Case Title: Carradus v. Lange

Citation: 203 N.W.2d 565

Docket Number: 55143

State: iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Date: 1973-01-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
203 N.W.2d 565 (1973) Phillip E. CARRADUS and Nancy R. Carradus, Appellees, v. Curtis Kent LANGE and Jack Donald Lange, Appellants. No. 55143. Supreme Court of Iowa. January 17, 1973. *567 David F. McGuire, Cedar Rapids, for appellants. Francis J. Pruss, Cedar Rapids, for appellees. Heard before MOORE, C. J., and MASON, RAWLINGS, REES and HARRIS, JJ. RAWLINGS, Justice. From judgment on jury verdict for plaintiffs in personal injury actions arising from motor vehicle collision the defendants appeal challenging damage award to one plaintiff alone. We reverse and remand for a limited new trial. The instant accident occurred about 5:15 p. m., July 16, 1967, on primary Highway #20 at a point about 350 feet west of the westerly limits of Independence in Buchanan County. Plaintiffs, Phillip E. Carradus and Nancy R. Carradus, were rear seat passengers in a Plymouth owned and driven by Gerald M. Connelly. Because of a turning vehicle ahead the Plymouth slowed and was struck from the rear by a Chevrolet owned by defendant Jack Donald Lange, operated by defendant Curtis Kent Lange. Plaintiffs were resultantly injured. Plaintiffs brought individual actions for damages against defendants which culminated in a judgment for each plaintiff. Motion by defendants for a new trial was overruled. On appeal only the damage award to Nancy R. Carradus is contested. She will therefore be here referred to as plaintiff and our review accordingly limited. Errors asserted in support of a reversal are, trial court erred in (1) permitting plaintiff to testimonially state her pretrial total cumulative loss of earnings, (2) submitting jury instructions regarding plaintiff's "permanent injury", disability, impairment of earning capacity and diminution of services as a wife and mother, (3) giving instructions to the jury as to future pain and suffering without any time limitation, (4) the submission of instructions regarding impairment of earning capacity and diminution of wife-mother services absent adequate proof, (5) overemphasizing the damage element by instructions given, and (6) overruling defendants' new trial motion. These issues will not be considered in the order assigned. I. First to be reviewed is the matter of damage evidence as it relates to plaintiff's accident related lost earnings. In course of trial plaintiff's income tax returns for 1963 through 1969 were prefatorily admitted in evidence, and later taken to the jury room. Plaintiff also related her injury associated loss of time in remunerative employment and the manner by which her services as a wife and mother had been diminished. She also described in some detail the pain experienced by her prior to and at time of trial. Finally, on direct examination, she was asked this question: "Well, are you able to state exactly how much earnings loss you have had as a result of your injuries in this collision that occurred on July 16, 1967, Mrs. Carradus?" Defendants then interposed the objection: Noticeably, the questions quoted above called for nothing more than a yes or no answer. So the objection voiced was both *568 inappropriate and premature. Furthermore, no motion was made to strike the response given as a voluntary statement. Thus the answer remained for consideration. Stated otherwise, error, if any, was waived. See Harrison v. Ulicki, 193 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Iowa 1972); Patton v. Town of Sanborn, 133 Iowa 650, 654, 110 N.W. 1032 (1907). See also 1 Wigmore on Evidence, § 18 at 344 (3d ed.); 3 Jones on Evidence, § 895 (4th ed.). II. The general problem next to be resolved is whether trial court's jury instructions as to damages were prejudicially erroneous. Initially defendants urge the evidence was not sufficiently definite to justify an instruction on impairment of earning capacity. At the outset we find no merit in the position thus taken by defendants. Dr. Robb, attending specialist in orthopedic surgery, testifying for plaintiff, stated she incurred an injury related sprain of the lumbar and cervical spine, described the activity restricting pain experienced by her together with his examination and treatments administered. The doctor also testified: Plaintiff's testimony discloses she secured employment in 1970 at Anamosa with Head Start. This six hour a day job required that she check on small children, take them to the doctor or dentist and deal with their parents. It paid $224 a month, plus ten cents a mile. Plaintiff further testified in part: Dispositive of the loss of earning capacity issue is this statement in Anthes v. *569 Anthes, 258 Iowa 260, 269-270, 139 N.W.2d 201, 208 (1965): See also Andrews v. Struble, 178 N.W.2d 391, 403 (Iowa 1970); 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, §§ 313, 315-316; 25 C.J.S. Damages § 40; Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 88. With regard to diminution of plaintiff's services as a wife and mother, this court said in Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines, Inc., 170 N.W.2d 632, 656-657 (Iowa 1969): We are satisfied a jury issue was adequately generated regarding plaintiff's right to damages for impairment of earning capacity and diminution of services as a wife and mother. III. It is also apparent the record tends to reveal plaintiff, at time of trial, experienced pain with some related restrictions on her ability to engage in normal employment and to perform regular household duties. Therefore a jury instruction as to past and future pain and suffering and related disability was appropriate. See Mabrier v. A. M. Servicing Corporation of Raytown, 161 N.W.2d 180, 183 (Iowa 1968); Rogers v. Jefferson, 226 Iowa 1047, *570 1051-1052, 285 N.W. 701 (1939). See also Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 10. IV. But defendants argue the instruction given relative to the foregoing was reversibly erroneous because trial court failed to specify a time limitation for any attendant damage award. We do not agree. Defendants would apparently have us arbitrarily convert a fact issue into a question of law. Where, as here, a fact issue is created it must be left to the judgment of the jury on appropriate "reasonable probability" instructions, subject only to judicial correction for abuse, passion or prejudice. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 344(f)(17); Anthes v. Anthes, supra. See generally 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, § 105; 25 C.J.S. Damages § 62. Touching on the subject at hand is this statement in Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines, Inc., 170 N.W.2d at 655: See also 25 C.J.S. Damages § 28. Furthermore, past and future pain and suffering defy any precise measurement. See Stutsman v. Des Moines C. R. Co., 180 Iowa 524, 537-538, 163 N.W. 580 (1917); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 81. The instruction given is substantially in accord with Iowa Uniform Jury Instruction 3.9 and contains the approved qualifying "if any you find" phraseology. See Miller v. McCoy Truck Lines, Inc., 243 Iowa 483, 490-491, 52 N.W.2d 62 (1952). We now hold fact questions as to plaintiff's pain and suffering, impairment of earning capacity, together with diminution of her services as a wife and mother, were here adequately generated, and the subject instructions were not susceptible to objection regarding time limitations. V. There are, however, two elements which remain to be considered. First, did the instructions given with which defendants took issue serve to overemphasize those factors discussed above? An examination of the instructions to which reference is made reveals only some unavoidable repetition essential to guidance of the jury, and appropriate limitations upon damages, if any, to be awarded. In brief, there is no more frequent reference to the matters noted above than was reasonably required. See Mickelson v. Forney, 259 Iowa 91, 100, 143 N.W.2d 390 (1966). VI. Next to be considered, however, is instruction 17, which states, to the extent here material: To the foregoing defendants objected: *571 Without question the charge thus leveled at instruction 17 was specific and sufficed to alert trial court to the error asserted. Moreover, the record discloses that during trial of this case plaintiff's request to "read into the record the life expectancy of Mrs. Carradus" was denied by the court with this comment: "I do not intend to instruct on life expectancy, nor on any permanent damages". Upon the record before us this observation appears to be correct. See Shuck v. Keefe, 205 Iowa 365, 370-371, 218 N.W. 31 (1928). Compare Morris v. LaBahn, 194 Iowa 377, 384-388, 189 N.W. 797 (1922). We are thus left to speculate as to whether the jury did or did not consider "permanent disability" in arriving at the general verdict returned for plaintiff. See State v. Faught, 254 Iowa 1124, 1133, 120 N.W.2d 426 (1963) and citations; Merch. T. & S. Co. v. Ry. Co., 170 Iowa 378, 396-397, 150 N.W. 720 (1915); 1 Reid's Branson Instructions to Juries, §§ 104, 138 (1960 Replacement, 3d ed.). As heretofore indicated, the evidence did not suffice to support an award of damages for permanent injury and plaintiff does not here contend otherwise. This means trial court, by instruction 17, erroneously submitted an issue previously found to have no evidential support. See Campbell v. Martin, 257 Iowa 1247, 1251, 136 N.W.2d 508 (1965) and citations. Additionally, the controverted instruction was such as to likely confuse and mislead the jury. See Bauman v. City of Waverly, 164 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Iowa 1969). In light of the foregoing it cannot be said that under proper instructions the jury might have found plaintiff entitled to damages in an amount at variance with the award instantly made. See Farmers Sav. Bank v. Newton, 154 Iowa 49, 55, 134 N.W. 436 (1912). Submission of the aforesaid erroneous jury instruction leaves us no alternative but to reverse and remand this case for a new trial upon plaintiff's cause of action alone. In other words, as heretofore initially observed, no appeal was taken from the judgment on verdict for plaintiff Phillip E. Carradus and it must therefore stand as a verity. VII. But the foregoing is not dispositive regarding issues to be determined on remand. In taking this appeal defendants, as noted above, contest only the damage award to plaintiff Nancy R. Carradus. And it is not here even inferred that the verdict for plaintiff stemmed from any compromise on the separate issue of liability as in Allbee v. Berry, 254 Iowa 712, 718-719, 119 N.W.2d 230 (1963). Moreover, defendants' liability to both plaintiffs has been effectually determined. Thus a resubmission of that separate issue would be an injustice to plaintiffs and a probable source of needless cost to defendants. See Barry v. State Surety Co., 261 Iowa 222, 230, 154 N.W.2d 97 (1967); Dailey v. Holiday Distributing Corp., 260 Iowa 859, 877, 151 N.W.2d 477 (1967). See also Annot., 85 A.L.R.2d 9 at 19, et seq. Our disposition of the instant appeal obviates any consideration of other errors here assigned. This case is reversed and remanded for a new trial limited to the matter of damages to be awarded plaintiff Nancy R. Carradus alone. Costs on appeal are taxed three-fourths to defendants, one-fourth to plaintiff Nancy R. Carradus. Reversed and remanded for a limited new trial.