Case Title: OLSON v MANION S INC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1973-05-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12384 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T OF T H E STATE O F MONTkIU 1973 DUANE OLSON, Claimant and Appellant, PIP,NIOII~I'S INC. , Employer, FEDERATED M U T U T A L K C 1 R D I d A R E & IMPLEMENT INSWANCE CBMPAM', Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert Kell er, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : McGarvey, Morrison and Hedman, K a l i s p e l l , Montana, James D. Moore argued, K a l i s p e l l , Montana. For Respondent : Korn, Warden, Walterskirchen and Christiansen, Kalispel.l, Montana. Meritt N . Warden argued, K a l i s p e l l , Montana. Submitted: April- 24, 1973 Decided : MR( 1 5 1973 Filed : MAY 1.5 :973 Y r . ?ustice Gene B. Dafy delivered the Opinion CIE the Court. This appeal i s from a decision of the d i s t r i c t court of the eleventh j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , Flathead County, affirming an . ~ r d e r af the I n d u s t r i a l Accident Board denying benefits t o p l a i n t i f f Duane Olson. O n January 23, 1962, Olson i n an i n d u s t r i a l accident sustained i n j u r i e s which impeded h i s movement and a b i l i t y t o assume c e r t a i n ~ o s i t i o n s . A claim was f i l e d by Olson and accepted by the In- d u s t r i a l Accident Board under Plan 2 of the Workmen's compensation Act5 carried by h i s employer Manion's I n c , , a car dealership and garage i n Kalispell. k t that time temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y compensation was paid f o r a period of 9 and 4/7ths weeks. In 1-967 the Industrial Accident Board on rehearing determined t h a t 3lson had suffered permanent p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y from 5% of the back t o 20% of the body a s a whole, Later t h a t year, a subsequent application f o r rehearing was denied by the Board and Olson ap- pealed the ~ o a r d ' s order t o the d i s t r i c t court. After several continuances, the d i s t r i c t court on July 5 , 1972, ruled against Olson, adopting the ~ o a r d ' s findings of f a c t and conclusions of law which denied admissibi.lity of c e r t a i n evi- dence offered by Olson on the ground i c was without l e g a l e f f e c t . The additional evidence offered by Olson and refused by the Soard and the d i s t r i c t court was: (1) A t the time Olson sustained t h e cornpensable injury i n 1962 he was earning $2.50 per hour but t h e same job a t Manion's paid $4,60 per hour i n 1972. ( 2 j ~ l s o n ' s present job, which pays $3.80 per hour, i s s u b s t i t u t e employment because he i s physically unable t o perform the job he held p r i o r Lo i.njury, O n appeal the sole issue i s whether the I n d u s t r i a l Accidcnt SoC*rd and the d i s t r i c t court erred i n refusing to admit and con- sider the offered evidence of impairment of earning capacity. Section 92-703, R. C.N. 1947, establishes the amount of compensation t o be paid i n cases of permanent p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y . It provides f o r a fixed percentage (subject t o a s t a t e d maximum): It* * * of the difference between the wages received a t the time of the injury and t h e wages t h a t such injured employee i s able t o earn thereafter 9: ik i?". (Emphasis added) Olson r e l i e s on cases decided by t h i s Court applying section IS 92-703, i n which the terms loss of earning capacityt' and "loss of a b i l i t y t o earn in the open markett' were used: Shaffer v , Midland Empire Packing Co., 127 Mont. 211, 259 P.2d 340; Mahlum v. Broeder, 147 Mont. 386, 412 P.2d 572. W e a l s o c i t e s section 92-838, R.C.M. 1947, which s t a t e s : I I Idhenever t h i s a c t or any part o r section thereof i s interpreted by a court i t s h a l l be l i b e r a l l y construed by such court. ! I ' It i s fundamental t o the issue of t h i s case t o keep i n mind t h a t the workmen's compensation system i s not based on common law t o r t l i a b i l i t y concepts, but r a t h e r depends upon the p a r t i c u l a r s t a t u t e s which the l e g i s l a t u r e enacts t o c r e a t e and administer the system. 2 arson's workmen's Compensation Law 5 57.10, pp.2,3 s t a t e s : I t It has been stressed repeatedly t h a t the d i s t i n c - t i v e feature of the compensation system, by contrast with t o r t l i a b i l - i t y i.s that i t s awards (apart from medical benefits) a r e made not f o r physical injury a s such, but f o r ' d i s a b i l i t y ' produced by such injury, The c e n t r a l problem, then, becomes t h a t of analyzing the unique and r a t h e r complex l e g a l concept which, by years of compensation l e g i s l a t i o n , decision, and prac- 1 t i c e , has been b u i l t up around the term compensable d i s a b i l i t y ' , " hrhat c o n s t i t u t e s a "compensable d i s a b i l i t y " i s not a s t a t i c concept, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the instance of permanent p a r t i a l dis- a b i l i t y , Section 92-830, R.C.M, 1947, empowers the Board a t any t i m e a f t e r an award i s made, t o review, increase o r diminish t h a t award. Possible bases f o r review include: changes i n the job market affecting the a v a i l a b i l i t y of jobs which the disabled can perform; changes i n tecl~nolagy o r method i n a p a r t i c u l a r job f i e l d so a s t o preclude a disabled person from performing; o r , a determination t h a t subsequent wages earned were based on con- sideration of sympathy o r relationship. None of these situations apply i n t h e i n s t a n t case. Essentially, Olson i s contending t h a t he has a compensable d i s a b i l i t y based on h i s i n a b i l i t y t o do h i s old job, 99 C,J.S. workmen's Compensation 5 295, p. 1031, s t a t e s : 1 I Earning power i n same o r other employment. It has been held under, apart from, o r without reference t o , s t a t u t e s so providing, t h a t t h e t e s t of an in- jured employee's r i g h t t o compensation i s h i s in- a b i l i t y by reason of t h e injury t o work and earn wages ' n t h e employment a t which he was engaged when injured, so t h a t the earning capacity remaining t o the employee i n other c a l l i n g s cannot be considered. r ow ever, i t i s otherwise under s t a t u t e s which impose no such limitation, o r where the compensation i s measured by the l o s s of a b i l i t y t o earn i n any s u i t - able employment or i n the sane-or any other employ- ment $ ? ;'c *. 11 The f a s t t h a t a claimant might have been earning more had he been able t o resume, and been promoted i n , the employment he was engaged i n when injured does not a f f e c t the determination. 'Idhere the average weekly wages which a claimant i s able t o earn a r e not limited t o those he could earn i n the same employment but include the whole monetary r e s u l t of a reasonable use of a l l h i s powers, mental and physical, whether working f o r himself o r f o r others and whether o r not h i s earnings a r e called wages i n common speech, no compensation can be had where t a l e n t s previously undiscovered produce an earning capacity greater than t h a t enjoyed p r i o r t o t h e injury." (Emphasis added). I n Montanaf s Workman's Compensation Act we find no limitation of consideration t o a disabled's earning a b i l i t y i n the same em- ployment, o r the same type of employment he was engaged i n when injured. Dosen v , East Butte Copper Min. Co., 78 Mont, 579, 254 P. 880; McXinzie v, Sandon, 141 Mont. 540, 380 P.2d 580. The N e w Hampshire court i n Desrosiers v , Dionne Bros. Furni- t u r e , Inc., 98 N.H. 424, 101 A.2d 775, 778, decided under a similar statutory provision an analagous f a c t s i t u a t i o n , and s t a t e d : 1 1 In some jurisdictions earning capacity r e f e r s only t o the employee's capacity t o earn i n the employment o r trade i n which he was working a t the time of the accident so t h a t f o r compensation purposes t h e earning capacity remaining t o him i n other c a l l i n g s i s not considered. * * Section 23 of our a c t imposes no such limitation nor has it been so interpreted. * 2 I I The t e s t of compensable d i s a b i l i t y under our s t a t u t e i s not the employee's a b i l i t y o r dis- a b i l i t y because of h i s injury t o do hi.s old job. Nor i s it what the claimant could have earned but f o r h i s injury i n t h e employment o r trade i n which he was working a t the time of the acci.- dent. * * It i s the difference between ' h i s average weekly wage before the injury and the average weekly wage he i s able t o earn t h e r e a f t e r ' with h i s injury i n s u i t a b l e work under normal employment conditions, 1 1 W e hold t h a t t h e t e s t of compensable d i s a b i l i t y under the Montana workmen's Compensation Act i s "the difference between the wages received a t the time of the i n j u r y and the wages t h a t such injured employee i s a b l e t o earn thereafter" i n any s u i t a b l e f i e l d of employment o r profession he subsequently e n t e r s under normal conditions, whether o r not h i s earnings in t h a t f i e l d of employment o r profession a r e comronly called "wages". Olsonls contention t h z t t h i s r u l e makes no provision for "inflation" o r "parity" i s correct. H e makes a meritorioils argu- ment supporting the desirabil-ity and p r a c t i c a l i t y of such a pro- vision, and we take j u d i c i a l notice of t h e f a c t t h a t prevailing wage scales have r i s e n i n the period between 1962 and 1972. However, it i s neither the function nor prerogative of t h i s Court t o rewrite the workmen's Compensation Act t o include such.a provision. That i s the function of the legisl.ature, The courts of t h i s s t a t e have followed the d i r e c t i v e s e t forth i n section 92-838, R.C.M. 1947, i n l i b e r a l l y construing the pro- visions of the Act, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the interpretation of the terms I I i n the course of" and "arising out of". Rut we see no room f o r 11 i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the words wages received a t the time of injury. As t h i s Court said i n ?font. Assn. of Tobacco and Candy Distributors v. State Board of Equalization, 156 Mont. 108, 114, 476 P.2d 775: "b+%ere the Language of a s t a t u t e i s p l a i n , un- ambiguous, d i r e c t , and c e r t a i n , the s t a t u t e speaks for i t s e l f and there i s nothing l e f t f o r the court t o construe. 11 The judgment of the d i s t r - - hief Justice i l / cociate Justice. \