Case Title: Hawthorne v. Village of Olympia Fields

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93462

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 93462-Agenda 35-September 2002.
SONYA D. HAWTHORNE, Appellee, v. THE VILLAGE OF
OLYMPIA FIELDS et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed April 17, 2003.
 
	JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:
	The issue we are asked to resolve in this case is whether a
non-home-rule unit of local government may use its statutory
zoning authority to prevent operation of a home day-care facility
licensed by the State of Illinois. On cross-motions for partial
summary judgment, the circuit court held that it may not. The
appellate court affirmed. 328 Ill. App. 3d 301. For the reasons that
follow, we now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
	Under Illinois law, the operation of child-care facilities is
regulated by the state. The governing statute is the Child Care Act of 1969 (225 ILCS 10/1 et seq. (West 2000)). Under the Act,
"[a]ny person, group of persons or corporation who or which
receives children or arranges for care or placement of one or more
children unrelated to the operator" must apply for and obtain a
license from the Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS). 225 ILCS 10/4(a) (West 2000). Unless certain
exemptions apply, operation of a child-care facility without the
requisite state license is prohibited. 225 ILCS 10/3(a) (West 2000).
Violators are subject to criminal prosecution. 225 ILCS 10/11, 18
(West 2000).
	One type of child-care facility for which licensure is
authorized by the Child Care Act is a "day care home." A day-care
home is a family home that receives "more than 3 up to a
maximum of 12 children for less than 24 hours per day." 225 ILCS
10/2.18 (West 2000). The specified number of children includes
the family's own natural or adopted children and all other persons
under the age of 12. 225 ILCS 10/2.18 (West 2000).
	In 1999, plaintiff, Sonia Hawthorne, and her husband,
Marcus, purchased a single family home at 3509 Ionia Avenue in
the Village of Olympia Fields. The home was located across the
street from a local school. The Hawthornes bought the property in
the hope that they could provide home day care there. After
moving into the residence, plaintiff applied to DCFS for licensure
under the Child Care Act as a day-care home. Her application was
approved. DCFS issued a license to plaintiff to operate a day-care
home at the Ionia Avenue property beginning October 28, 1999.
	Once she moved in and obtained her license from DCFS,
plaintiff contacted Olympia Fields to obtain a building permit so
that she could remodel portions of the premises. The purpose of
the remodeling was to facilitate the operation of the day-care
home. The precise nature of the proposed remodeling is unclear
from the record, but appears to have included installation of a
second kitchen. By letter dated December 16, 1999, Olympia
Fields advised plaintiff and her husband that operation of a day-care home at the Ionia Avenue location did not comply with the
village's zoning ordinance and that they would have to obtain a
zoning variance before their application for a building permit
could proceed.
	Plaintiff's home on Ionia Avenue is zoned residential.
Although Olympia Fields' zoning ordinance permits "home
occupations" in residential zones (Olympia Fields Municipal Code
§§22-187, 22-207, 22-227 (Ord. No. 17, as revised May 11,
1981)), the village did not believe that a licensed day-care home
was such a use.
	A "home occupation" is defined by Olympia Fields' zoning
ordinance as
		"any gainful occupation or profession engaged in by an
occupant of a dwelling unit as a use which is clearly
incidental to the use of the dwelling unit for residential
purposes. The 'home occupation' shall be carried on
wholly within the principal building or within a building
accessory thereto, and only by members of the family
occupying the premises ***. There shall be no exterior
display, no exterior sign except as allowed by the sign
regulations for the district in which such 'home
occupation' is located, no exterior storage of materials, no
other exterior indication of the 'home occupation,' or
variation from the residential character of the principal
building, and no offensive noise, vibration, smoke, dust,
odors, heat or glare shall be produced. Offices, clinics,
doctors' offices, hospitals, barbershops, beauty parlors,
dress shops, millinery shops, tearooms, restaurants, tourist
homes, animal hospitals and kennels, among other things,
shall not be deemed to be home occupations." Olympia
Fields Municipal Code §22-3 (Ord. No. 17, as revised
May 11, 1981).
	Olympia Fields did not think that plaintiff's use of her home
met the foregoing definition of "home occupation" for three
reasons. First, it would not be carried out "only by members of the
family occupying the premises." Plaintiff planned to hire someone
from outside the family to assist her. Second, parents would be
picking up and dropping off children at the house, an activity the
village believed would contravene the requirement that there be no
"exterior indication of the 'home occupation.' " Finally, the
proposed addition of a second kitchen would, in the village's view,
be a "variation from the residential character of the principal
building."
	Because Olympia Fields believed that plaintiff's licensed day-care home did not meet the requirements of a "home occupation"
and did not otherwise qualify as a permissible use under the
village's zoning ordinance, plaintiff applied to the village for a
zoning variance. Her application, dated January 5, 2000, requested
two forms of relief: permission to operate a day-care home as a
home occupation and a variance to allow her to employ at the
facility someone other than a family member who resided at the
home.
	A public hearing on plaintiff's application for the zoning
variance was conducted by Olympia Fields' board of trustees on
January 24, 2000. At the conclusion of the hearing, which included
statements from various neighbors and relatives of plaintiff, the
board of trustees unanimously denied plaintiff's application.
	Plaintiff subsequently initiated this civil action in the circuit
court of Cook County against Olympia Fields and the village
administrator in her official capacity. Plaintiff's complaint, as
amended, contained eight counts. Count I alleged that Olympia
Fields' determination that plaintiff's day-care home did not
constitute a "home occupation" within the meaning of the village's
zoning ordinance was erroneous, arbitrary, capricious,
unreasonable and contrary to state law. Count II averred that
Olympia Fields' interpretation of the "home occupations"
provision of its zoning ordinance had the effect of wholly
excluding home day care from the village and that such action is
beyond the village's power. Count III claimed the Child Care Act
and the DCFS regulations promulgated thereunder preempted
Olympia Fields' authority to use its zoning ordinance to impede
the operation of day-care homes authorized by the state.
	In count IV, plaintiff charged that the license issued to her by
the state is a type of property entitled to protection by the fifth
amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend.
V) and that defendants' interpretation of the village zoning
ordinance to deny her permission to operate a day-care home
pursuant to that license constituted an unconstitutional taking
without just compensation. Count V made a parallel claim under
article I, section 15, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, §15). Counts VI and VII alleged, respectively, denials
of equal protection and due process in violation of article I, section
2, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2).
Count VIII claimed that defendants' action denied plaintiff her due
process rights under the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV).
	In each count, plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief
and damages. Counts IV and VIII, which alleged violations of
plaintiff's federal constitutional rights and invoked the provisions
of 42 U.S.C. §1983, also included a request for an award of
plaintiff's attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988. Following an
unsuccessful effort by defendants to remove the cause to federal
court, plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment as to counts
I through V. Defendants opposed that motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment against plaintiff on counts II
through V.
	A hearing was held on the parties' cross-motions. In the
course of that hearing, count I of the complaint was dismissed as
moot. Following various developments not relevant here, the
circuit court entered a detailed written order addressing the merits
of the parties' respective requests for summary judgment. It
granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and against
defendants on count II of her complaint, declaring that the "home
occupations" provision of Olympia Fields' zoning ordinance was
null and void to the extent that it excludes or has the effect of
excluding the operation of licensed day-care homes in the village.
	With respect to count III, the court granted the parties'
respective motions for summary judgment in part and denied them
in part. The court declared that Olympia Fields could regulate day-care homes, but only if its regulations did not conflict with the
Child Care Act or the DCFS regulations promulgated thereunder.
To the extent that its zoning ordinance was interpreted to regulate
day-care homes "in a manner that conflicts in any way with the
*** Child Care Act or the DCFS regulations," the court held that
it was preempted by state law and was "null and void."(1)
Accordingly, the court ruled that Olympia Fields could not invoke
its zoning regulations to limit the number of children that may be
cared for in a day-care home, to restrict the employment of
nonfamily members to assist in the care of children in a day-care
home, or to limit operation of the day-care home to the building
portion of the premises.
	Based upon the foregoing determinations, the circuit court
permanently enjoined Olympia Fields from regulating day-care
homes, under its zoning ordinance or otherwise, "in a manner that
that conflicts in any way with the *** Child Care Act or the DCFS
regulations." It further held "that, notwithstanding any presently-existing provisions of the Olympia Fields [zoning ordinance],
Plaintiff is entitled to operate a day care home at [her residence]
pursuant to the terms of her DCFS license."
	With respect to counts IV and V of plaintiff's amended
complaint, which alleged that Olympia Fields' actions had
constituted an unconstitutional taking without just compensation,
the circuit court believed that genuine issues of material fact
remained. It therefore denied summary judgment as to both counts.
Those counts remain pending, as do the claims asserted by
plaintiff in counts VI, VII and VIII.
	Although the circuit court's judgment did not finally dispose
of all of plaintiff's claims, it included an express written finding
that there was no just reason for delaying either enforcement or
appeal. That finding permitted plaintiff to bring an immediate
appeal under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)).
We note parenthetically that because the circuit court's judgment
granted an injunction, it would also have been immediately
appealable pursuant to our Rule 307(a) (166 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)).
	In the appellate court, Olympia Fields challenged the trial
court's determination that its zoning ordinance had the effect of
unlawfully excluding day-care homes from the village. It also
argued that the trial court erred in determining that its power to
regulate day-care homes through its zoning ordinance was
preempted by state law to the extent that the ordinances conflicted
with the Child Care Act and the DCFS regulations promulgated
thereunder. Rejecting both arguments, the appellate court affirmed
the trial court's judgment, with one justice specially concurring in
part and dissenting in part. 328 Ill. App. 3d 301.
	Our court granted Olympia Fields' petition for leave to appeal
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315(a) (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). We
subsequently allowed motions by the following governmental
entities and private organizations for leave to file briefs as amici
curiae: (1) the City of Rockford; (2) the Villages of Grayslake,
Hinsdale, LaGrange and Lake Zurich; and (3) Voices for Illinois
Children, Day Care Action Council of Illinois, the Carole
Robertson Center for Learning, the Human Development Center,
the Women's Business Development Center, and the Women's
Self-Employment Project. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345. In addition, we
permitted DCFS to file a "statement of position."
	In our court, as it did in the appellate court, Olympia Fields
raises two basic arguments: first, that its zoning ordinance does
not have the effect of unlawfully excluding day-care homes from
the village, and second, that its power to regulate day-care homes
through its zoning ordinance has not been preempted by state law.
No issue is raised as to the trial court's dismissal of count I, which
concerned Olympia Fields' construction of the "home occupation"
provision in the zoning ordinance, or its refusal to grant summary
judgment on counts IV and V, which asserted that defendants'
interpretation of its zoning ordinance to deny plaintiff permission
to operate a day-care home pursuant to her state-issued license
constituted a taking without just compensation in violation of the
federal and state constitutions.
	Before we proceed to the merits of Olympia Fields' appeal, a
procedural issue warrants comment. When Olympia Fields denied
plaintiff the zoning variance she requested, plaintiff did not seek
administrative review of the denial in circuit court. Rather, she
initiated this independent civil action for declaratory and
injunctive relief and damages. The lack of administrative review,
however, is not an impediment to plaintiff's cause of action.
	It is true that under the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS
5/1-1-1 et seq. (West 2000)), all final administrative decisions by
a zoning board of appeals are subject to judicial review pursuant
to the provisions of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS
5/3-101 et seq. (West 2000)). See 65 ILCS 5/11-13-13 (West
2000). That includes decisions regarding variances. 65 ILCS
5/11-13-4, 11-13-5 (West 2000).
	It is also true that review of a final administrative decision in
circuit court in accordance with the Administrative Review Law
is regarded as an administrative remedy subject to the exhaustion
doctrine. Where the Administrative Review Law is applicable and
provides a remedy, a court may not redress a party's grievances
through any other type of action. The circuit court's power to
resolve factual and legal issues arising from the challenged
decision must be exercised within its review of the decision under
the Administrative Review Law and not in a separate proceeding.
County of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. The Highlands, L.L.C., 188 Ill. 2d 546, 551-52 (1999).
	In the case before us now, however, the final decision was
rendered by Olympia Fields' board of trustees rather than by a
zoning board of appeals. The Illinois Municipal Code expressly
authorizes the corporate authorities of municipalities with fewer
than 500,000 residents to reserve to themselves the power to
determine and approve zoning variances. When corporate
authorities elect to retain the power to determine and approve
zoning variances, as the village trustees in this case did, that power
can only be exercised through adoption of ordinances. 65 ILCS
5/11-13-5 (West 2000).(2) The enactment of an ordinance is a
legislative act. See Kleidon v. City of Hickory Hills, 120 Ill. App.
3d 1043, 1046 (1983). So, too, is the refusal of a legislative
agency, whether a municipality or a county, to amend its
ordinances. See Smith v. County Board, 86 Ill. App. 3d 708, 714-15 (1980).
	The Administrative Review Law does not apply to the
legislative acts of legislative bodies. See Fitzpatrick v. City of
Springfield, 10 Ill. App. 3d 317, 320-21 (1973). Administrative
review is applicable only where the legislative body transfers to
some administrative agency the authority to administer the
ordinance. See Smith v. County Board, 86 Ill. App. 3d at 715.
Accordingly, where zoning action is taken by the legislative body
itself, as it was in this case, a civil proceeding challenging the
legislative body's action is not subject to attack on the grounds
that the plaintiff failed to proceed under the Administrative
Review Law. Administrative review under the statute is not
required. See Camardo v. Village of La Grange Park, 61 Ill. App.
2d 302, 308 (1965). Indeed, proceedings to secure review of a
legislative determination under the Administrative Review Law
would be a nullity. See Flowers v. Village of Indian Creek, 22 Ill.
App. 3d 6, 9 (1974). Plaintiff's action for declaratory and
injunctive relief and damages is therefore not subject to challenge
on the grounds that she failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies.
	Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not an available
defense in this case for two additional reasons as well. First, to the
extent that plaintiff alleges that Olympia Fields lacked statutory
authority to bar operation of a day-care home licensed by the state,
she is challenging the village's jurisdiction. Such challenges are
not subject to the exhaustion doctrine. See County of Knox ex rel.
Masterson, 188 Ill. 2d  at 552-55. Second, the exhaustion doctrine
was not raised by defendants as a basis for challenging plaintiff's
complaint when this matter was pending in the circuit court.
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative
defense that is waived if not be raised in the trial court. People v.
Fiorini, 143 Ill. 2d 318, 337 (1991). As a result, defendants would
be precluded from invoking the doctrine now even if it were
applicable in cases such as this.
	We turn, then, to the merits of defendants' appeal. As we
indicated previously, this matter arose from an order of the circuit
court granting in part and denying in part cross-motions for
summary judgment. At issue is the construction of and interplay
between Olympia Fields' zoning ordinance, on the one hand, and
the Child Care Act and related DCFS regulations, on the other.
Resolution of that issue is a matter of statutory interpretation and
constitutional law. The applicability and effect of constitutional
provisions, the interpretation of statutes and ordinances, and the
evaluation of whether summary judgment should have been
allowed in a case all present questions of law, which this court
reviews de novo. People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 36, 46 (2002); People v. Lindsey, 199 Ill. 2d 460, 463 (2002);
see Memory Gardens Cemetery, Inc. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 250 Ill. App. 3d 553, 561 (1993).
	In analyzing the relationship between Olympia Fields' zoning
ordinance and state law regulating day-care homes, we begin by
noting that Olympia Fields is a non-home-rule unit of government.
As such, it is governed by article VII, section 7, of the Illinois
Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §7). Article VII,
section 7, confers six basic powers on non-home-rule
municipalities such as Olympia Fields: (1) the power to make local
improvements by special assessments; (2-4) the power, through
referendum, to adopt, alter or repeal their forms of government
and to provide for "their officers, manner of selection and terms of
office"; and (5-6) the power to incur debt and to levy or impose
additional taxes, subject to certain exceptions and limitations. Ill.
Const. 1970, art. VII, §7.
	Beyond the foregoing enumerated powers, "municipalities
which are not home rule units shall have only powers granted to
them by law." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §7. They have no inherent
powers. Ross v. City of Geneva, 71 Ill. 2d 27, 31 (1978). They may
exercise only those powers that the state legislature confers upon
them, either expressly or impliedly, by statute. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 156 Ill. 2d 399, 460 (1993) (Bilandic, J., dissenting), citing Pesticide
Public Policy Foundation v. Village of Wauconda, 117 Ill. 2d 107,
111-12 (1987).
	To the extent that Olympia Fields has the authority to regulate
land use through zoning, that power derives from article 11,
division 13, of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-13-1
et seq. (West 2000)). That statute confers on corporate authorities
in municipalities the power:
			"(4) to classify, regulate and restrict the location of
trades and industries and the location of buildings
designed for specified industrial, business, residential, and
other uses; (5) to divide the entire municipality into
districts of such number, shape, area, and of such different
classes (according to use of land and buildings, height and
bulk of buildings, intensity of the use of lot area, area of
open spaces, or other classification) as may be deemed
best suited to carry out the purposes of this Division 13;
(6) to fix standards to which buildings or structures
therein shall conform; (7) to prohibit uses, buildings, or
structures incompatible with the character of such districts
***."
	Consistent with this statutory authorization, Olympia Fields'
zoning ordinance divides the village into districts according to the
criteria set forth in the law, establishes the standards to which
buildings and structures in each district must conform, and
prohibits certain uses in certain districts. To this extent, the
ordinances are uncontroversial. The dispute here has centered on
precise scope of the village's power to prohibit uses it deems
incompatible with the districts it has established. While article 11,
division 13, of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-13-1
et seq. (West 2000)) unquestionably authorizes Olympia Fields to
exclude a particular use from a particular district, the appellate
court believed that the village zoning ordinance, as applied, had
the effect of completely excluding licensed day-care homes from
anywhere within the village. In the appellate court's view, the total
exclusion of a lawful use exceeds a municipality's statutory
authority and is impermissible.
	Olympia Fields countered this argument by asserting that its
zoning ordinance does not, in fact, completely exclude day-care
homes from the village. The appellate court rejected that argument
and so do we. While it may be possible to operate various kinds of
child-care facilities within the corporate limits of Olympia Fields,
this case concerns day-care homes. Day-care homes are a separate
and specific type of child-care facility under the Child Care Act.
By definition, a day-care home is conducted in a "family home."
225 ILCS 10/2.18 (West 2000). A "family home" is synonymous
with a "family residence" and refers to the "location or portion of
a location where the applicant and his or her family reside." 89 Ill.
Adm. Code §406.2 (2002). Under the Olympia Fields' zoning
ordinance, individuals may only reside in districts zoned
residential. Accordingly, the only possible place a day-care home
could be operated in Olympia Fields is in one of its residential
districts.
	Under the terms of the village's zoning ordinance, the only
businesses permitted in residential districts, aside from temporary
real estate offices, are "home occupations." There is no longer any
dispute that day-care homes do not meet the ordinance's definition
of a home occupation. Because day-care homes are not permissible
as a home occupation, they fall within the category of uses that are
not specifically permitted. Pursuant to section 22-171 of the
village's zoning ordinance, a use that is not specifically listed as
a permitted use is presumed to be expressly prohibited absent a
written decision by the zoning board of appeals. No such decision
exists here. In addition, no basis exists for overcoming the
presumption of express prohibition. We must therefore conclude
that day-care homes are expressly prohibited in Olympia Fields.
	This conclusion is consistent with basic principles of zoning
law. As noted earlier in this opinion, variances stand in contrast to
special use permits. Special use permits allow property owners to
put property to a use that zoning enactments expressly authorize.
Variances, by contrast, presuppose that under the terms of the
existing ordinance, the proposed use is forbidden. Living Word
Outreach, 196 Ill. 2d  at 17. They are changes in the law to permit
what, absent a change, the law would not allow. Had Olympia
Fields' zoning ordinance not prohibited the operation of day-care
homes, the question of a variance would therefore not even have
arisen. Accordingly, the appellate court did not err when it
determined that the zoning ordinance completely excludes day-care homes from operating anywhere in the village.
	The appellate court regarded the exclusionary effect of the
zoning ordinance to be dispositive of plaintiff's claim. In its view,
the ordinance must be deemed invalid because municipalities do
not have the power under Illinois law to wholly exclude a lawful
business from their boundaries. Defendants and certain of the
amici who support defendants take strenuous exception to that
proposition. In their view, there may be circumstances where the
total exclusion of a particular use is permissible. Amici the
Villages of Grayslake, Hinsdale, La Grange and Lake Zurich
argue, for example, that if municipalities are required to permit
every lawful use of property, a residential community that contains
no districts zoned for manufacturing or industrial uses could
nevertheless be obligated to allow operation of a manufacturing or
industrial facility such as a tannery. They contend that the law
should not countenance such a result.
	The point is a fair one. We need not resolve it here, however,
for even if municipalities do possess the authority to engage in
exclusionary zoning in appropriate circumstances, that power
would not extend to the situation presented by this case. Because
it is a non-home-rule unit, Olympia Fields cannot adopt ordinances
under a general grant of power that infringe upon the spirit of state
law or are repugnant to the general policy of the state. Although
the village possesses zoning powers by virtue of article 11,
division 13, of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-13-1
et seq. (West 2000)), ordinances enacted under those powers that
conflict with the spirit and purpose of a state statute are preempted
by the statute. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. City of
Warrenville, 288 Ill. App. 3d 373, 380 (1997). "[W]here there is
a conflict between a statute and an ordinance, the ordinance must
give way." Village of Mundelein v. Hartnett, 117 Ill. App. 3d
1011, 1015 (1983).
	As detailed earlier in this disposition, 	the operation of
child-care facilities in Illinois is regulated by the state. The
governing statute is the Child Care Act of 1969 (225 ILCS 10/1 et
seq. (West 2000)), which requires "[a]ny person, group of persons
or corporation who or which receives children or arranges for care
or placement of one or more children unrelated to the operator" to
apply for and obtain a license from the Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS). 225 ILCS 10/4(a) (West 2000).
Under the Act, responsibility for prescribing and publishing
"minimum standards for licensing that apply to the various types
of facilities for child care defined in [the] Act," including day-care
homes, rests with DCFS. 225 ILCS 10/7(a) (West 2000).
	Pursuant to its statutory authority, DCFS has promulgated
comprehensive regulations governing the physical facilities a day-care home must possess (89 Ill. Adm. Code §406.8 (2002)); the
characteristics and qualifications of the home's family, caregivers,
assistants and substitute caregivers (89 Ill. Adm. Code §§406.9
through 406.11 (2002)); the number and ages of children the home
may serve (89 Ill. Adm. Code §406.13 (2002)); the opportunities
for daily activity the home must provide to the children (89 Ill.
Adm. Code §406.16 (2002)); and a wide variety of other matters
ranging from nutrition and meals (89 Ill. Adm. Code §406.17
(2002)) to recordkeeping (89 Ill. Adm. Code §406.24 (2002)).
These standards apply uniformly throughout the state.
	The foregoing regulatory scheme is comparable in breadth to
the one considered by this court in Pesticide Public Policy
Foundation v. Village of Wauconda, 117 Ill. 2d 107 (1987).
Pesticide Public Policy Foundation concerned the system enacted
by the General Assembly for regulation of pesticides. As with the
regulations for child care at issue in this case, the pesticide statutes
in Pesticide Public Policy Foundation established statewide
standards and licensing requirements and gave regulatory and
enforcement authority to agencies of state government. "[N]otably
absent from the [state statutes was] any provision delegating
authority to, or allowing regulation by, units of local government."
Pesticide Public Policy Foundation, 117 Ill. 2d  at 116. The
Village of Wauconda nevertheless enacted a local ordinance that
purported to impose separate and additional requirements on
individuals who wished to apply pesticides.
	If followed, Wauconda's ordinance would have enabled the
village, which was a non-home-rule unit, to prevent persons from
applying pesticides even though they had been duly licensed to do
so by the state. We found that to be impermissible. "To allow a
local non-home-rule unit of government to override the
determinations of the legislature would frustrate the purposes of
the [state pesticide statutes]." Pesticide Public Policy Foundation,
117 Ill. 2d  at 119. Because of the comprehensiveness of the state
statutes and because of the legislature's interest in imposing
uniform standards, we concluded that the state statutes preempted
Wauconda from enacting its ordinance regulating pesticides.
Pesticide Public Policy Foundation, 117 Ill. 2d  at 120.
	We believe that the same principles hold true with respect to
the relationship between the Child Care Act and its attendant
regulations and the Olympia Fields zoning ordinance. Indeed, the
need to invoke the preemption doctrine is even more compelling
here than in Pesticide Public Policy Foundation. In Pesticide
Public Policy Foundation the challenged ordinance merely made
the business of pesticide application more onerous. A person
licensed by the state could still ply his trade if he conformed to the
additional requirements imposed by the municipality. In this case,
by contrast, the municipality's ordinance stands as a complete bar
to the operation of a state-licensed day-care home. Under Olympia
Fields' zoning ordinance, the licensing system for day-care homes
is rendered a nullity.
	Finally, defendants contend that if the General Assembly had
intended the Child Care Act and its regulations to have preemptive
effect, it would have said so explicitly in the legislation. In support
of that argument, defendants cite examples of legislation from
various foreign jurisdictions that specifically curtail or prohibit
local regulation of day-care homes. We do not find those examples
helpful to our analysis. There is no question that preemption can
be accomplished through explicit statutory language. That
preemption can be achieved explicitly does not mean, however,
that it must be done explicitly. The law of Illinois recognizes
preemption by implication. That doctrine holds that where the
legislature has enacted a comprehensive system of regulation and
licensure, as it did in this case, the legislature implies by that
system that there is no room for regulation by local governmental
units. Pesticide Public Policy Foundation, 117 Ill. 2d  at 115. The
absence of an express prohibition against local regulation in the
Child Care Act is therefore not an impediment to application of
the doctrine of preemption to the dispute before us.
	For the foregoing reasons, the appellate court acted correctly
when it upheld the judgment of the circuit court. Pursuit to the
circuit court's ruling, Olympia Fields is prohibited from regulating
day-care homes under its zoning ordinance in a manner that
conflicts in any way with the Child Care Act of 1969 or the DCFS
regulations adopted pursuant to that Act. In addition, plaintiff is
entitled to operate at day-care home at her residence pursuant to
the terms of her DCFS license. No separate questions have been
raised regarding the propriety of that relief. The judgment of the
appellate court is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
	I agree with the majority that non-home-rule municipalities
have the authority to regulate land use through zoning and that
article 11, division 13, of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS
5/11-13-1 et seq. (West 2000)) "unquestionably authorizes
Olympia Fields to exclude a particular use from a particular
district." Slip op. at 11. The majority concedes that Olympia Fields
is within its authority in promulgating ordinances that "divide[ ]
the village into districts according to the criteria set forth in the
law, establish[ ] the standards to which buildings and structures in
each district must conform, and prohibit[ ] certain uses in certain
districts." Slip op. at 10. However, I disagree with the majority
that the zoning ordinance in question expressly prohibits day-care
homes in Olympia Fields and that the Child Care Act of 1969 and
the DCFS regulations adopted pursuant to the Act have a
preemptive effect.
	In Olympia Fields, a proposed home business must satisfy
either the performance criteria set forth in the home occupation
ordinance or receive a variance under the municipality's
procedures. A home occupation is permitted based in part on the
nature of the business proposed and on the impact it will have on
the surrounding community. The majority states that there "is no
longer any dispute that day-care homes do not meet the
ordinance's definition of a home occupation." Slip op. at 11. The
declaration that all day-care homes fail to meet the ordinance's
definition of a home occupation is unwarranted. While this
particular proposed day-care home may fail to satisfy the
requirements set forth in the ordinance, it cannot be said
categorically that no day-care home could ever be deemed a home
occupation. In fact, one could easily conceive of a situation where
a proposed day-care home would meet the definition of home
occupation under the ordinance. For example, a proposed day-care
home owned and operated solely by the residents of the home,
adjacent to a park, without a sign or other profound exterior
indications of home occupation, and not requiring alteration of the
essential character of the building, could fall within the
ordinance's definition of home occupation.
	Assuming, arguendo, that the majority's conclusion that the
home occupation ordinance contains restrictions effectively
prohibiting day-care homes is correct, I do not agree that the
ordinance in question is rendered unconstitutionally exclusionary.
A use variance extends to property owners the ability to use
property in a manner forbidden by zoning enactments. City of
Chicago Heights v. Living Word Outreach Full Gospel Church &
Ministries, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 1 (2001). Exclusionary zoning occurs
when a municipality totally excludes a business from operating
anywhere within its corporate boundaries, without exception. It is
clear that Olympia Fields allows day-care homes, without a
variance, if the operation is run by members of the family who
occupy the premises, if the day-care home is run wholly within the
principal or an accessory building, and if there is no exterior
indication of the home occupation. If the proposed day-care home
does not meet these criteria, as was the case in this instance, the
prospective operator has the ability to apply for a variance.
Therefore, the ordinance does not operate as a blanket exclusion
of day-care homes throughout Olympia Fields, but rather allows
for a case-by-case determination of whether this home occupation,
or any other proposed home occupation, is appropriate at a
particular location.
	The majority relies heavily on our holding in Pesticide Public
Policy Foundation to find that the local ordinance must give way
to state law because the operation of child-care facilities in Illinois
is regulated by the state. In Pesticide Public Policy Foundation, a
non-home-rule municipality promulgated an ordinance that
imposed requirements separate from and in addition to those
enacted by the state for individuals who wished to apply
pesticides. We held that because of the comprehensiveness of the
state regulations, and because of a legislative interest in a uniform
scheme of pesticide regulation, the non-home-rule municipality
was preempted by state law from enacting local ordinances
regulating pesticides. The majority contends that the challenged
ordinance in that case "merely made the business of pesticide
application more onerous" and that a person "could still ply his
trade if he conformed to the additional requirements imposed by
the municipality." Slip op. at 14. By contrast, the majority
contends that Olympia Fields ordinance stands as a complete bar
to the operation of a state-licensed day-care home and that the
licensing system for day-care homes is rendered a nullity. Slip op.
at 14.
	Pesticide Public Policy Foundation is clearly distinguishable
from this matter. Unlike the ordinance at issue in Pesticide Public
Policy Foundation, the ordinance in question in this instance does
not attempt to regulate licensure or impose additional requirements
for obtaining certification for the operation of a day-care home.
The Child Care Act is designed to insure that the operators of
child-care facilities do so in a manner that protects the safety of
and promotes healthy environments for children receiving child
care. The Olympia Fields ordinance simply attempts to determine
whether a licensed child-care facility may operate at a particular
location in a manner that will not interfere with the essential
character of a specific neighborhood or the quiet use and
enjoyment of property by neighboring property owners. Olympia
Fields is not attempting to regulate child care. It is simply
regulating the location of industry and the location of buildings
designed for specific industrial, business, residential, and other
uses within its boundaries, as it is allowed to do pursuant to our
constitution and the Municipal Code. The Act is silent as to the
relationship between the regulated service provider and the
surrounding property owners, or as to the ability of municipalities
to determine whether a home day-care is appropriate in specific
locations. If the legislature had intended that the licensing
requirements of the Act would serve as a complete bar to local
zoning authority as it relates to child-care facilities, it could have
readily done so in a single sentence. It did not, and we should not
do so in its stead.
	I believe this case is more like Builders Supply & Lumber Co.
v. City of Northlake, 21 Ill. 2d 14 (1960). In Builders Supply &
Lumber Co., the plaintiff challenged a local zoning ordinance
because it did not affirmatively allow multifamily dwellings. We
held that the ordinance "does not prohibit multiple dwellings, it
merely fails to provide for the same." Builders Supply & Lumber
Co., 21 Ill. 2d  at 18. Because a multifamily dwelling may be a
legitimate use of land in some areas of the community and not in
others, it would be necessary to "prove the character of the
neighborhood, the classification and the use of nearby property,
the extent to which property values are diminished by the
particular zoning restrictions involved, the gain to the public
compared to the hardship imposed upon individual property
owners, and thus determine whether the purported exercise of the
police power is unreasonable or confiscatory." Builders Supply &
Lumber Co., 21 Ill. 2d  at 18. In other words, the validity of a
particular municipal zoning decision must be determined on a
case-by-case basis.
	I believe the same considerations are important in this
instance. As argued by the appellant, a proposed day-care home
located on a corner lot, with a spacious backyard, near a park, and
serving a small number of children is entirely permissible, if not
desirable. However, a proposed facility for a dozen or more
children, at a small mid-block house on a busy street, with limited
yard space, and with no driveway or drop-off area might be
extremely disruptive to neighboring property owners' quiet use
and enjoyment of their investments. Unfortunately, the effect of
the majority's holding is that a municipality has no authority to
conduct case-by-case zoning analyses of day-care home requests
and that competing interests will not be considered. So long as the
proposed operator has completed the requisite licensing
requirements, he or she could operate a day-care home at the
corner of the busiest intersection in town and the municipality and
neighboring residents could do nothing about it.
	The State of Illinois issues licenses or permits for numerous
and diverse occupations as part of its regulating authority.
However, the issuance of a state license is not an entitlement to
operate a business wherever one sees fit, irrespective of the rights
and interests of adjacent property owners and local governments
established to protect and provide for residents. Today's holding
threatens the ability of a non-home-rule municipality to exercise
any measure of control over the location of a state-regulated
business within its own boundaries and, therefore, the ability to
preserve the integrity of its residential neighborhoods from
potentially incompatible uses. I fear this holding severely erodes
long-standing principles of local governmental control inherent in
our state constitution and developed through both statutory and
case law.
	I respectfully dissent and would reverse the trial and appellate
courts' findings that the zoning ordinance had the effect of
unlawfully excluding day-care homes from the village.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this dissent.
	 
	 
1.      1Although the appellate court did not address the point, and although
it does not affect the outcome of this case, we feel obliged to point out
that under Illinois law, an ordinance which is preempted is not,
technically, null and void. Instead, it is "simply suspended or rendered
unenforceable as long as the conflicting legislation of a superior
legislative body remains in effect." Lily Lake Road Defenders v. County
of McHenry, 156 Ill. 2d 1, 15 (1993).

2.      2In this regard, the case before us here is distinguishable from our
recent decision in People ex rel. Klaeren v. Village of Lisle, 202 Ill. 2d 164 (2002). People ex rel. Klaeren v. Village of Lisle involved a special
use permit, not an application for a variance. Illinois law makes a clear
distinction between variances and special uses. Variances come into
play where the desired use is forbidden under existing zoning
ordinances. A special use, on the other hand, allows a property owner
to use his property in a manner the zoning ordinances already address
and allow. City of Chicago Heights v. Living Word Outreach Full
Gospel Church & Ministries, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (2001).