Case Title: Steadman v. Pagels

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015 ME 122

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2015-09-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2015 ME 122 
Docket: 
Was-14-462 
Submitted 
 
On Briefs: July 1, 2015 
Decided: 
September 3, 2015 
Corrected: 
March 1, 2016 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ. 
 
 
MELANIE (CURRIE) STEADMAN 
 
v. 
 
STEVEN PAGELS 
 
 
HJELM, J. 
[¶1]  Steven Pagels appeals from a judgment of the District Court 
(Calais, Alexander, J.) finding him liable to Melanie (Currie) Steadman for sexual 
assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, and awarding Steadman both compensatory and 
punitive damages.  Pagels contends that the court erroneously admitted evidence of 
his prior bad acts, see M.R. Evid. 404(b), and improperly found Pagels liable for 
both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.  Pagels also argues 
that several of the court’s findings are not supported by evidence in the record.1  
We affirm. 
                                         
1  Our review of the record demonstrates that, contrary to Pagels’s argument, the evidence supports the 
factual findings that he challenges, see Pelletier v. Pelletier, 2012 ME 15, ¶ 13, 36 A.3d 903 (findings of 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  We review the evidence in the light most favorable to Steadman as the 
prevailing party.  Jacob v. Kippax, 2011 ME 1, ¶ 2, 10 A.3d 1159. 
 
[¶3]  Steadman, who was born in 1986, is Pagels’s biological daughter.  As a 
child, she lived in the family residence in Cherryfield with Pagels; her mother, who 
was married to Pagels; her two younger brothers; her half-sister, who was born to 
her mother from a prior relationship; and occasionally Pagels’s son from a prior 
relationship.  
[¶4]  When Steadman was approximately seven or eight years old,2 Pagels 
began to sexually assault her in ways that escalated over time.  Early on, the sexual 
contact consisted of Pagels touching her breasts and genitals.  Pagels began taking 
Steadman’s clothes off during the assaults when she was between the ages of ten 
and eleven.  When Steadman was approximately twelve years old, her half-sister, 
whom Pagels had also sexually assaulted, left the family residence to go to college.  
Pagels’s assaults against Steadman then began to include incidents where he 
                                                                                                                                   
fact will be affirmed on appeal if they are supported by competent evidence in the record), and we do not 
discuss this argument further. 
2  Pagels filed an untimely answer to the complaint.  Over Steadman’s objection, the court allowed the 
portion of the answer that responded to the allegations in the complaint but did not allow any affirmative 
defenses, such as the statute of limitations, or a jury trial demand.  The Legislature has repealed the 
statute proscribing a statute of limitations for claims of sexual acts against minors.  See 14 M.R.S. 
§ 752-C (2014).  Additionally, any statute of limitations period is tolled while a plaintiff has a significant 
mental disability, such as Steadman's.  See 14 M.R.S. § 853 (2013) (this section has since been amended, 
see P.L. 2013 ch. 329, § 1 (codified at 14 M.R.S. § 853 (2014))).  Therefore, as the court noted, based on 
the combined effect of these two statutes, it is doubtful that an affirmative defense based on the statute of 
limitations would have been availing to Pagels. 
 
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required her to touch his penis, and forcibly penetrated her with his penis, 
including occasions when he bound her with rope.  The assaults occurred in 
various locations.  When Steadman attempted to resist, Pagels threatened to beat 
her if she did not comply.  Pagels also told Steadman that if she disclosed the 
assaults to her mother, the mother would become angry and jealous of Steadman.   
[¶5]  Nonetheless, in 2001 Steadman reported some of the assaultive conduct 
to her mother but was too afraid to divulge many of the details.  Her mother 
removed Steadman from the home, and Steadman and her mother ultimately 
resettled in Calais.  Steadman’s mother divorced Pagels and was granted “full 
custody” of Steadman while Steadman’s brothers remained with Pagels. 
[¶6]  On weekends, Steadman’s mother returned to the family home in 
Cherryfield to visit her sons, leaving Steadman alone in Calais.  As her mother 
spent an increasing amount of time at the Cherryfield residence, Steadman 
eventually learned that her mother had reconciled with Pagels and in fact had 
remarried him.  Later, her mother permanently returned to Cherryfield to live with 
Pagels.  Although her mother left money for food, Steadman often purchased drugs 
and alcohol instead.  
[¶7]  After Steadman left her family’s home in Cherryfield, she experienced 
nightmares, cut and burned herself, and used illegal drugs.  She left school, 
although she did graduate from an alternative education program, and as a juvenile 
 
4 
was charged with several drug-related offenses.  After she completed school she 
became involved in a series of abusive relationships.  She moved to Florida with an 
abusive man and became addicted to crack cocaine.  Later, she returned to Maine 
and attended a methadone clinic.  When she applied to college, she had no choice 
but to ask Pagels for money to buy books.  He insisted she work for him but when 
he made sexual advances toward her, she left.  
[¶8]  In July 2012, Steadman commenced this action, asserting claims for 
sexual assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress.  Before trial, Pagels filed a motion in 
limine to exclude evidence of his past sexual conduct with other females.  The 
court issued a pretrial order denying the motion, but limiting the evidence as 
follows: 
[Pagels’s] motion to exclude evidence of prior “sexualized” acts 
between [Pagels] and two other named individuals is DENIED.  The 
Court finds this evidence, as described by both [Steadman] and 
[Pagels], is relevant to show motive, opportunity, pattern, practice and 
interest in relations with individuals under the age of 18 in the home, 
office, and on boats under [Pagels’s] control.  The relevant evidence 
of acts on this issue would be limited to evidence of contacts between 
[Pagels] and the witnesses when the witnesses were under the age of 
18, and statements [Pagels] made to the witnesses, at any time, 
regarding the contacts that occurred when the witnesses were under 
18. 
 
The court also ruled that Steadman could call one of the witnesses, Pagels’s sister, 
to testify out of order because of scheduling issues and that because of the 
 
5 
sequence of testimony, “some of her testimony may be conditionally admitted, 
subject to later qualification.”   
 
[¶9]  A three-day bench trial began on September 29, 2014.  Steadman 
testified to the history of assaults inflicted by Pagels, and she further testified about 
her course of mental health counseling.  She presented evidence that she has been 
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, and opiate addiction in remission.  Because of her 
psychiatric conditions, the Social Security Administration found Steadman to be 
fully disabled.  
[¶10]  During the trial, Steadman also called three witnesses whose 
testimony is at issue on this appeal.  The first of those witnesses was Steadman’s 
half-sister, who is seven years older than Steadman and whose testimony was 
presented through a transcript from her deposition.  She testified that when she was 
an adolescent, Pagels spanked her bare buttocks, touched her breasts, and got on 
top of her and engaged in simulated intercourse.  She further testified that the 
sexual assaults against her ended when she left the family residence to go to 
college.  The second witness was Pagels’s sister, who testified that in the 
mid-1970s, when she was approximately sixteen years old and Pagels was twenty, 
he sexually assaulted her as many as six times.  The third witness was a woman 
who had babysat Steadman and her siblings, and who worked briefly for Pagels’s 
 
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boat company.  She testified that he sometimes touched her arms in a way that 
made her feel uncomfortable, and that once he told her that he wanted “to be with” 
her and invited her to try out the bed in his apartment.  
[¶11]  Pagels repeatedly objected to evidence of his conduct toward these 
other females.  Although the court sustained some of Pagels’s objections, it 
overruled others.  In many of those instances when the court admitted the evidence 
over Pagels’s objections, it explicitly stated that it would consider the evidence 
only on issues of motive, opportunity, and other purposes that are permitted 
pursuant to Maine Rule of Evidence 404(b), and that it would not treat the 
testimony as evidence of Pagels’s character. 
 
[¶12]  In October 2014, the court issued a twenty-eight-page decision 
containing comprehensive findings of fact.  The court found Pagels liable to 
Steadman for all three tort claims alleged in her complaint.  The court assessed 
damages without distinguishing among the three liability claims.  As special 
damages, the court awarded $33,594.10 for the costs of past medical care, 
consultation and treatment; $10,000 for future treatment and counseling; and 
$45,000 for lost earnings.  The court also awarded general damages of $1,300,000 
for past, present and future pain, suffering, mental anguish, and loss of enjoyment 
of life, and it assessed $500,000 in punitive damages.   
 
7 
[¶13]  In its findings, the court did not refer to any of the incidents described 
at trial by Pagels’s sister or the former babysitter.  The court, on the other hand, did 
refer to the testimony of Steadman’s half-sister and set out findings consistent with 
the testimonial descriptions of Pagels’s sexual assaults of her.  The court then 
stated, “The sexual or sexualized contacts with the stepdaughter ended when she 
entered college in the Fall of 1997.  The most serious sexual assaults on 
[Steadman] began shortly thereafter.” 
[¶14]  Pagels did not file a motion for further findings of fact, see M.R. 
Civ. P. 52(b), but appealed the judgment.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶15]  Pagels argues that the court erroneously admitted evidence of prior 
bad acts and that it improperly found him liable for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress.  We address these contentions in turn. 
A. 
Evidence of Prior Bad Acts 
[¶16]  Pagels claims that pursuant to Maine Rule of Evidence 404(b), the 
court erroneously admitted evidence of his prior bad acts through the testimony of 
Steadman’s half-sister, his own sister, and the woman who had babysat for the 
family.  He asserts that the evidence of prior bad acts is tantamount to improper 
character evidence barred by Rule 404(b), and that the court’s judgment 
demonstrates that the court used the evidence improperly.   
 
8 
[¶17]  At the time of trial, Maine Rule of Evidence 404(b) provided, 
“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character 
of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.”3  That 
rule, however, allowed an exception to the general principle of exclusion by 
permitting the admission of evidence of prior bad acts for any other “permissible 
purpose,” see State v. DeLong, 505 A.2d 803, 805 (Me. 1986), such as “motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake 
or accident.”  In re Rachel J., 2002 ME 148, ¶ 17, 804 A.2d 418 (quotation marks 
omitted); M.R. Evid. 404(b) Advisory Committee’s Note.  Here, when the court 
admitted evidence of prior bad acts that Pagels committed against others, it stated 
expressly that it would consider that evidence for only those non-propensity 
purposes.  This is consistent with the court’s pretrial order limiting the scope and 
purpose of evidence of prior bad acts.  We examine this series of rulings for 
reversible error. 
1. 
Testimony of Steadman’s Half-Sister 
[¶18]  At the outset of the trial, Steadman offered into evidence the 
transcribed testimony of her half-sister.  Pagels objected, claiming that it contained 
inadmissible evidence of his prior bad acts against her.  The court overruled the 
                                         
3  M.R. Evid. 404(b) has since been replaced, effective January 1, 2015, with restyled language that 
does not affect the substance of the rule. See M.R. Evid. 404(b) (restyled Maine Rules of Evidence). 
 
9 
objection, stating that “I am allowing evidence of prior acts as they related to plan, 
motive, opportunity, consistent practice, things like that, you know, not—
obviously, not—obviously, I’m not considering with regard to character, but for 
those other things.”  The court also noted that “it [would] have to go over [the 
deposition] after [it heard] all the testimony.”  Because Pagels objected to the 
admission of this evidence, “we review the trial court’s decision to admit the 
evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) for clear error and its determination pursuant to 
Rule 403 for an abuse of discretion.”4  State v. DeMass, 2000 ME 4, ¶ 11, 
743 A.2d 233; In re Rachel J., 2002 ME 148, ¶ 17, 804 A.2d 418.  
[¶19]  In its written decision, the court issued findings, which are based on 
the testimony of Steadman’s half-sister, that Pagels had “inappropriate physical 
contacts with his stepdaughter” several times and that the contact ended when she 
entered college in the fall of 1997.  The court further found that soon thereafter, 
“[t]he most serious sexual assaults on [Steadman] began.”  As described by the 
court, the sole use of evidence that Pagels sexually assaulted the half-sister 
therefore was on the issue of Pagels’s motive and opportunity—that when one 
victim of Pagels’s sexual assaults left the family home, he redirected his attention 
to Steadman, which corresponds to and corroborates evidence that the assaults 
                                         
4  Although Pagels did not renew his objection to the testimony later in the trial after the court had the 
opportunity to read the deposition transcript, he made his objection clear on the record when Steadman 
offered the transcript into evidence.  Because the court was fully aware of Pagels’s opposition to the 
evidence, his objection remained preserved. 
 
10 
against her significantly worsened at that time.  The court therefore considered this 
evidence for a “permissible purpose,” DeLong, 505 A.2d at 805, namely, the 
evolution of Pagels’s tortious conduct committed against Steadman herself.   
[¶20]  This application of the evidence was relevant to the issues in the case 
and was not improper, because the court did not treat it as propensity evidence in 
violation of Rule 404(b).  See State v. Larson, 577 A.2d 767, 770 (Me. 1990) (“[A] 
court sitting as the factfinder is presumed to accept admissible evidence only for 
the purpose for which it may be admitted.”).  The court’s description of the 
evidence and its express discussion about its significance corroborates the 
assurance that it articulated on the record when it admitted the evidence over 
Pagels’s objection that it would not consider the deposition testimony as evidence 
of Pagels’s character but would consider it only for purposes not prohibited by 
Rule 404.   
[¶21]  Further, although Pagels argues that the magnitude of the damages 
awarded to Steadman demonstrates that the court took an inflamed view of his 
conduct, the damages award is fully supported by a measured assessment of 
evidence of the harm he caused to Steadman.  See Lee v. Scotia Prince Cruises 
Ltd., 2003 ME 78, ¶ 21, 828 A.2d 210.  Therefore, nothing in the record supports a 
claim that the court violated its own ruling, and the court’s ruling that admitted the 
testimony of Steadman’s half-sister was not an erroneous application of Rule 404.   
 
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[¶22]  Similarly, contrary to Pagels’s argument on appeal, admission of 
Steadman’s half-sister’s testimony was not improper pursuant to Rule 403 because 
the court was entitled to conclude that the probative value of that evidence was not 
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.  See State v. Lockhart, 
2003 ME 108, ¶ 37, 830 A.2d 433 (evidence determined to be admissible pursuant 
to Rule 404 is then subjected to scrutiny pursuant to Rule 403); Field & Murray, 
Maine Evidence § 404.4 at 142 (6th ed. 2007).  Any unfair prejudice created by the 
evidence would be the court’s misuse of it as proof of Pagels’s propensity to 
engage in the assaultive conduct alleged by Steadman.  See State v. Thomes, 
1997 ME 146, ¶ 11, 697 A.2d 1262 (the nature of the prejudice created by 
admission of evidence of prior bad acts is “an undue tendency to move the tribunal 
to decide on an improper basis.” (quotation marks omitted)); see also Field 
& Murray, Maine Evidence § 404.5 at 145 (noting that when evidence of prior bad 
acts describes sex crimes, the risk of unfair prejudice is enhanced and requires the 
court to exercise “great caution” in deciding whether to admit the evidence).   
[¶23]  Here the risk of unfair prejudice was ameliorated when the court 
stated on the record that it would not treat the evidence in a way that would 
improperly breach the prohibition against character evidence created in 
Rule 404(b).  Because the evidence carried probative value to explain the 
chronology of abuse that Pagels inflicted on Steadman, and because the court 
 
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expressly circumscribed the use to which it would put the evidence, it acted within 
the bounds of the discretion created by Rule 403 when it admitted the evidence.  
2. 
Testimony of Pagels’s Sister and the Family’s Babysitter 
[¶24]  Pagels also argues that the court erred by admitting testimony from 
his sister and the family babysitter about his conduct toward them.  We need not 
address these claims of error, however, because there is no indication that the court 
relied on this evidence or gave it any weight whatsoever in reaching its verdict.  
The court’s findings spanned nearly thirty pages, and, in contrast to findings based 
on the testimony of Steadman’s half-sister, they made no mention of the testimony 
presented by either of these witnesses of prior bad acts, and the findings did not 
even refer to either of those witnesses.5  Additionally, Pagels did not move for the 
issuance of further findings of fact to address the question of whether the testimony 
of either his sister or the former babysitter influenced the court’s verdict in any 
way.  Thus, we are left without any suggestion in the court’s decision that it treated 
their testimony as material to its adjudication of Steadman’s claims.  In fact, the 
absence of any reference to this evidence in the court’s findings suggests that the 
court placed no weight on it, even though the court had concluded that the 
                                         
5  The court’s findings made reference to a babysitter who described Steadman’s behavior, but that 
babysitter was a different person than the one who testified about Pagels’s advances toward her. 
 
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evidence was admissible.  Therefore, even if the court committed error6 when it 
admitted that testimony—an issue we need not decide—Pagels has not 
demonstrated that the evidence was a factor in the court’s decision, and any error 
was therefore harmless.  See M.R. Civ. P. 61. 
B. 
Emotional Distress Claims 
 
[¶25]  The court found Pagels liable to Steadman on her claims for both 
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress (NIED).  Pagels contends here that the court erred by finding 
him liable for NIED because that claim was subsumed by the liability Steadman 
established for IIED.  See Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, ¶ 19, 784 A.2d 18.  
Pagels goes on to argue that as a result of the court’s determination of liability for 
the two counts, the court awarded damages in excess of what could be supported 
by only the IIED claim—in effect, giving Steadman a double recovery.  Pagels, 
however, did not argue to the court at any time that a finding of liability for IIED 
would, as a matter of law, foreclose a finding of liability for NIED.  Pagels could 
have raised the issue preemptively prior to trial, and the argument also could have 
been the basis for post-judgment relief in the trial court.  Because he did not do so, 
                                         
6  Pagels objected to the testimony of his sister and therefore preserved the claim of error for appellate 
review.  He did not, however, object to the portions of the former babysitter’s testimony he challenges 
here.  (He did object to other portions of that testimony, and the court sustained many of them.)  If we 
were to reach that challenge, we therefore would consider the issue only for obvious error.  See Searles v. 
Fleetwood Homes of Pa., Inc., 2005 ME 94, ¶ 33, 878 A.2d 509. 
 
14 
Pagels has failed to preserve this issue for appeal and raises it for the first time 
here, and so we do not consider it.  See Dobson v. Dep’t of the Sec’y of State, 
2008 ME 137, ¶ 3, 955 A.2d 266.  Rather, Pagels’s challenge to the court’s finding 
that he is liable to Steadman on her claim for NIED must be limited to the more 
general question of whether the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict on that 
count.  See Pelletier v. Pelletier, 2012 ME 15, ¶ 13, 36 A.3d 903. 
[¶26]  To succeed on her NIED claim, Steadman was required to prove that 
Pagels owed a duty to her; that he breached that duty; that Steadman sustained 
severe emotional distress; and that Pagels’s breaching conduct caused that harm.  
Curtis, 2001 ME 158, ¶ 18, 784 A.2d 18.  In Curtis, we noted that there is no 
general duty to avoid causing emotional harm to others through negligent conduct.  
Id.  For that reason, claims for NIED are often pleaded improvidently, and, in fact, 
are more properly treated as claims for recovery of emotional distress damages that 
must be pursued through tort claims that are less limited in scope.  Id. ¶ 22.  
Nonetheless, independent claims for NIED may be viable in bystander claims or 
when the parties stand in a “special relationship” to each other.  Id. ¶ 19.   
[¶27]  The relationship between a custodial parent and child is a “special 
relationship” that gives rise to a heightened responsibility of care.  See Estate of 
Cilley v. Lane, 2009 ME 133, ¶ 17, 985 A.2d 481; Lenoci v. Leonard, 21 A.3d 694, 
699 (Vt. 2011); see also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical 
 
15 
& Emotional Harm § 40(b)(7) (2012) (a custodian has a special relationship with 
the person who is in that person’s custody, if the custodian is required by law to 
exercise custody and “has a superior ability to protect” the person in custody).  
Such a relationship therefore supports a claim for NIED.   
[¶28]  Here, the evidence warranted a finding by the court that Pagels was 
Steadman’s custodial parent during the years when he assaulted her and that the 
parties were therefore in a special relationship that imposed a legal duty on Pagels 
to avoid causing severe emotional harm to his daughter through conduct that was 
sexually and physically assaultive and emotionally abusive.  Therefore, presented 
with this evidence, the court acted within its authority in finding that the 
relationship between Steadman and Pagels gave rise to a duty that supports a claim 
for NIED. 
[¶29]  The evidence also plainly supported the court’s findings that Pagels 
breached this duty,7 that Pagels’s tortious conduct caused injury to Steadman, and 
that the injury Steadman suffered rose to the level of severe emotional distress.  
The court therefore did not err when it concluded that Pagels was liable to 
Steadman on her claim for NIED.  
                                         
7  Pagels argues there is no evidence that any actionable conduct was “negligent.”  In making that 
argument, Pagels views an NIED claim too narrowly.  A claim for NIED is based on the breach of a duty.  
For the reasons set out in the text, Pagels was subject to a duty of care not to inflict severe emotional 
harm on his daughter.  The evidence warranted a finding that he breached that duty, thus rendering him 
liable for NIED. 
 
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[¶30]  Additionally, the court’s judgment establishes that the court did not 
award double damages for the same emotional distress resulting from Pagels’s 
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  In its order, the court 
addressed the liability issues first and concluded that Steadman had proved each of 
the three tort claims that she had asserted against Pagels.  The court then addressed 
the amount of Steadman’s total general and special damages without attributing or 
assigning her injuries to a specific cause of action.  It is therefore clear that the 
judgment is for a comprehensive but single award of damages, even though there 
were several legal theories that supported that unified award.   
[¶31]  We therefore conclude that the court’s formulation of the judgment 
and award of damages was not erroneous. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Daniel A. Pileggi, Esq., Roy, Beardsley, Williams & Granger, LLC, 
Ellsworth, for appellant Steven Pagels 
 
Sarah I. Gilbert, Esq., Elliott & MacLean, LLP, Camden, for 
appellee Melanie (Currie) Steadman 
 
Calais District Court docket number CV-2012-35 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY