Case Title: State v. Whitchurch

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1990-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
 
 
                                No. 89-035
 
 
State of Vermont                             Supreme Court
 
                                             On Appeal From
     v.                                      District Court of Vermont
                                             Unit No. 3, Washington Circuit
 
Gregory Whitchurch                           March Term, 1990
 
 
Michael S. Kupersmith, J.
 
Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Thomas J. Rushford,
  Assistant Attorney General, Waterbury, for plaintiff-appellee
 
Bauer, Gravel & Watson, Burlington, for defendant-appellant
 
 
PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.
 
 
     DOOLEY, J.   Defendant, Gregory Whitchurch, appeals from denial of his
motion by the trial court to strike one of his probation conditions.  We
affirm.
     On May 29, 1986 defendant was charged with lewd and lascivious conduct
in violation of 13 V.S.A. { 2601.  He entered a plea of nolo contendere
and, pursuant to a plea agreement, consented to a suspended sentence of four
to five years imprisonment.  The terms of probation were included in the
agreement and included the following conditions:
         #21.  You shall not reside with your children nor
         contact your children in any manner unless approved by
         the probation officer approved therapist and your
         probation officer.  In addition you shall not initiate,
         maintain, or establish contact with any other minor
         child, nor attempt to do so nor reside in the same
         residence with other minor children.
 
         #22.  You shall not initiate, maintain or establish
         contact with any person under age of 16 years nor
         attempt to do so, nor reside in the same residence with
         such other person without permission of probation
         officer approved therapist and your probation officer.
The plea agreement and the probation warrant were signed by defendant.
     On August 20, 1987, more than a year later, defendant sought to modify
these conditions.  Defendant claimed that condition #21 was overbroad and
violated his federal and state constitutional rights of due process,
association and privacy.  He argued that he was precluded from contacting
his son, G.W., even though the son was not involved in the adjudicated
offense.  On November 13, 1987, defendant filed a memorandum and sought to
strike probation conditions #21 and #22.  He offered no evidence in support
of this motion.
     On July 18, 1988, the court denied defendant's motion to strike, but
modified the conditions to read as follows:
         #21.  You shall not reside with your children, nor
         contact your children in any manner unless approved by
         your probation officer.
 
         #22.  You shall not initiate, establish or maintain
         contact with any minor, nor attempt to do so, nor reside
         in the same residence with any minor without the
         approval of your probation officer.  The following
         circumstances are excepted from this condition:
 
                        (a)  When the minor is in the physical pre-
                        sence of his/her parent or legal guardian;
                        (b) When the minor is engaged in a regular
                        commercial or business activity, the defendant
                        may engage in the normal business or commer-
                        cial activity with said minor, provided the
                        activity takes place in an area open to
                        public view.
                        (c) When the defendant is present in a public area,
                        as long as the defendant is not associating with a
                        minor, and the public area is not one frequented
                        mainly or exclusively by minors.
 
     In reaching its result, the court relied in part on facts it derived
from the file for the juvenile proceeding involving defendant's daughter.
Because the court took judicial notice of facts from the separate juvenile
case, it allowed the defendant to file a request for a hearing on the facts
pursuant to V.R.E. 201(e).
     In this Court, defendant claims that: (1) the lower court erred in its
application of V.R.E. 201 to judicially noticed material from a juvenile
case as a basis for its denial of defendant's motion to modify condition
#21; and (2) condition #21 is invalid because it was beyond the authority of
the court, based on an inadequate record and violative of defendant's
constitutionally protected liberty interests.  We take the issues in reverse
order.
     The authority for the imposition of probation conditions is contained
in 28 V.S.A. { 252.  That section authorizes the court to impose such
conditions as it "deems reasonably necessary to ensure that the offender
will lead a law-abiding life or to assist him to do so."  Id. { 252(a).  It
goes on to authorize twelve specific types of conditions, ending with the
authorization for the court to require the defendant to "[s]atisfy any other
conditions reasonably related to his rehabilitation."  Id. { 252(b)(13).
The parties agree that if there is authority for condition #21 in this case,
the authority comes from this "catchall" provision.
     In State v. Peck, 149 Vt. 617, 623,