Case Title: Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Donnelly

Citation: 

Docket Number: 53ag/22

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2024-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Vernon Charles Donnelly, AG No. 53, 
September Term, 2022.  Opinion by Hotten, J. 
 
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – DISBARMENT  
 
Respondent, Vernon Charles Donnelly, violated Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of 
Professional Conduct 19-301.4 (Communication), 19-301.8(a) (Conflict of Interest; 
Current Clients; Specific Rules), 19-303.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions), 19-
303.3(a) (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 19-308.1(a) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary 
Matters), and 19-308.4(a)–(d) (Misconduct).  These violations stemmed from Respondent 
entering into a loan agreement with a client without first advising the client, in writing, of 
the desirability of seeking the advice of independent counsel regarding the transaction; 
failing to repay the loan on time; continually refusing to fully repay the loan; failing to 
communicate with the client regarding his proposed change to the loan; misrepresenting 
the terms of the loan agreement before the Circuit Court for Calvert County, Bar Counsel, 
and during the disciplinary hearing; and engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice. 
 
Considering the nature of the misconduct, the lack of mitigating factors, and the presence 
of various aggravating factors, the Supreme Court of Maryland concluded that disbarment 
is the appropriate sanction. 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
AG No. 53 
 
September Term, 2022 
 
__________________________________ 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND 
v. 
VERNON CHARLES DONNELLY 
__________________________________ 
 
Fader, C.J., 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Booth, 
Biran, 
Gould, 
Eaves, 
 
JJ. 
__________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Hotten, J. 
__________________________________ 
 
Filed:  February 27, 2024 
 
Circuit Court for Calvert County 
Case No. C-04-CV-23-000066 
Argued: December 5, 2023 
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State 
Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
Gregory Hilton, Clerk 
2024.02.27 
15:15:46 
-05'00'
The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Petitioner”), acting through 
Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Vernon Charles 
Donnelly (“Respondent”) pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-721(a)(1).1  In accordance with 
Maryland Rule 19-722(a),2 we referred the matter to Judge Andrew S. Rappaport of the 
Circuit Court for Calvert County (“hearing judge”).   
On August 16, 2023, an evidentiary hearing was held, following which the hearing 
judge issued findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The hearing judge found clear and 
convincing evidence that Respondent violated Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional 
Conduct (“MARPC”) 19-301.4 (Communication), 19-301.8(a) (Conflict of Interest; 
Current Clients; Specific Rules), 19-303.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions), 19-
303.3(a) (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 19-308.1(a) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary 
Matters), and 19-308.4(a)–(d) (Misconduct).  Respondent took several exceptions to the 
hearing judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.   
 
For the following reasons, disbarment is warranted.   
THE HEARING JUDGE’S FINDINGS OF FACT 
We summarize and, where indicated, quote the hearing judge’s findings of fact, 
which have been established by clear and convincing evidence.  We begin with 
 
1 Maryland Rule 19-721(a)(1) states in relevant part: “Upon approval or direction 
of the [Attorney Grievance] Commission, Bar Counsel, on behalf of the Commission, shall 
file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Supreme Court.” 
 
2 Maryland Rule 19-722(a) states in relevant part: “Upon the filing of a Petition for 
Disciplinary or Remedial Action, the Supreme Court may enter an order designating (1) a 
judge of any circuit court to hear the action, and (2) the clerk responsible for maintaining 
the record.” 
2 
 
 
Respondent’s background and note “Respondent was admitted to the Maryland Bar on May 
25, 1982[]” and “[a]t all times relevant to this matter, Respondent maintained an office for 
the practice of law in Calvert County, Maryland.”  On February 15, 2018, this Court 
suspended Respondent from the practice of law for thirty days with the right to apply for 
reinstatement.  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Donnelly, 458 Md. 237, 182 A.3d 743 (2018).  
Respondent was reinstated on May 8, 2018.   
Respondent’s 2013 Loan From Mr. Kenneth Langley  
In 2011, a legal dispute arose between Mr. Kenneth Langley (“Mr. Langley”) and 
his siblings regarding the administration of their deceased mother’s estate.  Langley, et al., 
v. Langley (“Langley v. Langley”), Case No. 04-C-11-001414.  Mr. Langley retained 
Respondent in the matter and Respondent entered his appearance on April 9, 2012.  In 
September 2012, the circuit court appointed Mark S. Davis as trustee to sell real property 
retained by the estate and to equally disburse the proceeds between the Langley children.  
Following the March 2013 sale, Mr. Langley received a disbursement of approximately 
$50,000.  That same month, in an unrelated matter, a judgment was entered against 
Respondent for $540,793.59.   
In April 2013, cognizant his client was going to receive approximately $50,000, 
Respondent requested Mr. Langley loan him $40,000.  “Respondent did not advise Mr. 
Langley to seek independent counsel, nor did [Respondent] advise [Mr. Langley] of the 
recent [judgment] entered against him.”  Respondent drafted a promissory note for the loan, 
3 
 
 
which required monthly interest payments of $167 and repayment by September 30, 2013.  
On April 5, 2013, Mr. Langley signed the agreement and loaned Respondent $40,000.   
“From April 5, 2013, until September 30, 2013, Mr. Langley made repeated requests 
that Respondent honor the promissory note and make his monthly payments.  Despite these 
entreaties, Respondent claimed he had no money and made no monthly payments on the 
loan.”  Respondent failed to meet the September 30, 2013 deadline for repayment.  In the 
ensuing years, Respondent made “sporadic payments” upon the insistence of Mr. Langley.  
As of 2019, Respondent had repaid $24,000 on the loan, but still owed $16,000 in principal 
and $8,000 in interest.3   
Respondent’s Representation of Mr. Langley over “Pier Rights” 
In 2012, Respondent initiated litigation on behalf of himself and others who owned 
property in Solomon’s Island, Maryland, against Calvert County and the State regarding 
contractual rights to develop commercial piers (“Pier Rights” litigation).  In 2014, 
Respondent discussed the case with Mr. Langley and convinced him to purchase 
commercial pier rights.  Following the purchase, on September 16, 2014, Mr. Langley 
signed a retainer and contingency fee agreement (“2014 retainer”) with Respondent for 
representation in the ongoing suit.  The 2014 retainer made no reference to the personal 
loan between Mr. Langley and Respondent.  In April of 2015, Respondent added Mr. 
Langley as a plaintiff to the Pier Rights litigation.  Between 2015 and 2019, Respondent 
 
3 While the promissory note required the loan be repaid six months following the 
execution, the promissory note provided an annual interest rate of five percent and a five 
percent late fee on any of the monthly interest payments that were missed.   
4 
 
 
regularly communicated with Mr. Langley regarding the Pier Rights litigation, but did not 
indicate the 2014 retainer modified or affected the 2013 loan, or that Mr. Langley would 
owe money in the litigation prior to success in the suit.  In February of 2019, Respondent 
contacted Mr. Langley concerning his proportionate costs of the litigation.  “Ostensibly 
referring to Respondent’s outstanding debt to Mr. Langley, Respondent stated[:] 
‘Therefore, I am not about to go borrow money to in effect refund [] your costs.  I encourage 
you to get off the horse named stupid and [let’s] work together to solve your immediate 
needs.’”   
Bar Counsel’s Investigation 
In April 2019, Mr. Langley demanded full repayment via notarized letter, but 
Respondent did not repay the balance of the loan.  Following this, Mr. Langley filed a 
complaint against Respondent with Petitioner.  Upon receipt of the complaint, Petitioner 
notified Respondent that a complaint had been filed against him.  In a May 2019 written 
response to Bar Counsel, Respondent asserted the following: 
On or about April 1, 2013, [Mr. Langley] came into my office with no 
appointment carrying a bag with $40,000 in cash apparently from his share 
of the proceeds from the sale of his mother’s house, which was sold by a 
Trustee, Mark S. Davis, Esquire, pursuant to Court Order.  He announced 
that he wanted me to keep it as safekeeping for him.  I suggested he put it in 
a bank.  He said he didn’t trust banks.  I suggested he keep it at his place.  He 
ventured that he was moving to a new location, the Locust Inn, Solomons, 
Maryland and it was not a secure place.  He wanted me to put it in my office 
safe and he really did not need a note.  
 
*** 
 
When the Promissory Note matured in September 2013, [Mr. Langley] and I 
agreed orally to an extension of the Note and at one point I encouraged him 
5 
 
 
to begin withdrawing principal amounts for the loan which he did beginning 
on January 14, 2014.  He would call and request a sum of money and I would 
give it to him.  By September 2014, he had requested and received $9,000.00. 
 
In November 2019, Bar Counsel took Respondent’s statement under oath.4  Respondent 
testified: 
[Mr. Langley] walked in the office with a bag of money . . . .  But he wanted 
to give the money to me.  And he wanted to give it to me because I had 
always been good to his family, is what he said.  I told him I couldn’t do that. 
 
*** 
 
I know [Mr. Langley] was -- [Mr. Langley] was primarily interested in my 
holding the money after we got through the initial stage, holding it for him.   
 
*** 
 
So, I took it.  I think, given the date of the note, I believe it is -- and I’m just 
talking straight out here.  I’m not saying I know exactly the moment.  But as 
I recall, [the note] was something for him to take home and think about 
whether or not he wanted to invest it or leave it with me or find use or 
whatever. 
 
*** 
 
I mean, it’s basically a standard, if there’s such a thing, of a promissory note.  
Sets the amount.  Sets the date.  Sets the terms.  Kept very short for six 
months for reason.  That’s all that I saw was an opportunity for him.  He 
wanted me to invest it in what we call a commercial pier project that was 
around.  He wanted to be a part of the commercial pier project. 
 
We had talked about all this before this happened, months or two months 
before.  And I think it sets forth the fact that it is a confessed judgment note, 
acknowledges it’s for a business investment[.] 
 
4 Maryland Rule 19-712(a) allows Petitioner to authorize Bar Counsel to issue a 
subpoena compelling a person to give testimony on a disciplinary matter.  Maryland Rule 
19-712(d) requires “[a]ll testimony by the subpoenaed witness [] be under oath” and 
“contemporaneously recorded[.]”    
6 
 
 
The hearing judge found Respondent’s “version of facts in his statement under oath 
differed from the version of facts he provided” in his prior written response.   
Mr. Langley’s Suit Against Respondent  
On January 13, 2020, Mr. Langley filed suit in the Circuit Court for Calvert County.  
Langley v. Donnelly, Case No. C-04-CV-20-000060.  This suit prompted Bar Counsel to 
place the investigation of Respondent on their deferred docket.5  At trial in April 2021, 
Respondent testified, under oath, to the following:   
[Mr. Langley] walks into the office carrying a bag of money and wants me 
to take the bag of money.  And we joked about it afterwards, he wanted to 
give it to me. 
 
*** 
 
What happened [were] no requests for any money, no requests for any 
interest.  When we came together at that September period of time to talk 
about it, my recollection is that [Mr. Langley] said something to the 
equivalent -- it wouldn’t have been this, but -- let it ride.  And I said, no, 
you’ve got to start getting this money out of here.  And that’s why all of a 
sudden the payments began in January of 2014.   
 
Now, with that said I’m worried about my safe being broken into, because I 
don’t know who I’m dealing with and what I’m dealing with.  He was to get 
it out of there, because I told him I couldn’t find any investments. 
 
He didn’t want to get it out of there.  So we just -- I said, well, start taking 
the money out.  And you’ll notice the list of payments that are made all begin 
in January 2014 and they move right along. 
 
 
5 Maryland Rule 19-711(b)(5) allows Bar Counsel, with the permission of 
Petitioner, to defer action on a complaint where “a civil or criminal action involving 
material allegations against the attorney substantially similar or related to those alleged in 
the complaint is pending in any court of record in the United States[.]”   
7 
 
 
The hearing judge found these statements were knowingly false as Respondent was 
shown checks he provided to Mr. Langley reflecting they were for a “loan” or for “loan 
repayment.”  He also found Respondent contradicted his previous testimony: “The note -- 
the note was modified in that September -- in that meeting that we had in 2014, in my 
office, and it was modified in terms of we’re not going to be paying interest, too.”  The 
hearing judge further noted that Mr. Langley contradicted Respondent and found Mr. 
Langley more credible.   
 
At the conclusion of Langley v. Donnelly, the circuit court ruled against Respondent.   
The Circuit Court for Calvert County entered judgment against Respondent 
and in favor of Mr. Langley for $25,081.68.  Additionally, the Court ordered 
Respondent to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of $11,572.00 within thirty 
(30) days.  Respondent failed to pay the attorney’s fees as ordered, which 
precipitated [Mr. Langley’s attorney] filing a motion to reduce the award to 
a judgment on May 20, 2021.   
Approximately six months later, Respondent paid in full the judgments entered against him 
in favor of Mr. Langley.   
Procedural History 
Following the conclusion of Langley v. Donnelly, Bar Counsel resumed their 
investigation of Respondent.  On August 29, 2022, Petitioner directed Bar Counsel to file 
a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Respondent (“Petition”).  The 
Petition was filed with this Court on January 27, 2023.  On April 21, 2023, following our 
transmission of the matter to the circuit court, Respondent was served with process 
informing him of the Petition.  On May 5, 2023, Respondent filed a pro se answer to the 
8 
 
 
Petition and a motion to dismiss.  Respondent asserted he “did not represent Mr. Langley 
in March 2013.”  Respondent further asserted:  
On April 1, 2013, Mr. Langley appeared in [my] office without an 
appointment, carrying a bag with $40,000 in cash.  He explained that this 
was his share of the proceeds from the Partition Sale of his deceased mother’s 
home sold by a court appointed trustee, Mark S. Davis, Esquire.  The 
statement in his complaint that I demanded his “inheritance” money is simply 
untrue.  There was no demand for payment by me of $40,000 or any other 
amount.    
 
During our April 1, 2013, discussion, Mr. Langley wanted to know if there 
was an opportunity to invest in the Commercial Pier Litigation by perhaps 
buying into a contract right. . . .  He asked me to hold the money for an 
investment in the pier right litigation and I drafted the Promissory Note. I 
signed it several days later on April 5, 2013.  The handwriting at the bottom 
of the Note confirms that it was “cash” and it was signed by me individually. 
 
*** 
 
[I] had no obligation to inform [Mr. Langley] of the March 11, 2013, 
judgment entered against [me], nor to tell him to seek other counsel.  Mr. 
Langley was insistent on investing the money in the pier right litigation and 
I sent him away to return later so we could talk further about it and available 
opportunities, if any. 
 
On May 22, 2023, the hearing judge denied Respondent’s motion to dismiss.  An 
evidentiary hearing in this matter was held on August 26, 2023.   
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The hearing judge concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that 
Respondent violated MARPC 19-301.4, 19-301.8(a), 19-303.1, 19-303.3(a), 19-308.1(a), 
9 
 
 
and 19-308.4(a)–(d).6  Petitioner filed no exceptions.  Respondent filed several exceptions 
which we address infra.   
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
“[T]his Court has original and complete jurisdiction and conducts an independent 
review of the record.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. O’Neill, 477 Md. 632, 658, 271 A.3d 
792, 807 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  “In an attorney disciplinary 
proceeding, this Court reviews for clear error a hearing judge’s findings of fact and reviews 
without deference a hearing judge’s conclusions of law.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. 
Cassilly, 476 Md. 309, 339–40, 262 A.3d 272, 289 (2021).  “This Court shall not disturb 
the hearing judge’s findings where there is any competent evidence to support the finding 
of fact.”  O’Neill, 477 Md. at 658, 271 A.3d at 808 (quotation marks and citation omitted).   
Where, as here, a respondent files exceptions, Maryland Rule 19-740(b)(2)(B) 
requires that: 
the Supreme Court shall determine whether the findings of fact have been 
proved by the requisite standard of proof set out in [Maryland] Rule 19-
727(c).  The Court may confine its review to the findings of fact challenged 
by the exceptions.  The Court shall give due regard to the opportunity of the 
hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses. 
 
Maryland Rule 19-727(c) reads: “Bar Counsel has the burden of proving the averments of 
the petition by clear and convincing evidence.  If the attorney asserts . . . a matter of 
 
6 The hearing judge indicated that he “made findings of fact and conclusions of law 
as to each charge[.]”  However, the Petition charged twelve MARPC violations of which 
the hearing judge only addresses six.  Given that Petitioner did not take exception to the 
hearing judge’s conclusions, we will proceed without discussion of those charges.   
10 
 
 
mitigation or extenuation, the attorney has the burden of proving the defense or matter by 
a preponderance of the evidence.”  “If the hearing judge’s factual findings are not clearly 
erroneous and the conclusions drawn from them are supported by the facts found, 
exceptions to conclusions of law will be overruled.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Tanko, 
408 Md. 404, 419, 969 A.2d 1010, 1019 (2009).   
DISCUSSION 
RESPONDENT’S EXCEPTIONS 
Exception One: Respondent’s Lack of Representation 
Respondent argues that the hearing judge erred in requiring him to proceed while 
unrepresented by counsel.  Respondent argues the four months following the scheduling of 
the hearing was insufficient to secure counsel.  The hearing judge found that Respondent 
was given sufficient notice and participated substantially pro se in the disciplinary matter.  
During the August 2023 hearing, the hearing judge stated: 
Obviously, Mr. Donnelly, you are barred in the State of Maryland.  You are 
a lawyer, but there has been no mention of any continuance request 
throughout the entire proceedings, and there was nothing filed prior to today, 
other than this morning as we called the case, and you’re requesting a 
continuance.   
 
In Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Stewart, we held “a lawyer is entitled to the basic elements 
of due process[,] notice[,] and the opportunity to defend in a full and fair hearing.”  285 
Md. 251, 259, 401 A.2d 1026, 1030 (1979).  Following Mr. Langley’s complaint, 
Respondent was given notice and frequently kept apprised of the status of the investigation.  
11 
 
 
Respondent received his due process in this disciplinary proceeding and, therefore, we 
overrule this exception. 
Exception Two: The Hearing Judge Did Not Consider Respondent’s Pleadings 
Respondent argues that the hearing judge did not “properly evaluate the truth of the 
precise facts in issue in considering the representations and admissions in the pleadings in 
this matter[.]”  “[A]s far as what evidence a hearing judge must rely upon to reach his or 
her conclusions, we have said that the hearing judge may pick and choose what evidence 
to believe.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Kalarestaghi, 483 Md. 180, 220 n.7, 291 A.3d 
728, 751 n.7 (2023) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  The hearing judge is not 
required to cite Respondent’s pleadings with more frequency or accord them more weight.  
See id., 291 A.3d at 751 n.7.  The hearing judge reviewed Respondent’s pleadings and the 
evidence presented, including Respondent’s testimony, and did not find Respondent 
credible.  We defer to the hearing judge’s assessment and, therefore, overrule Respondent’s 
exception.   
Exception Three: The Creation of the Loan Agreement 
First, Respondent argues he did not solicit the loan and that Mr. Langley made the 
loan freely.  Mr. Langley testified that “Mr. Donnelly asked if he could borrow $40,000[,]” 
and the hearing judge found Mr. Langley credible.  We defer to the hearing judge’s 
credibility determination.  Id., 291 A.3d at 751 n.7.  Further, whether Mr. Langley entered 
into the loan willingly is not disputed and has no bearing on Respondent’s choice not to 
repay the loan.  Thus, we overrule this first portion of Respondent’s exception.   
12 
 
 
Second, Respondent contends there was no clear and convincing evidence that he 
and Mr. Langley were in an attorney-client relationship when they executed the loan.  
Respondent argues his representation of Mr. Langley ended following Langley v. Langley, 
and filings from the case were not clear and convincing evidence of any representation 
afterwards.  “[T]he hearing judge may pick and choose what evidence to believe[,]” and 
“we defer to the hearing judge’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility.”  Id., 291 A.3d 
at 751 n.7 (quotation marks and citations omitted).  Mr. Langley testified that Respondent 
was his attorney at the execution of the loan, and Bar Counsel was able to demonstrate the 
relationship via Respondent’s signature on pertinent filings from Langley v. Langley.  The 
hearing judge credited Mr. Langley’s testimony and the evidence presented by Petitioner.  
We defer to that finding and, therefore, we overrule this second portion of Respondent’s 
exception. 
Third, Respondent argues the hearing judge erred in finding that he did not inform 
Mr. Langley of the reason for the loan.  The hearing judge found “that just weeks prior to 
receiving this cash, the Respondent received a judgment against him in the amount of 
$540,793.59[,]” and that “Respondent testified his portion of the judgment was reduced to 
less than Fifty Thousand dollars ($50,000.00).”  We will “not disturb the hearing judge’s 
findings where there is any competent evidence to support the finding of fact.”  O’Neill, 
477 Md. at 658, 271 A.3d at 808 (quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added).  
Given that there was competent evidence presented to infer the reason for the loan was to 
satisfy Respondent’s judgment, the hearing judge had clear and convincing evidence to 
13 
 
 
find that Respondent did not advise Mr. Langley of the reason for the loan.  Accordingly, 
we overrule this third portion of Respondent’s exception.   
Fourth, Respondent argues the hearing judge did not have clear and convincing 
evidence that he failed to advise Mr. Langley to seek independent counsel.  MARPC 19-
301.8(a) requires advice to seek independent counsel be given in writing.  Respondent 
concedes “[t]here is no evidence showing there was written advice by Respondent 
informing Mr. Langley he should seek independent legal advice before he made the loan 
to Respondent.”  Thus, we overrule this fourth portion of Respondent’s exception. 
Fifth, Respondent unequivocally denies that Mr. Langley made repeated demands 
for repayment.  Mr. Langley testified, during Langley v. Donnelly and before the hearing 
judge, about his repeated requests for repayment.  The hearing judge possessed clear and 
convincing evidence Mr. Langley made repeated demands for repayment.  Assuming, 
arguendo, Mr. Langley had not made repeated requests, this failure would not have 
excused Respondent’s choice not to repay the loan.  Accordingly, we overrule this fifth 
portion of the exception and overrule the third exception in its entirety.   
Exception Four: Respondent’s Testimony on the Loan 
Next, Respondent takes exception to the finding that his testimony in Langley v. 
Donnelly was false.  “This Court shall not disturb the hearing judge’s findings where there 
is any competent evidence to support the finding of fact.”  O’Neill, 477 Md. at 658, 271 
A.3d at 808 (quotation marks and citation omitted).  “[T]he hearing judge is in the best 
position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and to decide which one to believe and, 
14 
 
 
as we have said, to pick and choose which evidence to rely upon.”  Kalarestaghi, 483 Md. 
at 220 n.7, 291 A.3d at 751 n.7 (quotation marks and citations omitted).  Respondent 
provides four arguments for this exception. 
First, Respondent asserts the hearing judge was not allowed to find that 
Respondent’s testimony in Langley v. Donnelly was false absent a specific finding from 
the presiding judge.  Respondent contends “[t]here was no specific transcript of the trial of 
[Langley v. Donnelly,] nor a specific finding by the other judge that such a statement was 
knowingly falsely made[.]”  The transcript of Langley v. Donnelly provided to the hearing 
judge reflects the following testimony by Respondent: “I did not ask [Mr. Langley] for a 
business loan.  I did not ask him for any money.  He showed up in the office with a bag 
with money in it.”  This statement denied the existence of the loan and provided the hearing 
judge with clear and convincing evidence that Respondent testified falsely.  Thus, we 
overrule this part of Respondent’s exception.   
Second, Respondent asserts:  
In light of Mr. Langley’s prior inconsistent statements about whether 
Respondent told him at the time the loan was made it would be used for 
expert witness fees or didn’t tell him what the use of the loan would be at the 
time it was made, Mr. Langley’s statement that Respondent solicited or asked 
for a loan is not clear and convincing evidence Respondent did in fact solicit 
or ask for the loan.  
 
We previously overruled Respondent’s exception that he did not solicit the loan, noting we 
defer to the hearing judge’s finding that Mr. Langley was credible.  Accordingly, we 
overrule this part of Respondent’s exception.   
15 
 
 
Third, Respondent asserts whether he provided false testimony to the circuit court 
is moot because of his repayment following Langley v. Donnelly.  “A case is moot if there 
is no longer an existing controversy between the parties, so that there is no longer any 
effective remedy which the court can provide.”  Powell v. Md. Dep’t of Health, 455 Md. 
520, 539, 168 A.3d 857, 868–69 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  Presently, 
the “dispute” concerns Respondent’s alleged MARPC violations, not the loan obligation 
itself.  This Court acts in attorney discipline matters to “protect members of the public from 
attorneys who have demonstrated that they are unfit for the practice of law[,]” not merely 
to rectify the specific harm suffered by an attorney’s client.  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. 
Keating, 471 Md. 614, 651, 243 A.3d 520, 543 (2020).  Respondent’s repayment does not 
render the issue moot, and we therefore overrule this portion of Respondent’s exception.   
Finally, Respondent argues his testimony on the modification of the loan is evidence 
that he understood the agreement with Mr. Langley to be a loan.  Indeed, Respondent 
testified the loan was modified by the 2014 retainer, acknowledging he understood his 
agreement with Mr. Langley to be a loan.  Respondent also testified as if the loan was not 
a loan.  Accepting that Respondent understood the agreement was a loan does not lead this 
Court to override the hearing judge’s finding.  In fact, quite the opposite.  We note that this 
exception highlights clear and convincing evidence of Respondent’s choice to repeatedly 
mischaracterize the loan in order to justify not repaying it.  Accordingly, we overrule this 
portion of the exception and the entirety of Respondent’s fourth exception.   
 
16 
 
 
Exceptions Five, Six, and Seven 
Respondent’s fifth and sixth exceptions focus on the hearing judge having found an 
absence of mitigating factors and several aggravating factors.  His seventh exception 
disputes the hearing judge’s conclusions of law, except for one.  We address these infra. 
RESPONDENT’S MARPC VIOLATIONS 
We begin with the hearing judge’s conclusions of law, which this Court reviews 
without deference.  Cassilly, 476 Md. at 339–40, 262 A.3d at 289.  “If the hearing judge’s 
factual findings are not clearly erroneous and the conclusions drawn from them are 
supported by the facts found, exceptions to conclusions of law will be overruled.”  Tanko, 
408 Md. at 419, 969 A.2d at 1019.  The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated 
MARPC 19-301.4 (Communication), 19-301.8(a) (Conflict of Interest; Current Clients; 
Specific Rules), 19-303.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions), 19-303.3(a) (Candor 
Toward the Tribunal), 19-308.1(a) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 19-
308.4(a)–(d) (Misconduct).  For the following reasons, we agree with the conclusions 
reached by the hearing judge.   
MARPC 19-301.4 (Communication) 
MARPC 19-301.4 reads in full: 
(a) An attorney shall: 
 
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance 
with respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined 
in Rule 19-301.0(g) (1.0), is required by these Rules; 
 
(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the 
matter; 
17 
 
 
 
(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; 
and 
 
(4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the 
attorney’s conduct when the attorney knows that the client 
expects assistance not permitted by the Maryland Attorneys’ 
Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. 
 
(b) An attorney shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. 
 
MARPC 19-301.0(g) defines informed consent as “the agreement by a person to a proposed 
course of conduct after the attorney has communicated adequate information and 
explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the 
proposed course of conduct.”   
 
In concluding Respondent violated MARPC 19-301.4, the hearing judge wrote: 
Hav[ing] no reference to, or incorporation of, the 2013 loan agreement in the 
2014 attorney client agreement pertaining to the loaned funds being used for 
litigation costs lends itself to the more plausible explanation that the 
Respondent failed to obtain Mr. Langley’s informed consent and unilaterally 
modified the 2013 loan agreement. 
 
In effect, the hearing judge found Respondent unsuccessfully asserted a retroactive change 
to both the promissory note and the 2014 retainer without informing Mr. Langley.   
Respondent takes exception and asserts he did not unilaterally modify the 
promissory note by interpreting his remaining loan balance to be offset by Mr. Langley’s 
attributable costs for the Pier Rights litigation.  “If the hearing judge’s factual findings are 
not clearly erroneous and the conclusions drawn from them are supported by the facts 
found, exceptions to conclusions of law will be overruled.”  Tanko, 408 Md. at 419, 969 
18 
 
 
A.2d at 1019 (emphasis added).  While Langley v. Donnelly shows Respondent was 
unsuccessful in his attempt to bind the loan to the 2014 retainer, the February 2019 letter 
from Respondent to Mr. Langley shows Respondent attempted to unilaterally enforce the 
modification.  The hearing judge had clear and convincing evidence Respondent had 
attempted to treat the agreement as modified and failed to inform Mr. Langley of this 
change and we overrule Respondent’s exception.   
MARPC 19-301.4(a)(1) requires an attorney to communicate with their client 
regarding any “circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent . . . is 
required.”  MARPC 19-301.8(a)(3) requires “the client give[] informed consent, in a 
writing signed by the client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the attorney’s role 
in the transaction,” when an attorney seeks to enter a business transaction with a client.  
Under these rules, when Respondent pursued a loan agreement with Mr. Langley, he was 
required to receive Mr. Langley’s informed consent and then “promptly inform” Mr. 
Langley “of any decision or circumstance” regarding that agreement.  MARPC 19-
301.4(a)(1).   
The record does not reflect Respondent communicated with Mr. Langley regarding 
a proposed modification to the 2013 promissory note.  In fact, many of the communications 
from Respondent regarding the Pier Rights litigation expressly stated Mr. Langley would 
not owe anything unless they prevailed in the suit.  These communications failed to 
“promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the 
19 
 
 
client’s informed consent[]” was required.  MARPC 19-301.4(a)(1).  Accordingly, we 
agree with the hearing judge that Respondent violated MARPC 19-301.4.   
MARPC 19-301.8 (Conflict of Interest; Current Clients; Specific Rules) 
MARPC 19-301.8(a) reads in relevant part, “[a]n attorney shall not enter into a 
business transaction with a client unless: . . . (2) the client is advised in writing of the 
desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek independent legal 
advice on the transaction[.]”  The hearing judge concluded Respondent violated MARPC 
19-301.8 when he entered into the loan agreement with Mr. Langley without first advising 
Mr. Langley to consult with independent counsel.  The hearing judge found there was an 
attorney-client relationship between Mr. Langley and Respondent at the execution of the 
2013 loan, and both Mr. Langley and Respondent agreed Respondent failed to provide 
advice to seek independent counsel.   
Respondent takes exception and argues that he committed a “technical violation of 
this Rule[]” in failing to provide written advice to Mr. Langley.  The provision of written 
advice is an essential element to MARPC 19-301.8.  See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. 
Shapiro, 441 Md. 367, 391, 108 A.3d 394, 408 (2015) (“Respondent violated clearly 
[MARPC 19-301.8](a)(2) by not providing [the client] with an appropriate written 
disclosure.”).  We noted supra Respondent’s admission that he did not provide Mr. Langley 
with written advice.  Given this admission, we overrule Respondent’s exception, and agree 
with the conclusion of the hearing judge that Respondent violated MARPC 19-301.8(a).   
 
20 
 
 
MARPC 19-303.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions) 
MARPC 19-303.1 reads in part, “[a]n attorney shall not bring or defend a 
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that 
is not frivolous[.]”  The hearing judge concluded that Respondent “violated [MARPC 19-
303.1] by creating [the] fictitious defense in” Langley v. Donnelly that the loan agreement 
had been modified.  The hearing judge found Respondent’s credibility on this claim was 
eroded when confronted with his repayment of the loan following its purported 
modification.    
Respondent takes exception, asserting he “had a right to contend he should have 
such offset right.”  We overruled Respondent’s prior exception on this issue and overrule 
it here as well.  See Tanko, 408 Md. at 419, 969 A.2d at 1019 (“If the hearing judge’s 
factual findings are not clearly erroneous and the conclusions drawn from them are 
supported by the facts found, exceptions to conclusions of law will be overruled.”).   
MARPC 19-303.1 restrains attorneys from using court processes and procedures 
abusively and frivolously.  See, e.g., Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Mixter, 441 Md. 416, 511, 
109 A.3d 1, 59 (2015) (“[Respondent] violated [MARPC 19-303.1], by continuing to 
pursue . . . litigation after it became clear that there was no good faith basis for doing so.”); 
Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Sloane, 483 Md 131, 157, 290 A.3d 1026, 1041 (2023) 
(sustaining a MARPC 19-303.1 violation because “[t]here was no legal basis for 
[r]espondent to raise the issue of Ms. Deneroff’s driving record and diary after Judge 
Callahan ruled on the matter”).  We agree that Respondent violated MARPC 19-303.1 by 
21 
 
 
inventing fictitious defenses in Langley v. Donnelly to avoid repaying Mr. Langley and 
repeating them before the hearing judge.  
MARPC 19-303.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal) 
MARPC 19-303.3(a)(1) reads in pertinent part “[a]n attorney shall not knowingly: 
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of 
material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the attorney[.]”  The hearing judge 
concluded Respondent violated MARPC 19-303.3(a) “for the reasons stated in reference 
to [MARPC 19-301.4, 19-301.8, and 19-303.1].”  Respondent takes exception to this 
conclusion, arguing he made no false statements of material fact and “simply described the 
facts as he remembered them[.]”  As discussed, the hearing judge credited Mr. Langley’s 
testimony on the loan agreement, and we will not disturb the hearing judge’s finding absent 
clear error.  Kalarestaghi, 483 Md. at 220 n.7, 291 A.3d at 751 n.7; Tanko, 408 Md. at 419, 
969 A.2d at 1019.  Accordingly, we overrule Respondent’s exception. 
MARPC 19-303.3 “sets forth special duties of attorneys as officers of the court to 
avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process.”  MARPC 19-
303.3 cmt. 2.  “[MARPC 19-303.3](a)(1) requires that a lawyer not knowingly make a false 
statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or 
law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer.”  Mixter, 441 Md. at 514, 109 A.3d at 
60–61 (quotation marks omitted).  As we concluded that the hearing judge had clear and 
convincing evidence that Respondent testified falsely before the tribunal, we agree 
Respondent violated MARPC 19-303.3(a).   
22 
 
 
MARPC 19-308.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters) 
MARPC 19-308.1(a) reads in pertinent part, “an attorney in connection with a bar 
admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: (a) knowingly 
make a false statement of material fact[.]”  The hearing judge concluded Respondent 
violated MARPC 19-308.1(a) by making false statements throughout the disciplinary 
process.  Respondent did not take exception to this conclusion.   
“The practice of law carries with it special responsibilities of self-regulation, and 
attorney cooperation with disciplinary authorities is of the utmost importance to the success 
of the process and the integrity of the profession.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Butler, 441 
Md. 352, 360, 107 A.3d 1220, 1225 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  We 
have held an attorney violates MARPC 19-308.1(a) where they “act[] dishonestly and 
deceitfully by knowingly making false statements to Bar Counsel.”  Att’y Grievance 
Comm’n v. Harris, 403 Md. 142, 164, 939 A.2d 732, 745 (2008).  In rendering false 
statements both orally and in writing under oath before Bar Counsel and the hearing judge, 
Respondent violated MARPC 19-308.1(a).  Accordingly, we agree with the hearing judge’s 
conclusion. 
MARPC 19-308.4 (Misconduct) 
 
MARPC 19-308.4(a)–(d) reads:  
It is professional misconduct for an attorney to: 
 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of 
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or 
do so through the acts of another; 
 
23 
 
 
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the attorney’s honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as an attorney in other respects; 
 
(c) engage 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit 
or 
misrepresentation; [or] 
 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.] 
 
 
The hearing judge found that Respondent violated MARPC 19-308.4(a), (b), (c), 
and (d).  First, as the hearing judge concluded Respondent violated other sections of the 
MARPC, he concluded Respondent violated MARPC 19-308.4(a).  Second, the hearing 
judge concluded that, while Respondent had not been charged, Respondent’s false 
testimony during Langley v. Donnelly amounted to perjury under Md. Code Ann., Criminal 
Law (“Crim. Law”) § 9-1017 and violated MARPC 19-308.4(b).  Third, the hearing judge 
found clear and convincing evidence Respondent violated MARPC 19-308.4(c) when he 
made repeated false statements to Bar Counsel and the circuit court.  Fourth, the hearing 
judge found clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated MARPC 19-308.4(d) 
by pursuing the $40,000 loan while still representing Mr. Langley, failing to advise Mr. 
Langley to seek independent counsel, and by making false statements to the circuit court 
that he and Mr. Langley modified the 2013 loan agreement.   
Respondent takes exception to each of these and reasserts his prior exceptions 
discussed supra.  Further, Respondent asserts he committed no misconduct and did not 
 
7 Crim. Law § 9-101(a)(1) reads, “[a] person may not willfully and falsely make an 
oath or affirmation as to a material fact: (1) if the false swearing is perjury at common 
law[.]” 
24 
 
 
violate MARPC 19-308.4.  As discussed supra, we overruled each of these exceptions and 
also overrule them here.  See O’Neill, 477 Md. at 658, 271 A.3d at 808.   
First, “we have held that [where the] respondent has violated several Rules of 
Professional Conduct, [they] necessarily violated [MARPC 19-308.4](a) as well[.]”  Att’y 
Grievance Comm’n v. Gallagher, 371 Md. 673, 710–11, 810 A.2d 996, 1018 (2002).  Since 
we agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent committed other MARPC 
violations, we also agree that Respondent violated MARPC 19-308.4(a). 
Turning to MARPC 19-308.4(b), for an example we look to Att’y Grievance 
Comm’n v. Bonner, 477 Md. 576, 271 A.3d 249 (2022).  In Bonner, we agreed with the 
hearing judge the respondent violated MARPC 19-308.4(b) where the attorney 
“intentionally misappropriated more than $14,000 from [a firm] in about 35 separate 
transactions[,]” which “amount[ed] to theft despite the absence of criminal charges[.]”  Id. 
at 595, 271 A.3d at 261 (emphasis added and footnote omitted).  Here, Respondent 
repeatedly made knowingly false statements which could be charged under Crim. Law § 
9-101(a)(1) as perjury.  Despite the absence of charges, this conduct violates MARPC 19-
308.4(b).  Accordingly, we agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion. 
On MARPC 19-308.4(c), “we note the significant overlap between [MARPC 19-
303.3(a)] and [MARPC 19-308.4(c)], recognizing that a violation of the former generally 
entails a violation of the latter.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. White, 480 Md. 319, 381, 280 
A.3d 722, 758 (2022).  Additionally, “[w]e have said that [MARPC 19-308.1(a)] and 
[MARPC 19-308.4(c)] are violated when an attorney acts dishonestly and deceitfully by 
25 
 
 
knowingly making false statements to Bar Counsel.”  Harris, 403 Md. at 164, 939 A.2d at 
745 (citation omitted).  As we agreed with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent 
violated MARPC 19-303.3(c) and 19-308.1(a), we agree Respondent violated MARPC 19-
308.4(c).   
Finally,  
MARPC 19-308.4(d) prohibits conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.  Conduct is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice when it reflects negatively on the legal profession and sets a bad 
example for the public at large or is likely to impair public confidence in the 
profession, impact the image of the legal profession and engender disrespect 
for the court[.] 
White, 480 Md. at 382, 280 A.3d at 758 (cleaned up).  In White, the respondent violated 
MARPC 19-308.4(d) when he “failed to adequately communicate with his clients [and] 
made knowing and intentional misrepresentations to various courts to cover up his 
misconduct[.]”  Id., 280 A.3d at 758–59.  Certainly, Respondent’s failure to communicate 
a proposed modification of the loan to Mr. Langley and his repeated false statements before 
the circuit court in Langley v. Donnelly “set[] a bad example for the public at large[.]”  Id. 
at 382, 280 A.3d at 758.  Repeating false statements in order to gain a personal windfall 
“impair[s] public confidence in the profession[.]”  Id., 280 A.3d at 758.  We agree with the 
hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent violated MARPC 19-308.4(d).   
MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING FACTORS 
“During an attorney grievance matter, the circuit court may consider the existence 
of aggravating and mitigating factors.”  O’Neill, 477 Md. at 656, 271 A.3d at 806.  The 
26 
 
 
hearing judge found that Respondent failed to establish any mitigating factor and noted 
several aggravating factors.   
Mitigating Factors 
Mitigating factors include: (1) the absence of prior attorney discipline; (2) 
the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) personal or emotional 
problems; (4) timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify the 
misconduct’s consequences; (5) full and free disclosure to Bar Counsel or a 
cooperative attitude toward the attorney discipline proceeding; (6) 
inexperience in the practice of law; (7) character or reputation; (8) a physical 
disability; (9) a mental disability or chemical dependency, including 
alcoholism or drug abuse, where: (a) there is medical evidence that the 
lawyer is affected by a chemical dependency or mental disability; (b) the 
chemical dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct; (c) the 
lawyer’s recovery from the chemical dependency or mental disability is 
demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful 
rehabilitation; and (d) the recovery arrested the misconduct, and the 
misconduct’s recurrence is unlikely; (10) delay in the attorney discipline 
proceeding; (11) the imposition of other penalties or sanctions; (12) remorse; 
(13) remoteness of prior violations of the [MARPC]; and (14) unlikelihood 
of repetition of the misconduct. 
 
Cassilly, 476 Md. at 403, 262 A.3d at 327.  Respondent bears the burden of proving 
mitigating factors “by a preponderance of the evidence.”  Md. Rule 19-727(c).   
The hearing judge found no mitigating factors.  Respondent asserts eight mitigating 
factors apply: (1) the delay in the grievance proceedings; (2) the absence of a selfish 
motive; (3) full and free disclosure to Petitioner; (4) his “apparent” mental disability; (5) 
his “timely” repayment of the loan balance after Mr. Langley’s suit; (6) the lack of harm 
to Mr. Langley; (7) the absence of prior “major” discipline; and (8) the unlikelihood of 
repeated misconduct.  We address each in turn and conclude that Respondent has failed to 
establish any mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence. 
27 
 
 
Prejudicial Delay 
First, Respondent asserts there was prejudicial delay in the disciplinary process.8  
Respondent contends there was delay through the initiation of the grievance process “more 
than six (6) years after execution of the April 1, 2013 Promissory Note.”  Respondent 
further contends there was an additional three-year delay during the pendency of Langley 
v. Donnelly.   
In Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Jackson, 477 Md. 174, 219, 269 A.3d 252, 279 
(2022), this Court decided not to sanction an attorney who was “prejudiced in having to 
explain her signature on two lines many years after they were filed[.]”  Jackson identified 
that the length of time Bar Counsel waits to initiate the attorney grievance process may 
become prejudicial when that time has the tendency to have weakened witnesses’ and the 
respondent attorney’s memories of the events.  Id., 269 A.3d at 278–79.  Here, assuming, 
arguendo, Respondent’s asserted nine-year delay correctly includes the time Mr. Langley 
did not file his grievance, Respondent was not similarly prejudiced.  The loan agreement 
 
8 Respondent’s argument mirrors a defense of laches.  In Cassilly, we reiterated our 
 
doubt about the applicability of the laches defense in attorney grievance 
proceedings given the underlying purpose of attorney discipline proceedings, 
which is to protect the public.  We continue to express strong reservation as 
to the applicability of the doctrine of laches in attorney discipline 
proceedings and now conclude that, with the possible exception of cases 
involving both extraordinary circumstances of delay and actual prejudice 
resulting in a clear due process violation, applying the doctrine of laches to 
attorney discipline proceedings would not be consistent with the goal of such 
proceedings, which is to protect the public. 
 
476 Md. at 348, 262 A.3d at 295 (quotation marks and citations omitted).  
28 
 
 
was a constant source of contention between Respondent and Mr. Langley for years as 
evidenced by Mr. Langley’s repeated request for repayment and his suit against 
Respondent.  Respondent presents no evidence he was prejudiced by the timing of the 
charges from Bar Counsel or the August 2023 hearing.  In failing to present such evidence, 
Respondent has failed to meet his burden to establish this mitigating factor.   
Absence of a Dishonest or Selfish Motive 
Second, Respondent argues that an unselfish motive was demonstrated through his 
“diligent” work for Mr. Langley on the Pier Rights litigation.  The hearing judge found 
Respondent exhibited a selfish motive by asking for and failing to repay the $40,000 loan.  
Respondent’s representation of Mr. Langley in the Pier Rights litigation has no bearing or 
connection to his choice not to repay Mr. Langley or misrepresent the loan in an attempt to 
avoid repayment.  Accordingly, we conclude Respondent has failed to establish this 
mitigating factor.  
Full and Free Disclosure to Bar Counsel 
Third, Respondent argues “[t]he entire record in this case demonstrates . . . full and 
free disclosure to Bar Counsel and [a] cooperative attitude toward the attorney discipline 
proceedings.”  In Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Brooks, we concluded the hearing judge 
found full and free disclosure where the respondent did not “ma[ke] any false statements 
to the Office of Bar Counsel in the course of the investigation[,]” or “ma[ke] any 
misrepresentations in connection with the acts, omissions or transactions alleged in the 
Petition[.]”  476 Md. 97, 122, 258 A.3d 266, 280 (2021).  In contrast here, the hearing 
29 
 
 
judge found Respondent made false statements throughout the investigation, disciplinary 
proceedings, and otherwise in connection with the allegations in the Petition.  We conclude 
Respondent did not meet his burden and has failed to establish this mitigating factor.   
Respondent’s Asserted Mental Disability 
Fourth, Respondent claims “[a]n apparent mental disability” impacting his behavior 
and representations to Bar Counsel and the hearing judge.  In Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. 
Wemple, we held the respondent failed to establish that poor health was a mitigating factor 
where he failed to provide relevant medical records or other support.  479 Md. 167, 203–
04, 277 A.3d 427, 448–49 (2022).  Here, Respondent does not provide medical records or 
other evidence which prove by a preponderance that he suffers from his asserted mental 
disability.  Thus, we conclude that Respondent has failed to establish this as a mitigating 
factor. 
Timely Good Faith Efforts to Make Restitution 
Fifth, Respondent asserts he made “timely payment of the entire balance of the 
[promissory n]ote after the judgment was entered against Respondent following the 
Langley v. Donnelly litigation had ended.”  This assertion is misleading.  After nearly six 
years with no repayment, Mr. Langley was required to sue Respondent to recover the 
remaining loan balance.  In all, it took Respondent nine years to completely satisfy the 
loan.  Following the suit, “Respondent failed to pay the attorney’s fees as ordered, which 
precipitated [Mr. Langley’s attorney] filing a motion to reduce the award to a judgment[.]”  
While Respondent is correct that he eventually repaid Mr. Langley after being forced to do 
30 
 
 
so, he omits that he then failed to pay the attorney fees he incurred as a result.  Respondent 
did not make timely good faith efforts to rectify his misconduct and, therefore, has failed 
to establish this mitigating factor.   
Lack of Harm to Mr. Langley 
Sixth, Respondent asserts “[n]o financial harm to Mr. Langley, in fact Mr. Langley 
profited from the full payment of interest and principal of the April 1, 2013[,] Promissory 
Note[.]”  Lack of harm to a client is not a mitigating factor we have so far accepted.  See 
Cassilly, 476 Md. at 403, 262 A.3d at 327 (listing the mitigating factors this Court 
considers).  “[O]ur case law does not establish that the lack of harm to a client will 
automatically result in the determination of a mitigating factor.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n 
v. Malone, 482 Md. 82, 112, 285 A.3d 546, 564 (2022).  Accordingly, we conclude 
Respondent has failed to establish this mitigating factor.   
The Absence of Prior Attorney Discipline 
Seventh, Respondent argues an “absence of any prior major attorney discipline 
sanction.”  (Emphasis added).  Respondent’s asserted distinction between “major” and his 
own, impliedly, “minor” discipline does not exist.  Respondent was previously disciplined.  
Donnelly, 458 Md. at 329, 182 A.3d at 797.  Thus, Respondent has failed to establish a 
lack of prior discipline as a mitigating factor. 
Unlikelihood of Repetition of the Misconduct 
Eighth, Respondent asserts that he is unlikely to repeat any of his misconduct.  
However, Respondent provides no argument or evidence to support his contention.  As 
31 
 
 
such, we conclude Respondent has failed to establish this mitigating factor by a 
preponderance of the evidence.   
Aggravating Factors 
Aggravating factors include: (1) prior attorney discipline; (2) a dishonest or 
selfish motive; (3) a pattern of misconduct; (4) multiple violations of the 
[MARPC]; (5) bad faith obstruction of the attorney discipline proceeding by 
intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency; 
(6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive 
practices during the attorney discipline proceeding; (7) a refusal to 
acknowledge the misconduct’s wrongful nature; (8) the victim’s 
vulnerability; (9) substantial experience in the practice of law; (10) 
indifference to making restitution or rectifying the misconduct’s 
consequences; (11) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of 
controlled substances; and (12) likelihood of repetition of the misconduct. 
 
Donnelly, 458 Md. at 321, 182 A.3d at 792. 
The hearing judge found that Respondent: (1) had prior discipline; (2) displayed a 
selfish motive in failing to repay the loan; (3) submitted false testimony; (4) demonstrated 
a pattern of misconduct by failing to seek his client’s informed consent and by 
mischaracterizing the loan agreement; (5) has substantial experience in the practice of law; 
and (6) has failed to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.  The only aggravating 
factor finding to which Respondent did not except was substantial experience in the 
practice of law.  We agree that Respondent has substantial experience in the practice of 
law and that this aggravating factor therefore is applicable. 
We now address Respondent’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s other findings 
concerning aggravating factors.   
 
32 
 
 
Prior Discipline 
First, the hearing judge noted Respondent was previously disciplined by this Court.  
Respondent acknowledges his prior discipline but argues “[s]uch [a] prior case should be 
evaluated in light of all the complexities involved and not be used as an aggravating factor 
in the case now under review.”  An attorney’s prior discipline is a pertinent factor for our 
consideration.  Compare Sloane, 483 Md. at 172, 290 A.3d at 1050 (“Respondent’s lack of 
prior attorney discipline over his extensive career cautions against the ultimate sanction of 
disbarment.”), with Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Myers, 333 Md. 440, 449, 635 A.2d 1315, 
1319 (1994) (“Viewed in light of the respondent’s prior suspension and the nature of the 
conduct for which it was imposed, we believe the proper sanction for the intentional 
misrepresentation in this case is the ultimate one, disbarment.”) see also Att’y Grievance 
Comm’n v. Sperling, 472 Md. 561, 615–17, 248 A.3d 224, 255–57 (2021) (observing that 
“all prior disciplinary offenses are aggravating circumstances[,]” but some prior 
disciplinary offenses may be particularly aggravating compared to others).  We conclude 
Respondent’s prior discipline is an applicable consideration, overrule Respondent’s 
exception, and agree with the hearing judge that this factor applies to Respondent.   
Selfish Motive 
Second, the hearing judge found Respondent exhibited a selfish motive in 
requesting and failing to repay the $40,000 loan.  Respondent contends there was no selfish 
motive.  By nature of Respondent’s refusal to repay Mr. Langley and his repeated use of a 
fictitious defense to avoid repayment, the hearing judge’s conclusion of a selfish motive is 
33 
 
 
supported by clear and convincing evidence.  Accordingly, we agree with the hearing judge 
and overrule Respondent’s exception.     
False Testimony 
Third, the hearing judge found Respondent falsely testified by mischaracterizing the 
loan and claiming he advised Mr. Langley to seek independent counsel.  Respondent 
repeats his prior exceptions on this topic.  We agree with the hearing judge that Respondent 
submitted false testimony.  Thus, we agree with the hearing judge that these falsehoods are 
an aggravating factor and, as a result, we overrule Respondent’s exception.   
Pattern of Misconduct 
Fourth, the hearing judge found Respondent displayed a pattern of misconduct by 
failing to get Mr. Langley’s informed consent to any proposed modifications to the loan 
agreement and repeatedly mischaracterizing the loan.  Respondent contends there was no 
pattern of misconduct.  For the same reasons articulated in discussing Respondent’s false 
testimony, we agree with the hearing judge that Respondent’s pattern of 
mischaracterizations is an aggravating factor.   
Refusal to Acknowledge the Wrongful Nature of the Misconduct 
Finally, the hearing judge found Respondent “failed to acknowledge the wrongful 
nature of his conduct, instead throughout the process and in [c]ourt he blames others for 
his own misconduct[.]”  Indeed, Respondent takes exception and asserts that he did nothing 
wrong.  As discussed supra, we agree Respondent committed various violations of the 
34 
 
 
MARPC, and we further agree Respondent’s failure to acknowledge his wrongful conduct 
is an aggravating factor and we, therefore, overrule Respondent’s exception. 
SANCTION 
“It is well-established that the purpose of sanctions is not to punish the attorney.  
Sanctions are also designed to effect general and specific deterrence.  Our guiding principle 
in determining sanctions for ethical violations is our interest in protecting the public and 
the public’s confidence in the legal profession.”  Bonner, 477 Md. at 607, 271 A.3d at 268 
(quotation marks and citations omitted).  Through sanction, we “protect members of the 
public from attorneys who have demonstrated that they are unfit for the practice of law.”  
Kalarestaghi, 483 Md. at 243, 291 A.3d at 764 (quotation marks and citation omitted).  
“[T]he appropriate sanction for [] violation[s] of the [MARPC] depends on the facts and 
circumstances of each case, including consideration of any mitigating factors [and 
aggravating factors].  [W]e impose a sanction that is commensurate with the nature and 
gravity of the violations and the intent with which they were committed.”  Id. at 244, 291 
A.3d at 765 (quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in original). 
Petitioner recommends disbarment.  Petitioner distinguishes Respondent’s conduct 
from that of the attorneys in Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Collins, 477 Md. 482, 270 Md. 
917 (2022) and Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Sloane to argue that Respondent’s conduct 
warrants disbarment rather than suspension.  Respondent asserts he committed no 
violations and no sanction is warranted.  In Collins, disbarment was removed as the 
standard sanction in cases where “there was no theft or intentional misappropriation of 
35 
 
 
funds by the attorney, the attorney had not benefitted or profited from the misconduct, and 
no client had been harmed.”  477 Md. at 530, 270 A.3d. at 946.  Likewise, Sloane concluded 
disbarment was not appropriate where the respondent’s misconduct was limited to a single 
matter, and he had no prior discipline.  483 Md. at 172, 290 A.3d at 1050 (“Respondent’s 
lack of prior attorney discipline over his extensive career cautions against the ultimate 
sanction of disbarment.”).   
Here, unlike Collins, Respondent attempted to deprive Mr. Langley of $26,000 to 
$40,000.  Respondent tried to accomplish this by lying to Mr. Langley and the circuit court 
in Langley v. Donnelly.  Respondent’s refusal to repay also harmed Mr. Langley by forcing 
him to go to court to recover and depriving him of tens of thousands of dollars for nearly a 
decade.  See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Edib, 415 Md. 696, 721, 4 A.3d 957, 972 (2010) 
(recognizing that clients were harmed in two cases in which attorneys took fees for no work 
or incompetent work).  And unlike Sloane, Respondent has been previously disciplined.  
Donnelly, 458 Md. at 325–26, 182 A.3d at 794–95.  Further, Respondent brought no one 
to testify to his good reputation in the community.  See Sloane, 483 Md. at 171, 290 A.3d 
at 1050 (“Respondent maintains a good reputation among his clients and friends, as 
evidenced by the testimony of his character witnesses.”).   
Respondent’s purposeful and repeated mischaracterizations in an attempt to avoid 
repaying Mr. Langley and skirt discipline is not the harmless misconduct contemplated by 
Collins and Sloane.  Respondent’s case is closer to Wemple, as he “never acknowledged 
the wrongful nature of his misconduct; rather, [r]espondent belatedly attempted to excuse 
36 
 
 
his conduct with assertions of illness without proper documentation or support.”  479 Md. 
at 204, 277 A.3d at 449.   
“Candor and truthfulness are two of the most important moral character traits of a 
lawyer.”  Myers, 333 Md. at 449, 635 A.2d at 1319.  It is this Court’s obligation to “protect 
members of the public from attorneys who have demonstrated that they are unfit for the 
practice of law.”  Kalarestaghi, 483 Md. at 243, 291 A.3d at 764 (quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  Based on Respondent’s MARPC violations, the lack of mitigating 
factors, and the presence of several aggravating factors, we conclude the appropriate 
sanction must be disbarment.  
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, we disbar Respondent for his violations of MARPC 19-
301.4, 19-301.8(a), 19-303.1, 19-303.3(a), 19-308.1(a), and 19-308.4(a)–(d).   
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT 
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED 
BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, 
INCLUDING 
COSTS 
OF 
ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS, 
PURSUANT 
TO 
MARYLAND RULE 19-709(d), FOR 
WHICH 
SUM 
JUDGMENT 
IS 
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE 
ATTORNEY 
GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION AGAINST VERNON 
CHARLES DONNELLY.