Case Title: Gafford v. Pemberton

Citation: 409 So. 2d 1367

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1982-02-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
409 So. 2d 1367 (1982)
Robert GAFFORD
v.
John W. PEMBERTON, Clerk of the House of Representatives of the State of Alabama, et al.
81-354.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 23, 1982.
*1368 Roger S. Morrow, Calvin M. Whitesell, Montgomery, for appellant.
Wayne Turner and Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., Montgomery, for appellees.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant filed an action for a declaratory judgment on October 20, 1981, in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County to determine the validity and constitutionality of Act No. 81-953, Acts of Alabama, 1981. Appellant filed the declaratory action as a member of the Alabama House of Representatives *1369 and a resident voting citizen of the State of Alabama.
The declaratory action named as defendants the appelleesJohn W. Pemberton, Clerk of the Alabama House of Representatives; McDowell Lee, Secretary of the Alabama Senate; Joe C. McCorquodale, Jr., Speaker of the Alabama House of Representatives; and George D. H. McMillan, Jr., Lieutenant Governor of the State of Alabamaas public officials charged with the administration of Act No. 81-953, Acts of Alabama 1981. Gafford claims that there was substituted for House Bill 38 an altered or amended bill, which was passed as Act No. 81-953, in violation of Art. IV, § 61, of the Alabama Constitution.
The parties tendered the trial court a stipulation of facts. This stipulation is summarized as follows:
1. On August 4, 1981, House Bill 38 was introduced in the House of Representatives. House Bill 38 proposed a constitutional amendment to provide for the budgetary process, the making of appropriations and a mandatory time in which to act, as well as a prohibition of other legislation.
2. On August 11, 1981, House Bill 38 was reported out of the House Judiciary Committee. Subsequently, a substitute bill was offered which was adopted by the House and then passed and sent to the Senate. The substitute bill proposed a statute to deal with the budgetary process. Substituted House Bill No. 38 was reported out of the Senate Finance and Taxation Committee and was passed by the Senate.
3. Governor James signed House Bill No. 38 as substituted and passed by both the House and the Senate; thus Act No. 81-953 became law on August 19, 1981.
At the final hearing on the declaratory action, the stipulation of facts and other evidence were presented to the court. In its final judgment the circuit court posed the question before it as being whether "a bill which is reported out of committee as a constitutional amendment [can] be altered or amended by either House to become a regular statutory bill and not be violative of Art. IV, Sec. 61 of the Constitution of Alabama upon its passage?"
The final judgment entered by the trial court is as follows:
"ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by this Court as follows:
Notice of appeal was filed January 21, 1982. The record and a supplement thereto were transmitted to this Court on January 22, 1982. Appellant moved to correct the record and it was corrected on February 9, 1982, and as corrected the record on this appeal was filed in this Court February 9, 1982. In the meantime appellant moved to expedite the consideration of this appeal on *1370 the grounds that the Legislature was in regular session and the challenged Act restricted the passage of other legislation until bills making "basic" appropriations were signed by the presiding officer of each House of the Legislature. By order of this Court on February 1, 1982, this appeal was expedited and submitted on briefs on February 9, 1982.
The issues raised by appellant Gafford on appeal are: (1) Whether Act No. 81-953 violates Art. IV, § 61, of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901; (2) whether Act No. 81-953, violates Art. IV, § 45, of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901; and (3) whether Act No. 81-953 violates Art. IV, § 66, of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901.
House Bill No. 38 as originally introduced provided:
"SYNOPSIS: This bill proposes an amendment to the Constitution that provides for the manner for considering the budget bills and the time frame therefor.
Act No. 81-953, as passed by the Legislature and signed by the Governor provides:
"`Basic Appropriations' means, with respect to any regular session of the Legislature, such appropriations as the Legislature may deem appropriate for the expenditures by the State during the ensuing Budget Period for the ordinary expenses of the executive, legislative and judicial departments of the State, for payment of the public debt, and for education (excluding, however, any item within the scope of the foregoing that is at the time provided for by a continuing appropriation or otherwise).
*1372 "`Budget Period' means a fiscal year of the State or such period other than fiscal year as may hereafter be fixed by law as the period with respect to which State budgets are prepared and State appropriations are made.
House Bill 38, as originally introduced proposed by bill a constitutional amendment, the "purpose" of which was to propose a constitutional amendment to require the Legislature to pass budgets and appropriations necessary for the operation of our state government, prior to the consideration and passage of other bills by the Legislature. The substitute bill proposed a statute, the "purpose" of which was to establish a paramount duty on the Legislature to consider and pass bills making appropriations necessary for the operation of our state government and to present such bills to the Governor before any other bills are signed by the presiding officer of either *1373 House of the Legislature. The "title" to House Bill 38 as originally introduced shows that it was a proposed constitutional amendment. The title to substituted House Bill 38 shows it is "an act."
The first question posed on appeal addresses Art IV, § 61, of the Constitution, which provides: "No law shall be passed except by bill, and no bill shall be so altered or amended on its passage through either House as to change its original purpose." The appellant submits that the substitution of a bill proposing a statute for a bill originally introduced proposing a constitutional amendment so alters the purpose of the original bill as to violate § 61.
Neither the appellant nor appellees have cited in their respective briefs any controlling precedents or authority from prior case law in this state or from other jurisdictions which addresses the precise issue, here presented as to Section 61. Accordingly, this Court must ascertain the meaning of the phrase "to change its original purpose" in Section 61 of the Constitution as the same relates to the authority of the Legislature to change an original bill proposing a constitutional amendment into a bill that proposes the enactment of a statute. Clearly, the legislative bodies can do both, but can they lawfully first propose a constitutional amendment and then amend that bill into a statute during the legislative process? We note that both proposals, the original House Bill 38 and the substitute therefor, do propose the establishment of some sort of priority or paramount duty to be imposed upon the Legislature to consider an act on budgetary matters and appropriation bills before other legislative bills are taken up and considered. It is observed, however, that the act as finally passed provides that it becomes effective on January 1, 1982, and then "self-destructs" or terminates on July 1, 1982. Therefore, Act No. 81-953 would have no effect on future Legislatures. One might then characterize this Act as a trial or experiment in legislative process and procedure. Obviously, the budgetary process is a most important duty which is conducted at each regular session of the Legislature.
Without question, Act No. 81-953 established a legislative rule of procedure, and our Constitution grants the power to each house to make rules governing its procedure. Ala.Const., Art. IV, § 53. While this power is usually exercised by the Legislature in adopting rules or procedure for each house, and joint rules, the Legislature has in the past adopted a rule or regulation of procedure by statute. Act No. 31, Acts of Alabama 1919, page 33; Code 1975, § 41-20-10(a).
In resolving the first issue presented in this appeal, we must consider the basic differences in statutory law and constitutional law. The Legislature can only propose a constitutional amendment; it cannot enact one. Constitution 1901, Art. XVIII, §§ 284 through 287, as amended. The legislative procedure for proposing constitutional amendments is specifically provided for in Article XVIII of the Constitution and not in Article IV relating to the Legislature. Only upon an affirmation vote of a majority of our citizens at a state-wide election can our basic law be amended; a constitutional amendment, until subsequently changed by the same process, permanently controls the matters provided for therein. Provisions of our Constitution are of a higher order of law than statutes. Constitutional provisions are more basic and permanent than statutes. The Legislature acting in its plenary power can adopt or amend a statute by majority vote of both houses, and upon approval by the Governor, it becomes law.
In proposing amendments to the Constitution under Section 284, as amended, the Legislature is not exercising its power to make laws. In Johnson v. Craft, 205 Ala. 386, 393, 394, 87 So. 375 (1921), this Court discussed the applicable principles of law which apply:
205 Ala. 386, 393, 394.
Significantly, many constitutional provisions relating to the enactment of statutes are not applicable to procedure amending the Constitution.
Opinion of the Justices, No. 29, 227 Ala. 296, 298, 149 So. 781 (1933).
Section 61 of the Constitution does not apply to bills proposing constitutional amendments. Opinion of The Justices, 227 Ala. 296, 149 So. 781 (1933); Jones v. McDade, 200 Ala. 230, 75 So. 988 (1917). Section 61 does apply to statutes enacted by the Legislature.
There are other differences between proposed constitutional amendments and acts of the Legislature. The approval of the Governor is not required on a bill enacted by the Legislature proposing constitutional amendments. See, Ala.Const. Art. XVIII, § 284, as amended. Statutes are enacted upon majority vote, while bills proposing constitutional amendments require a vote of three-fifths of all members elected to each house. Ala.Const. Art. IV, § 63 and Art. XVIII, § 284, as amended.
Since Act No. 81-953 was enacted into law as a statute, we hold that the provisions of Section 61 of the Constitution are applicable, and control the legislative process. The original "purpose" of House Bill 38, as introduced, was to propose a constitutional amendment, that is, a basic, permanent change in the supreme and paramount law of this state.
Johnson v. Craft, 205 Ala. at 393, 87 So. 375.
As was stated in the early history of this State, in the case of Perry County v. Selma, *1375 Marion & Memphis Railroad Company, 58 Ala. 546 (1877), this Court held:
"`The courts tread upon very dangerous ground when they venture to apply the rules, which distinguish directory and mandatory statutes, to the provisions of a Constitution. Constitutions do not usually undertake to prescribe mere rules of proceeding, except when such rules are looked upon as essential to the thing to be done; and they must then be regarded in the light of limitations upon the power to be exercised. It is the province of an instrument of this solemn and permanent character to establish those fundamental maxims, and fix those unvarying rules, by which all the departments of the government must at all times shape their conduct. * * * We are not, therefore, to expect to find in a Constitution provisions which the people, in adopting it, have not regarded as of high importance, and worthy to be embraced in our instrument which, for a time at least, is to control alike the government and the governed, and to form a standard by which is to be measured the power which can be exercised as well by the delegate, as by the sovereign people themselves. If directions are given respecting the times or modes of proceeding in which a power should be exercised, there is at least a strong presumption that the people designed it should be exercised in that time and mode only.'Cooley Const. Lim. 78."
58 Ala. at 556.
The violation of Section 61 occurs when the "purpose" of the bill passed is different from the original "purpose" of the bill as introduced. The "purpose" of a bill within this section is the general purpose of a bill, not the mere details through which its purpose is manifested and effectuated. Opinion of the Justices, 361 So. 2d 536 (Ala. 1978); Comer v. City of Mobile, 337 So. 2d 742 (Ala.1976); Blackwell v. State, 230 Ala. 139, 162 So. 310 (1935); State Docks Commission v. State, 227 Ala. 521, 150 So. 537 (1933). We hold that a bill proposing an amendment to our Constitution which is altered or amended on its passage through either house into a bill proposing the enactment of a statute has been changed in its original purpose. Changing a proposal to amend the Constitution into a bill proposing the enactment of a statute is not a mere detail through which the original purpose is manifested and effectuated. Such procedure violates Section 61 of the Constitution, and voids the resulting statute. Accordingly, Act No. 81-953 is invalid and therefore void, having been enacted contrary to and in violation of Section 61 of the Constitution.
In view of our holding with respect to the application of Section 61 of the Constitution, it is not necessary to address the other issues raised on this appeal. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and a judgment is rendered declaring Act 81-953 null and void.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
All Justices concur, except JONES, J., not sitting.