Case Title: Bly v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 092064

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2010-11-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
LINDSAY ALAN BLY 
             OPINION BY 
 
 
 
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
v.  Record No. 092064  
          November 4, 2010 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
This appeal from two convictions of drug distribution 
presents a single question:  whether the circuit court erred 
in failing to grant the defendant a new trial because of the 
Commonwealth’s failure to make pre-trial disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence.  The Commonwealth assigns cross-error to 
the Court of Appeals’ failure to hold that the non-disclosed 
evidence was neither admissible nor such as to lead to 
evidence that would have been admissible. 
Facts and Proceedings 
 
Applying familiar principles, we will state the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 
prevailing party at trial.  In the spring of 2004, the 
Rockbridge Regional Drug Task Force conducted a series of drug 
“buys” though Robert Hoyle, a paid confidential informant.  
Hoyle’s evidence led to two indictments of Lindsay Alan Bly in 
the Circuit Court of the City of Buena Vista.  At a bench 
trial, Bly was convicted of possession with intent to 
distribute an imitation controlled substance on May 17, 2004 
(the May Offense) and possession with intent to distribute 
methamphetamine on June 3, 2004 (the June offense).  
 
With respect to the May offense, task force members 
testified that their target was Bly, who lived in a ground-
floor apartment in a building at 1805 Walnut Avenue in Buena 
Vista and was suspected of selling controlled substances 
there.  In preparation for the “buy,” they met with Hoyle, 
searched him thoroughly to ensure that he had no money or 
controlled substances with him, gave him $50 in marked money 
and drove him to an area behind 1805 Walnut Avenue.  One of 
the members of the task force testified that he saw Hoyle walk 
up onto the back porch of the building and greet Bly, who was 
standing there with his wife.  The three then entered the back 
door of the building.  Hoyle emerged alone about three minutes 
later, re-entered the vehicle with the task force members, and 
they drove away.  Hoyle produced a small bag of white powder 
that looked like powder cocaine but turned out on subsequent 
analysis to contain no controlled substance.  Searched again, 
Hoyle had no money on his person when he returned to the 
officers’ car.  Hoyle testified that he purchased the bag of 
white powder from Bly with the marked money and confirmed the 
other details of the officers’ testimony. 
 
With respect to the June offense, task force members 
testified that they met with Hoyle again on that date to 
 
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arrange for a methamphetamine “buy” from Bly.  They thoroughly 
searched Hoyle to ensure that he had no money or controlled 
substances on his person, gave him $100 in marked money and 
drove him to an alley that led to 1805 Walnut Avenue.  They 
saw Hoyle enter the back door, from which he emerged seven or 
eight minutes later.  Hoyle produced a “baggie” containing a 
“pink, rock-like substance” that turned out on later analysis 
to consist of methamphetamine.  Hoyle testified that he had 
purchased the “baggie” and its contents from Bly with the 
marked money.  Hoyle was again searched after delivering the 
“baggie” to the officers and was found to be free of 
contraband. 
 
The record reflects that Hoyle was equipped with a 
digital recording device for each of the purchase 
transactions, but no recording was offered at the trial by the 
Commonwealth as to either episode.  Instead, Hoyle was called 
as a witness to provide a testimonial description of the 
actual purchase transactions – both of which took place 
indoors, beyond the view of the task force officers.  Hoyle 
gave details about handing money to the defendant, 
conversations that allegedly took place, and receipt of the 
controlled substances. 
 
At the conclusion of the trial on March 24, 2005, the 
circuit court found Bly guilty as charged under both 
 
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indictments but continued the case, leaving Bly free on bond 
and subject to supervision by the probation officer pending 
preparation of a pre-sentence report. 
 
On March 6, 2006, nearly a year after the trial, Bly’s 
counsel filed a motion for a new trial.  No sentences had yet 
been imposed.  Bly’s motion asserted that his convictions were 
necessarily dependent upon Hoyle’s credibility as a witness 
because there was no visual surveillance, visual or audio 
recording, fingerprint evidence, recovery of marked money, or 
other evidence to support Hoyle’s account of his purchases 
from Bly.  The motion further asserted that the chief 
investigator of the drug task force had been aware, more than 
four months before Bly’s trial, that Hoyle had been giving the 
task force false accounts of his purchases of controlled 
substances. 
 
Attached as an exhibit to Bly’s motion was a copy of a 
letter from the Commonwealth’s Attorney for Rockbridge County 
and the City of Lexington to another lawyer in a different 
case, written in response to a discovery motion.  That letter 
acknowledged that Hoyle had claimed that he made drug “buys” 
from one Jeff Breeden on two dates, resulting in Breeden’s 
indictment and arrest, but it was later found that Breeden had 
been incarcerated on both of those dates and could not have 
made the sales as Hoyle claimed.  The Commonwealth's 
 
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Attorney’s letter further acknowledged that on another 
occasion when Hoyle reported making a drug purchase from a 
suspect in Buena Vista, another member of the task force 
reported that he thought he had seen the suspect in a 
different location at the same time.  Consequently, the 
suspect was not charged.  The Commonwealth's Attorney’s letter 
stated that from January through July of 2004 Hoyle made 83 
controlled “buys” for the task force, for which he was paid a 
total of $4,281.70, plus $1,301.40 for his court appearances.  
Hoyle had a criminal record and had been found with a smoking 
device but was not charged with possession of marijuana in 
exchange for his services to the task force.  Hoyle was only 
paid if he made a “buy” and turned contraband over to the task 
force. 
 
Bly contended that he was entitled to a new trial because 
the foregoing information was exculpatory within the holding 
of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny, 
that the information was in the Commonwealth’s possession 
prior to Bly’s trial, that the Commonwealth had a duty to 
disclose it to the defense but failed to do so, and that the 
defense had no means of discovering it in the absence of such 
disclosure because it did not become public until the 
Commonwealth's Attorney’s letter described above was written, 
well after Bly’s trial had ended. 
 
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On March 30, 2006, the circuit court heard argument on 
the motion for new trial and sentencing.  The court took both 
matters under advisement and continued the case, again 
releasing Bly on supervised probation.  On September 13, 2007, 
Bly’s probation officer wrote to the court reporting that Bly 
was in violation of the terms of his probation in that he had 
repeatedly tested positive for marijuana use and had failed to 
complete several treatment efforts for his drug problem.  On 
October 25, 2007, the court denied Bly’s motion for a new 
trial and continued the case for sentencing.  On December 13, 
2007 the court entered an order imposing sentences of five 
years confinement on each of the two convictions, the 
sentences to run concurrently.  All but seven months of the 
sentence was suspended subject to probation for five years 
after release. 
 
Bly appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals, 
presenting only the question whether the circuit court had 
erred in failing to grant him a new trial.  By memorandum 
opinion dated January 13, 2009, a three-judge panel, with one 
judge dissenting, reversed the convictions and remanded the 
case for a new trial.  Bly v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2948-
07-3 (Jan. 13, 2009).  The Commonwealth successfully 
petitioned the Court for a rehearing en banc.  The full Court 
of Appeals, by a six-to-five majority, affirmed the judgment 
 
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of the circuit court.  Bly v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 1, 3, 
682 S.E.2d 556, 557 (2009).  We awarded Bly an appeal.  The 
Commonwealth assigned cross-error to the failure of the Court 
of Appeals to find that Bly had failed to establish the second 
requirement of the Brady test:  that the non-disclosed 
information was itself admissible evidence or would have led 
to evidence that was admissible. 
Analysis 
 
The Commonwealth concedes, as it must, that the evidence 
Bly contends was exculpatory, was in the possession of the 
Commonwealth’s agents prior to Bly’s trial and that it was not 
disclosed.  The Commonwealth argues, however, and the Court of 
Appeals held, that Bly suffered no prejudice from the 
Commonwealth’s failure to disclose it.  Bly, 55 Va. App. at 
10, 682 S.E.2d at 561.  The Court of Appeals held that Bly 
suffered no prejudice because the trial judge, as trier of 
both law and fact, heard sufficient evidence to support a 
conviction even if the testimony of Hoyle were totally 
disregarded.  The Court of Appeals pointed to the testimony of 
three task force officers and Bly’s own testimony that was 
inconsistent with theirs, thus impairing Bly's credibility.  
Id. at 10-13, 682 S.E.2d at 561-62. 
 
In Workman v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 633, 636 S.E.2d 368 
(2006), we summarized the applicable principles of the Brady 
 
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doctrine as expressed in the opinions of the Supreme Court of 
the United States:  
In Brady, this Court held that the suppression by 
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused 
upon request violates due process where the evidence 
is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution.  We have since held that the duty to 
disclose such evidence is applicable even though 
there has been no request by the accused, and that 
the duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as 
exculpatory evidence.  Such evidence is material if 
there is a reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different.  
Moreover, the rule encompasses evidence known only 
to police investigators and not to the prosecutor.  
In order to comply with Brady, therefore, the 
individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any 
favorable evidence known to the others acting on the 
government's behalf in this case, including the 
police.  
 
Id. at 644, 636 S.E.2d at 374 (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 
527 U.S. 263, 280-81 (1999)) (citations and quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
Most significantly, in the context of the present case, 
we noted in Workman: 
The question is not whether the defendant would more 
likely than not have received a different verdict 
with the evidence, but whether in its absence he 
received a fair trial, understood as a trial 
resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.  Kyles 
v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).  A 
constitutional error occurs, and the conviction must 
be reversed, only if the evidence is material in the 
sense that its suppression undermines confidence in 
the outcome of the trial.  United States v. Bagley, 
473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985). 
 
 
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. . . . 
In Kyles, the Supreme Court of the United States 
made several holdings concerning the test of 
materiality.  First, "a showing of materiality does 
not require demonstration by a preponderance that 
disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have 
resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal 
(whether based on the presence of reasonable doubt 
or acceptance of an explanation for the crime that 
does not inculpate the defendant.)"  Kyles, 514 U.S. 
at 434.  Second, materiality is not a sufficiency of 
the evidence test.  "A defendant need not 
demonstrate that after discounting the inculpatory 
evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, there 
would not have been enough left to convict."  Id. at 
434-35.  Third, a harmless error analysis is 
unnecessary once materiality has been determined.  
Id. at 435.  Fourth, suppressed evidence must be 
"considered collectively, not item by item."  Id. at 
436.  Upon consideration of these factors, a 
reviewing court is charged with the responsibility 
of determining if the suppression of evidence 
"undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial."  
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678. 
 
272 Va. at 645, 636 S.E.2d at 374-75 (brackets and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
In the present case, in view of (1) the Commonwealth’s 
failure to introduce the audio recordings Hoyle was equipped 
to make of his dealings with Bly, (2) the lack of any other 
evidence to corroborate Hoyle’s testimony as to those 
transactions, and (3) Hoyle’s obvious pecuniary incentive to 
fabricate drug “buys,” the suppression of evidence that could 
have led to a devastating impeachment of Hoyle’s credibility 
undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. 
 
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In its analysis, the Court of Appeals incorrectly assumed 
that the circuit court, having been the trier of fact, would 
have convicted Bly based on the other evidence in the case 
even if Hoyle’s testimony were entirely excluded.  When 
determining whether to grant a new trial because of a Brady 
violation, the court must take into consideration the use the 
defense may properly make of the non-disclosed information.  
As we observed in Workman, in the Brady context such non-
disclosed evidence may be, and often is, used to discredit an 
entire police investigation.  Id. at 647-48, 636 S.E.2d at 
376.  The non-disclosed evidence “may not have been admissible 
for the truth of the matter asserted, but it was admissible 
for a different reason[:] to discredit the police 
investigation.”  Id. at 646, 636 S.E,2d at 375.  See also 
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 445 (such evidence could have been used by 
the defense to attack the “thoroughness and even the good 
faith of the investigation”).  The Court of Appeals’ 
assumption overlooks the risk that impeachment of Hoyle, in 
discrediting the police investigation itself, might well have 
tainted the remaining evidence in Bly's case. 
Conclusion 
 
The non-disclosed evidence here, as in Workman, could 
clearly have led to evidence admissible at trial for 
impeachment purposes.  It was withheld by the Commonwealth and 
 
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Bly was thereby prejudiced.  The result was such as to impair 
confidence in the outcome of the trial.  Workman, 272 Va. at 
650, 636 S.E.2d at 375.  For these reasons, we will reverse 
the judgment appealed from and remand the case to the Court of 
Appeals with instruction to further remand the same to the 
circuit court for a new trial consistent with this opinion if 
the Commonwealth be so advised. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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