Case Title: State v. Anderson

Citation: 242 Or. 457, 410 P.2d 230

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1966-01-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Reversed and remanded January 26, 1966.
*459 Paul A. Thalhofer, Pendleton, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant.
Michael S. Killoran, Deputy District Attorney, Pendleton, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Richard J. Courson, District Attorney.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and PERRY, SLOAN, GOODWIN, DENECKE, LUSK and SCHWAB, Justices.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
LUSK, J.
The defendant was charged in a complaint filed in the District Court for Umatilla County with a violation of the Oregon nuisance statute, ORS 161.310. He was convicted in the district court, appealed to the circuit court, where he was again convicted, and has appealed to this court.
1. As we view the case, the only question that need be considered is whether the facts stated in the complaint constitute a crime. No demurrer was filed, but the objection was raised by motion in arrest of judgment. Upon such a motion the court is authorized to consider the sufficiency of the complaint: ORS 136.810; ORS 135.630 (4); ORS 156.030. The complaint reads:
ORS 161.310 reads:
2. This statute was intended to cover offenses against the public peace, the public health, and the public morals not elsewhere made punishable by the criminal statutes and which were known at common law as indictable nuisances: State v. Elkins et al, 216 Or 509, 511, 339 P2d 715; Mult. Co. Fair Ass'n. v. Langley, 140 Or 172, 176, 13 P2d 354; State v. Waymire, 52 Or 281, 285, 97 P 46, 132 Am St Rep 699, 21 LRA NS 56; State v. Nease, 46 Or 433, 440, 80 P 897.
3, 4. While, as a general rule, in an indictment for an offense created by statute, it is sufficient to describe the offense in the words of the statute, yet this is not always the case.
See State v. Smith, 182 Or 497, 502, 188 P2d 998.
5, 6. Obviously, these requirements apply with full force to a complaint or indictment charging a violation of the nuisance statute. "It is impractical," it is said in 2 Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure 684, § 819, "to attempt an exact definition [of a public nuisance] which will be universally applicable, because each individual case must stand on its own facts, and there is such a great variation between factual situations." Hence, without clear, direct and full allegations of the facts from which it can be seen that the act or conduct alleged falls within the embrace of the statute, it cannot be said that a crime is charged. As stated in 66 CJS 967-968, Nuisances § 164:
See State v. Elkins, supra, 216 Or at 514; In re Cohn, 37 Cal App 2d 39, 98 P2d 769; Commonwealth v. Phoenix Amusement Co., Inc., 241 Ky 678, 690-691, 44 SW2d 830; L. & N.R.R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 130 Ky 432, 435, 113 SW 517.
7-9. The only fact alleged in the complaint is that the defendant transported explosives upon the public highways of the state of Oregon. The transportation of explosives on the public highways is not per se a public nuisance, though it may be such in particular *462 circumstances: 2 Wharton, supra, 700, § 832; Kentucky Glycerine Co. v. Commonwealth, 188 Ky 820, 224 SW 360, 11 ALR 715, with Annotation at 719; Denney v. United States (10th Cir.) 185 F2d 108, 110; Smith v. United States (ED Va) 155 F Supp 605, 609; Holman v. Clark, 272 Mo 266, 275-276, 198 SW 868; 66 CJS 797, Nuisances § 47. As stated in Smith v. United States: "The manufacture, keeping or storing of explosives is not per se a public nuisance. * * * Whether or not such acts do constitute a nuisance depends upon the surrounding circumstances such as locality, quantity or manner of manufacture or storage." The complaint alleges that transportation of the explosives "grossly disturbed the public peace"; but this is a mere conclusion; in what way it disturbed the public peace is not disclosed and, for all that appears, the explosives may have been transported with every precaution being taken for the public safety.
10-12. If an accused can admit the truth of every allegation of fact in the complaint and still be innocent of a crime, the complaint is insufficient and will not support a conviction: State of Oregon v. Buck, 200 Or 87, 103-104, 262 P2d 495; State v. Smith, 11 Or 205, 207, 8 P 343. Giving due regard to the rule that the allegations of an indictment or complaint will be construed with less strictness when their sufficiency is first challenged by a motion in arrest of judgment: State v. Mims, 235 Or 540, 546, 385 P2d 1002, we are, nevertheless, of the opinion that the complaint is so entirely lacking in allegations of fact essential to state a crime that it was error to deny the motion.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.