Case Title: State v. Sholar

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2016AP000897-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2018-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 WI 53 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP897-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Lamont Donnell Sholar, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 377 Wis. 2d 337, 900 N.W.2d 872  
(2017 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 18, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 23, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Rebecca F. Dallet and Thomas J. McAdams 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by and an oral argument by Hannah Schieber Jurrs, 
assistant state public defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Lisa E.F. Kumfer, assistant attorney general, and Brad D. 
Schimel, attorney general.  There was an oral argument by Lisa 
E.F. Kumfer. 
 
 
2018 WI 53
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP897-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2011CF4807) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Lamont Donnell Sholar, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 18, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   Lamont Donnell Sholar 
seeks review of the court of appeals decision1 affirming the 
circuit court's2 order ruling that his trial counsel's failure to 
                                                 
1 State v. Sholar, No. 2016AP897-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. June 20, 2017) ("Sholar II"). 
2 The Honorable Thomas J. McAdams, Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court, presided over the Machner hearing and entered the order 
vacating one of Sholar's six convictions.  See State v. Machner, 
92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979).  The Honorable 
Rebecca F. Dallet, Milwaukee County Circuit Court, presided over 
the 
jury 
trial 
and 
entered 
the 
order 
denying 
Sholar's 
postconviction motion. 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
2 
 
object to an exhibit sent to the jury during deliberations 
constituted ineffective assistance only with respect to one of 
the six counts for which he was convicted.  He contends that his 
trial counsel's ineffective assistance should result in vacatur 
of all six of his convictions.  He also asserts the State 
forfeited its right to argue the prejudice prong of the 
ineffective assistance test at his Machner hearing because the 
State did not petition this court for review after the court of 
appeals' original decision remanding for a Machner hearing.3  We 
affirm. 
¶2 
We hold that circuit courts reviewing claims of 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
following 
multiple-count 
trials may conclude that deficient performance prejudiced only 
one of the multiple convictions.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 695-96 (1984), clearly contemplates such a result and 
does not require reversal on all counts when the prejudice 
proven affected only a single count.  We further hold the State 
did not forfeit its right to challenge the prejudice prong of 
the ineffective assistance test when it did not petition this 
court for review following the court of appeals' decision in 
Sholar I.  The issue decided adversely to the State in Sholar I 
                                                 
3 See State v. Sholar, No. 2014AP1945-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶40 (Wis. Ct. App. June 30, 2015) ("Sholar I") (reversing 
Judge Dallet's order summarily denying Sholar's postconviction 
motion on the ground that Sholar presented sufficient evidence 
to warrant a Machner hearing "at least as to the sexual assault 
charge"). 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
3 
 
was not whether prejudice existed, but whether Sholar was 
entitled to a Machner hearing.  If the State wanted to challenge 
whether a Machner hearing should occur at all, it would have 
needed to petition this court for review, but no petition was 
needed to contest prejudice.  Finally, we reiterate that the 
Strickland prejudice test is distinct from a sufficiency of the 
evidence test. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
In late September 2011, Sholar and his life-long 
friend, Shawnrell Simmons, were arrested after two victims, E.C. 
and S.G., separately reported to police that they had been 
victims of sex trafficking by Sholar (and that other girls had 
been trafficked by Simmons) out of several motel rooms near the 
Milwaukee airport, including the Econolodge on 13th Street.  The 
State charged both men, but their cases proceeded separately.  
The State charged Sholar with six counts:  (1) trafficking a 
child (victim E.C. who was 17 years old at the time); (2) 
soliciting 
a 
child 
for 
prostitution 
(E.C.); 
(3) 
pandering/pimping (E.C.); (4) human trafficking (victim S.G., 
who was 21 years old at the time); (5) second-degree sexual 
assault, use of force (S.G.); and (6) pandering/pimping (S.G.).4 
¶4 
Sholar pled not guilty, and in April 2012 his case 
went to trial.  Both victims testified.  During E.C.'s 
testimony, the jury heard:  
                                                 
4 We hereinafter refer to counts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 as 
"trafficking/pimping" counts. 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
4 
 
 E.C. met Simmons through a mutual friend after which he 
pressured her to work for him as a prostitute.  She 
initially refused, but, after two of her friends went to 
work for Simmons, and because she was desperate for 
money, she called Simmons.  He sent her to work for 
Sholar 
because 
Simmons 
already 
had 
enough 
girls 
prostituting for him. 
 Sholar picked up E.C. and her 13-year-old friend and both 
girls went to work for Sholar. 
 Sholar, other girls, or E.C. would take "half-naked" 
pictures, which Sholar posted on the "Backpage" website 
to solicit customers.5  In the pictures, E.C. wore 
lingerie or a bra and underwear. 
 E.C. identified six Backpage ads, each of which had 
multiple pictures, depicting the girls Sholar and Simmons 
were trafficking——including several ads with pictures of 
E.C. and S.G.  The ads had titles such as "Chula Ready 
For You-19," "Fun And Sexy Red-22," "Let's Sparkle Dazzle 
You-21," and "Roxy Limited Time Only Specials-19."  The 
ads listed a contact phone number.   
The jury learned through other witnesses that the contact phone 
number appearing in the ads matched the phone Sholar had in his 
possession when he was arrested. 
¶5 
E.C.'s testimony also revealed: 
                                                 
5 Backpage is a classified advertising website. 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
5 
 
 There were more Backpage ads in addition to the six 
previously discussed and the two additional ones E.C. 
identified 
depicting 
Simmons' 
trafficking 
victims, 
"Nicki,"6 and another girl whose name E.C. could not 
remember.  
 An "out-call" involved Sholar driving her to a customer 
who would pay her for sex while an "in-call" meant the 
customer would come to her motel room and pay her for 
sex. 
 Simmons and Sholar worked together at times to transport 
girls to out-calls. 
 Sholar gave E.C. a cell phone to use for the customer 
calls and to set up appointments.  When the customer 
arrived, he would text her phone and she would either 
meet him and bring him to her motel room or send him her 
room number. 
 During every appointment, which she estimated at possibly 
200, she had sexual intercourse with the customer for 
money.  She got the money upfront, $80-$100 for half-an-
hour, $150-$200 for an hour.  She would hide the money, 
give the man a condom that Sholar supplied, and have sex.  
When the man left, she texted Sholar so he could come 
back to the room and take the money. 
                                                 
6 During trial, some individuals were referenced by their 
first names only.  We use only first names for others for 
privacy reasons. 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
6 
 
 Some nights she only had one or two calls, but could have 
as many as seven to ten. 
 One time she worked a party with two girls working for 
Simmons after which Sholar and Simmons split the money. 
 When S.G. started working for Sholar, E.C. took pictures 
of S.G. that Sholar posted on Backpage. 
 E.C. was afraid of Sholar and the way he looked at her 
and screamed at her.  Sometimes he punched her, which 
left bruises.  A picture of one of her bruises was shown 
to the jury.  He threatened her and told her she could 
not leave.  She testified she wanted to stop prostituting 
"[r]ight away" but she did not have anywhere to go and 
she was scared.  She told Sholar that she wanted to stop 
but he said he would find her if she tried to leave.  He 
sent her threatening texts if he could not find her.  He 
showed up at various places kicking and banging on doors 
looking for her. 
 Sholar "was prostituting girls every age.  The lowest age 
was 13."  She saw three other girls who stayed at the 
motel——S.G., Roxy, and Nicki——also give Sholar money.  
Depending on the month, Sholar had up to four or five 
girls working for him. 
¶6 
E.C. testified that her work as Sholar's trafficking 
victim ended when E.C. borrowed her friend A.F.'s car and Sholar 
suggested instead of returning the car, they should sell it.  
E.C. said Sholar asked her if A.F. had anything else they could 
sell and E.C. told him about a 50-inch television she had seen 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
7 
 
in A.F.'s apartment.  Sholar, E.C., and another man known as 
Cookie drove to A.F.'s home in Sholar's red car.  E.C. waited in 
the car and Sholar and Cookie brought down the television, and 
some hats and shoes stolen from A.F.'s apartment.  They put the 
television in the back seat and the other items in the trunk.  
Sholar went back into the apartment to steal a smaller 
television, but A.F. came home, caught Sholar in the act, and 
called police. 
¶7 
E.C. testified that before police arrived, she drove 
Sholar's car with the stolen goods to the house where "Chrissy," 
the mother of Sholar's child, resided.  When E.C. arrived, 
Chrissy told her where to park the car, and then E.C. headed 
back 
to 
the 
Econolodge 
because 
Nicki 
(one 
of 
Simmons' 
trafficking victims) called her and said the police were at the 
motel threatening to take Nicki's children if E.C. did not come 
back. 
¶8 
E.C. told the jury that when she returned to the 
Econolodge, the police had left, but the desk clerk gave her a 
police business card with a detective's number.  E.C. called the 
number, but the detective was not available.  The next day, the 
police came to the Econolodge and arrested E.C. for the 
burglary.  She told them where Sholar's car was parked with the 
stolen television.  The prosecutor then asked E.C. to look at 
several photographs, which E.C. identified as pictures of 
Sholar's red car with the stolen television in the back seat, 
and the stolen hats and shoes in the trunk.  E.C. next explained 
that she told Detective Barbara O'Leary about working as 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
8 
 
Sholar's prostitute.  When asked why E.C. never called police 
for help to leave Sholar, E.C. said she was scared.  She said 
that even if Sholar was in jail, Simmons could still hurt her.  
She testified Simmons previously hurt her:  he "smacked" and 
"choked" her, "spit on [her] face," and held a gun to her head.  
She also disclosed that Simmons sexually assaulted her.  She 
explained that Sholar also had sex with her but that was 
expected because she worked for him.  E.C. testified that Sholar 
had sex with her almost every day. 
¶9 
S.G. also testified.  When she first took the stand, 
she was scared and the transcript indicates she was crying.  She 
said she was afraid that Sholar would harm her or her family 
because she was testifying against him.  The prosecutor had to 
ask her background questions to calm her.  After regaining 
composure, S.G. told the jury: 
 She met Sholar, whom she called "L," when he came to help 
her roommate move out.  Sholar seemed "very nice" and 
"was continuously complimenting" her and her friend.  
After that meeting, they started texting.  At the end of 
July 2011, Sholar came over to "hang out for a little 
bit" at her place. 
 Sholar started telling her and her friend about how "he 
had some girls that would, you know, go and do stuff for 
money" and that "he was a pimp."  S.G. said they thought 
he was joking.  She felt comfortable with Sholar because 
he was acting like a good friend, popping up when she 
needed a ride, and helping out "kind of like Superman."  
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
9 
 
As a result, she "confided in him about where [her] 
family stayed," about the struggles she had experienced 
in life, and about how she had worked as an exotic dancer 
in the past. 
 After getting close to Sholar, he started telling her she 
could make $300 if she gave private half-hour dances for 
people he knew.  She thought this would be an easy way to 
make a lot of money and agreed to the dancing.  Her first 
job went smoothly and was just dancing.  Later, however, 
Sholar took pictures of her at Econolodge with his cell 
phone and posted them on Backpage.  Sholar gave her a 
cell phone and she started getting texts and calls from 
men who saw her Backpage ads and wanted to pay her to 
have sex. 
 Sonya was the name S.G. had used when she danced.  S.G. 
identified two Backpage ads, one depicting her and E.C. 
together, titled "Satin & Silk-21" and an ad with 
multiple pictures of S.G. labeled "Miss Fiery Sonya-21."   
 She was shocked and told Sholar she did not want to do 
this, but he threatened her, saying he would harm her 
family, harm her, and get her evicted.  Sholar told her 
he had broken the jaw of a girl who tried to get away 
from him. 
 Sholar was controlling and mean and if she did not listen 
to him, he threatened to kill her and her family.  He 
would remind her he knew where her family lived.  He 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
10 
 
showed up at her parents' home looking for S.G. and 
threatened her mother. 
 Sholar set the price men paid to have sex with her, and 
she had sex with 10-15 men a night at $300/hour.  These 
encounters were usually at the Econolodge, but sometimes 
Sholar took her to the men for "out-calls."  She did this 
for about two weeks.  She would take the money when the 
man arrived, hide it, and then have sexual intercourse 
with the man.  Sometimes the man wanted to fulfill "weird 
fantasies" and that would require S.G. to call Sholar, 
who would tell her how much extra money the man needed to 
pay to complete those requests. 
 Sholar gave S.G. food, drugs, alcohol, and clothes.  She 
testified he provided her with Ecstasy, which she took 
because she could not have done "any kind of that stuff" 
sober. 
 Occasionally, she and another girl would work together 
and have sex with the same man.  She did this once with 
E.C. and once with Nicki, who worked for Simmons. 
 Although S.G. did not want to have sex with Sholar, this 
happened "[p]retty often."  She testified about one 
particular night when Sholar wanted to have sex with her, 
but she was tired.  She tried to go to the bathroom to 
avoid it, but Sholar grabbed her arm "[i]n a way that 
made me not want to fight back," pushed her onto the bed, 
and forced penis-to-vagina sex on her.  After that time, 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
11 
 
she did not fight Sholar when he wanted to have sex with 
her. 
 When S.G.'s boyfriend got out of jail, she tried to leave 
Sholar, but Sholar threatened to tell S.G.'s boyfriend 
how she "was sleeping with so many men."  S.G. said she 
agreed to come back to Sholar because she did not want 
her boyfriend to know what she was doing.  Sholar agreed 
to tell her boyfriend that Sholar was selling drugs for 
S.G., so S.G. would not have to sell them herself. 
 Then one day, S.G. left the cell phone Sholar had given 
her with a friend thinking Sholar would be so mad, it 
would give S.G. a way out of the situation.  S.G. went 
home and fell asleep.  While she was asleep, Sholar 
called her repeatedly, leaving threatening voicemails, 
said he was going to set her house on fire, went to her 
roommate's place of work, threatened to get the roommate 
fired, and told the roommate she should kick S.G. out of 
the house or Sholar would get them both evicted and set 
the house on fire.  Sholar came back to S.G.'s house and 
pounded on her bedroom windows, knocked on the doors, and 
harassed the neighbors looking for S.G.  S.G. was inside 
the house with the lights off hiding in a closet. 
 While in that closet, she called her mother, who called 
the police.  Sholar had been to the mother's house 
earlier looking for S.G. and demanding her mother give 
back a cell phone Sholar gave to S.G. 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
12 
 
 The police arrived at S.G.'s home and she quickly packed 
what she needed so the police could take her to her 
mother's home.  At first, S.G. was too scared to tell the 
police the truth, but then told them a little bit about 
what had been happening.  A few weeks later, the police 
came back and she disclosed more information. 
¶10 On cross-examination, S.G. testified Sholar most often 
drove her to out-calls, but on occasion Sholar and Simmons did 
so together.  She disclosed that on one occasion when she tried 
to leave without telling Sholar where she was going, he pulled 
her hair.  She also saw him get rough with E.C. on one occasion. 
¶11 S.G.'s mother testified and confirmed S.G.'s version 
of 
events. 
 
The 
mother 
testified 
that 
she 
received 
a 
"hysterical" call from her daughter saying there was a "man 
outside who wanted to kill" S.G.  The mother also told the jury 
about how Sholar came to the mother's home looking for S.G. and 
asking for the phone he had given to S.G.  She testified that 
Sholar asked for S.G. by name. 
¶12 The State also called several police witnesses, who 
corroborated E.C.'s and S.G.'s testimony.  Detective Lynda Stott 
testified about human trafficking and how the pimp-prostitute 
relationship evolves, which matched both victims' experience.  
Stott explained how the pimp befriends the victim, helps her, 
earns her trust, but when she starts working for him, everything 
changes.  The pimp is controlling, makes her dependent on him, 
and threatens her if she wants to stop or wants to leave.  Stott 
also told the jury about taking the hard drive from the 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
13 
 
Econolodge's lobby computer, which had been used to post the 
Backpage ads, and she testified about the women's clothing and 
other items collected from the rooms being used by Sholar at the 
Econolodge.  The jury saw pictures of these items, which 
included lingerie, high-heeled shoes, condoms, and an explicit 
magazine titled "Straight Stuntin." 
¶13 Detective Richard McQuown, a detective with the 
Milwaukee Police High Technology Unit who had experience 
investigating human trafficking, testified about his review of 
E.C.'s cell phone.  He created both a disk containing the 
contents of E.C.'s phone as well as a printout.  He told the 
jury that the texts on E.C.'s phone evidenced human trafficking 
because much of the content revealed attempts to arrange 
meetings for sexual encounters between people who had never met.  
He read several of the texts to the jury, including ones that 
referenced "Star"——which E.C. said was her prostitute name, and 
one looking for "Star" and "Sonya"——referring to E.C. and S.G.  
McQuown also testified that the photos on this phone with girls 
in "various poses and semi-sexually suggestive poses" without 
the person's head are typically the type that get posted on 
Backpage or a similar site. 
¶14 The State presented Detective Richard McKee as a 
witness.  McKee also worked in the Milwaukee High Technology 
Unit and had experience investigating human trafficking.  He 
examined the cell phone taken from Sholar when he was arrested.  
This phone's number was listed as the contact number on one of 
the Backpage ads posted for purposes of trafficking Sholar's 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
14 
 
victims.  McKee also examined the desktop computer taken from 
the lobby at the Econolodge, another laptop computer, S.G.'s 
cell phone, and Nicki's cell phone.  McKee composed a summary of 
the contents of all these devices and created a PowerPoint 
presentation that was shown to the jury on a television during 
his testimony.  McKee's presentation showed: 
 Metadata from pictures of girls on Sholar's cell phone 
indicating the photos were taken in September 2011 at the 
Econolodge.  These same pictures then appeared in ads 
posted on Backpage. 
 Data recovered from the desktop computer taken from the 
Econolodge's lobby including Backpage ads with pictures 
matching images on Sholar's cell phone; these ads were 
uploaded to Backpage from the Econolodge computer and the 
internet history of the Econolodge desktop showed "234 
visits to Backpage.com pages and 22 pages that were 
specifically relating to posting." 
 Text messages from S.G.'s phone indicating the user was 
"Sonya" and messages referencing "in-calls" and "out-
calls." 
 Photos from other cell phones and a laptop computer 
depicting more Backpage ads and text messages referencing 
prostitution. 
¶15 McKee testified that he examined Sholar's phone and 
printed its contents, which became Exhibit 79.  The printout 
included the phone's contact list, text messages, call log, 
photos, and listed the audio and video files.  The prosecutor 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
15 
 
took McKee through each text that referenced "L."  He testified 
about several incoming texts on that phone texting someone named 
"L," including from someone with E.C.'s first name and phone 
number.  For example, there was an outgoing message to someone 
with E.C.'s first name that said "just so you know I also put 
you down as a special of $100 hour just to increase the calls 
'cause something got to give; I can't keep paying for that room 
on my own."  E.C. texted back that other girls were working from 
that room too:  "every other girl just goes, handles business 
and that's it." 
¶16 McKee explained the exhibit showed 1,384 total text 
messages between September 14, 2011 and September 28, 2011.  
Exhibit 79 was admitted into evidence, but was not published in 
its entirety to the jury during trial.  The jury did, however, 
see and hear much of the exhibit's contents through witness 
testimony, McKee's PowerPoint presentation, and the individual 
Backpage ads, which were admitted as separate exhibits. 
¶17  Detective O'Leary also testified.  She confirmed much 
of E.C.'s version of events, including details about the A.F. 
burglary.  She also told the jury about her interview with 
Sholar after his arrest for the burglary, and how he consented 
to the search of "his" phone, the same phone that generated 
Exhibit 79.  She told the jury that she had left her contact 
card with the desk clerk at the Econolodge, which led to E.C.'s 
arrest 
for 
burglary. 
 
O'Leary 
testified 
that 
when 
she 
interviewed 
E.C., 
E.C. 
confessed 
to 
working 
as 
Sholar's 
prostitute and told O'Leary the police could find evidence of 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
16 
 
prostitution on Sholar's phone.  O'Leary explained how E.C. 
assisted O'Leary in locating and printing the Backpage ads of 
women who were trafficked by Sholar or Simmons. 
¶18 "Nicki" also testified for the State, corroborating 
much of what the victims said, although she described herself as 
an "escort" rather than a prostitute.  She admitted that 
sometimes she had sex with her escort dates, but claimed she 
worked independently.  She told the jury she lived at the 
Econolodge and would ask Simmons for a ride if she had an "out-
call."  She identified three other girls, including E.C., who 
worked in rooms at the Econolodge.  Nicki testified that E.C. 
stayed in a motel room with Sholar, whom she knew as "L." 
¶19 Finally, Peter Wargolet, the desk clerk and night 
auditor at the Econolodge testified.  He confirmed that E.C. was 
staying in Room 157 and that Sholar was paying cash for that 
room.  Sholar paid for that room from August 15, 2011 to 
September 28, 2011.  He also told the jury that Sholar rented a 
second room for two weeks in August 2011 and two other rooms for 
one night each in September 2011.  Wargolet confirmed that 
another room associated with Sholar was paid for by either 
someone named "Nicole" or Simmons. 
¶20 Sholar was the only witness for the defense.  He 
testified that Simmons, his friend for 20 years, was the pimp.  
Sholar denied any involvement.  He claimed the phone found on 
him when he was arrested belonged to Simmons, who had loaned it 
to Sholar because Sholar's phone had broken.  Sholar admitted 
befriending E.C., but claimed he met S.G. only one time when he 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
17 
 
was helping out her roommate, and a second time at the motel 
when she was working for Simmons.  Sholar denied ever having sex 
with S.G.  Sholar testified that he was staying at the 
Econolodge because his 14-year old son accidentally burned the 
kitchen in his apartment.  Sholar told the jurors he sold K2, 
which was like marijuana but legal, but he did not drink or do 
drugs.  He claimed he did not steal the television; rather, E.C. 
sold it to him.  He told the jury he had been convicted four 
times. 
¶21 In rebuttal, the State played part of the audio 
recording from O'Leary's interview with Sholar, during which 
Sholar acted as if the cell phone was his, consented to a search 
of it, and blamed E.C. for the burglary.  O'Leary testified that 
Sholar identified for her both the number of the cell phone and 
the security code needed to unlock the phone.  The State also 
called another police officer who responded to the A.F. burglary 
scene and testified that Sholar claimed he came to A.F.'s 
apartment to "sell some weed and then all this happened." 
¶22 Detective Steve Wells testified during the State's 
rebuttal case that when he interviewed Sholar, Sholar told a 
different story about his cell phone.  Sholar said nothing about 
his cell phone breaking; instead, Sholar claimed Simmons' cell 
phone had broken.  Sholar told Wells that Simmons had to borrow 
Sholar's cell phone, which is why pictures of the girls matching 
the Backpage ads were found on Sholar's phone.  The video 
recording of this interview was played for the jury.  The 
recording showed Sholar explaining that the Backpage pictures 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
18 
 
were on his phone not because he was involved in this 
trafficking ring, but simply because he was helping Simmons get 
pictures of his prostitutes since Simmons' phone was broken. 
¶23 During deliberations, the jury sent a question to the 
circuit 
court: 
 
"Can 
we 
request 
Lamont's 
phone 
records? . . . Looking for in/outbound re:  'I got $' txt msgs 
while with client."  In discussing the question with both 
attorneys, the circuit court asked: 
[I]sn't it all contained in the one exhibit that 
Detective McKee had, has put in the one big thick one, 
would all those things be answered in there?  Because 
I don't want to be parceling out.  I just want to give 
them the exhibit that they seem to be requesting. 
The exhibit referred to was Exhibit 79.  All agreed to send the 
entire exhibit into the jury room.  The jury later asked for 
E.C.'s phone records, which composed Exhibit 70, and that was 
also sent to the jury room. 
¶24 The jury returned guilty verdicts on all six counts 
and Sholar was sentenced.  His lawyer filed a postconviction 
motion seeking a new trial based on ineffective assistance.7  As 
material here, Sholar claimed his trial lawyer gave him 
ineffective assistance by failing to object "when hundreds of 
text messages" referencing drug dealing and other illegal 
activity were admitted into evidence and given to the jury 
during deliberations.  In support of the motion, appellate 
                                                 
7 Sholar's motion alleged additional errors not pertinent to 
this review. 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
19 
 
counsel attached pages 10-109 of Exhibit 79, which contained the 
text messages from Sholar's cell phone.  The rest of Exhibit 79, 
including the pictures from the cell phone depicted on pages 
130-173 of the exhibit, were not included in support of the 
postconviction motion. 
¶25 The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
Sholar's 
ineffective 
assistance claims without holding a Machner hearing, reasoning 
that even if parts of Exhibit 79 should have been excluded as 
other acts evidence, Sholar failed to prove prejudice.  Sholar 
appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the circuit court.  
The court of appeals held Sholar's motion alleged sufficient 
facts to warrant a Machner hearing, and remanded to the circuit 
court. 
¶26 At 
the 
Machner 
hearing, 
Sholar's 
trial 
counsel 
testified he filed a suppression motion seeking to exclude 
Sholar's 
cell 
phone, 
but 
the 
circuit 
court 
denied 
the 
suppression motion.  Trial counsel explained that after the 
failed suppression motion, he felt the phone evidence was 
admissible and there was no basis to object to its admission.  
At trial, the defense theory was that Simmons, rather than 
Sholar, was the pimp and that the cell phone belonged to 
Simmons, not Sholar.  Only a handful of the messages on the cell 
phone could be linked directly to Sholar while hundreds of them 
could be linked to Simmons.  When the jury asked for Sholar's 
phone records, trial counsel did not object to the entire 
exhibit going to the jury because parceling down the exhibit to 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
20 
 
only the messages linked to Sholar would be damaging to his 
client. 
¶27 The circuit court ruled that Sholar failed to prove 
Exhibit 79 prejudiced his defense of the counts relating to sex 
trafficking and pimping:  "So as to the trafficking counts which 
would be Counts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 I find that the performance was 
certainly not prejudicial as the evidence on those counts was 
overwhelming."  The circuit court explained that "virtually all 
of the things Mr. Sholar complains of here came in in this trial 
in more than one way."  That is: 
There was violence testified to by the girls.  There 
was testimony about drug use to make it through the 
night.  There was testimony from the girls about 
threats, there was testimony about burglary, there was 
testimony about a potential car theft.  There was 
testimony about fetishes and there was testimony about 
group sex parties and the list seems to go on and on.  
Given that circumstance, I believe there was no chance 
of a different result on the trafficking counts. 
The circuit court discussed Sholar's trial lawyer's strategy to 
not object to the admission of the texts as "sound trial 
strategy" given the defense theory of blaming Simmons.  The 
circuit court noted that "[m]uch of what is in these messages is 
mundane." 
¶28 The circuit court, however, saw the impact of Exhibit 
79's 
admission 
on 
the 
sexual 
assault 
conviction 
quite 
differently.  Although Sholar's argument rested on the text 
messages, the circuit court was most troubled by the pictures in 
the exhibit, which the circuit court viewed as "child porn" that 
"serve[d] to inflame the jury."  It did not "see how a fair 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
21 
 
trial could be had on the sexual assault count with the jury 
being given these photos."  Specifically with respect to that 
count, the circuit court commented:  "The messages and the 
pictures are in my opinion so inflammatory that I think a jury 
then and there might have convicted him of virtually anything.  
I do not have confidence in the result as to that count."  The 
circuit court ruled that "as to the sexual assault count the 
defense clearly has shown deficient performance and prejudice."  
The circuit court vacated the sexual assault conviction. 
¶29 The circuit court gave seven reasons why the law 
allowed it to distinguish the human trafficking counts from the 
sexual assault count and uphold the former while vacating the 
latter:  (1) the court of appeals decision suggested the split 
analysis; (2) this case involved multiple counts with more than 
one victim and an ineffective assistance analysis must be a 
charge-specific 
decision; 
(3) 
judicial 
economy 
dictates 
upholding the counts that would result in the same outcome on 
retrial; (4) vacating the unaffected counts would "waste the 
time and effort of the parties"; (5) a totality of the 
circumstances analysis means looking at "specific facts and 
specific charges"; (6) the sexual assault count is "separate and 
apart" from the others; and (7) Strickland and the singular 
verdict forms support the distinction, allowing vacatur of a 
weakly supported conviction while upholding an overwhelmingly 
supported conviction. 
¶30 Unhappy with the distinction, Sholar sought vacatur of 
all of his convictions.  The court of appeals rejected Sholar's 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
22 
 
arguments and affirmed the circuit court.  We accepted Sholar's 
petition for review. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A. 
Ineffective Assistance 
¶31 Sholar contends the prejudice he proved to support his 
ineffective assistance claim should result in vacatur of all of 
his convictions, not just the sexual assault conviction.  He 
argues the court of appeals should be reversed because it 
conducted 
a 
"count-by-count" 
sufficiency 
of 
the 
evidence 
analysis, contrary to Strickland.  The State counters that guilt 
is decided count-by-count and Strickland expressly permits a 
reviewing court to examine prejudice in the context of an 
ineffective assistance claim in the same way.  It contends that 
the trafficking/pimping counts were not affected by Exhibit 79 
because of overwhelming properly-admitted evidence supporting 
those convictions and because "virtually all of the things" 
Sholar claims prejudiced him from Exhibit 79 were already 
presented to the jury through properly-admitted evidence.  We 
agree with the State.8 
 
 
                                                 
8 We note that the State did not appeal the vacatur of the 
sexual assault conviction nor did it appeal the circuit court's 
ruling that trial counsel acted deficiently in allowing Exhibit 
79 to go to the jury.  Although the court questions the legal 
correctness of both decisions based on our review of the record, 
given the State's choices to forgo challenging either, we let 
both decisions stand without further discussion. 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
23 
 
1. Legal Principles 
¶32 A criminal defendant has the constitutional right to 
effective assistance of counsel.  See State v. Balliette, 2011 
WI 79, ¶21, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334 (citing Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 686).  To establish the assistance a defendant 
received was ineffective, he must prove two elements:  (1) his 
counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense.  Id. 
¶33 To prove prejudice, a defendant must establish that 
"particular errors of counsel were unreasonable" and "that they 
actually had an adverse effect on the defense."  Id., ¶24 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).  In assessing whether a 
defendant proves prejudice, the court considers the surrounding 
circumstances because "an act or omission that is unprofessional 
in one case may be sound or even brilliant in another."  Id.  We 
evaluate whether "there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for 
counsel's 
unprofessional 
errors, 
the 
result 
of 
the 
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  In other words, we 
examine whether there is "a reasonable probability that, absent 
the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt 
respecting guilt."  Id. at 695.  Our concern is whether the 
error rendered the trial unfair and unreliable.  Id. at 687, 
689, 693-96. 
¶34  In reviewing the prejudice prong, Strickland directs:   
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
24 
 
Some errors will have had a pervasive effect on the 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the 
entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an 
isolated, trivial effect.  Moreover, a verdict or 
conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more 
likely to have been affected by errors than one with 
overwhelming record support.  Taking the unaffected 
findings as a given, and taking due account of the 
effect of the errors on the remaining findings, a 
court making the prejudice inquiry must ask if the 
defendant has met the burden of showing that the 
decision reached would reasonably likely have been 
different absent the errors. 
466 U.S. at 695-96. 
¶35 Ineffective assistance claims present mixed questions 
of fact and law.  Balliette 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶19.  The circuit 
court's factual findings will be upheld "unless shown to be 
clearly erroneous," but "[t]he ultimate conclusion as to whether 
there was ineffective assistance of counsel is a question of 
law."  Id. 
2. Application 
¶36 In this case, there are two related issues underlying 
the ineffective assistance claim:  (1) whether a defendant who 
proves ineffective assistance as to one count, after being 
convicted of multiple counts, should get a new trial on all 
counts; and (2) whether Sholar has proven that publication of 
Exhibit 79 to the jury prejudiced him on the trafficking/pimping 
counts. 
¶37 The first is an issue of first impression:  if a 
defendant convicted of six counts proves his trial counsel's 
deficient performance prejudiced him on one of his convictions, 
is he entitled to a new trial on all six convictions?  Under 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
25 
 
Strickland, 
the 
answer 
is 
no. 
 
Strickland 
specifically 
recognizes that some errors will have a pervasive effect and 
others will have an "isolated, trivial effect."  466 U.S. at 
695-96.  Of particular importance in this case, Strickland 
acknowledges that some factual findings will be altogether 
unaffected by defense counsel's error.  Id. at 695.  A "verdict 
or conclusion" based on weak evidence is more likely to be 
affected by the error than a decision based on overwhelming 
evidence.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96.  Strickland speaks in 
terms of the "verdict" or "conclusion" and the "decision 
reached." 
 
Id. 
 
In 
single-count 
cases, 
the 
"verdict," 
"conclusion," or "decision" will be a single conviction.  In 
contrast, in multi-count trials, the "verdict," "conclusion," or 
"decision" will be count-specific. 
¶38 When this jury deliberated, it did not answer the 
single question——"is Sholar guilty or not guilty?"  Instead, it 
rendered 
six 
separate 
verdicts, 
answering 
six 
separate 
questions.  It determined whether Sholar was guilty or not 
guilty of six separate crimes.  There is no basis in law or 
logic to require a new trial on all six convictions if the error 
affected only one.  The circuit court gave seven legally valid 
and factually logical reasons supporting the split result.  See 
supra ¶29.  We ratify each of them. 
¶39 Sholar cites three cases he claims support his "all or 
nothing" position:  (1) State v. Jenkins, 2014 WI 59, 355 
Wis. 2d 180, 848 N.W.2d 786; (2) State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, 
264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305; and (3) State v. Honig, 2016 WI 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
26 
 
App 10, 366 Wis. 2d 681, 874 N.W.2d 589.  In Jenkins, the 
defendant 
was 
convicted 
of 
three 
crimes——first-degree 
intentional homicide, first-degree reckless injury, and felon in 
possession of a firearm.  355 Wis. 2d 180, ¶2.  We overturned 
all three convictions, ruling that trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance for failing to call a bystander witness 
who "would contradict or impeach the eyewitness upon whom the 
prosecution's entire case relied."  Id., ¶¶40-48, 59 (emphasis 
added).  In Thiel, the defendant was convicted of seven counts 
of sexual exploitation by a therapist, and all of the 
convictions were based on the credibility of a single witness.  
264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶¶2-4, 13-16.  We overturned all of the 
convictions, ruling that trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance 
by 
failing 
to 
discover 
and 
use 
substantial 
impeachment evidence in cross-examining the crucial witness.  
Id., ¶¶26-32, 46.  In Honig, the defendant was convicted of two 
child sexual assault charges based on the testimony of the five- 
and three-year-old child victims, and their Uncle Raymond.  Id., 
¶¶1, 33.  The court of appeals overturned the convictions, 
ruling that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for 
failing to call a witness who heard Uncle Raymond admit to 
framing the defendant by telling each of the child victims to 
make the false accusations.  Id., ¶¶6, 26, 29, 33. 
¶40 Sholar correctly notes that in all three of these 
cases, the reviewing court did not do a count-by-count prejudice 
analysis, but simply ordered a new trial on all the convictions.  
All three of these cases, however, are distinguishable from 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
27 
 
Sholar's case.  In Jenkins, Thiel, and Honig, the multiple 
charges depended on the same evidence and the deficient 
performance 
affected 
the 
reliability 
of 
that 
evidence.  
Significantly, no one argued in Jenkins, Thiel, or Honig that 
the prejudice affected only one count, but not others.  In each 
case, both sides presented the argument as an all or nothing 
proposition.  None of these cases involved circumstances where 
the prejudice attached to the defense of only one count, or 
involved one charge substantively separable from the other 
charges and the evidence presented, or involved one charge with 
less evidentiary support and other charges with overwhelming 
evidentiary support.  Accordingly, Jenkins, Thiel, and Honig do 
not preclude the split-prejudice conclusion reached in Sholar's 
case. 
¶41 Having concluded that a split result is lawful, we 
turn to the second issue——whether the error here prejudiced the 
trafficking/pimping counts.  This is not a close question.  The 
State 
presented 
overwhelming 
evidence 
to 
support 
the 
trafficking/pimping counts.  Both victims reported independently 
of each other and told consistent narratives about how Sholar 
trafficked them.  Other witnesses materially corroborated the 
victims' testimony, including the Econolodge desk clerk, whose 
testimony supplied corroborating details.  Physical and forensic 
evidence further verified the victims' version of events.  
Backpage ads tied to Sholar's cell phone number, Sholar's cell 
phone itself, and his admission to police that the cell phone 
was his all supported the victims' testimony. 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
28 
 
¶42 Sholar argues that Exhibit 79's publication to the 
jury prejudiced the trafficking/pimping convictions because the 
exhibit depicted him as a violent drug dealer with 150 illicit 
pictures on his cell phone.  But the jury saw "virtually all" of 
the exhibit's contents, which already had been admitted into 
evidence.  The jury heard testimony:  (1) from police witnesses 
about the damning text messages connecting Sholar to the 
trafficking ring; (2) from the victims that Sholar was violent 
and provided them with illegal drugs; and (3) about Sholar's 
threats of harm to the trafficking victims and their families.  
During the trial, the jury already viewed many Backpage 
pictures, most of which were identical to the ones contained in 
the exhibit.  During Detective McKee's testimony, the jury 
viewed many of the illicit photos from Sholar's cell phone on a 
television during McKee's PowerPoint presentation.  The jury saw 
evidence of physical harm Sholar caused to E.C.  And the jury 
heard and saw the fear E.C. and S.G. exhibited when each 
testified at trial. 
¶43 In order to prove Exhibit 79 prejudiced his defense of 
the trafficking/pimping counts, Sholar must show that but for 
Exhibit 79 going to the jury, there is a reasonable probability 
the jury would have had a reasonable doubt as to his guilt on 
those charges.  The record clearly thwarts Sholar's ability to 
do so.  There is no reasonable probability that absent Exhibit 
79's publication, the jury would have had a reasonable doubt as 
to Sholar's guilt on the trafficking/pimping convictions.  One 
witness after the next told the same story, with specific 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
29 
 
details corroborating other witnesses.  The physical and 
forensic evidence including the photos, the Backpage ads, the 
metadata, and the Econolodge records reinforced the State's 
case.  The result of the trial as to the trafficking/pimping 
convictions was fair and reliable.  Sholar advances nothing to 
shake our confidence in the outcome of these convictions. 
3. Clarification 
¶44 Finally, we address briefly Sholar's concern that 
reviewing 
courts 
are 
incorrectly 
applying 
the 
Strickland 
ineffective assistance prejudice test.  Sholar claims reviewing 
courts are improperly denying ineffective assistance claims by 
measuring prejudice under a sufficiency of the evidence test or 
holding defendants to a strict outcome-determinative test.  We 
reiterate that the Strickland prejudice test is distinct from a 
sufficiency of the evidence test and we confirm that a defendant 
need not prove the outcome would "more likely than not" be 
different in order to establish prejudice in ineffective 
assistance cases.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. 
¶45 In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, a 
court upholds a conviction unless "the evidence, viewed most 
favorably to the state and the conviction, is so insufficient in 
probative value and force that it can be said as a matter of law 
that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt." 
 
State 
v. 
Poellinger, 
153 
Wis. 2d 493, 501, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990).  To succeed on a 
sufficiency claim, a defendant must show a record devoid of 
evidence on which a reasonable jury could convict.  In contrast, 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
30 
 
to succeed in proving ineffective assistance, a defendant must 
show that but for his lawyer's deficient performance, there is a 
reasonable probability the outcome would have been different.  
"Reasonable probability" is tied to confidence in the outcome.  
Both standards require a reviewing court to examine the 
evidence, but in sufficiency challenges, convictions are upheld 
when the record shows a bare modicum of evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could find guilt.  In ineffective assistance 
challenges, a defendant must establish that but for his lawyer's 
error, there is a reasonable probability the jury would have had 
a reasonable doubt as to guilt. 
¶46 Accordingly, a defendant need not prove the jury would 
have acquitted him, but he must prove there is a reasonable 
probability it would have, absent the error.  If there is no 
reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a 
different verdict, then a defendant has not proven prejudice.  
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96. 
B.  Forfeiture 
¶47 Sholar contends the State forfeited its right to argue 
prejudice at the Machner hearing because the State did not 
petition this court for review after the court of appeals' 
decision in Sholar I.  The State denies forfeiture occurred 
because Sholar I did not decide the merits of the prejudice 
prong and had the State petitioned for review after Sholar I, 
the only issue "would have been whether Sholar sufficiently pled 
his motion to entitle him to a Machner hearing."  The State is 
correct. 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
31 
 
1. Legal Principles 
¶48 Forfeiture is a rule of judicial administration that 
may be applied when a party fails to assert a right.  State v. 
Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶¶28, 30, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612.  
It is primarily asserted when a party fails to object to an 
error at trial; its purpose "is to give the opposing party and 
the circuit court an opportunity to correct any error."  State 
v. McKellips, 2016 WI 51, ¶47, 369 Wis. 2d 437, 881 N.W.2d 258. 
¶49 The forfeiture rule has also been applied when a party 
asserts new issues before this court that were not raised in a 
petition for review, a response to a petition for review, or a 
cross-petition.  See, e.g., State v. Smith, 2016 WI 23, ¶41, 367 
Wis. 2d 483, 878 N.W.2d 135; State v. Sulla, 2016 WI 46, ¶7 n.5, 
369 Wis. 2d 225, 880 N.W.2d 659.  The purpose for forfeiture in 
Smith and Sulla, however, arose from the general rule that an 
issue not raised in the petition for review, response, or cross-
petition is not properly before us.  A petitioner's arguments 
are limited to the issues on which we granted review, unless 
this court orders otherwise.  See Sulla, 369 Wis. 2d 225, ¶7 
n.5. 
¶50 A Machner hearing is a prerequisite for consideration 
of an ineffective assistance claim.  State v. Machner, 92 
Wis. 2d 797, 804, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979); see also State 
v. Curtis, 218 Wis. 2d 550, 554, 555 n.3, 582 N.W.2d 409 (Ct. 
App. 1998) ("assuming there are factual allegations which, if 
found to be true, might warrant a finding of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, an evidentiary hearing is a prerequisite 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
32 
 
to appellate review of an ineffective assistance of counsel 
issue").  A defendant is entitled to a Machner hearing only when 
his motion alleges sufficient facts, which if true, would 
entitle him to relief.  State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶14, 274 
Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433.  If a defendant's motion asserting 
ineffective assistance "does not raise facts sufficient to 
entitle the movant to relief, or presents only conclusory 
allegations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates that the 
defendant is not entitled to relief, the circuit court has the 
discretion to grant or deny a hearing."  Sulla, 369 Wis. 2d 225, 
¶23 (citations omitted). 
¶51 When a circuit court summarily denies a postconviction 
motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel without 
holding a Machner hearing, the issue for the court of appeals 
reviewing an ineffective assistance claim is whether the 
defendant's motion alleged sufficient facts entitling him to a 
hearing.  See, e.g., State v. Love, 2005 WI 116, ¶2, 284 
Wis. 2d 111, 700 N.W.2d 62. 
2.  Application 
¶52 Sholar argues the forfeiture rule should have barred 
the State from challenging prejudice at the Machner hearing.  He 
premises his argument on the belief that the court of appeals in 
Sholar I decided the merits of the prejudice prong and simply 
sent the case back to the circuit court to decide whether trial 
counsel acted deficiently.  He claims the State "sandbagged" him 
by not filing a motion for reconsideration with the court of 
appeals seeking clarification of Sholar I and by not filing a 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
33 
 
petition for review to alert him the State believed "the 
question of prejudice remained open for debate."  The law does 
not support Sholar's position. 
¶53 First, the court of appeals could not decide Sholar's 
ineffective assistance claim because no Machner hearing had 
occurred.  A Machner hearing is required before a court may 
conclude a defendant received ineffective assistance.  Curtis, 
218 Wis. 2d at 554-55.  In Curtis, the defendant argued his 
"trial counsel's errors were so obvious and could not possibly 
have been trial tactics, no Machner hearing was required."  Id. 
at 554.  The Curtis court of appeals correctly rejected that 
argument, noting: 
The hearing is important not only to give trial 
counsel a chance to explain his or her actions, but 
also to allow the trial court, which is in the best 
position to judge counsel's performance, to rule on 
the motion. 
Id.9  We cited Curtis with approval in addressing whether a 
defendant was prejudiced when his counsel failed to object to 
the admission of evidence, and as a result whether this court 
should remand for a Machner hearing.  See State v. Beuchamp, 
2011 WI 27, ¶39 & n.32, 333 Wis. 2d 1, 796 N.W.2d 780. 
                                                 
9 There are rare circumstances when prejudice may be 
presumed, such as when counsel was actually or constructively 
denied altogether, or when a more limited presumption of 
prejudice is warranted, such as when counsel was burdened by an 
actual conflict of interest.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 692 (1984).  None of these circumstances apply in the 
matter before us. 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
34 
 
¶54 We 
acknowledge 
that 
appellate 
courts 
frequently 
decide——even in the absence of a Machner hearing——that the 
record conclusively demonstrates a defendant was not prejudiced 
by alleged deficient conduct, often presuming without deciding 
that counsel's performance was deficient.  Id.  But when an 
appellate court remands for a Machner hearing, it must leave 
both the deficient performance and the prejudice prongs to be 
addressed, because whether a defendant was prejudiced depends 
upon the existence of deficient performance.  If trial counsel 
testifies at the Machner hearing that the choice under attack 
was based on a trial strategy, which the circuit court finds 
reasonable, it is "virtually unassailable" and the ineffective 
assistance claim fails.  See generally State v. Breitzman, 2017 
WI 100, ¶65, 378 Wis. 2d 431, 904 N.W.2d 93, citing State v. 
Maloney, 2004 WI App 141, ¶23, 275 Wis. 2d 557, 685 N.W.2d 620; 
see also United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1074-75 (7th 
Cir. 1984) (noting defendant abandoned ineffective assistance 
claim because a strategic choice is "virtually unassailable.").  
Consequently, an appellate court should not decide prejudice 
exists in an ineffective assistance claim without a Machner 
hearing.  Doing so would put the cart before the horse.  For 
purposes 
of 
determining 
whether 
counsel 
was 
ineffective, 
prejudice cannot exist without being attached to an error on the 
part of counsel.  Presuming prejudice could result in the 
untenable scenario of an appellate court prematurely deciding a 
defendant was prejudiced by an act without knowing the reason 
for the act, followed by a Machner hearing where trial counsel 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
35 
 
gives a reasonable strategic choice for the act——meaning the 
defendant was not prejudiced at all, in the context of an 
ineffective assistance claim.  Under Strickland, a court 
evaluates the prejudicial impact of defense counsel's errors, 
not counsel's reasonable strategic choices.  466 U.S. at 687 
("[T]he defendant must show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense." (emphasis added)); Balliette, 336 
Wis. 2d 358, ¶21 (defendant must show "that the deficient 
performance resulted in prejudice to the defense."). 
¶55 Second, the forfeiture rule does not apply here.  
Although the forfeiture rule has been used to foreclose parties 
in this court from making arguments not raised in petitions for 
review, responses, or cross-petitions, it is primarily used to 
ensure parties voice objections at trial to give the circuit 
court and the opposing party the opportunity to correct any 
error.  Sholar does not provide, nor can we locate, any 
authority suggesting the forfeiture rule should be extended to 
preclude the State from challenging prejudice because it did not 
petition this court for review following the court of appeals' 
decision remanding for a Machner hearing. 
¶56 Third, the only issue decided adversely to the State 
in Sholar I was whether Sholar's postconviction motion entitled 
him to a Machner hearing.  Thus, the only issue the State could 
have petitioned this court to review was the court of appeals' 
determination that Sholar alleged sufficient facts in his 
postconviction motion to entitle him to a Machner hearing.  As 
No. 
2016AP897-CR   
 
36 
 
already noted, the court of appeals did not, nor could it, 
decide in Sholar I that prejudice had been established. 
¶57 Finally, the court of appeals in Sholar II confirmed 
that it did not decide the prejudice part of the ineffective 
assistance claim in Sholar I:  "This court did not rule that 
trial counsel's performance was deficient in any manner nor did 
this court rule there was prejudice as to any of the charges."  
Sholar II, ¶19.  That is the law of the case and we see no basis 
upon which to reject the court of appeals' own interpretation of 
its prior decision, particularly because the law does not 
support any other interpretation. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶58 We hold Strickland authorizes analyzing the prejudice 
prong of ineffective assistance claims on a count-by-count 
basis.  We affirm the court of appeals' decision upholding the 
circuit court's finding that Exhibit 79 was prejudicial only 
with respect to the sexual assault conviction, but not the 
trafficking/pimping convictions.  We agree with the court of 
appeals and the circuit court that Sholar failed to prove his 
lawyer's deficiency prejudiced him on the trafficking/pimping 
convictions, which were supported by overwhelming evidence.  We 
further hold the State did not forfeit its right to argue the 
prejudice prong because the only issue it could have raised in a 
petition for review after Sholar I was whether a Machner hearing 
should occur at all. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2016AP897-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶59 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
majority holds that Sholar's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim fails because he is unable to demonstrate that he was 
prejudiced 
by 
trial 
counsel's 
failure 
to 
object 
to 
the 
submission of Exhibit 791 to the jury during deliberations. 
¶60 Unlike the majority, I find the instant case to be a 
close call.  On the whole, I conclude that Exhibit 79 is so 
prejudicial that my confidence in the outcome of Sholar's entire 
trial is undermined. 
¶61 Although 
the 
majority 
correctly 
concludes 
that 
prejudice may be determined on a count-by-count basis, the 
majority acknowledges that there may be circumstances in which 
trial counsel's deficient performance results in errors that are 
so prejudicial that the result of the entire trial is 
undermined.2 
¶62 In State v. Sullivan, the court set forth what 
constitutes "unfair prejudice."  The Sullivan court explained: 
Unfair prejudice results when the proffered evidence 
has a tendency to influence the outcome by improper 
means or if it appeals to the jury's sympathies, 
arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to 
punish or otherwise causes a jury to base its decision 
on something other than the established propositions 
in the case.  In this case the danger of unfair 
prejudice was that the jurors would be so influenced 
by the other acts evidence that they would be likely 
                                                 
1 Exhibit 79 is composed of the printed contents of Sholar's 
phone, including the phone's contact list, text messages, call 
log, photos, audio files, and two videos.  Majority op., ¶15. 
2 Majority op., ¶¶37-40. 
No.  2016AP897-CR.ssa 
 
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to convict the defendant because the other acts 
evidence showed him to be a bad man. 
State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 789-90, 576 N.W.2d 30 
(citations omitted). 
¶63 The submission of Exhibit 79 to the jury is an example 
of an error with such a substantial prejudicial impact that 
confidence in the result of the entire trial is undermined.   
¶64 The circuit court aptly recounted the prejudicial 
nature of Exhibit 79.  It described several of the photos 
contained in Exhibit 79 as "child porn" that "serve[d] to 
inflame the jury."  The circuit court did not "see how a fair 
trial could be had on the sexual assault count with the jury 
being given these photos."  The circuit court opined that "[t]he 
messages and the pictures are in my opinion so inflammatory that 
I think a jury then and there might have convicted him of 
virtually anything.  I do not have confidence in the result as 
to [the sexual assault] count." 
¶65 It is hard to imagine anything more prejudicial than 
submitting child pornography extracted from the defendant's 
phone to the jury for its consideration during deliberations.  
Such inflammatory evidence creates a legitimate concern that the 
jury convicted Sholar not because the State proved every element 
of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, but instead to 
punish Sholar for being a bad man with child pornography on his 
phone.3   
                                                 
3 See State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 789-90, 576 
N.W.2d 30. 
No.  2016AP897-CR.ssa 
 
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¶66 As the circuit court put it, the content of Exhibit 79 
is "so inflammatory that I think a jury then and there might 
have convicted [Sholar] of virtually anything."  I agree with 
the circuit court, and for that reason, I would reverse the 
court of appeals and remand the instant case to the circuit 
court for a Machner hearing. 
¶67 Accordingly, I dissent.   
No.  2016AP897-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
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