Case Title: State v. Pulaski County Circuit Court

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-12-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE of Arkansas v. PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT
COURT

96-1286                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered December 16, 1996


1.   Prohibition -- when appropriate -- directed to court itself. -
     - A writ of prohibition is only appropriate when the acting
     court is wholly without jurisdiction; moreover, a writ of
     prohibition must be clearly warranted; a writ of prohibition
     is not directed to the jurisdiction of an individual judge but
     to the court itself.

2.   Prohibition -- essential prerequisite lacking because circuit
     court did not wholly lack subject-matter jurisdiction. --
     Where the Arkansas Constitution provides that circuit courts
     have superintending control over municipal courts and also
     have exclusive control over felony charges, and where the
     rules of criminal procedure contemplate that a second
     "judicial officer" may reduce the bail bond set by an original
     judicial officer, the supreme court, concluding that a
     superintending circuit judge qualifies as a judicial officer
     for purposes of the rule governing bail, the supreme court
     held that the essential prerequisite for a writ of prohibition
     was lacking because the circuit court did not wholly lack
     subject-matter jurisdiction.

3.   Certiorari -- appropriate vehicle for relief in bail
     proceedings. -- Writs of certiorari have been labeled the
     appropriate vehicle for relief in bail proceedings; certiorari
     lies to correct proceedings erroneous on the face of the
     record where there is no other adequate remedy, and it is
     available to the appellate court in its exercise of
     superintending control over a lower court that is proceeding
     illegally where no other mode of review has been provided; a
     demonstration of plain, manifest, clear, and gross abuse of
     discretion is essential before the supreme court will grant a
     petition for writ of certiorari; based on these standards, the
     supreme court concluded that a writ of certiorari appeared to
     be the correct vehicle for the relief sought by the State.

4.   Certiorari -- writ not warranted under facts of case --
     circuit judge's reduction of bail amount not erroneous on
     face. -- Under the facts of the case, the supreme court
     concluded that a writ of certiorari was not warranted;
     probable cause for detention had been found by the municipal
     court, and the case had been bound over to circuit court; the
     appropriate amount of bail following a probable-cause hearing
     for a felony arrest falls within the superintending power of
     the circuit courts over municipal courts; if a municipal court
     has the authority to set bail for arrested felons but no power
     to proceed with the resolution of felony matters, certainly
     the superintending circuit courts would have comparable
     authority; the supreme court held that, as a result, the
     action of the circuit judge in reducing the bail amount was
     not erroneous on its face.

5.   Jurisdiction -- municipal court was limited to determining
     whether reasonable cause existed that juvenile committed
     offense and whether he should be detained. -- The supreme
     court concluded that the municipal court had no authority to
     proceed with trying a felony offense and was limited to a
     determination of whether reasonable cause existed that the
     juvenile committed the offense and whether he should be
     detained pending further proceedings.

6.   Criminal procedure -- two-month delay in filing charges was
     unacceptable. -- The decision to file a felony information
     generally rests entirely in the prosecutor's discretion; in
     this case, however, the deputy prosecutor offered no
     explanation at a hearing concerning why no filing decision had
     been made by his office two months after the juvenile's arrest
     and detention; if no valid reason existed for the delay, a
     petition for writ of habeas corpus by the juvenile to the
     circuit court might well have been appropriate; but, the
     supreme court concluded that, regardless of the existence of
     an additional remedy, a two-month delay in filing charges
     without good reason was unacceptable; the State's petition for
     a writ of prohibition or, alternatively, for a writ of
     certiorari, was denied.


     Peitition for a Writ of Prohibition or, In the Alternative,
for a Writ of Certiorari; denied.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Kelly K. Hill, Deputy Att'y
Gen., for petitioner.
     James, Yeatman & Carter, PLC, by: Paul J. James and Steve W.
Haralson, for respondent.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.
     On October 25, 1996, the State of Arkansas filed its petition
for a writ of prohibition or, alternatively, for a writ of
certiorari and prayed that this court vacate the Pulaski County
Circuit Court's order reducing bail for David Bernard Batts from
$25,000 to $7,500.  We deny the petition.
     On July 16, 1996, Officer Charles Jones of the Sherwood Police
Department arrested David Bernard Batts, age 16, for the unlawful
discharge of a firearm, which is a Class B felony.  See Ark. Code.
Ann.  5-74-107(b)(1), (2) (Repl. 1993).  Officer Jones issued a
complaint against Batts for the offense by completing an Arkansas
Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint form in which he stated that
he had reasonable grounds to believe the offense was committed. 
Batts was booked in the Sherwood City Jail, and bail was fixed at
$50,000.
     The following day, Batts appeared with a deputy public
defender in Sherwood Municipal Court, presumably for a reasonable-
cause hearing on whether Batts committed the offense.  See Ark. R.
Crim. P. 4.1(e).  The municipal court apparently found reasonable
cause and, therefore, cause to detain Batts under Ark. R. Crim. P.
8.3(c), though the record before this court is void of any
information concerning a hearing.  The municipal court records do
reflect that bail was set at $25,000, and the matter was bound over
to Pulaski County Circuit Court.  Batts was transferred to the
Pulaski County Jail.
     On September 17, 1996, Pulaski County Circuit Judge Marion
Humphrey held a hearing on the Batts matter, after first notifying
the prosecuting attorney.  The catalyst for the hearing was a
meeting that Judge Humphrey had with Batts's parents the previous
day where they complained to the judge that Batts should be in
school and not in jail.  Batts had been in jail continuously since
his arrest on July 16, 1996.  The prosecuting attorney had filed no
formal felony charges against him.
     At the September 17, 1996 hearing, the deputy prosecutor
explained that the State's case against Batts would be that he shot
at another car while traveling on the Jacksonville/Sherwood highway
and struck a postal truck that was following behind the car he was
trying to hit.  A dispute at a roller skating rink led to the
shooting.  The prosecutor further informed the court that his
office had received the Batts file on August 19, 1996, but had not
yet made a decision to file formal charges against him as an adult. 
The deputy prosecutor stated:
     It hasn't gone to the first attorney for a file decision. 
     And we try and get all of our file decisions out within
     a month and we're right on the outside of that right now. 
     As the Court knows, some things [are] slowed down because
     of the turnover in the circuit clerk's office.
The deputy prosecutor further advised the circuit court that Batts
had been given his Miranda rights at the Sherwood Police Department
and had admitted to the shooting.  He further told the court that
the prosecutor would be charging Batts as an adult and that "there
will probably be two counts of unlawful discharge and probably one
terroristic act for hitting the mail truck that was occupied by a
postal worker."
     The deputy prosecutor then objected to the bond hearing
because charges had not been filed in circuit court.  The court
admonished the prosecutor to "move these [cases] along", and the
court reduced the bail to $7,500.  It is that action by the circuit
court that the State seeks to vacate with its petition.

                         I. Prohibition
     We first consider whether a petition for a writ of prohibition
is the appropriate remedy.  We conclude that it is not.  A writ of
prohibition is only appropriate when the acting court is wholly
without jurisdiction.  Steve Standridge Ins., Inc. v. Langston, 321
Ark. 331,