Case Title: VERNON ROY McELWAIN V. JUDY ANN McELWAIN, nka JUDY ANN MAC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-11-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
VERNON ROY McELWAIN V. JUDY ANN McELWAIN, nka JUDY ANN MAC2005 WY 147123 P.3d 558Case Number: 05-32Decided: 11/22/2005
OCTOBER TERM, 
A.D. 2005

 
 
VERNON ROY 
McELWAIN,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
JUDY ANN McELWAIN,

nka JUDY ANN MAC,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

 
 
Representing Appellant:

Vernon R. 
McElwain, pro se.

 
 
Representing Appellee:

            
James A. Hardee, Douglas, Wyoming.                 

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and BURKE, JJ., and PERRY, 
D.J.

 
 
BURKE, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]       Vernon Roy 
McElwain challenges an Order Entering Judgment and Modifying Decree issued by 
the district court.  Mr. McElwain 
claims the district court erred by entering a judgment for the unpaid balance of 
a mortgage debt because the debt was extinguished when the property was 
refinanced.  Alternatively, Mr. 
McElwain contends the district court erred by failing to credit him for prior 
payments made toward the debt.  Mr. 
McElwain also claims the court erred in entering a judgment for delinquent child 
support because the minor child was emancipated.  We affirm.

 
 

 
 
[¶2]       
We restate the issues as 
follows:

 
 

1.       
Was the 
district court's judgment regarding the mortgage debt 
erroneous?

 
 

2.       
Did the 
district court err in awarding delinquent child support because the minor child 
was emancipated?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]       
The parties were 
divorced on June 13, 1998.  The 
decree required Mr. McElwain to pay one-half of the mortgage debt owed on the 
residence retained by Mrs. McElwain and child support for the parties' minor 
child.1  From the date of the divorce through 
December 2003, Mr. McElwain made payments on both obligations as ordered.  In January 2004, Mrs. McElwain 
refinanced the mortgage debt.  That 
same month, Mr. McElwain ceased making his portion of the mortgage payment.  Mr. McElwain also stopped making his 
child support payments in March 2004.

 
 
[¶4]       
Mrs. 
McElwain filed a Motion for Order of Contempt premised upon the following 
grounds:

 
 

1.                   
That the 
Defendant, VERNON ROY McELWAIN, has failed and refused to pay Plaintiff child 
support in the sum of $265.00 for the months of March through July 2004 . . . 
.

 
 

2.                   
That 
pursuant to paragraph 8 b) of the decree of divorce entered herein, Defendant 
was to pay and hold Plaintiff harmless from one-half of the then existing 
mortgage by payment of one-half [of] the mortgage payment in the sum of $210.00 
per month, which Defendant paid until January of 
2004.

 
 

3.                   
That as of 
January 2004 Plaintiff had refinanced the debt and removed the Defendant from 
his obligation to the Bank, but did not terminate his obligation to pay the 
amount set forth in said decree to be paid to Plaintiff in order to hold her 
harmless from said indebtedness.

 
 

4.                   
That as of 
January 2004 the principal amount due and owing upon said indebtedness was 
$42,388.00, one-half of which is Defendant's obligation to pay in the sum of 
$21,194.00, together with interest accruing at the rate of 7.825 percent per 
annum.

 
 

5.                   
That 
[$]45.99 per payment of the sum of $210.00 paid by the Defendant to January 2004 
was for escrowed taxes and insurance, which are part and parcel of the mortgage 
debt, and which costs Defendant should continue to pay until the debt to 
Plaintiff is satisfied.

 
 
An order 
to show cause was issued on July 16, 2004.  
Mr. McElwain in his pro se 
response alleged:

 
 
1.  Child Support was paid to the Court 
through February 2004 as ordered.  
March 2004 child support was sent directly to [the child].  Judy McElwain demanded [the child] to 
turn over the child support to her of which [the child] told me he did.  $265.00.  The reason I chose to pay [him] the 
child support for March was he moved out of Judy McElwain's home after 
completing his required classes for graduation in January 2004.  [He] moved to SheridanWyoming to live with an older brother and work 
full time.  [He] was making a 
vehicle payment, motorcycle payment, vehicle insurance and etc.  With these circumstances I believed this 
would constitute emancipation per Decree of Divorce dated June 15, 1998, Page 3 
# 2.  I do not believe I owe Judy 
McElwain any back child support.

 
 
2.         
Mortgage Payment . . . . . This mortgage was a result of consolidation of 
several debts incurred by Judy McElwain and myself including Judy's credit 
cards, Judy's son Dax McCarty's vehicle, joint credit cards, monies to remodel 
Judy's house, pay off 1994 Toyota Camery (which Judy received in the divorce), 
two $1000 CD's which one was used to buy 1980's Ford Pickup for my use.  These debts were incurred jointly but 
not equally.

 
 
            
Divorce Decree reads ½ of mortgage est. $20,000.00.  I paid $210 from June 1998 through 
February 2004 which is 69 payments equal $14,490.00.  It was not stated that part of any 
payment went to taxes and insurance and I was never given a statement.  I believe any loan is set up with part 
of the payments going toward taxes and insurance.  If payments were $420.00 then over half 
of the original would have been paid off.  
It is my understanding that Judy McElwain refinanced the home for 
improvements.  What was the loan 
balance at that time?  I do not feel 
I should be held liable for extra monies Judy McElwain received for a new 
loan.  Judy McElwain was allowed to 
use the interest each year from 1998 thru 2003 for tax purposes even though I 
was suppose to be paying half the mortgage payment.  It is my understanding that Judy 
McElwain has sold this home.

 
 
[¶5]       
A 
hearing was held on October 11, 2004.  
Both parties attended, but no record was made.  The district court entered its order on 
November 10, 2004.  The court 
declined to hold Mr. McElwain in contempt; however, judgment was entered against 
Mr. McElwain for his unpaid portion of the mortgage indebtedness in the amount 
of $21,194.00 and for delinquent child support in the amount of $675.00.  The court made no specific finding 
concerning emancipation.  This 
appeal followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]       
We have 
previously stated our standard of review governing domestic relations contempt 
cases:

 
 
"[W]e will 
not disturb the decision of the trial court . . . in the absence of some serious 
procedural error, a violation of a principle of law, or a clear and grave abuse 
of discretion." 

 
 
"Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  We must determine 
whether the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any 
facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious."

 
 
Erhart v. 
Evans, 
2001 WY 79, ¶ 11, 30 P.3d 542, 545 (Wyo. 2001) (internal 
citations omitted).  As the 
appellant, Mr. McElwain is required to provide this Court with a 
sufficient record to allow proper evaluation of the trial court's decision.  Beeman v. Beeman, 2005 WY 45, ¶ 10, 109 P.3d 548, 551 (Wyo. 2005).  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
A.  Mortgage Indebtedness

 
 
[¶7]       
Mr. 
McElwain's chief complaint is that any judgment against him for the mortgage 
debt was erroneous.   He claims he is no longer obligated to 
pay any portion of the mortgage debt because the property was refinanced by Mrs. 
McElwain.  

 
 
[¶8]       
We 
addressed a similar situation in Roe v. Roe, 742 P.2d 203 (Wyo. 1987).  Roe involved a post-divorce 
dispute regarding an obligation to pay an outstanding mortgage.  Mr. Roe agreed to pay a portion of the 
mortgage indebtedness, in monthly installments of $250.00.  Id. at 203.  The terms of the settlement 
agreement also allowed Mr. Roe to prepay his obligation at any time.2  Id. at 204.  Mrs. Roe subsequently sold the property 
and paid the entire mortgage debt from the sale proceeds.  Mr. Roe ceased making his monthly 
payments contending his responsibility was discharged upon the sale of the 
property.  We disagreed.  In making our determination, we reviewed 
the Roe's agreement and found that Mr. Roe's assumed debt was not subject to 
Mrs. Roe's retention of the property or dischargeable by her prepayment of the 
entire debt.  Id.  In essence, we concluded that Mr. Roe 
had a "right to prepay, but not an opportunity to be excused" from the 
obligation.  Id. at 205. 

 
 
[¶9]       
The 
same analysis applies in this case.  
Mr. McElwain was ordered to pay one-half of the mortgage debt directly to 
Mrs. McElwain.  The decree permitted 
Mr. McElwain to pay his portion of the indebtedness in installments of $210.00 
per month.  Nothing in the divorce 
decree provides for this debt to be extinguished upon refinancing and Mr. 
McElwain points us towards no authority to support his position.  Furthermore, the decree awarded 
ownership of the property to Mrs. McElwain and authorized her to "mortgage, 
sell, pledge or otherwise deal in such property . . . ."  The provisions of the decree did not 
condition Mr. McElwain's obligation to Mrs. McElwain upon the existing financing 
or her continued ownership of the residence.  As we stated in Roe, 
"[p]repayment by one . . . does not vacate [the] payment obligation of the other 
. . . ."  Roe, 742 P.2d  at 
204.  

 
 
[¶10]     Alternatively, 
Mr. McElwain appears to challenge the amount of the judgment.  Mr. McElwain claims the decree capped 
his total obligation for the mortgage at $20,000.00.  He denies responsibility for any 
additional amounts for interest or other costs normally associated with a 
mortgage.  Mr. McElwain contends he 
has paid approximately $14,490.00 and the judgment for $21,194.00 fails to 
account for his past payments.  We 
disagree.

 
 
[¶11]     Pursuant to the decree, 
Mr. McElwain 
was ordered to pay "[o]ne half (1/2) of [the] Mortgage debt (est. at $20,000.00 
each) . . . ."  The divorce decree 
did not specifically exclude interest or the payment of other costs associated 
with the mortgage debt.  The 
outstanding mortgage debt at the time of refinancing in January 2004 was 
$42,388.00.3  The judgment entered by the court, 
$21,194.00, is one half of that amount.  
Furthermore, the contempt hearing was not recorded and no statement of 
the evidence was filed by either party pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03.4  Because the record is insufficient, we 
must assume the district court correctly applied Mr. McElwain's prior payments 
to the outstanding mortgage balance.  
"In the absence of anything to refute [the trial court's findings], we 
will sustain [them], and we assume that the evidence presented was sufficient to 
support those findings."  Beeman, ¶ 10.  Accordingly, we 
find no error by the trial court in entering its judgment concerning the 
mortgage debt.

            

B.      
Emancipation

 
 
[¶12]     In his second issue, Mr. 
McElwain claims the district court improperly entered a judgment for delinquent 
child support.  Mr. McElwain 
contends he provided ample evidence to the district court to support his claim 
that his son was emancipated, thus terminating his support obligation.  In Wyoming, emancipation is recognized under both 
statutory and common law.  Garver v. Garver, 981 P.2d 471, 474 
(Wyo. 
1999).  "A declaration of 
emancipation shall be conclusive evidence that the minor is emancipated" and 
emancipation "may also be proved by other evidence like any other fact."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-1-203(f) (LexisNexis 
2005).  Mr. McElwain does not 
contend that a declaration of emancipation exists to establish 
emancipation.  Additionally, he has 
failed to provide us with an adequate record to support his claim that 
sufficient evidence was presented to establish emancipation.  Absent a sufficient record, we must 
assume that sufficient evidence exists to support the trial court's implicit 
finding that the child was not emancipated.  Beeman, ¶ 
10.

 
 
[¶13]     Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the decision of the 
district court.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The mortgage provision of the decree 
provides:

8.         
[Mr. McElwain] shall pay and indemnify and hold [Mrs. McElwain] harmless 
from the following liabilities:

 
 
            
. . . 

 
 
b)         
One half (1/2) of Mortgage debt (est. at $20,000.00 each) to Converse 
County Bank, said payment in the sum of $210.00 per month shall be paid by the 
Defendant to the Plaintiff on or before the 1st day of each month through the 
Clerk of the District Court, P.O. Box 189, Douglas, Wyoming  
82633-0189.

 
 
The child support provision of the decree 
provides:

2.         
That [Mr. McElwain] shall pay to the Clerk of the District Court, . . . 
the sum of Two Hundred Sixty-five and no/100 Dollars ($265.00) per month for the 
minor child, . . . , beginning June 10, 1998, and continuing on the 1st day of 
each month thereafter until said minor child reaches the age of majority, is 
married, self-supporting, or otherwise emancipated.  The parties agree and the Court finds 
that the foregoing support amount falls substantially with the guidelines 
established in W.S. 20-6-304, as amended.  
Upon [the minor child] reaching the age of majority (July 24, 2004) child 
support shall terminate.

 
 

2If this option 
was exercised, the amount owed by Mr. Roe would be calculated at 32% of the 
unpaid principal balance of the note.  
Id. at 
204.

 
 

3Plaintiff's 
exhibit one contains the amortization schedule reflecting application of monthly 
mortgage payments to the original mortgage debt.  The exhibit reflects little reduction in 
principal because the monthly payments were first applied to pay accrued 
interest.

 
 

4W.R.A.P. 3.03 
states:

 
 
If no report 
of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a 
transcript is unavailable, appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or 
proceedings from the best available means including appellant's 
recollection.  The statement shall 
be served on appellee, who may serve objections or propose amendments within 15 
days after service.  The statement 
and any objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted to the trial court 
for settlement and approval and as settled and approved shall be included by the 
clerk of the trial court in the record on 
appeal.