Case Title: CHAMBERLAIN v EVANS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1979-03-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
NO. 14452 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 CARL B . CHAMBERLAIN and HERTHA A. CHAMBERLAIN, husband and wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants, L . E. EVANS et al., Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: ~istrict Cburt of the Eighth ~udicial District, Honorable B. W. Thomas, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Stacey and Nye, Billings, Montana Jerrold L. Nye argued, Billings, Montana For Respondents: Swanberg, Koby, Swanberg and Matteucci, Great Falls, Montana Raymond F. Koby, Jr. argued, Great Falls, Montana Submitted: February 6, 1979 ; - 1~33 Filed: M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This a c t i o n concerns a farm l e a s e f i l e d i n t h e District Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , County of Cascade. Motions and b r i e f s w e r e submitted by both p a r t i e s f o r sum- mary judgment, and on June 2 3 , 1978, summary judgment was granted t o t h e defendants. P l a i n t i f f s appeal. I n A p r i l 1971, p l a i n t i f f Chamberlain leased from defendants L.E. and Josephine Evans (Evans) 230 a c r e s of wheat land near Great F a l l s . The p e r t i n e n t p a r t s of t h e l e a s e i n t h i s a c t i o n provided t h a t it r a n t o November 1, 1971, and unless n o t i c e of termination w a s given by e i t h e r p a r t y , it would be automatically renewed f o r each succeeding year. Termination could be made i n two ways. I n t h e event Evans sold a l l o r p a r t of t h e land, t h e l e a s e would t e r m i - n a t e immediately as t o t h e p a r t sold and Chamberlain would become e n t i t l e d t o c e r t a i n payments. The lease could a l s o be terminated by nonrenewal, i f n o t i c e of nonrenewal w a s given by e i t h e r p a r t y a t least 60 days p r i o r t o t h e renewal d a t e of t h e lease. The lease continued u n t i l April 1974 through automatic renewal. On o r about April 1, 1974, however, Chamberlain received from Evans a n o t i c e of termination of the l e a s e . The n o t i c e s t a t e d t h a t t h e reason f o r termination w a s due t o sale of p a r t of t h e leased premises making f u r t h e r farming inconvenient. The n o t i c e a l s o d i r e c t e d Chamberlain t o do no summerfallow o r t o p l a n t any of t h e land. Evans t h e r e a f t e r entered i n t o a c o n t r a c t with illi ion- Moore, Inc., t o come onto t h e land i n t h e spring and summer of 1974 t o work t h e leased premises and t o p l a n t it t o wheat. The land under l e a s e was n o t sold. Because of Killion-Moore's operations, however, Chamberlain ceased farming t h e leased land. The i s s u e ( s ) on appeal a r e disputed by t h e p a r t i e s . Because t h e District Court granted Evans summary judgment, t h e i s s u e a s defined by him i s probably more c o r r e c t l y s t a t e d : Whether t h e r e was an i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t , t h e e x i s t e n c e of which would preclude summary judgment, and i f n o t , whether t h e movant should p r e v a i l a s a matter of law? Chamberlain more c i r c u i t u o u s l y states t h e i s s u e s as: 1. Whether an admitted i n t e r f e r e n c e by Evans with Chamberlain's r i g h t s t o t h e exclusive possession and q u i e t enjoyment of t h e leasehold during t h e t e r m of t h e l e a s e gave rise t o f a c t u a l and l e g a l questions of damages? 2. Whether t h e n o t i c e of termination which s t a t e d an untrue reason f o r termination of t h e l e a s e i n an attempt t o deprive Chamberlain of h i s termination r i g h t s was fraud on t h e p l a i n t i f f s ? Both p a r t i e s moved f o r summary judgment i n t h e c o u r t below. The order of t h e D i s t r i c t Court reads i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : . . . it appearing t o t h e Court t h a t , a s t o l a i n t i f f s ' motion t h e r e remain genuine i s s u e s f m a t e r i a l f a c t on questions of l i a b i l i t y , b u t t h a t as t o defendants' motion, t h e r e i s no gen- uine i s s u e of any m a t e r i a l f a c t and t h a t defen- d a n t s a r e e n t i t l e d t o judgment as a m a t t e r of law, " I t is, t h e r e f o r e , hereby ORDERED t h a t p l a i n t i f f s ' motion f o r p a r t i a l summary judgment be and it is hereby denied, and t h a t defendants' motion f o r summary judgment i n t h e i r favor be and it i s hereby granted." Chamberlain can bring no challenge t o t h a t p a r t of t h e D i s t r i c t Court order denying him p a r t i a l summary judgment. A l a r g e p a r t of h i s o r i g i n a l complaint and b r i e f on appeal i s devoted t o a discussion of how Evans allegedly fraudu- l e n t l y terminated t h e lease. B y s t a t u t e , fraud i s always a question of f a c t . Section 13-310, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 28-2-404 MCA. Therefore, Chamberlain himself w a s n o t e n t i t l e d t o summary judgment. The D i s t r i c t Court d i d g r a n t Evans' motion f o r summary judgment, however. O n review, t h i s Court must merely d e t e r - mine whether t h e r e e x i s t s a genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t and whether t h e moving p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o a judgment as a matter of l a w . Rule 5 6 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P. The termination provision of t h e lease reads: "2. TERM O F LEASE: This agreement s h a l l be f o r a t e r m commencing on t h e d a t e hereof and ter- minating on November 1, 1971, PROVIDED HOWEVER, t h a t t h i s agreement s h a l l be renewed automatically from year t o year f o r one year terms commencing November 1st of each year and terminating on November 1st of t h e next year, unless one p a r t y g i v e t o t h e o t h e r p a r t y n o t i c e of termination of t h e s a m e a t least s i x t y (60) days p r i o r t o t h e termination d a t e i n any given year, i n which event t h i s agreement s h a l l terminate November 1st f o l - lowing t h e giving of n o t i c e of termination." The n o t i c e of termination s e n t t o Chamberlain by Evans s t a t e d : "NOTICE of TERMINATION of F A R M LEASE C O N T R A C T between L. E. Evans and Josephine Evans (Owners) and C a r l V. Chamberlain and Hertha A. Chamberlain (Operators). "Due t o t h e s a l e of acreage on t h i s farm and sell- i n g of acreage i n various p a r t s of t h i s farm makes it very inconvenient t o farm. Therefore, a s of A p r i l 1, 1974, t h e Operators are t o do no spring planting o r summerfallowing except f o r reseeding i n s p o t s on winter wheat. "The Operators w i l l harvest t h e winter wheat crop now i n , a s s p e c i f i e d i n t h e Contract." I t i s c l e a r from t h e termination provision t h a t n e i t h e r p a r t y w a s required t o s t a t e any reason f o r t h e termination as long as n o t i c e of t h e termination was given s i x t y days p r i o r t o t h e November 1 termination d a t e i n any year. Evans gave (and Chamberlain received) t h i s n o t i c e on o r about A p r i l 1, a f u l l seven months before t h e s p e c i f i e d termina- t i o n d a t e . This n o t i c e complied f u l l y with t h e l e t t e r and s p i r i t of t h e lease. Chamberlain apparently recognized t h i s f a c t and d i d n o t attempt t o t a l k t o Evans about t h e matter a f t e r A p r i l 1. I n such circumstances, any claim by Chamber- l a i n t h a t Evans f r a u d u l e n t l y s t a t e d t h e reasons f o r termina- t i n g t h e lease are groundless f o r t h e simple reason t h a t Evans was n o t required t o s t a t e any reason a t a l l f o r termina- t i n g t h e lease. See Shanahan v. Universal Tavern Corp. (1978) 1 - Mont. , 585 P.2d 1314, 1317, 35 St-Rep. 1585, 1589. Evans followed t h e t e r m s of t h e lease i n terminating it and i s now e n t i t l e d t o summary judgment as a matter of law. Chamberlain's claim i n h i s o r i g i n a l complaint t h a t he is e n t i t l e d t o a s h a r e of t h e 1975 crop i s a l s o groundless. Sections 67-702, -703, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 70-26-206, MCA. H e n e i t h e r planted, c u l t i v a t e d , nor harvested t h e s e crops. I n any event, w e have s t a t e d under very s i m i l a r circumstances: "The record i s c l e a r t h a t p l a i n t i f f knew when he accepted t h e t e r m s of October 2, 1961, t h a t h i s t e r m ended November 1, 1962. A s a matter of f a c t he brought t h i s a c t i o n on May 15, 1962, even be- f o r e t h e t i m e f o r summer-fallow. Treating t h e m a t t e r i n t h e l i g h t most favorable t o p l a i n t i f f , t h a t a lease f o r one year e x i s t e d because of t h e letter of September 27, and t h e addendum of Oc- t o b e r 2, t h e t e r m s a r e p l a i n , and under such conditions t h e r e i s no b a s i s f o r any theory of 'away going' crop. " I n H a l l v. H i l l i n g , supra, t h e r u l e i s announced t h a t when a l e a s e , expressly o r by implication, recognizes t h e r i g h t of a t e n a n t t o sow i n t h e l a s t year of h i s t e r m , t h e t e n a n t has a r i g h t t o h a r v e s t t h e away-going crop a t t h e e x p i r a t i o n of h i s l e a s e , where t h e lease i s s i l e n t a s t o who i s e n t i t l e d t o t h e crop. This general proposition does n o t a i d a p p e l l a n t , s i n c e as we have previ- ously discussed, under t h e circumstances here, t h e very b a s i s f o r h i s l e a s e r i g h t , whether it was a l e a s e a t w i l l o r f o r one-year period, was t o t h e contrary. The o t h e r a u t h o r i t i e s a r e e i t h e r n o t i n p o i n t o r support our holding here. "Summarizing t h e circumstances here, t h e a p p e l l a n t knew when he accepted t h e t e r m s of t h e l a s t l e a s e --- --- t h a t h i s t e r m ended November 1, 1962. H e knew it --- -- --- would n o t b e extended. The l e a s e d i d n o t r e q u i r e -- him t o do any summer-fallowing i n 1962, and i f he chose t o do any t h a t he would be paid. "Under t h e s e circumstances, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t was c o r r e c t . . ." Johnson v. Anderson Ranch Co. (1963), 142 Mont. 251, 254-55, 384 P.2d 271, 272- 73. (Emphasis added. ) I n f a c t , t o accept Chamberlain's theory of t h e c a s e would be t o r e q u i r e i n e f f e c t a one year and s i x t y day n o t i c e of termination period because t h e t e n a n t would always be e n t i t l e d t o t h e crops harvested t h e year following h i s r e c e i p t of n o t i c e of termination. This c l e a r l y contravenes t h e l e a s e provisions. F i n a l l y , f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on appeal, Chamberlain a s s e r t s t h a t h i s claim a l l along has been f o r breach of h i s r i g h t t o q u i e t enjoyment of t h e leased premises. The record does n o t support t h i s a s s e r t i o n . I n t h e main paragraph and prayer of h i s complaint, Chamberlain s t a t e d : "2. That, on o r about March 27, 1974, Defendants gave n o t i c e of termination of lease a l l e g i n g s a l e and use a s an i n d u s t r i a l park, made it inconvenient t o farm. That P l a i n t i f f s r e l i e d upon Defendants r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s and ceased t o farm, although under s a i d l e a s e , they were e n t i t l e d t o summerfallow and farm t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l ground f o r 1975. That t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of Defendants were f a l s e and fraudu- l e n t and made f o r t h e purpose of deceiving Plain- t i f f s , with t h e i n t e n t t h a t P l a i n t i f f s r e l y thereon t o t h e i r detriment. P l a i n t i f f s r e l i e d thereon and s u f f e r e d detriment i n t h e l o s s of t h e i r 1975 crop share. That t h e reasonable value of P l a i n t i f f s ' s h a r e of t h e 1975 crop i s t h e sum of TWENTY SEVEN T H O U S A N D SIX H U N D R E D AND N0/100 DOLLARS ($27,600.00). "WHEREFORE, P l a i n t i f f s pray judgment a s follows: "1. For TWENTY SEVEN T H O U S A N D SIX H U N D R E D AND N0/100 D O L L A R S ($27,600.00) . " That t h i s s t a t e s t h e o r i e s of recovery based on fraud o r on e n t i t l e m e n t t o an "away-going" crop s h a r e i s supportable; t h a t it s t a t e s a theory of breach of q u i e t enjoyment is not. It has long been t h e r u l e t h a t a p a r t y may n o t change h i s theory on appeal t o t h i s Court from t h a t advanced i n t h e t r i a l court: "Under t h e well-known r u l e counsel ought n o t now t o p r e s e n t a d i f f e r e n t theory from t h a t upon which he t r i e d t h e case i n t h e c o u r t below. 'The r u l e i s s e t t l e d i n t h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n t h a t when a p a r t y has adopted one theory upon t h e t r i a l of h i s c a s e he may n o t change t h e theory on appeal. (Gay v. Lavina S t a t e Bank, 61 Mont. 449, 18 A.L.R. 1204, 202 Pac. 753.)' (O'Hanlon v. Ruby Gulch M. Co., 64 Mont. 318, 209 Pac. 1062; P a t t e r s o n v. Law, 78 Mont. 221, 254 Pac. 412.)" United S t a t e s Build- i n g & Loan Ass'n v . Burns (1931), 90 Mont. 402, 420, 4 P.2d 703, 707. Accord, W i l l i a r d v. Campbell (1932), 91 Mont. 493, 503, 1 1 Even i f w e assume t h a t Chamberlain's claim a l l along has been f o r breach of q u i e t enjoyment, he would s t i l l have no claim f o r r e l i e f a s t h e r e was no breach. Chamberlain would be e n t i t l e d t o a s h a r e of t h e 1974 crop harvested before t h e end of t h e l e a s e . A s i n d i c a t e d by t h e t e r m i - n a t i o n n o t i c e and t h e record, t h i s i s e x a c t l y what he d i d r e c e i v e . Nothing Evans o r Killion-Moore d i d i n 1974 i n t e r - f e r e d with Chamberlain's r i g h t t o h a r v e s t t h i s crop. Chamber- l a i n ' s f l a t a s s e r t i o n t h a t he i s e n t i t l e d t o some broader degree of possession of t h i s farm land when he would n o t be e n t i t l e d t o any of t h e f r u i t s of t h e land harvested a f t e r t h e termination of t h e lease i s i n s u f f i c i e n t grounds on which t o deny Evans' motion f o r summary judgment. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed. , ' J u s t i c e / ' We concur: