Case Title: State ex rel. Cunningham v. Amer Cunningham Co., L.P.A.

Citation: 2002-Ohio-789

Docket Number: 20011504

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Cunningham v. Amer Cunningham Co., L.P.A., 94 Ohio St.3d 323, 2002-
Ohio-789.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. CUNNINGHAM, APPELLANT, v. AMER CUNNINGHAM CO., 
L.P.A., APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Cunningham v. Amer Cunningham Co., L.P.A. (2002), 94 
Ohio St.3d 323.] 
Mandamus sought to compel law firm to remove relator’s surname from the 
firm’s name after he left firm — Court of appeals’ dismissal of complaint 
affirmed. 
(No. 01-1504 — Submitted January 8, 2002 — Decided February 27, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 20564. 
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Per Curiam.  According to appellant, attorney Richard T. Cunningham, in 
November 1971, he and attorneys Bernard J. Amer and David L. Brennan 
founded the law firm of Amer Cunningham Brennan Co., L.P.A., using their 
surnames in the firm name.  In 2000, Brennan left the law firm, and the firm name 
was changed to Amer Cunningham Co., L.P.A. (“Amer Cunningham”), appellee. 
 
In March 2001, Cunningham left Amer Cunningham and joined the 
Brouse McDowell law firm.  Cunningham requested Amer Cunningham to 
remove “Cunningham” from its name, but the firm refused. 
 
In May 2001, Cunningham filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for 
Summit County for a writ of mandamus to compel Amer Cunningham to 
promptly remove “Cunningham” from its name.  Cunningham alleged that the law 
firm was violating Gov.Bar R. III(2)1 by continuing to use his surname in the firm 
                                                          
 
1. 
Gov.Bar R. III(2) provides, “The name of a legal professional association, corporation, 
legal clinic, limited liability company, or registered partnership shall comply with DR 2-102 of the 
Code of Professional Responsibility.”  DR 2-102(B) provides, “A lawyer in private practice shall 
not practice under * * * a firm name containing names other than those of one or more lawyers in 
the firm  * * * .” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
name.  After Amer Cunningham filed a motion to dismiss, Cunningham filed a 
reply in which he asserted that through his mandamus action, he sought “to 
protect his legal rights in his surname from being appropriated and exploited by 
[Amer Cunningham] for its own gain.” 
 
In August 2001, the court of appeals granted Amer Cunningham’s motion 
and dismissed the complaint.  The court of appeals concluded that dismissal was 
appropriate because, among other reasons, Cunningham has adequate remedies at 
law by way of a tort action for an invasion of privacy or an action for declaratory 
judgment and injunctive relief.  The court of appeals also construed 
Cunningham’s request “as one seeking to enjoin [Amer Cunningham] from 
continuing to engage in the use of the disputed name.” 
 
This cause is now before the court upon Cunningham’s appeal as of right. 
 
Cunningham asserts that the court of appeals erred in granting Amer 
Cunningham’s motion and dismissing his complaint for a writ of mandamus.  
Dismissal of Cunningham’s complaint was appropriate if, after all factual 
allegations of the complaint were presumed true and all reasonable inferences 
were made in his favor, it appeared beyond doubt that Cunningham could prove 
no set of facts warranting the requested extraordinary relief.  State ex rel. 
Suburban Constr. Co. v. Skok (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 645, 646, 710 N.E.2d 710, 
711. 
 
For the following reasons, Cunningham’s complaint was properly 
dismissed.  “ ‘[I]f the allegations of a complaint for a writ of mandamus indicate 
that the real objects sought are a declaratory judgment and a prohibitory 
injunction, the complaint does not state a cause of action in mandamus and must 
be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.’ ”  State ex rel. Phillips v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 535, 537, 757 N.E.2d 319, 321-322, quoting State 
ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 629, 634, 716 N.E.2d 704, 
710.  In order to determine the real objects of Cunningham’s action, we must 
January Term, 2002 
3 
examine his complaint “to see whether it actually seeks to prevent, rather than to 
compel, official action.”  State ex rel. Stamps v. Montgomery Cty. Automatic Data 
Processing Bd. (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 164, 166, 538 N.E.2d 105, 108. 
 
Although Cunningham attempted to couch the allegations of his complaint 
in terms of compelling affirmative duties on the part of Amer Cunningham, i.e., to 
remove his surname from the firm name, it is evident that the true objects of his 
complaint for a writ of mandamus are a declaratory judgment that Amer 
Cunningham’s retention of his name violates Gov.Bar R. III(2) and DR 2-102 and 
a prohibitory injunction preventing Amer Cunningham from using his name in its 
firm name.  In fact, even in his argument on appeal, Cunningham notes that his 
preeminent concern is Amer Cunningham’s continued use and exploitation of his 
surname, which could be remedied by a prohibitory injunction.  Therefore, the 
court of appeals properly dismissed Cunningham’s complaint. 
 
Moreover, Cunningham has adequate alternate legal remedies.  A writ of 
mandamus will not be issued if there is a plain and adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2001), 93 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 5, 752 N.E.2d 854, 858.  “ ‘In order for an alternative remedy to 
constitute an adequate remedy at law, it must be complete, beneficial, and 
speedy.’ ”  Id.,  quoting State ex rel. Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assn., Ohio Conference v. 
Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv. (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 179, 183, 699 N.E.2d 64, 67. 
 
As Cunningham himself contends on appeal, through his mandamus 
action, he “is seeking to protect his common law rights (as illustrated and 
reflected in the Disciplinary Rules) to control the manner and use of his name and 
personality.”  In specifying this purpose, Cunningham cites cases commenced in 
common pleas courts that involve tort actions, i.e., invasion of privacy.  See, e.g., 
Housh v. Peth (1956), 165 Ohio St. 35, 59 O.O. 60, 133 N.E.2d 340; Strutner v. 
Dispatch Printing Co. (1982), 2 Ohio App.3d 377, 2 OBR 435, 442 N.E.2d 129. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
Cunningham has an adequate remedy at law by an action for invasion of 
privacy to protect the rights he specifies in his appellate argument.  In this regard, 
Cunningham counters that this action would not make him whole because “[a] 
monetary award under these circumstances would have to run for as long as 
[Amer Cunningham] uses and exploits Cunningham’s surname.”  Cunningham’s 
contention ignores the availability of an ancillary prohibitory injunction to prevent 
the continued use and exploitation of his name by the law firm.  See, e.g., State ex 
rel. Dewey v. McCullion (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 79, 572 N.E.2d 671 (application 
for stay or injunction pending appeal precluded mandamus action for stay of 
suspension of operator’s license).  “ ‘Where, as here, an action in mandamus does 
not provide effective relief unless accompanied by an ancillary [preventive] 
injunction, it would appear that injunction rather than mandamus is the 
appropriate remedy.’ ”  (Bracketed material sic.)  State ex rel. Walker v. Bowling 
Green (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 391, 392, 632 N.E.2d 904, 905, quoting State ex rel. 
Corron v. Wisner (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 160, 163, 54 O.O.2d 281, 283, 267 
N.E.2d 308, 310-311. 
 
Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals properly dismissed 
Cunningham’s complaint for a writ of mandamus.  Therefore, we affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals.  By so holding, we need not analyze the other 
reasons given by the court of appeals for dismissing the complaint, e.g., whether 
Cunningham’s action improperly seeks to enforce a private right against a private 
person and whether the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
has exclusive jurisdiction over his claim. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK, J., not participating. 
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January Term, 2002 
5 
 
Brouse McDowell, Clair E. Dickinson and Jay E. Krasovec, for appellant. 
 
Amer Cunningham Co., L.P.A., Jack Morrison, Jr., and Thomas R. 
Houlihan, for appellee. 
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