Case Title: State v. Palmer

Citation: 2012-Ohio-580

Docket Number: 2010-1660

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-02-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Palmer, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-580.] 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-580 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. PALMER, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Palmer, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-580.] 
Criminal law—Registration of sex offenders—Petition process of R.C. 
2950.031(E) and 2950.032(E)—Dismissal of indictment when statute 
cannot apply to accused. 
(No. 2010-1660—Submitted November 1, 2011—Decided February 21, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, Nos. 09AP-956 and 
09AP-957, 2010-Ohio-2421. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, did 
not invalidate the petition process for challenging a sex-offender 
classification under R.C. 2950.031(E) and 2950.032(E). 
2.  A trial court may dismiss an indictment for violations of R.C. Chapter 2950 
when it determines that the chapter’s regulations do not apply to the 
accused. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
 
MCGEE BROWN, J. 
{¶ 1} This appeal draws us to two procedural questions that linger after 
our decisions in State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 
N.E.2d 753, and State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 
N.E.2d 1108, each of which invalidated certain aspects of the Adam Walsh Act. 
{¶ 2} First, we review whether our decision in Bodyke invalidated the 
statutory petition process for challenging a classification under the Adam Walsh 
Act.  It did not.  Bodyke invalidated the reclassification provisions of the Adam 
Walsh Act because they violated Ohio’s separation-of-powers doctrine.  
However, because separation of powers implicates more than one branch of 
government, it is not at issue in the petition process, which involves only the 
judiciary and survives Bodyke. 
{¶ 3} Second, we address whether a trial court may dismiss an 
indictment alleging violations of the Adam Walsh Act.  Crim.R. 12 authorizes 
pretrial dismissal of defective indictments, and after Williams, duties under the 
Adam Walsh Act may not be imposed retroactively.  When a trial court faces an 
indictment based on the retroactive application of the Adam Walsh Act, the law 
not only allows but indeed demands dismissal. 
{¶ 4} Because the decision below is inconsistent with these holdings, we 
reverse and remand. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 5} Paul Palmer pleaded guilty to sexual battery in 1995.  Upon 
conviction, he served an 18-month prison sentence for that offense. 
{¶ 6} Since Palmer’s conviction, Ohio’s sex-offender laws have changed 
dramatically.  See Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, 
at ¶ 3–28 (detailing the General Assembly’s efforts to strengthen Ohio’s sex-
offender laws).  Palmer was not subject to Ohio’s first comprehensive sex-
offender regulations, enacted as Megan’s Law in 1996.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180, 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2560, 2601.  The regulations did not apply to offenders 
who, like Palmer, completed their sex-offense prison sentences before July 1, 
1997.  Former R.C. 2950.04(A), id. at 2609; see also State v. Champion, 106 Ohio 
St.3d 120, 2005-Ohio-4098, 832 N.E.2d 718, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 7} Unlike Megan’s Law, however, the Adam Walsh Act of 2007 
sweepingly applied to sex offenders regardless of when their offenses occurred.  
2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10; scope language appears in multiple provisions; e.g., 
R.C. 2950.04(A)(2).  Based on Palmer’s 1995 sexual-battery conviction, the 
Adam Walsh Act automatically imposed a Tier III sex-offender classification.  
R.C. 2950.01(G)(1)(a).  Tier III is the most restrictive category of R.C. Chapter 
2950.  It requires registration with authorities every 90 days for life as well as a 
number of community-notification obligations under R.C. 2950.11.  R.C. 
2950.07(B)(1) and 2950.06(B)(3). 
{¶ 8} The instant appeal stems from two related actions below.  First, 
after Palmer learned about his classification under the Adam Walsh Act, he 
petitioned the trial court under R.C. 2950.031(E) (entitling classified sex 
offenders to “a court hearing to contest the application to the offender * * * of the 
new registration requirements under Chapter 2950. of the Revised Code”).  At the 
same time, Palmer moved to stay enforcement of the community-notification 
provisions of R.C. 2950.11 while the court reviewed his petition.  The trial court 
granted the stay of community-notification requirements.  It also stayed Palmer’s 
petition pending this court’s review of the constitutionality of the Adam Walsh 
Act. 
{¶ 9} Second, before the trial court ruled on the petition, a Franklin 
County grand jury indicted Palmer for violating his registration requirements 
under the Adam Walsh Act.  The indictment alleged that Palmer had failed to 
provide notice of a change of address under R.C. 2950.05 and that he had failed to 
verify his current address under R.C. 2950.06.  Based on Palmer’s original 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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conviction, 
these 
offenses 
constituted 
third-degree 
felonies. 
R.C. 
2950.99(A)(1)(a)(ii). 
{¶ 10} Palmer moved to dismiss the indictment.  He also moved for 
immediate disposition of his petition challenging the classification.  The trial 
court ruled that Ohio’s sex-offender regulations did not apply to Palmer and 
granted his motion to dismiss the indictment.  Additionally, the trial court ordered 
the removal of Palmer’s name from any “local, state or federal” lists of sex 
offenders. 
{¶ 11} On appeal, the Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed.  As a 
preliminary matter, the Tenth District concluded that the trial court exceeded its 
authority when it dismissed the indictment because it looked to “evidence outside 
the face of the indictment” and “address[ed] the very issue to be determined at 
trial.”  2010-Ohio-2421, 2010 WL 2171662, at ¶ 15.  Additionally, the Tenth 
District found the dismissal erroneous in light of the Adam Walsh Act’s explicit 
retroactivity.  Id. at ¶ 23, citing R.C. 2950.04(A)(2).  Finally, the appellate court 
reversed the trial court order requiring Palmer’s removal from lists of sex 
offenders because the order stemmed from the erroneous determination that the 
requirements of the Adam Walsh Act did not apply to Palmer.  Id. at ¶ 25. 
{¶ 12} We accepted discretionary jurisdiction to hear Palmer’s appeal.  
128 Ohio St.3d 1411, 2011-Ohio-828, 942 N.E.2d 384. 
Petition Process 
{¶ 13} The first issue for our review is whether Bodyke invalidated the 
petition process of R.C. Chapter 2950.  This controversy began when Palmer 
petitioned the trial court under R.C. 2950.031(E).  Palmer asks us to reinstate the 
disposition of his petition below, in which the trial court ruled that the Adam 
Walsh Act does not apply to Palmer’s conviction.  The state, however, argues that 
the ruling was a nullity because Bodyke abolished the petition process. 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
{¶ 14} The Tenth District did not review the viability of the petition 
process.  Upon the state’s request, however, we address the issue now to resolve 
disagreement among the courts of appeals.  Compare Lyttle v. State, 191 Ohio 
App.3d 487, 2010-Ohio-6277, 946 N.E.2d 794, ¶ 16–17 (12th Dist.) (finding that 
Bodyke invalidated the petition process), with State v. Johnson, 10th Dist. No. 
10AP-932, 2011-Ohio-2009, ¶ 9 (finding that the petition process survived 
Bodyke). 
{¶ 15} Portions of R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032 impermissibly instructed 
the Ohio attorney general, an officer of the executive branch, to reopen final 
judgments of the judicial branch.  Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 
933 N.E.2d 753, at ¶ 62.  That instruction violated Ohio’s separation-of-powers 
doctrine.  Id. at ¶ 61.  To remedy the violation, in Bodyke we declared 
unenforceable “the unconstitutional component” of the Adam Walsh Act’s 
reclassification provisions.  However, we held that the component could be 
severed from the rest of the act, and accordingly, we “left in place * * * the 
remainder of the AWA, ‘which is capable of being read and of standing alone.’ ”  
Id. at ¶ 66, quoting State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 
470, ¶ 98. 
{¶ 16} Based on the holding of Bodyke, the state’s argument that the 
petition process was invalidated lacks merit.  The petition process of R.C. 
2950.031(E) and 2950.032(E) does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.  
The petition process does not require another branch of government to intrude 
upon the province of the judiciary.  The invalidated reclassification provisions 
created an unconstitutional relationship between two branches of government.  By 
contrast, the petition process involves only one branch of government, the 
judiciary. 
{¶ 17} Therefore, 
Bodyke’s 
severance 
of 
the 
unconstitutional 
reclassification process left intact the petition process, which “can be given effect 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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without the invalid” reclassification provisions.  Bodyke at ¶ 63, quoting R.C. 
1.50.  See also State v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462, 909 
N.E.2d 1254 (finding no violation of the separation of powers when a statute 
enabled a trial court to correct its own judgment entry).  Accordingly, we hold 
that Bodyke did not invalidate the petition process for sex offenders set forth by 
R.C. 2950.031(E) and 2950.032(E). 
{¶ 18} Moreover, we reject the state’s contention that Chojnacki v. 
Cordray, 126 Ohio St.3d 321, 2010-Ohio-3212, 933 N.E.2d 800, governs this 
case.  Chojnacki is inapposite.  It merely reflected that under Bodyke, any 
reclassification by the Ohio attorney general’s office under the Adam Walsh Act 
was unenforceable.  Therefore, issues regarding the appealability of the order 
arising in Chojnacki’s petition were moot.  Chojnacki did not speak to the 
viability of the petition process itself.  That process remains alive and well. 
{¶ 19} The Adam Walsh Act entitled Palmer to contest his classification.  
We find no error in the trial court’s compliance with R.C. 2950.031(E).  
Accordingly, we reject the state’s argument that the trial court lacked power to 
review Palmer’s claims after Bodyke. 
 
Dismissal of Indictment 
{¶ 20} We now turn to the second issue for our review, which is whether a 
trial court may dismiss an indictment under R.C. Chapter 2950 if Ohio’s sex-
offender regulations do not apply to the accused.  The trial court dismissed 
Palmer’s indictment because he was “not under any statutory duty to verify his 
current address or to register as required by Revised Code Chapter 2950.” 
{¶ 21} The Tenth District, however, reversed.  The appellate court found 
that Palmer’s “arguments not only draw upon evidence outside the face of the 
indictment but address the very issue to be determined at trial.”  2010-Ohio-2421, 
2010 WL 2171662, at ¶ 15.  Therefore, it held, the motion to dismiss “exceeded 
the permissible bounds of a pretrial motion under Crim.R. 12(C),” and the trial 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
court ruling which granted that motion was erroneous.  Id. at ¶ 17.  Palmer asks us 
to reverse, arguing that the trial court may dismiss an indictment that is legally 
defective, such as one that it is based on an unconstitutional classification. 
{¶ 22} Crim.R. 12 empowers trial courts to rule on “any defense, 
objection, evidentiary issue, or request that is capable of determination without 
the trial of the general issue.”  Crim.R. 12(C).  In conducting this pretrial review, 
courts may look to “evidence beyond the face of the indictment.”   State v. Brady, 
119 Ohio St.3d 375, 2008-Ohio-4493, 894 N.E.2d 671, at ¶ 18.  However, a 
Crim.R. 12 ruling may not decide “what would be the general issue at trial.”  Id.  
Accordingly, under our precedent, we must decide whether a trial court can 
determine if R.C. Chapter 2950 applies to an offender without embracing the 
general issue for trial. 
{¶ 23} The answer is clear.  Under Crim.R. 12(C)(2), trial courts may 
judge before trial whether an indictment is defective.  Without a doubt, an 
indictment is defective if it alleges violations of R.C. Chapter 2950 by a person 
who is not subject to that chapter.  There is no set of circumstances under which 
such a person may violate the law’s requirements.  This is especially so where, as 
in Palmer’s case, an indictment depends on the unconstitutional application of 
law.  Therefore, dismissal is appropriate. 
{¶ 24} Contrary to the Tenth District’s analysis below, such a 
determination does not embrace the general issue for trial.  The general issue for 
trial in this context is whether the accused violated the law as set forth in the 
indictment.  Where the law simply does not apply, the trial court is well within its 
authority to dismiss the indictment before trial.  In reaching that determination, 
the trial court may look beyond the four corners of the indictment.  Brady at ¶ 18. 
{¶ 25} Nor did the trial court err when it ruled that the Adam Walsh Act 
does not apply to Palmer.  The prohibition on retroactivity of Article II, Section 
28 of the Ohio Constitution forbids the application of the Adam Walsh Act to any 
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offense committed before the law’s enactment.  Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 
2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, ¶ 21.  Here, there is no question that Palmer’s 
1995 offense occurred before the Adam Walsh Act’s 2007 enactment.  Therefore, 
the act’s requirements do not apply.  And despite the state’s claim to the contrary, 
Megan’s Law also did not apply, as Palmer completed his sentence for sexual 
battery before July 1, 1997.  See State v. Champion, 106 Ohio St.3d 120, 2005-
Ohio-4098, 832 N.E.2d 718, ¶ 13 (holding that Megan’s Law does not apply to “a 
person whose prison term for a sexually oriented offense was completed before 
July 1, 1997,” regardless of whether the person was later released from a prison 
term for  another offense). 
{¶ 26} The trial court did not prematurely embrace the general issue for 
trial when it ruled that Ohio’s sex-offender regulations did not apply to Palmer. 
Order Dismissing Indictment 
{¶ 27} The state also asks us to review the trial court’s order that Palmer’s 
“name be removed from all sexually oriented lists maintained by the local, state or 
federal government.”  R.C. 2950.031(E) required the trial court, after ruling on 
Palmer’s petition, to notify the sheriff and the Bureau of Criminal Identification 
and Investigation of its decision.  It is not clear which other agencies or lists, if 
any, were contemplated by the trial court’s order.  On remand, we direct the trial 
court to clarify its order in this respect. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 28} We reverse the decision of the Tenth District Court of Appeals and 
remand this case to the Court of Common Pleas for Franklin County for an order 
consistent with our decision in Williams as well as R.C. 2950.031(E). 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
__________________ 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. 
Taylor, Chief Counsel, Appellate Division, for appellee. 
 
Yeura R. Venters, Franklin County Public Defender, and David L. Strait 
and Shayla L. Werner, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant. 
______________________