Case Title: City of Boulder v. Payne

Citation: 426 P.2d 194

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1967-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
426 P.2d 194 (1967) CITY OF BOULDER, State Compensation Insurance Fund, and Industrial Commission of Colorado, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Paul W. PAYNE, Defendant in Error. No. 22376. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. April 17, 1967. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Peter L. Dye, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff in error Industrial Commission of Colorado. *195 Harold Clark Thompson, Alious Rockett, Francis L. Bury, Denver, Feay B. Smith, Jr., Denver, for plaintiffs in error City of Boulder and State Compensation Insurance Fund. Ryan, Martin, Brotzman, Caplan & Knapple, Boulder, for defendant in error. KELLEY, Justice. This is a workmen's compensation case. It is here on a writ of error directed to a judgment of the District Court of Boulder County, which awarded compensation to the employee (claimant), the defendant in error. The plaintiffs in error are, the City of Boulder (the employer, or Boulder), State Compensation Insurance Fund (the fund), and the Industrial Commission of Colorado (the commission). The referee and the commission each, in turn, denied workmen's compensation benefits to claimant. The complaint in the district court sets forth the basic facts with which we must deal in answering the question propounded by this writ of error. In paragraph I thereof, it is alleged: Boulder, the fund and the commission, defendants in the foregoing complaint, in effect admitted the above facts and that the claimant had taken all required procedural steps preliminary to filing a complaint in the district court, but denied liability, asserting that the claimant's failure to file a claim for benefits until August 23, 1965, barred such claim, by virtue of C.R.S.1963, 81-13-5. The pertinent portion of the statute relied upon by the plaintiffs in error reads as follows: The pivotal word in the statute is injury. The statute says, "The right to compensation and benefits * * * shall be barred unless within one year after the injury * * *." (Emphasis added.) The commission's position was initially set out in a letter to a Dr. Gilman, who had written a letter in April 1965, in behalf of claimant, asking the commission how to "reopen the *196 case." The commission's letter, over the signature of the referee whose decision was appealed to the district court, advised Dr. Gilman: Again, on July 22, 1965, in response to a letter from Boulder, the commission called attention to the same limitations section, and then commented: "We have the original of the employer's First Report of Accident (your Exhibit A) which shows on its face that this claimant was injured September 21, 1959, he quit work the same day but returned to work September 26, 1959. Had his First Report shown on its face that the claimant was off work more than seven days, we would have sent him one of our form letters advising of the necessity of filing a claim within one year along with claim blanks." (Emphasis added.) In the answer which the fund filed in the district court, it took the same position in this fashion: The commission has used injury and accident interchangeably. We have reviewed the Workmen's Compensation Act from beginning to end, the leading texts, prior decisions of this court and those from other jurisdictions. Although there is some disagreement, the majority of the courts distinguish between "accident" and "injury." On this point we agree with the trial judge when he said: The general assembly saw fit in 1963 to define both terms. They are the only terms in the Act which are defined. C.R.S. 1963, 81-2-9, reads: Accident is the cause and injury is the effect. It does not follow in every instance that the two occur simultaneously. At least, in many instances, the total or ultimate effect is not immediately apparent. The slow, progressive development of the ultimate effect in the instant case was neither apparent to several doctors who treated claimant nor to the claimant. Surely, *197 it was not contemplated by the legislature that a workman have greater medical perception than a physician. The Workmen's Compensation Act was enacted for a beneficent purposeto allay the adverse economic effects upon a workman which flow from a disabling industrial accident. In order to carry out the intended purpose of the Act, it is necessary to avoid hypertechnical refinements in the construction of the terms and provisions of the Act. And this is especially true where, as here, there is no prejudice to the employer. The record in this case discloses that claimant was examined, treated and paid fees to a number of doctors between the time of his release in December 1959 by the physician who initially examined and treated him and the time in April 1965 when Dr. Gilman discovered the true cause of claimant's progressive disability to be the accident of September 21, 1959. The claimant was able to return to work on September 26, 1959, and he continued to work until April 1965; hence he was not disabledhe did not have a disabling injury. Since no benefits flow to a workman merely because he has been the victim of an accident and since injuries must be of sufficient magnitude to prevent him from working for more than seven days before they are compensable, it follows that the term "injury," as it is employed in 81-13-5, means compensable injury. In fact, the statute so states, in slightly different verbiage. It requires notice to be given "of an injury, for which compensation and benefits are payable * * * and the furnishing of medical, surgical or hospital treatment by the employer shall not be considered payment of compensation or benefits within the meaning of this section." (Emphasis added.) Before leaving the statute we should point out that the bar "does not apply to any claimant to whom compensation has been paid." Claimant was off duty from September 21 until September 26, a total of five days. If he had remained off duty another five days he would have drawn compensation for three of those days and, under such circumstances, the commission would not have invoked the statute of limitations. It is inconceivable that the lawmakers intended to penalize one whose hurt seems trivial as compared to one whose injury is only slightly less trivial, or whose recuperative powers are greater, or who, by sheer determination, continues to work. We believe the trial judge's reasoning works toward the equality of application which the legislature must have intended this law to have. We hold that the time begins to run for filing "a notice claiming compensation" when the claimant, as a reasonable man, should recognize the nature, seriousness and probable compensable character of his injury. Safeway Stores v. Newman, 123 Colo. 362, 230 P.2d 168; Anderson v. Contract Trucking Co., Inc., 48 N.M. 158, 146 P.2d 873; Baldwin v. Scullion, 50 Wyo. 508, 62 P.2d 531, 108 A.L.R. 304; 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 78.41. We adopt this rule with the conviction that the legislature could not have intended to give substantive benefits on the one hand and then, on the other, take them away by the imposition of a literally impossible procedural condition. This court in another area of the compensation law has relieved the employer of the responsibility of reporting every accident. The philosophy of this statement from Monks Excavating & Redi-Mix Cement v. Kopsa, 148 Colo. 586, 367 P.2d 321, is applicable here: Having disposed of the limitations problem we now turn to the final point raised by the defendants in error. They argue that if the lower court is correct in its ruling that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the injury becomes apparent to the claimant, then his right to compensation is foreclosed by C.R.S.1963, 81-13-6, which provides that: This statute is not one of limitations. It creates an arbitrary rule of evidence, which inhibits the commission from finding any causal connection between an injury and an accident when the disability has its beginning five years after the date of the accident. In this case, the beginning of the disability was at the time of the accident. Claimant was actually disabledoff work for a period of five days. A period of insufficient duration to entitle him to compensation benefits, but of sufficient magnitude to require initial treatment for some three months. The disability here is a recurrence of that initial disability and hence is not within the terms of the statute. See Industrial Commission v. Weaver, 81 Colo. 191, 254 P. 444. The judgment is affirmed and the cause remanded to the district court with directions to remand to the Industrial Commission for proceedings in conformance with the judgment of the district court. SUTTON, J., not participating.