Case Title: OLER v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Citation: 

Docket Number: 00-20

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-02-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
OLER v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA2001 WY 917 P.3d 27Case Number: 00-20Decided: 02/01/2001

OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2000

                                                                                                     FEBRUARY 
1, 2001

GREGG 
JAMES OLER,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Richard R. Jamieson, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing 
Appellee:

            
David D. Freudenthal, United States Attorney; and Lisa E. Leschuck, 
Assistant United States Attorney.

Representing 
the Attorney General of the State of Wyoming as Amicus 
Curiae:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; and Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, 
JJ.

  
            
THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]           
In this 
case, the Court, pursuant to a Notice of Agreement to Answer Certified 
Questions, in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-13-104 through 1-13-107 
(Lexis 1999) and W.R.A.P. 11, agreed to answer the following questions certified 
to this Court by the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, 
the Honorable William F. Downes presiding:

            
1.         
If a defendant was sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-13-203 (Michie 1977) and later discharged from probation after having 
served 30 months of a five year term of probation, was the defendant "convicted" 
or otherwise adjudicated guilty of the underlying crime?

            
2.         
If the answer to the foregoing question is "yes," did Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-13-203 (Michie 1977) operate automatically to expunge the record of a felony 
conviction?

We 
answer the first certified question in the negative, and in the interest of 
a complete resolution of the case, we also answer the second question in the 
negative.

[¶2]           
In its 
Certification Order, the United States District Court, in accordance with 
W.R.A.P. 11.03, set forth the undisputed facts and the nature of the controversy 
as:

            
An indictment was filed in United States District Court for the District 
of Wyoming on November 20, 1998, naming Gregg James Oler as the defendant.  The indictment contains two charges, 
where Oler is alleged to be a person having been previously convicted of a crime 
punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year with knowingly, 
intentionally, and unlawfully possessing firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 
922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).

            
The predicate offense upon which the United States asserts the Defendant 
is a felon was entered by a Wyoming state court, specifically, a Judgment and 
Sentence in the Eighth Judicial District Court filed on April 29th, 1985.  
There, Oler entered a plea of guilty to the charge of delivery of a 
controlled substance, marijuana, in violation [of] Wyo. Stat. § 
35-7-1031(a)(ii).  Judge Taylor 
sentenced Oler to not less than eighteen (18) months nor more than two (2) years 
in the Wyoming State Penitentiary.  
That sentence was suspended and the Defendant was placed upon probation 
for a period of five (5) years pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-203.  On November 6, 1987, Mr. Oler's 
probation officer filed a Petition for Discharge of Probation.  On November 6, 19[8]7, an Order of 
Discharge from Probation was signed by Judge Taylor and filed in the court 
records.

[¶3]           
In 
addition, we are taught by the record that at the sentencing hearing, counsel 
for Gregg James Oler (Oler) said to the trial court, "I would recommend that 
sentence in this matter be suspended pursuant to Wyoming Statute 7-13-203, and 
Mr. Oler [be] placed on supervised probation."  The trial court then 
stated:

Mr. 
Oler, I am going to accept the advice of your counsel  the recommendation, that 
is, and sentence you under the terms of 7-13-203.  So, Mr. Oler, it is going to be the 
judgment and sentence of this Court that you serve a term of not less than 18 
months nor more than two years at the Wyoming State Penitentiary at 
Rawlins.  However, I am going to 
suspend the imposition of that sentence and permit you to go at large and be 
paroled for a period of five years pursuant to the provisions of Section 
7-13-203.

There is 
no question that it was the intention of the trial court, supported by counsel 
for Oler and apparently counsel for the State, that Oler would be sentenced 
pursuant to the provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-203 (Michie 1977), and 
would receive the benefit of such a disposition.

[¶4]           
In 1985, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-203 provided:

If any 
person is found guilty of or pleads guilty to any felony except murder, sexual 
assault in the first or second degree or arson of a dwelling house or other 
human habitation in the actual occupancy of a human being, the court shall 
ascertain whether the offense of which the accused is guilty is his first 
offense, the extent of moral turpitude involved in the act committed, and other 
facts and circumstances relating to the accused as he may desire to know.  If the court is satisfied that he was a 
person of good reputation before the commission of the offense charged and had 
never before been convicted of any felony, and that if permitted to go at large 
would not again violate the law, the court may in its discretion, by an order 
entered of record, delay passing sentence and then parole the person and permit 
him to go at large upon his own recognizance, conditioned that he will 
personally appear and report to the court twice in each year at times and places 
fixed in the order and that he will demean himself while at large in a 
law-abiding manner and live a worthy, respectable life, and that he will not 
leave the state without the consent of the court.  The court, if satisfied at the time of 
appearance, that the person has demeaned himself in a law-abiding manner and 
lived a worthy, respectable life, may by an order of record, continue parole for 
the period of five (5) years, at the expiration of which the court shall enter 
an order finally discharging the person, and no further proceedings shall be had 
upon such verdict or plea.  At any 
time after the expiration of one (1) year from the date of the original parole 
the court shall have the power in its discretion to terminate parole and finally 
discharge the person and annul the verdict or plea of guilty.  At any time before the final discharge 
of the person that the court believes that the paroled person has attempted to 
leave the state or failed to comply with the terms of his parole the court shall 
cause a warrant to issue for the apprehension and arrest of the person and 
require him to be brought before the court.  The court shall inquire into his conduct 
since his parole, and if satisfied from the inquiry that the person has violated 
the terms of his parole and recognizance, the court may impose sentence upon the 
verdict or plea against him in the manner and to the same extent as though the 
passing of sentence had not been delayed and the person had not been paroled or 
permitted to go at large.

[¶5]           
The 
record establishes that the trial court followed the statutory standards, but 
despite the stated intention of the trial court, instead of delaying the passing 
of sentence, the trial court specifically sentenced Oler to a term in the state 
penitentiary.  The execution of that 
sentence was suspended and, following the suspension of sentence, the Judgment 
and Sentence provided, "that the Defendant be placed on supervised probation for 
a period of five (5) years pursuant to Wyoming Statute §7-13-203 upon the 
following terms and conditions."  
The record discloses an inconsistency if not a conflict between the clear 
intention of the trial court to invoke the statute and the imposition of a 
sentence for a term of years.

[¶6]           
In 
pursuing its prosecution of Oler, the United States relied upon the equivocal 
nature of the state court record and also upon proceedings at Oler's change of 
plea hearing, which was held on January 18, 1985.  The United States argues here that 
because of the circumstances disclosed in the record in the state district 
court, Oler was convicted of the charge of felony delivery of marijuana.  Based upon that conclusion, the United 
States also argues that the conviction was not automatically expunged because 
the court must deal affirmatively with the annulment of the plea of 
guilty.

[¶7]           
The 
disposition disclosed in this record did not comport with the correct 
application of the statute, as this Court explained that application in 
Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 412 (Wyo. 
1990).  In proceedings arising in the courts of 
Wyoming, we have a precedent for resolving similar cases by treating the 
sentence and any suspension of the sentence as surplusage.  Kahlsdorf v. State, 823 P.2d 1184, 1189-90 
(Wyo. 1991); 
Laing v. State, 746 P.2d 1247, 1250 (Wyo. 
1987); 
King v. State, 720 P.2d 465, 469 (Wyo. 
1986).  If the case were here for review, it is 
clear that we would hold that Oler had not been convicted under these 
circumstances.  Since the trial 
court specifically articulated its intention that Oler should receive the 
benefit of this Wyoming statute, we, consistently with our treatment in the 
cases cited, answer the first certified question, "No."  In our judgment, Oler was not 
"convicted" or otherwise adjudicated guilty of delivery of a controlled 
substance.

[¶8]           
We turn 
then to the second certified question as we have designated it.  In Billis, 800 P.2d  at 
423, after 
comparing the new statute with the old, this Court said:

Probation 
before entry of judgment is not a punitive sanction.  It is an opportunity for rehabilitation 
before sentencing.  The probationer 
is not an adjudicated convict.  If 
probation is successfully completed, the probationer may be discharged without 
adjudication of guilt.

It is 
apparent that the statute does not serve automatically to expunge Oler's 
record.  The expungement of a 
criminal record is an extraordinary form of relief and can only be recognized 
where the legislature has specifically provided for it.  Stanton v. State, 686 P.2d 587, 589 (Wyo. 
1984).  We consistently have ruled that courts 
have no inherent power to expunge criminal records.  Johnson v. State, 971 P.2d 973, 974 (Wyo. 
1998); 
Billis, 800 P.2d  at 416; 
Stanton, 686 P.2d  at 588-89. 
It follows that under the statute that was invoked for Oler's sentencing, 
expungement does not occur either automatically or by court 
order.

[¶9]           
While 
our discussion in Billis explains that some of the awkward language in 
the earlier statute was repaired in 1987, the statute still does not result in 
an automatic expungement.  In 
Dickson v. State, 903 P.2d 1019, 1025-26 
(Wyo. 1995), a case 
under the newer form of the statute, we reversed an order of the trial court 
revoking probation because the trial court had sentenced Dickson without first 
imposing a judgment of conviction on the no contest that had been entered.  It is evident that the plea entered in 
the case is still viable until it is annulled at the discretion of the trial 
court.  Under the statute, discharge 
from the order of probation does not automatically result in either expungement 
or the annulment of the plea of guilty.  
Since no action in that regard was taken by the trial court at the time 
the Order of Discharge from Probation was entered, Oler's plea has not been 
annulled.  Oler could file a 
petition in the trial court seeking such an annulment, which could be afforded 
at the discretion of the trial court.  
Until that occurs, however, Oler has entered a plea of guilty to the 
offense of delivery of a controlled substance, but lacking a judgment of 
conviction, he has not been convicted of that offense.

[¶10]      In 
summary, we answer the first certified question, "No," because Oler has not been 
convicted or otherwise adjudicated guilty of the crime with which he was charged 
in the state court.  We further 
answer the second certified question, "No," because the statute does not provide 
for expungement, although it does permit the annulment of the plea at the 
discretion of the trial court.