Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERT EDWARD HINE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 120484

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2002-09-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED SEPTEMBER 17, 2002  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 120484  
ROBERT EDWARD HINE,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
PER CURIAM  
I  
The defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree  
felony murder, MCL 750.316(b), and first-degree child abuse,  
MCL 750.136b. 
The defendant was sentenced to terms,  
respectively, of life without the possibility of parole and  
ten to fifteen years.  The defendant appealed as of right.  
The Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s convictions  
because of the perceived error in admission of other acts  
evidence against the defendant and remanded the case to the  
 
 
 
trial court.1  This Court vacated the judgment of the Court of  
Appeals 
and 
remanded 
the 
case 
to 
that 
Court 
for  
reconsideration in light of People v Sabin (After Remand), 463  
Mich 43; 614 NW2d 888 (2000).  463 Mich 926 (2000). 
On  
remand, the Court of Appeals again reversed the defendant’s  
convictions and remanded the case to the trial court.2  
On application for leave to appeal by the prosecutor, we  
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to  
that Court for consideration of the remaining issues of the  
defendant that have not yet been addressed.  The Court of  
Appeals erred in its determination that evidence of  
defendant’s assaultive behavior toward three women was  
inadmissible under Sabin. 
We hold that the evidence was  
admissible to establish the common scheme, plan, or system of  
the defendant in perpetrating a particular type of physical  
assault.
 From that evidence the jury could properly have  
inferred that the charged acts were committed, and were  
committed by the defendant. Sabin, supra at 66-67.  
1 
 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued February 25,  
2000 (Docket No. 207358).  The Court did not address  
defendant’s 
other 
issues, 
which 
concerned 
unsolicited  
testimony about other bad acts committed by the defendant, 
omission of an instruction on specific intent, and violation 
of double jeopardy principles in the imposition of sentences 
on both the felony murder and the predicate felony.  
2 
 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued November 13, 
2001 (Docket No 207358).  
2  
II  
On November 7, 1996, paramedics were called to a home in  
Battle Creek, Michigan, because of a report that a child was  
choking.  The paramedics found Caitlan McLaughlin, a two-and­
a-half-year-old girl who was not breathing, had no pulse, and  
appeared to be dead. After communication with physicians at  
the nearby hospital emergency room, Caitlan was officially  
pronounced dead.  An autopsy determined that the child had  
several internal injuries including a subdural hematoma, a  
healing tear of the liver, hemorrhage in the region of the  
pancreas, another area of bleeding in the colon (near the  
appendix), and a large amount of fluid in the abdomen.  
Caitlan had numerous circular bruises on her abdomen and a  
bruise across the bridge of her nose.  The injuries were of  
varying ages, from less than half a dozen hours up to five to  
seven days old. The cause of death was multiple blunt force  
injuries.  The pathologist opined that the aggregate of the  
injuries caused Caitlan’s death, and that the death was not  
accidental.  
The week before Caitlan died, defendant had been her sole  
care provider while her mother was at work.  Defendant denied  
any wrongdoing in connection with Caitlan’s death.  
The defendant was charged with open murder, MCL 750.316,  
felony murder on the basis of perpetration or attempted  
perpetration of child abuse, MCL 750.316(1)(b), and first­
3  
 
degree child abuse, MCL 750.136b.  The prosecutor notified the  
defendant of her intent to introduce other acts evidence  
pursuant to MRE 404(b). The trial court held an evidentiary  
hearing at which the proposed other acts witnesses testified.3  
Three of the witnesses were former girlfriends of the  
defendant and included the child’s mother.  Although the  
prosecutor referred to alternate theories of admissibility  
under MRE 404(b),4 the theory before us is proof of a common  
3 The prosecutor offered four witnesses, of whom three 
were allowed to testify at the trial.  Only their testimony 
will be discussed.  The prosecutor described the testimony 
that would be given by the pathologist, Laurence Simson, M.D., 
and an expert in child abuse, Stephen Guertin, M.D.  
4 MRE 404 states:  
Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes  
*
*
*  
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.  
(1) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for  
other 
purposes, 
such 
as 
proof 
of 
motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or 
system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident when the same is  
material, whether such other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts 
are 
contemporaneous 
with, 
or 
prior 
or  
subsequent to the conduct at issue in the case.  
(2) The prosecution in a criminal case shall 
provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or 
during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice 
on good cause shown, of the general nature of any 
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial and  
the 
rationale, 
whether 
or 
not 
mentioned 
in  
subparagraph (b)(1), for admitting the evidence.  
4  
scheme, plan, or system.  
One witness testified that she dated defendant in 1996,  
the year before Caitlan’s death. She described incidents in  
which the defendant grabbed her arms, put his hands in her  
mouth, and stretched her lips.  This resulted in bruises on  
her gums.  The witness attributed the violence to the  
defendant’s irritation with her.  She also described other  
incidents involving being threatened with a metal folding  
chair and with having her eyes blackened.  
Another witness testified that during the time she was  
involved with the defendant, she was assaulted by him at least  
once a week.  Defendant “head-butted” her, a movement  
described as defendant hitting his forehead on the witness’  
nose.  One incident caused bleeding from both her nostrils.  
The witness described being picked up and thrown down by the  
defendant.
 Although the defendant never punched her, the  
witness said the defendant would grab, throw, and shove her.  
Another witness was Caitlan’s mother.  She described the  
beginning of her relationship with the defendant in late 1995  
and their leasing of a residence together in the fall of 1996.  
She testified that the defendant would pin down her arms with  
his knees when he was angry, causing bruises on her arms.  The  
If 
necessary 
to 
a 
determination 
of 
the  
admissibility of the evidence under this rule, the 
defendant shall be required to state the theory or 
theories 
of 
defense, 
limited 
only 
by 
the  
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.  
5  
 
 
 
 
defendant would push and shove her.  Once, the defendant kneed  
her in her mouth, which caused her lips to become swollen and  
bruised.  The defendant poked her in the forehead and chest  
with enough force that it hurt.  Caitlan’s mother gave the  
descriptive name of “fish-hook” to the maneuver described by  
the first witness in which the defendant put his fingers or  
hand inside her mouth and forcefully pulled.  Caitlan’s mother  
also described several head-butting incidents.  
Additionally, 
the 
prosecutor 
summarized 
the 
evidence 
that  
would be presented by the forensic pathologist and the expert  
in child abuse.  
The trial court ruled on the prosecutor’s motion on the  
first day of trial.  The court looked to this Court’s decision  
in People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), and  
relied upon its four-pronged analysis:  
In VanderVliet, supra at 74-75, we adopted the 
approach to other acts evidence enunciated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Huddleston v United  
States, 485 US 681, 691-692; 108 S Ct 1496; 99 L Ed  
2d 771 (1988). 
That approach employs the  
evidentiary safeguards already present in the rules 
of evidence. First, the prosecutor must offer the 
other acts evidence under something other than a 
character to conduct or propensity theory.  MRE  
404(b).  Second, the evidence must be relevant 
under MRE 402, as enforced through MRE 104(b), to 
an issue of fact of consequence at trial.  Third, 
under MRE 403, a “‘determination must be made 
whether 
the 
danger 
of 
undue 
prejudice 
[substantially] outweighs the probative value of 
the evidence in view of the availability of other 
means of proof and other facts appropriate for 
making decision of this kind under Rule 403.’” 
VanderVliet, 
supra 
at 
75, 
quoting 
advisory 
committee notes to FRE 404(b). Finally, the trial  
6  
court, upon request, may provide a limiting 
instruction under MRE 105. [Sabin, supra at 55-56.]  
The trial court held that the evidence was not being  
offered to show the defendant’s propensity to commit the  
criminal act.  Rather, the other acts evidence was offered to  
show 
defendant’s 
scheme, intent, system, or plan in committing  
the acts and to show the lack of accident.5
 The court  
specifically noted the testimony regarding episodes of head­
butting and mouth-grabbing committed by the defendant.  The  
court ruled that the evidence was relevant to show who  
inflicted the injuries on the child and the intent with which  
they were done.  The court also found the other acts evidence  
to be highly probative.  It recognized the danger of unfair  
prejudice, but held that the prejudice was diminished because  
the other acts evidence involved women, not children, and the  
women gave no testimony about the defendant harming children.  
Finally, the court stated that it would give a limiting  
instruction to the jury regarding the use of the other acts  
evidence.  
At trial, an expert on child abuse opined that some of  
the bruises on Caitlan’s jaw were likely five days old and  
5 Contrary to the observation of the Court of Appeals, 
the defendant offered “accident” as an explanation of several 
of Caitlan’s injuries.  For example, the liver injury was 
attributed to a fall off a bicycle, and a facial injury was 
attributed to Caitlan falling on a toy box while in the 
defendant’s care. However, the testimony of the pathologist 
and the expert on child abuse presented ample evidence that 
the injuries were not accidental.  
7  
resembled a fingernail imprint.  Another mark on Caitlan’s jaw  
was described by the expert as typical of the mark left when  
picking up and shaking a child in a certain way.  The witness  
also 
described 
poking injuries sustained by Caitlan that could  
not have been accidental.  The expert opined that the head  
injuries had been inflicted on the day the child died.  
The defendant testified.  He attributed several of  
Caitlan’s injuries to a fall on a bathtub and falls on toy  
boxes that occurred while she was in his care. He denied he  
kicked or punched Caitlan on the day she died.  He admitted he  
spanked her two days previously, but said he had “swatted” her  
only once.6  
The jury convicted the defendant of felony murder and  
first-degree child abuse.  The defendant was acquitted of open  
murder.  
III  
The Court of Appeals has twice reversed the defendant’s  
convictions.  In its first opinion, the Court looked to  
VanderVliet, supra, and People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376; 582  
NW2d 785 (1998), and found that the other acts evidence made  
none of the facts in dispute at defendant’s trial more or less  
probable.  The Court held that substantial dissimilarities  
existed between the assaults on the other acts witnesses and  
6 The bruises on Caitlan’s buttocks were described by the 
experts as massive and as dating from three days before death. 
Multiple blows, not a single blow, were the cause.  
8  
the injuries sustained by the victim in this case.  The Court  
stated its concern that the evidence had been used to show the  
defendant’s propensity to commit a criminal act and concluded  
that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed any marginal  
probative value the evidence possessed.  
We remanded the case to the Court of Appeals after the  
prosecutor sought leave to appeal in this Court.  On remand  
for reconsideration in light of Sabin, the Court of Appeals  
again reversed, reasoning that the other acts evidence was  
used to prove the “very act” that was the object of proof.  
Perceiving that a higher degree of similarity between the  
other acts evidence and the charged act was required, the  
Court held that there was “nothing, within the universe of  
violent assaults” particularly unusual or distinctive in the  
conduct of the defendant.  The Court also stated that there  
was “precious little evidence that there was a criminal act”  
involving the child. In this the Court of Appeals erred.  
IV  
A trial court ruling admitting evidence is reviewed for  
an abuse of discretion.  People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261; 531  
NW2d 659 (1995).  An abuse of discretion occurs “when the  
result is ‘so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic  
that it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of  
will, not the exercise of judgment but [the] defiance [of it]  
. . . .’” Dep’t of Transportation v Randolph, 461 Mich 757,  
9  
  
 
 
 
768; 610 NW2d 893 (2000).  An abuse of discretion involves far  
more than a difference of opinion. 
Id. 
Further, a trial  
court’s decision on a close evidentiary question ordinarily  
cannot be an abuse of discretion. People v Smith, 456 Mich  
543, 550; 581 NW2d 654 (1998). An abuse of discretion might,  
however, result where the trial court operates within an  
incorrect legal framework.  In this case, the Court of Appeals  
expressed its difference of opinion with the trial court  
regarding the degree of similarity between the other acts  
evidence and the charged conduct. The approach taken by the  
Court of Appeals, however, failed to take into account the  
evidence presented to the trial court in support of the  
prosecutor’s theory that Caitlan died as a result of multiple,  
nonaccidental, blunt force injuries. The evidence presented  
at the evidentiary hearing and at trial supported the trial  
court’s conclusion that there was a common plan, scheme, or  
system in the defendant’s assaults on the women and on the  
child.  Indeed, the Court of Appeals panel’s recitation of the  
facts is perplexing.  Rather than viewing the evidence in a  
light most favorable to the prosecution, as it was required to  
do, the panel discounted the prosecution’s evidence and  
accorded undue weight to defendant’s version of the events.  
See slip op at 1-2.  
In Sabin, we held that evidence of similar misconduct is  
logically relevant to show that the charged act occurred where  
10  
 
the uncharged misconduct and the charged offense are  
sufficiently similar to support an inference that they are  
manifestations of a common plan, scheme, or system.  For other  
acts evidence to be admissible there must be such a  
concurrence of common features that the uncharged and charged  
acts are naturally explained as individual manifestations of  
a general plan.  Sabin, supra at 64-65. Sabin involved the  
use of other acts evidence to prove that the charged act  
occurred.  We recognized that the degree of similarity between  
the uncharged and charged conduct required as a threshold for  
admissibility in such a case was higher than that needed to  
prove intent, but not as great as that needed to prove  
identity. Id. at 65.  
In this case, the Court of Appeals imposed a standard of  
a high degree of similarity between the other acts and the  
charged 
acts, 
apparently because it believed that the evidence  
presented to the trial court did not demonstrate any unlawful  
conduct. Slip op at 10. The Court of Appeals was mistaken.  
The testimony and offers of proof at the evidentiary hearing  
suggested that Caitlan had died from multiple, nonaccidental,  
blunt force injuries, and that her death was a homicide.  
Specifically, the evidence established that the “fish­
hook” assaults on the defendant’s former girlfriends were  
similar to the method or system that could have caused the  
fingernail marks on Caitlan’s right cheek.  Further, one of  
11  
the other acts witnesses described the forceful and hurtful  
“poking” inflicted upon her by the defendant.  The forensic  
pathologist testified that Caitlan had fifteen to twenty  
circular bruises on her abdomen, the largest of which measured  
about one inch.  The expert on child abuse testified that  
these injuries were typical of injuries received when a child  
has been poked, and that accidental injuries in that area of  
a child’s body were completely atypical.  Thus, contrary to  
the observations of the Court of Appeals, there were both  
injuries 
distinctive 
from 
ordinary 
assaults,7 
and 
similarities  
between the other acts (uncharged conduct) and injuries to the  
child (charged conduct). As we stated in Sabin, distinctive  
and unusual features are not required to establish the  
existence of a common design or plan.  The evidence of  
uncharged acts needs only to support the inference that the  
defendant employed the common plan in committing the charged  
offense. Sabin, supra at 65-66.  
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in  
determining that the assaults by the defendant on his former  
girlfriends and the charged offenses regarding Caitlan shared  
sufficient common features to permit the inference of a plan,  
scheme, or system. The charged and uncharged acts contained  
common features beyond similarity as mere assaults.  
7 The Court of Appeals cited no authority for its view of 
what constitutes the “universe of violent assaults.”  
12  
 
 
 
 
 
V  
The trial court operated within the correct legal  
framework in determining the evidence admissible under Sabin.  
That the Court of Appeals had a different view of the evidence  
does not establish an abuse of discretion by the trial court.  
Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals,  
and remand this case to that Court for consideration of  
defendant’s remaining arguments.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred.  
CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ., concurred in the result only.  
13