Case Title: Hunter v. Hunter

Citation: 

Docket Number: 144, 2005

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2006-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
The Court’s Order of May 2, 2005, assigned pseudonyms to the parties.  Supr. Ct.
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R. 7(d).
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
KELLY M. HUNTER,
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(a/k/a KELLY M.  HUNTER-NEWMAN)
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No.  144, 2005
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Petitioner Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below--Family Court of 
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the State of Delaware  
v.
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and for Kent County in File   
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No. CK00-03979.
TERRY J. HUNTER,
§
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Respondent Below,
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Appellee,
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and
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OFFICE OF CHILD ADVOCATE/
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ATTORNEY GUARDIAN AD 
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LITEM,
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Appellee.
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Submitted: August 25, 2006
Decided:
November 30, 2006
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices.
O R D E R
This 30  day of November 2006, upon consideration of the briefs on
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appeal and the Family Court record, it appears to the Court that:
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(1)
The appellant, Kelly M. Hunter (“Mother”), filed an appeal from
the Family Court’s decision of March 14, 2005 that denied her motion to
modify custody and her petition for a rule to show cause.  The same decision
denied a petition for a rule to show cause filed by appellee-Terry Hunter
(“Father”). 
(2)
Mother and Father have spent the last six years engaged in a battle
over custody and visitation.  In 2002, Mother and Father executed a custody
and visitation agreement (“the agreement”) that was approved by the Family
Court.  The agreement provided that Mother and Father would share joint legal
custody of their three young children.  Father was allowed primary placement
and final legal decision-making authority.  Mother was allowed telephone
contact and visitation.
(3)
Under the agreement, Mother’s visitation was limited at first to
supervised therapeutic visitation in the office of a qualified psychologist or
psychiatrist chosen by the children’s guardian ad litem.  The agreement
provided that, upon the joint recommendation of the therapist and the guardian
ad litem, Mother’s visitation would increase in duration and frequency and
decrease in level of supervision.
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(4)
The agreement further provided that the parties would attempt to
mediate any custody and visitation-related issues.  Moreover, the parties agreed
that the custody provisions would be subject to modification only if continued
enforcement of the agreement could endanger the children’s physical health or
significantly impair their emotional development.
(5)
Within five months of executing the agreement, Mother and Father
had each filed a petition for a rule to show cause alleging that the other had
violated the agreement.   Seven months after signing the agreement, and while
the rule to show cause petitions were pending, Mother filed a motion for
modification of custody.  
(6)
Mother’s motion for modification of custody alleged that Father
and the guardian ad litem had coerced her into entering the agreement and that
she signed the agreement under duress.  Mother also alleged (a) that the legal
system had been used as a weapon against her and the children;(b) Father and
the guardian ad litem had breached the agreement; (c) the Children’s Bill of
Rights had been ignored; (d) Father had been convicted of domestic violence;
(e) Father had been convicted of violating an order of Protection from Abuse;
(f) Father had been arrested for Endangering the Welfare of a Child; (g) one of
the children had alleged sexual abuse by Father’s brother; (h) Father had not
See 
Del.  Code Ann. tit.  13, § 729(b) (1999 ) (providing that the Family Court may
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modify a consent order concerning custody at any time in accordance with the “best interests
of the child”); Del.  Code Ann.  tit.  13, § 722 (1999 & Supp.  2004) (setting forth factors to
consider when determining the best interests of the child).
Compare 
Del. Code Ann. tit.  13, § 729(b) (providing for modification of custody
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upon determination of “best interests”) and Del.  Code Ann.  tit.  13, § 729(c)(1) (providing
for modification of custody only if there is endangerment to physical health or impairment
of emotional development).
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complied with previous orders of the court; (i) Father was guilty of defamation
of character; (j) Mother’s civil rights had been violated; (k) the children had not
received necessary medical care; (l) there had been inappropriate medication
prescribed and administered to one of the children; (m) there had been
repetitive put-downs of Mother in front of the children; (n) Mother was not
informed of Father’s petition for a rule to show cause; and (o) Father had
committed perjury.
(7)
In pretrial proceedings the Family Court determined that it would
apply the “best interests” standard of review  when considering Mother’s
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motion to modify custody rather than the higher “endangerment/significant
impairment” standard that was contemplated by the agreement.   Moreover, the
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Family Court ruled that Mother was barred under the doctrine of judicial
estoppel from raising claims of coercion and duress.  Third, the Family Court
advised the parties that it intended to limit the evidence to events occurring
after the date the agreement was entered.
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(8)
The 2004 evidentiary hearing lasted a total of five days.  By order
dated March 14, 2005, the Family Court denied the parties’ petitions for rule
to show cause and Mother’s motion to modify custody.  This appeal followed.
(9)
On appeal Father filed a motion to affirm the Family Court’s
judgment on the ground that it was manifest on the face of Mother’s opening
brief that the appeal was without merit.  Also, Father and the guardian ad litem
filed motions to dismiss that were based in part on Mother’s failure to secure
the transcript that was necessary to evaluate her claims.  
(10)
By Order dated October 5, 2005, this Court denied the motion to
affirm and the motions to dismiss.  In the same Order, this Court determined
that the Family Court had erred when it barred Mother’s claims of coercion and
duress under the doctrine of judicial estoppel.  This Court remanded the appeal
to the Family Court for findings of fact and conclusions of law on Mother’s
claims of coercion and duress.
(11)
The Family Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on remand.
Over the course of the five-day hearing, the Family Court heard testimony from
a number of witnesses including Mother, Father, Mother’s former counsel,
Father’s former counsel, the guardian ad litem, Mother’s fifteen-year old child
It appears that transcript of this hearing as well as prior hearings was provided to
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Mother at State expense.
Devon v.  Mundy, 906 A.2d 750, 752 (Del.  2006) (citing Wife (J.F.V.)  v.  Husband
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(O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del.  1979)).
Id.  (citing In re Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 29 (Del.  1995)).
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from a prior marriage, a pastor and his wife, several licensed therapists, and a
State Police detective.  
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(12)
By order dated March 31, 2006, the Family Court determined that
Mother had not established that she was coerced into entering the agreement or
that she had signed the agreement under duress.  The Family Court concluded
that:
[M]other entered into the agreement because she believed it was
the appropriate action to take. . . . Thereafter, [M]other apparently
had second thoughts as to what she had done.  However, those
second thoughts do not affect the validity of the agreement.
In the wake of the Family Court’s decision on remand, Mother’s appeal is once
again before this Court.  
(13)
Appellate review of an appeal from a custody decision extends to
both the facts and the law, as well as to the inferences and deductions made by
the Family Court after considering the weight and credibility of the testimony.5
To the extent the Family Court’s decision implicates rulings of law, our review
is de novo.   Findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they are found to be
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Id. (citing Solis v.  Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del.  1983)).
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Id.  at 752-53.
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clearly erroneous and justice requires that they be overturned.   “The judgment
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of the Family Court must be affirmed when the inferences and deductions upon
which [the decision] is based are supported by the record and are the product
of an orderly and logical deductive process.”  
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(14)
After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and thorough
review of the record, this Court has determined that this appeal should be
affirmed on the basis of the Family Court’s well-reasoned decisions dated
March 14, 2005 and March 31, 2006.  It is clear that the trial judge considered
the evidence under the appropriate legal standards and applied an orderly and
logical deductive process to arrive at findings and conclusions that are amply
supported by the record.  Accordingly, there is no basis upon which to disturb
the Family Court’s judgment.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger
Justice