Case Title: Colecta Mireles v. Labor & Industry Review Commission

Citation: 2000 WI 96

Docket Number: 1998AP001607

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
2000 WI 96 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-1607 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Colecta Mireles,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Labor & Industry Review Commission,  
 
Defendant, 
Ametek-Lamb Electric and National Union  
Fire Insurance of Pittsburgh,  
 
Defendants-Appellants.  
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 
226 Wis. 2d 53, 593 N.W.2d 859 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999 – Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 12, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
January 6, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Wayne J. Marik 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there 
were briefs by John A. Becker and Becker, French & DeMatthew, 
Racine, and oral argument by John A. Becker. 
 
 
For the defendants-appellants, there was a brief 
by Douglas M. Feldman, Oyvind Winstrom, and Lindner & Marsack, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Douglas M. Feldman. 
 
2000 WI 96 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-1607  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Colecta Mireles,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Labor & Industry Review Commission,  
 
          Defendant, 
 
Ametek-Lamb Electric and National Union  
Fire Insurance of Pittsburgh,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   Colecta Mireles (Mireles) seeks 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals, Mireles 
v. LIRC, 226 Wis. 2d 53, 593 N.W.2d 859 (1999), reversing the 
judgment of the Circuit Court of Racine County, Wayne J. Marik, 
Judge.  Mireles suffered an "unscheduled" back injury while 
working for Ametek-Lamb Electric (Ametek) of Racine.  She 
eventually 
returned 
to 
work 
and 
subsequently 
suffered 
a 
"scheduled" wrist injury that precluded her from continuing 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-1607  
 
 
2 
employment at Ametek.  Both an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
and the Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) 
denied Mireles's claim for additional Worker's Compensation 
benefits.  The circuit court set aside LIRC's decision, but the 
court of appeals reversed.  We accepted Mireles's petition for 
review.   
¶2 
Two issues are presented:  First, can an injured 
worker apply for a reopening of an unscheduled injury award 
under Wis. Stat. § 102.44(6)(b)1 when a later scheduled injury 
causes the end of an employment relationship?  Second, can an 
injured worker qualify for permanent total disability benefits 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 102.44(2) based upon a combination of 
scheduled and unscheduled injuries? 
¶3 
We conclude, first, that Wis. Stat. § 102.44(6)(b) 
allows the appropriate agency2 to reopen a Worker's Compensation 
award to 
account 
for 
loss 
of earning capacity from an 
                     
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.03(4) dictates that the right to 
compensation "shall in all cases be determined in accordance 
with the provisions of law in effect as of the date of the 
injury."  Thus, when we discuss Mireles's claim for a reopening 
under Wis. Stat. § 102.44(6)(b), all references to Wisconsin 
statutes are to the 1991-92 volumes.  When we address Mireles's 
claim 
for 
permanent 
total 
disability 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.44(2), 
all 
references 
are 
to 
the 
1993-94 
volumes.  
Nonetheless, the pertinent statutory provisions have remained 
unchanged since Mireles's first injury. 
2 At the time Mireles applied for benefits, the Department 
of Industry, Labor and Human Relations (DILHR) administered the 
Worker's Compensation Act (the Act).  Currently the Act is 
administered by the Worker's Compensation Division of the 
Department of Workforce Development (DWD).  See 1995 Wis. Act 
289, § 275, 1995 Wis. Act 27, §§ 9130(4), 9430(5).  
No. 
98-1607  
 
 
3 
unscheduled injury, even if a scheduled injury causes the 
termination of an employment relationship.  
¶4 
We conclude, second, that Wis. Stat. § 102.44(2) 
permits the agency to find permanent total disability based upon 
a combination of a worker's scheduled and unscheduled injuries. 
 Read together with other statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 102.44(2) and 
102.44(4) specifically allow a scheduled injury to be considered 
as part of a total permanent disability.  When a scheduled 
injury is part of a total permanent disability that includes an 
unscheduled injury, the disability is not covered by Wis. Stat. 
§§ 102.52, 102.53, or 102.55.  Rather, it is covered by 
§ 102.44(2). 
¶5 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand this case to LIRC for additional factual 
determinations so that LIRC may process Mireles's application 
under the legal standards we outline today. 
THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT 
¶6 
Worker's 
Compensation 
benefits 
in 
Wisconsin 
are 
governed primarily by the Worker's Compensation Act (the Act), 
which is administered by the Department of Workforce Development 
(DWD).  The Act appears in Chapter 102 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes.  It establishes a complex formula for determining 
Worker's Compensation benefits.  Before we address Mireles's 
claims, we review the general structure of the Act to aid in 
reviewing Mireles's situation. 
¶7 
The Act is designed to compensate workers injured in 
the course of their employment.  State v. LIRC, 136 Wis. 2d 281, 
No. 
98-1607  
 
 
4 
288, 401 N.W.2d 585 (1987).  Benefits payable under the Act fall 
under one of two categories, temporary disability benefits or 
permanent disability benefits. 
¶8 
Temporary disability benefits are payable during an 
injured worker's healing period.  Wis. Stat. § 102.43; John D. 
Neal and Joseph Danas, Jr., Worker's Compensation Handbook § 5.3 
(4th ed. 1997).  By contrast, permanent disability benefits 
compensate an injured worker when a disability remains after the 
healing period.  Wis. Stat. § 102.44; Worker's Compensation 
Handbook § 5.15.  The focus of Mireles's appeal is LIRC's 
refusal to award permanent disability benefits. 
¶9 
Permanent disability benefits are divided into two 
distinct categories:  compensation for "scheduled" injuries and 
compensation for "unscheduled" injuries.  Worker's Compensation 
Handbook § 5.18.  Scheduled injuries are enumerated in Wis. 
Stat. § 102.52.  Scheduled injuries require the payment of 
benefits for a specific number of weeks, as outlined in the 
statute.  For example, § 102.52(1) mandates an award of 500 
No. 
98-1607  
 
 
5 
weeks of benefits for the loss of an arm at the shoulder.3  
Wisconsin Stat. § 102.53 mandates increases of awards for 
certain combinations of permanent disabilities. 
¶10 The schedules contained in Wis. Stat. § 102.52 presume 
that a worker has lost a body part entirely.  As noted, 
§ 102.52(1) awards 500 weeks of benefits for the "loss of an arm 
at the shoulder."  If a worker suffers a lesser injury, such as 
a major loss of motion of the arm at the shoulder, the worker is 
compensated based on how the injury compares to total loss of 
the arm.  Wis. Stat. § 102.55(3).  Thus, if a worker suffers a 
loss of motion of the arm deemed to be a 50 percent loss by DWD, 
the worker will receive 50 percent of the scheduled period of 
benefits, or 250 weeks.  
¶11 Scheduled injury benefits are presumed to include 
compensation for an injured worker's loss of earning capacity.  
Mednicoff v. ILHR, 54 Wis. 2d 7, 14, 194 N.W.2d 670 (1972). 
                     
3 For both temporary and permanent disability benefits, the 
Act uses a figure representing two-thirds of the injured 
worker's average earnings as a basis for calculating benefits, 
Wis. Stat. §§ 102.43, 102.44, and 102.52, subject to calculation 
methods 
and 
minimum 
and 
maximum 
statutory 
levels 
of 
compensation.  Wis. Stat. § 102.11; John D. Neal and Joseph 
Danas, Jr., Worker's Compensation Handbook §§ 5.4 and 5.15 (4th 
ed. 1997).  The Act individualizes compensation by awarding 
benefits at a two-thirds earnings rate for a certain number of 
weeks, depending on how the injury is classified within the Act. 
 Wis. Stat. §§ 102.43, 102.44, and 102.52; Worker's Compensation 
Handbook §§ 5.4 and 5.15.  For permanent partial disability 
benefits, however, the maximum benefits are set low enough by 
statute that most injured workers receive the maximum benefits 
allowable.  Worker's Compensation Handbook § 5.15. 
 
No. 
98-1607  
 
 
6 
¶12 Mireles suffered scheduled injuries to her wrists.  
She received compensation for permanent partial disability for 
the damage to her right wrist.  Mireles's right wrist injury was 
assessed to be a three percent permanent disability, and her 
scheduled award was limited by that determination pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 102.55(3).  
¶13 Many injuries are not included in the statutory 
schedules. 
 
Worker's 
Compensation 
Handbook 
§ 5.20. 
These 
"unscheduled" injuries, which are primarily injuries to the 
torso and head, as well as mental injuries, usually require more 
individualized evaluation than scheduled injuries.  See Worker's 
Compensation Handbook § 5.15.  Mireles suffered a back injury.  
Back injuries are unscheduled injuries. 
¶14 Permanent total disability based upon an unscheduled 
injury or injuries results in lifetime benefits.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.44(2).  Permanent partial disability from an unscheduled 
injury or injuries results in benefits payable for a portion of 
1,000 weeks, depending upon how the injury compares "to one 
causing permanent total disability."  Wis. Stat. § 102.44(3).  
For example, if a back injury causes a 20 percent permanent 
partial disability for a worker, the worker is eligible for 200 
weeks of benefits, or 20 percent of 1,000 weeks.  See Worker's 
Compensation Handbook § 5.33. 
¶15 The 
calculation 
to 
determine 
permanent 
partial 
disability is based upon a medical comparison "with injuries 
that would render a person permanently totally disabled for 
industrial purposes . . . and not to injuries that would totally 
No. 
98-1607  
 
 
7 
disable a person functionally without regard to loss of earning 
capacity."  Mednicoff, 54 Wis. 2d at 11 (quoting Kurschner v. 
ILHR, 40 Wis. 2d 10, 18, 161 N.W.2d 213 (1968)).  Such a 
calculation attempts to measure an injured worker's loss of 
earning capacity, not simply the physical effects of an injury.4 
¶16 A permanent partial disability that is not scheduled 
does not always result in compensation for loss of earning 
capacity.  If the employee returns to work, the employee 
                     
4 Compensation for loss of earning capacity accounts for: 
the effect of the injured [employee's] permanent 
physical and mental limitations resulting from the 
injury upon present and potential earnings in view of 
the following factors: 
 
(a) Age; 
(b) Education; 
(c) Training; 
(d) Previous work experience; 
(e) Previous earnings; 
(f) Present occupation and earnings; 
(g) Likelihood of future suitable occupational change; 
(h) Efforts to obtain suitable employment; 
(i) Willingness to make reasonable change in a residence 
to secure suitable employment; 
(j) Success 
of 
and 
willingness 
to 
participate 
in 
reasonable physical and vocational rehabilitation 
program; and 
(k) Other pertinent evidence. 
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.34 (Nov. 1998).   
No. 
98-1607  
 
 
8 
receives compensation for loss of earning capacity if the 
employee suffers a 15 percent or more wage decrease.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.44(6)(a)-(b). 
 
Otherwise, 
an 
employee 
receives 
compensation only for "the physical limitations resulting from 
the injury."  Id.  Whether or not an employee suffers a 15 
percent or more wage decrease, an employee still can receive 
compensation for loss of earning capacity if the employer 
terminates the employment relationship for any reason, or the 
employee terminates the relationship because of physical or 
mental limitations.  Wis. Stat. § 102.44(6)(b). 
¶17 Mireles presents two claims for benefits in this case. 
 Both claims are affected by the fact that Mireles suffered an 
unscheduled injury followed by a scheduled injury while she 
worked in a production job at Ametek.   
FACTS 
¶18 Mireles worked for Ametek from 1988 to 1993.  On April 
22, 1991, she injured her back at Ametek while hurriedly packing 
five-pound motors into boxes.  Mireles lifted a box containing 
four motors and "she felt a snap [of] pain in her back."  
Mireles could not work for some months afterward and received 
temporary total disability benefits from April 22, 1991, until 
November 25, 1991.  While she recovered, she underwent therapy 
and received injections.  At the time of her injury, Mireles 
earned $346 per week. 
¶19 She returned to work in the same department, but in 
June 1992 another back episode rendered her unable to work.  
Mireles reinjured her back when a lift truck bumped a table at 
No. 
98-1607  
 
 
9 
which she was sitting, and she was forced to jump to avoid being 
pinned between a pole and the table.  Ametek initially refused 
to compensate her for temporary total disability or permanent 
partial disability.  The parties, however, entered into a 
compromise agreement in September 1992 covering claims through 
the date of the agreement.   
¶20 After the June 1992 back episode, Mireles's doctor put 
her on maximum lifting restrictions of 30 to 35 pounds.  Mireles 
returned to a light duty job at Ametek in which she put tape on 
wires for motors.  The repetitive hand movements of this task 
caused Mireles to develop carpal tunnel syndrome.  The carpal 
tunnel syndrome incapacitated both of her wrists.  As a result, 
she could no longer work, and on October 18, 1993, her right 
wrist injury was handled as a separate work injury.  She 
received temporary total disability compensation from November 
26, 1993, until October 15, 1994. 
¶21 Mireles had surgery to correct the carpal tunnel 
syndrome in her right wrist.  She did not have surgery on her 
left wrist because surgery was not successful on her right 
wrist.  The doctor who treated her wrists assessed her partial 
permanent disability at three percent loss of use for her right 
hand and Mireles was compensated for this loss.5  The same doctor 
placed permanent restrictions on Mireles that limited her 
                     
5 At oral argument this court asked Mireles's counsel how 
much money Mireles had received for the permanent damage caused 
by the carpal tunnel syndrome.  Counsel indicated that she had 
received about $1,500 for her loss. 
No. 
98-1607  
 
 
10
lifting with her right hand to two pounds and precluded her from 
repetitive hand movements of any kind with either hand.   
¶22 Ametek concluded that it had no work available for 
Mireles within these restrictions.  The employment relationship 
between Ametek and Mireles ended after Mireles's sick leave 
exceeded one year. 
¶23 At a hearing in 1996, Mireles testified that the 
problems with her hands and back affect her daily.  She 
indicated that the surgery on her right hand did not eliminate 
occasional sharp pain and also did not reestablish strength in 
her right hand.  In addition, Mireles testified that her back 
still bothers her.  She stated that the pain in her back 
sometimes necessitates that she take twelve pain pills per day. 
 She still wears a back brace daily. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶24 On March 29, 1995, Mireles filed an application with 
the Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations (DILHR)6 to 
reopen the award for her unscheduled back injury.  She claimed 
that she deserved payment for 50 to 100 percent loss of earning 
capacity for her back injury.  The ALJ dismissed her claim.  The 
ALJ determined that Wis. Stat. § 102.44(6)(b), which allows DWD 
to reopen an unscheduled injury award for three different 
                     
6 As noted above, DIHLR administered the Act before DWD was 
created in 1995. 
No. 
98-1607  
 
 
11
reasons,7 would not permit Mireles to obtain a reopening of the 
previous award for her unscheduled back injury.  In addition, 
the ALJ concluded that Mireles was not eligible for either a 
loss of earning capacity award or permanent total disability 
benefits based upon a combination of scheduled and unscheduled 
injuries. 
¶25 In addressing Mireles's first argument, the ALJ 
dismissed her application because her situation satisfied none 
of the three conditions in Wis. Stat. § 102.44(6)(b).  First, 
according to the ALJ's findings, Mireles did not receive a 15 
percent or more wage reduction in her light duty position at 
Ametek.  Second, the ALJ indicated that Mireles did not satisfy 
either of the other two conditions in the statute because 
§ 102.44(6)(b) "mentions restrictions, but these are intended to 
be from the same work injury, not a later scheduled, work 
injury." 
¶26 LIRC agreed with the ALJ's decision, and it adopted 
the findings and order as its own.  LIRC also issued its own 
memorandum 
opinion, 
finding 
that 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.44(6)(b), "if the employment is terminated by the employer 
or the employe because his or her physical or mental limitations 
                     
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.44(6)(b) allows DWD to reopen an 
award for an unscheduled injury if, after returning to work, any 
of 
the 
following 
circumstances 
occur: 
(1) 
the 
employer 
terminates the employment relationship; or (2) the employee 
terminates the employment relationship because of physical or 
mental limitations; or (3) the employee suffers a wage loss of 
15 percent or more. 
No. 
98-1607  
 
 
12
prevent him or her from continuing such employment then loss of 
earning capacity must be taken into account."  Nonetheless, LIRC 
agreed with the ALJ "that although this section of law mentions 
restrictions, these are intended to be from the same work injury 
not a later scheduled injury."  LIRC concurred with the ALJ's 
finding that Mireles "could have continued to work within her 
restrictions due to her unscheduled back injury" had she not had 
the severe restrictions on the use of her hands.  Accordingly, 
LIRC affirmed the ALJ's dismissal of Mireles's application 
because LIRC did not find "that the applicant was terminated due 
to her unscheduled injury."  Rather, Ametek terminated Mireles 
because of the restrictions for her scheduled injury, a 
situation not covered under § 102.44(6)(b). 
¶27 LIRC also addressed Mireles's claim under Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.44(2), in which she alleged that she "suffered permanent 
total disability based on both the unscheduled and scheduled 
restrictions."8  Mireles argued that her earlier back injury 
caused her later acquired carpal tunnel syndrome because she 
never would have worked in a position requiring repetitive hand 
                     
8 Neither the ALJ's or LIRC's memorandum opinion addressed 
Mireles's 
arguments 
by 
explicitly 
applying 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.44(2).  Both opinions, however, did address Mireles's 
general argument as to the combination of her injuries, a claim 
that is before this court under Wis. Stat. § 102.44(2).  That 
statutory section is the governing section for claims of 
permanent 
total 
disability. 
 
LIRC's 
opinion 
specifically 
recognized that "[i]n addition" to her claim for permanent 
partial disability, Mireles also claimed she "suffered permanent 
total disability based on both the unscheduled and scheduled 
restrictions."  
No. 
98-1607  
 
 
13
movement without her back injury restrictions.  LIRC dismissed 
her argument, concluding that she had not established a causal 
link between her back injury and her carpal tunnel syndrome. 
¶28 The circuit court set aside LIRC's decision on the 
basis that the agency erroneously interpreted Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.44(6)(b).  The court of appeals reversed, addressing both 
of Mireles's Worker's Compensation claims.  The court of appeals 
applied great weight deference review to LIRC's decision. 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
¶29 This 
case 
presents 
a 
question 
of 
statutory 
interpretation.  The goal of statutory interpretation is to 
ascertain the intent of the legislature.  Doe v. American Nat'l 
Red Cross, 176 Wis. 2d 610, 616, 500 N.W.2d 264 (1993).  The 
first step of our interpretation process is to look at the 
language of the statute.  Kelley Co. v. Marquardt, 172 Wis. 2d 
234, 247, 493 N.W.2d 68 (1992).  If the language of the statute 
clearly indicates the legislative intent, it is our duty to 
apply that intent and not look beyond the statutory language.  
Id. at 247.  Although "it is true that statutory interpretation 
begins with the language of the statute, it is also well 
established that courts must not look at a single, isolated 
sentence or portion of a sentence, but at the role of the 
relevant language in the entire statute."  Alberte v. Anew 
Health Care Serv., 2000 WI 7, ¶ 10, 232 Wis. 2d 587, 605 N.W.2d 
515 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 
(1987)). 
No. 
98-1607  
 
 
14
¶30 If 
the 
legislature 
has 
directed 
an 
agency 
to 
administer a statute, we consider the interpretation of the 
agency under certain circumstances, State ex rel. Parker v. 
Sullivan, 184 Wis. 2d 668, 699, 517 N.W.2d 449 (1994). 
PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY CLAIM 
¶31 The first issue concerns the operation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.44(6)(b).  Mireles contends that she qualifies for a 
reopening of her unscheduled injury award under all three 
clauses of § 102.44(6)(b).  Under this claim, Mireles seeks 
compensation for loss of earning capacity caused by her back 
injury.  Ametek contends that Mireles does not qualify under the 
statute.  In particular, Ametek maintains that Mireles does not 
qualify under the second clause of § 102.44(6)(b) because the 
physical limitations that precluded her from working for Ametek 
were scheduled limitations, not unscheduled limitations.  Stated 
simply, Mireles was forced to leave her position because of her 
wrists, not her back. 
¶32 This case warrants due weight deference to the 
interpretation of the administrative agency.  LIRC has had 
experience interpreting the statute, but its interpretations 
No. 
98-1607  
 
 
15
have 
been 
inconsistent.9 
 
Due 
weight 
deference 
is 
the 
"appropriate deference."  Brauneis v. LIRC, 2000 WI 69, ¶ 19, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___N.W.2d ___.  We stated in Brauneis that when 
an agency's statutory interpretation is accorded due weight, the 
agency's interpretation is not conclusive.  Id.  If a court 
finds an alternative interpretation more reasonable, it need not 
adopt the agency's interpretation.  Here the court concludes 
that its alternative interpretation is not only more reasonable 
than LIRC's but also better fulfills the intent of the statute. 
¶33 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 102.44(6)(b) 
sets 
forth 
three 
situations in which DWD may reopen an unscheduled injury award. 
 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.44(6)(b) provides: 
(6)(b) If, during the period set forth in s. 102.17(4) 
the employment relationship is terminated by the 
employer at the time of the injury, or by the employe 
because his or her physical or mental limitations 
prevent his or her continuing in such employment, or 
if during such period a wage loss of 15% or more 
occurs the department may reopen any award and make a 
redetermination taking into account loss of earning 
capacity. 
                     
9 Previously, 
LIRC 
has 
concluded 
that 
the 
physical 
limitations causing the end of the employment relationship need 
not form the basis for a claim of benefits under Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.44(6)(b).  See Althaus v. Wingra Stone Co., No. 8504455 
(LIRC December 22, 1998) (ruling that, for the purposes of Wis. 
Stat. § 102.44(6)(b), an unscheduled physical injury is eligible 
for an accounting for loss of earning capacity even though the 
injured worker quit because of another unscheduled injury); 
Armstrong v. Heyde Health Sys., Inc., No. 92034936 (LIRC May 26, 
1998) (explaining that "Wis. Stat. § 102.44(6)(b) does not 
require that the physical limitations causing loss of employment 
be attributable to a Chapter 102 injury"). 
No. 
98-1607  
 
 
16
¶34 Subsection (6)(b) requires some explanation in order 
to address the issues in this case.  First, the statute refers 
to a period set forth in Wis. Stat. § 102.17(4).10  This period 
is a 12-year period beginning at the date of injury.  This 
section is a statute of limitations.  Second, the statute uses 
the phrase "the employer at the time of injury" in the first 
clause.  Wis. Stat. § 102.44(6)(b).  The phrase "at the time of 
the injury" modifies the employer, not the termination.  Thus, 
the statute can be understood to read:  If, during the period 
set 
forth 
in 
§ 102.17(4) 
the 
employment 
relationship 
is 
terminated by the employer for whom the employee worked at the 
time the employee was injured . . . the department may reopen 
any award and make a determination taking into account loss of 
earning capacity.  Wis. Stat. § 102.44(6)(b).  If the phrase "at 
the time of the injury" modified the words "is terminated," the 
statute of limitations would be rendered inoperative.  When 
interpreting statutes we give effect to every word in the 
statute so that no part of the statute is rendered superfluous. 
 Lake City Corp. v. City of Mequon, 207 Wis. 2d 155, 162, 558 
N.W.2d 100 (1997). 
                     
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.17(4) states: 
The 
right 
of 
an 
employe, 
the 
employe's 
legal 
representative or dependent to proceed under this 
section shall not extend beyond 12 years from the date 
of the injury or death or from the date that 
compensation, other than treatment or burial expenses, 
was last paid, or would have been last payable if no 
advancement were made. 
No. 
98-1607  
 
 
17
 
¶35 Under Wis. Stat. § 102.44(6)(b), an applicant may seek 
to revisit a previous award if the employer at the time of the 
injury terminates the employment relationship.  No reason for 
the termination is required.  By contrast, the second clause in 
the statute, in which the employee terminates the relationship, 
allows an employee to reopen only if physical or mental 
limitations 
caused 
the 
employee 
to 
end 
the 
employment 
relationship.  Had the legislature intended to place any 
qualifications on employer terminations, it would have created 
such qualifications.  Thus, if an employer terminates its 
relationship with an employee by closing its plant or laying off 
workers, a previously injured employee may apply for a reopening 
under § 102.44(6)(b).  If Ametek terminated the employment 
relationship with Mireles, the first clause of the statute would 
allow Mireles to apply for a reopening of the unscheduled injury 
award. 
¶36 Mireles 
and 
Ametek 
disagree 
about 
which 
party 
terminated the employment relationship in this case.  In factual 
disputes LIRC's findings are conclusive as long as they are 
supported by credible and substantial evidence.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.23(6); Ide v. LIRC, 224 Wis. 2d 159, 165, 589 N.W.2d 363 
(1999).  Moreover, we have a duty to search the record to find 
credible 
evidence 
that 
supports 
the 
agency's 
findings.  
Brakebush Bros. v. LIRC, 210 Wis. 2d 623, 630, 563 N.W.2d 512 
(1997). 
¶37 The record in this case is ambiguous about which party 
terminated the relationship.  The ALJ made findings of fact in 
No. 
98-1607  
 
 
18
his memorandum opinion, and LIRC adopted those findings as its 
own and issued its own memorandum opinion.  Both opinions 
describe the end of the employment relationship in a confusing 
manner.  The ALJ first wrote that Mireles "was terminated" by 
Ametek, but he later stated that Mireles "was required to leave 
her job at respondent."  In the introduction to the opinion, the 
ALJ wrote that Mireles's application "allege[d] that the 
applicant had to leave her employment." 
¶38 In its memorandum opinion, LIRC mentioned several 
times that Mireles "was terminated."  But LIRC also wrote that 
"the 
evidence 
indicates 
that 
the 
applicant 
subsequently 
terminated her employment." 
¶39 We conclude, therefore, that the present record is 
insufficient to classify Mireles's application under the first 
clause of Wis. Stat. § 102.44(6)(b).  The factual findings of 
LIRC were not developed adequately because of the position taken 
by the agency.  On remand to LIRC, it will be necessary to make 
a factual finding whether Mireles qualifies under this portion 
of the statute.  
¶40 The parties also focused on the second clause of Wis. 
Stat. § 102.44(6)(b).  The issue here is whether the "physical 
limitations" mentioned in the statute must derive from an 
unscheduled injury.  This part of the statute allows DWD to 
reopen an unscheduled injury award if the employee terminates 
the employment relationship "because his or her physical or 
mental limitations prevent his or her continuing in such 
employment."  Wis. Stat. § 102.44(6)(b).   
No. 
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¶41 We conclude that the second clause of Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.44(6)(b) does not require that the limitations that cause 
the employee to end the relationship arise from an unscheduled 
injury.  Had the legislature wished to make such a requirement, 
it could have written: 
 
If, during the period set forth in s. 102.17(4) the 
employment relationship is terminated . . . by the 
employe 
because 
his 
or 
her 
physical 
or 
mental 
limitations resulting from the injury prevent his or 
her continuing in such employment. 
The legislature did not draft the statute in that manner.  To 
give effect to the reading favored by Ametek would breach our 
duty to interpret statutes by their ordinary language whenever 
possible.  Moreover, we see nothing in Wis. Stat. § 102.44 to 
indicate that scheduled injuries cannot trigger the second 
clause of § 102.44(6)(b).  In particular, we note that the 
legislature 
wrote 
§ 102.44(6)(a) 
using 
the 
exact 
phrase 
"resulting from the injury" added to the hypothetical statute 
above.11 
 
¶42 Ametek argues that in cases of permanent partial 
disability from scheduled injuries, the schedule is exclusive.  
                     
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.44(6)(a) states: 
Where an injured employe claiming compensation for 
disability under sub. (2) or (3) has returned to work 
for the employer for whom he or she worked at the time 
of the injury, the permanent disability award shall be 
based upon the physical limitations resulting from the 
injury without regard to loss of earning capacity 
unless the actual wage loss in comparison with 
earnings at the time of injury equals or exceeds 15% 
(emphasis added). 
No. 
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Such exclusivity, however, applies to the award of benefits, see 
Vande Zande v. DILHR, 70 Wis. 2d 1086, 1093, 236 N.W.2d (1975); 
Mednicoff, 54 Wis. 2d at 14, not to the reasons for termination 
under Wis. Stat. § 102.44(6)(b).  Mireles is not asking for 
disability benefits for an injury covered by any of the 
statutory schedules.  Her claim is for benefits based on an 
unscheduled injury.  The reason for the end of the relationship, 
therefore, is irrelevant, as long as the termination under the 
second clause in the statute was caused by physical or mental 
limitations and not some other factor. 
 
¶43 Ametek argues that every scheduled injury that follows 
an unscheduled injury will give rise to a claim for loss of 
earning capacity.  This is true, however, only when one of the 
three 
situations 
envisioned 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.44(6)(b) 
actually occurs.  We conclude that the statute allows a claim 
for loss of earning capacity in such a factual situation.  Such 
an interpretation is not only clear from the language of the 
statute but also consistent with the purpose of the Act.  An 
injured worker in Mireles's predicament faces the task of 
finding work in the general labor market upon termination of the 
employment relationship.  Mireles, therefore, should not be 
penalized for having suffered a scheduled injury that in turn 
caused the end of her employment. 
¶44 LIRC's and Ametek's interpretation of the second 
clause of Wis. Stat. § 102.44(6)(b) does not conform with the 
language of the statute.  Here again, however, the factual 
record is insufficient to classify Mireles's application within 
No. 
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the second clause of § 102.44(6)(b).  On remand to LIRC, it will 
be necessary to make a factual finding whether Mireles qualifies 
under this portion of the statute. 
 
¶45 The parties also dispute whether the third clause in 
Wis. Stat. § 102.44(6)(b) applies to Mireles's application.  
That clause allows DWD to reopen an award if an employee suffers 
a wage loss of 15 percent or more.  The clause does not mention 
any 
other 
requirements 
other 
than 
the 
wage 
loss. 
When 
considering § 102.44(6) as a whole, we conclude that Mireles 
does not qualify under this portion of the statute. 
 
¶46 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.44(6)(a) governs situations in 
which an employee who suffers an unscheduled injury returns to 
work for the "employer for whom he or she worked at the time of 
the injury."  In that part of the statute, an employee cannot 
recover for loss of earning capacity unless the unscheduled 
injury causes a wage loss of 15 percent or more.  Id.  Like 
§ 102.44(6)(a), the first two clauses of § 102.44(6)(b) apply 
only to the employer for whom the injured party worked when the 
injury occurred.  Reading § 102.44(6) as a whole, we conclude 
that the last clause of § 102.44(6)(b) operates only when the 
employee continues to work for the employer at the time of the 
injury and suffers a wage loss of 15 percent or more.  The last 
clause of § 102.44(6)(b), therefore, refers to the situation 
mentioned in § 102.44(6)(a), namely a wage reduction of 15 
percent or more at the employer for whom the employee worked at 
the time of injury. 
No. 
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¶47 If 
the 
wage 
loss 
provision 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.44(6)(b) were to operate after the end of the employment 
relationship, the first two provisions of § 102.44(6)(b) would 
be superfluous.  An injured worker always could qualify for a 
reopening because any time the employment relationship ended, 
the employee would have suffered a wage loss of 15 percent or 
more.  Mireles does not qualify under this portion of the 
statute because the employment relationship ended before she 
experienced a 15 percent wage loss. 
¶48 LIRC's memorandum opinion contends that public policy 
concerns caution against our holding today.  LIRC agreed with 
the ALJ's statement that "it would be a great disincentive for 
employers to rehire anyone with a non-scheduled injury as a 
later, minor, scheduled injury could cause unanticipated greater 
liability.  It could be cheaper to pay the penalty to rehire 
than face the greater liability."  Five factors caution against 
LIRC's interpretation. 
¶49 First, the language of the statute allows an applicant 
to claim he or she deserves a reopening of an award even if an 
unscheduled injury is followed by a scheduled injury, and the 
scheduled injury causes the end of the employment relationship. 
 If employers choose to face penalties rather than rehire 
workers 
in 
Mireles's 
situation, 
it 
will 
become 
the 
responsibility of the legislature and the designated agency to 
design incentives to serve the overall purpose of the Act. 
¶50 Second, in many cases employers will have a strong 
incentive to rehire workers with unscheduled injuries.  When an 
No. 
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employer accommodates an injured worker with work within 
restrictions, the employer gains the work of the employee, as 
opposed merely to paying disability benefits to a non-worker.  
After all, had Ametek refused to rehire Mireles, she could have 
brought a claim for permanent partial disability benefits for 
her back injury.  Thus, Ametek faced no greater liability for 
Mireles's unscheduled injury after her scheduled injury than it 
would have confronted had it refused to rehire her initially.  
In addition, the employer would avoid penalties by rehiring such 
a worker. 
¶51 Third, even under our holding today, DWD and LIRC 
still maintain discretion to deny applications made under Wis. 
Stat. § 102.44(6)(b).  The legislature wrote this section in a 
way that gives the agency administering the law the option of 
fashioning policies. 
¶52 Fourth, the ALJ, LIRC, and Ametek have expressed 
concerns about a breakdown in the exclusiveness of scheduled 
benefits.  However, any additional compensation awarded to 
Mireles would account only for that portion of her disability 
caused by the unscheduled injury.  Any award would be subject to 
the apportionment guidelines in cases of permanent partial 
disability.  See Vande Zande, 70 Wis. 2d at 1093; Langhus v. 
LIRC, 206 Wis. 2d 494, 505, 557 N.W.2d 450 (Ct. App. 1996). 
¶53 Finally, we find it likely that the legislature 
intended that an injured worker such as Mireles would receive 
compensation for her unscheduled injury.  In numerous instances, 
the Act provides compensation for cases of multiple injuries.  
No. 
98-1607  
 
 
24
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 102.44(2), 
102.53, 
102.54. 
 
When 
the 
legislature enacted § 102.44(6)(b), it must have contemplated 
the occurrence of a situation like the one here.  Otherwise, it 
could have written § (6)(b) the same as § 6(a), which explicitly 
applies to "the physical limitations resulting from the injury." 
 The legislative intent evinces a concern about an injured 
worker's ability to find suitable employment after injury and a 
subsequent change in the employment relationship.  See Wis. 
Admin. Code § DWD 80.34 (July, 1996) (considering "[l]ikelihood 
of future suitable occupational change" in evaluating loss of 
earning capacity).   
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY CLAIM 
 
¶54 The second issue concerns the interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 102.44(2).  This statute grants lifetime benefits to 
workers who are totally and permanently disabled.  Mireles seeks 
benefits under § 102.44(2) based upon a combination of scheduled 
and unscheduled injuries.  Ametek argues that an unscheduled 
injury may not be combined with a scheduled injury under this 
section because scheduled injuries are covered exclusively under 
three other sections of the Act. 
¶55 As with the first issue, we conclude that we give 
LIRC's interpretation only due weight.  The plain language of 
Wis. Stat. § 102.44(2), when considered in concert with all of 
§ 102.44 and other statutes referred to in the text of § 102.44, 
dictates that Mireles may qualify for total permanent disability 
benefits.  Furthermore, LIRC's memorandum opinion did not 
No. 
98-1607  
 
 
25
develop significant reasoning about this claim12 and LIRC took a 
contrary position in another case, Langhus, 206 Wis. 2d 494.  
 
¶56 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.44(2) must be read in context.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 102.43, titled "Weekly Compensation Schedule," 
sets forth instructions about the payment of benefits.  The 
section 
covers 
total, 
partial, 
temporary, 
and 
permanent 
disabilities. 
¶57 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.44 modifies the immediately 
preceding section with limitations.  Subsection (2) of § 102.44 
provides: 
 
In case 
of permanent 
total 
disability 
aggregate 
indemnity shall be weekly indemnity for the period 
that the employe may live.  Total impairment for 
industrial use of both eyes, or the loss of both arms 
at or near the shoulder, or of both legs at or near 
the hip, or of one arm at the shoulder and one leg at 
the hip, constitutes permanent total disability.  This 
enumeration is not exclusive, but in other cases the 
department shall find the facts. 
¶58 Subsection (2) governs the permanent total disability 
indemnity.  The subsection lists several combinations of 
scheduled injuries that constitute permanent total disability.  
The text concludes:  "This enumeration is not exclusive, but in 
                     
12 LIRC's memorandum opinion focused on the argument by 
Mireles that her back injury caused her wrist injury because she 
never would have worked in the position that caused her wrist 
injury "but for" her back injury.  See Mireles v. Ametek Lamb 
Electric, No. 91027213 at 4-5 (LIRC April 25, 1997).  Thus, LIRC 
did not address Mireles's claim in accord with its position in 
Langhus v. LIRC, 206 Wis. 2d 494, 505, 557 N.W.2d 450 (Ct. App. 
1996).  
No. 
98-1607  
 
 
26
other cases the department shall find the facts."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.44(2). 
¶59 The question we must decide is whether the "other 
cases" of permanent total disability may include a combination 
of scheduled and unscheduled injuries.  Ametek contends that the 
combination of scheduled and unscheduled injuries suffered by 
Mireles may not give rise to a claim under Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.44(2).  Ametek bases its position on Langhus, 206 Wis. 2d 
at 505-06, which discussed the exclusionary reach of Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.44(4).  Section 102.44(4) states that "[w]here the 
permanent disability is covered by ss. 102.52, 102.53, and 
102.55, such sections shall govern." 
¶60 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 102.52, 102.53, and 102.55 must be 
examined in turn.  Section 102.52 is the "Permanent partial 
disability schedule."13  This schedule contains the full list of 
scheduled injuries.  Mireles's claim for permanent total 
disability is not covered by § 102.52 because one of her 
injuriesher back injuryis not part of the schedule. 
¶61 Section 
102.53 
relates 
to 
"Multiple 
injury 
variations."  Its introductory clause begins:  "In case an 
                     
13 The title of Wis. Stat. § 102.52 supports our reading of 
the Act.  "Although the title is not part of the statute it may 
be persuasive of the interpretation to be given the statute."  
Pure Milk Prods. Coop. v. National Farmers Org., 64 Wis. 2d 241, 
253, 219 N.W.2d 564 (1974).  The title of a statute cannot 
defeat the language of the law, but it is persuasive evidence of 
a statutory interpretation.  Id.  Section 102.52 is titled 
"Permanent partial disability schedule" (emphasis added).  The 
title, therefore, further evinces the legislature's intent that 
§ 102.52 applies only in cases of permanent partial disability. 
No. 
98-1607  
 
 
27
injury causes more than one permanent disability specified in 
ss. 102.44(3), 102.52, and 102.55."  Referenced sections 102.52 
and 
102.55 
deal 
exclusively 
with 
scheduled 
injuries 
and 
combinations of scheduled injuries.  Section 102.44(3) pertains 
to "permanent partial disability."  Because Mireles's claim is 
for 
permanent 
total 
disability, 
not 
permanent 
partial 
disability, Wis. Stat. § 102.44(3) does not apply.  Mireles's 
claim for permanent total disability is not covered by § 102.53. 
¶62 Section 102.55, "Application of schedules," refers 
back to § 102.52 and speaks to injuries "specified in this 
schedule."  Thus, § 102.55 does not cover Mireles's permanent 
total disability claim.  
¶63 We conclude that Wis. Stat. §§ 102.52, 102.53, and 
102.55 do not cover a claim for permanent total disability based 
on a combination of scheduled and unscheduled injuries.  In 
Langhus, the court of appeals reached the same conclusion when 
it observed: 
 
We note that LIRC's interpretation does not preclude a 
claimant who can prove total disability, stemming from 
both 
scheduled 
and 
unscheduled 
injuries, 
from 
receiving 
lifetime 
benefits. 
 
Section 
102.44(2), 
Stats., 
specifically 
provides 
that 
certain 
combinations of scheduled injuries are deemed to 
constitute permanent total disability.  In other 
situations, DWD is directed "to find the facts."  
There is no reason, therefore, that a claimant with 
both scheduled and unscheduled injuries could not 
establish facts that would allow LIRC to award 
benefits 
for 
permanent 
total 
disability 
under 
§ 102.44(2).  The burden of making that showing, 
however, rests on the claimant. 
Langhus, 206 Wis. 2d at 505 n.9. 
No. 
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¶64 This conclusion is not undermined by two previous 
decisions, Mednicoff, 54 Wis. 2d 7, and Vande Zande, 70 Wis. 2d 
1086.  In Mednicoff, this court confronted the issue of whether 
scheduled injuries could form the basis for a loss of earning 
capacity claim.  Mednicoff, 54 Wis. 2d at 14.  The applicant in 
Mednicoff suffered from a permanent partial disability, based on 
a combination of scheduled injuries.  Id. at 11.  She claimed 
agency error because the trier of fact did not consider her 
claim for loss of earning capacity.  Id. at 11-12.  This court 
determined that the applicant could not receive compensation for 
loss of earning capacity because loss of earning capacity is 
inherent for injuries in the schedule.  Id. at 12.  The court 
found 
that 
only 
the 
specific 
enumerated 
combinations 
of 
scheduled injuries qualified under Wis. Stat. § 102.44(2) and 
that "all other cases of multiple scheduled or relative injuries 
are to be compensated according to the provisions of § 102.53." 
Id. at 14.  The court's holding did not preclude a combination 
of scheduled and unscheduled injuries constituting permanent 
total disability. 
¶65 Vande Zande, 70 Wis. 2d at 1086, was another case 
involving multiple injuries amounting to a permanent partial 
disability.  The applicant sustained "a skull fracture, loss of 
sense of taste and smell, facial paralysis, intermittent 
headaches, dizziness, and vertigo, and 100 percent loss of 
hearing in his left ear."  Id. at 1091.  The agency awarded the 
applicant 
20 
percent 
permanent 
partial 
disability 
and 
a 
scheduled award for deafness of 55 weeks.  Id. at 1091-92.  The 
No. 
98-1607  
 
 
29
applicant contended that the deafness caused the other symptoms 
and that he deserved an award of 40 percent permanent partial 
disability.  Id. at 1091.  He asserted that the schedule should 
not apply to his case.  Id. at 1091.  We disagreed and ruled 
that the administrative agency correctly applied the schedule to 
the applicant's situation.  Vande Zande, 70 Wis. 2d at 1093. 
¶66 Both Mednicoff and Vande Zande affirm the explicit 
language of Wis. Stat. § 102.44(4) that where the permanent 
disability is covered by Wis. Stat. §§ 102.52, 102.53, and 
102.55, such sections shall govern.  Wis. Stat. § 102.44(4).  
Moreover, "in no case shall the percentage of permanent total 
disability 
be 
taken 
as 
more 
than 
100 
percent." 
 
Id.  
Nonetheless, these cases do not control a claim of permanent 
total disability not covered by the three sections. 
¶67 Langhus makes the point that eligibility to make a 
claim and proof of a claim are different.  In Langhus, the 
applicant claimed permanent total disability.  Langhus injured 
his knee at work, Langhus, 206 Wis. 2d at 497, an injury 
governed by the schedule.  Wis. Stat. § 102.52.  Later, Langhus 
reinjured his knee and shoulder outside of work.  Id.  Langhus 
subsequently developed an unscheduled back injury as a result of 
a limp from the knee injury.  Id.  Langhus claimed he suffered 
total and permanent disability as a result of the back, leg, and 
shoulder injuries.  Id. 
¶68 LIRC 
denied Langhus's claim 
for 
permanent 
total 
disability benefits because he did not demonstrate what portion 
of his disability could be attributed to his back injury.  Id. 
No. 
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30
at 506.  According to the court of appeals, LIRC did not contend 
that Langhus could not qualify for permanent total disability 
benefits under Wis. Stat. § 102.44(2).  Id. at 505-06.  The 
court of appeals found "that LIRC's interpretation [did] not 
preclude a claimant who can prove total disability, stemming 
from both scheduled and unscheduled injuries, from receiving 
lifetime benefits [under Wis. Stat. § 102.44(2)]."  Langhus, 206 
Wis. 2d at 505 n.9.  Presumably, LIRC wanted Langhus to show 
that his disability was caused in part by an unscheduled injury, 
so that compensation for loss of earning capacity was not 
awarded for an injury caused either significantly or wholly by a 
scheduled injury.  Id. at 505-06.  "LIRC did not exceed its 
authority in placing the burden on Langhus to prove that an 
ascertainable portion of his total disability was attributable 
to other than a scheduled injury."14  Id. at 506. 
¶69 Our holding today does not affect the absolute 
exclusiveness of scheduled benefits in cases of permanent 
partial disability.  See Langhus, 206 Wis. 2d at 505; Vande 
Zande, 70 Wis. 2d at 1093; Mednicoff, 54 Wis. 2d at 14.  This 
includes the apportionment guidelines for permanent partial 
disability cases from Vande Zande, 70 Wis. 2d at 1091-93, and 
Hagen v. LIRC, 210 Wis. 2d 12, 23, 563 N.W.2d 454 (1997).  An 
injured worker with a permanent partial disability attributable 
to both a scheduled and unscheduled injury still will be unable 
                     
14 As 
noted in Mireles's 
Reply Brief, 
the 
issue of 
apportionment is not before the court.  
No. 
98-1607  
 
 
31
to recover beyond the schedule limits for that portion of the 
disability attributable to the scheduled injury.  Hagen, 210 
Wis. 2d at 23. 
¶70 Our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 102.44(6)(b) and 
102.44(2) does not guarantee Mireles or any applicant additional 
benefits.  Our interpretation merely permits applicants in the 
unusual circumstances here to state claims that the department 
may consider and that the applicants must prove.  Ultimately, 
the department finds the facts. 
CONCLUSION 
¶71 We find that the language of Wis. Stat. § 102.44(6)(b) 
allows the department to reopen a Worker's Compensation award to 
account for loss of earning capacity from an unscheduled injury, 
even if a scheduled injury causes the termination of an 
employment relationship.  We also find that Mireles can qualify 
for permanent total disability benefits under Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.44(2) based upon the combination of her injuries, if she 
can prove such disability to the department.  We therefore 
remand for further agency proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded. 
 
 
 
No. 
98-1607  
 
 
1