Case Title: BURT v. BURT

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-08-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
BURT v. BURT2002 WY 12753 P.3d 101Case Number: 01-109Decided: 08/28/2002
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

                                                                                                
         

ROBERT 
L. BURT,

Appellant(Defendant),

v.

CHARLENE 
D. BURT,

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

The Honorable Hunter Patrick, Judge

 
 
   

Representing 
Appellant:

Robert L. Burt, Pro Se

 
 
   

Representing 
Appellee:

Charlene D. Burt, Pro Se

 
 
   

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

*Chief Justice at time of expedited conference.

 
 
     

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant, Robert 
L. Burt (Burt), seeks review of a provision of the district court's divorce 
decree granting a divorce to him and his wife.  The divorce proceedings were resolved 
upon Burt's default.  Although no 
record was developed in the district court, and the issue that Burt wishes to 
pursue was not raised there, he asks this Court to review the district court's 
division of his military pension.  
Burt's wife did not file a brief or otherwise appear in this 
court.

[¶2]      We will 
affirm.

[¶3]      Burt poses his 
issue in these words:

            
A military divorce has some additional factors that revolve around 
Federal law, military retired pay jurisdiction of state court.  First of all, military retired pay is 
treated separately by state courts as property and it will be dealt with in some 
manner by state divorce court.  As 
per the wording in the Decree of Divorce, retirement funds , Federal law, 
specifically the Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act1, give the state divorce courts 
limited power regarding military retired pay and gives the military pay centers 
the ability to enforce a divorce decree such [as] was ordered by District Court, 
Fifth Judicial District  of Wyoming.  
The pay centers can enforce the above order if it is in compliance with 
requirements and limitations described in  Federal law.

            
I feel the judge didn't follow  Federal law when he awarded Charlene 
Burt (former spouse) $400.00 .  I'm 
told there is no tape recording or transcript on the hearing done in open court 
at the Park County Annex, Powell, Park County, Wyoming on the 6th of April, 2001.  Since I was not there, I have no 
knowledge if any Federal law was used in the decision of the decree.  The disposable retired pay was not 
defined in accordance with Federal law.  
In my case I get VA disability pay.  
The amount of disposable pay is figured, gross pay minus VA pay and 
withholding tax.  The Federal law 
will not allow more than 50% of the disposable to be awarded.  In my case, it would be less than 
$400.00 and this can change.  My 
cancer, which may be caused by Agent Orange, would give me more disability pay, 
thus, my disposable income would be less.

            
I am not appealing the whole of the Decree of Divorce, but only my 
retirement fund to have the award follow Federal law.  I pray the court will give me relief on 
my disposable income.  [Footnoted 
added.]

[¶4]      We need not set 
out the factual background because there is really none to set out.  On November 7, 2000, Burt's wife filed a 
complaint seeking a divorce from Burt.  
Burt was served with the complaint on November 29, 2000.  Burt did not answer and default2 was entered on February 23, 
2001.  The decree of divorce was 
entered on April 6, 2001.  That 
decree included this provision:

            
7.  RETIREMENT 
FUNDS:  WIFE shall receive 
$400.00 per month alimony paid directly from HUSBAND'S military retired 
pay.  HUSBAND shall retain any other 
retirement funds he owns.  WIFE 
shall retain as her separate property any retirement funds she 
owns.

[¶5]      Burt filed a 
timely notice of appeal on May 3, 2001, but his brief was not filed here until 
February 27, 2002.  Burt was granted 
generous extensions by this Court because he was imprisoned at the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary and then was, for a time, incarcerated in Montana awaiting 
disposition of a criminal matter.  
This case was assigned to the expedited docket by order entered on April 
23, 2002.

[¶6]      The decree of 
divorce states that the divorce was considered by the district court based on 
the testimony and evidence presented by Burt's former wife, and without Burt 
being present in court.  It is 
apparent that the hearing was not reported, and the record on appeal does not 
include a transcript or the documentary evidence received by the district court, 
if any.  Burt did not undertake to 
settle the record below by other means.  
See W.R.A.P. 3.03.  
Burt's claim that the district court erred in dividing his military 
retirement benefit depends on the state of the record and the condition of the 
evidence in that regard.

[¶7]      When this Court 
does not have a properly authenticated transcript before it, it must accept the 
trial court's findings of fact upon which it bases any decisions regarding 
evidentiary issues.  Capshaw v. 
Schieck, 2002 WY 54, ¶ 21, 44 P.3d 47, ¶ 21 (Wyo. 2002).  The failure to provide a transcript does 
not necessarily require dismissal of an appeal, but our review is restricted to 
those allegations of error not requiring inspection of the transcript.  Lacking a transcript, or a substitute 
for the transcript, the regularity of the trial court's judgment and the 
competency of the evidence upon which that judgment is based must be 
presumed.  Stadtfeld v. 
Stadtfeld, 920 P.2d 662, 664 (Wyo. 1996); Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 55 (Wyo. 1993); and see Wood v. Wood, 865 P.2d 616 (Wyo. 1993) 
(dismissing appeal for lack of record, rather than affirming).  Therefore, we will presume that the 
district court had a proper basis for its division of Burt's military 
pension.

[¶8]      The decree of 
divorce is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

   1Because the 
record on appeal is incomplete and does not support Burt's issue, we will not 
address the merits of his claim.  
However, with respect to the issue raised, see the following 
authorities:  Forney v. 
Minard, 849 P.2d 724, 728-30 (Wyo. 1993); Major Michael H. Gilbert, A 
Family Law Practitioner's Road Map to the Uniformed Services Former Spouses 
Protection Act, 32 Santa Clara L. Rev. 61 (1992); and 24 Am.Jur.2d 
Divorce and Separation §§ 217, 539, and 782 
(1998).

  2W.R.C.P. 55 
states:

Rule 55.  Default.

            
(a) Entry.  When a 
party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to 
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to 
appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter the party's 
default.

            
(b) Judgment.  
Judgment by default may be entered as 
follows:

(1) 
By the Clerk.  When the plaintiff's 
claim against a defendant is for a sum certain, or for a sum which can by 
computation be made certain, the clerk upon request of the plaintiff and upon 
affidavit of the amount due shall enter judgment for that amount and costs 
against the defendant, if the defendant has been defaulted for failure to appear 
and is not a minor or an incompetent person;

(2) 
By the Court.  In all other cases 
the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor; 
but no judgment by default shall be entered against a minor or an incompetent 
person unless represented in the action by a guardian, guardian ad litem, 
trustee, conservator, or other such representative who has appeared 
therein.  If the party against whom 
a judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action the party (or, if 
appearing by representative, the party's representative) shall be served with 
written notice of the application for judgment at least three days prior to the 
hearing on such application.  If, in 
order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is 
necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to 
establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of 
any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references 
as it deems necessary and proper and shall accord a right of trial by jury to 
the parties when and as required by any statute.

            
(c) Setting Aside Default.  
For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if 
a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance 
with Rule 60(b).

            
(d) Plaintiffs; Counterclaimants; Cross-Claimants.  The provisions of this rule apply 
whether the party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a 
third-party plaintiff, or party who has pleaded a cross-claim or 
counterclaim.  In all cases a 
judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 
54(c).