Case Title: Arizona Corporation Commission v. Superior Court

Citation: 105 Ariz. 56, 459 P.2d 489

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1969-10-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
105 Ariz. 56 (1969) 459 P.2d 489 ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizona, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF MARICOPA and Yale McFate, a judge thereof, et al., Respondents. No. 9396. Supreme Court of Arizona. In Banc. October 8, 1969. Rehearing Denied November 12, 1969. Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Charles S. Pierson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner Arizona Corp. Commission. Yankee & Bernstein, Phoenix, for respondent Yale McFate, Judge, Superior Court. Hunter, Bartlett & Penn, by Joseph W. Mahowald and James E. Hunter, Jordan Green, Phoenix, for respondent Valley Air Lines. Fennemore, Craig, von Ammon, McClennen & Udall, by Thomas M. Wiley, *57 Phoenix, for respondent Apache Airlines, Inc. O'Connor, Cavanagh, Anderson, Westover, Killingsworth & Beshears, by Robert G. Beshears and David L. Haga, Phoenix for amicus curiae Arizona Aviation, Inc. Lesher, Scruggs, Rucker, Kimble & Lindamood, by James M. Sakrison, Tucson for amicus curiae Grand Canyon Airlines. McFARLAND, Justice: The Arizona Corporation Commission, by its commissioners, petitioned this Court to issue a Writ of Certiorari to review an order of the Superior Court of Maricopa County prohibiting the Arizona Corporation Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, from taking certain action. On September 1, 1948, the Commission adopted General Order A-1, which requires that a person obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity before engaging in the business of a common carrier by aircraft. General Order A-1 reads, in part, as follows: Apache Air Lines, Inc., hereinafter referred to as Apache, holds a certificate of convenience and necessity which was issued by the Commission pursuant to General Order A-1; Valley Air Lines, hereinafter referred to as Valley, does not hold such a certificate. On June 14, 1968, Apache filed a complaint before the Commission seeking an order requiring Valley to cease and desist from providing scheduled air service between certain points in the State of Arizona; Apache further sought to have Valley held in contempt for violation of the rules and regulations of the Commission. Two weeks later the Commission issued an Order to Show Cause with respect to Apache's complaint. On July 15, 1968, prior to a hearing by the Commission on Apache's complaint, Valley petitioned the Superior Court of Maricopa County for a Writ of Prohibition against the Commission, praying that the Commission be prohibited and restrained from taking any action upon the complaint of Apache; Valley contended that the Commission "does not have jurisdiction to issue certificates of convenience and necessity for scheduled air service in Arizona." On August 1, 1968, after hearing arguments of Apache, Valley, and the Commission, the Superior Court granted Valley's Petition for Writ of Prohibition. We granted the Commission's Petition to this Court for a Writ of Certiorari to review the action of the Superior Court. The first question to be answered is whether a common carrier by aircraft must obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity from the Commission before engaging in the business of transportation of property or passengers for hire. Article XV of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S., provides for the creation of the Commission, and Section 3 thereof gives certain powers to the Commission. *58 Article XV, Sections 3 and 6, read as follows: The scope of the Commission's power and authority as defined by Article XV, Sec. 3, of our Constitution was very exhaustively examined and discussed in Corporation Commission of State of Arizona v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 54 Ariz. 159, 94 P.2d 443. Pacific Greyhound involved the constitutionality of a statutory provision in which the legislature had specified regulations concerning the granting of certificates of convenience and necessity to motor carriers. [See A.R.S. § 40-607.] The Commission contended in that case that the statutory provision was in conflict with the constitutional provision giving the Commission "full power to * * * prescribe just and reasonable classifications and * * reasonable rates and charges to be made * * *." This Court upheld the constitutionality of the statutory provision, stating: *59 We stated, in William v. Pipe Trades Industry Program of Arizona, 100 Ariz. 14, 409 P.2d 720: Pacific Greyhound and Williams clearly establish that the issuance of certificates of convenience and necessity lies within the power of the legislature. The Commission argues that the legislature empowered it to issue certificates of convenience and necessity when it enacted A.R.S. § 40-607 which reads, in part, as follows: The primary duty involved in construing a statute is the ascertainment of the true intent of the legislature at the time the statute was enacted. Bushnell v. Superior Court, 102 Ariz. 309, 428 P.2d 987. In City of Phoenix v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 265, 419 P.2d 49, we held: Accordingly, A.R.S. § 40-607 must be interpreted in such a way that the legislative intent is not frustrated. Arizona has long been firmly committed to the doctrine of regulated monopoly in the area of common carriers. Arizona Corporation Commission v. People's Freight Lines, Inc., 41 Ariz. 158, 16 P.2d 420; Tucson Rapid Transit Company v. Old Pueblo Transit Company, 79 Ariz. 327, 289 P.2d 406; Arizona Corporation Commission v. Reliable Transportation Company, 86 Ariz. 363, 346 P.2d 1091; Arizona Corporation Commission v. Continental Security Guards, 103 Ariz. 410, 443 P.2d 406. In the case of Arizona Corporation Commission v. People's Freight Lines, Inc., supra, in which "regulated monopoly" was held to be the public policy of Arizona with reference to public-service corporations, we stated as follows: We emphatically reiterated our position in Old Pueblo Transit Co. v. Arizona Corporation Commission, 84 Ariz. 389, 329 P.2d 1108, when we stated: Legislative expression for our decisions dates back to Chapter 130 of the Session Laws of 1919; that law has been carried forward to A.R.S. §§ 40-607. The scope of the power and authority granted the Commission by the Constitution of this State in the area of public-service corporations is uniquely broad and exclusive; in fact, this Court once referred to the Commission as a fourth branch of government. State v. Tucson Gas, Electric Light and Power Co., 15 Ariz. 294, 138 P. 781. The framers of our State Constitution expressed their appreciation of the need for regulation in the area of public-service corporations for the safety and welfare of the public: Our state legislature, acting pursuant to constitutional authority[2], enacted A.R.S. § 40-607 which requires a common carrier by motor vehicle to obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity from the Commission before operating within this State; A.R.S. § 40-607 thereby enables the Commission to carry out effectively the expressly defined duties contained in Art. XV, Sec. 3, of Arizona's Constitution. In compliance with the dictates of both the State Constitution and the state legislature, *61 the Commission adopted General Order A-1 twenty-one years ago requiring a common carrier by aircraft to obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity before operating within this State; this administrative procedure of the Commission has been recognized in this State since the date of the adoption of General Order A-1 in 1948. It is argued that aircraft are not mentioned in A.R.S. § 40-607, and, therefore, they are not covered thereby. The same argument was made in Corporation Commission of State of Arizona v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, supra, in which it was contended that because motor vehicles were not mentioned in the Arizona Constitution, the Commission did not have authority to regulate them. We there held: This same rule of law is applicable in the instant case. While it is true that aircraft are not expressly mentioned in the statute, it should be noted that there were no common carriers by aircraft operating intrastate in Arizona in 1919, the date of the enactment of the statute. Section 10 of Article XV of the Constitution provides: Article XV, Sec. 10, of the Constitution, coupled with Art. XV, Sec. 3, clearly shows that it was the intent of the framers of the Constitution to place all common carriers under the same regulations. It was clearly the intent of the legislature to encompass the whole field of common carriers as evidenced by the all-inclusive language of the legislature in 1919. The alternative would be to leave the public and common carriers unprotected; the result could well be cutthroat competition not only between aircraft carriers themselves but also between aircraft carriers and other common carriers. In keeping with the purpose of our Constitution and legislation as declared in previous decisions of this Court, we hold that any person engaged in the transportation of persons or property for compensation as a common carrier, including transportation by aircraft, shall not operate within this State as such without first having obtained from the Commission a certificate of public convenience and necessity. Our decision is consistent with the wellsettled policy of regulated monopoly in this State as laid down by our legislature and long recognized by this Court. The second question is whether the power of the Commission is affected by A.R.S. § 40-205 and A.R.S. § 2-209. A.R S. § 40-205 reads as follows: A.R.S. § 2-209, which was enacted at the same time, and was a part of the same senate bill as A.R.S. § 40-205, provides as follows: As stated in Menderson v. City of Phoenix, 51 Ariz. 280, 76 P.2d 321: In the instant case, prior to the passage of A.R.S. § 40-205 and A.R.S. § 2-209, jurisdiction was granted by the Constitution to the Commission to regulate common carriers; A.R.S. § 40-607 enlarged the Commission's power to include the granting of certificates of convenience and necessity. If the only interpretation which can be assigned to A.R.S. § 40-205 conflicts with the grant of constitutional power to the Commission contained in Article XV of the Arizona Constitution, then the statute is clearly unconstitutional; power vested in the Commission by the Constitution cannot be limited by statute. Garvey v. Trew, 64 Ariz. 342, 170 P.2d 845. However, it is our duty in determining the intent of the legislature to attach a meaning to A.R.S. § 40-205 which upholds its constitutionality if at all possible. Osborne v. Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Company, D.C., 229 F. Supp. 674. A.R.S. § 40-205 and A.R.S. § 2-209 should be read together if to do so would avoid a conflict with the Arizona Constitution. A.R.S. § 2-209 provides for (1) certificating of commercial flight operators, and (2) carrying of a certain amount of insurance by such operators. It is our determination that A.R.S. § 40-205 provides simply that the Commission shall have no power or authority to certificate commercial flight operators or to require such operators to carry insurance. This Court has recognized the authority of the State to exercise its police power in areas involving public health, safety, and *63 welfare. Farmer v. Killingsworth, 102 Ariz. 44, 424 P.2d 172. By the same reasoning that the Highway Commission is given authority to require automobile chauffeurs to be licensed, so too is the Department of Aeronautics empowered to require the certificating of commercial pilots. We therefore hold that A.R.S. § 40-205 is not in conflict with Article 15 of the Arizona Constitution; we further hold that A.R.S. § 2-209 does not limit whatever power the Commission has to require and issue certificates of public convenience and necessity for common carriers by aircraft. We are accordingly of the opinion that the Commission has authority to require a certificate of convenience and necessity for regulating common carriers by aircraft in this State. The judgment of the trial court granting Valley's Petition for Writ of Prohibition is reversed. LOCKWOOD, V.C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, McFARLAND and HAYS, JJ., JAMES DUKE CAMERON, Judge, Court of Appeals, Div. One, concur. UDALL, C.J., having disqualified himself, CAMERON, J., participated in consideration of this opinion. [1] A corporation engaged in the business of a common carrier by aircraft is a Public Service Corporation within the meaning of Art. XV, Sec. 2, of the Arizona Constitution, which provides in part: "* * All corporations other than municipal engaged in carrying persons or property for hire * * * shall be deemed public service corporations." [2] "The law-making power may enlarge the powers and extend the duties of the Corporation Commission, and may prescribe rules and regulations to govern proceedings instituted by and before it; but, until such rules and regulations are provided by law, the Commission may make rules and regulations to govern such proceedings." Art. XV, § 6, Ariz.Const.