Case Title: Zanetti v. Zanetti

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-10-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Zanetti v. Zanetti1984 WY 107689 P.2d 1116Case Number: 83-170Decided: 10/29/1984TERRY M. ZANETTI, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

PETE ZANETTI, DONNA J. ZANETTI, JAMES F. ZELENKA, PETER A. ZANETTI, A/K/A PETE A. ZANETTI, JR., AND EDWIN V. MAGAGNA, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS), 

WILLIAM M. ZANETTI, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

Rehearing Denied December 5, 1984.

Supreme Court of Wyoming
TERRY M. ZANETTI, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

PETE ZANETTI, DONNA J. 
ZANETTI, JAMES F. ZELENKA, PETER A. ZANETTI, A/K/A PETE A. ZANETTI, JR., AND 
EDWIN V. MAGAGNA, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS), 

WILLIAM M. ZANETTI, 
APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

Rehearing Denied December 
5, 1984.

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, John D. Troughton, 
J.

 
 
Joe R. Wilmetti, 
Casper, for appellant 
(defendant).

John W. James of 
James & James, Rock 
Springs, for 
appellees (plaintiffs).

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROSE, 
Justice.

Nature of the 
Action

[¶1.]     Plaintiffs-appellees - 
the elder Pete Zanetti, his second wife, Donna, and Peter A. Zanetti, Jr., 
together with James F. Zelenka and Edwin Magagna - sued Pete Senior's sons, 
Terry and William Zanetti, for alleged breach of an oral agreement to sell their 
interests in a joint venture, in which action they sought specific performance, 
damages and partitioning of certain joint-venture property.1 Peter A. Zanetti, in turn, sought 
affirmative relief from his father on another alleged contract for the purchase 
of his (Peter's) interest in the joint venture. Pete Senior denied that he was 
obligated to his son Peter upon any enforceable contract to purchase his son's 
interest in the venture.

[¶2.]     Terry and William 
denied liability under any agreement with their father on the ground that he, as 
manager and overseer of the joint-venture properties, was attempting to defraud 
and cheat them and it was for this reason that they refused to go through with 
an agreement to sell their interests in the joint venture.

[¶3.]     In addition to the 
above disputes, the contractor and the engineer who had been hired to aid in the 
development of the joint-venture property filed separate suits for their 
expenses and services. In all, three actions were filed and consolidated for 
trial and appeal.

FACTS

[¶4.]     In 1974, Pete Zanetti, 
father of Terry, William and Peter A. Zanetti, acquired a one-half section of 
land in SweetwaterCounty with a view to a 
quick resale to Texasgulf, Inc. So that his friends Magagna, Zelenka and G. 
Gordon James, a trailer-sales business person, could share in the venture, Pete 
invited them and his sons to participate - and they all accepted and entered 
into a written joint-venture agreement. The initial capital investment of each 
of the adventurers was $6,400, of which Pete loaned son Peter $5,924.81 and son 
William $4,669.43. The relevant provisions of the agreement 
provide:

"WHEREAS, PETE ZANETTI, 
has heretofore entered into an Agreement with the ROCK SPRINGS GRAZING 
ASSOCIATION, a Wyoming Corporation, for the purchase of:

"The South Half (S 1/2) 
of Section Eleven (11), Township Eighteen (18) North, Range One Hundred Six 
(106) West of the Sixth (6th) Principal Meridian, Sweetwater County, 
Wyoming;

"AND, WHEREAS, PETE 
ZANETTI, has heretofore advanced funds which have been applied upon the 
purchased price, upon the cost of surveys, the cost of interest upon balances 
due or funds borrowed for said purposes and will hereafter be obligated to 
additional funds for the same purposes;

"AND, WHEREAS, it was and 
is the intent of the parties hereto that the purchase of said land, the 
improvement, development and sale thereof be a joint venture of PETE ZANETTI and 
the undersigned, PETE A. ZANETTI, JR., TERRY M. ZANETTI, WILLIAM M. ZANETTI, 
JAMES F. ZELENKA, G. GORDON JAMES and EDWIN V. MAGAGNA, upon the following terms 
and conditions:

"1. The title to said 
property until sold or otherwise disposed of shall remain in the name of Pete 
Zanetti.

"2. Advances heretofore 
made or hereinafter made or obligated to be made, up to but not to exceed the 
total sum of $196,000.00 shall be computed as capital investment by Pete Zanetti 
and the undersigned.

"3. Any advances by PETE 
ZANETTI, or by any one of the undersigned in excess of one-seventh (1/7th) of 
the capital investment, or in excess of $28,000.00 shall be computed as loans, 
to be repaid to the person making said loan from funds of said joint venture, 
together with interest at the highest current rate being charged by the North 
Side State Bank to Pete Zanetti, individually or to any one of his bus 
corporations.

"4. Any gain or loss 
resulting from said joint venture shall be shared one-seventh (1/7th) by Pete 
Zanetti and each of the undersigned.

"5. Pete Zanetti and each 
of the undersigned shall be obligated to furnish up to one-seventh (1/7th) of 
the various amounts that may be required from time to 
time.

"6. Funds received from 
any source shall be applied as follows:

"(a) In payment of 
amounts due to third parties;

"(b) In payment of loans 
of Pete Zanetti and the undersigned; 

"(c) On a pro-rata basis 
of one-seventh (1/7th) each to Pete Zanetti and the undersigned."   

[¶5.]     The sale to Texasgulf 
did not materialize, but Pete settled this sales agreement on a basis that was 
beneficial to the venture in that the settlement figure was nearly sufficient to 
pay the remaining balance due on the Purple Sage property. When Texasgulf 
refused to go through with the purchase of the Purple Sage property, Pete, who 
all adventurers agreed would be the managing partner, had trouble disposing of 
the property, mostly because of the unavailability of water. In an effort to 
improve its saleability, Pete undertook to drill water wells on an adjoining 
piece of land owned by Pete Zanetti. The brothers at first objected to 
contributing to the costs of the water wells because they were not drilled on 
the venture's property and for the further reason that the costs were too high, 
but the record discloses that they ultimately paid their share of these costs. 
The brothers admonished their father not to drill more wells, but he did it 
anyway and some of the wells produced water.

[¶6.]     In behalf of his 
further efforts to subdivide and sell the property, Pete Zanetti contracted for 
substantial development and engineering work. However, he first bought out G. 
Gordon James, whose interest had been divided by transferring one-half to Herman 
Franks. Pete paid for the James interest out of venture funds, and the Franks 
interest from his personal moneys, with the entire interest being held by him 
personally. The evidence revealed that it was necessary to acquire the James and 
Franks interests before development financing would be made 
available.

[¶7.]     After a meeting with 
the other members of the venture and in pursuit of his development plans, it was 
Pete Senior's understanding that he had an oral commitment from all of them that 
they would sell their various interests in the venture to him. The elder Zanetti 
offered to buy out the remaining interest holders by paying into the venture 
$3,500 per acre for 136 acres, with an option to pay $7,000 per acre for the 
remaining 173 acres - a price substantially in excess of the amount that each 
had contributed to the enterprise.

[¶8.]     With the understanding 
that he had an agreement to acquire all of the outstanding venture interests, 
Pete went ahead with the development project, and in the course of doing this, 
he incurred substantial expense. When the brothers learned about this 
development activity, they were reluctant to sell - particularly was this so in 
the case of Terry Zanetti, who had bought from and paid the venture for 11 acres 
but had not received a deed for the property. Terry was also critical of the 
fact that the venture had bought and paid for the interest of G. Gordon James 
with venture funds, while Pete Senior retained title to this interest with the 
announced intention of conveying it to his second wife, stepmother of the 
Zanetti sons.

[¶9.]     Because of these 
difficulties, the interest owners met a second time, and Pete presented a 
revised contract for purchase. At this meeting, Terry was presented a deed to 
the 11 acres which were in controversy and Pete offered to purchase 136 acres 
for $3,500 per acre with the remaining 173 acres to remain the property of the 
venture.

[¶10.]  The testimony reveals that William and 
Terry were still not satisfied. They learned that the elder Zanetti was 
proceeding with the development in his name and not in the name of the venture - 
they believed that their father was misleading them as to the cost and potential 
profits of the project and that he had an opportunity to sell the property to 
Comfort Housing at a price which was not being disclosed to the other 
participants. In his Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, the trial judge 
summed up the position of the appellant in this manner:

"The clear implication of 
the testimony was that the two (2) sons believed Pete Zanetti was attempting to 
defraud or cheat them out of a large profit."

Pete represented 
to his sons during the buy-and-sell negotiations and at the trial that he never 
had any legitimate offer of sale from Comfort Housing or any other potential 
purchaser at any time prior to the trial of this case. In consequence of all 
this, no sale of the adventurers' interest was consummated with the senior 
Zanetti who by then had paid out $666,424 for the development of the Purple Sage 
properties. Pete therefore caused the work on the project to come to a stop and 
commenced the action that brings on this appeal.

The Trial Court's 
Holding

[¶11.]  The court held generally in favor of the 
appellees and against the appellant in that it

1. partitioned the 
adventure property;

2. recognized and ordered 
enforced the terms of the joint-venture agreement;

3. found that there was 
no enforceable contract requiring Pete Senior to purchase the separate interest 
of his son Peter A. Zanetti in the venture;

4. held that the elder 
Zanetti was not guilty of fraud or mismanagement;

5. found against the 
contention of the elder Zanetti to the effect that there was an enforceable 
contract for the sale of the adventurers' interest in the venture to him; 
and

6. ordered that payment 
of liabilities and distribution be made under the terms of the venture 
agreement. Further, the court ordered that water-well, road and all other costs 
and financial obligations be assigned as liabilities of the joint venture only 
to the extent that they were actually incurred in the venture's behalf and that 
Pete Senior pay all other costs and expenses incurred and claimed which were not 
assignable to the benefit of the venture.

7. Lastly, the court held 
that, should there be sufficient proceeds from the sale of the property, they 
should be applied as follows:

(a) to the reimbursement 
of Pete Senior for advancement in the management and development of the property 
in the sum of $408,931 plus interest;

(b) the remaining 
balance, if any, to the six remaining adventurers in equal 
amounts.

Alleged 
Error

[¶12.]  The appellant identifies several issues 
which may be described and abbreviated as follows. He states that the trial 
judge committed error in overemphasizing the father-son relationship - committed 
error in disregarding the testimony of a witness named Cliff McCallum; in 
admitting certain bankruptcy testimony; in failing to make disposition of 
bankruptcy funds on hand; "in failing to place any conditions on plaintiff's 
recovery"; that additional error was committed in denying appellant's claim for 
damages for fraud and mismanagement; in failing to take enhanced value into 
account; and, finally, that the court erred in finding that the record contained 
sufficient evidence to support the judgment.

The 
Decision

Underlying Appellate 
Concepts

[¶13.]  We will apply the usual pertinent 
appellate rules to the decision-making here; that is, we must assume that 
evidence in favor of the successful party is true, leave out of consideration 
entirely evidence of the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, and give to 
the evidence of the successful party every favorable inference which may 
reasonably and fairly be drawn from it. Craver v. Craver, Wyo., 601 P.2d 999, 1001 (1979), citing Jelly v. Dabney, Wyo., 581 P.2d 622, 624 (1978); Zitterkopf v. Roussalis, Wyo., 546 P.2d 436, 437 (1976); Tavares v. 
Horstman, Wyo., 
542 P.2d 1275, 1277 (1975). We have said that:

"* * * [E]very favorable 
inference is to be given to the successful party. Upon appeal this court is 
required to resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the successful 
party." Barnette v. Doyle, Wyo., 622 P.2d 1349, 1355 
(1981).

In December of 
1983, we reemphasized these often-cited concepts as follows: 

"`* * * [W]e must assume 
the evidence in favor of the prevailing party as true and leave out of 
consideration the evidence in conflict therewith, giving to the evidence in 
favor of the prevailing party every favorable inference which may be reasonably 
and fairly drawn from it; and we are not to evaluate the evidence, rather we are 
to determine only if there was substantial evidence upon which the jury could 
arrive at its decision if it believed the evidence in favor of the prevailing 
party.'" Oberson v. Shreeve, Wyo., 
672 P.2d 1294, 1295 (1983), quoting from Brittain v. Booth, Wyo., 601 P.2d 532, 
535 (1979) and citing: Potts v. 
Brown, Wyo., 452 P.2d 975 (1969); Ford Motor Company v. Arguello, Wyo., 
382 P.2d 886 (1963); Brasel and Sims 
Construction Co. v. Neuman Transit Co., Wyo., 378 P.2d 501 (1963); Fisher v. Robbins, 78 Wyo. 50, 319 P.2d 116 (1957).

[¶14.]  We have also held that the judgment must 
be affirmed and the findings not interfered with unless it is clearly erroneous 
or so totally against the evidence as to be manifestly wrong. Clausen v. Boland, Wyo., 601 P.2d 541, 543 (1979), citing Bowen v. 
Korell, Wyo., 
587 P.2d 653, 655 (1978).

[¶15.]  Concerning the trial court's findings of 
fact, we reiterate the rule which holds that a finding carries with it every 
finding of fact that can be reasonably and fairly drawn from the evidence. Meeker v. Lanham, Wyo., 604 P.2d 556 (1979), citing True v. Hi-Plains 
Elevator Machinery, Inc., Wyo., 577 P.2d 991 (1978). Where, as here, the 
appeal comes to this court with a trial judge's findings of fact, "they must be 
construed liberally and favorably to the judgment." Madrid v. Norton, Wyo., 
596 P.2d 1108, 1117 (1979). We went on to say in Madrid v. Norton, 
supra, (a joint-venture appeal):

"* * * We presume that 
they [the court's findings of fact] are right and where the findings of the 
trial court are not inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous, or 
contrary to the great weight of the evidence, they will not be disturbed on 
appeal. Diamond Management Corp. v. 
Empire Gas Corp., 594 P.2d 964 (1979); LeBar v. Haynie, Wyo. 
1976, 552 P.2d 1107, 1110." 596 P.2d  at 1117.

In True v. Hi-Plains Elevator Machinery, 
Inc., supra, 577 P.2d  at 996, we said:

"* * * Unless the 
findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous or contrary to the great 
weight of evidence, they will not be disturbed on appeal. Wyoming National Bank of Casper & First 
National Bank of Casper v. Security Bank & Trust Co., Wyo. 1977, 572 P.2d 1120; Willis v. Asbury 
Transportation Co., Wyo. 1963, 386 P.2d 934, 937. We cannot properly 
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court on findings of fact. Zullig v. Zullig, Wyo. 1972, 502 P.2d 198."

[¶16.]  Since the issues here have to do with 
credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency of the evidence where the facts 
conflict, another of our observations in Madrid v. Norton, supra, is worthy of 
recall. There we noted the trial judge's superior vantage point where the 
observation of the witnesses is concerned, and we said:

"* * * Moreover, the 
trial judge was present and observed at first hand the demeanor and expressions 
of the witnesses. We must not forget that when we examine the cold words of the 
transcript of testimony, we do not have the benefit of how the trial judge sees 
and hears the witness - the pitch of the voice, facial changes, the movement in 
the witness - all of which may tell a separate story, to be given credence. The 
conclusion of what preponderates is with the trier of fact. Koch v. Brown, Wyo. 1965, 401 P.2d 459. 
[Footnote.]" 596 P.2d  at 1117.

[¶17.]  In the footnote reference from the above 
quote, we said:

"As said in Bogle v. Paulson, 1949, 185 Or. 211, 201 
P.2d 733:

"`* * * Many times the 
countenance of the witness and the tale it tells are a more reliable index to 
the truth than the witness's tongue. The tongue is subject to the witness's 
studied volition, but his manner, his gestures, his passions and the tone of his 
voice may be unwitting. A meditated, carefully thought-out answer, even though 
it dovetails perfectly with the rest of the witness's testimony, may be less 
convincing than testimony given readily and without delay by another whose 
answers do not always accord.'"

Disregard of Rule 
5.01(4), W.R.A.P. Requirements

[¶18.]  In this case, the appellant raises one 
issue after another either without citing any authority or without citing 
relevant authority. For example: appellant urges "error in disregarding testimony of witness Cliff 
McCallum" (emphasis added), contending that the judge abused his discretion. In 
the first place, the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law reveal that the 
testimony was not disregarded. It was 
taken into account by the court, but the credibility of this witness' testimony 
was found suspect2 when the court 
said:

"The Court finds and 
concludes that the testimony of Mr. McCallum is implausible and incredible in 
many respects."

In any case, 
this point in the appellant's brief contains no authority whatever in its 
support. It is true that the brief cites authority for the proposition that all 
parties to a joint venture are treated the same as in a partnership - and there 
is no dispute about that3 - this authority does not, however, 
address the claimed error to the effect that the court overemphasized the 
father-son relationship and it is, therefore, as though the point contained no 
citation of authority at all.

[¶19.]  The appellant urges error in the 
admission of testimony concerning one of the witness' businesses which was in 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and cites no authority to support this allegation of 
error. The same is true of the alleged error in the court's failure to make 
disposition of joint-venture funds on hand. To go on, the appellant complains 
of

"Error in failing to 
place any conditions upon plaintiff's recovery,"

and not a single 
legal authority is cited in support of this alleged error.

[¶20.]  Rule 5.01(4), W.R.A.P., "Brief of the 
Appellant," provides:

"The brief of the 
appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order here 
indicated:

* * * * * 
*

"(4) An argument. The 
argument may be preceded by a summary. The argument shall contain the 
contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the 
reasons therefor, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on; * * *." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶21.]  Concerning the requirements contained in 
Rule 5.01(4), and particularly the "citations to the authorities" provision 
thereof, we have said:

"The purpose of our 
appellate rules concerning briefs is to help focus the facts, issues and 
authorities." Strang Telecasting, Inc. v. 
Ernst, Wyo., 
610 P.2d 1011, 1015 (1980),

and we have made 
mention of our refusal in Dechert v. 
Christopulos, Wyo., 
604 P.2d 1039, 1044 (1980) to consider the appellant's argument unsupported by a 
factual discussion as required by Rule 5.01(3), 
W.R.A.P.

[¶22.]  In Knadler v. Adams, Wyo., 661 P.2d 1052, 1054 (1983), we said: 

"We will not consider 
issues which are not supported by proper citation of authority and cogent 
argument or which are not clearly defined." Citing Young v. Hawks, Wyo., 624 P.2d 235 
(1981); Elder v. Jones, Wyo., 608 P.2d 654 (1980); and Rule 5.01(2), W.R.A.P.

[¶23.]  Therefore, under the settled authority of 
this court, we will not consider these points which have not been briefed or 
where no authority is cited or where the authority which is cited does not 
constitute a cogent argument for the proposition for which the appellant 
contends.

Fraud and 
Mismanagement

[¶24.]  As the court has noted supra, the 
appellant charges his father with fraud and mismanagement. This is the 
underlying cause of action - fraud - and it is a resolution of this appeal. 
Specifically, Terry Zanetti charges error in not finding that his father was 
guilty of fraud and mismanagement in that the:

"(1) Said plaintiff 
commingled joint venture funds with his own personal 
funds.

"(2) Said plaintiff 
commenced a development in his own name, not in the name of the joint venture 
and as sole owner.

"(3) Said plaintiff 
expended his personal money and conducted the development activities after being 
informed by all members of the joint 
venture that they wanted no part of any development.

"(4) Said plaintiff 
failed to inform the members of the joint venture of his 
activities.

"(5) Said plaintiff 
accumulated a list of prospective buyers for lots in the development he was 
working on.

"(6) Said plaintiff 
drilled a water well on adjoining land belonging to said plaintiff personally 
but assessed each member of the joint venture one-sixth of the cost 
thereof.

"(7) Said plaintiff 
`bought out' the 1/7th share of G. Gordon James with joint venture moneys and 
then conveyed that 1/7th share to his wife, Donna Zanetti.

"(8) Said plaintiff, when 
he found he could not buy defendants' shares of the joint venture upon his own 
terms, stopped all further development.

"(9) Said plaintiff 
expended the large part of the `development' costs to construct a roadway from 
the highway access across his own lands (other than joint venture lands) and 
lands of third parties to which he had no easement or 
rights-of-way."

[¶25.]  The trial court said the following about 
these fraudulent-mismanagement contentions in its Findings of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law:

"Finally, Defendants 
contend that Pete Zanetti mismanaged the joint venture property and accounts. 
While Pete Zanetti commingled joint venture funds with his own, followed 
imperfect accounting procedures and in general, was by no means the model upon 
which to base a management school curriculum, nevertheless, the Court finds and 
concludes that Mr. Zanetti did not fraudulently, intentionally or negligently 
mismanage the property. The evidence is to the contrary. The Court carefully 
observed the demeanor of the parties and from the totality of the circumstances, 
concludes that Pete Zanetti was acting in good faith. Among other things, Pete 
Zanetti effectively purchased the property from the Rock Springs Grazing 
Association, made a deal with Texasgulf, Inc. for resale at a handsome profit 
and upon the default of Texasgulf, Inc. successfully negotiated a very 
beneficial settlement without the necessity of protracted litigation. The Court 
finds and concludes that Pete Zanetti was effectively and efficiently proceeding 
with the development of the property and that he would have resolved all 
remaining problems, including, among other things, those involving easements and 
rights-of-way, had the dispute with his sons not 
developed.

"The Court finds and 
concludes there is no evidence to indicate that any of the moneys received by 
the joint venture or paid to the joint venture by its members were fraudulently 
misappropriated by Pete Zanetti. Kevin Heybourne, who performed the audit of the 
books and accounts of the joint venture, testified that in his opinion the audit 
was correct and complete and that all the money that went into the joint venture 
has been accounted for and not misappropriated by Pete Zanetti. The Court 
accepts the testimony of Mr. Heybourne and concludes that the claim of 
Defendants founded on mismanagement should be denied."

The Law of Fraud 
(Generally)

[¶26.]  We have said that fraudulent conduct 
implies an act which is obnoxious to good morals, Otte v. State, Wyo., 563 P.2d 1361, 1364 
(1977), and that the basic elements of an action for fraud are false 
representations by the alleged defrauding party of material facts and reliance 
thereon to the detriment of the party asserting fraud, Davis v. Schiess, Wyo., 417 P.2d 19, 21 
(1966). Fraud will never be presumed and will only be sustained upon evidence 
that is clear and convincing, State Farm 
Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Petsch, 261 F.2d 331, 334 (10th Cir. 1958), and 
fraud will never be imputed to a party where the facts and circumstances out of 
which it is supposed to arise are equally consistent with honesty and purity of 
intention because fraud must be demonstrated in a clear and convincing manner. 
Johnson v. Soulis, Wyo., 542 P.2d 867, 874 (1975).

[¶27.]  Within the confines of our appellate 
authority, the only evidence concerning fraud and mismanagement which this court 
may consider is that which is favorable to the appellees. We summarize this 
evidence from the record and from the trial court's findings of fact and 
conclude that the trial court's decision that there was no fraud or 
mismanagement upon the part of Pete is amply supported by the 
record.

[¶28.]  Pete Zanetti, Sr. acquired the property 
in question and, in good faith, and mostly out of the goodness of his heart, 
brought his sons and friends into a joint venture which, at the time, looked as 
though it promised a quick profit for all involved. A joint-venture agreement 
was entered into, but, through no fault of Pete Senior, the sale to a committed 
purchaser fell through. He then settled the buy-and-sell agreement favorably to 
all adventurers, thus greatly enhancing the value of each partner's share in the 
venture without further contribution from them. Even so, once the settlement was 
made and most of the debt for the purchase of the property had been repaid, the 
raw land could not be sold, and so Pete Zanetti, Sr. undertook to develop water, 
roads and other facilities so that it could be disposed of. When some of the 
partners objected to the increased costs that would be involved in the 
development and thus the necessity for additional adventurer contribution, he 
offered to buy the interests of the remaining adventurers for what would have 
been a substantial profit for all of them, and he was firmly of the opinion that 
he had an agreement to purchase all of the adventurers' interest and therefore 
proceeded with the development.

[¶29.]  In the course of the development, 
believing he was to be the sole owner of all involved interests, Pete Senior 
drilled water wells with venture money. One was on Pete's property that adjoined 
the Purple Sage land, and the trial court found that this was not done in bad 
faith. Instead, it was done in an effort to establish the existence of water in 
the area. Roads were built and easements acquired with venture money. Some of 
the roadway development traversed property other than venture property, but the 
trial court found the road development was necessary to the development of the 
partnership property and no bad faith was involved in this road-building effort. 
Pete purchased one of the adventurers' interest with his own money, retaining it 
in his own name, but we surmise that the trial judge excused this for the reason 
that Pete believed that he had an agreement to buy out the others. Under the 
evidence, the trial judge was entitled to find that he had made two separate 
good-faith offers to purchase the interests of his coadventurers, and the 
evidence is to the effect that he believed he had an oral agreement with all of 
them that he would buy and they would sell all remaining interests. This 
agreement was not fulfilled because of the refusal of the brothers to carry out 
their end of the bargain. And, we can presume that the trial judge looked at the 
totality of the evidence and concluded that overall, even though there were 
indiscretions on the part of all parties, they did not, in this instance, amount 
to fraud, bad faith or mismanagement on the part of Pete Zanetti, 
Sr.

[¶30.]  Then there were allegations about 
commingling of funds and failure to report profitable offers of sale to the 
adventurers. In this respect, the trial court looked to the testimony of the 
accountant, found his testimony credible, and accepted it. The accountant stated 
that there was no mismanagement or misappropriation of the funds of the venture 
and that even though Pete Senior had commingled funds of the adventurers with 
his own, his accounting and bookkeeping, although far from ideally efficient, 
represented no intent to defraud or misappropriate the funds of the 
venture.

[¶31.]  As to the failure to report profitable 
offers of sale, the trial court did not find the offer in question to be bona 
fide, did not believe the witness who was supposed to have made the offer, and 
found that even if the alleged representation of the witness with respect to the 
purported offer was taken at face value, it could not be regarded as 
constituting a legitimate offer and thus Pete was not hiding offers of profit 
from the adventurers because there had been no legitimate profitable offer of 
purchase made to him.

[¶32.]  In any case, the trial judge found that 
the venture was risky from the beginning; that in good faith Pete brought his 
associates in with minimum investments; that he, Pete, extended his own credit, 
loaned some of the adventurers money to pay their share and made shrewd deals to 
protect the venture property and the interests of the adventurers. The trial 
judge found that the property had to be developed in order to dispose of it and 
that Pete was willing to pay all of the associates a substantial profit for 
their interests since some of them could not afford to contribute their share of 
the additional cost of development. The trial judge further found that these 
were good-faith efforts to bring his co-adventurers out with substantial profits 
while Pete undertook the entire risk of payment of old and new development 
obligations.

[¶33.]  At the time when the brothers refused to 
sell their interests to Pete and he was forced to cease development and bring 
suit, the trial judge found that

"Pete Zanetti was 
effectively and efficiently proceeding with the development of the property and 
that he would have resolved all remaining problems * * *." 

Findings of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law.

[¶34.]  The trial judge wisely distributed the 
debts and profits, if any, equitably. He held all participants to the venture 
agreement and disregarded all other alleged agreements as too nebulous, 
tentative, indefinite and thus unenforceable. The trial judge directed, in 
short, that the application of all funds on partition be assigned to debts 
attributable to the benefit of the venture; that Pete pay all other debts which 
he had incurred; and that profits, if any, be distributed equally among all the 
joint adventurers. This was what the adventurers themselves deemed to be an 
equitable solution because this is the way they all wrote the contract when they 
cared for one another and tensions were not bow-string tight. In addition, the 
trial judge directed Pete to return the G. Gordon James interest to the venture, 
there to be distributed equally among the partners, with Pete to receive credit 
for the amount paid James for the interest but that he would assume the expense 
of clearing the title to the Franks interest since the trial judge found this to 
be unreasonable under the circumstances.

[¶35.]  It is urged that the trial court 
committed "error in allowing recovery without having found amount of enhanced 
value." In this case, it was stipulated that the property should be partitioned 
and sold under the provisions of the applicable Wyoming statutes since the parties could not 
agree among themselves. In view of the manner that the trial judge distributed 
the assets over liabilities, the other adventurers will receive the benefit of 
any enhanced value of the property if any there is.

[¶36.]  We do not find substance to the remaining 
contentions of the appellants.

[¶37.]  Given the foregoing review of the 
evidence favorable to the appellees, we find no fraud or mismanagement under the 
above-cited authority, and find that the evidence is sufficient to uphold the 
trial court's judgment in this and all other respects.

[¶38.]  Affirmed.

1 Sometimes referred to 
here as the "Purple Sage" properties.

2 We said in Madrid v. Norton, supra, 596 P.2d at 
1117:

"* * * Credibility of 
witnesses is for the trial court. Hench 
v. Robinson, 1955, 75 Wyo. 1, 291 P.2d 417; 
Eblen v. Eblen, 1951, 68 Wyo. 353, 234 P.2d 434."

3 We said in Madrid v. Norton, supra, 596 P.2d at 
1118:

"* * * Nor is there any 
disagreement that joint adventures, commonly referred to as joint ventures, are 
governed by the law of partnership. True 
v. Hi-Plains Elevator Machinery, Inc., Wyo. 1978, 577 P.2d 991, 996. The principal 
distinction between a joint venture and a partnership is that a joint venture 
usually relates to a single transaction. P and M Cattle Co. v. Holler, Wyo. 1977, 559 P.2d 1019, 
1021."