Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Lee

Citation: 393 Md. 546

Docket Number: 20ag/05

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2006-07-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Norman Joseph Lee, III, AG No. 20, Sept. Term 2005.
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE - MARYLAND RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
1.3, 1.4, 1.16(d), 3.2, 8.1(b), 8.4(d) - SANCTION - INDEFINITE SUSPENSION 
Indefinite suspension from the practice of law is the appropriate sanction, in the absence of
mitigating circumstances, for violations of MRPC 1.3 (diligence), 1.4 (communication), 1.16
(declining or terminating representation), 3.2 (expediting litigation), 8.1(b) (bar admission
and disciplinary matters), and 8.4(d) (misconduct), where Respondent failed to: pursue
diligently his client’s bankruptcy matter in a timely manner, keep his client reasonably
informed, return papers and unearned fees to his client upon termination of representation,
respond to numerous requests of the Bankruptcy Trustee, and respond to Bar Counsel during
the investigation.
Circuit Court for Baltimore Cou nty
Case No. 03-C-05-007185 OC
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
AG No. 20 
September Term, 2005
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
NORM AN JOSEPH LEE, III
Bell, C.J.
                    Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Filed: July 31, 2006
1This is the third disciplinary proceeding against Respondent.  Respondent was
charged with violations of MRPC 1.3, 1.4(a), 8.1(a), and 8.4(c) in Attorney Grievance
Commission v. Lee (Lee I), 387 Md. 89, 874 A.2d 897 (2005), which we remanded to the
hearing judge for further proceedings.  Respondent was also the subject of another
disciplinary proceeding, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lee (Lee II), 390 Md. 517, 890 A.2d
273 (2006), in which he received a public reprimand for violating MRPC 1.3 and 1.4.
Respondent later received an indefinite suspension for his violations in the Lee I matter.
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lee (Lee III), ___ Md. ___, ___ A. 2d ___ (2006) (slip op.).
2MRPC 1.3 provides: 
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.
3 At the time Respondent was charged, MRPC 1.4 (a) and (b) provided:
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the
status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests
for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extend reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.
4MRPC 1.16(d) provides:
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps
to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests,
such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property
(continued...)
The Attorney Grievance Commission (“Petitioner”), acting 
through Bar Counsel, filed
with this Court a petition for disciplinary action against Norman Joseph Lee, III
(“Respondent”),1 alleging violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct
(“MRPC”) in his representation of Connie Marie Baker (“Complainant”) in her Chapter 7
bankruptcy petition.  Petitioner charged Respondent with violating MRPC 1.3 (diligence),2
1.4 (communication),3 1.16(d) (declining or terminating representation),4 3.2 (expediting
4(...continued)
to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance
payment of fee that has not been earned.  The lawyer may retain
papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law.
5MRPC 3.2 provides:
A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation
consistent with the interests of the client.
6MRPC 8.1(b) provides:
An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a
lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in
connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:
* * *
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension
known by the person to have arisen in the matters, or knowingly
fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an
admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this rule does
not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by
Rule 1.6.
7MRPC 8.4(d) provides:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
* * *
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.
2
litigation),5 8.1(b) (bar admission and disciplinary matters),6 and 8.4(d) (misconduct).7
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-752(a), we referred the matter to the Honorable Vicki Ballou-
Watts of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to conduct an evidentiary hearing and render
findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law.
8The Certificate of Service of Respondent’s Answer was dated 8 August 2005 by
Respondent, but the envelope transmitting the Answer via U.S. regular mail was postmarked
on 17 August 2005.
9The hearing judge made repeated efforts to contact Respondent when he failed to
appear at the hearing, and reached him on his cellular phone more than two hours later.
Respondent indicated that he was unaware of the hearing because the hearing date was not
listed on his work calendar, and that it would take him another hour and a half to arrive.
When asked specifically whether he had received any notification from the court about this
hearing, Respondent replied, “I am not denying that I did – didn’t received notification from
the [c]ourt; I’m saying it was not on my calendar.”  Respondent later denied in his Motion
for Reconsideration and during oral argument before this Court, held on 6 April 2006, that
he received any notification about this hearing.
3
I.
Respondent was served with the Petition, Order, and Writ of Summons on 14 July
2005, directing him to respond to the charges within 15 days from the date of service,
pursuant to the order of this Court and Maryland Rule 16-574(a).  Respondent filed his
Answer to the Petition for Disciplinary Action with the Clerk of the Circuit Court on 18
August 2005, more than a month after he was served.8  Petitioner filed on 25 August 2005
a Motion to Strike Respondent’s Answer to the Petition for Disciplinary Action. 
An Order of Default was entered against Respondent on 23 August 2005.  The
evidentiary hearing was set for 20 October 2005.  Respondent neither filed a request to
vacate the Order of Default nor appeared at the scheduled hearing.9  At the conclusion of the
hearing, the hearing judge granted Petitioner’s Motion to Strike Respondent’s Answer and
received Petitioner’s evidence.
4
On 16 December 2005, Judge Ballou-Watts filed the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law:
III. FINDINGS OF FACT
Respondent Norman Joseph Lee, III was admitted to the
Maryland Bar on March 31, 1981.  He is a solo practitioner in
Bel Air, Harford County, Maryland.
At all relevant times herein, Respondent maintained an
active general practice with a concentration in business,
bankruptcy, personal injury and estate matters.  He also
represented clients in criminal cases, though mostly at the
District Court level.
Complainant 
Connie 
Marie 
Baker 
retained 
the
Respondent to represent her in filing a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
Petition, which the Respondent agreed to do for a proposed fee
of $750.00 plus $200.00 costs.  During the representation,
Complainant paid $625.00 towards the total amount of $950.00
and expenses due.
Respondent filed a Chapter 7 Voluntary Petition for
Bankruptcy (Petition No. 03-81456) in the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court, District of Maryland, on behalf of Complainant, on
September 26, 2003.
The first meeting for creditors was scheduled to be held
on November 5, 2003 at 9:00 a.m. and 300 West Pratt Street,
#375, Baltimore, Maryland 21201.  Notice of this meeting was
posted to the Respondent on September 28, 2003.  Respondent
was requested to produce certain annuity documents deemed
necessary by the Bankruptcy Trustee.
Respondent was late to the meeting, thereby delaying the
proceedings and causing Complainant, the Trustee and creditors
to be kept waiting for his appearance.  Although the requested
documents were entrusted to Respondent, he failed to bring
them to the scheduled creditors meeting.  Respondent promised
to make the documents available but failed to do so.
Due to Respondent’s failure to provide the requested
annuity documents, the Bankruptcy Trustee was caused to file
numerous Motions to Extend Time to Object to Discharge and
Motions to Object to Exemptions.  Complainant received a letter
5
from the Trustee on or about January 14, 2004, and was
surprised to find that the annuity documents had still not been
forwarded to the Trustee.
By letter dated February 10, 2004, Complainant
expressed her disappointment with Respondent’s inactivity on
her behalf and his failure to respond to her contact attempts
regarding her representation.  This letter further notified
Respondent that he was discharged as her attorney and requested
a copy of all papers filed with the Bankruptcy Trustee, return of
her file and a refund of $50.00 of the $625.00 paid as of that
date.  Copies of the letter were sent to the Bankruptcy Trustee,
the attorney for the trustee and the Justice Department’s attorney
representing the Office of the United States Trustee.
Bankruptcy Trustee filed two additional Motions to
Extend Time to Object to Discharge after February 2004.  On
June 16, 2004, Bankruptcy Trustee filed a Motion to Reduce
Compensation and for Return of Excessive Fees.
By letter dated March 4, 2004, Connie Marie Baker filed
a complaint with the Attorney Grievance Commission regarding
Respondent’s representation of her in the Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
Proceeding.  At that time, Complainant still had not received her
client file or a refund of unearned fees.  Complainant attributed
a total of 125 days in additional postponements to Respondent’s
failure to cooperate, dilatory conduct and inaction.
The complaint was docketed and forwarded to the
Respondent, along with a letter seeking his response on March
22, 2004.  The letter requested response within ten (10) days and
directed Respondent’s attention to Maryland Rule of
Professional Conduct 8.1.  No response was made within this
time limit.
On April 9, 2004, a second request for information was
sent to the Respondent via certified mail, return receipt
requested.  The return receipt indicated that it was delivered on
April 14, 2004.  The second request for information sought a
response within seven (7) days.
While awaiting response to her complaint, Complainant
notified Petitioner, through Bar Counsel, that she had not
received any responses to letters posted to Respondent,
including the February 10, 2004 letter, discharging him as her
attorney.  This letter was mailed via certified mail, return receipt
6
requested.  Despite Respondent’s failure to reply to
Complainant’s letters, Complainant received a bill from his
office.
By letter dated April 15, 2004, Respondent’s secretary
notified Petitioner, through Bar Counsel, that Respondent had
suffered a severe injury in a fall and had to undergo emergency
surgery while out of state.  The letter indicated that Respondent
was hospitalized in intensive care in New Jersey.  As of the date
of the letter, Respondent’s prognosis and availability was
unknown.  Therefore, Respondent’s secretary sought an
extension on Respondent’s behalf.  The extension was granted
by letter dated April 21, 2004.
By letter dated May 6, 2004, Respondent’s secretary
notified Petitioner, through Bar Counsel, that Respondent was
not expected to return to his office on a regular basis until mid-
June, 2004.  By that time, Bar Counsel had previously requested
documentation of Respondent’s medical condition, diagnosis,
prognosis and recovery time.  Respondent allegedly requested
that the documentation be forwarded and, in the interim,
provided a copy of the hospital discharge paper and a hospital
bill.  Complainant was never notified by Respondent or
Respondent’s secretary of his medical condition.
By letter dated May 13, 2004 and addressed to his
secretary, Respondent was notified that written documentation
of his medical condition was still requested.  The letter also
indicated that the investigation would be held in abeyance until
mid-June, or until the doctors’ reports indicated that Respondent
was permitted to return to work.  Thereafter, no response was
received from Respondent or his secretary regarding his
prognosis or Petitioner’s request for information in the
disciplinary investigation.
A Statement of Charges was prepared and forwarded to
Respondent on December 10, 2004.  This letter directed that the
results of the investigation be forward to a Peer Review meeting
pursuant to Rule 16-741.  An investigative file and cover letter
were forwarded to the Respondent in addition to the Statement
of Charges.  All documentation indicated that Respondent had
a right to respond to the Statement of Charges in writing as set
forth pursuant to Rule 16-734(b)(4).  No written response was
provided.
7
The Bankruptcy Trustee brought an adversary proceeding
against the Complainant and initiated proceedings against the
Respondent personally for sanctions and to show cause why his
fees were unreasonable and should be returned to the estate.
These proceedings were brought, in part, because of
Respondent’s inaction.
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Petitioner requested findings of fact and conclusions of
law as to violations of Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct
1.3, 1.4, 1.16, 3.2, 8.1(b) and 8.4(d).
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-323(e), the averments set
forth in the Statement of Charges are deemed admitted unless
denied in the responsive pleading or covered by a general denial.
This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
Respondent Norman Joseph Lee, III committed the following
violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.
Rule 1.3 Diligence.
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client.
Respondent violated Rule 1.3 when he:
Failed to timely appear at the scheduled meeting of
creditors on behalf of his client;
Failed to bring and produce annuity documents requested
by the Trustee, which had already been entrusted to Respondent
by Complainant; and
Failed to diligently pursue the legal matter in a timely
manner, causing numerous Motions to Extend Time to Object to
the Discharge of his client’s petition for bankruptcy and
numerous Objections to Exemptions filed by the Bankruptcy
Trustee, delaying the remedy and relief sought by his client.
Rule 1.4 Communication.
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation.
8
Respondent violated Rule 1.4 when he:
Failed to keep his client reasonably informed about the
status of her bankruptcy proceeding;
Failed to respond to his client’s request for a copy of all
papers filed with the Trustee;
Failed to inform his client that he did not file promised
documents with the Trustee; and
Failed to respond to his client’s request for return of her
file and a refund of a portion of the fee promised as of that date.
Rule 1.16 Declining or Terminating Representation.
([d]) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall
take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect
a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to
the client, allowing time for employment of other
counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the
client is entitled and refunding advance payment of fee
that has not been earned.  The lawyer may retain papers
relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law.
Respondent violated rule 1.16 when he:
Failed to return the client file to Complainant after
receipt of her February 10, 2004 letter, discharging Respondent
as her attorney; and
Failed to refund Complainant unearned fees after receipt
of her February 10, 2004 letter, discharging Respondent as her
attorney.
Rule 3.2 Expediting Litigation.
A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite
litigation consistent with the interests of the client.
Respondent violated Rule 3.2 when he:
Failed to respond to numerous requests of the Bankruptcy
Trustee to provide necessary annuity documents; and
That such failure caused several Motions to Extend Time
to be filed, thus delaying the conclusion of the bankruptcy
proceedings on his client’s behalf.
Rule 8.1 Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters.
9
An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or
a lawyer in connection with a bar admission application
or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:
(b) Fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a
misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in
the matters, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful
demand for information from an admissions or
disciplinary authority, except that this rule does not
require disclosure of information otherwise protected by
Rule 1.6.
Rule 8.4 Misconduct.
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(d) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.
Respondent violated Rules 8.1(b) and 8.4(d) when he:
Failed to respond to the complaint of Connie Marie Baker
forwarded to Respondent by letter dated March 22, 2004;
Failed to respond to Petitioner’s request for information
dated April 9, 2004 by certified mail, return receipt requested;
and
Failed to respond to Petitioner’s repeated requests for
documentation regarding Respondent’s medical condition,
diagnosis, prognosis and recovery time which Respondent
claimed as the cause for delay in Complainant’s Bankruptcy
proceedings.
Neither Petitioner nor Respondent took any written exceptions to the hearing judge’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  On 4 January 2006, Petitioner filed a
Recommendation for Sanction, recommending that Respondent be suspended indefinitely
from the practice of law.
Oral argument in this Court was set for 6 April 2006.  Two days before oral argument,
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration Based on Fraud, Deceit and
Misrepresentation, in which he: (1) denied that he failed to answer the Petition for
10
Disciplinary Action in a timely manner; (2) alleged that the Assistant Bar Counsel handling
this matter pursued the case despite the Complainant’s request that it be dismissed; (3)
claimed that the Assistant Bar Counsel violated Maryland Rule 16-731(d), which requires
an investigation to be completed within 90 days after a complaint is filed, unless extension
is granted by the Commission; (4) averred that the Assistant Bar Counsel pursued this matter
in retaliation for Respondent’s allegation of misconduct against him in an earlier disciplinary
case against Respondent, and that Bar Counsel refused to address the alleged abusive conduct
of the Assistant Bar Counsel; and (5) asserted that the hearing judge was biased against him.
II.
The Court of Appeals exercises original jurisdiction over attorney discipline
proceedings.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zdravkovich, 381 Md. 680, 693, 852 A.2d 82,
90 (2004); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 371 Md. 510, 539, 810 A.2d 457, 474
(2002).  This Court has the ultimate authority to decide whether a lawyer has violated the
professional rules.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harrington, 367 Md. 36, 49, 785 A.2d
1260, 1267 (2001).  We accept a hearing judge’s findings of fact unless we determine that
they are clearly erroneous.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50, 891 A.2d
1085, 1095 (2006).  As to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law, our consideration is
essentially de novo, even where default orders and judgments have been entered at the
hearing level.  Harrington, 367 Md. at 49, 785 A.2d at 1267-68.
10Maryland Rule 16-758 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Notice of the filing of the record.  Upon receiving the record,
the Clerk of the Court of Appeals shall notify the parties that the
record has been filed.
(b) Exceptions; recommendations.  Within 15 days after service
of the notice required by section (a) of this Rule, each party may
file (1) exceptions to the findings and conclusions of the hearing
judge and (2) recommendations concerning the appropriate
disposition under Rule 16-759(c).
Neither party filed any written exceptions within the 15-day period.
11
Either party may file post-hearing written exceptions to the findings and conclusions
of the hearing judge.  Maryland Rule 16-758.10  Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(2) provides:
(2) Findings of fact. (A) If no exceptions are filed.  If no
exceptions are filed, the Court may treat the findings of fact as
established for the purpose of determining appropriate sanctions,
if any.
(B) If exceptions are filed.  If exceptions are field, the Court of
Appeals shall determine whether the findings of fact have been
proven by the requisite standard of proof set out in Rule 16-
757(b).  The Court may confine its review to the findings of fact
challenged by the exceptions.  The Court shall give due regard
to  the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility
of witnesses.
Thus, if no exceptions are filed timely, we accept the hearing court’s findings of fact as
established for the purposes of determining the appropriate sanction.  Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Logan, 390 Md. 313, 319, 888 A.2d 359, 363 (2005); Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Christopher, 383 Md. 624, 638-39, 861 A.2d 692, 700-01 (2004); Harrington,
367 Md. at 49, 785 A.2d at 1267.  
11The proper procedure to object to a hearing judge’s findings of fact and conclusions
of law in an attorney grievance proceeding is to file exceptions within the allotted time, not
a motion for reconsideration.  Maryland Rule 16-758(b).  We clearly stated in Lee I, and we
reiterate today, that it is entirely within the discretion of this Court whether to review an
improperly filed motion for reconsideration.
12
If a Motion for Reconsideration is filed subsequent to the filing of the hearing judge’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law, this Court has the authority and the discretion to
“order further proceedings . . . as justice may require from our review of what is before us”
even if the motion is untimely filed.11   Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lee (Lee I), 387 Md.
89, 117 n.25, 874 A.2d 897, 913 n.25 (2005).  We may remand the proceedings to the hearing
judge “[w]hen, subsequent to the evidentiary hearing before a judge, a respondent attorney
produces . . . new evidence that may be material to the matter, but was not introduced at the
hearing . . . .” Lee I, 387 Md. at 116, 874 A.2d at 913.
After reviewing Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration based on Fraud, Deceit and
Misrepresentation, we do not find it necessary to remand this matter to the hearing judge for
reconsideration because Respondent failed to suggest with specificity in his motion any new
facts material to the matter that were not, or could not have been, adduced at the hearing.  See
Lee I, 387 Md. at 115-20, 874 A.2d at 912-15 (remanding the case to the hearing judge where
the attorney presented in his Motion for Reconsideration newly discovered evidence that may
impeach the credibility of a key witness and reflect positively on the credibility of the
attorney in a case that depends heavily on witness credibility). The essence of Respondent’s
allegations in his Motion is that the disciplinary proceedings prejudiced him in one way or
13
another, but he did not, either in his motion or during oral argument before this Court,
challenge the hearing judge’s factual findings that led to the inevitable conclusion that his
conduct in question violated the rules as charged.  
Nonetheless, we choose to discuss one of Respondent’s asserted arguments to provide
guidance in future attorney disciplinary proceedings.  Respondent claims that “this case was
pursued by Bar Counsel [ ] despite Complainant Baker’s request that it be dismissed prior
to peer [r]eview,” and produced an affidavit signed by the Complainant in support of his
assertion, implying that Bar Counsel should have dismissed the complaint if the Complainant
so requests.  This evidence was not introduced by either party at the hearing.
Bar Counsel is not obliged to dismiss a complaint solely at the complainant’s request.
Maryland Rule 16-731(b) sets out the procedure for reviewing a complaint once it is filed
with the Attorney Grievance Commission:
(b) Review of complaint. (1) Bar Counsel shall make an
appropriate investigation of every complaint that is not facially
frivolous or unfounded.
(2) If Bar Counsel concludes that the complaint is either
frivolous or unfounded or does not allege facts which, if true,
would demonstrate either professional misconduct or incapacity,
Bar Counsel shall dismiss the complaint and notify the
complainant of the dismissal.  Otherwise, Bar Counsel shall (A)
open a file on a complaint, (B) acknowledge receipt of the
complaint and explain in writing to the complainant the
procedures of investigating and processing the complaint, (C)
comply with the notice requirement of section (c) of this Rule,
and (D) conduct an investigation to determine whether
reasonable grounds exist to believe the allegations of the
complaint.
14
Upon completion of an investigation, Bar Counsel may recommend that the complaint be
dismissed under Rule 16-735(a):
(a) Dismissal or Termination.  
(1) Upon completion of an investigation, Bar Counsel may recommend to the
Commission that:
(A) the complaint be dismissed because Bar Counsel has
concluded that the evidence fails to show that the attorney has
engaged in professional misconduct or is incapacitated; or
(B) the disciplinary or remedial proceeding be terminated, with
or without a warning because Bar Counsel has concluded that
any professional misconduct on the part of the attorney (i) was
not sufficiently serious to warrant discipline and (ii) is not likely
to be repeated.
The plain language of the Rule indicates that Bar Counsel has a duty to investigate all
complaints filed with the Commission that are not facially frivolous or unfounded, and that
once the investigation begins, a complaint should be dismissed only if Bar Counsel concludes
that the evidence fails to show sanctionable professional misconduct or incapacity.
Alternatively, Bar Counsel may recommend that the proceeding be terminated, even if there
was professional misconduct, but only when the misconduct is not sufficiently serious to
warrant discipline and is not likely to be repeated.  Thus, once Bar Counsel initiated an
investigation after the  complaint was received in this case, he was duty-bound to complete
the investigation and should not dismiss the complaint merely upon the Complainant’s
subsequent request to withdraw, unless he found the substantive complaint to be frivolous
or unfounded.  Indeed, if the Rule were construed otherwise, it would allow an attorney
under investigation to avoid disciplinary actions by offering the complainant incentives to
12In her affidavit, the Complainant stated that, after she filed the complaint with the
Attorney Grievance Commission and following his alleged health problems, Respondent
“went out of his way to convenience [her] . . .” and “has represented [her] in all [her]
bankruptcy matters without charge for his legal services and seems to be doing so in earnest.”
13During oral argument, Respondent asked this Court to excuse his failure to file
exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings and conclusions, because he was “in a chaotic
situation” in November 2005 when exceptions were due.  The chaotic situation, according
to Respondent, consisted of filing his own personal bankruptcy and relocating his office.
While we  are not unmindful of the adversities that sometimes arise in the professional lives
of attorneys, we are not convinced that Respondent’s situation was so chaotic that his failure
to file exceptions should be excused.  The lack of exceptions, viewed together with his
failure to appear at the hearing before the hearing judge, can only be characterized as poor
prioritization at best (choosing to relocate one’s law practice rather than filing exceptions in
a disciplinary proceeding may result in the office relocation becoming a moot activity), and
amounts to an utter disregard of the attorney disciplinary proceedings at worst.  We shall not
excuse Respondent’s failure to file exceptions in this case.
15
withdraw the complaint.  Even though an individual complainant may believe that he or she
was recompensed adequately as a result of the attorney’s post-complaint gestures,12 allowing
an attorney to avoid a pending investigation and potential disciplinary actions in such a
manner would be contrary and detrimental to the purpose of the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct “to protect the public and the public’s confidence in the legal
profession.”  Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Gore, 380 Md. 455, 471, 845 A.2d 1204, 1213
(2004).  
III.
As we observed, supra, neither Petitioner nor Respondent filed written exceptions to
the hearing judge’s findings of fact.  We therefore accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact
as established.13  Maryland Rule 16-579(2)(A); Logan, 390 Md. at 319, 888 A.2d at 363;
16
Christopher, 383 Md. at 638-39, 861 A.2d at 700-01; Harrington, 367 Md. at 49, 785 A.2d
at 1267.  
We conduct a de novo review of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law even when
default orders and judgments have been entered at the hearing level.  Harrington, 367 Md.
at 49, 785 A.2d at 1267-68.  Upon our de novo review, we agree with the hearing judge and
conclude that Respondent violated MPRC 1.3, 1.4, 1.16, 3.2, 8.1(b), and 8.4(d).
IV.
Having denied Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration and concluded that
Respondent violated MRPC 1.3, 1.4, 1.16, 3.2, 8.1(b), and 8.4(d), we next determine the
proper sanction.  It is well settled that
[t]he purpose of discipline under the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct is not to punish the lawyer, but to protect
the public and the public's confidence in the legal profession.
Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Post, 379 Md. 60, 70, 839 A.2d 718,
724 (2003). We protect the public through sanctions against
offending attorneys in two ways: through deterrence of “the type
of conduct which will not be tolerated,” id., and by removing
those unfit to continue in the practice of law from the rolls of
those authorized to practice in this State. See Attorney Griev.
Comm'n v. Protokowicz, 326 Md. 714, 729, 607 A.2d 33, 40-41
(1992). The public is protected when sanctions are imposed that
are commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations
and the intent with which they were committed. Post, 379 Md.
at 70-71, 839 A.2d at 724.
Gore, 380 Md. at 471-72, 845 A.2d at 1213.  The appropriate severity of the sanction
depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case, taking account of any particular
aggravating or mitigating factors.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Stolarz, 379 Md. 387, 403,
14Maryland Rule 16-757(b) provides:
(b) Burden of proof.  The petitioner has the burden of proving
the averments of the petition by clear and convincing evidence.
A respondent who asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of
mitigation or extenuation has the burden of proving the defense
or matter by a preponderance of the evidence.
17
842 A.2d 42, 51 (2004) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Myers, 333 Md. 440, 447, 635
A.2d 1315, 1318 (1994)).  Mitigation has been analyzed traditionally by this Court in terms
of the American Bar Association’s recommended standards.  See Guida, 391 Md. at 55, 891
A.2d at 1098.  In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 488-89, 671 A.2d
463, 483 (1996), we stated:
The mitigating factors listed in the ABA Standards include:
absence of a prior disciplinary record; absence of a dishonest or
selfish motive; personal or emotional problems; timely good
faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify consequences of
misconduct; full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or
cooperative attitude toward proceedings; inexperience in the
practice of law; character or reputation; physical or mental
disability or impairment; delay in disciplinary proceedings;
interim rehabilitation; imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
remorse; and finally, remoteness of prior offenses. (Citation
omitted).
A respondent attorney bears the burden of proving the mitigating factors, if he or she asserts
any, by a preponderance of the evidence.  Maryland Rule 16-757(b). 14
Indefinite suspension from the practice of law is the proper sanction where the
attorney violates MRPC 1.3, 1.4, 8.1(b), and 8.4(d) by failing to communicate with the client
and failing to cooperate with Bar Counsel and where the attorney’s conduct is not so
18
egregious that only disbarment can adequately protect the public.  Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Kovacic, 389 Md. 233, 884 A.2d 673 (2005).  In Kovacic, the attorney violated
MRPC 1.3, 1.4, and 8.1(b) by failing to communicate with her client in a divorce proceeding
and failing to respond timely to Bar Counsel’s inquiries.  Kovacic, 389 Md. at 239, 884 A.2d
at 676.  Noting that there was “neither a finding, nor any basis for mitigating the respondent’s
misconduct,” we imposed the sanction of indefinite suspension even though the attorney had
no prior sanction history.  Kovacic, 389 Md. at 240, 884 A.2d at 677.  See also Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Rose, 391 Md. 101, 113, 892 A.2d 469, 476 (2006) (holding that
indefinite suspension is the proper sanction where the attorney violated MRPC 1.3, 1.4,
8.1(b), and 8.4(d), among others, for client neglect and failure to cooperate with Bar Counsel
and had received previously an indefinite suspension with the right to seek reinstatement in
six month for similar violations).
On the other hand, we also have imposed a sanction of reprimand for similar
violations of the MRPC where there are significant mitigating factors, such as remorse and
a history of pro bono work by a respondent.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Tolar, 357 Md.
569, 745 A.2d 1045 (2000).  The attorney in Tolar violated MRPC 1.3 and 1.4 by failing to
communicate adequately to her client, and MRPC 8.1(b) by failing to respond to Bar
Counsel’s requests in the investigation.  Despite her prior sanction history, consisting of two
private reprimands, and her violations almost identical to those in Kovacic, she received the
less severe sanction of a public reprimand because she was remorseful for her misconduct
19
and because we found that repetition of the misconduct was unlikely.  Tolar, 357 Md. at 585,
745 A.2d at 1053-54.  We also found it significant in Tolar that the attorney provided
considerable pro bono service to the community, another mitigating factor that called for a
less severe sanction.  Tolar, 357 Md. at 584, 745 A.2d at 1053.
In the instant case, Respondent’s misconduct closely resembles that in Kovacic and
Tolar.  Among the rules violated by Respondent are MRPC 1.3, 1.4, and 8.1(b), the same
rules violated by the attorneys in those two cases.  Unlike the attorney in Kovacic, however,
Respondent also violated MRPC 1.16, 3.2, and 8.4(d), and previously has received two
sanctions for similar misconduct: a public reprimand in Lee II for violations of MRPC 1.3
and 1.4, and an indefinite suspension, with the right to reapply no sooner than one year, in
Lee III for violations of MRPC 1.3, 1.4(a), 8.1(a), and 8.4(c).  Thus, a sanction at least as
severe as the one imposed in Kovacic is appropriate.  Absent any significant mitigating
factors, such as those substantiated in Tolar, indefinite suspension from the practice of law
is the proper sanction for Respondent’s violations in the present case.
 
The hearing judge made no findings as to whether Respondent established by a
preponderance of the evidence any mitigating factors.  In particular, nothing in the record
suggests that Respondent’s alleged medical condition could be a mitigating factor.  Petitioner
first requested documentation of Respondent’s medical conditions no later than 6 May 2004,
as well as multiple times thereafter.  Until oral arguments before this Court, almost two years
after Bar Counsel’s initial request for information, and despite his claim that he requested
15It is unclear from the record to whom Respondent made the request - his secretary
or hospital administration.
20
that the documents be forwarded to Petitioner,15 all that Respondent was able to produce to
document his medical condition, in the record before us, was a hospital bill showing that he
was hospitalized between 7 April 2004 and 14 April 2004 and a doctor’s note stating that he
would be unable to work between 7 January 2005 and 7 February 2005.  We acknowledge
that Respondent may have faced health issues at certain times, but observe that Respondent
has not established by a preponderance of the evidence his medical condition as a mitigating
factor for his misconduct throughout the period of time in question.  We note that his
violations at issue in this disciplinary proceeding began in November 2003 (when he failed
to produce certain annuity documents entrusted to him) and continued into June 2005 (when
Petitioner formally filed charges against him after he failed to respond to Petitioner’s
repeated requests for information and documentation), spanning a period of almost 20
months, approximately five weeks of which Respondent was able to document and allegedly
attribute to his medical condition.  Furthermore, we reiterate that, if ill health indeed renders
an attorney physically unable to perform his or her duties to the court and clients, he or she
must promptly inform the court, clients, and other participating attorneys that his or her
caseload cannot be managed and, without unreasonable delay, make necessary arrangements
to protect clients’ interests, such as transferring cases to other attorneys.  See MRPC
1.16(a)(2) (stating that, except as provided in MRPC 1.16(c), “a lawyer shall not represent
21
a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of
a client if . . . the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer’s ability
to represent a client[.]”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. West, 378 Md. 395, 424, 836 A.2d
588, 605 (2003) (Harrell J., dissenting).
Respondent also failed to present any mitigating factors to this Court during oral
argument.  He neither explained his misconduct nor demonstrated remorse.  Even though he
introduced an affidavit from the Complainant stating that she was satisfied with
Respondent’s free services subsequent to the conduct mentioned in the complaint, we are not
convinced that this is a remedial act motivated by true remorse, rather than an attempt to
procure a withdrawal of the complaint.
We conclude that indefinite suspension from the practice of law is the appropriate
sanction.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK
OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING THE COSTS
OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO
MARYLAND RULE 16-715(C), FOR WHICH
SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR
OF 
THE 
ATTORNEY 
GR I E V A NCE
COMMISSION AGAINST NORMAN JOSEPH
LEE, III.