Case Title: Bunting v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 263, 2014

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2015-05-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SHAWN BUNTING, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 263, 2014 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0407024013 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  March 20, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
     Decided:   May 5, 2015  
 
Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 5th day of May 2015, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs, 
their supplemental memoranda, and the record on appeal, it appears to the 
Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Shawn Bunting (“Bunting”), filed this appeal 
from the Superior Court’s summary dismissal of his third motion for 
postconviction relief.  The case was scheduled to be considered by the Court 
on the basis of the briefs on October 31, 2014.  On October 22, however, the 
Court stayed the appeal pending the outcome of another appeal, Brown v. 
State, No. 178, 2014.  The Court issued its opinion in Brown on January 23, 
2 
 
2015.1  The parties were directed to file supplemental memoranda 
addressing the applicability of Brown to Bunting’s case.   After careful 
consideration of the parties’ briefs and supplemental memoranda, we find no 
merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.  
(2) 
The record reflects that, in February 2005, a Superior Court 
jury found Bunting guilty of multiple drug-related offenses.2  The Superior 
Court sentenced Bunting as a habitual offender to life imprisonment.  This 
Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment on direct appeal.3  Thereafter, 
Bunting filed two unsuccessful motions for postconviction relief under 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”),4 as well as a federal petition 
for habeas corpus, which was dismissed as untimely by the District Court.5 
(3) 
On January 7, 2014, Bunting filed his third motion for 
postconviction relief, claiming that his counsel was ineffective for failing to 
                                                 
1 Brown v. State, 108 A.3d 1201 (Del. 2015). 
2 The jury convicted Bunting of Possession With Intent to Deliver a Non-Narcotic 
Schedule I Controlled Substance, Use of a Dwelling for Keeping Controlled Substances, 
Use of a Vehicle for Keeping Controlled Substances, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, 
and Driving While License Suspended or Revoked but acquitted him of Possession of a 
Narcotic Schedule II Controlled Substance. 
3 Bunting v. State, 2006 WL 2587074 (Del. Sept. 7, 2006). 
4 See State v. Bunting, 2008 WL 1891708 (Del. Super. Apr. 28, 2008) (Superior Court’s 
final order denying Bunting’s first Rule 61 motion; no appeal taken); Bunting v. State, 
2011 WL 3849497 (Del. Aug. 30, 2011) (affirming the Superior Court’s denial of 
Bunting’s second Rule 61 motion).  
5 Bunting v. Phelps, 687 F. Supp. 2d 444, 448-49 (D. Del. 2009).  
3 
 
conduct a meaningful investigation, for failing to challenge the habitual 
offender statute, and for failing to raise an Equal Protection claim based on 
the State’s selective prosecution of eligible offenders under the habitual 
offender statute.  Bunting also filed a motion for appointment of counsel 
based on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan6 
and recent amendments to Rule 61(e)(1).7  A Superior Court Commissioner 
recommended summary dismissal of Bunting’s third postconviction motion 
on the grounds that his ineffective assistance of counsel claims were 
procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(1),8 61(i)(2),9 and 61(i)(4),10 and 
Bunting had failed to plead a colorable claim of a miscarriage of justice 
                                                 
6 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). 
7 Effective May 6, 2013, Rule 61(e)(1) was amended to provide that the Superior Court 
shall appoint counsel for an indigent defendant’s first postconviction motion, although 
appointment of counsel for second or subsequent motions remained discretionary with 
the Superior Court.  Rule 61 was amended again after Bunting filed his present motion.  
Among other things, Rule 61 was amended to distinguish between those limited types of 
cases in which counsel must be appointed to assist an indigent movant on a first 
postconviction motion from those cases in which appointment of counsel is discretionary.  
See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e) (2015) (effective June 4, 2014).  All references to Rule 
61 in this Order are to the applicable rule that was in effect at the time Bunting filed his 
postconviction motion in January 2014. 
8 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (barring motion filed more than one year after judgment of 
conviction becomes final). 
9 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2) (barring any ground for relief not asserted in a prior 
postconviction motion). 
10 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4) (barring any ground for relief that was formerly 
adjudicated). 
4 
 
under Rule 61(i)(5).11  The Commissioner also recommended denial of 
Bunting’s motion for appointment of counsel after concluding that Bunting 
was not entitled to counsel under Martinez and had not established good 
cause for appointment of counsel under Rule 61(e)(1).  After de novo 
review, the Superior Court adopted the Commissioner’s recommendations, 
denied Bunting’s motion for appointment of counsel, and summarily 
dismissed Bunting’s third motion for postconviction relief.12  This appeal 
followed.    
(4) 
Bunting essentially raises three arguments on appeal.  First, he 
contends that he was entitled, under Martinez, to the appointment of counsel 
to assist him in pursuing his third postconviction motion.  Second, he 
contends that a recent investigation into misconduct at the Office of the 
Medical Examiner calls into question the legitimacy of the chain of custody 
and forensic testing of the drug evidence in his case.  Finally, he contends 
that the Superior Court abused its discretion in dismissing his third motion 
for postconviction relief as procedurally barred.  This Court reviews the 
Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for abuse of discretion and 
                                                 
11 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (providing that barred claims can be reviewed if there is a 
colorable claim of a miscarriage of justice due to a constitutional violation that 
undermined the fairness of proceedings). 
12 State v. Bunting, 2014 WL 2119626 (Del. Super. May 13, 2014). 
5 
 
questions of law de novo.13  The procedural requirements of Rule 61(i) must 
be considered before any substantive issues are addressed.14   
(5) 
Bunting’s first claim on appeal is that the Superior Court 
abused its discretion in denying his motion for appointment of counsel 
because he was entitled to appointment of counsel under Martinez.  Bunting 
also appears to argue that he should be permitted to re-litigate his earlier 
postconviction motions with appointed counsel because he lacked counsel at 
the time of those motions. Neither contention has any merit.  Contrary to 
Bunting’s contention, Martinez simply does not stand for the proposition 
that an indigent defendant has a constitutional right to counsel in a first 
postconviction proceeding or in any subsequent postconviction proceeding.  
Moreover, this Court previously has rejected the argument that a defendant 
who proceeded without counsel in a first postconviction proceeding is 
entitled under Martinez to “re-do” his first postconviction proceeding with 
appointed counsel.15  Because his arguments find no support in the law, we 
reject Bunting’s contentions on appeal. 
                                                 
13 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 
14 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
15 Riley v. State, 2014 WL 98643 (Del. Jan. 9, 2014). 
6 
 
(6) 
Bunting next claims that he was convicted based on testimony 
and evidence offered by the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner 
(“OCME”), which has been the subject of a recent investigation by the 
Attorney General.  He suggests that the recent investigation calls into 
question the chain of custody of the drug evidence in his case.  In this 
appeal, the State disclosed in a letter dated June 6, 2014 that a person in the 
chain of custody for the drug evidence had been indicted on charges arising 
from the Attorney General’s investigation.  The State’s letter claimed that 
there was no evidence that the drugs in Bunting’s case had been 
compromised.   
(7) 
The parties were directed to file supplemental memoranda 
addressing the applicability, if any, of this Court’s recent opinion in Brown 
v. State.16  In Brown, among other things, we rejected the defendant’s 
postconviction claim that he was entitled to a new trial based on the newly 
discovered evidence of misconduct at the OCME.  In the context of that 
case, we held that Brown’s knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea 
waived any right to test the chain of custody of the drug evidence.17 
                                                 
16 108 A.3d 1201 (Del. 2015). 
17 Id. at 1205-06. 
7 
 
(8) 
In his supplemental memorandum, Bunting repeats his 
contention that counsel should have been appointed to help him pursue his 
claims in his first postconviction motion challenging the habitual offender 
statute.  He raises no argument about the OCME investigation, its arguable 
impact on his case, or the applicability of the Court’s holding in Brown to 
his case.  Moreover, he does not challenge the chain of custody or forensic 
testing of the drug evidence in his case in any way. 
(9) 
As the State points out in its supplemental memoranda, Bunting 
specifically waived his right to have each person in the chain of custody 
testify at his 2005 trial.  In fact, the Superior Court noted on the trial record 
that there was “no legitimate issue” with regard to chain of custody in 
Bunting’s case.  Indeed, in his defense at trial, in his direct appeal, and in all 
of his postconviction proceedings, Bunting has never challenged the validity 
of the forensic testing or the chain of custody of the drug evidence.  
(10) Even if we assume that Bunting had raised the chain of custody 
issue to the Superior Court in the first instance, we conclude that the claim is 
procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(1) and Rule 61(i)(2) and that Bunting has 
not established a miscarriage of justice under Rule 61(i)(5) sufficient to 
overcome these procedural hurdles. The record reflects that the testing of the 
drug evidence in Bunting’s case predates the OCME investigation by a 
8 
 
decade.  Bunting has not even alleged, let alone offered any proof, that the 
integrity of his trial proceedings in 2004 was compromised by the OCME 
investigation that began in 2014.  Under the circumstances, we conclude that 
Bunting’s conclusory and unsubstantiated assertion that the validity of the 
chain of custody of the drug evidence at his 2004 trial somehow has been 
called into question by the 2014 OCME investigation is insufficient to 
establish a miscarriage of justice under Rule 61(i)(5) in order to overcome 
the procedural bars of Rule 61(i)(1)-(2). 
(11) Finally, Bunting argues that the Superior Court abused its 
discretion in dismissing the ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in 
his third motion for postconviction relief as procedurally barred.  Bunting 
appears to assert that his claims should not be procedurally barred because 
this Court never addressed the merits of the issues he raised in his 2008 
appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his first postconviction motion.  
Bunting’s assertion, however, fails to acknowledge several important facts.  
First, the Superior Court addressed his ineffectiveness claims when it denied 
his first postconviction motion.18  Second, Bunting never filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s final order denying his first Rule 61 motion, so 
                                                 
18 State v. Bunting, 2008 WL 1891708 (Del. Super. Apr. 28, 2008). 
9 
 
this Court had no opportunity to address the merits of his claims on appeal.19  
Under these circumstances, there is simply no merit to Bunting’s suggestion 
that Rule 61(i)(4) should not bar his previously adjudicated claims.  
Moreover, to the extent Bunting asserts that review of his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims was warranted because there was a “miscarriage 
of justice” under Rule 61(i)(5),20 we find his claims to be conclusory and 
unsubstantiated.21  Accordingly, we find no error in the Superior Court’s 
denial of Bunting’s third motion for postconviction relief.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
19  The appeal that Bunting references in his opening brief, No. 117, 2008, was an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s interlocutory order denying some of his postconviction claims 
but granting his request to amend his Rule 61 motion to add ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims.  We dismissed that appeal as unopposed after Bunting failed to respond 
to the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal as interlocutory.  See Bunting v. State, 2008 
WL 2816949 (Del. July 23, 2008). 
20 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (providing that barred claims can be reviewed if there is 
colorable claim of miscarriage of justice due to constitutional violation that undermined 
fairness of proceedings). 
21 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 555-56 (holding conclusory allegations of ineffective 
assistance of counsel were not sufficient to show review was warranted in interest of 
justice or that constitutional violation occurred).