Case Title: JAMES THOMAS WHITTEN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-05-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
JAMES THOMAS WHITTEN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 55110 P.3d 892Case Number: 04-177Decided: 05/02/2005

            

APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
                                                                                                                                   

 
 
 
 
JAMES 
THOMAS WHITTEN,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Appellant, 
pro se

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General

 
 
            

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      James Thomas 
Whitten challenges the district court's order denying his motion to correct an 
illegal sentence.  We 
affirm.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]      Mr. 
Whitten sets forth the following issue on appeal with which the State 
substantially agrees:

 
 
Did the district court judge 
[err] and abuse his discretion when he denied appellant's motion to correct an 
illegal sentence, and when he modified his original order for 
restitution?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Mr. Whitten pled 
guilty to one count of first degree arson and one count of third degree 
arson.  He was sentenced on January 
25, 2002, to concurrent prison terms and was ordered to pay $93,966.02 in 
restitution to State Farm Insurance Company (State Farm).  The district court also ordered payment 
to the Wyoming Crime Victims' Compensation Fund, imposed a court automation fee, 
and ordered Mr. Whitten to pay public defender fees.  He did not appeal the judgment and 
sentence.  On May 12, 2004, Mr. 
Whitten filed a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 
35(a).  In his motion, Mr. Whitten 
challenged the restitution ordered by the court.  Mr. Whitten alleged that the restitution 
order was illegal because the district court:  (a) had not advised him of the 
possibility of restitution; (b) did not fix a reasonable amount of restitution; 
and (c) failed to make a finding regarding his ability to pay restitution.  Mr. Whitten did not challenge any other 
aspect of his sentence.

 
 
[¶4]      On May 24, 2004, 
the district court entered its Order on Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence.  The district court denied the 
motion.  The court did, however, 
modify the sentencing order and directed that the $93,966.02 in restitution be 
paid to the homeowner victim, rather than State Farm.

 
 
[¶5]      We will set forth 
additional facts as necessary in our discussion of the errors asserted by Mr. 
Whitten.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 

[¶6]      W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) 
governs motions to correct an illegal sentence.  "An illegal sentence is one which 
exceeds statutory limits, imposes multiple terms of imprisonment for the same 
offense, or otherwise violates constitutions or the law."  Martinez v. 
State, 2002 
WY 10, ¶9, 39 P.3d 394, ¶9 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting 
Duran v. State, 949 P.2d 885, 887 
(Wyo.1997)).  We employ an abuse of discretion 
standard when evaluating a trial court's denial of a motion to correct an 
illegal sentence.  Martinez, ¶7.  The exercise of discretion in the 
context of a motion to correct an illegal sentence is limited to a determination 
by the trial court as to whether the sentence was legal or illegal.  Mead v. State, 2 P.3d 564, 566 (Wyo. 
2000); Ramirez v. State, 800 P.2d 503, 504 (Wyo. 
1990).  A challenge to the authority 
of a trial court to make a particular award of restitution is reviewed de novo.  Merkison v. State, 996 P.2d 1138, 1141 
(Wyo. 2000).  Whether the district 
court adequately advised Mr. Whitten of the consequences of his plea is a 
question of law we review de 
novo.  Keller v. State, 723 P.2d 1244, 1246-47 
(Wyo. 1986); WERCS v. Capshaw, 2004 
WY 86, ¶14, 94 P.3d 421, ¶14 (Wyo. 2004); U.S. v. Gigot, 147 F.3d 1193, 1197 (10th Cir. 1998).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      Mr. Whitten alleges several errors with 
respect to the district court's restitution order.  He alleges that he was not properly 
advised of the amount of restitution prior to entry of his guilty plea.  Mr. Whitten contends that the 
restitution order was illegal because the district court failed to make a 
specific finding that he had the ability to pay restitution.  Additionally, Mr. Whitten claims that 
the district court abused its discretion in modifying the restitution order to 
require payment to the homeowner rather than the insurer.  

 
 
Advisement 
of consequences.

 
 

[¶8]      Mr. Whitten contends that 
the restitution order is illegal because the district court failed to advise 
him, prior to his guilty plea, of the maximum amount of restitution that could 
be imposed by the court.  W.R.Cr.P. 
11(b) provides in pertinent part:

 
 
(b)       Advice to Defendant.  Except for forfeitures on citations 
(Rule 3.1) and pleas entered under Rule 43(c)(2), before accepting a plea of 
guilty or nolo contendere to a felony or to a misdemeanor when the defendant is 
not represented by counsel, the court must address the defendant personally in 
open court and, unless the defendant has been previously advised by the court on 
the record and in the presence of counsel, inform the defendant of, and 
determine that the defendant understands, the following:

 
 
            
(1)       
The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory 
minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty 
provided by law and other sanctions which could attend a conviction including, 
when applicable, the general nature of any mandatory assessments (such as the 
surcharge for the Crime Victim Compensation Account), discretionary assessments 
(costs, attorney fees, restitution, etc.) and, in controlled substance 
offenses, the potential loss of entitlement to federal benefits.  However:

 
 
(A)       Disclosure 
of specific dollar amounts is not required;

 
 
(B)       Failure to advise 
of assessments or possible entitlement forfeitures shall not invalidate a guilty 
plea, but assessments, the general nature of which were not disclosed to the 
defendant, may not be imposed upon the defendant unless the defendant is 
afforded an opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea;  and

 
 
(C)       If 
assessments or forfeitures are imposed without proper disclosure a request for 
relief shall be addressed to the trial court under Rule 35 before an appeal may 
be taken on that issue.

            

The purpose of the rule 
is to allow the judge to determine if the defendant entered the plea voluntarily 
and with an understanding of the consequences of his guilty plea.  Restitution is a possible consequence of 
a guilty plea for which proper advisement must be given.  Keller, 723 P.2d  at 
1246.

 
 

[¶9]      Prior to acceptance of a 
guilty plea, the trial court must inform the defendant of the court's power to 
order restitution.  Keller, 723 P.2d  at 1247.  However, the "exact amount or upper 
limit of restitution need not be specified at the time of the plea."  Id.; see also W.R.Cr.P. 11(b)(1)(A).  The exact amount of restitution and the 
proper victim entitled to receive restitution must be specified at the time of 
sentencing, not when the plea is accepted.  
Meerscheidt v. State, 931 P.2d 220, 227 (Wyo. 
1997).  See also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-9-103 (LexisNexis 2001).1

[¶10]   Prior to entry of the 
guilty plea, the district court provided a detailed advisement of rights to Mr. 
Whitten.  The district court 
specifically addressed the potential consequences which Mr. Whitten faced if he 
pled guilty.  The district court 
asked Mr. Whitten on several occasions if he understood his rights and the 
consequences of his guilty plea.  
Mr. Whitten consistently indicated his understanding.  He declined all opportunities to ask 
questions concerning his rights or the consequences of his 
plea.

 
 

[¶11]   With regard to 
restitution, the district court specifically advised Mr. Whitten that:  "There are money losses here, obviously, 
and you may well be required to pay those as restitution."  Mr. Whitten confirmed that he understood 
the advisement and had no questions.  
The district court properly advised Mr. Whitten prior to acceptance of 
his guilty plea of his potential restitution obligation.

 
 
Ability 
to pay.

 
 

[¶12]   Mr. Whitten also contends 
that the district court erred by failing to make a specific finding that he had 
an ability to pay restitution.  Such 
a finding is not required.

 
 

[¶13]   A sentencing court is 
under no obligation to make a specific finding that there is an ability to pay 
restitution.  The trial court must 
order payment of restitution unless it specifically finds that the defendant is 
unable to pay.  Nixon v. State, 4 P.3d 864, 871 (Wyo. 
2000); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-102 (LexisNexis 2001)2; Jones v. State, 2002 WY 35, ¶26, 41 P.3d 1247, ¶26 (Wyo. 2002).  If a court 
determines that restitution is not appropriate, it must provide support for such 
decision and enter specific findings in the record supporting its determination 
that a defendant is unable to pay restitution.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-103(c) (LexisNexis 
2001)3.  

 
 

[¶14]   Mr. Whitten also contends 
that the sentencing order is illegal because it fails to comply with W.R.Cr.P. 
32(c)(2)(H) which states that a sentence shall "[i]nclude a finding as to 
whether the defendant is able to make restitution and if restitution is ordered 
fix the reasonable amount owed to each victim resulting from the defendant's 
criminal acts."  The sentencing 
order entered states the amount of restitution but does not include a finding as 
to Mr. Whitten's ability to pay.  

 
 

[¶15]   Mr. Whitten provides no 
legal authority to support his contention that a sentencing order's omission of 
a finding regarding ability to pay requires reversal of a restitution order.4  As we previously discussed, the district 
court did not make a specific finding of inability to pay restitution as 
required by Wyo. Stat. Ann § 7-9-103(c).  
"[A] silent record, that is, one containing neither a finding of ability 
to pay nor a finding of inability to pay, supports an order requiring the 
payment of restitution."  Jones, ¶26.  

 

[¶16]   Additionally, substantial 
evidence exists in the record to support a finding of an ability to pay 
restitution.  Mr. Whitten claimed to 
own a mobile home.  His employment 
history was relatively stable.  He 
received a $30,000 per year salary at his last employment position in 2001.  Mr. Whitten expressed his desire and 
prospective ability to make restitution, "I realize that I have cost the 
[c]ounty a [g]reat deal of money & I have always been able to make decent 
money by God[']s blessings in the past & know that I will be able [to] 
continue that in the long run. When I am released from whatever situation I am 
headed I will pay back every cent that I have cost everyone that has been 
injured by my actions."

 
 

[¶17]   Any error that exists 
because of the failure to include a specific finding of an ability to pay in the 
sentencing order is harmless.  The 
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Motion to Correct 
Illegal Sentence for failure to comply with W.R.Cr.P. 
32(c)(2)(H).

 
 
Modification 
of sentencing order.

 
 
[¶18]   In the original sentence, the district court 
ordered restitution payment of $93,966.02 to State Farm.  State Farm insured one of the homes 
damaged by Mr. Whitten.  In its 
Order on Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, the district court mandated that 
the restitution be paid to the homeowner, rather than State Farm.  Mr. Whitten challenges the modification 
on the basis that the homeowner never requested reimbursement for his losses and 
that the modification will result in a double recovery for the homeowner.  Mr. Whitten also contests the amount of 
restitution.

 
 

[¶19]   We will not consider Mr. Whitten's challenge 
to the amount of restitution because the issue is not properly before this 
Court.  In this appeal Mr. Whitten 
asserts, for the first time, that the value of the property was $70,000 rather 
than the $93,966.02 amount established by the court.  Mr. Whitten made no such claim during 
his sentencing or in his Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence.  Issues raised on appeal will not be 
considered unless they are jurisdictional or issues of such fundamental nature 
that they must be considered.  
Amoco 
Production Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 2004 WY 
89, ¶53, 94 P.3d 430, ¶53 (Wyo. 2004).  
The 
amount of restitution is not a jurisdictional or fundamental issue which 
requires our review.  
Gliszczynski v. State of Florida, 654 So. 2d 579, 580 (Fla.App. 5 
Dist. 1995). 

 
 

[¶20]   As 
previously discussed, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-102 (LexisNexis 2001) requires 
sentencing courts to order defendants to pay restitution to the victims of their 
crimes.  Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 7-9-101(a)(v) (LexisNexis 2001):

 
 
(v) 
"Victim" means a person who has suffered pecuniary damage as a result of a 
defendant's criminal activities.  An 
insurer which paid any part of a victim's pecuniary damages shall be regarded as 
the victim only if the insurer has no right of subrogation and the insured has 
no duty to pay the proceeds of restitution to the insurer. 

State 
Farm is a victim only if it has no rights of subrogation and the insured has no 
duty to reimburse the insurer from the proceeds of 
restitution.

 
 

[¶21]   The 
district court found that there was no evidence in the record regarding 
subrogation rights of State Farm.  
Because the record lacked such evidence, the district court was required 
to order that restitution be paid to the homeowner.  Meerscheidt, 931 P.2d  at 
227.

 
 

[¶22]   Whether 
such restitution might result in a double recovery or windfall to the homeowner 
victim at the expense of the insurer is of no consequence.  "We do not need to ponder whether the 
victims' insurance carriers will be able to protect themselves adequately in 
this regard . . ."  Williams v. State, 949 P.2d 878, 880 
(Wyo. 
1997).  We conclude that the 
district court properly modified its sentencing order to require that 
restitution be paid to the homeowner.

 
 
Miscellaneous 
assessments.

 
 
[¶23]   Mr. Whitten challenges that portion of the 
original sentencing order relating to the imposition of assessments for the 
court automation fee, public defender fees and the Wyoming Victims' Compensation 
Fund.  Mr. Whitten contends that 
such assessments were illegal because he was not advised of the possibility, or 
specific amount of such assessments, prior to entry of his guilty plea as 
required by W.R.Cr.P. 11(b)(1).

 
 
[¶24]   Mr. Whitten raises this issue for the first 
time in this appeal.  He did not 
object to the imposition of such assessments at his sentencing hearing, nor did 
he assert the issue in his Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence.  Such issues are not properly before this 
Court and we will not consider them.

 
 
We have 
stated that " [w]e strongly adhere to the rule forbidding us to "consider for 
the first time on appeal issues that were neither raised in, nor argued to, the 
trial court," except for those issues which are jurisdictional or are 
fundamental in nature.' " Hronek v. St. Joseph's Children's Home, 866 P.2d 1305, 1309 (Wyo.1994) (quoting Bredthauer v. TSP, 864 P.2d 442, 
446-47 (Wyo.1993) and Oatts v. Jorgenson, 821 P.2d 108, 111 
(Wyo.1991)).  " We follow this rule 
because "it is unfair to reverse a ruling of a trial court for reasons that were 
not presented to it, whether it be legal theories or issues never formally 
raised in the pleadings nor argued to the trial court." ' " Hronek, 866 P.2d  at 1309 (quoting  
Bredthauer, 864 P.2d  at 446-47 and Oatts, 821 P.2d at 
111).

 
 

Amoco 
Production Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 2004 WY 
89, ¶53, 94 P.3d 430, ¶53 (Wyo. 2004).  

 
 

[¶25]   Additionally, 
we note that Rule 11(b)(1)(C) precludes the consideration of this 
issue:

 
 
            
"If assessments or forfeitures are imposed without proper disclosure a 
request for relief shall be addressed to the trial court under Rule 35 before an 
appeal may be taken on that issue."

 
 

[¶26]   Mr. 
Whitten makes a misguided attempt to avoid the effect of his failure to timely 
assert the issue by labeling the contested assessments as "restitution."  Restitution is defined by Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-9-101(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2001) as "full or partial payment of pecuniary 
damage to a victim."  None of the 
challenged assessments fall within the definition of restitution.  They are not pecuniary damages as 
defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-101(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2001), which are paid 
to the victim of a criminal act.

 
 

[¶27]   For the 
reasons stated above, the decision of the district court is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-9-103, in applicable part, states: 

 
 
(a)       As part of the 
sentencing process including deferred prosecutions under W.S. 7-13-301, 
in any misdemeanor or felony case, the prosecuting attorney shall present to the 
court any claim for restitution submitted by any victim.

 
 

(b)       In every 
case in which a claim for restitution is submitted, the court shall fix a 
reasonable amount as restitution owed to each victim for actual pecuniary damage 
resulting from the defendant's criminal activity, and shall include its 
determination of the pecuniary damage as a special finding in the judgment 
of conviction or in the order placing the defendant on probation under 
W.S. 7-13-301.  In determining the 
amount of restitution, the court shall consider and include as a special 
finding, each victim's reasonably foreseeable actual pecuniary damage that will 
result in the future as a result of the defendant's criminal activity.  A long-term physical health care 
restitution order shall be entered as provided in W.S. 7-9-113 through 
7-9-115.

 
 

2 
Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-9-102 provides:

 
 
In 
addition to any other punishment prescribed by law the court shall, upon 
conviction for any misdemeanor or felony, order a defendant to pay 
restitution to each victim as determined under W.S. 7-9-103 and 7-9-114 unless 
the court specifically finds that the defendant has no ability to pay and that 
no reasonable probability exists that the defendant will have an ability to 
pay.

 
 

3Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-9-103(c) provides:

 
 
(c) The 
court shall order the defendant to pay all or part of the restitution claimed or 
shall state on the record specific reasons why an order for restitution was not 
entered.  If the court determines 
that the defendant has no ability to pay and that no reasonable probability 
exists that the defendant will have an ability to pay in the future, the court 
shall enter specific findings in the record supporting its 
determination.

 
 

4As noted 
by Mr. Whitten, W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(2)(H) seemingly requires a district court to 
include a finding in its order as to whether Mr. Whitten was able to pay 
restitution.  Such a requirement 
appears to be inconsistent with the plain language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-9-102 
and 7-9-103.  Rule 32(c)(2)(H), in 
its present version, has been in effect since 1993.  At that time, § 7-9-103(a) (Lexis 1999) 
indicated that a finding of a defendant's ability to pay was a condition 
precedent to the ordering of restitution.  
The ability to pay language of Rule 32(c)(2)(H) served to effectuate the 
requirements of that statutory provision.  
However, § 7-9-103 was amended in 2000 to conform with § 7-9-102, which, 
as previously discussed, mandates an order of restitution in the absence of a 
finding of inability to pay.  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-9-103(b) and (c) (LexisNexis 2000 Supp.).  Neither the plain language of § 7-9-102 
nor § 7-9-103 has been superseded by Rule 32(c)(2)(H).  See W.R.Cr.P. 61.