Case Title: The Florida Bar v. Daniel Peter Feinberg

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC93-165

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC93165
____________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,
vs.
DANIEL PETER FEINBERG,
Respondent.
[June 1, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
The Florida Bar petitions this Court to review a referee’s report
recommending that Daniel Peter Feinberg be publicly reprimanded for violating
certain Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.   We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15,
Fla. Const.
FACTS
The Bar filed a complaint against Feinberg, alleging that he had spoken with
an opposing counsel’s client without opposing counsel’s awareness, and was later
1  In its complaint, the Bar alleged that Feinberg violated the following Rules Regulating The
Florida Bar:  4-4.1(a) (requiring truthfulness in statements to others); 4-4.2 (prohibiting
communication with a person represented by counsel); 4-8.4(a) (prohibiting knowing violations of
the rules); 4-8.4(c) (prohibiting dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation); and 4-8.4(d)
(prohibiting attorneys from engaging in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice).  
2  The referee does not explain why the defendant was under Department of Corrections
supervision.  However, the referee does state in his report that the defendant had a criminal history
and that the trial court could have sentenced him as a habitual offender for the current drug charges.
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untruthful concerning the events.1  Upon conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings,
the referee issued a report making the following findings of fact.
Feinberg was an Assistant State Attorney working for the felony division of
the Charlotte County State Attorney’s Office during the relevant time period.  In
1996, Feinberg was approached by the private counsel of a criminal defendant
charged with drug offenses.  The attorney suggested that since the State had a strong
case against his client, the only way his client could avoid prison would be to
cooperate with the State Attorney’s Office and provide assistance to law
enforcement.  Feinberg, the private attorney, and the defendant subsequently met to
discuss a possible arrangement, but no agreement was reached.
The defendant was thereafter rearrested for violating the Department of
Corrections’ early release program,2 whereupon his counsel again approached
Feinberg in an attempt to negotiate a “deal” for the defendant.  Feinberg referred the
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attorney to two law enforcement officers, who were not interested in effectuating
such a “deal.”   The defendant proceeded to plead guilty to the drug charges. 
The defendant later was able to convince the law enforcement authorities that
he could provide assistance.  The day before his sentencing hearing, the defendent
met with law enforcement officers and Feinberg, but his private attorney was not
present.  At the meeting, Feinberg asked the defendent if he wanted his attorney
present, and the defendant said “no.”  Although it is not entirely clear what the
defendant said at this meeting, Feinberg testified:
I’m not 100 percent sure of what he said with regarding [sic] he is fired
or he’s gonna fire.  I know my mind set going out of the meeting is that
[the private attorney] is not going to represent [this defendant]
anymore, and he is not representing [the defendant] in that meeting. 
That I know is my mind set.
Accordingly, Feinberg asked the defendant  if he wanted court-appointed counsel
and the defendant declined.
At the meeting, the defendant, Feinberg and the law enforcement officers
reached an agreement through which the defendant, in exchange for providing
assistance to law enforcement, would be released from jail and receive house arrest.
The defendant then requested that his personal counsel not be advised of the
agreement.  The defendant asserted that his counsel had connections with the “drug
community,” meaning persons involved in selling illegal drugs, and if the
3  The referee found no merit to the defendant’s allegations regarding his attorney’s
connections with persons involved in selling illegal drugs.
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defendant’s agreement was disclosed, word would get back to the “drug
community” that he was acting as an informant.3  Later that same day, the
defendant’s attorney met with the defendant and the defendant advised him that an
agreement had been made with Feinberg and law enforcement officers. 
At the sentencing hearing the next day, Feinberg found it “remarkable”  to see
the attorney appear on the defendant’s behalf.  Feinberg approached the attorney
and told him that he had not prepared the necessary paperwork for sentencing, and
that he was going to request a continuance.  Feinberg did not mention the deal
reached with the defendant, and the continuance was granted.  
After the sentencing hearing, Feinberg went to his supervisor to discuss what
had occurred (i.e., the defendant telling Feinberg at the meeting with law
enforcement officers that he was not represented, and the defendant’s attorney
subsequently appearing on his behalf at sentencing).  Feinberg, with the advice of
his supervisor, decided that the defendant’s cooperation with the police was a
matter separate from the pending criminal charges.  Accordingly, Feinberg and his
supervisor decided to proceed with the informant arrangement and obtain the
defendant’s release from jail. 
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Shortly thereafter, the defendant’s attorney confronted Feinberg and inquired
if he had met with the defendant.  Feinberg responded that he had not.   Several
days later, the defendant met with Feinberg and entered into a stipulation that the
defendant would assist law enforcement.  
According to the defendant’s attorney, he asked Feinberg on two later
occasions if he was meeting with the defendant, and Feinberg responded that he was
not.  At a later court hearing, the attorney requested a private in-chambers meeting
with the judge and Feinberg.  The attorney advised the judge as to what had
occurred in the defendant’s case.  At Feinberg’s disciplinary hearing, the
defendant’s counsel testified that Feinberg told the judge he had “done nothing to
interfere in the attorney-client relationship between [counsel] and his client.”  The
judge instructed Feinberg and opposing counsel to work out their differences, and
the two attorneys agreed to a quasi-mediation session.  At the disciplinary hearing,
the mediator testified that when the attorney confronted Feinberg about speaking
with one of his clients, Feinberg stated, “Well, you know, [counsel], once in awhile
as attorneys we have to lie to one another.”  The mediator testified that within five
minutes of making this comment, Feinberg stated that he misspoke.  The mediator
testified that Feinberg appeared remorseful and stated that he felt he was not getting
guidance from his office as to how to handle the situation.  The record of this
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meeting did not indicate whether Feinberg ever disclosed to opposing counsel the
contact with the defendant.  
The attorney subsequently moved to withdraw as the defendant’s counsel and
eventually filed a grievance against Feinberg with The Florida Bar.  The Bar in turn
filed the complaint underlying the present case.  
As to guilt, the referee recommended that Feinberg be found guilty of
violating rules 4-4.1(a)(requiring truthfulness in statements to others) and 4-4.2
(prohibiting communication with a person represented by counsel).  The referee
expressed his belief that “Bar Counsel in its Memorandum of Law for Sanctions
appears only to request the Court to consider sanctions for [these violations]” and
accordingly recommended that Feinberg only be sanctioned for violating rules 4-
4.1(a) and 4-4.2.  The referee set forth that even if the Bar did seek sanctions on
Feinberg’s alleged violations of rules 4-8.4(a) (prohibiting knowing violations of the
rules), 4-8.4(c) (prohibiting dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation) and 4-
8.4(d) (prohibiting attorneys from engaging in conduct in connection with the
practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), he would
recommend that Feinberg be found not guilty of violating these rules.
As to discipline, the referee first noted that the defendant had manipulated
both his personal attorney and Feinberg to obtain his desired result.  The referee
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stated that he
has no doubt that [the defendant ] did indeed advise [Feinberg] not to
tell his lawyer . . . about a possible substantial assistance deal for fear
that his lawyer would somehow communicate this intentionally or
unintentionally to others who may put the word out on the street that
the Defendant was working for law enforcement.  The Referee  [finds]
that indeed [the defendant] was successful in manipulating law
enforcement and [Feinberg] into believing that somehow [defendant’s
attorney] was involved in illegal narcotics and that [Feinberg] and/or
[his] loved ones would be in danger if [opposing counsel] was advised
of this deal. 
The referee found no aggravating factors in the instant case; however, he did
find the following mitigating factors: (a) lack of guidance and supervision (Feinberg
went to his supervisor and the supervisor approved Feinberg’s conduct); (b) good
character or reputation (specifically noting that since the incident in this case,
Feinberg has continued to handle cases against the attorney involved in this case,
and the attorney has never asked that Feinberg be disqualified); (c) remorse; and (d)
absence of selfish motive.  Although not listed as a mitigating factor, the referee
expressly noted that the defendant was not harmed in any way by Feinberg’s
misconduct; in fact, he benefitted from Feinberg’s actions.  The referee also found
that Feinberg has continued his duties as an Assistant State Attorney without
incident.  Finally, the referee expressed his belief that “the chances of [Feinberg]
committing another violation of this type are less than zero.” 
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The referee stated that imposing a three-year suspension as recommended by
the Bar would destroy Feinberg’s career and that “the shame that has been cast on
[Feinberg’s] character and attendant local publicity about this matter is enough to
deter any attorney from committing a like violation.”  Concluding that Feinberg’s
“desire to protect [the defendant], along with [his] lack of guidance, combined with
ignorance of the law, is what fueled [his] behavior,” the referee recommended the
following discipline:  (1) a public reprimand; (2) a judgment of costs against
Feinberg, to be paid in equal monthly installments over a three-year period; (3) a
letter of apology from Feinberg to the attorney in this case acknowledging the
referee’s findings and sanctions imposed; and (4) a letter from Feinberg to the State
Attorney of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit acknowledging the referee’s findings and
sanctions imposed, as well as acknowledging Feinberg’s untruthfulness to a fellow
member of the Bar, with copies of this letter forwarded to (a) all Assistant State
Attorneys in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit; (b) all Assistant Public Defenders in the
Twentieth Judicial Circuit; (c) all attorneys in Charlotte County as listed in the
Florida Bar Journal; (d) all judges in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit; and (e) all
witnesses who testified on Feinberg’s behalf. 
The Florida Bar has petitioned this Court to review the referee’s report.
ANALYSIS
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In its petition, the Bar does not contest the referee’s findings of fact.   Rather,
the Bar challenges both the findings of guilt and the discipline recommended by the
referee.
A.  Guilt 
The Bar first argues that it did indeed intend to seek sanctions against
Feinburg for violating rules 4-8.4(a), 4-8.4(c) and 4-8.4(d), and that competent
substantial evidence is lacking in the record to support the referee’s legal conclusion
that Feinberg did not violate these rules.  “The party contending that the referee's
findings of fact and conclusions as to guilt are erroneous carries the burden of
demonstrating that there is no evidence in the record to support those findings or
that the record evidence clearly contradicts the conclusions.”   Florida Bar v.
Sweeney, 730 So. 2d 1269, 1271 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Florida Bar v. Spann, 682 So.
2d 1070, 1073 (Fla. 1996)).
We conclude that the referee’s finding that Feinberg is not guilty of violating
rules 4-8.4(a), 4-8.4(c) and 4-8.4(d) is simply not supported by the record.  First, in
his report the referee found that Feinberg violated rules 4-4.1(a) and 4-4.2.  Because
rule 4-8.4(a) prohibits attorneys from violating the rules of Professional Conduct, of
which rules 4-4.1(a) and 4-4.2 are a part, Feinberg is necessarily guilty of violating
rule 4-8.4(a).  
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Second, rule 4-8.4(c) prohibits attorneys from engaging in deceitful conduct. 
In his report, the referee found that Feinberg “deceived [opposing counsel] in
reference to contact with his client on several other occasions.”  This specific
finding of deceit compels the conclusion that Feinberg violated rule 4-8.4(c).  
Finally, Rule 4-8.4(d) prohibits attorneys from engaging in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice.  This Court has stated that “a lawyer is
an officer of the courts and as such is an essential component of the administration
of justice.”  State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608 (Fla. 1958).  
This Court has further noted that “[w]hile conduct that actually affects a given
proceeding may be prejudicial to the administration of justice, conduct that
prejudices our system of justice as a whole also is encompassed by rule 4-8.4(d).” 
Florida Bar v. Machin, 635 So. 2d 938, 939-40 (Fla. 1994).  In his report, the
referee found that Feinberg, an attorney for the state, deliberately made untruthful
statements to a defense attorney in the context of a criminal case.  Even though the
defendant encouraged and actually benefitted from Feinberg’s deception, and even
though Feinberg may have believed he had a good motive for being untruthful (i.e.,
the defendant’s alleged fear of his counsel), the fact is clear that Feinberg continued
to meet with a criminal defendant even after he was placed on notice that the
defendant was represented by counsel.  A prosecutor engaging in such conduct
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impugns the judicial system as a whole because it implies that state prosecutors are
willing to undermine the adversarial process.  Such is a very dangerous notion that
strikes to the heart of our justice system.  As such, Feinberg engaged in conduct that
was prejudicial to the administration of justice, thereby violating rule 4-8.4(d).  
In summary, we adopt the referee’s conclusion that Feinberg violated rules 4-
4.1(a) and 4-4.2; however, we reject the referee’s finding that Feinberg is not guilty
of violating rules 4-8.4(a), 4-8.4(c) and 4-8.4(d).
B.  Discipline  
The Bar next argues that the recommended discipline is too lenient and that a
three-year suspension is in order under the facts of this case. 
In reviewing a referee’s recommendation of discipline, the Court does not
“pay the same deference to this recommendation as we do to the guilt
recommendation because this Court has the ultimate responsibility to determine the
appropriate sanction.”  Sweeney, 730 So. 2d at 1272.  However, this Court “will not
second-guess a referee's recommended discipline as long as that discipline has a
reasonable basis in existing case law."  Id.  Attorney discipline serves the following
three purposes:
First, the judgment must be fair to society, both in terms of protecting
the public from unethical conduct and at the same time not denying the
public the services of a qualified lawyer as a result of undue harshness
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in imposing penalty.  Second, the judgment must be fair to the
respondent, being sufficient to punish a breach of ethics and at the
same time encourage reformation and rehabilitation.  Third, the
judgment must be severe enough to deter others who might be prone or
tempted to become involved in like violations.
Florida Bar v. Cibula, 725 So. 2d 360, 363 (Fla. 1998)(quoting Florida Bar v. Reed,
644 So. 2d 1355, 1357 (Fla. 1994)).
In Suarez v. State, 481 So. 2d 1201, 1206 (Fla. 1985), this Court held that it
was a clear ethical violation for “a prosecuting attorney to interview a defendant
represented by counsel without notice to defense counsel when the defendant
requests or acquiesces to the interview.”  In the instant case, Feinberg was
untruthful in discussions with an attorney regarding his meetings with that attorney’s
client.  Further, Feinberg continued to meet privately with a criminal defendant after
he discovered that the defendant was still represented by counsel.    Truth is critical
in the operation of our judicial system and we find such affirmative
misrepresentations by any attorney, but especially one who represents the State of
Florida, to be disturbing.  Feinberg’s actions, although generated by good intentions,
developed into serious violations which cast a shadow over the integrity of our
adversarial system.
 Nevertheless, we conclude that the referee’s recommended discipline of a
public reprimand with the additional conditions listed in the report is appropriate.  
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Our conclusion is primarily based on the unique circumstances of this case.  A
somewhat clever defendant indicated to Feinberg that he had discharged (or would
be discharging) his attorney.  The defendant then constructed an arrangement,
primarily with law enforcement officers but also with Feinberg’s participation,
without his counsel being present.  The defendant requested that Feinberg not reveal
these conversations to his counsel based upon an alleged fear for the defendant’s
safety (due to the attorney’s alleged contacts with the “drug community”).  After
Feinberg discovered that the defendant was in fact still represented, he sought
direction and advice from his supervisor, and his conduct was essentially approved. 
This placed Feinberg in the extremely volatile situation of having to decide whether
to inform opposing counsel of the deal (thereby possibly placing the defendant in
danger), or denying inappropriate contact with the defendant each time he was
confronted by opposing counsel.  Feinburg opted not to reveal his contacts with the
defendant.   
Although we understand the predicament in which Feinberg found himself, he
nevertheless exercised poor judgment by affirmatively misleading and being
untruthful with opposing counsel, and continuing to meet with the defendant after
realizing that, contrary to the defendant’s statements, he was represented by
counsel.  As is so often the case, had Feinberg simply relied upon the truth when
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confronted with the facts, the resulting trail of deception would have never occurred. 
It is this perpetuation of the untruthful approach that aggravates that which may
have initially been subject to understanding.
CONCLUSION
  In simply imposing a public reprimand in this case, it must be noted that we
in no way support Feinberg’s conduct in the instant case.   Had the unusual
circumstances of the instant case not been present, substantially more severe
discipline would have been imposed.  We conclude by emphasizing that attorneys
must be extremely cautious in determining whether to speak with an individual who
appears to be represented by counsel.  Moreover, as evidenced in the instant case,
attorneys must be ever vigilant to avoid inducement into compromising conduct that
is detrimental to our judicial system.  Attorneys must also be forthright and truthful
when confronted with a possible problem.  
Accordingly, we hereby reprimand attorney Daniel Peter Feinberg for
professional misconduct.  The reprimand shall be accomplished by the publication
of this opinion.  In addition to the reprimand, Feinberg is ordered to comply with the
conditions of the referee’s report that he write (1) a letter of apology to the attorney
in the instant case acknowledging the referee’s findings and sanctions imposed, and
(2) a letter to the State Attorney of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit acknowledging the
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referee’s findings and sanctions imposed, as well as acknowledging Feinberg’s
untruthfulness towards a fellow member of the Bar.  Copies of Feinberg’s letter to
the State Attorney shall be forwarded to all Assistant State Attorneys in the
Twentieth Judicial Circuit, all Assistant Public Defenders in the Twentieth Judicial
Circuit, all attorneys in Charlotte County as listed in the Florida Bar Journal, all
judges in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, and all witnesses who testified on
Feinberg’s behalf.  Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 650 Apalachee
Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399, for recovery of costs from Daniel Peter
Feinberg in the amount of $4,912.87, to be paid in equal monthly installments over a
three-year period, for which sum let execution issue.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ, concur.
HARDING, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which
WELLS, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
HARDING, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority as to the findings of guilt.  However, I dissent from the
acceptance of the recommendation for a public reprimand.  I believe that the conduct
in this case warrants a thirty-day suspension.  See Florida Bar v. Burkich-Burrell, 659
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So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1995) (attorney who failed to disclose materials to opposing counsel
and failed to ensure that information provided to opposing counsel was correct given
thirty-day suspension); Florida Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1989) (lead
attorney who failed to correct brief that misrepresented facts of case to court given
thirty-day suspension).
WELLS, J., concurs.
Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and John A. Boggs, Staff Counsel,
Tallahassee, Florida, and Stephen C. Whalen, Assistant Staff Counsel, Tampa, Florida,
       for Complainant
Arthur I. Jacobs of Jacobs & Associates, P.A., Fernandina Beach, Floridak
       for Respondent