Case Title: Wallace v. State

Citation: 466 So. 2d 900

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1985-03-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
466 So. 2d 900 (1985) Herbert WALLACE v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 54646. Supreme Court of Mississippi. March 20, 1985. Rehearing Denied April 10, 1985. *901 Forrest Johnson, Sr., Forrest Johnson, Jr., Johnson & Johnson, Natchez, for appellant. Bill Allain, Atty. Gen. by Henry C. Clay, III, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ. ROY NOBLE LEE, Presiding Justice, for the Court: Herbert Wallace was jointly indicted with Anthony Jackson, Ronald Fitzgerald and Ronnie Ross in the Circuit Court of Adams County for armed robbery. After three (3) mistrials, one of which resulted from prosecutorial misconduct and the other two on account of the jury's being unable to reach a verdict, Wallace was found guilty, but the jury could not agree upon punishment. Thereupon, the trial judge sentenced him to twenty-five (25) years in custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Wallace has appealed from that conviction and sentence and assigns two (2) errors in the trial below. About 9 p.m. on December 5, 1980, three (3) males entered the Minit Man #9 convenience store in Adams County and robbed it. Felix Brown and Tommy Byrd, employees of the store, were working at the time. According to them, one of the robbers wore a red ski mask and the other two had stockings over their heads and were wearing stocking hats. The man with the red ski mask was holding a gun on Brown, who thought the robber was wearing a blue jump suit. Byrd thought one of the other men wore the blue jump suit. The robbers took approximately twelve hundred dollars ($1,200) in cash, checks, and food stamps. Brown and Byrd were ordered to lie down on the floor. As the three men left the store, Arthur Byrd, uncle of Tommy Byrd, was walking up to the convenience store. He watched them because they were running. They passed within a few feet of Byrd, jumped down into a ditch and headed toward Highway 61. The men were wearing the same clothes and masks described by the employees of the store. They passed out of view and, in a few seconds, he saw a white Pontiac car with an antenna on the rear, and occupied by four males, heading toward the highway. Byrd suspected something had happened in the store. He entered the store, learned about the robbery, and called and reported it to the sheriff's office. Phil Marler, a sheriff's deputy, received a description of the white Pontiac and passed a vehicle fitting that description. He stopped the car, which was driven by Ronald Fitzgerald. Herbert Wallace was on the rider's side in front; Anthony Jackson and Ronnie Ross were on the backseat. The car belonged to Wallace's mother. A stocking was found tied to the waist of Anthony Jackson. Deputy Sheriff Tommy Ferrell was called to the scene, and he searched the automobile. He found fifty-four dollars ($54.00) in an ashtray on the right rear side of the car, where Jackson was sitting. Additional cash, checks, eight (8) ticket stubs marked Minit Man #9, one (1) marked Minit Man #10, and a gun were found stashed in the opening for the sunroof in the car. A red ski mask was found on the front seat. Ownership of the gun could not be traced and no fingerprints were lifted. *902 Anthony Jackson testified in behalf of Wallace and stated that he and Wallace had been drinking beer on the afternoon and night of December 5 and riding around. According to him, Wallace ran off the road and hit something, causing a flat tire. They changed the flat and were beginning to pull off when Ronald Fitzgerald, Ronnie Ross and a Michael Todd Douglas ran up and asked for a ride. Since they were drunk, Fitzgerald drove the automobile. Douglas ran off toward a blue Nova across the street. Jackson and Wallace knew the other males, but Jackson denied seeing any money or guns in the car. Wallace's testimony was essentially the same as that of Jackson. He also denied going in the store that night and that he saw guns or money. At the three preceding trials, which ended in mistrials, appellant was tried along with Anthony Jackson. Prior to the trial which resulted in the conviction of appellant, Anthony Jackson entered a plea of guilty to grand larceny. Appellant contends that the fourth prosecution, resulting in his conviction, was barred on double jeopardy grounds. Article 3, § 22, Miss. Const. 1890, provides the following: In Mallette v. State, 349 So. 2d 546 (Miss. 1977), this Court held that the lower court did not err in refusing to dismiss because of two previous mistrials. Mallette was convicted of manslaughter and appealed, contending that the conviction after two mistrials as a result of hung juries placed him in double jeopardy. The Court held that "... in order for a plea of former jeopardy to avail, it must appear that the defendant was actually acquitted or convicted in a former trial on the merits of the crime for which he is again sought to be convicted." 349 So. 2d 548. See also Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 93 S. Ct. 1066, 35 L. Ed. 2d 425 (1973); Bounds v. State, 271 So. 2d 435 (Miss. 1973); Smith v. State, 158 Miss. 355, 128 So. 891 (1930); and State v. Moor, 1 Miss. [Walk.] 134 (1823). The jury's inability to agree is not an acquittal. In Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 98 S. Ct. 824, 54 L. Ed. 2d 717 (1978), the Court said: 434 U.S. at 509, 98 S. Ct. at 832, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 730. In Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 69 S. Ct. 834, 93 L. Ed. 974 (1949), the United States Supreme Court stated: 336 U.S. at 688-689, 69 S. Ct. at 837, 93 L. Ed. at 978. We are of the opinion that double jeopardy did not attach as a result of the previous mistrials, and that this assignment is without merit. As previously stated, appellant and Anthony Jackson had been codefendants at three previous trials and, prior to the fourth trial, Jackson entered a plea of guilty to grand larceny. During cross-examination by the district attorney the following transpired: During argument by the district attorney, the following bill of exceptions was preserved: Appellant contends that the examination by the district attorney and his argument were reversible error and relies upon Henderson v. State, 403 So. 2d 139 (Miss. 1981). In that case, Ricky Scott, a defense witness, was improperly asked on cross-examination by the district attorney whether he had been indicted for burglary. The witness had previously answered, "No" on direct examination to the question by his attorney, "Have you ever been convicted of a felony?" Also presented was the impropriety of the district attorney inquiring on cross-examination of co-indictee, Michael Henderson, whether the jury had convicted him for the same offense of armed robbery on which the defendant was being tried. Before an objection could be interposed, the witness answered, "Yea, because of you... ." Objections and motions for a mistrial were properly made. In each instance, the trial judge sustained the objection but overruled the motions for a mistrial, and, in lengthy statements, admonished the jury to disregard the questions asked by the district attorney and the answers thereto. In reversing the case, the Court said: 403 So. 2d at 141. Cases involving the question prior to Henderson, supra, are Ivy v. State, 301 So. 2d 292 (Miss. 1974), where a witness co-indictee was called by the State and shown by the State to have entered a plea of guilty to the same crime; McCray v. State, 293 So. 2d 807 (Miss. 1974), where the State introduced into evidence a certified copy of the co-indictee's conviction and sentence; Buckley v. State, 223 So. 2d 524 (Miss. 1969), where the co-indictee Pitts was called as a witness by the State and shown to have entered a guilty plea in order to bolster his testimony as an accomplice; Pieper v. State, 242 Miss. 49, 134 So. 2d 157 (1961), where Rucker, a co-indictee was called as a witness by the State and was shown to have entered a guilty plea in the same case; and Griffin v. State, 293 So. 2d 810 (Miss. 1974), where the State was allowed to show on cross-examination of one James Griffin, a co-indictee, that he had *905 been tried and convicted the preceding week and found guilty of the same murder. We think the present case can be distinguished from Henderson and the line of cases set forth hereinabove. Counsel for appellant knew that Jackson had entered a plea of guilty and knew when they called him to the witness stand to testify for appellant that his testimony would be directly contrary to the facts stated in his plea of guilty. Although the record of the trial judge's examination of Jackson at the time of receiving the guilty plea is not a part of the record, it is common knowledge that when the lower courts in this state receive such a plea, the accused is placed under oath and a rigid examination is conducted of him to insure that the accused knew what he was doing in entering the plea, that he, in fact, committed the crime or participated in the commission of same, and that his guilt was established. Counsel for appellant interrogated Jackson on direct examination, and Jackson stated that he and appellant were not at the scene of the crime and that they were in an automobile some distance from the scene. Further, he testified under oath: It is obvious that Jackson's testimony was perjured and that the district attorney inquired concerning his guilty plea in order to impeach his testimony and to reflect upon his credibility. That inquiry was in response to such testimony. In the cases cited above, the purpose of the co-indictee's testimony was for substantive evidence and to bolster the testimony of the co-indictee. Although the questions involved in Day v. State, 382 So. 2d 1071 (Miss. 1980), Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S. Ct. 643, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1971), and Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S. Ct. 1215, 43 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1975), are not the same as here, the principle is analogous to that involved in the case sub judice. In those cases, confessions were excluded on the State's direct case because of failure to give Miranda warnings. The defendants took the stand and testified in their own behalf, which testimony was contrary to the confessions given by them. Whereupon, the prosecution offered the confessions in rebuttal, and the courts ruled that, even though they were not admissible on the State's direct case, they were admissible in rebuttal to impeach the credibility of the accused. In Harris, the Court said: 401 U.S. at 225-226, 91 S. Ct. at 645-646, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 4-5. In Day, supra, this Court said: 382 So. 2d at 1074. See also Ivory v. State, 336 So. 2d 732 (Miss. 1976). We are of the opinion that, under the facts of this case, the questions by the district attorney were for the purpose of impeachment and attacking the credibility of the witness Jackson and that they did not constitute reversible error. The search for truth in this case requires that the testimony of Jackson be exposed for what it apparently was, viz, perjury. With reference to the argument of the district attorney, the lower court sustained an objection to that part of the argument and instructed the jury to disregard the statement. We are of the opinion that the statement does not constitute reversible error in this case. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER, P.J., and HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.