Case Title: Miskelley v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: CR94-84-8

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-02-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Jessie Lloyd MISSKELLEY, Jr. v. STATE of
Arkansas

CR 94-848                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 19, 1996


1.   Appeal & error -- appeal of criminal conviction -- review of
     sufficiency -- general rule. -- It is the general rule that,
     where an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
     on appeal of a criminal conviction, the appellate court
     addresses that issue before all others. 

2.   Motions -- directed-verdict motion defined -- substantial
     evidence defined. -- A directed-verdict motion is a challenge
     to the sufficiency of the evidence; the test for determining
     the sufficiency of the evidence is whether there is
     substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict;
     substantial evidence is that which is forceful enough to
     compel a conclusion one way or another and which goes beyond
     speculation or conjecture; the appellate court reviews the
     evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee and
     considers only the evidence that supports the verdict.

3.   Jury -- determination of credibility -- free to believe part
     of evidence and reject other parts. -- Where inconsistencies
     appear in the evidence, the appellate court defers to the
     jury's determination of credibility; a jury is free to believe
     part of the evidence before it and reject other parts.

4.   Criminal law -- "purposely" defined. -- Under Ark. Code Ann.
      5-2-202(1) (Repl. 1993), a person acts purposely with
     respect to his conduct or a result thereof when it is his
     conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to
     cause such a result. 

5.   Criminal law -- murder -- intent usually inferred from
     circumstances. -- In cases of murder, a defendant's intent is
     seldom capable of proof by direct evidence; it must usually be
     inferred from the circumstances of the killing.

6.   Criminal law -- accomplice liability -- factors. -- A
     defendant may be found guilty not only of his own conduct, but
     also the conduct of his accomplice; where two or more persons
     assist one another in the commission of a crime, all are 
     accomplices and criminally liable for each other's conduct;
     the following factors are relevant in determining the
     connection of an accomplice with the crime: presence of the
     accused in the proximity of a crime, opportunity, and
     association with a person involved in the crime in a manner
     suggestive of joint participation.
7.   Criminal law -- accomplice liability -- mere presence,
     acquiescence, silence, or knowledge not sufficient -- when
     conviction will be upheld. -- Mere presence, acquiescence,
     silence, or knowledge that a crime is being committed, in the
     absence of a legal duty to act, is not sufficient to make a
     person an accomplice; where, however, the State establishes
     evidence that the accused purposefully aided in the commission
     of the crime, a conviction for first-degree murder based on
     accomplice liability will be upheld.

8.   Criminal law -- accomplice liability -- substantial evidence
     that appellant purposely aided and facilitated commission of
     first-degree murder. -- The supreme court concluded that the
     jury's decision to convict appellant of a greater offense in
     the death of one of the victims indicated that much importance
     was placed on appellant's chasing down the boy and returning
     him to the scene where brutal beatings and sexual assaults
     were taking place; such an act was highly suggestive of joint
     participation in the crime; there was also evidence that
     appellant knew the night before the murders that his two
     accomplices were going to "get some boys" and hurt them; the
     supreme court noted that appellant's participation in bizarre
     cult activities with his accomplices, while not conclusive of
     intent standing alone, reinforced the probability of his
     participation in such brutal murders; finally, appellant's
     detailed knowledge of the injuries inflicted on the boys
     suggested that he was in physical proximity to the activities
     taking place and took a much more active role than he
     admitted; the jury was not required to give credence to the
     appellant's contention that, for the most part, he was merely
     an observer; the supreme court concluded that there was
     substantial evidence the appellant purposely aided and
     facilitated his accomplices in the commission of first-degree
     murder and held that there was sufficient evidence to support
     his conviction.

9.   Criminal procedure -- confessions -- review of voluntariness -
     - factors. -- Where the voluntariness of a confession is at
     issue, the supreme court makes an independent determination of
     voluntariness based upon the totality of the circumstances
     surrounding the confession and does not reverse the trial
     court's finding of voluntariness unless it is clearly against
     the preponderance of the evidence; among the factors to be
     considered in determining the validity of a confession are the
     age, education and intelligence of the accused, the advice or
     lack of advice on constitutional rights, the length of
     detention, the repeated or prolonged nature of questioning, or
     the use of mental or physical punishment. 

10.  Criminal procedure -- confessions -- custodial confession
     presumed involuntary. -- A custodial confession is presumed
     involuntary and the burden is on the State to show that the
     confession was voluntarily made.

11.  Criminal procedure -- confessions -- false promise of reward
     or leniency invalidates confession -- no evidence appellant's
     confession obtained in such a manner. -- A confession obtained
     through a false promise of reward or leniency is invalid;
     however, there was no evidence that the appellant's confession
     was obtained in such a manner; despite the use of a circle
     diagram to encourage appellant to respond to questions, there
     was no implication that if the appellant talked the officers
     would recommend leniency or try to help him in any way;
     likewise, the existence of a monetary reward did not
     invalidate the confession; although their testimony was
     disputed, the police officers testified at the suppression
     hearing that they did not communicate the reward offer to the
     appellant at any time, and the trial judge was entitled to
     believe this evidence.
12.  Criminal procedure -- confessions -- age and mental capacity
     alone are not sufficient to suppress confession. -- While age
     and mental capacity are factors considered in determining
     voluntariness, they are not, standing alone, sufficient to
     suppress a confession.

13.  Criminal procedure -- confessions -- youth alone not
     sufficient to exclude confession. -- At the time appellant was
     interrogated he was seventeen years old, and just thirty-seven
     days away from his eighteenth birthday; persons younger than
     he have been held capable of giving voluntary confessions.

14.  Criminal procedure -- confessions -- low intelligence quotient
     alone will not render confession involuntary. -- Although
     evidence indicated that appellant's intelligence quotient was
     72 and that he read at a third-grade level, a low score on an
     intelligence-quotient test does not mean that a suspect is
     incapable of voluntarily making a confession or waiving his
     rights. 

15.  Criminal procedure -- confessions -- appellant repeatedly
     advised of his rights -- no stranger to criminal-justice
     system. -- Appellant, who was nearly eighteen years old when
     he made his confession, was advised of his rights, both
     verbally and in writing, on three separate occasions over the
     course of four hours; there was evidence that, between 1988
     and 1992, he had been advised of his rights in juvenile
     proceedings on three occasions; appellant was no stranger to
     the criminal-justice system, a factor that the supreme court
     has considered in the past.

16.  Criminal procedure -- confessions -- four-hour interrogation
     not undue -- officers' persistent questioning was permissible
     -- no evidence of mental or physical punishment. -- Between
     the first time appellant was advised of his rights and the
     time he gave his first statement, a period of just over four
     hours elapsed, which was not undue; the officers' questioning
     was persistent, but that was permissible; there was no
     evidence of mental or physical punishment.

17.  Criminal procedure -- confessions -- police may use some
     psychological techniques so long as accused's free will is not
     completely overborne -- numerous factors pointed to
     voluntariness of confession. -- The police may use some
     psychological tactics in eliciting a custodial statement so
     long as the accused's free will is not completely overborne;
     police use of a circle diagram symbolizing those who committed
     the murders and those who were trying to solve the crime, a
     polygraph examination, and a picture of the victim did not
     invalidate the confession; the supreme court observed,
     however, that the tactic of playing a tape recording of a
     boy's voice saying "Nobody knows what happened but me" came
     perilously close to psychological overbearing, and the court
     could not condone its use; in this instance, however, because
     numerous other factors pointed to the voluntariness of the
     confession, the supreme court would not invalidate the
     confession.

18.  Criminal procedure -- confessions -- trial judge's
     determination of voluntariness was correct -- waiver of rights
     was voluntary. -- After an independent review of the foregoing
     factors, the supreme court concluded that the trial judge's
     determination of voluntariness was correct; the appellate
     court was also convinced, based upon the same facts, that
     appellant's waiver of his rights was voluntary, knowing, and
     intelligent; when the supreme court analyzes the validity of
     a rights waiver, it looks to many of the same factors used in
     determining the voluntariness of a confession.

19.  Criminal procedure -- confessions -- juveniles -- failure to
     obtain parent's signature on waiver form does not render
     confession inadmissible -- requirement of parental consent
     limited to juvenile-court proceedings. -- At the time the
     appellant signed his waiver, Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-317(f)
     (Repl. 1993) provided that a juvenile's waiver form must be
     signed by a parent, guardian, or custodian; where a person
     under age eighteen is charged as an adult in circuit court,
     failure to obtain a parent's signature on a waiver form does
     not render a confession inadmissible; when a juvenile is
     charged as an adult, he becomes subject to the procedures
     applicable to adults; the requirement of parental consent is
     limited to juvenile-court proceedings.

20.  Constitutional law -- statutes presumed constitutional -- when
     classifications permitted. -- On appellate review, the supreme
     court presumes that a statute is constitutional, and the
     attacking party has the burden of proving otherwise; all
     doubts are resolved in favor of constitutionality;
     classifications are permitted that have a rational basis and
     are reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose; the
     supreme court's role is not to discover the actual basis for
     the legislation, but to consider whether any rational basis
     exists that demonstrates the possibility of a deliberate nexus
     with state objectives so that the legislation is not the
     product of utterly arbitrary and capricious government
     purpose.

21.  Constitutional law -- statutes -- rationale for distinction
     between rights accorded those tried in juvenile court and
     those tried as adults. -- The supreme court concluded that a
     rationale could be found for a distinction between the rights
     accorded those tried in juvenile court and those tried as
     adults that would remove Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-317(f) (Repl.
     1993) from the specter of arbitrary and capricious government
     purpose, namely that a juvenile over the age of sixteen who
     commits a crime that would subject him to adult punishment
     will not be accorded the protection of full parental
     involvement in the interrogation process.

22.  Criminal procedure -- warning to persons asked to appear at
     police station. -- Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.3
     requires an officer who asks a person to come to a police
     station to take reasonable steps to make it clear that there
     is no legal obligation to comply with the request.

23.  Appeal & error -- objections must be raised in timely manner.
     -- Objections must be raised in a timely manner.

24.  Appeal & error -- issue precluded from appellate review where
     there is no clear ruling by trial court. -- An issue is
     precluded from review on appeal where there is no clear ruling
     by the trial court; where appellant obtained rulings on the
     voluntariness of his confession and his waiver, but no ruling
     on his illegal seizure, the supreme court did not consider the
     issue.

25.  Criminal procedure -- confessions -- failure of police to
     record entire interrogation -- not required by Arkansas law --
     considered as factor -- did not invaldate confession. --
     Although appellant attacked the failure of the police to
     record the interrogation in its totality, no Arkansas law
     requires such a procedure; the supreme court will consider
     such a factor in the totality-of-the-circumstances mix but
     will not invalidate a confession for that reason alone.

26.  Constitutional law -- statutes -- accomplice testimony --
     rationale for greater safeguards where appellant's conviction
     is based on testimony of third person. -- Arkansas Code
     Annotated  16-89-111(e)(1) (1987) provides that a conviction
     may not be had on the testimony of an accomplice unless
     corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the
     appellant with the commission of the offense; there is a
     legitimate rationale for greater safeguards where an
     appellant's conviction is based on the testimony of a third
     person rather than on his own words.

27.  Discovery -- denial of -- discretion of trial court -- policy
     considerations regarding depositions of police officers -- no
     abuse of discretion. -- Where the trial court offered to make
     the interrogating officers available for questioning but would
     not require them to submit to depositions, the supreme court
     declared that it does not reverse for failure to grant
     discovery in a criminal case without a showing of abuse of
     discretion; public-policy considerations dictate that
     depositions of police officers should not be taken as a matter
     of routine, but only in rare cases, subject to the trial
     court's discretion; a defendant's discovery needs are
     ordinarily met by the broad access given to him by the rules
     of criminal procedure; the supreme court found nothing in the
     record to indicate that the trial court had abused its
     discretion in denying the depositions.
28.  Evidence -- trial court accorded wide discretions in rulings.
     -- A trial court is accorded wide discretion in evidentiary
     rulings and will not be reversed on such rulings absent a
     manifest abuse of discretion.

29.  Evidence -- polygraph tests -- results not admissible. --
     Where appellant argued that his proffered evidence concerning
     the results of his polygraph test was necessary to apprise the
     jury of the totality of the circumstances surrounding his
     confession, the supreme court reasserted its long-standing
     rule prohibiting the admission of polygraph results.

30.  Evidence -- trial court's exclusion of polygraph results
     upheld. -- The supreme court, noting the unreliability of
     polygraph tests, upheld the trial court's exclusion of 
     evidence of the results of appellant's polygraph examination.

31.  Evidence -- expert testimony -- witness not allowed to refer
     to interview with appellant -- no prejudicial violation of
     Ark. R. Evid. 703. -- Where appellant's expert in the coercive
     influence of police interrogation techniques was allowed to
     offer an opinion that the tactics used by the West Memphis
     Police were suggestive and led the appellant to make his
     statements but was not permitted to refer to a three-hour
     interview he had conducted with appellant, appellant argued
     that the trial court erred, citing Ark. R. Evid. 703 for the
     proposition that an expert must be able to reveal the factual
     bases for his opinions; the supreme court held that appellant
     had not shown that he was prejudiced under Rule 703 by the
     court's ruling, noting that the expert was allowed to identify
     all other matters on which he based his opinion, such as the
     transcripts of appellant's statements, appellant's treatment
     records, the officers' notes, and the officers' testimony;
     additionally, during cross-examination, the expert was asked
     whether he had formed a preliminary opinion regarding the
     coercive nature of the interrogation, and he answered that his
     opinion at that point was "based on the materials available to
     me which included my having interviewed Jessie Misskelley";
     the jury was thus informed that the expert had interviewed
     appellant and had used that interview as a basis for his
     opinion.

32.  Evidence -- expert testimony -- "suggestibility" test results
     -- appellant not prejudiced by trial court's refusal to allow
     -- witness allowed to offer opinion. -- Where the trial court
     refused to allow evidence of a suggestibility test
     administered, admittedly for the first time, by a psychologist
     who, as appellant's expert witness, was allowed to offer his
     opinion and who, further, informed the court that his opinion
     would not be altered by the absence of test results, the
     supreme court concluded that appellant could not show that he
     was prejudiced by the court's ruling; the supreme court does
     not reverse in the absence of prejudice.

33.  Evidence -- relevant evidence defined -- trial court's ruling
     on relevancy given great weight. -- Relevant evidence is any
     evidence having the tendency to make the existence of any fact
     that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
     probable or less probable than it would be without the
     evidence; a trial court's ruling on relevancy is entitled to
     great weight and will be reversed only for an abuse of
     discretion.

34.  Evidence -- every item of challenged evidence corroborated
     some aspect of appellant's confession -- evidence offered by
     the State to corroborate other evidence is relevant. -- The
     supreme court held that every item of evidence challenged by
     appellant as irrelevant served to corroborate some aspect of
     appellant's confession; evidence that is offered by the State
     to corroborate other evidence is relevant.

35.  Evidence -- any corroboration of confession was highly
     probative -- ruling admitting evidence upheld. -- The supreme
     court rejected appellant's argument that the challenged
     evidence was more unfairly prejudicial than probative; with
     the confession being the State's only meaningful evidence
     against the appellant, any corroboration was highly probative; 
     this was especially true in light of appellant's contention
     that his confession was false; the prejudicial effect of the
     evidence was not so high as to outweigh its important
     probative value, and the supreme court deferred to the sound
     discretion of the trial judge and upheld his ruling admitting
     the evidence.

36.  Trial -- jury instructions -- AMCI 401 matched statutory
     language -- no error to refuse proffered non-AMCI instruction.
     -- If an Arkansas Model Criminal Instruction is available on
     a subject, a non-AMCI instruction should not be used unless
     the AMCI does not state the law; where the trial court
     instructed the jury on accomplice liability using AMCI 401,
     which matched the language contained in Ark. Code Ann.  5-2-
     403(a) (Repl. 1993) and was a proper statement of the law, it
     was not error to refuse appellant's proffered instruction.

37.  Trial -- jury instructions -- failure to instruct on lesser-
     included offense is harmless error where jury convicted
     defendant of greater offense. -- Failure to instruct on a
     lesser-included offense is harmless error where a jury has
     been instructed on some lesser-included offense yet has
     convicted the defendant of a greater offense.

38.  Trial -- jury instructions -- proper to refuse instruction if
     not supported by rational basis -- no rational basis for
     manslaughter instruction. -- It is proper to refuse an
     instruction on manslaughter if there is no rational basis to
     support it; appellant, who asked for a manslaughter
     instruction on the chance that the jury might consider his
     conduct reckless, as opposed to purposeful or knowing, was
     fully aware of the magnitude of the crimes to which he was an
     accomplice; he was fully aware of the severe beating, cutting,
     and sexual molestation of the victims; his retrieval of the
     boy who tried to escape was evidence of an overall state of
     mind which far exceeded the "gross deviation from the standard
     of care" involved in reckless conduct; the supreme court held
     that there was no rational basis for a manslaughter
     instruction.

39.  Criminal law -- motion for new trial -- newly dicovered
     evidence -- grounds for reversal. -- Newly discovered evidence
     is the least-favored ground for a new-trial motion; where a
     new trial is denied on this ground, the supreme court will
     reverse only for an abuse of discretion; to prevail, appellant
     must show that the new evidence would have impacted the
     outcome of his case and that he used due diligence in trying
     to discover the evidence.

40.  Criminal law -- motion for new trial -- newly discovered
     evidence -- appellant did not use due diligence in trying to
     discover most of evidence. -- Although appellant used due
     diligence in seeking an opinion from the medical examiner
     regarding time of death, the same could not be said of the
     evidence regarding the use of a knife and the scene of the
     murders, which was brought out in the accomplices' trial on
     cross-examination; the supreme court determined that appellant
     did not show that, prior to his conviction, he could not have
     discovered such evidence.

41.  Criminal law -- motion for new trial -- newly discovered
     evidence -- medical examiner's opinion would not have had
     impact on trial's outcome -- trial court did not abuse its
     discretion in denying new trial. -- The supreme court
     concluded that the medical examiner's opinion concerning time
     of death would not have had an impact on the outcome of
     appellant's trial because appellant's statements were already
     filled with mistakes, inconsistencies, and gross inaccuracies
     regarding the time that the murders took place, and it was
     obvious that the jury disregarded appellant's time estimates,
     as it was their right to do; under the circumstances, the
     supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse its
     discretion in denying appellant's motion for a new trial.


     Appeal from Clay Circuit Court; David Burnett, Judge;
affirmed.
     Stidham & Crow, by: Daniel T. Stidham and Gregory L. Crow, for
appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  J. Brent Standridge, Asst.
Att'y Gen., for appellee.

     Bradley D. Jesson, Chief Justice.February 19, 1996 *ADVREP1*






JESSIE LLOYD MISSKELLEY, JR.,
                    APPELLANT,

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS,
                    APPELLEE,




CR94-848


APPEAL FROM THE CLAY COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. CR93-47,
HON. DAVID BURNETT, JUDGE,




AFFIRMED.




                 CHIEF JUSTICE BRADLEY D. JESSON


     
     On June 21, 1993, the appellant, Damien Echols, and Charles
Jason Baldwin were charged with the murders of three West Memphis
boys.  Steven Branch, Christopher Byers, and Michael Moore, all
eight years of age, had been missing since the early evening hours
of May 5, 1993.  Their bodies were found the next day submerged in
a creek in a park-like area of West Memphis known as Robin Hood. 
The boys' bodies were nude, their hands and feet had been tied, and
it was evident they had been severely beaten and mutilated.
     The West Memphis Police began an extensive investigation.  On
June 3, 1993, they questioned the appellant regarding any knowledge
he might have about the murders.  In the course of the
interrogation, he made statements in which he implicated himself,
Baldwin, and Echols.  All three were arrested and charged with
capital murder.
     The appellant was tried separately from Baldwin and Echols. 
The jury convicted him of first-degree murder in the death of
Michael Moore, for which he received a life sentence, and second
degree murder in the deaths of Steven Branch and Christopher Byers,
for which he received a combined sentence of 40 years.  It is from
these convictions that he appeals.  He raises numerous and varied
points for reversal.  After thorough consideration of each issue,
we find no error and affirm the convictions.
                   Sufficiency of the Evidence
          It is our general rule that, when an appellant challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence, we address that issue prior to all
others.  Harris v. State, 284 Ark. 247,