Case Title: Harris v. City of Newark, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2022-03-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office
of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor
approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.

               Hamid Harris v. City of Newark (A-59-20) (085028)

Argued November 30, 2021 -- Decided March 30, 2022

JUSTICE PATTERSON, writing for a unanimous Court.

       In this appeal, the Court reviews the Appellate Division’s order dismissing the
notice of appeal filed by defendants the City of Newark, Detective Donald Stabile,
and Police Officer Angel Romero following the trial court’s denial of their motion
for summary judgment, in which defendants asserted qualified immunity as a
defense to plaintiff Hamid Harris’s claims brought under the New Jersey Civil
Rights Act (NJCRA),  N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2. Defendants contend that the trial
court’s order denying summary judgment was a legal determination and should
therefore be deemed appealable as of right, in keeping with both New Jersey
appellate practice and federal law.

       Plaintiff alleges that Stabile, a Newark Police Department detective, falsely
accused him of four armed robberies that were committed in Newark in January
2015 and unlawfully arrested him in connection with those robberies based on an
improperly issued arrest warrant. After the charges against plaintiff were dismissed,
he filed this action. He asserted, as relevant here, NJCRA claims against Stabile for
false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution and an NJCRA claim
against Stabile and Romero for civil rights conspiracy. Defendants asserted the
defense of qualified immunity to those claims and moved for summary judgment.

       The trial court rejected defendants’ claim. It reasoned that because Stabile
did not have probable cause to arrest plaintiff, and because Stabile’s belief that
plaintiff committed the robberies was objectively unreasonable, defendants were not
entitled to qualified immunity.

       Defendants filed a notice of appeal, asserting that Rule 2:2-3(a)(3) authorized
them to appeal as of right the trial court’s decision denying qualified immunity.
They also moved for leave to file an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 2:5-6.
The Appellate Division ruled that “[t]he appeal is interlocutory as it is not from a
final order” and dismissed defendants’ notice of appeal. The appellate court also
denied defendants’ motion for leave to appeal. The Court granted certification.  246 N.J. 231 (2021).

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HELD: The trial court’s order in this case was a decision premised on factual
findings as well as legal conclusions, not an exclusively legal determination. A trial
court’s order rejecting as a matter of law a claim of qualified immunity should not
be designated as a final order appealable as of right under Rule 2:2-3(a), and federal
law does not require the contrary result. In an NJCRA action, a defendant seeking to
challenge a trial court’s order denying qualified immunity prior to final judgment
must proceed by motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal in accordance with
Rules 2:2-4 and 2:5-6.

1. The NJCRA provides a remedy for deprivation of or interference with federal
civil rights and substantive rights guaranteed by New Jersey’s Constitution and laws.
See  N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c). Qualified immunity operates to shield government officials
performing discretionary functions generally from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known. Generally, application of the
defense of qualified immunity is a legal question for the court rather than the jury
that should be raised before trial. Case law, however, recognizes an exception to the
rule that qualified immunity issues are legal issues to be decided by the court when
the case involves disputed issues of fact. (pp. 10-12)

2. Here, the trial court’s denial of summary judgment was premised on factual
disputes as well as the court’s legal conclusions. It was not an exclusively legal
determination. The court identified factual disputes regarding plaintiff’s false arrest
and false imprisonment civil rights claims and witnesses’ identifications of plaintiff,
and the court stated that those factual disputes precluded summary judgment on the
issue of qualified immunity. (pp. 13-14)

3. The Court nevertheless considers the issue raised in this appeal: whether a trial
court’s purely legal determination denying qualified immunity should be appealable
as of right under Rule 2:2-3(a). The court rules governing New Jersey appellate
practice generally draw a sharp distinction between final judgments appealable as of
right and interlocutory orders that may be challenged by motion for leave to appeal
governed by the “interest of justice” standard. Rule 2:2-3(a)(3), however, authorizes
an appeal as of right to the Appellate Division in such cases as are provided by law,
and lists a group of orders that, although technically interlocutory, are appealable as
final judgments. The Court reviews three decisions in which it diverged from the
general policy against piecemeal determinations to deem specific categories of
interlocutory orders final for purposes of appeal. See Moon v. Warren Haven
Nursing Home,  182 N.J. 507 (2005); Wein v. Morris,  194 N.J. 364, (2008); GMAC
v. Pittella,  205 N.J. 572 (2011). In those decisions, the Court considered such
factors as the impact of an immediate right to appeal on the litigation between the
parties, the burdens imposed on the parties, the language and legislative purpose of
the governing statute, the prospect of substantial prejudice to parties absent an
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appeal as of right, and uniformity in appellate procedure as applied to similar
categories of trial court orders. (pp. 14-19)

4. Several of those factors inform the Court’s decision in this appeal. First, a
motion for leave to appeal pursuant to Rules 2:2-4 and 2:5-6 provides a meaningful
opportunity for interlocutory appellate review and protects the public entity’s
interest in avoiding trial costs and potential liability. Second, in contrast to the
legislative goals of the tort claims and arbitration statutes reviewed in Moon, Wein,
and GMAC, the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the NJCRA would not be
advanced by appeal as of right. Third, the NJCRA does not prescribe appellate
review of some orders and deny appellate review of other orders, and so uniformity
in the application of laws is not a factor here. Fourth, an appeal as of right of the
trial court’s qualified immunity decision would not resolve this litigation, given
plaintiff’s tort claims. Here, the Court perceives no reason to depart from the
general policy in favor of restrained appellate review of issues relating to matters
still before the trial court to avoid piecemeal litigation. The Court declines to add
legal determinations denying the defense of qualified immunity to the narrow class
of interlocutory orders subject to direct appeal under Rule 2:2-3(a). (pp. 19-21)

5. The Court next considers defendants’ contention that Rule 2:2-3(a) should be
conformed to federal law by adopting the collateral order doctrine that governs
appellate practice in federal civil rights actions. Under United States Supreme Court
case law, a state may adopt or reject the collateral order doctrine even in actions
brought in state court under federal law, and a state is clearly free to adopt or reject
that doctrine in state court actions premised on state civil rights statutes such as the
NJCRA. The Court views New Jersey’s current appellate procedure to effectively
balance the interests of the parties and promote judicial economy in NJCRA actions
and declines to adopt the collateral order doctrine for such claims. (pp. 21-27)

6. The Court also disagrees with defendants’ contention that Rule 2:2-3(a), as
applied to this appeal, is preempted by federal law. Rule 2:2-3(a) is clearly a neutral
state procedural rule, and it does not determine the outcome of this appeal, let alone
raise the specter of inconsistent dispositions of civil rights claims in state and federal
court. See Johnson v. Fankell,