Case Title: State v. Frey

Citation: 2012 WI 99

Docket Number: 2010AP002801-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2012-07-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
2012 WI 99 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP2801-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Michael L. Frey, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 337 Wis. 2d 429, 805 N.W.2d 735 
(Ct. App. 2011 - Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 17, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 18, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Florence   
 
JUDGE: 
Leon D. Stenz 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
and oral argument by Devon M. Lee, assistant state public 
defender.  
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
2012 WI 99
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2010AP2801-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2009CF14) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael L. Frey, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 17, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Frey, No. 
2010AP2801-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 
2011) affirming the felony convictions of Michael L. Frey 
(Frey). 
¶2 
Frey pleaded no contest to three felonies on the 
morning of a scheduled trial in which he was facing six felony 
charges.  As part of a plea bargain, the State agreed to dismiss 
three felony charges, but there was no agreement that the 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
2 
 
dismissed 
charges 
would 
be 
"read-in" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.20(1g)(b).1 
¶3 
At sentencing, the Florence County Circuit Court, Leon 
D. Stenz, Judge, explicitly considered the dismissed charges in 
explaining and imposing Frey's sentence.  As a result, Frey 
challenged the validity of the sentence.  The circuit court 
denied Frey's motion for resentencing, and the court of appeals 
affirmed. 
¶4 
The issues presented here may be stated as follows: 
1. 
May a circuit court consider dismissed charges in 
imposing a sentence when the defendant asserts that the charges 
were "dismissed outright"? 
2. 
Did the circuit court consider a dismissed charge for 
more 
than 
determining 
Frey's 
character 
and 
need 
for 
incarceration and rehabilitation, entitling Frey to a new 
sentencing hearing? 
¶5 
We 
conclude 
that 
a 
circuit 
court 
may 
consider 
dismissed charges in imposing sentence.  Nothing in this case 
alters that longstanding rule.  The circuit court here did not 
use the dismissed charges for an improper purpose.  In addition, 
we conclude that Frey had adequate opportunity to refute the 
purported inaccuracies of the facts underlying the dismissed 
charges.  Therefore, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
3 
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶6 
Michael Frey and his girlfriend moved to the Town of 
Aurora in Florence County in the summer of 2008.  M.G. lived at 
Frey's home with her mother, her half-sister, and Frey.  This 
family unit had lived together for almost 10 years.  M.G.'s high 
school friend, A.B., occasionally visited M.G. at the Aurora 
home and slept there overnight.   
¶7 
In the spring of 2009, A.B. and M.G. accused Frey of 
sexually assaulting them at different times at the Aurora home.  
Both girls were 16 years old at the time.  Frey was 43.  
¶8 
A.B. alleged that when she visited M.G., she would 
"smoke weed" with M.G. and Frey.  Frey would provide the 
marijuana as well as pills that caused her to get tired or 
dizzy.  
¶9 
A.B. alleged that when she was visiting M.G. one night 
in early February 2009, after an evening of smoking marijuana, 
taking pills, and smoking cigarettes, she came downstairs from 
M.G.'s bedroom to get a drink in the kitchen.  She alleged that 
Frey came up behind her, pushed her against the sink, and 
attacked her.  A.B. alleged that Frey pushed her to the ground, 
flipped her onto her back, and forcibly had sexual intercourse 
with her.  A.B. screamed and tried to get away from Frey and 
eventually slipped away and ran upstairs to M.G.'s room.  Early 
the next morning she called a friend who took her home. 
¶10 M.G. alleged that Frey would give her pills, including 
sleeping pills, almost every night——usually seven per night.  
These pills would cause M.G. to fall asleep.  On March 30, 2009, 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
4 
 
Frey gave pills to M.G. causing her to fall asleep.  M.G. woke 
up to find Frey's hand inside her pants.  
¶11 M.G. had previously accused Frey of similar conduct, 
but charges were not filed after M.G. withdrew her statement to 
police. 
¶12 On April 15, 2009, police obtained and executed a 
search warrant and discovered two baggies of marijuana and two 
scales, one digital and one mechanical, in Frey's home. 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶13 On April 21, 2009, Michael L. Frey was charged with 
(1) second degree sexual assault, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.225(2)(a); (2) attempted second degree sexual assault, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(d); (3) possession of 
tetrahydrocannabinols, second and subsequent, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 961.41(3g)(e); and (4) possession of drug paraphernalia, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.573(1). 
¶14 At the initial appearance on April 21, 2009, the court 
found probable cause, reduced bail to $100,000 cash, and set the 
preliminary examination date. 
¶15 A preliminary examination was held on April 28, 2009, 
at which both A.B. and M.G. testified. 
¶16 On April 30, 2009, an information was filed that 
contained six counts: 
COUNT 1: Second Degree Sexual Assault, Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.225(2)(a)——A Class C Felony 
COUNT 2: Second Degree Sexual Assault, Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.225(2)(cm)——A Class C Felony 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
5 
 
COUNT 3: Child Enticement, Wis. Stat. § 948.07(6)——A 
Class D Felony 
COUNT 4: Child Enticement, Wis. Stat. § 948.07(6)——A 
Class D Felony 
Count 5: Deliver a Controlled Substance, Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.41(1)(h)1——A Class I Felony 
COUNT 6: Deliver a Controlled Substance, Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.41(1)(h)1——A Class I Felony 
¶17 Counts 1, 3, and 5 related to the incident involving 
A.B. while counts 2, 4, and 6 related to the incident involving 
M.G. 
¶18 On September 2, 2009, on the morning set for trial, 
the State and Frey negotiated a plea bargain.  It was a last-
minute agreement, as the courtroom was full of prospective 
jurors when the court left to take the plea in a different room.  
¶19 The court asked Florence County District Attorney 
Douglas Drexler to state the plea bargain on the record.  
Drexler replied that, "the defendant would plead either guilty 
or no contest to Count Two, Count Five, and Count Six of the 
Information . . . .  And Count One, Three, and Four would be 
dismissed."  
The 
parties agreed that there would be a 
presentence investigation and that the parties could argue about 
the proper sentence. 
¶20 Frey pleaded no contest to one count of second degree 
sexual assault and two counts of delivery of marijuana or 
tetrahydrocannabinols.  These were counts 2, 5, and 6 of the 
information.  The court accepted the pleas and found Frey guilty 
of the three counts.  The other three counts were dismissed. 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
6 
 
¶21 On November 10, 2009, the circuit court sentenced 
Frey.  Certain statements that the court made during sentencing 
are the issue in this appeal and are set forth in detail. 
¶22 Frey's defense counsel, Sam Filippo, stated that 
"Another factor for the court to consider is the viciousness or 
aggravated nature of the crime.  This [Count 2] was a nonviolent 
crime.  And it was not by the use of force or threat of force."  
Filippo was permitted to make this argument because Count 1 had 
been dismissed. 
¶23 Before imposing sentence, the court stated that it had 
considered the arguments of the attorneys and the statements of 
the parties and had reviewed several documents submitted by 
Frey, by M.G., and by the attorneys. 
¶24 The court then provided a lengthy and thorough 
explanation for the sentence it was imposing.  The court 
explicitly stated that it was considering:  (1) The gravity and 
nature of the offense; (2) Frey's character and rehabilitative 
needs; (3) The need to protect the public; (4) Frey's criminal 
history; (5) Frey's drug and alcohol problem; (6) Frey's 
personality, character, and social traits; (7) Frey's work 
history; 
(8) 
Frey's 
mental 
health; 
(9) 
The 
presentence 
investigation; (10) The recommendations of defense counsel; (11) 
Frey's culpability; (12) The aggravated nature of this offense; 
(13) That Frey was responsible for the welfare of the child, 
having lived with her for 10 years; (14) That Frey was the only 
father figure M.G. ever had; (15) The ongoing nature of the 
offense; (16) The impact on M.G.; (17) The demeanor of the 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
7 
 
defendant; (18) Frey's age and the victims' ages; (19) Frey's 
intelligence; (20) Frey's remorse and cooperation; (21) That 
Frey avoided a trial; (22) The victim impact statements; (23) 
That M.G. was knocked out and drugged; (24) That there could 
have been a penalty enhancer; (25) That Frey manipulated the 
child during and after the offense; (26) Previous inappropriate 
text messages sent by Frey to M.G.; (27) That M.G. was 
unconscious because of Frey and his plan to drug her so that he 
could take advantage of her; and (28) Frey's previous community 
supervision.   
¶25 The circuit court was very thorough in its remarks——
explaining every factor that it was considering in sentencing.  
¶26 Within the court's lengthy sentencing remarks were a 
few statements about other charges and incidents that are the 
center of this dispute: 
[T]his is Mr. Frey's fault. . . . [H]e was 43.  And I 
think the girls were 16. 
 
. . . .  
 
I believe that one girl said that they were 
sleeping pills. . . .  [W]hat would happen he would 
give them six or seven each night and every night just 
about. . . . [T]hen he would follow-up the pills with 
marijuana. . . . [T]he 
cumulative 
effect 
of 
these 
drugs and marijuana was that they would become sleepy.  
And I think that effect was not lost upon the 
defendant. 
 
In the court's opinion that was the precise 
intention of the defendant, to knock them out and make 
them sleepy.  And when they were sleeping and lost 
some of their control he would take advantage of them 
and abuse them.  And also considering that the offense 
for which he has been charged is not the only such 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
8 
 
offense.  Although the court has dismissed Count One, 
the sexual assault of [A.B.], I believe the court can 
consider that charge in determining the sentence.  And 
I can consider uncharged offenses.  And I can consider 
unproven offenses. 
 
[W]hen 
I 
consider 
the 
character 
of 
the 
defendant . . . . 
[I]t was clear what had happened with respect to 
[A.B.]  She came to the kitchen and he attacked her 
and pushed her down and pulled her pants off and 
actually had intercourse with her forcibly.  And he 
forced himself on her and she wasn't quite so 
[affected] by the drugs and all the pills that she 
couldn't escape.  And she did eventually escape.  But 
it is important to remember and . . . which the court 
gives great consideration to . . . that at that point 
it was a clear indication to the court that the abuse 
that Mr. Frey was imposing on these girls was 
escalating.   
 
Once 
he 
moved 
from . . . the 
girl 
that 
he 
was . . . acting as a stepfather to and escalated that 
to her friends, that is a clear indication to the 
court that there is a significant problem and that Mr. 
Frey needs to be stopped with respect to this conduct. 
 
. . . .  
[H]e also used force in these cases . . . which is 
also a significant [aggravating] factor. 
 
. . . .  
I find it was intercourse and it was definitely 
intercourse with [A.B.] 
 
. . . .  
 
And I find that there was prior abuse[,] which is 
another [aggravating] factor.  And I considered the 
allegations 
in 
Michigan. 
 
I 
considered 
the 
allegation[s concerning] [A.B.], which were dismissed 
as part of the plea agreement.  And I considered the 
preexisting relationship between the victim and the 
defendant as an [aggravating] factor. 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
9 
 
 
And I considered the age of the victim and the 
age of the defendant as an [aggravating] factor.  And 
he was 43 and she was 16.  And the type of harm, there 
was, in fact, force used. . . . against [A.B.] in any 
event.  And although he wasn't convicted of that 
offense, once again, the court can consider that as 
part of his character. 
 
. . . .  
¶27 After this lengthy explanation, the circuit judge 
sentenced Frey.  The court stated that there were many more 
aggravating circumstances than mitigating circumstances.  The 
court believed that probation would "depreciate the seriousness 
of the offense" and undermine Frey's rehabilitation.  The court 
also focused on protecting the community because Frey "has more 
than one victim and that he felt bold enough to molest [M.G.]'s 
friend [A.B.] when she was at the home."  The court stated that 
Frey's conduct had caused "great harm" to M.G. and A.B. and 
their families and that Frey must be punished.  The court also 
mentioned rehabilitation and deterrence as factors.  
¶28 The court imposed a sentence of 25 years imprisonment 
on count 2——20 years of initial confinement followed by 5 years 
extended supervision.  The court imposed 3 years imprisonment 
for each of the drug counts——2 years of initial confinement and 
1 year of extended supervision.  The court ordered that all 
sentences be consecutive.  
¶29 The court later amended the sentences for the drug 
counts to be 1 year of initial confinement and 2 years of 
extended supervision each, consecutive to each other and to the 
sexual assault charge. 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
10 
 
¶30 Nine months later, Frey filed a motion for post-
conviction 
relief. 
 
In 
that 
motion, 
Frey 
recounted 
the 
procedural history of the case between the filing of the 
information on April 30 and the plea on September 2.  Frey also 
asserted that "In exchange for his no contest pleas, the state 
agreed to dismiss outright the remaining charges."  (Emphasis 
added.) 
¶31 Frey also asserted that the dismissed charges were 
used for improper purposes, that the court made unreasonable 
inferences from the facts, and that his sentence was unduly 
harsh and excessive. 
¶32 On October 5, 2010, the court held a hearing on this 
motion.  At this hearing, Frey again alleged that the charge 
involving A.B. had been "dismissed outright."  
¶33 On October 29, 2010, the court denied all claims 
brought by Frey.  
¶34 The court of appeals affirmed in a brief unpublished 
per curiam opinion.  Frey, No. 2010AP2801-CR, unpublished slip 
op.  The court of appeals rejected Frey's arguments that "the 
sentencing court improperly exercised its discretion by focusing 
on a dismissed charge, drew unreasonable inferences from the 
facts and sentenced Frey on an erroneous belief that force was 
used in the sexual assault."  Id., ¶1.   
¶35 Relying on Elias v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 278, 284, 286 
N.W.2d 559 (1980), and State v. Bobbitt, 178 Wis. 2d 11, 18, 503 
N.W.2d 11 (Ct. App. 1993), the court of appeals stated that the 
sentencing court "can consider uncharged and unproven offenses, 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
11 
 
pending charges, and even charges for which the defendant has 
been acquitted" in order to measure the defendant's "character 
and the pattern of his behavior."  Id., ¶4.  The court of 
appeals noted when a crime is read in at sentencing, a defendant 
has agreed that the court can consider that offense and the 
State is relieved of "its obligation to establish a factual 
basis for the offense."  Id.  In this case, the factual basis 
for the offense was A.B.'s testimony at the preliminary 
examination. 
¶36 The court of appeals also rejected Frey's argument 
regarding the inferences that the circuit court drew and Frey's 
construction of the statements that the circuit court made 
regarding the violence used against A.B. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶37 Frey challenges only the sentence imposed by the 
circuit court.  This court reviews sentencing decisions under 
the erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  State v. 
Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197; 
Elias, 93 Wis. 2d at 281. 
¶38 This court "will start with the presumption that the 
trial court acted reasonably."  Elias, 93 Wis. 2d at 282.  
Stated differently, "sentencing decisions of the circuit court 
are generally afforded a strong presumption of reasonability 
because the circuit court is best suited to consider the 
relevant factors and demeanor of the convicted defendant."  
State v. Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d 749, 781-82, 482 N.W.2d 883 
(1992).  "An [erroneous exercise] of discretion may be found 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
12 
 
where the trial court relied upon factors which are totally 
irrelevant or immaterial to the type of decision to be made."  
Elias, 93 Wis. 2d at 282. 
¶39 This court reviews whether the trial court properly 
considered dismissed charges in determining the proper sentence.  
See id. at 280-83. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
¶40 This case implicates three critical stages in a 
criminal prosecution: (1) plea bargaining, (2) the plea, and (3) 
sentencing.  The defendant raises an issue that appears to focus 
solely on sentencing.  We interpret that issue to be: May a 
circuit court consider charges that have been dismissed outright 
in imposing a sentence?  The answer is yes, but the answer has 
implications for other stages in the prosecution. 
¶41 The defendant contends that this court "should hold 
that when a circuit court approves a plea agreement in which a 
charge will be dismissed outright, it is also agreeing not to 
consider that charge at sentencing."  In dealing with this 
suggestion, there must be no confusion about our terminology.  
For purposes of sentencing, this opinion makes no distinction 
between charges that are "dismissed" and charges that are 
"dismissed outright."  For sentencing, they are exactly the 
same. 
¶42 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.20, dealing with restitution, 
provides in part: 
(1g) In this section: 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
13 
 
 
(a) "Crime considered at sentencing" means any 
crime for which the defendant was convicted and any 
read-in crime. 
 
(b) "Read-in crime" means any crime that is 
uncharged or that is dismissed as part of a plea 
agreement, that the defendant agrees to be considered 
by the court at the time of sentencing and that the 
court 
considers 
at 
the 
time 
of 
sentencing 
the 
defendant for the crime for which the defendant was 
convicted.   
(Emphasis added.) 
¶43 Under this restitution statute, there is a distinction 
between dismissed charges that the defendant agrees to have read 
in (read-ins) and dismissed charges that are not read in 
(dismissed charges).  Read-in charges are acknowledged as true 
and are subject to restitution.  They may not be prosecuted 
separately in the future.  Dismissed charges may be considered 
by the court in sentencing, but they are not subject to 
restitution.  Whether they may ever be prosecuted depends on the 
terms of any plea agreement and considerations of due process.  
For the circuit court in sentencing, there is no distinction 
between "dismissed" charges and charges that are purportedly 
"dismissed outright." 
¶44 There 
are 
several 
reasons 
why 
the 
defendant's 
suggestion, 
that 
dismissed 
charges 
not 
be 
considered 
in 
sentencing, is not reasonable. 
¶45 First, we agree with the State that a sentencing court 
needs the fullest amount of relevant information concerning a 
defendant's life and characteristics.  Williams v. New York, 337 
U.S. 241, 247 (1949).  In State v. Guzman, 166 Wis. 2d 577, 592, 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
14 
 
480 N.W.2d 446 (1992), this court declared that "Wisconsin has a 
strong public policy that the sentencing court be provided with 
all relevant information."  It quoted from another United States 
Supreme Court decision, Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 
563 (1984), that "[t]he sentencing court or jury must be 
permitted to consider any and all information that reasonably 
might bear on the proper sentence for the particular defendant, 
given the crime committed."  In Elias, 93 Wis. 2d at 285, the 
court made an even stronger statement, declaring that it was the 
"responsibility" of the sentencing court "to acquire full 
knowledge of the character and behavior pattern of the convicted 
defendant before imposing sentence." 
¶46 In sentencing, the circuit court must consider the 
nature of the crime, the character of the defendant, and the 
rights of the public.  Embry v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 151, 157, 174 
N.W.2d 521 (1970); Elias, 93 Wis. 2d at 284 (citing cases, 
including McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 274-76, 182 
N.W.2d 512 (1971)). 
¶47 To discharge its obligation to discern a defendant's 
character, "[a] sentencing court may consider uncharged and 
unproven offenses," State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, ¶45, 253 
Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341, whether or not the defendant 
consents to having the charge read in.  Indeed, the court may 
consider not only "uncharged and unproven offenses" but also 
"facts related to offenses for which the defendant has been 
acquitted."  Id.; see also State v. McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d 116, 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
15 
 
126, 452 N.W.2d 377 (1990); Elias, 93 Wis. 2d at 284; Bobbitt, 
178 Wis. 2d at 16-17. 
¶48 Against this background, it is hard to imagine 
directing a court not to consider dismissed charges unless those 
charges are groundless or unreliable.  Agreements not to reveal 
"relevant and pertinent" information to a sentencing court are 
contrary to public policy.  Grant v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 441, 448, 
243 N.W.2d 186 (1976); see also McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d at 124-26.  
In short, the defendant's suggestion conflicts with longstanding 
public policy. 
¶49 Second, 
the 
defendant's 
suggestion 
violates 
the 
principle that circuit courts may not participate in plea 
bargaining. 
 
State 
v. 
Hampton, 
2004 
WI 
107, 
¶27, 
274 
Wis. 2d 379, 683 N.W.2d 14; State v. Williams, 2000 WI 78, ¶26, 
236 
Wis. 2d 293, 
613 
N.W.2d 132; 
State 
v. 
Comstock, 
168 
Wis. 2d 915, 927, 485 N.W.2d 354 (1992); State v. Erickson, 53 
Wis. 2d 474, 481, 192 N.W.2d 872 (1972); State v. Wolfe, 46 
Wis. 2d 478, 487, 175 N.W.2d 216 (1970). 
¶50 The defendant points to State v. Conger, 2010 WI 56, 
¶3, 325 Wis. 2d 664, 797 N.W.2d 341, where the court held that a 
circuit court may reject a plea agreement that does not, in its 
view, serve the public interest.  The holding in Conger is 
correctly stated but it does not follow that a plea agreement 
not rejected by the sentencing court must be endorsed by that 
court.  In Conger, the court rejected a plea agreement that 
would have reduced charges to secure the defendant's cooperation 
and his plea.  The court, in effect, directed the district 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
16 
 
attorney to proceed with the original charges.  This action was 
unusual, and it involved circumstances and principles that do 
not apply to this defendant's plea bargain. 
¶51 One of the critical elements of the Wisconsin plea 
colloquy is for the court to establish personally that the 
defendant understands that the court is not bound by the terms 
of any plea agreement, including recommendations from the 
district attorney.  State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶35, 293 
Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906.  This required admonition is 
inconsistent with the defendant's suggestion that the court must 
accept an agreement on dismissed charges. 
¶52 Third, the defendant's suggestion is not practical.  
Once 
relevant, 
credible information about the defendant's 
character comes to the court's attention, it is difficult to 
wholly disregard it.  In this case, the most serious of the 
dismissed charges was featured in the criminal complaint, 
testified to at the preliminary examination, and repeated in the 
information.  The charge was likely reviewed as the circuit 
court prepared for trial.  It could have been discussed in the 
presentence investigation after the defendant's plea. 
¶53 In addition, the law now provides an important role 
for crime victims in criminal proceedings.  See Wis. Stat. 
Chapter 950.  For instance, the district attorney must offer 
victims the opportunity to confer with the district attorney 
about the prosecution of the case2; make reasonable attempts to 
                                                 
2 Wis. Stat. § 971.095(2). 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
17 
 
notify victims about scheduled court proceedings3; and make 
reasonable attempts to inform victims of dismissed charges.4  The 
district attorney is also required to advise a victim of the 
opportunity to make a statement to the court at sentencing.5  The 
court, in turn, before pronouncing sentence, must inquire 
whether the district attorney has complied with these duties,6 
and determine whether a victim wishes to make a statement to the 
court.7  Some victims or their surrogates do make statements.  
Thus, the facts surrounding dismissed charges and the impact of 
dismissed charges on victims are often before the court 
immediately before sentencing.   
¶54 Consequently, we think it is better practice for the 
court to acknowledge and discuss dismissed charges, if they are 
considered by the court, giving them appropriate weight and 
describing their relationship to a defendant's character and 
behavioral pattern, or to the incident that serves as the basis 
for a plea.8  The defendant should be given an opportunity to 
                                                 
3 Wis. Stat. § 971.095(3). 
4 Wis. Stat. § 971.095(5). 
5 Wis. Stat. § 972.14(3)(b). 
6 Wis. Stat. § 972.14(2m). 
7 Wis. Stat. § 972.14(3)(a). 
8 E.g., State v. Bobbitt, 178 Wis. 2d 11, 503 N.W.2d 11 (Ct. 
App. 1993)(holding that the circuit court judge could consider 
all the evidence surrounding a robbery, including facts related 
to a charge of which the defendant was acquitted, to discern the 
gravity of the offense).  
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
18 
 
explain or dispute these charges.  Open discussion of the 
charges is consistent with the court's sentencing methodology 
set out in State v. Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535.  It creates a 
record for review. 
¶55 In sum, we reject the defendant's suggestion that the 
circuit court not be permitted to consider charges that are 
dismissed as the result of a plea bargain. 
¶56 Having determined that the circuit court did not err 
in considering the dismissed charges when it sentenced Frey, we 
move to the issues of plea bargaining that this case raises.   
¶57 Plea bargaining has become central to our criminal 
justice system.  The United States Supreme Court highlighted 
this development in two recent cases, Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 
__, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); and  Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. __, 
132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).   
In 
many——perhaps 
most——countries 
of 
the 
world, 
American-style 
plea 
bargaining 
is 
forbidden 
in 
[serious] cases . . . .  In Europe, many countries 
adhere 
to 
what 
they 
aptly 
call 
the 
"legality 
principle" by requiring prosecutors to charge all 
prosecutable offenses, which is typically incompatible 
with the practice of charge-bargaining.  Such a system 
reflects an admirable belief that the law is the law, 
and those who break it should pay the penalty 
provided.   
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1397 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(internal 
citations omitted).  In contrast, "[i]n the United States, we 
have plea bargaining a-plenty."  Id.   
¶58 A different view was voiced by the Supreme Court's 
majority.  The Court stated that plea bargaining "is not some 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
19 
 
adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal 
justice system."  Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Robert E. 
Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale 
L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)). 
¶59 The gist of Lafler and Frye is that plea bargaining is 
so critical to our criminal justice system that it requires the 
effective 
assistance of counsel throughout the bargaining 
process.  A defendant may now be able raise specific challenges 
to counsel's performance in plea bargaining even if the 
defendant receives a fair trial.   
¶60 Defense counsel have many responsibilities in plea 
bargaining, including researching the factual basis for the 
offenses 
charged, 
discussing 
the 
possible 
penalties 
the 
defendant faces if he does not accept a plea offer, seeking to 
reduce 
a 
defendant's 
exposure 
to 
prison, 
discussing 
a 
defendant's chances of success in a trial, and discussing the 
implications of a plea offer——including the impact that read-in 
offenses might have as well as the effect of dismissed charges.   
¶61 This case gives us the opportunity to clarify how the 
read-in procedure and dismissed charges fit into the plea 
bargaining process.9  In light of our discussion about sentencing 
above, we must decide "what does 'dismissed outright' mean 
anyway?" and whether it is a proper procedure for prosecutors 
                                                 
9 The State in oral argument before this court suggested 
that the read-in procedure and the term "dismissed outright" 
have developed as a part of the "legal folklore."  
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
20 
 
and defendants to utilize.  State v. Wesley, 2009 WI App 118, 
¶1, 321 Wis. 2d 151, 772 N.W.2d 232.10 
¶62 Dismissed charges are different from charges that are 
read in, as explained in paragraph 43, supra.  Charges that are 
"dismissed 
outright" 
appear 
to 
some 
to 
have 
special 
significance.  Wesley, 321 Wis. 2d 151, ¶¶15-16 (citing In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Chvala, 2007 WI 47, 300 
Wis. 2d 206, 730 N.W.2d 648).  We disagree. 
¶63 To explain, we begin with a history of the read-in 
procedure. 
 
This 
court's 
recent 
decision 
in 
State 
v. 
Straszkowski, 2008 WI 65, 310 Wis. 2d 259, 750 N.W.2d 835, 
contains a comprehensive history of the read-in procedure.  We 
repeat some of that discussion in this case. 
¶64 The read-in procedure is not, strictly speaking, an 
aspect of plea bargaining.  Rather, it is a sentencing mechanism 
that is often used in plea negotiations.  Austin v. State, 49 
Wis. 2d 727, 733, 183 N.W.2d 56 (1971).   
¶65 Austin was "this court's first extensive description 
of 
Wisconsin's 
read-in 
procedure." 
 
Straszkowski, 
310 
Wis. 2d 259, ¶59.  In Austin, Chief Justice E. Harold Hallows 
referred to the read-in procedure as being "somewhat unique to 
                                                 
10 In State v. Wesley, 2009 WI App 118, 321 Wis. 2d 151, 772 
N.W.2d 232, the court of appeals reviewed a case in which the 
circuit court considered the substance of a charge that was 
"dismissed outright," and it remanded the case for a Machner 
hearing on grounds that the meaning of the plea bargain was not 
clear to the defendant.  See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 
285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979). 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
21 
 
Wisconsin."  Austin, 49 Wis. 2d at 729.  The Austin decision 
begins with a discussion of Embry, 46 Wis. 2d at 157.   
¶66 Embry involved an individual convicted at trial of 
fraudulent use of a Standard Oil credit card.  A presentence 
report had revealed "other convictions or arrests for perjury, 
mail theft, forgery, con games, obtaining merchandise under 
false pretenses, crime against nature, theft and deceptive 
practices."  Id. at 158-59 (emphasis added).  This court 
considered whether the trial court had improperly sentenced the 
defendant for more than one offense because the trial court 
stated "you aren't being sentenced for one."  Id. at 157.  This 
court rejected the defendant's argument alleging an improper 
sentence, and determined that, in context, the statement was 
referring to the trial court's proper consideration of "the 
nature of the crime, the character of the accused, and the 
rights of the public" and whether the crime was "an isolated act 
or a pattern of conduct."  Id. 
¶67 The Embry court then engaged in a discussion of the 
read-in procedure: 
 
This procedure must be distinguished from a 
practice in this state, especially in Milwaukee, of 
charging a multiple offender with two or more offenses 
for which the evidence is most conclusive and bringing 
the judge's attention to additional uncharged offenses 
prior to sentencing.  Upon agreement between the state 
and the accused, the judge may take these offenses 
into consideration and the prosecution agrees not to 
prosecute.  It is expected the uncharged crimes will 
influence the length of the sentence for the crime or 
crimes the defendant has been found guilty of or to 
which he has [pled] guilty.  The advantage of this 
technique to the accused is that he can clean his 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
22 
 
slate of several uncharged crimes with the safety of 
only receiving at the most the maximum sentence on the 
one or two crimes of which he is convicted. 
Id. at 157-58. 
¶68 Thus, when the State and a defendant agree that 
charges will be read in, those charges are expected to be 
considered in sentencing, State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, ¶27, 232 
Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155, with the understanding that the 
read-in charges could increase the sentence up to the maximum 
that the defendant could receive for the conviction in exchange 
for the promise not to prosecute those additional offenses. 
¶69 Whether utilized as a part of plea bargaining or at 
sentencing after trial, the read-in procedure has benefits for 
both the State and for a defendant.   
¶70 The State preserves precious prosecutorial resources 
by not prosecuting other charges, while having the defendant 
agree that the trial court may consider uncharged or unproven 
offenses with the understanding that this consideration could 
increase the defendant's sentence.  
¶71 The defendant, in turn, "can clean his slate of 
several uncharged crimes with the safety of only receiving at 
the most the maximum sentence" on the crimes of which he is 
convicted and receive immunity from future prosecution of any 
read-in offense.  Embry, 46 Wis. 2d at 158. 
¶72 The promise by the prosecutor not to prosecute the 
read-in charges in the future is an essential component to a 
read-in.  This bar to future prosecution is protected by due 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
23 
 
process.  Austin, 49 Wis. 2d at 733, 736; State v. Drown, 2011 
WI App 53, ¶14, 332 Wis. 2d 765, 797 N.W.2d 919. 
¶73 In exchange for this benefit, the defendant exposes 
himself to the likelihood of a higher sentence within the 
sentencing range and the additional possibility of restitution 
for the offenses that are "read-in."  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.20 
requires that the sentencing judge order partial or full 
restitution for the crime of which a defendant was convicted and 
for any read-in crime.  See also Straszkowski, 310 Wis. 2d 259, 
¶¶81-87. 
¶74 Both parties may receive benefits from a read-in at 
sentencing and may negotiate such a procedure either as a part 
of a plea bargain or as part of sentencing.  Also, both parties 
give something up by accepting a read-in procedure——the State 
agrees not to prosecute other crimes and a defendant risks 
greater restitution and a higher sentence. 
¶75 There 
is 
less 
clarity 
about 
charges 
that 
are 
dismissed.  
¶76 Courts have found the term "dismissed outright" to be 
ambiguous.  Wesley, 321 Wis. 2d 151, ¶17.  Because "[t]he 
interpretation of plea agreements is rooted in contract law,"  
id., ¶12, "dismissed outright" might mean several things 
depending on the parties intended bargain: (1) The State might 
dismiss the charge with prejudice and agree not to refer to the 
underlying facts at sentencing; (2) The State might dismiss the 
charge with prejudice and the parties agree that either party 
could comment on the underlying facts at sentencing; (3) The 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
24 
 
State might move to dismiss charges and recommend that the court 
not consider the dismissed charges as aggravating factors.  Id., 
¶17; McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d at 119.  Each of these interpretations 
has been recognized as a possible interpretation of charges 
dismissed outright.   
¶77 In the context of interpreting plea bargains under 
contract law, dismissed charges do not have a static meaning.  
They are a product of the parties' negotiations and they mean 
what the parties intend them to mean. 
¶78 The one obvious and immutable exception to this 
principle is that a plea agreement involving one or more 
dismissed charges cannot limit what the judge may consider at 
sentencing.  McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d 116; Grant, 73 Wis. 2d at 448.  
Such agreements are contrary to public policy.  Elias, 93 
Wis. 2d at 
285 
("At 
the 
sentencing 
stage 
of 
a 
criminal 
proceeding there is no way that pertinent factors relating to 
the 
defendant's 
character 
and 
behavioral 
pattern 
can 
be 
immunized by a plea agreement between the defendant and the 
state.").   
¶79 A plea agreement might require the district attorney 
to recommend that the circuit court not consider the dismissed 
charge to be an aggravating factor.  The plea agreement might 
require the district attorney to acknowledge the unreliability 
of a dismissed charge, or not mention a dismissed charge at all.  
The plea agreement might incorporate a commitment not to 
prosecute a dismissed charge.  Conversely, the agreement might 
permit each party to argue the relevance of a dismissed charge 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
25 
 
as the party deems appropriate.  See Wesley, 321 Wis. 2d 151, 
¶17. 
¶80 These agreements do not limit the circuit court's 
ability to consider dismissed charges.  Rather, they embody the 
commitments that the prosecutor and the defendant, via defense 
counsel, 
make 
to 
each 
other, 
including 
the 
prosecutor's 
recommendations, range of arguments, and collateral commitments.  
In plea bargaining, defense counsel has a duty to assure that 
the defendant understands and approves the plea agreement. 
¶81 In analyzing the specific plea bargain in this case, 
Frey does not contend that the State breached the plea agreement 
in any way.   
¶82 The parties placed the plea agreement on the record 
before the court accepted the plea.  Austin, 49 Wis. 2d at 734.  
The transcript of the exchange reads as follows: 
[THE COURT]: 
[W]hat is the nature of the plea 
agreement? 
MR. DREXLER: 
Your Honor, the agreement would be that 
the defendant would plead either guilty or no contest 
to Count Two, Count Five, and Count Six of the 
Information.  And Counts One— 
THE COURT: 
Hold on, Mr. Drexler.  Let me get the 
document.  Find the Information. 
THE CLERK: 
(Looking through the file.) 
THE COURT: 
Go ahead.  Count One. 
MR. DREXLER: 
Count Two would be [pled] to and Count 
Five and Six would be [pled] to.  And Count One, 
Three, and Four would be dismissed. 
THE COURT: 
And is that your understanding, Mr. 
Filippo? 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
26 
 
MR. FILIPPO: 
Yes. 
THE COURT: 
And is that how you want to proceed, 
Mr. Filippo? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
¶83 As noted, Frey does not claim that the district 
attorney breached the plea agreement.  In fact, in oral argument 
Frey's counsel claimed that the district attorney and trial 
counsel were on the same page regarding the agreement and that 
the district attorney did not mention the dismissed charges.  At 
sentencing, the district attorney focused his remarks on the 
aggravated nature of the crime against M.G.——that Frey acted as 
a father to her but then gave her drugs and abused her.  The 
district attorney made only a brief reference to "taking 
advantage of the situation" after providing "those girls" drugs. 
¶84 We see no reason to fault the district attorney for 
his role in the Frey plea bargain.   
¶85 This shifts the focus to his defense counsel.  But we 
don't see a problem with defense counsel either. 
¶86 We are in a new dynamic after Lafler and Frye.  
Defense counsel are likely to face new responsibilities in the 
plea bargaining process and new vulnerability as well.  The two 
cases leave many issues unresolved, including what conduct might 
be viewed as deficient performance and what remedies will be 
afforded to defendants who receive ineffective assistance. 
¶87 Defense counsel can avoid many potential problems by 
creating a record.  In drafting plea agreements, defense counsel 
and district attorneys should be clear as to what they mean in 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
27 
 
terms of their personal commitments with regard to defendants.  
In addition, defense counsel should assure that defendants 
entering a plea understand the potential consequences——including 
that the court may consider any crimes that the defendant may 
have committed when it determines the defendant's character, 
pattern of behavior, and need to protect the public.   
¶88 The term "dismissed outright" should be discontinued.  
It leads to misunderstanding.  Instead, plea bargains should pin 
down whether a district attorney is agreeing not to prosecute a 
dismissed charge.   
¶89 The defendant must understand and agree to a plea 
bargain.  The effort to educate the defendant and secure his 
agreement should be documented in the plea questionnaire, and in 
a written plea agreement or on the record.  Defense counsel 
already have extensive duties to fulfill when communicating with 
defendants——even, 
or 
especially, 
in 
the 
context 
of 
plea 
bargaining.  See L. Michael Tobin, Wisconsin Criminal Defense 
Manual § 1.64, at Ch. 1 Pg. 43; §§ 6.18, 6.19, 6.20, at Ch. 6 
Pg. 11; § 6.35, at Ch. 6 Pg. 18 (5th ed. 2011).  The duty to 
assure the defendant's understanding and approval of any plea 
agreement should not be minimized. 
¶90 We now move to Frey's plea.   
¶91 At the hearing on the motion for resentencing, Frey's 
counsel declared, "Frey is not seeking to withdraw his pleas in 
this case and not seeking to shirk responsibility for the crimes 
for which he was convicted.  He is simply asking for a 
resentencing." 
 
Nevertheless, 
Frey 
appears 
to 
hint 
that 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
28 
 
ambiguity surrounding the term "dismissed outright" raises doubt 
whether his plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  
¶92 "The 
United 
States 
Constitution 
sets 
forth 
the 
standard that a guilty or no contest plea must be affirmatively 
shown to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary."  State v. 
Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶25.   
¶93 The court of appeals in Wesley considered whether the 
term "dismissed outright" was ambiguous in the mind of the 
defendant when he entered his plea.  Wesley, 321 Wis. 2d 151, 
¶¶20-21.  The Wesley court noted that, "as a matter of due 
process, if a guilty plea is induced by promises from the 
government, 'the essence of those promises must in some way be 
made known.'"  Id., ¶20 (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 
U.S. 257, 261-62 (1971)).   
¶94 The court's duties established in Wis. Stat. § 971.08, 
and in such cases as State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986), and Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, seek to ensure 
that a defendant’s plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.   
¶95 In Bangert, this court held that a plea is not 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary unless a defendant has a 
full understanding of the charges against him, Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 257, and the "nature of the constitutional rights he 
is waiving."  Id. at 265-66.  Bangert also requires that a trial 
judge 
ascertain 
a 
"defendant's 
education 
and 
general 
comprehension."  Id. at 261.  Drawing on precedent and Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08, Bangert outlined the duties of a judge at a plea 
hearing.  Id. at 261-62, 270-71.   
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
29 
 
¶96 In Brown, this court restated and supplemented the 
Bangert outline.  Three provisions relating to a judge's duties 
are especially relevant here: 
 
During the course of a plea hearing, the court 
must address the defendant personally and: 
 
. . . .  
(2) Ascertain whether any promises, agreements, 
or 
threats 
were 
made 
in 
connection 
with 
the 
defendant's anticipated plea, his appearance at the 
hearing, or any decision to forgo an attorney; 
 
. . . .  
(8) Establish 
personally 
that 
the 
defendant 
understands that the court is not bound by the terms 
of any plea agreement, including recommendations from 
the district attorney, in every case where there has 
been a plea agreement;  
(9) Notify 
the 
defendant 
of 
the 
direct 
consequences of his plea.  
Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶35 (emphasis added).   
¶97 In this case, there is no explicit dispute whether 
Frey gave his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  
At the plea hearing, the trial judge, the district attorney, and 
defendant Frey participated in the following exchange: 
THE COURT: 
And is there any agreement with respect 
to the potential sentence? 
MR. DREXLER: 
Only, Judge, that we both agree that 
there be a presentence investigation conducted. 
THE COURT: 
All right.  And are you bound by the 
presentence or each party free to argue? 
MR. DREXLER: 
Each party is free to argue. 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
30 
 
THE COURT: 
Mr. Frey, [has] that plea agreement 
been accurately stated by Mr. Drexler? 
THE DEFENDANT: Not by Mr. Drexler[,] by my attorney. 
THE COURT: 
By 
your 
attorney. 
 
And 
do 
you 
understand the plea agreement? 
THE DEFENDANT: I didn't understand what you meant 
there with the PSI being open.  I didn't understand 
that. 
THE COURT: 
My question was: Was there an agreement 
with respect to the sentencing?  And when Mr. Drexler 
suggests a presentence investigation[,] it is an 
evaluation 
by 
the Department of Corrections and 
probation officer to determine your background and 
social history and the like.  And they do make a 
recommendation as to potential penalties.   
 
On occasion district attorneys, since I was 
district attorney for awhile, you would——the agreement 
would 
call 
for 
the 
State 
not 
to 
exceed 
the 
recommendation of the PSI.  And so I wanted to make 
sure if there was a PSI that wasn't the agreement.  
The agreement, in fact, is that each [is] going to ask 
for one.  I don’t have to order one.  Each attorney 
will ask for one.  And each attorney will be free to 
argue for whatever sentence that they deem appropriate 
[regardless] of what the PSI says.  Do you understand 
that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: 
With that understanding is that how you 
want to proceed today? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: 
About . . . pleading pursuant to the 
plea agreement? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.   
¶98 Another exchange also occurred: 
THE COURT: 
And you further understand that upon a 
plea of guilty that I can impose any sentence which I 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
31 
 
deem 
appropriate 
up 
to 
the 
maximum 
potential 
penalties? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: 
Do you understand that I will not be 
bound by any sentencing recommendations of the State 
or any arguments of the State or any arguments of your 
attorney and that I can impose up to the maximum? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
The court then explained the maximum sentence for each count in 
Frey's plea.   
¶99 This exchange highlights the trial judge's attempt to 
ensure that Frey understood the significance of the pre-
sentencing 
investigation 
(PSI) 
report; 
that 
the 
district 
attorney and defendant would be free to argue the findings of 
the PSI and whatever sentence each side thought was appropriate; 
that the judge was not bound by the plea agreement; and that 
Frey, understanding the stakes, wanted to proceed with the plea 
agreement.  The judge's questions and Frey's answers indicate 
that Frey's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.    
¶100 The circuit court must engage in an exchange with a 
defendant about what the plea agreement means, Brown, 293 
Wis. 2d 594, ¶35, but the court is not bound by the plea 
agreement.  Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶20; State ex rel. White 
v. Gray, 57 Wis. 2d 17, 24, 203 N.W.2d 638 (1973).   
¶101 This exchange must be on the record.  Brown, 293 
Wis. 2d 594, ¶38 (concluding that the court, with the assistance 
of the district attorney, must engage a defendant at a plea 
colloquy to make "a complete record.").  The plea agreement 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
32 
 
should be reduced to writing if at all possible.  Here, the 
circuit court fulfilled its ultimate role in assuring that the 
defendant understood and approved the plea agreement. 
¶102 To sum up, we determine that a sentencing court may 
consider dismissed charges when it imposes a sentence.  As a 
general rule, parties may not immunize certain offenses from 
consideration by the court.  Rather, the court is expected to 
utilize the fullest amount of relevant information concerning a 
defendant's life and character in fashioning a sentence.  It is 
the responsibility of defense counsel to assure that the 
defendant understands and consents to the terms of any plea 
bargain and appreciates the authority and independence of the 
sentencing 
court. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
must 
confirm 
the 
defendant's understanding.  The State and defense counsel would 
be well advised to make sure they agree on the terms of any plea 
bargain by putting the agreement in writing and documenting 
efforts to keep the defendant informed of all important 
developments. 
¶103 We note that Frey is also asking for the opportunity 
to refute the accuracy and reliability of uncharged offenses.  
However, as the State points out, Frey's counsel took the 
opportunity at sentencing to refer to the dismissed sexual 
assault, and he disputed the reliability of the information.  
The circuit court did not sua sponte refer to the dismissed 
charges and thereby take counsel and defendant by surprise.  
A.B.'s mother was given the opportunity to speak at the 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
33 
 
sentencing 
hearing, 
before 
Frey's 
counsel 
argued. 
 
Her 
statement, included the following comments: 
[I am] the mother of [A.B.]  And I do not agree with 
the presentence report.  And I believe this man 
deserves the maximum sentence.  And he is a pedophile.  
And [it is a] known fact that statistics show that he 
cannot be rehabilitated.  And given any chance this 
man will get back out and find another woman to prey 
upon and another child to assault.  And my daughter 
was abruptly raped by this man and drugged and 
sexually assaulted many times [which] she could not 
prove because she had been drugged and she suffers 
greatly and [is] going through therapy. 
 
And this is something that is going to haunt her 
the rest of her life.  And so I plead with you to give 
him the maximum amount.  And also I'm not the mother 
of M.G. but for what she has been through and no one 
to speak for her, I also ask the same for her.  This 
man does not deserve to see daylight.  If you could 
lock him away forever he deserves a lifetime.  And God 
reserves a special place in hell for people like you. 
¶104 Frey's counsel spoke after these accusations.  He not 
only had the opportunity to refute the charges, he began his 
remarks by attempting to discredit their accuracy.  Frey's 
counsel stated: 
 
And the rape to which [A.B.'s mother] refers was 
not proven.  And it was chosen by the prosecutor not 
to be prosecuted.  And I might add that on one 
occasion the complaining witness in this case did not 
believe that rape could have happened or actually did 
happen.  And so I would temper [A.B.'s mother]'s 
comments with those considerations. 
¶105 At least two separate times later in the hearing, 
Frey's counsel referred to other charges from Michigan and 
attempted to discourage the court's consideration of those 
previously dismissed or yet untried charges. 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
34 
 
¶106 We note that a defendant has a right at sentencing to 
speak, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 972.14(2), 
and 
to 
refute 
allegedly 
inaccurate information that the court might otherwise consider 
during sentencing.  State v. Groth, 2002 WI App 299, ¶¶22-23, 
258 Wis. 2d 889, 655 N.W.2d 163.  Defendants have a right to 
dispute even read-in charges.  Straszkowski, 310 Wis. 2d 259, 
¶5.  Of course, defendants have an opportunity to dispute the 
validity of other dismissed, uncharged offenses.  We conclude 
that that opportunity was not denied here. 
¶107 We are also called upon in this case to review the 
extent to which a sentencing court can utilize dismissed counts 
when sentencing a defendant.  
¶108  While Frey alleges that the court used the charges 
for an improper purpose, his argument is somewhat conclusory.  
In the sentencing transcript that Frey directs us to, the 
circuit court explicitly states that it was considering the 
dismissed charges to determine Frey's character.  Both times 
when the court made detailed reference to A.B. the court stated:  
"when I consider the character of the defendant" and "although 
he wasn't convicted of that offense, once again, the court can 
consider that as part of his character."  A thorough review of 
the entire transcript of the plea hearing indicates that the 
circuit court judge carefully listed all the factors that he was 
considering.  The judge also carefully noted, when he referred 
to the dismissed charges, that he was using the dismissed 
charges to discern the defendant's character and pattern of 
behavior. 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
35 
 
¶109 Frey admits that this court has already recognized 
that circuit courts may consider dismissed charges to determine 
a defendant's character.  This case does not require us to 
determine the extent of other permissible uses for dismissed 
charges at sentencing.  We simply reaffirm that circuit court 
judges may consider dismissed charges to determine a defendant's 
character when sentencing that defendant.  The circuit court 
judge properly considered the dismissed charges in this case and 
thoroughly explained his use of the charges.  Therefore, we 
uphold the judge's exercise of discretion in sentencing Frey. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶110 We 
conclude 
that 
a 
circuit 
court 
may 
consider 
dismissed charges in imposing sentence.  Nothing in this case 
alters that longstanding rule.  The circuit court here did not 
use the dismissed charges for an improper purpose.  In addition, 
we conclude that Frey had adequate opportunity to refute the 
purported inaccuracies of the facts underlying the dismissed 
charges.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
No. 
  2010AP2801-CR 
 
 
 
1