Case Title: State v. Toran

Citation: 2023-Ohio-3564

Docket Number: 2022-1203

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2023-10-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Toran, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3564.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3564 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. TORAN, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Toran, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3564.] 
Criminal law—Fourth Amendment to United States Constitution—Warrantless 
searches—Inventory searches—Government’s failure to submit copy of 
written inventory-search procedure into evidence in support of warrantless 
inventory search does not render search per se unreasonable—Law-
enforcement officer’s testimony attributing inventory-search policy to law-
enforcement agency that conducted inventory search, explaining when 
policy must be followed, and explaining whether policy was followed, 
combined with body-camera footage documenting search, is sufficient 
evidence to establish existence of such procedure, that officer who 
conducted search acted in accordance with policy, and that search was 
reasonable, and therefore lawful, under Fourth Amendment—Court of 
appeals’ judgment reversed and convictions reinstated. 
(No. 2022-1203—Submitted June 28, 2023—Decided October 4, 2023.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, 
No. C-210431, 2022-Ohio-2796. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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__________________ 
KENNEDY, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from a judgment of the First District Court 
of Appeals, we consider whether a deputy sheriff’s testimony and body-camera 
footage was sufficient evidence to support a finding that a warrantless inventory 
search of a vehicle was reasonable, and therefore lawful, under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
{¶ 2} The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable searches 
and seizures.  Typically, the government must obtain a warrant before performing 
a search, but there are exceptions to this rule.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
357-358, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.E.2d 576 (1967).  One exception is when law 
enforcement performs an inventory search of an automobile.  Illinois v. Lafayette, 
462 U.S. 640, 643, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983).  For that exception to 
apply, the law-enforcement agency must have adopted before the search a 
standardized procedure for inventory searches.  See South Dakota v. Opperman, 
428 U.S. 364, 372, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976).  Such procedures are 
put into place to carry out certain community-caretaking functions, such as 
protecting citizens’ property, protecting law enforcement against claims for damage 
to property, and ensuring officer safety.  Id. at 368-369; Colorado v. Bertine, 479 
U.S. 367, 372, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987).  When law-enforcement 
officers comply with these procedures in good faith, a warrantless inventory search 
is reasonable and lawful under the Fourth Amendment.  Bertine at 374; see 
Opperman at 376. 
{¶ 3} Appellee, Jamie Toran, was driving under a suspended driver’s 
license when Hamilton County Sheriff’s Deputy Kevin Singleton pulled him over.  
Deputy Singleton subsequently impounded the truck that Toran was driving and 
performed an inventory search that revealed a handgun in the truck’s right door 
panel.  Toran moved to suppress the evidence of the gun on Fourth Amendment 
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grounds.  At the suppression hearing, the state did not submit into evidence a 
written copy of the sheriff’s office’s inventory-search procedures.  Instead, Deputy 
Singleton testified about the policy, although not at length.  The trial court denied 
Toran’s motion to suppress, and Toran later pled no contest to felony charges 
stemming from the search.  The trial court found him guilty of the offenses and 
sentenced him to five years of community control.  The First District reversed 
Toran’s convictions and the trial court’s decision on Toran’s suppression motion, 
2022-Ohio-2796, ¶ 31, and the state appealed to this court. 
{¶ 4} We hold that the government’s failure to submit a copy of written 
inventory-search procedures into evidence in support of a warrantless inventory 
search does not render the search per se unreasonable.  We further hold that a law-
enforcement officer’s testimony that attributes an inventory-search policy to the 
law-enforcement agency that conducted the inventory search, explains when the 
policy must be followed, and explains whether the policy was followed, combined 
with body-camera footage documenting the inventory search, is sufficient evidence 
to establish the existence of such procedures, that the officer who conducted the 
search acted in accordance with the policy, and that the search was reasonable, and 
therefore lawful, under the Fourth Amendment. 
{¶ 5} We therefore reverse the judgment of the First District and reinstate 
Toran’s convictions. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 6} In 2019, Deputy Singleton was on patrol when he stopped a truck for 
improperly displaying a temporary license plate in violation of R.C. 4503.21.  
Toran was the driver of the truck.  After obtaining Toran’s personal information, 
Deputy Singleton learned that Toran’s license had been suspended since 2016.  
Driving under a suspended driver’s license is a violation of R.C. 4510.111(A). 
{¶ 7} Although the truck was legally parked following the stop, Deputy 
Singleton determined that it would need to be towed and impounded under the 
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sheriff’s office’s policy because Toran had a suspended driver’s license.  Deputy 
Singleton then conducted an inventory search of the truck.  Deputy Singleton’s 
body-camera footage captured him stating at the beginning of the search that he 
was going to have the vehicle towed and would conduct an inventory search of the 
vehicle.  During the search, Deputy Singleton discovered a loaded handgun in the 
truck’s right door panel. 
{¶ 8} Upon discovering the gun, Deputy Singleton halted the search and 
placed Toran under arrest, securing him in the back seat of the deputy’s cruiser.  
Deputy Singleton then secured the gun by removing the ammunition from it, 
placing the gun into a folder and the ammunition into a clear bag, and then 
consolidating the folder and the clear bag into a bag marked “Evidence/Property.”  
He then resumed the search, finding Toran’s prescription medication.  He secured 
the medication by placing it into a folder in the trunk of his cruiser.  And after 
finishing the search, he also placed the evidence bag containing the gun and the 
ammunition into the trunk of his cruiser. 
{¶ 9} Toran was later indicted on one count each of fourth-degree-felony 
carrying concealed weapons, fourth-degree-felony improperly handling firearms in 
a motor vehicle, and third-degree-felony having weapons while under disability. 
{¶ 10} Toran moved to suppress the evidence of the gun on the grounds that 
Deputy Singleton’s search of the truck violated his rights under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio 
Constitution.  At the suppression hearing, Deputy Singleton testified about the stop 
and the search.  He explained what happened after he determined the truck was 
going to be impounded: 
 
Due to the stop and [Toran’s] status, what our policy is, an 
inventory search of that vehicle was conducted, any damage, 
anything.  I have been doing this occupation, road patrol, just short 
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of 20 years.  I am systematic about how we do the tows because, if 
there is damage all over the car, valuables can be in the car, and 
officers need to be accountable. 
 
{¶ 11} During the hearing, Deputy Singleton’s body-camera footage was 
admitted into evidence without objection.  The trial court viewed the footage, up to 
the point of Toran’s arrest, in chambers.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the court 
determined that the “[s]heriff’s department, by policy, indicated the deputy’s duty 
was to conduct an inventory search, which was done.”  The court denied Toran’s 
motion to suppress, and Toran later pled no contest to all the counts in the 
indictment.  The trial court found him guilty of the offenses and sentenced him to 
five years of community control. 
{¶ 12} Toran appealed his convictions to the First District.  He argued that 
the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because, in his view, the 
traffic stop was unlawful and, relevant here, the warrantless search of the truck was 
not a proper inventory search under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 
14, 2022-Ohio-2796 at ¶ 13, 22, although he did not set forth a separate argument 
under the Ohio Constitution.  Toran did not challenge Deputy Singleton’s decision 
to impound the truck.  The court of appeals held that the traffic stop was lawful, id. 
at ¶ 21, but that the search “was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,” 
because the state’s evidence was “insufficient to demonstrate that the inventory 
search of the vehicle was made in accordance with standardized procedures of the 
sheriff’s department,” id. at ¶ 30.  The court reversed Toran’s convictions and the 
trial court’s judgment denying his motion to suppress.  Id. at ¶ 31. 
{¶ 13} The state appealed, and we accepted jurisdiction to consider a single 
proposition of law: 
 
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Where the stop and impoundment of a vehicle is lawful, the 
subsequent inventory search of the vehicle in accordance with 
Sheriff Department procedures is not rendered constitutionally 
unreasonable by the State’s failure to introduce actual written policy 
into evidence or the deputy’s failure to testify as to specific details 
of the policy at the suppression hearing. 
 
See 168 Ohio St.3d 1471, 2022-Ohio-4380, 199 N.E.3d 546. 
II.  Standard of Review 
{¶ 14} Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a 
mixed question of law and fact.  State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-
5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8.  An appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings 
of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.  See State v. Fanning, 
1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982).  But the appellate court must decide 
the legal questions independently, without deference to the trial court’s decision.  
Burnside at ¶ 8. 
III.  Law and Analysis 
A.  The Fourth Amendment and Inventory Searches 
{¶ 15} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
 
{¶ 16} Reasonableness, therefore, is paramount in determining whether a 
search was lawful under the Fourth Amendment.  And “except in certain carefully 
January Term, 2023 
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defined classes of cases, a search of private property without consent is 
‘unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.”  Camara 
v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528-529, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 
930 (1967). 
{¶ 17} One exception to the warrant requirement is the reasonable inventory 
search of a vehicle.  See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 373, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 
1000.  The reasoning behind this exception comes from the “community caretaking 
functions” that law-enforcement officers often engage in when dealing with 
vehicles.  Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 
(1973).  Inventory searches function “to protect an owner’s property while it is in 
the custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized 
property, and to guard the police from danger.”  Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372, 107 S.Ct. 
738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739.  Deference is afforded to such “police caretaking procedures 
designed to secure and protect vehicles and their contents within police custody.”  
Id.  But such deference does not give law-enforcement officers free reign; rather, 
inventory searches must be conducted in good faith and not for the sole purpose of 
investigation.  See id. at 372, 374. 
{¶ 18} The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 655, 660, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).  Based on the federal 
caselaw discussed above, we have determined that warrantless inventory searches 
are lawful if they are conducted “in good faith and in accordance with reasonable 
standardized procedure(s) or established routine,” State v. Hathman, 65 Ohio 
St.3d 403, 604 N.E.2d 743 (1992), paragraph one of the syllabus.  Regarding the 
process of evaluating a law-enforcement officer’s good faith, the United States 
Supreme Court has said: 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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“[O]ur good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively 
ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer 
would have known that the search was illegal” in light of “all of the 
circumstances.”  [United States v.] Leon, 468 U.S. [897,] 922, n. 23, 
104 S.Ct. 3405[, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984)].  These circumstances 
frequently include a particular officer’s knowledge and experience, 
but that does not make the test any more subjective than the one for 
probable cause, which looks to an officer’s knowledge and 
experience, Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699-700, 116 
S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), but not his subjective intent, 
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 
L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). 
 
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 145-146, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 
(2009). 
B.  Deputy Singleton’s Inventory Search Was Conducted in Accordance with 
Reasonable Standardized Procedure 
{¶ 19} To decide whether Deputy Singleton’s inventory search of the truck 
was conducted “in accordance with reasonable standardized procedure[] or 
established routine,” Hathman at paragraph one of the syllabus, we must first 
determine whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that a standardized 
procedure or routine existed regarding the inventory search. 
{¶ 20} As an initial matter, we conclude that the state was not required to 
submit the inventory-search policy in writing as evidence to establish the existence 
of such a policy.  Numerous state and federal courts across the country have agreed 
with this conclusion.  See, e.g., People v. Walker, 20 N.Y.3d 122, 127, 980 N.E.2d 
937 (2012); People v. Gipson, 203 Ill.2d 298, 306, 786 N.E.2d 540 (2003); State v. 
Huisman, 544 N.W.2d 433, 437 (Iowa 1996); United States v. Tackett, 486 F.3d 
January Term, 2023 
9 
 
230, 233 (6th Cir.2007); United States v. Agofsky, 20 F.3d 866, 872-873 (8th 
Cir.1994); United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1002 (3d Cir.1988).  When other 
evidence such as officer testimony is available, the reasonableness of an inventory 
search does not hinge on whether a written policy was submitted as evidence.  We 
therefore hold that the government’s failure to submit a written inventory-search 
policy as evidence does not per se mean that the challenged inventory search was 
unreasonable.  However, prosecutors should be mindful that submitting a written 
policy as evidence would certainly assist judges in determining the reasonableness 
of an inventory search. 
{¶ 21} The issue then becomes whether Deputy Singleton’s testimony and 
body-camera footage was sufficient to establish the existence of an inventory-
search policy at the sheriff’s office.  When discussing the search at the suppression 
hearing, Deputy Singleton stated: 
 
Due to the stop and [Toran’s] status, what our policy is, an 
inventory search of that vehicle was conducted, any damage, 
anything.  I have been doing this occupation, road patrol, just short 
of 20 years.  I am systematic about how we do the tows because, if 
there is damage all over the car, valuables can be in the car, and 
officers need to be accountable. 
 
{¶ 22} This testimony was sufficient to establish the existence of an 
inventory-search policy at the sheriff’s office.  Contrary to Toran’s assertion, the 
issue before this court is not whether Deputy Singleton’s decision to impound the 
truck was reasonable.  Indeed, that issue is not what the proposition of law before 
this court is predicated on, and regardless, it “was not raised in any way in the 
[c]ourt of [a]ppeals and was not considered or decided by that court,” State v. Price, 
60 Ohio St.2d 136, 398 N.E.2d 772 (1979), paragraph two of the syllabus.  The 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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issue here is whether Deputy Singleton established that the Hamilton County 
Sheriff’s Office has an inventory-search policy, explained when that policy must 
be followed, and showed whether it was followed in this case. 
{¶ 23} Deputy Singleton explained the reasons for the policy—to require 
surveying for damage to property and keeping track of valuables found in the 
vehicle.  These are some of the community-caretaking functions that inventory-
search policies are designed to facilitate.  See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372, 107 S.Ct. 
738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739.  Deputy Singleton’s safekeeping of Toran’s medication found 
in the search is a prime example of these functions.  And the fact that a handgun 
was discovered during the search further supports the notion that inventory searches 
guard law enforcement from danger.  See id. 
{¶ 24} Further, Deputy Singleton provided testimony regarding the 
circumstances in which inventory searches are appropriate in Hamilton County—
namely, when it is discovered during a vehicle stop that the driver has a suspended 
license, which requires the vehicle to be towed and impounded.  Because Toran had 
been driving under a suspended license, Deputy Singleton ordered the truck to be 
towed and impounded and performed an inventory search.  In doing so, Deputy 
Singleton acted in accordance with the policy of the sheriff’s office. 
{¶ 25} Therefore, Deputy Singleton’s testimony was sufficient to establish 
both the existence of the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office’s inventory-search 
policy and that he acted in accordance with the policy. 
C.  Deputy Singleton’s Inventory Search Was Conducted in Good Faith 
{¶ 26} We are also convinced that Deputy Singleton acted in good faith in 
conducting the inventory search and that the search was not conducted for the sole 
purpose of investigation.  See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372, 374, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 
L.Ed.2d 739.  As discussed above, the sheriff’s office had a policy to perform 
inventory searches under the circumstances presented.  Deputy Singleton’s 
discovering that Toran was driving under a suspended license justified his decision 
January Term, 2023 
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to have the truck towed.  Following that decision, and pursuant to the sheriff’s 
office’s policy, Deputy Singleton performed an inventory search.  Even after he 
found the gun and arrested Toran, he continued the search, which allowed him to 
find and inventory Toran’s medication before the truck was impounded, showing 
adherence to the policy’s purpose.  In addition, his testimony indicated that he had 
nearly 20 years of experience and was systematic about the impoundment process.  
His knowledge, experience, and actual use of a systematic process showed that he 
was well trained in the area of vehicle searches and that the inventory search was 
not conducted for the sole purpose of investigation.  Therefore, he acted in good 
faith. 
{¶ 27} Deputy Singleton’s testimony established the existence of an 
inventory-search policy at the sheriff’s office.  Both the testimony and body-camera 
footage proved that he acted in accordance with that policy and in good faith.  For 
those reasons, we hold that his warrantless inventory search of the truck was 
reasonable, and therefore lawful, under the Fourth Amendment. 
IV.  Conclusion 
{¶ 28} “The Framers of the Fourth Amendment have given us only the 
general standard of ‘unreasonableness’ as a guide in determining whether searches 
and seizures meet the standard of that Amendment in those cases where a warrant 
is not required.”  Cady, 413 U.S. at 448, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706.  Since 
Cady was decided, courts have striven to ascertain under what circumstances a 
warrantless inventory search is reasonable.  Caselaw paves our path in such 
determinations, requiring us to ask whether the law-enforcement agency had 
standardized inventory-search procedures, whether the inventory search was 
conducted in accordance with these standardized procedures, and whether, if the 
officer complied with the procedures, he did so in good faith.  See Hathman, 65 
Ohio St.3d at 407-408, 604 N.E.2d 743. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 29} While prosecutors facing inventory-search challenges might be wise 
to introduce written inventory-search policies into evidence and to routinely ask 
complete questions regarding the procedures, a written policy is not a constitutional 
requirement to establish the reasonableness of an inventory search.  Testimony that 
establishes the existence of an inventory-search policy, explains when the policy is 
to be followed, and explains whether the policy was followed, combined with body-
camera footage documenting the inventory search, may be sufficient evidence to 
support a finding that a warrantless inventory search was reasonable, and therefore 
lawful, under the Fourth Amendment.  And here, we conclude that Deputy 
Singleton’s inventory search was lawful. 
{¶ 30} Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the First District Court of 
Appeals and reinstate Toran’s convictions. 
Judgment reversed 
and convictions reinstated. 
DEWINE, DONNELLY, and LEWIS, JJ., concur. 
GALLAGHER, J., concurs, with an opinion. 
STEWART, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by BRUNNER, J. 
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, sitting for 
FISCHER, J. 
RONALD C. LEWIS, J., of the Second District Court of Appeals, sitting for 
DETERS, J. 
__________________ 
GALLAGHER, J., concurring. 
{¶ 31} I fully concur in the majority opinion, but I write separately to 
emphasize that no reviewing court could have addressed the question whether the 
warrantless inventory search of the vehicle that appellee, Jamie Toran, had been 
driving was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution because the impoundment of the vehicle was itself unlawful based on 
January Term, 2023 
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the state’s failure to enter the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office’s policy on 
impoundment into the trial-court record.  This question implicates broader 
procedural concerns.  The record contains scant evidence of any departmental 
impoundment policy, because Toran failed to challenge the policy as a basis to 
suppress evidence either in his motion to suppress or at the hearing on that motion.  
Under Crim.R. 12(H) and 47, he waived any such argument pertaining to that 
policy at the trial-court level.  See United States v. Concepcion-Guliam, 62 F.4th 
26, 31 (1st Cir.2023) (defendant’s Fourth Amendment claims were waived and 
could not be reasserted on appeal); see also United States v. Pierre, 486 Fed.Appx. 
59, 66 (11th Cir.2012). 
{¶ 32} The argument portion of Toran’s motion to suppress was limited to 
two paragraphs, the first of which generically cited the Ohio Constitution and the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  The second 
paragraph presented a boilerplate argument that the stop of the vehicle must have 
been pretextual because, in Toran’s view, he had “properly displayed th[e] 
temporary plate.”  No legal authority in support of that proposition was ever 
presented to the trial court.  During his opening statement at the suppression 
hearing, defense counsel reiterated Toran’s position: “This is a warrantless search.  
[The state] has to prove the search was lawful.  There was no search warrant to 
search [Toran’s] vehicle.  There is no exception to the search warrant requirement 
that would allow the officer to lawfully search the vehicle * * * Toran was driving.”  
(Emphasis added.)  The state thereafter focused on proving that the inventory-
search exception to the warrant requirement applied, based on Toran’s framing of 
the Fourth Amendment issue.  This should have ended any potential for appellate 
review on the impoundment-policy issue.  See State v. Wintermeyer, 158 Ohio St.3d 
513, 2019-Ohio-5156, 145 N.E.3d 278, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 33} Despite the limited framing of the issues within the motion to 
suppress, the First District Court of Appeals reviewed the reasonableness of the 
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inventory search conducted by the deputy sheriff under constitutional standards.  
The First District never addressed the impoundment-policy issue.  That issue was 
articulated for the first time in Toran’s appellate briefing.  The lawfulness of the 
decision to impound the vehicle, however, was not an issue that could have been 
raised for the first time by Toran in his direct appeal to the First District, much less 
as a basis to affirm the appellate court’s decision. 
{¶ 34} Toran’s belated argument pertaining to the legality of the deputy’s 
decision to impound the vehicle, a decision that then triggered the need for the 
inventory search, represents a broader trend of parties presenting new arguments 
during the appellate process by looking first to any federal constitutional question 
before considering Ohio’s procedural rules, thus eroding the traditional rule that an 
issue should not be decided on constitutional grounds unless doing so is necessary.  
See State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 177, 2004-Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201, ¶ 9 (“It 
is well settled that this court will not reach constitutional issues unless absolutely 
necessary”), citing In re Miller, 63 Ohio St.3d 99, 110, 585 N.E.2d 396 (1992), and 
Hall China Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 50 Ohio St.2d 206, 210, 364 N.E.2d 852 
(1977); see also State v. Pugh, 43 Ohio St. 98, 122, 1 N.E. 439 (1885).  Not all 
challenges implicating a constitutional question need be analyzed or discussed 
through that lens.  The answer to the question regarding the lack of evidence 
concerning the impoundment policy is simple: Toran failed to raise the issue in the 
trial court with the specificity and citations to authority required by Crim.R. 12(H) 
and 47.  Under Crim.R. 12(H), Toran waived any challenges to the legality of the 
deputy’s decision to impound the vehicle he had been driving, and he is not 
permitted to cite any deficiencies in the state’s presentation of evidence, which 
depended on that waiver, for the first time on appeal.  See, e.g., State v. Mock, 11th 
Dist. Lake No. 2012-L-066, 2013-Ohio-874, ¶ 9 (because the defendant failed to 
advance arguments in a suppression motion filed in the trial court, the state lacked 
notice of the arguments and an opportunity to present its case on the issues 
January Term, 2023 
15 
 
pertaining to the arguments; the issues were waived and the trial court could not 
make any findings of fact on the waived issues, because there was no evidence 
introduced on them at the suppression hearing); State v. Walker, 2017-Ohio-9255, 
103 N.E.3d 325, ¶ 28-29 (1st Dist.) (following Mock); see also State v. Harrison, 
166 Ohio St.3d 479, 2021-Ohio-4465, 187 N.E.3d 510, ¶ 16 (lead opinion) (failure 
to raise an argument in the trial court precluded the opposition from developing a 
record that could be reviewed on appeal). 
{¶ 35} Accepting Toran’s argument here would send the wrong message to 
litigants and courts in Ohio that courts of review may find error and redefine the 
scope of black-letter law concerning decisions never made by the trial courts and 
on evidentiary foundations never timely tested.  Permitting parties to partake in this 
form of gamesmanship would serve no legitimate purpose.  See Wintermeyer, 158 
Ohio St.3d 513, 2019-Ohio-5156, 145 N.E.3d 278, at ¶ 24.  Ohio courts would be 
faced with the prospect that regardless of the argument actually presented by a 
defendant at the trial-court level, the state would be required to anticipate and 
disprove every claim that could have been asserted by the defendant in order to 
preserve the defendant’s conviction as the issues morph throughout the appellate 
process.  And Ohio law does not require this form of preemptive advocacy.  Id. at 
¶ 19, quoting State v. Peagler, 76 Ohio St.3d 496, 500, 668 N.E.2d 489 (1996) 
(“when a defendant makes stipulations or narrows the issues to be decided at a 
suppression hearing, the prosecution need not ‘prove the validity of every aspect of 
the search’ ”).  Our adversarial system is designed around the premise that the 
parties “ ‘are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to 
relief.’ ”  Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 244, 128 S.Ct. 2559, 171 
L.Ed.2d 399 (2008), quoting Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386, 124 
S.Ct. 786, 157 L.Ed.2d 778 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment).  This system does not depend on an opposing party’s prediction and 
preemption of potential arguments that might be belatedly raised.  The Rules of 
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Criminal Procedure precluded Toran from challenging the legality of the deputy’s 
decision to impound the vehicle in his direct appeal, and as a result, that cannot be 
an independent basis to affirm the appellate court’s decision. 
{¶ 36} Crim.R. 47 unambiguously requires any pretrial motion to “state 
with particularity the grounds upon which it is made” and the relief sought and to 
be supported by “a memorandum containing citations of authority” and, if 
applicable, an affidavit.  “By requiring the defendant to state with particularity the 
legal and factual issues to be resolved, the prosecutor and court are placed on notice 
of those issues to be heard and decided by the court and, by omission, those issues 
which are otherwise being waived.”  State v. Shindler, 70 Ohio St.3d 54, 58, 636 
N.E.2d 319 (1994) (collecting cases); State v. F.O.E. Aerie 2295, Port Clinton, 38 
Ohio St.3d 53, 54-55, 526 N.E.2d 66 (1988) (failure to comply with Crim.R. 47 
results in waiver of the argument).  As a result, “before the state is put to [its] burden 
[on a suppression issue], the defendant must assert the grounds upon which he 
intends to challenge the validity of the search.”  Wintermeyer at ¶ 18, citing Xenia 
v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 524 N.E.2d 889 (1988), and State v. Codeluppi, 139 
Ohio St.3d 165, 2014-Ohio-1574, 10 N.E.3d 691, ¶ 10.  Toran made no attempt to 
provide any specificity within his suppression motion.  The burden never shifted to 
the state to introduce a foundation for the invocation of the Hamilton County 
Sheriff's Office’s impoundment policy. 
{¶ 37} Arguably, the state abandoned any claim that Toran waived the 
argument by not advancing a waiver argument in his appeal, see, e.g., State v. 
Martin, 151 Ohio St.3d 470, 2017-Ohio-7556, 90 N.E.3d 857, ¶ 77, but the state 
was never provided with the opportunity to advance a waiver argument with respect 
to the impoundment-policy questions.  The trial court agreed with the state’s 
arguments, and Toran did not raise the issue of any lack of evidence pertaining to 
the impoundment policy until his appeal to the First District.  Because the First 
District implicitly rejected any argument pertaining to the legality of the 
January Term, 2023 
17 
 
impoundment and presumed the validity of the decision to impound the vehicle as 
the underlying basis to reach the inventory-search question, the state bore no burden 
to address Toran’s waiver of the issue. 
{¶ 38} Notwithstanding Toran’s waiver, even if the procedural rules are 
discarded in favor of addressing the merits of his argument, the record is sufficient 
to demonstrate the existence of an impoundment policy at the sheriff’s office and 
the particular criteria underlying the deputy’s decision to impound the vehicle. 
{¶ 39} According to the transcript of the suppression hearing, Hamilton 
County Sheriff’s Deputy Kevin Singleton articulated the basis of his decision for 
having the vehicle towed: he was following procedures under “the policy” applying 
to a situation in which the sole occupant, who was not under arrest, could not be 
left with the vehicle following the issuance of a citation because he did not have a 
valid driver’s license.  As Deputy Singleton clarified on defense counsel’s 
prompting, before the inventory search was conducted, “there was no arrest.”  
Deputy Singleton then provided the criteria justifying his decision to impound the 
vehicle, which necessitated the inventory search: “When someone hasn’t had a 
driver’s license for three years with multiple suspensions and the record indicated 
he had been pulled over by another agency, pulled over in the same vehicle, that 
vehicle is going to be towed due to that status.”  He then said, “I have a procedure 
that I follow.  It is in the policy, and I am going to follow my policy.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Toran’s counsel conceded the existence of that policy: “I understand you 
have a policy.”  And counsel then attempted to explore the outer limits of that policy 
in the remainder of his cross-examination of the deputy, suggesting that an officer 
may release a vehicle to another person who is present when the traffic stop ends. 
{¶ 40} In other words, when the deputy made the decision to impound the 
vehicle, Toran was not under arrest.  He was free to leave at that point, but because 
he was not licensed to drive and had been the only occupant of the vehicle, the 
vehicle was going to be impounded to prevent him from operating it after the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
deputies departed the scene.  Although that decision and the criteria under which it 
was made may be challenged based on the totality of the evidence, Toran never 
questioned the existence of a policy in the trial court, and the evidence was 
determined by the trial court to be sufficient to justify the decision to implicate the 
inventory-search policy.  The questions surrounding the decision to impound the 
vehicle turn on Toran’s failure to adhere to the Rules of Criminal Procedure.  See 
Crim.R. 12(H) and 47.  They do not require analysis under the Ohio or federal 
Constitutions. 
{¶ 41} Therein lies the danger of permitting parties to shirk procedural rules 
in favor of raising new constitutional arguments for the first time on appeal.  The 
scant evidence of the departmental impoundment policy was a direct result of 
Toran’s failure to state with specificity the basis of his motion to suppress.  He then 
failed to timely challenge the legality of the impoundment, and his counsel elicited 
statements from the deputy justifying the deputy’s decision to impound the vehicle 
based on the criteria under the policy that a vehicle may not be left with the sole 
occupant of the vehicle when he or she has no valid driver’s license. 
{¶ 42} Courts of review should not resort to broad discussions of 
constitutional requirements to resolve cases in which the parties have failed to 
comply with the procedural rules at the most basic levels.  If we were to affirm the 
judgment of the First District relying on the lack of a record regarding the 
impoundment policy, this court would be sending a message that defendants no 
longer need to abide by the Rules of Criminal Procedure governing motions to 
suppress and that constitutional questions may be resolved in the defendant’s favor 
despite his or her failure to trigger the state’s requirement to build a record in the 
trial court.  With this in mind, I concur in the majority opinion and join this court’s 
judgment. 
________________ 
 
 
January Term, 2023 
19 
 
STEWART, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 43} This case involves questions about whether the impoundment and 
search of a vehicle were legal.  The law in this area is straightforward: 
(1) The impoundment must be legal in order for the inventory search to be legal, 
(2) both the impoundment and the inventory search must follow established policy 
and procedure, and 
(3) the burden of proof is on the state to show that the impoundment and the search 
were valid. 
{¶ 44} Here, appellant, the state of Ohio, failed to carry that burden.  The 
state failed to show that (1) the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office had a policy in 
place for determining when and how to impound and then conduct an inventory 
search of a vehicle and (2) whether that policy was followed here.  The majority 
opinion glosses over many conflicting facts and ignores others to create an 
expansive conception of an inventory search that transforms the search from a 
narrow exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution into a discretionary investigatory tool with no 
boundaries or standards for its use.  In sum, the majority concludes that an arresting 
officer’s testimony that he followed “our policy” (assuming “our policy” means the 
policy of his law-enforcement agency)—and that testimony alone—is legally 
sufficient to establish that the officer’s agency had a policy on the impounding and 
searching of vehicles and that the officer followed that policy.  This is not, however, 
what the law requires. 
{¶ 45} In reaching its conclusion, the majority not only ignores the burden 
of proof placed on the state to establish the applicability of an exception to the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, but it also bypasses any analysis of the 
arresting deputy sheriff’s decision to impound the vehicle in the first place.  
Because the majority erodes the protections of the warrant requirement in favor of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
an expansive conception of the inventory-search exception that swallows the 
general rule, I dissent. 
{¶ 46} Warrantless searches and seizures “are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.”  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 
L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); see also State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 
850 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 98.  And those “exceptions to the warrant requirement are to be 
narrowly construed.”  New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 464, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 
L.Ed.2d 768 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (collecting cases).  Consequently, the 
state has the burden of demonstrating that a challenged warrantless search falls 
within one of the narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment.  United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51, 72 S.Ct. 93, 96 L.Ed. 59 
(1951), citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 
153 (1948).1 
{¶ 47} The warrantless search at issue in this case is an inventory search of 
the truck that appellee, Jamie Toran, was driving when Hamilton County Sheriff’s 
Deputy Kevin Singleton pulled him over.  An inventory search is “the search of 
property sc and detained, in order to ensure that it is harmless, to secure valuable 
items (such as might be kept in a towed car), and to protect against false claims of 
loss or damage.”  (Emphasis added.)  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811, 
116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), fn. 1.  Before a court reaches the issue of 
the legality of an inventory search, it must determine that the impoundment of the 
vehicle prompting the inventory search was legal.  See United States v. Williams, 
936 F.2d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir.1991) (“If a search is to be upheld under the 
 
1. Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution contains language that is nearly identical to that of 
the Fourth Amendment, “and we have interpreted it as affording at least the same protection as the 
Fourth Amendment.”  State v. Leak, 145 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-154, 47 N.E.3d 821, ¶ 13, 
citing State v. Hoffman, 141 Ohio St.3d 428, 2014-Ohio-4795, 25 N.E.3d 993, ¶ 11. 
January Term, 2023 
21 
 
inventory search doctrine, * * * the police must first have the authority to impound 
the vehicle and must then follow the procedures outlined in the policy”); State v. 
Leak, 145 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-154, 47 N.E.3d 821, ¶ 29 (“testimony about 
the police procedure for conducting the inventory is insufficient to establish the 
reasonableness of the search under the Fourth Amendment if the impoundment of 
the vehicle is not itself lawful”).  Here, the state asserts that “[b]ecause the 
impoundment of Toran’s vehicle was proper, the search was proper.”  But the 
state’s assertion that impounding the vehicle was lawful does not make it so. 
The state did not show that the decision to impound the vehicle was lawful 
{¶ 48} Following the hearing on Toran’s motion to suppress the evidence 
of the handgun found in his truck, the trial court stated from the bench that the 
impoundment of the vehicle was proper because it could not be released to Toran 
since he did not have a valid driver’s license.  Toran challenged the legality of the 
impoundment in his direct appeal to the First District Court of Appeals.  Although 
the court of appeals did not reach the underlying issue whether the decision to 
impound the vehicle was lawful, it nonetheless reached the correct conclusion that 
Deputy Singleton’s search of the vehicle was not justified under the inventory-
search exception because the state did not meet its burden of demonstrating that the 
search was in accordance with standardized procedures of the sheriff’s department.  
See 2022-Ohio-2796, ¶ 30-31. 
{¶ 49} The majority avoids analyzing the deputy’s decision to impound the 
vehicle.  It states as its grounds for doing so that Toran forfeited the issue by not 
raising it in the court of appeals and that it “is not what the proposition of law before 
this court is predicated on.”  Majority opinion, ¶ 22.  The concurrence also decries 
the analysis regarding the impoundment on the ground that Toran waived the issue.  
The majority and the concurrence are wrong on those points.  Toran did raise this 
issue in both the trial court and the court of appeals.  Although he combined his 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
arguments challenging Deputy Singleton’s decision to impound the vehicle and the 
propriety of the concomitant inventory search, he argued that Deputy Singleton was 
not justified in impounding the vehicle.  And while the proposition of law we 
accepted for review is written on the flawed assumption that Deputy Singleton’s 
decision to impound the vehicle was lawful, the state argues in its brief that the 
impoundment was lawful under R.C. 4513.61.2  Despite the concurrence’s apparent 
frustration with what one might deem ineffective assistance of counsel, there is no 
evidence of gamesmanship in the record before us, as the concurring opinion 
suggests.  In each of the courts below, Toran raised issues concerning the vehicle 
stop, the impoundment, and the search.  His theory of the Fourth Amendment 
violation has not changed: the stop was pretextual, and the impoundment and 
therefore any ensuing search were unlawful.  Toran also correctly notes that in order 
to determine that an inventory search was permissible, the impoundment of the 
vehicle must have been lawful.  The state bears the burden to demonstrate that its 
challenged conduct falls within the inventory-search exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement.  And it is the act of impounding the vehicle 
that gives rise to the need for, and the justification of, an inventory search.  Thus, 
the threshold inquiry when determining the lawfulness of an inventory search is 
whether the impoundment of the vehicle was proper.  See Leak at ¶ 29; see also 
United States v. Snoddy, 976 F.3d 630, 634 (6th Cir.2020) (“A vehicle is lawfully 
seized and, thus, subject to an inventory search if it is lawfully impounded”); United 
States v. Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir.1996) (“Both the decision to take the 
car into custody and the concomitant inventory search must meet the strictures of 
the Fourth Amendment”).  If the evidence of such an impoundment policy is 
“scant,” concurring opinion, ¶ 31, as the concurring opinion suggests, then the 
blame for any deficiency in the record lies with the state. 
 
2. As discussed below, the state’s reliance on this statute is misplaced. 
January Term, 2023 
23 
 
{¶ 50} It is well established that in the interests of public safety and as part 
of their community-caretaking functions, law-enforcement officers have the 
authority to seize vehicles and remove them from the streets.  South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-369, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000, 96 S.Ct. 3092 (1976).  
Officers may impound a vehicle if the decision to do so is based on standardized 
criteria and is not solely a basis to search for evidence of other criminal activity.  
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987); 
Duguay at 351, quoting Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 109 
L.Ed.2d 1 (1990)  (“ ‘[S]tandardized criteria or established routine must regulate’ 
inventory searches. * * * Among those criteria which must be standardized are the 
circumstances in which a car may be impounded’ ” [brackets added in Duguay]); 
United States v. Young, 751 Fed.Appx. 381, 388, (4th Cir.2018), fn. 3 (“a police 
officer’s initial decision to tow and impound a vehicle—the necessary predicate for 
an inventory search—also must be governed by standardized criteria”). 
{¶ 51} Courts have recognized that the decision to impound a vehicle is 
valid when the decision is in line with a departmental policy or a statute and is 
based on the totality of the circumstances rather than being based solely on the 
officer’s discretion.  Compare State v. Calvin, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-15-17, 2015-
Ohio-4801, ¶ 23 (decision to impound was lawful when it was pursuant to a written 
policy and took into account that the vehicle was located on a busy highway at 
approximately 1:20 a.m. and it was unclear whether or when another driver could 
retrieve the vehicle) with State v. Myrick, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21287, 2006-
Ohio-580, ¶ 23 (decision to impound was unlawful when the officer failed to 
produce or articulate any impoundment policy and testified only that impoundment 
decision was solely in an officer’s discretion).  In Myrick, the defendant was 
arrested for trespassing at a nightclub, and at the time of the arrest, his car was 
legally parked in the common parking lot where the nightclub and other businesses 
were located.  Id. at ¶ 2-3, 26.  Upon being placed in the arresting officer’s police 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
 
cruiser, Myrick asked an acquaintance who was nearby to call Myrick’s wife and 
to drive his car home.  Id. at ¶ 3.  The officer refused to allow Myrick’s acquaintance 
to take possession of the car and impounded and searched the car, finding a 
handgun.  Id. at ¶ 3-4. 
{¶ 52} Similarly, in this case, the state failed to produce any evidence of a 
departmental impoundment policy—written or otherwise—and Deputy Singleton 
failed to articulate the criteria for impoundment under any such policy.  Instead, the 
deputy spoke of a general, sweeping policy: “There is not going to be a time in my 
entire career [that] you are going to find that I let a vehicle go.  That’s not the policy 
of the Department and not my policy as an officer.”  Assuming arguendo that such 
a departmental policy actually exists, it is overbroad.  Deputy Singleton’s testimony 
in no way indicates what criteria or factors he or other law-enforcement officers in 
his department are supposed to consider when deciding whether to impound a 
vehicle, such as the location and safety of the vehicle, whether another driver is 
available to drive the vehicle, or other factual circumstances.  In fact, the deputy 
testified that he would not release the vehicle “regardless of who showed up to get 
[it], including the registered owner.  That was not going to change [his] conduct 
and [his] procedure.”  This purported policy leaves the decision whether to impound 
a vehicle completely within the discretion of an individual officer and does not take 
into account the unique factual circumstances of each vehicle stop, let alone what 
the law actually requires.  This runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment. 
{¶ 53} The facts in the record before us cannot sustain any conclusion other 
than that the impoundment of the vehicle was unlawful.  The vehicle was legally 
parked on a residential street, in line with other vehicles, so there was no concern 
that the vehicle was impeding traffic or was located on a busy highway.  Toran’s 
driving with a suspended license was not an arrestable offense.  Upon being 
stopped, Toran immediately informed Deputy Singleton that Toran’s mother was 
the owner of the vehicle and lived nearby.  Toran even attempted to call his mother 
January Term, 2023 
25 
 
to have her retrieve the vehicle, but Deputy Singleton said she did not need to come, 
because he was only issuing a ticket.  However, since Toran had already informed 
Deputy Singleton that he did not have a license, the deputy knew Toran was not 
authorized to drive the vehicle, and there are no facts demonstrating why Toran’s 
mother could not retrieve the vehicle.  Toran’s mother appeared at the scene 
anyway, arriving shortly after the vehicle had been searched and Toran arrested for 
having the gun but before Deputy Singleton had called for a tow truck or started 
the process of physically removing the vehicle.  She offered Deputy Singleton 
evidence of her valid registration and proof of insurance, which he declined to 
review.  In short, there was no lawful basis for Deputy Singleton to impound the 
vehicle, and therefore there was no lawful reason for him to search the vehicle. 
{¶ 54} The record shows that Deputy Singleton also made conflicting 
statements about when and why he impounded the vehicle.  He testified that he 
made the decision to impound the vehicle based on Toran’s “driving status” and 
that he would never have released the vehicle to its owner.  But his body-camera 
footage shows that he informed Toran’s mother that the car was being impounded 
because it was connected to a felony arrest.  He made a similar statement to Toran, 
telling him that the vehicle was being towed because of Toran’s “driving status.”  
But Deputy Singleton also told Toran that if he were not making an arrest, he could 
release the vehicle to the vehicle’s owner “but not when [he] t[ook] a gun out of it.” 
{¶ 55} The problem with this sequence of events is that in order for the 
search to have been lawful, the deputy had to have made the decision to impound 
the vehicle, as authorized by statute or departmental policy, before he searched it 
and found the gun that gave rise to the felony charge.  He was not permitted under 
the Fourth Amendment to unlawfully search the vehicle and then use any evidence 
he found during the search as a basis to impound the vehicle.  The majority opines 
that the impoundment and the search were legal based on the combination of the 
deputy’s testimony and his body-camera footage.  But the exchange detailed above 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
 
conflicts with Deputy Singleton’s testimony that he impounded the vehicle based 
on Toran’s suspended license and completely undermines the deputy’s decision to 
impound, let alone search, the vehicle. 
{¶ 56} In an attempt to bolster Deputy Singleton’s decision to impound the 
vehicle, the state contends that R.C. 4513.61 applies to this case.  This argument is 
a nonstarter. 
{¶ 57} R.C. 4513.61(A)(1) through (2) states: 
 
 
The sheriff of a county * * * may order into storage any 
motor vehicle, including an abandoned junk motor vehicle as 
defined in [R.C. 4513.63], that * * * [h]as come into the possession 
of the sheriff * * * as a result of the performance of the sheriff’s 
* * * duties * * * or * * * [h]as been left on a public street or other 
property open to the public for purposes of vehicular travel, or upon 
or within the right-of-way of any road or highway, for forty-eight 
hours or longer without notification to the sheriff * * * of the 
reasons for leaving the motor vehicle in such place.  However, when 
such a motor vehicle constitutes an obstruction to traffic it may be 
ordered into storage immediately * * *. 
 
{¶ 58} Under any view of the facts here, this statute does not apply.  The 
vehicle Toran had been driving was not in Deputy Singleton’s possession as a result 
of the performance of his duties—as discussed above, Toran’s mother owned the 
vehicle, could legally operate it, and was at the scene before it was impounded and 
the deputy provided conflicting reasons as to why it was being impounded.  See 
Leak, 145 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-154, 47 N.E.3d 821, at ¶ 26 (finding no 
reason to impound a vehicle when the driver had been present and was duly licensed 
and able to drive the vehicle and there was no reason to believe the vehicle would 
January Term, 2023 
27 
 
be left unattended).  And it is undisputed that the vehicle was not left on the street 
for 48 hours or longer.  Further, the record shows—and the state does not dispute—
that the vehicle was not obstructing traffic; it was parked on the side of the road 
like other vehicles.  Deputy Singleton offered no statute, ordinance, or policy of the 
sheriff’s department evincing a community-caretaking rationale for impounding 
and subsequently searching the vehicle.  Compare Blue Ash v. Kavanagh, 113 Ohio 
St.3d 67, 2007-Ohio-1103, 862 N.E.2d 810, ¶ 12-16 (upholding the impoundment 
of a vehicle when the defendant could not have lawfully driven the vehicle away, 
the vehicle could not safely have been allowed to remain on Interstate 71, and the 
impounding officer had authority to have the vehicle towed pursuant to the Revised 
Code and a city ordinance). 
{¶ 59} Additionally, there was no basis for the impoundment of the vehicle 
in the local law.  Toran was stopped (at approximately 800 Adams Street in 
Hamilton County) in the Village of Lincoln Heights.  See State v. Marshall, 2022-
Ohio-3795, 199 N.E.3d 665, ¶ 16 (noting that a court may take judicial notice of 
geographic facts not subject to reasonable dispute).  Lincoln Heights has passed 
ordinances authorizing police to remove vehicles that are illegally parked or are 
obstructing traffic, and Lincoln Heights allows for a court to order the 
immobilization and impoundment of a vehicle involved in a driving-under-a-
suspended-license offense.  See Lincoln Heights Code of Ordinances 71.18(A), 
76.03, and 76.09(B).  Lincoln Heights does not, however, have an ordinance 
specifically permitting police impoundment of a vehicle based on the driver’s status 
of having a suspended license.  Therefore, there is no local ordinance or state statute 
that authorized the impoundment here. 
{¶ 60} Because the state has not shown that the impoundment of the vehicle 
was lawful in this case, it cannot show that the deputy’s search of the vehicle fell 
within the inventory-search exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement.  See Leak at ¶ 29.  Therefore, the deputy’s search of the vehicle 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
 
violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. 
The state did not show that the search was conducted in accordance with a valid 
inventory-search policy 
{¶ 61} Even if Deputy Singleton’s decision to impound the vehicle was 
valid, an analysis similar to that for the impoundment applies to the inventory 
search—namely, was the inventory search conducted pursuant to a valid policy (or 
statute), and was that policy actually followed?  See State v. Mesa, 87 Ohio St.3d 
105, 110-111, 717 N.E.2d 329 (1999) (police officers followed a detailed written 
policy that specified where officers could and could not search and when an 
inventory report was required).  Similarly, the state has the burden of demonstrating 
the lawfulness of the inventory search.  See State v. Hathman, 65 Ohio St.3d 403, 
408, 604 N.E.2d 743 (1992) (concluding that the opening of a closed container 
during an inventory search was unlawful, because the state did not meet its burden 
of establishing the existence of a standardized policy or practice governing the 
opening of such containers). 
{¶ 62} When discussing the impoundment and the inventory search at the 
suppression hearing, Deputy Singleton stated: 
 
 
Due to the stop and the status [of Toran’s suspended license], 
what our policy is, an inventory search of that vehicle was 
conducted, any damage, anything.  I have been doing this 
occupation, road patrol, just short of 20 years.  I am systematic about 
how we do the tows because, if there is damage all over the car, 
valuables can be in the car, and officers need to be accountable. 
 
{¶ 63} The majority concludes that Deputy Singleton’s testimony “was 
sufficient to establish both the existence of the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office’s 
January Term, 2023 
29 
 
inventory-search policy and that he acted in accordance with the policy.”  Majority 
opinion at ¶ 25.  But the deputy’s testimony tells us nothing about the substance of 
any policy of the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office, nor does it demonstrate that he 
followed any such policy.3  Deputy Singleton testified that he followed a policy in 
deciding to impound and search the vehicle.  But his testimony does not 
demonstrate whose policy he followed, the details or criteria of that policy, and how 
his actions complied with the policy.  Officer testimony must outline the law-
enforcement agency’s standardized inventory-search policy and specifically 
describe how the decision to search adhered to the policy.  See State v. Smith, 1st 
Dist. Hamilton No. C-200352, 2021-Ohio-2654, ¶ 35-40 (upholding trial court’s 
determination that an inventory search was unlawful when officer failed to testify 
to the details of the policy, such as whether closed containers found in the vehicle 
could be opened and searched); State v. Beasley, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180152, 
2019-Ohio-3936, ¶ 14 (finding that an inventory search was unlawful when an 
officer testified about a general policy that the contents of vehicles searched must 
be cataloged to ensure the contents are protected and returned). 
{¶ 64} Similarly, the body-camera footage does not prove the existence of 
any inventory-search policy at the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office, nor does it 
show that Deputy Singleton followed such a policy.  For example, there is no 
footage of Deputy Singleton completing an inventory-search form, physically 
producing a handbook or written policy for his review, or discussing any such 
policy with his partner at the scene.  The majority’s reliance on the body-camera 
 
3. Inventory-search policies typically contain a provision requiring the officer conducting the search 
to list or catalog the items in the vehicle and any damage to the vehicle—for the very reasons Deputy 
Singleton stated in his testimony.  See Mesa at 112, fn. 4 (policy required that every item removed 
from a vehicle be listed on a report); State v. Beasley, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180152, 2019-Ohio-
3936, ¶ 14 (noting that officer conducting the search did not appear to adhere to generic inventory 
policy and failed to write down items removed from the vehicle).  The record in this case contains 
no evidence of any inventory catalog or list regarding the search of the vehicle. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
 
footage makes little sense here, because the footage does not answer any Fourth 
Amendment questions in this case. 
{¶ 65} Without having offered more, the state has failed to carry its burden 
to prove that the inventory search in this case was lawful, and I would affirm the 
judgment of the First District based on the facts presented.  To be clear, I agree with 
the majority that the state is not always required to produce a written policy to 
justify the impoundment of a vehicle and a concomitant inventory search (though, 
obviously, producing such a policy could alleviate the need for a court to consider 
this precise issue and would provide clarity to law-enforcement officers).  But the 
Fourth Amendment requires more than general, personalized and unsupported 
officer testimony that a departmental or agency policy exists and the officer 
followed it.  See Hathman, 65 Ohio St.3d at 404-405, 604 N.E.2d 743 (finding 
officer’s general testimony about departmental policy on how to properly conduct 
an inventory search insufficient to support search of closed containers found in 
vehicle); Leak, 145 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-154, 47 N.E.3d 821, at ¶ 37.  This 
is not an onerous burden for the state to carry.  So while there may be evidence 
showing that the decision to impound the vehicle in this case was made pursuant to 
departmental policy, if that evidence exists, it is not in the record.  Without knowing 
the requirements of the policy the deputy referred to in his testimony, just like the 
court of appeals, this court is unable to determine whether he acted pursuant to the 
policy. 
{¶ 66} The majority skips past the rigorous standards of the Fourth 
Amendment to determine that the ends here justify the means.  The majority states 
that one purpose of the inventory-search exception is to safeguard officers from 
danger and that the fact that a gun was found (and thus secured) during the search 
means the search was appropriate.  The majority is right that one purpose of 
inventory searches is to safeguard officers, but the majority also knows better than 
to declare that finding the weapon makes the search lawful.  That analysis puts the 
January Term, 2023 
31 
 
cart before the horse and glosses over the serious deficiencies related to the search 
in this case, all to the detriment of the safeguards that the Fourth Amendment 
enshrines.  It is the Fourth Amendment that “gives concrete expression to a right of 
the people which ‘is basic to a free society.’ ”  Camara v. Mun. Court of San 
Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967), quoting Wolf 
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949).  Because the 
majority concludes that the inventory search here was lawful, I dissent, and I would 
affirm the decision of the First District Court of Appeals. 
BRUNNER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
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Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip R. 
Cummings, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Brian A. Smith Law Firm, L.L.C., and Brian A. Smith, for appellee. 
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Christine Y. 
Jones, Director, Appellate Division; Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public 
Defender, and Jonathan Sidney and Michael V. Wilhelm, Assistant Public 
Defenders; and Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, 
Assistant Public Defender, urging affirmance or dismissal for amici curiae 
Hamilton County Public Defender, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Office 
of the Ohio Public Defender. 
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