Case Title: Paul Augustus Howell v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC03-103

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2004-05-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC03-103
____________
PAUL AUGUSTUS HOWELL,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[May 6, 2004]
PER CURIAM.
Howell appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction relief under
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, §
3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  Howell asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in declining
to present evidence, in support of a defense of intervening cause in the guilt phase
and as nonstatutory mitigation in the penalty phase, that the victim in this case, a
Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) trooper, violated agency policy in conducting a
search of the package containing the bomb that caused the trooper's death.  
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Howell also asserts that his sentence is unconstitutional in light of recent United
States Supreme Court decisions.  For the reasons that follow, we reject both
contentions and affirm the denial of the motion for postconviction relief.
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Most of the pertinent facts from trial are contained in this Court's opinion in
the direct appeal:
In January of 1992, Howell constructed a bomb for the specific
purpose of killing Tammie Bailey at her home in Marianna, Florida.
Bailey, Howell, and Howell's brother, Patrick, were part of a drug
ring involving a number of other individuals in which drugs were
obtained in Fort Lauderdale and then sold in Marianna, Florida.
Howell intended to eliminate Bailey as a witness because she had
knowledge that could link Howell and his brother to a prior murder.
The bomb was placed inside a microwave oven and then the oven was
gift-wrapped. Howell paid Lester Watson to drive and deliver the
microwave to Bailey. Although he knew that Howell had often made
pipe bombs, Watson testified that he thought the microwave
contained drugs. Howell rented a car for Watson to use for the trip.
Watson was accompanied on the trip by Curtis Williams.
While traveling on I-10 toward Marianna, Watson was stopped
by Trooper Jimmy Fulford for speeding. Fulford ran a registration
check on the car and a license check on Watson, who gave the trooper
a false name and birth date because he did not have a valid driver's
license. The radio dispatcher contacted the car rental company and
was informed that Howell had rented the car. The dispatcher
contacted Howell at his home in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, to
determine whether the rental car had been stolen from him. Howell
told the dispatcher that he had loaned the car to Watson but did not
know that Watson would be traveling so far with the vehicle. Howell
was informed by the dispatcher that Watson was going to be taken to
the Jefferson County Jail. Howell did not give any warning to the
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dispatcher regarding the bomb.
Deputies Harrell and Blount of the Jefferson County Sheriff's
Department arrived at the scene and Watson gave them permission to
search the vehicle. Trooper Fulford and the deputies observed the
gift-wrapped microwave in the trunk of the car. Watson was arrested
for speeding and driving without a valid driver's license and was
transported, along with Williams, to the jail by Deputy Blount.
Deputy Harrell also proceeded to the jail, leaving Trooper Fulford
alone with the rental car. Shortly thereafter, a massive explosion took
place at the scene. Testimony presented at Howell's trial by the State's
explosives expert indicated that Trooper Fulford had been holding the
microwave in his hands when the bomb went off. Trooper Fulford
died instantly due to the massive trauma caused by the explosion.
Howell v. State, 707 So. 2d 674, 676 (Fla. 1998).
Attorney Frank Sheffield was appointed to represent Howell both in the
state prosecution for the murder of Trooper Fulford and in a related federal drug
conspiracy prosecution.  The federal case was tried first.  Sheffield withdrew from
the federal case after jury selection because his wife received a phone call
threatening Sheffield if Howell "goes down." Id. at 678.  Sheffield remained
counsel in the state murder prosecution, and the case went to trial nine months
after the threat was made.  Id. at 678-79.  Because an impartial jury could not be
impaneled in Jefferson County, where Trooper Fulford was killed, the trial was
transferred to Escambia County.  The jury found Howell guilty of first-degree
murder and of making, possessing, placing, or discharging a bomb.  In a special
verdict, the jury also found that Howell committed both premeditated and felony
1.  The jury had been instructed on unlawfully throwing, placing, or
discharging a destructive device or bomb and drug trafficking as the predicate
felonies for first-degree felony murder.
2.  The trial court found the following aggravating circumstances: (1)
Howell knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons, (2) the murder
was committed while Howell was unlawfully making, possessing, placing, or
discharging a bomb, (3) the murder was committed to prevent lawful arrest, (4) the
victim was a law enforcement officer engaged in official duties, and (5) the murder
was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP).  The court found the mitigating
circumstances of (1) no significant criminal history (no assignment of weight), (2)
the murder was committed while Howell was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance (little weight), (3) Howell served in and was
honorably discharged from the military (little weight), (4) Howell behaved well as
a pretrial detainee (no assignment of weight), and (5) Howell was a good family
man (deemed inconsequential).
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murder.1  In the penalty phase, the jury recommended death by a vote of ten to
two.  The trial court concluded that the aggravating circumstances far outweighed
the mitigating circumstances and imposed death for the murder.  See id. at 676-
77.2
On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Howell's convictions and death
sentence.  See id. at 679.  The Court rejected Howell's guilt-phase claim that the
trial court erred in refusing to appoint different counsel or a second attorney.  The
Court also rejected Howell's challenge to the aggravators of knowingly creating a
great risk to many persons, commission of the murder to prevent arrest, CCP, and
that the victim was a law enforcement officer engaged in official duties.  See id. at
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680-82.  Addressing the claim that Howell did not knowingly kill a law
enforcement officer, this Court stated:
[Howell] had knowledge that Lester Watson had been arrested and
that law enforcement officers had custody of the car. At the time the
dispatcher called Howell to ask whether the rental car had been
stolen, Howell chose not to warn the officers of the lethal bomb in the
trunk. Based on this knowledge, Howell knew or could have
reasonably foreseen that law enforcement personnel would search the
vehicle and its contents and thereby detonate the bomb. We find that
this aggravator was properly found by the trial court.
Id. at 682.  Finally, this Court held that the death penalty was not disproportionate. 
See id. at 682-83.
Howell's initial postconviction counsel filed a "shell" motion for
postconviction relief, and successor counsel filed an amended motion.  Many of
the claims initially raised were abandoned below, and only two issues are
presented in this appeal: (1) whether trial counsel was ineffective in both the guilt
and penalty phases in failing to assert that the trooper's violation of FHP
procedures in opening the package containing the bomb constituted an intervening
cause, and (2) whether Florida's death penalty is unconstitutional under Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the first of these claims.
Attorney William Pfeiffer testified that he represented Howell in his federal drug
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conspiracy trial.  Pfeiffer assumed representation in the federal case after jury
selection and three days before trial when Sheffield, who had previously been
appointed counsel, withdrew.  Based on a policy statement in an FHP manual that
officers were not permitted to search closed and wrapped containers, Pfeiffer
moved in the federal trial to suppress the physical evidence concerning the
explosion that killed Fulford.  The motion was denied on grounds that Howell
lacked standing to contest the search because the vehicle that he rented was not in
his possession.
Sheffield testified that he withdrew from the federal case because of the
threat communicated to his wife just before trial.  Sheffield testified that he
remained Howell's counsel on the state murder case, which was tried nine months
after the threat, because tensions had subsided and because he was both more
experienced than Pfeiffer in murder cases and more familiar with this particular
case.  In the murder trial, Sheffield originally considered an insanity defense, but it
did not "materialize."  He also considered and rejected raising any guilt- or
penalty-phase issue that would have blamed Fulford for his own death.  The theory
of defense used at trial was that Howell did not make the bomb, based on an
assertion that several of the witnesses who identified him as the bombmaker were
not credible because they made deals with the State for lesser sentences.  Sheffield
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also attempted to shift the blame to Watson, who was "the most guilty because he
knew exactly what was in the package, and he was the one that was standing
looking Trooper Fulford in the eye, and he didn't say anything."
Sheffield said he rejected an "intervening cause" argument in both the guilt
and penalty phases despite his belief that Fulford violated FHP policy in opening
the package.  Among the considerations that influenced counsel's decision was the
fact that although Howell was contacted by the FHP dispatcher during the stop of
Watson and was told that the car rented in his name would be impounded, Howell
did not give any warning about the bomb in the microwave oven.  Sheffield also
stated that it was his understanding that the package would be searched at some
point, either on the side of the road or at an impound lot.  Moreover, although the
trial was moved from Jefferson County, where passions ran high, the case was
tried in Escambia County, where in Sheffield's experience the jurors tended to be
"very law-and-order, very pro-prosecution oriented."  Sheffield stated that after
discussion with Howell, he did argue to the jury that there was no intent to kill an
officer. 
In light of these considerations, Sheffield maintained that any argument that
Fulford was responsible for his own death was "no defense" or, at best, a legal
argument that would have resulted in a unanimous death recommendation rather
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than the ten-to-two death recommendation actually rendered.  Accordingly, trial
counsel did not present evidence or argument, in either the guilt or penalty phase,
that Fulford violated FHP rules in opening the package containing the bomb.
The trial court denied the motion for postconviction relief on all grounds. 
The court specifically addressed the "intervening cause" claim, and found that
because of the concern over alienating the jury, trial counsel was "not ineffective
for failing to attempt to shift blame for the explosion to the trooper for his
actions." 
II.  ANALYSIS
A.  Ineffective Assistance Claim
This claim concerns a paragraph in the Florida Highway Patrol Policy
Manual concerning items in impounded vehicles:
11.04.04  Impounded Vehicle Inventories
In order to secure the owner's property and to protect the
Department from claims, it is necessary to inventory the contents of
all vehicles being towed and/or stowed.  The contents of the vehicle
include, but are not limited to, all packages and containers located
within the passenger compartment, the trunk, or any other secured
area of the vehicle.  Unless locked or securely wrapped, all luggage,
packages, and containers, whether opened or closed, shall be opened
and their contents inventoried.  Locked or securely wrapped luggage,
packages, and containers shall not be opened except as otherwise
authorized by law or by owner consent, but shall be indicated on the
inventory list as locked or securely wrapped items.
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Howell claims that trial counsel was prejudicially deficient in failing to
assert, in support of both a defense of intervening cause during the guilt phase and
as nonstatutory mitigation during the penalty phase, that Trooper Fulford violated
this policy statement, thereby contributing to his own demise.  The State responds
that there is no evidence that the trooper violated the policy, because he was acting
pursuant to consent to search given by the car's driver.  The State also relies upon
trial counsel's testimony during the rule 3.850 hearing that he did not consider any
claim that blamed the trooper for his own death to be viable trial strategy because
it would have offended the jurors.  Howell counters that the evidence of the
trooper's policy violation could have been presented in a sensitive and inoffensive
manner, that this would have been a better strategy than the meritless defense
presented at trial, and that the evidence would have supported a penalty-phase
theme of lack of specific intent to kill Trooper Fulford.  In addressing Howell's
claim, we assume but do not decide that the policy relied upon by Howell actually
applied to the facts in this case. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a
defendant in a criminal case the right to assistance of counsel.  A defendant
seeking to establish a denial of this right because of counsel's ineffectiveness must
make a two-pronged showing of deficient performance by counsel and resulting
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prejudice.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  First, 
a defendant must establish conduct on the part of counsel that is outside the broad
range of competent performance under prevailing professional standards.  See 
Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216, 219 (Fla. 1998).  Second, the deficiency must
be shown to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceedings that
confidence in the outcome is undermined.  See id.  The two prongs are related, in
that "[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process
that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."  Id. (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686) (alteration in original).  In reviewing a trial court's
ruling on an ineffective assistance claim in postconviction proceedings, this Court
defers to findings of fact based on competent, substantial evidence but
independently assesses deficiency and prejudice as mixed questions of law and
fact.  See Freeman v. State, 858 So. 2d 319, 323 (Fla. 2003); Stephens v. State,
748 So. 2d 1028, 1033 (Fla. 1999).
Howell acknowledges that this is not a case of inadequate investigation of a
viable defense in which trial counsel overlooked the alleged policy violation. 
Rather, trial counsel concluded that a defense based on the violation was not
viable and, as a strategic matter, would only have inflamed the jury.  In Strickland,
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the Supreme Court stated that "strategic choices made after thorough investigation
of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable."  466
U.S. at 690.  See also Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2003) (stating that
"the deference owed such strategic judgments" under Strickland is defined "in
terms of the adequacy of the investigations supporting those judgments").  In
Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000), this Court held that
"strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if
alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was
reasonable under the norms of professional conduct."  Additionally, this Court has
recognized that a concern about being perceived as blaming the victim for his or
her own death is a valid reason for declining to introduce particular evidence.  See
Spencer v. State, 842 So. 2d 52, 61-62 (Fla. 2003) (concluding that trial counsel
was not ineffective in choosing not to present evidence of an antagonistic
relationship between the defendant and the victim for fear of being perceived of
blaming the victim for the defendant's actions). 
Howell concedes that the alleged policy violation would not have been an
intervening cause as a matter of law, but asserts nonetheless that had trial counsel
introduced the evidence and requested an instruction thereon, the jury might have
returned a verdict other than guilty of first-degree murder.  In support of this
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contention, Howell cites State v. Rushing, 532 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988),
in which the court reversed the dismissal of an information charging manslaughter
by culpable negligence based on the defendant's act of giving a loaded gun to the
suicidal victim.  The court concluded in Rushing that because "as a matter of law
it cannot be said that it was unforeseeable that the victim would do that very thing
which she had already announced she would," the question of foreseeability was
for the jury.  Id. at 1340.  See also Miller v. State, 782 So. 2d 426, 430 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2001) (holding that the issue of whether the defendant's removal of a stop
sign from an intersection was the proximate cause of a motorist's death was a jury
question).
In this case, death was a clearly foreseeable result of Howell's act of placing
a bomb in a gift-wrapped microwave oven and setting it to explode when the oven
door was opened.  Indeed, it was almost certain that Howell's actions would result
in the death of someone, if not his intended victim.  Therefore, the alleged policy
violation by the trooper in searching the package's contents would not have
negated any of the elements of first-degree murder, including that the death was
caused by Howell's criminal act.  
Moreover, evidence presented during the guilt phase showed that by the
time Fulford opened the package, Howell could have foreseen that law
3.  Additionally, to the extent that Howell questions the sufficiency of the
evidence to establish either premeditation or felony-murder, and reasserts the
alleged conflict of interest based on the alleged death threat during the federal trial
addressed in the direct appeal, these issues are procedurally barred on collateral
review.  See Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So. 2d 1253, 1256 (Fla. 1995) (holding that
claims that were or could have been raised on direct appeal are procedurally barred
from consideration in a rule 3.850 motion). 
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enforcement personnel, rather than Bailey, would detonate the bomb.  The jury
heard testimony that on the day of Fulford's death, Howell was informed by a
police dispatcher that the car that contained the bomb and was rented in his name
would be impounded, yet he gave no warning of its contents.  As this Court
previously noted in relying upon this evidence to reject the challenge to the CCP
aggravator in the direct appeal, Howell "had sufficient opportunity to formulate
the intent that law enforcement personnel would be the bomb's intended victim." 
Howell, 707 So. 2d at 682.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the low probability of success, combined
with the tremendous potential for alienating the jury by blaming the trooper for his
own death, fully justifies trial counsel's strategic decision to forego presentation of
the alleged policy violation during the guilt phase as being well within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.3  The same lack of merit in an
"intervening cause" defense based on the alleged policy violation leads us to
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conclude that Howell has also failed to establish prejudice under Strickland.  Had
counsel raised this defense, there is no probability, sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome, of a different verdict.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
In regard to the penalty phase, Howell asserts that trial counsel was
ineffective in declining to use the alleged policy violation in support of  a
nonstatutory mitigating factor that there was no intent to injure the trooper and that
his death was unforeseeable.  We conclude again that counsel made a reasonable
strategic decision that introducing the evidence of the policy violation would have
alienated the jury without contributing substantially to mitigation.  
Concerning nonstatutory mitigation, we have stated that "[e]vidence is
mitigating if, in fairness or in the totality of the defendant's life or character, it may
be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability for the
crime committed."  Merck v. State, 763 So. 2d 295, 298 (Fla. 2000).  In this case,
the jury was made aware during the guilt phase that the bomb was intended for
Tammie Bailey and not Trooper Fulford.  Counsel could reasonably have
concluded that evidence of the alleged policy violation would not have further
reduced or extenuated Howell's moral culpability for the bomb's premature
detonation.  Further, on the question of whether the alleged policy violation made
the death less foreseeable and therefore mitigated against imposition of the death
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penalty, Howell does not assert that he knew of the policy.  Therefore, evidence of
the alleged policy violation would not have appreciably changed the
circumstances that led the jury to recommend death, the trial judge to impose
death, and this Court to conclude, in rejecting the challenge to the law-
enforcement aggravator in the direct appeal, that "Howell knew or could have
reasonably foreseen that law enforcement personnel would search the vehicle and
its contents and thereby detonate the bomb."  Howell, 707 So. 2d at 682.  
Moreover, counsel made a reasonable strategic decision that any benefit in
introducing the alleged policy violation during the penalty phase would have been
outweighed by the perception that the defense was blaming Trooper Fulford for
his own death.  The jury in this case recommended death by a ten-to-two vote, and
the trial court found five aggravating factors which it concluded far outweighed
the two statutory mitigating factors, one of which was given little weight, and the
three nonstatutory mitigators, two of which were given little weight or deemed
inconsequential.  See id. at 677.  Indeed, as trial counsel testified at the evidentiary
hearing, had he asserted the policy violation in advocating a nonstatutory
mitigator, thus necessarily suggesting to some extent that the victim could be
blamed for his own death, the recommendation of death might have been
unanimous.  Therefore, his performance was not constitutionally deficient under
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Strickland.  Even if counsel's decision to forego presentation of the alleged policy
violation in the penalty phase could be viewed as unreasonable, we conclude that
there is no probability that the decision affected the outcome of the penalty phase,
and thus Howell's claim fails to satisfy the second prong of Strickland.
In Strickland, the Court stated:
A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort
be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct
the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate
the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the
difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action "might be considered sound trial strategy."
466 U.S. at 689.  Even in hindsight, trial counsel appears to have made a sound
strategic decision not to introduce evidence, in either the guilt or penalty phase of
Howell's capital trial, that Fulford may have violated FHP policy in opening the
gift-wrapped package.  As found by the trial court, counsel's decision "was
appropriate given the probability that such an argument may have influenced the
jury against the defendant."  Accordingly, Howell has not overcome the
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance, and has not shown that the alleged deficiency affected the
outcome of either phase of his capital trial.  Because he has not satisfied either the
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deficiency or prejudice prong of Strickland, we conclude that the trial court did
not err in denying this claim of ineffective assistance.
B.  Ring Issue
Howell asserts that the United States Supreme Court decisions in Ring and
Apprendi render Florida's capital sentencing statute, section 921.141, Florida
Statutes (2003), unconstitutional.  In Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla.),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1070 (2002), and King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 1069 (2002), this Court denied relief under Ring.  Subsequently,
this Court has rejected postconviction challenges to section 921.141 that relied on
Apprendi and Ring.  See, e.g., Jones v. State, 855 So. 2d 611, 619 (Fla. 2003);
Wright v. State, 857 So. 2d 861, 877-78 (Fla. 2003), cert. denied, 72 U.S.L.W.
3614 (U.S. Mar. 29, 2004); Chandler v. State, 848 So. 2d 1031, 1034 n.4 (Fla.
2003).
In addition, the trial court in this case found that the murder was committed
in the course of the felony of making, possessing, placing, or discharging a bomb,
and the jury also unanimously found Howell guilty of this separate felony beyond
a reasonable doubt.  This Court has relied upon the same aggravator resting on
contemporaneous convictions in rejecting Ring claims in several cases.  See Lugo
v. State, 845 So. 2d 74, 119 n.79 (Fla.), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 320 (2003); Jones
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v. State, 845 So. 2d 55, 74 (Fla. 2003); Banks v. State, 842 So. 2d 788, 793 (Fla.
2003).  Howell likewise is not entitled to relief on this claim.
III.  CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, we affirm the denial of Howell's motion
for postconviction relief.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO and BELL, JJ., concur.
CANTERO, J., concurs with an opinion, in which WELLS and BELL, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs specially with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
CANTERO, J., concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion.  Moreover, regarding Howell’s claim that
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violates Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002), I also would hold, for the reasons stated in my specially concurring 
opinion in Windom v. State, Nos. SC01-2706 & SC02-2142 (Fla. May 6, 2004), 
that Ring does not apply retroactively.
WELLS and BELL, JJ., concur.
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ANSTEAD, C.J., specially concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion in all respects except for its discussion of
the decision in Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Jefferson County, 
F. E. Steinmeyer, III, Judge - Case No. 92-22-CF
Clyde M. Taylor, Jr., Tallahassee, Florida; and Baya Harrison, III, Associate
Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida
for Appellant
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee