Case Title: State ex rel. Nichols v. Eppinger

Citation: 2016-Ohio-7367

Docket Number: 2015-1969

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2016-10-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Nichols v. Eppinger, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-7367.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-7367 
THE STATE EX REL. NICHOLS, APPELLANT, v. EPPINGER, WARDEN, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Nichols v. Eppinger, Slip Opinion No.  
2016-Ohio-7367.] 
Habeas corpus—Petition fails to allege defect in sentencing court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction—Court of appeals’ judgment affirming dismissal of petition 
affirmed. 
(No. 2015-1969—Submitted July 12, 2016—Decided October 19, 2016.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County, No. 15CA010807. 
_____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} We affirm the Ninth District Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by appellant, BreShaun Nichols.  That 
court correctly held that Nichols did not allege a defect in the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court.  Moreover, because Nichols was convicted of 
attempted murder, not attempted felony murder, his petition also fails on the merits. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 2} Nichols is currently incarcerated in the Grafton Correctional 
Institution.  In 2009, a jury found him guilty of attempted murder and several other 
offenses, including aggravated robbery.  The trial court sentenced him to a ten-year 
prison term for attempted murder and ordered that sentence to be served 
consecutively with the sentences for his other convictions.  Nichols appealed his 
convictions, and the court of appeals affirmed.  State v. Nichols, 9th Dist. Summit 
No. 24900, 2010-Ohio-5737.  Nichols then filed a petition for postconviction relief.  
The court of common pleas dismissed the petition, and the court of appeals affirmed 
the dismissal.  State v. Nichols, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26923, 2014-Ohio-102. 
{¶ 3} Nichols now in this habeas corpus case argues for the first time that 
he was convicted of attempted felony murder and that because we determined in 
State v. Nolan, 141 Ohio St.3d 454, 2014-Ohio-4800, 25 N.E.3d 1016, that 
attempted felony murder is not a crime in Ohio, the trial court lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction to convict him of that offense. 
{¶ 4} The court of appeals correctly dismissed Nichols’s petition because, 
as it recognized in its opinion, we “treated the issue in Nolan as one of error that 
could be voided on appeal rather than one of subject matter jurisdiction that resulted 
in a void judgment.”  In other words, we held in Nolan not that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction but that it had erred in exercising its jurisdiction.  See Nolan at ¶ 3 and 
10 (affirming court of appeals’ judgment remanding cause to trial court for further 
proceedings).  Because the trial court had jurisdiction over Nichols’s criminal case, 
and because Nichols has not served his maximum term of imprisonment, habeas 
relief is unavailable.  Pence v. Bunting, 143 Ohio St.3d 532, 2015-Ohio-2026, 40 
N.E.3d 1058, ¶ 9. 
{¶ 5} Moreover, even if we were to reach the substance of Nichols’s 
argument, it is without merit.  In Nolan, we noted that a person cannot commit an 
attempt offense unless he or she has acted purposely or knowingly.  Id. at ¶ 7.  On 
the other hand, we observed, the felony-murder statute imposes strict liability; 
January Term, 2016 
 
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intent to kill need not be proven to obtain a conviction for felony murder.  Id. at  
¶ 9, citing R.C. 2903.02(B).  We therefore concluded in Nolan that a person cannot 
be guilty of attempting to cause an unintended death.  Id. at ¶ 10. 
{¶ 6} Count 3 of Nichols’s indictment alleged that he 
 
did commit the crime of ATTEMPTED MURDER in that he did 
purposely attempt to cause the death of [the victim], and/or did 
purposely attempt to cause the death of [the victim] as a proximate 
result of [Nichols] committing or attempting to commit Aggravated 
Robbery or Robbery, an offense of violence that is a felony of the 
first or second degree, and did engage in conduct that, if successful, 
would constitute or result in Murder, in violation of Section 
2903.02(A)/(B)/2923.02 of the Revised Code. 
 
(Boldface and capitalization sic.)  The jury ultimately found Nichols “GUILTY of 
ATTEMPTED MURDER, as contained in Count 3 of the Indictment.”  
(Capitalization sic.)  Thus, Nichols was convicted of attempt to commit murder in 
violation of R.C. 2903.02(A) “and/or” attempt to commit felony murder in violation 
of R.C. 2903.02(B). 
{¶ 7} According to the Ninth District’s decision on direct appeal, however, 
at Nichols’s trial, the victim testified that Nichols placed a gun to the back of the 
victim’s head and pulled the trigger and that the gun had either run out of bullets or 
misfired.  State v. Nichols, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24900, 2010-Ohio-5737, at ¶ 55.  
Therefore, there is no “intent” issue here as there was in Nolan—Nichols intended 
to kill his victim by putting a gun to his head and pulling the trigger.  Nichols cannot 
argue that his conviction for attempted murder is void under Nolan, because he 
clearly had the intent to murder the victim.  He therefore committed—and was 
convicted of—attempted murder. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
_________________ 
BreShaun Nichols, pro se. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Jerri L. Fosnaught, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
_________________