Case Title: State v. Burgess

Citation: 163 Vt 259, 657 A.2d 202

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1995-01-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_BURGESS.93-448; 163 Vt 259; 657 A.2d 202

[Filed 27-Jan-1995]

      NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont
Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any
errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to
press. 


                                 No. 93-448


State of Vermont                                  Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
     v.                                            District Court of Vermont,
                                                  Unit No. 1, Rutland Circuit


Robert J. Burgess                                 September Term, 1994



Francis B. McCaffrey, J.

Peter R. Neary, Rutland County Deputy State's Attorney, Rutland, for
 plaintiff-appellant 

John H. Bloomer and John H. Bloomer, Jr., of Bloomer & Bloomer, P.C.,
 Rutland, for defendant-appellee 


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     MORSE, J.   The State appeals from an order of the Rutland District
Court granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence that defendant was
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, 23 V.S.A.  1201.  We affirm. 

     The essential facts are not in dispute.  On the afternoon of December 7,
1992, a police officer travelling south on a road in Proctor observed a
vehicle in a lawful pull-off area on the west side of the road, facing north.
 Driving by, the officer noticed that the vehicle had its engine running and
its parking lights on.  The officer turned his cruiser around and pulled up

 

behind the parked vehicle, activating his blue lights.  He had no indication
that anything was wrong or any information about the vehicle before stopping.
 The officer approached the driver's side of the vehicle and observed
defendant behind the wheel and a passenger in the next seat. The officer
asked the defendant whether he was having problems.  Defendant replied that
there were none and that he had only stopped "to relieve himself."  At that
point the officer made observations leading to DUI processing. 

     Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained by the officer on the
ground that the officer lacked probable cause for the initial stop.  The
court found that there was no evidence that defendant was either violating a
traffic law or committing a crime.  The court then noted our decision in
State v. Marcello, 157 Vt. 657, 658, 599 A.2d 357, 358 (1991) (mem.), holding
that in some circumstances a police officer may intrude on privacy to carry
out "community caretaking" functions, but concluding that the facts of this
case did not fall within the Marcello exception: 

   While clearly the level of proof to justify the inquiry and intrusion is
   slight, there must be some reasonable basis on which to make the inquiry. 
   Without such a requirement, an officer would be free, under the community
   caretaking function, to inquire of any stopped/parked vehicle the nature and
   circumstances of the stop. Such intrusions, without specific and articulable
   facts to justify them, are clearly outside the scope of the community
   caretaking exception set forth in Marcello. 

The State's appeal focuses principally on the argument that no stop occurred,
and that there was no need for a "reasonable and articulable suspicion" of
wrongdoing. 

                                     I.

     The question before the Court is whether the conduct of the police in
displaying blue lights after pulling in behind defendant's stopped vehicle
constituted a stop, and we hold that it did.  A "stop" is shorthand way of
referring to a seizure that is more limited in scope and 

 

duration than an arrest.  3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure  9.1(c) at 340,
9.2(d) at 363 (2d ed. 1987).  Consequently, police need not force or signal a
vehicle to the side of the road to effect a stop of persons in the vehicle. 
See Adams v. Williams,