Case Title: Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility v. Peter N. Flessas

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1994AP002122-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1996-02-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 94-2122-D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  94-2122-D 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against PETER N. FLESSAS, Attorney at Law. 
 
FILED 
 
 
FEB 19, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
 
                                                                 
  
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding. 
 
Attorney's 
license 
suspended. 
 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Peter N. Flessas appealed from the 
referee's conclusions that he engaged in professional misconduct 
in two matters and from the recommendation that his license to 
practice law be suspended for 90 days as discipline for that 
misconduct.  As personal representative in an estate, Attorney 
Flessas sold the decedent's home to his own son at a price below 
its appraised value without having sought or obtained court 
approval, failed to disclose the purchaser's identity to the 
estate's attorney and to its sole heir and ignored other offers to 
purchase the property.  In another matter, Attorney Flessas 
 
No. 94-2122-D 
 
 
 
2 
refused to endorse an insurer's settlement check for one year, 
claiming a fee in the matter, notwithstanding that the injured 
person informed him within one week of her initial contact that 
she did not wish to retain him.  He also refused the woman's 
attorney's offer to place the amount he claimed as a fee in escrow 
and have his claim arbitrated so that the woman could receive her 
portion of the settlement proceeds.   
 
We determine that the referee's conclusions that Attorney 
Flessas engaged in professional misconduct in these two matters 
are supported by the facts properly found and that none of 
Attorney Flessas' allegations of impropriety in the conduct of the 
disciplinary proceeding has merit.  The seriousness of Attorney 
Flessas' professional misconduct established in this proceeding 
warrants the suspension of his license to practice law for 90 
days.  Particularly serious is Attorney Flessas' violation of his 
fiduciary duty to the estate and its heir in order to provide a 
financial benefit to a member of his own family.  That misconduct 
is exacerbated by the fact that the estate's heir, who was 
financially harmed by it, was a needful person whose medical 
condition diminished his ability to protect his own interests.   
 
Attorney Flessas was admitted to practice law in Wisconsin in 
1954 and practices in Milwaukee.  He has not previously been the 
subject of an attorney disciplinary proceeding.  The referee, 
Attorney Kathleen Callan Brady, made findings of fact based on the 
testimony and evidence presented at a lengthy disciplinary 
 
No. 94-2122-D 
 
 
 
3 
hearing.   
On March 11, 1991, a woman Attorney Flessas had 
represented for many years in income tax and other matters died.  
The woman had spent the last 10 years of her life in a nursing 
home and her son, who was 61 years old at the time of her death, 
resided in her home, as he had all his life.  The son was a 
diagnosed 
paranoid 
schizophrenic 
and 
had 
suffered 
several 
breakdowns requiring hospitalization.  His sole source of income 
was Social Security and disability benefits.   
 
Shortly before the woman's death, a couple who lived near her 
home had asked Attorney Jerome Iverson, the woman's guardian, 
whether the house would be put up for sale.  When advised that it 
probably would, the couple submitted an offer to purchase on March 
5, 1991 for $60,000 cash, subject to inspection of the premises.  
Attorney Iverson sent that offer to Attorney Flessas, who, 
consistent with the provisions of the woman's will he had drafted, 
had been appointed personal representative of the estate and 
retained Attorney Iverson as its attorney.  The estate's principal 
asset was the decedent's home in Wauwatosa, a suburb of Milwaukee. 
  
Soon after submitting the offer, the couple went with 
Attorney Flessas to see the property but the son refused to let 
them in.  The next day, when again refused admittance into the 
house, Attorney Flessas telephoned the police, who removed the son 
and had him transported by ambulance to the county mental health 
center.   
 
No. 94-2122-D 
 
 
 
4 
 
In mid-March, 1991, Attorney Flessas had the property 
appraised.  Following inspection, the real estate appraiser valued 
the home at $59,500.  Because of the son's neglect, the house was 
filthy and in poor repair:  the furnace had been shut off, burst 
water pipes had caused water damage, and substantial amounts of 
human waste and garbage had accumulated.  The appraiser also gave 
an estimate of the costs of repairs in the amount of $11,900.   
 
Following the son's removal from the property, Attorney 
Flessas visited the home with his son, John, who was in the 
business of rehabilitating properties and managed his own rental 
properties.  The man who had made the offer to purchase the 
property viewed the interior of the house with them and discussed 
its condition with John Flessas and the possibility of their 
purchasing it together for $40,000, cleaning and reselling it and 
splitting the profit.  After discussing with John Flessas the 
terms to be included in an offer, the man's wife, who worked for a 
realty firm, prepared an offer to purchase naming only herself and 
her husband as the purchasers and delivered that offer to the 
office where John Flessas ran his management business.  That 
offer, dated March 22, 1991, was for $40,000 cash, with closing in 
30 days.  Attorney Flessas, who knew of the joint venture between 
the couple and his son, disregarded that offer.   
 
On March 26, 1991, John Flessas prepared an offer to purchase 
the property for $41,000, with closing in 120 days, naming as 
purchaser a long-time neighbor and childhood friend who was a 
 
No. 94-2122-D 
 
 
 
5 
carpenter.  John Flessas and the friend had agreed to rehabilitate 
the property, with John Flessas financing the cost, and resell it, 
using the proceeds to pay the purchase price and splitting the 
balance.  The offer required the estate to pay all expenses of the 
property prior to sale.  Attorney Flessas accepted that offer on 
March 28, 1991, without advertising the property, listing it with 
a broker or otherwise actively marketing it.   
 
On April 1, 1991, the couple, unaware of the offer submitted 
in the name of the friend, prepared a third offer, without John 
Flessas' participation, on terms of $47,500 cash, with closing in 
30 days.  The couple sent that offer to Attorney Flessas' law 
office by certified mail and telephoned him that they had done so. 
 That certified letter was returned to the couple unclaimed after 
an unsuccessful attempt at delivery and two notices of it having 
been sent to Attorney Flessas' office.  Attorney Flessas did not 
respond to the offer, which he testified he never received.   
 
Following acceptance of the offer submitted in the name of 
his son's friend, the friend worked on the property, cleaning and 
repairing it and doing some remodeling, for which he was to 
receive from John Flessas a $1000 per week draw for five weeks.  
Attorney Flessas himself paid the friend one of those draws, which 
he and his son testified was merely for the son's convenience.   
 
On June 25, 1991, Attorney Flessas had his son's friend sign 
an assignment of offer to purchase giving all of his interest in 
the property to John Flessas.  The friend testified that he 
 
No. 94-2122-D 
 
 
 
6 
understood the purpose of the document merely to include John 
Flessas' name on the title to the property.  When rehabilitation 
and remodeling were completed, the property was sold July 19, 1991 
for $96,200 and the sale from the estate to John Flessas closed at 
the same time.  John Flessas subsequently reported a capital gain 
on the property of $33,196.   
 
Attorney Flessas did not disclose to the probate court his 
sale of the decedent's home to his son or seek court approval of 
the sale, even though it was at a price below the appraised value. 
 He also did not disclose to the estate's attorney that the 
purchaser was his son and did not advise the decedent's son of the 
purchaser's identity.  When the probate of the estate was 
completed, the heir signed a receipt for approximately $9000, 
representing the estate's assets.   
 
On the basis of those facts, the referee concluded that 
Attorney Flessas violated the rule established by this court's 
decision in State v. Hartman, 54 Wis. 2d 47, 194 N.W. 2d 653 
(1972) and, thus, SCR 20:8.4(f),
1 by failing to seek court 
approval of the sale of the property to his son and failing to 
disclose the purchaser's identity to the estate's attorney and to 
the heir.  The referee further concluded that Attorney Flessas 
                     
     
1  SCR 20:8.4 provides, in pertinent part:   
 
Misconduct 
 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:   
 
. . . 
 
(f)  violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme court 
order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of lawyers;  
 
No. 94-2122-D 
 
 
 
7 
engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit and 
misrepresentation, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c),
2 by refusing to 
consider the offers to purchase submitted by the couple, by 
accepting an offer in which his son was the principal on less 
favorable terms and at a price below the appraised value of the 
property, and by failing to disclose to the heir that his son was 
the purchaser.   
 
The other misconduct established in this proceeding concerns 
Attorney Flessas' refusal to endorse a settlement check in a 
personal injury matter.  In March, 1992, two days after being 
injured in an auto accident, a woman telephoned Attorney Flessas 
at the suggestion of relatives who were friends of Attorney 
Flessas to discuss the matter.  In that telephone call, Attorney 
Flessas advised the woman to see her doctor and obtain a wage 
statement from her employer, and he told her not to discuss the 
case and to have the insurance company call him.  The following 
day, the woman telephoned Attorney Flessas to tell him she had 
seen her doctor and was told she could return to work.  Attorney 
Flessas responded that she could not be well enough to go back to 
work and said he would call her within the week.   
                     
     
2  SCR 20:8.4 provides, in pertinent part:   
 
Misconduct 
 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:   
 
. . . 
 
(c)  engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation; 
 
No. 94-2122-D 
 
 
 
8 
 
Attorney Flessas did not know the woman personally, never met 
with her to discuss her injury and did not have her sign a written 
contingent fee agreement for him to represent her in the matter.  
The day after the woman's first telephone call, Attorney Flessas 
sent the insurance company involved a notice of retainer and claim 
for attorney's lien, advising that his law office had been 
retained to represent the woman.   
 
Approximately one week thereafter, the woman telephoned 
Attorney Flessas' office and left a message that she would not be 
using Attorney Flessas' services but would handle the matter 
herself.  One week after that, the woman retained Attorney Douglas 
Keberle to represent her, signing a written retainer agreement 
setting forth a contingent fee.  On May 5, 1992, the insurer sent 
Attorney Flessas a letter stating that it had received a letter of 
retainer from another attorney and that one of them must withdraw. 
 Attorney Flessas did not respond to that letter.   
 
Attorney Keberle settled the client's claim and in March, 
1993, the insurer issued a settlement check for $9000 payable to 
him, the client and Attorney Flessas, as the latter had not 
withdrawn his claim of attorney's lien.  Following discussions 
with Attorney Keberle and at his request, Attorney Flessas 
prepared a statement setting forth four hours of services in the 
matter at a rate of $150, for a total of $600.  Subsequently, 
claiming entitlement to a contingent fee, Attorney Flessas refused 
to endorse the settlement check and permit Attorney Keberle to 
 
No. 94-2122-D 
 
 
 
9 
place $600 of the settlement into escrow pending resolution of his 
claim for a fee.  Attorney Flessas also refused Attorney Keberle's 
offer to have the fee matter arbitrated.  Attorney Flessas did 
endorse the check on March 8, 1994, almost one year later and two 
days before it would have become void and after his conduct had 
been 
reported 
to 
the 
Board 
of 
Attorneys 
Professional 
Responsibility.   
 
On the basis of those facts, the referee concluded that 
Attorney Flessas' claim of a contingent fee in the personal injury 
matter without having a written agreement for it violated SCR 
20:1.5(c).
3  The referee also concluded that Attorney Flessas 
failed to take proper steps to protect the woman's interests 
following her decision not to retain him by his refusal to endorse 
the settlement check, permit the escrow of the amount he was 
claiming as a fee and cooperate with fee arbitration, thereby 
depriving the woman of her settlement funds for almost one year.   
                     
     
3  SCR 20:1.5 provides, in pertinent part:   
 
Fees 
 
. . . 
 
(c)  A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for 
which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a 
contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law.  A 
contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the 
method by which the fee is to be determined, including the 
percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the 
event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other 
expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such 
expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is 
calculated.  Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the 
lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating 
the outcome of the matter and if there is a recovery, showing the 
remittance to the client and the method of its determination.   
 
No. 94-2122-D 
 
 
 
10 
 
As discipline for his professional misconduct in these two 
matters, the referee recommended that the court suspend Attorney 
Flessas' license to practice law for 90 days.  The referee 
emphasized the seriousness of Attorney Flessas' violation of his 
fiduciary obligation as personal representative to the estate and 
the heir, noting particularly the heir's mental condition.  Rather 
than protect and promote the heir's interests in the estate's 
assets, he exercised his authority as personal representative in 
favor of his own son, manipulating the sale of the property to 
benefit his son and himself, making no reasonable effort to offer 
the property for sale to anyone else or to obtain the best price 
available in the market.  The referee found that Attorney Flessas 
"embarked upon a specific course of conduct which involved fraud, 
dishonesty, deceit and misrepresentation" in respect to the offers 
to purchase he ignored, his acceptance of the offer submitted in 
the name of his son's friend, and his conduct toward the 
decedent's son.   
 
In the personal injury matter, the referee found that without 
a written contingent fee agreement, Attorney Flessas attempted to 
obtain a fee to which he was not entitled by asserting a lien that 
was unenforceable, as it did not conform to the statutory 
requirements.  The referee also determined that, even if he had a 
claim for services actually rendered in the matter, Attorney 
Flessas' refusal to endorse the settlement check and permit the 
amount he claimed to be placed in escrow and settled by 
 
No. 94-2122-D 
 
 
 
11 
arbitration was improper and deprived the injured person of prompt 
receipt of her portion of the settlement.   
 
None of Attorney Flessas' attempts in his appeal to justify 
his conduct in these matters or his attacks on the integrity of 
others involved in this proceeding has merit.  His insistence that 
the woman injured in the automobile accident committed perjury 
when she testified that she had not retained him to represent her 
in the matter is based principally on the woman's having stated in 
her subsequent telephone call declining to retain him that she 
would be handling the matter herself, when in fact she retained 
another attorney to do so.   
 
Likewise without merit is Attorney Flessas' contention that 
the woman's attorney was responsible for the delay in her 
receiving the settlement proceeds.  Notwithstanding the absence of 
a written retainer agreement with the woman, Attorney Flessas 
continued to contend that he was justified in refusing the 
attorney's offer to escrow the $600 he had itemized as a fee 
because an arbitrator might have awarded him more than that amount 
out of her attorney's contingent fee.   
 
In this appeal, Attorney Flessas again argued that the 
referee was required to recuse herself because of a statement she 
was alleged to have made privately to the court reporter 
concerning dismissal of the proceeding, notwithstanding that the 
court previously decided this issue when Attorney Flessas filed a 
recusal motion in the course of the proceeding.  The court denied 
 
No. 94-2122-D 
 
 
 
12 
that motion on the grounds that the procedural rules make no 
provision for interlocutory appeals in disciplinary proceedings 
and that the motion had no merit.  Not only did the reporter 
refuse to sign an affidavit prepared by Attorney Flessas' counsel 
acknowledging the alleged statement; the reporter signed an 
affidavit denying that the referee had made the statement 
attributed to her and averring that it was Attorney Flessas' 
counsel who had made such a statement during a conversation he had 
initiated with the reporter.   
 
Attorney Flessas also attempted to justify his sale of the 
estate's property to his son without considering other offers on 
the basis of an offhand remark made by the father of one of the 
offerors concerning the value of the property and his son's 
financial ability to purchase it.  As the referee pointed out in 
her report, Attorney Flessas made no effort to inquire further 
into or ascertain the offeror's financial condition; indeed, he 
promptly accepted the offer submitted in the name of his son's 
friend, a person he considered personally and financially 
unreliable.  
 
We also reject, as did the referee, Attorney Flessas' 
assertion that the estate was not harmed by the sale of the house 
to his son.  Given the mental condition of the estate's heir, 
Attorney Flessas' attempt to support that assertion by insisting 
that he never complained of the sale price is disingenuous.   
 
No. 94-2122-D 
 
 
 
13 
 
We adopt the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law in respect to Attorney Flessas' professional misconduct in 
these matters.  The seriousness of that misconduct, particularly 
the use of his authority as personal representative to sell the 
estate's principal asset to his son only 17 days after the 
decedent's death at a price below the appraised value in a 
transaction in which his son's name had not been disclosed as 
offeror, thereby depriving the estate's heir of what could have 
proven to be the true value of the home, warrants a 90-day 
suspension of Attorney Flessas' license to practice law.   
 
IT IS ORDERED that the license of Attorney Peter N. Flessas 
to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 90 days, 
commencing March 25, 1996. 
  
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of this 
order Peter N. Flessas pay to the Board of Attorneys Professional 
Responsibility the costs of this proceeding, provided that if the 
costs are not paid within the time specified and absent a showing 
to this court of his inability to pay the costs within that time, 
the license of Peter N. Flessas to practice law in Wisconsin shall 
remain suspended until further order of the court.   
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Peter N. Flessas comply with the 
provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person whose 
license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended.   
 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J., did not participate.  
 
No. 94-2122-D 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-2122-D 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary  
 
 
 
Proceedings Against 
 
 
 
Peter N. Flessas, 
 
 
 
Attorney at Law. 
 
 
 
__________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST FLESSAS 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
February 19, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
February 2, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
BABLITCH, J., did not participate 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For Peter N. Flessas there were briefs and oral 
argument by Robert W. Flessas, Brookfield. 
 
 
For the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility there 
was a brief and oral argument by Cynthia A. Lepkowski, Greendale.