Case Title: CED Properties, LLC v. City of Oshkosh

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2016AP000474

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2018-04-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 WI 24 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP474 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
CED Properties, LLC, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
City of Oshkosh, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 373 Wis. 2d 767, 895 N.W.2d 855 
(2017 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 3, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 1, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago 
 
JUDGE: 
John A. Jorgensen 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. dissents, joined by A.W. BRADLEY, 
J. (opinion filed) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Erik S. Olsen, Joseph J. Rolling, Andrew D. Weininger, 
and Eminent Domain Services, LLC, Madison.  There was an oral 
argument by Erik S. Olsen. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Richard J. Carlson and Silton Seifert Carlson, SC, Appleton.  
There was an oral argument by Richard J. Carlson. 
 
 
 
2018 WI 24 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP474 
(L.C. No. 
2015CV70) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
CED Properties, LLC, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Oshkosh, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 3, 2018 
 
Shelia T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
the cause remanded to the circuit court.   
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   CED Properties, LLC (CED) 
challenges the special assessment imposed by the City of Oshkosh 
(City)1 following the reconfiguration of a traditional traffic 
light intersection into a roundabout.2  We review the unpublished 
court of appeals decision, CED Properties, LLC v. City of 
                                                 
1 The City imposed the special assessment on other affected 
commercial property owners, but this case involves only CED's 
challenge to the special assessment. 
2 Roundabout, American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language (5th ed. 2011) ("A traffic circle."). 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
2 
 
Oshkosh, No. 2016AP474, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 
18, 2017), affirming the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the City.3  CED raises two issues:  
(1) whether the term "special benefits" in Wisconsin's eminent 
domain statute has the same meaning in Wisconsin's special 
assessments statute, and if so, whether the City's denial of the 
existence of any special benefits during the earlier eminent 
domain 
proceeding 
precludes 
the 
City 
from 
asserting 
the 
conferral of special benefits in the later special assessment 
action; and (2) whether CED raised genuine issues of material 
fact precluding summary judgment.   
¶2 
We hold that "special benefits" has the same meaning 
under both statutes.  Although the failure to raise the issue of 
special 
benefits 
in 
an 
eminent 
domain 
action 
does 
not 
necessarily preclude a municipality from later doing so in a 
special assessment action, a municipality's admission that 
special benefits are non-existent in the context of an eminent 
domain proceeding constitutes relevant evidence in a later 
challenge to the special assessment. 
¶3 
We further hold the court of appeals erred in 
concluding CED failed to overcome the presumption of correctness 
afforded 
the 
City's 
special 
assessment 
and 
to 
establish 
sufficient genuine issues of material fact.  The affidavit of 
CED's 
expert 
raises 
material 
factual 
issues 
in 
dispute, 
                                                 
3 The 
Honorable 
John 
A. 
Jorgensen, 
Winnebago 
County, 
presiding.   
No. 
2016AP474   
 
3 
 
including whether the roundabout project conferred a local 
rather than a general benefit, whether the project conferred any 
special benefits on CED's property or actually diminished its 
value, and whether the amount of the special assessment was fair 
and equitably apportioned among the commercial properties 
involved as well as proportionate to the benefits accruing to 
the property.  Because we conclude CED overcame any presumption 
of correctness by presenting competent evidence to the contrary, 
we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand to 
the circuit court for a trial.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
CED owns property located on the northeast corner of 
the intersection of United States Highway 45 and State Highway 
76. Locally, United States Highway 45 is called Murdock Avenue 
and State Highway 76 is called Jackson Street.  A Taco Bell 
franchise has operated on the property since 1992.   
¶5 
In January 2008, the City and the Wisconsin Department 
of Transportation entered into an improvement plan agreement to 
reconstruct and install a multi-lane roundabout at the Jackson-
Murdock intersection.  The reconstruction plan proposed the 
removal of traffic signals, concrete and asphalt paving, 
concrete driveway approaches, sidewalk replacement and repair, 
sanitary and storm sewer laterals, and the improvement of 
streetscaping and landscaping.  The plan required the City to 
take about six percent of CED's property to ensure enough space 
to build the roundabout.  The City used its power of eminent 
domain under Wis. Stat. ch. 32 to do so.  In April 2012, after 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
4 
 
lengthy litigation, the City and CED agreed the City would pay 
CED $180,000 just compensation for the taking.  During that 
litigation, the City filed with the circuit court the appraisal 
of its expert, Patrick Wagner.  According to Wagner's report, 
the City's partial taking caused CED's property to decrease in 
value by $38,850, and he testified during his deposition that 
the taking did not confer any "special benefits" on CED's 
property under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(3) (2015-16).4   
¶6 
In July 2010, the City passed a resolution that levied 
special assessments upon CED's property and other commercial 
properties pursuant to its police power under Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0703(1)(a)5 to help fund the intersection improvement 
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated.   
Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09(3) provides:   
Special 
benefits 
accruing 
to 
the 
property 
and 
affecting its market value because of the planned 
improvement shall be considered and used to offset the 
value of property taken or damages under [Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09(6)], but in no event shall such special 
benefits be allowed in excess of damages described 
under sub. (6). 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0703(1)(a) provides:   
(a)  Except as provided in s. 66.0721, as a complete 
alternative to all other methods provided by law, any 
city, town or village may, by resolution of its 
governing body, levy and collect special assessments 
upon property in a limited and determinable area for 
special benefits conferred upon the property by any 
municipal work or improvement; and may provide for the 
payment of all or any part of the cost of the work or 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
5 
 
project.  CED challenged the special assessment, but the City 
argued the challenge was untimely.  That dispute ended after 
this court ruled that CED's appeal of the assessment was timely 
and its complaint sufficient; we instructed the circuit court to 
grant summary judgment in favor of CED.  See CED Properties, LLC 
v. City of Oshkosh, 2014 WI 10, 352 Wis. 2d 613, 843 N.W.2d 382 
[hereinafter "CED I"].6     
¶7 
Following this court's decision in CED I, the City re-
assessed CED pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(10),7 imposing a 
                                                                                                                                                             
improvement out of the proceeds of the special 
assessments. 
Paragraph (b) provides where "an assessment represents an 
exercise of the police power, the assessment shall be upon a 
reasonable basis as determined by the governing body of the 
city, town or village." 
6 CED asserted in CED I that the improvement project had not 
conferred special benefits under Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(1)(a), but 
this substantive issue was not addressed or resolved.  See CED 
Properties, LLC v. City of Oshkosh, 2014 WI 10, 352 Wis. 2d 613, 
843 N.W.2d 382. 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0703(10) provides:   
 
If the actual cost of any project, upon completion or 
after the receipt of bids, is found to vary materially 
from the estimates, if any assessment is void or 
invalid, 
or 
if 
the 
governing 
body 
decides 
to 
reconsider and reopen any assessment, it may, after 
giving notice as provided in sub. (7)(a) and after a 
public hearing, amend, cancel or confirm the prior 
assessment. A notice of the resolution amending, 
canceling or confirming the prior assessment shall be 
given by the clerk as provided in sub. (8)(d). If the 
assessments are amended to provide for the refunding 
of special assessment B bonds under s. 66.0713(6), all 
direct and indirect costs reasonably attributable to 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
6 
 
special assessment of $19,486.36 based on CED's frontage along 
Jackson Street and $20,616.67 based on CED's frontage along 
Murdock Avenue for a total special assessment of $40,103.03.8  
The City issued a final resolution authorizing the re-assessment 
and a report describing the special benefits conferred upon CED 
as:  "a substantial increase in accessibility, which includes 
safer, lower cost, and shorter travel times for customers, 
deliveries and employees.  These special benefits are different 
in kind than those enjoyed by the public for through traffic."  
The City said additional special benefits were conveyed by 
correcting sidewalk defects in sections contiguous with the 
property, which "provide[d] a safe corridor for pedestrians to 
access the site," and by improving the streetscape, which 
enhanced the property's overall aesthetics.   
¶8 
The City's report further explained that the project 
improved the intersection's primary function of moving and 
carrying traffic (a "community benefit") as well as the 
secondary benefit of providing access to traffic flow (a 
"special benefit" to abutting property owners, like CED).  
According to the City, this intersection served about 25,000 
                                                                                                                                                             
the refunding of the bonds may be included in the cost 
of the public improvements being financed. 
 
8 The 
entire 
project 
cost 
$4,060,000. 
The 
Wisconsin 
Department of Transportation paid $2,610,750.  The City paid 
$1,449,250, but specially assessed the affected property owners 
$307,118.72 of that amount.  The $40,103.03 charged to CED 
equaled 0.99 percent of the total entire project cost.  
No. 
2016AP474   
 
7 
 
vehicles each day, with 1,973 (or about 7.9 percent) of those 
vehicles tied to stops at the Taco Bell on CED's property.   The 
City's analysis indicated that before the roundabout, it took a 
vehicle 37.9 seconds to travel through the intersection; this 
was reduced to 10.5 seconds per vehicle after the project. 
¶9 
CED again appealed the special assessment to the 
circuit court, claiming the project conferred only community or 
general benefits of better traffic flow and no local or special 
benefits at all.  CED further claimed the assessment was 
unreasonable because it had no nexus between the linear feet 
upon which the property was assessed and the alleged benefits 
conferred.   
¶10 The City moved for summary judgment.  It acknowledged 
the improvement conferred public benefits, but asserted that the 
improvement also conferred special benefits assessable against 
CED, that the resulting assessment was reasonable, and that CED 
failed to overcome the presumption of correctness afforded the 
City's assessment.   
¶11 CED opposed the motion, arguing that because the City 
conceded "special benefits" did not accrue to CED's property 
during the Wis. Stat. ch. 32 eminent domain action, the City 
forfeited the opportunity to assert "special benefits" during 
the later special assessment appeal.  Alternatively, CED argued 
that even if asserting special benefits during the eminent 
domain action was not a condition precedent to asserting them 
during the ch. 66 special assessment action, the improvements 
were not local in nature, no special benefits accrued, and the 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
8 
 
assessments' costs were unreasonably apportioned among the 
abutting property owners.  CED also argued that the special 
assessment violated the equal protection clause of the Wisconsin 
and United States Constitutions.9   
¶12 In support of its arguments, CED submitted the 
affidavit and appraisal of its expert witness, James C. Johnson.  
According to his affidavit, Johnson is a certified general 
appraiser 
who 
was 
previously 
employed 
by 
the 
Wisconsin 
Department of Transportation as an "access specialist."  During 
his time with that department, he "served on the committee that 
established 
the 
'Special 
Benefits 
Criteria' 
which 
were 
implemented and used by the [department] for assessing whether 
benefits were general benefits or special benefits."  He cites 
to cases on which he acted as an "access expert . . . on the 
issue of reasonable access."  He served as the department's 
"litigation coordinator," training the department's consultant 
appraisers "on evaluating general vs. special benefits."  "[A]ll 
requests for changes in the amount of compensation due to 
landowners 
in 
the 
southwest 
region 
were 
reviewed 
by 
[Johnson] . . . includ[ing] consideration of any access issues, 
general benefits, and special benefits."   
¶13 Having personally inspected CED's property, Johnson 
believed that "absolutely no benefit to [CED's property], let 
alone a special benefit" arose from any of the improvements.  In 
                                                 
9 CED does not make this argument before this court. 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
9 
 
fact, Johnson opined that the roundabout was a detriment to 
CED's property, explaining:  "Retail fast food sites like the 
subject 
are 
more 
valuable 
when 
they 
are 
on 
controlled 
intersections" since "[g]reater time at the intersection is 
desirable for the subject because the subject is an impulse 
stop."  According to Johnson's appraisal, as of October 29, 
2009, the roundabout project caused the fair market value of 
CED's property to decrease $251,370.   
¶14 CED also submitted an affidavit from its attorney, 
attaching, as material here, Wagner's appraisal and the page 
from Wagner's deposition where he said no special benefit 
accrued to CED's property in the eminent domain action.  CED 
asserted in its brief opposing summary judgment that Wagner's 
appraisal and testimony precluded the City from later specially 
assessing CED for "special benefits."  
¶15  The circuit court granted the City's motion for 
summary judgment.  It did not address whether genuine issues of 
fact remained regarding the existence of a special benefit, 
whether the benefit was local or general, or whether the 
assessment was reasonable.   
¶16 CED appealed and the court of appeals affirmed, with 
Judge Mark Gundrum dissenting.  CED Properties, LLC v. City of 
Oshkosh, No. 2016AP474, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 
18, 2017).  The court of appeals' majority ruled CED failed to 
prove "a genuine issue of material fact to show that it has 
overcome the presumption of correctness" and failed to prove the 
special assessments were not reasonable.  Id., ¶29.  Judge 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
10 
 
Gundrum disagreed, concluding that CED's expert's affidavit 
setting forth reasons why the project made vehicle access to 
CED's property "worse, not better" was sufficient evidence that 
"could support a finding by a reasonable jury that a special 
benefit does not exist."  Id., ¶34 (Gundrum, J. dissenting) 
(quoting First State Bank v. Town of Omro, 2015 WI App 99, ¶20, 
366 Wis. 2d 219, 873 N.W.2d 247).  Judge Gundrum said "a jury 
issue exists as to whether the Jackson-Murdock Project conferred 
special benefits on the CED property," and the "matter should be 
returned to the circuit court for a jury trial on the issue."  
Id., ¶¶30, 34.  CED petitioned for review in this court, which 
we granted. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶17 This case requires us to review a grant of summary 
judgment against CED.  "We independently review a grant of 
summary judgment using the same methodology of the circuit court 
and the court of appeals."  Water Well Sols. Serv. Grp., Inc. v. 
Consol. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 54, ¶11, 369 Wis. 2d 607, 881 
N.W.2d 285.  The law governing summary judgment is well-known.  
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute 
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  Summary judgment must 
be 
granted 
"if 
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  Id.   
No. 
2016AP474   
 
11 
 
¶18 We apply a two-step test to make this determination.  
Garza v. Am. Transmission Co. LLC, 2017 WI 35, ¶21, 374 
Wis. 2d 555, 893 N.W.2d 1 (citing Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 
136 Wis. 2d 304, 314-15, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987)).  First, this 
court asks if the plaintiff stated a claim for relief.  Id.  
Second, this court applies Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2), asking if any 
factual issues exist that preclude a grant of summary judgment.  
Id.  It is undisputed here that CED's complaint states a claim 
for relief.  The parties' dispute focuses on whether CED 
presented sufficient evidence to create any material issues of 
fact to overcome the presumption of correctness.   
¶19 "Summary judgment is a drastic remedy; therefore, the 
moving party must clearly be entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law."  Genrich v. City of Rice Lake, 2003 WI App 255, ¶6, 268 
Wis. 2d 233, 673 N.W.2d 361 (citing Vill. of Fontana-On-Geneva 
Lake v. Hoag, 57 Wis. 2d 209, 214, 203 N.W.2d 680 (1973)).  In 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts in a 
light most favorable to CED, the nonmoving party.  See Genrich, 
268 Wis. 2d 233, ¶6.  Any doubts as to whether a genuine issue 
of material fact exists should be resolved against the City as 
the moving party.  Id.   
¶20 This 
case 
also 
involves 
the 
interpretation 
and 
interplay 
of 
two 
statutes, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 32.09 and 66.0703(1)(a).  The interpretation of statutes 
presents a question of law we review de novo.  State v. Talley, 
2017 WI 21, ¶24, 373 Wis. 2d 610, 891 N.W.2d 390. 
 
 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
12 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶21 CED and the City disagree on whether the term "special 
benefits" has the same meaning in both Wis. Stat. ch. 32 and 
ch. 66.  CED argues that if it has the same meaning, then the 
City cannot take the position that no special benefits exist in 
a ch. 32 action but later assert special benefits exist in a 
ch. 66 action.  We hold the term "special benefits" has the same 
meaning in both statutes, but that it is used differently in 
each context.  Accordingly, the City is not barred from imposing 
a special assessment on CED's property to pay for improvements, 
provided the City establishes the improvements were local, 
conferred special benefits on CED's property, and were fair, 
equitable, and in proportion to the benefits accruing to the 
property.  These issues involve questions of fact for the trier 
of fact to resolve.  
A.  The Meaning and Application of "Special Benefits" 
¶22 We begin with the language of the statutes.  See State 
ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 
WI 76, ¶31, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).  Except for 
technical or specially-defined words or phrases, "[s]tatutory 
language 
is 
given 
its 
common, 
ordinary, 
and 
accepted 
meaning. . . ."  Id.  Additionally, because "[c]ontext is 
important to meaning. . . . statutory language is interpreted in 
the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of 
a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
No. 
2016AP474   
 
13 
 
related 
statutes; 
and 
reasonably, 
to 
avoid 
absurd 
or 
unreasonable 
results." 
 
Id., 
¶46 
(citations 
omitted).  
"Statutory language is read where possible to give reasonable 
effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."  Id. 
¶23 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 32.09 and 66.0703(1)(a) both use 
the term "special benefits."  Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09 governs 
"all matters involving the determination of just compensation in 
eminent domain proceedings."  Section 32.09(3) provides:   
Special 
benefits 
accruing 
to 
the 
property 
and 
affecting its market value because of the planned 
improvement shall be considered and used to offset the 
value of property taken or damages under [Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09(6)], but in no event shall such special 
benefits be allowed in excess of damages described 
under sub. (6).[10] 
(Emphasis added.)  Section 66.0703 governs the general rules 
applicable to special assessments imposed by a city, town or 
village.   Section 66.0703(1)(a) provides: 
Except as provided in s. 66.0721,[11] as a complete 
alternative to all other methods provided by law, any 
city, town or village may, by resolution of its 
governing body, levy and collect special assessments 
upon property in a limited and determinable area for 
special benefits conferred upon the property by any 
municipal work or improvement; and may provide for the 
payment of all or any part of the cost of the work or 
improvement out of the proceeds of the special 
assessments. 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 32.09(6) 
provides 
the 
method 
to 
determine the amount a property owner shall be compensated in 
the case of a partial taking of property.   
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0721, entitled "Special assessments 
on certain farmland or camps for construction of sewerage or 
water system," is not relevant to the analysis of this case.   
No. 
2016AP474   
 
14 
 
(Emphasis added.)   
¶24 Because neither statute defines the non-technical term 
"special benefits," we give the term its common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  The common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning of the term "special benefits" 
itself does not change from one statutory section to another, 
particularly 
when 
the 
statutory 
provisions 
have 
some 
relationship as they do here.12  "Statutes in pari materia are to 
be interpreted together as though they were one law."  Antonin 
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of 
Legal Texts 252 (2012).  In other words, laws addressing the 
same subject should be interpreted harmoniously, if possible.  
Id.  There is no textual basis for assigning different 
interpretations of "special benefits" accruing to property in 
the 
context 
of 
eminent 
domain 
versus 
"special 
benefits" 
conferred on property upon which a special assessment is levied.  
Wisconsin courts have applied the same definition of special 
benefits in both the eminent domain and special assessment 
contexts.  
¶25 "Special benefits" means "an uncommon advantage."  Red 
Top Farms v. DOT, 177 Wis. 2d 822, 833, 503 N.W.2d 354 (Ct. App. 
1993) (eminent domain); Goodger v. City of Delavan, 134 
                                                 
12 "The presumption of consistent usage applies also when 
different sections of an act or code are at issue" and "the more 
connection the cited statute has with the statute under 
consideration, 
the 
more 
plausible 
the 
argument 
becomes."  
Antonin 
Scalia 
& 
Bryan 
A. 
Garner, 
Reading 
Law: 
 
The 
Interpretation of Legal Text 172-73 (2012). 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
15 
 
Wis. 2d 348, 352, 396 N.W.2d 778 (Ct. App. 1986) (special 
assessment).  "Special" is defined as "[s]urpassing what is 
common or usual."  Special, American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language (1992 3d. ed.).  "Benefit" is defined as 
"[s]omething 
that 
produces 
or 
enhances 
well 
being; 
an 
advantage."  Benefit, American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language (1992 3d ed.).  This judicial definition of 
"special benefits" as "an uncommon advantage" aligns with the 
text of both statutes.  
¶26 In Goodger, the court of appeals addressed whether a 
special benefit was conferred for purposes of determining the 
validity of a special assessment.  134 Wis. 2d at 352.  It 
adopted a plain meaning definition of "special benefits" to 
denote 
"uncommon 
advantage" 
because 
"[a]bsent . . . a 
legislative definition, the ordinary and accepted meaning of a 
word used by the legislature can be established by reference to 
a recognized dictionary."  Id. (citation omitted).  
¶27 The legislature uses the term "special benefits" in 
each statute differently.  In Wis. Stat. § 32.09(3), the term 
begins the subsection and is qualified by the words that follow:  
"Special benefits accruing to the property and affecting its 
market value because of the planned improvement . . . ."  In 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(1)(a), the term is embedded in the middle 
of a sentence and is not qualified by an effect on the 
property's market value:  " . . . for special benefits conferred 
upon the property by any municipal work or improvement. . . ."  
Although the meaning of the term "special benefits" itself 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
16 
 
remains the same in both statutes, how it is used and applied in 
the eminent domain and special assessment contexts is textually 
different.  
¶28 In the eminent domain statute, "special benefits" are 
restricted to those local improvements that affect the market 
value of the property13 for purposes of determining whether to 
offset compensation to the owner of property taken for a planned 
public improvement.  If the improvement project necessitating 
the taking does not affect the market value of the property, 
then the City is not entitled to an offset for any special 
benefits accruing to the property because of the planned 
improvement.  An assertion of "special benefits" in eminent 
domain actions acts as an affirmative defense for the condemnor; 
the governmental body has the burden of showing it is entitled 
to an offset when property immediately increases or imminently 
will increase in market value.  Hietpas v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 
650, 656-57, 130 N.W.2d 248 (1964); see also Molbreak v. Vill. 
of Shorewood Hills, 66 Wis. 2d 687, 703, 225 N.W.2d 894 (1975) 
("special benefits accruing to land not taken in eminent 
domain . . . may be set off against damages if they enhance the 
                                                 
13 This court expanded the scope of special benefits to 
include "imminent adaptability of the land to a higher and 
better use from an economic standpoint because of proximity to 
the public improvement."  Hietpas v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 650, 656, 
130 N.W.2d 248 (1964).  Concomitantly, this court also extended 
the meaning of special benefits "to include enhanced value  
because of more advantageous adaptability for use."  Petkus v. 
State, 24 Wis. 2d 643, 648, 130 N.W.2d 253 (1964). 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
17 
 
market value immediately" (emphasis added) (citing Hietpas, 24 
Wis. 2d at 656-57)).   
¶29 The statutory qualification in Wis. Stat. § 32.09(3) 
links special benefits to an effect on the market value of the 
property.  When the property's market value remains unaffected 
by the planned improvement, a particular taking may not require 
an offset against compensation owed to the property owner.  
Regardless, the improvement project may nevertheless confer 
special benefits on the property owner within the meaning of 
ch. 66.    
¶30 Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0703(1)(a) does not condition 
special assessments on the conferral of special benefits 
affecting the market value of the property.  The work or 
improvement must only provide an uncommon advantage specific to 
that property.  See Genrich, 268 Wis. 2d 233, ¶¶13-14; Goodger, 
134 Wis. 2d at 352.  Under § 66.0703(1)(a), "special benefits" 
can 
include 
an 
increase 
in 
market 
value 
following 
the 
improvement.  Molbreak, 66 Wis. 2d at 703.  But the text does 
not require it. 
¶31 CED argues that the word "shall" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09(3) is mandatory language requiring the City to consider 
and use any special benefits to offset compensation to the 
property owner in an eminent domain action; therefore, CED 
argues, failing to raise special benefits in an eminent domain 
action forecloses a municipality from later assessing the 
property for special benefits purportedly conferred.  This 
argument ignores the narrowing of § 32.09(3)'s mandate to only 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
18 
 
those special benefits affecting a property's market value.  In 
the absence of an immediate or imminent increase in a property's 
fair market value triggered by the planned public improvement, 
the municipality need not consider or use special benefits to 
offset the value of property taken under § 32.09.14  
¶32 In the eminent domain proceeding involving CED's 
property, the City's expert witness testified that he did not 
believe CED's property received any special benefits from the 
improvement project: 
                                                 
14 CED asserted at oral argument before this court that the 
City is judicially estopped from specially assessing CED for 
"special benefits" because it conceded no special benefits arose 
in the condemnation action. We disagree. Judicial estoppel 
"precludes a party from asserting a position in a legal 
proceeding and then subsequently asserting an inconsistent 
position."  State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 347, 548 N.W.2d 817 
(1996)(citations omitted).  The doctrine is equitable in nature, 
intended to protect the proceedings against "cold manipulation" 
rather than "unthinking or confused blunder[s]."  Id. (citations 
omitted).  Accordingly, "[t]he doctrine is only applied when the 
positions 
taken 
by 
a 
party 
are 
truly 
inconsistent."  
Id. at 350 n.5.  
The City's position in each proceeding is not clearly 
inconsistent.  "Special benefits" in condemnation actions are 
limited to immediate or imminent increases to a property's fair 
market value.  The City is not specially assessing CED on the 
basis of an increase in the fair market value of CED's property.  
If the City successfully establishes the conferral of special 
benefits on CED's property, based on the asserted "substantial 
increase[s] in accessibility, which includes safer, lower cost, 
and 
shorter 
travel 
times 
for 
customers, 
deliveries 
and 
employees," then the City may levy and collect a special 
assessment 
upon 
CED's 
property, 
provided 
the 
other 
prerequisites——the 
improvement 
is 
local 
and 
the 
special 
assessment is reasonable——are met.  
No. 
2016AP474   
 
19 
 
Q.  Okay.  In your appraisal here, did you find any 
special benefits to the subject property? 
A.  No. 
Q.  Okay.  Are there any special benefits to the 
property in this case? 
A. 
I don't believe so. 
This testimony does not resolve the issue of special benefits in 
the context of a special assessment because the record is 
unclear regarding whether the City's expert identified no 
special benefits that affected the property's market value or if 
he identified no special benefits whatsoever.  
¶33 We conclude that "special benefits" has the same 
meaning in each statute, but the failure to raise the issue of 
special 
benefits 
in 
an 
eminent 
domain 
action 
does 
not 
necessarily preclude a municipality from levying and collecting 
"special 
benefits" 
via 
a 
subsequent 
special 
assessment.  
Notably, in an eminent domain action, only special benefits 
accruing to the property that affect its market value because of 
the planned improvement are required to be considered and used 
to offset the value of the property taken.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09(3).  In contrast, special assessments upon property may 
be levied and collected for special benefits conferred on the 
property by the improvement, regardless of the impact on the 
property's market value; Wis. Stat. § 66.0703 is silent on the 
subject.  
¶34 CED decries the inefficiency and burden of forcing 
property owners to "endure" two proceedings; however, the remedy 
lies not with the judiciary but with the legislature, which 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
20 
 
produced the ostensible problem.  Perhaps, as CED contends, the 
legislature did not intend this result but this court does not 
divine the legislature's intentions; it interprets what the 
legislature actually enacted. 
B. 
Prerequisites to Police Power Special Assessments 
¶35 While the City's denial of special benefits in the 
eminent domain action does not foreclose its assertion of 
special benefits in a subsequent special assessment, the City 
must satisfy certain requirements in order for its assessment to 
be valid.  In order for the City to exercise its police power15 
to levy a special assessment on property to pay for public 
improvements, 
three 
requirements 
must 
be 
met: 
 
(1) 
the 
improvement 
must 
be 
local 
rather 
than 
general; 
(2) 
the 
improvement must confer special benefits on the property; and 
(3) the assessment must be fair and equitable and in proportion 
to the benefits accruing.  First State Bank, 366 Wis. 2d 219, ¶9 
(citations 
omitted). 
 
These 
three 
requirements 
are 
interdependent.  If the improvement is deemed general, the 
inquiry stops and the special assessment is not permissible.  If 
the improvement is local, the analysis shifts to whether the 
property received special benefits.  If not, the special 
assessment is invalid.  If special benefits are found, the 
review 
moves 
to 
the 
assessment's 
reasonableness. 
 
Each 
requirement is addressed in turn. 
                                                 
15 It is undisputed that the City exercised its police power 
in imposing the special assessments to fund the improvement 
project. 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
21 
 
 
1. 
Local versus general improvements 
¶36 Because special assessments can be levied only for 
local improvements, the character of the improvement must first 
be determined before the propriety of the assessment is 
considered.  Genrich, 268 Wis. 2d 233, ¶9.  A public improvement 
is general in character if it "confers a substantially equal 
benefit and advantage on the property of the whole community or 
benefits the public at large."  Duncan Dev. Corp. v. Crestview 
Sanitary Dist., 22 Wis. 2d 258, 264, 125 N.W.2d 617 (1964).  
Typically, general improvements are "financed by general taxes."  
Id.  Because a general improvement benefits the whole community, 
it may naturally provide a benefit of some degree to the 
affected property.  In contrast, although a local improvement 
"may incidentally benefit all the property in the municipality 
and the public at large" it "is made primarily for the 
accommodation and convenience of inhabitants of a particular 
area in the community whose property receives a special benefit 
from the improvement."  Id. (emphasis added).  "The fact that an 
improvement confers a general benefit on the community does not 
mean that certain property cannot benefit specially."  Molbreak, 
66 Wis. 2d at 699 (first citing Brock v. Lemke, 455 P.2d 1, 3 
(1969); then citing 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corps. § 1314) (special 
assessment); see also Red Top Farms, 177 Wis. 2d at 829 
("special benefit . . . accrues to a property owner in addition 
to the benefit enjoyed by other property owners in the 
community"). 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
22 
 
¶37 Because special assessments can be levied only "for 
local improvements . . . the circuit court must examine whether 
the improvement was local, that is, whether the purpose was to 
accommodate particular property owners and confer a special 
benefit."  Park Ave. Plaza v. City of Mequon, 2008 WI App 39, 
¶20, 308 Wis. 2d 439, 747 N.W.2d 703 (citations omitted).  In 
order to be considered local rather than general, the special 
benefit must also have "the effect of furnishing an uncommon 
advantage to a property differing in kind, rather than in 
degree, from the benefits enjoyed by the general public."  Id., 
¶17 (citations omitted); Genrich, 263 Wis. 2d 233, ¶14; Petkus 
v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 643, 648, 130 N.W.2d 253 (1964).  This 
concept dates back to 1851, when this court held that "common 
advantages 
to 
the 
neighborhood 
were 
not 
chargeable 
as 
benefits . . . but only such as were peculiar to [the particular 
parcel]."  Red Top Farms, 177 Wis. 2d at 826 (citing Milwaukee & 
Miss. R.R. v. Eble, 3 Pin. 334, 358 (1851)).  The test is 
whether the property upon which the special assessment is levied 
"has gained a benefit not shared by any other parcel."  Id. at 
832. 
2. 
Special benefits 
¶38 If an improvement is local in character, the next 
consideration is whether the improvement conferred special 
benefits on the subject property.  Section III.A comprehensively 
examines the meaning of "special benefits."  Additionally, we 
note that "a benefit could accrue without any actual use of the 
improvement."  Molbreak, 66 Wis. 2d at 701.  Commercial property 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
23 
 
may receive special benefits from improved traffic safety and 
aesthetic improvements to an adjacent public road.  Id. at 699.  
Finally, "the benefits necessary to sustain a special assessment 
'must be substantial, certain, and capable of being realized 
within a reasonable time.'"  Wm. H. Heinemann Creameries, Inc. 
v. 
Vill. 
of 
Kewaskum, 
275 
Wis. 636, 
641, 
82 
N.W.2d 902 
(1957)(citation omitted).  
¶39 We also address CED's argument that this court 
incorrectly expanded "special benefits" to mean not only an 
improvement, but also to encompass a "service."  Duncan, 22 
Wis. 2d at 264 
(first 
citing 
14 
McQuillin, 
Municipal 
Corporations § 38.11 (3d ed.); then citing 48 Am. Jur. 2d 
Special or Local Assessments § 1 (1964)).  The expansion of 
"special benefits" in Duncan ostensibly to include services was 
repeated but not applied by the court of appeals in Genrich, 268 
Wis. 2d 233, ¶13, and First State Bank, 366 Wis. 2d 219, ¶20 
("[a]n uncommon advantage will either increase services to 
property or enhance its value").  Notably, Duncan involved an 
assessment based on enhanced value of the property as a result 
of the improvement.  22 Wis. 2d at 268. 
¶40 Accepting CED's argument could require us to overrule 
Duncan, a step we need not analyze.16  While it is questionable 
whether services constitute "special benefits" for which a 
                                                 
16 Because a roundabout is unquestionably an improvement and 
not a service, we defer a thorough analysis of 
Duncan 
Development 
Corp. 
v. 
Crestview 
Sanitary 
District, 
22 
Wis. 2d 258, 125 N.W.2d 617 (1964).  
No. 
2016AP474   
 
24 
 
special assessment potentially could be levied,17 the issue is 
irrelevant in this case because a roundabout is an improvement, 
not a service.  "Service" as defined in § 66.0627(1)(c) 
includes:   
snow 
and 
ice 
removal, 
weed 
elimination, 
street 
sprinkling, oiling and tarring, repair of sidewalks or 
curb 
and 
gutter, 
garbage 
and 
refuse 
disposal, 
recycling, 
storm 
water 
management, 
including 
construction of storm water management facilities, 
tree care, removal and disposition of dead animals 
under s. 60.23 (20), loan repayment under s. 70.57 (4) 
(b), soil conservation work under s. 92.115, and snow 
removal under s. 86.105. 
Construction of a roundabout is not mentioned in the statutory 
definition of services and nothing in the list of services is 
analogous to a roundabout.  While use of the word "includes" 
indicates that what follows are examples rather than an 
                                                 
17 Under Wis. Stat. § 66.0627(2), a municipality "may impose 
a special charge against real property for current services 
rendered . . . ."  Section 66.0627(1)(c) defines "service."  In 
contrast, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
66.0703 
governs 
the 
levying 
and 
collection of "special assessments" for "special benefits" 
conferred on property by an improvement.  Because special 
charges are imposed for services, whereas special assessments 
are levied and collected for improvements, the legislature 
regards services and improvements as distinct things subjecting 
property owners to different taxes:  charges for services and 
assessments for improvements. 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
25 
 
exhaustive list,18 the associated-words canon instructs that 
associated words bear on one another's meaning.  Brown v. Chi. & 
N.W. Ry. Co., 102 Wis. 137, 156, 78 N.W. 771 (1899) ("You may 
know the meaning of a term by its associates,——what precedes and 
what follows it.  When?  Not in every case; but when not 
apparent 
from 
the 
language 
itself."); 
Scalia 
& 
Garner, 
supra ¶24, at 195.  The statutory examples of "services" have in 
common the removal or rectification of temporary but recurring 
occurrences, such as snow, weeds, and dead animals, along with 
repair of sidewalks, curbs, or gutters——but not the construction 
of a permanent structure like a roundabout.19  Contrary to the 
City's characterization, infrastructure is not a service.  
                                                 
18 "The 
verb 
to 
include 
introduces 
examples, 
not 
an 
exhaustive list."  Scalia & Garner, supra note 12, at 132; State 
v. James P., 2005 WI 80, ¶26, 281 Wis. 2d 685, 698, 698 N.W.2d 
95, 102 (quoting Wis. Citizens Concerned for Cranes and Doves v. 
DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶17 n.11, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612) 
("'Generally, the word "includes" is to be given an expansive 
meaning, indicating that which follows is but a part of the 
whole.'  While courts may sometimes read the word 'includes' as 
a term of limitation or enumeration under the doctrine of 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, there must be some 
textual evidence that the legislature intended this doctrine to 
apply."). 
19 The reconstruction of the intersection included the 
replacement and repair of sidewalks:  According to the report of 
the Public Works Director and City Manager, "[d]efective 
sidewalks section include those with open cracks, offset joints 
or other defects that create a hazard to those using the 
sidewalk.  Removal of the hazards provides a safe corridor for 
pedestrians to access the site." "[R]epair of sidewalks" is 
specifically enumerated as a service for which the City may 
impose a special charge on real property under Wis. Stat. § 
66.0627(2). 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
26 
 
Improved infrastructure may facilitate the delivery of services 
to a property but it is not, in and of itself, a service. 
3. 
Reasonableness 
¶41 The third prerequisite to the exercise of the police 
power to levy a special assessment requires a reasonable basis 
for the assessment.  An assessment made under the police power 
is not limited to the value of the benefits conferred on the 
property but must be made on a reasonable basis.  Steinbach v. 
Green Lake Sanitary Dist., 2006 WI 63, ¶13, 291 Wis. 2d 11, 715 
N.W.2d 195.  Reasonableness in this context requires (1) 
uniformity——the 
assessment 
must 
be 
fairly 
and 
equitably 
apportioned among all affected properties; and (2) uniqueness——
the assessment on a particular property must be in proportion to 
the benefits conferred.  Genrich, 268 Wis. 2d 233, ¶¶20-21.   
¶42 Multiple methods may be used to achieve uniformity.  
Id., ¶21.  The City's selected method must be fair and equitable 
and produce an assessment in proportion to the benefits accruing 
to the property.  Berkvam v. City of Glendale, 79 Wis. 2d 279, 
287, 255 N.W.2d 521 (1977).  In examining uniqueness, the 
circuit court must consider the degree, effect, and consequences 
of the special benefits.  Id.  "Whether the facts relating to a 
special assessment made pursuant to the police power fulfill the 
'reasonableness' 
standard 
is 
a 
question 
of 
law . . . ."  
Steinbach, 291 Wis. 2d 11, ¶11.  A special assessment in 
substantial excess of special benefits accruing to the property 
is an unlawful taking without compensation.  Wm. H. Heinemann 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
27 
 
Creameries, 275 Wis. at 640-41 (citing Vill. of Norwood v. 
Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 279 (1898)). 
C.  Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist Regarding the 
Validity of the Special Assessment Levied on CED's Property. 
¶43 Having set forth the law governing the validity of 
assessments, we now apply it to the City's assessment of CED's 
property.  CED argues the court of appeals erred in affirming 
the circuit court's grant of summary judgment because CED 
presented sufficient evidence demonstrating disputed issues of 
material fact.  The City responds that CED failed to overcome 
the presumption of correctness and therefore summary judgment 
was proper.  In the case of a special assessment appeal, "where 
the assessing body did consider what property would be benefited 
by the improvement and assessed according to the amount of the 
benefit . . . in the absence of evidence to the contrary there 
is a conclusive presumption that the assessment was on the basis 
of benefits actually accrued."  Molbreak, 66 Wis. 2d at 696 
(emphasis added) (first citing Hennessy v. Douglas Cty., 99 Wis. 
129, 139, 74 N.W. 983 (1898); then citing Friedrich v. 
Milwaukee, 118 Wis. 254, 256, 95 N.W. 126 (1903)).  To overcome 
this presumption on appeal to the circuit court,  
the burden is on the objector to show either that:  
(1) The statutory procedure was not followed, or 
(2) that the assessment was not based on benefits, or 
(3) that the assessing authority did not view the 
premises to make such a determination, or (4) for the 
objector to produce competent evidence that the 
assessment is in error. 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
28 
 
Id.  Significantly, the presumption of correctness exists only 
in the absence of evidence to the contrary.  Molbreak, 66 
Wis. 2d at 696.   
¶44 CED contends the affidavit of its expert witness, 
James C. Johnson, raises genuine issues of material fact 
regarding whether the improvement plan was general or local, 
whether 
the 
project 
conferred 
special 
benefits 
on 
CED's 
property, and whether the assessment was reasonable.  The City 
dismisses the Johnson affidavit as insufficient to overcome the 
presumption of correctness and asserts this matter is controlled 
by Park Ave. Plaza, 308 Wis. 2d 439, in which the court of 
appeals upheld a grant of summary judgment in favor of the City 
because the new road project resulted in increased traffic flow.  
We hold that CED overcame any presumption of correctness and 
presented sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues of 
material fact regarding whether the improvement was general or 
local and whether the project conferred special benefits on 
CED's property.  Resolution of these issues will determine 
whether the circuit court reaches the reasonableness of the 
assessment on remand.  
¶45 With respect to the first issue, the City's Initial 
Resolution Declaring Intent to Reassess CED's property declares 
"[t]he purpose of the project is to reduce congestion at the 
intersection, increase traffic safety, renew utilities and 
enhance aesthetics."  Generally, the City identifies the 
sidewalk replacement and repair, concrete paving, new and re-
laid 
sewer 
laterals, 
concrete 
driveway 
approaches, 
and 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
29 
 
streetscape/landscape 
improvements 
as 
providing 
local 
and 
specific benefits to CED's property.  The City also points to 
the 
improved 
traffic 
flow, 
a 
substantial 
increase 
in 
accessibility, and reduced congestion as local and specific 
benefits.   
¶46 In response, CED generally argues the roundabout was 
constructed not to benefit nearby businesses, but for the 
primary 
purpose 
of 
benefiting 
the 
traveling 
public.  
Specifically, CED proffers Johnson's affidavit as evidence 
contradicting the City's assertion of local benefits.  In his 
affidavit, Johnson denies the purpose of the roundabout was 
local, points to a decreased value of CED's property as a result 
of its construction, and opines that the project did not improve 
the convenience of CED's property or its customers, noting the 
safety 
issues 
created 
by 
the 
reconfiguration 
of 
the 
intersection.  CED also points to evidence indicating that 
increased accessibility was not an effect of the reconstruction 
project, citing testimony in the affidavit of the City's 
Assistant Director of Public Works/City Engineer that "[t]he CED 
property has the exact same access after completion of the 
project as it did prior to the project.  The driveway access is 
in the same location.  The driveway access has the same 
configuration."   
¶47 "[T]he inquiry into the nature of an improvement"——
that is, whether a special benefit is local or general——
"presents a question of fact."  Genrich, 268 Wis. 2d 233, ¶2.  
"What may be called a local improvement under one set of facts 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
30 
 
may well constitute a general improvement in the context of 
different facts."  Duncan, 22 Wis. 2d at 265.  On remand the 
finder of fact must determine whether the purpose was to 
accommodate CED's property in particular, along with the other 
property owners, with the effect of conferring special benefits 
on CED's property.   
¶48 Whether a special benefit has been conferred is also a 
question of fact.  First State Bank, 366 Wis. 2d 219, ¶20 
(citing Park Ave. Plaza, 308 Wis. 2d 439, ¶20).  "Summary 
judgment is improper if specific facts could support a finding 
by a reasonable jury that a special benefit does not exist."  
Id.  In this case, the testimony of the City's expert witness 
during the eminent domain proceeding regarding the absence of 
special benefits, coupled with the comparable testimony of CED's 
expert witness, who opined that "[t]here is absolutely no 
benefit to [CED's property] let alone a special benefit" from 
the improvement, contradict the City's position in the special 
assessment proceeding.  The existence or absence of a special 
benefit presents a question for the factfinder to decide.  
Hietpas, 24 Wis. 2d at 656. 
¶49 Here, 
Johnson's 
affidavit 
contains 
evidence 
contradicting the City's position; he insists the property 
received no special benefits whatsoever.  Johnson's affidavit 
and appraisal assert that the placement of the roundabout 
actually impairs rather than benefits CED's property for a 
variety of reasons, including reduced congestion discouraging 
impulse 
stops 
at 
fast 
food 
restaurants, 
the 
removal 
of 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
31 
 
landscaping that obscured drive-thru traffic for diners inside, 
and the lack of direct access to the property for traffic coming 
from three directions, potentially causing unsafe lane changes 
to access it.  Johnson opines that the roundabout's construction 
overall reduced the value of CED's property.  The City disagrees 
with Johnson's assessment and points out that the roundabout 
improved traffic flow through the area, improved existing 
sidewalks and landscaping, and made the area safer.  In his 
affidavit, Johnson refutes the notion that the landscaping on 
the central island of the roundabout increases the value of 
CED's property, noting that CED possesses no property rights in 
landscaping, which could be changed at any time.  
¶50 Johnson's affidavit "cuts to the heart of the matter 
and creates a genuine issue of material fact" rendering summary 
judgment inappropriate.  Genrich, 268 Wis. 2d 233, ¶17.  A 
reasonable jury could find that CED's property received no 
benefits at all from the reconfigured intersection or it could 
find that CED received the exact same benefits as the public at 
large.  Park Ave. Plaza is distinguishable because the property 
owner presented "nothing to rebut the City's conclusion that 
commercial properties received special benefits."  Id., ¶26.  
Here, CED presented Johnson's evidentiary affidavit.  Because 
disputed issues of material fact must be resolved by the 
factfinder, summary judgment was improper. 
¶51 Additionally, CED contends that the assessment imposed 
upon it was unreasonable because it was unfairly and inequitably 
apportioned among similarly situated property owners.  CED's 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
32 
 
$40,103.03 assessment was twice as much as any other assessment.  
The City responds that it performed a "per lineal foot" 
assessment and justifies the higher assessment on CED's property 
because it sits on the corner.  Accordingly, it has footage on 
both Murdock and Jackson Streets.  While the reasonableness of 
the assessment presents a question of law, the analysis depends 
upon 
resolution 
of 
the 
first 
two 
issues. 
 
Because 
"'[r]easonableness' turns on the totality of the facts and 
circumstances" this issue "is not easily disposed of on summary 
judgment."  Preloznik v. City of Madison, 113 Wis. 2d 112, 122 
n.3, 334 N.W.2d 580 (1983) (citation omitted).  In this case, 
the issue of reasonableness cannot be disposed of on summary 
judgment because issues of fact related to the character of the 
improvement and whether it conferred any special benefits on 
CED's property must first be resolved.  Specifically, the trier 
of fact must determine what, if any, benefits CED's property 
received 
in 
order 
to 
determine 
if 
the 
assessment 
is 
proportionate to those benefits compared with the benefits 
accruing 
to 
all 
benefited 
properties. 
 
Steinbach, 
291 
Wis. 2d 11, ¶20.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶52 The term "special benefits" means the same in both the 
eminent domain statute, Wis. Stat. § 32.09(3), and the special 
assessments statute, Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(1)(a):  "uncommon 
advantage."  Under § 32.09(3), only those special benefits that 
affect the market value of a property because of a planned 
improvement 
must 
be 
considered 
and 
used 
to 
offset 
the 
No. 
2016AP474   
 
33 
 
compensation owed to the owner of property taken for the 
improvement.  Section 66.0703(1) permits a municipality to levy 
and collect a special assessment upon property for special 
benefits 
conferred 
upon 
the 
property 
by 
an 
improvement, 
regardless of the improvement's effect on the property's market 
value.  Because of this distinction, a governmental body's 
failure to raise special benefits in the eminent domain action 
does not foreclose its ability to levy and collect a special 
assessment upon a property for special benefits conferred.   
¶53 The circuit court improperly entered summary judgment 
in the City's favor in light of CED's submission of evidence 
challenging the validity of the special assessment, which showed 
a genuine dispute regarding whether the improvement plan was 
general or local and whether the project conferred special 
benefits on CED.  Each of these issues must be decided by the 
trier of fact.  If the factfinder on remand finds the 
improvement was local and conferred a special benefit on CED's 
property, the circuit court will then determine whether the 
assessment was reasonable as a matter of law.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.  
 
 
 
 
No.  2016AP474.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶54 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  The court 
of appeals got it right.   The majority errs.   
¶55 I write separately to make two points. 
¶56 First, the court of appeals (correctly) made clear 
that although "'[s]pecial benefits' in the eminent domain 
context and the special assessment context [are] similar in 
definition, they are distinct and different considerations under 
distinct and different governmental actions."1  The majority 
recognizes that unlike in condemnation proceedings, "special 
benefits" in eminent domain proceedings must affect the market 
value of the property.  Majority op., ¶33.      
¶57 Second, 
the 
majority 
stumbles 
by 
failing 
to 
acknowledge that CED has not overcome the presumption of 
correctness of the City's actions and has not established a 
genuine issue of material fact to overcome summary judgment.   
¶58 I agree with Chief Judge Lisa Neubauer, who emphasized 
these points in her concurrence in the court of appeals:  "[CED] 
has failed to show by 'strong . . . clear and positive proof' 
that the $20,000 special assessments are not reasonable——given 
that it is undisputed that improvements to the sidewalks, curb 
and gutters, etc. have been made——and the reasonableness 
analysis requires only that CED's property be 'benefited to some 
extent' and that the amount of the assessment can exceed the 
value of the special benefits."2   
                                                 
1 CED Props., LLC v. City of Oshkosh, No. 2016AP474, 
unpublished slip op., ¶24 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2017).   
2 CED Props., unpublished slip op., ¶29. 
No.  2016AP474.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶59 The City is entitled to summary judgment.        
¶60 For these reasons, I dissent. 
¶61 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissenting opinion. 
 
No.  2016AP474.ssa 
 
1