Case Title: Jones (Robert) v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 030310

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2004-01-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, 
JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
ROBERT I. JONES, SR. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 030310 
JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
JANUARY 16, 2004 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY 
PAUL M. PEATROSS, JR., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the University of 
Virginia (“the University”) is a governmental entity for the 
purposes of determining its status as a statutory employer under 
the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act (“the Act”), Code 
§§ 65.2-100 to –1310. 
I. 
Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
Robert I. Jones, Sr. (“Jones”) was employed by Waco, Inc. 
(“Waco”), an independent contractor employed by the University 
to perform asbestos abatement in a building on the grounds.  
Part of this work included the removal of electrical conduits.  
Jones received an electrical shock while attempting to remove an 
electrical conduit. 
 
Jones filed a motion for judgment against the University 
and its employees alleging that they had negligently informed 
him that the electrical power to that conduit had been turned 
off when the conduit actually contained live wires. The 
defendants each filed pleas in bar based on the Act.  The 
Commonwealth of Virginia, on behalf of the University, and the 
individual defendants asserted that the University was the 
statutory employer of Jones because it is a governmental entity 
with a statutory mandate to maintain its buildings and Jones was 
engaged in the maintenance of a University building. 
 
The trial court sustained the defendants’ pleas in bar, 
dismissing Jones’s action, and denied Jones’s motion to 
reconsider on November 20, 2002.  Jones appeals the adverse 
judgment of the trial court. 
II. Analysis 
 
Jones asserts that the trial court erred by holding that 
the University is a governmental entity and that its trade or 
business included asbestos removal from buildings under its care 
and control.  Further, Jones argues that the trial court erred 
in applying the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ 
Compensation Act despite the language of the Virginia Tort 
Claims Act stating that “the Commonwealth shall be liable . . . 
where the Commonwealth . . ., if a private person, would be 
liable . . . .”  Code § 8.01-195.3. 
 
The Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act provides that: 
When any person (referred to in this section as 
“owner”) undertakes to perform or execute any 
work which is a part of his trade, business or 
occupation and contracts with any other person 
(referred to in this section as “subcontractor”) 
for the execution or performance by or under such 
subcontractor of the whole or any part of the 
work undertaken by such owner, the owner shall be 
liable to pay to any worker employed in the work 
 
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any compensation under this title which he would 
have been liable to pay if the worker had been 
immediately employed by him. 
Code § 65.2-302(A).  This “statutory employer” provision is 
designed to ensure that owners do not escape liability for 
workers’ compensation benefits by having their work performed by 
others.  Henderson v. Central Tel. Co., 233 Va. 377, 381, 355 
S.E.2d 596, 598-99 (1987); Smith v. Horn, 232 Va. 302, 305-06, 
351 S.E.2d 14, 16 (1986). 
 
In this case, the University was the owner of the building 
on which Jones was working when he was injured.  Once an owner 
is found to be a statutory employer, it is subject to all the 
mandates, duties, and rights as to its statutory employee 
mandated by the Act, including the “exclusivity rule.”  The 
exclusivity rule provides that when an employee is eligible for 
remedy under the Act, he or she may not seek any other remedy 
against the employer or his fellow employees.  See Code § 65.2-
307(A). 
As discussed below, the analysis of the liability as an 
owner for governmental entities and private entities differs.  
In other words, state agencies, municipalities, and counties are 
treated differently from private corporations and individuals.  
Jones argues that we have never extended governmental entity 
status to a college or university under the Act.  However, both 
 
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statutory language and case law indicate that the University is 
entitled to governmental entity status. 
The most obvious difference between a governmental entity 
and a private entity is that the control of a governmental 
entity ultimately lies with publicly elected officials.  Code 
§ 23-69 establishes the Board of Visitors of the University as a 
public corporation that is “at all times subject to the control 
of the General Assembly.”  It would challenge reason to suggest 
that an institution, subject at all times to the control of the 
legislature, is not a governmental entity. 
In Phillips v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 97 Va. 
472, 474, 34 S.E. 66, 67 (1899), we held that buildings owned by 
the University could not be subject to mechanic’s liens because 
the University’s buildings were protected by the general rule 
that mechanic’s liens “do not, in the absence of express 
provisions, apply to public buildings erected by States, 
counties, and towns for public uses.”  In determining “the 
nature of the University of Virginia,” we noted that “the 
University, from its foundation, has been wholly governed, 
managed, and controlled by the State . . . and private 
individuals have no interest in or control over it.”  Id. at 
475, 34 S.E. at 67.  We pointed to language nearly identical to 
that in the current Code “provid[ing] that the Rector and 
 
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Visitors should be at all times subject to the control of the 
General Assembly.”  Id.  We concluded that the University’s 
property should be treated like the property of a state, county, 
or town because 
the University . . . is in the strictest sense a 
public institution, and that its grounds and 
buildings are public property, the property of 
the State; that it is governed and controlled 
solely by the State; that its grounds and 
buildings are wholly dedicated to public uses; 
and that the interest of the public constitutes 
its ends and aims. 
Id. at 475-76, 34 S.E. at 67. 
The reasoning that led to our holding in Phillips applies 
here with equal force.  The characteristics of the University 
informing our decision in that case are the same here.  Although 
we did not use the specific term “governmental entity” in 
Phillips, certainly an entity that is established by statute, is 
governed and controlled solely by the General Assembly, owns 
property through money appropriated by the General Assembly, and 
whose very essence is public use and service is a governmental 
entity, is to be treated in the same manner as municipalities 
for the purposes of the Act. 
 
In a situation in which an employee of an independent 
contractor sues a private entity that owns a project, we have 
applied the “normal work test” to determine whether the injured 
party was engaged in the trade, business, or occupation of the 
 
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owner at the time of his or her injury.  See Bassett Furniture 
Indus., Inc. v. McReynolds, 216 Va. 897, 902-03, 224 S.E.2d 323, 
326-27 (1976); Johnson v. Jefferson Nat’l Bank, 244 Va. 482, 
485, 422 S.E.2d 778, 780 (1992).  However, the normal work test 
does not apply to the determination of the trade, business, or 
occupation of a governmental entity. 
 
In Nichols v. VVKR, Inc., 241 Va. 516, 403 S.E.2d 698 
(1991), we held: 
A governmental entity or a public utility 
does not share the ability to choose its 
activities.  Therefore, if the project’s 
owner is a governmental agency or a public 
utility, any activity which the owner is 
authorized or required to do by law or 
otherwise, is considered the trade, 
business, or occupation of the owner. 
Id. at 521, 403 S.E.2d at 701.  See Henderson, 233 Va. at 383-
85, 355 S.E.2d at 599-601; Ford v. City of Richmond, 239 Va. 
664, 667, 669, 391 S.E.2d 270, 271-73 (1990).  The unique nature 
of a governmental entity requires examination of statutory 
authorization and mandated duties to determine the entity’s 
trade, business, or occupation.  What the legislature has 
authorized or required an entity to do is the trade, business, 
or occupation of the entity, whatever the frequency with which 
 
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the task is performed or the number of employees directly 
employed to perform the task.*
 
Jones relies on Board of Supervisors v. Boaz, 176 Va. 126, 
10 S.E.2d 498 (1940), to support his argument that the 
University was not his statutory employer because building 
repair is not the University’s trade, business, or occupation.  
Boaz, however, is inapplicable.  The opinion in Boaz was based 
largely on the fact that the Act at that time did not include 
the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions in its 
provisions.  Id. at 130, 10 S.E.2d at 499.  The Act has long 
                     
 
* We have held cities, a ferry district, and a turnpike 
authority to be governmental entities whose trade, business, or 
occupation is defined by statute, irrespective of the number of 
the entity’s own employees engaged in the work that resulted in 
injury to a contractor’s employee.  See Ford v. City of 
Richmond, 239 Va. 664, 669, 391 S.E.2d 270, 273 (1990) (holding 
that the city of Richmond was the statutory employer of the 
employee of a contractor hired to repair the roof on a water 
reservoir); Roberts v. City of Alexandria, 246 Va. 17, 19-20, 
431 S.E.2d 275, 276-77 (1993) (holding that the City of 
Alexandria was the statutory employer of an employee of a 
medical services provider contracted to provide medical services 
at the city jail); Williams v. E.T. Gresham Co., 201 Va. 457, 
464-65, 111 S.E.2d 498, 503-04 (1959) (holding that the 
Chesapeake Bay Ferry District was the statutory employer of the 
employees of a contractor hired to drive piles for a ferry 
landing even though Ferry District employees had never driven 
piles on their own); Anderson v. Thorington Construction Co., 
201 Va. 266, 271-72, 110 S.E.2d 396, 400-01 (1959) (holding that 
a turnpike authority was the statutory employer of the employee 
of an engineering firm contracted to consult on the construction 
on a portion of the turnpike despite the fact that the Authority 
did not directly employ any individuals engaged in construction-
related work).  The statutory language on which these decisions 
have been based has not been materially altered and the 
reasoning in these cases is instructive here. 
 
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since been amended to specifically include the Commonwealth and 
its subdivisions.  We have previously noted that Boaz is no 
longer applicable law.  See Ford at 668-69, 391 S.E.2d at 272-
73. 
 
The University is a governmental entity.  Its powers and 
duties, exercised by the Rector and Visitors of the University, 
are created by statute and are controlled by the General 
Assembly.  Code §§ 23-62 to –91.23:1.  Applying the rule 
established in Nichols, any activity of the University 
authorized or required by statute is the trade, business, or 
occupation of the University for purposes of the Act.  Pursuant 
to Code § 23-76, the University’s Board of Visitors “shall be 
charged with the care and preservation of all property belonging 
to the University.”  Accordingly, the care and preservation of 
the University’s buildings is part of the trade, business, or 
occupation of the University.  The asbestos abatement performed 
by Jones and Waco was part of the maintenance of the 
University’s buildings; therefore, Jones was involved in the 
trade, business, or occupation of the University at the time of 
his injury.  The University was his statutory employer; 
consequently, Jones is barred from seeking a remedy in tort 
against the University and its employees. 
 
Additionally, Jones argues that the Virginia Tort Claims 
Act, Code §§ 8.01-195.1 to –195.9, requires the court to treat a 
 
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governmental entity as though it were a private person under the 
Workers’ Compensation Act.  We disagree.  The Tort Claims Act is 
a waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity in certain 
circumstances allowing the imposition of liability equivalent to 
that of a private entity.  Id.  Because the Tort Claims Act is a 
statute in derogation of the common law, its limited waiver of 
immunity must be strictly construed.  See Baumgardner v. 
Southwestern Va. Mental Health Inst., 247 Va. 486, 489, 442 
S.E.2d 400, 402 (1994); Hyman v. Glover, 232 Va. 140, 143, 348 
S.E.2d 269, 271 (1986); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Virginian Ry., 110 
Va. 631, 646, 66 S.E. 863, 868 (1910).  The Tort Claims Act does 
not waive other jurisdictional bars or defenses available to the 
Commonwealth and its agencies.  Code § 8.01-195.3.  The 
exclusivity bar under the Workers’ Compensation Act is a 
jurisdictional bar independent of the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity, applying to private and governmental entities in like 
manner. 
 
For the reasons stated, we hold that Jones is a statutory 
employee of the University of Virginia and is barred by the 
workers’ compensation exclusivity rule from pursuing his tort 
claim against the University and its employees.  The trial court 
did not err in granting the defendants’ pleas in bar and we will 
affirm its judgment. 
Affirmed. 
 
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