Case Title: Shirley v. McNeal

Citation: 145 So. 2d 415

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1962-08-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
145 So. 2d 415 (1962)
Lola P. SHIRLEY et al.
v.
Edward E. McNEAL et al.
6 Div. 698.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 30, 1962.
Rehearing Denied October 18, 1962.
J. Terry Huffstutler, Birmingham, for appellants.
John J. Smith and Geo. S. Brown, Birmingham, for appellees.
SIMPSON, Justice.
Edward E. McNeal and Pansy Louise McNeal, appellees, filed their original bill, and subsequently an amended bill, against Lola P. Shirley, as administratrix of the estate of Gordon M. Parson, deceased, and Rodney R. Parsons and Dr. M. B. Parsons, all heirs of Gordon M. Parson, deceased. ("Parson" seems to have been used interchangeably with "Parsons".) They sought to establish a resulting trust in favor of complainants and to enjoin the administratrix of the estate of Gordon M. Parson from any action ousting the complainants from the possession of the real estate involved herein pending this litigation. An agreement was reached between counsel for complainants and respondents whereby *416 it was agreed that a restraining order should be issued by the court upon the posting of bond by complainants. The bond was posted and the restraining order entered by consent.
The case was tried on the substantial issue remaining, i. e., whether or not the complainants under the facts and law were entitled to have impressed on the real property involved a resulting trust in their favor.
The bill alleged that on or about August 10, 1948, they bought from Lena Saizis, a widow:
and
The cause was tried ore tenus by the court, who at the close of the testimony entered a decree impressing a resulting trust upon the property in favor of complainant Edward E. McNeal.
The court's decree alludes to much of the evidence adduced at the trial of this cause. It is reproduced in part here for an understanding of the facts of the case:
The first two assignments claim error in the action of the trial court in overruling the demurrer to the amended or substitute bill. The third assignment is the claimed error in the rendering of the final decree in favor of appellee.
We, like the trial court, think it "best to put the dispute at rest on the merits without too much regard to the generality of the pleading". Nevertheless, the allegations of the bill show that there was no hostile adverse possession on the part of the decedent, but to the contrary, clearly states that at no time since the purchase did Mr. Parson make any claim or assert any interest or right in or to the dwelling house and lot. We entertain the view, therefore, that the demurrer on the ground that the complaint showed on its face that the action was barred by the statute of limitations was not well taken. The ten-year statute of limitations based on adverse possession does not begin to run in such a case as long as there is a recognition of the trust by the trustee. Sykes v. Sykes, 262 Ala. 277, 78 So. 2d 273; Jacksonville Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Profile Cotton Mills, 236 Ala. 4, 180 So. 583.
Appellants next claim error in the court's rendering its final decree establishing a resulting trust in the property in favor of appellee McNeal. In the case of J. A. Owens & Co. v. Blanks, 225 Ala. 566, 144 So. 35, the court thus exposited the doctrine:
Where the purchase is evidenced by an executory contract in writing, a portion of the money being paid, balance to be paid in deferred installments, an equitable interest or title vests in the purchaser. Love v. Butler, 129 Ala. 531, 30 So. 735; Heard & Lee v. Heard, 181 Ala. 230, 61 So. 343; Bessemer Coal, Iron & Land Co. v. Bullard, 215 Ala. 433, 111 So. 5.
In such cases, this court has approved the rule that a party to such purchase, who makes the cash payment, or his aliquot portion thereof, and becomes absolutely bound for the deferred installments, and thereafter pays the same, the deed being taken in the name of another, a resulting trust arises. Upchurch v. Goodroe, 242 Ala. 395, 6 So. 2d 869; Bibb v. Hunter, 79 Ala. 351; Butts v. Cooper, 152 Ala. 375, 44 So. 616; Watkins v. Carter, 164 Ala. 456, 51 So. 318; J. A. Owens & Co. v. Blanks, 225 Ala. 566, 144 So. 35(5).
Such is the law, generally, on the subject. 5th Pomeroy, Eq.Jur., § 1037, pp. 71-72.
It, of course, is well settled that the evidence of payment of the purchase price or an aliquot part thereof must be full, clear and satisfactory. J. A. Owens & Co. v. Blanks, supra. The trial court believed such a case was made in the present litigation. There is much evidence to the effect that the $500.00 down payment was made by appellee McNeal; that all subsequent payments were also made by him. We cannot say that the trial court's finding in that regard was clearly wrong. He states that the reason for title being taken in Parson's name was not clear, but we know of no rule which requires the motivations of the parties to be shown by full and satisfactory evidence.
The issue tried in the court below presented purely questions of fact for the trial judge. He heard and had an opportunity to see the witnesses, many of whom have no interest in the outcome of this litigation. He found that the appellee, McNeal, paid the down payment and became obligated to pay the deferred installments. Such facts are sufficient basis for the relief granted in the decree. We should not substitute our judgment as to the facts unless his conclusion is palpably wrong and unjust, which we cannot so affirm. Culpepper v. Davis, 267 Ala. 541, 103 So. 2d 179; Beavers v. Harris, 265 Ala. 548, 93 So. 2d 161; Parrish v. Davis, 265 Ala. 522, 92 So. 2d 897; Casey v. Krump, 260 Ala. 280, 69 So. 2d 864.
*421 The argument of learned counsel for appellants is most cogent, but in view of the presumption attending the ruling below on conflicting matters of fact, we are persuaded that to disturb that ruling would be unwarranted.
Affirmed.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and MERRILL and HARWOOD, JJ., concur.