Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner

Citation: 2003-Ohio-4048

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2003-08-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003-Ohio-4048.] 
 
 
OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. GARDNER. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003-Ohio-4048.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Six-month suspension — Engaging in 
undignified or discourteous conduct that is degrading to a tribunal — 
Knowingly making a false accusation about a judge — Attorney may be 
sanctioned for making accusations of judicial impropriety that a 
reasonable attorney would believe are false. 
(No. 2002-1461 — Submitted January 8, 2003 — Decided August 13, 2003.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 01-76. 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Respondent, Mark J. Gardner of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0061172, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in May 
1993.  On August 13, 2001, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, filed a complaint 
charging respondent with several violations of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility, including DR 7-106(C)(6) (engaging in undignified or 
discourteous conduct which is degrading to a tribunal) and 8-102(B) (knowingly 
making a false accusation about a judge).  A panel of the Board of Commissioners 
on Grievances and Discipline heard the matter and, based on stipulations and 
respondent’s testimony, made findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
recommended a sanction. 
{¶2} 
The record establishes that in 2001, respondent appealed to the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth District on behalf of a client convicted of driving 
under a court-ordered license suspension.  Respondent challenged the conviction 
as a denial of due process, arguing that his client had not received sufficient 
notice of the crime with which he had been charged.  Respondent essentially 
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acknowledged that his client was guilty of driving in violation of a court order; 
however, he maintained that the police officer had mistakenly charged his client 
with driving in violation of Ohio’s Financial Responsibility Act (“FRA”), a crime 
of which his client was not guilty.  The court of appeals affirmed the conviction.1 
{¶3} 
In a motion seeking reconsideration or, in the alternative, 
certification of the case as a conflict to this court, respondent accused the panel 
that decided his client’s appeal of being dishonest and ignoring well-established 
law.  He declared that the panel had issued an opinion so “result driven” that “any 
fair-minded judge” would have been “ashamed to attach his/her name” to it.  He 
then added that the panel did not give “a damn about how wrong, disingenuous, 
and biased its opinion is.” 
{¶4} 
Throughout the several pages that followed, respondent inveighed 
against the panel, contrasting it with “fair-minded Ohio appellate districts” and 
stating that “[n]o matter how bad [the] panel wants to skew or ignore the facts,” it 
could only conclude that his client had been improperly charged.  He lamented 
that “honesty and truth [were] damned” in the panel’s opinion and that the panel’s 
“desire to be ‘tough on crime’ [had] blind[ed] it to basic law and fairness.”  
Respondent then posed these questions: “Why does this panel only apply the law 
as a hammer to crush citizens and not as a shield to protect their basic rights?” and 
                                                 
1 During the trial and appeal, respondent emphasized that the crimes of driving under a court-
ordered license suspension and driving under an FRA license suspension were different 
subsections of the general ordinance prohibiting driving under suspension.  He argued that his 
client had actually been charged with the “wrong” crime because the charging officer had 
identified only the general ordinance on the client’s ticket, the officer had described the 
suspension as “FRA,” and the officer’s trial testimony suggested that he had intended to charge 
the client with an FRA suspension violation.  On the authority of Barberton v. O’Connor (1985), 
17 Ohio St.3d 218, 17 OBR 452, 478 N.E.2d 803, paragraph two of the syllabus, the court of 
appeals held that the client was sufficiently charged because the general ordinance noted on the 
ticket allowed the client with “reasonable inquiry” to know exactly the charge against him.  
Lakewood v. Cirino (Feb. 1, 2001), Cuyahoga App. No. 78057, appeal not allowed (2001), 92 
Ohio St.3d 1414, 748 N.E.2d 547. 
January Term, 2003 
3 
“Is having a prosecutorial bent [so] hard to let go of that truth must be cast aside 
to achieve a particular result?” 
{¶5} 
Respondent went on to accuse the panel of having “distorted the 
truth” and having “manufactured a gross and malicious distortion.”  His 
discussion continued: 
{¶6} 
“Wouldn’t it be nice if this panel had the basic decency and 
honesty to write and acknowledge these simple unquestionable truths in its 
opinion?  Would writing an opinion that actually reflected the truth be that hard?  
Must this panel’s desire to achieve a particular result upholding a wrongful 
conviction of a man who was unquestionably guilty of an uncharged offense—
necessarily justify its own corruption of the law and truth?  Doesn’t an oath to 
uphold and follow the law mean anything to this panel? 
{¶7} 
“Is that claim that ‘We are a nation of laws, not men’ have any 
meaning after reading the panel’s decision?  Can’t this panel have the decency to 
actually address—rather than to ignore—the cases cited by [the client] which 
demonstrate beyond any doubt that he was convicted of an offense he was never 
charged with having violated? 
{¶8} 
“In this case, beyond the ignored concepts of the law and truth, lies 
that of policy.  As a policy matter, is this court really encouraging all officers in 
the Eighth District to charge a generic statute—or Chapter or Title—and not the 
particular offense they are accusing a citizen of violating?  In the name of God, 
WHY?  What is so difficult with a police officer doing his job in an intelligent 
manner?  Why must this panel bend over backwards and ignore well established 
law just to encourage law officers to be slovenly and careless?  In State v. Homan 
(2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 421 [732 N.E.2d 952], didn’t the Ohio Supreme Court just 
state that officers actually have to follow the rules strictly?  Doesn’t that mean 
anything to this panel? 
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{¶9} 
“Perhaps, if this panel is not strong enough to admit its obvious 
prosecutorial bias in its opinion, it will discover the internal fortitude to certify 
this matter to the Ohio Supreme Court under Rule IV of the Rules of Practice of 
the Supreme Court of Ohio.” 
{¶10} The board’s panel found, consistent with the parties’ stipulation, 
that respondent had violated DR 7-106(C)(6).  The panel also found respondent in 
violation of DR 8-102(B) by clear and convincing evidence. 
{¶11} In recommending a sanction, the panel considered that respondent 
had no previous record of discipline and had apologized for the manner in which 
he expressed his frustration about the affirmance of his client’s conviction.  
Respondent also recognized during the hearing that his response to the court of 
appeals’ opinion was neither appropriate nor professional.  However, while 
respondent professed to understand the need to challenge judicial decisions only 
in an appropriate manner, he confirmed his continued belief that the court of 
appeals during his client’s appeal had skewed and ignored the facts, disregarded 
honesty and truth, and violated their oaths to decide cases fairly and impartially. 
{¶12} The panel recommended the sanction suggested by the parties – 
that respondent be publicly reprimanded for the cited misconduct.  The board 
adopted the findings that respondent violated DR 7-106(C)(6) and 8-102(B), but 
rejected the panel’s sanction.  The board recommended, based on his “outrageous 
behavior toward a tribunal,” that respondent be suspended from the practice of 
law for a period of six months, with all six months stayed on the condition that he 
commit no further violations of the Disciplinary Rules. 
{¶13} In objections to the board’s finding that he violated DR 8-102(B) 
and its recommendation, respondent argues that his accusations are federally 
protected free speech because they are opinions and thus immune from 
disciplinary measures in the same way that mere opinions are not actionable in 
defamation.  He also argues that even if his attacks were capable of being proved 
January Term, 2003 
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true or false, relator nevertheless failed to prove that respondent knowingly made 
“false” accusations for the purpose of DR 8-102(B). We review these arguments 
to determine whether respondent’s statements, which specifically accuse the 
appellate court panel of prosecutorial bias and corrupting the law in order to 
sustain an unlawful conviction, may be disciplined as professional misconduct. 
The First Amendment 
{¶14} The United States Supreme Court has held that “[i]t is 
unquestionable that in the courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever 
right to ‘free speech’ an attorney has is extremely circumscribed.  * * * Even 
outside the courtroom, a majority of the Court in two separate opinions in the case 
of In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 [79 S.Ct.1376, 3 L.Ed.2d 1473] (1959), observed 
that lawyers in pending cases were subject to ethical restrictions on speech to 
which an ordinary citizen would not be.”  Gentile v. Nevada State Bar (1991), 501 
U.S. 1030, 1071, 111 S.Ct. 2720, 115 L.Ed.2d 888.  See, also, In re Disciplinary 
Action Against Garaas (N.D.2002), 652 N.W.2d 918, 925.  An attorney’s speech 
may be sanctioned if it is highly likely to obstruct or prejudice the administration 
of justice.  Gentile at 1075, 111 S.Ct. 2720, 115 L.Ed.2d 888.  These narrow 
restrictions are justified by the integral role that attorneys play in the judicial 
system, which requires them to refrain from speech or conduct that may obstruct 
the fair administration of justice.  Id. at 1074, 111 S.Ct. 2720, 115 L.Ed.2d 888. 
{¶15} Thus, attorneys may not invoke the federal constitutional right of 
free speech to immunize themselves from even-handed discipline for proven 
unethical conduct.  In re Sawyer (1959), 360 U.S. 622, 646, 79 S.Ct. 1376, 3 
L.Ed.2d 1473 (Stewart, J., concurring in result).  The First Amendment does not 
shield an attorney from discipline for falsely suggesting “unseemly complicity” 
by the judiciary in unlawful or unethical practices.  Id. at 633, 79 S.Ct. 1376, 3 
L.Ed.2d 1473.  Such false statements, whether by attorneys or others, enjoy no 
constitutional protection when they are made with knowledge of their falsity or 
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reckless disregard for their truth.  Garrison v. Louisiana (1964), 379 U.S. 64, 75, 
85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125.  Although neither Sawyer nor in In re Snyder 
(1985), 472 U.S. 634, 105 S.Ct. 2874, 86 L.Ed.2d 504, definitively so held, all of 
the justices who participated in those decisions assumed or stated that a lawyer’s 
false accusations of criminal conduct directed against named judges could be the 
basis for discipline.  In re Palmisano (C.A.7, 1995), 70 F.3d 483, 487.  “Even a 
statement cast in the form of an opinion (‘I think that Judge X is dishonest’) 
implies a factual basis, and the lack of support for that implied factual assertion 
may be a proper basis for a penalty.”  Id. at 487, citing Milkovich v. Lorain 
Journal Co. (1990), 497 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1.  While Milkovich 
is a defamation case not involving attorney discipline, it demonstrates that the 
First Amendment does not protect any individual who knowingly makes false 
statements or expresses opinions that imply false statements of fact.  In re 
Complaint Against Harper (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 211, 673 N.E.2d 1253. 
{¶16} Thus, the First Amendment does not insulate an attorney from 
professional discipline even for expressing an opinion, during court proceedings, 
that a judge is corrupt when the attorney knows that the opinion has no factual 
basis or is reckless in that regard.  Respondent’s contention that his statements are 
protected as unverifiable opinions is incorrect.  Milkovich rejected the premise 
that the First Amendment mandates an inquiry into whether a statement is one of 
opinion or of fact.  Id. at 18-19, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1.  Accordingly, the 
United States Constitution offers respondent no protection. 
Section 11, Article I, Ohio Constitution 
{¶17} This court has never addressed the question of whether the Free 
Speech Clause of the Ohio Constitution, Section 11, Article I, forbids imposing 
discipline on an attorney for criticizing a judge during a pending court 
proceeding.  DR 8-102(B) specifically permits such discipline where a lawyer 
knowingly makes a false accusation against a judge.  Section 11 states: 
January Term, 2003 
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{¶18} “Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments 
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of the right; and no law shall be 
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech * * *.” 
{¶19} The tension between Section 11 and DR 8-102(B) lies at the heart 
of this case.  Under Ohio law, speech that may violate DR 8-102(B) may be 
otherwise protected by the state Constitution.  When the statement in question 
cannot reasonably be interpreted by the ordinary reader as stating actual facts 
about an individual, the statement is protected as the free expression of opinion 
under Section 11.  Harper, 77 Ohio St.3d at 229, 673 N.E.2d 1253; McKimm v. 
Ohio Elections Comm. (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 139, 144, 729 N.E.2d 364.  Thus, 
the Ohio Constitution goes beyond the federal Constitution in that certain false 
statements of opinion are protected.  This protection exists as a separate and 
independent guarantee ancillary to freedom of expression and requires a 
reviewing court to determine whether the language in question is fact or opinion.  
Vail v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 279, 649 N.E.2d 182, 
certiorari denied (1996), 516 U.S. 1043, 116 S.Ct.700, 133 L.Ed.2d 657; Wampler 
v. Higgins (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 111, 117-118, 752 N.E.2d 962.  The test for 
deciding whether a statement is fact or opinion is an objective one based on a 
totality of circumstances and on the specificity, verifiability, general context, and 
social context of the words used.  Id. at 126, 752 N.E.2d 962; McKimm, 89 Ohio 
St.3d at 145, 729 N.E.2d 364. 
{¶20} In re Complaint Against Judge Harper, 77 Ohio St.3d 211, 673 
N.E.2d 1253,  employed this distinction to publicly reprimand a judge for airing a 
campaign advertisement that falsely accused her judicial opponent of being 
associated with dishonest lawyers intent upon corrupting the legal system.  
Although the Harper court did not explicitly apply the totality-of-circumstances 
test for distinguishing fact from opinion, the accusation in that case was 
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sufficiently specific and weighed in favor of sanction.  The advertisement in 
effect charged the judge’s opponent with a crime—conspiring to fix cases. 
{¶21} To accuse a court of appeals of affirming a conviction out of 
prosecutorial bias and corruption is no less specific.  Such allegations are charges 
of criminal or unethical activity and, therefore, constitute classic examples of 
statements having a well-defined meaning.  Wampler, 93 Ohio St.3d at 128, 752 
N.E.2d 962, citing Ollman v. Evans (C.A.D.C.1984), 750 F.2d 970, 979-980.  
Accord Standing Commt. on Discipline, U.S. Dist. Court, Cent. Dist. of Calif. v. 
Yagman (C.A.9, 1995), 55 F.3d 1430, 1440 (statements that can reasonably be 
understood as imputing specific criminal or other wrongful acts are not entitled to 
constitutional protection merely because they are phrased in the form of an 
opinion).  Allegations of criminal or ethical misconduct are also readily capable 
of being proved or disproved. 
{¶22} Moreover, allegations of corruption made in documents filed in 
court, unlike allegations raised in a political campaign, are not what the average 
reader would reasonably consider to be an opinion.  A courtroom is not a forum 
for personal or political grandstanding, and the attorneys who practice in it 
“possess, and are perceived by the public as possessing, special knowledge of the 
workings of the judicial branch of government.”  State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar 
Assn. v. Porter (Okla.1988), 766 P.2d 958, 969.  Lawyers’ statements made 
during court proceedings are “likely to be received as especially authoritative.”  
Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074, 111 S.Ct. 2720, 115 L.Ed.2d 888.  Thus, in the context 
of his motion and that appeal, respondent’s statements are reasonably understood 
to be factual assertions of the appellate court’s corruption and prosecutorial bias. 
{¶23} Accordingly, we reject respondent’s contention that his attacks 
against the court of appeals represented any sort of “rhetorical hyperbole” or 
“imaginative expression” for which he might escape sanction.  Harper, 77 Ohio 
St.3d at 229, 673 N.E.2d 1253, quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 
January Term, 2003 
9 
111 L.Ed.2d 1.  Nor could respondent’s accusations be “ ‘loosely definable’ ” or “ 
‘variously interpretable’ ” as his criticism of the law as applied by the panel.  
Wampler, 93 Ohio St.3d at 128, 752 N.E.2d 962, quoting Ollman, 750 F.2d at 
980.  Accord In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 634, 79 S.Ct. 1376, 3 L.Ed.2d 1473.  
Respondent charged with “crystal clarity,” Wampler, 93 Ohio St.3d at 129, 752 
N.E.2d 962, that the panel’s affirmation of his client’s conviction resulted not 
from error, but from prosecutorial bias and corruption.  For this offense against 
the integrity and impartiality of the court of appeals and the judicial system, he 
may be held responsible.  Harper, 77 Ohio St.3d at 229, 673 N.E.2d 1253. 
Knowledge 
{¶24} DR 8-102(B) provides that a lawyer “shall not knowingly make 
false accusations against a judge or other adjudicatory officer.”  Respondent 
claims that this prohibition required relator to prove that his accusations of 
prosecutorial bias and corruption were false and that he subjectively knew that 
they were false.  Relator urges us to apply an objective test. 
{¶25} Respondent advocates the “actual malice” standard applicable in 
defamation cases under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), 376 U.S. 254, 84 
S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686;  Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. (1984), 
466 U.S. 485, 511, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502, fn. 30.  At least three states 
have used the actual-malice standard in attorney discipline cases, that is, they 
have framed the issue as whether the lawyer uttered the statement with knowledge 
that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to its truth.  If no 
knowledge or recklessness is found, these courts have declined to discipline 
lawyers for accusing judges in public of bias.  See In re Green (Colo.2000), 11 
P.3d 1078, 1085; Oklahoma Bar Assn. v. Porter, 766 P.2d 958; Ramsey v. Bd. of 
Professional Responsibility (Tenn.1989), 771 S.W.2d 116, certiorari denied 
(1989), 493 U.S. 917, 110 S.Ct. 278, 107 L.Ed.2d 258.  Similarly, in Butler v. 
Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm. (Ala.2001), 802 So.2d 207, the court modified 
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an overbroad judicial canon by incorporating the actual-malice test for judicial 
campaign speech. 
{¶26} We, however, agree with the majority of courts that have addressed 
this issue and adopt “an objective standard to determine whether a lawyer’s 
statement about a judicial officer is made with knowledge or reckless disregard of 
its falsity.”  Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct (4th Ed.1999) 566, 
Rule 8.  This standard assesses an attorney’s statements in terms of “ ‘what the 
reasonable attorney, considered in light of all his professional functions, would do 
in the same or similar circumstances’ * * * [and] focuses on whether the attorney 
had a reasonable factual basis for making the statements, considering their nature 
and the context in which they were made.”  Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1437, quoting 
United States Dist. Court, E. Dist. of Wash. v. Sandlin (C.A.9, 1993), 12 F.3d 861, 
867.  Accord In re Chmura (2000), 461 Mich. 517, 608 N.W.2d 31; In re 
Disciplinary Action Against Graham (Minn.1990), 453 N.W.2d 313, 321-322, 
certiorari denied sub nom. Graham v. Wernz (1990), 498 U.S. 820, 111 S.Ct. 67, 
112 L.Ed.2d 41; In re Westfall (Mo.1991), 808 S.W.2d 829, 837; and In re 
Holtzman (1991), 78 N.Y.2d 184, 192-193, 573 N.Y.S.2d 39, 577 N.E.2d 30, 
certiorari denied sub nom. Holtzman v. Tenth Judicial Dist. Grievance Commt. 
(1991), 502 U.S. 1009, 112 S.Ct. 648, 116 L.Ed.2d 665. 
{¶27} “As the Court of Appeals of New York observed in Holtzman, 
supra, at 192, 573 N.Y.S.2d 39, 577 N.E.2d 30, adopting a subjective standard 
‘would immunize all accusations, however reckless or irresponsible, from censure 
as long as the attorney uttering them did not actually entertain serious doubts as to 
their truth * * * .’  The state’s interest in protecting the public, the administration 
of justice, and the legal profession supports applying a different standard in 
disciplinary proceedings.”  Chmura, 461 Mich. at 543, 608 N.W.2d 31, quoting 
Sandlin,12 F.3d at 867. 
January Term, 2003 
11 
{¶28} Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1437-1438, further explained why an 
“objective version” of the actual-malice test is permissible in the context of 
disciplinary proceedings: 
{¶29} “[T]here are significant differences between the interests served by 
defamation law and those served by rules of professional ethics.  Defamation 
actions seek to remedy an essentially private wrong by compensating individuals 
for harm caused to their reputation and standing in the community.  Ethical rules 
that prohibit false statements impugning the integrity of judges, by contrast, are 
not designed to shield judges from unpleasant or offensive criticism, but to 
preserve public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of our system of 
justice.  See In re Terry, 271 Ind. 499 [502], 394 N.E.2d 94, 95 (1979); In re 
Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313, 322 (Minn.1990). 
{¶30} “Though attorneys can play an important role in exposing 
problems with the judicial system, see Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. 
Porter, 766 P.2d 958, 967 (Okla.1988), false statements impugning the integrity 
of a judge erode public confidence without serving to publicize problems that 
justifiably deserve attention.  * * * [A]n objective malice standard strikes a 
constitutionally permissible balance between an attorney’s right to criticize the 
judiciary and the public’s interest in preserving confidence in the judicial system: 
Lawyers may freely voice criticisms supported by a reasonable factual basis even 
if they turn out to be mistaken.” (Emphasis added.) 
{¶31} We similarly conclude that the state’s compelling interest in 
preserving public confidence in the judiciary supports applying a standard in 
disciplinary proceedings different from that applicable in defamation cases.  
Under the objective standard, an attorney may still freely exercise free speech 
rights and make statements supported by a reasonable factual basis, even if the 
attorney turns out to be mistaken.  Accord In re Chmura, 461 Mich. at 544, 608 
N.W.2d 31.  Accordingly, we hold that an attorney may be sanctioned for making 
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accusations of judicial impropriety that a reasonable attorney would believe are 
false. 
{¶32} Relator does not contest that it bore the burden of proof on this 
issue.  Thus, we determine that a reasonable attorney would believe that 
respondent’s accusations were false. 
{¶33} Respondent obviously disagreed with the court of appeals’ analysis 
and disposition of his client’s appeal.  But as relator aptly points out, he made no 
real inquiry into the court’s integrity at all prior to launching his attacks, even 
ignoring his law partner’s advice against making the accusations of bias and 
corruption.  A failure to investigate charges of judicial impropriety when EC 8-6 
admonishes attorneys to “be certain” that their criticism has merit demonstrates 
reckless disregard for truth.  This is particularly true where, as here, the attorney 
proceeds against the advice of a close colleague in whom he has previously 
shown confidence. 
{¶34} Moreover, we have reviewed the court of appeals’ opinion for 
evidence of bias and corruption and see nothing that could possibly be 
characterized as anything other than error, if that.  Respondent simply assumed 
that the judges had conspired to defy their individual oaths to faithfully and 
impartially discharge the duties incumbent on their respective judicial offices to 
the best of their ability and understanding.  R.C. 3.23.  He thereby violated DR 8-
102(B). 
Sanction 
{¶35} We find respondent in violation of DR 7-106(C) and 8-102(B).  
We also find that his misconduct warrants a more serious sanction than that 
recommended by the board. 
{¶36} Unfounded attacks against the integrity of the judiciary require an 
actual suspension from the practice of law.  Disciplinary Counsel v. West (1999), 
85 Ohio St.3d 5, 706 N.E.2d 760 (18-month suspension, 12 months stayed on 
January Term, 2003 
13 
conditions); Columbus Bar Assn. v. Hartwell (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 258, 520 
N.E.2d 226 (one-year suspension).  Respondent is therefore suspended from the 
practice of law in Ohio for a period of six months.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, BOWMAN and O’CONNOR, JJ., 
concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
 
DONNA BOWMAN, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for COOK, J. 
__________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶37} I concur with the majority’s judgment and most of its analysis.  
However, I do not believe that Section 11, Article I of the Ohio Constitution and 
DR 8-102(B) are in conflict because I do not believe that the Ohio Constitution 
protects “false statements of opinion.” 
{¶38} The majority indicates that there is a conflict between DR 8-
102(B) and Section 11, Article I of the Ohio Constitution because DR 8-102(B) 
prohibits “false accusations against a judge” while the Ohio Constitution protects 
“certain false statements of opinion.”  I believe that the Ohio Constitution protects 
opinions but not false statements of opinion. 
{¶39} In support of its position, the majority cites In re Complaint 
Against Harper (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 211, 229, 673 N.E.2d 1253, and McKimm 
v. Ohio Elections Comm. (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 139, 144, 729 N.E.2d 364.  The 
cited portion of McKimm merely holds that alleged defamatory statements must 
be examined from a reasonable reader’s perspective to distinguish fact from 
opinion.  In Harper we recognized that an opinion is often “ ‘rhetorical 
hyperbole,’ ” which cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts.  
Harper, 77 Ohio St.3d at 229, 673 N.E.2d 1253, quoting Greenbelt Coop. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Publishing Assn., Inc. v. Bresler (1970), 398 U.S. 6, 14, 90 S.Ct. 1537, 26 
L.Ed.2d 6. 
{¶40} I believe that a false statement of opinion connotes a deceitfulness 
that is absent in hyperbole.  Accordingly, a distinction must be drawn between 
statements that may be reasonably interpreted by the ordinary reader as stating 
actual facts about an individual versus statements that can reasonably be 
interpreted by the reader as a free expression of an opinion only of the author.  
See Harper, 77 Ohio St.3d at 229, 673 N.E.2d 1253; McKimm, 89 Ohio St.3d at 
144, 729 N.E.2d 364.  Stating that a “false statement of opinion” is protected by 
the Ohio Constitution precariously and unnecessarily blurs the line between a 
mere opinion, which is protected by the Ohio Constitution, and a false statement 
of fact, which is not always protected. 
{¶41} Accordingly, I believe that the better approach is to state that the 
Ohio Constitution protects opinions, but not false statements of opinion.  
Otherwise, I concur with the majority. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶42} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Grimes (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 607, 614 
N.E.2d 740, a case involving a lawyer who made an off-color reference about a 
judge to a newspaper reporter and a smart-aleck remark to another judge in court, 
I dissented from the majority’s decision to impose a public reprimand.  In Grimes, 
I wrote that the conduct at issue was out of character and inconsequential, but also 
that “[o]ur legal system relies upon vigorous advocacy, which occasionally leads 
to spirited interplay between lawyers and judges” and that we “ought not rule in a 
way that may affect that friction.” 66 Ohio St.3d at 610, 614 N.E.2d 740. 
{¶43} I feel much the same way about the respondent in this case.  By all 
accounts, his behavior was out of character.  Certainly, a motion for 
reconsideration in an appellate court, while a public document, would receive 
January Term, 2003 
15 
about as much scrutiny from the public if it were written on the wind.  The 
offending statements were between this attorney and the bench, and were 
presented in such a way that only the bench and opposing counsel would see 
them. 
{¶44} That being said, the disturbing thing about this case that separates 
it from Grimes is that the comments here were not made off-the-cuff in a moment 
of anger.  They were written down, edited, and presumably checked for spelling.  
The attorney then made copies and filed his motion with the court.  At any time 
he could have thought better of his comments and retracted them.  It is a tried and 
true practice that the first thing a lawyer should do with a fiery pleading or letter 
is to file it under his or her pillow. 
{¶45} The respondent here did not do that, or if he did sleep on it, made a 
mistake in filing it with the court.  He admits as much, and thinks he deserves a 
public reprimand.  I agree, especially given the virtually nonpublic release of his 
comments. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
James A. Vollins, for respondent. 
__________________