Case Title: MISSOULA COUNTY v AMERICAN ASPHAL

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1985-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
No, 84-559 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1985 MISSOULA COUPJTY, Plaintiff and Appellant, -vs- AMERICAN ASPHALT, INC . , Defendant and Respondent, APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Missoula, The Honorable Douglas Harkin, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Robert L . Deschamps, 111, County Attorney, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Snavely & Phillips, Missoula, Montana Worden, Thane & Haines; Ronald Bender, Missoula, Montana Filed: Submitted on Briefs: March 14, 1985 Decided: June 25, 1985 - Clerk M r . J u s t i c e L. C. Gulbrandson d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. Missoula County a p p e a l s from a judgment of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Missoula County, holding t h a t s e c t i o n s 76-1-113 and 76-2-209, MCA exempted American A s p h a l t ' s mining o p e r a t i o n s from county zoning and planning. W e a f f i r m . The Department o f S t a t e Lands i s s u e d a permit t o American Asphalt under t h e Montana Open Cut Mining A c t , s e c t i o n 82-4-401, e t s e q . , MCA, on September 1, 1982 and American Asphalt began excavating g r a v e l . This Department r e q u i r e d American Asphalt t o c r e a t e a v i s u a l and sound b a r r i e r o f t o p s o i l ; t o p l a n t trees t o reduce v i s u a l and sound impact; t o u s e d u s t suppressant on t h e road t o t h e p i t ; t o fence t h e a r e a t o p r o t e c t c h i l d r e n ; and t o d r i v e t r u c k s e n t e r i n g o r leaving t h e m i n e only on a s p e c i f i c r o u t e i n o r d e r t o avoid d r i v i n g by an elementary school. The Missoula Planning O f f i c e , i n response t o a c i t i z e n ' s complaint, asked them t o c e a s e excavation w i t h i n t h e Clark Fork River Floodplain a r e a u n t i l t h e y obtained a f l o o d p l a i n permit. When American Asphalt continued t o excavate g r a v e l without a permit, Missoula County sought a preliminary i n j u n c t i o n t o h a l t t h e o p e r a t i o n . On September 14, 1982, t h e D i s t r i c t Court denied t h e r e q u e s t f o r an i n j u n c t i o n b u t ordered American Asphalt t o apply f o r a f l o o d p l a i n permit. American Asphalt a p p l i e d f o r and r e c e i v e d a permit on November 9 , 1982 from t h e Board of County Commissioners. The f l o o d p l a i n permit was l i m i t e d t o g r a v e l e x t r a c t i o n u n l e s s t h e c o u r t decided o t h e r proposed a c t i v i t i e s w e r e allowable under t h e a p p l i c a b l e zoning and comprehensive planning f o r t h e a r e a . The s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y was zoned f o r s i n g l e family r e s i d e n t i a l uses w i t h a l i m i t of one dwelling p e r a c r e p r i o r t o t h e grave1 e x t r a c t i o n by American Asphalt. The u s e s designated i n t h e Missoula Urban Area Comprehensive Plan a r e r u r a l low d e n s i t y r e s i d e n t i a l , parks and open space. Gravel e x t r a c t i o n , g r a v e l processing, and a s p h a l t and c o n c r e t e production a r e n o t permitted uses i n t h i s zone. The County r e g u l a t i o n s c u r r e n t l y allow g r a v e l e x t r a c t i o n only i n c e r t a i n a r e a s w i t h a s p e c i a l exception permit. Processing, of g r a v e l , such a s washing, s c r e e n i n g , c r u s h i n g and mixing w i t h a s p h a l t o i l o r cement i s allowed o n l y i n i n d u s t r i a l zones. American Asphalt is c u r r e n t l y e x t r a c t i n g , washing, crushing, and s o r t i n g g r a v e l with s p e c i a l equipment on t h e site. They i n t e n d t o l o c a t e an a s p h a l t b a t c h p l a n t i n which a s p h a l t o i l i s added t o t h e s o r t e d g r a v e l and a c o n c r e t e batch p l a n t i n which cement i s added t o t h e s o r t e d gravel on t h e site a s w e l l . According t o testimony presented by American Asphalt a t t r i a l , t h e a s p h a l t and c o n c r e t e b a t c h i n g a r e p a r t o f t h e recovery process. The District Court found t h a t t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s a r e contained w i t h i n t h e t e r m s "mining", "use" and "recovery" a s commonly used i n t h e i n d u s t r y . Missoula County, i n an amended complaint f i l e d October 12, 1982, sought a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment on t h e i s s u e s t a t e d above. The c a s e was heard by t h e D i s t r i c t Court, s i t t i n g without a j u r y , on June 28 and 29, 1984. O n J u l y 31, 1984, t h e D i s t r i c t Court issued f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and conclusions of law and judgment i n f a v o r o f American Asphalt. Missoula County a p p e a l s from t h a t p a r t o f t h e judgment holding t h a t s e c t i o n s 76-1-113 and 76-2-209, MCA exempt a l l mining o p e r a t i o n s from t h e zoning and comprehensive planning of Missoula County. The i s s u e s presented f o r review a r e : (1) Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court p r o p e r l y i n t e r p r e t s e c t i o n s 76-1-113 and 76-2-209, MCA t o exempt American A s p h a l t ' s grave1 o p e r a t i o n s from Missoula County zoning and planning r e g u l a t i o n s ? (2) Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court c o r r e c t l y f i n d t h a t t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f American Asphalt were w i t h i n t h e "complete u s e , development and recovery o f a mineral r e s o u r c e " pursuant t o s e c t i o n 76-2-209, M C A ? S e c t i o n 76-2-209, MCA, p a r t o f t h e zoning e n a b l i n g l e g i s l a t i o n , provides: "No r e s o l u t i o n o r r u l e adopted pursuant t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s p a r t . . . s h a l l prevent t h e complete u s e , development, o r recovery of any m i n e r a l , f o r e s t , o r a g r i c u l t u r a l r e s o u r c e s by t h e owner t h e r e o f . " The c h a p t e r on planning c o n t a i n s a n e a r l y i d e n t i c a l p r o v i s i o n , s e c t i o n 76-1-113, MCA which s t a t e s : "Nothing i n t h i s c h a p t e r s h a l l be deemed t o a u t h o r i z e an ordinance, r e s o l u t i o n , o r r u l e which would p r e v e n t t h e complete u s e , development, o r recovery o f any m i n e r a l , f o r e s t , o r a g r i c u l t u r a l r e s o u r c e s by t h e owner t h e r e o f . " Missoula County contends t h a t t h e s e s t a t u t e s do n o t p r o h i b i t t h e r e g u l a t i o n o f t h e l o c a t i o n and manner of performance o f g r a v e l e x t r a c t i o n and p r o c e s s i n g a c t i v i t i e s ; t h e l e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t intend t o p r o h i b i t c o u n t i e s from e x e r c i s i n g any form of planning and zoning over mineral r e s o u r c e s ; and t h e phrase "complete u s e , development, o r recovery'' does n o t i n c l u d e t h e range o f a c t i v i t i e s proposed by American Asphalt. American Asphalt contends t h a t t h e statutes prohibit any rule or regulation under zoning and planning law which would interfere with a property owner's complete use, development and recovery of a mineral resource and Missoula County's interpretation would render the statutes a nullity. The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intention of the legislature controls. Section 1-2-102, MCA; Montana Department of Revenue v. American Smelting and Refining Co. (1977), 173 Mont. 316, 324, 567 P.2d 901, 906, appeal dismissed 434 U.S. 985, 98 S.Ct. 884, 54 L.Ed.2d 793, and Haker v . Southwestern Railway Co. (1978), 178 Mont. 364, 578 P.2d 724. The intention of the legislature must first be determined from the plain meaning of the words used. Haker, 578 P.2d at 727; State ex rel. Sol v. Bakker (Mont. 1982), 649 P.2d 456, 39 St.Rep. 1471; and Tongue River Electric Co-op, Inc. v. Montana Power Co. (1981), 636 P.2d 862, 864, 38 St.Rep. 2032. If the intent of the statute cannot be determined from the plain meaning, the court then may resort to other rules of statutory construction. State ex rel. Sol, --- 649 P.2d at 459. The District Court concluded that the statutes in question were not of doubtful meaning and that the statutes ex~mpted all mining operations from Missoula County's zoning and planning authority. However, neither statute expressly prohibits regulation of mineral processing or extraction. The statutes only say that no regulation shall prevent the complete use, development or recovery of certain natural resources. An illustration of plain language expressly prohibiting regulation of particular land uses is found in section 76-2-109, MCA. That section states: "No planning district or recommendations adopted under this part shall regulate lands used f o r g r a z i n g , h o r t i c u l t u r e , a g r i c u l t u r e , o r t h e growing of timber. " S e c t i o n 76-1-113 and 76-2-209, MCA, by comparison, do n o t p r o h i b i t r e g u l a t i o n of t h e named r e s o u r c e s by t h e i r p l a i n language, they merely s a y any r e g u l a t i o n s imposed by t h e county cannot r e s u l t i n p r e v e n t i n g t h e complete u s e , development o r recovery o f t h e named resources. P a r t o f t h e l e g i s l a t i v e purpose o f t h e s e s t a t u t e s i s c l e a r and unambiguous. They demonstrate the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s awareness t h a t a range o f a c t i v i t i e s must occur on site i n o r d e r f o r t h e owner o f mineral, timber, o r a g r i c u l t u r a l r e s o u r c e s t o b e n e f i t and t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e did n o t i n t e n d f o r c o u n t i e s t o have t h e power t o p r e v e n t t h e owner from having t h a t b e n e f i t . However, what t h e range o f a c t i v i t i e s a r e t h a t cannot be prevented, i s by no means c l e a r and unambiguous. There i s ambiguity i n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and con- s t r u c t i o n o f t h e phrase "complete u s e , development, o r recovery o f any mineral . . . resource" and i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o g r a v e l e x t r a c t i o n and processing. I n o r d e r t o i n t e r p r e t t h i s phrase w i t h i n t h e p l a i n meaning r u l e " t h e language used must be reasonably and l o g i c a l l y i n t e r p r e t e d , g i v i n g words t h e i r u s u a l and o r d i n a r y meaning." I n re Matter o f McCabe (1975), 168 Mont. 334, 339, 544 P.2d 825, 828. I f t h e s t a t u t e s p l a i n l y expressed l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t without s t r a i n - i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , no e x t e n s i o n beyond t h a t p l a i n popular meaning would be r e q u i r e d . Adams v. Morton (C.A.Mont. 1 9 7 8 ) , 581 F.2d 1314, 1320, c e r t . denied. Gros Ventre Tribe o f F o r t Belknap I n d i a n Reservation v. U.S. (1979), 440 U.S. 958, 99 S.Ct. 1498, 59 L.Ed.2d 771. I f w e r e s o r t t o t e c h n i c a l meanings o r o t h e r r e l a t e d s t a t u t e s i n o r d e r t o a s c e r t a i n l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t , t h e n w e a r e no longer w i t h i n t h e p l a i n meaning rule. The District Court here relied on the technical meanings of the words within the gravel industry in order to interpret and apply the statutes. A reasonable construction of these broad statutes depends, to an extent, on the circumstances in which they are applied. Therefore, we must look to industry practices to discern the extent to which the legislature authorized the regulation of "use, development or recovery." Considering the legislative intent to not prevent the owner of the resource from benefiting, a county must at least allow the activities necessary to develop the resource to a point at which it can be effectively utilized. In the case at bar, the District Court found that processing occurs at the site of gravel extraction because the cost of transporting the material elsewhere for processing would render the mining economically infeasible. The District Court also found that gravel processing on site includes washing, crushing, screening, and concrete and asphalt batching and that these activities are part of the recovery of gravel resources. Missoula County argues that if gravel mining industry practices are relevant to this case, American Asphalt did not produce sufficient evidence to show that industry practices include the full range of processing on site. We will not reverse a District Court's findings of fact unless the record as a whole lacks substantial, credible evidence to support the findings. Wallace v. Wallace (Mont. 1983), 661 P.2d 455, 457, 40 St.Rep. 430, 433. We hold that the record supports the District Court's findings noted above and that the District Court properly applied the statutes involved. Missoula County has urged this Court to construe the meaning of these statutes in a broader context applicable to a l l m i n e r a l , a g r i c u l t u r a l , and t i m b e r r e s o u r c e s . The r e c o r d b e f o r e u s c o n c e r n s g r a v e l mining i n a p a r t i c u l a r g e o g r a p h i c 1 oca t i o n . W e d e c l i n e t o announce a broad, sweeping i n t e r p r e t a t i o n on such a narrow r e c o r d and restrict t h e h o l d i n g o f t h i s o p i n i o n a c c o r d i n g l y . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s judgment i s 4. W e concur: - /