Case Title: McNew v. McCoy

Citation: 

Docket Number: 951237

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1996-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
ARTHUR B. McNEW 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.   Record No. 951237                   March 1, 1996 
 
TIM McCOY, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TAZEWELL COUNTY 
 
Donald R. Mullins, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether an access road was 
dedicated as a public way for the benefit of landowners adjacent 
to that road.   
 
Tim and Joyce McCoy own a tract of land which formerly 
consisted of six lots in a subdivision, since vacated, known as 
the J. B. Hawley Subdivision, located near the village of Falls 
Mill in Tazewell County.  The McCoys claim an interest in a 
gravel access road adjacent to the western boundary of their 
property.  This road extends across a farm owned in part by 
Arthur B. McNew.   
 
The plat of subdivision for the J. B. Hawley Subdivision was 
recorded in November 1961, before Tazewell County's Board of 
Supervisors had enacted a subdivision ordinance.  That plat shows 
a road in the same location as the access road at issue in this 
appeal.  In September 1961, Ruth T. Vickers and Roy O. Vickers, 
husband and wife who were the McCoys' predecessors in title, 
acquired the former subdivision.   
 
In 1986, the Tazewell County Board of Supervisors vacated 
the plat of subdivision.  Ruth Vickers had requested the vacation 
of the plat because an "unopened ten (10) foot wide street as 
shown on said plat encroached upon the porch and possibly a 
corner of [her] dwelling house."   
 
A dispute ensued between the McCoys and McNew when McNew 
erected a fence along the eastern boundary of the 16-foot access 
road to prevent the McCoys from using the road.  The McCoys filed 
their bill of complaint alleging, inter alia, that they are 
entitled to use the road because it is a publicly dedicated road 
or, alternatively, that they had acquired property rights in the 
road by prescription.   
 
Subsequently, the McCoys filed a motion for summary 
judgment, and McNew filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.  
The trial court granted the McCoys' motion for summary judgment, 
holding that the gravel road was dedicated at the time the 
subdivision plat was recorded and that such dedication was for 
the benefit of the owners of the lots shown on that plat.  The 
court entered a judgment which included certain injunctive relief 
in favor of the McCoys.  We awarded McNew an appeal.   
 
McNew argues that the trial court erred in holding that the 
road, which is located on his property, has been dedicated as a 
public way for the benefit of owners of the adjoining property.  
McNew asserts that the McCoys failed to prove there was a 
dedication and acceptance of the access road for public use by 
Tazewell County.  The McCoys assert that Tazewell County accepted 
the dedication of the platted access road.  We disagree with the 
McCoys.   
 
We recently stated the applicable principles which control 
our resolution of this appeal: 
 
 
Dedication, at common law, was a grant to the 
public, by a landowner, of a limited right of user in 
his land.  No writing or other special form of 
conveyance was required; unequivocable evidence of an 
intention to dedicate was sufficient.  Until the 
dedication was accepted by the public, it was a mere 
offer to dedicate, no matter how finally expressed.  
Prior to acceptance, the offer to dedicate imposed no 
responsibilities upon the public and was subject to 
unilateral withdrawal at any time by the landowner.  2 
Minor on Real Property 1696-1702 (F. Ribble 2d ed. 
1928).  See also Bradford v. Nature Conservancy, 224 
Va. 181, 198-99, 294 S.E.2d 866, 875 (1982).  
Acceptance could be formal and express, as by the 
enactment of a resolution by the appropriate governing 
body, or by implication arising from an exercise of 
dominion by the governing authority or from long 
continued public user of requisite character.   
 
Brown v. Tazewell County Water and Sewerage Authority, 226 Va. 
125, 129-30, 306 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1983).  Applying these 
principles, we hold that the McCoys do not have a right to use 
the access road because there is no evidence in this record that 
Tazewell County ever accepted the dedication.  The record is 
devoid of any evidence:  (1) of a formal and express acceptance 
by the County; (2) that the County exercised dominion of the way 
or; (3) that there has been long continued public user of the 
way. 
 
We reject the McCoys' assertion that Tazewell County 
impliedly accepted the access road when it vacated the 
subdivision plat in 1986 at Ruth Vickers' request.  The County's 
resolution vacating the subdivision plat was without legal 
efficacy because the County had neither accepted the dedication 
nor acquired any other rights in the access road and, thus, the 
County had acquired no property rights that could be vacated.  
Furthermore, we recently observed that "the doctrine of implied 
acceptance only applies in urban areas.  '[A] formal acceptance 
or express assertion of dominion over the road by public 
authority is required before dedication of a rural road is 
complete.'"  E.S. Chappell & Son, Inc. v. Brooks, 248 Va. 571, 
574, 450 S.E.2d 156, 158 (1994) (quoting Burks Bros. of Virginia, 
Inc. v. Jones, 232 Va. 238, 248, 349 S.E.2d 134, 141 (1986)). 
 
The McCoys argued at the bar of this Court that in the event 
the trial court's judgment is reversed, they are entitled to a 
remand of this proceeding so that they can pursue their claim 
that they acquired rights in the road by prescription.  We 
disagree.  The trial court did not rule upon this claim, and the 
McCoys did not assign cross-error to the trial court's failure to 
do so.  See Loving v. Hayden, 245 Va. 441, 445, 429 S.E.2d 8, 11 
(1993).  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and enter final judgment here on behalf of McNew. 
 
Reversed and final judgment.