Case Title: Intern. Soc. for Krishna etc. v. City of L.A.

Citation: 48 Cal. 4th 446

Docket Number: S164272

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2010-03-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 3/25/10 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR  
) 
KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS OF  
) 
CALIFORNIA, INC., et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
) 
 
 
) 
S164272 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
9th Cir. No. 01-56579 
CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., 
) 
C.D. Cal. No. 
 
) 
CV-97-03616-CBM 
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
In 1997, the City of Los Angeles enacted an ordinance prohibiting persons 
from soliciting funds at Los Angeles International Airport.  The International 
Society for Krishna Consciousness of California, Inc. sought an injunction in 
federal district court, which ruled that the ordinance violated the free speech 
clause of the California Constitution.  The city appealed and, following protracted 
litigation, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals requested that this court decide the 
following question:  “Is Los Angeles International Airport a public forum under 
the Liberty of Speech Clause of the California Constitution?”  California Rules of 
Court, rule 8.548 provides that this court may decide a question of California law 
upon which there is no controlling precedent at the request of a federal court of 
appeals if “[t]he decision could determine the outcome of a matter pending in the 
requesting court.” 
2 
We granted the Ninth Circuit‟s request and directed the parties to address 
the following questions:  “1) Is Los Angeles International Airport a public forum 
under the Liberty of Speech Clause of the California Constitution?  2) If so, does 
the ordinance at issue violate the California Constitution?”  For the reasons that 
follow, we conclude that whether or not Los Angeles International Airport is a 
public forum for free expression under the California Constitution, the ordinance 
is valid as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction of expressive rights to 
the extent that it prohibits soliciting the immediate receipt of funds.  Accordingly, 
we do not determine whether Los Angeles International Airport is a public forum 
under the liberty of speech clause of the California Constitution, because the 
resolution of that question could not determine the outcome of the present matter. 
FACTS1 
Former section 23.27(c) of the Los Angeles Administrative Code (hereafter 
section 23.27(c)), which became effective on May 15, 1997, provided that “[n]o 
person shall solicit and receive funds” “in a continuous or repetitive manner” 
“inside the airport terminals” at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), “in the 
parking areas at the Airport,” or “on the sidewalks adjacent to the airport terminals 
or the sidewalks adjacent to the parking areas at the Airport.”2  (Intern. Soc. for 
Krishna v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2008) 530 F.3d 768, 770.) 
                                              
1  
These facts are based on the record provided to this court which, in minor 
respects, varies from some published sources. 
2  
Section 23.27(c) provided, in relevant part:  “(c)(1) No person shall solicit 
and receive funds inside the airport terminals at the Airport.  [¶]  (2) No person 
shall solicit and receive funds in the parking areas at the Airport.  [¶]  (3) No 
person shall solicit and receive funds on the sidewalks adjacent to the airport 
terminals or the sidewalks adjacent to the parking areas at the Airport.  [¶]  (4) 
Subdivisions (c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(3) apply only if the solicitation and receipt of 
funds is conducted by a person to or with passers-by in a continuous or repetitive 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
3 
LAX occupies 3,550 acres of land, approximately 93 acres of which is 
occupied by nine passenger terminals that include 195,000 square feet of space for 
concession and retail establishments for the benefit of travelers and their guests.  
In 2005, LAX served nearly 60 million passengers, making it one of the largest 
airports in the world.  “The upper level of the airport contains commercial 
concessions and amenities, including four duty free shops, five fast food 
restaurants, five full service restaurants, 18 gift shops/newsstands, 19 cocktail 
lounges, five cafeterias, eight snack bars, three coffee shops, two food courts, six 
business centers, two bookstores, three postal facilities, and four specialty stores.  
[¶] At LAX, there are areas open to the public where people may come and go 
freely and engage in a variety of activities for which facilities are provided, 
including those mentioned above.” 
On May 13, 1997, the International Society for Krishna Consciousness of 
California, Inc. and others (hereafter ISKCON) filed a complaint for declaratory 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
manner.  Nothing herein is intended to prohibit the distribution of flyers, 
brochures, pamphlets, books, or any other printed or written matter as long as such 
distribution is not made with the intent of immediately receiving funds, as defined 
in Subdivision (c)(5), at the locations referred to in (c)(1), (c)(2), or (c)(3).  [¶]  (5) 
„Solicit and receive funds‟ means any written or oral request for  [¶]  (A) the 
donation of money, alms, property or anything else of value, or,  [¶]  (B) the 
pledge of a future donation of money, alms, property, or anything else of value, or,  
[¶]  (C) the sale or offering for sale of any property upon the representation, 
express or implied, that the proceeds of such sale will be used for a charitable or 
religious purpose.” 
 
Effective June 19, 2000, section 23.27 was deleted and transferred without 
change to section 171.02 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code.  As do the parties 
and the federal courts, we will continue to refer to the ordinance as section 
23.27(c). 
4 
and injunctive relief against the City of Los Angeles and others (hereafter City) in 
the United States District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that 
section 23.27(c) violates article I, section 2 of the California Constitution and the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.  ISKCON practices the 
Krishna consciousness religion, a basic tenet of which involves an evangelical 
activity known as sankirtan, which requires members of ISKCON to approach 
people in public places in order to proselytize, solicit donations, sell and distribute 
literature, and disseminate information about Krishna consciousness programs and 
activities.  Sankirtan has four purposes: to spread religious truth; to proselytize 
and attract new members; to distribute Krishna consciousness literature; and to 
generate funds. 
On June 6, 1997, the district court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining 
the City from enforcing section 23.27(c) against ISKCON.  On May 27, 1998, the 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of ISKCON, declaring section 
23.27(c) unconstitutional and permanently enjoining the City from enforcing the 
ordinance.  The district court held “that solicitation is not basically incompatible 
with the normal activity of the airport or the primary use of the airport, to facilitate 
air travel.  Any difficulties caused by solicitation can be addressed by the use of 
less restrictive measures.”  The court found “that „the Ordinance is inconsistent 
with the Liberty of Speech Clause of the California Constitution‟ and that the 
airport is a public forum in relation to solicitation.”  The district court further held 
that section 23.27(c) was a prohibited content-based regulation of speech because 
it “regulates solicitation but not other equivalent forms of speech.”  The court 
noted, however, that “the California Supreme Court has never addressed whether 
regulation directed solely at solicitation of money violates the California Liberty 
of Speech Clause . . . .”  The City appealed on June 26, 1998. 
5 
While the appeal was pending, this court issued its decision in Los Angeles 
Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 352, 357, which 
held that an ordinance “that is directed at activity involving public solicitation for 
the immediate donation or payment of funds should not be considered content 
based or constitutionally suspect under the California Constitution, and should be 
evaluated under the intermediate scrutiny standard applicable to time, place, and 
manner regulations, rather than under the strict scrutiny standard.”  The Ninth 
Circuit vacated the summary judgment and remanded this case back to the district 
court for reconsideration in light of this decision. 
On August 2, 2001, the district court again granted summary judgment in 
favor of ISKCON on the grounds that LAX was a public forum under California 
law and section 23.27(c) was not a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction 
of the solicitation of funds at LAX.  The court stated:  “The Ordinance, in the 
present case, bans all solicitation for the immediate receipt of funds in the LAX 
terminals, parking lots and adjacent sidewalks. . . .  [T]he court finds that the 
Ordinance constitutes a content-neutral restriction on expressive activity.”  The 
court further found, however, “that LAX is a public forum for purposes of 
California‟s Liberty of Speech clause,” and “[t]he Ordinance does not constitute a 
reasonable restriction on the time, place and manner of solicitation activities,” in 
part because the ordinance‟s “ban on all solicitation for the immediate receipt of 
funds at all times — not just during peak hours or in overcrowded locations — 
places a substantial burden on several forms of lawful solicitation, such as 
solicitation of immediate donations for lawful charitable, religious, political and 
protest activities.”  The City again appealed, two weeks before the terrorist attacks 
on September 11, 2001.  (Intern. Soc. for Krishna v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 
530 F.3d at p. 771.) 
6 
While the present appeal was pending, the City enacted section 171.07 of 
the Los Angeles Municipal Code, which became effective on December 16, 2002, 
and permits organizations to apply for a permit to “solicit and receive funds” in 
designated locations at LAX.  This ordinance provides that:  “ „Solicit and receive 
funds‟ shall mean any oral or written request for funds conducted by a person to or 
with passers-by in a continuous and repetitive manner where funds are 
immediately received.”  (Ibid.)  This ordinance states that its provisions are 
“temporary and provisional pending the outcome” of the present litigation.  (Id., 
§ 171.07(G)(1); quoted in Intern. Soc. for Krishna v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 
530 F.3d at p. 772.)  ISKCON filed a suit challenging this new ordinance on 
January 13, 2003.  (C.D. Cal. No. CV 03-00293.) 
On March 21, 2003, the Ninth Circuit announced in the present appeal that 
it intended to ask this court to decide “[w]hether the Liberty of Speech Clause of 
the California Constitution should be interpreted more expansively than the federal 
First Amendment,” but first remanded the present case to the district court “for the 
limited purpose of allowing the parties to supplement the record with post-9/11 
evidence that would aid the California Supreme Court in its deliberations.”  
(Intern. Soc. for Krishna v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 530 F.3d at p. 772.)  The 
parties informally agreed that the discovery then being conducted in the related 
case challenging section 171.07 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (C.D. Cal. 
No. CV 03-00293) would be used in the present appeal as well. 
Ultimately, the parties stipulated that 62 documents filed in the related case 
be deemed to have been filed in the present appeal.  These documents establish the 
following.  The nine passenger terminals in LAX are located on the outside ring of 
a horseshoe-shaped, double-deck roadway.  The upper level roadway serves the 
departure areas, and the lower level roadway serves the arrival areas.  Sidewalks 
run the length of both the departure and arrival areas and total 154,604 square feet.  
7 
The City does not regulate religious or charitable solicitation on the sidewalks and 
does not prohibit persons in the publicly accessible areas of the terminals from 
distributing literature and speaking with members of the traveling public about 
their views and beliefs. 
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the departure areas of 
the passenger terminals at LAX were separated into prescreening areas that are 
open to the public, and postscreening areas to which only ticketed passengers are 
admitted.  Consumer amenities such as stores and restaurants in most of the 
terminal buildings are located in the postscreening areas to which only ticketed 
passengers are admitted, but there are exceptions.  In the international terminal, 
most of the retail amenities and concessions, including a food court, are located in 
the prescreening area that is open to the general public.  Commercial amenities 
and facilities are also located in areas open to the general public in three other 
terminals.  The prescreening area has become more congested due to the presence 
of explosive detection system (EDS) and explosive trace device (ETD) equipment 
that is used to scan each piece of baggage.  Approximately 211,000 square feet of 
the area of the terminals is open to the general public and the City has allocated 
approximately 670 square feet for solicitation activities. 
On September 18, 2006, in the related case (C.D. Cal. No. CV 03-00293), 
the district court, having declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
ISKCON‟s state law claim, granted summary judgment in favor of the City, ruling 
that section 171.07 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code did not violate the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.  ISKCON appealed on November 
16, 2006. 
On June 9, 2008, the Ninth Circuit issued an order in the present appeal 
requesting that this court decide the following question:  “Is Los Angeles 
International Airport a public forum under the Liberty of Speech Clause of the 
8 
California Constitution?”  (Intern. Soc. for Krishna v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 
530 F.3d at p. 770.)3  The court added:  “Our phrasing of the question should not 
restrict the California Supreme Court‟s consideration of the issues involved.”  (530 
F.3d at p. 770.)  The Ninth Circuit stated that the “answer will be determinative of 
the appeal presently before us.”  (Id. at p. 769.) 
On August 13, 2008, this court granted the request and directed the parties 
to address the following questions:  “1) Is Los Angeles International Airport a 
public forum under the Liberty of Speech Clause of the California Constitution?  
2) If so, does the ordinance at issue violate the California Constitution?”4 
DISCUSSION 
“The constitutional right of free expression is an essential ingredient of our 
democratic society.  „It is designed and intended to remove governmental 
restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what 
views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of 
such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect 
polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of 
individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.‟ [Citations.]  
The airing of opposing views is fundamental to an informed electorate and, 
through it, a free society.”  (Spiritual Psychic Science Church v. City of Azusa 
                                              
3  
California Rules of Court, rule 8.548(a) states:  “On request of the United 
States Supreme Court, a United States Court of Appeals, or the court of last resort 
of any state, territory, or commonwealth, the Supreme Court may decide a 
question of California law if:  [¶] (1) The decision could determine the outcome of 
a matter pending in the requesting court; and [¶] (2) There is no controlling 
precedent.” 
4  
California Rules of Court, rule 8.548(f)(5) states:  “At any time, the 
Supreme Court may restate the question . . . .” 
9 
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 501, 511, disapproved on another ground in Kasky v. Nike, Inc. 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 968.) 
It is well established that public areas such as streets and parks are public 
forums for free expression.  As the high court has stated:  “Wherever the title of 
streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use 
of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.  Such 
use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the 
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.  The privilege of a citizen 
of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on 
national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but 
relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and 
convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the 
guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.”  (Hague v. C. I. O. (1939) 307 U.S. 
496, 515-516.)  Even in a public forum, the right of free speech may be restricted 
by reasonable restrictions on its time, place, or manner.  (Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism (1989) 491 U.S. 781, 791.) 
The Ninth Circuit asked this court to determine whether LAX is a public 
forum under the liberty of speech clause of the California Constitution.  But our 
court rules provide that we should resolve such an issue only if “[t]he decision 
could determine the outcome of a matter pending in the requesting court.”  (Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 8.548(a)(1).)  Declaring whether LAX is a public forum 
would not determine the outcome of the present case, because the ordinance is a 
10 
valid time, place, and manner restriction of free expression even if LAX is a public 
forum.5 
Section 23.27(c) prohibits only solicitation of the immediate receipt of 
funds and permits other forms of free expression, including soliciting future 
donations.6  “Many forms of solicitation are constitutionally protected.”  (People 
v. Fogelson (1978) 21 Cal.3d 158, 165.)  In Fogelson, we held unconstitutional on 
its face an ordinance enacted by the City of Los Angeles that made it unlawful to 
“ „seek, beg, or solicit . . . alms or donations‟ ” on city property without a permit.  
(Id. at p. 161, fn. 1.)  We concluded that the ordinance “lends itself to a substantial 
number of unconstitutional applications,” (id. at p. 164) noting that it would 
regulate several forms of protected solicitation including soliciting religious or 
political contributions.  (Id. at pp. 164-165, fn. omitted.)  But we recognized that 
“[t]he mere fact that the challenged ordinance attempts to regulate constitutionally 
                                              
5  
In reviewing the validity of a restriction on free expression on public 
property, there is no need to wrestle with the sometimes difficult question of 
whether the public property constitutes a public forum if the regulation qualifies as 
a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction.  If so, the regulation is valid 
whether or not the area constitutes a public forum. 
6  
The district court stated that section 23.27(c) “prohibits any person from 
soliciting and immediately receiving funds inside the LAX terminals, parking 
areas and on the sidewalks adjacent to the parking areas or airport terminals.”  The 
City agrees with the district court that the ordinance prohibits only soliciting the 
immediate receipt of funds, stating in its opening brief that “§ 23.27(c) only limits 
solicitors in one respect:  Solicitors may no longer actually immediately receive 
funds in conjunction with their solicitation efforts . . . .  They may receive funds 
. . . in the mail, over the internet, and at other areas of LAX not covered by the 
ordinance . . . .”  The Ninth Circuit‟s certification order similarly describes the 
ordinance as prohibiting “any person from soliciting and immediately receiving 
funds.”  (Intern. Soc. for Krishna v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 530 F.3d at p. 770, 
italics added.)  We accept for purposes of our analysis the interpretation of the 
ordinance urged by the City and adopted by the district court and the Ninth 
Circuit. 
11 
protected speech and religious activity does not, of course, render it 
unconstitutional.  Speech and religious exercise are not wholly exempt from 
controls.  [Citation.]  The state may, for example, reasonably regulate the time, 
place and manner of engaging in solicitation in public places.  [Citations.]”  (Id. at 
p. 165.)  The flaw in the ordinance at issue in Fogelson was that it granted public 
officials “ „wide or unbounded discretion in granting or denying permits,‟ ” which 
permitted the officials to base their decisions “ „on the content of the ideas sought 
to be expressed.‟ [Citations.]”  (Id. at p. 166.)  We struck down the ordinance, 
stating it “contains absolutely no standards to guide licensing officials in 
exercising their discretion to grant or deny applications to solicit on city property.  
Thus, the ordinance gives officials unbridled power to prohibit constitutionally 
protected forms of solicitation.”  (Id. at p. 167, fn. omitted.) 
In Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 22 
Cal.4th 352, 357 (Los Angeles Alliance), we upheld an ordinance that banned 
soliciting an “immediate donation” in certain public places and in all public places 
if done in an aggressive manner.  The ordinance enacted by the City of Los 
Angeles prohibited “aggressive solicitation” in any public place (id. at p. 398) and 
banned all solicitations in certain locations, such as near banks and automated 
teller machines, in dining areas of restaurants, or directed at occupied vehicles.  
(Id. at pp. 399-400.)  The ordinance limited the term “solicit” to requests for “an 
immediate donation of money or other thing of value.”  (Id. at p. 399.)  We 
recognized that the ordinance “plainly implicates the liberty of speech clause of 
the California Constitution,” but added that “[t]he circumstance that an ordinance 
regulates protected conduct does not in itself, however, render the ordinance 
invalid . . . .  California decisions long have recognized that even with regard to 
protected activity, a regulation may be enforceable if it survives the intermediate 
scrutiny of time, place, and manner analysis.”  (Id. at p. 364.)  The ordinance will 
12 
survive such intermediate scrutiny if “it is (i) narrowly tailored, (ii) serves a 
significant government interest, and (iii) leaves open ample alternative avenues of 
communication. [Citation.]”  (Ibid., fn. omitted; Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 
supra, 491 U.S. at p. 791 [“[E]ven in a public forum the government may impose 
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided 
the restrictions „are justified without reference to the content of the regulated 
speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, 
and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the 
information.‟ [Citations.].”) 
In order to qualify for intermediate scrutiny, a time, place, and manner 
regulation of protected speech must be content neutral, in contrast to content-based 
regulations, which are subjected to strict scrutiny.  (Los Angeles Alliance, supra, 
22 Cal.4th at pp. 364-365.)  To be content neutral, a regulation must “be „justified‟ 
by legitimate concerns that are unrelated to any „disagreement with the message‟ 
conveyed by the speech. [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 368; Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 
supra, 491 U.S. at p. 791 [“A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the 
content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some 
speakers or messages but not others.”].)  Observing that “the regulation of 
solicitation long has been recognized as being within the government‟s police 
power,” we held that “regulations such as the Los Angeles ordinance here at issue, 
that single out the public solicitation of funds for distinct treatment, should not be 
viewed as content based or constitutionally suspect for purposes of analysis under 
article I, section 2(a), of the California Constitution.”  (Los Angeles Alliance, 
supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 378.) 
Upon reconsideration in light of our decision in Los Angeles Alliance, the 
district court concluded that the ordinance at issue here was content neutral, but 
did not survive the intermediate scrutiny described in our decision in Los Angeles 
13 
Alliance, which requires that the regulation be narrowly tailored, serve a 
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative avenues of 
communication.  The district court held that section 23.27(c) was not narrowly 
tailored because the ordinance‟s “ban on all solicitation for the immediate receipt 
of funds at all times — not just during peak hours or in overcrowded locations — 
places a substantial burden on several forms of lawful solicitation, such as 
solicitation of immediate donations for lawful charitable, religious, political and 
protest activities.”  The district court further ruled that the ordinance failed to 
leave open ample alternate avenues of communication.  Although the court 
acknowledged that the ordinance does not ban all solicitation, including “speaking 
with travelers about any subject or distributing literature,” it left “no ample venue” 
for ISKCON to “solicit financial support for their charitable, religious or political 
activities.”  The district court again granted ISKCON‟s motion for summary 
judgment. 
The district court misapplied our decision in Los Angeles Alliance and the 
concept of narrow tailoring that it incorporates.  We relied in Los Angeles Alliance 
on the Court of Appeal‟s decision in Savage v. Trammell Crow Co. (1990) 223 
Cal.App.3d 1562, 1571, which held that a ban on distributing religious pamphlets 
in the parking lot of a shopping center was a valid time, place, and manner 
regulation.  The ban on leafleting was narrowly drawn because it furthered the 
shopping center‟s “interest in controlling litter and traffic.”  (Id. at p. 1574.)  The 
court emphasized that “in determining whether a regulation is narrowly drawn, . . . 
we must give some deference to the means chosen by responsible decisionmakers. 
[Citation.]”  (Ibid.)  To be narrowly drawn, a regulation “ „need not be the least-
restrictive or least-intrusive means of doing so.  Rather, the requirement of narrow 
tailoring is satisfied “so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial 
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.”  
14 
[Citations.] . . . So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than 
necessary to achieve the government‟s interest, . . . the regulation will not be 
invalid simply because a court concludes that the government‟s interest could be 
adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative.  “The validity of 
[time, place, or manner] regulations does not turn on a judge‟s agreement with the 
responsible decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting 
significant government interests” or the degree to which those interests should be 
promoted.  [Citations.]‟ [Citations.]”  (Id. at pp. 1574-1575; Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, supra, 491 U.S. at p. 797 [“[R]estrictions on the time, place, or manner of 
protected speech are not invalid „simply because there is some imaginable 
alternative that might be less burdensome on speech.‟ [Citation.].”) 
Section 23.27(c) (as interpreted by the City, the district court, and the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals) prohibits only soliciting the immediate receipt of funds, 
and permits other forms of communication, including soliciting funds to be sent at 
a later time by mail or through a Web site, distributing literature, and speaking 
with willing listeners.  Prohibiting persons from soliciting the immediate receipt of 
funds at LAX is a narrowly tailored regulation of expressive activity because it is 
not substantially broader than necessary to addresses the particular problems 
caused by requests for the immediate receipt of funds.  We noted in Los Angeles 
Alliance that the solicitation of the immediate receipt of funds is far more intrusive 
than other forms of communication, such as distributing literature:  “ „The 
distribution of literature does not require that the recipient stop in order to receive 
the message the speaker wishes to convey; instead, the recipient is free to read the 
message at a later time. . . .  In contrast, . . . sales and the collection of solicited 
funds not only require the [person] to stop, but also “engender additional 
confusion . . . because they involve acts of exchanging articles for money, 
fumbling for and dropping money, making change, etc.” ‟  [Citation.]”  (Los 
15 
Angeles Alliance, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 369.)  We observed that solicitation that 
requests the physical exchange of money “ „creates a risk of fraud and duress that 
is well recognized, and that is different in kind from other forms of expression or 
conduct. . . . [S]olicitation has been associated with coercive or fraudulent 
conduct.‟ [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 371.)  Finally, we added:  “ „[R]equests for 
immediate payment of money create a strong potential for fraud or undue pressure, 
in part because of the lack of time for reflection. . . . [Q]uestionable practices 
associated with solicitation can include the targeting of vulnerable and easily 
coerced persons, misrepresentation of the solicitor‟s cause, and outright theft.”  
(Id. at p. 372.) 
Soliciting the immediate receipt of funds at a busy international airport like 
LAX is particularly problematic.  Although portions of the airport are open to the 
general public, people usually come to the airport only to travel or to accompany a 
traveler.  Travelers often are in a hurry, and the airport often is crowded.  The 
problems posed by solicitations for the immediate receipt of funds that arise in any 
public place would be exacerbated in the often crowded and hectic environment of 
a large international airport.  As the high court has observed:  “ „Solicitation 
requires action by those who would respond:  The individual solicited must decide 
whether or not to contribute (which itself might involve reading the solicitor‟s 
literature or hearing his pitch), and then, having decided to do so, reach for a 
wallet, search it for money, write a check, or produce a credit card.‟ [Citations.]  
Passengers who wish to avoid the solicitor may have to alter their paths, slowing 
both themselves and those around them.  The result is that the normal flow of 
traffic is impeded. [Citation.]  This is especially so in an airport, where „[a]ir 
travelers, who are often weighted down by cumbersome baggage . . . may be 
hurrying to catch a plane or to arrange ground transportation.‟ [Citation.]  Delays 
may be particularly costly in this setting, as a flight missed by only a few minutes 
16 
can result in hours worth of subsequent inconvenience. [¶]  In addition, face-to-
face solicitation presents risks of duress that are an appropriate target of 
regulation.  The skillful, and unprincipled, solicitor can target the most vulnerable, 
including those accompanying children or those suffering physical impairment and 
who cannot easily avoid the solicitation. [Citation.]  The unsavory solicitor can 
also commit fraud through concealment of his affiliation or through deliberate 
efforts to shortchange those who agree to purchase. [Citations.]  Compounding 
this problem is the fact that, in an airport, the targets of such activity frequently are 
on tight schedules.  This in turn makes such visitors unlikely to stop and formally 
complain to airport authorities.  As a result, the airport faces considerable 
difficulty in achieving its legitimate interest in monitoring solicitation activity to 
assure that travelers are not interfered with unduly.”  (International Soc. for 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (1992) 505 U.S. 672, 683-684.) 
We do not agree with the district court that the City was required to prohibit 
such practices only “during peak hours or in overcrowded locations.”  Peak 
periods of congestion and overcrowded locations at LAX vary depending on the 
arrival and departure schedule of flights.  Under these circumstances, generally 
prohibiting solicitation of the immediate receipts of funds at LAX is narrowly 
tailored to avoid the particular problems caused by this form of free expression. 
As noted above, the district court further ruled that the ordinance failed to 
leave open ample alternate avenues of communication because it left “no ample 
venue” for ISKCON to “solicit financial support for their charitable, religious or 
political activities.”  Again, we disagree.  In Frisby v. Schultz (1988) 487 U.S. 
474, 483, the high court upheld an ordinance prohibiting picketing in front of a 
residence, concluding it was “virtually self-evident that ample alternatives 
remain,” including going door-to-door and distributing literature in person or 
through the mails.  In the present case, ISKCON has ample alternative means of 
17 
conveying its message.  It can distribute literature and speak to willing travelers.  
It can even seek financial support, as long as it does not request the immediate 
exchange of funds.  The City acknowledges that it would be permissible for 
ISKCON to “ask for donations” and distribute “self-addressed stamped 
envelope[s]” in the areas of the airport open to the general public. 
CONCLUSION 
In response to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals‟ request, we conclude 
that even if those areas of Los Angeles International Airport that are open to the 
general public are public forums under the free speech clause of the California 
Constitution, section 23.27, subdivision (c) of the Los Angeles Administrative 
Code is valid on its face as a reasonable, content-neutral regulation of the manner 
of protected speech. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
The court‟s opinion, authored by Justice Moreno, holds that a city 
ordinance prohibiting the solicitation and receipt of funds in public areas of Los 
Angeles International Airport does not violate the California Constitution‟s liberty 
of speech clause (Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (a) [“A law may not restrain or 
abridge liberty of speech or press.”]) but instead is a valid time, place, and manner 
restriction on expressive activity. 
I join in that holding, but I do so only under compulsion of this court‟s 
decision in Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 
Cal.4th 352.  There, a majority of this court held that under the state Constitution‟s 
liberty of speech clause, a city ordinance prohibiting, at specified locations, any 
solicitation for the immediate donation of funds was not a content-based 
regulation of speech and that such an ordinance was to be evaluated as a time, 
place, and manner restriction on speech.  (Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City 
of Los Angeles, supra, at p. 357.)  I disagreed, concluding that a solicitation ban is 
based on the content of speech, and therefore its validity must be determined using 
a standard of scrutiny more rigorous than the standard used to evaluate the validity 
of time, place, and manner restrictions.  (Id. at p. 383 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).)  
Although my view on that question has not changed, I recognize that the 
majority‟s holding in Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles has 
the force of precedent and that reiteration of dissenting views is rarely justified.  
 
2 
(See People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1072-1073 (conc. opn. of 
Kennard, J.).) 
In this case, I would also decide an issue that the court‟s opinion does not 
address.  Although this case comes to this court upon a request of the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals for a decision on a question of California law, the court‟s 
opinion here does not answer the particular question of California law that the 
Ninth Circuit asked this court to decide.  That question is whether Los Angeles 
International Airport is a public forum for free expression under the California 
Constitution‟s liberty of speech clause.  More precisely, the question is whether 
the areas of that airport that are accessible to the general public — excluding the 
areas reserved for ticketed passengers who have passed through security screening 
— are public forums.  I would answer “yes” to that question. 
My answer is based primarily on two of this court‟s decisions:  In re 
Hoffman (1967) 67 Cal.2d 845, holding that a railway station (Union Station in 
Los Angeles) was a public forum, and Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National 
Labor Relations Bd. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 850, holding that a privately owned 
shopping mall was a public forum (see also Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center 
(1979) 23 Cal.3d 899). 
To determine whether particular areas are public forums for purposes of the 
California Constitution‟s liberty of speech clause, this court has generally 
proceeded by asking whether, in relevant ways, the area in question is similar or 
dissimilar to areas that have already been determined to be public forums.  (See, 
e.g., Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Bd., supra, 42 Cal.4th 
850, 858 [stating that an area may be a public forum “if it is open to the public in a 
manner similar to that of public streets and sidewalks”]; In re Hoffman, supra, 67 
Cal.2d 845, 851 [comparing railway station with “a public street or park”].)  
Applying that approach here, I conclude that the prescreening public areas of Los 
 
3 
Angeles International Airport are public forums because, in relevant ways, they 
are similar to shopping malls and railway stations. 
Like railway stations and shopping malls, the prescreening areas of Los 
Angeles International Airport are open to the public; they contain restaurants, 
newsstands, shops, and seats or benches for waiting; and they are places where 
people frequently have leisure for discussion and socializing.  Therefore, in 
answer to the Ninth Circuit‟s request, I would decide that the prescreening public 
areas of Los Angeles International Airport are public forums. 
In reaching this conclusion, I am aware of the United States Supreme 
Court‟s holding that, for purposes of the free speech guarantee of the federal 
Constitution‟s First Amendment, airports are not public forums.  (International 
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (1992) 505 U.S. 672, 680.)  But the 
free speech guarantees of the federal and California Constitutions are not identical, 
particularly as regards the concept of public forum.  Thus, for example, although 
the federal high court has held that privately owned shopping malls are not public 
forums for free expression under the First Amendment (Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner 
(1972) 407 U.S. 551), this court has not found that holding persuasive in 
interpreting our state Constitution, which is “a document of independent force and 
effect particularly in the area of individual liberties” (People v. Hannon (1977) 19 
Cal.3d 588, 606, fn. 8).  This court has recognized that our state Constitution‟s 
free speech guarantee “differs from its counterpart in the federal Constitution both 
in its language and its scope” (Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor 
Relations Bd., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 862; see also Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. 
Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 486) and that those differences explain the broader 
application of the public forum concept under our state Constitution (Fashion 
Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Bd., supra, at pp. 862-863).   
 
4 
When an area has been determined to be a public forum for purposes of our 
state Constitution‟s liberty of speech clause, that determination does not have the 
effect of prohibiting all regulation of expressive activities at that location.  
Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on expressive activities in public 
forums are valid, as this court‟s conclusion here about the validity of the ordinance 
prohibiting solicitation of funds amply demonstrates.  Speech activities at airports 
that interfere with the legitimate interests of the airport management, arriving or 
departing passengers, security screeners, or airline or airport employees need not 
be tolerated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY CHIN, J. 
 
 
I agree with the majority that the challenged ordinance governing the Los 
Angeles International Airport (LAX) does not violate the California Constitution.  
But I would answer the question the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals posed, 
identify the legal standard applicable to that answer, and apply that standard to 
determine whether the ordinance is valid. 
The Ninth Circuit requested this court to answer this question:  “Is Los 
Angeles International Airport a public forum under the Liberty of Speech Clause 
of the California Constitution?”  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (a).)  Consistent 
with the United States Supreme Court‟s resolution of the same question under the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution, I would answer that LAX is 
not a public forum for free speech purposes under the California Constitution.  
(See International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (1992) 505 U.S. 
672 (Lee).)  This answer does not mean free speech rights do not exist at LAX.  It 
just means that speech at LAX receives a lower level of protection than speech 
receives at traditional free speech zones such as parks and public squares.  LAX is 
not the same as a park and should not be treated the same as a park. 
 
2 
A.  Whether Los Angeles International Airport Is a Public Forum 
Under the California Constitution 
The United States Supreme Court developed the public forum doctrine to 
distinguish between public property subject to the highest free speech protection 
under the First Amendment and public property subject to a lower level of free 
speech protection.  (See generally Clark v. Burleigh (1992) 4 Cal.4th 474, 482-
483.)  The high court applied that law and concluded that airport terminals (in that 
case the three major airports in the greater New York City area) are not public 
forums.  (Lee, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 680-683.)  I would reach the same conclusion 
for LAX under the California Constitution. 
First, I agree with what is implied in the Ninth Circuit‟s question and the 
majority opinion:  Public forum analysis applies under the California Constitution 
as well as under the First Amendment even though the doctrine was developed in 
First Amendment cases.  It is a useful doctrine for deciding what level of 
protection speech receives in a given context.  (See Clark v. Burleigh, supra, 4 
Cal.4th at pp. 482-483.) 
Although this court sometimes interprets the California Constitution 
differently than the First Amendment, no reason appears to do so here, and good 
reason exists not to do so.  The public, litigators, and government attorneys 
advising their clients need a clear, consistent “public forum” doctrine in cases 
arising on public property, not seemingly random fluctuations between state and 
federal constitutional law.  This is especially true of airports.  After the events of 
September 11, 2001, Congress enacted the Aviation and Transportation Security 
Act of 2001, which created the Transportation Security Administration and gave it 
broad authority to “oversee the implementation, and ensure the adequacy, of 
security measures at airports” like LAX.  (49 U.S.C. § 114(f)(11).)  Federal and 
other authorities overseeing security measures at international airports throughout 
 
3 
the country should have one set of constitutional rules to contend with, not 
multiple sets.  Because of the need for interstate and international security 
cooperation, it benefits no one to have different constitutional rules at California 
airports than at other airports. 
Airports are not traditional free speech zones like parks.  This is true of the 
prescreening areas open to the public as well as the postscreening areas.  As the 
majority aptly observes, “Although portions of the airport are open to the general 
public, people usually come to the airport only to travel or to accompany a 
traveler.  Travelers often are in a hurry, and the airport often is crowded.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 15; see also id. at pp. 15-16 [quoting Lee, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 
683-684].)  People do not go to airports to relax or to socialize, to be entertained or 
to spend time; they go to airports to get themselves or their friends and loved ones 
safely and efficiently to their destination.  The parties‟ stipulation of agreed facts 
(as well as common experience) tells us that “[t]he „basic purpose‟ of LAX is to 
facilitate, process and serve the traveling public in getting to and from airline 
flights and moving into and out of the airport terminal areas in a safe, secure, 
convenient, and efficient fashion.”  LAX is not, and should not be declared to be, a 
free speech public forum under either the United States or the California 
Constitution. 
In concluding that California constitutional law should differ from First 
Amendment law regarding airports, Justice Kennard relies “primarily” on two 
cases:  Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Bd. (2007) 42 
Cal.4th 850 (Fashion Valley) and In re Hoffman (1967) 67 Cal.2d 845 (Hoffman).  
(Conc. opn. of Kennard, J., ante, at p. 2.)  Neither case addresses, much less 
answers, this question. 
Hoffman, supra, 67 Cal.2d 845, held that “First Amendment activities 
[cannot] be prohibited [at train stations] solely because the property involved is 
 
4 
not maintained primarily as a forum for such activities.”  (Id. at p. 850.)  For three 
reasons, that opinion has nothing to do with the issue here.  First, Hoffman cited 
solely the First Amendment with no hint that the California Constitution should 
diverge from First Amendment law in this area.  Second, Hoffman concerned train 
stations in the 1960‟s, not airports in the 21st century.  As the Lee court — in an 
opinion long predating September 11, 2001 — noted, there are major differences 
between airports and other “ „transportation nodes.‟ ”  (Lee, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 
681.)  “To blithely equate airports with other transportation centers, therefore, 
would be a mistake.”  (Id. at p. 682.)  Finally, Hoffman simply did not address the 
question whether a train station is a public forum under the First Amendment, 
much less whether it is one under the California Constitution, which it never cites.  
Hoffman held only that free speech rights exist at train stations, which is also true 
of airports even under my conclusion that they are not public forums.  (See pt. B., 
below.)  But Hoffman conducted no public forum analysis, which is not surprising 
given that the First Amendment public forum doctrine largely developed after that 
opinion.  It never considered what level of protection speech receives at train 
stations:  the highest level reserved for true public forums or the lower level given 
nonpublic forums.1 
Fashion Valley, supra, 42 Cal.4th 850, held that a shopping mall is a public 
forum under the California Constitution.2  A shopping mall is entirely different 
                                              
1  
The Hoffman opinion does say that in one “respect, a railway station is like 
a public street or park.”  (Hoffman, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 851.)  But saying that a 
railway station is like a public street in one respect does not mean the court found 
it to be a public forum under a later-developed doctrine that it never mentioned. 
2  
I dissented in Fashion Valley, supra, 42 Cal.4th 850, but only because the 
shopping mall at issue there was private property.  (Id. at pp. 870-882.)  If the 
shopping mall had been public property, I would have agreed that it was a public 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
5 
from an airport for free speech purposes.  As Fashion Valley noted, “in many 
cities the public areas of the shopping mall are replacing the streets and sidewalks 
of the central business district, which „have immemorially been held in trust for 
the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of 
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions.‟ ”  (Id. at p. 858.)  None of this is remotely true of airports.  To equate 
an airport with a free speech zone is to ignore reality and, perhaps worse, trivialize 
free speech interests at true public forums. 
B.  The Standard Applicable to a Nonpublic Forum 
Declaring an area a nonpublic forum does not mean free speech rights do 
not exist there.  Free speech rights exist on public property open to the public 
whether or not the property is considered a public forum.  This is true under the 
First Amendment and, I have no doubt, also true under the California Constitution.  
My conclusion that an airport is not a public forum just means that restrictions on 
speech at an airport are not subject to the same level of “highest scrutiny” that 
applies to the “regulation of speech on government property that has traditionally 
been available for public expression . . . .”  (Lee, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 678.)  As 
the high court explained, designating property as a public forum would mean that 
a restriction of speech on that property “could be sustained only if it was narrowly 
tailored to support a compelling state interest.”  (Id. at p. 676.)  A restriction on 
speech at a nonpublic forum such as an airport must still pass a constitutional test, 
albeit a less rigorous one.  “The challenged regulation need only be reasonable, as 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
forum.  But LAX is public property.  Accordingly, the disagreement between the 
majority and dissent in Fashion Valley is irrelevant here. 
 
6 
long as the regulation is not an effort to suppress the speaker‟s activity due to 
disagreement with the speaker‟s view.”  (Id. at p. 679.) 
I would conclude that the ordinance at issue here passes this test for the 
reasons the majority gives for concluding it would pass even the more rigorous 
test reserved for public forums.  Accordingly, I concur with the majority opinion. 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
BAXTER, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion International Society for Krishna Consciousness of California v. City of Los Angeles 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX (on certification pursuant to rule 8.548, Cal. Rules of Court) 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S164272 
Date Filed: March 25, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: 
County: 
Judge: 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen A. Trutanich, City Attorneys, Kelly Martin, Managing City Attorney, D. 
Timothy Dazé, Deputy City Attorney; Law Offices of John Werlich and John M. Werlich for Defendants 
and Appellants. 
 
Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney (San Francisco), Danny Chou, Chief of Complex and Special Litigation, 
Mara Rosales, Chief Airport Counsel, Burk E. Delventhal, Ellen Forman and Rafal Ofierski, Deputy City 
Attorneys; Patricia B. Heilbron, Deputy Port Attorney (Oakland); and Breton Lobner for City and County 
of San Francisco, League of California Cities, California State Association of Counties, Port of Oakland 
and San Diego County Regional Airport Authority as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Appellants. 
 
Kent S. Scheidegger and Maritza B. Meskan for Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Law Offices of David M. Liberman, David M. Liberman; Law Offices of Robert C. Moest and Robert C. 
Moest for Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
Peter J. Eliasberg; Julia Harumi Mass, Alan L. Schlosser; and David Blair-Loy for American Civil 
Liberties Union of Southern California, American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California and  
American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego and Imperial Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs 
and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
John M. Werlich 
Law Offices of John Werlich 
1563 Shadowglen Court 
Westlake Village, CA  91361 
(805) 236-1694 
 
Danny Chou 
Chief of Complex and Special Litigation 
1390 Market Street, Seventh Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94102-5408 
(415) 554-3807 
 
David M. Liberman 
Law Offices of David M. Liberman 
9709 Venice Boulevard, No. 4 
Los Angeles, CA  90034 
(424) 298-8648