Case Title: Black v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 315, 2008

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2009-03-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JONATHAN D. BLACK, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 315, 2008 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0310017732 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: January 14, 2009 
Decided: 
March 27, 2009 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 27th day of March 2009, upon consideration of the appellant's 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney's motion to withdraw, and the 
State's response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Jonathan D. Black (Black), was 
convicted by a Superior Court jury in April 2004 of three counts of unlawful 
sexual contact in the second degree.  The jury acquitted Black of first degree 
rape.  The Superior Court sentenced Black as a habitual offender to fifteen 
years at Level V incarceration on each conviction.  Black did not file a direct 
appeal.  In May 2008, he filed a motion for postconviction relief alleging 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal.  The 
 
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Superior Court granted postconviction relief and thereafter resentenced 
Black, with the assistance of substitute counsel, to the same forty-five year 
term of incarceration.  This is Black’s direct appeal. 
(2) 
Black's counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to 
withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c).  Black's counsel asserts that, based upon a 
complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably 
appealable issues.  By letter, Black's attorney informed him of the provisions 
of Rule 26(c) and provided Black with a copy of the motion to withdraw and 
the accompanying brief.  Black also was informed of his right to supplement 
his attorney's presentation.  Black has raised five issues for this Court's 
consideration.  The State has responded to Black’s arguments, as well as to 
the position taken by Black's counsel, and has moved to affirm the Superior 
Court's judgment. 
(3) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable 
claims; and (b) this Court must conduct its own review of the record and 
 
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determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably 
appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.1 
(4) 
In response to his counsel’s Rule 26(c) brief, Black has raised 
five issues for the Court’s consideration.  First, he contends that the Superior 
Court improperly questioned the child victim regarding her competency in 
front of the jury.  Second, Black asserts he was denied his constitutional 
right to effectively confront the child victim at trial.  Third, Black contends 
the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.  Fourth, he argues 
that the charges against him constituted one continuous criminal act and that 
his multiple convictions violate double jeopardy principles.  Finally, he 
asserts that the Superior Court committed plain error in sentencing him as a 
habitual offender.  We address these claims in order. 
(5) 
Black first contends that the Superior Court erred by 
questioning the four-year-old victim in front of the jury in order to determine 
her competency to testify.  Black argues that, under McGriff v. State,2 the 
competency examination should have occurred outside the presence of the 
jury.  We disagree.  While the competency examination occurred outside the 
jury’s presence in the McGriff case, McGriff does not stand for the 
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of 
Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
2 McGriff v. State, 672 A.2d 1027, 1028 (Del. 1996). 
 
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proposition that the competency examination must occur outside the jury’s 
presence.  The competency examination simply was not at issue in McGriff. 
Moreover, 10 Del. C. § 4302 provides, among other things, that the trier of 
fact may consider the child’s age and understanding of the obligation of 
taking an oath in judging the child’s credibility.3  The trier of fact in Black’s 
case was the jury.  Thus, Section 4302 anticipates that the examination of the 
child-witness regarding the child’s competency to take an oath may occur in 
the jury’s presence. 
(6) 
Black’s second argument is that he was denied his 
constitutional right to confront the victim at trial.  While Black contends that 
he was denied his right to cross-examine the victim, an argument that simply 
is unsupported by the record, it appears that Black’s underlying point is that 
the Superior Court erred in admitting a prior out-of-court statement that the 
victim made to an interviewer at the Child Advocacy Center.  We review 
that claim for abuse of discretion.4  Section 3513 of Title 11 provides in 
pertinent part that the out-of-court statement of a child victim may be 
admitted if the child is present and the child’s testimony touches upon the 
                                                 
3 10 Del. C. § 4302 provides, “No child under the age of 10 years may be 
excluded from giving testimony for the sole reason that such child doe not understand the 
obligation of an oath.  Such child’s age and degree of understanding of the obligation of 
an oath may be considered by the trier of face in judging the child’s credibility.” 
4 Dailey v. State, 956 A.2d 1191, 1194 (Del. 2008). 
 
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event and is subject to cross-examination.5  In Black’s case, the record 
supports the Superior Court’s admission of the statement because the child 
was present, her testimony touched upon the events in question, and she was 
subject to cross-examination.  Accordingly, we find no abuse of the Superior 
Court’s discretion.6 
(7) 
Next, Black contends that the Superior Court erred in denying 
his motion for judgment of acquittal.  In reviewing a sufficiency of the 
evidence claim, the Court must determine, after viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, whether any rational trier of fact 
could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.7  In this 
case, the evidence at trial reflected that the victim reported that Black was 
laying in bed with her and placed her on top of him.  He then touched her 
buttocks and vagina with his finger and touched her buttocks with his penis.  
This testimony alone was sufficient to support Black’s convictions on three 
counts of second degree unlawful sexual contact.8 
(8) 
Furthermore, we reject Black’s contention that his multiple 
convictions violate double jeopardy because his actions were part of one 
                                                 
5 11 Del. C. § 3513(b)(1) (2007). 
6 Accord Dailey v. State, 956 A.2d at 1194. 
7 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 
8 See Styler v. State, 417 A.2d 948, 950 (Del. 1980). 
 
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continuous act.  This Court previously has held that a defendant who 
commits multiple sexual assaults on the same victim may be punished for 
each separate and distinct act, even if those acts are violations of the same 
statutory provision.9  Black’s actions constituted three separate acts, distinct 
from one another.  Having committed the three acts within a short time 
frame does not prohibit his conviction on three distinct charges. 
(9) 
Finally, Black argues that the Superior Court erred in 
sentencing him as a habitual offender because the trial court did not comply 
with the terms of 11 Del. C. § 4215(a).  This argument is without merit.  
Section 4215(a) specifically states that it does not apply in cases of fourth 
offenders, like Black, who are eligible to be sentenced to a term of life 
imprisonment under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a).   Black does not challenge his 
prior felony convictions or his eligibility to be sentenced under Section 
4214(a).  Accordingly, we find no error in the Superior Court’s sentencing 
of Black as a habitual offender.  
(10) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Black’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Black's counsel has made a 
                                                 
9 Feddiman v. State, 558 A.2d 278, 288-89 (Del. 1989). 
 
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conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly 
determined that Black could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice