Case Title: P. v. Nguyen

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2009-07-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 7/2/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S154847 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 6 H028798 
VINCE VINHTUONG NGUYEN, 
) 
 
 
) 
Santa Clara County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CC476520 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
California‘s Three Strikes Law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, 
subds. (a)-(d))1 increases the maximum sentence for an adult felony offense upon 
proof that the defendant has suffered one or more qualifying ―prior felony 
convictions‖ — a term that specifically includes certain prior criminal 
adjudications sustained by the defendant, while a minor, under the juvenile court 
law.  (§§ 667, subd. (d)(3), 1170.12, subd. (b)(3); see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 601 et 
seq.)  Does the United States Constitution allow such use of a prior juvenile 
adjudication even though there was no right to a jury trial in the juvenile 
proceeding?  Like the majority of recent decisions to address the issue, we 
conclude the answer is yes. 
The question arises in the following context:  A series of United States 
Supreme Court decisions, beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 
                                              
1  
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
 
2 
466 (Apprendi), establishes an adult criminal defendant‘s general right, under the 
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, to a jury finding beyond reasonable 
doubt of any fact used to increase the sentence for a felony conviction beyond the 
maximum term permitted by conviction of the charged offense alone.  (E.g., 
Oregon v. Ice (2009) 555 U.S. ___, ___ [129 S.Ct. 711, 714] (Ice); Cunningham v. 
California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 274-275 (Cunningham); Blakely v. Washington 
(2004) 542 U.S. 296, 303-305 (Blakely); Apprendi, supra, at p. 490.)  Apprendi 
found this principle inherent in the common law tradition, in effect when the Sixth 
Amendment was adopted, that any fact crucial to the maximum punishment for an 
offense was, for that purpose, an ―element‖ of the offense, and thus equally subject 
to the requirements of indictment or presentment, proof beyond reasonable doubt, 
and jury trial.  (Apprendi, supra, at pp. 476-485.) 
Here, in adult felony proceedings, the complaint charged, for purposes of 
sentence enhancement, that defendant previously had sustained a juvenile 
adjudication which qualified as a ―prior felony conviction‖ under the Three Strikes 
Law.  By statute, California affords an adult criminal defendant the right to a jury 
trial on whether he or she ―has suffered‖ an alleged prior conviction.  (§§ 1025, 
subds. (a), (b), 1158.)  Defendant waived that jury-trial right in this case.  
Documentary evidence presented to the court indicated that, in a prior juvenile 
proceeding, defendant, then 16 years old, had admitted committing an aggravated 
assault, and an adjudication to that effect had been entered accordingly.  On this 
basis, the sentencing court in this case found the prior conviction allegation true.  
Applying the ―second strike‖ provision of the Three Strikes Law, the court 
doubled defendant‘s sentence for the current offense. 
Nonetheless, defendant claims the Apprendi rule barred use of the prior 
juvenile adjudication to enhance his maximum sentence in the current case 
because the prior juvenile proceeding, though it included most constitutional 
3 
guarantees attendant upon adult criminal proceedings, did not afford him the right 
to a jury trial.  (McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) 403 U.S. 528 (McKeiver); 
People v. Lara (1967) 67 Cal.2d 365, 398; In re Daedler (1924) 194 Cal. 320; see 
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 702.)  He bases this claim on language employed by the 
United States Supreme Court to justify an exception to the Apprendi rule — i.e., 
that ―the fact of a prior conviction,‖ used to enhance the maximum sentence for a 
later offense, need not be proved to a jury beyond reasonable doubt, but may 
simply be found by the sentencing court.  (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, 490; 
Almendarez-Torres v. United States (1998) 523 U.S. 224, 239-247 (Almendarez-
Torres); see Jones v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 227, 248-249 (Jones).) 
The high court has given several reasons for treating ―the fact of a prior 
conviction‖ differently from other sentencing facts that may increase the 
maximum punishment for an offense.  The court has noted that ―recidivism‖ is a 
highly traditional basis for a court to increase a current offender‘s sentence, and 
that, unlike a typical ―element,‖ this factor relates not to the circumstances of the 
current offense, but only to punishment.  Finally, in remarks upon which 
defendant primarily relies, the court has stressed that prior convictions have been 
obtained in proceedings which themselves included substantial procedural 
protections, including proof beyond reasonable doubt and the right to a jury trial.  
(Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, 488, 496; Jones, supra, 526 U.S. 227, 249; see 
Almendarez-Torres, supra, 523 U.S. 224, 243-244.) 
On this basis, the Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that, under 
Apprendi, the absence of a jury-trial right in juvenile proceedings bars the use of 
prior juvenile adjudications to increase the maximum sentence for a subsequent 
adult felony offense.  In essence, the Court of Appeal found Apprendi requires a 
jury-trial right at some point in the determination of any fact that may increase the 
maximum sentence for an adult felony conviction. 
4 
But the People urge that, because juvenile law adjudications of criminal 
conduct are subject to virtually all constitutional protections that apply to adult 
criminal trials — particularly including the standard of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt — they fairly and reliably demonstrate the defendant‘s ―recidivism.‖  Thus, 
the People argue, if a prior juvenile proceeding included all the rights and 
guarantees constitutionally applicable therein, the resulting adjudication satisfies 
Apprendi‘s justifications for the ―prior conviction‖ exception, and is properly 
included within that exception, even though it did not include the right to a jury 
trial.  Even if the ―prior conviction‖ exception does not apply, the People assert, 
California complies with the basic holding of Apprendi by affording the right to a 
jury trial in the current case as to the sentencing ―fact‖ therein at issue — i.e., the 
existence of the prior juvenile adjudication. 
We generally agree with the People.  As noted, Apprendi requires, at most, 
the right to a jury trial in the current criminal proceeding with respect to any 
sentencing fact that may increase the maximum punishment for the underlying 
conviction.  California statutory law afforded defendant the right to have a jury 
determine the existence of the sentencing fact here at issue — whether he suffered 
a ―prior felony conviction‖ as defined by the Three Strikes Law — but he waived 
that right. 
In any event, we find nothing in the Apprendi line of cases, or in other 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, that interferes, under the circumstances here 
presented, with what the high court deemed a sentencing court‘s traditional 
authority to impose increased punishment on the basis of the defendant‘s 
recidivism.  That authority may properly be exercised, we conclude, when the 
recidivism is evidenced, as here, by a constitutionally valid prior adjudication of 
criminal conduct.  As we explain below, the high court has expressly so held in 
5 
analogous circumstances.  (See Nichols v. United States (1994) 511 U.S. 738 
(Nichols).)  We will therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
An amended complaint, filed in December 2004, charged defendant Vince 
Vinhtuong Nguyen2 with four felony counts:  possession of a firearm by an ex-
felon (§ 12022.1, subd. (a)(1)), possession of ammunition by an ex-felon 
(§ 12316, subd. (b)(1)), possession of a billy (§ 12020, subd. (a)(1)),3 and 
possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)).  The 
amended complaint also charged two misdemeanors, being under the influence of 
a controlled substance (id., § 11550, subd. (a)) and possession of drug 
paraphernalia (id., § 11364, subd. (a)).  Finally, for sentencing purposes the 
amended complaint alleged, under the Three Strikes Law, that defendant had 
suffered, as a qualifying ―prior felony conviction‖ (§§ 667, subd. (d)(3), 1170.12, 
subd. (b)(3)), a 1999 juvenile adjudication for assault with a deadly weapon 
(§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), committed when he was 16 years of age or older. 
In March 2005, pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant pled no 
contest to one felony, firearm possession by an ex-felon, and to a misdemeanor, 
possession of a billy.  The charges of possession of methamphetamine and drug 
                                              
2  
The Court of Appeal spelled defendant‘s middle name ―Vinthuong,‖ as do 
the briefs in this court.  However, all trial court records, including the amended 
complaint and the abstract of judgment, spell it ―Vinhtuong.‖  We adopt the latter 
spelling. 
 
3  
The offense described in section 12020, subdivision (a)(1) is a ―wobbler,‖ 
for which the defendant can be charged and/or convicted of either a felony or a 
misdemeanor.  (See § 17, subds. (a), (b).) 
 
6 
paraphernalia, ex-felon ammunition possession, and being under the influence of a 
controlled substance were dismissed. 
Defendant waived his statutory right to a jury trial on the issue whether he 
―[had] suffered‖ the prior strike (§§ 1025, subds. (a)-(b), 1158), i.e., the 1999 
juvenile adjudication.  This question was tried to the court on the basis of 
documentary evidence, and the court found the strike allegation true.  The court 
file in the 1999 juvenile matter indicates, among other things, that defendant there 
admitted to a violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1).4 
Defendant objected that because he had no right to a jury in the juvenile 
proceeding, use of his juvenile adjudication as a strike in the current case was a 
violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.5  The court rejected this argument and 
sentenced defendant to the lower term of 16 months for the firearm possession 
conviction (Pen. Code, § 18), doubled to 32 months because of the prior strike 
(id., §§ 667, subd. (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)).6 
                                              
4  
As the Court of Appeal explained, the documents submitted to the court 
were not made part of the appellate record, and were subsequently lost.  Acting on 
its own motion, the Court of Appeal thus took judicial notice of the juvenile court 
file. 
 
5  
Defendant does not claim that his juvenile adjudication fails to qualify, 
under the terms of the Three Strikes Law, as a ―prior felony conviction‖ for 
purposes of sentence enhancement.  Nor, as the dissent points out, does he raise 
any constitutional objection other than the jury trial issue we address here. 
 
6  
Apprendi‘s jury-trial requirement applies only to sentencing facts that 
increase the maximum penalty for an offense; a sentencing court retains, under 
Apprendi, its discretion to impose a sentence within the range permitted solely by 
the underlying conviction, on the basis of facts not found by a jury.  (E.g., 
Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, 481; see Harris v. United States (2002) 536 U.S. 
545, 556-569 [sentencing judge alone may find facts increasing mandatory 
minimum sentence].)  The Three Strikes Law provides that any determinate 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
7 
Defendant appealed, raising only the Sixth Amendment sentencing issue.  
In its first opinion, the Court of Appeal held that, because of the lack of a jury-trial 
right in juvenile cases, the Sixth Amendment forbids use of a contested juvenile 
adjudication as a prior conviction to enhance the sentence for a subsequent adult 
offense.  However, the court originally held that because defendant had admitted, 
in the juvenile case, that he committed the criminal conduct there at issue, his 
current sentence was not affected by the earlier deprivation of a right to jury trial, 
and he therefore was not entitled to relief. 
The Court of Appeal granted rehearing to reconsider this latter holding.  On 
rehearing, the court reversed the trial court.  This time, the majority held that, 
because minors tried for criminal offenses as juveniles are denied the right to jury 
trials, the use of any juvenile adjudications as prior convictions to enhance 
subsequent adult sentences is prohibited by the Sixth Amendment. 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
sentence for a current felony offense shall be doubled upon pleading and proof of 
one prior ―strike.‖  (§§ 667, subd. (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).)  Ex-felon firearm 
possession is punishable, under the determinate sentencing law (DSL), by a term 
of 16 months, or two or three years.  (§ 18.)  Here, the sentencing court imposed 
the lower DSL term of 16 months, doubled to 32 months under the Three Strikes 
Law in light of the juvenile prior.  That sentence did not exceed the three-year 
upper term for ex-felon firearm possession, but it did exceed the two-year middle 
term for this offense.  Under the California scheme in effect at the time defendant 
was sentenced, the federal Constitution did not permit the sentencing judge alone 
to impose any sentence above the middle DSL term, except where an upper-term 
sentence was authorized by virtue of ―the fact of a prior conviction.‖  (See 
Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. 270, 288-293; People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 
799, 805, 809-810 (Black).)  The court‘s use of the prior juvenile adjudication as a 
―strike‖ increased defendant‘s actual punishment above that middle-term 
maximum.  Under such circumstances, we assume the Apprendi issue is properly 
raised in this case.  The People do not contend otherwise. 
 
8 
We granted review. 
DISCUSSION7 
Defendant argues, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that because he had no 
right to a jury trial in the prior juvenile proceeding, the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments, as construed in Apprendi, bar use of the resulting 
criminal adjudication to enhance his maximum sentence in this adult proceeding.  
For several reasons, we reject the contention. 
As indicated above, the high court determined in Apprendi that ―[o]ther 
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.‖  (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, 490.)  Thus, under 
Apprendi, any ―fact‖ that allows enhancement of an adult defendant‘s maximum 
sentence for the current offense must, unless the defendant waives his jury-trial 
right, be determined by a jury in the current case. 
Defendant‘s claim, of course, does not come within this express holding.  
The statutorily relevant sentencing ―fact‖ in this case is whether defendant‘s 
record includes a prior adjudication of criminal conduct that qualifies, under the 
Three Strikes Law, as a basis for enhancing his current sentence.  Aside from any 
exception that might apply here, the literal rule of Apprendi thus required only that 
                                              
7  
Amicus curiae briefs have been filed in support of defendant by 
(1) Criminal Defense Clinic, Mills Legal Clinic of Stanford Law School, 
(2) California Public Defenders Association, and (3) Pacific Juvenile Defender 
Center, Juvenile Law Center, Juvenile Division of the Los Angeles Public 
Defender, Alternate Public Defender, National Center for Youth Law and Youth 
Law Center (Pacific Juvenile Defender Center et al.).  The Los Angeles County 
District Attorney has filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the People. 
 
9 
a jury in the current proceeding determine the existence of such an alleged prior 
adjudication. 
California statutory law afforded defendant precisely this right.  Whenever, 
for purposes of enhancing the sentence on current charges, the prosecution alleges 
a prior conviction sustained by the defendant, and the defendant disputes the 
allegation, the question whether he or she ―has suffered‖ the prior conviction 
must, unless a jury is waived, be submitted to a jury in the current proceeding.  
(§§ 1025, subds. (a), (b), 1158.)  This jury-trial requirement would extend, of 
course, to a prior juvenile adjudication included within the Three Strikes Law‘s 
definition of a ―prior felony conviction.‖  As we have explained, defendant 
expressly waived his right to a jury trial in the current proceeding on the issue 
whether he had suffered the alleged prior, and he agreed to submit that issue to the 
court.8 
Nonetheless, defendant contends, as below, that under the principles of 
Apprendi, and regardless of his jury-trial rights in the current case, the lack of a 
                                              
8  
Defendant suggests in passing that, even if Apprendi guarantees only the 
right to a jury trial in the present case concerning the ―fact‖ of his prior 
adjudication, California‘s jury-trial statutes do not satisfy this requirement, 
because they sharply limit the issues to be decided by the jury trying a prior-
conviction allegation.  (§ 1025, subd. (c) [issue whether defendant is the person 
who suffered the prior conviction must be tried to the court]; see People v. Kelii 
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 452, 455-459 [issue whether prior conviction qualifies as 
―serious felony‖ for purposes of Three Strikes Law must be determined by court]; 
People v. Wiley (1995) 9 Cal.4th 580, 583, 592 [court, not jury, decides whether 
prior convictions were upon charges ―brought and tried separately‖].)  However, 
defendant did not raise that issue below.  As noted above, he waived his statutory 
jury-trial right as to the existence of the prior, and he focused exclusively on 
whether Apprendi permits any use of nonjury juvenile adjudications to enhance 
adult sentences.  We therefore need not address his statutory argument here. 
 
10 
jury-trial right in the prior juvenile proceeding precludes all use of the resulting 
adjudication to enhance the maximum sentence for his current offense.  To support 
his view that Apprendi contemplates such a bar by implication, defendant cites 
language the high court has used to justify the single exception it consistently 
recognizes to the rule that a jury must find sentencing facts which increase the 
maximum punishment — the exception for ―the fact of a prior conviction‖ (italics 
added).  (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, 490; see also, e.g., Blakely, supra, 
542 U.S. 296, 301; United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220, 231; 
Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. 270, 275; Ice, supra, 555 U.S. ___, ___ [129 S.Ct. 
711, 714].)  For reasons we now explain, we are not persuaded. 
The ―prior conviction‖ exception arises primarily from a pre-Apprendi case, 
Almendarez-Torres.  There, an indictment charged the defendant with the offense 
of illegal reentry by a deported alien.  The pertinent statute increased the 
maximum punishment if the prior deportation arose from the alien‘s conviction of 
one or more aggravated felonies.  The indictment did not allege this latter 
circumstance.  However, at his plea hearing, the defendant admitted it, and the 
court imposed sentence accordingly.  On appeal, the defendant urged, among other 
things, that the Constitution required treatment of his prior convictions as an 
element of the current criminal offense, which must be charged in the indictment 
and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  The court disagreed, refusing to 
adopt a blanket rule that recidivism — a ―highly traditional‖ basis upon which 
courts had imposed increased sentences — must be treated as an element.  
(Almendarez-Torres, supra, 523 U.S. 224, 243-247.) 
In Jones, which also preceded Apprendi, the court addressed a federal 
statute that punished carjacking in interstate commerce with a maximum sentence 
of 15 years.  However, maximum sentences of 25 years and life imprisonment, 
respectively, applied if the carjacking resulted in serious bodily injury or death.  
11 
The government claimed the statute described only a single offense, subject to 
mere ―sentencing enhancements‖ that need not be separately charged and could be 
imposed solely by a judge.  The defendant insisted the law established three 
separate offenses, each with its own requirement of charging notice and jury trial.  
The court chose the latter construction, primarily to avoid the constitutional 
problem, soon thereafter confirmed in Apprendi, of allowing an increased 
sentence, beyond the maximum provided for the charged offense, on the basis of 
additional facts not separately alleged or found by a jury. 
During an extensive discussion of the Sixth Amendment concerns thus 
presented, the Jones court conceded Almendarez-Torres had recently held that 
sentence-enhancing prior convictions do not require charging notice and proof 
beyond reasonable doubt to a jury.  (Jones, supra, 526 U.S. 227, 248.)  This 
holding, Jones explained, had depended ―in substantial part on the tradition of 
regarding recidivism as a sentencing factor, not as an element to be set out in the 
indictment.  The Court‘s repeated emphasis on the distinctive significance of 
recidivism leaves no question that the Court [in Almendarez-Torres] regarded that 
fact as potentially distinguishable for constitutional purposes from other facts that 
might extend the range of possible sentencing.  [Citations.]‖  (Jones, supra, at 
p. 249.) 
In language upon which defendant relies here, the Jones court continued:  
―One basis for that possible constitutional distinctiveness is not hard to see: unlike 
virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty for an 
offense, and certainly unlike the factor before us in this case, a prior conviction 
must itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, 
reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.‖  (Jones, supra, 526 U.S. 227, at 
p. 249, italics added.) 
12 
Soon after Almendarez-Torres and Jones, the court squarely held in 
Apprendi that except for the fact of a prior conviction, the Constitution requires 
any fact which authorizes a penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum for 
the charged offense to be separately alleged in the charging document and proved 
to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  Apprendi addressed a New Jersey statute that 
specified the maximum sentence for the offense of possession of a firearm for an 
unlawful purpose, but provided additional punishment if the trial court found, by a 
preponderance of evidence, that the unlawful purpose was to intimidate on the 
basis of group bias. 
The Apprendi court rejected New Jersey‘s attempt to defend the statute by 
invoking Almendarez-Torres.  For multiple reasons, the court explained, the rule 
of Almendarez-Torres was confined to recidivism as a sentencing fact.  As in 
Jones, the court noted Almendarez-Torres‘s emphasis on recidivism as a highly 
― ‗traditional‘ ‖ basis for imposition of increased punishment by sentencing courts.  
(Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, 488.)  As defendant emphasizes, however, the 
court also noted, as it had in Jones, that the evidence of Almendarez-Torres‘s 
recidivism consisted of prior adjudications of criminal conduct obtained in 
proceedings which themselves afforded substantial constitutional protections. 
Thus, the Apprendi court observed that ―[b]ecause Almendarez-Torres had 
admitted the three earlier convictions for aggravated felonies — all of which had 
been entered pursuant to proceedings with substantial procedural safeguards of 
their own — no question concerning the right to a jury trial or the standard of 
proof that would apply to a contested issue of fact was before the Court.‖  
(Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, 488.)  In other words, the court concluded, 
―[b]oth the certainty that procedural safeguards attached to any ‗fact‘ of prior 
conviction, and the reality that Almendarez-Torres did not challenge the accuracy 
of that ‗fact‘ in his case, mitigated the due process and Sixth Amendment concerns 
13 
otherwise implicated in allowing a judge to determine a ‗fact‘ increasing 
punishment beyond the maximum of the statutory range.‖  (Ibid.) 
Finally, the Apprendi court distinguished Almendarez-Torres from the 
situation presented in Apprendi itself.  The court observed:  ―The reasons 
supporting an exception from the general rule for the statute construed in 
[Almendarez-Torres] do not apply to the New Jersey [hate crime] statute [at issue 
in Apprendi].  Whereas recidivism ‗does not relate to the commission of the 
offense‘ itself, [citation], New Jersey‘s biased purpose inquiry goes precisely to 
what happened in the ‗commission of the offense.‘  Moreover, there is a vast 
difference between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of conviction 
entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the 
right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
allowing the judge to find the required fact under a lesser standard of proof.‖  
(Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, 496, italics added.)9 
                                              
9  
Both we and the United States Supreme Court have confirmed that the 
―prior conviction‖ exception extends beyond the bare ―fact‖ that such a conviction 
occurred, and permits the sentencing court, without a jury, to determine related 
issues about a prior conviction‘s relevance to the recidivist sentencing scheme, 
when those issues primarily involve either legal questions of a kind typically 
decided by judges, or factual matters that may be conclusively determined by 
examination of the official court record in the prior case.  (See, e.g., Shepard v. 
United States (2005) 544 U.S. 13, 16, 26 [sentencing court may examine statutory 
definition of prior charge, as well as official court records in prior case that 
conclusively establish elements therein adjudicated, to determine if nature of prior 
conviction qualifies it as basis for increasing current sentence]; People v. McGee 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 682, 708-709 [under Apprendi, sentencing court, not jury, 
determines from court records in prior case whether it qualifies for use under 
recidivist sentencing scheme]; Black, supra, 41 Cal.4th 799, 818-820 [court, not 
jury, decides from court records whether prior convictions are numerous and of 
increasing seriousness]; People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63, 72-83 (Towne) 
[court, not jury, may determine from records of prior convictions whether 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
14 
From these remarks, defendant, the Court of Appeal, and the dissent have 
drawn the inference that, under Apprendi, the defendant‘s ―recidivism‖ may 
enhance the current sentence only insofar as this ―recidivism‖ — i.e., the 
defendant‘s prior criminal behavior — either is found true by a jury in the current 
proceeding, or was already found true in a prior proceeding wherein he or she had 
protections that included the right to a jury trial.  In other words, they conclude, 
Apprendi means the jury-trial right — along with the right to charging notice and 
the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt — must attach at some point to the 
determination of any fact about an adult offense, or offender, that increases the 
maximum punishment for the offense beyond the prescribed statutory range. 
However, we do not read Apprendi so broadly.  For reasons we set forth 
below, we agree with the majority view that the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments, as construed in Apprendi, do not preclude the sentence-enhancing 
use, against an adult felon, of a prior valid, fair, and reliable adjudication that the 
defendant, while a minor, previously engaged in felony misconduct, where the 
juvenile proceeding included all the constitutional protections applicable to such 
matters, even though these protections do not include the right to jury trial. 
The United States Supreme Court has confirmed that minors accused under 
the juvenile law of criminal conduct for which they may be confined in a 
correctional institution are constitutionally entitled to virtually all the procedural 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
defendant served prior prison terms, committed the current offense while on 
parole, or has performed poorly on parole or probation].)  It is also now clear that 
Apprendi does not require a jury determination of facts bearing on whether to 
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for separate offenses.  (Ice, supra, 
555 U.S. ___, ___-___ [129 S.Ct. 711, 716-719]; Black, supra, at pp. 820-823.) 
 
15 
rights and protections they would enjoy as adult criminal defendants.  (See In re 
Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1 (Gault) [fair notice of charges; counsel, appointed if 
necessary; confrontation and cross-examination; testimony by sworn witnesses; 
privilege against self-incrimination]; In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358 (Winship) 
[proof beyond a reasonable doubt]; Breed v. Jones (1975) 421 U.S. 519 [double 
jeopardy].)  However, the court has concluded that the Constitution does not 
afford the right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings.  (McKeiver, supra, 403 U.S. 
528.) 
The various McKeiver opinions offered multiple reasons for declining to 
recognize such a right.  At least five justices cited, as a paramount concern, a 
reluctance to deem juvenile adjudications ―criminal proceedings‖ within the Sixth 
Amendment‘s ambit, given the juvenile system‘s greater emphasis on informality, 
rehabilitation, and parens patriae protection of the minor, as opposed to the more 
formal, adversary, and punitive nature of the adult criminal system.  (McKeiver, 
supra, 403 U.S. 528, 545-546, 547, 550 (plur. opn. of Blackmun, J.); id., at 
pp. 551-552 (conc. opn. of White, J.).)  As Justice White further noted, such 
differences ameliorate the need, in the juvenile system, for the jury‘s role as a 
community buffer against government oppression, judicial bias, and politicized 
justice.  (Id., at p. 552 (conc. opn. of White, J.).) 
On the other hand, five concurring justices in McKeiver also were strongly 
influenced by their determination that a jury is not essential to fair and reliable 
factfinding in a juvenile case.  Thus, Justice Blackmun deemed it incorrect to say 
that ―the jury is a necessary component of accurate factfinding‖ (McKeiver, supra, 
403 U.S. 528, 543 (plur. opn. of Blackmun, J.)), and further opined that ―[t]he 
imposition of the jury trial on the juvenile court system would not strengthen 
greatly, if at all, the factfinding function‖ (id., at p. 547).  Justice White agreed, 
noting that ―[a]though the function of the jury is to find facts, that body is not 
16 
necessarily or even probably better at the job than the conscientious judge.‖  (Id., 
at p. 551 (conc. opn. of White, J.).) 
These factors have persuaded the overwhelming majority of courts to reject 
the contention defendant makes in this case.  Except for the decision here under 
review, all California Court of Appeal panels to address the issue, both before and 
after Apprendi, have squarely held that the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments permit the use of prior juvenile adjudications to enhance the 
sentences for subsequent adult offenses, even though there is no right to a jury trial 
in juvenile proceedings.  The United States Supreme Court has denied all petitions 
for certiorari arising from these cases.  (People v. Del Rio (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 
439, 441; People v. Buchanan (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 139, 149, cert. denied sub 
nom. Buchanan v. California (2007) U.S. ___ [127 S.Ct. 2920]; People v. 
Superior Court (Andrades) (2004) 113 Cal.App.4th 817, 830-834, cert. denied sub 
nom. Andrades v. California (2004) 543 U.S. 884; People v. Lee (2003) 
111 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1316, cert. denied sub nom. Lee v. California (2004) 
542 U.S. 906; People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1079; People v. 
Bowden (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 387, 393-395; People v. Fowler (1999) 
72 Cal.App.4th 581, 586; see People v. Palmer (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 724, 729-
734 [Apprendi allows use of prior Nevada misdemeanor conviction to enhance 
sentence, even though there was no right to jury trial in Nevada proceeding].) 
The overwhelming majority of federal decisions and cases from other states 
have reached the same conclusion in the wake of Apprendi, holding that nonjury 
juvenile adjudications may be used to enhance later adult sentences.  Again, the 
17 
United States Supreme Court has declined numerous opportunities to decide 
otherwise.10 
The majority decisions reason, in essence, as follows:  Prior juvenile 
adjudications substantially satisfy all the reasons set forth in Almendarez-Torres, 
Jones, and Apprendi why prior convictions may be employed to increase the 
maximum punishment for a subsequent adult offense without the need for jury 
findings in the later case.  Like prior adult criminal convictions, such prior 
juvenile judgments do not involve facts about the current offense that were 
withheld from a jury in the current case, but instead concern the defendant‘s 
recidivism — i.e., his or her status as a repeat offender — a basis on which courts, 
acting without juries, traditionally have imposed harsher sentences.  Moreover, the 
                                              
10  
(E.g., U. S. v. Matthews (1st Cir. 2007) 498 F.3d. 25, 34-36, cert. denied 
sub nom. Matthews v. United States (2008) ___ U.S. ___ [128 S.Ct. 1463]; U.S. v. 
Crowell (6th Cir. 2007) 493 F.3d 744, 749-751, cert. denied sub nom. Crowell v. 
United States (2008) ___ U.S. ___ [128 S.Ct. 880]; U.S. v. Burge (11th Cir. 2005) 
407 F.3d 1183, 1187-1191, cert. denied sub nom. Burge v. United States (2005) 
546 U.S. 981; U.S. v. Jones (3d Cir. 2003) 332 F.3d 688, 694-696, cert. denied sub 
nom. Jones v. United States (2004) 540 U.S. 1150; U.S. v. Smalley (8th Cir. 2002) 
294 F.3d 1030, 1031-1033, cert. denied sub nom. Smalley v. United States (2003) 
537 U.S. 1114; People v. Mazzoni (Colo.Ct.App. 2007) 165 P.3d 719, 722-723; 
State v. McFee (Minn. 2006) 721 N.W.2d 607, 615-619; State v. Weber 
(Wn. 2006) 149 P.3d 646, 649-653, cert. denied sub nom. Weber v. Washington 
(2007) 551 U.S. 1137; Nichols v. State (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2005) 910 So.2d 863, 
864-865; Ryle v. State (Ind. 2005) 842 N.E.2d 320, 321-323, cert. denied sub nom. 
Ryle v. Indiana (2006) 549 U.S. 836; State v. Hitt (Kan. 2002) 42 P.3d 732, 740, 
cert. denied sub nom. Hitt v. Kansas (2003) 537 U.S. 1104; see State v. Harris 
(Or. 2005) 118 P.3d 236, 238-246 [holding that lack of jury trial in juvenile 
proceedings does not prevent all use of prior juvenile adjudications to enhance 
later adult sentences, but does mean defendant is entitled to jury trial in the adult 
case as to the fact of the prior adjudication]; but see U.S. v. Tighe (9th Cir. 2001) 
266 F.3d 1187, 1191-1195; State v. Brown (La. 2004) 879 So.2d 1276, 1281-
1290, cert. denied sub nom. Louisiana v. Brown (2005) 543 U.S. 1177.) 
 
18 
prior criminal misconduct establishing this recidivism was previously and reliably 
adjudicated in proceedings that included all the procedural protections the 
Constitution requires for such proceedings — indeed, every substantial safeguard 
required in an adult criminal trial except the right to a jury.  Use of such reliably 
obtained juvenile judgments of prior criminality to enhance later adult sentences 
does not offend an adult defendant‘s constitutional right to a jury trial in an adult 
criminal proceeding.  Conversely, it makes little sense to conclude, under 
Apprendi, that a judgment of juvenile criminality which the Constitution deemed 
fair and reliable enough, when rendered, to justify confinement of the minor in a 
correctional institution is nonetheless constitutionally inadequate for later use to 
establish the same individual‘s recidivism as the basis for an enhanced adult 
sentence.  Such a determination would preclude a rational and probative basis for 
increasing an adult offender‘s sentence — that he or she was not deterred from 
criminal behavior by a youthful brush with the law — unless juveniles were 
afforded a right to jury trial, which the Constitution does not require. 
However, the minority view, urged by defendant and accepted by the Court 
of Appeal, is that the right to a jury trial in proceedings leading to the prior 
adjudication is essential to permitting its use for later enhancement of an adult 
sentence.  As the Court of Appeal suggested, ―the jury trial right is an 
indispensable part of ‗ ―a fundamental triumvirate of procedural protections 
intended to guarantee the reliability of criminal convictions,‖ ‘ ‖ and, under 
Apprendi, ― ‗ ―one of the requisite procedural safeguards‖ necessary for a prior 
conviction to be exempt from its rule.‘ ‖ 
We agree with the majority view, and disagree with defendant and the 
instant Court of Appeal.  For the reasons repeatedly stated by the majority 
decisions cited above, we conclude that the Apprendi rule does not preclude use of 
nonjury juvenile adjudications to enhance later adult sentences. 
19 
The United States Supreme Court has left no doubt of the importance of the 
jury trial guarantee, among other due process and fair trial protections, in the 
formal, fully adversary, and fully penal context in which one is convicted of, and 
sentenced for, a crime committed as an adult.  Under Apprendi and its progeny, 
every previously unadjudicated fact about an adult offense or offender that 
authorizes an increase in the maximum sentence for the adult crime must be 
specifically alleged or charged, presented to a jury, and proved beyond reasonable 
doubt except to the extent the defendant waives those rights.  Moreover, in 
concluding that prior convictions are available to enhance later sentences without 
new jury involvement, the court has stressed that the defendant enjoyed, among 
others, the right to a jury trial in those prior adult proceedings. 
But the court has struck a delicate balance as to the constitutional treatment 
of juveniles alleged to have violated the criminal law.  Such a juvenile, like an 
adult accused, faces both the stigma of adjudged criminality and the significant 
loss of liberty by confinement in a correctional institution if the allegations prove 
true.  Thus, ―[t]he same considerations that demand extreme caution in factfinding 
to protect the innocent adult apply as well to the innocent child.‖  (Winship, supra, 
397 U.S. 358, 365.)  Accordingly, the highest standard of factual certainty, proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, attaches equally to adult and juvenile proceedings.  
(Id., at p. 368.)  Similar considerations have led the court to insist that most other 
procedural protections available to accused adults — including the rights to 
counsel (appointed if necessary), notice of charges, confrontation and cross-
examination, and protection against compelled self-incrimination and double 
jeopardy — be equally available to juveniles subject to adjudication of criminal 
conduct.  (Gault, supra, 387 U.S. 1, 31-57; Breed v. Jones, supra, 421 U.S. 519, 
528-531.) 
20 
The court‘s decision in McKeiver not to find a constitutional jury trial right 
in juvenile proceedings reflected its concern that the introduction of juries in that 
context would interfere too greatly with the effort to deal with youthful offenders 
by procedures less formal and adversarial, and more protective and rehabilitative 
—at least to a degree — than those applicable to adult defendants.  (McKeiver, 
supra, 403 U.S. 528, 545-551 (plur. opn. of Blackmun, J.); id. at pp.551-553 
(conc. opn. of White, J.).)  But the McKeiver majority made clear that the absence 
of a right to trial by jury did not appreciably undermine the accuracy of the 
factfinding function in juvenile cases.  (McKeiver, supra, at p. 543 (plur. opn. of 
Blackmun, J.); id. at p. 551 (conc. opn. of White, J.).) 
If the parens patriae features of the juvenile justice system have succeeded 
in rehabilitating a youthful offender, all well and good.  But if the person was not 
deterred, and thus reoffends as an adult, this recidivism is a highly rational basis 
for enhancing the sentence for the adult offense.  So long as an accused adult is 
accorded his or her right to a jury trial in the adult proceeding as to all facts that 
influence the maximum permissible sentence, no reason appears why a 
constitutionally reliable prior adjudication of criminality, obtained pursuant to all 
procedural guarantees constitutionally due to the offender in the prior proceeding 
— specifically including the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt — should 
not also be among the facts available for that sentencing purpose. 
We do not read the passages from Almendarez-Torres, supra, 523 U.S. 224, 
Jones, supra, 526 U.S. 227, and Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, upon which 
defendant and the Court of Appeal have relied, as prohibiting the use of 
previously adjudicated criminal misconduct to authorize an increased sentence in a 
later criminal case unless the prior proceeding — whether juvenile or adult — 
specifically included the right to a jury trial.  Defendant‘s contrary argument is 
unconvincing in several respects. 
21 
We first note the obvious:  Neither Jones nor Apprendi was directly 
concerned with deciding the circumstances under which prior adjudications of 
criminal conduct may be used to enhance the maximum sentence for a subsequent 
adult offense.  Hence, the court‘s comments on that subject were dictum. 
Moreover, nothing in Jones or Apprendi, or in Almendarez-Torres itself, 
stated or implied that a prior criminal adjudication forming the basis of a 
―recidivism‖ sentencing factor in an adult criminal proceeding must always have 
been obtained in a proceeding that included, in particular, the right to jury trial.  
Those cases cited a group of procedural rights and safeguards that make prior 
adult convictions fair and reliable evidence of previous criminal misconduct, but 
they did not state that each and every one of these guarantees, or any one of them 
in particular, is essential to the availability of a prior criminal adjudication to 
furnish such proof. 
Finally, as indicated above, Apprendi and its progeny concern an adult’s 
right to jury findings, in the adult case, of all previously unadjudicated facts that 
bear upon the maximum sentence for the adult offense.  On the other hand, these 
decisions have suggested that recidivism already adjudicated in fair and reliable 
prior proceedings may be used to enhance later sentences without new jury 
involvement, and the high court has not disturbed McKeiver‘s determination that 
juvenile adjudications of criminality are constitutionally fair and reliable even 
though the Constitution does not require jury trials in juvenile proceedings. 
Under these circumstances, we decline to hold that a prior juvenile 
adjudication, highly probative on the issue of recidivism, is unavailable to enhance 
the punishment for the individual‘s subsequent adult offenses, for the sole reason 
that there was no right to a jury trial in the juvenile case. 
Defendant and his amici curiae, like the Court of Appeal majority, stress 
the philosophical difference between juvenile and adult criminal proceedings.  
22 
This line of reasoning proposes that proceedings under the juvenile law may 
dispense with jury trials only because, as parens patriae attempts by the state to 
protect, rehabilitate, and reform wayward minors, they are not fully ―criminal‖ in 
nature, and they lack the truly penal objectives and consequences of the system 
that governs adult violations of law.  Hence, the argument runs, even if a juvenile 
adjudication is reliable and procedurally fair enough for juvenile purposes, it is not 
sufficiently fair and reliable, without the right to a jury trial, for use to affect a 
later adult criminal sentence. 
Again, we disagree, for the reasons indicated above.  Sentence 
enhancement based on recidivism flows from the premise that the defendant‘s 
current criminal conduct is more serious because he or she previously was found 
to have committed criminal conduct and did not thereafter reform.  A prior 
juvenile adjudication, like a prior adult conviction, is a rational basis for increased 
punishment on the basis of recidivism.  Indeed, a juvenile prior demonstrates that 
the defendant did not respond to the state‘s attempt at early intervention to prevent 
a descent into further criminality.  The high court has never held that the 
Constitution places a direct restriction on the use of prior juvenile adjudications 
for this purpose. 
Accordingly, we are persuaded that Apprendi does not bar the use of a 
constitutionally valid, fair, and reliable prior adjudication of criminal conduct to 
enhance a subsequent adult sentence simply because the prior proceeding did not 
include the right to a jury trial.  For the reasons discussed at length above, we 
agree with the court in McKeiver, at least for this purpose, that the absence of jury 
23 
trials from juvenile proceedings does not significantly undermine the fairness or 
accuracy of juvenile factfinding.11 
Under these circumstances, the philosophical and legal distinctions between 
the juvenile and adult criminal justice systems — differences that informed 
McKeiver‘s determination not to impose a jury-trial entitlement in juvenile cases 
— fail to convince us that adjudications of criminal conduct obtained in juvenile 
                                              
11  
Taking issue with McKeiver‘s premise that the absence of a jury does not 
materially undermine factfinding accuracy, the Court of Appeal cited Ballew v. 
Georgia (1978) 435 U.S. 223, a post-McKeiver case, which held that conviction of 
a nonpetty offense by a state jury of fewer than six persons violates the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  (Compare Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78 
[holding that jury of as few as six persons in state criminal trial for nonpetty 
offense does not violate the Constitution].)  As the Court of Appeal noted, the high 
court in Ballew cited statistical studies suggesting the diminished effectiveness of 
―group deliberation,‖ and thus diminished factfinding accuracy, as the number of 
jurors decreased.  (Ballew, supra, at pp. 232-239.)  But Ballew was concerned 
with the undoubted right to a jury trial as to the facts of a charged adult offense, 
and it focused on whether the accuracy of factfinding rose or fell depending on the 
number of lay jurors on the panel.  Though the court‘s opinion in Ballew briefly 
described one study indicating a significant degree of judge-jury disagreement in 
civil cases (id., at p. 238), it did not suggest that, in a juvenile proceeding where a 
jury is not required, judicial factfinding is insufficiently reliable. 
 
Defendant also notes that in Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, which 
applied Apprendi to sentencing facts supporting eligibility for the death penalty, 
the court rejected Arizona‘s argument that judicial findings on this subject were 
sufficiently reliable to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.  The court explained that 
―[t]he Sixth Amendment jury trial right . . . does not turn on the relative 
rationality, fairness, or efficiency of potential factfinders.‖  (Ring, at p. 607.)  
Again, however, Ring was dealing with an adult’s right to a jury trial on all 
previously unadjudicated facts bearing on the maximum punishment for the adult 
offense (in Ring‘s case, that he was a major participant in an armored car robbery, 
and that he personally shot and killed the vehicle‘s driver).  Ring was not 
concerned with facts about recidivism, already reliably determined in a juvenile 
proceeding in which the Constitution did not require a jury trial. 
 
24 
proceedings without the right to jury trial are unavailable, under Apprendi, to 
increase the maximum punishment for later adult offenses.12 
Nor does the use of nonjury juvenile adjudications to enhance later adult 
sentences compromise the core purpose of the constitutional right to a jury trial — 
to provide a criminal defendant, by application of the lay common sense of the 
community, ―with . . . an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous 
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.‖  (Duncan v. 
Louisiana (1968) 391 U.S. 145, 156.)  Implicit in the high court‘s juvenile justice 
decisions is the premise that this particular safeguard is not constitutionally 
essential to a fair and reliable adjudication in a juvenile case.  Once that 
adjudication is made, one facing a subsequent adult sentence gains, in the adult 
proceeding, no meaningful jury-trial protection against government oppression or 
judicial bias — no ―bulwark at trial between the State and the accused‖ (Ice, 
supra, 555 U.S. ___, ___ [129 S.Ct. 711, 718]) — by virtue of a rule barring use 
of the earlier finding to enhance the sentence for the current adult offense. 
Finally, we deem highly pertinent a decision of the high court in which, 
overruling prior authority, the court concluded, under analogous circumstances, 
that a constitutionally valid prior criminal adjudication may be used to enhance the 
maximum penalty for a subsequent felony offense, even though the prior 
proceeding did not include all the safeguards required for felony trials. 
                                              
12  
Amici curiae Pacific Juvenile Law Center et al. argue that to allow the use 
of juvenile adjudications to enhance later adult sentences ―is inconsistent with the 
purpose of juvenile court and disregards California‘s carefully drawn boundaries 
between juvenile and adult court jurisdiction.‖  This argument, essentially based 
on nonconstitutional state law, overlooks the express provision in California‘s 
Three Strikes Law that certain serious prior juvenile adjudications shall be deemed 
―prior convictions‖ available for adult sentence enhancement.  (Pen. Code, §§ 667, 
subd. (d)(3), 1170.12, subd. (b)(3).) 
25 
Thus, in Scott v. Illinois (1979) 440 U.S. 367, the court had ruled that one 
charged with a misdemeanor has no constitutional right to counsel when no period 
of incarceration is imposed.  The next year, in Baldasar v. Illinois (1980) 446 U.S. 
222 (Baldasar), a divided court determined that such an uncounseled 
misdemeanor conviction, though itself constitutional under Scott, could not 
constitutionally be used to convert a second misdemeanor into a felony for 
purposes of an Illinois recidivism statute. 
In Nichols, the court overruled Baldasar, holding that a prior 
constitutionally valid uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could be employed in 
a subsequent federal felony proceeding to increase the defendant‘s criminal 
history score, and thus his maximum punishment, for the felony offense.  Among 
other things, the court noted, as relevant here, that recidivism is a traditional basis 
for sentence enhancement, that this factor goes only to punishment and does not 
involve the circumstances of the current offense, and that the criminal conduct 
evidenced by the prior conviction was subject to the standard of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  (Nichols, supra, 511 U.S. 738, 747-748.)  In our view, the 
court‘s holding in Nichols strongly supports our similar result here.13 
                                              
13  
We further observe that we see no fatal gap between our holding here and 
certain portions of our analysis in Towne, supra, 44 Cal.4th 63.  There we 
suggested that, under Apprendi, the sentencing court alone may find, as the basis 
for an increased maximum sentence, that the defendant performed poorly during a 
previous term of parole or probation arising from an earlier conviction, if the 
evidence of such poor performance is the defendant‘s conviction of one or more 
new crimes committed during the parole or probationary period.  On the other 
hand, we said, a nonjury ―poor performance‖ finding could not be based ―upon . . . 
evidence of misconduct that was not previously adjudicated in a criminal trial.‖  
(Towne, supra, at p. 82.)  In particular, we admonished, even evidence that a prior 
probation or parole had been revoked on the basis of new criminal conduct could 
not support a ―poor performance‖ finding by the current sentencing court acting 
without a jury, because revocation proceedings ―do not entail the same procedural 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
26 
In its most recent examination of the Apprendi rule, the high court majority 
has explained that ―[t]he rule‘s animating principle is the preservation of the jury‘s 
historic role as a bulwark between the State and the accused at the trial for an 
alleged offense.  [Citation.]  Guided by that principle, our opinions make clear that 
the Sixth Amendment does not countenance legislative encroachment on the jury‘s 
traditional domain.  [Citation.]  We accordingly [have] considered whether the 
finding of a particular fact was understood as within ‗the domain of the jury . . . by 
those who framed the Bill of Rights.‘  [Citation.]  In undertaking this inquiry, we 
remain cognizant that administration of a discrete criminal justice system is among 
the basic sovereign prerogatives States retain.  [Citation.]‖  (Ice, supra, 555 U.S. 
___, ___ [129 S.Ct. 711, 717].)  In deciding whether Apprendi should be extended 
to situations not previously considered, we must bear in mind ―[t]hese twin 
considerations — historical practice and respect for state sovereignty.‖  (Ibid.) 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
safeguards as a criminal trial.‖  (Id., at p. 83.)  We noted that although parolees 
and probationers faced with revocation proceedings are entitled to notice and an 
opportunity to appear, be heard, and present evidence, ―[t]he right to a jury trial 
and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt . . . do not apply in 
revocation proceedings.‖  (Ibid.)  Of course, like Almendarez-Torres, Jones, and 
Apprendi, Towne was not specifically concerned with the use of prior juvenile 
adjudications as evidence of recidivism to increase the maximum punishment for 
a later crime.  Moreover, as in Almendarez-Torres, Jones, and Apprendi, nothing 
in Towne declares that unless the prior adjudication specifically included the right 
to a jury trial, its use to demonstrate recidivism that may increase the maximum 
punishment for a later offense is forbidden.  The probation and parole revocation 
proceedings discussed in Towne lack both the right to a jury trial and the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Juvenile adjudications, on the 
other hand, include the latter requirement, thus substantially bolstering their 
fairness and reliability as evidence of recidivism.  Our reasoning in Towne thus 
does not preclude us from deciding here that the Constitution permits the use of 
prior juvenile adjudications for that purpose. 
27 
As indicated above, the high court‘s decisions establish that neither juvenile 
adjudications nor previously adjudicated recidivism as a sentencing factor is, as a 
matter of ―historical practice,‖ within the ―traditional domain‖ of juries.  On the 
other hand, California, in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative, has made the 
rational determination, expressed in its Three Strikes Law, that certain serious 
prior juvenile adjudications should serve as ―prior felony convictions‖ for the 
purpose of enhancing the sentences for subsequent adult felony offenses.14  The 
―twin considerations‖ identified in Ice thus clearly weigh in favor of a conclusion 
that the Apprendi rule should not be construed to bar such use. 
We therefore hold, contrary to the Court of Appeal, that the absence of a 
constitutional or statutory right to jury trial under the juvenile law does not, under 
Apprendi, preclude the use of a prior juvenile adjudication of criminal misconduct 
to enhance the maximum sentence for a subsequent adult felony offense by the 
same person. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J.
                                              
14  
Indeed, the Three Strikes provisions embodied in section 1170.12, 
including its provision for use of prior juvenile adjudications as strikes, were 
enacted as an initiative measure by popular vote.  (Prop. 184, as approved by 
voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994).) 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
In California, a minor accused of a crime in a juvenile court proceeding — 
unlike a person accused in an adult criminal proceeding — has no right to a jury 
trial.  The lack of that right becomes an issue when, as here, a juvenile court 
adjudication is based on one of certain statutorily specified felonies and later the 
juvenile, by then an adult, commits another felony.  At that point, California‘s 
―Three Strikes‖ law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b) – (i); 1170.12) comes into 
play.  Because of the prior juvenile court adjudication, the sentence for the new 
felony conviction is doubled, as happened here; with two such priors, the prison 
term is a minimum of 25 years to life.   
Central here is the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Apprendi v. 
New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 (Apprendi), which holds that the federal 
Constitution requires a jury trial on ―any fact‖ that increases the maximum penalty 
for a charged offense.  Is that right violated when, as here, the additional 
punishment is imposed because of prior juvenile criminal conduct for which there 
was no right to a jury trial?  The majority perceives no problem.  I do. 
I 
As relevant in this case, defendant as an adult was charged with being a 
convicted felon in possession of a firearm, a felony.  (Pen. Code, § 12021.1, 
subd. (a)(1).)  The prosecution alleged that he had a prior juvenile court 
adjudication based on a violation of subdivision (a)(1) of Penal Code section 245 
2 
(assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to inflict great bodily 
injury),15 and that this adjudication was a ―strike‖ under the Three Strikes law.  
Defendant pled guilty in return for dismissal of other charges against him.  At a 
court trial on the alleged strike, defendant conceded the prior adjudication‘s 
existence.  But, citing Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, he argued that the use of 
that prior adjudication to increase the maximum penalty for the new offense 
violated his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury because the adjudication 
occurred in juvenile court, where he had no right to a jury trial.   
The trial court rejected that argument, found the allegation of the prior 
juvenile adjudication to be true, and sentenced defendant to a total of 32 months in 
prison (based on 16 months‘ imprisonment for the current felony, doubled because 
of the prior adjudication).  On defendant‘s appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed 
the trial court‘s judgment.  This court granted the Attorney General‘s petition for 
review. 
II 
In a quintet of relatively recent decisions (Oregon v. Ice (2009) 555 U.S. 
___ [129 S.Ct. 711]; Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 
                                              
15  
A prior adult conviction for violating subdivision (a)(1) of Penal Code 
section 245 is a ―strike‖ if the assault was committed with a deadly weapon (Pen. 
Code, §§ 667, subd. (d)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(31)), but not if it was committed by 
means of force likely to inflict great bodily injury.  (People v. Haykel (2002) 96 
Cal.App.4th 146, 148; see also People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1065.)  
But a prior juvenile court adjudication for violating the same statute is a strike not 
only when the assault was committed with a deadly weapon but also when it was 
committed by means of force likely to inflict great bodily injury.  (See Pen. Code, 
§§ 667, subd. (d)(3)(B), 1192.7, subd. (c)(31); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. 
(b)(14).)  This difference between the two categories of priors appears to present a 
serious constitutional issue.  But it was not raised in this case and thus need not be 
resolved now. 
3 
(Cunningham); United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220 (Booker); Blakely v. 
Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296; Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466), the United 
States Supreme Court has set forth the constitutional principle that ―[o]ther than 
the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.‖  (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490.) 
What led to the development of this constitutional rule was the high court‘s 
concern about ―a new trend in the legislative regulation of sentencing.‖  (Booker, 
supra, 543 U.S. at p. 236.)  The court noted in Booker that various legislatures had 
begun to enact sentencing laws providing that if the trial court found certain 
statutorily specified facts to exist, it was authorized — and sometimes mandated 
— to impose a sentence greater than would otherwise have been statutorily 
permitted.  These sentencing laws effectively increased the power of trial courts 
but diminished that of juries.  (Ibid.)  In the words of Booker:  ―As the 
enhancements became greater, the jury‘s finding of the underlying crime became 
less significant.  And the enhancements became very serious indeed. . . .  [¶]  . . .  
The new sentencing practice forced the Court to address the question how the right 
of jury trial could be preserved, in a meaningful way guaranteeing that the jury 
would still stand between the individual and the power of the government under 
the new sentencing regime.‖  (Id. at pp. 236-237.) 
California‘s Three Strikes law exemplifies that current trend of harsh 
sentence enhancements.  Under this law, any felony, even relatively minor ones 
ordinarily punishable by a maximum of three years in prison, must be punished by 
a sentence of at least 25 years to life in prison when the defendant has two 
4 
qualifying prior juvenile adjudications.16  (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (d)(3), 
(e)(2)(A).)  When, as here, there is only one such adjudication, the sentence on the 
underlying felony is doubled.  (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (d)(3), (e)(1).)  Unlike an 
adult accused of a crime, a minor so accused in a juvenile court proceeding has, 
under California law, no right to have a jury determine the truth of the conduct 
underlying the offense.17  Yet, as I have just pointed out, under the Three Strikes 
law a prior juvenile court adjudication increases ―the range of sentences possible‖ 
(Booker, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 236) for an adult charged with a felony, and the 
increased sentence, to use Booker’s words, can be ―very serious indeed‖ (id. at 
p. 236).  In basing the additional punishment on alleged facts whose truth was 
never determined by a jury, the Three Strikes law is, in my view, contrary to the 
holding of Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490, that under the Sixth Amendment 
to the federal Constitution a criminal defendant has a right to have a jury 
determine ―any fact‖ that increases the penalty for a charged offense.  
The majority advances two reasons for concluding otherwise.  As explained 
below, its reasons are not persuasive. 
First, the majority asserts that defendant‘s claim does not come within the 
―express holding‖ (maj. opn., ante, at p. 8) of Apprendi that ―[o]ther than the fact 
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
                                              
16  
Although the increased penalties of California‘s Three Strikes law are 
mandatory, a trial court has the power to order a juvenile prior as well as a prior 
adult conviction stricken in the interest of justice.  (See Pen. Code, § 1385; People 
v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) 
17  
When the juvenile court agrees with the prosecution that the minor is ―not a 
fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law‖ (Welf. & Inst. 
Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1)), the minor is charged as an adult, in which case the 
minor has the right to a jury trial.   
5 
reasonable doubt.‖  (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490, italics added.)  
According to the majority, here the ―fact that increases the penalty . . . beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum‖ (ibid.) was not the defendant‘s felonious conduct 
that led to the prior adjudication in juvenile court; rather, the majority asserts, it 
was the adjudication itself.  And, the majority points out, under California law 
defendant did have the right to have a jury determine whether he was indeed the 
person who suffered that prior juvenile court adjudication, a right that defendant 
waived.  Thus, the majority concludes, defendant was not denied the right to a jury 
trial that Apprendi requires. 
The majority is correct that under California‘s Three Strikes law the 
existence of a prior juvenile court adjudication of criminal conduct is the fact that 
triggers increased punishment.  But I construe the italicized language of Apprendi, 
supra, 530 U.S. at page 490, that I quoted in the preceding paragraph as requiring 
a jury trial not only on the ―fact‖ of the existence of a prior adjudication, as the 
majority does, but also, unlike the majority, as requiring a jury trial on the conduct 
that led to that adjudication.   
The prior juvenile court adjudication forming the basis for the increased 
punishment is simply a legal document telling us that, in a proceeding in which the 
accused minor had no right to a jury trial, a juvenile court judge determined that 
the minor committed a criminal offense.  The essential teaching of the high court‘s 
decision in Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, is that such nonjury determinations 
cannot be used to increase criminal penalties beyond prescribed statutory 
maximums.  Thus, to permit the mere existence of a prior nonjury juvenile court 
adjudication to increase the penalty for a later crime beyond the statutory 
maximum is contrary to the rationale underlying Apprendi.  Indeed, the majority‘s 
reasoning here opens the door to wholesale evasion or trivialization of the holding 
in Apprendi.  Under the majority‘s reasoning, the Legislature could enact or 
6 
amend laws to define any sentence-increasing circumstance of the current offense 
in terms of the existence of a prior court determination or adjudication.  Under 
such a law, a trial judge, rather than a jury, would determine whether a statutorily 
specified aggravating circumstance (for example, use of a firearm or infliction of 
great bodily injury) had occurred during the commission of the current crime, after 
which the jury would be permitted to decide only whether the trial judge had 
actually made that specific factual determination.  This cannot be what the United 
States Supreme Court intended in Apprendi.  
Also, the majority‘s conclusion here is inconsistent with this court‘s recent 
decision in People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63 (Towne).  There, this court held 
that under Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, a defendant‘s sentence may not be 
increased based on a prior determination, in a nonjury revocation proceeding, that 
the defendant had violated the conditions of probation or parole.  Towne explained 
that a sentence may be increased for a prior probation or parole violation only 
when that violation is based on a conviction for a criminal offense.  (Towne, 
supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 82-83.)  In the latter situation, of course, the defendant 
would have had the right to a jury trial in the proceeding that resulted in the 
conviction.  Implicit in the holding of Towne is the view that the constitutional 
jury trial right extends to the conduct underlying a prior nonjury adjudication and 
not merely to the existence of that nonjury adjudication.  Thus, the majority‘s 
conclusion here — that the high court‘s holding in Apprendi can be satisfied by 
having a jury determine the mere existence of a prior nonjury juvenile court 
adjudication of criminal conduct — cannot be reconciled with this court‘s decision 
in Towne that Apprendi is not satisfied by having a jury determine only the 
existence of a prior nonjury adjudication of a probation or parole violation.   
I now turn to the majority‘s second reason for concluding that the use of a 
prior juvenile court adjudication to increase an adult defendant‘s sentence beyond 
7 
the ―prescribed statutory maximum‖ (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490) does 
not violate the defendant‘s constitutional right to a jury trial, even though the 
defendant had no right in that prior proceeding to have a jury determine the truth 
of the facts underlying the prior adjudication.  As mentioned earlier, this case is 
governed by the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Apprendi, which 
holds:  ―Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted 
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.‖  (Ibid., italics added.)   
The majority observes that juvenile priors ―concern the defendant‘s 
recidivism — i.e., his or her status as a repeat offender‖ (maj. opn., ante, at p. 17, 
italics deleted), and ―the prior criminal misconduct establishing this recidivism 
was previously and reliably adjudicated in proceedings that included . . . every 
substantial safeguard required in an adult criminal trial except the right to a jury‖ 
(id. at pp. 17-18).  Thus, the majority reasons, ―the Apprendi rule does not 
preclude use of nonjury juvenile adjudications to enhance later adult sentences.‖  
(Id. at p. 18.)  Implicit in that reasoning is the majority‘s view that juvenile priors 
fall within Apprendi’s ―fact of a prior conviction‖ language, which creates an 
exception to Apprendi’s holding that a defendant has a right to have a jury 
determination of the truth of any factual allegations used to increase the 
defendant‘s sentence beyond the statutory maximum.   
It is unclear whether Apprendi’s ―fact of a prior conviction‖ exception 
applies to prior juvenile court adjudications.  As the majority notes, federal and 
state courts are divided on the issue.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 17, fn. 10.) 
Apprendi itself says that the exception to the jury trial right applies only to 
the ―fact of a prior conviction.‖  (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490, italics 
added.)  As used in the field of law, the term ―conviction‖ ordinarily does not 
include juvenile court adjudications.  (People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 633 
8 
[―Juvenile court adjudications under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 are 
not criminal convictions, . . .‖].)  This is not a matter of semantics:  A conviction is 
obtained in a trial court proceeding at which the adult defendant has the right to a 
jury trial.  By contrast, a juvenile court adjudication results from a proceeding at 
which the accused juvenile has no right to a jury trial.  Therefore, it is the right to a 
jury trial afforded under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution that is at 
stake here.  To borrow language from Apprendi, ―there is a vast difference 
between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of conviction entered in a 
proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury trial‖ (Apprendi, supra, 
530 U.S. at p. 496) and one in which the defendant lacked that right.  (See also 
Jones v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 227, 249 [―[U]nlike virtually any other 
consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty for an offense . . . a prior 
conviction must itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair 
notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.‖  (Italics added.)].)  It is thus 
reasonable to infer that when the high court in Apprendi created a ―prior 
conviction‖ exception to the general right to a trial by jury on any fact supporting 
a sentence increase beyond the statutory maximum, it did so only for proceedings 
in which the accused did have that right. 
The majority‘s reasoning here — that prior juvenile court adjudications 
may constitutionally be used because they have been ―reliably adjudicated in 
proceedings that included . . . every substantial safeguard‖ except the right to jury 
trial (maj. opn., ante, at p. 18) — misses the point.  ―The Sixth Amendment jury 
trial right . . . does not turn on the relative rationality, fairness, or efficiency of 
potential factfinders.‖  (Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 607.)  The problem 
here is not that prior juvenile court adjudications are unreliable.  The problem is 
that the facts underlying a juvenile court adjudication were determined by ―a 
single employee of the State,‖ namely, the judge (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at 
9 
p. 498 (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.)), which is contrary to ―the system envisioned by a 
Constitution that guarantees trial by jury‖ (ibid., italics added).   
For the reasons given above, I conclude that the Sixth Amendment‘s right 
to a jury trial does not permit a trial court to impose additional punishment that is 
based on prior juvenile criminal conduct for which there was no right to a jury 
trial.  Thus, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which held that 
the trial court erred in doubling defendant‘s sentence on the underlying crime 
because of his prior juvenile adjudication.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Nguyen 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 152 Cal.App.4th 1205 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S154847 
Date Filed: July 2, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Santa Clara 
Judge: Ray E. Cunningham 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Mary J. Greenwood, Public Defender, Seth Flagsberg, Deputy Public Defender; The Law Offices of 
Douglas L. Rappaport, Douglas L. Rappaport and Michelle M. Thomson for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Seth Flagsberg, Deputy Public Defender (Santa Clara); and Michael Ogul, Chief Deputy Public Defender 
(Solano), for California Public Defenders Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Jonathan Laba; Maureen Pacheco; Marsha Levick; Neha Desai; and Jessica Feierman for Pacific Juvenile 
Defender Center, Juvenile Law Center, Juvenile Division of the Los Angeles Public Defender, Alternate 
Public Defender, National Center for Youth Law and Youth Law Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Dallas Sacher for Sixth District Appellate Program as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Appellant 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson and Dane R. Gillette, 
Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Donald E. de Nicola, 
Deputy State Solicitor General, René A. Chacón, Laurence K. Sullivan, Eric D. Share and Amy Haddix, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Steve Cooley, District Attorney (Los Angeles), Lael Rubin, Phyllis Asayama and Roberta Schwartz, 
Deputy District Attorneys, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Galit Lipa and Michael S. Romano for Criminal Defense Clinic and Mills Legal Clinic of Stanford Law 
School as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Douglas L. Rappaport 
The Law Offices of Douglas L. Rappaport 
260 California Street, Suite 1002 
San Francisco, CA  94111 
(415) 989-7900 
 
Eric D. Share 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-1375