Case Title: Miller v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 312, 2005

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPEME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
SYLVESTER MILLER,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 312, 2005 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 0408012099 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  February 8, 2006 
Decided:  March 9, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
David J. Facciolo, Minster & Facciolo LLC, Wilmington, Delaware for 
appellant. 
 
 
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for 
appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
Police arrested and a New Castle County grand jury indicted Sylvester 
Miller for Rape First Degree and Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child for sexually 
assaulting his daughter, Alicia Miller.  On March 28, 2005, a trial jury returned a 
guilty verdict on six counts of Rape First Degree and one count of Continuous 
Sexual Abuse of a Child.1  Miller now appeals these convictions.  Miller raises 
eight claims of error:  (1) the trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to allow 
voir dire on whether individual prospective jurors would give more weight to a 
police officer’s testimony than that of other witnesses; (2) the trial judge erred by 
refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of Unlawful Sexual 
Contact; (3) the trial judge abused his discretion by denying defense counsel’s 
proposed Conduct of the Jury Instruction which focused on “not surrendering your 
opinion for the purpose of a verdict;” (4) the trial judge abused his discretion by 
denying Miller’s motion in limine in which Miller sought to redact a portion of a 
videotaped police interview with Miller where the police officer made unsupported 
suggestions that Miller may have been unable to recall that he had sexually 
assaulted Alicia because he was using marijuana or abusing alcohol; (5) the trial 
judge abused his discretion by denying Miller’s Motion for a Mistrial when the 
victim gave an unresponsive answer to a prosecutor’s question and made reference 
to an inadmissible earlier sexual assault; (6) the trial judge abused his discretion by 
                                                 
1  
During trial, the prosecutor dropped two of the eight counts in the indictment. 
 
 
 
3 
 
admitting Alicia’s handwritten statement describing the abuse; (7) the trial judge 
abused his discretion by limiting the cross-examination of Alicia when he refused 
to allow defense counsel to ask Alicia questions about her relationship with 
Miller’s girlfriend;  and (8) the trial judge unfairly commented on the evidence in 
his jury instruction when he linked the six counts of Rape to specific “allegations” 
made by Alicia.  Because we find that the trial judge acted within his discretion 
and that any errors he made were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm. 
I. 
Facts 
  
 
Alicia Miller visited her stepmother in the summer of 2004 and informed her 
stepmother that her father, Sylvester Miller, had sexually abused her.  Alicia’s 
stepmother contacted the Florida police.  The Florida Police asked Alicia to 
provide a handwritten statement of the events and contacted Delaware authorities.  
Delaware police then investigated resulting in Miller’s arrest and indictment.   
 
At Miller’s trial both Alicia and Anthony Miller, Miller’s son, testified 
against him.  Alicia testified to six specific instances when her father raped or 
sexually abused her: (1) a time when her father forced her to have sexual 
intercourse the night before Christmas; (2) a time when Alicia’s father forced her 
to have sexual intercourse and her brother opened the bedroom door; (3) a time 
when her father dragged her into his bedroom and forced her to perform oral sex; 
(4) the first time her father forced her to have anal sex; (5) the summer after she 
 
 
 
4 
 
turned 14 and her father, again, forced her to have anal sex; and (6) a time when 
her father forced her to have sexual intercourse before she left for Florida.   
 
Anthony corroborated Alicia’s testimony.  Anthony saw his father enter 
Alicia’s bedroom late at night and during those times he heard bedsprings 
“creaking” and Alicia saying “no” and “stop.”  Anthony also testified to an 
occasion when he walked into Alicia’s bedroom and saw Miller under the sheets 
with Alicia.  Finally, Anthony explained that his sister had told him about the 
abuse two years before the trial but he never mentioned anything because he was 
confused about what action he should take. 
 
Miller never testified, but the jury had the opportunity to view Miller’s 
videotaped police interview.  During the police interview, Miller denied all of 
Alicia’s allegations.  Despite Miller’s repeated denials in the videotape and other 
evidence suggesting that Alicia and Anthony had motives to lie,2 the jury found 
Miller guilty of six counts of Rape First Degree and one count of Continuous 
Sexual Abuse of a Child.  The trial judge sentenced Miller to the mandatory 
minimum fifteen years at Level V incarceration for each Rape count and two years 
Level V incarceration followed by probation for Continuous Sexual Abuse of a 
Child.  Miller now appeals that verdict.   
                                                 
2  
Both Alicia and Anthony agreed that they were embarrassed by their father’s accent and 
the way he dressed.  Moreover, Alicia and Anthony both expressed desires to live with their 
stepmother in Florida.   
 
 
 
 
5 
 
II. 
Eight Claims of Error 
 
 
We now address Miller’s eight claims of error. 
 
A.  
The trial judge allegedly abused his discretion by refusing to ask during 
voir dire whether the jury members would give more weight to a police 
officer’s testimony than to any other testimony. 
 
 
Before trial, Miller submitted a proposed list of voir dire questions. One of 
the questions reads as follows:  
Police officers may testify at trial. Would the fact that a police officer 
testified affect your ability to render a fair and impartial verdict in this 
case? 
 
Alternate version: Can you give the same weight to a Police Officer’s 
testimony as to any other fact witness? 
 
In a sidebar conversation before beginning jury selection, the trial judge explained 
to defense counsel why he was not going to ask the proposed question: 
 
I think this question has particular relevance when the case is one 
that’s kind of been developed by police conduct, meaning they’ve 
been active participants and they become the real – it’s their issue of 
credibility…. I think in this case what they’re going to be testifying to 
is either events or statements made by others and so I’m not finding it 
as critical here. You have in the jury questionnaire information 
concerning whether or not they have any family or friends who are in 
the law enforcement field, so I don’t think it’s necessary in this 
case…. 
 
During voir dire, the clerk asked the prospective jurors, “Do you have any 
biases or prejudice, either for or against the State or the defendant?” The clerk also 
asked if the prospective jurors knew any of the potential witnesses, one of whom 
was Detective Joe Szcerba. One of the prospective jurors came forward. When the 
 
 
 
6 
 
trial judge asked what prompted her to come forward she indicated that her 
husband was a New Castle County Police Officer. The trial judge then determined 
that the prospective juror knew Joe Szcerba as “a regular officer”, but that she and 
her family did not socialize with him on a regular basis. The trial judge next asked 
whether the fact that the prospective juror’s husband was a New Castle County 
Police Officer would affect her ability to fairly and impartially consider the 
evidence. She responded, “possibly.” Rephrasing the question the trial judge asked: 
“would you tend to give greater credence and testimony to the police officer 
because of the role that they have?” The prospective juror responded in the 
affirmative. The trial judge clarified this response by asking, “If there was a 
conflict between the testimony of a lay witness and an officer, would you give the 
benefit to the officer?” The prospective juror said that she would; whereupon the 
trial judge excused her.  
Initially, the trial judge ruled that the police officers’ testimony would not be 
that “critical” because the police would be testifying to “events or statements” 
made by others.  The trial judge knew that counsel had the jury questionnaire 
responses and could determine from them whether any prospective jurors had 
family or friends who were law enforcement officers. Understandably, the trial 
judge believed those responses would allow counsel to exercise a peremptory 
challenge should they question a prospective juror’s objectivity.  After the juror 
 
 
 
7 
 
came forward in response to the question about whether any member of the venire 
might know a prospective witness, the trial judge asked substantially the same 
question Miller proposed to ask the entire venire. The trial judge then excused that 
prospective juror because she claimed that she would find a police officer more 
credible than a lay witness (even though the police officer’s testimony was not 
“critical” in this case.) We address below whether this methodology sufficiently 
identified prospective jurors who would tend to believe a police officer over any 
other witness and whether in this case such a juror on the panel ultimately selected 
might have unfairly prejudiced Miller.  
 
Miller appeals the trial judge’s initial ruling claiming that the trial judge 
abused his discretion by “refusing to grant voir dire as to extra weight jurors might 
give to police officer testimony.” He alleges that the “[t]he failure to allow this voir 
dire coupled with the police officer’s improper questions on the videotape 
exacerbated the unfairness of this trial, and violated the defendant’s due process 
rights.” 
 
It is well-settled that “the extent of a voir dire examination of prospective 
jurors and the questions to be permitted lay within the broad discretion of the trial 
judge.”3 “The exercise of that discretion is restricted only by constitutional 
                                                 
3  
Parson v. State, 275 A.2d 777, 780 (Del. 1971).  
 
 
 
 
8 
 
requirements and the essential demands of fairness.”4 Accordingly, any limitation 
the trial judge imposes on the defendant’s right to have prospective jurors 
questioned “will not constitute an abuse of discretion unless the broad discretion 
reposed in the trial judge has been clearly abused to the prejudice of the 
defendant.”5  
 
We have never before squarely addressed the issue of whether the trial judge 
must always ask the jury venire whether they would give more weight to or assign 
more credibility to a police officer’s testimony than they would any other fact or 
opinion witness.  Miller cites only Gray v. State6 to support the proposition that the 
trial judge abused his discretion by not automatically doing so in this case.  
According to Miller, in Gray we “presumed the relevance of the question” that the 
trial judge denied in this case.  In Gray, like here, the defendants claimed that the 
trial judge abused his discretion by failing to ask prospective jurors certain 
questions relating to jurors’ potential biases because the case involved several 
inflammatory aspects. In concluding that the trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion, we explained the procedure he followed in conducting voir dire and 
noted that he asked “Would you give the testimony of a police officer more 
                                                 
4  
Ortiz v. State, 869 A.2d 285, 292 (Del. 2005) 
 
5  
Parson, 275 A.2d at 781.  
 
6  
441 A.2d 209 (Del. 1981).  
 
 
 
 
9 
 
credence than others merely because he is a police officer?”7 In Gray, despite his 
paring-down of the questions submitted from the 83 questions the defendants 
submitted to the 23 questions he actually used, the trial judge “did not merely go 
through the motions; rather he conducted an examination designed to elicit answers 
which provide an objective basis for his evaluation” of “whether [each] prospective 
juror can render an impartial verdict upon the evidence and the law.”8  
Whalen v. State,9 is also relevant to the issue here. In Whalen, the defendant 
submitted 58 questions to the trial judge for preliminary submission to the entire 
jury venire.  The trial judge rejected all questions the defendant requested, 
including question 21 of 58:  “Will you give the testimony of a police officer more 
credence than that of other witnesses merely because he is a police officer.”10  The 
trial judge did, however, ask the prospective jurors, among other things, whether 
they were related to any police officer, had any friends in the police department or 
law enforcement agencies, or if their jobs caused them to work with the Delaware 
State Police.11  We held that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion and, 
                                                 
7  
Id. at 219.  
 
8  
Id. at 219. 
 
9  
434 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1980). 
 
10  
Id. at 1348,1366, Appendix 2.  
 
11  
Id. at 1368-1369, Appendix 3. 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
therefore, rejected the defendant’s contention that the trial judge abused that 
discretion by declining to submit the defendant’s requested questions to the 
panel.12  
Neither Gray nor Whalen provide clear guidance to the question of whether 
a bright line rule should apply to questions for the venire when police officer 
testimony may be contradicted at trial by civilian witnesses.  A leading case on this 
subject in the federal system is Brown v. United States.13  A jury convicted the 
defendant in Brown of assault with intent to commit robbery for attacking a victim 
and taking property from his person. Two military police officers observed the 
incident, gave chase, and captured the defendant. Their testimony constituted the 
bulk of the government’s case.14  
 
Before jury selection, the defendant requested that the trial judge direct the 
following question to the jury venire:  “Would you give greater credence to the 
testimony of a law enforcement officer merely because he is an officer as 
compared to any other witness?”15  The trial judge denied the request.  In 
reversing, the D.C. Circuit explained that “[a]lthough the trial court possesses a 
                                                 
12  
Id. at 1348.  
 
13  
338 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See Butler v. City of Camden, 352 F.3d 811 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(describing Brown as a leading case).  
 
14  
Brown, 338 F.2d at 544. 
 
15  
Id. 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
broad discretion as to the question to be asked on voir dire, the exercise of that 
discretion is subject to the essential demands of fairness.”16  The Court then set 
forth the general rule that: 
when important testimony is anticipated from certain categories of 
witnesses, whose official or semi-official status is such that a juror 
might reasonably be more, or less, inclined to credit their testimony, a 
query as to whether a juror would have such an inclination is not only 
appropriate but should be given if requested…. 17 
 
Applying the general rule, the Court concluded that: 
 
Responses to the requested query might have supplied the defense 
counsel, or indeed, the prosecutor, with relevant and useful 
information for exercising peremptory challenges or challenges for 
cause. We hold that … failure to inquire of the jury panel as requested 
regarding possible predilections concerning police testimony was 
reversible error in this case18 
 
In many cases, however, “[f]ailure to make appropriate inquiry, when requested, 
does not necessarily require reversal; the issue turns on the degree of impact which 
the testimony in question would be likely to have had on the jury and what part 
such testimony played in the case as a whole.”19  Several years later, the Ninth 
Circuit elaborated on this (essentially) harmless error rule by setting forth a four 
factor test to determine whether a trial judge’s error in voir dire by failing to ask 
                                                 
16  
Id. This is the same rule that applies in Delaware. See Supra pg. 7-8. 
 
17  
Id. at 545.  
 
18  
Id. at 545.  
 
19  
Id.  
 
 
 
 
12 
 
“the question of whether prospective jurors would be unduly influenced by the 
testimony of a law enforcement officer” served to deny a defendant the right to 
have his claims decided by a fair and impartial jury.20 The question of whether the 
error is reversible hinges on: 
1) The importance of the government agent’s testimony to the case as a 
whole;  
2) The extent to which the question concerning the venireperson’s 
attitude toward government agents is covered in other questions  on 
voir dire and on the charge to the jury; 
3) The extent to which the credibility of the government agent-witness is 
put into issue; and 
4) The extent to which the testimony of the government agent is 
corroborated by non-agent witnesses.21  
 
Over the years this “Brown-Baldwin” rule22 has become the majority rule 
among the federal circuits.23 Indeed, many State courts have adopted a rule similar 
                                                 
20  
United State v. Baldwin, 607 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1979).  
 
21  
Id. at 1298.  
 
22  
See United State v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Murnaghan, Circuit 
Judge, dissenting) (referring to the Brown-Baldwin rule).  
 
23  
See  Butler v. City of Camden, 352 F.3d 811 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The majority of federal 
courts of appeals to have passed on this question have held that the district court may, in certain 
circumstances, commit error when it fails to examine the jury pool for potential law enforcement 
bias when requested by counsel.”) (citing Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1964); 
United States v. Victoria-Peguero, 920 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 
1155 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Baldwin, 607 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Spaar, 748 F.2d 1249, 1254 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Espinosa, 771 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 
1985) but see United States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (split panel), 
overruling United States v. Evans, 917 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Lawes, 292 
F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (split panel)). 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
to that in Brown.24 We have discussed Brown once before. In Parson v. State25 we 
considered, among other things, whether the trial judge committed reversible error 
by not excusing for cause certain members of the venire who stated that they would 
tend to believe the testimony of a police officer more readily than that of a lay-
witness.26  There, three prospective jurors, two of whom were actually seated on 
the jury and one of whom the defendant peremptorily challenged, “stated in 
substance that they would tend to believe more readily a police officer when he is 
testifying as to matters for which he is trained, and which he learned about in the 
course of the performance of his duty.”27  All of the prospective jurors, however, 
                                                 
24  
See e.g., Nodd v. State, 549 So. 2d 139, 147 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (“We hold that, 
where the State's case consists primarily of police testimony and that testimony is crucial in 
establishing the State's case, the defense has a right to inquire, either through counsel or the trial 
judge, whether any member of the jury venire might be more, or less, inclined to credit the 
testimony of a police officer simply because of his or her official status. The trial judge's refusal 
of such requested inquiry will constitute an abuse of discretion when the issue has not been 
adequately covered in other questions on voir dire or in the judge's charge to the jury.”); State v. 
Hill, 196 Conn. 667, 673 (Conn. 1985) (citing Brown) (“When important testimony is anticipated 
from certain witnesses whose official or semi-official status is such that a juror might reasonably 
be more, or less, inclined to credit their testimony, a query as to whether a juror would have such 
an inclination should be permitted.”); Langley v. State, 281 Md. 337, 349 (Md. 1977) ([I]n a case 
such as this, where a principal part of the State's evidence is testimony of a police officer 
diametrically opposed to that of a defendant, it is prejudicial error to fail to propound a question 
such as that requested in this case. However, in the words of Brown, we suggest that "the 
phrasing of the court's inquiry should include whether any juror would tend to give either more 
or less credence [merely] because of the occupation or category of the prospective witness”); 
State v. Hyzer, 729 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Commonwealth v. Futch, 469 Pa. 422 
(Pa. 1976). 
 
25  
275 A.2d 777 (Del. 1971) 
 
26  
Id. at 782.  
 
27  
Id.  
 
 
 
14 
 
testified that if the “testimony concerned was not directly related to or growing out 
of the performance by the policeman of his duties as an officer that they would 
treat his testimony as that of any other witness.”28  The trial judge denied the 
defendant’s challenge for cause.29  
The defendant in Parson relied on Brown30 to support his argument. We 
concluded that Brown was inapplicable and noted that Brown held only that “it was 
reversible error not to allow the questioning of a prospective juror upon the subject 
of whether or not he would give greater weight toward policemen’s testimony.”31 
We continued by noting that the Court in Brown did not “rule upon the question of 
whether or not the witnesses answering in the affirmative should be excused for 
cause. In point of fact, the questions were allowed in the case at bar and, therefore, 
there is no violation of the holding in … Brown.”32 Accordingly, we held there was 
no error in the refusal of the trial judge to dismiss the jurors for cause.33 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
28  
Id.  
 
29  
Id.  
 
30  
He also relied upon Sellers v. United States, 271 F.2d 475 (D.C. Cir. 1959) a D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals case cited and discussed in Brown.  
 
31  
Parson, 275 A.2d. at 782.  
 
32  
Id.  
 
33  
Id.  
 
 
 
 
15 
 
The rationale articulated in Brown provides a substantial reason to adopt the 
Brown-Baldwin rule in Delaware, namely that “responses to the requested query 
might have supplied the defense counsel, or indeed, the prosecutor, with relevant 
and useful information for exercising peremptory challenges.” 34  This is true even 
if, as happened in Parson, the trial judge does not abuse his discretion by failing to 
excuse for cause a prospective juror who answers affirmatively that he will give 
police officers’ testimony greater weight than that of lay witnesses.  
Thus we join the majority of the federal circuits in concluding that “where 
government [law enforcement] agents are apt to be key witnesses, the trial court, 
particularly if seasonably requested, should ordinarily make inquiry into whether 
prospective jurors are inclined to have greater faith in the agents' testimony merely 
by virtue of their official positions.”35  Moreover, we will apply the harmless error 
analysis of the Baldwin court to determine whether the failure to do so served to 
deny the defendant the right to have his claims decided by a fair and impartial jury, 
again, examining: 
(1) The importance of the government agent’s testimony to the case as a 
whole;  
 
                                                 
34  
Brown, 338 F.2d at 545; See Parson, 275 A.2d at 780-781 (“[Voir dire] aids the State and 
the defendant by eliciting facts upon which they can exercise intelligently rights to peremptory 
challenges.”)  
 
35  
Butler v. City of Camden, 352 F.3d 811, 817 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations and quotation 
omitted).  
 
 
 
 
16 
 
(2) The extent to which the question concerning the venireperson’s 
attitude toward government agents is covered in other questions  on 
voir dire and on the charge to the jury; 
 
(3) The extent to which the credibility of the government agent-witness is 
put into issue; and, 
 
(4) The extent to which the testimony of the government agent is 
corroborated by non-agent witnesses.36  
 
When a party requests the trial judge to ask the venire if any member of the venire 
would “be more likely to believe the testimony of a police officer than the 
testimony of any other fact or opinion witness,” the trial judge should address the 
Baldwin factors and rule accordingly.37   
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the trial judge erred here by 
refusing to ask the venire Miller’s proposed question or a variation of the question 
proposed, we are satisfied that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
First, the police officer’s testimony was not central to the State’s case.  Rather the 
case rested primarily on Alicia’s testimony corroborated by the testimony of her 
brother.  Second, the credibility of the police officer was not really an issue at trial; 
instead, consistent with the above, the credibility determinations related largely to 
the defendant’s videotaped statement and Alicia’s and Anthony’s trial testimony.  
                                                 
36  
Baldwin, 607 F.2d. at 1298; Butler, 352 F.3d at 817. 
 
37  
We recognize that the Baldwin test generally applies as a harmless error test when an 
appellate court is reviewing a trial judge’s decision not to ask the “police officer credibility 
question” on voir dire. We also think that it provides useful guidance to a trial judge who must 
decide whether to ask the question in the first place. To the extent the trial judge has any doubt, 
however, he should err on the side of asking the proposed question.  
 
 
 
17 
 
Third, the trial judge used the jury questionnaire to determine whether any 
prospective juror was related to or friends with a law enforcement officer.  This 
ultimately resulted in the trial judge excusing a prospective juror whose husband 
was a police officer.    Fourth, to the extent any corroboration was necessary – and 
it arguably was not – Alicia’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated by 
Anthony’s testimony.  Examining all of the factors here, we conclude that even if 
there was error, it was harmless.  Accordingly, Miller’s claim on this issue must 
fail.38 
B. 
The trial judge allegedly erred by denying a Lesser Included Offense 
Instruction. 
 
 
Miller requested that the trial judge instruct the jury on the lesser included 
offense of Unlawful Sexual Contact Second Degree.  Miller suggested that, based 
on his statements to the police that he could only recall that he may have “hugged” 
or “rubbed” his daughter, a rational jury could have found him guilty of the lesser 
included offense of Unlawful Sexual Contact Second Degree.  The trial judge 
disagreed and ruled that there was no basis in the record to convict Miller of the 
                                                 
38  
To the extent that Miller argues that the officer used “misleading representation and 
techniques in questioning” him and that the failure to allow the voir dire question coupled with 
the “interrelated concerns raised on the videotape” violated his due process rights, we disagree. 
The officer was not a witness when asking questions on the videotape. The jury was not called 
upon to weigh her credibility. Accordingly, the proposed voir dire question is largely irrelevant 
to what the officer did or said on the videotape.   
 
 
 
 
18 
 
lesser included offense because “hugging” or “rubbing” another are not crimes in 
Delaware. 
 
The prosecution or the defense is entitled to a lesser included offense 
instruction if the crime not charged is in fact a lesser-included offense, and if there 
is a rational basis in the evidence to convict the defendant of the lesser crime rather 
than the greater.39  Both parties agree that Unlawful Sexual Contact Second Degree 
is a lesser included offense of Rape First Degree.  The parties disagree about 
whether there was a rational basis in the record to convict Miller of Unlawful 
Sexual Contact Second Degree.  We review de novo Miller's claim that there was a 
rational basis for the requested instruction.40 
 
We conclude that there was no rational basis in the evidence to support a 
charge of Unlawful Sexual Contact Second Degree.  The victim testified that 
Miller raped her vaginally, orally, and anally numerous times over several years.  
Miller, in his statement to the police, denied all of the victim’s allegations, and 
stated that he had occasionally “hugged” or “rubbed” his daughter in bed.  Based 
on these two accounts, the jury could have found that Miller raped his daughter 
numerous times or “hugged” or “rubbed” her.  However, the trial judge found that 
neither “hugging” nor “rubbing” are crimes in Delaware.  Therefore, the trial judge 
                                                 
39  
See Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d 1055, 1061 (Del. 1994); Ward v. State, 575 A.2d 1156, 1159 
(Del. 1990). 
 
40  
Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 628 (Del. 2001).   
 
 
 
19 
 
properly denied Miller’s request for an instruction on Unlawful Sexual Contact 
Second Degree because the facts support only the crime of Rape First Degree. 
C. 
The trial judge allegedly abused his discretion by failing to give defense 
counsel’s proposed Conduct of Jury Instruction. 
 
 
At the prayer conference, defense counsel requested that the trial judge give 
a particular “Conduct of Jury” instruction.  Defense counsel suggested that a 
pattern instruction existed that contained language “something along the lines of 
you must not surrender your opinion solely for the purposes of reaching a verdict 
but must fairly listen to each of the comments of your fellow jurors.”  The trial 
judge explained that he used a different instruction “concerning jury deliberations.”  
The trial judge ultimately used the following instruction: 
 
 
Now, upon retiring to the jury room, I suggest that you carry on 
your discussions in an orderly way and give everyone an 
opportunity to express their views before taking a vote or 
attempting to decide the case.  All the issues should be fully and 
fairly discussed and everyone should have a fair chance to be 
heard. 
 
 
After the instructions, the trial judge excused the jury for deliberations.  
Before reaching a verdict, the jury sent three questions to the trial judge.  One of 
the questions asked for a clarification of the term “reasonable doubt.”  After 
learning of this question, defense counsel again asked the trial judge for a 
particular “Conduct of Jury” instruction: 
 
 
Your Honor, I was also wondering if the Court thinks that the 
instruction that you didn’t feel we needed, when I raised it before, 
 
 
 
20 
 
about the conduct of a jury might help them, because it sounds as if 
they are not clear whether they’re getting close to being logjammed, 
or hung.  And that’s the one that talks about the reasonableness of 
your conscience but also trying to reach a verdict.  It’s in the standard 
instructions.  I’m suggesting it at this point, because it seems like it 
touches on where they might be. 
 
The trial judge again denied the request: 
 
 
 
The language that the defense is suggesting is the language that 
kind of goes along with the Allen charge.  So I don’t think we are 
quite there yet. 
 
 
Miller challenges the trial judge’s denial of his proposed pattern “Conduct of 
Jury” instruction.  The decision to give a particular jury instruction is within the 
sound discretion of the trial judge, and we will not reverse that decision absent an 
abuse of discretion.41 
We have recognized that pattern jury instructions “are a most valuable 
resource and should be consulted in the first instance when the trial court is 
conducting a prayer conference and selecting the wording of its instructions.”42  
We have also held, however, that pattern instructions are not mandatory because a 
defendant does not have a right to a particular jury instruction.43  Rather, a 
defendant has an unqualified right to instructions that “correctly state the law and 
                                                 
41  
Carter v. State, 873 A.2d 1086, 1088 (Del. 2005). 
 
42  
Bordley v. State, 832 A.2d 1250 (Del. 2003)(citing Cabrera v. State, 747 A.2d 543, 545 
(Del. 2000)). 
 
43  
Id. 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
are reasonably informative and not misleading, judged by common practices and 
standards of verbal communication.”44 Therefore, we focus “not on whether any 
special words were used, but whether the instruction correctly stated the law and 
enabled the jury to perform its duty.”45 
Here, the instruction correctly stated the law and adequately guided the jury 
about how to conduct their deliberations.  Further, not only did the trial judge’s 
instruction correctly state the law and enable the jury to perform its duty, but the 
instruction also did not materially differ from Miller’s proposed instruction.  In 
sum, Miller simply quibbles over the denial of special words he preferred.  We 
have consistently held that no particular form of words or phrases must be used in 
any instruction. 
Moreover, the trial judge acted within his discretion by denying the second 
request for the instruction.  Defense counsel suggested for a second time that the 
instruction was necessary because the jury may have been “logjammed or hung.”  
In fact, as the trial judge stated, the jury only wanted a clarification on the 
definition of “reasonable doubt” and gave no indication that they had questions 
about how they were to conduct their deliberations. 
                                                 
44   
Id. (citing Sirmans v. Penn, 588 A.2d 1103, 1104 (Del. 1991)). 
 
45  
Cabrera, 747 A.2d at 545. 
 
 
 
22 
 
D. 
The trial judge allegedly abused his discretion by denying Miller’s 
motion in limine which sought to redact portions of Miller’s videotaped 
police interview. 
 
 
During trial, the prosecutor sought to introduce Miller’s videotaped police 
interview.  Defense counsel, however, objected, expressing concern over some of 
the police officer’s statements while questioning Miller.  Defense counsel wanted 
to redact a portion of the video where the police officer suggested that Miller might 
have not remembered raping his daughter because he might have been under the 
influence of alcohol or marijuana.46  The prosecutor summarized the police 
officer’s statement: 
 
In questioning the defendant, the detective says she – she’s 
 
saying maybe he might have forgotten about this, maybe  he 
 
might have been intoxicated and her line of question [sic] is 
 
maybe you came home, you were drunk, maybe you were 
 
high and you got – maybe you were drunk, maybe you 
 
smoked some pot and you got in bed and you didn’t realize 
 
what you were doing. 
 
 
The trial judge, after viewing the video, denied Miller’s motion in limine: 
[A]fter the close of trial yesterday, I took the video, looked at it 
and I do not believe that the references to alcohol or potential 
drug use having perhaps made him[Miller] forget the events 
needed to be redacted because, first of all, he[Miller] denied 
that it had any effect and, if anything, it’s clear that it’s the 
suggestion of the officer and not his[Miller’s] suggestion  
that 
for some reason justified his[Miller’s] acts, so I don’t see it to 
be prejudicial. 
 
                                                 
46  
The police officer had no actual knowledge that Miller used marijuana but was 
employing a tactic to get Miller to confess to sexually assaulting his daughter. 
 
 
 
23 
 
We understand the trial judge’s ruling to mean that the police officer’s suggestions 
of alcohol or drug use to the point of memory loss were not prejudicial because 
they did not come from Miller and Miller flatly denied them.  Put simply, no 
prejudice could have resulted from mere suggestions by the police officer. 
Miller claims that the trial judge abused his discretion by denying the motion 
in limine.  We decline to address whether the trial judge abused his discretion in 
denying Miller’s motion.  Instead, for the sake of argument, we will assume that 
the trial judge abused his discretion by denying Miller’s motion in limine.  The 
mere fact the trial judge abused his discretion, however, does not require reversal.  
We must determine whether the mistakes constituted significant prejudice so as to 
have denied Miller a fair trial.47 
Miller fails to articulate any significant prejudice.  The State presented 
substantial evidence that Miller raped and sexually abused his own daughter over a 
long period of time.  Miller’s natural daughter testified against him and his natural 
son corroborated her story.  Miller provided evidence to suggest that both of his 
children were biased and had motives to lie.  To resolve the case the jury simply 
needed to decide who was more credible, Miller’s two children or Miller himself.  
The jury obviously accepted Alicia’s story and Anthony’s corroboration.  Miller 
has failed to articulate how the police officer’s totally uncorroborated statements, 
                                                 
47 
Strauss v. Biggs, 525 A.2d 992, 997 (Del. 1987). 
  
 
 
 
24 
 
that he flatly denied, would affect the jury’s determination of his credibility in light 
of the balance of the evidence.48  Therefore, even if the trial judge abused his 
discretion by refusing to redact references to criminal use of marijuana and alcohol 
abuse, Miller has failed to articulate why the jury’s verdict would turn on that issue 
and prejudice him to the degree that we can conclude that he was denied a fair trial. 
Despite the fact that admitting the police officer’s suggestive questions did 
not affect the outcome of Miller’s trial, we reluctantly find it necessary to comment 
about the prosecutor’s trial tactics.  The trial judge should never have been faced 
with the question of whether a portion of the videotape should have been redacted.  
Instead, the prosecutor should have stipulated to redacting the portion of the video 
where the police officer made reference to a criminal act, using marijuana, because 
that portion of the video had little, if any, probative value to the State’s case.49  
This case involved a credibility determination; either the jury would believe Alicia 
and Anthony or Miller.  Certainly the police officer’s unsupported suggestions had 
no bearing on the credibility of either party.  The only thing the prosecutor could 
have hoped for by not stipulating to redact this portion of the video is that the jury 
                                                 
48  
Moreover, the fact that defense counsel did not seek a curative instruction leads to the 
reasonable conclusion that if any prejudice existed it was minimal.  Certainly defense counsel 
would have sought a curative instruction if he believed that admitting the statement would result 
in significant prejudice. 
 
49  
The only probative value that the State could explain at oral argument was that the jury 
needed to see the whole video to understand the full context of the questioning.  This specious 
argument is embarrassingly lacking in substance. 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
would consider the police officer’s suggestion as true and view Miller in a bad 
light.  The prosecutor leaves us only one conclusion – he wanted the jury to 
consider the police officer’s suggestion of marijuana use for an improper purpose. 
Delaware attorneys pride themselves on treating their opponents fairly and 
with the utmost respect and we expect that all Delaware attorneys follow the 
Principles of Professionalism for Delaware Lawyers.50  A few excerpts from the 
Principles are pertinent here: 
A lawyer should develop and maintain the qualities of integrity, 
compassion, learning, civility, diligence and public service that mark 
the most admired members of our profession…. Whenever possible, 
stipulating and agreements should be made between counsel to 
reduce both the cost and the use of judicial time….  Good faith 
efforts should be made to resolve by agreement objections to 
matters contained in the pleadings, discovery requests, and 
objections. 
 
Therefore, even putting aside a prosecutor’s heightened duties,51 the 
prosecutor, as a Delaware attorney, should have stipulated to the redaction of the 
                                                 
50  
See e.g., Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 64 (Del. 1994).   
 
51  
We have repeatedly recognized the important role of a prosecutor and discussed a 
prosecutor’s ethical obligations.  Over 40 years ago, we stated “A prosecuting attorney 
represents all the people, including the defendant who [is] being tried. It is his duty to see that the 
State's case is presented with earnestness and vigor, but it is equally his duty to see that justice be 
done by giving defendant a fair and impartial trial.”  Bennett v. State, 164 A.2d 442, 446 (Del. 
1960).  More recently we stated “prosecutors must resist the urge to win at all costs.”  Trump v. 
State, 753 A.2d 963, 969 (Del. 2000). 
 
Here, the prosecutor could have simply redacted the portions of the tape referencing 
marijuana and Miller still would have been convicted.  Instead, the prosecutor decided to force 
this small, irrelevant issue and risk the chance that Miller’s conviction would be overturned on 
appeal.  In sum, the admission of the portion of the statement suggesting prior bad acts did not 
 
 
 
26 
 
statements about marijuana because the statements offered little, if anything, to the 
State’s case and had the clear potential to create unfair prejudice. 
E. 
The trial judge allegedly abused his discretion by denying Miller’s 
Motion for a Mistrial . 
 
 
Miller next contends that the trial judge erred by denying his Motion for a 
Mistrial.  Miller sought a mistrial because Alicia, during her direct examination, 
made reference to an earlier sexual assault by Miller.  The trial judge denied 
Miller’s motion: 
I think what happened, so the record can reflect this, she began 
making a statement, I interrupted her and she may have completed it 
but it was over my ‘Counsel, I need to see you at sidebar,’ so I am not 
convinced that the jury would have clearly heard her whole response 
and I’m concerned that if I try to cure it by asking them to strike it, I 
may be highlighting what I’m trying not to have them – what I’m 
going to generally say is that the last question and answer doesn’t 
have any relevance and is stricken and I’ll ask you to go on… 
 
 
We review a trial judge’s denial of a motion for a mistrial under an abuse of 
discretion standard.52  “A trial judge should grant a mistrial only where there is a 
‘manifest necessity’ or the ‘ends of public justice would be otherwise defeated.’”53 
                                                                                                                                                             
further the State’s case, and the mere presence of the issue in the case ultimately has resulted in a 
waste of judicial, prosecutorial, and defense resources.   
 
52  
Taylor v. State, 690 A.2d 933, 935 (Del. 1997). 
 
53  
Hendricks v. State, 871 A.2d 1118, 1122 (Del. 2005)(citing Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d 5, 
11 (Del.1998)(quoting Fanning v. Superior Court, 320 A.2d 343, 345 (Del. 1974))).   
 
 
 
 
27 
 
Miller’s argument lacks merit.  The trial judge interrupted Alicia before she 
finished her unresponsive answer.  Because the trial judge interrupted the witness, 
neither defense counsel nor the prosecutor were immediately aware of any 
prejudice resulting from Alicia’s answer.54  As the State suggests, if the attorneys 
did not note the potential for prejudice, it is highly unlikely that the jury would 
have recognized the potential for prejudice.  Moreover, the trial judge properly 
removed any potential for prejudice without placing emphasis on the issue by 
striking the question and answer from the record.  Therefore, because the trial 
judge removed any potential for prejudice and the unresponsive answer did not 
undermine Miller’s right to a fair trial, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion 
by denying Miller’s Motion for a Mistrial. 
F. 
The trial judge allegedly abused his discretion by admitting Alicia’s 
handwritten statements explaining the sexual assaults. 
 
 
Alicia provided the Florida police with a handwritten statement describing 
how and when Miller sexually assaulted her.  Over defense counsel’s objection, the 
State introduced the statements under 11 Del. C. §3507. Miller contends that the 
                                                 
54  
After the trial judge interrupted the witness, the following exchange took place at sidebar: 
 
[Defense]: 
I actually was almost ready to object but wasn’t sure what was said 
because I couldn’t hear it. 
 
Court: 
I can tell you, ‘Because when she told me and my brother about an 
incident like this happened in Jamaica.’ 
 
 
[Prosecutor]: If I heard that, I certainly would have interrupted her. 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
trial judge erred by admitting these handwritten statements. “Our review of a ruling 
on the admissibility of a Section 3507 statement is for abuse of discretion.”55 
11 Del.C. § 3507 provides:   
 
(a) In a criminal prosecution, the voluntary out-of-court prior 
statement of a witness who is present and subject to cross-examination 
may be used as affirmative evidence with substantive independent 
testimonial value. 
 
Here, the parties agree that Alicia voluntarily made the statement.  Miller, 
however, argues that the Florida police had to be subject to cross-examination for 
the statements to be admissible under §3507.  In Keys v. State, we addressed the 
“subject to cross-examination requirement” of §3507: 
the declarant must be called as a witness by the party introducing the 
statement and the direct examination of the declarant ‘should touch 
both on the events perceived and the out-of-court statement itself.’56 
 
Alicia, not the Florida police, made the written statements. The State called 
Alicia, the author (declarant) of the written statements, and her direct examination 
touched on the written statements themselves.   Therefore, because Alicia’s 
statements were voluntary and she was subject to cross-examination, her 
statements were admissible under §3507. 
Miller’s also suggests that even if the statements were admissible under 
§3507, the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution as interpreted in 
                                                 
55  
Johnson v. State, 878 A.2d 422, 427 (Del., 2005) (citations omitted).  
 
56  
Smith v. State, 669 A.2d 1, 16 (Del. 1995) (citing Keys v. State, 337 A.2d 18 (1975)). 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
Crawford v. Washington57 bars the admission of the statements.  This argument 
also lacks merit.  In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court stated: 
when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the 
Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his 
prior testimonial statements.58 
 
 
As discussed above, Alicia, the declarant, testified at trial and defense 
counsel cross-examined her about her earlier written statements.  Therefore, the 
Confrontation Clause placed no constraints on the use of her earlier statements.59 
G. 
The trial judge allegedly abused his discretion by limiting defense 
counsel’s cross of Alicia. 
 
 
At trial defense counsel sought to attack Alicia’s credibility in various ways.  
Defense counsel suggested that Alicia had a motive to lie because she disliked her 
father.  Particularly, defense counsel suggested that Alicia disliked Miller because 
he allowed Megan Cantwell, Miller’s girlfriend who mistreated Alicia, to move 
into his home. Miller now contends that the trial judge prevented him from asking 
Alicia detailed questions about his relationship with Cantwell, and that this limit on 
                                                 
57  
541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 
58  
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59. 
 
59  
Miller also contends, in a conclusory fashion, that the trial judge abused his discretion by 
admitting Alicia’s handwritten statements because the probative value of the handwritten 
statements was outweighed by “undue prejudice or cumulativeness and unfair confusion.”  We 
disagree.  Alicia’s statements had probative value to the State’s case - they implicated Miller and 
corroborated Alicia’s live testimony – and Miller failed to articulate any unfair prejudice. 
 
 
 
30 
 
Alicia’s cross-examination prevented Miller from demonstrating Alicia’s bias and 
motive to lie, resulting in an unfair trial. 
Miller’s argument lacks merit.  When questioning Alicia about Cantwell, 
defense counsel asked Alicia whether her father went to Family Court to have 
Cantwell removed from his residence for threatening Alicia and her brother.  The 
State objected and the trial judge sustained the objection: 
The Court: You can inquire whether or not she enjoyed having her 
there, liked her, believed she was a good mother, you can 
make inquiry, but this Family Court matter has no 
relevance at all.  So you may inquire— 
 
 
… what you’re trying to do in a roundabout way is trying 
to boost the credibility of your client.  It has nothing to 
do with the potential bias or prejudice of this witness.  
You’re trying to say, well, your client did the right thing 
so, therefore, the jury should like him. 
 
 
The trial judge’s ruling simply pointed out that the fact that Miller went to 
Family Court to have Cantwell removed was inadmissible because it injected 
improper character evidence.  The trial judge’s ruling did not hinder Miller’s 
ability to show that Alicia was angry at Miller for allowing Cantwell to live with 
them.  In fact, the questions immediately following the trial judge’s ruling 
demonstrate that Miller had an opportunity to establish that Alicia resented him as 
a result of his relationship with Cantwell: 
Q: 
Alicia, was there a period of time when [Cantwell] made you 
feel extremely uncomfortable? 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
A: 
Yes. 
 
 
Q: 
And were you mad at your dad for that for a while? 
 
 
A. 
Yes. 
 
Q: 
And even after you dad got [Cantwell] to leave, were you still 
angry at your dad because of your feelings about Megan? 
 
 
A: 
No. 
 
Q: 
So you didn’t harbor any resentment about Megan after she was 
gone. 
 
A: 
No. 
 
Q: 
How long were you angry with you dad while Megan was there 
and for that reason? 
 
A: 
A while, until she actually left. 
 
Clearly the testimony above indicates that the trial judge’s ruling did not affect 
Miller’s ability to show Alicia’s bias. Further, as the trial judge found, the fact that 
Miller went to Family Court to have Cantwell removed had no relevance to 
Alicia’s bias and was an indirect way of admitting improper character evidence.  
Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by sustaining the State’s 
objection. 
H. 
The trial judge allegedly commented on the evidence when he instructed 
the jury. 
 
 
Before trial, the trial judge asked the prosecutor to clarify some general 
assertions in the indictment.  Particularly, the trial judge wanted to know how the 
 
 
 
32 
 
jury could distinguish between the eight general counts of Rape.  In response the 
prosecutor explained that he planned to link each count of Rape to specific acts 
about which Alicia would testify. 
 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor did exactly what he suggested 
before trial.  He explained six60 specific acts that Alicia testified about and linked 
each act to a count in the indictment.  After closing arguments, the trial judge 
instructed the jury using the same format as the prosecutor: 
 
 
So let me turn to the first offenses, which are Rape in the First 
Degree.  Defendant is charged with six counts of Rape First Degree.  
And the first four counts are identical and read as follows: 
 
 
Sylvester Miller, between on or about the first day of October, 1998 
and the 31st day of December, 2002 in the County of New Castle, 
State of Delaware, did intentionally engage in sexual intercourse with 
Alicia Miller, a child who had not yet reached her 16th birthday, and 
the defendant stands in a position of trust, authority or supervision 
over the child. 
 
 
 
Now, while these four counts read alike, each count references 
a particular act which allegedly occurred and which is characterized 
as follows: 
 
 
 
Count I relates to the alleged sexual intercourse the night 
before Christmas. 
 
 
 
Count II relates to the alleged sexual intercourse the night 
Alicia Miller’s brother observed her and her father. 
 
 
 
Count III relates to the alleged sexual intercourse on the night 
she was allegedly dragged into her father’s bedroom to have oral sex. 
                                                 
60  
As indicated earlier, two of the eight counts in the indictment were dismissed at the 
suggestion of the prosecutor.  
 
 
 
33 
 
 
 
 
And Count IV relates to the first time Alicia Miller was 
allegedly forced to have anal intercourse. 
 
 
 
Now, the remaining two counts of Rape First Degree are similar 
but reference conduct that occurred between January 1, 2003 and July 
27, 2004 after Alicia Miller had turned 14 years of age.  And these 
two counts are identical and state. 
 
 
Sylvester Miller, between on or about the 1st day of January, 2003 and 
the 27th day of July 2004, in the County of New Castle, State of 
Delaware, did intentionally engage in sexual intercourse with Alicia 
Miller, a child who had not yet reached her 16th birthday and the 
defendant stands in a position of trust, authority and supervision over 
the child. 
 
 
 
Again, each count, Counts V and VI reference a particular act 
which is characterized as follows: 
 
 
 
Count V relates to the first summer after Alicia Miller had 
turned 14 and allegedly had anal sex. 
 
 
Count VI relates to the most recent allegation of sexual 
intercourse just before Alicia Miller went to Florida. 
 
 
For the first time on appeal, Miller contends that the trial judge 
impermissibly commented on the evidence in violation of Article IV, Section 19 of 
the Delaware Constitution.  We review this issue under the plain error standard.  
“Under the plain error standard of review, the error complained of must be so 
clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of 
the trial process.”61 
                                                 
61  
Wainright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
 
Article IV, Section 19 of the Delaware Constitution states that "judges shall 
not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state the questions of fact 
in issue and declare the law." We recently discussed Section 19 of the Delaware 
Constitution in Herring v. State62.  There, we stated: 
Section Nineteen was adopted as a new provision in the 1897 
Constitution to ensure that judges confined themselves to making 
determinations of law and leaving juries to determine the facts. The 
purpose of the provision was to protect the province of the jury on 
factual issues.  It was not, however, the intention of the framers to 
impose any restraint on the proper province of the trial judge in either 
passing upon the legal admissibility of evidence or in instructing the 
jury on the law.63  
 
Further, we discussed when a trial judge’s comment about a fact would violate the 
Delaware Constitution: 
   
Trial judges may properly combine a statement regarding a 
fact in issue with a declaration of law. Trial judges may not, 
however, comment on the facts in their charge to the jury since only 
juries are entitled to judge the facts. An improper comment 
or charge as to ‘matters of fact’ is an expression by the court, 
directly or indirectly, that conveys to the jury ‘the court's 
estimation of the truth, falsity or weight of testimony in relation to 
a matter at issue.’64  
 
 
Here, the trial judge acted within the bounds of the Delaware Constitution 
because none of his statements conveyed the court’s estimation of the truth or 
                                                 
62  
805 A.2d 872, 876 (Del. 2002). 
 
63  
Id. (citing Lunnon v. State, 710 A.2d 197, 201 (Del. 1998)). 
 
64  
Id. (citing State v. Halko, 193 A.2d 817, 829 (Del. Super. Ct. 1963)). 
 
 
 
35 
 
weight of the testimony.  In fact, directly contrary to what Miller suggests, every 
“fact” that the trial judge commented upon he described as an “allegation.” 
 
Miller contends, however, that despite framing every fact as an “allegation”, 
the trial judge’s instruction was an improper comment on the evidence because it 
correlated the events to the vague indictment.  We disagree.  The trial judge’s 
combination of the factual “allegations” with the law ensured that the jury 
understood how the asserted facts, if true, related to each of the indictment counts.  
Therefore, the trial judge did not impermissibly comment on the evidence in 
violation of Article IV, Section 19 of the Delaware Constitution. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is 
AFFIRMED.