Case Title: State v. Fazenbaker

Citation: 2020-Ohio-6731

Docket Number: 2019-1567

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Fazenbaker, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6731.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-6731 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. FAZENBAKER, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Fazenbaker, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6731.] 
Breaking and entering—Definition of “unoccupied structure”—A vacant trailer 
that is designed for overnight accommodation but is winterized and stored 
is an unoccupied structure pursuant to R.C. 2911.13(A)—Judgment 
reversed. 
(No. 2019-1567—Submitted July 22, 2020—Decided December 18, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 29108,  
2019-Ohio-3972. 
________________ 
 
DONNELLY, J. 
{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal, we are asked to determine the meaning 
of “unoccupied structure” in the breaking-and-entering statute, R.C. 2911.13(A).  
The Ninth District Court of Appeals held that entering a recreational travel trailer 
to commit theft does not constitute breaking and entering if the trailer is winterized, 
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covered, and stored, because a trailer in that condition is not an unoccupied 
structure.  We conclude that a structure that is specifically designed for overnight 
accommodation and physically capable of being occupied, but is winterized, 
covered, stored, and uninhabited at the time of a break-in, is an unoccupied 
structure for purposes of R.C. 2911.13(A).  Because such a structure was involved 
here, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
I.  Background 
{¶ 2} At some point between the spring of 2016 and May 2017, appellee, 
Andrew Fazenbaker, broke into a recreational travel trailer and stole a television 
and stereo system that had been built into the trailer.  The winterized trailer had 
been sitting covered outdoors at a storage facility ever since the owners had towed 
it there in 2015.  The trailer was built for occupation and overnight accommodation; 
it included a bedroom, bathroom, kitchen, and living room, which contained the 
entertainment center that Fazenbaker dismantled and stole. 
{¶ 3} Appellant, the state of Ohio, charged Fazenbaker with breaking and 
entering under R.C. 2911.13(A), which prohibits “by force, stealth, or deception” 
trespassing in an “unoccupied structure” to commit theft or a felony offense.  At 
trial, Fazenbaker unsuccessfully moved for acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29, 
arguing that the trailer was not an unoccupied structure.  The trial court overruled 
the motion, determining that the trailer was an “occupied structure” when used as 
a temporary dwelling and therefore was an unoccupied structure when not used for 
that purpose.  A jury found Fazenbaker guilty, and he received a 12-month prison 
sentence. 
{¶ 4} A majority of the Ninth District panel concluded that the trailer did 
not constitute an unoccupied structure for the purposes of R.C. 2911.13(A) and 
reversed Fazenbaker’s conviction.  2019-Ohio-3972, ¶ 18.  The majority held that 
a structure’s status as an “occupied structure” pursuant to R.C. 2909.01(C) depends 
on whether it is being “maintained” for residential use when the crime occurs.  Id. 
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at ¶ 17.  Because the trailer here was not being maintained for residential use, the 
majority held that the trailer was not capable of being an occupied structure, and 
since the trailer was winterized and not “adapted for overnight accommodation,” 
the trailer was not an unoccupied structure either.  Id. at ¶ 18.  The majority vacated 
Fazenbaker’s conviction and sentence on this ground and determined that 
Fazenbaker’s additional assignments of error were moot.  Id. at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 5} The dissenting judge found fault in the majority’s reasoning that 
because the trailer could not be an occupied structure, it therefore could not be an 
unoccupied structure.  The dissenter opined that “no structure would ever qualify 
as an ‘unoccupied structure’ for purposes of R.C. 2911.13(A)” under the majority’s 
logic.  Id. at ¶ 26 (Teodosio, P.J., dissenting). 
{¶ 6} We accepted one proposition of law for review:  
 
Any house, building, outbuilding, watercraft, aircraft, 
railroad car, truck, trailer, tent, or other structure, vehicle, or shelter, 
or any portion thereof, is a structure under R.C. 2909.01(C).  A 
structure will be an “occupied structure” if any of the factors 
enumerated in R.C. 2909.01(C)(1-4) apply; if none of the factors 
apply, the structure will be an “unoccupied structure.” 
 
See 158 Ohio St.3d 1406, 2020-Ohio371, 139 N.E.3d 910. 
II.  Analysis 
{¶ 7} Fazenbaker’s conviction for breaking and entering was pursuant to 
R.C. 2911.13(A), which prohibits trespassing into an “unoccupied structure” to 
commit certain offenses.  “Unoccupied structure” is not defined in R.C. 2911.13 or 
anywhere else in the Revised Code.  This court has previously suggested that the 
definition of “occupied structure” in R.C. 2909.01(C), which is used to define 
property offenses like aggravated arson, R.C. 2909.02(A)(2) and (B)(1), and 
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burglary, R.C. 2911.12(A), (C), and (D), has traditionally informed the inverse 
concept of “unoccupied structure.”  See State v. Carroll, 62 Ohio St.2d 313, 314, 
405 N.E.2d 305 (1980). 
{¶ 8} The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and accordingly, 
we review the matter de novo.  State v. Pariag, 137 Ohio St.3d 81, 2013-Ohio-
4010, 998 N.E.2d 401, ¶ 9.  When dealing with an issue of statutory construction, 
our main concern is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the General 
Assembly.  Henry v. Cent. Natl. Bank, 16 Ohio St.2d 16, 242 N.E.2d 342 (1968), 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  We determine legislative intent largely from the 
plain language of a statute.  Summerville v. Forest Park, 128 Ohio St.3d 221, 2010-
Ohio-6280, 943 N.E.2d 522, ¶ 18. 
{¶ 9} Ohio’s breaking-and-entering statute states: 
 
No person by force, stealth, or deception, shall trespass in an 
unoccupied structure, with purpose to commit therein any theft 
offense, as defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or any 
felony. 
 
R.C. 2911.13(A). 
{¶ 10} R.C. 2909.01(C) defines “occupied structure” as 
  
any house, building, outbuilding, watercraft, aircraft, railroad car, 
truck, trailer, tent, or other structure, vehicle, or shelter, or any 
portion thereof, to which any of the following applies: 
(1) It is maintained as a permanent or temporary 
dwelling, even though it is temporarily unoccupied and 
whether or not any person is actually present. 
January Term, 2020 
 
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(2) At the time, it is occupied as the permanent or 
temporary habitation of any person, whether or not any 
person is actually present. 
(3) At the time, it is specially adapted for the 
overnight accommodation of any person, whether or not any 
person is actually present. 
(4) At the time, any person is present or likely to be 
present in it. 
 
{¶ 11} Although R.C. 2909.01(C) refers to objects that are widely thought 
of as structures, such as houses and buildings, it also refers to temporary dwellings 
like tents, as well as objects that can be physically occupied but that are not 
normally thought of as structures or dwelling places, such as vehicles and 
watercraft.  The sheer breadth of the list of objects in R.C. 2909.01(C) suggests that 
some objects, such as motor vehicles, are considered structures only if occupied, 
which in turn implies that those objects cease to be structures if they are neither 
occupied nor presently capable of being occupied. 
{¶ 12} This court addressed the potential gray areas between unoccupied 
structures and nonstructures in R.C. 2909.01(C) and 2911.13 in Carroll, 62 Ohio 
St.2d at 315, 405 N.E.2d 305, in which this court determined that a Volkswagen 
bus was not an “unoccupied structure” within the meaning of R.C. 2911.13.  
Fazenbaker urges that the facts of this case present a similar gray area and that 
Carroll is controlling.  We disagree.  While details about the Volkswagen bus in 
Carroll are sparse, the opinion seems to imply that the bus was not a structure 
because it was a motor vehicle and because it was not set up for overnight 
accommodations.  See Carroll at 315, quoting the 1973 Legislative Service 
Commission Comment to Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511 (“ ‘The tent camper rigged for an 
overnight stay is an occupied structure, but would not come under the definition [of 
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an occupied structure] when collapsed for travel’ ”).  Unlike the bus in Carroll, a 
recreational travel trailer that is pulled like the one here is not a motor vehicle.  
Moreover, it is not capable of being collapsed like a tent and thereby impossible to 
physically enter. 
{¶ 13} Although when Fazenbaker broke into the trailer it was not intended 
for immediate occupation, given that it was winterized and covered with a tarp, the 
same argument could be made regarding an empty, winterized building.  That it has 
been closed, abandoned, or shut down does not make it a nonstructure.  Because 
the trailer was designed for the specific purpose of providing a temporary dwelling, 
including overnight accommodation, and because winterizing the trailer did not 
change its purpose or render it physically incapable of being occupied, it remained 
a structure capable of being occupied despite conditions that indicated that the 
owners did not want it to be occupied at the time. 
{¶ 14} When a statute’s meaning is clear and unambiguous, the statute is 
applied as written.  Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 510, 
2010-Ohio-2550, 929 N.E.2d 448, ¶ 20.  The recreational travel trailer—when in 
use—fits squarely within the definition of an “occupied structure” under R.C. 
2909.01(C).  Nothing about its nature or physical attributes would cause it to 
become a nonstructure when unoccupied, and it therefore fits squarely within the 
meaning of an “unoccupied structure” as the term is used in R.C. 2911.13(A).  
Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in reversing Fazenbaker’s conviction and 
sentence based on insufficient evidence of the “unoccupied structure” element in 
R.C. 2911.13(A). 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 15} The recreational travel trailer at issue here was manufactured for 
overnight accommodation.  The fact that it was not occupied at the time of 
Fazenbaker’s theft rendered it an unoccupied structure rather than a nonstructure.  
We therefore reverse the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals and 
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remand the cause for that court to consider Fazenbaker’s assignments of error that 
it previously deemed moot. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, and STEWART, JJ., 
concur. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in judgment only. 
_________________ 
Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Jacquenette S. Corgan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
James W. Armstrong, for appellee. 
_________________