Case Title: Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 061361

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2007-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
MICHAEL LEE FITZGERALD 
 
 OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 061361 
      JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
  April 20, 2007 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In a jury trial held in the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania 
County, Michael Lee Fitzgerald was convicted on two counts of 
indecent liberties with a minor by a person in a custodial or 
supervisory relationship, Code § 18.2-370.1, and one count of 
object sexual penetration, Code § 18.2-67.2.  In this appeal, 
the sole issue we consider is whether the trial court erred in 
permitting a licensed professional counselor to testify as an 
expert witness that the alleged victim suffered from post-
traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”).1 
BACKGROUND 
 
To resolve the limited issue presented in this appeal, we 
need not recite the trial evidence that led to Fitzgerald’s 
criminal convictions.  The case arises from allegations, 
supported by the Commonwealth’s evidence, that Fitzgerald 
engaged in unlawful sexual acts with his stepdaughter (“the 
                     
1 We consider a similar issue with regard to expert 
testimony by a licensed clinical social worker in Conley v. 
Commonwealth, 273 Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2007) (this day 
decided). 
 
 
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victim”), who was under the age of thirteen years at the time.  
The focus of our analysis in resolving the issue presented is 
upon the challenged testimony of the Commonwealth’s expert 
witness, Linda Giles. 
 
At trial, the Commonwealth called Giles, a licensed 
professional counselor,2 to testify as an expert witness.  Giles 
testified that she held a master’s degree in counseling in 
addition to a bachelor’s degree.  Additionally, Giles testified 
that she had completed three years of clinical training, which 
involves supervision by a licensed psychologist or a licensed 
professional counselor.  Giles related that, at the time of 
trial, she had practiced as a licensed professional counselor 
for nine years and that her “primary background” involved 
working with children who were victims of abuse. 
 
Giles testified that she first met with the victim and her 
mother through a referral by Child Protective Services.  Giles 
explained that at that time her objective as a clinician was to 
“determine symptomology and treat the symptoms.”  She further 
explained that “[w]hat I would do with someone with [the 
                     
2 Code § 54.1-3500 defines a “[p]rofessional counselor” as 
“a person trained in counseling interventions designed to 
facilitate an individual’s achievement of human development 
goals and remediating mental, emotional, or behavioral disorders 
and associated distresses which interfere with mental health and 
development.” 
 
 
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victim’s] background would be to try and make her feel safe in 
the world again . . . based on the symptoms that I was seeing 
with her.” 
 
Giles testified that she conducted six counseling sessions 
with the victim after the initial meeting, and had an ongoing 
professional relationship with her at the time of trial.  During 
the counseling sessions, Giles determined from the victim and 
her mother that Fitzgerald “[a]llegedly . . . had an 
inappropriate sexual penetration with [the victim] on her living 
room floor when her mother was not there.” 
 
Giles then testified that the victim “experiences 
moderately severe symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder,” 
which she defined as “a collection of symptoms that happen after 
a traumatic event that has occurred that has made someone feel 
horror, helplessness.”  She stated that “any kind of 
inappropriate sexual contact with a . . . child qualifies and 
they relive the experience in all of their senses.” 
 
At this point, Fitzgerald objected, stating that Giles was 
not “clinically qualified to make that diagnosis.”  Fitzgerald 
asserted that a diagnosis of PTSD “has to be made by a doctor 
and cannot be made by a licensed professional counselor.”  The 
trial court overruled Fitzgerald’s objection. 
 
 
4
 
Continuing her testimony, Giles stated that she uses the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Health Disorders 
(“DSM”) as her standard for looking for symptoms and making a 
diagnosis.  She testified that the DSM “is the standard printed 
by the American Psychiatric Association and [is] used by 
psychologists, licensed professional counselors, [and] licensed 
clinical social workers.”  Giles explained that the DSM “is an 
effort to organize symptoms and organize thoughts in such a way 
that we can effect a treatment.” 
 
Giles testified that she first encountered PTSD, which she 
characterized as a “psychiatric diagnosis,” in her master’s 
degree program but encountered it in “much more detail” during 
her clinical training.  She listed numerous symptoms 
characteristic of PTSD, and stated that the victim reported or 
displayed “most” of those symptoms.  Giles testified that under 
the specific diagnostic scoring system set forth in the DSM for 
PTSD, the victim clearly met the criteria for PTSD and it was 
“[n]owhere near” a close call. 
 
On cross-examination, Giles reiterated that PTSD is a 
“psychiatric diagnosis.”  However, she did not agree that 
psychiatric diagnoses are usually made by psychiatrists, again 
stating that psychologists, licensed professional counselors, 
and licensed clinical social workers are trained to use the DSM. 
 
 
5
 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found 
Fitzgerald guilty of the charged offenses.3  Fitzgerald perfected 
an appeal to the Court of Appeals. 
 
A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals concluded that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Giles’ 
testimony because “Virginia law expressly permits professional 
counselors to diagnose . . . mental, emotional, and behavioral 
disorders” and “the evidence adduced at trial supported a 
finding that Giles was, in fact, qualified to exercise that 
diagnostic authority in this case.”  Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 
48 Va. App. 271, 276, 630 S.E.2d 337, 339 (2006).  This appeal 
followed. 
DISCUSSION 
 
Fitzgerald’s principal basis for making the assertion that 
the trial court erred in permitting Giles to testify as an 
expert that the victim suffered with PTSD is that a diagnosis of 
PTSD is a “psychiatric diagnosis” and Giles is not a 
psychiatrist.  According to Fitzgerald, only a psychiatrist or 
psychologist4 may qualify to give expert testimony regarding a 
                     
3 The jury found Fitzgerald not guilty of an additional 
count of object sexual penetration. 
4 On brief, while referring both to a psychiatrist, who is a 
physician, and a psychologist, who is a non-physician, 
Fitzgerald necessarily concedes that a psychologist may qualify 
to render an expert opinion regarding a mental disorder.  See 
 
 
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diagnosis based on the mental disorders identified in the DSM 
and, thus, licensed professional counselors, including Giles, 
are categorically unqualified to give such testimony. 
 
To support his contentions, Fitzgerald asserts that no 
provision in Title 54.1, Chapter 35 of the Code, which is 
entitled “Professional Counseling,” Code §§ 54.1-3500 through -
3515, enables a licensed professional counselor to engage in the 
practice of psychiatry or psychology.  Furthermore, Fitzgerald 
notes that Title 54.1, Chapter 36 of the Code, which is entitled 
“Psychology,” Code §§ 54.1-3600 through –3616, contains “no 
mention of a licensed professional counselor or anyone other 
than a psychologist.”  Thus, Fitzgerald maintains that the 
organization of the Code in this manner supports the conclusion 
that psychology, and making related diagnoses, is a field of 
expertise limited to psychiatrists and psychologists.  We 
disagree with Fitzgerald’s contentions. 
 
It is axiomatic that in order to qualify to give expert 
testimony a witness must possess sufficient knowledge, skill, or 
experience regarding the subject matter of the testimony to 
assist the trier of fact in the search for truth.  See Velazquez 
v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 95, 103, 557 S.E.2d 213, 218 (2002) 
                                                                  
Ward v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 648, 653, 570 S.E.2d 827, 831 
(2002). 
 
 
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(quoting Neblett v. Hunter, 207 Va. 335, 339-40, 150 S.E.2d 115, 
118 (1966)); Sami v. Varn, 260 Va. 280, 284, 535 S.E.2d 172, 174 
(2000); Combs v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 256 Va. 490, 496, 
507 S.E.2d 355, 358 (1998).  Generally, a witness possesses 
sufficient expertise when, through experience, study or 
observation the witness acquires “knowledge of a subject beyond 
that of persons of common intelligence and ordinary experience.”  
Velazquez, 263 Va. at 103, 557 S.E.2d at 218; see also Norfolk & 
Western Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 207 Va. 567, 571, 151 S.E.2d 628, 
631 (1966).  “[A]ll that is necessary for a witness to qualify 
as an expert is that the witness have sufficient knowledge of 
the subject to give value to the witness’s opinion.”  Velazquez, 
263 Va. at 103, 557 S.E.2d at 218.  Notwithstanding these 
general principles, we have concluded that certain subject 
matter is exclusive to a particular field of expertise such that 
only witnesses trained as professionals in that field of 
expertise are qualified to render expert opinions regarding that 
subject matter.  See Combs, 256 Va. at 496-98, 507 S.E.2d at 
358-59 (holding that only a medical doctor may testify as to the 
causation of a human physical injury); John v. Im, 263 Va. 315, 
321, 559 S.E.2d 694, 697 (2002) (following Combs).  But see 
Velazquez, 263 Va. at 104, 557 S.E.2d at 218 (sexual assault 
 
 
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nurse examiner may testify as to cause of sexual assault related 
physical injury).  
 
In resolving the issue presented, Conley v. Commonwealth, 
273 Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2007) (this day decided), is 
instructive.  In Conley, we held that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in permitting a licensed clinical social 
worker to render an expert opinion that the victim of a sexual 
offense suffered from PTSD.  We concluded that the statutory 
scheme by which clinical social workers become licensed and 
submit to other regulation authorized licensed social workers to 
“provide direct diagnostic, preventive and treatment services” 
regarding mental disorders such as PTSD.  Accordingly, we held 
that since licensed clinical social workers are authorized by 
statute to provide direct diagnostic services, they may in 
appropriate circumstances render expert testimony as to such 
diagnoses. 
 
While Conley involved testimony by a licensed clinical 
social worker, this case involves testimony by an individual 
belonging to a different category of mental health professional, 
a licensed professional counselor.  However, licensed 
professional counselors are governed by a statutory scheme 
similar to the one applicable to licensed clinical social 
workers discussed in Conley.  Professional counselors are 
 
 
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governed by a health regulatory board, the Board of Counseling, 
which possesses the authority and duty to issue licenses to 
qualified applicants seeking to join the profession.  See Code 
§ 54.1-3503; Code § 54.1-2400(3).  Furthermore, Code § 54.1-3506 
requires that “[i]n order to engage in the practice of 
counseling . . . it [is] necessary to hold a license” issued by 
the Board of Counseling. 
 
As provided in the statutory scheme pertaining to the 
regulation of professional counselors the term “[p]rofessional 
counselor” is defined as a “person trained in counseling 
interventions designed to . . . remediat[e] mental, emotional, 
or behavioral disorders.”  Code § 54.1-3500.  More 
significantly, “[c]ounseling” is defined to include “the 
therapeutic process of . . . conducting assessments and 
diagnoses for the purpose of establishing treatment goals and 
objectives and . . . to identify and remediate mental, emotional 
or behavioral disorders and associated distresses which 
interfere with mental health.”  Id.  With absolute clarity, this 
statutory language expressly authorizes those qualified to 
engage in the practice of counseling to make diagnoses of mental 
disorders and design treatment strategies for them. 
 
Furthermore, Code § 16.1-356 authorizes licensed 
professional counselors to perform competency evaluations for 
 
 
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juveniles.  Without question, such evaluations may entail 
identifying and diagnosing mental disorders. 
 
Based upon these statutes, and in accordance with our 
holding in Conley, we hold that a licensed professional 
counselor is authorized to diagnose recognized mental disorders 
such as PTSD.  Thus, we further hold that a licensed 
professional counselor may in appropriate circumstances render 
expert testimony regarding a diagnosis of a mental disorder. 
 
However, we stress that the trial court must determine 
whether a licensed professional counselor called as an expert 
witness in a given case in fact possesses sufficient skill, 
knowledge and experience as to the subject matter of the 
anticipated testimony.  “The issue whether a [potential] witness 
is qualified to testify as an expert on a given subject is a 
matter submitted to the trial court’s discretion, and the trial 
court’s ruling in this regard will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless it plainly appears that the witness was not qualified.”  
Velazquez, 263 Va. at 104, 557 S.E.2d at 218 (citing Johnson v. 
Commonwealth, 259 Va. 654, 679, 529 S.E.2d 769, 783 (2000)).  
Here, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion when it permitted Giles to testify as an 
expert that the victim suffered from PTSD.  We agree with the 
Court of Appeals.   
 
 
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Giles’ educational background clearly indicates that she is 
well-versed in the area of mental health treatment.  She 
underwent seven years of higher education, receiving a master’s 
degree in counseling in addition to her bachelor’s degree.  She 
also completed three years of clinical training under the 
supervision of another counselor or a psychologist.  
Furthermore, her training initially focused on working with 
children who were victims of abuse.  At the time of trial, Giles 
had practiced as a licensed professional counselor for nine 
years. 
 
Giles testified that she studied PTSD while getting her 
master’s degree and “in much more detail” during her three year 
clinical training.  At trial, she listed the symptoms of PTSD 
set forth in the DSM, which is the standard diagnostic manual of 
the American Psychiatric Association.  Giles testified that she 
had met with the victim several times and determined that, under 
the DSM’s diagnostic criteria, the victim suffered from PTSD. 
 
The record contains sufficient evidence to support the 
trial court’s conclusion that Giles possessed sufficient 
knowledge and experience regarding PTSD and the victim’s mental 
condition that Giles’ opinion could be of value to the jury.  
Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct to hold that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Giles to 
 
 
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testify as an expert witness under the circumstances of this 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we hold that the Court of Appeals 
correctly held that the trial court did not err in ruling that 
Giles was qualified to testify as an expert.  Accordingly, the 
Court of Appeals’ judgment will be affirmed. 
Affirmed.