Case Title: Lovorn v. Hathorn

Citation: 365 So. 2d 947

Docket Number: 49446

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1979-01-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
365 So. 2d 947 (1978) Mrs. Bobby LOVORN, Sammy Carter, Joe Goodin, J.D. Eaves and Prentiss Carter v. Ralph HATHORN, Mayor of Louisville, et al. No. 49446. Supreme Court of Mississippi. October 4, 1978. As Corrected On Denial of Rehearing January 10, 1979. Laurel G. Weir, Philadelphia, for appellants. Fair & Mayo, James Mayo, Louisville, William A. Allain, Jackson, Frank Deramus, Louisville, for appellees. Sara E. Gallaspy, Jackson, amicus curiae brief for Mississippi Municipal Association. En Banc. LEE, Justice, for the Court: Mrs. Bobby Lovorn, et al., filed their bill of complaint against Ralph Hathorn, Mayor of Louisville, et al., in the Chancery Court of Winston County, seeking a mandatory injunction to enforce the election of a five-member school board for the Louisville Municipal Separate School District. The chancellor entered a decree dismissing the bill and complainants below appeal and assign the following errors in the trial: (1) The chancellor erred in holding Mississippi Code Annotated Section 37-7-203 (1972) to be unconstitutional. (2) The chancellor erred in holding that the constitutional rights of appellant were not being violated under the one-man one-vote principle. (3) The chancellor erred in amending his decree after an appeal had been perfected to the Mississippi Supreme Court. Since July 1, 1960, Louisville Municipal Separate School District has covered all of Winston County and has been the only school district in said county. Twenty-six hundred seventy-five (2,675) pupils outside the Louisville city limits and fourteen hundred eighteen (1,418) pupils inside the city limits attend the schools of said district. The population of Winston County is approximately eighteen thousand four hundred six (18,406) of which number approximately seven thousand (7,000) live within the City of Louisville. Taxes in the school district are assessed and collected by the Louisville City Tax Assessor and Collector, and the school district has issued negotiable bonds for the purpose of funding construction and maintenance of the schools. School taxes collected inside the city amount to two hundred ninety-four thousand nine hundred sixty-four dollars three cents ($294,964.03) and said taxes collected outside the city amount to two hundred *948 fifty-five thousand eight hundred twelve dollars twenty-four cents ($255,812.24). There are fifty-two (52) municipal separate school districts in Mississippi and at least forty-eight (48) such districts have territory located outside the municipality which is embraced within the school district. Since 1960, the Board of Trustees of Louisville Municipal Separate School District has been composed of five (5) members, three (3) of which are appointed by the governing authorities of the City of Louisville, and two (2) of which are elected by the qualified electors of the school district outside the city. That part of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 37-7-203 (1972) as amended, which applies to this suit provides: "... in any county in which a municipal separate school district embraces the entire county in which Highways 14 and 15 intersect, one (1) trustee shall be elected from each supervisors district." (Emphasis added). It is not disputed that the underscored phrase applies only to Winston County. Appellants' suit was brought to enforce election of one (1) trustee from each supervisor's district. They also contend that the method of selecting trustees for said municipal separate school district violates the one-man one-vote rule and that the right of individuals residing outside the Louisville city limits to vote for trustees was being unconstitutionally diluted in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The chancellor found the quoted part of the statute to be in violation of Section 90, Mississippi Constitution 1890, and unconstitutional. He also held that the one-man one-vote rule was inapplicable to the present case. Did the chancellor err in holding Mississippi Code Annotated Section 37-7-203 (1972), as amended, to be unconstitutional? The basis of the chancellor's ruling is that the part of said statute referring to Highways 14 and 15 bears no rational relationship to the means of electing trustees in the school district, that it could not apply to any county except Winston County and that it is a local and private law in violation of Section 90(p), Mississippi Constitution 1890, which follows: We held in Wilson v. Jones County Board of Supervisors, 342 So. 2d 1293 (Miss. 1977), where the statute under consideration involved levying an additional two-mill tax in a county having a population in excess of fifty-nine thousand five hundred forty (59,540) and being traversed by U.S. Highway 11 which intersected U.S. Highway 84 (Jones County), that the classification must bear a rational relationship to the purpose of the section. We said: An act providing that a county having two judicial districts and being intersected by U.S. Highway 84 and Interstate 59 was held to be unconstitutional in Smith v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corporation, 310 So. 2d 281 (Miss. 1975). It was emphasized that the classification must be germane to the subject matter of the legislation. In Vardaman v. McBee, 198 Miss. 251, 21 So. 2d 661 (1945), the Court stated: The statute under consideration in Board of Education v. Educational Finance Commission, 243 Miss. 782, 138 So. 2d 912 (1962), provided: In holding that the statute was not unconstitutional, the Court said: Absent the provision referring to Highways 14 and 15 intersecting, the statute, which is a general statute, appears to be constitutional. Even though Louisville Municipal Separate School District encompasses all territory of the county, there are statutory procedures whereby any other county in the state could become similarly situated. Without the offensive part of Section 37-7-203, the statute appears to be rational and germane to the subject matter. We hold that the part of said statute under consideration here which reads "in which Highways 14 and 15 intersect" is unconstitutional, that such offensive language be stricken from the act and that the remaining portion of the statute is constitutional. We further hold that the chancellor erred in finding the entire portion of the statute to be unconstitutional and the decree is reversed and judgment entered here on said question. Did the chancellor err in holding that the constitutional rights of appellants were not being violated under the one-man one-vote principle? Did the chancellor err in amending his decree after an appeal had been perfected to the Mississippi Supreme Court? Appellants contend that their right to vote for trustees is being unconstitutionally diluted in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the one-man one-vote rule is applicable to the election of trustees for said school district. They cite Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 88 S. Ct. 1114, 20 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1968), and Hadley v. Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas City, Missouri, 397 U.S. 50, 90 S. Ct. 791, 25 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1970). In Hadley, the Supreme Court stated: Appellees argue that the one-man one-vote rule does not apply and, among other decisions, cite Sailors v. Board of Education of the County of Kent, 387 U.S. 105, 87 S. Ct. 1549, 18 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1967), wherein the court said that the rule did not apply since the county school board members were elected by delegates from local school boards and that the function of said school board was administrative rather than legislative or governmental. The Court further stated: The selection process here is neither fish nor fowl, three members of the board being appointed in the city and two members being elected outside the city. However, since the decision on Question I decides this case, we do not reach the problem presented by the one-man one-vote rule, and it is not necessary that we pass on the second and third questions here. Suffice it to say, we call attention of the Bench, Bar and Legislature to the question (which we do not decide) presented by the one-man one-vote rule which may affect fifty-two (52) municipal separate school districts in the State of Mississippi. After consideration of this case by a conference of justices en banc, and for the reasons stated, the decree of the trial court is reversed, judgment is rendered here for appellants, and the case is remanded to the chancery court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. PATTERSON, C.J., SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and SUGG, WALKER, BROOM and COFER, JJ., concur. BOWLING, J., took no part.