  Plaintiffs worked in 
the National Ignition Facility on a project designed to determine the safety and 
reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile.  One method of evaluating 
the safety and reliability of these weapons involved shooting laser beams at 
“nuclear material” placed in a “Target Chamber.” 
As their work proceeded, plaintiffs “identified problems with the . . . 
project, including, inter alia, potential collisions by large million dollar robotic 
‘positioners’ within the [Target Chamber] . . . , the delivery of unusable and 
untested control software, a lack of defined engineering and operational 
processes . . . , and inadequate . . . control operator training . . . .”  Plaintiffs 
repeatedly expressed their concerns to management, both orally and in writing, 
enumerating specific mechanical problems with the positioners and the robotic 
controls. 
On Friday, February 28, 2003, defendants Kim Minuzzo, Larry Lagin, and 
Jerry Krammen, who were supervisory employees of the Laboratory, fired 
 
3 
Miklosy.  As he was leaving the premises, Miklosy heard Minuzzo tell Krammen:  
“Messina is next.”  Believing her performance was comparable to that of Miklosy, 
Messina submitted a letter of resignation.  Lagin and Minuzzo asked Messina to 
reconsider her resignation over the weekend, which she agreed to do.  When 
Messina returned to her office after this meeting, she found her computer 
disconnected. 
On Monday, March 3, 2003, Messina inquired about transferring to a 
different position at the Laboratory, but Minuzzo telephoned her the next day and 
directed her to return to the National Ignition Facility.  After that conversation had 
ended, but before the telephone call was disconnected, Messina overheard 
Minuzzo tell another employee that he intended to fire Messina.  Messina resigned 
as of March 7, 2003. 
On August 16, 2003, plaintiffs filed complaints with the University under 
section 8457.10, subdivision (a), of the Whistleblower Act.  The Laboratory’s 
Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual requires the director of the Laboratory 
to appoint a “Retaliation Complaint Officer” (RCO) to investigate a complaint of 
whistleblower retaliation.  The RCO must prepare findings within 90 days; once 
the findings are submitted, the director of the Laboratory must reach a decision on 
the complaint within 15 days.  The director’s decision may include “appropriate 
relief for the complainant” and may be appealed to the president of the University.  
This procedure is generally comparable to the procedure the State Personnel Board 
follows when evaluating similar complaints by state agency employees.  (See Cal. 
Code Regs., tit. 2, § 56.3, subd. (a) [appointment of an investigator]; id. at §§ 56.3, 
subd. (b), 56.5, subd. (a) [issuance of findings based on the investigator’s report]; 
id. at § 56.5, subd. (d) [appeal to the five-member State Personnel Board]; id. at 
§§ 56.2, subd. (c), 56.5, subd. (d), 56.8 [no right to a formal hearing at any point in 
the process, though one may be granted at the board’s discretion].) 
 
4 
In regard to plaintiffs’ complaints, John S. Hunt, a Laboratory employee, 
acted as the RCO.  The Laboratory has a staff that exceeds 8,000, and there is no 
indication in the complaint that Hunt was in any way involved in the direct 
management of the National Ignition Facility or had any personal connection with 
the dispute.  Hunt interviewed 23 witnesses and submitted his findings to Robert 
Perko, the Staff Relations Officer, on November 4, 2003.  Hunt found that 
Laboratory management had not reacted adversely to plaintiffs’ reports of 
problems at the National Ignition Facility, instead treating those reports as a 
normal part of project development.  Hunt found no support for the assertion that 
management had retaliated against either Miklosy or Messina.  Hunt determined 
instead that the Laboratory had fired Miklosy for unsatisfactory work performance 
and that the Laboratory had never intended to fire Messina and actually had tried 
to convince her to stay.  The Laboratory director adopted Hunt’s findings and 
conclusions on November 17, 2003, and plaintiffs concede that the Laboratory 
reached its decision within the time limits specified in its internal policies.  
Plaintiffs did not appeal the director’s decision to the president of the University, 
and therefore the decision became the University’s final resolution of the matter. 
On February 10, 2004, plaintiffs filed a damages action in superior court 
against the University and three supervisory employees — Minuzzo, Lagin, and 
Krammen.  The complaint alleged four causes of action:  (1) unlawful retaliation 
in violation of the Whistleblower Act (both plaintiffs); (2) wrongful termination in 
violation of public policy (Miklosy); (3) wrongful constructive termination in 
violation of public policy (Messina); and (4) intentional infliction of emotional 
distress (both plaintiffs).  The complaint sought compensatory damages, punitive 
damages, and attorney fees. 
The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer with leave to amend, and 
when plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, defendants again demurred.  The trial 
 
5 
court then sustained defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, and dismissed 
plaintiffs’ action.  The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that plaintiffs had no 
viable claim under the Whistleblower Act because the University timely resolved 
their complaints, and further holding that plaintiffs’ common law claims were 
statutorily barred.  We granted plaintiffs’ petition for review. 
II 
In 1993, the Legislature enacted the Whistleblower Act, codifying it as 
sections 8547 through 8547.11.  (Stats. 1993, ch. 12, § 8, pp. 96-101.)  At that 
time, the Act was entitled the “Reporting of Improper Governmental Activities 
Act,” and its stated purpose was to encourage the disclosure of “improper 
governmental activities,” which the Act generally defined as activities that were 
unlawful, economically wasteful, or involved gross misconduct or incompetence.  
(Id. at pp. 96-97.)  The Act was not wholly new; rather, it built on existing 
provisions of the Government Code, in some cases renumbering those provisions 
without changing their substantive content.  In 1999, the Legislature extended the 
Act to cover disclosures of health and safety problems (Stats. 1999, ch. 673, §§ 4, 
6, 7), giving the Act its present name (id., § 1) and declaring, as its purpose, “that 
state employees should be free to report waste, fraud, abuse of authority, violation 
of law, or threat to public health without fear of retribution” (id., § 3). 
Since its inception, the Act has dealt with employees of the state and the 
University in separate provisions, indicating the Legislature’s awareness of the 
University’s unique constitutional status and the concomitant need for special 
provisions to govern whistleblowing at the University.  For example, section 
8547.3 imposes liability on state employees or officeholders who use their 
authority to interfere with the disclosure rights conferred by the Act, and section 
8547.11 imposes similar liability on employees and officers of the University.  
Likewise, section 8547.8 protects state employees against whistleblower 
 
6 
retaliation, and section 8547.10 confers similar protections on employees and 
officers of the University. 
Regarding whistleblower retaliation, section 8547.8, subdivision (c), 
imposes liability “in an action for damages” on “any person who intentionally 
engages in acts of reprisal, retaliation, threats, coercion, or similar acts against a 
state employee” for disclosing improper governmental activities or unsafe 
conditions.  But, as enacted, section 8547.8, subdivision (c), included the 
following caveat:  “However, any action for damages shall not be available . . . 
unless the injured party has first filed a complaint with the State Personnel 
Board . . . , and the board has failed to reach a decision regarding any hearing 
conducted pursuant to Section 19683.”  (Stats. 1993, ch. 12, § 8, p. 99, italics 
added.)  Thus, as enacted, section 8547.8, subdivision (c), appears to have limited 
damages actions by state employees to cases in which the State Personnel Board 
has failed to reach a decision, essentially making the damages action a secondary 
alternative, contingent on the malfunctioning of the primary alternative, rather 
than an additional source of relief. 
Section 8547.10, subdivision (c), imposes similar liability for retaliation 
against employees or officers of the University, and it includes a similar caveat, 
providing:  “However, any action for damages shall not be available . . . unless the 
injured party has first filed a complaint with the [designated] university 
officer . . . , and the university has failed to reach a decision regarding that 
complaint within the time limits established for that purpose by the regents.”  
(Italics added.)  This provision on its face appears to make the damages action an 
alternative remedy available only if the University fails to act. 
In 1994, the Legislature added section 8547.12 to the Act, extending 
whistleblower protections to employees and officers of the California State 
University.  (Stats. 1994, ch. 834, § 1, pp. 4117-4118.)  Section 8547.12, 
 
7 
subdivision (c), authorizes a damages action for whistleblower retaliation and 
includes the same caveat as sections 8547.8 (governing state employees) and 
8547.10 (governing University of California employees), but section 8547.12, 
subdivision (c), adds a sentence that does not appear in the other provisions.  
Specifically, section 8547.12, subdivision (c), provides:  “However, any action for 
damages shall not be available . . . unless the injured party has first filed a 
complaint with the [designated] university officer . . . , and the university has 
failed to reach a decision regarding that complaint within the time limits 
established for that purpose by the trustees.  Nothing in this section is intended to 
prohibit the injured party from seeking a remedy if the university has not 
satisfactorily addressed the complaint within 18 months.”  (Italics added.)  The 
addition of the last sentence, and specifically the modifier “satisfactorily,” raises 
the possibility that a court might find the state university’s decision unsatisfactory 
(though timely) and on that basis permit a damages action.  (See Ohton v. Board of 
Trustees of the California State University (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 749, 765.)  
Here, we need only construe section 8547.10, subdivision (c), and therefore we 
express no view on the substantive content, if any, of the term “satisfactorily” in 
section 8547.12, subdivision (c).  Above, we have set forth the text of section 
8547.8, subdivision (c), and section 8547.12, subdivision (c), for the purpose of 
comparison with section 8547.10, subdivision (c), the provision at issue here. 
In 2001, the Legislature amended section 8547.8, subdivision (c), 
governing state employees, to expressly permit a damages suit even when the 
State Personnel Board has issued timely findings.  (See Stats. 2001, ch. 883, § 3.)  
As amended, the caveat in section 8547.8, subdivision (c), now provides:  
“However, any action for damages shall not be available . . . unless the injured 
party has first filed a complaint with the State Personnel Board . . . , and the board 
has issued, or failed to issue, findings . . . .”  (Italics added.)  Arguably, this 
 
8 
amendment changed the provision from an alternative remedy (available only 
when the administrative remedy fails to function) to a general remedy (available in 
all cases, though requiring the employee to first exhaust administrative remedies).2  
The Legislature, however, did not enact a comparable amendment to section 
8547.10, subdivision (c), pertaining to employees of the University of California. 
Therefore, as amended, the Whistleblower Act appears at first blush to 
distinguish three groups of public employees:  (1) a state employee may bring a 
damages action alleging whistleblower retaliation after first seeking relief from the 
State Personnel Board (§ 8547.8, subd. (c));3 (2) a California State University 
employee may seek “a remedy” if the state university’s administrative remedy 
fails to proceed to a timely decision or does not “satisfactorily address[]” the 
employee’s complaint within 18 months (§ 8547.12, subd. (c)); and (3) a 
University of California employee may bring a damages action only if the 
University’s administrative remedy fails to result in a timely decision (§ 8547.10, 
                                              
2  
As discussed below, plaintiffs argue that the amendment was intended 
merely as a clarification of existing law and that section 8547.8, subdivision (c), 
was never anything other than an exhaustion requirement.  The phrase “exhaustion 
requirement” is perhaps inappropriate because it suggests that an employee who 
has first pursued an administrative remedy before the State Personnel Board may 
proceed with a damages action regardless of the State Personnel Board’s decision.  
We express no view as to whether section 8547.8, subdivision (c), is properly 
characterized in those terms, or whether a damages action is available only after a 
favorable decision from the State Personnel Board.  We also express no view as to 
whether an employee must seek judicial review of an unfavorable decision from 
the State Personnel Board before bringing a damages action, and the collateral 
estoppel effect of the resulting judicial decision.  These questions are not at issue 
here and are now pending before us in other cases. 
3  
As noted in footnote 2, ante, whether the state employee must receive a 
favorable decision from the State Personnel Board before bringing a damages 
action is unclear.  Also unclear is whether the employee must seek judicial review 
of an unfavorable decision from the State Personnel Board.  These questions are 
not at issue here and are now pending before us in other cases. 
 
9 
subd. (c)) — if the University reaches a timely decision in its own favor, the 
employee has no cause of action for damages. 
III 
Plaintiffs argue that their claims against the University of California for 
damages under the Whistleblower Act remain viable notwithstanding the 
Laboratory director’s timely decision rejecting those claims on the merits.  This 
argument requires us to interpret the terms of section 8547.10, subdivision (c), 
which governs retaliation against University of California employees.  Our task is 
a familiar one.  “We apply well-established principles of statutory construction in 
seeking ‘to determine the Legislature’s intent in enacting the statute, “ ‘so that we 
may adopt the construction that best effectuates the purpose of the law.’ ” ’  
(Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital Dist. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 192, 199; 
see People v. King (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617, 622; Fitch v. Select Products Co. (2005) 
36 Cal.4th 812, 817-818.)  We begin with the statutory language because it is 
generally the most reliable indication of legislative intent.  (City of Burbank v. 
State Water Resources Control Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 613, 625.)  If the statutory 
language is unambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the 
plain meaning of the statute controls.  (People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 
1009.)”  (Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 211.)  We 
consider extrinsic aids, such as legislative history, only if the statutory language is 
reasonably subject to multiple interpretations.  (People v. King, supra, 38 Cal.4th 
at p. 622.) 
The plain language of section 8547.10, subdivision (c), states that a 
damages action “shall not be available . . . unless . . . the university has failed to 
reach a [timely] decision . . . .”  The word “unless” when used as a conjunction 
means “except on the condition that.”  (Webster’s 9th New Collegiate Dict. (1988) 
p. 1292.)  Thus, as a matter of established usage, the “unless” clause states 
 
10 
conditions that must be satisfied in every case; if the conditions are not satisfied, 
then the damages action “shall not be available.”  Moreover, the two conditions set 
forth in section 8547.10, subdivision (c), are clear:  (1) “the injured party” must 
have “filed a complaint with the [designated] university officer,” and (2) “the 
university” must have “failed to reach a decision regarding that complaint within 
the time limits established for that purpose by the regents.”  If, as here, the 
University has reached a timely decision in its own favor, then it has not “failed to 
reach a decision,” the conditions stated in section 8547.10, subdivision (c), have 
not been met, the “unless” clause is not satisfied, and “an[] action for damages 
shall not be available.”  (§ 8547.10, subd. (c).) 
In short, the function of section 8547.10, subdivision (c), appears to be 
limited to enforcing the University’s internal mechanism for resolving disputes by 
providing an alternative secondary remedy that is available only when the 
University’s internal mechanism fails to operate.  As long as the University 
completes in a timely fashion its own internal dispute-resolution process, the 
alternative remedy of a damages action in state court is unavailable.  If, however, 
the University’s dispute-resolution process fails to function, the injured party is 
protected by the statutory alternative of bringing a damages action in state court, 
which has the potential to be much more costly to the University. 
This interpretation is the only one that fits comfortably with the plain 
meaning of section 8547.10, subdivision (c), and it is also the interpretation we 
have given the statute in our prior decisions, albeit in dictum.  Thus, in Campbell 
v. Regents of the University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 327 (Campbell), 
we paraphrased the statute as follows:  “[T]he employee may not proceed with a 
court action against the university unless that institution has failed to reach an 
administrative decision on the action within specified time limits.  (§ 8547.10, 
 
11 
subd. (c).) . . .  If, by contrast, the university has reached a decision on the 
administrative action, the statute does not authorize any statutory damages action.” 
Moreover, this interpretation is reasonable in light of the unique 
constitutional status of the University of California.  As we explained in 
Campbell:  “The California Constitution establishes the Regents [i.e., the 
University of California] as a ‘public trust . . . with full powers of organization and 
government.’  (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 9, subd. (a).)  We have observed that ‘Article 
IX, section 9, grants the [R]egents broad powers to organize and govern the 
university and limits the Legislature’s power to regulate either the university or the 
[R]egents.  This contrasts with the comprehensive power of regulation the 
Legislature possesses over other state agencies.’  (San Francisco Labor Council v. 
Regents of University of California (1980) 26 Cal.3d 785, 788 . . . .)  This grant of 
constitutional power to the University includes the grant of quasi-judicial powers, 
a view that is generally accepted in our jurisprudence.  (Ishimatsu v. Regents of 
University of California (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 854, 864; see also Apte v. Regents 
of University of California (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1084, 1091.)  [¶]  The Regents 
may also exercise quasi-legislative powers, subject to legislative regulation.  
Indeed, ‘policies established by the Regents as matters of internal regulation may 
enjoy a status equivalent to that of state statutes.’  (Regents of University of 
California v. City of Santa Monica (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 130, 135, citing 
Hamilton v. Regents (1934) 293 U.S. 245.)  The authority granted the Regents 
includes ‘full powers of organization and government, subject only to such 
legislative control as may be necessary to insure compliance with the terms of the 
endowment of the University and the security of its funds.’  (Goldberg v. Regents 
of University of California (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 874.)  Thus, ‘[t]he Regents 
have been characterized as “a branch of the state itself” [citation] or “a statewide 
administrative agency” [citation]’ (Regents of University of California v. City of 
 
12 
Santa Monica, supra, 77 Cal.App.3d at p. 135), and ‘[i]t is apparent that the 
Regents as a constitutionally created arm of the state have virtual autonomy in 
self-governance’ (ibid.).”  (Campbell, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 320-321.) 
In short, the University functions in some ways like an independent 
sovereign, retaining a degree of control over the terms and scope of its own 
liability.  Given the University’s unique constitutional status, it is not surprising 
that the Legislature would take a deferential approach when authorizing damages 
actions against the University.  Thus, section 8547.10, subdivision (c), gives the 
University the flexibility appropriate to a semiautonomous branch of the state 
government to create its own mechanism for resolving whistleblower retaliation 
claims, but it also provides an alternative remedy when the University’s remedy is 
withheld.  A damages action in state court may afford complainants a more 
favorable forum because the fact finder in state court is not a University employee, 
and because other procedural protections apply, such as evidentiary rules, 
testimony under penalty of perjury, and cross-examination of witnesses.  But the 
appropriateness of granting these procedural protections to University 
whistleblowers is a matter of policy that is not for this court to determine.4 
The Legislature has encouraged the University to establish its own neutral 
procedure for resolving whistleblower retaliation claims brought by University 
employees or officers, and it has stated that if the University follows its procedure 
and reaches a timely decision, a damages action cannot be brought against it in 
                                              
4  
We do not mean to suggest that there are no limits that apply in this 
context.  The University must provide a viable mechanism for fairly evaluating 
whistleblower retaliation complaints, and the University’s consideration of a 
complaint cannot be so perfunctory or arbitrary as to violate the due process 
guarantee of the state or federal Constitutions.  Plaintiffs here, however, do not 
assert a due process violation. 
 
13 
state court.  (§ 8547.10, subd. (c).)  This legislative approach does not leave the 
University’s decision completely unreviewable — an action for a writ of mandate 
provides limited review5 — but it does give considerable leeway to the University 
to operate with relative autonomy within the state governmental system. 
If the University fails to follow its own procedures in a timely manner, the 
Legislature has provided injured parties the protection of an alternative remedy in 
the form of a state court damages action.  This alternative remedy is not an 
additional source of relief over and above whatever the University awards or fails 
to award; rather, it is a backup remedy available only when the University has 
failed to timely resolve the whistleblower complaint. 
Plaintiffs direct our attention to the legislative history of the Whistleblower 
Act.  Although we find no ambiguity in the statutory language of section 8547.10, 
subdivision (c), and therefore no reason to consult the legislative history, the 
legislative history actually supports our conclusion. 
The statutory language that now appears in sections 8547.8 (governing state 
employees) and 8547.10 (governing University of California employees) actually 
predates the 1993 enactment of the Reporting of Improper Governmental 
Activities Act, having its roots in two predecessor statutes — former sections 
10548 (state employees) and 10550 (University of California employees).  Former 
section 10548 was enacted in 1986 and looked very much like section 8547.8 as 
enacted in 1993.  Specifically, subdivision (c) of former section 10548 authorized 
a damages action for whistleblower retaliation against state employees but added 
the caveat that “any action for damages shall not be available to the injured party 
unless the injured party has first filed a complaint with the State Personnel 
                                              
5  
Plaintiffs here did not file a mandate action challenging the University’s 
decision. 
 
14 
Board . . . , and the board has failed to reach a decision regarding any hearing 
conducted pursuant to Section 19683.”  (Stats. 1986, ch. 353, § 4, p. 1511.)  This 
caveat is, of course, identical to the caveat contained in section 8547.8, 
subdivision (c), as enacted in 1993. 
Early drafts of the 1986 legislation authorized a damages action for 
whistleblower retaliation but did not include the caveat.  The Department of 
Personnel Administration (DPA) objected to those versions, expressing among 
other things the following concern:  “This measure would seemingly permit an 
employe[e] to have his or her case investigated and heard by the [State Personnel 
Board] and then, if the findings and ruling are not to the employee’s liking, to file 
with the court for a new trial.  This is a departure from current procedure which 
permits the court to simply determine whether the Board decision (for or against 
an employee) is supported by substantial evidence in the existing record.  No new 
court trial is held.”  (Dept. of Personnel Admin., analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1916 
(1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) Jan. 31, 1986, p. 2.)  In other words, the DPA criticized 
the early versions of the bill precisely because it made the proceeding before the 
State Personnel Board into a mere exhaustion requirement.  The DPA’s analysis 
further noted that this issue had “been discussed at length with the author’s staff” 
and that staff had “indicated a willingness to take amendments.”  (Id. at p. 1.) 
Less than six weeks after the DPA issued this analysis, the bill was revised.  
(Assem. Bill No. 1916 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 10, 1986, § 4, 
pp. 7-8.)  Among other things, this revision added the caveat restricting the 
availability of a damages action:  “However, any action for damages shall not be 
available to the injured party unless the State Personnel Board has failed to reach a 
decision regarding any hearing conducted pursuant to Section 19683.”  (Id., p. 8.)  
It appears that this caveat was added specifically to address the DPA’s criticism 
that the damages action should not give complaining state employees a second bite 
 
15 
at the apple after losing before the State Personnel Board.  Therefore, at least as of 
1986, the Legislature expressly did not intend the State Personnel Board 
proceeding to be a mere exhaustion requirement.  Rather, it expressly sought to 
restrict damages actions to those cases in which the State Personnel Board failed 
to reach a timely decision; in all other cases, the State Personnel Board proceeding 
was the employee’s exclusive remedy, subject only to substantial evidence review 
in the courts.  Notably, the DPA prepared a flowchart of the amended measure 
indicating only two possibilities for proceeding to court after bringing a complaint 
before the State Personnel Board:  “1.  For damages if no timely SPB decision [¶] 
or [¶] 2.  For review of SPB decision on merits.”  (Italics added.)  This flowchart 
was attached to, and referred to in, a bill analysis by a Senate committee, 
indicating that it came to the attention of the Legislature at least at the committee 
level.  (Sen. Com. on Public Employment & Retirement, Analysis of Assem. Bill 
No. 1916 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 12, 1986, p. 2 & attachment). 
Two years later, the Legislature enacted former section 10550, addressing 
whistleblower retaliation against University of California employees.  In language 
identical to that currently found in section 8547.10’s subdivision (c), former 
section 10550’s subdivision (c) provided:  “However, any action for damages shall 
not be available . . . unless the injured party has first filed a complaint with the 
[designated] university officer . . . , and the university has failed to reach a 
decision regarding that complaint within the time limits established for that 
purpose by the regents.”  (Stats. 1988, ch. 1385, § 3, p. 4669.)  The Legislature 
appears to have adapted this language directly from former section 10548, 
subdivision (c), which pertained to whistleblower retaliation against state 
employees.  It follows, therefore, that the Legislature likewise did not intend the 
University’s internal proceeding to be a mere exhaustion requirement.  Rather, it 
expressly sought to restrict damages actions to those cases in which the University 
 
16 
failed to reach a timely decision on the complaint; in all other cases, the University 
proceeding was to be the employee’s exclusive remedy. 
In describing this new statute governing University employees, the 
Legislative Counsel’s Digest first summarizes the effect of former section 10548, 
which governed state employees:  “Under existing law, a state employee . . . who 
files a written complaint alleging acts of reprisal or intimidation due to disclosure 
of improper governmental activities may file a copy of the complaint with the 
State Personnel Board . . . .  Existing law provides that failure of the board to 
reach a decision on the complaint, as specified, is a condition precedent to filing a 
civil action for damages.”  (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2765 (1987-
1988 Reg. Sess.) 4 Stats. 1988, Summary Dig., p. 475, italics added.)  This 
summary confirms our reading of former section 10548; a damages action was 
available only when the State Personnel Board failed to reach a timely decision.  
The Legislative Counsel’s Digest next explains the impact of the new statute (that 
is, former section 10550):  “This bill would add provisions, applicable exclusively 
to University of California employees, . . . similar to the provisions administered 
by the State Personnel Board, as described above, except the Regents of the 
University of California would designate an officer to whom complaints could be 
filed . . . and the regents would administer these provisions.”  (Ibid.)  This 
description indicates that the Legislature both understood and intended that a 
damages action against the University would be available only when the 
University failed to reach a timely decision.  It also indicates that the Legislature 
intended the University to have autonomy in administering this process.  Nothing 
suggests that the Legislature had a different intent in 1993 when it repealed former 
sections 10548 and 10550 (Stats. 1993, ch. 12, § 16, p. 101), and included 
substantially identical language in sections 8547.8 and 8547.10 (Stats. 1993, ch. 
12, § 8, pp. 98-100). 
 
17 
This interpretation of the Legislature’s intent is confirmed by later 
amendments to section 8547.8.  As noted, sections 8547.8, subdivision (c), and 
8547.10, subdivision (c), originally included parallel language limiting the 
damages remedy to situations in which either the State Personnel Board or the 
University, as the case may be, failed to reach a timely decision.  In 2001, 
however, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 413 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) 
(Senate Bill 413), amending section 8547.8, subdivision (c), to allow state 
employees to file a damages action if the State Personnel Board “has issued, or 
failed to issue, findings,” thereby arguably making the provision into a mere 
exhaustion requirement.  As amended, a final decision at the administrative level 
(or the failure of the administrative agency to reach a timely decision) clears the 
way for the state employee to file a civil damages action.  (But see fn. 2, ante.) 
The Legislative Counsel’s Digest for Senate Bill 413 explained the effect of 
the bill as follows:  “[Existing law] provides that any action for civil damages is 
only available to an injured party who has first filed a complaint with the State 
Personnel Board and the board has failed to reach a decision pursuant to specified 
procedures.  [¶]  . . . This bill would . . . provide instead that civil damages are 
available to an injured party only if the State Personnel Board has issued, or failed 
to issue, findings pursuant to the specified procedures.”  (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., 
Sen. Bill No. 413 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as chaptered Oct. 14, 2001, p. 1, italics 
added.)  Then, in a new paragraph, the digest adds:  “The bill would specify that 
its provisions shall apply to the California State University and the University of 
California.”  (Ibid.)  Plaintiffs point to the latter sentence as indicative of a 
legislative intent to amend, not just section 8547.8, but also sections 8547.10 and 
8547.12, making the requirement of administrative proceedings (which is common 
to all three sections) into mere exhaustion requirements in all three cases.  We 
disagree. 
 
18 
The first part of the above-quoted excerpt discusses the law as it was before 
enactment of Senate Bill 413.  In other words, it discusses the statutory language 
that constituted the pre-amendment version of section 8547.8, subdivision (c) — 
language that remains in section 8547.10, subdivision (c).  Thus, the Legislative 
Counsel’s discussion — stating that a damages action “is only available” when 
“the board has failed to reach a decision” — actually supports defendants’ view 
here that a damages action against the University is precluded so long as the 
internal administrative process reaches a timely decision, even one unfavorable to 
the employee.  Moreover, by using the phrase “This bill would . . . provide 
instead” (italics added), the Legislative Counsel’s Digest makes clear that the 
Legislature intended to change existing law, not merely to explain existing law.  
Therefore, plaintiffs’ argument would require us to adopt the following 
implausible line of reasoning:  When two parallel statutes use nearly identical 
language, and when the Legislature amends one but not the other, and when the 
amendment does not merely clarify existing law but actually changes the law, we 
should nevertheless continue to give the two statutes the same meaning, treating 
them as if the Legislature had actually amended both, and we should do so 
because the Legislative Counsel’s Digest tells us that the bill will so “specify,” 
though the actual text of the bill does not so specify.  We reject this reasoning, 
relying instead on the text of the bill, which amends section 8547.8, subdivision 
(c), but not section 8547.10, subdivision (c). 
Moreover, the sentence from the Legislative Counsel’s Digest on which 
plaintiffs rely can be readily explained in a way that does not give it the 
substantive significance plaintiffs wish it to bear.  When first introduced, Senate 
Bill 413 was limited to adding several new sections to the Government Code (see 
§ 8548 et seq.) concerning the dissemination of information about the 
Whistleblower Act.  (Sen. Bill 413, as introduced Feb. 21, 2001, §§ 1-2, pp. 1-4.)  
 
19 
Later, provisions were added amending the Whistleblower Act.  (See Sen. Bill 
413, as amended Mar. 26, 2001, §§ 2, 4, 5, 6, pp. 3-4, 6-10; id., as amended June 
14, 2001, §§ 3, 5, 6, pp. 4, 8-9; id., as amended July 11, 2001, § 8, p. 12.)  The 
specific provision we are considering here (authorizing a damages action under 
section 8547.8, subdivision (c), when “the State Personnel Board has issued, or 
failed to issue, findings”) was a relatively late addition to the bill.  (See Sen. Bill 
413, as amended Aug. 20, 2001, § 3, p. 5.)  The early versions of the Legislative 
Counsel’s Digest included the same sentence plaintiffs now highlight — that 
“[t]he bill would specify that its provisions shall apply to the California State 
University and the University of California” (see, e.g., Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. 
Bill No. 413 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 26, 2001, p. 2; id., as 
amended June 14, 2001, p. 2; id., as amended July 11, 2001, p. 2; cf. id., as 
introduced Feb. 21, 2001, p. 1); in the digest’s early versions, however, this 
sentence necessarily referred to other changes Senate Bill 413 would effect, not 
the specific change to section 8547.8, subdivision (c), at issue here, because the 
change at issue here was not then a part of the bill. 
When the Assembly amended Senate Bill 413 to add the specific change to 
section 8547.8, subdivision (c), at issue here, the Legislative Counsel revised the 
digest for the bill to describe this new provision.  (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill 
No. 413 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 20, 2001, pp. 1-2.)  
Significantly, this new bit of descriptive material was inserted at the end of the 
paragraph immediately preceding the sentence on which plaintiffs are now relying, 
giving rise to the confusing circumstance that the sentence can be read as referring 
to the new provision, though the actual text of the bill makes clear the opposite is 
true.  (Ibid.)  Nevertheless, the fact that the sentence remains set off in its own 
separate paragraph tends to disassociate it from the new descriptive material and to 
 
20 
associate it more generally with the other provisions of the bill (which, by their 
terms, apply to the University). 
Plaintiffs further rely on a dialogue that took place during a hearing, held 
on February 28, 2001, before the Senate Select Committee on Governmental 
Oversight.  At the hearing, an attorney for the California State Employees 
Association complained that the original language of section 8547.8, subdivision 
(c), governing state employees, could be read to preclude a damages action 
whenever the agency has issued a timely decision, even a decision in its own favor 
— which of course is exactly what defendants now argue about section 8547.10, 
subdivision (c), governing University employees.  The attorney said:  “But I think 
if you read the plain language, it makes it sound that if the Board has reached a 
decision . . . [n]ot to act, then that’s it.  That you can only bring a complaint if the 
State Personnel Board has failed to act.  I think it reads as a bar to civil litigation, 
but I think it was meant as an exhaustion requirement.”  (Italics added.)  The 
committee chair then asked:  “So shall we clarify that?”  Plaintiffs argue that to 
“clarify” statutory language means to explain its already existing meaning, not to 
change the law, and therefore they assert that section 8547.8, subdivision (c) — 
and, by parallel reasoning, section 8547.10, subdivision (c) — was always 
intended to be a mere exhaustion requirement, allowing the employee to file a 
damages action once the agency has reached its decision, regardless of what the 
decision might be. 
This brief dialogue, however, cannot support the substantive conclusions 
plaintiffs draw from it.  First, the passing comment of a committee chair at a 
legislative hearing hardly establishes the intent of the Legislature as a whole.  
Moreover, the statement of the attorney for the California State Employees 
Association actually supports defendants’ argument that the original language of 
section 8547.8, subdivision (c) — language that remains in section 8547.10, 
 
21 
subdivision (c) — is best read to preclude a damages action.  As the attorney 
pointed out, “if you read the plain language, . . . it reads as a bar to civil 
litigation.”  (Italics added.)  Therefore, the committee chair’s use of the word 
“clarify” is not strong evidence that the committee intended to explain existing law 
rather than to change the law.  This conclusion finds further support in the 
legislative history already discussed, indicating that the predecessor statute to 
section 8547.8 — former section 10548 — was drafted to preclude the precise 
interpretation plaintiffs are now advocating.  Therefore, considered in this context, 
the word “clarify” meant only that the committee would address the issue. 
Moreover, in light of this dialogue, the committee was certainly made 
aware that the original language of section 8547.8, subdivision (c) (which remains 
in section 8547.10, subdivision (c)), was subject to the restrictive interpretation 
defendants now urge.  That the Legislature chose to amend section 8547.8’s 
subdivision (c), which pertains to state employees, but not section 8547.10’s 
subdivision (c), which pertains to University employees, must be treated as 
substantively significant.  (See People v. Athar (2005) 36 Cal.4th 396, 409 
[“[W]hen the Legislature uses a critical word or phrase in one statute, the omission 
of that word or phrase in another statute dealing with the same general subject 
generally shows a different legislative intent.”]; see also People v. Licas (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 362, 367; In re Young (2004) 32 Cal.4th 900, 907.)  Plaintiffs suggest that 
the Legislature’s failure to amend section 8547.10, subdivision (c), when it 
amended section 8547.8, subdivision (c), was due simply to inadvertence or 
oversight, and that we therefore should fulfill the Legislature’s intent by 
construing section 8547.10 as if the Legislature had amended it.  In other words, 
plaintiffs suggest that the Legislature would certainly have amended section 
8547.10, subdivision (c), at the same time that it amended section 8547.8, 
subdivision (c), if that section had been brought to its attention. 
 
22 
A serious problem with this argument is that the restrictive language of 
section 8547.10’s subdivision (c), which pertains to University of California 
employees, was brought to the Legislature’s attention twice, but the Legislature 
made no changes.  The first such occasion was in 1994, when the Legislature was 
considering the bill that added section 8547.12 (relating to the California State 
University) to the Whistleblower Act.  At that time, an organization called “The 
University Plaintiffs Co-op” complained about several “loopholes” in the Act and 
proposed (among other things) an amendment that would have authorized a 
damages action against the University of California whenever the University’s 
resolution of a whistleblower retaliation complaint was unsatisfactory to the 
injured party.  The views of this organization were summarized in various 
legislative committee analyses, indicating that these committees gave 
consideration to the organization’s proposals.  (See Assem. Com. on Public 
Employees, Retirement, and Social Security, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2097 
(1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 20, 1994, p. 2; Assem. Com. on 
Consumer Protection, Governmental Efficiency, and Economic Development, 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2097 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 20, 1994, 
p. 2.)  Nevertheless, the Legislature took no action at that time to amend the 
restrictive language in section 8547.10, subdivision (c).  Later, in 2006, a bill was 
introduced that would have amended section 8547.10, subdivision (c), in virtually 
the same way the Legislature amended section 8547.8, subdivision (c), in 2001.  
(Sen. Bill No. 165 (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan. 4, 2006, § 3, p. 10.)  
That bill is currently inactive.  Ordinarily, we do not draw substantive conclusions 
based on legislative inaction (Quinn v. State of California (1975) 15 Cal.3d 162, 
175 [“legislative inaction is indeed a slim reed upon which to lean”]), but here we 
use this legislative history only to show that the restrictive language of section 
8547.10, subdivision (c), was twice brought to the Legislature’s attention and 
 
23 
therefore that the Legislature’s failure to amend that section in 2001 was not 
necessarily a matter of inadvertence or oversight. 
Plaintiffs argue that defendants’ interpretation of section 8547.10, 
subdivision (c), undermines the purpose of the Whistleblower Act, which as noted 
is to prevent retaliation against state employees who “report waste, fraud, abuse of 
authority, violation of law, or threat to public health.”  (§ 8547.1.)  Plaintiffs assert 
that the availability of a civil remedy by which an employee could seek 
compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees would serve to deter 
whistleblower retaliation.  That may well be true, but a statutory statement of 
purpose does not override the express limits the Legislature has placed in the 
statutory text; rather, the purpose is advanced only to the extent and in the manner 
the statutory text has specified.  Tenfold damages might also deter whistleblower 
retaliation, but the statutory text does not impose such damages, and they are not 
therefore awarded. 
Finally, plaintiffs point to the “ ‘ “settled principle of statutory 
interpretation that language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if 
doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not 
intend.” ’ ”  (Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 113, quoting 
People v. Barksdale (1972) 8 Cal.3d 320, 334, quoting Bruce v. Gregory (1967) 
65 Cal.2d 666, 673-674; see also Commission on Peace Officer Standards & 
Training v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 278, 290; California School 
Employees Assn. v. Governing Bd. of South Orange County Community College 
Dist. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 574, 588 [“[I]n rare cases, . . . the literal meaning of 
the words may be disregarded to avoid absurd results.”].)  Plaintiffs find absurdity 
in a rule that distinguishes between state employees and University of California 
employees, denying only the latter the possibility of a damages action after 
exhausting administrative remedies.  We conclude, however, that a rational, 
 
24 
nonabsurd basis for the distinction may be found in the University’s unique status 
as a self-governing institution, and the Legislature’s consequent desire to preserve 
the University’s autonomy.  (See Campbell, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 320-321; see 
also pp. 11-12, ante.)  Significantly, the “grant of constitutional power to the 
University includes the grant of quasi-judicial powers” (Campbell, at p. 320) and 
“[t]he Regents may create a policy for handling whistleblower claims under their 
power to organize and govern the University.”  (Id. at p. 321.)  Therefore, the 
Legislature could reasonably have intended the University to resolve 
whistleblower retaliation claims by way of its own internal procedures, reserving 
the alternative remedy of a damages action for those instances when the University 
fails to complete its process in a timely manner.6 
We conclude that section 8547.10, subdivision (c), means what it says:  a 
civil action for damages against the University is available only when the plaintiff 
employee has first filed a complaint with the University and the University has 
failed to reach a timely decision on the complaint. 
IV 
Plaintiffs also assert common law claims of wrongful termination in 
violation of public policy.  (See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 
167 (Tameny).)  In Tameny, we stated:  “[W]hen an employer’s discharge of an 
employee violates fundamental principles of public policy, the discharged 
employee may maintain a tort action and recover damages traditionally available 
in such actions.”  (Id. at p. 170.)  Later, in Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 
                                              
6  
  We recognize the possibility of abuse in the self-policing mechanism that 
the Legislature has established to prevent whistleblower retaliation at the 
University, but because we find no compelling evidence of legislative error, and 
because the statutory scheme is neither absurd nor inherently unfair, we must 
construe the law as written by the Legislature. 
 
25 
Cal.4th 1083, 1095 (Gantt), we clarified that a Tameny cause of action must be 
“carefully tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or 
statutory provisions.” 
Here, plaintiffs base their Tameny claims on the policy set forth in the 
Whistleblower Act, which declares “that state employees should be free to report 
waste, fraud, abuse of authority, violation of law, or threat to public health without 
fear of retribution.”  (§ 8547.1.)  Plaintiffs also rely on Labor Code section 6310, 
which prohibits the firing of an employee who complains to a governmental 
agency having responsibility for regulating safety in the relevant industry.  
Plaintiffs argue that their Tameny claims are expressly preserved by section 
8547.10, subdivision (f), which provides:  “Nothing in this article shall be deemed 
to diminish the rights, privileges, or remedies of any employee under any other . . . 
state law . . . .”  Plaintiffs assert that the tort we recognized in Tameny constitutes 
“other . . . state law” under this provision.  Defendants respond, however, that a 
Tameny action is unavailable against a public entity such as the University, and 
therefore the savings clause found in section 8547.10, subdivision (f), is of no help 
to plaintiffs.  We agree. 
The Government Claims Act (§ 810 et seq.) establishes the limits of 
common law liability for public entities, stating:  “Except as otherwise provided 
by statute:  [¶]  (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury 
arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any 
other person.”  (§ 815, subd. (a), italics added.)  The Legislative Committee 
Comment to section 815 states:  “This section abolishes all common law or 
judicially declared forms of liability for public entities, except for such liability as 
may be required by the state or federal constitution, e.g., inverse 
condemnation. . . .”  (Legis. Com. com., 32 West’s Ann. Gov. Code (1995), foll. 
§ 815, p. 167, italics added.)  Moreover, our own decisions confirm that section 
 
26 
815 abolishes common law tort liability for public entities.  (See Eastburn v. 
Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1179; Zelig v. County 
of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1127-1128; see also Adkins v. State of 
California (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1802, 1817-1818; Michael J. v. Los Angeles 
County Dept. of Adoptions (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 859, 866-867.) 
In Palmer v. Regents of University of California (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 
899, the Court of Appeal applied section 815 in a context similar to that presented 
here:  a whistleblower retaliation claim against the University of California.  The 
court observed:  “The only statutory authorization for a civil damage action based 
on alleged retaliation against a University of California employee for reporting 
improper activity is section 8547.10.  Accordingly, a university employee who 
believes she is the victim of retaliation is limited to a statutory claim for damages 
under section 8547.10.”  (Palmer, supra, at p. 909.)  The court went on to affirm 
summary judgment against the plaintiff, who had asserted only a Tameny cause of 
action:  “Because the ‘classic Tameny cause of action’ is a common law, judicially 
created tort . . . and not authorized by statute, it is not properly asserted against the 
Regents.”  (Palmer, supra, at p. 909, citations omitted.)  Although the Court of 
Appeal’s discussion of section 815 was dictum (see Palmer, supra, at p. 910 & fn. 
11), we agree with the Palmer court that section 815 bars Tameny actions against 
public entities.7 
                                              
7  
In City of Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1143, 1158-1161, 
we held that an employee could bring a Tameny cause of action for disability 
discrimination.  The defendant in that case happened to be a public entity, but the 
question of a public entity’s tort immunity under section 815 was not raised in that 
case.  “It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered.”  
(People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1268, fn. 10.) 
 
27 
We are left, therefore, with plaintiffs’ Tameny claims against the individual 
defendants.  Plaintiffs argue that irrespective of whether section 815 abolishes 
common law liability for public entities, the individual employees are subject to 
common law liability, and under section 815.2, the University, as their employer, 
bears that liability in their place.  Section 815.2, subdivision (a), codifies the 
doctrine of respondeat superior as it applies to public entities like the University, 
stating:  “A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or 
omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment 
if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of 
action against that employee . . . .” 
Plaintiffs, however, overlook the fact that a Tameny action for wrongful 
discharge can only be asserted against an employer.  An individual who is not an 
employer cannot commit the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy; rather, he or she can only be the agent by which an employer commits that 
tort.  This conclusion flows logically from our reasoning in Tameny. 
The tort we recognized in Tameny, and reaffirmed in Gantt, is premised on 
the wrongful termination of an employment relationship.  If an employer 
terminates an employment relationship for a reason that contravenes some 
fundamental public policy, then the employer breaches a general duty imposed by 
law upon all employers and the employee’s remedy therefore sounds in tort.  
(Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 176.)  In that case, the various terms of the 
employment relationship are not the source of the employee’s legal rights; rather, 
tort law is the source of the employee’s legal rights, and the employment 
relationship is merely the medium through which the tort is inflicted.  (Ibid.)  
Nevertheless, the breach of the employment relationship is an indispensable 
element of the tort, because it serves factually as the instrument of injury.  Thus, 
 
28 
there can be no Tameny cause of action without the prior existence of an 
employment relationship between the parties. 
This point was elaborated upon by the Court of Appeal in Weinbaum v. 
Goldfarb, Whitman & Cohen (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1310:  “[T]he tort of 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy . . . arises when an employer 
conditions employment upon required participation in unlawful conduct by the 
employee.  But the fact that an employee discharged in violation of public policy 
has a tort remedy wholly independent of his express or implied contractual 
relationship with his employer [citation] does not mean there exists a tort of 
‘wrongful termination in violation of public policy’ independent of the duty rising 
from the employment relationship.  To the contrary, the duty on which the tort is 
based is a creature of the employer-employee relationship, and the breach of that 
duty is the employer’s improper discharge of an employee otherwise terminable at 
the will or whim of the employer.  [Citation.]  There is nothing in . . . any . . . case 
we have found to suggest that this tort imposes a duty of any kind on anyone other 
than the employer.  Certainly, there is no law we know of to support the notion 
that anyone other than the employer can discharge an employee.”  (Id. at p. 1315, 
italics omitted and added.)  Later cases have followed Weinbaum in reaching the 
same conclusion.  (See Khajavi v. Feather River Anesthesia Medical Group 
(2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 32, 53; Phillips v. Gemini Moving Specialists (1998) 63 
Cal.App.4th 563, 576; Jacobs v. Universal Development Corp. (1997) 53 
Cal.App.4th 692, 703-704.) 
Plaintiffs rely on Walrath v. Sprinkel (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1237, in which 
the Court of Appeal concluded that supervisory employees can be held personally 
liable under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) for acts of retaliation.  
We recently rejected that conclusion (Jones v. The Lodge at Torrey Pines 
Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1173-1174), and in any case, the holding of 
 
29 
Walrath rested on the specific language of the retaliation provision of the FEHA, 
which applies to “any employer, labor organization, employment agency, or 
person.”  (§ 12940, subd. (h), italics added.)  We see no analogous justification for 
imposing personal liability on supervisorial employees based on a common law 
tort that depends on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between 
the tortfeasor and the victim.  We conclude therefore that the common law Tameny 
cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy lies only 
against an employer.8 
V 
Plaintiffs allege defendants engaged in “outrageous conduct” that was 
intended to, and did, cause plaintiffs “severe emotional distress,” giving rise to 
common law causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The 
alleged wrongful conduct, however, occurred at the worksite, in the normal course 
                                              
8  
One might argue that even if, strictly speaking, a Tameny action is 
inappropriate against a supervisorial employee, we should nevertheless recognize 
an analogous tort that applies to the conduct of supervisors.  In other words, we 
should hold that a supervisor who retaliates against a whistleblower violates a 
general duty the law imposes on all supervisors and therefore commits a tort 
separate from the tort he or she causes the employer to commit. 
 
This argument does not, however, withstand careful analysis.  The 
supervisor, when taking retaliatory action against the employee, is necessarily 
exercising authority the employer conferred on the supervisor, and it is only that 
authority that makes the supervisor’s action injurious, not the action in itself.  The 
words “You are fired,” for example, have no legal significance if spoken by a 
junior-level employee who has no role in hiring and firing decisions; it is only 
when the speaker is in a position to exercise authority on behalf of the employer 
that these words have significance.  Thus, in a retaliation case, it is the employer’s 
adverse employment action that constitutes the substance of the tort, and the 
supervisor’s action merges with that of the employer.  We could only hold that the 
supervisor commits an independent tort if the supervisor’s action were somehow 
by itself injurious, irrespective of the adverse employment action it causes the 
employer to take, but that is not alleged here. 
 
30 
of the employer-employee relationship, and therefore workers’ compensation is 
plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy for any injury that may have resulted.  (Livitsanos v. 
Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 744, 754; Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 
1, 25; Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 160.) 
Shoemaker v. Myers is of particular relevance here because it involved 
termination of a whistleblower employee.  We said:  “To the extent plaintiff 
purports to allege any distinct cause of action, not dependent upon the violation of 
an express statute or violation of fundamental public policy, but rather directed at 
the intentional, malicious aspects of defendants’ conduct . . . , then plaintiff has 
alleged no more than the plaintiff in Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. . . . .  
The kinds of conduct at issue (e.g., discipline or criticism) are a normal part of the 
employment relationship.  Even if such conduct may be characterized as 
intentional, unfair or outrageous, it is nevertheless covered by the workers’ 
compensation exclusivity provisions.”  (Shoemaker v. Myers, supra, 52 Cal.3d at 
p. 25.)  We reaffirmed this holding in Livitsanos v. Superior Court, which also 
involved a terminated employee:  “So long as the basic conditions of 
compensation are otherwise satisfied (Lab. Code, § 3600), and the employer’s 
conduct neither contravenes fundamental public policy (Tameny . . . , supra, 27 
Cal.3d 167) nor exceeds the risks inherent in the employment relationship (Cole 
[v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist.], supra, 43 Cal.3d 148), an employee’s 
emotional distress injuries are subsumed under the exclusive remedy provisions of 
workers’ compensation.”  (Livitsanos v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.4th at 
p. 754.) 
These holdings apply equally here.  Nor are the exceptions stated in 
Livitsanos v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.4th at page 754, of any help to plaintiffs 
here.  The exception for conduct that “contravenes fundamental public policy” is 
aimed at permitting a Tameny action to proceed despite the workers’ 
 
31 
compensation exclusive remedy rule.  As already discussed, however, plaintiffs’ 
Tameny action is barred by section 815.  As to the exception for conduct that 
“exceeds the risks inherent in the employment relationship,” it might seem at first 
blush to apply here — based on the argument that whistleblower retaliation is not 
a risk inherent in the employment relationship — but we rejected this same 
argument in Shoemaker v. Myers, supra, 52 Cal.3d at page 25.  Like plaintiffs 
here, the plaintiff in Shoemaker alleged whistleblower retaliation and also a 
Tameny cause of action, and although he incorporated these allegations as part of 
his claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, we held workers’ 
compensation to be his exclusive remedy and affirmed the trial court’s dismissal 
of that cause of action.  (Shoemaker v. Myers, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 26.)  The 
same holding applies here. 
Accordingly, we conclude that plaintiffs’ causes of action for intentional 
infliction of emotion distress are barred by the workers’ compensation exclusive 
remedy provisions. 
VI 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
I agree with the majority that Government Code section 8547.10, 
subdivision (c) must be read as precluding a whistleblower from bringing a 
damages action against the University of California (University) when that person 
has made an internal complaint to the University and the University has reached a 
timely adverse decision finding its own actions did not constitute retaliation for a 
protected disclosure in violation of Government Code section 8547.10.1  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 24.)  Like the majority, I reach this conclusion because the statute 
unambiguously states that a damages action following an internal complaint of 
retaliation for whistle blowing is not available “unless . . . the university has failed 
to reach a decision regarding that complaint within the time limits established for 
that purpose by the regents.”  (§ 8547.10, subd. (c).) 
I write separately because, unlike the majority, I do not find this result 
“reasonable in light of the unique constitutional status of the University of 
California.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11.)  To the contrary, this literal reading will 
act powerfully to defeat the purposes of the Whistleblower Protection Act (§ 8547 
et seq.) (the Act) with respect to University employees.  As discussed below, I do 
not believe the same Legislature that in section 8547.10 created a civil action for 
damages on behalf of a whistleblower subjected to retaliation by the University 
                                              
1 
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Government Code. 
 
 
2
“could reasonably have intended the University to resolve whistleblower 
retaliation claims by way of its own internal procedures” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 24) 
without any meaningful judicial review.   
The decision we reach today, giving section 8547.10 its literal reading, will 
strongly undermine the purposes of the Act, whose central purpose is explained in 
section 8547.1:  “The Legislature finds and declares that state employees should 
be free to report waste, fraud, abuse of authority, violation of law, or threat to 
public health without fear of retribution.”  For whistle blowing employees to be 
confident they are protected against retaliation, they must have recourse to a fair 
and impartial decisionmaking process outside the line management of their 
employing agency or university.  If the same government organization that has 
tried to silence the reporting employee also sits in final judgment of the 
employee’s retaliation claim, the law’s protection against retaliation is illusory.  
The Legislature recognized and met the need for independent review by expressly 
authorizing civil claims for retaliation by state agencies, the University of 
California, and the California State University.  (§§ 8547.8, 8547.10, 8547.12.)  
Yet today’s decision eliminates meaningful independent review for University of 
California employees.2  As a result, a University employee, knowing that any 
                                              
2   
Because the University’s process for resolving whistleblower retaliation 
complaints does not include the right to an evidentiary hearing before a neutral 
hearing officer, substantial-evidence review by petition for writ of administrative 
mandate is not available.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.)  On petition for 
ordinary mandate (id., § 1085), the agency decision is reviewed on the much laxer 
and more limited arbitrary-and-capricious standard (Strumsky v. San Diego County 
Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 34-35, fn. 2; Valnes v. Santa 
Monica Rent Control Bd. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1119), effectively 
insulating University decisions so long as they are timely made under regular 
procedures and are not facially irrational.    
 
 
3
complaint of retaliation will be decided by the University itself, will be unable to 
act “without fear of retribution.”  (§ 8547.1.)  The legislative goal will be defeated, 
as University employees will have less reason to be “candid and honest without 
reservation in conducting the people’s business.”  (Ibid.) 
As noted, the majority finds this result consistent with legislative intent 
because of the University’s significant autonomy in running its internal affairs.  
Had the Legislature simply exempted the University from the Act’s strictures, 
I might agree.  But it did not.  By bringing the University under the Act’s 
prohibitions on retaliation and providing University employees, like employees 
with state agencies, a civil damages action for retaliation, the Legislature made 
clear its view that “waste, fraud, abuse of authority, violation of law, or threat to 
public health” (§ 8547.1) in public education, as in other areas of government, are 
matters of vital concern to all the people of California — even when they occur at 
the University.  The problems addressed by the Act, the Legislature manifestly 
believed, go beyond the internal affairs of the University and affect the public 
generally.  Consequently, the Legislature intended its policy to protect University 
whistleblowers as well as those employed in other parts of state government. 
The Act does recognize the University’s administrative autonomy to the 
extent of permitting it to set its own procedures and timelines for the internal 
investigation of whistleblower complaints.  (§ 8547.10, subds. (a), (c).)  But at the 
same time the Legislature expressly permitted a civil damages action — and 
authorized criminal liability — against University managers and officials for their 
retaliation against whistleblowers.  (Id., subds. (b), (c).)  The court’s reading of the 
Act, making the University the judge of its own civil liability and leaving its 
employees vulnerable to retaliation for reporting abuses, thwarts the demonstrated 
legislative intent to protect those employees and thereby encourage candid 
reporting. 
 
 
4
The literal reading of section 8547.10 we adopt today borders on the 
absurd, bringing into possible play the principle that language of a statute should 
not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences the 
Legislature did not intend.  (Commission on Peace Officer Standards & Training 
v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 278, 290.)  But when, as here, the statutory 
language is clear and unambiguous, to invoke this principle is to assert, in effect, 
that the language can be corrected on the ground it resulted from a drafting error.  
Courts should use this power to rewrite statutes “with great restraint,” only where 
“the error is clear and correction will best carry out the intent of the Legislature.”  
(Bonner v. County of San Diego (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1346, fn. 9.)  In the 
present case, I cannot be sure the language of section 8547.10, subdivision (c) 
resulted from a drafting error.  While the language is clearly contrary to the overall 
purposes of the Act, its inclusion may have been the product of conceptual 
confusion or failure to fully consider the problem rather than an error in the 
drafting process itself. 
As the majority explains, the legislative history of former section 10548, 
the predecessor to section 8547.8, can be read to suggest that when originally 
applied to state agency employees the presently disputed language was not 
intended to create a mere administrative-remedies exhaustion requirement, but to 
bar a subsequent civil damages action in all cases in which the State Personnel 
Board reached a timely decision.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 13-15.)  And the 
legislative history contains no indication that language was intended to operate 
differently when included in former section 10550, enacted in 1988 to extend  
 
 
5
protections to University employees.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 15-16.)3  For this 
reason, I cannot confidently conclude the disputed language was originally the 
result of drafting error. 
In 2001, the Legislature amended section 8547.8 so as to clearly impose 
only an exhaustion requirement:  a damages action by a state agency employee is 
now authorized when the State Personnel Board “has issued” timely findings as 
well as when it has “failed to issue” such findings.  (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 17.)  
The Legislature’s failure to similarly amend section 8547.10 at the same time 
appears to have been an oversight.  The amendment to section 8547.8 was 
proposed and drafted by an attorney for the California State Employees 
Association, an organization that represents state agency employees but not 
employees of the University.  Nowhere in the transcript of the February 2001 
hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Government Oversight at which the 
amendment was first proposed, or in the correspondence between the California 
State Employees Association and the committee chair that led directly to the 
amendment of section 8547.8, does any mention appear of section 8547.10 or of 
University employees, much less any indication of a desire to defer to the  
                                              
3   
In using parallel language for the new statute, the Legislature may have 
overlooked the fact that in former section 10548 the language applied to State 
Personnel Board findings made after a hearing (see maj. opn., ante, at p. 14), 
whereas the new statute, former section 10550, did not require the University to 
hold hearings on whistleblower retaliation complaints.  The difference is 
important, because adverse State Personnel Board findings after an evidentiary 
hearing were presumably reviewable for substantial evidence, while University 
findings were not.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15; see fn. 2, ante.)   
 
 
6
University’s constitutional autonomy.4  Unlike the majority (see maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 21), therefore, I see nothing significant in the Legislature’s failure to amend 
section 8547.10 at the same time as section 8547.8. 
While I therefore suspect the current text of section 8547.10 is the result of 
oversight, I cannot be sure.  That the Legislature would have amended section 
8547.10 at the same time as section 8547.8 had it been brought to its attention 
appears likely, but not certain.  As the majority notes (maj. opn., ante, at p. 22), 
since 2001 the problematic language of section 8547.10 has been brought before 
the Legislature, with no action thus far having been taken.  In any event, that the 
Legislature should — logically — have amended section 8547.10 when it 
amended section 8547.8 is not a sufficient warrant for us to read the section as if it 
had been amended.  While the court may correct drafting errors, for us to reverse a 
legislative failure to act — absent certainty that the failure was inadvertent and not 
a legislative choice, however ill-advised — would overstep our proper bounds. 
In sum, we cannot know whether the Legislature intended section 8547.10, 
subdivision (c) to state only an administrative exhaustion requirement or to 
preclude a damages action as well, when the University timely denies a 
whistleblower’s retaliation claim.  The latter interpretation accords with the 
statute’s unambiguous language but is contrary to the overall purposes and 
structure of the Act.  I urge the Legislature to revisit this statute and if, as I 
                                              
4  
Indeed, nowhere in any of the statutory and legislative history I have 
reviewed is there any suggestion the Legislature intentionally distinguished the 
University from state agencies with respect to protection of whistleblowers against 
retaliation, because of the University’s relative autonomy over its internal affairs.  
That the Legislature had such a distinction in mind is simply the majority’s 
invention. 
 
 
7
suspect, it intended to create only a requirement that complainants exhaust their 
internal remedies, to amend the statute in a manner that makes that intent clear. 
  
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Miklosy v. Regents of University of California 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion NP opn. filed 10/27/05 – 1st Dist., Div. 4 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S139133 
Date Filed: July 31, 2008 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Alameda 
Judge: John Frederick Kraetzer 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Gwilliam, Ivary, Chiosso, Cavalli & Brewer, J. Gary Gwilliam; Law Offices of Jan C. Nielsen and Jan C. 
Nielsen  for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Loraine V. Johnson as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Kerr & Wagstaffe, Michael von Loewenfeldt and Michael K. Ng for Project on Government Oversight as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Joel Golden for Dr. Larry M. Brand as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Ross, Dixon & Bell and Jon R. Williams for Whistlebusters.org as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs 
and Appellants. 
 
Loulena Miles for Tri-Valley CAREs as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Beeson, Tayer & Bodine and Dale L. Brodsky for Society of Professionals, Scientists, and Engineers, Local 
11 and University Professional and Technical Employees, CWA Local 9119, AFL-CIO as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Reed Smith, Paul D. Fogel, Dennis Peter Maio; Melissa M. Allain, Janet G. Tulk, Gabriela B. Odell, Max 
A. Creamer; Jeffrey A. Blair; Hanson Bridgett Marcus Vlahos & Rudy, Patrick M. Glenn, Sandra K. 
Rappaport and Sarah D. Mott for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
J. Gary Gwilliam 
Gwilliam, Ivary, Chiosso, Cavalli & Brewer 
1999 Harrison Street, Suite 1600 
Oakland, CA  94612-3528 
(510) 832-5411 
 
Paul D. Fogel 
Reed Smith 
Two Embarcadero Center, Suite 2000 
San Francisco, CA  94111-3922 
(415) 543-8700