Case Title: Polston v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-148

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-06-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Polston v. State1984 WY 58685 P.2d 1Case Number: 83-148Decided: 06/15/1984RUSSELL M. POLSTON, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
RUSSELL M. POLSTON, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, WestonCounty, Paul T. Liamos, 
Jr., J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender; Sylvia Lee Hackl, Appellate Counsel, Wyoming 
Public Defender Program; Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid 
Program; and Gerald P. Luckhaupt, Student Intern, for appellant; oral argument presented 
by Gerald P. Luckhaupt.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Margaret M. White, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee; oral argument presented 
by Margaret M. White.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and 
CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Russell Polston appeals 
his conviction of mayhem pursuant to § 6-4-601, W.S. 19771 and his sentence to the Wyoming 
State Penitentiary for a term of not less than three nor more than ten years 
with the last three months thereof required to be served at the Wyoming State 
Hospital in the alcohol and drug abuse program. 

[¶2.]     We will modify the 
sentence and affirm the judgment as modified.

I

[¶3.]     The first issue we 
consider is, as stated by appellant:

"The evidence was 
insufficient to support appellant's conviction for mayhem. Thus the trial court 
erred in not granting appellant's motions for judgment of acquittal as the 
evidence was not sufficient to establish that appellant had the requisite 
`malicious intent to disfigure' * * *"

[¶4.]     In ruling upon a motion 
for judgment of acquittal, which is addressed to questions of sufficiency of 
evidence, we adhere to our long-established rule that if, viewing the evidence 
presented in a light most favorable to the prosecution, leaving out of 
consideration any evidence in conflict therewith, and drawing all possible, 
reasonable inferences therefrom, there exists substantial evidence which would 
support a conviction, the question is for the jury; and if it returns a 
conviction, its verdict, at least with respect to sufficiency of evidence, must 
be affirmed. Murray v. State, Wyo., 671 P.2d 320 
(1983).

"`* * * Stated another 
way - it is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
for us, but rather whether it is sufficient to form the basis for a reasonable 
inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by the jury when the 
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. * * *'" Grabill v. State, Wyo., 621 P.2d 802, 803 
(1980).

[¶5.]     The evening of December 
18, 1982, Russell Polston, appellant, and his girl friend Virginia "Ginger" 
Olson attended a party at the home of a friend. Appellant was drinking heavily 
and, in his words, became "very drunk." When Ginger was in the bathroom, a man 
opened the door. Appellant became angry, "ticked off," and said something to 
Ginger about it. She left the party with a girl friend, going to a nightclub in 
Newcastle, Wyoming.

[¶6.]     A short time later, 
appellant left the party and appeared at the nightclub, walking around, asking 
about and looking for Ginger. He found her dancing with another man, grabbed her 
by the arm, was angry, pulled her away and was talking to her as they left the 
dance floor. The man who had been dancing with Ginger was walking behind them 
when suddenly appellant turned around, punched him alongside the head, and then 
took another swing that missed as the man's glasses fell off. Ginger left the 
nightclub with a girl friend, upset and crying.

[¶7.]     A short time passed, 
and appellant soon was involved in an argument with another patron of the 
nightclub. Someone stepped between them to "break it up," and appellant jumped 
on him. There was a fight. Appellant was drunk, stumbling, was kicked in the 
head, and apparently knocked unconscious. In a short time appellant was 
conscious and then was put out the back door of the 
nightclub.

[¶8.]     A Miss Cox walked with 
appellant from the back to the front of the nightclub parking area. She decided 
that, because of his drinking, he should not operate a vehicle and that she 
would drive him home. They walked to his pickup. Appellant entered the passenger 
side of the pickup and sat on the seat. Virginia Olson had walked up near the 
rear of the pickup. Suddenly appellant yelled "Ginger," jumped out of the 
pickup, ran to the rear of it, where in a "split second" he was on top of Ginger 
(Miss Olson), his body at an angle, his head over hers. Miss Olson cried out or 
yelled. According to Miss Cox, appellant had bitten off Miss Olson's nose at 
that time. Some people across the street heard Miss Olson yell. They ran over to 
the scene of this incident, grabbed appellant but could not pull him off her. 
One of the men hit him alongside of the head, and he went limp. They then pulled 
him off, and he was helped into his truck. Miss Cox, in driving him home, noted 
that he spit something out, but thought it was blood. It was two-thirds of Miss 
Olson's nose he spit out on the floor of the truck. 

[¶9.]     The next morning, while 
driving his pickup, appellant was arrested by a deputy sheriff. The deputy found 
Virginia Olson's nose on the floor of the pickup. He put the nose in a vial of 
cracked ice and sent it to the hospital in South Dakota, to which Miss Olson had been 
admitted. The nose could not be reattached. A photograph of the nose was 
received into evidence.

[¶10.]  Mayhem, a specific intent crime, requires 
for conviction a "malicious intent to maim or disfigure," § 6-4-601, supra. We 
have long held that,

"`When a statute makes an 
offense to consist of an act combined with a particular intent, that intent is 
just as necessary to be proved as the act itself, and must be found by the jury, 
as matter of fact, before a conviction can be had. * * *'" Bryant v. State, 7 Wyo. 311, 318, 56 P. 596, 
597 (1899).

Specific intent 
being a state of mind ordinarily must be proved by circumstantial evidence. 21 
Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 130. With respect to the proof required, we 
said:

"* * * it was unnecessary 
to prove the specific intent by direct, positive, and independent evidence; but, 
as the court remarked, by quoting from one of its own earlier decisions, `The 
jury may draw the inference, as they draw all other inferences, from any facts 
in evidence which to their minds fairly prove its existence,' * * *." Id., 56 P.  at 
597.

[¶11.]  Miss Olson, who was married to appellant 
at the time of trial, testified that what occurred was an accident. However, she 
admitted on cross-examination that she had not claimed the incident was an 
accident when she testified at the preliminary hearing. Appellant, testifying in 
his own behalf, admitted that he was "ticked off" over the bathroom incident 
earlier in the evening. Other witnesses testified that appellant was angry when 
he grabbed Miss Olson's arm, stopped her from dancing, and forced her off the 
dance floor. Whatever he said to her at that time, she was upset and crying as 
she left the nightclub. Appellant was then involved in a second fight from which 
one could reasonably infer he might be further angered. Next, while seated in 
his pickup, he noticed Miss Olson standing near the rear of the pickup. Miss 
Cox, who was present, testified that appellant yelled "Ginger" and was "out of 
the pickup in a split second." "He was running around the end of the pickup 
where Ginger was at." "And he had her on the ground, was doing the damage, or 
whatever - I mean he was on top of her." "After Ginger yelled and after that 
they came over, some people came over and pulled Russ off and some people helped 
Ginger up off the ground." A doctor testified to the considerable force required 
in biting to break the skin and to the difficulty involved in biting off the 
nose.

[¶12.]  From this evidence the jury could 
reasonably infer that appellant was angry the entire evening. He expressed his 
anger over Miss Olson being in the bathroom when the bathroom door was opened; 
he was in two fights involving physical violence; he forcibly stopped Miss Olson 
from dancing with another man and took her crying off the dance floor. His being 
ejected from the nightclub through the back door was a culmination of all that 
had occurred; and when he saw Miss Olson, who in his mind was the cause of all 
his anger, the physical violence, he yelled at her, grabbed her and put her down 
on the ground and bit off two-thirds of her nose with the deliberate intention 
of maiming or disfiguring her. The jury found this a more reasonable inference 
than that the occurrence was accidental. That was the function of the jury, and 
we will not retry the case on appeal. There was evidence from which the jury 
could find "malicious intent to maim or disfigure," and substantial evidence 
supporting the conviction.

II

[¶13.]  Appellant raises a second issue, 
stating:

"The trial court erred by 
refusing to instruct the jury as to automatism or unconsciousness, which theory 
was offered in defendant's Instruction A and so prejudiced the defendant thereby 
as to be a denial of * * * due process * * *."

[¶14.]  The defense of unconsciousness and the 
defense of insanity are not the same, Carter v. State, Okla. Cr.App., 376 P.2d 351 (1962), although both involve an abnormal mental condition. They differ in 
statutory and other definition, the rules governing pleas and proof, and their 
treatment by the courts. The statute2 providing the defense of not guilty 
by reason of "insanity" was repealed by the legislature with the adoption of § 
7-11-305(a), W.S. 19773 which substituted therefor the 
defense of not guilty by reason of "mental illness or 
deficiency."

[¶15.]  Mental deficiency is defined as, among 
other things:

"* * * [A] defect 
attributable to * * * brain damage * * *." Section 7-11-301(a)(iii), W.S. 
1977.

[¶16.]  If the abnormal mental condition raised 
as a defense is a "mental illness or deficiency," then defendant may not 
introduce evidence to establish this defense without first entering a plea of 
"not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency." Upon entry of this plea, 
§ 7-11-303, W.S. 1977,4 provides for a court-ordered mental 
examination of defendant with reports of the results of the examination being 
provided to both the prosecution and defense.

[¶17.]  In Fulcher v. State, Wyo., 633 P.2d 142 
(1981), over a vigorous dissent by Justice John Raper, Retired, we became one of 
a few states that recognize the abnormal mental condition called "automatism" 
caused by brain injury as a defense in itself, separate and apart from the 
defense of not guilty because of "mental illness or deficiency" provided by § 
7-11-305(a), supra. We approved the defense where there was "unconsciousness" 
resulting from "brain damage" caused by "concussion," but held that the "brain 
damage" must be only a "simple brain trauma with no permanent aftereffects"; and 
we stated further that brain damage causing a "serious and irreversible 
condition having an impact upon the ability of the person to function * * * far 
more significant than a temporary and transitory condition," was a "mental 
deficiency" within § 7-11-301(a)(iii), supra, requiring a plea beforehand of not 
guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency. Fulcher v. State, 
supra.

[¶18.]  The effect of proof of the defense of 
"unconsciousness" causing an automatistic state is that the action resulting in 
the crime charged is not voluntary; that therefore the actor cannot entertain 
either a specific or general intent necessary to guilt of a crime. The defense 
of automatism may be raised upon a plea of not guilty as was done in this case. 
Being a special defense, however, involving an abnormal mental condition, the 
prosecution should have reasonable notice of it before trial and an opportunity 
for examination of defendant. Although not controlling in this case, we herewith 
announce that in all future cases, the defense of automatism may not be raised 
unless such notice and opportunity for examination is 
provided.

[¶19.]  The elements necessary to establish the 
defense of automatism under the facts of this case are the 
following:

(a) The actor must be a 
person with a healthy mind

(b) who because of a 
concussion

(c) resulting from a 
brain injury

(d) that is a simple 
brain trauma with no permanent aftereffects

(e) acts in a state of 
unconsciousness

(f) in which his actions 
are devoid of criminal intent. State v. 
Fulcher, supra.

[¶20.]  We have heretofore held in cases where 
the defense of insanity was raised that the defendant was presumed to be sane 
and, therefore, defendant carried the burden of proving insanity. Once evidence 
was introduced, however, reasonably demonstrating insanity, it then was the 
burden of the State to prove defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Reilly v. State, Wyo., 496 P.2d 899, 
rehearing denied 498 P.2d 1236 (1972). With respect to a plea of not guilty by 
reason of mental illness or deficiency, § 7-11-305(b), W.S. 1977, 
provides:

"(b) The prosecution 
shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense charged 
and the mental responsibility of the defendant. However, every defendant is 
presumed to be mentally responsible and the burden of first going forward and 
entering evidence on the issue of mental responsibility is upon the 
defendant."

We are not bound 
in this case by the rules governing sanity pleas or pleas of not guilty by 
reason of mental illness or deficiency for, as we have said, the defenses are 
not the same as where the defense of automatism is asserted. Carter v. State, supra. We agree with Commonwealth ex rel. Cummins v. Price, 
421 Pa. 
396, 218 A.2d 758 (1966), wherein, quoting from another case, it is 
stated:

"`* * * The general 
presumption is that every man is normal and is possessed of ordinary faculties; 
such defenses as intoxication, insanity and aphasia (or a mind not conscious of 
its acts) are affirmative defenses, and the burden is on the defendant to 
establish them. * *'" 218 A.2d  at 760.

We therefore 
hold that a defendant who raises the automatism defense is presumed to be a 
person with a healthy mind; that the burden is upon the defendant who raises the 
defense of automatism to prove the elements necessary to establish the defense; 
and the burden remains with the defendant throughout the 
trial.

[¶21.]  A concussion is defined 
as

"The condition or damage 
resulting from a violent impact or jarring of a tissue, especially of the brain. 
A concussion of the brain is marked by slow breathing, weak pulse, vomiting, 
unconsciousness, etc." 1 Schmidt's Attorneys' Dictionary of Medicine (1984), p. 
C-206.

3A Gordy-Gray, 
Attorneys' Textbook of Medicine (3rd Ed. 1983), states 
that,

"* * * [C]lassic 
manifestations of cerebral concussion include 1) loss of consciousness; 2) 
amnesia, and 3) disturbances of nervous system mechanisms." Section 
88.20

Section 
88.22:

"Amnesia may be 
anterograde or retrograde, meaning that the patient won't remember anything 
about a variable point of time extending both before or after concussion. * * 
*"

Section 
88.23:

"Many other disturbances 
are observed in concussion but they are variable so that no single symptom can 
be considered characteristic. Among them are nausea; vomiting; alterations in 
pulse rate, blood pressure and temperature; dizziness; headaches; disturbances 
of respiration; tremors; and sensations of heat and cold. * * * 

"Two signs which are 
observed in all cases of concussion, however, are apathy and 
weakness."

Amnesia is 
defined as

"Loss of memory as a 
result of organic trauma, delirium lesions of the diencephalon area of the 
brain, hysteria or epilepsy. Functionally, identity loss can represent a means 
of coping with neurotic conflict. Three types of amnesia are: anterograde 
(inability to retain new impressions; may be a feature of senility); retrograde 
(failure to recall prior experiences); lacunar (loss of memory for certain 
periods of life). * * *" Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979), p. 
76.

Automatism is 
defined as

"Behavior performed in a 
state of mental unconsciousness or dissociation without full awareness, i.e., 
somnambulism, fugues. [The] term is applied to actions or conduct of an 
individual apparently occurring without will, purpose, or reasoned intention on 
his part; a condition sometimes observed in persons who, without being actually 
insane, suffer from an obscuration of the mental faculties, loss of volition or 
of memory, or kindred affections. `Ambulatory automatism' describes the 
pathological impulse to purposeless and irresponsible wanderings from place to 
place often characteristic of patients suffering from loss of memory with 
dissociation of personality. * * *" Black's Law Dictionary, supra, p. 
122.

One suffering 
from amnesia may have no memory of events for a period of time both before and 
after the alleged occurrence. The period of time covered by memory loss may be 
as short as a few minutes and as long as several years. Merely because one has 
no memory of an event does not establish that the event occurred in an 
automatisic state in which there was no voluntary action. In United States ex rel. Parson v. 
Anderson, 354 F. Supp. 1060 (D.Del. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1072, 94 S. Ct. 586, 38 L. Ed. 2d 479 (1973), Parson's memory of past events was intact 
except for a few hours before the crime and a few hours after his arrest. He 
could not remember any of the events during this period of time. The court noted 
that amnesia was not an unusual phenomena and quoting from other cases stated 
that:

"* * * [C]ases abound 
with commonly used statements or testimony by a person accused or convicted of 
murder that `I don't remember anything'; `my mind went blank'; `I blacked out'; 
`I panicked and don't remember what I did or anything that happened.'" 354 F. Supp.  at 1071.

Thus a 
concussion and lack of memory by themselves are not sufficient to establish that 
the individual during the period of time he is unable to recall was acting in an 
automatistic state. That individual during that period of time may have been 
fully conscious, aware, angry, acting purposely, and with intent to maim and 
disfigure, and later not recall any of the events. The inability to recall may 
have been a means of "coping with neurotic conflict"; an inability to accept or 
face the enormity of his actions that resulted in maiming and disfiguring 
another human being by biting off two-thirds of a nose; an inability to accept 
blame or responsibility for such action.

[¶22.]  In Goodman v. State, Wyo., 573 P.2d 400, 409 
(1977), citing from 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1313, we 
said,

"`No instruction should 
be given which is not reasonably supported by the evidence, or which is not 
based on some theory logically deducible from some portion of the evidence. Thus 
an instruction should not be given on evidence which at the most merely raises a 
possibility or a conjecture, or which is inconsistent with the physical facts, 
or which is so inconsistent and its connection so slight that the court may set 
aside a verdict thereon. * * * For the purpose of determining whether an 
instruction in favor of accused should be given, the court must view the 
evidence in a light as favorable to him as is justifiable, and accused's 
testimony must be taken as entirely true.'" (Emphasis 
omitted.)

 

[¶23.]  We look to appellant's testimony which we 
accept as true. It was as follows:

"Q. How drunk do you feel 
you were that night?

"A. The - I don't know 
how to put it. I have never been that drunk in my life.

"Q. Okay. 
Drunk?

"A. Yes; very 
drunk."

And with respect 
to his memory of what occurred, appellant, after testifying he had been drinking 
whiskey early in the evening, said he did not remember anything, not from the 
time he received the kick to the head, but from the time of leaving the party at 
a friend's house in a drunken condition.

[¶24.]  Appellant thereafter was in a fight in 
which he was kicked in the head. The only evidence in the entire trial that 
appellant may have suffered a concussion before he bit off Miss Olson's nose 
comes from this single question and answer on 
cross-examination,

"Q. And Mr. Polston was 
knocked out?

"A. Yes, 
sir."

Appellant 
testified that he was unable to remember the events of the evening beginning 
sometime before the fight and kick to the head and ending with the time Janice 
Cox insisted on driving him home after the incident. He said he did not recall 
biting off two-thirds of Miss Olson's nose. This is the entire evidence upon 
which appellant relies to establish that the court was required as a matter of 
law to instruct upon automatism. There was no evidence that he suffered a 
concussion except that he was unconscious for a short time. We do not know 
whether the unconsciousness resulted from the blow to the head or his extreme 
drunken condition. There was no medical examination or x-rays or evidence of 
skull fracture or head injury. Appellant received no medical treatment. A 
concussion was never diagnosed. If he suffered a concussion, there was no 
testimony that it was a simple brain trauma with no permanent aftereffects as 
required by Fulcher v. State, supra. 
If it was more significant than a temporary and transitory condition, he could 
not raise this defense. There was no evidence that appellant was devoid of 
criminal intent as required by Fulcher v. 
State, supra. Not a single witness, medical or otherwise, testified to facts 
that could be said to reasonably place before the jury the elements necessary to 
raise the defense of automatism. The evidence here raises no more than a 
possibility or conjecture, and we have said that is not enough to support an 
instruction to the jury. Goodman v. 
State, supra.

[¶25.]  The defense of automatism is provided by 
legislative enactment in California. Whether it was error to fail to 
instruct the jury on this defense was considered in People v. Ray, 14 Cal. 3d 20, 120 Cal. Rptr. 377, 533 P.2d 1017 (1975), a case in which defendant relied upon 
evidence,

"* * * that four hours 
before the killing he had been rendered unconscious as the result of a beating 
by the victim and that during the altercation immediately preceding the killing 
the victim inflicted other wounds which, according to defendant, when combined 
with his previous wound, rendered him unconscious." 120 Cal. Rptr.  at 379, 533 P.2d  at 1019.

[¶26.]  Defendant contended the court was 
required to instruct sua sponte on the defense of unconsciousness. The 
California 
court, quoting from another case, agreed, stating,

"`It is settled that in 
criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial court must instruct 
on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. 
* * *' * * * The duty to instruct * * * includes * * * the defense of 
involuntary unconsciousness but only when it appears that the defendant is 
relying on that defense, `or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such 
a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the 
case.' * * *" 120 Cal. Rptr.  at 379, 533 P.2d  at 
1019.

[¶27.]  An expert witness testified that 
defendant had taken drugs and that the drug level of defendant in conjunction 
with a concussion of the brain would result in difficulty in thought 
transmissions and in the formation of sound judgments. Lay witnesses testified 
that defendant appeared dazed at the times of the 
encounters.

[¶28.]  The court then held that the trial court 
was not required to instruct on the defense of automatism since no expert 
testified that following the first altercation defendant thereafter continued to 
function in an unconscious state as a result of his 
experiences.

[¶29.]  The court further stated that such an 
instruction is not required where it would have been inconsistent with the 
complete defense asserted by defendant that he killed only in 
self-defense.

[¶30.]  In the above case, the California court 
held that a blow to the head with a claimed unconscious state at the time of the 
homicide even when supported by psychiatric testimony was not enough to require 
giving an automatism instruction where no witness testified that defendant was 
functioning in an unconscious state, and where the defendant relied upon 
self-defense in defending at trial. We have no difficulty holding that a blow to 
the head, coupled with a claimed loss of memory and nothing more in the way of 
evidence, does not require the giving of an instruction on automatism, 
especially where, as here, the defendant also defends claiming the biting off of 
Miss Olson's nose was an accident. Miss Olson testified in support of this 
theory in considerable detail as to how her leg gave way, she fell to the 
ground, and as she struck the ground, the accident occurred in which appellant 
bit off her nose. The trial judge properly refused the 
instruction.

[¶31.]  Though unnecessary to our decision, we 
note in passing, the overwhelming evidence of appellant's extreme drunken 
condition. His lack of memory did not commence with the blow to the head but 
commenced more than an hour earlier when he left the party at which he was 
drinking whiskey - in his words, drinking heavily, becoming the drunkest he had 
ever been.

[¶32.]  The defense of automatism is not 
available if the unconscious condition results primarily from voluntary 
intoxication. Section 6-1-116, W.S. 1977, in effect at the time of this offense, 
provided:

"* * * Where a crime 
rests in intention, the inebriated condition of the defendant at the time of 
committing the offense may be proven to the jury, as bearing upon the question 
of intention."

[¶33.]  Voluntary intoxication resulting in 
unconsciousness is not a complete defense as unconsciousness resulting from 
other causes might be. Voluntary intoxication can only negate a specific intent, 
permitting a finding of guilt of other or lesser included general intent crimes. 
People v. Baker, 42 Cal. 2d 550, 268 P.2d 705 (1954). Where unconsciousness results primarily from self-induced 
intoxication, the defense of automatism is not available but rather the defense 
is that of intoxication. In this case, at appellant's request, the jury was 
fully instructed upon the effect of intoxication on existence of the intent 
required as an element of the crime and, nevertheless, found that appellant 
possessed the specific intent to maim or disfigure Miss Olson. Had the jury 
accepted appellant's claim of drunkenness and loss of memory, they would have 
found him guilty of a lesser included general intent crime. This the jury 
declined to do.

[¶34.]  We note here that subsequent to our 
decision in Fulcher v. State, supra, 
and the occurrence of this incident, the legislature amended § 7-11-304(a), W.S. 
1977, and defined "mental illness or deficiency" to mean:

"* * * only those 
severely abnormal mental conditions that grossly and demonstrably impair a 
person's perception or understanding of reality and that are not attributable 
primarily to self-induced intoxication as defined by W.S. 
6-1-202(c)."

Although the 
amended statute does not govern the disposition of this case, we do note the 
legislature's apparent intent that this defense not be available where the 
mental state is "attributable primarily to self-induced intoxication," § 
7-11-304(a), supra.

[¶35.]  Appellee raises an additional 
issue:

Did the sentencing court 
have jurisdiction to sentence the defendant to three months in the WyomingStateHospital?

[¶36.]  The trial court sentenced appellant to 
not less than three years and not more than ten years in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary ordering further that the last three months of the sentence be 
served at the WyomingStateHospital, Evanston, Wyoming, in the alcohol and drug abuse 
program. The court acted beyond its jurisdiction in including a mandate 
requiring that the last three months of the sentence be served at the state 
hospital.

[¶37.]  Appellant was convicted of violation of § 
6-4-601, W.S. 1977, which provides a penalty of imprisonment in the penitentiary 
for a term of not more than fourteen years. In Dean v. State, Wyo., 668 P.2d 639, 
645-646 (1983), we said:

"The court may order 
commitment of a mentally ill person to the state hospital for treatment pursuant 
to the proceedings set forth in § 25-10-101, et seq., W.S. 1977; it may order an 
examination of a defendant at the state hospital pursuant to § 7-11-304, W.S. 
1977 (see fn. 2); it may order custody, care and treatment of a defendant at the 
state hospital pursuant to § 7-11-306, W.S. 1977; and there may be other 
specific statutory provisions authorizing the court to order a person to become 
a patient at the state hospital. But jurisdiction has not been given to the 
trial court to sentence a person to the WyomingStateHospital as part of the 
penalty for criminal activity. * * *"

[¶38.]  The sentence of three to ten years was a 
lawful and proper sentence. The provision that the final three months of the 
sentence be served at the WyomingStateHospital at Evanston, Wyoming, exceeded the jurisdiction of the 
court and it is stricken. There remains the sentence of three to ten years and 
this sentence must be served in the Wyoming State Penitentiary at Rawlins, Wyoming. This is in accord with the statute 
under which appellant was convicted. The judgment and sentence, therefore, is 
modified by striking therefrom the paragraph requiring the last three months of 
the sentence to be served at the state hospital; and, with this modification, 
the judgment and sentence is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 6-4-601, W.S. 
1977, in effect at the time of this offense, provided:

"Whoever with malicious 
intent to maim or disfigure, cuts, bites or slits the nose, ear or lip, cuts out 
or disables the tongue, puts out or destroys an eye, cuts off or disables a limb 
or any member of another person, is guilty of mayhem, and shall be imprisoned in 
the penitentiary not more than fourteen (14) years."

2 Section 7-240, W.S. 
1957.

3 Section 7-11-305(a), 
W.S. 1977, provides:

"(a) When a defendant 
couples a plea of not guilty with a plea of not guilty by reason of mental 
illness or deficiency, there shall be a sequential order of proof before the 
same jury in a continuous trial. First, evidence shall be heard and a special 
verdict taken on whether the defendant in fact committed the acts charged in the 
alleged criminal offense. If by special verdict the jury finds that the 
defendant did in fact commit such acts, then evidence shall be heard on the 
remaining elements of the alleged criminal offense and on the issue of the 
mental responsibility of the defendant. In addition to other forms of verdict 
submitted to the jury, the court shall submit a verdict by which the jury may 
find the defendant not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency 
excluding responsibility."

4 Section 7-11-303(b), 
W.S. 1977, provides:

"(b) The district court 
shall order an examination of the accused by a designated examiner. The order 
may include, but is not limited to, an examination at the Wyoming state hospital on 
an inpatient or outpatient basis, the utilization of local mental health centers 
on an inpatient or outpatient basis, or the examination of the accused, should 
he be incarcerated for any reason, at his place of detention. In selecting the 
examination site, the court may consider proximity to the court, availability of 
an examiner or examiners, and the necessity for security precautions. If the 
order provides for commitment of the accused to a designated facility, the 
commitment shall continue no longer than a thirty (30) day period for the study 
of the mental condition of the accused."

ROSE, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶39.]  I am unable to agree with the conclusion 
of the majority that appellant Russell Polston had no right to a jury 
determination concerning the validity of his defense 
theory.

[¶40.]  In Fulcher v. State, Wyo., 633 P.2d 142 
(1981), we recognized automatism to be a complete defense to criminal activity. 
We set out in that case the following definition of 
automatism:

"* * * Automatism is the 
state of a person who, though capable of action, is not conscious of what he is 
doing. While in an automatistic state, an individual performs complex actions 
without an exercise of will. Because these actions are performed in a state of 
unconsciousness, they are involuntary. Automatistic behavior may be followed by 
complete or partial inability to recall the actions performed while unconscious. 
Thus, a person who acts automatically does so without intent, exercise of free 
will, or knowledge of the act." 633 P.2d  at 145.

[¶41.]  The question before the court in the 
instant case is whether the evidence was sufficient to entitle appellant to 
submit to the jury Wyoming's Pattern Jury Instruction on 
automatism.1 This court discussed the quantum of 
evidence necessary to justify instructing the jury on a particular issue in Goodman v. State, Wyo., 573 P.2d 400 
(1977). There we said that due process requires an instruction on the 
defendant's theory of the case if the offered instruction sufficiently informs 
the jury of defendant's theory and if there is "competent evidence in the record to 
support the theory." 573 P.2d  at 408. We quoted with approval the following 
passage from 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1313, pp. 776-778:

"* * * [I]t is generally 
recognized that any evidence which will authorize the jury to find on it, 
although in the opinion of the court it may be weak, inconclusive, or unworthy 
of belief, is sufficient to justify an instruction on the issue raised by such 
evidence; and even positive testimony is not required, for it is sufficient if 
the fact in issue reasonably may be inferred from circumstances proved. However, 
in order to warrant giving an instruction, the evidence should be sufficient 
fairly to raise the question involved therein.

"No instruction should be 
given which is not reasonably supported by the evidence, or which is not based 
on some theory logically deducible from some portion of the evidence. Thus an 
instruction should not be given on evidence which at the most merely raises a 
possibility or a conjecture, or which is inconsistent with the physical facts, 
or which is so inconsistent and its connection so slight that the court may set 
aside a verdict thereon. * * * For the purpose of determining whether an 
instruction in favor of accused should be given, the court must view the 
evidence in a light as favorable to him as is justifiable and accused's 
testimony must be taken as entirely true." 533 P.2d  at 
409.

[¶42.]  Most jurisdictions which recognize the 
defense have concluded that loss of memory, in and of itself, is not sufficient 
to mandate an automatism instruction. People v. Morrall, 144 Cal. App. 3d 406, 
192 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1983); State v. 
Caddell, 287 N.C. 266, 215 S.E.2d 348 (1975). However, evidence of loss of 
memory in combination with evidence of a blow to the head constitute a 
sufficient basis to submit the question to the jury. People v. Morrall, supra; State v. Caddell, supra; People v. Ray, 14 Cal. 3d 20, 120 Cal. Rptr. 377, 533 P.2d 1017 (1975). The California Supreme Court in People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal. 3d 703, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913 (1974), disapproved on other grounds in People v. Flannel, 25 Cal. 3d 668, 160 Cal. Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1 (1980), set out the appropriate 
test:

"* * * An unconscious act 
within the contemplation of the Penal Code is one committed by a person who 
because of somnambulism, a blow on the head, or similar cause is not conscious 
of acting and whose act therefore cannot be deemed volitional." 112 Cal. Rptr.  at 10, 518 P.2d  at 922.

[¶43.]  The majority rely on People v. Ray, supra, in holding that a 
blow to the head coupled with loss of memory is insufficient to support an 
instruction on automatism. In People v. 
Ray, however, the California Supreme Court was concerned with whether the 
trial court, on its own initiative, should have given an automatism instruction 
where the defendant claimed self-defense at trial and where no automatism 
instruction had been requested. The appellate court set out the standard 
governing the trial court's obligation to submit an unrequested instruction in 
such cases:

"* * * `It is settled 
that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial court must 
instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the 
evidence. * * * The general principles of law governing the case are those 
principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and 
which are necessary to the jury's understanding of the case.' [Citation.] The 
duty to instruct sua sponte on 
general principles closely and openly connected with the facts of a case 
includes an obligation to instruct on the defense of involuntary unconsciousness 
but only when it appears that the defendant is relying on that defense, `or if 
there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is 
not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case.' (People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal. 3d 703, 
716, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 10, 518 P.2d 913, 921)." 120 Cal. Rptr.  at 379, 533 P.2d  
at 1019.

The court then 
concluded that an automatism instruction was not required under the facts of 
that case:

"Although defendant 
sustained a severe beating which left him unconscious following his initial 
confrontation with the victim, it taxes the imagination to give any credence to 
his contention that he remained unconscious during the following four hours and 
until the time he fired two bullets into the victim's head. The evidence is 
undisputed that defendant regained consciousness and drove his car away from the 
scene. * * * [E]ven defendant's own testimony does not support his claims of 
continuing unconsciousness. He stated that he remembered very clearly the events 
leading up to the shooting. * * *

"There is likewise no 
merit to the claim that defendant was unconscious as the result of wounds 
received in the second confrontation immediately prior to the killing. * * * 
Defendant described this encounter as a `scuffle' * * *. No blows were struck * 
* *. Defendant described these events in sharp detail and he could not 
reasonably be deemed to have been rendered unconscious by these incidents. * * * 
Police officers who were on the scene almost immediately after the killing found 
defendant to be functioning normally." 120 Cal. Rptr.  at 380, 533 P.2d  at 
1019-1020.

[¶44.]  In the trial of the instant case, 
appellant presented evidence corresponding to the textbook symptoms of a 
concussion as described in the majority opinion on . The bar patron, who 
delivered a karate kick to Polston's head shortly before the nose-biting 
incident, testified that he knocked out Polston. Appellant testified that he 
could not remember anything that had occurred for a period of time before and 
after the blow to his head. Furthermore, the bystander who hit appellant on the 
side of the head in order to remove him from his girl friend testified that 
Polston was knocked unconscious or had passed out.

[¶45.]  With regard to absence of criminal 
intent, Polston testified that he would never intentionally bite off Miss 
Olson's nose or disfigure her in any way. The victim herself testified that the 
incident was an accident and that Polston had not acted "on 
purpose."

[¶46.]  Where two independent witnesses testified 
that appellant was unconscious shortly before and immediately after the 
nose-biting incident, where appellant testified that he had no memory of the 
incident, and where appellant and the victim both testified as to the 
unintentional nature of the incident, reasonable minds could disagree as to 
whether appellant's behavior was that of an automaton. Certainly, such evidence 
more than satisfies the test for an automatism instruction adopted by other 
courts.

[¶47.]  The majority bolster their conclusion 
that the trial court properly refused the unconsciousness instruction by noting 
that appellant also defended the nose-biting incident as accidental. I see no 
inconsistency between accidental conduct and automatism, since both involve 
unintentional acts. More importantly, nothing precludes a defendant from 
presenting evidence at trial and seeking a jury determination on diverse defense 
theories. Stevenson v. United States, 
162 U.S. 313, 16 S. Ct. 839, 40 L. Ed. 980 (1896). The assertion of a defense 
theory on appeal inconsistent with that asserted at trial bears only on the 
trial court's duty to submit an unrequested instruction sua sponte. People v. Ray, 
supra.

[¶48.]  The majority say:

"* * * We do not know 
whether the unconsciousness resulted from the blow to the head or his extreme 
drunken condition."

And, 
further:

"* * * The inability to 
recall may have been a means of `coping with neurotic conflict'; an inability to 
accept or face the enormity of his actions that resulted in maiming and 
disfiguring another human being * * *."

 

It must be 
remembered, however, that the jury, not this court, was the appropriate body to 
weigh the conflicting evidence and to determine whether appellant, in fact, 
acted unconsciously when he bit off his future wife's nose and further to 
determine the cause of such unconscious state. The fact that this court finds 
the appellant's evidence "weak, inconclusive, or unworthy of belief" should not 
strip the jury of its function to determine the validity of the offered defense. 
Goodman v. State, supra, 573 P.2d  at 
409.

[¶49.]  In Goodman, we established a reasonable, 
evidential threshold for submitting the defendant's theory of the case to the 
jury. I believe that appellant Polston met this threshold and, therefore, would 
have reversed his conviction and remanded the case for a new 
trial.

FOOTNOTES

1 Wyoming Pattern Jury 
Instruction, Criminal 4.301, Unconscious Acts, provides:

"Where a person commits 
an act without being conscious thereof, such act is not criminal even though, if 
committed by a person who was conscious, it would be a 
crime.

"This rule of law applies 
only to cases of the unconsciousness of person of sound mind, in which there is 
no functioning of the conscious mind."

The Use Note 
states:

"Specific examples of 
where this instruction would apply include: sleep walkers or persons suffering 
from the delirium of fever, epilepsy, a blow on the head or the involuntary 
taking of drugs or intoxicating liquor."