Case Title: Durham v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 371, 2022

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2023-02-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MICHAEL DURHAM, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 371, 2022 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID No. 0208019524A (K) 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: November 14, 2022 
Decided: 
February 2, 2023 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VAUGHN and TRAYNOR, Justices.  
 
ORDER 
 
After consideration of the opening brief, the motion to affirm, and the record 
on appeal, it appears to the Court that:   
(1) 
The appellant, Michael Durham, filed this appeal from a Superior Court 
order denying his third motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 61.  The State of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the judgment 
below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Durham’s opening brief that 
his appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm.   
(2) 
In December 2003, a Superior Court jury found Durham guilty of 
attempted first-degree robbery and numerous related offenses arising from the home 
invasion of a Dover residence.  After granting the State’s motion to declare Durham 
 
2 
a habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214, the Superior Court exercised its 
discretion to sentence Durham to life imprisonment.  This Court affirmed the 
Superior Court’s judgment on direct appeal.1  In September 2006, the Court affirmed 
the Superior Court’s denial of Durham’s first motion for postconviction relief.2 
(3) 
In June 2022, Durham filed a motion to stay and a third motion for 
postconviction relief.  The Superior Court denied the motion for postconviction 
relief as procedurally barred and denied the motion to stay as moot.  After Durham 
filed an untimely appeal and this Court remanded for the Superior Court to issue a 
new order so that Durham could file a timely appeal,3 Durham filed this appeal.   
(4) 
In his opening brief, Durham argues that the Superior Court erred in 
treating his motion for postconviction relief as a finalized motion and denying it 
instead of giving him the opportunity to amend the motion under Rule 61(b)(6).  
Durham contends that he was trying to file a placeholder postconviction motion 
within one year of this Court’s June 17, 2021 decision in Purnell v. State4 as required 
by Rule 61 and that while the proceeding was stayed he intended to file a 
postconviction motion explaining why his reliance on Purnell satisfied the Rule 
61(d)(2) and 61(i)(5) exceptions to the Rule 61 procedural bars.  Durham also argues 
 
1 Durham v. State, 867 A.2d 176 (Del. 2005). 
2 Durham v. State, 2006 WL 2795079 (Del. Sept. 28, 2006). 
3 Durham v. State, 2022 WL 4113147 (Del. Sept. 8, 2022). 
4 254 A.3d 1053 (Del. 2021). 
 
3 
that the Superior Court erred in finding that he relied upon the June 2014 
amendments to Rule 61 as establishing a new rule of constitutional law that applied 
retroactively to his case.   
(5) 
This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for 
postconviction relief for abuse of discretion.5  We review legal or constitutional 
questions de novo.6  The Court considers the procedural requirements of Rule 61 
before addressing any substantive issues.7 
(6) 
Rule 61(d)(2) provides for summary dismissal of a second or 
subsequent postconviction motion unless the movant was convicted after trial and 
the motion either:  
(i) pleads with particularity that new evidence exists that creates a 
strong inference that the movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts 
underlying the charges of which he was convicted; or 
 
(ii) pleads with particularity a claim that a new rule of constitutional 
law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United States 
Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to the movant’s 
case and renders the conviction or death sentence invalid. 
 
Under Rule 61(i)(1), a motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more than 
one year after the judgment of conviction is final, or if it asserts a retroactively 
applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of conviction is final, 
 
5 Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 2013). 
6 Id. 
7 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990) 
 
4 
more than one year after the right is first recognized by this Court or the United 
States Supreme Court.  Rule 61(i)(5) provides that a postconviction motion is not 
barred by the procedural bars of Rule 61(i)(1)-(4) if the movant satisfies Rule 
61(d)(2)(i) or (ii).  In Purnell, this Court held that a defendant satisfied Rule 
61(d)(2)(i) where he relied on evidence of actual innocence that was not obtained or 
presented by his conflicted trial counsel.    
(7) 
 Durham referred to Purnell throughout his motion to stay and motion 
for postconviction relief, but failed to explain how it applied to his case.   He claims 
on appeal that if the Superior Court had granted the motion to stay or allowed him 
to amend the postconviction motion he would have explained that Purnell applies to 
his case because there is evidence of actual innocence that he could not have timely 
discovered.  Durham alleges that this evidence consists of: (i) an undisclosed plea 
offer, (ii) an undisclosed agreement with a State witness and co-defendant who later 
admitted perjury, and (iii) the victim’s admission that the police coerced him to 
identify Durham.   
(8) 
These conclusory and unsupported allegations, which appear at best to 
be impeachment evidence, do not create a strong inference that Durham “is actually 
innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which he was convicted.”8  As 
 
8 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i).  See also Mason v. State, 2020 WL 7392348, at *1 n.2 (Del. 
Dec. 16, 2020) (“New evidence that is ‘merely cumulative or impeaching” will not satisfy the 
 
5 
this Court stated in Purnell, “[i]nnocence of the ‘acts underlying the charges’ 
requires ‘more than innocence of intent; it requires new evidence that a person other 
than the petitioner committed the crime.’”9  Unlike Purnell, Durham has not offered 
any evidence, new or otherwise, to suggest that someone other than him committed 
the crimes.  The Superior Court did not err in concluding that Durham failed to 
satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 61(d)(2). 
(9) 
As to Durham’s claim that the Superior Court misunderstood his claim 
concerning the June 2014 amendments to Rule 61, this Court has previously rejected 
the claim that he made in the Superior Court—namely, that he could rely on the pre-
June 2014 version of Rule 61 to argue that there was a colorable claim of a  
miscarriage of justice that rendered the Rule 61 procedural bars inapplicable.  The 
June 2014 amendments to Rule 61 eliminated the miscarriage-of-justice exception 
to the Rule 61 procedural bars.10  This Court has consistently held that the version 
of Rule 61 in effect when the Rule 61 motion is filed applies to that motion.11  
Because Durham filed his Rule 61 motion in June 2022, the version of Rule 61 in 
effect at the time, not the pre-June 2014 version of Rule 61, applied to his Rule 61 
 
‘actual innocence’ standard.”) (quoting Taylor v. State, 2018 WL 655627, at *1 (Del. Jan. 31, 
2018)). 
9 Purnell, 254 A.3d at 1095 (quoting State v. Taylor, 2018 WL 3199537, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. 
June 28, 2018), aff’d 2019 WL 990718 (Del. Feb. 27, 2019)). 
10 Id. at 1094-95 nn. 185, 187. 
11 Durham v. State, 2017 WL 5450746, at *2 (Del. Nov. 13, 2017); Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 
748, 767 (Del. 2016). 
 
6 
motion.  The Superior Court did not err in denying Durham’s Rule 61 motion and 
motion to stay.  
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.   
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice