Case Title: Insurance Company of America v. Hogsett

Citation: 486 S.W.2d 730

Docket Number: 

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1972-11-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
486 S.W.2d 730 (1972) INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Appellant, v. Stephen L. HOGSETT, Appellee. Supreme Court of Tennessee. November 6, 1972. *731 Milligan, Hooper & Harris, Chattanooga, for appellant. Duggan & McDonald, Chattanooga, for appellee. CHATTIN, Justice. This is an appeal from a decree awarding workmen's compensation benefits to appellee. Appellee alleged in his petition for workmen's compensation benefits that on October 5, 1970, he was an employee of the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company; and that while pursuing his duties as an operator of a forklift he was struck in the face by a Pepsi-Cola bottle from which he suffered severe and disabling injuries. The Chancellor found the following facts: Thereafter, the Chancellor filed a memorandum opinion in which he found appellee "in `goosing' his fellow employee thereby resulting in injury to plaintiff was one `arising out of and in the course of employment' and that it did not amount to wilful misconduct barring recovery." A decree was entered granting appellee $1,314.00 for medical expenses. Appellant has perfected an appeal and assigned as error the failure of the Chancellor to find from the facts the injury *732 arose out of the wilful misconduct of appellee; and that the accident did not arise out of his employment. T.C.A. Section 50-910 provides: The Chancellor relied on the cases of Ransom v. H.G. Hill Co., 205 Tenn. 377, 326 S.W.2d 659; Taylor v. Meeks, 191 Tenn. 695, 236 S.W.2d 969; and Webster v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 211 Tenn. 8, 362 S.W.2d 244. We are of the opinion those cases are not applicable to the facts of this case. In the Ransom case, Ransom was a truck driver for H.G. Hill Company. Ransom's duties were to deliver merchandise to two stores in Nashville from a warehouse and on the return trip to haul trash from the stores to a dump, and then report to the warehouse for other work. On the day of the accident, he was at the warehouse awaiting orders. There was ten or twelve drivers doing similar work in the yard awaiting orders. In a playful mood Ransom grabbed the seat of the pants of a fellow employee as he was walking, and as a result, Ransom fell and injured his knee. The issue in that case was whether he departed from his work when he grabbed the pants of his fellow employee. This Court held the action of Ransom was not a departure from his work because he and the other employees were standing around in the yard awaiting for orders; and that at the time of the accident there were no duties to be performed nor to be abandoned. In Webster, Webster placed an open flame near a can of gasoline while on the employer's premises after working hours in the presence of the employer's sale manager who warned him against such action. As a result, Webster was severely burned. The Court held Webster's action "was a wilful failure to follow a course of safety required by common sense and common knowledge in the handling of the dangerous agency of gasoline." Compensation was denied. In the Taylor case, the employer operated a sawmill. He carried his employees to and from work in a truck. On the day of the accident the employees were riding home from the mill. Taylor was scuffling with another employee when an overhanging limb struck him in the eye. This Court held, although Taylor had been instructed not to scuffle on the truck, the injury was not a wilful injury within the meaning of the statute. T.C.A. Section 50-910. The record in this case shows Mr. Hill was appellee's superior. Appellee was, at the time of the injury, operating a forklift. A forklift is used to convey empty bottles from a delivery truck into the company's building and bottles of soft drinks to the truck for delivery. The forklift, at the time of the injury, was traveling in reverse and as it passed Hill Appellee punched Hill in the ribs which caused him to unintentionally throw the bottle. We are of the opinion the conduct of appellee in goosing Hill in the ribs on the occasion of the injury was wilful misconduct on his part. In the case of Brown v. Birmingham Nurseries, 173 Tenn. 343, 117 S.W.2d 739 (1938), it is said: The Chancellor found appellee knew it was dangerous to "goose" Hill in the ribs. Under the facts as found by the Chancellor, we are of the opinion the employer has shown the three elements, as deduced from the opinions of this Court, constituting wilful misconduct as contemplated by the statute and they are: (1) an intention to do the act, (2) purposeful violation of orders, and (3) an element of perversiveness. Coleman v. Coker, supra. The Chancellor found appellee intentionally punched or goosed Hill in his ribs for no reason but to see his reaction therefrom and within five minutes after having been ordered not to do so. We are of the further opinion the accident and injury did not arise out of the employment. Obviously, the accident and injury resulted from the act of appellee in "goosing" Hill in the ribs. His work did not require such on his part. In fact, it was contrary to an order of his foreman. While this Court is bound by the findings of the Chancellor on questions of fact, whenever there is any evidence to sustain the findings, we are not bound by the conclusions drawn by the Chancellor from undisputed facts, and may reach a different legal conclusion from that of the Chancellor on the same findings of fact. Wilson v. Van Buren County, 196 Tenn. 487, 268 S.W.2d 363 (1954). *734 The decree of the Chancellor is reversed and the petition dismissed. Appellee will pay the costs. DYER, C.J., HUMPHREYS and McCANLESS, JJ., and WILSON, Special Justice, concur.