Case Title: WESLEY M.WHITE and CAROLE A. KENNEY v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., THE WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION and HAROLD DWAIN CAREY

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0224

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
WESLEY M.WHITE and CAROLE A. KENNEY v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., THE WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION and HAROLD DWAIN CAREY2009 WY 90210 P.3d 1096Case Number: No. S-08-0224Decided: 07/10/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
WESLEY 
M. WHITE and CAROLE A. KENNEY,

 
 
Appellants

 
 
(Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE 
OF WYOMING, ex rel., THE WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION and HAROLD DWAIN 
CAREY,

 
 
Appellees

 
 
(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

 
 
The 
Honorable Michael K. Davis, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Bernard 
Q. Phelan, Phelan Law Offices, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Theodore Racines, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.

 
 

Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Appellants, 
Wesley White and Carole Kenney, challenge the district court's order dismissing 
their complaint pursuant to W.R.C.P. 37(b)(2)1 as a sanction for their failure to 
comply with two orders compelling discovery.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]        
Did 
the district court abuse its discretion when it dismissed Appellants' cause of 
action pursuant to W.R.C.P. 37(b)(2)?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
On 
July 10, 2006, Appellants filed their complaint.  They sought damages for personal 
injuries incurred as a result of a motor vehicle collision allegedly caused by 
Mr. Carey's negligence.  They 
alleged that, at the time of the collision, Mr. Carey was acting in the course 
and scope of his employment as a snowplow operator for the State of 
Wyoming.  On December 12, 2006, the 
district court entered a scheduling order requiring that discovery be completed 
no later than 10 days prior to trial.  Two days later, the court set the case 
for trial on April 10, 2007.  Shortly thereafter, the court entered a 
Stipulated Scheduling Order providing 
that "discovery shall be completed by April 1, 2007."  On March 9, 2007, the district court 
entered an order rescheduling the trial for June 18.  The April 1, 2007 discovery cut-off date 
remained in effect.

 
 

[¶4]        
On 
April 2, Appellees filed Defendants' 
Motion for Order Compelling Discovery.  
They alleged that they had served Appellants with interrogatories and 
requests for production on February 16 and that Appellants had failed to respond 
to the discovery requests.  
Appellants did not respond to the motion.  The district court granted the motion 
and ordered that Appellants provide discovery responses no later than April 13. 
 The court also ordered Appellants 
to reimburse Appellees for costs incurred in filing the motion to compel 
discovery.  The order warned that 
"[f]ailure to comply with this Order may result in a dismissal of this 
action."

 
 

[¶5]        
On 
May 14, Appellees filed Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss Complaint.  In 
the motion, Appellees alleged that Appellants still had not complied with 
Appellees' discovery requests, and asked the court to impose sanctions, 
including dismissal of Appellants' complaint with prejudice.  Appellees included as attachments 
excerpts from Appellants' depositions.  
In response to questions regarding the reason for the failure to provide 
discovery responses, Mr. White stated in his deposition:

 
 
I 
now work out in Grover, Colorado.  I 
drive back and forth every day working from 7:00 in the morning until 5:30 at 
night.  My travel time starts at 
6:00 a.m., and I don't get home until around 6:30 every evening Monday through 
Saturday.

 
 
So 
that right now has been keeping me from getting the information.  I'm trying to balance a lot of things 
right now, but basically get some money in the door so I can live.  So I apologize for not getting that 
in.  I apologize to the Court and 
everybody else on that.  I'm really 
trying hard to cover all bases.

 
 
Ms. 
Kenney's deposition contained the following exchange:

 
 
Q. 
[By Appellees' Counsel] And there was a number of interrogatories, written 
answers, that you needed to get in.  
Do you understand that?

 
 
A.  Yes.

 
 
Q.  And they're a little over due 
[sic].

 
 
A.  Yes.

 
 
Q.  Is there any reason for 
that?

 
 
A.  Just been extremely busy, and I did get 
them down and give them to [Appellants' Counsel].

 
 
Q.  So I'll get them shortly.  Other things took precedence over the 
case?

 
 
. 
. .

 
 
A.  Yeah, life in 
general.

 
 
Q.  Anything in 
particular?

 
 
A.  My work, my job.

 
 

[¶6]        
In 
response to Appellees' motion to dismiss, Appellants alleged that they had 
provided all materials in their possession and that they gave "releases to 
obtain information of any kind" to Appellees.  Appellants also claimed that they were 
"preparing responses to the written discovery requests and will have them to 
[Appellees] on or before May 29."  On May 30, Appellants filed a Revised Response to Motion to Dismiss, 
in which they stated that responses to written discovery requests would be 
delivered no later than May 30.  The 
court held a hearing on the matter on May 31.

 
 

[¶7]        
On 
July 10, the district court entered an Order on Rule 37 Sanctions.  In that order, the court noted that 
Appellants submitted some responses to Appellees' discovery requests, but found 
them to be deficient because:

 
 
a.         
Plaintiff White failed to provide any answers to interrogatories in 
writing under oath, failed to sign his answers to interrogatories and failed to 
answer in a timely manner in violation of W.R.C.P., Rules 33(b)(1)(2) and 
(3).

 
 
b.         
Plaintiff Kenney failed to provide her answers in a timely manner in 
violation of W.R.C.P., Rule 33(b)(1)(2).

 
 
c.         
Plaintiff White failed to produce medical reports pertaining to previous 
injury, tax records, employment records, worker's compensation records, record 
of driving history, title and registration of the vehicle involved in the crash, 
union records and audio tape of Circuit Court proceedings concerning the 
citation issued as a result of this incident.

 
 
d.         
Plaintiff Kenney has failed to produce medical reports pertaining to 
previous injury, tax records, [and] employment records.

 
 

[¶8]        
At 
this point, the district court declined Appellees' request to dismiss 
Appellants' complaint.  It did, 
however, order Appellants to pay Appellees' expenses and fees relating to the 
motions to compel discovery.  The 
court also ordered Appellants to supply answers to interrogatories within 10 
days and to provide requested documents within 30 days.  In doing so, the court stated that "[i]t 
is the intent of the Court that [Appellants] bear the burden of producing these 
items.  This Order shall not be 
satisfied merely by providing a waiver to the Defendants."  Once again, the court warned that 
"Failure to comply with this Order may result in further sanctions, including 
dismissal of [the] Complaint."  The 
court vacated the trial and ordered that it be reset only after Appellants 
complied with the order and submitted notarized certification of compliance to 
the court. 

 
 

[¶9]        
On 
June 13, 2008, Appellees filed a Renewed 
Motion to Dismiss.  In this 
motion, they alleged that Appellants still had not responded to Appellees' 
discovery requests as required by the court's Order on Rule 37 Sanctions, and that 
Appellants had not paid the costs and fees imposed as a sanction in that order. 
 Appellees requested that the action 
be dismissed both for failure to comply with the court's discovery order and for 
lack of prosecution.  Appellees' 
motion was subsequently amended to note that Mr. White had produced the Circuit 
Court audio tape cassette as the district court required.  The court held a hearing on this motion 
on July 21.  Appellants did not 
dispute that they failed to comply with the court's Order on Rule 37 Sanctions.  On July 25, Appellants filed a Notice and Certification of Providing 
Discovery.  This notice stated 
that certain documents had been provided to Appellees.  It identified several of Mr. White's 
prior employers, and stated that Mr. White had previously given Appellees an 
"employment records release."  The 
notice was not signed by either Appellantonly by their counseland it was not 
notarized.  On August 20, the court 
entered an Order Granting Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss.  The court 
found Appellants' behavior "egregious" and, as a sanction for failing to comply 
with the court's discovery orders, dismissed the suit with prejudice.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 

[¶10]     
We 
review the district court's dismissal of an action for failure to comply with 
discovery requirements for abuse of discretion.  Global Shipping & Trading, Ltd. v. 
Verkhnesaldincky Metallurgic Co., 892 P.2d 143, 145-46 (Wyo. 1995).  We affirm if the court's action was 
within the bounds of reason under the circumstances.  Mueller v. Zimmer, 2007 WY 195, ¶ 11, 
173 P.3d 361, 364 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
Discussion

 
 

[¶11]     
A 
party served with discovery requests must respond within 30 days of service 
unless that party objects or moves for a protective order.  E.g., W.R.C.P. 33(b)(3) and 34(b); Farrell v. Hursh Agency, Inc., 713 P.2d 1174, 1177-78 (Wyo. 1986).  It is 
undisputed that Appellants did not respond to Appellees' discovery requests 
within the requisite 30-day period, and did not respond at all to some of the 
requests.  It is also undisputed 
that Appellants never filed any objection or motion for a protective order in 
response to the discovery requests.

 
 

[¶12]     
When 
Appellants failed to provide discovery responses, Appellees sought an order 
compelling discovery pursuant to W.R.C.P. 37(a).  The court found that Appellants had 
failed to comply with their discovery obligations and entered an order 
compelling compliance.  If a party 
fails to comply with a court's discovery order, the court has broad discretion 
to issue further orders and to impose such sanctions "as are just."  W.R.C.P. 37(b)(2).  Among the sanctions specifically 
mentioned in the rule is "dismissing the action or proceeding or any part 
thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party."  W.R.C.P. 37(b)(2)(C).  "Rule 37 clearly authorizes the court to 
dismiss pleadings as well as grant default judgment against the disobedient 
party."  Global Shipping, 892 P.2d  at 
146.

 
 

[¶13]     
In 
Global Shipping, the underlying facts 
were similar to the current case.  
We affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint 
and entry of judgment in the defendants' favor on their counterclaims.  We stated:

 
 
The 
plaintiffs were given ample opportunity to comply with the district court's 
discovery order, and they were given adequate notice and warning by the district 
court that failure to comply would result in these sanctions. . . . Yet the 
plaintiffs failed to comply.  The 
plaintiffs cannot now complain of what they were notified would happen upon 
their failure to comply with the district court's discovery order.  "Little sympathy will be shown those who 
undermine the principles of discovery."  
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. 
Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1285 (Wyo. 1983).  The district court's order was clear 
that the plaintiffs failed to comply with the court's discovery order and, based 
upon that failure, the plaintiffs' complaint was dismissed and default was 
entered against them.

 
 

Id.  See also Farrell, 713 P.2d  at 1178-80 
(entry of default not abuse of discretion where the court entered two orders 
compelling discovery; the second warned that default judgment would result, and 
defendant failed to comply).

 
 

[¶14]     
Appellants 
were provided with ample opportunity to comply with the court's orders prior to 
dismissal.  The court specifically 
warned Appellants in each order that failure to comply could result in dismissal 
of their complaint.  Despite these 
warnings, Appellants failed to comply with the court's orders.  Appellants imply throughout their brief 
that Appellees' discovery requests were unduly burdensome and overbroad.  If Appellants believed that to be the 
case, they should have objected to the requests or moved for a protective 
order.  Failure or refusal to comply 
was not an alternative available under the rules.  We hold that, under the circumstances of 
this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion.2

 
 

[¶15]     
We 
address one additional point raised by Appellants.  They contend that we should find per se abuse of discretion because the 
district court, in its initial order compelling discovery, vacated the trial and 
stated that a new date would not be set until Appellants paid the costs imposed 
as a sanction.  There is no 
indication in the record that Appellants presented this argument to the district 
court.  In their appeal, the claim 
is not supported by citation to authority or cogent argument.  Appellants' argument consists of a 
single paragraph that does nothing more than make a vague, conclusory claim that 
the district court improperly barred their access to the courts, with a general 
citation to art. 1, § 8 of the Wyoming Constitution.3  In addition to lacking cogent argument 
or citation to relevant authority, this claim is without merit.  W.R.C.P. 37(b)(2)(C) specifically permits 
the court to enter an order "staying further proceedings until the order is 
obeyed."  W.R.C.P. 37(b) provides 
that the trial court "shall require the party failing to obey the order or the 
attorney advising that party or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including 
attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure 
was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of 
expenses unjust."  We have expressly 
held that there is no violation of art. 1, § 8 of the Wyoming Constitution when 
a district court orders a trial postponed until sanctions are paid.  Terry v. Sweeney, 10 P.3d 554, 559-60 
(Wyo. 2000).  Finally, we emphasize 
that Appellants did have "access to the courts" when they filed their 
complaint.  The action was dismissed 
solely because of Appellants' failure to comply with appropriate court 
orders.

 
 

[¶16]     
Affirmed.

 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1W.R.C.P. 
37(b)(2) states, in pertinent part:

If 
a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including 
an order made under subdivision (a) of this rule or . . . an order entered under 
Rule 26(f), the court . . . may make such orders in regard to the failure as are 
just, and among others the following:

. 
. .

(C)  An order . . . dismissing the action or 
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the 
disobedient party . . . .

2Appellants 
have noted that the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit employs a five-factor 
test for whether dismissal was proper, articulated in Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 921 
(10th Cir. 1992).  We have not adopted this test.  Appellants do not explicitly ask this 
Court to adopt the Ehrenhaus factors, 
nor do they provide any reasons that we should consider doing 
so.

3Art. 
1, § 8 of the Wyoming Constitution states in full:

All 
courts shall be open and every person for an injury done to person, reputation 
or property shall have justice administered without sale, denial or delay.  Suits may be brought against the state 
in such manner and in such courts as the legislature may by law 
direct.