Case Title: Marr. of LaMusga

Citation: 

Docket Number: S107355

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 4/29/04 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
In re the Marriage of SUSAN and GARY 
) 
LAMUSGA. 
) 
____________________________________) 
 
) 
SUSAN POSTON NAVARRO, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S107355 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/5 A096012 
GARY LAMUSGA, 
) 
 
) 
Contra Costa County 
 
Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. D95-01136 
___________________________________ ) 
 
In In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 28-29, we held that a 
parent seeking to relocate after dissolution of marriage is not required to establish 
that the move is “necessary” in order to be awarded physical custody of a minor 
child.  Similarly, a parent who has been awarded physical custody of a child under 
an existing custody order also is not required to show that a proposed move is 
“necessary” and instead “ ‘has the right to change the residence of the child, 
subject to the power of the court to restrain a removal that would prejudice the 
rights or welfare of the child.’  (Fam. Code, §  7501.)”  (Id. at p. 29.) 
In the present case, the superior court ordered that primary physical custody 
of two minor children would be transferred from their mother to their father if 
their mother moved to Ohio.  The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that if the 
custodial parent “has a good faith reason to move . . . the custodial parent cannot 
 
2
be prevented, directly or indirectly, from exercising his or her right to change the 
child’s residence” unless the noncustodial parent makes a “substantial showing” 
that a change of custody is “essential” to prevent detriment to the children.  We 
granted review to determine whether the Court of Appeal in the present case 
misapplied our holding in Burgess.  We conclude that it did and reverse its 
judgment. 
As explained below, we conclude that just as a custodial parent does not 
have to establish that a planned move is “necessary,” neither does the noncustodial 
parent have to establish that a change of custody is “essential” to prevent 
detriment to the children from the planned move.  Rather, the noncustodial parent 
bears the initial burden of showing that the proposed relocation of the children’s 
residence would cause detriment to the children, requiring a reevaluation of the 
children’s custody.  The likely impact of the proposed move on the noncustodial 
parent’s relationship with the children is a relevant factor in determining whether 
the move would cause detriment to the children and, when considered in light of 
all of the relevant factors, may be sufficient to justify a change in custody.  If the 
noncustodial parent makes such an initial showing of detriment, the court must 
perform the delicate and difficult task of determining whether a change in custody 
is in the best interests of the children.   
The father in the present case satisfied his initial burden of showing that the 
mother’s planned move would cause detriment to the children, requiring a 
reevaluation of the children’s custody.  The superior court properly considered the 
relevant factors and did not abuse its discretion in deciding that a change in 
primary custody from the mother to the father would be in the best interests of the 
children if the mother moves to Ohio. 
 
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I.  FACTS 
Susan and Gary LaMusga married on October 22, 1988, and had two 
children: Garrett, who was born on May 5, 1992, and Devlen, who was born two 
years later to the day on May 5, 1994.  The mother filed an amended petition for 
dissolution of marriage on May 10, 1996, and requested sole physical custody of 
the children, who were living with her in the family residence.  The father objected 
and requested joint legal and physical custody. 
The parties were unable to agree on a visitation schedule and, pursuant to a 
court order, stipulated to the appointment of Philip Stahl, Ph.D, a licensed 
psychologist, to conduct a child custody evaluation.  Pending this evaluation, the 
parties agreed to a visitation schedule under which the children would be with 
their father every Wednesday from 3:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. and Sunday from 10 
a.m. to 5 p.m.  The mother asserted that even this limited visitation with the father 
was detrimental to the children, causing Garrett to become overly aggressive, 
disorganized, unfocused, and to regress in toilet training, and causing Devlen to 
develop a facial tick, a stutter, and a squint. 
In a report dated October 10, 1996, Dr. Stahl observed that “there has been 
a great deal of verbal hostility between Mr. and Mrs. LaMusga for years, at times 
escalating to some pushing and shoving between them. . . .  Both acknowledge that 
communication has deteriorated completely and that there is no trust between 
them.  Mrs. LaMusga is concerned that Mr. LaMusga lives in an unsafe 
environment, doesn’t take adequate care of the boys and is not responsive to their 
needs.  She would prefer that his time be even more limited.” 
“Additionally, Ms. LaMusga has expressed a desire to move with the boys 
to the Cleveland, Ohio, area. . . . [¶] In contrast, Mr. LaMusga is quite upset that 
she wants to take the boys to Cleveland, and describes the environment there as 
hostile to him.  He believes that Ms. LaMusga has attempted to alienate him from 
 
4
both the boys and . . . is quite concerned that, if she does get to move, he’ll end up 
having no relationship with his boys whatsoever.” 
Dr. Stahl opined that, in general, both the mother and the father were “good 
enough parents,” but noted that the mother was “struggling with supporting and 
encouraging frequent and continuing contact between” the children and their 
father.  Dr. Stahl believed that “each parent has different positive qualities to give 
to the children and that it is in the children’s best interest to maintain a relationship 
with each of them as they continue to grow.”  But he noted his concern “about the 
dynamic of conflict between Mr. and Ms. LaMusga and its impact on the children.  
They don’t speak to one another, their conflict does filter down to the children, 
and the children do show some evidence of anxiety related to this.  Additionally, 
their charges and counter-charges reflect the extent to which both parents are 
willing to go to make the other look bad, something that is clearly detrimental to 
Garrett and Devlen. . . . [T]he conflict level between the parents is the single-most 
significant problem, and it has been going on for years.” 
Dr. Stahl stated that the mother’s desire to move to Cleveland “must be 
balanced with the children’s apparent need for frequent and continuing contact 
with their father and looked at in the context of the parental hostility.  As we 
already observe, it appears that Ms. LaMusga has been reluctant to support 
additional time or overnight time with the boys and their father, even though they 
live less than five miles apart.  She has been reluctant to support consistent phone 
calls, as well.  As indicated, Ms. LaMusga has concerns about the boys and their 
functioning and she has chosen to respond to these concerns with efforts at 
keeping Mr. LaMusga’s time rather limited.  Additionally, it is this examiner’s 
observation that Ms. LaMusga sees little or no negative impact on the boys at the 
potential distance in their relationship with their father.  While the likelihood of 
parental conflict will be significantly reduced on a day-to-day basis if Ms. 
 
5
LaMusga is in Cleveland (and that will likely benefit the boys), it is this 
examiner’s observation that we must be concerned about Ms. LaMusga’s 
willingness to follow through on regular and consistent visitation if she is half a 
country away.  [¶]  It is this examiner’s opinion that the attachment between 
Garrett and Devlen and their father is strong.  However, the children have not 
reached an age where they can maintain this attachment if they are away from him 
over long distance and time. . . .  Thus, it is this examiner’s observation that a 
move at this time would be difficult for the boys given their developmental needs.  
If we add the concern regarding Ms. LaMusga’s follow through associated with 
the current level of conflict, a move might be difficult for the boys.” 
Following a hearing on November 14, 1996,  the superior court awarded the 
parties joint legal custody of the children, with the mother having “primary 
physical custody.”1  With the mother’s agreement, the father’s visitation was 
increased over a period of months to a final schedule of every Tuesday and 
Wednesday from 4 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. and every other weekend from Friday at 5 
p.m. to Sunday at 6 p.m.  Judgment subsequently was entered dissolving the 
marriage as of December 31, 1997. 
On July 6, 1998, the parties stipulated that during the summer, the father 
would have custody of the children from July 9-15 and August 21-27, 1998, and 
                                             
 
1  
The provisions in the Family Code governing custody of children do not 
use the term “primary physical custody.”  (In re Marriage of Richardson (2002) 
102 Cal.App.4th 941, 945, fn. 2.)  Rather, the code uses the terms “joint physical 
custody,” which “means that each of the parents shall have significant periods of 
physical custody” (Fam. Code, § 3004), and “sole physical custody,” which 
“means that a child shall reside with and be under the supervision of one parent, 
subject to the power of the court to order visitation” (Fam. Code, § 3007).  The 
term “primary physical custody” does appear in Family Code section 4045, 
subdivision (d)(3), which grants the Judicial Council the authority to review the 
statewide uniform child support guidelines. 
 
6
the mother would have custody of the children from July 17-23 and August 13-19, 
1998.  The preexisting custody and visitation schedule would apply at all other 
times.  On November 15, 1998, the father filed an order to show cause to have the 
court establish a holiday visitation schedule, which it did by an order issued on 
December 8, 1998. 
The mother subsequently married Todd Navarro and, on September 16, 
1999, gave birth to a daughter.  The father also remarried.  His wife, Karin, has a 
daughter from her prior marriage. 
On February 13, 2001, the mother filed an order to show cause to modify 
the visitation order to permit her to relocate with the children to Cleveland, Ohio.  
She alleged that she had family in the Cleveland area and her husband had 
received an offer for a more lucrative job there.  She noted in her supporting 
declaration that Dr. Stahl had been reappointed and was conducting an evaluation 
to determine whether the father’s visitation should be increased. 
The father objected to the mother’s plan to move the children to Ohio and 
asked that primary custody of the children be transferred to him if the mother 
moved to Ohio.  The father declared that the mother had attempted to alienate him 
from their sons since their separation and feared that moving the boys to Ohio 
would result in his “being lost as their father.” 
On February 26, 2001, Dr. Stahl submitted a supplemental report that did 
not address the mother’s proposal to move to Ohio, which she had made less than 
two weeks earlier.  Dr. Stahl stated that the parents were “at a continued impasse”; 
the father wanted “equal joint custody of the boys” while the mother wanted to 
discontinue the boys’ midweek visits with their father.  He reported some 
disturbing aspects of the boys’ relationship with their father, noting that the boys 
were very critical of their father, but almost always in rather vague terms.  Dr. 
Stahl observed, however, that the children “seemingly had a good time at their 
 
7
father’s home.”  Once, Dr. Stahl “observed Devlen being affectionate with his dad, 
but he later denied it.” 
Dr. Stahl concluded that the boys were “alienated and split in their feelings 
toward their parents,” in part because “[t]hey appear to be very aware of the 
conflicts between the parents” and appeared to take the mother’s side.  Dr. Stahl 
further concluded the children seemed to be “somewhat overindulged,” stating:  
“With their extreme polarization and with their overindulged emotions, both 
Garrett and Devlen run the risk of having significant struggles emotionally, 
especially with their peers, and with authority figures.  In addition, it is this 
examiner’s impression that both the boys also struggle a bit with difficulties in 
self-image and feelings of inadequacy in comparison to others.”  He blamed this, 
in part, on “their parent’s high conflict divorce.”  Dr. Stahl noted that the mother 
“does appear to be contributing to the alienation of the boys,” although this 
alienation tended to be “covert” and “unconscious.”  He observed that the father 
was “somewhat self-centered and doesn’t seem to deal with the boys’ feelings that 
well.” 
Dr. Stahl recommended that the father be awarded longer periods of 
visitation and raised the possibility of transferring primary physical custody of the 
children to their father if the situation did not improve, stating:  “Research 
suggests that alienated children do better with longer rather than shorter blocks of 
time with each parent, and also that it’s helpful if fathers participate with children 
in the schooling. . . .  I would recommend a schedule in which they are with their 
father every other week from Thursday after school until return to school on 
Monday morning and every other week from Thursday after school until Friday 
morning.  Not only does this reduce the number of transitions that need to take 
place with the parents together, but it also broadens the blocks of time that they are 
with their dad.  It also keeps mother as the primary parent, which is consistent for 
 
8
them.”  Dr. Stahl noted that if the situation did not improve, he might recommend 
either “a truly joint custody arrangement” or giving “primary custody” to the 
father. 
Following a hearing on March 19, 2001, the father’s visitation was 
increased as recommended by Dr. Stahl.  The court again reappointed Dr. Stahl “to 
provide a focused evaluation on the issue whether the relocation of the parties’ 
two minor children is in the best interest of said children.” 
Dr. Stahl’s June 29, 2001, supplemental report notes that the mother has 
wanted to move ever since the divorce but waited, at Dr. Stahl’s urging, until the 
children were older.  The move would improve her family’s “economic standard 
of living, and . . . inherent quality of life . . . .”  The mother “believes that she will 
have no difficulty supporting the boys in their relationship with their dad,” 
asserting “that she has always supported the boys in their relationship with their 
dad, and that she is not a contributor to any alienation that the boys might feel. [¶] 
Not surprisingly, Mr. LaMusga doesn’t see things the same way. . . .  He is 
opposing the move, especially at this time, because he worries that the boys will 
regress in their relationship with him, especially after making tremendous progress 
in their work with Dr. Tuggle [the boys’ therapist]. . . .  He feels strongly that a 
disruption now will break the bond that is developing.” 
Dr. Stahl was concerned “that the boys might not maintain any positive 
relationship with their dad if they move,” noting that such a loss “would be 
significant.”  But he added that this “must be balanced with the potential losses 
that the boys might experience if their mother moves, and they stay,” observing:  
“They have been in the primary care of their mother since the parents’ divorce and 
they will likely have a significant loss [if] she moves without them.  They also 
have a very close relationship with their sister Aisley, as well as Todd, and they 
will feel those losses as well.  Third, they have their own desire to move. . . .  If 
 
9
they don’t move, they’re likely to feel that their wishes aren’t being heard.”  Dr. 
Stahl also observed that forcing the children to remain in California could cause 
them to further reject their father. 
Dr. Stahl opined that if the boys were permitted to move to Ohio:  “The 
primary loss for the boys will be related to the growing and improving relationship 
with their dad.  I suspect that they’ll have few problems adjusting to a new school, 
friends, or activities, but it may be hard for them to deal with the emerging change 
in their relationship with their dad.  The relationship currently is tenuous at best, 
for all of the reasons I outlined in the original update, and it is unlikely that there 
will be no impact to their relationship. . . .  [¶]  The underlying risk, however, is 
that, with absence, they will regress to a more detached and disconnected state 
with their father.  With regular and somewhat increased contact, there is 
improvement in the relationships.  However, this improvement is tenuous, and I 
am concerned that the move will interrupt any progress that might be occurring at 
the present time.” 
Although the mother stated that she wanted to move to Ohio because that 
“is where she is originally from and where she has family support,” Dr. Stahl 
suggested an additional motive:  “Underneath, however, it has always appeared 
that [the mother] has wanted to move so that she can remove herself and the boys 
from the day-to-day interactions with [the father].  She has difficulty dealing with 
him and prefers to have as little communication with him as possible.” 
“I am concerned about ways that she might inadvertently or unconsciously 
provoke loyalty conflicts, as the children are all too aware of her negative dealings 
toward their father.  Her contribution to the conflict is a major contribution to the 
boys’ loyalty conflicts and alienation.” 
Acknowledging that there was “no good solution in this matter,” Dr. Stahl 
observed that “there is a risk that both moving or not moving may create a 
 
10
significant change” in the children’s relationship with their father, stating, “It’s 
difficult to predict which way this will go.  Mother believes that the boys will be 
less rejecting of their dad if they move and father believes that a move will put the 
nail in the coffin of their relationship.  I suspect that neither of them is accurate 
and the actual reaction of the boys will be based on how the parents handle their 
issues over time. 
“In fact, in my opinion, the critical issue will be mother’s ‘real’ behavior 
after the move takes place.  If she acts as she says she will, the boys will talk with 
their father two or three times per week, and these conversations and 
communications will be substantive and not superficial.  If she acts as she says she 
will, the boys will enjoy their father’s periodic visits to Ohio.  If she acts as she 
says she will, they will get on the plane and come to California for dad’s custodial 
time, and they’ll be ready to have a good time with their dad.  If she acts as she 
says she will, it could be that the boys will actually improve in their relationship 
with their dad, and the gains being made now can continue.  [¶]  However, the risk 
is that she won’t act as she says she will.  If dad is correct, and mother’s sister is 
going to foment the anger, there won’t be any support in Ohio for her to act as she 
says she will.  If that’s the case, once they get to Ohio, he’ll be correct that his 
relationship with the boys will regress. . . .” 
On August 23, 2001, a hearing was held in the superior court on the 
mother’s request to move the children’s residence to Ohio.  The mother declared 
that her husband had accepted a position as sales manager at a Toyota dealership 
in Cleveland, Ohio in March 2001 and had been living in Cleveland with her 
family since then. 
Dr. Stahl testified and responded to a question by the mother’s counsel why 
the mother should not be permitted to move the children to Ohio, stating:  “I think 
the reasons would be twofold:  [¶]  One, there is no evidence that I’ve seen in the 
 
11
five years that I’ve known this family that [the mother] will really do what she 
said she will do.  In terms of being supportive of the boys’ relationship with their 
father in a way that truly will reduce the loyalty conflicts and truly will help them, 
um, feel better about things with him.  [¶]  That would be one reason.  [¶]  The 
other is it is still a tenuous relationship.  And in that it’s a tenuous relationship, I’ll 
stick with what I said in 1996:  It makes it very difficult to — to predict that it’s 
likely to get better rather [than] stay tenuous or get worse if the move is allowed.” 
Dr. Stahl acknowledged that the father also bore some of the responsibility 
for his strained relationship with his sons, stating:  “He gets frustrated and 
impatient sometimes.”  Dr. Stahl added that the father contributes to the children’s 
alienation to the extent he perpetuates his conflict with the mother. 
The superior court ruled as follows:  “The issue is not whether either of 
these parents are competent and qualified to be custodial parents, I think the 
evidence indicates that they are.  That is not the question.  [¶]  The question is 
whether there is sufficient evidence at this point to determine, one, that the best 
interests of the children is served by relocating with Mother to Ohio, or whether 
the best interests are served by the —a change of physical custody if [the mother] 
is to relocate.” 
The court acknowledged that the mother is not purposely trying to alienate 
the children from their father, but noted that the mother’s inability to “let go” of 
her anger toward the father caused her to project those feelings onto their children 
and to reinforce the children when they expressed negative feelings toward their 
father.  “That aligns the children with one parent and results in a strained or hostile 
relationship with the other parent.”  The court also acknowledged that this was not 
“a bad faith move away.  I don’t think this is an instance where [the mother is] 
attempting to relocate with the children for the specific purpose of limiting their 
contact or relationship with their father.  I think it’s far more subtle than that. . . .” 
 
12
“The primary importance, it seems to me at this point, is to be able to 
reinforce what is now a tenuous and somewhat detached relationship with the boys 
and their father. . . .  [¶]  I think the concerns about the relationship being lost if 
the children are relocated at this time are realistic. . . .  [¶]  Therefore, I think that a 
relocation of the children out of the State of California, the distance of 2000 miles 
is – would inevitably under these circumstances be detrimental to their welfare.  It 
would not promote frequent and continuing contact with the father, and I would 
deny the request to relocate the children.  [¶]  If [the mother] wishes to relocate to 
the state of Ohio, certainly she is entitled to do that.  Should she choose to do so, 
then I would implement the recommendations contained in Dr. Stahl’s 
supplemental report of June 29th of 2001 which would provide for the primary 
physical custody of the children, at least during the school year, to Mr. Lamusga. 
. . .  [¶]  [I]f [the mother] decides not to relocate, then the existing custodial 
arrangement will remain.” 
The mother appealed and the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment.  The 
Court of Appeal applied the deferential abuse of discretion standard of review we 
recognized in In re Marriage of Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th 25, 32:  “The precise 
measure is whether the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the order 
in question advanced the ‘best interest’ of the child.”  But the appellate court 
concluded that “although the [superior] court referred several times during the 
hearing to ‘best interest’ as the applicable standard, its order was not truly based 
on that criterion as it applies in the context of this custodial parent’s relocation.”  
The Court of Appeal concluded that the superior court “neither proceeded from the 
presumption that Mother had a right to change the residence of the children, nor 
took into account this paramount need for stability and continuity in the existing 
custodial arrangement.  Instead, it placed undue emphasis on the detriment that 
 
13
would be caused to the children’s relationship with Father if they moved.”  We 
granted review. 
Shortly after we granted review, the mother filed a notice of abandonment 
of her appeal, supported by a declaration stating that she no longer intended to 
move to Ohio, but intended to move to Arizona instead.  She asked this court to 
dismiss the appeal.  The father objected.  We denied the mother’s motion to 
dismiss the appeal.  The mother’s counsel later sent to this court a copy of a letter 
dated July 8, 2003, informing the father that the mother and their children had 
moved to Arizona.  Upon the request of the mother, and without objection by the 
father, we have taken judicial notice of an order of the superior court filed on 
August 29, 2003, permitting the children to live with the mother in Arizona 
“temporarily” pending our ruling in the present proceedings. 
Despite the fact that it appears that the mother no longer intends to move to 
Ohio, the matter under review is not moot.  It remains possible that the mother 
could chose to move to Ohio, and she has changed the residence of the children to 
Arizona.  Accordingly, the issue of whether it is in the children’s best interests to 
modify the custody order if the mother changes the residence of the children is not 
moot.  In any event, we may decline to dismiss a case that has become moot 
“where the appeal raises issues of continuing public importance.  [Citations.]”  
(Lundquist v. Reusser (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1193, 1202, fn. 8.)  This appeal certainly 
does. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
In In re Marriage of Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th 25 (Burgess), the mother 
was awarded temporary sole physical custody of the couple’s two children upon 
the dissolution of their marriage.  Seven months later, the mother informed the 
court that she had accepted a job transfer and planned to move with the children to 
Lancaster, California, which was about a 40-minute drive from the couple’s 
 
14
former home in Tehachapi.  She explained that her new job would be “career 
advancing” and that moving to Lancaster would afford the children greater access 
to medical care, extracurricular activities, private schools, and day care facilities.  
The father objected and asked that sole physical custody of the children be 
transferred to him, contending that he could not maintain his current visitation 
schedule if the children moved to Lancaster. 
The superior court awarded the mother sole physical custody of the 
children and modified the father’s visitation schedule.  The court found “ ‘that it is 
in the best interest of the minor children that the minors be permitted to move to 
Lancaster with the [mother] and that the [father] be afforded liberal visitation.’ ”  
(Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 30.)   The father appealed and the Court of 
Appeal reversed, holding that the mother had failed to sustain her burden of 
showing that moving the children to Lancaster was “ ‘reasonably necessary.’ ”  
(Id. at p. 31.)  We granted review and reversed the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal. 
We observed that “[i]n an initial custody determination, the trial court has 
‘the widest discretion to choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of the 
child.’  (Fam. Code, § 3040, subd. (b).)  It must look to all the circumstances 
bearing on the best interest of the minor child.  [Citation.]”  (Burgess, supra, 13 
Cal.4th at pp. 31-32.)  Citing Family Code section 7501, which states that “[a] 
parent entitled to custody of a child has a right to change the residence of the 
child, subject to the power of the court to restrain a removal that would prejudice 
the rights or welfare of the child,” we noted that the court must also consider “the 
presumptive right of a custodial parent to change the residence of the minor 
children, so long as the removal would not be prejudicial to their rights or welfare.  
[Citation.]  Accordingly, in considering all the circumstances affecting the ‘best 
 
15
interest’ of minor children, it may consider any effects of such relocation on their 
rights or welfare.”  (Burgess, supra, at p. 32.) 
In reviewing the superior court’s ruling, we applied “the deferential abuse 
of discretion test.”  “The precise measure is whether the trial court could have 
reasonably concluded that the order in question advanced the ‘best interest’ of the 
child.”  (Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 32.)  We concluded that the superior 
court had not abused its discretion.  “After extensive testimony from both parents, 
the trial court not unreasonably concluded that it was in the ‘best interest’ of the 
minor children that the father and the mother retain joint legal custody and that the 
mother retain sole physical custody, even if she moved to Lancaster.”  (Ibid.) 
We rejected the Court of Appeal’s holding that the mother was required to 
show that it was “necessary” for her to move to Lancaster:  “The trial court must 
— and here it did — consider, among other factors, the effects of relocation on the 
‘best interest’ of the minor children, including the health, safety, and welfare of 
the children and the nature and amount of contact with both parents.  [Citation.]  
We discern no statutory basis, however, for imposing a specific additional burden 
of persuasion on either parent to justify a choice of residence as a condition of 
custody.”  (Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 34.)  We observed that the statutory 
policy promoting “frequent and continuing contact with both parents” (Fam. Code, 
§ 3020) does not limit “the trial court’s broad discretion to determine, in light of 
all the circumstances, what custody arrangement serves the ‘best interest’ of minor 
children.”  (Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 34.)  Rather, we noted, Family Code 
section 3040, subdivision (b), expressly provides the court with “ ‘the widest 
discretion to choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of the child.’ ”  
(Burgess, supra, at pp. 34-35.) 
Although Burgess involved an initial determination of custody, we held that 
“the same conclusion applies when a parent who has sole physical custody under 
 
16
an existing judicial custody order seeks to relocate:  the custodial parent . . . bears 
no burden of demonstrating that the move is ‘necessary.’ ”  (Burgess, supra, 13 
Cal.4th at p. 37.)  But we recognized that, as with any allegation that “changed 
circumstances” warrant a modification of an existing custody order, the 
noncustodial parent has a substantial burden to show that “ ‘some significant 
change in circumstances indicates that a different arrangement would be in the 
child’s best interest.’  [Citation.]”  (Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 38.)  The 
changed circumstance rule provides “that once it has been established that a 
particular custodial arrangement is in the best interests of the child, the court need 
not reexamine that question.  Instead, it should preserve the established mode of 
custody unless some significant change in circumstances indicates that a different 
arrangement would be in the child’s best interest.  The rule thus fosters the dual 
goals of judicial economy and protecting stable custody arrangements.  
[Citations.]”  (Burchard v. Garay (1986) 42 Cal.3d 531, 535.)2  “In a ‘move-away’ 
case, a change of custody is not justified simply because the custodial parent has 
chosen, for any sound good faith reason, to reside in a different location, but only 
if, as a result of relocation with that parent, the child will suffer detriment 
rendering it ‘ “essential or expedient for the welfare of the child that there be a 
change.” ’  [Citation.]”  (Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 38.) 
                                             
 
2  
In his reply brief, the father argues that the changed circumstance rule does 
not apply in this case because there has not been “a final judicial custody 
determination.”  We do not agree.   The court’s December 23, 1996 “Order After 
Hearing,” granting joint legal custody to the parties and sole primary physical 
custody to the mother, constituted a final judicial custody determination that the 
court need not reconsider in the absence of changed circumstances.  Our holding 
in Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, cited by the father, involved a 
stipulated custody order, rather than an order following a hearing as in the present 
case, and does not alter our conclusion. 
 
17
We were quick to emphasize, however, that “bright line rules in this area 
are inappropriate:  each case must be evaluated on its own unique facts.  Although 
the interests of a minor child in the continuity and permanency of custodial 
placement with the primary caretaker will most often prevail, the trial court, in 
assessing ‘prejudice’ to the child’s welfare as a result of relocating even a distance 
of 40 or 50 miles, may take into consideration the nature of the child’s existing 
contact with both parents . . . and the child’s age, community ties, and health and 
educational needs.  Where appropriate, it must also take into account the 
preferences of the child.  [Citation.]”  (Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 39.)3 
Recently, the Legislature codified our decision in Burgess by amending 
Family Code section 7501 to add subdivision (b), which reads:  “It is the intent of 
the Legislature to affirm the decision in In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 25, and to declare that ruling to be the public policy and law of this state.”  
(Fam. Code, § 7501, as amended by Stats. 2003, ch. 674, § 1.) 
The Courts of Appeal have applied the rules we stated in Burgess on 
numerous occasions.  In all but two cases (In re Marriage of Williams (2001) 88 
Cal.App.4th 808 and In re Marriage of Campos (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 839, 
which are discussed below), the Courts of Appeal have affirmed the superior 
court’s exercise of discretion. 
In Cassady v. Signorelli (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 55, the Court of Appeal 
affirmed an order denying the mother’s request to change the residence of the 
                                             
 
3  
We noted that “[a] different analysis may be required when parents share 
joint physical custody of the minor children under an existing order and in fact, 
and one parent seeks to relocate with the minor children.”  (Burgess, supra, 13 
Cal.4th at p. 40, fn. 12.)  In such cases, if it is shown that the best interests of the 
children require modification or termination of the order, the court “must 
determine de novo what arrangement for primary custody is in the best interest of 
the minor children.”  (Ibid.) 
 
18
child to Florida so she could seek employment there as a “parapsychologist.”  The 
superior court had observed that the mother had no serious job prospects in Florida 
and that the proposed move “seemed intended simply to frustrate father’s 
relationship with” the child.  (Id. at p. 59.)  The Court of Appeal affirmed, stating:  
“We find no abuse of discretion . . . . The trial court could quite properly conclude 
it was in [the child’s] best interests to have continued regular visitation with her 
father, with whom she has a good relationship, and that a move to Florida would 
almost entirely frustrate this interest in a continued parental relationship.”  (Ibid.)  
Agreeing with the superior court that the mother “simply wishe[d] to get away 
from father by moving elsewhere” (id. at p. 60), the Court of Appeal reiterated that 
the proposed move was “an apparent pretext to defeat visitation.”  (Id. at p. 61.) 
In several cases, the Courts of Appeal have affirmed orders permitting a 
custodial parent to change the residence of a child.  In In re Marriage of Condon 
(1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 533, the superior court permitted the mother to return with 
the children to Australia where the couple had been married and the children were 
born.  Because the court found the balancing of factors “only slightly favor” 
permitting the mother to move the children to Australia, the court ruled that it 
would switch primary physical custody of the children to the father if the mother 
chose instead to relocate to France where she also had career opportunities.  
Among the factors considered by the superior court were the mother’s ability to 
financially support herself in Australia rather than be wholly dependent on the 
father for support; the impact of the parties’ stressful relationship on the children; 
the mother’s extensive family in Australia; the children’s primary emotional 
attachment to their mother; and the “children’s lack of a firm long-time base in 
California.”  (Id. at p. 539.)  The Court of Appeal affirmed in large part the 
superior court’s order, noting that “[g]reat deference must be given to the trial 
court’s adjudication of the facts” and commending the superior court’s “herculean 
 
19
efforts to fairly balance all the factors in the case.”  (Id. at p. 549; see also In re 
Marriage of Whealon (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 132 [affirming an order permitting 
the mother to move with her young child to Syracuse, New York to accept a new 
job].) 
In In re Marriage of Edlund & Hales (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1454, the 
Court of Appeal affirmed the superior court’s order permitting the mother to move 
with the child to Indiana, stating:  “After a thorough review of the record, we are 
satisfied that the trial court carefully considered all the factors bearing on [the 
child’s] best interest, and that its decision was supported by substantial evidence 
of the strength and primacy of the bond between [the child] and her mother, [the 
mother’s] proven ability to provide and care for [the child] on a full-time basis, 
and the overwhelming, undisputed proof that [the father] was not adequately 
prepared to assume primary physical custody of his daughter.”  (Id. at p. 1473-
1474.) 
In In re Marriage of Bryant (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 789, the superior court 
had awarded primary physical custody of the children to the mother, who intended 
to move to New Mexico, where she had been raised, to be with her family.  An 
evaluation conducted by a court-appointed expert showed that the mother was the 
“primary parent” and “had a greater level of involvement in the children’s lives” 
than did the father.  (Id. at p. 792.)  The superior court noted that “it would be 
detrimental to the children to make a ‘radical shift’ to [the father] as the primary 
parent.”  (Ibid.)  The superior court found that the mother was not motivated to 
move by bad faith and had not unreasonably interfered with the father’s visitation 
with the children. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed, recognizing that the superior court has 
“ ‘ “the widest discretion to choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of 
the child.” ’  [Citation.]  This requires the court to consider all the circumstances.”  
 
20
(In re Marriage of Bryant, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 793.)  The Court of Appeal 
also recognized the difficulty of the decision that faced the superior court:  
“Unfortunately where, as here, both parents are competent and loving, there is 
frequently no solution that is fair to everyone involved.”  (Id. at p. 794; In re 
Marriage of Lasich (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 702 [permitting the mother to return 
with the children to her native country of Spain]; In re Marriage of Abrams (2003) 
105 Cal.App.4th 979 [affirming an order permitting the mother to move with the 
children from Elk Grove, California (near Sacramento) to San Ramon, California 
(near San Francisco)].) 
The difficulty of the task facing the courts in these matters is exemplified 
by the quandary posed in In re Marriage of Abargil (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1294, 
which the Court of Appeal correctly observed would challenge the wisdom of 
King Solomon.  The parents were both Israeli citizens who came to the United 
States on tourist visas and overstayed.  They married and had a son.  When they 
separated, the child lived primarily with the mother and visited the father.  The 
mother returned to Israel to nurse her dying mother, taking the boy with her.  
While she was in Israel, the father filed for divorce.  When the mother attempted 
to return to California, she was barred from entering the United States for 10 years 
as a sanction for having overstayed her visa.  This sanction was stayed, however, 
to permit her to return to California to litigate the custody of the child.  The father 
asserted that he would be unable to visit his son if he moved to Israel, because the 
father was applying for permanent residency in the United States and could not 
leave the country for an extended time. 
Following a five-day trial, the court permitted the child to move to Israel 
with the mother, noting that she had been the child’s primary caregiver and finding 
that she was more likely to facilitate visitation with the father than if the parental 
roles were reversed.  (In re Marriage of Abargil, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at 
 
21
p. 1298.)  The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the superior court’s finding 
that moving to Israel with the mother was in the child’s best interests was 
supported by substantial evidence. 
In only two cases have the Courts of Appeal reversed the superior court’s 
exercise of discretion, and both cases involved unusual circumstances. 
In In re Marriage of Williams, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th 808, the superior 
court permitted two of the couple’s four children to move to Utah with their 
mother, but ordered the other two children to remain in Santa Barbara with their 
father.  This apparent attempt at compromise pleased no one.  On appeal by the 
father, both parents asserted that the superior court abused its discretion.  The 
Court of Appeal agreed, holding that the superior court’s order was not supported 
by “compelling circumstances warranting the separation of the siblings.”  (Id. at p. 
810.)  The Court of Appeal noted, however:  “Had the family law court allowed all 
of the children to either reside in Santa Barbara or move to Utah, we could easily 
affirm on the deferential standard of appellate review.  [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 813.) 
The other case in which the Court of Appeal reversed the superior court 
was In re Marriage of Campos, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th 839.  The father in that 
case sought modification of a child custody and visitation order relating to his 
sons, aged 15 and 12, after their mother announced she would move with the 
children from Santa Barbara to Moorpark, about two hours away by car.  The 
superior court summarily denied the request, finding that the mother did not have a 
bad faith reason for the move.  The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the 
matter for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the proposed move would 
be detrimental to the welfare of the children.  The Court of Appeal recognized that 
even when the custodial parent has a good faith reason for the proposed move, “a 
change of custody may be ordered in a ‘move away’ case where, as a result of the 
move, the children will suffer detriment rendering a change of custody essential or 
 
22
expedient for their welfare.”  (Id. at p. 843.)  “In a move away case, the trial court 
must always consider whether a custodial parent is acting in bad faith.  [Citation.]  
It must also always consider whether ‘as a result of relocation with [the custodial] 
parent, the child will suffer detriment rendering it “ ‘essential or expedient for the 
welfare of the child that there be a change.’ ” ’  [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 844.) 
The Court of Appeal in the present case held that the superior court abused 
its discretion in ordering that primary physical custody of the children would be 
transferred to the father if the mother moved to Ohio.  The Court of Appeal 
concluded that the superior court “neither proceeded from the presumption that 
Mother had a right to change the residence of the children, nor took into account 
this paramount need for stability and continuity in the existing custodial 
arrangement.  Instead, it placed undue emphasis on the detriment that would be 
caused to the children’s relationship with Father if they moved.”  We disagree. 
We reaffirm our statement in Burgess that “the paramount need for 
continuity and stability in custody arrangements – and the harm that may result 
from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional bonds with the 
primary caretaker – weigh heavily in favor of maintaining ongoing custody 
arrangements.  [Citations.]”  (Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 32-33.)  But there 
is nothing in the record before us that indicates that the superior court failed to 
consider the children’s “interest in stable custodial and emotional ties” with their 
mother.  (Burchard v. Garay, supra, 42 Cal.3d 531, 536.)  The court carefully 
considered the comprehensive reports prepared by Dr. Stahl and the evidence 
submitted by both parties.  The court placed “primary importance” on the effect 
the proposed move would have on “what is now a tenuous and somewhat detached 
relationship with the boys and their father,” concluding that the proposed move 
would be “extremely detrimental” to the children’s welfare because it would 
disrupt the progress being made by the children’s therapist in promoting this 
 
23
relationship.  The superior court found that it was “realistic” to be concerned that 
the proposed move could result in the relationship between the father and the 
children “being lost.”  In future cases, courts would do well to state on the record 
that they have considered this interest in stability, but the lack of such a statement 
does not constitute error and does not indicate that the court failed to properly 
discharge its duties.  (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133 
[“A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all 
intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness”].) 
Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeal, the superior court did 
not place “undue emphasis” on the detriment to the children’s relationship with 
their father that would be caused by the proposed move.  The weight to be 
accorded to such factors must be left to the court’s sound discretion.  The Court of 
Appeal erred in substituting its judgment for that of the superior court. 
Noting that the superior court relied on the history of animosity between the 
parents, and the mother’s failure to foster and encourage a healthy relationship 
between the children and their father, the Court of Appeal quoted the superior 
court’s comment:  “ ‘Clearly if the parties had been co-parenting with the children 
and cooperative in this matter, under those circumstances there might well be a 
presumptive right’ for Mother to relocate with the children.”  The Court of Appeal 
concluded that the superior court improperly punished the mother for her past 
conduct by transferring primary physical custody of the children to their father.  
We disagree. 
The Court of Appeal correctly noted that the superior court’s function in 
determining custody is not to reward or punish the parents for their past conduct, 
but to determine what is in the best interests of the children.  (In re Marriage of 
Condon, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th 533, 553.)  But this does not mean that the court 
may not consider the past conduct of the parents in determining what future 
 
24
arrangement will be best for the children.  (See In re Marriage of Abargil, supra, 
106 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1299 [finding that the mother respected the father’s 
relationship with his son and was likely to foster continuing contact between them, 
noting her past efforts to nurture that relationship, and contrasting the father’s 
disparagement of the mother’s parenting skills]; In re Marriage of Lasich, supra, 
99 Cal.App.4th 702, 719 [noting that the mother had never tried to block the father 
from exercising his visitation rights]; In re Marriage of Bryant, supra, 91 
Cal.App.4th 789, 792 [noting in permitting a change of the child’s residence that 
the mother had not “unreasonably interfered with [the father’s] visitation with the 
children].)  Clearly, the court must consider the past conduct of the parents in 
fashioning a custody order that serves the best interests of the children. 
In the present case, the superior court recognized that “[t]he issue is not 
whether either of these parents are competent and qualified to be custodial parents 
. . . . [¶] The question is whether . . . the best interests of the children is served by 
relocating with Mother to Ohio, or whether the best interests are served by . . . a 
change of physical custody if [the mother] is to relocate.”  There is nothing in the 
record before us that indicates the superior court acted out of a desire to punish or 
reward either parent.  But the mother’s past conduct indicated that it was unlikely 
that she would follow through on her promises to encourage the children’s 
relationship with their father if they moved to Ohio.  Dr. Stahl testified that “there 
is no evidence that I’ve seen in the five years that I’ve known this family that [the 
mother] will really do what she said she will do.  In terms of being supportive of 
the boys’ relationship with their father in a way that truly will reduce the loyalty 
conflicts and truly will help them . . . feel better about things with him.” 
The superior court did misspeak, however, in stating that the mother might 
have had a presumptive right to relocate with the children if the parents had co-
parented cooperatively.  The mother — as the parent with primary physical 
 
25
custody of the children — had a presumptive right to change the children’s 
residence unless the proposed move “would result in ‘prejudice’ to [the children’s] 
‘rights or welfare.’ [Citation.]”  (Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 38.)  But we are 
convinced, after examining the entire record, that the court’s imperfect choice of 
words in this single regard does not indicate that the court misperceived the 
standard for determining the question before it.  The court was correct that the 
situation might have been far different had the parents shown a history of 
cooperative parenting.  If that had been the case, it might have appeared more 
likely that the detrimental effects of the proposed move on the children’s 
relationship with their father could have been ameliorated by the mother’s efforts 
to foster and encourage frequent, positive contact between the children and their 
father.  But the court reasonably concluded that the present case presented the 
opposite situation.  The parents’ history of animosity and the mother’s consistent 
attempts to limit contact between the children and their father indicated that the 
proposed move would be detrimental to the children.  Essentially, the court 
concluded that the mother’s past conduct made it unlikely that she would facilitate 
the difficult task of maintaining the father’s long-distance relationship with the 
boys. 
The Court of Appeal was concerned about the superior court’s reliance 
upon the detriment to the children’s relationship with their father that would be 
caused by the proposed move, because “[t]here is inevitably a significant 
detriment to the relationship between the child and the noncustodial parent” 
whenever the custodial parent relocates with the children.  The Court of Appeal 
observed that “if evidence of some detriment due to geographical separation were 
to mandate a change of custody, the primary custodial parent would never be able 
to relocate.”  We agree.  We do not suggest that a showing that a proposed move 
will cause detriment to the relationship between the children and the noncustodial 
 
26
parent mandates a change in custody.  But it is within the wide discretion of the 
superior court to order a change of custody based upon such detriment, if such a 
change is in the best interests of the children in light of all the relevant factors. 
It is instructive to compare the present case to In re Marriage of Edlund & 
Hales, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th 1454, which involved similar circumstances.  The 
mother in Edlund wished to move with her child to another state where her fiancé 
had accepted a job and was already living and where they would have a lower cost 
of living, allowing her to stay at home with her children rather than working full 
time outside the home.  A mediator found that “ ‘the mother does not appear to 
have negative motives for the move, i.e., [to] frustrate contact between the father 
and the child’ ” (id. at p. 1459) and an evaluator opined that the mother “was 
sincere about her reasons for moving” (id. at p. 1462).  Significantly, the court 
relied upon the evaluator’s opinion that the mother had not attempted to limit the 
father’s visitation in the past, noting that the mother “ ‘did not express any anger 
or upset’ ” with the father and “ ‘acknowledged the importance of his role as 
Natalie’s father. She endorsed their relationship and believes it is paramount for 
them to continue to have a strong bond. There is no evidence that [the mother] has 
frustrated or endeavored to limit or prohibit [the father’s] custodial time with 
Natalie in the past.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Finally, the evaluator noted that the father “ ‘would 
experience great difficulty’ ” if he were given primary physical custody of the 
child.  (Id. at p. 1463.)  Although the superior court questioned the mother’s 
judgment, it permitted the mother to change the residence of the child. 
The Court of Appeal in Edlund affirmed, concluding that the superior court 
had not abused its discretion:  “After a thorough review of the record, we are 
satisfied that the trial court carefully considered all the factors bearing on Natalie’s 
best interest, and that its decision was supported by substantial evidence of the 
strength and primacy of the bond between Natalie and her mother, [the mother’s] 
 
27
proven ability to provide and care for Natalie on a full-time basis, and the 
overwhelming, undisputed proof that [the father] was not adequately prepared to 
assume primary physical custody of his daughter. Thus, we conclude the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion by issuing a move-away order in the circumstances of 
this case.”  (In re Marriage of Edlund & Hales, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1473-
1474.) 
The Edlund court considered the detriment to the child’s relationship with 
her father that was likely to result from the move, but correctly concluded that, 
under the circumstances of that case, this was insufficient to alter its holding:  “we 
cannot imagine a case in which a child with any meaningful relationship with the 
noncustodial parent would not be ‘significantly negatively impacted’ by a good 
faith decision by a custodial parent to move, over the noncustodial parent’s 
objection, to a distant location. But if the evidence of ‘detriment’ contained in [the 
evaluator’s] report were sufficient to support denial of a move-away order in this 
case, no primary custodial parent would ever be able to secure such an order.”  (In 
re Marriage of Edlund & Hales, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 1472.) 
We agree that, considering all of the circumstances in Edlund, the superior 
court in that case did not abuse its discretion in permitting the change in the 
child’s residence, but the Court of Appeal in Edlund may have inadvertently 
generated some confusion when it stated as a general conclusion:  “The showing 
of ‘changed circumstances’ required of the noncustodial parent must consist of 
more than the fact of the proposed move.”  (In re Marriage of Edlund & Hales, 
supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 1469.)  If we interpret this statement narrowly, it 
certainly is true.  The mere fact that the custodial parent proposes to change the 
residence of the child does not automatically constitute “changed circumstances” 
that require a reevaluation of an existing custody order.  A proposed change in the 
residence of a child can run the gamut from a move across the street to a relocation 
 
28
to another continent.  As we have noted, the noncustodial parent has the burden of 
showing that the planned move will cause detriment to the child in order for the 
court to reevaluate an existing custody order. 
But some courts have mistakenly interpreted the above quoted statement in 
Edlund more broadly to mean that the likely consequences of a proposed move 
can never constitute changed circumstances that justify a reevaluation of an 
existing custody order.  (In re Marriage of Abrams, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th 979, 
988 [“it is not enough to show the child has a meaningful relationship with the 
noncustodial parent and will be ‘negatively impacted’ by the custodial parent’s 
good faith decision to move. If this were sufficient to support denial of a move-
away order, no primary custodial parent would ever be able to secure such an 
order”]; In re Marriage of Lasich, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th 702, 711 [“Relocation 
alone cannot prove detriment because no move-away request could succeed under 
that standard,” citing In re Marriage of Edlund & Hales, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th 
1454].)  This is incorrect.  The likely consequences of a proposed change in the 
residence of a child, when considered in the light of all the relevant factors, may 
constitute a change of circumstances that warrants a change in custody, and the 
detriment to the child’s relationship with the noncustodial parent that will be 
caused by the proposed move, when considered in light of all the relevant factors, 
may warrant denying a request to change the child’s residence or changing 
custody.  The extent to which a proposed move will detrimentally impact a child 
varies greatly depending upon the circumstances.  We will generally leave it to the 
superior court to assess that impact in light of the other relevant factors in 
determining what is in the best interests of the child. 
The Court of Appeal in the present case held that the father bore the burden 
of showing “that modification of custody is essential for the child’s welfare,” 
citing our statement in Burgess that a change of custody in a move-away case is 
 
29
justified “only if, as a result of relocation with that parent, the child will suffer 
detriment rendering it ‘ “essential or expedient for the welfare of the child that 
there be a change.” ’  [Citation.]”  (Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th 25, 38.)  It is 
significant that the Court of Appeal reduced the phrase “essential or expedient” 
that we used in Burgess to simply “essential.”  In doing so, the Court of Appeal 
placed too great a burden on the noncustodial parent in a move-away case. 
The phrase “essential or expedient” in Burgess derives from the opinion in 
Washburn v. Washburn (1942) 49 Cal.App.2d 581, 587, which held that a change 
of custody could be ordered only “where adequate cause therefore arises out of 
changed conditions.”  The Washburn court stated:  “Generally speaking, there may 
be no change in the custody provisions of a decree unless the material facts and 
circumstances occurring subsequently are of a kind to render it essential or 
expedient for the welfare of the child that there be a change.”  (Id. at p. 588.)  The 
court further noted that “[i]n custody cases the underlying principle, paramount to 
all others, is the welfare and best interests of the child” (id. at p. 587) and “each 
case must be solved on its own facts.”  (Id. at p. 588.)  Neither Washburn nor 
Burgess imposes upon the noncustodial parent an artificial requirement to prove 
that a change in custody is “essential.”  Both cases recognize that the paramount 
concern is the welfare and best interests of the child.  A change in custody is 
“essential or expedient” within the meaning of Burgess, therefore, if it is in the 
best interests of the child. 
The Court of Appeal in the present case further concluded that the superior 
court improperly used its conditional order transferring primary physical custody 
to the father as a device to restrain the mother from relocating.  We agree that a 
court must not issue such a conditional order for the purpose of coercing the 
custodial parent into abandoning plans to relocate.  Nor should a court issue such 
an order expecting that the order will not take effect because the custodial parent 
 
30
will choose not to relocate rather than lose primary physical custody of the 
children.  But there is nothing in the record before us that indicates the superior 
court did so in the present case.  The father had long sought joint physical custody 
or, barring that, increased visitation, and the superior court had slowly but 
consistently increased the time the children spent at their father’s residence.  The 
court found that both parties were “good enough” parents to their children.  There 
is nothing to indicate that the order transferring primary physical custody of the 
children to the father if the mother relocated was issued to coerce the mother into 
abandoning her plans to move. 
The mother places great emphasis on the superior court’s finding that she 
was not acting in “bad faith.”  The father contends that the “bad faith test” 
announced in Burgess “is generally unworkable.”  We discussed good faith and 
bad faith in two footnotes in our opinion in Burgess. 
In rejecting the argument that a parent who wishes to change the residence 
of a child bears the burden of proving the move is “necessary,” we noted that such 
a rule would encourage costly litigation and would “require the trial courts to 
‘micromanage’ family decisionmaking by second-guessing reasons for everyday 
decisions about career and family.”  (Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 36.)  In a 
footnote, we observed that “the parties continue to dispute whether the mother’s 
change of employment was merely a ‘lateral’ move or was ‘career enhancing.’  
The point is immaterial.  Once the trial court determined that the mother did not 
relocate in order to frustrate the father’s contact with the minor children, but did so 
for sound ‘good faith’ reasons, it was not required to inquire further into the 
wisdom of her inherently subjective decisionmaking.”  (Id. at p. 36, fn. 5.) 
We then stated that a decision to change a child’s residence ordinarily does 
not reflect upon the parent’s suitability to retain primary physical custody.  We 
pointed out in another footnote, however:  “An obvious exception is a custodial 
 
31
parent’s decision to relocate simply to frustrate the noncustodial parent’s contact 
with the minor children. . . . Even if the custodial parent is otherwise ‘fit,’ such 
bad faith conduct may be relevant to a determination of what permanent custody 
arrangement is in the minor children’s best interest.  [Citations.]”  (Burgess, supra, 
13 Cal.4th at p. 36, fn. 6.) 
We referenced these discussions of good faith and bad faith in our 
formulation of the rule:  “In a ‘move-away’ case, a change of custody is not 
justified simply because the custodial parent has chosen, for any sound good faith 
reason, to reside in a different location, but only if, as a result of relocation with 
that parent, the child will suffer detriment rendering it ‘ “essential or expedient for 
the welfare of the child that there be a change.” ’ ”  (Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at 
p. 38.) 
The Courts of Appeal have correctly applied these rules, but in one 
published decision the Court of Appeal overstated the importance of an absence of 
bad faith. 
In In re Marriage of Bryant, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 789, the superior court 
awarded primary physical custody to the mother who intended to move with the 
children to New Mexico to be with her family.  A custody evaluation revealed that 
the mother had been the “primary parent,” having had “a greater level of 
involvement in the children’s lives” than the father and that it would be 
“detrimental to the children to make a ‘radical shift’ to [the father] as the primary 
parent.”  (Id. at p. 792.)  The evaluator saw no reason to believe that the move 
would end the children’s relationship with their father.  The superior court found 
that the mother “was not motivated to move by bad faith” and had not 
“unreasonably interfered with [the father’s] visitation with the children.”  (Ibid.) 
The Court of Appeal affirmed, correctly noting that “the trial court has 
‘ “the widest discretion to choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of the 
 
32
child.” ’  [Citation.] This requires the court to consider all the circumstances.”  (In 
re Marriage of Bryant, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 789, 793.)  But the Court of Appeal 
went on to overstate the importance of the superior court’s finding that the mother 
was not acting in bad faith, holding that that once the superior court found that the 
mother was not acting in bad faith, “[n]o further inquiry [into the reasons for the 
proposed move] was necessary or appropriate.”  (Id. at p. 794.)  Rejecting the 
father’s contention that the court should “consider the reason for the move in light 
of the circumstances of the case,” the Court of Appeal stated: “except to show that 
the move is not in bad faith, the reason is irrelevant.”  (Id. at p. 795.)4 
This is not what we said in Burgess; we said simply that a finding that a 
reason for the proposed move constitutes bad faith “may be relevant” in 
determining custody arrangements.  (Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 36, fn. 6.)  
While we noted that the court need not evaluate the wisdom of the custodial 
parent’s decisionmaking (id. at p. 36, fn. 5), we did not say that the reasons for a 
proposed move are irrelevant if the custodial parent is acting in good faith. 
Absolute concepts of good faith versus bad faith often are difficult to apply 
because human beings may act for a complex variety of sometimes conflicting 
motives.  As the superior court in the present case observed after finding that the 
mother was not acting in bad faith because she had legitimate reasons for the move 
                                             
 
4  
In Cassady v. Signorelli, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th 55, the Court of Appeal 
commented on the wisdom of the mother’s proposal to move with her child to 
Florida to pursue a career as a parapsychologist, referring to the “mother’s 
somewhat whimsical plans,” but it is clear from a full reading of the opinion that 
the appellate court affirmed the superior court’s denial of the mother’s request to 
move the child’s residence because it agreed that the mother was not seriously 
seeking employment as a parapsychologist and “simply wishe[d] to get away from 
father by moving elsewhere.”  (Id. at p. 60.)  Although the Court of Appeal did not 
use the term “bad faith,” it concluded that the mother’s proposed move was “an 
apparent pretext to defeat visitation.”  (Id. at p. 61.) 
 
33
and was not acting for the specific purpose of limiting the father’s contact with his 
children:  “I think it’s far more subtle than that . . . .”  As Dr. Stahl stated in his 
evaluation:  “On the surface, the reasons for the move are clear.  [The mother] has 
always wanted to move to Ohio to be closer to her sister and family. . . .  [Her 
husband] has received a good job opportunity in Cleveland, which he has taken.  
Their economic standard of living, and the inherent quality of life, will improve 
under such circumstances.  All of these are reasonable reasons to make the move.  
[¶]  Underneath, however, it has always appeared that [the mother] has wanted to 
move so that she can remove herself and take the boys from the day-to-day 
interactions with [the father].  She has difficulty dealing with him and prefers to 
have as little communication with him as possible.” 
Even if the custodial parent has legitimate reasons for the proposed change 
in the child’s residence and is not acting simply to frustrate the noncustodial 
parent’s contact with the child, the court still may consider whether one reason for 
the move is to lessen the child’s contact with the noncustodial parent and whether 
that indicates, when considered in light of all the relevant factors, that a change in 
custody would be in the child’s best interests.5 
The foregoing cases, many of which involve heart-wrenching 
circumstances, remind us that this area of law is not amenable to inflexible rules.  
Rather, we must permit our superior court judges — guided by statute and the 
principles we announced in Burgess and affirm in the present case — to exercise 
their discretion to fashion orders that best serve the interests of the children in the 
                                             
 
5  
We have no occasion in this case to consider circumstances in which a 
reason for a proposed move is to minimize contact with a noncustodial parent who 
has engaged in a pattern of abuse of the custodial parent or the children or who has 
a substance abuse problem. 
 
34
cases before them.  Among the factors that the court ordinarily should consider 
when deciding whether to modify a custody order in light of the custodial parent’s 
proposal to change the residence of the child are the following:  the children’s 
interest in stability and continuity in the custodial arrangement; the distance of the 
move; the age of the children; the children’s relationship with both parents; the 
relationship between the parents including, but not limited to, their ability to 
communicate and cooperate effectively and their willingness to put the interests of 
the children above their individual interests; the wishes of the children if they are 
mature enough for such an inquiry to be appropriate; the reasons for the proposed 
move; and the extent to which the parents currently are sharing custody. 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the matter is 
remanded to that court with directions to affirm the superior court’s postjudgment 
order transferring custody of the children to the father if the mother moves to 
Ohio.  On remand, the superior court  should consider the views expressed in this 
opinion and may consider the parties’ present circumstances in issuing any further 
custody and visitation order. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
BROWN, J. 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
A mother who had been the primary caretaker of her two children since 
their birth, and who had never violated the trial court’s visitation orders, wanted to 
provide a better life for her children by moving with them to another state where 
she had relatives and where her new husband had accepted a better paying job.  
Concerned that his tenuous relationship with the children would be weakened, the 
children’s father objected.  After a hearing, the trial court ordered that custody of 
the children be transferred to the father in the event the mother moved.  The 
majority holds the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling.  I disagree. 
When it explained its ruling, the trial court said that moving the children to 
another state could damage the children’s relationship with their father, but the 
court never mentioned the potential harm to the children from losing their mother 
as their primary caretaker, despite undisputed evidence that this harm would be 
significant.  The majority acknowledges that the trial court was required to 
consider this detriment—indeed it acknowledges “ ‘the paramount need for 
continuity and stability in custody arrangements’ ” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 22, italics 
added)—but it assumes the trial court adequately considered this point. 
In a matter of this importance, involving the custody and welfare of minor 
children, a reviewing court should not make such a speculative assumption.  When 
a trial court’s explanation for exercising its discretion in a particular way does not 
mention a critical matter that the court was bound to consider, and does not 
accurately state the controlling legal standard, a reviewing court cannot simply 
 
2
ignore these omissions.  When, as here, the appellate record raises substantial 
doubts that the trial court applied the proper legal principles and policies that 
should have guided its decision, reversal is required. 
I 
In May 1996, Susan Navarro (the mother) petitioned the superior court to 
dissolve her marriage to Gary LaMusga (the father) and to obtain custody of their 
two young children.  The father requested joint legal and physical custody.  
Pending final determination of the custody issue, the children remained in the 
family home with the mother, and the father established his own separate 
residence.  The court appointed Philip Stahl, Ph.D., a psychologist, to conduct a 
custody evaluation.  Pending this evaluation, the parties agreed to a visitation 
schedule for the father. 
During the initial custody evaluation, the mother told Stahl she wanted to 
move with the children to Ohio, where she had grown up, to be closer to her 
relatives and to take advantage of a lower cost of living.  Stahl advised against the 
move because of the children’s ages (then four and two) and their need to establish 
a stronger relationship with their father before relocating.  Accepting this 
recommendation, the mother voluntarily postponed her plans. 
In December 1996, the trial court awarded primary physical custody to the 
mother, with continued visitation for the father.  Over the next four years, the 
mother obeyed all court orders for visitation and frequently stipulated to increases 
in the father’s visitation time with the children.  During this time, both parties 
remarried.  The mother married Todd Navarro and they had a daughter, Aisley.  
The father’s new wife had a daughter from her previous marriage. 
In April 1999, the mother and the father stipulated to a second evaluation 
by Stahl to determine how the children were doing, whether any change in the 
custody timeshare was appropriate, and whether counseling for the children or the 
 
3
parties was indicated.  Stahl’s report, submitted in February 2001, expressed the 
view that although the children had a good relationship with the mother, their 
primary caretaker, they did not get along well with the father.  In Stahl’s opinion, 
the children’s difficulties with the father were partly the mother’s fault.  Although 
she was not intentionally subverting the relationship, Stahl thought the mother was 
unconsciously contributing to the children’s alienation from their father by telling 
them too much about her disputes with the father and by overindulging them when 
they expressed negative emotions about the father.  Stahl also placed part of the 
blame on the father, observing that he “is somewhat self-centered and doesn’t 
seem to deal with the boys’ feelings that well” and that “he is a bit detached from 
them and has a hard time interacting with them when they are with him, even 
though he tries reasonably well.” 
To remedy this situation, Stahl suggested having the children spend fewer 
but longer blocks of time with their father during the school year, and equal blocks 
of time during holidays and during the summer.  He also recommended that all 
disputes be referred to mediation “so that [the parents] can learn problem solving 
skills and learn to deal with disputes away from their children,” and so that they 
“learn to disengage from their conflict by trying to parallel parent the boys.”  He 
explained:  “With parallel parenting, each parent will strive to do the best job of 
parenting the boys during the time they are in their respective care, and relinquish 
the boys to the other parent during the time they are in the other parent’s care.” 
In February 2001, the mother requested a modification of the custody order 
by allowing her to relocate with the boys to Ohio, where her new husband had 
obtained a better paying job.  In March 2001, the trial court ordered a focused 
evaluation on the mother’s relocation request from Stahl.  In a supplemental 
report, submitted in June 2001, Stahl noted that if the mother moved with the 
children to Ohio, “[t]heir economic standard of living, and the inherent quality of 
 
4
life, will improve . . . .”  He also acknowledged that ordering a custody change to 
the father would have a significant detrimental effect on the children:  “They have 
been in the primary care of their mother since their parents’ divorce and they will 
likely have a significant loss [if] she moves without them.  They also have a very 
close relationship with their sister, Aisley, as well as with Todd, and they will feel 
those losses as well.  Third, they certainly have their own desire to move. . . .  If 
they don’t move, they’re likely to feel that their wishes aren’t being heard. . . .  On 
top of that, they’re likely to blame their dad, potentially increasing their rejection 
of their dad if forced to stay in California.”  Stahl also expressed concern, 
however, that a move to Ohio could further weaken the children’s relationship 
with the father.  Stahl characterized this relationship as “tenuous at best.” 
At an August 2001 hearing, the trial court denied the mother’s request to 
have her sons move with her, and it ordered a transfer of custody to the father if 
the mother relocated.  The court said it was making this order “to reinforce what is 
now a tenuous and somewhat detached relationship with the boys and their 
father.”  In explaining its ruling, the court never mentioned the detriment that the 
boys were likely to suffer in the event of a custody change from the mother to the 
father. 
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the trial court had erred by not 
considering the detriment to the children that would result from a change in 
custody. 
This court granted review. 
II 
A parent with custody of minor children has a “presumptive right” to 
change the children’s residence.  (In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 
32, 38; see also Fam. Code, § 7501.)  A noncustodial parent opposing such a 
change of residence bears the initial burden of showing that the move will cause 
 
5
some detriment to the children.  (In re Marriage of Burgess, supra, at p. 37.)  
Once this showing of detriment has been made, the trial court must then weigh the 
likely effects on the child’s welfare from moving with the custodial parent, against 
the likely effects from a change in custody.  (Id. at pp. 38-39.)  Only if the child’s 
interests are better served by changing custody than by relocating with the 
custodial parent may a court order custody transferred to the other parent.  (Ibid.) 
Here, the trial court’s explanation for its ruling shows that it properly 
considered how relocation to Ohio might detrimentally affect the children—
including the impact on their tenuous relationship with their father.  But the trial 
court was also required to weigh this detriment against the detriment that would 
result from removing the boys from the mother’s custody.  This the court did not 
do.  In its statement of reasons, the court said:  “So I don’t think that I have any 
real question as to the qualifications or competence of either parent, that is not the 
issue before me.  The issue is the effect on these children of relocating, and the 
effect of the relationship with their father if they are permitted to relocate.”  
(Italics added.)  But the effect of the relocation on the children’s relationship with 
the father was not the issue before the court.  Rather, it was just one of the 
potential detriments shown by the evidence that the trial court was required to 
consider.  Equally important was the potential detriment from disrupting the 
existing custodial arrangement by transferring custody from the mother to the 
father. 
This court has stressed that the “the paramount need for continuity and 
stability in custody arrangements—and the harm that may result from disruption 
of established patterns of care and emotional bonds with the primary caretaker—
weigh heavily in favor of maintaining ongoing custody arrangements.”  (In re 
Marriage of Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 32-33.)  Here, the trial court’s 
 
6
explanation for its ruling provides no assurance that the trial court gave any weight 
to the importance of continuity and stability in custody arrangements. 
The trial court’s ruling on this custody issue is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  (In re Marriage of Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 32)  “The courts 
have never ascribed to judicial discretion a potential without restraint.”  (People v. 
Russel (1968) 69 Cal.2d 187, 194.)  Rather, “all exercises of legal discretion must 
be grounded in reasoned judgment and guided by legal principles and policies 
appropriate to the particular matter at issue.”  (Id. at p. 195; accord, People v. 
Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977.)  Thus, a trial court abuses 
its discretion whenever it applies the wrong legal standard to the issue at hand.  
(Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435-436 [a discretionary order 
based upon improper criteria or incorrect assumptions must be reversed]; In re 
Carmaleta B. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 482, 496 [“discretion can only be truly exercised if 
there is no misconception by the trial court as to the legal basis for its action”].)  It 
follows that a reviewing court must examine the trial court’s stated reasons for an 
exercise of discretion to determine whether those reasons reflect a correct 
understanding of the relevant legal standards and principles.  (See, e.g., Linder v. 
Thrifty Oil Co., supra, 23 Cal.4th 429.) 
Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, the majority says 
that “nothing in the record before us indicates that the superior court failed to 
consider the children’s ‘interest in stable custodial and emotional ties’ with their 
mother.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 22.)  But it is equally true that nothing in the 
record indicates that the court did consider this interest.  The majority goes on to 
state, “In future cases, courts would do well to state on the record that they have 
considered this interest in stability, but the lack of such statement does not 
constitute error and does not indicate that the court failed to properly discharge its 
duties.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 23.)  I disagree.  In the absence of such a statement, 
 
7
or some other evidence in the record showing that the trial court affirmatively 
considered and weighed the required factors, I cannot conclude that the trial court 
properly exercised its discretion. 
III 
Like the Court of Appeal, I conclude in this case that “[t]he [trial] court’s 
remarks do not reflect a true ‘best interest’ of the child custody evaluation because 
they do not give any weight to the presumption favoring continuation of the 
existing custodial arrangement so that the stability and continuity of the child’s 
environment is not disrupted.”  Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal reversing and remanding to the trial court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
 
1
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Marriage of LaMusga 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 5/10/02 - 1st Dist., Div. 5 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S107355 
Date Filed: April 29, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Contra Costa 
Judge: Terence L. Bruiniers 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Law Office of Kim M. Robinson, Kim M. Robinson and Eric H. Zagrans for Appellant. 
 
Vicky L. Barker and Marci Fukuroda for California Women’s Law Center, California Women Lawyers, 
Coalition for Family Equity, California Federation of Business and Professional Women, California 
National Organization for Women, The Feminist Majority Foundation, Children Now, California Alliance 
Against Domestic Violence, National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, National Network to End 
Domestic Violence, San Francisco Women Lawyer’s Alliance, Queen’s Bench Bar Association of the San 
Francisco Bay Area, Women Lawyers Association of Los Angeles, Lawyers Club of San Diego, Women 
For:, National Council of Jewish Women/Los Angeles, Women’s Equal Rights Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, Asian Pacific American Legal Center, Arizona Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 
Iowa Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Minnesota Program Development Inc., New Jersey Coalition 
for Battered Women and Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Appellant. 
 
Law Offices of Joanne Schulman and Joanne Schulman for Margaret A. Gannon, Cheryl Sena, Carole 
Cullum, Joanne Schulman, Deborah Appel, Patricia Wagner, Leslie Knight, Gloria Sandoval, Stand! 
Against Domestic Violence, Roy F. Malahowski, Barbara Hart, Lynne Arrowsmith, Nina Balsam, Andrea 
Farney, Diane Post and Anne Thorkelson as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellant. 
 
Law Offices of Tony J. Tanke and Tony J. Tanke for Judith S. Wallersten, Paulina F. Kernberg, Joyanna 
Lee Silberg, Julia M. Lewis, John B. Sikorski and Stephanie Joan Dallam as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Appellant. 
 
Carol S. Bruch, Scott Altman, Edward Imwinkelried and Mary Ann Mason for Herma Hill Kay, Grace 
Ganz Blumberg, Carol S. Bruch, Janice E. Kosel, Frances Olsen, Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Mary Ann Mason, 
D. Kelly Weisberg, Jan C. Costello, Sheila James Kuehl, John E. B. Myers, Lisa C. Ikemoto, Scott Altman 
and Janet Bowermaster as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
Page 2 - counsel continued - S107355 
 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Garrett C. Dailey and Steven A. Greenfield for Respondent. 
 
Leanne Schlegel for Minors 
 
Donald E. Eisenberg for Constance R. Ahrons, William G. Austin, Sanford L. Braver, James H. Bray, Dr. 
David Demo, Robert Emery, Dr. William V. Fabricius, Dr. Michael Gottlieb, Dr. John Guidubaldi, Dr. 
Joan B. Kelly, Marsha Kline Pruett, Dr. Michael E. Lamb, Dr Jay Lebow, Dr. Patrick McKenry, Dr. Kay 
Pasley, Isolina Ricci, John W. Santrock, Dr. Richard A. Warshak, Sidney J. Brown, James R. Flens, 
Michael A. Fraga, Lyn R. Greenberg, Dr. Neil S. Grossman, Leslye Hunter, Eva Baranoff McKenzie, 
Nancy Williams Olesen, Gary R. Rick and Jan Tyler as Amici Curiae on behalf of Minors. 
 
Leslie Ellen Shear for Association of Certified Family Law Specialists, Marjorie G. Fuller, Nancy Williams 
Olesen, Pamela Panasiti Stettner, Michael E. Lamb, Dawn Gray, Joan B. Kelly, Lawrence E. Leone, 
William G. Austin, Constance R. Ahrons, Harold J. Cohn, Sanford L. Braver, Frieda Gordon, James M. 
Hallett, Sidney J. Brown, Lynette Berg Robe, Michael Gottlieb, Tammy-Lyn Gallerani, Richard A. 
Warshak, Kenneth C. Cochrane, Neil S. Gossman, David R. Lane, Maureen Stubbs, Fred Norris, Dianna 
Gould-Saltman, Carol Silbergeld, Susan Ratzkin, Jeffrey M. Lulow, Dale S. Frank, Leslye Hunter, Ronald 
S. Granberg, James R. Flens, Rebekah A. Frye, Renée A. Cohen, Tracy Duell-Cazes, Marnee W. Milner, 
Jacqueline Singer, Erica L. Hedlund, James Livingston, Josephine A. Fitzpatrick, Michael A. Fraga, 
Timothy C. Wright, Avery Cooper, Lawrence W. Thorpe, Trevor C. Thorpe, Steven R. Liss, Mark J. 
Warfel, John R. Schiller and Mary McNeil as Amici Curiae on behalf of Minors. 
 
 
 
 
 
3
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Tony J. Tanke 
Law Offices of Tony J. Tanke 
1949 5th Street, Suite 101 
Davis, CA  95616 
(530) 758-4530 
 
Garrett C. Dailey 
2915 McClure Street 
Oakland, CA  94609 
(510) 465-3920