Case Title: Burns v. Gagnon

Citation: 

Docket Number: 110754

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2012-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
TRAVIS BURNS 
 
v. 
Record No. 110754 
 
GREGORY JOSEPH GAGNON, ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 OPINION BY 
JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 20, 2012 
GREGORY JOSEPH GAGNON 
 
v. 
Record No. 110767 
 
TRAVIS BURNS, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GLOUCESTER COUNTY 
R. Bruce Long, Judge 
 
 
These companion appeals arise out of a personal-injury 
suit brought by a former Gloucester High School (GHS or school) 
student who was injured in a fight with another student on 
school grounds.  On the morning of the fight, an assistant 
principal at the school received a report that the fight would 
occur sometime that day.  He did not act on the report before 
the fight. 
 
The injured student sued the other student involved in the 
fight, a third student who encouraged the fight, and the 
assistant principal, asserting claims for simple and gross 
negligence, assault, and battery.  A jury returned a verdict 
against all three defendants and awarded the injured student a 
total of $5 million in damages, with a different amount awarded 
against each defendant.  The circuit court entered judgment on 
the verdict but refused to hold the defendants jointly and 
severally liable. 
 
We granted the assistant principal's appeal1 and the 
injured student's cross-appeal to consider (1) whether the 
assistant principal owed the injured student a legal duty; (2) 
whether the assistant principal is entitled to the protection 
of sovereign immunity; (3) whether there was evidence to 
support the injured student's proffered jury instruction on 
gross negligence; (4) whether the deposition of an absent 
witness was admissible; and (5) whether intentional and 
negligent tortfeasors can be held jointly and severally liable.  
For the reasons that follow, we reverse in part and remand the 
case to the circuit court for a new trial. 
I. 
A. 
 
At around 9:00 a.m. on December 14, 2006, Shannon H. Diaz, 
a student at GHS, met with Principal Layton H. Beverage and 
Vice Principal W. R. Travis Burns to discuss a disciplinary 
offense.  When the meeting ended, Diaz informed Burns that, 
according to messages sent through the social-networking 
website MySpace, his friend and fellow student Gregory J. 
Gagnon was going to get into a fight with another student 
                                                 
 
1 Neither of the other two defendants appealed; thus, the 
judgment is final as to them. 
sometime that day.  Burns wrote down Gagnon's name and told 
Diaz that he would "alert [his] security and we'll make sure 
this problem gets taken care of."  Burns did not, however, act 
on Diaz' report that morning. 
 
Roughly two hours after Diaz and Burns met, Gagnon was 
approached by another student, James S. Newsome, Jr. (Newsome), 
in the school's cafeteria.  The two exchanged words, and 
Newsome's sister and fellow student, Christine D. Newsome 
(Christine), who was standing behind Newsome, said, "either 
. . . hit [Gagnon] or walk away."  Newsome then punched Gagnon 
once in the face, knocking his head back into a brick pillar. 
B. 
 
In 2009, Gagnon filed an amended complaint against Burns, 
Newsome, and Christine, asserting claims for simple and gross 
negligence, assault, and battery.  With respect to Newsome and 
Christine, Gagnon alleged that Newsome assaulted and battered 
him, and that Christine aided and abetted the assault and 
battery.  As for Burns, Gagnon alleged that he owed him various 
duties of care and that he breached those duties by, among 
other things, (1) failing to implement necessary policies and 
procedures to "rein[] [in] student-on-student fights" at the 
school; (2) taking no action in response to Diaz' report; and 
(3) failing to protect him from Newsome's conduct.  Gagnon 
claimed that the defendants' intentional and negligent acts 
caused him to suffer permanent disability, including a "present 
and future brain injury."  He sought judgment against all three 
defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $9,000,000.2 
 
Burns filed a demurrer and plea in bar, arguing that he 
owed no legal duty to Gagnon and that he was immune from 
Gagnon's simple negligence claim under both Code § 8.01-220.1:2 
and the common law.  In addition, Burns contended that Gagnon's 
allegations were insufficient to support a claim against him 
for gross negligence. 
C. 
 
The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on Burns' 
plea in bar.  At that hearing, Burns testified that, in 2006, 
he was the assistant principal at GHS in charge of ninth-grade 
student discipline and that his duties included receiving 
reports of disciplinary offenses.  When asked to recount the 
events of December 14, 2006, Burns said that he and Beverage 
met with Diaz that morning to discuss a disciplinary matter.  
Burns testified that, after the meeting, Diaz told him that, 
based on "some exchanges" happening on MySpace, there was a 
fight that "may occur between . . . Gagnon[] and another boy."  
According to Burns, Diaz did not give him the name of the other 
student or the date, time, or place of the fight.  Burns 
                                                 
 
2 Gagnon originally prayed for punitive damages as well, 
but he later abandoned that claim. 
further testified that "the only thing [he] did" in response to 
Diaz' report "was [he] took . . . Gagnon's name down and . . . 
told [Diaz] that [he] would look into the matter." 
 
When asked why he did not act on Diaz' report, Burns said 
that he had other priorities to attend to that morning and that 
he did not consider the report to present an immediate concern.  
Yet Burns acknowledged that, had he "see[n the report] as 
pressing," he could have located Gagnon that morning using the 
school's computer system, could have asked one of the school's 
security guards to remove Gagnon from class, and could have had 
Gagnon brought to his office. 
 
Over Burns' objection, Gagnon introduced portions of Diaz' 
de bene esse deposition at the hearing, representing to the 
circuit court that Diaz was unable to appear because he was on 
active military duty.  In the admitted portions, Diaz testified 
that he told Burns on December 14, 2006, that Gagnon was going 
to get into a fight with another student sometime that day, but 
that he did not say who the other student would be.  According 
to Diaz, Burns told him that he would "alert security" and 
"make sure this problem [was] taken care of."  But Diaz said 
that Burns never asked him for the name of the other student or 
for the time or place of the fight. 
 
Gagnon's mother and father both testified at the hearing 
that Burns spoke to them individually in the days following the 
fight and apologized for "dropp[ing] the ball."  And a deputy 
assigned to GHS testified that soon after the fight, Burns 
admitted that "he believe[d] he screwed up."  During his 
testimony, Burns denied making these admissions. 
 
The circuit court denied Burns' demurrer and plea in bar.  
On the threshold issue of legal duty, the circuit court held 
that Burns owed Gagnon "legal duties," but it did not specify 
what those duties were.  As to whether Burns was entitled to 
common-law sovereign immunity, the circuit court applied the 
four-factor test established in James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 53, 
282 S.E.2d 864, 869 (1980), and explained in Messina v. Burden, 
228 Va. 301, 312-13, 321 S.E.2d 657, 663-64 (1984), finding 
that the only factor that was contested by the parties was 
whether Burns' alleged wrongful act was discretionary or 
ministerial.  Relying on B.M.H. v. School Bd. of City of 
Chesapeake, 833 F. Supp. 560, 571 (E.D. Va. 1993), as 
persuasive authority, the circuit court concluded that Burns' 
omitted act of "notifying school security of the reported 
impending physical altercation or otherwise investigating the 
report of . . . Diaz" was ministerial.  The circuit court thus 
held that Burns was not entitled to common-law sovereign 
immunity.  It also held that Burns was not entitled to 
statutory sovereign immunity because Code § 8.01-220.1:2 – 
which provides, among other things, civil immunity to teachers 
under certain circumstances — did not apply to Gagnon's claims. 
 
The circuit court further concluded that "Burns' acts or 
omissions did not constitute gross negligence, but did, for 
purposes of the plea in bar, make out a sufficient case of 
simple negligence to permit the issue to be determined by a 
jury."  Lastly, the circuit court denied Burns' post-hearing 
motion to strike Diaz' deposition, finding that the deposition 
was taken in another action with substantially similar parties 
and issues,3 that Diaz was an unavailable witness, and that 
Burns' counsel had participated in the deposition. 
D. 
 
The case proceeded to a nine-day jury trial in which Burns 
and Gagnon presented substantially the same evidence that they 
offered at the plea in bar hearing.  In addition, Burns 
testified that he asked Diaz the name of the other student who 
would be involved in the fight with Gagnon, but that Diaz said 
that he did not know.  According to Burns, Diaz also said that 
he did not know the other student's grade or "what the conflict 
was about."  Burns further testified that he believed that Diaz 
had a "credibility issue" because he was slow to admit that he, 
and not some other students that he had initially implicated, 
                                                 
 
3 Gagnon originally sued Burns and the Gloucester County 
School Board.  That case was nonsuited, and this case was filed 
against Burns, Newsome, and Christine. 
had committed the disciplinary offense that was being 
investigated on the morning of the fight. 
 
At the close of all evidence, the circuit court considered 
jury instructions and verdict forms.  As relevant here, Gagnon 
proposed an instruction and special interrogatory on gross 
negligence.  The circuit court refused both, citing its prior 
ruling at the plea in bar stage that Burns' acts or omissions 
did not constitute gross negligence. 
 
With respect to damages, Gagnon argued that Burns should 
be liable for all of the damages awarded by the jury, even 
those damages that resulted from Newsome's assault and battery.  
Gagnon accordingly offered a "general personal injury and 
property damage" instruction that did not separate the damages 
awards for each defendant.  The circuit court rejected the 
instruction, ruling that damages for assault and battery would 
be specific to Newsome in the instructions. 
 
Gagnon proposed that a single verdict form be used, but 
the circuit court expressed its preference for separate forms 
for all three defendants.  The circuit court thus prepared a 
form for each defendant, which asked the jury to find whether 
the particular defendant was liable, and, if so, to list the 
amount of damages as to that defendant. 
 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Gagnon against 
Burns in the amount of $1,250,000, against Newsome in the 
amount of $3,250,000, and against Christine in the amount of 
$500,000.  Burns asked the circuit court to give an 
interrogatory to the jury asking whether it was its intent to 
render separate damages verdicts for each defendant.  Gagnon 
objected to the interrogatory, stating that the jury rendered a 
verdict on the forms provided by the circuit court.  Although 
the circuit court thought it clear that the jury had rendered 
separate verdicts, it nonetheless asked the jury whether its 
intent was that each defendant be responsible only for the 
amount awarded against him or her, and not liable for the 
amounts awarded against the other defendants; and the jury 
responded in the affirmative. 
E. 
 
In a post-trial motion, Gagnon asked the circuit court to 
hold the defendants jointly and severally liable for the total 
$5,000,000 verdict.  He argued that his injury was indivisible 
and that the jury found all three defendants liable as joint 
tortfeasors.  Moreover, he maintained, the jury had no right to 
dictate the legal consequences of its damages calculation, and 
Code § 8.01-443 commanded joint and several liability.  The 
circuit court denied the motion and entered judgment in 
accordance with the verdict. 
 
Burns and Gagnon now cross-appeal.  Burns challenges the 
circuit court's rulings on the issues of legal duty, sovereign 
immunity, and Diaz' deposition.  And Gagnon challenges the 
circuit court's rulings on the issues of gross negligence and 
joint and several liability. 
II. 
 
"Negligence," we have long said, "is not actionable unless 
there is a legal duty, a violation of the duty, and consequent 
damage."  Marshall v. Winston, 239 Va. 315, 318, 389 S.E.2d 
902, 904 (1990).  The first question that we must answer, then, 
is whether Burns owed Gagnon a legal duty.  "The issue whether 
a legal duty in tort exists is a pure question of law," and 
thus is subject to de novo review.  Kellermann v. McDonough, 
278 Va. 478, 487, 684 S.E.2d 786, 790 (2009); see also Fox v. 
Custis, 236 Va. 69, 74, 372 S.E.2d 373, 375 (1988). 
 
The circuit court ruled that Burns owed Gagnon "legal 
duties," but it did not indicate what those duties were.  
Gagnon argues, as he did below, that Burns owed three:  (1) an 
elevated duty of care to protect him from Newsome's conduct; 
(2) a common-law duty of ordinary care; and (3) an assumed duty 
to investigate Diaz' report and notify school security about 
the fight. 
A. 
 
"We have consistently held that 'generally a person does 
not have a duty to protect another from the conduct of third 
persons.' "  Kellermann, 278 Va. at 492, 684 S.E.2d at 793 
(quoting Didato v. Strehler, 262 Va. 617, 628-29, 554 S.E.2d 
42, 49 (2001)).  "This is particularly so when the third person 
commits acts of assaultive criminal behavior because such acts 
cannot reasonably be foreseen."  Burdette v. Marks, 244 Va. 
309, 311-12, 421 S.E.2d 419, 420 (1992).  There is an exception 
to the general rule, however, where "a special relation exists 
(1) between the defendant and the third person which imposes a 
duty upon the defendant to control the third person's conduct, 
or (2) between the defendant and the plaintiff which gives a 
right to protection to the plaintiff."  Id. at 312, 421 S.E.2d 
at 420. 
 
Whether a special relationship exists between a principal 
and a student is a question of first impression in this Court.  
"Examples of special relationships we have recognized between a 
defendant and a plaintiff include common carrier-passenger, 
business proprietor-invitee, innkeeper-guest, and employer-
employee with regard to the employer's potential duty of 
protecting or warning an employee."  Kellermann, 278 Va. at 
492, 684 S.E.2d at 793.  While "this list of relationships that 
give rise to a special relationship is not exhaustive," we have 
exercised caution in expanding it to include new relationships.  
See id. 
 
"When a negligence claim is made against a public 
official, a distinction must be drawn between the official's 
public duty owed to the citizenry at large and the official's 
special duty owed to a specific, identifiable person or class 
of persons."  Burdette, 244 Va. at 312, 421 S.E.2d at 421.  
Only a violation of the latter will give rise to liability 
"because it is not in society's best interest to subject public 
officials to potential liability for every action undertaken."  
Id. 
 
In determining whether a special relationship exists under 
the facts presented here, "it is important to consider whether 
[Burns] reasonably could have foreseen that he would be 
expected to take affirmative action to protect [Gagnon] from 
harm."  Id.  Although Diaz told Burns on the morning of the 
fight that Gagnon was going to be in a fight with another 
student sometime that day, Diaz did not tell Burns who the 
other student would be or the time or place of the fight. 
 
These facts, we think, make this case distinguishable from 
Burdette, in which we held that a deputy sheriff owed a duty to 
protect a motorist from the criminal conduct of a third person 
because the particular facts alleged created an exception to 
the general rule.  Id. at 312-13, 421 S.E.2d at 421.  In that 
case, the deputy sheriff responded to the scene of a car crash, 
where he witnessed the motorist being attacked by a third 
person, with first a shovel and then an iron pipe.  Id. at 310-
11, 421 S.E.2d at 420.  Despite the motorist's calls for help, 
the deputy sheriff did not intervene.  Id. at 311, 421 S.E.2d 
at 420.  We concluded that a special relationship existed 
between the deputy sheriff and the motorist, because the 
sheriff "knew or should have known that [the motorist] was in 
great danger of serious bodily injury or death."  Id. at 312, 
421 S.E.2d at 421. 
 
In this case, by contrast, there is no evidence in the 
record suggesting that Burns knew or should have known that 
Gagnon "was in great danger of serious bodily injury or death."  
Id.  Again, all that Diaz told Burns was that, according to 
messages sent through MySpace, there would be a fight involving 
Gagnon sometime that day.  Moreover, Burns was not present when 
Newsome punched Gagnon; thus, unlike the deputy sheriff in  
Burdette, Burns was not in a position to step in and stop the 
fight. 
 
This case is also distinguishable, in our view, from 
Taboada v. Daly Seven, Inc., 271 Va. 313, 626 S.E.2d 428 
(2006), a case upon which Gagnon heavily relies.  There we 
reaffirmed that a special relationship exists between an 
innkeeper and guest.  Id. at 323, 626 S.E.2d at 432.  In doing 
so, we noted that the innkeeper-guest special relationship 
dates back to the Middle Ages when travellers were "[e]xposed 
. . . to robbery and violence" while on their pilgrimages, and 
thus were "compelled to repose confidence" in innkeepers when 
stopping for the night; "and hence there grew up the salutary 
principles that a host owed his guest the duty, not only of 
hospitality, but also of protection."  Id. at 323 n.4, 626 
S.E.2d at 432 n.4 (quoting Kveragas v. Scottish Inns, Inc., 733 
F.2d 409, 412 (6th Cir. 1905)). 
 
Gagnon argues that the principal-student relationship is 
similar to the innkeeper-guest relationship and therefore asks 
us to recognize it as a special relationship, too.  Just as the 
guest entrusts his safety to the innkeeper, Gagnon maintains, 
so also the student entrusts his safety to the principal.  In 
addition, Gagnon contends, the student, like the guest, has 
little ability to control his environment and thus relies on 
the principal to make the school safe, just as the guest relies 
on the innkeeper to make the inn safe. 
 
We decline Gagnon's invitation to expand our special-
relationship jurisprudence to include the principal-student 
relationship.  For one thing, the innkeeper-guest relationship 
has long been recognized by this and other courts as a special 
relationship.  See id. at 323 & n.4, 626 S.E.2d at 432-33 & 
n.4.  Indeed, as noted above, its status as such in the common 
law dates back to the Middle Ages.  Id. at 323 n.4, 626 S.E.2d 
at 432 n.4.  The principal-student relationship, on the other 
hand, has no history – deep-rooted or otherwise – in the common 
law.  In fact, Gagnon fails to point us to even a single case 
in which a court has recognized it as a special relationship. 
 
In addition, we have repeatedly been hesitant to recognize 
a special relationship where a public official is being sued 
for acts committed in his official capacity.  See, e.g., 
Marshall, 239 Va. at 319, 389 S.E.2d at 905 (holding that a 
sheriff and a jailer had no special relationship with a member 
of the general public); Fox, 236 Va. at 75-76, 372 S.E.2d at 
376 (concluding that two parole officers did not have a special 
relationship with a parolee).  The reason for our hesitation, 
we have explained, is that "it is not in society's best 
interest to subject public officials to potential liability for 
every action undertaken."  Burdette, 244 Va. at 312, 421 S.E.2d 
at 421. 
B. 
 
This Court recently held that under the common law, "when 
a parent relinquishes the supervision and care of a child to an 
adult who agrees to supervise and care for that child, the 
supervising adult must discharge that duty with reasonable 
care."  Kellermann, 278 Va. at 487, 684 S.E.2d at 790.  But we 
were careful to note that the supervising adult "is not an 
insurer of the child's safety.  Rather, the supervising adult 
must discharge his or her duties as a reasonably prudent person 
would under similar circumstances."  Id. 
 
Gagnon argues that, pursuant to our holding in Kellermann, 
Burns had a common-law duty to supervise and care for him.  
Admittedly, the facts presented in this case are markedly 
different from those we confronted in Kellermann, where the 
defendants agreed to supervise and care for their daughter's 
teenage friend.  Id. at 484-85, 684 S.E.2d at 788-89.  We 
nonetheless agree with Gagnon that the duty recognized in that 
case is applicable here. 
 
By law, Gagnon's parents had to send Gagnon to school, 
where it was the responsibility of Burns and other school 
officials to supervise and ensure that "students could . . . 
have an education in an atmosphere conducive to learning, free 
of disruption, and threat to person."  Thus, just as the 
defendants in Kellermann owed a duty to supervise and care for 
their daughter's teenage friend, Burns owed a duty to supervise 
and care for Gagnon.  That does not mean, however, that Burns 
was an insurer of Gagnon's safety; instead, like the defendants 
in Kellermann, Burns can only be held liable if he failed to 
"discharge his . . . duties as a reasonably prudent person 
would under similar circumstances."  Id. at 487, 684 S.E.2d at 
790. 
C. 
 
We have adopted the common-law principle of assumption of 
a duty.  Didato, 262 Va. at 629, 554 S.E.2d at 48.  Under that 
principle, "one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, 
may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if 
he acts at all."  Kellermann, 278 Va. at 489, 684 S.E.2d at 791 
(quoting Nolde Bros. v. Wray, 221 Va. 25, 28, 266 S.E.2d 882, 
884 (1980)) (quotation marks omitted).  As noted earlier, 
whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty in tort is 
generally a question of law.  But when the issue is not whether 
the law recognizes a duty, but rather whether the defendant by 
his conduct assumed a duty, the existence of that duty is a 
question for the fact-finder.  Id. at 490, 684 S.E.2d at 791-
92; Didato, 262 Va. at 629, 554 S.E.2d at 48. 
 
In accordance with the principle of assumption of a duty, 
an actor who fails to exercise reasonable care in performing 
his undertaking may be subject to liability for physical harm 
caused not only to the one to whom he has agreed to render 
services, but also to a third person.  Liability to the latter 
is addressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A, which 
provides: 
 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for 
consideration, to render services to another which he 
should recognize as necessary for the protection of a 
third person or his things, is subject to liability to 
the third person for physical harm resulting from his 
failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his 
undertaking, if 
 
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care 
increases the risk of such harm, or 
 
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by 
the other to the third person, or 
 
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of 
the other or the third person upon the 
undertaking. 
 
 
Gagnon argues that Burns assumed a duty to investigate 
Diaz' report and notify school security about the fight under 
the principle of assumption of a duty, because Burns told Diaz 
that he would "alert security," "look into it," and "take care 
of it."  While there is evidence in the record pertinent to the 
issue whether Burns assumed this duty, neither the circuit 
court at the plea in bar hearing nor the jury at trial made 
such a finding.  In truth, they were never asked to.  Because 
we cannot decide the issue as a matter of law, it is to be 
decided by the fact-finder on remand.  We stress, however, that 
Burns can only be subject to liability for Gagnon's physical 
harm under Restatement § 324A if Gagnon proves, first that 
Burns undertook to investigate Diaz' report and notify school 
security about the fight, and then either:  (1) that Burns' 
failure to exercise reasonable care in performing his 
undertaking increased the risk of the harm; (2) that Burns 
undertook to perform a duty owed by Diaz to Gagnon; or (3) that 
the harm was a result of Diaz' or Gagnon's reliance upon Burns' 
undertaking. 
 
III. 
 
Having concluded that Burns owed at least a common-law 
duty to supervise and care for Gagnon, we now turn to the 
question whether Burns is entitled to the protection of 
sovereign immunity.  " 'The existence of sovereign immunity is 
a question of law that is reviewed de novo.' "  Lee v. City of 
Norfolk, 281 Va. 423, 439, 706 S.E.2d 330, 338 (2011) (quoting 
City of Chesapeake v. Cunningham, 268 Va. 624, 633, 604 S.E.2d 
420, 426 (2004)). 
 
Burns asserts that he is immune from Gagnon's simple 
negligence claim under both Code § 8.01-220.1:2 and the common 
law.  We disagree that the statute affords Burns immunity, but 
agree that the common law does. 
A. 
 
Entitled "Civil immunity for teachers under certain 
circumstances," Code § 8.01-220.1:2, in relevant part, 
provides: 
 
A.  Any teacher employed by a local school board 
in the Commonwealth shall not be liable for any civil 
damages for any acts or omissions resulting from the 
supervision, care or discipline of students when such 
acts or omissions are within such teacher's scope of 
employment and are taken in good faith in the course 
of supervision, care or discipline of students, unless 
such acts or omissions were the result of gross 
negligence or willful misconduct. 
 
 
B.  No school employee or school volunteer shall 
be liable for any civil damages arising from the 
prompt good faith reporting of alleged acts of 
bullying or crimes against others to the appropriate 
school official in compliance with specified 
procedures. 
 
Burns maintains that he is entitled to immunity from Gagnon's 
simple negligence claim under both of these subsections.  We 
address them in turn. 
1. 
 
Burns argues that he is immune under subsection (A) 
because Gagnon's simple negligence claim arises out of acts or 
omissions relating to the "supervision, care or discipline of 
students" within the scope of Burns' employment.  Code § 8.01-
220.1:2(A).  Burns acknowledges that subsection (A) speaks only 
of "[a]ny teacher," id., but argues that, under this Court's 
decision in Tazewell County School Board v. Brown, 267 Va. 150, 
162, 591 S.E.2d 671, 677 (2004), "teacher" includes principals.  
Hence, he concludes, principals, too, are shielded from 
liability under subsection (A). 
 
We disagree.  By its terms, subsection (A) applies only to 
"[a]ny teacher."  Code § 8.01-220.1:2(A).  Because "teacher" is 
not defined in Code § 8.01-220.1:2, we must accord the term its 
"ordinary meaning."  James v. City of Falls Church, 280 Va. 31, 
43, 694 S.E.2d 568, 575 (2010); see also Hubbard v. Henrico 
Ltd. P'ship, 255 Va. 335, 340, 497 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1998) 
("When . . . a statute contains no express definition of a 
term, the general rule of statutory construction is to infer 
the legislature's intent from the plain meaning of the language 
used.").  A "teacher" is defined as "one whose occupation is to 
instruct."  Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2346 
(1993). 
 
Burns' reliance on Brown to argue that, for purposes of 
subsection (A), "teacher" also includes principals – i.e., 
those whose occupation is to lead educational institutions, id. 
at 1802 – is misplaced.  In that case, we considered, among 
other things, whether "teacher" includes "the position of 
principal" for purposes of Part III of the State Grievance 
Procedure.  Brown, 267 Va. at 162, 591 S.E.2d at 677.  And we 
held that it did.  Id. at 164, 591 S.E.2d at 678. 
 
In reaching that result, we first noted that "teacher" was 
not defined anywhere in Part III.  Id. at 162, 591 S.E.2d at 
677.  We then observed that the term had been defined by the 
Board of Education, in accordance with its rule-making 
authority:  "The definition of the term 'teacher' for purposes 
of Part III . . . includes 'all regularly certified/licensed 
professional public school personnel employed under a written 
contract . . . as a teacher or supervisor of classroom 
teachers."  Id. (second alteration in original; citation 
omitted).  Because a principal is required to hold a license 
and because a principal is a supervisor of classroom teachers, 
we reasoned that a principal fell under the definition of 
"teacher" for purposes of Part III.  Id. at 162-63, 591 S.E.2d 
at 677. 
 
Brown's definition of "teacher" has no application here.  
As just explained, Brown dealt with a grievance procedure that 
was promulgated and construed by a State agency.  This case, in 
contrast, involves an immunity provision enacted by the General 
Assembly.  In interpreting that provision, we cannot put a 
construction upon the plain and definite words chosen that 
"amounts to holding the legislature did not mean what it has 
actually expressed."  Id. at 162, 591 S.E.2d at 677.  In other 
words, we " 'cannot change or amend a statute under the guise 
of construing it.' "  Id. (quoting Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of 
Roanoke, Inc. v. County of Botetourt, 259 Va. 559, 565, 526 
S.E.2d 746, 750 (2000)).  For purposes of subsection (A), then, 
we define "teacher" according to its ordinary meaning, and not 
according to the meaning we adopted in Brown and urged by 
Burns. 
 
Applying that ordinary meaning in this case, we think it 
plain that Burns is not a "teacher" under subsection (A).  His 
occupation is not to instruct at an educational institution, 
see Webster's, at 2346; rather, his occupation is to lead an 
educational institution.  See id. at 1802.  We thus conclude 
that subsection (A) affords Burns no immunity from Gagnon's 
simple negligence claim. 
2. 
 
Burns contends that he is also immune under subsection 
(B), because, according to him, Gagnon's simple negligence 
claim arises out of the "good faith reporting of alleged acts 
of bullying or crimes against others to the appropriate school 
official in compliance with specified procedures."  Code 
§ 8.01-220.1:2(B).  We find this argument without merit.  Burns 
was not sued because he reported an alleged act of bullying or 
crime against another to the appropriate school official; 
rather, he was sued because he failed to respond to such a 
report.  We accordingly hold that Burns is not entitled to 
immunity from Gagnon's simple negligence claim under subsection 
(B). 
3. 
 
Since neither subsection (A) nor subsection (B) of Code 
§ 8.01-220.1:2 applies in this case, we conclude that the 
circuit court did not err in holding that Burns was not immune 
from Gagnon's simple negligence claim under the statute. 
B. 
 
Burns further argues that the common law affords him 
immunity from Gagnon's simple negligence claim.  "This Court 
has outlined a four-factor test for determining whether an 
individual working for an immune governmental entity . . . is 
entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity."  Friday-
Spivey v. Collier, 268 Va. 384, 387-88, 601 S.E.2d 591, 593 
(2004).  See also Messina, 228 Va. at 312-13, 321 S.E.2d at 
663-64; James, 221 Va. at 53, 282 S.E.2d at 869.  Those factors 
are:  "(1) the nature of the function the employee performs; 
(2) the extent of the governmental entity's interest and 
involvement in the function; (3) the degree of control and 
direction exercised by the governmental entity over the 
employee; and (4) whether the alleged wrongful act involved the 
exercise of judgment and discretion."  Lentz v. Morris, 236 Va. 
78, 82, 372 S.E.2d 608, 610 (1988).  Burns and Gagnon, as the 
circuit court noted, disagree only over whether the fourth 
factor is satisfied.  We agree with Burns that it is. 
 
Burns contends that this case is on all fours with Banks 
v. Sellers, 224 Va. 168, 294 S.E.2d 862 (1982).  There we held, 
among other things, that a high school principal is entitled to 
immunity because he "performs a large number of discretional 
and managerial functions in the school."  Id. at 173, 294 
S.E.2d at 865.  Other than this oblique reference to the 
discretionary nature of a number of the functions performed by 
a principal, however, the Court did not discuss the application 
of the governing four-factor immunity test in holding the 
principal immune.  See id.  Thus, Banks is not dispositive 
here. 
 
More recently, in Lentz, we considered whether a 
schoolteacher's "supervision and control" of a physical 
education class involved judgment and discretion.  236 Va. at 
83, 372 S.E.2d at 610.  We concluded that it did, reasoning:  
"[A] teacher's supervision and control of a physical education 
class, including the decision of what equipment and attire is 
to be worn by the student participating, clearly involves, at 
least in part, the exercise of judgment and discretion by the 
teacher."  Id., 372 S.E.2d at 611.  We accordingly held that 
the schoolteacher was entitled to immunity.  Id. 
 
Like the schoolteacher's supervision and control of his 
physical education class in Lentz, Burns' response (or lack 
thereof) to Diaz' report involved the exercise of judgment and 
discretion.  Upon receiving Diaz' report, Burns had to make 
several decisions.  To start, Burns had to decide whether to 
respond at all.  Diaz had misled Burns and Beverage that 
morning about an unrelated disciplinary offense, so there was 
reason to doubt the report's veracity.  Next, Burns had to 
decide when to respond.  While Diaz said that the fight would 
occur sometime that day, he did not provide Burns with a 
specific time; thus, there was no reason to think that an 
immediate response was required.  And finally, Burns had to 
decide how to respond.  Diaz did not reveal the identity of the 
other student who would be involved in the fight or say where 
the fight would occur, so the type of response needed was not 
readily apparent. 
 
In light of these decisions that Burns had to make upon 
receiving Diaz' report, we conclude that his response (or lack 
thereof) was not simply a ministerial act; instead, it was an 
act involving the exercise of judgment and discretion.  The 
circuit court therefore erred in holding that Burns was not 
entitled to common-law immunity from Gagnon's simple negligence 
claim. 
IV. 
 
If an individual working for an immune governmental entity 
is entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity under the 
common law, he is not immunized from suit.  Colby v. Boyden, 
241 Va. 125, 128, 400 S.E.2d 184, 186 (1991).  "Rather, the 
degree of negligence which must be shown to impose liability is 
elevated from simple to gross negligence."  Id.  Here the 
circuit court refused to give the jury a gross negligence 
instruction, relying on its prior holding at the plea in bar 
stage that Burns' acts or omissions did not amount to gross 
negligence.  Gagnon asserts that this ruling was in error.  We 
agree. 
 
"A litigant is entitled to jury instructions supporting 
his theory of the case if sufficient evidence is introduced to 
support that theory."  Price v. Taylor, 251 Va. 82, 85, 466 
S.E.2d 87, 88 (1996); see also Bowers v. May, 233 Va. 411, 413-
14, 357 S.E.2d 29, 30 (1987).  "It is immaterial that the jury 
could have reached contrary conclusions.  If a proffered 
instruction finds any support in credible evidence, its refusal 
is reversible error."  McClung v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 654, 
657, 212 S.E.2d 290, 293 (1975).  In this case, then, the 
circuit court was required to instruct the jury on gross 
negligence unless the evidence was " 'clearly insufficient to 
support [that] theory.' "  Price, 251 Va. at 85, 466 S.E.2d at 
89 (quoting Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Walker, 190 
Va. 1016, 1028, 59 S.E.2d 126, 131 (1950)). 
 
"[G]ross negligence," we recently reiterated, is "the 
utter disregard of prudence amounting to complete neglect of 
the safety of another.  It is a heedless and palpable violation 
of legal duty respecting the rights of others which amounts to 
the absence of slight diligence, or the want of even scant 
care."  Volpe v. City of Lexington, 281 Va. 630, 639, 708 
S.E.2d 824, 829 (2011) (quoting Chapman v. City of Virginia 
Beach, 252 Va. 186, 190, 475 S.E.2d 798, 800-01 (1996)).  
"Ordinarily, the question whether gross negligence has been 
established is a matter of fact to be decided by a jury."  
Frazier v. City of Norfolk, 234 Va. 388, 393, 362 S.E.2d 688, 
691 (1987). 
 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Gagnon, we believe that it was sufficient to submit the 
question whether Burns was grossly negligent to the jury.  Diaz 
told Burns on the morning of the fight that, according to 
messages sent through MySpace, Gagnon "was going to get into a 
fight" sometime that day.  Upon receiving Diaz' report, Burns 
wrote down Gagnon's name and said that he would "alert 
security," that "he would look into it," and that he would 
"take care of it."  In our view, the fact that Burns did not 
respond to Diaz' report – or at least did not respond in time 
to stop the fight – could possibly lead a jury to conclude that 
he acted in "utter disregard of prudence amounting to a 
complete neglect of [Gagnon's] safety," and thus was grossly 
negligent.  Koffman v. Garnett, 265 Va. 12, 15, 574 S.E.2d 258, 
260 (2003) (quoting Ferguson v. Ferguson, 212 Va. 86, 92, 181 
S.E.2d 648, 653 (1971)).  We thus hold that the circuit court 
erred in refusing to instruct the jury on gross negligence. 
V. 
 
We finally turn to Diaz' deposition.  Burns challenged its 
admissibility both at the plea in bar hearing and at trial.  
Although we remand this case for a new trial, we nonetheless 
address the objections that Burns made at both stages of the 
case because they may arise again on retrial.  See Dandridge v. 
Marshall, 267 Va. 591, 595, 594 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2004). 
 
Burns first argues, as he did at both the plea in bar 
hearing and trial, that Diaz' deposition was inadmissible under 
Rule 4:7, because Diaz' unavailability was not proved by Gagnon 
or found by the circuit court, and because the deposition was 
taken in a previous action involving different parties.  We 
disagree. 
 
We review a circuit court's decision to admit the 
deposition of an absent witness under Rule 4:7 for an abuse of 
discretion.  Greater Richmond Transit Co. v. Massey, 268 Va. 
354, 357, 601 S.E.2d 609, 611 (2004).  That Rule, as relevant 
here, provides: 
 
(4) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a 
party, may be used by any party for any purpose in any 
action upon a claim arising at law . . . if the court 
finds: . . . (B) that the witness is at a greater 
distance than 100 miles from the place of trial or 
hearing, or is out of this Commonwealth, unless it 
appears that the absence of the witness was procured 
by the party offering the deposition . . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
 
(7) In any action, the fact that a deposition has 
not been offered in evidence prior to an interlocutory 
decree or order shall not prevent its thereafter being 
so offered except as to matters ruled upon in such 
interlocutory decree or order; provided, however, that 
such deposition may be read as to matters ruled upon 
in such an interlocutory decree or order if the 
principles applicable to after-discovered evidence 
would permit its introduction. 
 
 
Substitution of parties does not affect the right 
to use depositions previously taken; and when there 
are pending in the same court several actions or suits 
between the same parties, depending upon the same 
facts, or involving the same matter of controversy, in 
whole or in part, a deposition taken in one of such 
actions or suits, upon notice to the same party or 
parties, may be read in all, so far as it is 
applicable and relevant to the issue; and, when an 
action in any court of the United States or of this or 
any other state has been dismissed and another action 
involving the same subject matter is afterward brought 
between the same parties or their representatives or 
successors in interest, all depositions lawfully taken 
and duly filed in the one action may be used in the 
other as if originally taken therefor. 
 
 
Diaz' deposition was admissible under these subsections if 
(1) he was more than "100 miles from the place of [the] trial 
or hearing, or [was] out of this Commonwealth"; (2) it was 
taken in a previous "action involving the same subject matter" 
as the present action; and (3) the present action is "between 
the same parties" as the previous action.  We conclude that all 
of these conditions were met.  First, the evidence showed, and 
Burns did not challenge, that Diaz was on active military duty 
in Georgia, which is both more than "100 miles from the place 
of [the] trial and hearing" and "out of this Commonwealth."  
Second, this action "involv[es] the same subject matter" as the 
action in which the deposition was taken — namely, the fight 
between Newsome and Gagnon.  Third, this action is between 
Gagnon and Burns and so was the action in which the deposition 
was taken; it did not matter that the other parties changed. 
 
We accordingly hold that the circuit court did not abuse 
its discretion in admitting Diaz' deposition at the plea in bar 
hearing or at trial, pursuant to Rule 4:7.  Of course, if Burns 
wishes to introduce any portion of the deposition on retrial, 
Diaz' unavailability will again have to be established in 
accordance with Rule 4:7's requirements. 
 
Burns also contends that numerous statements in the 
portions of Diaz' deposition that were admitted at both the 
plea in bar hearing and trial should have been excluded by the 
circuit court because they contained inadmissible hearsay.  
Specifically, Burns points to Diaz' "substantive references" to 
an affidavit that Diaz executed some months after the fight, 
which detailed, among other things, his interactions with Burns 
before and after the fight.  In one admitted portion of the 
deposition, Diaz "dr[ew] a blank" when asked by Gagnon's 
counsel whether Burns said "[a]nything else . . . about what he 
could have done," so Diaz reviewed the affidavit.  The 
following colloquy then occurred: 
 
[Gagnon's counsel]:  Let the record reflect 
you're looking through your affidavit on that. 
 
By [Gagnon's counsel]: 
 
 
 
Q.  What page are you on? 
 
 
 
A.  The last, third page. 
 
 
 
Q.  Okay. 
 
 
 
A.  I wish he [Burns] would have done something. 
 
 
 
Q.  That's what you said to him? 
 
 
 
A.  That is what I said to him. 
 
 
 
Q.  That's what your affidavit says? 
 
 
 
A.  That is what my affidavit says. 
 
 
 
Q.  Is that affidavit correct? 
 
 
 
A.  It's a hundred percent correct. 
 
 
We will not overturn a circuit court's decision to admit 
or exclude evidence unless the court abused its discretion.  
Gray v. Rhoads, 268 Va. 81, 86, 597 S.E.2d 93, 96 (2004).  Here 
we cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion in 
admitting the above-quoted portion or any of the other portions 
of Diaz' deposition in which the affidavit is mentioned at 
either the plea in bar hearing or trial. 
 
We have long upheld the use of written materials to 
refresh a witness's recollection.  As we recently explained: 
[W]hen a witness has a memory lapse on the stand and 
forgets some portion (or even all) of the facts of the 
matter about which [he or she is] called to testify, a 
party may attempt to "refresh" the witness's memory by 
having the witness examine materials relating to the 
matter for which they are testifying.  After examining 
such materials, a witness may then speak to the facts 
from his own recollection. 
 
Ruhlin v. Samaan, 282 Va. 371, 379, 718 S.E.2d 447, 451 (2011) 
(second alteration in original; some internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). 
 
In this case, we think it clear that Diaz' examination of 
the affidavit was for the sole purpose of refreshing his 
recollection about what occurred between him and Burns after 
the fight.  It is equally clear that Diaz' review of the 
affidavit did refresh his recollection, as he avers that his 
statement, "I wish he [Burns] would have done something," was 
"a hundred percent correct."  Although it may have been 
improper for Gagnon's counsel to ask Diaz if his answer was as 
stated in the affidavit and for the circuit court not to redact 
that portion of the deposition, Diaz did have an independent 
recollection of the events, and his testimony was not hearsay. 
 
In the other admitted portions of the deposition in which 
the affidavit is mentioned, Diaz merely confirms that he 
executed one and explains that he waited several months to do 
so because he was afraid of retribution by the school.  Also, 
he acknowledges that he reviewed the affidavit in preparation 
for the deposition and, when asked by Gagnon's counsel whether, 
"[a]part from the affidavit, [he] still ha[s] an independent 
recollection of what happened [on the day of the fight]," Diaz 
answers, "Yes, I do."  We do not believe that any of these 
references to the affidavit by Diaz or Gagnon's counsel 
presented a hearsay problem. 
 
Burns further claims that the admitted portions of Diaz' 
deposition contained four other statements that should have 
been excluded by the circuit court as inadmissible hearsay.  He 
did not, however, object to those statements on hearsay grounds 
at the plea in bar hearing.  And for purposes of trial, he only 
objected to three of them as inadmissible hearsay.  We thus 
only consider whether the circuit court abused its discretion 
in admitting those three statements into evidence at trial. 
 
In the first statement, Diaz testified that he waited 
until June 2007 to execute the affidavit because he was afraid 
"of retribution" "[b]y the school about this particular 
incident."  This statement was not hearsay, since it was made 
by Diaz while he was testifying under oath during his 
deposition – which, pursuant to Rule 4:7, is treated as live, 
in-person testimony.  Horne v. Milgrim, 226 Va. 133, 138, 306 
S.E.2d 893, 895 (1983) (stating that deposition testimony 
admitted into evidence under rule 4:7 "as substantive proof is 
oral testimony, not an exhibit"); Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 
218 Va. 462, 465, 237 S.E.2d 779, 781 (1977) (" 'Hearsay' is a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted." (quoting Unif. R. 
Evid. 801(c)). 
 
In the second statement, Diaz testified that he informed a 
hall monitor after the fight that he had "told Vice Principal 
Burns about this already.  And she was like, let's go talk to 
Dr. Beverage."  This statement was not hearsay because it was 
not offered to prove the truth of what the hall monitor said.  
Id.  Rather, it was introduced to show the actions Diaz took 
following the fight. 
 
And in the third statement, Diaz testified that he told 
Beverage that Burns had said that "he was going to get security 
on it before the fight."  Although this statement was hearsay, 
it was admissible under the party-admission exception to the 
rule against hearsay.  Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 461, 
470 S.E.2d 114, 127 (1996) ("A statement made by a party is 
admissible in evidence against him."). 
 
Since these three statements were either not hearsay or 
admissible under a well-established exception to the rule 
against hearsay, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse 
its discretion in admitting them into evidence with the other 
portions of Diaz' deposition. 
VI. 
 
Because the circuit court erred by holding that Burns is 
not entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity under the 
common law and by refusing Gagnon's proffered jury instruction 
on gross negligence, we reverse in part and remand the case to 
the circuit court for a new trial limited to Gagnon's gross 
negligence claim against Burns.  In light of this decision, we 
do not reach the question raised by Gagnon's cross-appeal, 
namely, whether intentional and negligent tortfeasors can be 
held jointly and severally liable. 
Record No. 110754 – Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
 
  and remanded. 
 
  Record No. 110767 — Dismissed. 
 
 
JUSTICE MIMS, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
I agree with most of the majority opinion.  However, I 
disagree with its determination that Burns is immune under the 
common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity and thus I must 
dissent from Part III(B) and would not reach the issue of the 
gross negligence jury instruction considered in Part IV. 
 
The majority determines that the fourth prong of the test 
for sovereign immunity applied in Lentz v. Morris, 236 Va. 78, 
82, 372 S.E.2d 608, 610 (1988), is met because Burns had to 
decide whether, when, and how to respond to Diaz’s warning.  It 
therefore concludes that his failure to notify the school’s 
security personnel about the danger involved the exercise of 
judgment and discretion, and consequently was not simply a 
ministerial act.  However, in my view, Burns’ statement to Diaz 
that he would “alert [his] security and we’ll make sure this 
problem gets taken care of” reflects that he had already 
exercised his discretion and decided whether and how to 
respond.  All that remained was to put the course of action he 
had decided upon into execution.  Consequently, the 
discretionary portion of his response had been fully discharged 
and his failure to execute the decision he had made was as much 
a failure to perform a ministerial act as if he had delegated 
it to a subordinate who thereafter disobeyed his order. 
 
I acknowledge that under ordinary circumstances an 
official’s discretion may include not only the capacity to make 
a decision in the first instance but also to change his mind 
and make a new, even contradictory decision, at a later time.  
But there is no evidence in this case that Burns first decided 
to alert security and subsequently changed his mind.  Moreover, 
Burns’ statement assured Diaz that “this problem [would be] 
taken care of,” thereby potentially deterring the student from 
warning other administrators who might have decided, as Burns 
did, to alert security but who actually would have followed 
through on that decision as well. 
 
I therefore believe that Burns’ failure to notify security 
was the failure to perform a ministerial act and would hold 
that the test for sovereign immunity was not met.  
Consequently, the jury need not have decided whether Burns’ 
inaction was gross negligence and the circuit court was not 
obliged to instruct them on it.