Case Title: In re Estate of Orville Tucker

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2011-05-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
2011 VT 54













In re Estate of Tucker (2009-438)
 
2011 VT 54
 
[Filed 20-May-2011]
 
ENTRY ORDER
 
2011 VT 54
 
SUPREME COURT
  DOCKET NO. 2009-438
 
JANUARY TERM, 2011
 
In re Estate of Orville Tucker
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APPEALED FROM:
 
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Orange Superior Court 
 
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DOCKET NO. 248-12-05
  Oecv
 
 
 
 
 
Trial Judge:  Mary Miles Teachout
 
In the above-entitled
cause, the Clerk will enter:
 
¶ 1.            
Appellant, testator's daughter, seeks reversal of the trial court's
judgment declining to admit testator's purported last will and testament to
probate.  This judgment followed a trial by jury, which rendered a special
verdict finding that testator lacked testamentary capacity.  Appellant
raises various issues relating to the burden of proof, the use of the doctrine
of suspicious circumstances, the jury instructions, and the denial of
post-judgment motions.  We conclude that all of appellant's claims are
moot or unpreserved, and accordingly, we affirm.  
¶ 2.            
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  Testator passed away on
March 14, 2005, leaving four living children: two daughters and two sons. 
Two of these children, one son and one daughter ("son" and "daughter"), are the
opposing parties in this case.  On October 20, 2004, testator executed a
will that was contrary to his earlier wills and left the bulk of his property
to daughter and to a second son, who is not a party to this action. 
Testator had written at least two wills before the 2004 will, one in 1981 and
another in 1991.  In his 1981 will, testator left his home and farm to
son.  Son had been instructed in the will to provide a home for his
sister, who has cerebral palsy and who is not participating in this case. 
The 1981 will left one dollar to daughter.  In 1991, testator executed a
second will that was similar in purpose to his 1981 will.  This 1991 will
left testator's home and farm to son with an instruction to provide a life
estate for his sister.  It left daughter "$1.00, since she has already
received a six and one-half (6.5) acre parcel of land as her share of [the]
estate."  
¶ 3.            
Testator's wife predeceased him on March 27, 2004.  Several months
later, testator petitioned the probate court to appoint daughter as his
voluntary guardian.  The probate court appointed daughter "guardian of the
person and property of [testator]" on July 29, 2004.  
¶ 4.            
In the fall of 2004, daughter contacted an attorney on behalf of
testator in order to create a new will.  Daughter drove testator to
appointments with his attorney, and testator signed his new will and testament
on October 20, 2004.  The 2004 will leaves forty-five percent of the
estate to daughter.  This will does not significantly provide for son or
for his sister with cerebral palsy; it leaves them each one dollar and includes
a handwritten note that the sister should also receive two rooms of
furniture.  Contrary to his earlier wills, the 2004 will does not provide
for the sister's living arrangements.  
¶ 5.            
After testator's death, daughter petitioned to open a testate estate and
to admit testator's 2004 will to probate.  Son contested this
filing.  The probate court concluded that the will was properly executed
in accordance with 14 V.S.A. § 5; however, it also found that testator was not
able to recall to mind the nature and extent of his property, nor was he able
to dispose of his property in accordance with "some plan formed in his
mind."  The probate court concluded that undue influence was used to
procure the 2004 will and declined to admit it to probate.  Daughter
appealed to the trial court, requesting a jury trial.
¶ 6.            
The parties agreed that the major issues before the trial court were
testamentary capacity and undue influence.  They skirmished over which
party had the burden of proof with respect to undue influence.  Daughter
argued that son had the burden because he was asserting undue influence and
because there were no suspicious circumstances.  Son argued that there
were suspicious circumstances so that the burden shifted to daughter. 
They agreed that the court had to determine whether suspicious circumstances
were present to allocate the burden of proof.  See In re Estate of Raedel,
152 Vt. 478, 481-82, 568 A.2d 331, 333 (1989) (recognizing that burden of proof
shifts to proponent of will when there are suspicious circumstances and that
"[t]he existence of suspicious circumstances is a preliminary question for
determination by the court").  In response to daughter's motion that the
court determine whether suspicious circumstances were present in advance of
trial, the court ruled that it would determine whether suspicious circumstances
were present based on the evidence submitted to the jury and inform the jury of
its decision at the end of the evidence.  Further, at a pretrial
conference, the court stated it would also reserve the issue of which party had
the burden of proof on testamentary capacity until after the jury had heard all
the evidence.  Daughter did not object to this decision.[1]  At that time, both parties agreed
with this decision.  
¶ 7.            
Following the evidence, the trial judge ruled that suspicious
circumstances were present, and, as a result, daughter had the burden to rebut
a presumption of undue influence.  The court also ruled that daughter had
the burden to show testamentary capacity.  The jury returned a special
verdict finding testator lacked testamentary capacity and did not reach the
issue of undue influence.  Based on the verdict, the court ordered that
testator's 2004 will not be admitted to probate.  Daughter filed four
post-trial motions: a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a motion for
relief from judgment, a motion for a new trial, and a motion for mistrial.
 The court denied all of these, and this appeal followed.
¶ 8.            
On appeal, daughter makes the following five arguments: (1) the trial
court erred in applying the doctrine of suspicious circumstances because the
relationship in question was between a father and daughter; (2) the trial court
erred in failing to inform the jury from the outset that the burden of proof on
testamentary capacity was on daughter as proponent of testator's will; (3) the
decision by the trial court not to establish which of the parties had the
burden of proof denied daughter procedural due process; (4) the trial court
erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the law relating to insane
delusions, instead relying solely on an instruction concerning testamentary
capacity; and (5) the trial court erred by failing to rule in daughter's favor
on her post-trial motions.
¶ 9.            
We do not reach the first issue.  Daughter's claim of error relates
solely to the court's decision in allocating the burden of proof on undue
influence.  The jury rendered its verdict solely on testamentary
capacity.  Daughter must show that the asserted error produced prejudice
and the jury relied upon the asserted error.  See Lorrain v. Ryan,
160 Vt. 202, 209, 628 A.2d 543, 548 (1993) ("[Appellants] must show that an
error in instructing the jury produced prejudice. . . . Where there are
multiple theories that could support the jury's action, it is appellant's
responsibility to demonstrate . . . that the jury relied on the erroneous
theory.").  Here, the asserted error played no part in the jury's verdict,
so there could be no prejudice.  See Parizo v. Wilson, 101 Vt. 514,
518, 144 A. 856, 858 (1929) ("The rule is well settled that a judgment will not
be reversed for an error that, by the verdict, is rendered immaterial.").
 
¶ 10.        
We next consider daughter's two arguments about the burden of
proof.  As described above, daughter claims that the trial court erred in
failing to inform the jury from the outset that the burden of proof for
testamentary capacity was on daughter, an error that daughter argues denied her
procedural due process.  We decline to reach these issues because neither
was properly preserved in the trial court.  
¶ 11.        
The court's decision to reserve the determination of which party bore
the burden of proof on testamentary capacity was initially explained to the
parties at a pretrial conference.  The court explained as follows: "One
issue that we were going to discuss was how to address with the jury at the
beginning of the trial the fact that the burden of proof is not yet
established. . . . In many trials . . . the jurors will
know which party has something to prove . . . . But in this
case . . . they are going to hear all of the evidence first, before they find
out . . . which party has the burden of proof."  After
this explanation, the court directly asked daughter's counsel whether she had
any objection.  Daughter's counsel replied, "That would be fine with us,
Your Honor."  Thus, when the court made the decision to reserve allocation
of the burden of proof, daughter did not object to the reservation and, in
fact, agreed with it.  
¶ 12.        
Daughter also failed to properly object to the delay in deciding who
bore the burden of proof on testamentary capacity when, at the start of trial,
the court informed the jurors that they would be instructed on the burden of
proof at the close of the evidence.  Daughter's counsel expressed
confusion at that time about the burden of proof for testamentary capacity,
saying, "My understanding with respect to undue influence [is that] you were
going to reserve that issue to determine who had the burden of proof, but I
didn't understand that we might be given the burden of proving that [testator]
had testamentary capacity.  I would have believed that would always be on
the opponent to the will."  Son's attorney reminded the court that, at the
pretrial conference, the parties had confirmed there were two issues on appeal,
undue influence and testamentary capacity, and that he believed the proponent
of a will has the burden of proof to show testamentary capacity.  The
court explained to daughter's attorney that the decision to reserve the burden
of proof allocation as to both undue influence and testamentary capacity was
consistent with what was agreed to at the pretrial conference.  Daughter's
attorney made no clear objection to this decision, and simply replied, "Thank
you very much," to the court's explanation.  
¶ 13.        
Daughter's attorney eventually objected to the reservation of a
determination on the allocation of the burden of proof as to testamentary
capacity, but only when the court determined that the burden of proof of
testamentary capacity was on daughter.[2] 
This objection came after daughter's counsel agreed to the reservation decision
and after the jury instructions on the issue.  Daughter did not claim that
the reservation decision denied her due process of law.
¶ 14.        
We conclude that the late objection does not properly preserve the
reservation issue for appeal.  In addition to requiring that a party raise
objections with "specificity and clarity," In re White, 172 Vt. 335,
343, 779 A.2d 1264, 1270 (2001) (quotation omitted), we also require that an
objection be raised in a "timely manner," Burton v. Jeremiah Beach Parker
Restoration & Constr. Mgmt. Corp., 2010 VT 55, ¶ 6, ___ Vt. ___, 6 A.3d 38, and "in a manner which gives the trial court a fair opportunity to rule on
it."  White, 172 Vt. at 343, 779 A.2d  at 1270 (quotation
omitted).  Daughter's objection to the reservation of the burden of proof
was not timely and failed to give the trial court an opportunity to properly
consider the issue and to weigh her reasons for claiming that a determination
of the burden of proof should not be reserved.  See id. at 343, 779 A.2d  at 1270-71 (emphasizing purpose of preservation rule is to give original
forum opportunity to decide in first instance).  She did not claim during
the trial that she was denied due process of law.  Consequently,
daughter's argument pertaining to the burden of proof as to testamentary
capacity and her claim that she was denied procedural due process because of
the court's handling of the burden of proof decision are waived on
appeal.  Follo v. Florindo, 2009 VT 11, ¶ 14, 185 Vt. 390, 970 A.2d 1230.  
¶ 15.        
We next address daughter's claims relating to jury instructions. 
Daughter argues the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on insane delusions,
instead relying solely on an instruction concerning testamentary
capacity.  We decline to reach this argument because daughter did not
properly preserve it before the trial court.  
¶ 16.        
Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 51(b) specifically addresses the
requirement of objections to jury instructions in order to preserve claims of
error.  It states that "[n]o party may assign as error the giving or the
failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the
jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to
and the grounds of the objection."  To preserve an objection to jury
instructions, a party must additionally renew any objection made during the
charge conference after the court instructs the jury.  Venturella v.
Addison-Rutland Supervisory Union, 2010 VT 115, ¶ 5, ___ Vt. ___, 12 A.3d 558 (mem.).
¶ 17.        
In this case, daughter raised no objection at the trial court about the
court's failure to instruct the jury on insane delusions.  When the court
asked daughter's attorney if he had objections upon review of the jury charge,
he replied, "We do not have an exception to the charge."  He made no
mention that the law on insane delusions was not included in the instructions. 
In fact, the only instance where we find reference to "insane delusions" in the
jury trial transcripts is where, on the third day of trial, daughter's attorney
specifically stated, "[Son's] entire case for suspicious circumstances and
undue influence seems to simply flow from the fact that he felt that his father
might have insane delusions of some kind, a doctrine that was not pled, and
is not being argued.  I might argue that even a person with insane
delusions, as long as they have testamentary capacity, can write a will."
(Emphasis added.)  Shortly afterward, daughter's attorney continued
by saying, "The suggestion [here] is not [that testator had] insane
delusion[s].  The suggestion is lack of testamentary capacity." 
Because of her failure to raise the issue below, daughter may not raise a claim
of error as to jury instructions on appeal.  V.R.C.P. 51(b). 
¶ 18.        
Lastly, we address daughter's argument that the trial court erred in
failing to rule in her favor on a number of post-trial motions.  The
motions that daughter raises on appeal include: (1) a motion for judgment as a
matter of law; (2) a motion for relief from judgment; (3) a motion for a new
trial; and (4) a motion requesting a mistrial.  We consider each motion in
turn.
¶ 19.        
We hold the trial court properly denied daughter's post-trial motion for
judgment as a matter of law.  Daughter did not make a motion for judgment
as a matter of law before the submission of the case to the jury.[3]  See V.R.C.P. 50(a)(2) ("Motions for
judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time before submission of the
case to the jury.").  In the absence of such a motion, daughter's
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is waived, Ferrisburgh Realty
Investors v. Schumacher, 2010 VT 6, ¶ 27, 187 Vt. 309, 992 A.2d 1042, and
the trial court properly denied the post-verdict motion on this ground.  
¶ 20.        
The latter three post-verdict motions all relate to daughter's claim,
discussed above, that the trial court failed to allocate the burden of proof on
testamentary capacity prior to trial.  As we have held above, this
claimmade in different forms in daughter's various argumentswas waived. 
Daughter could not save this claim by including it in post-verdict motions.
¶ 21.        
Daughter's motion for a mistrial was also moot.  This motion was
made in response to son's motion to dismiss because daughter failed to present
the testimony of all the subscribing witnesses.  Daughter sought a
mistrial to enable her to present that testimony, arguing that the deficiency
resulted from the trial court's failure to assign the burden of proof. 
The court denied son's motion, making moot daughter's motion for a
mistrial.  There was no reason for the trial court to rule on this moot
motion.
           
Affirmed.
 
 
 
BY THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul L. Reiber, Chief
  Justice
 
 
  
 
 
John A. Dooley, Associate
  Justice
  
 
 
 
 
Denise R. Johnson, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn S. Skoglund,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Brian L. Burgess, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 

[1]  Daughter was represented at the
hearing by an associate in her counsel's law firm.  There is no indication
in the record that her representation was limited in any way.  Thus,
daughter is bound by the actions of the associate to the same extent as those
of her primary counsel.
[2]  Under an agreement of the parties, son
presented his evidence first.  Following the son's evidence, daughter made
a motion for a judgment as a matter of law on testamentary capacity.  The
court interrupted daughter's counsel to say that the decision had been made to
delay a determination of the allocation of the burden of proof on testamentary
capacity, but the court would rule that the burden was on daughter.  We
take this discussion as the point where daughter finally objected to the
reservation of the burden of proof decision.
[3]  Daughter tried to make such a motion,
but the court cut off daughter's counsel because the court ruled that the
burden of proof on testamentary capacity was on daughter.  Only son had
put on any evidence at this point.  See supra, ¶ 13 n.2. 
Thus, daughter needed to put on evidence to carry her burden. The court stated,
"I'm going to stop you at this point.  You may renew this motion
later."  Daughter's counsel asked if the court meant, "At the close of all
the evidence."  The court answered, "Right."  At that point, daughter
put on one witnessher son.  Following that testimony, the court asked,
"Are there any motions?"  Daughter did not make a motion for a judgment as
a matter of law at that time.  Viewing the record overall, we cannot
conclude that daughter made a timely motion for a judgment as a matter of law.