Case Title: Riley v. Lake

Citation: 203 N.W.2d 331

Docket Number: 

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1972-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
203 N.W.2d 331 (1972) Carolyn M. RILEY, Respondent, v. Henry Arthur LAKE et al., Appellants. No. 43004. Supreme Court of Minnesota. December 1, 1972. *333 Reavill, Neimeyer, Johnson, Fredin & Killen and Steven J. Seiler, Duluth, for appellants. MacDonald & Munger, Palmer, Hood, Crassweller & McCarthy, Duluth, for respondent. Heard before KNUTSON, C. J., and OTIS, PETERSON, TODD, and MASON, JJ. Reheard en banc. KNUTSON, Chief Justice. This is an appeal from an order denying defendant's motion for amended answers to the interrogatories to the jury or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury, or for a new trial and from the judgment entered pursuant to the court's order. The case arises out of an intersection collision between a car driven by plaintiff and one driven by defendant Henry Arthur Lake and owned by his father, defendant Elmer H. Lake. Henry Arthur Lake will be referred to as the defendant hereinafter since the father is involved only because he was the owner of the car. The collision occurred on January 26, 1968, at approximately 1:55 p. m. While there was some snow and moisture on the street, the day was clear. Dodge Street for all essential purposes of this opinion runs east and west and intersects 51st Avenue East at right angles. The intersection is unprotected by either stop signs or lights. To the southeast of the intersection there is a public works building. While the evidence is somewhat conflicting, the jury could find that this building is located about 58 feet south of Dodge Street. Fifty-first Avenue from curb to curb is 30 feet in width. Dodge Street had no curbs, but the improved portion of the street was about 20 feet wide. Snow had been plowed on both streets, which somewhat limited the width of the driving portion. Everyone agrees that the snowbanks were not high enough to interfere with vision. Plaintiff was traveling north on 51st Avenue. Defendant was traveling west on Dodge Street. Plaintiff testified that a person following the route she was taking would have a clear view to the east along Dodge Street for at least a city block after passing the public works building. She said she looked to her right but saw nothing approaching the intersection. There was a car parked somewhere on the driveway of the public works building, the exact location of which is not clear. Plaintiff said this car momentarily obstructed her view to the east. The drivers of both cars approached the intersection at a speed of *334 about 25 miles per hour. Plaintiff testified that she took her foot off the accelerator as she approached the intersection but otherwise did nothing to slow down. Plaintiff did not see defendant until the moment of impact. While there is some dispute in the evidence as to where plaintiff's automobile was when the collision occurred, the jury could find that she was about 90 percent through the intersection when defendant collided with the rear right side of her car. The impact of the collision spun her car around and it came to rest against a tree near the side of the road. The jury returned a special verdict finding that plaintiff was not guilty of negligence and defendant was 100-percent responsible. They awarded plaintiff damages in the amount of $15,500. The post-trial motions were denied by the trial court. Plaintiff's principal contentions are that she entered the intersection first and that the car parked on the driveway obstructed her view of approaching traffic on Dodge Street. While there is some dispute as to the location of the parked car, it is clear that at most it could only have obstructed her view momentarily. She admitted that after passing the buildings she had a clear view down Dodge Street for at least a block. Her testimony was: Her testimony as to whether the parked car obstructed her view is not persuasive. On cross-examination she testified: Plaintiff places considerable stress on the following statement made by defendant to Officer Robert G. Kohl at the scene of the accident: The trouble is that plaintiff's statement to Officer Kohl is equally damaging: The net result is that whatever can be said about defendant's failure to keep a proper lookout applies with equal force to plaintiff, in addition to which plaintiff failed to yield the right-of-way, as was her duty. She either did not look or she failed to see what was in plain sight. Plaintiff seeks to use the negligence of defendant to excuse her failure to yield the right-of-way. This, we submit, may not be done. No one quarrels with the fact that defendant can be found guilty of negligence. That, however, does not excuse plaintiff from keeping a proper lookout and yielding the right-of-way to approaching traffic. Next, plaintiff contends she entered the intersection first. The physical facts would bear her out, but her entry into the intersection must have occurred only a split second ahead of defendant's. Both were traveling at about the same speed. Plaintiff's car would have traveled at most about the width of Dodge Street plus the length of that part of her car which had cleared the intersection when she was struck. At the rate she was traveling, it would have taken her about 1½ seconds to travel this distance. The case is governed by Minn.St. 169.20, subd. 1. Prior to 1955, this statutory provision read in part: The statute was amended by L. 1955, c. 595, § 1, by eliminating the first *336 paragraph of the statute as it then existed. Since 1955 it has read: It seems obvious that the purpose of that amendment was to prevent a race into the intersection and to give effect to the directional right-of-way of one approaching from the right. Even before the amendment, we attempted to spell out the rights of drivers of vehicles approaching an intersection at approximately the same time in Moore v. Kujath, 225 Minn. 107, 112, 29 N.W.2d 883, 886, 175 A.L.R. 1007, 1010 (1947). We there said: In Moore we quoted with approval from Zettle v. Lutovsky, 72 N.D. 331, 335, 7 N.W.2d 180, 182 (1942), where the North Dakota court said, with respect to a statute similar to ours: In Moore we also quoted with approval the following from Smith v. Aspaas, 71 S.D. 111, 114, 21 N.W.2d 878, 879 (1946): *337 We have a somewhat unusual situation in this case in that we have a completely disinterested witness who observed the approach of both cars to the intersection and their eventual collision. Robert A. Wek was approaching the intersection from the west, driving east on Dodge Street, as plaintiff and defendant approached the intersection. He stopped before entering the intersection to yield the right-of-way to plaintiff, as she should have done for defendant. His testimony is quite illuminating as to what happened: Applying what we have said in Moore and other cases to this evidence, the conclusion is inescapable that plaintiff simply failed to yield the right-of-way when the cars were in the danger zone. If we permit evasion of statutory directional right-of-way by allowing a driver to ignore his duty to yield where he enters the intersection a fraction of a second before the driver on the right, we will have effectively destroyed the protection intended by the statute, which requires the driver approaching from the left to yield to the one approaching from the right. While we have frequently held that the right-of-way rule does not absolve the one in whose favor it operates of exercising due care for his own safety and that of others, there are cases where the evidence does not present any valid excuse for failure to yield the right-of-way. We have frequently held that whether the prima facie case established by failure to yield right-of-way has been overcome is for the jury, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances involved. Our cases on this subject are too numerous to attempt a comparison. When the evidence permits only one inference, however, it is our duty to apply the law as it exists. In Seeger v. Dalton, 285 Minn. 220, 172 N.W.2d 563 (1969), we affirmed the trial court's order granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict for plaintiff in an intersection case where the facts are somewhat similar to those here. We there said (285 Minn. 222, 172 N.W.2d 565): Under Minn.St. 169.96, failure to yield the right-of-way is prima facie evidence of negligence. Where there is no evidence to excuse a violation of the right-of-way statute, the court should hold the violator negligent as a matter of law. In Halloran v. Tousignant, 230 Minn. 399, 401, 41 N.W.2d 874, 876 (1950), in construing Moore v. Kujath, supra, we said: In Lee v. Molter, 227 Minn. 557, 563, 35 N.W.2d 801, 804 (1949), we said: Again, in Warning v. Kanabec County Co-op. Oil Ass'n, 231 Minn. 293, 295, 42 N.W.2d 881, 882 (1950), we said: Many of our cases on this subject are collected in the cases from which we quote and we can see no useful purpose in reviewing all of them. It is clear that the rule is that if there is no credible evidence to excuse a failure to comply with a statutory rule of the road, the prima facie case established by evidence of that failure has not been overcome. Both parties seem to have relied to some extent on Martin v. Bussert, 292 Minn. 29, 193 N.W.2d 134 (1971). That appeal involved two cases, consolidated for trial, in which the drivers involved in a collision sued each other for negligence. The jury found one driver accountable for 80 percent of the causal negligence and the other accountable for 20 percent. The facts are somewhat similar to those involved in the case before us, although Martin involved failure to give a left-turn signal on approaching an intersection rather than failure to yield directional right-of-way. We held that it was error for the trial court to refuse to instruct that the person who failed to yield the right-of-way was guilty of negligence as a matter of law, but that it was error without prejudice because the jury did actually find both parties guilty of negligence. We reviewed a number of Wisconsin cases on the question of apportionment of negligence and finally came to the conclusion that the verdict of the jury should be permitted to stand. We *339 quoted with approval from Pruss v. Strube, 37 Wis.2d 539, 544, 155 N.W.2d 650, 652 (1968), where the Wisconsin court said: Minnesota took its comparative negligence law largely from Wisconsin and we might be inclined to follow their decisions if there were a clear path to follow. However, an examination of their decisions leaves us somewhat in doubt as to whether the Wisconsin court would today hold as a matter of law that the negligence of one party was at least as great as that of the other. Our comparative negligence statute, Minn.St. 604.01, subd. 1, in material part reads: The Wisconsin comparative negligence law was amended in 1971 so that Wis.Stat. § 895.045 now reads: The Wisconsin court has apparently had the same difficulty as we have in determining when that situation arises. In Hikade v. Ernst, 52 Wis.2d 276, 279, 190 N.W.2d 133, 135 (1971), that court said: In the earlier case of Hollie v. Gilbertson, 38 Wis.2d 245, 156 N.W.2d 462 (1968), the court held that the trial court was correct in holding as a matter of law that plaintiff's negligence was at least equal to defendant's. In that case the court stated (38 Wis.2d 251, 156 N.W.2d 466): At best it would seem that, unless the evidence is so conclusive that reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion, the question of the apportionment of causal negligence should be left to the jury. We are dealing with a new concept of negligence with which this court has had little experience. Under our former contributory negligence law, defendant would be entitled to a directed verdict under the evidence in this case. Under comparative negligence, the question is: How do we treat apportionment of negligence of the respective parties where it appears that one of the parties was guilty of negligence as a matter of law? On rehearing by the court en banc, we have concluded that, except in those rare cases where there is no dispute in the evidence and the factfinder could come to only one conclusion, the apportionment of negligence should be left to the jury. This case was originally heard by a division of this court. The members of the division were unanimous in holding that plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a matter of law and that her negligence was at least as great as that of defendant. On rehearing by the court en banc, we have come to the conclusion, as stated above, that, in all but those rare cases which have been mentioned, the percentage of causal negligence of the parties should be left to the jury. In the case of Juvland v. Mattson, 289 Minn. 365, 184 N.W.2d 423, 56 Minn.L.Rev. 973 (1971), we held that it was not proper to remand the case to the jury for the sole purpose of determining the percentage of causal negligence of the parties. We are convinced that the verdict of the jury that plaintiff was free from negligence and that defendant was 100-percent responsible for the collision cannot stand. We therefore conclude that on the *341 record before us a new trial should be had in which the jury should be instructed that plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a matter of law and that, if the jury finds defendant guilty of negligence, they should then determine the percentage of the causal negligence of the parties. The amount of damages awarded by the jury is sustained by the evidence so there is no need of trying that issue again. The case is affirmed to that extent. No costs or disbursements are allowed to either party. Reversed in part and new trial granted on the issue of liability. Affirmed as to the amount of damages. The opinion filed on March 17, 1972, is withdrawn and this opinion is substituted in its place. TODD, Justice (concurring specially). I concur in the result. [1] No damage was done to either in this collision.