Case Title: Schramm, Jr. v. Spottswood

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1110794

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2012-10-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 10/19/2012
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013
____________________
1110794
____________________
Howard M. Schramm, Jr.
v.
George G. Spottswood and Amy H. Spottswood
____________________
1110915
____________________
George G. Spottswood and Amy H. Spottswood
v.
Howard M. Schramm, Jr., et al.
Appeals from Baldwin Circuit Court
(CV-05-710)
1110794, 1110915
STUART, Justice.
Howard M. Schramm, Jr., appeals the March 6, 2012,
judgment of the Baldwin Circuit Court approving pier-
construction permits issued to Schramm's neighbors, George G.
Spottswood and Amy H. Spottswood, by the Alabama Department of
Conservation 
and 
Natural 
Resources 
("DCNR") 
and 
Baldwin 
County
even though the proposed pier would violate the 10-foot
setback rule in the applicable DCNR and Baldwin County rules
and regulations (appeal no. 1110794).  The Spottswoods cross-
appeal the order of the Baldwin Circuit Court denying their
January 9, 2012, motion to alter, amend, or vacate its
February 27, 2007, judgment setting the boundaries of their
riparian-use area (appeal no. 1110915).  We affirm.
I.
This dispute concerns the boundaries between three
coterminous lots located on the eastern shore of Mobile Bay
approximately one mile south of the Grand Hotel at Point
Clear.  In March 2005, the Spottswoods bought the middle of
those lots from the Demouy family and thereafter commenced
replacing the existing pier on the lot ("the Demouy pier"),
which had been built in the 1950s but had been damaged by
2
1110794, 1110915
Hurricane Ivan in 2004.  When it became apparent to the
Spottswoods' neighbors to the south, Henry E. Reimer, Sr.,
Daniel E. Reimer, Sr., Regina R. Ehlert, and Melanie R. Moore
(collectively referred to as "the Reimers"), that the
Spottswoods intended to build their new pier to the south of
where the Demouy pier had been located, the Reimers became
concerned that their view of the sunset and of the Grand Hotel
would be obstructed, and they accordingly commissioned a
survey to ascertain the proper boundary lines for the lots,
both the upland boundary line between the lots and the
riparian boundary line extending out from the shore and into
Mobile Bay.   When that survey showed the upland boundary line
1
between the lots as being in a location that significantly
decreased what was believed to be the Spottswoods' water
frontage and the riparian boundary line as being in a location
that bisected the Demouy pier, the Reimers initiated an action
seeking to establish conclusively the boundary lines 
set 
forth
in that survey as the boundaries between the two lots.  The
Although 
the 
State 
owns 
all 
property 
below 
the 
shoreline,
1
owners of lands upon navigable waters have certain rights in
those waters, including the right to build piers within the
waters in front of those lands.  See §§ 33-7-50 through 33-7-
54, Ala. Code 1975.
3
1110794, 1110915
Spottswoods filed a counterclaim seeking to establish the
property lines in a manner consistent with their own survey,
which afforded them significantly more waterfront footage. 
Eventually Schramm, the Spottswoods' neighbor to the north,
intervened, seeking a judgment declaring the boundary lines
between his lot and the Spottswoods' lot as well.
On February 27, 2007, the trial court entered a final
judgment in the case.  In that order, the trial court noted
that the determination of the boundaries was complicated by
the fact that the documentary evidence did not clearly define 
boundaries along the beach area, which had changed shape and
grown by a minimum of approximately 50 feet and perhaps as
much as 150 feet over an approximately 150-year period. 
Applying equitable principles, the trial court therefore held
that the boundary line proposed by the Spottswoods was the
proper border between their lot and the Reimers' lot, thus
giving 
the 
Spottswoods 
ownership 
of 
a 
disputed 
triangle-shaped
piece of land also claimed by the Reimers.  However, the trial
court also declined to apply the general rule holding that
riparian boundary lines should run perpendicular to the
shoreline because doing so would have placed the riparian
4
1110794, 1110915
boundary between the Spottswoods and the Reimers directly
through the Reimers' pier, which had existed since the 1950s
and which, when built, was undisputedly south of a line
running perpendicular to the shore where the Spottswood and
Reimer parcels met.  Thus, the trial court held that the
riparian boundary line should instead extend out into the
water at the same angle as the upland boundary line.
The trial court also held that both the upland and
riparian boundary lines between Schramm's lot and the
Spottswoods' lot had been defined in a 1956 agreement between
their predecessors in title.  That agreement also required any
pier or similar structure constructed on Schramm's lot to
observe a 25-foot setback along the riparian boundary line
with the Spottswoods, which line, pursuant to the general
rule, extended perpendicular from the shore.  The trial court
further held that the 1956 agreement imposed no similar
setback requirements upon the owners of the Spottswoods' lot. 
Once the riparian boundary lines of the Spottswood
property were established, the result was that the 
Spottswoods
had riparian rights to a triangle-shaped area in front of
their property bordered by the shore on the east and the
5
1110794, 1110915
above-described riparian boundary lines on the north 
and 
south
until they intersected at a point approximately 105 yards
offshore.  With regard to the placement and style of any pier
constructed by the Spottswoods, the trial court held that the
Spottswoods could proceed with the construction of a new pier
without any limitation upon the height, structure, or
materials used, provided (1) that they complied with all
applicable state and federal permitting requirements and (2)
that they built the pier in the same general footprint of the
Demouy pier –– even though the Demouy pier had in fact
encroached to a small extent into waters as to  which Schramm
had riparian rights.  Finally, the trial court noted that it
retained jurisdiction "to determine any subsequent issues
regarding the establishment or description of the land and
riparian boundary lines decreed herein or the Spottswoods'
construction of their pier."
The Spottswoods subsequently appealed the judgment of the
trial court, arguing that the court erred in its determination
of their riparian boundary line with the Reimers and in
requiring them to build any new pier within the footprint of
the Demouy pier; the Reimers cross-appealed, arguing that the
6
1110794, 1110915
trial court erred in its determination of the upland boundary
line between their lot and the Spottswood lot.  On July 24,
2009, in Spottswood v. Reimer, 41 So. 3d 787, 796-98 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2009), the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial
court's judgment insofar as it established both the upland and
riparian boundaries between the Spottswood and Reimer lots;
however, it reversed the trial court's judgment to the extent
it required the Spottswoods to build any future pier in the
footprint of the Demouy pier, holding that that restriction
was in violation of § 33-7-50, Ala. Code 1975, which, this
Court held in Ex parte Cove Properties, Inc., 796 So. 2d 331,
334 (Ala. 2000), authorizes owners of riparian lands to
construct a pier in navigable waters in front of their
property subject only to harbor and pier lines established by
the United States or the State of Alabama and the additional
caveat that the pier not unreasonably obstruct navigation. 
On approximately February 10, 2010, the Reimers began
seeking permits to begin repairing their pier, which had been
damaged in August 2005 during Hurricane Katrina, by preparing
(1) a joint application to the United States Army Corps of
Engineers and the Alabama Department of Environmental
7
1110794, 1110915
Management; (2) an application to DCNR; and (3) an application
to Baldwin County.  On February 26, 2010, the Reimers
submitted a copy of their applications and plans to the trial
court, the Spottswoods, and Schramm, asking the trial court to
confirm that the construction of their pier was in compliance
with the trial court's February 27, 2007, order.  On April 19,
2010, the trial court entered an order confirming that the
Reimers' proposed pier did not violate its earlier judgment
and again stating that it would retain jurisdiction "to review
any application hereafter submitted by [the Spottswoods] for
the construction of their pier."
Subsequently, 
however, 
the 
Spottswoods 
filed 
an 
objection
to the Reimers' proposal with DCNR, arguing that the Reimers'
proposed pier would come within 10 feet of the riparian
boundary separating their riparian-use area, in violation of
DCNR rules requiring all piers on State-owned submerged land
to be "setback 10 feet from the riparian lines of adjacent
property 
owners," 
Ala. 
Admin. 
Code 
(Department 
of 
Conservation
and Natural Resources), Rule  220-4-.09(4)(b)(11), as well as
a similar Baldwin County regulation.  The Reimers thereafter
requested the trial court to intervene, arguing that they were
8
1110794, 1110915
rebuilding their pier in the footprint on which it had existed
for over 50 years, with the exception of a 3-foot addition to
the boat lift –– the boat lift being the only part of the pier
within 10 feet of the riparian boundary –– that had been made
in 1998 with the approval of the Demouy family, the
Spottswoods' predecessors in title.  However, the Reimers
subsequently conceded the issue and redrew their plans to
place the boat lift on the south side of their pier so as to 
completely prevent any portion of their pier from intruding
into the 10-foot setback area.
The Spottswoods thereafter filed for permits to build
their own pier, receiving the permits in January and February
2011.  Those permits approved the Spottswoods' plans to build
a pier just inside the riparian boundary line separating the
Spottswoods' and Schramm's riparian-use areas.  In other
words, the proposed pier left essentially no setback area on
the Spottswoods' side of the riparian boundary line.  In an
affidavit explaining the decision to approve the Spottswoods'
plans in spite of the lack of the required 10-foot setback,
DCNR employee Jeff Jordan stated:
"In this case, the court decision memorialized
the projection of the Reimer lateral upland property
9
1110794, 1110915
boundary with the Spottswoods as a riparian line. 
The boundary line takes an acute angle from the
shore that now intersects with the Spottswoods other
riparian line to the north.  The area determined by
the court does not follow the guidance used by
[DCNR] described above.
"That results in the Spottswoods having an
unusually confined riparian use area when compared
to the width of their shoreline and the width and
shape of the water body.  In contrast, the Reimer
property to the south while having a very similar
shoreline width now enjoys much larger riparian use
area than any similar parcel with similar shoreline
width.
"The Schramm property adjacent and north to the
Spottswoods, while having a shorter width of
shoreline, also enjoys a larger riparian use area.
"During the review it became evident that the
Spottswood riparian area now artificially terminates
so close to shore and converges so closely that it
may not be possible to reach reasonable navigable
depths given the unique near shore dynamics of the
Mobile Bay along that area and still meet the
setbacks.
"Upon review and with consideration toward
efforts to be consistent and predictable I reviewed
similar permit requests and [DCNR's] responses.
"One situation involved a private riparian
property owner applying to repair and expand a pier
on Arnica Bay.  The applicant's adjacent riparian
property owner built a pier immediately on the
setback and the other neighbor had an unpermitted
pier built but at an angle to the shoreline that
followed a projection of his lateral upland property
boundary.  To allow the applicant to build and
maintain a similar size pier and boathouse and to be
able to reach navigable depths the applicant was
10
1110794, 1110915
allowed to build within the setback.  In [an] effort
to determine the reasonable use area, a minimum
distance 
was 
determined 
between 
the 
proposed
structure and the adjacent existing structure .... 
Due to the confined nature of the area, the
applicant was allowed to maintain a minimum ten-foot
setback from the adjacent riparian property owner's
existing structure and not the riparian line.
"The pier line boundary agreement between the
Schramm and Spottswood property specifies a 25-foot
setback referenced as the center of the Schramm
structure as it currently exists.  The Spottswood
pier maintains a distance from the Schramm pier
greater than the 10-foot requirement used in the
previous situation.
"In 
both 
situations, 
in 
order 
to 
not
unreasonabl[y] restrict the traditional common-law
riparian right of the applicants or their ability to
reach reasonable navigational depth and to be
allowed a similar structure as those immediately
adjacent with similar riparian shoreline widths,
encroachment into the setbacks [was] allowed.
"The above conforms to [Ala. Admin. Code
(Department of Conservation and Natural Resources),
Rule  220-4-.09(4)(c)(1)]: 'None of the provisions
in this rule shall be implemented in a manner that
would unreasonably infringe upon the traditional,
common-law riparian rights of the upland property
owners adjacent to state-owned submerged lands.'
"As 
in 
previous 
similar 
situations 
and 
given 
the
confined riparian use area that now restricts the
Spottswoods' use of their riparian lands, in order
to satisfy the requirement to not infringe upon the
riparian rights of an owner of riparian lands
fronting 
public 
waters, 
the 
Spottswoods 
were
permitted to construct within the setbacks."
11
1110794, 1110915
Schramm became aware of the Spottswoods' plans in April
2011 after he was given a copy of the plans by a member of the
Reimer family.  A short time later, the Spottswoods commenced
construction of their pier, and, on May 9, 2011, Schramm asked
the trial court to set a hearing to review the plans for the
Spottswoods' pier.  The Spottswoods thereafter voluntarily
stopped construction on their pier, and the Reimers and
Schramm subsequently filed a formal joint motion asking the
trial court to prohibit the Spottswoods from building the
planned pier based on the failure to observe the 10-foot
setback required by DCNR and by Baldwin County regulations.2
On January 9, 2012, the Spottswoods filed a motion asking
the trial court to amend its February 27, 2007, order setting
the riparian boundaries for the water in front of their lot
because, they argued, pursuant to § 9-12-22, Ala. Code 1975,
they were entitled to grow and harvest oysters "in the waters
in front of their land to the distance of 600 yards from the
shore."  However, the Spottswoods argued, the riparian
boundaries set by the trial court caused their riparian-use
DCNR and Baldwin County thereafter filed consent
2
agreements with the trial court agreeing to recognize the
court's judgment regarding the validity and propriety of the
pier permits issued to the Spottswoods.
12
1110794, 1110915
area to terminate only 105 yards from the shore, thus
prohibiting them from the full enjoyment of their rights under
§ 9-12-22.  The trial court conducted an ore tenus evidentiary
hearing on all pending matters on March 2, 2012, and on March
6, 2012, issued separate orders denying both the Reimers' and
Schramm's joint request to invalidate the pier permits issued
the Spottswoods and the Spottswoods' motion to amend its
February 
27, 
2007, 
judgment 
setting 
their 
riparian 
boundaries. 
On March 19, 2012, Schramm appealed the judgment entered
against him, and, on April 11, 2012, the Spottswoods appealed
the judgment entered against them.  
II.
This Court explained the standard of review applicable to
Schramm's appeal in Ex parte City of Fairhope, 739 So. 2d 35
(Ala. 1999), in which we considered the City of Fairhope's
argument that the Court of Civil Appeals had improperly
reversed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the City
of Fairhope's issuance of a permit authorizing a second-floor
addition to a grandfathered nonconforming garage that did not
meet the side-yard setback requirement.  We stated then:
"There is no dispute that the proper standard of
review in cases based on an administrative agency's
13
1110794, 1110915
decision is whether that decision was arbitrary or
capricious or was not made in compliance with
applicable law.
"'Our standard of review regarding
administrative actions is very limited in
scope.  We review the circuit court's
judgment 
without 
any 
presumption 
of
correctness since that court was in no
better position than this court to review
the agency decision.  State Health Planning
& Resource Dev. Admin. v. Rivendell of
Alabama, Inc., 469 So. 2d 613 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1985).  The special competence of the
agency lends great weight to its decision. 
That decision must be affirmed unless
arbitrary, capricious, or not made in
compliance 
with 
applicable 
law. 
 
Rivendell. 
Neither the circuit court nor this court
may substitute its judgment for that of the
administrative agency.  Alabama Dep't of
Public Health v. Perkins, 469 So. 2d 651
(Ala. Civ. App. 1985).'
"State Dep't of Revenue v. Acker, 636 So. 2d 470,
473 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994)."
739 So. 2d at 38.  The standard of review applicable to the
Spottswoods' 
cross-appeal 
is 
the 
standard 
of 
review 
applicable
to the denial of a Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., postjudgment
motion to alter, amend, or vacate a judgment.  "Whether to
grant relief under Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., is within the
trial court's discretion."  Bradley v. Town of Argo, 2 So. 3d
819, 823 (Ala. 2008).  
14
1110794, 1110915
III.
On appeal, Schramm argues that DCNR's issuance of a
permit to the Spottswoods for construction of a pier violated
the agency's own rules and that DCNR's decision was arbitrary
and capricious.   Specifically, he cites Ala. Admin. Code
3
(Department of Conservation and Natural Resources), Rule  
220-
4-.09(4)(c)(4), which provides:
"Except as provided herein, all structures ...
must be set back a minimum of 10 feet inside the
applicant's riparian rights lines.  Exceptions to
the setbacks are:  private residential single-family
docks or piers where such structures are shared by
two adjacent single-family parcels; utility lines;
bulkheads, seawalls, riprap or similar shoreline
protection structures located along the shoreline;
structures and activities previously authorized by
[DCNR]; structures and activities built or occurring
prior to any requirement for [DCNR] authorization;
when a letter of concurrence is obtained from the
affected adjacent upland riparian owner; or when 
[DCNR] determines that locating any portion of the
structure or activity within the setback area is
necessary to avoid or minimize adverse impacts to
natural resources."
It is undisputed that none of the listed exceptions apply
here, and Schramm argues that it was accordingly error for
On 
appeal, 
Schramm 
challenges 
only the 
pier 
permit 
issued
3
by DCNR, not the pier permit issued by Baldwin County. 
Presumably, this is because, during the evidentiary hearing
conducted by the trial court, a Baldwin County official
testified 
that 
the 
county 
granted 
the 
Spottswoods' 
application
for a permit essentially because DCNR had already done so.
15
1110794, 1110915
DCNR to base its decision on an unenumerated exception.  The
Spottswoods, however, cite DCNR employee Jordan's testimony
that Ala. Admin. Code (Department of Conservation and Natural
Resources), Rule  220-4-.09(4)(c)(1), authorizes DCNR to
decline to enforce a rule if doing so would "unreasonably
infringe upon the traditional, common-law riparian rights of
upland property owners adjacent to state-owned submerged
lands."  We agree that Rule 220-4-.09(4)(c)(1) provides
another basis on which DCNR can grant exceptions to the 10-
foot setback requirement; however, this conclusion in turn
raises the issue whether enforcing the 10-foot setback
requirement against the Spottswoods would infringe upon a
common-law riparian right held by them.  Schramm argues that
it would not; the Spottswoods argue that it would.
Jordan testified that DCNR granted the Spottswoods'
application for a pier permit because enforcing the setback
requirement would infringe upon the general common-law right
held by all owners of riparian property to be able to "wharf
out" to waters of a reasonable navigational depth.   Schramm
disputes that such a common-law riparian right exists;
however, caselaw reveals that this common-law right has in
16
1110794, 1110915
fact 
been 
recognized 
in 
most 
jurisdictions, 
including 
Alabama. 
In Cove Properties, Inc. v. Walter Trent Marina, Inc., 796 So.
2d 322, 326-27 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999), reversed in part on
other grounds, 796 So. 2d 331 (Ala. 2000), the Court of Civil
Appeals stated:
"[W]hile there are no Alabama cases explicitly
adopting the principle, the majority common-law rule
(which, in this area of riparian property law, is
binding on this court; see Wehby [v. Turpin], 710
So. 2d [1243,] 1249 [(Ala. 1998)], and § 1–3–1, Ala.
Code 1975), is that the right to wharf out is
derived from a riparian landowner's right of access
to navigable or deep water, and as soon as that
landowner reaches the point of navigability, the
purpose of the right is fulfilled and his or her
access rights cease.  E.g., Port Clinton Associates
v. Board of Selectmen, 217 Conn. 588, 598 n. 13, 587
A.2d 126, 132 n. 13 (1991); State ex rel. Head v.
Slotness, 289 Minn. 485, 487, 185 N.W.2d 530, 532
(1971); Rogers v. South Slope Holding Corp., 172
Misc. 2d 33, 38–39, 656 N.Y.S.2d 169, 174 (Sup. Ct.
1997), modified on other grounds and aff'd, 255
A.D.2d 898, 680 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1998); Hoff v.
Peninsula Drainage Dist. No. 2, 172 Or. 630, 638–39,
143 P.2d 471, 474 (1943); see generally 65 C.J.S.
Navigable Waters § 73b (1966)."
Thus, the Spottswoods do have the common-law right to build a
pier in the waters in front of their property extending out to
the 
point 
of 
navigability, 
and, 
under 
Rule 
220-4-.09(4)(c)(1),
DCNR may interpret and implement its rules in a manner that
will respect that right.
17
1110794, 1110915
However, 
even 
if 
this 
Court 
does 
recognize 
the
Spottswoods' right to wharf out to the point of navigability,
Schramm nevertheless argues that DCNR's approval of their
permit application was arbitrary and capricious because, he
argues, there is no evidence indicating that disregarding the
10-foot setback along their riparian boundary enables them to
wharf out to a deeper part of the bay.  Although it is true
that there is no specific evidence of water depths or offshore
slopes indicating that the Spottswoods will reach 
deeper 
water
by placing their pier along the riparian boundary, we
nonetheless conclude that DCNR's decision to issue the permit
is reasonable in light of that goal.  
In his affidavit, Jordan stated that, after reviewing the
boundary lines set by the trial court and considering "the
unique near shore dynamics of the Mobile Bay along that area,"
he concluded that it may not be possible for the Spottswoods
to reach reasonable navigable depths and still observe the
required setbacks.  He further stated that it was DCNR policy
to allow riparian property owners to construct piers similar
to those maintained by neighboring properties with similar
shoreline widths, and the evidence and maps in the record
18
1110794, 1110915
indicate 
that 
the 
Spottswoods' proposed 
pier 
extends
approximately as far into Mobile Bay as the piers of both
Schramm and the Reimers.  Presumably, those piers extend to
the point of navigability, because they have no right to
extend any further.  Cove Properties, Inc. v. Walter Trent
Marina, Inc., 796 So. 2d at 326-27; see also Great American
Ins. Co. v. Tugs "Cissi Reinauer", 933 F. Supp. 1205, 1218
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("The right to construct a wharf derives from
the right of access to 'navigable' or 'deep' water.  1 H.P.
Farnham, Water and Water Rights § 62.  For that reason, 'as
soon as the point of navigability is reached, the purpose of
the pier is fulfilled, and the right to construct it ceases at
that point.'  Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387, 13 S.Ct. 110, 36 L.Ed. 1018 (1892).").  The maps in
evidence indicate that moving the Spottswoods' proposed pier
south of the riparian boundary line any significant distance
would immediately move it within the setback area for the
riparian boundary line adjoining the Reimers' riparian-use
area.  Thus, the only way the Spottswoods may have a pier
similar in length to the pier of either Schramm or the Reimers
is to disregard the setback requirements on either one side or
19
1110794, 1110915
the other.  DCNR had a reasonable basis upon which to waive
the setback on the Spottswoods' northern riparian border
adjacent to Schramm's riparian-use area instead of the
southern riparian border because of the 25-foot setback
Schramm maintains on his side of the riparian boundary line,
thus assuring that all three piers are separated by a
reasonable distance, given the unique circumstances of these
lots.  Moreover, we note that the Demouy pier had also
apparently encroached upon the 10-foot setback –– and to a
minor extent over the riparian boundary-line –– for several
decades, and, for all that appears, this was never the subject
of dispute among the parties.  For these reasons, we cannot
conclude that DCNR's decision to approve the Spottswoods'
plans for construction of the pier was clearly unreasonable,
arbitrary, or without a rational basis, and we accordingly
affirm the judgment of the trial court denying Schramm and the
Reimers' request that the Spottswoods be prohibited from
building a pier consistent with that permit.
We also affirm the order of the trial court denying the
Spottswoods' motion to alter, amend, or vacate its February
27, 2007, order setting the boundaries of the Spottswoods'
20
1110794, 1110915
riparian-use area.  The Spottswoods argue that their motion,
filed almost five years after the trial court's final
judgment, was nevertheless timely and appropriate because the
trial court stated in that order that it would retain
jurisdiction over the case to determine any "subsequent
issues" that arose regarding the boundary lines.  We disagree. 
The Spottswoods' motion does not raise any new issue because
determining the riparian boundary lines of the Spottswoods'
property was one of the central issues in this case from its
inception.  Rather, the Spottswoods' motion is an attempt to
advance a new argument in order to revisit an issue already
decided by the trial court in its February 27, 2007, order,
which decision was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals in
Spottswood,  41 So. 3d at 797 ("[W]e affirm the trial court's
judgment insofar as it determines that the riparian boundary
line is an extension of the Spottswood line.").  This they
cannot do.  See Ex parte S.T.S., 806 So. 2d 336, 341 (Ala.
2001) ("The issues decided by an appellate court become the
law of the case on remand to the trial court, and the trial
court is not free to reconsider those issues.  Murphree v.
Murphree, 600 So. 2d 301 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992).").  The trial
21
1110794, 1110915
court did not exceed its discretion in rebuffing the
Spottswoods' attempt to relitigate this issue.
IV.
In appeal no. 1110794, Schramm appealed the judgment of
the trial court approving the pier-construction permit issued
to the Spottswoods by DCNR, arguing that DCNR's decision to
issue its permit was arbitrary and capricious.  However,
because the evidence indicates that DCNR had a rationale basis
for its decision, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
In appeal no. 1110915, the Spottswoods cross-appealed from the
order of the trial court denying their motion to alter, amend,
or vacate its February 27, 2007, judgment setting the
boundaries of their riparian-use area.  Because that motion
sought to relitigate an issue already decided by the trial
court and the Court of Civil Appeals, we affirm that order as
well. 
1110794 –– AFFIRMED.
1110915 –– AFFIRMED.
Malone, C.J., and Parker, Shaw, and Wise, JJ., concur.
22