Case Title: Venegas v. County of L.A.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S113301

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 4/5/04 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
 
DAVID VENEGAS et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
S113301 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/7 B148398 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. BC207136 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Does a sheriff act on behalf of the state or county when conducting a 
criminal investigation, including detaining suspects and searching their home and 
vehicle?  As we shall see, based on the analysis in prior California cases, sheriffs 
act on behalf of the state when performing law enforcement activities.  Under the 
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, the state is absolutely immune from tort liability under the 
federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983, hereafter section 1983).  Accordingly, 
as agents of the state when acting in their law enforcement roles, California 
sheriffs are likewise absolutely immune from prosecution for asserted violations of 
that section.  We will reverse that part of the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
reaching a contrary conclusion in this case.   
We also consider whether the sheriff’s deputies involved here were entitled 
to qualified immunity under section 1983 because reasonable officers in their 
position would have believed their actions were lawful under established law.  We 
 
2
conclude that the Court of Appeal employed incorrect legal principles in resolving 
this issue.  After explaining the applicable principles, we will remand to the Court 
of Appeal to reconsider this primarily factual issue in the context of defendants’ 
motion for nonsuit.   
Finally, we determine whether plaintiffs stated a cause of action against the 
County of Los Angeles (County), its sheriff’s department, sheriff, and deputies, 
under Civil Code section 52.1, for committing an unreasonable detention, search, 
and seizure.  We conclude that plaintiffs did state a cause of action against these 
defendants, and we will affirm that portion of the Court of Appeal’s judgment so 
holding.   
I.  FACTS 
The following uncontradicted facts are largely taken from the Court of 
Appeal’s opinion in this case.  The Task Force for Regional Auto Theft Prevention 
(TRAP) was an interagency task force run by the County’s Sheriff’s Department 
to facilitate theft investigations involving multiple jurisdictions.  Defendant Steven 
Wiles, a police officer for the City of Vernon and a TRAP member, was 
investigating plaintiff David Venegas’s brother, Ricardo Venegas, who was 
believed to be involved in an automobile theft ring.  Wiles and other TRAP 
officers (evidently, defendants Michael Gray, Robert Harris and Thomas Jimenez, 
each sheriff’s deputies) pursued a car driven by Beatriz Venegas, accompanied by 
her husband David.  TRAP officers, noting a resemblance between David and 
Ricardo, stopped the car and learned that David was Ricardo’s brother.  David 
argued with the officers and they handcuffed him and detained Beatriz.  Wiles 
questioned David about his car, which had no license plates or vehicle 
identification number.  David told Wiles he had just bought the car and it was a 
salvaged vehicle.  The officers impounded the car to determine whether it was 
stolen.   
 
3
When asked for identification David told the officers it was at his home 
nearby.  David refused to sign an entry and search waiver form to allow the 
officers to pick up his identification, but he gave verbal consent for the officers to 
accompany Beatriz to their home for that purpose.  Wiles assured the couple their 
home would not be searched.   
TRAP officers took Beatriz home and had her sign a written entry and search 
waiver form granting “full and unconditional authority” to the officers to enter and 
conduct a search for identification and “any related investigation in any related 
criminal or non-criminal law enforcement matter.”  The officers accompanied her 
inside her home.  While she was retrieving David’s identification card, the officers 
searched the entire house and found papers indicating that David was on felony 
probation.  On learning this, Wiles directed the officers to arrest David for 
violating Vehicle Code section 10751, subdivision (a), a misdemeanor, and for 
also violating his probation.  Police officers eventually booked David into custody.  
They detained Beatriz for two hours but did not charge her with any offense.  The 
next day, after determining that the car was probably not stolen, Wiles directed 
that David be released from custody, but he was not released for another two days.  
No charges were ever filed against him.   
Plaintiffs David and Beatriz Venegas filed an action against Wiles, the City 
of Vernon, the Vernon Police Department, the County and its sheriff’s department, 
sheriff and deputies.  The complaint purported to state causes of action under 
section 1983 on behalf of both plaintiffs for unreasonable search and seizure, and a 
similar cause of action under Civil Code section 52.1, subdivision (b), on David’s 
behalf.  David also sued for false detention and arrest.   
After certain of these claims were settled or resolved in defendants’ favor on 
demurrer, the remaining ones (concerning the legality of the search of the Venegas 
home and the detention/arrest of David and Beatriz) were tried.  After plaintiffs 
 
4
rested their case-in-chief, defendants moved for a nonsuit, which the trial court 
granted, entering judgment in defendants’ favor.   
Plaintiffs appealed and the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that:  (1) triable 
factual questions existed as to whether Beatriz’s and/or David’s detention was 
unreasonable and whether the search of their house was invalid; (2) the trial court 
erred in sustaining the demurrers of County, its sheriff’s department, sheriff and 
deputies, to plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims on the ground these persons were 
immune from liability; and (3) the trial court erred in sustaining these defendants’ 
demurrers to plaintiffs’ Civil Code section 52.1 cause of action on the ground 
plaintiffs failed to allege they were members of a protected class.   
II.  STATE AGENT IMMUNITY UNDER SECTION 1983 
County, on behalf of its sheriff’s department and sheriff (hereafter 
defendants) contends that California sheriffs conducting criminal investigations 
are acting on behalf of the state when performing law enforcement activities.  
Accordingly, defendants claim that, as a state agent, the sheriff enjoys the state’s 
immunity from prosecution for the asserted violations of section 1983 occurring in 
this case.  Contrary to the Court of Appeal, we agree with defendants.   
Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:  “Every person who, under color of 
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or 
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress . . . .” 
Is a sheriff engaged in a criminal investigation a “person” under section 
1983?  The United States Supreme Court has held that cities, counties, and local 
officers sued in their official capacity are themselves “persons” for purposes of 
 
5
section 1983 and, although they cannot be held vicariously liable under section 
1983 for their subordinate officers’ unlawful acts, they may be held directly liable 
for constitutional violations carried out under their own regulations, policies, 
customs, or usages by persons having “final policymaking authority” over the 
actions at issue.  (McMillian v. Monroe County (1997) 520 U.S. 781, 784-785 
(McMillian); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 
658, 690-692 (Monell); see Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 348 
(Pitts); County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1166, 
1171 (Peters).)   
On the other hand, states and state officers sued in their official capacity are 
not considered persons under section 1983 and are immune from liability under 
the statute by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity.  (Howlett v. Rose (1990) 496 U.S. 356, 365; Will v. Michigan Dept. of 
State Police (1989) 491 U.S. 58, 63-67, 71; Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 348; 
Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1171.)  As Will stated, “it does not follow that 
if municipalities are persons then so are States.  States are protected by the 
Eleventh Amendment [of the United States Constitution] while municipalities are 
not . . . .”  (Will, supra, at p. 70.)  Will continued, noting that “Obviously, state 
officials literally are persons.  But a suit against a state official in his or her official 
capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s 
office.  [Citation.]  As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.  
[Citations.]”  (Id. at p. 71.)  The rule exempting the state and its officers applies to 
officers such as sheriffs if they were acting as state agents with final policymaking 
authority over the complained-of actions.  (McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at pp. 784-
785.)   
Defendants claim they are immune from liability under the Eleventh 
Amendment on the ground that in California, the sheriff acts on behalf of the state 
 
6
rather than the county when engaged in investigating crime.  The Court of Appeal 
disagreed, holding that the sheriff was acting as an agent of County, not the state, 
while engaged in the warrantless search of plaintiffs’ home.  The court relied 
primarily on two federal cases that had concluded that California sheriffs act on 
behalf of the county in performing at least some of their law enforcement 
functions.  (Bishop Paiute Tribe v. County of Inyo (9th Cir. 2002) 291 F.3d 549 
(Bishop); vacated on other grounds and remanded in Inyo County v. Paiute-
Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Cmty. of the Bishop Colony (2003) 538 U.S. 701 
[Indian tribes lack standing to sue under section 1983]; Brewster v. Shasta County 
(9th Cir. 2001) 275 F.3d 803, 807-808 (Brewster), cert. den. sub nom. Shasta 
County v. Brewster (2002) 537 U.S. 814.)  Defendants argue these federal 
decisions are inapposite, and they claim that two California cases are controlling.  
(Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th 340; Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 1166.)  We agree with 
defendants that the state cases more accurately reflect California law.   
The Court of Appeal in the present case concluded that the sheriff, exercising 
his or her crime investigation functions (here, searching plaintiffs’ house and 
seizing certain documents), acted as an agent of County, not the state.  The court, 
largely ignoring Pitts, found Peters factually distinguishable because it involved 
the limited question whether the sheriff in setting policies concerning the release 
of persons from county jail, acts on behalf of the state or county.  The Court of 
Appeal therefore found Peters not dispositive of the issue whether sheriffs act for 
the state in carrying out crime investigations.  Accordingly, the appellate court 
looked to the two above cited federal cases holding that California sheriffs are 
county actors when investigating crime occurring within the county.  (Bishop, 
supra, 291 F.3d at p. 566; Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at pp. 807-808; see also 
Cortez v. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2002) 294 F.3d 1186, 1191-1192 
 
7
[sheriff’s department acts as county agent in administering county jail policies]; 
Streit v. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2001) 236 F.3d 552, 559-565 [same].)   
Based on its analysis of these federal cases, and its belief that a contrary rule 
would preclude all section 1983 suits against local law enforcement officers, the 
Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrers of 
the County, its sheriff’s department, and sheriff.  We disagree.  As is apparent, 
resolution of the question before us inevitably involves careful analysis of several 
state and federal cases.  We start with the two California cases deemed by 
defendants to be most apposite, and then consider the principal federal cases cited 
by plaintiffs and relied on by the Court of Appeal.   
A.  Pitts 
In Pitts, persons whose child molestation convictions were reversed on 
appeal brought civil actions against County of Kern, its district attorney, and his 
employees, asserting civil rights violations under section 1983 arising from 
alleged misconduct during the criminal prosecution.  The district attorney and his 
employees prevailed under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity and, 
accordingly, Pitts was concerned only with the liability of the county.  (Pitts, 
supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 345-347, 352.)   
The plaintiffs’ action against the county alleged that its district attorney had 
established a pattern or practice of procuring false statements and testimony by 
threats, promises, and intimidation, and also failed to provide adequate training 
procedures and regulations to prevent such conduct.  (Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 
352.)  As noted above, although the county could not be held vicariously liable 
under section 1983, it could be held directly liable for constitutional violations 
carried out under its own policies.  (Monell, supra, 436 U.S. at pp. 690-692.)  Pitts 
held, however, that a district attorney represents the state rather than the county 
 
8
when preparing to prosecute crimes and training and developing policies for 
prosecutorial staff.  Although Pitts involved district attorneys rather than sheriffs, 
the court relied on statutes and analysis applying to both kinds of officers.   
In Pitts, we first observed that the question whether a public official 
represents a county or a state when acting in a particular capacity is analyzed 
under state, not federal law.  (Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 352-353, 356; see 
McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 786 [determining actual functions of government 
officer is dependent on relevant state law].)  For guidance in resolving this 
question, Pitts next turned to McMillian, which had examined Alabama state law 
to determine whether a sheriff was a state or county official.  In McMillian, after 
his murder conviction was reversed due to suppression of exculpatory evidence, 
the plaintiff sued an Alabama sheriff for damages under section 1983 for 
intimidating a witness and withholding evidence.  The United States Supreme 
Court examined Alabama’s constitutional and statutory provisions concerning 
sheriffs and concluded that, while executing their law enforcement duties in 
Alabama, sheriffs are executive officers of the state, not the county, and 
accordingly are immune from section 1983 liability.  (McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. 
at pp. 791-793.)   
Among other factors, the McMillian court considered the role of sheriffs as 
state representatives under the Alabama Constitution and Alabama statutes, the 
authority of Alabama sheriffs to enforce state criminal laws in their counties, and 
the lack of similar enforcement authority by the counties themselves.  (McMillian, 
supra, 520 U.S. at pp. 787-791.)  McMillian concluded that these factors 
outweighed several countervailing factors that supported the conclusion that 
Alabama sheriffs were officers of the county, namely, that the county paid the 
sheriffs’ salary and provided them with equipment, lodging and expenses, that the 
 
9
sheriffs’ jurisdiction was limited by county borders, and that county voters elected 
these sheriffs.  (Id. at pp. 791-792.)   
Pitts applied McMillian’s analytical framework to conclude that a 
California district attorney acts on behalf of the state rather than the county in 
preparing to prosecute crimes and in training and developing policies for 
prosecutorial staff.  (Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 356-366.)  In reaching its 
conclusion, the court considered several constitutional and statutory provisions 
tending to support or negate state agency, but placed special emphasis on article 
V, section 13, of the state Constitution, providing that “[t]he Attorney General 
shall have direct supervision over every district attorney . . . in all matters 
pertaining to the duties of their . . . offices . . . .”  Under this same provision, the 
Attorney General may require district attorneys to make appropriate reports 
“concerning the investigation, detection, prosecution, and punishment of crime in 
their respective jurisdictions,” and may prosecute violations of law if, in his or her 
opinion, state laws are not adequately being enforced in any county.  (Pitts, supra, 
17 Cal.4th at pp. 356-357.)  We also noted in Pitts that Government Code sections 
12550 and 12524, and Penal Code section 923 contain similar provisions placing 
county district attorneys under the supervision of the state Attorney General.  
(Pitts, supra, at pp. 357-358, & fn. 5.)  
We observed in Pitts that, in contrast to the broad supervisory powers of the 
Attorney General over district attorneys, Government Code section 25303 bars 
county boards of supervisors from affecting or obstructing the district attorneys’ 
investigative or prosecutorial functions.  (Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 358.)  We 
also pointed out that a district attorney acts in the name of the people of the state 
when prosecuting criminal violations of state law.  (Id. at p. 359.)   
Pitts readily acknowledged that other constitutional and statutory 
provisions would support a conclusion that a district attorney is a county officer:  
 
10
For example, county voters elect district attorneys (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 4, subd. 
(c)), who are listed as county officers (Gov. Code, § 24000, subd. (a)), are 
generally ineligible to hold office unless they are registered voters of the county in 
which they perform their duties (Gov. Code, § 24001), and are compensated as 
prescribed by the county board of supervisors (Gov. Code, § 25300).  (Pitts, supra, 
17 Cal.4th at pp. 360-361.)  Furthermore, under Government Code section 25303, 
the county board of supervisors supervises the district attorney’s official conduct 
and expenditure of funds, although it cannot affect the district attorney’s 
independent investigative and prosecutorial functions.  (Pitts, supra, at p. 361.)  
Necessary expenses incurred by the district attorney in the prosecution of criminal 
cases are considered county charges.  (Gov. Code, § 29601, subd. (b)(2).)   
Yet, after balancing the competing factors, and relying on McMillian’s 
similar analysis, we concluded in Pitts that, when preparing to prosecute and 
prosecuting crimes, a district attorney represents the state, and is not considered a 
policymaker for the county.  (Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 362.)  We similarly 
concluded that a district attorney does not represent the county when training staff 
and developing policy in the area of criminal investigation and prosecution.  We 
stated that “[n]o meaningful analytical distinction can be made between these two 
functions [i.e., prosecuting crime on the one hand, and training/policymaking 
regarding criminal investigation and prosecution on the other].  Indeed, a contrary 
rule would require impossibly precise distinctions.”  (Ibid.)  Thus, the 
constitutional and statutory provisions discussed above give the Attorney General 
“oversight not only with respect to a district attorney’s actions in a particular case, 
but also in the training and development of policy intended for use in every 
criminal case.”  (Id. at p. 363.)   
 
11
B.  Peters 
As noted, Pitts involved the question whether district attorneys were state 
agents when investigating and prosecuting crime, or when training staff and 
developing policy involving such matters.  Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 1166, 
applied Pitts’s analysis and extended it to California sheriffs, concluding that in 
setting policies concerning the release of persons from the county jail, the sheriff 
acts as a state officer performing state law enforcement duties.  Although Peters 
did not consider whether a sheriff acts as a state or county officer when, as here, 
investigating criminal activity, Peters’s reasoning would clearly apply to the 
present case.   
The plaintiff in Peters brought a civil rights action under section 1983 
alleging that the sheriff and his deputies, relying on an inapposite arrest warrant, 
improperly detained her in county jail after she had posted bail.  Peters applied the 
McMillan/Pitts analysis to determine whether a California sheriff acts as a state or 
county officer in setting policies governing release of prisoners from the county 
jail.  Peters found Pitts to be controlling, noting that the same constitutional and 
statutory provisions governing district attorneys considered in Pitts also apply to 
sheriffs.  (Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1170, 1174-1175.)   
For example, article V, section 13 of the California Constitution provides 
that subject to the powers and duties of the Governor, “[t]he Attorney General 
shall have direct supervision over every district attorney and sheriff and over such 
other law enforcement officers as may be designated by law, in all matters 
pertaining to the duties of their respective offices, and may require any of said 
officers to make reports concerning the investigation, detection, prosecution, and 
punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions as the Attorney General may 
seem advisable.”  (Italics added.)   
 
12
Similarly, Government Code section 12560, which relates to sheriffs, is 
substantially identical to Government Code section 12550, which relates to district 
attorneys and was relied on in Pitts.  Section 12560 gives the Attorney General 
“direct supervision” of all sheriffs, with power to order reports “concerning the 
investigation, detection and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions,” 
and to direct their activities regarding these investigations.  Peters also cited 
Government Code sections 26600 (sheriffs’ duty to preserve the peace through 
crime prevention projects), 26601 (sheriffs’ authority to arrest criminal offenders), 
and 26602 (sheriffs’ duty to prevent breaches of peace and investigate public 
offenses).  Like Pitts, the court in Peters found all these provisions instructive on 
the issue whether a sheriff acts as a state or county agent in establishing policies 
for the release of arrestees from jail.  (Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1174-
1175.)   
In addition, Peters pointed out that, as in Pitts with respect to district 
attorneys, the county board of supervisors has no direct control over a sheriff’s 
performance of law enforcement functions.  Government Code section 25303, 
upon which Pitts relied for this proposition, applies to both offices.  Among other 
things, that section reaffirms “the independent and constitutionally and statutorily 
designated investigative and prosecutorial functions of the sheriff and district 
attorney of a county.  The board of supervisors shall not obstruct the investigative 
function of the sheriff of the county nor shall it obstruct the investigative and 
prosecutorial function of the district attorney of a county.  [¶] Nothing contained 
herein shall be construed to limit the budgetary authority of the board of 
supervisors over the district attorney or sheriff.”  (Gov. Code, § 25303, italics 
added; see Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1175.)   
As in Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pages 360-361, Peters acknowledged that 
other constitutional and statutory provisions tended to support a theory of county 
 
13
agency.  For example, article XI, sections 1, subdivision (b), and 4, subdivision 
(c), of the state Constitution provide for “an elected sheriff” in each county, and 
Government Code section 24000 includes sheriffs within the general category of 
county officers.  But as in Pitts, Peters concluded that these provisions were 
outweighed by those supporting the argument that sheriffs are not policymakers 
for the county board of supervisors but are functionally independent of county 
control when performing their law enforcement functions.  (Peters, supra, 68 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1176-1177.) 
C.  Brewster and Bishop decisions 
As indicated above, the Court of Appeal in this case relied on federal Ninth 
Circuit cases that had reached seemingly contrary conclusions to Pitts and Peters.  
(Bishop, supra, 291 F.3d at p. 566; Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at pp. 807-808.)  
These cases, while purporting to defer to state law as required by McMillian, 
supra, 520 U.S. at page 786, nonetheless ultimately took the position that 
questions regarding section 1983 liability implicate federal law and accordingly 
were not necessarily controlled by Pitts or Peters.  (See Bishop, supra, 291 F.3d at 
pp. 562, 564-565 [Pitts factually distinguishable]; Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at pp. 
807, 811 [expressly declining to follow Peters].)  Lower federal decisions such as 
Brewster and Bishop may be entitled to great weight but they are not binding on 
this court.  (E.g., People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 431; People v. Bradley 
(1969) 1 Cal.3d 80, 86.)  In any event, having reviewed those federal decisions, 
we conclude that they erred in failing to follow the guidance given by McMillian, 
Pitts, and Peters.   
1.  BrewsterIn Brewster, Shasta County and its sheriff’s department 
allegedly violated the plaintiff’s civil rights during a murder investigation by 
manipulating a witness into making a false identification, failing to test physical 
 
14
evidence, and ignoring exculpatory evidence.  (Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at p. 
805.)  Brewster concluded that the sheriff was acting as a county agent during the 
investigation.  The court concentrated on such factors as (1) inclusion of sheriffs 
as county officers in the state Constitution, article XI, section 1, subdivision (b), 
and Government Code section 24000, and (2) county supervision of sheriffs’ 
activities under Government Code section 25303.  (Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at 
pp. 806-808.)  Yet, as we noted above, Pitts and Peters found these factors 
insufficient to establish a county agency relationship with, respectively, district 
attorneys and sheriffs when performing law enforcement functions.  (Pitts, supra, 
17 Cal.4th at pp. 360-362; Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176.)   
Brewster, like Justice Werdegar’s concurring and dissenting opinion herein, 
also deemed significant the fact that monetary damages assessed against sheriffs 
for section 1983 claims would be paid by the counties, not the state.  (Brewster, 
supra, 275 F.3d at pp. 807-808, citing Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a) [vicarious 
liability of government agencies for employee’s torts].)  Section 815.2, 
subdivision (a), applies, however, to both the state and counties (Pitts, supra, 17 
Cal.4th at p. 360, fn. 7), and although it may provide a general basis for vicarious 
public liability, significantly subdivision (b) of the section immunizes both the 
state and county from torts that are committed by employees who are themselves 
immune.  So, we dispute the present relevance of section 815.2, as it fails to 
answer the questions whether the sheriff was indeed acting as a county, not state, 
employee during the events in question, and whether he lacked immunity from 
federal civil rights actionsthe very questions we are attempting to answer here.   
In addition, we think the Brewster analysis is faulty for other reasons.  As 
Brewster earlier acknowledged, if sheriffs indeed are acting as state agents in 
crime investigations, they would be immune from liability under section 1983 if 
sued in their official capacity, and their counties would not be liable for their 
 
15
actions.  (Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at p. 805 [“if [the sheriff] is a policymaker for 
the state, then the county cannot be liable for his actions”].)   
To the extent Brewster was referring to a sheriff’s liability when sued in his 
personal capacity, we have no occasion here to consider whether the Los Angeles 
County Sheriff is personally immune under any California statute.  We note, 
however, that apart from the immunity sheriffs would enjoy while acting as state 
agents, sheriffs enjoy additional immunities under Government Code sections 
820.2 (discretionary acts) or 820.4 (executing or enforcing laws).  Significantly, 
Pitts discarded a similar argument under section 815.2, subdivision (a), because of 
the immunity of the district attorney under section 821.6 (instituting or prosecuting 
an action).  (See Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 360, fn. 7.)   
In any event, even assuming California sheriffs lack such immunity, the 
fact that their counties may be called on to pay any tort damage judgment rendered 
against their sheriffs sued in their personal capacity is only one of the many factors 
McMillian requires us to consider.  That single factor, if it truly exists, is 
outweighed by the constitutional and statutory provisions discussed above, 
demonstrating that a sheriff represents the state, not the county, when performing 
law enforcement duties in his official capacity.   
The concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Werdegar suggests that 
the high court in McMillian found the vicarious liability point “critical” to its 
holding, but we read the case differently.  What the high court found “critical” was 
the fact that the Alabama Supreme Court had determined that the framers of the 
Alabama Constitution took steps to ensure that its sheriffs would be considered 
executive officers of the state.  (McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at pp. 788-789.)  
Based on these critical factors, Alabama cases later concluded that sheriffs are 
state officers so that tort claims against them are deemed suits against the state.  
(Id. at p. 789.)  The analysis in this opinion is consistent with McMillian, for our 
 
16
review of our state’s Constitution and statutes similarly convinces us that sheriffs 
while performing law enforcement duties are state agents, so that the present suits 
should be deemed suits against the State of California.   
Justice Werdegar relies in part on Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson 
Corporation (1994) 513 U.S. 30, 48, as emphasizing the importance of “the 
vulnerability of the State’s purse” (conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 4), but that case 
did not involve a section 1983 claim but was an action brought under the Federal 
Employers Liability Act against a multi-state port authority, which unsuccessfully 
sought Eleventh Amendment immunity as a state agent.  Interestingly, Justice 
Ginsburg wrote Hess, and several years later, she wrote the dissent in McMillian, 
joined by three other justices.  In the latter case, as Justice Werdegar observes, the 
majority noted that the state would be liable for tort judgments against an Alabama 
sheriff.  However, in her dissent in McMillian arguing that sheriffs are county, not 
state officers, Justice Ginsburg fails even to mention this factor.  Rather, she cites 
such factors as the inclusion of Alabama sheriffs in the executive department, and 
impeachment of sheriffs by state officers, and says, “these measures are the 
strongest supports for the Court’s classification of county sheriffs as state actors.”  
(McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 798.)   
Surely, if payment of tort judgments were indeed the critical factor in 
determining whether a sheriff was a state officer, Justice Ginsburg, who authored 
Hess, would have at least mentioned that factor, and indeed would have been 
required to distinguish it, in her subsequent dissent in McMillian.   Thus, it appears 
that we are instead instructed by both the majority and the dissenting opinions in 
McMillian to consider a variety of factors, not simply one, under state law in 
reaching an “understanding of the actual function of a governmental official, in a 
particular area.”  (McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 786.)   
 
17
Justice Werdegar’s opinion also asserts that unquestionably a California 
sheriff is a county employee for purposes of Government Code section 815.2, 
citing Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710, 717.  But Sullivan 
was not faced with the question whether such a sheriff might be deemed a state 
agent for purposes of federal section 1983 civil rights liability, or indeed for any 
other purpose.  The question simply was not before us in that case.  Thus, section 
815.2 seemingly adds nothing helpful to the resolution of the question whether 
sheriffs are state or county agents.   
2.  BishopIn Bishop, supra, 291 F.3d 549, a Native American tribe and 
its wholly owned gaming corporation sued the County of Inyo, its district attorney, 
and its sheriff, seeking equitable and monetary relief and alleging these defendants 
conducted an unlawful records search on tribal property.  The federal appeals 
court in its now vacated opinion in Bishop, concluded that both the district 
attorney and sheriff were acting as county officers in obtaining and executing an 
invalid search warrant aimed at uncovering welfare fraud.  (Bishop, supra, 291 
F.3d at pp. 562-566.)  As in Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at pages 806-808, the 
Bishop court relied on such factors as (1) inclusion of district attorneys and 
sheriffs as county officers in the state Constitution, article XI, section 1, 
subdivision (b), and Government Code section 24000, and (2) county supervision 
of the district attorney and sheriff activities under Government Code section 
25303.  (Bishop, supra, at pp. 563-564.)  As we noted above, Pitts and Peters 
deemed these factors insufficient to establish a county agency relationship with, 
respectively, district attorneys and sheriffs when performing law enforcement 
activities.  (Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 360-362; Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 1176.)   
Acknowledging the constitutional and statutory supervisory authority of the 
state Attorney General over district attorneys and sheriffs in their law enforcement 
 
18
functions, Bishop nonetheless expressed concern that “to allow the Attorney 
General’s supervisory role to be dispositive . . . would prove too much,” for “if 
taken to its logical extreme, all local law enforcement agencies in California 
would be immune from prosecution for civil rights violation,” contrary to Monell’s 
holding (Monell, supra, 436 U.S. at pp. 690-692) preserving section 1983 actions 
against local agencies.  (Bishop, supra, 291 F.3d at p. 564.)  To the contrary, 
merely because the sheriff is a state officer, as demonstrated by the foregoing 
constitutional and statutory provisions, does not mean that all local law 
enforcement officers are also to be deemed state officers.   
Pitts and Peters are clearly confined, respectively, to situations in which 
district attorneys and sheriffs are actually engaged in performing law enforcement 
duties, such as investigating and prosecuting crime, or training staff and 
developing policy involving such matters.  (See Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 366; 
Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1172.)  Immunizing these persons when 
actually engaged in such activities would not violate Monell’s broad refusal to find 
all local agencies immune from suit under section 1983.  Other torts or civil rights 
violations by these and other local officers might well be deemed acts committed 
by county agents, for which they and their counties could be responsible.  As 
Peters states, “This determination does not require an ‘all-or-nothing’ 
categorization applying to every type of conduct in which the official may engage.  
Rather, the issue is whether the official is a local policymaker with regard to the 
particular action alleged to have deprived the plaintiff of civil rights.  [Citations.]”  
(Peters, supra, at p. 1172.)   
Moreover, Bishop’s analysis appears to express a policy concern (overly 
broad immunity from suit) that is extraneous to the high court’s factor-balancing 
test employed in McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at pages 786, 790-791, a test that, as 
 
19
Brewster acknowledged, requires a weighing of the state’s Constitution, statutes, 
and case law.  (Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at p. 806.)   
Bishop also stressed the fact that the search warrant at issue there sought to 
disclose evidence of welfare fraud, a matter falling within the jurisdiction of the 
county’s health and human services department.  (Bishop, supra, 291 F.3d at p. 
565.)  The fact remains, however, that welfare fraud is a state offense (e.g., Welf. 
& Inst. Code, §§ 11482-11483).  Attempting to distinguish Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th 
340, the Bishop court observed that Pitts involved prosecutorial conduct, whereas 
Bishop concerned investigating possible welfare fraud in advance of prosecution.  
(Bishop, supra, at pp. 564-565.)  But nothing in Pitts supports such a fine 
distinction.  Indeed, Pitts’s precise holding was that a district attorney “is a state 
official when preparing to prosecute and when prosecuting criminal violations of 
state law.”  (Pitts, supra, at p. 360, italics added.)  It is noteworthy that the 
plaintiffs in Pitts had alleged misconduct (procuring false witness statements and 
failing to provide adequate training procedures) squarely falling in the pre-
prosecution category.  (Id. at p. 352.)   
3.  ConclusionIn short, we are unconvinced that either Brewster or 
Bishop affords cogent reasons for ruling that in California, sheriffs act as county 
officers in performing their law enforcement activities.  We conclude that, 
following the analysis prescribed in McMillian, Pitts and Peters, California 
sheriffs act as state officers while performing state law enforcement duties such as 
investigating possible criminal activity.   
Plaintiffs assert that even if the sheriff acted as a state agent in this case, 
County’s other agents and employees played such a significant role in the events 
as to justify its liability.  The limited issue before us, however, involves the 
potential liability of the County for the acts of its sheriff.  The question of the 
County’s liability for the acts of other persons is not before us.   
 
20
We conclude the trial court properly sustained the demurrers of County, its 
sheriff’s department, and sheriff to plaintiffs’ civil rights action under section 
1983.   
 
III.  QUALIFIED IMMUNITY OF SHERIFF’S DEPUTIES UNDER  
SECTION 1983 
As McMillian explains, the rule exempting the state and its officers from 
liability under section 1983 applies to officers such as sheriffs only if they were 
acting as state agents with final policymaking authority over the complained-of 
actions.  (McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at pp. 784-785.)  Accordingly, the parties in 
this case have correctly assumed that the sheriff’s deputies would not be shielded 
by the sheriff’s own state agent immunity, and are “persons” who may be held 
liable for damages under section 1983 for violating someone’s constitutional 
rights.  County, however, argues these deputies were entitled to qualified 
immunity under section 1983 because reasonable officers in their position would 
have believed their actions were lawful under established law.  (See Saucier v. 
Katz (2001) 533 U.S. 194, 201-202 (Saucier); Hunter v. Bryant (1991) 502 U.S. 
224, 227.)  Because this issue is primarily a factual one once the correct legal 
principles are identified, and the factual record is extensive, we will remand the 
case to the Court of Appeal for a redetermination of the issue.   
Saucier furnishes adequate guidance as to the controlling principles.  A rule 
of qualified immunity shields a public officer from an action for damages under 
section 1983 unless the officer has violated a “clearly established” constitutional 
right.  (Saucier, supra, 533 U.S. at p. 201.)  As stated in Saucier, “The relevant, 
dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether 
it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the 
situation he confronted.  [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 202.)  The high court explained that 
“[i]f the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly 
 
21
unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate.”  (Ibid.)  
Saucier confirmed that, despite a possible Fourth Amendment violation, officers 
still must be granted immunity “for reasonable mistakes as to the legality of their 
actions.”  (Id. at p. 206.) 
The plaintiff in Saucier brought a section 1983 action against police 
officers alleging that they used excessive force in arresting him.  At issue was 
whether the immunity analysis was so intertwined with the question of excessive 
force that the qualified immunity and constitutional violation issues should be 
treated as one question, to be decided by the trier of fact.  The Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals held that the inquiries merged into a single question for the jury.  The 
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ruling on qualified 
immunity required an analysis separate from the question whether unreasonable 
force was used in making the arrest.  (Saucier, supra, 533 U.S. at p. 199.)  Saucier 
set forth the following framework for ruling on a claim of qualified immunity:  
First, accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true, was a constitutional right 
violated?  If so, was the right so well established that it would be clear to a 
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the circumstances?  (Ibid.)   
Thus, Saucier makes clear that a ruling on qualified immunity requires an 
analysis separate from the question whether a constitutional violation occurred.  
Yet, the Court of Appeal in this case appeared to assume that a bare showing of 
possible constitutional rights violations would be sufficient to avoid defendants’ 
motion for nonsuit.  The court phrased the relevant inquiry as simply whether the 
evidence, viewed in plaintiffs’ favor, “support[ed] a determination that 
respondents’ conduct violated a federal right under the Fourth Amendment,” and 
proceeded to find sufficient evidence to support such a violation.  This analysis 
seemingly ignores Saucier and its emphasis on whether a reasonable officer would 
believe his conduct clearly unlawful.  Without such a finding, defendant deputies 
 
22
would be immune from a section 1983 action.  Significantly, the Court of Appeal 
opinion failed to cite Saucier, which was decided only a few months earlier.   
Here, as the Court of Appeal noted, the trial court in granting nonsuit 
expressly found that the officers “acted reasonably by any objective standard.”  
The briefs before us argue at length as to whether or not the record supports that 
finding.  Given the Court of Appeal’s failure to consider Saucier and review the 
evidence with the Saucier principles in mind, it is appropriate that the Court of 
Appeal reconsider this primarily factual issue.   
IV.  LIABILITY OF COUNTY AND ITS SHERIFF UNDER CIVIL CODE SECTION 52.1 
Finally, County argues that the Court of Appeal erred in concluding 
plaintiffs could state a cause of action against County, its sheriff’s department and 
sheriff, under Civil Code section 52.1 for unreasonable search and seizure.  
According to County, the section applies only to so-called hate crimes and 
requires a showing, not alleged here, that the defendants acted with 
“discriminatory animus,” i.e., an intent to threaten or coerce another in violation of 
their constitutional rights, based on the victim’s actual or apparent racial, ethnic, 
religious, or sexual orientation or other minority status.  (See, e.g., In re Michael 
M. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 718, 725-726 [describing the intent element underlying 
hate crime legislation].)  We disagree, as nothing in Civil Code section 52.1 
requires any showing of actual intent to discriminate.   
Civil Code section 52.1, subdivision (a), provides that if a person interferes, 
or attempts to interfere, by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or 
enjoyment of the constitutional or statutory rights of “any individual or 
individuals,” the Attorney General, or any district or city attorney, may bring a 
civil action for equitable or injunctive relief.  Subdivision (b) allows “[a]ny 
individual” so interfered with to sue for damages.  Subdivision (g) states that an 
action brought under section 52.1 is “independent of any other action, remedy, or 
 
23
procedure that may be available to an aggrieved individual under any other 
provision of law,” including Civil Code section 51.7.   
Civil Code section 51.7, a separate and independent enactment referred to 
in section 52.1, declares that all persons have the right to be free from violence or 
intimidation because of their race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, 
political affiliation, sex, sexual orientation, age, disability, or position in a labor 
dispute, or because they are perceived by another to have any of these 
characteristics.  Section 52, subdivision (b), makes persons who violate section 
51.7 liable for actual and exemplary damages and penalties. 
Boccato v. City of Hermosa Beach (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1797, 1809, 
concluded that a plaintiff who brings an action under Civil Code section 52.1 must 
be a member of one of the classes protected by Civil Code section 51.7.  
Thereafter, in 2000, after the events giving rise to this action, the Legislature 
enacted Assembly Bill No. 2719 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) (hereafter Assembly Bill 
2719) to explain that Boccato erred in that assumption, and to clarify that Civil 
Code section 52.1 applies to an affected plaintiff “without regard to his or her 
membership in a protected class identified by its race, color, religion, or sex, 
among other things.”  (Stats. 2000, ch. 98, § 1.)  
The Court of Appeal in the present case determined that the trial court, 
relying on Boccato’s erroneous interpretation of the statute, improperly sustained 
demurrers without leave to amend to plaintiffs’ cause of action under Civil Code 
section 52.1.  The appellate court recognized that the 2000 pronouncements of 
legislative intent did not apply in this case, but based on its independent 
interpretation of the statute, the court rejected Boccato and determined that Civil 
Code section 52.1 did not, in 1998, require a plaintiff to be a member of a 
protected class.   
 
24
County evidently agrees with the Court of Appeal’s analysis in this respect, 
as it does not presently rely on Boccato, which indeed seems inconsistent with the 
statutory language of Civil Code section 52.1, subdivision (b), allowing “[a]ny 
individual” (italics added) whose exercise or enjoyment of constitutional or 
statutory rights has been interfered with to sue the perpetrator for damages.  Had 
the Legislature intended to limit the scope of section 52.1 to individuals protected 
under section 51.7, it could easily have done so.   
Instead of asserting that Boccato controls, County narrowly reads Assembly 
Bill 2719 as clarifying that a person can state a cause of action under Civil Code 
section 52.1 only if he or she is the victim of intimidation or interference based on 
an actual or perceived class or characteristic protected under section 51.7.  We see 
no reasonable basis for such an interpretation.  Assembly Bill 2719 explained that 
“[s]ection 52.1 of the Civil Code guarantees the exercise or enjoyment by any 
individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state 
without regard to his or her membership in a protected class identified by its race, 
color, religion, or sex, among other things.”  (Italics added.)  We cannot 
reasonably interpret this language, or the unambiguous language of section 52.1 
itself, to restrict the benefits of the section to persons who are actual or perceived 
members of a protected class.  Such an interpretation could have anomalous 
results, permitting or disallowing recovery based solely on the defendant’s 
perceptions of the plaintiff’s protected status.   
In Jones v. Kmart Corp. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 329, 338, we acknowledged that 
Civil Code section 52.1 was adopted “to stem a tide of hate crimes.”  But contrary 
to County’s position, our statement did not suggest that section 52.1 was limited to 
such crimes, or required plaintiffs to demonstrate that County or its officers had a 
discriminatory purpose in harassing them, that is, that they committed an actual 
 
25
hate crime.  We continued in Jones by simply observing that the language of 
section 52.1 provides remedies for “certain misconduct that interferes with” 
federal or state laws, if accompanied by threats, intimidation, or coercion, and 
whether or not state action is involved.  (Jones, supra, at p. 338.)  Plaintiffs have 
alleged such misconduct here.   
County predicts that allowing unrestricted civil actions under Civil Code 
section 52.1 will result in “an incalculable increase in the filing of lawsuits in our 
State’s courts,” imposing heavy burdens on “the already financially-strapped court 
system . . . .”  County observes that if section 52.1 indeed applied to all tort 
actions, the section would provide plaintiffs in such cases significant civil 
penalties and attorney fees as well as compensatory damages.   
First, Civil Code section 52.1 does not extend to all ordinary tort actions 
because its provisions are limited to threats, intimidation, or coercion that interfere 
with a constitutional or statutory right.  Second, imposing added limitations on the 
scope of section 52.1 would appear to be more a legislative concern than a judicial 
one, and perhaps the Legislature would be advised to reexamine the matter.  But 
we need not decide here whether section 52.1 affords protections to every tort 
claimant, for plaintiffs in this case have alleged unconstitutional search and seizure 
violations extending far beyond ordinary tort claims.  All we decide here is that, in 
pursuing relief for those constitutional violations under section 52.1, plaintiffs 
need not allege that defendants acted with discriminatory animus or intent, so long 
as those acts were accompanied by the requisite threats, intimidation, or coercion.  
The Court of Appeal was correct in holding that plaintiffs adequately stated a 
cause of action under section 52.1.   
 
26
V.  CONCLUSION  
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed as to plaintiffs’ asserted 
causes of action under 42 United States Code section 1983, and we remand to that 
court for its redetermination of the qualified immunity issue in light of our 
opinion.  The Court of Appeal’s judgment sustaining plaintiffs’ causes of action 
under Civil Code section 52.1 is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
BAXTER, J. 
BROWN, J. 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY BAXTER, J. 
 
 
I concur in the majority opinion’s conclusion that the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff acted as an agent of the state in undertaking the criminal investigation in 
this case, and that under Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity principles, the 
sheriff was immune from prosecution for the asserted violations of the Civil 
Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (section 1983)).  (Majority opn. of Chin, J., ante, pt. 
II.)  I further concur in the majority opinion’s discussion of the qualified immunity 
defense that may be available to the sheriff’s deputies with regard to those same 
section 1983 claims.  (Majority opn., ante, pt. III.) 
With considerably less enthusiasm, I also join in the majority opinion’s 
determination that, given the unambiguous language of subdivision (g) of Civil 
Code section 52.1 (section 52.1), plaintiffs adequately pleaded a cause of action 
“for unreasonable search and seizure” under that section notwithstanding their 
failure to allege that defendants acted with intent to discriminate, also commonly 
referred to as discriminatory animus.  (Majority opn., ante, pt. IV.)  I write 
separately to voice my concern that the Legislature, in amending section 52.1 by 
adding subdivision (g) in response to the Court of Appeal decision in Boccato v. 
City of Hermosa Beach (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1797, 1809 (Boccato), may have 
inadvertently transformed section 52.1 from its originally intended purpose as a 
weapon in the arsenal of interrelated statutory provisions designed to combat the 
rising incidence of hate crimes, to a generally applicable catchall provision that 
2 
will encourage claimants to seek section 52.1’s sweeping remedies—including 
compensatory money damages, very substantial fines ($25,000), attorney fees, and 
other equitable relief—in commonplace tort actions to which those special 
statutory remedies were never intended to apply.  As Los Angeles County 
(County) urges, to give effect to the literal language of section 52.1, 
subdivision (g) could result in an incalculable increase in the filing of lawsuits in 
our State’s courts and impose an inordinately heavy burden on our already 
financially strapped court system. 
As will be explained, because the language of section 52.1 as amended 
through the addition of subdivision (g) is unambiguous, this court must dutifully 
construe it according to the plain import of its express terms.  It is ultimately 
within the Legislature’s purview to determine if section 52.1, as amended, 
accurately effectuates the purpose and intent behind this antidiscrimination 
legislation, or whether the literal language of the amended statutory scheme now 
paints with far too broad a brush.  I believe the Legislature would be well advised 
to reexamine the matter, and for that purpose, I offer the following brief survey of 
relevant legislative history and decisions of this and other courts to demonstrate 
that section 52.1 has always been understood as the anti-hate crime tool it was 
originally intended to be, and that the section has also long been understood as 
requiring that one charged with a violation of its letter and spirit must be shown to 
have acted with discriminatory intent. 
I 
The legislative history of section 52.1 clearly reflects that it was originally 
enacted “to stem a tide of hate crimes.”  (Jones v. Kmart Corp. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 
329, 338.)  Nearly every court which has construed this statute has recognized that 
in light of its original purpose, to combat hate crimes, a violation of section 52.1 
requires a showing that the defendant acted with discriminatory animus, i.e., an 
3 
intent to interfere “by threats, intimidation, or coercion” (§ 52.1, subd. (a)) with 
the victim’s exercise or enjoyment of his or her constitutional or statutory rights, 
based on the victim’s actual or perceived racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual 
orientation or other minority status.  (See, e.g., In re Michael M. (2001) 86 
Cal.App.4th 718, 725-726 [defining requisite intent for hate crimes].) 
Section 52.1, commonly referred to as the “Tom Bane Civil Rights Act” or 
the “Bane Act,” was enacted in 1987 as part of a renewed effort to combat the 
disturbing rise in “hate crimes,” or, put otherwise, the rising incidence of civil 
rights violations motivated by hatred and discrimination.  This purpose of the 
legislation is undeniably evidenced by both its legislative history and the case law 
interpreting it, including several decisions of this court. 
The Legislature’s focused effort to combat discriminatory and pernicious 
conduct often referred to as hate crimes began with the 1976 enactment of Civil 
Code section 51.7, commonly referred to as the “Ralph Civil Rights Act” or the 
“Ralph Act.”  That legislation provides, in pertinent part:  “All persons within the 
jurisdiction of this state have the right to be free from any violence, or intimidation 
by threat of violence, committed against their persons or property because of their 
race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, sex, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, or position in a labor dispute, or because another 
person perceives them to have one or more of those characteristics. . . .”  (§ 51.7, 
subd. (a).)  The obvious purpose of the Ralph Act is to declare unlawful, and 
civilly actionable, any acts of violence or intimidation by threats of violence 
directed against any individual because of his actual or perceived membership in a 
minority or similarly protected class. 
It is particularly noteworthy that the enumerated list of protected classes of 
persons found in the Ralph Act was never intended to be exclusive.  Section 51.7 
expressly provides that, “The identification in this subdivision of particular bases 
4 
of discrimination is illustrative rather than restrictive.”  (§ 51.7, subd. (a), italics 
added.) 
In this same vein, 10 years later, the Legislature enacted section 52.1 to 
further address the rising tide of hate crimes in California.  As originally enacted, 
the core provisions of section 52.1 read: 
“(a)  Whenever a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of 
law, interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion, . . . with the exercise or 
enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or 
laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of 
this state, the Attorney General, or any district attorney or city attorney may bring 
a civil action for injunctive and other appropriate equitable relief in the name of 
the people of the State of California, in order to protect the peaceable exercise or 
enjoyment of the right or rights secured. 
“(b)  Any individual whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the Constitution 
or laws of this state, has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, as 
described in subdivision (a), may institute and prosecute in his or her name and on 
his or her own behalf a civil action for injunctive and other appropriate equitable 
relief to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights secured.”  
(Added by Stats. 1987, ch. 1277, § 3, p. 4544, italics added.) 
These central provisions of the Bane Act have not been substantively 
changed since its enactment nearly 20 years ago.  Amendments since 1987 added 
new penalty provisions ($25,000) which may be sought in both public and private 
actions under the act.  Of particular interest here, subdivision (g) of section 52.1 
was added by amendment in response to the Court of Appeal’s holding in Boccato, 
supra, 29 Cal.App.4th 1797, 1809.  Subdivision (g) declares that an action brought 
under section 52.1 is “independent of any other action, remedy, or procedure that 
5 
may be available to an aggrieved individual under any other provision of law, 
including, but not limited to, an action, remedy, or procedure brought pursuant to 
Section 51.7 [the Ralph Act].” 
From its inception, the Bane Act’s purpose has been to specifically target 
unlawful conduct motivated by discriminatory animus that interferes with the 
victim’s enjoyment of statutory or constitutional civil rights.  The report on 
Assembly Bill No. 63 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) by the Senate Rules Committee, 
1987-1988 Regular Session (Senate Report), identifies as the “key issue” in the 
enactment of the Bane Act whether there should be “additional civil and criminal 
penalties for crimes[1] which are committed because of the victim’s racial, ethnic, 
religious, sexual orientation or other minority status?”  (Sen. Rep., p. 1.) 
The Senate Report explained further that under the then current law, i.e., 
the Ralph Act, quoted above, hate crimes perpetrated through acts of violence or 
threats of violence were subject to considerably expanded civil penalties.  (Sen. 
Rep., p. 2.)  However, due to the inadequacy of that law and the rise in hate 
crimes, the stated purpose of the Bane Act was to subject “the use of force or 
threats to interfere with the free exercise of one’s constitutional rights” (Sen. Rep., 
pp. 2-3), based on the victim’s membership or perceived membership in one of the 
enumerated protected classes, to both civil and criminal remedies.  In other words, 
what the Bane Act did at its inception was to add “threats, intimidation or 
coercion” to the already proscribed “violence, or threats of violence” sanctioned 
under the Ralph Act, where any such conduct interferes with or attempts to 
interfere with the statutory and constitutional rights of persons in minority or 
                                             
 
1 
Violations of court orders issued pursuant to Civil Code section 52.1 are 
declared to be punishable as misdemeanors under the act.  (See § 52.1, subd. (d); 
see also Pen. Code, § 422.9.) 
6 
similarly protected classes, or who were perceived by the defendant to be 
members of such protected classes. 
I agree with County’s observation that the motivation behind the Bane Act 
was neither expressly nor indirectly linked to any dramatic rise in the violation of 
federal and state civil rights in general, and that the enactment of the statute was 
clearly driven by the rise in violations of such rights motivated by hate and 
discriminatory animus.  That a violation of the Bane Act was originally envisioned 
as being circumscribed by the requirement that the defendant be shown to have 
acted with discriminatory intent has been repeatedly recognized in both this 
court’s decisions and numerous decisions of the Courts of Appeal that have 
construed section 52.1. 
We effectively acknowledged this circumscribed purpose and scope of the 
legislation in Jones v. Kmart Corp., supra, 17 Cal.4th 329, wherein we observed:  
“The Legislature enacted section 52.1 to stem a tide of hate crimes.  [Citation.]  
The statutory language fulfills that purpose by providing remedies for certain 
misconduct that interferes with any ‘right[] secured by the Constitution or laws of 
the United States, or . . . of this state . . . .’ ”  (Id. at p. 338, italics added.) 
Similarly, in In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, we observed that the Bane 
Act was “enacted by the Legislature . . . in response to the alarming escalation in 
the incidence of hate crimes in California and the inadequacy of existing laws to 
deter and punish them.”  (Id. at pp. 706-707, fn. 1.)  The issue in In re M.S. 
involved two Penal Code provisions (Pen. Code, §§ 422.6, 422.7) which, like their 
civil counterpart, section 52.1, were also enacted by the Bane Act.  It is significant 
that each of those Penal Code sections are criminal hate crime provisions, and that 
each requires a showing that the violator acted with unlawful discriminatory intent 
insofar as victims under those sections must belong to, or be perceived by the 
defendant as belonging to, a minority or similarly protected class. 
7 
Likewise, the Court of Appeal in In re Michael M., supra, 86 Cal.App.4th 
718, recognized that “The Bane Act and related California statutes dealing with 
discriminatory threats and violence are California’s response to the alarming 
increase in hate crimes.”  (Id. at p. 725, italics added, fn. omitted.)  The court 
explained that “In urging gubernatorial approval of the Bane Act, its author 
referred to a report issued by the Los Angeles County Commission on Human 
Relations noting the increase of acts of racial violence and religious incidents in 
Los Angeles County during 1986 and stated that the Bane Act ‘addresses this 
problem.’ ”  (Ibid., italics added.)  And the court concluded that “the principal 
thrust of the statute is toward preventing the intimidation of a victim . . . , when 
the intimidation or interference is based on the victim’s actual or perceived 
protected characteristic.”  (Id. at p. 726, italics added; see also McMahon v. 
Albany School District (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1294 [“Civil Code sections 
52 and 52.1, along with other statutes, were enacted in a coordinated effort to 
combat hate crimes”]; In re Joshua H. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1734, 1748, fn. 9 
[“The Bane Act and related California statutes deal[] with discriminatory threats 
and violence” (italics added)]; Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. v. Superior Court 
(1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 141, 144 [Bane Act “provides for a personal cause of 
action for the victim of a hate crime” (second italics added)].) 
In short, both the legislative history of section 52.1 and the manner in 
which the core purpose of that antidiscrimination statute has been viewed by this 
and other courts, since the time of its enactment, support a conclusion that intent to 
discriminate has long been understood as a required element of a section 52.1 
violation, thereby justifying a plaintiff’s eligibility for the hate crime provision’s 
greatly expanded remedies. 
8 
II 
The Court of Appeal in Boccato, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th 1797, 1809, 
concluded that a plaintiff who brings an action under Civil Code section 52.1 (the 
Bane Act) must be a member of one of the classes protected by Civil Code section 
51.7 (the Ralph Act).  Thereafter, in 2000, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 
No. 2719 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) (hereafter Assembly Bill 2719) to explain that 
Boccato erred in that assumption, and to clarify that Civil Code section 52.1 
applies to an affected plaintiff “without regard to his or her membership in a 
protected class identified by its race, color, religion, or sex, among other things.”  
(Stats. 2000, ch. 98, § 1.) 
The majority opinion observes that “Assembly Bill 2719 explained that 
‘[s]ection 52.1 of the Civil Code guarantees the exercise or enjoyment by any 
individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state 
without regard to his or her membership in a protected class identified by its race, 
color, religion, or sex, among other things.’  (Italics added.)  We cannot 
reasonably interpret this language, or the unambiguous language of section 52.1 
itself, to restrict the benefits of the section to persons who are actual or perceived 
members of a protected class.”  (Majority opn., ante, at p. 23.) 
I agree that the unambiguous language of section 52.1, as amended by 
Assembly Bill 2719 through the addition of subdivision (g), does not on its face 
restrict the benefits of the section to persons who are actual or perceived members 
of a protected class.  Nor do the findings and declarations made in connection with 
the enactment of Assembly Bill 2719 suggest that a plaintiff’s membership in such 
a protected class is a requirement for bringing suit under section 52.1.  (Stats. 
2000, ch. 98, § 1, subd. (a)(1).) 
9 
Boccato’s holding—that a section 52.1 plaintiff must be an actual member 
of a protected class—was wrong.  Even for a Ralph Act violation (§ 51.7), a 
plaintiff’s actual membership in a protected class has never been required; it has 
always been understood that it is the defendant’s intent and his perception that his 
victim is a member of a protected class that controls, or, to put it another way, that 
the defendant be shown to have acted with discriminatory intent whether or not he 
was factually mistaken as to his victim’s actual status as a member of a protected 
class.  To the extent a violation of the Bane Act (§ 52.1) has long been understood 
as requiring the same discriminatory intent as a violation of the Ralph Act, and 
that it is the actor’s unlawful intent, and not the victim’s actual membership in a 
protected class, that controls in establishing that requisite intent—it is not 
suprising that Boccato’s conclusion, that a section 52.1 victim must be an actual 
member of a protected class, cried out to the Legislature for nullification and 
correction. 
Nonetheless, when one considers the legislative response to Boccato, as 
reflected in the language of section 52.1, subdivision (g), it is difficult to read that 
language as conveying anything other than that a defendant sued for a Bane Act 
violation need not be shown to have acted with discriminatory intent.  Having 
amended section 52.1 with the chosen language of subdivision (g), which provides 
that an action under section 52.1 is “independent of any other action, remedy, or 
procedure that may be available to an aggrieved individual under any other 
provision of law, including, but not limited to, an action, remedy, or procedure 
brought pursuant to section 51.7 [the Ralph Act],” it is hard to escape the 
conclusion that, under that literal langauge, a defendant’s alleged violation of the 
Bane Act no longer need be shown to have been motivated by discriminatory 
intent.  In short, I conclude the Legislature amended section 52.1 with the intent to 
nullify and correct Boccato’s holding that a victim must be an actual member of a 
10 
protected class, but may have inadvertently chosen language that, on its face, can 
only reasonably be read as providing that defendants alleged to have violated 
section 52.1 need not be shown to have acted with discriminatory intent. 
Since the plain wording of amended section 52.1, on its face, is not 
reasonably susceptible of any other construction, I am constrained to join in the 
majority opinion’s conclusion that “in pursuing relief for those constitutional 
violations under section 52.1, plaintiffs need not allege that defendants acted with 
discriminatory animus or intent, so long as those acts were accompanied by the 
requisite threats, intimidation, or coercion.”  (Majority opn., ante, at p. 24.) 
The Legislature, of course, is not so constrained.  The Legislature can 
choose to revisit the matter and reevaluate whether Assembly Bill 2719’s 
amendment of section 52.1 through the addition of subdivision (g), which now 
unambiguously distinguishes actions under the Bane Act from actions under the 
Ralph Act, is no longer faithful to the true purpose and intent to be served by these 
interrelated antidiscrimination provisions found side by side in the Civil Code. 
III 
Under section 52.1 as now amended, whenever any person, whether or not 
acting under color of law, interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion with the 
exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the 
Constitution or laws of this state, a civil action may be brought under its 
provisions for greatly expanded compensatory damages, substantial fines 
($25,000), injunctive and other appropriate equitable relief, as well as attorney 
fees. 
Pragmatically speaking, the limitation in section 52.1 that the right being 
interfered with under section 52.1 be a right guaranteed by any state or federal law 
or constitutional provision is hardly a limitation at all.  And although the 
11 
proscribed conduct is further delineated by the requirement that it be delivered in 
the form of a threat, intimidation, or coercion, it should not prove difficult to 
frame many, if not most, asserted violations of any state or federal statutory or 
constitutional right, including mere technical statutory violations, as incorporating 
a threatening, coercive, or intimidating verbal or written component.  Without the 
further limitation that the violator be shown to have acted with discriminatory 
intent or animus, as originally intended from the time of the statute’s enactment, 
section 52.1 will soon come to be widely viewed as a convenient civil litigation 
tool through which to reach a garden variety tort defendant’s deep pocket. 
When one further considers that under a section 1983 cause of action the 
defendant must be shown to have acted under color of law, which is not a 
requirement for proceeding under section 52.1, and also, that under our holding 
today (applicable to county sheriffs), as well as our prior holding in Pitts v. County 
of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 348 (applicable to district attorneys), principles of 
sovereign immunity applicable to section 1983 suits will force many such actions 
to be brought instead under section 52.1 and similar state statutory counterparts, it 
is not difficult to envision how the statute will soon come to be abused. 
In this time of economic crisis and uncertainty, the construction we are 
today compelled to place on the unambiguous language of amended section 52.1 
could prove crippling to the coffers of local jurisdictions and municipalities.  The 
Legislature would be well advised to take another careful look at the practical 
impact its recent amendment of section 52.1 will have on the scope and reach of 
the section’s greatly expanded remedial provisions. 
12 
With the foregoing reservations in mind, I concur in the majority opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
I CONCUR: 
BROWN, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
This case presents three issues arising from a civil rights action brought by 
plaintiffs David and Beatriz Venegas against the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
Department, the sheriff, and three of his deputies.  I join the majority in the 
resolution of two of those issues but not the third.  
I. 
Evidence at trial established that when plaintiffs were pumping gas into 
their car, the three deputies stopped them on suspicion of car theft, searched the 
car, and then went to plaintiffs’ home and searched it.  The deputies arrested 
David for possessing a car without a visible vehicle identification number (Pen. 
Code, § 10751), a misdemeanor.  The district attorney did not file any criminal 
charge against either plaintiff.  
Plaintiffs brought suit, claiming violations of federal and state civil rights 
laws.  The trial court ruled in favor of defendants, sustaining demurrers to some 
causes of action and entering nonsuit on others.  The Court of Appeal reversed.  
This court reverses in part and affirms in part the judgment of the Court of Appeal, 
which on remand is to decide whether the sheriff’s deputies have a qualified 
immunity from liability on plaintiffs’ federal civil rights claims.  (See maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 25.)  I agree on the remand.   
I also agree with the majority that the Court of Appeal correctly reinstated 
plaintiffs’ actions under Civil Code section 52.1 for interference with statutory or 
2 
constitutional rights.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 21.)  I do, however, share Justice 
Baxter’s concerns about the potential breadth of the statute.  (Conc. opn. of 
Baxter, J., ante.) 
The third and last issue is this:  Does the Los Angeles County Sheriff act on 
behalf of the state or the county when performing law enforcement functions?  
Reversing the Court of Appeal on this point, the majority holds that in California, 
a county sheriff acts as a law enforcement officer on behalf of the state, not the 
county, and thus is absolutely immune from liability in a federal civil rights action.  
(See 42 U.S.C., § 1983 (section 1983).)  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 4.)  I disagree.   
II. 
 
Section 1983 provides for a damages action against “[e]very person” who, 
while acting under color of law, subjects another to “the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”  The federal 
Constitution’s Eleventh Amendment grants sovereign immunity from such suits 
not only to each of the 50 states but also to state officers.  (Will v. Michigan Dept. 
of State Police (1989) 491 U.S. 58, 71.)  This is because a suit against a state 
officer “is no different from a suit against the State itself.”  (Ibid.)  Whether this 
immunity applies to a particular governmental official is a question of federal law, 
but the “inquiry is dependent on an analysis of state law.”  (McMillian v. Monroe 
County (1997) 520 U.S. 781, 786.)    
 
The majority concludes that county sheriffs, when performing law 
enforcement functions, are state rather than county officers and thus immune from 
section 1983 lawsuits.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 4.)  Central to that conclusion is this 
court’s decision in Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 345 (Pitts), in 
which the majority held that a county’s district attorney acts on behalf of the state 
in prosecuting crimes, in establishing policy, and in training prosecutorial staff.  
Acknowledging that “Pitts involved district attorneys rather than sheriffs,” the 
3 
majority here is quick to point out that Pitts “relied on statutes and analysis 
applying to both kinds of officers” and thus applies with equal force here.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 8, italics omitted.)   
 
I agree with the majority that the provisions governing district attorneys 
and sheriffs are the same.  (See Cal. Const., art. XI [Local Government], §§ 1(b), 
4(c) [Legislature and county charters shall provide for county officers including 
“an elected county sheriff [and] an elected district attorney”]; Gov. Code, § 24000 
[“The officers of a county are:  [¶]  (a) A district attorney [and] [¶] (b) A sheriff”].)  
Both, in my view, are county officers.  In Pitts, I joined Justice Mosk’s dissent.  
Relying on the same constitutional and statutory provisions just mentioned, the 
dissent concluded that a district attorney was an officer of the county.  (Pitts, 
supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 366 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)   
 
A brief observation about Justice Werdegar’s concurring and dissenting 
opinion.  Justice Werdegar joined the majority in Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th 340, 
concluding that district attorneys were state actors immune from section 1983 suit.  
But she reaches a contrary conclusion here, concluding as I do that sheriffs 
exercising their law enforcement functions are county officers.  (Conc. & dis. opn. 
of Werdegar, J., post, at p. 1.)  Justice Werdegar finds significant here that each 
“California county must pay tort judgments against its sheriff personally for acts in 
the scope of his or her employment, as well as judgments against the sheriff’s 
department generally.”  (Id. at pp. 5-6.)  These obligations derive from 
Government Code provisions imposing liability on public entity employers, 
including counties, for their employees’ torts and requiring them to allocate budget 
provisions for tort judgments.  (Gov. Code, §§ 815.2, 970.8.)  These statutes, 
however, make no distinction between county sheriffs and district attorneys as 
employees of a county.  Thus, I cannot join Justice Werdegar’s concurring and 
4 
dissenting opinion, which relies on these statutes to justify her different legal 
conclusions about the status of county sheriffs and county district attorneys.   
 
Justice Moreno has signed Justice Werdegar’s separate opinion.  Thus, 
three members of this court — Justice Werdegar, Justice Moreno, and I — would 
hold that a California county sheriff is a county officer subject to federal civil 
rights suit.  This is also the assessment of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, as expressed in two decisions resolving the exact issue here, 
whether a sheriff performing law enforcement functions is a state or county 
officer.  (See Bishop Paiute Tribe v. County of Inyo (9th Cir. 2002) 291 F.3d 549, 
vacated on other grounds and remanded in Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone 
Indians of the Bishop Cmty. of the Bishop Colony (2003) 538 U.S. 701; Brewster 
v. Shasta County (9th Cir. 2001) 275 F.3d 803, 807-808.)  The Ninth Circuit has 
said it is not bound by a state court’s determination that its county sheriffs are state 
actors because the “[q]uestions regarding section 1983 liability implicate federal, 
not state, law.”  (Brewster, supra, at p. 811.)   
 
Because the Ninth Circuit considers California sheriffs performing law 
enforcement functions to be county officers, the majority’s contrary conclusion 
here creates a split that results in immunizing sheriffs from section 1983 liability 
in actions brought in state court while exposing them to liability in identical 
actions filed in federal court.  This effectively drives California civil rights 
plaintiffs with actions against a county sheriff out of our court system and into 
federal court.  To ensure uniformity in the enforcement of federal civil rights law 
in both state and federal courts in California, the United States Supreme Court 
should decide which view is correct.  
 
Based on my conclusion that a county sheriff exercising law enforcement 
functions does so for his employing county, I would affirm that part of the Court 
5 
of Appeal’s judgment reinstating plaintiffs’ section 1983 actions against the Los 
Angeles County Sheriff and Los Angeles County.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
I concur in the majority opinion’s discussion of the deputy sheriffs’ 
qualified immunity defense (maj. opn., ante, pt. III) and its analysis of liability 
under Civil Code section 52.1 (maj. opn., ante, pt. IV).  I respectfully dissent from 
the decision (id., pt. II) as to the immunity of a California sheriff’s office from 
liability for law enforcement activities under section 1983 (42 U.S.C. § 1983).   
The majority opinion’s conclusion on state-agent immunity, that in 
enforcing the law California sheriffs act under the control and as agents of the 
State of California, rather than their counties, and are thus not to be considered 
“persons” subject to official-capacity suits under section 1983, is not without 
precedent.  It draws some support from the high court’s decision in McMillian v. 
Monroe County (1997) 520 U.S. 781 (McMillian), which relied prominently on the 
source of authoritative control in holding Alabama sheriffs were state rather than 
local officers, as well as this court’s decision in Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 
Cal.4th 340, which applied a source-of-control analysis to reach the same 
conclusion about California district attorneys.   
Nevertheless, I believe the better view is that California sheriffs are county 
officers for purposes of section 1983 liability, even when investigating possible 
crimes, because any tort judgment against the sheriff’s department would, as 
counsel for Los Angeles County (the County) conceded at oral argument, be a 
liability of the county rather than the state, and the control exercised by the state 
2 
over sheriffs is not so pervasive and immediate as to overcome this crucial factor.  
The immunity of state agents from official-capacity suits under section 1983 
derives from the sovereign immunity of states under the common law and the 
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution; these sovereign 
immunities predate section 1983’s enactment, and Congress, in enacting the civil 
rights law, did not intend to disturb them.  (Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police 
(1989) 491 U.S. 58, 66-68 (Will).)  And while the degree of state control is a 
relevant factor under the Eleventh Amendment, it is not dispositive; rather, “the 
vulnerability of the State’s purse” has been recognized as “the most salient factor 
in Eleventh Amendment determinations.”  (Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson 
Corporation (1994) 513 U.S. 30, 48 (Hess).)  The present suit for damages under 
section 1983 against the Los Angeles County Sheriff in his official capacity 
threatens neither the state’s sovereign dignity nor its treasury; hence, it should not 
be barred under Will.  Moreover, as explained in part II, infra, this conclusion is 
consistent with the high court’s most recent discussion of section 1983 state-agent 
immunity, in McMillian. 
Today’s decision creates a direct conflict between this court and the federal 
Court of Appeals on the immunity of California sheriffs from liability on a federal 
cause of action.  (See Brewster v. Shasta County (9th Cir. 2001) 275 F.3d 803.)  
Both positions have some support in precedent and logic, suggesting that the 
anomaly of conflicting decisions is likely to endure until resolved by a higher 
authority.  Although dependent on an understanding of sheriffs’ functions under 
state law, immunity from section 1983 liability is of course a federal question.  
(McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 786.)  The conflict created today can, therefore, 
be resolved effectively only by the United States Supreme Court. 
3 
I 
Will, supra, 491 U.S. 58, in which the high court first articulated the 
distinction between state immunity and local government liability at issue here, 
establishes a close organic link between that distinction and the doctrine of state 
sovereign immunity.  As the court explained, Congress enacted the 1871 Civil 
Rights Act, of which section 1983’s predecessor was a part, against a background 
of state immunity to damages suits under the Eleventh Amendment (for suits in 
federal courts) and common law sovereign immunity (for suits in state courts).  
From language, legislative history, and interpretive precedent the high court 
concluded that “Congress, in passing § 1983, had no intention to disturb the 
States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity” (Will, supra, at p. 66) or to “disregard the 
well-established [common law] immunity of a State from being sued without its 
consent” (id. at p. 67).  Moreover, because a suit against a state official in his or 
her official capacity is “a suit against the official’s office,” the Will court extended 
immunity under section 1983 to such actions, holding “neither a State nor its 
officials acting in their official capacity are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”  (Will, supra, 
at p. 71.) 
Official-capacity suits seeking only injunctive relief against state officials, 
on the other hand, are not considered actions against the state under section 1983, 
as they likewise would not be under traditional sovereign immunity doctrine.  
(Will, supra, 491 U.S. at p. 71, fn. 10.)  Most pertinent here, the Will court 
explained that state-agent immunity under section 1983 is not inconsistent with the 
municipal liability previously recognized in Monell v. New York City Dept. of 
Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658 (Monell), because “by the time of the 
enactment of § 1983, municipalities no longer retained the sovereign immunity 
they had shared with the states.”  (Will, supra, at p. 67, fn. 7.)  Just as Monell 
limited municipal liability to entities that “are not considered part of the State for 
4 
Eleventh Amendment purposes” (Monell, supra, at p. 690, fn. 54), so the 
immunity holding in Will “does not cast any doubt on Monell, and applies only to 
States or governmental entities that are considered ‘arms of the State’ for Eleventh 
Amendment purposes.”  (Will, supra, at p. 70.) 
The immunity recognized in Will thus bars only section 1983 suits seeking 
money damages from a state, which are barred under the Eleventh Amendment if 
brought in federal court.  (See also Alden v. Maine (1999) 527 U.S. 706, 756-757 
[sovereign immunity generally does not extend to municipalities, or to injunctive 
relief and personal-capacity actions against state officials, for in those cases “relief 
is not sought from the state treasury”].)  Thus, in deciding whether a government 
official sued in his or her official capacity under section 1983 enjoys state-agent 
immunity, as in deciding directly under the Eleventh Amendment whether the 
office is an arm of the state, the court’s primary consideration should be whether 
or not the state is obligated to pay the office’s liabilities. 
In Hess, supra, 513 U.S. 30, in holding that the Port Authority of New 
York and New Jersey, an entity created by compact between those two states, was 
not an arm of either for Eleventh Amendment purposes, the high court relied 
primarily on the Port Authority’s financial independence, rather than on the states’ 
control or lack thereof over it.  Although an examination of how the office is 
controlled can be helpful to the overall inquiry, “rendering control dispositive does 
not home in on the impetus for the Eleventh Amendment:  the prevention of 
federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State’s treasury.”  (Hess, supra, 
at p. 48.)  The high court considered “the vulnerability of the State’s purse [to be] 
the most salient factor in Eleventh Amendment determinations.”  (Ibid. [citing 
extensive list of lower court decisions to same effect]; Regents of the Univ. of 
California v. Doe (1997) 519 U.S. 425, 429 [11th Amend. immunity applies 
“ ‘when the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state’ ”]; 
5 
Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (1979) 440 U.S. 
391, 401 [“[S]ome agencies exercising state power have been permitted to invoke 
the Amendment in order to protect the state treasury from liability”]; Quern v. 
Jordan (1979) 440 U.S. 332, 338 [11th Amend. forbids “ ‘retroactive award which 
requires the payment of funds from the state treasury’ ”]; Streit v. County of Los 
Angeles (9th Cir. 2001) 236 F.3d 552, 567 [potential liability of state is “most 
important factor in identifying an arm of the state”].)  Thus, in determining whether a 
California sheriff’s office is an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes 
(and therefore immune from section 1983 liability in state court, as well), we must 
look to whether a judgment against the sheriff’s office potentially threatens 
California’s treasury.  An examination of the laws governing the Los Angeles 
Sheriff’s Department shows a judgment against it does not have that potential.   
California law defines sheriffs as elected officers of the county.  (Cal. 
Const., art. XI [“Local Government”], §§ 1(b), 4(c) [Legislature and county 
charters shall provide for county officers including “an elected county sheriff”]; 
Gov. Code, § 24000 [“The officers of a county are:  . . . (b) A sheriff”].)  The Los 
Angeles County Charter (art. IV, § 12) similarly lists the sheriff as one of the 
“elective County officers.”   
In addition, a California sheriff’s office is funded by the county, even as to 
enforcement of state criminal laws.  (Gov. Code, §§ 25300 [county board of 
supervisors sets compensation of county officers and employees], 29430, 29435 
[county required to appropriate special fund for sheriff’s law enforcement 
activities], 29601, subd. (b)(1) [sheriff’s expenses incurred in “the detection of 
crime” are county charges]; Los Angeles County Code, ch. 4.12 [board of 
supervisors sets budget for all departments and offices].)   
Finally and most significantly, a California county must pay tort judgments 
against its sheriff personally for acts in the scope of his or her employment, as well 
6 
as judgments against the sheriff’s department generally.  (See Gov. Code, §§ 815.2 
[public employer liable in respondeat superior for torts of employees], 970.8 
[public entity required to make provision in its budget to pay judgments]; Sullivan 
v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710, 717 [sheriff is county employee 
for purposes of Gov. Code, § 815.2].)  Indeed, as noted earlier, the County 
concedes as much.  While the state may help to fund certain activities of the 
sheriff’s department, the parties have not cited, nor have I discovered, any 
provision of California law that would make the state legally responsible for a 
judgment against the Sheriff of Los Angeles County in his official capacity. 
Viewing the “potential legal liability” of the state as “an indicator of the 
relationship between the State and its creation” (Regents of the Univ. of California v. 
Doe, supra, 519 U.S. at p. 431), California law thus clearly regards a sheriff’s 
office not as an arm of the state but, rather, as a department of the county 
government.  The existence of some degree of state control over sheriffs should 
not change this assessment.  The majority opinion relies on the general 
supervisory authority the California Attorney General enjoys over sheriffs (Cal. 
Const., art. V, § 13), which includes the power to appoint a person “to perform the 
duties of sheriff with respect to the investigation or detection of a particular crime” (Gov. 
Code, § 12561).  How often, if ever, this theoretical power is exercised is unclear, 
but in the vast majority of cases sheriffs appear to retain wide autonomy 
(restrained of course by general state law) over formulation of law enforcement 
policies and their implementation. 
In Roe v. County of Lake (N.D.Cal. 2000) 107 F.Supp.2d 1146, 1151, 
footnote 13, the district court, expressing skepticism regarding the real degree of 
Attorney General supervision, noted that “[a]lthough county sheriffs have been 
frequently sued for civil rights violations in federal court, I have found no 
regulations which enable the Attorney General to prohibit or remedy such 
7 
violations and have found no reported case in which the Attorney General has 
attempted to do so.”  Nor, in this case, has the County directed us to any such 
regulations or instance of the Attorney General’s exercising his appointment 
authority under Government Code section 12561. 
True, a county board of supervisors, while charged with “supervis[ing] the 
official conduct of all county officers,” is also enjoined not to “obstruct the investigative 
function of the sheriff.”  (Gov. Code, § 25303.)  But this provision simply shows that 
a California sheriff acts in some respects autonomously from the county board of 
supervisors; it does not logically make the sheriff a state agent.  As explained in 
Brewster v. Shasta County, supra, 275 F.3d at page 810, the restriction in 
Government Code section 25303 “is akin to a separation of powers provision, and as 
such has no obvious bearing on whether the sheriff should be understood to act for the 
state or the county when investigating crime within his county.  Merely because a county 
official exercises certain functions independently of other political entities within the 
county does not mean that he does not act for the county.”  A California sheriff, then, 
makes law enforcement policy for his or her own department, which, though it 
operates outside direct county legislative control in some respects, is nonetheless 
part of the county government, both formally and financially, rather than an arm of 
the state.1 
“The purpose of a McMillian analysis is to cull from cases seeking a federal 
remedy for civil rights violations, those in which the remedy would impugn state 
                                             
 
1 
Cf. Franklin v. Zaruba (7th Cir. 1998) 150 F.3d 682, 685-686 (although 
Illinois sheriffs are not county agents for respondeat superior purposes, neither are 
they immune from section 1983 liability as state agents; sheriff is instead “an 
agent of the county sheriff’s department, an independently-elected office that is 
not subject to the control of the county in most respects”). 
8 
sovereignty.”  (Roe v. County of Lake, supra, 107 F.Supp.2d at p. 1151.)  As 
discussed above, California sheriffs are elective county officers, whose 
compensation and budgets are set by county boards of supervisors and whose tort 
judgments are county liabilities.  Moreover, as a county officer, a California 
sheriff can be removed only at an election by the county voters or, during his or 
her term of office, by trial on an accusation returned by a county grand jury.  
(Gov. Code, § 3060; People v. Hulburt (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 404, 409.)  To 
paraphrase the decision in Roe v. County of Lake, supra, at page 1152, “[t]he 
deterrent effect of paying any judgment plaintiff may obtain will be felt in [Los Angeles] 
County.  If the public is dissatisfied with [the sheriff’s policies], he will either not be 
reelected by the voters of [Los Angeles] County or he will be impeached before a [Los 
Angeles] County grand jury.”  In sum, the Los Angeles County Sheriff is not a 
designated state officer under the California Constitution, nor is he appointed by 
the state, nor removable by the state, nor subject to the immediate day-to-day 
supervision of any state agency or officer.  Most important, a tort judgment against 
the Los Angeles County Sheriff in his personal or official capacity is a liability of 
the County, which funds the sheriff’s office, not of the state.  Truly, “[i]t is hard to 
see how any of this will violate California’s sovereignty.”  (Ibid.) 
II 
McMillian itself is not to the contrary.  The role of sheriffs and other county 
officers vis-à-vis state government varies from State to State; thus “no 
inconsistency [is] created by court decisions that declare sheriffs to be county 
officers in one State, and not in another.”  (McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 795.)  
More significantly, the McMillian court, though it discussed at length aspects of 
9 
state classification of and control over Alabama sheriffs,2 relied crucially on 
Alabama law fixing any potential responsibility for a sheriff’s torts on the state, 
which was immune under the state constitution, rather than the county.  
(McMillian, supra, at p. 789.)  The McMillian court observed that the Alabama 
Constitution classified sheriffs as officers of the state’s executive department and 
gave the state authority to remove sheriffs by impeachment.  (McMillian, supra, at 
pp. 787-788.)  “Critically for our case,” the high court continued, the Alabama 
Supreme Court, relying on those constitutional provisions, had held sheriffs were 
state officials for tort law purposes, and the counties were therefore not liable for 
their torts.  (Id. at p. 789.) 
The majority opinion argues that the McMillian court found “critical” to its 
reasoning not Alabama’s assignment of tort liability but, rather, “the fact that the 
Alabama Supreme Court had determined that the framers of the Alabama 
Constitution took steps to ensure that its sheriffs would be considered executive 
officers of the state.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15.)  That reading of McMillian may 
be facially plausible, but, unlike my own, it fails to harmonize McMillian with the 
high court’s previous holdings in Will, supra, 491 U.S. at page 70, that state-agent 
immunity to section 1983 liability applies “only to States or governmental entities 
                                             
 
2 
McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at pages 787-788, 790-792.  Alabama law on 
this point differs from that of California in several notable respects.  Where 
Alabama classifies sheriffs as members of the state executive department (see id. 
at p. 787), California classifies them as elective county officers (Cal. Const., art. 
XI, §§ 1(b), 4(c); Gov. Code, § 24000).  Where the Alabama Legislature sets its 
sheriffs’ salaries (McMillian, supra, at p. 791), California delegates that choice to 
the county boards of supervisors (Gov. Code, § 25300).  And where impeachment 
of an Alabama sheriff may be initiated by the Governor in that state’s Supreme 
Court (McMillian, supra, at p. 788), a California sheriff may be removed only on 
an accusation returned by a county grand jury (Gov. Code, § 3060).   
10 
that are considered ‘arms of the State’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes,” and 
Hess, supra, 513 U.S. at page 48, that the state’s potential legal liability for 
damages is “the most salient factor in Eleventh Amendment determinations.”  As I 
read McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at page 789, the court concluded, from the fact 
Alabama law classifies sheriffs, with respect to tort damages, as officials of the 
state, rather than the county, that an Alabama sheriff’s office is an “arm of the 
state” for sovereign immunity purposes under Hess.  A section 1983 damages suit 
against an Alabama sheriff in his official capacity is therefore an action seeking 
money damages from the state, rather than from a county, and for that reason is 
barred under Will. 
The same, of course, cannot be said of California sheriffs.  When sheriffs 
are sued personally in tort, their counties, not the state, are liable in respondeat 
superior.  (Gov. Code, § 815.2; Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 12 
Cal.3d at p. 717.)  Although section 1983 liability cannot be imposed on a public 
entity vicariously, but only for acts done pursuant to the entity’s own policies or 
customs (Monell, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 694), the counties’ vicarious liability for 
sheriffs’ state law torts is nonetheless “strong evidence” (McMillian, supra, 520 
U.S. at p. 789) that California sheriffs ordinarily act as county, not state, agents.3  
Where, as here, a sheriff is sued in his official, not personal, capacity, any 
judgment for damages would be a liability of his office, here the Los Angeles 
                                             
 
3 
The majority opinion suggests discussion of county liability under 
Government Code section 815.2 begs the question because if the sheriff were 
immune so would be his or her public employer.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.)  I 
disagree.  The question of which government entity would bear tort liability for 
acts of a particular government official is, in this context, a hypothetical one; it 
assumes the existence of an action in which the official is not immune from 
liability.  But it does not make the assumption that the official is not immune in 
the action at bench. 
11 
Sheriff’s Department.4  Such a judgment would thus be a liability of the County, 
which establishes the budget of the sheriff’s department and must include therein 
the funds to pay judgments.  (Gov. Code, §§ 970.8, 29601, subd. (b)(1); Los 
Angeles County Code, ch. 4.12.)  Considering the liability factor held critical in 
McMillian, then, a section 1983 damages suit against a California sheriff in his 
official capacity is not an action seeking money damages from the state and is, 
therefore, not barred under Will. 
Our decision in Pitts v. County of Kern, supra, 17 Cal.4th 340, does not, in 
my view, compel a different result.  To be sure, in holding that district attorneys 
act for the state when prosecuting and preparing to prosecute criminal violations of 
state law, the court relied in part on provisions of California law equally applicable 
to sheriffs.  (See id. at pp. 356-358 [discussing Cal. Const., art. V, § 13 and Gov. 
Code, § 25303].)  But the court expressly declined to consider the tort liability 
factor held critical in McMillian, reasoning that it was of little importance because 
public employees and their employers enjoy broad statutory immunity, under 
California law, for instituting or prosecuting an action.  (Pitts v. County of Kern, 
supra, at pp. 360-361, fn. 7.)   
Whether or not the analysis in Pitts v. County of Kern was adequate to 
explain why the lack of potential state liability was not relevant or determinative, 
it distinguishes the present case, for California public employees and entities enjoy 
no such blanket immunity for illegal arrests and searches, the area of activity at 
                                             
 
4 
See Will, supra, 491 U.S. at page 71 (official-capacity suit “is not a suit 
against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office”).  In this case, 
plaintiffs redundantly sued both the County’s sheriff in his official capacity and its 
sheriff’s department.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 3.) 
12 
issue here.5  District attorneys, moreover, have a particularly strong association 
with the direct exercise of the state’s power, and are thus further distinguished 
from sheriffs, in that they prosecute state criminal offenses in the name of, and as 
the legal representatives of, the People of the State of California.  (See Pitts v. 
County of Kern, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 360.)  Nothing comparable to that direct 
link suggests a California sheriff acts as an arm of the state by apprehending 
criminals within his or her county. 
III 
The issue that primarily divides the majority opinion from this separate 
opinion and from the Ninth Circuit decisions in Brewster v. Shasta County, supra, 
275 F.3d 803, and Streit v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 236 F.3d 552, is one of 
federal, rather than California, law.  I believe that under the United States Supreme 
Court’s decisions establishing state sovereign immunity from section 1983 
liability, the state’s potential legal liability for torts of a local government office is 
a critical factor in deciding whether or not that office is an arm of the state.  
(McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 789; Hess, supra, 513 U.S. at p. 48; Will, supra, 
491 U.S. at p. 70; see also Brewster v. Shasta County, supra, 275 F.3d at p. 808; 
Streit v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 236 F.3d at p. 562.)  The majority opinion 
                                             
 
5 
The majority opinion (ante, at p. 15) cites Government Code sections 820.2 
(discretionary acts) and 820.4 (law enforcement) as providing sheriffs potential 
immunity.  But the former provision applies only to basic policy decisions 
committed to the legislative or executive branches of government (Barner v. Leeds 
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 676, 685), while the latter statute provides immunity only for 
acts taken with “due care” and exempts “false arrest or false imprisonment.”  It is 
also well established that “a governmental entity can be held vicariously liable when a 
police officer acting in the course and scope of employment uses excessive force or 
engages in assaultive conduct.”  (Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 
215.)  The cited statutes thus indicate no broad immunity comparable to that relied upon 
in Pitts v. County of Kern, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pages 360-361, footnote 7, for 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
13 
does not dispute that California law assigns potential liability for acts of a sheriff 
to the county rather than the state, but considers this fact irrelevant.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 15.)  Thus, the disputed point is the relevance and weight, under federal 
law, to be given a particular aspect of state law defining the relationship of 
California sheriffs to the state and county governments.   
Until this question is resolved, federal district courts in California will be 
required to follow one rule, permitting section 1983 suits against sheriffs’ 
departments, while California superior courts will be required to follow the 
opposite rule, prohibiting such actions.  I urge the United States Supreme Court to 
consider removing this anomaly by deciding the underlying issue of federal law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
I CONCUR: 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Venegas v. County of Los Angeles 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 105 Cal.App.4th 636 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S113301 
Date Filed: April 5, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Daniel S. Pratt 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Robert Mann and Donald W. Cook for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Law Offices of John Burton, John Burton and Mary Anna Soifer for LA Police Watch as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Franscell, Strickland, Roberts & Lawrence, Cindy S. Lee, Jin S. Choi and Adrian J. Barrio for Defendants 
and Respondents County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, Sheriff Lee Baca, 
Deputy Michael Gray, Deputy Robert Harris and Deputy Thomas Jimenez. 
 
Eduardo Olivo, City Attorney (Vernon); and John J. Cardenas for Defendants and Respondents Vernon 
Police Department and Detective Steven Wiles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Robert Mann 
3435 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 2900 
Los Angeles, CA  90010 
(213) 252-9444 
 
John Burton 
Law Offices of John Burton 
414 South Marengo Avenue 
Pasadena, CA  91101 
(626) 449-8300 
 
Cindy S. Lee 
Franscell, Strickland, Roberts & Lawrence 
100 West Broadway, Suite 1200 
Glendale, CA  91210 
(818) 545-1925