Case Title: Four Nines Gold, Inc. v. 71 Const., Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-04-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Four Nines Gold, Inc. v. 71 Const., Inc.1991 WY 49809 P.2d 236Case Number: 90-227Decided: 04/12/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
FOUR 
NINES GOLD, INC., a Colorado corporation registered to do business in 
Wyoming, 
Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

71 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Wyoming corporation, Appellee 
(Defendant)

Appeal from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty, the Honorable Dan Spangler, 
Judge.

Thomas 
A. Fasse of Miller and Fasse, Riverton, for appellant.

Thomas 
F. Reese of Brown & Drew, Casper, for appellee.

Before Urbigkit, C.J., and Thomas, Cardine, 
Macy and Golden, JJ. Urbigkit, C.J., filed a dissenting 
opinion.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

 [¶1.]     Four Nines Gold, Inc. 
(Four Nines) brought this action against 71 Construction, Inc. to recover 
damages for wrongful interference with contractual relationship, for breach of 
contract, and for breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial 
court granted summary judgment in favor of 71 Construction, 
Inc.

 [¶2.]     Four Nines brings this 
appeal presenting the following issues:

"1. 
Did the court err in ruling that there was no genuine issue of material fact in 
dismissing plaintiff/appellant's claim for intentional interference with a 
prospective contractual relationship and that the defendant/appellee was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law?

"2. 
Did the court err in ruling that there was no genuine issue of material fact in 
dismissing plaintiff/appellant's claim for breach of contract and that the 
defendant/appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law?

"3. 
Did the court err in ruling that there was no genuine issue of material fact in 
dismissing plaintiff/appellant's claim for breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, and that the defendant/appellee was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law?"

 [¶3.]     We 
affirm.

 [¶4.]     On July 12, 1989, the 
city of Riverton 
advertised for bids for a street construction project. The deadline for 
submitting bids was July 28, 1989, at 2 p.m. After reviewing the plans for the 
project, Bill DeLapp, president of Four Nines, contacted Steve Loftin, president 
of 71 Construction, informed Loftin that Four Nines would bid on the project as 
general contractor, and asked Loftin to supply a subcontractor bid for aggregate 
bituminous surfacing.

 [¶5.]     On the morning of July 
28th, Loftin submitted 71 Construction's subcontractor bid by telephone. 71 
Construction's bid totaled $ 88,316. Four Nines incorporated 71 Construction's 
bid into its bid which it submitted to the city of Riverton before the 2 p.m. 
deadline. That day, the city of Riverton engineer informed Four Nines that it 
had submitted the lowest bId.

 [¶6.]     The Riverton city 
council was scheduled to consider the bids on August 1. Before any action was 
taken on the bids, Loftin realized he had made a mistake on 71 Construction's 
bid. Loftin had neglected to include the cost of asphalt oil in computing the 
bid, which resulted in the bid being about $ 30,000 lower than it should have 
been. Loftin first attempted to contact Four Nines to alert the company to the 
problem. He was unsuccessful, so he called the project engineer, the city 
engineer, and the city attorney. The city engineer and attorney determined that, 
as a result of 71 Construction's error, a substantial material defect had been 
made in the bids. The city engineer sent a memorandum alerting the city council 
to the problem and recommending that all bids be rejected. The council rejected 
all bids. The bid information sheet provided that the city could reject any and 
all bids. Wyoming Statute 15-1-113(c) provides that a city can reject all bids 
for a public improvement contract if none serve the public interest. When the 
project was rebid, Four Nines was not the low bidder and did not receive the 
contract.

 [¶7.]     Four Nines filed suit 
against 71 Construction in the Ninth District Court in FremontCounty on December 29, 1989. The suit 
alleged that 71 Construction intentionally interfered with a prospective 
contractual relationship, breached a contract with Four Nines and breached an 
implied covenant of good faith and faith dealing. 71 Construction's answer was a 
general denial and objection to improper venue. Pursuant to stipulation between 
the parties, venue was moved to NatronaCounty. 71 Construction was granted 
summary judgment on August 6, 1990. The trial court held that 71 Construction 
was attempting to protect its own interest and, therefore, did nothing improper 
by informing the city of the mistake. The trial court held that 71 Construction 
did not breach a contract because it was not bound to perform a contract until 
the city accepted Four Nines' bid. It also held that 71 Construction did not 
violate a covenant of good faith and fair dealing because it did not act 
dishonestly.

 [¶8.]     Summary judgment is 
proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the prevailing 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56(c). We review a 
summary judgment in the same light as the district court, using the same 
materials and following the same standards. We examine the record from the 
vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that 
party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the 
record. Wagner v. First Wyoming Bank, 
N.A. Laramie, 784 P.2d 224, 226 (Wyo. 1989).

 [¶9.]     This court recognizes 
intentional interference with a prospective contractual relationship as a cause 
of action in tort. Martin v. Wing, 
667 P.2d 1159 (Wyo. 1983). In Martin, at 1162, we adopted Restatement, 
Second, Torts § 766B, which states:

"One 
who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's prospective 
contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is subject to liability to the 
other for the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of the 
relation, whether the interference consists of

"(a) 
inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or continue the 
prospective relation or

"(b) 
preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective 
relation."

 [¶10.]  Malice motivating the interference need 
not be shown. Toltec Watershed 
Improvement District v. Johnston, 717 P.2d 808, 814 (Wyo. 
1986). However, if the interference is not improper, a necessary element of  the tort is lacking. Allen v. Safeway Stores, 699 P.2d 277, 
280 (Wyo. 
1985). 71 Construction's interference in this case was not improper for two 
reasons.

 [¶11.]  First, truthful 
statements, whether solicited or volunteered, are not actionable as intentional 
interference with prospective contractual relations. Prazma v. Kaehne, 768 P.2d 586, 590 
(Wyo. 1989). 
See also Restatement, Second, Torts § 772(a) (1979), which 
states:

"One 
who intentionally causes a third person not to perform a contract or not to 
enter into a prospective contractual relation with another does not interfere 
improperly with the other's contractual relation, by giving the third 
person

"(a) 
truthful information * * *."

In 
its brief, Four Nines discusses the possible consequences had the city of 
Riverton 
accepted its bid. These possible consequences included binding 71 Construction 
to its low bid or having the city bear the added costs. Four Nines does not 
dispute that 71 Construction made an error in submitting its subcontractor bid. 
It does not allege that 71 Construction's report of the mistake nor the manner 
in which 71 Construction reported the mistake was untrue.

 [¶12.]  Second, interference 
is permitted when the actor interferes in good faith to protect an economic 
interest. Toltec, 717 P.2d  at 814. 
The interference must have been in good faith which requires a belief on the 
actor's part that "his interest may otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the 
performance of the contract or transaction." Toltec at 814, quoting Restatement, 
Second, Torts § 773. We can find no inference in the record to indicate that 71 
Construction did not act in good faith. 71  
Construction's economic interests motivated it to contact the city. The 
company stood to lose a substantial amount of money if it were to be bound by 
its bid. Before contacting the city, 71 Construction attempted to contact Four 
Nines to bring the error to the general contractor's attention. The city 
engineer's affidavit, filed by Four Nines in opposition to the motion for 
summary judgment, states that Loftin, 71 Construction's president, informed him 
that there had been lawsuits where subcontractors had made errors. Loftin states 
in his affidavit and deposition that he does not remember making such 
statements. However, for summary judgment purposes, we assume the statement was 
made and give Four Nines every favorable inference that flows 
therefrom.

 [¶13.]  That statement alone is not such bad 
faith as results in improper interference. The engineer explained in his 
affidavit that Loftin told him about the lawsuits to suggest that 71 
Construction may be entitled to some relief for its mistake. Loftin told the 
engineer that in some of these lawsuits either the subcontractor was let out of 
the contract or the owner was required to bear the increased costs. The 
engineer's affidavit does not state that Loftin threatened to bring a lawsuit 
against the city nor are we able to draw that inference. We can only conclude 
from the affidavit that the statement was one layman's attempt to explain his 
perception of the law in this area to another layman. Thus, the making of the 
statement does not negate the good faith showing necessary to justify the 
interference. Because the information furnished by 71 Construction to the city 
of Riverton was 
true, correct and furnished in good faith to protect its interest which might 
otherwise be impaired or destroyed, it was not improper.

 [¶14.]  In its second issue, Four Nines claims 71 
Construction breached its contract with Four Nines. Four Nines argues that a 
contract existed for 71 Construction to provide aggregate bituminous surfacing 
subject to a condition precedent of the award of the contract to Four Nines. We 
disagree.

 [¶15.]  The authority Four Nines cites to support 
this issue allows recovery under a theory of promissory estoppel, not breach of 
contract.  
Subcontractor bids can become irrevocable under this theory in absence of 
an enforceable contract. Drennan v. Star 
Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757, 759 (1958). Thus, a promise is 
enforceable under promissory estoppel without a valid contract if the injured 
party justifiably relied on the promise to his detriment. Id.; see Tremblay v. Reid, 700 P.2d 391, 
395 (Wyo. 
1985) and Restatement, Second, Contracts § 90(1) (1981). The cases upon which 
Four Nines relies allows recovery on this theory when the general contractor's 
bid is accepted. E.g., Drennan, and Mead Associates, Inc. v. Antonsen, 677 P.2d 434 (Colo.App. 1984). Four Nines' use of 71 Construction's bid in its bid 
to the city does not create a binding contract between the two. N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman 
Construction Co., 115 App. D.C. 335, 319 F.2d 736, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1963). See generally,  J. Sweet, Legal Aspects of Architecture, 
Engineering and the Construction Process § 32.02 (3rd ed. 1985). In this case, 
Four Nines' bid was never accepted by the city of Riverton. Therefore, there was no contract 
between any of the parties and no breach of contract. The trial court correctly 
granted summary judgment in 71 Construction's favor on this issue because no 
contract existed.

 [¶16.]  Four Nines' final issue asks whether 71 
Construction violated an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Its 
argument is dependant on the existence of a contract. Since no contract was 
formed between Four Nines and 71 Construction, we cannot say such a covenant 
existed in the dealing between the parties. This implied 
covenant does not deal with the formation of a contract. Restatement, Second, 
Contracts § 205, comment c (1981). Furthermore, as we stated in our discussion 
concerning the intentional interference allegation, 71 Construction's attempt to 
alert Four Nines and the city of Riverton to its mistake were acts undertaken in 
good faith.

 [¶17.]  Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, 
C.J., filed a dissenting opinion.

 
 
URBIGKIT, 
Chief Justice, dissenting.

I. 
INTRODUCTION

 [¶18.]  We create by this decision a new way for 
a subcontractor-bidder to escape from an inopportunely priced street 
construction bid. The way now paved 
is for the subcontractor to go to the owner to get the general contractor's bid 
cancelled -- no general contract and no subcontract responsibility to meet the 
terms of its bid. Lacking conviction that this "easy" way out is appropriate for 
the bidding subcontractor to default and still pass the transactional loss on to 
the general contractor, I respectfully dissent.

II. 
EVENTS ABOUT WHICH WE WRITE

 [¶19.]  This is the "good old boy" process of 
public contract management. The subcontractor, 71 Construction, Inc., claims to 
have underbid its asphalt supply paving subcontract supplied to the general 
contractor, appellant Four Nines Gold, Inc., for street utility work in the City 
of Riverton, Wyoming. After the bids were opened on July 28, 1989, it was 
determined that Four Nines was low and 71 Construction was advised of its 
successful subcontract bid and low price for street surfacing 
material.

 [¶20.]  On July 31, 71 Construction as 
subcontractor was informed by Four Nines that its bid was successful and would 
be given the subcontract in accord with the bid then accepted. A city council 
meeting was then scheduled for August 1, 1989 to provide for the formal contract 
award.

 [¶21.]  On the morning of August 1, 71 
Construction's president called the city engineer to relate that it had underbid 
its subcontract to Four Nines and wanted out. The admitted purpose of the call 
by 71 Construction to the city engineer was to secure a denial of Four Nines' 
bid so that 71 Construction could escape from its claimed mistake in bidding to 
supply 25,130 square yards of asphalt material at a price of $ 3.20 per square 
yard plus $ 7,900 mobilization expense reimbursement.1 n1 Lawsuits were mentioned by 71 
Construction in the telephone call with the city engineer as a justification or 
explanation why Four Nines' bid should not be accepted since 71 Construction had 
made a mistake and might choose to do an insufficient job.2

 [¶22.]  It worked. To avoid litigation, the city 
rejected all bids and rebid the contract with a few minor changes. With its 
bidding hand exposed, Four Nines was unsuccessful on second bid and subsequently 
sued 71 Construction for damages in loss of profits resulting from 71 
Construction's activities in successfully defeating the award of the general 
contract to Four Nines. 71 Construction escaped further responsibility for its 
improvident bid which had beer used by the general contractor in pricing its 
general contract bid. The claimed loss in profits totalled about $ 50,000 to 
Four Nines which provides the substance of this 
litigation.

 [¶23.]  On the complaint for recovery of the 
profits by Four Nines and against 71 Construction, summary judgment was granted 
to 71 Construction to relieve it as a matter of law from liability when it 
undertook to have its principal's contract vacated or invalidated in order to 
release its separate responsibility for performance on the supply bId.

III. 
SUBSTANCE OF ISSUES PRESENTED

 [¶24.]  Broadly portrayed, the issue in this case 
determined that there is a liability free ride of the agent  to manipulate nonconsummation of the 
principal's general contract so that the agent is relieved of its prospective 
obligations to perform on a subcontract. The scope of this concept of harm 
causing immunized default in construction cases is self-evident. The rule in 
this case will pervade any supply or contributory service contract where the 
agent as a subcontractor wants out after its bid has been made and is accepted 
by the principal.

 [¶25.]  In this subcontractor bid reneging, owner 
contract rejection, and immunized scenario, the majority rejects potential 
liability for intentional interference with a prospective contract, breach of 
contract and burden  of a covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. The principal basis adopted is absence of bad 
faith when 71 Construction set out to deliberately injure Four Nines for its own 
benefit, namely immunized default in performance. It is in essence, kill the 
obligee in order for obligor to escape from agreement to supply 
food.

 [¶26.]  I reject the preclusive adaptation in 
legal synopsis that the interference was not improper since justified by 
truthful statements and self-interest to either provide a sufficiently confined 
and determinative record or an appropriate legal thesis for this summary 
judgment disposition. 71 Construction was not a disassociated third-party 
stranger to this transaction. That entity was a companion and co-performer in 
the economic wagon. It arranged to have the horses shot so it was no longer 
obligated to assist in driving to the conclusion of the journey. 71 Construction 
escaped scot-free and Four Nines lost opportunity for any reward after journey 
completion.3

IV. 
ANALYSIS OF THE CASE

 [¶27.]  We have here an almost classical, 
intentional interference situation. See Martin v. Wing, 667 P.2d 1159 
(Wyo. 1983); 
Carpenter, Interference with Contract 
Relations, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 728 (1928); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B 
(1979); Annotation, Liability of Third 
Party for Interference With Prospective Contractual Relationship Between Two 
Other Parties, 6 A.L.R.4th 195 (1981).  

 [¶28.]  1. Four Nines had a valid expectancy as 
low bidder for award of the construction contract. Wartensleben v. Willey, 415 P.2d 613 
(Wyo. 
1966).

 [¶29.]  2. 71 Construction, as a prospective 
participant, was aware of the proposed contract which, if executed, would create 
duties and opportunity for its own financial benefit. First Wyoming Bank, Casper v. Mudge, 748 P.2d 713 (Wyo. 
1988).

 [¶30.]  3. 71 Construction perceived a more 
immediate economic benefit by assuring the contract did not come into existence 
in order that its obligation for performance under the contract would be 
voided.

 [¶31.]  4. Acting in the interest of its own 
economic benefit with intent to harm its bidding principal, 71 Construction 
managed to have the successful general contract bid rejected and the contractual 
expectancy of its principal eviscerated.

 [¶32.]  This sequence of events is similar to the 
conduct of the Martins in Martin, 667 P.2d 1159, where the action of the defendant was directed to dissuade the 
anticipated buyer from completion of a house purchase contract. The threat of 
litigation here has no greater ring of validity than did the suggested flooding 
in Martin. In any event, whether 71 
Construction actually underbid and whether, even if underbid, it would have 
constituted a problem to anyone but the bidder is no less a question of fact for 
trial resolution than was the question of flooding in Martin.

 [¶33.]  The real legal principle at stake here is 
whether the bidding subcontractor or supplier or performing sub-agent has a privilege as a matter of law to attempt 
by whatever means to effect avoidance of the principal's contract in order to 
secure vacation of its own responsibilities under its separate bid. I remain 
convinced that Toltec Watershed Imp. 
Dist. v. Johnston, 717 P.2d 808 (Wyo. 1986) was an 
improvident (and erroneous) decision, but its text provides no authority on this 
situation where an agent sets out to harm its principal for economic benefit 
from its separately eliminated responsibility. Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277 (Wyo. 
1985) also provides no authority since the state worker derived no personal 
advantage in reporting the "bad attitude" of the plaintiffs as store employees. 
Likewise, the dicta in Prazma v. 
Kaehne, 768 P.2d 586 (Wyo. 1989), relating to access easement 
litigation, is not persuasive. 

V. 
TORT ELEMENTS

 [¶34.]  The Arizona court in Snow v. Western 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 152 Ariz. 27, 730 P.2d  204, 211-12 (1986) carefully considered 
the principle involved in applying the five elements of tort, Cf. Mudge, 748 P.2d 713 (using four element 
test), which in some jurisdictions subdivide intention and impropriety as 
separate elements:

The 
tort is intentional in the sense that Western must have intended to interfere 
with the Snows' contract or have known that this result was substantially 
certain to be produced by its conduct. Restatement § 8(A) and § 766 comment j; 
accord 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & O. 
GRAY, [THE LAW OF TORTS] supra § 6.8 
[2d ed. 1986], at 321-22. The question of intent ordinarily is for the finder of 
fact. * * *

* * 
*

The 
final element -- whether a defendant has acted improperly -- generally is 
determined by weighing the social importance of the interest the defendant seeks 
to advance against the interest invaded. 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & O. GRAY, supra § 6.12, at 350-51; Restatement § 
767 comment b; H & M Associates v. 
City of El Centro, 109 Cal. App. 3d 399, 409, 167 Cal. Rptr. 392, 398-99 (1980) 
(question of justification "comprises a factual issue which should properly be 
placed before the trier of fact"). To be "improper," an interference must be 
"wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself." Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate 
Insurance Co., 283 Or. 201, 209, 582 P.2d 1365, 1371 (1978), quoted in 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 
O. GRAY, supra § 6.6, at 306-07; see also Restatement § 
767.

That 
court, in reversing summary judgment, concluded that triable issues of fact 
existed on the due-on-sale intentional interference case on both questions of 
good faith and privilege.

 [¶35.]  This court has also assessed the 
relationship of the three terms -- privilege, justification and "not improper" 
-- in the same fashion in Basin Elec. 
Power Co-op.-Missouri Basin Power Project v. Howton, 603 P.2d 402, 405 (Wyo. 
1979), where, in speaking to the changes in terminology from First Restatement 
to Second Restatement to use "improperly" rather than "privilege", we 
said:

Section 
766, Restatement of the Law of Torts (1939), cited in Wartensleben, stated that liability for 
purposeful interference with a contract will not arise if there was a privilege 
to act. A cause of action will arise if "one who, without a privilege to do so," 
induces another not to perform a contract. The authors of the second edition of 
Restatement of the Law of Torts (see introductory note to Ch. 37, p. 4, et seq., 
Vol. 4 (1979)) chose not to use the word privilege or justification in the 
revised § 766. They considered these terms to lack clarity and therefore not 
meaningful. Section 766 of the Second Restatement of the Law of Torts (1979) 
states that "one who intentionally and improperly interferes with the 
performance of a contract * * * is subject to liability * * *." While we do not 
find this change of language particularly helpful in our inquiry, it still is 
consistent with the view that however the tort of interference is expressed -- 
whether as conduct "without justification," "without privilege," or merely 
"improper" -- the question is one of fact rather than one of 
law.

 [¶36.]  The subcontractor bonding case of Morrow v. FBS Ins. Montana-Hoiness LaBar, 
Inc., 230 Mont. 262, 749 P.2d 1073, 1076 (1988) provides the same authority 
requiring resolution of intent and whether "improper" is a factual 
decision:

We 
cannot say that interference motivated to gain business advantage among the 
relationships between bonding agents, general contractors, and subcontractors is 
necessarily proper. And when there is

"room 
for different views, the determination of whether the interference was improper 
or not is ordinarily left to the jury, to obtain its common feel for the state 
of community mores and for the manner in which they would operate upon the facts 
in question."

Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 767 at 38-39 (1977).

First, 
in questioning whether the interference was intentional, the Montana court  observed that it certainly was not 
accidental. After Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 767 is cited, the Montana court analyzed 
the relationship of decision to summary judgment. That consideration is 
explicitly appropriate here.

Other 
Courts have emphasized the impropriety of granting summary judgment where the 
credibility of an affiant may be crucial to decision of a material fact. See Durant v. Stahlin (Mich.1965), 375 
Mich. 628, 135 N.W.2d 392, 398; Arnstein v. Porter 
(2d Cir. 1946), 154 F.2d 464, 469-70.

Morrow, 749 P.2d  at 1075. The same 
factual concept reappeared by  
another reversal in this same case which came after remand by a directed 
verdict in Phillip R. Morrow, Inc. v. FBS 
Ins. Montana-Hoiness Lebar, Inc., 236 Mont. 394, 770 P.2d 859 (1989). 
Justification, e.g. privilege or not improper, is a question of fact. Northside Mercury Sales & Service, Inc. 
v. Ford Motor Co., 871 F.2d 758 (8th Cir. 1989); Phil Crowley Steel Corp. v. Sharon Steel 
Corp., 782 F.2d 781 (8th Cir. 1986); In re Scallywags, Inc., 84 B.R. 303 
(Bkrtcy.D.Mass. 1988); Alyeska Pipeline 
Service Co. v. Aurora Air Service, Inc., 604 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Alaska 1979); 
Irwin & Leighton, Inc. v. W.M. 
Anderson Co., 532 A.2d 983 (Del. 1987); and Larocco v. Bakwin, 108 Ill.App.3d 723, 
64 Ill.Dec. 286, 439 N.E.2d 537 (1982).

VI. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

 [¶37.]  The clear rule explicitly defined 
furthermore determines that justification-privilege-not improper, all being the 
same concept, are the affirmative burden for the defendant to demonstrate when 
the criteria for basic interference has been established. Haupt v. International Harvester Co., 
582 F. Supp. 545 (N.D.Ill. 1984).  
The rule generally followed is:

"Whether 
an intentional interference by a third party is justifiable depends upon a 
balancing of the importance, social and private, of the objective advanced by 
the interference against the importance of the interest interfered with, 
considering all circumstances including the nature of the actor's conduct and 
the relationship between the parties. * * * Justification is an affirmative 
defense and may not be considered as supporting the trial court's action in 
sustaining a demurrer unless it appears on the face of the complaint. * * 
*"

Winn v. McCulloch Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 663, 131 Cal. Rptr. 597, 602 (1976) (quoting Herron v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 56 Cal. 2d 202, 
206-07, 14 Cal. Rptr. 294, 296, 363 P.2d 310, 312 (1961)). See likewise Kinco, Inc. v. Schueck Steel, 
Inc., 283 Ark. 72, 671 S.W.2d 178 (1984); Gianelli Distributing Co. v. Beck & 
Co., 172 Cal. App. 3d 1020, 219 Cal. Rptr. 203, 222 (1985); and Boyles v. Thompson, 585 S.W.2d 821 
(Tex.Civ.App. 1979). Although not specifically defined, the assumptive nature of 
justification as an affirmative defense appears in Wartensleben, 415 P.2d  at 614 and 
Annotation, Liability for Procuring 
Breach of Contract, 26 A.L.R.2d 1227, 1263-64 (1952) (and later case 
service).

 [¶38.]  The principle is stated appropriately for 
our review here in H & M Associates 
v. City of El 
Centro, 109 Cal. App. 3d 399, 167 Cal. Rptr. 392, 396 
(1980):

Privilege 
or justification for the interference is an affirmative defense, not an element 
of plaintiff's cause of action, and thus may not be considered in support of the 
trial court's action in sustaining a demurrer unless apparent upon the face of 
the complaint.

See also Federal Pants, Inc. v. 
Stocking, 762 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1985); Lowell v. Mother's Cake & Cookie 
Co., 79 Cal. App. 3d 13, 144 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1978); and Calbom v. Knudtzon, 65 Wash. 2d 157, 396 P.2d 148 (1964).4 The factual issue is purposeful 
conduct of the actor which results in contract loss. Ronald M. Sharrow,  Chartered v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 306 Md. 754, 511 A.2d 492 (1986). We should take 
heed from what the Maryland court said:

There 
is, of course, a big difference between that which is necessary to prove the 
commission of the tort and that which is necessary merely to allege its 
commission.

Id. at 500. The 
source of the justification defense is said to be derived from Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1 (1894).

In 
using the label "wrongful interference" the courts have apparently applied to 
the protection of business relations the rule which Holmes contended was (or 
ought to be) a general principle of the common law: that "when a responsible 
defendant seeks to escape from liability for an act which he had notice was 
likely to cause temporal damage to another, and which has caused such damage in 
fact, he must show a justification." A justification arises when other 
considerations of public policy are stronger than the policy of protecting 
business enterprise.

Note, 
Tortious Interference with Conduct of a 
Business, 56 Yale L.J. 885, 888 (1947) (quoting Holmes, supra, 8 Harv. L. Rev. at 
9).

 [¶39.]  We are presented here with a summary 
judgment disposition and not given the benefit of a trial resolution. There is a 
remarkable similarity between the insurance company case directed to remove an 
attorney from claimant representation, Thompson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1973), and this case where the action was directed to remove the 
general contractor as a player to provide economic advantage for the actor. Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co. v. 
Farish, 464 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1985); Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 479 N.E.2d 113, cert. denied 474 U.S. 1013, 106 S. Ct. 546, 88 L. Ed. 2d 475 (1985) (induced disclosure of confidential 
information contrary to the physician-patient relationship); Annotation, Liability in Tort for Interference with 
Attorney-Client or Physician-Patient Relationship, 26 A.L.R.3d 679 (1969). 
Similarly, in employment cases, see Davenport v. Epperly, 744 P.2d 1110 
(Wyo. 1987) 
and Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. Standard 
Pump-Aldrich Div., 281 Pa.Super. 560, 422 A.2d 611 (1980). Cf. Annotation,  Liability of One Who Induces Termination of 
Employment of Another by Threatening to End Own Contractual Relationship with 
Employer, 79 A.L.R.3d 672 (1977).

VII. 
EVALUATIVE FACTORS

 [¶40.]  The evaluative factors which test whether 
the conduct was "privileged", "justified", or "not improper" envision intent 
consideration by categories provided in Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 767. Mudge, 748 P.2d 713. One of the mistakes 
made by the majority in analysis and conclusion is applying Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, supra, § 772(a) without 
relation to Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 772(b) or in the context of 
whether improper by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 767 evaluative 
factors.

Section 
767 of the Restatement catalogues the factors considered in evaluating the 
propriety of interference with contractual relations. The section 
reads:

In 
determining whether an actor's conduct in intentionally interfering with a 
contract or a prospective contractual relation of another is improper or not, 
consideration is given to the following factors:

(a) 
the nature of the actor's conduct,

(b) 
the actor's motive,

(c) 
the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct 
interferes,

(d) 
the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,

(e) 
the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the 
contractual interests of the other,

(f) 
the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference 
and

(g) 
the relations between the parties.

Zilg v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 717 F.2d 671, 677 (2nd Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied 466 U.S. 938, 104 S. Ct. 1911, 80 L. Ed. 2d 460 (1984). See likewise Northside Mercury Sales & 
Service, Inc., 871 F.2d 758; Irwin 
& Leighton,  Inc., 532 A.2d  
at 993; La Rocco, 64 Ill.Dec. 286, 439 N.E.2d 537; and Bolz v. Myers, 200 Mont. 286, 651 P.2d 606 
(1982). We specifically adopted those factors in Mudge, 748 P.2d  at 
717.

VIII. 
COMPARABLE PRECEDENT: TRUTHFULNESS AS A DISPOSITIVE 
CONCEPT

 [¶41.]  In the myriad of present intentional 
interference with contract cases, none is found in which a subcontractor went to 
the owner to entice non-award so that the subcontractor could escape a 
contractually inopportune bId.5 A case involving similar aspects is 
Leek v. Brasfield, 226 Ark. 316, 290 S.W.2d 632 
(1956), where the defendant's land was upstream from plaintiff. Someone cut a 
dam above plaintiff's location in the water course which reduced ponding of 
water out onto defendant's land. Plaintiff further wanted the dam repaired to 
protect from downstream flooding. The county commissioners agreed and hired a 
contractor to repair the dam. The defendant reciprocated from his upstream 
landowner status by running the contractor off the construction site by threat 
of an expensive lawsuit. When the flood came, plaintiff was damaged down below 
the damaged dam and he sued defendant for scaring the contractor through 
suggestion of litigation not to take the county contract which had been 
presented to repair the dam.

 [¶42.]  Following jury consideration, the damaged 
landowner plaintiff won. The Arkansas Supreme Court recognized that the wrongful 
conduct in preventing repair was just as injurious to appellee (plaintiff) as 
the wrongful act committed by whomever of cutting the dam originally. Words 
caused action and precisely that result also occurs here where the subcontractor 
went to the city with the unquestioned purpose of stopping the award of Four 
Nines' contract on the basis of the bid in order to be relieved of performance 
responsibility on its own contract. Here, as in Leek, the issue was properly presented 
for jury decision. Furthermore, it is apparent that the so-called truth defense 
of Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 772(a) is subject to content 
and circumstances. One of those circumstances can be Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, supra, § 772(b) -- whether 
solicited -- which is not in any regard discussed in the majority 
opinion.

 [¶43.]  The historic case of Knickerbocker Ice Co. of Baltimore City v. 
Gardiner Dairy Co. of Baltimore City, 107 Md. 556, 69 A. 405 (1908) has some 
similarities where a supplier of ice stated that it would cease deliveries to 
the dairy unless the dairy's customer discontinued business with the plaintiff. 
The resulting damage verdict was sustained.

 [¶44.]  Perhaps the principal circumstance is the 
inquiry regarding intent with which the action is taken. Williams v. Chittenden Trust Co., 145 
Vt. 76, 484 A.2d 911 (1984).

Intent 
to interfere with a contractual relationship exists if "the actor acts for the 
primary purpose of interfering with the performance of the contract, and also if 
he [or she] desires to interfere, even though he [or she] acts for some other 
purpose in addition." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 comment j (1979). 
Intent also exists if the actor does not act with the desire to interfere with 
the contract but knows that interference will  be substantially certain to occur as a 
result of his or her action. Id.

Id. at 914. That 
court considered the advice and suggestions where the offending actor offered to 
do the work for less in architectural planning. True enough, the advice simply 
indicated that the architect would do the work for less. The court 
said:

The 
defendant also argues that its interference was not improper because it merely 
rendered "honest advice" to the owner, which,  if argues, is allowed under § 772 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts. We think, however, that the plaintiff presented 
sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the defendant's actions went 
beyond mere "advice," and instead constituted architectural services. The 
defendant prepared sketches, plans and detailed drawings for the project. 
Therefore, we reject the defendant's argument.

Id. at 915 
(footnote omitted).

 [¶45.]  The subject is similarly addressed in Scussel v. Balter, 386 So. 2d 1227, 
1228-29 (Fla.App. 1980) (footnote omitted):

Scussel 
secondly suggests that his actions were protected by the privilege afforded an 
agent who, upon request, gives "honest advice" that it is in his principal's 
best interests to breach an existing relationship. See 4 Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 772(b) (1979). We find, however, that the showings in the record of 
Scussel's active involvement in Wolf's affairs and of his personal motivations 
and ulterior purposes for securing Wolf's withdrawal from his undertaking with 
Balter demonstrate the inapplicability of this principle. See London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. 
Horn, 206 Ill. 493, 69 N.E. 526 
(1903);  Morgan v. Andrews, 107 Mich. 33, 64 N.W. 869 
(1895); W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 129 test and authorities at 944, nn. 5-7 (4th 
ed. 1971).

 [¶46.]  The relationship of the truth defense to 
an affirmed judgment for tortious interference was also recognized in Pony Exp. Cab & Bus, Inc. v. Ward, 
841 F.2d 207, 209, aff'd 845 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting Pony 
Express Cab & Bus, Inc. v. Ward, 662 F. Supp. 85, 89 (D.Neb. 1987)), were 
the actor's statement to the third-party customer was "'a primary reason for the 
denial of the contract * * *.'" The court recognized in footnote that the theory 
of defamation or business slander overlapped intentional interference with a 
business expectancy, and truth, as an absolute defense in defamation, did not 
have the same effectiveness in tortious interference defense. See likewise Walsh v. Glendale Federal Sav. 
& Loan Ass'n, 1 Cal. App. 3d 578, 81 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1969), which 
recognized that in regard to furnishing credit information, tortious action also 
falls more completely within Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 772(b).

 [¶47.]  The court in Chaves v. Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 335 S.E.2d 97, 
103 (1985)  was unpersuaded by a 
freedom-of-speech argument as a defense to the intentional 
interference:

The 
tort complained of here is an intentional wrong to the property rights of 
another, accomplished by words, not defamatory in themselves, but employed in 
pursuance of a scheme designed wrongfully to enrich the speaker at the expense 
of the victim. The law provides a remedy in such cases, and the constitutional 
guarantees of free speech afford no more protection to the speaker than they do 
to any other tortfeasor who employs words to commit a criminal or a civil 
wrong.

 [¶48.]  The Chaves case has some similarity to our 
present situation where, involving contracting with a city, the defendant 
competitor as an architect advised the city that the plaintiff's charges were 
excessive and his experience insufficient. The court found a written 
communication on the subject not to be defamatory in consideration of free 
speech and truth, but rejected the defense of truth and taxpayer privilege in 
reversing an appellate court decision which had reversed the original verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff.

 [¶49.]  Truthfulness under Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, supra, § 772(a) is not 
alone the test since the actual communication involved at least a questionably 
valid "underbid" statement and then included general  advice and opinion, including comments 
about litigation.6 Consequently, the requirements and 
function of Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 772(a) and (b) and the 
intrinsic function of Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 766B are called into analysis. 
Reliance on Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 772(a) alone is inappropriate 
and certainly Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 772(b) would be irrelevant 
under the circumstances because of the failure to meet the first requirement 
"that [the] advice be requested, * * *". Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 772(c). "The privilege [of 
truth] is conditional and if the occasion were used not to give bona fide advice, but to injure the 
plaintiff for any ulterior reason, the defendant should lose his privilege and 
therefore fail in his defense." Carpenter, supra, 41 Harv. L. Rev. at 749-50 
(citing Northern Wisconsin Co-op. Tobacco 
Pool v. Bekkedal, 182 Wis. 571, 197 N.W. 936 (1923) and Holmes, supra, 8 Harv. L. Rev. at 
6).

 [¶50.]  This difference is of the essence in this 
case. The city did not go to 71 Construction. We have unsolicited conduct of 71 
Construction in going to the city to raise the specter of litigation and bad 
workmanship that provided the atmosphere upon which the intentional interference 
complaint existed and the contractual loss occurred. None of the three criteria 
for application of Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 772(c) exists in this case: 
"(1) that advice be requested," -- it was not; "(2) that the advice given be 
within the scope of the request" -- it was not; "and (3) that the advice be 
honest" -- at best, we have a factual decision based upon exactly what the 
representative of 71 Construction said in order to secure a rebid decision by 
the city and a release of the subcontractor from the onerous burden of its 
subcontract proposal.

 [¶51.]  In Basin Elec. Power Co-op.-Missouri Basin 
Power Project, 603 P.2d  at 404, we set the parameters of the cause of 
action: "(1) the existence of the contract; (2) defendant's knowledge of the 
contract; (3) intentional interference with plaintiff's contract without 
justification; and (4) resulting damages." In that case the issue was  justification, and we 
said:

In 
considering the question of interference with a contract this court has never 
attempted to define as a matter of law what constitutes reasonable justification 
for interference with a contract.

Id. (citing Wartensleben, 415 P.2d 613; Board of Trustees of Weston County School 
Dist. No. 1, Weston County v. Holso, 584 P.2d 1009, reh. denied 587 P.2d 203 (Wyo. 1978); 
and Kvenild v. Taylor, 594 P.2d 972 
(Wyo. 1979)). Furthermore, we then said:

Nor 
will we attempt to formulate any hard and fast definitions for the term in the 
case at bar. The term justification is broad and the question of whether there 
was an unjustified interference depends upon the facts of each 
case.

Basin Elec.PowerCo-op.-MissouriBasin Power Project, 603 P.2d  at 404. And 
then we quoted with approval the general rule from Carnes v. St. Paul Union Stock-Yards 
Co., 164 Minn. 457, 205 N.W. 630, 632, reh'g denied 164 Minn. 457, 206 N.W. 396 
(1925):

"The 
courts have not attempted to formulate a rule by which justification or lack of 
justification may be determined, but have said that in general the issue is 
largely one of fact for the jury; the standard being reasonable conduct under 
all the circumstances of the case."

Basin Elec.PowerCo-op.-MissouriBasin Power Project, 603 P.2d  at 405. We 
further quoted from Royal Realty Company 
v. Levin, 244 Minn. 288, 69 N.W.2d 667, 673 
(1955):

"* * 
* We need not here concern ourselves with what constitutes sufficient 
justification. The term is not susceptible of any precise definition, and 
normally it is a question of fact for the jury's determination. In any event, 
the general view is that the burden of proving sufficient  justification for the interference rests 
on the defendants."

Basin Elec.PowerCo-op.-MissouriBasin Power Project, 603 P.2d  at 405. We 
further noted that the authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 766 lacked clarity even after 
they substituted "improperly interferes". Basin Elec.PowerCo-op.-MissouriBasin Power Project, 603 P.2d  at 405.7

While 
we do not find this change of language particularly helpful in our inquiry, it 
still is consistent with the view that however the tort of interference is 
expressed -- whether as conduct "without justification," "without privilege," or 
merely "improper" -- the question is one of fact rather than one of 
law.

* * 
* Good cause, good faith, reasonable conduct, all appear to us to involve 
factual and not legal determinations. On this question of law versus fact, this 
remark in 4 Restatement of the Law of Torts, § 767, p. 38, comment 1 (1979), is 
pertinent:

"* * 
* The analogy to negligence continues to hold in the situations where no 
recognized privilege has been formulated. Here [tortious interference with a 
contract], as with negligence, when there is room for different views, the 
determination of whether the interference was improper or not is ordinarily left 
to the jury, to obtain its common feel for the state of community mores and for 
the manner in which they would operate upon the facts in 
question."

Id. at 405. We 
again considered the function of justification in Texas West Oil and Gas Corp. v. 
Fitzgerald, 726 P.2d 1056 (Wyo. 1986) (Texas West I) (majority and dissenting 
opinion). See, however, Dobbs, Tortious 
Interference with Contractual Relationships,  34 Ark. L. Rev. 335 (1980). Truthfulness 
when said to be some kind of excuse for harmful action cannot be extracted from 
propriety and justification.

IX. 
CONCLUSION

 [¶52.]  I conclude the majority improvidently 
applies Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 772(a) and even more 
improvidently fails to apply the criteria of Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 767. Clearly, we have 
determined that the issue is basically one of fact, Texas West I, 726 P.2d 1056 (Thomas, J., 
specially concurring, n. 1 at 1065),8 and the burden of proof of 
justification or culpability remains with the offending 
party.

 [¶53.]  This court has directly addressed 
intentional interference in thirteen cases, but has not clearly or consistently 
delineated factual content of the issues provided nor the nature of the 
affirmative defense status for privilege, justification or "not improper 
decisions".9 The Wyoming cases can be categorized within groups, but the 
basic principle stated in Mudge, 748 P.2d 713; Texas West I, 726 P.2d 1056; Martin, 667 P.2d 1159;  and Basin Elec. Power Co-op.-Missouri Basin 
Power Project, 603 P.2d  at 405, can realistically be followed as the basic 
Wyoming law. 
First excluded are cases where a third party really does not exist: Kvenild, 594 P.2d 972 and Holso, 584 P.2d 1009; and job related 
duty or right to act by virtue of relationship: Davenport, 744 P.2d 1110; Erickson v. Magill, 713 P.2d 1182 
(Wyo. 1986); Dehnert v. Arrow Sprinklers, Inc., 705 P.2d 846 (Wyo. 
1985); and Allen, 699 P.2d 277. In 
essence, the remaining Wyoming cases addressed intent and 
privilege-justification-or being not improper as a factual review under the 
circumstances to either sustain a verdict or judgment or to determine that 
summary judgment was proper. Wartensleben, 415 P.2d 613.

 [¶54.]  It is clearly apparent in review of the 
Wyoming cases 
that a defined understanding of a consistent theory for bench and bar has not 
been enumerated by this court sufficient to provide certainty and process for 
resolution of this field of rapidly expanding law. A defined national precedent 
provides the guidance for a structured status of the law of intentional 
interference. That review demonstrates the essential errors in majority decision 
in this case.

 [¶55.]  1. A clear factual issue existed which 
rendered summary judgment inappropriate in any event. Kobielusz v. Wilson, 701 P.2d 559 (Wyo. 1985).

 [¶56.]  2. Self-standing dispositive application 
of an alleged truthful statement is inappropriate without consideration of the 
circumstances within which the statement was made and from which the result was 
adverse to the plaintiff. Scussel, 
386 So. 2d 1227; Bekkedal, 197 N.W. 936.

 [¶57.]  3. "Justification", "privilege" and "not 
improper" all constitute an affirmative defense to action otherwise constituting 
intentional interference as a tort and creates a burden of presentation on the 
defendant which normally invokes a factual resolution. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985); Alberts, 395 Mass. 59, 479 N.E.2d 113.

 [¶58.]  The majority opinion not only disrupts 
normal contract law and agency relationships and inappropriately applies 
intentional interference tort concepts, but also justifies a character of 
conduct as insulated from liability which is disingenuous to the thesis of 
responsibility for intentionally causing harm to another for your own 
benefit.

 [¶59.]  Consequently, I 
dissent.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The claimed mistake totalled about $ 
30,000 in the subcontract bid of $ 88,316 total. The bidder explained in a 
confused discussion in his deposition that as a batch plant operator, he used 
cost of asphalt mix (aggregate) in 
his computed price instead of asphalt oil. While the oil was $ 118 per ton, the 
mix constituted only six percent of the oil and was priced at about $ 25 per 
ton. Consequently, the bid was $ 14.21 per ton and should have been $ 21.85 per 
ton. The record does not reflect how much experience the subcontractor had or 
how long he had been in the business. The expected job requirement was 
approximately 300 tons which, when computed on the $ 7.64 differential, would 
provide a misbid of $ 19,864 compared to the oil differential of 300 tons at the 
$ 81 differential per ton or $ 24,300. Obviously, none of this totalled $ 30,000 
as the "purported mistake." His further calculation in deposition was that his $ 
3.20 per square yard laid down price was underbid from $ 4.91 or a $ 1.71 
differential. With 25,130 square yards, we would find his total bid mistake to 
be $ 43,000 which involved the job of approximately $ 80,416 plus mobilization 
of $ 7,900. Clearly by that bid the 53.5% mistake could not be attributed to 
using the price of mix rather than oil in 
computation.

 
 

2Particularly for a record limited in 
factual information as is this case, there are a lot of conflicts in the factual 
statements. Since this is a summary judgment case, Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 
1986), we consider what the disinterested witness, the city engineer Brad 
Nelson, and William DeLapp, president of Four Nines, factually stated in 
affidavits. Those statements are comparable and clearly in conflict with the 
deposition of Steven Loftin, officer of 71 Construction, which revealed that he 
as the managing officer of 71 Construction had developed a bad memory by the 
date his deposition was taken. The city engineer's affidavit 
states:

2. That in July, 1989, the City of 
Riverton 
advertised for bids on the Monroe Avenue Project which specifically is called 
the Economic Development Administration Project No. 
05-01-02356;

3. That on or about July 28, 1989, 
bids for the Monroe Avenue Project contract were opened and that Four Nines Gold 
was the lowest qualified responsible bidder on the contract at $ 414,790.82, and 
that shortly thereafter, Four Nines Gold was notified of this 
fact;

 
 
4. That the bids were presented to Jim 
Gores and Associates, the project engineers and that they recommended that the 
contract be awarded to Four Nines Gold;

5. That in the morning of August 1, 
1989, I received a telephone call from Steve Loftin who identified himself as 
being with 71 Construction Company and that his company was a subcontractor for 
Four Nines Gold on the Monroe Avenue Project for the Bituminous Aggregate 
Surfacing material;

6. That Loftin indicated that he 
knew that Four Nines Gold was the low bidder on the Monroe Avenue Project and 
that 71 Construction had made a $ 36,000 mistake in its bid as a subcontractor 
to Four Nines Gold on the Bituminous Aggregate Surfacing material for the 
project;

7. That Loftin explained in his 
telephone conversation the nature of the 71 Construction mistake and that 71 
Construction "could not do this job for the amount that they had bid it for", 
and that Loftin used those words exactly;

8. That Loftin told me about a 
number of lawsuits in which subcontractors were let out contracts [sic] when 
they could show mistakes in their bids and other cases where the owner was held 
responsible for increased costs change orders in the contract were [sic] it was 
shown that they awarded a contract knowing that there was a mistake in the 
bid;

9. That Loftin made it perfectly 
clear to me that he thought that there was a mistake in his bid to Four Nines 
Gold on the Bituminous Aggregate surfacing material and that he wanted me to 
know of it prior to the time the contract was awarded to Four Nines 
Gold;

10. That once Loftin explained the 
situation to me, I was afraid that if the contract was awarded to Four Nines 
Gold that 71 Construction would sacrifice the quality of its work or short 
materials to make up for the mistake in its bid or that Four Nines Gold would 
ask for a $ 36,000 change order to cover the mistake, and that the City, as 
owner, would have to go to extra expenses to make sure that 71 Construction did 
the job correctly without cutting corners or shorting 
material;

11. That because of this 
conversation with Loftin, I began to seriously question whether or not Four 
Nines Gold could perform the contract with quality acceptable to the City and at 
the bid price given the subcontractor considering the bid problem with Loftin 
and 71 Construction;

12. That because of this 
conversation that I had with Steve Loftin, and only for this reason, I 
determined that the best course of action for the City was to reject all bids 
and re-bid the project with a few minor changes;

13. That I reported all of the 
previously set forth information to Don White, the city attorney, along with my 
recommendations and he agreed with me and I made the same recommendation to 
Mayor Albert Brown on the afternoon of August 1, 1989, before the City Council 
meeting, and all bids were rejected and the project relet for bids with a few 
minor changes;

14. That the bid of Four Nines Gold 
had no mistake, error or ambiguity on its face, that Four Nines Gold's bid bond 
was in order and that I considered Four Nines Gold to be a reputable company 
cable of doing the job had the problem not come up with their 
subcontractor;

15. That had Loftin not called me 
with the information regarding 71 Construction's mistake in its subcontract bid 
on the Bituminous Aggregate Surfacing material to Four Nines Gold and his 
statement that his company "could not do this job for the amount that they had 
bid it for", I would have recommended that Four Nines Gold be awarded the 
contract and it probably would have been so 
awarded;

16. That Loftin told me that he had 
given the same bid on the Bituminous Aggregate surfacing material to other 
general contractors on this bid, but I also later found out that the second low 
bidder on the project, Gilpatrick Construction, used a different subcontractor 
on this material and that its price was very close to the price 71 Construction 
gave that supposedly contained the mistake and that any mistake in 71 
Construction's bid was not so low as to call attention to the 
number.

The affidavit of Mr. DeLapp states 
in part:

4. That on or about July 12, 1989, 
the city of Riverton, a municipality located in Fremont County, Wyoming, 
published notice of an upcoming construction project to be let for bids, said 
construction project and contract was officially designated as Economic 
Development Administration Project No. 05-01-02356;

5. That the Monroe Avenue Project 
concerned the installation of new water and sewer mains and approximately one 
mile of curb, gutter, and paving on Monroe Avenue located in Riverton, 
Fremont County, Wyoming;

6. That on or about July 21, 1989, 
I, acting on behalf of Four Nines, contacted Loftin, an agent and employee of 71 
Construction concerning a bid on item #7 in schedule 2 of the Monroe Avenue 
Project bid schedule, specifically calling for the supply and application of 
25,130 square yards of aggregate bituminous 
surfacing;

7. That I informed Loftin that Four 
Nines intended to bid on the Monroe Avenue Project with the city of Riverton, 
that I wanted a bid from 71 on supplying and laying down 25,130 square yards of 
the aggregate bituminous surfacing material, and that the deadline for 
submitting the bids to the city of Riverton on the contract was July 28, 1989, 
at 2:00 p.m.'

8. That Loftin informed me that 71 
had a copy of the bid specifications on the Monroe Avenue Project and that 71 
would submit a bid to me for the aggregate bituminous surfacing material and lay 
down process;

9. That on July 28, 1989, at 9:45 
a.m., I had a telephone conference with Loftin while Loftin was in Riverton 
investigating and inspecting the site of the Monroe Avenue Project wherein 
Loftin, acting for 71, submitted a bid to me in which 71 would supply 25,130 
square yards of aggregate bituminous surfacing to me for $ 3.20 per square yard 
plus $ 7,900 mobilization charges for the application 
equipment;

10. That upon receiving 71's bid, I 
informed Loftin that he was the low bidder on the aggregate, and that if Four 
Nines was low bidder and was awarded the job, 71 would have the subcontract for 
supplying the aggregate bituminous surfacing 
material;

11. That shortly thereafter, and 
before the 2:00 p.m. bid deadline on July 28, 1989, I submitted a bid to the 
city of Riverton on the Monroe Avenue Project incorporating and using 71's price 
at $ 3.20 per square yard on the aggregate bituminous surfacing material, and 
that Four Nines relied upon the subcontract bid of 71 in submitting its general 
contractor bid to the City of Riverton;

12. That on or about 2:00 p.m. on 
July 28, 1989, the City Engineer, Brad Nelson, opened the bids received and that 
Four Nines was the low bidder on the Monroe Avenue 
Project;

13. That later in the morning of 
July 31, 1989, I called 71's office and left a message that Four Nines was the 
low bidder on the Monroe Avenue project and that 71 had the contract to supply 
and lay down the aggregate bituminous surfacing material at $ 3.20 per square 
yard, plus $ 7,900 mobilization charges when the city of Riverton awarded the 
contract to Four Nines at its meeting on the evening of August 1, 
1989;

14. That on Tuesday, August 1, 1989, 
our low bid on the Monroe Avenue Project was to be taken to the Riverton City 
Council Meeting for the formal contract award and that 71 and Loftin had 
knowledge of this fact because I had told them the previous 
day;

15. That I relied upon the bid given 
to me by Loftin and 71 when formulating and computing Four Nines' bid as general 
contractor on the Monroe Avenue Project, and I told Loftin specifically that I 
was going to do the same;

16. That the bid given to me by 
Loftin and 71 for the aggregate bituminous surfacing material and installation 
was the low bid, but not so low as to cause me to believe that a mistake had 
been made and I subsequently learned that the company that ultimately was 
awarded the work on the Monroe Avenue Project utilized a bid for the aggregate 
bituminous surfacing material that was very similar to the one Loftin initially 
gave me;

17. That Four Nines had the ability 
to perform the Monroe Avenue Project at the amount of its initial bid as general 
contractor and additionally, make $ 50,000 profit on the 
contract;

18. That I was informed by Brad 
Nelson, City Engineer, on or about August 2, 1989, that all bids had been 
rejected, the project relet for bids with certain changes, and on rebid, Four 
Nines was the second lowest bidder on the project;

19. That the bid given to me by 71 
on or about July 28, 1989, was not revocable and was an agreement or contract 
dependent only upon Four Nines being awarded the contract by the Riverton City 
Council.

 
 

3We could probably label this conduct as 
"Harmful Speech Type 1." D'Amato, Harmful 
Speech and the Culture of Indeterminacy, 32 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 329 
(1991).

 
 

4It is apparent that the Oregon Supreme 
Court has developed a contrary construction derived from a conclusion that the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts which it adopted requires an assertion of proof 
upon plaintiff to disprove privilege. Top 
Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 Or. 201, 582 P.2d 1365 
(1978). The authority of the Oregon cases has 
not found general adaptation in other jurisdictions and certainly does not 
accord with any approval to be found in the more recent Wyoming 
decisions.

 
 

5See, however, Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other 
Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 61, 99 (1982) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 766B) (footnotes 
omitted):

The Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes 
liability for intentionally and improperly preventing another person from 
performing his contract or for causing his performance to be more expensive, and 
for preventing another from "acquiring or continuing [a] prospective relation." 
The defendant in these cases may be a stranger to the severed relationship, or 
he may be a discontented promisee seeking to avoid his own contractual 
obligations by preventing the plaintiff from 
performing.

The author cited Fradus Contracting Co. v. Taylor, 201 
A.D. 298, 194 N.Y.S. 286 (1922). The case in footnote also reflected the common 
law duty to act in good faith. In Fradus 
Contracting Co., performance by the contractor was prevented by a city 
official who denied a dock site for contract performance. An injunctive answer 
was provided.

 
 

6With the affidavits in conflict, we are 
required by our precedent to accept the factual statements included in the 
affidavits provided in resistance to the motion for summary judgment. Davenport, 744 P.2d 1110; England v. Simmons, 728 P.2d 1137 (Wyo. 
1986).

 
 

7For an assertion about a lack of clarity 
of the entire subject of intentional interference, see Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual 
Relationships, 34 Ark. L. Rev. 335 (1980).

 
 

8I have difficulty relating Texas West I, and specifically the 
special concurrence, to then be followed by Texas West II, Texas West Oil and Gas Corp. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Casper, 743 P.2d 857 (Wyo. 1987), reconfirmed 749 P.2d 278 (Wyo. 1988) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting), with the present language of this majority that here no cause of 
action is stated. Clearly, in this case, an official representative of 71 
Construction for the self-interest of his business took action directed to deter 
award of the contract to Four Nines in order that it, as subcontractor, would be 
safe from perceived loss with a specific result which caused damage to Four 
Nines. 71 Construction acted contrary to the interest of Four Nines in accord 
with its own countervailing seal interest. Here, the conduct resulted in 
wrongful interference with a contract expectancy, benefit to the actor, and 
damage to the victimized contractor. If there is a philosophical cohesion and 
cogency to the Texas West cases, that 
is exactly the scenario played out as the determinative legal thesis of recovery 
against the surety and non-recovery against the assignor 
bank.

 
 

9Mudge, 
748 P.2d 713; Davenport, 744 P.2d 1110; 
Texas West II, 743 P.2d 857; Texas West I, 726 P.2d 1056; Toltec Watershed Imp. Dist., 717 P.2d 808; Erickson v. Magill, 713 P.2d 1182 (Wyo. 1986); Dehnert v. Arrow 
Sprinklers, Inc., 705 P.2d 846 (Wyo. 1985); Allen, 699 P.2d 277; Martin, 667 P.2d 1159; Basin Elec. Power Co-op.-Missouri Basin 
Power Project, 603 P.2d 402; Kvenild, 594 P.2d 972; Holso, 584 P.2d 1009; Wartensleben, 415 P.2d 613.