Case Title: Kucera v. Bradbury

Citation: 

Docket Number: S51756

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2004-09-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  September 22, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
SANDRA KUCERA,
an elector of Oregon
and candidate for Vice President of the United States,
SARAH THERESE WINDER, KRISTEN ZUBEL, and NATALIE BOLTON,
each an elector of Oregon
and signor of petition for nomination of Ralph Nader
for President of the United States
and Sandra Kucera as Vice President of the United States
and as a circulator of said nominating petition,
PHILLIP SALISBURY and SAMANTHA BERG,
each an elector of and signor of a
petition for nomination of Ralph Nader
for President of the United States
and Sandra Kucera as Vice President of the United States,
TIMOTHY JOHNSON,
a circulator of said nominating petition
who is not an elector of Oregon,
GREGORY KAFOURY,
an individual, an elector of Oregon and Co-Chair,
Nader for President 2004 in Oregon,
Plaintiffs-Adverse Parties,
v.
BILL BRADBURY,
Secretary of State,
Defendant-Relator,
and
DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF OREGON,
JOHN NEEL PENDER and JAMES EDMUNSON,
Intervenors Below.
(CC 04C18259; SC S51756)
En Banc
Original proceeding in mandamus.*
Submitted September 17, 2004.
Kaye E. McDonald, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed
the petition and supplemental memorandum for defendant-relator. 
With her on the petition and memoranda were Hardy Myers, Attorney
General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
Daniel W. Meek, Portland, filed the memorandum in opposition
for plaintiffs-adverse parties. 
Margaret Olney, Smith, Diamond & Olney, Portland, filed the
memorandum for amici curiae Service Employees International Union
and Oregon Education Association. 
DURHAM, J.
Combined peremptory writ and appellate judgment to issue
forthwith.  ORAP 9.25, providing for petitions for
reconsideration, is waived on the court's own motion.  ORAP
1.20(5).
* On petition for a writ of mandamus from an order of the
Marion County Circuit Court, Paul Lipscomb, Judge.
DURHAM, J.
Oregon's Secretary of State Bill Bradbury seeks a writ
of mandamus from this court requiring Judge Lipscomb of the
Marion County Circuit Court to vacate an order that he entered in
the underlying proceeding, which we describe below in detail. 
The order required the Secretary of State to certify the
nomination of Ralph Nader as an independent candidate on Oregon's
November 2, 2004, general election ballot.  For the reasons set
out below, we direct that a peremptory writ of mandamus issue
requiring the trial court to withdraw that order.
THE NADER CAMPAIGN'S PETITION
FOR NOMINATION BY INDIVIDUAL ELECTORS
Oregon law provides for the nomination of candidates
for partisan public office by a major political party, ORS
249.078, a minor political party, an assembly of electors, or
individual electors, ORS 249.705.  ORS 249.740 describes the
procedure for nomination of candidates by individual electors:
"(1) A certificate of nomination made by
individual electors shall contain a number of
signatures of electors in the electoral district equal
to not less than one percent of the total votes cast in
the electoral district for which the nomination is
intended to be made, for all candidates for
presidential electors at the last general election.
"(2) Each elector signing a certificate of
nomination made by individual electors shall include
the residence mailing address of the elector.  Except
for a certificate of nomination of candidates for
electors of President and Vice President of the United
States, a certificate of nomination made by individual
electors shall contain the name of only one candidate.
"(3) Before beginning to circulate the certificate
of nomination, the chief sponsor of the certificate
shall file a signed copy of the prospective certificate
with the filing officer referred to in ORS 249.722. 
The chief sponsor of the certificate shall include with
the prospective certificate a statement declaring
whether one or more persons will be paid money or other
valuable consideration for obtaining signatures of
electors on the certificate.  After the prospective
certificate is filed, the chief sponsor shall notify
the filing officer not later than the 10th day after
the chief sponsor first has knowledge or should have
had knowledge that:
"(a) Any person is being paid for obtaining
signatures, when the statement included with the
prospective certificate declared that no such person
would be paid.
"(b) No person is being paid for obtaining
signatures, when the statement included with the
prospective certificate declared that one or more such
persons would be paid.
"(4) The circulator shall certify on each
signature sheet that the individuals signed the sheet
in the presence of the circulator and that the
circulator believes each individual is an elector
registered in the electoral district.
"(5) The signatures contained in each certificate
of nomination made by individual electors shall be
certified for genuineness by the county clerk under ORS
249.008.
"(6) As used in this section, 'prospective
certificate' means the information, except signatures
and other identification of certificate signers,
required to be contained in a completed certificate of
nomination."
Under ORS 249.740(5), the county clerk must certify for
genuineness the signatures of electors in the county that
accompany the certificate of nomination by individual electors. 
ORS 249.008 requires the county clerk of each county, before the filing of the certificate of nomination by individual electors, to verify the elector signatures and to certify the number of signatures believed to be genuine.  ORS 249.008 provides in part:
"(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this
section, before a nominating petition, minutes of an
assembly of electors, or petition by individual
electors is offered for filing, the county clerk of
each county in which the signatures were secured shall
compare the signatures of electors on the petition or
minutes with the signatures of the electors on the
elector registration cards.  Any petition or minutes
submitted for verification under this section shall
contain only original signatures.  The county clerk
shall attach to the petition or minutes a certificate
stating the number of signatures believed to be
genuine.  The certificate is prima facie evidence of
the facts stated in it.  A signature not included in
the number certified to be genuine shall not be counted
by the officer with whom the petition is filed.  No
signature in violation of the provisions of this
chapter shall be counted.
"(2) If the total number of signatures presented
to a county clerk for verification is 15,000 or more,
the county clerk may use a statistical sampling
technique authorized by the Secretary of State to
verify the signatures.  The sample shall be drawn from
at least 100 percent of the number of signatures
required for nomination."
ORS 249.009(1) authorizes the Secretary of State to
adopt administrative rules prescribing the form of certificates
of nomination by individual electors and a system for numbering
all signature sheets of certificates for nomination by individual electors.  
"The Secretary of State by rule shall:
"(a) Design the form of nominating or recall
petitions, certificates of nomination by individual
electors, minutes of an assembly of electors or minor
political party formation petitions; and
"(b) Prescribe a system for numbering all
signature sheets of nominating or recall petitions,
certificates of nomination by individual electors,
minutes of an assembly of electors or minor political
party formation petitions."
The Secretary of State has exercised the authority that
ORS 249.009(1) grants by designating as an administrative rule
the "2004 State Candidate's Manual:  Individual Electors"
(SCMIE).  OAR 165-010-0005(5).  We discuss below in greater
detail the rules that the SCMIE contains.
Plaintiffs are supporters of a campaign (the "Nader
campaign") that seeks to nominate Ralph Nader and Sandra Kucera
as President and Vice President, respectively, of the United
States on the November 2, 2004, Oregon general election ballot
through the nomination by individual electors procedure described
in ORS 249.740.  According to the record, ORS 249.740(1)
obligated the Nader campaign to file not less than 15,306
signatures of Oregon electors with its certificate of nomination
by individual electors under ORS 249.740(1).  However, the
Secretary of State determined that numerous signature sheets that
the Nader campaign filed with its certificate of nomination
contained errors in the certification or dating of the sheets by
circulators or in the numbering of the sheets by Nader campaign
representatives.  In addition, a number of county clerks, acting
on instructions from the Secretary of State, declined to verify
elector signatures on sheets that reflected errors that the
Secretary of State identified.  In some cases, they removed the
noncomplying signature sheets from the group of signatures
certified for genuineness under ORS 249.740(5).  Plaintiffs do
not agree that the asserted errors in the signature sheets exist
or, if they do exist, that they affect the validity of the
elector signatures or the certificate of nomination by individual
electors.
Due to his conclusion that numerous signature sheets
did not comply with applicable legal requirements, the Secretary
of State declined to count the elector signatures on the
noncomplying signature sheets in determining whether sufficient
valid elector signatures supported the certificate of nomination. 
On September 2, 2004, the Secretary of State notified Nader that
his campaign had submitted 15,088 qualified signatures, which was
218 signatures short of the required number.  The Secretary of
State advised Nader, "Consequently, there are not sufficient
qualified signatures for you to gain ballot access for this
office."
PLAINTIFFS' LEGAL ACTION
On September 3, 2004, plaintiffs filed in Marion County
Circuit Court an appeal of the action of the Secretary of State
under ORS 246.910 (1) and a petition for review of
administrative action under ORS 183.484. (2)  Plaintiffs
alleged eight claims for relief.  We summarize those claims for
relief, because they are relevant to our disposition here. 
The first claim for relief alleged that the Secretary
of State's "decision to reject the nominating petitions was not
accompanied by any findings of fact or conclusions of law
sufficient to enable Plaintiffs (or anyone) to determine the
reasons for the rejection" and that "[s]uch deficiency renders
the decision unlawful."
The second claim for relief alleged that the Secretary
of State "has apparently rejected over 3,000 valid and verified
voter signatures" due to "some errors" committed by persons who
circulated signature sheets or by the Nader campaign.  Plaintiffs
alleged that the refusal of the Secretary of State to count those
signatures "is beyond his authority, is arbitrary and capricious,
and is otherwise unlawful."
The third claim for relief alleged that the Secretary
of State had rejected signature sheets "containing in the range
of 2,000 valid and verified voter signatures on the ground that
the sheets, as submitted to the Secretary of State, were not
sequentially numbered."  Plaintiffs asserted that the Nader
campaign had complied with applicable requirements for numbering
sheets and that the Secretary of State's action was unlawful.
The fourth claim for relief alleged that the Secretary
of State had rejected signature sheets containing "in the range
of 700 valid and verified voter signatures on the ground that the
sheets display some defect in the signature of the circulator or
the date on the signature of the circulator."  Plaintiffs
asserted that the Secretary of State had "not stated which
signature sheets were rejected for these reasons" and "has not
stated the reason for the rejection of any signature sheet      
* * *."  Plaintiffs alleged that the Secretary of State's
rejection of signature sheets due to the appearance of or date
pertaining to a circulator's signature was unlawful.
The fifth claim for relief alleged that the Secretary
of State's implementation of a rule that disqualified voter
signatures on a nominating petition on the basis of alleged or
proven errors by petition circulators, in signing, dating, or
placing numbers on the sheets, violated the First and Fifth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. (3)
The sixth claim for relief alleged that the Secretary
of State's implementation of a rule that disqualified voter
signatures on a nominating petition on the basis of alleged or
proven errors by petition circulators -- in signing, dating, or
placing numbers on the sheets with no opportunity for
administrative cure of alleged defects -- violated Article I,
sections 8 and 20, and Article II, section 1, of the Oregon
Constitution. (4)
The seventh claim for relief alleged that the Secretary
of State's implementation of a rule that disqualified a
circulator's signature if it varied from the signature on the
circulator's Oregon voter registration card discriminated against
Oregon voters who are not registered to vote and violated the
First Amendment right of plaintiffs to travel across state lines
into Oregon to engage in core political speech and to circulate
petition sheets.
Plaintiffs' eighth claim for relief sought reasonable
attorney fees and costs for the action.  Plaintiffs also
requested declaratory and injunctive relief nullifying the
Secretary of State's action.
Along with their complaint, plaintiffs filed a motion
for preliminary injunction requiring the Secretary of State "to
certify the Nader/Kucera ticket for the 2004 general election
ballot * * *."  Plaintiffs supported the motion with affidavits
from several circulators of the certificate of nomination
signature sheets.
THE TRIAL COURT PROCEEDING
The case came before the trial court on September 8,
2004, on plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction.  The
court granted the motion of the Democratic Party of Oregon and
two of its officers to intervene in support of the Secretary of
State.  The court denied a request by Service Employees
International Union (SEIU) to intervene as a party, but allowed
SEIU to appear as amicus curiae.  The parties stipulated that the
court could combine the hearing on the motion for preliminary
injunction, including live testimony, affidavits, and all
arguments, with a trial on the merits.
On September 9, 2004, the court filed its opinion and
order, which we discuss below in greater detail.  In the opinion,
the court reviewed the pertinent statutes and administrative
rules governing nominations by individual electors and focused
its analysis on plaintiffs' fourth claim for relief, described
above.  
The court concluded that the Secretary of State had no
authority, under applicable statutes and rules, to instruct
county clerks to screen signature sheets for various problems
related to the signature of the circulator and the date of the
circulator's signature.  Those problems included the action of
some circulators in certifying the signature sheets with the
signer's initials or to cross out or attempt to modify the date
of the circulator's certification.  The court also concluded that
the Secretary of State's instructions to county clerks to screen
elector signature sheets for circulator signature and dating
problems before verifying the elector signatures were
inconsistent with ORS 247.005, (5) with the Secretary of
State's written rules in the SCMIE, and "with the Secretary's
policy position set out in Nelson v. Keisling[, 155 Or App 388,
964 P2d 284 (1998), rev den, 328 Or 246, 987 P2d 507 (1999)]." 
We analyze those bases for the court's conclusion below.
Ultimately, the court concluded that the Secretary of
State had exceeded his authority by (1) instructing county clerks
not to verify elector signatures if the signature sheets
displayed circulator certification problems; and (2) disapproving
elector signature sheets that county clerks had certified if the
signature sheets displayed similar circulator certification
problems.
The court rejected plaintiffs' third claim for relief,
which alleged that the Secretary of State had exceeded his
authority in rejecting signature sheets that had not been
numbered sequentially.  The court did not address or resolve
other claims for relief in its order and opinion.
On September 13, 2004, the court entered a general
judgment that stated:
"This case came before the Court upon plaintiffs'
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and heard on
September 8, 2004.  By stipulation of the parties, the
request for preliminary relief was combined with trial
on the merits, including live testimony, testimony by
affidavits, oral argument and extensive legal briefing
by the parties, including intervenor-defendant,
Democratic Party of Oregon.  The Court issued its Order
and Opinion dated September 9, 2004 with regard to
plaintiffs' third and fourth claims for relief as set
forth in said opinion and order, and finding that its
ruling on the fourth claim for relief is dispositive of
the merits without reaching constitutional claims, now
enters judgment as follows:
"Now, hereby, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED:
"1.  Defendant Secretary of State is hereby
ordered to certify the results of the nominating
petitions of Ralph Nader and Sandra Kucera for
independent candidate to the appropriate elections
authorities and to order the preparation of ballots for
President and Vice-President for the 2004 General
Election which contain the names of Ralph Nader and
Sandra Kucera as independent candidates for President
and Vice-President.
"2.  Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their
costs and disbursements incurred herein."
POST-JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS
The Secretary of State filed his petition for writ of
mandamus on September 15, 2004.  With the petition, he also filed
an emergency motion requesting expedited review of the petition
and a decision from this court by September 22, 2004, if
possible, so that elections officials could proceed with the
printing of accurate ballots for the November 2, 2004, general
election.  
On September 16, 2004, this court allowed the motion to
expedite review and set an accelerated briefing schedule.  In
addition, this court allowed a motion by SEIU and the Oregon
Education Association to appear as amici curiae.  The parties
filed their briefs and excerpts of record on September 17, 2004,
and the court took the petition under advisement.  The court
expresses its appreciation to counsel for all parties and amici
curiae for their cooperation and prompt submission of materials
to the court in this case. (6)
MANDAMUS IS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY
Plaintiffs assert that mandamus is not an appropriate
remedy in the circumstances.  We disagree.  The Secretary of
State has a strong interest in a prompt resolution through this
mandamus proceeding of plaintiffs' challenge to his authority to
reject the certificate of nomination by individual electors filed
by the Nader campaign.  The petition seeks the determination of
questions of law regarding the authority of the Secretary of
State, not to control discretionary determinations by the trial
court, as plaintiffs argue.  Without a prompt resolution of
plaintiffs' challenge to the authority of the Secretary of State,
the state's strong interest in the efficient administration of
the November 2, 2004, general election will suffer irreparable
injury.  Under the circumstances, the Secretary of State's right
to appeal from the trial court's judgment provides a remedy at
law that is chimerical at best.
Plaintiffs further argue that this mandamus proceeding
improperly seeks to resolve unadjudicated questions of fact. 
They contend, for example, that the Secretary of State was
estopped from requiring the submission of sequentially numbered
signature sheets to each county by reason of advice that the
"appropriate person" in the Secretary of State's office had given
to the Nader campaign.  Additionally, plaintiffs argue that they
asserted in the trial court the factual claim that the circulator
signatures on a large number of rejected signature sheets were
indeed authentic signatures.  Again, we disagree.  
Plaintiffs challenged several actions of the Secretary
of State, including the application of administrative rules, the
promulgation and application of written instructions and
directives, and the determination that the Nader campaign had
filed insufficient elector signatures to support a certificate of
nomination by individual electors.  Properly viewed, the issues
in this mandamus proceeding concern a single legal question:  Did
Oregon law authorize the Secretary of State to take the actions
that he took at the time he acted?  As that question makes clear,
the facts that are most pertinent to that inquiry are those that
responsible elections officials knew or should have known when
they acted.  We turn now to the legal question stated above.  
AUTHORITY OF SECRETARY OF STATE TO DISQUALIFY
ELECTOR SIGNATURES DUE TO VIOLATION
OF CIRCULATOR SIGNATURE REQUIREMENTS
The premise for the trial court's decision was that no
statute or rule expressly authorized the Secretary of State to
prohibit the counting of otherwise valid signatures of electors
that supported a certificate of nomination simply because of
arguable violations of signature and dating requirements
respecting circulators.  The trial court also believed that
disqualification of elector signatures was inconsistent with ORS
247.005 and with "the prior policy of the Elections Division," as
recited in the Court of Appeals decision in Nelson.  For the
following reasons, we disagree with the trial court.
The legislature has acted in several ways to provide
the procedures for nominating candidates by individual electors. 
First, the legislature has enacted ORS 249.740.  Second, the
legislature has adopted several statutes that delegate authority
over that procedure, and other election procedures, to the
Secretary of State.  ORS 249.009(1), quoted above, is one
example.  In addition to authorizing rulemaking, the legislature
has enacted ORS 246.110, which provides:
"The Secretary of State is the chief elections
officer of this state, and it is the secretary's
responsibility to obtain and maintain uniformity in the
application, operation and interpretation of the
election laws." 
The legislature also has enacted ORS 246.150, which provides:
"The Secretary of State may adopt rules the
secretary considers necessary to facilitate and assist
in achieving and maintaining a maximum degree of
correctness, impartiality and efficiency in
administration of the election laws."
In addition to the foregoing authority, and to ensure that the
Secretary of State carries out the responsibility described in
ORS 246.110, the legislature has required the Secretary of State
to communicate with each county clerk through written directives
and other means on election procedures that are under the
direction and control of the county clerk.  ORS 246.120 provides: 
"In carrying out the responsibility under ORS
246.110, the Secretary of State shall prepare and
distribute to each county clerk detailed and
comprehensive written directives, and shall assist,
advise and instruct each county clerk, on registration
of electors and election procedures which are under the
direction and control of the county clerk. The
directives and instructions shall include relevant
sample forms of ballots, documents, records and other
materials and supplies required by the election laws. A
county clerk affected thereby shall comply with the
directives or instructions."
(Emphasis added.)
As already noted, the Secretary of State exercised the
rulemaking authority that ORS 249.009(1) delegates by adopting
SCMIE as a rule.  The record also demonstrates that the Secretary
of State exercised his authority under ORS 246.120 by issuing
written instructions to all county clerks regarding the
verification of elector signature sheets from the Nader campaign,
including directions for addressing potential problems with the
signature and dating of signature sheets by circulators. (7) 
The written instructions to the county clerks from John W.
Lindback, Director of the Elections Division for the office of
Secretary of State, stated:
"Following are procedures we need all counties to
follow when verifying the signature sheets for the
Nader for President petition.
"1.  Counties will initially screen for
potential problems with circulator signature and dating
of signature sheets.
"2.  Counties will highlight with a
highlighter the areas of concern on the signature
sheet.  Do not verify any signatures on the sheets that
have any potential problems or issues.  Once the
Secretary of State's office makes a determination on
these sheets, the county will be contacted and advised
on whether to verify these signatures or to reject the
sheet.
"3.  The areas to review for concern are:
"The circulator signature line is blank
or the circulator has signed using initials only. 
(First name initial with the full last name is
sufficient).
"There is no date on the circulator date
signed line.
"Circulator date has been crossed out or
modified.
"The circulator signed and dated before
the dates of some or all of the the [sic.] signers. 
"Circulator name is a signature stamp.
"Circulator signature is photocopied or
carbon copied.
"White out is used on the circulator
name or date area.
"There are two different circulator
names on the certification.
"The original signature of a circulator
has been crossed out, and a new circulator's signature
is inserted.
"4.  Once the counties have screened for
these items the county will fax any sheets of concern
to the Secretary of State Elections Division * * *
[Elections Division officials] will make the final
determination on these sheets.
"5.  Counties will retain and not return any
signature sheets to the Nader Campaign that may have
any potential problems until the Secretary of State has
resolved these issues and notified the county.
"6.  On signature sheets that have no issues
and appear to be sufficient, the counties will verify
the signatures and cross through any blank signature
lines on the signature sheets with a marker so that no
other signers may be added to that sheet after the
county has verified the sheets.
"7.  Counties will verify all signatures
submitted only on signature sheets that do not have any
issues.  The county will retain a copy of all signature
sheets submitted and return the original sheets with
the counties certification to the Nader Campaign."
(Boldface in original.)
Lindback explained by affidavit the circulator
signature review procedures that his office follows in inspecting
the signature sheets that the county elections officials submit. 
According to Lindback, state officials generally accepted a
circulator's signature if the signature sheet bore a mark that
appeared to be that person's signature.  However, they engaged in
further review if the purported signature was illegible or
appeared to consist only of initials.  That further review sought
to confirm that the mark was the circulator's valid signature. 
To that end, state officials compared the mark on the signature
sheet with the signature on the circulator's voter registration
card, if applicable, or another signature exemplar.  Lindback
stated:
"It bears emphasis that our practice is to accept
a purported circulator's signature if there is any
reasonable way to do so."
Lindback also described the procedures that his office
follows to confirm compliance by circulators with the requirement
that they state the date on which they certified each signature
sheet.  In general, state officials rejected signature sheets
containing no date or alterations in the date, such as stricken
material, but accepted signature sheets that the circulator had
redated and re-signed or sheets that told a "clear story" about
their completion and whose circulators apparently had completed
the certification properly.
The trial court determined that the signature and date
review procedures that Lindback had followed in his office were
"unwritten rules," that they were "not supported by the written
administrative rules as set forth in the Manual," that they were
"inconsistent with ORS 247.005" and "the prior policy of the
Elections Division" as stated in Nelson, and that they "were not
applied either uniformly or consistently in actual practice."
It is true that the review procedures that Lindback
described were not themselves written, but that does not render
them unlawful.  On the contrary, the review procedures are
nothing more than the step-by-step process by which the Secretary
of State carried out legal authority found elsewhere in statute,
in rule, and in the Secretary of State's written instructions to
the county clerks.  The review procedures were not, as the trial
court's comments appear to suggest, yet another layer of
unannounced legal barriers.  They were, instead, the methodology
by which the Secretary of State enforced existing legal
standards.  Specifically, Lindback designed the review procedures
as a means to carry out the Secretary of State's duty under ORS
246.110 to "obtain and maintain uniformity in the application,
operation and interpretation of the election laws."  The
necessity for the review procedures arose in this case because
the Secretary of State gave written instructions to the county
clerks to return to the Secretary of State for further review all
signature sheets "that have any potential problems or issues,"
and gave them a list of those potential problems.  The review
procedures that Lindback described did not enlarge upon the
written list; rather, they merely effectuated it with the goal of
insuring that review by his office was a uniform process.  The
trial court's concern in this respect was not well taken.
The trial court's criticism that the Secretary of
State's review procedures were "not supported by the written
administrative rules as set forth in the [SCMIE]" appears also to
reflect a concern that the SCMIE provides that a signature sheet
format violation "will result in the rejection of those sheets,"
but does not similarly warn of potential rejection of signature
sheets for other errors, such as in the signature and dating of
sheets by circulators.  Relatedly, the trial court noted that the
SCMIE warns that violation of the circulator certification
requirements may result in conviction of a felony with a
significant fine and imprisonment, but gives no notice that a
violation of those requirements will lead to a disqualification
of the elector signatures.
Those concerns of the trial judge also are not well
taken.  In practical terms, the trial court construed the SCMIE
not to permit the sanction of disqualification of elector
signatures due to circulator certification errors, because,
although the SCMIE mentioned other potential sanctions, it did
not mention that particular sanction under these particular
circumstances.  But, when we consider the circulator
certification rules in context, their silence about the possible
effect of a violation on the validity of elector signatures is
just that –- silence.  The notice in the rule that certain
criminal consequences "may result" from a violation is a pointed
warning to circulators, not an assurance to electors who sign the
signature sheet that their signatures will count despite the
circulator's improper certification.
It is important to remember that ORS 249.740(4)
requires each circulator to certify on each signature sheet that
the signer had signed the sheet in the circulator's presence and
that the circulator believed that the signer was an elector
registered in the electoral district.  The term "certify" means
"to attest esp. authoritatively or formally * * * to present in
formal communication, esp. in a document under hand or seal     
* * *."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 367 (unabridged ed
1993).  In keeping with the legislature's requirement of a formal
attestation, SCMIE requires the circulator to "sign" the
signature sheet, and the Secretary of State's written
instructions call for the use of a "signature."  A "signature" is
"the name of a person written with his own hand to signify that
the writing which precedes accords with his wishes or
intentions."  Id. at 2116.  Thus, for example, the Secretary of
State logically could disqualify a mark that consisted of mere
initials, because the mark fails to display the required
signature.  See Don't Waste Oregon Com. v. Energy Facility
Siting, 320 Or 132, 142, 881 P2d 119 (1994) (sustaining "agency's
plausible interpretation of its own rule").  
In adopting the rules set out in the SCMIE, in issuing
written instructions to the county clerks, and in utilizing the
circulator signature and date review procedures, the Secretary of
State was obtaining and maintaining uniformity in the operation
of an election law, i.e., the certification requirement in ORS
249.740(4), as ORS 246.110 required.  The Secretary of State thus
may conclude, and clearly has so concluded, that a circulator's
failure to comply with the Secretary of State's requirements for
circulator certification means that the purported certification
is invalid and the signature sheet does not comply with ORS
249.740(4).
The trial court opined that there was no valid policy
reason to enforce the circulator certification requirement by
disqualifying the signature of an elector if the county clerk had
been able to verify that the electors' signatures on the
disqualified sheets were genuine.  That overlooks the requirement
in ORS 249.740(4) that the circulator must certify that the
individual signed the sheet in the presence of the circulator. 
The bare presence of an elector's signature on a sheet is not
enough to show compliance with that requirement.  The
certification requirement serves to discourage fraud in the
execution of signature sheets.  The Secretary of State's choice
to invalidate a signature sheet if the circulator violates the
certification requirement promotes that objective.  The trial
court's concerns in this respect were not legally justified.
We next note that the trial court's reliance on ORS
247.005 was misplaced.  That statute is the legislature's
statement of state policy to assist electors in the exercise of
the franchise.  It does not purport to invalidate rules and
procedures that the Secretary of State lawfully adopts pursuant
to statutory command or delegated authority.  Were the rule
otherwise, virtually any election law or rule would be vulnerable
to invalidation under ORS 247.005.  We decline to accord that
intention to the legislature.
The trial court's reliance on Nelson, 155 Or App 388,
also was misplaced.  In Nelson, the Court of Appeals determined
that a civil penalty of a $250 fine was the exclusive remedy for
violation of an election statute, ORS 260.560, and that the
legislature did not authorize the invalidation of signatures as
an additional remedy.  The court stated:
"Neither ORS 260.560 nor OAR 165-014-0005 spells
out the consequence for violating the requirement that
petition circulators be Oregon registered voters.  ORS
260.995, however, provides that the Secretary or the
Attorney General may impose a civil penalty not to
exceed $250 
"'for each violation of any provision of
Oregon Revised Statutes relating to the
conduct of any election, any rule
adopted by the Secretary of State under
ORS chapters 246 to 260 or any other
matter preliminary to or relating to an
election, for which no penalty is
otherwise provided.'
"There is no question that the civil penalty provision
applies to violations of ORS 260.560 and OAR 165-014-0005 (1996).  The question is whether that remedy is
the exclusive remedy for violations of the statute and
the rule.  Certainly, nothing in the language of the
statute suggests any legislative intention to make the
civil fine cumulative of other remedies such as the
invalidation of signatures.  The legislature expressly
has provided for invalidation of signatures upon
violation of other statutes.  See, e.g., ORS 249.008(1)
('No signature in violation of the provisions of this
chapter shall be counted.'); ORS 249.865(5) ('[a]ny
intentional or willful violation [of the statute] shall
invalidate the prospective petition'); ORS 250.105(2)
(the Secretary shall not accept initiative or
referendum petition if fewer than required number of
signatures are submitted).  The failure of the
legislature to include similar language in its
description of the consequences of violating ORS
260.560 strongly suggests that it did not intend
invalidation of signatures to be a remedy for violating
that statute."
Id. at 393-94.  The trial court read Nelson to suggest that the
legislature's decision not to state expressly in ORS 249.740(4)
or elsewhere that a violation of circulator certification
requirements would lead to the invalidation of signatures, as the
legislature had so stated in ORS 249.008(1), meant that the
legislature did not intend to authorize that remedy.  
Even if Nelson correctly construed the contrast in the
statutory texts that it considered –- an issue that we need not
decide here -- that case is distinguishable.  As we have
explained elsewhere, the Secretary of State has determined, in
the lawful exercise of delegated authority, that a circulator's
violation of certification requirements deprives the affected
signature sheet of the certification that ORS 249.740(4)
requires.  The Secretary of State's determination advances the
legislature's objective of deterring fraud in the nomination
process.  Nelson did not address the legal effect of the
Secretary of State's delegated authority to reach that
determination and to adopt rules and procedures to deter fraud in
the election system.
Finally, the trial court noted that some counties did
not comply with the Secretary of State's written instruction to
scrutinize signature sheets for circulator certification
problems.  After those counties submitted their sheets of
verified elector signatures, the Secretary of State's staff
examined the signature sheets for the circulator certification
problems that the counties had neglected to investigate.  If the
staff determined that the circulator certifications violated the
Secretary of State's requirements, then staff did not count the
elector signatures on the affected signature sheets.  The trial
court determined that "[t]here appears to be no statutory or
administrative rule authority for that novel action by the
Secretary at the post-verification stage" and that that action
violated ORS 247.005.
The trial court acknowledged that Lindback had sought
to justify that action by citing the Secretary of State's
responsibility, expressed in ORS 246.110, "to obtain and maintain
uniformity in the application, operation and interpretation of
the election laws."  We agree with Lindback's explanation.  The
noncompliance by several counties with the Secretary of State's
written instructions, issued under the Secretary of State's
express authority in ORS 246.120, threatened a violation of the
uniform application of the Secretary of State's requirements for
circulator certification.  See ORS 246.120 ("A county clerk
affected thereby shall comply with the [Secretary of State's]
directives and instructions.")  Faced with that potential
violation of uniformity, the Secretary of State's choice to
engage in a post-verification review of signature sheets from
noncomplying counties was a permissible one.  And, for the
reasons already stated, the policy statement in ORS 247.005 does
not undermine the Secretary of State's authority under ORS
246.110 to make that choice.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude, that the trial
court impermissibly sustained plaintiff's fourth claim for
relief.  Plaintiffs argue, however, that the court should not
grant a writ of mandamus because each of their other claims for
relief would warrant the same injunctive relief that the trial
court granted.  Plaintiffs assert that the record demonstrates,
as a matter of law, that plaintiffs are entitled to the same
relief under each of those claims.  We have considered
plaintiffs' alternative theories, because, if one or more were
correct, it would obviate the necessity of relief in mandamus.  
Plaintiffs correctly identify their burden at this
point respecting their other claims for relief.  ORS 18.082(3)
provides:
"Upon entry of a general judgment, any claim in
the action that is not decided by the general judgment
or by a previous limited judgment, that has not been
incorporated into the general judgment under subsection
(2) of this section, or that cannot be decided by a
supplemental judgment, is dismissed with prejudice
unless the judgment provides that the dismissal is
without prejudice."
Under that statute, the trial court's general judgment dismissed
with prejudice all claims for relief except the fourth claim for
relief that the court expressly sustained.  Consequently,
plaintiffs can prevail on their alternative arguments only if
there is no evidence in the record to support the dismissal with
prejudice of the remaining claims.  We turn now to those claims.
PLAINTIFFS' ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENTS
Plaintiffs assert in their first claim for relief that
the Secretary of State, in notifying Nader that his campaign had
filed insufficient signatures, failed to include with the
decision any findings of fact or conclusions of law to explain
the reasons for that action.  Plaintiffs seek review of that
notification under ORS 183.484 as an order in other than a
contested case.
Plaintiffs' first claim relies on a misinterpretation
of an agency's responsibility in issuing an order in other than a
contested case.  In that context, "nothing in the APA directs an
agency in other than a contested case proceeding to make a record
or to make findings of fact before issuing its order."  Norden v.
Water Resources Dept., 329 Or 641, 647, 996 P2d 958 (2000). 
Under Norden, an agency's failure to incorporate findings of fact
or conclusions of law into an order in other than a contested
case to explain the basis for the order is not a violation of any
law.  Consequently, plaintiffs' first claim for relief fails.
Plaintiffs' second claim for relief asserts that the
Secretary of State has no authority to refuse to recognize
verified elector signatures on signature sheets that contain
errors committed by circulators or the Nader campaign.  However,
the claim rests on the same false premise that this court
rejected above in discussing plaintiffs' fourth claim for relief. 
For the same reasons, plaintiffs' second claim for relief is not
well taken.
Plaintiffs' third claim for relief challenges the
Secretary of State's rejection of signature sheets that the Nader
campaign submitted without sequential numbering.  Plaintiffs
contend, and the Secretary of State disputes, that the Nader
campaign followed the instruction of elections officials in
numbering submitted signature sheets.  Plaintiffs argue that the
Secretary of State is estopped to deny the advice that the Nader
campaign received.
ORS 249.009(1)(b) authorizes the Secretary of State to
adopt rules that "[p]rescribe a system for numbering all
signature sheets of * * * certificates of nomination by
individual electors * * *."  The Secretary of State has exercised
that authority by adopting the following rule in the SCMIE:
"Before submitting the signature sheets to the
appropriate county elections official for signature
verification, the chief sponsor must * * * [w]ithin
each individual county, sequentially number each
signature sheet in the space provided; * * *"
Lindback explained that his office rejected the signature sheets
in question because the Nader campaign had failed to number the
sheets before submission to county election officials in
violation of the rule.  
As a general proposition, a governmental agency may be
estopped from asserting a claim inconsistent with a previous
position that it has taken.  Dept. of Transportation v. Hewitt
Professional Group, 321 Or 118, 126, 895 P2d 755 (1995). 
However, one element required for estoppel is reasonable reliance
on a governmental actor's misstatements.  Reliance on a
misstatement is not reasonable if the governmental actor had no
authority to make the misstatement.  Id.  The alleged
misstatement on which plaintiffs rely would have had the effect
of negating the administrative rule that the Secretary of State
enforced.  Nothing in the record demonstrates that any person who
may have advised the Nader campaign had (or indeed could have)
any authority to negate a rule.  Thus, any reliance on that
statement, if made, was not reasonable.  The third claim for
relief is legally flawed for that reason.
Plaintiffs' fifth, sixth, and seventh claims for relief
assert various constitutional challenges, which we summarized
above, to the Secretary of State's disqualification of signature
sheets due to errors by circulators in signing and dating the
sheets.  Plaintiffs contend that a compelling justification must
support the state's enforcement of any rule that results in the
disqualification of the signatures of registered voters.
We do not dispute that the statutory procedure for
nomination by individual electors implicates important aspects of
the political liberty and associational freedom of Oregon's
electors.  However, plaintiffs' claim that the Secretary of
State's action effectively compels them to collect thousands of
signatures in addition to the number required by Oregon statute
or the state constitution is illusory.  Plaintiffs, like all
political participants, must collect only the number of
signatures, and comply with the pertinent signature gathering
procedures, that Oregon law requires.  Thus, contrary to
plaintiffs' argument, the Secretary of State has not imposed an
undue burden on plaintiffs' political freedoms under the state or
federal constitutions. (8)
The United States Supreme Court has noted, in an
analogous context, that a state (there, Colorado) "retains an
arsenal of safeguards" to protect the integrity of a ballot-initiative process, to deter fraud, and to diminish corruption. 
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 US
182, 204-05, 119 S Ct 636, 142 L Ed 2d 599 (1999).  The Court in
Buckley specifically cited a state statute that invalidated an
initiative "if [the] circulator has violated any provision of the
laws governing circulation" as one example of a legitimate state
safeguard.  Id. at 205.  The Court also noted that states "have
considerable leeway to protect the integrity and reliability of
the initiative process, as they have with respect to election
processes generally," id. at 191, citing as an example Colorado's
requirement that petition circulators attach to each petition
section an affidavit containing particular factual statements.
We recognize, of course, that functional differences
exist between the initiative process scrutinized in Buckley and
the candidate nomination procedure under consideration here. 
But, as noted, the underlying signature collection and circulator
certification procedures are analogous.  For that reason, we
conclude that, according to the principles discussed in Buckley,
Oregon's circulator certification procedure, and the other
procedures discussed above that protect the electoral process
from fraud, withstand federal constitutional scrutiny.  It
follows from the foregoing that the Secretary of State's
disqualification of signature sheets in this case is not
unconstitutional for the reasons asserted by plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs' only remaining claim concerns attorney fees
and costs.  That claim affords no alternative basis for
sustaining the action of the trial court.
CONCLUSION
We conclude, for the reasons stated above, that the
Secretary of State is entitled to relief from the order of the
trial court that required the Secretary of State "to forthwith
certify the Nader nomination as an independent candidate for the
2004 general election ballot."  A peremptory writ will issue
forthwith requiring the trial court to withdraw that order and
enter judgment in favor of the Secretary of State.  We will
combine the writ with this court's appellate judgment.  On the
court's own motion, the court waives the application of ORAP
9.25, providing for petitions for reconsideration.
Combined peremptory writ and appellate judgment to
issue forthwith.  ORAP 9.25, providing for petitions for
reconsideration, is waived on the court's own motion.  ORAP
1.20(5).
1. ORS 246.910 provides:
"(1) A person adversely affected by any act or
failure to act by the Secretary of State, a county
clerk, a city elections officer or any other county,
city or district official under any election law, or by
any order, rule, directive or instruction made by the
Secretary of State, a county clerk, a city elections
officer or any other county, city or district official
under any election law, may appeal therefrom to the
circuit court for the county in which the act or
failure to act occurred or in which the order, rule,
directive or instruction was made. 
"(2) Any party to the appeal proceedings in the
circuit court under subsection (1) of this section may
appeal from the decision of the circuit court to the
Court of Appeals.
"(3) The circuit courts and Court of Appeals, in
their discretion, may give such precedence on their
dockets to appeals under this section as the
circumstances may require.
"(4) The remedy provided in this section is
cumulative and does not exclude any other remedy
against any act or failure to act by the Secretary of
State, a county clerk, a city elections officer or any
other county, city or district official under any
election law or against any order, rule, directive or
instruction made by the Secretary of State, a county
clerk, a city elections officer or any other county,
city or district official under any election law."
(Emphasis added.)
2. ORS 183.484(1) provides:
"Jurisdiction for judicial review of orders other
than contested cases is conferred upon the Circuit
Court for Marion County and upon the circuit court for
the county in which the petitioner resides or has a
principal business office. Proceedings for review under
this section shall be instituted by filing a petition
in the Circuit Court for Marion County or the circuit
court for the county in which the petitioner resides or
has a principal business office."
3. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation."
4. Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution
provides:
"No law shall be passed restraining the free
expression of opinion, or restricting the right to
speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever;
but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of
this right."
Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution provides:
"No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or
class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which,
upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all
citizens."
Article II, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution provides:  "All
elections shall be free and equal."
5. ORS 247.005 provides:
"It is the policy of this state that all election
laws and procedures shall be established and construed
to assist the elector in the exercise of the right of
franchise."
6. In addition to this mandamus proceeding, the Secretary
of State filed an appeal from the trial court's general judgment. 
On September 16, 2004, the Court of Appeals entered an order
certifying the appeal to this court under ORS 19.405 and ORAP
10.10.  On the same day, this court accepted the certification. 
7. The record contains no evidence that any campaign other
than the Nader campaign was employing the nomination procedure in
ORS 249.740 at the time.  That accounts for the reference to the
Nader campaign in the written instructions now before us.  We
assume that the written instructions are applicable generally to
all the elections procedures to which the Secretary of State has
addressed them, not just to a single candidate or campaign, until
the Secretary of State withdraws, modifies, or supercedes them. 
We note also that the candidate nominating process that is the
subject of this case comprises a different set of statutes than
those associated with ballot measures.
8. Plaintiffs present no separate argument under the state
constitution in this court.