Case Title: IMO Patrick M. Pajerowski, An Attorney at Law

Citation: 

Docket Number: d-224-97

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 1998-12-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). PER CURIAM This is an attorney disciplinary matter, which arises from a recommendation for discipline filed by the Committee on Attorney Advertising (CAA) against respondent, Patrick M. Pajerowski. Pajerowski, who was admitted to practice in 1978, maintains a law office in Newark, New Jersey. He entered into a Stipulation of Facts and Discipline in which he admitted that he had violated numerous Rules of Professional Conduct ( RPCs ) , the most serious of which included RPC 1.8(e)(acquiring proprietary interest in client's cause of action); RPC 5.4(splitting fees with nonlawyer); RPC 5.5(assisting in unauthorized practice of law); RPC 7.2(c)(giving something of value for recommending legal services); RPC 7.3(b)(soliciting client unable to exercise reasonable judgment); and RPC 7.3(d)(providing compensation for recommending lawyer's services). The Stipulation detailed respondent's misconduct, which can be grouped into four categories: the Runner cases, the Loan cases, the Failure to Communicate case, and the Conflict of Interest case. In the runner cases, between 1991 and 1994, Pajerowski solicited clients through his office manager and investigator, who contacted accident victims either at their homes or in hospitals on the same day that the accidents occurred or shortly thereafter. In most of those cases, Pajerowski did not know the physical, emotional or mental state of many of his prospective clients and therefore could not know whether they could exercise reasonable judgment in retaining his services. Moreover, in one of those cases, respondent undertook to represent both driver and passenger in a vehicle, without disclosing the circumstances of the multiple representation and without obtaining their consent thereto. In addition, in many of these cases, the runner had either directed the victims to a particular medical provider for treatment or offered to do so, regardless of whether the victims had complained of injury. Finally, respondent had paid the runner wages far in excess of the reasonable value of his services as an office manager and investigator. Pajerowski also stipulated that in ten separate matters, he had provided financial assistance to individual clients in connection with their pending or contemplated litigation by advancing sums of money up to the amount he thought would be the net settlement or recovery on the particular claim. Moreover, Pajerowski failed to explain to those clients the potential conflicts that could arise from advancing money and did not suggest that those clients execute any written agreement for the loan transactions. The stipulation further provided that throughout the five years during which a particular personal injury matter was pending, Pajerowski failed to communicate with his client in any form whatever. Pajerowski settled that matter without any input from or communication with his client. In the Stipulation of Facts and Discipline, the CAA recommended a three-year suspension. However, a majority of the Disciplinary Review Board ( DRB ) recommended disbarment, concluding that Pajerowski's misconduct was so unsavory and repugnant to the profession and harmful to the victims that the public would be effectively protected only by his disbarment. The majority further indicated that it [would] not hesitate to recommend disbarment when a pattern of pervasiveness is proven by the requisite standard of proof. The dissenting members of the DRB believed that Pajerowski's misconduct did not rise to the level of misconduct that would justify disbarment. Focusing on Pajerowski's cooperation with the disciplinary authorities and his acceptance of the impropriety of his conduct, the dissenting members concluded that he should be suspended for three years. The matter was before the Supreme Court pursuant to R. 1:20-16(a). HELD: Pajerowski is disbarred for his serious and numerous acts of misconduct with respect to the runner cases, together with his other ethical transgressions. 1. Although Pajerowski may have been unaware of each solicitation at the time it occurred, by previously authorizing such conduct and by subsequently ratifying it by accepting the clients and paying the runner, respondent encouraged the runner to engage in similar future misconduct, and therefore violated RPC 5.3; RPC 7.1(a); RPC 7.3(b); RPC 8.4(a); and RPC 8.4(d). (pp. 8-9) 2. By giving the runner such a substantial salary, Pajerowski was compensating him to recommend or secure his employment by clients and thus engaged in unethical fee-splitting with a non-lawyer and assisted him in the unauthorized practice of law, in violation of RPC 5.4; RPC 5.5; RPC 7.2 and RPC 7.3(d). (pp. 9-10) 3. By representing both driver and passengers without disclosing the potential conflict of interest or obtaining his clients' consent to the multiple representation, and by continuing to represent the passengers after terminating the representation of the driver, Pajerowski violated RPC 1.7(a) & (b) and RPC 1.9(a). (p.10) 4. By failing to communicate with his client over the five year period during which her claim was pending, and by failing to consult with her prior to settlement of her claim, Pajerowski violated RPC 1.2(a); RPC 1.3, and RPC 1.4(a). (p. 10) 5. In advancing sums to clients, Pajerowski violated RPC 1.7(b)&(c) and RPC 1.8(e)&(j). (pp. 10-11) 6. When an attorney pays a runner to solicit clients, numerous problems arise that adversely affect the public, the bar and the judicial system, presenting an opportunity for fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of vexatious conduct. (pp. 15-17) 7. Although the public needs to be protected from the solicitation of legal business by runners, every runner case will not call for disbarment. Rather, the circumstances surrounding each case will be considered in determining the appropriate measure of discipline. (pp. 17-18) 8. Pajerowski's knowledge and countenance of the runners' conduct in assisting his clients to file false medical claims poisons the well of justice and constitutes grave misconduct that goes to the heart of the administration of justice. (pp. 18-19) Patrick Pajerowski is DISBARRED and is to reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in the Court's opinion. IN THE MATTER OF PATRICK M. PAJEROWSKI, An Attorney at Law. Argued October 14, 1998--Decided December 4, 1998 On an Order to Show Cause why respondent should not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined. Robert J. De Groot argued the cause on behalf of the Office of Attorney Ethics. Lewis P. Sengstacke argued the cause for respondent (Davis, Saperstein & Salomon, attorneys). PER CURIAM This matter arises from a recommendation for discipline filed by the Committee on Attorney Advertising ("CAA") against respondent, Patrick M. Pajerowski. Respondent and the CAA executed a Stipulation of Facts and Discipline in which respondent admitted that he had violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct: RPC 1.2(a) (failing to abide by client's decision); RPC 1.3 (failing to act with diligence); RPC 1.4(a) (failing to communicate); RPC 1.7(a), RPC 1.7(b), and RPC 1.7(c) (representing clients with conflicts of interest); RPC 1.8(e) (providing financial assistance to client); RPC 1.8(j) (acquiring proprietary interest in client's cause of action); RPC 1.9(a) (representing client with interest adverse to former client); RPC 5.3 (failing to properly supervise nonlawyer); RPC 5.4 (splitting fees with nonlawyer); RPC 5.5 (assisting in unauthorized practice of law); RPC 7.1(a) (providing misleading communication about lawyer's services); RPC 7.2(c) (giving value for recommending legal services); RPC 7.3(b) (soliciting client unable to exercise reasonable judgment); RPC 7.3(d) (providing compensation for recommending lawyer's services); RPC 8.4(a) (violating Rules of Professional Conduct); and RPC 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). In seventy-three paragraphs, the Stipulation detailed respondent's misconduct. It proposed a three-year suspension. A majority of the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) voted to disbar respondent. Three members voted to impose a three-year suspension. Based on our independent review of the record, we are persuaded that the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that respondent should be disbarred. Although not injured in the accident, Kimberlee and John Bartee obtained treatment from the doctor recommended by Burgess. According to a statement given by Kimberlee to Home Insurance Company, which was investigating possible insurance fraud, all of the patients in the doctor's waiting room had indicated that they had been referred by respondent. Kimberlee told Home Insurance Company that neither she nor her brother had suffered any pain until after they were treated by the doctor. The pain disappeared only after they discontinued the treatment. At 6:00 P.M. on the day of the accident, December 28, 1994, Burgess and an unidentified individual also went to Chanel Churchwell's home to solicit her representation. Burgess obtained Chanel's consent to retain respondent as her attorney. Although respondent was engaged to simultaneously represent the driver of the vehicle and its passengers, he failed to disclose to his clients the circumstances of the multiple representation and to obtain their consent thereto. According to Kimberlee, she never met respondent or went to his office. On February 2, 1995, respondent notified Kimberlee that he would not be representing her, ostensibly because the police report and other investigation demonstrated that she had caused the automobile accident. Respondent continued to represent the passengers, who filed claims against Kimberlee, without disclosing to all of them the circumstances of the representation or obtaining their consent to continue as their attorney. The Lewis Matter Tracey Lewis was treated at a hospital for injuries sustained in an automobile accident on October 3, 1993. The next day Burgess appeared at Lewis's residence, gave her respondent's business card and solicited respondent's professional employment. At the time of the solicitation, respondent did not know if Lewis's physical, emotional or mental state was such that she could exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer. In fact, according to the investigative report, Lewis was very upset that Burgess went to her home. She had been traumatized by the car accident and had not yet obtained a copy of the police report. Despite making it clear to Burgess that she was not interested in retaining respondent, two weeks later she received in the mail a t-shirt with the logo of respondent's law firm on it. The Santos Matter On February 16, 1991, Eileen Santos was taken to the emergency room of a hospital for treatment, following a car accident. The next day Burgess went to the Santos residence and introduced himself as respondent's "legal assistant." Burgess gave Santos a copy of the police report, a retainer agreement and other documents. Burgess told Santos that he would arrange for examination and treatment by a doctor as soon as she signed the retainer agreement. At the time of Burgess's solicitation, respondent did not know whether Santos's physical, emotional or mental state was such that she could exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer. The Graves Matter Regetta Graves was injured while riding as a passenger on a New Jersey Transit bus on September 21, 1993. On the same day Burgess and another individual went to the Graves residence. Burgess told Graves that respondent represented other bus passengers. He offered to refer her to doctors and to assist her in obtaining compensation for her injuries. Later that day a solicitation letter from respondent was taped to Graves's mailbox. The Quarles Matter On September 10, 1991, Andrew and Lucille Quarles suffered injuries as a result of an automobile accident. On the same day Burgess went to the Quarles residence. Although he was not able to see them, Burgess left respondent's business cards, which listed Burgess's name under the law firm's name. This attempt to contact Mr. and Mrs. Quarles occurred prior to the filing of police reports. At the time of the attempted solicitation, respondent did not know whether the Quarleses' physical, emotional or mental state was such that they could exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer. The Harris Matter George Harris, Jr. sustained injuries in an automobile accident on December 5, 1991. Later that day, Burgess left respondent's business card at Harris's residence. The business card listed Burgess's name under the law firm's name. Burgess's attempted solicitation took place before the filing of police reports, at a time when respondent did not know whether Harris's physical, emotional or mental state was such that he could exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer. The Green Matter On July 20, 1993, Janet Green was taken to a hospital after being injured in an automobile accident. Burgess approached her in the emergency room, gave her one of respondent's business cards and told her that respondent would obtain a larger monetary award for her than any other attorney. At the time of this solicitation, respondent did not know whether Green's physical, emotional or mental state was such that she could exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer. The Gonzalez Matter Adelaida Gonzalez was injured in an automobile accident on July 20, 1993. Burgess visited her at the hospital emergency room, handed her respondent's busines card with Burgess's name on it and solicited her to retain respondent as her attorney. Later Burgess contacted Gonzalez by letter and telephone to persuade her to retain respondent. At the time Burgess approached Gonzalez, respondent had no knowledge of whether her physical, emotional or mental state was such that she could exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer. The DRB further observed: Respondent's misconduct was not only unprofessional and intrusive, but also regrettably contributes to the negative image that some members of the public associate with attorneys. Respondent's misconduct not only dishonored himself but also the profession whose reputation this Board is charged to protect. Respondent's ethics violations damaged not only the prospective clients he solicited, but also the entire bar. Indeed, the majority of the DRB found that "there is no penalty short of disbarment appropriate for this fact pattern." Accordingly, the DRB suggests that it "will not hesitate to recommend disbarment when a pattern of pervasiveness is proven by the requisite standard of proof." The dissenting members of the DRB view respondent's misconduct differently. They believe that it does not rise to the level of conduct that would justify disbarment. They found that respondent had not engaged in a continuous course of misconduct that demonstrates an attitude wholly inconsistent with and indifferent to ethical standards (thus warranting the label "incorrigible"). Nor did they find that respondent committed an offense of so gross a nature, such as bribery of a public official, theft, or embezzlement, that no other penalty but disbarment would be suitable. They particularly focused on respondent's cooperation with the disciplinary authorities and his acceptance of the impropriety of his conduct in determining that appropriate discipline would be a three-year suspension. Further, the Court observed that "[f]or such infractions in the future more drastic measures may be expected." Id. at 599. In a strong dissent Justice Brennan, then of the New Jersey Supreme Court, joined by Chief Justice Vanderbilt, advocated Frankel's disbarment: I do not think we can fail to emphasize the seriousness of the offense committed by the respondent. In the vernacular, it is 'ambulance chasing,' * * * Three decades ago this pernicious practice was rampant in many sections of the country and led to numerous investigations which, for a time at least, cleansed the profession of a number of practitioners guilty of the most flagrant abuses. The next "runner" case was In re Introcaso, 26 N.J. 353, 359 (1958). There, the Court found that the respondent had violated Canons 22, 27, 28 and 34, by employing a runner to solicit clients in three criminal matters, by improperly dividing legal fees, and by testifying with a lack of candor. However, because Introcaso's conduct had occurred before the Court's decision in In re Frankel, supra, and due to his unblemished reputation, the Court imposed only a three-year suspension. In 1972, the Court held that a three-month suspension from the practice of law was appropriate discipline for a respondent who accepted referrals and who had remitted part of his fees to his runner. In re Bregg, 61 N.J. 476 (1972). In that case the Court observed that the case was different from the "kind of studied and hardened disregard for ethical standards, accompanied by a total lack of candor, that was present in both In re Frankel, supra, 20 N.J. at 588, and In re Introcaso, supra, 26 N.J. at 353." Id. at 478-79. In In re Shaw, 88 N.J. 433 (1982), however, the Court disbarred an attorney who represented both passenger and driver involved in an accident suit, used a runner to solicit a client in a personal injury case, "purchased" the client's cause of action for $30,000, settled the case for $97,500 and then had his runner forge the client's name on the check. In that case the DRB recommended a suspension of three years. Observing that ["i]t is difficult to imagine a more sinister threat to a professional relationship than the conduct so painstakingly portrayed in the DRB's report," the Court held that respondent must be disbarred. Id. at 442. As recently as 1998, we voiced our strong disapproval of the employment of a runner to solicit legal business. In re Ravich, Koster, Tobin, 155 N.J. 357, 374 (1998). In observing that one of the attorney's actions bordered on the "unethical practice of running," we stated: In In re Frankel, 20 N.J. 588, 120 A.2d 603 (1956), we disciplined an attorney for entering into a monetary agreement with a photographer who would visit accident scenes and solicit negligence cases for the attorney. We characterized the conduct as "reprehensible and vicious" and a "serious transgression of the ethical principle[s]." Id. at 598, 120 A.2d 603. Misconduct based on "running" remains a public and professional concern. See, e.g., Assembly Bill No. 1829 (reflecting view that the hiring of a runner to solicit professional services on behalf of an attorney should be subject to criminal sanctions). We recognize that when In re Frankel, supra, 20 N.J. 588 and In re Introcaso, supra, 26 N.J. 353, were decided attorneys were forbidden from soliciting business, either directly or through employees or runners. See Canon 28 (then in effect); Canon 27 (forbidding "touters."). Today lawyers are allowed to advertise and solicit business subject to reasonable regulations. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462, 98 S. Ct. 1912, 1921, 56 L. Ed. 2d 444, 457 (1978). Nonetheless, when an attorney pays a runner to solicit clients, numerous problems arise that adversely affect the public, the bar and the judicial system. Soliciting accident victims so soon after their injuries presents an opportunity for "fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of vexatious conduct." Ibid. As is evident in this case, Burgess was fabricating false medical claims and respondent authorized such communications. For example, with respect to the Bartee matter, respondent stipulated the following: 7. Kenneth Burgess advised Kimberly Bartee that Respondent's office would send her to a doctor and that she would receive treatments for her back two or three times a week. He then directed her to fill out a form indicating that she was suffering from back and head pain. 8. When John Bartee, Jr. entered the room and advised him that he too had been in the car, Mr. Burgess directed him to fill out a form indicating that he was suffering from back and head pain. 9. Respondent authorized Kenneth Burgess to communicate this information to prospective personal injury clients such as Kimberly Bartee and have them execute retainer agreements and, in some instances, forms indicating that they were suffering from back and head pain. Indeed, the dangers Justice Brennan discussed in his dissent in In re Frankel, supra, 20 N.J. at 610 are amply demonstrated in this case. Quoting from the 1929 Report of the Special Committee on Professional Abuses in Accident Litigation, chaired by Henry S. Drinker, Jr., Justice Brennan stated: Such organized solicitation of accident claims, conducted by such type men, inevitably results in the manufacture of fake claims, in the gross exaggeration of scratches and bruises to the appearance of major injuries, and in the fraudulent attempt to attribute real injuries or ailments to accidents which really had no causal relation to them -- all by means of perjured testimony, usually in collusion with one or more of a class of physicians who make a practice, for a contingent compensation, of giving such expert testimony as will meet the necessities of the case. 'The practice of 'ambulance chasing' is so well known and so obviously improper as to require no extensive comment. It is most prevalent in large communities, and comprehensive investigations and drives to stamp it out have been held, with more or less success, usually but temporary, in many such jurisdictions.' NO. D-224 Decided December 4, 1998 Order returnable Opinion by PER CURIAM