Case Title: State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-152

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-12-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz1983 WY 127674 P.2d 732Case Number: 83-152Case Number: 83-152Decided: 12/12/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING ON THE RELATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, A STATE AGENCY, 
PETITIONER,

 
 
v.

 
 
HONORABLE 
JOHN HOLTZ, RESPONDENT.

 
 
A.G. 
McClintock, Atty. Gen., Ron Arnold, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.

 
 
Daniel 
E. White, Vines, Gusea & White, P.C., Cheyenne, for respondent.

 
 
Before 
ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN 
and CARDINE, JJ. 

 
 
PER 
CURIAM.

 
 

[¶1.]     Petitioner requested 
this court to issue a Writ of Mandamus directing Respondent to complete and 
furnish to the Motor Vehicle Division of the Department of Revenue and Taxation 
(hereinafter referred to as Division) certain forms reflecting court action and 
other matters concerning cases before the court involving the charge of Driving 
While Under the Influence of Intoxicants or Drugs (hereinafter referred to as 
DWUI). We issued an Alternate Writ of Mandamus directing Respondent to complete 
and furnish such forms or to show cause for not doing so. The issues were 
briefed by both parties, and Respondent did show such 
cause.

 
 

[¶2.]     Wherefore an order 
shall issue contemporaneously with this opinion quashing the Alternate Writ of 
Mandamus and denying the Motion for a Peremptory Writ of 
Mandamus.

 
 
BACKGROUND

 
 

[¶3.]     This matter is the 
consequence of two legislative enactments, the administration and execution of 
which result in a discord between (1) the Division, and (2) the county courts 
and justice of the peace courts (hereinafter referred to as Courts) exercising 
jurisdiction over DWUI violations. In this opinion, we will go somewhat beyond 
the scope necessary to dispose of the case in anticipation that the 
inconsistencies and administrative problems in and from the present statutes 
will result in corrective legislation.

 
 

[¶4.]     For many years, the 
Courts would sentence those found guilty of violation of the DWUI statutes to 
either fine or imprisonment, and this disposition was relayed to the Division - 
usually by the arresting agency - where it was entered on the Division records. 
When the prior convictions of DWUI or violations of other motor vehicle 
requirements were sufficient for consideration of suspension or revocation of 
the driver's license, the Division would notify the violator of its intention to 
suspend or revoke his privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the highways of 
the state, afford him a hearing if necessary, and take appropriate action 
relative to the suspension or revocation of his license.

 
 

[¶5.]     During the last three 
or four years, the legislature has increased the penalty which the Courts can 
and must impose for DWUI violations, making it more severe as the number of 
prior DWUI convictions of the driver increased. This, in a laudable effort to 
take the drunk or drugged driver off the roads. Section 31-5-233, W.S. 1977, 
Cum. Supp. 1983, as amended by Ch. 15, § 1, Session Laws of Wyoming, 1979, Ch. 
58, § 1, Session Laws of Wyoming, 1980, Ch. 12, § 1, Session Laws of Wyoming, 
1981, Ch. 50, § 1, and Ch. 52, § 1, Session Laws of Wyoming, 
1982.

 
 

[¶6.]     Subsection (e) of § 
31-5-233 now reads:

 
 
"Every 
person convicted under this section shall, in addition to the penalty above 
provided, have his driver's license suspended at the time of conviction by the 
court. The court shall forward the license to the motor vehicle division of the 
Wyoming tax commission. Upon first conviction only, the court may issue to the 
person a temporary license which shall be valid for a period of thirty (30) 
days. The division shall provide the court with forms for issuance of the 
temporary licenses, including notification of the person's right to a hearing 
pursuant to W.S. 31-7-127(e). The temporary license may be extended by the 
division until the hearing provided for in W.S. 31-7-127(e) is 
held."

 
 

[¶7.]     Section 31-7-127, W.S. 
1977, Cum.Supp. 1983, provides in part:

 
 
"(d) 
Upon conviction under W.S. 31-5-233, the license shall be:

 
 
"(i) 
For the first conviction, suspended for three (3) months from the date of the 
expiration of the temporary license issued under W.S. 
31-5-233(e);

 
 
"(ii) 
For the second conviction, suspended for one (1) year from the date of the 
expiration of the temporary license issued under W.S. 
31-5-233(e);

 
 
"(iii) 
For the third conviction, revoked. 

 
 
"(e) 
After suspension or revocation under subsection (d) of this section, the 
licensee shall have twenty (20) days from date of conviction within which to 
request the [a] hearing. If requested, the hearing shall be held within 
forty-five (45) days after receipt of the request. For a first conviction only, 
upon hearing and demonstration that undue hardship would result from a mandatory 
suspension, the division may suspend or amend the requirements of license 
suspension if the person agrees to pursue and completes an alcohol education or 
treatment program as the division prescribes."

 
 

[¶8.]     The first sentence of § 
31-5-233(e), supra, can be said to direct the court to suspend the driver's 
license of the defendant:

 
 
"Every 
person convicted under this section shall, in addition to the penalty above 
provided, have his driver's license suspended at the time of conviction by the court." 
(Emphasis added.)

 
 
Or, 
this sentence can be read as directing the suspension of the driver's license 
when convicted by the court but with the suspension to be accomplished in the 
historical manner:

 
 
"Every 
person convicted under this section shall, in addition to the penalty above 
provided, have his driver's license suspended at the time of conviction by the court." 
(Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶9.]     If the direction is to 
have the court suspend the license, the criminal "penalty above provided" would 
be increased by the suspension of the driver's license of the person convicted - 
a result which would be entirely within the power of the legislature to direct. 
But when read in pari materia and by giving effect to the other provisions of 
the statutes, the manifested intent of the legislature is to have the Courts 
impose a fine and jail sentence and to have the Division suspend or revoke the 
driver's license, i.e., "by the court" in the first sentence of § 31-5-233(e), 
supra, modifies "time of conviction" and not "have his driver's license 
suspended."1 All statutes must be construed in 
pari materia. In ascertaining the meaning of a given law, all statutes relating 
to the same subject or having the same general purpose must be considered and 
construed in harmony. Brinegar v. 
Clark, Wyo., 371 P.2d 62 (1962); and Stringer v. Board of County Commissioners of 
Big Horn County, Wyo., 347 P.2d 197 (1959).

 
 

[¶10.]  The portions of § 31-7-127, other than 
subsections (d) and (e), supra, set forth the procedure and conditions for 
suspension and revocation of a driver's license by the Division after 
convictions for multiple violations of other traffic laws; § 31-7-105, W.S. 
1977, Cum.Supp. 1983, creates the office of hearing examiner to sit as an 
administrative hearing agency of the Division for review of "all matters arising 
from driver's license and related matters including suspension." Section 
31-7-127(d), supra, provides that the Division shall suspend the driver's 
license for the specified period of time "from the date of the expiration of the 
temporary license" issued by the court.

 
 

[¶11.]  There is no indication that the 
legislature intended the Division, an agency of the executive branch of the 
government, to act in an appellate capacity over the Courts, and, of course, 
such would be unconstitutional as a violation of the separation-of-powers 
doctrine. Carter v. Board of County 
Commissioners of County of Laramie, Wyo., 518 P.2d 142 (1974).2 If the suspensions were 
accomplished by the Courts, the statutory duties of the Division would be either 
superfluous or appellate. As noted, the latter would be unconstitutional. In 
other words, the historic intent to have the Courts impose fines and jail 
sentences on those found guilty of the crime of DWUI and to have the Division 
suspend and revoke drivers' licenses is still manifested in the statutes when 
considered in pari materia.

 
 

[¶12.]  In construing statutes, legislative 
intent is the primary consideration. If the language is sufficiently clear, 
there is no need to resort to rules of construction. When the language is not 
clear or is ambiguous, the court must look to the mischief the statute was 
intended to cure, the historical setting surrounding its enactment, the public 
policy of the state, the conclusions of law, and other prior and contemporaneous 
facts and circumstances, making use of the accepted rules of construction to 
ascertain a legislative intent that is reasonable and consistent. Sanches v. Sanches, Wyo., 626 P.2d 61 
(1981); State ex rel. Albany County Weed 
and Pest District v. Board of County Commissioners of County of Albany, 
Wyo., 592 P.2d 1154 (1979); Saffels v. 
Bennett, Wyo., 630 P.2d 505 (1981); Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. State 
Board of Control, Wyo., 578 P.2d 557 (1978); In re Romer, Wyo., 436 P.2d 956 
(1968).

 
 

[¶13.]  Nevertheless, the language in § 
31-5-233(e), supra, authorizing suspension of a driver's license "by the court" 
"at the time of conviction," and the language therein directing the court to 
take custody of the driver's license of one convicted of DWUI and to forward the 
same to the Division, have caused confusion and varied interpretations thereof, 
not only within and between the Courts and the Division, but also and more 
importantly to many members of the public generally.

 
 

[¶14.]  In a typical situation, John Doe is 
arrested for DWUI. When brought before the court, the complaint or information 
reflects one prior conviction for DWUI within the year in a Wyoming state court. 
After a guilty plea, he is sentenced to thirty days imprisonment and a fine of 
$500.00, with the execution of the jail sentence in excess of seven days being 
suspended upon defendant's agreement to pursue and complete a prescribed 
treatment program.3 Shortly thereafter, he receives a 
communication from the Division which reads in part:

 
 
"* 
* * The Notice of SUSPENSION/REVOCATION given to you by the Court indicated that 
this was your second (2nd) conviction. THAT NOTICE IS 
INCORRECT.

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"* 
* * IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Notice of SUSPENSION/REVOCATION issued by 
the ____ Court of ____ Wyoming be and is hereby amended. * * 
*"

 
 

[¶15.]  John Doe thought he had concluded the 
matter by the court action. He, his friends and all to whom he speaks about the 
matter are surprised that the Division can "overrule" the court and change the 
court's sentence. The court is disturbed in finding that the case before it was 
not premised on all of the previous convictions, that the treatment program 
prescribed by the court was agreed to by the defendant without knowledge of all 
of the consequences of his conviction, and that the Division is alleging 
inaccuracy in the court's judgment which the Division is "overruling." The news 
media and the public generally find something inherently wrong in a criminal 
sentence gauged on "x" number of prior convictions and a license suspension or 
revocation gauged on "x-plus" number of prior convictions. Obviously, the 
petitioner does not fully understand the procedure inasmuch as it contends in 
its petition that the suspension or revocation of the license occurred at the 
time of conviction by "operation of law." If such were so, there would be no 
need for the hearing and other procedure provided by statute for the Division to 
follow in connection with such suspension or revocation.

 
 

[¶16.]  There are two other aspects of the 
problem which have surfaced during the attempts to consistently carry out the 
directions of the statutes. One, the Courts recognize that they cannot enlarge 
on or change the plain and unambiguous provisions of a statute. Croxton v. Board 
of County Commissioners of Natrona County, Wyo., 644 P.2d 780 (1982); Sanches v. 
Sanches, supra. In this matter, the statutes are clear and unambiguous in 
restricting consideration of prior offenses to those convictions "under this 
act." Accordingly the Courts consider only those prior convictions which were 
obtained under § 31-5-233(e)4 in computing the number of prior 
convictions which enhance the sentence. However, in computing prior convictions 
for suspension or revocation of drivers' licenses, the Division considers 
convictions for DWUI under the acts of other states regardless of whether or not 
the level of blood alcohol content for presumption purposes in the other states 
is less or more than that under the Wyoming statutes and whether or not there 
are other differences between the two statutes. The Division also considers 
convictions for DWUI in municipal courts for such purposes. Convictions in 
municipal courts are for violations of ordinances and not state statutes. This 
is true even if a state statute is copied verbatim in the ordinance or even if 
it is adopted as the ordinance by reference to it.

 
 
"(ix) 
`Ordinance' means a legislative enactment of general effect validly adopted by 
the governing body of any city or town." Section 15-1-101(a)(ix), W.S. 1977 
(1981 Replacement).

 
 
"(b) 
All cities and towns are hereby empowered to determine their local affairs and 
government as established by ordinance passed * * * subject only to statutes 
uniformly applicable to all cities and towns * * *." Art. 13, § 1(b), Wyoming 
Constitution.

 
 

[¶17.]  If the DWUI statutes were to be 
considered uniformly applicable to all cities and towns, the authority of the 
cities and towns to legislate by ordinance on DWUI would not exist and 
convictions could not be had in municipal courts. However, the DWUI statutes do 
not contain language making them exceptions to the municipal powers granted 
under the home rule provision of the constitution. Of course, one arrested for 
DWUI within the limits of a city can be charged under the state statute and be 
taken to the Courts (JP or county) for disposition rather than be charged under 
the ordinance and be taken to the municipal court for disposition. Some cities 
have repealed all DWUI ordinances to force such action. (The usual purpose being 
to avoid the expense of jury trials.)

 
 

[¶18.]  In considering convictions for DWUI in 
municipal courts for purposes of suspension and revocation of drivers' licenses, 
the Division is undoubtedly giving attention to subsection (h) of § 31-5-233, 
supra, which provides:

 
 
"(h) 
Any person charged under this section shall be prosecuted under this section and 
not under a reduced charge. Ordinances of cities and towns are superseded to the 
extent inconsistent with this subsection."

 
 

[¶19.]  The subsection presents a number of 
questions not pertinent to the issues in this matter. E.g., Does the "charge" 
refer to the information filed by the prosecuting attorney? Does the "reduced 
charge" refer to a lesser-included offense? If so, what is it? Is the jury 
precluded from convicting under the lesser-included offense, if there is one? 
Does the last sentence purport to make void all city and town DWUI ordinances so 
that DWUI violations in cities and towns cannot be presented to the municipal 
courts? Does it purport to enact ordinances for cities and towns? If it purports 
to do either of these things, is it the legislative intent to do so in view of 
the many other grants of power to municipal corporations inconsistent therewith? 
Etc. We need not address these questions for the purpose of determining whether 
or not such subsection authorizes consideration by the Division of DWUI 
convictions in municipal courts in connection with suspension or revocation of 
drivers' licenses inasmuch as the last sentence of the subsection specifically 
refers to ordinances "inconsistent with this subsection" (emphasis added). The 
subsection has to do with reduction of charges in cases prosecuted "under this 
section." Prosecution under a DWUI ordinance would not be "under this section," 
therefore, the prohibition against reduction of charges would have no 
application to prosecution under ordinances. In other words, the subsection does 
not pertain to anything concerning which an ordinance could be 
inconsistent.

 
 

[¶20.]  Two, the statutory requirement that the 
sentence to be imposed by the court be more severe as the number of prior 
convictions of the defendant increases makes the statute a habitual criminal 
act. Before the sentence of a defendant can be enhanced under such act, he must 
have notice of the fact that such is contemplated. Generally, the notice must be 
contained in the information or charge under which he is prosecuted. Evans v. 
State, Wyo., 655 P.2d 1214 (1982). Section 6-10-203(a), W.S. 1977 (1983 
Replacement), provides:

 
 
"(a) 
An information or indictment which charges a person as an habitual criminal 
shall set forth the charged felony and allege the previous 
convictions."

 
 
Although 
here we are not concerned with felonies, the reason upon which this section is 
predicated is pertinent to the requirement of similar notice in DWUI cases. The 
California Supreme Court voices the reason as follows:

 
 
"A 
question is raised whether there is a requirement to further advise an accused 
with respect to the effect which a determination of habitual criminality will 
have on the punishment and other sanctions to be imposed upon the accused's 
conviction of the substantive crime charged. As stated, severe sanctions are at 
issue and there are numerous and complex circumstances in which those sanctions 
and the degrees thereof are to be made applicable. The consequences of an 
admission could, without imposing any undue burden on the judicial process, be 
explained to an accused in the interest of achieving justice both for the 
accused and the state. We deem these to be persuasive and compelling reasons in 
support of the rule urged and conclude accordingly that as a judicially declared 
rule of criminal procedure * * * an accused, prior to the time the court accepts 
his admission of an allegation of a prior criminal conviction or convictions, is 
entitled to be advised: (1) that he may thereby be adjudged an habitual criminal 
* * *; (2) of the precise increase in the term or terms which might be imposed 
if any, in the accused's case * * *; and (3) of the effect of any increased term 
or terms of imprisonment on the accused's eligibility for parole. The failure to 
so advise an accused in the enumerated instances will constitute error which, if 
prejudice appears, will require the setting aside of a finding of the truth of 
an allegation of prior convictions." (Footnotes omitted.) In re Yurko, 10 Cal. 3d 857, 112 Cal. Rptr. 513, 519 P.2d 561, 565-566 (1974).

 
 
"A 
person accused of crime as a recidivist is entitled to be informed by indictment 
or information that he is being charged as such. The pleading must allege all 
the facts that are necessary to bring the case within the statute authorizing 
enhanced punishment. * * *" 39 Am.Jur.2d, Habitual Criminals and Subsequent 
Offenders, § 20, p. 324.

 
 

[¶21.]  Accordingly, the Courts cannot impose a 
sentence based on prior convictions unless such potential is made known to the 
defendant at a time when it can enter into his consideration in deciding upon 
his plea or a change therein. We may ultimately be faced with a question as to 
whether or not the Division can suspend or revoke a license on the basis of 
prior convictions when the driver was not given express notice that such could 
result at a time prior to court action in the case in which the conviction 
triggers the consideration of suspension or revocation. This issue is not now 
before us. As long as the Courts and the Division are working under different 
requirements, the space could further widen between that which the Courts can do 
in their sentencing with reference to prior convictions and that which the 
Division can do in revocation or suspension of the driver's license with 
reference to prior convictions. The result is public dissatisfaction with the 
entire process.

 
 

[¶22.]  A few months ago, the prosecuting 
attorneys and the heads of law enforcement agencies in the state were directed 
to require the arresting officer presenting the case on a complaint or the 
assistant prosecuting attorney presenting the case on an information to first 
check with the Division and include the fact of prior convictions as contained 
in the Division records in the complaint or information so that the defendant 
would have the notice necessary for the imposition of any enhanced sentence by 
the court, and so that the Courts and Division would be proceeding on the same 
basis in this respect.5 It was anticipated that the 
procedure would obviate the necessity for Division letters to defendants 
"overruling" the Courts' sentences until the legislature would have an 
opportunity to consider legislation to be suggested by the Division and the 
Courts. The filing of the petition in this case evidenced the fact that such 
efforts have not been successful.

 
 

[¶23.]  Finally, with reference to the background 
of this matter, it should be noted that the legislation involved the Courts in 
the driver's license aspect of DWUI cases because of the difficulty encountered 
by the Division and prosecuting authorities in enforcement of a suspension or 
revocation of a driver's license. Prior to the legislation which required the 
Courts to collect the license at the time of conviction and issue temporary 
licenses, the Division sent letters to those convicted requesting return of the 
license and advising of the hearing procedures to determine the propriety, 
conditions and extent of suspension or revocation. Often the defendant did not 
receive the letter, or, at least, if he did, he contended that he did not 
receive it, and the license was not returned. Subsequent prosecution for driving 
without a valid license was made difficult by the inability to prove knowledge 
of the suspension.

 
 

[¶24.]  This difficulty was helped considerably 
by involving the Courts in the process, but the other problems discussed supra 
were created. Corrective legislation could be (1) to include revocation and 
suspension of licenses as part of the penalty to be imposed for DWUI by the 
Courts, thus removing any discretion from the Division and leaving it with only 
the resulting ministerial functions relative thereto pursuant to the judgment 
and sentence of the Courts, or (2) to not involve the Courts in license 
suspensions or revocations in any way, making provisions for the arresting 
officer to collect the driver's license and to issue a temporary license to be 
valid until the Division processes the result of the arrest. The second method 
would not prevent a disparagement relative to the number of prior convictions 
between the Courts' sentences and the Division's action on the license, but the 
separation of the two functions would be better defined and 
understood.

 
 
THIS 
CASE

 
 

[¶25.]  The issues presented as a result of the 
petition in this case were founded on the fact that the forms furnished by the 
Division pursuant to subsection (e) of § 31-5-233, supra, required more than 
specified in such subsection, with a result that Respondent refused to execute 
and return them to the Division.

 
 

[¶26.]  The statutory direction with reference to 
the forms to be furnished by the Division is that they be for issuance of the 
temporary license, including notification of the person's right to a hearing by 
the Division pursuant to § 31-7-127(e), supra. The furnished forms contained 
these two things, but they contained more. They were titled "Notice of 
Suspension/Revocation," and they required the signature of the judge or clerk of 
court. They recited in part:

 
 
"You 
are hereby notified that your conviction of the following which has been checked 
requires the IMMEDIATE SURRENDER of your license and the SUSPENSION/REVOCATION 
OF YOUR DRIVING PRIVILEGE in the State of Wyoming.

 
 
"[] 
1st conviction of DWUI, W.S. 31-5-233, driving privileges suspended from the 
date of conviction for 3 months. This suspension is stayed if the Temporary 
License is issued below.

 
 
"[] 
2nd conviction of DWUI, W.S. 31-5-233, driving privileges suspended from date of 
conviction for one (1) year.

 
 
"[] 
3rd or subsequent conviction of DWUI, W.S. 31-5-233, driving privileges revoked 
from the date of conviction, and may not apply for a new license for a period of 
five (5) years after revocation.

 
 
"[] 
DWUI causing serious bodily injury, W.S. 31-5-233(g), driving privileges revoked 
from the date of conviction for 2 years, pursuant to W.S. 
31-5-233(g)(iii).

 
 
"In 
addition to the Suspension/Revocation indicated above, you are required to have 
on file with the Department of Revenue and Taxation, Future Proof of Financial 
Responsibility. Said proof must be maintained for three (3) years from the date 
of conviction."

 
 

[¶27.]  After receiving the above notice from the court, with one of the first 
two boxes checked, the chagrin of the defendant and his question as to the 
ability of the Division to "overrule" the court can be understood when he 
receives the communication from the Division that the court's notice is 
"incorrect" and "is hereby amended" to show additional prior convictions. The 
court's reluctance to execute and return such forms to the Division is also 
understandable.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶28.]  The following issues were presented 
directly or indirectly in the petition, the answer and the briefs of the 
parties:

 
 
1. 
Do the statutes contemplate return by the Courts of copies of the forms 
furnished by the Division?

 
 
2. 
Are drivers' licenses suspended at the time of conviction "by operation of 
law?"

 
 
3. 
Can the Division suspend or revoke drivers' licenses on the basis of prior 
convictions other than those considered by the Courts in imposing 
sentence?

 
 
4. 
Under the present wording of the statute, can convictions in other states or in 
municipal courts be considered in revocation or suspension of drivers' 
licenses?

 
 
5. 
Were the forms furnished by the Division proper ones?

 
 
6. 
Is the return of the forms by the Courts a ministerial 
act?

 
 
7. 
Is Article 2, Section 1 of the Wyoming Constitution violated by legislative 
direction to the Courts to collect drivers' licenses and to execute and return 
the forms furnished by the Division?

 
 
FIRST 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶29.]  Respondent argues that although § 
31-5-233(e), supra, directs the Division to furnish forms to the Courts for 
issuance of temporary licenses and for notification of the right to a hearing by 
the Division, neither it nor any other statute directs the Courts to return 
copies of the forms to the Division. Obviously, this is true, but, as already 
noted, the legislative intent for the Division to do the actual suspension or 
revocation of drivers' licenses is manifested when the several statutes having 
to do with revocation and suspension of such licenses are read in pari materia. 
The fact of conviction, etc., may be made known to the Division in the historic 
and customary fashion. Subsection (d) of § 31-7-127, supra, requires the 
suspension of the driver's license by the Division to begin on the expiration 
date of the temporary license issued by the court.6 The Division must be advised of the 
expiration date of the temporary license and it must have a record that the 
defendant had notice of his right to a hearing within the Division. A copy of 
the form will provide this information.

 
 

[¶30.]  Accordingly, the legislature did 
contemplate execution and return by the Courts of copies of the forms furnished 
by the Division. The propriety of the forms and the constitutionality of that 
contemplated by the legislature will be discussed infra in the fifth and seventh 
issues.

 
 
SECOND 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶31.]  That already said reflects the fact that 
the drivers' licenses are not suspended at the time of conviction "by operation 
of law." The licenses are suspended or revoked by the Division. The principal 
objective of involving the Courts in the suspension and revocation procedure was 
to obtain immediate surrender of the license, but the Division was intended to 
perform the function of suspension or revocation.

 
 
THIRD 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶32.]  Aside from the constraints on both the 
Courts and the Division discussed in the Fourth Issue, infra, and under the 
present status of the law, the Division can suspend or revoke drivers' licenses 
on the basis of prior convictions other than those considered by the Courts in 
imposing sentences. As noted supra, the Courts can only consider those prior 
convictions referred to in the complaint or information upon which the defendant 
is charged. All of the prior convictions "under this act" may not be there set 
forth. Historically, the Division has not been subject to the same restrictions 
as have the Courts with reference to enhanced penalties under a habitual 
criminal act. And we need not, and will not, address the propriety of the 
Division's actions in this respect. At the present time, the Division will 
probably be considering prior convictions not being considered by the 
Courts.

 
 
FOURTH 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶33.]  We do hold that neither the Division nor 
the Courts can consider prior convictions under the laws of other states or 
under municipal ordinances of this state in connection with sentences or with 
suspension or revocation of drivers' licenses. Again, as already noted, the 
statute is plain and unambiguous and therefore not subject to interpretation in 
providing that sentences shall be enhanced only by convictions "under this 
section," (see fn. 3 and § 31-5-233(e), supra) and in providing that suspensions 
and revocations of drivers' licenses shall be for convictions "under this 
section" § 31-5-233(e), supra, and "upon conviction under W.S. 31-5-233" § 
31-7-127(d), supra. Until the legislature sees fit to change the express wording 
of these statutes, only convictions under the indicated sections can be counted 
as prior convictions for enhancement of sentences or for suspension and 
revocation of drivers' licenses.

 
 
FIFTH 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶34.]  We have already set forth wherein the 
forms furnished by the Division went beyond that specified in the statute. The 
forms were obviously designed by the Division with the belief that the 
suspensions of drivers' licenses were to be done by the Courts upon conviction 
of the defendants. If this were so, the suspension would be a part of the 
sentence and not subject to review or change by the Division. We find that it 
was not the legislative intent to remove the suspension or revocation procedure 
from the Division and place it with the Courts. The Division still has its 
historic position in this respect, with its determinations and actions being 
subject only to judicial review in the same fashion as are those of any other 
administrative agency. Thus, the forms were predicated on an erroneous basis and 
are improper.

 
 
SIXTH 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶35.]  Respondent argues that the execution and 
return of the forms were more than ministerial acts wherefore mandamus would not 
lie. LeBeau v. State, Wyo., 377 P.2d 302 (1963); and State ex rel. Badley v. City of Sheridan, Wyo., 513 P.2d 647 
(1973). He contends that discretion is involved in determining into which of the 
several categories the defendant is placed as a result of his conviction. We do 
not agree. The discretion was exercised before there was a need to give any 
attention to the forms. Once sentence was imposed, the forms could be filled out 
from the court record. In fact, they could be prepared and executed by the clerk 
of the court. The required action is ministerial and mandamus will lie if the 
situation is one in which the issuance of the writ would be 
proper.

 
 
SEVENTH 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶36.]  The Courts are anxious to cooperate with 
anyone or any program with an objective to remove the drunk or drugged drivers 
from the highways - whether or not the cooperation is mandated by law. However, 
the judges of the Courts take an oath to abide by the constitution. Art. 2, § 1 
of the Wyoming Constitution (fn. 2, supra) does not leave room for exercise by 
one branch of the government of the powers of another even with the permission 
or direction of the other branch. It directs that such exercise shall not occur.

 
 

[¶37.]  The Courts are not constitutional courts 
as are the district courts and this court. The legislature is constitutionally 
authorized to establish courts (other than the supreme court and district 
courts). It can create them, designate the extent of their jurisdiction, and 
abolish them. It did create the Courts (JP and county) and designate their 
jurisdiction. It can abolish them.

 
 

[¶38.]  Petitioner argues that the legislature 
can direct the Courts to do various acts even if such properly belong to the 
executive branch. Once created, the Courts became part of the judicial branch 
and are subject to the restrictions contained in Art. 2, § 1, Wyoming 
Constitution (fn. 2, supra). The legislature cannot legally direct the Courts to 
patrol the highways and enforce the motor vehicle code. It cannot direct them to 
perform the duties of the secretary of state or to do any other executive 
function. The Courts become involved in executive or legislative functions only 
by virtue of judicial review. 

 
 

[¶39.]  Only the legislature can make certain 
acts a crime and establish the penalties for violation of them. It has defined 
DWUI as a crime and set the penalty for imposition by the Courts. It could 
include suspension of drivers' licenses as part of such penalty. As noted supra, 
the intent to do so is not manifested, and the power to suspend or revoke the 
privilege of driving upon the highways of the state has been placed in the 
Division where an opportunity for a hearing is provided and where discretion is 
placed to allow exercise of the privilege only under certain 
conditions.

 
 

[¶40.]  The collection of a driver's license from 
a convicted person and the issuance of a driver's license - permanent or 
temporary - are functions of the executive branch of the government. These 
functions cannot constitutionally be performed by the judicial branch. The 
surrender of a driver's license as a part of the penalty defined by the 
legislature can be the function of the court imposing sentence, but the 
legislature has not seen fit to include suspension or revocation of drivers' 
licenses as part of the criminal penalty for DWUI. Should it do so, the penalty 
could not be reviewed or changed or approved by the executive 
branch.

 
 

[¶41.]  The provisions in § 31-5-233(e), supra, 
for collection of a driver's license by the court and for the issuance of a 
temporary driver's license by the court are unconstitutional in that they 
violate Art. 2, § 1 of the Wyoming Constitution by directing the exercise of 
powers properly belonging to the executive branch of the government to the 
judicial branch.

 
 

[¶42.]  The dispositions as a result of judicial 
action in cases before the Courts are generally a matter of public record7 and the Courts shall continue to 
advise the arresting officer, county attorneys, etc., including the Division, of 
such disposition.

 
 

[¶43.]  In summary, the forms furnished by the 
Division were not those directed to be furnished by the statute. They are 
misleading and reflect involvement by the Courts in suspension or revocation of 
drivers' licenses even more than legislated. They need not be executed, with 
copies distributed as contemplated by the Division. Unless and until changed by 
the legislature, only prior convictions under § 31-5-233, supra, may be 
considered by the Courts in imposing sentences and by the Division in suspending 
and revoking drivers' licenses. The statutory direction to the Courts to collect 
drivers' licenses and execute and return the Division furnished forms is 
unconstitutional. The Courts will furnish dispositions on all DWUI cases to the 
Division and any other interested parties.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶44.]  For the foregoing reasons, the Alternate 
Writ of Mandamus will be quashed and the Petition for a Peremptory Writ of 
Mandamus will be denied.

 
 
ORDER 
QUASHING ALTERNATE WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND DENYING THE MOTION FOR PEREMPTORY WRIT 
OF MANDAMUS

 
 

[¶45.]  An Alternate Writ of Mandamus having 
issued out of this Court directing Respondent to complete and furnish to the 
Motor Vehicle Division of the Department of Revenue and Taxation certain forms 
furnished by such Division relative to court action and other matters concerning 
cases before the Respondent court involving the charge of Driving While Under 
the Influence of Intoxicants or Drugs or to show cause for not doing so; and 
briefs on the matter having been furnished by both parties, and the Respondent 
having shown cause for not completing and furnishing such forms; it 
is

 
 

[¶46.]  ORDERED that the Alternate Writ of 
Mandamus heretofore issued out of this Court in this matter be, and the same 
hereby is, quashed for the reasons contained in the opinion of this Court issued 
contemporaneously with this order, and for the same reasons, it 
is

 
 

[¶47.]  FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner's request 
for a Peremptory Writ of Mandamus be, and the same hereby is, 
denied.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 
Other than in the first sentence the provisions of § 31-5-233(e), supra, 
requiring the court to issue a temporary driver's license and to collect the 
driver's license, violate Art. 2, § 1 of the Wyoming Constitution (see fn. 2, 
infra) as more particularly noted under the Seventh Issue in the Issues section 
of this opinion.

 
 

2 
Art. 2, § 1 of the Wyoming Constitution provides:

 
 
"The 
powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct 
departments: The legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or 
collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to 
one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either 
of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or 
permitted."

 
 

3 
Section 31-5-233, W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1983, supra, provides in 
part:

 
 
"(d) 
Except as provided in subsection (g) of this section, a person convicted of 
violating this section is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for 
not more than six (6) months or a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty 
dollars ($750.00). On a subsequent conviction within five (5) years after a 
conviction for a violation of this section, he shall be punished by imprisonment 
for not less than seven (7) days nor more than six (6) months and shall not be 
eligible for probation, pardon, parole, commutation or suspension of sentence or 
release on any other basis until he has served at least seven (7) days in jail. 
In addition, the person may be fined not less than two hundred dollars ($200.00) 
nor more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00). The judge may suspend part 
or all of the discretionary portion of an imprisonment sentence under this 
subsection if the defendant agrees to pursue and completes an alcohol education 
or treatment program as prescribed by the judge.

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"(g) 
Whoever causes serious bodily injury to another person resulting from the 
violation of this section shall be punished as provided in paragraphs (i), (ii) 
and (iii) of this subsection. As used in this subsection, `serious bodily 
injury' means bodily injury which creates a reasonable likelihood of death or 
which causes miscarriage or serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss 
or impairment of any bodily member or organ:

 
 
"(i) 
For a first conviction, by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars 
($5,000.00), or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one (1) 
year, or both;

 
 
"(ii) 
For a subsequent conviction, by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more 
than twenty (20) years, and

 
 
"(iii) 
Any person convicted under this subsection shall also have his driver's license 
revoked by the motor vehicle division and that person may not apply for a new 
license for a period of two (2) years after revocation. At the time of 
conviction, the court shall require the person to surrender his license, and the 
court shall forward the license to the division."

 
 

4 
Section 31-5-233(e), supra, begins by providing that: "Every person convicted 
under this section shall * * *" (emphasis added). Section 31-7-127, supra, 
begins: "Upon conviction under W.S. 31-5-233 * * *" (emphasis 
added).

 
 

5 
Of course, this procedure would not resolve the difference resulting from the 
Division consideration of out-of-state and municipal convictions which could not 
be considered by the Courts.

 
 

6 
This evidences another inconsistency in the legislation. The temporary license 
is for a 30-day period. The suspension or revocation begins at the end of that 
period in accordance with § 31-7-127(d), supra, but subsection (e) of that 
section provides in part:

 
 
"(e) 
After suspension or revocation under subsection (d) of this section, the 
licensee shall have twenty (20) days from date of conviction within which to 
request the [a] hearing. * * *"

 
 
He 
cannot request a hearing both (1) within twenty days of conviction, and (2) 
after suspension or revocation which occurs thirty days after 
conviction.

 
 

7 
Exceptions exist for juvenile matters, adoption proceedings and similar 
matters.