Case Title: Scadden v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 86-39

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1987-02-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Scadden v. State1987 WY 12732 P.2d 1036Case Number: 86-39Decided: 02/05/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
BRYAN SCADDEN, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Alan B. Johnson, 
J.

 
 

ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL 
PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] 

 
 

Leonard D. Munker, Public 
Defender, Martin J. McClain, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.

 
 

A.G. McClintock, Atty. 
Gen., John W. Renneisen, and Sylvia Lee Hackl, Senior Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

 
 

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant, a high 
school teacher and girl's volleyball coach, was convicted on one count of second 
degree sexual assault. The victim was a student and team member. Appellant was 
charged with using his position of authority to cause submission to sexual 
intercourse, in violation of § 6-2-303(a)(vi), W.S. 1977. On appeal, appellant 
raises one statutory construction constitutional question, and six procedural or 
sufficiency issues, as claimed error:

 
 

I. Unconstitutionality of 
the statute: Section 6-2-303(a)(vi) violates Art. 1, § 6 of the Wyoming Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United 
States Constitution.

 
 

II. Course-of-activities 
evidence: Introduction of testimony concerning appellant's teaching and coaching 
methods and his influence over students other than the two alleged victims 
violated the Wyoming Rules of Evidence, and deprived appellant of a 
fundamentally fair trial.

 
 

III. Sex-offense expert 
testimony: Admission of Detective Reikens' testimony about the range of 
responses she encountered as a police officer investigating sexual-abuse and 
sexual-assault cases constituted error.

 
 

IV. Motion for a 
mistrial: Denial of appellant's motion for a mistrial was unjustified in light 
of Ms. Hoxey's improper testimony as the State Crime Laboratory specialist, 
regarding the 38 undesignated pubic hairs found in the school closet where 
admitted sexual activity occurred.

 
 

V. Cumulative evidence: 
Rejection for introduction of the transcript of MBS' preliminary hearing denied 
appellant his constitutional right to defend.

 
 

VI. Sufficiency of the 
evidence: There was insufficient evidence to support appellant's 
conviction.

 
 

VII. Instructions: 
Refusal to give the jury Instruction 14 and appellant's proposed Instructions A 
and B was error.

 
 

[¶2.]     Finding no reversible 
error, we affirm.

 
 

FACTS

 
 

[¶3.]     Bryan Scadden, then age 
29, was a continuing-contract teacher and girl's volleyball coach at Cheyenne's EastHigh 
School. The sexual-assault allegations involve his 
relationship with MBS, a high school student and volleyball athlete who 
graduated in 1984, and with KR, another EastHigh 
School student and volleyball player who graduated 
in 1985. 

 
 

[¶4.]     Commencing on or about 
November 1, 1983, when MBS was 17 years old, appellant and MBS began a course of 
sexual relations that continued through September 12, 1984. The sexual affair 
between the coach and KR began in October of 1984, and lasted a shorter time, 
terminating when police investigatory activities intervened.

 
 

[¶5.]     Appellant was charged 
with five counts of sexual assault: one of first-degree sexual assault, and four 
of second-degree. The four second-degree sexual assault charges were brought 
under § 6-2-303(a)(vi), W.S. 1977, hereafter referred to as the "position of 
authority" statute. Appellant was convicted on one charge of second-degree 
sexual assault under that statute, and acquitted of the other four charged 
offenses. The conviction, which resulted in a sentence of confinement for two to 
five years, involved an incident with MBS that occurred about December 26, 
1983.

 
 

[¶6.]     Throughout the trial, 
the prosecution sought to portray appellant as a highly influential authority 
figure who encouraged the victims to become dependent on him in an atmosphere of 
trust, and who then used this influence to impose his sexual will on those 
students. Conversely, appellant sought to convince the jury that with MBS he 
developed a relationship of consensual sex founded on love, and that KR seduced 
him. In both cases he maintained that the young women freely consented. 
Appellant's argument apparently won favor with the jury on four charges but not 
the fifth - or it decided that a conviction on one offense would suffice. 
Logically, in result, the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was not met 
on the four counts for which he was acquitted.

 
 

[¶7.]     The ten-day trial was 
explicit in scope and detail, and encompassed graphic descriptions of various 
sexual acts. The details will only be included in this opinion as justified in 
the discussion and disposition of the issues raised on appeal.

 
 

I

 
 

Unconstitutionality of 
the statute: Section 6-2-303(a)(vi) violates Art. 1, § 6 of the Wyoming Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United 
States Constitution.

 
 

[¶8.]     The relevant portion of 
the challenged statute, § 6-2-303(a)(vi), W.S. 1977 states:

 
 

"(a) Any actor who 
inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in the second 
degree if * * *:

 
 

"(vi) The actor is in a 
position of authority over the victim and uses this position of authority to 
cause the victim to submit."

 
 

"Position of authority" 
is defined in § 6-2-301(a)(vi), W.S. 1977 as

 
 

"* * * that position 
occupied by a parent, guardian, relative, household member, teacher, employer, 
custodian and [or] any other person who, by reason of his position, is able to 
exercise significant influence over a person."

 
 

[¶9.]     It is well settled that 
"`"every law must be presumed to be constitutional, with all reasonable doubt 
resolved in its favor."'" Keser v. State, Wyo., 
706 P.2d 263, 266 (1985), quoting from Sanchez v. State, Wyo., 567 P.2d 270, 274 
(1977). In this context, we examine appellant's two constitutional 
challenges.

 
 

[¶10.]  Appellant asserts that under Griswold v. 
State of Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1965), 
and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147, reh. denied 410 U.S. 959, 93 S. Ct. 1409, 35 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1973), due process 
limits the state's ability to invade certain zones of privacy, and that a zone 
of privacy extends to individuals' decisions whether or not to engage in 
consensual sexual relations. He concedes that the State of Wyoming does have the 
power to regulate sexual relations, but that that power is limited by 
due-process protections of this fundamental and protected liberty. This court 
agrees.

 
 

[¶11.]  However, appellant's argument fails to 
recognize that this case does not involve sexual relations between consenting 
adults. Appellant tried his case under the consent theory, but the jury found 
him guilty under a statute and instructions which required it to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the victim did not consent. May it suffice to say that 
where the constitutional rights to privacy confront the state's police power, 
the privacy rights do not extend to sexual relations between high school 
coach-instructors and underage students. Within the purview of this case, we 
determine that instructors do not have a constitutional right to have sexual 
relations with minor students in the state's educational system. We distinguish 
any authority which pertains to adults or concerns the privacy-of-the-home 
relationship. E.g., Griswold v. State of Connecticut, supra. Cf. majority and 
dissenting opinions in Bowers v. Hardwick, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 92 L. Ed. 2d 140, reh. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S. Ct. 29, 92 L. Ed. 2d 779 (1986).

 
 

[¶12.]  The jury was instructed both that lack of 
consent is an element of the crime which the State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and that consent is a defense to the crime for which appellant 
was convicted. Instruction No. 9 states, in relevant part:

 
 

"The necessary elements 
of each charge of sexual assault in the second degree are:

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"4. The alleged victim 
did not consent to sexual intrusion, but was caused to submit because of 
defendant's use of his position of authority as to her.

 
 

"If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any of these elements has not been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt as to a charge, then you should find the defendant not 
guilty of that charge.

 
 

"If on the other hand, 
you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements 
has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt as to a charge, then you should find 
the defendant guilty of that charge."

 
 

[¶13.]  Instruction No. 10 states:

 
 

"`Submit' as used in this 
case means that the person subjected to sexual intrusion by an actor, who is in 
a position of authority over that person, does not give free, full and reasoned 
consent."

 
 

[¶14.]  Instruction No. 11 states:

 
 

"Consent by the person 
assaulted is a defense to the charge of sexual assault in the first and second 
degree. The defense of consent involves two separate elements.

 
 

"1. That the alleged 
victim did voluntarily consent to the act by word or conduct; and

 
 

"2. That the alleged 
victim had the present ability to consent or the defendant could not reasonably 
have known that the alleged victim lacked the present ability to 
consent.

 
 

"The State has the burden 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no consent by the alleged 
victim."

 
 

[¶15.]  The State contended, and the jury found, 
that the victim did not give free, full and reasoned consent to the sexual act 
for which appellant was convicted. See an excellent discussion of the 
course-of-conduct consent question in State v. Kennedy, Utah, 
616 P.2d 594 (1980).

 
 

[¶16.]  The law in Wyoming, and indeed the 
law in general, has always limited some sexual contacts. The primary purpose for 
these proscriptions against sexual relations is the absence of acceptable 
consensual participation in the act. The State of Wyoming has a compelling 
interest in regulating sexual contacts between persons when one of those persons 
does not consent or lacks the capacity to consent. Incest or statutory rape are 
readily apparent examples. State v. Ross, 16 Wyo. 285, 301, 93 P. 299, reh. denied 16 
Wyo. 285, 94 P. 217 (1908).

 
 

[¶17.]  In the exercise of its governmental 
police power, the legislature has thrown out the protecting arm of the law to 
guard those persons who are vulnerable to the powers and influence of one in a 
position of authority. This legislative act permits the State to show that the 
victim did not consent, by demonstrating that the perpetrator occupied a 
position of authority over the victim and used that position to impose his 
sexual will. The consensual status of the conduct can be disproved by 
establishing the participants' relationship, and the defendant's use of that 
relationship to compel the victim to succumb. This statute is neither 
unreasonable nor arbitrary, and is within the police power of the state to enact 
laws for the general welfare of the people. Kalman v. Western Union Telegraph 
Co., Wyo., 390 P.2d 724, 726 (1964); Pirie v. 
Kamps, 68 Wyo. 
83, 229 P.2d 927, 929, 26 A.L.R.2d 647 (1951).

 
 

[¶18.]  The challenged statute allows the 
factfinder to evaluate whether there was legal consent. Because, under the 
position-of-authority statute, the jury found no legal consent, this case does 
not involve consensual sexual relations, and appellant's due-process argument 
does not apply.

 
 

[¶19.]  Appellant's equal-protection challenge 
that the statute is void for vagueness also fails. The well-established standard 
for an equal-protection challenge was stated by this court in Keser v. State, 
supra, 706 P.2d at 266:

 
 

"An ordinance or statute 
is void for vagueness if it fails to give a person of ordinary sensibility fair 
notice that the contemplated conduct is forbidden. Part of the rationale for 
this rule is that vagueness encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and 
convictions. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S. Ct. 839, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1972). Wyoming has followed the constitutional 
guideline that a criminal statute violates an essential principle of due process 
if

 
 

"`[m]en must necessarily 
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' Sanchez v. State, 
Wyo., 567 P.2d 270, 274 (1977)."

 
 

[¶20.]  This court clearly set out these 
requirements in State v. Gallegos, Wyo., 384 P.2d 967 (1963), summarizing the analysis of Day 
v. Armstrong, Wyo., 362 P.2d 137 (1961), which has since 
been regularly followed:

 
 

"1. The requirement of a 
reasonable degree of certainty in legislation, especially in the criminal law, 
is a well-established element of the guarantee of due process of 
law.

 
 

"2. No one may be 
required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of 
penal statutes.

 
 

"3. All are entitled to 
be informed as to what the state commands or forbids.

 
 

"4. A statute which 
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of 
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application violates the first essential of due process of law.

 
 

"5. The constitutional 
guarantee of equal rights under the law (see Art. 1, §§ 2 and 3, Wyoming 
Constitution) will not tolerate a criminal law so lacking in definition that 
each defendant is left to the vagaries of individual judges and juries." State 
v. Gallegos, Wyo., supra, 384 P.2d  at 968.

 
 

See also Newton v. State, Wyo., 698 P.2d 1149 (1985); Armijo v. State, Wyo., 678 P.2d 864 (1984); and Dover v. State, Wyo., 664 P.2d 536 
(1983).

 
 

[¶21.]  The Supreme Court of Louisiana recently 
restated the above principles in State v. Griffin, La., 495 So. 2d 1306, 
1308-1309 (1986):

 
 

"Attacks on the 
constitutionality of a statute may be made by two methods. The statute itself 
can be challenged, or the statute's application to a particular defendant can be 
the basis of the attack. Possible constitutional challenges may be based on 
either `vagueness' or `overbreadth' grounds. * * *

 
 

"A statute would be void 
for vagueness when it does not give `a person of ordinary intelligence . . . 
fair notice of what conduct is forbidden. . . .' [Citation.] The requirement of 
lack of vagueness or definiteness is derived from the due process clauses of the 
United 
States and Louisiana Constitutions * * *. Under 
these provisions, a criminal statute must meet two requirements in order to pass 
constitutional muster. First, it must give adequate notice to individuals of the 
conduct which is proscribed and punishable by law. Second, adequate standards 
must be provided for those charged with determining the guilt or innocence of 
the accused. [Citations.]"

 
 

See also Commonwealth v. 
Stenhach, 356 Pa. Super. 5, 514 A.2d 114 (1986).

 
 

[¶22.]  Section 6-2-303(a)(vi), W.S. 1977 makes 
it criminal for any person in a position of authority over a victim to use that 
position to cause the victim to submit. "Position of authority" is further 
defined as:

 
 

"* * * [T]hat position 
occupied by a parent, guardian, relative, household member, teacher, employer, 
custodian and [or] any other person who by reason of his position is able to 
exercise significant influence over a person." Section 
6-2-301(a)(vi).

 
 

[¶23.]  The State did not rely separately on 
appellant's position as a teacher, although that relationship was obviously a 
factor in appellant's status. Rather, the State prosecuted and appellant was 
convicted under the last phrase of the definition: "any other person who by 
reason of his position is able to exercise significant influence over a person." 
It is this phrase which appellant challenges for vagueness.

 
 

[¶24.]  Appellant argues that under this statute 
it is a crime for anyone to convince another to have sex with him by using 
emotional involvement, and extends this construct to apply to numerous 
hypothetical situations, including the marriage relationship. We do not find 
appellant's characterization of the law persuasive, since common sense will be 
applied by this court to the statutory language. Dover v. State, supra.

 
 

[¶25.]  First, this court follows the principle 
announced by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550, 95 S. Ct. 710, 42 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1975), that "vagueness challenges 
to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in 
the light of the facts of the case at hand." Sorenson v. State, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1031, 1034 (1979); Sears v. State, 
Wyo., 632 P.2d 946, 951 (1981).

 
 

[¶26.]  This case involves a very young woman, 
then in high school, who was in large part controlled by the attention and 
demands of appellant as her teacher, coach and confidant. It is not necessary, 
nor does the law permit us to examine the constitutionality of the statute by 
inventing situations in which the law's application might seem absurd or 
invalid. Sanchez v. State, supra, 567 P.2d 270; In re Romer, Wyo., 436 P.2d 956 
(1968).

 
 

[¶27.]  Second, the words employed by the 
legislature in announcing the law must be given their plain and ordinary 
meaning. McArtor v. State, Wyo., 699 P.2d 288, 
292 (1985); Hurst v. State, Wyo., 698 P.2d 1130 
(1985). It is helpful to look to Burton's Legal Thesaurus, which defines 
authority as: "[J]urisdiction, legal power, legitimacy, prerogative, right to 
adjudicate, right to command, right to determine, right to settle issues, 
rightful power." Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed. (1979) defines authority as: 
"Permission. Right to exercise powers; to implement and enforce laws; to exact 
obedience; to command; to judge. Control over; jurisdiction. Often synonymous 
with power."

 
 

[¶28.]  From these sources it is apparent that 
the legislature used the word "authority" to mean an externally granted power, 
not a self-generated control. One in a position of authority is a person who 
acquires that status by virtue of society and its system of laws granting to him 
the right of control over another. For example, society grants to a jailer power 
over his prisoner, and, therefore, the jailer is in a position of authority over 
the prisoner. Likewise, the teacher or coach is vested with power by a grant 
from society. The legislature enacted the statute to prohibit persons in such 
positions of authority from using those positions to cause any individual who 
might be subject to authoritative power to submit to sexual acts.

 
 

[¶29.]  In this case, appellant was the victim's 
teacher and coach. As reposed in our educational system, society vested him with 
an authoritative status over her. Even though, in the criminal prosecution, the 
State did not rely on his employment as a teacher, his authority devolved from 
that ascribed status.

 
 

[¶30.]  Appellant, however, seems to argue that 
his position as a teacher is somehow separable from his holding a position of 
authority. We think it is not. The State's structural positing of this case, in 
not relying on the fact that appellant was a teacher to show that he was in a 
position of authority over MBS, does not somehow negate the fact that appellant 
indeed occupied that position. Absent the fact that appellant was the victim's 
teacher, none of the events for which appellant was charged and convicted would 
have occurred. In light of these facts, we decline appellant's invitation to 
strike the statute as void for vagueness. A plethora of trial evidence 
comprehensively demonstrated that appellant was in a position of authority over 
MBS. A person of ordinary sensibilities in appellant's position clearly should 
have known that his conduct was forbidden.

 
 

II

 
 

Course-of-activities 
evidence: Introduction of testimony concerning appellant's teaching and coaching 
methods and his influence over students other than the two alleged victims 
violated the Wyoming Rules of Evidence, and deprived appellant of a 
fundamentally fair trial.

 
 

[¶31.]  The State presented extensive evidence 
about appellant's behavior toward his students, and particularly toward his 
"favorites" on the volleyball team. Several of the young women on the team 
testified about the games the team members and appellant played on the bus when 
traveling to compete. The games included, among others, "blue dot" (thumping 
another's forehead with a knuckle to create a bruise), "Texas brain finders" 
(twisting a knuckle into another's temple), and "snuggies" (reaching into 
another's pants and pulling up her underpants). When the team was on the road at 
away games appellant spent considerable time in the young women's motel rooms, 
kissed some of the team members good-night and "tucked them in." The team 
members also testified about how appellant favored certain of the young women 
(particularly the victims) with his attention and affections, and how he sat 
with them and held their hands. Other testimony included appellant's habit of 
walking into their locker room while the young women were dressing, general 
comments about how they trusted and respected him, how appellant made them feel 
comfortable around him, and how his intimacy with them and casual attitude 
around them fostered their trust and cultivated his influence.

 
 

[¶32.]  Appellant contends that any testimony 
concerning his interactions with other students and their impressions of his 
general conduct was irrelevant. He argues further that the testimony was highly 
prejudicial, and its admission deprived him of a fair trial.

 
 

[¶33.]  Rule 402, W.R.E. provides that generally 
"[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible *." Rule 401, W.R.E. states that relevant 
evidence

 
 

"* * * means evidence 
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to 
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence."

 
 

[¶34.]  The State was required to prove that 
appellant possessed significant influence over MBS and KR in order to establish 
his position of authority. This was pursued at trial by the testimony of the 
other observing team members. The fact that when the team was on the road at 
away games appellant "tucked the girls in," lay on the bed with them, and kissed 
them good-night while in their motel rooms, and that the high school girls 
(including the victims) were comfortable with that behavior, is highly relevant 
to show the enormous extent of his influence, and demonstrates the status and 
stature appellant enjoyed with regard to the victims. Undoubtedly, appellant 
could not have structured the same influence and authority if he had associated 
with his students only in a normal classroom situation. 

 
 

[¶35.]  It was not improper to admit evidence 
regarding the general state of affairs and relationship between appellant and 
his team of which the victims were members. One can hardly separate appellant's 
actions with regard to the victims from those events and behaviors which 
occurred before the entire team. The victims were usually present and influenced 
by the activities about which the team members testified.

 
 

[¶36.]  The evidence involved appellant's 
relationship to his volleyball team, particularly the victims, and was relevant 
to appellant's influence, position of authority, and his use of that position. 
Some of the witnesses told about their perceptions of and reactions to 
appellant's behavior. Merely because some of the testimony did not directly 
relate to the victims' perceptions does not mean that the testimony is 
irrelevant to proving the influence and position of authority he held as to 
them. Certainly the jury could draw reasonable inferences about appellant's 
influence over the victims from the general testimony of the other members of 
the volleyball team. This evidence was not unfairly prejudicial, although often 
casting appellant in a negative light. That the testimony of the witnesses for 
the prosecution reflects negatively on the appellant is hardly to be unexpected. 
But where, as here, that testimony is relevant to proving an element of the 
crime, its probative character justifies its introduction.

 
 

[¶37.]  Appellant also asserts that the broad 
admission of his conduct as a teacher and coach is inadmissible evidence of 
other bad acts, properly excluded under Rule 404(a), W.R.E. We disagree. The 
testimony essentially involves appellant's course of conduct as specifically 
related to the charges against him, and is admissible under Rule 404(b), W.R.E. 
Crozier v. State, Wyo., 723 P.2d 42 (1986). The testimony does not bear upon 
separate criminal occurrences or bad acts. Rather, it is helpful to explain what 
happened between appellant and his victim, and is integral to understanding the 
context of the crime charged. State v. Beck, 151 Ariz. 130, 726 P.2d 227 (App.Ct. 1986); State 
v. Rupp, Minn.App., 393 N.W.2d 496 (1986). In some jurisdictions it is defined 
as the evidence of the context of the offense and consequently admissible with 
the reasoning that "events do not occur in a vacuum and the jury has the right 
to have the offense placed in its proper setting." Mann v. State, Tex.Cr. App., 
718 S.W.2d 741, 744 (1986).

 
 

[¶38.]  We find appellant's general behavior 
toward and relationship with his student athletes admissible because it is 
integrally related to the State's proof that he occupied a position of authority 
over MBS and KR as the situational relationships that existed at that time and 
place. This is not bad-acts evidence of unrelated events.

 
 

[¶39.]  The trial court admitted the testimony 
under Rule 404(b), W.R.E., as evidence tending "to show a motive or a plan on 
the part of the Defendant." In accord with Crozier v. State, supra, we define 
this evidence as the appellant's course of conduct. As such, it is properly 
admissible, and we find that it did not deprive appellant of a fair 
trial.

 
 

III

 
 

Sex-offense expert 
testimony: Admission of Detective Reikens' testimony about the range of 
responses she encountered as a police officer investigating sexual-abuse and 
sexual-assault cases constituted error.

 
 

[¶40.]  Detective Donna Reikens of the Cheyenne 
Police Department investigated the allegations made by MBS and KR against 
appellant, and then testified not only about her interviews with the victims and 
appellant, but also about her experience with the range of responses victims 
generally exhibit in response to sexual assault or abuse. She stated that the 
victims she had encountered often delayed reporting sexual abuse or assault. 
Appellant claims that this latter testimony is improper because it is 
inadmissible testimony regarding rape-trauma syndrome, and, further, that 
Detective Reikens is not a psychologist or psychiatrist and would not be 
qualified to give such testimony even if it were admissible. In order to 
accurately evaluate Detective Reikens' testimony, it is helpful to more 
completely set forth the nature of her testimony and the parties' positions with 
regard to its admissibility. The following portions of the trial transcript are 
beneficial:

 
 

"Q. (By Mr. Forwood) 
Based on your experience, when does a victim report a crime?

 
 

"A. Based on my 
experience, I can recall out of all of the cases that I have worked, one person 
that reported the crime, a child, that reported the crime immediately following 
the incident. Other than that, it may be years. It may never be 
reported.

 
 

"Q. So silence is a 
reaction you see by the victim?

 
 

"A. I 
refer to it as secrecy, yes.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"Q. (By Mr. Forwood) 
Based on your experience with these victims that you have talked to, have you 
interviewed them as to why they have remained quiet?

 
 

"A. Yes.

 
 

"Q. Approximately how 
many victims are we talking about that you have interviewed as to why they kept 
quiet?

 
 

"A. That's something that 
I ask almost all of them.

 
 

"Q. How many victims are 
we talking about that you have interviewed in your sexual assault 
investigations?

 
 

"A. Over 200.

 
 

"Q. Based on this 
experience that you've had in the field of interviewing victims that have 
remained silent after the assault, why is that? What is the typical reason you 
hear?

 
 

"A. It's usually a 
multiple reason of fear, and many times guilt. And the fears vary. Or they may 
all - one person may experience all the same. Some of the fears are a fear that 
if she says anything the offender may go to prison. Another fear is that she may 
be alienated from her family. That is typically true in intrafamily sexual abuse 
type cases.

 
 

"She may have fear which 
is instilled simply by the perpetrator that he has threatened to do some type of 
harm to her. Another fear is that she will break up the family, and that being 
the family of the perpetrator, whether that's her own family or whether that 
would be another family, one that she is not related to. However, I have 
definitely found that the biggest fear that any of the girls or children have is 
that they will not be believed.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"MR. KLINE: Your Honor, 
at this point we would like a continuing objection to this line of questioning 
and move that the previous testimony be stricken. There's been no showing that 
this witness is an expert with regard to the counselling or therapy or treatment 
of rape victims. She is a police detective, an investigator. There are rape 
crisis advocates. There are counsellors of that sort that deal in this all the 
time and are experts.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"MR. FORWOOD: Your Honor, 
the State would submit that the evidence is highly relevant. We've offered Donna 
Reikens as the main investigative officer not only in this jurisdiction, but 
primarily in this state dealing with what she has found to be as a result of her 
investigations in interviewing victims and perpetrators.

 
 

"We are offering her 
testimony to the Jury to aid the Jury in understanding why victims react as they 
do. Why they remain silent. Matters that are very material to this particular 
case.

 
 

"I would submit to the 
Court that we have gone through the foundation of Detective Reikens' expertise, 
the hours she's had, the courses she's attended, the places she has instructed. 
I would submit to the Court she is qualified to render this opinion to the Jury. 
It is a specialized area outside the common expertise of most jurors and an area 
that is important in this case to understand the whys.

 
 

"I would submit to the 
Court we have stayed with `based upon her experience.' We have not gone into 
theories of someone else. We have not offered her as a psychologist to explain 
what goes on in a victim's mind as diagnosed under the DSM III or whatever else. 
We're utilizing her as an investigator in this area with specialized knowledge 
that quite frankly no one but investigators in this area have. And unless that 
information is put before the Jury they don't have the requisite tools to 
understand why."

 
 

[¶41.]  The trial court responded by first 
outlining the criteria for the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702, 
W.R.E., as set forth in Buhrle v. State, Wyo., 627 P.2d 1374 (1981):

 
 

"`* * * The subject 
matter must be so distinctively related to some science, profession, business or 
occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average layman.'"

 
 

The trial court stated 
further that

 
 

"* * * `the witness must 
have sufficient skill, knowledge, or experience in that field or calling as to 
make it appear that his opinion or inference will probably aid the trier in his 
search for the truth.'"

 
 

Based on these criteria, 
the court ruled that

 
 

"Here this witness is 
testifying about her expertise as a police investigator for the Cheyenne Police 
Department specializing in the area of child sexual abuse.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"In this case, the 
benefit of her experience in approximately 200 cases is and could be of great 
benefit in assisting the Jury in understanding the background of these types of 
cases and the special materials in handling that may be necessary to try 
them.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"* * * I find that some 
of the testimony here generally is of assistance, but I have great concern. I 
don't think this witness is qualified by way of expertise to provide any 
testimony of what went on in the minds of the girls. I think she is capable of 
testifying from her interviews that there is a range of responses in terms of 
why people do not report a case. [Emphasis added.]

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"I don't think she has 
even given a satisfactory basis by way of expertise or training or anything else 
to establish that she knows how the typical victim would react or be able to 
give that opinion. However, she is able to give a range of responses which she 
has testified to."

 
 

[¶42.]  Detective Reikens then testified further, 
drawing generalized conclusions about victim and perpetrator behaviors based on 
her extensive experience and research in the areas of sexual abuse and sexual 
assault. Detective Reikens never testified about whether or not she thought that 
MBS or KR fit the pattern of behaviors she outlined. It is clear, however, that 
her testimony was offered to rebut the implication by the defense that the 
victims' delay in reporting the incident was inconsistent with their claims of 
nonconsensual sexual relations.

 
 

[¶43.]  This court has previously ruled that this 
type of expert testimony about the behavioral characteristics of victims is 
admissible. In Lessard v. State, Wyo., 719 P.2d 227, 233-234 (1986), we 
considered similar testimony:

 
 

"* * * The expert * * * 
testified that most rape victims at some point ask their assailant not to tell. 
The witness then gave her opinion of why victims usually do this. * * * [T]he 
trial judge permitted the expert witness to testify on the basis of her 
specialized knowledge in order to assist the jury to understand one aspect of 
the evidence. That was a matter which had troubled both the prosecutor and the 
defense counsel, i.e., why would a victim ask the assailant not to tell about 
the sexual encounter."

 
 

[¶44.]  We found no abuse of discretion in the 
admission of that testimony, and likewise we find no abuse of discretion in the 
trial court's admission of Detective Reikens' testimony here. Our conclusion in 
Lessard, that relevant expert testimony about the behavioral characteristics of 
victims is admissible, is dispositive.

 
 

[¶45.]  We are also persuaded by the holding in 
State v. Sandberg, Minn.App., 392 N.W.2d 298 (1986) (review granted October 17, 
1986). In that case the court held that an experienced police officer's expert 
testimony on the psychological, emotional and behavioral characteristics of 
minor victims of sexual abuse was proper. That court stated:

 
 

"* * * [T]he record shows 
the police officer was experienced with the reporting practices of abused 
children. * * * His testimony concerned primarily statistical reporting 
practices of minor victims, rather than the psychological evaluation of the 
victim's behavior. The officer also testified that the 13-year-old complainant's 
failure to report the incident to authorities was not unusual. Under these 
circumstances, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised its 
discretion in qualifying this police officer as an expert for the purpose of 
testifying about reporting practices of victims of sex crimes." 392 N.W.2d  at 
302-303.

 
 

[¶46.]  We note that the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals which decided Sandberg did not feel constrained to exclude this expert's 
testimony by the Minnesota Supreme Court's unequivocal rejection of the 
admissibility of rape-trauma-syndrome testimony in State v. Saldana, Minn., 324 N.W.2d 227, 229-30 (1982).

 
 

[¶47.]  Detective Reikens' expert testimony was 
not testimony regarding rape-trauma syndrome, and therefore we do not now decide 
whether such testimony is admissible. In any event, the admissibility of 
rape-trauma testimony must be carefully confined to avoid jury convictions based 
not on what the direct evidence shows occurred, but on expert opinion. 
United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1986); People v. Koon, Colo. 
App., 724 P.2d 1367 (1986).

 
 

[¶48.]  Detective Reikens did not testify about 
the victims' states of mind, expressed no opinion whether the victims were 
suffering from rape-trauma syndrome, and, in fact, never mentioned rape-trauma 
syndrome. She did testify about the range of responses to sexual assault that 
she had encountered, and the trial court properly limited her testimony to her 
experience. While the victims' reactions about which she testified may be 
consistent with the behavior of one suffering from rape-trauma syndrome, her 
testimony was not rape-trauma-syndrome testimony. The difference is between 
generalized expert testimony about behaviors common to a class, and an 
evaluation of the actions of an individual complainant. United States v. 
Azure, supra. For an excellent discussion of rape-trauma syndrome testimony see 
Comment, The Use of Rape Trauma Syndrome as Evidence in a Rape Trial: Valid or 
Invalid?, 21 Wake Forest L.Rev. 93 (1985).

 
 

[¶49.]  Detective Reikens' testimony was proper 
in this case. Her experience and expertise in the area of sexual abuse and 
sexual assault were extensively presented; she testified about the knowledge she 
acquired in her field and gave the jury general information based on her 
investigative experience from which the jury could infer that the victims' delay 
in reporting the sexual assaults was not inconsistent with their claims that 
they had been assaulted. This sort of expert testimony which serves to rebut a 
defendant's assertions that delay in reporting sexual assault is inconsistent 
with its occurrence is admissible in Wyoming. Lessard v. State, supra. See also 
People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 457, 681 P.2d 291, 298 
(1984), in which the California Supreme Court stated that this kind of 
testimony

 
 

"* * * may play a 
particularly useful role by disabusing the jury of some widely held 
misconceptions about rape and rape victims, so that it may evaluate the evidence 
free of the constraints of popular myths."

 
 

[¶50.]  Admissibility of evidence is generally 
within the sound discretion of the trial court, and decisions will not be 
overturned absent clear abuse of discretion. Lessard v. State, supra, 719 P.2d  
at 234; Stamper v. State, Wyo., 662 P.2d 82 (1983). We find no abuse of 
discretion. The trial court properly found the expert testimony beneficial, and 
appropriately limited it to providing a general context in which the jury could 
more knowledgeably address the issues with which it was presented.

 
 

IV

 
 

Motion for a mistrial: 
Denial of appellant's motion for a mistrial was unjustified in light of Ms. 
Hoxey's improper testimony as the State Crime Laboratory specialist, regarding 
the 38 undesignated pubic hairs found in the school closet where admitted sexual 
activity occurred.

 
 

[¶51.]  In the course of the investigation, 
Janelle Hoxey from the State Crime Laboratory examined pubic hair exemplars 
obtained from appellant and the two victims. She compared the exemplars to the 
hairs taken from the carpet and from a pair of semenstained shorts found in the 
school volleyball closet where some of the sexual activity occurred. Ms. Hoxey 
was qualified as an expert forensic scientist in the area of serology and trace 
evidence. She testified that (1) she found 19 pubic hairs from the carpet that 
were similar in microscopic characteristics to appellant's pubic hairs; (2) 
there were nine facial hairs from the carpet microscopically similar to 
appellant's facial hairs; (3) 23 pubic hairs from the carpet were 
microscopically similar to MBS' pubic hairs; (4) three pubic hairs from the 
carpet were microscopically similar to KR's pubic hairs; and (5) there were 37 
pubic hairs from the carpet and one adhered to a semen stain on a pair of shorts 
that were microscopically similar to each other but different from the pubic 
hairs of appellant, MBS, and KR.

 
 

[¶52.]  Ms. Hoxey testified further about the 
semen stains on the gym shorts, the witness was tendered for cross-examination, 
and the court took its morning recess. The proceedings were reconvened in 
chambers at defense counsel's request who then formally objected to Ms. Hoxey's 
testimony about the 38 similar pubic hairs on the grounds of relevancy, and 
moved for a mistrial. The court found "that the evidence is not relevant, and in 
fact invites speculation on the part of the Jury," but denied the motion for a 
mistrial. Instead, the court ordered Ms. Hoxey's testimony about the 38 pubic 
hairs be stricken, and directed the jury to disregard it.

 
 

[¶53.]  Appellant asserts that the State was 
trying to prove the existence of another unidentified victim, and that such 
highly prejudicial and inadmissible evidence could not be corrected by mere 
instructions to the jury to disregard it. He contends that the only proper means 
to remedy the improper evidence was to grant a mistrial, and that the trial 
court erred in refusing to do so.

 
 

[¶54.]  Other than the apparent indication that 
this closet was a "busy place," we could find the questioned testimony to be 
neither harmful nor beneficial, but we do agree that the questioned testimony 
was irrelevant within the context of the lack of foundational evidence. Not, 
however, until the meeting in chambers, after the recess, did appellant object 
to Ms. Hoxey's prior testimony. The trial court properly found that the 
objection was not timely made, and based its refusal to grant a mistrial in part 
on that fact.1

 
 

[¶55.]  Appellant contends that he "didn't want" 
to object to Ms. Hoxey's irrelevant testimony to avoid drawing the jury's 
attention to the potentially prejudicial evidence. We agree with the trial court 
that appellant's justification for failing to timely object is inadequate. 
People v. McNutt, 146 Ill. App.3d 357, 100 Ill.Dec. 24, 496 N.E.2d 1089 (1986). As a Wyoming trial practice, a bench conference is 
usually available to avoid the prejudicial effect of particularly disturbing 
evidence if a motion in limine cannot be utilized earlier.

 
 

[¶56.]  The general rule in Wyoming is that a failure 
to interject a timely objection is treated as a waiver unless the error is so 
flagrant as to constitute plain error, thus requiring reversal. Jeschke v. 
State, Wyo., 
642 P.2d 1298, 1301 (1982). The plain-error doctrine will only be applied when 
the appellant clearly demonstrates the violation of a clear and unequivocal rule 
of law which adversely affects his substantial rights, so that he is materially 
prejudiced. Id., 642 P.2d  at 1301; Ketcham v. 
State, Wyo., 
618 P.2d 1356, 1359 (1980).

 
 

[¶57.]  Although this part of Ms. Hoxey's 
testimony might have led to speculation on the part of the jury in perceiving 
the involvement of another student or perhaps another instructor, we find that 
the trial court's curative admonition was sufficient to prevent prejudice to a 
substantial right of appellant. No later testimony was received, nor did the 
State argue that appellant was somehow linked to the presence of those 38 
unknown hairs. In the absence of an attempt to directly link these extraneous 
and irrelevant hairs to appellant, the initially unresisted evidence revealing 
the unknown with the known did not materially prejudice appellant. Ostrowski v. 
State, Wyo., 
665 P.2d 471, 489 (1983).

 
 

"Judicial discretion is a 
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously." Martin v. 
State, supra, 720 P.2d  at 897.

 
 

[¶58.]  We conclude that there was no abuse of 
discretion in denying the mistrial motion at this stage of the trial, and 
certainly no plain error. The order to strike the testimony, the instruction to 
the jury, and the refusal to grant a mistrial constitute a proper exercise of 
the trial court's discretion.2 DeSersa v. State, Wyo., 729 P.2d 662 (1986); Martin v. State, Wyo., 720 P.2d 894 (1986); People v. Roy, Colo., 723 P.2d 1345, 
1348 (1986); State v. Borchardt, 224 Neb. 47, 395 N.W.2d 551 (1986).

 
 

V

 
 

Cumulative evidence: 
Rejection for introduction of the transcript of MBS' preliminary hearing denied 
appellant his constitutional right to defend.

 
 

[¶59.]  After cross-examining MBS, appellant's 
counsel offered into evidence a transcript of her testimony at the preliminary 
hearing. The State objected, and contended that the statements contained in the 
transcript were not shown to be inconsistent and were not admissible under Rule 
613(b), W.R.E. The trial court reserved ruling on the admissibility of the 
offered transcript. Later, at a hearing in chambers, the trial court admitted a 
handwritten statement by MBS on which 
she had been cross-examined, but ruled that the transcript was cumulative and 
did not contain anything helpful to the trier of fact.

 
 

[¶60.]  Appellant contends that the trial court's 
refusal to admit the preliminary hearing transcript violated his right to defend 
guaranteed him by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 
1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution. He correctly contends 
that he has a Constitutional right to "`a meaningful opportunity to present a 
complete defense,'" Crane v. Kentucky, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 2146, 90 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1986), quoting from California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 2532, 81 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1984), "through the calling and interrogation 
of favorable witnesses, the cross-examination of adverse witnesses, and the 
orderly introduction of evidence." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2533, 
45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975). 

 
 

[¶61.]  However, this Constitutional right does 
not guarantee the opportunity to a criminal defendant to have every tendered 
exhibit introduced into evidence. We find the reasoning of Judge Wright in 
Williams v. United 
States, 403 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1968), 
persuasive. In that case, the appellant argued that the trial court erred in 
refusing to admit into evidence a witness' written statement which was 
contendably inconsistent with his later trial testimony. The appellant contended 
that

 
 

"* * * he [was] entitled 
to the fuller attention the jury might have given to the inconsistency between 
the statement and the witness' initial testimony if the statement had been 
admitted and the jury allowed to take it into the jury room." 403 F.2d  at 
179.

 
 

[¶62.]  The Williams court, relying on Gordon v. 
United States, 344 U.S. 414, 73 S. Ct. 369, 97 L. Ed. 447 
(1953), agreed, but concluded that "the failure to admit [the] prior statement 
into evidence was not so prejudicial as to require reversal." Williams v. 
United 
States, supra at 179.

 
 

[¶63.]  In Stinehart v. State, Wyo., 727 P.2d 1010 
(1986), this court recently addressed a similar contention that a trial court's 
refusal to admit the transcript of a prior statement was error. In relying in 
part on the extensive cross-examination of the victim, the court found that the 
transcript of the victim's statement was properly excluded as cumulative as well 
as harmless.

 
 

[¶64.]  In this case, appellant's counsel 
extensively examined MBS in his attempt to impeach her testimony with prior 
inconsistent statements. Counsel began his cross-examination as 
follows:

 
 

"Q. Miss [S] you've given 
a couple of statements to the police, haven't you?

 
 

"A. Yes, sir.

 
 

"Q. One on the 4th of 
January and one on the 7th of January; isn't that true?

 
 

"A. Yes.

 
 

"Q. You've also been 
through a preliminary hearing in this matter; isn't that true?

 
 

"A. Yes.

 
 

"Q. And you have told the 
story under oath at that time, didn't you?

 
 

"A. Yes.

 
 

"Q. Or a version of the 
facts?

 
 

"A. Yes.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"Q. You told a different 
version each time, haven't you?"

 
 

[¶65.]  Appellant's counsel then asked questions 
about the differences and omissions in the prior statements. During 
cross-examination the witness was presented with her handwritten statement, but 
was never presented with a copy of the preliminary hearing transcript. Counsel 
did ask her, however, to explain the fact that her testimony at trial included 
details about which she did not testify during the preliminary hearing. 
Appellant's counsel pointed out on numerous occasions that MBS' testimony at 
trial was not entirely consistent, identical to, or as complete as her testimony 
at the preliminary hearing.

 
 

[¶66.]  The court in Stinehart said:

 
 

"Even assuming a finding 
by this Court that the transcript was improperly excluded, we would find the 
error harmless under the circumstances of this case and affirm appellant's 
conviction. In order for an error to be regarded as harmful, there must be a 
reasonable possibility that in the absence of the error, the verdict might have 
been more favorable." Stinehart v. State, supra, 727 P.2d  at 1016, citing Bishop 
v. State, Wyo., 687 P.2d 242 (1984), cert. 
denied 469 U.S. 1219, 105 S. Ct. 1203, 84 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1985).

 
 

It is difficult to 
conceive how, in the case at bar, the verdict possibly could have been more 
favorable had the transcript of the preliminary hearing been admitted. First, 
the inconsistencies contained therein were clearly presented to the jury. And 
second, the text of that hearing was even less restrained in its inculpatory 
detail than was the vividly explicit testimony at the trial itself.3 As this author stated in his 
concurrence in Stinehart:

 
 

"* * * The only way that 
availability of the document for jury-room deliberations could have delayed the 
conviction verdict would arise from time invested in their reading its 
explicitly detailed text." 727 P.2d  at 1018, Urbigkit, J., concurring.4

 
 

VI

 
 

Sufficiency of the 
evidence: There was insufficient evidence to support appellant's 
conviction.

 
 

[¶67.]  The jury convicted appellant of 
committing second degree sexual assault on December 28, 1983. Appellant contends 
that the only testimony on point concerned an incident on December 26, 1983, and 
that there was no testimony regarding any sexual contact between appellant and 
the victim on December 28. He also asserts that there was no testimony 
concerning appellant's use of substantial influence on December 26 to cause MBS 
to submit.

 
 

[¶68.]  Under the circumstances of this case, we 
refuse to reverse appellant's conviction because of a two-day discrepancy in the 
jury verdict form and the testimony at trial. This court recently affirmed a 
conviction where the notice and sufficiency of the indictment was clearly more 
questionable. Stewart v. State, Wyo., 724 P.2d 439 (1986). See also Marshall v. State, Minn. App., 395 N.W.2d 362 (1986); State 
v. Wehrle, 223 Neb. 928, 395 N.W.2d 142 (1986); In re K.A.W., 
104 N.J. 112, 515 A.2d 1217 (1986).

 
 

[¶69.]  The fourth count with which appellant was 
originally charged was second degree sexual assault on December 28, 1983. In 
April of 1985 the State filed and served appellant with an Amended Bill of 
Particulars, in which the date of that count was changed from December 28, 1983 
to December 26, 1983.

 
 

[¶70.]  On direct examination the victim 
testified as follows:

 
 

"Q. Did you have sex with 
Bryan Scadden after the 21st of December at school?

 
 

"A. Yes. 

 
 

"Q. When 
then?

 
 

"A. It was - The best I 
can recall immediately after Christmas.

 
 

"Q. December 
26th?

 
 

"A. (Witness nods 
head.)

 
 

[¶71.]  In his testimony appellant acknowledged 
having sex with MBS 40 or 50 times. He did not present an alibi defense; he 
agreed that the sex occurred.

 
 

[¶72.]  Rule 9(a), W.R.Cr.P. states in relevant 
part:

 
 

"Error in the citation or 
its omission or any other defect or 
imperfection which does not tend to 
prejudice any substantial right of the defendant upon the merits or to 
mislead the defendant to his prejudice shall not be grounds for * * * reversal 
of a conviction." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

The policy of the rule 
"is that imperfections of form which are not prejudicial are disregarded." State 
v. Faltynowicz, Wyo., 660 P.2d 368, 371 (1983). We fail to see 
how appellant was prejudiced by the failure to correct the jury form to conform 
to the Amended Bill of Particulars and the testimony at trial. The imperfection 
does not amount to an insufficiency of the evidence.

 
 

[¶73.]  Appellant's second assertion, that the 
evidence regarding his influence over MBS on December 26, 1983 was insufficient, 
fails as well. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 
criminal conviction, this court examines all the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the state. Dangel v. State, Wyo., 
724 P.2d 1145, 1148 (1986); Aden v. State, 
Wyo., 717 P.2d 326, 327 (1986); Broom v. State, 
Wyo., 695 P.2d 640 (1985).

 
 

"`In reviewing the 
sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case, this court makes a painstaking 
review of the record to determine if the evidence is sufficient to permit the 
jury to reach the conclusion that it did. [Citation.] The court will not disturb 
the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence 
and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could 
reasonably conclude that a defendant was proved guilty of the offense charged. 
[Citation.] The court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
verdict and will assume that the jury disbelieved any testimony in conflict with 
the result it reached. [Citation.]' State v. Richardson, Minn., 393 N.W.2d 657, 661-662 (1986)." 
DeSersa v. State, supra, 729 P.2d  at 664.

 
 

[¶74.]  The State presented extensive evidence of 
the continuing nature of appellant's influence and authority, and his use of 
that influence and authority to cause MBS to submit to sexual intrusion. The 
victim, MBS, also testified extensively about the influential tenor of 
appellant's position over her and the threats he used to cause her to submit to 
sex. Her testimony included the following:

 
 

"A. * * * [H]e was 
controlling me more and more, monitoring what I did * * *.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"Q. Were you afraid of 
anything besides being physically hurt?

 
 

"A. Yes, I was afraid of 
him taking advantage of his coaching and teaching position over me.

 
 

"Q. What do you mean by 
that?

 
 

"A. Well, messing up my 
chance to have a scholarship or messing up my grades * * *.

 
 

"Q. You said you were 
afraid of him as a teacher. What could he do to you as a teacher?

 
 

"A. He could give me 
grades that were different from what I had earned. Poor grades.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"Q. Did you think of 
telling anyone?

 
 

"A. I wanted to, but I - 
I didn't want to because I was afraid.

 
 

"Q. Afraid of 
what?

 
 

"A. Well, * * * I was 
afraid that no one would believe me * * *.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"Q. Why did it go on? Why 
did you let it go on?

 
 

"A. * * * I didn't have 
anyone to tell. I couldn't tell my parents. And I was more and more afraid of 
him because after a few times that had happened, he began threatening 
me.

 
 

"Q. What were those 
threats that he started using?

 
 

"A. Well, he never really 
- He never really threatened me, `If you don't have sex with me.' It was if I 
made any hint of trying to get away from him or trying to break away from him he 
would say, `Okay. Go ahead. That's fine with me. But I'm going to make life hell 
for you.'

 
 

"Q. What did that mean to 
you when he said that?

 
 

"A. It meant everything 
that I've described. Scholarship, grades could get ruined. I didn't want my 
parents to find out.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"Q. Did you feel you had 
any control over your own life then?

 
 

"A. No, I was basically 
doing everything he wanted me to do."

 
 

[¶75.]  With regard to the sexual assault on 
December 26, 1983 for which appellant was convicted, the victim testified on 
direct examination:

 
 

"Q. Where at 
then?

 
 

"A. At 
school.

 
 

"Q. How did you have 
occasions to be up at school then?

 
 

"A. He would call me and 
ask me to come up there.

 
 

"Q. Why would you 
go.

 
 

"A. Because of the 
threats and because I was frightened of him. It was still the same thing. It had 
never stopped."

 
 

[¶76.]  We conclude that the evidence of 
appellant's influence over MBS was sufficient to support appellant's conviction 
of second degree sexual assault.

 
 

VII

 
 
Instructions: Refusal to 
give the jury

 
 
Instruction 14 and 
appellant's proposed

 
 

Instructions A and B was 
error.

 
 

[¶77.]  Appellant's objection and comment 
regarding jury instructions consisted of the following:

 
 

"We have no objections, 
Judge, with respect to any of the instructions that you have proposed. The only 
objection, I guess, I would have is to the removal of Proposed Instruction 14. 
If it is not given, I guess, I would request an instruction coming from McCarter 
(phonetic) vs. State or something similar indicating that force or a substitute 
for force is required in each of those specific instances. We would also, of 
course, offer those two instructions that we previously gave to the 
Court."

 
 

[¶78.]  The general rule in reviewing questions 
involving instructions is that the trial judge is afforded latitude to tailor 
the instructions to the facts of the case, and reversible error will not be 
found as long as the instructions when viewed as a whole and in the context of 
the entire trial fairly and adequately cover the issues. McDonald v. State, 
Wyo., 715 P.2d 209 (1986); Ostrowski v. State, supra, 665 P.2d 471; Jeschke v. State, 
supra.

 
 

[¶79.]  Instructions A and B offered by appellant 
both involve the issue of consent. The trial court did instruct the jury that 
lack of consent is an element of second-degree sexual assault (Instruction No. 
9) and that consent is a defense to the charge (Instruction No. 11). The court 
also set out the standard to show lack of consent in Instruction No. 12. The 
trial court's instructions adequately covered the issue of consent, and its 
refusal to give the requested instructions is not error.

 
 

[¶80.]  The trial court's initially proposed 
Instruction No. 14, to which the State had objected, stated:

 
 

"An actor will be 
justified in assuming the existence of voluntary consent if the conduct of the 
alleged victim toward the actor at the time of the occurrence creates an honest 
and reasonable belief that the victim has consented by yielding her will freely 
to the commission of the act."

 
 

As explanation for 
removal, the trial court said:

 
 

"* * * I have decided to 
remove what I'd previously put in instructions as Instruction No. 14 which 
discusses a reasonable belief that the victim has consented by yielding freely 
to commission of the act. I don't think it's a bad instruction, but I think it 
is a matter of argument. And certainly it can be argued by the - both sides in 
this case. That there was a reasonable belief on the part of the Defendant that 
there had been a yielding - free yielding to the commission of the act. This 
case is focusing in on the consent aspect and those instructions will 
remain."

 
 

After this comment, 
appellant objected to the trial court's refusal to give the instruction. We 
conclude that the trial court provided adequate instruction regarding consent in 
the context of the position-of-authority stature of the criminal prosecution. 
Furthermore, Instruction No. 12, as given, more relevantly stated:

 
 

"You are instructed that 
the standard to show a lack of voluntary consent is a relative one. The victim 
is not required to do more than her age, strength, surrounding facts, and all 
attending circumstances make it reasonable for her to manifest 
opposition."

 
 

[¶81.]  We find no error in the instructions as 
given or refused.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶82.]  We have considered appellant's attack on 
the validity of the statute under which he was convicted, as well as his many 
contentions that errors in the proceeding deprived him of a fair trial. None of 
the issues raised requires this court to reverse. Nor do we agree that this case 
presents sufficient imperfections, the cumulative effect of which might 
otherwise justify reversal.

 
 

[¶83.]  Affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 The trial court also 
pointed out that "the situation is as much a creation of the Defense as it is of 
the Prosecution." The court was referring to the parties' disputes and inability 
to cooperate in the discovery process. Conjunctively with the motion for a 
mistrial, appellant also moved for a motion in limine to exclude further 
evidence of these pubic hairs. The court granted the motion and ruled that the 
subject was foreclosed and the jury would be instructed to 
disregard.

 
 

2 An exhibit, which 
included slides of all the pubic hairs, including the 38 undesignated ones, was 
introduced into evidence without objection. The diligent cross-examination that 
followed the denial of a mistrial pursued the expert witness' absence of 
knowledge about any range of dates relating to the hair particles or 
specifically how the hair particles got on the carpet.

 
 

3 For example, MBS' 
testimony in the proposed exhibit included the following:

 
 

"Q. So you went over 
there at his request on that afternoon. When you got there that afternoon what 
happened?

 
 

"A. I was in his house, 
in his living room. We were sitting on the couch and he, he just, he started to 
kiss me and I just really didn't know what to do. I was very, you know, all this 
time this man, you know, my volleyball coach, I had always trusted him. I just 
thought, I couldn't believe that he would do this. I thought, why me, you know, 
why would he do this and I was just kind of frozen, you know. And he, it just 
progressed, you know, he would kiss me and I would kind of push away and he 
just, he was very persistent. And he, um, he put me on the floor, you know, he 
kind of picked me up and put me on the floor.

 
 

"Q. From the couch to the 
floor?

 
 

"A. Yes, and was kissing 
me. He was on top of me and he would put his hands up my shirt, or he undid my 
bra and, um * * *."

 
 

KR similarly narrated, as 
found in the proposed exhibit:

 
 

"A. I was at school and I 
got a message in my second hour class to call him at home. And I went down to 
the Junior office and I called and he told me that he was feeling sick and 
really depressed, you know, and he asked if I would go over and talk to him. And 
I said fine and he said that he would get me out of school, that he'd call to 
the office and just say that he was my dad and that I had an appointment. So I 
went down to the Junior office, well I had to call him back, you know, and say 
that it was my dad and he told them that he was my dad and that I had an 
appointment and then I left and I went to his house.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"A. We watched TV for a 
while and then I had my arm like laying off the edge of the couch and he held my 
hand for a while and then he pulled me over the couch and he kissed me and then 
he said, I asked him what was wrong, and he said that he didn't know, he was 
just feeling down and he had been throwing-up all night and all this 
stuff.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"A. He, you know, kept 
kissing me and everything and then he laid down on the floor and he pulled me on 
the floor with him * *."

 
 

4 This author's special 
concurrence, written in contemplation of the case at bar, remains unadjusted. 
This is not to suggest as a non-discretionary principle that whatever is 
introduced into evidence need necessarily be sent into the jury room for 
consideration during deliberations.