Case Title: EMILIO FELIX TENIENTE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 05-171

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
EMILIO FELIX TENIENTE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 165169 P.3d 512Case Number: 05-171Decided: 10/18/2007
it'OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

EMILIO 
FELIX TENIENTE,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OFWYOMING,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina 
N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Kerin.

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Leda M. Pojman, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Pojman.

Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

HILL, 
Justice.

[¶1]      A jury convicted 
Emilio Teniente of first-degree murder and conspiring to commit murder in the 
death of Joseph Lopez.  On appeal, 
Teniente argues that multiple issues arose during trial which affected his right 
to a fair trial.  We disagree, and 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Both parties 
similarly phrase eight issues.  
Teniente's phrasing is as follows:

1.   Did 
reversible error occur when the trial court failed to make inquiry into the 
effect of threats of retaliation made to the jurors?

2.   Did 
prosecutorial misconduct occur, warranting reversal?

3.   Did the 
trial court err in admitting irrelevant information of alleged gang 
activity?

4.   Was 
[Teniente] denied a fair trial, due to the receipt of hearsay 
testimony?

5.   Was 
[Teniente] denied his right to confrontation by the elicitation of testimonial 
hearsay?

6.   Did the 
trial court err in denying [Teniente's] motion for mistrial after the prosecutor 
commented on [Teniente's] exercise of his right to 
silence?

7.   Is 
Wyoming Statute § 6-2-101(c) unconstitutionally vague and violative of due 
process, and is it unconstitutional as applied to 
[Teniente]?

8.   Does 
cumulative error warrant reversal?

FACTS

[¶3]      The facts of this 
case are set out in detail in Magallanes 
v. State, 2006 WY 119, 
¶¶ 3-10, 142 P.3d 1147, 1149-51 (Wyo. 2006):

During 
the evening hours of January 17, 2004, Joseph Lopez and his younger brother, 
Anthony, went to the home of Emilio Teniente in Greeley, Colorado.  There, they met Bobby Rojas, Magallanes 
and his brother, Jesse Magallanes (hereinafter "Jesse").  The six young men sat around drinking, 
conversing, and listening to music.  
After a period of time, Teniente, Rojas, Lopez, Magallanes and Jesse 
decided to drive to Cheyenne to party.

Jesse 
drove that evening, and Teniente occupied the front passenger seat.  In the rear, Magallanes sat behind 
Jesse, Lopez sat in the middle, and Rojas sat behind Teniente.  At some point during the drive to 
Cheyenne, Lopez 
made an inflammatory comment to Magallanes about his mother.  Magallanes became angry and began 
punching Lopez.  Thereafter, punches 
were thrown by all three occupants of the back seat.  When the men reached Cheyenne, Jesse stopped 
the car, and he and Magallanes pulled Lopez out of the vehicle.  Apparently believing they intended to 
leave Lopez there, Teniente told them to put Lopez back in the car because "he 
knows who I am."

After 
placing Lopez back in the car, the men went to the house where Teniente's sister 
Sophia lived.  Sophia immediately 
noticed blood on Lopez's face and admonished the men for fighting.  She then helped Lopez clean up and gave 
him a clean shirt to wear while she washed the one he had been wearing.  After that, things calmed down between 
the men and they sat around drinking and talking with Sophia and one of her 
female friends, Vanessa Hernandez.  
Approximately two hours later, Teniente suggested they return to 
Greeley, and the 
five men left Sophia's house.1

Shortly 
thereafter, Lopez began to scold the others for hitting him earlier.  He told them they should have killed him 
and that they needed to take care of him before they returned to Greeley because his family 
would get revenge for the beating he had taken.  At that point, Magallanes struck Lopez, 
and Teniente pulled out his .25 caliber semi-automatic pistol, pointed it at 
Lopez's head and told him to shut up.  
Teniente then directed Jesse to drive to Campstool Road.  When they arrived at the College Drive 
overpass on Campstool Road, Magallanes and Teniente had Jesse stop the 
vehicle under the bridge.

Magallanes 
removed Lopez from the car and started beating and kicking him, eventually 
driving him to the ground.  By this 
time, Jesse and Teniente were outside the vehicle.  While Jesse attempted to stop the 
fracas, Teniente passed his pistol to Magallanes and told him to "shoot that 
guy."  Magallanes then shot Lopez 
twice in the head, once above the left ear and once toward the back of the 
head.  The four men left Lopez on 
the road and returned to Sophia's house, where Magallanes and his brother 
dropped off Teniente and Rojas before heading home.  Approximately forty-five minutes later, 
around 2:00 a.m., Sophia and Hernandez drove Teniente and Rojas back to 
Greeley.

Shortly 
before 2:00 a.m., Michael Hampton, a security officer for Frontier Refinery, 
left the refinery and drove east on Campstool Road.  As he approached the area of the 
overpass, he saw what appeared to be debris on the roadway and attempted 
unsuccessfully to swerve and avoid it.  
After hitting it, Hampton stopped his vehicle and discovered that 
the object was the body of a young man.  
The Laramie County Sheriff's Office was immediately 
contacted.

During 
the ensuing investigation, law enforcement learned that Lopez had accompanied 
Teniente and others to Cheyenne the previous evening.  Law enforcement's investigation into 
Lopez's murder, however, was hampered by an orchestrated effort to cover up what 
had taken place in Cheyenne.  
As part of the cover-up, Rojas, Jesse, Sophia and Hernandez told a 
similar fabricated story that Lopez had left Sophia's home by himself and never 
returned, and conveniently failed to mention Magallanes' presence in Cheyenne on the night in 
question.  Those fabrications 
started to unravel when Sophia was arrested for possession of a controlled 
substance.

Based 
on information obtained from the ongoing investigation, the State charged 
Magallanes with the premeditated murder of Lopez and with conspiring with 
Teniente to commit that murder.  In 
September 2004, a jury found him guilty on both charges.  The district court sentenced Magallanes 
to concurrent terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  This appeal 
followed.

For 
purposes of the instant appeal, we will set out additional facts as they are 
pertinent to the issues raised.

ARGUMENT

Issue I 
- Juror Note

[¶4]      In his first 
issue, Teniente argues that reversible error occurred when the trial court 
failed to inquire into a note it received from the jury.  The State contends that the trial court 
responded appropriately to the note and properly exercised its discretion in its 
treatment of it.

[¶5]      During its 
deliberation, the jury sent a note to the court, which 
read:

Dear 
Judge Grant:

            
During our deliberation some concerns have arose about the safety and any 
retaliation of either family, towards any of us or our families.  Some of us have been approached by some 
of the family members.  

Please 
advise us of our course of action.

Thank 
you.

Respectfully 
yours,

The 
Jury.

[¶6]      The note referred 
to a specific instance when a female juror was approached during trial by 
Teniente's girlfriend in a public restroom.  The girlfriend first introduced herself, 
and then mentioned that she had just had Teniente's baby and that "things were 
really hard."  The juror did not 
respond, terminated contact, and immediately notified the bailiff.2  After learning of the juror's contact 
with Teniente's girlfriend, the court informed the juror, via the bailiff, that it was 
comfortable with her continued service on the jury, as long as the juror was 
also comfortable with continuing.  
The juror testified to feeling comfortable continuing, but admitted the 
contact did make her "a bit nervous."

[¶7]      Teniente contends 
that this incident improperly affected his right to a fair trial.  In analyzing this issue, we turn to a 
legal principle established both in our court and the United States Supreme 
Court.  It is well settled 
that:

[i]n a 
criminal case, any private communication, contact, 
or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the 
matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively 
prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the 
instructions and directions of the court made during the trial, with full 
knowledge of the parties.  The 
presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government 
to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact 
with the juror was harmless to the defendant.

Martinez 
v. State, 2006 
WY 20, ¶ 28, 128 P.3d 652, 665 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting 
Remmer v. 
United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S. Ct. 450, 98 L. Ed. 654 (1954)).  Martinez further points out that in order to 
implicate such a presumption, there must be some "quantum of evidence indicating 
that an out-of-court communication or contact occurred and that it concerned 
the matter pending before the jury.'"  
Martinez, 
¶ 29, 128 P.3d  at 665.

[¶8]      Furthermore, in 
Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, 33 P.3d 758 (Wyo. 2001) we 
cited this language with favor:

                        
When a trial court is apprised of the fact that extrinsic influence may 
have tainted the trial, the proper remedy is a hearing to determine the 
circumstances of the improper contact and the extent of the prejudice, if any, 
to the defendant.  The court's 
questioning of a juror who is the recipient of extraneous information is limited to the circumstances and 
nature of the improper contact, as Fed.R.Evid. 606(b) precludes the court from 
delving into the subjective effect of the contact on the juror's 
decision-making.  Accordingly, an 
objective test should be applied in making an assessment of whether the 
defendant was prejudiced by the extraneous information.  
The court "should assess the possibility of prejudice' by reviewing the 
entire record, analyzing the substance of the extrinsic evidence and compa"ring 
it to that information of which the 
jurors were aware.'  United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777, 
783 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944, 106 S. Ct. 308, 88 L. Ed. 2d 285 (1985).

Id., ¶ 13, 33 P.3d  at 
763 (citing Sisneros v. City of 
Laramie, 773 P.2d 933, 936 (Wyo. 1989)).  In other words, a mere showing of 
improper communication is not sufficient  prejudice must also be shown.  Id.  Furthermore, a new trial is not required 
every time a juror is placed in a potentially compromising 
situation:

[I]t is 
virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might 
theoretically affect their vote.  
Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on 
the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial 
occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they 
happen.

Skinner, ¶ 14, 33 P.3d  at 763 (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S. Ct. 940, 71 L. Ed. 2d 78 (1982)).  Gunnett v. State, 2005 WY 8, ¶ 25, 
104 P.3d 775, 781 (Wyo. 2005), notes 
that,

[i]n 
such circumstances, many courts have abandoned the "presumption" mechanism in 
favor of common sense inquiries into the likely effect of the information or 
influences on the average juror:

Under 
all of these standards, the court must attempt to draw inferences as to the 
probable effects of the extraneous information or outside influence in light of 
objectively apparent facts about the context in which those matters came to the 
jury's attention.  Thus, probable 
effect is estimated in light of the importance of the issue to which the 
information or influence related, the nature of the information or influence, 
the strength of the admitted evidence supporting the verdict, the number of 
jurors exposed to the information or influence, when the jury was exposed to the 
information or influence, how long the jury discussed these matters during 
deliberations, the manner in which the court dealt with the information at 
trial, and any other matters which logically might have a bearing on the 
effect of the information or influence on the jury.

27 
Charles Alan Wright & Victor James Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Evidence, § 6075 at 469-71 (1990)]; and see Wiser v. People, 732 P.2d 1139, 1142-44 (Colo. 1987).

[¶9]      Here, lessons 
from both Skinner and Gunnett undeniably hold true.  As previously noted, after the female 
juror was approached by Teniente's girlfriend, the juror immediately terminated 
the contact and notified the bailiff.  
The court was informed and 
through the bailiff contacted the juror to ensure that her level of ease at 
serving on Teniente's jury was not compromised.  Furthermore, the district court spoke 
with counsel about ensuring the avoidance of any contact between families and 
jurors after the verdict was read and specifically answered juror questions and 
concerns about their safety after trial.  
After reviewing the record developed specifically to address this issue, 
we confidently conclude that the district court's actions regarding the note 
were altogether appropriate.

Issue II 
 Prosecutorial 
Misconduct

[¶10]   Teniente claims that several 
instances of prosecutorial misconduct occurred in this case.  Where there has been no objection below, 
claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed for plain 
error.

First, 
the record must be 
clear as to the incident which is alleged as error. Second, the party claiming 
the error amounted to plain error must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal 
rule of law was violated. Finally, that party must prove a substantial right has 
been denied him and, as a result, he has been materially 
prejudiced.

Farmer 
v. State, 2005 WY 162, ¶ 26, 124 P.3d 699, 
709 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 7, 49 P.3d 975, 981 (Wyo. 2002)).  Furthermore, 
the defendant bears the burden of proving prejudice. Id.

[¶11]   However, where there has been an 
objection below, claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed for harmless 
error, which occurs if

                        
there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more 
favorable to the defendant if the error had never occurred.  To demonstrate harmful error, the 
defendant must show prejudice under circumstances which manifest inherent 
unfairness and injustice or conduct which offends the public sense of fair 
play.

Butcher 
v. State, 2005 
WY 146, ¶ 38, 123 P.3d 543, 554 (Wyo. 2005) (citations 
omitted).

[¶12]   Finally, we note that when 
reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, the prosecutor's comments and 
arguments must be reviewed in the context of the entire record, and Teniente has 
the burden of proving that he was so prejudiced by the alleged misconduct that 
he was denied his right to a fair trial.  
Butcher, ¶ 39, 123 P.3d  at 555.  The propriety of any comment made during 
closing argument is measured in the context of the entire argument.  Virgilio v. State, 834 P.2d 1125, 1127 
(Wyo. 
1992).  Reversal is not warranted 
unless a reasonable probability exists that absent the error, the appellant may 
have enjoyed a more favorable verdict.  
Id.

Discussion

[¶13]   
Teniente claims that five instances of prosecutorial misconduct 
occurred during his trial.  Each 
will be discussed separately with the appropriate standard of review 
applied.

a.         
Conviction of Co-Defendant

[¶14]   First, Teniente argues that 
prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the prosecutor referred to Eddie 
Magallanes' conviction during the cross-examination of a witness and referenced 
that same testimony during rebuttal closing argument.  The State admits that it is a general 
rule that when two persons are indicted for separate offenses growing out of the 
same circumstance, the fact that one has pleaded guilty is inadmissible against 
the other.  See Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372, 1375-1376 (Wyo. 1979).  Also, the State admits that prejudice 
occurs when the accused timely objects and requests curative action by the trial 
court.  However, the State contends 
that because Teniente did not object to the alleged error, and as a result has 
the burden of proving plain error, that his argument fails because the requisite 
application of plain error falls short.

[¶15]   We begin with the problematic 
testimony of which Teniente complains:

Prosecutor:  Mr. Gutierrez, I guess begin by 
explaining to me Magallanes versus Gutierriez.  You're a half brother of  

Gutierrez:  Yes, sir.

Prosecutor:  Now, you say Jesse called you on the 
phone?

Gutierrez:  Yes, sir.

Prosecutor:  When you were in some state, you 
don't remember where?

Gutierrez:  If you tell me the date, I probably 
got it on paper showing where because of Qual-Com, it shows every state, every 
time you use that, where you were at.

Prosecutor:  So you brought that with you today. 
What's it say?

Gutierrez:  I don't know.  Tell me what date, 
and I'll get the paper and tell you.

Prosecutor:  I thought you were the one telling 
us he called.  
Don't you know what day he called you?

Gutierrez:  A year ago? Come on. Not even you 
could remember, okay?

Prosecutor:  So you're saying sometime in the 
last year Jesse called you and said he killed someone?

Gutierrez:  Yes, that's all he said, okay?

Prosecutor:  Was that before or after Eddie was 
charged?

Gutierrez:  That was before.

Prosecutor:  Before Eddie was charged?

Gutierrez:  I think so, yes, sir.

Prosecutor:  And then Eddie got charged?

Gutierrez:  Yes.

Prosecutor:  In fact  

Gutierrez:  I don't know when Eddie got 
charged.

Prosecutor:  Right, but he came back, he was 
jailed here in April, and you visited him in jail?

Gutierrez:  Yes, I have  I have a couple of 
times, but I don't have too much to do with him because I'm always on the 
road.

Prosecutor:  And you knew Eddie was charged with 
killing someone, didn't you?

Gutierrez:  Yeah, just what I read when I came  
I took a week off for his trial, and you had me kicked out of the courtroom.

Prosecutor:  And you sat through his trial, 
didn't you?

Gutierrez:  No, I didn't.  You kicked me out 
of the courtroom.  
Remember that?

Prosecutor:  You were present when the jury was  
came back and found Eddie guilty?

Gutierrez:  No, I was not here.

Prosecutor:  Do you remember Eddie was found 
guilty?

Gutierrez:  Yeah, because my wife was here, and 
she told me.

Prosecutor:  You knew he was charged with killing 
Joseph Lopez?

Gutierrez:  Yes, I did.

[¶16]   During rebuttal closing, the prosecutor 
referenced this same testimony by saying,

            
It's like, wait a minute.  "Eddie's charged with a murder, and you're 
saying all this time you knew Jesse said he did it? You sit through Eddie's 
trial, watch him get convicted."  "Jesse said he did it."  Where was he? Where 
did this come from? Why is he here? This is the family picking sides.

[¶17]   During trial, the court ruled and the 
prosecution agreed that testimony and/or evidence regarding the conviction of 
Eddie Magallanes was inadmissible during the State's case in chief.  Accordingly, the 
State refrained from presenting any testimony or evidence of Magallanes' 
conviction during its case in chief and went so far as instructing its witnesses 
to not make any reference to that conviction.  Nevertheless, the prosecutor did reference 
the conviction, and we must determine whether or not Teniente was so prejudiced 
by the reference as to warrant a reversal.

[¶18]   There are several non-exhaustive 
factors we weigh when evaluating if there was prejudicial plain error at the 
trial level by reference to a co-defendant's conviction:

1)         
the degree to which the prosecutor's remarks have a 
tendency to mislead the jury and prejudice the accused;

2)         
whether the remarks were isolated or extensive;

3)         
the strength of competent proof to establish guilt, absent 
the remarks;

4)         
whether the comments were deliberately placed before the 
jury to divert attention to extraneous matters;

5)         
the presence or absence of a limiting instruction;

6)         
whether there was a proper purpose for introducing the 
conviction;

7)         
whether the conviction was improperly emphasized;

8)         
whether the conviction was used as substantive evidence of 
guilt;

9)         
whether the error was invited by defense counsel;

10)     whether the failure to object could have been the result of 
tactical decisions; and

11)     whether, in light of all the evidence, the error was 
harmless.

Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 539 (Wyo. 2000).  In applying these factors to the Teniente 
facts, we do not believe that he suffered material prejudice as a result of the 
prosecutor's remarks.  
Under the circumstances, it does not appear that the remarks had a 
tendency to mislead the jury or prejudice the accused, as the remarks were not 
extensive.  
Additionally, substantial evidence existed for Teniente's convictions, 
and even without the remarks made by the prosecutor, the strength of the 
evidence was substantial.

[¶19]   Given the substantial evidence against 
Teniente, it does not appear that the prosecutor's comments were deliberately 
placed before the jury to divert attention to extraneous matters.  We can plainly 
gather from the record on appeal that the prosecutor was trying to develop the 
theory that Gutierrez never came forward with information that was pertinent to the 
crime, not trying to imply that Teniente was guilty because his co-defendant was 
also found guilty.

[¶20]   We do not see how the asserted error 
could have been invited by defense counsel but, nevertheless, our review of the 
record shows that the conviction was not improperly emphasized, nor was it used 
as substantive evidence of Teniente's guilt.  It is thus apparent that, in light of all the 
evidence, the error was harmless, and plain error did not occur in this 
instance.

b.         
Comments on Right to Remain Silent

[¶21]   Teniente next argues that at trial, the 
prosecutor improperly commented on his right to remain silent during the State's 
closing argument, which follows in pertinent part:

PROSECUTOR:   But Emilio, he just stays  last 
statement he gave this detective on January 26th, "I was at the Stinson house, and I told Eddie and 
Jesse to take Joe home.  That's all I know."  That's his 
first.  That's 
what he stuck by.  
That's where we stand today.  That's the only statement we have out of 
Emilio Teniente.

DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Your Honor, may we 
approach?

BENCH CONFERENCE

            
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Your Honor, I object to [Prosecutor] saying 
that that is the only statement that we have for Mr. Teniente.  That is a comment 
on his right to remain silent.  That is a comment on him not testifying at 
this trial, and it is improper and I hate to do it, and I hate to do it, but I 
move for a mistrial.

            
COURT: Motion for mistrial denied.  I think in the context, the statement didn't 
violate the rule.

            
PROSECUTOR:  I'll clarify it.

END OF BENCH CONFERENCE

            
PROSECUTOR:  Statement Mr. Teniente  the 26th was the last statement to law enforcement, first 
one to Brady Olson, second one January 19th to 
this detective, third and last to law enforcement January 26th, "Joe went out the door with Eddie and 
Jesse[.]"

[¶22]   As the trial transcript reflects, 
defense counsel objected to the remarks, prompting our review to be harmless 
error.  Under 
this standard, error occurs and is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility 
that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant if the error 
had never occurred.  
Butcher, ¶ 38, 123 P.3d  at 
554.  To 
demonstrate harmful error, the defendant must show prejudice under circumstances 
which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice or conduct which offends 
the public sense of fair play.  Id.

[¶23]   Where evaluations of alleged 
improper comments on the right to silence have occurred before this Court, we 
have stated:

Prosecutorial violations are subject to the Clenin [v. State, 573 P.2d 844 (Wyo.1978)] 
rule's mandate that failure to respect the constitutional right of the 
citizen-accused not to have his silence called to the jury's attention will 
entitle the accused to a reversal of conviction. Westmark v. State, 693 P.2d 220, 221-22 (Wyo.1984), citing Clenin. A reference to silence which is not a 
"comment" will not be reversed absent a showing of prejudice. Parkhurst v. State, 628 P.2d 1369, 1382 
(Wyo. 1981).

.

A comment upon an accused's silence occurs when used to the 
state's advantage either as substantive evidence of guilt or to suggest to the 
jury that the silence was an admission of guilt.

Abeyta v. State, 2003 WY 
136, ¶ 11, 78 P.3d 664, 667 (Wyo. 2003).  And as we said in Spinner v. State, 2003 WY 106, ¶ 19, 75 P.3d 1016, 1024 (Wyo. 
2003):

            
In analyzing right-to-silence cases, we consider "the 
entire context in which the statements were made" and we will "not take 
sentences and phrases out of context." [citation omitted.]  We also 
evaluate

whether the prosecutor asked improper questions, whether he 
emphasized or followed up on the silence issue, and whether he attempted to 
exploit the issue in any way.

Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 39, 43 P.3d 80, 96 (Wyo. 
2002).

A prosecutor does not "comment" on a defendant's exercise 
of his right to silence where he does not attempt to use the silence to the 
state's advantage, where he does not argue to the jury that the silence was 
evidence of guilt or an admission of guilt, and where the defendant does not 
show any prejudice.  
Shipman v. State, 2001 WY 11 ¶ 24, 17 P.3d 34, 39 (Wyo. 
2001).  
Furthermore, material prejudice is shown only where there is a reasonable 
possibility that the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant if 
the evidence or prosecutorial comment had not been allowed.  Emerson v. State, 988 P.2d 518 at 522 
(Wyo. 1999).

[¶24]   Here, the prosecutor's statements were 
made during closing, and when taken in context, certainly did not attempt to use 
Teniente's right to silence to the State's advantage.  Neither did the 
prosecutor argue to the jury that the silence was evidence of Teniente's guilt, 
or worse, an admission of guilt.  Of course, this Court can never know what was 
going through the prosecutor's mind at closing; nevertheless, the statements 
appear to only highlight inconsistencies between witness statements and 
Teniente's statements given to police prior to trial.  In other words, the 
prosecutor was pointing out what Teniente had said, not his failure to 
speak.  We 
conclude that Teniente has failed to demonstrate harmful error in this instance and that no 
prejudice was shown such that it affected any substantial rights.

[¶25]   Relevant to this issue is another issue 
of Teniente's:  
That the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after the prosecutor commented on his 
right to silence.  
We will address that issue now. 

[¶26]   We review the denial of a mistrial motion under an abuse of discretion 
standard.  
Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously.  Lucero v. State, 
14 P.3d 920, 924 (Wyo. 
2000).

[¶27]   "Granting a mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy 
that should be resorted to only in the face of an error so prejudicial that 
justice could not be served by proceeding with trial."  Allen v. State, 2002 WY 48, ¶ 75, 43 P.3d 551, 575 (Wyo. 
2002) (quoting Warner v. State, 897 P.2d 472, 474 
(Wyo. 1995)).  In reviewing the 
district court's decision for an abuse of discretion, we inquire as to the 
reasonableness of the choice made by the trial court.  Lucero, 14 P.3d  at 924.  We have recognized that the district court is 
in the best position to assess any prejudicial impact of this type of claimed 
error.  Allen, ¶ 75, 43 P.3d  at 575.

[¶28]   In Hughes v. 
State, 658 P.2d 1294, 1296 
(Wyo. 1983) we held that "a fleeting 
reference to appellant's silence, not resulting from inquiry by the prosecution 
nor exploited by the prosecution, is not error."  We agree with the district court's 
assessment. Given our previous discussion above of why the prosecutor's 
statements at trial were not improper, we can find no abuse of discretion in the 
district court's denial of Teniente's motion for a mistrial.

c.         
Improper Vouching

[¶29]   Teniente next claims that the 
prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of Jesse Magallenes, and two 
defense witnesses, Robert Riojas and Ruben Gutierrez, both on cross-examination 
and in closing argument.  Furthermore, Teniente alleges that the 
prosecutor asserted his own personal beliefs and opinions as to the truth of 
testimony and guilt of Teniente during closing argument.

[¶30]   The credibility of witnesses and the 
guilt of the accused are questions for the jury to resolve.  Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 116, ¶ 47, 142 P.3d 1134, 1146 (Wyo. 
2006).  Counsel 
are allowed wide latitude during the scope of their closing arguments, and a 
prosecutor may comment on all of the evidence in the record and suggest 
reasonable inferences from that evidence.  However, the prosecutor may not inflame or 
mislead the jury or express his personal beliefs or opinions about the 
evidence.  
Davis v. State, 2005 WY 93, ¶ 25, 117 P.3d 454, 463 (Wyo. 2005).  Similarly, a prosecutor cannot personally 
vouch for the credibility of a state's witness, nor can a prosecutor assert his 
own credibility as a basis for conviction of a defendant.

[W]hen the prosecutor asserts his credibility or personal 
belief, an additional factor is injected into the case. This additional factor 
is that counsel may be perceived by the jury as an 
authority whose opinion carries greater weight than their own opinion; that 
members of the jury might be persuaded not by the evidence, but rather by a 
perception that counsel's opinions are correct because of his position as 
prosecutor, an important state official entrusted with enforcing the criminal 
laws of a sovereign state. While the prosecutor is expected to be an advocate, 
he may not exploit his position to induce a jury to disregard the evidence or 
misapply the law.

Condra v. State, 2004 WY 
131, ¶ 11, 100 P.3d 386, 390 (Wyo. 2004).

[¶31]   While a prosecutor cannot continuously 
and repeatedly express his opinions or beliefs as to the truth or falsity of 
testimony or the innocence or guilt of the defendant, he may comment on evidence 
and present reasonable inferences that logically flow from that evidence 
including making a reasonable inference that a witness is not truthful, assuming 
that the evidence supports such an inference.  Id.

[¶32]   During closing, the prosecutor said 
(regarding the testimony of Jesse Magallenes):

[W]e have one eyewitness, one eyewitness that stepped up to 
the plate February 18th, and said, I was there.  This is what 
happened.'  A 
statement as, you know, he has stayed consistent with, a statement he testified 
to in Eddie's trial.

As you notice, when [Defense counsel] went to question him, 
he couldn't impeach him on any of his prior inconsistent statements because 
there weren't any.  
He has stayed consistent, ladies and gentlemen, even in the face of 
threats from his family, ostracism by his family.

He saw what happened, and he decided to step forward and 
tell the truth, even though the first time, it's against his very own brother, 
and now the second time, against his cousin.  Courage.

[¶33]   Teniente claims that this is improper 
vouching for the credibility of Magallenes.  We do not interpret the comments in the same 
fashion.  The 
prosecutor was not vouching for the credibility of Magallenes.  Rather, he was 
arguing reasonable inferences, drawn from evidence introduced at trial, that 
Magallenes' testimony could be seen as reliable.

[¶34]   Teniente also claims that the 
prosecutor erred when he commented, "Once again, he's guilty ladies and 
gentlemen ..." and "Your verdict, ladies and gentlemen, is truly, guilty on both 
counts."  
However, the State is permitted to ask the jury to return a finding of 
guilty against a defendant unless the State implies that the jury should do so 
regardless of or in disregard of its duty to weigh the evidence and follow the 
court's instructions.  
LaFond v. 
State, 2004 WY 51, ¶¶ 24-25, 
89 P.3d 324, 332 (Wyo. 
2004).  Here, 
there was no implication that in order for the jury to satisfy its duty, it had to return a 
guilty verdict.  
When taken in context, there is no impropriety in the prosecutor's 
comments.

[¶35]   Finally, Teniente argues that the State 
"improperly criticized" defense witnesses Gutierrez and Riojas during the 
cross-examination of Riojas3, and during 
rebuttal closing, stating, "Ruben [Gutierrez], he'll come in and say 
anything."  
Also during rebuttal, Teniente takes issue with the following comments 
about Riojas:  
"[He]'s charged, and you saw why." and "Bobby has no idea what the truth 
is, does he?" and "Well, if it's so easy, what happened to Bobby? The truth is 
the truth is the truth."  Teniente claims that the prosecutor was 
arguing to the jury that the State did not believe Riojas was telling the truth, 
and that the jury should believe the State because Riojas was charged.

[¶36]   As to the cross-examination of Riojas, 
a prosecutor is allowed to suggest reasonable inferences that a witness has not 
been truthful.  
Condra, 
¶ 25; 100 P.3d  at 392.  Under W.R.E. 608(b), the prosecutor was well 
within his boundaries when he attacked Riojas' credibility.  The prosecutor was 
suggesting to the jury that Riojas testified to a different version of events 
than he told law enforcement, which brought into question his inherent 
reliability issues.

d.                 
Prosecutor's Misstatement of Evidence During Closing

[¶37]   Next, Teniente claims that the 
prosecutor committed misconduct when he made the following statement during 
rebuttal closing argument: "Bobby [Riojas]  we both forgot to ask  Do you have 
a felony or not? I don't know.  It doesn't matter in this equation."  In fact, the 
prosecutor had earlier asked Riojas whether or not he had a felony record, to 
which Riojas answered that he did not.  Because defense counsel objected, this claim 
is reviewed for harmless error.  We conclude that any error in the comment was 
harmless, for several reasons.

[¶38]   In our judgment, during closing 
argument, the prosecutor was offering a way of viewing the significance of the 
evidence heard by the jury.  See Delacruz v. State, 10 P.3d 1131, 1133 (Wyo. 
2000).  The 
inference was logical that Gutierrez's testimony was tenuous because he did not 
come forward in a timely fashion.  It was also logical to infer that Riojas was 
not truthful because he admitted lying to law enforcement and to persons of 
authority  but insisted at trial that he was being truthful.  Clearly, the 
prosecutor's statements were simply suggesting those reasonable inferences, 
staying within the bounds of acceptable argument.

e.         
Introduction of Uncharged Misconduct Under W.R.E. 404(b) and Improper 
Impeachment

[¶39]   Finally, Teniente's last claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct involves two instances of alleged impropriety:  First, that the 
prosecutor failed to give notice to the defense before introducing uncharged 
misconduct evidence under W.R.E. 404(b) during his cross-examination of Robert 
Riojas, and second, that the prosecutor improperly impeached Riojas.4  The State contends that the evidence was not 
404(b) evidence; rather, it was admissible under 404(a)(3) and 608(b), which 
provide that evidence of specific instances of a witness's conduct, for purposes 
of attacking or supporting his credibility, may be inquired into during 
cross-examination of the witness, as long as the inquiry concerns his character 
for truthfulness or untruthfulness.5  Such instances, 
however, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.

[¶40]   Regarding the uncharged misconduct 
evidence, Riojas was questioned regarding: (1) his past use of aliases, (2) who 
paid for the liquor everyone drank on the night of the murder, and (3) whether 
or not Teniente was supposed to "cover" Riojas when he ran out of the store with 
alcohol the night of the murder.  Given that Riojas admitted on the record that 
he used an alias and that he had, in the past, volunteered to violate the law on 
numerous occasions, in fact, does show his credibility, or lack thereof.  Under this limited 
situation, and given the narrow scope of the prosecutor's inquiry, no error was 
present.

[¶41]   We next turn to Teniente's claim that 
the prosecutor allegedly improperly  impeached Riojas in several instances.  The first 
challenged occurrence of impeachment took place when the State reviewed with 
Riojas his first interview with law enforcement and his statements about why he 
came to Cheyenne on the night of the 
murder.

Q:  Detective starts out, "Let's start off, 
Bobby, what happened down in Greeley?" and you said, "I 
was drinking having a good time.  They wanted  Eddie wanted some dope so we 
came to Cheyenne, couldn't 
buy any dope down in Greeley"; is that 
true?

A:  Huh?

Q:  No dope to be had down in Greeley?

A:  No, sir.

Q:  They don't sell that down there?

A:  I don't know anybody that does.

Q:  Now, nobody came up to Cheyenne and got any dope, did 
they?

A:  No, sir.

[¶42]   Teniente complains that this inquiry 
violated an Order in 
Limine by the court where the judge ruled, "The State will offer no evidence 
from any witness that the defendant possessed, nor in any way was associated 
with, controlled substances on the night in question with the exception of the 
defendant's statement, which the State contends is false, that the purpose of 
the trip to Cheyenne was to get ice,6 that the 
victim left out the back door to get it and wasn't seen."

[¶43]   Also relevant to our discussion is the 
following exchange which occurred between counsel on the record:

Defense Counsel:  So you're not going to present 
any witness that's going to come in here and say, on the night in question, they 
saw methamphetamine or ice in the possession of my client?

Prosecutor:  No.  The only drugs we know to have been possessed 
 the only ice  methamphetamine is Eddie.

[¶44]   It is true that when an order on a 
motion in limine excludes evidence, W.R.E. 103(a) requires no further action to 
preserve the issue.  
Robinson v. 
State, 11 P.3d 361, 369 (Wyo. 
2000).  Here, 
however, the testimony at issue is clearly not covered by the Order in Limine, 
nor the on-the-record discussion between counsel.  As such, because no objection was lodged to 
the complained of testimony, Teniente has the burden of proving plain error, 
which requires that the record show the incident alleged as error, and that a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated.  The first element is satisfied, but Teniente 
still has the burden of proving that a clear rule of law was violated that 
materially prejudiced his right to a fair trial.

[¶45]   The testimony at issue references Eddie 
Magallenes', not Teniente's, desire to obtain "dope."  Additionally, the 
testimony confirms that no one, including Teniente, obtained any "dope" on the 
night in question.  
Rather, the line of questioning seems to show the contradictions between 
Riojas' statements to law enforcement, his statements on direct examination, and 
his statements during cross-examination.  In short, no rule of law was violated 
materially prejudicing Teniente's right to a fair trial.

[¶46]   Next, Teniente contends that the 
prosecutor improperly inquired into matters falling within the attorney-client 
privilege between Riojas and his attorney.  The following exchange occurred:

Q:  So you got him back in the car, and I 
continue on, So Chowie's driving?'

And you go, "yeah."

I said, "So you guys come up South Greeley 
Highway, come up over the viaduct?"

And you say, "No, East Lincolnway."

And I go, "Okay."

And you go, "Right over the viaduct just right there, we 
dropped him off."

And I say, "Which would be right where the Hardee's is as 
you come over the viaduct?"

And you say, "Just right by that light, you know.  There's a viaduct 
right there.  
There's a light thing going towards that Hobby Lobby right there.  There's a Kum & 
Go right there, and a Mini-Mart and a Kum & Go on the corner."

Remember all that?

A:  Um-hum.

Q:  Now, do you remember the conversation that 
happened then?

A:  No.

Q:  Go to the next page.  So I ask you the 
question at the top of the page, "So you guys came up on South Greeley from 
Greeley?"

A:  What page are you on?

Q:  Seven.  Then you say, "No, no, no, no.  We was on the 
interstate."

            
And your attorney, who's sitting there with you, says, "They were on the 
interstate."

Now, your attorney sat through this whole interview with 
you, didn't she?

A:  Yes.

Q:  Had you told her the truth of what actually 
happened before you sat down in this interview?

A:  No.

Q:  So she didn't know you were lying to her all 
the time?

A:  (Witness shook head).

[¶47]   We review this exchange for plain 
error, as no objection appears on the record.  Indeed, the decision whether to waive the 
attorney-client privilege belongs solely to the client.  Bennett v. State, 
794 P.2d 879, 883 
(Wyo. 1990).  In this 
circumstance, however, it does not appear that any privilege was invoked, or 
waived.  The 
State was not inquiring into what Riojas actually told his lawyer, or even what 
the truth actually was.  Instead, Riojas was asked if he had, at that 
point, told his lawyer the real story.  This question obviously went again to Riojas' 
credibility.7

[¶48]   Lastly, Teniente contends that the 
State used improper hearsay testimony to impeach Riojas.  Riojas testified on 
direct that he, in fact, lied to Detective Gesell but that he did so of his own 
accord.  During 
cross-examination, however, Riojas testified that he lied to the detective 
because his mother told him to do so.  The following line of questioning ensued:

Q:  Mr. Riojas, you testified in the Eddie 
Magallenes trial, didn't you?

A:  Yes, sir.

Q:  You took an oath in that case and swore to 
tell the truth?

A:  Yes, sir.

Q:  And you told the truth then?

A:  Yes, sir.

Q:  Your testimony in that last trial was the 
truth also?

A:  Yes, sir.

Q:  Now, you testified yesterday that you lied to 
the detective here because your mother told you to, remember that?

A:  Yes, sir.

Q:  Now, your mom testified in the Eddie 
Magallenes trial, too, didn't she?

A:  Yes, sir.

Q:  Sat on that very witness stand where you are, 
didn't she?

A:  Yes, sir.

Q:  She, in fact,  testified under oath that you're a liar, 
didn't she?

A:  Yes, sir.

[¶49]   Prior to trial, the defense filed a Motion in Limine 
asking the court to prohibit hearsay evidence.  However, the court never specifically ruled 
on the admission of such evidence stating, "[s]ome of these things [specific 
instances of hearsay] just have to be handled when they arise.  I'm sure you'll 
make the appropriate objections at the time."  Defense counsel did not object and once 
again, because no objection appears on the record, we review this exchange for 
plain error.

[¶50]   In brief, what occurred here was not 
hearsay.  Under 
our rules of evidence, the reputation of a person's character among his 
associates or in the community is an exception to the hearsay rule.  W.R.E. 
803(21).  
Furthermore, the credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by 
evidence in the form of an opinion or reputation as to the witness's character 
for truthfulness or untruthfulness.  W.R.E. 608(a).  That the witness whose credibility was at 
issue conceded as to his less-than-perfect reputation was a boon for the 
State.

[¶51]   In arguing this issue, Teniente 
suggests to this Court a line of cases wherein we have condemned a prosecutor 
using "lying" lines of questioning to undermine a witness's credibility.  See Jensen v. State, 2005 WY 85, ¶¶ 18-22, 
116 P.3d 1088, 1094-97 
(Wyo. 2002) ("There is a limit to the cross-examination of a criminal defendant: 
nonetheless, it is likewise error and misconduct for the prosecutor to 
cross-examine a defendant using the "lying" or "mistaken" technique (i.e., well, 
then if "so-and-so" said "such-and-such," was he "mistaken" or "lying?").  Such questions are 
improper.").  
See also Beaugureau v. State, 2002 WY 160, 
¶¶ 14-17, 56 P.3d 626, 632-36 (Wyo. 
2002).  
Certainly, courts prohibit "were-they-lying" questions for several 
reasons:  1) 
They invade the province of the jury, as determinations of credibility are for 
the jury, 2) they are argumentative and have no probative value, 3)  they 
create a risk that the jury may conclude that, in order to acquit the defendant, 
it must find that a contradictory witness has lied, 4) they are inherently 
unfair, as it is possible that neither the defendant nor the contradictory 
witness has deliberately misrepresented the truth, and 5) they create a "no-win" 
situation for the defendant.  If the defendant states that a contradictory 
witness is not lying, the inference is that the defendant is lying, whereas if 
the defendant states that the witness is lying, the defendant risks alienating 
the jury.

[¶52]   Teniente's comparison of the 
"were-they-lying" cases to his circumstances is misplaced.  Rather than a line 
of questioning designed to inquire whether or not a witness was being truthful, 
the prosecutor here simply asked Riojas whether or not his mother previously 
testified that he 
was a liar.  
The prosecutor was not implying that she was unreliable  he was simply 
trying to show that it was the reputation of Riojas that preceded him.

Issue III  Admission of Gang Related Evidence

[¶53]   In Teniente's third argument, he 
asserts that the trial court erroneously admitted "irrelevant information of alleged gang 
activity."  The 
State disagrees and argues that the testimony was properly admitted because it 
showed witness bias and lack of credibility.

[¶54]   The standard of review for this issue 
is abuse of discretion:

Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the 
trial court and include determinations of the adequacy of foundation and 
relevancy, competency, materiality, and remoteness of the evidence.  This Court will 
generally accede to the trial court's 
determination of the admissibility of evidence unless that court clearly abused 
its discretion.'  
Solis v. 
State, 981 P.2d 34, 36 
(Wyo. 1999) (citation omitted).  We have described 
the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the question of the 
reasonableness of the trial court's choice.  Judicial discretion is a composite of many 
things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  In the absence of an abuse of discretion, we 
will not disturb the trial court's determination.'  [Griswold v. State, 
2001 WY 14, ¶ 7, 17 P.3d 728, 731 (Wyo. 
2001).]  The 
burden is on the defendant to establish such abuse.

Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 
100, ¶ 19, 49 P.3d 975, 984-85 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d 758, 766 (Wyo. 
2001, cert. 
denied, 535 U.S. 994, 122 S. Ct. 1554, 152 L. Ed. 2d 477 (2002)); see also, Gabbert v. State, 2006 WY 108, ¶ 24, 141 P.3d 690, 697 (Wyo. 
2006); Brown v. 
State, 2005 WY 37, ¶ 12, 109 P.3d 52, 56 (Wyo. 
2005).

[¶55]   In order to determine the propriety of 
the testimony elicited, we must consider what equals "relevant" evidence.  According to the 
Wyoming Rules of Evidence, relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence.  
W.R.E. 401.  
Furthermore, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  W.R.E. 403.  This rule, however, 
does not allow the exclusion of evidence simply because it is prejudicial  the 
evidence must be unfairly prejudicial before its prejudicial effect is weighed 
against its probative value.  Robinson v. State, 716 P.2d 364, 367 
(Wyo. 1986).

[¶56]   In James v. State, 998 P.2d 389 (Wyo. 2000), 
this Court held that where a sufficient foundation established the common gang 
membership of the defendant and a witness, evidence of that gang membership was 
relevant to show witness bias.  In James, we agreed with the defendant that journal 
entries read aloud to the jury "containing numerous racial slurs, referring to 
James' own bragging that he was a gang member, telling of James' penchant for 
making gang signs, and describing him as thuggish and controlling" were 
irrelevant to prove or disprove any elements of the charged crimes.  Id., 998 P.2d  at 394.

[¶57]   No journal entries were read aloud to 
the jury in the instant case; however, extensive witness questioning about 
tattoos and their meanings, the terms "homies" and "buddies," and the gang term 
"jumping in" occurred.  We do not excerpt the testimony here, but our 
thorough review of the record reflects that the prosecutor simply was trying to 
establish the witness' bias toward Teniente and, thus, his lack of credibility 
as a witness.

[¶58]   First, the prosecutor questioned the 
witness regarding his tattoos.  Even as defense counsel objected, the 
prosecutor explained that the tattoo line of questioning was in an effort to 
"[show] his affiliation with the LP gang to which [sic] he is a member to which 
[sic] Mr. Teniente's a member."  The following day, the prosecutor continued 
his line of questioning, this time talking about how to become a member of the 
gang and what "jumping in" means.8  The "loyalty" theme repeatedly occurs during 
the prosecutor's questioning and the evidence being sought as part of that 
theme, through questions about tattoos and gang activity, was indeed 
relevant.

[¶59]   According to our review of the record, 
the prosecutor's line of questioning was not, contrary to Teniente's assertion, 
unlimited or unfettered, gratuitous, or lurid.  Simply put, the testimony reflects the 
prosecutor's effort to discredit the witness.  Accordingly, we hold that there was no abuse 
of discretion in admitting relevant testimony that had probative value.

Issue IV  Hearsay

[¶60]   In his fourth issue, Teniente argues 
that the prosecutor elicited hearsay testimony from two witnesses, and that he 
was thus denied his right to due process and a fair trial.  Furthermore, 
Teniente asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
the same.

[¶61]   Specifically, Teniente claims that the 
prosecutor at trial "overtly led hearsay from Jesse [Magallenes] to the effect 
that Mr. Teniente had threatened to shoot the victim, that Mr. Teniente directed 
Jesse to drive to the scene of the shooting, that Mr. Teniente (not Jesse) 
handed the shooter a gun, that Mr. Teniente (not Jesse) instructed Eddie to 
shoot the victim twice and that Mr. Teniente afterwards told him, and others in 
the car, be quiet.  
Don't say nothing.'"  Teniente also claims that Detective Linda 
Gesell also improperly testified about hearsay.

[¶62]   We review instances objected to under 
an abuse of discretion standard, determining whether or not the trial court 
abused its discretion by allowing the objected to testimony.  Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 19, 49 P.3d 975, 984 (Wyo. 
2002).  When 
there is no objection, we utilize the plain error standard of review.  Hernandez v. State, 
2007 WY 105, ¶ 10, 162 P.3d 472, 476 (Wyo. 
2007).

[¶63]   We first look to the testimony of 
Detective Gesell.  
Defense counsel objected to Detective Gesell's testimony, but lodged 
objections as to vouching and redundancy  not hearsay.  Therefore, 
regarding the testimony of Detective Gesell, Teniente must show: 1) the claimed 
error clearly appears in the record; 2) the error violated a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law in an obvious way; and 3) he was deprived of a 
substantial right resulting in material prejudice.  Hernandez, 
¶ 10, 162 P.3d  at 476.

[¶64]   Element one is satisfied because the 
detective's testimony clearly appears in the record.  Whether the 
testimony violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law in an obvious way is our 
next concern.  
As we recently stated in Martin v. State, 2007 WY 76, ¶ 24, 157 P.3d 923, 929 (Wyo. 
2007):

Pursuant to Rule 802 of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence, 
hearsay is inadmissible "except as provided 
by these rules or by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Wyoming or by 
statute."  Wilde v. State, 2003 WY 93, ¶ 11, 74 P.3d 699, 706 (Wyo. 
2003); O'Brien v. State, 2002 WY 63, ¶ 28, 45 P.3d 225, 234 (Wyo. 
2002); W.R.E. 802. Hearsay, as defined by W.R.E. 801(c): "is a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or 
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted." 
 O'Brien, ¶ 28, 45 P.3d  at 234.

[¶65]   After reviewing the detective's 
testimony in full, we are confident that the portions alleged to be hearsay are 
indeed not hearsay, because the statements were not offered to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted.  Instead, the detective's testimony showed a 
history of inconsistency by Bobby Riojas' statements, depicting him as 
unreliable and uncredible.  Moreover, the testimony was prefaced by this 
exchange:

Prosecutor:  Detective, you sit in a unique 
position being the one person that's interviewed Bobby Riojas twice on tape 
before and sat through both of his testimonies?

A:  Correct.

Prosecutor:  You're familiar with all four?

A:  Yes.

Prosecutor:  Ever tell the same story twice?

A:  No.

It is apparent to this Court that a clear rule of law was 
not violated by the detective's testimony, eradicating any notion of plain error 
having occurred in this instance.

[¶66]   We next consider the testimony of Jesse 
Magallenes, which we review in part for plain error and in part for abuse of 
discretion.  We 
address first the testimony that warrants plain error review.  Teniente suggests 
that Magallenes' testimony contained hearsay when he related that the victim 
said, "You should have done something to me or you should have hurt me because 
my family's not going to let that go."  Magallenes further testified that Teniente 
"jumped over, turned around, and pulled the gun, put it in his face, and said, 
Shut your f----ing mouth, or I'll shoot you.'"  Magallenes also testified that Teniente told 
him to drive to Campstool Road and 
then stop, to shoot the victim, to drive back home, and to "be quiet" and "don't 
say nothing."  
This testimony is clearly reflected in the record.  However, when taken 
in context, and after reading Magallenes' testimony as a whole, it is apparent 
that rather than the statements being offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted, they illustrated, as the State suggests, the chain of events that 
resulted in the victim's death. 

[¶67]   Not only were the statements not 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, they were exceptions to the 
hearsay rule as admissions by a party-opponent offered to prove what happened on 
the night in question.  W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A).

[¶68]   Finally, Teniente contends that 
Magallenes gave hearsay testimony when he testified that Bobby Riojas called him 
the day after Lopez's murder, told him that the police had just been at 
Teniente's and Riojas' residences, and instructed Magallenes to tell the police 
a fabricated story about the night before.  Because defense counsel objected on the 
grounds of hearsay, we must determine if the trial court abused its discretion 
by allowing the testimony.

[¶69]   Again, hearsay is a statement, other 
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered 
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  While no 
explanation was offered to the objection being overruled at trial as to what 
exception applied, there are twenty-three exceptions to the hearsay rule.  In its brief, the 
State suggests two possibilities for this Court to consider, which are set forth 
in W.R.E. 803(2) and 803(3): "excited utterances" and "then existing mental, 
emotional, and physical conditions," respectively.

[¶70]   The exception for a then-existing mental, emotional, or physical 
condition, found in W.R.E. 803(3), reads:

Then-existing mental, emotional, or physical 
condition. -- A statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, 
or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, 
pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to 
prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution,  
revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will[.]

[¶71]   Our review of the record shows that the 
challenged statement qualified as a statement of Magallenes' then-existing state of mind pursuant to W.R.E. 
803(3).  It was a statement of what the witness 
perceived at the time.  The statement was not hearsay, offered for 
the truth of the matter asserted, and the trial court accordingly did not abuse 
its discretion in admitting the statement.

[¶72]   Before we leave this particular issue, 
we feel it necessary to address a portion of Teniente's argument that the 
specific error in allowing this testimony was that it "inferred but did not 
competently prove the accused's guilt."  Similar to Cowell v. 
State, 
719 P.2d 211, 214 
(Wyo. 1986), Teniente contends that 
the jury was able to find him guilty in part due to a chain of inferences from 
the so-called hearsay testimony above.  As we stated in Cowell,

Introductory to a discussion of inferences in Downs v. State, [581 P.2d 610 (Wyo. 1978)], the court said:

"The defendant urges essentially that guilt cannot be based 
solely on circumstantial evidence because it means piling up inferences. We know 
of no such concept representing accepted jurisprudence with respect to 
circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is many times the only way that 
an ultimate fact may be shown. Blakely v. State, 
Wyo. 1975, 542 P.2d 857, explains 
that circumstantial evidence has standing and stature and is to be measured upon 
the same basis as direct evidence. It is a chain of proven circumstances 
indicating the guilt or innocence of the defendant.

"We see no proving of an inference from another inference 
in this case. There may be something offensive about basing an inference on an 
inference. It is an extremely technical as well as much criticized theory, 
Annotation, 5 A.L.R.3d 100, entitled, 'Modern status of the rules against basing 
an inference upon an inference or a presumption upon a presumption,' and has 
been noted in the jurisprudence of Wyoming but found inapplicable or of at least 
questionable application in those cases where mentioned. Richey v. State, 1921, 28 Wyo. 117, 201 P. 154, reh. denied, 
205 P. 304; Rosencrance v. State, 1925, 33 Wyo. 360, 239 P. 952.  Be that as it may, 
we cannot see its applicability to this case, even if an accepted rule. In the 
case before us now, the circumstantial facts presented through direct evidence 
point to only one ultimate inferential fact -- guilt. That is distinctively 
different from pyramiding inferences." 581 P.2d  at 614-615.

Cowell, 719 P.2d  at 215-16.  Sequentially, the "chain of proven 
circumstances" referred to in Cowell is also present here as a reasonable course of 
times and events, including the men being together in Greeley and Cheyenne on 
the night in question, all of them traveling around each town, and from Greeley 
to Cheyenne in the same vehicle, the corroborative testimony by family members 
and friends of the men's whereabouts that night, and the timing of it all.  The testimony 
regarding the series of events that night and the ensuing days satisfies us that 
the jury could reasonably find Teniente guilty 
without basing that conclusion on inference upon inference.  Sufficient evidence 
for conviction clearly existed, enough so that the jury was convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt.

[¶73]   And, finally, we address the 
ineffective assistance of counsel issue.  Teniente contends that ineffective assistance 
of counsel occurred to the extent that trial counsel failed to object to 
inadmissible hearsay. 

[¶74]   We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the 
following standard:

When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the paramount 
determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's 
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance.  Herdt v. State, 891 P.2d 793, 796 
(Wyo. 1995); Starr v. State, 888 P.2d 1262, 1266-67 
(Wyo. 1995); Arner v. State, 872 P.2d 100, 104 
(Wyo. 1994); Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 
(Wyo. 1986).  The reviewing court 
should indulge a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance 
and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 
judgment.  Herdt, at 796; Starr, at 
1266; Arner, at 104; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

Under the two-prong standard articulated in Strickland and Frias, an 
appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must 
demonstrate on the record that counsel's performance was deficient and that 
prejudice resulted.  
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064; Starr, 888 P.2d  at 1266; King v. State, 810 P.2d 119, 125 
(Wyo. 1991) (Cardine, J., 
dissenting); Campbell v. State, 728 P.2d 628, 629 
(Wyo. 1986); Frias, 722 P.2d  at 145.  In other words, to warrant reversal on a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an 
appellant must demonstrate that his counsel failed to "render such assistance as 
would have been offered by a reasonably competent attorney" and that "counsel's 
deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case."  Lower v. State, 
786 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo. 1990).  "The benchmark for 
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."  Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 686, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064.

Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, ¶ 36, 99 P.3d 928, 943 (Wyo. 
2004),  cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1062, 125 S. Ct. 2513, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1113 
(2005).  The 
burden of proving that counsel was ineffective rests entirely on an 
appellant.  
Id. 
(citing Asch v. State, 2003 WY 18, ¶ 11, 62 P.3d 945, 949-50 (Wyo. 
2003); Barkell v. State, 2002 WY 153, ¶ 10, 55 P.3d 1239, 1242 (Wyo. 
2002)).  "To 
satisfy his burden, an appellant must provide more than mere speculation or 
equivocal inferences."  Id. 
(citing Sincock v. State, 2003 WY 115, ¶ 37, 76 P.3d 323, 337 (Wyo. 
2003); Barkell, ¶ 13, 55 P.3d at 1243).

[¶75]   Teniente faults trial counsel for not 
objecting to the alleged instances of hearsay discussed above.  We reject 
Teniente's claim because he has failed to provide any legal analysis supporting 
his ineffectiveness claim.  We have consistently stated that we will not consider claims devoid of cogent 
argument and citation to legal authority.  Duke, ¶ 49, 
99 P.3d  at 946; Eustice v. State, 11 P.3d 897, 904 (Wyo. 
2000); Blumhagen v. State, 11 P.3d 889, 897 n.2 (Wyo. 
2000).  We 
apply that rule in this instance.

Issue V  Right to Confront Witnesses

[¶76]   Teniente next argues that his right to 
confront witnesses was compromised by the elicitation of testimonial 
hearsay.  
Specifically, Teniente argues that pursuant to Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), the admission of 
testimonial hearsay from Jesse Magallenes and Detective Gesell violated his 
Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him.

[¶77]   The first issue for our determination 
is whether the introduction of the hearsay statements at issue was error.  Vigil v. State, 2004 WY 110, ¶ 18, 98 P.3d 172, 178 (Wyo. 
2004).  In Vigil, we discussed 
at length the concepts introduced, and clarified, in Crawford.

The introduction of any testimonial hearsay evidence violates the Confrontation 
Clause unless the declarant is legally unavailable and the defendant has had a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant:

[T]he Framers would not have allowed admission of 
testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was 
unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination.  
The text of the Sixth Amendment does not suggest any open-ended 
exceptions from the confrontation requirement to be developed by the 
courts. 

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1365, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 
(2004).  The 
Crawford Court specifically 
overruled prior precedent that allowed hearsay statements of an unavailable 
declarant to come into evidence if it fit within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or bears "particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness" as initially developed in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980): 

The legacy of Roberts in other 
courts vindicates the Framers' wisdom in rejecting a general reliability 
exception.  The 
framework is so unpredictable that it fails to provide meaningful protection 
from even core confrontation violations.

Reliability is an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, 
concept.  There 
are countless factors bearing on whether a statement is reliable; the 
nine-factor balancing test applied by the Court of Appeals below is 
representative.  
See, e. g., People v. Farrell, 34 P.3d 401, 
406-407 (Colo. 2001) (eight-factor 
test).  Whether 
a statement is deemed reliable depends heavily on which factors the judge 
considers and how much weight he accords each of them.  Some courts wind up 
attaching the same significance to opposite facts.  For example, the 
Colorado Supreme Court held a statement more reliable because its inculpation of 
the defendant was "detailed," Id., at 407, while the Fourth Circuit found a 
statement more reliable because the portion implicating another was "fleeting," 
United States v. Photogrammetric Data Servs., Inc., 259 F.3d 229, 245 
(C. A. 4 2001).  
The Virginia Court of Appeals found a statement more reliable because the 
witness was in custody and charged with a crime (thus making the statement more 
obviously against her penal interest), see Nowlin v. 
Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 327, 335-338, 579 S.E.2d 367, 371-372 (2003), 
while the Wisconsin Court of Appeals found a statement more reliable because the 
witness was not in custody and not a suspect, see State v. 
Bintz, 2002 WI App 204, ¶ 13, 257 Wis. 2d 177, 187, 650 N.W.2d 913, 
918.  Finally, 
the Colorado Supreme Court in one case found a statement more reliable because 
it was given "immediately after" the events at issue, Farrell, supra, at 407, while that same court, in 
another case, found a statement more reliable because two years had elapsed, Stevens v. People, 29 P.3d 305, 316 (Colo. 2001).

The unpardonable vice of the Roberts test, however, is not its unpredictability, but 
its demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the 
Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude.  Despite the plurality's speculation in Lilly, 527 U. S., at 137, 119 S. Ct. 1887, that it was "highly 
unlikely" that accomplice confessions implicating the accused could survive Roberts, courts continue routinely to admit them.  See Photogrammetric Data Servs., supra, at 245-246; Farrell, supra, at 406-408; 
Stevens, supra, at 314-318; Taylor v. Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 151, 166-168 (Ky. 2001); State v. Hawkins, No. 2001-P-0060, 2002 WL 31895118, 
¶¶ 34-37,  
(Ohio App., Dec. 31, 2002); Bintz, supra, 
¶¶ 7-14, 257 Wis. 2d, at 183-188, 650 N.W. 2d, at 916-918; People v. LaW.R.E.nce, 55 P.3d 155, 160-161 (Colo. App. 
2001); State v. Jones, 171 Ore. App. 375, 387-391, 
15 P.3d 616, 623-625 (2000); State v. Marshall, 136 Ohio App. 3d 742, 747-748, 737 N.E.2d 1005, 1009 (2000); People v. Schutte, 240 Mich. App. 
713, 718-721, 613 N.W.2d 370, 376-377 (2000); People v. 
Thomas, 313 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1005-1007, 246 Ill. Dec. 593, 730 N.E.2d 618, 
625-626 (2000); cf. Nowlin, supra, at 335-338, 579 
S.E. 2d, at 371-372 (witness confessed to a related crime); People v. Campbell, 309 Ill. App. 3d 423, 431-432, 242 
Ill. Dec. 694, 699, 721 N.E.2d 1225, 1230, (1999) (same).  One recent study 
found that, after Lilly, appellate courts admitted 
accomplice statements to the authorities in 25 out of 70 cases--more than 
one-third of the time. Kirst, Appellate Court Answers to the Confrontation 
Questions in Lilly v. Virginia, 53 Syracuse L. Rev. 87, 105 (2003). 
Courts have invoked Roberts to admit other sorts of 
plainly testimonial statements despite the absence of any opportunity to 
cross-examine. See United States v. Aguilar, 295 F.3d 1018, 1021-1023 (C.A. 9 2002) (plea allocution showing existence of a 
conspiracy); United States v. Centracchio, 265 F.3d 518, 527-530 (C.A.7 2001)  (same); United States v. 
Dolah, 245 F.3d 98, 104-105 (C.A.2 2001) (same); United States v. Petrillo, 
237 F.3d 119, 122-123 (C.A.2  2000) (same); United States v. 
Moskowitz, 215 F.3d 265, 268-269 (C.A.2 2000) (same); United States v. Gallego, 191 F.3d 156, 166-168 (C.A.2 
1999) (same); United States v. Papajohn, 212 F.3d 1112, 1118-1120 (C.A.8 2000) (grand jury testimony); United States v. Thomas, 30 
Fed. Appx. 277, 279 (C.A.4 2002) (same); Bintz, supra, ¶¶ 15-22, 257 Wis. 2d, at 188-191, 650 N.W. 2d, 
at 918-920 (prior trial testimony); State v. 
McNeill, 140 N.C.App. 450, 457-460, 537 S.E.2d 518, 523-524 (2000) 
(same).

To add insult to injury, some of the courts that admit 
untested testimonial statements find reliability in the very factors that make the statements testimonial.  As noted earlier, 
one court relied on the fact that the witness's statement was made to police 
while in custody on pending charges --the theory being that this made the 
statement more clearly against penal interest and thus more reliable.  Nowlin, supra, at 335-338, 579 S.E. 2d, at 
371-372.  Other 
courts routinely rely on the fact that a prior statement is given under oath in 
judicial proceedings.  
E. g., Gallego, supra, at 168 (plea 
allocution); Papajohn, supra, at 1120 (grand jury 
testimony).  
That inculpating statements are given in a testimonial setting is not an 
antidote to the confrontation problem, but rather the trigger that makes the 
Clause's demands most urgent.  It is not enough to point out that most of 
the usual safeguards of the adversary process attend the statement, when the 
single safeguard missing is the one the Confrontation Clause demands.

Crawford, 124 S. Ct.  at 1371-72.  The 
Crawford Court 
concluded that "[w]here testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium 
of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the 
Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation." Id. at 1374.3

[¶78]   Regarding Jesse Magallenes, he 
testified that as he walked into the jail before Eddie Magallenes' trial, Eddie 
yelled, "Keep your mouth shut."  Defense counsel objected on the grounds that 
the testimony violated Crawford.  The court 
overruled the objection, stating that the testimony was not offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted.  Instead, the testimony was offered to perhaps 
show that Jesse was scared.  The statements at issue do not fall within 
the categories of testimonial evidence described in Crawford - that the statements were within earshot of 
law enforcement does not allow them to rise to the level of "testimonial" as 
described in Crawford.

[¶79]   Regarding the statements made by 
Detective Gesell, we also conclude that they do not present a problem under Crawford.  Rather, Crawford 
specifically states that when a declarant appears for cross-examination at 
trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints whatsoever on the use of 
prior testimonial statements.  Crawford, 541 U.S.  at 59.  As the State points 
out, Riojas was the actual declarant, and not only was he cross-examined 
regarding his inconsistent testimony and previous statements, he testified on 
Teniente's behalf.

[¶80]   Finally, we summarily dismiss 
Teniente's one-sentence claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not lodging 
a Crawford 
objection to Detective Gesell's testimony.  Because this argument is not supported with 
legal argument or citation to pertinent authority, we will not address it 
here.

Issue VI  Motion for Mistrial9

Issue VII  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-101(c) is Unconstitutionally Vague

[¶81]   Teniente argues that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-101(c) is unconstitutionally vague on its face, first because its lack of 
guidelines for imposing a sentence of life without parole renders such a 
sentence arbitrary.  
Second, Teniente contends that the statute is unconstitutionally vague as 
applied to his case because he did not know what evidence the trial court would 
consider in sentencing him, and as a result, his counsel was deprived of any 
meaningful opportunity to argue for a lesser sentence.  Lastly, Teniente 
argues that his sentence is an enhanced punishment, vis- -vis a normal life 
sentence, which due process requires to be based on findings by a jury rather 
than a judge.

[¶82]   The State disagrees, and argues that 
the statute is not unconstitutionally vague, and that district courts have broad 
discretion to determine the appropriate length of imprisonment, so long as it is 
within the legislatively mandated minimum and maximum sentence, which was the 
case with the sentence here.  Furthermore, the State contends that the 
court sentenced Teniente based upon reliable and accurate information to which Teniente 
had the opportunity to respond.

[¶83]   We review constitutional challenges de novo.  Rabuck v. State, 
2006 WY 25, ¶ 13, 129 P.3d 861, 864 (Wyo. 2006).  We begin our review with the presumption that 
the statute is constitutional.  Carfield v. State, 
649 P.2d 865, 870 
(Wyo. 1982). Teniente bears the 
heavy burden of proving his contention, with all reasonable doubt resolved in 
favor of the statute's constitutionality.  Id.

[¶84]   Teniente challenges § 6-2-101(c), 
claiming that it is unconstitutionally vague both on its face and 
as applied.  At 
the outset, we note that our legislature may not promulgate vague or uncertain 
statutes under the constitutions of Wyoming and the United 
States. Rabuck, 
¶ 14, 129 P.3d  at 864.

A statute violates due process under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution on vagueness grounds and 
is void if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that 
his contemplated conduct is forbidden by statute, and violates equal protection 
if it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions.

Moe v. State, 2005 WY 58, ¶ 9, 110 P.3d 1206, 1210 (Wyo. 
2005) (internal citations omitted).

[¶85]   As we begin our analysis, we would be 
remiss to not refer to our prior opinion on this exact issue in Kenyon v. State, 2004 WY 100, ¶ 13, 96 P.3d 1016, 1022 (Wyo. 
2004).  In Kenyon, we 
concluded that:

The statutory penalty of life without parole is one of 
three punishments for which no further factfinding is required once a jury has 
determined that the crime of first degree murder has been proved.

Furthermore, we stated, "[b]ecause the statute does not 
require the finding of additional facts independent of those proving the 
underlying offense, the constitutional concerns addressed in Apprendi [v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 
147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000)] are not implicated."  Id. ¶ 13, 96 P.3d  
at 1022.

[¶86]   With these principles in mind, we first 
address Teniente's facial challenge:

[A] facial challenge is available in only two situations: 
(1) when the statute reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected 
conduct, and (2) when the statute is shown to specify no standard of conduct at 
all."  Moe, ¶ 9, 110 P.3d  at 1210.

To succeed on a facial vagueness challenge to a legislative 
measure that does not threaten constitutionally protected conduct . . . a party 
must do more than identify some instances in which the application of the 
statute may be uncertain or ambiguous; he must demonstrate that the law is 
impermissibly vague in all of its applications. 

Alcalde v. State, 2003 WY 99, ¶ 15, 74 P.3d 1253, 1260-61 
(Wyo. 2003) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Harris v. State, 2006 WY 76, ¶ 17, 137 P.3d 124, 130 (Wyo. 
2006).  
Furthermore, successful challenges to statutes for facial vagueness are 
rare.  Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 975 
(Wyo. 1988).  Courts do not 
ordinarily permit a party whose particular conduct is adequately described by a 
criminal statute to challenge the statute on the grounds it does not provide 
adequate warning concerning other conduct that might fall within its ambit.  Id.  It is only 
where a statute reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected 
conduct or specifies no standard of conduct at all that such challenges will be 
considered.  
Id.

[¶87]   Teniente contends that the statute at 
issue reaches constitutionally protected conduct, and that it does not specify 
any standard of conduct  in other words, § 6-2-101(c) does not articulate 
a "minimum" and "maximum" sentence and, ultimately, sentencing under the statute 
results in an enhancement.  He asserts that the sentences of life and 
life without parole are sentencing alternatives, for which no guidance is 
provided to the sentencing court, other than the vague language that the court 
should take into account "any negotiated plea agreement and any evidence 
relevant to a determination of sentence which the court deems to have probative 
value." § 6-2-101(c).  Teniente is also concerned that he serves his 
sentence with "no idea" of what the court considers evidence which made his 
sentence of life without parole appropriate to him.  We addressed this 
very argument in Kenyon, ¶ 13, 96 P.3d  at 1022.

[¶88]   Teniente rebuts our reasoning in Kenyon with his 
belief that the lack of additional fact-finding by the jury is in large part the 
problem.  
Furthermore, he suggests that the restrictions on the procedures to be 
used and the issues to be considered in imposing the death penalty, as set forth 
in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-102 (LexisNexis 2007), should also apply to the 
imposition of a sentence of life without parole because it qualifies as a 
"sentence enhancement."

[¶89]   Taking all of Teniente's arguments into 
consideration, we stand by our holding in Kenyon.  First, a sentence of life in prison 
without parole does not require the same degree of channeling of discretion or 
individualization of the ultimate sentencing decision as attends imposition of 
the death penalty.  
Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995-996, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2701-2702 (1991).  Even the extreme sentence of life without 
parole is available for a variety of crimes in American jurisdictions, without 
departure from procedures provided for other non-capital sentences.  Holland v. Donnelly, 216 F. Supp. 2d 227, 
245 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  
Considering the qualitative difference between the death penalty and any 
other punishment, our state's sentencing scheme is reasonable and does not 
offend the Constitution.  See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 
1189 (2003) ("It is enough that the [legislature] has a reasonable basis for 
believing that dramatically enhanced sentences advance[s] the goals of [its] 
criminal justice system in any substantial way.'").  Beyond that, 
however, sentencing by its very nature requires only the informed and reasonable exercise 
of discretion on the part of the district court.  Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 
100, ¶ 40, 49 P.3d 975, 991 (Wyo. 2002) ("Trial courts have broad discretion to determine the 
appropriate length of imprisonment.").10

[¶90]   Our holding in Kenyon applies to 
this case:  
That the sentence of life without parole under our current statute is not 
a sentence enhancement under Apprendi and does not require further fact-finding.11  A sentence enhancement allows the sentence 
for a particular crime to be increased beyond the statutory maximum set for that 
offense when circumstances other than those used to define the offense are 
proven to exist.  
However, the maximum sentence allowed for first degree murder is life 
without parole (if the death penalty is not sought).  Life without 
parole, then, is the upper limit of the range of non-capital punishment 
available under § 6-2-101(c).

[¶91]   We next review Teniente's as applied 
challenge.  To succeed in his 
claim, he must show that the statute provided insufficient notice to a person of 
ordinary intelligence that his conduct was illegal, and whether the facts of his 
case demonstrate arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.  Lovato v. State, 901 P.2d 408, 412 
(Wyo. 1995). Teniente has failed to 
do so.

[¶92]   The statute at issue states that the 
judge shall take into consideration "any evidence relevant to a determination of 
sentence which the court deems to have probative value."  Again, this 
language reflects the trial court's broad discretion to determine the 
appropriate length of imprisonment within the legislatively mandated minimum and 
maximum sentence.  
Kenyon, ¶ 11, 96 P.3d  
at 1021-22.  
Here, the record clearly shows that Teniente was well aware of the trial 
court's ability to impose either life or life without parole.  Defense counsel 
argued against a sentence of life without parole, while urging the court to 
consider Teniente's age, prior record, that he did not actually shoot the 
victim, that he was a productive member of society, took care of his family, who 
supported him, and that he had a "good heart."  Teniente undoubtedly had a meaningful 
opportunity to argue to the trial court that life without parole was 
inappropriate and, in fact, did so at sentencing.

[¶93]   During sentencing, the State painted an 
altogether different picture of Teniente.  The court heard about his extensive criminal 
history, which included crimes of violence, his numerous probation violations, 
and his involvement in the death of Mr. Lopez.

[¶94]   The question before us is whether or 
not a person of ordinary intelligence would know that his conduct was prohibited 
under § 6-2-101(c).  The answer is yes.

[¶95]   Teniente claims, but fails to 
establish, that he was the victim of arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.  
Teniente points to two Wyoming cases, Kenyon, supra, 96 P.3d 1016, and Bhutto v. State, 2005 WY 78, 114 P.3d 1252 (Wyo. 2005), 
where sentences of life without parole have been imposed since the enactment of 
§ 6-2-101(c).  
Teniente argues that those cases gave him no notice that his conduct in 
this case would garner him two life without parole sentences.  From our 
perspective, all three cases, including Teniente's, ended in homicide.  Whether or not 
Teniente was the shooter is not determinative.  Teniente was sentenced pursuant to Rule 32, 
W.R.Cr.P., and was sentenced only after a jury found him guilty of the crimes 
charged, and after the court was informed by both sides of the defendant's 
character, the nature of the crime, and its circumstances.

[¶96]   Teniente's argument that his case 
differs substantially from two other "life without parole" cases is insufficient 
to demonstrate that he suffered arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.  For the foregoing 
reasons, the concurrent sentences of life without parole for the first degree 
murder conviction are affirmed.

Issue VIII  Cumulative Error

[¶97]   Teniente claims that viewed separately, 
and as a whole, the errors in this case require reversal.  However, when no 
error has occurred, a claim of cumulative error cannot be recognized.  Marquez v. State, 
941 P.2d 22, 26 
(Wyo. 1997).  Because Teniente 
has not established error in the various issues he raises in this appeal, his 
claim of cumulative error fails.

Conclusion

[¶98]   For the foregoing reasons, Emilio 
Teniente's conviction and sentence is affirmed in all respects.

FOOTNOTES

1Jesse, once again, drove 
the car and the other men sat in the seats they occupied on the trip to 
Cheyenne.

2This information was developed at an 
October 2006 remand hearing.  Teniente initially filed his brief on appeal 
in January 2006, when the record regarding the note consisted only of the note 
and no development of the court's treatment of it.  At that time, the 
record was silent as to what, if any, action the court took in response to the 
note.  
Accordingly, concurrent with filing his brief on appeal, Teniente also 
filed a Motion for 
Partial Remand for purposes of developing the record regarding the 
note.  As a 
result, on July 13, 2006, this Court ordered a stay in the briefing schedule and 
remanded the matter back to the district court to develop the record regarding 
the jury's note, pursuant to Calene v. State, 846 P.2d 679, 692 (Wyo. 
1993).

3During cross-examination, 
the prosecutor asked, "you've been in jail since last October, haven't you?" to 
which Riojas replied, "Yes, sir, I have."  The prosecutor then asked, "I told you what 
would happen if you do not tell the truth, didn't I?" to which Riojas replied, 
"Yes, sir."

4Teniente filed a 
pre-trial demand for notice of intent to use 404(b) evidence at trial.  Accordingly, he was 
not required to object during trial to the challenged evidence.  Howard v. State, 2002 WY 40, ¶ 23, 42 P.3d 483, 491 (Wyo. 
2002).  Thus, 
the claims of prosecutorial misconduct under this subsection are reviewed under 
the harmless error standard.  Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 
146, ¶ 38, 123 P.3d 543 , 554 (Wyo. 2005).

5W.R.E. 404(a)(3) states: 

(a)  Character evidence generally. - Evidence of a person's 
character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of 
proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, 
except:

  

6"Ice" apparently is a 
euphemism for methamphetamine.

7Teniente also 
tangentially claims that because Mr. Riojas, perhaps as recently as the morning 
of his testimony, had become represented by counsel, the State may have violated 
Rule 4.2 of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct, which disallows an 
attorney to communicate with a party who is represented by another lawyer in the 
matter, without consent.  However, Riojas was called by the defense, 
and, accordingly, was subject to cross-examination by the State.  This was not 
objected to specifically at trial, thus we decline to further address the matter 
on appeal.

8"Jumping in" apparently 
is a gang term that means a group of males attack one male, proving the loyalty 
of the one being attacked.  After the attack, the male who was attacked 
becomes a member of the gang.

9This issue is addressed 
within Issue II above, ¶¶ 27-30.

10Teniente advances an 
argument within this issue that § 6-2-101(c) is unconstitutional because our 
legislature has arbitrarily granted to some accused persons, but not others, the 
right to have a jury determine the sentence for first degree murder.  Without an 
"official" argument to this issue, and without citation to pertinent authority, 
we will not evaluate this question with vigor.  We will say, however, that life without 
parole is available as a punishment for a variety of crimes without departure 
from the basic sentencing procedures provided for other non-capital 
sentences.

11Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 
147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000) ruled that factual findings that increase the maximum 
penalty must be considered an element of the offense and determined by a 
jury.