Case Title: Gallagher v. Cleveland Browns Football Co.

Citation: 1996-Ohio-320

Docket Number: 19940835

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-02-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Gallagher et al., Appellants, v. Cleveland Browns Football Company et al., 
Appellees. 
[Cite as Gallagher v. Cleveland Browns Football Co. (1996), ______ Ohio St.3d 
_____.] 
Torts -- Participants and spectators at sporting event are barred from bringing 
actions for injuries that arise out of the normal conduct of the game unless 
the conduct amounts to an intentional tort or reckless misconduct. 
- - - 
A defendant who wishes to rely on the defense of primary assumption of risk must 
raise it before or during trial.  Failure to raise primary assumption of risk 
before or during trial precludes the defendant from raising the defense for 
the first time in a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
- - - 
 
(No. 94-835 -- Submitted September 13, 1995 -- Decided February 7, 1996.) 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 63311. 
 
Plaintiff-appellant Michael Gallagher, a sportscaster employed by WJET-
TV in Erie, Pennsylvania, was assigned by the station to cover a professional 
football game between the Houston Oilers and Cleveland Browns at Cleveland 
Municipal Stadium on December 18, 1988.  Appellant was operating a video 
camera on the sideline of the field late in the first half when the Oilers had the ball 
 
 
 
 
2 
at the Browns’ nineteen-yard line.  The Oilers were moving toward the Browns’ 
goal line, at the end of the field commonly known as “the Dawg Pound.” 
 
Anticipating that the Oilers would attempt to score by throwing a pass into 
the end zone, appellant positioned himself and his video camera off the field of 
play, near the corner of the end zone.  At that end of the field, the bleachers are 
close to the back of the end zone and a slope separates the playing field from the 
spectators.  It had snowed the night before the game, and although the snow had 
been removed from the field, the hill and the area between the hill and the end 
zone were still snow-covered.  A line around the field to mark where media 
personnel should stand was covered by snow and so was not visible.  After being 
reminded by a member of the stadium’s security force that he was subject to a 
policy requiring all media personnel to kneel in this area to keep from obstructing 
spectators’ views of the game, appellant knelt and prepared to capture the play on 
his video camera. 
 
The Oilers then attempted a pass into the corner of the end zone in front of 
where appellant was positioned.  The pass was overthrown and came directly at 
appellant.  An Oilers receiver and a Browns defender collided with appellant as 
 
 
 
 
3 
they went for the ball.  Appellant suffered extensive injuries to his jaw, neck and 
mouth. 
 
Appellant filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, 
naming as defendants the Cleveland Browns Football Company, Inc., the 
Cleveland Browns, Inc., the Cleveland Stadium Corporation (collectively referred 
to as appellees or as “the Browns”), and Andy Frain Services, Inc. (“Andy Frain”), 
a company hired to provide security at the stadium.  The complaint was later 
amended to add appellant Gallagher’s medical insurer, Northbrook Property and 
Casualty Insurance Company, as a plaintiff. 
 
In his complaint, appellant alleged that defendants required him to crouch or 
kneel in an unprotected area of the sidelines of the field, thereby making it 
difficult for him to avoid the oncoming players, and so causing his injuries.  
Appellant also alleged that defendants were negligent in failing to provide him 
with a safe place from which to film the game.  In their answers, along with other 
defenses, all defendants asserted generally as affirmative defenses that appellant 
was contributorily negligent and that appellant assumed the risk of his injuries.  
 
 
 
 
4 
Specifically, the Browns answered that “plaintiff Michael Gallagher assumed any 
risk of injury” without further elaboration. 
 
The case proceeded to be tried before a jury.  At the close of evidence, the 
Browns and Andy Frain each moved for a directed verdict.  The Browns premised 
their motion on the grounds that appellant was a licensee when he was injured, and 
that the Browns had not breached the duty of care owed to a licensee.  Defendant 
Andy Frain’s motion argued that Andy Frain owed no duty to Gallagher, and also 
that no evidence had been introduced to establish that the security guard who 
reminded appellant to kneel was Andy Frain’s employee rather than one of the 
Browns’ own employees.  The trial court denied the Browns’ motion, but granted 
a directed verdict for Andy Frain based on the failure of the evidence to support a 
finding that one of Andy Frain’s employees was involved. 
 
The trial court instructed the jury on the duty of care owed to invitees, 
licensees and trespassers, and on the standards applicable to determining if a 
breach of duty occurred.  The court also instructed that implied (secondary) 
assumption of risk could reduce appellant’s recovery if the jury decided that 
 
 
 
 
5 
appellees were negligent.  Appellees did not request an instruction on primary 
assumption of risk, and none was given. 
 
The jury returned a verdict in appellant’s favor for $800,000, and also in 
favor of appellant’s insurer for $106,000.  The jury determined that appellant was 
thirty-five percent responsible for his own injuries due to contributory 
negligence/implied assumption of risk.  Under comparative fault principles, the 
recoveries were reduced accordingly. 
 
After the trial court entered judgment on the verdict, appellees moved for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative for a new trial.  At this 
point, for the first time, appellees urged that they owed no duty to appellant, so 
that any judgment against them was barred by the doctrine of primary assumption 
of risk.  The trial court denied the motion. 
 
The sole assignment of error on appeal was that the trial court had erred in 
denying appellees’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  The Court of 
Appeals for Cuyahoga County, in a split decision, reversed the judgment of the 
trial court and held for appellees on their primary assumption of risk argument.  
The dissenting judge believed that appellees had waived the defense of primary 
 
 
 
 
6 
assumption of risk by failing to raise it until after the jury returned its verdict, and 
would have affirmed appellant’s award. 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
 
Nurenberg, Plevin, Heller & McCarthy Co., L.P.A., Joel Levin, Maurice L. 
Heller and Kathleen J. St. John, for appellants. 
 
Isaac, Brant, Ledman & Teetor, Charles E. Brant, Donald L. Anspaugh and 
David E. Ballard; Kitche, Deery & Barnhouse and Eugene B. Meador, for 
appellees. 
 
Thomas H. Bainbridge, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of 
Trial Lawyers. 
 
Alice Robie Resnick, J.  The issue presented is whether a defendant who 
makes no attempt to introduce primary assumption of risk as an issue before or 
during a trial, but instead waits until after the jury returns a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff, is precluded from relying on primary assumption of risk as a complete 
defense in a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  For the reasons that 
follow, we determine that appellees waived primary assumption of risk as a 
 
 
 
 
7 
defense because they failed to raise it in a timely manner.  By failing to take 
advantage of numerous opportunities to inject the defense of primary assumption 
of risk into the trial before the case went to the jury, appellees made the tactical 
determination to rely on the semantically related but distinctly separate defense of 
implied (secondary) assumption of risk.  Having waived the defense of primary 
assumption of risk, appellees were precluded from raising it in a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  We reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals, and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.1 
 
To comprehend why appellees clearly waived primary assumption of risk as 
a defense, it is necessary first to trace the development of two types of assumption 
of risk recognized by this court’s opinion in Anderson v. Ceccardi (1983), 6 Ohio 
St.3d 110, 6 OBR 170, 451 N.E.2d 780.  Anderson held that the General 
Assembly’s then-recent enactment of R.C. 2315.19 (the comparative negligence 
statute) required that the defenses of implied assumption of risk and contributory 
negligence be merged, so that a plaintiff who impliedly assumed the risk of a 
particular action was no longer totally barred from recovery due to that 
assumption.2  The court thus found that implied assumption of risk could limit a 
 
 
 
 
8 
plaintiff’s recovery in the same way that contributory negligence limited recovery 
under R.C. 2315.19.  In explaining its reasoning, the Anderson court cogently 
observed: 
 
“Under the prior cases, the overlap in these doctrines [implied assumption 
of risk and contributory negligence] posed no problems because in practice it did 
not matter whether the plaintiff’s conduct was denominated as assumption of risk 
or contributory negligence, since both stood as absolute bars to a plaintiff’s 
recovery.  However, now, under R.C. 2315.19, if a plaintiff’s conduct constitutes 
both contributory negligence and assumption of risk, continued adherence to the 
differentiation of the doctrines can lead to the anomalous situation where a 
defendant can circumvent the comparative negligence statute entirely by asserting 
the assumption of risk defense alone.”  6 Ohio St.3d at 113, 6 OBR at 173, 451 
N.E.2d at 783. 
 
Although the Anderson court merged implied assumption of risk with 
contributory negligence, the court found that two other types of assumption of risk 
did not merge with contributory negligence -- express (e.g., contractual) 
assumption of risk and primary (“no duty”) assumption of risk.  Anderson’s 
 
 
 
 
9 
statement that primary assumption of risk does not merge with contributory 
negligence is of critical importance to our discussion here because when a plaintiff 
is found to have made a primary assumption of risk in a particular situation, that 
plaintiff is totally barred from recovery, as a matter of law, just as he or she would 
have been before Anderson.  The net result of Anderson’s differentiation between 
primary and implied assumption of risk is that now it is of utmost importance 
which type of assumption of the risk is put forth as a defense.  In fact, after 
Anderson, these two defenses are so distinct that it is misleading that each 
continues to bear the title “assumption of risk,” as if the two were interrelated 
concepts.  Due to the confusion occasioned by continuing usage of “assumption of 
risk,” many commentators have advocated abolishment of the term.  “[T]he 
concept of assuming the risk is purely duplicative of other more widely understood 
concepts, such as scope of duty or contributory negligence. ***It adds nothing to 
modern law except confusion.”  4 Harper, James & Gray, Law of Torts (2 
Ed.1986) 259, Section 21.8.  However, despite this confusion, Ohio continues to 
recognize the term and its accompanying variations. 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
Primary assumption of risk is a defense of extraordinary strength.  Based on 
the distinction drawn in Anderson between implied assumption of risk and primary 
assumption of risk, and the doctrine that a plaintiff who primarily assumes the risk 
of a particular action is barred from recovery as a matter of law, it becomes readily 
apparent that primary assumption of risk differs conceptually from the affirmative 
defenses that are typically interposed in a negligence case.  An affirmative defense 
in a negligence case typically is the equivalent of asserting that even assuming that 
the plaintiff has made a prima facie case of negligence, the plaintiff cannot 
recover.  A primary assumption of risk defense is different because a defendant 
who asserts this defense asserts that no duty whatsoever is owed to the plaintiff.  
See Prosser & Keeton, Law of Torts (5 Ed.1984) 496-497, Section 68 (Primary 
assumption of risk “is really a principle of no duty, or no negligence, and so denies 
the existence of any underlying cause of action.”).  Because a successful primary 
assumption of risk defense means that the duty element of negligence is not 
established as a matter of law, the defense prevents the plaintiff from even making 
a prima facie case. 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
Because of the great impact a ruling in favor of a defendant on primary 
assumption of risk grounds carries, a trial court must proceed with caution when 
contemplating whether primary assumption of risk completely bars a plaintiff’s 
recovery.  Indeed, in Cincinnati Base Ball Club Co. v. Eno (1925), 112 Ohio St. 
175, 147 N.E. 86, the case cited in Anderson as support for the survival of the 
concept of primary assumption of risk, the doctrine itself was inapplicable, as 
plaintiff there was a spectator injured by a ball hit by a player who was practicing 
very near the stands.  The Eno court intimated in dicta that primary assumption of 
risk would have applied if plaintiff had been struck by a ball hit into the stands 
during the normal course of a game: “[I]t is common knowledge that in baseball 
games hard balls are thrown and batted with great swiftness, that they are liable to 
be thrown or batted outside the lines of the diamond, and that spectators in 
positions which may be reached by such balls assume the risk thereof.”  Eno, 112 
Ohio St. at 180-181, 147 N.E. at 87.  Eno demonstrates that only those risks 
directly associated with the activity in question are within the scope of primary 
assumption of risk, so that no jury question would arise when an injury resulting 
from such a direct risk is at issue, meaning that no duty was owed by the defendant 
 
 
 
 
12 
to protect the plaintiff from that specific risk.  In many situations, as in Eno, there 
will be attendant circumstances that raise questions of fact whether an injured 
party assumed the risk in a particular situation.  In that case, the doctrine of 
implied assumption of risk, not primary assumption of risk, would be applicable. 
 
Appellees in their answer raised a generic claim of assumption of risk as an 
affirmative defense.  From that alone, at that time in the litigation, it was not clear 
whether they intended to rely on primary assumption of risk, or on implied 
assumption of the risk, or possibly on both, as their theory of defense.  By raising 
assumption of risk in their answer, appellees met the minimal Civ.R. 8(C) pleading 
requirement that “a party shall set forth affirmatively *** assumption of risk *** 
and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.” 3  
(Emphasis added.) See Hoover v. Sumlin (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 1, 3-4, 12 OBR 1, 
3, 465 N.E.2d 377, 379.  Thus, this case can be distinguished from the more 
common waiver situation in which a defendant fails to raise a defense in the 
answer, also fails to amend the answer pursuant to Civ.R. 15(A), and further 
cannot obtain amendment to conform to the evidence under the “express or 
implied consent of the parties” provision of Civ.R. 15(B) because the issue was 
 
 
 
 
13 
not developed at trial, i.e., when it was not tried by the express or implied consent 
of the parties.  See State ex rel. Evans v. Bainbridge Twp. Trustees (1983), 5 Ohio 
St.3d 41, 5 OBR 99, 448 N.E.2d 1159; Cooper v. Grace Baptist Church of 
Columbus, Ohio, Inc. (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 728, 735, 612 N.E.2d 357, 361.  
However, even though it can be found that appellees avoided a waiver by virtue of 
the generic statement in their answer that plaintiff’s claim was barred by 
assumption of risk, appellees still had a responsibility to specifically raise primary 
assumption of risk sometime before the case went to the jury, and to put appellant 
and the court on notice through supporting arguments that primary assumption of 
risk would be an issue in the litigation. 
 
Because primary assumption of risk, when applicable, prevents a plaintiff 
from establishing the duty element of a negligence case and so entitles a defendant 
to judgment as a matter of law, it is an issue especially amenable to resolution 
pursuant to a motion for summary judgment.  Yet appellees never moved for 
summary judgment or attempted in any other way to call primary assumption of 
risk to the trial court’s attention prior to trial.  In most cases, when a defendant 
potentially has a full and complete defense available that would defeat a plaintiff’s 
 
 
 
 
14 
prima facie negligence case, one would expect that defendant to raise that defense 
as soon as possible in an attempt to prevail without going to trial.  Although there 
is no suggestion in Civ.R. 56 that a party who fails to make a motion for summary 
judgment on a particular issue waives the right to raise the issue, judicial economy 
favors raising an issue on which the moving party claims entitlement to “judgment 
as a matter of law,” Civ.R. 56(C), at the earliest practicable time.  While appellees 
therefore did not waive primary assumption of risk by the mere failure to raise it 
through an argument that they owed no duty to plaintiff in a summary judgment 
motion, that failure further supports our ultimate conclusion. 
 
Besides our concerns with appellees’ failure to make a motion for summary 
judgment on primary assumption of risk grounds, other developments at trial make 
it obvious that implied assumption of risk was the defense appellees chose to rely 
on, to the obvious exclusion of any primary assumption of risk defense.  A close 
examination of the record makes manifest that appellees made absolutely no 
attempt to inject primary assumption of risk as an issue in this case until after the 
jury returned a verdict against them.  The following observations illustrate that 
 
 
 
 
15 
appellees waived primary assumption of risk as a defense because they failed to 
carry their burden of timely making “no duty” an issue: 
• As alluded to above, appellees generically stated in their answers that appellant 
assumed the risk of the injuries.  Although this avoided a Civ.R. 8(C) waiver of 
primary assumption of risk as a defense, it did not in any way specifically make 
appellees’ lack of duty an issue in the case. 
• Appellees conspicuously did not discuss primary assumption of risk at all in 
their trial brief filed just two weeks prior to trial.  Rather, they discussed what 
duty of care they owed:  whether a duty to an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser.  
Thus, appellees conceded that they owed a duty to appellant, a position clearly 
inconsistent with primary assumption of risk, which involves no duty and 
which, if established, would have prevented appellant from making a prima 
facie negligence case. 
• When appellees submitted proposed jury instructions with their trial brief, they 
did not request an instruction on primary assumption of risk.  Likewise, when 
appellees later proposed additional jury instructions, no primary assumption of 
 
 
 
 
16 
risk instruction was requested.  Obviously, appellees continued to concede that 
they owed a duty to appellant. 
• When appellees moved for a directed verdict after the presentation of evidence 
at trial, their argument again focused on appellant’s status, claiming that he was 
a licensee rather than an invitee, and they accordingly claimed that they owed 
him only a duty to refrain from willful and wanton conduct.  Appellees never 
claimed then that they owed appellant no duty whatsoever, and at that time 
never mentioned primary assumption of risk. 
• In closing arguments to the jury, appellees did not raise primary assumption of 
risk, and continued to advance their “licensee” argument, conceding that they 
owed a duty to appellant. 
• After the trial judge instructed the jury, the judge gave counsel for appellees an 
opportunity to state any objections for the record.  None of the instructions 
were on primary assumption of risk, and appellees’ attorney stated that he had 
no objections.  The case then went to the jury with appellees’ never making “no 
duty” an issue. 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
At this point in the trial, when the case went to the jury, appellees had 
clearly waived the right to raise primary assumption of risk as a defense.  Because 
primary assumption of risk is a question of law for a court to decide, rather than 
for a jury, we detail many of the above considerations primarily to illustrate that 
appellees made the conscious choice, for whatever reason, to allow this case to go 
to the jury as it did.  Appellees’ waiver occurred due to their total failure to call 
primary assumption of risk to the attention of the trial judge until after the jury 
returned its verdict.  We do not mean to imply that a primary assumption of risk 
defense could be raised solely through proposed jury instructions or during closing 
arguments to the jury.  To the contrary, because appellees never made a primary 
assumption of risk argument, they put on no evidence to support application of 
that defense, which is a legal question for the court.  No jury instructions on 
primary assumption of risk could have been appropriate, even if appellees would 
have proposed them, as there was no evidence before the jury to support the issue.  
See Murphy v. Carrollton Mfg. Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 585, 591, 575 N.E.2d 
828, 832. 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
In the same way that primary assumption of risk, in that it is a question of 
law to be decided by the trial judge, is not appropriately raised when factual 
questions are presented to the jury to determine whether a defendant was negligent 
and a plaintiff contributorily negligent, primary assumption of risk is also not a 
defense particularly amenable to presentation in a motion for a directed verdict or 
in a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  The same standard applies 
to resolve both of these motions.  Posin v. A.B.C. Motor Court Hotel (1976), 45 
Ohio St.2d 271, 275, 74 O.O.2d 427, 430, 344 N.E.2d 334, 338.  That standard, 
found in Civ.R. 50(A)(4), is that the motion should be granted if, when the 
evidence is strongly construed in favor of the nonmoving party, “reasonable minds 
could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that 
conclusion is adverse to such party.”  This standard obviously presupposes that 
any questions of law have been previously resolved, and is concerned with 
questions of fact that are to be submitted to the jury (directed verdict motion) or 
have already been submitted to the jury (motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict.)  Inasmuch as the standard is concerned with what determination could be 
reached by reasonable minds based upon the evidence presented, these motions 
 
 
 
 
19 
are not the proper way to resolve a question dependent upon a ruling by the trial 
court on a matter of law. 
 
For all the foregoing reasons, we hold that a defendant who wishes to rely 
on the defense of primary assumption of risk must raise it before or during trial.  
Failure to raise primary assumption of risk before or during trial precludes the 
defendant from raising the defense for the first time in a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
 
For purposes here, the policy reason behind the requirement that a defendant 
has a responsibility to make primary assumption of risk an issue by calling it to the 
trial court’s attention prior to the jury’s reaching a verdict is obvious -- it is a 
fundamental tenet of jury trial procedure that the judge decides questions of law, 
and the jury, as factfinder, then decides questions of fact.  Our entire system of 
trial procedure is built around this basic proposition, which would be turned on its 
ear if we allowed the jury first to decide questions of fact, and then expected the 
trial court to rule on pure issues of law after the jury returns a verdict.  We require 
the defendant to put forth alleged defenses, and arguments to support them, in 
order to define the issues in a case to put both the plaintiff and the trial court on 
 
 
 
 
20 
notice of the particular defense to be at issue so that the litigation may be 
formulated and shaped.  When the defendant interposes an avoidance or 
affirmative defense which appears to have merit, the defense frequently becomes 
an issue upon which the case may turn.  Generally, the plaintiff must vigorously 
oppose the defense at the earliest opportunity.  The idea that a defendant waives a 
defense he or she fails to raise is especially applicable when the defendant 
supposedly has available a defense that, if established, is of such extraordinary 
strength that it can prevent the plaintiff from making a prima facie negligence 
case.  If a plaintiff is not put on notice of such a defense, he or she of course 
should not be expected to anticipate it, as the plaintiff cannot counter a defense 
that has never been introduced as an issue.  Likewise, a trial judge is not required 
to anticipate the existence of a defense that is not raised.  To require a trial court to 
grant a defendant judgment as a matter of law on an issue never timely raised 
would fly in the face of fundamental rules of our adversarial system of trial, which 
place specific responsibilities on parties involved in litigation to shape the course 
of the trial. 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
Appellees did not in any way urge application of the defense of primary 
assumption of risk until after the jury had returned its verdict finding appellees to 
be negligent and appellant to have been thirty-five percent negligent due to 
implied assumption of the risk and contributory negligence.  Only after the jury 
returned the award against them did appellees raise primary assumption of risk in 
their motion for judgment nothwithstanding the verdict.  At this time it was too 
late, as the primary assumption of risk defense had already been waived.  The trial 
judge rightly denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  The 
court of appeals majority was mistaken in finding that appellees’ motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict was sufficient to raise the issue of primary 
assumption of risk before the trial court, and to preserve the issue for appellate 
review.  The argument based on primary assumption of risk was waived when 
appellees failed to raise it before the case went to the jury.  To the extent that 
appellees argue on appeal that the trial court erred by not granting their motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the failure to timely raise the issue before 
the trial court also waived the issue for appeal.  See State v. Williams (1977), 51 
Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph one of the syllabus 
 
 
 
 
22 
(appellate court need not consider an error which a party could have called to the 
trial court’s attention but did not); Buchman v. Wayne Trace Local School Dist. 
Bd. of Edn. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 260, 271, 652 N.E.2d 952, 961 (litigant cannot 
procure a reversal of a judgment for an error for which the litigant was 
responsible). 
 
Appellees in essence argue that this case should have never gone to the jury, 
because appellant could not make a prima facie negligence case.  However, as 
discussed above, appellees failed to raise the defense of primary assumption of 
risk until it was far too late.  This case went to the jury in the way it did precisely 
because appellees made the tactical choice, for whatever reason, to rely on implied 
assumption of the risk as their defense, and not to rely on primary assumption of 
risk.4  Appellees chose to focus the trial on the behavior of appellant, and claimed 
throughout that he had impliedly assumed the risk of his actions.  Appellees could 
have also presented a “no duty” defense, as the theory of primary assumption of 
risk would require, but clearly did not.  Only after the verdict was returned did 
appellees for the first time raise primary assumption of risk as a defense. 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
In conclusion, it is apparent from the record here that appellees failed to 
raise a primary assumption of risk defense in a timely manner.  We reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals, and reinstate the judgment of the trial court 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur 
 
DOUGLAS and WRIGHT, JJ., dissent. 
 
FOOTNOTES: 
1  Appellant did not specifically argue that appellees waived the defense of 
primary assumption of risk in his brief in opposition to defendants’ motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict filed in the trial court after the jury had 
returned its verdict.  Appellant also did not specifically argue that appellees 
waived the defense in his answer brief filed in the court of appeals.  However, 
appellant in both briefs strenuously urged that a “no duty” analysis was 
inapplicable, based on the facts of the case and the way the assumption of risk 
issues developed before and at trial.  Appellant repeatedly stressed that this was an 
implied assumption of risk case.  The record shows that the reason this was an 
 
 
 
 
24 
implied assumption of risk case is that appellees chose to try it as such a case, and 
so waived a primary assumption of risk defense. 
2  Current R.C. 2315.19 has been amended to reflect the holding of Anderson that 
implied assumption of risk and contributory negligence merge for purposes of that 
statute.  See Section 3(C), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1, 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1661, 1752. 
3  An argument could be made that appellees waived a primary assumption of risk 
defense pursuant to Civ.R. 8(C) by never specifically raising it in any pleading.  
Implied assumption of risk assumes establishment of a prima facie case (including 
the duty element), and therefore is a traditional affirmative defense.  However, 
primary assumption of risk is technically not an affirmative defense, as it directly 
attacks the duty element of a prima facie negligence case, rather than accepting the 
allegations of the complaint as true.  See 4 Harper, James & Gray, Law of Torts (2 
Ed.1986) 256, Section 21.7 (“[A]ssumption of risk in the primary sense does not, 
analytically, describe a defense at all.  It is simply a left-handed way of describing 
a lack of duty.”).  Yet “it could be urged that a defendant who would escape the 
general rule requiring due care should plead and prove facts that bring him within 
an exception to it.”  Id. at 258, Section 21.7.  Regardless of this ambiguity, we 
 
 
 
 
25 
must acknowledge that Civ.R. 8(C) simply requires a party to put forth 
“assumption of risk” as an affirmative defense without taking into account the 
significant distinction between primary and secondary assumption of risk 
engendered by Anderson’s statement that primary assumption of risk does not 
merge with contributory negligence.  Like the court of appeals majority, we 
therefore feel compelled to find that appellees met their minimal Civ.R. 8(C) 
burden by generically raising assumption of risk as an affirmative defense.  
Nevertheless, even assuming that the answer met the minimal Civ.R. 8(C) 
requirement, primary assumption of risk could still be waived if appellees did not 
timely inject it as an issue in the litigation. 
 
The entire seemingly circular preceding discussion illustrates just some of 
the confusion associated with the term and concept of assumption of risk.  It may 
be worthwhile to consider amending Civ.R. 8(C) to deal with the ambiguities, in 
what perhaps could be the first step toward eventual abolishment of the term.  It is 
less confusing merely to say that a defendant owed no duty to a plaintiff, rather 
than to say that a plaintiff primarily assumed the risk of injury.  It is less confusing 
 
 
 
 
26 
to say that a plaintiff was contributorily negligent, rather than to say that a plaintiff 
impliedly assumed the risk of injury. 
4  The dissenting judge at the court of appeals discusses at length possible tactical 
advantages appellees may have gained by declining to raise a primary assumption 
of risk defense at trial.  See Gallagher v. Cleveland Browns Football Co. (1994), 
93 Ohio App.3d 449, 466-469, 638 N.E.2d 1082, 1094-1096 (Nugent, J., 
dissenting).  The dissenting judge also points out that defendant Andy Frain did 
request a jury instruction on primary assumption of risk, and also argued the 
defense in a trial brief.  Id. at 465, 638 N.E.2d at 1093, fn. 1.  Thus, unlike 
appellees, Andy Frain did attempt to inject the primary assumption of risk issue 
into the litigation. 
 
WRIGHT, J., dissenting.  Although I certainly favor judicial economy, I do 
not believe that it should control the disposition of a case when it needlessly 
trammels substantial justice.  Such a result is even more troubling when it is 
rooted in a mischaracterization of a procedural issue.  For these reasons and the 
supporting analysis which follows, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
As the majority opinion acknowledges, the Browns did not waive primary 
assumption of risk (“PAR”) at the pleading stage because the general reference to 
“assumption of risk” in their answer satisfied the requirements of Civ.R. 8.  The 
majority opinion goes on, however, and recites a litany of factors, the 
accumulation of which allegedly amounts to waiver of PAR. 
 
I am at a loss to explain how any of these considerations force this 
conclusion when most, if not all, of the truly cogent reasons given by the court 
center on the jury’s fact-finding role.  As the majority states repeatedly, PAR is a 
question of law.  As such, it is an issue which must be decided by the court.  The 
absence of evidence presented to the jury, the lack of instructions on PAR, and the 
omission of any reference to this issue in closing arguments cannot possibly be 
construed as waiver in the context of this particular case.   
 
In addition, I am unaware of any rule that requires a legal issue to be raised 
on summary judgment before it is entitled to an airing on a motion for a directed 
verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  Finally, Civ.R. 50(B) permits a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict regardless of whether a directed 
verdict premised on the same theory was requested.  Accordingly, the 
 
 
 
 
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circumstances in the proceedings below strike me as inapplicable to this court’s 
determination of this matter.   
 
What is pertinent is that appellees raised the defense of assumption of risk 
in their answer.  For whatever reason, they chose to reserve PAR until after the 
jury returned its verdict.  Since I see no principled reason to forbid this sort of 
tactical calculation at the trial level, I would affirm the court of appeals’ decision.  
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.