Case Title: HAABY v HAABY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1974-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12814 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1974 L O U I S ! : M O H R HAABY , P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs - EARL S T A N L E Y HAABY, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth J u d i c i a l District, Honorable R. J. Nelson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Church, Harris, Johnson & Williams, Great F a l l s , Montana Cresap S. McCracken, argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent : John McCarvel argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted: November 18, 1974 Decided 'DEc 8 1974 M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court . This is an appeal from t h e d i s t r i c t court, Cascade County. The record d i s c l o s e s t h e p a r t i e s were divorced on March 24, 1969. Pursuant t o t h e divorce decree Earl Stanley Haaby was ordered t o pay $100 per month i n c h i l d support f o r each of h i s two minor daughters (then aged 17 and 12) as long a s they were minors o r enrolled i n school. A house j o i n t l y owned by t h e p a r t i e s was t o be placed on t h e market f o r s a l e immediately. Louise Mohr Haaby w a s allowed t o r e s i d e i n t h e house, and Earl was ordered t o make t h e house payments of $183 per month u n t i l it was sold. The p a r t i e s were t o share equally i n t h e n e t equity. Since t h e divorce E a r l has made t h e house payments every month thereby reducing t h e mortgage balance from $12,344.16 t o $9,038.36 a s of April 1 2 , 1974. The house remains unsold. E a r l has a l s o paid $600 f o r t h e support of h i s two daughters. However, according t o t h e terms of t h e divorce decree, a t o t a l of $7,000 i n c h i l d support should have been paid from t h e t i m e of t h e decree of divorce t o t h e f i l i n g of t h e p e t i t i o n which led t o t h i s s u i t . O n April 16, 1974, E a r l p e t i t i o n e d t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Cascade County f o r an order e s t a b l i s h i n g s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h e divorce decree. Louise's response put s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h a t decree i n i s s u e and sought an order requiring payment of unpaid c h i l d support. Hearing on t h e matter was held on May 2 , 1974, with Earl being t h e only witness. H e t e s t i f i e d t h e r e w a s an understanding between t h e p a r t i e s t h a t s i n c e t h e house was not sold r i g h t away house payments would be made i n l i e u of t h e c h i l d support payments; but admitted t h e r e had never been any formal agreement t o t h a t e f f e c t . O n May 7, 1974 t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t entered an order which, among other things, granted E a r l ' s p e t i t i o n The reasons f o r t h i s order were: (1) t h e house had not been sold immediately, as t h e divorce decree had provided, and ( 2 ) t h e a c t i o n s of both p a r t i e s during t h e f i v e years s i n c e t h e divorce had, i n f a c t , already amended t h e decree. From t h i s order appeal i s taken. The r u l e t h a t t h e findings of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t w i l l not be disturbed absent s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t o t h e contrary i s so w e l l established t h a t it r e q u i r e s no r e c i t a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y . In t h e i n s t a n t case, w e f i n d l i t t l e , i f any, contrary c r e d i b l e evidence; indeed, appellant appears t o have reaped f a r more b e n e f i t from t h e house payments than she bar- gained f o r under t h e divorce decree. Had t h e decree been r i g i d l y observed, appellant would have received approximately $7,000 i n c h i l d support payments, plus a t most $1,200 f o r s i x months use of t h e house (which had a r e n t a l value of $200 per month) plus her share of the n e t equity a f t e r t h e house was sold. A s it turned o u t , appellant received $600 i n c h i l d support plus $10,800 f o r t h e use of t h e house f o r an "additional" four and one-half years. Meanwhile, her share of t h e n e t equity has increased by over $1,600 on account of t h e mortgage reduction, t o say nothing of t h e recent general increase i n property values. To accept a p p e l l a n t ' s proposition t h a t respondent was obligated t o pay both c h i l d support and house payments during t h e e n t i r e period i n question would be t o read i n t o t h e divorce decree an onerous burden it p l a i n l y never contemplated. Appellant next points out t h a t , a s i d e from t h e i n i t i a l $600 payment f o r c h i l d support, respondent has r e a l l y only "paid" $91.50 per month s i n c e t h e divorce, on t h e theory t h a t half of t h e $183 monthly house payments accrued t o h i s b e n e f i t and, fur- thermore, respondent has r e a l i z e d t h e r e s u l t a n t income t a x ad- vantages. Apparently t h e implication t o be drawn i s t h a t t h i s somehow makes respondent delinquent under t h e divorce decree because h i s pocket book was not h i t q u i t e a s hard as o r i g i n a l l y tlioug hi;. This c o n t e n t i o n , o f course, is every b i t a s tenuous a s i t sounds: F i r s t , a s t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t recognized, it is elementary t h a t t h e person who makes house payments is, with- o u t more, e n t i t l e d t o any t a x b e n e f i t s flowing therefrom. Sec- ond, simple a r i t h m e t i c demonstrates t h a t a p p e l l a n t was h a r d l y shortchanged i n r e c e i v i n g house payments i n s t e a d of c h i l d sup- p o r t . F i n a l l y , a p p e l l a n t ' s l i n e of reasoning overlooks t h e main purpose of t h e d i v o r c e decree--financial p r o t e c t i o n of a p p e l l a n t and h e r daughters. Whether o r n o t economic advantages accrued t o respondent by v i r t u e of making t h e payments he made i s immaterial a s long a s t h e o b j e c t i v e of p r o t e c t i o n was s a t i s - f a c t o r i l y achieved. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t , a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g re- s p o n d e n t ' s f a i t h f u l n e s s i n making t h e house payments and appel- l a n t ' s apparent contentment w i t h t h e s i t u a t i o n f o r f i v e y e a r s , concluded t h e whole arrangement was eminently f a i r . W e a g r e e . It i s simply a m a t t e r of s t r i p p i n g away t h e form t o g e t a t t h e substance. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s o r d e r is a f f i r m e d . Chief J u s t i c e