Case Title: Brown v. State

Citation: 633 So. 2d 1042

Docket Number: 91-KA-00600

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1994-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
633 So. 2d 1042 (1994) Lawrence BROWN v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 91-KA-00600. Supreme Court of Mississippi. Decided March 10, 1994. Robert A. Davis, Rex K. Jones, Hattiesburg, for appellant. Michael C. Moore, Atty. Gen., John R. Henry, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before HAWKINS, C.J., and SULLIVAN and SMITH, JJ. HAWKINS, Chief Justice, for the Court: Lawrence Brown was indicted under a multicount indictment charging him with burglary of an inhabited dwelling (Count 1), rape of Toni Sue Davis (Count 2), sexual battery of Toni Sue Davis (Count 3),[1] and aggravated assault of Wendy Davis (Count 4). A jury found Brown not guilty of burglary of an inhabited dwelling but found him guilty of rape and aggravated assault. He was sentenced to serve twenty years in the Mississippi Department of Corrections for rape and ten years in the Mississippi Department of Corrections for aggravated assault, the second sentence to run consecutive to the first. Because Brown's conviction of aggravated assault of Wendy Davis is not supported by the evidence, we reverse and remand for the sole purpose of sentencing him for simple assault on this charge. This is a companion case to Davis v. State, 611 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992). The sordid facts forming the basis of criminal charges are set forth in Davis, and there is no need to repeat them. Brown was the strange man in Mrs. Davis' bedroom when she awakened around 2:00 to 2:30 a.m. on the early morning of July 19, 1989. He admitted being on the Davis premises and having intercourse with Mrs. Davis but insisted that his participation in the events resulted from the express request of Charles Ralph Davis, the victim's husband. Although Brown asserts error in his conviction of the rape of Mrs. Davis, we have concluded, after careful examination of the record, that there is no reversible error in his conviction on this charge of the indictment. We, therefore, direct our attention *1043 towards Brown's conviction of aggravated assault of Wendy Davis. Wendy, eight-year-old daughter of Toni Sue and Charles Ralph Davis, was asleep in the bed with her mother when Brown entered the Davis bedroom prior to the rape. Brown threatened to kill Mrs. Davis and told her in explicit words he was going to have sex with her. Mrs. Davis submitted to Brown's desires and neither screamed nor yelled for fear of awakening Wendy. When a foreign object was subsequently forced into her vagina, Mrs. Davis, unable to control the pain, screamed and Wendy awakened. Wendy started screaming. Brown pointed a gun toward Wendy and commanded her to "shut up." Wendy complied. Brown did not touch or make any advances toward Wendy. After relating the gun pointing incident, Wendy testified: Wendy did testify that she was afraid of getting shot when the gun was pointed toward her. This is the full extent of the testimony supporting the verdict on this count. The undisputed evidence shows Brown had the means and opportunity to cause Wendy great bodily harm but did not "attempt" to do so. Nothing prevented Brown from discharging the firearm. On the other hand, the same evidence shows conclusively that Brown attempted by physical menace to put Wendy in fear of imminent serious bodily harm. Upon conclusion of the State's case-in-chief, Brown moved for a directed verdict alleging the evidence failed to show he attempted, by use of a deadly weapon, to cause bodily injury to Wendy. The motion was renewed upon conclusion of all the evidence. Brown sought and was refused a peremptory instruction on the issue and preserved the point in his new trial motion. On appeal, he maintains that the evidence showed clearly he could have only been guilty of simple assault. We agree. Murray v. State, 403 So. 2d 149 (Miss. 1981), controls the issue. In Murray, we reversed a verdict of aggravated assault upon a law enforcement officer by a prison inmate because the proof failed to show an actual unequivocal intent on the part of the inmate to cause the officer bodily harm when the inmate had the means and opportunity to do so. In Murray, we stated: Murray at 151-53. In the case sub judice, Brown had the means and opportunity to cause Wendy great bodily harm but did not "attempt" to do so. There were no extraneous events preventing Brown from or hindering him in discharging the firearm. Under the adduced facts and established law, Brown is guilty of simple rather than aggravated assault. AS TO COUNT II: CONVICTION OF RAPE AND SENTENCE OF TWENTY YEARS AFFIRMED; AS TO COUNT IV: CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING FOR SIMPLE ASSAULT. DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, P.JJ., and SULLIVAN, PITTMAN, BANKS, McRAE, JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., and SMITH, JJ., concur. [1] The jury was not instructed on the sexual battery charge, hence it was effectively abandoned.