Case Title: Beal v. Town of Stockton Springs

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017 ME 6

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2017-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 6 
Docket: 
Wal-16-133 
Argued: 
December 15, 2016 
Decided: 
January 12, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
HOLLIE A. BEAL 
 
v. 
 
TOWN OF STOCKTON SPRINGS 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  Hollie A. Beal appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court 
(Waldo County, R. Murray, J.) affirming a decision by the Town of Stockton 
Springs’s Board of Selectman (the Board) determining that a structure owned 
by Beal was a dangerous building or nuisance pursuant to 17 M.R.S. § 2851 
(2016).  Beal contends that (i) the Board violated her due process rights when 
the Board allegedly denied Beal the opportunity to be heard, to cross-examine 
witnesses, and to have an impartial fact-finder, and (ii) there was insufficient 
evidence in the record to support the Board’s findings.  We affirm the 
judgment.  
 
2 
I.  CASE HISTORY 
 
[¶2]  Beal acquired property located at 65 Sandy Point Road in Stockton 
Springs in 2004.  The 556-square-foot building was originally built around 
1900 as a grain storage shed but was more recently used as a residence.  In 
June 2014, the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer (CEO) made a site visit to 
Beal’s residence after receiving a complaint about the condition of the 
property.  After the July 17, 2014, Board meeting, when Beal and her attorney 
met with the Board to discuss concerns about the habitability of her property 
raised by the CEO’s site visit, Beal agreed to present a rehabilitation plan to 
the Board within thirty days.  
[¶3]  About a month later, Beal notified the CEO that a general 
contractor had assessed her property, and she submitted a one-page 
rehabilitation plan.  On August 20, the CEO informed Beal that the plan was 
inadequate because it lacked a complete list of items needing repair and a 
time frame for completion.  The CEO further informed Beal that the Board 
anticipated that the parties would enter a consent agreement at the 
September 4 meeting.  Because Beal did not attend the September 4 meeting, 
the Board did not take any action regarding Beal’s property.  The matter was 
discussed by two members of the Board.  One of the Board members 
 
3 
indicated, during the conversation, that he believed that the structure should 
be condemned.  At the end of September, the Board set a public hearing to 
determine whether the structure constituted a dangerous building within the 
meaning of 17 M.R.S. § 2851.  
[¶4]  Just before the start of the November 20, 2014, hearing, Beal 
requested that the three members of the Board recuse themselves based upon 
her concern that they had already prejudged the case.  The Board members 
expressly stated on the record that they had not already decided the issue and 
would base their decision on the evidence presented at the hearing.  
Accordingly, each member of the Board declined to recuse from participating 
in the hearing and subsequent decision-making.   
[¶5]  The Board proceeded with the public hearing and heard testimony 
from the CEO, Beal’s general contractor, and Beal.  The CEO presented 
photographs and testified about numerous deficiencies and hazards regarding 
the plumbing, chimney, roof, and structural supports.  Beal’s general 
contractor testified that, although the building needed many repairs, the only 
safety hazard in the building was a support issue that recently had been 
corrected.  
 
4 
[¶6]  The Board asked witnesses questions that were submitted, but did 
not allow Beal’s counsel to question any of the witnesses by either direct or 
cross examination.  The chair invited Beal’s attorney to submit written 
questions that the Board would then pose to the witness.  The Board also 
allowed Beal’s counsel to present a summation argument.  Beal’s counsel 
formally objected to the hearing procedure.  At the conclusion of the hearing, 
the Board members voted unanimously that the structure was a dangerous 
building, and requested that the town manager and CEO draft written findings 
of fact to be presented at its upcoming meeting.   
[¶7]  During an executive session held on December 15, the Board 
consulted with the Town’s attorney to discuss the focus of a dangerous 
building hearing, the process for obtaining an administrative site inspection 
warrant, and the Board’s ability to reopen the hearing.  At its next meeting, the 
Board voted to reopen the public hearing, “for the purpose of allowing 
additional testimony to be presented to ensure all areas of the definition of a 
dangerous building have been thoroughly explored.”  It scheduled the 
reopened hearing for January 15, 2015.   
[¶8]  At the January 15 hearing, the Board heard additional testimony 
from the CEO regarding his concerns about the structural integrity of the 
 
5 
building.  He explained that the building has rotted sills and a chimney in very 
poor condition, and that his ability to give a more thorough report had been 
stymied by Beal’s refusal to allow him “access to the interior of the structure, 
specifically the basement or the lower level.”  The Town’s attorney questioned 
the CEO about several aspects of his testimony.  
[¶9]  Beal attended the reopened hearing, but, although offered the 
opportunity, affirmatively declined to present any further information to the 
Board.  Beal’s counsel was absent from the hearing.  At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the Board affirmed its November 20 decision declaring the building 
hazardous.  In addition, it continued the hearing with regard to the issue of 
disposition, and ordered the CEO to apply for an administrative warrant to 
inspect the interior of the structure.  
[¶10]  On April 16, 2015, after the administrative warrant had been 
issued and executed, the Board resumed the public hearing and heard 
extensive testimony from the CEO regarding the interior condition of the 
structure.  Beal attended the hearing, presented evidence, and was provided 
an opportunity to question the CEO and dispute his observations.  Again, 
Beal’s counsel was absent from the proceeding.  At the close of the hearing, 
 
6 
the Board unanimously concluded that the structure was a dangerous 
building.  
[¶11]  In May 2015, the Board issued a written order in which it found 
that the following deficiencies collectively made the structure unsafe, 
unstable, unsanitary, and a fire hazard: rotted sills that caused a deck to 
collapse, a chimney with deteriorated mortar and no flue liner, a sagging roof 
caused by an improper foundation and cracked roof joists, floor joists that did 
not properly rest on a carrying beam, exposed wiring and electric wires, and 
unsanitary and improperly installed plumbing.  In the “disposition” portion of 
the order, the Board included requirements that Beal have a licensed plumber 
and a licensed electrician bring the building up to code, and required her to 
“repair and/or replace all structural members” by August 26, 2015. 
[¶12]  Beal filed a complaint for review of government action in the 
Superior Court.  See M.R. Civ. P. 80B; 17 M.R.S. § 2852 (2016).  The court 
affirmed the decision of the Board in a written order dated March 3, 2016.  
Beal timely appealed to this Court.  See M.R. Civ. P. 80B(n); M.R. App. P. 
2(b)(3). 
 
7 
II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. 
Standard of Review 
 
[¶13]  Our review of administrative decision-making is deferential and 
limited.  Friends of Lincoln Lakes v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2010 ME 18, ¶ 12, 
989 A.2d 1128.  “When the Superior Court acts in an appellate capacity we 
review directly a local agency’s decision for abuse of discretion, errors of law, 
and findings not supported by the evidence.”  Duffy v. Town of Berwick, 
2013 ME 105, ¶ 13, 82 A.3d 148.  The party challenging a Board’s decision 
bears the burden of persuasion on appeal.  Id. 
B. 
Due Process 
 
[¶14]  Beal contends that the Board violated her due process rights 
when, at the November 2014 hearing, the Board allegedly denied her the 
opportunity to present evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, and to have an 
impartial fact-finder.1 
 
[¶15]  The due process clauses of the Maine and federal Constitutions 
guarantee due process before a government entity deprives any person of a 
property right.  Kirkpatrick v. City of Bangor, 1999 ME 73, ¶ 13, 728 A.2d 
                                         
1  Beal urges us to confine our review on appeal to the November 20, 2014, hearing because the 
Board did not rescind its original decision when it conducted the subsequent hearings.  We are not 
persuaded by this argument.  Beal appealed from the final May 2015 decision that followed three 
days of hearings—not from the preliminary November 2014 decision. 
 
8 
1268; see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Me. Const. art. I, § 6-A.  Due process 
will “vary from case to case . . . to assure the basic fairness of each particular 
action according to its circumstances.”  Kirkpatrick, 1999 ME 73, ¶ 13, 
728 A.2d 1268.  We must analyze three distinct factors when assessing 
whether an individual’s due process rights have been violated:   
first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail. 
 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶ 31, 
126 A.3d 718; Hale v. Petit, 438 A.2d 226, 231-32 (Me. 1981).   
[¶16]  There is no dispute that declaring Beal’s property a dangerous 
building affects an important private property interest or that the Town has 
an interest in limiting use of or eliminating dangerous buildings.  See Mathews, 
424 U.S. at 335.  The only issue here is whether Beal was afforded the process 
she was due, including “notice of the issues, an opportunity to be heard, the 
right to introduce evidence and present witnesses, the right to respond to 
claims and evidence, and an impartial fact-finder.”  Jusseaume v. Ducatt, 
2011 ME 43, ¶ 12, 15 A.3d 714.   
 
9 
[¶17]  Although the Board prohibited cross-examination of any 
witnesses at the November hearing, after consultation with the Town’s 
attorney the Board reopened the evidence and rescinded this restriction for 
the remaining hearings.  In addition, even at the November hearing, Beal had 
an opportunity to respond to evidence presented against her, in two ways.  
First, Beal could—and did—present rebuttal testimony to refute the CEO’s 
claims.  Second, the Board allowed the submission of written questions which 
could then be asked by the Board and the presentation of a summation 
argument. 
[¶18]  During the January and April hearings, when Beal could have 
directly questioned witnesses, she declined to do so, and Beal has not 
explained how she was prejudiced or what additional information she might 
have developed from cross-examining the CEO at the November hearing.  
See Hale, 438 A.2d at 231-32 (lack of opportunity for cross-examination not 
deprivation of due process when applicant had opportunity to support its 
proposal, criticize competing application, and comment on criticism of its 
proposal).  On this record, we see no reason to disturb forty years of 
precedent that does not require that boards provide the opportunity for 
cross-examination at every local administrative hearing.  See In re Me. Clean 
 
10 
Fuels, Inc., 310 A.2d 736, 745-48 (Me. 1973) (the due process right to respond 
to opposing evidence does not include cross-examination of opposing 
witnesses in an administrative hearing). 
[¶19]  Persons who come before an administrative board are entitled to 
a fair and unbiased hearing.  Fitanides v. City of Saco, 2015 ME 32, ¶ 22, 
113 A.3d 1088; Gorham v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 625 A.2d 898, 902 
(Me. 1993).  An administrative hearing officer “enjoys a presumption of 
honesty and integrity, which is only rebutted by a showing of some substantial 
countervailing reason to conclude that a decisionmaker is actually biased with 
respect to factual issues being adjudicated.”  Mr. & Mrs. V. v. York Sch. Dist., 
434 F. Supp. 2d 5, 12-13 (D. Me. 2006). 
 
[¶20]  Because Beal did not move for a trial of the facts, we must confine 
our examination of her bias claim to the existing record.  See Baker’s Table, Inc. 
v. City of Portland, 2000 ME 7, ¶ 9, 743 A.2d 237 (stating that a party may 
move for a trial of the facts pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B(d) to supplement the 
record on issues such as bias, to the extent necessary to the appeal). 
[¶21]  To support her claim of bias, Beal relies on a letter sent to her by 
the CEO on August 20, 2014, in which he states that “[he] and the Selectboard 
agreed that a complete list of items that need remediation . . . shall be 
 
11 
required” prior to the signing of the consent agreement between Beal and the 
Town on September 4, 2014.  In addition, Beal relies on statements made at 
the September 4 public meeting by members of the Board who were 
responding to a citizen’s question about Beal’s property.  All the statements 
were made prior to the initiation of the dangerous building proceedings. 
[¶22]  The statement made by the CEO, who is not a member of the 
Board, does not demonstrate denial of due process.  See Gorham, 625 A.2d at 
902.  The statements made by the Board members must be considered in 
context.  Although one member of the Board stated that he thought that the 
house “should be condemned,” he and the other Board member also stated 
several times that there is a process that must be followed, that the property 
owner has rights, and that the Board has an obligation to do things correctly.   
[¶23]  At the time that those statements were made, the Board—acting 
in its executive/administrative capacity—was anticipating an informal 
resolution of the matter.  It was not until several weeks later that the Board 
decided to proceed with a formal hearing.  When Beal presented her motion 
for recusal, the Board members—now acting in an adjudicatory capacity—
affirmatively stated on the record that they had not prejudged the case and 
that their decision would be based upon the testimony and evidence 
 
12 
presented at the hearings.  The Board members listened and asked questions 
over the course of several months before rendering their final decision.  
See Lane Constr. Corp. v. Town of Wash., 2008 ME 45, ¶ 30, 942 A.2d 1202; 
Gorham, 625 A.2d at 902-03.  Beal has not rebutted the presumption that the 
Board members acted with honesty and integrity when they ceased informal 
negotiations and instead conducted the formal hearing.   
[¶24]  On her appeal, Beal has not demonstrated that she was denied 
due process or that she was subjected to a decision by a biased decision-
maker.  
C. 
Substantial Evidence 
 
[¶25]  Beal contends that the Board’s decision was not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record.  Beal argues that the building’s deficiencies 
do not meet the statutory definition of dangerous building, and the Town 
failed to meet its burden.   
[¶26]  “Substantial evidence exists when a reasonable mind would rely 
on that evidence as sufficient support for a conclusion.”  Osprey 
Family Trust v. Town of Owls Head, 2016 ME 89, ¶ 9, 141 A.3d 1114.  When 
reviewing administrative findings of fact, we “examine the entire record to 
determine whether, on the basis of all the testimony and exhibits before it, the 
 
13 
[Board] could fairly and reasonably find the facts as it did.”  Friends of Lincoln 
Lakes, 2010 ME 18, ¶ 13, 989 A.2d 1128.  We must affirm findings of fact if 
they are supported by any competent evidence in the record “even if the 
record contains inconsistent evidence or evidence contrary to the result 
reached by the [Board].”  Id. ¶¶ 13-14. 
 
[¶27]  Here, the CEO provided detailed testimony about the interior and 
exterior conditions of the house—including major structural deficiencies, 
plumbing issues, and fire hazards—and presented photographs to support his 
observations.  Although Beal provided some testimony to the contrary, the 
Board was not obligated to accept it.  Therefore, there was substantial 
evidence on the record to support the Board’s findings of fact and ultimate 
determination that Beal’s property constituted a dangerous building within 
the meaning of 17 M.R.S. § 2851. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
Aaron Fethke, Esq. (orally), Law Office of Aaron Fethke, Searsport, for 
appellant Hollie A. Beal 
 
Erik M. Stumpfel, Esq. (orally), Rudman Winchell, Bangor, for appellee Town 
of Stockton Springs 
 
 
Waldo County Superior Court docket number AP-2015-5 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY