Case Title: STATE v PEPPERLING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1978-07-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13482 I N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE OF MONTANA 1978 STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs- RICHARD C L A R E N C E PEPPERLING, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Jack D. Shanstrom, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Richard Pepperling, Pro Se, Deer Lodge, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, B i l l i n g s , Montana - - Submitted on b r i e f s : May 9 , 1978 Decided : JUL 26 3$M M r . J u s t i c e John C. Sheehy delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court . This i s an appeal by t h e defendant Richard Clarence Pepperling from an order of t h e D i s t r i c t Court, Thirteenth J u d i c i a l District, Yellowstone County, on J u l y 2 , 1976, denying t h e motion of t h e a p p e l l a n t Pepperling t o with- draw h i s g u i l t y p l e a and t o vacate h i s sentence. H i s g u i l t y p l e a was made on November 5, 1975 t o a charge of burglary with increased punishment, and a sentence of 20 years w a s given t o him as a r e s u l t of s a i d plea. This case come on r e g u l a r l y f o r consideration without o r a l argument under t h e I n t e r n a l Operating Rules of t h i s Court. O n August 22, 1975, an information was f i l e d a g a i n s t t h e defendant, charging him with t h e crime of burglary of t h e F r a t e r n a l Order of Eagles building located i n Laurel, Montana. Under s e c t i o n 94-6-204(1), R.C.M. 1947, a t t h e t i m e of h i s arraignment, t h e defendant was served i n open c o u r t by t h e county a t t o r n e y with a Notice t o Increase Punishment, i n which n o t i c e t h e defendant was informed t h a t t h e S t a t e of Montana would seek increased punishment of t h e defendant a s a p r i o r convicted f e l o n , on two previous convictions, one f o r grand larceny committed i n 1971, and one f o r burglary committed i n 1972. A t t h e t i m e of h i s arraignment, t h e defendant informed t h e court t h a t he w a s indigent. Accordingly, t h e c o u r t appointed Michael Whalen, an a t t o r n e y i n B i l l i n g s , one of t h r e e who a c t a s p u b l i c defenders i n t h a t c o u r t , t o r e p r e s e n t defendant i n t h i s case. Defendant t o l d t h e c o u r t t h a t of t h e t h r e e a t t o r n e y s then employed by t h e county a s public defenders, Michael Whalen, ~ o h n Adams, and Russell F i l l n e r , he would p r e f e r n o t t o have e i t h e r M r . Whalen o r M r . Adams appointed. he c o u r t f i r s t appointed M r . F i l l n e r t o represent him and then learned t h a t M r . F i l l n e r was representing a co- defendant charged i n a separate information with t h e s a m e crime. Because t h i s appeared t o present a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t , t h e c o u r t then appointed M r . Whalen t o repre- s e n t defendant. This was approved by defendant a t t h e t i m e . O n September 12, 1975, defendant came i n t o c o u r t upon h i s p e t i t i o n -- pro s e , t h a t h i s counsel, M r . Whalen, be dismissed and t h a t he be assigned another counsel t o represent him i n t h e case. He informed t h e c o u r t t h a t , "me and M r . Whalen d o n ' t s e e eye t o eye". H e t o l d t h e c o u r t t h a t he f e l t he was e n t i t l e d t o f a i r representation and he j u s t d i d n ' t f e e l t h a t he would receive t h a t representation from M r . Whalen. The c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t M r . Whalen was an e x c e l l e n t attorney and w e l l q u a l i f i e d i n criminal matters and t h e c o u r t expressed its f e e l i n g t h a t M r . Whalen took a personal i n t e r e s t i n t h e persons he w a s appointed t o represent. The D i s t r i c t Court explained t o defendant t h e problem he was presenting t o t h e court, inasmuch a s defen- dant d i d not want t h e services of M r . Adams, and M r . F i l l n e r was representing another party t h a t might give rise t o a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t . The c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t it had appointed a competent attorney t o represent him. M r . Whalen was present a t t h e hearing of September 1 2 , 1975. He s t a t e d t o t h e c o u r t i n t h e presence of defendant t h a t t h e r e were two things t h a t defendant had requested of him. One, defendant f e l t t h a t M r . Whalen should make a motion f o r discovery and two, he f e l t t h a t M r . Whalen should make a motion f o r s e p a r a t e t r i a l s . M r . Whalen explained t o t h e c o u r t t h a t he had pointed o u t t o defendant t h a t he was i n f a c t receiving a s e p a r a t e t r i a l and t h a t he would n o t be t r i e d with t h e co-defendant. Further, M r . Whalen had gone through t h e e n t i r e p o l i c e f i l e and had obtained and had i n h i s possession copies of t h e statements of witnesses a g a i n s t defendant s o t h a t he had a l l of t h e in- formation t h a t any motion f o r discovery might reveal. H e had made t h e s e copies of statements a v a i l a b l e t o defendant. The c o u r t denied t h e motion of t h e defendant t o d i s - m i s s h i s counsel and t o appoint s u b s t i t u t e counsel. On t h e same day, September 1 2 , 1975, defendant Pep- p e r l i n g presented t o t h e c o u r t h i s w r i t t e n p e t i t i o n = - s e , o b j e c t i n g t o t h e r e g u l a t i o n s of t h e county j a i l r e l a t i n g t o v i s i t i n g hours and inspection of mail. O n September 15, 1975, he presented t o t h e c o u r t h i s w r i t t e n p e t i t i o n - pro set s t a t i n g t h a t he was being harassed by t h e j a i l e r i n t h e - county j a i l . O n September 19, 1975, a hearing was had before t h e D i s t r i c t Court respecting t h e s e p e t i t i o n s where defendant was represented by M r . Russell F i l l n e r . Upon hearing t h e evidence presented by p l a i n t i f f , t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court denied t h e p e t i t i o n s . O n September 19, 1975, defendant came i n t o c o u r t with h i s a t t o r n e y M r . Whalen, and t h e r e M r . Whalen advised t h e c o u r t t h a t defendant was d i s s a t i s f i e d with M r . ~ h a l e n ' s s e r v i c e s and was asking for s u b s t i t u t i o n of counsel. The c o u r t took t h e matter under advisement and on t h a t day again denied p e t i t i o n e r ' s request t h a t h i s counsel be d i s - missed and t h a t s u b s t i t u t e counsel be appointed. ~ e a n w h i l e , t h e c o u r t set t h e t r i a l of t h e cause f o r September 24, 1975 a t 1:30 p.m. Further, on September 19, 1975, defendant f i l e d w r i t t e n motions, again pro s e , f o r (1) a r e q u e s t f o r d i s - - missal of h i s counsel, and ( 2 ) a r e q u e s t f o r postponement of h i s t r i a l . O n September 22, 1975, defendant f i l e d h i s letter i n support of h i s motion f o r postponement of h i s t r i a l . O n September 2 4 , 1975, defendant f i l e d a w r i t t e n motion pro -- se, f o r change of venue, charging prejudice a g a i n s t him i n t h e county, and h i s w r i t t e n request f o r t h e dismissal of t h e presiding judge. A motion of defendant f o r withdrawal of t h e judge was t r e a t e d a s a motion f o r d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n , and on September 2 6 , 1975, h i s motion was granted and t h e cause was t r a n s f e r r e d t o Judge C. B. Sande. A l l of t h e o t h e r pending p e t i t i o n s and motions of defendant were denied on September 2 4 , 1975. The t r i a l w a s vacated and r e s e t t o October 2 1 , 1975. O n September 26, 1975, defendant, again a c t i n g on h i s own, f i l e d a w r i t t e n p e t i t i o n f o r t h e dismissal of Judge Sande. A hearing was held on t h i s motion on October 3, 1975, with Judge Jack Shanstrom presiding and i n t h i s c a s e , a f t e r a hearing of testimony adduced both by defendant and t h e county, the motion f o r t h e d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n of Judge Sande was denied. M r . Whalen was p r e s e n t a t t h i s hearing and t o l d t h e c o u r t t h a t he had advised defendant as t o t h e proper r e q u i s i t e s f o r an a f f i d a v i t of d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n of a judge i n a criminal case. On t h e 6th day of October, 1975, defendant f i l e d h i s motion through M r . Whalen f o r an order of s u b s t i t u t i o n of Judge Sande and t h e r e a f t e r , on October 15, 1975, ~ u d g e ~ h a r l e s Luedke assumed j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h e case. The t r i a l of defen- dant was then r e s e t f o r November 5, 1975, a t 9:30 a.m. O n October 22, 1975, defendant had again f i l e d h i s w r i t t e n motion f o r dismissal of h i s counsel, and a l s o a p e t i t i o n f o r a show cause hearing, which is i n e f f e c t a motion f o r suppression of c e r t a i n evidence obtained a g a i n s t him, and a t h i r d w r i t t e n p e t i t i o n t o t h e same e f f e c t with r e s p e c t t o t h a t evidence. These p e t i t i o n s were f i l e d with- o u t t h e a i d of h i s counsel, M r . Whalen. O n October 23, 1975, defendant f i l e d h i s motion t o d i s q u a l i f y Judge Luedke and a t t h e same t i m e , f i l e d with t h e c o u r t h i s p e t i t i o n t h a t Judge Luedke dismiss h i s counsel and appoint another a t t o r - ney f o r him. October 2 4 , 1975, Judge Luedke r e s e t t h e t r i a l of defendant f o r November 4 , 1975, and on t h a t same d a t e , Judge Jack Shanstrom of t h e Sixth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t assumed j u r i s d i c t i o n . O n October 29, 1975, defendant, through h i s counsel, moved t h e c o u r t f o r t h e d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n of Judge Shanstrom. However, on November 5, 1975, a t 9:30 a . m . , t h e time set f o r t r i a l , defendant and h i s counsel, M r . Whalen, appeared be- f o r e Judge Shanstrom and n o t i f i e d t h e judge t h a t they wished t o make a motion t o change t h e p l e a of defendant from n o t g u i l t y t o g u i l t y . I n t h e meantime, before t h e t r i a l d a t e , M r . Whalen, a s defendant's counsel, had given n o t i c e t o t h e county a t t o r n e y of two a d d i t i o n a l a l i b i w i t - nesses required by defendant; M r . Whalen had requested and obtained an o r d e r t h a t a p o t e n t i a l defense witness imprisoned a t Deer Lodge be brought t o ~ i l l i n g s f o r t h e t r i a l ; and he had obtained t h e county a t t o r n e y ' s e n t i r e case f i l e p r i o r t o t h e d a t e set f o r t r i a l . I n t h e proceedings which occurred on November 5, 1975, defendant was p r e s e n t i n c o u r t with h i s counsel, M r . Whalen. The c o u r t advised defendant t h a t before accepting h i s p l e a of g u i l t y , he should understand t h a t t h e S t a t e was ready t o proceed t o t r i a l a t t h a t t i m e and t h a t t h e witnesses were a l l subpoenaed and p r e s e n t and a v a i l a b l e t o go t o t r i a l and t h a t t h e f u l l jury panel w a s a l s o present, ready f o r t h e t r i a l , and t h a t any plea t h a t he made would have t o be voluntary on h i s p a r t , f r e e l y made by him, and t h a t he must agree t h e r e had been no coercion o r duress, o r t h r e a t s made t o him. To t h i s statement, defendant agreed. The c o u r t f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t hewan'ted t h e record t o show t h a t he had discussed with defendant's counsel what sen- tence he would impose on a plea of g u i l t y and t h a t he had informed him t h a t he would impose a sentence of 20 years. Defendant s t a t e d he understood t h a t . Defendant f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t no o t h e r promises had been made t o him and t h a t he f u l l y understood what t h e sentence would be. He a l s o s t a t e d t h a t he understood t h a t i f it w a s h i s d e s i r e t o go t o t r i a l , everything was a v a i l a b l e a t t h a t t i m e and t h a t he could go t o t r i a l . Defendant s t a t e d t h a t he would j u s t a s soon withdraw h i s plea. H i s counsel then reminded t h e c o u r t t h a t it was h i s understanding t h a t on a plea bar- gaining b a s i s , t h e 20 year sentence imposed would run con- c u r r e n t l y with any time t o be served f o r defendant's vio- l a t i o n as a parolee. The c o u r t s a i d t h i s was h i s under- standing and t h a t t h e sentence and t h e p a r o l e v i o l a t i o n time, i f any, would run concurrently. Thereupon t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court accepted t h e p l e a of g u i l t y then made by defendant and imposed the sentence of 20 y e a r s , defendant having waived h i s r i g h t f o r f u r t h e r t i m e f o r pronouncing t h e judg- ment and sentence. On December 18, 1975, t h e District Court received i n t h e mail from defendant, confined i n t h e p r i s o n a t Deer Lodge, h i s r e q u e s t - i n forma pauperis f o r a copy of t h e t r a n s c r i p t concerning h i s change of p l e a on November 5. his t r a n s c r i p t was furnished t o defendant. On January 21, 1976, t h e District Court received t h e motion of defendant, appearing pro -- se, t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y p l e a and t o va- ~ a t e t h e sentence imposed upon him. O n J u l y 11, 1976, Judge Shanstrom denied t h e motion t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y p l e a and t o v a c a t e t h e sentence. I n its o r d e r of d e n i a l , t h e c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t t h e m a t t e r of t h e change of p l e a was discussed i n advance with counsel and t h e defendant, and during t h e proceedings, defendant asked t h e c o u r t i f t h i s would run concurrently with t h e sentence he was p r e s e n t l y s e r v i n g and t h a t t h e accused w a s advised by t h e c o u r t t h a t it would run concurrently. The c o u r t a l s o pointed o u t t h a t a t t h e t i m e of t h e change of p l e a , defendant knew t h a t t h e jury was p r e s e n t i n t h e jury box and a l l t h e prosecution witnesses w e r e p r e s e n t and ready t o go t o t r i a l and t h a t t h e evidence overwhelmingly pointed t o h i s g u i l t . The c o u r t f u r t h e r found t h a t t h e r e was no m e r i t t o defendant's attempt t o d i s q u a l i f y him and denied any motion t o d i s q u a l i f y him i n t h e case. With r e s p e c t t o d e f e n d a n t ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by counsel, t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court a l s o noted t h a t t h e Supreme Court has r e p e a t e d l y held t h a t t h e defendant i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o counsel of h i s choice b u t r a t h e r t o adequate and competent counsel. The Court s t a t e d t h a t M r . Whalen was a competent, capable and a b l e defense a t t o r n e y and t h a t he adequately p r o t e c t e d defendant a t a l l s t a g e s of t h e proceedings. O n ~ u l y 12, 1976, defendant f i l e d h i s w r i t t e n n o t i c e of appeal, and was given permission t o proceed on h i s appeal - i n forma pauperis. Defendant had noted several grounds i n h i s motion of the c o u r t f o r withdrawal of h i s g u i l t y p l e a , but on h i s appeal, h i s s i n g l e contention is t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court's r e f u s a l t o dismiss h i s appointed counsel and appoint f o r him d i f f e r e n t counsel deprived him of t h e opportunity of a f a i r t r i a l and caused him t o plead g u i l t y . The p r i n c i p a l force of h i s argument i s t h a t he d i d not receive e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of appointed counsel. W e have set o u t t h e r e p l e t i o n of motions and p e t i t i o n s f i l e d by defendant on h i s own, even though he was repre- --- sented by counsel a t t h e time, t o show t h e voluntariness of h i s decision t o change h i s plea t o g u i l t y . A s t h e D i s - t r i c t Court noted i n denying defendant's motion t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y plea, defendant w a s " c e r t a i n l y w e l l aware and w e l l advised about h i s l e g a l r i g h t s under t h e Constitution of t h e United S t a t e s , t h e S t a t e of Montana, and c e r t a i n l y a l l of t h e a d d i t i o n a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s a s s e t down under t h e Miranda decision". It i s c l e a r from t h e record t h a t defendant decided t o change h i s plea --- on h i s own. There is no suggestion here t h a t he changed h i s plea on advise of h i s counsel, o r t h a t h i s counsel misled him i n t o changing h i s plea. T h e contentions of defendant a r e t h a t a t t h e time t h e t r i a l had been set, h i s counsel was n o t prepared t o go t o t r i a l , "did not wish t o take t h e case t o t r i a l " , had not investigated t h e f a c t s of t h e case o r interviewed t h e w i t - nesses. Defendant then contends t h a t , r e a l i z i n g t h e f u t i l i t y of going t o t r i a l with h i s attorney, he had no other choice but to plead guilty. He now contends he was innocent of the charge. Assignments of error not contained in the record need not be considered by an appellate court. See State v. Wong Son (1943), 114 Mont. 185, 133 P.2d 761; State v. Stevens (1946), 119 Mont. 169, 172 P.2d 299; State v. Thomson (1976), 169 Ilont. 158, 545 P.2d 1070. The granting or refusal of permission to withdraw a plea of guilty and to substitute a plea of not guilty rests in the discretion of the trial court and is subject to re- view only where an abuse of discretion has been shown. State v. Nance (1947), 120 Mont. 152, 184 P.2d 554; State v. Mack (1958), 134 Mont. 301, 330 P.2d 968. Here the record does not support defendant's conten- tions regarding his counsel, nor does it show that the District Court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to change his plea of guilty. With respect to his counsel, the record points the other way: the attorney had obtained the full county attorney's file with respect to defendant, had made that file available to defendant, had applied to the court to procure witnesses to attend the trial, and was present with the defendant on the morning the trial had been set, ready to go to trial. It further appears that defendant was not misled into pleading guilty and he did so with full understanding as to the consequences. State v. Nance, supra. Since Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, an indigent defendant in a state criminal prosecution is entitled to have counsel appointed to repre- sent him. The indigent's right to counsel includes the right to have "effective assistance". State V. McElveen (1975), 168 Mont. 500, 503, 544 P.2d 820. While t h e D i s - t r i c t Court here d i d not r e q u i r e hearings on t h e conten- t i o n s of defendant with r e s p e c t t o h i s appointed counsel, such hearings a r e unnecessary where it appears t h a t t h e contentions of t h e defendant a r e contradicted by f a c t s i n t h e record. See United S t a t e s v. Morrissey (2nd C i r . 1972), 461 F.2d 666. Defendant relies on F a r e t t a v. C a l i f o r n i a (1974), 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, t o support h i s contention t h a t s i n c e he was d i s s a t i s f i e d with h i s appointed counsel, he was e n t i t l e d t o have t h e c o u r t appoint new counsel f o r him. H i s confidence i n F a r e t t a i s misplaced. F a r e t t a holds only t h a t a criminal defendant, under t h e S i x t h and Fourteenth Amendments of t h e United S t a t e s Consti- t u t i o n , has a r i g h t t o have appointed counsel dismissed and t o proceed without counsel, should he wish t o do so. Here, defendant is i n s i s t i n g t h a t because he was d i s s a t i s f i e d with h i s appointed counsel, t h e c o u r t should have discharged t h a t a t t o r n e y from representing defendant and appointed d i f f e r e n t counsel. N o case s o f a r concedes t h a t r i g h t . Rather, t h e cases a r e i n t h e o t h e r d i r e c t i o n . H i s r i g h t t o counsel does not include t h e r i g h t t o s e l e c t an a t t o r n e y of h i s own choosing, United S t a t e s v. Clark, (W.G. Okla. 1976), 429 F.Supp. 89, 98, o r r e q u i r e t h a t t h e p a r t i c u l a r a t t o r n e y appointed must be approved by t h e defendant, P e t i t i o n of Hunsinger (1969), 153 Mont. 445, 456 P.2d 304. W e hold, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t an i n d i g e n t defendant has a r i g h t t o appointed counsel, and t h a t such counsel must ren- d e r " e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e " . W e f u r t h e r hold, t h a t once counsel has been appointed by t h e ~ i s t k i c t Court, and such counsel i s rendering e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e defendant, the defendant may not have his appointed counsel dismissed or discharged and obtain different counsel or demand that certain counsel be appointed for him. When his appointed counsel is rendering effective assistance, the defendant has the choice of (1) continuing with the counsel so appointed, or (2) having his counsel dismissed and pro- ceeding on defendant's own, pro se. See Faretta v. Cali- fornia, supra. Here the defendant voluntarily pleaded guilty to the crime charged. Since we find that he was receiving effec- tive representation by his appointed counsel, such plea of guilty by defendant wiped out any claim of defendant as to defects or irregularities in the criminal proceedings before that plea, short of constitutional dimensions. Tol- lett v. Henderson (1973), 411 U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235. Defendant, having received the benefit of plea bargaining in his case, is bound thereby. The State is entitled to be assured that defendant will be held to his bargain. The order of the District Court denying the motion of defendant to change his plea from guilty to not guilty is af firmed. We Concur: ............................... Justices