Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE AND GUARDIANSHIP OF ANDREWS, INCOMPETENT

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE AND GUARDIANSHIP OF ANDREWS, INCOMPETENT2002 WY 1739 P.3d 1021Case Number: 00-267Decided: 02/05/2002

October Term, A.D. 2001

IN THE 
MATTER OF THE ESTATE

AND 
GUARDIANSHIP OF PAUL

K. 
ANDREWS, Incompetent:

ETHEL 
SHEETS and BLANCHE WOOD, 

Appellants(Defendants),

v.

                                                                                    

U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS

AFFAIRS; 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF

BUFFALO, 
N.A.; and JACK R. ANDREWS, 

Appellees(Plaintiffs).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County:

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

Representing 
Appellants Ethel Sheets and Blanch Wood:

F.M. 
Andrews, Jr., Riverton, WY.

 Representing 
Appellees U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs; First Nat'l Bank of Buffalo, N.A., and 
Jack R. Andrews:

Aleksander 
D. Radich for U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs; William D. Omohundro, Buffalo, WY 
for First Nat'l Bank of Buffalo; and Fred R. Dollison, Sheridan, WY for Jack R. 
Andrews.

 Guardian 
ad Litem for Paul K. Andrews:

Scott 
Powers, Sheridan, WY.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

LEHMAN, 
C.J., 
delivered the opinion of the court.  
HILL, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

  

LEHMAN, 
Chief Justice. 

[¶1]      This is 
an appeal from an order setting aside a deed executed by Paul K. Andrews 
(Andrews) to appellants Ethel Sheets and Blanch Wood.  The district court set aside the deed as 
void after determining Andrews had been adjudicated an incompetent person in 
1989, and thus did not have the power to execute the deed.  Appellants assert that Andrews has never 
been "adjudicated" as incompetent and that the appointment of a conservator for 
Andrews under the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act (UVGA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
3-6-101 through 3-6-119, is of limited effect and cannot be used as a 
mechanism to set aside their warranty deed.  We agree and reverse the district 
court's order setting aside the deed and remand for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellants 
present these issues for review:

I.  The lower court was without in 
personum jurisdiction over the person and property of the ward for want of 
personal ser­vice. 

II.  If the Court had jurisdiction over any 
property of Andrews, it was limited to the monies received by him from the 
Bureau of Veterans Affairs as disability compensation and the earnings, interest 
and profits therefrom.

III.  The Court erred as a matter of law in 
finding that Andrews did not have the power to convey his property on November 
[25], 1998 and declaring the warranty deed from Paul K. Andrews to Ethel Sheets 
and Blanche Wood void, and setting it aside.

IV.  The Court's findings and conclusions 
were erroneous as a matter of fact and law.

Appellees Department of Veterans Affairs and 
conservators assert these issues:

I.  Appellants have no standing to 
challenge the lower court's exercise of in personum jurisdiction over the 
original guardian­ship proceeding.

II.  Laches, waiver and res judicata 
preclude a collateral attack of the 1989 court 
proceedings.

III.  The trial court's findings and 
conclusions contained in the order appealed from are not clearly 
erroneous.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL 
HISTORY

[¶3]      Andrews is a 
veteran who is entitled to benefits.  
In January of 1989, the Veterans' Administration (hereinafter "the VA") 
in an ex parte administrative proceeding rated Andrews, then aged sixty-two, as 
incompetent.  See 38 
C.F.R.§ 3.353.  Subsequently, 
though Andrews continued to live in his Story, Wyoming home unassisted, on April 
13, 1989, a Petition for Appointment of Conservator and Guardian was filed in 
the probate court of Sheridan County by Key Bank of Wyoming and Jack R. Andrews 
(Andrews' brother).  This petition 
was captioned "In the Matter of the V.A. Guardianship and Conservatorship of 
Paul K. Andrews, an incompetent."  
It alleged inter alia:

9.  That Paul K. Andrews is a veteran and 
receives a retirement in the sum of Seven Hundred and Eighty Dollars ($780.00) 
per month and a disability payment in the sum of One Thousand Four Hundred and 
Eleven Dollars ($1,411.00) per month. 

10.  That the appointment of a Guardian or 
Conservator of his estate is necessary, as Paul K. Andrews is unable to manage 
his financial affairs and as a condition precedent to the continuing payment of 
monies due him by the Veterans Administration.

11.  That notice of these proceedings has 
been served upon the Veterans Administration Medical Center at Sheridan, 
Wyoming.

[¶4]      In their prayer 
for relief, the petitioners requested

that Key Bank of Wyoming, Trust Division, and Jack R. 
Andrews be appointed Co-Conservators of the estate of Paul K. Andrews, an 
incompetent, that Jack R. Andrews be appointed Guardian of the person of Paul K. 
Andrews, and that letters of guardianship be issued to the Co-Guardians of the 
estate and to the Guardian of the person of Paul K. Andrews upon the taking of 
the oath prescribed by law and bond as set by the Court.

Jack R. Andrews, the Vice President/Trust Officer of 
Key Bank, and the attorney for the petitioners signed the petition. 

[¶5]      Attached to the 
petition were two certificates.  The 
first, dated October 20, 1988, was signed by a physician employed by the 
Veterans' Hospital certifying that he had examined Andrews on that date and 
stating his opinion that Andrews was incompetent to manage his financial affairs 
unassisted.  It further declared, 
"this Certificate is made and given pursuant to Wyoming Statutes, Sections 
3-6-101 through 3-6-119."  The 
District Counsel for the Veterans' Administration in the State of Wyoming 
executed the second certificate, dated February 6, 1989.  It certified that the VA had rated 
Andrews incompetent and that "appointment of a guardian is a condition precedent 
to the continuing payment of monies due Paul K. Andrews by the Veterans 
Administration."1  It further stated that, "this 
Certificate is made and given pursuant to Section 3-6-107, Wyoming Statutes 
1977."  

[¶6]      On the date the 
petition was filed, the district court issued an Order Appointing 
Conser­vator and Guardian which named Key Bank of Wyoming and Jack R. 
Andrews as co-conservators to the estate of Andrews and Jack R. Andrews as 
guardian.  Pursuant to the court's 
order, an initial inventory and receipt of estate assets was executed by Key 
Bank, approved by VA district counsel, and filed with the district court on 
August 1, 1989.  In December of 
1989, the co-conservators petitioned the court to order Andrews an allowance of 
$1,200 per month, to order the purchase of a new satellite dish, to order 
reasonable funds disbursed to pay for Andrews' traveling expenses to visit his 
family in Idaho and California, and to order the donation of Andrews' 1971 Jeep 
to Sheridan County Search and Rescue.  
On 
January 11, 1991, Andrews executed a Last Will and Testament revoking his 
previous wills and codicils. 

[¶7]      In August of 1992, the 
co-conservators petitioned the court for: 1) a hearing on the annual accounting 
of Andrews' estate; 2) an order authorizing payment for a $1,255.81 feed and 
equipment bill Andrews had incurred; and 3) an order changing the 
"co-guardianship" from Key Bank Trust Company to an appropriate financial 
institution in Buffalo, Wyoming. Upon the hearing, with no objection from the 
co-conservators or the VA, First National Bank of Buffalo, Wyoming was 
substituted as co-conservator for Key Bank of Wyoming.  During the course of 
1993, with leave of the court and no objection by the co-conservators or the VA, 
Andrews sold his real property and home in Story and purchased a smaller home in 
Sheridan, Wyoming.  

[¶8]      Sometime in the fall 
of 1994, Appellant Ethel Sheets, Andrews' cousin, moved from Powell, Wyoming to 
Sheridan.  Her 
mother, appellant Blanch Wood, is Andrews' aunt and a long-time resident of 
Sheridan. Ms. Sheets began to live with Andrews in his home and undertook 
cooking for Andrews as well as general home care.  Later that year, apparently concerned about 
this arrangement and Ms. Sheets' access to Andrews' allowance income, the 
co-conservators unsuccessfully attempted to evict her from Andrews' home. 

[¶9]      On September 11, 1995, 
Andrews petitioned the court to terminate his guardianship.  He alleged, inter alia, that he had been examined by a local 
physician and, based upon this examination and a psychological evaluation taken 
by a local psychologist, he was mentally competent to handle his own financial 
affairs and to care for himself and that a guardianship and a co-conservatorship 
were no longer necessary and "an unwarranted expense and an unnecessary drain 
upon [his] assets."  
The VA, through counsel, responded to this petition. Andrews did not 
further pursue the termination. 

[¶10]   Andrews and Ms. Sheets continued to 
reside in his home together until October 16, 1998.  On that date, Ms. 
Sheets returned from an out of town trip and found Andrews lying on the floor in 
his bedroom.  
She contacted the VA Hospital, and Andrews was admitted to the hospital 
by ambulance.  
The doctor who admitted Andrews reported that Ms. Sheets sent for the 
ambulance because Andrews was found in an unhygienic condition and because she 
was concerned he did not have the awareness to help resolve the situation or 
care for himself. This doctor diagnosed Andrews as suffering from "dementia" 
among other physical ailments. 

[¶11]   In November of 1998, Andrews was 
transferred to the VA's Nursing Home Care Unit.  Repeated neuropsychological testing by the VA 
since that time has led it to continue to evaluate Andrews as incompetent.  It was further 
determined that his physical and mental condition prohibited him from returning 
to his home.  On 
November 6, 1998, Andrews exe­cuted and signed a document in front of two 
witnesses which read:

TO WHOM 
IT MAY CONCERN:

This 
will give my cousin, Ethel Sheets, permission to live in my house at [address], 
Sheridan, Wy., and to take care of the house and yard for me as she has done in 
the past.  The 
duration to be while I am in the Veterans Hospital and nursing home.  The expenses for 
running the home are to be paid for as in the past by the conservatorhip [sic]. 

Thereafter, Ms. Sheets continued to reside in Andrews' home, 
and it was her presence that is the presumed impetus behind the litigation that 
followed.

[¶12]   On January 14, 1999, the co-conservators 
petitioned the court to sell Andrews' home, stating that his medical providers 
did not feel he could ever return to live there and that they "desire and need 
the sole custody of the premises and the property of [Andrews'] estate in order 
to serve the best interests of [Andrews]."  In response to this petition, the same 
attorney who had represented Andrews in his request to terminate his 
guardianship in 1995, came forward with a warranty deed dated and filed with 
public record on November 25, 1998.  This deed prepared by the attorney, signed by 
Andrews, and notarized by a Sheridan notary, conveyed Andrews' home to Ethel 
Sheets and Blanch Wood as joint tenants with a right of survivorship reserving a 
life estate to Andrews.  This attorney filed many petitions and 
counter-petitions on behalf of Andrews and Ethel Sheets.  On May 27, 1999, in 
response to the co-conservators' motion to disqualify this attorney from 
representing Andrews on the grounds of conflict of interest, the district court 
disqualified the attorney from representing Andrews.  He also ordered all 
of the pleadings and petitions filed by the attorney on behalf of Andrews 
stricken from the record.  On November 19, 1999, in response to the 
co-conservator's motion to disqualify the attorney, the district court, citing 
conflict of interest in his representation of Andrews, further ordered that this 
attorney be disqualified from repre­senting either Ethel Sheets or Blanch 
Wood and that all responsive pleadings or petitions he had filed on their behalf 
be stricken from the record.  The issue of the correctness of these rulings 
is not before us, and we take no position on them herein.  It is solely the 
validity of this deed that is the subject of the instant appeal.  

[¶13]   On April 9, 1999, in a cross-claim, the 
co-conservators moved to set aside the war­ranty deed as void.  Thereafter, on April 
27, 2000, the case culminated in a hearing on the conservators' Amended Petition 
for Guidance from the Court Regarding Status and Disposi­tion of Real and 
Personal Property of the Ward.  In this petition the co-conservators alleged 
inter alia that the co-conservator bank was currently 
paying all of the expenses associated with Andrews' residence and that the 
co-conservator has requested Ethel Sheets and Blanch Wood pay a reasonable 
rental for their occupation of the residence.2  They further 
petitioned the court to set aside the deed as invalid because it was executed by 
one adjudicated incom­petent; or, should the court find the deed valid, that 
the court grant permission for them to terminate payment from Andrews' estate 
for any expenses associated with the house.  Sheets and Wood responded arguing inter alia that the proceeding in 1989 was not an 
adjudication of incompetency and alleged that the 1989 order should be set aside 
as a violation of Andrews' due process rights.  They also asserted that at the time the deed 
was executed Andrews was competent to make such disposition as he desired. 

[¶14]   On June 12, 2000, the district court 
entered its order finding in part that:  1) the 1989 proceedings were valid and 
according to law in all respects and were an adjudication of incompetency 
because the original court found Andrews to be suffering from a mental illness 
or deficiency; 2) that Andrews continues to be a mentally incompetent person; 3) 
because Andrews has been consistently represented by counsel over the years and 
none of his counsel have ever raised any issues regarding any irregularity in 
the initial appointment of the guardian any attack on it now is barred by res 
judicata, laches, and waiver; 4) that pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-6-110(b) 
the conservators in this matter are authorized to manage all of Andrews' assets; 
and 5) pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-1-202, Andrews did not have power to 
convey real property; accordingly, the deed executed by Andrews was void in all 
respects and of no force or effect.  This timely appeal followed.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶15]   In deciding this case, the district 
court made express findings of fact and conclusions of law.  We have stated that 
we do not afford the factual findings of a judge the limited review given a jury 
verdict.  Mathis v. Wendling, 962 P.2d 160, 163 (Wyo. 
1998); Springer v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 
Wyoming, 944 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Wyo. 
1997) (citing Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 
861 P.2d 531, 538 (Wyo. 
1993)).  While 
this court presumes that the district court's findings of fact are correct, we 
may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record.  Springer, 944 P.2d  at 1176.   Our review 
does not include reweighing disputed evidence, and we give the judge's 
opportunity to assess the witnesses' credibility due regard.  Id. We will not set aside the district court's findings 
of fact unless the findings are inconsistent with the evidence, clearly 
erroneous, or contrary to the great weight of the evidence.  Frost Const. Co. v. Lobo, Inc., 951 P.2d 390, 394 (Wyo. 
1998) (citing Narans v. Paulsen, 803 P.2d 358, 360 (Wyo. 
1990)).  
Additionally, we review a district court's conclusions of law de 
novo.  Springer, 944 P.2d  at 1176.

DISCUSSION

[¶16]   We believe the issues before us can 
most effectively be resolved if addressed in the following manner: 1) standing 
of the appellants to assert deficiencies in the 1989 proceed­ings; 2) 
determination of the character of the 1989 proceedings; 3) the scope and effect 
of the 1989 appointment of the guardian and conservators on the estate of 
Andrews, including the power of Andrews to convey real property.  

Standing/Collateral 
Attack

[¶17]   Appellees urge that this court 
recognize that appellants lack standing to collaterally attack the 1989 
proceedings, arguing that they stand in no different posture with respect to 
this guardianship than do complete strangers off the street.  They further 
assert: "Their rela­tively recent beneficiary status under a deed executed 
in violation of state statute cannot confer standing to retroactively attack the 
propriety of proceedings leading to the establish­ment of the guardianship 
in 1989."  In 
regard to standing, this court has said:

At 
its most elementary level, the standing doctrine holds that a decision-making 
body should refrain from considering issues in which the litigants have little 
or no interest in vigorously advo­cating.  Accordingly, the doctrine of standing focuses 
upon whether a litigant is properly situated to assert an issue for 
judi­cial or quasi-judicial determination.  A litigant is said to have standing when he 
has a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy."  This personal stake 
requirement has been described in Wyoming as a "tangible interest" at 
stake.  The 
tangible interest requirement guarantees that a litigant is suffi­ciently 
interested in a case to present a justiciable controversy.  

Schulthess v. Carollo, 832 P.2d 552, 556-57 (Wyo. 
1992) (citations omitted).

[¶18]   In the instant case, appellants' 
property interest in having their warranty deed declared valid by the court as a 
proper conveyance and quieting title to the residence in them is a "tangible 
interest" sufficient to give them a "personal stake in the outcome of the 
contro­versy."  
We further note, in fact, it was appellees who summoned the appellants 
into this litigation when they petitioned the district court to void the 
appellants' deed.  
Appellees can­not now assert that appellants have no standing to 
defend their deed and urge that it be recognized as valid.  

[¶19]   The question, then, remains whether 
appellants may assert that the 1989 proceedings are void and thus subject to 
collateral attack.  
This court has defined a collateral attack as

an 
attack on a judgment in any manner other than by action or proceeding whose very 
purpose is to impeach or overturn the judgment, or, stated affirmatively, a 
collateral attack upon a judgment is an attack made by or in an action or 
proceeding that has an independent purpose other than impeaching or 
overturn­ing the judgment . . . .

Hume v. Ricketts, 69 Wyo. 222, 240 P.2d 881, 883 (1952) (quoting L.R.A. 1918D 470, 472).  We discussed the 
doctrine as follows:

Jurisdiction of the court over the parties is an essential 
to the validity of any judgment and a personal judgment rendered without such 
jurisdiction is void.  
However, the judgment is pre­sumed to be valid and the presumption in 
favor of jurisdiction extends to jurisdiction of the parties. By the general 
rule, a col­lateral attack may not be made upon a judgment where the absence 
of jurisdiction over the parties does not appear upon the record.  It seems to be the 
general rule that a void judgment, such as one wherein the court lacks 
jurisdiction over the parties, can be attacked collaterally only where the 
invalidity appears on the face of the record.  Where the invalidity does not appear on the 
face of the record, the proper action is a direct attack.

Id. (citations omitted); see also 
Osborn v. Painter, 909 P.2d 960, 963 (Wyo. 
1996).

[¶20]   In Travis v. 
Estate of Travis, 79 Wyo. 329, 334 P.2d 508 (1959), a probate court vacated and set aside 
as void a district court's earlier decree of divorce.  On appeal, the 
Travis appellants asserted that the decree had been 
attacked collaterally in violation of law.  The Travis 
appellees, relying on Wyoming cases, asserted that a judgment affirmatively 
appearing on the face of the record to be void may be attacked collaterally or 
otherwise.  In 
deciding the issue, this court then necessarily undertook to decide whether or 
not the record, on its face, showed the divorce decree to be void.  Ultimately, the 
court determined that the record did not make that showing sufficiently to 
overcome the presumption of jurisdiction recited in the district court's 
order.  Id. 

[¶21]   As to who may assert that a judgment is 
void and thus subject to collateral attack, we think that 47 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 916 (1995) aptly states the general rule 
which this court has followed in the course of its jurisprudence:  "A void judgment or 
final order is subject to collateral attack at the instance of any person 
affected by it, at any time and in any proceed­ing in another court of equal 
jurisdiction."  
In the instant case, appellants indisputably have been "affected by" the 
1989 judgment appointing the guardian and establishing the conser­vatorship 
because it was enforced against them to render their 1998 deed invalid.  Therefore, we find 
they are proper parties to assert that the 1989 proceedings were void ab initio.   Nonetheless, ultimately whether this or 
any judgment is subject to collateral attack must begin with a determination of 
whether or not the record on its face shows the judgment to be void.  

Character of the 1989 
Proceedings

[¶22]   The district court in its order of 
June 12, 2000, determined that "[t]he file contains suffi­cient evidence 
that the ward, Mr. Paul Andrews, was an incompetent person as defined in Wyoming 
Statute 3-1-101(a)(xii) on April 13, 1989.  The 1989 Order was an adjudication of 
incompetency because it specifically found Mr. Andrews to be suffering from a 
mental illness or deficiency."  This 
conclusion drawn by the district court on the character of the 1989 proceedings 
is significant.  
As discussed infra whether a guardian or 
conservator is appointed under the general guardianship statutes found in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 3-1-101 through 3-2-202, or under the veterans guardianship 
statutes found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-6-101 through 3-6-119, will determine the 
scope and effect of the appointment.  We find this conclusion by the district court 
to be clearly erroneous.  

[¶23]   The 1989 proceeding was an appointment 
of a guardian under the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act (UVGA), Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 3-6-101 through 3-6-119.  The petition itself, as well as the 
certificates attached to it executed by the VA physician and VA general 
coun­sel, each indicate that the guardianship was sought under the 
UVGA.  The 
petition complies with § 3-6-105 precisely, going so far as to list all of the 
proposed Ward's nearest relatives and their residences as required by subsection 
(b).  Moreover, 
the petition purports to have provided notice to the VA.  That fact, coupled 
with the VA's continued inclusion in this case as a party in interest as 
mandated by § 3-6-103(b), clearly shows that the action was brought under the 
UVGA.  

[¶24]   Further, the various co-conservators 
have explicitly acknowledged over the years that the appointment was brought 
under the UVGA.  
The first year's accounting of the estate exe­cuted by Key Bank 
spanning the time period of April 13, 1989 to April 30, 1990 states

[t]hat, to the best of affiant's understanding and belief, 
Wyoming Statutes Section 3-6-112, which governs fees allow­able to guardians 
under the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act and is applicable to this estate, 
permits compensation to a guardian for ordinary services up to an amount of five 
percent (5%) of the income of the ward for the said accounting period; and that, 
for the said accounting period, the amount so calcu­lated would be 
$2,778.92.

The 
court and VA approved this accounting and have generally continued to do so over 
the course of the guardianship.  

[¶25]   It appears from its order that the 
district court made its determination that the 1989 proceeding was an 
adjudication of incompetency based solely on the fact that the original court 
had referenced Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-1-101(a)(xii) in the order establishing the 
guardian­ship.  
However, were we to conclude that the 1989 proceedings were an attempt to 
adjudicate the incompetency of Andrews, this court would be compelled herein to 
declare the order issued void.  

[¶26]   It was stated in Thoeming v. District Court of Sixth Jud. Dist., 379 P.2d 543, 544 (Wyo. 1963) in which this court issued a writ of prohibition 
against a district court:

It is 
elementary that proceedings for adjudication of insanity or mental incompetency 
are required to be in strict compliance with statutory requirements.  In the absence of 
such compliance a judgment declaring a person to be of unsound mind is 
void.  One 
court in this area has well expressed the rule in saying, "If there is any class 
of cases which should be conducted with the utmost care to observe all of the 
requirements of the statute, it is the cases conducted for the purpose of 
determining the sanity of a citizen . . . ."

. . 
.

. . . The procedure for determining that a person 
is insane or mentally incompetent is definite and clear.  It requires a 
finding either by a lunacy commission or by a jury and that only after various 
steps have been taken.  Any attempt to adjudicate a per­son as an 
incompetent' without compliance with the statutes contained in this chapter 
would be a deprivation of due process.  Since there had been no adjudication of 
Thoeming's incompe­tence on July 13, 1962, the district court was without 
jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for him and such purported order is void.

Id. (citations omitted); see also 
Interest of AM, 694 P.2d 734 (Wyo. 1985).

[¶27]   The Wyoming statutes found in title 
three governing adjudications of incompetency contain detailed and extensive 
procedural safeguards as well as substantive guidelines to ensure that the 
appointment of a guardian and/or conservator takes place in a manner 
consis­tent with constitutional due process.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-102 enacted in 1985 
explicitly lists the parties who must be provided notice of the involuntary 
appointment of a guardian.3  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-103 continues to codify 
the State's statutory and constitutional prece­dent by providing that "[t]he 
petitioner, the proposed 
ward or his custodian may demand a jury 
trial" on the question of incompetency.  See Byers v. Solier, 
16 Wyo. 232, 93 P. 59, 63 (1907) (discussing 1899 revised probate code governing "Guardians of 
Insane and Incompe­tent Persons, Lunatics and Drunkards" and issuing a writ 
of habeas corpus in favor of a party in state mental institution).  

[¶28]   Based upon our review of the record in 
this case, we hold that the 1989 appointment of a guardian and conservator for 
Andrews took place pursuant to the provisions of the UVGA.  Moreover, this court 
will not place its imprimatur of approval on the 1989 pro­ceedings as an 
adjudication of Andrews' incompetency sufficient to satisfy the due process 
guaranteed to him by the United States and Wyoming Constitutions.  

Scope & Effect of 
Appointment of Guardian under UVGA

[¶29]   Having herein determined that the 
appointment of the guardian and conservator for the estate of Andrews took place 
pursuant to the UVGA, we must now address whether this appointment deprives 
Andrews of his ability to validly convey the property of his estate.  For the following 
reasons, we hold that it does not.

[¶30]   In 1929, Wyoming adopted the UVGA found 
in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-6-102 through 3-6-119.  1929 Wyo. Sess. Laws 
ch. 6 § 18.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-6-118 and 3-6-119 expressly state the manner in 
which the UVGA shall be construed, interpreted, and applied:

This 
act [§§ 3-6-101 through 3-6-119] shall be construed liber­ally to secure the 
beneficial intents and purposes thereof, and shall apply only to beneficiaries 
of the bureau.

and

This 
act [§§ 3-6-101 through 3-6-119] shall be so interpreted and construed as to 
effectuate its general purpose to make uni­form the law of those states 
which enact it.

This 
court has had previous occasion to interpret and construe the scope and effect 
of the UVGA in Matter of Estate of Roosa, 753 P.2d 1028 (Wyo. 
1988).  In that 
case we held:

The 
Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act does not specify any grounds for appointment 
of a guardian.  
Such a guardianship is of limited effect and relates primarily to the 
receipt of veterans' benefits.  The conclusion of the Veterans' 
Administration as to incompetency does not depend upon a finding of insanity 
which would justify an adjudication in state courts.  Annotation, 
Constitutionality, Construction, and Effect of the Uniform Vet­erans 
Guardianship Act, 173 A.L.R. 1061 [(1948)].  The ordinary procedural safeguards involved 
in the creation of guardianship are not required under the Uniform Veterans' 
Guardianship Act.  
Furthermore, the appointment of a guardian or conservator in this state 
does not constitute any adjudication of unsoundness of mind or lack of 
testamentary capacity.  Section 3-1-201, W.S.1977 (1985 
Replacement).  
We hold that the creation of a guardianship pursuant to the Uniform 
Veterans' Guardianship Act does not result in any presumption of insanity or 
lack of testamentary capacity, a conclusion that is supported by author­ity 
elsewhere.  Morse v. Caldwell, 55 Ga.App. 804, 191 S.E. 479 (1937); 
Annotation, 173 A.L.R. 1061, supra, and cases cited 
therein.

Id. at 1036-37.

[¶31]   We find no reason to now depart from 
our holding in Estate of Roosa as to the limited 
effect of the appointment of a guardian under the UVGA. 
 On the 
specific point of whether the appointment of a guardian under the UVGA strips a 
veteran ward of his ability to validly convey property, we again turn for 
reference to Annotation, Constitutionality, 
construction, and effect of the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act, 173 
A.L.R. 1061 (1948) and cases decided by other jurisdictions.  

The 
effect of the appointment of a guardian under the uniform act is very limited as 
compared with the effect of an appointment under the general laws.  In view of the 
nature of the grounds upon which a guardian may be appointed, the 
appoint­ment is not an adjudication that the ward is mentally 
incompetent.  
In fact, one of the purposes of the uniform act is to secure a simplified 
procedure for the appointment of a guardian without the expense and notoriety of 
an inquiry as to the veteran's sanity. 

Accordingly, the appointment of a guardian under the 
uniform act has been held not to affect the legal capacity of the ward with 
respect to various matters other than the administra­tion of property 
received from the United States under veterans' legislation.  Thus, the ward may conduct litigation in 
person, he may make valid contracts notwithstanding the appointment of a 
guardian under the uniform act . . . 

173 
A.L.R. § 12 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).  In explanation of 
the reference to the simplified procedure of the uniform act, the annotation 
clarifies:

To 
some extent the procedure is simplified by the provisions . . . 
concerning prima facie evidence of the necessity for the appointment of a 
guardian. [Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-6-107].  To a larger extent the procedure is 
simplified because it does not involve an inquiry into the sanity of the 
beneficiary, which often requires a trial by jury, testimony by psychiatrists, 
and a protracted trial, although the beneficiary may convert the proceeding into 
a complicated one if he wishes to contest the appointment.  Another factor 
simplifying the actual appointment is the fact that even a mentally incompetent 
beneficiary can ordinarily be made to understand that the Veterans' 
Administra­tion will not make payments without the appointment of a 
guardian, and so he is not apt to contest the appointment of a guardian for the 
limited purposes specified in the act.  

Annotation, 173 A.L.R. § 12 n.7 (citations omitted).  See also 77 Am.Jur.2d Veterans 
and Veterans' Laws § 50 (1997). 

[¶32]   We find this reasoning persuasive.  In the instant 
case, we also take specific note that in order to set aside the appellants' 
warranty deed as invalid, it was necessary for the district court to reference 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-1-202.  This provision is located within the General 
Guardianship statutes and provides: 

(a)       A ward who is a 
minor or a mentally incompetent person for whom a conservator has been appointed 
does not have the power to convey, encumber or dispose of property in any 
man­ner, except:

(i)  By will if he possesses the requisite 
testamentary capacity; or

(ii)  As provided by W.S. 2-1-203(a), 13-7-202 
and 34.1-4-405.

No 
similar provision is found within the UVGA, and it would violate basic rules of 
statutory construction as well as the mandates of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-6-119 for 
us to herein judicially enact such a provision.4

[¶33]   Therefore, we hold that the district 
court erred as a matter of law when it utilized Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-1-202 to 
void the warranty deed granted from Andrews to Ethel Sheets and Blanch 
Wood.  However, 
in so holding we do not in any sense imply that Andrews was competent to execute 
a warranty deed on November 25, 1998.  Rather, our holding herein simply requires 
that, should the guardian and/or co-conservators seek to set aside the 
war­ranty deed granted to the appellants on the grounds of the incompetency 
of Andrews,  
they must do so in an evidentiary hearing consistent with this court's 
precedent on the issue. 

[¶34]   Furthermore, the district court, though 
finding that the 1989 proceeding was a general adjudication, then decided that 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-6-110(b) of the UVGA authorizes and requires the 
co-conservators in this manner "to manage not only the assets of the ward 
derived from the Veterans' Administration, but any other property of the ward 
that may have been derived from other sources and said co-conservators have 
managed the ward's assets other than those derived from the Veterans' 
Administration pursuant to this statute and have reported lawfully and properly 
to this Court."  
While we presume that the guardian and con­servators at all times 
were acting with the approval of the court, in Andrews' best interests in this 
case, and genuinely believed that their appointment authorized them to control 
the whole of Andrews' estate and further recognize that Andrews generally 
acquiesced in this treatment of his property by the guardian and 
co-conservators, we cannot agree that the UVGA grants a guardian appointed 
pursuant to it such broad authority.  While some of the language con­tained 
within Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-6-110(b) may appear to grant the UVGA appointed 
guardian the option of administering property of the ward derived from sources 
other than the VA, this is not how this subsection has generally been 
interpreted in light of § 3-6-102(a)(iii) which defines "estate" and "income" 
as:  "The terms 
estate' and income' shall include only moneys received by the guardian from 
the bureau and all earnings, interest and profits derived therefrom."  

[¶35]   We find the following reasoning of the 
California court in Estate of Vaell, 322 P.2d 579 (Ca.App. 1958) referencing the annotation persuasive: 

            

            
As stated in the annotation on the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act 
found in 173 A.L.R., 1061, at page 1080: "While the 
sections of the uniform act concerning the disposi­tion of the income' and the 
estate' of the ward seem broad enough to include all income or estate, these provisions 
must be limited by the definitions of terms contained in section 1 of the original 
and revised acts. This 

view is strengthened by the facts that the original act 
requires an accounting only for moneys received from the Veterans' Bureau, that the revised 
act requires an accounting of moneys thus received and earnings, interest 
or profits derived therefrom and all property acquired therewith,' and that 
the revised act also provides that where a guardian is accountable for property 
derived from other sources, the general laws of the state shall govern the 
accounting, and he shall not be limited to the compensation provided by the uniform act 
with respect to the management of such other property, although he may combine 
his accountings for both types of property in a single account or report."  At pages 1077-1078: 
"The 

effect of the appointment of a guardian under the uniform 
act is very limited as compared with the effect of an appointment under the 
general laws. . . . 

Accordingly, the appointment of a guardian under the 
uniform act has been held not to affect the legal capacity of the ward with respect to 
various matters other than the administration of property received from the United States 
under veterans' legislation." (Citations.)  And on page 1079: "Although it has been held that the uniform act is broad enough to authorize a decree giving a 
guardian control of all the ward's property, the better view is that the act 
deals only with 

property derived from the Veterans' Administration and the 
income of property acquired in whole or in part 
therewith" citing Mitchell v. Mitchell, 201 
Ga. 621, 40 S.E.2d 738; Morse 
v. Caldwell, 55 Ga.App. 804,  191 S.E. 479; Rentz v. King, 66 Ga.App. 292, 17 S.E.2d 896; In 
re Parks, 210 La. 63, 26 So. 2d 289; 173 A.L.R. 1056, Borough of East 
Paterson v. Karkus, 136 N.J.Eq. 286 41 A.2d 332; In re Farina, 253 App.Div. 
510, 2 N.Y.S.2d 987, reversed on another ground In re Hewson, 279 N.Y. 780, 18 N.E.2d 865.  

            
As was said in Morse v. Caldwell, supra, 191 S.E. at page 484: "What definition of 
incompetent' is applied by the 
Veterans' Administration, in determining whether or 
not the condition of a hospital patient 
requires that a guardian be appointed to 
receive and disburse for him such benefits as he may be entitled to is not shown 
by the record. But, upon the issuance of the certificate by the Director or his 
authorized representative setting forth the fact that such person 
has been rated 
incompetent,' etc., the court of ordinary may, upon a peti­tion filed, appoint a guardian to 
handle the benefits due such person by the federal government. Except as to 
the relationship thus created for the special purpose 
named, it does not follow 
that the ward is not sui juris, and, with respect to his other 
prop­erty and 
purposes, entitled to assert for himself his full legal rights in and out of 

court."

322 P.2d  at 583-84 (emphasis added).

[¶36]   The Vaell 
court ultimately concluded that because a guardianship under the UVGA was 
never intended as a substitute for the issuance of general letters of 
guardianship under the state's probate code, the lower court's order purporting 
to give the guardian care of the ward's "property and estate" was overly broad 
necessitating reversal.  Id. at 584.  

[¶37]   Upon examination of this issue, we find 
that the original purpose of the UVGA as enacted was to allow the Veterans' 
Administration a simplified procedure to ensure that recipients of federal funds 
were competent and capable of managing those funds.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
3-6-107 carries out this purpose by providing that the VA's rating of 
incompetency is to be "prima facie evidence of the necessity for such 
appointment."  
Currently, however, the VA need not seek appointment of a guardian for 
one of its beneficiaries through state court pursuant to the UVGA but may 
appoint such a fiduciary through its own administrative procedures.5  Nevertheless, in Wyoming if a guardian is 
appointed under the simplified proce­dures of the UVGA, it is undoubtedly a 
limited appointment.  
A proposed ward's incompetency is the issue to be decided through an adjudication 
of incompetency as a condi­tion precedent before a general guardian or 
conservator may be appointed.

CONCLUSION

[¶38]   We hold that the guardian and 
co-conservators of Andrews' estate were appointed under the provision the 
UVGA.  
Consequently, that appointment was limited in scope and effect and the 
district court's order voiding appellants' warranty deed granted by Andrews was 
erroneous.  On 
remand, should appellees seek to invalidate appellants' warranty deed, they must 
make an evidentiary showing that Andrews was incompetent at the time he executed 
the deed.  In 
addition, though we hold that under the 1989 appointment Andrews' guardian and 
co-conservator do not have authority to manage Andrews' whole estate, rather 
only those portions authorized under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-6-101 through 3-6-119, 
because of the current alleged incapacity of Andrews, in his best interests, we 
will allow the district court, in its discretion to stay the effect of this 
holding to allow the appellees adequate time to seek a general 
guardianship/conservatorship in strict compliance with the procedures set forth 
in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-1-101 through 3-3-1106 should they so choose.  

[¶39]   Reversed and remanded.

HILL, Justice, dissenting. 

[¶40]   I do not agree 
with the legal authority and reasoning as applied by the majority to the facts 
of this case and, therefore, I respectfully dissent.

[¶41]   The majority's reliance on Matter of Estate of Roosa, 753 P.2d 1028 (Wyo. 1988), 
exceeds the limited bounds of that case, which I would restrict solely to the 
issue of testamentary capacity.  That issue remains to be determined by the 
district court in this case, and I trust it will be decided in accordance with 
governing law, including the guidance available in Roosa.

[¶42]   At a minimum, I would shift the burden 
of proof from requiring Andrews and the guardian to show incompetence at the 
time the deed in controversy was signed, to requiring the Appellants to 
demonstrate Andrews' competence.  See Home Town Finance Corporation v. Frank, 13 Utah 2d 26, 
368 P.2d 72, 76 (1962); 77 
Am.Jur.2d Veterans and Veterans' Laws § 50 
(1997).  
Anything less renders meaningless the purpose of the statutes which 
afford special protection to incompetent veterans.

[¶43]   Because I do see those statutes as 
providing significant protections to veterans, especially in circumstances such 
as those present in this case, I would also favor the additional step of fully 
affirming the district court for the reason that the Appellants clearly had 
actual notice of Andrews' incompetence and were not bona fide purchasers.  See Grose v. Sauvageau, 942 P.2d 398, 402 (Wyo. 1997).  Appellants did not act in good faith 
vis- -vis this transaction, did not pay valuable consideration to Andrews or his 
guardian, had actual notice of Andrews' infirmities and the role of the guardian 
in his business and financial affairs, and would not be prejudiced by 
cancellation or reformation of the disputed deed (except they would have 
nothing, which is what they paid).  How Andrews chooses to structure his last 
will and testament would then be decided, but his estate (including his home) 
would be available to provide care for Andrews during the remainder of his 
life.

[¶44]   Although the case is not directly in 
point with respect to the wording of the governing statutes, I find enough 
similarity in the case of Rymer v. Smith, 274 S.W.2d 643, 646-48 (Tenn. App. 1954), to accord it the status of persuasive precedent 
for the propositions set out above.  In Rymer, the 
court held that establishment of a UVGA guardianship, in the manner provided for 
in the statute, was constructive notice to all, and financial transactions with 
a protected veteran were void.  In this case, we need not sweep quite so 
broadly because the facts establish that the Appellants had actual notice of 
Andrews' incompetence.  I also conclude that Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
3-6-110(b)1 and 3-6-1132 (LexisNexis 
2001) (emphasis added) contemplate a more robust role for a veteran's guardian 
appointed under the UVGA than that espoused by the majority, at least under such 
circumstances as those evident in this case.  I disagree with the majority's determination 
that these Appellants may use alleged due process violations in the 
establishment of the UVGA guardianship as a sword to defeat the protections 
provided by the UVGA.  
Andrews and his guardian, on the other hand, should be able to use those 
statutes as a shield against a deed prepared by Appellants, to their sole 
advantage, and contrary to Andrews' interests.   For these reasons, I would affirm the 
order of the district court.

FOOTNOTES

  
1This statement is required under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 3-6-107 (LexisNexis 2001) for the appointment of a guardian under the 
UVGA.  However, 
clearly under federal rule it is no longer necessary for such appointment to 
take place through the UVGA.  See fn.5.  We find no 
authority that ever required any such appointment take place through a 
state adjudication of incompetency as a condition precedent to the payment of VA 
benefits to veterans rated as incompetent by the VA.  

2Blanch Wood 
denied that she resided in Andrews' home.  Both Sheets and Wood denied that they had 
been requested to pay rent. 

3Appellees argue 
that it could plausibly be concluded that Andrews' acquiescence in the 1989 
establishment of the guardianship/conservatorship indicate that the proceeding 
was voluntary and, thus, did not require notice be given to Andrews.  While we agree that 
it appears from the record that Andrews acquiesced in the original appointment, 
the version of Wyo. Stat. § 3-2-105 in place in 1989 provides the method by 
which a voluntary guardianship may be established and leaves no doubt that a 
voluntary guardianship is not available under the facts of the instant case:

A guardian may 
be appointed by the court upon 
the petition of the proposed ward if the petitioner is not a mentally incompetent 
person or a minor under the age of fourteen (14) years, if the court 
determines that the appointment is in the best interest of the petitioner.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 3-2-105 (Michie 1997) (enacted 1985) (emphasis added).

4Various 
subsections within the UVGA reference and require application of the general 
laws of the state in governing the guardian/ward relationship.  By this holding, we 
do not imply that in all cases these general laws may not be used to supplement 
the UVGA in some manner so long as such supplementation is not inconsistent with 
the scope and purpose of the UVGA.  

5See 
38 C.F.R. 3.353; 38 C.F.R. 3.850; 38 C.F.R. 3.855; 38 
C.F.R. Part 13-Veterans Benefits Administration, Fiduciary 
Activities-13.55;13.56;13.57; 13.58; 13.59.  In fact, 38 C.F.R. 13.55 (1975 & Supp. 
2001) explicitly provides: 

(a)        
Authority.  
The Veterans Services Officer is authorized to select and appoint (or in 
the case of a court-appointed fiduciary, to recommend for appointment) the 
person or legal entity best suited to receive Department of Veterans Affairs 
benefits in a fiduciary capacity for a beneficiary who is mentally ill 
(incompetent) or under legal disability by reason of minority or court action, 
and beneficiary's dependents.

(b)        Payees. 
 Authorized 
payees include:

(1) The beneficiary (§ 13.56(c));

(2) The beneficiary under supervision (supervised 
direct payment) (§ 13.56 (a) and (b));

(3) The wife or husband of an incompetent veteran (§ 
13.57);

(4) The legal custodian of a beneficiary's Department 
of Veterans Affairs benefits (§ 13.58);

(5) A court-appointed fiduciary to a beneficiary (§ 
13.59);

(6) The chief officer of the institution in which the 
veteran is receiving care and treatment (§ 13.61);

(7) The bonded officer of an Indian reservation (§ 
13.62);

(8) A custodian-in-fact of the beneficiary (§ 
13.63);

(9) Dependents of the veteran by an apportioned award 
(§ 13.70).

(c)                 
Certification.  The Veterans 
Services Officer's certification is authority to make payments to the designated 
payee.

Footnotes for the Dissent

   1§ 3-6-110. Annual accounting; copy of accounts and 
pleadings to be filed with bureau; notice of hearing; administration of property 
from other sources.

            
(a) Every guardian, who has received or shall receive on account of his 
ward, any moneys from the veterans' administration, its predecessors or 
successor, shall file with the court annually, on the anniversary date of the 
appointment, in addition to such other accounts as may be required by the court, 
a full, true, and accurate account under oath, of all moneys so received by him, 
of all disbursements thereof, and showing the balance thereof in his hands at 
the date of such account and how invested.  A certified copy of each of such accounts 
filed with the court shall be sent by the guardian to the office of the 
veterans' administration having jurisdiction over the area in which such court 
is located.  A 
duplicate signed copy or certified copy of any petition, motion, or other 
pleading which is filed in the guardianship proceedings, or in any proceeding 
for the purpose of removing the disability of minority or of mental 
incompetency, shall be furnished by the person filing the same, to the office of 
the veterans' administration concerned.  The court shall fix a time and place for the 
hearing on such account, petition, or other pleading, not less than fifteen (15) 
days nor more than thirty (30) days from the date of filing same, and notice 
thereof shall be given by the court to the aforesaid veterans' administration 
office not less than fifteen (15) days prior to the date fixed for the 
hearing.  
Notice of such hearing shall in like manner be given to the guardian.

            
(b) Any guardian appointed under this act [§§ 
3-6-101 through 3-6-119] shall be accountable for property derived from sources 
other than the veterans' administration and shall be accountable as is or may be 
required under the applicable law of this state pertaining to the property of 
minors or persons of unsound mind who are not beneficiaries of the veterans' 
administration; provided, however, that he may at his option administer the same 
as provided in this act and include an accounting for such assets and income in 
the same account required with respect to assets derived from the veterans' 
administration, and if so included, the procedure with respect thereto shall be 
that hereinabove prescribed.

   2§ 3-6-113. Investment of 
surplus money; notice to bureau.

            
(a) It shall be the duty of such guardians to 
invest and keep invested their ward's surplus money, but only in the 
securities or other property, and in the manner hereinafter indicated, and in 
which securities or other property the guardian has no interest.  The investments, 
except those provided in paragraphs (i) and (ii) of this subsection hereof, 
shall be made only upon the prior approval of the court, after notice to the 
veterans' administration as provided in W.S. 3-6-110, as amended:

                        
(i) Direct obligations of this state and of the United States government, 
and obligations, the interest and principal of which are both unconditionally 
guaranteed by the United States government;

                        
(ii) The bonds of this state or of any other state, or any county, school 
districts, city, or town in the United States with a population as shown by next 
preceding federal census of not less than one thousand (1,000) inhabitants; and 
where the laws do not permit such counties, cities, school districts, or towns 
to become indebted in excess of six percent (6%) of the assessed valuation of 
property for taxation therein, and where the total indebtedness of such county, 
school districts, city, or municipality, does not exceed six percent (6%) of the 
assessed valuation of property for taxation at the time of such investment:  provided always, 
there has been no default for more than thirty (30) days during the preceding 
ten (10) years upon any bonds of the issuing state, county, city or town;

                        
(iii) In the legally issued notes of the owner of the fee simple title to 
improved, unencumbered real property located in this state secured by first 
mortgage or deed of trust thereon:  provided, that the total debt secured by such 
encumbrances shall not exceed sixty percent (60%) of the actual cash value of 
such real property at the time of such investment unless such loan be insured 
and while held by the guardian remain insured, by the federal housing 
administrator in accordance with the National Housing Act [12 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.];

                        
(iv) In the entire fee simple title to real 
estate or lease of real estate in this state and the purchase of all necessary 
equipment, but only as a home for the ward, or as a home for his dependent 
family, or to rehabilitate the ward, or to protect his interests.  Such purchase or 
lease of real estate or other investment provided in this paragraph shall not be 
made except upon the entry of an order of the court after hearing upon verified 
petition.  
Notice of such hearing shall be given the veterans' administration as 
provided in W.S. 3-6-110, as amended.  Title shall be taken in the ward's name. 
 This paragraph 
shall not be construed to limit the right of the guardian, on behalf of his 
ward, to bid and to become the purchaser of real estate at a sale thereof 
pursuant to decree of foreclosure of a lien held by or for the ward, or at a tax 
or a trustee's sale, to protect the ward's right in the property so foreclosed 
or sold, or at a sale under partition decree, if necessary to protect the ward's 
interest in such property.