Case Title: State ex rel. Schreiner v. Erie Cty. Bd. of Elections

Citation: 2024-Ohio-290

Docket Number: 2024-0052

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2024-01-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Schreiner v. Erie Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-290.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-290 
THE STATE EX REL. SCHREINER v. ERIE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS  
ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Schreiner v. Erie Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip 
Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-290.] 
Elections—Prohibition—R.C. 2961.02—Writ sought to compel board of elections 
to remove candidate for Ohio House of Representatives from primary-
election ballot—A person is incompetent to hold a public office under R.C. 
2961.02 if (1) person was convicted of a disqualifying offense, (2) public 
office “involves substantial management or control over the property of a 
state agency, political subdivision, or private entity,” and (3) person’s 
conviction has not been expunged, reversed, annulled, or pardoned—Office 
of state representative does not involve substantial management or control 
over property of a state agency, political subdivision, or private entity—
Board of elections did not abuse its discretion or act in clear disregard of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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applicable law in keeping candidate for Ohio House of Representatives on 
primary-election ballot—Writ denied. 
(No. 2024-0052—Submitted January 24, 2024—Decided January 29, 2024.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this expedited election case, relator, Dennis Schreiner, seeks a writ 
of prohibition against respondents, the Erie County Board of Elections and its 
members, Thomas Ferrell, Maryann Groot, Lisa Crescimano, and Nancy McKeen.  
Schreiner seeks a writ ordering the board of elections to remove Steven Kraus, a 
candidate for the Ohio House of Representatives, from the March 2024 primary-
election ballot.  Because Schreiner has not shown that the office of state 
representative involves substantial management or control over the property of a 
state agency, political subdivision, or private entity, see R.C. 2961.02(B), we deny 
the writ. 
I.  FACTUAL, PROCEDURAL, AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} Kraus is a Republican candidate in the March 2024 primary election 
for the office of state representative for the 89th Ohio House District.  In 2015, 
Kraus was convicted in the Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas of theft from 
an elderly person in violation of R.C. 2913.02, a felony of the fifth degree.  He was 
sentenced to two years of community control and ordered to pay a $2,500 fine.  
Kraus successfully completed all requirements of his community control, and his 
community control was terminated in 2018.  In 2022, the common pleas court 
conducted a hearing on a motion filed by Kraus to seal the record of his conviction 
under R.C. 2953.32.  The common pleas court granted the motion on January 23, 
2023, and determined that Kraus was entitled “to have his record sealed in [his] 
case, including any records of his arrest.” 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
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{¶ 3} On or about December 19, 2023, Kraus filed his declaration of 
candidacy with the board of elections to run for state representative.  As part of his 
declaration, Kraus declared that “if elected to said office or position, I will qualify 
therefor.”  See R.C. 3513.07.  On December 27, Schreiner filed a written protest 
against Kraus’s candidacy with the board of elections in accordance with R.C. 
3513.05.  Schreiner is a registered-Republican voter living in Erie County within 
the 89th Ohio House District.  In his protest, Schreiner argued that Kraus’s 
declaration was invalid because Kraus was not qualified to hold office under R.C. 
2961.02(B) due to his conviction of a “disqualifying offense.” 
{¶ 4} The board of elections held a hearing on the protest on January 5, 
2024.  At the hearing, Kraus stipulated that he had been convicted of a disqualifying 
offense for purposes of R.C. 2961.02 but argued that he was eligible to hold office 
because his conviction had been expunged.  Schreiner argued that Kraus’s 
conviction had been sealed, which he contended was not equivalent to being 
expunged.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the members of the board of elections 
voted unanimously to deny Schreiner’s protest, thus allowing Kraus to remain on 
the March 2024 primary-election ballot. 
{¶ 5} On January 10, Schreiner filed this verified petition for a writ of 
prohibition.  He seeks a writ prohibiting the board of elections from placing Kraus 
on the ballot in the March 2024 primary election.  Kraus filed a motion to intervene 
as a respondent, which we granted.  __ Ohio St.3d __, 2024-Ohio-156, __ N.E.3d 
__. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Legal standards 
{¶ 6} Prohibition is an appropriate remedy to challenge a board of elections’ 
decision to place a candidate on the ballot.  State ex rel. Emhoff v. Medina Cty. Bd. 
of Elections, 153 Ohio St.3d 313, 2018-Ohio-1660, 106 N.E.3d 21, ¶ 13.  To be 
entitled to a writ of prohibition, Schreiner must prove by clear and convincing 
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evidence that (1) the board of elections exercised quasi-judicial power, (2) the 
exercise of that power was unlawful, and (3) he lacks an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Federle v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
156 Ohio St.3d 322, 2019-Ohio-849, 126 N.E.3d 1091, ¶ 10.  “A board of elections 
exercises quasi-judicial authority when it decides a protest after a mandatory 
hearing that includes sworn testimony.”  State ex rel. Moscow v. Clermont Cty. Bd. 
of Elections, 169 Ohio St.3d 161, 2022-Ohio-3138, 202 N.E.3d 684, ¶ 15.  Here, 
the board of elections was required to and did hold a hearing on Schreiner’s protest, 
see R.C. 3513.05, and it heard sworn testimony at the hearing.  In addition, given 
the proximity of the March 2024 primary election, Schreiner lacks an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  See State ex rel. Finkbeiner v. Lucas Cty. 
Bd. of Elections, 122 Ohio St.3d 462, 2009-Ohio-3657, 912 N.E.2d 573, ¶ 18-19. 
{¶ 7} The remaining question is whether the board of elections acted 
unlawfully when it denied Schreiner’s protest.  A board of elections’ exercise of 
judicial or quasi-judicial power “is unauthorized if it engaged in fraud, corruption, 
abuse of discretion, or clear disregard of statutes or applicable legal provisions.”  
State ex rel. Youngstown v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 72 Ohio St.3d 69, 72, 
647 N.E.2d 769 (1995).  Schreiner does not argue that the board engaged in fraud 
or corruption.  He instead argues that the board of elections abused its discretion 
and acted in clear disregard of statutes or applicable legal provisions. 
B.  R.C. 2961.02: The disqualification statute 
{¶ 8} The core issues in this case involve the interpretation of R.C. 2961.02, 
which this opinion calls the “disqualification statute.”  R.C. 2961.02 was first 
enacted in 2005.  See Sub.H.B. No. 181, 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 6185, 6214-6215.  
It was last revised in 2008.  See 2008 Sub.H.B. No. 195. 
{¶ 9} R.C. 2961.02(A) defines various terms, including a “disqualifying 
offense.”  R.C. 2961.02(B) and (C) then provide: 
 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
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(B) Any person who pleads guilty to a disqualifying offense 
and whose plea is accepted by the court or any person against whom 
a verdict or finding of guilt for committing a disqualifying offense 
is returned is incompetent to hold a public office or position of 
public employment or to serve as a volunteer, if holding the public 
office or position of public employment or serving as the volunteer 
involves substantial management or control over the property of a 
state agency, political subdivision, or private entity. 
(C) Division (B) of this section does not apply if a plea, 
verdict, or finding of the type described in that division regarding a 
disqualifying offense is reversed, expunged, or annulled.  The full 
pardon of a person who has pleaded guilty to a disqualifying offense 
and whose plea was accepted by the court or a person against whom 
a verdict or finding of guilt for committing a disqualifying offense 
was returned restores the privileges forfeited under division (B) of 
this section, but the pardon does not release the person from the costs 
of the person’s conviction in this state, unless so specified. 
 
Thus, in accordance with the disqualification statute, a person is incompetent to 
hold a public office if (1) the person was convicted of a disqualifying offense, (2) 
the public office “involves substantial management or control over the property of 
a state agency, political subdivision, or private entity,” and (3) the person’s 
conviction has not been expunged, reversed, annulled, or pardoned. 
{¶ 10} Here, the parties agree that Kraus’s 2015 felony-theft conviction for 
violating R.C. 2913.02 is a disqualifying offense.  See R.C. 2961.02(A)(5) (“theft 
offense” in the disqualification statute has the same meaning as in R.C. 2913.01) 
and 2913.01(K)(1) (“theft offense” includes a violation of R.C. 2913.02).  Kraus 
argues, however, that the office of state representative does not involve substantial 
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management or control over the property of a state agency, political subdivision, or 
private entity.  Kraus and the board of elections also argue that Kraus’s conviction 
was expunged within the meaning of R.C. 2961.02(C).  Kraus further argues that 
applying the disqualification statute to remove him from the ballot would be 
unconstitutional. 
C.  Substantial management or control 
{¶ 11} Kraus argues that the disqualification statute does not disqualify him 
from serving as a state representative, because the position does not “involv[e] 
substantial management or control over the property of a state agency, political 
subdivision, or private entity” as required by R.C. 2961.02(B).  We agree. 
{¶ 12} The disqualification statute does not define the phrase “substantial 
management or control,” nor has any case analyzed what the phrase means.  As 
such, the ordinary definition of the terms the General Assembly used at the time of 
enactment should be used to guide our determination of legislative intent.  Rockies 
Express Pipeline, L.L.C. v. McClain, 159 Ohio St.3d 302, 2020-Ohio-410, 150 
N.E.3d 895, ¶ 12.  A contemporary edition of Webster’s New World College 
Dictionary (4th Ed.1999) defined “substantial” as “considerable; ample; large,” id. 
at 1428, “manage” as “to have charge of; direct; administer,” id. at 871, and 
“control” as “to exercise authority over; direct; command,” id. at 317.  Similarly, 
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th Ed.2000) defined 
“substantial” as “[c]onsiderable in importance, value, degree, amount, or extent,” 
id. at 1727, “manage” as “[t]o direct the affairs or interests of,” id. at 1061, and 
“control” as “[a]uthority or ability to manage or direct,” id. at 400. 
{¶ 13} Applying these terms, a state representative has no direct 
management or control over the property of any state agency, political subdivision, 
or private entity.  Rather, the directors of a state agency, political subdivision, or 
private entity manage and control the property.  See, e.g., R.C. 121.07(A) (state-
January Term, 2024 
 
 
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department offices and divisions “shall be under the direction, supervision, and 
control of the directors of their respective departments”). 
{¶ 14} Schreiner argues that the General Assembly manages and controls 
state agencies through the budgeting process and general legislative oversight of 
state agencies.  But such oversight is not the equivalent of directing or 
administering a state agency in the usual sense.  And even if such oversight is 
considered substantial management or control, the General Assembly acts as a 
whole in exercising such authority, and each state representative is only 1 of 99 
members of one chamber of the assembly.  Schreiner has not established that acting 
alone, a single state representative exercises substantial management or control 
over a state agency’s property. 
{¶ 15} Schreiner also argues that the disqualification statute applies here 
because a state representative has control over office space and must manage 
legislative assistants.  The General Assembly is not explicitly included in the 
disqualification statute’s definition of a state agency.  See R.C. 2961.02(A)(4) 
(defining “state agency” as having the same meaning as in R.C. 1.60, which defines 
“state agency” as “every organized body, office, or agency established by the laws 
of the state for the exercise of any function of state government”).  But even if a 
state representative’s office space is considered part of a state agency, Schreiner 
has the burden of proof, see Federle, 156 Ohio St.3d 322, 2019-Ohio-849, 126 
N.E.3d 1091, at ¶ 10, and Schreiner presents no evidence, much less clear and 
convincing evidence, regarding how much property a state representative 
individually controls or to what extent he or she controls that property.  Every 
public office or position of public employment involves control over some minimal 
amount of property—even if just a pen and paper.  But the disqualifying statute 
speaks to “the property” (emphasis added) of a state agency, not negligible 
components of it, and requires “substantial”—i.e., considerable or large—
management or control over the property. 
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{¶ 16} In addition to the plain language of R.C. 2961.02, a different statute 
sheds light on this distinction.  R.C. 2921.41(C)(1) provides that a “public official 
or party official who pleads guilty to theft in office and whose plea is accepted by 
the court or a public official or party official against whom a verdict or finding of 
guilt for committing theft in office is returned is forever disqualified from holding 
any public office, employment, or position of trust in this state.”  Thus, if a person 
is convicted of theft in office (a violation of R.C. 2921.41), he or she is prohibited 
from holding any public office, while persons convicted of other specified theft 
offenses are prohibited from public offices or employment only if the position 
involves substantial management or control over the property of a state agency, 
political subdivision, or private entity, R.C. 2961.02(B).  And Schreiner has not 
shown by clear and convincing evidence that the office of state representative 
involves such management or control. 
{¶ 17} Because Schreiner has not shown that the office of state 
representative involves substantial management or control over the property of a 
state agency, political subdivision, or private entity, see id., he has not established 
that the board of elections abused its discretion or acted in clear disregard of statutes 
or applicable legal provisions when it denied his protest, see Youngstown, 72 Ohio 
St.3d at 72, 647 N.E.2d 769.  He is thus not entitled to a writ of prohibition. 
{¶ 18} Because we deny the writ on this ground, we need not address 
whether a sealed conviction is the equivalent of an expunged conviction for 
purposes of the disqualification statute.  We also do not need to address Kraus’s 
constitutional arguments. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 19} The board of elections did not abuse its discretion or act in clear 
disregard of the applicable law when it denied Schreiner’s protest and kept Kraus 
on the March 2024 primary-election ballot.  We therefore deny Schreiner’s petition 
for a writ of prohibition. 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
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Writ denied. 
FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, and DETERS, JJ., 
concur. 
KENNEDY, C.J., concurs in judgment only. 
_________________ 
Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., and Taylor M. Thompson, for relator. 
Kevin J. Baxter, Erie County Prosecuting Attorney, and Gerhard R. Gross 
and Jason R. Hinners, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for respondents. 
Mayle, L.L.C., Andrew R. Mayle, Benjamin G. Padanilam, and Nichole 
Kanios Papageorgiou, for intervening respondent. 
_________________