Case Title: Velazquez v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13345

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2023-02-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13345 
 
CHAYANNE VELAZQUEZ  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 6, 2023. - February 9, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Pretrial Detention.  Time.  Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on April 19, 2022. 
 
Following transfer to the Appeals Court, the case was heard 
by Eric Neyman, J., and the case was reported by him to a panel 
of that court. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Catherine Langevin Semel, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the petitioner. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  "General Laws c. 276, § 58B, provides that where 
a person on pretrial release has violated a condition of that 
release, . . . the release may be revoked and the person may be 
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subject to pretrial detention."  Commonwealth v. Lougee, 485 
Mass. 70, 79-80 (2020).  This case requires us to determine 
whether the presumptive time limit on pretrial detention 
outlined in § 58B is calculated from when an individual is first 
detained or from when an order of detention formally issues.  We 
conclude that the presumptive time limit must be calculated from 
the date a person is detained regardless of when a formal order 
of detention issues. 
Background and prior proceedings.  While facing various 
charges in the Boston Municipal Court (BMC) and the Superior 
Court in Middlesex County (Middlesex Superior Court), the 
petitioner, Chayanne Velazquez (defendant), was released on 
bail.  On December 26, 2021, while on release, the defendant 
allegedly committed an assault and battery on a family or 
household member, and he was arraigned on February 2, 2022, in 
the Lynn Division of the District Court Department (Lynn 
District Court).  The Commonwealth filed two motions in the Lynn 
District Court.  The first sought pretrial detention pursuant to 
G. L. c. 276, § 58A, in the Lynn District Court case, and the 
second, pursuant to § 58B, sought to revoke the defendant's bail 
in the cases pending in the BMC and the Middlesex Superior 
Court.  The arraignment judge made a determination of probable 
cause under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, and ordered that the defendant 
be held without bail pending resolution of the Commonwealth's 
3 
 
motions.  The motions were scheduled to be heard on February 4, 
2022. 
On the scheduled hearing date, the court house was closed 
due to inclement weather, and the hearing was ultimately held on 
February 8, 2022.  At that time, the judge ordered the defendant 
held for 120 days pursuant to § 58A, until June 8, 2022, and for 
ninety days pursuant to § 58B, until May 9, 2022.  The May 9, 
2022, date was communicated to both the BMC and the Middlesex 
Superior Court; the Middlesex Superior Court entered the 
detention under § 58B on its docket for "a period of [ninety] 
days as of 2022 FEB 2."1 
On April 7, 2022, the Lynn District Court charge was 
dismissed.  The defendant then filed a motion to reconsider the 
bail revocation order, which was denied.  Defense counsel asked 
that the docket be corrected to reflect that the defendant's 
ninety days of detention, pursuant to § 58B, began to run on the 
date of arraignment rather than the date that the formal order 
issued.  The judge denied this request. 
 
1 "The ninety-day revocation period under § 58B . . . 
includes excusable delay under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2)[, 
378 Mass. 909 (1979)], which means that the period of pretrial 
detention can extend well beyond ninety days."  Josh J. v. 
Commonwealth, 478 Mass. 716, 723 n.8 (2018).  Neither the judge 
below nor the parties raised the issue of excusable delay under 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2). 
4 
 
The defendant filed a petition in the county court for 
extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  A single 
justice of this court transferred the matter to a single justice 
of the Appeals Court.2  The single justice of the Appeals Court 
granted the defendant's request for relief and also reported the 
case to a panel of that court.  We allowed the defendant's 
application for direct appellate review. 
Discussion.  "To determine the proper application of . . . 
[§] 58B, we apply the well-established principles of statutory 
construction."  Josh J. v. Commonwealth, 478 Mass. 716, 719 
(2018). "Our fundamental aim is to 'discern and effectuate the 
intent of the Legislature.'"  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. 
Morgan, 476 Mass. 768, 777 (2017).  "To that end, '[t]he 
language of the statute is the primary source of insight into 
the intent of the Legislature.'"  Josh. J., supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Millican, 449 Mass. 298, 300 (2007).  
"Therefore, where the statute is clear and unambiguous, our 
inquiry into the Legislature's intent need go no further than 
the statute's plain and ordinary meaning."  Josh J., supra.  But 
"[w]here the draftsmanship of a statute is faulty or lacks 
precision, it is our duty to give the statute a reasonable 
construction."  Commonwealth v. Pagan, 445 Mass. 315, 319 
 
2 See Order Regarding Transfer of Certain Single Justice 
Matters During the COVID-19 Pandemic, No. OE-144 (June 8, 2020). 
5 
 
(2005), quoting Capone v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Fitchburg, 
389 Mass. 617, 622 (1983). 
Pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58B, "a defendant's release may 
be revoked where, after hearing, a judge makes two findings:  
(1) that there is probable cause to believe that a person on 
pretrial release has committed a new crime while on release, or 
clear and convincing evidence that the person has violated any 
other condition of release; and (2) that 'there are no 
conditions of release that will reasonably assure the person 
will not pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the 
community' or 'the person is unlikely to abide by any condition 
or combination of conditions of release'" (citation omitted).  
Lougee, 485 Mass. at 80. 
Section 58B sets forth two different time limitations 
related to the bail revocation.  The first concerns 
continuances.  The statute provides that "[u]pon the person's 
first appearance . . . for revocation of an order of release 
under this section," the revocation hearing must be held 
immediately unless the person or the Commonwealth seeks a 
continuance.  G. L. c. 276, § 58B.  If the person is detained 
without bail during the continuance period, the continuance 
period cannot exceed three business days on the Commonwealth's 
motion and cannot exceed seven days on the person's motion.  Id. 
6 
 
The second time limitation, which is at issue in this case, 
is the final sentence of the statute.  The sentence states, "A 
person detained under this subsection, shall be brought to trial 
as soon as reasonably possible, but in the absence of good 
cause, a person so held shall not be detained for a period 
exceeding ninety days excluding any period of delay as defined 
in [Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2), 378 Mass. 909 (1979)]."  Id. 
The Commonwealth claims that the statute's ninety-day time 
limit begins to run when a formal order issues.3  The defendant 
asserts that the time period must begin to run when a person is 
initially detained.  We conclude that the ninety-day limit must 
be calculated from the date a person is detained regardless of 
when the formal order of detention is issued. 
"The right of an individual to be free from physical 
restraint is a paradigmatic fundamental right" (citation 
omitted).  Mushwaalakbar v. Commonwealth, 487 Mass. 627, 633 
 
3 To support its position, the Commonwealth argues that 
there are two separate and distinct periods of detention 
contemplated by § 58B -- (1) detention during a period of 
continuance and (2) detention after a formal order has entered -
- and that the different detention periods arise only in a 
situation where a continuance is requested.  Relying primarily 
on Millican, 449 Mass. at 301, where we explained that the words 
"section" and "subsection" cannot be used interchangeably, the 
Commonwealth contends that because the statute refers to "[a] 
person detained under this subsection" in reference to the 
ninety-day detention period, the Legislature did not intend for 
the ninety-day detention period to apply to the entirety of ways 
or time periods that a person can be detained under the statute.  
We do not agree, for the reasons discussed infra. 
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(2021).  It is a right that "is firmly embedded in the history 
of Anglo-American law."  Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 
676 (1993).  "Pretrial detention schemes[, such as the one 
outlined in § 58B,] necessarily balance the liberty interest of 
individuals presumed innocent against public safety concerns 
posed by high-risk defendants."  Mushwaalakbar, supra, quoting 
Matter of the Request to Release Certain Pretrial Detainees, 245 
N.J. 218, 231 (2021).  Our conclusion that the clock starts 
running as soon as a person is detained maintains the required 
balance and is in keeping with the well-established principles 
that pretrial detention "is constitutional precisely because it 
is 'temporary and provisional' and 'the trial itself provides an 
inevitable end point to the State's preventive authority.'"  
Mushwaalakbar, supra at 632, quoting Mendonza v. Commonwealth, 
423 Mass. 771, 781, 790 (1996). 
Moreover, our holding is equally consistent with our 
previous analysis of this very sentence in Lougee, 485 Mass. at 
76-77, 79-80.4  In that case, we clearly explained that "by 
stating . . . that persons held in pretrial detention 'shall be 
brought to trial as soon as reasonably possible,' the 
 
4 We recognize that in Lougee, 485 Mass. at 76-77, our 
analysis focused on a sentence in G. L. c. 276, § 58A (3).  
However, we stated that "[e]xcept for the shorter, ninety-day 
time limit" the sentence at issue in this case is "virtually 
identical" and, as a result, that analysis "is therefore equally 
applicable to § 58B."  Id. at 80. 
8 
 
Legislature declared its intent that pretrial detainees be given 
priority when there is a queue of criminal cases awaiting trial" 
and that "this sentence sets a presumptive time limit for such 
cases to be brought to trial -- [ninety days]" (emphasis added; 
citation omitted).  Id. at 76.  Thus, where § 58B is applicable, 
the ninety-day clock begins to run at the time that a person is 
detained and his or her liberty is curtailed irrespective of 
when the formal order is issued.  Any other interpretation would 
be antithetical to the statute's presumptive time limit on when 
the case will be "brought to trial" and the Legislature's intent 
that priority be given to cases where § 58B has been invoked.5  
Id.  Cf. Abbott A. v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 24, 40 (2010) 
("Pretrial detention under § 58A was intended to be short lived, 
ending on the conclusion of a speedy trial"). 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed supra, we hold that 
the presumptive ninety-day time limit on pretrial detention 
outlined in G. L. c. 276, § 58B, begins to run at the time an 
 
5 Moreover, "where the language of a criminal statute 
plausibly can be found ambiguous, the rule of lenity requires 
that the defendant receive the benefit of the ambiguity."  
Commonwealth v. Dayton, 477 Mass. 224, 226 (2017).  "We 
recognize that [§ 58B] is not a 'criminal' statute in the sense 
of enumerating the elements of a particular crime.  However, it 
applies only where someone has been charged with a crime, and it 
opens the door to a potentially severe curtailment of a 
defendant's liberty . . . .  Therefore, the rule of lenity 
applies" and further supports our conclusion.  Id. at 226 n.2.  
See Lougee, 485 Mass. at 79-80. 
9 
 
individual is detained, regardless of whether a formal order of 
detention has entered.  We therefore affirm the order of the 
Appeals Court single justice allowing the defendant's petition 
for extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.