Case Title: DeJulio v. Foster

Citation: 

Docket Number: 85-164

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-03-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
DeJulio v. Foster1986 WY 56715 P.2d 182Case Number: 85-164Decided: 03/04/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
RICK DeJULIO, AS PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF ERIC J. DeJULIO, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

 
 
v. 

 
 
JOE W. FOSTER, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Alan B. Johnson, 
J.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Jack R. Gage, Cheyenne.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

George E. Powers of 
Godfrey & Sundahl, Cheyenne.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ.

 
 

BROWN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Twelve-year old Eric 
DeJulio was killed when he was run over by a truck driven by appellee Joe 
Foster. As personal representative of Eric's estate, his father, appellant Rick 
DeJulio brought suit for damages under the wrongful death act, §§ 1-38-101 and 
1-38-102, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1985). From a judgment entered pursuant to a jury 
verdict in favor of appellee, appellant now appeals.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant raises the 
following issues:

 
 
1. "The judgment is 
clearly erroneous and against the great weight of the 
evidence.

 
 
2. "Did the trial court 
commit reversible error when it refused to give a proffered proper lookout 
instruction, Wyoming Pattern July Instruction 7.03? 

 
 
3. "The trial court 
committed reversible error by refusing to give plaintiff's proposed jury 
instruction No. 10.

 
 
4. "The jury was guilty 
of misconduct by failure to follow the court's 
instructions.

 
 
5. "The trial court was 
given an opportunity to direct the verdict or correct the erroneous result by 
granting a new trial or a judgment NOV.

 
 
6. "Did the trial court 
err when it refused to allow evidence that the surviving parents of the decedent 
and only child, Eric DeJulio, are unable to have 
children?"

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellee restates the 
issues as follows:

 
 
1. "Was the jury's 
verdict of no negligence supported by sufficient evidence or should this Court 
substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact?

 
 
2. "Was the proper 
lookout instruction a correct statement of law, tailored appropriately to the 
particular facts and circumstances of this case?

 
 
3. "Was the Trial Court's 
decision to refuse Appellant's `presumption of love of life' instruction a 
proper decision within the discretion of the Trial Court and did the refusal 
result in any prejudice to Appellant?

 
 
4. "Was there any 
evidence of jury misconduct?

 
 
5. "Did the Trial Court 
properly deny Appellant's motions for directed verdicts and motion for post 
trial relief in the form of a judgment N.O.V. and/or a new 
trial?

 
 
6. "Was the Trial Court's 
decision to exclude evidence of the surviving parents' infertility an 
appropriate exercise of the Trial Court's discretion and did this refusal result 
in any prejudice to Appellant?"

 
 

[¶5.]     On August 16, 1982, 
Eric and appellee, Eric's great-uncle, were checking windmills and cattle on 
appellee's ranch in Laramie 
County, Wyoming. With 
them was Eric's second cousin, Kelly Tegeler. As they were driving back to the 
ranch house they spotted a coyote north of the road, and at the boys' urging 
appellee stopped the truck. The boys got out of the cab and climbed up onto the 
rear bumper to look for the coyote. It was not in sight, and therefore, appellee 
decided to back up the truck a short distance to get a better view. Appellee 
climbed back into the cab, but before backing up, turned and saw both boys 
standing on the rear bumper holding onto the tailgate. He then began backing up, 
and as he did so, he turned forward momentarily to look for oncoming traffic. 
Almost immediately, he felt a bump as if he had run over something. He stopped 
the truck and climbed out of the cab to see what it was. At that point, only 
Kelly was standing on the rear bumper. Appellee asked him where Eric was, and he 
said he did not know. Appellee then discovered Eric lying on the ground beneath 
the truck between the front and rear tires on the passenger side, obviously 
critically injured. Appellee picked him up, placed him in the cab and quickly 
drove the four miles to the nearest telephone. When the ambulance arrived Eric 
was dead.

 
 

[¶6.]     On July 18, 1984, 
appellant filed a complaint in the District Court of Laramie County, Wyoming, 
alleging that appellee negligently drove his automobile, which negligence 
proximately caused the death of Eric DeJulio. The case was tried before a 
twelve-person jury; appellee was the only witness called by appellant to testify 
to the circumstances of Eric's death. At the appropriate times throughout the 
trial appellant moved for a directed verdict on the issue of Eric's negligence 
and on the issue of appellee's negligence. The motions were denied and the case 
submitted to the jury.

 
 

[¶7.]     On May 9, 1985, the 
jury rendered a verdict for appellee. Judgment on the verdict was entered May 
16, 1985; on May 22 appellant asked the court to set aside the verdict and 
judgment and grant a new trial, or in the alternative, modify the judgment. An 
order denying the motion was filed on June 26, 1985.

 
 
I

 
 

[¶8.]     In the first issue 
appellant claims that the jury's verdict is clearly erroneous and against the 
great weight of the evidence. As appellant recognizes, when dealing with 
questions of fact, this court will not ordinarily substitute its judgment for 
that of the jury. Rissler & McMurray 
Company v. Atlantic Richfield Company, Wyo., 559 P.2d 25 (1977). As a reviewing 
court, we assume the evidence of the successful party is true, leave out of 
consideration entirely evidence of the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, 
and give the evidence of the successful party every favorable inference which 
may reasonably be drawn from it. Landmark, Inc. v. Stockmen's Bank&Trust Company, 
Wyo., 680 P.2d 471 (1984). So long as there is sufficient 
evidence upon which the jury could rationally base its findings, such findings 
will not be adjusted in any way by this court. Thomasi v. Koch, 
Wyo., 660 P.2d 806 (1983). We will rarely accept the 
invitation to place ourselves in the position of a substitute 
jury.

 
 

[¶9.]     Despite appellant's 
awareness of these standards of review, he argues that in the present case we 
have a duty to examine the record and reach our own independent conclusion from 
the evidence contained therein. He bases his claim on the rule that where 
evidence is uncontroverted, the findings in the trial court may be treated as 
legal conclusions, reversible by this court, and where such evidence admits of 
only one conclusion, a contrary one may not stand. Murphy v. Petrolane Wyoming Gas Service, Wyo., 468 P.2d 969 (1970). We do not find that 
rule to be controlling here. Appellant's assertion presumes that the evidence 
presented as to the circumstances of Eric's death was conclusive. We cannot 
agree. That appellee was the only witness to testify to the circumstances of 
Eric's death does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that his testimony was 
dispositive.

 
 

[¶10.]  On the basis of his testimony appellant 
argued to the jury that appellee was negligent and that his negligence caused 
the death of Eric DeJulio. On the basis of the same testimony, appellee argued 
that he was not negligent and that his acts were not the cause of Eric's death. 
We are not willing to say that either position is correct as a matter of law. 
The evidence presented was susceptible of more than one conclusion. Either of 
two reasonable inferences could be drawn from it. Therefore, it was proper for 
the jury to determine which of the two, if either, was the more reasonable or 
probable. Bocek v. City of Sheridan, Wyo., 
432 P.2d 893 (1967). Based on the evidence presented, the jury found that 
appellee was not negligent. We are not prepared to say that the finding was 
clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of the evidence. That we might 
have reached a different result is not grounds for overturning a jury verdict. 
Doenz v. Garber, Wyo., 665 P.2d 932 
(1983).

 
 
II

 
 

[¶11.]  Before trial appellant submitted the 
following proposed jury instruction:

 
 
"The law provides that 
any person driving a motor vehicle on a public highway shall keep a proper 
lookout for other persons using the highway. By a `proper lookout' is meant that 
lookout which would be maintained by an ordinarily careful person in light of 
all present conditions and those reasonably to be 
anticipated.

 
 
"`Proper lookout' 
includes a duty to see objects in plain sight and a driver is bound to see 
reasonably that which is open and apparent and he must take knowledge of obvious 
dangers. This duty is not merely one of looking, but of observing which imposes 
upon a motorist the necessity of being observant as to the traffic and general 
situation."

 
 

[¶12.]  The court modified appellant's proposed 
instruction as follows:

 
 
"The law requires that 
any person using a public highway shall keep a proper lookout. By a `proper 
lookout' is meant that lookout which would be maintained by an ordinarily 
reasonable and prudent person in light of all present conditions and those 
reasonably to be anticipated."

 

[¶13.]  Appellant now contends that the court 
improperly modified the instruction, thereby committing reversible error. More 
specifically, appellant claims that the modification resulted in an incomplete 
statement of applicable Wyoming law. Again, we are not persuaded by 
appellant's claim. We have said that the function of jury instructions is to 
give the jury guidance regarding the law of the case. Hursh Agency, Inc. v. Wigwam Homes, 
Inc., Wyo., 664 P.2d 27 (1983). The trial court is 
not obligated to give an instruction offered by a party as long as the jury is 
adequately instructed on the law as it pertains to that case. Matter of MLM, Wyo., 682 P.2d 982 
(1984). The trial court's ruling on an instruction will not constitute 
reversible error absent a showing of prejudice, and prejudice will not be said 
to result unless it is demonstrated that the instruction confused or misled the 
jury with respect to the proper principles of law. Cervelli v. Graves, Wyo., 
661 P.2d 1032 (1983).

 
 

[¶14.]  Applying these standards to the 
instructions given in this case, we find no prejudicial error requiring a 
reversal. The instruction, as modified, adequately informed the jury that anyone 
using a public highway must keep a proper lookout, an entirely adequate 
statement of applicable Wyoming law. The instruction then defines 
proper lookout as that lookout which would be maintained by an ordinarily 
reasonable and prudent person in light of all present conditions and those 
reasonably to be anticipated. We fail to see how that instruction could be said 
to have misled or confused the jury. It fully and clearly defined the duty of 
appellee to keep a proper lookout. Any additional explanation of that duty was 
unnecessary, and therefore properly deleted.

 
 

[¶15.]  As further support of our finding that 
the trial court did not err, we point to the rule that a party is not prejudiced 
when a refused instruction is covered by other instructions which have been 
given. Banks v. Crowner, Wyo., 694 P.2d 101 (1985); Scheikofsky v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107 (1981); Zanetti Bus Lines, Inc. v. Logan, 
Wyo., 400 P.2d 482 
(1965).

 
 

[¶16.]  In the present case, in addition to the 
proper lookout instruction, the trial court gave the following instructions 
pertaining to appellee's duty:

 
 
"Instruction No. 
17

 
 
"It is the duty of every 
person using a highway, as a driver of a vehicle, to exercise ordinary care at 
all times to avoid placing himself or others in danger and to use like care to 
avoid an accident from which an injury might result."

 
 
"Instruction No. 
18

 
 
"Violation of a statute 
is evidence of negligence. If you determine that a party violated a statute, 
ordinance or code provision on the occasion in question and that the violation 
was a direct cause of the occurrence, then you may consider that fact together 
with all other facts and circumstances in evidence in determining whether or not 
the party was negligent at the time of the occurrence."

 
 
"Instruction No. 
20

 
 
"You are instructed that 
W.S. § 31-5-226 provides as follows:

 
 
"`(a) The driver of a 
vehicle shall not back the vehicle unless the movement can be made with 
safety.'"

 
 

[¶17.]  The combined effect of these instructions 
was to fully and clearly inform the jury of the nature and extent of appellee's 
duty. Under these circumstances there was no prejudice, and thus, no reversible 
error.

 
 
III

 
 

[¶18.]  We find appellant's third contention 
equally unpersuasive. Appellant offered, and the trial court refused, the 
following proposed instruction:

 
 
"You are instructed that 
there is a presumption that the decedent (Eric DeJulio) was exercising due and 
proper care for the protection of his person and the preservation of his life at 
the time of the accident. This presumption arises from the instinct of 
self-preservation and the disposition of persons to avoid personal harm. This 
presumption is not conclusive, but is a matter to be considered by the jury, in 
connection with all the other facts and circumstances of the case, in 
determining whether or not Eric DeJulio was guilty of negligence at the time of 
the accident."

 
 

[¶19.]  Although appellant neglects to cite any 
authority in support of the presumption contained in his proposed instruction, 
this court has recognized the validity of the presumption that in the absence of 
eye witnesses to the accident or other evidence sufficient to dispel or rebut 
the presumption, the decedent, acting on the instinct of self-preservation, was 
exercising ordinary care. Gish v. 
Colson, Wyo., 
475 P.2d 717 (1970). However, the presumption becomes important only when 
negligence is found on the part of the defendant. Absent such a finding, the 
question of the decedent's due care does not arise. In the present case the jury 
found that appellee was not negligent; therefore, the question of Eric DeJulio's 
due care never arose. It has always been incumbent upon the party claiming 
prejudicial error to show that absent such error a different result would have 
occurred. Walton v. Texasgulf, Inc., Wyo., 634 P.2d 908 (1981). Even assuming error 
was committed in instructing the jury, we fail to see how such error affected 
the result of this case since the question of comparing the parties' relative 
negligence was never before the trier of fact.

 
 
IV

 
 

[¶20.]  Appellant next contends that the jury was 
guilty of misconduct by failing to follow the court's instructions. Appellant 
bases his claim in part on the jury's alleged disregard of the following 
instruction:

 
 
"Instruction No. 
25

 
 
"You should not be 
governed or influenced by any prejudice or feeling either in favor or against 
the plaintiffs-claimant or in favor of or against the defendant. In arriving at 
your verdict in this case you should and must be governed solely by the evidence 
given from the witness stand and by the instructions of this 
court."

 
 

[¶21.]  According to appellant, the jury 
demonstrated its intent to disregard the instruction by submitting the following 
questions to the court after deliberating for only fifteen 
minutes:

 
 
1. "The picture of the 
truck does not clearly show how wide the bumper is that the boys were standing 
on. How wide is that bumper? In inches.

 
 
2. "The testimony on the 
pump that fell over - it was spilling out oil - did that pump fall forward? Did 
the oil go on the bumper?

 
 
3. "Did he look back 
after he was in the cab or before he got in the cab?"

 
 

[¶22.]  In response the court instructed the jury 
to:

 
 
"* * * [D]etermine the 
issues of fact in this case from the testimony of witnesses who have been 
presented here from the witness stand and by means of video depositions and from 
the evidence which has been admitted by the Court. * * *

 
 
"As to some of the 
questions you have presented there is no answer because there was no evidence 
presented. As to other questions you as the judges of the facts should continue 
to consult together to resolve these fact issues."

 
 

[¶23.]  Based on these events and the jury's 
ultimate finding of no negligence, appellant contends that the jury ignored the 
evidence that had been introduced and sought to find additional evidence on its 
own in disregard of the court's instruction to do otherwise. We will not assume 
that the jury disregarded an instruction. Goggins v. Harwood, Wyo., 704 P.2d 1282 (1985); and State 
Highway 
Commission v. Peters, Wyo., 416 P.2d 390 (1966). And we cannot 
assume that the jury ignored the evidence. For these reasons we find no merit in 
appellant's claim.

 
 

[¶24.]  As further evidence of misconduct 
appellant cites the jury's failure to assess damages or pecuniary loss. We 
cannot follow appellant's claim. Obviously, damages need only be assessed if 
liability has been established. Here, the jury found no liability; therefore, an 
assessment of damages was unnecessary.

 
 
V

 
 

[¶25.]  As indicated previously, at the 
appropriate times throughout the proceedings, appellant moved for a directed 
verdict, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and a new trial. He now 
contends that the motions were improperly denied. It is well established that 
questions of fact should be submitted to a jury unless reasonable men can draw 
but one inference from the evidence. Brockett v. Prater, Wyo., 675 P.2d 638 
(1984). As we have already indicated, the questions raised in the present case 
were not susceptible to but one inference; therefore, appellant's motions for a 
directed verdict were properly denied.

 
 

[¶26.]  It is also well-established that a trial 
court has broad discretion when ruling on a motion to set aside a judgment or 
grant a new trial, and the decision will not be overturned on appeal absent an 
abuse of discretion. Stevens v. 
Murphy, Wyo., 680 P.2d 78 (1984); and Cody v. Atkins, Wyo., 
658 P.2d 59 (1983). Appellant fails to demonstrate any grounds upon which the 
relief sought should be granted. We find no abuse of discretion; therefore, the 
trial court properly denied appellant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict or a new trial.

 
 
VI

 
 

[¶27.]  The final issue raised by appellant 
concerns the trial court's refusal to admit evidence of medical expenses 
incurred by the DeJulios in their effort to conceive a second child. Appellant 
has proposed a rather cabalistic theory of damages and its imprimatur is 
suspect. As indicated, however, the jury found no liability, and therefore an 
assessment of damages was unnecessary. Having affirmed the jury's finding of no 
liability, we decline to address the issue of damages.

 
 

[¶28.]  For all the reasons stated above, we 
affirm.

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶29.]  Although recognizing the generally 
accepted validity of the court's discussion, I would respectfully disagree as to 
the affirmation of the trial court's denial of directed verdict, judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, or the motion for new trial, as requested by 
appellant as original plaintiff in this back-up and run-over, adverse-verdict 
case. Consequently, I dissent.

 
 

[¶30.]  The pervasive criticism of the tort 
system of today is emotionally premised on contorted examples of extremity in 
jury-verdict result.1

 
 

[¶31.]  The subject should be first analyzed 
under the principle of probability and the rule of possibility.2 Defined in logic or statistics, it 
equates to the realization that with sufficient occurrences nearly everything 
will happen sooner or later (principle of probability), and nearly anything can 
happen at any given time, no matter how unlikely (rule of 
possibility).

 
 

[¶32.]  With the proliferated litigation of 
today, the justice delivery system is challenged to recognize that the principle 
of probability and the rule of possibility also apply to jury decisions. The 
rogue jury, the confused jury, and the overwhelmed jury are explicable and 
existent. Trial ability with expertise, method and preparation is not always 
equalized by the sophistication of juries in contemplation and conclusion. 

 
 

[¶33.]  The present unmitigated challenge to the 
jury system is misplaced. However, resort to responsibility would be well 
decided. This is to say that the judicial responsibility to reasonable justice 
is not always adequately recognized in contemplation of the "sanctity of the 
jury verdict" where the result lacks rational 
justification.

 
 

[¶34.]  The arena of reasonable result can be 
equalized to approximate justice, and, if exceeded, then system self-correction 
should be afforded in order to defend the institution in accomplishing its 
principal and generally successful societal 
responsibility.

 
 

[¶35.]  Although other subjects are suitably 
considered in the context of the justice system self-correction, this case of DeJulio v. Foster comes to issue from 
the defendant's verdict in a wrongful-death lawsuit.

 
 

[¶36.]  In contemplation of jury fact-finding, 
there are four ways for jury self-correction:

 
 

[¶37.]  (1) Motion for summary judgment, directed 
verdict, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of defendant, in cases 
where reasonable persons "normally" would not differ as to the evidence 
sufficiency to find the absence of claimed liability. Erickson v. Magill, Wyo., 
713 P.2d 1182 (1986).

 
 

[¶38.]  (2) Remittitur, where the jury verdict is 
excessive in dollar amount. Ford Motor 
Co. v. Kuhbacher, Wyo., 518 P.2d 1255 (1974); Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Hause, 1 
Wyo. 27 
(1871).

 
 

[¶39.]  (3) Additur, where the jury verdict is 
inadequate in dollar amount. Venes v. 
Heck, 642 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1981); Douglas Reservoirs Water Users Ass'n v. 
Cross, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1280 (1977) (nonjury).3

 
 

[¶40.]  (4) Directed verdict on liability, or 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a new trial in favor of plaintiff, 
where reasonable persons "normally" would not differ as to the evidence 
sufficiency to find the existence of claimed liability.4 Brown v. Sievers, Wyo., 410 P.2d 574 
(1966).

 
 

[¶41.]  Inconsistency of applied review and 
absence of judicial reactivity exist in the probability/possibility 
circumstances in all regards except summary judgment, and otherwise equivalency 
of result surely cannot be found in a case-by-case analysis, whether it is a 
ten-plus billion-dollar Texaco debacle or the verdict for defendant in this 
case. The justice institution is unbalanced in favoring summary judgment and 
nonrecovery disposition. Iglehart v. 
Petrossi, Wyo., 
409 P.2d 964 (1966).

 
 

[¶42.]  Inconsistencies, but more particularly 
uncertainties, spawn trial required resolution. A realistic demonstration and 
understanding of the contended parameters of probability/possibility are 
excellent medicine to cure an adventuresome trial 
proclivity.

 
 

[¶43.]  The deserving plaintiff who fails to 
recover or recovers inadequately is equally denied justice, as is the case where 
an excessive or undeserved settlement or disposition is achieved. 

 
 

[¶44.]  We have, in this case, a relatively 
simple fact situation, as amply addressed by the majority opinion. Defendant, 
without looking to the rear, backed up a vehicle while a 12-year-old boy was 
apparently standing on the back bumper and who then jumped or fell off and was 
run over and killed. The defendant, as the driver, was a nice guy, a relative of 
the decedent, and a respected citizen. The boy was dead.

 
 

[¶45.]  If one hundred juries heard this case, 
one would wonder how often a jury verdict would result in favor of the 
defendant.

 
 

[¶46.]  Clear evidence of negligence exists (see 
rule of law stated in Fegler v. 
Brodie, Wyo., 574 P.2d 751 
(1978)):

 
 

[¶47.]  (1) Backing up without looking to that 
direction. Davies v. Dugan, 
Wyo., 365 P.2d 198 
(1961).

 
 

[¶48.]  (2) Backing up with young boys standing 
on the back bumper of the pickup. Holstedt v. Neighbors, Wyo., 377 P.2d 181 
(1962).

 
 

[¶49.]  (3) Backing up without knowing exactly 
where or how the boys were physically located on the back of the pickup. Cf. McDowall v. Walters, Wyo., 360 P.2d 165, reh. 
denied 361 P.2d 528 (1961).

 
 

[¶50.]  (4) Backing up without looking at the 
terrain to determine the scope of danger to either passengers or vehicle.5 Blakeman v. Gopp, Wyo., 364 P.2d 986 (1961); Gilliland v. Rhoads, Wyo., 
539 P.2d 1221 (1975).

 
 

[¶51.]  Instead of the actual conduct from which 
the death occurred, at least three distinct things should have been done by the 
driver to avoid negligence and the resulting death:

 
 

[¶52.]  (1) Require safer vehicle location for 
children passengers and particularly so for reverse-direction 
travel;

 
 

[¶53.]  (2) Physically determine location of 
passengers before starting to back up;

 
 

[¶54.]  (3) Watch both boys and route for danger 
to passengers, in exercise of an obviously dangerous maneuver with young 
passengers on back of pickup, by maintaining a proper 
lookout.

 
 

[¶55.]  The pervasive duty of lookout comes from 
managing the most destructive instrument of modern society, the motor 
vehicle.

 
 

[¶56.]  Applying a reasoned-justice test of 
judicial responsibility, I would find "an irrational result" and consequent 
error in the trial court's failure to grant summary judgment or judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict or finally a new trial after jury verdict. I cannot 
find even an inference from the record of due care, and would assert that the 
court in this case fails responsibility in desired recognition of the 
intervention obligation in the occurrence of extreme results as factored in the 
probability/possibility principle in jury conduct. Under the circumstances of 
this negligence case, a new trial should be granted. Vassos v. Roussalis, Wyo., 625 P.2d 768 (1981); Maxted v. Pacific Car 
& Foundry Co., Wyo., 527 P.2d 832 (1974); 2 Blashfield 
Automobile Law and Practice § 104, revised 3d ed. See Stowers v. Carp, 29 Ill. App.2d 52, 172 N.E.2d 370 (1961).

 
 

[¶57.]  Error should also be found in the failure 
to give the instruction submitted by appellant on lookout, since it was 
intrinsic to the case presentation in the actual facts that the defendant did 
not even look to judge the scope of danger. Blashfield, supra, §§ 104.3, 104.4 
and 104.5.

 
 

[¶58.]  The case should be reversed, and a new 
trial granted.

1 Compare philosophic 
discussions, Kalven, The Dignity of the 
Civil Jury, 50 Va.L.Rev. 1055 (1964); Tavris, The Law of an Unwritten Law: A Common 
Sense View of Jury Nullification, 11 WesternState Univ.L.Rev. 97 (1983); Alexander, Civil Juries in Maine: Are the Benefits Worth the Costs?, 34:1 
Maine L.Rev. 
63 (1982), in the context of the oft-repeated comments of the Chief Justice of 
the United 
States.

2 A rule is precise, is 
not a matter of weight, and is declared to be valid by the authority. A 
principle is not a matter of relative specificity and is asserted and cannot be 
declared. Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal 
Thought, 90 Yale L.J. 970, 978 (1981).

3 A significant body of 
law is developing as considering both additur and remittitur, which includes 
evolving principles and rules. Note, Civil Procedure - Abuse of Discretion 
Standard - Worthington v. Bynum, 18 
WakeForest L.Rev. 1111 (1982); 
Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs. 49 
W.Va.L.Rev. 1 (1942); Commentary, Remittitur Practice in Alabama, 34 
Ala.L.Rev. 275 (1983); Comment, Appellate 
Remittitur, 33 Mo. L.Rev. 637 (1968); Pippen v. Denison, Division of Abex 
Corporation, 66 Mich. App. 664, 239 N.W.2d 704 (1976); Pearl River Valley Water Supply District v. 
Brown, Miss., 202 So. 2d 919 (1967); Earl T. Browder, Inc. v. County Court of 
Webster County, 145 W. Va. 696, 116 S.E.2d 867 (1960); Lent v. Huntoon, 143 Vt. 539, 470 A.2d 1162 (1983); Hardy v. Ruhnke, 47 N.J. 
10, 218 A.2d 861 (1966); Genzel v. 
Halvorson, 248 Minn. 527, 80 N.W.2d 854 (1957); Dorsey v. Barba, Cal.App., 226 P.2d 677 
(1951); United States v. 93,970 Acres of 
Land, 258 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1958), rev'd on other grounds 360 U.S. 328, 79 S. Ct. 1193, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1275 (1959); Jehl 
v. Southern Pacific Company, 66 Cal. 2d 821, 59 Cal. Rptr. 276, 427 P.2d 988 
(1967).

4 It is recognized that 
courts have applied a different standard for granting a new trial as more 
lenient when compared with a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Cody v. Atkins, Wyo., 
658 P.2d 59 (1983); Tidewater Oil Co. v. Waller, 302 F.2d 638 (10th 
Cir. 1962); Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350 (4th Cir. 1941).

5 Defendant 
testified:

 
 
"Q. * * * And then as I 
understand it, Kelly Tegler and Eric DeJulio got on the back bumper or stood on 
the back bumper; is that correct?

 
 
"A. 
Yes.

 
 
"Q. After you righted the 
pump jack, you got back in the cab; is that correct?

 
 
"A. 
Yes.

 
 
"Q. It's my understanding 
that you then backed up, but you were watching to the east for any vehicles that 
might be approaching from the east; is that correct?

 
 
"A. They were both 
standing on the bumper with both hands on the tailgate before I started to back 
up. And then I looked to make sure there was no vehicles coming from the 
east.

 
 
"Q. So in fact when you 
did back up you weren't looking backwards; is that 
correct?

 
 
"A. That's 
correct.

 
 
"Q. You didn't look in 
either - as you backed up, as I understand it, you didn't look in either the 
rearview mirror in the cab or in either of the side mirrors; is that 
correct?

 
 
"A. I don't think I 
did.

 
 
"Q. And then however it 
happened you backed over Eric; isn't that correct?

 
 
"A. 
Yes.

 
 
"Q. So you don't know 
where Eric was at the time that you backed over him; isn't that correct? You 
don't know if he was getting in the bed of the truck; isn't that 
correct?

 
 
"A. I don't know that, 
no.

 
 
"Q. And you don't know if 
he had gotten off and was standing on the ground; isn't that 
correct?

 
 
"A. I don't know 
that.

 
 
"Q. And you don't know 
whether or not he may have fallen off; isn't that correct?

 
 
"A. That's 
correct."