Case Title: Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Sinclair

Citation: 2004-Ohio-7014

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Sinclair, 105 Ohio St.3d 65, 2004-Ohio-7014.] 
 
 
MAHONING COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. SINCLAIR. 
[Cite as Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Sinclair,  
105 Ohio St.3d 65, 2004-Ohio-7014.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct —— Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty or 
deceit — Engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice 
law — Indefinite license suspension required when attorney has paid 
illegal gratuities to public official. 
(No. 2004-1064 — Submitted October 12, 2004 — Decided December 29, 2004.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 03-045. 
_______________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, R. Allen Sinclair of Boardman, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0055915, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1991.  
On March 29, 2000, we ordered a six-month suspension of respondent’s license, 
which we stayed, for his failure to comply with requirements for advertising his 
legal services.  We placed respondent on probation for one year with conditions.  
See Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Sinclair (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 328, 725 N.E.2d 
1114.  The court terminated respondent’s probation on June 22, 2001.  See 
Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Sinclair (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 1425, 749 N.E.2d 753. 
{¶ 2} On May 13, 2003, relator, Mahoning County Bar Association, 
charged respondent with additional violations of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility, all of which involved his association with former United States 
Congressman James A. Traficant Jr., who had been convicted of conspiracy to 
commit bribery, conspiracy to violate illegal-gratuity statutes, accepting an illegal 
gratuity, obstructing justice, conspiring to defraud the federal government, filing 
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false tax returns, and racketeering.  See United States v. Traficant (C.A.6, 2004), 
368 F.3d 646 (convictions affirmed).  A panel of the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline heard the cause, made findings of misconduct, and 
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two 
years, with 18 months stayed on the condition that he commit no further 
misconduct.  The board adopted the panel’s findings of misconduct but 
recommended a two-year suspension. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 3} The complaint alleged misconduct in three separate but related 
events: (1) respondent’s kickbacks to Traficant from his salary as a congressional 
staff member, (2) respondent’s agreement to rent Traficant office space through 
KAS Enterprises, and (3) respondent’s preparation of a quitclaim deed for 
Traficant to transfer some property to Traficant’s daughter.  The complaint 
charged that respondent had in the course of these events violated DR 1-
102(A)(3) (barring illegal conduct involving moral turpitude), 1-l02(A)(4) 
(barring conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 1-
102(A)(6) (barring any conduct that adversely reflects on a lawyer’s fitness to 
practice law), 7-102(A)(6) (prohibiting a lawyer from using false evidence), 7-
102(A)(7) (prohibiting a lawyer from counseling or assisting a client in illegal or 
fraudulent conduct), and 7-102(A)(8) (prohibiting any illegal conduct or act in 
violation of a Disciplinary Rule). 
{¶ 4} Upon graduation from law school, respondent started a private law 
practice and leased office space from then attorney Henry A. DiBlasio in 
Youngstown.  In addition to practicing law, DiBlasio was Traficant’s chief of 
staff and had been for years.  DiBlasio eventually resigned from the Ohio bar with 
disciplinary action pending.  See In re Resignation of DiBlasio, 99 Ohio St.3d 
1207, 2003-Ohio-2733, 789 N.E.2d 239. 
January Term, 2004 
3 
{¶ 5} Respondent came to rely on DiBlasio as his mentor, and from this 
relationship, respondent’s ethical problems developed.  DiBlasio had an extensive 
general law practice that included corporate representation.  DiBlasio also served 
as a special counsel to the Ohio Attorney General, overseeing collection cases 
with sales-tax issues.  Respondent helped DiBlasio in his practice and also started 
accepting criminal cases and court appointments in an attempt to extend his own 
practice.  Respondent had previously worked for years in the medical field, and he 
worked to establish a personal-injury practice as well. 
{¶ 6} Before leasing office space with DiBlasio, respondent knew 
Traficant only through intermittent interaction in their community.  Afterward, the 
two became more familiar because Traficant also rented space in DiBlasio’s 
building.  Traficant’s suite occupied the entire first level of the two-story building.  
He also had a private office on the second floor. 
{¶ 7} In January 1996, DiBlasio and respondent formed a partnership 
that lasted for two years.  During this time, DiBlasio continued to pay for the 
firm’s advertising and advanced these expenses and others for respondent’s 
developing personal-injury practice.  But in the summer of 1998, DiBlasio 
unexpectedly announced his retirement. 
{¶ 8} With DiBlasio’s retirement looming, respondent became deeply 
concerned about the financial end of the partnership, particularly funding the 
advertising that he considered necessary to build a solid practice.  In fact, when 
DiBlasio expressed his intention to retire, respondent owed him approximately 
$100,000 for advertising expenses.  Moreover, as part of his retirement, DiBlasio 
planned to sell the building that housed the partnership’s offices, to liquidate all of 
his assets, and to move to Florida.  This development also troubled respondent 
because he had personally remodeled the office space, devoting much time and 
money to the project. 
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{¶ 9} Against this backdrop, DiBlasio advised respondent that he would 
be resigning as Traficant’s chief of staff, and he offered to recommend respondent 
for Traficant’s staff.  Respondent learned in October 1998 that Traficant was 
interested in hiring him.  Traficant later came to respondent’s office and requested 
that they take a ride to discuss respondent’s employment. 
{¶ 10} In the car, Traficant offered to hire respondent as an administrative 
assistant and counsel, explaining that he had always had an attorney on staff and 
always would.  Although respondent had previously performed some work for 
Traficant, he expressed reservations about what services he could realistically 
offer as an aide.  Traficant reassured respondent, describing various research or 
constituent projects and other work that he would ask respondent to complete 
from time to time.  Traficant offered respondent an annual salary of $60,000 to 
$65,000 and said that respondent could maintain his law practice as long as he 
could still work at Traficant’s discretion.  Traficant also told respondent that, as a 
condition of his employment, he would be required to repay $2,500 of his 
monthly paycheck to Traficant. 
{¶ 11} Traficant and respondent’s conversation eventually turned to office 
space.  Respondent and Traficant agreed that if respondent paid the kickback and 
also bought DiBlasio’s building, a purchase respondent was already considering, 
Traficant would rent DiBlasio’s office space.  Respondent thought that this 
arrangement would enable him to maintain his private law practice while working 
for Traficant. 
{¶ 12} Respondent accepted the staff position in Traficant’s office and 
started  immediately.  The job and Traficant’s increased lease payments were 
essential to respondent financially.  And in exchange for respondent’s job, the 
kickbacks and leasehold arrangement were essential to Traficant. 
{¶ 13} Respondent later discussed with DiBlasio the $2,500 monthly 
payments that Traficant had demanded.  DiBlasio confirmed that he and Traficant 
January Term, 2004 
5 
had had a similar arrangement.  DiBlasio told respondent how to pay the kickback 
– by cashing his paycheck, placing $2,500 each month in an envelope, and giving 
the envelope to Traficant. 
{¶ 14} Respondent eventually purchased the office building, which was 
actually owned by a corporation that DiBlasio had formed, for $120,000.  He did 
not, however, buy the building in his own name.  Because DiBlasio had told him 
that ethics rules precluded a congressional staff member from leasing property to 
a congressman, respondent bought the property using a trade name, KAS 
Enterprises, registered to his wife.  Respondent claimed that this arrangement 
satisfied congressional ethics rules. 
{¶ 15} Over the next year or so, until January 2000, Traficant leased 
office space from KAS Enterprises in accordance with his and respondent’s 
agreement.  Also during this period, respondent paid Traficant over $32,000 in 13 
or 14 monthly installments of $2,500.  Unlike DiBlasio, however, respondent 
deposited his paycheck and then withdrew Traficant’s kickback, transactions 
memorialized in bank statements that would eventually be used to prosecute 
Traficant.  Traficant, in turn, paid $656 ($6 a square foot ) per month, a somewhat 
low rental price for his expanded office space. 
{¶ 16} While working for Traficant as his administrative aide and counsel, 
respondent assisted Traficant in deeding some rural property, referred to as 
Traficant’s farm, to Traficant’s daughter.  In or around December 1999, 
respondent prepared a quitclaim deed; however, respondent did not acknowledge 
his role as the preparer in the space provided because he “didn’t feel comfortable” 
having his name on the document.  Respondent knew of tax judgments against 
Traficant and that Traficant was trying to hide assets from creditors, and 
respondent feared that transferring this property might constitute a fraudulent 
conveyance.  The deed was later recorded and apparently has not been challenged. 
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{¶ 17} Relator withdrew its allegation that respondent had violated DR1-
102(A)(3).  The parties stipulated, the panel agreed, and the board found that 
respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and 1-102(A)(6) by making kickbacks to 
Traficant.  Rejecting respondent’s claim that he was not acting as Traficant’s 
attorney when he prepared the quitclaim deed, the panel and board also found 
clear and convincing evidence that, in addition to violating DR 1-102(A)(4) and 
1-102(A)(6), respondent had violated 7-102(A)(6), 7-102(A)(7), and 7-102(A)(8) 
by preparing the deed for Traficant. 
Sanction 
{¶ 18} In recommending a sanction for this misconduct, the panel 
considered the aggravating and mitigating features of respondent’s case. See 
Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and 
Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
(“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  In aggravation, the panel found that respondent had a prior 
disciplinary record for failing to make required disclosures in direct-mail 
solicitations.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a).  And although respondent accepted 
Traficant’s job offer in part because of DiBlasio’s retirement and although 
Traficant had said that the $2,500 payments were merely “loans,” the panel found 
that respondent knew in his heart that the payments were wrong or illegal.  On the 
other hand, the panel did not find a pattern of misconduct or multiple offenses, 
even though respondent had paid Traficant kickbacks for over one year, 
concluding instead that the whole transaction was one isolated incident.  See 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c) and (d). 
{¶ 19} In mitigation, the panel found that respondent had made a good-
faith effort to rectify the consequences of his misconduct inasmuch as he had 
cooperated in the government’s prosecution and had testified against Traficant.  
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(c).  Respondent had also fully and freely disclosed his 
transgressions during the disciplinary process, expressed remorse for his 
January Term, 2004 
7 
misconduct, and acknowledged that he had acted with poor judgment and 
dishonesty.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(d).  Moreover, three character witnesses 
and numerous reference letters asserted respondent’s good character and 
reputation for honesty apart from the underlying incidents.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(e).  An assistant United States attorney and an FBI agent noted 
respondent’s cooperation during the corruption investigation in Youngstown.  
Finally, the panel found that respondent would never repeat his misconduct and 
had already paid a price for his wrongdoing – respondent’s reputation had been 
under a cloud during the four-year criminal investigation leading to Traficant’s 
conviction.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(f). 
{¶ 20} Relator initially suggested that respondent be disbarred for his 
misconduct.  After the panel hearing, however, relator reconsidered and proposed 
an indefinite suspension.  Respondent advocated a stayed suspension.  The panel 
recommended a two-year suspension with the last 18 months stayed on the 
condition that respondent commit no further misconduct.  The board 
recommended, “based on the nature and seriousness of the offenses,” that 
respondent be suspended from the Ohio bar for two full years. 
Review 
{¶ 21} Objecting to the board’s findings and recommendation, respondent 
argues that he did not violate DR 7-102(A)(6), (7), and (8) in preparing the 
quitclaim deed for Traficant.  He also urges us to defer to the panel’s 
recommended sanction or to be more lenient.  Relator objects as well, arguing that 
respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and (6) by leasing office space to Traficant 
as part of the bribery deal to get on Traficant’s congressional staff.  Relator urges 
us to indefinitely suspend respondent. 
{¶ 22} Pursuant to our independent review in disciplinary cases, Ohio 
State Bar Assn. v. Reid (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 327, 708 N.E.2d 193, paragraph one 
of the syllabus, we find that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and (6) first in 
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paying Traficant kickbacks in exchange for employment and second in leasing 
office space to Traficant despite being Traficant’s employee.  We also find, as did 
the board, that respondent violated these Disciplinary Rules a third time by 
concealing his name as the preparer of the quitclaim deed that he realized 
Traficant might use to avoid future creditors.  Finally, because respondent’s 
admitted suborning and dishonesty manifest a fundamental breach of his duty to 
the public, we find that an indefinite suspension is appropriate regardless of any 
concomitant violations of DR 7-102(A)(6), (7), or (8). 
{¶ 23} Few offenses so calamitously violate the public trust placed in the 
legal profession as does the secret offer of gratuities to a public official.  Whether 
or not a conviction results, this misconduct lays waste to the community’s 
expectation that lawyers will exhibit “the highest standards of honesty and 
integrity,” American Bar Association, ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions (1992) 9, and contributes to the fear that lawyers will “take advantage 
of public trust if given the opportunity.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Pizzedaz 
(1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 486, 487, 628 N.E.2d 1359.  We have therefore disbarred 
attorneys for bribery-related acts involving public officials.  See Cleveland Bar 
Assn. v. Jurek (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 318, 581 N.E.2d 1356 (attorney’s bribing of 
bond commissioner to avoid random judicial assignments warranted permanent 
disbarment); Disciplinary Counsel v. DiCarlantonio (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 479, 
628 N.E.2d 1355 (city attorney who received $15,000 for his part in changing 
fire ordinance was disbarred), and Disciplinary Counsel v. Melamed (1991), 62 
Ohio St.3d 187, 580 N.E.2d 1077 (attorney disbarred for paying bribes to court's 
bond commissioner in order to obtain assignment of his cases to judges of his 
choice, among other misconduct). 
{¶ 24} Despite the magnitude of this misconduct, respondent contends 
that the mitigating features of his case, mainly his cooperation in the 
prosecution’s case against Traficant, warrant a lesser sanction than indefinite 
January Term, 2004 
9 
suspension.  Stressing that the disciplinary system exists to protect the public 
rather than to punish offending lawyers, respondent essentially argues that 
because he has promised not to pay kickbacks ever again, a more rigorous 
sanction is unnecessary.  We disagree. 
{¶ 25} Even after taking a lawyer’s cooperation, contrition, and other 
evidence of mitigation into account, we have historically imposed at least an 
indefinite suspension when lawyers have paid either a bribe or gratuity to a 
public official.  Disciplinary Counsel v. McClenaghan (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 21, 
565 N.E.2d 572; Bar Assn. of Greater Cleveland v. Italiano (1986), 24 Ohio 
St.3d 204, 24 OBR 431, 494 N.E.2d 1113; Columbus Bar Assn. v. Gloeckner 
(1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 83, 1 OBR 120, 437 N.E.2d 1197. 
{¶ 26} In fact, we routinely indefinitely suspend lawyers who merely 
suggest that public officials may be subject to financial influence.  Dayton Bar 
Assn. v. O'Brien, 103 Ohio St.3d 1, 2004-Ohio-3939, 812 N.E.2d 1263 (attorney 
indefinitely suspended for suggesting to client that judge would allow withdrawal 
of a guilty plea for money); Columbus Bar Assn. v. Benis (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 
199, 5 OBR 415, 449 N.E.2d 1305 (attorney indefinitely suspended for offering 
to influence a member of the governor's staff to get clemency for a client’s 
husband); and Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Consoldane (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 337, 4 
O.O.3d 477, 364 N.E.2d 279 (attorney indefinitely suspended for suggesting that 
he could obtain client’s shock probation with a bribe).  And contrary to 
respondent’s argument, although these sanctions generally result in combination 
with a lawyer’s conviction for influence-peddling, the fact of a conviction has 
never been critical to our disposition.  Whether or not the lawyer is ultimately 
held criminally accountable, the lawyer’s pledge to spurn such corruption is  
violated, and the breach of that duty threatens the public interest. 
{¶ 27} Moreover, as relator argues, the circumstances preceding 
respondent’s decision to cooperate with federal authorities are not as extenuating 
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as respondent asserts.  Respondent did not alert the FBI about Traficant when 
agents initially interviewed him on January 21, 2000, while investigating 
DiBlasio’s affairs.  By that time, respondent’s payoffs to Traficant were routine.  
And after meeting with the FBI, respondent did not immediately seek legal 
counsel to help him consider cooperating.  He instead reported the meeting to 
Traficant, who recommended that respondent refuse any further communication 
with the agency. 
{¶ 28} Respondent did not heed Traficant’s admonition, and on January 
24, 2000, he met with FBI agents again.  On that day, respondent again did not 
raise the possibility of his cooperation.  To the contrary, when asked point-blank 
if he was kicking money back to Traficant, respondent appeared shocked and 
offered nothing.  The inquiring FBI agent recalled respondent’s reaction: 
{¶ 29} “When I asked him the question, he was very startled.  He gave 
me what I thought was a thousand yard stare.  I could tell he didn’t know what to 
do at that point.  He seemed very confused.  He said something to the effect of 
I’m not going to help you get Traficant or something.  He left the office.  He 
ended the interview and left the office.” 
{¶ 30} After the second FBI meeting, respondent again reported to 
Traficant, who became very angry at the news.  Then, to avoid any surveillance 
devices, Traficant and respondent took another ride, drove around for hours, and 
at some point went to Traficant’s office and switched vehicles.  In the second 
vehicle, Traficant offered respondent envelopes of money in a plastic bag and 
suggested ways that he might explain the surplus funds to exonerate Traficant. 
{¶ 31} They ended up in the basement of respondent’s home, where 
Traficant removed $16,000 in cash from some 30 envelopes.  Respondent 
recognized some of the envelopes as those that he had stuffed with cash to pay off 
Traficant, while others were marked with Traficant’s initials in what respondent 
knew to be DiBlasio’s handwriting.  Traficant gave the money to respondent, and 
January Term, 2004 
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respondent took it.  On Traficant’s direction and in his presence, respondent 
afterward burned the envelopes in a concrete washtub with a butane torch. 
{¶ 32} Respondent later returned to Traficant’s office, where Traficant 
gave him an envelope with $2,500 in cash and some empty envelopes.  
Respondent took the money and went home to burn the additional envelopes.  
Before he had completely incinerated the envelopes, however, respondent put out 
the fire.  Finally, respondent decided that what he was doing was wrong. 
{¶ 33} Respondent cooperated as a witness for the prosecution against 
Traficant, and his testimony was instrumental in obtaining that conviction, as well 
as DiBlasio’s eventual conviction for perjury.  Moreover, respondent turned over 
the partially burned envelopes and money to the FBI before the agency offered 
him an agreement to proffer his story without incrimination.  But as relator 
cogently submits, any mitigating effect of respondent’s cooperation is decimated 
by the timing of his cooperation and the obvious rationale for providing it. 
{¶ 34} Respondent benefited for more than one year from paying 
gratuities to Traficant and leasing him office space.  Not until the investigative 
noose began to tighten did respondent take action to stop the corruption, and only 
then to save himself from possible criminal liability.  He succeeded.  For the 
purpose of his testimony before the grand jury and trial, the prosecution granted 
respondent use immunity at a subsequent criminal proceeding.  Thus, as long as 
respondent did not perjure himself, he would avoid prosecution. 
{¶ 35} For these reasons, respondent’s cooperation with federal 
authorities is of little mitigating effect.  We also reject the finding that 
respondent’s illicit association with Traficant represented an isolated incident 
rather than a pattern of misconduct or multiple offenses.  Respondent and 
Traficant deliberated the consideration respondent would pay for his job and then 
executed the payment plan for more than one year.  Respondent also concealed 
his preparation of the quitclaim deed for Traficant.  Moreover, these acts clearly 
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constitute the multi-step course of conduct for which an actual suspension must be 
imposed.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Shaffer, 98 Ohio St.3d 342, 2003-Ohio-1008, 
785 N.E.2d 429. 
{¶ 36} We do, however, accept all the other factors listed by the panel and 
board as mitigating.  Thus, having found that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4) 
and (6) relative to the gratuities, which included the kickbacks, the lease of office 
space, and preparing the misleading quitclaim deed, we temper our disposition 
and do not disbar respondent.  Respondent is instead indefinitely suspended from 
the practice of law.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Ronald E. Slipski and David C. Comstock Jr., for relator. 
 
Kegler, Brown, Ritter & Hill Co., L.P.A., Geoffrey Stern, and Christopher 
J. Weber, for respondent. 
_____________________