Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Cushion

Citation: 2001-Ohio-181

Docket Number: 20002267

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Cushion, 92 Ohio St.3d 144, 2001-Ohio-181.] 
 
 
 
OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. CUSHION. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Cushion (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 144.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Indefinite suspension with allowance for 
petition for reinstatement one year after release from prison on 
conditions — Conviction of felonious assault, carrying a concealed 
weapon, discharging a firearm while under the influence of alcohol and 
drugs, and driving under the influence. 
(No. 00-2267 — Submitted January 31, 2001 — Decided June 20, 2001.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 99-36. 
 
Per Curiam.  On May 6, 1999, being advised of the felony conviction of 
respondent, Ralph P. Cushion II of Nelsonville, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 
0037116, we suspended him from the practice of law for an interim period.  In re 
Cushion (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 1472, 709 N.E.2d 845.  After an investigation, 
relator, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, filed a complaint on June 7, 1999, 
charging that the conduct by respondent that resulted in the felony conviction 
violated DR 1-102(A)(3) (engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude) 
and 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s 
fitness to practice law).  After respondent’s answer, the matter was referred to a 
panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the 
Supreme Court (“board”). 
 
Based on stipulations of the parties and testimony at a hearing, the panel 
found that respondent had been convicted of felonious assault with a firearm 
specification, carrying a concealed weapon, discharging a firearm while under the 
influence of alcohol and drugs, and two counts of driving under the influence.  As 
a result of those convictions, respondent was sentenced in February 1999 to two 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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years in prison for felonious assault, seventeen months in prison for carrying a 
concealed weapon, 180 days in prison for driving under the influence, and 180 
days in prison for using weapons while intoxicated.  He was also sentenced to 
three years for an underlying firearm specification.  The sentence for the firearm 
specification was to be served prior to the other four sentences of two years, 
seventeen months, 180 days and 180 days, all of which were to be served 
concurrently.  These charges resulted from an incident in which, while under the 
influence of both alcohol and drugs, which he claims to have taken because of his 
despondency, respondent shot a female companion.  He claims that the pistol 
inadvertently discharged. 
 
The panel concluded that respondent’s conduct violated the Disciplinary 
Rules as charged.  The panel found in mitigation that respondent has shown 
genuine remorse for his actions.  While in prison he engaged in public service and 
educational activities, attended Alcoholic Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous 
meetings, and resolved not to use drugs or alcohol again. 
 
The panel recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended from 
the practice of law in Ohio but that he be allowed to petition for reinstatement one 
year after his release from prison, conditioned on successful postrelease control 
until that date.  The board adopted the findings, conclusions, and recommendation 
of the panel. 
 
Upon review of the record in this matter, we adopt the findings, 
conclusions, and recommendation of the board.  Respondent is hereby indefinitely 
suspended from the practice of law in Ohio.  However, respondent may petition 
for reinstatement one year after his release from prison, conditioned on successful 
postrelease control until that date and the passage of at least two years from the 
date of this order.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur. 
January Term, 2001 
3 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.  I believe that the respondent’s 
criminal actions warrant a more severe sanction than indefinite suspension from 
the practice of law.  While respondent claims that the shooting of Deanna Woods 
was accidental, he was convicted in a full jury trial “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) with a firearm 
specification, carrying a concealed weapon in violation of R.C. 2923.12, two 
counts of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of R.C. 
4511.19(A)(1) and (2), and using a weapon while intoxicated in violation of R.C. 
2923.15.  Respondent was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for the felonious 
assault, with three years for the gun specification to run consecutively, seventeen 
months on the concealed weapon charge to run concurrently, and one hundred 
eighty days each on the counts of driving under the influence and discharging a 
weapon while intoxicated to run concurrently.  Respondent’s convictions were 
affirmed on appeal. 
 
According to a footnote in the board’s report, the respondent’s version was 
“dramatically different” from that of a key witness.  Respondent claims that his 
shooting of Ms. Woods was an accident.  I do not believe that we should accept a 
different version of events once a respondent has been convicted by a jury.  That 
conviction should be conclusive as to respondent’s culpability. 
 
Even if we were to accept respondent’s radically different version of the 
events, he nevertheless abandoned the victim in the driveway after he shot her, 
sped recklessly away, and eventually crashed his vehicle before he was arrested.  
Such actions show a conscious disregard for whether Ms. Woods lived or died, 
which does not support his claim that the shooting was accidental.  The 
requirements of DR 1-102(A)(3) would be met by that act alone. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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While respondent acknowledged his drug and alcohol addictions and his 
ego problems and promised to reform, these promises are not sufficient, in my 
opinion, to mitigate the circumstances of his conduct, which I believe merit his 
disbarment.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and RESNICK, J., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Summers & Vargas Co., L.P.A., William L. Summers and Edwin J. Vagas, 
for respondent.