Case Title: Commonwealth v. Resende

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11849

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11849 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ADMILSON RESENDE. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     December 10, 2015. - June 9, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Firearms.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Sentence. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 26, 2011. 
 
 
Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by Charles 
J. Hely, J., and a motion for reconsideration was considered by  
him; and the cases were heard by Frank M. Gaziano, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
Carolyn A. Burbine, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  In a jury-waived trial in June, 2014, a 
Superior Court judge found the defendant, Admilson Resende, 
guilty of several firearms offenses, each of which had 
2 
 
 
associated with it an armed career criminal sentence enhancement 
charge under G. L. c. 269, § 10G (§ 10G), the Massachusetts 
armed career criminal act (Massachusetts ACCA).  After a 
separate jury-waived trial on the enhancement charges, the judge 
sentenced the defendant under § 10G (c) to a mandatory minimum 
State prison term of from fifteen years to fifteen years and one 
day.  In his appeal from these convictions, the defendant 
presents an unanswered question about the proper interpretation 
of § 10G, which provides sentence enhancements for designated 
firearms offenses where a defendant previously has been 
convicted of one or more "violent crimes" or "serious drug 
offenses," or a combination of the two.  For reasons we shall 
explain, we interpret § 10G to mean that where the previous 
convictions of predicate offenses forming the basis of the 
sentence enhancement charge were all part of a single 
prosecution, they properly should be treated as a single 
predicate conviction.  In this case, therefore, the defendant's 
previous drug offense convictions, which were part of a single 
prosecution, should have been considered as one previous 
conviction that would be punishable under § 10G (a) rather than 
§ 10G (c).1 
                     
 
1 In addition to his claim concerning the sentence imposed 
under G. L. c. 269, § 10G (§ 10G), the defendant challenges the 
denial of his pretrial motions to suppress evidence.  We 
3 
 
 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Prior drug convictions.  On August 22, 
2006, when the defendant was nineteen years old, he was arrested 
and charged with five counts of distribution of cocaine and one 
count of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, G. L. 
c. 94C, § 32A (a).  The five distribution counts arose from 
hand-to-hand transactions that took place on five different days 
within a seventeen-day period from August 5 through August 22, 
2006; the possession with intent count arose from the 
defendant's actions on August 22, 2006.  All of the counts were 
included in a single set of charges.  On January 23, 2007, the 
defendant pleaded guilty to the distribution charges as part of 
a single plea proceeding, and received concurrent house of 
correction sentences.2 
 
b.  Convictions at issue in this appeal.  i.  Procedural 
history.  On August 26, 2011, a grand jury returned indictments 
against the defendant for unlawful possession of a firearm, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); unlawful possession of a loaded firearm, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n); unlawful possession of a firearm or 
ammunition without a firearm identification card, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (h); and unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute, subsequent offense, G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (c) and (d).  
                                                                  
conclude in this opinion that the defendant's motions to 
suppress were properly denied. 
 
 
2 The possession with intent charge was placed on file. 
4 
 
 
Each of the firearms offenses carried a concomitant sentence 
enhancement charge under § 10G.  On May 7, 2012, the defendant 
filed motions to suppress the physical evidence seized by the 
police and his postarrest statements.  After an evidentiary 
hearing, a Superior Court judge (motion judge) denied the 
motions on December 4, 2012.  On June 30, 2014, at the 
conclusion of a bench trial on all charges other than the 
sentence enhancement charges, a different Superior Court judge 
(trial judge) found the defendant guilty of unlawful possession 
of a firearm, unlawful possession of a loaded firearm, and 
unlawful possession of a firearm or ammunition without a firearm 
identification card; he found the defendant not guilty of 
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.  Thereafter, 
the trial judge in a separate bench trial found the defendant 
guilty of two of the armed career criminal sentence enhancement 
charges as a person previously convicted of three or more 
serious drug offenses, and imposed the mandatory minimum 
sentence.3,4 
                     
 
3 The defendant's conviction of unlawful possession of a 
loaded firearm and the accompanying armed career criminal charge 
were dismissed by agreement. 
 
 
4 At the conclusion of the trial on the sentence enhancement 
charges, the trial judge denied the defendant's request for a 
required finding that each of the previous drug charges did not 
constitute a separate predicate offense under the Massachusetts 
armed career criminal act (ACCA). 
5 
 
 
 
ii.  Facts.5  On May 28, 2011, State police Trooper Erik 
Telford was on patrol in Brockton with Sergeant Michael 
McCarthy.  Telford had substantial experience working as a 
member of law enforcement units focused on individuals involved 
in guns, violence, and drugs in urban areas, and he had worked 
specifically in Brockton and with the Brockton police.  At 
approximately 11:40 P.M., Telford and McCarthy, driving in an 
unmarked police vehicle, were near the intersection of Ames and 
Intervale Streets, where, on one corner, a bar was located.  The 
neighborhood was an area where Telford had been assigned to work 
since 2003, and he had made numerous arrests for gun offenses as 
well as drug offenses in this area.  Telford saw a young man, 
the defendant, walking with two women on the opposite side of 
Intervale Street, and believed that the defendant made eye 
contact with him.  The defendant was wearing a long polyester 
jacket that extended past his hips and covered his pants 
pockets.  Telford noticed the jacket because it was not a 
particularly cold night and Telford himself was not wearing a 
jacket.  Telford saw the defendant move his hand under the 
jacket and into the waistband area underneath his shirt, and 
                     
 
5 The facts are taken primarily from the findings made by 
the motion judge in ruling on the defendant's motions to 
suppress; the judge's findings are themselves based primarily on 
the testimony of Trooper Erik Telford and Sergeant Michael 
McCarthy of the State police, witnesses whom the motion judge 
found to be "highly credible." 
6 
 
 
became suspicious that the defendant was carrying a gun.  
Telford also believed that the defendant appeared similar to a 
man depicted in a bulletin that had been posted at various 
locations in the Brockton police station.6 
 
Telford turned his vehicle around, "and waited in the 
vicinity of the [bar]."  As he did so, the defendant and the two 
women walked through the bar's parking lot toward the front door 
of the bar.7  Telford and McCarthy left their vehicle and 
approached the defendant, while wearing clothing marked "State 
Police," with their badges and guns clearly visible.  As he 
approached, Telford noticed that the defendant had his right 
hand out of his pocket and at his waist area.  Telford asked the 
                     
 
6 On or about May 25, 2011, Brockton police Officer Robert 
Saquet posted bulletins containing a photograph of a young 
African-American man holding a "TEC-9" automatic pistol in the 
Brockton police station detectives' office and the report room, 
where uniformed officers write their reports; the name of the 
man depicted in the photograph was not provided.  Trooper Erik 
Telford had seen one of the bulletins while in the Brockton 
police station within a few days of May 28, 2011.  Although at 
some point the Brockton police learned the name of the person 
depicted, who was not the defendant, and added the name to the 
bulletin, the original version viewed by Telford had not had a 
name added to it. 
 
 
The motion judge found that the defendant shared similar 
basic characteristics with the man in the bulletin, including 
height, approximate age, facial hair, and wearing of a baseball 
cap, and noted that these similarities could apply to many men 
in the Brockton area. 
 
 
7 The motion judge did not make any finding about precisely 
when the two police officers drove into the bar parking lot 
itself, or about where the officers parked their vehicle in 
relation to the entrance to the bar. 
7 
 
 
defendant his name, and the defendant gave his correct name in 
response.  Telford then remembered that he had encountered the 
defendant in connection with a search of a residence pursuant to 
a warrant -- a search that had resulted in the discovery of two 
guns.  At this point, Ryan Guinta, a bouncer at the bar, came 
out of the bar and told the officers that the defendant had been 
in the bar all night.  Telford knew that this was not true, and 
told Guinta to go back inside, which he did. 
 
Telford motioned to the defendant to follow him to a 
different part of the parking lot where they could speak 
further.  As the defendant walked to this location, Telford 
noticed that the defendant had his right hand in his pocket but 
was holding it close to his body at the waistband area, and that 
the defendant "bladed away" from him.8  During the ensuing 
conversation, the defendant, with his right hand in his pocket, 
made movements that appeared to Telford to be retention checks -
- touching the area where a weapon or heavy object is located to 
ensure it stays in place because it is not holstered.  Telford 
recognized these types of movements as being consistent with 
someone who is carrying a weapon in his waistband.  Telford 
asked the defendant to remove his right hand from his pocket, 
                     
 
8 Telford testified that "blading away" refers to the action 
of creating a thin profile of oneself with respect to another 
viewpoint, effectively hiding one side of the body from the 
other person's view. 
8 
 
 
which the defendant did briefly, before putting it back into the 
pocket.  Telford asked the defendant again to remove his right 
hand from his pocket, which he did, and then the defendant 
touched an area near his waistband, consistent with another 
retention check.  After noticing that the defendant was looking 
from left to right, as if to attempt to flee, Telford asked him 
to lift his shirt, twice.  The defendant did so, but both times 
exposed only the left side of his waistband, where Telford saw 
nothing.  At this point, because the officers were convinced 
that the defendant was carrying a gun, they decided to handcuff 
him, but before the handcuffs were applied, Telford reached to 
the right side of the defendant's waistband and retrieved a gun 
containing one round of ammunition in the chamber and at least 
one other round in the gun magazine.  The officers arrested the 
defendant for unlawfully carrying a firearm and advised him of 
the Miranda rights.  After stating that he understood his 
rights, the defendant said that he had obtained the gun in 
Providence, Rhode Island, the cost was $750, the gun was not 
stolen, and it had serial numbers.  In a subsequent search of 
the defendant incident to his arrest, the officers found plastic 
bags containing cocaine and, when asked if the bags contained 
more than fourteen grams, the defendant responded that they did 
not. 
9 
 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Motions to suppress.  On review of a 
ruling on a motion to suppress, "we accept the judge's 
subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error 'but conduct an 
independent review of his ultimate findings and conclusions of 
law'" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 
646 (2004).  We "make an independent determination of the 
correctness of the judge's application of constitutional 
principles to the facts as found" (citation omitted).  Id. 
 
The defendant argues that the denial of his motions to 
suppress was error because he was seized without reasonable 
suspicion -- a contention turning primarily on the propriety of 
the motion judge's ruling that no seizure of the defendant 
occurred at least until the defendant was directed to go speak 
with Trooper Telford in a different area of the parking lot from 
where the officers first encountered him.  The defendant 
contends that this ruling was incorrect because, contrary to the 
motion judge's findings, the uncontradicted testimony of Telford 
showed that as the defendant approached the front door of the 
bar, the officers "cut off [the defendant's] path of travel and 
immediately got out of their car and approached him" with their 
guns and badges displayed.  In doing so, the defendant argues, 
the officers effectuated a seizure of his person at that point, 
because a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave 
under those circumstances.  The defendant contends further that, 
10 
 
 
at this point in time, the officers did not have a reasonable 
suspicion of any criminal activity, and accordingly, all of the 
officers' actions that followed, culminating in the defendant's 
arrest, were constitutionally prohibited and his motions to 
suppress should have been allowed.  The Commonwealth argues that 
the motion judge correctly concluded that there was no seizure 
of the defendant until he was directed to a different area of 
the parking lot, at which time the officers had a reasonable 
suspicion that the defendant was illegally carrying a gun, and 
their subsequent, measured actions fit well within the scope of 
a permissible stop, frisk, and seizure pursuant to Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  We agree with the Commonwealth. 
 
We reject the defendant's challenge to the motion judge's 
factual findings.  As previously stated, the judge did not make 
a specific finding as to when the two officers drove into the 
parking lot,9 but insofar as the findings may suggest that the 
officers entered the parking lot and came to a stop before the 
defendant and his two companions reached the bar's door and at a 
distance that permitted them to do so, the testimony of Sergeant 
McCarthy supports that view.10  Accordingly, we do not agree with 
                     
 
9 See note 7, supra, and accompanying text. 
 
 
10 McCarthy testified that "when [he] pulled into the 
parking lot with Trooper Telford, . . . the defendant and the 
two females continue[d] to walk towards the entrance of the 
[bar]." 
11 
 
 
the defendant that the judge made clearly erroneous findings 
concerning the initial encounter between the defendant and the 
two officers.  Rather, our review of the motion record persuades 
us that the judge was warranted in concluding that the officers' 
exit from their vehicle with their State police identification 
and weapons visible, followed by Telford's question asking the 
defendant for his name, was not itself a stop or seizure in the 
constitutional sense.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Narcisse, 457 
Mass. 1, 5-6 (2010) (no seizure where officers pulled alongside 
defendant and got out of vehicle, asking defendant's name and 
what he was doing in vicinity); Commonwealth v. Gomes, 453 Mass. 
506, 510 (2009) (defendant not seized when police got out of 
vehicles quickly and approached him as he stood in doorway; no 
indication that police activated blue lights); Commonwealth v. 
Lopez, 451 Mass. 608, 610-614 (2008) (two uniformed officers in 
two marked patrol cruisers followed defendant on bicycle late at 
night; one officer emerged from cruiser, and asked, "Can I speak 
with you?" after which defendant approached him; officer's 
actions did not constitute seizure); Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 
449 Mass. 367, 370-371 (2007) (no seizure where police got out 
of unmarked vehicle and approached defendant, while engaging in 
brief conversation). 
 
The motion judge determined that a limited "intrusion" -- 
i.e., seizure -- occurred when Telford requested or directed the 
12 
 
 
defendant to walk to a different part of the parking lot to talk 
to the trooper, and that this seizure was justified in the 
circumstances.  We agree.  By that point, Telford had observed 
the defendant holding his hand at his waist in a manner that 
Telford believed from his training and experience was consistent 
with someone holding a gun in the waistband of his pants.  
Moreover, before speaking with the defendant at the new location 
in the parking lot, Telford had observed the defendant "blading" 
away from him and making motions with his hand that were 
consistent with weapon retention checks.  We also agree with the 
motion judge that Telford's series of increasingly intrusive 
actions that followed -- asking the defendant to take his hands 
out of his pocket, then asking the defendant to raise his shirt, 
then reaching for the defendant's hands and putting them behind 
his back, and then grabbing a gun from the defendant's waist 
area on his right side -- were all reasonable responses to new 
information supplied by the defendant's actions that provided an 
increasingly robust basis for suspecting the defendant was 
holding a concealed gun in his pants on the right side of his 
body.  The seizure of the defendant effectuated by Telford and 
McCarthy was constitutionally proper.  See DePeiza, 449 Mass. at 
371.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Torres, 433 Mass. 669, 675 (2001) 
(officer's actions no more intrusive than necessary at each 
13 
 
 
phase of increasingly suspicious interaction with defendant and 
passengers in vehicle during traffic stop). 
 
b.  Defendant's armed career criminal status.  The 
defendant argues that his armed career criminal convictions 
cannot stand because his five previous drug convictions were 
encompassed in a single prosecution.  As such, he claims, the 
convictions should be counted as a single predicate offense for 
purposes of § 10G, and therefore within the scope of level one, 
see § 10G (a), rather than level three, see § 10G (c).  The 
Commonwealth takes the position that, under § 10G, similar to 
the enhancement scheme under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006), the 
Federal armed career criminal act (Federal ACCA), each 
qualifying violent crime or serious drug offense of which a 
defendant has previously been convicted represents a separate 
predicate offense for purposes of determining sentence 
enhancement levels, regardless of whether those previous 
convictions were the result of a single or several prosecutions.  
Although this court has considered questions concerning the 
proper interpretation of § 10G in prior cases,11 the issue raised 
here is one of first impression. 
                     
 
11 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Eberhart, 461 Mass. 809 
(2012); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 461 Mass. 616, cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 433 (2012); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44 
(2011); Commonwealth v. Furr, 454 Mass. 101 (2009).  The Appeals 
Court has as well.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Colon, 81 Mass. 
14 
 
 
 
Section 10G provides in relevant part: 
 
"(a) Whoever, having been previously convicted of a 
violent crime or of a serious drug offense, both as defined 
herein, violates the provisions of paragraph (a), (c) or 
(h) of [§] 10 shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
state prison for not less than three years nor more than 
[fifteen] years. 
 
 
"(b) Whoever, having been previously convicted of two 
violent crimes, or two serious drug offenses or one violent 
crime and one serious drug offense, arising from separate 
incidences, violates the provisions of said paragraph (a), 
(c) or (h) of said [§] 10 shall be punished by imprisonment 
in the state prison for not less than ten years nor more 
than [fifteen] years. 
 
 
"(c) Whoever, having been previously convicted of 
three violent crimes or three serious drug offenses, or any 
combination thereof totaling three, arising from separate 
incidences, violates the provisions of said paragraph (a), 
(c) or (h) of said [§] 10 shall be punished by imprisonment 
in the state prison for not less than [fifteen] years nor 
more than [twenty] years."  (Emphasis added.) 
 
G. L. c. 269, § 10G (a)-(c).12 
 
The question of interpretation before us relates to the 
meaning of the phrase, "having been previously convicted of 
three [qualifying crimes] arising from separate incidences," 
that appears in § 10G (c), and more specifically the meaning of 
                                                                  
App. Ct. 8, 12 (2011); Commonwealth v. Ware, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 
220, 222 (2009). 
 
 
12 Under § 10G (d), any sentence imposed under the statute 
shall not be reduced to less than the minimum mandatory sentence 
or suspended, and the defendant is not eligible for probation or 
parole until he has served the minimum term. 
15 
 
 
the phrase, "arising from separate incidences."13  To answer that 
question, we consider first the meaning of the actual language 
used by the Legislature.  See Commonwealth v. Robertson, 467 
Mass. 371, 376 (2014).  However, "we also seek guidance from 
[the statute's] legislative history, . . . the language and 
construction of related statutes, . . . and the law of other 
jurisdictions" (citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Welch, 444 
Mass. 80, 85 (2005). 
 
The word "incidences" or "incidence" is not defined in 
§ 10G.  Dictionary definitions of "incidence" include "an act or 
the fact or manner of falling upon or affecting:  occurrence," 
the "rate, range, or amount of occurrence or influence," 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1142 (1993), and 
"[t]he frequency with which something occurs, such as crime" or 
"the number of times that something happens," Black's Law 
Dictionary 879 (10th ed. 2014).  The word thus appears to focus 
more on the measurement of something's frequency of occurrence 
than on the definition of the "something" itself.  In that 
sense, it is distinct from the word "incidents," or "incident."14  
                     
 
13 At issue in this case are the defendant's convictions 
under § 10G (c), but our analysis applies with equal force to 
§ 10G (b). 
 
14 The word "incident" is defined as "a separate unit of 
experience:  happening," Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 1142 (1993), and "[a] discrete occurrence or 
16 
 
 
But the fact that the Legislature chose not to use the word 
"incidents" provides little direct guidance as to what the 
Legislature meant by selecting "incidences."  Nor is the 
statute's legislative history illuminating on this point.  
Section 10G was enacted in 1998 as one section of an omnibus 
piece of legislation entitled, "An Act relative to gun control 
in the Commonwealth," that was designed to provide a stricter 
gun control regime by adding a wide variety of new statutory 
provisions.15  It appears that from the earliest drafts, the 
phrase "arising from separate incidences" was included in what 
is now § 10G, and nothing in these drafts or any other 
legislative materials available for review offers any 
explanation or guidance as to the reason for this choice of 
                                                                  
happening; an event, esp. one that is unusual, important, or 
violent," Black's Law Dictionary 879 (10th ed. 2014). 
 
 
15 Section 10G was inserted by St. 1998, c. 180, which, 
among other things, enacted into Massachusetts law the Federal 
assault weapons ban; created negligence liability for gun owners 
who improperly stored guns; created a new category of large 
capacity weapons, see G. L. c. 140, § 121, and G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10F; created a new licensing structure for all guns, see G. L. 
c. 140 § 123; established a firearms record-keeping trust fund; 
prohibited the possession or sale of "sawed-off" shotguns, see 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (c); required that gun dealers operate out of 
a location separate from their residence; prohibited mail order 
gun sales within the State, G. L. c. 140, § 123; established 
penalties for possession of a weapon while intoxicated, G. L. 
c. 269, § 10H; and required all new gun license applicants to 
pass a gun safety course, G. L. c. 140, § 131P. 
17 
 
 
words, or the meaning that the Legislature ascribed to them.16  
However, three separate considerations lead us to conclude that 
the phrase "arising from separate incidences" is best understood 
to mean that each previous conviction serving as a predicate 
offense under § 10G must result from a separate prosecution, and 
not simply from a separate criminal event.  The three 
considerations are the Legislature's departure from the language 
used in the Federal ACCA, the analysis of cases from other 
jurisdictions, and the rule of lenity. 
 
The Federal ACCA provides: 
 
"In the case of a person who violates [18 U.S.C. 
§922(g)] and has three previous convictions . . . for a 
violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, 
committed on occasions different from one another, such 
person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not 
less than fifteen years, and, notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence 
of, or grant a probationary sentence to, such person with 
respect to the conviction under [§] 922(g)" (emphasis 
supplied). 
 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).  The language "committed on occasions 
different from one another" was added to the Federal ACCA by 
                     
 
16 The legislative record of the omnibus bill's enactment 
includes two recommendations from the Governor's legislative 
director to his legislative office and a House of 
Representatives "Executive Bill Summary" memorandum, both of 
which provide summaries of the bill by section.  With respect to 
§ 10G, the documents state that if a defendant has "three 
previous felony convictions the punishment shall be imprisonment 
in a [S]tate prison for not less than [fifteen] nor more than 
[twenty] years," but do not address the timing of those 
convictions in relation to each other, or the statutory phrase 
"arising from separate incidences." 
18 
 
 
amendment in 1988.  See Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 
§ 7056 (1988).  In United States v. Letterlough, 63 F.3d 332, 
335 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 955 (1995), the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit articulated the 
test that it noted was used by the courts of almost every 
Federal Circuit for determining whether the Federal ACCA applies 
to a defendant's prior crimes:  "Convictions occur on occasions 
different from one another 'if each of the prior convictions 
arose out of a 'separate and distinct criminal episode"'" 
(emphasis in original).  Id., quoting United States v. Hudspeth, 
42 F.3d 1015, 1019 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1105 
(1995). 
The Legislature enacted the Massachusetts ACCA ten years 
after the Federal ACCA was amended to include the phrase 
"committed on occasions different from one another" and three 
years after the Letterlough decision.  The Massachusetts ACCA 
adopts the definitional language of the Federal ACCA.17  See 
Commonwealth v. Colon, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 8, 12 (2011).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Eberhart, 461 Mass. 809, 815 (2012).  However, 
we disagree with the Commonwealth that the Massachusetts statute 
                     
 
17 A comparison of the definitions of "violent crime" and 
"serious drug offense" in the Massachusetts ACCA with the 
language used by Congress to define "violent felony" and 
"serious drug offense" in the Federal ACCA indicates that the 
two definitions are virtually identical in substance; the 
inference that the Legislature had the Federal ACCA in mind when 
enacting the Massachusetts ACCA appears inescapable. 
19 
 
 
"largely replicates," Colon, supra, the entire structure of its 
Federal counterpart.  In fact, § 10G departs from the Federal 
ACCA precisely in relation to the language in contention here, 
namely, the description of what makes a prior violent crime or 
serious drug offense qualify as a predicate offense.  That is, 
§ 10G does not incorporate the Federal ACCA language that the 
crimes be "committed on occasions different from one another," 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), to qualify, but rather requires that the 
predicate crimes be ones "arising from separate incidences."  
Considering the Legislature's obvious awareness of the language 
used in the Federal ACCA (witness the § 10G definitions) and the 
Legislature's presumptive knowledge of the nearly uniform 
judicial interpretation of the phrase "committed on occasions 
different from one another,"18 its decision to use different 
words to refer to qualifying offenses suggests that the 
Legislature affirmatively intended to enact a sentence 
enhancement scheme that did not march in lock step with the 
Federal ACCA.  Differences in language between a State statute 
and a previously enacted, analogous Federal statute "reflect a 
conscious decision by the Legislature to deviate from the 
standard embodied in the Federal statute."  Globe Newspaper Co. 
                     
18 Cf. Commonwealth v. Callahan, 440 Mass. 436, 441 (2003) 
(we "presume that the Legislature is aware of the prior state of 
the law as explicated by the decisions of this court" [citation 
omitted]). 
20 
 
 
v. Boston Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 433 (1983).  See 
Commonwealth v. McGhee, 472 Mass. 405, 413 n.8 (2015).  We 
therefore reject the Commonwealth's argument, adopted by the 
dissent, that in § 10G the Legislature simply employed different 
words to convey the exact same meaning as the Federal ACCA. 
 
That the Legislature had a sentencing scheme different from 
the Federal ACCA in mind when it enacted § 10G is made even more 
clear when the structures of the Massachusetts and Federal 
statutes are compared.  The Federal ACCA imposes only one level 
of enhancement that comes into play after three qualifying 
offenses; in contrast, § 10G provides for three separate levels 
of enhancement, each with an increasing mandatory minimum 
sentence depending on the number of predicate offenses 
committed, up to a maximum of three -- i.e., a graduated 
approach to enhanced penalties.  Again, given its familiarity 
with the Federal statute, the Legislature's rejection of the 
single, "three strikes, you're out" model of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) 
and the adoption of a graduated approach is significant. 
 
In terms of structure, the Massachusetts ACCA shares less 
in common with the Federal ACCA than it does with a large number 
of armed career criminal sentencing statutes with graduated 
penalty provisions that have been enacted by other States.  The 
language of these statutes varies, but a majority of State 
appellate courts have interpreted statutory provisions providing 
21 
 
 
progressively longer sentences for crimes a defendant commits 
after having been previously convicted of one, two, or three 
qualifying offenses to require that the prior convictions be 
sequential -- i.e., that the first conviction (and imposition of 
sentence) occur before the commission of the second predicate 
crime, and the second conviction and sentence occur before the 
commission of the third crime.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Shiffler, 583 Pa. 478, 480, 492-495 (2005).  See also Hall v. 
State, 473 A.2d 352, 356-357 (Del. 1984); State v. Lohrbach, 217 
Kan. 588, 591 (1975); State v. Ellis, 214 Neb. 172, 174-176 
(1983).19  See generally Annot., Chronological or Procedural 
Sequence of Former Convictions as Affecting Enhancement of 
Penalty under Habitual Offender Statutes, 7 A.L.R. 5th 263, 
§§ 2(a), 7(d) (1992 & Supp. 2015).20 
                     
 
19 But see, e.g., Watson v. State, 392 So. 2d 1274, 1279 
(Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (no requirement that prior convictions be 
sequential); Knight v. State, 277 Ark. 213, 215-216 (1982) 
(same); People v. District Court in & for the County of Larimer, 
643 P.2d 37, 38-39 (Colo. 1982) (same); Stradt v. State, 608 
N.W.2d 28, 29-30 (Iowa 2000) (same). 
 
 
20 It bears noting that despite the actual language and 
judicial interpretation of the Federal ACCA -- which, as we have 
discussed, focuses on whether the prior convictions involved 
distinct criminal episodes -- the United States Sentencing 
Commission has adopted guidelines providing that simultaneous 
convictions, i.e., convictions charged in the same charging 
instrument or for which sentences are entered on the same day, 
should qualify only as a single predicate offense under the 
Federal ACCA, unless the offenses were separated by intervening 
arrests.  See Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2(a)(2) 
(updated Nov. 2015). 
22 
 
 
 
The rationale underlying the majority view that graduated 
sentence enhancement statutes should be interpreted to require 
sequential prosecutions and convictions of the predicate crimes 
is well expressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Shiffler, 
583 Pa. at 494: 
 
"'[T]he point of sentence enhancement is to punish 
more severely offenders who have persevered in criminal 
activity despite the theoretically beneficial effects of 
penal discipline.' . . .  Particularly salient here is the 
implicit link between enhanced punishment and behavioral 
reform, and the notion that the former should 
correspondingly increase along with a defendant's foregone 
opportunities for the latter.  Any other conception would 
ignore the rationale underlying the recidivist philosophy, 
i.e., that the most culpable defendant is 'one, who after 
being reproved, "still hardeneth his neck."' . . .  The 
generally recognized purpose of such graduated sentencing 
laws is to punish offenses more severely when the defendant 
has exhibited an unwillingness to reform his miscreant ways 
and to conform his life according to the law" (emphasis in 
original; citations omitted).21 
 
Decisions in other States reflect similar reasoning.  See, e.g., 
State v. Ledbetter, 240 Conn. 317, 328-330, 332 (1997) ("We 
agree with the defendant that the legislative purpose of [the 
State's armed career criminal statute] is fulfilled only by 
requiring a sequence of offense, conviction and punishment, thus 
allowing a felon the opportunity to reform prior to being 
labeled a persistent felony offender"); Buckingham v. State, 482 
                     
 
21 Accord Commonwealth v. McClintic, 589 Pa. 465, 483 (2006) 
("Following the recidivist logic, each strike that serves as a 
predicate offense must be followed by sentencing and, by 
necessary implication, an opportunity for reform, before the 
offender commits the next strike"). 
23 
 
 
A.2d 327, 330-331 (Del. 1984) (punishment enhanced only for 
individuals who failed to reform after separate encounters with 
criminal justice system); Lohrbach, 217 Kan. at 591 ("The basic 
philosophy underlying recidivist statutes might be expressed in 
this fashion:  where the punishment imposed against an offender 
for violating the law has failed to deter him from further 
infractions, a harsher and more severe penalty is justified, the 
idea being, hopefully, that the greater punishment may serve as 
an object lesson and cause him to accomplish his reformation, 
where the lesser penalty had failed in that respect").22 
 
As noted, the available legislative history of the 
Massachusetts ACCA does not reveal the Legislature's specific 
rationale or purpose for eschewing the Federal ACCA's approach 
and establishing a graduated penalty structure tied to the 
number of a defendant's previous convictions of predicate 
offenses.  But the Legislature having done so, we are persuaded 
that the most logical interpretation of § 10G (a)-(c) is one 
                     
 
22 See also State v. Ellis, 214 Neb. 172, 175-176 (1983) 
("We believe that the purpose of enacting the habitual criminal 
statute is to serve as a warning to previous offenders that if 
they do not reform their ways they may be imprisoned for a 
considerable period of time, regardless of the penalty for the 
specific crime charged. . . .  We believe we should join the 
majority of jurisdictions in their interpretation of the 
habitual criminal statute, and now, therefore, declare that in 
order to warrant the enhancement of the penalty under the 
Nebraska habitual criminal statute . . . the prior convictions, 
except the first conviction, must be for offenses committed 
after each preceding conviction, and all such prior convictions 
must precede the commission of the principal offense"). 
24 
 
 
that reflects and implements the principle that penal discipline 
can have (or should have) a reforming influence on an offender, 
with enhanced consequences if prior convictions and sentences do 
not have such an effect.23  As a consequence, the most logical 
and appropriate interpretation of § 10G (c) is that its sentence 
enhancement of a mandatory minimum of fifteen years applies only 
when a defendant's previous convictions of three qualifying 
crimes "arising from separate incidences" were the results of 
separate, sequential prosecutions. 
 
Finally, insofar as the meaning of "arising from separate 
incidences" in § 10G (c) is ambiguous,24 the rule of lenity 
supports the interpretation we have adopted here: 
                     
 
23 This rationale reflects what the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court terms a "recidivist philosophy."  See Commonwealth v.  
Shiffler, 583 Pa. 478, 494 (2005).  The dissent contends that 
there is little to no support for our conclusion that a 
recidivist philosophy underlies the Legislature's enactment of 
§ 10G.  Post at    .  Certainly the scant legislative history 
relating to § 10G contains no evidence that the Legislature used 
that term.  But the Legislature's express adoption of a 
graduated penalty structure in § 10G, increasing the mandatory 
minimum sentence as the defendant acquires more "strikes," and 
the decisions of other State courts construing habitual offender 
statutes akin to § 10G in a manner consistent with the 
substantive tenets of a recidivist philosophy work together to 
support our interpretation.  See Commonwealth v. Welch, 444 
Mass. 80, 85 (2005) (court may use language and construction of 
related statutes and law of other jurisdictions to determine 
legislative intent). 
 
 
24 The dissent states that § 10G is not ambiguous and 
asserts that the statute's plain meaning is that "previous 
convictions are convictions occurring prior to the ACCA 
violation for offenses 'arising from separate' criminal 
25 
 
 
 
"Under the rule of lenity, 'if we find that the 
statute is ambiguous or are unable to ascertain the intent 
of the Legislature, the defendant is entitled to the 
benefit of any rational doubt.'  Commonwealth v. 
Constantino, 443 Mass. 521, 524 (2005).  'This principle 
applies to sentencing as well as substantive provisions.'  
Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 569 (1982)." 
 
Commonwealth v. Richardson, 469 Mass. 248, 254 (2014).  See 
Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 459 Mass. 422, 436-437 (2011).  The 
Commonwealth posits that § 10G's requirement that qualifying 
convictions "aris[e] from separate incidences" is satisfied so 
long as the defendant's conduct underlying the convictions 
involved distinct criminal offenses even if all the convictions 
were the result of a single prosecution.  This interpretation is 
not compelled by the language and particularly the structure of 
§ 10G.25  Accordingly, in this case -- where the defendant's 
previous drug offense convictions were the result of counts that 
                                                                  
incidents."  Post at    .However, this construction of the 
statute conflates the terms "incident" and "incidence," which, 
as discussed previously, have distinct definitions.  See note 
14, supra.  Where the Legislature used the term "incidences" in 
§ 10G, we will interpret the statute with that word in mind, and 
will not substitute for it a word that means something else. 
 
 
25 It is clear that the defendant could not have been 
sentenced as an armed career criminal under § 10G during the 
prosecution of the crimes committed in 2006 because those 
convictions were simultaneous –- i.e., none of the convictions 
could be considered a previous conviction in relation to any of 
the others.  Allowing the defendant to be sentenced as a third-
time repeat offender under § 10G (c) here, despite the fact that 
he could not have, at any previous time, been charged as even a 
first-time repeat offender under § 10G (a), is a result that we 
do not believe the Legislature intended.  Cf. Shiffler, 583 Pa. 
at 492. 
26 
 
 
were brought at the same time, combined in a single set of 
charges, prosecuted and handled as a single criminal 
prosecution, and resolved by guilty pleas in a single plea 
proceeding -- the convictions represented a single "incidence" 
for purposes of § 10G.  The defendant, therefore, could not be 
prosecuted or sentenced under § 10G (c) (or § 10G [b]), but 
could be prosecuted and sentenced pursuant to § 10G (a). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The motion judge properly denied the 
defendant's motions to suppress evidence, and the order denying 
the motions to suppress is affirmed.  With respect to the 
defendant's appeal from his convictions as an armed career 
criminal pursuant to G. L. c. 269, § 10G (c), those convictions 
are vacated, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
 
CORDY, J. (dissenting in part, with whom Spina, J., joins).  
I agree that the defendant's motions to suppress were properly 
denied.  I disagree that the Massachusetts armed career criminal 
act, G. L. c. 269, § 10G (ACCA), is ambiguous, and would adopt 
what I perceive to be the plain meaning of its words:  previous 
convictions are convictions occurring prior to the ACCA 
violation for offenses "arising from separate" criminal 
incidents.  Crimes arising from separate incidents are crimes 
committed on different occasions as contrasted with multiple 
crimes arising out of a single occasion or criminal episode. 
 
The issue is purely one of legislative intent at the time 
of enactment, and, absent any evidence to the contrary, I would 
not read into the statute a "recidivist philosophy," rather than 
an intent to ensure public safety by significantly increasing 
the penalties for persons who commit crimes with firearms after 
having been convicted of multiple serious felonies. 
 
In my view, the Massachusetts statute should be interpreted 
as the Federal ACCA statute has been by virtually every Federal 
Circuit and District Court to undertake the task.1  18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e) (2006) (offenses "committed on occasions different from 
one another").  So long as the prior offenses of which the 
                     
 
1 See, e.g., United States v. Elliott, 703 F.3d 378, 383 
(7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2359 (2013), and 
United States v. Letterlough, 63 F.3d 332, 335 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 955 (1995), and the numerous cases cited 
therein. 
2 
 
 
defendant has been convicted arise out of different criminal 
episodes (whether termed different occasions, occurrences, 
incidents, or incidences), they should qualify as separate 
previous convictions for purposes of the Massachusetts ACCA 
statute. 
 
The court's interpretation would essentially incorporate 
all crimes, no matter how separate in time, victim, or nature, 
into a single conviction (for ACCA purposes) if they were 
eventually resolved by guilty plea or trial in the same 
prosecution.  For example, a person who commits a string of 
armed robberies in Suffolk County over a period of months and 
who is eventually apprehended, linked to, charged with, and 
convicted of all of the robberies, in a combined prosecution, 
would have only "one" prior felony conviction for purposes of 
the Massachusetts ACCA statute -- no matter how many robberies 
he is convicted of committing. 
 
Further, the court suggests that prior convictions must be 
sequential.  In other words, the first conviction must occur 
before the second predicate crime and its prosecution and 
conviction, and the second conviction must occur before the 
commission and prosecution of the third crime, and so on -- 
apparently, so that the recidivist felon has multiple 
opportunities to correct his criminal behavior before facing far 
greater punishment when he once again commits a serious felony, 
3 
 
 
this time with a firearm.  Hence, by way of example, if the 
armed robber is prosecuted in Suffolk County, and, subsequent to 
his conviction, it is determined that before his conviction he 
had committed a series of armed robberies in Hampden County and 
is, accordingly, now prosecuted and convicted of those armed 
robberies, he would still only have one prior conviction under 
the Massachusetts ACCA statute when and if he commits his next 
armed felony.  This could not have been what the Legislature 
intended.2 
 
The fact that some State courts have interpreted their own 
armed career criminal statutes (variously worded) differently 
(and as this court now would), based on their view of what their 
Legislatures intended to punish, is not terribly relevant or 
revealing.3  Other State courts have concluded the opposite.4  
                     
 
2 The court's interpretation would also result in the 
following:  An individual is arrested for a serious drug offense 
and is released on personal recognizance.  He is then arrested 
for another serious drug offense and is released on bail.  He is 
finally arrested for an armed robbery and is held without bail.  
All three separate crimes (for which he has been separately 
arrested and charged) are eventually resolved by guilty pleas 
and sentencing in a single plea and sentencing proceeding.  
Result -- one prior conviction only. 
 
 
3 For example, the court cites a Nebraska case, State v. 
Ellis, 214 Neb. 172, 175 (1983), in support of its proposition 
that habitual offender statutes should be interpreted in a 
manner that allows felons the opportunity to "reform their 
ways."  The Nebraska Supreme Court was, of course, interpreting 
the meaning and legislative intent behind its own statute, which 
provided that a habitual criminal is one who has previously 
"been twice convicted of crime, sentenced and committed to 
4 
 
 
There is no consensus as to how such statutes, no matter how 
differently worded or intended, must be interpreted. 
 
I would not infuse our analysis with hindsight doubts about 
whether the statute has served as an effective deterrent, or 
whether it might seemingly prove unduly harsh in some 
circumstances.  That is the Legislature's responsibility, not 
ours.  And I would not use the modest facts in this case, in 
which the defendant's prior convictions were for five drug 
sales, each occurring on a different day during a three-week 
period, as an excuse to broadly transplant a new policy that has 
no traceable origin in legislative history, onto a statute 
plainly intended to protect the public from felons with multiple 
felony convictions who use firearms in committing new crimes. 
                                                                  
prison."  Id. at 172-173.  See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2221.  The 
court, in a four-to-three decision, concluded that where the 
defendant was convicted of two crimes (robbery and the use of a 
firearm in the course of the robbery), occurring on the same 
day, and for which he was sentenced on the same day, he had only 
one prior conviction and sentence under its statute.  Ellis, 
supra at 172-173, 175-176.  The court went on to more broadly 
endorse the "recidivist philosophy" behind its habitual offender 
statute, see id. at 175, over a vigorous dissent noting that the 
court had "chosen to substitute doubtful sociological 
assumptions (without legislative history to show that the 
Legislature shared its view) for the logical construction of 
[the] statute."  Id. at 177 (White, J., dissenting). 
 
 
4 See, e.g., Watson v. State, 392 So. 2d 1274, 1279 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 1980); Linn v. State, 658 P.2d 150, 152 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1983); Knight v. State, 277 Ark. 213, 215-216 
(1982); Stradt v. State, 608 N.W.2d 28, 29-30 (Iowa 2000); 
Rushing v. State, 461 So. 2d 710, 713 (Miss. 1984).