Case Title: Sheet Metal Workers' Internatl. Assn., Local Union No. 33 v. Mohawk Mechanical, Inc.

Citation: 1999-Ohio-209

Docket Number: 19980403

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-09-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Sheet Metal Workers’ Internatl. Assn., Local Union No. 33 v. Mohawk Mechanical, Inc., 86 Ohio St.3d 
611, 1999-Ohio-209.] 
 
 
 
SHEET METAL WORKERS’ INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, LOCAL UNION NO. 33, 
APPELLANT, v. MOHAWK MECHANICAL, INC., APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Sheet Metal Workers’ Internatl. Assn., Local Union No. 33 v. Mohawk 
Mechanical, Inc. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 611.] 
Employer and employee — Wages and hours on public works — Alleged violations 
of prevailing wage law — Union meets requirements of an “interested 
party” under R.C. 4115.03(F) and is authorized to file complaints pursuant 
to R.C. 4115.16, when. 
(No. 98-403 — Submitted January 27, 1999 — Decided September 29, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Knox County, No. 97CA13. 
 
This case arises from a civil action brought by appellant, Sheet Metal 
Workers’ Union International Association, Local Union No. 33 (“Local 33”), 
against appellee, Mohawk Mechanical, Inc. (“Mohawk”), for Mohawk’s alleged 
violations of Ohio’s prevailing wage law for work it did on the Knox County 
Career Center project (“career center”). 
 
Mohawk was a subcontractor on the project, contracting with the general 
contractor, American Standard, Inc. (“Standard”), to install some of the necessary 
heating and cooling equipment at the career center.  The contract price was 
$123,805.  The career center project was exempt from the competitive bidding 
requirements normally associated with public works because it fell under R.C. 
3313.372, which exempts certain improvements to public schools. 
 
Mohawk performed various installation and replacement tasks on the project 
between June 1995 and November 1995.  Mohawk did not pay prevailing wage 
rates to its employees who worked on the career center and did not attempt to 
comply with other requirements of Ohio’s prevailing wage laws.  Mohawk 
maintains that the prevailing wage laws did not apply to the career center project. 
2 
 
Local 33 is a labor organization that represents various members involved in 
the building trades in Knox County.  While Mohawk was engaged in the career 
center project, Local 33 was involved in a labor organization and representation 
drive with Mohawk’s employees.  Through its involvement with Mohawk’s 
employees, Local 33 reviewed the employees’ pay stubs      and learned that 
Mohawk was not paying its employees prevailing wages.  Local 33 asserts that 
some Mohawk employees, fearful of retaliation by their employer if they sought to 
enforce their prevailing wage rights, requested that Local 33 do so on their behalf. 
 
On September 18, 1995, Local 33 filed a prevailing wage complaint before 
the appropriate administrative bureau (such complaints were under the jurisdiction 
of the Department of Industrial Relations at the time of the filing, but during its 
pendency became the responsibility of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services 
[“OBES”]), asserting that Mohawk failed to pay its employees prevailing wages on 
the career center project.  By November 6, 1995, three Mohawk employees, Harry 
Matheny, John Vesper, and Michael Howell, had signed authorization forms that 
expressly granted authority to Local 33 to pursue the complaint on their behalf.  
Over the course of the next year, three other men who had worked for Mohawk on 
the project signed authorization forms. 
 
The OBES administrator did not rule on the prevailing wage complaint 
within sixty days.  Pursuant to R.C. 4115.16(B), Local 33 then proceeded to file a 
complaint against Mohawk in the Knox County Court of Common Pleas.  Both 
parties filed motions for summary judgment.  The court granted Mohawk’s motion, 
finding that Local 33 did not have standing to bring its action because it did not 
meet the R.C. 4115.03(F)(3) definition of an “interested party.”  Local 33 
appealed. 
 
The court of appeals affirmed.  The court found that Local 33 could not gain 
standing under R.C. 4115.03(F), since the statute confers standing only where the 
3 
project in question was competitively bid.  Further, the court held that the statute 
requires a labor organization to be a party to a collective bargaining agreement 
with the employer at issue before it may be authorized to represent that employer’s 
employees on a prevailing wage claim.  The court reasoned that, since Local 33 
was not a party to a collective bargaining agreement with Mohawk, it lacked the 
authority to represent Mohawk’s employees. 
 
The cause is before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Allotta & Farley Co., L.P.A., Joseph J. Allotta, Richard P. James and 
Marilyn L. Widman, for appellant. 
 
Weldon, Huston & Keyser and David D. Carto, for appellee. 
 
Ross, Brittain & Schonberg Co., L.P.A., Alan G. Ross and Brian A. Paton, 
urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio ABC, Inc. 
 
Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff L.L.P., N. Victor Goodman and 
Mark D. Tucker, urging reversal for amicus curiae, the Ohio State Building & 
Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO. 
 
Stewart Jaffy & Associates, Stewart Jaffy and Marc J. Jaffy, urging reversal 
for amicus curiae, Ohio AFL-CIO. 
 
Bricker & Eckler L.L.P. and Luther L. Liggett, Jr., urging reversal for 
amicus curiae, Ohio Mechanical Contracting Industry, Inc. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J.  We find that Local 33 meets the requirements of an interested 
party under R.C. 4115.03(F)(3) and thus had standing to represent the Mohawk 
employees in a prevailing wage action.  We reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
 
R.C. 4115.16(A) allows “an interested party” to file a prevailing wage 
complaint with the Bureau of Employment Services.  R.C. 4115.16(B) provides 
4 
that if the bureau administrator does not rule on the merits in sixty days, “the 
interested party may file a complaint in the court of common pleas of the county in 
which the violation is alleged to have occurred.”  R.C. 4115.03(F) defines an 
“interested party”: 
 
“ ‘Interested party,’ with respect to a particular public improvement, means: 
(1) Any person who submits a bid for the purpose of securing the award of a 
contract for construction of the public improvement; (2) Any person acting as a 
subcontractor of a person mentioned in division (F)(1) of this section; (3) Any 
bona fide organization of labor which has as members or is authorized to represent 
employees of a person mentioned in division (F)(1) or (2) of this section and which 
exists, in whole or in part, for the purpose of negotiating with employers 
concerning the wages, hours, or terms and conditions of employment of 
employees; (4) Any association having as members any of the persons mentioned 
in division (F)(1) or (2) of this section.” 
 
This case turns on whether Local 33 meets the requirements of R.C. 
4115.03(F)(3), and, specifically, whether Local 33 was “authorized to represent 
employees of a person mentioned in division (F)(1) or (2) of this section * * *.”  
The first step is to determine whether the Mohawk employees worked for “a 
person mentioned in division (F)(1) or (2) of this section.” 
 
Standard meets the requirements of division (F)(1).  The appellate court 
seemed to indicate that no one on the career center project could meet the 
description of division (F)(1), since the project was not competitively bid.  
However, R.C. 4115.03(F)(1) does not require the contractor at issue to have been 
involved in a competitive bid process, but only to have submitted a bid on the 
project.  There is no dispute that Standard did submit a bid for the work it 
performed at the career center.  The contract was not awarded without 
consideration of cost. 
5 
 
R.C. 4115.10(B) undercuts any argument that prevailing wage claims can be 
brought only in competitive bid situations.  Under the statute, “[a]ny employee 
upon any public improvement who is paid less than the prevailing rate of wages 
applicable thereto may file a complaint * * *.”  R.C. 4115.10 makes it clear that 
the prevailing wage law applies to any public improvement not specifically 
excepted from the coverage of the law.  R.C. 3313.372, while exempting Standard 
and Mohawk from the competitive bid process, does not specifically exempt them 
from the prevailing wage law. 
 
Since a competitive bid situation is not an element of R.C. 4115.03(F)(1), 
Standard meets the requirements of a “person” under division (F)(1).  It follows 
that Mohawk, as a subcontractor of “a person mentioned in division (F)(1),” meets 
the requirements of division (F)(2). 
 
The key question is whether Local 33 was “authorized to represent 
employees of a person mentioned in division * * * (2) of this section.”  While the 
statute requires that the labor organization “exists, in whole or in part, for the 
purpose of negotiating with employers concerning the wages, hours, or terms and 
conditions of employment of employees,” it does not require that it perform that 
function for the employees at issue. 
 
The court of appeals erred in interpreting the statute as stating that “[t]he 
term ‘authorized’ refers to a bona fide organization being permitted to represent 
employees * * * for the purpose of negotiating with the employer concerning 
wages, hours or terms and conditions of employment.”  The court concluded that, 
since Local 33 did not have a collective bargaining agreement with Mohawk, it 
could not represent those employees in a prevailing wage action. 
 
There is not even a hint of a requirement in the statute that the labor 
organization be a party to a collective bargaining agreement with the employer in 
question.  The statute states that the labor organization must exist, in whole or in 
6 
part, for the purpose of negotiating with employers, not “the employer in question.”  
The statute speaks in a general sense, ensuring that the labor organization in its 
normal course concerns itself with the stuff of the prevailing wage statute. 
Bargaining about wages and hours just has to be something that the labor 
organization normally does.  This provision ensures that employees will have their 
rights defended by an organization with some expertise.  Mohawk makes no claim 
that Local 33 does not regularly involve itself in collective bargaining negotiations 
for its members. 
 
The statute does not require that a majority of employees authorize the 
representation.  Employees of Mohawk took affirmative acts to authorize Local 33 
to file a complaint on their behalf.  Local 33 claims that the union received oral 
authorization from Mohawk employees to represent them in the prevailing wage 
complaint.  While verbal authorization may be enough under the terms of the 
statute to allow a union to file a complaint, the record is devoid of any evidence of 
such authorization.  However, within sixty days of the filing of the complaint, three 
Mohawk employees had given written authorization to Local 33 to represent them 
in the prevailing wage action.  That action cured any jurisdictional defect that may 
have been present. 
 
Therefore, we find that Local 33 met the requirements of an “interested 
party” under R.C. 4115.03(F), which authorized it to file complaints pursuant to 
R.C. 4115.16. 
 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals on this 
question and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
7 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting.  R.C. 4115.16(A) provides that an “interested party” 
may file a complaint with the Administrator of the Bureau of Employment Services, 
alleging violations of the prevailing wage laws set forth in R.C. Chapter 4115.  The 
statute thereby grants “interested parties” standing to initiate prevailing wage 
investigations. 
 
The union contends that it falls within the definition of “interested party” 
provided by subsection (F)(2) of R.C. 4115.03.  It claims that it was the authorized 
representative of employees of a subcontractor (Mohawk) of a person “mentioned in 
division (F)(1)” (Standard), who had “submit[ted] a bid for the purpose of securing 
the award of a contract for construction of [a] public improvement,” that being the 
heating and cooling upgrade of the Knox County Career Center. 
 
The sole issue before us is whether the union had standing to file a prevailing 
wage complaint on behalf of employees of Mohawk.  We need not, and should not, 
address Mohawk’s proposition of law on the broad terms presented by it.  Instead, 
this case should be narrowly resolved solely based on statutory interpretation of the 
language the General Assembly chose to use in R.C. 4115.03. 
 
Had the General Assembly chosen to limit subsection (F)(1) “interested party” 
status to persons who had submitted competitive bids, it could have expressly so 
provided.  It did not.  I agree with the majority to the extent that it recognizes that 
“interested part[ies],” as defined in R.C. 4115.03(F)(1), may include persons who 
have submitted bids in the form of requests for proposals as well as persons who 
have submitted formal competitive bids.  I concur in the opinion of the majority 
insofar as it recognizes Standard to be a legal person who had submitted “a bid for 
the purpose of securing the award of a [public improvement] contract,” thereby 
qualifying as an interested party under subsection (F)(1) of R.C. 4115.03.  Similarly, 
Mohawk qualifies as an interested party pursuant to subsection (F)(2), in that it was a 
8 
“subcontractor of a person mentioned in division (F)(1) of this section,” i.e., 
Standard. 
 
It must therefore be determined whether the union fits within the definitional 
language of subsection (F)(3).  The union asserts that it meets all three criteria set 
forth therein:  (1) it is a bona fide organization of labor; (2) it was authorized to 
represent employees of a person mentioned in subsection (F)(1) or (2) of the statute, 
i.e., Mohawk; and (3) it exists, in whole or in part, for the purpose of negotiating with 
employers concerning the wages, hours, or terms and conditions of employment of 
employees. 
 
Like the majority, I also reject Mohawk’s argument that Local 33 does not fall 
within subsection (F)(3) of the R.C. 4115.03, in that the union had not negotiated 
with either Standard or Mohawk on behalf of its members.  Local 33 did exist, “in 
whole or in part, for the purpose of negotiating with employers concerning the 
wages, hours, or terms and conditions of employment of employees.”  I do not read 
the statute to impose a requirement that the union must exist, at least in part, for the 
purpose of negotiating with any particular employer.  It suffices that the union exists 
for the purpose of negotiating wages, hours, or terms and conditions of employment 
with employers generally. 
 
I dissent to the judgment of the majority because I believe the record before us 
fails to demonstrate that the union met the second branch of the three-prong test 
prescribed by subsection (F)(3).  The record fails to prove that the union was 
“authorized to represent” Mohawk employees at the time the union filed its 
administrative complaint. 
 
On September 18, 1995, Local 33 filed an administrative complaint alleging 
that Mohawk had violated the prevailing wage law.  Local 33 acknowledges that it 
had no members who were Mohawk employees on that date or at any other time.  It 
contends, however, that it had obtained signed authorization forms from six Mohawk 
9 
employees.  The forms stated that the signatories “authorize[d]  * * * Local 33, its 
agents and representatives to represent me in all manners [sic] pertaining to my 
claims regarding prevailing wage payments, pursuant to any Federal or State law.”  
All of the forms were signed on or after October 10, 1995, subsequent to filing of the 
administrative complaint with the Department of Industrial Relations. 
 
In my view, the execution of authorization forms may be used to authorize a 
union to stand in the place of non-member employees in regard to alleged prevailing 
wage claims. Execution of authorization forms such as those used in this case is 
analogous to the creation of an attorney-in-fact relationship, and sufficient to satisfy 
subsection (F)(3), if the forms are executed before the union takes any action on 
behalf of the employees.  That would seem to be a basic principle that applies in a 
myriad of circumstances. 
 
In the case at bar, the union did not hold “interested party” status at the time 
the administrative complaint was filed.  In order to demonstrate its standing as an 
interested party pursuant to R.C. 4115.03(F)(3) based on the execution of 
authorization forms by non-union members, a labor organization should be required 
to demonstrate that the persons it claims to represent are, in fact, employees of the 
company accused of violating prevailing wage laws.  As the record failed to establish 
that the authorization forms in favor of Local 33 were signed by persons employed 
by Mohawk at the Knox County Career Center project and that those forms had been 
executed prior to the filing of the administrative complaint, the trial court correctly 
ruled that the union had failed to establish standing to file prevailing wage claims on 
behalf of non-union member employees of Mohawk. 
 
The majority holds that the execution by Mohawk employees of written 
authorization forms after the filing of the administrative complaint cured the 
deficiency.  I do not agree.  There is no evidence that the union advised the 
Department of Industrial Relations of the subsequent signing of these forms, and the 
10 
department’s failure to act on the complaint may well have been based on an 
administrative determination that the complainant had not demonstrated standing.  I 
note that the printed complaint form provided by the Department of Industrial 
Relations, and used by the union in this case, states, “To allege Interested Party status 
you MUST attach with the complaint sufficient evidence that you [comply with R.C. 
4115.03(F)].” 
 
R.C. 4115.16(B) contemplates a determination of the merits of a prevailing 
wage claim by a common pleas court only where the appropriate administrative 
agency has not ruled on the complaint within sixty days after its filing.  I therefore 
cannot join in the majority’s conclusion that the deficiency in the legal status of the 
union, which existed at the time of filing of the administrative complaint, was cured 
by the subsequent execution of authorization forms, especially where there is no 
reason to believe that their execution, and consequent establishment of standing, was 
brought to the attention of the administrative agency.  The record does not support 
the conclusion that Local 33 either amended its administrative complaint or filed a 
new complaint after having obtained the requisite interested party status. 
 
There is no statutory provision allowing a complainant to retroactively obtain 
the necessary interested party status so as to validate a prematurely filed complaint by 
a complainant who lacked standing.  Rather, R.C. 4115.03(F)(3) uses the present 
tense in defining an “interested party” as a labor organization that “is authorized to 
represent” affected employees. 
 
The majority gives new meaning to the legal status of an interested party and 
to the words “is authorized.” I trust we would not so easily change the meaning of 
“authorized” if a lawyer who has a right as a member of the Ohio bar to represent a 
person in a court does so with no authorization by the person to act as the person’s 
lawyer. 
11 
 
I would hold that, because Local 33 was not authorized to act for Mohawk 
employees on the date it filed the prevailing wage complaint, Local 33 lacked 
standing when it filed the complaint and that the complaint thereby was legally 
deficient.  Accordingly, I would hold that the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction 
to consider the merits of the prevailing wage claims. 
 
I therefore respectfully dissent to the judgment of the majority. 
 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting 
opinion.