Case Title: State v. Miller

Citation: 2012 WI 61

Docket Number: 2010AP000557-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2012-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
2012 WI 61 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP557-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Joseph C. Miller, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(No Cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 12, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 24, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Marinette 
 
JUDGE: 
Tim A. Duket 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
and oral argument by Martha K. Askins, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by David 
H. Perlman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
2012 WI 61
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP557-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2008CF129) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Joseph C. Miller, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 12, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of a summary 
disposition of the court of appeals1 affirming the decision of 
the Marinette County Circuit Court, the Honorable Tim A. Duket 
presiding.  The circuit court denied a motion by Joseph C. 
Miller (Miller)2 to suppress evidence and his statement that 
                                                 
1 State v. Miller, No. 2010AP557-CR, unpublished order (Wis. 
Ct. App. June 29, 2011). 
2 While briefing was underway, counsel sent a letter 
advising this court that Miller had passed away.  Neither party 
moved to dismiss this case as moot following Miller's death, and 
both parties briefed and argued the issues before us.  We decide 
the novel issues presented in this case consistent with this 
court's role to develop and clarify the law.  Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.62(1r) (2009-10).    
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
2 
 
police obtained after an investigatory stop.  The sole issue on 
review is whether information provided to police from several 
informants 
along 
with 
police 
corroboration 
provided 
the 
requisite reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop of 
Miller in the car he was driving. 
¶2 
Officers in the Marinette County Sheriff's Department 
stopped a black Ford Explorer that Miller was driving on 
suspicion that Miller was engaged in a drug-related crime.  
Leading up to the stop, the police had received information from 
several informants indicating that Miller was involved in 
selling drugs.   
¶3 
Initially, 
police 
were 
unable 
to 
corroborate 
information from two sources of limited reliability, an inmate 
awaiting revocation of his supervision and anonymous tips from 
Crime Stoppers.  Police later received information from an 
informant who wished to remain anonymous but provided his 
cellphone number and first name to Deputy Rick Berlin (Deputy 
Berlin), a Marinette County Sheriff's Deputy on the Northeast 
Tri-County 
Drug 
Task 
Force. 
 
The 
informant 
also 
risked 
disclosing his identity to police by contacting Deputy Berlin 
through one of Deputy Berlin's confidential informants.  The 
information provided by this final informant, including police 
corroboration of some details and future predictions in the 
tips, along with information from the prior tips, led police to 
conduct an investigatory stop of the black Ford Explorer that 
Miller was driving on August 20, 2008.  As a result of the 
investigatory stop and search, police discovered marijuana, 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
3 
 
cocaine, a digital scale and cash.  Miller also admitted using 
heroin that morning.   
¶4 
The circuit court denied Miller's motion to suppress 
the evidence and statement obtained from this stop, and Miller 
pleaded no contest to possession of between five and 15 grams of 
cocaine with intent to distribute as a party to a crime contrary 
to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1m)(cm)2. and § 939.05 (2007-08).3  Miller 
appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.4    
¶5 
We 
conclude 
that 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances police acted reasonably when they conducted an 
investigatory stop of the vehicle that Miller was driving based 
on reasonable suspicion "that criminal activity may be afoot."5  
We are confident that police had the requisite reasonable 
suspicion primarily based on the reliability of the final 
informant and the information provided by him.  Such information 
was supported by the prior tips to police.  We note that while 
the initial tips were of limited reliability, the final 
informant and his tips had significant indicia of reliability 
because the informant provided self-identifying information that 
made him more reliable than a truly anonymous informant.6  
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
4 Miller, No. 2010AP557-CR. 
5 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
6 State v. Williams, 2001 WI 21, ¶¶28-36, 241 Wis. 2d 631, 
623 N.W.2d 106; State v. Rutzinski, 2001 WI 22, ¶21, 241 Wis. 2d 
729, 623 N.W.2d 516. 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
4 
 
Additionally, the final informant provided details and accurate 
future predictions that police were able to corroborate.7  We 
hold that the officers acted reasonably under the circumstances 
in stopping Miller based on the objective test set forth in 
Terry v. Ohio, which asks: "[W]ould the facts available to the 
officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a 
man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken 
was appropriate?"8  We conclude that the answer to that question 
is yes. 
 
¶6 
Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I 
 
¶7 
In the months leading up to the investigatory stop at 
issue here, Deputy Berlin received information from several 
sources that Miller was trafficking drugs in Marinette County.   
 
¶8 
The first source was Nathan Manicor (Manicor), who was 
being held in the Marinette County jail awaiting the revocation 
of his parole when he asked to speak with Deputy Berlin on 
November 19, 2007.  Manicor told Deputy Berlin that Miller was 
selling drugs——including "ready rock cocaine," which is crack 
cocaine and marijuana, and acid-laced Spree candies that Miller 
was storing in a pizza box——from Miller's residence at an 
address on Water Street.  Further, Manicor indicated that 
someone from Milwaukee was delivering the drugs to Miller in 
                                                 
7 Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990). 
8 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (quoting Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
5 
 
Marinette and that Miller was paying $950 per ounce of cocaine.  
Manicor reported that Miller owned a blue and silver Chevy S-10 
pickup truck at that time.  Manicor indicated that he had 
personal knowledge of these facts because he had been selling 
drugs with Miller before he was detained for the revocation of 
his parole.    
¶9 
The second source of information came from three tips 
to the Marinette County Crime Stoppers Program.9  On June 16, 
2008, a tipster reported that Miller was living in lot number 12 
of a trailer park located behind a Domino's Pizza and was 
selling cocaine that he picked up from Chicago.  The report also 
indicated that Miller drove a teal four-door vehicle.  On July 
8, 2008, another tip indicated that Miller lived at 334 Terrace 
Avenue in the City of Marinette, drove a green extended cab 
pickup truck and was selling pain killers, cocaine, heroin, and 
marijuana.  On July 24, 2008, a third tip reported that Miller 
planned to sell an ounce of cocaine and 300 methadone tablets.  
Deputy Berlin testified at the suppression hearing that he 
believed all of these tips came from the same person because, in 
the later tips, the caller expressed irritation that police had 
not done anything in response to the earlier tips. 
                                                 
9 Deputy 
Berlin 
explained 
that 
Crime 
Stoppers 
is 
a 
"program . . . where people can call in anonymously, report 
criminal activity, [are] assigned a code number and if that 
information leads to an arrest or criminal complaint and summons 
issued against the suspect or suspects, that tipster is offered 
a cash reward."  
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
6 
 
¶10 After Deputy Berlin got these tips and before the 
final tips that led to Miller's stop and arrest, Deputy Berlin 
conducted some follow-up investigation.  Deputy Berlin watched 
Miller's residences but was unable to either corroborate or 
disprove the allegations that Miller was dealing drugs.  Deputy 
Berlin did discover that, in 2001, Miller was convicted of 
possession 
of 
drug 
paraphernalia 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 961.573(1) (1999-2000). 
¶11 The third source of information was an informant who 
provided information to Deputy Berlin on the condition that he 
remain anonymous.  The first of several contacts with this 
informant occurred on August 19, 2008, around 9:00 p.m.  A 
confidential informant that Deputy Berlin had worked with 
previously contacted Deputy Berlin on his work cellphone.  The 
confidential informant told Deputy Berlin that someone wanted to 
talk with him and then handed the phone to the informant who 
gave the final tips that police relied on in this case.  The 
informant told Deputy Berlin that he wanted to remain anonymous, 
but gave Deputy Berlin his first name.  Deputy Berlin could not 
remember the name when he testified. 
¶12 In the first call to Deputy Berlin the informant 
stated that either Miller or Ryan Kowalski (Kowalski) or both 
were planning to drive Kowalski's black Ford Explorer, license 
plate number 712 NNE, to Milwaukee to buy drugs.  The informant 
offered that Miller lived on the corner of Fourth Street and 
Terrace Avenue in the City of Marinette and that Kowalski lived 
on Kowalski Road.  The informant stated that the men would leave 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
7 
 
with between $5,000 and $10,000 to buy 200-300 packs of heroin, 
200 packs of cocaine and Oxycontin tablets.  Further, the 
informant indicated that they would be back in the Marinette 
area before 2:00 or 3:00 p.m. the next day, August 20.  Deputy 
Berlin testified that the informant did not say, and Deputy 
Berlin 
did 
not 
know, 
how 
the 
informant 
obtained 
this 
information. 
¶13 Deputy Berlin verified that a black Ford Explorer, 
license plate number 712 NNE, was registered to Kowalski at 
N2401 Kowalski Road.  At around 8:00 a.m. the following morning, 
on August 20, 2008, Deputy Berlin drove past Kowalski's 
residence and saw that Kowalski's black Ford Explorer was parked 
in the driveway.  
¶14 That same morning on August 20, Deputy Berlin called 
the informant back on the informant's cellphone,10 as he had the 
cellphone number saved in his cellphone.  Deputy Berlin told the 
informant that he did not think Miller and Kowalski went to 
Milwaukee because Kowalski's vehicle was still parked in his 
                                                 
10 Based on the testimony in the record, we conclude, as did 
the circuit court, that it was this final informant's cellphone 
number, not the confidential informant's number, that Deputy 
Berlin had saved in his phone.  The record is somewhat unclear 
in regard to whose cellphone it was that Deputy Berlin called 
during the morning of August 20, 2008.  We uphold the circuit 
court's finding of fact that this cellphone belonged to the 
informant who gave the final tips in this case because that 
finding is not clearly erroneous.  Williams, 241 Wis. 2d 631, 
¶18.  The circuit court's finding is consistent with the most 
reasonable conclusion from the record, which includes the fact 
that the deputy was able to reach the final informant directly 
when he called him back. 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
8 
 
driveway.  The informant agreed with the deputy's inference 
because the informant had also seen the black Ford Explorer 
parked in Kowalski's driveway that morning.  The informant told 
Deputy Berlin that he would call him back if he got any more 
information. 
¶15 In a third call, the informant called Deputy Berlin at 
4:34 p.m. that same day, August 20, to report that Miller had 
left for Milwaukee at around 2:00 p.m., by himself, to pick up 
drugs.  The informant stated that Miller was driving Kowalski's 
black Ford Explorer and would be back in the Marinette area no 
later than 11:00 p.m. that same day. 
¶16 Deputy Berlin immediately followed up on that tip by 
driving past Miller's and Kowalski's residences.  Kowalski's 
black Ford Explorer was not there.  Deputy Berlin and other 
officers took a position along Highway 41 to watch for 
Kowalski's vehicle to come back into Marinette County before 
11:00 p.m.  At 10:30 p.m., about a thirty minute drive outside 
of the City of Marinette, the officers saw a black Ford Explorer 
with registration tags matching those of Kowalski driving on 
Highway 41 toward Marinette County.  The officers, including 
Deputy Berlin, followed Kowalski's black Ford Explorer, and 
after it crossed into Marinette County, a marked squad car 
stopped the vehicle.   
¶17 Miller was driving the vehicle, and the officers 
arrested him and a passenger, James Orzel (Orzel).  The officers 
discovered cocaine, marijuana, a digital scale and cash in a 
search of Miller, Orzel and the vehicle.  Miller was ill and had 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
9 
 
vomited on himself at some point before the police stopped him.  
Deputy Berlin testified that he was concerned that Miller might 
have overdosed, and for that reason he had asked Miller whether 
he had used any drugs.  Miller responded that he had used heroin 
that morning. 
II 
 
¶18 The State charged Miller with possession of cocaine 
with 
intent 
to 
distribute 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 961.41(1m)(cm)2.,11 and possession of marijuana with intent to 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 961.41(1m)(cm)2. provides in relevant 
part:  
(1m) Possession with intent to manufacture, distribute 
or deliver. Except as authorized by this chapter, it 
is unlawful for any person to possess, with intent to 
manufacture, 
distribute 
or 
deliver, 
a 
controlled 
substance or a controlled substance analog. Intent 
under this subsection may be demonstrated by, without 
limitation because of enumeration, evidence of the 
quantity 
and 
monetary 
value 
of 
the 
substances 
possessed, the possession of manufacturing implements 
or paraphernalia, and the activities or statements of 
the person in possession of the controlled substance 
or a controlled substance analog prior to and after 
the alleged violation. Any person who violates this 
subsection is subject to the following penalties:  
 . . .  
(cm) Cocaine and cocaine base. If a person violates 
this subsection with respect to cocaine or cocaine 
base, or a controlled substance analog of cocaine or 
cocaine base, and the amount possessed, with intent to 
manufacture, distribute or deliver, is:  
 . . .   
2. More than 5 grams but not more than 15 grams, the 
person is guilty of a Class E felony. 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
10 
 
distribute contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1m)(h)1.12 as party to 
a crime contrary to Wis. Stat. § 939.05.13  Miller moved to 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 961.41(1m)(h)1. provides in relevant 
part:  
(1m) Possession with intent to manufacture, distribute 
or deliver. Except as authorized by this chapter, it 
is unlawful for any person to possess, with intent to 
manufacture, 
distribute 
or 
deliver, 
a 
controlled 
substance or a controlled substance analog. Intent 
under this subsection may be demonstrated by, without 
limitation because of enumeration, evidence of the 
quantity 
and 
monetary 
value 
of 
the 
substances 
possessed, the possession of manufacturing implements 
or paraphernalia, and the activities or statements of 
the person in possession of the controlled substance 
or a controlled substance analog prior to and after 
the alleged violation. Any person who violates this 
subsection is subject to the following penalties: 
 . . .  
(h) Tetrahydrocannabinols. If a person violates this 
subsection 
with 
respect 
to 
tetrahydrocannabinols, 
included 
under 
s. 961.14(4)(t), or a controlled 
substance analog of tetrahydrocannabinols, and the 
amount 
possessed, 
with 
intent 
to 
manufacture, 
distribute, or deliver, is:  
1. Two hundred grams or less, or 4 or fewer plants 
containing tetrahydrocannabinols, the person is guilty 
of a Class I felony. 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.05 provides:  
(1) Whoever is concerned in the commission of a crime 
is a principal and may be charged with and convicted 
of the commission of the crime although the person did 
not directly commit it and although the person who 
directly committed it has not been convicted or has 
been convicted of some other degree of the crime or of 
some other crime based on the same act.  
(2) A person is concerned in the commission of the 
crime if the person:  
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
11 
 
suppress the evidence and his statement on the basis that, 
according to Miller, police lacked reasonable suspicion for the 
investigatory stop.14     
 
¶19 The Marinette County Circuit Court denied Miller's 
motion to suppress.  Significantly, the circuit court found that 
the final informant was not truly an anonymous source because he 
had provided Berlin with his first name and cellphone number.  
The circuit court found this informant more credible and 
reliable because he provided self-identifying information that 
exposed him to prosecution for obstructing an investigation if 
                                                                                                                                                             
(a) Directly commits the crime; or  
(b) Intentionally aids and abets the commission of it; 
or  
(c) Is a party to a conspiracy with another to commit 
it or advises, hires, counsels or otherwise procures 
another to commit it. Such a party is also concerned 
in the commission of any other crime which is 
committed in pursuance of the intended crime and which 
under the circumstances is a natural and probable 
consequence of the intended crime. This paragraph does 
not apply to a person who voluntarily changes his or 
her mind and no longer desires that the crime be 
committed and notifies the other parties concerned of 
his or her withdrawal within a reasonable time before 
the commission of the crime so as to allow the others 
also to withdraw. 
14 Before the circuit court, Miller challenged the legality 
of the investigatory stop, the frisk and his arrest.  Before 
this court, Miller challenges only the investigatory stop.  
Therefore, we address only that part of the circuit court's 
decision relevant to the propriety of the investigatory stop. 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
12 
 
he provided false information.15  The circuit court emphasized 
the details in the final informant's tips that turned out to be 
true: the black Ford Explorer, license plate number 712 NNE, was 
registered to Kowalski at N2401 Kowalski Road and, on August 20, 
2008, was heading towards the City of Marinette on the most 
direct route from Milwaukee, on schedule to arrive in the City 
of Marinette around 11:00 p.m.  The circuit court also found 
that the source of the informant's information was not evident 
from the testimony.  On that basis, the circuit court rejected 
Miller's argument that the tips were based on hearsay. 
¶20 The circuit court noted that the prior tips, while of 
limited reliability standing alone, added to the officers' 
suspicion that Miller was involved in illegal drug activity.  
The 
tips 
from Manicor and Crime Stoppers were not, by 
themselves, inherently reliable, and police were not able to 
corroborate the information in the tips, but the circuit court 
stated that it was reasonable for police to take these tips into 
account when weighing the information provided by the final 
informant.  Further, the circuit court noted that Deputy Berlin 
had discovered, prior to getting the final tips, that Miller had 
a prior conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia.  Under 
the totality of these circumstances, the circuit court concluded 
that officers acted reasonably with the requisite reasonable 
                                                 
15 See Wis. Stat. § 946.41 (providing criminal penalties for 
anyone who knowingly provides false information to an officer 
who is acting in an official capacity). 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
13 
 
suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of Miller when he was 
driving Kowalski's black Ford Explorer on August 20, 2008. 
¶21 Miller pleaded no contest to possession of between 
five and 15 grams of cocaine with intent to distribute as party 
to a crime contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1m)(cm)2. and 
§ 939.05.  The circuit court sentenced Miller to four years of 
initial confinement and three years on extended supervision.  
Miller appealed the circuit court's denial of his motion to 
suppress.16 
¶22 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
denial 
of 
Miller's 
motion 
to 
suppress 
and 
judgment 
of 
conviction.  State v. Miller, No. 2010AP557-CR, unpublished 
order (Wis. Ct. App. June 29, 2011).  In a summary disposition, 
the court of appeals concluded that, while the tips by Manicor 
and Crime Stoppers were of limited reliability, the information 
provided by the final informant was more credible and reliable, 
and police had reasonable suspicion for the investigatory stop 
considering the totality of the circumstances.  Id. at 5. 
¶23 The court of appeals stated that the information from 
Manicor was of limited reliability "due to the inmate's 
questionable motivations, the time which had passed, and the 
fact that the information could not be contemporaneously 
corroborated."  Id.  Further, the court of appeals concluded 
that the Crime Stoppers tips were also of limited reliability 
                                                 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.31(10) allows the appeal and review 
of 
the circuit court's denial of a motion to suppress 
notwithstanding the defendant's subsequent plea of no contest. 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
14 
 
"because the source was anonymous, the tipster provided little 
detail, and the police were unable to verify it."  Id.  The 
court of appeals noted that, while not corroborated, this 
information also had not been proven to be false.  Id. 
¶24 The court of appeals concluded that the information 
from the final informant was more credible and reliable because 
the informant called from "a traceable cell phone and provided 
considerably more verifiable details."  Id.  The court of 
appeals noted that police were able to corroborate many of these 
details.  Id.  The court of appeals concluded that despite the 
limited reliability of the prior tips standing alone, "the 
police were certainly entitled to consider the fact that they 
had received multiple reports of Miller's involvement in drug 
dealing when assessing the final, most detailed tip about 
ongoing activity."  Id.  Therefore, the court of appeals 
concluded that police had reasonable suspicion to conduct an 
investigatory stop under the totality of the circumstances. 
¶25 Miller petitioned this court for review, and we 
granted his petition. 
III 
¶26 This case presents a single issue on review: whether 
information provided to police from several informants along 
with police corroboration provided the requisite reasonable 
suspicion for an investigatory stop of Miller in the car he was 
driving.  This issue presents a question of constitutional fact, 
which this court reviews under a two-step analysis.  State v. 
Williams, 2001 WI 21, ¶18, 241 Wis. 2d 631, 623 N.W.2d 106.  
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
15 
 
First, this court examines the circuit court's findings of fact.  
We will uphold the circuit court's findings of fact unless they 
are clearly erroneous.  Id.  Second, this court reviews de novo 
whether the facts meet the constitutional standard of reasonable 
suspicion.  Id.   
IV 
¶27 We begin by examining the applicable legal standards 
to determine whether police had the reasonable suspicion 
required to conduct an investigatory stop of the vehicle that 
Miller was driving.  We then turn to examine the officers' 
actions in this case under these standards.  
A 
¶28 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution provide 
citizens with the guarantee to be free from "unreasonable 
searches and seizures."  State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 
137, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990) (internal quotations omitted).  We 
generally interpret Article I, Section 11 consistent with the 
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the parallel 
Fourth Amendment, and therefore rely on United States Supreme 
Court precedent in applying and interpreting Article I, Section 
11 as well as the Fourth Amendment.  State v. Felix, 2012 WI 36, 
¶38, 339 Wis. 2d 670, 811 N.W.2d 775.   
¶29 In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8, 30 (1968), the United 
States Supreme Court explained that it is reasonable and 
consistent with Fourth Amendment protections for an officer to 
conduct a temporary, "investigatory 'stop'" of an individual if 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
16 
 
the officer has reasonable suspicion "that criminal activity may 
be afoot."  "[I]n justifying the particular intrusion[——the 
investigatory stop——]the police officer must be able to point to 
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion."  Id. at 21.  The test is an objective one: "[W]ould 
the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure 
or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the 
belief' that the action taken was appropriate?"  Id. at 21-22 
(quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).  
¶30 The Terry investigatory-stop test has been adopted by 
this court, State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 55, 556 N.W.2d 681 
(1996), and codified by the Wisconsin legislature in Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.24,17 Williams, 241 Wis. 2d 631, ¶21.  We consider the 
totality of the circumstances leading up to the investigatory 
stop and focus our analysis on "the reasonableness of the 
officers' actions in the situation facing them."  Williams, 241 
Wis. 2d 631, ¶¶22-23.   
                                                 
17 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.24 provides:  
Temporary questioning without arrest. After having 
identified himself or herself as a law enforcement 
officer, a law enforcement officer may stop a person 
in a public place for a reasonable period of time when 
the officer reasonably suspects that such person is 
committing, is about to commit or has committed a 
crime, and may demand the name and address of the 
person and an explanation of the person's conduct. 
Such detention and temporary questioning shall be 
conducted in the vicinity where the person was 
stopped. 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
17 
 
¶31 When police have relied, at least in part, on 
information from an informant, we balance two factors to 
determine whether officers acted reasonably in reliance on that 
information.  Id., ¶22.  The first is the quality of the 
information, which depends upon the reliability of the source.18  
Id.  The second is the quantity or content of the information.  
Id.  There is an inversely proportional relationship between the 
quality and the quantity of information required to reach the 
threshold of reasonable suspicion.  Id.   
¶32 In other words, if an informant is more reliable, 
there does not need to be as much detail in the tip or police 
corroboration in order for police to rely on that information to 
                                                 
18 There are several types of informants, including a 
citizen 
informant——"someone 
who 
happens 
upon 
a 
crime 
or 
suspicious activity and reports it to police"——who is generally 
considered among the most reliable informants, State v. Kolk, 
2006 WI App 261, ¶12, 298 Wis. 2d 99, 726 N.W.2d 337; a 
confidential informant——someone, "often with a criminal past 
him- or herself, who assists the police in identifying and 
catching criminals"——who may be more reliable if he or she has 
provided truthful information to police in the past, id.; and an 
anonymous informant——someone "whose identity is unknown even to 
the police"——who is considered reliable if police are able to 
corroborate details in the informant's tip, id. 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
18 
 
conduct an investigatory stop.19  On the other hand, if an 
informant has limited reliability——for example, an entirely 
anonymous informant——the tip must contain more significant 
details or future predictions along with police corroboration.20  
The relevant question is whether the tip contained "sufficient 
indicia of reliability," along with other information known to 
police, to support reasonable suspicion for an investigatory 
stop.  Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990).   
¶33 The law recognizes that the reliability of informants 
varies greatly.  Rutzinski, 241 Wis. 2d 729, ¶17.  There is 
variation even within the realm of informants who wish to remain 
anonymous depending upon whether the informant risked disclosing 
his or her identity to police.  Information from an entirely 
anonymous informant, without more, is not considered very 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., Williams, 241 Wis. 2d 631 (upholding an 
investigatory stop based on a tip from a reliable informant and 
some police corroboration of innocent details in the tip); 
Rutzinski, 241 Wis. 2d 729 (upholding an investigatory stop 
based on a tip from a reliable informant who was traceable by 
police even though there was little police corroboration of the 
informant's allegations prior to the stop); Adams v. Williams, 
407 U.S. 143 (1972) (upholding an investigatory stop based on 
information provided by a more reliable informant known to the 
investigating officer even though there was little corroboration 
of or specific information provided in the tip). 
20 State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 456 N.W.2d 830 
(1990) (upholding an investigatory stop based on an anonymous 
tip of limited independent reliability because the tip included 
significant details and future predictions verified by police); 
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990) (same); State v. Sherry, 
2004 WI App 207, 277 Wis. 2d 194, 690 N.W.2d 435 (same); Florida 
v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) (concluding that police lacked 
reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop based on an 
anonymous tip that lacked detail and police corroboration).  
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
19 
 
reliable 
because 
the 
"tip 
alone 
seldom 
demonstrates 
the 
informant's basis of knowledge or veracity."   Florida v. J.L., 
529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000).  In contrast, an informant who 
provides 
some 
self-identifying information is likely more 
reliable than an anonymous informant because "[r]isking one's 
identification intimates that, more likely than not, the 
informant is a genuinely concerned citizen as opposed to a 
fallacious prankster."  Williams, 241 Wis. 2d 631, ¶35.  This is 
so because an informant who discloses his or her identity to 
police could potentially "'be held responsible if [his or] her 
allegations turned out to [have been] fabricated.'"  Id., ¶38 
(alterations in original) (quoting J.L., 529 U.S. at 270); see 
also Wis. Stat. § 946.41.   
¶34 The key to this analysis is the informant's knowledge 
or presumed knowledge that a consequence of disclosing his or 
her identity is accountability for providing a false tip.  
Stated differently, police may infer that an informant who risks 
disclosing his or her identity is more likely to be providing 
truthful information because the informant knows that police can 
hold him or her accountable for providing false information.21   
                                                 
21 See Rutzinski, 241 Wis. 2d 729, ¶32 (The officer "thus 
could infer that by revealing that he or she was in a particular 
vehicle, the informant understood that the police could discover 
his or her identity by tracing the vehicle's license plates or 
directing the vehicle to the side of the road[,] . . . [and the 
officer] could reasonably have concluded that the informant knew 
that he or she potentially could be arrested if the tip proved 
to be fabricated."); 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A 
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.5(h), at 598 (4th ed. 
2004). 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
20 
 
¶35 As we turn to examine how these principles have been 
applied to the facts presented in past cases, we keep in mind 
that each case that examines whether police had reasonable 
suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances is 
naturally highly fact specific and must "be decided on its own 
facts."  Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.   
B 
¶36 Cases 
examining 
reasonable 
suspicion 
for 
an 
investigatory stop are fact intensive, and even in the category 
of cases involving information from a purportedly anonymous 
informant, each case strikes a different balance between the 
quality and quantity of information required.  We plot out a few 
established points along this spectrum to guide our analysis of 
whether the quality and quantity of information in this case 
adds up to reasonable suspicion. 
¶37 Where an investigatory stop is based on an entirely 
anonymous tip, it is critical that the informant provide 
significant, specific details and future predictions that police 
are able to corroborate.  In White, 496 U.S. 325, the details 
and future predictions lent sufficient credibility to the 
anonymous tip.  Police received an anonymous call that White 
would be leaving her apartment carrying a brown attaché case 
with an ounce of cocaine and driving to a particular motel at a 
certain time in a brown Plymouth station wagon that had a broken 
right taillight.  Id. at 327.  Officers conducted surveillance 
and observed White leave her apartment and get into her car, 
carrying nothing.  Id.  Officers followed as White drove along 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
21 
 
the most direct route to the motel.  Id.  Police stopped the car 
before she got to the destination, searched her car and 
discovered marijuana in a brown attaché case.  Id.  The United 
States Supreme Court concluded that "the anonymous tip had been 
sufficiently corroborated to furnish reasonable suspicion that 
[White] was engaged in criminal activity."  Id. at 331.  The 
Court emphasized that "'the anonymous [tip] contained a range of 
details 
relating 
not 
just 
to 
easily 
obtained 
facts 
and 
conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future 
actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted.'"  Id. 
at 332 (alteration in original) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 245 (1983)).  The Court noted that White was a close 
case, suggesting that the quantity of details provided by the 
informant may be at the lower end of the permissible range.  Id.  
¶38 In Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, this court concluded 
that there was reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop 
based on an entirely anonymous tip because the tip contained 
significant 
details 
and 
future 
predictions 
that 
were 
corroborated by police.  In Richardson, an anonymous caller 
provided police with substantial and significant details and 
future 
predictions, 
specifically: 
Richardson 
"and 
another 
specifically identified man were en route from Viroqua to La 
Crosse with about one-quarter ounce of cocaine which they 
intended to sell in La Crosse";  the men left Viroqua and were 
expected to arrive in La Crosse at particular times; Richardson 
was the passenger in the car; the men were travelling on 
Highways 14 and 35, would travel through Westby and Coon Valley, 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
22 
 
and planned to stop at a residence in La Crosse; the men were 
driving a 1978 Camaro; Richardson was a large man, weighing 
around 300 pounds and standing about six feet tall, had scarring 
on his face and was missing parts of his fingers; and Richardson 
had previous drug-related offenses.  Id. at 133-34.  The 
anonymous informant also provided the license plate number of 
the vehicle and stated that he had been with Richardson and the 
other man and had seen the cocaine.  Id. 
¶39 The officer had no knowledge of Richardson or any 
planned drug sales before speaking with the anonymous caller.  
Id. at 134.  Based solely on the information in this tip, the 
officer set up surveillance on Highway 14 near the intersection 
with Highway 35 along with another officer.  Id. at 134-35.  
When the Camaro passed the surveillance point, the officers 
followed the car and observed that it stopped at an apartment 
building in La Crosse.  Id. at 135.  Police stopped the vehicle 
after the men returned.  Id.  This court held that police had 
"reasonable articulable suspicion for an investigatory stop" 
based on the officers' corroboration of a significant number of 
the innocent details and future predictions provided in the tip, 
even more so than the details present in White.   Id. at 138, 
142-43.  
¶40 In State v. Sherry, 2004 WI App 207, 277 Wis. 2d 194, 
690 N.W.2d 435, the court of appeals concluded that police had 
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop based on 
an anonymous Crime Stoppers tip.  The anonymous tip indicated 
that, presently or in the near future, Sherry would be 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
23 
 
travelling from the Readstown area to the Soldiers Grove area 
with a large amount of marijuana.  Id., ¶11.  The caller 
provided the make, color and license plate number of the car and 
stated that it belonged to Sherry.  Id.  The caller indicated 
that another person, Ryan Saint, "might be in the car and, if he 
was, he would be driving."  Id.  Police set up surveillance 
along the likely route and, about an hour after receiving the 
tip, the vehicle described passed along the route to Soldiers 
Grove.  Id., ¶12.  An officer followed and verified that the 
make and license plate of the vehicle matched the one described 
in the tip.  The officer observed that the driver was likely 
male.  Id. 
¶41 The court of appeals concluded that the anonymous tip 
was 
sufficiently reliable to support reasonable suspicion 
because it included significant details and detailed future 
predictions.  
Id., 
¶¶13-14.  The court noted that the 
differences between the facts in Sherry and White were "a wash"—
while there was more corroboration in White, there was an 
additional future prediction in Sherry, i.e., that another 
person might be in the car and, if so, he would be driving.  
Id., ¶14. 
¶42 The United States Supreme Court, in J.L., 529 U.S. 
266, delineated some limits on using an anonymous tip that is 
accompanied by minimal police corroboration as the sole basis 
for reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop, where the 
tip lacked detail and future predictions.  In J.L., police 
received an anonymous tip that a young black male, wearing a 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
24 
 
plaid shirt and standing at a particular bus stop, was carrying 
a firearm.  Id. at 268.  Police went to that bus stop and 
observed three black males standing at the bus stop, one of whom 
was wearing a plaid shirt.  Id.  Without obtaining any 
additional information the officers conducted an investigatory 
stop and frisk, and discovered that J.L., the young black male 
at the bus stop who was wearing a plaid shirt, was carrying a 
gun.  Id.  The United States Supreme Court concluded that this 
bare-bones anonymous tip, with no predictive information or 
other means to test the anonymous informant's knowledge or 
credibility, lacked the indicia of reliability required to 
provide police with reasonable suspicion.  Id. at 271.  In terms 
of the balance between the quality and quantity of information, 
the low-quality anonymous tip in J.L., with minimal police 
corroboration, lacked the quantity of detailed information and 
future predictions required to reach the level of reasonable 
suspicion. 
¶43 Where an investigatory stop is based on a higher-
quality tip from an informant who has provided some self-
identifying information, police often rely on information in 
that tip where police can corroborate some of the details 
provided, even if the tip lacks the quantity of details and 
future predictions required for a truly anonymous tip.  For 
example, in Williams, 241 Wis. 2d 631, ¶34, this court examined 
J.L. and distinguished that case in part on the basis that the 
informant in Williams was not truly anonymous.  In Williams, the 
tip came from a 911 caller who wanted to remain anonymous.  Id., 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
25 
 
¶4.  The informant reported that someone was dealing drugs from 
a vehicle behind the caller's apartment and that the vehicle was 
there as that person was on the phone.  Id.  When asked to 
provide a description of the vehicle, the caller put down the 
phone, 
presumably 
to 
take 
another 
look 
outside, 
before 
describing the vehicle as a blue and burgundy Bronco.  Id.  The 
caller provided the address of the apartment and indicated that 
the vehicle was in the driveway next to the apartment.  Id. 
¶44 This 
information was dispatched to officers who 
arrived at the address provided by the informant shortly 
thereafter.  Id., ¶¶5-6.  The officers saw a vehicle matching 
the description provided by the informant parked in a driveway 
alongside an empty lot behind the building.  Id., ¶6.  They also 
observed that the vehicle had no license plates and that the 
male in the driver's seat, Williams, reached down and behind the 
passenger's seat when the officers pulled into view.  Id., ¶¶7-
8.  Officers drew their weapons, conducted an investigatory stop 
and found substances that were likely marijuana and cocaine base 
in the area where Williams had been reaching.  Id., ¶¶8-10. 
¶45 This court held that, under the totality of the 
circumstances, police had reasonable suspicion for the stop.  
This court distinguished J.L. in a number of respects.  First, 
in 
Williams, 
the 
informant 
explained 
how 
she 
knew 
the 
information: she was observing it.  Id., ¶33.  Second, it was 
significant that the informant was not entirely anonymous in 
Williams——in fact the circuit court found that she was a citizen 
informant because she provided the address to the apartment that 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
26 
 
she described as her home.  Id., ¶¶34-36.  Third, the police 
were able to corroborate innocent, but significant, details of 
the tip including the location and description of the vehicle.  
Id., ¶39.  Fourth, police noticed two additional suspicious 
facts when they responded to the tip: (1) the vehicle had no 
license plates, and (2) Williams reached down and behind the 
passenger's seat when the officers pulled into view, suggesting 
that he may have been trying to reach for a weapon or conceal 
evidence.  Id., ¶¶43, 45. 
¶46 In 
Rutzinski, 
241 
Wis. 2d 729, 
this 
court 
also 
concluded 
that 
police 
had 
reasonable 
suspicion 
for 
an 
investigatory stop based on a tip that contained limited details 
from an informant who risked disclosing her identity.  The 
informant in Rutzinski, an unidentified motorist, called police 
to report that a black pickup truck driving behind him or her 
was weaving in its lane, varying its speed dramatically and 
following too closely behind his or her vehicle.  Id., ¶4.  
After receiving this report, an officer on patrol, Officer 
Sardina, pulled behind the black pickup truck and the informant, 
who was still on the phone with police and directly in front of 
the black pickup truck, said that the officer was following the 
right vehicle.  Id., ¶6.  The officer did not observe any 
erratic driving but stopped the black pickup truck on suspicion 
of drunken driving based on the tip.  Id., ¶7. 
¶47 This 
court concluded that police had reasonable 
suspicion for the investigatory stop, primarily based on the 
reliability of the information provided by the informant.  Id., 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
27 
 
¶¶31-34.  The informant and the tip were more reliable because 
the informant had exposed his or her identity to police and 
could 
have 
been 
held 
accountable 
for 
providing 
false 
information:   
Officer Sardina thus could infer that by revealing 
that he or she was in a particular vehicle, the 
informant understood that the police could discover 
his or her identity by tracing the vehicle's license 
plates or directing the vehicle to the side of the 
road.  That is, like the officer in Adams, Officer 
Sardina could reasonably have concluded that the 
informant knew that he or she potentially could be 
arrested if the tip proved to be fabricated. 
Id., ¶32 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  We also indicated 
that the information from the informant was reliable because "he 
or 
she 
was 
making 
personal 
observations 
of 
Rutzinski's 
contemporaneous actions."  Id., ¶33.  Finally, we indicated that 
the officer's actions in conducting an investigatory stop were 
particularly reasonable given the imminent risk to public safety 
presented by an alleged drunk driver presently on the road.  
Id., ¶34. 
C 
¶48 We now apply the standard for reasonable suspicion to 
the facts in this case, guided by the framework set out above.  
As an initial matter we conclude, as both parties agree, that 
the officers' actions in conducting an investigatory stop of the 
black Ford Explorer that Miller was driving is a seizure for the 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11.  
Rutzinski, 241 Wis. 2d 729, ¶14.  The parties' dispute is 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
28 
 
focused on whether police had the requisite reasonable suspicion 
for the investigatory stop. 
¶49 Miller argues that police lacked reasonable suspicion 
in this case because there were insufficient specific and 
articulable facts to support a reasonable belief that Miller was 
engaged in a crime when the vehicle he was driving was stopped.  
Miller asserts that the tips from Manicor and Crime Stoppers 
cannot provide a basis for reasonable suspicion because those 
tips are unreliable and uncorroborated.  Miller further argues 
that information from the final informant does not provide 
police with reasonable suspicion for several reasons.  First, 
according to Miller, anonymous or confidential informants start 
off with low reliability.  Second, Miller argues that the 
tipster was wrong in a number of important respects, most 
significantly by first telling Deputy Berlin that Miller would 
leave with Kowalski on August 19 to pick up drugs in Milwaukee.  
Third, Miller asserts that the police conducted only minimal 
investigation and corroborated only innocent details from the 
tips, which included information that would be obvious to anyone 
familiar with Miller.  Fourth, Miller argues that the informant 
reported only hearsay information, which further undermines his 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
29 
 
reliability.22  Miller argues that several unreliable and 
uncorroborated tips cannot add up to reasonable suspicion. 
¶50 The State responds that the police had reasonable 
suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances.  The State 
asserts that the officers acted reasonably pursuant to the 
standard articulated by this court in Williams and Richardson, 
based on all of the information they had from multiple tips and 
through police corroboration.  According to the State, the 
information provided to and obtained by police in this case is 
very similar to information that the United States Supreme Court 
concluded was sufficient in White and that the court of appeals 
found sufficient in Sherry.  In some respects, according to the 
State, the information is even stronger here than in White 
because, in this case, the tipster was not entirely anonymous, 
which makes his information more reliable, and the police had 
previously received information linking Miller to illegal drug 
                                                 
22 Deputy Berlin testified that, as his report reflected, 
the informant told him in the first call that someone had told 
the informant that Miller and Kowalski were going to Milwaukee 
to buy drugs on August 19, 2008.  Miller argued on this basis 
that the information was unreliable hearsay.  The circuit court 
found that the record did not support Miller's argument that the 
final informant provided only hearsay information because that 
argument was based solely on the informant's statement that he 
was told the information he provided in the first call to Deputy 
Berlin.  We agree and uphold the circuit court's finding because 
it is not clearly erroneous.  Williams, 241 Wis. 2d 631, ¶18.  
The fact that the record is somewhat unclear about the source of 
the informant's information is not enough to support Miller's 
argument premised on the fact that the tips were, in fact, 
hearsay, particularly given the circuit court's finding to the 
contrary.  
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
30 
 
activity.  The State asserts that the court of appeals properly 
affirmed Miller's judgment of conviction. 
¶51 We 
conclude 
that 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, police had reasonable suspicion to conduct an 
investigatory stop of the black Ford Explorer that Miller was 
driving.  Police acted on reasonable suspicion based on multiple 
tips that Miller was driving the vehicle and was involved in an 
ongoing drug-related crime.  The key information that supports 
reasonable suspicion was that provided by the final informant 
and corroborated by police, including the make, model, license 
plate 
and 
registration 
of 
the 
vehicle, 
and 
an 
accurate 
prediction of where it could be found and when.  It was also 
entirely reasonable for Deputy Berlin to rely on his knowledge 
that prior tips by Manicor and Crime Stoppers had also alleged 
that Miller was selling drugs.   
¶52 The factor that weighs most heavily in our analysis is 
the fact that the tips by the final informant contained 
significant indicia of reliability, as was the case in Williams 
and Rutzinski, because here the informant was not truly 
anonymous.  We note that whether an informant is anonymous for 
the purpose of analyzing the informant's reliability and 
credibility is not controlled by whether he or she wanted to 
remain anonymous.    Instead, a purportedly anonymous informant 
is not anonymous in this analysis if he or she provides self-
identifying information such that we may infer that the 
informant knew that he or she could be held accountable for 
providing false information.  Rutzinski, 241 Wis. 2d 729, ¶32.   
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
31 
 
¶53 In this case, the informant told Deputy Berlin that he 
wanted to remain anonymous but nevertheless risked disclosing 
his identity to police.  Most significantly, the informant 
provided his first name and cellphone number to Deputy Berlin.  
In fact, Deputy Berlin was able to call the informant back on 
his cellphone and reach him directly when Deputy Berlin had 
follow-up questions for the informant the morning of August 20, 
2008.  Further, the fact that this informant contacted Deputy 
Berlin initially through one of the deputy's confidential 
informants provides another avenue through which the final 
informant's identity could have been discovered.  Based on the 
testimony and arguments at the suppression hearing, the circuit 
court explicitly determined that this informant was more 
reliable because he risked disclosing his identity to police.  
We agree with the circuit court's determination because it is 
supported by the record and our precedent.  The facts here are 
similar to those in Williams and Rutzinski, where the informants 
did not disclose their identities outright but provided enough 
information from which we could reasonably infer that the 
informants realized that they could be tracked down for 
providing false information.   
¶54 As in Rutzinski, 241 Wis. 2d 729, ¶32, the police 
reasonably relied on the final informant's information as 
truthful because one can reasonably infer that this informant 
knew that by risking the disclosure of his identity he could be 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
32 
 
held accountable for providing false information.23  Whether or 
not the informant realized the implications of his disclosure in 
the first call, it is reasonable to infer that after he was 
called back by Deputy Berlin the following day with follow-up 
questions, he must have realized that he was traceable and could 
be subject to criminal penalties for any false allegations.  As 
we stated in Williams, "[r]isking one's identification intimates 
that, more likely than not, the informant is a genuinely 
concerned citizen as opposed to a fallacious prankster."  241 
Wis. 2d 631, ¶35.  Therefore, it was reasonable for police to 
rely more heavily on information from such a reliable source.         
¶55 Further, the final informant in this case provided 
some details and future predictions that police were able to 
corroborate similar to the details that the informants provided 
in White, Richardson and Sherry.24  Deputy Berlin verified that a 
                                                 
23 Wisconsin Stat. § 946.41 provides criminal penalties for 
anyone who knowingly provides false information to an officer 
who is acting in an official capacity. 
24 Miller argues that this case is more akin to the quality 
and quantity of information known to police in Kolk, 298 
Wis. 2d 99, in which the court of appeals looked at tips from a 
citizen informant.  We do not find Kolk——a case that centered on 
the question of whether a frisk was justified——particularly 
helpful to resolve whether police had reasonable suspicion for 
the investigatory stop in this case, which is the sole issue 
before this court.  We analyze whether police had reasonable 
suspicion to conduct a protective search for weapons during an 
investigatory 
stop 
under a different standard——"whether a 
reasonably prudent [officer] in the circumstances would be 
warranted in the belief that his [or her] safety or that of 
others was in danger."  State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, ¶21, 299 
Wis. 2d 675, 729 N.W.2d 182 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).      
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
33 
 
black 
Ford 
Explorer, 
license 
plate 
number 
712 
NNE, 
was 
registered to Kowalski at N2401 Kowalski Road.  Additionally, 
the informant accurately predicted that Miller25 would be driving 
Kowalski's black Ford Explorer, license plate number 712 NNE, 
along the most likely route back to the City of Marinette from 
Milwaukee, Highway 41, en route to arrive in the Marinette area 
at about 11:00 p.m. on August 20, 2008.    While the informant 
in this case did not provide as many unique details and future 
predictions as the informants in White, Richardson and Sherry, 
the informant in this case started off with more credibility by 
providing 
self-identifying 
information. 
 
The 
quantity 
of 
information in this case is counterbalanced by the reliability 
of the informant. 
¶56 It is also notable that Deputy Berlin spoke directly 
with the informant multiple times and would have been able to 
take first-hand account of the informant's tone and delivery in 
evaluating the honesty and reliability of the tips.  Williams, 
241 Wis. 2d 631, ¶37 (noting that the recorded 911 call allowed 
for later judicial review "of the tipster's veracity, not only 
based upon content, but also based upon its tone and delivery").  
                                                 
25 We note that the officers did not identify Miller as the 
driver of Kowalski's black Ford Explorer until after the 
officers stopped the vehicle, and we therefore do not rely on 
the fact that Miller was driving in our reasonable suspicion 
analysis.  Instead, police had reasonable suspicion based on the 
other details provided by the final informant——the vehicle's 
make, model, license plate and registration, and the route and 
time——the fact that the informant was more reliable, because he 
provided self-identifying information, and the prior information 
to police. 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
34 
 
Additionally, the credibility of the informant's information is 
not fatally undermined because he was not able to make an 
absolute prediction of the future, i.e., because he initially 
told Deputy Berlin that Miller would leave the night of August 
19, 2008.  As the court of appeals noted, it is entirely 
reasonable to infer that the informant's initial tip was 
accurate, but plans changed and Miller decided to go on August 
20 instead.   
¶57 While the prior tips from Manicor and Crime Stoppers 
were of limited reliability standing alone, it was reasonable 
for Deputy Berlin to consider these prior allegations when 
evaluating the reliability of the final tips.  We agree with the 
court of appeals that the tip from Manicor was of limited 
reliability for several reasons.  First, Manicor's motivation 
was questionable, which makes him less reliable.  Manicor was in 
jail for parole revocation and he may have hoped that giving a 
tip to law enforcement would improve his situation.  Second, 
Manicor's tip was nine months old when Deputy Berlin got the 
final tips, so Manicor's tip is of limited usefulness for the 
purposes of justifying this stop.  The three Crime Stoppers tips 
were also of limited reliability because they were entirely 
anonymous, and Deputy Berlin was unable to corroborate the 
information.  Deputy Berlin did discover, after receiving these 
tips and before the tips from the final informant, that Miller 
had a prior conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia.  
Despite the limited reliability of these earlier tips, they 
weigh in favor of reasonable suspicion because, as the court of 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
35 
 
appeals noted, these tips, while not corroborated, were also not 
proved false and were generally consistent with the allegations 
in the final tips.  
¶58 We 
note 
that 
the 
existence 
of 
prior, 
though 
uncorroborated, tips that are consistent with the information 
from a reliable informant is a factor present in this case that 
apparently was not present in any of the above cases upon which 
we have relied to conclude that police had reasonable suspicion 
here.  This factor adds to the totality of the circumstances and 
strengthens 
our 
conclusion 
that 
the 
officers 
acted 
with 
reasonable suspicion in this case.  
V 
¶59 We 
conclude 
that 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances police acted reasonably when they conducted an 
investigatory stop of the vehicle Miller was driving based on 
reasonable suspicion "that criminal activity may be afoot."26  We 
are confident that police had the requisite reasonable suspicion 
primarily based on the reliability of the final informant and 
the information provided by him.  Such information was supported 
by the prior tips to police.  We note that while the initial 
tips were of limited reliability, the final informant and his 
tips 
had 
significant 
indicia 
of 
reliability 
because 
the 
informant provided self-identifying information that made him 
more reliable than a truly anonymous informant.27  Additionally, 
                                                 
26 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
27 Williams, 
241 
Wis. 2d 631, 
¶¶28-36; 
Rutzinski, 
241 
Wis. 2d 729, ¶21. 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
36 
 
the final informant provided details and accurate future 
predictions that police were able to corroborate.28  We hold that 
the officers acted reasonably under the circumstances in 
stopping Miller based on the objective test set forth in Terry 
v. Ohio, which asks: "[W]ould the facts available to the officer 
at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was 
appropriate?"29  We conclude that the answer to that question is 
yes. 
¶60 Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
                                                 
28 White, 496 U.S. at 332. 
29 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 
162). 
No. 
2010AP557-CR   
 
 
 
1