Case Title: The People v. Miguel Alemany

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-11-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 150  
The People &c.,
            Appellant,
        v.
Miguel Alemany,
            Respondent.
Aaron Ginandes, for appellant.
Denise Fabiano, for respondent.
READ, J.:
We are asked to decide whether homelessness may be
considered an inappropriate living situation within the meaning
of risk factor 15 of the Risk Assessment Instrument (RAI) used to
rate the threat to the community posed by a defendant covered
under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) (Correction Law
art 6-C).  We hold that a hearing court may assess points under
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this risk factor where there is clear and convincing evidence
that the defendant is undomiciled and lacks any history of living
in shelters or community ties.  Because there was such clear and
convincing evidence in this case, Supreme Court properly
adjudicated defendant Miguel Alemany a level two sex offender.
I.  
At approximately 6:30 P.M. on November 29, 2005,
defendant was riding a bicycle toward a woman who was jogging on
the bridle path in Central Park in Manhattan.  After he passed
her, defendant got off the bicycle, made kissing noises, and then
lunged at the woman and attempted to grab her thighs.  She
managed to escape defendant's grasp and ran away, with defendant
in pursuit for a short distance.  The woman hurried to the
Central Park Police Precinct, where she reported this encounter.
She then accompanied three police officers as they
patrolled the park by car, looking for defendant.  They soon
spotted him running down another woman on his bicycle.  The
police stopped defendant and arrested him; this second female was
crying hysterically and shaking.  Defendant admitted to the
police that he had gone to Central Park to "have sex with a woman
by force" because he was angry that his girlfriend had cheated on
him.  Defendant also told the police that he had chased after a
third woman, who got away from him.
Defendant was charged in a felony complaint with two
counts of attempted rape in the first degree (Penal Law 
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§§ 110.00; 130.35 [1]), and one count of resisting arrest (Penal
Law § 205.30).  Prior to his arraignment on November 30, 2005, an
interviewer from the New York City Criminal Justice Agency (CJA)
assessed defendant's risk of flight.  The CJA interviewer's
report stated that defendant had been homeless for two years; did
not "report a NYC area address"; did not "have a working
telephone in residence/cell phone"; provided "no contacts" to
CJA; was unemployed; did not have "other sources of financial
support"; and did not "provide support for others."  Accordingly,
defendant was "not recommended for ROR" (i.e., release on
recognizance) because he was a "high risk for FTA" (i.e., failure
to appear).  
On January 17, 2006, defendant signed a written waiver
of indictment, and agreed to be prosecuted on a superior court
information charging him with attempted first-degree sexual abuse
(Penal Law §§ 110.00; 130.65 [1]).  That same day, defendant
pleaded guilty to this crime in exchange for a sentence of six
months in jail, to run concurrently with a 10-year period of
probation.  Defendant was informed that as a consequence of his
plea he would be required to register as a sex offender pursuant
to SORA.
Supreme Court put over sentencing in order for a
presentence report (PSR) to be prepared by the New York City
Department of Probation.  The probation officer who interviewed
defendant on January 17, 2006 noted on the PSR that he
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"appear[ed] to have minimal community ties, reporting that he
[was] undomiciled and unemployed"; and "reported that he [was]
currently undomiciled and was unable to provide an address or
shelter as to where he was residing."   
Prior to the SORA hearing, the People prepared and
provided the court and defendant with the RAI, as required by
Correction Law § 168-d (3).  The People sought to assess
defendant 75 points on the RAI, thus classifying him
presumptively as a level two sex offender.  As relevant here, the
People assigned defendant 10 points under risk factor 15, "Living
or Employment Situation" in the SORA Guidelines promulgated by
the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders (the Board).  These 10
points were critical because a score of 70 or less on the RAI
results in a presumptive risk assessment of level one.
With respect to risk factor 15, the SORA Guidelines
state simply that the "offender's living or employment situation
is inappropriate (10 points)."  The accompanying commentary
expands on the meaning of "inappropriate" as follows:
"Many sex offenders are opportunistic criminals whose
likelihood of reoffending increases when their release
environment gives them access to victims or a reduced
probability of detection.  An example of an offender in
an inappropriate work situation is a child molester
employed in an arcade or as a school bus driver.  If
the same offender were to live near an elementary
school playground, his living environment would be
inappropriate.  An offender is assessed 10 points in
this category if either his work or living environment
is inappropriate" (SORA Risk Assessment Guidelines and
Commentary [SORA Commentary], at 17-18 [2006 ed]
[citation omitted]).
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At the SORA hearing on February 17, 2006, defense
counsel asserted that defendant should not be assigned points
under risk factor 15.  First, he stated his "understanding that 
. . . defendant has been advised that when he is released, that
he should go to the Bellevue men's shelter as he has no other
place to live and then he will be working with [a community
organization] to try to find him employment."  He argued that
risk factor 15 was limited to "living in a place, where there is
for example a child or living with someone who had been abused in
the past."
The People advanced a less restrictive reading of risk
factor 15.  The prosecutor noted that "defendant was known to be
prior to this case basically homeless and not working"; further,
although "[t]he commentary in the sex offender guidelines" talks
about 
"living situation[s] or work situations that give
defendant[s] access to victim[]s . . . [it] also talks
about situations where there is a reduced probability
of detection and given that [defendant] has no
community ties, if he were to . . . commit this type of
crime again, there is a reduced possibility of
detection because he will be hard to locate [which] is
a factor . . . relevant to whether he poses a risk."
Defense counsel countered that when the SORA Commentary
on risk factor 15 refers to "a reduced probability of detection,"
this means only that a defendant  
"will . . . be in a certain situation where because of
his relationship with possible victims, that will never
be detected not because someone is homeless but because
someone lives in the type of situation for example
[with] a niece and it will not be detected."
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He further argued that homelessness was relevant to whether
defendant would be "adequately supervised," which was covered by
a different risk factor in the RAI, and
"here[,] in fact, [defendant] is given five additional
points [under risk factor 14] because while he will be
released with supervision, and not released with no
supervision, he won't be released with specialized
supervision.  So he already is being given points
because he has a somewhat precarious supervision
situation."
Supreme Court then asked if either attorney wanted an
evidentiary hearing.  When both responded negatively, the judge
said that he "would like an opportunity to reflect on the
arguments put forward" prior to making his decision.
At the next court appearance on March 3, 2006, Supreme
Court summarized the arguments made by both defense counsel and
the prosecutor at the SORA hearing relative to risk factor 15;
discussed a case cited by defense counsel as well as another
case; and noted that he had reviewed the SORA guidelines and
commentary.  Having "fully considered" the arguments, the judge
adjudicated defendant a level two sex offender.  Explaining his
decision, he stated that "the fact that . . . defendant is
undomiciled creates a very difficult situation as far as the
probability of detection for any violations," and that there was
no reason for a downward departure from the presumptive risk
level.  On March 10, 2006, Supreme Court imposed the agreed-upon
sentence on defendant.
Defendant subsequently appealed his classification as a
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level two sex offender.  On November 6, 2008, the Appellate
Division modified Supreme Court's order "on the law" by reducing
defendant's classification to level one.  Citing People v Ruddy
(31 AD3d 517 [2d Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 714 [2006]), a case
handed down after Supreme Court's SORA determination here, the
court reasoned that 
"[t]he evidence established that, at most, defendant's
future living situation was uncertain in that, although
he was described as homeless at the time of his arrest,
upon his release from incarceration under the
supervision of the Department of Probation, he was
advised to go to the Bellevue men's shelter where he
would be assisted by a community organization in trying
to find employment.  This was insufficient as a matter
of law to meet the People's burden of showing, by clear
and convincing evidence, that defendant's living
situation was inappropriate" (People v Alemany, 56 AD3d
251, 251 [1st Dept 2008]).
We subsequently granted the People leave to appeal, and now
reverse.
II.
The "primary government interest" underlying SORA is
"protecting vulnerable populations[,] and in some instances the
public, from potential harm" posed by sex offenders (L 1995, ch
192, § 1 [Legislative purpose or findings]; see also People v
Mingo, 12 NY3d 563, 574 [2009]).  To safeguard this interest, the
Legislature sought to furnish law enforcement with sufficient
information to track and monitor a sex offender's whereabouts
(see e.g. Correction Law §§ 168-b [1] [a]; 168-c [2]; 168-d [2];
168-e [1]; 168-f; 168-j; 168-k).  Concomitantly, the Board
recognizes that sex offenders are more likely to reoffend if
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their living situation upon release "gives them access to victims
or a reduced probability of detection" (SORA Commentary [risk
factor 15], at 17).
Defendant interprets risk factor 15 as limited to a
living situation that "gives [a sex offender] access to victims
or opportunities to perpetrate crimes out of the public eye with
the accompanying reduced probability of detection" (emphasis
added), citing as an example a case where a child molester
planned to reside with small children who were family members. 
The SORA Commentary gives a different example -- i.e., a child
molester "liv[ing] near an elementary school playground" (id. at
18).  What both illustrations have in common is proximity to
potential victims, not an increased risk that any future crimes
may go unreported because of the setting in which they are
carried out.
We see no reason to interpret "reduced probability of
detection" to mean only access to victims, whether or not "out of
the public eye."  A sex offender who has no address, does not
frequent a shelter or participate in any community programs and
is unemployed is, for these reasons, more difficult for law
enforcement authorities to locate.  This living situation
presents a "reduced probability of detection" because the
inability to find a sex offender reduces law enforcement
authorities' capacity to discover or investigate any future
crimes the sex offender might commit, to connect him to those
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crimes, or to apprehend him.  And a lessened likelihood of
getting caught is thought to increase the risk of recidivism. 
Finally, our interpretation is consistent with SORA's overall
concern with keeping track of sex offenders, and does not create
any overlap between risk factors 15 and 14, as defendant claims. 
The latter assigns points depending on the existence and
specialization of supervision afforded a sex offender upon his
release into the community, independent of his living situation
(see SORA Commentary [risk factor 14] at 17).
Here, there was clear and convincing evidence that
defendant was homeless and lacked any history of living in
shelters or community ties.  Specifically, the CJA interviewer's
report, based on information provided by defendant himself,
indicated that he had been homeless for two years, that he could
not provide a "NYC area address" where he resided, that he did
not have a residential or cell phone, and that he furnished "no
contacts" to the CJA.  Similarly, the PSR report stated that
defendant "report[ed] that he [was] undomiciled and unemployed"
and was "currently undomiciled and . . . unable to provide an
address or shelter as to where he was residing."
 
Moreover, this evidence was not negated by defense
counsel's professed "understanding" that defendant had been
"advised" to go to the Bellevue men's shelter upon his release. 
As the Board has explained, the "Release Environment" section of
the SORA Guidelines, which includes risk factor 15,
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"will involve an assessment of the offender's planned
work and living arrangements upon his release from
custody.  Because those arrangements are prospective
and can readily change, the Board chose not to weigh
this section as heavily as others in the assessment
instrument" (SORA Commentary at 6).
In short, the uncertainty inherent in a sex offender's future
living arrangements has been taken into account in the weight
afforded factor 15; it is not a reason to disregard factor 15 in
an individual case.  And as the People point out, an anomaly
would be created if a sex offender planning a stable living
situation may be assessed points under risk factor 15, depending
upon the particular circumstances, but a homeless sex offender
may never be assessed points under this risk factor simply
because he might someday choose to live in a shelter. 
Finally, we emphasize that we are not creating any per
se rule such that a sex offender who is homeless must always be
assessed points under risk factor 15.  In an individual case,
there may be evidence that a sex offender has a history of living
in shelters, or community ties.  In Ruddy, for example, the
defendant had been renting a room and living in a "sober house"
at the time of his arrest.  Furthermore, the defendant stated
that, upon his release from prison, he intended to resume living
at the sober house, assuming that his room had not been rented to
someone else.  But he also informed the probation officer that,
in the event he could not return to the sober house, he would
find housing in a shelter (Ruddy, 31 AD3d at 518-519).  That is,
the defendant's living situation was "uncertain" in Ruddy because
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it was not known at the time of the SORA hearing whether he would
be living in the sober house or a shelter upon his release from
incarceration; there was no evidence showing that he would likely
live on the streets after he left prison, as was the case here. 
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed, without costs, and the order of Supreme Court
reinstated.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   * 
Order reversed, without costs, and order of Supreme Court, New
York County, reinstated.  Opinion by Judge Read.  Judges
Ciparick, Graffeo, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.  Chief Judge
Lippman took no part.
Decided November 23, 2009