Case Title: Columbus Bar Assn. v. Christensen and Kluesener

Citation: 2020-Ohio-167

Docket Number: 2019-0802

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-01-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Christensen and Kluesener, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-167.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-167 
COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION v. CHRISTENSEN AND KLUESENER. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Christensen and Kluesener,  
Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-167.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Public 
reprimand (Christensen)—Conditionally stayed one-year suspension 
(Kluesener). 
(No. 2019-0802—Submitted July 9, 2019—Decided January 23, 2020.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the  
Supreme Court, No. 2018-070. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This attorney-discipline case involves two attorneys.  The first 
respondent, Michael Dean Christensen, of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney Registration 
No. 0071612, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1999.  Christensen has 
no prior disciplinary offenses. 
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{¶ 2} The second respondent, Jeffrey Thomas Kluesener, of Columbus, 
Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0087256, was admitted to the practice of law in 
Ohio in 2011.  Since becoming a lawyer, Kluesener has worked for Christensen’s 
law firm, the Law Offices of Michael D. Christensen.  In June 2017, we imposed a 
conditionally stayed six-month suspension on Kluesener for neglecting and failing 
to provide competent representation in a client’s product-liability case.  Columbus 
Bar Assn. v. Kluesener, 150 Ohio St.3d 322, 2017-Ohio-4417, 81 N.E.3d 457. 
{¶ 3} In December 2018, relator, Columbus Bar Association, separately 
charged Christensen and Kluesener with professional misconduct for issuing 
invalid prelawsuit subpoenas as a method of obtaining information during the 
investigation stage of potential civil actions.  The Board of Professional Conduct 
considered the case on the parties’ consent-to-discipline agreements.  See Gov.Bar 
R. V(16).  For the reasons explained below, we accept the parties’ agreements and 
recommended sanctions. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 4} In their agreements, the parties stipulated to the following facts.  On 
at least seven occasions, Christensen sent invalid subpoenas to opposing parties 
seeking information about potential personal-injury actions, even though 
Christensen had not yet filed a lawsuit or an R.C. 2317.48 action for discovery 
regarding any of those matters.  Kluesener, while employed by Christensen, sent at 
least six invalid subpoenas under similar circumstances.  Respondents issued the 
“subpoenas” on preprinted Civ.R. 45 forms that either included the word “pending” 
in the space provided for a case number or left that space blank.  The forms also 
included language threatening the recipients with contempt or other sanctions for 
failure to comply. 
{¶ 5} Respondents admit that they used the invalid subpoenas as a way to 
obtain litigation-related materials when a letter requesting such materials may not 
have been successful.  For example, some of the “subpoenas” requested that 
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recipients produce videos of incidents being investigated.  One “subpoena” 
requested attendance records from an employer, and another “subpoena” that was 
directed to a police officer requested a radio report, witness statements, and pictures 
of an accident scene.  At least one of the recipients produced materials in response 
to the “subpoena.” 
{¶ 6} According to Christensen, he mistakenly believed that the practice 
was acceptable based on a conversation he had had with a clerk at the Franklin 
County Court of Common Pleas.  Christensen also admits, however, that he knew 
that the “subpoenas” were unenforceable and that he never attempted to enforce 
them.  Kluesener also never sought to enforce the invalid subpoenas and 
acknowledges that although he never researched the propriety of serving them, he 
should have known that they were improper.  Both respondents recognize that by 
issuing the “subpoenas” without first filing a complaint, they improperly invoked a 
court’s authority with third parties. 
{¶ 7} Christensen also admits that as Kluesener’s supervisor, he had 
responsibility for Kluesener’s work and that he had implicitly authorized 
Kluesener’s use of the invalid subpoenas.  Kluesener admits that he directed a 
nonlawyer assistant to send one invalid subpoena and that a paralegal working with 
him followed up with a recipient about materials requested through an invalid 
subpoena and continued to do so even after the recipient’s attorney had contacted 
Kluesener to complain about the inappropriateness of the request.  Kluesener later 
directed the paralegal to refrain from further efforts seeking the materials. 
{¶ 8} Based on this conduct, Christensen and relator stipulated that he 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation 
to a client), 5.1(c) (declaring that a lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer’s 
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if the lawyer orders or, with 
knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved or if the lawyer 
has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer and knows of the conduct at 
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a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take 
reasonable remedial action), and 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
{¶ 9} Kluesener and relator stipulated that he violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1, 
5.3(b) (requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to ensure that a nonlawyer 
employee’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer), 
5.3(c) (declaring that a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of a nonlawyer that 
would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer 
if the lawyer orders or ratifies the conduct involved or the lawyer has direct 
supervisory authority over the nonlawyer and knows of the conduct at a time when 
its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial 
action), and 8.4(d). 
{¶ 10} We agree that Christensen and Kluesener engaged in the stipulated 
misconduct. 
Christensen’s Sanction 
{¶ 11} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
{¶ 12} The parties stipulate that no aggravating factors are present in 
Christensen’s case.  In mitigation, they agree that Christensen has a clean 
disciplinary record, made full and free disclosures to the board and cooperated in 
the disciplinary process, and submitted evidence of good character and reputation.  
See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (4), and (5). 
{¶ 13} Based on Christensen’s commitment to abandon any further use of 
the invalid subpoenas, the parties recommend that he receive a public reprimand.  
According to the parties, this is a case of first impression in Ohio, especially 
considering the Prof.Cond.R. 5.1 violation, and to support the recommended 
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sanction, they cite cases involving misconduct of what they consider to be 
comparable severity.  For example, the parties cite Disciplinary Counsel v. Davis, 
156 Ohio St.3d 414, 2019-Ohio-1314, 128 N.E.3d 199, in which we publicly 
reprimanded an attorney who failed to perform monthly reconciliations of his client 
trust account and failed to adequately supervise a nonlawyer assistant, facilitating 
her ability to embezzle more than $185,000 from the attorney, including $59,417 
from his client trust account. 
{¶ 14} The board concluded that Christensen’s consent-to-discipline 
agreement conforms to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(16) and recommends that 
we adopt it.  To support the recommended sanction, the board relies on Davis and 
In re Boyce, 371 S.C. 259, 639 S.E.2d 44 (2006), in which the Supreme Court of 
South Carolina publicly reprimanded an attorney who instructed her nonlawyer 
assistant to send to a bank a subpoena including false and misleading statements 
even though no action had yet been filed.  The court found that the attorney had 
violated several South Carolina disciplinary rules, including those equivalent to 
Prof.Cond.R. 5.3(b) and 8.4(d). 
{¶ 15} Considering the mitigating factors and the lack of any aggravating 
factors, we agree that a public reprimand is the appropriate sanction in 
Christensen’s case. 
Kluesener’s Sanction 
{¶ 16} The parties stipulate that one aggravating factor is present in 
Kluesener’s case—his prior disciplinary record.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1).  In 
mitigation, the parties agree that he made full and free disclosures during the board 
proceedings and cooperated in the disciplinary process.  See Gov.Bar R. 
V(13)(C)(4).  The parties also note that Kluesener has accepted responsibility for 
his actions, although they did not expressly characterize this stipulation as a 
mitigating factor. 
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{¶ 17} Kluesener and relator recommend that he serve a one-year 
suspension, with the entire suspension stayed on conditions, including that he 
refrain from issuing any additional improper prelawsuit subpoenas, commit no 
further misconduct, and submit to an attorney’s monitoring of his practice.  Because 
the parties could not identify any Ohio cases involving similar misconduct, they 
cite cases involving similar rule violations to support their recommended sanction.  
See, e.g., Columbus Bar Assn. v. LaFayette, 152 Ohio St.3d 147, 2017-Ohio-9205, 
93 N.E.3d 970 (imposing a conditionally stayed six-month suspension on an 
attorney who violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 by failing to competently represent clients 
in immigration and bankruptcy matters, among other professional misconduct); 
Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Lavelle, 107 Ohio St.3d 92, 2005-Ohio-5976, 836 
N.E.2d 1214 (imposing an 18-month suspension, with 12 months conditionally 
stayed, on an attorney who failed to supervise nonlawyer staff and thereby created 
an office environment allowing employees to alter and falsely notarize documents). 
{¶ 18} The board concluded that Kluesener’s consent-to-discipline 
agreement conforms to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(16) and recommends that 
we adopt it.  The board found that Kluesener’s violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 and 
8.4(d) are more egregious than his violations of Prof.Cond.R. 5.3 for failing to 
supervise a nonlawyer assistant.  Therefore, to support the recommended sanction, 
the board cites cases involving similar Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 and 8.4(d) violations.  See, 
e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Miller, 149 Ohio St.3d 731, 2017-Ohio-2821, 77 
N.E.3d 979 (imposing a conditionally stayed one-year suspension on an attorney 
who violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 and 8.4(d) and other rules for failing to timely record 
documents relating to a real-estate transaction and then engaging in fraudulent 
efforts to conceal his misconduct). 
{¶ 19} Considering the balance of the aggravating and mitigating factors—
including that this is Kluesener’s second disciplinary case in a roughly two-year 
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period—we agree that a conditionally stayed one-year suspension is the appropriate 
sanction in his case. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 20} For the reasons explained above, we accept the parties’ consent-to-
discipline agreements.  Michael Dean Christensen is hereby publicly reprimanded 
for the above-described misconduct.  Jeffrey Thomas Kluesener is suspended from 
the practice of law for one year, with the entire suspension stayed on the conditions 
that he (1) refrain from any further use of improper prelawsuit subpoenas, (2) 
engage in no other misconduct, and (3) serve a one-year period of monitored 
probation pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(21).  If Kluesener fails to comply with any 
condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted and he will serve the full one-year 
suspension.  One-half the costs of this proceeding are taxed to Christensen, and 
one-half the costs are taxed to Kluesener. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, FISCHER, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., 
concur. 
FISCHER, J., concurs, with an opinion joined by DONNELLY, J. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion joined by 
DEWINE, J. 
__________________ 
FISCHER, J., concurring. 
{¶ 21} I join the majority opinion.  I write separately to respectfully disagree 
with the viewpoint set forth in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part 
that monitored probation is not necessary in respondent Jeffrey Thomas 
Kluesener’s case and with that opinion’s argument that specific conditions need to 
be attached to his term of monitored probation under the Supreme Court Rules for 
the Government of the Bar. 
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{¶ 22} As I stated in Disciplinary Counsel v. Halligan, ___Ohio St.3d ___, 
2019-Ohio-3748, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 33-36 (Fischer, J., concurring), Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Harmon, ___Ohio St.3d___, 2019-Ohio-4171, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 60 
(Fischer, J., dissenting), and Dayton Bar Assn. v. Sullivan, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 
2020-Ohio-124, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 40 (Fischer, J., concurring), neither the Supreme 
Court Rules for the Government of the Bar nor decades of this court’s case law 
addressing attorney discipline supports such a requirement.  Thus, I must disagree 
with the viewpoint espoused by the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in 
part that a term of monitored probation must include specific conditions. 
{¶ 23} And after reviewing the record in this case, I also disagree with the 
concurring-and-dissenting opinion’s conclusion that Kluesener’s consent-to-
discipline agreement should be rejected because monitored probation is not 
necessary. 
{¶ 24} Monitored probation is an effective tool to keep a disciplined 
attorney on “ ‘ “on a short leash,” ’ ” Halligan at ¶ 34 (Fischer, J., concurring), 
quoting Disciplinary Counsel v. Sarver, 155 Ohio St.3d 100, 2018-Ohio-4717, 119 
N.E.3d 405, ¶ 47 (Fischer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), by allowing 
a monitoring attorney to act as the eyes of this court and effectively monitor the 
disciplined attorney’s actions and behavior for the duration of the probation period.  
See Gov.Bar R. V(21)(C). 
{¶ 25} While monitored probation can be utilized to provide education and 
support to an attorney in a specific area, see, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Bennett, 
146 Ohio St.3d 237, 2016-Ohio-3045, 54 N.E.3d 1232, ¶ 19, it can also be utilized 
in a more general manner that allows this court, through the monitoring attorney, 
the flexibility to help guide the disciplined attorney and meet his or her needs, while 
also adequately protecting the public.  See Sullivan at ¶ 49 (Fischer, J. concurring). 
{¶ 26} The opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part concludes that 
the benefits of Kluesener’s monitored probation are outweighed by the burdens that 
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will be imposed on relator, Columbus Bar Association.  But that is unsupported 
given that it was relator and Kluesener who entered into this consent-to-discipline 
agreement and proposed a term of monitored probation without specific conditions.  
If monitored probation in Kluesener’s case would unduly burden relator or was 
unnecessary to protect the public, I think it unlikely that relator would have 
recommended the requirement.  Thus, by submitting this agreement to this court, 
relator, Kluesener, and the Board of Professional Conduct have all expressed that 
monitored probation, without specific conditions, will be an effective resource to 
Kluesener and will help protect the public.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Schuman, 
152 Ohio St.3d 47, 2017-Ohio-8800, 92 N.E.3d 850, ¶ 17 (the primary purpose of 
disciplinary sanctions is to protect the public). 
{¶ 27} Nevertheless, it is not enough for the board to simply recommend 
monitored probation for it to be imposed; this court is the ultimate authority on 
attorney discipline, Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Heitzler, 32 Ohio St.2d 214, 220, 291 
N.E.2d 477 (1972), and may reject the consent-to-discipline agreement, see, e.g., 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Sarver, 150 Ohio St.3d 1439, 2017-Ohio-7742, 82 N.E.3d 
1173; Gov.Bar R. V(16)(A)(4)(e) and (D).  I agree, however, with the majority 
opinion that the sanction recommended in the consent-to-discipline agreement, 
which includes a term of monitored probation, is an appropriate sanction. 
{¶ 28} The general term of monitored probation being imposed in this case 
will help protect the public far more effectively than would a sanction without that 
requirement, as Kluesener will be required to be in regular and repeated contact 
with the monitoring attorney and will have “the proverbial ‘sword of Damocles’ of 
* * * time without his license ‘hanging over his head’ if he violates any ethical duty 
or any of the conditions during the suspension period,” Sarver, 155 Ohio St.3d 100, 
2018-Ohio-4717, 119 N.E.3d 405, at ¶ 47 (Fischer, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  Should problems arise, the monitoring attorney would be able 
to assist and generally guide Kluesener in the right direction.  See id. 
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{¶ 29} Thus, because ordering a general term of monitored probation 
without specified conditions is appropriate in a variety of cases, including this case, 
I join the majority opinion and respectfully disagree with the opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part. 
DONNELLY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
___________________ 
KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 30} The majority today publicly reprimands respondent Michael Dean 
Christensen and suspends respondent Jeffrey Thomas Kluesener from the practice 
of law for one year but stays the entire suspension on the conditions that he (1) 
refrain from any further use of improper prelawsuit subpoenas, (2) engage in no 
other misconduct, and (3) serve a one-year period of monitored probation pursuant 
to Gov.Bar R. V(21).  I agree with the majority’s determination that a public 
reprimand is the appropriate sanction for Christensen, but I disagree with the 
majority’s requirement that Kluesener serve a one-year term of monitored 
probation as a condition of the stay of his suspension.  Therefore, I would reject the 
consent-to-discipline agreement submitted on behalf of Kluesener and remand that 
matter to the Board of Professional Conduct for further proceedings. 
{¶ 31} Monitored probation “should be meted out judiciously rather than 
reflexively,” Disciplinary Counsel v. Harmon, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2019-Ohio-
4171, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 57 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), to avoid overwhelming the 
volunteer monitoring attorneys on whom the probation system designed by 
Gov.Bar R. V(21) depends.  “[A]ttorneys who serve as monitors are a precious 
finite resource.  And we should be good stewards of that resource and employ their 
services only when it is absolutely necessary: when the benefit of a monitor’s 
service will educate the errant attorney and alleviate the underlying misconduct, 
while protecting the public.”  Toledo Bar Assn. v. Manore, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 
2019-Ohio-3846, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 23 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
January Term, 2020 
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dissenting in part).  For example, monitored probation is useful for helping a 
disciplined attorney learn how to properly operate a law practice and manage client 
trust accounts, see, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Simmons, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 
2019-Ohio-3783, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 21 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part), but not when the misconduct involves an attorney’s deliberate 
acts or willful ignorance of the attorney’s professional obligations, see, e.g., 
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Begovic, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2019-Ohio-4531, ___ N.E.3d 
___, ¶ 43-44 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
{¶ 32} Staying a suspension from the practice of law on conditions can be 
a preferable method to compel compliance with a disciplinary order of this court 
without “overburden[ing] attorneys who contribute their time to volunteer as 
probation monitors,” Harmon at ¶ 57 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  In contrast to 
Gov.Bar R. V(21)’s provisions on monitored probation, the Rules for the 
Government of the Bar do not provide any specific requirement or procedure for a 
relator or a monitoring attorney to supervise an attorney’s compliance with the 
conditions of a stayed suspension.  Rather, when we impose conditions on a stayed 
suspension, we reserve our power to dissolve the stay and reinstate the suspension 
from the practice of law, encouraging a disciplined attorney to take control of his 
or her own rehabilitation and to comply with his or her professional obligations. 
{¶ 33} In the circumstances of this case, the benefits of Kluesener’s 
monitored probation do not outweigh the burdens that will be imposed on relator, 
Columbus Bar Association, and the monitoring attorney.  First, the majority itself 
recognizes that the improper prelawsuit use of subpoenas, standing alone, does not 
warrant monitored probation, because the majority does not impose that 
requirement on Christensen for the same misconduct.  Second, monitored probation 
is not needed to teach Kluesener about his professional obligations, because the 
disciplinary process and the majority opinion in this case should make it clear to 
him that his prelawsuit use of subpoenas was improper, and it is now incumbent on 
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Kluesener himself to take responsibility for conforming his conduct to the Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  Third, imposing conditions on the stay of Kluesener’s 
suspension discourages any future use of improper prelawsuit subpoenas or other 
professional misconduct; if he engaged in further misconduct, then the stay of the 
suspension would be lifted. 
{¶ 34} But even if I agreed with the majority’s inclusion of probation as a 
condition of the stay of Kluesener’s suspension, I would not join the majority  
opinion, because it neglects to impose any conditions on the probation.  See 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Halligan, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2019-Ohio-3748, ___ 
N.E.3d ___, ¶ 41-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(explaining that when this court imposes probation, it must also impose conditions 
on the probation).  The monitored-probation scheme established by Gov.Bar R. 
V(21) cannot function effectively without this court’s imposition of conditions on 
probation.  After all, the first duty listed for monitoring attorneys in Gov.Bar R. 
V(21)(B)(1) is to “[m]onitor compliance by the respondent with the conditions of 
probation imposed by the Supreme Court.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 35} Specific conditions of probation, tailored to the facts and 
circumstances of a respondent’s misconduct, define the obligations of the 
respondent and of the monitoring attorney.  “Monitors should be given a framework 
in which to skillfully examine certain aspects of a respondent’s practice, rather than 
be forced to attempt an all-encompassing, untargeted supervision of the practice.”  
Harmon, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2019-Ohio-4171, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 57 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting).  Establishing expectations for a respondent and his or her monitoring 
attorney makes monitoring more manageable and rehabilitative.  Id.  It is also what 
the Rules for the Government of the Bar require. 
{¶ 36} But here, the majority gives no specific guidance to Kluesener or his 
monitor regarding their respective duties during the term of monitored probation.  
The majority does not describe what the monitor should be monitoring during the 
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monthly in-person meetings that will be required by Gov.Bar R. V(21)(C)(1), nor 
does it determine what access the monitor should have to Kluesener’s client files 
and records or even what would constitute a violation of probation.  The majority 
gives no explanation of how this court would ever be able to find that Kluesener 
had violated the conditions of probation pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(21)(K) when no 
conditions will have been imposed by the court in the first instance.  Without 
specifying conditions, imposing probation is not only unworkable as a practical 
matter, but it also raises due-process concerns regarding a disciplined attorney’s 
right to fair notice of what is expected of him or her during the term of probation. 
{¶ 37} Moreover, in a consent-to-discipline case such as this, the parties 
have the opportunity to design the most appropriate conditions based on the facts 
and circumstances of the case.  The relator, which must supervise the term of 
probation, and the respondent, who must serve it, share an interest in ensuring that 
the conditions of probation promote the disciplined attorney’s rehabilitation while 
protecting the public and making good use of the time and energy of the relator, the 
respondent, and the monitoring attorney.  When the relator and the respondent enter 
into a consent-to-discipline agreement stipulating that the sanction for the 
respondent’s misconduct should include monitored probation, the parties need to 
include conditions for the probation.  Conditions are essential to monitored 
probation and must be specified by this court when probation is imposed, but 
neither the board nor this court has the authority to modify a consent-to-discipline 
agreement to add conditions that the parties omitted, see Gov.Bar R. V(16)(B) and 
(C); Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D); see also Gov.Bar R. V(12)(I) (“If applicable, the panel 
shall include in its report any conditions of probation”).  Therefore, consent-to-
discipline agreements that include monitored probation but do not specify its 
conditions should be rejected by the board or, failing that, should be rejected by 
this court. 
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{¶ 38} “An effective attorney-probation system—one that follows the Rules 
for the Government of the Bar—requires the considered input of this court in 
establishing the conditions of probation.”  Halligan, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2019-
Ohio-3748, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 47 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part).  Because the majority imposes monitored probation when it is unnecessary, 
and because it fails to impose sufficient conditions on the probation, I dissent from 
the sanction imposed by the court on Kluesener and would remand this matter to 
the board for further proceedings. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
___________________ 
Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., and R. Leland Evans; and Kent R. 
Markus, Bar Counsel, and A. Alysha Clous, Assistant Bar Counsel, for relator. 
Charles J. Kettlewell, L.L.C., and Charles J. Kettlewell, for respondent 
Michael Dean Christensen. 
Coughlan Law Firm and Jonathan E. Coughlan, for respondent Jeffrey 
Thomas Kluesener. 
______________________