Case Title: In re Marriage of Davis

Citation: 

Docket Number: S215050

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2015-07-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed 7/20/15 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
 
) 
In re Marriage of SHERYL JONES  
) 
DAVIS and KEITH XAVIER DAVIS. 
) 
____________________________________) 
 
) 
SHERYL JONES DAVIS, 
) 
 
 
) 
S215050 
 
Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/1 A136858 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Alameda County 
KEITH XAVIER DAVIS, 
) 
Super. Ct. No. RF08428441 
 
) 
 
Appellant. 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
In a marital dissolution proceeding, a court determines the division of 
property between the spouses by first characterizing the parties‘ property as 
community property or separate property.  (In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 
Cal.4th 1396, 1399.)  Family Code section 760 provides that all property acquired 
by the spouses during the marriage is community property ―[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided by statute.‖  One such statute is Family Code section 771, subdivision (a) 
(section 771(a)), which provides that ―[t]he earnings and accumulations of a 
spouse . . . , while living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate 
property of the spouse.‖  In this case we consider whether a couple may be ―living 
separate and apart,‖ for purposes of section 771(a), when they live together in the 
same home.  We conclude the answer is no.  The statute requires the spouses to be 
2 
living in separate residences in order for their earnings and accumulations to be 
their separate property.  Because the Court of Appeal concluded otherwise, we 
reverse its judgment. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Keith Xavier Davis (husband) and Sheryl Jones Davis (wife) were married 
on June 12, 1993.  They have two children, a daughter born in August 1995 and a 
son born in November 1999.  Wife filed for dissolution on December 30, 2008.   
 
At trial on the issue of the date of their separation, wife described the 
couple‘s marriage as turbulent.  She testified that they stopped being sexually 
intimate after their son was conceived in 1999.  They never went on a ―date‖ after 
their son was born.  The parties disagreed as to when they stopped sharing a 
bedroom in their marital home.  Husband testified wife moved to another bedroom 
in 2001; wife testified this happened in 2004.  Their trial testimony indicates that 
they both attended the children‘s activities, but traveled to the locations by 
separate cars.  Wife did her own and the children‘s laundry.  Husband did his 
laundry.  Both parties prepared meals, but wife would not prepare something 
different for husband if he was dissatisfied with the meal she made for herself and 
the children.  The parties took some family vacations together, but also took 
separate vacations.  In deposition testimony, wife claimed that by 2004 they were 
―living entirely separate lives.‖  They spoke about divorce, but stayed together for 
the sake of the children.   
 
The parties maintained a joint bank account from the beginning of their 
marriage, which wife managed.  In 2001, however, husband started his own 
business and at some point opened a separate bank account.  In 2003, wife 
reactivated a separate bank account of her own to manage her business funds and 
pay for her personal expenses.  Husband contributed $3,200 a month to the 
parties‘ joint account from his separate account for the payment of household 
3 
expenses.  But both parties were unhappy with each other‘s contributions to the 
joint account.  In January 2006, husband became employed by Clorox, 
substantially increasing his earnings.  Wife was frustrated when he did not 
increase his financial support to the household.   
 
On June 1, 2006, after the end of their son‘s school year, wife announced to 
husband that she was ―through‖ with the marriage.  According to her, the ―last 
component‖ of their marriage was their finances.  On June 1, 2006, wife presented 
husband with a financial ledger that itemized their joint household expenses and 
their individual expenses.  She did this because she wanted the parties to 
contribute equally to running the home and funding the children‘s expenses, while 
being solely responsible for their own respective personal expenses.  Wife 
removed husband from her American Express credit account and returned several 
of husband‘s credit cards to him.  She believed at this point that they were acting 
simply as roommates.  In July 2006, wife began working full-time, substantially 
increasing her earnings.  Husband left his job with Clorox in September 2006.   
 
The parties continued to live in the marital home after June 1, 2006.  Wife 
continued to keep her personal belongings there.  She continued to receive mail 
and telephone calls there.  She continued to cook meals at the home when she was 
in town, although she often traveled for her work.  She did not change the address 
on her driver‘s license.  In August 2006, the parties took a family vacation to 
Hawaii with their children.  However, they subsequently took no out-of-state 
vacations with one another.  They continued to celebrate special occasions, such as 
birthdays and holidays, together as a family as they had previously done.  They 
both continued to use their joint bank account.   
 
When wife filed the petition for dissolution of the marriage on 
December 30, 2008, she listed the date of their separation as June 1, 2006.  In his 
initial response to wife‘s petition, husband listed the date of separation as 
4 
January 2, 2009 (a few days after wife‘s filing of the petition).  Wife did not move 
out of the marital home until July 2011.  Husband subsequently filed an amended 
response listing the date of separation as July 1, 2011.   
 
After trial of the issue, the court found the date of separation to be June 1, 
2006.  The Court of Appeal affirmed.  In relevant part, it disagreed with the 
majority decision in In re Marriage of Norviel (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1152 
(Norviel), which held that physically living apart is ―an indispensable threshold 
requirement‖ for separation under section 771(a).  (Norviel, supra, at p. 1162.)  
We granted review to resolve the apparent conflict in interpretation of the statute.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Contentions of the parties and standard of review 
 
Husband contends that spouses cannot be ―living separate and apart‖ for 
purposes of section 771(a) when they continue to share a residence.  He urges such 
a bright-line rule in order to provide clear guidance to judges and a measure of 
predictability to attorneys and litigants.  Wife contends that no particular fact, 
including place of residence, is determinative.  Instead, wife argues that a court 
should consider the totality of the circumstances and decide the date of separation 
based on conduct by either or both of the spouses evidencing a complete and final 
intent to part ways with no plan of resuming the marital relationship, even if at that 
time they are still living in the same residence.  According to wife, husband‘s 
proposed bright-line rule is unworkable and would lead to harsh results.  Husband 
claims the same thing about wife‘s proposed rule. 
 
Although the date of separation is normally a factual issue to be reviewed 
for substantial evidence (In re Marriage of Manfer (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 925, 
930 (Manfer)), resolution of the opposing contentions here depends on statutory 
construction of the language of section 771(a), a question of law to which we 
5 
apply a de novo standard of review.  (Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc. (2013) 56 
Cal.4th 1113, 1119.)   
B.  Statutory construction of section 771(a) 
 
Section 771(a) is part of California‘s statutory community property scheme, 
a system of law that ―originated in continental Europe, came to Mexico from 
Spain, and became California law through the treaty of 1848.‖  (11 Witkin, 
Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Community Property, § 1, p. 529; see In re 
Marriage of Bonds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 1, 12.)  In interpreting the language of 
section 771(a), as with all questions of statutory construction, ―our objective ‗is to 
ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the 
statute.‘ ‖  (Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1119.)  This 
principle is especially important in construing a statute within the community 
property scheme because the system itself is a ―creature of statute.‖  (1 Bassett, 
Cal. Community Property Law:  A Treatise on Marital Property Rights (3d ed. 
1994) Origins & Development, § 1:4, p. 8 (Bassett).)  
 
― ‗We begin with the plain language of the statute, affording the words of 
the provision their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory 
context, because the language employed in the Legislature‘s enactment generally 
is the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.‘  [Citations.]  The plain meaning 
controls if there is no ambiguity in the statutory language.  [Citation.]  If, however, 
‗the statutory language may reasonably be given more than one interpretation, 
― ‗ ―courts may consider various extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the 
statute, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and the 
statutory scheme encompassing the statute.‖ ‘ ‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. Cornett (2012) 53 
Cal.4th 1261, 1265.)   
6 
1. The plain meaning of “living separate and apart” 
 
As noted earlier, section 771(a) states that ―[t]he earnings and 
accumulations of a spouse . . . , while living separate and apart from the other 
spouse, are the separate property of the spouse.‖  (Italics added.)   
 
In considering whether this statute has a plain meaning, we recognize that 
―the phrase ‗living separate and apart‘ is a term of art.‖  (1 Kirkland et al., Cal. 
Family Law:  Practice and Procedure (2d ed. 2014) Characterization — Division 
in General, § 20.06[2][a], p. 20-26.)  As such, it has been defined in Black‘s Law 
Dictionary as spouses ―residing in different places and having no intention of 
resuming marital relations‖ (Black‘s Law Dict. (7th ed. 1999) p. 945, col. 2, italics 
added) and more recently as spouses ―living away from each other, along with at 
least one spouse‘s intent to dissolve the marriage.‖  (Black‘s Law Dict. (10th ed. 
2014) p. 1076, col. 2, italics added.)  These definitions contemplate both a 
physical separation of residence and an accompanying intent to end the marital 
relationship.  They incorporate an ordinary and common linguistic understanding 
of the word ―apart,‖ used as an adverb, as being ―[a]t a distance in place, position, 
or time‖ or ―[a]way from‖ and the word ―separate‖ as denoting being ―ke[pt] 
apart,‖ ―space[d] apart‖ or ―scatter[ed].‖  (Amer. Heritage Dict. (4th ed. 2000) pp. 
82, col. 2, 1587, col. 1; accord, Webster‘s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 98, col. 
2 [defining ―apart‖ as ―at a ‗ ―distance,‖ ―separate[] in space or time‖].)1   
 
Indeed, both legal usage of the phrase ―living separate and apart‖ and 
colloquial understanding of what it means for someone to live ―separate‖ and 
                                              
1  
Although not binding, it can be useful to refer to the dictionary definition of 
a word in attempting to ascertain the meaning of statutory language.  (Wasatch 
Property Management v. Degrate (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1111, 1121-1122; MacKinnon 
v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2003) 31 Cal.4th 635, 649.) 
7 
―apart‖ from someone else do not include persons living together in the same 
home.  Ordinary usage of the language itself contemplates the parties‘ occupation 
of separate residences.  Therefore, the statute on its face appears to have a 
commonly understood, plain meaning.  
 
Nevertheless, we recognize that the phrase as used in section 771(a) is not 
without at least some ambiguity.  The phrase ―living separate and apart‖ could less 
likely, but still plausibly, be read to mean that the spouses are in effect ―living 
separate lives‖ with the requisite intent to end the marital relationship.  (See 
Webster‘s 3d New Internat. Dict., supra, p. 2069, col. 3 [defining the adjective 
―separate‖ as ―not shared with another,‖ ―existing by itself: autonomous, 
independent‖ or ―distinct, different‖].)  Such an interpretation would not require 
separate residences for purposes of section 771(a).  Instead, it would focus a 
court‘s attention on the spouses‘ independence or autonomy from each other in 
their daily living.  Under this understanding of the statutory phrase, physical 
separation would, as wife contends, be simply one of many factors to consider in 
determining the date of a couple‘s separation.   
 
To consider whether the Legislature intended the language of section 
771(a) to encompass this less likely, but still possible secondary meaning, we turn 
to extrinsic aids — the statute‘s long history, its prior judicial construction, and the 
Legislature‘s use of the phrase elsewhere in the Family Code — to consider what 
light they may shed on the Legislature‘s intent.  We find evidence there bolstering 
the ordinary and common meaning of the language as requiring separate 
residences along with demonstrated intent to finally end the marital relationship 
before a spouse‘s earnings and accumulations are considered that spouse‘s 
separate property. 
8 
2. Consideration of extrinsic aids 
 
The language of section 771(a) originated in a predecessor statute that was 
enacted 145 years ago in 1870.  (Stats. 1870, ch. 161, p. 226, entitled ―An Act to 
protect the rights of married women in certain cases‖ — hereafter the 1870 Act.)  
In its first section, the 1870 Act provided that ―the earnings of [a] wife‖ were ―not 
liable for the debts of [her] husband.‖  (1870 Act, Stats. 1870, ch. 161, § 1, 
p. 226.)  More significantly for our purposes, in language identical to section 
771(a) except for the original text‘s restriction to wives, the 1870 Act provided 
that ―[t]he earnings and accumulations of the wife . . . , while the wife is living 
separate and apart from her husband, shall be the separate property of the wife.‖  
(Id., § 2, p. 226.)  Further, the 1870 Act specified that a wife ―living separate and 
apart from her husband‖ had ―sole and exclusive control [over] her separate 
property,‖ could ―sue and be sued,‖ without joinder of her husband, and could 
―avail herself of and be subject to all legal process in all actions, including actions 
concerning her real estate.‖  (Id., § 3, p. 226.)   
 
The 1870 Act did not contain a definition of the phrase ―living separate and 
apart‖ used in section 2.  (Stats. 1870, ch. 161, § 2, p. 226.)  However, the 
Legislature‘s understanding that the phrase connoted a threshold requirement of 
separate residences may be discerned from an additional section of the statute.  
Section 4 of the 1870 Act provided a procedure for a wife who was ―living 
separate and apart‖ from her husband to sell her real property without joining with 
her husband.  To do so, the wife was required to record a verified and 
acknowledged declaration ―containing a description of such real estate, the name 
of her husband, her own place of residence, and [stating] that she is a married 
woman, living separate and apart from her husband.‖  (1870 Act, Stats. 1870, 
ch. 161, § 4, p. 226, italics added.)  The statutory requirement that the wife state in 
a declaration ―her own‖ place of residence that is ―separate and apart from her 
9 
husband‖ strongly suggests that the 1870 Act was directed at a situation where the 
spouses had physically separated and the wife in fact had ―her own‖ residence.  It 
is some indication that the 1870 Legislature had in mind what we have described 
as the common meaning of the language when it first adopted it. 
 
In this regard, we find it additionally helpful to recall the historical context 
of the 1870 Act.  At that time, married women had very limited power over their 
property.  In the absence of a binding premarital agreement, the husband had the 
absolute right of ―management and control‖ of the community property of the 
marriage, including the power of sale of assets.  (Stats. 1850, ch. 103, §§ 9, 14, 
pp. 254-255.)  Under the original 1850 statute defining spousal property rights, the 
―rents and profits of the separate property‖ of both husband and wife were deemed 
community property and were, therefore, under the exclusive control of the 
husband.  (Id., § 9, p. 254.)  In addition, the husband had the ―right of management 
and control‖ of the wife‘s separate property ―during the continuance of the 
marriage.‖  (Id., § 6, p. 254.)  Her protection against her husband‘s inappropriate 
sale of her separate property ―during the continuance of the marriage‖ lay in a 
procedural requirement that the sale or encumbrance must be in an instrument in 
writing signed by both husband and wife, and her protection against her husband‘s 
general mismanagement of her separate property during the marriage lay in an 
application to the court for the appointment of a trustee to act on her behalf.  (Id., 
§§ 6, 8, p. 254.)   
 
Between 1850 and 1870, the Legislature recognized a few circumstances 
under which a married woman could have some control over her separate 
property.  By legislation in 1852, a married woman was given authority to run a 
business in her own name under limited circumstances as a ―sole trader‖ and under 
such circumstances, could retain the earnings of such a business as her separate 
property; they were not subject to the debts of her husband and she had the 
10 
authority to sue her debtors.  (See Bassett, supra, § 1:3, at pp. 6-7.)  By legislation 
in 1853, if the terms of an instrument bequeathing, devising or gifting property to 
the wife provided that the rents and profits were to ―be applied to her sole and 
separate use,‖ the wife could manage and dispose of such rents and profits.  (Stats. 
1853, ch. 116, § 1, p. 165.)  Legislation adopted in 1855 gave a married woman 
whose husband was absent from the state for a year the right to convey her 
separate property real estate (Stats. 1855, ch. 17, § 1, p. 12), but apparently not any 
other property left in her possession.  (See Prager, The Persistence of Separate 
Property Concepts in California’s Community Property System, 1849-1975 (1976) 
24 UCLA L.Rev. 1, 39-41 (Prager); Stats. 1852, ch. 42, p. 101.)   
 
Nevertheless, under the statutory scheme in effect in 1870, until entry of a 
decree of dissolution of the marriage (Stats. 1850, ch. 103, § 12, p. 255 [requiring 
a division of a couple‘s community property in the decree of dissolution]), it 
appears that a woman who was either involved in divorce proceedings or whose 
husband had deserted or otherwise left her, and who did not have separate property 
coming within one of the statutory provisions giving her control over it, would 
have no right of access to the financial sustenance needed to meet the expenses of 
daily life on her own.  Commentators have observed that the law‘s restrictive 
provisions at this time were to some extent inconsistent with traditional principles 
of community property law — principles that actually afforded more legal 
protection to women than did the common law principles that seem to have 
filtered into the California system.  (See Prager, supra, 24 UCLA L.Rev. at pp. 34-
46; see also Cammack, Marital Property in California and Indonesia: Community 
Property and Harta Bersama (2007) 64 Wash. & Lee L.Rev 1417, 1431-1433; 
Schuele, Community Property Law and the Politics of Married Women’s Rights in 
Nineteenth Century California (1994) 7 W. Legal His. 245, 262-264; Bassett, 
supra, § 1:3, at pp. 7-8.)   
11 
 
When read as a whole and in this context, it seems evident that the 1870 
Act was intended to afford married women some additional protection from the 
rigors of the law generally denying them control over their earnings and separate 
property.  Under the authority of the 1870 Act, a wife whose husband was not 
physically living with her could undertake to support herself in her ―own‖ 
residence.  Unlike other married women, she could retain her earnings and 
accumulations as her separate property to maintain her separate residence.  She 
was given the right to control and dispose of her separate property.  She could sue 
and be sued without the joinder of her husband.  Nothing in the 1870 Act indicates 
a different intent — to characterize a wife‘s earnings and accumulations as her 
separate property while she was still physically living with her husband in the 
marital home so long as she and her husband were sufficiently leading ―separate 
lives.‖  To the contrary, the 1870 Act should be understood as a limited exception 
to the general rule of that time that the husband had full management and control 
over the marital and separate assets for the duration of the marriage.  It appears the 
Legislature was concerned only with the special and limited circumstance of a 
wife who was living physically separate from her husband.  Such a wife was likely 
to be incurring separate expenses associated with her separate residence and could 
be anticipated to need the authority to separately maintain, control and manage 
such property.  In such a situation, the 1870 Legislature determined an exception 
to the normal community property characterization of earnings and accumulations 
acquired during marriage and husband‘s control was appropriate.   
 
When the Legislature adopted the Civil Code in 1872, it enacted a version 
of section 2 of the 1870 Act as Civil Code section 169 (former section 169).  As 
enacted in 1872, former section 169 provided that ―[t]he earnings and 
accumulations of the wife . . . , while she is living separate from her husband, are 
the separate property of the wife.‖  (Civ. Code, § 169, as adopted 1872.)  Again, 
12 
nothing suggests that the 1872 Legislature contemplated that anything other than 
separate residences would qualify as ―living separate,‖ i.e., that it intended the 
language to be construed differently from its common and ordinary meaning.  In 
fact, the Legislature enacted at the same time section 5 of the Civil Code, which 
states that ―[t]he provisions of this Code, so far as they are substantially the same 
as existing statutes or the common law, must be construed as continuations 
thereof, and not as new enactments.‖  Because former section 169 was 
substantially the same as section 2 of the 1870 Act, Civil Code section 5 directs 
that it be interpreted as continuing in effect the former law.   
 
Moreover, it might reasonably be suggested that the lack of a statutory 
definition of the phrase is some indication itself that the Legislature intended the 
ordinary meaning to apply.  Otherwise, the Legislature would likely have provided 
a specialized definition of the term.  It did not. 
 
And indeed, with respect to the language now found in section 771(a), from 
the earliest cases on, the issue presented regarding the interpretation of the statute 
was not whether separate places of residence were a prerequisite for application of 
the law, but rather whether separate residences sufficed.  That question was 
answered in the negative.   
 
For example, in 1874, this court held that the 1870 Act did not apply when 
the evidence showed that the wife was only temporarily physically separated from 
her husband.  We concluded that for the wife to be ― ‗living separate and apart‘ ‖ 
within the meaning of the statute ―[t]here must have been an abandonment on the 
part of the husband or wife, or a separation which was intended to be final.‖  
(Tobin v. Galvin (1874) 49 Cal. 34, 36-37.)   
 
On the other hand, a husband and wife were living separate and apart 
within the meaning of former section 169 where the husband left his wife, lived in 
a separate town, and determined during his absence that he would never resume 
13 
marital relations with his wife, while his wife and children continued to live in the 
marital home, where the wife kept boarders and did other work to support herself 
and the children.  (Loring v. Stuart (1889) 79 Cal. 200, 201-202; see Tagus Ranch 
Co. v. First Nat. Bk. (1935) 7 Cal.App.2d 457 [money borrowed by wife who had 
been deserted by her husband constituted her separate property under former 
section 169].)  These facts illustrate the apparent purpose of the statute: to provide 
for an estranged wife, whose husband was not physically living with her, a means 
of maintaining herself in her separate place of residence by allowing her earnings 
and accumulations to be her separate property.   
 
Without questioning whether separate residences was a necessary predicate, 
courts struggled to articulate a uniform standard for determining the date of 
separation in circumstances where the parties had moved into separate homes.   
 
The court in Makeig v. United Security Bk. & T. Co. (1931) 112 Cal.App. 
138 (Makeig), for example, summarized the then-existing law and concluded that 
―[l]iving separate and apart . . . , as contemplated by section 169, does not apply to 
a case where a man and wife are residing temporarily in different places due to 
economic or social reasons, but applies to a condition where the spouses have 
come to a parting of the ways and have no present intention of resuming marital 
relations and taking up life together under the same roof.‖  (Id., at p. 143, italics 
added.)  The court explained that ―[u]nder modern conditions there is many a man 
living and working in one place and his wife living and working in another, seeing 
one another only on week ends, sometimes not for months at a time, yet they are 
not living separate and apart within the meaning of the section, for there has been 
no marital rupture, and there is a present intention to live together as man and 
wife, and their status is only temporary, although it may happen that the condition 
might exist for some years.‖  (Id., at pp. 143-144; accord, Kerr v. Kerr (1960) 182 
14 
Cal.App.2d 12, 18 [evidence showed that there was no final parting of the ways or 
intention not to resume marital relations under the same roof until such time as 
wife refused to permit husband‘s return to their home].)   
 
Subsequent legislative developments suggest no intent to change the 
meaning of the phrase ―living separate and apart.‖  In 1969, the Legislature 
repealed the family law portions of the Civil Code and replaced them with the 
Family Law Act.  (Stats. 1969, ch. 1608, §§ 3, 6, 8, pp. 3313-3314.)  Relevant to 
our discussion, former section 169 was repealed and Civil Code section 5118 
(former section 5118) was adopted.  (Stats. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, p. 3340.)  Like its 
predecessor, former section 5118 provided that ―[t]he earnings and accumulations 
of the wife . . . , while she is living separate from her husband, are the separate 
property of the wife.‖  (Stats. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, p. 3340.)  As before, no 
specialized definition of the language was provided, and by enacting language 
identical to former section 169, the 1969 Legislature once again expressed its 
intent to continue in effect the former law.  (Civ. Code, § 5.)  Therefore, as it did 
originally, the statute continued to address the situation in which a wife was living 
estranged in a separate residence from her husband.  
 
We pause at this point to observe that by this time the Legislature had also 
used the phrase ―living separate and apart‖ elsewhere in the Civil Code.  Civil 
Code former section 34.6 specified certain circumstances under which ―a minor 15 
years of age or older who [was] living separate and apart‖ from his or her parents 
or legal guardian, ―whether with or without the consent of a parent or guardian and 
regardless of the duration of such separate residence,‖ could consent to his or her 
own medical or dental care.  (Civ. Code, former § 34.6, added by Stats. 1968, 
ch. 371, § 1, p. 788, italics added.)  Former section 34.6 was repealed in 1992 
(Stats. 1992, ch. 163, § 2, p. 724), but its substance was restated in Family Code 
section 6922, where it continues to use the phrase ―living separate and apart‖ to 
15 
mean the minor occupies a separate residence.  (Fam. Code, § 6922, subd. (a)(2); 
see Family Code, 22 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1992) foll. § 6922, p. 545 
[―Section 6922 restates former Civil Code § 34.6 without substantive change.‖].)  
This statute further supports our view that the Legislature likely intends the 
common meaning of the language when it uses this statutory phrase. 
 
Returning to the predecessor statutes to section 771(a), we note that in 
1971, the Legislature amended the Family Law Act to address an inequity that had 
developed in the treatment of husbands and wives.  (Assem. Com. on Jud., 
Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1549 (1971 Reg. Sess.) May 10, 1971.)  By this time, 
under Civil Code former section 5119, the earnings and accumulations of either 
spouse became the separate property of such spouse after rendition of a judgment 
of legal separation.  (Civ. Code, former § 5119, subd. (a), added by Stats. 1969, 
ch. 1608, § 8, p. 3340.)  In addition, the earnings and accumulations of a husband 
became his separate property after rendition of an interlocutory judgment of 
dissolution and while he was living separate and apart from his wife.  (Civ. Code, 
former § 5119, subd. (b), added by Stats. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, pp. 3340-3341.)  But 
under former section 5118, the earnings and accumulations of a wife while she 
was living separate from her husband were her separate property regardless of 
whether an interlocutory judgment of dissolution had been rendered.  (Former 
§ 5118, added by Stats. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, p. 3340.)  In 1971, the Legislature 
repealed subdivision (b) of former section 5119 and amended former section 5118 
to provide equal treatment by specifying that ―[t]he earnings and accumulations of 
a spouse . . . , while living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the 
separate property of the spouse.‖  (Stats. 1971, ch. 1700, pp. 3639-3640, italics 
added.)  Nothing in the legislative history, however, indicates any intent to change 
16 
the original (and commonly understood) meaning of the phrase ―living separate 
and apart.‖2  Rather, the focus was simply on equalizing the treatment of husbands 
and wives.  (In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 588 [The 
Legislature‘s purpose in amending the statute was likely to address its possible 
constitutional infirmity as gender discrimination.].)   
 
The post-1971 cases continued to refine the description of what was 
necessary for application of former section 5118.  But again, none of them 
questioned that a threshold requirement was separate residences.  In In re 
Marriage of Baragry (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 444 (Baragry), the appellate court 
reversed a trial court‘s determination that the parties had separated on the date that 
the husband moved out of the marital home.  (Id., at p. 449.)  The reviewing court 
observed that the fact that husband and wife lived in separate residences was not 
determinative of whether they were ―living separate and apart‖ for purposes of 
former section 5118.  The court stated:  ―The question is whether the parties‘ 
conduct evidences a complete and final break in the marital relationship.‖  
(Baragry, supra, at p. 448.)  It found no such conduct in the case before it because 
the husband maintained continuous and frequent contact with his family after 
moving from the marital home.  He continued to eat dinner at the home, 
maintained his mailing and voter registration address at the home, sent his wife 
                                              
2  
The 1870 Act used the phrase ―living separate and apart from her husband.‖  
(1870 Act, Stats. 1870, ch. 161, § 1, p. 226.)  Former section 169 in 1872 and 
former section 5118 in 1969 both used the phrase ―living separate from her 
husband.‖  The 1971 amendment to former section 5118 restored the phrase 
―living separate and apart.‖  (Stats. 1971, ch. 1700, § 1, p. 3640.)  The difference 
in wording has not been considered significant.  (Bruch, The Legal Import of 
Informal Marital Separations: A Survey of California Law and a Call for Change 
(1977) 65 Cal. L.Rev. 1015, 1020, fn. 11, and cases cited therein.)   
17 
cards and gifts, took her to social occasions, had her do his laundry, and otherwise 
maintained the appearance of being married.  He never informed his wife that he 
had no intention of reconciling.  (Id., at pp. 447-448.)   
 
Similarly, a reviewing court concluded the evidence supported a 
determination that a husband and his wife were not ―living separate and apart‖ 
under former section 5118 even though the wife had moved out of the marital 
home, in a case in which they continued their sexual relationship, sought marriage 
counseling and made multiple efforts at reconciliation.  (In re Marriage of 
Marsden (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 426, 432-435.)   
 
In In re Marriage of Umphrey (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 647 (Umphrey), 
another case in which the spouses were living in separate residences, the Court of 
Appeal cautioned that in determining the date of separation for purposes of former 
section 5118, courts are ―duty bound to consider all of the relevant evidence‖ 
regarding ― ‗whether the parties‘ conduct evidences a complete and final break in 
the marital relationship.‘ ‖  (Umphrey, supra, at p. 657, quoting Baragry, supra, 
73 Cal.App.3d at p. 448.)  It concluded that the parties‘ stipulation to a separation 
date after they physically moved apart was not conclusive.  (Ibid.)   
 
In 1989, the Legislature directed the Law Revision Commission to organize 
disparate statutes into a Family Code.  (Family Code, 22 Cal. Law Revision Com. 
Rep., supra, p. 7.)  In 1992, the Legislature enacted the Family Code, operative 
January 1, 1994.  In pertinent part, the language of former section 5118 was placed 
into Family Code section 771.  (Stats. 1992, ch. 162, § 10, p. 489.)  The Law 
Revision Commission comment to section 771 states that ―[s]ection 771 continues 
. . . Civil Code [former] [s]ection 5118 without change.‖  (Family Code, 22 Cal. 
18 
Law Revision Com. Rep., supra, com. foll. § 771, p. 137; see also Cal. Law 
Revision Com. com., 29C West‘s Ann. Fam. Code (2004 ed.) foll. § 771, p. 405.)3   
 
In 1994, the issue of the proper construction of the phrase ―living separate 
and apart‖ was again before the court in In re Marriage of von der Nuell (1994) 23 
Cal.App.4th 730 (von der Nuell).  The von der Nuell court concluded that the trial 
court erred in holding the date of separation of the parties was the date the 
husband moved out of the family residence even if the parties had, at that time, no 
intent to resume marital relations.  (Id., at p. 732.)  The court held that ―legal 
separation requires not only a parting of the ways with no present intention of 
resuming marital relations, but also, more importantly, conduct evidencing a 
complete and final break in the marital relationship.‖  (Id., at p. 736, italics 
changed.)  By requiring both subjective intent and demonstrated conduct, the von 
der Nuell court essentially combined the requirements of Makeig, supra, 112 
Cal.App. at p. 143 and Baragry, supra, 73 Cal.App.3d at p. 448.  (In re Marriage 
of Hardin (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 448, 451 (Hardin) [making this observation].)  
Pointing to evidence of the parties‘ attempts to reconcile, the von der Nuell court 
found that it was not until some years after the couple separated physically that 
their conduct evidenced the complete and final break in their marital relationship 
that was necessary to constitute ―living separate and apart.‖  (von der Nuell, supra, 
at pp. 732, 734-737.)  
 
In Hardin, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 448, the Court of Appeal likewise 
reversed a trial court‘s finding that the parties had separated on the date that 
husband moved out of their residence.  Like the court in von der Nuell, the Hardin 
                                              
3  
In 1999, the language of section 771 was designated section 771(a) without 
change.  (Stats. 1999, ch. 940, § 1, p. 6859.)   
19 
court concluded that both subjective intent to end the marriage and objective 
conduct demonstrating such intent is necessary for legal separation.  (38 
Cal.App.4th at p. 451.)  ―Simply stated, the date of separation occurs when either 
of the parties does not intend to resume the marriage and his or her actions 
bespeak the finality of the marital relationship.  There must be problems that have 
so impaired the marriage relationship that the legitimate objects of matrimony 
have been destroyed and there is no reasonable possibility of eliminating, 
correcting or resolving these problems.‖  (Ibid.)  The court declared that ―[a]ll 
factors bearing on either party‘s intentions ‗to return or not to return to the other 
spouse‘ are to be considered,‖ but ―[n]o particular facts are per se determinative.‖  
(Id., at p. 452.)  ―The ultimate question to be decided in determining the date of 
separation is whether either or both of the parties perceived the rift in their 
relationship as final.  The best evidence of this is their words and actions.  The 
husband‘s and the wife‘s subjective intents are to be objectively determined from 
all of the evidence reflecting the parties‘ words and actions during the disputed 
time in order to ascertain when during that period the rift in the parties‘ 
relationship was final.‖  (Id., at p. 453.)4   
                                              
4  
The reviewing court in Manfer, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th 925, found 
Hardin‘s articulation of the standard for determining the date of separation to be 
the most helpful.  In Manfer, the husband moved out of the marital home and wife 
decided that their stormy marriage was finally over, but the parties agreed to hide 
their circumstances from family and friends until after the year-end holidays.  The 
Court of Appeal held that the trial court ―erroneously applied an ‗outsider‘s 
viewpoint‘ standard to defer the date of separation to [a date] after the parties had 
revealed to the world their hitherto secret that the marriage was over.‖  (Id., at 
p. 927.)  The Manfer court stated that ―[t]he date-of-separation test does not ask 
what the public thinks, but whether at least one of the parties intended to end the 
marriage and whether there was objective conduct ‗bespeak[ing] the finality of the 
marital relationship.‘ ‖  (Id., at p. 928.)  Once again, as in all the other cases 
discussed previously, the facts in Manfer involved the separation of residences. 
20 
 
In our view, the language in these cases — requiring consideration of ―all 
of the relevant evidence‖ regarding ― ‗whether the parties‘ conduct evidences a 
complete and final break in the marital relationship‘ ‖ (Umphrey, supra, 218 
Cal.App.3d at p. 657, quoting Baragry, supra, 73 Cal.App.3d at p. 448), requiring 
both a lack of ―present intention of resuming marital relations . . . [and] conduct 
evidencing a complete and final break in the marital relationship‖ (von der Nuell, 
supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 736, italics omitted), and indicating that ―[a]ll factors 
. . . are to be considered‖ in deciding the ―ultimate question‖ of ―whether either or 
both of the parties perceived the rift in their relationship as final‖ (Hardin, supra, 
38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 452, 453, italics omitted) — must be understood in the 
context of their facts, which reflect that in each case the parties had moved into 
separate places of residence.  These cases do not address, and therefore are not 
authority for a conclusion that ―living separate and apart‖ was intended by the 
Legislature, originally or subsequently, to require, as wife argues, only 
demonstrated conduct reflecting a subjective intent to part ways with no plan of 
resuming the marital relationship, which might, but need not necessarily, include 
physical separation.  (In re Marriage of Cornejo (1996) 13 Cal.4th 381, 388 [― ‗It 
is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered.‘ ‖].)  
They are consistent with a view that both separate residences and demonstrated 
intent are necessary.  
 
Moreover, as far as can be determined from the decisions, none of the cases 
that have construed section 771(a) and its predecessors have traced the statutory 
language back to the original, uncodified, 1870 Act.  In our view, consideration of 
the 1870 Act and its historical background helps to determine the Legislature‘s 
intent in using the phrase ―living separate and apart.‖  It provides support for a 
common meaning interpretation of the language, as well as context for what  
21 
followed.  It is true that a number of cases have noted the lack of a specific 
statutory definition and have expressed a view that there is a similar lack of 
legislative history regarding how to determine the date of separation, i.e., the date 
on which the parties began living separate and apart.  (Manfer, supra, 144 
Cal.App.4th at p. 929 [observing that ―the statute does not define ‗date of 
separation‘ or specify a rule for determining it‖]; Norviel, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 1158 [same]; Hardin, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 450-451 [same]; Baragry, 
supra, 73 Cal.App.3d at p. 448 [referring to ―what little law defines separation‖].)  
But to the extent these comments suggest that there is a lack of discernable 
legislative intent with respect to the underlying requirement of separate residences, 
we disagree.  When the 1870 Act is viewed as part of section 771(a)‘s statutory 
history and in context, there emerges an apparent legislative intent and purpose 
substantiating the ordinary linguistic understanding of the phrase ―living separate 
and apart.‖   
 
The issue of whether spouses must be residing in separate places in order to 
support a finding that they are ―living separate and apart‖ under the statute was 
finally expressly considered in Norviel, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th 1152.  Citing 
many of the cases that we have reviewed, the majority in Norviel recognized that 
―[d]ecisional law . . . clearly establishes that parties may live apart and yet not be 
separated.‖  (Id., at p. 1162.)  It concluded, however, that the reverse is not also 
true.  The Norviel majority held that ―living apart physically is an indispensable 
threshold requirement to separation, whether or not it is sufficient, by itself, to 
establish separation.‖  (Ibid.)  The court found support for that conclusion in the 
statutory language, in the early decisions of this state, and in decisions from 
22 
several other jurisdictions.  (Id., at pp. 1162-1163.)5  The Norviel majority 
acknowledged that its ―conclusion [did] not necessarily rule out the possibility of 
some spouses living apart physically while still occupying the same dwelling[,]‖ 
but found that ―this [was] not such a case.‖  (Id., at p. 1164.)   
 
The dissent in Norviel found that substantial evidence supported the trial 
court‘s finding of a date of separation that was prior to husband moving out of the 
marital home because husband had clearly communicated his intent to end the 
marriage and the parties‘ conduct thereafter was consistent with that intent.  
(Norviel, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1165-1167 (dis. opn. of Bamattre-
Manoukian, J.).)  According to the dissent, the majority‘s rule was unworkable, 
largely because it did not allow a couple who has reached the decision to end their 
marriage ―a transition period to take the necessary steps to untangle the financial, 
legal and social ties incident to their decision.‖  (Id., at p. 1166.)  Without 
recognizing that the facts in Hardin, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 448, reflected a 
separation of residences, the dissent stated that it would apply the test articulated 
by the Hardin court, which required consideration and evaluation of all of the 
                                              
5  
The Norviel majority noted In re Marriage of Johnson (1982) 134 
Cal.App.3d 148, was the only case husband proffered as authority for his position 
that parties may live together and still be considered separated.  (Norviel, supra, 
102 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162.)  In Johnson, supra, at page 155, husband contested 
the trial court‘s finding of the date of separation, but the reviewing court 
concluded, in a single paragraph with little discussion, that the trial court‘s 
determination was based upon substantial evidence.  The Norviel majority was not 
convinced that Johnson was contrary to the conclusion that it reached, given 
Johnson‘s sparse recitation of the relevant facts.  (Norviel, supra, at p. 1162.)  We 
agree.  But to the extent that it can be argued that the Johnson court determined 
that living separate lives was sufficient for purposes of former section 5118 
(Johnson, supra, at p. 155), it is contrary to the evidence of legislative intent that 
we have discussed. 
23 
evidence regarding ― ‗the parties‘ words and actions during the disputed time in 
order to ascertain when during that period the rift in the parties‘ relationship was 
final.‘ ‖  (Norviel, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 1168.)6   
 
There appears to have been no reaction from the bench or bar subsequent to 
the Norviel decision contending that the Norviel majority had introduced a sudden 
new rule that was legislatively unintended and unworkable.  No movement to 
promote the position of the Norviel dissent seems to have materialized.  And, 
although we recognize that legislative inaction after a judicial decision does not 
necessarily imply legislative approval (County of Los Angeles v. Workers’ Comp. 
Appeals Bd. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 391, 404), it is also interesting to observe that the 
Legislature has had more than a decade to amend section 771(a) in response to the 
Norviel majority‘s recognition of a threshold requirement of physically separate 
places of residence and has failed to do so.   
 
From this survey of the history of section 771(a) and its predecessor 
statutes, as judicially construed, we are convinced that the Legislature intended the 
statutory phrase ―living separate and apart‖ to require both separate residences and 
accompanying demonstrated intent to end the marital relationship.  Consistent 
with the statute‘s history and the developed standard articulated by the case law, 
we hold that ―living separate and apart‖ refers to a situation in which spouses are 
living in separate residences and at least one of them has the subjective intent to 
end the marital relationship, which intent is objectively evidenced by words or 
                                              
6  
The Court of Appeal in the present case found the dissenting opinion in 
Norviel to be compelling and wife reiterates the position here. 
24 
conduct reflecting that there is a complete and final break in the marriage 
relationship.7   
3. Public Policy Considerations 
 
Wife contends that a bright-line rule, such as we articulate, will be overly 
simplistic, will lead to unjust, harsh results, and is, essentially, against current 
public policy considerations.  She suggests that ―[a] typical spouse in California, 
for example, may face further financial difficulties simply by being required to 
move out of the marital residence as a prerequisite to establishing the date of 
separation rather than intentionally and meaningfully living as roommates at the 
same residence, while taking the necessary steps to untangle any outstanding 
financial, legal and social ties incident to that spouse‘s decision to terminate the 
marriage.‖  She points out that there may be spouses who need to reside in the 
same residence as ―roommates‖ because of foreclosure, job loss, or other 
economic factors.  She suggests that others may wish to share the same residence 
in order to coparent their children.  Finally, she speculates concerning the 
difficulty a spouse may encounter in obtaining a move-away order.   
 
Wife‘s arguments are not without weight.  However, it bears repeating that 
the issue before us is a question of interpretation of a community property statute.  
Our goal in construing statutory language is to give effect to the Legislature‘s 
intent and purpose.  (Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1119.)  
Here we find original legislative intent to use the language in its common and  
                                              
7  
Under the facts presented by this case, we have no occasion to consider, 
and expressly reserve the question, whether there could be circumstances that 
would support a finding that the spouses were ―living separate and apart,‖ i.e., that 
they had established separate residences with the requisite objectively evidenced 
intent, even though they continued to literally share one roof.   
25 
ordinary sense as requiring separate places of residence before the earnings and 
accumulations of a wife during marriage could be characterized as the wife‘s 
separate property.  We understand the original legislative purpose of the statute to 
be the protection of and provision for a wife who was estranged and living 
physically separate from her husband.  Thus, the statutory phrase ―living separate 
and apart‖ required that the spouses be living in separate residences.  We find no 
evidence of any subsequent change in the legislative intent to apply the commonly 
understood meaning of that language or change of legislative purpose in protecting 
a vulnerable spouse, which alter the meaning of this statutory phrase.  Admittedly, 
the statute, as so construed, may work hardship in some specific situations, but we 
cannot say it is absurd.  (People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 506 [a literal 
construction may be rejected where it would result in absurd consequences the 
Legislature could not have intended].)  Very much to the contrary; a bright-line 
rule, as husband points out, promotes fairness by providing a measure of 
predictability to the parties and their attorneys, as well as clear guidance to judges.  
It reduces the potential for manipulation of a more elastic standard by the higher 
earner in situations of significant disparity of spousal income.  It provides separate 
property classification of earnings and accumulations where the need is greatest 
because each spouse is maintaining his or her own separate place of residence.  It 
retains the presumption of community property for earnings and accumulations 
acquired during marriage during a period of time likely to be prior to the 
institution of court proceedings and any court order of support, thereby protecting 
the lower earning spouse.   
 
The requirement of separate residences for purposes of section 771(a) 
promotes reasonable public policy interests, but if there are other policy concerns 
that now advise the adoption of a different rule, it is up to the Legislature to craft 
26 
one.  (Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1015; Cel-Tech 
Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 
163, 174.) 
C.  Conclusion 
 
We conclude that living in separate residences ―is an indispensable 
threshold requirement‖ (Norviel, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162) for a finding 
that spouses are ―living separate and apart‖ for purposes of section 771(a).  This 
interpretation of the statutory language aligns with the common understanding of 
the words, the statutory history of the provision, and legitimate public policy 
concerns.  Because the Court of Appeal rejected such a requirement as a matter of 
statutory construction, it erred as a matter of law. 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the matter is 
remanded for proceedings consistent with our opinion.   
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY LIU, J. 
 
I agree with today‘s opinion that the phrase ―living separate and apart‖ in 
Family Code section 771, subdivision (a) (hereafter section 771(a)) ―refers to a 
situation in which spouses are living in separate residences and at least one of 
them has the subjective intent to end the marital relationship, which intent is 
objectively evidenced by words or conduct reflecting that there is a complete and 
final break in the marriage relationship.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 23–24.)  I also 
agree that it remains open ―whether there could be circumstances that would 
support a finding that the spouses were ‗living separate and apart,‘ i.e., that they 
had established separate residences with the requisite objectively evidenced intent, 
even though they continued to literally share one roof.‖  (Id. at p. 24, fn. 7.)  I 
write separately to note that in addressing that question, courts should understand 
the purpose of section 771(a) in light of relevant changes in historical context that 
have occurred since 1870 when the Legislature enacted the original version of the 
statute. 
The phrase ―living separate and apart‖ first appeared in an uncodified 1870 
statute titled ―An Act to protect the rights of married women in certain cases.‖  
(Stats. 1870, ch. 161, p. 226 (hereafter the 1870 Act).)  This statute provided that 
―[t]he earnings and accumulations of the wife . . . , while the wife is living 
separate and apart from her husband, shall be the separate property of the wife.‖  
(Id., § 2, p. 226.)  The 1870 Act further provided that a wife ―living separate and 
 
2 
apart from her husband‖ had ―sole and exclusive control [over] her separate 
property,‖ could ―sue and be sued‖ without joinder of her husband, and could 
―avail herself of and be subject to all legal process in all actions, including actions 
concerning her real estate.‖  (Id., § 3, p. 226.) 
Although the 1870 Act included no definition of ―living separate and 
apart,‖ the Legislature clearly contemplated separate addresses for the husband 
and wife.  As the court explains, ―[s]ection 4 of the 1870 Act provided a procedure 
for a wife who was ‗living separate and apart‘ from her husband to sell her real 
property without joining with her husband.  To do so, the wife was required to 
record a verified and acknowledged declaration ‗containing a description of such 
real estate, the name of her husband, her own place of residence, and [stating] that 
she is a married woman, living separate and apart from her husband.‘  (1870 Act, 
Stats. 1870, ch. 161, § 4, p. 226, italics added.)  The statutory requirement that the 
wife state in a declaration ‗her own‘ place of residence that is ‗separate and apart 
from her husband‘ strongly suggests that the 1870 Act was directed at a situation 
where the spouses had physically separated and the wife in fact had ‗her own‘ 
residence.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 8–9.) 
Today‘s opinion accurately describes the context and purpose of the 1870 
Act.  At the time, ―married women had very limited power over their property.  In 
the absence of a binding premarital agreement, the husband had the absolute right 
of ‗management and control‘ of the community property of the marriage, 
including the power of sale of assets,‖ as well as considerable power over the 
wife‘s separate property.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 9–10.)  ―Under the statutory 
scheme in effect in 1870, until entry of a decree of dissolution of the marriage . . . , 
it appears that a woman who was either involved in divorce proceedings or whose 
husband had deserted or otherwise left her, and who did not have separate property 
coming within one of the statutory provisions giving her control over it, would 
 
3 
have no right of access to the financial sustenance needed to meet the expenses of 
daily life on her own.‖  (Id. at p. 10.) 
―When read as a whole and in this context, it seems evident that the 1870 
Act was intended to afford married women some additional protection from the 
rigors of the law generally denying them control over their earnings and separate 
property.  Under the authority of the 1870 Act, a wife whose husband was not 
physically living with her could undertake to support herself in her ‗own‘ 
residence.  Unlike other married women, she could retain her earnings and 
accumulations as her separate property to maintain her separate residence.  She 
was given the right to control and dispose of her separate property. . . . [T]he 1870 
Act should be understood as a limited exception to the general rule of that time 
that the husband had full management and control over the marital and separate 
assets for the duration of the marriage.  It appears the Legislature was concerned 
only with the special and limited circumstance of a wife who was living physically 
separate from her husband.  Such a wife was likely to be incurring separate 
expenses associated with her separate residence and could be anticipated to need 
the authority to separately maintain, control and manage such property.  In such a 
situation, the 1870 Legislature determined an exception to the normal community 
property characterization of earnings and accumulations acquired during marriage 
and husband‘s control was appropriate.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11.) 
The 1870 Act may be understood as a legislative response to cases like 
Lawrence v. Spear (1861) 17 Cal. 421.  There a wife deserted by her husband 
engaged in a furniture business and sold furniture to the defendant.  The husband 
sued the defendant to void the sale on the ground that he never consented to it.  
The court upheld the sale based on the legal fiction that the husband, having 
abandoned the wife, impliedly consented to her disposition of property for her 
own support.  (Id. at pp. 423–424.)  This fiction was necessary because the wife 
 
4 
had no control over community property and no way to accumulate or control her 
own separate property, even though she was living separate and apart from her 
husband.  Moreover, divorce did not appear to be a widely accessible option.  (See 
Stevenson & Wolfers, Marriage and Divorce:  Changes and their Driving Forces 
(Spring 2007) 21 J. Econ. Persp. 27, 29, fig. 1 (Stevenson & Wolfers) [showing 
very low rate of divorce in the United States between 1860 and 1900].)  The 1870 
Act provided a narrow exception to the male-dominated property regime in order 
to protect a wife in such circumstances. 
In 1971, the Legislature amended former Civil Code section 5118, the 
immediate predecessor to section 771(a), to make the statute gender-neutral.  The 
amended statute said:  ―The earnings and accumulations of a spouse . . . , while 
living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the 
spouse.‖  (Stats. 1971, ch. 1700, pp. 3639–3640.)  As the court notes, this 
amendment remedied ―an inequity that had developed in the treatment of husbands 
and wives,‖ whereby a wife living separate and apart from her husband could 
accumulate separate property before formal dissolution of the marriage, yet the 
husband could only accumulate separate property after obtaining an interlocutory 
judgment of dissolution.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15.) 
Beyond addressing this specific concern, however, it is evident from 
context that the amended statute served a different purpose than the original 1870 
Act.  By 1971, the Legislature had long enacted reforms that gave married women 
control of their own earnings even though such earnings remained community 
property (Stats. 1951, ch. 1102, pp. 2860–2861), and by 1975, the Legislature had 
abandoned the male-controlled community property regime in favor of giving both 
spouses equal control (Stats. 1973, ch. 987, pp. 1897–1905; Stats. 1974, ch. 11, 
pp. 3590–3591).  (See Prager, The Persistence of Separate Property Concepts in 
California‘s Community Property System, 1849–1975 (1976) 24 UCLA L.Rev. 1, 
 
5 
65–67, 73–74 & fn. 350.)  Moreover, divorce had become more common by 1971 
(Stevenson & Wolfers, supra, 21 J. Econ. Persp. at p. 29, fig. 1), and two years 
earlier, California had become the first state in the nation to adopt a no-fault 
divorce law (Family Law Act, 1969 Stat., ch. 1608, § 8).  These reforms occurred 
in the context of other legal developments promoting gender equality.  (See Sail’er 
Inn, Inc. v. Kirby (1971) 5 Cal.3d 1; Reed v. Reed (1971) 404 U.S. 71.) 
Thus, by 1971, an estranged wife living separate and apart from her 
husband had no need for a special statutory dispensation to earn and control 
separate property in order to provide for her own sustenance.  She already 
controlled the portion of the community comprised of her own earnings, and she 
was soon to have equal control of all community property.  Thus, the gender-
neutral version of the statute enacted in 1971 no longer served the same protective 
purpose of the gender-specific 1870 Act.  The modern statute is best understood to 
have a different purpose:  Instead of addressing a nonexistent need to free one 
spouse from the other‘s exclusive control of community property, the statute — 
consistent with contemporary norms of gender equality — evenhandedly 
recognizes the separateness of each spouse‘s earnings and accumulations in 
situations where the spouses have effectively though not formally ended their 
marriage.  In short, the statute recognizes a separation before divorce that 
effectively ends the community. 
Today‘s opinion ascribes to the Legislature a continuing purpose of 
―protecting a vulnerable spouse‖ in construing the phrase ―living separate and 
apart‖ to have the same meaning today as it did in 1870.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 25.)  But whereas a narrow construction of the phrase now ―protect[s] the lower 
earning spouse‖ by ―reduc[ing] the potential for manipulation of a more elastic 
standard by the higher earner‖ (ibid.), a narrow construction served no similar 
protective purpose in 1870.  To the contrary, the Legislature in 1870 understood 
 
6 
―living separate and apart‖ narrowly to mean separate addresses because it sought 
to create ―a limited exception to the general rule of that time that the husband had 
full management and control over the marital and separate assets for the duration 
of the marriage.‖  (Id. at p. 11, italics added.)  A broader understanding of ―living 
separate and apart‖ — one that enabled an estranged wife to earn and control 
separate property without living at a separate address from her husband — would 
have been more protective of the vulnerable spouse in 1870.  Yet it also would 
have meant greater property rights for married women at the expense of the male-
controlled property regime, and there is no indication that the Legislature in 1870 
had any interest in fundamentally changing that regime.  The 1870 statute was 
protective because it created an exception to the male-dominated property regime, 
not because the exception it created was a narrow one. 
By 1971, the Legislature had revised the archaic laws granting husbands 
exclusive control of marital assets, and the original motivation for construing 
―living separate and apart‖ narrowly had become obsolete.  Now the gender-
neutral statute, premised on the legal equality of husband and wife, simply 
recognizes the separateness of each spouse‘s earnings and accumulations at the 
point when the spouses have effectively but not formally ended the marriage, i.e., 
when the spouses are ―living separate and apart.‖  Construing this phrase as it 
appears in the modern statute, I agree that its most natural meaning (maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 6–7) as well as practical considerations of clarity and 
administrability (id. at p. 25) suggest that whether spouses are ―living separate and 
apart‖ turns not solely on the subjective intent of at least one spouse, but also on 
an objective manifestation of that intent by some form of physical separation.  
However, countervailing considerations of family economics and parenting (id. at 
p. 24) suggest that the physical separation need not assume the precise form that 
the Legislature in 1870 envisioned, namely, separate addresses. 
 
7 
In considering whether spouses living under the same roof are ―living 
separate and apart‖ for purposes of section 771(a), we are not bound by the 1870 
Legislature‘s narrow understanding of that term.  Rather, in light of the current 
purpose of section 771(a), the question is whether the spouses, in addition to their 
intent to separate, have demonstrated ―unambiguous, objectively ascertainable 
conduct amounting to a physical separation under the same roof.‖  (In re Marriage 
of Norviel (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1164.)  In order to qualify as ―living 
separate and apart,‖ the spouses must have a living arrangement that clearly and 
objectively signals a complete and final termination of the marital relationship.  
Neither the Legislature nor this court has foreclosed the possibility that such a 
living arrangement may occur within a single dwelling. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
I CONCUR: 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
1 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Marriage of Davis 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 220 Cal.App.4th 1109 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S215050 
Date Filed: July 20, 2015 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Alameda 
Judge: Elizabeth Hendrickson, Commissioner 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Law Office of Stephanie J. Finelli and Stephanie J. Finelli for Appellant. 
 
Ferguson Case Orr Paterson, Wendy C. Lascher; Ivie, McNeill & Wyatt and Lilia E. Duchrow for 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Stephanie J. Finelli 
Law Office of Stephanie J. Finelli 
3110 S Street 
Sacramento, CA  95816 
(916) 443-2144 
 
Lilia E. Duchrow 
Ivie, McNeill & Wyatt 
444 South Flower Street, Suite 1800 
Los Angeles, CA  90071 
(213) 489-0028