Case Title: Neale Constr. Co. v. TOPEKA TOWNSHIP SEWER DIST. NO. 1

Citation: 178 Kan. 359, 285 P.2d 1086

Docket Number: 39,817

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1955-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
178 Kan. 359 (1955)
285 P.2d 1086
NEALE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., a Corporation, Appellant,
v.
TOPEKA TOWNSHIP SEWAGE DISTRICT No. 1, a Corporation, Appellee.
No. 39,817

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 6, 1955.
C.K. Sayler, of Topeka, argued the cause, and L.M. Ascough, and John A. Bausch, both of Topeka, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Lester M. Goodell, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Walter T. Chaney, of Topeka, was with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, J.:
This action, to recover an unpaid balance alleged to *360 be due and payable under its terms, is founded on a unit price contract entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant Sewage District for the construction of a sewer line. With issues joined on all questions relating to liability of the parties, under pleadings consisting of the plaintiff's petition, the defendant's answer and the plaintiff's reply, all as finally amended, the cause came on for trial by the district court where defendant's motion for judgment on plaintiff's opening statement was ultimately sustained. Thereafter a judgment was rendered against plaintiff on such opening statement. However, because defendant had theretofore confessed judgment in its answer for the sum of $2,861.55 the trial court gave plaintiff judgment for that amount. The appeal is from the order sustaining the motion for judgment on the opening statement, the judgment as rendered, and from an order overruling a motion for a new trial.
The opinion in this case will be simplified at the outset by reference to certain matters having to do with the disposition of the cause, about which the record discloses there is implied if not express agreement between the parties. Those having that status will now be mentioned and can be stated thus:
1. Notwithstanding the scope of the notice of appeal the fundamental and all decisive issue involved is whether the trial court erred in holding as a matter of law that appellee was entitled to judgment on the appellant's opening statement.
2. In reaching the decision just mentioned the trial court's decision was founded on the premise no issues of fact were presented for determination by the opening statement, and other facts included therein by reference, because valid provisions of the contract, which were conditions precedent to appellant's recovery, were not followed.
3. If the decision sustaining the motion for judgment on the opening statement is warranted by the record the judgment of $2,861.55 is proper by reason of the allegations of the appellee's answer confessing judgment for that amount.
4. Since appellant's opening statement specifically adopted and included by reference the allegations of its petition and all exhibits attached thereto, including the formal contract entered into between the parties, the facts alleged in the petition and such exhibits are to be regarded as a part of the opening statement and *361 all matters and things therein set forth must be considered together and liberally construed in determining its sufficiency.
5. Under its decisions (See West's Kansas Digest, Trial, § 109, and Hatcher's Kansas Digest [Rev. Ed.], Trial, § 69 1/2) this court is committed to the rules (a) that no judgment can be rendered on an opening statement unless in the making of such statement it appears the party making it has admitted facts which necessarily and absolutely preclude his recovery and (b) that where in making such a statement a plaintiff admits or states facts having the force and effect just mentioned the court may close the case at once and give judgment against him.
The nature of the decisive issue on which this lawsuit depends is such that even if limits of time and space permitted it would not be necessary to detail the contents of appellant's opening statement proper or the petition and exhibits incorporated therein by reference. Instead, for informative and other purposes essential to appellate review, it will suffice to quote a factual statement appearing in appellant's own brief on which it relies to sustain its position the opening statement was sufficient to withstand the attack made against it by the motion for judgment; quote portions of the contract relied on by appellee as sustaining its position; and then direct attention to matters to which no reference whatsoever is made in the opening statement or in the petition.
The factual statement just mentioned, which we pause to note is based on averments to be found in both the opening statement and the petition, reads:
The valid provisions of the contract (Paragraph VI.), which appellee contends create conditions precedent to appellant's recovery and were not followed, read:
*363 Touching matters to which no reference is made in the opening statement or petition it can be stated a careful analysis of the record discloses that neither the statement nor the petition contains allegations of any character which can be construed as avoiding or attempting to avoid the mutual contractual obligations assumed by the parties under Paragraph VI of the contract; no claim is advanced that such contractual provisions have been followed in any respect; and no attempt is made to impeach the engineer's decision on any question arising relative to the contract upon the ground of fraud, mistake, undue influence, or any other good cause.
Appellant, ignoring the provisions of Paragraph VI of the contract, contends that the conditions and circumstances heretofore related disclose a factual dispute between the parties as to work performed and the materials furnished under the contract and the amounts due therefor. In essence its claim, when carefully analyzed, is that it was entitled to a trial on such issues without regard to whether Paragraph VI is to be construed as creating conditions precedent to the maintenance of an action on the contract. We agree the opening statement discloses issues of fact on the subject mentioned but are unable to subscribe to appellant's view those issues require judicial determination and the overruling of the motion for judgment if the provisions of Paragraph VI of the contract which, it cannot be denied were clearly before the trial court in determining the sufficiency of the opening statement, preclude appellant's recovery. The gist of all arguments advanced by appellee is that in the absence of allegations of the petition disclosing avoidance of their requirements, the provisions of Paragraph VI of the contract, must be given that force and effect, hence the trial court's action in sustaining its motion for judgment on the opening statement was not only proper but required.
Thus we come to the sole and decisive question involved in the action which, we pause to note, presents no new or startling issue. Long ago in Board of Education v. Shaw, 15 Kan. 33, this court announced the rule, subsequently followed and quoted with approval in The State v. Construction Co., 91 Kan. 74, 87, 136 Pac. 905, this court held:
*364 Later in Edwards v. Hartshorn, 72 Kan. 19, 82 Pac. 520, it held:
And at page 24 of the opinion said:
See, also, Ritchie v. City of Topeka, 91 Kan. 615, 623, 138 Pac. 618; Wilson v. Drainage District, 113 Kan. 82, 213 Pac. 635; Wheat Growers Ass'n v. Bridges, 124 Kan. 601, 603, 261 Pac. 570, where Edwards v. Hartshorn, supra, is cited with approval and the rule therein announced is followed and adhered to.
For other Kansas cases, wherein the same rule is recognized and applied, see Atchison v. Rackliffe, 78 Kan. 320, 96 Pac. 477; Dolman and Clark v. Kingman County, 116 Kan. 201, 203, 226 Pac. 240.
Upon examination of the decisions of other jurisdictions there can be no doubt that the rule adhered to by our own decisions is the one followed and approved by the great weight of authority.
See, e.g., 9 Am. Jur., Building and Construction Contracts, 23, 24 §§ 33, 34, which reads:
And 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, 898 § 342, where the following statement appears:
See, also, United States v. George A. Fuller Co., 14 F. (2d) 813, dealing with the sufficiency of a pleading which failed to plead facts avoiding the terms and provisions of a contract containing a provision somewhat similar to Paragraph VI of the contract here involved, where it is said:
For other well-recognized textbooks, legal treatises and decisions wherein the same rule is recognized, discussed and applied, see 3 Corbin on Contracts 590, 598 §§ 650, 652; Simpson on Contracts (Hornbook Series) 410 § 112; Restatement of the Law, Contracts, 448 § 303; 17 C.J.S., Contracts, 828, 846 §§ 367 (c), 371 (d); 54 A.L.R., Anno. 1255; 110 A.L.R., Anno. 137; and Stiers Bros. Const. Co. v. Broderick, 60 F. Supp. 792.
*366 In the face of the foregoing authorities and under the facts and circumstances heretofore related we are forced to the conclusion the appellant's opening statement, including its petition, discloses it had failed to comply with requirements of the contract constituting conditions precedent to its right to maintain an action to recover under the terms of that instrument and contained no allegations or averments which can be construed as legally avoiding conformance with such conditions. Therefore we are constrained to hold the trial court did not err in sustaining appellee's motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the judgment rendered.
The judgment is affirmed.