Case Title: STATE v WARREN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 80-335

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1981-05-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
N o . 80-335 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, VS. D O N A L D A N D E R S O N W A R R E N , Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Yellowstone. Honorable William Speare, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Record: For Appellant: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, B i l l i n g s , Montana Corbin Howard argued, Deputy Couhty Attorney, B i l l i n g s , Montana Far Respondent : Moses Law Firm, B i l l i n g s , Montana Stephen Moses argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted: March 2 4 , 1981 Decided: May 20, 1981. Filed: MAY 2 O 1 9 8 1 M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr., d e l i v e r e d the Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant was convicted of the offense of tampering with o r f a b r i c a t i n g physical evidence pursuant t o s e c t i o n 45-7-207 (1) ( a ) , MCA. Defendant moved the c o u r t f o r a judgment notwithstanding t h e v e r d i c t and f o r a new trial; the new t r i a l was granted. The defendant i n t h i s case, Donald Warren, i s the f a t h e r of Ray Warren who was a r r e s t e d on a d e l i b e r a t e homicide charge a r i s i n g o u t of a shooting which occurred August 15, 1979. The defendant h a s b e e n charged w i t h suppressing m a t e r i a l evidence, s p e c i f i c a l l y a . 2 2 c a l i b e r p i s t o l , i n connection with t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n of h i s son on t h e d e l i b e r a t e homicide charge. The b a s i s of t h e case a g a i n s t defendant, Donald Warren, s t e m s from t h e testimony of Norman Hopkins. Hopkins, who l i v e d with t h e defendant's daughter, K i m Warren, and was a f r i e n d of the Warren family, t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had received a . 2 2 c a l i b e r p i s t o l from Donald Warren t h e afternoon following t h e a r r e s t of Ray Warren on d e l i b e r a t e homicide charges. Hopkins t e s t i f i e d t h a t he recognized t h e p i s t o l as being one t h a t Ray Warren had taken when he accompanied Hopkins on s e v e r a l coyote hunting t r i p s . Hopkins t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e defendant, Donald Warren, s t a t e d the gun was possibly unre- g i s t e r e d and t h a t he d i d n o t want the p o l i c e t o f i n d it i n t h e Warren house because of i t s uncertain l e g a l i t y . Hopkins t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was i n s t r u c t e d by defendant, Donald Warren, t o dispose of the gun, n o t because it had anything t o do with t h e pending homicide charges a g a i n s t h i s son, b u t r a t h e r because t h e weapon was not r e g i s t e r e d . Hopkins then s t a t e d he had possession of t h e gun from t h a t time, August 15, 1979, u n t i l December 3 , 1979, when he gave it t o the police. ~ o p k i n s gave the weapon t o the p o l i c e a f t e r he had severed h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p with K i m Warren. Ray Warren, a f t e r posting bond, disappeared and has never been t r i e d on t h e d e l i b e r a t e homicide charge. Both t h e s t a t e and the defendant r a i s e d numerous i s s u e s f o r review. Three i s s u e s a r e d i s p o s i t i v e : (1) Was Hopkins, a s a matter of law, an accomplice? ( 2 ) I f Hopkins was an accomplice, a s a matter of law, then was t h e r e any evidence t o corroborate h i s testimony? (3) Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n granting a new t r i a l ? Section 45-2-302(3), MCA, d e f i n e s t h e elements of being an accomplice, p e r t i n e n t t o t h i s case. One i s l e g a l l y accountable f o r a n o t h e r ' s conduct i f ". . . e i t h e r before o r during the commission of an offense with t h e purpose t o promote o r f a c i l i t a t e such commission, he s o l i c i t s , a i d s , a b e t s , agrees, o r attempts t o a i d such o t h e r person i n the planning o r commission of t h e offense." The only d i r e c t evidence bearing on t h e i s s u e s of de- f e n d a n t ' s i n t e n t and Hopkins being an "accomplice" i s t h e testimony given by Hopkins a t time of t r i a l . Hopkins testi- f i e d t h a t he intended t o dispose of the .22 c a l i b e r p i s t o l because he was t o l d by t h e defendant, Donald Warren, t h a t t h e p i s t o l was unregistered and perhaps i l l e g a l . heref fore, Hopkins contends he d i d n o t a i d Donald Warren i n suppressing evidence m a t e r i a l t o a homicide i n v e s t i g a t i o n ; r a t h e r ~ o p k i n s contends h i s only i n t e n t was t o dispose of an unregistered gun. I f t h e jury believed t h a t t h i s was a c t u a l l y defendant's reason f o r disposing of t h e p i s t o l , t h e jury would n e c e s s a r i l y have a c q u i t t e d t h e defendant, Donald Warren, because he was charged with suppressing evidence i n a homicide i n v e s t i g a t i o n . The jury obviously chose t o d i s b e l i e v e t h e f a c t of "no r e g i s t r a t i o n " a s being t h e reason f o r d i s p o s a l of t h e weapon. I f Hopkins' testimony could be considered t h e r e were /from then f a c t s which t h e jury could i n f e r i n t e n t t o suppress m a t e r i a l evidence i n a homicide i n v e s t i g a t i o n . A t t h e time Hopkins claimed defendant, Donald Warren, delivered t h e .22 c a l i b e r weapon t o him with i n s t r u c t i o n s t o dispose of same, both Hopkins and defendant knew Ray Warren, defendant's son, was i n j a i l and t h a t a homicide i n v e s t i g a t i o n was being conducted. The jury i n f e r r e d from these circumstances t h a t defendant, having t h i s knowledge, intended t o dispose of t h e .22 c a l i b e r weapon s o t h a t it could n o t be used as evidence t o convict h i s son. However, t h i s same inference would n e c e s s a r i l y have t o be drawn about the motives of Hopkins. I f twelve reasonable minds i n f e r r e d from t h e evidence t h a t defendant, Donald Warren, intended t o suppress t h e weapon because it was p o t e n t i a l evidence i n a homicide case, those same twelve reasonable minds would have t o i n f e r t h a t t h e same i n t e n t e x i s t e d f o r Norman Hopkins. This inference would n e c e s s a r i l y make Hopkins an accomplice a s a matter of law. W e have c a r e f u l l y examined t h i s record t o determine i f t h e r e was any corroboration t o support t h e testimony of Norman Hopkins. This case presents a p e r f e c t i l l u s t r a t i o n of why an accomplice's testimony must be corroborated. Without corroboration, an innocent man could be convicted by t h e testimony of one with a strong motive f o r seeing t h a t such a conviction occurred. Norman Hopkins had opportunity f o r access t o t h e son, Ray Warren, following the shooting. Had Ray Warren disposed of the . 2 2 c a l i b e r p i s t o l through Norman Hopkins, Hopkins could l a t e r exonerate himself and c o n v i c t t h e f a t h e r , Donald Warren, simply by r e l a t i n g t h e s t o r y which was given under o a t h i n t h i s case. I n order t o corroborate the testimony of Hopkins, it was necessary f o r t h e s t a t e t o show t h a t t h e . 2 2 c a l i b e r weapon could be traced from t h e homicide scene back t o t h e Warren residence, where defendant, Donald Warren, would have access t o the weapon. The s t a t e was a b l e t o show t h a t t h e gun was a t the residence p r i o r t o the a l l e g e d homicide. Of course, i f t h e gun was owned by Ray Warren, it most l i k e l y would have been a t h i s residence. However, the c r i t i c a l i n q u i r y must be d i r e c t e d toward i t s l o c a t i o n a f t e r t h e shooting. There was absolutely no corroborative evidence, e i t h e r d i r e c t o r c i r c u m s t a n t i a l , which would provide a b a s i s f o r f i n d i n g t h a t t h e weapon traveled from t h e a l l e g e d homi- c i d e scene t o t h e Warren residence. The s t a t e contends t h a t the presence of Ray Warren's v e h i c l e a t the Warren residence s e v e r a l hours a f t e r t h e shooting occurred, tends t o provide corroboration. This evidence only proves t h a t Ray Warren may have returned t o h i s residence following the shooting, b u t i t does n o t prove t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e weapon. I t Seems probable t h a t Ray Warren may have disposed of the weapon p r i o r t o r e t u r n i n g h i s v e h i c l e t o t h e Warren residence. It seems implausible t h a t Warren would have taken the weapon t o h i s home where p o l i c e would most l i k e l y conduct a search. I n f a c t , such a search was conducted s e v e r a l days l a t e r and no . 2 2 c a l i b e r p i s t o l was found. A t the t i m e of t h e search, a spare c l i p f o r t h e . 2 2 c a l i b e r p i s t o l was found i n the glove compartment of an automobile owned and driven by Joy Warren, wife of t h e defendant. The s t a t e argues t h a t t h i s provides corroboration. However, t h e presence of a spare c l i p only tends t o prove t h a t t h e . 2 2 c a l i b e r p i s t o l was on the premises a t some t i m e . The c r i t i c a l question i s not whether the s u b j e c t p i s t o l belonged t o Ray Warren o r whether it had been a t t h e Warren residence on p r i o r occasions; t h e determinative question i s whether t h e r e i s any evidence, other than Hopkins' testimony, t o show t h a t the weapon moved from the a l l e g e d homicide scene back t o the Warren residence. W e can f i n d no evidence i n the record t o corroborate Hopkins' testimony t h a t t h e defendant, Donald Warren, was ever i n possession of t h e . 2 2 c a l i b e r p i s t o l following t h e shooting of August 1 4 , 1979. Section 46-16-213, MCA, s e t s f o r t h t h e requirement of corroboration f o r accomplice testimony. I t s t a t e s : "A conviction cannot be had on the testimony of one responsible o r l e g a l l y accountable f o r the same offense . . . unless t h e testimony i s corroborated . . ." The s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e testimony be corroborated by independent evidence tend- ing t o connect t h e defendant with the commission of t h e Mont. offense. I n S t a t e v. Kemp (1979), - , 597 P.2d 96, 36 St.Rep. 1215, t h i s Court discussed t h e c h a r a c t e r , scope and s u f f i c i e n c y of corroborating evidence: "To be s u f f i c i e n t , corroborating evidence must show more than t h a t a crime was i n f a c t committed o r t h e circumstances of i t s commission. ( C i t a t i o n omitted. ) I t must r a i s e more than a suspicion of the defendant's involvement i n , o r opportunity t o commit, t h e c r i m e charged. ( C i t a t i o n omitted.) But corroborative evi- dence need n o t be s u f f i c i e n t , by i t s e l f , t o support a defendant's conviction o r even t o make o u t a prima f a c i e case a g a i n s t him. ( C i t a t i o n omitted. ) Corro- borating evidence may be c i r c u m s t a n t i a l ( c i t a t i o n omitted) and can come from t h e defendant o r h i s witnesses. " ( C i t a t i o n omitted. ) I n the case a t b a r , only Hopkins' testimony e s t a b l i s h e d the defendant's a c t i o n i n t r a n s f e r r i n g t h e p i s t o l . There- f o r e , a s a matter of law, t h e r e was no corroborating e v i - dence t o support a conviction. I n r u l i n g on t h e defendant's motion f o r a judgment not- withstanding t h e v e r d i c t , o r i n the a l t e r n a t i v e f o r a new t r i a l , the lower c o u r t s t a t e d : ". . . and t h a t was t h e only testimony about t h e gun--was Hopkins. I was i n hopes t h a t t h i s would be i n corroboration. I was i n hopes t h a t t h i s Allore would t e s t i f y , b u t t h a t can s t i l l be done . . . " I n any event, t h a t ' s t h e d e c i s i o n of t h i s Court, and t h e r e w i l l be a new t r i a l . " These statements show t h a t the lower c o u r t s u b s t a n t i a l l y agreed with the proposition t h a t Norman Hopkins was an accomplice and t h a t h i s testimony was not corroborated. However, t h e lower c o u r t i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e s t a t e ' s f a i l u r e t o p r e s e n t s u f f i c i e n t corroborating evidence could be cured perhaps a t a second t r i a l . Such a c t i o n places t h e defendant i n double jeopardy and i s n o t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y permissible. Burks v. United S t a t e s (1978), 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1. I n Burks t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court held t h a t " [ t l h e Double Jeopardy Clause f o r b i d s a second t r i a l f o r t h e purpose of affording t h e prosecution another opportunity t o supply evidence which it f a i l e d t o muster i n the f i r s t proceeding." 437 U.S. a t 11, 98 S.Ct. a t 2147, 57 L.Ed.2d a t 9. This holding was limited t o s i t u a t i o n s where a r e v e r s a l of a lower c o u r t determination was n e c e s s i t a t e d because of e v i d e n t i a r y i n s u f f i c i e n c y , n o t because of t r i a l e r r o r . I n t h e case a t bar, t h i s Court i s faced with t h e p r e c i s e problem of e v i d e n t i a r y i n s u f f i c i e n c y . W e have determined t h a t Norman Hopkins' testimony renders him an accomplice of t h e defendant a s a matter of law and t h a t t h e s t a t e f a i l e d t o p r e s e n t s u f f i c i e n t evidence corroborating Hopkins' testimony. Therefore, no evidence e x i s t s t o support a conviction of t h e - defendant. Allowing t h e s t a t e a second chance t o b u t t r e s s i t s c a s e would e x p r e s s l y v i o l a t e t h e p r i n c i p l e espoused i n Burks v. United S t a t e s , supra. This Court has a l s o held t h a t a new t r i a l cannot be granted where t h e evidence adduced a t t h e f i r s t t r i a l i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o support a conviction. S t a t e v. Johnson (1978), 177 Mont. 182, 188, 580 P.2d 1387, 1390; S t a t e v. Langan (19681, 151 Mont. 558, 568, 445 P.2d 565, 570. Thus, t h e q u e s t i o n becomes: What i s t h e proper remedy? I n Burks v. United S t a t e s , supra, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court s t a t e d t h a t , ". . . Since w e hold today t h a t t h e Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second t r i a l once t h e reviewing c o u r t has found t h e evidence l e g a l l y i n s u f f i c i e n t , t h e only ' j u s t ' remedy a v a i l a b l e f o r t h a t c o u r t i s t h e d i r e c t i o n of a judgment of a c q u i t t a l . " 437 U.S. a t 18, 98 S.Ct. a t 2150-2151, 57 L.Ed.2d a t 1 4 . The Supreme Court f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t such a c t i o n was t h e proper remedy regard- less of whether t h e defendant ". . . sought a new t r i a l a s one of h i s remedies, o r even a s t h e s o l e remedy." 437 U.S. a t 17, 98 S.Ct. a t 2150, 57 L.Ed.2d a t 13. The c o u r t con- cluded by s t a t i n g , ". . . To the e x t e n t t h a t our p r i o r d e c i s i o n s suggest t h a t by moving f o r a new t r i a l , a defendant waives h i s r i g h t t o a judgment of a c q u i t t a l on t h e b a s i s of e v i d e n t i a r y i n s u f f i c i e n c y , those c a s e s a r e overruled." 437 U.S. a t 18, 98 S.Ct. a t 21-51, 57 L.Ed.2d a t 1 4 . This Court adopts t h e p r i n c i p l e s e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n Burks v. United S t a t e s , supra; t h e r e f o r e , a judgment of a c q u i t t a l i s t h e proper remedy i n t h i s c a s e . I n concl~usion, w e f i n d t h a t Norman Hopkins was an accomplice a s a m a t t e r of law and t h a t before t h i s c a s e could be submitted t o a jury, it was incumbent upon t h e s t a t e t o produce independent corroborating evidence. W e f i n d t h a t t h e s t a t e f a i l e d t o produce s u f f i c i e n t evidence of corroboration necessary f o r c r e a t i o n of a jury i s s u e and t h a t , t h e r e f o r e , t h e s t a t e ' s case f a i l s a s a matter of law. This case i s remanded t o the D i s t r i c t Court with d i r e c - t i o n s t o e n t e r a judgment of a c q u i t t a l f o r defendant, Donald Warren. W e concur: M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea d i s s e n t s and w i l l f i l e a w r i t t e n d i s s e n t l a t e r .