Case Title: STATE v 1978 LTD II

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1985-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 84-439 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1985 STATE OF MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, 1978 L T D I1 and RICKY HENDRICKSON, Defendant and Respondent. APPEAL F R O M : D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Twelfth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of H i l l , The Honorable Chan E t t i e n , Judge p r e s i d i n g . COUNSEL O F RECORD: For Appellant: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Ronald W. Smith, County Attorney, Havre, Montana Edward Corrigan argued, Deputy County Attorney, Havre For Respondent : James Conway argued, Montana Legal S e r v i c e s , K a l i s p e l l , Montana Submitted: A p r i l 15, 1985 Decided: June 2 5 , 1985 F i l e d : - JI \:',! < : i92j5 Clerk M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. T h i s i s an a p p e a l from a n o r d e r o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , Twelfth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , d i s m i s s i n g f o r f e i t u r e p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t an automobile on t h e grounds t h a t p r o p e r n o t i c e o f s e i z u r e and i n t e n t i o n t o i n s t i t u t e f o r f e i t u r e p r o c e e d i n g s was n o t s e n t t o t h e owner w i t h i n f o r t y - f i v e d a y s o f t h e s e i z u r e a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 44-12-201, MCA. Ricky Hendrickson was a r r e s t e d on J a n u a r y 2 5 , 1984, f o r having LSD and marijuana i n h i s p o s s e s s i o n w h i l e d r i v i n g h i s Ford LTD t o G r e a t F a l l s . A s a u t h o r i z e d by s e c t i o n 44-12-103, MCA, t h e c a r was s e i z e d and impounded by t h e H i l l County S h e r i f f ' s Department. P u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 44-12-201, MCA, n o t i c e o f t h e s e i z u r e o f t h e c a r , a l o n g w i t h t h e County A t t o r n e y ' s i n t e n t i o n t o i n s t i t u t e f o r f e i t u r e p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t it, was s e n t t o Hendrickson w i t h i n f o r t y - f i v e d a y s o f t h e s e i z u r e . The n o t i c e was s u f f i c i e n t i n a l l r e s p e c t s b u t one: it d i d n o t inform Hendrickson t h a t h e must f i l e a n answer w i t h i n twenty d a y s o f t h e m a i l i n g o f t h e n o t i c e o r f a c e d e f a u l t judgment. An answer was n o t f i l e d and on March 2 7 , 1984, d e f a u l t judgment was e n t e r e d . O n A p r i l 5 , 1984, Hendrickson's a t t o r n e y f i l e d a motion f o r r e l i e f from t h e d e f a u l t judgment on t h e grounds t h a t t h e n o t i c e d i d n o t comply w i t h r e q u i r e m e n t s o f due p r o c e s s o r Montana Rules o f C i v i l Procedure. The H i l l County A t t o r n e y a g r e e d t h a t t h e n o t i c e was d e f i c i e n t and d i d n o t c o n t e s t t h e motion f o r r e l i e f . I n s t e a d , he f i l e d an amended n o t i c e of i n t e n t i o n t o i n s t i t u t e f o r f e i t u r e p r o c e e d i n g s , though more t h a n f o r t y - f i v e days had passed s i n c e t h e c a r was s e i z e d . O n May 21, 1984, Hendrickson f i l e d a motion t o d i s m i s s . H e argued t h a t t h e amended n o t i c e c a n n o t r e l a t e back t o t h e f i l i n g o f t h e o r i g i n a l n o t i c e , s o t h a t t h e f o r t y - f i v e day n o t i c e requirement o f s e c t i o n 44-12-201, MCA, was n o t complied with. Judge Chan E t t i e n agreed w i t h t h i s argument and dismissed t h e c a s e on J u l y 13, 1984. I t i s conceded by both p a r t i e s t o t h i s appeal t h a t t h e n o t i c e of s e i z u r e and i n t e n t i o n t o i n s t i t u t e f o r f e i t u r e proceedings which was i s s u e d by t h e H i l l County S h e r i f f and served on Hendrickson was d e f e c t i v e and v i o l a t i v e o f due process. The p a r t i e s a l s o concede t h a t t h i s d e f e c t i v e n o t i c e deprived t h e D i s t r i c t Court o f j u r i s d i c t i o n t o e n t e r d e f a u l t judgment. W e agree. Therefore, t h e s o l e i s s u e t o be resolved i s whether t h e d e f e c t i v e n o t i c e , t i m e l y f i l e d i n accordance w i t h s e c t i o n 44-12-201, MCA, could be amended though more than f o r t y - f i v e days had passed s i n c e t h e automobile sought t o be f o r f e i t e d was s e i z e d . Appellant argues t h a t , a s a c i v i l a c t i o n , t h e f o r f e i t u r e proceedings under s e c t i o n 44-12-201 should be governed by t h e Montana Rules o f C i v i l Procedure. S p e c i f i c a l l y a p p e l l a n t c i t e s t o Rule 4 ( D ) (7) , M.R.Civ.P., which reads: "Amendment. A t any t i m e , i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n , and upon such n o t i c e and t e r m s a s it deems j u s t , t h e c o u r t may allow any process o r proof o f s e r v i c e t h e r e o f t o be amended u n l e s s it c l e a r l y appears t h a t m a t e r i a l p r e j u d i c e would r e s u l t t o t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s o f t h e p a r t y a g a i n s t whom t h e p r o c e s s i s s u e d . " This r u l e , a p p e l l a n t contends, e x p r e s s e s t h e philosophy o f c i v i l procedure favored today: t h a t c a s e s should be decided on t h e i r m e r i t s , and n o t be dismissed due t o procedural d e f e c t s . I n support o f t h i s c o n t e n t i o n , a p p e l l a n t c i t e s t o Meyers v. I n t e r w e s t Corp. (Utah 19811, 632 P.2d 879. In Meyers t h e p l a i n t i f f f i l e d a complaint on t h e f i n a l day o f a f o u r y e a r s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d . Approximately t w o y e a r s a f t e r summons was i s s u e d t h e d e f e n d a n t , having f a i l e d t o f i l e an answer, f i l e d a motion t o d i s m i s s on t h e grounds t h a t t h e summons s t a t e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t had twenty d a y s t o answer when t h e law allowed t h i r t y days. The Utah t r i a l c o u r t denied t h e motion t o d i s m i s s and allowed t h e summons t o he amended d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s had run. C i t i n g t o r u l e 4 ( h ) o f t h e Utah Rules o f C i v i l Procedure, which i s i d e n t i c a l t o Rule 4 ( ~ ) ( 7 ) , M.R.Civ.P., s u p r a , t h e Utah Supreme Court found t h a t a l l o w i n g an amendment d i d n o t amount t o m a t e r i a l p r e j u d i c e t o t h e r i g h t s o f t h e p a r t y a g a i n s t whom p r o c e s s i s s u e d . I n a d d i t i o n it found t h a t t h e d e f e c t i n t h e summons was i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l , and t h e r e f o r e t h e p a s s a g e o f t i m e d i d n o t d e p r i v e t h e t r i a l c o u r t o f j u r i s d i c t i o n t o p e r m i t an amendment. S p e c i f i c a l l y t h e Utah c o u r t held t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t had j u r i s d i c t i o n t o e n t e r t a i n a motion t o amend summons a f t e r t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s had r u n . F u r t h e r , it h e l d t h a t t h e amendment r e l a t e d back t o t h e i n i t i a l summons, j u s t a s amendments t o c o m p l a i n t s r e l a t e back t o t h e f i l i n g o f t h e i n i t i a l complaint under Rule 1 5 ( e ) , Utah Rules o f C i v i l Procedure. (Rule 15 (c) , M.R.Civ. P.) W e have no q u a r r e l w i t h t h e r e a s o n i n g used o r t h e d e c i s i o n reached i n Meyers. W e do n o t b e l i e v e however, t h a t Meyers can b e c o n v i n c i n g l y a n a l o g i z e d t o t h e c a s ~ a t hand. T h i s a c t i o n f o r f o r f e i t u r e i s based on a p r o c e d u r e a u t h o r i z e d by Chapter 12 o f T i t l e 44 o f t h e Montana Code. S e c t i o n 44-12-201 r e a d s a s f o l l o w s : "Notice o f s e i z u r e and i n t e n t i o n t o i n s t i t u t e f o r f e i t u r e p r o c e e d i n g s . A peace o f f i c e r o r an o f f i c e r o f t h e s e i z i n g agency who s e i z e s any property o t h e r t h a n c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e s under t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s c h a p t e r s h a l l , w i t h i n 45 days of t h e s e i z u r e s , f i l e a n o t i c e of t h e s e i z u r e and i n t e n t i o n t o i n s t i t u t e f o r f e i t u r e proceedings w i t h t h e c l e r k o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t o f t h e county i n which t h e s e i z u r e o c c u r s , and t h e c l e r k s h a l l s e r v e n o t i c e t h e r e o f on a l l owners o r c l a i m a n t s o f t h e p r o p e r t y by one o f t h e following methods . . . " (Emphasis added. ) The language o f t h i s s t a t u t e i s mandatory. Notice o f s e i z u r e and i n t e n t t o i n s t i t u t e f o r f e i t u r e proceedings must be served on t h e owners of t h e p r o p e r t y w i t h i n f o r t y - f i v e days. Th.ere i s no p r o v i s i o n i n Chapter 12 f o r an e x t e n s i o n o f t h i s t i m e l i m i t . Despite t h i s , a p p e l l a n t u r g e s t h a t Rule 4 ( D l (7) , M.R.Civ.P. be a p p l i e d , a s p e r t h e Meyers c a s e , t o allow amended n o t i c e a f t e r f o r t y - f i v e days. W e r e f u s e t o do s o and a f f i r m t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r t h e following reasons. F i r s t , t h e s t a t u t e involved i n t h i s c a s e i s an exception t o t h e g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t p r o p e r t y may n o t be s e i z e d without a p r i o r f a c t f i n d i n g hearing. Though t h e Supreme Court h a s upheld such f o r f e i t u r e s t a t u t e s a s i n v o l v i n g e x t r a o r d i n a r y s i t u a t i o n s , Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. (1974), 416 U.S. 663, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed.2d 452, w e concur w i t h t h e Wisconsin Court i n S t a t e v . Rosen ( W i s c . 1976), 240 N.W.2d 168, t h a t because such s e i z u r e s a r e e x p a r t e , t h e s t a t u t o r y safeguards should b e r i g i d l y adhered t o . I n Rosen t h e Wisconsin Court discussed t h e procedural requirements i n f o r f e i t u r e a c t i o n s under a s t a t u t e very s i m i l a r t o t h e one a t i s s u e i n t h i s case. O n May 29, 1974 David Rosen had h i s c a r s e i z e d by t h e p o l i c e i n accordance w i t h t h e Uniform Controlled Substances A c t o f Wisconsin. O n June 12, 1974, papers were served t h a t commenced t h e f o r f e i t u r e a c t i o n . On September 9 , 1974, Rosen f i l e d a motion t o dismiss on t h e grounds t h a t a h e a r i n g had n o t been set w i t h i n t h e s i x t y day t i m e period provided by s t a t u t e . The t r i a l c o u r t granted t h e motion. The Wisconsin Supreme Court a f f i r m e d , s t a t i n g t h a t i n f o r f e i t u r e a c t i o n s safeguards which a r e s t a t u t o r i l y provided should be s t r i c t l y construed. Therefore, t h e c o u r t continued, t i m e l i m i t a t i o n s provided by s t a t u t e must be considered mandatory. F o r f e i t u r e s t a t u t e s seek: " t o provide a prompt a d j u d i c a t i o n o f t h e i s s u e s involved i n t h e f o r f e i t u r e proceeding, and seek t o m i t i g a t e t h e harsh e f f e c t s o f t h e s e i z u r e and f o r f e i t u r e proceeding . . . The i n t e r e s t of t h e s t a t e and t h e p u b l i c i n c o n t r o l l i n g t h e drug t r a f f i c , which t h e f o r f e i t u r e a c t i o n i s designed t o p r o t e c t , i s adequately served by t h e i n i t i a l s e i z u r e . The i n t e r e s t s o f t h e p o s s i b l y innocent owner should l i k e w i s e be p r o t e c t e d by s t r i c t compliance w i t h t h e procedural mandate of [ t h e s t a t u t e ] . " Rosen, 240 N.W.2d a t 172. W e agree. The S t a t e ' s r e l i a n c e on Meyers v. I n t e r w e s t Corp., along w i t h i t s i n s i s t e n c e t h a t Rule 4 ( D ) ( 7 ) , M.R.Civ.P., be a p p l i e d t o t h i s c a s e , misses t h e e s s e n t i a l p o i n t t h a t t h e s e i z u r e and f o r f e i t u r e s t a t u t e s a t i s s u e a r e s p e c i a l i n t h a t t h e y allow an ex p a r t e t a k i n g of p e r s o n a l property. No such s t a t u t e s a r e a t i s s u e i n Meyers and f o r t h a t reason w e f i n d t h a t c a s e unpersuasive. Second, i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e requirement t h a t n o t i c e o f s e i z u r e and i n t e n t i o n t o i n s t i t u t e f o r f e i t u r e proceedings be given w i t h i n f o r t y - f i v e days, s e c t i o n 44-12-202, MCA provides that. w i t h i n twenty days a f t e r t h e mailing o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f n o t i c e , t h e owner o f t h e p r o p e r t y s h a l l f i l e a v e r i f i e d answer t o t h e a l l e g a t i o n s concerning t h e use o f t h e p r o p e r t y . N o extension of t i m e f o r f i l i n g t h e answer may he g r a n t e d . F u r t h e r , s e c t i o n 44-12-203, MCA, provides t h a t t h e r e i s a r e b u t t a b l e presumption o f f o r f e i t u r e o f t h e p r o p e r t y and t h a t if a v e r i f i e d answer is n o t f i l e d w i t h i n twenty d a y s a f t e r m a i l i n g o r p u b l i s h i n g n o t i c e , t h e c o u r t upon motion "must o r d e r t h e p r o p e r t y f o r f e i t e d t o t h e s t a t e . " The s t r i c t r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h e s e s t a t u t e s i n d i c a t e s t h e no-nonsense a t t i t u d e o f t h e d r a f t e r s w i t h r e s p e c t t o d r u g t r a f f i c . But j u s t a s t h e s e s t a t u t e s impose s t r i c t r e q u i r e m e n t s , t h e y must be enforced s o a s t o a v o i d , t o t h e g r e a t e s t e x t e n t p o s s i b l e , p r e j u d i c i n g t h e r i g h t s o f t h e p a r t y a g a i n s t whom t h e y a r e d i r e c t e d . S i n c e , i n e f f e c t , a p a r t y whose p r o p e r t y i s s e i z e d under t h e s e s t a t u t e s must answer w i t h i n twenty d a y s o r l o s e t h e p r o p e r t y , t h e r e i s s t r o n g reason t o i n s i s t t h a t t h e S t a t e p r o v i d e p r o p e r n o t i c e so a s t o p r o t e c t t h e i n n o c e n t person from t h e u n w i t t i n g s u r r e n d e r o f h i s p r o p e r t y . T h i r d , even i f t h e S t a t e c o u l d demonstrate t h a t Rule 4 ( D ) ( 7 ) should a p p l y i n t h i s c a s e , no amendment would b e a 1 lowed. For c o n t r a r y t o t h e c o n t e n t i o n o f t h e S t a t e , a l l o w i n g an amendment t o t h i s p r o c e s s beyond t h e l i m i t a t i o n p e r i o d would s i g n i f i c a n t l y p r e j u d i c e Hendrickson's r i g h t s . The v e r y e x e r c i s e o f t h e s e i z u r e and f o r f e i t u r e s t a t u t e s by t h e S t a t e i s a s e r i o u s i n f r i n g e m e n t on t h e r i g h t s o f t h e p a r t y whose p r o p e r t y i s s e i z e d w i t h o u t a h e a r i n g . Such a procedure i s allowed o n l y because it i s c o n s i d e r e d a s i g n i f i c a n t weapon i n t h e b a t t l e a g a i n s t d r u g t r a f f i c k i n g . To a s s e r t , a s t h e S t a t e d o e s , t h a t t h e r e i s no p r e j u d i c e t o Hendrickson by a l l o w i n g amended n o t i c e n i n e t y - f i v e d a y s a f t e r s e i z u r e and f i f t y days p a s t t h e s t a t u t o r y requirement i s simply unreasonable. By a d h e r i n g t o due p r o c e s s and s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s , t h e S t a t e e n s u r e s t h e r i g h t s o f t h e p e r s o n charged, and p e r m i t s t h e i n n o c e n t p e r s o n t o r e g a i n t h e u s e o f h i s p r o p e r t y a s r a p i d l y a s p o s s i b l e . To a l l o w amended n o t i c e p a s t t h e l i m i t a t i o n p e r i o d under s e c t i o n 44-12-201, MCA, would have the potential for serious infringement of the rights of innocent persons. The decision of the District Court is affirmed. We concur: