Case Title: Walker v. State

Citation: 343 Md. 629

Docket Number: 63/95

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1996-11-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 63, September Term, 1995
Donald Walker v. State of Maryland
[Whether The Petitioner Presented A Cognizable Claim For Relief
Under The Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act, Maryland Code
(1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 645A]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 63 
September Term, 1995
________________________________________
DONALD WALKER
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
_______________________________________
   * Murphy, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker,
    
            JJ.
________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
________________________________________
        Filed:
* Murphy, C.J., now retired, partici-
pated in the hearing and conference of
this case while an active member of this
Court; after being recalled pursuant to
the Constitution, Article IV, Section
3A, he also participated in the decision
and the adoption of this opinion.
The broad issue in this case is whether the petitioner
presented a cognizable claim for relief under the Maryland Post
Conviction Procedure Act, Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.),
Art. 27, § 645A.
I.
The petitioner, Donald Walker, was charged with assault with
intent to murder, common law assault, and related offenses arising
from a shooting that occurred in a crowded bar during the early
morning hours of July 5, 1978.  He was tried in June 1979 before a
jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore.  Following the presenta-
tion of the evidence, the trial judge gave the jury the following
instruction regarding assault with intent to murder (emphasis
added):
"The essence of the offense of assault with
intent to murder is the term `intent to
murder.'  In order for a person to be found
guilty of assault with intent to murder, the
assault must have been committed with such
intent that if death had ensued the result
would have been murder in either first or
second degree.
"Murder is killing with intent to kill that
person or with the intent to seriously or
severely injure that person without any
- 2 -
       In his direct appeal to the Court of Special Appeals,
1
Walker challenged his conviction on several grounds, namely that
the trial court committed reversible error by denying his requested
self-defense instruction, by allegedly refusing to permit reference
to the relative credibility of witnesses in closing argument, and
by refusing to exclude evidence allegedly unrelated to the charged
offenses.  He also argued that there was insufficient evidence
presented at trial to support his conviction.  Nowhere in his
appellate brief did he argue that the jury instruction regarding
intent was incorrect.
excuse, justification or mitigation.  There-
fore, if you decide Mr. Walker beyond a rea-
sonable 
doubt was 
the 
person 
who 
shot
Mr. Wheeler and that he intended to kill or
severely injure him, then you find him guilty
of the crime of assault with intent to
murder."
No objection to this instruction was made by Walker's attorney.  
The jury convicted Walker of assault with intent to murder,
and, in accordance with the court's instructions, rendered no
verdict on the count charging common law assault.  Walker's
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals in an
unreported opinion in November 1980, and this Court denied his
petition for a writ of certiorari in March 1981.  Walker did not
challenge the above-quoted jury instruction in his direct appeal
and certiorari petition.   
1
Walker then filed two petitions for post conviction relief,
one in 1981 and the other in 1984, and both were denied.  Although
he made several allegations, Walker failed to challenge the jury
- 3 -
       Walker's first post conviction petition made the following
2
allegations: (1) he was never informed as to the proper standard of
proof to be applied in a trial before a judge or jury, or that the
jury would have to agree unanimously as to his guilt or innocence
before finding him guilty or not guilty; (2) his Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal should have been granted as to all counts at
the conclusion of the State's case; (3) the trial court improperly
instructed the jury as to the disposition of charges to which
Motions for Judgment of Acquittal were granted; (4) the trial court
improperly instructed the jury as to the reasonable doubt standard;
(5) he was denied his constitutional right to a fair and impartial
trial because a substantial amount of prejudicial evidence was
admitted at his trial and contributed to his conviction; and (6) he
was denied his constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial
because his attorney failed to represent competently.   
In his second post conviction petition, Walker argued, as his
sole ground for relief, that he was not present at every stage of
the trial proceedings because he was not present at several bench
conferences among the court, the prosecuting attorney, and defense
counsel.
 
instruction at issue in either petition.2
The current proceedings were commenced in December 1993,
when Walker filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City his third
petition for post conviction relief.  In this petition, Walker
asserted that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury that
an intent to inflict severe injury was sufficient to support a
conviction for assault with intent to murder, and that this error
permitted the State to obtain his conviction without proving every
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  
The circuit court granted post conviction relief in an
opinion and order filed in March 1994, concluding that Walker's
conviction of assault with intent to murder should be vacated based
- 4 -
upon this Court's decisions in Franklin v. State, 319 Md. 116, 571
A.2d 1208 (1990), and State v. Jenkins, 307 Md. 501, 515 A.2d 465
(1986).  See also Glenn v. State, 68 Md. App. 379, 511 A.2d 1110,
cert. denied, 307 Md. 599, 516 A.2d 569 (1986).  Those cases held
that a specific intent to kill was an element of the statutory
crime of assault with intent to murder, and that the intent element
of the crime could not be satisfied by an intent to commit grievous
bodily injury.  In the Franklin case, there had been no objection
to a jury instruction that the intent element of the offense could
be satisfied by an intent to commit grievous bodily injury.  In
fact, the erroneous instruction had been requested by defense
counsel.  Nonetheless, upon direct review of Franklin's conviction,
this Court held that the instruction was "plain error" affecting
"the right of the defendant to a fair trial," and we reversed the
conviction.  Franklin v. State, supra, 319 Md. at 120, 571 A.2d at
1210.  
The circuit court in the present case held that the
Franklin, Jenkins, and Glenn decisions should be applied to
Walker's case.  The circuit court indicated that, prior to Jenkins,
many trial judges and lawyers believed that a jury instruction like
that given at Walker's trial was a correct statement of the law.
Nevertheless, the court expressed the view that the Jenkins case
"did not announce a new rule of law," and that "it simply identi-
fied a correct application of an existing rule."  Consequently, in
- 5 -
the view of the circuit court, the principles set forth in Jenkins
were fully applicable to Walker's case when his trial took place in
1979, and no issue concerning a "prospective only" application of
Jenkins was presented.  With regard to the lack of any objection by
Walker's counsel to the erroneous instruction, the circuit court
reasoned as follows:
"Thus, as I view the matter, the issue
largely comes down to whether standards of
`plain error' on direct appeal differ signif-
icantly or meaningfully from the standards
applicable on post conviction review of an
issue . . . .  The answer is `no.'"
Upon the State's application for leave to appeal, the Court
of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, remanded the case to
the circuit court.  The Court of Special Appeals seemed to agree
with the circuit court that the jury instruction at Walker's trial
"was incorrect at the time it was given."  The intermediate
appellate court went on to construe the circuit court's action as
a decision applying the "plain error" doctrine embodied in Maryland
Rules 4-325(e) and 8-131(a).  The Court of Special Appeals then
stated that these rules apply only to direct appellate review, and
that they do not authorize a court in a post conviction proceeding
to invoke the "plain error" doctrine.  The Court of Special Appeals
directed the circuit court to reconsider the case and determine if
Walker's complaint about the jury instruction was cognizable under
the Post Conviction Procedure Act or if it had been waived for
- 6 -
purposes of that statute.
After the remand, the circuit court issued another opinion
and order again granting Walker's petition and vacating his
conviction of assault with intent to murder.  The court reiterated
that State v. Jenkins, supra, Franklin v. State, supra, and Glenn
v. State, supra, should be applied to vacate Walker's conviction,
reasoning that the instruction given to the jury at Walker's trial
was erroneous when given and constituted "fundamental error"
entitling Walker to post conviction relief and a new trial.  In
accordance with the Court of Special Appeals' directive to
determine whether there had been a waiver for purposes of the Post
Conviction Procedure Act, the circuit court concluded that Walker
did not waive the claim that the jury instruction was erroneous
because Walker himself did not intelligently and knowingly fail to
object and because "[c]ounsel's lack of prescience is not attribut-
able to Walker."  Alternatively, the court held that if the claim
had been waived, the waiver was excused by the existence of
"special circumstances" within the meaning of the Post Conviction
Procedure Act, Art. 27, § 645A(c)(l).  The "special circumstances"
found by the circuit court were that, at the time of Walker's
trial, the law concerning the intent element of assault with intent
to murder was misunderstood by trial judges and lawyers, and that
the law was not finally clarified until this Court's opinion in
State v. Jenkins, supra, more than five years after Walker's
- 7 -
conviction became final.
 
Thereafter, the State filed another application for leave to
appeal.  The Court of Special Appeals granted the application and
reversed the circuit court's judgment in an unreported opinion.
Unlike its earlier opinion remanding the case, this time the Court
of Special Appeals did not view the controlling issue as whether
Walker's claim had been waived or was cognizable under the Maryland
Post Conviction Procedure Act.  In fact, the intermediate appellate
court's opinion did not mention that statute.  Moreover, the Court
of Special Appeals' opinion did not refer to the lack of an
objection to the jury instruction, and made no reference to waiver
or to the circuit court's alternative holding that there existed
"special circumstances" within the meaning of the Post Conviction
Procedure Act.  Instead, the intermediate appellate court stated
that "[t]he question is whether the . . . rule [set forth in
Franklin, Jenkins, and Glenn] should be applied retroactively to
this case."  After stating its view that "[t]he law for determining
whether a case is to be afforded retroactive effect is somewhat
muddled," the Court of Special Appeals concluded that State v.
Jenkins and Glenn v. State overruled prior law concerning the
intent element of assault with intent to murder.  The appellate
court stated that "the law announced in" Jenkins and Glenn
represented a "`clear break with the past,'" quoting Griffith v.
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 325, 107 S.Ct. 708, 714, 93 L.Ed.2d 649,
- 8 -
659-660 (1987).  Consequently, according to the Court of Special
Appeals, the Jenkins and Glenn cases are "not accorded retroactive
effect."
Walker then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari which
this Court granted.  We agree with Walker that the Court of Special
Appeals erred in holding that the Jenkins case represented a "clear
break with the past" and should be applied only prospectively.
Moreover, we believe that the issues identified in the first
opinion by the Court of Special Appeals, and in the circuit court's
final opinion, i.e., waiver and "special circumstances" for
purposes of the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act, are the
dispositive issues in the case.  We disagree, however, with the
circuit court's resolution of these issues, and, for this reason,
we shall affirm the Court of Special Appeals' judgment.
II.
When a decision of the United States Supreme Court with
regard to the federal constitution or federal law, or a decision of
this Court with regard to a constitutional provision, a statute, or
a common law principle, is overruled on the ground that the
decision represented an erroneous interpretation or application of
the constitutional provision, statute, or common law principle, the
question of whether the new ruling should be applied prospectively
only is governed by the principles set forth in Owens-Illinois v.
Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 470-472, 601 A.2d 633, 658 (1992); State v.
- 9 -
Colvin, 314 Md. 1, 25-26, 548 A.2d 506, 518 (1988); American
Trucking Ass'ns v. Goldstein, 312 Md. 583, 591-595, 541 A.2d 955,
959-961 (1988); Houghton v. County Com'rs of Kent Co., 307 Md. 216,
218-224, 513 A.2d 291, 292-295 (1986); Potts v. State, 300 Md. 567,
576-583, 479 A.2d 1335, 1340-1343 (1984); McClain v. State, 288 Md.
456, 470, 419 A.2d 369, 375 (1980); State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310,
336-338, 403 A.2d 356, 370-371 (1979); Wiggins v. State, 275 Md. at
689, 698-716, 344 A.2d at 80, 85-95 (majority opinion), 275 Md. at
732-741, 344 A.2d at 104-109 (dissenting opinion) (1975).  In
addition, when the "prospective-retroactive" issue arises in a
proceeding under the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act, the
provisions of that statute may be controlling.  See Code (1957,
1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 645A(d); State v. Colvin, supra, 314
Md. at 25, 548 A.2d at 518; Davis v. State, 285 Md. 19, 24-31, 400
A.2d 406, 408-412 (1979); State v. Evans, 278 Md. 197, 210-211, 362
A.2d 629, 636-637 (1976).
Nevertheless, as this Court explained in Houghton v. County
Com'rs of Kent Co., supra, 307 Md. at 220, 513 A.2d at 293,
"the question of whether a particular judicial
decision should be applied prospectively or
retroactively, depends in the first instance
on whether or not the decision overrules prior
law and declares a new principle of law.  If a
decision 
does 
not 
declare 
a 
new 
legal
principle, no question of a `prospective only'
application arises; the decision applies
retroactively in the same manner as most court
decisions."
- 10 -
See American Trucking Ass'ns v. Goldstein, supra, 312 Md. at 591,
541 A.2d at 958-959 ("In the overwhelming majority of cases, a
judicial decision sets forth and applies the rule of law that
existed both before and after the date of the decision.  In this
usual situation, . . . no issue of a `prospective only' application
arises"); Potts v. State, supra, 300 Md. at 577, 479 A.2d at 1341
("where a decision has applied settled precedent to new and
different factual situations, the decision always applies retro-
actively."  It is only "where a new rule . . . constitutes `a clear
break with the past'" that the question of prospective only
application arises); Jones v. State, 297 Md. 7, 24-25, 464 A.2d
977, 985 (1983) ("There was no overruling of a prior decision or
overruling of an interpretation by this Court . . . .  Therefore,
the issue of retroactivity is not presented"); State v. Hicks,
supra, 285 Md. at 336, 403 A.2d at 370 ("our holdings in the
instant case did overrule a prior interpretation [by this Court] of
the same [statutory] language and did set forth a new interpreta-
tion of that language.  Thus, the case is an appropriate one for
considering whether such new interpretation should be given only
prospective effect").
This Court's opinion in State v. Jenkins, supra, holding
that a specific intent to kill was an element of the statutory
offense of assault with intent to murder, and that the element was
- 11 -
not satisfied by an intent to inflict severe injury, was not novel
and did not overrule any prior decisions by this Court.  No
previous case in the Court of Appeals had ever held that the intent
element of the offense alternatively included an intent to inflict
severe or grievous bodily injury.  On the contrary, numerous prior
opinions of this Court, reviewed in the Jenkins case, 307 Md. at
513-515, 515 A.2d at 471-472, had reiterated that the intent
element of the offense was a "specific intent to murder" or an
"intent to kill" or "a design to kill."  
More than one hundred years ago in Fenwick v. State, 63 Md.
239 (1885), which was a criminal prosecution involving an attack
upon the victim with an axe, this Court made it clear that, if the
defendant's intent was not to kill the victim, the defendant could
not properly be convicted of assault with intent to murder.
Because the trial judge in Fenwick had not allowed the defendant to
testify with regard to his purpose, the conviction of assault with
intent to murder was reversed.  Shortly thereafter, Lewis Hoch-
heimer wrote that, "[i]n order to constitute assault with intent to
murder, . . . it is essential, that there should be an actual,
specific intent to take life."  L. Hochheimer, The Law of Crimes
and Criminal Procedure, 294 (2d ed. 1904).  See also L. Hochheimer,
A Manual of Criminal Law As Established In The State of Maryland,
139-141 (1889). 
The Jenkins opinion did acknowledge that, in a few previous
- 12 -
opinions of this Court, particularly Hall v. State, 213 Md. 369,
131 A.2d 710 (1957), and Webb v. State, 201 Md. 158, 93 A.2d 80
(1952), there was unfortunate dicta indicating that the intent
element of assault with intent to murder could be satisfied if "an
intent to commit grievous bodily harm" was "shown."  The Jenkins
opinion pointed out that this language reflected a confusion
between the intent element of the offense and the evidentiary
proposition that proof of an intent to commit severe bodily injury
may support an inference of an intent to kill.  Nevertheless, as
Jenkins went on to discuss, many opinions by this Court after Hall
and Webb clearly held that a specific intent to kill must be proven
in order to sustain a conviction of assault with intent to murder.
See also Glenn v. State, supra, 68 Md. App. 379, 511 A.2d 1110,
rendered shortly before Jenkins, where Judge Moylan for the Court
of Special Appeals discussed in much more detail this entire
matter.
Although our opinion in Jenkins may have corrected erroneous
dicta which had appeared in a few earlier opinions by this Court
and in some earlier opinions by the Court of Special Appeals, the
mere correction of prior incorrect dicta does not represent "a
clear break with the past" generating the question of a "prospec-
tive only" application.  This is particularly true under the
circumstances here, where the great majority of this Court's prior
opinions, both before and after the cases containing the unfortu-
- 13 -
nate dicta, had correctly set forth the elements of assault with
intent to murder.
As the circuit court pointed out in the present case, before
Jenkins many lawyers and trial judges apparently believed that the
intent element of assault with intent to murder could be satisfied
by an intent to commit severe bodily injury.  Nonetheless, when an
opinion of this Court correctly delineates a legal principle which
had also been correctly set forth in prior opinions by this Court,
the erroneous "perception of [some of the] Bar and Judges" does not
create a situation necessitating an analysis of whether the opinion
should be applied only prospectively.  Houghton v. County Com'rs of
Kent Co., supra, 307 Md. at 218-224, 513 A.2d at 292-295.  See
Davis v. State, supra, 285 Md. at 27, 400 A.2d at 409-410 (that
"`[s]ome trial courts and members of the bar seemingly have
[mis]construed'" a prior case does not mean that a later decision,
setting forth a proper interpretation, "comprise[s] a departure
from the law applicable to criminal causes in Maryland").
Consequently, the circuit court in the instant case
correctly held that Jenkins "did not announce a new rule of law"
and that no question regarding a "prospective only" application of
Jenkins was presented.  The Court of Special Appeals, in reaching
a contrary conclusion, was in error.
III.
We now turn to the circuit court's holdings that there had
- 14 -
been no waiver of the jury instruction issue and, alternatively, if
there had been a waiver, the failure to object to the jury
instruction was excused by special circumstances.
A.
The principal subsection of the Maryland Post Conviction
Procedure Act concerning waiver of an issue, Art. 27, § 645A(c),
states as follows:
"(c) When allegation of error deemed to
have been waived. - (1) For the purposes of
this subtitle, an allegation of error shall be
deemed to be waived when a petitioner could
have made, but intelligently and knowingly
failed to make, such allegation before trial,
at trial, on direct appeal (whether or not the
petitioner actually took such an appeal), in
an application for leave to appeal a convic-
tion based on a guilty plea, in any habeas
corpus or coram nobis proceeding actually
instituted by said petitioner, in a prior
petition under this subtitle, or in any other
proceeding actually instituted by said peti-
tioner, unless the failure to make such alle-
gation shall be excused because of special
circumstances.  The burden of proving the
existence of such special circumstances shall
be upon the petitioner.
"(2) When an allegation of error could
have been made by a petitioner before trial,
at trial, on direct appeal (whether or not
said petitioner actually took such an appeal),
in an application for leave to appeal a con-
viction based on a guilty plea, in any habeas
corpus or coram nobis proceeding actually
instituted by said petitioner, in a prior
petition under this subtitle, or in any other
proceeding actually instituted by said peti-
tioner, but was not in fact so made, there
shall be a rebuttable presumption that said
petitioner intelligently and knowingly failed
- 15 -
to make such allegation."
The circuit court implicitly found that Walker had rebutted the
presumption, set forth in paragraph (2) above, that he had
"intelligently and knowingly failed" to raise the jury instruction
issue at trial, on direct appeal, or in his two previous post
conviction proceedings.  The court, applying the definition of
waiver contained in § 645A(c), went on to hold that Walker
personally had not intelligently and knowingly failed to raise the
issue and that the failure of Walker's attorneys to object to the
jury instruction or subsequently to raise the issue "is not
attributable to Walker."
The circuit court's application of the definition of waiver
in the Post Conviction Act's subsection (c) may well have been
correct if the waiver issue in this case were governed by sub-
section (c).  The court, however, overlooked our interpretation of
the statute as a whole, set forth in Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132,
395 A.2d 464 (1978), and reaffirmed on numerous occasions.  See,
e.g., Oken v. State, 343 Md. 256, 270-272, 681 A.2d 30, 37-39
(1996); McElroy v. State, 329 Md. 136, 140-142, 147-149, 617 A.2d
1068, 1070-1071, 1073-1075 (1993); Trimble v. State, 321 Md. 248,
259, 582 A.2d 794, 799 (1990); State v. Romulus, 315 Md. 526, 539-
540, 555 A.2d 494, 500 (1989); Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124, 141,
522 A.2d 950, 958-959 (1987); State v. Calhoun, 306 Md. 692, 702-
704, 511 A.2d 461, 465-467 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910, 107
- 16 -
S.Ct. 1339, 94 L.Ed.2d 528 (1987); State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428,
464, 509 A.2d 1179, 1197, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995, 107 S.Ct.
598, 93 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986); Foster, Evans and Huffington v. State,
305 Md. 306, 315-316, 503 A.2d 1326, 1331, cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1010, 1023, 106 S.Ct. 3310, 3315, 92 L.Ed.2d 723, 745 (1986);
Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 215-216, 438 A.2d 1301, 1308
(1981); State v. Magwood, 290 Md. 615, 622-623, 432 A.2d 446, 449-
450 (1981). 
This Court held in Curtis v. State, supra, 284 Md. at 141,
395 A.2d at 469, that the General Assembly, when it enacted the
Post Conviction Procedure Act, did not "intend that the definition
of `waiver' set forth in subsection (c) determine in all cases the
right to raise for the first time any issue in a post conviction
action, regardless of the nature of prior procedural defaults,
tactical decisions of counsel, or omissions of counsel . . . ."  We
pointed out in Curtis that, with regard to certain rights, courts
traditionally have required that a person intelligently and
knowingly relinquish or abandon the right before he or she is
deemed to have waived the right.  We noted that the Supreme Court,
in the seminal case of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58
S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938), had applied this
strict "intelligent and knowing" concept to waiver of the right to
counsel.  The Curtis opinion reviewed some of the other rights
which, under decisions by the Supreme Court, this Court, and other
- 17 -
courts, have required intelligent and knowing action by an
individual for there to be a waiver of the right.  
We went on in Curtis, however, to point out that courts had
not applied the "intelligent and knowing" test of waiver to most
rights and issues arising in litigation, and that litigants,
including criminal defendants, may often be precluded from
asserting a right or raising an issue because of prior actions or
inactions by the litigants or their attorneys.  After discussing
several cases, we stated in Curtis, 284 Md. at 147, 395 A.2d at
473,
"that whether one is precluded from asserting
a . . . right because of what may have oc-
curred previously, even though the failure was
not `intelligent and knowing,' depends upon
the nature of the right and the surrounding
circumstances.  A defendant may forego a broad
spectrum of rights which are deemed to fall
within the category of tactical decisions by
counsel or involve procedural defaults."
The Curtis opinion then addressed the Maryland Post Conviction
Procedure Act.  After examining the language, history, and purposes
of the Post Conviction Procedure Act, as well as the previous
decisions by this Court interpreting the statute, we concluded as
follows (284 Md. at 149-150, 395 A.2d at 474):
"Consequently, we believe that the Legis-
lature, when it spoke of `waiver' in subsec-
tion (c) of Art. 27, § 645A, was using the
term in a narrow sense.  It intended that
subsection (c), with its `intelligent and
- 18 -
knowing' standard, be applicable only in those
circumstances where the waiver concept of
Johnson v. Zerbst . . . was applicable.  Other
situations are beyond the scope of subsection
(c), to be governed by case law or any perti-
nent statutes or rules.  Tactical decisions,
when made by an authorized competent attorney,
as well as legitimate procedural requirements,
will normally bind a criminal defendant."
A few years later, in Williams v. State, supra, 292 Md. at
215-216, 438 A.2d at 1308, we reaffirmed the interpretation of the
Post Conviction Procedure set forth in Curtis, stating:
"Curtis held that the definition of waiver in
the Post Conviction Procedure Act, Code (1957,
1976 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 645A(c), as an
intelligent and knowing failure by the defen-
dant himself to raise an issue, was only
applicable to those rights which, under cases
like Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 439, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837
(1963), and similar holdings, could only be
waived if there was a voluntary, knowing and
intelligent relinquishment of the right by the
defendant himself.  We held that the waiver of
other rights, which ordinarily do not require
such knowing and voluntary action for a waiver
to be effective, was not governed by the
definition of waiver in the Post Conviction
Procedure Act."
The Court in Williams, 292 Md. at 216, 438 A.2d at 1308, reiterated
"that a defendant was in most situations bound by the tactical
decisions, actions or inactions of his attorney . . . ."  Later,
the Williams opinion explained (292 Md. at 218, 438 A.2d at 1309):
"Today, with the complexity of many crimi-
nal trials and the absolute right of counsel
- 19 -
if there is a danger of incarceration, our
system proceeds upon the assumption that it is
primarily counsel's function to assert or
waive most `rights' of the defendant.  Unless
a defendant speaks out, normally he must be
bound by the trial decisions, actions and
inactions of counsel.  Otherwise, the system
simply would not work.  Estelle v. Williams,
425 U.S. 501, 512, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d
126 (1976); Curtis v. State, supra, 284 Md. at
145-149."
Very recently, in Oken v. State, supra, 343 Md. at 270-271,
681 A.2d at 37, Judge Raker for the Court emphasized that the
Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act "does not require applica-
tion of the `intelligently and knowingly' standard of waiver to
every . . . right," and that, 
"[i]n Curtis, we recognized the potential for
chaos if every time counsel made a tactical
decision or a procedural default the `intel-
ligently and knowingly' waiver standard was
triggered."
Turning to the present case, we are aware of no decision by
the Supreme Court or this Court holding that waiver of an issue
over the accuracy of a jury instruction concerning the elements of
an offense requires intelligent and knowing action by the defendant
himself.  On the contrary, Maryland Rule 4-325(e), as well as a
multitude of cases in this Court, make it clear that the failure to
object to a jury instruction ordinarily constitutes a waiver of any
later claim that the instruction was erroneous.  See, e.g., Bowman
v. State, 337 Md. 65, 67, 650 A.2d 954, 955 (1994) ("review of a
- 20 -
jury instruction will not ordinarily be permitted unless the
appellant has objected seasonably so as to allow the trial judge an
opportunity to correct the deficiency before the jury retires to
deliberate"); Ayers v. State, 335 Md. 602, 627-628, 645 A.2d 22, 34
(1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 942, 130 L.Ed.2d 886
(1995) ("a party who fails to object to a jury instruction at trial
may not later raise the issue"); Baker v. State, 332 Md. 542, 563,
632 A.2d 783, 793 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1078, 114 S.Ct.
1664, 128 L.Ed.2d 380 (1994); Collins v. State, 318 Md. 269, 284,
568 A.2d 1, 8, cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1032, 110 S.Ct. 3296, 111
L.Ed.2d 805 (1990) ("Counsel's failure to except to the reinstruc-
tion is indicative of an acceptance . . . .  Under these circum-
stances, defense counsel has failed to preserve the challenge to
the court's instructions"); Johnson v. State, 310 Md. 681, 685-689,
531 A.2d 675, 677-679 (1987).
Furthermore, we have consistently held that the failure to
object to or otherwise challenge a jury instruction constitutes a
waiver of the issue for purposes of the Maryland Post Conviction
Procedure Act.  Thus, in Davis v. State, supra, 285 Md. 19, 400
A.2d 406, this Court addressed the question of whether the intelli-
gent and knowing waiver standard of § 645A(c) was applicable when
the defendant, in a post conviction proceeding, sought relief based
on a concededly erroneous jury instruction requiring that the
defendant "conclusively" prove his alibi.  Although the defendant-
- 21 -
petitioner asserted that this erroneous instruction relieved the
prosecution of its burden of proving criminal agency beyond a
reasonable doubt, neither the defendant nor his attorney had
challenged the instruction at trial, on direct appeal or in an
earlier post conviction proceeding.   After reviewing the opinion
in Curtis v. State, supra, Judge Orth for the Court stated in Davis
(285 Md. at 33-34, 400 A.2d at 413):
"It is patent from our comprehensive discus-
sion in Curtis leading to [the] determination
of legislative intent, 284 Md. at 141-150,
that the waiver concept of Johnson v. Zerbst
and Fay v. Noia is not applicable to the
advisory jury instruction here.
* * *
"The jury instruction here falls within the
category of those matters which are capable of
being waived other than by the `intelligent
and knowing' standard."
After pointing out that our view was in accord with decisions from
other jurisdictions, the Court in Davis concluded (285 Md. at 35,
400 A.2d at 413-414):
"The short of it is that we found in Curtis
on the authorities therein referred to, that
`it [was] clear that a "procedural default" in
certain circumstances, even where a defendant
may personally have been without knowledge or
understanding of the matter, may result in his
being precluded from asserting important
rights. . . .  A defendant may forego a broad
spectrum of rights which are deemed to fall
within the category of tactical decisions by
counsel or involve procedural defaults.'  284
- 22 -
Md. at 147.  The right to a correct jury
instruction in the circumstances of the in-
stant case falls within the category involving
procedural defaults.  Thus, the waiver concept
of Johnson v. Zerbst and Fay v. Noia was not
applicable, and, therefore, the provisions of
subsection (c) were not applicable.  The
answer to [the] question . . . is that a new
trial was not required under the provisions of
§ 645A(c) of the Act."
Our subsequent decisions are entirely in accord.  See, e.g.,
Trimble v. State, supra, 321 Md. at 257, 582 A.2d at 798 ("The
[jury instruction] issue is not, at any rate, a proper subject for
review in this [post conviction] proceeding because the issue of
the instruction was not raised [previously] and was waived"); State
v. Tichnell, supra, 306 Md. at 465-466, 509 A.2d at 1198 (The
circuit court "held that because there was no objection to the
instruction, the issue was waived and thus not properly before the
post conviction court.  . . . [W]e agree").  See also the discus-
sion in Foster, Evans and Huffington v. State, supra, 305 Md. at
314-316, 503 A.2d at 1331 ("Even where the penalty in a case is as
awesome as death, there must at some point be an end to litigation.
Therefore, we hold that the present complaints concerning the jury
instructions have been waived by the failure to raise them
[previously]").  
Consequently, the circuit court erred in holding that the
failure of Walker's attorneys to object to the jury instruction, or
subsequently to challenge the instruction is not attributable to
- 23 -
Walker.  There was a waiver of the jury instruction issue.
B.
As previously discussed, the circuit court alternatively
held that, if there was a waiver, it should be excused under the
circumstances.  The circuit court in its first opinion referred to
the "standards of [the] `plain error'" doctrine which is embodied
in Rules 4-325(e) and 8-131(a), and which were applied by this
Court in Franklin v. State, supra, 319 Md. at 120, 571 A.2d at
1210.  The circuit court in its second opinion, after the remand by
the Court of Special Appeals, referred to the language of the Post
Conviction Procedure Act's § 645A(c), authorizing a waiver to "be
excused because of special circumstances."  
Rules 4-325(e) and 8-131(a), authorizing a court to take
cognizance of "plain error" despite the waiver of an issue,
literally apply only to direct appellate review of a judgment.
Moreover, the similar "special circumstances" doctrine set forth in
§ 645A(c)(1), authorizing a court in a post conviction action to
excuse a waiver, is applicable only to situations encompassed by
§ 645A(c), i.e., situations requiring intelligent and knowing
action before there is a waiver.
Nevertheless, as the circuit court recognized in the present
case, this Court has taken the position that a court, in a post
conviction proceeding, can excuse a waiver based upon an earlier
procedural default if the circumstances warrant such action.  In
- 24 -
effect, we have upheld the application of the "plain error" or
"special circumstances" principles to waivers of the type here
involved.  
For example, very recently in Oken v. State, supra, 343 Md.
at 272-274, 681 A.2d at 38, which was an action under the Post
Conviction Procedure Act, the defendant-petitioner challenged his
conviction on the ground, inter alia, that the trial court's voir
dire had been inadequate.  After reviewing the nature of this issue
and the opinion in Curtis v. State, supra, we determined that the
voir dire issue "may be relinquished by failure to raise the claim
on direct appeal and is not controlled by the `intelligent and
knowing' waiver standard of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58
S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), thus falling outside Art. 27,
§ 645A(c)."  Oken v. State, supra, 343 Md. at 271-272, 681 A.2d at
37.  The Court then held that "Oken's failure to raise this claim
on direct appeal constituted waiver."  343 Md. at 272, 681 A.2d at
38.  We went on, however, to recognize that "this Court retains
discretion to excuse [the] waiver."  343 Md. at 273, 681 A.2d at
38.  After further reviewing the matter, we found "no circumstances
excusing the failure to raise this issue on direct appeal."  343
Md. at 274, 681 A.2d at 38.  See also Foster, Evans and Huffington
v. State, supra, 305 Md. at 315-316, 503 A.2d at 1331.
As discussed in Part I of this opinion, this Court in
Franklin v. State, supra, 319 Md. at 120, 571 A.2d at 1210, upon
- 25 -
       In addition to the facts set forth in this Court's Franklin
3
opinion, see the Briefs and Record Extract filed in this Court in
No. 180, September Term, 1987.
direct appeal, held that the failure to object to an erroneous jury
instruction, which was essentially the same as the instruction
given at Walker's trial, should be excused because of the pre-
Jenkins misconception by a large segment of the bench and the bar
concerning the intent element of assault with intent to murder.
The circuit court in the present case held that this same miscon-
ception should excuse the failure to object at Walker's trial.
We assume that, if the circumstances in the present case
were similar to those in Franklin, the circuit court's decision
excusing Walker's waiver of the jury instruction issue would have
been warranted.  The circumstances in the two cases, however, were
not at all comparable.
In the Franklin case, the uncontradicted evidence showed
that the defendant, over several hours, repeatedly had beaten his
former girlfriend with his fists and had kicked her.  The record
and briefs in this Court disclose that the identity of the
assailant was not an issue at the trial.  Instead, Franklin's
defense related entirely to his intent when he inflicted the
beatings.   As pointed out in this Court's opinion in Franklin, 319
3
Md. at 119, 571 A.2d at 1209,
"[a]fter deliberating for an hour and a half,
the jury asked the trial court to explain
- 26 -
`what specifically constitutes intent to
murder.'  The court repeated its instructions
including the statement that `a specific
intent to murder is not a necessary element
for the conviction of assault with intent to
murder.  It is sufficient if there was an
intention to commit grievous bodily harm.'
There was no objection.  Based on these in-
structions, 
the 
jury 
convicted 
Franklin
. . . ."
We initially pointed out in the Franklin opinion that we could take
cognizance of plain error in a jury instruction, which was not
objected to, only "where the error is material and affects the
right of the defendant to a fair trial."  319 Md. at 120, 571 A.2d
at 1210.  Since Franklin's defense centered on the nature of his
intent when he assaulted and battered the victim, and because the
jury experienced difficulty with the intent element of assault with
intent to murder, we concluded in Franklin that the erroneous
instruction "affect[ed] materially Franklin's right to a fair and
impartial trial."  319 Md. at 126, 571 A.2d at 1213.
In the Walker case, the victim was in a crowded bar and was
shot with a gun.  The record discloses that Walker's defense was
that the State "had the wrong man."  This was the theme of his
attorney's opening statement and closing argument.  It was the
substance of the testimony of the witnesses called on Walker's
behalf.  The cross-examination of the State's witnesses was
directed to the identity of the shooter.  The only time Walker's
counsel suggested an alternative defense was when he requested a
- 27 -
self-defense instruction, and the trial court declined to give the
instruction because there was no evidence generating the issue.  At
no time during Walker's trial was any issue raised concerning the
nature of the shooter's intent.  It was never suggested to the
court or the jury that the shooter's intent may have been something
less than an intent to murder.
In sum, the circumstances of the Franklin case are totally
different from the circumstances involved here.  In Franklin, the
nature of the defendant's intent was the disputed issue.  In the
present case, intent was simply not an issue at all.  Thus, the
error in the jury instruction concerning intent clearly did not
deprive Walker of a fair trial.  The circuit court's holding to the
contrary was erroneous.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED.  PETITIONER TO
PAY COSTS.