Case Title: In re Guardianship of Carlsmith

Citation: 113 Haw. 236

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2007-01-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Law UeRAR:

 

}POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER**+
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

 

000

 

IN THE MATTER
oF

‘THE GUARDIANSHIP OF

oad

EDITH M. CARLSMITH, Incapacitated Person

 

nbz Ws SZ NU WML

No. 27569

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
(FC-G NO.03-1-0350)

JANUARY 25, 2007

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOA, J.

Respondent-Appellant Edith M. Carlemith (Edith) filed a

motion for reconsideration' (the motion) on October 30, 2006,

which Respondent-Appellant Duane C. Carlsmith (Duane)

(collectively, Respondents] subsequently joined, of this court's
October 18, 2006 opinion (the opinion) wherein the Septenber 26,

2005 order of the family court of the firet circuit (the court)

granting in part and denying in part the motion for attorney's

fees and sanctions filed by Petitioner-Appellee Cynthia

Carlsmith-Crespi (Cynthia), and the court’s September 26, 2005

judgment, were affirmed and the case remanded for further

2 Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 40(b) (2005)
provides in pertinent part that a motion for reconsideration “shall stave with
Darticularity the points of law or fact that the moving party contends the

Court has overlooked or aisapprehended, together with a brief argument on the
points raised.”
 

\7OR FUBLICATION IH WEST'S HAKAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTE
proceedings. Ince Guardianship of Carlsmith, No. 27569, 2006 WL

2981430 (Haw. Oct. 18, 2006). We ordered that a response to the

 

notion be filed pursuant to Hawai'i Rule of Appellate Procedure
(HRAP) Rule 40(c) (2005), and Cynthia filed a response on

November 16, 2006.

 

In the motion, Respondents argue that they
(1) “properly raised, properly preserved, and properly presented
[these] argument (s] that Hawai'i Family Court Rule (HFCR) [Rule]

of the Hawai'i

 

65? violates the due process c(lJa
Constitution”; and (2) that “Hawai'l Revised Statute (HRS) [$)

560:5-101 [(1993)*] purporting to define ‘incapacitated person’

 

2 ARP Rule 40(c) provides that, “(alo response to a motion for
reconsideration of reply to 8 response will be received unless requested by
the appellate court.”

 

5 weoR Rule 65(b) entitled “Restraining orders notice; hearings
uration," states as follows:

 

A restraining order may be granted without notice to
the adverse party when it clearly appesrs from specific
Facts shows by affidavic or by the verified complaint or
cross-complaiae that jeant is
Auniouriate, Svery restraining order granted without notice
Shall be filed forthwith in the clerk's office and entered

of record, shall_be accompanied by an auproriate

8 with upon any Bares
Te shall continue in effect untal further

by she oraer.
birder of the court.” On 2-dave notice to the sarty who

 

 

ne
‘Sdverss party nav appear and ove for cissolution or
ear and ‘zupeaitiously a the ands
pL iustice require.
(Emphases added.)
‘Rs § $60:5-102(2) defined an “incapacitated person” as follows:

[Alny person who is impaired by reason of mental illness,
(continued...)
 

VOR PUBLICATION IK WEST’ § HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTERS#+

 

is unconstitutionally vague, overly broad, and not sufficiently
definite,” thus “creating . . . arbitrary subjective and non-
uniform discretion, in violation of (Bdith’s] rights to due
process of law and the equal protection of the laws under both
the Hawai'i and United States Constitutions.” For the reasons
herein, we discuss the claims raised but deny the motion for
reconsideration inasmuch as we conclude the claims are not

sustainable.

In

 

As to Edith’s contentions that she properly preserv
her constitutional claims, Edith stated in the conclusion to her

reply brief that:

This court does not have to reach the unconstitutionaliey of
HFCR or [HRS § $60:5-101] to 1. Vacate the Judgnent; 2.
Declare void ab inicio the fanily Court's Tenporary,
Restraining Order of October 24, 2003, and all subsequent
findings, orders, and sanctions; 3. Order the Family Court
to dismiss the Petition for Appoininent of Guardian of the
Person; and 4. Award Appellants their attorneys’ fees and

  

 

 

 

‘The above statement could have been interpreted as a waiver of
Edith’s arguments regarding the constitutionality of HFCR 65 and

HRS § 560:5-101. See In re Guardianship of Carlsmith, 2006 WL
2981430 at 8 n.15. Although the statement is somewhat

ambiguous, on reconsideration it appears that Edith did not

 

*(.,seontinuea)
imental deficiency, physical {llness or disability, advanced
lage, chronic use of drugs, chronte intoxication, or other
cause (except minority)

Kesnonsible decisions concermina one™s persont-7
(Emphasis added.)
seevOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ HAKAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*++

intend to waive her constitutional claims. Accordingly, we

 

address the constitutionality of HFCR Rule 65 and HRS § 560:5-101
here.
nt,

“This court reviews questions of constitutional law de
nova, under the ‘right/wrong’ standard and, thus, exercises its
own independent constitutional judgment based on the facts of the
” State ex rel, Anzai v, City 4 County of Honolulu, 99
Hawas't $08, 515, 57 P.3d 433, 440 (2002) (citing State vw

 

Yenkina, 93 Hawai‘ 87, 100, 997 P.2d 13, 26 (2000) (citations
omitted). This court, as a general matter, has long adhered to
the proposition that “(1) legislative enactments are
presumptively constitutional; (2) a party challenging a statutory
scheme has the burden of showing unconstitutionality beyond a
reasonable doubt; and (3) the constitutional defect must be
clear, manifest, and unnistakable.” Child Support Enforcement
Agency v. Doe, 109 Hawai'i 240, 246, 125 P.3d 461, 467 (2005)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted) .

Ww.

Respondents’ first position is that HFCR Rule 65
wviolat [es] . . . the due process clause[, article I, section §
of the Hawai"i Constitution], [because] it creates subjective
standardless discretion authorizing drastic relief without
notice, without any of the constitutionally necessary procedural
safeguards” and is thus (1) “unconstitutional on its face” and
(2) unconstitutional “as applied in this case.”
‘s+4f0OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTERY+#

 

v,
With respect to due process, both the Fourteenth
Amendnent to the United States Constitution and article 1,
section 5 of the Hawai'i State Constitution guarantee, inter
alia, that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without the due process of law.” “at its core,
procedural due process of law requires notice and an opportunity
to at a ne: e and
before governmental deprivation of a significant liberty
interest.” State v, Bani, 97 Hawai‘ 285, 293, 36 P.34 1255,
1263 (2001) (citing Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple of Hawa:
vs Sullivan, 67 Hawai'i 217, 243, 983 P.2d 1315, 1341 (1998);
Price v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 77 Hawai'i 168, 172, 883 P.2d
629, 633 (1994); Sandv Beach Def. Fund v. city & County of
Honolulu, 70 Haw. 361, 376, 173 P.2d 280, 260 (1989) (citing
Mathews v, Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 336 (1976)) (emphasis added).
However, “the requirements of due process frequently
vary with the type of proceeding involved.” Calasa v. Greenvell,
2 Haw. App. 395, 399, 633 P.24 583, 556 (1981) (internal
quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). This court has
said that “due process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands.” State v.
Guidry, 105 Hawai'i 222, 234, 96 P.3d 242, 254 (2004) (quoting
Bani, 97 Hawai'i at 296, 36 P.3d at 1266) (citations omitted))

(internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets in original), It
 

/SFOR PUBLICATION IM WEST'S MAWAI'T REPORTS AND FACIFIC REPORTER:

 

 

was made clear in In re Herrick, 82 Hawai'i 329, 922 P.2d 942
(1996), that a due process challenge will fail where the

following standard is met:

An elenantary and fundamental requirement of due process in
‘any proceeding which 1a to be accorded finality 12 notica

‘xeasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise
Antereated carties of the cendency of the action and afford
hem an coportunity to erasent their obsections.

Id. at 343, 922 P.2d at 956 (citation omitted) (emphasis added) ;

 

see also, Calasa, 2 Haw. App. at 399, 633 P.2d at 556 (quoting

Mullane v. Cent, Hanover Tr, Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950)).

vr.
HFCR Rule 65(b) allows for the issuance of an ex parte
TRO without notice to the adverse party “when it clearly appears
from specific facts . . . that inmediate relief to the applicant
is appropriate.” Generally “*{a) TRO is designed to preserve the
status quo until there is an opportunity to hold a hearing on the
application for a preliminary injunction.’” Wahba, LLC v. SRP
APonl. LIC, 106 Hawai'i 466, 472, 106 P.3d 1109, 1115 (2005)
(quoting Whitman v. Havaiian Tua & Barge Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d
1225, 1228 (D. Haw. 1998)) (brackets and other citations
omitted). In various harassment and abuse contexts, the issuance
of an ex parte TRO has been held proper and not violative of
constitutional rights. See, e.a., Luat vi Cacho, 92 Hawai'i 330,
346, 991 P.24 840, 856 (App. 1999) (stating that a “TRO, in view
of its emergency renedial nature, may be granted ex parte”); Kie
YeHcMahel, 91 Hawai'i 438, 442, 984 P.2d 1264, 1267 (App. 1999)

(examining a statute allowing for an ex parte TRO to issue upon
 

‘*#7OR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER:

 

showing of “probable cause to believe that a recent past act or
acts of abuse have occurred, or that threats of abuse make it
probable that acts of abuse may be imminent”); Covle v. Compton,
85 Hawai'i 197, 940 P.2d 404 (App. 1997) (upholding issuance of
an ex parte TRO in a domestic abuse situation).
vir.

In regard to contention (1), Respondents
specifically maintain that (a) “(o]n its face, HFCR [Rule] 65(b)
requires only @ showing that ‘imediate relief to the applicant
is appropriate’ and that “[t]here is no requirement of a showing
that ‘immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will
result to the applicant before the adverse party or that party's
attorney can be heard in opposition,’ (b) nor is there a
“requirement of a certification of efforts made to give notice or
the reasons supporting the claim that notice should not be
required,” and (c) “unlike {Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure
(RCP) Rule] 65(b) which limits the duration of a TRO to 10 days,
the Family Court TRO is open-ended, and extends until ‘further
order of the court.’ All of the language Respondents point to

is quoted from HRCP Rule 65(b) (2005)* and, thus, it appears

 

+ RCP Rule 65(b) requires:

 

Temporary Restraining Order; Notices
Duration. A

without written of oral notice to the adverse party oF that
party's attorney only if (1) it clearly appears from
Specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified

 

yarings

 

Complaint that innediate and irreparable Intury, loss, or
reveal je heard in an
Teontinved. ..)
}FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*+#

Respondents contend that unless the sane or similar procedural

 

safeguards present in HRCP Rule 65(b) are contained in HFCR Rule
65, HECR Rule 65 is unconstitutional.*

virr.
Respondents provide no authority for the proposition

that the same safeguards present in HRCP Rule 65 must be read

 

(continued)

Be_teaulzed, Every temporary restraining order granted
Without notice shall be indorsed with the date and hour of
issuance; shall be filed forthwith in the clerk's office and
entered of records shall define the injury and state why it
Se irreparable and why the order was granted without notice;
pot fo exceed 10 dave, as the court fixes, unless within the
Eine so fixed the order, for good cause shown, is extended
for a like period or uniess the party against whom the order
snded for a longer

period. The Fe wall be entered of
Eecord. In case a temporary restraining order is granted
Without notice, the motion for a preliminary injunction
Shall be set down for hearing at the earliest possible tine

precedence of all matters except older matters of
the same character? and when the motion cones on for hearing
the party who obtained a teaporary restraining order shall
proceed with the application fora preliminary injunction
ng, if that party does not do so, the court shall dissolve
the tesporary restraining order. On 2 days’ notice to the
party sho obtained the temporary restraining order without
Rotice of on auch shorter notice to that party as the court
ay Prescribe, the adverse party may appear and move its
Gissolution of modification and in that event the court
‘Shall proceed to hear and determine such motion as
expeditiously as the ends of justice require

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

(Emphases added.)

* cynthia contends that (1) “[Respondents"] assertion that the
identical safeguards of {HRCP Rule 65) must be read into (HFCR 65] ia without
merit” because "the differences in the language of the Hawai'l Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Hawai'i Family Court Rules were approved by this court” and
Sthis (clourt specificelly exempted the application of the Hava'l fules of
Civil Procedure to family court proceedings”? (2) "(HECR Rule 65... moat
Gefinitely satisfies the constitutional due process requirements” because
S[gdith] received notice of the pendency of the TRO and guardianship
proceedings because she appeared at the hearing before the family court with
her attorney” and "(Eaith) snd her attorney had an opportunity to present
their sbjections to the TRO and (g)uardianship [pletition[s)"? and
(3) Hawaii's [aJppellate (clourts have nade clear that issuance of an ex
parte 720 is constitutional and does not infringe upon constitutional rights.”

   

 

 
[POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S KAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

 

into HECR 65 and there is no merit in condemning HFCR 65 as
unconstitutional merely because that rule employs different
language. For, “‘[d]ue process is not a fixed concept requiring
a specific procedural course in every situation." Guidry, 105
Hawai'i at 234, 96 P.3d at 254 (quoting Bani, 97 Hawai" at 296,
36 P.3d at 1266). Moreover, HRCP 81(a) (4) expressly provides
that “these rules shall not apply to. - . [p]roceedings in the
family court[.J” See In.re Protection of the Property of
Jaffarian, 72 Haw. 154, 155, 808 P.2d 1277, 1279 (1991) (noting
that “(p]roceedings under HRS (c]hapter 560 are specifically
exempted from the operation of the [HRCP] by . . . HRCP [Rule]

Br(ay (2).

 

Although it is not necessary that HFCR 65 provide
identical safeguards as HRCP 65, HFCR 65 must nevertheless
comport with due process which requires at its most fundanental
level, “notice and an opportunity to be heard at @ meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner before governmental deprivation
of a significant Liberty interest." Bani, 97 Hawai'i at 293, 36
P.3d at 1263 (citations omitted).

In regard to Respondents’ contention (a), HECR Rule 65
only allows a restraining order to issue without notice if “it
clearly appears from specific facts shown . . . that immediate
relief to the applicant is appropriate.” (Emphases added) The
Inmediacy requirement speaks to the exigent nature of the TRO.
The applicant must present facts that are specific and that make
“clear” the need for relief that must be “inediately” granted.

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‘*+POR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAZ'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS##

 

Respondent's’ argument that there should be an express requirement
of showing “immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage
will result” as set forth in HRCP Rule 65(b) is not persuasive.
In HFCR Rule 65(b), the court’s discretion is guided by
statutory directives indicating that the court may issue a TRO
only based on “specific facts” that would make the request for
speedy relief proper. HFCR Rule 65(b) is comparable to HRCP Rule
65(b) inasmuch as applicants are required to make a specific
showing justifying the restraint requested in the proposed TRO.
This is confirmed by HFCR Rule 65(d) which states in pertinent

part that “[elvery restraining order shall set forth the reasons

 

for ita issuance; shall be specific in terns; shall describe in
reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other
docunent, the act or acts sought to be restrained{.J” HECR Rule
65(b) thus contains sufficient direction for the court to guide

At in issuing TROs.
In regard to contention (b), as noted above, “TRO(s),
in view of (their) emergency remedial nature, may
{constitutionally} be granted ex parte(.]” Luat, 92 Hawai'i at
346, 991 2.2d at 856. HFCR Rule 65(b) directs that “[elvery
(780] granted . . . shall be served forthwith upon any party or
parties effected by the order.” Thus, the party affected is
entitled to notice as soon as the TRO is issued. Further,
although HECR Rule 65(b) does not specifically state that a
certification of efforts “nade to give the notice and the reasons
supporting the claim that notice should not be required” be

10
 

ss4POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S IAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*
present, HRCP Rule 65(b), HECR Rule 65 authorizes the granting of

a TRO “without notice to the adverse party” on the condition that
the “specific facts” shown in the affidavit or sworn pleading
“clearly” indicate “immediate relief . . . is appropriate.” This
is analogous to the showing necessary for supporting issuance of
a TRO without prior notice to the adverse party in HRCP Rule
65(b). Because, all that due process requires is “notice
reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
an opportunity to present their objections{,]” Ince Herrick, 82
Hawai's at 343, 922 P.2d at 956 (citation omitted), this portion
of the rule comports with due process.

In regard to contention (c), although the TROs issued
under HFCR Rule 65 are not expressly limited in duration, under
that rule, the adverse party may apply to terminate the TRO “{oln
2 days notice to the party who obtained the (TRO) . . .

‘such shorter notice to thet party as the court may prescribe(.]”

(Emphasis added.) The party restrained may then “appear and move

 

for . . . dissolution or modification” of the TRO. Id, In the
event that @ party does seek to dissolve or modify the TRO, the
court is required to “proceed to hear and determine such motion
as expeditiously as the ends of justice require.” Id. (emphasis
added). Such a requirement expressly preserves the “opportunity
to be heard” promptly after the TRO is issued. In view of the

foregoing, HFCR Rule 65(b) is not “open-ended,” but subject to

time constraints as may be imposed appropriately by the court at

a
 

'VFOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*

 

 

the behest of 2 party. In sum, because “due process is flexible
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands[,]” Guidry, 105 Hawai'i at 234, 96 P.3d at 254,
and HECR Rule 65 “afford[s] 2 reasonable time for those
interested to make their appearance[,]” In re Herrick, 82 Hawai'i
at 343, 922 P.2d at 956, the rule on its face satisfies the
constitutional requirements.

Ix.

Respondents’ next contention is that HFCR Rule 65 is
unconstitutional “as applied” in this case. In support of this
claim Respondents argue that “the court extended the October 2,
2003 TRO depriving (Edith) of her liberty for [more than] two
years.” Insofar as the TRO involved an order aimed at
restricting her movement, there was no unconstitutional
application of HFCR Rule 65.

In this case, Cynthia filed an ex parte petition for a

 

‘TRO and appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL) for Edith on
October 22, 2003, pursuant to HFCR 65 and HRS $ 560:5-303 (1993).
In that petition, Cynthia alleged that Ouane was physically or
mentally abusing Edith and that he planned to take Edith to his
home in Panama. Two days later, on October 24, 2003, the court
granted the TRO and GAL petitions. The TRO was based on “the TRO
Petition, . . . the affidavits of cynthia . . . and others, and
the opinion of Dr. Blanchette, and pursuant to (HECR] Rule
65(b).” Ine Guardianship of Carlenith, 2006 WL 2981430 at +3.
Within four days of the issuance of the TRO, on October

12
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28, 2003, Edith had an opportunity to make objections and to
present evidence before the court. Edith appeared at the October
28, 2003 hearing accompanied by her attorney. As the opinion
noted, “any objections by Respondents as to the lack of notice
[were] deemed waived by Edith's appearance, her failure to object
to the purported defect of notice or summons, and insistence upon
proceeding with an evidentiary hearing.” In re Guardianship of
Garlamith, 2006 WL 2981430 at +13. Prior to proceeding with the
hearing, the court questioned Edith to confirm that she had
received a copy of the TRO and GAL petitions, Edith’s counsel
indicated that he had read both petitions to her because she was
legally blind. Thus, it appears that Edith had both “notice” and
the “opportunity to present [her] objections” at the hearing
before the court determined the TRO should be continued. See In
xelierrick, 82 Hawai'i at 343, 922 P.2d at 956.

ed, dnter alia, the

 

On Novenber 5, 2003, the court h
parties’ jurisdictional arguments. After oral arguments, the
court ruled that it had jurisdiction over Edith and that
Jurisdiction was concurrent with the State of California. the
court stated that Duane was free to return to Panama, but
explained that “[t]he reason I issued a [TRO] that [Edith] not go
is to be able to have an independent evaluation of was she

competent, was there abuse going on, would there be any abuse

 

within the State of Hawaii while she was here [sic].” In re
Guardianship of Carlsmith, 2006 WL 2981430 at *4. At the

hearing’ s conclusion, the court indicated that it would be

2B
 

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issuing a further written order regarding its concurrent
jurisdiction and the logistics for an IME.

on that same day, the temporary GAL submitted his first
report in which he concluded that after talking to two of Edith’s
doctors and her caregivers, Edith was in relatively good mental
health but that the caregivers had serious misgivings about Duane
and his treatment of Edith. On November 26, 2003, the court
entered an order finding that Edith was subject to the
jurisdiction of the court and ordered that an IME be performed by
a court-appointed physician. The court also amended the TRO
stating that “{Edith] shall not leave the United States for the
next 90 days. [Edith] may return to her home in San Rafael,
california or other United States location so long as she informs
the [TGAL] of her travel itinerary and address and telephone
number.” Inte Guardianship of Carlsmith, 2006 WL 2981430 at *4.
on that same day, Edith’s counsel filed an affidavit stating that
Respondents had left Hawai'i and had gone to Panama where they

apparently still resid

 

over the course of the proceedings the court extended
the TRO seven times because of various events, so that Edith
could complete the IME and the court could assess her capacity.
‘The court even granted Duane’s motion for a “Competency
Examination” of Edith in Panama which would allow her to complete
the IME there. According to the court, although the Panamanian
doctor attempted to arrange an IME, Edith “did not submit to [it]
nor did Duane make [Edith] available for an IME.” Edith

u“
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repeatedly refused to submit to an IME even though, based on the
october 28, 2003 hearing testimony, it appeared that Respondents
themselves sought to have her mental capacity assessed. Had the
IME been completed, the court would have had no reason to renew
the TRO. Because Edith apparently left the country, an IME was
never conducted. As noted above, a “(TRO] is designed to

preserve the status quo until there is an opportunity to hold a

at 472, 106 P.3d at 1115, and

 

hearing(,] Wahba, LLC, 106 Hawa
here the status quo was to ensure Edith’s capacity could be
properly assessed. Respondents simply failed to complete the
IME.

Bi

 

don the foregoing circumstances, HFCR Rule 65 did

 

not violate due process as applied in this case. It appears that
Respondents had ample notice of the pendency of the proceedings
and numerous opportunities to be heard and to resolve the TRO.
x.
Respondents’ second position is that “{HRS) $ 560:5-101

purporting to define ‘incapacitated person,’” is (1)

unconstitutionally vague, and (2) overly broad.’ In support of

 

> cynthia argues that (1) [Respondents] fail to cite any applicable
case law to support thelr position and ‘cannot satisfy their Legal burden
of proving that this provision is unconstitutional” because *[u]nder Hawai't
case Lae, [HRS] § 5€0"5-101 Lo presumptively constitutional” and
SfRespondents] have the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that
the due process violation resulting from the application of $ 560:5-101 is
glteryveundtest and conigcalable’/” 2) Respondente!“sellance on the studert
law review note is “nisplaced” because it “failed to cite any case that held
this particular Illinois guazdienship statute unconstitutional” and did not
examples in which the application of this language violated du
GG)’ "Gelvar 1s Inapposite” because “its finding was made in the
Gontext of evaluating treatment choices for a mentally 11 person” who “could
be involuntarily comitted in a hospital for an indefinite period merely
because the mentally ill person elected one medically valid treatment over
(cont inued.

 

 

       

 

 

15
/"FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*+#
these claims, they argue that HRS § 560:5-101 is not sufficiently

 

 

definite creating “an arbitrary, subjective and non-uniform
discretion, in violation of Edith’s constitutional rights to due
process and equal protection of the laws under both the Hawaii
and United States Constitutions.” Apparently Respondents’
specific argument is that “(HRS § 560:5-101] permits a finding of
Incapacity and result(s in a) loss of personal autonomy based
only on the finding that the person is unable to make
‘responsible’ decisions, without explaining what ‘responsible’
Respondents rely on a student law review note! and on
Colvar v. Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, 469
F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1979), Colvar involved a Utah statute that
allowed for the involuntary civil commitment “of an individual
who 1s mentally 111, in need of treatment and who ‘lacks
sufficient insight to make a Responsible decision as to the need

for care and treatment as demonstrated by evidence or inability

 

*(,-scontinved)
"} and’ (4) “(HRS chapter $60, Article 5) ig based on the Uniform Code”
fand was “reviewed and commented on by the national conference of
Commissioners, who are experienced practitioners and conmentators in their
respective fields of law[,]” and “(t]heir success of approving uniform state
Inus that comport with constitutional mandates ia clear by the paucity of
decisions holding the uniform code provisions unconstitutional.”

 

 

* See Mark 0, Andrans, Note, in
y 3 Elder L,J--75 {1997}, Andrews argues similar
Tanguage fron an Illinois statute should not survive constitutional scrutiny.
Id, at 108. Andrews further states that "[«)hether ‘the capacity to make oF
Communicate responsible decisions’ is 2 ‘legally fixed stanaard’ is quite
lncertain(, and t]he standard does not give enough guidance or criterion by
which to measure one’s capacity. Nor 1s the standard ‘eutficiently,
Gefinite.’” Ig. Andrews concludes that “statutes as vaque as that of
Mlinois do not give the trier of fact any guidance or standards for
determining the meaning of the word ‘responsible-’" Id. Andrews draws this
conclusion with little analysis and relies, as Respondents do, on Colyar’

 

 

 

 

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to follow through with treatment.” Id. at 432 (quoting Utah Code
Ann, § 64-7-36(6) (c) (I) (1953)). ‘The Colyar court noted that
“[ulnder the parens patrige power a state may commit an
individual to a mental hospital even though the individual poses
no threat to society” but “[t]he state cannot work such a
deprivation, as a natter of substantive due process, without
first showing a compelling interest to justify its action” such
as “protecting its citizens from harm, whether the source of the
harm is from other citizens or from the citizen himself.” Id. at
429-30 (citations onitted).

In Colyag, the court held that “to the extent that the
utah statute allows for the commitment of mentally 111
individuals who are not a threat to thenselves and/or who are
able to make a rational decision as to treatment, it is both
overly broad and impermissibly vague.” Id. at 433.

Respondents quote Colvar which states that:

to “A responsible decision.” This

‘snd overbroad to allow for a
great deal of abuse. of the word “responsible”
focuses the committing authority's attention on the Content
of the decision rather than on the ability of the individual
fo engage in a rational decision-making Process. The word
Sfesponaible,”" being given co further content, lends itself
toa completely subjective and, therefore, potentially
arbitrary and fonuniform, evaluation of hat is decided
Father then an objective evaluation of the Method by which
the decision 1s reached.

[t]he statute refe:

    
 

 

 

Id. at 432-33. They further cite the Colvar court to the effect
that, “[t]he statute, as worded, sweeps within the state's power
individuals whom the state has no valid parens patrize interest
in committing and lends itself to arbitrary and capricious
decisions.” Id. at 433. The State of Hawai'i filed an amicus

uv
 

‘s+e7OR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS:

 

 

brief asserting the constitutionality of HRS § 560:5-101 on June
19, 2006. The State (Amicus) only addressed the facial
challenges of the statute.’

xr.

  

We note that HRS § 560:5-101 is distinguishable from
the statute addressed in Colvar in that it addresses guardianship
rather than civil commitment and, thus, does not implicate the
same liberty interests. As the Colvar court noted, “it must be
recognized that involuntary commitment represents a ‘nassive
curtailment of liberties’ which, because it may be for an
indeterminate period of time, can be a more intrusive use of the
state’s power than incarceration under the criminal code.” 469
F. Supp. at 429 (citation omitted).! Unlike the Utah statue, an

immediate loss of liberty is not a necessary consequence in

applying the definition of “incapacitated person” under HRS

 

 

+ amicus argues that “HRS § $60:5-101 18 not unconstitutionally
vague or overbroad." It contends that (1) =(Respandents] make no. argument
regarding the particular unconstitutionality of this definition, but generally
guste fron a law review article and a distinguishable Utah District Court cass
for the proposition chat the statute's use of the term ‘responsible decision”
{8 vague") (2) that HRS § 6015-101 1s not vague because “the court must have
found s mental illness, mental deficiency, physical iliness or disability,
ete., coupled with an insufficient capacity for making responsible decisions
bout Ale cr ner person"; (3) "ene legislature adopted this definition [of an
incapacitated person] from the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) [,]” gaa 1997 Hav
Sess, L. Act 200, at 372, 438, after “‘intensive review By’ judges, probate,
lawyers, and professional fiduciaries,’" Conf. Com. Rep. No. 24-76, in 1976
Senate Journal, at 850; and (4) *[Respondenes} have not argued chat Hawaii's
definition is ‘substantially incomprehensible,’ vague ‘in all that ite
Spplications,/ of that Le does not comport with the legislature's. intent under
HRS Chapter $60.” (Quoting In ze Gardens at ed
LMaul, 90 Hawai'i 334, 345, 978 P.2a 772, 781 (1999) >

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

% amicus argues similarly that “Hawaii's statute is markedly
different, It ia 2 guardianship statute, nota civil commitment statute, and
30 does not implicate the seme liberty interests. In light of this interest
land Because (Respondents) make no other argument, ie La difeicult to tell what,
(Respondents’] arguments for vagueness truly boils down C0."

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§ 560:5-101. The TRO merely prohibited Edith from leaving the

 

United States until her capacity could be assessed and did not
involve commitment in any way.
xin.
As to Respondents’ vagueness claim, this court has
held, as Amicus urges, that “{w]hen a statute is not concerned

with criminal conduct or first amendment considerations, the

 

court must be fairly lenient in evaluating a claim of vaguene:
Ince Gardens at West Maui Vacation Club, 90 Hawai'i at 343, 978
P.2d at 781 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In
order “to constitute a deprivation of due process, the civil
statute must be so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule
or standard at all. To paraphrase, uncertainty [in a] statute is
not enough for it to be unconstitutionally vague; rather, it must
be substantially incomprehensible.” Ig. (brackets, internal
quotation marks, and citations omitted).

XIII.

  

To reiterate, HRS § 560:5-101(2) defined" an

“incapacitated person" as follow:

 

(Alay person who is impaired by reason of mental illness,
ental deficiency, physical illness or disability, advanced
age, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, or other
cause (except minority)

sutficsent undercstandina or capacity to make or companies

Kesponsible decisions concerning one"s persoa(.7

 

the statute was amended by Act 161 in 2004 and Respondents do not
contend that the present version 1s unconstitutional.

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(Emphasis added.) Thus, the definition required that a person
(2) be mentally or physically “impaired” and (2) lack “sufficient
understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible
decisions concerning one’s person[.]”

Contrary to Respondents’ argument, a court could not
properly appoint a guardian simply because a person failed to
make a “responsible decision.” Rather, the court must have found
first, that the person was impaired by a “mental illness, mental
deficiency, physical illness or disability” etc, Second, the
court was mandated to determine whether the incapacity existed to
the extent that the person lacked understanding or capacity to
make decisions concerning his or her person. Hence, the term
“responsible” was not simply used in a general sense, but as
applied in the context of decisions affecting “one’s [oun]
person.” Additionally, the term “responsible” is not ambiguous
and can be easily understood by a person of ordinary
Cf. State v. Kam, 69 Haw. 483, 487, 748 P.2d 372,
375 (1988) (stating that a “statute is vague if a person of

 

intelligence.

ordinary intelligence cannot obtain an adequate description of
the prohibited conduct or how to avoid committing illegal acts”
(citations omitted)). The word “responsible” is defined as

“having the character of a free moral agent” or “capable of

determining one’s own acts.” Webster's Third New Int’).

the definition of an incapacitated person was adopted from the UFC
in 1976. Seg 1976 Maw. Sess. L. Act 200, at 372, 438. The legislatare
adopted’ the UEC definition after review by “judges, probate lawyers, and
professional fiduciaries.” Conf. Con. Rep. No. 24-76, in 1976 Senate Journal,
at eso:

  

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TOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

 

Dictionary 1935 (1961). Under these circumstances the court’s
exercise of discretion was inforned by the statute and was
reviewable on appeal. Because HRS § 560:5-101 was not “so vague
and indefinite as to really be no. . . standard at all[,)” the
statute was not unconstitutionally vague. In xe Gardens at West
Maui Vacation Club, 90 Hawai'i at 343, 978 P.2d 772 at 781
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The definition
of incapacitated person, then, when read as a whole, sufficiently
apprised Edith of the bases on which the court would review the
guardianship petition and any ambiguity in the statute did not
render it “substantially inconprehensible(,]” ids, so as to
overcome the “presumptifion of] constitutionality.” child
‘Support Enforcement Agency, 109 Hawai'i at 246, 125 P.3d at 467.
xiv.
“101 is

 

As to Respondents’ claim that HRS § 560

 

overbroad, ‘(t]he doctrine of overbreadth, although closely
related to a vagueness claim, is distinct in that while a statute
may be clear and precise in its terms, it may sweep so broadly
that constitutionally protected conduct is included in its
proscriptions.’” ate, Dep't of Labor

Relations, 113 Hawai'i 1, ~
(quoting State v. Bui, 104 Hawai'i 462, 465, 92 P.34 471, 474

 

1.27, 147 P.3d 785, 811 n.27 (2006)

(2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Respondents do not identify any constitutionally protected
conduct included within the statute's proscriptions. Thus, this
argument is not meritorious.

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xv.

As to Respondents’ claim that HRS § 560:5-101 also
violates Edith’s right to equal protection, Respondents make no
discernable argunent in regard to this claim. This court may
“disregard (a) particular contention” if the appellant “nakes no
discernible argument in support of that position{.]" Morton ve
Admin. Dir, of the Court, 60 Hawai'i 197, 200, 908 P.2d 545, 548
(1995) (citing HRAP Rule 28(b) (7) (2007) (“Points not argued may
be deemed waived.”). Thus, Respondents’ equal protection claim
is deemed waived

xvr.

Respondents have not met their burden of showing
“unconatitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt,” nor have they
shown a “constitutional defect that is clear, manifest, and
unmistakable”; thus HRS § 560:5-101 retains the “presumpti(on of]
constitutionality.” Child Support Enforcement Agency, 109
Hawas's at 246, 125 P.3d at 467.

 

XVI.
‘Therefore, based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

that the motion for reconsideration is denied.

Howard Glickstein, on the
notion for Respondent- Grr

Appellant Edith M. :
Carlsmith. SERA iccre—
stuart M, Cowan, on the Piece Oost ore

joinder for Respondent
Rppellant C. Duane
carisnith.

Yon <. Dudiyith

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Jeffrey S. Portnoy,
Rhonda L. Griswold, and
Allison Mizuo Lee

(cades Schutte), in
opposition for
Petitioner-Appellee
cynthia Carlsmith-Crespi.

23