Case Title: Lorain Cty. Aud. v. Ohio Unemp. Comp. Rev. Comm.

Citation: 2007-Ohio-1247

Docket Number: 20052359 and 20052375

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-04-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Lorain Cty. Aud. v. Ohio Unemp. Comp. Rev. Comm., 113 Ohio St.3d 124, 2007-Ohio-
1247.] 
 
 
 
LORAIN COUNTY AUDITOR ET AL., APPELLEES, v. OHIO UNEMPLOYMENT 
COMPENSATION REVIEW COMMISSION ET AL., APPELLEES; DIR., OHIO 
DEPARTMENT OF JOB & FAMILY SERVICES, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Lorain Cty. Aud. v. Ohio Unemp. Comp. Rev. Comm., 
 113 Ohio St.3d 124, 2007-Ohio-1247.] 
Unemployment compensation — Intermittent employee — Eligibility for 
unemployment benefits — R.C. 4141.29. 
(Nos. 2005-2359 and 2005-2375 – Submitted October 4, 2006 – Decided 
April 4, 2007.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Lorain County, 
No. 05CA008679, 2005-Ohio-5807. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. For purposes of eligibility for unemployment benefits, an employee who has 
worked the maximum number of hours under an intermittent-employment 
contract is not discharged for just cause and does not become voluntarily 
unemployed as described in R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a). 
2. A formal discharge is not required for a successful claim for unemployment 
benefits. 
__________________ 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶1} 
In this case we are required to determine whether an intermittent-
employment contract prevents an employee’s eligibility for benefits under the 
Unemployment Compensation Act, R.C. Chapter 4141, once the employee is not 
scheduled for work.  We hold that satisfaction of an intermittent-employment 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
contract does not create voluntary unemployment or a discharge sufficient to 
render an employee ineligible for unemployment benefits. 
I. Background 
{¶2} 
Appellant, the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services 
(“ODJFS”), appeals the decision to vacate the award of unemployment benefits to 
Kristie L. Brinkman. 
{¶3} 
Brinkman was employed by the appellee, Lorain County Sheriff’s 
Department (“Lorain”), as a registered nurse.  At the commencement of her 
employment, Brinkman signed a contract agreeing to serve as an “intermittent 
employee,” a position characterized “generally” by fewer than 1,000 hours of 
work during one fiscal year.  After Brinkman served approximately 1,000 hours in 
fiscal year 2002, Lorain removed Brinkman from the work schedule.  Brinkman 
filed for unemployment compensation benefits, and ODJFS issued a 
determination concluding that Brinkman was entitled to receive unemployment 
benefits. 
{¶4} 
Lorain requested a reconsideration of the decision, and the director 
of ODJFS issued a redetermination affirming the original determination.  Lorain 
appealed the redetermination, and ODJFS transferred jurisdiction to the 
Unemployment Compensation Review Commission. After a hearing, the review 
commission awarded Brinkman unemployment-compensation benefits and 
declined further review. 
{¶5} 
Lorain appealed to the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas.  
The trial court reversed the decision of the review commission and vacated the 
award of benefits to Brinkman. 
{¶6} 
ODJFS appealed the trial court’s decision, asserting that the review 
commission’s finding that Brinkman had been discharged without just cause, was 
lawful, reasonable, and supported by credible evidence in the record.  The 
appellate court disagreed.  It held that an employee who voluntarily enters a fixed-
January Term, 2007 
3 
term contract is not involuntarily unemployed at the term’s end and that the 
review commission’s decision to grant benefits to Brinkman was unlawful, 
unreasonable, and against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
{¶7} 
The appellate court thereafter certified three cases as being in 
conflict with its decision in this case: Mathieu v. Dudley (1967), 10 Ohio App.2d 
169, 39 O.O.2d 332, 226 N.E.2d 763; Lexington Twp. Trustees v. Stewart (Mar. 
17, 1986), Stark App. No. CA-6766, 1986 WL 3925; and Case W. Res. Univ. v. 
Ohio Unemp. Comp. Rev. Comm., Cuyahoga App. No. 81773, 2003-Ohio-2047. 
{¶8} 
On February 22, 2006, we determined that a conflict existed. The 
question certified is: “Is a claimant entitled to unemployment compensation when 
the claimant worked under a fixed-term contract and has completed the term of 
the contract?”  Lorain Cty. Aud. v. Ohio Unemp. Comp. Rev. Comm., 108 Ohio 
St.3d 1469, 2006-Ohio-665, 842 N.E.2d 1050. We also accepted jurisdiction over 
a discretionary appeal in order to address whether a worker who is employed 
under an intermittent-schedule employment contract is involuntarily unemployed 
and eligible for benefits under R.C. 4141.29 for any weeks in which the worker is 
neither scheduled nor paid for work. Lorain Cty. Aud. v. Ohio Unemp. Comp. Rev. 
Comm., 108 Ohio St.3d 1473, 2006-Ohio-665, 842 N.E.2d 1053. The appeals 
were consolidated and have been briefed and argued. 
II. Analysis 
{¶9} 
We begin by noting that this court may reverse a decision of the 
Unemployment Compensation Review Commission only if the decision is 
unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence.  R.C. 
4141.282(H); Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs. (1995), 73 
Ohio St.3d 694, 653 N.E.2d 1207, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
A. The Conflict Cases 
{¶10} In Mathieu v. Dudley, 10 Ohio App.2d 169, 39 O.O.2d 332, 226 
N.E.2d 763, an employer enacted a mandatory retirement plan a number of years 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
after the employee was hired.  The employee had misstated her age at the time she 
was hired. When the employer learned of the misstatement, it gave the employee 
a choice between immediate termination and termination without retirement 
benefits when she reached the age of 65.  The employee chose the latter, 
continued to work until she reached the age of 65, and was then terminated 
pursuant to company policy.  The appellate court held that the employee was 
eligible for unemployment-compensation benefits because she did not quit within 
the meaning of R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a) as enacted at that time.  The court 
explained that “the basic eligibility for unemployment benefits depends upon the 
establishment of an ‘employment’ relationship followed by ‘involuntary 
employment.’  The fact that the unemployment is the result of the expiration of a 
contract for employment is irrelevant.”  (Citations omitted.)  Id. at 174, 39 O.O.2d 
332, 226 N.E.2d 763. 
{¶11} In Lexington Twp. Trustees v. Stewart, Stark App. No. CA-6766, 
1986 WL 3925, the employee had a six-month contract.  The employee’s last 
scheduled day of work was one week before the contract’s termination date.  The 
employer argued that the termination was a direct result of the employee’s 
voluntary agreement, and that for the purposes of unemployment benefits, the 
employee should be considered an independent contractor.  Because there was 
work available to the employee at the beginning of the contract, and there was a 
lack of work at its end, the appellate court affirmed the finding of the 
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review.  The appellate court held that the 
employee was not an independent contractor and that the contract length was 
among the terms unilaterally presented by the employer.  It held that the contract 
did not affect the employee’s eligibility for unemployment-compensation 
benefits. 
{¶12} In Case W. Res. Univ. v. Ohio Unemp. Comp. Rev. Comm., 
Cuyahoga App. No. 81773, 2003-Ohio-2047, the employee was discharged at the 
January Term, 2007 
5 
end of a nine-month contract.  The employer reported that there was no work 
available for the employee.  The appellate court relied on Mathieu and Lexington 
to argue that eligibility for unemployment benefits depended on establishing an 
employment relationship followed by involuntary unemployment and that the 
expiration of an employment contract is irrelevant.  The appellate court explained 
that there is a presumption that the separation was for lack of work, which could 
be rebutted by testimony that the employer had work but that the employee left 
voluntarily.  The employer did not rebut this presumption, and the court held that 
the employee was eligible for unemployment benefits. 
B. The Statutory Regime 
{¶13} Several statutes indicate the importance of the unemployment-
compensation system. R.C. 4141.32 prohibits any attempt to contractually or 
otherwise waive the right to benefits and states that benefits are exempt from all 
claims of creditors and from levy, execution, garnishment, or attachment.  R.C. 
4141.46 mandates that R.C. Chapter 4141 “shall be liberally construed.” 
{¶14} R.C. 
4141.29 
establishes 
the 
criteria 
for 
unemployment 
compensation benefits.  Benefits are compensation for a “loss of remuneration 
due to involuntary total or partial unemployment.”  R.C. 4141.29.  An employee 
meets the definition of total unemployment for a given week if she performs no 
services and is due no payment.  R.C. 4141.01(M). 
{¶15} An employee may not be eligible for benefits under certain 
circumstances. First, there are several statutory exceptions. An employee may be 
found ineligible for benefits if the employee has quit without just cause, or if the 
employer discharged the employee for just cause in connection with the 
employee’s work.  R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a).  With specific concern for intermittent 
employees, an additional restriction on eligibility for employees of academic 
institutions is contained in R.C. 4141.29(I), which limits eligibility for employees 
in the periods between academic terms. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
{¶16} Second, the common-law exception to eligibility for benefits is 
specific to union-represented employees.  When an employee has a termination 
package pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement between her union and the 
employer, the employee is deemed to have accepted the benefits of the package, 
and waived her right to benefits, in return for her agreement to be terminated at a 
certain time.  Ivy v. Dudley (1966), 6 Ohio St.2d 261, 35 O.O.2d 423, 217 N.E.2d 
875; see, also, Salzl v. Gibson Greeting Cards, Inc. (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 35, 15 
O.O.3d 49, 399 N.E.2d 76. The termination when a collective-bargaining 
agreement exists is deemed to have been for just cause, rendering the employee 
statutorily ineligible for unemployment compensation. Ivy, 6 Ohio St.2d at 262, 
35 O.O.2d 423, 217 N.E.2d 875. 
{¶17} One rationale for this exception is that union-supported employees 
are in a protected class and are afforded more bargaining power through the 
union. Salzl, 61 Ohio St.2d at 38, 15 O.O.3d 49, 399 N.E.2d 76. Employees who 
do not have the protection of union bargaining are not subject to this exception 
and are unable to waive their rights to unemployment benefits even if they agree 
to be discharged at a certain time. 
{¶18} This court has rejected the expansion of this narrow common-law 
exception when lower courts have erroneously applied the law applicable to 
collective-bargaining agreements to find an employee ineligible for benefits under 
R.C. 4141.29.  In May Dept. Stores Co. v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs. Bd. of Rev. 
(1975), 49 Ohio App.2d 21, 3 O.O.3d 100, 358 N.E.2d 1389, the appellate court 
concluded that an employee, regardless of union involvement, was terminated for 
just cause when he had agreed to compulsory termination as a condition of 
employment. 
{¶19} We disagreed with this conclusion and differentiated between a 
collective-bargaining agreement and an employee’s acquiescence to a unilaterally 
imposed retirement plan in Salzl, 61 Ohio St.2d at 37-38, 15 O.O.3d 49, 399 
January Term, 2007 
7 
N.E.2d 76.  In stating that the purpose of R.C. Chapter 4141 is “to provide 
financial assistance to an individual who had worked, was able and willing to 
work, but was temporarily without employment through no fault or agreement of 
his own,” id. at 39, 15 O.O.3d 49, 399 N.E.2d 76, this court was referring only to 
an agreement reached by collective bargaining, not to an employee’s 
acquiescence to an employer’s unilateral policy, where the alternative was 
immediate unemployment.  Thus, for the purposes of eligibility for 
unemployment benefits, an employee’s acquiescence to a unilaterally imposed 
policy setting a retirement age does not equate to a discharge for just cause, nor 
does it trigger voluntary unemployment, as described in R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a). 
{¶20} This court recognizes that the purpose of R.C. Chapter 4141 is to 
protect employees from economic adversity. Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio 
Bur. of Emp. Servs., 73 Ohio St.3d at 697, 653 N.E.2d 1207.  An employer’s 
ability to plan for such economic adversity does not and should not detract from 
an employee’s rights to this protection. 
{¶21} Thus, although it may be a prudent economic decision for an 
employer to plan to terminate an employee (be it one day in advance, or years in 
advance), the employee is no less eligible for unemployment benefits.  Id. (stating 
that “while a termination based upon an employer's economic necessity may be 
justifiable, it is not a just cause termination when viewed through the lens of the 
legislative purpose of the Act” (emphasis sic)). 
{¶22} In the present case, Brinkman agreed to work for Lorain under an 
agreement characterizing her as an “intermittent employee,” or one usually 
working fewer than 1,000 hours per year.  Brinkman was not supported by a 
union, and her agreement to the contract did not endow her with much, if any, 
bargaining power.  Her agreement was subject to the R.C. 4141.32 rule against 
the waiver of benefits.  Her agreement did not cause her to be voluntarily 
unemployed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
{¶23} The facts of Brinkman’s case are also distinguishable from Univ. 
of Toledo v. Heiny (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 143, 30 OBR 454, 507 N.E.2d 1130, 
which focused exclusively on the rights and exceptions given to employees of 
educational institutions under R.C. 4141.29(I).  Under subsection (I), 
unemployment benefits are specifically not to be given to employees during the 
period between academic terms.  R.C. 4141.29(I)(1)(a).  This “vacation” 
exception is not used in R.C. 4141.29 outside of subsection (I). 
{¶24} In construing the applicability of these sections to other 
circumstances, we are mindful that the intent of the statute is determined by the 
words used, and that words may not be inserted in or deleted from a plainly 
worded statute. Rice v. CertainTeed Corp. (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 417, 419, 704 
N.E.2d 1217; Cline v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 93, 97, 
573 N.E.2d 77. There is simply no statutory or common-law exception that makes 
Brinkman ineligible to receive benefits under the plain language of R.C. 4141.29. 
{¶25} The lower court asserts that the grant of benefits to Brinkman was 
unlawful and unreasonable because she was not discharged: she was removed 
from the work schedule but not removed from the payroll. The failure to schedule 
Brinkman for work was not due to lack of work or lack of funds. 
{¶26} There is no statutory requirement that Brinkman be “terminated, * 
* * separated, [or] laid off” in order to receive benefits. 2005-Ohio-5807, ¶ 15.  
R.C. 4141.29 requires that an individual be involuntarily unemployed before 
receiving unemployment benefits, and subsection (D)(2)(a) makes an employee 
who is discharged for just cause ineligible for benefits. 
{¶27} Although we stated in Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos that an 
employee is not eligible for benefits if he has “quit work without just cause or has 
been discharged for just cause in connection with [his] work,” R.C. 
4141.29(D)(2)(a), it appears that the lower court in this case has taken that 
instruction to an illogical extreme.  If an employee is unemployed, that is, not 
January Term, 2007 
9 
working and not getting paid, but has not been discharged, the employee is placed 
in an untenable limbo. 
{¶28} Once Brinkman was removed from the work schedule, she was not 
able to perform any services for the county or to receive payment, and thus 
satisfied the statutory definition of “total unemployment” as described in R.C. 
4141.01(M).  Because Lorain caused Brinkman to be unemployed as provided in 
R.C. 4141.01(M), and none of the circumstances described in R.C. 
4141.29(D)(2)(a) are applicable, Brinkman is eligible for unemployment-
compensation benefits. A formal discharge is not required for a successful claim 
for unemployment benefits. 
 
{¶29} The appellate court in this case adhered to the public policy of a 
business’s freedom to contract by creating an additional opportunity for an 
employee to contract away his eligibility for unemployment compensation.  The 
remedial purpose of R.C. 4141.29 focuses on the protection of the employee, not 
the employer.  By limiting the possibility of a unilateral employer limitation on an 
employee’s statutory rights, as the courts did in Mathieu, Lexington Twp. 
Trustees, and Case W. Res. Univ., the policy of the Act is fully supported. 
{¶30} An employee who accepts employment and agrees to a termination 
date does not waive her right to unemployment benefits.  More specifically, the 
employee has not agreed to become voluntarily unemployed or to be discharged 
with just cause, unless an explicit exception is applicable. 
{¶31} The protections of an employee under R.C. 4141.29 are to be 
liberally construed.  Thus, the exceptions to R.C. 4141.29 should be narrowly 
construed.  The exceptions to the bar on waiver (such as union-contract and 
educational-institution employees) do not specifically apply to the employee in 
this case and should not be analogized to apply to the employee in this case. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
{¶32} For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the commission was 
lawful and supported by competent, credible evidence.  The judgment of the court 
of appeals is therefore in error. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., BRESSLER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
 
H.J. BRESSLER, J., of the Twelfth Appellate District, was assigned to sit for 
RESNICK, J., whose term ended on January 1, 2007. 
 
CUPP, J., whose term began on January 2, 2007, did not participate in the 
consideration or decision of this case. 
__________________ 
 
BRESSLER, J., dissenting. 
{¶33} I agree with the majority's affirmative answer to the question 
certified in this case and its conclusion that a claimant is entitled to 
unemployment compensation benefits when the claimant is an intermittent 
employee who has satisfied the terms of the employment contract.  However, I 
disagree with the majority's application of this statement of law to the facts of this 
particular case and believe that the terms of Brinkman's employment contract 
compel us to dismiss this appeal as having been improvidently granted. 
{¶34} Our purpose in interpreting contracts is to ascertain and effectuate 
the intent of the parties, and “[t]he intent of the parties is presumed to reside in the 
language they chose to use in their agreement.”  Graham v. Drydock Coal Co. 
(1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 311, 313, 667 N.E.2d 949.  "Common words appearing in a 
written instrument will be given their ordinary meaning unless manifest absurdity 
results, or unless some other meaning is clearly evidenced from the face or overall 
contents of the instrument."  Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co. (1978), 53 Ohio 
St.2d 241,  O.O.3d 403, 374 N.E.2d 146, paragraph two of the syllabus.  “If a 
contract is clear and unambiguous, the court need not go beyond the plain 
January Term, 2007 
11 
language of the agreement to determine the parties' rights and obligations; instead, 
the court must give effect to the agreement's express terms.”  Uebelacker v. 
Cincom Sys., Inc. (1988), 48 Ohio App.3d 268, 271, 549 N.E.2d 1210. 
{¶35} The contract between Brinkman and Lorain provides: 
{¶36} "I, Kristie Brinkman, the undersigned, do hereby understand and 
agree to abide by the following rules pertaining to Intermittent Employees: 
{¶37} "1.  My appointment as REGISTERED NURSE is classified as 
Intermittent.  An intermittent employee is defined by Rule #123:1-47-01(44) of 
the Ohio Civil Service Laws and Rules as:  An employee who works an irregular 
schedule which is determined by fluctuating demands of the work and is not 
predictable and is generally characterized as requiring less than 1000 hours per 
year. 
{¶38} "* * *  
{¶39} "3.  I must complete a probationary period of 2000 hours worked." 
{¶40} The majority holds that "satisfaction of an intermittent-
employment contract does not create voluntary employment or a discharge 
sufficient to render an employee ineligible for unemployment benefits."  In 
concluding that Brinkman is entitled to unemployment-compensation benefits, the 
majority implicitly holds that Brinkman had satisfied the terms of her 
intermittent-employment contract. 
{¶41} Brinkman's intermittent-employee contract provided, as an express 
condition to her employment, that she was required to work 2,000 hours during a 
probationary period that began in October 2001.  However, the contract clearly 
limits Brinkman to working 1,000 hours per year or less, meaning that Brinkman's 
contract is a multiyear contract that cannot be completed in less than one year.  
Therefore, Brinkman could not have satisfied her intermittent-employee contract 
as of the date she applied for and received unemployment benefits, because she 
had not yet worked 2,000 hours.  Brinkman began her probationary period in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
October 2001, which was Lorain's fiscal-year 2001, and worked until November 
2002, after she had accumulated 1,000 hours during Lorain's fiscal-year 2002.  
Brinkman then resumed her duties in December 2002, which was the beginning of 
Lorain's fiscal-year 2003, and became a permanent part-time employee in June 
2003, thereby completing her 2,000-hour probationary period.  Accordingly, 
Brinkman did not satisfy her intermittent-employee contract after working 1,000 
hours during Lorain's fiscal-year 2002.  Rather, she satisfied her contract after 
completing her 2,000-hour probationary period, which lasted approximately 21 
months. 
{¶42} Moreover, Brinkman received exactly as much compensation as 
she expected to receive pursuant to the contract, albeit in a shorter period of time 
than she apparently desired.  Had Lorain simply scheduled Brinkman to work no 
more than approximately 20 hours per week for an entire year, Brinkman 
certainly would have no claim for unemployment-compensation benefits.  
However, such a schedule obviates the need for an intermittent employee, which 
by definition is an employee who works an irregular and unpredictable schedule. 
{¶43} I do not believe that Brinkman was involuntarily unemployed at 
any time during her 21-month probationary period.  While I do believe that a 
claimant who has satisfied an intermittent-employee contract is not voluntarily 
unemployed or discharged, I do not believe that Brinkman satisfied the terms of 
her intermittent-employee contract before she completed her probationary period.  
Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur in the foregoing 
opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Dennis P. Will, Lorain County Prosecuting Attorney, and M. Robert 
Flanagan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees Lorain County Auditor 
and Lorain County Sheriff. 
January Term, 2007 
13 
Marc Dann, Attorney General, Stephen P. Carney, State Solicitor, and 
David E. Lefton, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. 
 
Frederick M. Gittes, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Employment 
Lawyers Association. 
 
Anita L. Myerson, urging reversal for amicus curiae Legal Aid Society of 
Cleveland. 
 
Thomas W. Weeks, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio State Legal 
Services Association, Legal Aid Society of Cleveland, National Employment Law 
Project, and Ohio Employment Lawyers Association. 
______________________