Case Title: State v. Gary M. B.

Citation: 2004 WI 33

Docket Number: 2001AP003393-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 33 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-3393-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Gary M.B.,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 72 
Reported at:  261 Wis. 2d 811, 661 N.W.2d 435 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 26, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 7, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Grant   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert P. VanDeHey   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent. 
SYKES, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
T. Christopher Kelly and Kelly & Habermehl, S.C., Madison, and 
oral argument by T. Christopher Kelly. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Jenifer E. Nashold, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2004 WI 33 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-3393-CR  
(L.C. No. 
99 CF 74) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Gary M. B.,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 26, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   Petitioner, Gary M.B. (Gary), 
seeks a review of a published court of appeals decision, State 
v. Gary M.B., 2003 WI App 72, 261 Wis. 2d 811, 661 N.W.2d 435, 
which affirmed his convictions for three counts of first-degree 
sexual assault of a child in Grant County Circuit Court, Robert 
P. VanDeHey, Judge.  
I. 
ISSUES 
¶2 
Two issues are presented for review.  First, Gary 
contends that the circuit court erred in admitting three of his 
five 
prior 
convictions 
for 
impeachment 
purposes 
under 
No. 
01-3393-CR   
 
2 
 
Wis. Stat. § 906.09 (1999-2000).1  In addition, the State raises 
the issue of whether Gary strategically waived his objection to 
the 
admission 
of 
his 
prior 
convictions 
by 
preemptively 
introducing this evidence during his direct examination.  We 
hold that Gary did not strategically waive his objection to the 
introduction of this evidence.  Further, we hold that the 
circuit court did not err in admitting Gary's prior convictions.   
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶3 
On June 23, 1999, the State filed a criminal complaint 
charging Gary with three counts of first-degree sexual assault 
of a child.  The State alleged that Gary had sexual contact with 
a child under the age of 13 during the years 1995, 1996, and 
1997.  The alleged victim was the daughter of Gary's wife.  The 
alleged incidents occurred inside the apartment where all three 
resided.  Many of the alleged incidents occurred when other 
family members were present in the apartment.  The allegations 
arose in 1998, when the victim was residing with her natural 
father, following the death of her mother.  
¶4 
Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion in 
limine, requesting "a hearing be held as to the number of 
convictions or adjudications of delinquencies that would be used 
as to all witnesses and as to the defendant."  Defense counsel 
did not file a memorandum of law relating to Gary's prior 
convictions or those of any other witness.   
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
01-3393-CR   
 
3 
 
¶5 
Gary had previously been convicted of five crimes.  In 
1973 he was convicted of uttering in Maine and received one-year 
probation.  In 1975 he was convicted of disorderly conduct in 
Maine and received a fine.  In 1977 Gary was convicted of 
assault in Maine and received a 30-day suspended jail term and 
probation.  Gary was also convicted of domestic abuse in Iowa 
during 1991 and received a fine.  Finally, Gary had another 
conviction in Iowa during 1991 for domestic abuse with a penalty 
enhancement and received one-year probation. 
¶6 
During the motion in-limine hearing, defense counsel 
objected to the introduction of the three oldest convictions. 
The following colloquy took place: 
Ms. Oliveto:  Your Honor, we ask that the court not 
allow him to testify as to the convictions in the 
1970's since it has been –'73, '75, and '77—since it 
has been quite some time since those had occurred.  I 
don't believe they would go towards truthfulness.  I 
realize Wisconsin law doesn't have it but the federal 
law does.  One is assault and the other disorderly 
conduct, and the bank check happened almost 20 years 
ago.  We ask that the court not allow that to be 
admitted against him. 
Mr. Everix:  The consistent series of '73, '75, and 
'77, twice in '91 make it significant. 
Court:  The law generally in Wisconsin doesn't follow 
the 
federal 
law. 
 
There 
is 
no 
exclusion 
for 
convictions more than 10 years old.  Some of these are 
27 years, 25 years, 23 years.  But to the extent that 
there is I guess a presumption in the statute and the 
statute allows for prior convictions to be brought in 
because it does say something about the person's 
credibility, I will allow it. 
Thus, the court ruled that all five of Gary's prior convictions 
could be used for impeachment purposes.   
No. 
01-3393-CR   
 
4 
 
¶7 
During Gary's direct examination, defense counsel 
asked him if he had ever been convicted of a crime and how many 
times.  Gary answered "yes" and "five times."  The State never 
discussed the issue of Gary's prior criminal record during the 
evidentiary phase of the trial.  There was no physical evidence 
presented at trial regarding the allegations of sexual assault, 
and no witness actually observed the alleged assault.  Simply 
put, this was a "he said, she said" case.   
¶8 
At closing argument, 
during 
rebuttal, 
the 
State 
brought up the issue of Gary's prior convictions as they related 
to his credibility.  The prosecutor cautioned "use it only in 
terms of whether or not he is credible, not in terms of whether 
something else happened."  The circuit court also gave a 
limiting instruction to the jury before deliberation regarding 
Gary's prior convictions.2  After three hours of deliberation, 
the jury informed the court that it was deadlocked.  The court 
then read Jury Instruction 520,3 and 20 minutes later, the jury 
returned a verdict of guilty on all three counts.   
                                                 
2 The court stated:  "Evidence has been received that the 
defendant, [Gary M.B.], has been convicted of crimes.  This 
evidence 
was 
received 
solely 
because 
it 
bears 
upon 
the 
credibility of a defendant as a witness.  It must not be used 
for any other purpose and particularly you should bear in mind 
that a criminal conviction at some previous time is not proof of 
guilt of the offense now charged." 
3 Wis 
JI-Criminal 
520, 
Supplemental 
Instruction 
on 
Agreement, provides: 
You jurors are as competent to decide the 
disputed issues of fact in this case as the next jury 
that may be called to determine such issues. 
No. 
01-3393-CR   
 
5 
 
III. PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶9 
Gary 
appealed, 
arguing 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
improperly admitted three of his five prior convictions.  The 
State argued that Gary had strategically waived any objection 
because 
the 
defense 
preemptively 
introduced 
the 
prior 
convictions.  The court of appeals rejected the State's 
strategic waiver argument, relying on Vanlue v. State, 87 
Wis. 2d 455, 275 N.W.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1978), rev'd on other 
grounds, 96 Wis. 2d 81, 291 N.W.2d 467 (1980).4  Gary M.B., 261 
Wis. 2d 811, ¶¶12-13.  The court reasoned that "a pre-trial 
ruling permitting the introduction of prior conviction evidence 
effectively forces the defendant to introduce the evidence 
preemptively, and the defendant's introduction of the evidence 
should not therefore constitute a waiver of his or her prior 
objection to its admissibility."  Id., ¶18.  In responding to 
the State's argument that the harm to Gary was too speculative 
to be considered on appeal because the State could have chosen 
                                                                                                                                                             
You are not going to be made to agree, nor are 
you going to be kept until you do agree.  It is your 
duty to make an honest and sincere attempt to arrive 
at a verdict.  Jurors should not be obstinate; they 
should be open-minded; they should listen to the 
arguments of others, and talk matters over freely and 
fairly, and make an honest effort to come to a 
conclusion on all of the issues presented to them. 
You will please retire again to the jury room. 
4 In overruling the court of appeals' decision in Vanlue, 
this court did not address the court of appeals' application of 
the strategic waiver doctrine.  Vanlue v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 81, 
96, 291 N.W.2d 467 (1980). 
No. 
01-3393-CR   
 
6 
 
not to introduce the number of prior convictions, the court 
ruled that it made no difference who introduced the evidence 
because "[o]nce the court ruled that all five convictions were 
admissible for impeachment purposes, it was reasonable for Gary 
to assume that the State would elicit the number of his 
convictions on cross-examination."  Id., ¶21.   
¶10 Regarding 
the 
admissibility 
of 
Gary's 
prior 
convictions, the court of appeals held that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in failing to balance the 
probative value of the three oldest convictions to which Gary 
objected against the danger of unfair prejudice.  Id., ¶27.  
Further, the court of appeals declined to independently review 
the record for evidence supporting the circuit court's ruling 
because "there were no evidentiary proceedings []and only very 
brief argument[] on the issue . . .[,]" such that it could not 
conclude that the circuit court would have reached the same 
result if the circuit court had engaged in the balancing test.  
Id.  However, the court of appeals nonetheless affirmed the 
circuit court after utilizing a harmless-error analysis.  Id., 
¶¶28, 40. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. 
Strategic Waiver 
¶11 Under the doctrine of strategic waiver, also known as 
invited error, "[a] defendant cannot create his own error by 
deliberate choice of strategy and then ask to receive benefit 
from that error on appeal."  Vanlue, 87 Wis. 2d at 460-61. Thus, 
whether a defendant has strategically waived an objection is a 
No. 
01-3393-CR   
 
7 
 
question of law subject to de novo review.  See State v. Ruud, 
41 Wis. 2d 720, 726, 165 N.W.2d 153 (1969).  One commentator has 
remarked that Wisconsin's strategic waiver rule:  
prevents a party from counterattacking with otherwise 
inadmissible evidence when he has deliberately chosen 
not to object with the aim of using the otherwise 
inadmissible evidence to his own advantage. . . . The 
flip side of this coin is that a party who does object 
to the use of inadmissible evidence by his opponent 
does not forgo his right to claim error on appeal 
merely because he makes an effort to use the same or 
similar evidence in a defensive fashion after he has 
failed in his effort to exclude the evidence. 
1 
Wigmore, 
Evidence 
§ 15, 
at 
733 
n.3 
(Tiller's 
rev. 
1983)(emphasis in original) (citing Vanlue, 87 Wis. 2d at 460-
62).  Thus, there is a distinction between a party's use of 
objected to evidence for his own benefit and the use of such 
evidence purely for defensive purposes.  Id., § 18, at 836-38 & 
n.37 (citing Vanlue, 87 Wis. 2d at 460-62). 
¶12 In Ruud, 41 Wis. 2d at 723, the defendant argued on 
appeal that certain statements given to police were not preceded 
by an adequate Miranda5 warning.  However, the defense had 
entered into a stipulation with the State regarding the 
admissibility of the statements at trial.  Ruud, 41 Wis. 2d at 
724.  On appeal, the court noted that the defendant had made a 
"knowing 
election 
between 
alternative 
courses 
of 
action.  
Instead of making any attempt to attack the validity of the 
statement the defense, as a matter of strategy, chose to use it 
                                                 
5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
No. 
01-3393-CR   
 
8 
 
to support his theory of the case."  Id. at 726.  In such a 
circumstance, a defendant is estopped from claiming error.  Id.  
¶13 In contrast, in Vanlue, 87 Wis. 2d at 457-58, the 
defendant objected to the circuit court's ruling allowing the 
State to cross-examine him regarding the nature of two previous 
convictions.  After his objection was overruled, the defendant 
introduced evidence relating to the nature of his prior offenses 
during his case-in-chief.  Id. at 460.  The State claimed that 
the defendant had strategically waived his objection because he 
made a knowing election to introduce the evidence in an attempt 
to lessen the prejudice against him.  Id. at 460-61.  In 
rejecting 
the 
State's 
argument, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
distinguished Ruud, id. at 461, and reasoned: 
When the defendant's objection was overruled, the 
evidence was going to be placed before the jury by the 
State.  In order to lessen the prejudicial impact the 
evidence would have on the jury, the defense counsel 
had no choice but to offer the evidence himself.  To 
decide whether to put the damaging evidence in or let 
the State put it in amounted to no election at all.  
There was no way this evidence could be used favorably 
by the defendant.   
Id. at 462.  The court concluded, "[s]ince Vanlue's counsel 
objected . . . it made no difference who placed the evidence 
before the jury. . . . There was no strategic waiver."  Id.  
¶14 Vanlue is directly on point with the present case.  
However, the State argues that we should overrule the court of 
appeals' holding in Vanlue regarding strategic waiver in light 
of Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753 (2000); and State v. 
Frank, 2002 WI App 31, 250 Wis. 2d 95, 640 N.W.2d 198. 
No. 
01-3393-CR   
 
9 
 
¶15 In Ohler, 529 U.S. at 755, the United States Supreme 
Court addressed whether, under federal law, a defendant waives 
her right to challenge an in-limine ruling, allowing the use of 
prior crimes for impeachment purposes, when the defendant 
introduces the evidence during her direct examination.  The 
Court utilized the rule that when a party objects to evidence of 
a certain fact and then introduces evidence of that fact through 
its own witness, the party has waived its objection.  Id.  The 
Court held that when a defendant objects to an in-limine ruling 
and that objection is overruled, the defendant's preemptive 
introduction of the evidence at trial constitutes waiver.  Id. 
at 760.  The court reasoned that because both parties must make 
tough choices at trial, there is nothing unfair about putting a 
party to its choice, and any harm flowing from the in-limine 
ruling 
would 
be 
wholly 
speculative 
after 
the 
defendant 
preemptively introduced the evidence.  Id. at 757-59.   
¶16 In Frank, 250 Wis. 2d 95, ¶¶1-3, a decision subsequent 
to Ohler, the defendant, charged with sexual contact with a 
child under the age of 13, objected to the State's in-limine 
motion to introduce other acts evidence.  The defendant 
thereafter entered into a Wallerman6 stipulation, whereby he 
conceded intent and motive to avoid introduction of the other 
acts evidence.  Id., ¶¶3-6.  On appeal the defendant challenged 
the circuit court's ruling on the in-limine motion.  Id., ¶1.  
                                                 
6 State 
v. 
Wallerman, 
203 
Wis. 2d 158, 
167-68, 
552 
N.W.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1996). 
No. 
01-3393-CR   
 
10 
 
The court of appeals held that the defendant could not challenge 
the in-limine ruling because, due to the Wallerman stipulation, 
the other acts evidence was never introduced.  Id., ¶15.  In so 
holding, the court of appeals relied heavily upon the Court's 
rationale in Ohler that a defendant cannot claim error based on 
a choice made at trial.  Id., ¶¶13-15.  However, the court's 
reliance on Ohler in Frank was not necessary to its holding.  
The court of appeals correctly stated that error cannot be 
assigned to an in-limine ruling when the evidence is never 
introduced at trial.  Frank, 250 Wis. 2d 95, ¶9.   
¶17 This court is not bound to follow Ohler.  As the court 
of appeals noted in the instant case, Wisconsin courts are not 
bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court when 
federal law does not govern the dispute.  Gary M.B., 261 
Wis. 2d 811, ¶11 (citing State v. King, 205 Wis. 2d 81, 93, 555 
N.W.2d 189 (Ct. App. 1996)).  Further, while decisions of the 
Supreme Court interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence may be 
persuasive authority, they are not binding on this court.  State 
v. Blalock, 150 Wis. 2d 688, 702, 442 N.W.2d 514 (Ct. App. 
1989).  Ohler involved a judicial formulation of the strategic 
waiver rule to be used in federal courts; the Court's ruling did 
not involve a question of federal constitutional law or a 
construction of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  The Court's 
formulation of the strategic waiver rule in Ohler is contrary to 
the approach Wisconsin courts have utilized.  Finally, as the 
dissent recognized in Ohler, the majority's holding is against 
No. 
01-3393-CR   
 
11 
 
the great weight of academic authority.  See Ohler, 529 U.S. at 
762-63 (Souter, J., dissenting)(collecting authority). 
¶18 The present case is distinguishable from both Ruud and 
Frank.  Unlike the defendant in Ruud, Gary did object to the use 
of the disputed evidence.  Further, Gary did not introduce the 
evidence himself in order to further his theory of the case.  
Unlike the defendant in Frank, Gary was not successful in 
preventing the jury from hearing the objectionable testimony.  
Gary did nothing more than follow what the court of appeals 
recognized as "'the usual trial strategy of raising the issue of 
defendant's prior convictions on the premise that this approach 
is less damaging than if the prosecutor raises the issue 
first.'"  Gary M.B., 261 Wis. 2d 811, ¶22 (emphasis added, 
quoting State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 631, 369 N.W.2d 711 
(1985)).  Therefore, we conclude that the court of appeals' 
formulation of the strategic waiver doctrine in Vanlue was 
correct and hold that under Wisconsin law, a defendant does not 
commit strategic waiver when he unsuccessfully objects to the 
introduction 
of 
evidence 
and 
preemptively 
introduces 
the 
evidence in an attempt to mitigate its prejudicial effect.   
B. 
Admission of Prior Convictions 
¶19 
It is within the discretion of the circuit court to 
determine whether to admit evidence of prior convictions for 
impeachment purposes under 
Wis. Stat. § 906.09. 
 
State v. 
Kruzycki, 192 Wis. 2d 509, 525, 531 N.W.2d 429 (Ct. App. 1995).  
This court will affirm a circuit court decision to admit 
evidence of prior convictions if the circuit court properly 
No. 
01-3393-CR   
 
12 
 
exercised its discretion, regardless of whether we would have 
made the same ruling.  Id.  In general, "[a] court properly 
exercises its discretion when it correctly applies accepted 
legal standards to the facts of record and uses a rational 
process to reach a reasonable conclusion."  Id.  We conclude 
that although the circuit court did not explicitly set forth its 
reasoning on the record, it implicitly balanced the probative 
value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice and 
thus properly exercised its discretion in admitting the prior 
convictions.  
¶20 Wisconsin Stat. § 906.09 governs the admission of 
prior criminal convictions for the purposes of impeaching a 
witness' character for truthfulness.7  Wisconsin Stat. § 906.09 
provides, in pertinent part: 
(1)  General Rule.  For the purpose of attacking 
the credibility of a witness, evidence that the 
witness has been convicted of a crime or adjudicated 
delinquent is admissible.  The party cross-examining 
the witness is not concluded by the witness's answer. 
(2)  Exclusion.  Evidence of a conviction of a 
crime or an adjudication of delinquency may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
¶21 Under § 906.09, any prior conviction is relevant to a 
witness' 
character 
for 
truthfulness 
because 
Wisconsin law 
                                                 
7 See 7 Daniel D.  Blinka, Wisconsin Practice:  Wisconsin 
Evidence § 609.1, at 415 n.1 (2d ed. 2001) (noting that the rule 
is not directed at credibility but, "[m]ore correctly . . . is 
aimed at credibility through an inference from the witness' 
character for truthfulness"). 
No. 
01-3393-CR   
 
13 
 
presumes that criminals as a class are less truthful than 
persons who have not been convicted of a crime.  Kruzycki, 192 
Wis. 2d at 
524; 
7 
Daniel 
D. 
Blinka, 
Wisconsin 
Practice:  
Wisconsin Evidence § 609.1, at 418 (2d ed. 2001).8  The exclusion 
in 
§ 906.09(2) 
is 
"a 
particularized 
application" 
of 
the 
balancing 
test 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 904.03. 
 
Judicial 
Council 
Committee Note, 1974, § 906.09, Stats.  In considering whether a 
conviction should be excluded under the balancing test, the 
circuit court should consider: 
whether from the lapse of time since the conviction, 
the rehabilitation or pardon of the person convicted, 
the 
gravity 
of 
the 
crime, 
the 
involvement 
of 
dishonesty or false statement in the crime . . . , the 
probative value of the evidence of the crime is 
substantially 
outweighed 
by the 
danger 
of 
undue 
prejudice. 
                                                 
8 See also State v. Smith, 203 Wis. 2d 288, 295, 553 
N.W.2d 824 (Ct. App. 1996). 
No. 
01-3393-CR   
 
14 
 
Judicial Council Committee Note, 1974, § 906.09, Stats.9  See 
also State v. Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 722, 752, 467 N.W.2d 531 
(1991); Kruzycki, 192 Wis. 2d at 525.  Further, when there are 
multiple prior convictions, a circuit court should also consider 
the frequency of the convictions.  See Nicholas v. State, 49 
Wis. 2d 683, 688, 183 N.W.2d 11 (1971)(noting that "the more 
often one has been convicted, the less truthful he is presumed 
to be").10 
                                                 
9 The State suggested that there is some confusion over 
whether these factors are merely elements to be considered in 
determining 
the 
degree 
to 
which 
the 
probative 
value 
is 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or whether the 
balancing test is a separate factor.  In fact, Gary states in 
his brief that the degree to which the probative value is 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice is a fifth factor.  
On the contrary, as the Judicial Council Committee Note makes 
clear, the enumerated factors are elements to be considered 
under this particularized application of the § 904.03 balancing 
test.  "[A] judge should consider whether from [the listed 
factors] the probative value of the evidence of the crime is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice."  
Judicial Council Committee Note, 1974, § 906.09, Stats.  Also, 
in State v. Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 722, 753, 467 N.W.2d 531 (1991), 
the court, after discussing some of the aforementioned factors, 
stated, 
"[n]one 
of 
the 
other 
prejudicial 
factors 
to 
be 
considered apply to this case."  Thus, the listed factors are 
merely 
elements 
to 
be 
considered 
when 
applying 
the 
"particularized application" of the § 904.03 balancing test 
under § 906.09(2).  See State v. Smith, 203 Wis. 2d at 296 
(noting that "[t]hese factors are weighed in a balancing test to 
determine whether the probative value of the prior conviction 
evidence 'is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice'")(quoting Wis. Stat. § 906.09(2) (1993-94)).   
10 Daniel D. Blinka, Evidence of Character, Habit and 
"Similar Acts" in Wisconsin Civil Litigation, 73 Marq. L. Rev. 
283, 292 & n.29 (1989)(citing Nicholas v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 683, 
688, 183 N.W.2d 11 (1971)). 
No. 
01-3393-CR   
 
15 
 
¶22 Gary contends that the court of appeals correctly 
determined that the circuit court failed to exercise its 
discretion in admitting three of his previous convictions 
because it failed to perform the balancing test.  We disagree.  
The first question in reviewing a discretionary determination is 
whether the circuit court applied the correct legal standard.  
As noted by the court in Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d at 750, "[t]he 
Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, as a general rule, permit evidence 
of conviction of a crime to attack the credibility of a 
witness."  Unlike Wis. Stat. § 904.04, which presumes other act 
evidence is inadmissible, subject to certain exceptions, the 
circuit court was correct in stating that § 906.09 presumes that 
evidence of prior convictions is admissible to attack a witness' 
credibility.   
¶23 Further, the circuit court was correct that under 
Wisconsin law, all prior convictions are relevant to a witness' 
character 
for 
truthfulness. 
 
See 
State 
v. 
Smith, 
203 
Wis. 2d 288, 294-95, 553 N.W.2d 824 (Ct. App. 1996).  Under 
Wisconsin law: 
The crimes need not have any relevance to a person's 
character for truthfulness[, and] it is not necessary 
to directly link the nature of the offense with the 
character trait for truthfulness; the link is provided 
by 
the 
fact 
of 
conviction 
[because] 
Wisconsin 
law . . . embodies the idea that persons who have been 
convicted of crimes are as a class less worthy of 
belief than those who have no criminal record. 
7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice:  Wisconsin Evidence 
§ 609.1, at 417-18 (2d ed. 2001).  Finally, the circuit court 
No. 
01-3393-CR   
 
16 
 
was correct that Wisconsin law does not follow the federal rule, 
which bars convictions more than ten years old.  See Judicial 
Council Committee Note, 1974, § 906.09, Stats.  In short, this 
case is not one, such as Smith, 203 Wis. 2d at 296-98, where the 
circuit court misapplied the law. 
¶24 As the circuit court utilized the correct legal 
standards, the next inquiry then is whether the circuit court 
employed a rational process to reach a reasonable conclusion in 
conducting the balancing test.  We note that the trial record is 
admittedly sparse.  The circuit court's decision constitutes no 
more than four sentences.  However, defense counsel's motion in 
limine is equally sparse.  The motion merely asked for a hearing 
to determine the number of prior convictions to be admitted 
against Gary.  The motion did not specifically identify what was 
the danger of unfair prejudice with regard to each conviction 
and why the probative value of the evidence was substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  At the hearing, 
defense counsel objected only on the grounds that three of the 
convictions were old and did not bear on truthfulness.  We 
review the circuit court's determination in light of the actual 
objections defense counsel raised.  See State v. Pharr, 115 
Wis. 2d 334, 347, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983) (noting that "defense 
counsel failed to specify the nature of the unfair prejudice or 
No. 
01-3393-CR   
 
17 
 
to pursue the matter further when the court made its ruling, and 
this contributed to the inadequacy of the record").11  
¶25 While the Kruzycki decision presents an example of a 
proper exercise of discretion under § 906.09, there are few 
published cases that provide guidance as to what constitutes an 
improper exercise of discretion under § 906.09.  However, as the 
exclusion under § 906.09 is a "particularized application" of 
§ 904.03, we may look to decisions involving the latter statute 
for guidance.   
¶26 We begin by noting the circuit court's failure to use 
the words 
"balancing," 
"probative 
value," 
or 
"prejudicial 
effect" is not determinative.   
The fact that the trial court did not expressly state 
the name of sec. 904.03, Stats., or use the words 
"weighing" or "balancing" or some similar word or 
words to describe its analysis, does not mean that the 
court failed to exercise its discretion.  We do not 
recognize such a "magic words" argument.  
State v. Lindh, 161 Wis. 2d 324, 361 n.14, 468 N.W.2d 168 (1991) 
(noting that the court's failure to use these words, at most, 
constitutes a failure to set forth its reasoning).  Further, in 
conducting our analysis, if a circuit court does not explicitly 
engage in balancing on the record, an appellate court can 
nevertheless affirm, if the record indicates that balancing is 
implicit from the circuit court's determination.  See Lindh, 161 
                                                 
11 We note that with regard to another witness, counsel's 
objection to his prior convictions consisted of the following:  
"The '74 one he was under the age of 18.  We recognize the 
Wisconsin law but it has been some time ago."   
No. 
01-3393-CR   
 
18 
 
Wis. 2d at 361 n.14; State v. Rutchik, 116 Wis. 2d 61, 74, 341 
N.W.2d 639 (1984); Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 347; State v. Locke, 
177 Wis. 2d 590, 598-99, 502 N.W.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1993).12 
¶27 Here, defense counsel objected to the three oldest 
convictions on the grounds that they were stale and bore no 
relation to the witness' credibility.  The prosecutor responded, 
"[t]he consistent series of '73, '75, and '77, twice in '91 make 
it significant."  As noted supra, when multiple convictions are 
present, part of the balancing test involves consideration of 
the repetitive nature of the convictions over a period of time.  
While the circuit court did not expressly agree with the 
prosecutor's argument on the record, its decision exhibits 
implicit agreement.  As the court in Lindh noted, when examining 
a circuit court's exercise of discretion, "the appellate court 
should 
conclude 
that 
the 
trial 
court 
relied 
on 
the 
considerations expressed by the prosecutor as grounds for the 
court's ruling, where the court obviously acquiesced in the 
prosecutor's explanation, but did not expressly articulate all 
of its reasoning itself."  Lindh, 161 Wis. 2d at 364.  While 
Gary, in his briefs before this court, makes a lengthy argument 
                                                 
12 Gary argues that such independent review is prohibited 
under Barrera v. State, 99 Wis. 2d 269, 282, 298 N.W.2d 820 
(1980).  Barrera does not stand for this proposition.  In 
Barrera, we concluded that the court of appeals erred in making 
its 
own 
determination 
regarding 
the 
admission 
of 
other 
convictions instead of reviewing the circuit court's exercise of 
discretion.  Id.  The court in Barrera specifically concluded 
that the record in the case before it supported the circuit 
court's determination.  Id. 
No. 
01-3393-CR   
 
19 
 
that his prior convictions do not constitute a "pattern," 
counsel never made this argument to the circuit court during the 
hearing on this matter; nor did he argue that Gary had been 
"rehabilitated" with respect to the three convictions from the 
1970s.13   
¶28 We also note that, contrary to defense counsel's 
statement at trial, Gary's 1973 uttering conviction is a crime 
that does, in fact, involve dishonesty.  While Gary is correct 
that "petty crimes [such as disorderly conduct] seemingly lose 
whatever value they possess in a much shorter period of time[,]" 
7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice:  Wisconsin Evidence 
§ 609.1, at 419 (2d ed. 2001), it is equally true that "[w]here 
the witness has multiple convictions, the gap between the date 
of the testimony and the oldest offense on the record should be 
assessed in light of the intervening crimes, which belie an 
inference that the individual has 'changed.'"  Id.  Thus, Gary's 
1973 
conviction 
for 
uttering, 
which 
bears 
directly 
on 
truthfulness, must also be assessed in light of his subsequent 
1975 disorderly conduct conviction, 1977 assault conviction, and 
two convictions for domestic abuse in 1991.  We therefore 
conclude that the circuit court's decision displays that the 
court adopted the prosecutor's argument that "[t]he consistent 
series of '73, '75, and '77, twice in '91 make it significant." 
                                                 
13 See Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 290, 149 N.W.2d 557 
(1967)(noting that "[t]his court has not looked with favor upon 
claims of prejudicial error based upon the trial court's failure 
to act when no action was requested by counsel"). 
No. 
01-3393-CR   
 
20 
 
¶29 Moreover, even if the circuit court did not expressly 
state on the record that it considered the possible danger of 
unfair prejudice, the fact that the court gave a limiting 
instruction "can reveal that the trial court considered the 
possibly prejudicial nature of such evidence and was seeking to 
ensure that it was properly utilized by the jury in reaching its 
verdict."  State v. Johnson, 121 Wis. 2d 237, 253-54, 358 
N.W.2d 824 (Ct. App. 1984)(finding the circuit court's use of a 
limiting instruction was sufficient to conclude that the circuit 
court had implicitly performed the § 904.03 balancing test).  
See also Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 348 (noting that the use of a 
cautionary instruction demonstrates "that the trial court had 
considered the possibly prejudicial nature of [such] evidence 
and was seeking to ensure that the evidence was used properly by 
the jury in reaching its verdict").  The circuit court in the 
instant case did, in fact, issue a limiting instruction to the 
jury regarding the evidence of prior convictions.14  Thus, we can 
conclude that in admitting the evidence, the circuit court 
considered the danger of unfair prejudice of the evidence.  
Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court, considering the 
                                                 
14 The court specifically stated:  "[The evidence of prior 
convictions] must not be used for any other purpose and 
particularly you should bear in mind that a criminal conviction 
at some previous time is not proof of guilt of the offense now 
charged."  (Emphasis added.)  One commentator has noted that 
"[i]t would appear that the 'unfair prejudice' specified in the 
rule refers to the danger that the jury might use the 
evidence . . . .[to] conclude that the defendant is guilty 
because he is a 'criminal.'"  7 Daniel Blinka, Wisconsin 
Practice:  Wisconsin Evidence § 609.1, at 418 (2d ed. 2001). 
No. 
01-3393-CR   
 
21 
 
two factors objected to by the defendant, implicitly balanced 
the probative value of the convictions against the danger of 
unfair prejudice. 
¶30 While there is no evidence that the circuit court 
considered the other factors that defense counsel did not 
mention, we will not find error predicated upon the circuit 
court's failure to address factors not brought to its attention 
by defense counsel.  The court in Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d at 753, 
stated that in conducting the § 906.09 balancing test, the 
circuit court need not consider factors that do not apply to the 
case.15  As noted supra, § 906.09 presumes evidence of prior 
convictions is admissible, and it is not necessary to link the 
crime to the witness' character trait for truthfulness.  Thus, 
the onus is on defense counsel to articulate the relevant 
balancing test factors and discuss why the probative value of 
the particular convictions is substantially outweighed by the 
danger 
of 
unfair 
prejudice. 
 
See 
Whitty 
v. 
State, 
34 
Wis. 2d 278, 290, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967)(noting that "[t]he 
primary duty of trying a lawsuit is upon trial counsel, not the 
trial judge").  Here, the circuit court did consider the factors 
articulated by defense counsel.   
                                                 
15 In the context of § 904.03, courts have repeatedly stated 
that a circuit court need not engage in balancing when defense 
counsel does not raise the objection or specifically request the 
court to engage in balancing.  See, e.g., McClelland v. State, 
84 Wis. 2d 145, 157-58, 267 N.W.2d 843 (1978); State v. Gollon, 
115 Wis. 2d 592, 604-05, 340 N.W.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1983)(citing 
Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 294-95, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967)).  
No. 
01-3393-CR   
 
22 
 
¶31 Both of the dissents in their harmless error analyses 
provide an accurate summary of why the admission of Gary's five 
prior convictions was prejudicial to his case.  However, before 
"prejudice" can be considered in the context of a harmless error 
analysis, the circuit court must first be found to have erred in 
admitting the evidence.  To that extent, prior convictions 
cannot be excluded merely because they are prejudicial; rather, 
their probative value must be "substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice,"  Wis. Stat. § 906.09(2).  As noted 
supra, the exclusion in § 906.09(2) is "a particularized 
application" of the balancing test in § 904.03.  As this court 
has previously stated in the context of § 904.03:  
Unfair 
prejudice 
results 
when 
the 
proffered 
evidence has a tendency to influence the outcome by 
improper means or if it appeals to the jury's 
sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its 
instinct to punish or otherwise causes a jury to base 
its decision on something other than the established 
propositions in the case.  
State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 789-90, 576 N.W.2d 30 
(1998).  
¶32 Neither dissent has explained how allowing Gary to 
state he had five prior convictions rather than two unfairly 
prejudiced his case or how that unfair prejudice substantially 
outweighed the probative value of the extra convictions, such 
that the failure to exclude these three convictions would 
constitute error in the first instance.  Here, the jury was not 
provided with any additional information regarding Gary's prior 
convictions; they were not told the nature of his crimes or even 
No. 
01-3393-CR   
 
23 
 
when they occurred.  Unlike gruesome photos from the scene of a 
crime, a witness stating the number five cannot possibly arouse 
the jury's sense of horror, provoke its instinct to punish, or 
appeal to its sympathies.  The only "unfair prejudice" that 
could arguably result is that the jury may conclude the 
defendant is guilty because he is a "criminal."  See 7 Daniel 
Blinka, Wisconsin Practice:  Wisconsin Evidence § 609.1, at 418 
(2d ed. 2001).   
¶33 However, while the prosecutor in closing argument did 
stress Gary's prior convictions in relation to his credibility, 
he specifically told the jury that the prior convictions could 
be used only to assess Gary's credibility.  More importantly, 
the circuit court gave a precise limiting instruction cautioning 
the jury that Gary's prior convictions could be used only to 
assess his credibility and could not be used to determine he 
committed the charged offenses.  When a circuit court gives a 
proper cautionary instruction, appellate courts presume that the 
jury followed that instruction and acted in accordance with the 
law.  State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 507, 451 N.W.2d 752 
(1990); 
State 
v. 
Pitsch, 
124 
Wis. 2d 628, 
644 
n.8, 
369 
N.W.2d 711 (1985); State v. Leach, 124 Wis. 2d 648, 673, 370 
N.W.2d 240 (1985); State v. Adams, 221 Wis. 2d 1, 12-13, 584 
N.W.2d 695 (Ct. App. 1998).   
¶34 As noted supra, the trial in this case was essentially 
a swearing contest, pitting the credibility of Gary against that 
of the victim.  It is the duty of the jury to determine a 
witness' credibility.  Wis JI-Criminal 300.  The jury was 
No. 
01-3393-CR   
 
24 
 
entitled to consider Gary's prior convictions when assessing his 
character for truthfulness and to find him less credible because 
of those convictions.  That is the entire point of allowing 
prior convictions to be admitted.  In light of the circuit 
court's limiting instruction, which prevented the jury from 
utilizing the prior convictions for an impermissible purpose, 
and despite the circuit court's failure to explicitly engage in 
balancing on the record, we cannot say that allowing Gary to 
testify that he had five prior convictions rather than two 
unfairly prejudiced his case such that the circuit court erred 
in admitting the convictions.  
¶35 Having reviewed the record in light of defense 
counsel's objections, the prosecutor's response, and the court's 
use of a limiting instruction, we hold that the circuit court 
did not erroneously exercise its discretion in admitting Gary's 
three oldest prior convictions because the circuit court 
implicitly balanced the probative value of this evidence against 
the danger of unfair prejudice.  We note that in the future, it 
would be prudent for circuit courts to explicitly set forth 
their reasoning in ruling on § 906.09(2) matters in order to 
demonstrate that they considered the relevant balancing factors 
applicable in the case before them.  Nonetheless, the record 
before us contains enough evidence that the circuit court 
implicitly 
balanced 
the 
probative 
value 
of 
Gary's 
prior 
convictions against the danger of unfair prejudice such that we 
cannot 
say 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion in admitting the convictions.  Although the court of 
No. 
01-3393-CR   
 
25 
 
appeals concluded that error had occurred, it ultimately 
concluded 
that 
the 
error 
was 
harmless. 
Gary 
M.B., 
261 
Wis. 2d 811, ¶¶27, 40.  Thus, with regard to the issue of Gary's 
prior convictions, we affirm the court of appeals, although on a 
different basis.  
V. 
SUMMARY 
¶36 
We hold that under Wisconsin's formulation of the 
strategic waiver doctrine, Gary did not strategically waive his 
objection to the introduction of evidence regarding his prior 
convictions simply because he preemptively introduced this 
evidence after losing his objection.  Further, we hold that the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
admitting Gary's three oldest prior convictions for impeachment 
purposes because we conclude that the circuit court implicitly 
balanced the probative value of the evidence against the danger 
of unfair prejudice. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  01-3393.npc 
 
1 
 
 
¶37 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority opinion that the court of appeals' decision to 
uphold the conviction of Gary M.B should be affirmed.  However, 
I write to express my opinion that this case is more 
appropriately decided under a harmless error analysis.   
 
¶38 The majority uses a balancing test to determine if the 
circuit court erred in allowing Gary M.B.’s three older 
convictions to be admitted into evidence, along with two more 
recent ones.  See majority op., ¶19.  The majority concludes 
that in admitting the evidence, the circuit court correctly 
considered 
the 
frequency 
of 
Gary’s 
convictions 
and 
the 
possibility that admitting the evidence would cause unfair 
prejudice, which would substantially outweigh the probative 
value.  See Majority op., ¶31.  Additionally, the majority 
reasons that the burden is on the defense counsel to state the 
relevant factors of the balancing test and discuss why these 
factors would cause such unfair prejudice.  See majority op., 
¶30.  The majority also contends that error will not be 
predicated upon the circuit court’s failure to consider factors 
not brought to its attention by the defense counsel.  Id. 
¶39 Under a harmless error analysis, an "error is harmless 
if it is 'clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury 
would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.'"  State 
v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶¶49, 51, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 
(quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)).  While 
a reviewing court may initially focus on the error itself when 
No.  01-3393.npc 
 
2 
 
conducting a harmless error analysis, the error should be 
evaluated in the context of the entire circumstances that are 
present.  State v. Tucker, 2003 WI 12, ¶26, 259 Wis. 2d 484, 657 
N.W.2d 374.  Thus, an error that has some probative value, but 
is not a significant part of the case, may be deemed harmless.  
See State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶31, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 
N.W.2d 485.   
¶40 Applying a harmless error analysis to the case at 
hand, it is evident that any error in admitting evidence of Gary 
M.B.’s five prior convictions, as opposed to the two defense 
counsel argued for, was not outcome determinative.   In its 
opinion in this case, the court of appeals stated, "once a jury 
is apprised of a witness’s past criminal conduct, evidence of 
the exact number of the witness’s prior convictions will rarely 
be outcome determinative."  State v. Gary M.B., 2003 WI App 72, 
¶34, 261 Wis. 2d 811, ¶34.  I agree with that court's analysis.  
Gary’s credibility would have been questioned by the jury based 
on these two convictions alone.  The jurors would have doubted 
Gary’s credibility, based on his prior criminal history and 
would have reached the same verdict.  The difference between two 
convictions and five is not significant enough to have affected 
the jury’s verdict.  State v. Bowie, 92 Wis. 2d 192, 204-06, 284 
N.W.2d 613 (1979).   
¶41 In Bowie, we stated that the jury is not given special 
instructions to consider the number of convictions.  Id. at 205. 
In the case at hand, the State rarely made mention of the fact 
that Gary had five prior convictions.  This suggests that the 
No.  01-3393.npc 
 
3 
 
exact number of convictions played an insignificant role in the 
State's case.  I agree with the court of appeals that the 
circuit court’s cautionary instruction to the jury focused the 
jurors' attention on Gary’s past criminal conduct, not the exact 
number of convictions.  Gary M.B., 261 Wis. 2d 811, ¶34.  The 
majority spends a good deal of time articulating a balancing 
test that it claims the circuit judge implicitly applied in this 
case.  
A harmless error 
analysis 
provides 
a 
much 
more 
straightforward, and in my opinion more persuasive, framework 
and would yield the same result. 
¶42 In this case, while not conceding that there was 
error, consistent with the harmless error rule enunciated in the 
Neder and Harvey decisions, "it is clear beyond a reasonable 
doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty 
absent the error" alleged.  State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶¶ 49, 
51, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189. 
¶43 For the foregoing reasons I respectfully concur. 
 
 
No.  01-3393-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶44 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
with the majority opinion that Gary M.B. did not strategically 
waive 
his 
objection 
to 
the 
introduction 
of 
his 
prior 
convictions.16  I also agree that the circuit court has the 
discretion to determine whether to admit evidence of prior 
convictions for impeachment purposes under Wis. Stat. § 906.09.17  
After that, the majority opinion and I part ways.  
¶45 Three 
justices 
(Justices 
Wilcox, 
Prosser, 
and 
Roggensack) join the lead opinion, concluding that this case 
does not involve an erroneous exercise of discretion.  The 
concurring justice (Justice Crooks) takes no position on whether 
there was error, but concludes that if there were error it was 
harmless.  Three justices (Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justices 
                                                 
16 Majority op., ¶18.   
The majority opinion appears to characterize the court of 
appeals decision in Vanlue as persuasive.  See majority op., 
¶13-14.  The court of appeals in the present case viewed its 
decision in Vanlue as precedential and binding because this 
court on review of Vanlue did not address the court of appeals' 
application of the strategic waiver doctrine.  Vanlue v. State, 
87 Wis. 2d 455, 275 N.W.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1978), rev'd on other 
grounds, 96 Wis. 2d 81, 291 N.W.2d 467 (1980).     
While the court of appeals apparently treats all or parts 
of its decisions as precedential even after this court has 
reviewed them, the question of the precedential value of a court 
of appeals decision that has been reviewed by this court has not 
been decided by this court.  My own view at this time is that 
when this court reviews a decision of the court of appeals, the 
court of appeals decision no longer has precedential value.   
17 Majority op., ¶19. 
No.  01-3393-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
Bradley and Sykes) conclude that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion and that the error was prejudicial.   
¶46 I 
disagree 
with 
the 
majority 
opinion 
and 
the 
concurring opinion for two reasons:  First, the majority opinion 
eviscerates the notion that a circuit court's exercise of 
discretion 
requires 
a 
meaningful 
process 
of 
reasoning 
demonstrated on the record and drastically expands the scope of 
the independent appellate review doctrine beyond what has been 
previously recognized in this state.  Second, the concurring 
opinion's conclusion that any error in this case was harmless 
ignores the relevant standard for evaluating harmless error 
claims and eviscerates this court's formulation of the "counting 
rule" for admitting prior convictions as evidence at trial. 
I 
¶47 I conclude that in this case the circuit court judge 
did not properly exercise discretion in admitting the three 
prior convictions.  This court has frequently explained that 
"[a] 
discretionary 
determination, 
to 
be 
sustained, 
must 
demonstrably be made and based upon the facts appearing in the 
record and in reliance on the appropriate and applicable law.  
Additionally, 
and 
most 
importantly, 
a 
discretionary 
determination must be the product of a rational mental process 
by which the facts of record and law relied upon are stated and 
are considered together for the purposes of achieving a reasoned 
and reasonable determination."18  
                                                 
18 Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 
(1981). 
No.  01-3393-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶48 The purposes of requiring a circuit court to perform 
this process on the record are many.  The process increases the 
probability that a circuit court will reach the correct result, 
provides appellate courts with a more meaningful record to 
review, 
provides 
the 
parties 
with 
a 
decision 
that 
is 
comprehensible, 
and 
increases 
the 
transparency 
and 
accountability of the judicial system. 
¶49 That said, I recognize that no record is perfect, 
however diligent circuit courts may be in their efforts to 
explain their decisions.  Circuit courts will sometimes fail to 
explain their decisions fully, not because of incompetence or 
carelessness, but because the requirements of circuit court 
judges are boundless and the resources available to meet those 
demands are few. 
¶50 Recognizing these facts, appellate courts can provide 
assistance 
to 
circuit 
courts. 
 
An 
appellate 
court 
may 
independently review a record and uphold a circuit court's 
exercise of discretion where at least the foundation of an 
explanation have been laid, even if the circuit court has not 
stated all of the facts, stated all of the law, and fully 
demonstrated the rational mental process to connect the two. 
¶51 In this case, however, the foundation is missing.  The 
majority opinion exercises its discretion when the circuit court 
has failed to do so as the law requires.  After this decision, I 
am concerned that the exercise of discretion no longer requires 
a "rational mental process," no longer requires that the facts 
and law relied upon be "stated," and no longer requires that a 
No.  01-3393-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
"reasonable determination" be made on the record by a circuit 
court.  Instead this court acts as both the initial decision 
maker and reviewing court.  
¶52 I turn now to examine the facts of this case and the 
circuit court's decision to admit the evidence in question. 
¶53 The State sought to introduce five prior convictions 
of the defendant, which are as follows: 
• 1973 State of Maine. Uttering or insufficient 
funds; suspended sentence; 1 year probation. 
• 1975 State of Maine.  Disorderly conduct; fine. 
• 1977 State of Maine. Assault; 30 days jail 
suspended, probation. 
• 1991 State of Iowa.  Assault, domestic; fine. 
• 1991 State of Iowa.  Domestic abuse; 2 days jail 
suspended, one year probation. 
¶54 I begin by reprinting the transcript of the motion in 
limine held between the circuit court and counsel regarding the 
admission of the defendant's five prior convictions: 
COURT:  There was a discussion about witnesses with 
prior convictions.  Mr. Everix. 
MR. EVERIX:  Mr. Bassett's record in Main[e] and in 
the 
State 
of 
Iowa, 
in 
1973 
was 
uttering 
or 
insufficient funds.  It says suspended, one year 
probation, in the District Court for Bath, Main[e].  
In September of '75, disorderly conduct.  Paid a fine 
through the District Court of Augusta, Maine.  1977, 
assault, 
30 
days 
in 
jail, 
suspended 
probation, 
Lewiston, Maine; and also a record out of the State of 
Iowa I believe in——I think it was in 1991, domestic 
disorderly conduct, and in the same year there was an 
enhancer for domestic disorderly conduct.  I'm trying 
to find that teletype. 
No.  01-3393-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
February 23 of '91, domestic abuse, assault——
charge was assault, domestic abuse.  Sentenced on 
March 4 of '91, guilty, and paid a fine at that time; 
and on October 24 of '91 also found guilty of domestic 
abuse with a penalty enhancement, two days, suspended, 
one year probation with assault class.  So I believe 
that there are five convictions during an extended 
period of time. 
MS. OLIVETO:  Your Honor, we ask that the court not 
allow him to testify as to the convictions in the 
1970's since it has been——'73,'75, and '77——since it 
has been quite some time since those had occurred.  I 
don't believe they would go towards truthfulness.  I 
realize Wisconsin law doesn't have it but the federal 
law does.  One is assault and the other disorderly 
conduct, and the bank check happened almost 20 years 
ago.  We ask that the court not allow that to be 
admitted against him. 
MR. EVERIX:  The consistent series of '73, '75, and 
'77, twice in '91 make it significant. 
COURT:  The law generally in Wisconsin doesn't follow 
the 
federal 
law. 
 
There 
is 
no 
exclusion 
for 
convictions more than 10 years old.  Some of these are 
27 years, 25 years, 23 years.  But to the extent that 
there is I guess a presumption in the statute and the 
statute allows for prior convictions to be brought in 
because it does say something about the person's 
credibility, I will allow it. 
¶55 This concluding paragraph presents the only analysis 
of the circuit court in deciding to admit the three contested 
convictions.  Of the four sentences the judge articulated on the 
subject, the first two sentences merely reiterate that Wisconsin 
law differs from federal law in that there is no bar on the 
admission of convictions more than 10 years old.  The third 
sentence simply states the number of years that had elapsed 
since the defendant had been convicted of those offenses.  Thus, 
it is the concluding sentence of the circuit court judge on this 
issue that sets forth the sole reasoning behind the admission of 
No.  01-3393-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
the convictions.  It is this sentence, therefore, that should 
guide the court in determining whether the circuit court 
properly exercised its discretion in admitting the prior 
convictions. 
¶56 I agree with the majority opinion that even though all 
prior convictions are relevant under Wisconsin law because the 
convictions speak to a witness's truthfulness,19 circuit courts 
are nevertheless required, in determining whether to admit or 
exclude prior convictions, to examine a number of factors, 
including: 
the 
lapse 
of 
time 
since 
the 
conviction, 
the 
rehabilitation or pardon of the person convicted, the gravity of 
the crime, and the degree to which the crime involved dishonesty 
or false statements.20  A circuit court is also required under 
Wis. Stat. § 906.09(2) to determine whether the value of the 
evidence of a prior conviction is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of undue prejudice. 
¶57 The issue on appeal is whether the circuit court 
exercised its discretion in accordance with the accepted legal 
standards and in accordance with the facts of record.  
¶58 The majority opinion quotes and cites these rules, but 
speaks louder with its actions than with its words.  The 
majority opinion minimizes the import of a circuit court's 
                                                 
19 Majority op., ¶23. 
20 These factors, initially set forth in the Judicial 
Council's Note accompanying Chapter 906, have long been relied 
on by courts in this state.  See, e.g., State v. Kuntz, 160 
Wis. 2d 722, 467 N.W.2d 531 (1991). 
No.  01-3393-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
obligation to consider the factors and engage in balancing in a 
number of ways.     
¶59 First, the majority opinion tries to shift the inquiry 
from the actions (or inaction) of the circuit court to the 
actions of defense counsel and the alleged sparseness of her 
motion in limine.21   
In support of this proposition, the 
majority opinion cites State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 340 
N.W.2d 498 (1983).  The Pharr court did not base its holding on 
defense counsel's failures.  Rather, the court concluded that 
the record implicitly supported the circuit court court's 
exercise of discretion.22  
¶60 Furthermore, in the present case defense counsel 
properly specified the nature of the prejudice.  Of the four 
factors to be considered in evaluating the prejudicial effect of 
introducing a prior conviction, defense counsel articulated two 
of them: the lapse of time since the oldest three convictions 
and the lack of involvement of dishonesty or false statement in 
                                                 
21 Majority op., ¶24. 
22 State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983), 
is significantly different from the case at bar.  In Pharr, the 
circuit court individually evaluated two pieces of other crimes 
evidence and admitted one while excluding the other.  No such 
process occurred in this case.  The accused sought to exclude 
three prior convictions from being introduced at trial.  The 
circuit court summarily responded to all three convictions 
without individually evaluating them.  The implicit exercise of 
discretion present in Pharr did not occur in this case. 
No.  01-3393-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
the crimes.23  Defense counsel was not remiss in her obligation 
to articulate the nature of the prejudice in this case.24 
¶61 Second, the majority opinion minimizes the importance 
of a circuit court's responsibility to consider the relevant 
balancing 
factors. 
 
The 
majority 
opinion 
converts 
the 
requirement that circuit courts "should consider" these factors 
to the requirement that circuit courts "may consider" these 
factors. 
¶62 Third, the majority opinion effectively neutralizes 
the need for circuit courts to exercise discretion by finding 
that the circuit court engaged in "implicit balancing" in this 
case.  The majority opinion asserts that a circuit court need 
not invoke the "magic words" in order to demonstrate an exercise 
                                                 
23 The majority opinion correctly points out that the 1973 
conviction for uttering is a crime that involves dishonesty.  I 
agree that this very old conviction may have been admitted had 
the circuit court performed the proper analysis.  However, since 
the circuit court did not distinguish between the three crimes 
in its brief analysis, this court is not in the position, as I 
discuss below, to make post hoc rationalizations as to why the 
circuit court did what it did. 
24 The majority opinion asserts that the defendant failed to 
respond to the prosecution's argument that the three convictions 
in the 1970s plus the two convictions in 1991 constituted a 
pattern and cites Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 290, 149 
N.W.2d 557 (1967) for the proposition that this court is 
unlikely to find prejudicial error when "no action was requested 
by counsel."  Whitty is inapposite, however.  In that case, the 
defendant complained that the circuit court erred in failing to 
instruct the jury to disregard certain foundation testimony sua 
sponte.  Defendant's counsel failed to make any motion to so 
instruct the jury in that case.  In the present case, defense 
counsel's motion did provide a sufficient trigger for the 
circuit court to engage in the balancing and consider the 
factors in making its determination. 
No.  01-3393-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
of discretion.25  I agree.  That the circuit court failed to use 
words like "weighing" and "balancing" is not dispositive. 
¶63 Nevertheless, the record must demonstrate that the 
circuit court gave some consideration to the relevant factors.  
When the record shows that the circuit court did not consider 
the relevant factors, this court should not construct a record.  
¶64 In this case, we have only the circuit court's one 
sentence: "But to the extent that there is I guess a presumption 
in the statute and the statute allows for prior convictions to 
be brought in because it does say something about the person's 
credibility, I will allow it."  The circuit court never 
acknowledged any legal standard beyond the presumption of 
admissibility.  
¶65 The majority opinion bolsters the paucity of the 
circuit court's explanation by noting that the district attorney 
prompted: "The consistent series of '73, '75, and '77, twice in 
'91, make it significant."  Even if the majority opinion is 
correct that an appellate court could conclude that a circuit 
court adopted the reasoning expressed by the prosecutor,26 the 
circuit court did not expressly agree with the prosecutor's 
arguments, and the district attorney's argument in this case 
provides precious little additional traction for the circuit 
court judge's thought processes. 
¶66 Fourth, the majority opinion relies on the concept of 
"implicit balancing."  I find it difficult to distinguish 
                                                 
25 Majority op., ¶26. 
26 Id., ¶27. 
No.  01-3393-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
between implicit balancing and independent appellate review.  
Under the independent appellate review doctrine, when a circuit 
court "fails to set forth its reasoning in exercising its 
discretion to admit evidence, the appellate court should 
independently review the record to determine whether it provides 
a basis for the [circuit] court's exercise of discretion."27    
None of the cases cited by the majority opinion required an 
appellate 
court 
to 
engage 
in 
the 
extensive 
post 
hoc 
reconstruction that the majority opinion engages in to find an 
appropriate exercise of discretion in this case.     
 
¶67 Fifth, the majority opinion's reasoning that the 
circuit court's issuance of the limiting instruction in this 
case demonstrated the exercise of discretion is unpersuasive.  
Although the court of appeals apparently found this argument 
persuasive in State v. Johnson, 121 Wis. 2d 237, 253-54, 358 
N.W.2d 824 (Ct. App. 1984), I do not.  A limiting instruction 
merely serves to exercise a check on how the jury uses a 
particular piece of evidence.  It demonstrates a conclusion of 
the circuit court to admit the evidence, not the circuit court's 
reasoning why the evidence is admissible. 
 
¶68 The majority opinion admonishes circuit courts that in 
the future "it would be prudent for circuit courts to explicitly 
set forth their reasoning in ruling on § 906.09(2) matters in 
order to demonstrate that they considered the relevant balancing 
factors applicable in the case before them."28  As a practical 
                                                 
27 Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 343. 
28 Majority op., ¶31. 
No.  01-3393-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
matter, such a warning is futile because this case demonstrates 
that this court will consider the relevant balancing factors 
itself. 
 
¶69 I conclude that the circuit court erred in failing to 
exercise its discretion in admitting the prior convictions.  The 
presumption that prior convictions are relevant to the issue of 
a witness's credibility is a correct statement of law, but the 
circuit court did not consider the relevant factors and did not 
weigh the probative value of the three oldest convictions 
against the danger of unfair prejudice.  I agree with the court 
of appeals that because there were no evidentiary proceedings 
and only very brief argument, the record provides no basis for 
me or this court to conclude that had the circuit court applied 
the correct legal standard, it would have reached the same 
result.  
II 
¶70 I turn to whether the error in admitting evidence of 
the three oldest convictions was harmless.  I must first state 
the facts.  I agree with the majority opinion that this was a 
"he said, she said" case.  There was no physical evidence and no 
witnesses to the crime.29  The case turns on the credibility of 
the accused and the defendant. The defendant's case relied 
heavily on impeaching the credibility of the accuser, while the 
State focused on challenging the credibility of the defendant, 
primarily through his prior convictions. The State made the 
                                                 
29 Id., ¶7. 
No.  01-3393-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
defendant's 
prior 
convictions 
an 
integral 
part 
of 
the 
credibility issue. 
¶71 Evidence of this strategy is apparent in the State's 
brief 
closing 
argument, 
which 
raised 
the 
issue 
of 
the 
defendant's credibility three separate times and discussed his 
prior convictions twice: 
The defense is [sic] basically put into issue, the 
entire issue, of credibility; and the credibility of 
Dessa versus the credibility of the defendant who 
testified in this case . . . . First of all, you have 
to look in terms of everybody's credibility, including 
that 
of 
the 
defendant. 
 
You 
can 
take 
into 
consideration his interest, who has the ultimate 
interest to gain by a finding of not guilty.  He does. 
He 
has 
the 
absolute 
ultimate 
greater 
interest.  
Because of that you can take into consideration the 
fact that he had five prior convictions.  Use it only 
in terms of whether or not he is credible, not in 
terms of whether something else happened.  It goes 
toward his credibility. 
. . . . 
But let's look at the credibility issue again.  When 
you take into consideration, and the Judge will give 
you the various categories and things that you can 
consider, it includes the witness Gary [B.] as it does 
any other witness who testified in this trial, the 
position to know, their ability to recollect, bias, 
prejudice, if any is shown, and as I say the ultimate 
interest in this case comes from Gary [B].  He does 
not want 12 of you to go back there and say guilty. 
. . . .  
But you can look at credibility as well.  He said that 
it didn't happen.  But look at his prior record and 
look at his interest in the outcome of this case and 
he has the ultimate interest.30 
                                                 
30 R. 18 at 73, 76, 87 (Transcript of Jury Trial, Sept. 20, 
2000) (emphasis added). 
No.  01-3393-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶72 Although the court has stated the harmless error test 
a number of ways, the court generally applies the Chapman test,31 
namely that an error is not harmless if it "contributed to the 
outcome of the trial."32  An error is not harmless when it 
appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of 
"contributed to the verdict obtained."33  The harmless error test 
does not ask whether there is evidence in the record, apart from 
erroneously admitted evidence, that could support a conviction. 
The focus of the Chapman test is on whether the error might 
reasonably have contributed to the conviction.  In other words 
the question is whether the defendant's testifying to five prior 
convictions instead of only two prior convictions contributed to 
the jury's verdict. 
¶73 The court has posited several guidelines for assessing 
whether an error was harmless, including but not limited to the 
nature of the error, the frequency of the error, the nature of 
the state's case, the nature of the defense, the importance of 
                                                 
31 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
32 State v. Vanmanivong, 2003 WI 41, ¶43, 261 Wis. 2d 202, 
661 N.W.2d 76.  
33 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24;  State v. Carlson, 2003 WI 40, 
¶85, 261 Wis. 2d 97, 661 N.W.2d 51 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
The State concludes that "the test for harmless error 
articulated in [State v. 
Harvey, 
2002 WI 
93, 
¶46, 254 
Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189] is not substantively different from 
the court's prior articulation of the test, i.e., 'whether there 
is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the 
conviction. 
 
A 
reasonable 
possibility 
is 
a 
possibility 
sufficient to undermine our confidence in the conviction.'  
State v. Williams, 2002 WI 58, 253 Wis. 2d  99, ¶50, 644 
N.W.2d 919."  Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 20. 
No.  01-3393-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
the 
erroneously 
admitted 
or 
excluded 
evidence 
to 
the 
prosecution's or defense's case, the presence or absence of 
evidence corroborating or contradicting the erroneously admitted 
or excluded evidence, whether the erroneously admitted evidence 
duplicates the untainted evidence, and the overall strength of 
the prosecution's case.34  
¶74 Considering the nature of the error, the nature of the 
state's case, the nature of the defense, the importance of the 
erroneously admitted evidence to the prosecution and defense, 
and the overall strength of the prosecution's case, I conclude 
that the error was not harmless.  
¶75 I part with the court of appeals and the concurring 
opinion on whether the error in admitting five prior convictions 
instead of two was, in their words, "outcome determinative."35 
They take the position that once a jury is apprised of a 
witness's past criminal convictions, evidence of the exact 
number of prior convictions is rarely "outcome determinative."36  
I conclude that the error contributed to the verdict.   
¶76 The reason for allowing the jury to hear the number of 
convictions that a defendant has had without an explanation of 
what those offenses were is based on the notion that the number 
                                                 
34 State v. Norman, 2003 WI 72, ¶48, 262 Wis. 2d 506, 664 
N.W.2d 97; State v. Billings, 110 Wis. 2d 661, 668-70, 329 
N.W.2d 192 (1983). 
35 See State v. Gary M.B., 2003 WI App 72, ¶34, 261 
Wis. 2d 811, 661 N.W.2d 435; concurring op., ¶40.  
36 Id. 
No.  01-3393-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
of convictions speaks to the credibility of the witness.37  "The 
assumption is that the longer the criminal record, the less 
credible the individual."38 
¶77 In Wisconsin, we have codified this "counting rule."  
The rule provides as follows: 
All prior criminal convictions, regardless of their 
nature, are potential fodder for the counting rule.  
Misdemeanors "count" as heavily as felonies.  The 
crimes need not have any relevance to a person's 
character for truthfulness.  The rule assumes that the 
longer the criminal record, the less credible the 
individual.39 
¶78 In Wisconsin, we have concluded as a matter of law 
that the number of convictions, regardless of their type, is 
highly relevant to a witness' character for truthfulness.  I 
agree with the defendant that 
[t]here 
is 
a 
logical 
disconnect 
between 
the 
presumption that a person who has five convictions is 
less credible that a person who has only been 
convicted twice, and the court of appeals' holding 
that 
the 
incremental 
difference 
between 
two 
convictions and five convictions is too insignificant 
to 
have 
swayed 
the 
jury's 
assessment 
of 
[the 
defendant's] credibility."40   
                                                 
37 State v. Midell, 39 Wis. 2d 733, 738-39, 159 N.W.2d 614 
(1968). 
38 State v. Smith, 203 Wis. 2d 288, 297-98, 553 N.W.2d 824 
(Ct. App. 1996) (quoting 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: 
Evidence § 609.1 at 311 (1991)). 
39 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Evidence, § 609.1 
at 417 (2d ed. 2001); State v. Smith, 203 Wis. 2d 288, 297, 553 
N.W.2d 824 (Ct. App. 1996). 
40 Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 
25. 
No.  01-3393-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
I agree with Judge Dykman's dissent that "[t]o say that it 
doesn't matter whether a defendant answers [regarding his 
convictions] 'once,' 'nine times,' or '57 times' does not 
comport with the way ordinary people think."41  
¶79 The curative instruction emphasizing that the prior 
convictions could be used only to determine the credibility of 
the defendant and not to decide whether the defendant committed 
the crime charged only exacerbated the prejudicial effect of 
admitting the five convictions into evidence.  The significant 
issue in the case was the defendant's credibility, as the State 
emphasized in its closing statement.  The circuit court 
emphasized that the convictions could be used to persuade them 
about the defendant's credibility.   
¶80 The jury had a hard time with the case.  The jurors 
deliberated for approximately three hours before announcing 
their inability to reach a unanimous verdict.  The circuit court 
instructed them to continue deliberating.  The jury then 
returned guilty verdicts.  
¶81 Because the central issue in this case was the 
defendant's and accuser's credibility, because each conviction 
and the cumulative number of convictions bear on the defendant's 
character for truthfulness, and because the State stressed the 
prior convictions and the number thereof in closing argument, I 
cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict.  In asserting 
                                                 
41 State v. Gary M.B., 2003 WI App 72, ¶46, 261 Wis. 2d 811, 
661 N.W.2d 435 (Dykman, J., dissenting). 
No.  01-3393-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
otherwise the court of appeals and the concurring opinion 
eviscerate the counting rule. 
¶82 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶83 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  01-3393-CR.dss 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
¶84 DIANE S. SYKES, J.   (dissenting).  I agree with the 
conclusion of the Chief Justice and the court of appeals that 
there was error here.  Prior to his own testimony, the defendant 
moved to exclude the use of three of his five prior convictions 
for impeachment purposes because they were too old (more than 20 
years) and insufficiently related to dishonesty or false 
statements.  The circuit court summarily denied the motion, 
invoking 
only 
the 
statutory 
presumption of 
admissibility, 
neglecting to apply the legal standard that governs the 
discretionary decision whether to exclude prior convictions for 
impeachment purposes under Wis. Stat. § 906.09(2). 
¶85  As the court of appeals noted, Wis. Stat. § 906.09 
"does 
not 
end 
with 
the 
'general 
rule'" 
of 
presumptive 
admissibility.  State v. Gary M.B., 2003 WI App 72, ¶26, 261 
Wis. 2d 811, 661 N.W.2d 435.  Rather, it specifies that any 
presumptively admissible prior conviction nevertheless "may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice."  Wis. Stat. § 906.09(2).  As 
the majority opinion and the Chief Justice's dissent note, this 
statutory exclusion represents a particularized application of 
the balancing test in Wis. Stat. § 904.03 and generally requires 
consideration of the following factors: 1) lapse of time since 
the conviction; 2) rehabilitation or pardon; 3) the gravity of 
the crime; and 4) the extent to which the crime involved 
dishonesty or false statements.  Majority op., ¶21; Chief 
No.  01-3393-CR.dss 
 
2 
 
Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶56; State v. Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 
722, 752, 467 N.W.2d 531 (1991); State v. Kruzycki, 192 Wis. 2d 
509, 525, 531 N.W.2d 429 (Ct. App. 1995). 
¶86  Here, the circuit court did not engage in any 
balancing of the probative value of the defendant's three older 
convictions against the danger of unfair prejudice, and did not 
address itself to any of the Kuntz factors.  There is no record 
of any exercise of discretion at all, only the summary 
invocation of the statutory presumption of admissibility. 
¶87  A sustainable exercise of discretion requires some 
record of the application of the correct legal standard to the 
decision at hand, regardless of whether the reviewing court 
would have made the same discretionary judgment call.  Kuntz, 
160 Wis. 2d at 745-46; Kruzycki, 192 Wis. 2d at 525.  A 
misapplication of law or failure to apply the appropriate legal 
standard is an erroneous exercise of discretion, Kruzycki, 192 
Wis. 2d at 525; here, the circuit court misapplied the law by 
relying entirely on the statutory presumption, foregoing any 
analysis of the legal standard appropriate to the exclusion 
decision itself. 
¶88  An incomplete or even incorrect application of the law 
to a discretionary evidentiary decision can sometimes be upheld 
by application of the independent review doctrine, see State v. 
Hunt, 2003 WI 81, ¶¶43-45, 263 Wis. 2d 1, 666 N.W.2d 771, but as 
the court of appeals noted, this record is insufficient to 
support the exercise.  Gary M.B., 261 Wis. 2d 811, ¶27.  This is 
not just an omission of certain "magic words" associated with a 
No.  01-3393-CR.dss 
 
3 
 
decision——understandable sometimes given the press of business 
in circuit court and in any event usually not fatal because 
"magic words" are not required, as long as the record otherwise 
supports the decision reached. 
¶89  I agree with the Chief Justice that a one-sentence 
reference to the presumption of admissibility is insufficient to 
support a conclusion that discretion was "implicitly" exercised 
here.  Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶64.  I also agree 
with her conclusion that the prosecutor's reference to a 
"consistent series" of convictions cannot substitute for an 
actual on-the-record exercise of discretion by the circuit 
court, and the fact that the circuit court used a limiting 
instruction is not by itself enough to fill the gap left by the 
absence of any record of discretionary balancing.  Chief Justice 
Abrahamson's dissent, ¶¶65-66.  A reviewing court cannot 
undertake the missing discretionary balancing on behalf of the 
circuit court; we do not know what the circuit court might have 
decided had it undertaken to apply the appropriate legal 
standard to this important evidentiary decision.  
¶90  Ultimately, I also agree with the Chief Justice's 
conclusion that the error at issue here was not harmless.  I 
write separately to emphasize that the presumption underlying 
Wisconsin's "counting rule" regarding prior convictions for 
impeachment purposes does not necessarily make every mistake of 
this sort harmful. 
¶91  It is well-settled, as the majority and the Chief 
Justice note, that Wisconsin law presumes that persons who have 
No.  01-3393-CR.dss 
 
4 
 
been convicted of a crime are less credible than those who have 
not, and the longer the criminal record, the less credible the 
witness is presumed to be.  Majority op., ¶¶21-23; Chief Justice 
Abrahamson's dissent, ¶¶76-77; State v. Smith, 203 Wis. 2d 288, 
295, 297-98, 553 N.W.2d 824 (Ct. App. 1996); Kruzycki, 192 Wis. 
2d at 524-25.  That every additional conviction potentially 
"counts" on the credibility scale, however, does not mean that a 
circuit court error on the number of convictions admitted will 
usually or even often be harmful.  The assessment of harmless 
error depends entirely upon an individualized application of 
harmless error analysis to the circumstances of the case. 
¶92  Last term we synthesized the harmless error rule as 
follows: 
To assess whether an error is harmless, we focus 
on the effect of the error on the jury's verdict.  
[State v.] Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶44, 
647 N.W.2d 189; see also State v. Carlson, 2003 WI 40, 
¶87, 261 Wis. 2d 97, 661 N.W.2d 51 (Sykes, J., 
dissenting).  This test is "'whether it appears 
"'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained 
of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."'"  
Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶44 (quoting 
Neder [v. United States], 527 U.S. at 15-16, quoting 
in turn Chapman [v. California], 386 U.S. at 24).  We 
have held that "in order to conclude that an error 
'did not contribute to the verdict' within the meaning 
of Chapman, a court must be able to conclude 'beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found 
the defendant guilty absent the error.'"  Id., ¶48 
n.14 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 18).  In other words, 
if it is "clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would have convicted absent the error," 
then the error did not "contribute to the verdict."  
Neder, 527 U.S. at 15, 18 (citation omitted.) 
State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶29, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485. 
No.  01-3393-CR.dss 
 
5 
 
¶93  Harmless error analysis begins with an evaluation of 
the nature of the error in question and the harm it is alleged 
to have caused, in order to determine whether it appears beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the 
verdict obtained.  Id., ¶30.  The test for harmless error is not 
the same as the test for sufficiency of the evidence.  Id., ¶28.  
Neither does it necessarily turn on whether the specific error 
in question was by itself "outcome determinative," although an 
"outcome 
determinative" 
error 
would 
certainly 
qualify 
as 
harmful.  Rather, the harmless error test evaluates the nature 
of the error and the manner and extent to which it can 
reasonably be said to have contributed to the verdict obtained.  
"[T]he focus is on the effect of the evidentiary or legal 
mistake on the case as a whole, presupposing a rational jury."  
State v. Carlson, 2003 WI 40, ¶87, 261 Wis. 2d 97, 661 N.W.2d 51 
(Sykes, J., dissenting).  In contrast to an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, where the burden of showing 
prejudice is on the defendant, the burden of demonstrating an 
error's harmlessness is on the state as the beneficiary of the 
error.  State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶41, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 
N.W.2d 189. 
¶94  The error in this case is the circuit court's decision 
to admit the defendant's three criminal convictions from the 
1970s for credibility impeachment purposes, resulting in the 
placement before the jury of evidence of a criminal conviction 
record totaling five rather than two.  Under the circumstances 
No.  01-3393-CR.dss 
 
6 
 
of this case, this was not an evidentiary decision of only minor 
significance. 
¶95  That it was the defendant's criminal record rather 
than that of another witness is a substantial consideration.  
While all trials are credibility contests, this one was 
exclusively so.  It was a delayed-report sexual molestation case 
with no physical or medical evidence and no other evidentiary 
corroboration of the victim's version of events.  The defendant, 
the victim's stepfather, testified and denied the allegations.  
The verdict therefore depended completely upon the jury's 
evaluation of the credibility of the victim as against the 
credibility of the defendant.  The victim's credibility was 
impeached with a number of prior inconsistent statements and by 
statements and letters to the defendant after moving to her 
grandmother's home after the death of her mother, in which she 
stated that she missed the defendant and wanted to live with 
him.  
¶96  In closing argument, the prosecutor twice invited the 
jury to evaluate the defendant's credibility in light of his 
criminal record, the first reference highlighting the actual 
number of prior convictions ("you can take into consideration 
the fact that he has had five prior convictions").  Apart from 
the fact that the defendant's interest in the outcome of the 
case provided a built-in incentive to deny the allegations, the 
evidence of his five prior convictions was the only record 
evidence bearing upon his credibility.  No prior inconsistent 
statements tending to undermine his credibility were admitted 
No.  01-3393-CR.dss 
 
7 
 
into evidence, nor was there any evidence of behaviors on his 
part tending to show a consciousness of guilt.  The jury, of 
course, had no information about the nature, seriousness, or age 
of the prior convictions; the only evidentiary basis upon which 
to evaluate the effect of the priors on the defendant's 
credibility was the number. Under these circumstances, the 
number of the defendant's prior convictions for credibility 
impeachment purposes took on heightened significance. 
¶97  As the Chief Justice has noted, the jury had trouble 
with this case, and was very nearly hung.  Chief Justice 
Abrahamson's dissent, ¶80.  The case required an extremely 
difficult judgment about credibility.  It may be true in many 
cases that once a jury knows that a witness has a criminal 
record, an erroneous overstatement of the number of prior 
convictions will present little difficulty for the reviewing 
court, such that it may conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that 
a rational jury would have convicted absent the error——that is, 
that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained.  For 
the foregoing reasons, however, I cannot reach that beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt conclusion here, and therefore respectfully 
dissent. 
¶98 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY 
joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  01-3393-CR.dss 
 
 
 
1