Case Title: People v. Woodruff

Citation: 

Docket Number: S115378

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2018-07-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 7/19/18 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S115378 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
STEVE WOODRUFF, 
) 
 
) 
Riverside County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. RIF095875 
 
____________________________________) 
 
A jury convicted defendant of the first degree murder of Riverside Police 
Officer Charles Douglas Jacobs and the attempted murder of Police Officer 
Benjamin Baker.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 664.)1  It found true three special 
circumstances allegations:  murder to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest, intentional 
killing of a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and 
murder by means of lying in wait.  (§§ 190.2, subd. (a)(5), (7), (15).)  It also found 
true allegations of personal discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury 
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and personal discharge of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. 
(c)).   
After finding that defendant did not have an intellectual disability, and 
following a penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of death.  The court denied the 
automatic motion to modify the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and imposed a 
judgment of death.  It also imposed a prison sentence on the other counts and 
                                                 
1  
All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated. 
2 
enhancement allegations.  This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We 
reverse the judgment of death because of the erroneous exclusion of a prospective 
juror during jury selection and remand the case for a new penalty trial.  We affirm 
the judgment in all other aspects.   
I.  THE FACTS 
A. Guilt Phase   
 
1. Overview 
Police responded to a neighbor’s call that defendant’s mother, who lived in 
a two-unit house upstairs from defendant, was playing a loud radio outside, which 
had been a longstanding source of conflict.  Because the mother refused to turn 
down the radio, officers began to arrest her.  During the process, defendant, who 
had retrieved a gun from his house and was watching and listening from his porch, 
leaned into the outdoor stairwell leading up to the mother’s apartment, and, as 
observed by Officer Benjamin Baker and by a neighbor, fired up at the officers, 
killing Officer Douglas Jacobs.  That evening, defendant admitted to the police 
that he shot Jacobs.  At trial, however, he denied killing Jacobs, and he also 
presented evidence to contest the required mental state.  The parties also presented 
contested evidence as to whether defendant had an intellectual disability and a 
brain injury.   
2. Prosecution Evidence 
On the afternoon of January 13, 2001, Holly Menzies called the Riverside 
Police Department because her neighbor Parthenia Carr had been playing very 
loud music outside for 45 minutes.  Carr lived upstairs and her son, defendant, 
lived downstairs in a two-unit house.  Carr would play her radio outside her door 
on the landing at the top of her stairs.  Over the past year, Menzies and her 
3 
husband had spoken to Carr several times about the loud music and had reported it 
to the police at least twice.  Carr’s response invariably was contentious and angry.   
On-duty Police Officer Baker responded to the disturbance call.  When he 
arrived at the residence, he saw a portable radio outside, on the landing.  The 
music was at its maximum volume and “extremely loud,” such that other sounds 
were inaudible.    
There was a porch on the ground floor.  Seeing someone moving inside the 
house, Baker asked through the screen door if the person had called the police.  
The male, defendant, responded “No,” and that it was his mother’s radio upstairs.    
Baker went upstairs and turned off the radio.  Carr opened the screen door 
and “began screaming and yelling, saying that it was her radio, it’s her property.  
[Baker had] no right to touch her radio . . . .”  Baker informed Carr about the 
disturbance call.  Carr was angry and “out of control pretty much the entire time 
[Baker] was there, constantly talking, not pausing between words, just constantly 
saying something.”  She threatened to sue Baker for violating her Fourth 
Amendment rights.    
Baker radioed his supervisor, Sergeant Leach, for assistance.  Leach 
responded he was en route.  Baker continued to speak with Carr, who refused to 
cooperate.  Baker informed Carr he would arrest her for disturbing the peace if she 
did not lower the radio volume.    
Baker left to speak with Menzies.  The music sounded “extremely loud” 
from outside Menzies’s house.  Menzies signed a citizen’s arrest form but wanted 
to speak with Carr to resolve the situation informally.  Baker accompanied 
Menzies to Carr’s landing to provide assistance.  Carr came out on the landing and 
“immediately began screaming” at Menzies, pushed open the screen door into 
Menzies’s foot, and “lunged” toward Menzies, startling her.  According to 
Menzies, she was jostled when Carr opened the door and she did not perceive that 
4 
Carr was intentionally pushing her.  Baker stepped between them and Menzies 
started walking down the stairs.  Menzies observed Baker to be “exceedingly 
polite” throughout the encounter.    
Baker grabbed Carr’s wrist to arrest her for disturbing the peace and for 
committing battery on Menzies.  Menzies, who had returned to her home, could 
from a window hear Carr tell Baker he could not arrest her.  At that point, Claude 
Carr (Claude), who, unbeknownst to Baker, had been sleeping inside, came out 
and stepped between Baker and Carr, within four inches of Baker, and told him to 
“[g]et your hands off my mom.” 
Baker then heard defendant say from downstairs in a threatening manner, 
“You better not touch my momma.”  Baker saw defendant leaning over the 
stairway from the porch.  Mark Delgado, who lived across the street and had been 
outside washing his car, saw defendant come out of his house, walk to the end of 
the porch and look up, and say something like, “Don’t be touchin’ my momma.  
Leave my momma alone.” 
Feeling unsafe, Baker called for immediate assistance.  Within a couple of 
minutes, Jacobs, Baker’s beat partner, arrived and Baker met him in the middle of 
the stairs to brief him on the situation.  Baker had determined to arrest Carr and 
Claude, and wanted to wait for Leach for additional assistance.  While waiting, 
Baker and Jacobs walked up to the landing to prevent Carr and Claude from going 
inside and creating an unsecure situation.  The officers informed Carr they were 
detaining her for disturbing the peace.  Carr said she was going into her house if 
the officers did not leave and started to do so.  Baker grabbed her wrist to start the 
arrest.  Claude tried to grab Baker, so Jacobs grabbed Claude’s wrist and put him 
in a wrist lock.  Baker let go of Carr to assist Jacobs.  Carr went into the house.  
When Claude became still, Baker reached for his handcuffs.    
5 
As Baker moved to handcuff Claude, he heard a gunshot.  Baker 
immediately looked down the stairs where the shot came from and saw defendant 
standing on the porch, leaning over the railing with his body minimally exposed, 
pointing a handgun up at the officers.  Baker let go of Claude, saw Jacobs going 
into the house, and thought Jacobs was taking cover.  According to Claude, Jacobs 
looked surprised and pushed Claude to the ground as Claude heard gunfire.  Baker 
was not sure if he was the only one on the landing at that point.  He grabbed his 
gun, a .40-caliber firearm, and fired at defendant.    
Baker saw defendant, who had fired the first shot, point the gun in his 
direction and shoot multiple times.  Jacobs did not have his gun out.  Defendant 
retreated after Baker’s third shot. 
After defendant had told the officers to leave Carr alone, Delgado saw him 
walk back into his house for a second and come back out.  He looked across at 
Delgado.  Delgado noticed defendant had a silver- or chrome-plated handgun.  
When Delgado looked over, defendant put the gun behind his back slightly.  
Defendant walked to the end of the porch, peeked up over the railing furtively, 
held the gun up and aimed, firing twice without hesitation.  He then walked 
quickly back into the house.  Delgado had an unobstructed view of defendant.  
Defendant looked agitated and like he “didn’t think twice” before getting the gun 
and shooting.  No more than 30 seconds passed from the time defendant told the 
police to leave Carr alone to the time he fired the gun.  Menzies had heard Claude 
yell “No, don’t,” in a “heart-wrenching plea” to defendant just before she heard 
shots.    
Baker realized Jacobs, who was lying faceup with his torso in Carr’s 
doorway, had been shot.  Blood was coming out of Jacobs’s nose “like a water 
faucet,” and his airway was full of blood.  Baker could not feel a pulse.  He 
radioed that an officer was down.  Baker saw Leach arriving and advised him that 
6 
defendant was downstairs and had shot Jacobs.  Leach took Carr and Claude down 
to the curb.  A paramedic arriving to assist observed that Jacobs’s gun was 
holstered.   
Other officers arrived.  They set up a perimeter around the house, 
announced their presence over a speaker system, and ordered anyone in the house 
to come out.   
Suddenly the downstairs door flew open, defendant yelled that he was 
coming out, and he threw out a rifle.  Defendant crawled out of the house naked.  
The police arrested defendant and put him in a squad car.  They later found a 
jammed bullet in the rifle.   
Defendant told the officer who was handcuffing him that he was sorry or 
that he had not meant “to do this.”  During the ride to the station, defendant 
volunteered that he did not mean to kill the officer and had panicked because they 
would not let Carr go.    
After securing the house, officers found defendant’s four-year-old daughter 
hiding under a bed.  They found a rifle and bullets on the bedroom floor along 
with .30- and .44-caliber ammunition in the closet area, a Lorcin nine-millimeter 
handgun on the kitchen stove and a rifle in the pantry, and expended shotgun 
shells and two 9-millimeter Speer casings in the backyard.  The police took photos 
of a possible bullet strike to the wall adjacent to the outside stairs.  About a year 
later, the police cut out a portion of the wall and found a bullet lodged inside.    
Detectives interviewed defendant the evening of the shooting.  Defendant 
told them that when Baker first arrived, defendant called his brother John 
Woodruff (John) to say that the police were there again harassing Carr.  He went 
outside and heard Baker tell Carr that she would go to jail if she did not turn down 
her music.  Defendant watched for a minute until he saw Baker calling someone.  
He then walked into his house and retrieved his gun from the bedroom closet, 
7 
loaded it, and placed it on the television.  Watching from inside his front door, 
defendant saw Jacobs arrive in his police car, jump out, and run up the stairs.    
Defendant went outside with the gun to listen.  Nobody could see the gun.  
He listened for about one or two minutes, until he heard Claude ask the officers to 
wait for a sergeant.  Jacobs responded, “We’re not waitin’ on no sergeant,” and 
grabbed Carr.  Defendant told Jacobs to let Carr go and fired his gun.  Defendant 
fired three times and ran into the house.  The officers returned fire.  Once inside, 
defendant got a rifle because he thought the officers might kill him, but then 
changed his mind, threw the gun out of the house, removed his clothes so that the 
police would not shoot him, and crawled out.  Defendant acknowledged that the 
rifle had jammed.    
Defendant explained he panicked, and was not thinking but instead reacted.  
He did not aim.  He explained that the police would come to the house two or 
three times a day about the loud music and that Menzies was using the police to 
harass Carr.  John had filed a complaint about it with the police.  
In response to defendant’s explanation that he panicked, the detectives 
pointed out that he had retrieved his gun, and then watched and waited before 
shooting at the officers.  Defendant’s response was that he did not “mean” to do it 
and that it was a coincidence that he hit Jacobs.  When confronted with Baker’s 
statement that he saw defendant aiming through the sight of his gun and with the 
interviewing detective’s disbelief that defendant would not aim since his mother 
and brother were also in the group, defendant responded that he lost his “cool” and 
acknowledged that he was “mad.”  Defendant meant to shoot at the officers and 
shot Jacobs.  He also acknowledged that the officers did not hurt Carr.  
Carr testified that the police did not hurt her.  Delgado could hear Carr 
yelling but she was not calling for help and did not sound scared or in pain.    
8 
Jacobs died from a bullet entering his nose and passing through the base of 
his brain.  It destroyed 50 percent of his brain stem and rendered him immediately 
unconscious.   
Senior criminalist Richard Takenaga compared bullets test-fired from the 
Lorcin recovered from defendant’s kitchen to the Speer bullet recovered from 
Jacobs’s skull and concluded that the Lorcin had discharged the bullet that killed 
Jacobs.  The bullet found in the wall was damaged and difficult to compare, but 
had characteristics similar to those of the bullet from the Lorcin.   
3. Defense Evidence 
Carr testified on cross-examination in the prosecution’s case that Baker 
seemed angry.  Baker grabbed Claude by the wrist and took his gun out and 
pointed it at Claude.  Carr was crying and felt afraid and angry.  Carr testified that 
she grew up in Mississippi watching the civil rights movement and felt she had not 
committed any crime or broken any law that day and that Baker was violating her 
constitutional rights.  She felt that the police shoot and kill Black people, including 
“Tyisha Miller” (an apparent reference to a police killing of a young African-
American woman about two years before this shooting), and that they had been 
harassing her family.  She described an incident in which she said that the police 
would not let her other son Jimmy Taylor use the bathroom and arrested him for 
urinating on a tree.  The police had been to the house about the radio three or four 
times but they had never harmed her.    
Defendant testified and denied shooting Jacobs.  When Jacobs arrived, 
defendant saw that he was wearing a gun and moving fast.  Defendant got his gun 
because he was “afraid that the police had sent some crooked police” to his house 
who were “disrespectful [and] prejudiced.”  He feared the police would harm Carr 
because he knew she would not turn down the radio volume.  Carr seemed upset 
9 
and yelled, “You’re hurtin’ me.”  Defendant thought the police were hurting Carr 
when he heard her screaming, and “chills” went over his body.  Defendant was 
“furious” and “ready to go to war.” 
Defendant got his gun, ran across the porch to the railing, raised his gun, 
and asked the officers what they were doing.  When Baker saw defendant’s gun, 
Baker reached for his gun.  Defendant shot first, over Baker’s head, when he saw 
that Baker was going to shoot him.  Baker started shooting and defendant returned 
fire before going into the house.   
Stella Alvarez lived across the street and had been cooking dinner that day 
by her kitchen window.  She saw the police go up Carr’s stairs with Menzies, saw 
Menzies hurry down the stairs, and heard a male voice say to leave his mom alone.  
Alvarez then heard gunfire and saw defendant run in and out of his house, but did 
not see weapons on him. 
John, defendant’s brother, testified that defendant called him that day to 
come over because the police were harassing Carr and defendant was concerned 
because he had a driving under the influence (DUI) warrant and did not want to go 
outside.  Defendant did not recall telling John about a warrant.    
Several years before the shooting, Carr had had a mental breakdown and 
was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia.  Before moving in, defendant would 
visit Carr most days and would cook and go to the store for her.  Defendant 
explained, “She was the only one that raised me and . . . in ’63, you know, it was 
hard back then.  And she did not leave us, you know.  She kept her 
responsibilities . . . .”  Defendant worried about Carr because she became hard to 
handle after her breakdown.  Carr played the radio because it would calm her and 
make her happy.    
Defendant recounted the four previous times that the police had come to his 
house about the radio and said John had filed a complaint with the police for 
10 
harassing Carr.  Defendant felt the police were harassing his family because of 
where he grew up.  He described what he had observed of the incident concerning 
Jimmy Taylor.  Defendant later saw his mother crying and upset about the 
incident.  He knew Tyisha Miller’s mother and felt that the police had murdered 
Miller and had no regard for Black people.  John also testified that the police had 
come to the house three or four times and that he had filed a complaint with the 
police.    
Defendant could read and write “[a] little” and reached the tenth grade in 
school.  He was an electrician by trade and did plumbing and Sheetrock work and 
worked on cars.  He had worked for the Press-Enterprise newspaper as a driver 
and would count, stack, and bundle the papers.  He had a “learning problem” and 
was in special education classes.  He was in the process of purchasing the house he 
lived in and knew about escrow.   
Defendant had been knocked unconscious three times in his life, including 
in 1985 when a car ran over him.  He lost consciousness, suffered spinal injuries 
and a split skull, and had to learn to walk again.   
Dr. Joseph Wu, a physician and clinical director of the University of 
California, Irvine School of Medicine’s Brain Imaging Center, evaluated 
defendant for brain injury by administering a PET (positron emission tomography) 
scan, which shows activity in the brain.  Wu compared defendant’s scan to that of 
56 “normal” patients, meaning patients who did not have identified brain disease.  
Specifically, Wu compared defendant’s scan to an image generated from the 56 
normal patients that was also “normalized” for differences in age, gender, brain 
size, and shape.  Wu observed abnormalities in defendant’s temporal lobe, interior 
cortex, and central cortex.  The abnormalities observed would affect the ability to 
regulate emotion, to think “appropriately or correctly,” and to make abstract 
inferences.  Based on his review of the PET scan and defendant’s medical records, 
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which stated defendant had suffered head injuries when he was run over by a car 
in 1985 and assaulted in 1989, Wu opined that defendant had traumatic brain 
injury.  
Dr. Curtis Booraem, a clinical psychologist, evaluated defendant.  Booraem 
was experienced in assessing people with developmental disabilities but had never 
been court-appointed for an evaluation in a criminal case.  He met with defendant, 
administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Third Edition (WAIS-III), 
reviewed defendant’s school and medical records, and concluded defendant was a 
“high functioning” intellectually disabled person.  Defendant had a full-scale IQ 
score of 66, a verbal score of 68, and a performance score of 69.  In school, 
defendant was diagnosed with a learning disability, earned mostly D’s and F’s, 
and scored poorly on standardized and diagnostic tests.  
Booraem took a limited social history of defendant and found him to be a 
person of few words.  Defendant’s affect was flat, which is an indication of mental 
illness or brain dysfunction.  Booraem observed defendant to be emotional and 
distraught in the video of the police interview, which would cause decreased 
intellectual functioning and would cause a person to say what the interviewer 
wanted.   
4. Rebuttal Evidence 
Dr. Alan Waxman, a physician and co-chair of the department of imaging 
for Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles, reviewed Wu’s assessment.  
Waxman concluded that Wu’s method was appropriate for research but not 
diagnostics.  He criticized Wu’s methodology of “morph[ing]” the 56 images of 
normal brains to fit into the same shape for comparison, which would result in 
artificial “abnormalities” and faulty comparison, and he challenged Wu’s lack of 
validation of his method.  Waxman explained that Wu’s scanning machine, which 
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was “almost an obsolete machine,” would not have accounted for variation in skull 
thickness and would have produced a lot of image “noise.”  Two colleagues 
performed a blind comparison of defendant’s brain to the 56 normal brains and 
found defendant’s brain to be one of the more “normal” brains, with fewer 
irregularities and asymmetries.  Waxman concluded defendant’s brain was a 
“normal brain.”  Waxman did not perform any tests on defendant’s brain using his 
own brain imaging machine.    
Dr. Craig Rath, a clinical psychologist, evaluated defendant.  Rath had 
performed evaluations in over 6,500 court cases, including approximately 400 
court-appointed defense evaluations on intellectual disability, and had testified 
mostly for the defense.  Rath met with defendant three times, reviewed his records, 
and readministered the WAIS-III.  Defendant had a full-scale IQ of 78, a verbal 
quotient of 80, and a performance quotient of 79.  Rath readministered the WAIS-
III because defendant said he had not tried hard the first time.  Rath would have 
accounted for “practice effects” of retaking the test within five months but 
defendant’s areas of improvement would not have been due to test familiarity.  
According to Rath, it is not possible for an intellectually disabled individual to 
fake more aptitude than his true capacity.  Defendant scored 86 on the Vineland 
Adaptive Behavior Scales test (Vineland test), administered by Rath, and a 65 on 
the communication portion of the test.  
Based on his experience with approximately 1,000 intellectually disabled 
individuals, Rath had no doubt that defendant was not intellectually disabled.  
Defendant had a learning disability.  Rath, however, observed defendant to be 
communicative, providing detailed information, understanding the questions posed 
by Rath, and recalling his personal history with general accuracy.  Defendant 
recalled he had worked as an electrician through the temporary agency Manpower, 
at a factory assembly, and at the Press-Enterprise newspaper, where he had 
13 
managed a crew.  Defendant had performed commercial work where he would 
“wire rooms, run wires, fix switches, install[] receptacles,” and, in his own words, 
“troubleshoot[].”  He also repaired automobiles.    
Defendant demonstrated levels of abstract reasoning inconsistent with 
intellectual disability, such as explaining that we study history to learn where we 
have been, who we are, and where we are going.  Removing his clothing so that 
the police would not shoot him was another example of defendant’s abstract 
reasoning ability, which was all the more significant given the high-stress 
situation.  Defendant was able to discuss abstract concepts that he had learned 
from the Bible and could describe his cooking skills, his ability to write and mail 
letters and make long-distance phone calls, the events for which he was charged, 
world events, and card games he had played, as well as his understanding of the 
fundamentals of chess.  Defendant described daily activities of self-care and 
personal shopping, passing the written test to obtain a driver’s license, his ability 
to drive and follow directions, and his ability to engage in monetary transactions 
with the assistance of a calculator, all of which indicated higher-level functioning 
and adaptive behavior.  At age 30, defendant was able to successfully apply the 
Heimlich maneuver, which he learned in high school, on a child that he had 
observed choking in a restaurant. 
B. Intellectual Disability Phase  
  
Booraem, the sole witness to testify during the intellectual disability 
hearing, concluded defendant was “mildly” intellectually disabled.  Booraem 
explained that intellectual disability is typically ascribed to people with an IQ 
under 70 to 75, taking into consideration the standard error of measurement, along 
with deficiency in at least two areas of adaptive behavior. 
14 
Booraem concluded defendant had adaptive deficits in communication, 
academics, work, and self-direction.  Defendant was deficient in communication 
based on his score of 65 on that portion of the Vineland test.  Defendant had 
earned poor grades in school, tested at the third or fourth grade level in various 
subject areas at age 16, and had been diagnosed with a learning disability.  
Defendant was “significantly deficient” in the areas of self-direction and work 
because he had had only brief periods of employment and seemed “satisfied with 
not being employed.”   
C. Penalty Phase 
The prosecution presented evidence of defendant’s criminal activity 
involving the use or threatened use of force or violence (§ 190.3, factor (b)), and 
the impact of the incident on Baker and on the victims’ families.    
In a 1988 physical altercation initiated by a previous live-in girlfriend, 
Patricia Woodson, defendant repeatedly pushed Woodson, causing her arm to go 
through a window and requiring hospital treatment.    
In 1989, a man named Arnold Palmer, his sister Tamara, and Clinton 
Williams went to a liquor store.  Children were in the car.  Defendant, his cousin 
Dennis Smith, another adult passed out drunk, and children were in another car 
parked nearby.  An altercation developed and accounts varied as to who shot first.  
Tamara observed two shooters, Smith and another man who was not defendant.  
The other man shot at Palmer.  Palmer died from a bullet wound and Williams was 
shot in the stomach.  Smith testified that defendant was present, but he thought 
defendant was in the liquor store or in the car during the shooting.  Smith did not 
see defendant with a gun.  Freddy Williamson, who was friends with defendant, 
told a detective that defendant said he was involved in a liquor store shootout and 
15 
a bullet grazed his shoulder.  The detective visited defendant in jail and observed a 
scar on his shoulder.   
A few days after the liquor store shooting, the police arrested defendant and 
Smith during a traffic stop in Arizona for possession of a concealed firearm as 
well as a second, altered, firearm.   
In 1993, defendant robbed and assaulted Paul Spicer, who had to go to the 
hospital for a fractured wrist.    
In 1999, the police arrested defendant for carrying a concealed weapon 
after his girlfriend Melvina Crowden called the police because defendant was 
upset that she was moving out and had showed her a gun.    
In 1999, Freddy Williamson and Mario Brooks went to a house to buy 
marijuana.  According to Williamson, four males approached their vehicle, and 
someone tried to hit Brooks with an object.  Defendant might have been present.  
Someone shot Brooks.  Williamson told a detective that defendant was involved in 
the confrontation.  Another officer testified that “Eddie Phillips” told him during a 
hospital interview, while Phillips was receiving treatment for a gunshot wound, 
that defendant approached him that day while he was in a vehicle and tried to hit 
him with an object.  The officer did not know if Phillips was the same person as 
Brooks.    
Baker testified about having posttraumatic stress disorder and not returning 
to work as a police officer because of the event’s impact on him and his family.  
He believed Jacobs probably saved his life.  Baker’s wife testified about the 
impacts of the shooting on her family, their two young children, and on Baker, 
who became withdrawn, lost his optimistic and cheerful demeanor, and suffered 
from nightmares.   
Jacobs’s widow, Tammy Jacobs, testified about her grief in losing her 
husband and having to make decisions alone, and the impact Jacobs’s death had on 
16 
their daughter and on Tammy’s son from a previous relationship.  Jacobs had 
become a loving father to her son, who had since gone into a “downward spiral” 
and was in therapy and on medication.  Jacobs had been studying for his master’s 
degree.  Jacobs’s mother, Cathy Miller, testified about the grief that she and 
Jacobs’s siblings experienced; the kind, hard-working and involved son Jacobs 
was from childhood; how he aided her as a single mother; and how he had 
diligently pursued his dream to become a police officer.    
The defense presented evidence about defendant’s background and mental 
functioning.  John testified that defendant was born prematurely and was 
hospitalized for a month when he was run over by a car in 1985.  Defendant had 
trouble holding a job and had lived in his van at times.  Defendant worried about 
Carr.  The family was religious.  Defendant was a loving partner and father, 
including to a former partner’s children.  John’s wife testified that defendant was 
kind, a loving dad, and not a violent person.    
Wu testified that defendant had a brain injury that impairs a person’s ability 
to regulate emotions and respond appropriately to provocation under stress.  Dr. 
Booraem testified that defendant had the mental functioning of a 10-year-old, 
which meant that in emotional situations he tended to act in fight-or-flight mode.  
II.  DISCUSSION  
A. Competence To Stand Trial  
Citing several instances when he expressed on the record a lack of 
comprehension of certain aspects of the court proceedings, defendant contends the 
trial court erred in failing to declare a doubt, sua sponte, as to his competence to 
stand trial, and that remand is required for a retrospective competency 
determination.   
17 
“Both the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and state law prohibit the state from trying or convicting a 
criminal defendant while he or she is mentally incompetent.”  (People v. Rogers 
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 846; see § 1367, subd. (a); Drope v. Missouri (1975) 
420 U.S. 162, 172.)  “A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if [he] is unable to 
consult with [his] attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or 
lacks a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against [him].”  
(People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 624.)   
“The decision whether to order a competency hearing rests within the trial 
court’s discretion, and may be disturbed upon appeal ‘only where a doubt as to 
[mental competence] may be said to appear as a matter of law or where there is an 
abuse of discretion.’  (See People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 518 . . . .)  
When the court is presented with ‘substantial evidence of present mental 
incompetence,’ however, the defendant is ‘entitled to a section 1368 hearing as a 
matter of right.’  [Citation.]  On review, our inquiry is focused not on the 
subjective opinion of the trial judge, but rather on whether there was substantial 
evidence raising a reasonable doubt concerning the defendant’s competence to 
stand trial.  [Citation.]  . . .  A trial court reversibly errs if it fails to hold a 
competency hearing when one is required under the substantial evidence test.”  
(People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 195.)   
Defendant first points to statements he made during a pretrial hearing 
requested by the prosecution to inquire into the qualifications of retained pro bono 
counsel Mark Blankenship to try a capital case and whether defendant was making 
an informed decision as to his choice of counsel.2  During the hearing, defendant 
                                                 
2  
Apparently, Blankenship agreed to represent defendant pro bono.  We use 
the term “retained” in the sense that Blankenship’s representation was secured by 
the defendant, rather than by court appointment. 
18 
responded to the trial court’s suggestion that he listen to its review of pertinent 
case law with “I don’t understand nothin’ you sayin’, Judge. . . .  I’m not a lawyer, 
you know.  I’m listening.  I just don’t understand.”  Later, when the court asked if 
defendant wanted to continue with Blankenship’s representation, defendant 
explained, “Yes.  I’ll assure you, Judge, that, you know, there is a higher up that 
sent Mr. Blankenship to me, and he must be the one to represent me, you know, 
because there’s someone over you and that you work for.  So, I really don’t 
understand what is really going on here, anyway, you know.”  
Further discussion with the court resolved defendant’s comprehension 
difficulties.  When defendant said he was listening but did not understand, the 
court responded that it would explain in nonlegal language.  The court explained 
to defendant that it was his choice whether to proceed with Blankenship, that he 
had the right to an attorney, that the court would appoint one for him if he could 
not afford an attorney, and that the public defender’s office had many experienced 
attorneys who had handled capital cases.  The court emphasized Blankenship’s 
lack of familiarity with the criminal justice system.  The court admonished 
defendant to listen carefully, explained further that it had serious concerns about 
Blankenship’s failure to request defense investigation funds, and told defendant 
again that if he could not afford an attorney, the court would appoint a qualified, 
experienced death penalty attorney to represent him.  The trial court asked 
defendant if he understood, and defendant replied affirmatively.  The court asked 
if he still wished to proceed with Blankenship, and defendant said that he did.  
Regarding defendant’s comment that a “higher up” had sent Blankenship to 
represent defendant, and that he did not understand what was “going on here,” the 
court further explained that defendant needed to carefully consider his legal 
representation because he was facing a potential sentence of death.  Nevertheless, 
the court reassured defendant that it could not later remove Blankenship against 
19 
defendant’s wishes.  When defendant expressed confusion about Blankenship’s 
failure to request money, the court explained that money was available for the 
investigation of defendant’s defense under state law.  Defendant said that he 
understood.    
Defendant’s desire to proceed with Blankenship’s representation because a 
“higher up” had sent Blankenship did not suggest an inability to understand the 
proceedings.  On the contrary, it reflected defendant’s desire to accept 
Blankenship as his attorney and thus defendant’s ability to assist in his defense.  
Simply because, as defendant characterizes it, his comment indicated “a belief that 
his volunteer attorney was a gift from God,” it does not follow that he was not 
competent to understand the proceedings.  (See People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 
Cal.4th 856, 895 [“[R]eligion-infused comments,” without more, are not indicative 
of mental illness and do not suggest the need for a competency determination].)    
Second, defendant contends that his request for bail, despite his attorney’s 
explanation that bail was not available in capital prosecutions, was another 
indication of his incompetence.  But the fact that defendant, a nonlawyer, did not 
understand the unavailability of bail did not suggest incompetence.  Neither 
defendant’s confusion about bail nor his inability to understand the court’s 
discussion of case law was evidence of inability to understand the proceedings 
against him.  (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1364 [“ ‘technical legal 
knowledge’ ” is irrelevant for determining competency].) 
Reviewed in their entirety, defendant’s comments at the hearing support a 
finding that he understood the proceedings and could communicate how he wanted 
to try his case.  For example, defendant asked the court, “You, the Judge, is going 
to be doing this trial, too, right?”  After the judge’s affirmative response, he asked 
further, “They not gonna change you, right?”  When the court responded 
affirmatively again, defendant stated, “Well, I’m satisfied.”  Defendant’s questions 
20 
and comments showed that he could discuss his confusion with the court and 
express his concerns, and thus showed that he was able “ ‘to conduct his own 
defense in a rational manner.’ ”  (People v. Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at 
p. 515.)    
As further evidence of incompetence, defendant next points to his trial 
testimony that he “somewhat” understood what was happening at trial that day, 
that he could read and write a “little bit,” and that he did not understand what he 
was reading at the jail law library.  We have reviewed defendant’s testimony at 
trial and cannot conclude that defendant lacked understanding of the proceedings.  
Defendant answered questions coherently.  On direct examination, he explained 
his protective relationship towards his mother and his family’s negative 
experiences with law enforcement, and gave his account of what happened on the 
day of the shooting.  On cross-examination, he was able to adhere to his version of 
events despite persistent questioning from the prosecutor.  Similarly, he was able 
to appropriately state when he did not understand a question.  Defendant “testified, 
in a completely rational manner, in his own defense.”  (People v. Rundle (2008) 
43 Cal.4th 76, 180.)  
Finally, defendant notes that defense evidence showed he had an IQ score 
of 66 and a verbal comprehension index score of 61.  The prosecution expert 
testified defendant’s full-scale IQ score was 78 and his verbal quotient was 80.  As 
we have previously explained, the “evidence, which addressed defendant’s alleged 
intellectual disability, did not pertain to the question of competence to stand trial.  
Although a defendant’s incompetence to stand trial might, in some cases, be 
inferred from evidence of severe intellectual disability, the . . . evidence of 
possible incompetence presented here was not so substantial as to deprive the trial 
court of discretion.  Therefore, we defer to the trial court, which heard 
the . . . evidence, observed defendant and the witnesses, and did not form a doubt 
21 
about defendant’s mental competence.”  (People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 
446, 467.)    
We therefore see no due process or statutory error resulting from the 
absence of a competency hearing.  For these reasons, we also reject defendant’s 
claim of violation of his other federal constitutional rights.3 
B. Attorney Representation Issues 
Attorney Mark Blankenship substituted in for the public defender as 
defendant’s retained pro bono counsel a few days after defendant’s arrest.  
Defendant raises a set of contentions related to asserted deficiencies in 
Blankenship’s representation and his potential conflicts of interest.  First, he 
contends the trial court erred in failing to remove Blankenship for incompetence 
and in failing to ensure that defendant had made a knowing and intelligent waiver 
of his right to effective assistance of counsel with respect to his decision to 
continue with Blankenship as his counsel.  Next, he claims the trial court erred in 
misleading Blankenship regarding the requirements for appointment of cocounsel 
in a capital case and that Blankenship was ineffective for failing to request 
appointment of cocounsel.  Finally, defendant contends his waivers of his rights to 
conflict-free counsel with respect to Blankenship’s prior representation of two 
prosecution witnesses were not knowing, intelligent and voluntary.    
                                                 
3  
“With respect to this and other claims on appeal, defendant contends that 
the asserted error also violated various of his constitutional rights.  The 
constitutional claims do not invoke [different] facts or legal standards . . . but 
merely assert that the alleged errors were also constitutional violations.  Because 
we find no error, we necessarily also find no constitutional violation.  
Accordingly, we provide no separate constitutional discussion.”  (People v. Avila 
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 496, 513, fn. 3.) 
22 
1. Asserted Failure To Remove Blankenship for Incompetence and 
To Make Adequate Inquiry into Defendant’s Choice of Counsel 
Defendant contends the trial court failed to intervene and remove 
Blankenship for incompetence.  Relatedly, defendant challenges the adequacy of 
the trial court’s inquiry into defendant’s choice of Blankenship as counsel.  We 
review the pertinent proceedings below.    
a. Factual Background  
i. Prosecution’s Motion and the Ensuing Hearing on 
Blankenship’s Qualifications for Capital Litigation 
and on Defendant’s Choice of Counsel 
In August 2001, about a month before trial, the prosecutor moved for a 
court inquiry into Blankenship’s qualifications to try a capital case, and for an 
inquiry into whether defendant was making an informed choice regarding his 
retention of Blankenship, who was representing him pro bono, and if necessary to 
obtain a waiver from defendant that he wished to proceed with Blankenship’s 
representation despite being informed that Blankenship had previously been 
suspended from the practice of law.  The State Bar had previously suspended 
Blankenship from the practice of law for incompetence and he was serving a five-
year probation.    
At the hearing in September, Blankenship described his educational 
background and explained that he had handled “a variety of criminal trials” and “a 
strong handful of civil trials.”  The court asked him several questions about his 
trial preparation.  Regarding whether he had considered filing a motion to set aside 
the indictment, Blankenship explained, “I would just as soon take my chances with 
the jury as opposed to outlining a series of evidentiary presentations which, to me, 
are tantamount to choreographing the strategy we intend to utilize at the trial 
level.”  Regarding change of venue, Blankenship believed defendant would get “a 
better trial in his own community,” which was “suffering from racial strife when it 
23 
comes to minorities and law enforcement.”  Blankenship provided similar 
explanations regarding other motions he declined to file.    
In reliance on our decision in Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 
547, the trial court decided not to remove Blankenship, concluding he had “set 
forth in an articulate fashion and demonstrate[d] clearly that [he had] considered 
these issues” and made strategic decisions after consultation with defendant.    
The court explained to defendant two areas of concern.  First, with a month 
remaining before trial, Blankenship had done little penalty phase investigation.  
Second, Blankenship had not applied for indigent defense funds.  Blankenship 
responded he needed more time to prepare.   
The court informed defendant that he had the right to representation by an 
attorney at no cost, and that the Riverside County Public Defender’s Office had 
death penalty experienced attorneys.  The court told defendant to “listen to me 
carefully” because it had “very, very serious concerns” that Blankenship had not 
sought defense funds.  The court repeated, “If you cannot afford to hire an 
attorney, I will appoint an experienced death penalty qualified attorney to 
represent you.”  Defendant said that he understood.    
As previously noted, defendant told the court, “I’ll assure you, Judge, that, 
you know, there is a higher up that sent Mr. Blankenship to me, and he must be the 
one to represent me, you know, because there’s someone over you and that you 
work for.  So, I really don’t understand what is really going on here, anyway, you 
know.”  The court explained that if the jury found just one of the special 
circumstances true, defendant would die in prison whether by a life sentence or by 
the death penalty.  The court cautioned, “So it is in your best interest that you 
consider very carefully your representation in this matter.”  The court explained 
that it was defendant’s right to choose Blankenship, and the court would not 
interfere with defendant’s decision.  Defendant responded, “You tellin’ me that’s 
24 
my decision, but then later on down in trial, you’s tellin’ me that you have the 
power to say that this man might not be competent to represent me.”  The court 
explained it would not remove Blankenship.  Blankenship interjected, “Your 
Honor, Mr. Woodruff has said—and I know Mr. Woodruff fairly well.  He said 
that he chooses me as his counsel, and that he said that in his mind it’s based on 
his own feelings and beliefs.”  Defendant agreed.  The prosecutor informed 
defendant that Blankenship’s suspension was for incompetence.    
The trial court verified that defendant understood that defense funding was 
available and that a well-trained death penalty lawyer would have applied for 
funds.  The court explained again, “I want you to understand, because ultimately 
your life is the one that’s on the line here, this Court, me, I will, if you ask me to, I 
will appoint an attorney to represent you for free, who is experienced in this type 
of defense, a person who has handled death penalty cases in the past and who is 
intimately familiar with all of the requirements involved in a death penalty case, 
both in terms of investigation, preparation, the interviewing of witnesses, the 
conducting of the trial, all the way from jury selection through the penalty phase.  
And I will do that if you ask me to.   
“If you don’t ask me to, that’s fine.  If you want to proceed with Mr. 
Blankenship, knowing of the concern that I have with respect to his 
experience . . . .  And as Mr. Blankenship has readily acknowledged, his 
background in criminal law is not extensive.  He has had some victories, both in 
San Diego County and this county, but none of those cases even approach the 
gravity or seriousness of the case involving you.” 
Defendant indicated that he understood.  The court stated again, “Now, 
with that in mind, is it your decision, at least at this point, to continue to proceed 
with Mr. Blankenship representing you?”  Defendant responded affirmatively.  
25 
The trial court vacated the impending trial date, electing to “take a wait-and-see 
approach” and to monitor defense counsel’s progress.   
ii. Further Hearings Indicating Blankenship’s Lack of 
Preparedness, Defendant’s Affirmance of 
Blankenship as Counsel of Choice, and the Trial 
Court’s Efforts To Ensure Adequate Defense 
At trial readiness conferences in March 2002, Blankenship’s lack of 
preparedness again became evident.  The prosecution had not received any defense 
discovery requests with two weeks remaining before the new trial date.  
Blankenship needed additional time to procure a ballistics expert, and he also had 
not filed a Pitchess motion discussed several months before.  Of most concern, 
Blankenship had not yet obtained a psychological evaluation of defendant.  
Despite Blankenship’s reassurance, the court determined it would have to 
postpone the trial by several more weeks and dismiss the 183 jurors who had been 
time-qualified during two days of jury selection.    
The court expressed concern about potentially sentencing to death someone 
whose trial counsel was unprepared and decided to delay the trial to make sure the 
defense had sufficient time to prepare.  It explained to Blankenship, “I admire 
your zealousness and your desire to defend this man, . . . but I think you’re in over 
your head here.”   
Blankenship responded, “My position is that my tactical decisions through 
the course of this trial regarding the protection of my client and the promotion and 
preservation of the truth, those decisions that I’ve made, they may not be perfect 
and they may be different than what you would do or different than what 
[prosecutor] Soccio would do . . . .”   
The court noted that the defense “probably should” have filed the following 
motions:  a motion attacking the makeup of the grand jury; a motion to challenge 
the sufficiency of the grand jury testimony, particularly with respect to one of the 
26 
special circumstance allegations; and a motion for change of venue.  Blankenship 
responded that motions that a court would likely deny are “an exercise in futility.”   
The prosecutor asked the court to again take a waiver from defendant 
because of the “appearance of ineffective assistance” and asked the court to 
appoint experienced counsel to consult with Blankenship and defendant.    
The court asked defendant, “Mr. Woodruff, are you comfortable with the 
way your case is being handled thus far?”  Defendant responded, “Yes.”  The 
court determined it would not inquire of defendant at the length it had done 
previously, stating:  “Mr. Woodruff has made, in my estimation, a sound and 
informed decision to continue on with counsel of his choice, and I cannot conclude 
that there has been ineffective assistance at this point.” 
The court concluded, “There’s no question in my mind that the 
representation being provided thus far to Mr. Woodruff is zealous and, thus far, 
within the bounds of the law.”  The court stated further, “In examining the history 
of this case, the Court feels that there may well be sound, tactical reasons behind 
the failure to pursue certain motions, such as those I referred to earlier this 
morning. . . .  All of these, in my opinion, had such motions been brought they 
would have been denied.   
“And taking Mr. Blankenship at his word, he may very well have had a 
sound, tactical reason and may have concluded legally . . . that such motions 
would have been fruitless.”  The court noted, however, that there was “no sound, 
tactical” reason for failing to make a Pitchess motion and “strongly suggest[ed]” 
that Blankenship do so.  Blankenship agreed and the court set a hearing date.    
Although Blankenship filed the Pitchess motion, the trial court found it to 
be defective, and after providing several opportunities, denied the final motion for 
failure to cure the defect.  The court concluded that Blankenship’s performance, 
27 
while poor, did not rise to the level of “flagrant ineffective assistance,” but that if 
it were to do so in the future, the court would not hesitate to remove Blankenship.    
b. Analysis 
i. No Error in Allowing Blankenship To Represent 
Defendant  
Defendant contends the trial court failed to intervene and remove 
Blankenship when the prosecutor raised doubts about Blankenship’s competence 
to provide adequate representation in defendant’s capital trial.  The trial court did 
not err.   
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel guarantees a criminal defendant the 
right to choose his own counsel when he does not need appointed counsel.  
(United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006) 548 U.S. 140, 144.)  While a defendant 
has a constitutional right to competent representation, he also has the right to 
counsel of his choice so that he may defend himself in “ ‘whatever manner he 
deems best.’ ”  (Smith v. Superior Court, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 559.)   
“California decisions in this area reflect a determination that respect for the 
dignity of the individual shall be maintained within the context of enforcing the 
criminal law, and that a reasonable accommodation of seemingly conflicting 
values shall thereby be achieved.  Thus, though it is clear that a defendant has no 
absolute right to be represented by a particular attorney, still the courts should 
make all reasonable efforts to ensure that a defendant financially able to retain an 
attorney of his own choosing can be represented by that attorney.”  (People v. 
Crovedi (1966) 65 Cal.2d 199, 207, fn. omitted.)  The erroneous deprivation of a 
defendant’s right to counsel of his choice results in automatic reversal.  (United 
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, supra, 548 U.S. at p. 150; People v. Ramirez (2006) 
39 Cal.4th 398, 422.)   
28 
In People v. Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pages 419 to 422, the defendant 
contended that the trial court erred in granting his request for substitution of 
counsel despite the court’s concerns that his two chosen counsel were unqualified 
to try a capital case.  Concluding there was no error, we explained that a trial court 
can deny a defendant counsel of his choice only if it “ ‘ “will result in significant 
prejudice to the defendant.” ’ ”  (Id. at pp. 422-423.) 
In Maxwell v. Superior Court (1982) 30 Cal.3d 606, 613, where the 
question was under what circumstances a defendant could demand deficient 
counsel, we concluded that “[w]hile … the right to chosen counsel is not absolute 
[California decisions] limit severely the judge’s discretion to intrude on 
defendant’s choice of counsel in order to eliminate potential conflicts, ensure 
adequate representation, or serve judicial convenience.”  We explained that while 
a defendant has a constitutional guarantee to effective counsel, that effectiveness is 
“linked closely to representation by counsel of choice.  When clients and lawyers 
lack rapport and mutual confidence the quality of representation may be so 
undermined as to render it an empty formality.”  (Ibid.; see Smith, supra, 
68 Cal.2d at pp. 561 [the attorney-client relationship is “particularly essential” 
when defending the client’s life].)   
In Smith, the issue concerned whether a trial court could remove an 
indigent defendant’s attorney based on “the judge’s subjective opinion that the 
attorney [was] ‘incompetent’ . . . .”  (Smith, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 549.)  We 
explained that “the constitutional guarantee of the defendant’s right to counsel 
requires that his advocate . . . be free in all cases of the threat that he may be 
summarily relieved as ‘incompetent’ by the very trial judge he is duty-bound to 
attempt to convince of the rightness of his client’s cause.”  (Id. at p. 562.)  While 
“it is the duty of the trial judge to protect the defendant’s right to a counsel who is 
effective . . . in discharging that duty the judge must be on his guard neither to 
29 
infringe upon the defendant’s right to counsel of his choice, nor to compromise the 
independence of the bar.”  (Id. at p. 559.)   
We explained that a trial court has several measures available “when it 
appears to him that a defense counsel is making serious mistakes to his client’s 
prejudice.”  (Smith, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 560.)  The “judge may intervene, at least 
within reasonable limits,” such as by “controlling the scope of examination, 
questioning witnesses himself, making appropriate suggestions as to the items or 
order of proof, commenting on the evidence, admonishing or instructing the jury 
on his own motion, or exercising any of his other inherent powers over the 
conduct of the proceedings to insure that the defendant receives a fair trial.”  
(Ibid.)   
Nonetheless, “[w]hile we recognize that courts should exercise their power 
to remove defense counsel with great circumspection,” a trial court has a duty to 
remove counsel even over the defendant’s objection where other measures have 
failed, in cases of “ ‘obviously deficient performance’ ” such as when counsel 
refuses to participate in the trial.  (People v. McKenzie (1983) 34 Cal.3d 616, 630.) 
Here, the trial court relied on Smith in declining to relieve Blankenship.  
The court took the approach endorsed in Smith, intervening when it observed that 
Blankenship’s actions or omissions could potentially harm defendant.  For 
instance, the court provided guidance to Blankenship about applying for defense 
funds and urged him to do so, and afforded repeated opportunities and instruction 
on how to file a sufficient Pitchess motion.  The court also delayed the trial for a 
year through several continuances to allow Blankenship time to prepare.  (Cf. 
People v. Crovedi, supra, 65 Cal.2d at pp. 208-209 [court reasonably delayed trial 
by several weeks to allow a defendant to keep his retained counsel and have time 
to prepare].)  As a result, Blankenship did retain a psychologist to examine 
defendant and arranged for further testing to support the defense theory that 
30 
defendant had an intellectual disability and a brain injury.  The court also 
intervened at times during the trial, for example by admonishing the jury that it 
was not to consider a witness’s opinion as to guilt when Blankenship elicited a 
prosecution investigator’s opinion that defendant was guilty.   
Given the court’s twin duties as outlined in Smith—to protect defendant’s 
right to effective assistance as well as his right to chosen counsel (Smith, supra, 
68 Cal.2d at pp. 558-562)—and given defendant’s repeated affirmance of 
Blankenship as his choice of counsel, the court’s approach was reasonable.   
Moreover, it is evident from the record that Blankenship never relinquished 
his responsibility to represent defendant and instead actively litigated issues and 
examined witnesses on defendant’s behalf throughout the trial.  As Blankenship 
explained at the September 2001 and March 2002 hearings, his approach was not 
to rely on motions that he felt would telegraph the defense strategy, but instead to 
try the case in front of the jury and allow it to determine the strength of the 
evidence.  Blankenship’s actions throughout the trial reflected his stated strategy 
of presenting this case as a Riverside community issue involving minorities and 
law enforcement.  For example, during jury selection, Blankenship questioned 
potential jurors about their sensitivity to racial injustice and their knowledge of the 
Tyisha Miller shooting.  Blankenship’s examination of defendant and Carr at trial 
similarly demonstrated this approach by highlighting the family’s earlier 
experiences with law enforcement as well as their familiarity with the Tyisha 
Miller shooting.  
Thus, Blankenship actively defended defendant with a strategy we cannot 
say was unreasonable, given the evidence in the case and the events taking place 
in the Riverside community at the time.  “Different attorneys will pursue different 
strategies with regard to investigation and discovery, development of the theory of 
defense, selection of the jury, presentation of the witnesses, and style of witness 
31 
examination and jury argument.”  (United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, supra, 
548 U.S. at p. 150.)  We also note that Blankenship endeavored to work with the 
court to meet its concerns and the court accepted his explanations as to his actions.  
We cannot say Blankenship’s decisions rose to the level of “ ‘flagrant 
circumstances of attorney misconduct or incompetence when all other judicial 
controls have failed.’ ”  (Maxwell v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 615, 
quoting Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1975) 14 Cal.3d 678, 
697.)  Rather, Blankenship’s decisions fall into the realm of tactical choices by the 
defense with which the court could not properly interfere.  When Blankenship did 
make mistakes, such as the failure to arrange for expert evaluations in a timely 
manner, the trial court mitigated the harm by delaying the trial.   
Defendant asserts the trial court was unaware it possessed the discretion to 
remove Blankenship for incompetence.  However, the court stated just the 
opposite, acknowledging that “[t]he narrow circumstances in which removal may 
occur are flagrant attorney misconduct or incompetent attorney, incapacity, 
significant[] prejudice to the defendant, or serious circumstances that undermine 
the integrity of the judicial process or orderly administration of judicial process.”  
Aware of this discretion, however, the trial court concluded, “There’s no question 
in my mind that the representation being provided thus far to Mr. Woodruff is 
zealous and, thus far, within the bounds of the law.”  At a later hearing, the court 
said it would not hesitate to remove Blankenship if he reached a standard of 
“flagrant ineffective assistance.”    
The trial court’s “wait-and-see” approach, coupled with active intervention 
when concerns arose, struck the right balance in protecting defendant’s dual rights 
to effective assistance of counsel and to defend himself in “ ‘whatever manner he 
deems best.’ ”  (Smith, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 559.)    
32 
ii. The Inquiry into Defendant’s Choice of Counsel 
was Sufficient 
Defendant also challenges the court’s inquiry into his choice of 
Blankenship as his counsel.  Specifically, defendant contends that the trial judge 
did not make adequate inquiry “into the defendant’s comprehension of his 
constitutional rights and how defense counsel’s actions were jeopardizing them,” 
and “did not actually ask Mr. Woodruff to waive his right to effective assistance.”  
The trial court did not err.   
“[T]the right to counsel can be waived only if such waiver is knowing, 
intelligent and voluntary.”  (People v. McKenzie, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 635.)  
When posed with the claim that a defendant had “impliedly waived his right to 
effective assistance of counsel,” we explained that “ ‘The record must show, or 
there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered 
counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer.’ ”  (Id. at p. 636.)  
On the question of when a defendant may demand deficient counsel, where the 
issue concerns a conflict, we explained that when “the danger of proceeding with 
chosen counsel has been disclosed generally to defendant, he may insist on 
retaining his attorney[] if he waives the conflict knowingly and intelligently for 
purposes of the criminal trial.”  (Maxwell v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.3d at 
p. 619.)  If “an adequate waiver of defendant’s effective-assistance rights cannot 
be obtained on the record, the court must presume that he has not knowingly and 
intelligently chosen to proceed with retained counsel.  [Citation.]  The court may 
then protect the record and defendant’s right to effective assistance by requiring 
counsel’s withdrawal.”  (Id. at p. 620.)  
At the September 2001 hearing, the trial court inquired of defendant 
whether he wished to proceed with Blankenship as his attorney, urging him to 
“consider very carefully your representation,” given the possibility of a death 
33 
sentence.  The court sought to ensure that defendant was making an informed 
decision to retain Blankenship by describing its concerns about Blankenship’s 
limited experience and his failure to take certain actions in the case, and verifying 
that defendant nonetheless wished to continue with Blankenship.  The court 
discussed its concerns about Blankenship’s failure to apply for defense funds 
carefully and at length.  Defendant participated in the discussion, offering 
comments and asking questions when he did not understand, and the court 
provided further clarification.  The court also explained at length that he had the 
right to an attorney at no cost and that the court would appoint a public defender 
experienced in capital cases if defendant wished and verified that defendant 
understood.4 
Every time the court asked defendant whether he wanted to proceed with 
Blankenship as his counsel, defendant responded affirmatively, even reassuring 
the judge that Blankenship “must be the one to represent me” and obtaining 
confirmation that the court would not later override defendant’s decision.  
Defendant indicated that he understood the court’s concerns about Blankenship.  
Defendant sought further assurance from the trial judge that the judge would 
remain assigned to the case, finally telling the court, “Well, I’m satisfied.” 
Thus, the court took the time to inform defendant of his right to counsel and 
of its concerns regarding Blankenship’s lack of experience and lack of preparation, 
and cautioned defendant to think carefully about his choice of counsel given the 
serious consequences he faced.  Given that the trial court did not find Blankenship 
to be ineffective, defendant’s argument about the failure to take a “waiver” of 
effective assistance is misplaced.  In response to concerns the prosecution raised 
                                                 
4  
A few days after defendant’s arrest, the court had advised defendant of his 
right to an attorney.  Defendant asked for and was appointed a public defender that 
day. 
34 
regarding Blankenship, the court sought to affirmatively ensure that defendant was 
making an informed decision in his choice of counsel, as was his right.   
At the hearing in March 2002, when the court determined that Blankenship 
was again unprepared for trial, the court asked and received an affirmative 
response from defendant to the question, “Mr. Woodruff, are you comfortable with 
the way your case is being handled thus far?”  Concluding defendant had made “a 
sound and informed decision to continue” with Blankenship, the court reasonably 
elected not to question him to the extent it had at the September hearing; further 
inquiry could have been viewed as interference with defendant’s right to counsel 
of his choice.  “We observed in Maxwell v. Superior Court[, supra,] 30 Cal.3d [at 
p. 615,] . . . ‘[d]efendant’s confidence in his lawyer is vital to his defense.  His 
right to decide for himself who best can conduct the case must be respected 
wherever feasible.’ ”  (People v. Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 422.)   
The court again concluded Blankenship had not provided ineffective 
assistance “at this point.”  It noted areas where it had concerns about 
Blankenship’s representation of defendant, but also found that Blankenship had 
“sound, tactical reasons” for his decision not to file or pursue certain motions.  
Thus, the circumstance did not call for taking a “waiver” of effective assistance of 
counsel.   
Further, defendant’s repeated affirmative choice of Blankenship as his trial 
counsel has not prevented him from raising ineffective assistance in support of 
various claims in his appeal.  “A defendant whose request to substitute counsel is 
granted cannot complain on appeal that the trial court should have denied that 
request.  The defendant’s only contention on appeal in such circumstances can be 
that he or she was denied effective assistance of counsel.”  (People v. Ramirez, 
supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 423; see Wheat v. United States (1988) 486 U.S. 153, 162 
[“we note . . . the apparent willingness of Courts of Appeals to entertain 
35 
ineffective-assistance claims from defendants who have specifically waived the 
right to conflict-free counsel”].)   
Defendant further contends that the court erred in making no attempt to 
determine his “mental ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his rights . . . .”  
However, as noted in section II.A., ante, the record does not indicate that 
defendant was incompetent to stand trial, and nothing in his colloquy with the 
court suggests he lacked the mental capacity to make an informed decision to 
continue with Blankenship.   
Therefore, the trial court’s inquiry into defendant’s knowledge of his right 
to counsel and his decision to proceed with his chosen counsel did not fall short of 
any requirement in the circumstances.   
2. Availability of Appointment of Cocounsel    
As explained in Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424, 429, a 
trial court has discretion under section 987 to appoint cocounsel to the defense in a 
capital case.  Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion when it “misled 
the inexperienced defense attorney into thinking he had a high threshold for 
obtaining” cocounsel.  Defendant also contends Blankenship was prejudicially 
ineffective in failing to request the appointment of second counsel.    
a. Factual Background  
At a hearing in March 2001, the prosecution inquired whether Blankenship 
would request appointment of Keenan counsel since there were indications that 
defendant did not have funds for a private attorney.  The court stated that it would 
“consider anything you wish to bring to my attention.”  Keenan counsel was a 
“novel” concept to Blankenship.  The court explained, “I’m sure once you conduct 
your evaluation you’ll discover that the justification for appointing second 
counsel—or as it’s referred to, Keenan counsel, is limited to some rather narrowly 
36 
defined situations, particularly regarding the complexity of the case, the types of 
issues that will be raised during the course of the case, and various related factors.  
So once you’ve had a chance to evaluate that, by all means bring it to my 
attention.” 
When Blankenship raised the prospect of Keenan counsel at the September 
2001 hearing, the trial court noted uncertainty about whether it could appoint 
second counsel in the current situation, stating:  “Well, there’s a question in my 
mind about that.  Now, Keenan counsel, in certain circumstances, can be 
appointed, assuming the appropriate procedures regarding the request for second 
counsel are complied with.  But . . . the Keenan case itself involved appointed first 
counsel, and in virtually every situation I have seen that is the case.  Appointed 
counsel makes the request for a second appointed counsel and, you know, that’s 
how it goes. . . .  [M]y question to you, . . . very simply stated, is whether the 
Keenan case allows for appointment of second counsel in a situation where first 
counsel is not appointed but rather retained.”  The court also observed that it might 
become necessary for Blankenship to brief this question.   
Blankenship responded that he had received a lot of inquiries about offers 
to assist the defense, so he felt “certain” he would be able to bring in another 
attorney to serve pro bono.   
b. Analysis 
i. The Trial Court Did Not Discourage Defense 
Counsel from Seeking Appointment of Cocounsel   
Section 987, subdivision (d), provides that in a capital case, a trial court 
“may appoint an additional attorney as a cocounsel upon a written request of the 
first attorney appointed.  The request shall be supported by an affidavit of the first 
attorney setting forth in detail the reasons why a second attorney should be 
appointed. . . .  The court shall appoint a second attorney when it is convinced by 
37 
the reasons stated in the affidavit that the appointment is necessary to provide the 
defendant with effective representation.  If the request is denied, the court shall 
state on the record its reasons for denial of the request.”  “The initial burden . . . is 
on the defendant to present a specific factual showing as to why the appointment 
of a second attorney is necessary to his defense against the capital charges.”  
(People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 279.)  “The appointment of a second 
counsel in a capital case is not an absolute right protected by either the state or the 
federal Constitution.”  (People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 997, fn. 22.)  We 
review a decision denying the appointment of second counsel for abuse of 
discretion.  (People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 278.)   
Defendant asserts the trial court “discouraged” Blankenship from seeking 
appointment of second counsel.  On the contrary, the court stated it would 
“consider anything you wish to bring to my attention,” with regard to a Keenan 
appointment.  Moreover, in response to Blankenship’s comment that Keenan 
counsel was a “novel” concept to him, the court helpfully responded that once 
Blankenship had a chance to consider the matter, he would learn the requirements 
for the appointment of second counsel, stating generally the criteria to be “the 
complexity of the case, the types of issues that will be raised during the course of 
the case, and various related factors.”  (See Keenan v. Superior Court, supra, 
31 Cal.3d at p. 432 [When assessing the need for another attorney, the court “must 
focus on the complexity of the issues involved, keeping in mind the critical role 
that pretrial preparation may play in the eventual outcome of the prosecution.”].)  
Therefore, rather than discouraging Blankenship from applying for cocounsel, the 
court seemed to encourage him.   
Further, the statute providing for the appointment of second counsel states 
that it may be available “upon a written request of the first attorney appointed.”  
(§ 987, subd. (d).)  Thus, the trial court reasonably questioned whether it could 
38 
appoint second counsel where defendant had privately retained his attorney and 
simply suggested to Blankenship that he might need to brief the issue.  (See 
People v. Verdugo, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 278 [finding no error in the trial court’s 
denial of an application for appointment of second counsel, “[e]ven assuming 
without deciding” that the court could appoint second counsel where the first 
counsel was privately retained]; People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 954 
[noting that section 987 states that cocounsel can be appointed on the request of 
the “first attorney appointed”].)   
Moreover, since defendant never filed an application for cocounsel, as 
section 987 requires, there is no decision to review.  “ ‘[T]he trial court lacks any 
specific authority to appoint a second attorney in the absence of a request from the 
first attorney and the making of a factual record sufficient to support such an 
appointment.  To the extent that defendant’s argument is that the trial courts have 
inherent power to appoint a second attorney, no authority supporting that 
proposition is cited.’ ” (People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 667.)  
Assuming, arguendo, that the court discouraged defense counsel, counsel still had 
to apply for cocounsel to preserve the court’s decision for review.  
ii. Defense Counsel Was Not Ineffective in Failing To 
Request Cocounsel.  
Defendant also contends Blankenship rendered ineffective assistance by 
failing to apply for cocounsel.    
“[A] defendant claiming a violation of the federal constitutional right to 
effective assistance of counsel must satisfy a two-pronged showing:  that counsel’s 
performance was deficient, and that the defendant was prejudiced, that is, there is 
a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different were it not for the 
deficient performance.”  (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 888, citing 
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.)  Rarely is ineffective 
39 
assistance of counsel established on appeal since the record usually sheds no light 
on counsel’s reasons for action or inaction.  (E.g., People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 
15 Cal.4th 264, 265-268.)   
The record does not show that Blankenship provided ineffective assistance 
in failing to request appointment of second counsel.  Defendant contends “it would 
have been an abuse of discretion [for the court] not to appoint second counsel for 
Mr. Woodruff because of the inexperience of defense counsel, who was totally 
unfamiliar with capital trial procedure . . . .”  However, it was defendant’s 
repeated choice to remain with Blankenship despite the court’s warning about 
Blankenship’s lack of experience.  Thus, given defendant’s choice, Blankenship’s 
lack of experience did not provide grounds for appointment of second counsel.  
(See People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 62-64, 71-73 [rejecting capital 
defendant’s claim of abuse of discretion in denying appointment of second counsel 
where counsel retained by defendant and serving pro bono was inexperienced and 
unprepared].) 
Defendant also contends it would have been an abuse of discretion not to 
appoint second counsel given “the complexity of the issues, which included 
scientific testimony to mental retardation5 and brain injury, as well as other 
criminal acts alleged as aggravating factors at the penalty phase.”  On the contrary, 
the trial court would have been within its discretion to deny an application for 
second counsel based on this bare assertion of complexity.  “An ‘abstract 
assertion’ regarding the burden on defense counsel ‘cannot be used as a substitute 
for a showing of genuine need.’ ”   (People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 447; 
                                                 
5 
This opinion uses the term “intellectually disabled” in accordance with 
current terminology except when quoting from the source.  (See Stats. 2012, ch. 
448 [revising various statutes to replace the term “mental retardation” with the 
term “intellectual disability”].) 
40 
see People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 287 [no abuse of discretion where 
denied application for cocounsel made no “factual assertions,” instead relying 
generally on the “ ‘circumstances surrounding the case’ ”]; People v. Verdugo, 
supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 278 [application for second counsel insufficient because 
“unlike in Keenan, on which defendant relies, counsel did not state that he needed 
to interview more than 100 witnesses, that the case involved complicated scientific 
and psychiatric testimony, that trial would occur soon after counsel was appointed, 
or that other criminal cases were pending against defendant and that the 
prosecution intended to rely on evidence related to those cases here”].)   
“In any event, because the claim is presented as one of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, relief depends solely on whether counsel’s error, if any, may 
have affected the outcome.”  (People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 437.)  
Defendant does not explain how any failure to obtain cocounsel prejudiced him, 
only summarily stating, “In failing to make the request anyway, defense counsel 
provided prejudicially ineffective assistance.”  Regardless, as discussed in section 
II.B.1., ante, the trial court monitored the case and protected defendant’s rights, 
for example, by delaying the trial by several months so that Blankenship would 
have sufficient time to prepare.  The record does not suggest that a more favorable 
result was reasonably probable but for the failure to request cocounsel.    
3. Adequacy of Defendant’s Waivers of Right to Conflict-free 
Counsel   
Finally, defendant contends that the trial court erred in “solicit[ing] three 
pretrial waivers of [the] right to unconflicted counsel without showing defendant 
made [a] knowing, intelligent and voluntary choice,” and that Blankenship 
violated his duty of loyalty.  Defendant contends that Blankenship’s conflicts 
“adversely affected” his performance.  (Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980) 446 U.S. 335, 
348.)  Defendant fails to show that Blankenship’s representation was ineffective. 
41 
a. Factual Background 
Defendant waived his right to conflict-free counsel on three occasions.  
First, defendant waived the right with respect to Blankenship’s recent 
representation of his mother, Carr, on charges of misdemeanor disturbing the 
peace and resisting arrest stemming from the same event.  The court explained to 
defendant that “it is possible . . . some evidence that may have been produced 
during the course of [Carr’s] trial . . . would be in conflict, or against your best 
interests.”  Defendant indicated he understood.  The court explained further that 
defendant would have to waive any conflict of interest in Blankenship’s 
representation of his mother.  Defendant indicated he was willing to waive the 
potential conflict and that he was “satisfied with Blankenship.” 
The second and third waivers concerned Blankenship’s former 
representation of defendant’s cousin, Dennis Smith, whom the prosecution 
expected to testify at the penalty phase and potentially at the guilt phase to 
impeach defendant.  Blankenship had represented Smith on an unrelated matter 
and stated he had no confidential information that would benefit defendant.  The 
court surmised that conflict was unlikely but sought to protect both Smith’s and 
defendant’s rights.  Noting that Smith’s testimony would be incriminating to 
defendant and would potentially result in an aggravated sentence, the court 
explained at length to defendant that Blankenship would have limited ability to 
impeach Smith with Smith’s prior criminal conduct because of Smith’s right to 
attorney-client confidentiality.  The court explained, “If someone else was 
representing you, someone who had absolutely no connection with Mr. Smith over 
here, . . . that attorney . . . [could] inquire to his heart’s content about information 
that was exchanged between Mr. Smith and someone else, . . . without fear of any 
conflict of interest, without fear of any attorney-client privilege.”  Defendant 
42 
indicated that he understood and nonetheless wished to proceed with Blankenship, 
and on both occasions, waived any potential conflict of interest.    
The prosecution expected Smith to testify at the penalty phase about an 
earlier incident at a liquor store, in which he would implicate defendant in a 
shooting.  Blankenship had no confidential information about the incident.  The 
court said that the defense could question Smith about whether he had had a felony 
conviction involving moral turpitude but would disallow inquiry into the 
underlying facts of the conviction.    
b. Analysis 
A defendant’s Sixth Amendment guarantee to effective assistance of 
counsel includes the right to counsel free from conflicts of interest.  (Wood v. 
Georgia (1981) 450 U.S. 261, 271; People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 411.)  
“Conflicts of interest broadly embrace all situations in which an attorney’s loyalty 
to, or efforts on behalf of, a client are threatened by his responsibilities to another 
client . . . .”  (People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 835, citing ABA Model Rules 
Prof. Conduct, rule 1.7 and com. thereto.)  “Conflicts may also arise in situations 
in which an attorney represents a defendant in a criminal matter and currently has 
or formerly had an attorney-client relationship with a person who is a witness in 
that matter.”  (People v. Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 835.) 
Assuming without deciding that Blankenship had a conflict of interest that 
defendant did not validly waive, we do not find that his representation was 
ineffective.  A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a defendant to 
establish that counsel’s performance was deficient and that absent those 
deficiencies it is reasonably probable the outcome would have been more 
favorable to him.  “ ‘Hence, to obtain reversal of a criminal verdict, the defendant 
must demonstrate that (1) counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest that 
43 
adversely affected counsel's performance, and (2) absent counsel's deficiencies 
arising from the conflict, it is reasonably probable the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.’ ”  (People v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 65.)   
“Determining ‘whether counsel's performance was “adversely affected” . . . 
“requires an inquiry into whether counsel ‘pulled his punches,’ i.e., whether 
counsel failed to represent defendant as vigorously as he might have, had there 
been no conflict.  [Citation.]  In undertaking such an inquiry, we are . . . bound by 
the record.  But where a conflict of interest causes an attorney not to do 
something, the record may not reflect such an omission.  We must therefore 
examine the record to determine (i) whether arguments or actions omitted would 
likely have been made by counsel who did not have a conflict of interest, and (ii) 
whether there may have been a tactical reason (other than the asserted conflict of 
interest) that might have caused any such omission.”  [Citation.]’ ”  (People v. 
Rices, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 65.)   
Here, the record does not indicate that Blankenship “pulled his punches” in 
questioning either defendant’s mother or his cousin.  Although called as a 
prosecution witness, Carr’s testimony supported the defense’s case that the family 
was afraid and distrustful of the police and that defendant was afraid the police 
were hurting his mother that day.  Blankenship cross-examined Carr thoroughly on 
various topics, including earlier encounters with the police, her knowledge of the 
Tyisha Miller shooting, her fear of the police, and her recollection of the events 
that day, including her perception that Baker appeared angry and had aimed a gun 
at Claude.  Blankenship asked her repeatedly about whether she was screaming 
and crying and afraid, which would have supported defendant’s testimony that he 
reacted because he heard his mother screaming.  Carr’s testimony was therefore 
helpful to the defense, and Blankenship would not have needed to impeach Carr 
with any confidential information. 
44 
Smith testified briefly at the penalty phase about the liquor store shooting 
but, contrary to the prosecution’s expectation, he minimized defendant’s 
involvement, stating that he did not see defendant with a gun.  Thus, Blankenship 
likely realized it was not in defendant’s interest to impeach Smith, since his 
testimony indicated defendant had not been involved in the shooting.  Suggesting 
that Smith had a tendency for untruthfulness would have cast doubt on his 
testimony that defendant was not involved.  Blankenship stated in his penalty 
phase closing argument that the prosecution’s evidence at most implicated 
defendant as being present at the liquor store incident, which indicates his strategy 
was to use Smith’s testimony at face value rather than to impeach it.  Thus, there is 
nothing to suggest that Blankenship “pulled his punches” with respect to either 
witness. 
Because Blankenship’s performance was not deficient, we need not reach 
the second prong of the Strickland test, i.e., whether counsel’s performance 
affected the outcome.  Defendant offers no argument supporting the claim that 
Blankenship’s deficient performance impacted the guilt or penalty verdicts.   
Finally, defendant asserts that Blankenship labored under actual conflicts 
with respect to defendant’s six-year-old daughter as well as his brother Claude 
Carr, as evidenced by comments Blankenship made about the possibility of 
sparing defendant’s daughter from testifying as a prosecution witness and about 
potentially merging defendant’s trial with Claude’s.  An attorney labors under an 
actual conflict of interest when he “fail[s] to represent defendant as vigorously as 
he might have, had there been no conflict.”  (People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 
948.)  Based on these brief inquiries, we discern no potential for conflict.  
Blankenship did not represent defendant’s daughter or Claude.  Blankenship may 
have had tactical reasons for his queries or may have been responding to an 
instruction from defendant to spare his daughter the trauma of testifying. 
45 
C. Jury Selection Issues 
1. Exclusion of Prospective Juror Based on Written Questionnaire   
Defendant contends the trial court, over defense objection, erroneously 
excused for cause two prospective jurors, W.C. and D.K., based solely on their 
written responses to questions about their views on capital punishment.  We 
conclude the trial court erred in excusing D.K. based on his questionnaire 
responses, requiring reversal of the penalty verdict.  We thus need not reach 
defendant’s claim regarding W.C. 
The prosecution challenged for cause prospective juror D.K. based on his 
responses to the questionnaire.  The defense would not stipulate to his removal.  
The trial court denied the prosecution’s challenge, explaining, “He’s pretty strong 
here.  He doesn’t believe in the death penalty.  He rates himself a one.  He does 
state in 55-C he would consider all the evidence.  However, the reason I am not 
gonna grant your challenge at this point is his response to 53-C where he says it 
would not—Because he’s against the death penalty, his opinion would not make it 
difficult to vote for the death penalty.  He would follow the law.  So, I think that 
needs to be explored.” 
On further argument by the prosecutor, the trial court responded, “But what 
harm what do we lose if he comes in here and you question him further on this, 
and if his answers don’t change I grant the challenge for cause?”  The prosecution 
articulated the suspicion that the reason for the court’s refusal to grant the 
challenge as to D.K. was because he was African-American.  The court had 
previously stated concern “about the relatively small number of African-
Americans here.” 
Regarding his general feelings about the death penalty, D.K. wrote in his 
questionnaire, “I don’t believe in death penalty,” and on a scale of 1 to 10, circled 
1, which corresponded to being “strongly against” the death penalty.  (Circling 10 
46 
indicated being “strongly in favor of the death penalty.”)  D.K. explained, “Men 
are equals only God can make those choices.”  However, D.K. checked “no” to the 
question whether his opinion would make it difficult to vote for the death penalty 
regardless of the evidence, explaining in his own words, “I would followed the 
law.”  D.K. responded “none” to the questions asking what purpose he thought the 
death penalty served and what impressions he had of life in prison without parole 
as a punishment for murder.  On question 55, which asked whether he would 
“ALWAYS” vote for the death penalty, or “ALWAYS” vote for life without 
parole, or consider all the evidence and instructions and impose the penalty he 
personally felt appropriate, D.K. checked the last response.6 
The prosecution later filed a written motion asking the court to reconsider 
its rulings denying the prosecutor’s request to remove three prospective jurors for 
cause, including D.K., based on their written responses, reiterating the concern 
that the court’s decision was based in part on the impermissible factor of race.    
 
 
                                                 
6  
The full question read as follows:  “It is important that you have the ability 
to approach this case with an open mind and a willingness to fairly consider 
whatever evidence is presented as opposed to having such strongly held opinions 
that you would be unable to fairly consider all the evidence presented during the 
penalty phase.  [¶] There are no circumstances under which a jury is instructed by 
the court that they must return a verdict of death.  No matter what the evidence 
shows, the jury is always given the option in a penalty phase of choosing life 
without the possibility of parole.  Assuming a defendant was convicted of a special 
circumstance murder, would you: 
__ a. No matter what the evidence was, ALWAYS vote for the death penalty. 
__ b. No matter what the evidence was, ALWAYS vote for life without possibility 
of parole. 
__ c. I would consider all of the evidence and the jury instructions as provided by 
the court and impose the penalty I personally feel is appropriate.” 
47 
At the hearing on the motion, the defense asserted that the prosecution 
would have “plenty of opportunity during voir dire to determine whether or not the 
answers, indeed, were trustworthy,” and that “the word ‘believe’ and all those 
things are talked about in a vacuum.  They are talked about in advance of hearing 
and seeing evidence.  They are—they are certainly not bright lines that would 
deprive anyone of the right to serve on a jury.”  The defense explained that it 
might advance a Wheeler motion based in part on the prosecution’s challenges.7  
The prosecution acknowledged that the defense was correct about the voir dire 
process but that the court had not used the same standard in excusing for cause 
prospective jurors of different races. 
The trial court granted the motion as to W.C. and D.K., explaining it had 
reconsidered the responses and determined that “there is not even a theoretical 
possibility of evidence that would allow them to vote for the death penalty . . . .” 
The next day, the defense added that the prosecution motion did not include 
the information that D.K. had written in his questionnaire that he would follow the 
law.  The court explained that D.K.’s “statements otherwise in the questionnaire 
make it clear to me . . . that there was no reasonable possibility he would vote for 
the death penalty if placed in the position of having to do so.” 
A prospective juror may be excused for cause due to that juror’s views on 
the death penalty only when those views would “ ‘prevent or substantially impair 
the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his 
oath.’ ”  (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424.)  “ ‘Prospective jurors may 
be dismissed based on written questionnaire responses alone if the responses leave 
no doubt that their views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially 
impair the performance of their duties in accordance with the court’s instructions 
                                                 
7  
People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258; see Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 
479 U.S. 79. 
48 
and the jurors’ oath.  [Citation.]  By contrast, if a juror’s questionnaire responses 
are inconsistent and do not clearly reveal an inability to serve, the court may not 
grant a cause challenge without further questioning to clarify the juror’s views.’ ”  
(People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 863.)   
“When the trial court’s assessment of a prospective juror’s capacity to serve 
is based at least in part on the juror’s tone, demeanor, or other elements that 
cannot be reflected in the written record, its ruling is owed deference by reviewing 
courts.  [Citation.]  But no such deference is warranted when a trial court’s ruling 
on a for-cause challenge is based solely on the prospective jurors’ answers to a 
written questionnaire.  [Citation.]  In those circumstances, we review de novo the 
trial court’s dismissal of the prospective juror for cause.”  (People v. Zaragoza 
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 21, 37.)   
“[A] prospective juror may not be excluded for cause simply because his or 
her conscientious views relating to the death penalty would lead the juror to 
impose a higher threshold before concluding that the death penalty is appropriate 
or because such views would make it very difficult for the juror ever to impose the 
death penalty.  Because the California death penalty sentencing process 
contemplates that jurors will take into account their own values in determining 
whether aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors such that the death 
penalty is warranted, the circumstance that a juror’s conscientious opinions or 
beliefs concerning the death penalty would make it very difficult for the juror ever 
to impose the death penalty is not equivalent to a determination that such beliefs 
will ‘substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a juror’ . . . .”  
(People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 447.)   
Even if a juror checked the box indicating that it would be “very difficult” 
for him or her to impose the death penalty, the juror might nonetheless, “in 
response to brief follow-up questioning, persuasively demonstrate an ability to put 
49 
aside personal reservations, properly weigh and consider the aggravating and 
mitigating evidence, and make that very difficult determination concerning the 
appropriateness of a death sentence.  Such a prospective juror would not be 
substantially impaired in performing his or her duties as a juror.”  (People v. 
Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 447.)   
Reviewing the decision to remove D.K. independently, we conclude the 
trial court erred in sustaining the challenge for cause based on the juror’s written 
questionnaire responses.  Simply because he did not “believe” in the death penalty, 
it does not follow that D.K. would have been unable to “put aside personal 
reservations, properly weigh and consider the aggravating and mitigating 
evidence, and make that very difficult determination concerning the 
appropriateness of a death sentence.”  (People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at 
p. 447.)   
Despite his beliefs, D.K., in response to question 55, which asked whether 
he would always vote for the death penalty, always vote for life without parole, or 
consider all the evidence and instruction and impose the penalty he felt 
appropriate, chose the third option.  Additionally, he responded “yes” to the 
question whether, if the judge gave an instruction on the law that differed from his 
beliefs or opinions, he would follow the law as instructed by the judge.  D.K.’s 
responses thus “did not clearly demonstrate that his death penalty views would 
prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a capital juror.”  
(People v. Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 866.)  
D.K.’s responses provide little ambiguity as to his ability to set aside his 
beliefs and follow the law.  In response to the question whether his beliefs (which 
included that “only God can make those choices”) would make it difficult to vote 
for the death penalty, D.K. responded “No,” explaining, “I would follow[] the 
law.”  Thus, D.K.’s written response did not support the trial court’s conclusion.  
50 
“Those who firmly oppose the death penalty may nevertheless serve as jurors in a 
capital case as long as they state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set 
aside their own beliefs and follow the law.”  (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 
491, 529.)  Here, in his own words, D.K. expressly stated that he would “follow[] 
the law.”  These views, including the pledge to follow the law, do not demonstrate 
a substantial impairment in his ability to serve as a juror.   
The parties could have, and should have, examined D.K.’s responses 
further through voir dire.  As the trial court noted in its initial decision to deny the 
challenge for cause, D.K.’s response that he would follow the law “need[ed] to be 
explored” and there was nothing to be lost by questioning him in voir dire.    
“We simply do not know how [this] potential juror[] would have responded 
to appropriate clarifying questions posed to [him] by the trial court.  Had the trial 
court conducted a follow-up examination of [D.K.] and thereafter determined (in 
light of the questionnaire responses, oral responses, and its own assessment of 
demeanor and credibility) that the prospective juror’s views would substantially 
impair the performance of his . . . duties as a juror in this case, the court’s 
determination would have been entitled to deference.”  (People v. Stewart, supra, 
33 Cal.4th at pp. 450-451.)   
“[U]nder existing United States Supreme Court precedent, the erroneous 
excusal of a prospective juror for cause based on that person’s views concerning 
the death penalty automatically compels the reversal of the penalty phase without 
any inquiry as to whether the error actually prejudiced defendant’s penalty 
determination.”  (People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 783, citing Gray v. 
Mississippi (1987) 481 U.S. 648.)  Accordingly, “[u]nder compulsion of Gray, we 
reverse defendant’s penalty phase verdict.”  (Riccardi, at p. 783) 
51 
2. Assertedly Biased Juror 
 
We address defendant’s remaining claims of error concerning jury selection 
since they may affect the validity of the guilt verdict.  The court seated Juror No. 3 
over the prosecutor’s challenge for cause.  Based on Juror No. 3’s responses in his 
written questionnaire and in voir dire, defendant asserts that the juror was biased, 
and thus the trial court erred in seating him and defense counsel was ineffective 
for failing to make a for-cause challenge and instead opposing it.  Regardless of 
how defendant frames the claim, we find no error.8 
Juror No. 3, a 31-year-old African-American man, stated in his jury 
questionnaire that the nature of the charges would make it “[d]ifficult to be fair” 
because his mother and uncle were peace officers.  However, he stated that he 
would not credit the testimony of a witness simply because the witness is a law 
enforcement officer.  Juror No. 3 stated he would follow the law where it differed 
from his opinions and would require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  In his other responses, Juror No. 3 indicated he could listen to 
fellow jurors and receive the benefit of their thinking.  Juror No. 3, a former 
Marine, had grown up in Alabama.    
Both parties questioned Juror No. 3 at voir dire.  The juror explained that 
his mother’s status as a correctional officer, and the subject matter of the case, 
would cause him to “be strongly on the side of [defendant] being guilty.”  
However, he stated he would “evaluate options before making conclusions,” and 
affirmed his duty to be “open-minded and listen[] to all the evidence.”  The juror 
stated more than once that he would “try to be fair and impartial” but expressed 
uncertainty about his ability to do so.  Defense counsel briefly questioned Juror 
No. 3 about growing up in Alabama.    
                                                 
8  
Because we conclude there is reversible Witt error, we do not review 
defendant’s contention that Juror No. 3 had penalty bias. 
52 
The prosecution “hesitatingly” submitted Juror No. 3 for challenge to “see 
if the court thought he could or could not be fair” to the defense.  Defense counsel 
opposed the challenge, citing the juror’s demeanor and race, and concluding for 
“tactical reasons” that the juror was “perfectly accessible to my opinion, and he 
has not answered in a way that he could not be fair.”  The trial court denied the 
challenge, noting it was not considering the juror’s race, and concluding Juror No. 
3’s responses, “albeit somewhat hesitatingly, indicated that he would do his best to 
be fair in both the guilt and penalty phases.”   
Defendant does not meet his burden of demonstrating that his counsel’s 
performance was deficient.  Given the defense strategy of showing that defendant 
and his family distrusted the police due to their experiences growing up in 
Mississippi during the civil rights movement, it would have been reasonable for 
defense counsel to conclude that Juror No. 3, who grew up in Alabama, would 
have been “accessible,” as counsel described, and open to hearing defendant’s side 
of the case.  “[A] reviewing court will reverse a conviction based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if there is affirmative evidence that 
counsel had ‘ “ ‘no rational tactical purpose’ ” ’ for an action or omission.”  
(People v. Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 198.)   
Further, the record supports the trial court’s finding that Juror No. 3 could 
be impartial.  Although the juror expressed concern about his ability to be fair 
because he had relatives in law enforcement, he repeatedly stated that he would try 
to be fair and impartial.  We credit the trial court’s conclusion, based on observing 
the juror firsthand, that he had the ability to serve on defendant’s trial.  “ ‘ “In 
many cases, a prospective juror’s responses to questions on voir dire will be 
halting, equivocal, or even conflicting.  Given the juror’s probable unfamiliarity 
with the complexity of the law, coupled with the stress and anxiety of being a 
prospective juror in a capital case, such equivocation should be expected.  Under 
53 
such circumstances, we defer to the trial court’s evaluation of a prospective juror’s 
state of mind, and such evaluation is binding on appellate courts.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 123.)  Defendant thus cannot show prejudice or that 
the court erred.   
Therefore, defendant’s claims fail.   
3. Denial of Two Batson/Wheeler Motions 
Defendant, an African-American, contends that the trial court erroneously 
denied two motions challenging the prosecution’s peremptory challenges to three 
African-American prospective jurors.  (Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. 79; 
People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258.)  On the first motion, the court found no 
prima facie showing of discrimination in the removal of L.T. and S.J.  Defendant 
disputes the finding with respect to S.J.  On the second motion, challenging the 
removal of M.M., defendant contests the court’s conclusion that the prosecutor’s 
proffered race-neutral reasons were credible.  We find no error. 
a. First Motion  
i. Background   
When the court heard defendant’s first motion, 36 randomly selected jurors 
had been questioned.  The court excused seven jurors for hardship or cause, 
leaving 29 jurors available for peremptory challenge, including three African-
Americans, L.T., S.J., and Juror No. 3.  The prosecutor exercised nine peremptory 
challenges; he used his first and sixth challenges on jurors L.T. and S.J., 
respectively.  At one point, the prosecutor accepted the jury as composed with 
Juror No. 3.    
Before voir dire, prospective jurors filled out a 20-page questionnaire on 
their views and background.  Prospective juror S.J. felt “fine” about law 
enforcement and the judicial system.  He responded affirmatively to several 
54 
questions about whether he could be a fair and impartial juror regarding race.  
There was nothing about the charges that would affect his ability to be fair and 
impartial, he would follow the law as instructed, he would not credit more or less a 
police officer witness, he could discuss his thinking about the case and listen to 
other jurors, and he could be fair to both sides because he had an “open mind.”  
S.J. had “no feeling” about the death penalty, circled 6 out of 10 on whether he 
was in favor of it, and explained that its purpose was “an eye for an eye.” 
During defense voir dire, when asked if he wanted to sit on this jury, S.J. 
responded, “I look at it as, if I have to, I have to.”  When asked again if he were 
willing to sit on the jury and be fair, S.J. replied, “Yes, if I have to.”  In response 
to the prosecutor’s question about whether he was a “very quiet man,” S.J. said 
“sometimes.”  He indicated he was not a “very private man.”  When the prosecutor 
pressed him about having no opinion on the death penalty, S.J. explained, “That 
means that I believe that in some cases a death penalty is justified and in some 
case I have to look at the case.”  S.J. affirmed that the death penalty could be used 
sometimes, stating, “Yeah, I would think I was more neutral.  If I have to make a 
decision, I can make that decision.”  S.J. indicated he was not “easily fooled.” 
The trial court found the defense had failed to make a prima facie showing 
that the prosecutor had exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race, 
commenting that S.J.’s “initial remarks [were that jury duty] is like having a root 
canal.  He clearly didn’t want to be here.  Would be here if forced to stay, but his 
whole attitude and reluctance, the air about him suggests that a peremptory 
challenge was appropriate.”  However, the court appears to have at least partially 
confused S.J. with another prospective juror, D.B., who made the comment 
likening jury duty to a root canal.  The court also noted that the prosecutor had 
accepted the panel when it included Juror No. 3.  
55 
Before the jury was sworn, the prosecutor peremptorily challenged a total 
of 17 out of 47 jurors available for challenge after for cause and hardship excusals, 
including challenges to three of four African-American jurors (L.T., S.J., M.M., 
Juror No. 3).  In alternate jury selection, the prosecutor peremptorily challenged 
three out of 13 jurors, including a challenge to one of two available African-
American jurors (challenging juror D.B. and accepting Alternate Juror No. 3).  
ii. Analysis 
“ ‘Both the federal and state Constitutions prohibit any advocate’s use of 
peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors based on race.  [Citations.]  
Doing so violates both the equal protection clause of the United States 
Constitution and the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-
section of the community under article I, section 16 of the California 
Constitution.’  [Citation.] 
“ ‘There is a rebuttable presumption that a peremptory challenge is being 
exercised properly, and the burden is on the opposing party to demonstrate 
impermissible discrimination.’  [Citation.]  ‘A three-step procedure applies at trial 
when a defendant alleges discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.  First, the 
defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecution exercised a 
challenge based on impermissible criteria.  Second, if the trial court finds a prima 
facie case, then the prosecution must offer nondiscriminatory reasons for the 
challenge.  Third, the trial court must determine whether the prosecution’s offered 
justification is credible and whether, in light of all relevant circumstances, the 
defendant has shown purposeful race discrimination.  [Citation.]  “The ultimate 
burden of persuasion regarding [discriminatory] motivation rests with, and never 
shifts from, the [defendant].” ’ ”  (People v. Parker (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1184, 1210-
1211.)   
56 
“Because the trial predated the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, and exactly what standard the lower 
court used in finding no prima facie case is unclear, ‘we review the record 
independently to “apply the high court’s standard and resolve the legal question 
whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror” on a 
prohibited discriminatory basis.’ ”  (People v. Parker, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 
pp. 1211-1212.) 
“Although we examine the entire record when conducting our 
review, certain types of evidence are especially relevant.  These include whether a 
party has struck most or all of the members of the venire from an identified group, 
whether a party has used a disproportionate number of strikes against members of 
that group, whether the party has engaged those prospective jurors in only 
desultory voir dire, whether the defendant is a member of that group, and whether 
the victim is a member of the group to which a majority of remaining jurors 
belong.  [Citation.]  We may also consider nondiscriminatory reasons for the 
peremptory strike that ‘necessarily dispel any inference of bias,’ so long as those 
reasons are apparent from and clearly established in the record.”  (People v. 
Reed (2018) 4 Cal.5th 989, 999-1000.) 
Defendant asserted in each of his Wheeler motions that the prosecutor’s 
lengthier voir dire of African-American jurors, and his effort to establish bias, 
revealed his race-based jury selection, especially when contrasted with his effort to 
rehabilitate non-African-American jurors.  He asserts the prosecutor’s comment 
that he was “forced to take jurors simply because of their race” reveals his 
discriminatory intent.  
Defendant provides no examples in support of his general claim about the 
prosecutor’s style of voir dire, and the record does not support his claim.  The 
prosecutor’s comment that he was forced to accept jurors on the basis of race was 
57 
in response to an earlier comment by the trial court in which it expressed 
reluctance to dismiss African-American jurors because of the small number of 
available African-American jurors, and thus was a comment on the court’s 
approach to jury selection.    
The trial court found S.J. did not want to be a juror based on his demeanor, 
which would have been a permissible basis for excusal.  (E.g., People v. Parker, 
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1213.)  S.J.’s response to the two questions about whether he 
was willing to sit on the jury was, “if I have to,” which suggests he “didn’t want to 
be here” as the court noted.    
However, as defendant observes on appeal, the trial court erroneously 
attributed to S.J. a comment likening jury service to a root canal.  It is unlikely, 
however, that the trial court completely confused the two jurors given that S.J. was 
an African-American male and D.B. was a Caucasian female (peremptorily 
challenged by defendant).  As noted above, the trial court had stated its concern 
about retaining African-American jurors in the pool, which could be seen, for 
example, in the court’s effort to rehabilitate L.T. through its own voir dire of L.T. 
when she had stated that she would have difficulty with the case.  The more likely 
explanation for the apparent confusion, therefore, is that both jurors appeared 
reluctant to serve and the trial court correctly surmised S.J. “didn’t want to be 
here” based on his demeanor, but misremembered which juror made the specific 
comment.  Notably, in his follow-up response in the hearing below, defense 
counsel did not address the court’s observation about S.J.’s demeanor, instead 
acknowledging the low number of African-Americans excluded and a lack of 
pattern in the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges, but reiterating his assertion that 
the prosecutor had questioned African-American jurors at length to establish bias.   
The trial court also noted the prosecutor’s acceptance of Juror No. 3 on the 
panel.  (See People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 906 [while not dispositive, 
58 
acceptance of a member of the group indicates prosecutor’s good faith].)  With 
respect to both Wheeler motions, defendant challenges the significance of this fact 
because Juror No. 3 had expressed pro-prosecution sentiments as described in 
section II.C.2, ante.  The prosecutor had previously made a for-cause challenge to 
Juror No. 3, for the reason that the juror had expressed bias in favor of the 
prosecution, explaining in response to defense objection to the challenge, that he 
had similarly stipulated to the excusal of other jurors who had expressed pro-
prosecution views out of a duty to ensure that defendant had a fair trial, which is 
supported by the record.  From these circumstances, it is difficult to draw an 
inference about the prosecutor’s acceptance of Juror No. 3 on the panel.  Even if 
we agreed that the prosecutor accepted Juror No. 3 only because of his pro-
prosecution views, that circumstance would simply show that he was exercising 
his challenges based on which jurors would be most favorable for him and not for 
racial reasons.   
Turning to jury statistics, prior to the court’s ruling on defendant’s motion, 
“[w]hile the prosecutor did excuse two out of three [African-Americans], the small 
absolute size of this sample makes drawing an inference of discrimination from 
this fact alone impossible.”  (People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 597-598, fn. 
omitted.)  Neither does the prosecutor’s use of two out of nine peremptory 
challenges against African-American jurors suggest a disproportionate use of 
peremptory challenges.  (See, e.g., People v. Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 436 
[use of two of eight peremptory challenges against Hispanic jurors was 
insignificant].)  While the percentage of African-American jurors challenged (2 
out of 3) was much higher than the percentage of African-American jurors 
available for challenge (3 out of 29), “because of the small sample size the 
disparity carries relatively little information.”  (People v. Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at 
pp. 598, fn. 4.)  Before the jury was sworn, the prosecutor had struck three out of 
59 
four available African-American jurors in the main jury pool and a total of four 
out of six available jurors with the inclusion of the alternate jury selection.  The 
prosecutor used 3 out of his 17 challenges against African-American jurors in the 
main jury selection and 4 out of 20 challenges in the entire jury selection.  The 
final jury and the alternate jury each included one African-American juror (Juror 
No. 3 and Alternate Juror No. 3).   
Any inference of bias is “ ‘necessarily dispel[led]’ ” because 
nondiscriminatory reasons for the prosecutor’s peremptory strikes of L.T., M.M., 
and D.B. “are apparent from and clearly established in the record.”  (People v. 
Reed, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1000.)  L.T.’s responses both in her written 
questionnaire and in her voir dire, and as noted by the prosecutor during two 
earlier for cause challenges of her, revealed significant race-neutral reasons for 
L.T.’s challenge, namely, that she perceived a conflict between her religious 
beliefs and the death penalty, and had felt upset about an incident where she was a 
victim and believed the Riverside Police Department had made an inadequate 
investigation.  L.T. had also expressed deep reluctance to serve on a jury where 
she would have to view autopsy photos.  As discussed in section II.C.3.b, post, the 
record supports the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral reason for peremptorily 
challenging M.M.  As to the prosecutor’s challenge to D.B. during alternate jury 
selection, the trial court denied defendant’s third Wheeler motion at the first stage, 
noting that D.B. had served on a hung jury, which defendant has not challenged on 
appeal.  The prosecutor had questioned D.B. about her service on the hung jury.  
Likewise, the prosecutor’s voir dire of S.J. specifically addressed his questionnaire 
responses and was not desultory.  (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 698-
699.)   
Defendant also asserts that “the prosecutor attempted to exclude the first 
eight Black jurors to appear in the jury box.”  Defendant does not identify any 
60 
specific jurors.  While a prosecutor’s specious for-cause challenge to other jurors 
of the same race might support an inference of race-based discrimination (People 
v. Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 437), none appears here.   
Defendant also requests that we compare S.J.’s questionnaire responses to 
those of Juror Nos. 7 and 12, both non-African-American, asserting that all three 
jurors “were males in their 50s, with service/repair jobs for major companies” and 
all three circled “6” on the death penalty scale.  “We have often declined to 
undertake comparative juror analysis at step one of the Batson/Wheeler 
framework.  [Citations.]  Nonetheless, such analysis can be helpful in certain 
circumstances to assess whether a defendant established a prima facie case of 
bias.”  (People v. Reed, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1002.)  In his questionnaire, Juror 
No. 7 was more expressive than S.J. in explaining his opinions.  Neither juror’s 
voir dire comments indicated a reluctance to serve, but neither was asked about it.  
It is difficult to form a conclusion without having observed the demeanor of the 
three jurors. 
S.J.’s affirmative response to several questions on the jury questionnaire 
indicated that he could be fair and impartial, and the trial court, in concluding that 
S.J. did not want to be a juror, erroneously attributed to him the comments made 
by another juror likening jury service to a root canal.  However, it is difficult to 
make a prima facie showing from the statistics of the peremptory challenges and 
the record reveals race-neutral reasons for the prosecutor’s challenges.  Moreover, 
S.J.’s comment that he would serve as a juror if required is consistent with the trial 
court’s finding that S.J.’s demeanor indicated he did not want to be a juror.  In his 
response below, defendant did not address the court’s comment that S.J. “[w]ould 
be here if forced to stay, but his whole attitude and reluctance, the air about him” 
indicated that he did not want to perform jury duty.  Defendant therefore fails to 
show that “the totality of relevant circumstances gives rise to an inference of 
61 
discriminatory purpose” in the prosecutor’s challenge of S.J.  (People v. Parker, 
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1213.)   
b. Second Wheeler Motion  
i. Background   
Defendant’s second Wheeler motion concerned the prosecutor’s fifteenth 
peremptory challenge, to M.M.  M.M. had a master’s degree in sociology and had 
been working at the Los Angeles County Department of Public Social Services for 
eight years as an administrator managing assistance programs and conducting 
research in the jobs training program.  M.M. stated he would be capable of voting 
for the death penalty after hearing the facts.  He affirmed that he would not hold 
the prosecutor to a higher standard than the law required.  M.M. was born in 
Africa and had lived in the United States for 21 years, and explained that his 
master’s thesis was about colonial education, which was, “[t]o put it simply, just a 
brainwash to allow the education of Africa.”  M.M. was “neutral” on the death 
penalty, denied having “sociological problems” with it, concluded it was “just . . . 
a form of punishment,” and “respect[ed] different views” about it.  M.M. would be 
able to vote for the death penalty even after seeing defendant in the courtroom for 
several weeks.   
In response to the Wheeler motion, the prosecutor explained that he 
excused M.M. because his dissertation had been about colonization, which M.M. 
“found . . . to be a brainwashing to exploit his country, I guess.”  The prosecutor 
had “grave concerns” about anyone who worked or had training in social services, 
citing M.M.’s master’s degree in sociology and career at a social services agency.  
The prosecutor was familiar with “the social services work mindset” and the 
employment services division that employed M.M., and concluded M.M. “would 
62 
not make a good juror.”  During his voir dire of M.M., the prosecutor had stated 
that people with a sociology degree often “want to help others.”   
The trial court found defense counsel had made a prima facie showing of 
race-based jury selection but credited the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons for 
excusing M.M.  The court explained that in his experience both as a judge and a 
former prosecutor, “prosecutors generally will excuse people with social welfare 
type of backgrounds.  And the reason for that—again, this is based on my 
observations and personal experience—is that they are very much inclined to hold 
the prosecution to a higher standard than that required by the law.  In other words, 
something more than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”  The court also observed 
that Juror No. 3 was still on the jury.  
ii. Analysis 
At the third step of Batson analysis, after a prosecutor has posited a race-
neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge, “the trial court must decide 
whether the movant has proven purposeful discrimination.  [Citation.]  In order to 
prevail, the movant must show it was ‘ “more likely than not that the challenge 
was improperly motivated.” ’  [Citation.]  This portion of the Batson/Wheeler 
inquiry focuses on the subjective genuineness of the reason, not the objective 
reasonableness.  [Citation.]  At this third step, the credibility of the explanation 
becomes pertinent.  To assess credibility, the court may consider, ‘ “among other 
factors, the prosecutor’s demeanor;  . . . how reasonable, or how improbable, the 
explanations are; and . . . whether the proffered rationale has some basis in 
accepted trial strategy.” ’  [Citation.]  To satisfy herself that an explanation is 
genuine, the presiding judge must make ‘a sincere and reasoned attempt’ to 
evaluate the prosecutor’s justification, with consideration of the circumstances of 
the case known at that time, her knowledge of trial techniques, and her 
63 
observations of the prosecutor’s examination of panelists and exercise of for-cause 
and peremptory challenges.  [Citation.]  Justifications that are ‘implausible or 
fantastic . . . may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful 
discrimination.’  [Citation.]   We recognize that the trial court enjoys a relative 
advantage vis-à-vis reviewing courts, for it draws on its contemporaneous 
observations when assessing a prosecutor’s credibility.”  (People v. Gutierrez 
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1158-1159.)   
Here, the court, relying on its experience as a trial judge and a prosecutor, 
credited the prosecutor’s reason for excusing M.M. because of his background in 
sociology and career in social services.  We conclude that the prosecutor’s 
proffered reason, and the trial court’s reliance on its knowledge of jurors and 
prosecutorial trial strategy, in crediting the reason, to be reasonable.  (People v. 
Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 225 [reasonable to believe that a social services 
caseworker would be more sympathetic to the defense]; People v. Watson (2008) 
43 Cal.4th 652, 677 [prosecutor’s concern about social worker’s ability to be 
objective was reasonable in light of her work at the Los Angeles County 
Department of Children and Family Services]; People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 
415, 476 [finding credible prosecutor’s asserted reasons for striking a juror who 
worked as a correctional counselor and had a background in psychology and 
sociology].)  There is substantial evidence in the record to support the prosecutor’s 
stated reason given M.M.’s responses about his background and work and given 
the prosecutor’s familiarity with the agency for which M.M. worked.   
Defendant contends that comparative juror analysis shows that the 
prosecutor’s reasons for excusing M.M. were not genuine because he accepted 
Juror Nos. 2 and 11, who had similar backgrounds but were Caucasian.  
“[E]vidence of comparative juror analysis must be considered in the trial court and 
even for the first time on appeal if relied upon by the defendant and the record is 
64 
adequate to permit the urged comparisons.”  (People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 
602, 622.)  “ ‘The rationale for comparative juror analysis is that a side-by-side 
comparison of a prospective juror struck by the prosecutor with a prospective juror 
accepted by the prosecutor may provide relevant circumstantial evidence of 
purposeful discrimination by the prosecutor.  [Citations.]’  [Citation.]  ‘If a 
prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an 
otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to 
prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson’s third step.’  
[Citation.]  ‘At the same time, “we are mindful that comparative juror analysis on 
a cold appellate record has inherent limitations.”  [Citation.]  In addition to the 
difficulty of assessing tone, expression and gesture from the written transcript of 
voir dire, we attempt to keep in mind the fluid character of the jury selection 
process and the complexity of the balance involved.’ ”  (People v. Winbush (2017) 
2 Cal.5th 402, 442.) 
The prosecutor’s proffered reasons for excusing M.M. were M.M.’s thesis 
about the brainwashing of Africa through colonial education and his master’s 
degree in sociology, as well as his career in social services.  Juror No. 2 had a 
master’s degree in entomology, the study of insects, and worked as a research 
associate in that field.  Juror No. 11 had a bachelor’s degree in “general 
education,” including psychology courses, and had been working as an elementary 
school teacher for four years.  So, in fact, neither Juror No. 2 nor Juror No. 11 
shared much in common with M.M. from a career or educational perspective.   
This court has also compared the responses of a challenged juror to other 
peremptorily challenged jurors of a different race.  (People v. Lewis, supra, 43 
Cal.4th at p. 478.)  Prior to the peremptory challenge of M.M., the prosecutor 
similarly inquired of, and peremptorily challenged, L.G., a non-Black juror, who 
had a bachelor’s degree in sociology and career as a school teacher.  The 
65 
prosecutor asked L.G. if her background in sociology and child development 
would make it difficult to impose the death penalty.  Like M.M., L.G. said she 
could impose the death penalty, but the prosecutor nonetheless excused her, which 
suggests the reason for excusing M.M. based on his sociology background was 
genuine. 
Therefore, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the 
prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons for challenging M.M. were credible.   
4. Comment on Right to Trial 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during voir dire 
by making comments about a defendant’s right to trial.   
A prospective juror had explained that she had been a witness to a crime 
but that the case had never gone to trial because the defendant confessed.  The 
prosecutor responded, “Do you understand, though, that even somebody who did it 
can ask for a trial?”  He stated further, “That it’s a constitutional right for 
everybody, even if they did it, to ask for a trial?  Will you not hold it against the 
defendant?”  The court overruled defendant's objection.  Counsel renewed the 
objection the next day, expressing concern “that some of these jurors now think 
that Mr. Woodruff could have avoided this trial but asked for it.”  The trial court 
concluded the comments were not prejudicial but instead “ingrain[ed] in the minds 
of the jurors that they’re to follow the law, to accord him with the presumption of 
innocence that the law requires . . . .”   
“ ‘In general, a prosecutor commits misconduct by the use of deceptive or 
reprehensible methods to persuade either the court or the jury.’  [Citation.]  
‘When, as here, the point focuses on comments made by the prosecutor before the 
jury, the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury 
66 
construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable 
fashion.’ ”  (People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 797.) 
Defendant contends the comments implied that the prosecution offered 
defendant a plea deal that he had rejected and that the jurors would “plausibly 
conclude that even though the defendant was guilty, he had asked for a trial.”  The 
comments were not misconduct.  The prosecutor was responding to a juror’s 
statement suggesting that cases do not go to trial if there has been a confession.  
Because defendant admitted shooting Officer Baker, the prosecutor did not 
commit misconduct in clearing up the juror’s misconception.  The main point of 
his comments was that the jurors could not hold defendant’s decision to go to trial 
against him; in other words, jurors were to presume defendant to be innocent and 
require that the prosecution prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  “The 
prosecutor’s statements ‘were not legally erroneous, and defendant had ample 
opportunity to correct, clarify, or amplify the prosecutor’s remarks through his 
own voir dire questions and comments.’ ”  (People v. Thomas, supra, 53 Cal.4th at 
p. 797.)  And in fact, he did:  on further voir dire, defense counsel commented to 
the jury, “So, all of you believe at this point that Mr. Woodruff is innocent?  You 
all understand that concept?  You all understand that Mr. Woodruff doesn’t have 
to—It’s the prosecution’s obligation to prove that he’s not innocent.  Do you 
understand he’s innocent up until the point that you actually return a verdict . . . ?”  
Therefore, defense counsel cleared up any erroneous assumptions by the jury.   
“Moreover, as a general matter, it is unlikely that errors or misconduct 
occurring during voir dire questioning will unduly influence the jury’s verdict in 
the case.  Any such errors or misconduct ‘prior to the presentation of argument or 
evidence, obviously reach the jury panel at a much less critical phase of the 
proceedings . . . .’ ”  (People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 741.)   
67 
D. Guilt Phase Issues 
 
1. Presence of Officers in the Courtroom   
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing his request to limit the 
number of uniformed officers present in the courtroom, which “created [an] 
intimidating atmosphere.”   
Before trial, defendant requested an order “limiting or prohibiting the 
presence of uniformed peace officers in the trial,” expressing concern that the 
presence of several officers would distract the jury.  The court responded, “I 
certainly understand and understand your concern.  I can’t say that I am not 
without the same concern to some extent myself, but here’s the problem:  I have 
no right to tell them how to dress when they come in here.  This is a public 
proceeding and they can come in here.”   
“The right to a public trial is not that of the defendant alone.  (Cal. Const., 
art. I, § 29; Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1986) 478 U.S. 1, 7.)  The 
public policy in favor of open judicial hearings was emphasized in this court’s 
opinion in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 772, 779-780.  
[Citation.]  Only if restriction is necessary to preserve a defendant’s right to a fair 
trial may the court restrict attendance by members of the public.  Because a First 
Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings is also recognized, they may 
not be closed ‘unless specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that 
“closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that 
interest.” ’ ”  (People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1298-1299.)   
In determining whether the presence of uniformed officers denies a 
defendant’s right to a fair trial, a reviewing court must look “at the scene presented 
to jurors and determine whether what they saw was so inherently prejudicial as to 
pose an unacceptable threat to defendant’s right to a fair trial; if the challenged 
practice is not found inherently prejudicial and if the defendant fails to show 
68 
actual prejudice, the inquiry is over.”  (Holbrook v. Flynn (1986) 475 U.S. 560, 
562, 572; People v. Stevens (2009) 47 Cal.4th 625, 638.)   
We conclude there was no abuse of discretion.  Defendant points to no 
place in the record that states the number of officers present in the courtroom.  At 
the record correction hearing, when asked about the number of uniformed officers 
present during the trial, the trial court noted there were never enough uniformed 
officers present “to give me concern that there would be an intimidation factor” 
and that if during the trial there had been more than two or three uniformed 
officers present, the court would have expressed concern.  Therefore the concerns 
expressed by defendant prior to the trial are insufficient to support a claim of error 
or prejudice.   
Defendant also contends that the presence of officers wearing blue 
wristbands in memory of Jacobs diminished his chance of receiving a fair trial.  
Defendant bases this assumption on the responses of two officer-witnesses to 
defense counsel’s own questions concerning the wristbands the witnesses were 
wearing and whether many officers wore the wristbands.  Because defendant never 
objected to the presence of officers wearing wristbands and instead called 
attention to them, he has forfeited his claim.  (People v. Carrasco, supra, 
59 Cal.4th at p. 965.)  
Defendant also asserts an intimidating atmosphere was created when 
“Officer Baker’s brother, a former police officer, had gestured with his fingers like 
he was pointing a gun at the defendant as the room was emptying for a recess.”  
Blankenship objected to the gesture at trial on the ground that it would intimidate 
defendant, who was going to testify.  The trial court asked the sheriff’s department 
to investigate the incident and stated, “The Court will not tolerate any disruptive or 
intimidating or other inappropriate conduct by anyone in the audience.  And if it 
69 
occurs and if I see it, you will, at the very least, be removed from the courtroom 
for the duration of this trial.  And, if appropriate, sterner measures will be taken.”   
Blankenship’s objection at the trial was out of concern for defendant’s 
“sense of peace” rather than for its effect on the jury, which was leaving for 
recess.  Thus, the claim is forfeited because defendant did not object on the ground 
he now urges.  It also lacks merit.  Following the court’s instruction to the sheriff's 
department to investigate the incident, the issue was not mentioned again.  
“ ‘Spectator misconduct is a ground for mistrial if it is “of such a character as to 
prejudice the defendant or influence the verdict,” ’ and the trial court has broad 
discretion in making this determination.”  (People v. Carrasco, supra, 59 Cal.4th 
at p. 965.)  Here there is no evidence that the jury saw or was prejudiced by the 
gesture, assuming it occurred.  We find no error.   
2. Photographs of Defendant in Jail Jumpsuit  
Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting, over defense 
objection, two photographs showing him in an orange jail jumpsuit on the day of 
his arrest and that this allowed the jury to speculate that he was dangerous.  Carr 
testified that when defendant crawled out of the house, four or five officers 
“dived” onto him and an officer put his knee into defendant’s back, and she heard 
defendant cry out in pain.  The prosecutor subsequently sought to introduce the 
photos to show defendant was not injured and explained that defendant had been 
given the jumpsuit to wear because he had not been wearing any clothes when he 
was arrested.  The trial court examined the photographs and found them to be 
relevant and not prejudicial.  
Later, a prosecution witness was shown a photograph of defendant in an 
orange jail jumpsuit to identify for the jury what he looked like on the day of his 
arrest.  The witness testified that the police gave defendant the jumpsuit because 
70 
he had come out of his house naked.  Defense counsel renewed his earlier 
objection, explaining his concern about the prejudicial impact of the sight of 
defendant in jail clothing even though “it’s very clear that they know he’s in 
custody.”  Defendant wore civilian clothing at the trial.  At an earlier hearing 
concerning how defendant would appear at the crime scene viewing, the court had 
noted that the jury “knows he’s in custody.”   
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs 
because they corroborated the prosecution witnesses’ testimony.  (People v. 
Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 459.)  In any event, defendant fails to show 
prejudice.  In People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 734, 768, the defendant 
similarly objected on grounds of irrelevance and prejudice to the admission of a 
photograph showing him in handcuffs and an orange prison jumpsuit.  We 
concluded, “To the extent the jury could have inferred that defendant had been in 
custody and was dangerous because of the use of handcuffs, it seems unlikely for 
the jury not to believe that he was, at some point, in custody and under arrest” 
while the case was under investigation.  (Ibid.)  Here, although it was undisputed 
that the jury knew defendant had been in custody, he wore civilian clothing 
throughout the trial.  There was, therefore, no “constant reminder” that defendant 
was in custody, and “the fundamental presumption of our system of criminal 
justice that the defendant is innocent until proved guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt” was not disturbed.  (People v. Taylor (1982) 31 Cal.3d 488, 494, citing 
Estelle v. Williams (1976) 425 U.S. 501, 504.) 
3. Testimony Referencing Defendant’s Arrest Record    
 
During cross-examination, prosecution witness Keith Kensinger briefly 
referenced defendant’s “previous arrest record.”  He said nothing specific about 
71 
the record.  Defense counsel did not object.  Defendant contends the reference 
violated his state and federal rights to due process and a fair trial.   
“By statute, evidence of prior specific acts of misconduct is ordinarily 
inadmissible either to prove conduct on a specific occasion or to attack a witness’ 
credibility.  ([Evid. Code], §§ 787, 1101, subd. (a); see § 788 (exception for prior 
felony convictions).)  More specifically, it has long been held that evidence of an 
accused’s prior arrests is inadmissible.”  (People v. Anderson (1978) 20 Cal.3d 
647, 650.)  A witness’s volunteered statement can be the basis for error.  (People 
v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 565-566.)   
Defendant has forfeited the contention by failing to object.  (Evid. Code, 
§ 353; People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 375 [“Because defendant fails to 
establish that testimony revealing his ex-convict status, and his prior arrest, is so 
prejudicial that its admission must always result in reversal of the judgment, we 
hold counsel’s failure to object or seek some other form of remedial action waived 
the issue for appeal.”].)    
Moreover, the comment was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt even if 
we assume, without deciding, that it violated defendant’s federal constitutional 
rights.  (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)  The brief and vague 
comment told the jury nothing it did not know from other evidence in the case.  
The jury was already aware that defendant had an arrest record.  In defendant’s 
interview, the police had questioned him about whether he was currently on any 
drugs or alcohol, noting his arrest history for drunk driving.  Defendant explained 
to the officers that he had stopped drinking when he got a DUI in 1994 and had 
been sober since then.  The jury also knew that defendant had been afraid to go 
outside when the police arrived because he thought he had an arrest warrant for 
drunk driving.  No reason exists for the jury to believe the reference to an arrest 
record referred to more than this.  The comment could not have been prejudicial. 
72 
4. Testimony of Lead Investigator Opining on Guilt   
Several times, in response to questions by both parties, prosecution witness 
Martin Silva, the lead investigator in the case, expressed to the jury his opinion 
that defendant was guilty, as well as his reasons for so concluding.  “ ‘[O]pinions 
on guilt or innocence are inadmissible because they are of no assistance to the trier 
of fact.’ ”  (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 77.)  Defendant 
claims ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and judicial 
misconduct with respect to the admission of Silva’s testimony.  We find no error.   
Part of the defense strategy was to show that the police failed to make a 
thorough investigation into the case because they prejudged defendant to have 
murdered Jacobs.  While questioning Silva, defense counsel tried to show that the 
investigation had been compromised and that Silva was determined to conclude 
defendant was guilty.  At one point, counsel asked, “You believe, with everything 
that you are, that Mr. Woodruff fired a bullet that didn’t ricochet that hit Mr. 
Jacobs, don’t you?”  Counsel then elicited the “factual basis for [Silva’s] belief.”  
On redirect, the prosecutor reviewed with Silva the evidence that had been 
developed in the investigation and that led him to conclude “that this defendant is 
guilty of murder.”  To the prosecution’s question whether, “having investigated 
six to 700 murders . . . , [Silva had] any doubt that the defendant’s guilty,” Silva 
responded he did not.  On recross, defense counsel sought to show that Silva was 
biased.   
During a break, the court expressed concern that Silva’s opinion and 
described reasons for concluding defendant was guilty had prejudiced defendant, 
and discussed the issue with defendant at length before asking if he wished to 
continue the trial and continue with Blankenship.  Defendant said that he did.   
Defense counsel explained that given the testimony presented by several 
prosecution witnesses over the previous 13 days of trial, Silva’s testimony would 
73 
not have prejudiced defendant and the jury would have surmised that Silva had 
concluded that defendant was guilty.  Thus Blankenship needed to elicit Silva’s 
opinion about the case to expose his bias and show why the investigation had not 
been thorough.  The court concluded that the testimony had prejudiced defendant 
nonetheless and that the court should have disallowed the questioning on its own 
motion.  Given defendant’s decision to continue with the trial, the court instructed 
the jury with CALJIC No. 2.20 (“Believability of Witness”), and further instructed 
the jury that “[a]ny witness who has testified in this proceeding and who may have 
voiced an opinion as to the question of guilt or innocence of the defendant, that 
testimony is not to be considered by you.”  When Silva’s testimony resumed, the 
court reinstructed the jury to disregard any opinion of any witness as to guilt and 
that “only you will ultimately make that determination that is the ultimate question 
of fact before you, and only you, the members of the jury, will make that 
determination.”   
We find no misconduct.  In light of the defense strategy of trying to show 
that the police simply believed defendant guilty and thus failed to investigate the 
case fully, the prosecution was certainly entitled to show why the police did 
believe him to be guilty and thus investigated the case as they did. 
We also find no judicial error.  The court did intervene, foreclosing any 
further testimony by Silva as to his opinion on guilt, and reinstructing the jury 
when it appeared the prosecution was revisiting the topic during redirect.  Given 
defense counsel’s stated strategy of drawing out Silva’s bias, and given 
defendant’s reaffirmation of Blankenship as his choice of counsel, the court was 
limited in its discretion to prohibit the testimony.  “A criminal defendant’s 
constitutional right to confront witnesses is violated when the court prohibits the 
defendant from conducting otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to 
show a prototypical kind of bias on the witness’s part, and thereby provide the jury 
74 
with facts from which it could appropriately draw inferences regarding the 
witness’s reliability.”  (People v. Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 450.)  Moreover, 
the court offered defendant a mistrial, but he elected to continue the trial after 
being sufficiently apprised by the court of its concerns about prejudice.  Therefore, 
the court did not abuse its discretion in acceding to defendant’s decision to 
continue with Blankenship and in mitigating any harm by instructing the jury that 
it alone was to determine guilt.   
The real question is whether, as defendant contends, his attorney was 
ineffective.  To show ineffective assistance, defendant must show that “counsel’s 
performance was deficient, and that the defendant was prejudiced, that is, there is 
a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different were it not for the 
deficient performance.”  (People v. Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 888; see 
Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687.)  “A reasonable probability is 
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  (Strickland v. 
Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.)  Trying to show that the police believed 
defendant was guilty and thus did not adequately investigate the case was a 
reasonable defense strategy.  “A reviewing court will not second-guess trial 
counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions.”  (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 
520.)  
Moreover, we see no prejudice, especially in light of the trial court’s 
admonitions.  In People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, the prosecutor elicited 
from an investigator (Pina), the opinion that the defendant was guilty.  We found 
no prejudice.  The witness’s “testimony that he believed defendant was guilty as 
charged . . . did not present any evidence to the jury that it would not have already 
inferred from the fact that Pina had investigated the case and that defendant had 
been charged with the crimes.  There was no implication from the questions or 
answers that Pina’s opinions were based upon evidence that had not been 
75 
presented to the jury.  [Citation.]  In addition, we see nothing in the record that 
would lead us to conclude that the jury was likely to disregard the instructions it 
received concerning its duty to decide the issues of credibility and guilt based 
upon its own assessment of the evidence, not the opinions of any witness.”  (Id. at 
p. 300.)   
For similar reasons we see no prejudice here.  As defense counsel noted, 
the jury would hardly have been surprised that Silva had concluded that defendant 
was guilty.  Moreover, the jury had heard over two weeks of testimony from 
prosecution witnesses before Silva testified, and none of his stated reasons for 
concluding defendant was guilty was based on information that the jury had not 
heard or would not hear from other prosecution witnesses.  Thus, “[t]he jury’s 
exposure to the unsurprising opinions of the investigating officer that he believed 
the person charged with the crimes had committed them . . . could not have 
influenced the verdict—especially in light of the overwhelming evidence against 
defendant.”  (People v. Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 300-301.)   
5. Asserted Prosecutorial Misconduct   
a. Questioning About Defendant’s Mother’s 
Convictions Resulting from the Same Incident    
Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by asking 
Parthenia Carr about her convictions for resisting arrest and for disturbing the 
peace, stemming from the same events, and then further asking, after the court had 
sustained a defense objection, whether she had gone through a trial regarding the 
events.  
“[E]vidence of a misdemeanor conviction, whether documentary or 
testimonial, is inadmissible hearsay when offered to impeach a witness’s 
credibility.”  (People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 300.)  However, Evidence 
Code section 352 considerations aside, evidence of misdemeanor misconduct is 
76 
admissible to impeach a witness so long as it involves moral turpitude.  (Id. at 
pp. 295–297, p. 300, fn. 14.)   
The trial court here concluded that the misdemeanor convictions were 
inadmissible and, further, that they did not involve offenses of moral turpitude.  
The court noted it had read to the jury the pretrial instruction to disregard any 
question to which an objection was sustained and to not speculate as to what the 
answer might have been, and further offered to instruct the jury to disregard the 
question.  Defense counsel wanted to consider, over the weekend, the best 
approach for the defense, including whether, “now that the door’s open,” he might 
want to elicit the fact that Carr had been “punished and she spent almost a year in 
jail . . . .” 
Defendant now contends that a “corrective instruction” would not have 
cured the harm caused by the question and, further, that even though the court 
sustained the objection, because the prosecutor nonetheless persisted in the line of 
questioning by asking Carr if she had gone through a trial regarding the events, the 
jury would have concluded that she had been convicted of the offenses.  Defendant 
contends two aspects of the error were prejudicial—the improper impeachment of 
Carr, and the supposed inference that “if the mother was guilty of a crime, so was 
the son.”   
We do not find it reasonably probable that a different outcome would have 
resulted had the prosecution not asked Carr about her convictions.  (People v. 
Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 298.)  Furthermore, the question did not infect the 
trial with such unfairness as to deny defendant due process.  (Ibid.)  The trial court 
had preinstructed the jury to disregard any questions to which the court sustained 
an objection and not to speculate as to the answer, and reinstructed it to the same 
effect prior to closing argument.  Further, the jury was aware of the facts 
underlying the convictions—that Carr frequently played the radio loudly, causing 
77 
Menzies to call the police, and that Carr was resisting the officer’s attempt to 
arrest her for disturbing the peace.  Carr’s involvement in the events was central to 
the case.  It is unlikely that evidence of Carr’s convictions stemming from the 
same events was significant to the jury or would have caused it to reach a different 
conclusion as to defendant’s guilt.  Therefore, there was no prejudicial 
misconduct.   
b. Asserted Mocking of Defense Counsel 
Defendant contends “the prosecutor . . . repeatedly mocked defense counsel 
in front of the jury,” thereby undermining counsel’s credibility and that defense 
counsel was ineffective where he failed to object.  We find no merit to defendant’s 
contentions.   
 Defendant claims there were five instances of prosecutorial misconduct.  
We consider them in order.  “With regard to some of the points raised in this 
section, defendant registered no objection to the purported acts of misconduct, and 
there is no reason to believe that any harm could not have been cured.  Those 
points must therefore be rejected on procedural grounds.”  (People v. Osband 
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 693.)  Moreover, we see no prejudice or general 
misconduct even if defendant had objected. 
Defendant first claims the “prosecutor mocked defense counsel’s haircut 
with a gratuitous, sarcastic and irrelevant comment in jury selection, ‘Maybe I can 
get a ponytail by the end of this trial.’ ”9  The prosecutor had asked a prospective 
juror, “Not to point you out from anybody in the courtroom, but would anybody’s 
haircut influence you in any way?”  The juror answered “No,” to which the 
prosecutor responded, “Maybe I can get a ponytail by the end of this trial.”  The 
                                                 
9  
While this incident took place during jury selection, we discuss it in this 
section for efficiency. 
78 
court sustained defense counsel’s objection.  The record does not state whether 
Blankenship had a ponytail, but the parties assume the comment was about him.    
“ ‘Personal attacks on opposing counsel are improper and irrelevant to the 
issues.’ ”  (People v. Lopez (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1028, 1072; see People v. Reyes 
(1974) 12 Cal.3d 486, 506 [“name calling of opposing counsel should be 
avoided”].)  Assuming the comment was referring to Blankenship’s hairstyle, we 
find it was harmless.  The comment was “fleeting and rather obscure.  Even if [it] 
constituted misconduct, [it did] not constitute the type of deceptive and 
reprehensible methods that require reversal.”  (People v. Lopez, supra, 56 Cal.4th 
at p. 1073.)  Counsel immediately objected and the court sustained the objection.  
(People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800.)  Moreover, misconduct occurring during 
voir dire is unlikely to unduly influence a jury’s verdict.  (People v. Thomas, 
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 797.)   
Defendant next contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by 
commenting in front of the jury that he “would ask for sanctions” regarding 
defense counsel’s cross-examination of a police detective.  The comment came 
after a series of questions in which defense counsel sought to establish that the 
police did not adequately investigate possible bullet entries in a tree and in the 
ground and similarly did not do sufficient work to search for a bullet found more 
than a year later lodged in the side of the house.  The court sustained several 
prosecution objections to the questioning before the prosecutor eventually made 
the comment about sanctions.  The court responded, “All right.  You’ll not do that 
in front of the jury.  And you’ll move on to a new area.  I think you’ve established 
your point.”   
During a recess, the court told the prosecutor not to ask for sanctions in 
front of the jury, stating “You’re reacting to him, and you’re letting it show.”  The 
court then addressed defense counsel, “I can see what you’re doing.  You 
79 
obviously have a lot of ability.  You’re an extremely intelligent gentleman.  But 
I’m gonna start cracking down on the editorializing before you ask your 
questions.”  Counsel complained of misconduct by the prosecutor in asking for 
sanctions before the jury.    
There is no reason to believe the prosecutor’s comment would have had any 
significance to the jury in its deliberation of the charges.  In response to the 
comment, the court directed the prosecutor not to “do that” in front of the jury and 
similarly reprimanded defense counsel to move to another topic in the questioning, 
noting, “You’ve established your point.”  If anything, the prosecutor’s comment 
might have reflected poorly on him because, as the court noted during the break, 
“you’re reacting to him, and you’re letting it show.” 
Next, defendant claims that the prosecutor’s comment, while he was 
searching for an exhibit in the jury’s presence, “I’m sure I’ll never see it again,” 
was an “accusation that defense counsel was hiding or misplacing evidence.”  
Defendant reaches this conclusion by referring to an earlier comment by the 
prosecutor, out of the jury’s presence, that defense counsel had removed exhibits 
from the court.  “ ‘To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on 
remarks to the jury, the defendant must show a reasonable likelihood the jury 
understood or applied the complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous 
manner.’ ”  (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 771-772.)  We see no 
reasonable likelihood the jurors would have believed this innocuous comment 
referred to defense counsel, given that they had not heard the earlier comment.  By 
itself, the comment did not suggest that defense counsel had taken the exhibits.   
Defendant’s remaining contentions concern the prosecutor’s closing 
argument.  First, he complains of the prosecutor’s comment that “[t]he defendant 
has cloaked himself in infirmities of people that are legitimate infirmities. . . .  
Mental retardation?  How shameful. . . .  How shameful to pretend to be a member 
80 
of their population to avoid responsibility. . . .  And to cloak this trial in the civil 
rights movement in Mississippi is despicable.”  Finally, in rebuttal to defense 
counsel’s repeated assertion that the prosecution was “dialing into emotions,”10 
the prosecutor stated, “And shame on them for making any comment about police 
officers who cried or were tearful about a fallen friend.  Despicable.  Turned on 
emotions?  Dialed up emotions?  How insulting.” 
Defendant contends the prosecutor’s comments were “disparaging” to 
defense counsel, which in turn would have resulted in the jury’s “moral 
indignation” directed at defendant.  On the contrary, the prosecutor’s comments 
were not a personal attack on defense counsel, but a critical response to his 
arguments, and thus a “fair rebuttal” to the defense theory that the case was about 
race and mental disability and that the officers were feigning tears.  (People v. 
Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 771.)  “The prosecutor’s remarks . . . attacked the 
defense theory, not defense counsel’s integrity, and did not constitute denigration 
of counsel.”  (People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 749.)   
Moreover, “the rebuttal argument was a response to defense counsel’s 
inflammatory attack upon the prosecution.  It is probable that the jurors viewed the 
argument as mere polemic retaliation intended to rehabilitate the integrity of the 
maligned law enforcement agencies and gave it little or no consideration.  Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, the judge instructed the jurors that they had to 
decide the case based on the evidence received in court and that they could not 
                                                 
10  
The defense argued, “Did you notice how on one hand the officers would 
sob and weep and cry about Officer Jacobs?  Officer Baker almost like a faucet 
turned on.  And then I did this on purpose.  And then I remember I dialed into 
those emotions like Mr. Soccio would, then I waited about a minute or two, then 
I’d talk about whether or not they wanted to kill Mr. Woodruff.  And then Mr. 
Baker went from being visibly upset about Mr. Jacobs, then looked at Mr. 
Woodruff, saying he intended to kill him. . . .  It’s all fake.  It’s all made up.” 
81 
consider statements of counsel as evidence.”  (People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 
756, 790-791.) 
c. Asserted “Golden Rule” Comments    
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct in making 
several statements during closing argument which purportedly “urged jurors to 
place themselves in the shoes of the victims, prosecution witnesses, the 
defendant’s neighbors and even defense expert witnesses’ patients.”  There was no 
misconduct.   
“As a general rule, a prosecutor may not invite the jury to view the case 
through the victim’s eyes, because to do so appeals to the jury’s sympathy for the 
victim.”  (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1406.)  
Defendant challenges the following comments:  (1)  The prosecutor stated, 
“ ‘Menacing Ben Baker.’  I loved that term when the defense used it.  If you were 
gonna be cited for some misdemeanor mild conduct, wouldn’t you want to be 
treated like he treated Parthenia Carr?”  (The prosecutor was responding to the 
defense argument that Baker was “menacing.”); (2)  The prosecutor stated, “How 
would you like them as your neighbors, the Woodruff/Carr clan?  Each of them in 
trouble with the law.  Every day near your bedroom a radio blasts for hours, and 
it’s gone on for years, and you had the gall to call the police three times?  Shame 
on you for wanting peace and quiet in your own home. . . .  Your neighbors, the 
Woodruff/Carrs, urinate on trees outside.  And you’d like them as a neighbor, to 
have them play the radio?  How comforting.”  (This was a response to the defense 
argument that “the world would be a better place” if more people were like 
Parthenia Carr.); (3)  The prosecutor argued, “[W]ouldn’t you want to sell your 
house, too, if you lived there?  Would you want somebody out on this stoop 
listening to Oldies three and four hours a day and drinking beer?  No.  Would you 
82 
be accused and faulted for calling the police?  Yes, if you were a witness in this 
trial.”  The prosecutor further argued, “Would you want to stay up there with 
[Carr] and a police officer?  Who would feel safe?  The door had already been 
pulled away from her.  She was already yelled at.  Would you stay?  Not if you 
had any sense.”  (The prosecutor was responding to the defense argument that 
Menzies was “relentless in making sure that the radio stopped,” and that she had 
run away from Baker and Carr.); (4)  The prosecutor stated, “Can you imagine a 
more deadly place to be trapped with an angry parolee than on a three-foot by six-
foot landing, suspended, what, fifteen feet above the ground?  Where do you go?  
Screen door is behind you.  The mother is to one side.  If you’re pushed, hit, 
you’re tall—shorter would have been better up there.  Railing at least could have 
been a little bit safe.”  (This was a response to defense counsel’s observation that 
Claude Carr was 4 feet, 11 inches tall to suggest he did not pose a threat.);  
(5)  The prosecutor stated, “He may have been about as far as I am from you when 
he shot and killed Doug Jacobs.  Is that very far to take a gun and point it at you 
and shoot?”  (The prosecutor was responding to defendant’s statement that he did 
not aim at Jacobs.)     
Defendant also challenges the following comments:  (1)  Regarding the 
defense experts, the prosecutor argued, “Let’s talk about the doctors for a minute.  
You met Einstein the other day.   If you had a brain problem or suspected problem, 
would you want him to be the one to interpret your scan?  If you had a child who 
was sick, would you want Dr. Wu to be the one to take the picture and talk about 
what it meant? . . . .  Would you want Dr. Booraem to be your psychologist?”;  
(2)  In discussing the jury instruction on justifiable homicide, the prosecutor 
stated, “I can say anything I want, that I was in fear for my life so I had to kill 
you. . . .  Well, number one, it assumes I killed you.  Now, he’s told you he didn’t, 
so he shouldn’t be entitled to that instruction based on his version.  He says he 
83 
didn’t do it.  You know he did.  So what are you going to do, play defense lawyer 
and say, Well, let’s try to apply this.”     
In none of these comments did the prosecutor “invite the jury to view the 
case through the victim’s eyes.”  (People v. Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at 
p. 1406.)  Rather, the prosecutor responded to defense arguments, including the 
defense’s sympathetic portrayal of defense witnesses and unfavorable 
characterizations of prosecution witnesses.  “We see nothing wrong with this 
approach, which was a reasoned rebuttal to defense counsel’s argument, not an 
appeal to the jurors’ sympathy for the victims.”  (Ibid.)    
6. Asserted Judicial Misconduct   
Defendant contends that the trial court engaged in a pattern of misconduct 
that discredited the defense and demonstrated “that the trial judge allied himself 
with the prosecution.”  We disagree.  As in People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 
78, where a similar claim was made, we conclude that although the trial judge 
showed impatience with both the prosecution and the defense at times, and a few 
of the court’s comments to defense counsel were more pointed, the comments did 
not rise to the level of “an unconstitutional display of judicial bias,” but instead 
amounted to correct rulings occasionally accompanied by impatience at defense 
counsel’s argumentative examination of witnesses and improper remarks.   
“Although the trial court has both the duty and the discretion to control the 
conduct of the trial [citation], the court ‘commits misconduct if it persistently 
makes discourteous and disparaging remarks to defense counsel so as to discredit 
the defense or create the impression it is allying itself with the prosecution’ 
[citation].  Nevertheless, ‘[i]t is well within [a trial court’s] discretion to rebuke an 
attorney, sometimes harshly, when that attorney asks inappropriate questions, 
ignores the court’s instructions, or otherwise engages in improper or delaying 
84 
behavior.’  [Citation.]  Indeed, ‘[o]ur role . . . is not to determine whether the trial 
judge’s conduct left something to be desired, or even whether some comments 
would have been better left unsaid.  Rather, we must determine whether the 
judge’s behavior was so prejudicial that it denied [defendant] a fair, as opposed to 
a perfect, trial.’ ” (People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 78.) 
To support his claim, defendant cites 12 instances of purported misconduct, 
which he does not discuss individually, instead arguing that they cumulatively 
demonstrated “the trial judge’s message to the jury . . . that defense counsel’s 
questions and objections were without merit, and by extension, his entire case was 
without merit.”  Defendant objected only to the first instance of alleged 
misconduct.  In his briefing, he tries to avoid appellate forfeiture of claims 
stemming from the remaining instances by arguing that “defense counsel’s 
attempts to object that the trial judge’s sarcastic comments were ‘prejudicial 
to . . . Mr. Woodruff’ fell on deaf ears.”   
“Ordinarily, the lack of an objection at trial forfeits the claim on appeal.  
[Citation.]  However, a failure to object to judicial misconduct does not preclude 
appellate review when an objection could not have cured the prejudice or would 
have been futile.  (People v. Sturm (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1218, [1237.])  In Sturm, we 
ruled the defendant had not forfeited his claim of judicial misconduct, despite his 
lack of objections, because the hostility between the trial court and defense 
counsel was evident.  (Ibid.)  Moreover, Sturm involved numerous, extensive 
disparaging remarks.”  (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1220.)   
We disagree that defendant’s lone objection to the purported misconduct 
“fell on deaf ears” and warranted the conclusion that future objections would have 
been futile.  During testimony, defense counsel had made a series of objections on 
several grounds.  The court stated:  “Are you gonna run through the whole 
Evidence Code?”  Counsel responded, “Might as well.”  To which the court 
85 
replied, “Well, I haven’t heard a legitimate one yet, so overruled.”  Defense 
counsel later commented at length about his concern that the court’s comment 
“feels like it’s outside the scope of maintaining respect for me as an advocate on 
behalf of Mr. Woodruff.”  The court responded, “Let me say this:  I certainly did 
not intend to be demeaning of you.  And if my tone of voice suggests otherwise, I 
apologize for that.  It’s certainly not my intent.  But when a lawyer makes an 
objection that’s overruled and then runs through half a dozen or so other reasons 
for it, I think I was perfectly justified in making the comment I did.”   
We see nothing in the court’s comments indicating that the court was 
antagonistic towards the defense or that future objections would have been futile.  
The court was merely rebuking defense counsel for articulating a series of 
objections rather than identifying the appropriate basis for his objection.  
Moreover, defense counsel invited the court’s further response by his comment, 
“Might as well.”   
Defendant alternatively argues that that any failure to object was “yet 
another example of the ineffective assistance defense counsel provided to Mr. 
Woodruff.”  We have reviewed the remaining portions of the record he cites as 
showing misconduct and find defendant’s claims of judicial misconduct and bias 
to be without merit.  The court’s comments were certainly not “ ‘so prejudicial 
that [they] denied [defendant] a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.’ ” (People v. 
Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 78.)   
Two of the alleged instances of judicial misconduct occurred outside the 
presence of the jury and thus could not have prejudiced defendant.  In any event, 
there was no misconduct.  First, defendant identifies a heated exchange between 
the court and defense counsel on December 12 outside the presence of the jury, 
which defendant claims demonstrated “the judge’s antagonism toward and 
contempt for defense counsel.”  Counsel had complained at length to the court, 
86 
stating, “I think if you scrutinize what you were doing, with respect to your 
objections and also your effort to intervene in my advocacy and the facial 
characteristics that you exhibit, I think that’s not fair to me as counsel, and it’s not 
fair to Mr. Woodruff, and it’s interfering with his right to a fair trial. . . .  I have 
made a list of all the different things that are beginning to trouble me regarding the 
constant, constant little asides and commentary.  And, for the record, I disagree 
with it.  And I was not badgering the witness, and I don’t like being dressed down 
in front of the jury.  I consider it to be inappropriate, and I consider it to be 
prejudicial to . . . Mr. Woodruff.”   
The court responded, “I don’t like misbehavior, and I told you at the start of 
this trial, I told you I wouldn’t hesitate to dress you down or embarrass you in 
front of the jury.  [¶] . . . [¶]  Be as zealous and vigorous and as aggressive as you 
want, but do it professionally.  [¶] . . . [¶]  It’s my obligation to control what’s 
going on in this courtroom.  If I think you’re being unprofessional or acting 
inappropriately, I’ll call you on it.”   
The court’s comments were an accurate explanation of its duty “to control 
the conduct of the trial” and of its discretion to “ ‘rebuke an attorney, sometimes 
harshly, when that attorney asks inappropriate questions, ignores the court’s 
instructions, or otherwise engages in improper or delaying behavior.’ ”  (People v. 
Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 78.)  Such instances of friction as the one described 
above “are virtually inevitable in a long trial.”  (Id. at pp. 78-79.)  Moreover, in 
reviewing the record, contrary to defense counsel’s assertion, we do not see 
partiality on the part of the court towards the prosecution.  For instance, the court 
similarly rebuked the prosecutor in the presence of the jury when he asked for 
87 
sanctions against defense counsel, stating, “All right. You’ll not do that in front of 
the jury.”11 
The other alleged instance of bias occurring outside the presence of the jury 
is also without merit.  Defense counsel wanted to recall the defense experts Wu 
and Booraem, who had testified regarding defendant’s mental status.  The court 
stated that if counsel did that, then “we can bring [prosecution expert] Waxman 
back and we could be doing this until next year.”  Defendant asserts that the 
court’s use of the word “we” indicates “the judge, a former deputy district 
attorney, still viewed trials from the perspective of the prosecution team.”  We 
understand the judge’s use of the word “we” to be speaking in general terms about 
the trial.   
Regarding the purported instances of misconduct occurring in the presence 
of the jury, defendant refers to several other comments by the trial court without 
explaining how they were misconduct.  During the cross-examination of Officer 
Donald Goodner, who testified that he found defendant’s daughter in the house 
following the shooting, defense counsel asked Goodner in succession four similar 
questions about whether he knew where the other SWAT team members might 
have been in relation to the crime scene prior to his arrival, even though Goodner 
had in response to each question indicated that he did not know.  Defense 
counsel’s last question, “They could have been anywhere, right?” prompted the 
court’s response, “Obviously they were somewhere.”  Defendant does not explain 
how this comment “expressed sarcasm and scorn to defense counsel.”  Instead, the 
                                                 
11  
In other instances outside the presence of the jury, the court similarly 
chastised both counsel, stating, “I told both of you before, I will not tolerate 
talking to each other.  You talk to me.  When one of you is talking, I will listen 
and the other one keeps quiet.  I will give you the floor to say whatever you want.”  
And, “Both of you, editorial comments have no effect on me, other than to annoy 
me.  And to the extent either or both of you are trying to yank the chain of the 
other one, knock it off.  Because the only one who is getting annoyed is me.” 
88 
court “showed considerable restraint given that defense counsel repeatedly asked 
the same question after the witness said he did not know . . . .”  (People v. Maciel 
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 537.)  
Other instances of claimed misconduct described by defendant are similarly 
without merit.   
During the prosecutor’s direct examination of Officer Ron Sanfilippo, 
following a sustained defense objection and motion to strike, defense counsel 
asked the court to “explain to the jury that they’re not supposed to listen to that 
last answer,” to which the court responded, “I’ll tell you what, I’ll do the 
explaining and you won’t. . . .  The last half of the answer referring to the jammed 
chamber is ordered stricken.  The jury is ordered to disregard it.”   
Near the end of lengthy cross-examination of prosecution expert witness 
Richard Takenaga, the court intercepted defense counsel’s repeated questions to 
Takenaga on the same line of inquiry with the comment, “Come on.  If you’re 
going to continue along with this, I’m going to cut you off right now.  Let’s move 
on to something probative.”   
During the prosecution’s cross-examination of defense expert Dr. Joseph 
Wu, the prosecution objected to Wu’s nonresponsive answer following similar 
nonresponsive answers.  In response to defense counsel’s objection to the court’s 
telling Wu to respond to the question asked, defense counsel objected that Wu had 
answered the question.  The court responded, “And you’re testifying.  Unless you 
want to raise your right hand and take the oath, don’t do it again.”   
In response to defense counsel’s instruction to a prosecution witness not to 
“editorialize,” the court interjected, “The only editorializing I have heard is in your 
statement.  You will conduct yourself professionally.  Zealousness is fine.  
Sarcasm and editorializing is not appropriate.”  Defendant points out another 
instance where the court instructed the witness not to respond to an argumentative 
89 
question posed by defense counsel, stating, “[Defense counsel] wants to argue 
with you.”12 
Without addressing the comments individually, defendant simply asserts 
that the comments demonstrate “sarcasm and scorn to defense counsel” that 
cumulatively was prejudicial.  We disagree.  The comments were an exercise of 
the court’s discretion to rebuke Blankenship, “ ‘sometimes harshly, when that 
attorney asks inappropriate questions, ignores the court’s instructions, or otherwise 
engages in improper or delaying behavior.’ ”  (People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th 
at p. 78.)  The isolated comments in a lengthy trial in which the court exhibited 
some impatience with counsel’s argumentative comments and questions do not 
demonstrate misconduct or bias, much less misconduct that was “so prejudicial 
that it deprived defendant of ‘ “a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1112.)   
7. Asserted Misrepresentation of Facts by Defense Counsel 
Defendant contends that Blankenship was ineffective because he made 
several “false or misleading statements, which diminished the defense’s credibility 
with the trial court and jury.”  We disagree.   
As noted previously, a claim of ineffective assistance requires a showing of 
deficient performance and a reasonable probability that the outcome would have 
differed absent the deficient performance.  (People v. Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th 
at p. 888.)  Here, the inquiry fails at the outset because the seven instances 
identified by defendant do not show that Blankenship made “false or misleading 
statements.”   
                                                 
12  
Defendant lists three more examples from the cross-examination of 
prosecution rebuttal expert Dr. Craig Rath, which reflect similar responses by the 
court to argumentative questions posed by defense counsel.  We need not address 
each individually because like the above example, they do not support defendant’s 
claim of judicial bias. 
90 
Defendant first contends that Blankenship misrepresented that he had only 
received discovery from the prosecution for the first time in March 2002, even 
though the trial record shows that he had received discovery six months before.  In 
support of this contention, defendant relies on Blankenship’s statement, “I 
received discovery for the first time last week and got a phone call today saying 
there’s additional discovery.”  Defendant takes Blankenship’s comments out of 
context.  A fuller reading of the discussion between the court and parties makes 
clear that Blankenship was stating that discovery was incomplete and that the 
prosecution was still sending him discovery.  Moreover, this exchange was outside 
the presence of the jury.  Defendant’s next claim, concerning a misunderstanding 
about whether the prosecutor would be presenting a witness at trial, also took 
place outside the presence of the jury and we need not discuss it. 
Defendant next contends that Blankenship attempted to mislead Baker 
during his cross-examination by reading him a portion of his interview out of 
context.  During the cross-examination, Baker accused Blankenship of lying to 
him about what Baker had said in the interview.  Having reviewed the transcript of 
the interview, we find Blankenship’s understanding to be a reasonable 
interpretation of Baker’s comments as to the timing of the events that day.  
Baker’s comments were less than clear, in part because his description of what had 
happened that day changed over time.    
Next, defendant contends that Blankenship “misrepresented Baker’s 
testimony” when he stated in his question to Baker that Baker was not sure where 
the gunshots had come from.  This was a misrepresentation, defendant claims, 
because Baker had reported on various occasions that he had looked down the 
stairway to where he heard the shot.  However, in earlier cross-examination, Baker 
had twice stated that he had “looked to see where the shot had come from.”  
91 
Likely Blankenship was referring to this testimony, and no “false or misleading 
statement” is apparent. 
Defendant further faults Blankenship for asking Sanfilippo whether “stinger 
balls” could cause harm to a four year old.  Defendant seems to be suggesting that 
Blankenship attempted to mislead the jury because the police had removed the 
child from the home before they deployed the stinger balls.  We see no 
misrepresentation in the question.  Baker had previously testified that when he 
first arrived on the scene he had interacted with two small children on the front 
porch.  Blankenship’s question seems to encompass the possibility that one or both 
of the children might still have been on the property when the police cleared it 
with the stinger balls.   
Next, based on Takenaga’s testimony that he photo-documented the 
extraction of the bullet from the wall adjacent to Carr’s staircase, Blankenship 
asked whether he had turned over those photographs to the defense.  In claiming 
this question amounted to a misrepresentation, defendant relies on the prosecutor’s 
comment at a sidebar that the “implication from Mr. Blankenship in asking his 
question is that somehow there’s surreptitious withholding of Polaroids.”  We 
conclude there was no “false or misleading statement.”  Blankenship explained at 
the sidebar, “It is the truth.  He did not provide photographs of the extraction.  He 
provided photos of the wall.  He just shows a wall.  Mr. Soccio’s and my 
interpretation of that testimony is the essence of our dispute with respect to this 
case.  It hits—it has every single element of the difference of how we look at this 
case.”   
Finally, defendant similarly relies on another comment by the prosecutor at 
sidebar that Blankenship’s questions to Wu about whether he had turned over all 
records to the prosecution was “creating a false impression to the jury.”  However, 
as the parties resolved in the sidebar, Wu had some records that he had turned over 
92 
to neither party.  Blankenship questioned Wu about the records to counter the 
prosecutor’s implication that the defense had withheld records in discovery.  
Therefore, defendant’s claim that his counsel made misleading statements is 
without merit.   
E. Sufficiency of the Evidence of the Lying-in-wait Special 
Circumstance   
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the lying-
in-wait special circumstance finding.   
“To determine whether the evidence supports a special circumstance 
finding, we must review ‘ “the entire record in the light most favorable to the 
judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, 
and of solid value such that a reasonable jury could find” ’ the special 
circumstance allegation true ‘ “beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Becerrada (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1009, 1028.)   
The capital murder in this case occurred in 2001, after the Legislature 
amended section 190.2, subdivision (a)(15) to make the special circumstance 
applicable when a defendant commits the murder “by means of lying in wait.”  
“Like the former version, the amended lying-in-wait special circumstance requires 
‘ “ ‘an intentional murder, committed under circumstances which include (1) a 
concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an 
opportune time to act, and (3) . . . a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from 
a position of advantage. . . .’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 629.)   
Defendant does not challenge the evidence of intent to kill or claim that 
there was no substantial period of watching and waiting, but he contends that the 
evidence does not show he committed the murder with a concealment of purpose 
and that the shooting was not a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim.   
93 
On the contrary, the evidence indicates concealment of purpose.  When 
defendant heard Jacobs say that he would not wait for a sergeant to arrive, 
defendant retrieved his gun from his bedroom, loaded it, and placed it on the 
television by the front door.  He remained inside listening to the activity upstairs.  
Defendant eventually exited the house and crossed the porch with his gun.  When 
defendant looked across the street and saw his neighbor Mark Delgado watching 
him, defendant moved the gun behind his back.  Defendant also told the police that 
the officers upstairs could not see the gun and that he was standing on the porch 
“peek[ing]” from behind the wall watching and listening for two to three minutes.  
His “true intent and purpose were concealed by his actions.”  (People v. 
Sassounian (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 361, 407.)   
Defendant’s conduct also satisfied the element of surprise attack.  
Defendant fired on the officers from a position of tactical advantage and without 
warning.  The officers, who were occupied with arresting defendant’s mother and 
his brother, could not have known that defendant had armed himself and was 
considering shooting at them.  Defendant later confirmed that Jacobs had not seen 
him when he fired at him.  Delgado also observed that defendant was acting 
“sneaky” and did not hesitate prior to shooting.  Thus defendant foreclosed any 
opportunity for the officers to observe him, firing at them while they were 
“entirely unsuspecting.”  (People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1173 
[“Defendant also attacked from a position of advantage—shooting suddenly with a 
semiautomatic firearm on victims trapped in a small room reading a newspaper or 
conversing.”].) 
Defendant contends there was no concealment of his location because he 
had warned the officers from that location to leave his mother alone.  However, 
“[t]he element of concealment is satisfied by a showing ‘ “that a defendant’s true 
intent and purpose were concealed by his actions or conduct.  It is not required that 
94 
he be literally concealed from view before he attacks the victim.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 432-433.)   
Defendant also contends his attack on the officers was not a surprise since 
Baker had called for assistance because he “suspected the defendant represented a 
threat . . . .”  However, Baker, who was making a routine arrest for disturbing the 
peace, could not, from defendant’s warning to leave Carr alone, reasonably “have 
anticipated defendant’s deadly intentions.”  (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 
22.)   
Thus, the evidence supports the lying-in-wait special circumstance.   
F. Intellectual Disability Phase Issues  
 
1. Procedure Followed in Atkins Hearing   
After the guilty verdict, the court held a hearing to determine whether 
defendant was intellectually disabled in response to the then-recent decision in 
Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304 (Atkins).  At the close of the hearing, the 
jury found defendant not intellectually disabled.  The Legislature had not yet 
enacted section 1376, which created procedures courts are to follow when 
determining a defendant’s intellectual disability in a capital case.  Defendant 
contends that we should reverse the jury’s intellectual disability finding because 
the hearing he received denied him his constitutional rights to due process and 
equal protection of the law.  He contends the procedure deprived the jury of 
guidance on how to evaluate whether defendant had an intellectual disability and 
also that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a pretrial jury determination 
of intellectual disability.  He further contends the court erroneously admitted at the 
guilt phase prejudicial statements he made to the prosecution’s intellectual 
disability expert.  We find no error.   
95 
a. Factual Background 
Before trial, the court and the parties discussed at what stage of the trial the 
court should hold the intellectual disability hearing required by Atkins and whether 
defendant had a right to a jury determination.  The court proposed three phases, a 
guilt phase followed by an intellectual disability hearing, concluding with the 
penalty phase.  Defendant sought a pretrial determination of intellectual disability, 
stating it would be “fine” and “appropriate” for the court to determine the issue 
because it concerned scientific evidence and would avoid prejudicing, as well as 
death-qualifying, the jury in advance of the determination.  The court and the 
prosecution stated a willingness to have a pretrial bench determination if 
defendant waived any right to a jury.  However, defense counsel also hesitated to 
give up the right to a jury because of “the benefit of having the . . . death-qualified 
jury hear elaborately about Mr. Woodruff’s mental condition and trouble.”   
Defendant ultimately filed a motion for a pretrial jury determination of 
whether defendant was intellectually disabled.  The court denied the motion, 
deciding that the jury would determine the intellectual disability question 
following the guilt phase.  The court encouraged defendant to file a petition for 
writ of mandate on the issue so that a higher court could provide guidance.  The 
court asked the parties to review its proposed instructions concerning intellectual 
disability, keeping in mind the teachings of Atkins and noting that defendant bore 
the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.  Defense counsel agreed 
with the instructions.   
Following testimony at the intellectual disability hearing, the court 
instructed the jury that it had to unanimously determine whether defendant had 
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he was “significantly subaverage 
in general intellectual functioning” and “significantly limited in adaptive 
functioning in at least two of the following skill areas:”  communication, self-care, 
96 
home living, social and/or interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-
direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety.  The jury 
also had to find that the disability manifested before age 18.  The court also read 
standard jury instructions on expert and lay opinion testimony and on 
preponderance of the evidence, and instructed the jury it could consider the 
evidence presented in the guilt phase in reaching its decision.  Following argument 
by both parties, the jury returned a finding of no intellectual disability.   
b. Analysis 
Holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of an 
intellectually disabled defendant, Atkins defined intellectual disability as 
“ ‘characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing 
concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable 
adaptive skill areas:  communication, self-care, home living, social skills, 
community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, 
and work.  Mental retardation manifests before age 18.’ ”  (Atkins, supra, 536 U.S. 
at p. 308, fn. 3; see id. at p. 321.)  Atkins left to the states “ ‘the task of developing 
appropriate ways’ ” to ensure that intellectually disabled defendants are not 
sentenced to death.  (Id. at p. 317.)   
Section 1376, enacted in response to Atkins (In re Hawthorne (2005) 
35 Cal.4th 40, 44), defined intellectual disability as “the condition of significantly 
subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in 
adaptive behavior and manifested before 18 years of age.”  (§ 1376, subd. (a).)  
CALCRIM No. 775 issued in response to section 1376 lists the adaptive behavior 
areas and instructs the factfinder that it must find deficits in two or more areas.  
Once a defendant submits an expert declaration on intellectual disability, the court 
orders a hearing to determine the issue.  (§ 1376, subd. (b)(1).)  “At the request of 
97 
the defendant, the court shall conduct the hearing without a jury prior to the 
commencement of the trial.  The defendant’s request for a court hearing prior to 
trial shall constitute a waiver of a jury hearing on the issue of intellectual 
disability.”  (§ 1376, subd. (b)(1).)  The procedure for determining intellectual 
disability is the same whether by a pretrial court hearing or a jury trial following 
the guilt phase:  Each side presents evidence and has the option to present rebuttal 
evidence, and each side makes a closing argument.  (§ 1376, subd. (b)(2) & (3).)  
“A statement made by the defendant during an examination ordered by the court 
shall not be admissible in the trial on the defendant’s guilt.”  (Id., subd. (b)(2).) 
Here, the jury trial devised by the trial court was essentially identical to the 
procedures stated in section 1376.  The trial court’s instructed definition of 
intellectual disability was as provided in section 1376 and in Atkins.  The skill 
areas identified by the court, obtained from Atkins, supra, 536 U.S. at page 308, 
footnote 3, are identical to those listed in the later CALCRIM No. 775.  The 
hearing followed the guilty verdict, as provided in section 1376.  (§ 1376, subd. 
(b)(1).)  Both sides presented evidence and gave closing arguments.  (§ 1376, 
subd. (b)(2) & (3).)  The court instructed the jury that the defense bore the burden 
of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, as later provided by the statute.  
(§ 1376, subd. (b)(3).)  The jury returned a unanimous verdict.  Defendant’s claim 
that the “makeshift format gave the jury untrammeled discretion” lacks merit, 
given that the hearing in fact comported with the key elements of section 1376.  
Additionally, “[t]he decision in Atkins did not require that defendant’s trial be 
conducted in any particular fashion.  The decision in Atkins simply held that 
defendant could not be executed” if he is intellectually disabled.  (People v. 
Jackson (2009) 45 Cal.4th 662, 680.)   
Defendant also asserts that section 1376 “would have [granted him] the 
authority” to choose the pretrial jury determination that the court denied.  This is 
98 
not true.  Section 1376 only provides for a determination by the jury following the 
guilt phase or a determination by the trial court preceding the guilt phase.  (§ 1376, 
subd. (b)(1).)  The court proposed both options and ultimately adopted the first.  
Defendant considered both options, noting the benefits of each, but ultimately 
rejected both options by filing a motion for a pretrial jury determination.  He thus 
rejected the options he would have had under section 1376.  Moreover, putting 
section 1376 aside, there is “no constitutional mandate” that a jury determine 
whether a capital defendant is intellectually disabled.  (In re Hawthorne, supra, 
35 Cal.4th at p. 50; see Schriro v. Smith (2005) 546 U.S. 6, 7-8 [reversing Ninth 
Circuit’s order for jury trial determination of whether defendant was intellectually 
disabled].)  The United States high court left “ ‘to the State[s] the task of 
developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction’ ” on the 
execution of intellectually disabled defendants.  (Atkins, supra, 536 U.S. at 
p. 317.)   
Defendant’s due process and equal protection claims are thus without merit.  
When we devised the procedure for adjudicating postconviction Atkins claims, we 
explained that taking an approach similar to section 1376 would “maintain 
consistency with our own legislation and the judicial frameworks adopted in other 
jurisdictions and . . . avoid due process and equal protection implications.”  (In re 
Hawthorne, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 47.)  
Defendant contends that if section 1376 had been in force, “the jury would 
have had guidance about how to evaluate the importance of the full-scale IQ 
scores.”  However, the court’s instructions provided as much guidance as section 
1376 or CALCRIM No. 775.  Section 1376 “makes no reference to one or another 
clinical test of intelligence, any more than it refers to a particular score as the 
cutoff point for mental retardation.”  (People v. Superior Court (Vidal) (2007) 
40 Cal.4th 999, 1012.)   
99 
Finally, defendant contends that his statements to the prosecution expert 
would have been inadmissible at the guilt phase under section 1376, pointing 
specifically to Rath’s testimony that defendant said he did not try hard on the 
earlier IQ test but would do his best the second time because he did not want the 
label “retarded” and thought his attorney’s strategy was a “stupid idea.”  Rath’s 
testimony was in response to Booraem’s testimony that defendant had “put forth 
his best effort” on the WAIS-III and “was pleased” where he performed well.  As 
part of the defense strategy to negate the mental state for the charges, Booraem 
had testified in the guilt phase that defendant was intellectually disabled.  The 
prosecution thus was permitted to rebut Booraem’s testimony on intellectual 
disability through its own expert.  (People v. Townsel (2016) 63 Cal.4th 25, 46, 
fn. 3; People v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1159 [“The prosecution also may 
call, in rebuttal, another expert of comparable background to challenge defense 
expert methods.”].)  Moreover, defense counsel did not object to the testimony and 
in fact asked the trial court to consider merging the guilt and intellectual disability 
phases of the trial, noting “there’s advantages to [defendant] having the retardation 
woven into the trial as far as other issues involving the requirements that [the 
prosecutor] needs to prove.”  Therefore, defendant is precluded from now 
objecting to Rath’s rebuttal testimony.   
In sum, the court provided defendant a hearing that comported with the 
requirements of section 1376 and Atkins, supra, 536 U.S. 304.   
2. The Prosecutor’s Comments About Intellectual Disability   
During closing argument, the prosecutor stated, “If a person doesn’t look 
retarded or act retarded, it’s because they’re not retarded.  It doesn’t take any 
professional to let you know that.”  Defendant contends this was misconduct 
because it was an “appeal[] to the jurors’ uninformed stereotypes of what mentally 
100 
retarded people look like.”  Because he did not object, he has forfeited the 
contention on appeal.  (People v. Rices, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 80.)  Recognizing 
this, defendant also contends his attorney was ineffective in failing to object.  We 
disagree.   
a. Factual Background 
In closing argument, the defense asserted, “None of us are medical 
professionals or psychiatric professionals, and we may have an opinion about 
whether or not Mr. Woodruff is mentally retarded or not.  But that really isn’t as 
relevant, perhaps, as the professional’s interpretation.”  He told the jury, “Whether 
you, in your own independent assessment, think Mr. Woodruff is able to 
communicate well,” defendant had scored 65 on the communication portion of the 
Vineland test.  Counsel further argued, “When you start to look at it from a more 
clinical perspective rather than how you feel about Mr. Woodruff or how you feel 
about the facts relating to this case, you have to kind of rely on what we’re all 
learning, which is Mr. Woodruff has subaverage intellectual functioning, as 
defined by the test results of both doctors . . . .”  Counsel emphasized that even if 
the jury were to conclude that it “[l]ooks like he’s not mentally retarded [and he] 
doesn’t act mentally retarded,” the test results indicated that he was intellectually 
disabled.   
The prosecutor argued, “[T]here are a couple things that I think need some 
clarification. . . .  For instance, counsel told you that your opinion or people’s 
opinion of whether or not Mr. Woodruff is mentally retarded doesn’t matter.  But 
that’s not true.  If it didn’t matter, you wouldn’t be asked to make this finding.  If 
we only wanted professionals to come in here and make the decision, there would 
be no need for a jury.  Your opinion does matter.  That’s what we’re asking you to 
do. . . .  And I submit this to you:  If a person doesn’t look retarded or act retarded, 
101 
it’s because they’re not retarded.  It doesn’t take any professional to let you know 
that.”  The prosecutor then went on to argue the evidence in the case:  that 
defendant’s overall IQ score was 78 as tested by Rath, that Rath had attributed 
defendant’s low Vineland communication score to his poor writing skills rather 
than deficits in verbal communication, that Rath had spent time interviewing 
defendant and observing him, that defendant had been able to work, including at a 
newspaper, that intellectual disability was defined by “significantly” subaverage 
intellectual functioning, that the jury had observed defendant every day in court, 
and that, in defense counsel’s words, defendant had been able to go “toe to toe” 
with the prosecutor during cross-examination.  The prosecutor emphasized Rath’s 
extensive experience, pointed out deficiencies in Booraem’s evaluation methods, 
and noted that psychology is not an “infallible science.”   
b. Analysis 
“[M]ental retardation is a question of fact.  [Citations.]  It is not measured 
according to a fixed intelligence test score or a specific adaptive behavior 
deficiency, but rather constitutes an assessment of the individual’s overall capacity 
based on a consideration of all the relevant evidence.”  (In re Hawthorne, supra, 
35 Cal.4th at p. 49.)  However, “the medical profession has endeavored to counter 
lay stereotypes of the intellectually disabled. . . .  Those stereotypes, much more 
than medical and clinical appraisals, should spark skepticism.”  (Moore v. Texas 
(2017) __ U.S. __, __ [137 S.Ct. 1039, 1052], citations omitted.)   
Assuming without deciding that the comment was erroneous, we conclude 
it was harmless because it was said in passing and the prosecutor went on to 
review the evidence, including the experts’ findings, to support his contention that 
defendant was not intellectually disabled.  Taking the prosecutor’s comments as a 
whole, there is no “reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of 
102 
the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.”  (People v. Samayoa 
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841.)   
Accordingly, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object. 
G. Penalty Phase Issues   
In light of the reversal based on Witt error, we need not address defendant’s 
penalty phase claims, including the claim of cumulative error, nor his challenges 
to California’s death penalty law.   
H. Reporter’s Transcript Was Duplicated in Several Places and 
Inaccurate  
Section 190.9 requires that a “court reporter [] prepare and certify a daily 
transcript of all proceedings” in a capital trial.  (§ 190.9, subd. (a)(1).)  Defendant 
notes several instances where, in violation of this requirement (see People v. 
Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1192), the court reporter appears to have 
copied earlier proceedings and pasted them in the place of later proceedings 
instead of preparing an accurate transcription of the later proceedings.  Defendant 
contends this violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to “an 
appellate record that is adequate to permit meaningful review.”  At the record 
correction hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial 
stemming from the reporting issues.    
Specifically, defendant cites 11 instances in the reporter’s transcript where 
the reporter copied portions of the transcript of the instructions read to earlier 
groups of prospective jurors and inserted those portions into the reporter’s 
transcript in lieu of preparing an actual transcription of the court’s instructions to 
later groups of jurors.  Most of the instances defendant identifies concern the jury 
selection occurring in March 2002, which did not result in a jury because the court 
dismissed the panel and continued the trial for several months.  The remaining 
103 
three instances concern the court’s opening statements during the November 2002 
jury selection.  
“ ‘All proceedings in a capital case must, under section 190.9, be conducted 
on the record with a reporter present and transcriptions prepared.  [Citation.]  
“ ‘[N]o presumption of prejudice arises from the absence of materials from the 
appellate record [citation], and defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that 
the record is inadequate to permit meaningful appellate review [citations].’ ” 
[Citations.]’  [Citation.]  ‘The record on appeal is inadequate . . . only if the 
complained-of deficiency is prejudicial to the defendant’s ability to prosecute his 
appeal.  [Citation.]  It is the defendant’s burden to show prejudice of this sort.’ ”  
(People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1070, fn. omitted.)   
Here, defendant fails to show that the copying and pasting of the judge’s 
pre-voir dire remarks prejudiced him.  He states only that the prejudice is derived 
“from the realization that the entire record is untrustworthy.”  Such speculation 
fails to support a claim that the record prevents meaningful review.  (People v. 
Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1170.)  Most of the instances of copying and 
pasting defendant cites occurred during the jury selection that did not result in the 
seating of a jury and therefore are immaterial to the review of defendant’s case.  
The remaining instances concern the court’s opening statements to prospective 
jurors during the time-qualification phase of jury selection.  The copied material 
concerns mundane matters of no significance and does not prevent meaningful 
review of defendant’s trial.  (People v. Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1194.)   
The record, which consists of approximately 6,000 pages in both the clerk’s 
and reporter’s transcripts, does not support defendant’s claim of untrustworthiness.  
Moreover, in response to defendant’s motion for a new trial, the court made the 
reporter’s original notes available for both parties to review.  Defendant has 
submitted briefing of approximately 300 pages, raising some 26 issues in his 
104 
appeal.  “ ‘With respect to every issue raised on appeal, we have found the record 
sufficient to permit review.  It is in this context that we must find that any [error] 
was not prejudicial, because the record is clearly adequate for meaningful 
appellate review.’ ”  (People v. Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1075.)   
Regarding defendant’s claim of constitutional violation, we have rejected 
the argument that “statutory noncompliance automatically violates the Fourteenth 
or the Eighth Amendments or impairs a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel.”  (People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 
1258.)  “The federal due process clause requires only that the state furnish the 
defendant with a record sufficient to permit adequate and effective review.”  
(Ibid.) 
I. Asserted Cumulative Error 
Defendant claims that even if we determine his asserted errors are not 
individually prejudicial, we must conclude that their combined cumulative effect 
requires reversal.  We disagree.  We have found little error, and it did not have 
cumulative prejudicial effect.  Even if we assume Blankenship’s former 
representation of prosecution witnesses Smith and Carr presented a conflict that 
defendant did not validly waive, Carr’s testimony supported the defense, and 
Smith testified at the penalty phase only.  To the extent references during the trial 
to defendant’s arrest record and Carr’s convictions stemming from the same 
events were error, the references were brief and insignificant given other evidence 
in the case presenting this information.  “Defendant has demonstrated few errors, 
and we have found each error or possible error to be harmless when considered 
separately. Considering them together, we likewise conclude that their cumulative 
effect does not warrant reversal of the judgment.”  (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 
Cal.4th 515, 567-568.)   
105 
III.  CONCLUSION  
 
We reverse the judgment of death and affirm the judgment in all other 
respects.   
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
LEVY, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
—————————————————— 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by the 
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Woodruff 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S115378 
Date Filed: July 19, 2018 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Riverside 
Judge: Christian F. Thierbach 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Dennis C. Cusick, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens and Arlene A. Sevidal, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Dennis C. Cusick 
3053 Freeport Boulevard, #124 
Sacramento, CA  95818 
(916) 743-7358 
 
Arlene A. Sevidal 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 738-9071