Case Title: Greene v. Patterson

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC-2023-0945

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2024-05-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: May 3, 2024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0945 
_________________________ 
 
Raymond Shane Greene 
 
 v.  
 
Nicki E. Patterson 
 
 
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court 
(CV-23-901385) 
 
SELLERS, Justice. 
Raymond Shane Greene appeals from an order of the Mobile Circuit 
Court granting Nicki E. Patterson's motion to dismiss an action that 
SC-2023-0945 
2 
 
Greene purportedly commenced pursuant to Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  
We affirm. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
In November 2015, Greene was convicted of rape in the first degree, 
a violation of § 13A-6-61(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975; sodomy in the first degree, 
a violation of § 13A-6-63, Ala. Code 1975; and sexual abuse of a child 
under 12 years of age, a violation of § 13A-6-69.1, Ala. Code 1975.   The 
trial court sentenced Greene to life imprisonment for the rape conviction, 
99 years' imprisonment for the sodomy conviction, and 10 years' 
imprisonment for the sexual-abuse conviction; the sentences for rape and 
sodomy were ordered to run consecutively, and the sexual-abuse 
conviction was ordered to run concurrently with the other two.  
 
Greene was initially tried for the above-stated offenses in August 
2015, but that trial resulted in a mistrial based on the State's inadvertent 
failure to provide defense counsel with certain evidence, which prejudiced 
the trial. A transcript of the August 2015 trial proceedings indicates that, 
although defense counsel asked for the mistrial, counsel, nonetheless, 
represented to the trial judge that there had been no bad faith on the part 
of the State in failing to provide the evidence and that double jeopardy 
SC-2023-0945 
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therefore would not bar a second trial. Based on those representations 
and the totality of the circumstances, the trial court declared a mistrial.  
Following the mistrial, Greene filed a motion to dismiss the charges 
against him on the ground of double jeopardy stemming from alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct.  The trial court presumably denied that 
motion, because Greene was retried in November 2015, convicted of the 
charged offenses, and sentenced as previously indicated.      
  
On July 7, 2023, Greene, acting pro se, purported to commence in 
the Mobile Circuit Court ("the circuit court") an action pursuant to Rule 
60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., arguing, in relevant part, that his November 2015 
criminal convictions were due to be set aside on double-jeopardy 
grounds.1  In that action, Greene accused Patterson, the assistant district 
attorney who had prosecuted him in the August 2015 trial, of 
prosecutorial misconduct. Specifically, he claimed that, because 
Patterson's misconduct had caused the mistrial, his second trial violated 
 
1Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that "[t]his rule does not limit 
the power of a court to entertain an independent action within a 
reasonable time and not to exceed three (3) years after the entry of the 
judgment (or such additional time as is given by § 6-2-3 and § 6-2-8, Code 
of Alabama 1975)."  
 
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the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  The action was docketed as case no. CV-23-901385, and 
Patterson was served with the summons and complaint. The Mobile 
County District Attorney's Office, on behalf of Patterson, filed a motion 
to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., on the grounds that 
the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the complaint, 
that the complaint failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could 
be granted, that the claims asserted in the complaint were barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations, and that Patterson was entitled to 
State-agent and prosecutorial immunity. The circuit court, thereafter, 
entered an order granting Patterson's motion to dismiss. Greene filed a 
postjudgment motion to alter, amend, or vacate, which the circuit court 
denied.  This appeal followed. 
Discussion 
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the circuit court properly 
granted Patterson's motion to dismiss.  We review the circuit court's 
ruling on the motion to dismiss without a presumption of correctness.  
Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993). Greene seeks relief 
from his 2015 criminal convictions through an independent action 
SC-2023-0945 
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purportedly commenced pursuant to Rule 60(b).2 However, Rule 1, Ala. 
R. Civ. P., states that the rules of civil procedure govern "all actions of a 
civil nature."  The Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption of Rule 1 
further state that the rules of civil procedure "have no application in 
criminal proceedings."  Rather, Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., exclusively 
governs postconviction-relief litigation under Alabama law. In fact, Rule 
32.1, Ala. R. Crim. P., states, in relevant part, that "any defendant who 
has been convicted of a criminal offense may institute a proceeding in the 
court of original conviction to secure appropriate relief …."  See also Rule 
32.4, Ala. R. Crim. P. ("A proceeding under [Rule 32] displaces all post-
trial remedies except post-trial motions under Rule 24[, Ala. R. Crim. P.,] 
and appeal.  Any other post-conviction petition seeking relief from a 
conviction or sentence shall be treated as a proceeding under this rule.").  
In  Citizenship Trust v. Keddie-Hill, 68 So. 3d 99, 106 (Ala. 2011), this 
 
2Greene cites Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), for the 
proposition that commencing an action pursuant to Rule 60(b) is a proper 
means by which to challenge his criminal convictions.  Gonzalez, 
however, is inapplicable because it concerns the use of Rule 60(b), Fed. 
R. Civ. P., in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See also, e.g., Bandy v. 
State, 727 So. 2d 892, 893 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (noting that "a petition 
for the writ of habeas corpus filed in state court is not the appropriate 
method by which to seek relief from a conviction or sentence"). 
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Court specifically held that trial courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction 
over civil actions purporting to collaterally attack judgments in criminal 
cases. See also Tyson v. Macon Cnty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 43 So. 3d 
587, 589 (Ala. 2010) (holding that, with exceptions not applicable here, 
courts "may not interfere with the enforcement of criminal laws through 
a civil action").  That is essentially the same situation we have here; 
Greene has attempted to use a civil action to challenge the propriety of 
his convictions by suing the prosecuting attorney.  In light of the plain 
language of Rule 1, Ala. R. Civ. P., the Committee Comments thereto, 
and this Court's existing caselaw, a state prisoner such as Greene may 
not use a rule of civil procedure to collaterally attack a criminal 
judgment; rather, Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., provides the exclusive 
remedy for challenging a final judgment of conviction. Because the circuit 
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain Greene's civil action, 
it properly granted Patterson's motion to dismiss.3 
 
3The circuit court did not indicate in its order a specific ground on 
which it granted Patterson's Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss.  However, it is 
well settled that "this Court will affirm the trial court on any valid legal 
ground presented by the record, regardless of whether that ground was 
considered, or even if it was rejected, by the trial court." Liberty Nat'l Life 
Ins. Co. v. University of Alabama Health Servs. Found., P.C., 881 So. 2d 
1013, 1020 (Ala. 2003).  
SC-2023-0945 
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Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court's order granting 
Patterson's motion to dismiss is affirmed.  
 
AFFIRMED. 
 
Wise, Mendheim, Stewart, and Cook, JJ., concur. 
 
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, J., concur in the result. 
 
Mitchell, J., dissents, with opinion, which Bryan, J., joins. 
 
 
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MITCHELL, Justice (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent because I believe that exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction of this matter lies with the Court of Criminal Appeals, not 
our Court.  I would therefore transfer this appeal to the Court of Criminal 
Appeals and allow that court to decide it. 
I agree with the majority opinion that Raymond Shane Greene has 
attempted to "use a rule of civil procedure to collaterally attack a criminal 
judgment." ___ So. 3d at ___.  Greene purported to file his complaint 
under Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., a rule of civil procedure that can relieve 
a party from a "final judgment, order, or proceeding."  But the only "final 
judgment[s], order[s], or proceeding[s]" here are Greene's criminal 
convictions.  The substance of Greene's complaint is also telling: the only 
relief he sought was the vacatur of his convictions.  Because this Court 
"treat[s] a pleading and any other filing according to its substance, rather 
than its form or its style," Ex parte Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co., 
879 So. 2d 577, 584 (Ala. 2003), I agree with the majority opinion that we 
should treat Greene's complaint as a petition under Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. 
P., which "provides the exclusive remedy for challenging a final judgment 
of conviction."  ___ So. 3d at ___; see Rule 32.4, Ala. R. Crim. P. (stating 
SC-2023-0945 
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that, with few exceptions that do not apply here, "any … post-conviction 
petition seeking relief from a conviction or sentence shall be treated as a 
proceeding under [Rule 32]").  
The majority leaps from those observations to a discussion of the 
merits of the appeal, including a dispute over the trial court's subject-
matter jurisdiction.  But before analyzing the trial court's jurisdiction, we 
must examine our own.  And because this case -- despite its label as a 
civil action -- is actually criminal in nature, appellate jurisdiction lies 
only with the Court of Criminal Appeals, not our Court.  That is because, 
under Alabama law, "[t]he Court of Criminal Appeals has exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction of all misdemeanors, including the violation of town 
and city ordinances, habeas corpus and all felonies, including all post 
conviction writs in criminal cases." § 12-3-9, Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis 
added).   
Paradoxically, by reaching the merits of this appeal, the majority 
opinion treats the case as a civil matter for purposes of determining our 
jurisdiction while simultaneously holding that this is a criminal matter 
for purposes of determining whether the trial court had jurisdiction.  This 
contradictory approach cannot be squared with either the text of § 12-3-9 
SC-2023-0945 
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or our longstanding recognition that substance, not form, controls.  See, 
e.g., Lockhart v. Phenix City Inv. Co., 488 So. 2d 1353 (Ala. 1986). 
I would transfer this appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals and 
allow that court to decide it.  I therefore respectfully dissent. 
Bryan, J., concurs.