Case Title: People v. Tate

Citation: 2012 IL 112214

Docket Number: 112214

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2012-11-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
2012 IL 112214
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 112214)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
DOUGLAS TATE, Appellant. 
Opinion filed November 29, 2012.
JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Thomas, Garman, Karmeier,
Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1
Petitioner, Douglas Tate, filed a postconviction petition in the
circuit court of Cook County. The appellate court affirmed the circuit
court’s summary dismissal. No. 1-09-2379 (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted leave to appeal, and now
reverse the judgment of the appellate court and remand to the circuit
court for further proceedings.
¶ 2
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3
Tate’s conviction arose from the August 2001 murder of Maurice
Wesley in Chicago. Tate’s bench trial, which began in June 2005,
presented the testimony of four eyewitnesses who identified him as
the shooter. Police found four spent shell casings at the scene of the
crime, but no gun. The parties stipulated that the casings yielded no
latent fingerprint impressions suitable for comparison. The medical
examiner testified Wesley died of multiple gunshot wounds. His
wounds were consistent with eyewitness accounts of the manner in
which he was shot. The trial judge found Tate guilty of first degree
murder and aggravated discharge of a firearm, and sentenced him to
50 years’ imprisonment. The appellate court affirmed. People v. Tate,
No. 1-07-1094 (2008) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule
23).
¶ 4
In his postconviction petition, which was filed through private
counsel, Tate alleged his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
call four witnesses, two of whom Tate claimed could establish an
alibi. Tate also alleged actual innocence, based on the same four
affidavits. Attached to the postconviction petition were Tate’s own
affidavit; the affidavit of Tina Louise Tate (Tina), his girlfriend at the
time of the shooting and, since July 2006, his wife; the affidavit of
Tina’s cousin and roommate, Marilyn Pass; and the affidavits of
occurrence witnesses Charles Hebron and Shevell Wilson.
¶ 5
In his affidavit, Tate averred that he spent the night before the
shooting with Tina and remained at her apartment until 10:00 or
11:00 the following night. The affidavits of Tina and Pass provided
support for this alibi: each averred Tate spent that night at Tina’s
apartment and did not leave until 10:00 or 11:00 the next night.
Wilson stated in his affidavit that at the time of the shooting, he did
not see Tate anywhere near the corner where the incident occurred.
Hebron’s affidavit averred that he was five feet from the victim at the
time of the shooting, he witnessed the shooting, he had known Tate
for years, and he was sure Tate was not the shooter.
¶ 6
The circuit court summarily dismissed Tate’s postconviction
petition without comment. The appellate court affirmed. No. 1-09-
2379 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 7
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 8
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.
(West 2008)) provides a method by which persons under criminal
sentence in this state can assert that their convictions were the result
of a substantial denial of their rights under the United States
Constitution or the Illinois Constitution or both. People v. Hodges,
234 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2009); People v. Peeples, 205 Ill. 2d 480, 509 (2002).
A postconviction action is not an appeal from the judgment of
conviction, but is a collateral attack on the trial court proceedings.
Thus, issues raised and decided on direct appeal are barred by res
judicata, and issues that could have been raised but were not are
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forfeited. An action for postconviction relief is initiated by the person
under criminal sentence, who files a petition in the circuit court in
which the original proceeding took place. As a result, most such
petitions are filed pro se by persons who are incarcerated and lack the
means to hire their own attorney.
¶ 9
In a noncapital case, a postconviction proceeding contains three
stages. At the first stage, the circuit court must independently review
the petition, taking the allegations as true, and determine whether
“ ‘the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit.’ ” Hodges, 234
Ill. 2d at 10 (quoting 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2006)). A
petition may be summarily dismissed as frivolous or patently without
merit only if the petition has no arguable basis either in law or in fact.
Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 11-12. This first stage in the proceeding allows
the circuit court “to act strictly in an administrative capacity by
screening out those petitions which are without legal substance or are
obviously without merit.” People v. Rivera, 198 Ill. 2d 364, 373
(2001). Because most petitions are drafted at this stage by defendants
with little legal knowledge or training, this court views the threshold
for survival as low. At this initial stage of the proceeding, there is no
involvement by the State.
¶ 10
If the circuit court does not dismiss the petition as “frivolous or
*** patently without merit” (725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2008)),
the petition advances to the second stage, where counsel may be
appointed to an indigent defendant (725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 2008)),
and where the State, as respondent, enters the litigation (725 ILCS
5/122-5 (West 2008)). It is at this point, not the first stage, where the
postconviction petition can be said to be at issue, with both sides
engaged and represented by counsel. See 725 ILCS 5/122-4, 122-5,
122-6 (West 2008). At this second stage, the circuit court must
determine whether the petition and any accompanying documentation
make “a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.” People v.
Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 246 (2001) (citing People v. Coleman, 183
Ill. 2d 366, 381 (1998)). If no such showing is made, the petition is
dismissed. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 246. If, however, a substantial
showing of a constitutional violation is set forth, the petition is
advanced to the third stage, where the circuit court conducts an
evidentiary hearing. Id.; 725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2008). The
summary dismissal of a postconviction petition is reviewed de novo.
People v. Brown, 236 Ill. 2d 175, 184 (2010).
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¶ 11
In the case at bar, the State notes that Tate’s petition was prepared
by privately retained counsel, and argues that, as such, it must make
a “substantial showing of a constitutional violation” (Edwards, 197
Ill. 2d at 246), as opposed to simply clearing the “frivolous or ***
patently without merit” hurdle.
¶ 12
The State’s argument is unpersuasive. Under the State’s proposal,
a first-stage postconviction petition prepared by an attorney would
essentially be required to make a substantial showing of a
constitutional violation, which is the standard at the second stage,
after the State has entered the litigation. This second-stage standard
is inappropriate at the first stage, where the State has no involvement
(725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2008)) and where the petition cannot be
said to be at issue. The State nevertheless argues that because some
first-stage petitions are prepared by counsel and others are pro se,
both the lower standard (for pro se petitions) and the higher standard
(for attorney-prepared petitions) must apply at the first stage of the
proceeding. The State thus would add complexity to a stage where, as
noted, the court acts “strictly in an administrative capacity by
screening out those petitions which are without legal substance or are
obviously without merit” (Rivera, 198 Ill. 2d at 373). In the process,
the State would necessarily alter the three-stage postconviction
structure set forth in the Act. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2), (b) (West
2008). We decline the State’s invitation to take this step.
¶ 13
Before we address Tate’s contentions, we first dispose of the
State’s assertion that Tate’s ineffective assistance claims are forfeited
because he did not include them in his posttrial motion.
¶ 14
As noted, Tate alleged his trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to call four witnesses whose affidavits were attached to his petition.
Tate’s ineffective-assistance claims thus are based on what trial
counsel should have done, not on what counsel did. An ineffective
assistance claim based on what the record discloses counsel did, in
fact, do is subject to the usual procedural default rule. People v.
Erickson, 161 Ill. 2d 82, 88 (1994).  “But a claim based on what
ought to have been done may depend on proof of matters which could
not have been included in the record precisely because of the
allegedly deficient representation.” Id. Thus, this court has 
“repeatedly noted that a default may not preclude an ineffective-
assistance claim for what trial counsel allegedly ought to have done
in presenting a defense.”  People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 427 (1999).
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¶ 15
In the case at bar, none of the four witnesses were called to testify. 
As a result of counsel’s allegedly deficient representation, the
contents of their affidavits could not have been included in the record. 
In this situation, forfeiture does not preclude Tate’s claims that
counsel was ineffective for failing to call these witnesses, even
though they were not included in Tate’s posttrial motion.  Cf.
Erickson, 161 Ill. 2d at 86-88 (declining to excuse procedural default
of claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to show witness lied
about holding degree in psychology, where witness admitted on cross-
examination that he was not a psychologist).
¶ 16
Before this court, Tate argues the circuit court erred in summarily
dismissing his postconviction petition because he presented an
arguable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. In other words,
Tate claims that his petition was not frivolous or patently without
merit and should have been advanced to the second stage and
docketed for further consideration, and the State ordered to answer or
otherwise respond. We agree.
¶ 17
Tate alleged his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
investigate and call the two alibi witnesses and two occurrence
witnesses whose affidavits were attached to the petition. Tate also
alleged he was actually innocent, based on the same four affidavits.
¶ 18
In evaluating Tate’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
appellate court below expressly referred to the standard set forth in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In describing that
test, the court stated: “To demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial
counsel, the defendant must allege facts showing that counsel’s
performance was objectively unreasonable and resulted in prejudice
to defendant.” (Emphases added.) No. 1-09-2379 (unpublished order
under Supreme Court Rule 23). Thus, to meet the Strickland test, the
defendant must demonstrate ineffective assistance by showing that his
counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. The State describes the
Strickland test in similar terms, adding: “Both prongs of Strickland
must be satisfied to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.”
¶ 19
Both the State and the appellate court correctly describe the
Strickland test as it would be applied at the second stage of
postconviction proceedings, where the petitioner must make a
“substantial showing of a constitutional violation” (Hodges, 234 Ill.
2d at 11 n.3) in order to avoid dismissal. At that stage, it is
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appropriate to require the petitioner to “demonstrate” or “prove”
ineffective assistance by “showing” that counsel’s performance was
deficient and that it prejudiced the defense. However, as we have
pointed out, this appeal is not from a second-stage dismissal; it is
from a first-stage summary dismissal. A different, more lenient
formulation applies at the first stage, as Hodges clearly indicated.
There, we began by stating the Strickland standard as applied at the
second stage: “To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance under
Strickland, a defendant must show both that counsel’s performance
‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’ and that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” (Emphasis added.)
Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 17 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88).
We next stated, by contrast: “At the first stage of postconviction
proceedings under the Act, a petition alleging ineffective assistance
may not be summarily dismissed if (i) it is arguable that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
(ii) it is arguable that the defendant was prejudiced.” (Emphases
added.) Id.
¶ 20
This “arguable” Strickland test demonstrates that first-stage
postconviction petitions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel are
judged by a lower pleading standard than are such petitions at the
second stage of the proceeding. The same is true for all other first-
stage postconviction petitions, which may be summarily dismissed
only if they have “no arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Id. at 11-
12.
¶ 21
The State argues that Tate’s claims regarding trial counsel’s
failure to present the alibi testimony of Tina and Pass, and the
occurrence testimony of Hebron and Wilson, have no arguable basis
in law or in fact. The State contends, for example, that Tate’s trial
counsel had a sound strategic reason for not calling Hebron.
According to the State, Hebron’s purported testimony had the
potential to hurt Tate more than it would have helped. The State
focuses on Hebron’s “admission in his affidavit that he was present
for the shooting.” Hebron’s testimony, the State continues, would
have bolstered the credibility of the State’s eyewitnesses, three of
whom identified Hebron as having been present at the shooting. “By
affirming the accuracy of their observations of him as having been
present, Hebron’s testimony would have corroborated the correctness
of their observations and the accuracy of their identification of [Tate]
as the shooter.”
-6-
¶ 22
This argument is more appropriate to the second stage of
postconviction proceedings, where both parties are represented by
counsel, and where the petitioner’s burden is to make a substantial
showing of a constitutional violation. The State’s strategy argument
is inappropriate for the first stage, where the test is whether it is
arguable that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness and whether it is arguable that the defendant was
prejudiced.
¶ 23
We conclude that the affidavits attached to Tate’s postconviction
petition meet the “arguable” Strickland test for first-stage petitions.
Hebron’s affidavit is illustrative. In it, he averred that he was five feet
from the victim at the time of the shooting, he witnessed the shooting,
he had known Tate for years, and he was “sure that the shooter was
not Douglas Tate.”
¶ 24
The State’s main case against Tate consisted of the testimony of
the four eyewitnesses. No murder weapon was recovered. No
fingerprints or DNA linked Tate to the crime. Nor was there a
confession. Moreover, while the medical examiner opined that
Wesley’s wounds were consistent with eyewitness accounts of the
manner in which he was shot, none of the medical examiner’s
testimony directly linked Tate to the shooting. As Tate correctly
notes, this testimony corroborated that someone shot Wesley, but it
shed no light on the key issue of the identity of the shooter. In this
context, Hebron’s testimony would have provided a first-person
account of the incident which directly contradicted the prior
statements of the State’s eyewitnesses. It is at least arguable that Tate
was prejudiced by the lack of this witness, and that defense counsel’s
performance, or lack thereof, fell below an arguable standard of
reasonableness.
¶ 25
Tate’s affidavits are sufficient for his petition to advance to the
second stage of postconviction proceedings. We reverse the judgment
of the appellate court, which affirmed the circuit court’s summary
dismissal of Tate’s petition, and we remand to the circuit court for
further proceedings.
¶ 26
We express no opinion as to whether Tate’s affidavits ultimately
will support a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. That
is a second-stage issue.
¶ 27
In view of our holding on this issue, we need not address Tate’s
argument regarding his Illinois due process claim of actual innocence.
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¶ 28
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 29
We reverse the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed
the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. We remand to the
circuit court for further proceedings.
¶ 30
Reversed and remanded.
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