Case Title: In re Guardianship of V.V.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11739

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-02-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11739 
 
GUARDIANSHIP OF V.V. 
 
 
 
Essex.     January 5, 2015. - February 10, 2015. 
 
Present:  Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Probate Court, Guardian.  Due Process of Law, Assistance of 
counsel.  Practice, Civil, Appointment of guardian, Relief 
from judgment, Assistance of counsel, Moot case.  Moot 
Question. 
 
 
 
 
Petition for appointment of a guardian for a minor filed in 
the Essex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on 
July 17, 2012. 
 
 
The case was heard by Susan D. Ricci, J., and a motion for 
relief from judgment was considered by her; a petition for 
removal of the guardian, filed on May 7, 2013, was heard by 
Randy J. Kaplan, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Glenna Goldis for the mother. 
 
Andrew L. Cohen, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
 
Susan R. Elsen, Jamie Ann Sabino, Julie Gallup, Russell 
Engler, Mary K. Ryan, Shaghayegh Tousi, & Alison Holdway, for 
Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, Inc., & others, amici 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
2 
 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  The mother of the minor child, V.V., appeals 
from the denial, in the Probate and Family Court, of her motion 
for relief from judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 
60 (b) (4), 365 Mass. 828 (1974).  In the motion she alleged 
that a judgment appointing a permanent guardian for V.V. was 
void for lack of due process because she was not appointed 
counsel or afforded alternative procedural safeguards in the 
guardianship proceeding.  We granted her application for direct 
appellate review.  We dismiss the appeal as moot but also hold 
that a parent of a minor child has a right to counsel where, as 
here, someone other than the parent seeks to have himself or 
herself appointed as the child's guardian pursuant to G. L. 
c. 190B, § 5-206.1 
 
Background.  The details of the events leading up to the 
guardianship decree are set forth in Gianareles v. Zegarowski, 
467 Mass. 1012 (2014).  The essential facts are as follows.  A 
judge in the Probate and Family Court appointed the mother's 
                                                 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services; and, collectively, the 
Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, Inc., Boston Bar 
Association, Massachusetts Bar Association, Women's Bar 
Association of Massachusetts, Greater Boston Legal Services, 
Community Legal Aid, Justice Center of Southeast Massachusetts 
LLC (a subsidiary of South Counties Legal Services, Inc.), 
MetroWest Legal Services, Community Legal Services and 
Counseling Center, Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee, 
Children's Law Center of Massachusetts, Harvard Legal Aid 
Bureau, Center for Public Representation, and Safe Passage, Inc. 
3 
 
grandmother, and V.V.'s great-grandmother, as V.V.'s permanent 
guardian in December, 2012.  Id. at 1013.  The mother was not 
represented by counsel in the guardianship proceeding.  Id.  In 
May, 2013, then represented by counsel, the mother filed her 
rule 60 (b) (4) motion as well as a petition to remove the 
great-grandmother as V.V.'s guardian pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, 
§ 5-212 (a).  Id.  The judge denied the rule 60 (b) (4) motion.  
While the mother's appeal from that denial has been pending, her 
petition for removal of the guardian proceeded in the regular 
course.  On July 29, 2014, after a trial, a judge (who was not 
the judge who had appointed the guardian) vacated the 
guardianship.  All parties, including both the mother and V.V., 
were represented by counsel at the trial on the removal 
petition.  The great-grandmother did not appeal from the 
judgment vacating the guardianship. 
 
Because the guardianship has been vacated and V.V. has been 
returned to the mother's custody, the issue whether the mother 
was entitled to counsel is moot.2  The issue, however, is of 
significant public importance.  It is also capable of repetition 
and, given the short time periods in which guardianship matters 
                                                 
2 That the mother was represented by counsel at the trial on 
her petition to remove the guardian would not render the 
appointment of counsel issue moot.  The fact remains that the 
mother was not represented by counsel at the outset of the 
guardianship proceedings, and our concern regarding whether a 
parent is entitled to counsel applies to all proceedings related 
to guardianship. 
4 
 
are often decided and the fluidity of the proceedings even after 
an appointment of a guardian (as demonstrated by this case), it 
is an issue that can easily evade appellate review in the 
ordinary course.  We therefore exercise our discretion to 
address it.  See, e.g., Care & Protection of Erin, 443 Mass. 
567, 568 (2005), and cases cited. 
 
Discussion.  "The interest of parents in their relationship 
with their children has been deemed fundamental, and is 
constitutionally protected."  Department of Pub. Welfare v. 
J.K.B., 379 Mass. 1, 3 (1979), and cases cited.  Due process 
requirements must therefore be met before a parent is deprived 
of his or her parental rights.  Id.  Due process includes "the 
right to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner.'"  Id. at 4, quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 
552 (1965).  An indigent parent whose parental rights may be 
terminated, for example, "cannot be said to have a meaningful 
right to be heard in a contested proceeding without the 
assistance of counsel."  Department of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 
supra at 4. 
These interests are no less compelling for a parent whose 
child is the subject of a guardianship proceeding.  The 
guardian, once appointed, assumes significant rights and 
responsibilities during the period of guardianship that 
otherwise would have resided with the parent.  See G. L. 
5 
 
c. 190B, § 5-209.  "A guardian of a ward has the powers and 
responsibilities of a parent regarding the ward's support, care, 
education, health and welfare."  G. L. c. 190B, § 5-209 (a).  
The guardian's rights and responsibilities to ensure the child's 
welfare effectively displace those of the parent.  The guardian, 
and not the parent, becomes the primary caretaker and decision 
maker for the child.  Even if the guardianship lasts for only a 
brief period of time, the displacement impacts the parent's 
liberty interests.  Cf. Matter of Hilary, 450 Mass. 491, 496 
(2008) (noting that even six-month placement of child outside 
home when child has been adjudicated child in need of services 
has impact on parent's liberty interest in parent-child 
relationship).  While it is true that the parent's underlying 
parental rights are not forever terminated as a result of the 
guardianship, they are severely circumscribed, becoming 
subsidiary to those of the guardian, for as long as the 
guardianship remains in effect. 
Because of the impact of a guardianship on the parent-child 
relationship, and the particular nature of the fundamental 
rights at stake, an indigent parent whose child is the subject 
of a guardianship proceeding is entitled to, and must be 
furnished with, counsel in the same manner as an indigent parent 
whose parental rights are at stake in a termination proceeding 
or, similarly, in a care and protection proceeding.  To be sure, 
6 
 
the Legislature has already expressly provided for the 
appointment of counsel in a guardianship proceeding where the 
Department of Children and Families or a licensed child 
placement agency is a party.  General Laws c. 119, § 29, thus 
provides: 
"Whenever the department or a licensed child placement 
agency is a party to child custody proceedings, the parent, 
guardian or custodian of the child . . . shall have and be 
informed of the right to counsel at all such hearings, 
including proceedings under [G. L. c. 190B, § 5-201, 5-204 
or 5-206], and that the court shall appoint counsel if the 
parent, guardian or custodian is financially unable to 
retain counsel . . ." (emphasis added). 
 
The same interests that warrant appointment of counsel when the 
State is involved in a guardianship proceeding are also at stake 
in a guardianship proceeding when the State is absent. 
 
We encountered a similar situation recently in Adoption of 
Meaghan, 461 Mass. 1006 (2012).  In that case the legal 
guardians of a child petitioned to adopt the child pursuant to 
G. L. c. 210, §§ 3 (a) and 6.  Id. at 1006.  We considered 
whether the child's father, who was indigent and whose rights 
would be terminated by the adoption, was entitled to counsel in 
a private adoption case as he would have been if the State were 
involved in the adoption.  Id. at 1007.  We concluded that he 
was, noting that "the same fundamental, constitutionally 
protected interests are at stake, and the cost of erroneously 
terminating the parent's rights remains too high to require an 
7 
 
indigent parent to risk it without counsel."  Id.  The same 
general considerations govern here.  There is no reason why an 
indigent parent whose child is the subject of a guardianship 
proceeding should receive the benefit of counsel only if the 
State is involved.  To the contrary, there is every reason, 
given the fundamental rights that are at stake, why an indigent 
parent is entitled to the benefit of counsel when someone other 
than the parent, whether it be the State or a private entity or 
individual, seeks to displace the parent and assume the primary 
rights and responsibilities for the child, whether it be in a 
care and protection proceeding, a termination proceeding, an 
adoption case, or a guardianship proceeding. 
 
Conclusion.  The mother's appeal must be dismissed as moot 
because the guardianship has been vacated and the child has been 
returned to the mother's custody.  We hold, however, that a 
parent whose minor child is the subject of a guardianship 
proceeding pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, § 5-206, and who cannot 
afford counsel, has a right to have counsel appointed and to be 
so informed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.