Case Title: White v. Welsh

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Hubert L. WHITE & Sharon G. White v. Evelyn
R. WELSH, Representative of the Estate of
Martin Hardcastle; Marion County, Arkansas,
by Judge Kenneth Jefferson, Intervenor

96-223                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered March 3, 1997


1.   Civil procedure -- actions shall be prosecuted by real party
     in interest -- appellee clearly had property interest. --
     Appellee, as duly appointed representative of an estate,
     clearly had a property interest giving her standing to file
     suit where she had petitioned to sell 120 acres of the
     estate's land and that petition was granted by the probate
     court; the record amply supported the trial court's finding
     that appellee, in protecting the estate's interest in this
     cause, was properly and timely substituted and ratified under
     the terms of Ark. R. Civ. P. 17(a), which states that every
     action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-
     interest; real property is an asset in the hands of the
     personal representative when the court finds that the real
     property should be sold. 

2.   Limitation of actions -- amendment of complaint substituting
     proper party regarded as institution of new action -- claim
     filed within seven-year statute of limitations. -- Where an
     action is brought in the name of a nonexisting plaintiff, an
     amendment of complaint substituting the proper party to the
     action as plaintiff will be regarded as the institution of a
     new action as regards the statute of limitations; here, the
     appellants blocked the disputed roadway in 1991, and on May 2,
     1995, appellee ratified the estate's complaint against the
     appellants; appellee's claim was filed well within the seven-
     year statute of limitations that the trial court found
     applicable. 

3.   Civil procedure -- appellants' argument that estate's
     complaint was conclusory was without merit -- appellants
     answered complaint with denials to allegations therein. --
     Appellants' argument that they were prejudiced by the
     substitution and ratification because the original complaint,
     as ratified, contained only conclusory statements of the
     estate's interest in the easement, and neither they nor the
     estate were parties to the 1978 agreed order, was without
     merit where appellants, rather than moving for a more definite
     statement under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(e), answered the original
     complaint against them, denying each allegation.  

4.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- denial of motion for summary
     judgment neither reviewable nor appealable. -- The denial of
     a motion for summary judgment is neither reviewable nor
     appealable. 

5.   Evidence -- challenge to sufficiency of evidence insufficient
     -- trial court's holding affirmed. -- Where the trial court's
     holding that the 1978 agreed order established an easement
     appurtenant to the testator's land by prescription across
     appellants' property was supported by testimony of a surveyor,
     the county judge who served in 1978, and the testator's
     lessee, and appellants merely objected to these witnesses and
     chose not to call any of their own, the supreme court could
     not say the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous; the
     trial court's ruling that the 1978 order gave the testator a
     prescriptive easement across appellants' property and that the
     roadway continued in use until 1991 when appellants locked the
     gates, preventing the roadway's use was affirmed; appellants'
     challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was deficient.

      
     Appeal from Marion Chancery Court; Roger V. Logan, Jr.,
Chancellor; affirmed.
     Hubert L. White and Sharon G. White, pro se.
     Michael E. Kelly, for appellees.

     Tom Glaze, Justice. 
     In 1978, Jack McPherson filed suit against Marion County,
seeking to enjoin the use of a roadway across his property and to
prevent the County from grading the roadway, which served as access
to property owned by Martin Hardcastle.  McPherson and the County
settled their dispute, and on November 20, 1978, an order was
entered in which the parties agreed that McPherson was to provide
an alternate access or roadway across his property to serve the
needs of Hardcastle's land, and that the County would grade and
maintain it.
     In July of 1990, Hardcastle died, and on October 26, 1990, the
Hardcastle Estate was opened, and Evelyn Welsh was appointed
personal representative.  In 1991, the McPhersons sold their
property to Hubert and Sharon White, and shortly afterwards, the
Whites locked the gates across the alternate roadway, preventing
access to Hardcastle's land.  On October 14, 1991, the Hardcastle
Estate filed suit in chancery court against the Whites and
McPhersons, seeking to enjoin them from interfering with the
roadway.  The Whites counterclaimed.
     On August 28, 1992, the chancery court entered an order
substituting Welsh, personal representative of the Estate, as the
plaintiff.  On July 14, 1993, the chancery court granted Marion
County's petition to intervene as a necessary party, and the County
pled the same claims and requested the same relief as the Estate. 
Subsequently, the McPhersons were dismissed from the litigation.  
     The Whites then moved to dismiss Welsh, asserting she had no
standing.  The trial court treated the motion as one to make more
definite and certain, and allowed Welsh twenty days to file an
amended complaint.  Welsh timely filed her pleading on November 9,
1994.  Because Welsh's probate order authorizing her to sell the
Hardcastle land was not effective until November 10, 1994, the
trial court later allowed Welsh to ratify her November 9 petition,
which she did on May 2, 1995.
     Following trial on the matter, the court entered its final
order on November 29, 1995, wherein it held that the easement
described in the earlier November 20, 1978 court order had been
established by use and prescription and was appurtenant to the
Hardcastle land.  The trial court found that Welsh's suit was not
barred by the seven-year statute of limitations for recovery of
real estate.  Further, the court directed the Whites to remove
obstructions to the roadway within ten days and permanently
enjoined them from obstructing the roadway again.  The trial court
dismissed the Whites' counterclaim and remaining motions.
     On appeal, the Whites argue four main points, but we consider
points one and three together, since they tend to overlap.  First,
the Whites contend the trial court erred in allowing Welsh to be
substituted as a party-plaintiff and in failing to dismiss Welsh's
complaint.  The Whites maintain the original complaint filed by the
Estate was void because it was filed by the Hardcastle Estate, a
legal nonentity and nonexisting party, that had no standing to sue,
and in the amended complaint filed by Welsh, she failed to show any
title or ownership in the disputed easement. 
     Welsh clearly had a property interest giving her standing. 
Rule 17(a) provides that every action shall be prosecuted in the
name of the real party-in-interest.  Also relevant is Ark. Code
Ann.  28-49-101(b)(1) (1987), which provides that real property
shall be an asset in the hands of the personal representative when
the court finds that the real property should be sold.  Here, Welsh
petitioned to sell 120 acres of the Hardcastle land, and that
petition was granted by the probate court.  Specifically, Rule
17(a) provides as follows:
          No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it
     is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in
     interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after
     objection for ratification of commencement of the action
     by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in
     interest; and such ratification, joinder or substitution
     shall have the same effect as if the action had been
     commenced in the name of the real party in interest.
What constitutes a reasonable time under Rule 17 is a matter of
judicial discretion and will depend upon the facts of each case. 
Insurance from CNA v. Keene Corp., 310 Ark. 605,