Case Title: Biloxi Development Commission v. Frey

Citation: 401 So. 2d 716

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1981-07-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
401 So. 2d 716 (1981) BILOXI DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Biloxi, Mississippi, Successor to the City of Biloxi Housing Authority v. Abe FREY, et al. No. 52693. Supreme Court of Mississippi. July 15, 1981. Rehearing Denied August 12, 1981. Grier J. Gregory, W. Raymond Hunter, Bryant & Stennis, Gulfport, for appellant. Charliene Roemer, Thomas L. Wallace, Sekul, Hornsby, Wallace & Teel, Biloxi, for appellees. Before PATTERSON, C.J., and LEE and HAWKINS, JJ. *717 PATTERSON, Chief Justice, for the Court: This appeal emanates from a confirmation of title suit brought by the Biloxi Development Commission (hereinafter City) and a cross-bill to confirm title by Abe, Morris, and Rose Spector Frey (hereinafter Freys) in the Second Judicial District of Harrison County Chancery Court. The property, or a part of it, in dispute, was condemned in a prior suit brought in the Special Court of Eminent Domain of the County Court of Harrison County. To understand the posture of this case, it is necessary to review its prior litigation. The City filed a petition for condemnation of certain property owned by the Freys on November 1, 1971. The property was described as: The controversy arises because there are two lots in Parcel 33-6 and only one is described in some detail. A lot, probably the northern one, with a frontage of 47.8 feet on Couevas Street is described in some particularity; but the remaining lot in Parcel 33-6 is not described in metes and bounds. The Freys were paid $22,500.00 for their land which was taken in the eminent domain proceeding. The judgment of March 20, 1972, did not contain a detailed description of the 71 foot lot, which is now in dispute, although Parcel 33-6, composed of the 47.8 foot lot and the 71 foot lot, was used in the description. Subsequently, on November 7, 1973, the Freys brought suit against the City to cancel a cloud and confirm title in them to the 71 foot lot. A demurrer was sustained to this bill because of no equity and no deraignment of title. The chancellor also abated any conveyance of the 71 foot lot and granted leave to amend. The Freys did not amend their bill of complaint and the cause was thereafter dismissed by the court. This brings us to the present confirmation suit by the City to quiet title to the 71 foot lot which it alleges it owns via the eminent domain proceeding. The Freys answered, denying the title of the City and seeking confirmation of title in Rose Spector Frey, the wife of Abe. The City thereupon moved to dismiss the Freys' claim because of res judicata, estoppel, accord and satisfaction, or in the alternative, a motion to strike the Freys' affirmative defenses. The trial court determined it could not alter the judgment of the eminent domain court. In considering that judgment, the chancellor ruled it contained two incompatible descriptions and the more specific description controlled; therefore, confirmation of title in the City was denied. It also ruled the Freys' previous cloud suit was not res judicata to their cross-bill to confirm title because there was no identity *718 of the cause of action or the thing sued for. Further, the cross-bill failed to show the Freys were in possession of the land or there was no adverse occupancy; and therefore, it was dismissed with prejudice with costs assessed against the City. The final decree leaves the title to the litigated property undecided and in dispute. The City appeals, assigning three errors: The Freys cross-appeal assigning as error that the trial court erred in failing to make a positive determination as to the ownership of the property. We are of the opinion the trial court erred in not finding the Freys equitably estopped to deny the City's title. The record of the eminent domain proceeding leads us to this conclusion. John M. Smallwood, Sr., an appraiser, testified concerning block 33, parcel 6 in the condemnation proceeding. Portions of his condemnation testimony follow: From the above testimony, it is clear that Abe Frey was present when testimony was received concerning the appraisal value of the two lots, being Parcel 33-6. Also, a map SD-1 (almost identical to Map SD-3 referred to at trial and referenced in the judgment) was utilized at trial to indicate the exact property to be condemned. Smallwood encircled in red the property to be taken which included both the northern lot and disputed southern lot. Abe Frey readily accepted the $22,500 without expressing any reservation about the lots condemned. On deposition, Frey testified: Although there may have been some mental reservation on Frey's part, he did not make it known at the condemnation trial so that he is now estopped to assert title to the disputed lot. By payment of the $22,500 for Parcel 33-6, the City relied on Frey's acceptance of the sum to its detriment. See Thomas v. Bailey, 375 So. 2d 1049 (Miss. 1979). The fact that Rose Spector Frey was not a party to the condemnation suit is of no consequence for "it is the general rule that an estoppel operates on the privies of the original party." Wabash Drilling Co. v. Ellis, 230 Ky. 769, 20 S.W.2d 1002 (1929), as cited in Cummings v. Midstates Oil Corporation, 193 Miss. 675, 704, 9 So. 2d 648, 655 (1942). In Phelps v. Clinkscales, 247 So. 2d 819 (Miss. 1971), the defendant in a prior partition proceeding had openly agreed to partition of certain property and thereafter had attempted to convey to his son the entire parcel of the partitioned property. This *720 Court held the defendant barred by equitable estoppel to assert title to the partitioned land. In the present case, Abe Frey agreed in open court, the eminent domain proceeding, to accept $22,500 for Parcel 33-6, which obviously contained both lots. Therefore, we are of the opinion they are estopped to assert title to the 71 foot lot previously condemned. We do not reach the merits of the res judicata and accord and satisfaction issues; for regardless of the prior cloud suit brought by the Freys, estoppel acts as a bar to their claim of ownership to the subject property. This brings us to the second assignment of error that as a matter of law the chancellor erred in failing to confirm title to the disputed property in the City as the property sought to be confirmed is a portion of the same property that was taken in the prior eminent domain proceeding. We are of the opinion that the City sufficiently deraigned and proved its title to the disputed property in accordance with MCA § 11-17-35 (1972). The City took title to Parcel 33-6 by condemnation proceedings in 1972 as evidenced by the deeds and judgment. The effect of the judgment is, by operation, the same as if a deed were made conveying the same rights. Baldwin v. Mississippi State Highway Dept., 187 Miss. 642, 193 So. 789 (1940). An examination of the description of property in the judgment reveals an adequate description by monuments of the entire parcel 33-6, including the 47.8 foot lot and the 71 foot lot. "[A] call for natural or artificial monuments will prevail over courses and distances in discrepancies in deeds... ." O'Herrin v. Brooks, 67 Miss. 266, 274, 6 So. 844, 845 (1889). The described distance is 47.8 feet by 108 1/2 feet; however the monuments described indicate a distance of approximately 118.8 X 108 1/2 feet which would include both the northern and southern lots contained in Parcel 33-6. The property condemned is described as being "bounded on the North by Jackson Street, on the East by property now or formerly of Atkinson; on the South by property now or formerly of Patton: and on the West by Couevas Street." This boundary description is also more definite and certain than the reference to 47.8 feet because there is no cardinal point of beginning for the 47.8 feet. It is impossible to discern the northern or southern boundary of the described property by the language "having a frontage on Couevas Street of 47'8"." Concerning construction to be given deeds, this Court stated in Dunn v. Stratton, 160 Miss. 1, 7, 133 So. 140, 142 (1931), the following: Therefore we are of the opinion the language "bounded on the north by Jackson Street, on the East by property now or *721 formerly of Patton; and on the West by Couevas Street" is more certain and dependable as descriptive items and will interpret the less certain descriptive term "having a frontage on Couevas Street of 47'8"." See also Moore v. Kuljis, 207 So. 2d 604, (Miss. 1967); Texas Company v. Newton Naval Stores Co., 223 Miss. 468, 78 So. 2d 751 (1955). In addition, the property is also described as "Being Parcel 33-6" and reference is made to property Map SD-3. Not only does the call for natural and artificial monuments prevail over courses and distances when interpreting a deed, but "the call for the lot itself must prevail over any description by courses and distances, or other descriptive particulars... ." O'Herrin v. Brooks, supra. We conclude the court erred in not confirming title to the disputed area in the City of Biloxi and in not dismissing the cross-bill of the Freys. REVERSED AND JUDGMENT HERE FOR THE CITY OF BILOXI. SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and SUGG, WALKER, BROOM, LEE, BOWLING and HAWKINS, JJ., concur.