Case Title: LaPLANT v LaPLANT

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13200 I N THE SUPREME COUKT O F THE STATE OF MONTANA 1976 LINDA J. LaPTANT, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -VS - DOLVALI) L . La PLANT, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable W. W. Less ley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : McKinley Anderson argued, Bozeman, Montana For ~ e s p o n d e n t : Hartelius and Lewin, Great F a l l s , Montana Alan Jay Lerner argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted: April 19, 1976 Decided : - <SUN 2 Filed : - Jt! 2 Honorable Arnold Olsen, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g i n place of M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison, delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. P l a i n t i f f Linda J. LaPlant f i l e d an a c t i o n f o r divorce a g a i n s t defendant Donald L. LaPlant. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t dissolved t h e bonds of matrimony between t h e p a r t i e s . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t a l s o decreed p l a i n t i f f had made monetary and o t h e r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e marriage and helped t o acquire t h e r e a l and personal prop- e r t y owned by t h e p a r t i e s . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t decreed t o plain- t i f f some personal property, including t h e mobile home of t h e p a r t i e s and t e n a c r e s of r e a l property upon which t h e mobile home was s i t u a t e d . From t h e decree, defendant Donald L. LaPlant appeals only a s t o t h a t p o r t i o n of t h e decree awarding p l a i n t i f f t h e r e a l property. Defendant a l l e g e s t h e c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n awarding one f o u r t h of defendant's r e a l property acquired by him before t h e marriage t o p l a i n t i f f . Further, he challenges t h a t t h e decree does n o t provide a s u f f i c i e n t d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e property required t o be conveyed by p l a i n t i f f t o defendant and does not provide a s t o how t h e p a r t i e s s h a l l pro r a t e t h e pay- ments of indebtedness a g a i n s t t h e r e a l property, and t h e decree i s t h e r e f o r e so i n d e f i n i t e a s t o be void. W e look t o t h e findings of f a c t and conclusions of l a w of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . I t i s c l e a r t h e c o u r t d i d f i n d t h a t "while l i v i n g with t h e p l a i n t i f f , but p r i o r t o t h e i r marriage t h e husband purchased i n h i s own name c e r t a i n r e a l property c o n s i s t i n g of f o r t y a c r e s , more o r l e s s , located i n G a l l a t i n County, Montana. " Further t h e c o u r t found p l a i n t i f f and defendant were l i v i n g together a s husband and wife during t h e years of 1 9 7 0 and 1971 i n Alaska. That immediately following t h e i r marriage i n 1971, p l a i n t i f f and defendant s e t up a j o i n t account o u t of which a l l household b i l l s were paid, and during t h e years 1972, 1973, and 1974, p l a i n t i f f earned a t o t a l of $6,513 which was deposited i n t o t h e p a r t i e s ' j o i n t account and used f o r t h e payment of various household b i l l s . F u r t h e r , t h e c o u r t found p l a i n t i f f had an income before t h e i r marriage and while l i v i n g together i n Alaska, her income was used f o r t h e payment of t h e domestic b i l l s accrued by t h e p a r t i e s t h e r e . The p a r t i e s made j o i n t t a x r e t u r n s and received t a x refunds j o i n t l y . The findings of f a c t and conclusions of law of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t a r e upheld by a reading of t h e t r a n s c r i p t . I n Libra v. Libra, 157 Mont. 252, 258, 484 P.2d 748, t h i s Court held: " * * * a d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n a divorce a c t i o n has e q u i t a b l e powers t o a d j u s t property i n t e r e s t s of t h e p a r t i e s , and i n so doing w e a f f i r m Johnson and o v e r r u l e Emery on t h i s p o i n t . * * *" Since Libra, t h i s Court has repeatedly confirmed t h e power of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n dealing with adjustment of prop- e r t y r i g h t s between t h e p a r t i e s i n a divorce a c t i o n . I n Cook v. Cook, 159 Mont. 98, 102, 495 P.2d 591, t h i s Court s t a t e d : "Libra and Hodsson should have l a i d t o r e s t t h e d - - - - - - - - husband's argument on appeal here. It has already been a t l e a s t t w i c e decided i n t h i s S t a t e t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t may make an e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n of t h e l i t i g a n t s ' property i n a divorce a c t i o n r e g a r d l e s s of t h e s t a t e of t i t l e t o t h a t property and regard- l e s s of a c t u a l f i n a n c i a l contribution." Emphasis added.) Counsel f o r defendant seems t o contend t h e r e i s some requirement t h a t t h e property of t h e divorced p a r t i e s must have been acquired j o i n t l y , f a i l i n g t h a t , t h e c o u r t has no j u r i s d i c - t i o n o r i s powerless t o d i v i d e t h e property between t h e l i t i g a n t s . The r u l e is b e s t s t a t e d i n Hunnewell v. Hunnewell, 160 Mont. 125, 129, 500 P.2d 1198: " I t is a well e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e of l a w i n t h i s s t a t e t h a t i n determining a property settle- ment pursuant t o t h e granting of a divorce, t h e c o u r t w i l l consider t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s made by t h e p a r t i e s i n acquiring t h e property i n question." From t h e record, it would appear p l a i n t i f f and defend- a n t sustained a common law marriage a t t h e time defendant f i r s t incurred t h e o b l i g a t i o n f o r t h e land a t i s s u e here. In- deed, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t found t h a t p l a i n t i f f and defendant l i v e d together during t h e years 1970 and 1971 a s husband and wife i n Alaska. The property involved was acquired during t h e marriage. P l a i n t i f f contributed t o t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of t h e land by wages deposited i n t h e j o i n t account and i n her e f f o r t s i n taking c a r e of t h e r e a l e s t a t e when defendant was i n Alaska t o earn t h e money which was used t o pay f o r t h e land. Clearly, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i d not abuse its d i s c r e t i o n i n awarding only one f o u r t h of t h e r e a l e s t a t e and a small p o r t i o n of t h e personal property t o p l a i n t i f f . This award was not o u t of proportion t o her c o n t r i b u t i o n i n money and labor t o t h e property acquired by t h e e f f o r t s of t h e marriage. I n Johnson v. Johnson, 137 Mont. 11, 17, 349 P.2d 310, t h i s Court s t a t e d : " * * * ( t ) h e b e t t e r reasoned c a s e s support t h e view s t a t e d i n 27B C.J.S., Divorce, s e c t i o n 294(3), page 280, a s follows: " ' I n some j u r i s d i c t i o n s t h e c o u r t granting divorce may d i v i d e o r a d j u s t r i g h t s i n property accumu- l a t e d by t h e j o i n t e f f o r t s of t h e spouses. Proper- t y acquired j o i n t l y during t h e marriage may be divided whether t h e t i t l e t h e r e t o is i n e i t h e r o r both of t h e p a r t i e s . ' "And, equal d i v i s i o n under normal conditions of property accumulated through j o i n t e f f o r t s i s n o t regarded a s unreasonable. 27B C . J . S . , Divorce, s e c t i o n 2 9 5 ( 5 ) , page 304, e t seq." (Emphasis added.) The findings of f a c t and judgment do not d e s c r i b e t h e r e a l property by metes and bounds. However, t h e t e n a c r e s granted p l a i n t i f f by t h e c o u r t a r e those t e n a c r e s upon which t h e Nashua mobile home i s located. There is nothing i n t h e law t h a t requires a metes and bounds description of land i n t h e decree. Certainly no o t h e r t e n a c r e s would f i t t h e description. I n Kottas v. Kottas, 164 Mont. 30, 32, 518 P.2d 1404, t h i s Court held t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t had j u r i s d i c t i o n t o c l a r i f y t h e decree of divorce and t o make it read what t h e c o u r t intended judgment t o be: "We base our holding on t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between a c t u a l modification of a judgment and c l a r i f i - c a t i o n o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a judgment. This Court i n S t a t e ex rel. Kruletz v. District Court, 110 Mont. 36, 4 1 , 98 P.2d 883, 885, said: "'The test i s whether on t h e one hand t h e change w i l l make t h e record speak t h e t r u t h as t o what w a s a c t u a l l y determined o r done o r intended t o be determined o r done by t h e c o u r t , o r whether on t h e o t h e r hand, it w i l l a l t e r such a c t i o n o r intended a c t i o n . ' "h%& i n s t a n t c a s e does n o t present such a clear c u t case of s c r i v n e r ' s e r r o r , o r inadvertent ommission; nevertheless, we think t h e problem i s of such a nature t h a t t h e c o u r t rendering t h e decree should take j u r i s d i c t i o n t o resolve t h e issue. Such a r e s o l u t i o n w i l l not change t h e r i g h t s of t h e p a r t i e s a s set f o r t h i n t h e o r i g i n a l decree, r a t h e r it w i l l be a f u r t h e r d e c l a r a t i o n and amplification of what w a s o r i g i n a l l y held. "In 27B C.J.S., Divorce, § 300(4a), it is said: "'The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o r c l a r i f i c a t i o n of an ambiguous judgment does not involve amendment thereof, so t h a t even though power t o modify is lacking, a c o u r t m a y construe and c l a r i f y a decree disposing of property, o r enforce it.' "That application is exactly what i s c a l l e d f o r i n t h e i n s t a n t case." (Emphasis added.) I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t obviously, from t h e findings of f a c t and conclusions of l a w , knew t h e t e n acres granted p l a i n t i f f w a s t h a t t e n a c r e s upon which t h e mobile home i s located. In t h i s instance, t h e p a r t i e s should request t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o supervise t h e d i r e c t i o n t o t h e p a r t i e s t o obtain a metes and bounds d e s c r i p t i o n by survey of t h e property conveyed. The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t refused t o burden p l a i n t i f f with a portion of t h e d e b t a g a i n s t t h e land. Con- sequently, t h e e n t i r e remaining d e b t remains with t h e defendant who received seventy-five percent of t h e real e s t a t e . Again, it i s obvious t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i d n o t abuse its d i s c r e t i o n , such an adjustment i s n o t unreasonable. The judgment and decree of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t is affirmed, with d i r e c t i o n s t o s p e c i f i c a l l y r e q u i r e a mete.s and bounds d e s c r i p t i o n i n a deed conveying t h e r e a l property h e r e i n from defendant t o p l a i n t i f f . / Hon. Arnold Olsen, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g i n p l a c e of M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison. W e concur: J u s t i c e s