Case Title: State v. Robertson

Citation: 630 So. 2d 1278

Docket Number: 92-KA-2660

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 1994-01-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
630 So. 2d 1278 (1994) STATE of Louisiana v. Allen ROBERTSON, Jr. No. 92-KA-2660. Supreme Court of Louisiana. January 14, 1994. *1279 Lennie F. Perez, Richard C. Guerriero, Jr., Baton Rouge, for applicant. Richard P. Ieyoub, Atty. Gen., Douglas P. Moreau, Dist. Atty., Premila Burns, Gwendolyn K. Brown, Baton Rouge, for respondent. KIMBALL, Justice.[*] A jury convicted defendant, Allen Robertson, Jr., of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced him to death for the January 1, 1991 stabbing deaths of Morris and Kazuko Prestenback. On direct appeal to this court under La. Const. Art. 5, § 5(D), defendant appeals his conviction and sentence, assigning thirty-one assignments of error. Because we find reversible error in the failure of the trial court to sustain defendant's challenge for cause of venire member Robert Payne, we reverse the convictions and the sentence of death, pretermit discussion of defendant's remaining assignments of error, and remand for a new trial. Defendant argues the trial judge erred in denying his challenge for cause of prospective juror, Robert Payne, thus requiring defendant to exercise one of his peremptory challenges to excuse Mr. Payne, and thereby depriving him of the use of one of his peremptory challenges. In State v. Breedlove, 199 La. 965, 7 So. 2d 221 (1942), this court held three requirements were necessary before the ruling of a trial judge refusing to sustain a defendant's challenge for cause constituted reversible error: (1) an erroneous ruling refusing to sustain the defendant's challenge for cause; (2) exhaustion of all of the defendant's peremptory challenges; and (3) the forced acceptance by defendant of an obnoxious juror, either the one that should have been excused for cause, or, if the juror was peremptorily challenged, a subsequent juror that defendant would have peremptorily challenged but for the fact that he had already *1280 exhausted his peremptory challenges.[1] Chief Justice O'Neill strongly dissented, arguing the latter requirement was not necessary. When the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure became effective on January 1, 1967, it was clear, as the Official Revision Comment notes, that Article 800 legislatively overruled the Breedlove decision in part by adopting the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice O'Neill regarding the third requirement.[2] Thus, if the defendant could show (1) he had exhausted all of his peremptory challenges; and (2) the trial judge erred in refusing to sustain a challenge for cause by the defendant, then there was reversible error.[3] The error was held to be reversible, and not merely harmless, primarily because of the protection given to a defendant's right to peremptory challenges found in the Louisiana Constitution at Article 1, Section 17. As explained in State v. Monroe, 366 So. 2d 1345, 1347 (La.1978), and State v. McIntyre, 365 So. 2d 1348, 1351 (La.1978) (emphasis added): In 1983, Article 800 was amended and currently provides in pertinent part: Whereas before 1983, a defendant who had been erroneously denied a valid challenge for cause could not even complain about the error on appeal unless he had exercised all his peremptory challenges, under the new version of Article 800, a defendant is now permitted to complain of a ruling refusing to sustain his challenge for cause even if he had not thereafter exercised all of his peremptory challenges. State v. Vanderpool, 493 So. 2d 574, 575 (La.1986). See also State v. Copeland, 530 So. 2d 526, 535 (La.1988). In such a case, the defendant must be able to show some prejudice in order to overcome the requirement of La.C.Cr.P. art. 921 that "[a] judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate court because of any error ... which does not affect substantial rights of the accused." The 1983 amendment to Article 800 does not change the law, however, as regards a defendant who has exhausted all of his peremptory challenges. "Prejudice is presumed when a challenge for cause is erroneously denied and all of defendant's peremptory challenges are exhausted. A trial court's erroneous ruling which deprives a defendant of a peremptory challenge substantially violates that defendant's rights." State v. Ross, 623 So. 2d 643, 644 (La.1993) (citing McIntyre) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also State v. Bourque, 622 So. 2d 198, 225 (La.1993); State v. Lee, 559 So. 2d 1310, 1317 (La.1990); State v. Comeaux, 514 So. 2d 84, *1281 93 (La.1987); and State v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 261, 263-66 (La.1986). To prove there has been reversible error warranting reversal of the conviction, defendant need only show (1) the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause; and (2) the use of all his peremptory challenges. Ross, 623 So. 2d at 644; Bourque, 622 So. 2d at 225; McIntyre, 365 So. 2d at 1351. Defendant in this case exhausted all of his peremptory challenges. Therefore, we must determine whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's challenge for cause as to potential juror Robert Payne. If so, then defendant's constitutional and statutory right to 12 peremptory challenges has been violated, prejudice is presumed, and there is reversible error requiring reversal of the convictions and sentence.[4] At issue in this case is a challenge for cause based on a potential juror's apparent predisposition to automatically impose the death penalty, regardless of any evidence that might be developed at the trial or the sentencing hearing, and regardless of the fact the law requires a juror to consider mitigating circumstances in the sentencing phase. Under La.C.Cr.P. art. 797(2), a defendant may challenge a juror for cause on the ground that "[t]he juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality." Additionally, La.C.Cr.P. art. 797(4) provides a defendant may challenge a juror for cause on the ground that "[t]he juror will not accept the law as given to him by the court." A trial judge is vested with broad discretion in ruling on challenges for cause, and his ruling will be reversed only when a review of the entire voir dire reveals the judge abused his discretion. State v. Knighton, 436 So. 2d 1141, 1148 (La.1983). A refusal by a trial judge to excuse a prospective juror on the ground he is not impartial is not an abuse of discretion where, after further inquiry or instruction (frequently called "rehabilitation"), the potential juror has demonstrated a willingness and ability to decide the case impartially according to the law and the evidence. Copeland, supra, 530 So. 2d at 534. "[A] challenge for cause should be granted, even when a prospective juror declares his ability to remain impartial, if the juror's responses as a whole reveal facts from which bias, prejudice or inability to render judgment according to law may be reasonably implied." State v. Hallal, 557 So. 2d 1388, 1389-90 (La.1990). As Chief Justice Calogero stated in Lee,supra, 559 So. 2d at 1318 (citations omitted): During voir dire, Mr. Payne initially answered in the affirmative when asked by the judge whether or not he would be able to apply the law as instructed. Later, the following exchange took place between the District Attorney and Mr. Payne. The District Attorney then questioned Mr. Payne as to whether he would have any problem voting to put the defendant to death, to which the defendant responded in the negative. The defendant's attorney then began to question Mr. Payne: The defense attorney then attempted to ask substantially the same question several times, with the District Attorney objecting to the phrasing of the question each time before Mr. Payne could respond. After a recess during which the attorneys met with the judge in chambers to determine the proper phrasing of the question, the following exchange took place between the defense attorney and Mr. Payne. The defense counsel then moved to challenge Mr. Payne for cause. The trial judge attempted to rehabilitate the potential juror. The trial judge then denied the challenge for cause, with defense counsel objecting. Defense counsel then questioned Mr. Payne again regarding his "problem." The District Attorney again objected before Mr. Payne could respond, with the trial judge sustaining the objection. Based on a reading of the entire voir dire of Mr. Payne, it is absolutely clear that Mr. Payne, if chosen to serve, would have automatically voted to impose the death penalty because of the "double murder" nature of this case. Mr. Payne was not impartial as to the sentence to be imposed in this case, nor was he able to accept the law as given him by the court as he clearly stated several times that he would not be able to consider mitigating circumstances and other evidence presented in the penalty phase. The trial judge committed reversible error in failing to grant the defendant's challenge for cause of Mr. Payne. The trial judge apparently believed Mr. Payne had been properly rehabilitated by his statements that he could conceive of certain situations where he would vote for life imprisonment rather than for the death penalty. However, it was clear that Mr. Payne would automatically vote for the death penalty in the case of a double murder. That a prospective juror can conceive of certain situations where he might vote for life imprisonment rather that for death is inconsequential where that same juror has clearly stated he could only vote for the death penalty in the case before him. In State v. Watson, 449 So. 2d 1321, 1330 (La.1984), this court was faced with an analogous situation wherein the trial court granted the state's challenge for cause on the basis that the potential juror would not consider imposing the death penalty in the case before her. The juror had answered that she did not believe she could consider the death penalty in the specific case involving the murder of a girl who had been raped twice and robbed, the exact factual scenario of the case before her. On appeal, the defendant argued that the challenge for cause should have been denied because the juror had never said that she would automatically vote against the death penalty in every case. In affirming the trial court's granting of the challenge for cause, this court stated: The Fifth Circuit in [Williams v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 381 (5th Cir., 1982) ] declared: Likewise, a potential juror who indicates that he will not consider a life sentence and that he will automatically vote for the death penalty under the factual circumstances of the case before him is subject to a challenge for cause by the defendant. It is irrelevant that the potential juror can conceive of different factual situations where he might consider voting for a life sentence where his unwillingness to consider such a sentence in the case before him is clear. The potential juror indicated his belief that the death penalty is the only appropriate punishment for a first degree murder case involving a double murder. When a juror holding such an opinion is not excused for cause, and the defense exhausts its peremptory challenges, as occurred in this case, there is reversible trial court error. Therefore, the conviction of Allen Robertson, Jr. is reversed and vacated. REVERSED: CONVICTION VACATED: REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL. [*] Hall, J., not on panel. See Rule IV, Part 2, § 3. [1] The Breedlove court based this conclusion on an interpretation of former Article 353 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provided: No defendant can complain of any ruling sustaining or refusing to sustain a challenge for cause, unless his peremptory challenges shall have been exhausted before the completion of the panel; moreover, the erroneous allowance of challenges for cause affords the defendant no ground of complaint, unless the effect of such ruling is the exercise by the prosecution of more peremptory challenges than it is entitled to by law, or unless the defendant by such ruling is forced to accept an obnoxious juror. [2] Article 800 at that time stated in pertinent part: A defendant cannot complain of a ruling refusing to sustain a challenge for cause made by him, unless his peremptory challenges shall have been exhausted before the completion of the panel. [3] The defendant no longer had to make the additional showing, previously required under Breedlove, that he had been forced to accept an obnoxious juror. [4] See, e.g., Lee, supra, 559 So. 2d at 1316-17 ("In this case, the defendant did exercise all of his peremptory challenges prior to the selection of the entire jury; therefore, he has the right to complain of any alleged errors committed by the trial judge. Any ruling by the trial judge in erroneously denying a challenge for cause would reduce the number of peremptory challenges available to the defendant. Such error, if shown, denies the defendant a `substantial constitutional and statutory right' and merits reversal."). [5] See also Comeaux, supra, 514 So. 2d at 94.