Case Title: Reavis v. Reavis

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-03-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Reavis v. Reavis1998 WY 33955 P.2d 428Case Number: 97-209Decided: 03/20/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

Rebecca 
A. REAVIS, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Calvin D. REAVIS, Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

Appeal from the District Court, 
Park County, Hunter Patrick, J.

 

Rhonda Sigrist Woodard of 
Burke, Woodard & O'Donnell, P.C., Cheyenne, for 
Appellant.

Marc C. Thompson of Webster 
Law Office, Cody, for Appellee.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

 

TAYLOR, 
Chief Justice.

 [¶1] Appellant contests the district court's order 
alternating physical and legal custody of three children between appellant and 
appellee six times a year. Appellant also appeals the denial of her request for 
temporary spousal support. Finding no record evidence to support the district 
court's custody arrangement, and overwhelming evidence that the district court's 
order is contrary to the children's best interests, we reverse and remand with 
instructions.

 

                                             
I. ISSUES

 

[¶2] Appellant, Rebecca A. 
Reavis (Mother), presents two rather lengthy issues for review. We summarize the 
issues as follows:

 

1. 
Was the divided custody arrangement ordered by the district court contrary to 
the best interests of the children?

 

2. 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ignored the fact that 
Rebecca Reavis was the primary caregiver to the three children and her care was 
undisputedly exemplary?

 

3. 
Did the district court abuse its discretion in refusing to award Rebecca Reavis 
temporary spousal support?

 

[¶3] Appellee, Calvin D. 
Reavis (Father), responds with these issues:

 

1. 
Was the trial court acting within its discretion by establishing a shared 
custody arrangement for the parties' minor children? 

 

2. 
Was the trial court acting within its discretion by denying to award alimony to 
the former wife?

 

                                             
II. FACTS

 

[¶4] After Mother and Father 
graduated from the University of Wyoming in 1979, they married in July and 
settled in Cody, Wyoming.  Father 
began employment with Marathon Oil Company, and continued that employment 
through the time of the divorce. Mother worked for one year in an entry-level 
clerical position and thereafter worked full-time in the home; a decision which 
Father fully supported.

 

[¶5] The parties' first son 
was born in 1986, and twin sons arrived in 1989. From 1986 until 1995, Mother 
and Father agreed that it was in the children's best interests for Mother to 
stay home in order to be a full-time caregiver to the children. Over the course 
of the marriage, the parties moved several times in order to facilitate Father's 
progress in his career. The couple returned to Cody approximately two years 
before they separated.

 

[¶6] In 1995, recognizing 
that the marriage was in trouble, Mother took action to return to employment 
outside the home, and obtained a Wyoming real estate license. Mother chose this 
line of work because of her interest in real estate and because it would provide 
her flexibility to spend time with the children before and after school. Again, 
Father approved of Mother's choice to enter this field of 
employment.

 

[¶7] After marriage 
counseling and mediation failed to resolve the differences between Mother and 
Father, Mother was advised that the best interests of the children would be 
furthered if the couple ceased living in the same residence. Upon Father's 
refusal to move, Mother relocated with the children within Cody, and filed for 
divorce. By ex parte order, Mother received temporary custody of the children in 
October 1995, which Father challenged in November. On February 5, 1996, the 
parties signed a stipulation resolving the temporary custody and child support 
issues, agreeing to continue the arrangements already in place. Mother retained 
primary custody, while Father received visitation on alternating weekends, one 
afternoon or evening per week, and six weeks during the summer vacation period. 
Father was to pay the presumptive child support of $1,300.00 per month and 
maintain the children on his health insurance. The district court approved this 
stipulation on February 8, 1996.

 

[¶8] Prior to trial, the 
parties had reached a stipulation as to the division of the marital property. At 
the hearing on November 4, 1996, Father sought primary custody, or in the 
alternative, joint custody with physical custody alternating every year. Mother 
requested primary custody of the children with liberal visitation for Father, 
and temporary spousal support for a period of three years. During three days of 
trial, the district court heard testimony from numerous witnesses, including 
Mother, Father, Father's parents, teachers, friends, and Father's expert, Larry 
Andrews, who had acted as mediator for the parties prior to the filing for 
divorce, and later was Father's counselor. 

 

[¶9] On November 8, 1996, 
ruling from the bench, the district court ordered that each party would have 
custody of the children during one-half of the summer and during alternating 
periods every nine weeks during the school year. The children's primary place of 
residence was that of the primary custodial parent during each period. 
Visitation was ordered one evening per week and every other weekend, alternating 
on the same schedule as the primary custody. The district court underscored that 
it was not ordering joint custody, but a shared custody arrangement. However, 
the district court also ordered the parties to cooperate and consult with each 
other regarding decisions affecting the children and to choose medical and 
health care professionals together.

 

[¶10] Mother's request for 
alimony was denied, the district court finding that "the property settlement 
tends to put the parties on substantial footing, other than their current 
earning abilities." The district court entered a final Nunc Pro Tunc Decree of 
Divorce on March 28, 1997. This timely appeal followed. 

 

                                      
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶11] Custody, visitation, 
child support, and alimony are all committed to the sound discretion of the 
district court. Scherer v. Scherer, 931 P.2d 251, 253-54 (Wyo. 1997); Triggs v. 
Triggs, 920 P.2d 653, 657 (Wyo. 1996); Basolo v. Basolo, 907 P.2d 348, 352 (Wyo. 
1995). It has been our consistent principle that in custody matters, the welfare 
and needs of the children are to be given paramount consideration. Scherer, 931 P.2d  at 254; Rowan v. Rowan, 786 P.2d 886, 890 (Wyo. 1990); see also Gurney v. 
Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 55 (Wyo. 1995) and Fink v. Fink, 685 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 
1984). The determination of the best interests of the child is a question for 
the trier of fact. "We do not overturn the decision of the trial court unless we 
are persuaded of an abuse of discretion or the presence of a violation of some 
legal principle." Fink, 685 P.2d  at 36.

 

[¶12] A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances.  Pinther v. 
Pinther, 888 P.2d 1250, 1252 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Dowdy v. Dowdy, 864 P.2d 439, 
440 (Wyo. 1993)). Our review entails evaluation of the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the district court's decision, and we afford to the 
prevailing party every favorable inference while omitting any consideration of 
evidence presented by the unsuccessful party. Triggs, 920 P.2d  at 657; Cranston 
v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 351 (Wyo. 1994). Findings of fact not supported by 
the evidence, contrary to the evidence, or against the great weight of the 
evidence cannot be sustained. Jones v. Jones, 858 P.2d 289, 291 (Wyo. 1993). 
Similarly, an abuse of discretion is present "`when a material factor deserving 
significant weight is ignored.'" Triggs, 920 P.2d  at 657 (quoting Vanasse v. 
Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 996 (Wyo. 1993)).

 

                                          
IV. DISCUSSION

 

A. CUSTODY

 

[¶13] Mother claims the 
district court's division of custody is an abuse of discretion because it is 
unsupported by evidence and because the district court failed to consider 
Mother's role as the primary caregiver to the children. The law affords wide 
discretion to the district court when fashioning custody and visitation 
provisions for the best interests of the children. Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-113 (Repl. 
1994) provides, in relevant part:

 

(a) In granting a divorce or annulment of a marriage, 
the court may make such disposition of the children as appears most expedient 
and beneficial for the well-being of the children. The court shall consider the 
relative competency of both parents and no award of custody shall be made solely 
on the basis of gender of the parent. If the court finds that both parents have 
shown the ability to act in the best interest of the child, the court may order 
any arrangement that encourages parents to share in the rights and 
responsibilities of rearing their children after the parents have separated or 
dissolved their marriage. * * *

 

          
* * *

 

(p) The court may award custody under this section in 
accordance with subsection (a) of this section. Custody shall be crafted to 
promote the best interests of the child, and may include any combination of 
joint, shared or sole custody as the circumstances may 
require.

 

[¶14] The great discretion 
given to the district court in fashioning family relationships encompasses one 
of the most difficult and demanding tasks assigned to a trial judge. This 
life-altering decision is perhaps most exacting in cases such as this, where it 
is apparent that both parents love their children and are fit and competent to 
have custody. Every case, however, requires careful weighing of relevant 
factors, looking to the unique and individual family relationships, in order to 
reach a resolution in the best interests of the children in that 
family.

 

[¶15] To determine whether a 
district court has abused its discretion, we must rely on the district court's 
articulation of the factors which were considered and how those factors support 
its conclusions.

 

To play fair, a trial judge relying on discretionary 
power should place on record the circumstances and factors that were crucial to 
his determination. He should spell out his reasons as well as he can so that 
counsel and the reviewing court will know and be in a position to evaluate the 
soundness of his decision.

 

Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial 
Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 Syracuse L.Rev. 635, 665-66 
(1971).  Unfortunately, we are 
provided scarce explanation for the custody arrangement ordered in this case; 
one which substantially deviates from the requests of the parties and is unique 
to the experience of this court.

 

[¶16] Looking to the 
district court's oral rulings1 regarding custody, the district 
court began by noting that the children "have two good parents, and the decision 
is made in what appears to be in their best interests." The district court then 
detailed the shared custody arrangement and encouraged the parties to provide 
visitation in addition to the designated weekends and one evening per week. The 
district court continued:

 

Now, this may sound like a lot of going back and 
forth, but actually it isn't that much. From what I've already heard the kids 
are already going back and forth a lot right now. They love both parents. They 
are comfortable in either home. They both live in the same community. Both 
testified here in Court that they have no plans to move or change their 
residences. So I'm trying to devise this in such a way that neither parent has 
the upper hand over the other, but more importantly from the standpoint of the 
kids, that they maintain an on-going, strong and healthy parent to child 
relationship between both mother and father.

 

[¶17] We have repeatedly 
stated that divided custody is not favored by this court. Martin v. Martin, 798 P.2d 321, 322 (Wyo. 1990); Feaster v. Feaster, 721 P.2d 1095, 1098 (Wyo. 1986); 
Fink, 685 P.2d  at 36 n. 1; Forbes v. Forbes, 672 P.2d 428, 430 (Wyo. 1983); 
Ayling v. Ayling, 661 P.2d 1054, 1055 n. 3 (Wyo. 1983). There are several 
reasons for our reluctance to embrace the concept, but first and foremost is the 
recognition that stability in a child's environment is of utmost importance to 
the child's well-being, and divided custody places the stability of a child's 
environment at risk. Whether termed "divided," "shared," or "joint" physical 
custody, "a measure of instability is inherent" in the arrangement. Gurney, 899 P.2d  at 55.2 We do not dispute that there may be 
cases where joint or shared physical custody may approximate the former family 
relationships more closely than other custodial arrangements, or for other good 
reason may be in the best interests of the children. However, divided physical 
custody may not be indiscriminately substituted for an award of sole custody to 
one parent in order to appease one party.

 

[¶18] The district court 
stated that it ordered divided custody, in part, to promote "an ongoing, strong 
and healthy parent to child relationship between both mother and father." There 
is nothing in the record, however, which supports the notion that transferring 
the children from one household to the other six times a year is necessary to 
maintain their current relationship with both parents.  Neither is there evidence that such an 
arrangement would improve these relationships in the 
future.

 

[¶19] During the year 
preceding the hearing, Mother had sole custody of the children. During that 
time, Father's relationship with the children did not deteriorate, but improved. 
Father admitted that during the separation he devoted more time to the children 
than when the marriage was intact. He also stated that Mother was flexible about 
arranging visitation to his schedule and that Mother assisted the children's 
relationship with Father. Mr. Andrews, Father's expert, testified that shared 
physical custody does not necessarily help keep the relationship with both 
parents strong any more than other custody options.

 

[¶20] Neither is there 
evidence that divided custody more closely approximates the family relationships 
at any time prior to the court's order. The district court's comment that the 
children were already "going back and forth" has no basis in the record. All the 
testimony reflects a traditional visitation schedule with Father. The record is 
replete with testimony, however, which established Mother as the primary 
caregiver of the children throughout their lives, and her exemplary ability to 
nurture and care for the children. There is nothing which supports the 
conclusion that the divided custody arrangement would not be a drastic change 
from what the children had known before.

 

[¶21] The district court's 
determination that the children were "comfortable" in both homes does not 
sufficiently address the disruption which unavoidably results from moving the 
children's primary residence four times during the school year. Although it is 
true that the parents intended to remain in the same town, the district court 
did not consider the children's dependence on Mother as the primary caregiver, 
which was consistent throughout the children's lives. The district court offered 
no explanation regarding the children's ability to handle the sweeping changes 
imposed, nor did the district court express why such changes would be in the 
children's best interests.

 

[¶22] The success of a joint 
or shared custody arrangement hinges on the extent to which the parents are able 
to communicate and agree on the matters relevant to the children's welfare. 
Gurney, 899 P.2d  at 54-55. As to the communication between these parties and 
their ability to work together, the district court stated:

 

Part of what I'm doing, I'll admit, comes really 
close to the idea of joint custody, but it falls short of that because in the 
final analysis the parent providing the primary residence at the time is the 
primary custodian. But, what you really have to do and this was mixed testimony 
about this, and I know [Mother] said she didn't think [Father] could agree and 
cooperate, but I read a couple letters that [Mother and Father] wrote that were 
in evidence, which were only for the good and you were working very hard on 
that, and you did come to agreement on the property issue and some other 
issues.

 

I 
guess what I'm doing is putting my money on this proposition that if I get you 
past the gap that you couldn't bridge, that was the question of custody and 
visitation and give that to you in a Court order, you both are big enough, smart 
enough, and compassionate enough people to take this order and cooperate with 
each other and make it work because that's what the kids need you to 
do.

 

Apparently uncertain whether 
the parties would take to heart its words of encouragement for future 
cooperation, the district court concluded by adding a little salt with the 
sugar:

 

The other thing I need to mention is that always, 
always, on matters of importance in school and church, medical care, and the 
like, don't even think of making these important decisions by yourself. You 
can't do it. * * * You discuss those things. You must. You may not want to. You 
may be reluctant to, but if you don't I'll tell you to come back and enjoy your 
time in Court every year, and that is to go off on your own tangent, make your 
own decision without regard to the other regarding the children, and I'll 
guarantee you I will be seeing you often and it will cost you a lot, more in 
terms of emotions, bitterness, anger than in terms of 
money.

 

So 
I hope that you will not do that to the children. I hope you won't do it to 
yourselves.

 

I 
can't think of a couple I have ever had in Court before that I can look at and 
say with more meaning, I think you can do this. I know that you 
can.

 

[¶23] We fail to find record 
support for the district court's optimistic evaluation of the parties' future 
ability to cooperate. While it is true that the parties did reach agreement 
regarding temporary custody and a property settlement, the record indicates that 
agreement was achieved only after lengthy negotiation. Moreover, not only did 
the parties fail to agree on a permanent custody arrangement, but the transfer 
of favorite toys and clothing, inherent in the arrangement ordered by the 
district court, was a major source of contention during the separation period. 
While these problems may abate with resolution of the custody issues, "[b]lind 
hope that a joint custody agreement will succeed, or that forcing the 
responsibility of joint decision-making upon the warring parents will bring 
peace, is not acceptable." Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 508 A.2d 964, 972 
(1986). The fact that the parties finally reached agreement on property issues 
is insufficient to conclude that they are able to communicate on the level 
necessary to resolve the custodial details.

 

[¶24] The district court's 
ruling makes no mention of the three individual children that are affected by 
this order, nor does the district court attempt in any way to address their 
individual needs. Mr. Andrews testified regarding the difficulties children 
experience when they are required to move from one home to the other. When asked 
about annually alternating physical custody, the arrangement proposed by Father, 
Mr. Andrews stated that such arrangements can be very disruptive due to a lack 
of consistency in scheduling, discipline, and contact with playmates. Loyalty 
conflicts experienced by children, which arise in many custody situations, can 
be exacerbated when the children are shifted from one environment to the other. 
Although Mr. Andrews found Father to be capable and caring, he recommended 
Mother be given primary custody with visitation by Father "as close to fifty 
percent * * * as is humanly possible."

 

[¶25] The problems for 
children who are required to alternate between residences has been recognized by 
many courts. In re Marriage of Swanson, 275 Ill. App.3d 519, 212 Ill.Dec. 62, 
656 N.E.2d 215, 218 (1995) (constantly shifting children between houses is 
detrimental - children need a home base); Davis v. Davis, 63 Ill. App.3d 465, 20 
Ill.Dec. 437, 380 N.E.2d 415, 418 (1978); In re Marriage of Hickey, 386 N.W.2d 141, 143 (Iowa App. 1986); Brisco v. Brisco, 713 S.W.2d 586, 590 (Mo. App. 
1986). Implicit in the authorization to award divided custody is that the court 
do so after becoming reasonably satisfied that for the child the positive 
aspects outweigh the negative.

 

[¶26] Here, there is no 
evidence to support the conclusion that the transfer of custody six times a year 
affords any benefit to these children. To the contrary, it is uncontested that 
the children were well-behaved, well-adjusted, and performing at above-average 
levels at school throughout the time that Mother had primary custody of the 
children. Father's relationship with the children improved under this 
arrangement. In other words, the evidence points to only one reasonable 
conclusion: the temporary custody arrangement in place for almost a year promoted the best interests 
of these children. No evidence was presented at the hearing which justified the 
changes ordered by the district court.

 

[¶27] The district court's 
order, calculated to avoid a parental "upper hand," appears to stem from the 
belief that splitting the prize down the middle is the fairest means to resolve 
an impasse. The district court's ruling focuses on the abilities of the parents 
to pull off what might be fairly characterized as a social experiment. We 
believe that social experimentation is best left to volunteers and firmly reject 
the indiscriminate resolution of a custodial dispute via mathematical 
equity.

 

[¶28] The children's best 
interests are unquestionably promoted by the continuance of Mother's primary 
nurturing role, with Father continuing to exercise liberal visitation. The order 
of the district court is reversed and the matter is remanded with instruction to 
award primary custody to Mother.

 

                                            
B. ALIMONY

 

[¶29] Based on the 
substantial discrepancy in Mother's earning capability compared to that of 
Father, Mother requested an award of alimony for a period of three years. She 
maintains that the district court abused its discretion in denying her request. 

 

[¶30] Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-114 
(1997) provides:

 

In 
granting a divorce, the court shall make such disposition of the property of the 
parties as appears just and equitable, having regard for the respective merits 
of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the 
party through whom the property was acquired and the burdens imposed upon the 
property for the benefit of either party and children. The court may decree to 
either party reasonable alimony out of the estate of the other having regard for 
the other's ability and may order so much of the other's real estate or the 
rents and profits thereof as is necessary be assigned and set out to either 
party for life, or may decree a specific sum be paid by either 
party.

 

The decision for any award 
of alimony is vested within the responsible discretion of the district court. 
Muller v. Muller, 838 P.2d 198, 200 (Wyo. 1992). We have said that "in making a 
just and equitable settlement, judicial discretion is not a reward or punishment 
but simply fairness." Id. Although alimony may not be favored under Wyoming case 
law, Broadhead v. Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731, 739 (Wyo. 1987); Hendrickson v. 
Hendrickson, 583 P.2d 1265, 1269 (Wyo. 1978) (McClintock, J., dissenting); see 
also Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 821 (Wyo. 1984) and Young v. Young, 
472 P.2d 784, 786 (Wyo. 1970), it is specifically authorized by statute and 
recognized to be appropriate under the proper 
circumstances.

 

[¶31] The purpose of alimony 
is to provide a post-divorce substitute for the support provided to a spouse 
during the marriage. Sellers v. Sellers, 775 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Wyo. 1989). "The 
objective criteria for an award of alimony include the ability of the payor 
spouse to pay and the necessity of support for the payee." Id. In determining 
whether alimony is appropriate, child support, alimony, division of property and 
other financial matters must be considered together. Smith v. Smith, 704 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Wyo. 1985); Klatt v. Klatt, 654 P.2d 733, 738-39 (Wyo. 
1982).

 

[¶32] In this case, there is 
no doubt that there was a substantial difference in the parties' earning 
abilities at the time of the hearing.  
Having spent the last fifteen years working full-time at home, Mother 
entered the field of real estate in 1995. Testimony revealed that it takes two 
to three years to "be up and running" as a real estate agent, and the average 
yearly income at that time would be $15,000.00 to $20,000.00. While Mother 
earned $2,300.00 from January through October 1996, Father's annual income was 
over $80,000.00. During the separation, Mother supported herself and the 
children with child support payments supplemented by loans from her parents. The 
property division was essentially a 50/50 division with Mother receiving 
approximately $100,000.00 as her share of the home, investments and personal 
property, plus half the retirement funds through a Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order.

 

[¶33] An award of 
maintenance involves an evaluation of the financial needs of both parties and is 
necessarily affected by a determination of child custody. In re Marriage of 
Swanson, 212 Ill.Dec. at 67-68, 656 N.E.2d  at 220-21. Given our disposition of 
the custody issues, the changed circumstances of the parties may affect the 
district court's assessment of Mother's need for maintenance. We therefore 
vacate the district court's decision regarding alimony and remand for 
reconsideration.

 

                       
                   V. 
CONCLUSION

 

[¶34] The district court's 
order mandating divided custody is unsupported by the evidence. To the contrary, 
the evidence presented results in only one reasonable conclusion. The children's 
best interests are served by awarding primary custody to Mother, with liberal 
visitation for Father. We therefore reverse the order of the district court and 
remand for disposition in accordance with this opinion. Given that the 
determination of alimony is inextricably bound to a custody determination, we 
vacate this portion of the district court's order and remand for 
reconsideration.

 

          

FOOTNOTES

1The final Amended Nunc Pro Tunc Decree 
of Divorce is silent as to the factors supporting shared custody other than the 
custody arrangement is "[i]n the best interests of the minor children * * 
*."

2In the 
past, we have discussed the importance of stability for a child in the context 
of a request to modify a custody order, recognizing our standard requiring "a 
substantial change of circumstances" appropriately protects the stability 
created by a permanent custody order. Gurney, 899 P.2d  at 54. Although the 
"substantial change of circumstances" standard is not applicable in the 
determination of an original custody order, the district court must nonetheless 
consider each child's past experiences to determine his or her best interests in 
the future. When a child is in a stable and nurturing environment, that 
arrangement should not be unduly disrupted absent good reasons for doing so.