Case Title: State v. Eric A. Henderson

Citation: 2001 WI 97

Docket Number: 1999AP002296-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 97 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-2296-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Eric A. Henderson,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 9, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
October 3, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Portage 
 
JUDGE: 
John V. Finn 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs and 
oral argument by Eileen A. Hirsch, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Diane M. Welsh, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2001 WI 97 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-2296-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Eric A. Henderson,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Portage 
County, John V. Finn, Judge.   Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.   This is a challenge to a "no-
knock" entry during the execution of a search warrant.  The 
court of appeals certified the case to us to decide whether a 
reviewing court may consider information known to the police but 
not included in the warrant application in evaluating the 
constitutionality of the unannounced entry. 
¶2 
Stevens Point police obtained a warrant to search 
defendant Eric Henderson's home for evidence of drug dealing.  
They requested no-knock authorization, but for unexplained 
reasons, the warrant neither granted nor denied it.  The police 
did 
not 
knock 
and 
announce 
when 
executing 
the 
warrant.  
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-2296-CR 
 
 
2 
Henderson moved to suppress the evidence recovered in the search 
of his home, and during the suppression hearing the narcotics 
officers who sought and executed the warrant testified to facts 
regarding Henderson and his associates known to the police but 
not included in the warrant application.  The circuit court 
denied the motion.  Henderson pled guilty and appealed, and the 
court of appeals certified the case to us.   
¶3 
The 
rule 
of 
announcement 
derives 
from 
the 
reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment rather than the 
warrant clause.  Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 930 (1995).  
The constitutional reasonableness of a no-knock entry is 
determined by reference to the circumstances existing at the 
time of the entry rather than at the time the warrant was 
issued.  Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395 (1997); State 
v. Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d 729, 753, 576 N.W.2d 260 (1998).  
Accordingly, we conclude that a reviewing court may consider 
evidence 
beyond 
that 
which 
was 
included 
in 
the 
warrant 
application in evaluating the reasonableness of a no-knock 
execution of a search warrant.  We further conclude that the 
evidence introduced at the suppression hearing——including the 
facts known to the police but not included in the warrant 
application——was sufficient to support the no-knock entry in 
this case, and therefore affirm the circuit court's denial of 
the defendant's suppression motion. 
I 
¶4 
In late 1997 and early 1998, the Stevens Point Police 
Department targeted Eric Henderson in an ongoing cocaine and 
No. 
99-2296-CR 
 
 
3 
marijuana investigation.  As part of that investigation, a 
confidential 
police 
informant, 
using 
marked 
"buy 
money," 
purchased approximately two grams of cocaine from Henderson at 
Henderson's apartment and turned it over to the police.   
¶5 
The following day, February 27, 1998, Detective Mike 
Retzki, a Stevens Point Police Department drug investigator, 
applied to the Portage County Circuit Court for a warrant to 
search Henderson's apartment.  The warrant application alleged 
probable cause that controlled substances would be found in the 
apartment based upon information obtained from confidential 
informants and the controlled buy the previous day.  The warrant 
application also requested authorization for no-knock execution 
of the warrant.  In support of no-knock execution, the 
application stated: 
 
Your affiant knows through his training and experience 
in drug enforcement that dealers/traffickers in large 
quantities of cocaine and marijuana have access to 
weapons used in the defense of their persons, currency 
and contraband, and are likely to threaten law 
enforcement officers with the same.  And further, your 
affiant knows through his training and experience that 
dealers/traffickers in large quantities of cocaine and 
marijuana are likely to engage in the immediate 
destruction of evidence upon notification that law 
enforcement 
authorities 
are 
in 
the 
process 
of 
executing a search warrant, and thus hinder law 
enforcement's capacity to gain evidence of criminal 
activity.   
The Circuit Court for Portage County, Judge John V. Finn, issued 
the search warrant.  The warrant neither expressly granted nor 
denied authorization for a no-knock entry.   
No. 
99-2296-CR 
 
 
4 
¶6 
Later that day, Retzki and the SWAT team executed the 
warrant with a no-knock entry.  In the subsequent search of 
Henderson's apartment, officers seized approximately 220 grams 
of marijuana, $959 (including $120 of marked "buy money" that 
the confidential informant used to purchase cocaine from 
Henderson the day before), and a digital scale.  Henderson was 
charged with possession with intent to deliver marijuana within 
1000 feet of a city park or school as a repeat offender, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1m), 961.49, and 961.48(1) 
(1995-96).1  Henderson moved to suppress the evidence recovered 
during the search, contending that the search was unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment because officers did not comply with 
the rule of announcement when executing the warrant.2  Henderson 
also argued that the information contained in the warrant 
application in support of no-knock authorization was defective 
because 
it 
did 
not 
allege 
particularized 
circumstances 
justifying a no-knock warrant in this case.3  
¶7 
At the suppression hearing, the State presented two 
witnesses, Detective Mike Retzki and Gary Koehmstedt, a Portage 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Henderson did not dispute that the warrant application 
demonstrated sufficient probable cause.   
3 Henderson's motion appears to concede that the warrant 
issued in this case authorized a no-knock entry, and only 
disputes whether or not the underlying facts were sufficient to 
justify no-knock execution.  The warrant itself, however, does 
not contain explicit authorization for a no-knock entry.   
No. 
99-2296-CR 
 
 
5 
County Sheriff's deputy who had participated in the search.  
Both Retzki and Koehmstedt were veteran drug investigators who 
had participated in training programs for drug investigation and 
enforcement.  Retzki had executed between 15 and 20 search 
warrants and Koehmstedt had executed over 30 warrants.  Both 
testified to two concerns that prompted them to execute a no-
knock entry.   
¶8 
First, the officers said they were concerned that 
Henderson may attempt to destroy evidence if given the standard 
search warrant warning by the police.  Both Retzki and 
Koehmstedt testified that they had personally executed search 
warrants on drug dealers who destroyed drug evidence by flushing 
it down a toilet.  Koehmstedt stated that on one occasion he had 
attempted to retrieve marijuana that a suspect had flushed down 
a toilet.   
¶9 
Furthermore, and specifically as to Henderson, the 
officers were aware that Henderson had been charged with 
possession of marijuana in 1994 and that he had been present in 
a residence upon which narcotics officers, including Koehmstedt, 
had executed a drug warrant in 1996.  At that time, Henderson 
had been found in possession of large quantities of marijuana 
and currency.  Retzki believed that Henderson's prior arrests 
gave him a strong incentive to avoid being caught again and 
charged as a repeater.   
¶10 Additionally, the layout of Henderson's apartment made 
destruction of drug evidence easier in this case.  The 
confidential informant had provided police with a diagram of the 
No. 
99-2296-CR 
 
 
6 
apartment indicating that the bedroom where Henderson stored his 
drugs was located directly across from the bathroom.  Retzki 
testified that given that proximity, it would be easy for 
Henderson to dispose of any controlled substances during the 
time it took officers to knock and announce themselves.  
Finally, Retzki stated that he knew Henderson and his associates 
to be "very in tune with drug trafficking practices," "very 
careful," and "very difficult to catch," all factors leading 
Retzki to believe that Henderson would destroy evidence if given 
the opportunity. 
¶11 Second, 
the 
officers 
testified 
that 
they 
were 
concerned about the possibility of violence.  The officers were 
aware that one of Henderson's associates, Larry Moore, sold guns 
to his friends, and shortly before the warrant was executed, had 
sold a pistol to the confidential informant.  Police were 
uncertain whether Moore carried a weapon himself.  Retzki 
testified 
that 
another 
of 
Henderson's 
associates, 
Kevin 
Rutherford, was a "big concern" to the police and had been 
present in the apartment during the controlled buy the day 
before the search.  The confidential informant had also told 
Retzki that Henderson had threatened him, telling the informant 
that he would retaliate if the informant ever betrayed Henderson 
and his associates. 
¶12 Furthermore, Retzki testified that while working as a 
patrol officer he had dealt with both Henderson and Rutherford 
"in a very combative atmosphere" on more than one occasion.  
Retzki indicated that police concerns were heightened because 
No. 
99-2296-CR 
 
 
7 
Henderson's associates were known to be involved in gang 
activity.  The officers were also concerned that they could not 
know how many of Henderson's associates would be inside the 
apartment at the time the search warrant was executed.  
¶13 On cross-examination, Retzki testified that he was 
aware of the foregoing facts when he applied for the search 
warrant, but had not included them in his request for no-knock 
authorization.  Retzki said he was not aware of any changes in 
circumstances or additional facts that came to light between the 
time of the warrant application and the time police executed the 
warrant. 
¶14 Henderson argued that because the police were aware of 
the information now proffered as justification for the no-knock 
entry at the time they sought the warrant, but had not included 
it in the warrant application, the State was barred from 
introducing the information after-the-fact at the suppression 
hearing on the no-knock entry.  In a written decision, the 
circuit court denied the suppression motion, relying on the 
distinction between a probable cause inquiry, in which a 
reviewing court is confined to the evidence presented to the 
magistrate who issued the warrant, and a no-knock inquiry, in 
which a reviewing court examines the facts as of the time the 
search warrant was executed.  The circuit court found the 
totality of the evidence sufficient to justify the officers' 
concerns about the destruction of evidence and the possibility 
of violence, and upheld the no-knock entry.  
No. 
99-2296-CR 
 
 
8 
¶15 Following denial of his motion, Henderson pleaded no 
contest to one count of possession of marijuana with intent to 
deliver 
as 
a 
repeat 
offender, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 961.41(1m)(h)1 and 961.48(1).  He then appealed.  The court 
of appeals certified the case, asking us to decide two 
questions: 1) may the State use information known to the police 
but not included in a warrant application to later justify an 
unannounced entry in the execution of the warrant, and 2) was 
the evidence introduced at the suppression hearing——either 
including or excluding the facts known to the police but not 
included in the warrant application——sufficient to justify the 
unannounced entry in this case? 
II 
¶16 This case presents a question of constitutional fact 
that we review under a two-part standard.  State v. Hughes, 2000 
WI 24, ¶15, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621.  We uphold the 
circuit court's findings of historical or evidentiary fact 
unless clearly erroneous.  Id.  We independently review the 
circuit court's application of constitutional principles to 
those evidentiary facts.  Id. 
¶17 Henderson 
argues 
that the 
officers' 
decision to 
dispense with the rule of announcement in the execution of the 
search warrant at his home violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 
 The 
Fourth Amendment 
prohibits unreasonable 
searches and 
seizures and sets forth the manner in which warrants shall 
issue: 
 
No. 
99-2296-CR 
 
 
9 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV.4 
¶18 The reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment is a 
statement of broad protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  The determination of reasonableness is made by 
reference to the particular circumstances of each individual 
case, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963) (plurality 
opinion), and balances "'the nature and quality of the intrusion 
on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the 
importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the 
intrusion.'"  Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (quoting 
United 
States 
v. 
Place, 
462 
U.S. 
696, 
703 
(1983)).  
Constitutional reasonableness relates not only to the grounds 
for a search or seizure but to the circumstances surrounding the 
search or seizure's execution.  Id.   
¶19 The Fourth Amendment's warrant clause provides more 
particularized protections governing the manner in which search 
and arrest warrants are issued.  The warrant clause requires 
that officers obtain prior judicial authorization for a search 
                     
4 Wisconsin's search and seizure provision, Article I, 
Section 11 of the state constitution, is substantively identical 
to the Fourth Amendment.  Our interpretation of the state 
constitutional provision has been consistent with the United 
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.  
State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶55, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517.  
No. 
99-2296-CR 
 
 
10
from a neutral, disinterested magistrate.  Dalia v. United 
States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979).  It also requires the officer 
seeking a warrant to demonstrate upon oath or affirmation 
probable cause to believe that "'the evidence sought will aid in 
a particular apprehension or conviction'" for a particular 
offense.  Id. (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 
(1967)).  Finally, it requires that warrants must particularly 
describe the place to be searched, as well as the items to be 
seized.  Id.  Searches made without warrants issued pursuant to 
the requirements of the warrant clause are presumed to be 
unconstitutional.  Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-49 
(1984).   
¶20 The specific focus of this case is the rule of 
announcement, which relates to the manner in which search 
warrants are executed.  State v. Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d 615, 
623, 348 N.W.2d 512 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State 
v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 430, 511 N.W.2d 591 (1994).  The 
rule of announcement requires that, when executing a search 
warrant, officers: 1) announce their identity; 2) announce their 
purpose; and 3) momentarily wait for the occupants to refuse 
their admittance or open the door.  Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d at 734-35 
n.4.  The rule protects the safety of police officers and 
others, prevents the physical destruction of property, and takes 
into 
consideration 
the 
limited 
privacy 
interests 
of 
the 
occupants of the premises to be searched.  Id.; State v. 
Williams, 168 Wis. 2d 970, 981-82, 485 N.W.2d 42 (1992), 
overruled on other grounds by Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d at 430.   
No. 
99-2296-CR 
 
 
11
¶21 The modern rule of announcement derives from an 
English common law rule that required a sheriff, when executing 
a search warrant, to announce his purpose before breaking down a 
door.  Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931-32 (citing Semayne's Case, 77 
Eng. Rep. 194, 195-96 (K.B. 1603)).  This common law rule was 
recognized as a tradition "embedded in Anglo-American law."  
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958). 
¶22 For some time it was uncertain whether the rule of 
announcement was simply a common law tradition or whether it had 
constitutional dimensions.  The Court's decision in Ker seemed 
to suggest the latter: "the method of entering the home may 
offend federal constitutional standards of reasonableness and 
therefore vitiate the legality of an accompanying search."  Ker, 
374 U.S. at 38.  It was not until Wilson, 514 U.S. at 930, that 
the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue directly.   
¶23 In Wilson, narcotics officers executing search and 
arrest warrants at Sharlene Wilson's Arkansas home did not knock 
and announce, but, rather, entered the home through an unlocked 
screen door, while identifying themselves as police.  Wilson, 
514 U.S. at 929.  Wilson challenged the entry, arguing that the 
search was invalid because of the officers' failure to comply 
with the rule of announcement.  Id. at 930.  The Court explored 
the long history of the common law knock and announce principle, 
and concluded that the rule of announcement forms part of the 
Fourth Amendment's reasonableness inquiry: 
 
[W]e have little doubt that the Framers of the Fourth 
Amendment thought that the method of an officer's 
No. 
99-2296-CR 
 
 
12
entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be 
considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search 
or seizure . . . we hold that in some circumstances an 
officer's unannounced entry into a home might be 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.   
Id. at 934.   
¶24 Like 
other 
components 
of 
constitutional 
reasonableness, the rule of announcement is not an absolute 
requirement.  Id.  Indeed, since the rule's earliest common law 
origins, courts have recognized that under certain circumstances 
law enforcement officers may forcibly enter a premises without 
announcement.  Ker, 374 U.S. at 38.  While the Supreme Court in 
Wilson firmly grounded the rule of announcement in the Fourth 
Amendment's reasonableness clause, the Court also recognized 
that the "flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be 
read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores 
countervailing law enforcement interests."  Wilson, 514 U.S. at 
934.  Wilson indicated that an unannounced entry might be 
reasonable 
in 
circumstances 
"presenting 
a 
threat 
of . . . violence," or "where police officers have reason to 
believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance 
notice were given."  Id. at 936. 
¶25 The Court later clarified the circumstances that 
constitute exceptions to the rule of announcement in Richards, 
520 U.S. at 394.  The issue in Richards focused on the 
constitutionality of a blanket exception to the rule of 
announcement in felony drug cases.  Id. at 387-88.  The judicial 
officer who issued the warrant in Richards had declined no-knock 
authorization, but the police dispensed with the rule of 
No. 
99-2296-CR 
 
 
13
announcement anyway.  Id. at 388.  This court concluded that 
police officers executing search warrants in felony drug cases 
are never required to comply with the rule of announcement.  
State v. Richards, 201 Wis. 2d 845, 866, 549 N.W.2d 218 (1996). 
¶26 The United States Supreme Court concluded that a 
blanket exception to the rule of announcement for all felony 
drug cases is not constitutionally permissible.  Richards, 520 
U.S. at 387-88.  However, the Court held that police officers 
may dispense with the rule of announcement where there is "a 
reasonable 
suspicion 
that 
knocking 
and 
announcing 
their 
presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous 
or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation 
of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of 
evidence."  Id. at 394; accord Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d at 734-35. 
¶27 The Supreme Court in Richards also held that the 
reasonableness of an officer's decision to enter without 
knocking and announcing is evaluated by a reviewing court based 
upon information known to the officer at the time of entry.  
Richards, 520 U.S. at 395; accord Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d at 753.  
Thus, while rejecting a blanket exception for felony drug cases, 
the Court nevertheless upheld the unannounced entry in Richards 
because it was reasonable under the circumstances at the time of 
the entry.  The Court held that a magistrate's refusal to pre-
authorize a no-knock entry in a search warrant does "not alter 
the reasonableness of the officers' decision, which must be 
evaluated 
as 
of 
the 
time 
they 
[executed 
the 
warrant]."  
Richards, 520 U.S. at 395. 
No. 
99-2296-CR 
 
 
14
¶28 In another context, the Supreme Court has rejected the 
argument that the manner in which a warrant is executed is 
subject to the requirements of the warrant clause.  Dalia, 441 
U.S. at 257.  In Dalia, the Justice Department sought and 
obtained a warrant to intercept telephone conversations on two 
phones at Lawrence Dalia's business office.  Although the 
warrant did not explicitly authorize agents to covertly enter 
Dalia's office to plant the bugging device, agents did so.  Id. 
at 245.  Dalia challenged the evidence obtained from the bugs.  
The Supreme Court upheld the entry, concluding that the Fourth 
Amendment does not require officers to obtain prior judicial 
authorization for the exact manner of execution of a warrant: 
 
Nothing in the language of the Constitution or in this 
Court's decisions interpreting that language suggests 
that, in addition to the three requirements [of the 
warrant clause] discussed above, search warrants also 
must include a specification of the precise manner in 
which they are to be executed.  On the contrary, it is 
generally left to the discretion of the executing 
officers to determine the details of how best to 
proceed with the performance of a search authorized by 
warrant——subject of course to the general Fourth 
Amendment protection "against unreasonable searches 
and seizures." 
. . .  
 
It would extend the Warrant Clause to the extreme 
to require that, whenever it is reasonably likely that 
Fourth Amendment rights may be affected in more than 
one way, the court must set forth precisely the 
procedures to be followed by the executing officers.  
Such an interpretation is unnecessary, as we have 
held——and the Government concedes——that the manner in 
which a warrant is executed is subject to later 
judicial review as to its reasonableness. 
Id. at 257-58 (footnote omitted). 
No. 
99-2296-CR 
 
 
15
¶29 These cases yield a number of fundamental principles: 
1) the rule of announcement is a requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment's reasonableness clause, not its warrant clause; 2) 
the validity of a no-knock execution of a search warrant is 
subject to after-the-fact judicial review for constitutional 
reasonableness, 
which 
is 
determined 
by 
reference 
to 
the 
circumstances as they existed at the time of the entry; and 3) 
the manner in which a search warrant is executed is not subject 
to the requirements of the warrant clause and therefore does not 
require prior judicial authorization. 
¶30 Applying these principles here, we conclude that a 
court reviewing the reasonableness of a no-knock execution of a 
search warrant is not precluded from considering facts known to 
the police but not included in the search warrant application.  
The relevant inquiry focuses on the circumstances existing at 
the time of the entry and the reasonableness of dispensing with 
the rule of announcement because compliance with the rule would 
be dangerous or futile, would risk destruction of evidence or 
would otherwise inhibit the effective investigation of the 
crime. 
¶31 This 
conclusion 
is 
not, 
as 
Henderson 
suggests, 
contrary to the rule against "rehabilitating" a warrant after-
the-fact by information known to the police but not included in 
the warrant application.  See Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State 
Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n.8 (1971) ("an otherwise 
insufficient affidavit cannot be rehabilitated by testimony 
concerning information possessed by the affiant when he sought 
No. 
99-2296-CR 
 
 
16
the warrant but not disclosed to the issuing magistrate"); 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n.1 (1964) ("[i]t is 
elementary that in passing on the validity of a warrant, the 
reviewing court may consider only information brought to the 
magistrate's attention").  See also State v. Kerr, 181 Wis. 2d 
372, 380, 511 N.W.2d 586 (1994) (a court reviewing the validity 
of a warrant is confined to the record presented to the issuing 
magistrate, 
whose 
findings 
are 
upheld 
unless 
"clearly 
insufficient to support a finding of probable cause"). 
¶32 The 
rule, 
stated 
in 
Aguilar 
and 
reiterated 
in 
Whiteley, applies only to challenges to the sufficiency of a 
search warrant under the warrant clause, not challenges to the 
manner of execution of a search warrant under the reasonableness 
clause.  The cases recognized that allowing the probable cause 
basis for the issuance of a warrant to be bolstered after the 
fact would render the warrant clause meaningless by essentially 
allowing warrants to be issued upon less than probable cause, as 
long as the proper showing could be made later.  Whiteley, 401 
U.S. at 565 n.8 (citing Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 109 n.1).  They 
also 
recognized 
that 
allowing 
defective 
warrants 
to 
be 
"rehabilitated" in this way would remove the initial probable 
cause determination from the neutral magistrate where the 
constitution explicitly places it.  Id. at 565-66.  These 
concerns are not present in the post hoc evaluation of a law 
enforcement decision to dispense with the rule of announcement, 
which is not a component of the Fourth Amendment's warrant 
No. 
99-2296-CR 
 
 
17
clause but its reasonableness clause and therefore is not 
subject to prior judicial authorization.   
¶33 Moreover, jurisdictions are divided over the question 
of whether magistrates may authorize no-knock entries in a 
warrant at all.  See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 4.8(g) (3d ed. 1996).  Some courts have concluded that such 
warrants are permissible only where they are authorized by a 
specific statutory enactment.  See, e.g., State v. Eminowicz, 
520 P.2d 330, 332 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974); Parsley v. Superior 
Court, 513 P.2d 611, 614 (Cal. 1973); State v. Bamber, 630 So. 
2d 1048 (Fla. 1994).  But see, e.g., Cox v. State, 286 S.E.2d 
482, 484-85 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981); Commonwealth v. Scalise, 439 
N.E.2d 818, 822 (Mass. 1982); State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833, 838 
(Minn. 1978).   
¶34 In Wisconsin, judicial officers are authorized to 
issue no-knock warrants.  In Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d at 626, we 
considered the question of whether, in the absence of specific 
statutory authorization, judicial officers may issue no-knock 
warrants.  We concluded that they may, because "there may be 
occasions in which facts justifying an unannounced entry would 
be known at the time the warrant is sought, and that both law 
enforcement officers and citizens benefit from review of the 
entry by a neutral magistrate."  Id. (footnotes omitted).  
Similarly, in Williams we stated: 
 
[W]henever the police officers possess sufficient 
information at the time of the application for a 
search warrant that justifies dispensing with the 
announcement 
rule, 
they 
should 
present 
such 
No. 
99-2296-CR 
 
 
18
information to a judge for the determination of 
whether to authorize the no-knock entry by police. 
Williams, 168 Wis. 2d at 986. 
¶35 The court of appeals, in its certification, asked us 
to address "[w]hether the directives offered in Williams and 
Cleveland should be elevated to a constitutional rule comparable 
to that for probable cause challenges."  The court asks, in 
effect, whether the reference to "should" in Williams actually 
means "must."  It does not.  Wilson, Richards, and Dalia 
establish quite clearly that as a matter of Fourth Amendment 
law, a no-knock entry is subject only to an after-the-fact 
judicial review for reasonableness; it does not require prior 
judicial authorization inasmuch as it is not a component of the 
Fourth Amendment's warrant clause.  
III 
¶36 The constitutional validity of the unannounced entry 
in this case therefore turns on whether the evidence introduced 
at the suppression hearing——including the facts known to the 
police 
but 
not 
included 
in 
the 
warrant 
application——was 
sufficient to meet the Richards test.  That is, was the evidence 
sufficient to establish a "reasonable suspicion that knocking 
and announcing . . . under the particular circumstances, would 
be dangerous or futile, or . . . would inhibit the effective 
investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the 
destruction of evidence"?  Richards, 520 U.S. at 394; Meyer, 216 
Wis. 2d at 734-35.  This showing is not high.  Richards, 520 
U.S. at 394.  
No. 
99-2296-CR 
 
 
19
¶37 The evaluation focuses on the particular facts of the 
case and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the 
facts, considered in combination with the officer's training and 
experience.  Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d at 735.  We do not resort to 
blanket rules or generalizations.  Id. at 748-51.  As we have 
seen, two considerations typically justify dispensing with the 
rule 
of 
announcementofficer 
safety 
and 
preservation 
of 
evidence.  Both are present under the specific circumstances of 
this case. 
¶38 The 
officers 
who 
executed 
this 
search 
warrant 
reasonably suspected that Henderson might destroy the drug 
evidence if they knocked and announced.  Henderson's prior 
record of drug dealing certainly gave him an incentive to do so, 
given the heightened penalties for repeat drug offenders.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 961.48.  Furthermore, the officers knew that the 
layout of Henderson's apartment and, more specifically, the 
location of the room in which he stored his drugs——across from 
the 
bathroom——made 
quick 
destruction 
of 
the 
evidence 
particularly easy.  The officers were also aware, based upon 
their previous experiences, that drugs like marijuana and 
cocaine are easily destroyed and that drug dealers often flush 
them down the toilet as the police are crossing the threshold 
with a warrant. 
¶39 The officers also reasonably suspected that announcing 
entry in this case might endanger their safety.  The police knew 
Henderson to be combative during previous encounters and also 
knew that he had threatened violence against the confidential 
No. 
99-2296-CR 
 
 
20
informant.  Furthermore, they were aware that Henderson's 
associate, Larry Moore, had sold guns to his friends and to the 
confidential informant.  They also knew Henderson and his 
associates were involved in gang activity. 
¶40 Henderson argues that it was unreasonable to suspect 
that he would attempt to destroy evidence since he had not done 
so in the past, and that it was improper to consider the 
activities of his associates in evaluating the risk to officer 
safety.  These are weak arguments at best.  A history of 
evidence destruction is not a threshold requirement for a no-
knock entry, and the potential presence of associates known to 
have weapons or gang affiliation is highly relevant to the 
inquiry.  The no-knock entry was reasonable under all the 
circumstances. 
IV 
¶41 We 
conclude, 
therefore, 
that 
because 
the 
constitutionality of a no-knock execution of a search warrant 
depends upon its reasonableness at the time of execution, a 
reviewing court may consider all facts and circumstances known 
to the police at the time of the unannounced entry, including 
information not included in the warrant application.  We further 
conclude that the facts of this case support the circuit court's 
conclusion that compliance with the rule of announcement would 
have endangered officer safety and risked the destruction of 
evidence.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
No. 99-2296-CR.ssa 
 
1 
¶42 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).  I 
do not agree that the officers' testimony in this case satisfies 
the U.S. Supreme Court's test5 for a no knock entry.6  I 
therefore dissent. 
¶43 The majority opinion concludes that the officers in 
this case had two grounds for dispensing with the constitutional 
rule of knocking and announcing their presence: (1) knocking and 
announcing their presence might have allowed the defendant to 
destroy evidence and (2) knocking and announcing their presence 
might have endangered the officers' safety.  Some particularity 
to support reasonable suspicion is required under Richards v. 
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997).  
¶44 First, there are not sufficiently particular facts to 
suggest that the officers had reasonable suspicion that knocking 
and announcing their presence would allow the destruction of 
evidence. 
                     
5 State v. Richards, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997). 
6 The magistrate in the present case failed to authorize a 
no knock entry.  The fact that a warrant does not authorize a no 
knock entry adds a layer of complexity to the good faith 
exception adopted in State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ___ Wis. 2d 
___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  In Eason, this court concluded that the 
exclusionary rule does not apply where officers rely in good 
faith on a warrant authorizing a no knock entry, provided that 
the officers conduct sufficient investigation and review before 
applying for the warrant.  Good faith reliance may be undermined 
where, as here, officers do not include in the affidavit all 
information known at the time they apply for a warrant or where 
the 
officers 
subsequently 
learn 
of 
facts 
that 
undermine 
reasonable suspicion. 
No. 99-2296-CR.ssa 
 
2 
¶45 The majority opinion relies on the fact that the 
bedroom where the drugs were kept is near a bathroom, making 
destruction of evidence easy.  However, in most apartments and 
indeed in most houses, each room usually has easy access to a 
bathroom.7  
¶46 The majority opinion also relies on the fact that 
Henderson had a prior drug-dealing record.  Thus, the majority 
concludes, Henderson had added incentive to avoid getting 
caught.8  What criminal lacks incentive to avoid getting caught? 
 If anything, Henderson's own criminal history supports the 
conclusion that Henderson was unlikely to destroy evidence.  
Indeed, testimony established that in two prior searches that 
turned up drugs, Henderson did not attempt to destroy evidence. 
¶47 Second, there are not sufficiently particular facts to 
suggest that the officers had reasonable suspicion that knocking 
and announcing their presence would endanger their safety.  
¶48 The officers' testimony focused on the dangerousness 
posed by a so-called associate of the defendant, Larry Moore.  
But the testimony gives no indication of the extent of Moore's 
"association" with the defendant or whether the officers 
                     
7 See State v. Bamber, 630 So. 2d 1048, 1055 n.6 (Fla. 1994) 
(information that drugs were stored "near the bathroom" was not 
sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion that they may be 
destroyed, because "there is nothing in the affidavit to show 
that the proximity of drugs to the bathroom is anything but 
happenstance.  The residence was a conventional four-bedroom, 
four-bath home, and virtually any room in the home would have 
been 'near a bathroom.'"). 
8 See majority op. at ¶38. 
No. 99-2296-CR.ssa 
 
3 
believed that Moore or Moore's weapons would be present in the 
home.  
¶49 Although the testimony establishes that the officers 
believed that a second individual, Kevin Rutherford, might be 
present in the defendant's residence, the officers did not 
provide any information to evaluate the reasonableness of their 
suspicion 
that Rutherford's 
presence 
might 
endanger 
their 
safety, were officers to knock and announce their presence.  The 
officers testified only that Rutherford was "a big concern" and 
that they had previously interacted with Rutherford in a 
combative atmosphere.  
¶50 But the officers also testified that the defendant was 
not known to carry a weapon, and they did not testify about any 
specific acts of violence by the defendant against officers.  
Without particular allegations of violent conduct, general 
allegations regarding the defendant's "gang affiliation" do not 
establish a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing 
the officers' presence might endanger the officers' safety. 
¶51 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶52 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
 
No. 99-2296-CR.ssa 
 
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