Case Title: Michael J. Landwehr v. Bernadette N. Landwehr

Citation: 2006 WI 64

Docket Number: 2003AP002555

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
2006 WI 64 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP2555 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Marriage of: 
 
Michael J. Landwehr, 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Bernadette N. Landwehr, 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 279 Wis. 2d 516, 693 N.W.2d 146 
(Ct. App. 2005 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 6, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 13, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
William Sosnay   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Rex R. Anderegg and Anderegg & Mutschler, LLP, Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Rex R. Anderegg. 
 
For the respondent-respondent there was a brief by Bruce C. 
O’Neill, Diane Slomowitz, and Fox, O’Neill & Shannon, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Bruce C. O’Neill. 
 
 
2006 WI 64
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP2555  
(L.C. No. 
1999FA5277) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Marriage of: 
 
 
 
Michael J. Landwehr, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Bernadette N. Landwehr, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 6, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.  Michael Landwehr seeks 
review of an unpublished decision by the court of appeals 
affirming a decision of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, the 
Honorable William Sosnay, that modified the physical placement 
schedule of his two children.  The circuit court granted the 
modification for summer placement, but denied Michael's motion 
to modify physical placement during the school year.  The court 
of appeals affirmed the circuit court's placement decision.  
No. 
2003AP2555   
 
2 
 
Landwehr v. Landwehr, No. 2003AP2555, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. January 27, 2005).1 
¶2 
Michael Landwehr asks this court to find that under 
the particular facts of this case, the maximization language in 
Wis. Stat. § 767.24(4)(a)2. (2003-04)2 mandates equal placement, 
and therefore requires reversal of the circuit court's placement 
decision for the school year.  We disagree.   
¶3 
We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 767.24(4)(a)2. does not 
require a court to grant each parent equal placement if the 
court determines that the placement should be modified.  We 
conclude, therefore, that in making modification determinations, 
the Wisconsin Statutes direct the circuit court to maximize the 
amount of time a child spends with his or her parents within an 
overall placement schedule, taking into account the best 
interests of the child, the presumption of the status quo under 
Wis. Stat. § 767.325(1) and (2), the general factors listed in 
Wis. Stat. § 767.24, and the particular factors listed under 
§ 767.24(5)(am) when relevant to the child.  Finally, because we 
determine 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
properly 
exercised 
its 
discretion in retaining the existing school year placement and 
                                                 
1 Along with appealing the circuit court's order modifying 
his placement, Michael also appealed the court's order denying 
his motion for a reduction in child support payments.  Landwehr 
v. Landwehr, No. 2003AP2555, unpublished slip op., ¶1, (Wis. Ct. 
App. January 27, 2005).  The child support payments are not 
before this court.   
2  All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are from 2003-04 
unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2003AP2555   
 
3 
 
increasing the children's placement with Michael during the 
summer months, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I 
¶4 
The relevant facts are as follows.  Michael and 
Bernadette were divorced on June 20, 2000.  They had two 
children, born in May 1993 and January 1997.  The children's 
placement 
schedule, 
established in 
the 
Marital 
Settlement 
Agreement, was based on the particular schedules of Michael and 
Bernadette at the time of their divorce.3  Under the Marital 
Settlement Agreement, Michael and Bernadette agreed that the 
children's primary placement would be with Bernadette, with 
Michael 
having 
placement 
on 
Wednesday 
evenings, 
Thursday 
overnights, and every other weekend.   
¶5 
Shortly after the divorce, Michael stopped working at 
his then-existing place of employment, the Menasha Corporation, 
and started his own business, PackX, which became a competitor 
of Menasha Corporation.  Michael's self-employment allowed him 
to work more flexible hours.  Michael also moved within a few 
minutes of his children's school and the home where his children 
lived with Bernadette. 
                                                 
3 When the children's placement was finalized, Michael was 
working at Menasha Corporation at least 45 hours per week.  
Michael was also required to travel for his job.  Bernadette 
worked 16 hours per week as a registered nurse at Froedert 
Hospital. 
No. 
2003AP2555   
 
4 
 
¶6 
On June 24, 2002, Michael petitioned the court to 
reduce his child support payments4 and to modify the physical 
placement schedule.  Michael sought equal placement of his 
children based on his reduced hours and the fact that he moved 
closer to the children and their school.  The Family Court 
Commissioner certified the placement issue to the trial court on 
September 25, 2002.  The circuit court heard testimony regarding 
the children's placement on February 24, 2003, and July 2, 2003.  
On July 11, 2003, the circuit court increased Michael's 
placement by ten nights in the summer, but kept the same 
placement schedule for the school year.5  Michael appealed the 
trial court's order.  The court of appeals affirmed the 
placement decision, concluding that Wis. Stat. § 767.24(4)(a)2. 
does not require, nor presume, equal placement.  This court 
accepted review. 
II 
¶7 
This case presents questions regarding the application 
of the Wisconsin Statutes to a parent's request for modification 
                                                 
4 In 
the 
Marital 
Settlement 
Agreement, 
Michael 
and 
Bernadette also agreed that Michael's child support payments for 
his children would be either $1,800 or 25 percent of Michael's 
gross income, whichever was greater.  The circuit court denied 
Michael's request to reduce his child support obligation.  
Landwehr, slip op., ¶11.  The court of appeals reversed the 
trial 
court's 
child 
support 
decision 
and 
remanded 
for 
redetermination of the issue.  Id., ¶1.  Michael did not ask 
this court to review the child support issue, and it is 
therefore not relevant to our review. 
5 On August 21, 2003, the circuit court entered a written 
order memorializing its decision. 
No. 
2003AP2555   
 
5 
 
of the children's placement schedule.  We give deference to the 
circuit 
court's 
decisions 
regarding 
the 
modification 
of 
placement under an erroneous exercise of discretion standard of 
review, Andrew J. N. v. Wendy L. D., 174 Wis. 2d 745, 764, 498 
N.W.2d 235 (1993),6 and affirm the circuit court's decisions when 
                                                 
6 In Hamachek v. Hamachek, 270 Wis. 194, 70 N.W.2d 595 
(1955), this court announced that appellate courts should review 
circuit courts' child custody modification decisions under an 
erroneous exercise of discretion standard of review.   
[T]he matter of the custody of children in divorce 
actions is a matter peculiarly within the jurisdiction 
of the trial court, who has seen the parties, had an 
opportunity to observe their conduct, and is in much 
better position to determine where the best interests 
of the child lie than is an appellate court.  
Id. at 202 (quoting Adams v. Adams, 178 Wis. 522, 525, 190 N.W. 
359 (1922)). 
Subsequent to this court's decision in Hamachek, the 
Wisconsin 
Legislature 
significantly 
amended 
the 
statutes 
governing modification decisions.  In Andrew J. N., this court 
examined whether the erroneous exercise of discretion remained 
the proper standard of review even though the statutes had been 
significantly revised.  This court concluded that the rationale 
from 
Hamachek 
applied 
to 
modification 
decisions 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 767.325(1)(a) by the circuit court even though the 
law had been amended. 
We conclude that the decision to modify custody and 
placement under sec. 767.325(1)(a), Stats., is within 
the trial court's discretion.  It will not be 
disturbed unless the trial court erroneously exercises 
that discretion.   
Andrew J. N. v. Wendy L. D., 174 Wis. 2d 745, 764, 498 N.W.2d 
235 (1993).   
We similarly conclude that the erroneous exercise of 
discretion is the proper standard of review for a circuit 
court's modification decision under Wis. Stat. § 767.325(1)(b).  
No. 
2003AP2555   
 
6 
 
the court applies the correct legal standard and reaches a 
reasonable 
result. 
 
Id. 
at 
766; 
Hughes 
v. 
Hughes, 223 
Wis. 2d 111, 119-20, 588 N.W.2d 346 (Ct. App. 1998).   
¶8 
Whether the circuit court has applied the correct 
legal standard is a question of law reviewed de novo.  J.A.L. v. 
State, 162 Wis. 2d 940, 962, 471 N.W.2d 493 (1991) (citation 
omitted).  See also Kenyon v. Kenyon, 2004 WI 147, ¶11, 277 
Wis. 2d 47, 690 N.W.2d 251; State v. Stenklyft, 2005 WI 71, ¶7, 
281 Wis. 2d 484, 697 N.W.2d 769 (citation omitted).   
¶9 
This 
case 
presents 
a 
question 
of 
statutory 
interpretation, which we review de novo.  State v. Reed, 2005 WI 
53, ¶13, 280 Wis. 2d 68, 695 N.W.2d 315.  The purpose of 
statutory interpretation is to give the statute its full, 
proper, and intended effect.  Id. (citations omitted).  We begin 
with the statute's language because it is assumed that the 
legislature's intent is expressed in the words it used.  State 
ex rel. Kalal v. Dane County Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  We refrain from interpreting 
statutory language in isolation and interpret the language in 
the context in which it is used in order to avoid absurd or 
unreasonable results.  Id., ¶46.  In addition, when the plain 
wording of a statute unambiguously evinces the legislative 
intent, this court may examine the legislative history to 
support our reading of the plain meaning of the statute.  Wis. 
Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves v. DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶8, 
270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612 (citations omitted). 
 
No. 
2003AP2555   
 
7 
 
III 
¶10 This 
case 
compels 
us 
to 
clarify 
the 
statutory 
requirements imposed upon a circuit court in modifying a custody 
placement order.  Michael Landwehr asks this court to find that 
when 
both 
parents 
are 
available, 
willing, 
and 
able 
to 
accommodate equal placement, and when the parents are located 
near each other, Wis. Stat. § 767.24(4)(a)2. mandates equal 
placement because a child's time with his or her parents cannot 
otherwise be "maximized."   
¶11 Although this court has not previously examined the 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 767.24(4)(a)2., various published court 
of appeals decisions have concluded that this statute does not 
require equal placement.  Keller v. Keller, 2002 WI App 161, 
¶12, 256 Wis. 2d 401, 647 N.W.2d 426; Lofthus v. Lofthus, 2004 
WI App 65, ¶14, 270 Wis. 2d 515, 678 N.W.2d 393; Arnold v. 
Arnold, 2004 WI App 62, ¶11, 270 Wis. 2d 705, 679 N.W.2d 296.  
We agree with these conclusions.  Our analysis of the plain 
meaning of Wis. Stat. §§ 767.325 and 767.24(4)(a)2., supported 
by 
the 
statute's 
legislative 
history, 
reveals 
that 
the 
legislature did not intend the term "maximizing" to mean equal 
placement or equal time. 
A 
¶12 This case involves a parent's request to substantially 
modify an existing placement order that has been in effect for 
at least two years.  Prior to substantially modifying any such 
placement order, the moving party must show that there has been 
"a substantial change of circumstances since the entry of the 
No. 
2003AP2555   
 
8 
 
last 
order 
affecting 
legal 
custody 
or 
the 
last 
order 
substantially affecting physical placement," and the circuit 
court must take into account whether the current or future 
custodial conditions and physical placement are in the child's 
best interest.  Wis. Stat. § 767.325(1)(b)1.a and b.7  See also 
                                                 
7 The statute reads:   
1.  Except as provided under par. (a) and sub. (2), 
upon petition, motion or order to show cause by a 
party, a court may modify an order of legal custody or 
an order of physical placement where the modification 
would substantially alter the time a parent may spend 
with his or her child if the court finds all of the 
following: 
 a.  The modification is in the best interest of the 
child. 
 b. 
 
There 
has 
been 
a 
substantial 
change 
of 
circumstances since the entry of the last order 
affecting 
legal 
custody 
or 
the 
last 
order 
substantially affecting physical placement. 
 2.  With respect to subd. 1., there is a rebuttable 
presumption that: 
 a.  Continuing the current allocation of decision 
making under a legal custody order is in the best 
interest of the child. 
 b.  Continuing the child's physical placement with 
the parent with whom the child resides for the greater 
period of time is in the best interest of the child. 
 3.  A change in the economic circumstances or marital 
status of either party is not sufficient to meet the 
standards for modification under subd. 1. 
Wis. Stat. § 767.325(1)(b).   
No. 
2003AP2555   
 
9 
 
Greene v. Hahn, 2004 WI App 214, ¶22, 277 Wis. 2d 473, 689 
N.W.2d 657.  In this analysis there exists a rebuttable 
presumption that the status quo is in the best interest of the 
child.  Wis. Stat. § 767.325(1)(b)2.  When the initial order 
granted greater placement with one parent as compared to the 
other——as the circuit court ordered in this case——continuing the 
current allocation of decision-making authority under a legal 
custody order and continuing the child's physical placement with 
the parent with whom the child resides for the greater period of 
                                                                                                                                                             
If the modifications sought are within two years of the 
initial order entered under Wis. Stat. § 767.24, the party 
seeking 
modification 
must 
file 
a 
motion 
that 
shows 
by 
substantial evidence that the modification of custody or 
placement is necessary because the current conditions are 
physically or emotionally harmful to the best interest of the 
child.  The statute states: 
(a)  Within 2 years after initial order.  Except as 
provided under sub. (2), a court may not modify any of 
the following orders before 2 years after the initial 
order is entered under s. 767.24, unless a party 
seeking the modification, upon petition, motion, or 
order to show cause shows by substantial evidence that 
the modification is necessary because the current 
custodial conditions are physically or emotionally 
harmful to the best interest of the child: 
1. An order of legal custody. 
2. An 
order 
of 
physical 
placement 
if 
the 
modification would substantially alter the time a 
parent may spend with his or her child. 
Wis. Stat. § 767.325(1)(a).  This statute is inapplicable to the 
present case. 
No. 
2003AP2555   
 
10 
 
time is therefore presumed to be in the best interest of the 
child.  Id.;8 Greene, 277 Wis. 2d 473, ¶22.     
¶13 If the circuit court determines that a change in 
placement may be appropriate, Wis. Stat. § 767.325(5m) further 
directs 
the 
circuit 
court 
to 
"make 
its 
[modification] 
determination 
in 
a 
manner 
consistent 
with 
s. 
767.24," 
specifically taking into account the 16 factors considered 
during 
the 
court's 
initial 
placement 
determination.9  
Wis. Stat. § 767.325(5m).10   
                                                 
8  The statute reads: 
Continuing the child's physical placement with the 
parent with whom the child resides for the greater 
period of time is in the best interest of the child. 
Wis. Stat. § 767.325(1)(b)2.b.   
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.24(5) establishes the 16 factors 
that the circuit court must consider in determining physical 
placement.  The 16 factors include: 
1. The wishes of the child's parent or parents, as 
shown by any stipulation between the parties, any 
proposed parenting plan or any legal custody or 
physical placement proposal submitted to the court at 
trial. 
2. The wishes of the child, which may be communicated 
by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem 
or other appropriate professional. 
3. The interaction and interrelationship of the child 
with his or her parent or parents, siblings, and any 
other person who may significantly affect the child's 
best interest. 
4. The amount and quality of time that each parent has 
spent with the child in the past, any necessary 
changes to the parents' custodial roles and any 
reasonable life−style changes that a parent proposes 
No. 
2003AP2555   
 
11 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
to make to be able to spend time with the child in the 
future. 
5. The child's adjustment to the home, school, 
religion and community. 
6. The age of the child and the child's developmental 
and educational needs at different ages. 
7. Whether the mental or physical health of a party, 
minor child, or other person living in a proposed 
custodial household negatively affects the child's 
intellectual, physical, or emotional well−being. 
8. The need for regularly occurring and meaningful 
periods 
of 
physical 
placement 
to 
provide 
predictability and stability for the child. 
9. The availability of public or private child care 
services. 
10. The cooperation and communication between the 
parties and whether either party unreasonably refuses 
to cooperate or communicate with the other party. 
11. Whether each party can support the other party's 
relationship with the child, including encouraging and 
facilitating frequent and continuing contact with the 
child, or whether one party is likely to unreasonably 
interfere with the child's continuing relationship 
with the other party. 
12. Whether there is evidence that a party engaged in 
abuse, as defined in s. 813.122(1)(a), of the child, 
as defined in s. 48.02(2). 
13. Whether there is evidence of interspousal battery 
as described under s. 940.19 or 940.20(1m)or domestic 
abuse as defined in s. 813.12(1)(am). 
14. Whether either party has or had a significant 
problem with alcohol or drug abuse. 
15. 
The 
reports of 
appropriate 
professionals if 
admitted into evidence. 
16. Such other factors as the court may in each 
individual case determine to be relevant. 
No. 
2003AP2555   
 
12 
 
B 
¶14 Michael asserts that due to the particular facts and 
circumstances of his situation——because he now lives a short 
distance from the children and the children's school and now has 
a flexible schedule that can accommodate more time with his 
children——the court should have granted him equal placement.  
Michael relies on Wis. Stat. § 767.325(5m), which, as stated 
above, instructs the circuit court to "make its [modification] 
determination in a manner consistent with 767.24," and the fact 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 767.24(4)(a)2. 
instructs 
the 
courts 
to 
maximize the time spent with each parent within the placement 
schedule.  Section § 767.24(4)(a)2. states: 
In determining the allocation of periods of physical 
placement, the court shall consider each case on the 
basis of the factors in sub. (5)(am), subject to sub. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wis. Stat. § 767.24(5)(am)(1) to (16). 
In addition, Wis. Stat. § 767.24(5)(bm) addresses cases of 
spousal abuse, battery, or domestic violence, stating that when 
such circumstances are present, "the safety and well−being of 
the child and the safety of the parent who was the victim of the 
battery or abuse shall be the paramount concerns in determining 
legal custody and periods of physical placement."  Such 
circumstances are not present in this case. 
10 The relevant statute states, in full: 
 
In all actions to modify legal custody or physical 
placement orders, the court shall consider the factors 
under s. 767.24(5)(am), subject to s. 767.24(5)(bm), 
and 
shall 
make 
its 
determination 
in 
a 
manner 
consistent with s. 767.24. 
Wis. Stat. § 767.325(5m). 
No. 
2003AP2555   
 
13 
 
(5)(bm).  The court shall set a placement schedule 
that allows the child to have regularly occurring, 
meaningful periods of physical placement with each 
parent and that maximizes the amount of time the child 
may spend with each parent, taking into account 
geographic separation and accommodations for different 
households. 
Wis. Stat. § 767.24(4)(a)2. (emphasis added).    
¶15 We begin our review by examining the text of the 
statute.  Wisconsin Stats. § 767.24(4)(a)2. contains no language 
regarding 
the 
notion 
of 
equal 
placement. 
 
Instead, 
the 
legislature used the phrase "maximizes the amount of time."  The 
legislature failed to define what it means to maximize the 
amount of time a child spends with each parent.   
¶16 When a statute does not define a term, we examine the 
ordinary 
meaning 
of 
that 
term, 
and 
rely 
on 
dictionary 
definitions 
for 
undefined, 
non-technical 
terms. 
Mared 
Industries, Inc. v. Mansfield, 2005 WI 5, ¶32, 277 Wis. 2d 350, 
690 N.W.2d 835 (quoting State v. Polashek, 2002 WI 74, ¶19, 253 
Wis. 2d 527, 646 N.W.2d 330)).  The pertinent dictionary 
definition of "maximize" is "[t]o increase or make as great as 
possible," and "[t]o find the highest value of."  American 
Heritage Dictionary 1112 (3d ed. 1992).  Thus, the legislature 
has instructed the court to make the amount of time a child 
spends with each parent as great as possible.  In order to 
determine the proper meaning of this language, we consider the 
term in the context of the entire subsection in which it is 
used, Wis. Stat. § 767.24(4)(a)2., and in the context of chapter 
767 in its entirety.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46. 
No. 
2003AP2555   
 
14 
 
¶17 The term "maximizing" is found in the second sentence 
of subsection 767.24(4)(a)2.  The first sentence of the 
subsection directs that, "[i]n determining the allocation of 
periods of physical placement, the court shall consider each 
case on the basis of the factors in sub. (5)(am), subject to 
sub. (5)(bm)."  The circuit court is then instructed to set 
meaningful periods of physical placement that maximize each 
parent's time with the children, also taking into account 
geography and accommodations.   
¶18 We conclude that the concept of "maximizing" does not 
supersede the specific considerations explicitly required under 
this subsection.  Although the statute establishes a general 
directive 
for 
a 
circuit 
court 
to 
make 
modification 
determinations 
consistent 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 767.24, 
which 
includes "maximiz[ing] the amount of time the child may spend 
with each parent," this general directive does not trump the 
other considerations specifically required in the statute.  The 
statute specifically establishes a presumption of the status quo 
and specifically requires the court to examine the 16 factors 
enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 767.24(5).  The specific directives 
involving the status quo presumption and the 16 considerations 
listed under § 767.24(5)(am) and (bm) clearly and unambiguously 
control the general directive to "make its determination in a 
manner consistent with s. 767.24."  Wis. Stat. § 767.325(5m).  
See Abbas v. Palmersheim, 2004 WI App 126, ¶41, 275 Wis. 2d 311, 
685 N.W.2d 546 (Lundsten, J., concurring).     
No. 
2003AP2555   
 
15 
 
¶19 As a result, the circuit court is required to set a 
placement 
schedule 
that 
establishes 
meaningful 
periods of 
physical placement and maximizes each parent's time with the 
child, in the context of the status quo presumption and the 16 
factors enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 767.24(5) as applied to the 
particular facts and circumstances of the child. 
¶20 Under this statutory scheme, the circuit court is 
required to take into account all the considerations in making 
an initial placement decision under Wis. Stat. § 767.24.  This, 
of course, includes the notion of maximizing time with each 
parent under § 767.24(4)(a)2., but the court must attempt to 
maximize the children's time with each parent within the context 
of the various other considerations the court is instructed to 
contemplate under § 767.24.  The term "maximize" does not 
supersede the trial court's discretion to construct a schedule 
it determines is in the best interest of the child and otherwise 
in conformity with the intricate dictates of § 767.24. 
¶21 This 
court 
has 
previously 
recognized 
that 
"the 
legislature has clearly and repeatedly expressed the policy that 
courts are to act in the best interest of children."  Holtzman 
v. Knott, 193 Wis. 2d 649, 682, 533 N.W.2d 419 (1995).  Had the 
legislature intended to create an equal placement presumption in 
modification determinations, over and above the other various 
considerations 
that 
the 
statutes 
instruct 
the 
court 
to 
contemplate, the legislature would have used specific and 
explicit language to accomplish this goal.  See, e.g., Eau 
Claire County v. General Teamsters Union Local No. 662, 2000 WI 
No. 
2003AP2555   
 
16 
 
57, ¶17, 235 Wis. 2d 385, 611 N.W.2d 744.  As we have stated in 
other contexts, "[s]uch a dramatic change in public policy 
should not have to be made by inference."  Id.11 
¶22 Moreover, 
the 
legislature 
itself 
has 
explicitly 
recognized that, with respect to the modification of legal 
custody and physical placement orders, the phrase "maximizes the 
amount of time" cannot be equated with the notion of "equal 
placement."  Where the initial order has been in existence for 
more than two years, the legislature has created two separate 
rebuttable presumptions, both in favor of the status quo.  One 
presumption applies to situations where a child is originally 
placed with each parent for substantially equal amounts of time.  
In these situations, there is a rebuttable presumption that 
maintaining substantially equal periods of physical placement is 
in the best interest of the child.  Wis. Stat. § 767.325 (2)(b).  
A different presumption applies to situations, like the current 
case, where the court's original order places a child with one 
parent for a greater period of time as compared to the other 
parent.  When a party seeks to modify an initial placement order 
that gives one parent greater placement, there exists a 
                                                 
11 Addressing arbitration, this court stated: "Given such 
strong statements of public policy favoring arbitration, it is 
difficult to conceive that the legislature would enact a statute 
directly in contravention of this state's announced public 
policy without using specific explicit language to do so. Such a 
dramatic change in public policy should not have to be made by 
inference."  Eau Claire County v. General Teamsters Union Local 
No. 662, 2000 WI 57, ¶17, 235 Wis. 2d 385, 611 N.W.2d 744 
(citation and quotation omitted). 
No. 
2003AP2555   
 
17 
 
rebuttable presumption that continuing the child's physical 
placement with the parent with whom the child resides for the 
greater period of time is in the best interest of the child.  
Wis. Stat. § 767.325(1)(b)2.b. 
The 
legislature's 
explicit 
creation of alternative presumptions that depend on where the 
child was initially placed is a legislative recognition that  
the phrase "maximizes the amount of time" does not mean equal 
placement is required in modification determinations.    
¶23 We therefore conclude that interpreting the term 
"maximize" to mandate equal placement would be a distortion of 
the term as it is used within this statutory scheme.  The 
proposed 
interpretation 
ignores 
the 
additional 
statutory 
directives and would allow the "maximizing" principle to trump 
the statutory emphasis on the child's best interest and other 
relevant considerations, rendering numerous provisions of the 
Wisconsin Statutes irrelevant and meaningless. 
C 
¶24 The legislative history further reinforces the plain 
language of the statute.  Although we need not examine 
legislative history when we find a statute unambiguous, we 
occasionally consult the legislative history to demonstrate "how 
that history supports our interpretation of a statute otherwise 
clear on its face."  Megal Development Corp. v. Shadof, 2005 WI 
151, ¶22, 286 Wis. 2d 105, 705 N.W.2d 645 (citation omitted). 
¶25 In 1999, the legislature made significant changes to 
Chapter 767.  See 1999 Wis. Act 9 §§ 3051n-3065di.  The original 
version of this Act changed Wis. Stat. § 767.24(5)(bm) to state 
No. 
2003AP2555   
 
18 
 
that a child had the "right to spend the same or substantial 
periods of time with each parent."  However, then-Governor Tommy 
Thompson vetoed this provision.  Governor Thompson explained his 
rationale in a veto message that accompanied his veto.  Because 
a governor's veto message is part of the legislative history and 
is evidence of legislative intent, see Juneau County v. 
Courthouse Employees, 221 Wis. 2d 630, 649, 585 N.W.2d 587 
(1998), we examine his statement to further understand the 
legislative intent 
in 
enacting § 767.24(5)(bm). 
 Governor 
Thompson stated in his veto message, in relevant part: 
Under current law, any placement schedule is evaluated 
against the standard of what is best for a child. Also 
under current law, a child is already entitled to 
periods of physical placement with both parents unless 
the court determines placement with a parent may be 
harmful to the child.   
Another change introduced creates a goal for the court 
to award regularly occurring and meaningful periods of 
physical placement which maximizes the amount of time 
each parent may spend with a child. I feel this latter 
change is sufficient to encourage courts to award as 
much 
placement 
as 
possible 
to 
each 
parent 
in 
accordance with what is best for a child. Creating a 
right of a child, however, goes too far and I object 
to the use of the budget bill to create new rights for 
children. If such a right exists, it should receive 
additional public and legislative review. Furthermore, 
by framing this issue in terms of a right, this 
section could arguably override the best interest 
standard. Therefore, I am vetoing section 3054cw and 
removing this right. 
Governor's Veto Message, October 27, 1999, at 88 (emphasis 
added).   
¶26 Moreover, the same year the legislature enacted the 
sweeping changes to Chapter 767, the legislators also rejected a 
No. 
2003AP2555   
 
19 
 
bill that would have eliminated the best interest of the child 
standard and would have created an equal placement presumption 
in all cases.  See 1999 Senate Bill 107.12  The legislature 
rejected SB 107 and instead enacted 1999 Wis. Act 9 §§ 3051n-
3065di.   
¶27 In addition, 1999 Wis. Act 9 §§ 3051n-3065di also 
created Wis. Stat. § 767.24(2), which established a presumption 
of joint legal custody in the initial placement determination.  
The fact that the legislature established a presumption of joint 
legal custody but did not use similar terms in § 767.24(4)(a)2., 
and instead used the phrase "maximizes the amount of time," 
demonstrates the legislature did not intend the provisions to 
have the same meaning.  Responsible Use of Rural and Agric. Land 
(RURAL) v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 2000 WI 129, ¶39, 239 
Wis. 2d 660, 619 N.W.2d 888 ("If a word or words are used in one 
subsection but are not used in another subsection, we must 
conclude that the legislature specifically intended a different 
meaning.") (citations omitted).   
¶28 Further, when the legislature modified Chapter 767 in 
1999, it chose to retain § 767.325(1)(b)2.b., which creates a 
presumption of the status quo in modification decisions when the 
original order granted one parent greater placement to continue 
the child's physical placement with the parent with whom the 
child 
resides 
for 
the 
greater 
period 
of 
time.  
                                                 
12 Senate Bill 107 also eliminated the role of guardians ad 
litem in family court.  That portion of the bill is not 
pertinent to this case. 
No. 
2003AP2555   
 
20 
 
Wis. Stat. § 767.325 (1)(b)2.b.  Had the legislature wanted to 
replace the status quo presumption with a presumption of equal 
placement in modification decisions, it would have done so 
explicitly by changing these provisions. 
¶29 The legislative history clearly supports the plain 
language of the statute: the maximization language was intended 
neither to override the best interests standard, nor to create a 
presumption of equal physical placement when the original 
placement order granted one parent greater placement.    
D 
¶30 Applying the plain meaning of the statutes to the 
present case, we conclude that the court did not abuse its 
discretion in modifying Michael's placement order. 
¶31 We note that the circuit court's discretion is 
entitled to deference if it applies the correct legal standard 
and reaches a reasonable result.  See Hughes, 223 Wis. 2d at 
119-20.  The circuit court determined that modification of the 
placement order was in the children's best interest and that the 
circumstances had substantially changed when Michael became 
self-employed and moved closer to his children.  In addition, 
the trial court concluded that Michael successfully rebutted the 
presumption that the status quo was not in the children's best 
interest during the summer months, but that Michael failed to 
rebut the presumption that continuing the children's placement 
during the school year was in the children's best interest.  In 
modifying the placement order, the circuit court also considered 
the factors relevant to the Landwehr children's particular 
No. 
2003AP2555   
 
21 
 
situation, such as the children's adjustment to their home and 
school, their existing placement order, their developmental 
needs, their need for stability, and the parents' relationship. 
¶32 Upon consideration of the children's best interest and 
factors relevant to the Landwehrs' particular situation, the 
circuit court increased the children's placement with their 
father during the summer months, but found that modification of 
the existing placement schedule during the school year was not 
in the children's best interest.  We find that the record 
reflects that the court applied the correct legal standard and 
reached a reasonable conclusion.  We therefore affirm the 
circuit court's modification determinations.   
IV 
¶33 In addition to concluding that the circuit court did 
not abuse its discretion in modifying Michael's placement order 
in 
July 
2003, 
we 
also 
acknowledge 
that 
in 
making 
its 
modification decision, the circuit court did not issue a written 
decision setting forth its reasons for the modification.  
Wisconsin Stats. § 767.325(5) requires a court to state in 
writing its reasons for a modification when the placement 
modification is contested.  The relevant statute reads, in full: 
If either party opposes modification or termination of 
a legal custody or physical placement order under this 
section the court shall state, in writing, its reasons 
for the modification or termination. 
Wis. Stat. § 767.325(5) (emphasis added).   
¶34 Although 
the circuit 
court 
did not 
specifically 
delineate its reasons for the modification decision in a written 
No. 
2003AP2555   
 
22 
 
decision, we find that under the circumstances of this case, the 
circuit court order substantially met the requirement of 
Wis. Stat. § 767.325(5) 
that 
the 
court's 
reasoning 
be 
in 
writing. First, the circuit court's written order incorporated 
by reference the court's "findings of facts and conclusions of 
law on the record on July 11, 2003."  Second, upon review of the 
transcripts of the circuit court's decision on July 11, 2003, we 
find that the court substantially explained its reasons for the 
court's modification decision.  Third, the court's rationale 
that is reflected in the record supports the circuit court's 
modification of Michael's placement schedule.  We therefore 
conclude that the court's order was in substantial compliance 
with Wis. Stat. § 767.325(5), that the purpose of § 767.325 has 
not been frustrated,13 and that a reversal of the orders of the 
circuit court is not required.  See State v. Coble, 100 
Wis. 2d 179, 215, 301 N.W.2d 221 (1981).14   
 
                                                 
13 A principal concern of the modification statutes is to 
protect the best interest of the child.  See generally 
Wis. Stat. §§ 767.11; 767.24; 767.325.   
In 
addition, 
another 
important 
objective 
of 
the 
modification statutes is continuity in the child's placement.  
See Wis. Stat. § 767.325(1)(b)2.  Here, the custody modification 
was ordered in July 2003.  Reversal of the court's custody order 
from nearly three years ago does not further the goal of 
maintaining continuity in the Landwehr children's placement, 
which the legislature has determined is in the children's best 
interest.   
14 We also note that this issue was not raised, briefed, nor 
argued by either party.   
No. 
2003AP2555   
 
23 
 
V 
¶35 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 767.24(4)(a)2. requires 
the circuit court to maximize the amount of time within an 
overall placement schedule and take into consideration the best 
interest of the child, the presumption of the status quo under 
Wis. Stat. § 767.325(1) and (2), the general factors listed in 
§ 767.24, 
and 
the 
particular 
factors 
listed 
under 
§ 767.24(5)(am), when relevant to the child.  We further 
conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion 
in retaining the existing school year placement and increasing 
Michael's summer placement.  We therefore affirm the court of 
appeals.  
By the Court.— The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2003AP2555.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶36 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I write 
to explain how I read the statutes applicable to the present 
case.  
¶37 First, I discuss how a circuit court proceeds under a 
request to modify an order of physical placement, including the 
meaning of the word "maximizes."   
¶38 Second, I discuss the statutory requirement that a 
circuit court state its reasons in writing for modification of 
physical placement. 
I 
¶39 The circuit court faced with a request to modify an 
order of physical placement more than two years after the 
initial order was entered under Wis. Stat. § 767.24 should 
approach the request as follows:1 
¶40 The 
circuit 
court 
must 
determine 
whether 
to 
substantially alter the time a parent may spend with his or her 
child.  Before making any modification that would alter the time 
a parent may spend with his or her child, the circuit court must 
find: 
(1) The modification is in the best interest of the 
child,2 and  
(2) A substantial change of circumstance since the last 
order substantially affecting physical placement.3 
                                                 
1 Wis. Stat. § 767.325(1)(b). 
2 Wis. Stat. § 767.325(1)(b)1.a. 
No.  2003AP2555.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶41 In determining the best interest of the child under 
(1) 
above, 
the 
circuit 
court 
considers 
the 
rebuttable 
presumption that continuing the child's physical placement with 
the parent with whom the child resides for the greater period of 
time is in the best interest of the child.4   
¶42 After 
considering 
the 
presumption, 
making 
the 
necessary 
findings, 
and 
deciding 
to 
modify 
the 
physical 
placement, the circuit court then must decide what the physical 
placement should be.  In deciding the modified physical 
placement, the circuit court "shall consider the factors under 
s. 767.24(5)(am), subject to s. 767.24(5)(bm),5 and shall make 
its determination in a manner consistent with s. 767.24."6   
                                                                                                                                                             
3 Wis. Stat. § 767.325(1)(b)1.b.  Because the initial court 
order did not provide substantially equal periods of physical 
placement for the parties, Wis. Stat. § 767.325(2) does not come 
into play in the present case. 
4 Wis. Stat. § 767.325(1)(b)2.b.   
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.24(5)(bm) refers to an abusive 
parent.  It has no application in the present case.  
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.325 provides as follows:  
Except for matters under s. 767.327 or 767.329, the 
following provisions are applicable to modifications 
of legal custody and physical placement orders: 
. . . . 
(5m) Factors to consider.  . . . [I]n all actions to 
modify legal custody or physical placement orders, the 
court 
shall 
consider 
the 
factors 
under 
s. 
767.24(5)(am), subject to s. 767.24(5)(bm), and shall 
make its determination in a manner consistent with s. 
767.24. 
No.  2003AP2555.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶43 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.24(5)(am) provides that the 
circuit court "shall consider all facts relevant to the best 
interest of the child" and lists 17 factors the circuit court 
shall consider in making its determination about periods of 
physical placement. 
¶44 The circuit court shall make its determination about 
how to modify the physical placement "in a manner consistent 
with s. 767.24."  This reference to "a manner consistent with s. 
767.24" is unclear.7  The majority opinion reasonably concludes 
that the reference in § 767.325(5m) to § 767.24 includes 
§ 767.24(4) (as well as any other provision in § 767.24(4) 
applicable 
to 
physical 
placement), 
which governs physical 
placement when a circuit court orders sole or joint legal 
custody in the initial order.     
¶45 Under Wis. Stat. § 767.24(4), in modifying physical 
placement the circuit court "shall consider each case on the 
basis of the factors in sub.(5)(am) . . . [and] shall set a 
placement schedule that allows the child to have regularly 
occurring, meaningful periods of physical placement with each 
                                                 
7 See Abbas v. Palmersheim, 2004 WI App 126, ¶20, 275 
Wis. 2d 311, 685 N.W.2d 546. 
Does the reference in Wis. Stat. § 767.325(5m) to § 767.24 
refer to everything in § 767.24 relating to physical placement, 
or is the reference only to the provisions of § 767.24 relating 
to the manner in which the circuit court makes its decisions, as 
set forth in § 767.24(6)?  If the reference is to § 767.24(4), 
why did the legislature use the word "manner" and why did the 
legislature 
not 
explicitly 
refer 
to 
§ 767.24(4), 
as 
it 
explicitly referred to § 767.24(5)(am) and (bm)?  It seems 
reasonable, however, that a circuit court modifying a physical 
placement order consider the factors set forth in § 767.24(4). 
No.  2003AP2555.ssa 
 
4 
 
parent and that maximizes the amount of time the child may spend 
with each parent, taking into account geographic separation and 
accommodations for different households."8  The question then 
arises about the meaning of the word "maximizes."9 
¶46 To 
harmonize 
the 
statutes, 
I 
conclude 
that 
in 
complying with Wis. Stat. § 767.24(5m) by considering the best 
interest of the child and the 17 factors, the circuit court 
shall also "maximize[] the amount of time the child may spend 
with each parent" by setting a placement schedule that considers 
the actual amount of time the child is likely to spend with the 
parent.  In other words, the circuit court in setting a 
placement schedule should, in addition to considering all the 
other factors required by statute, take into account the actual 
amount of time the child is likely to spend with each parent.  
Thus the circuit court might consider such matters as the time 
the child is, for example, in school, or with a caretaker, or 
asleep, and the times a parent works or is otherwise unavailable 
to be with the child. 
¶47 I conclude that the approach I have set forth 
satisfies the statutory requirements and gives meaning to all 
parts of the statutes. 
 
                                                 
8 Wis. Stat. § 767.24(4)(a)2. (emphasis added). 
9 Several court of appeals decisions have concluded that the 
statutes do not require equal placement.  See, e.g., Keller v. 
Keller, 2002 WI App 161, ¶¶2, 10, 12, 256 Wis. 2d 401, 647 
N.W.2d 426; Arnold 
v. Arnold, 
2004 
WI App 
62, ¶2, 270 
Wis. 2d 705, 679 N.W.2d 296.  
No.  2003AP2555.ssa 
 
5 
 
II 
¶48 I also write to discuss part IV of the majority 
opinion, majority op., ¶¶33-34, relating to the requirement in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.325(5) 
that 
when 
either 
party 
opposes 
modification of physical placement, the court shall state in 
writing its reason for the modification.  In the instant case, 
one of the parents opposed the modification to the physical 
placement and the circuit court modified physical placement.  
¶49 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.325(5) states in full: 
(5) Reasons for modification.  If either party opposes 
modification or termination of a legal custody or 
physical placement order under this section the court 
shall 
state, 
in 
writing, 
its 
reasons 
for 
the 
modification or termination. 
¶50 The writing requirement in Wis. Stat. § 767.325(5) may 
serve several purposes.  First and most importantly, the written 
statement assists the party objecting to modification to 
understand 
better 
the 
reasons 
for 
the 
circuit 
court's 
modification of placement.  A circuit court's written statement 
of reasoning is particularly important in family law cases 
because of the high percentage of self-represented litigants.10 
¶51 In addition, a written statement of reasons for 
modification forces the circuit court to think through and 
                                                 
10 See The Wisconsin Pro Se Working Group, Meeting The 
Challenge of Self-Represented Litigants in Wisconsin 8 (Dec. 
2000) 
(available 
at 
http://www.wicourts.gov/about/pubs/supreme/docs/prosereport.pdf) 
(reporting that in 1999, 53% of the family case litigants in 
judicial administrative district 10 were not represented by 
counsel and that 72% of the family case litigants in judicial 
administrative 
district 
1 
(Milwaukee 
County) 
were 
not 
represented by counsel). 
No.  2003AP2555.ssa 
 
6 
 
express its rationale carefully; allows for easier appellate 
review to determine whether the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion; and will later assist a circuit court 
that 
may 
be 
asked 
for 
further 
modification 
of 
physical 
placement. 
¶52 That the legislature wanted a circuit court to write 
its reasoning is evidenced by yet another requirement applicable 
to the present case, namely, that a circuit court, in physical 
placement disputes, state its findings relating to the best 
interest of the child.  Wisconsin Stat. § 767.24(6) states as 
follows in pertinent part: "If . . . physical placement is 
contested, the court shall state in writing why its findings 
relating to . . . physical placement are in the best interest of 
the child."    
¶53 The circuit court in the instant case did not state in 
writing the reasons for the modification or why its findings are 
in the best interest of the child.  The majority opinion 
concludes that "the circuit court order substantially met the 
requirement" that the order be in writing, reasoning that the 
written order incorporated by reference the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law stated orally on the record.11 
¶54 I do not think that the writing requirements of Wis. 
Stat. § 767.24(6) and § 767.325(5) were met in the instant case.  
Nor were the requirements "substantially met."  The legislature 
                                                 
11 Majority op., ¶34. 
No.  2003AP2555.ssa 
 
7 
 
has not stated that the circuit court shall incorporate by 
reference an oral record of its reasons.12 
¶55 In the instant case neither party claimed that the 
order did not meet the statutory writing requirements.  
¶56 Were this court or the court of appeals considering a 
challenge to a circuit court's order modifying placement based 
on the lack of the writings required by Wis. Stat. § 767.24(6) 
and § 767.325(5), the reviewing court should, in my opinion, 
remand the case to the circuit court to state its reasoning in 
writing before determining whether the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion.  
¶57 For the reasons set forth I write separately.   
                                                 
12 The majority cites State v. Coble, 100 Wis. 2d 179, 215, 
301 N.W.2d 221 (1981), for the proposition that substantial 
compliance by the circuit court is sufficient.  Coble is not 
applicable to the instant case.  In Coble, Milwaukee County jury 
commissioners improperly allowed jurors to be dismissed from the 
jury pool based on the jurors' requests.  This court held that 
the Milwaukee County Circuit Court was in substantial compliance 
with the jury selection statute and did not frustrate its 
purpose because, regardless of this error, it provided for an 
essentially random jury pool.  In Coble, the legislative 
purpose, namely random jury selection, was met.  In the instant 
case, the legislative purposes for requiring written reasons 
have not been fulfilled. 
No.  2003AP2555.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶58 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
I 
write 
separately 
with 
regard 
to 
the 
writing 
requirement 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 767.325(5).  The majority acknowledges that this 
issue was not raised, briefed, or argued.  Majority op., ¶34 
n.14. 
¶59 Without the assistance of adversarial briefing or 
arguments, both the majority and the above concurrence divine 
purposes behind the writing requirement.  See id., ¶34 & n.13; 
concurrence, ¶50.  They do not agree on those purposes.  I would 
leave for another day our interpretation of the writing 
requirement in § 767.325(5).  
 
 
No.  2003AP2555.awb 
 
 
 
1