Case Title: Hunt v. Hunt

Citation: 162 Vt. 423, 648 A.2d 843

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1994-08-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
HUNT_V_HUNT.93-424; 162 Vt. 423; 648 A.2d 843

[Opinion Filed August 5, 1994]


 Filed 05-Aug-1994

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 93-424


 Linda Lee Hunt                               Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Essex Family Court

 Eugene Earl Hunt                             December Term, 1993



 Alan W. Cook, J.

 Jeffrey L. Martin, Waterbury, for appellee Office of Child Support, Agency
   of Human Services

 Jean A. Swantko, Island Pond, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      ALLEN, C.J.   Defendant Eugene Hunt was found in contempt of court for
 failure to comply with an order to pay child support.  He appeals both the
 finding of contempt and the underlying support order, alleging that their
 imposition violates his right to free exercise of religion, as guaranteed by
 the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Chapter I, Article
 3 of the Vermont Constitution.  We affirm the order of support, but vacate
 the judgment of contempt.
      Defendant belongs to the Northeast Kingdom Community Church in Island
 Pond.  In keeping with their faith in an "everlasting covenant" with God,
 described in Christian scriptures, members of the Church lead an ascetic,
 communal existence.  Members eschew all personal possessions and work for

 

 the benefit of the community, often in one of the various Church-run
 business enterprises that offer goods to the public and provide income to
 the Church.  A recognized nonprofit corporation, the Church pays taxes and
 meets all other obligations to the State.  Defendant files tax returns
 reporting dividend income from the Church, but has no access to the funds
 themselves, which apparently are retained in the Church treasury.  In
 return, the Church provides for each member's housing and living
 necessities.  The Church does not believe in no-fault divorce, and forbids a
 member to support an estranged spouse or children who live outside the
 community.
      Defendant has been a member of the Church for the past fourteen years.
 Except for a brief period, defendant and his family lived in the Church
 community at Island Pond.  Plaintiff left the community with their children
 sometime in 1989, but defendant remained.  Plaintiff began receiving Aid to
 Needy Families with Children (ANFC) benefits, and assigned all rights of
 child support to the Vermont Department of Social Welfare.  Defendant
 refused to enter into a voluntary agreement to make periodic support
 payments in an amount satisfactory to the Commissioner of Social Welfare.
 Defendant maintained, and has continued to maintain, that he cannot sanction
 his wife's choice to leave him without just cause in the eyes of the Church,
 and therefore cannot support his children outside the community.  Further,
 defendant contends that because he himself owns nothing and cannot,
 consistent with his faith, work outside the community, he cannot earn money
 to meet a support obligation.  Nevertheless, he expresses concern for his
 children and his desire to care for them, which he asserts is possible only

 

 if they reside in the community with him.  He has provided the children with
 shoes from the community cobbler shop where he works.
      In early 1990, the Department of Social Welfare sought an order fixing
 a monthly child support payment amount and appropriate arrearages.  A
 hearing was held before the Human Services Officer, at which defendant
 represented himself.  On April 18, 1990, the Human Services Officer ordered
 defendant to pay fifty dollars per month for the support of his children,
 and to pay past amounts due for ANFC benefits already received.(FN1)
      Plaintiff filed for divorce in August 1990, and the Office of Child
 Support (OCS) intervened on the issue of child support.  Defendant appeared
 and testified at the hearings, but did not contest the divorce.  In the
 final decree, plaintiff was given full parental rights and responsibilities
 for the minor children.  On July 3, 1991, the family court, which assumed
 the former appellate jurisdiction of the Human Services Board, "affirmed"
 the decision of the Human Services Officer.  The court ordered a fifty-
 dollar-per-month child support obligation, and liability for amounts past
 due.  After nearly a year with no payments, OCS filed a petition in August
 1992 to find defendant in contempt of the family court's order.  On April
 20, 1993, at a conference before the family court concerning the contempt
 petition, defendant contended that he never had a proper opportunity to
 appeal the Human Service Officer's finding that he had the ability to make
 child support payments.  The family court granted defendant a de novo

 

 hearing on the issue of his ability to pay child support, as part of the
 hearing on the OCS contempt petition.
      At the contempt hearing, the court took testimony from plaintiff,
 defendant, and an official of the Church.  The court found, as the Human
 Services Officer had, that defendant has a ninth-grade education and no
 physical or mental infirmities that would prevent him from earning enough to
 meet the monthly support obligation.  The court acknowledged defendant's
 claim that the Church does not sanction no-fault divorce and that working
 outside the community would constitute a breach of faith, and found that his
 beliefs were sincerely held.  The court further found that defendant had
 given up all his worldly possessions.  For the purposes of its analysis, the
 trial court accepted "at full face value" the proposition that defendant's
 faith does not permit church members to earn an independent income.
 Nevertheless, the court concluded that defendant is an otherwise able-
 bodied individual, whose claim of incapacity arises from a conscious,
 controllable choice to adhere to certain religious tenets.  Therefore, the
 court concluded, defendant has the ability to pay child support as "a matter
 of law."  It also noted that "[m]atters of religious belief, as a matter of
 law, do not furnish an exemption from that ability [to pay]."
      The court went on to find that the monthly support and arrearages were
 valid and enforceable obligations, and that defendant had the present
 ability to comply with the order.  Defendant was held in contempt for his
 willful failure to comply with the order.  On September 9, 1993, defendant
 was committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections pending
 payment of $640, approximately one-quarter of his total obligation as of
 April 30, 1993.  Defendant was released pending this appeal.

 

      Defendant makes two interrelated claims, alleging violations of his
 right to free exercise of religion under the United States and Vermont
 constitutions.  First, he contends that the support order is invalid because
 the hearing officer and the family court erred in finding that he has the
 ability to pay child support in any amount whatsoever.  Second, defendant
 contends that the family court should have considered alternatives to
 contempt and incarceration to enforce the support order.
                                     I.
      We begin with defendant's claim regarding the validity of the support
 order itself.
                                     A.
      The State of Vermont recognizes the general duty of child support on
 the part of a parent:  "The legislature . . . finds and declares as public
 policy that parents have the responsibility to provide child support."  15
 V.S.A. { 650.  To promote this policy, the family court must order "either
 or both parents . . . to pay an amount for the support of the child," id.
 { 658(a), which is allocated between the parents in proportion to their
 respective incomes, id. { 656(a).  However, in the case of the noncustodial
 parent, the family court may depart from the presumed total support
 obligation, as determined under the support guideline adopted under { 654.
         If the noncustodial parent's gross income is less than
         the lowest income figure in the support guideline . . .
         or is less than the self-support reserve, the court
         shall use its discretion to determine support using the
         factors in section 659 of this title and shall require
         payment of a nominal support amount.
 Id. { 656(b) (emphasis added).  This Court has noted in construing these
 provisions that "it is clear that the Legislature . . . intended to require

 

 at least a nominal child support award in all cases."  Viskup v. Viskup, 150
 Vt. 208, 210, 552 A.2d 400, 402 (1988).
      In determining defendant's support obligation, the hearing officer
 calculated a monthly gross income of $480 in accordance with the relevant
 guidelines of 15 V.S.A. { 653(5):
    "Gross income" means actual gross income of a parent.
           Gross income shall include:
                                      . . .
              (B)  expense reimbursements or in-kind payments
           received by a parent in the course of employment or
           self-employment or operation of a business if they
           reduce personal living expenses;
              (C)  in its discretion, the court may consider as
           gross income the difference between the amount a parent
           is earning and the amount a parent has earned in cases
           where the parent voluntarily becomes unemployed or
           underemployed, unless the parent is physically or
           mentally incapacitated.
 15 V.S.A. { 653(5)(B), (C) (1989).(FN2)  Of the $480, $180 was attributed to
 { 653(5)(B) in-kind payments, which must be included in gross income.  The
 hearing officer exercised discretion under { 653(5)(C) to include the
 remaining $300 that defendant "could be receiving either through wages,
 worker's compensation or disability payments."
      Defendant contends that imputing the $300 as gross income was an abuse
 of discretion, because his religious beliefs, not personal choice, bar him
 from accepting state benefits or wages from employment outside the
 community.  Had this amount not been included, however, the mandatory
 inclusion of in-kind payments still would have resulted in a monthly gross
 income, for purposes of { 653, of $180.  Since the hearing officer
 determined that the $480 monthly income amount was less than the self-

  

 support reserve defendant was entitled to under { 653(7), an income of $180
 would also fall below this minimum maintenance level.  In either case,
 defendant has a gross income greater than zero but less than the self-
 support reserve, which requires the court to exercise discretion,
 considering the factors of { 659, in figuring a monthly support obligation.
 See 15 V.S.A. { 656(b).  Therefore, if the hearing officer erred in not
 exercising discretion to exclude the income described in { 653(C), the error
 is harmless.
      Defendant also asserts that { 659 may be construed to exempt him from
 the legal obligation to support his children.  When defendant's child
 support obligation was first computed, { 659(a) read, in relevant part:
            The total support obligation shall be presumed to be
         the amount of child support needed.  If the court finds
         that a child support order based on the support
         guidelines would be inequitable, the court shall
         establish support after considering all relevant
         factors, including but not limited to:

              (1)  the guidelines for child support established
           under section 654 of this title;
              (2)  the financial resources of the child;
              (3)  the financial resources of the custodial parent;
              (4)  the standard of living the child would have
           enjoyed had the marital relationship not been
           discontinued;
              (5)  the physical and emotional condition of the
           child;
              (6)  the educational needs of the child;
              (7)  the financial resources and needs of the
           noncustodial parent; and
              (8)  inflation with relation to the cost of living.
      15 V.S.A. { 659(a) (1989) (emphasis added).(FN3)

 

      Defendant argues that the language "all relevant factors, including but
 not limited to," permits consideration of his ability to provide support in
 light of his religious beliefs, and gives the family court discretionary
 powers to relieve him of any support responsibility.  We agree that the
 plain language of the statute ensures flexibility in situations in which a
 parent cannot meet the support amount suggested in the child support
 guideline, and that the non-exclusive list of relevant factors would not
 rule out consideration of religious beliefs in fixing the support amount.
 Nevertheless, the plain language of the statutory scheme mandates at least a
 nominal payment, notwithstanding the court's conclusions drawn from evidence
 regarding the ability to meet a regular support obligation.  See 15 V.S.A.
 { 656(b).
      Defendant does not contest the amount of the support award, but the
 fact that any payment at all was ordered.  As a matter of fairness, the
 family court may depart from the presumed child support obligation in cases
 of hardship, but the Legislature has clearly required that SOME payment must

 

 be made.  Cf. Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 154 Vt. 103, 109-12, 574 A.2d 772,
 775-78 (1990) (court has narrow discretion under { 659 to depart from
 guideline presumption).  We cannot agree with defendant that the family
 court has the discretion not to order any support obligation if, as in this
 case, the parent has gross income as defined in { 653.  Therefore, the order
 must stand unless it impermissibly infringes upon defendant's constitutional
 right to free exercise of religion.
                                     B.
      The First Amendment to the United States Constitution mandates that
 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
 prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ."  U.S. Const. amend. I.  This
 provision binds the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
 Amendment.  Cantwell v. Connecticut,