Case Title: Brown v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 223, 2014

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2014-08-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MICHAEL A. BROWN,  
 
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§ 
No. 223, 2014 
Defendant-Below,  
 
§ 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court of   
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff-Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 0412008486 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 25, 2014 
Decided: 
August 28, 2014  
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and VALIHURA, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
This 28th day of August 2014, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening 
brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Michael A. Brown, filed this appeal from the denials of 
his fourth motion for postconviction relief and motion for appointment of counsel 
under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”).  Brown also appeals the 
Superior Court’s denial of his motion for transcripts at State expense.  The 
appellee, State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior Court judgments on 
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the ground that it is manifest on the face of Brown’s opening brief that the appeal 
is without merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
(2) 
In 2005, Brown was indicted on numerous counts of Robbery in the 
First Degree, Attempted Robbery in the First Degree, Wearing a Disguise During 
the Commission of a Felony, and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission 
of a Felony.  Brown was tried before a jury in 2006.  At the close of the State’s 
case-in-chief, Brown’s trial counsel moved to dismiss five counts in the 
indictment, arguing that the State had not presented sufficient evidence to sustain a 
conviction on those counts.  The Superior Court denied the motion to dismiss.  At 
the end of the eight-day trial, the jury convicted Brown of most of the offenses 
charged in the indictment, including multiple counts of Robbery in the First 
Degree, Attempted Robbery in the First Degree, Wearing a Disguise During the 
Commission of a Felony, and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a 
Felony. 
(3) 
On direct appeal, Brown argued, without success, that the prosecutor 
committed misconduct when delivering the State’s closing statement.  We 
concluded that the argument was without merit and affirmed the Superior Court 
judgment.2  In his first motion for postconviction relief, Brown reargued the 
                                          
 
1 Del. Supt. Ct. R. 25(a).  
2 Brown v. State, 2007 WL 2399227 (Del. Aug. 22, 2007).  
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prosecutorial misconduct claim as an ineffective counsel claim, asserting that his 
trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s closing statement was 
ineffective representation.  Also, Brown argued that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to move to dismiss the indictment on the basis of insufficient 
evidence. When denying the motion, the Superior Court ruled that both aspects of 
Brown’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim were procedurally barred and that 
the underlying claim of insufficient evidence was without merit.  The court found 
that:   
The undisputed record contradicts Brown’s claim that 
there was no direct or circumstantial evidence linking 
him to the crimes for which he was convicted.  At trial, 
there was testimony from the victims of the robberies, 
surveillance tapes, testimony from the police, and 
evidence from a search of his person and home, all of 
which demonstrated that he was the perpetrator of the 
crimes.  The Court thus finds that the jury had more than 
sufficient evidence to convict Brown.3 
 
Brown did not appeal the Superior Court’s denial of his first postconviction 
motion. 
(4) 
In his second motion for postconviction relief, Brown asserted 
ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel’s failure to present an 
alibi defense and to move to suppress illegally seized evidence.  Brown’s second 
postconviction motion was referred to a Superior Court Commissioner who issued 
                                          
 
3 State v. Brown, 2008 WL 555921, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 2008). 
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a report recommending that the motion should be summarily dismissed as 
procedurally barred.  The Commissioner found that the alibi defense claim was 
“substantially no differen[t]” from the insufficient evidence claim raised in the first 
postconviction motion, and that Brown should have raised “all that he believed was 
wrong with his counsel’s representation” in his first postconviction motion.4  The 
Superior Court adopted the Commissioner’s report and recommendation and 
denied the motion.5  Brown did not appeal from that decision. 
(5) 
In his third motion for postconviction relief, Brown again asserted 
ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective 
when he failed to investigate and interview prospective witnesses, when he advised 
Brown to reject a plea, and when he forced Brown to take the stand and “commit 
perjury.”  Brown asserted that any procedural bars to the ineffective counsel claim 
should be excused under the United States Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in 
Lafler v. Cooper.6 
(6) 
Brown’s third postconviction motion was referred to a Commissioner 
who issued a report recommending that the motion should be summarily dismissed 
                                          
 
4 State v. Brown, Cr. ID No. 0412008486, at 124 (Del. Super. Comm’r Feb. 6, 2009). 
5 Id., at 128 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 1, 2011). 
6 See Lafler v. Cooper, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012) (addressing a defense counsel’s duty 
to communicate a plea offer effectively). 
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as procedurally barred.7  The Commissioner found that the Lafler decision was 
inapposite to Brown’s case and did not excuse the applicable procedural bars.  
After that, Brown filed a motion for appointment of counsel, which the Superior 
Court denied.  The court found that: 
Brown has not shown good cause why the Court should 
appoint counsel on his behalf.  As the voluminous record 
indicates, Mr. Brown has had ample opportunity to raise 
any claims he may have had regarding his convictions 
and sentences.  Moreover, although he may be unskilled 
at law, Mr. Brown has filed numerous pro se motions, 
including three Superior Court Rule 61 motions.  In those 
motions, Mr. Brown has discussed federal and state case 
law and has been able to assert and prosecute varying 
bases for relief without counsel.8 
 
By order filed on July 19, 2013, the Superior Court, after considering Brown’s 
objections and reviewing the matter de novo, adopted the Commissioner’s report 
and recommendation and denied the motion.9  Brown’s appeal from the denial of 
his third postconviction motion was dismissed as untimely filed.10 
(7) 
In his fourth motion for postconviction relief, the denial of which 
forms the basis of this appeal, Brown asserted several grounds for relief based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel and insufficient evidence.  Brown also filed a 
motion for appointment of counsel.  By separate orders filed on April 14, 2014, the 
                                          
 
7 State v. Brown, Cr. ID No. 0412008486, at 136 (Del. Super. Comm’r Mar. 5, 2013). 
8 State v. Brown, 2013 WL 1182219 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 15, 2013). 
9 State v. Brown, Cr. ID No. 0412008486, at 145 (Del. Super. Ct. July 19, 2013).  
10 Brown v. State, 2013 WL 6389742 (Del. Dec. 4, 2013). 
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Superior Court denied the postconviction motion as procedurally barred and the 
motion for appointment of counsel as without merit.11 
(8) 
On appeal, Brown argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion 
when it barred his ineffective assistance of counsel claim “without first utilizing 
the Strickland test.”12  The claim is without merit.  Because Brown’s original 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim was based on underlying claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct and insufficient evidence that were previously considered 
and found to be without merit, the court’s analysis of the ineffective counsel claim 
under the Rule 61 procedural bars rather than Strickland was “entirely correct.”13  
Brown “is not entitled to have a court re-examine an issue that has been previously 
resolved ‘simply because the claim is refined or restated.’”14 
(9) 
To the extent Brown argues that the Superior Court abused its 
discretion when it denied his motion for appointment of counsel and motion for 
transcripts at State expense, his arguments are without merit.  The rule in effect in 
January 2014, when Brown filed his fourth postconviction motion, provided that, 
                                          
 
11 State v. Brown, Cr. ID No. 0412008486, at 152-53 (Del. Super. Ct. April 14, 2014).  
12 The Strickland test was developed by the United States Supreme Court to determine 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Under Strickland, a petitioner must show that “counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that “there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984).  
13 Skinner v. State, 607 A.2d 1170, 1173 (Del. May 11, 1992) (concluding that a prior disposition 
of an issue on direct appeal “was, in fact, a substantive resolution of . . . [the] present 
ineffectiveness of counsel claim”).  
14 Id. at 1172 (quoting Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719, 721 (Del. 1990)). 
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in a second or subsequent motion for postconviction relief, the court will appoint 
counsel “only in the exercise of discretion and for good cause shown, but not 
otherwise.”15  Similarly, in the absence of a showing of good cause, a defendant 
does not have a right to free transcripts to pursue postconviction relief.16  In this 
appeal from the denial of an untimely fourth postconviction motion raising 
formerly adjudicated claims, Brown has not demonstrated, and the record does not 
reflect, good cause for the appointment of counsel or for transcripts at State 
expense.  
(10) When reviewing the denial of postconviction relief, this Court will 
address any applicable procedural bars before considering the merits of any claim 
for relief.17  In this case, Brown’s fourth postconviction motion is barred as 
untimely under Rule 61(i)(1)18 and repetitive under Rule 61(i)(2).19  Brown’s 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and insufficient evidence are barred as 
formerly adjudicated under Rule 61(i)(4).20  On appeal, Brown has not 
demonstrated that reconsideration of any of the formerly adjudicated claims is 
                                          
 
15 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(1) (2013).  
16 Miller v. State, 2008 WL 623236 (Del. Mar. 7, 2008) (citing United States v. MacCollum, 426 
U.S. 317, 325-26 (1976)). 
17 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
18 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (barring motion filed more than one year after judgment 
of conviction is final). 
19 See id. at (i)(2) (barring any ground for relief not asserted in a prior postconviction proceeding 
as required by R. 61(b)(2)). 
20 See id. at (i)(4) (barring formerly adjudicated claim).  
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warranted under the narrow “in the interest of justice” exception found under Rule 
61(i)(4).21  Nor has Brown demonstrated that the claims warrant review under Rule 
61(i)(5) because of a constitutional violation so substantial that is constitutes a 
“miscarriage of justice” undermining the “fundamental legality . . . or fairness of 
the proceedings”22 or under Rule 61(i)(1) because of a newly recognized 
retroactively applicable right.23 
(11) Finally, we note the obvious.  This is Brown’s fourth Rule 61 petition.  
On appeal from the denial of the motion, we have invested considerable time 
detailing our reasons why we conclude that the Superior Court properly found that 
Brown’s claims do not present grounds for relief from his judgment of convictions.  
In the future, if Brown files additional petitions, we do not intend to continue to 
invest scarce judicial resources in addressing his repetitive claims.  We also 
encourage Brown to be mindful of subsection (j) of Rule 61.24    
                                          
 
21 See id. (providing that a formerly adjudicated claim may be reconsidered in the interest of 
justice).  See Lindsey v. State, 2014 WL 98645, at *3 (Del. Jan. 9, 2014) (quoting Weedon v. 
State, 750 A.2d 521, 527-28 (Del. 2000)). 
22 See id. at (i)(5) (providing that the procedural bars of (i)(1), (2) and (3) shall not apply “to a 
colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that 
undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading 
to the judgment of conviction”). 
23 See id. at (i)(1) (providing that an untimely motion may be considered when it asserts a newly 
recognized retroactively applicable right). 
24 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(j) (“If a motion is denied, the state may move for an order 
requiring the movant to reimburse the state for costs and expenses paid for the movant from 
public funds.”). 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice