Case Title: In re Laura Marie Watson

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC13-1333

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2015-06-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-1333 
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INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE, NO. 12-613  
RE: LAURA MARIE WATSON. 
 
[June 18, 2015] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This matter is before the Court to review the determination of the Florida 
Judicial Qualifications Commission (“JQC”) that Laura Marie Watson has violated 
the Rules Regulating Professional Conduct and its recommendation that she be 
removed from office.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 12, Fla. Const.  Article 
V, section 12(c)(1) of the Florida Constitution provides that we “may accept, 
reject, or modify in whole or in part the findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations of the commission . . . .”  Further, section 12(c)(1) provides that 
“[m]alafides, scienter, or moral turpitude on the part of a justice or judge shall not 
be required for removal from office of a justice or judge whose conduct 
demonstrates a present unfitness to hold office.”  And, while we are mindful that 
removal is the ultimate sanction, “we will impose that sanction when we conclude 
 
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that the judge’s conduct is fundamentally inconsistent with the responsibilities of 
judicial office.”  In re Hawkins, 151 So. 3d 1200, 1202 (Fla. 2014) (citing In re 
Shea, 759 So. 2d 631, 638 (Fla. 2000)).  For the reasons we explain below, we 
conclude that the JQC’s findings and conclusions are supported by clear and 
convincing evidence and agree with the JQC’s recommendation that Judge Watson 
be removed from the bench. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
At some point prior to 2002, the law office of Laura M. Watson, P.A. d/b/a 
Watson & Lentner entered into a joint business plan with Marks & Fleischer, P.A., 
and Kane & Kane, acting through the firm principals, Gary Marks, Amir Fleischer, 
Charles Kane, Harley Kane, Darin James Lentner, and Watson (collectively, “the 
PIP attorneys”), to represent healthcare provider clients in numerous lawsuits 
involving Personal Injury Protection (“PIP”) claims against Progressive Insurance 
Company.  The firms shared expenses for marketing and the procurement of 
clients.  Each firm maintained and managed its own clients and files, but entered 
into joint representation contracts in which all of the firms agreed to represent the 
clients and assume joint responsibility for the claims.  The PIP attorneys alleged 
that Progressive had systematically underpaid health care providers in a scheme 
known as a “silent PPO.” 
 
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The PIP attorneys retained the services of Slawson Cunningham Whalen & 
Stewart, P.A., to initiate a bad-faith case against Progressive filed in the name of 
Drs. Fisher & Stashak, M.D., P.A. d/b/a Gold Coast Orthopedics and Gold Coast 
Orthopedics and Rehabilitation (“Gold Coast”).  Todd Stewart was the attorney 
working the case.  When Todd Stewart left Slawson Cunningham, and formed 
Todd S. Stewart, P.A., he elicited the help and expertise of his father, Larry 
Stewart of Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A. 
In or about February 2002, the PIP attorneys met with Larry Stewart to 
discuss the Gold Coast case and bad faith claims.  Larry Stewart eventually asked 
William C. Hearon to assist with the prosecution of the bad faith claims.  (Todd 
Stewart, William C. Hearon, and Larry Stewart are collectively referred to as the 
“bad faith attorneys.”) 
On or about April 24, 2002, the PIP attorneys and bad faith attorneys 
reached an agreement concerning how the work would be handled and the fees to 
be split.  The clients were to receive sixty percent of the recovery and the 
attorneys’ fees would amount to forty percent.  Of the attorneys’ fees, the bad faith 
attorneys were to receive sixty percent. 
Initially, the Gold Coast case encompassed approximately 40 health care 
providers, and it was contemplated that the bad faith claims would ultimately be 
asserted on behalf of all the clients of the PIP attorneys once those claims became 
 
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perfected, which was approximately 441 clients.  This list of 441 clients was used 
in settlement negotiations with Progressive.   
The bad faith attorneys participated in extensive discovery in which they 
were successful in obtaining an order compelling Progressive to produce internal 
documents.  During this time, the PIP attorneys continued to encourage the bad 
faith attorneys to pursue their claims by joining in the bad faith claims, or by 
settling the PIP claims while preserving the bad faith claims.  Due to the pressure 
placed on Progressive by the bad faith attorneys over the following two years, 
Progressive commenced settlement negotiations with both sets of attorneys.  On 
numerous occasions, the PIP attorneys referred settlement negotiations of the bad 
faith claims to the bad faith attorneys and gave full authority to the bad faith 
attorneys to negotiate a global settlement of all of the bad faith claims, including 
the ones filed through the PIP attorneys.   
On January 21, 2004, the bad faith attorneys met with Progressive and 
demanded $20 million to settle all of the bad faith claims and reported this to the 
PIP attorneys.  Progressive counter-offered with a $3.5 million settlement of all the 
bad faith claims, but the bad faith attorneys did not accept the offer and no 
settlement was reached.  The bad faith attorneys continued to pressure Progressive 
to produce more documents.   
 
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On May 14, 2004, the PIP attorneys accepted an aggregate settlement offer 
from Progressive in an undifferentiated amount of $14.5 million to settle the PIP 
claims as well as all bad faith claims, perfected or potential, without notifying the 
bad faith attorneys.  After the settlement was accepted, Progressive and the PIP 
attorneys drafted a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”), which made clear 
that the settlement applied to all PIP claims and bad faith claims irrespective of 
whether they were perfected.   
The MOU did not allocate any recovery to the bad faith claims, but required 
the release of those claims.  After learning of the MOU, the bad faith attorneys 
objected.  The PIP attorneys amended the MOU to award $1.75 million to the bad 
faith claims. 
The PIP attorneys then notified their clients, via letter, of the settlement but 
did not disclose the conflicts of interests, provide closing statements, or advise the 
clients of the material facts necessary to make an informed decision about their 
cases or execution of the releases. 
On or about June 22, 2004, the PIP attorneys received funds from 
Progressive, which were placed in the attorneys’ respective trust fund accounts.  
Watson’s firm received $3,075,000, from which $361,470.30 was paid to clients.  
The clients still did not receive closing statements. 
 
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The bad faith attorneys notified the PIP attorneys that, in accordance with 
The Florida Bar rules governing claims of disputed property, all of the attorneys’ 
fees should be held in a separate escrow account.  The PIP attorneys did not hold 
the funds.   
The bad faith attorneys subsequently sued the PIP attorneys for fraudulent 
inducement and in quantum meruit for the work they performed.  During the bench 
trial, Judge David Crow carefully reviewed all of the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the joint business plan between the PIP attorneys and the bad faith 
attorneys.   
In April 2008, the trial court found that the actions taken by the PIP 
attorneys, including the settlement of the bad faith claims without notifying the bad 
faith attorneys or notifying the clients with bad faith claims that their claims would 
be released and they would be receiving little to no compensation for those claims, 
violated several rules of professional conduct.  The trial court also found that the 
PIP attorneys exaggerated the number of hours they spent working on these PIP 
and bad faith claims.  Ultimately, the trial court awarded the bad faith attorneys 
additional attorneys’ fees due to an unjust enrichment the PIP attorneys received 
and for the cost of the work performed by the bad faith attorneys during the two-
year span.  Additionally, Judge Crow sent a copy of his order to The Florida Bar. 
 
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The Florida Bar began grievance proceedings against the PIP attorneys.  In 
her response, Watson requested that the prosecution be deferred until after she 
finished appealing Judge Crow’s April 2008 final judgment.  The Fourth District 
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment on February 29, 2012, see 
Kane v. Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A., 85 So. 3d 1112, 1113 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2012), and the Bar proceeded with its investigation.     
In June 2012, Watson was advised that her case was being referred to a 
grievance committee for probable cause review, and then in October 2012, she was 
advised that the grievance committee had found probable cause.  In November 
2012, Watson was elected to the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit; she assumed office 
in January 2013.  Accordingly, The Florida Bar forwarded its file to the JQC; 
additionally, Larry Stewart filed a formal complaint.  
On July 24, 2013, the JQC filed a Notice of Formal Charges against Judge 
Laura Marie Watson alleging that she violated Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct and violated Florida Rules of Professional Conduct 3-4.2, 3-4.3, 
4-1.4(a), 4-1.4(b), 4-1.5(f)(1), 4-1.5(f)(5), 4-1.7(a), 4-1.7(b), 4-1.7(c), 4-1.8(g), 4-
8.4(a), 4-8.4(c), and 5-1.1(f).   
At the conclusion of its proceedings, the JQC determined that: 
 
Watson and the others hired Larry Stewart, who warned them in 
advance that the PIP claims and bad faith claims were adverse, 
requiring careful handling throughout settlement negotiations, with 
full client transparency.  When Progressive dangled a pot of money, 
 
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ethical restraints were swept aside.  Watson and the PIP lawyers (at 
Progressive’s insistence) excluded the only attorney sufficiently 
experienced and knowledgeable to see them through settlement 
negotiations, and reached a quick (and ethically flawed) settlement 
agreement. 
“Watson never told her PIP clients that Progressive paid funds to settle the bad 
faith claims, and they weren’t allowed to participate in that recovery, despite the 
fact they were required to release these claims.”  The JQC concluded that Watson 
unilaterally decided that those clients had no interest in the bad faith case and that 
they had no duty to pay or include unknown people who may or may not someday 
have a claim.  Additionally, the JQC concluded that Watson “entered into an 
undisclosed side deal with Gold Coast, contrary to the interests of the other bad 
faith claimants,” and further concluded that Watson failed to disclose material 
information to her clients, including the conflicts of interest and the methodology 
of allocating funds between the PIP and bad faith claims that substantially 
decreased the funds available for distribution to the clients.  Under this 
methodology, the PIP attorneys took $10,960,000 in fees in addition to their 
portion of the Gold Coast attorneys’ fees. 
 
Based on these facts, the JQC concluded that 
 
attorney Watson violated R. Reg. Fla. Bar 3-4.2 (violating Rules of 
Professional Conduct); 3-4.3 (commission of acts contrary to honesty 
or justice); 4-1.4(a) (failing to keep clients informed about the status 
of a matter); 4-1.4(b) (failing to explain matter to the extent 
reasonably necessary to permit clients to make informed decision 
regarding the representation); 4-1.5(f)(1) (failing to provide written 
 
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statement to bad faith clients stating the outcome of the matter, the 
remittance to the client, and the method of its determination); 4-
1.5(f)(5) (failing to provide closing statements to bad faith clients 
reflecting an itemization of costs and expenses, together with the 
amount of fees received by participating lawyers or firms); 4-1.7(a) 
(representing clients with directly adverse interests); 4-1.7(b) 
(representing clients where representation was materially limited by 
lawyers’ responsibilities to other clients, third persons, and the 
lawyers’ own interests); 4-1.8(g) (making an aggregate settlement of 
the claims of two or more clients without requisite disclosure or 
consent); 4-8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct by 
herself, and through the acts of others); 4-8.4(c) (engaging in conduct 
involving deceit); and 5-1.1(f) (failing to treat disputed funds as trust 
property). 
Additionally, the JQC concluded that “[t]here was no clear and convincing 
evidence presented, and Judge Watson is not guilty of violating Rule 4-1.7(c) . . . .”   
 
Based on these findings and conclusions, the JQC determined that Judge 
Watson “sold out her clients, her co-counsel, and ultimately herself.  This conduct 
is ‘fundamentally inconsistent with the responsibilities of judicial office,’ and 
mandates removal.”   
ANALYSIS 
In judicial disciplinary proceedings, this Court reviews the findings of the 
JQC to determine if they are supported by clear and convincing evidence, and 
reviews the recommendation of discipline to determine whether it should be 
approved.  In re Andrews, 875 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 2004).  Clear and convincing 
evidence is “ ‘a standard which requires more proof than a “preponderance of the 
evidence” but less than “beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.” ’ ”  In 
 
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re Henson, 913 So. 2d 579, 589 (Fla. 2005) (quoting In re Graziano, 696 So. 2d 
744, 753 (Fla. 1997)).  In In re Davey, 645 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1994), this Court 
fleshed out its standard of review in JQC inquiries: 
This intermediate level of proof entails both a qualitative and 
quantitative standard.  The evidence must be credible; the memories 
of the witnesses must be clear and without confusion; and the sum 
total of the evidence must be of sufficient weight to convince the trier 
of fact without hesitancy.   
[C]lear and convincing evidence requires that the 
evidence must be found to be credible; the facts to which 
the witnesses testify must be distinctly remembered; the 
testimony must be precise and explicit and the witnesses 
must be lacking in confusion as to the facts in issue.  The 
evidence must be of such weight that it produces in the 
mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction, 
without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations sought 
to be established.   
Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).   
 
Id. at 404; see also In re Holloway, 832 So. 2d 716, 726 (Fla. 2002). 
Additionally, this Court has noted that any conflicts in the evidence should 
be resolved in favor of the JQC’s findings.  In re Henson, 913 So. 2d 579, 591-92 
(Fla. 2005) (“Resolving conflicts in the evidence in favor of the Hearing Panel’s 
findings, we conclude that the accusation . . . is supported by clear and convincing 
evidence.”).  According to article V, section 12(c)(1) of the Florida Constitution, 
this Court has discretion to either accept, reject, or modify the commission’s 
findings and recommendation of discipline.  Although this Court gives the JQC’s 
findings and recommendations great weight, the ultimate power and responsibility 
 
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in making a determination to discipline a judge rests with this Court.  In re Angel, 
867 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 2004).   
 
We have emphasized that the object of these “proceedings is not for the 
purpose of inflicting punishment, but rather to gauge a judge’s fitness to serve as 
an impartial judicial officer.”  In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560, 571 (Fla. 2001).  
“In making this determination, judges should be held to higher ethical standards 
than lawyers ‘by virtue of their position in the judiciary and the impact of their 
conduct on public confidence in an impartial justice system.’ ”  In re Hawkins, 151 
So. 3d at 1212 (citing In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d at 571). 
 
Additionally, at the outset, we note that despite Judge Watson’s protestations 
to the contrary, the JQC and this Court have jurisdiction over her conduct.  See In 
re Henson, 913 So. 2d at 588 (“Misconduct committed by an attorney who 
subsequently becomes a judge falls within the subject-matter jurisdiction of this 
Court and the JQC, no matter how remote. . . .  JQC proceedings are 
constitutionally authorized for alleged misconduct by a judge during the time he or 
she was a lawyer.”); see also In re Davey, 645 So. 2d at 403 (“[T]he Commission 
has constitutional authority to investigate pre-judicial acts and recommend to this 
Court the removal (for unfitness) or reprimand (for misconduct) of a sitting 
judge.”). 
 
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We have reviewed the entire record of this proceeding and conclude that 
clear and convincing evidence supports the JQC’s factual findings and conclusions 
that Judge Watson violated Florida Rules of Professional Conduct 3-4.2, 3-4.3, 4-
1.4(a), 4-1.4(b), 4-1.5(f)(1), 4-1.5(f)(5), 4-1.7(a), 4-1.7(b), 4-1.8(g), 4-8.4(a), 4-
8.4(c), and 5-1.1(f).   The JQC heard testimony from Larry Stewart and Laura 
Watson; and as character witnesses, Thomas Lynch, IV, Terrence O’Connor, and 
Lawrence Kopelman.  Larry Stewart, in particular, testified at length regarding the 
details of the agreement between the PIP attorneys and the bad faith attorneys.  
Larry Stewart stated that he could only say that Watson was present for each of the 
meetings he held with the PIP attorneys; he could not testify as to exactly what she 
said.  Nevertheless, Larry Stewart testified that Watson never objected or corrected 
any of the agreements or understandings reached at those meetings.  Stewart’s 
interpretation of the meetings is bolstered in particular by one e-mail from Watson 
wherein she congratulated Stewart on getting the favorable discovery ruling and 
stated, “We need to keep our foot on their throat and not let them lose [sic].”   
Watson’s argument that she was not involved in making the agreement with 
Stewart’s firm, and in fact had no knowledge of any agreement with Larry Stewart 
to pursue bad faith claims on behalf of any of her clients, including Gold Coast, or 
that she was not aware that he was in settlement negotiations with Progressive is 
not a reasonable inference from this record.  Accordingly, Watson’s arguments 
 
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were justifiably disregarded by the JQC.  Watson’s primary contention that the PIP 
attorneys never contracted with Larry Stewart’s firm is belied by her e-mail 
correspondence with him and her admission that he won favorable rulings in the 
Gold Coast case.    
As it relates to them, the clients were provided with a form release letter to 
sign that only disclosed the amount they would receive.  The settlement was 
structured so that the clients would receive the PIP payment they were due from 
Progressive, and little or nothing towards the bad faith recovery.  In exchange the 
bad faith claims were released.  The clients were never informed of the entire 
amount of the offers of settlement received from Progressive, or even that there 
had been multiple offers.  The clients were also not informed of the amount of the 
settlement that would be retained by the attorneys.  In response to this allegation, 
Watson only offers that she complied with the contracts she had with her clients, 
which only provided for the PIP claim recovery.  Additionally, the clients were 
never fully informed that the bad faith claims were not compatible with the PIP 
recovery claims.  It is undisputed that Watson failed to provide closing statements 
to any of the clients.  In fact, Watson stated that it is common practice for these 
types of cases not to have closing statements.  Furthermore, it is undisputed that no 
client was aware of the aggregate settlement.  Likewise, Watson did not obtain 
written consent for aggregate settlement.   
 
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Finally, after the bad faith attorneys disputed the settlement agreement, the 
PIP attorneys placed $710,000 in escrow in connection with the settlement of the 
Gold Coast case.  The escrow account was created for the purpose of setting aside 
the forty percent attorneys’ fees in that case.  On or about May 31, 2006, Watson 
transferred $515,000 to the law firm of Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A., 
leaving the remainder in dispute.  Watson therefore agreed to disburse the balance 
subject to court control.  On June 1, 2006, Judge Crow ordered that no further 
distributions from the account be made without further order of his court.  On June 
5, 2006, the bad faith attorneys executed a settlement agreement with all the PIP 
attorney firms except Watson & Lentner.  Because the dispute between Watson 
and Stewart was not resolved until either Judge Crow entered his order in April 
2008, or the appeal from his order become final in 2012, the JQC’s finding is 
supported by clear and convincing evidence.   
CONCLUSION 
As stated by Judge David Crow of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for 
Palm Beach County, the complex facts of the underlying case “could be a case 
study for a course on professional conduct involving multi-party joint 
representation agreements. . . .”  We have previously found that a pattern of deceit 
and deception “casts serious doubt on [a judge’s] ability to be perceived as truthful 
by those who may appear before her in her courtroom.”  In re Ford-Kaus, 730 So. 
 
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2d 269, 277 (Fla. 1999).  Further, “[s]uch conduct diminishes the public’s 
confidence in the integrity of the judicial system.”  Id. at 277.  Under these 
circumstances, “removal from judicial office is the appropriate sanction,” because 
Judge Watson’s “conduct is fundamentally inconsistent with the responsibilities of 
judicial office.”  Id. at 276.  Additionally, this Court has previously removed a 
judge from office for conduct that occurred, in part, while she was still a practicing 
attorney.  See In re Hapner, 718 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1998).  
Based on the foregoing, we find that Judge Watson’s actions while a 
practicing attorney, and her demeanor during these proceedings “cast[ ] serious 
doubts” on her “ability to be perceived as truthful by those who may appear before 
her in her courtroom.”  Accordingly, we find that removal is the appropriate 
sanction.  
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur.  
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.  
 
Original Proceeding – Judicial Qualifications Commission  
 
Ricardo Morales, III, Chair, and Michael Louis Schneider, General Counsel, 
Tallahassee, Florida; Judge Kerry I. Evander, Hearing Panel Chair, Daytona 
Beach, Florida; Lauri Waldman Ross of Ross & Girten, Hearing Panel Counsel, 
Miami, Florida; Marvin E. Barkin and Lansing Charles Scriven of Trenam, 
Kemker, Scharf, Barkin, Frye, O’Neil & Mullis, P.A., Special Counsel, Tampa, 
Florida, 
 
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for Judicial Qualifications Commission, Petitioner 
 
Robert A. Sweetapple and Alexander Demetrios Varkas, Jr., of Sweetapple, 
Broeker & Varkas, PL, Boca Raton, Florida; and Colleen Kathryn O’Loughlin of 
Colleen Kathryn O’Loughlin, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida,   
 
for Judge Laura Marie Watson, Respondent