Case Title: Nicholson v. Dep't of Employment

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-12-0117

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
CYNTHIA A. NICHOLSON, a Wyoming individual v. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION2012 WY 81Case Number: S-12-0117Decided: 06/13/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
April Term, A.D. 
2012
 
CYNTHIA 
A. NICHOLSON, a Wyoming individual, Appellant 
(Petitioner)
v. 

DEPARTMENT 
OF EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
COMMISSION, 
Appellee (Respondent).
 
 
Order 
Dismissing Appeal
 
[¶1]      This 
matter came 
before the Court upon a “Motion to Dismiss Appeal,” which was e-filed herein May 
21, 2012.  The Court, having 
carefully reviewed the motion, the “Memorandum of Law in Support of Appellee’s 
Motion to Dismiss Appeal,” Appellant’s “Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal,” 
and the file, finds that the captioned appeal should be 
dismissed.
 
 [¶2]     Through these 
proceedings, Appellant is attempting to challenge an agency decision denying her 
claim for unemployment benefits.  
Appellant filed a timely petition for review of agency action, pursuant 
to W.R.A.P. 12.  The district court dismissed the 
petition, due to procedural deficiencies.  
The district court entered its 
“Order Granting Motion to Dismiss” on February 28, 
2012.
 
[¶3]      Nine days later, 
on March 8, 2012, Appellant filed a “Motion for Reconsideration Based on Wyoming 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 & 61 and Wyoming Rules of Appellant [sic] 
Procedure, Rule 9.04.”  On April 5, 
2012, the district court entered its “Order Denying Motion for 
Reconsideration.”  Appellant filed a 
notice of appeal on April 24, 2012, to challenge the Order Denying Motion for 
Reconsideration.  She has not filed 
a notice of appeal to challenge the “Order Granting Motion to 
Dismiss.”
 
[¶4]      After this appeal 
was docketed, Appellee (Commission) promptly filed a motion to dismiss.  The Commission argues that Appellant’s 
motion for reconsideration was a nullity, making the Order Denying Motion for 
Reconsideration a nullity as well.  
The Commission relies on Plymale 
v. Donnelly, 2006 WY 3, ¶¶ 7, 10, 125 P.3d 1022, 1024-25 (Wyo. 2006), where 
this Court wrote:  “Henceforth, we 
will enforce the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure as written and consider 
postjudgment motions for reconsideration, so denominated, a nullity.” ***** “The 
obvious consequence of categorizing a motion for reconsideration as a nullity is 
that 'all judgments or final orders from said motion are a nullity.’”  This Court concludes that, even if the 
motion for reconsideration is not a nullity based on how the motion was styled, 
the motion was not an authorized motion under court rules. 

 
[¶5]      With regard to 
W.R.C.P. 60(b), this Court has never addressed this question:  When a 
district court enters a final judgment in a W.R.A.P. 12 agency appeal, can a 
party file a W.R.C.P. 60 motion to set aside the district court’s judgment?  This Court has never squarely addressed 
this issue, although it was referenced in Town of Evansville Police Dept. v. 
Porter, 2011 WY 86, ¶ 12, 256 P.3d 476, 484 (Wyo. 2011).  
 
[¶6]      After examining 
the Rules of Appellate Procedure, including W.R.A.P. 12, this Court concludes 
that a Rule 60 motion is not an avenue available to mount a challenge to a 
district court’s final decision in an agency appeal.  The scope W.R.A.P. 12 is described in 
this rule: 
 
W.R.A.P. 
12.01. Generally
 
To 
the extent judicial review of administrative action by a district court is 
available, any person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a final 
decision of an agency in a contested case, or who is aggrieved or adversely 
affected in fact by any other agency action or inaction, or who is adversely 
affected in fact by a rule adopted by that agency, may obtain such review as 
provided in this rule.  All appeals 
from administrative agencies shall be governed by these 
rules.
 
[¶7]      This rule says 
nothing about whether or not civil rules should apply to agency appeals. 
However, if the civil rules were intended to apply in agency appeals, then it 
would not be necessary for W.R.A.P. 12 to specifically state that certain civil 
rules apply in W.R.A.P. 12 cases.  
See W.R.A.P. 12.03(b) (“Copies of the petition shall be served without 
unnecessary delay upon the agency and all parties in accordance with Rule 5, 
Wyo. R. Civ. P.”); W.R.A.P. 12.04(d) (“Written evidence disclosing the portions 
of the transcript ordered and compliance with this paragraph shall be served 
upon the agency and all parties as provided in Rule 5, Wyo.R.Civ.P.”); W.R.A.P. 
12.05 (“If the stay involves an order preventing an agency or another party from 
committing or continuing an act or course of action, the provisions of Rule 65, 
Wyo.R.Civ.P., relating to injunctions shall apply.”)
 
[¶8]      Also, there is 
nothing in the civil rules that indicate those rules extend to agency 
appeals.  The scope of the civil 
rules is defined in Rule 1:
 
W.R.C.P. 
1.  Scope and Purpose of 
Rules
 
   These rules govern procedure in 
all courts of record in the State of Wyoming, in all actions, suits or 
proceedings of a civil nature and in all special statutory proceedings except as 
provided in Rule 81.  They shall be 
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action.
 
Taking 
these rules together, this Court concludes that a Rule 60 motion is not 
available to challenge a district court judgment in a W.R.A.P. 12 case.  
 
[¶9]      In her pro se opposition to the motion to 
dismiss, Appellant argues that her motion to reconsider was actually an 
application for rehearing under W.R.A.P. 9.07 and that her motion was timely 
under that rule.  Even if this Court 
were to consider Appellant’s motion as an application for rehearing, this Court 
concludes that neither a W.R.A.P. 9.07 petition for rehearing nor a W.R.A.P. 15 
petition for reinstatement is available in a W.R.A.P. 12 case.  Much like the case with a Rule 60 
motion, if the other appellate rules were intended to apply to a W.R.A.P. 12 
case, then it would be unnecessary for W.R.A.P. 12 to specify that other 
appellate rules apply in a W.R.A.P. 12 case.  See W.R.A.P. 12.10; 12.11(b); 
12.09(b)(6).  Also, this Court finds 
it significant that there is no rule that permits a petition for rehearing or 
reinstatement to essentially toll the time for filing an appeal from the 
district court’s W.R.A.P. 12 decision.  
Compare W.R.A.P. 12.04(a) (“In a contested case, or in an uncontested 
case, even where a statute allows a different time limit on appeal, the petition 
for review shall be filed within 30 days after service upon all parties of the 
final decision of the agency or denial of the petition for a rehearing, or, if a 
rehearing is held, within 30 days after service upon all parties of the 
decision.”); Compare also W.R.A.P. 2.02 and 2.03.   Instead, 
there appears to be only one avenue for review of a district court’s decision in 
a W.R.A.P. 12 agency appeal—an appeal to this Court.  W.R.A.P. 12.11(a) (“An aggrieved party 
may obtain review of any final judgment of the district court by appeal to the 
supreme court.”)  

 
[¶10]   This Court concludes that, even if 
Appellant’s motion is not a nullity based on how it was styled, a district 
court’s judgment in a W.R.A.P. 12 case is not subject to challenge through a 
W.R.C.P. 60 motion, a W.R.A.P. 9.07 application for rehearing, or a W.R.A.P. 15 
petition for reinstatement.  It is, 
therefore, 
 
[¶11]   ORDERED that the 
captioned appeal be, and hereby is, dismissed.
 
[¶12]   DATED this 13 
day of June, 2012.
 
                        
            
                                    
BY THE COURT:

                                                                        
/s/
 
                                                                        
MARILYN S. KITE
                                                                        
Chief Justice