Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Wingerter

Citation: 400 Md. 214

Docket Number: 71agx/05

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket (Subtitle AG)
 No. 71
September Term, 2005
Attorney Grievance Commission
of Maryland
v.
Rex B. Wingerter
Bell, C.J.
         Raker
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan M.
(Retired, specially assigned)
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C. J.
Filed: July 30, 2007 
1The respondent stands suspended from the practice of law, this Court having
entered an order to that effect on May 4, 2006, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-771 (c).
Rule 16-771 provides that an order of temporary suspension is available when the
respondent has committed a serious crime.   Rule 16-701 (k) (3) defines “serious crime”
as “a crime that is in at least one of the following categories: (1) a felony under Maryland
law, (2) a crime in another state or under federal law that would have been a felony under
Maryland law had the crime been committed in Maryland, and (3) a crime under federal
law or the law of any state that is punishable by imprisonment for three years or more.” 
The hearing court, having reviewed that definition in light of the definition of 
“Professional misconduct” and the proscriptions of Rule 8.4 (a), (b) and (c), opined:
“Noting the acknowledged plea of guilty entered by the Respondent on
August 26, 2005, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia ... to 18 U.S.C. Section 4, misprision of a felony ... , said plea
undisputedly qualifies (by clear and convincing evidence) as a serious crime
under Maryland Rule 16-701 (k) (3) - a crime under Federal law punishable
by imprisonment for three years or more.   It matters not therefore whether
‘misprision of a felony’ is a crime under M aryland law.”
That analysis is consistent with what this Court necessarily must have concluded when
issuing its temporary suspension order.  
2Misprision of a felony, codified at 18 U.S.C. Section 4, a federal, but not a
Maryland, crime, is committed when someone, “having knowledge of the actual
commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not
as soon as possible make known to some judge or other person in civil or military
authority under the United States.”   It is punishable by fine and imprisonment for not
more than three years, or both.
Rex B. Wingerter, the respondent,1 was convicted, following the tender of a guilty
plea in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, of misprision of
a felony.2   In consideration of the plea of guilty, the United States Government dismissed
the remaining counts of a multi-count Indictment that earlier had been filed against him. 
The respondent was thereafter sentenced to a period of imprisonment, a year of supervised
release, community service and a fine.    Subsequently, Bar Counsel, acting on behalf, and
with the approval, of the petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, filed
3Maryland Rule 16-751, as relevant, provides:
“(a)  Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action. ...
“(2) Conviction of Crime; Reciprocal Action. If authorized by
Rule 16-771 (b) or 16-773 (b), Bar Counsel may file a
Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of
Appeals without prior approval of the Commission. Bar
Counsel promptly shall notify the Commission of the filing.
The Commission on review may direct the withdrawal of a
petition that was filed pursuant to this subsection.” 
4 Maryland Rule16-771 (b) provides:
“(b) Petition in Court of Appeals. Upon receiving and verifying information
from any source that an attorney has been convicted of a serious crime, Bar
Counsel may file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the
Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 16-751 (a)(2). The petition may be filed
whether the conviction resulted from a plea of guilty, nolo contendere, or a
verdict after trial and whether an appeal or any other post-conviction
proceeding is pending. The petition shall allege the fact of the conviction
and include a request that the attorney be suspended immediately from the
practice of law. A certified copy of the judgment of conviction shall be
attached to the petition and shall be prima facie evidence of the fact that the
attorney was convicted of the crime charged.”
5Rule 8.4, as relevant, provides:
“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
“(a)  violate or attempt to violate the rules of professional conduct,
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts
of another;
“(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
“(c)   Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation ...[.]”
2
in this Court, pursuant to Maryland Rules 16-7513 and 16-771,4 a Petition for Disciplinary
or Remedial Action.   In that petition, referencing the respondent’s conviction and, indeed
relying on it, the respondent was charged with violating Rule 8.4, Misconduct,5 of the
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, as adopted by Maryland Rule 16-812.  
6Maryland Rule 16-752 (a) provides:
“(a)  Order. Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial
Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any
circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the
record. The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation
with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the
extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of discovery, filing
of motions, and hearing.”  
7Maryland Rule 16-757 (c) provides:
“(c)  Findings and conclusions. The judge shall prepare and file or dictate
into the record a statement of the judge's findings of fact, including findings
as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and conclusions of law. If
dictated into the record, the statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless
the time is extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed
statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record no later
than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The clerk shall mail a copy
of the statement to each party.” 
3
We referred the case, pursuant to Rule 16-752 (a),6 to the Honorable Richard H.
Sothoron, Jr., of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, for hearing pursuant to Rule
16-757 (c).7   Following that hearing, Judge Sothoron found facts, by clear and convincing
evidence, as follows:
“1.  Respondent Rex B. Wingerter, a member of the Maryland Bar since 1986,
entered a plea of guilty in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia (Judge Ellis) on August 26, 2005, by way of a criminal
information, to ‘misprision of a felony,’ in violation of 18 U.S.C., Section 4.
“2.  The charge of ‘misprision of a felony’ is a felony under Federal law and
carries a penalty of not more than three years, in addition to being fined.
“3.  That the transcript of the August 26, 2005, plea proceedings clearly
reflected the voluntariness of the Respondent’s plea and the fact that he was
represented by competent and experienced counsel.
“4.  That the written plea agreement and related statements of facts entered
4
into the record on August 26, 2005, clearly and concisely described the nature
and extent of Respondent’s criminal culpability in committing a misprision of
a felony, the time frame of which covered a period from 2000-2004.
“5.  That the statement of facts is unambiguous in describing dishonest,
fraudulent and deceitful conduct by the Respondent over a time frame from
2000 to 2004 while Respondent was employed as in-house counsel for Global
Recruitment and Immigration Services, Inc. (GRIS) based in Falls Church,
Virginia.
“6.  That the conduct referenced in paragraph 5 included but was not limited
to:
“a.  Respondent’s awareness that his signature on various
immigration documents was being forged.
“b.  Respondent’s awareness that the signatures of immigrant
clients of GRIS were being forged.
“c.  Respondent’s awareness that a light box was being utilized
to forge signatures.
“d.  Respondent’s awareness that hundreds of ETA 750
applications were submitted on behalf of Cleaners of America
(a potential employer of immigrant clients of GRIS) even
though Cleaners of America did not have the capacity to hire
such large numbers of immigrants.
“e.  Respondent’s awareness that he was not, in his capacity as
GRIS’ in house legal counsel, the attorney of record for the
applicants referenced in paragraph d.
“f.  Respondent’s awareness that GRIS was under investigation
by the Federal government regarding the submission of
hundreds of ETA 750 forms on behalf of immigrant clients.
“g.  Respondent’s awareness [that] GRIS was misinforming its
immigrant clients regarding the status of their ETA 750
applications.
“h.  Respondent’s awareness of GRIS charging its immigrant
clients fees to prepare ETA 750 forms.
“7.  That the conduct referred to in paragraph 6 and its subparts was never
reported in any manner to law enforcement authorities by the Respondent.
“8.  That Respondent was sentenced by [Judge Ellis, consistent with the plea
5
agreement and as the hearing court had earlier reported III, and that] this
sentence was within the Federal guideline range and much more lenient than
sentences imposed as to other GRIS principals.”
 
“9.  That as of the date of the November 8, 2006, Attorney Grievance hearing
before this Court, Respondent had successfully completed serving his six
months of incarceration in Cumberland, Maryland, and was currently serving
his six months of community confinement in Rockville, Maryland.”
The hearing court concluded that the charge of misprision of a felony, while not a
crime in Maryland “qualifies as a serious crime in accord with Maryland [Rule] 16.701 (k)
(3).”    It concluded further that it was supported by “the unequivocal and unambiguous
statement of facts” offered as the factual basis for the plea and that the conduct establishing
that charge “constituted misconduct as defined by Rule 8.4 (b) and (c), Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct.”   Indeed, the hearing court expressly determined, by clear and
convincing evidence,  that “Respondent committed a criminal act involving dishonesty, fraud
and misrepresentation, which reflected adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness and fitness
as a lawyer.”
Rule 8.4 (b) and (c) proscribe, respectively, criminal acts which call into question a
lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness and conduct “involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.”   In determining that misprision of a felony was a proper predicate for
those misconduct charges, to which the respondent was called to answer, the hearing court
relied on the factual basis for the respondent’s plea, as indicated.   It also relied on the plea
agreement itself, noting that, in that agreement, the respondent indicated that he was pleading
guilty “because [he was]] in fact guilty of the charged offense,” that he “admit[ted] the facts
8“[A]n ETA 750 application is an application required by the immigration laws and
the regulations prescribed thereunder.”   The respondent agreed, in the statement of facts,
that substantially more than one hundred ETA 750 applications were involved in the
criminal violations referenced and that each of them contained “false statements that were
material to their adjudication.”
6
set forth in the statement of facts filed with this plea agreement and agree[d] that those facts
establish guilt of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.”  With regard to the factual
basis for the plea, significantly, the respondent, having acknowledged the existence, timing
and details of, and the participants engaged in, the conspiracy to commit immigration fraud,
making false statements and encouraging aliens to enter the United States unlawfully,
identified by the government, confessed that he not only 
“did not notify federal judicial or law enforcement authorities of the fraud [or]
take steps to stop the fraud[, he] took at least two steps to conceal the crime.
First, [he] instructed employees at Global to start writing their initials next to
his signature whenever they forged it, but further instructed the same
employees to refrain from marking their initials whenever they forged an
immigrant’s or an employer’s signature on an ETA 750 application[8] (or
related  documents).   [He] instructed the employees so because he was
concerned that if the employees began to initial the forged signatures of the
immigrants and employers on the ETA 750 applications, the initials would
expose the fact that the signatures were in fact forgeries.   Second, [he]
repeatedly informed the Department of Labor and certain immigrant clients
that certain of the employer sponsors had decided to abandon certain ETA 750
applications for economic reasons when in fact he knew or should have known
that it was because the government was investigating Global.”
Statement of Facts, Paragraph 8.   As significantly, the respondent acknowledged, in
paragraph 9 of the statement of facts, that he “abused a position of public trust in the
commission of his offense,” and, in paragraph 11,  that the actions in which he engaged and
7
which were recounted in the statement of facts “were in all respects knowing and deliberate,
and were not committed by mistake, accident, or other innocent reason.”   
In addition, the hearing court determined that the plea and sentencing proceedings are
confirmatory.   The respondent admitted during the plea proceedings that he was aware of
the conspiracy, that “he saw acts that should have led [him] to understand and realize that the
... there was a conspiracy to fraudulently bring in non-citizens into the United States.”  That
conspiracy consisted of forging signatures of the aliens and reporting false job offers and job
descriptions.   Moreover, having heard the recitation of the statement of facts by the Assistant
United States Attorney, who, in addition to reiterating the facts surrounding the fraud
conspiracy, repeated, detailing the specifics,  the respondent’s admission that he took “active
steps to ... conceal the fraud, and not to report it to competent authorities,” the respondent
responded, “Yes, your Honor,” to the trial judge’s inquiry as to its truth and accuracy.
Consistently, the respondent, at the sentencing proceeding, in allocution, advised the
trial court:
“... I am before this Court to be sentenced for misprision of a felony, for failing
to report what I believed to be fraudulent contact - to be fraudulent conduct at
my former place of employment, Global Recruitment and Immigration
Services.
“I make no excuses for my conduct.   I made a series of bad choices during my
tenure at Global and I and my family have suffered tremendously from my
actions.”
  The hearing court also made findings with regard to the respondent’s testimony in
mitigation.   They are:
8
“13.  That the Respondent, by way of his testimony presented at the November
8, 2006, attorney grievance hearing, contradicted the unambiguous statement
of facts that served as the factual basis of his plea. Specifically, the
Respondent:
“a.  disputed the time frame as to when he became aware of any
wrongdoing by GRIS principals;
“b.  disputed committing any fraudulent conduct;
“c.  disputed possessing any criminal intent;
“d.  attributed his actions to bureaucratic sloppiness.
“14.  That the Respondent’s testimony on November 8, 2006, focused upon
minimizing his criminal culpability as outlined in the unambiguous statement
of facts referenced herein.   Further, this position contradicted Respondent’s
admission, without excuse, of guilt before Judge Ellis at both the plea and
sentencing proceedings of August 26 and November 18, 2005, respectively.
“15.   That Respondent’s testimony on November 8, 2006, reflected little, if
any, remorse regarding his conduct as in house counsel for GRIS and the
resulting plea and sentencing for misprision of a felony.
“16.   That the character evidence presented at the November 8, 2006, hearing,
in addition to prior character references provided at the sentencing hearing on
November 18, 2005, all confirmed, as did the pre sentence investigation, that
the Respondent enjoyed a well earned reputation as a respected member of the
bar (prior to his employment with GRIS), specializing in immigration law, a
community activist, a provider of pro bono services, and devoted husband and
father of two teenage children.
“17.  That other than the finding s set forth in paragraph 16, the Respondent
has failed to prove by preponderance of evidence, any additional mitigating
factors.”
The same factors - the plea agreement, the statement of facts in support, the
respondent’s responses during the plea and sentencing proceedings  -  that supported the Rule
8.4 findings and conclusion, the hearing court found undermined and, indeed, all but negated,
the respondent’s mitigation testimony.    Accordingly, it rejected that testimony.
9
The respondent, unlike the petitioner, that took no exceptions to either the hearing
court’s findings of fact or conclusions of law, filed Exceptions of Rex B. Wingerter,
Respondent, To The Findings And Conclusions Of The Hearing Judge And Opposition To
The Recommendation Of Petitioner.   In that pleading, he took three exceptions to the
findings of facts made by the hearing court and the conclusions it drew and offered his
reasons for urging this Court to reject the recommendation of disbarment made by the
petitioner.
The thrust of the first exception, to Paragraph 4, was to dispute the clarity and
conciseness with which his criminal conduct was described.    Thus, noting that he was not
alleged to have been “a direct co-conspirator,” only “that he was present at Global
Recruitment and Immigration Service, Inc. ... at the time in question as in-house counsel, and
that during that time, and based on his activities, he came to have an awareness that the
conspirators were committing the immigration crimes in question,” and that there was no
specific allegation, either in the plea agreement or the statement of facts in support of that
agreement, of a definite time frame when the respondent became aware of those crimes, the
respondent argues that “Paragraph 4 of the Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law is erroneous when it concludes that the Statement of Facts and Plea
Agreement clearly and concisely ‘described the nature and extent of the Respondent’s
criminal culpability in committing a misprision of a felony.”   Necessarily, he submits,
therefore, that “his testimony at the November 8, 2006 hearing is very relevant as to what he
10
knew and when he knew it in judging his culpability.”
The respondent’s second exception is to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Findings of fact and
Conclusions.   Like the first, he decries the manner in which the respondent’s conduct is
described and characterized, and the time frame during which that conduct occurred, arguing
that the factual basis for the plea  “does not unambiguously describe dishonest, fraudulent
or deceitful conduct by Respondent over a time frame from 2000-2004.”   To make the point,
the respondent directs our attention to the Statement of Facts, Paragraph 7, which, he
maintains, “fails to specifically state when, during the course of the conspiracy perpetuated
by others, ... Respondent became aware of their actions.”  That, he submits, contradicts
Paragraph 5 and, in fact, renders it clearly erroneous.
With regard to the Sixth Paragraph, the respondent maintains that his subjective
understanding of the facts enumerated in Paragraph 7 of the Statement of Facts is relevant
and critical to the determination of his culpability.   In that regard, he refers us to the
evidence addressing each of the statements made in the Statement of Facts, which, he asserts,
is both significant and relevant.   That evidence, he explained, illuminated his subjective
understanding of the facts, which was in each instance, contrary to that acquired by the
hearing court from the plea agreement and the statement of facts in support of the plea.   For
example, conceding that he knew, and, indeed, permitted his signature to be signed on “pro
forma” documents, the respondent argues that his signature was not a forgery and that he
“had no fraudulent intent when he authorized employees of Global to sign his name to the
11
routine appearance of counsel on immigration forms.”   Similarly, he denied knowing that
his signature had been signed to hundreds more documents than he authorized until “after the
indictment.”     To like effect, the respondent explained that, although he was aware that the
signatures of aliens and corporate sponsors were being signed to documents by persons other
than the alien and subject corporate sponsor, he trusted the representation of Global’s
management that it had permission to do so.
The respondent complains that, rather than accept his subjective understanding of the
facts, “[t]he Hearing Judge focused solely on the broad record of conviction and concluded
that the Respondent’s behavior at Global was ‘unambiguous ... dishonest, fraudulent and
deceitful’ ... [and] inferred that the Respondent’s explanations almost to be an extension of
his offense by construing that Respondent ‘repeatedly attempted to excuse or minimize his
criminal culpability.”’ Further, he argues:
“It is certain that particular facts within the broad plea agreement did not
comport with the Respondent’s specific, subjective understanding of his
understanding of events.   But the Respondent certainly did not endorse, and
there is nothing in the record to support, the embellished dialogue between the
Assistant U.S. Attorney and Judge Ellis where they assume the Respondent
‘knew he was complicit in fraud, and he knew it for a long time, and even
offered a suggestion on how it could be concealed, is that right?’” 
Thus, the respondent submits that the hearing court’s reliance on the plea and
sentencing proceedings contradicting his contentions, and disregarding his subjective
understanding of the facts “is totally wrong.”    By so relying, he says, the hearing court
“mistakenly interpret[ed] the Respondent’s admission that he knew of Global’s wrongdoing,
12
which was the basis of the plea to misprision of a felony, to mean that the Respondent took
part and was complicit in the substantive offenses of the co-defendants.”  To the respondent,
considered in light of his testimony at the disciplinary hearing and the subjective
understanding of the facts it conveyed, 
“[t]here was no evidence presented by the Assistant U.S. Attorney that the
Respondent engaged in the dishonest, fraudulent and deceitful conduct
embodied in the underlying, substantive offenses.”
With respect to the allegations in Paragraph 8 of the Statement of Facts, the
respondent explained his failure to inform the proper authorities of the fraudulent
immigration activities by stating that he became aware of the information only after “the
indictments had been issued” and 
“Concerning the two steps ‘to conceal the crime,’ first, Respondent understood
Global employees had authorization to sign the names of immigrant’s or
employer’s signatures on the forms.   Second, Respondent insisted in plea
negotiations that the phrase ‘knew or should have known’ be inserted because
the government insisted on declaring that certain applications were withdrawn
solely on account of their investigation, which Respondent firmly believed was
not true.”
The respondent’s third exception relates to the nature of the offense of misprision of
a felony.    He maintains that that offense “is not a criminal act involving dishonesty, fraud
and misrepresentation” and his conduct constituting the offense “does not evidence
dishonesty, fraud or misrepresentation.”    The factor critically important to the respondent’s
position is that “[t]he Respondent’s testimony and the Statement of Facts supporting the
conviction of misprision of a felony do not establish conduct that embodied dishonesty, fraud
9Judge Chasanow noted in State v. McCallum, 321 Md. 451, 458, 583 A.2d 250,
253 (1991) (Chasanow, J., concurring), that willful blindness,
“exists where a person believes that it is probable that something is a fact, but
deliberately shuts his or her eyes or avoids making reasonable inquiry with a
conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth.”
Willful blindness is not the only theory that would support the respondent’s guilt of
misprision of a felony.   He was an immigration expert and, therefore, setting aside any
requirement to be bound by the respondent’s subjective understanding, it may be inferred
that the respondent’s acquisition of knowledge of fraudulent conduct was the acquisition
of the knowledge that a crime was being committed, which under federal law, he had a
duty to report.
13
or deceit under Maryland disciplinary law.”  Thus, stressing that he was not charged as a co-
conspirator and that his admissions of acquiring knowledge of fraud being committed by
Global and the named individuals and not reporting it supported his conviction of the offense
of misprision of a felony - he argues on the theory of willful blindness, citing United States
v. Messer, 139 F.3d 895, 1998 WL 112532 (4th Cir. 1998)9 - the respondent maintains that
he “never possessed or ever admitted to having the mens rea to commit those [substantive]
crimes.”   He argues further that, because“[h]e never participated in the offenses of his co-
defendants[, h]e can not be, and he was not, held responsible as a co-conspirator for the
crime he failed to report.”
Acknowledging and conceding, as he must, that paragraph 8 of the statement of facts
in support of the plea agreement states that, in addition to having knowledge of the crimes,
the immigration fraud and false statements, he took at least two steps to conceal the crimes,
the respondent proffers, nevertheless, that his admission in that paragraph “reasonably
satisfied” the concealment element and, in any event, any steps aimed at concealment did not
10Maryland Rule 16-759(b) provides:
“(1) Conclusions of Law. The Court of Appeals shall review de novo the
circuit court judge's conclusions of law.
“(2) Findings of Fact.
“(A) If No Exceptions Are Filed. If no exceptions are filed,
the Court may treat the findings of fact as established for the
purpose of determining appropriate sanctions, if any.
“(B) If Exceptions are filed. If exceptions are filed, the Court
of Appeals shall determine whether the findings of fact have
14
rise to the level of deceit, intentional dishonesty or misrepresentation.   More particularly, he
argues:
“In the Respondent’s circumstances, he agreed that he ‘concealed’ purported
forged names for individuals who he subjectively believed 
had authorized their
signing.   Similarly, he consented to ‘concealing’ the truth about abandoned
applications because the paragraph specifically included a negligent, ‘should
have known’ standard.”
Aware that concealment may have a more sinister motivation, the respondent denies
that his conduct in this case could be equated with “the more egregious offenses of making
false statements or purposefully deceiving a government authority” or involved moral
turpitude.   Rather, he argues that “[t]here simply was no proof by clear and convincing
evidence that Respondent committed a criminal act involving dishonesty, fraud or
misrepresentation or that he had any intent whatsoever to engage in such acts.”   That is
confirmed, the respondent submits, by the fact that he “did not make any financial gain as a
result of his conduct or from the underlying conduct of the co-defendants.”
It is well settled that we review the conclusions of law drawn by the hearing court de
novo.  Rule 16-759(b)(1).10   See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Goff, 399 Md. 1, 27-28,
been proven by the requisite standard of proof set out in Rule
16-757(b). The Court may confine its review to the findings
of fact challenged by the exceptions. The Court shall give due
regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the
credibility of witnesses.”
15
922 A.2d 554, 569-70 (2007); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Mahone, 398 Md. 257, 265-66,
920 A.2d 458, 463 (2007); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. 690, 700,
919 A.2d 669, 675 (2007); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Hodgson, 396 Md. 1, 6-7, 912
A.2d 640, 644 (2006); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. McLaughlin,  372 Md. 467, 493, 813
A.2d 1145, 1160 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Joehl, 335 Md. 83, 88, 642 A.2d
194, 196 (1994) (noting that the ultimate decision as to whether  an attorney has engaged in
professional misconduct rests with this Court). When the factual findings are not clearly
erroneous and the conclusions drawn from them are supported by the facts found, exceptions
to conclusions of law will be overruled. Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. at 700, 919 A.2d at 675;
Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Manger, 396 Md. 134, 146-147, 913 A.2d 1, 8 (2006). 
Moreover, a hearing court's findings of fact will not be overruled unless we determine that
they are clearly erroneous. Mahone, 398 Md. at 265, 920 A.2d at 463; Attorney Grievance
Comm'n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50, 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006).  “Weighing the credibility
of witnesses and resolving any conflict in the evidence are tasks proper for the fact finder.”
16
State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733, 750, 720 A.2d 323, 331 (1998).
We overrule the respondent's exceptions.   The respondent does not, indeed, he can
not, dispute the facts - they are set forth in detail in the plea agreement and the Statement of
Facts in support of that agreement.   What he disputes is what should be made of those facts,
and, in particular, whether they should, indeed must, be moderated or explained, by the
respondent’s subsequent testimony concerning his subjective understanding and intent.   His
position is that, because the facts, as they are reflected in the plea agreement and the
Statement of Facts, do not specifically charge him with being a co-conspirator and are
ambiguous as to the when he learned of the crimes, what criminal conduct the facts do
establish is unclear and must be elucidated by extrinsic evidence, i.e., his testimony at the
disciplinary hearing.    More specifically, the respondent believes that his testimony not only
was relevant to the issue of when and what he knew, but was required to be believed in
determining his culpability and hence sanction.  
The hearing court was not required to accept the respondent’s explanation for his
conduct.  It was free to disbelieve, as it undoubtedly did, his explanation.  See Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 328 Md. 276, 292, 614 A.2d 102, 110 (1992) (in which, citing
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Nothstein, 300 Md. 667, 684, 480 A.2d 807, 816 (1985), we
stated that “[i]t is elementary that a trier of fact may elect to pick and choose which evidence
[or story] to rely upon”).  Moreover, a final judgment of conviction is conclusive evidence
11Maryland Rule 16-771(g) provides:
“(g) Conclusive Effect of Final Conviction of Crime. In any proceeding
under this Chapter, a final judgment of any court of record convicting an
attorney of a crime, whether the conviction resulted from a plea of guilty,
nolo contendere, or a verdict after trial, is conclusive evidence of the guilt
of the attorney of that crime. As used in this Rule, "final judgment" means a
judgment as to which all rights to direct appellate review have been
exhausted. The introduction of the judgment does not preclude the
Commission or Bar Counsel from introducing additional evidence or the
attorney from introducing evidence or otherwise showing cause why no
discipline should be imposed.”
To be sure, as the respondent argues, this Rule does not preclude his offering evidence to
establish that no sanction should be imposed.   That does not give license, however, to a
respondent to prove that his conviction was not justified and, on that basis, to argue for no
sanction.   That is essentially what the respondent has attempted in this case.   The hearing
court’s findings in this regard, that the respondent has contradicted the plea agreement
and the statement of facts in support and demonstrated a lack of remorse and appreciation
for his conduct, are not erroneous.
12We are not persuaded by the respondent’s explanation of the concealment
element of the statement of facts.   An admission to being aware of wrong-doing and not
reporting it is a far cry from being aware and counseling how to conceal that wrong-
doing.   Nor can counseling concealment under the circumstance of this case, in our view,
be anything other than the equivalent of, if not more egregious than, making false
17
of the guilt of the crime charged.  See Maryland Rule 16-771 (g).11   The respondent pled
guilty to misprision of a felony and the statement of facts in support detailed the
circumstances in which the crime occurred.    The respondent admitted being aware of facts
indicating that the named co-defendants were engaging in immigration fraud, making false
statements and encouraging aliens to enter this country illegally and not reporting those
crimes to the proper authorities.   But the respondent also admitted taking steps to conceal
the conspiracy.    This was evidence of not simply a passive involvement; it demonstrated an
active involvement.   With this active concealment as a predicate,12 the hearing court can
statements or deceiving a governmental authority.  
18
hardly be faulted for concluding that the respondent engaged in conduct in violation of Rule
8.4 (b) and (c) - helping and counseling violators as to how to conceal their violations is a
criminal act that reflects adversely on a lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness in other
regards - and, in so doing, also engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.  It was “the charge of misprision of a felony, as supported by the
unequivocal and unambiguous statement of facts entered into the record on August 26, 2005"
that the hearing court concluded constituted the misconduct in violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct.   The concealment steps were clearly alleged and stated in the
statement of facts and they were not disputed.   That is certainly a substantial basis for the
hearing court’s conclusions. 
This leaves for resolution the issue of the appropriate sanction.  The petitioner
recommends disbarment.   It relies on the nature of the respondent’s conduct involved in the
respondent’s conviction, conduct that the hearing court determined to be infected with
dishonesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation.   Noting this Court’s growing intolerance for
attorneys who engage in such conduct, stressing the respondent’s testimony at the
disciplinary hearing, which the hearing court characterized as “reflect[ing] little, if any,
remorse regarding his conduct as in-house counsel for GRIS and the resulting plea and
sentencing for misprision of a felony,” and contending that the respondent  has failed to
present extenuating circumstances warranting a lesser sanction, the petitioner argues that the
13The respondent proffers the following as confirmatory of his assertion: In re
Felmeister, 890 A. 2d 334 (N. J. 2006) (18 month suspension); In re Harper, 2006 WL
1479547 at 1 (S.C. 2006) (two year suspension); Duncan v. Board of Disciplinary
Appeals, 898 S.W. 2d 759, 762(Tex. 1994) (misprision of a felony not a crime of moral
turpitude, requiring compulsory discipline); In re Lockhart, 795 So. 2d 309, 310 (La.
2001) (three year suspension, misprision of a felony and conspiracy to commit mail
fraud); Disciplinary Counsel v. Mesi, 647 N. E. 2d 473, 476 (Ohio 1995) (indefinite
suspension for misprision of a felony and other serious acts of misconduct); In re Russell,
493 N.W. 2d 715, 716 (S.D. 1992) (one year suspension, although, in addition to not
reporting the crime, the respondent assisted the flight of the criminals “by lending money,
furnishing a car, and providing his credit cards to them”); Office of Disciplinary Counsel
v. Shortall, 592 A. 2d 1285, 1291 (Pa. 1991) (three year suspension, despite also
providing the FBI with a false story supporting his client and testifying untruthfully at
grand jury); Matter of Morris, 793 P. 2d 544, 547 (Ariz. 1990) (6 month suspension, no
showing of dishonest motive or desire for pecuniary gain); In re Fishman, 801 N.Y.S.2d
825, 826 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (one year suspension); Matter of Fronk, 666 N.Y.S. 2d
1023, 1024 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (two year suspension).   But see Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Longo, 761 N.E. 2d 1042, 1043 (Ohio 2001) (disbarment where respondent
convicted of misprision of a felony, with knowledge of his intention to purchase
marijuana out of state, also transferred funds to his partner).  
We see this case as quite close to Longo, where it was the underlying conduct,
rather than the conviction, that determined the level of the respondent’s culpability.  As in
that case, there is more in this case than simply a conviction for failing to report a crime;
the respondent participated in the crime, by taking steps to conceal it.   In any event, we
do not agree that a sanction less than disbarment, imposed in those cases where the
respondent actually and positively assisted the perpetrator, see, e.g., Shortall; In re
Russell, was appropriate.   Those cases simply are not persuasive.
19
only appropriate sanction is disbarment.
The respondent opposes the petitioner’s recommendation of disbarment.   He
maintains initially, citing the cases,13 that “there are no reported cases in the United States
finding that the crime of misprision of a felony requires automatic disbarment.   A review of
the reported cases from other jurisdictions shows that the general punishment is suspension
20
from the practice of law  for a period of time.”
He next embraces the hearing court’s finding of mitigation, adding that, in addition
to having been convicted of misprision of a felony:
“The Respondent also stands as an attorney whose nearly twenty (20) years of
practice were devoted to providing legal services and defenses to individuals
without means or rank.   He was a local leader in the practice of immigration
law and an expert on the immigration consequences of criminal convictions,
providing numerous presentations at judicial conferences, bar associations
seminars, and offering mentoring to less experienced attorneys.   He did this
all without financial compensation.   He taught asylum and refugee law at the
Washington College of Law at the American University, published widely in
the field and had a book contract with West Law prior to his conviction.   He
offered countless hours of pro bono advice.  The Hearing Judge acknowledged
the Respondent’s legal services were ‘stellar in nature.’  That the Respondent’s
yearly income rarely topped $ 60,000 underscored the fact that his commitment
to the practice of law was not pecuniary but to lend a helping hand to those
who needed it.”
In arguing for a sanction less than disbarment, the respondent poses the question as
“when did he come to know about the fraud ... and ... was his behavior so egregious, when
juxtaposed against the Respondent’s prior twenty (20) years of legal services, that the public
need be protected from him, and perhaps equally important, ought the public be deprived of
his future services.”
This Court has made clear that the well settled purpose and goal of attorney discipline
proceedings is to protect the public, not to punish the erring attorney. Mba-Jonas, 397 Md.
at 702-703, 919 A.2d at 677;  Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Rees, 396 Md. 248, 254, 913
A.2d 68, 72 (2006). See  Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Parker, 389 Md. 142, 155, 884 A.2d
104, 112 (2005); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Culver, 381 Md. 241, 283-84, 849 A.2d
21
423, 448-49 (2004).
 
“That purpose is achieved, the public is protected, when the sanctions are
commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with
which they were committed. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Stein, 373 Md.
531, 533, 819 A.2d 372, 375 (2003). While the circumstances of each case-the
nature and effect of the violations-are critical, and ordinarily decisive, factors
in determining the severity of the sanction to be imposed, Parker, 389 Md. at
155, 884 A.2d at 112, there are other important factors we have identified,
including ‘‘the lawyer's state of mind which underlies the misconduct, actual
or potential injury flowing from the misconduct, the duty of this Court to
preserve the integrity of the profession, the risk to the public in allowing the
Respondent to continue in practice, and any mitigating or aggravating
factors,’’ Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Monfried, 368 Md. 373, 396, 794
A.2d 92, 105 (2002), the attorney's remorse for the misconduct, Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Wyatt, 323 Md. 36, 38, 591 A.2d 467, 468 (1991), the
likelihood of repetition of the misconduct, Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Freedman, 285 Md. 298, 300, 402 A.2d 75, 76 (1979), and the attorney's prior
grievance history. Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Phoebus, 276 Md. 353, 362,
347 A.2d 556, 561 (1975).”
Rees, 396 Md. at 254-55, 913 A. 2d at 72.
What this Court said in Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Ward,  396 Md. 203, 218, 913
A.2d 41, 50 (2006) has a particular relevance to the case sub judice:
“It is well settled that ‘[d]isbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for
intentional dishonest conduct.’  Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Vanderlinde,
364 Md. 376, 418, 773 A.2d 463, 488 (2001). See Attorney Grievance Comm'n
v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 597, 876 A.2d 642, 660-61 (2005); Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Lane, 367 Md. 633, 646, 790 A.2d 621, 628 (2002).
This is so, because ‘[u]nlike matters relating to competency, diligence and the
like, intentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined with the most important
matters of basic character to such a degree as to make intentional dishonest
conduct by a lawyer almost beyond excuse.’ Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 418, 773
A.2d at 488. Thus, like in the case of a misappropriation of entrusted funds,
see Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Bakas, 323 Md. 395, 403, 593 A.2d 1087,
1091 (1991), in the absence of compelling extenuating circumstances
justifying a lesser sanction, intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer will
22
result in disbarment.”
In Vanderlinde, we addressed what would suffice as extenuating circumstance justifying a
lesser sanction, where intentional dishonest conduct by an attorney has been established.   We
said that the compelling extenuating circumstances must be “present and associated with the
illegal or improper acts at the time committed.” Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 397, 773 A.2d at
475.   We elucidated this point in the holding:
“in cases of intentional dishonesty, misappropriation cases, fraud, stealing,
serious criminal conduct and the like, we will not accept, as ‘compelling
extenuating circumstances,’ anything less than the most serious and utterly
debilitating mental or physical health conditions, arising from  any source that
is the ‘root cause’ of the misconduct and that also result in an attorney's utter
inability to conform his or her conduct in accordance with the law and with the
MRPC. Only if the circumstances are that compelling, will we even consider
imposing less than the most severe sanction of disbarment in cases of stealing,
dishonesty, fraudulent conduct, the intentional misappropriation of funds or
other serious criminal conduct, whether occurring in the practice of law, or
otherwise.”
Id. at 413-414, 773 A.2d at 485 (emphasis in original).
There have been no compelling extenuating circumstances shown in this case. The
respondent’s past “stellar” practice, his pro bono commitment, his lack of pecuniary over-
reaching or motivation and his mentoring, while all are commendable and are not
disregarded, do not meet the standard we have set for compelling extenuating circumstances
that would justify a lesser sanction than disbarment.  Accordingly, we adopt the petitioner's
recommendation.  Disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this case.
23
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK
OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF
ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS, 
PURSUANT 
TO
MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH
SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR
O F 
THE 
A TTOR NEY 
G RIE V A N CE
C O M M I S S I O N  
A G A I N S T  
R EX  
B .
WINGERTER.