Case Title: Bennett v. Gentile

Citation: 

Docket Number: 25/23

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2024-08-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Madelyn Bennett, Individually and as Successor Trustee of the Pauline A. Bennett 
Revocable Living Trust v. Thomas A. Gentile, No. 25, September Term, 2023. Opinion by 
Gould, J. 
 
ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE – STRICT PRIVITY RULE 
The Supreme Court held that the strict privity rule set out in Noble v. Bruce, 349 Md. 730 
(1998), is still good law. Applying the doctrine of stare decisis, the Supreme Court held 
that the strict privity rule applies in legal malpractice cases when a beneficiary under the 
inter vivos trust sues the attorney who advised a decedent in the estate planning context. 
 
ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE - THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY 
The Supreme Court reviewed Noble v. Bruce, 349 Md. 730 (1998), and Ferguson v. 
Cramer, 349 Md. 760 (1998), and concluded that one’s status as a testamentary beneficiary 
does not entitle that person to claim third-party beneficiary status for claims against the 
drafting attorney. Rather, under Noble, the presumption is that a mere testamentary or trust 
beneficiary is not a third-party beneficiary. But Noble does not foreclose the possibility 
that the presumption against third-party beneficiary status cannot be overcome by 
allegations and proof of sufficient facts showing that the client’s intent to benefit the 
beneficiary was the direct purpose of the transaction or relationship. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
Case No.: 481150V 
Argued: March 5, 2024 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 25 
 
September Term, 2023 
______________________________________ 
 
MADELYN BENNETT, 
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR 
TRUSTEE OF THE PAULINE A. 
BENNETT REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST 
 
v. 
 
THOMAS A. GENTILE 
______________________________________ 
 
Fader, C.J., 
Watts, 
*Hotten, 
Booth, 
Biran, 
Gould, 
Eaves, 
  
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Gould, J. 
______________________________________ 
 
 
 
Filed: August 12, 2024 
 
* Hotten, J., now a Senior Justice, participated in 
the hearing and conference of this case while an 
active member of this Court.  After being 
recalled pursuant to the Maryland Constitution, 
Article IV, § 3A, she also participated in the 
decision and adoption of this opinion. 
 
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State 
Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
Gregory Hilton, Clerk 
2024.08.12 
12:03:58 -04'00'
 
 
 
In this legal malpractice case by the beneficiary of an inter vivos trust against the 
drafting attorney, we are mainly asked to abandon or relax the rule—known as the “strict 
privity rule”—under which “a third party not in privity with an attorney has no cause of 
action against the attorney for negligence in the absence of fraud or collusion.” Noble v. 
Bruce, 349 Md. 730, 738 (1998). Alternatively, the beneficiary asks us to hold that she can 
proceed against the attorney on a third-party beneficiary theory. As explained below, we 
hold that the strict privity rule under Noble is still good law and that, on the undisputed 
facts, the beneficiary does not have a claim against the attorney as a third-party beneficiary.  
I 
A 
A trust is “a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by 
whom the title is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another 
person[.]” Klein v. Bryer, 227 Md. 473, 477 (1962). A trust is created by a “settlor”: The 
person who contributes property to the trust. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS 
(“ET”) § 14.5-103(w)(1) (1974, 2022 Repl. Vol.); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 3 
(“RESTATEMENT”) (Am. L. Inst. 2003, June 2024 Update). The trust property is held by 
the “trustee” for the benefit of one or more “beneficiaries.” RESTATEMENT § 3. 
A trust may be created for any legal purpose. Klein, 227 Md. at 476. A settlor, 
trustee, and beneficiary are all required for the creation of a trust. Waesche v. Rizzuto, 224 
Md. 573, 583 (1961). The settlor may create a trust either by will or, as here, inter vivos. 
RESTATEMENT § 3. Either way, the trust may be created through a “[t]rust instrument,” 
which is defined as “an instrument executed by the settlor that contains the terms of the 
 
2 
trust, including amendments to the trust.” ET § 14.5-103(bb). The phrase “terms of the 
trust” “means the manifestation of the intent of the settlor regarding the provisions of a 
trust as expressed in the trust instrument or as may be established by other evidence that 
would be admissible in a judicial proceeding.” ET § 14.5-103(aa). The terms of the trust 
can also, if the settlor so chooses, reserve the right to amend the terms or revoke the trust 
altogether. See Vito v. Grueff, 453 Md. 88, 93-94 (2017); AMY MORRIS HESS ET AL., 
BOGERT’S THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1 (2023). 
B 
In 2015, Madelyn Bennett’s1 mother, Pauline Bennett, age 91, retained Respondent 
Thomas Gentile, Esquire, to prepare her estate planning documents. Mr. Gentile prepared 
a trust instrument memorializing the terms of the Pauline A. Bennett Revocable Living 
Trust (“Trust”), which Pauline executed on October 30, 2015 (“2015 Instrument”). Pauline 
wore three hats under the 2015 Instrument: “Settlor,” “Trustee,” and “Beneficiary.” The 
2015 Instrument was broken down into nine sections, each with one or more subsections.  
In subsection 1.02, Pauline stated that her intention as Settlor was “to transfer certain 
real and [personal property] into this trust” and that “[t]he Trustee hereby agree[s] to hold 
any such property, IN TRUST, on the terms set forth in this instrument.” That subsection 
also specifically identified two properties to be transferred: 11605 Fillmore Drive in Silver 
Spring (“Fillmore”) and 4715 Wissahican Avenue in Rockville (“Wissahican”). On the 
same day she signed the 2015 Instrument, Pauline also signed deeds to transfer Fillmore 
 
1 To assist the reader in keeping track of the parties, we refer to the Bennett family 
members by their first names. In doing so, we intend no disrespect.  
 
3 
and Wissahican to herself, as Trustee under the Trust. Both deeds were duly recorded. This 
dispute concerns the disposition of Wissahican upon Pauline’s death. 
Subsection 2.01 of the 2015 Instrument stated that until her death, Pauline as Settlor 
“shall utilize” the Trust’s property as Trustee for her benefit, with just one exception: 
Wissahican could be used solely for the benefit of Pauline’s daughter, Audrey Bennett-
Eney.  
Subsection 3.01 directed the disposition of the Trust’s assets upon Pauline’s death 
with this introductory clause: “Upon the death of Settlor, the Successor Trustee shall 
distribute the real property in the trust, and any personal property, and any property and 
funds later added to the trust corpus, as follows[.]” The subsections that followed instructed 
the Trustee to distribute: (a) Wissahican and its contents to Audrey; (b) Fillmore to 
Pauline’s son, Matthew Bennett, and to Madelyn; (c) Fillmore’s contents “equitably” to 
Audrey, Madelyn, and Matthew; and (d) “any other funds and property of the trust” in 
equal shares to Audrey, Madelyn, and Matthew.  
In subsection 7.01 of the 2015 Instrument, Pauline appointed herself to serve as the 
“Initial Trustee” and Madelyn to serve as “Successor Trustee” upon Pauline’s “death or 
disability.” 
C 
Pauline executed a new trust instrument in May 2017 called the “Revised Pauline 
A. Bennett Revocable Living Trust” (“2017 Instrument”), also prepared by Mr. Gentile. 
This instrument contained the same nine sections and their subsections as its predecessor. 
Many of these provisions were untouched, including the provisions regarding Wissahican.  
 
4 
But the 2017 Instrument also made some significant changes. Subsection 1.02 was 
changed to acknowledge that Pauline had transferred the property as contemplated in the 
prior version, and it retained the provision stating that she “agree[s] to hold any such 
property, IN TRUST, on the terms set forth in this instrument.” Also, by that time, Matthew 
had died, so the provisions addressing Fillmore and its contents were modified to replace 
Matthew with Pauline’s grandson, Jonathan. Audrey was added as a Successor Trustee to 
serve jointly with Madelyn.  
D 
In 2019, while temporarily living in a nursing facility, Pauline learned that Audrey 
had withdrawn money from Pauline’s bank accounts, used Pauline’s credit cards without 
authorization, and mismanaged Pauline’s money. In November 2019, Pauline expressed 
these concerns and others to Mr. Gentile, including her fear that she lacked sufficient funds 
to pay for home nursing care. She told Mr. Gentile that she needed to sell Wissahican to 
pay for that care. Recall that under subsection 2.01, as Trustee, Pauline was required to 
“utilize” Wissahican “for the benefit” of Audrey, so an amendment to the 2017 Instrument 
would be required to use that property for her benefit, that is, to sell Wissahican and use 
the proceeds for her own needs. Pauline asked Mr. Gentile to adjust her estate planning 
documents accordingly and told Mr. Gentile “don’t put anything about [Wissahican] going 
to Audrey.”  
Mr. Gentile prepared a new trust instrument called the “Amended Revised Pauline 
A. Bennett Revocable Living Trust,” which Pauline signed on November 20, 2019 (“2019 
Instrument”). This version contained the same nine sections as the two previous ones, again 
 
5 
with most of the provisions unchanged. Subsection 2.01 was amended by removing the 
clause that required Pauline to use Wissahican for Audrey’s benefit.  
In addition, subsection 3.01 was changed substantially. The provision in subsection 
3.01 calling for Audrey to receive Wissahican upon Pauline’s death was removed. The 
subsections disposing of Fillmore and “any other funds and property of the trust not listed 
above” were changed to remove Audrey and Jonathan as beneficiaries, leaving Madelyn 
as the sole beneficiary under those clauses. And, under subsection 7.01, Audrey was 
removed as a Successor Trustee, leaving Madelyn as the sole Successor Trustee. 
E 
Pauline died on December 31, 2019, and Madelyn became the Successor Trustee of 
the Trust. A dispute arose between Madelyn and Audrey over the ownership of Wissahican. 
Audrey believed she was entitled to Wissahican due to a deed, signed by Pauline in 
November 2019, that would have transferred Wissahican to Audrey. After Pauline 
executed the deed, and due to her concerns about Audrey’s conduct, Pauline instructed Mr. 
Gentile not to deliver it to Audrey, and the deed was never delivered or recorded. In January 
2020, Audrey’s counsel asked Mr. Gentile to record the deed or deliver it to Audrey, but 
Mr. Gentile refused.  
Madelyn, as Trustee, filed a four-count complaint in the Circuit Court for 
Montgomery County on April 3, 2020. Count One was a claim to quiet the title to 
Wissahican. Count Two, captioned “Waste,” sought damages from Audrey for allegedly 
neglecting Wissahican, and allowing it to fall into disrepair to the point that it became rat-
infested. Count Three, captioned, “Wrongful Taking,” sought damages because of 
 
6 
Audrey’s alleged taking of Pauline’s personal property while Pauline was confined to a 
nursing home, and Count Four, captioned “Detinue in the Alternative,” sought the return 
of the personal property as an alternative remedy to damages.  
Over the ensuing 26 months, many pleadings were filed. In June 2020, before her 
quiet title action had been resolved, Madelyn, as Trustee, contracted to sell Wissahican to 
third-party buyers. The contract purchasers and Mr. Gentile were made parties in one or 
more pleadings.2 The details of each count in each pleading are not necessary to frame the 
issues before us. We can group the relevant claims into two categories: (1) claims that 
turned on whether Wissahican belonged to Madelyn or Audrey upon Pauline’s death; and 
(2) if Wissahican was determined to belong to Audrey, claims that turned on whether Mr. 
Gentile was liable to Madelyn, either as a Trustee or in her individual capacity, for 
allegedly negligently preparing the 2019 Instrument. 
The circuit court resolved the first question in Audrey’s favor on summary 
judgment. Construing the terms of the 2017 Instrument and 2019 Instrument, the court held 
that the provisions regarding Wissahican in the former were untouched by the latter, which 
meant that the disposition of Wissahican was governed by the 2017 Instrument—so the 
property went to Audrey.  
 
2 Audrey was the first to sue Mr. Gentile, alleging primarily that he, along with 
Madelyn, took advantage of Pauline’s frail state of mind to cut Audrey out of any 
inheritance. Audrey’s claims against Mr. Gentile were eventually dismissed on summary 
judgment.  
 
7 
Madelyn sought en banc review by the circuit court under Maryland Rule 2-551.3 
The en banc panel affirmed the summary judgment entered in Audrey’s favor on that issue.4  
Now to the claims that bring this matter before us. Having lost the battle over 
Wissahican to Audrey, Madelyn pursued her claims against Mr. Gentile. Madelyn argued 
that Pauline intended that Wissahican or any remaining proceeds from its sale would, along 
with all other Trust property, go to her upon her mother’s death. She alleged that but for 
Mr. Gentile’s negligent drafting of the 2019 Instrument, Wissahican or its sales proceeds 
would have been distributed to her upon Pauline’s death. She argued that Mr. Gentile 
admitted under oath that he had made a drafting mistake by failing to specifically provide 
for the transfer of Wissahican or its sales proceeds to Madelyn in the 2019 Instrument.5 To 
substantiate her claim of negligent drafting, Madelyn relied on the circuit court’s 
 
3 The parties contested whether the court’s resolution was immediately appealable. 
That was resolved in Madelyn’s favor, as the en banc panel resolved the matter on the 
merits. Whether it was, in fact, immediately appealable is not before us, and we note that 
the appeal that brings this matter before us was from a final judgment, so jurisdiction in 
this Court is not an issue. 
 
4 The en banc panel also recognized that Madelyn, as Trustee—and under the 
mistaken belief that Wissahican belonged to her under the 2019 Instrument—contracted to 
sell Wissahican to third-party buyers. The en banc panel remanded the case for the circuit 
court to determine whether that transaction, and the improvements Madelyn made to 
Wissahican to prepare the property for sale, served Audrey’s best interest as beneficiary. 
On remand, the court answered that question in the affirmative and determined that Audrey 
was entitled to the net proceeds of the sale, that is, the sale price less the costs of renovations 
and cost of sale.  
 
5 We reviewed the testimony on which Madelyn bases this assertion. We do not 
agree that Mr. Gentile’s testimony constituted an admission of a drafting mistake. And we 
do not take a position on whether the circuit court correctly interpreted the trust instruments 
when it concluded that the 2017 Instrument governed the distribution of Wissahican upon 
Madelyn’s death. 
 
8 
determination, confirmed by the en banc panel, that the provisions of the 2017 Instrument 
regarding Wissahican remained in effect when Pauline signed the 2019 Instrument.  
Madelyn sought damages in her capacity as Trustee as well as in her individual 
capacity. As Trustee, Madelyn sought indemnification from Mr. Gentile for any damages 
awarded to the third-party buyers and compensatory damages consisting of the attorneys’ 
fees and litigation costs that she incurred as Trustee in the litigation over title to 
Wissahican. She also sought compensatory damages equal to the sales price for Wissahican 
so that, she alleged, she could distribute the same to herself as the beneficiary.  
In her individual capacity, Madelyn claimed that she was an intended third-party 
beneficiary of the attorney-client contract between Pauline and Mr. Gentile, that but for 
Mr. Gentile’s negligence, Wissahican would have been hers, and that she was therefore 
entitled to compensatory damages.  
Each claim was resolved in Mr. Gentile’s favor on summary judgment, in two 
stages. In the first stage, the circuit court denied Madelyn’s motions for summary judgment 
on her claims.  
In the second stage, the circuit court granted Mr. Gentile’s motion for summary 
judgment as to Madelyn’s claims. In two thorough and well-reasoned opinions (one for the 
first stage and one for the second), the circuit court held that in Noble v. Bruce, 349 Md. 
730 (1998), this Court affirmed the continuing vitality of the strict privity rule in legal 
malpractice cases and “closed the door altogether to non-client third-party beneficiary 
claims of legal malpractice in the estate planning context[.]” The court further held that 
even if Noble left open the possibility for such third-party beneficiary claims, the 
 
9 
undisputed facts showed that Pauline engaged Mr. Gentile to draft the 2019 Instrument to 
serve her own anticipated financial needs and her desire to cut Audrey out of her estate. 
The court explained that there was no evidence “that Pauline’s direction [to Mr. Gentile] 
that Madelyn, her only other living child, receive ‘anything left’ was any more than 
incidental to removing Audrey as a beneficiary.” Accordingly, the circuit court granted 
summary judgment in Mr. Gentile’s favor on all claims.  
F 
Madelyn noted an appeal to the Appellate Court of Maryland. While this case was 
pending before the Appellate Court, she petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which this Court 
granted. Bennett v. Gentile, 486 Md. 228 (2023). She presents three questions for our 
review, which we have rephrased as follows: 
Should the strict privity rule as applied in Noble v. Bruce be overturned in 
favor of the “balancing of factors” approach articulated in Lucas v. Hamm, 
364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961)? 
 
If the strict privity rule under Noble remains binding precedent in the context 
of malpractice claims against attorneys who draft estate planning documents 
or give estate planning advice, does the third-party beneficiary exception to 
the strict privity rule apply to Madelyn’s claims against Mr. Gentile? 
 
Can Madelyn recover litigation costs from Mr. Gentile under the collateral 
litigation doctrine?6 
 
 
 
 
6 Because we hold that the circuit court correctly granted Mr. Gentile summary 
judgment on Madelyn’s claims, we do not reach this question, as the collateral litigation 
fees and costs were components of the compensatory damages she sought in her claims 
against Mr. Gentile. 
 
10 
II 
A 
Human interactions and activities involve risks and duties of many kinds. Risks and 
duties are allocated in two main ways. The first way is through contracts. Parties to a 
contract decide which duties they will assume and which risks they will bear. The second 
way is through tort law. For example, if you drive a car, you put others at risk, so tort law 
imposes a duty to exercise reasonable care when you drive. If you breach that duty and 
injure someone, you bear that loss by paying damages. Under tort law, therefore, you owe 
duties to people you do not know and have never met. 
Although the attorney-client relationship is contractual by nature, the essence of a 
malpractice claim against an attorney sounds in negligence—the “negligent breach of the 
contractual duty.”7 Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116, 134 (1985). But even though the 
work of an attorney could harm non-clients, almost 150 years ago in National Savings Bank 
of District of Columbia v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879), the Supreme Court of the United 
States held that without fraud or collusion, privity of contract is required for alleging 
negligence against an attorney. In other words, under the strict privity requirement, in the 
absence of fraud or collusion, non-clients injured by an attorney’s work have no recourse. 
B 
 
7 The terms of the written agreement between the client and the attorney can be 
enforced in a breach of contract action. But given that the attorney-client relationship is a 
special relationship under our caselaw, the privity between the attorney and client also 
imposes, outside of the contract, a tort duty of care. See, e.g., Balfour Beatty Infrastructure, 
Inc. v. Rummel Klepper & Kahl, LLP, 451 Md. 600, 625 (2017). That’s why a legal 
malpractice claim can be alleged under both theories. 
 
11 
The strict privity rule has been applied in legal malpractice cases in Maryland since 
at least 1940. Wlodarek v. Thrift, 178 Md. 453 (1940). In Wlodarek, we held that a non-
client could not hold a title attorney liable for a negligent title examination. Id. at 468. 
Three years later, in Kendall v. Rogers, 181 Md. 606 (1943), this Court applied the privity 
rule where a title attorney for the buyer negligently advised the non-clients about their duty 
to remedy a certain title defect to the transferred property. Id. at 613-14. 
In Flaherty v. Weinberg, this Court considered abandoning the strict privity test in 
legal malpractice cases in favor of a “balancing of factors” test. Id. at 124. The balancing 
of factors approach was formulated by the Supreme Court of California in Biakanja v. 
Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958), and later modified for application in the estate planning 
context in Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961). Under this test, courts consider the 
following factors to determine whether a non-client beneficiary of a will can sue the 
attorney who drafted the will: (1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to benefit 
the beneficiary; (2) the foreseeability of harm to the beneficiary; (3) the degree of certainty 
that the beneficiary was injured; (4) the causal connection between the injury and the 
attorney’s negligent drafting; and (5) “the policy of preventing future harm.” Lucas, 364 
P.2d at 687. 
In Flaherty, the home buyers sued the settlement attorney employed by the buyers’ 
mortgage lender. 303 Md. at 132-33. At settlement, the attorney allegedly told the buyers 
that the property being conveyed was the one specified in the sale contract. Id. Recognizing 
that the strict privity rule barred the buyers’ claims against the lender’s attorney, this Court 
noted that other jurisdictions had adopted other approaches, including a “balancing of 
 
12 
factors theory.” Id. Despite acceptance in other jurisdictions, this Court observed that this 
theory “has not met with universal acceptance” and has been criticized for being “too 
broad” and “so unworkable that it has led to ad hoc determinations and inconsistent 
results.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). But although we did not replace the strict privity 
test with the balancing of factors test, we allowed the non-clients to pursue their claims 
under a third-party beneficiary theory. We will return to that below. 
Thirteen years after Flaherty, the strict privity rule was invoked in the estate 
planning context in Noble v. Bruce, which consolidated two cases from the circuit courts 
for Somerset and Talbot counties. In the case from Somerset County—Noble v. Bruce—
the testamentary beneficiaries sued the attorney who advised the testators on the structure 
of their estate plan, alleging that he negligently failed to recommend the use of credit or 
shelter bypass trusts to shelter up to $1.2 million from estate taxes. Noble, 349 Md. at 734. 
The result: more taxes paid by the estate; less money distributed to beneficiaries. Id. 
In the case from Talbot County—Fauntleroy v. Blizzard—the testamentary 
beneficiaries sued the law firm that drafted a testator’s will. Noble, 349 Md. at 737. The 
beneficiaries alleged that the firm negligently drafted the will contrary to the testator’s 
intent, such that all taxes were paid out of the residuary estate—to which the plaintiff 
beneficiaries were entitled—instead of from the assets that generated the taxes, which were 
left to someone else. Id. 
Taking up both cases together, the Court considered whether the strict privity rule 
should apply in the “will drafting or estate planning context” or should be replaced with 
the balancing of factors test that the Court had previously rejected in Flaherty. Id. at 741, 
 
13 
743-44. We observed that, despite a trend to depart from the strict privity rule, “a number 
of jurisdictions” still maintained it. Id. at 740. We noted that the strict privity rule in the 
estate planning context was justified on several public policy grounds. It protects the 
attorney’s duty of loyalty and client confidences, prevents conflicts of interests between 
clients and beneficiaries, and enables the attorney to assess the risk of the engagement. Id. 
at 741-42, 758. And the strict privity rule “protects the integrity and solemnity of the will” 
as well as protecting an attorney from liability disproportionate to the legal fees earned.8 
Id. at 756. 
We again declined to adopt California’s balancing of factors test, but not without 
giving it full consideration. We discussed each factor and remained convinced that the 
balancing of factors approach was “too broad,” unworkable, and susceptible to “ad hoc 
determinations and inconsistent results.” Id. at 744. Thus, we saw “no valid reason to 
adopt” it. Id. 
The Court also considered whether the Noble or Fauntleroy beneficiaries could 
pursue their claims as third-party beneficiaries, a topic we address below. But we will spoil 
the ending by adding that, at the end of the analysis, this Court rejected their third-party 
beneficiary theory, applied the strict privity rule, and affirmed the dismissals of both cases. 
Id. at 752-53. 
 
 
 
8 Madelyn argues that the public policy considerations justifying the strict privity 
rule do not apply to her. But we do not apply the rule on a case-by-case basis. 
 
14 
C 
Madelyn urges this Court to overturn Noble and abolish the strict privity 
requirement for legal malpractice claims involving the negligent drafting of estate 
documents or negligent estate planning advice. She argues that beneficiaries should not be 
denied a remedy for injuries proximately caused by the negligence of the attorney who 
drafted the estate planning documents or rendered negligent advice to the attorney’s 
now-deceased client. Madelyn also points to the modern trend of abandoning or relaxing 
the strict privity rule in this context. She notes that only a few states, other than Maryland, 
apply the strict privity rule in claims against the drafting attorney.9 She contends that six 
states and the District of Columbia allow disappointed beneficiaries to sue estate planning 
attorneys in tort actions despite a lack of privity.10 Six of those jurisdictions use the 
 
9 In addition to Maryland, eight other states apply the strict privity rule to such 
claims: Alabama, Colorado, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia. 
See Robinson v. Benton, 842 So.2d 631, 637 (Ala. 2002); Baker v. Wood, Ris & Hames, 
Pro. Corp., 364 P.3d 872, 879 (Colo. 2016); Lilyhorn v. Dier, 335 N.W.2d 554, 555 (Neb. 
1983); Victor v. Goldman, 344 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1973), aff’d, 351 N.Y.S.2d 956 
(App. Div. 1974); Viscardi v. Lerner, 510 N.Y.S.2d 183, 185 (App. Div. 1986); Simon v. 
Zipperstein, 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (Ohio 1987); Barcelo v. Elliot, 923 S.W.2d 575, 578-79 
(Tex. 1996); Strong v. Fitzpatrick, 169 A.3d 783, 786 (Vt. 2017); Copenhaver v. Rogers, 
384 S.E.2d 593, 597 (Va. 1989). But see Est. of Schneider v. Finmann, 933 N.E.2d 718, 
720-21 (N.Y. 2010) (allowing the personal representative of a decedent’s estate to bring a 
legal malpractice claim against the drafting attorney); Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, 
Harrison & Tate, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 780, 787 (Tex. 2006) (same).  
 
10 According to Madelyn, those six states are Idaho, Missouri, Montana, West 
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 90 P.3d 884, 888 (Idaho 
2004); Donahue v. Shughart, Thompson & Kilroy, P.C., 900 S.W.2d 624, 628-29 (Mo. 
1995); Stanley L. & Carolyn M. Watkins Tr. v. Lacosta, 92 P.3d 620, 630 (Mont. 2004); 
Calvert v. Scharf, 619 S.E.2d 197, 203 (W. Va. 2005); Auric v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 331 
 
 
15 
“balancing of factors” test articulated in Biakanja v. Irving, and one uses a pure negligence 
analysis.11 Madelyn also points out that thirteen states allow such claims under a third-party 
beneficiary theory if the testamentary beneficiaries can establish that they were intended 
beneficiaries of the attorney-client relationship.12 Another ten states permit both tort and 
third-party beneficiary contract claims,13 and one state has legislatively abolished the strict 
 
N.W.2d 325, 329 (Wis. 1983); In re Est. of Drwenski, 83 P.3d 457, 464-65 (Wyo. 2004); 
see also Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (D.C. 1983). 
 
11 That jurisdiction is West Virginia. Calvert, 619 S.E.2d at 694 (“Accordingly, we 
now hold that direct, intended, and specifically identifiable beneficiaries of a will have 
standing to sue the lawyer who prepared the will where it can be shown that the testator’s 
intent, as expressed in the will, has been frustrated by negligence on the part of the lawyer 
so that the beneficiaries’ interest(s) under the will is either lost or diminished.”). 
 
12 Those states are Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South 
Dakota. See Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen & Heilbronner, 612 So. 2d 1378, 
1379-80 (Fla. 1993); Young v. Williams, 645 S.E.2d 624, 625 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); Pelham 
v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96, 100 (Ill. 1982); Walker v. Lawson, 526 N.E.2d 968, 968 
(Ind. 1988); Goodman v. Goldberg & Simpson, P.S.C., 323 S.W.3d 740, 747-48 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 2009); In re Succession of Killingsworth, 292 So. 2d 536, 542-43 (La. 1973); Mieras 
v. DeBona, 550 N.W.2d 202, 211-12 (Mich. 1996); Sec. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Larkin, 
Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren, Ltd., 916 N.W.2d 491 (Minn. 2018) (acknowledging that a 
third party can bring a claim as an intended beneficiary in Minnesota, but finding that the 
petitioner was not an intended beneficiary of the trust); Simpson v. Calivas, 650 A.2d 318, 
322 (N.H. 1994); Hesser v. Cent. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 956 P.2d 864, 867-68 (Okla. 1998); 
Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 750 (Pa. 1983); Credit Union Cent. Falls v. Groff, 966 
A.2d 1262, 1271-72 (R.I. 2009); Friske v. Hogan, 698 N.W.2d 526, 530 (S.D. 2005). 
 
13 The ten states are California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, New 
Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina, and Washington. See Lucas, 364 P.2d at 689; Stowe v. 
Smith, 441 A.2d 81, 84 (Conn. 1981); Pinckney v. Tigani, Del., No. 03A-12-001RRC, 
2004, Cooch, J. (Nov. 30, 2004); Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452, 464 (Haw. 2001); Schreiner v. 
Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Iowa 1987); Pizel v. Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42, 49, 53-54 (Kan. 
1990); Leyba v. Whitley, 907 P.2d 172, 175-76 (N.M. 1995); Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289, 
1292 (Or. 1987); Fabian v. Lindsay, 765 S.E.2d 132, 140 (S.C. 2014); Bowman v. Doe, 
 
 
16 
privity rule.14 In sum, Madelyn argues that the strict privity rule as applied in Noble is 
unsound and therefore does not warrant the protective shield of stare decisis.15  
Stare decisis is a Latin phrase meaning “to stand by things decided[.]” Md. Small 
MS4 Coal. v. Md. Dep’t of the Env’t, 479 Md. 1, 31 (2022). The essence of this doctrine is 
that we follow and apply our prior decisions even though, if we were starting from a clean 
slate, we would reach a different decision today. State v. Waine, 444 Md. 692, 700 (2015). 
Stare decisis promotes the consistent development of the law, reliance on our judicial 
decisions, “and the perceived integrity of the courts.” Lawrence v. State, 475 Md. 384, 415 
(2021) (quoting State v. Stachowski, 440 Md. 504, 520 (2014)). 
As we recently explained: 
Although the doctrine is not absolute, stare decisis encourages courts to 
“reaffirm, follow, and apply . . . the published decisional holdings of our 
appellate courts[.]” Only in rare circumstances should this Court overrule its 
own precedent. We recognize two “extremely narrow” situations where it 
would be appropriate to do so. This Court may abandon the doctrine of stare 
decisis when the decision is “clearly wrong and contrary to established 
principles” or where there is “a showing that the precedent has been 
superseded by significant changes in the law or facts.” 
 
704 P.2d 140, 143 (Wash. 1985) (citing Peters v. Simmons, 552 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Wash. 
1976)). 
 
14 Mississippi is the lone state that has legislatively abolished the privity 
requirement. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-20 (West 2024); Century 21 Deep S. Props., 
Ltd. v. Corson, 612 So. 2d 359, 373-74 (Miss. 1992) (recognizing the legislative abrogation 
of the privity requirement and “extending liability to foreseeable third parties who 
detrimentally rely” on an attorney’s services). 
 
15 Neither party has argued that Noble does not apply in the estate planning context 
where, as here, the estate is distributed under the terms of a trust instead of a will. Although 
we perceive no reason not to apply Noble in this context, this opinion should not be 
interpreted as holding that the laws governing wills and trusts are the same in any other 
respect. 
 
17 
Wadsworth v. Sharma, 479 Md. 606, 630 (2022) (internal citations omitted). And the 
argument that the majority in a prior case was wrong is not enough to disregard stare 
decisis. DRD Pool Serv., Inc. v. Freed, 416 Md. 46, 69 (2010). 
We also consider whether the question presents an issue of public policy suitable 
for the General Assembly to determine. State v. Wiegmann, 350 Md. 585, 604 (1998). Take 
contributory negligence, once referred to by an esteemed former member of this Court as 
that “dinosaur [that] roams yet the landscape of Maryland . . . feeding on the claims of 
persons injured by the negligence of another, but who contributed proximately in some 
way to the occasion of his or her injuries, however slight their culpability.” Coleman v. 
Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 432 Md. 679, 695 (2013) (Harrell, J., dissenting). In Coleman, 
the Majority upheld the doctrine, noting the General Assembly’s repeated failure to 
abrogate that doctrine, and that Maryland stands with only four other jurisdictions in 
retaining contributory negligence as a defense. Id. at 691-95 (majority opinion). In any 
event, our predecessors kept the doctrine intact in the face of substantial arguments that it 
is antiquated and widely disfavored. Id. at 699 n.3 (Harrell, J., dissenting). 
In asking us to disregard stare decisis, Madelyn does not argue that the decision was 
clearly wrong or contrary to established principles, and with good reason. The Court’s 
analysis of the development of the strict privity rule was grounded in a thorough discussion 
and analysis of Maryland precedent going back decades. 
Nor has Madelyn showed a significant change in law or facts to justify overturning 
Noble. When the Court in Noble kept the rule intact, it was aware of the arguments against 
the strict privity rule and the trend in other jurisdictions to move away from it. Madelyn 
 
18 
offers nothing new in this regard, except perhaps citations to a few non-Maryland cases 
decided after Noble that make the same case against the strict privity rule. 
In any event, in the context of a trust instrument, changes in the law since Noble 
have, if anything, ameliorated the perceived harshness of the strict privity rule. On January 
1, 2015, the Maryland Trust Act, codified at ET §§ 14.5-101 to -1006, went into effect. 
2014 MD. LAWS, ch. 585. ET § 14.5-411 states: 
(a)(1) The court may modify the administrative or dispositive terms of a trust 
or terminate the trust if, because of circumstances not anticipated by the 
settlor, modification or termination will further the purposes of the trust. 
(2) To the extent practicable, the modification described in paragraph (1) of 
this subsection shall be made in accordance with the probable intention of 
the settlor. 
 
(b) The court may modify the administrative terms of a trust if continuation 
of the trust on its existing terms would be impracticable or wasteful or impair 
the administration of the trust. 
 
(c) On termination of a trust under subsection (a) of this section, the trustee 
shall distribute the trust property in a manner consistent with the purposes of 
the trust as ordered by the court. 
 
In addition, ET § 14.5-413 provides: 
The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform 
the terms to the intention of the settlor if it is proved by clear and convincing 
evidence that both the intent of the settlor and the terms of the trust were 
affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement. 
 
We do not know whether Madelyn sought to invoke the court’s modification powers 
under sections 14.5-411 or 14.5-413 and, if she did not, we do not opine on whether a claim 
under either provision would have been appropriate or successful. We point this out only 
to show that the General Assembly, which is far better suited to determine questions of 
 
19 
public policy than this Court, took action that suggests an interest in these issues.16 The 
General Assembly’s activity in this space supports our decision to decline this opportunity 
to abrogate the strict privity rule. 
D 
1 
Having determined that the strict privity rule survives Madelyn’s challenge, we turn 
to the only exception recognized by this Court: the third-party beneficiary exception. We 
first recognized this exception in an attorney malpractice case in Prescott v. Coppage, 266 
Md. 562 (1972). Prescott involved a claim by a creditor against the court-appointed 
receiver of the borrower and the receiver’s court-appointed counsel. Id. at 565. The creditor 
alleged that the receiver and his attorney negligently caused the borrower to pay lower 
priority creditors rather than satisfying the creditor’s higher priority claim. Id. Although 
this Court applied the privity rule to preclude a direct claim for negligence, we held that 
the creditor could maintain a claim as a third-party beneficiary. Id. at 574. We explained: 
 
16 The unusual posture in which this case comes to us also weighs against disturbing 
the strict privity rule. The underlying issue—whether the terms of the Trust required 
Wissahican to be conveyed to Madelyn or Audrey—was decided by the circuit court and 
affirmed by an en banc panel under Rule 2-551. Under section (h) of that rule, Madelyn 
had no further appellate rights. So whether the circuit court correctly decided that issue is 
not before us. 
 
For purposes of our stare decisis analysis, having our hands tied in such a fashion 
denies us an appropriate basis to determine whether the injustice that Madelyn claims here 
was the product of the strict privity rule or of something else, including an erroneous circuit 
court decision. When a party urges a change in the law based on an alleged grave injustice 
caused by the existing law, we would be more likely to make the change if we are satisfied 
that the current law is the cause of the alleged injustice.  
 
20 
[T]he intention of the parties to recognize a person or class as a primary party 
in interest as expressed in the language of the instrument and consideration 
of the surrounding circumstances as reflecting upon the parties’ intention, are 
controlling factors in making the judgment whether there is or is not a class 
of persons meeting the definition of creditor beneficiary. 
 
Id. This Court observed that the judicial order of appointment clarified that all creditors of 
the loan company were third-party beneficiaries of that appointment. Id. We added that the 
appointment of the attorney “by necessary implication bound him to those creditor 
beneficiaries.” Id. Thus, we held that the third-party beneficiary theory was viable under 
those circumstances. Id. 
2 
We addressed the third-party beneficiary exception in Flaherty v. Weinberg—the 
case discussed above, in which the settlement attorney was sued by the non-client home 
buyers for a misrepresentation made at settlement. After rejecting California’s balancing 
of factors test, this Court recognized a third-party beneficiary theory as the “sole exception” 
to the strict privity rule. Flaherty, 303 Md. at 130. We concluded that the buyers alleged 
sufficient facts to pursue their claim under a third-party beneficiary theory. Id. at 138-39. 
This Court emphasized, though, that the exception has a “rather narrow scope” and 
applies only when the non-client alleges and proves that the client’s intent and “direct 
purpose” in retaining estate planning counsel was to benefit the non-client.  Id. at 130-31. 
The attorney would owe no duty to a non-client who derives merely an incidental benefit 
from the attorney’s services. See id. at 131 n.6. Because the case came to us on a motion 
to dismiss, which tests the sufficiency of the allegations, we held that the borrower alleged 
 
21 
sufficient facts to support an inference that its lender intended for them to directly benefit 
from the attorney’s services. Id. at 138-39. 
3 
This brings us back to Noble. In Noble, this Court not only applied the strict privity 
rule to the testamentary beneficiaries’ claims, but also rejected their third-party beneficiary 
claims. Of importance to Madelyn’s claims is whether Noble per se foreclosed all third-
party beneficiary claims in the estate planning context or whether it left that door open, 
however so slightly, with each case rising or falling on the specific facts. 
Reasonable minds might differ, as one could fairly find language in Noble to support 
either view. The circuit court interpreted Noble as closing the door on such claims, and not 
without reason. Among other statements, in Noble, the Court suggested that it was 
promulgating a bright-line rule: “We agree with the Supreme Court of Texas that ‘the 
greater good is served by preserving a bright-line rule which denies a cause of action to all 
beneficiaries whom the attorney did not represent.’” 349 Md. at 759 (quoting Barcelo v. 
Elliott, 932 S.W.2d 575, 578 (Tex. 1996)). 
Under Noble, one’s status as a testamentary beneficiary does not entitle that person 
to claim third-party beneficiary status for claims against the drafting attorney. In fact, Noble 
presumes that a testamentary beneficiary is not a third-party beneficiary. But we do not 
read Noble as precluding third-party beneficiary status if, as framed in Flaherty, benefiting 
the non-client was the primary purpose of the client’s engagement of estate planning 
counsel. Flaherty, 303 Md. at 130-31. That is because the Court in Noble did not 
categorically reject the beneficiaries’ third-party beneficiary claims based on a bright-line 
 
22 
rule, but instead considered the merits of those claims, including the evidence in the record, 
and determined that the beneficiaries were not third-party beneficiaries. We explain. 
In rejecting the third-party beneficiary claims in Noble, we first distinguished 
Flaherty. Noble, 349 Md. at 753. In Flaherty, the attorney communicated directly with the 
non-client claimants, and the claimants alleged they relied on the attorney. Noble, 349 Md. 
at 753-54. In contrast, in Noble, we stated that “[a]ttorney malpractice cases arising out of 
will drafting or estate planning generally are very different from the scenario presented in 
Flaherty” and implicate the public policy considerations in support of the strict privity rule. 
Id. at 753. The real-time interaction between a lawyer and non-client at a real estate 
settlement is unlike a will drafting lawyer’s relationship—which may be nonexistent—to 
the beneficiary under a will. Thus, with respect to the third-party beneficiary exception, 
testamentary beneficiaries do not stand in shoes that are analogous to those of a non-client 
at a real estate settlement. We then addressed the beneficiaries’ argument that “a 
testamentary beneficiary is by definition the intended beneficiary of the testator’s 
contractual relationship with the attorney who drafted the will.” Id. This was a per se 
argument which, if adopted, would have conferred third-party beneficiary status on all 
testamentary beneficiaries because of their status as such. We rejected that argument, 
emphasizing that “the client’s intent to benefit the non-client must be a direct purpose of 
the transaction or relationship” to sustain third-party beneficiary status. Id. at 753-54. We 
explained: 
The testator/client’s intent and purpose in executing a will may not be to 
benefit the beneficiaries named in the will, but rather to prevent the intestate 
distribution of assets. In other words, the testator’s intent may be 1) to 
 
23 
exclude certain individuals who would otherwise inherit the testator’s 
property without a will and to ensure that those individuals are unable to 
inherit, or 2) to personally provide for distribution of assets rather than 
leaving distribution to the intestate succession. 
 
Id. at 754. Put simply, we recognized that people sign wills for all kinds of reasons, so the 
law will not presume that benefiting the testamentary beneficiary was the direct purpose of 
the attorney-client relationship.   
We then turned to the facts underlying the beneficiaries’ claims and concluded that 
“there is no admissible evidence contradicting the supposition that the testators intended 
their contractual relationships with their attorneys to benefit themselves in planning their 
estates and in creating and maintaining their wills.”17 Id. (emphasis added). The use of 
“supposition” in this context informs our understanding that the Court created a 
presumption against third-party beneficiary status in this context; that is, the “supposition” 
is that the testator executed the will to benefit herself, not the beneficiaries. And in the next 
sentence, we stated the consequence of failing to overcome the supposition with contrary 
evidence: 
Thus, we conclude that the beneficiaries in the instant cases are not 
third-party beneficiaries of the testators’ representation agreements with the 
attorneys, and the third-party beneficiary exception to the strict privity rule 
does not apply. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
4 
 
17 This Court stated that, in attorney malpractice cases brought by non-clients in the 
estate planning context, “extrinsic evidence is not admissible to show that the testator’s 
intent was different from that expressed in the will.” Noble, 349 Md. at 755. Whether that 
rule applies in the trust context is not before us. 
 
24 
This Court’s opinion in Ferguson v. Cramer, 349 Md. 760 (1998), issued the same 
day as Noble, offers more guidance on the viability of a third-party beneficiary claim in 
this context. There, we addressed “whether a beneficiary under a will may maintain a cause 
of action for professional malpractice against an attorney retained by the personal 
representative of the testator’s estate.” Ferguson, 349 Md. at 762. The sole heirs of the 
testator’s estate sued the attorney employed by the estate’s personal representative, alleging 
that the attorney negligently failed to properly administer the estate. Id. at 762-64. The 
beneficiaries contended that, although they did not employ the attorney, the third-party 
beneficiary exception nonetheless applied to their claim. Id. at 765. 
In the opinion’s opening paragraph, we characterized our holding in Noble: 
We recently held that, as a matter of law, a non-client, testamentary 
beneficiary could not maintain a cause of action for professional malpractice 
against the testator’s attorney for negligently drafting the testator’s will or 
providing negligent estate planning advice where there was a lack of privity 
between the beneficiary and the attorney. We believe that the Noble decision 
is controlling and therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Special 
Appeals. 
 
Ferguson, 349 Md. at 762-63 (internal citation omitted). We also confirmed that this Court 
has “recognized the third-party beneficiary exception as a limited exception to the strict 
privity rule.” Id. at 766. We explained that 
we held in Noble that the third-party beneficiary exception did not apply 
because the direct purpose and intent of the testator/client in executing a will 
was not necessarily to benefit the beneficiaries named in the will. Thus, 
under the traditional rule of strict privity, the beneficiaries could not maintain 
a malpractice action against the attorneys because no employment 
relationship existed between the beneficiaries and the attorneys. 
 
Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
 
25 
Considered on their own, these statements could be interpreted as foreclosing all 
third-party beneficiary claims in this context. But we believe the more appropriate 
interpretation is that, as in Noble, we were explaining that a testamentary beneficiary is not 
automatically a third-party beneficiary. That is, by saying that the testator’s intent “was not 
necessarily to benefit the beneficiaries named in the will[,]” we left open the possibility 
that a testator’s primary intent could be to benefit the beneficiaries, a conclusion which 
accords with common sense.18 
Indeed, if we were announcing a per se rule, the facts would not have mattered to 
the third-party beneficiary analysis. But just as we explained why the facts did not support 
a third-party beneficiary claim in Noble, we did the same in Ferguson. We observed that 
“the beneficiaries in the instant case did not allege in their complaint that [the personal 
representative] intended the beneficiaries to benefit directly from [the] services [of the] 
attorney.” Id. at 770. Instead, we noted, “the beneficiaries alleged in the complaint that, ‘as 
the only heirs of the [decedent’s estate], [the beneficiaries] were specifically intended to 
be the beneficiaries of [the attorney’s] service as attorney for the estate.” Id. (second 
alteration in original). In other words, the beneficiaries in Ferguson relied exclusively on 
 
18  Say, for example, a single parent with one child who has physical and mental 
disabilities and will need lifelong care and support, retains counsel for estate planning. 
During the consultation, the client explains to counsel that the sole purpose of the estate 
plan is to make sure that the child is taken care of after the client dies, and the engagement 
letter between the client and counsel identifies that purpose. We do not read Noble or 
Ferguson as precluding, as a matter of law, the possibility that the child could claim third-
party beneficiary status. 
 
26 
their status as testamentary beneficiaries. We rejected that as insufficient for the same 
reason we did in Noble: 
The beneficiaries’ status as the only heirs of [the decedent] does not 
automatically make them third-party beneficiaries of the contract between 
[the attorney] and [the personal representative]. As we noted in Noble, 
“[t]here is a critical difference between being the intended beneficiary of an 
estate and being the intended beneficiary of a contract between a lawyer and 
his client.” 
 
Id. 
Accordingly, under Noble and Ferguson, a testamentary beneficiary is not 
automatically a third-party beneficiary of the attorney-client relationship. To claim third-
party beneficiary status, the beneficiary will have to allege and then prove, as the Court 
said in Flaherty, “that the intent of the client to benefit the non-client was a direct purpose 
of the transaction or relationship.” 303 Md. at 130-31. 
5 
We conclude that the circuit court was correct in granting summary judgment for 
Mr. Gentile on whether Madelyn was an intended third-party beneficiary of Pauline’s and 
Mr. Gentile’s attorney-client relationship. The material facts, which were not genuinely 
disputed, showed that Pauline’s primary intent in revising the Trust in 2019 was to ensure 
that she had enough money to fund her care and to ensure that Audrey received none of the 
Trust property. That is not to say Pauline did not want Madelyn to reap a benefit if the sales 
proceeds she had anticipated from Wissahican’s sale were not depleted by the time she 
died. But, as the circuit court observed, “Pauline’s direction that Madelyn, her only other 
 
27 
living child, receive ‘anything left’ was [nothing] more than incidental to removing Audrey 
as beneficiary.” The circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment on that basis.19 
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT 
COURT 
FOR 
MONTGOMERY 
COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO 
BE PAID BY PETITIONER. 
 
19 Madelyn argues that, in her capacity as Trustee, the strict privity rule is satisfied 
because she stepped into Pauline’s shoes. We disagree. Madelyn stepped into Pauline’s 
shoes solely as the Successor Trustee. Pauline’s right to amend the terms of the Trust 
derived from her status as the Settlor, not Trustee. In other words, the Settlor, not the 
Trustee, retained Mr. Gentile to amend the Trust instrument. 
 
In addition, because we affirmed the circuit court’s entry of summary judgment 
against Madelyn on her claims against Mr. Gentile, we will not address her claim against 
him for attorneys’ fees incurred in her litigation with Audrey.