Case Title: Ragland v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 266, 2009

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2009-08-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
EDGAR RAGLAND, 
 
 
Petitioner Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Respondent Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 266, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID 0606001306 
§   
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 26, 2009 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: August 18, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 18th day of August 2009, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief , the State’s motion to affirm,1 and the record below, it appears 
to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Edgar Ragland, filed this appeal from the 
Superior Court’s order denying his petition for postconviction relief.  The 
State has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is 
manifest on the face of Ragland’s opening brief that the appeal is without 
merit.  We agree and affirm. 
                                                 
1 Ragland attempted to file a response to the State’s motion to affirm, which was 
stricken by the Court as a violation of Supreme Court Rule 25(a).  He requested 
reconsideration of that decision, which is hereby denied. 
 
2
(2) 
The record reflects that a Superior Court jury convicted 
Ragland in March 2007 of trafficking, possession with intent to deliver 
cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. This Court affirmed his 
convictions on direct appeal.2  Thereafter, Ragland filed a petition for 
postconviction relief.  After receiving responses from both defense counsel 
and the prosecutor, the Superior Court denied Ragland’s motion.  This 
appeal followed. 
(3) 
Ragland enumerates eight claims in his opening brief on 
appeal.3  He contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because she: (i) 
failed to request a hearing on the motion to suppress; (ii) failed to object to a 
juror on the panel; (iii) informed the jury that Ragland’s co-defendant had 
entered a guilty plea; (iv) failed to adequately cross-examine his co-
defendant; and (v) failed to adequately cross-examine the police officer to 
whom Ragland made a confession.  Ragland also raises three additional 
claims asserting that his constitutional rights were violated because the 
Superior Court: (i) failed to hold a hearing on the motion to suppress; (ii) 
allowed a juror to remain on the panel even though the juror knew the 
prosecutor; and (iii) failed to issue a ruling on the motion to suppress.   
                                                 
2 Ragland v. State, 2007 WL 4374235 (Del. Dec. 17, 2007). 
3 Ragland raised additional issues in his postconviction motion filed in the 
Superior Court.  Ragland’s failure to brief these issues constitutes a waiver of the claims 
on appeal. Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997). 
 
3
(4) 
This 
Court 
reviews 
the 
Superior 
Court’s 
denial 
of 
postconviction relief for abuse of discretion.4  The Court first must consider 
the procedural requirements of Rule 61(i) before addressing any substantive 
issues.5   In this case, three of Ragland’s claims, relating to the juror and to 
his co-defendant’s guilty plea, were raised and rejected on their merits by 
this Court in Ragland’s direct appeal.  The Court is not required to 
reconsider these previously adjudicated claims simply because Ragland has 
restated his arguments as ineffective assistance of counsel claims.6  
Accordingly, we find Ragland’s second, third, and seventh arguments to be 
barred by Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(4).  Reconsideration is not 
warranted in the interest of justice. 
(5) 
Moreover, Ragland’s claim that the Superior Court failed to 
rule on his motion to suppress is factually incorrect.  The docket reflects that 
the Superior Court denied his motion on March 8, 2007.  Accordingly, there 
is no merit to Ragland’s eighth argument. 
(6) 
Ragland’s first and sixth argument in his opening brief relate to 
his pretrial suppression motion.  Specifically, he contends that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to request a hearing on the motion.  He 
                                                 
4 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 
5Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
6 Skinner v. State, 607 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Del. 1992). 
 
4
also contends that the Superior Court erred in failing to hold a hearing, even 
in the absence of a defense request for one.  To prevail on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish that (i) his trial 
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; 
and (ii) but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome of the 
proceedings would have been different.7  In this case, we agree with the 
Superior Court’s conclusion that counsel committed no error because a 
hearing was not warranted in this case.  As counsel pointed out in response 
to Ragland’s motion, an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress was 
not necessary because the suppression motion only challenged the 
sufficiency of the “four corners” of the affidavit of probable cause.  The 
argument was strictly legal in nature and did not require the presentation of 
additional evidence.  Accordingly, we find no error by either trial counsel or 
the trial court. 
(7) 
Ragland’s remaining arguments challenge his trial counsel’s 
effectiveness in the cross-examination of two trial witnesses.  Specifically, 
Ragland argues that counsel failed to elicit testimony from his co-defendant, 
Duane Richardson, regarding conversations allegedly overheard by 
Richardson between the arresting officer and Ragland.  As counsel pointed 
                                                 
7 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). 
 
5
out in her affidavit, however, she made a strategic decision not to question 
Richardson along this line because the testimony elicited would have 
inculpated Ragland and was detrimental to his defense.  Strategic decisions 
by counsel are entitled to a “strong presumption” of professional 
reasonableness.8  We do not find counsel’s strategic decision to be 
objectively unreasonable in this case.  Moreover, Ragland has failed to set 
forth and substantiate any concrete allegation of actual prejudice.9 
Accordingly, we reject this claim on appeal. 
(8) 
Ragland’s final claim is that counsel was ineffective for failing 
to elicit testimony on cross-examination of the arresting officer regarding 
statements the officer made to Ragland prior to Ragland’s admissions.  
Ragland fails to identify the officer’s alleged statements with any specificity.  
To the extent Ragland is claiming, as he did in the Superior Court, that 
counsel should have cross-examined the arresting officer about statements 
he made seeking to elicit Ragland’s cooperation, it is clear from the record 
that defense counsel did cross-examine the arresting officer about any offers 
made to Ragland in exchange for his cooperation.  Accordingly, we reject 
this argument as being unsupported by the record. 
                                                 
8 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689. 
9 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
 
6
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice