Case Title: Daniel Jon Peterka V. State Of Florida & SC03-482 - Daniel Jon Peterka V. James V. Crosby, Jr.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC02-1410

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2004-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida 
____________ 
 
No. SC02-1410 
___________ 
 
DANIEL PETERKA, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
____________ 
No. SC03-482 
____________ 
DANIEL PETERKA, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JAMES V. CROSBY, JR., etc., 
Respondent. 
[September 30, 2004] 
PER CURIAM. 
Daniel Peterka was sentenced to death for the 1989 murder of his roommate, 
John Russell.  This Court affirmed Peterka's first-degree premeditated murder 
conviction and death sentence.  See Peterka v. State, 640 So. 2d 59, 62 (Fla. 1994).  
Peterka now appeals a trial court order denying postconviction relief following an 
 
 
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evidentiary hearing and further petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.1  
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's order denying Peterka 
postconviction relief and deny Peterka's habeas petition. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The facts of this case are fully set forth in this Court's opinion on direct 
appeal.  See Peterka, 640 So. 2d at 62-65.  Briefly stated, Peterka fled Nebraska in 
February 1989 after being sentenced to a one-year prison term for theft.  He 
reappeared in Niceville, Florida, and sometime in April 1989, he moved into a 
rental duplex with Russell because Russell was having difficulty paying the rent.  
On June 27, 1989, Peterka obtained a duplicate driver's license with his picture and 
Russell's name.  Peterka then cashed a $300 money order that was payable to 
Russell and had been mailed to Russell by a relative.  Russell suspected that 
Peterka had stolen the money order but told several people that he was not going to 
confront Peterka, who kept a gun at the house. 
Russell was reported missing by his friend and co-worker, Gary Johnson, on 
July 13, 1989.  Sheriff's Deputy Daniel Harkins questioned Peterka about Russell's 
whereabouts, and subsequently ran Peterka's name and birth date in the sheriff's 
office's computer, which indicated that Peterka was a fugitive from Nebraska with 
an outstanding warrant.  Peterka was arrested early the next morning. 
                                        
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  
 
 
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On July 18, 1989, Peterka gave a statement to police in which he admitted 
shooting Russell.  This Court summarized Peterka's statement as follows: 
Peterka forged Russell's signature and cashed the money order.  He 
paid Russell one hundred dollars to use Russell's identification.  
Russell instigated a shoving match over the money order that 
escalated into a fight in the living room of the duplex.  Both men 
reached for Peterka's gun, but Peterka got it first.  As Russell got up 
from the couch, the weapon accidentally fired and the bullet entered 
the top of Russell's head.  Russell fell down on the couch.  Peterka 
wrapped Russell's body in a rug, drove to a remote part of Eglin Air 
Force Base, and buried the body in a shallow grave. 
Id. at 64.  Peterka subsequently led police to Russell's body and gave a videotaped 
statement similar to the statement he had given earlier.  This videotaped statement 
was introduced into evidence at trial. 
The medical examiner testified that Russell died from a close-range gunshot 
wound to the head and that the wound was consistent with Russell having been 
shot from behind while in a reclining position.  A firearms expert testified that in 
his opinion Peterka's gun would not accidentally fire and that the gun had two 
safety mechanisms that would prevent it from firing unless the trigger was pulled. 
The jury found Peterka guilty of first-degree premeditated murder.  During 
the penalty phase, Peterka presented the testimony of friends and family members 
to establish mitigation.  Collectively they testified that Peterka is a good brother 
and son, is caring and understanding, is an excellent, responsible employee, and is 
always helpful.  Peterka also testified on his own behalf, stating that he feels he has 
 
 
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something to share with society and that if he could bring Russell back he would 
be glad to give his life.  At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury 
recommended the death penalty by a vote of eight to four.  After weighing the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the trial court followed the jury's 
recommendation and sentenced Peterka to death.2 
Peterka raised twelve issues on appeal.  See id.3  We concluded that the trial 
court erred by (1) allowing the State to present evidence of Peterka's juvenile 
                                        
2.  The trial court found the following five aggravating circumstances:  (1) 
the murder was committed while Peterka was under a sentence of imprisonment; 
(2) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing lawful 
arrest; (3) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain; (4) the murder was 
committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of a governmental function or 
the enforcement of laws; and (5) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, 
and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification.  See 
Peterka, 640 So. 2d at 65.  In mitigation, the trial court found the statutory 
mitigator that Peterka had no significant history of prior criminal activity but found 
no nonstatutory mitigation.  See id. 
3.  These issues were that the trial court erred by (1) excusing for cause 
prospective juror Piccorossi because of his personal opposition to the death 
penalty; (2) denying Peterka's motion to suppress his statements to the police; (3) 
denying Peterka's motion for judgment of acquittal based upon insufficient 
evidence of premeditation; (4) admitting hearsay evidence that Peterka had fled 
Nebraska and was considered "armed and dangerous"; (5) admitting testimony that 
Russell suspected Peterka of stealing the money order and that Russell intended to 
let the police handle the matter; (6) admitting into evidence a photograph of 
Russell's skull; (7) entering a sentencing order that lacked clarity; (8) finding the 
aggravating factor that the homicide was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful 
exercise of a governmental function or the enforcement of laws; (9) finding that the 
murder was committed for pecuniary gain; (10) referring to other "mitigating 
circumstances" in the sentencing order without stating what they were or why they 
did not amount to mitigation as required by Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 
1990); (11) allowing the State, during cross-examination of Peterka's mother at the 
 
 
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record during the penalty phase, (2) failing to merge the hinder law enforcement 
aggravator with the avoid arrest aggravator, and (3) finding the pecuniary gain 
aggravator.  See id. at 70-71.  However, we further concluded that these errors 
were harmless and affirmed Peterka's conviction and sentence.  See id. at 72-73. 
Peterka filed a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rules of 
Criminal Procedure 3.850 and 3.851, in which he raised numerous claims.4 
                                                                                                                              
penalty phase, to allege that Peterka had an extensive juvenile record; and (12) 
partially denying Peterka's motion to suppress his statements because his requests 
for assistance of counsel were ignored.   
4.  These claims were:  (1) trial counsel were ineffective during voir dire; (2) 
trial counsel were ineffective during the guilt phase for (a) conceding Peterka's 
guilt during opening statements, (b) failing to adequately object to the State's 
presentation of evidence of Russell's reputation for peacefulness, (c) failing to 
investigate and present evidence of the full extent of Russell's poor financial 
situation, (d) failing to object to a State witness speaking to an individual who sat 
in the courtroom during other testimony, (e) failing to prevent suppressed evidence 
from reaching the jury, (f) failing to take advantage of the opportunity provided by 
the firearms expert to demonstrate the plausibility of Peterka's version of the 
shooting, (g) failing to independently investigate the medical examiner's opinion 
that the gunshot wound was a contact wound, (h) failing to question the medical 
examiner about deposition testimony that was consistent with Peterka's version of 
the shooting, (i) failing to elicit information from the medical examiner that no 
tests had been conducted to support his opinion that the residue found on the skull 
was gun powder, (j) failing to object to the medical examiner's lack of qualification 
as a expert to testify as to how the shooting occurred, (k) failing to undermine the 
State's hearsay evidence that Russell was not going to confront Peterka about the 
stolen money order, (l) failing to present a defense case, and (m) making numerous 
errors during closing argument; (3) trial counsel were ineffective in failing to 
properly advise Peterka of his right to testify; (4) trial counsel were ineffective 
during the penalty phase for (a) failing to present available witnesses to offer 
mitigating evidence, including that Peterka was a "model prisoner," (b) failing to 
present evidence of Peterka's record of service in the Minnesota National Guard, 
(c) failing to investigate and present evidence of Peterka's character trait for 
 
 
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Following a Huff5 hearing, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on many of 
these claims.  During the hearing, Peterka presented the testimony of his mother, 
father, sister, and brother regarding his military service, relationships with family, 
and history of good deeds and nonviolent behavior.  Peterka testified as to his good 
behavior in jail, including his refusal to participate in an escape planned by his 
cellmates.  Allen Atkins, a Lieutenant with the Okaloosa County Jail, testified 
regarding Peterka's good behavior.  Peterka also presented the testimony of Dr. 
Joseph Cohen, an expert in the field of forensic pathology, who reviewed the 
physical evidence in the case and disagreed with the medical examiner's 
conclusions about the trajectory of the bullet through Russell's skull. 
In rebuttal, the State presented the testimony of Peterka's trial counsel, 
Assistant Public Defenders Earl D. Loveless and Mark V. Harlee, investigator 
James W. Graham, and Dr. Edward Berkland, the Medical Examiner for the First 
                                                                                                                              
peacefulness, (d) failing to object to vague and inadequate jury instructions 
regarding the aggravating circumstances, (e) failing to investigate and prepare 
evidence to rebut or lessen the weight of these factors, (f) failing to present 
evidence that Peterka refused to participate in a successful escape plan executed by 
three of his cellmates, and (g) failing to properly object to the State's cross-
examination of Peterka's mother regarding unverified prior juvenile convictions; 
(5) the death sentence imposed on Peterka is unconstitutional because the jury was 
allowed to consider aggravating circumstances that were erroneously admitted; and 
(6) the trial court failed to give weight to proven mitigation. 
5.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993) (holding that the judge 
must conduct a preliminary hearing on an initial 3.850 motion for the purpose of 
determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required and to hear legal argument 
relating to the motion). 
 
 
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Judicial Circuit.  Because Peterka's file was destroyed in a flood, Loveless, Harlee, 
and Graham were unable to review their notes on Peterka's case and testified based 
solely on their independent recollections of what occurred at trial twelve years 
earlier. 
The trial court issued an order denying relief and Peterka appeals, raising six 
issues, which include numerous subissues, for this Court's review. 6  Peterka also 
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, raising eight claims for relief.7 
                                        
6.  These issues are: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying Peterka's 
claim that trial counsel were ineffective during the guilt phase; (2) whether the trial 
court erred in denying Peterka's claim that trial counsel were ineffective in failing 
to advise Peterka of his right to testify; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying 
Peterka's claim that trial counsel were ineffective during the penalty phase; (4) 
whether the trial court erred in denying Peterka's claim that trial counsel were 
ineffective during voir dire; (5) whether Peterka was denied due process during the 
postconviction evidentiary hearing; and (6) whether Peterka was denied due 
process by postconviction counsel's failure to investigate and present evidence 
supporting his claims for relief. 
7.  These claims are: (1) Peterka is entitled to relief under the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); (2) appellate 
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the trial court's denial of Peterka's 
motion to suppress evidence seized from his residence; (3) appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to raise issues regarding the prosecutor's arguments; (4) 
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the admission of crime scene 
photographs; (5) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the admission 
of evidence of Russell's character; (6) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 
to raise that the jury was improperly instructed on and the trial court improperly 
considered invalid aggravating circumstances; (7) appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to adequately present Peterka's claim that the trial court erred 
in admitting hearsay evidence that Peterka was considered "armed and dangerous"; 
and (8) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately present Peterka's 
claim that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony that Russell was 
afraid of Peterka's gun. 
 
 
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POSTCONVICTION APPEAL 
I.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
In his first four issues on appeal, Peterka asserts that the trial court erred in 
denying his numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (A) during the 
guilt phase generally, on a number of grounds, (B) during the guilt phase for 
failing to advise Peterka of his right to testify, (C) during the penalty phase, and 
(D) during voir dire.  In order to be entitled to relief on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, Peterka must establish 
deficient performance and prejudice, as set forth in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  See Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 
2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1998).  As to the first prong, deficient performance, 
a defendant must establish conduct on the part of counsel that is 
outside the broad range of competent performance under prevailing 
professional standards.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.  Second, as to 
the prejudice prong, the deficient performance must be shown to have 
so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceedings that 
confidence in the outcome is undermined.  See id. at 694; Rutherford, 
727 So. 2d at 220. 
Gore v. State, 846 So. 2d 461, 467 (Fla. 2003). 
Both the performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland are mixed 
questions of law and fact, and the Court will give deference to the trial court's 
findings of fact that are supported by competent, substantial evidence.  See 
Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1033-34 (Fla. 1999).  Further, as the United 
States Supreme Court explained in Strickland, 
 
 
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[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly 
deferential. . . .  A fair assessment of attorney performance requires 
that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged 
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the 
time.  Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a 
court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. 
466 U.S. at 689.  We address Peterka's first four issues, raising ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims, separately below. 
A.  Guilt Phase 
Peterka first asserts that the trial court erred in denying eight claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase.  Specifically, Peterka 
argues that trial counsel were ineffective for (a) failing to present a coherent theory 
of defense, (b) conceding Peterka's guilt of first-degree premeditated murder, (c) 
failing to present expert testimony about the physical evidence, (d) failing to 
investigate and present evidence of the full extent of Russell's poor financial 
situation, (e) failing to undermine the State's hearsay evidence that Russell was not 
going to confront Peterka about the stolen money order, (f) failing to prevent 
suppressed evidence from reaching the jury, (g) failing to present an adequate 
closing argument, and (h) failing to object to improper prosecutorial argument.  
We conclude that trial counsel were not ineffective for any of the aforementioned 
reasons and therefore affirm the trial court's denial of relief. 
 
 
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Peterka's first claim is that trial counsel failed to present a coherent theory of 
defense.  We conclude that in light of Peterka's statement to police, trial counsel 
presented a viable, coherent defense strategy of either self-defense or unintentional 
killing.  Peterka relies on the language in this Court's 1936 decision in Hopson v. 
State, 168 So. 810 (Fla. 1936), to support his argument that trial counsel were 
ineffective for relying on the theory of self-defense.  However, this Court was not 
addressing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Hopson, but was deciding 
whether a new trial was required because the jury was instructed on self-defense 
when there was no evidence presented in support of the theory.  See id. at 811. 
We conclude that Henry v. State, 862 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 2003), presents 
circumstances closer to those in Peterka's case.  In Henry, we rejected a defendant's 
claim that counsel was ineffective for relying on the theories of self-defense and 
diminished capacity.  See id. at 682.  The defendant argued that the theory of self-
defense was not viable because "he stabbed his wife many times and the police 
presented evidence contradicting that theory."  Id.  However, evidence was also 
elicited at trial that the victim had a violent nature and attacked the defendant first.  
See id.  Noting that self-defense was consistent with the defendant's version of 
events, that trial counsel presented enough evidence to justify a jury instruction on 
self-defense, and that trial counsel argued in the alternative for a "depraved mind, 
second-degree murder conviction," this Court concluded that the defendant failed 
 
 
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to establish deficient performance.  Id.; see also Lusk v. State, 498 So. 2d 902, 905 
(Fla. 1986) (concluding that "trial counsel's decision to rely on self-defense . . . was 
a strategic choice which did not fall outside the acceptable range of competent 
choices"). 
Here, the State's theory was that Peterka came up behind Russell as Russell 
was lying on the couch and shot him in the head at close range.  Although Peterka 
did not testify during the guilt phase, his videotaped statement to police was 
presented to the jury.  According to Peterka, Russell instigated the fight, both he 
and Russell reached for the gun, and as Russell was coming towards him, Peterka 
accidentally fired the gun.  See Peterka, 640 So. 2d at 64. 
Assistant Public Defender Loveless, who was responsible for presenting the 
guilt phase defense at trial, testified at the evidentiary hearing that based on 
Peterka's videotaped statement, the theory of defense was either an accidental 
shooting or self-defense.  Loveless stated that in light of Peterka's statement and 
the fact that Peterka was the one in possession of the gun, Loveless did not think 
the jury would acquit Peterka on a pure accident or self-defense theory.  Rather, 
Loveless said that realistically he was hoping that these theories, perhaps in 
tandem, would lead to a verdict of guilty of manslaughter.  Loveless's 
postconviction testimony is supported by the trial record.  Further, as in Henry, 
defense counsel presented sufficient evidence to have the jury instructed on both 
 
 
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excusable and justifiable homicide.  Thus, we conclude that Loveless's 
performance was not deficient in this regard and that the trial court did not err in 
denying this claim for relief. 
In his second claim, Peterka asserts that trial counsel were ineffective for 
conceding Peterka's guilt during opening statements.  This claim is refuted by the 
record.  A review of Loveless's opening statement confirms that he did not admit 
that Peterka was guilty of first-degree premeditated murder.  Rather, Loveless 
conceded only that if the prosecutor proved the facts he promised to prove, the jury 
could find Peterka guilty.  Further, Loveless explained why he did not believe the 
prosecutor could establish the facts necessary to prove first-degree premeditated 
murder.  In fact, in his closing argument Loveless asked the jury to hold the 
prosecutor to his promise about what the evidence would show and argued that the 
State did not meet its burden of proof.  Thus, the trial court properly denied this 
claim. 
Peterka's third claim of ineffective assistance during the guilt phase is that 
counsel were ineffective for failing to present expert testimony about the physical 
evidence.  During trial, Dr. Edmund Kielman, the medical examiner who 
conducted the autopsy on Russell, testified about the physical evidence, including 
the trajectory of the bullet and the nature of the gunshot wound.  Dr. Kielman used 
Russell's skull, which he had reconstructed, as a demonstrative aid during his 
 
 
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testimony on these issues.  Dr. Kielman opined that the gun was in contact with or 
almost in contact with Russell's skull when it was fired.8  With regard to the 
trajectory of the bullet, Dr. Kielman identified a hole in the top of Russell's skull as 
the bullet's point of entry.  Dr. Kielman then identified a large hole at the bridge of 
the nose, which he initially concluded was where the bullet exited.  However, after 
being questioned by defense counsel during a deposition about the possibility that 
the bullet went straight down from the top of the head, Dr. Kielman began to 
consider this scenario.  A few days before trial, Dr. Kielman reconstructed the 
skull and noticed a sizable hole at the base of the skull.  Dr. Kielman testified at 
trial that he now believed this was the exit wound, rendering the trajectory of the 
bullet straight down.  Dr. Kielman agreed that this was consistent with Russell 
being shot from behind while in a reclined position.  However, on cross-
examination, Dr. Kielman admitted that there were a number of other possible 
scenarios. 
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Peterka presented the expert 
testimony of Dr. Joseph Cohen concerning the exit wound and trajectory of the 
bullet.  Dr. Cohen disagreed with Dr. Kielman's conclusions regarding the 
trajectory of the bullet.  Dr. Cohen explained that when he examined the skull just 
prior to the evidentiary hearing he found defects or injuries that had not been 
                                        
8.  Dr. Kielman stated that the gun was no more than one-half to three-
quarters of an inch away from Russell's head.  
 
 
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documented in Dr. Kielman's report.  Specifically, Dr. Cohen indicated two holes 
in the rear of the skull that he opined were more likely where the bullet exited than 
the other two options considered by Dr. Kielman.  In Dr. Cohen's opinion, these 
injuries were consistent with exiting bullet fragments and this trajectory of the 
bullet was inconsistent with the State's theory of the murder but would support 
Peterka's version of events. 
The trial court denied Peterka's claim, stating: 
The Court finds that the testimony of Dr. Cohen is not credible 
and completely rejects his opinion and testimony. 
Dr. Kielman had testified during the trial regarding the exit 
wound and trajectory of the bullet.  The victim's skull was assembled 
and used by Dr. Kielman to formulate his opinion and conclusions 
regarding the method and manner of death.  The Court finds that the 
condition of the skull at the time of the evidentiary hearing was 
different than the condition of the skull at the time of trial.  The skull 
had been kept in a container, which had bone fragments in the bottom 
of the container consistent with the skull being crushed while in the 
container post-trial.  The Defendant's postconviction expert, Dr. 
Cohen, examined the skull in this condition and testified that he could 
identify exit wounds to the skull that contradicted Dr. Kielman's 
opinion.  Dr. Cohen examined the skull after it had been crushed, but 
failed to thoroughly examine the skull and the fragments that were 
inside the skull's container.  Dr. Michael Berkland, Okaloosa County 
Medical Examiner, was called by the state as a witness during the 
evidentiary hearing to examine the skull.  Dr. Berkland did examine 
the skull and the skull fragments and was able to piece the skull back 
together, and then testified regarding the "exit wounds" identified by 
Dr. Cohen.  The "exit wounds" identified by Dr. Cohen were actually 
the result of the post-trial crushing of the skull. 
Furthermore, Dr. Berkland opined that the victim in this case 
was shot while in a reclining position and that the crime scene, 
condition of the body, and the blood evidence were all consistent with 
the state's theory of the case.  Dr. Berkland concluded that the gunshot 
 
 
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wound was a contact wound, which is the same conclusion Dr. 
Kielman testified to at trial.  Accordingly, the Court rejects Dr. 
Cohen's opinion and testimony. 
Moreover, the Defendant's trial counsel testified that Dr. 
Kielman's trial testimony was consistent with the defense theory of the 
case.  Dr. Kielman's opinion that the exit wound was at the hole in the 
base of the skull making the trajectory of the bullet straight down was 
consistent with the Defendant's statement that he shot the victim as the 
victim came off of the couch with his head pointed at him.  Thus, Mr. 
Loveless made a reasoned tactical decision not to call an additional 
expert and did not render ineffective assistance of counsel. 
This Court has recognized that the trial court has "the superior vantage point 
to see and hear the witnesses and judge their credibility."  Guzman v. State, 721 
So. 2d 1155, 1159 (Fla. 1998).  Thus, "[s]o long as its decisions are supported by 
competent, substantial evidence, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that 
of the trial court on . . . the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given 
to the evidence."  Cummings-El v. State, 863 So. 2d 246, 250 (Fla. 2003) (quoting 
Porter v. State, 788 So. 2d 917, 923 (Fla. 2001)). 
We find no error in the trial court's rejection of Dr. Cohen's testimony 
because it was based on the crushed condition of the skull, which occurred after 
trial.  We further conclude that there is no error in the trial court's finding that trial 
counsel made a reasoned tactical decision not to call a forensic expert.  Peterka has 
thus failed to establish that Loveless's decision not to call an independent forensic 
expert was deficient performance under the first prong of Strickland, and we affirm 
the trial court's denial of relief on this claim. 
 
 
- 16 - 
In his fourth claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase, 
Peterka contends trial counsel were ineffective for failing to introduce evidence of 
the full extent of Russell's poor financial condition to support Peterka's statement 
that Russell confronted him about the money order.  The trial court rejected this 
claim, stating: 
Mr. Loveless testified during the evidentiary hearing that he was 
aware of John Russell's poor financial situation but chose not to put 
on any additional evidence of his financial condition in the defense 
case.  Mr. Loveless made a reasoned tactical decision based on his 
belief that there had been ample evidence of Mr. Russell's financial 
situation presented to the jury.  Therefore, Mr. Loveless was not 
ineffective in his representation of Mr. Peterka. 
We affirm the trial court's denial of relief on this claim. 
During the evidentiary hearing, Loveless testified there was "no question" of 
Russell's poor financial condition and that he did not put on additional evidence 
regarding this fact because it undermined Peterka's version of events that Russell 
shared the $300 check with him.  Loveless also stated that he did not want to 
present any evidence unless it was necessary because he did not want to waive 
rebuttal closing argument. 
At trial, evidence was presented that Russell was in a difficult financial 
situation.  Mrs. Purvis, Russell's landlord, testified on cross-examination that 
Peterka moved in with Russell because Russell was behind on the rent and needed 
a roommate.  Russell's friend and co-worker, Gary Johnson, testified that he 
 
 
- 17 - 
thought it would have been unusual for Russell to leave his cigarettes at home 
because Russell smoked regularly and did not have the money to leave a pack at 
home and buy a new one. 
In addition, Loveless argued during closing statements that the jury should 
consider Russell's financial situation in evaluating the testimony that Russell was 
not going to confront Peterka about the money order: 
Would [Russell] have done as people suggest that he did, given the 
particular financial circumstance he was in?  A man in such condition 
financially, that according to one of his friends, Mr. Johnson, I 
believe, would never have left a part pack of cigarettes laying around 
because he could not afford to.  They will have you believe that when 
he comes up missing, three hundred dollars, which to him must have 
been a small fortune at that time, but he was missing three hundred 
dollars and he made no effort to ask Dan Peterka about it or find out 
what happened. 
Thus, the issue of Russell's financial status was presented to the jury for its 
consideration in the State's case-in-chief and Loveless's decision not to present 
additional evidence of this fact was not deficient performance. 
We also conclude that Peterka has failed to establish deficient performance 
with regard to counsel's failure to rebut hearsay evidence that Russell was not 
going to confront Peterka about the stolen money order.  The trial court found the 
claim was not sufficiently established under Strickland because Peterka "failed to 
identify particular evidence that could have been presented to undermine the state's 
evidence."  We agree.  Peterka did not present any evidence during the evidentiary 
 
 
- 18 - 
hearing that could have been used by trial counsel to undermine the State's 
evidence on this issue. 
Further, we note that Loveless argued during his closing statement that the 
record contained conflicting evidence about whether Russell was going to confront 
Peterka about the stolen money order.  Specifically, Loveless stated: 
[Mr. Elmore] has given you John Russell's family and friends to 
assure you that he was a peaceful man, had a reputation for 
peacefulness in the community and would never confront Dan Peterka 
concerning anything I assume, or especially that check.  Except for 
what Deborah Trently said which was that he would not confront him 
until the gun was out of the house.  I assume he meant by that that he 
would then confront him.  Apparently he was a person who would 
confront another person. 
(Emphasis supplied.)  Thus, we affirm the trial court's denial of relief on this claim. 
Peterka's sixth claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt 
phase involves trial counsel's failure to object to the jury hearing, in a portion of 
Peterka's videotaped statement, that Peterka signed a second waiver of rights form 
related to a statement previously held inadmissible.  "Whether to object is a matter 
of trial tactics which are left to the discretion of the attorney so long as his 
performance is within the range of what is expected of reasonably competent 
counsel."  Stevens v. State, 552 So. 2d 1082, 1084 (Fla. 1989) (quoting 
Muhammad v. State, 426 So. 2d 533, 538 (Fla.1982)).  In Brown v. State, 846 So. 
2d 1114, 1122 (Fla. 2003), we rejected the defendant's claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to a witness's testimony regarding statements made 
 
 
- 19 - 
by the victim.  We agreed with the trial court that counsel's decisions not to object 
were "trial tactics on his part not to object to what he perceived as very minor 
hearsay matters."  Id. 
In this case, Loveless indicated at trial that he did not ask that the videotape 
be edited to exclude the reference to Peterka's signature on a previous waiver of 
rights form because he did not think that the jury would have any particular 
questions about it.  During the evidentiary hearing, Loveless testified that he did 
not request a curative instruction because he believed that would bring more 
attention to the issue than the statement itself.  Similar to the situation in Brown, 
we conclude that Loveless's performance was not deficient in this regard.  
However, even if Loveless's performance could be considered deficient, we 
conclude that it did not so seriously affect the fairness and reliability of the 
proceedings that our confidence in the jury's verdict of guilt is undermined.  
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Peterka's claim. 
Peterka next contends that Loveless was ineffective during closing argument 
for failing to take advantage of the physical evidence and thereby conceding the 
State's theory, for improperly bolstering the State's evidence that Russell had a 
reputation for peacefulness, for only weakly suggesting that Russell did in fact 
confront Peterka, and for unreasonably denigrating the importance and 
 
 
- 20 - 
persuasiveness of his closing argument by emphasizing that he is Peterka's 
advocate and is supposed to believe Peterka's statement. 
The trial court denied this claim, finding that the "record conclusively 
demonstrates that trial counsel argued a coherent theory of self-defense, which as 
testified to by trial counsel during the evidentiary hearing was the theory that the 
defense was relying on in the trial."  Although the trial court's order does not 
specifically address Peterka's alleged instances of ineffective assistance, we affirm 
the denial of relief on this claim because Peterka has failed to establish that the 
alleged errors constitute deficient performance. 
First, Peterka's arguments that Loveless (1) failed to take advantage of the 
physical evidence, thereby conceding the State's theory, (2) improperly bolstered 
the State's evidence that Russell had a reputation for peacefulness, and (3) only 
weakly suggested that Russell did confront Peterka, are reiterations of the same 
issues raised in his previous claims of ineffective assistance.  Having concluded 
that these claims are without merit, we further conclude that counsel's closing 
argument on these issues does not constitute deficient performance.  See Brown, 
846 So. 2d at 1126 (summarily disposing of claims that counsel was ineffective 
during closing argument where the claims were "repeats . . . of the same issues 
already raised, only this time based on ineffective assistance of counsel in closing 
argument"). 
 
 
- 21 - 
Second, Peterka has not established that Loveless failed to function as 
effective counsel by stating in his closing argument that, as Peterka's advocate, he 
is supposed to believe Peterka's version of events.  Cf. Clark v. State, 690 So. 2d 
1280, 1283 (Fla. 1997) ("[C]ounsel failed to function reasonably as . . . effective 
counsel when he indicated his own doubts or distaste for the case and when he 
attacked Clark's character and emphasized the seriousness of the crime.").  Peterka 
points to the following portion of Loveless's argument to support his claim: 
Throughout the preparation for this trial we are depending on the 
testimony or statements of a particular witness to determine what the 
facts are to determine strategy at trial.  Dan has said all along, 
describe[d] what happened.  In preparing for it, I am Dan's advocate.  
I am supposed to believe him.  That's my job.  Even if I didn't want to, 
that's my job.  I am going to do that. 
However, directly after making the above statement, Loveless continued:
 
Even in those situations, occasionally even a defense attorney has a 
problem, particularly in a situation like how do you rectify an angle of 
a bullet from what your client told you or his basic statement that he 
made on video tape with what the doctor tells me?  You get in court 
and all of here sudden you find out it's true. 
Thus, when read in context it is apparent that Loveless was emphasizing that he 
believed Peterka's version of events despite the medical examiner's deposition 
testimony regarding the angle of the bullet and that his belief turned out to be well 
founded in light of the medical examiner's changed opinion on this issue at trial.  
Thus, Loveless's performance during his closing argument was not deficient and 
the trial court did not err in denying Peterka relief on this claim. 
 
 
- 22 - 
In his last claim of ineffective assistance during the guilt phase, Peterka 
argues that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the following 
comment made by the prosecutor during closing: 
I've got a lot of points.  There is not just one point.  I've told you all of 
them.  I've done everything I can do.  I've showed you all of the 
evidence that I can bring in here to you.  It proves Dan Peterka is 
guilty beyond any reasonable doubt.  The evidence casts away any 
reasonable doubt. 
(Emphasis supplied.)  Peterka asserts that this comment implied that there was 
evidence of Peterka's guilt that was not presented to the jury.  The trial court 
denied Peterka's claim, finding that the prosecutor's closing argument was a fair 
comment on the evidence and that even if counsel's performance had been 
deficient, no prejudice resulted due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt 
presented.  We agree. 
Although it is improper for the prosecutor to imply that there is additional 
evidence of a defendant's guilt that was not presented during trial, see Ruiz v. 
State, 743 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1999), the prosecutor did not make such an implication 
in this case.  Contrary to Peterka's characterization of the comment, we conclude 
that the prosecutor was merely stating that he had presented the jury with all of the 
State's evidence, which he believed proved first-degree premeditated murder.  Cf. 
Stewart v. State, 622 So. 2d 51, 56 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (holding that the 
prosecutor's comment that "during the next phase we'll get into more of the proof, 
 
 
- 23 - 
the discussion of why he actually did it" was improper and prejudicial because it 
clearly suggested that the State had additional evidence that it had not provided the 
jury).  Thus, trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to object and the trial 
court did not err in denying relief on this claim. 
B.  Right to Testify 
In Peterka's second issue on appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in 
denying his claim that Loveless was ineffective for failing to advise him of his 
right to testify during the guilt phase.  In denying this claim, the trial court found 
Loveless credible when he testified that he and Peterka discussed Peterka's right to 
testify at trial, and rejected Peterka's assertion in his postconviction motion that he 
was not advised of this right. 
Loveless testified that he always discusses the right to testify with a 
defendant and that he advised Peterka not to testify because Peterka's version of 
events were being introduced by his videotaped statement.  Peterka did not testify 
at the evidentiary hearing and has not produced any evidence to contradict or 
otherwise undermine the credibility of Loveless's testimony.  Therefore, Peterka's 
claim that Loveless was ineffective for not informing him of his right to testify 
during the guilt phase is contrary to the evidence presented on the issue.  Further, 
to the extent Peterka relies on the fact that there is no on-the-record waiver of his 
right to testify to support his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court 
 
 
- 24 - 
has rejected the argument that an on-the-record waiver is required.  See Davis v. 
State, 875 So. 2d 359, 368-69 (Fla. 2003); Lawrence v. State, 831 So. 2d 121, 132 
(Fla. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 926 (2003).  Accordingly, we affirm the trial 
court's denial of relief on this claim. 
C. Penalty Phase 
Peterka next argues that the trial court erred in denying five claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase.  In his first three claims, 
Peterka asserts that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate and 
present mitigating evidence of (1) Peterka's military service, including 
commendations received, (2) Peterka's good behavior during pretrial detention, and 
(3) Peterka's relationships with family members, good, helpful nature, and 
nonviolent past.  We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Peterka 
relief on these three claims. 
When evaluating claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to present 
mitigating evidence, the defendant has the burden of showing that counsel's 
ineffectiveness "deprived the defendant of a reliable penalty phase proceeding."  
Asay v. State, 769 So. 2d 974, 985 (Fla. 2000).  However, this Court has 
recognized that "the obligation to investigate and prepare for the penalty portion of 
a capital case cannot be overstated."  State v. Lewis, 838 So. 2d 1102, 1113 (Fla. 
2002).  "[A]n attorney has a strict duty to conduct a reasonable investigation of a 
 
 
- 25 - 
defendant's background for possible mitigating evidence."  Ragsdale v. State, 798 
So. 2d 713, 716 (Fla. 2001) (quoting State v. Riechmann, 777 So. 2d 342, 350 (Fla. 
2000)) (alteration in original). 
The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the importance of a 
thorough investigation by defense counsel into mitigating factors in Wiggins v. 
Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003): 
[The] principal concern in deciding whether [counsel] exercised 
"reasonable professional judgmen[t]" is not whether counsel should 
have presented a mitigation case.  Rather, [the] focus [is] on whether 
the investigation supporting counsel's decision not to introduce 
mitigating evidence of Wiggins' background was itself reasonable.  In 
assessing counsel's investigation, [the Court] must conduct an 
objective review of their performance, measured for "reasonableness 
under prevailing professional norms," which includes a 
context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen 
"from counsel's perspective at the time," [Strickland], at 689 ("[E]very 
effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight"). 
539 U.S. at 522-23 (some citations omitted).  The Court in Wiggins noted that 
efforts should be made to discover available mitigating evidence and evidence to 
rebut any aggravating evidence from such sources as "medical history, educational 
history, employment and training history, family and social history, prior adult and 
juvenile correctional experience, and religious and cultural influence."  Id. at 223 
(citing ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death 
Penalty Cases 11.8.6, at 133 (1989)). 
 
 
- 26 - 
In denying Peterka's claim that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to 
investigate and present evidence of his military background, the trial court found 
that Assistant Public Defender Harlee, who was responsible for the presentation of 
the penalty phase defense at trial, made a reasoned tactical decision not to present 
Peterka's military background and that Peterka was not prejudiced by the omission 
of this evidence in light of the aggravating and mitigating factors that were 
presented during the penalty phase.  We agree. 
Although Peterka testified at the evidentiary hearing that he was never asked 
about his military record, Harlee testified that he believed he had been apprised of 
Peterka's military service, and both Loveless and Investigator Graham testified that 
they knew Peterka had military experience.  Moreover, both Graham and Loveless 
testified that the penalty phase form used by the Public Defender's Office in the 
regular course of business in 1989 had a space for military background.  Thus, 
there is competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that trial 
counsel asked Peterka about and was aware of Peterka's military history. 
There is also competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court's 
finding that trial counsel made a reasoned tactical decision not to present this 
evidence in mitigation.  Harlee testified that in this case there was a "negative" side 
to the military service mitigation because Peterka's illegal conduct led to his 
discharge from the National Guard.  Harlee believed that because the trial was 
 
 
- 27 - 
being held in "a very heavy military area," Peterka's conduct could be viewed as 
"besmirching the name of the military."  Fearing that the prosecutor would "come 
back and destroy" it if Peterka's military service was highlighted, Harlee decided 
not to pursue this mitigation.  Thus, Harlee's tactical decision not to focus on 
Peterka's military service as a mitigating circumstance was not deficient 
performance. 
However, even if Harlee's performance could be considered deficient, we 
conclude that Peterka has failed to established prejudice.  Military service is not 
strong mitigation, especially when weighed against the CCP, avoid arrest, and 
under sentence of imprisonment aggravators.  We conclude that Peterka has failed 
to establish that he has been deprived of a reliable penalty phase. 
The trial court also denied Peterka's claim that trial counsel were ineffective 
for failing to present mitigating evidence of Peterka's good behavior in jail and his 
refusal to participate in an escape.  Without deciding whether counsel's 
performance was deficient in this regard, we conclude that Peterka has failed to 
establish the prejudice prong of Strickland.  See Waterhouse v. State, 792 So. 2d 
1176, 1182 (Fla. 2001) ("[W]hen a defendant fails to make a showing as to one 
prong, it is not necessary to delve into whether he has made a showing as to the 
other prong.").  In light of the three valid aggravating circumstances found by the 
trial court, this additional good behavior mitigation, even considered with the 
 
 
- 28 - 
mitigation that Peterka had no significant criminal history, does not undermine our 
confidence in the outcome in this case.  Thus, the trial court did not err in denying 
this claim. 
We also conclude that there is no error in the trial court's denial of Peterka's 
claim that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to present evidence of his 
relationships with his family, his good, helpful nature, and his nonviolent past.  In 
denying this claim, the trial court found that 
the jury was presented all the evidence that the Defendant asserts his 
counsel failed to present and the evidence was presented in an 
effective manner.  The Defendant has not established that his trial 
counsel's performance was deficient nor has he established that the 
outcome of the penalty phase would have been different. 
The record supports the trial court's finding that much of the evidence 
presented at the evidentiary hearing was cumulative to the evidence presented by 
counsel at trial.  Further, Peterka's father was unable to testify at trial because he 
was having symptoms of a heart attack during that time and Peterka's mother 
testified at the evidentiary hearing that she would not have wanted Peterka's 
siblings exposed to the trial because of their ages at that time.  Thus, trial counsel 
were not ineffective for failing to have these witnesses testify. 
In his next claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty 
phase, Peterka asserts that Harlee was ineffective for failing to prevent the State 
from eliciting testimony about Peterka's juvenile record from Peterka's mother on 
 
 
- 29 - 
cross-examination.  During direct examination, Peterka's mother testified that 
Peterka was close to his family, helped other people and had "good" to give and 
share.  On cross-examination, the State questioned Peterka's mother about whether 
Peterka was arrested multiple times for burglary when he was a teenager and 
adjudicated delinquent.  In response to the trial court's inquiry at sidebar, the State 
admitted not having certified copies of convictions of the juvenile offenses but 
indicated that Peterka's adult records included a determination that he had been 
adjudicated delinquent.  The trial court overruled Harlee's objection to this line of 
questioning, finding that Peterka had opened the door to questions about his 
juvenile record by placing his character at issue through his mother's testimony that 
he was a loving, caring child. 
The postconviction trial court denied Peterka's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, finding that Peterka raised this issue on direct appeal and "[w]hile 
the Florida Supreme Court held that the issue had not been preserved for appeal, it 
went on to hold that the trial court had committed error in allowing the state's 
cross-examination, [but] the error was harmless."  As the postconviction court 
noted, on direct appeal, this Court found the error to be harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See Peterka, 640 So. 2d at 70 ("Although the record does not 
support the trial court's ruling that defense counsel opened the door for the State to 
offer rebuttal evidence of Peterka's character, the error was harmless.").  Thus, 
 
 
- 30 - 
Peterka cannot establish prejudice.  See Vining v. State, 827 So. 2d 201, 214 (Fla. 
2002) (concluding that the defendant could not establish prejudice from trial 
counsel's failure to object to the CCP instruction where the Court held that the trial 
court's error in finding CCP was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).   
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of relief on this claim. 
In Peterka's final claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the 
penalty phase, he asserts that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge 
or minimize the aggravating circumstances argued by the State.  With respect to 
Peterka's contention that trial counsel should have objected to the applicability of 
the aggravating circumstances or to the specific instructions given, the trial court 
found this claim procedurally barred because it was or should have been raised on 
direct appeal.  We agree. 
Peterka challenged the applicability of the aggravating circumstances on 
direct appeal.  See Peterka, 640 So. 2d at 70-71.  This Court concluded that the 
evidence supported the trial court's finding that Peterka committed the murder to 
avoid lawful arrest, while under a sentence of imprisonment, and in a cold, 
calculated, and premeditated manner without pretense of moral or legal 
justification.  See id. at 71.  However, we also concluded that the trial court erred 
in finding the "hinder law enforcement" and "pecuniary gain" aggravating 
circumstances.  See id.  Peterka cannot seek a second appeal of theses issues by 
 
 
- 31 - 
couching them as ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  See, e.g., Schwab v. 
State, 814 So. 2d 402, 413 (Fla. 2002). 
As to Peterka's claim that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to present 
evidence to minimize the aggravating circumstances, the only specific evidence 
Peterka argues that trial counsel should have presented to rebut the aggravating 
circumstances was that Peterka did not escape from jail but rather failed to report 
to jail.  However, contrary to Peterka's allegation, this evidence was put before 
both the trial judge and the jury when Cindy Rush testified that she tried to 
convince Peterka to report to prison to serve his sentence but that he was scared 
and wanted to go somewhere to reestablish himself.  Thus, counsel's performance 
was not deficient in this regard and the trial court did not err in denying this claim. 
D. Voir Dire 
In Peterka's final ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he argues that 
Loveless was ineffective during voir dire for (1) failing to challenge several jurors 
for cause, (2) failing to question the prospective jurors about their knowledge of 
firearms, opinions regarding Peterka's reasons for fleeing Nebraska, and 
understanding of reasonable doubt, and (3) failing to object when the trial court 
provided two jurors with improper definitions of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances.  With regard to challenging jurors for cause, we have explained that 
[t]he test for determining juror competency is whether the juror 
can set aside any bias or prejudice and render a verdict solely on the 
 
 
- 32 - 
evidence presented and the instructions on the law given by the court.  
A juror must be excused for cause if any reasonable doubt exists as to 
whether the juror possesses an impartial state of mind. . . .  In a death 
penalty case, a juror is only unqualified based on his or her views on 
capital punishment, if he or she expresses an unyielding conviction 
and rigidity toward the death penalty. 
Barnhill v. State, 834 So. 2d 836, 844 (Fla. 2002) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 
539 U.S. 917 (2003).  After having reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court's 
denial of relief on this claim.  None of the jurors Peterka argues trial counsel 
should have challenged for cause either indicated that they could not set aside any 
bias or prejudice and render a verdict solely on the evidence presented and the 
instructions on the law given by the court, or expressed an unyielding conviction 
and rigidity toward the death penalty.  Thus, Loveless's failure to challenge these 
jurors for cause was not deficient performance. 
As to Peterka's claim that trial counsel failed to question the prospective 
jurors about their knowledge of firearms, their views regarding Peterka's reasons 
for fleeing Nebraska, and their understanding of reasonable doubt, the trial court 
denied these claims, stating: 
In Claims C(1)(i) and (k), the Defendant alleges that trial counsel 
failed to question prospective jurors about their understanding of 
intent, premeditation, and their attitudes toward the factual 
circumstances of the case, as well as, failed to inquire as to their 
understanding of burden of proof and reasonable doubt.  Defendant's 
trial counsel made a tactical decision as to how to best conduct voir 
dire in this case and was not ineffective in his voir dire examination. 
As to Claim C(1)(j), the Defendant alleges deficient 
performance of trial counsel for failing to inquire into the prospective 
 
 
- 33 - 
jurors' opinions about Mr. Peterka's motive for fleeing Nebraska.  
Again, trial counsel was not deficient in his performance.  The 
Defendant's trial counsel made a reasoned tactical decision not to 
inquire about the prospective jurors' opinions regarding the 
Defendant's motive for fleeing Nebraska for the reason that there were 
motions in limine pending to keep this information out of evidence; 
thus, trial counsel did not want to bring it to the attention of the jurors. 
The trial court's findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence. 
Although Assistant Public Defender Loveless testified at the evidentiary 
hearing that he did not have an independent recollection of the voir dire 
proceedings in this case, he believed that he did not extensively question jurors 
about reasonable doubt because the State usually covered this area and he would 
only try to clarify issues if he felt it was necessary.  A review of the voir dire 
proceedings in this case supports Loveless's testimony.  The prosecutor 
consistently asked potential jurors about the State's burden of proof being 
reasonable doubt. 
With respect to Peterka's reason for leaving Nebraska, Loveless testified that 
he did not question jurors about this issue because there were a number of pending 
motions in limine to keep this information out of the trial.  As to the issue of 
firearms, Loveless testified that he probably did not question jurors about this issue 
because he felt that jurors who own firearms are the type that would agree with a 
self-defense theory but jurors who do not own firearms would be better penalty 
phase jurors.  Thus, Loveless felt that he broke even with regard to the issue of 
 
 
- 34 - 
firearm ownership.  Based on the record and postconviction testimony, we 
conclude that the trial court correctly found these decisions to be reasoned tactical 
decisions and not deficient performance. 
Lastly, Peterka contends that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to 
object when the trial court provided two jurors with improper definitions of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  The trial court found that 
[a]gain, the record conclusively demonstrates that the Defendant is 
entitled to no relief on this claim.  The prosecutor told juror King that 
the Court would instruct the jury as to what things could be 
considered as an aggravating circumstance and she indicated that she 
would follow the law.  Moreover, the trial court did properly instruct 
the jury during the penalty phase. 
Claim C(1)(g) alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for 
failing to challenge juror Martin for cause is conclusively refuted by 
the record.  The prosecutor explained to Juror Martin that the judge 
would give a list of what aggravating circumstances existed in this 
case and she stated that she understood and could follow the law. 
The trial court's findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence in the 
record.  Further, even if Loveless's performance could be considered deficient for 
failing to clarify the definitions of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 
Peterka cannot establish prejudice because the jury was properly instructed during 
the penalty phase on the specific aggravating circumstances they could consider.  
Thus, we also affirm the trial court's denial of relief on this claim. 
II.  Evidentiary Rulings during the Evidentiary Hearing 
 
 
- 35 - 
In Peterka's fifth issue on appeal he asserts that he was denied due process 
during the evidentiary hearing when the trial court improperly limited the 
testimony of his mother and brother.  This Court addressed a similar claim in Asay, 
in which the defendant asserted that the trial court erred in limiting the testimony 
of some of his siblings concerning mitigation evidence not presented during the 
penalty phase.  See 769 So. 2d at 981.  Noting that "trial courts have wide latitude 
to regulate proceedings before them in order that the administration of justice be 
speedily and fairly achieved in an orderly, dignified manner," we held that the trial 
court had not abused its discretion in limiting this testimony.  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  In this case, we similarly conclude that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in limiting the testimony of Peterka's mother and 
brother. 
With respect to Peterka's mother, the trial court did not prohibit Peterka from 
presenting testimony that was not presented at trial.  Rather, the trial court 
expressed its opinion that the testimony regarding Peterka's relationship with his 
family and responsibilities while growing up appeared to be cumulative to what 
was presented at trial.  Postconviction counsel agreed to move on and Mrs. Peterka 
was permitted to testify that trial counsel did not ask her about specific instances of 
Peterka's conduct over his life and did not give her instructions or advice on how to 
testify.  Mrs. Peterka also testified about some of the responsibilities Peterka was 
 
 
- 36 - 
given with regard to his younger siblings and that Peterka had never been violent 
growing up.  Moreover, the trial court held the prosecutor to the same standard on 
cross-examination, suggesting that he move on when he began questioning Mrs. 
Peterka about things she testified to at trial. 
With respect to Peterka's brother, the State objected to his testimony about 
the meaning of the Minnesota National Guard commendation Peterka received.  
The trial court found that Peterka's brother, who was a sergeant in the Marine 
Corps, was not an expert in Minnesota National Guard commendations and, 
therefore, could not testify about their significance.  The trial court further found 
that the document, which was admitted into evidence, spoke for itself.  After 
reviewing the trial and postconviction record, we conclude that Peterka has failed 
to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting the testimony of 
either his mother or brother. 
III.  Ineffective Assistance of Postconviction Counsel 
In his final issue on appeal, Peterka argues that he was denied due process 
during his postconviction proceedings because of postconviction counsel's failure 
to both present sufficient evidence to support the claims raised and raise other 
meritorious claims.  To the extent that Peterka asserts a claim of ineffective 
assistance of postconviction counsel, we have held that this is not a valid basis for 
relief.  See King v. State, 808 So. 2d 1237, 1245 (Fla. 2002) (stating that the claim 
 
 
- 37 - 
that initial postconviction counsel was ineffective did not state a valid basis for 
relief).  We further conclude that Peterka has not established in this case that the 
alleged errors of prior postconviction counsel rise to the level of a constitutional 
due process violation.  Accordingly, we deny this claim for relief. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Peterka raises seven claims of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  Peterka also asserts that he is entitled 
to relief under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona,  536 
U.S. 584 (2002).  We address each of these issues separately below. 
I. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
"The criteria for proving ineffective assistance of appellate counsel parallel 
the Strickland standard for ineffective trial counsel."  Wilson v. Wainwright, 474 
So. 2d 1162, 1163 (Fla. 1985); see also Valle v. Moore, 837 So. 2d 905, 907 (Fla. 
2002).  Thus, the Court must consider 
first, whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to 
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably 
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, 
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the 
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the 
correctness of the result. 
Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So. 2d 1009, 1027 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Suarez v. 
Dugger, 527 So. 2d 190, 192-93 (Fla. 1988)).  In Valle, we explained that 
 
 
- 38 - 
appellate counsel cannot be considered ineffective under this standard 
for failing to raise issues that were not properly raised during the trial 
court proceedings and do not present a question of fundamental error. 
See Rutherford, 774 So. 2d at 643. The same is true for claims without 
merit because appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for 
failing to raise nonmeritorious claims on appeal.  See id.  In fact, 
appellate counsel is not necessarily ineffective for failing to raise a 
claim that might have had some possibility of success; effective 
appellate counsel need not raise every conceivable nonfrivolous issue. 
See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-53 (1983) (appellate counsel 
not required to argue all nonfrivolous issues, even at request of client); 
Provenzano v. Dugger, 561 So. 2d 541, 549 (Fla. 1990) (noting that 
"it is well established that counsel need not raise every nonfrivolous 
issue revealed by the record").  Finally, a claim that has been resolved 
in a previous review of the case is barred as "the law of the case."  See 
Mills v. State, 603 So. 2d 482, 486 (Fla. 1992). 
837 So. 2d at 907-08 (parallel citations omitted).  It is within this legal framework 
that we analyze Peterka's claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
A.  Motion to Suppress 
Peterka first asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 
a claim that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence seized 
from Peterka's residence as a result of a warrantless search directly after his arrest 
in the early morning hours of July 14, 1989, and in a subsequent warrantless search 
on the afternoon of July 14.  This Court has explained the proper analysis to apply 
when appellate counsel fails to raise an issue that was properly preserved by 
objection at trial: 
With regard to evidentiary objections which trial counsel made 
during the trial and which appellate counsel did not raise on direct 
appeal, this Court evaluates the prejudice or second prong of the 
 
 
- 39 - 
Strickland test first.  In doing so, we begin our review of the prejudice 
prong by examining the specific objection made by trial counsel for 
harmful error.  A successful petition must demonstrate that the 
erroneous ruling prejudiced the petitioner.  If we conclude that the 
trial court's ruling was not erroneous, then it naturally follows that 
habeas petitioner was not prejudiced on account of appellate counsel's 
failure to raise that issue.  If we do conclude that the trial court's 
evidentiary ruling was erroneous, we then consider whether such error 
is harmful error.  If that error was harmless, the petitioner likewise 
would not have been prejudiced. 
Jones v. Moore, 794 So. 2d 579, 583-84 (Fla. 2001).  Because we conclude that the 
trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, we deny Peterka's 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. 
Although warrantless searches and seizures are generally prohibited by the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the 
Florida Constitution, police may conduct a search without a warrant if consent is 
given or if the individual has abandoned his or her interest in the property in 
question.  See Jorgenson v. State, 714 So. 2d 423, 426 (Fla. 1998) (stating that 
although a "warrantless search is per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, . . . [such] a search will be considered lawful if conducted pursuant to 
consent which was given freely and voluntarily"); Jones v. State, 648 So. 2d 669, 
675 (Fla. 1994) (holding that search and seizure of defendant's clothes violated the 
Fourth Amendment where the defendant did not voluntarily abandon his clothes); 
Maxwell v. State, 443 So. 2d 967, 969 (Fla. 1983) (holding that suitcase seized 
from a bus did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights when the 
 
 
- 40 - 
defendant did not claim the suitcase and thus abandoned "all possessory interests 
and expectations of privacy in the suitcase").  In this case, the trial court denied 
Peterka's motion to suppress, finding that Peterka consented to the search 
conducted immediately following his arrest and that Peterka had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the residence at the time of the second search on the 
afternoon of July 14 because he had abandoned the premises.  Both of these 
findings are supported by the record.  The trial court did not err in denying the 
motion to suppress. 
Because the trial court did not err in denying Peterka's motion to suppress, 
Peterka was not prejudiced by appellate counsel's failure to raise this issue on 
direct appeal.  Accordingly, we deny this claim for relief. 
B.  Improper Prosecutorial Comments 
Peterka next claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 
several instances of alleged improper prosecutorial comments during closing 
argument even though no objection was raised at trial.  Generally, appellate 
counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise claims which were not preserved.  
See, e.g., Johnson v. Singletary, 695 So. 2d 263, 266 (Fla.1996) ("[A]ppellate 
counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise claims which were not preserved 
due to trial counsel's failure to object."); Ferguson v. Singletary, 632 So. 2d 53, 58 
(Fla. 1993) (finding appellate counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise 
 
 
- 41 - 
allegedly improper comments by the prosecutor which were not preserved for 
appeal by objection).  One exception to this general rule is where the unobjected to 
comments rise to the level of fundamental error.  See Owen v. Crosby, 854 So. 2d 
182 (Fla. 2003).  Fundamental error is error that reaches "down into the validity of 
the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained 
without the assistance of the alleged error."  Spencer v. State, 842 So. 2d 52, 74 
(Fla. 2003) (quoting Brown v. State, 124 So. 2d 481, 484 (Fla. 1960)).  In order for 
improper comments made in the closing argument of a penalty phase to constitute 
fundamental error, they "must be so prejudicial as to taint the jury's recommended 
sentence."  Fennie v. State, 855 So. 2d 597, 609 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Thomas v. 
State, 748 So. 2d 970, 985 n.10 (1999)).  We have reviewed the numerous 
prosecutorial comments that Peterka asserts were improper and conclude that none 
rise to the level of fundamental error.  We therefore deny Peterka's claim that 
appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to raise these 
issues on appeal. 
C.  Admission of Crime Scene Photograph and the Victim's Skull 
In Peterka's third claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, he 
contends that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise as error the 
admission of a gruesome, prejudicial crime-scene photograph and the admission of 
the victim's skull.  Because we conclude that these issues are without merit, 
 
 
- 42 - 
Peterka cannot establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to raise these 
issues on direct appeal. 
D.  Victim's Reputation for Peacefulness 
Peterka next asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 
as error the admission of evidence of Russell's reputation for peacefulness.  Three 
witnesses, Kevin Trently, Deborah Trently, and Gary Johnson, testified at trial that 
Russell had a reputation for peacefulness.  Trial counsel objected each time the 
State attempted to elicit this testimony.  We conclude that the trial court erred in 
allowing evidence of Russell's reputation for peacefulness to be presented to the 
jury.  However, we further conclude that this error was harmless and, therefore, 
that Peterka was not prejudiced by appellate counsel's failure to raise this issue on 
direct appeal.  See Jones, 794 So. 2d at 584. 
The admissibility of character evidence is governed by section 90.404, 
Florida Statutes (2003).  Section 90.404(1)(b)(2) provides that evidence of a 
victim's character trait of peacefulness is admissible when "offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the 
aggressor."  In this case, the State elicited the testimony regarding Russell's 
reputation for peacefulness prior to its presentation of Peterka's statement that 
Russell initiated a physical confrontation.  Thus, this evidence could not have been 
used to rebut evidence that Russell was the aggressor.  Cf. Taylor v. State, 855 So. 
 
 
- 43 - 
2d 1, 20 n.21 (Fla. 2003) ("[A] victim-declarant's statements cannot be admitted 
during the State's case-in-chief to rebut evidence or testimony that has not been 
introduced by the defense."), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1605 (2004). 
Further, Peterka's taped statement was introduced by the State, not by 
Peterka.  In Stoll v. State, 762 So. 2d 870, 875 (Fla. 2000), we rejected the State's 
argument that a witness's testimony as to the victim's state of mind was relevant to 
rebut the defendant's taped statements introduced by the State in its case-in-chief.  
We held that the "State may not introduce rebuttal evidence to explain or contradict 
evidence that the State itself offered."  Id.  We recognize that Stoll had not been 
decided at the time that Peterka's direct appeal was filed in 1990.  However, the 
citation in Stoll to the Fourth District's 1988 decision in Brown v. State, 524 So. 2d 
730, 731 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), indicates that this argument was one that appellate 
counsel should have been aware of at that time. 
Nevertheless, we do not decide whether this oversight renders counsel's 
performance deficient because we conclude that there was no prejudice.  During its 
case-in-chief, the State also presented evidence that Russell did not intend to 
confront Peterka about the stolen money order because he was afraid of Peterka's 
gun and that Russell intended to let the police handle the matter.  Appellate counsel 
raised the admission of this evidence as error on direct appeal but this Court held 
that there was no error in admitting this testimony.  See Peterka, 640 So. 2d at 69.  
 
 
- 44 - 
Because the admissible evidence that Russell stated he was not going to confront 
Peterka is much stronger evidence that Russell did not initiate the altercation with 
Peterka than the evidence of Russell's reputation for peacefulness, the erroneous 
admission of Russell's reputation for peacefulness was harmless.  Thus, Peterka 
cannot establish prejudice and is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
E.  Aggravating Circumstances 
In his fifth ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, Peterka asserts 
that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise several issues regarding 
the aggravating circumstances instructed on and found by the trial court.  Peterka 
first argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assert that the trial 
judge misinformed jurors during voir dire about the nature of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances.  However, trial counsel did not object to the trial court's 
comments.  Thus, this issue was not preserved for review.  Further, in light of our 
conclusion that trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to object to the trial 
court's characterization of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, we conclude 
that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal as 
fundamental error. 
Peterka next argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 
the improper consideration by the jury and the trial judge of both the "avoid lawful 
arrest" and "hinder a governmental function" aggravators.  However, appellate 
 
 
- 45 - 
counsel did argue on appeal that the trial court erred in finding both of these 
aggravating circumstances.  This Court agreed that this constituted an 
impermissible doubling but found the error to be harmless.  See Peterka, 640 So. 
2d at 71-72.  Thus, Peterka's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim on 
this issue is without merit. 
Lastly, Peterka asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise the issue that the jury instructions on the avoid arrest, pecuniary gain, and 
CCP aggravators were unconstitutionally vague.  Although trial counsel objected 
to the applicability of the avoid arrest and pecuniary gain aggravators, trial counsel 
did not object to the instructions on these aggravators as unconstitutionally vague.  
As to CCP, trial counsel did file a motion objecting to the CCP aggravator on 
vagueness grounds but trial counsel did not renew the objection at the penalty 
phase charge conference or specifically object to the language of the jury 
instruction submitted by the State. 
In Pace v. State, 854 So. 2d 167, 180-81 (Fla. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 
1155 (2004), we rejected a similar claim of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel.  In concluding that Pace's appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing 
to challenge the CCP instruction as unconstitutionally vague, we noted that the 
issue was not properly preserved for review, that Pace did not assert that the 
erroneous CCP instruction was fundamental error, and that this Court had 
 
 
- 46 - 
previously held that vagueness challenges to the CCP instruction "are procedurally 
barred unless '[t]he objection at trial [attacks] the instruction itself, either by 
submitting a limiting instruction or making an objection to the instruction as 
worded.'"  Id. at 181 (quoting Pope v. State, 702 So. 2d 221, 223-24 (Fla. 1997)) 
(alterations in original).  These same circumstances are present in Peterka's case.  
Accordingly, we deny Peterka relief on this claim. 
F.  Hearsay Evidence 
In his last two claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Peterka 
asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately present his 
claims that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence that Peterka was 
considered "armed and dangerous" and that Russell was afraid of Peterka's gun.  
Peterka admits that these issues were raised on direct appeal but asks the Court to 
reconsider them.  In Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 645 (Fla. 2000), we 
held that "if an issue was actually raised on direct appeal, the Court will not 
consider a claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 
additional arguments in support of the claim on appeal."  Accordingly, we decline 
to address these issues. 
II.  Ring v. Arizona 
In his final habeas claim, Peterka asserts that the United States Supreme 
Court decision in Ring renders Florida's capital sentencing statute, section 921.141, 
 
 
- 47 - 
Florida Statutes (2003), unconstitutional.  In Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 
(Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1070 (2002), and King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 
(Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1069 (2002), this Court denied relief under Ring.  
Subsequently, this Court has rejected postconviction challenges to section 921.141 
that relied on Ring.  See, e.g., Wright v. State, 857 So. 2d 861, 877-78 (Fla. 2003); 
Jones v. State, 855 So. 2d 611, 619 (Fla. 2003); Chandler v. State, 848 So. 2d 
1031, 1034 n.4 (Fla. 2003).  Moreover, we note that Peterka stipulated that he was 
under a sentence of imprisonment when the murder occurred, thereby relieving the 
State of its burden of proof with regard to this aggravating circumstance.  Cf.  
Brown v. State, 719 So. 2d 882, 889 (Fla. 1998) ("[T]he defendant's stipulation of 
convicted felon status satisfies the prosecution's burden of proof for that element of 
the crime."); Agan v. State, 503 So. 2d 1254, 1256 (Fla. 1987) (indicating that the 
defendant's stipulation to aggravating circumstances relieved the State of its burden 
of proof).  Thus, we deny this claim for relief. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed, we affirm the trial court's denial of Peterka's 
motion for postconviction relief and deny Peterka's petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. 
It is so ordered. 
 
 
 
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PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in result only. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Okaloosa County, 
G. Robert Barron, Judge - Case No. 89-966C 
and an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Linda McDermott, Assistant Capital Collateral Counsel, Northern Region, 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant 
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent