Case Title: MARK ENGLE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-05-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
MARK ENGLE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1989 WY 124774 P.2d 1303Case Number: 88-123Decided: 05/31/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARK ENGLE, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Daniel R. Spangler, 
J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender and Steven E. Weerts, Sr. Asst. Public Defender, 
for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Patrick M. Anderson, Legal Intern, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Mark E. Engle 
(appellant), an unemployed twenty-four year old transient, was sentenced for 
felony auto theft, and his appeal now presents procedural and documentary 
sufficiency for judicial determination of either his competency to stand trial 
or to be convicted.

I. 
FACTS

[¶2.]     On September 11, 1987, 
Nick Stovall parked at a store in Casper to purchase an ice cream cone. On return 
to the parking lot, his 1979 GMC Suburban was gone. A witness in the vicinity 
saw the vehicle being driven around a corner at a fast speed and skid into an 
adjacent tree. The driver got out, appeared to be drunk, looked at witnesses at 
the scene and vehicle damage, got back in the vehicle and drove away. An hour or 
so later, at a point about thirty miles east of town toward Douglas, a highway 
patrolman stopped the vehicle because of a REDDI report (Report Every Drunk 
Driver Immediately) and his observation of swerving and general erratic driving. 
The arresting officer drew his weapon and called for backup. Circumstances of 
the resulting arrest indicated strangeness of behavior, if not 
intoxication.

[¶3.]     Appellant, as the 
driver, was arrested upon confirmation of vehicle theft and charged with felony 
auto theft and not the joyriding misdemeanor. When thereafter arraigned in 
district court, appellant, as an indigent, was provided appointed counsel and 
first pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, on November 2, 1987, a stipulated order 
approved and entered by the district court provided:

COMES NOW the Defendant, 
by and through his court appointed attorney, Jack Vreeland, and hereby moves the 
Court to enter his pleas of not guilty by reason of mental illness and not 
triable by reason of mental illness or deficiency, and upon the stipulation by 
the State of Wyoming by and through Patrick Crank, Assistant District Attorney, 
and the Court being duly apprised in the premises FINDS that it would be in the 
best interest of justice that the Defendant be transported to the Wyoming State 
[H]ospital at Evanston for an evaluation to determine whether or not the 
Defendant is fit to proceed and to determine whether or not the Defendant had a 
mental illness or deficiency at the time of the commission of the 
offense.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant shall be transported by the Natrona County 
Sheriff's Department to the StateHospital at Evanston for an evaluation 
pursuant to Wyoming Stat[ut]e 7-11-303 and 7-11-304.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that the Defendant shall remain at the WyomingStateHospital on an in-patient 
basis for a period no longer than thirty days (30) for the study of the mental 
condition of the accused.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that written reports of the pre-trial examination shall be filed with the Clerk 
of Court and including those matters as set forth with Wyoming Statute 7-11-303 
and 7-11-304.

II. INSANITY DEFENSE 
PROCEDURE

[¶4.]     Responsive to the 
district court order, a letter dated November 24, 1987, as filed November 30, 
1987, was furnished and signed in behalf of Frank L. Rundle, M.D. and approved 
by the state hospital superintendent, which stated in full 
text:

Mr. Engle was admitted to 
the WyomingStateHospital on 12 Nov 87 in accordance with 
your order for evaluation.

He was interviewed by the 
undersigned on 13 Nov 87 at which time he declared that he had had no prior 
knowledge of his coming to the hospital for evaluation, that he had not been 
informed of this by his attorney, that he objected to being here and would not 
undergo evaluation. His attorney, Mr. Vreeland, was contacted, and he stated 
that indeed he had discussed the evaluation with his client and that he did, in 
fact, know that he was being sent to the hospital. He further explained that one 
of the difficulties he has had in working with the client is that he presents 
different stories at different times about the same set of circumstances and it 
has been impossible to know which was accurate.

I met with Mr. Engle 
again on 16 Nov 87 at which time he again stated that he had no knowledge of 
coming to the hospital for evaluation and declared again that he would not 
participate in the procedure. It was therefore decided that he would be returned 
to jail.

In the two brief 
interviews which were held with Mr. Engle at this hospital, he did provide some 
limited information. He stated that he had been in the ArizonaStateHospital in Phoenix at some time in 
the past, that having been also for a court ordered evaluation, and he was found 
to be competent. He had also been treated in a private psychiatric hospital in 
Phoenix as a 
result of an accidental overdose of Methamphetamine, a drug which he had used 
regularly over a period of several years.

In these two interviews, 
Mr. Engle manifested no obvious signs of mental illness or deficiency. There was 
no associational thought disorder, no disturbance of mood or affect, and no 
evidence for hallucinations or delusions or other major psychopathology. He was 
well oriented, there was no impairment of attention or concentration, memory was 
intact, and intellectual level was estimated to be high 
average.

III. INTENT AS AN ISSUE 
OF THE OFFENSE

[¶5.]     It is the statutory 
sufficiency of this correspondence which was not even signed by the author from 
which we are called to consider effectiveness to deny and nullify a pleaded 
defense of non-responsibility and mental illness or deficiency. The state of 
appellant's intent and his degree of intoxication were peculiarly significant 
because, dependent upon the character of intent in regard to displacement of 
rights of ownership, the undenied offense was either a felony auto theft or 
misdemeanor joyriding.

[¶6.]     The felony auto theft, 
as provided by W.S. 6-3-402(a), states:

A person who steals, 
takes and carries, leads or drives away property of another with intent to 
deprive the owner or lawful possessor is guilty of 
larceny.

The maximum 
punishment is ten years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine or both if the property 
value is $500 or more. The joyriding statute, W.S. 31-11-102, 
provides:

Any person who without 
specific authority of the owner or his authorized and accredited agent 
willfully, wantonly, or maliciously takes possession of, or drives, propels or 
takes away, or attempts to take possession of, drive, propel, or take away a 
vehicle, the property of another, for the purpose of temporarily making use of 
the vehicle, or who knowingly aids, abets or assists another in so doing, upon 
conviction, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more 
than one (1) year, a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or 
both.

[¶7.]     Consequently, in 
defense theory as now presented and since the obvious unauthorized taking did 
occur, the appellate issue becomes whether permanent intent to deprive was 
refuted either by intoxication or lack of mental competency. Facts singularly 
applied to these potential defenses were the characterization of the arresting 
officer to his supervisor that, upon arrest, it looked like he had a "fruitcake" 
as well as the corollary circumstance that appellant had checked into a 
transient facility in Casper where his belongings were found and was driving 
down the road toward Douglas having abandoned both his belongings and his 
arranged residence for the day.1

IV. COMPETENCY 
HEARING

[¶8.]     Following the filing of 
the letter from the WyomingStateHospital, procedurally, a 
"competency hearing" was convened on January 7, 1988 to consider the stipulated 
pleas of "not guilty by reason of mental illness and not triable by reason of 
mental illness or deficiency. " The choices presented by counsel for appellant 
were:

[A]sking Mr. Engle to be 
sent down to the Hospital to try for an evaluation on him. I anticipate in the 
alternative asking the Court for a continuance for us to get a psychiatrist for 
us to look at him, and as a third option we would ask the Court to withdraw 
because I don't think we can be effective, if there is not in fact the 
cooperation that the evidence will show the Court between Mr. Engle and 
myself.

[¶9.]     The State responded to 
the alternative choices requested by standing on the sufficiency of the state 
hospital letter and by objection to a further psychiatric 
examination:

MR. CRANK: Your Honor, 
the State doesn't intend on calling any witnesses in this matter, and we would 
stand on the report that we have received from the StateHospital as to Mr. Engle's competency to 
proceed at the stated proceedings.

THE COURT: Are you 
opposed to the notion of the Defense obtaining their own psychiatrist to examine 
him?

MR. CRANK: I am, Your 
Honor, for a couple of reasons. Mr. Engle has been incarcerated since the time 
of his arrest for this offense. I think we will be running into speedy trial 
problems if we get another evaluation. Secondly, you know, we did receive a 
report back on November 30th, of 1987, from the StateHospital, where - the Court has a copy of this, where 
Mr. Engle refused to cooperate with the authorities at the StateHospital in performing an evaluation. Once 
we received that report, then there was certainty pursuant to that statute and 
the rules, the Defendant certainly had the opportunity at that point in time to 
request a second evaluation. We haven't done that. And, I believe, the time has 
run for that type of relief. Mr. Engle had every opportunity when he went to the 
StateHospital the first time to 
cooperate and have a report, and he just didn't do so. I think the evidence 
today will show Your Honor Mr. Engle has been through the system on a number of 
occasions, and he is aware of how to work the system, and the State would 
respectfully submit to the Court that is all he is doing, and to allow him a 
continuance of this trial, at the late date, at this late date, would just 
further serve what he is attempting to do is just to mess with the system until 
such time as we do have a trial and getting Mr. Engle out of all of our 
hair.

THE COURT: Well, the 
statute places a time limit upon the request for the subsequent 
examination.

MR. CRANK: I believe so, 
Your Honor.

MR. VREELAND: I believe 
there is a five day afterwards, Judge, but part of our contention is that what 
we have received from the Hospital in the first place really isn't in accordance 
with the statute. Any way I don't see how a person could really consider this a 
report in accordance with the Statute 7-11-303, which sets out what the Hospital 
should do for us. It is our position we really haven't gotten an evaluation from 
the Hospital and don't see how we can call this letter from there November 24th 
an evaluation, it doesn't address the statutory criteria. I think in that it 
does try to address some issues, and I think explained to everyone what went on, 
but other than that I don't think we can call this an evaluation, with what we 
requested or ordered the hospital to do.

MR. CRANK: Your Honor, I 
can't find that time limit statute right now, but I know there is a relatively 
short period of time to request a second evaluation.

THE COURT: 
7-11-304(d).

MR. CRANK: It does state 
within five days after receiving a copy of the report. I recognize what Mr. 
Vreeland is saying, but, you know, the StateHospital did the best they could do 
because of Mr. Engle's uncooperativeness. If he had gone down there and 
cooperated with them, then we would have a report that complies with 7-11-303. 
They wrote us a report with as much information as they had, based on Mr. 
Engle's complete refusal to cooperate with them, and they did what they had to 
do, and then sent him back to jail here in NatronaCounty to await 
trial.

[¶10.]  The state hospital superintendent who had 
signed the letter in behalf of the examiner and then signed his approval but had 
no personal contact with appellant in any fashion during the period of supposed 
examination was called as the first witness for the hearing. The actual 
institution author of the letter was gone from the hospital and was apparently 
not available to testify. Consequently, the testifying witness could provide no 
personal knowledge of the mental condition of appellant and except for the 
letter, did submit no other documentary evidence to be considered. 
Cf.State v. Zespy, 723 P.2d 564 (Wyo. 
1986).

[¶11.]  A private investigator was then called by 
the defense who testified about his contacts and attempted interviews with 
appellant. In essence, he stated:

A. I have talked to Mr. 
Engle probably six or seven times in [the] prior two or three months, and he has 
never been consistent or ever told me the same story twice. Also have different 
twists, different facts, some of them, I don't know how you put it, every time I 
approach him as far [as] why, that is just the way it happened, he doesn't 
understand why I don't believe his story.

Q. He never refused to 
talk to you or anything like that?

A. No, never 
has.

Q. Did you ever obtain 
any medical reports on Mr. Engle?

A. Yes, I had talked to 
Mr. Engle about a doctor he had seen before he ever came to Wyoming, and he gave me the names of two or three 
different doctors that he had seen at Phoenix, Arizona, at three different hospitals. I then 
contacted the hospitals after I had obtained a medical release form, sent to 
them also, and they sent me back his complete files at three different 
hospitals.

Q. In general were these 
treatments for psychological matters or for physical 
disabilities?

A. Most of them 
psychological.

[¶12.]  At hearing conclusion, following the 
cross-examination of the investigator about the lack of cooperation and 
inconsistency of the mental character of appellant, the district court denied 
any second evaluation, denied the withdrawal of appellant's counsel, and denied 
a continuance for the trial then scheduled to convene four days later. The 
principal basis for the district court's decision was that the five-day 
re-examination period had passed without required request by appellant's counsel 
for the second evaluation. By this decision, the district court determined both 
issues of triability and prospective defense on the merits which are separate 
"discrete" questions because each is governed by different medical and legal 
standards. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S. Ct. 896, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1975); United 
States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1971). Thus, 
assistance for defense was denied to appellant. United States v. 
Crews, 781 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1986).

[¶13.]  This time limitation was derived from 
W.S. 7-11-304(d), which provides:

In all cases where a plea 
of "not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency" is made, the judge 
shall order the defendant examined as provided in W.S. 7-11-303(b). If an 
examination provided in W.S. 7-11-303(b) was made, the report may be received in 
evidence and no new examination shall be required unless, in the discretion of 
the court, another examination is necessary. Within five (5) days after 
receiving a copy of the report, both the accused and the state, upon written 
request, may obtain an order granting them an examination of the accused by a 
designated examiner of their own choosing. The clerk of court shall deliver 
copies of the report or reports to the district attorney and to the accused or 
his counsel. All reports required by this subsection shall conform to the 
requirements of W.S. 7-11-303(c). These reports are not public records or open 
to the public.

[¶14.]  The record really does not establish when 
the report was received by the public defender and probably never was furnished 
to appellant. There seems to be an assumption from the record that the public 
defender became aware of the letter, and the context now presented is that the 
letter was not considered to be an adequate evaluation since the text of the 
letter failed to comply with the statute. It was on the basis of the statutory 
non-compliance analysis that the public defender's office had perhaps belatedly, 
in the alternative, requested either a re-examination to constitute the first 
real evaluation at the state hospital or that another examiner be 
designated.

V. PROBLEM WITH JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS

[¶15.]  The defense trial problems were not then 
to end. Requested jury instructions which were denied by the district court 
included:

A finding that Defendant 
was mentally responsible for his acts is not equivalent to a finding that he 
acted with the specific intent necessary for the crime charged. Even if you find 
from the evidence in the case beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was 
mentally responsible for his acts at the time of the alleged offense, it is 
still your duty to consider all the evidence in the case which may aid in 
determining whether he acted with the necessary specific 
intent.

Mental illness or 
deficiency can be brought about by the continuous use of intoxicating liquor or 
drugs. A defendant is not barred from using the defense of lack of me[n]tal 
responsibility beca[us]e his mental illness or deficiency was brought about by 
continued use of any such substance.

Under certain 
circumstances a person is not legally responsible for his criminal conduct. 
Among those circumstances, Defendant is not legally responsible for criminal 
conduct if:

(1) He was suffering at 
the time of the criminal conduct from a mental illness or deficiency; 
and

(2) As a result, he 
lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct 
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.

The term "mental 
deficiency" means a defect attributable to mental retardation, brain damage and 
a learning disability.

The phrase "mental 
illness or deficiency" does not include an abnormality manifested only by 
repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.

The State must prove that 
the Defendant was mentally responsible for the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.

Thus, if you do not 
believe that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant 
was mentally responsible, then you should find him not guilty by reaso[n] of 
mental illness or deficiency.

[¶16.]  The lesser included instruction was 
given, but the principal justification - mental condition for the felony offense 
- had been denied. Actually, there is nothing in this record, even if we expand 
its scope to the investigator's comments and analysis, that even intimates that 
appellant had a particular intent to deprive Stovall, as the owner of the 
vehicle, of permanent possession of his vehicle. As observed from this 
insufficient record, all one derives is a conclusion that appellant lacked 
defined rationality in taking the vehicle and what he did thereafter during his 
aimless driving. The issue of sufficiency of the evidence is not presented on 
appeal and need not, consequently, be further pursued.

VI. WHAT HAPPENED TO 
INSANITY DEFENSE

[¶17.]  The prime subject of appellant's concern 
in this appeal is what happened, not only to his defense of not triable by 
reason of mental illness, but also to the substantive plea of not guilty by 
reason of mental illness or deficiency after pleading presentation by 
stipulation and district court order. It can only be explained that defense 
counsel waived both of these aspects by virtue of his delay in requesting a 
second examination, which might provide some realistic mental condition 
information. Lacking that examination, there was no available viable evidence to 
litigate the mental sufficiency condition of appellant. Similarly, this case was 
the same as another case where, "[a]s a 
result, there was no expert testimony for either side on Ake's sanity at the 
time of the offense." Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 72, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1985). Notwithstanding that, "[a]n insanity defense after all, 
unlike a medical malpractice claim, does not require expert testimony as a 
prerequisite for presentation to a jury." Motes v. State, 256 Ga. 831, 353 S.E.2d 348, 
349 (1987). In this case, the defense simply disappeared by the district court's 
decision in initial hearing that the letter was sufficient to determine 
competency and that other examinations were waived by delayed request. See also 
Zespy, 723 P.2d 564.

[¶18.]  This procedure cannot meet the standard 
required by Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S. Ct. 836, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815 (1966), 
since no adequate hearing on competency was provided either pretrial or during 
trial which was responsive to the mental deficiency plea. Similar authority is 
found in Dusky v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824 
(1960), which also requires conviction reversal. In result, the district court 
denied consideration to appellant of his mental condition when the state 
hospital failed to comply with statutory requirements for a mental examination 
report. Thereafter, by interpretation that the letter did not fulfill the 
requirements for a proper report, appellant's counsel, by untimely request, lost 
his right to have any real mental evaluation to secure compliance with W.S. 
7-11-304(d).

It is well settled that 
the conviction of an accused while he is legally incompetent to stand trial 
violates due process. Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108, 
75 S. Ct. 145, 147, 99 L. Ed. 135, 138 (1954); * * *. A state must provide 
procedures that are adequate to protect a defendant's due process right not to 
be tried while he is incompetent. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 
86 S. Ct. 836, 838, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815, 818 (1966); * * *.

Manning v. 
State, 766 S.W.2d 551, 553-54 (Tex. App. 1989).

[¶19.]  What occurred to appellant in this case 
calls into direct question the text of the examination statute, W.S. 7-11-303, 
which provides:

(a) If it appears at any 
stage of a criminal proceeding, by motion or upon the court's own motion, that 
there is reasonable cause to believe that the accused has a mental illness or 
deficiency making him unfit to proceed, all further proceedings shall be 
suspended.

(b) The court shall order 
an examination of the accused by a designated examiner. The order may include, 
but is not limited to, an examination of the accused at the Wyoming state hospital on 
an inpatient or outpatient basis, at a local mental health center on an 
inpatient or outpatient basis, or at his place of detention. In selecting the 
examination site, the court may consider proximity to the court, availability of 
an examiner, and the necessity for security precautions. If the order provides 
for commitment of the accused to a designated facility, the commitment shall 
continue no longer than a thirty (30) day period for the study of the mental 
condition of the accused.

(c) Written reports of 
the pretrial examination shall be filed with the clerk of court. The report 
shall include:

(i) Detailed 
findings;

(ii) An opinion as to 
whether the accused has a mental illness or deficiency, and its probable 
duration;

(iii) An opinion as to 
whether the accused, as a result of mental illness or deficiency, lacks capacity 
to comprehend his position, to understand the nature and object of the 
proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to 
cooperate with his counsel to the end that any available defense may be 
interposed;

(iv) An opinion as to 
whether at the time of the alleged criminal conduct the accused, as a result of 
mental illness or deficiency, lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of 
law;

(v) A recommendation as 
to whether the accused should be held in a designated facility for treatment 
pending determination by the court of the issue of mental fitness to proceed; 
and

(vi) A recommendation as 
to whether the accused, if found by the court to be mentally fit to proceed, 
should be detained in a designated facility pending further 
proceedings.

(d) The clerk of court 
shall deliver copies of the report to the district attorney and to the accused 
or his counsel. The report is not a public record or open to the public. After 
receiving a copy of the report, both the accused and the state may, upon written 
request and for good cause shown, obtain an order granting them an examination 
of the accused by a designated examiner of their own choosing. For each 
examination ordered, a report conforming to the requirements of subsection (c) 
of this section shall be furnished to the court and the opposing 
party.

* * * * * 
*

(f) If neither the state, 
nor the accused or his counsel contests the opinion referred to in subsection 
[paragraph] (c)(iii) of this section relative to fitness to proceed, the court 
may make a determination and finding of record on this issue on the basis of the 
report filed or the court may hold a hearing on its own motion. If the opinion 
relative to fitness to proceed is contested the court shall hold a hearing on 
the issue. The report or reports may be received in evidence at any hearing on 
the issue. The party contesting any opinion relative to fitness to proceed has 
the right to summon and cross-examine the persons who rendered the opinion and 
to offer evidence upon the issue.

* * * * * 
*

(h) A finding by the 
court that the accused is mentally fit to proceed shall not prejudice the 
accused in a defense to the crime charged on the ground that at the time of the 
act he was afflicted with a mental illness or deficiency excluding 
responsibility. Nor shall the finding be introduced in evidence on that issue or 
otherwise brought to the notice of the jury. No statement made by the accused in 
the course of any examination or treatment pursuant to this section and no 
information received by any person in the course of the examination or treatment 
shall be admitted in evidence in any criminal proceeding then or thereafter 
pending on any issue other than that of the mental condition of the 
accused.

(j) Notwithstanding any 
provision of this section, counsel for the accused may make any and all legal 
objections which are susceptible of a fair determination prior to trial without 
the personal participation of the accused.

[¶20.]  This means that the required written 
report will contain six specific items constituting detailed findings by the 
qualified expert from his evaluation of appellant's mental 
state.

[¶21.]  Without examination, appellant had no 
testimony to submit about his mental competency. Denied consideration of the plea of not 
guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency, the verdict form given by the 
district court permitted jury decision only of not guilty; guilty of a lesser 
charge, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle; or guilty of the felony. The 
pleaded defense of not guilty by reason of mental illness of deficiency was 
never submitted to the jury, although it had been made by joint stipulation of 
counsel and authenticating order of the district court. Found guilty of the 
felony, appellant was then sentenced to not less than six years nor more than 
eight years with credit for the 200 days served in the county jail while 
awaiting trial. Appellant has now been in continuous confinement since offense 
date of September 11, 1987 or nearly twenty months.

[¶22.]  This case is even more egregious than 
Ake, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53, since here the substantive defense of the accused was not submitted to the 
jury for any consideration. The three cases cited by the State, Ball v. State, 
278 Ark. 423, 
646 S.W.2d 693 (1983); Mikel v. State, 550 S.W.2d 863 (Mo. App. 1977); and State 
v. Bacon, 501 S.W.2d 499 (Mo. App. 1973), can easily be distinguished by 
differences in facts and controlling state statutes. We find the case of Miller 
v. State, 498 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. App. 1973) to be more relevant and more persuasive. 
See also Drope, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S. Ct. 896, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103.

[¶23.]  The Illinois appellate court, when considering 
similar facts and including expert witness denial, 
discerned:

In failing to appoint a 
psychiatrist to determine defendant's mental condition at the time the offense 
occurred, the trial court denied defendant his constitutionally guaranteed right 
to due process. (Ake, 470 U.S.  at 83, 105 S. Ct.  at 1096, 84 L. Ed. 2d  at 66.) This was clearly an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion.

People v. 
Kegley, 175 Ill. App.3d 335, 125 Ill.Dec. 42, 529 N.E.2d 1118, 1123 (1988).

VII. SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
REPORT

[¶24.]  The issue spotlighted in specificity for 
this appeal is whether the state hospital letter substantially complied with the 
statutory requirements. Also focused was what happens if the state hospital 
letter does or does not comply when appellant was denied any additional 
examination so he had no substantive evidence for his mental condition defense. 
The present requirement for mental examination statutorily provided and 
constitutionally required in Wyoming was enunciated long 
ago.

"It has long been 
accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity 
to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult 
with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a 
trial. Thus, Blackstone wrote that one who became `mad' after the commission of 
an offense should not be arraigned for it `because he is not able to plead to it 
with that advice and caution that he ought.' Similarly, if he became `mad' after 
pleading, he should not be tried, `for how can he make his defence?' 4 W. 
Blackstone, Commentaries[*] 24."

State v. 
Pedersen, 309 N.W.2d 490, 501 (Iowa 1981) 
(quoting Drope, 420 U.S.  at 171, 95 S.Ct. at 
903).

[¶25.]  Clearly, the state hospital letter did 
not contain the information required by W.S. 7-11-303(c). Hayes v. State, 599 P.2d 558, 562 n. 3 (Wyo. 1979). Within the text, it gave no 
explanation as to why he did not understand his examination, included no comment 
as required by W.S. 7-11-303(c)(iv) as to his condition at the time of the 
alleged criminal conduct, referenced no conclusion in regard to cooperation with 
his counsel, and failed to suggest what other examination or observation might 
provide some realistic evidence. No indication is given that other medical 
records were considered or prior history reviewed for opinion support. See Drob 
and Berger, The Determination of Malingering: A Comprehensive Clinical-Forensic 
Approach, 15 J. Psychiatry and the Law 519 (1987). The federal court considered 
that being mean and manipulative does not necessarily equate to legal sanity, 
United States v. Samuels, 801 F.2d 1052 (1986), reh'g denied 808 F.2d 1298 (8th 
Cir. 1987). We do not have confirming evidence of either characteristic here. It 
is established that "in some cases a `failure to cooperate may itself be a 
symptom of mental disorder.'" Taylor, 437 F.2d  at 378 (quoting Judicial 
Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, Report of the Committee on 
Problems Connected with Mental Examinations of the Accused in Criminal Cases 
Before Trial 34 (1966)).

VIII. RIGHT TO SECOND 
OPINION

[¶26.]  This court is faced with the second 
problem of waiver by the office of the public defender of a claimed right to 
secure a second opinion because, in their analysis, as not completely 
unreasonable, the first report failed totally to comply with the statutory 
responsibility of the state hospital. Suffice it to say that within an Evitts v. 
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 105 S. Ct. 830, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821, reh'g denied 470 U.S. 1065, 
105 S. Ct. 1783, 84 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1985) concept, counsel cannot waive such a 
fundamental right under the United States Constitution or Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
6, due process of law; and art. 1, § 10, right of accused to defend.2

IX. 
CONCLUSION

[¶27.]  Factually, the plea of not guilty by 
reason of mental deficiency was extinguished because (1) the state hospital did 
not conduct a reasonable evaluation, and (2) the response was not vigorously 
attacked by appellant's counsel within five days after receipt. Disregarding 
other complex appellate issues conjecturally presented, we would simply conclude 
that (1) the report of the state hospital did not comply as a medical illness or 
deficiency report pursuant to W.S. 7-11-303 and, consequently, did not provide a 
basis in response to the order for examination by which further examination 
could be denied; and (2) pleas of not guilty by reason of present mental illness 
or deficiency and not guilty by reason of mental illness were not eviscerated or 
waived by the state hospital letter.

[¶28.]  We reverse and remand for an appropriate 
evaluation by one or more designated examiners who will prepare a written report 
in compliance with the mandatory criteria of W.S. 7-11-303(c) to provide a basis 
upon which a realistic incompetency hearing can be conducted and for jury 
consideration of appellant's defenses.3

GOLDEN, J., specially 
concurs.

CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, J., 
dissents.

FOOTNOTES

1 In this 
one-and-a-half-day trial encompassing about ninety transcript pages for 
prosecution and ten pages for defense, the only uncertain factual inquiry was 
why appellant did what he did. The discernable and undisputable facts were 
appellant left a bar, saw an unattended vehicle and took off while leaving his 
belongings where he had checked in at the Souls Anchor Rescue Mission (since 
called Central Wyoming Rescue Mission), a transient facility. Perhaps as 
explainable as any other reason was the appellant's version stated to the 
probation officer for presentence investigation after conviction, since 
appellant had not, for whatever reason, elected to testify at 
trial:

"I went to My Brothers Place that 
day after I allready [sic] drank a bottle of peach schnapps and bought a couple 
of beers (4)[.] I had been shooting coke for awhile and did some more in the 
bathroom there. The bartender I felt did not like me and I think he put 
something in my beer and when I was one quarter of the way through the last beer 
I started spinning so I got up[,] went to the bathroom [and] then left cause 
[sic] I thought something strange was going on. I could hardly see. I went to 
Nick[']s truck and it had the keys so I got in to be able to get out of there, 
and I got into a wreck with a tree, I left the accident, and I just got onto the 
closest freeway and drove until I got busted in Douglas."

Comparable to this 
completely irrational course of events, including appellant's action in leaving 
his belongings at the transient facility, was the characterization by the 
arresting officer to his superior that:

Q. And in fact in 
discussing it with your captain you referred to pulling over this "fruitcake" 
is, I believe how you termed it?

A. Well, no, 
sir.

Q. Officer Becker, is 
that the way you termed it or not?

A. Oh, yes, sir, I 
called, I told Captain Morrison that this could be a 
"fruitcake."

Q. And that was based on 
information you had garnered from REDDI reports and your 
observations?

A. Yes, 
sir.

And as part of 
the arrest process:

Q. Okay, he was laying on 
the ground and complaining about it being dirt and you are telling him it is 
just pavement not dirt.

A. 
Right.

Q. So apparently his 
observations were somewhat inaccurate at that time?

A. Either that or he was 
just trying to give me a hard time.

Q. I guess ultimately you 
decided he had had a little bit too much to drink?

A. Yes, I 
did.

2 The prosecution in final 
argument stated:

Ladies and 
Gentlemen I want to talk to you for a moment about inconsistent defenses. The 
Defense told you the defendant had plead not guilty and not guilty by reason of 
mental illness. Mental illness has gone by the wayside. Now Mr. Vreeland stands 
up and tells you that he didn't intend to deprive Mr. Stovall of his car, but if 
that doesn't work, he was too drunk to form the necessary 
intent.

There are inconsistent 
defenses, Ladies and Gentlemen, and they are all dodges, all smokescreens put up 
by Mr. Vreeland to hide the defendant's complicity in the charged crime of grand 
larceny. All of the so-called defenses are inconsi[s]tent with any of the facts 
or any of the evidence that you have heard, that we listened to all day 
yesterday.

3 See for example an 
interesting law journal article on the intent - mental condition subject. 
Comment, Criminal Law - Mental Illness - Insanity Defense Reform Act Does Not 
Bar Defendant From Offering Psychiatric Evidence of Mental Abnormality on Issue 
of Mens Rea. United States v. 
Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1987), 20 Rutgers 
L.J. 271 (1988).

GOLDEN, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶29.]  I concur in the reversal of the 
conviction on the simple ground that the state hospital's mental examination and 
subsequent letter report did not comply with the statutory requirements. 
Appellant raised only that issue on appeal. We should decide the case on that 
single issue and restrain ourselves from unnecessarily expanding the opinion. 
Without such restraint, we serve up dicta on points of law or trial strategies 
or other matters "merely as a majority of the court may at that particular time 
consider them of future importance. To me, this amounts to the issuance of 
advisory opinions, a procedure that we ordinarily reject." Stuebgen v. State, 
548 P.2d 870, 886-87 (Wyo. 1976) (McClintock J., specially 
concurring). See also State v. Rosachi, 549 P.2d 318, 322 (Wyo. 
1976).

CARDINE, Chief Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶30.]  I cannot join in the opinion of the court 
and therefore dissent. The opinion is too broad, goes much too far, and decides 
questions without supporting authority which are not presented in this appeal. 
For example, under "Right to Second Opinion," the court discusses waiver by the 
public defender's office of a "claimed right" to a second opinion. Evitts v. 
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 105 S. Ct. 830, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821 (1985), is cited for the proposition that counsel cannot waive "such a 
fundamental right." Assuming that the right referred to is the right to a second 
opinion by a designated examiner defined by W.S. 7-11-304(d), this court has 
never decided this to be a "fundamental" right in the constitutional sense. The 
only case cited, Evitts, is an ineffective assistance of counsel case. Three 
separate questions of constitutional law are apparently being decided with 
nothing more than scant discussion.

[¶31.]  Additionally, the opinion describes 
appellant's behavior in stealing the truck as a "completely irrational course of 
events." The opinion heavily stresses the fact that the appellant abandoned his 
belongings at the rescue mission, apparently because this could be evidence of 
intent to return. Since this case is going back on remand, I question whether 
the court should characterize the behavior as "completely irrational." I, for 
one, think it would be rational to conclude that the benefit to be obtained from 
a 1979 Suburban might be greater than the intrinsic value of the transient's 
possessions left at the Souls Anchor Rescue Mission.

[¶32.]  In conclusion, my major concern with the 
court's opinion is that appellant raises just one issue. That issue is 
dispositive of the case. I cannot accept this opinion which discusses six other 
issues not raised, especially when the discussion is painted in such broad 
strokes.

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶33.]  I cannot join the majority opinion in 
this case, and I dissent from the disposition there made. Mental incompetents 
are favored in the law. We long have recognized the impact of mental illness or 
deficiency with respect to criminal responsibility or the capacity of an accused 
to assist in addressing the issues involved in a trial to determine culpability 
for criminal conduct. Section 7-11-302, W.S. 1977, capsulizes the social 
position:

"(a) No person shall be 
tried, sentenced or punished for the commission of an offense while, as a result 
of mental illness or deficiency, he lacks the capacity, 
to:

"(i) Comprehend his 
position;

"(ii) Understand the 
nature and object of the proceedings against him;

"(iii) Conduct his 
defense in a rational manner; and

"(iv) Cooperate with his 
counsel to the end that any available defense may be 
interposed."

Section 
7-11-305(a), W.S. 1977, then provides for the submission of a verdict form to a 
jury "by which the jury may find the defendant not guilty by reason of mental 
illness or deficiency excluding responsibility." Wyoming statutory procedures with respect to 
the issues of responsibility or inability to stand trial because of mental 
illness or deficiency are designed to comport with what historically has been 
perceived as a valid humanitarian approach.

[¶34.]  Analyzed in this way, however, these 
procedures are a means to an end and not simply an end in itself. In pursuing 
the means to an end, perhaps it is necessary to instruct the staff at the 
WyomingStateHospital with respect to how the report 
should be written. The majority opinion, however, quotes the report which, in 
this instance, essentially is negative. Considering that the examination perhaps 
was limited because Engle refused to cooperate in connection with it, still, the 
physician stated in his report:

"In these two interviews, 
Mr. Engle manifested no obvious signs of mental illness or deficiency. There was 
no associational thought disorder, no disturbance of mood or affect, and no 
evidence for hallucinations or delusions or other major psychopathology. He was 
well oriented, there was no impairment of attention or concentration, memory was 
intact, and intellectual level was estimated to be high 
average."

[¶35.]  Given these findings by the examiner, it 
is difficult for me to conclude that they are not detailed. Because the findings 
are negative, I am unable to perceive what else the examiner might do to furnish 
an opinion as to whether Engle has a mental illness or deficiency or whether, as 
a result of any mental illness or deficiency, he lacked capacity to comprehend 
his position or to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against 
him or to conduct his defense in a rational manner or to cooperate with his 
counsel to the end that any available defense might be interposed. It is clear 
to me that the findings do constitute an opinion that Engle did not suffer from 
mental illness or deficiency or lack substantial capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the theft of the vehicle. Under the 
circumstances, recommendations as to where he should be held pending trial, or a 
determination of his fitness to proceed, seem unnecessary.

[¶36.]  While the examiner may not have dotted 
his i's or crossed his t's, given his overall conclusion with respect to Engle, 
I have to ask whether it is really necessary to require a report that follows 
the outline of the statute. Is it possible that the court simply is saying that 
if one claims to be afflicted with a mental illness or deficiency, no report 
saying he is not satisfies the requirements of the 
statute?

[¶37.]  The court has chosen to pursue additional 
issues as a matter of dictum, which apparently is uttered in its role as an 
advocate rather than its role as an arbiter. In addressing those additional 
issues, the majority opinion overlooks the provision of § 7-11-305(b), W.S. 
1977, which provides, in pertinent part:

"* * * Every defendant is 
presumed to be mentally responsible. The defendant shall have the burden of 
going forward and proving by the greater weight of evidence that, as a result of 
mental illness or deficiency, he lacked capacity either to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the 
law."

I note that the 
majority alludes to testimony by Engle's investigator that he had obtained 
medical reports from three different hospitals relating to psychological 
matters. Curiously, no effort was made to introduce those reports at any stage 
of these proceedings. If they were favorable to Engle on the question of 
competency, then he was a victim of inadequate representation. However, the 
other possibility is that these reports also were negative, which would make it 
very understandable why counsel did not want to develop them further at either 
the proceedings on competency or at the trial. In fact, that does seem to be the 
most logical way to understand this record.

[¶38.]  This brings us back to the threshold 
language in § 7-11-303(a), W.S. 1977, which states as 
follows:

"If it appears at any 
stage of a criminal proceeding, by motion or upon the court's own motion, that 
there is reasonable cause to believe 
that the accused has a mental illness or deficiency making him unfit to proceed, 
all further proceedings shall be suspended." (emphasis 
added).

I recognize that 
the common practice is to pursue the statutory examination procedure whenever 
the issue is raised. In this instance, however, once Engle had been to the state 
hospital and that report had been received, the reasonable cause to believe that 
Engle was afflicted with mental illness or deficiency no longer was present in 
the absence of additional information. The trial judge saw through this effort 
by Engle, which well might be described as specious. My interpretation of the 
record is that Engle set out to cozen his defense counsel, his investigator, the 
prosecutor, the trial court, and the examiner at the WyomingStateHospital. That technique did not work for 
him there, but it worked in this court. I must confess a suspicion on my part 
that Engle will chuckle all the way back to the state hospital, or wherever he 
chooses not to go, for his next incompetency examination. I shall await further 
developments with interest.

[¶39.]  I would, however, affirm Engle's 
conviction.