Case Title: Robert Zellner v. Daryl Herrick

Citation: 2009 WI 80

Docket Number: 2007AP002584

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2009-07-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
2009 WI 80 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP2584 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Robert Zellner, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Daryl Herrick and Cedarburg School District, 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
Heidi Morgan, 
          Intervenor-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 15, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 22, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Paul V. Malloy   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the intervenor-appellant there were briefs by Joseph 
Louis Olson, Aaron H. Kastens, and Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Joseph Louis Olson. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by Jina L. 
Jonen and the Wisconsin Education Association Council, Madison, 
and oral argument by Jina L. Jonen. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Richard Thal, Heather 
L. Curnutt, and Lawton & Cates, S.C., Madison, on behalf of 
Wisconsin State Employees Union, AFSCME, Council 24 and Madison 
Teachers Inc. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 80
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP2584  
(L.C. No. 
2007CV26) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Robert Zellner, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Daryl Herrick and Cedarburg School District, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Heidi Morgan, 
 
          Intervenor-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 15, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Ozaukee 
County, Paul V. Malloy, Judge.  Appeal dismissed; order 
affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 809.61 (2005-06).1   
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2007AP2584   
 
2 
 
¶2 
This 
review 
arises 
from 
a 
request 
made 
under 
Wisconsin's Open Records Law, Wis. Stat. § 19.35, for the public 
release of a transcript of a closed arbitration hearing.  The 
plaintiff, Robert Zellner (Zellner), the former teacher whose 
firing was at issue in the arbitration hearing, sued the 
Cedarburg School Board to prevent the release of the transcript. 
¶3 
The circuit court issued an order enjoining the 
transcript's release.  The person requesting the transcript, 
Heidi Morgan (Morgan), filed notice to intervene, as Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.356(4) authorizes, and appealed.  The court of appeals 
denied Zellner's motion to dismiss on grounds that the appeal 
was not timely filed and subsequently certified two questions to 
this court:  whether a transcript of a closed arbitration 
proceeding is a public record under Wisconsin's "public records" 
law, and, if so, whether all personal and medical information 
must be redacted before release.  Zellner's contention that 
Morgan's appeal was untimely was not certified to this court.  
In this court's standard order accepting the certification, we 
stated that "the appeal is accepted for consideration of all 
issues raised before the court of appeals."  See State v. 
Stoehr, 134 Wis. 2d 66, 70, 396 N.W.2d 177 (1986) ("When this 
court grants direct review upon certification, it acquires 
jurisdiction of the appeal, which includes all issues, not 
merely the issues certified or the issue for which the court 
accepts the certification." (citing Wis. Stat. § 808.05(2) 
(1983-84))). 
No. 
2007AP2584   
 
3 
 
¶4 
For the reasons stated below, we now hold that the 
court of appeals erred when it found the appeal timely under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.356(8), which requires that an appeal of a 
decision relating to an open records request be filed in "the 
time period specified in s. 808.04(1m)."  The time period 
specified in that statute is 20 days.  Because the appeal was 
filed outside the 20-day period, there was no jurisdiction for 
the court of appeals to review.  Since the appeal was not 
timely, we do not reach the certified questions. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
The circumstances of this case have given rise to 
litigation on several distinct issues not relevant to this 
appeal.  The litigation from which this appeal arises is based 
on the following facts: 
¶6 
First, the Cedarburg School Board fired Zellner——a 
teacher with the Cedarburg School District (the District) and a 
union 
official 
who 
had 
been 
highly 
critical 
of 
the 
superintendent——on 
the 
grounds 
that 
Zellner's 
accessing 
pornography on a school computer constituted just cause for his 
termination.  The Cedarburg Education Association filed a 
grievance 
on 
Zellner's 
behalf, 
arguing 
that 
Zellner's 
termination was, among other things, disproportionate to the 
offense and greatly out of line with the District's handling of 
similar infractions by other personnel.  
¶7 
The matter was sent to an arbitration panel, pursuant 
to a collective bargaining agreement.  The arbitration panel 
issued a decision stating that the District "did not have just 
No. 
2007AP2584   
 
4 
 
cause to terminate [Zellner's] employment," and directing the 
District to reinstate Zellner, reduce his discipline to a 
written reprimand, and to make him whole for all lost wages and 
benefits.  The District refused and additional litigation 
ensued.2  
¶8 
Following the arbitration hearing, Morgan requested 
the transcript of the closed arbitration hearing.  The District 
concluded that the transcript was a public record and informed 
Zellner that it planned to release it. 
¶9 
Zellner filed this action seeking to prevent release 
of the transcript or, in the alternative, seeking redaction of 
medical and familial information that Zellner had submitted 
during arbitration.  On October 1, 2007, the Ozaukee Circuit 
Court, the Honorable Paul V. Malloy presiding, entered an order 
enjoining the District from releasing the transcript.  The 
circuit court held that the transcript was a public record, but 
it then applied the second prong of the Linzmeyer test3 and held 
that the transcript was not subject to release because the 
                                                 
2 The decision of the Ozaukee County Circuit Court, the 
Honorable Joseph D. McCormack presiding, that the arbitration 
award was improper was upheld by the court of appeals in 
Cedarburg Education Association v. Cedarburg School District, 
No. 2007AP852, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 23, 
2008), 
review 
denied, 
Cedarburg 
Education 
Association 
v. 
Cedarburg Board of Education, 2009 WI 23, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 764 
N.W.2d 531 (unpublished table decision). 
3 Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 2002 WI 84, ¶¶10-11, 254 Wis. 2d 306, 
646 N.W.2d 811 (creating a two-step test:  first, establishing 
that the record requested is a public record, and, second, 
determining whether there is a public policy that overcomes the 
presumption of openness). 
No. 
2007AP2584   
 
5 
 
public's 
interest 
in 
the 
release 
of 
the 
transcript 
was 
outweighed 
by 
the 
public 
policy 
favoring 
privacy 
in 
an 
alternative dispute resolution such as arbitration.4 
¶10 On November 9, 2007, Morgan filed a notice of 
intervention pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 19.356(4) and on the same 
day filed a notice of appeal.  On November 16, 2007, Zellner 
filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  
Zellner argued that Morgan had filed her notice of appeal more 
than 20 days after the circuit court's October 1 order, and, 
therefore, the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 808.04(1m). 
¶11 In an order dated December 5, 2007, the court of 
appeals denied Zellner's motion to dismiss.  On November 26, 
2008, the court of appeals, as noted above, certified two 
questions to this court concerning the release of closed 
arbitration hearing transcripts and the redaction of medical 
information in such transcripts.  This court accepted the 
certification on January 14, 2009. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶12 We resolve the issue presented here on the basis of 
statutory interpretation.  Statutory interpretation presents a 
                                                 
4 The circuit court essentially found that the public has an 
interest in keeping arbitration proceedings private.  As we have 
noted, "[I]n applying the common-law balancing test, the concern 
is not personal embarrassment and damage to reputation, but 
whether disclosure would affect any public interest[] . . . in 
the protection of the privacy and reputation of citizens 
generally."  Zellner v. Cedarburg Sch. Dist., 2007 WI 53, ¶52, 
300 Wis. 2d 290, 731 N.W.2d 240. 
No. 
2007AP2584   
 
6 
 
question of law that is reviewed de novo.  Stuart v. Weisflog's 
Showroom Gallery, Inc., 2008 WI 22, ¶11, 308 Wis. 2d 103, 746 
N.W.2d 762. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶13 The 
outcome 
of 
this 
case 
turns 
on 
the 
proper 
understanding of the procedural rules set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.356, which governs appeals of rulings made on records 
requested under the Open Records Law.  It is helpful to begin 
with a brief examination of the context in which this provision 
appears. 
¶14 Wis. Stat. § 19.31 codifies the state's strong policy 
favoring free access to public records.  Subsequent sections set 
forth the limited exceptions to that general principle, as well 
as the mechanism for judicial review prior to granting public 
access under certain circumstances. 
¶15 Wis. Stat. § 19.356 was among the provisions added 
when the legislature revisited the statute in 2003, following 
this court's decisions in Woznicki5 and Milwaukee Teachers.6  
2003 Wisconsin Act 47, which created this section, was the 
product of the Joint Legislative Council's Special Committee on 
Review of the Open Records Law.7  The Act created limited rights 
                                                 
5 Woznicki v. Erickson, 202 Wis. 2d 178, 549 N.W.2d 699 
(1996). 
6 Milwaukee Teachers' Educ. Ass'n v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. 
Dirs., 227 Wis. 2d 779, 596 N.W.2d 403 (1999). 
7 The Joint Legislative Council introduced Assembly Bill 196 
on March 25, 2003.  The Assembly passed the bill June 24, 2003, 
and sent it to the Senate, which concurred in the passage.  
No. 
2007AP2584   
 
7 
 
to judicial review prior to the release of public records for 
individuals 
whose 
privacy 
or 
reputational 
interests 
are 
implicated by the release.  Such an individual is defined in the 
statute as a "record subject"——"an individual about whom 
personally identifiable information is contained in a record."  
Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2g). 
¶16 The subsections of Wis. Stat. § 19.356 deal with a 
particular subset of public records, which includes records 
containing information relating to public employees.  The 
subsections describe the timeline envisioned by the legislature 
with strict time limits at each step.  The clock starts running 
when an authority decides "to permit access" to such a record.  
At that point, the authority must, within three days, "serve 
written notice" on "any record subject to whom the record 
pertains."  Wis. Stat. § 19.356(2).  After the record subject 
receives such notice, he or she may, within five days, alert the 
authority that he or she plans to challenge the release of the 
information.  Wis. Stat. § 19.356(3).  Within ten days of 
receiving the notice, the record subject may seek judicial 
review and ask that a court enjoin the release of the 
information.8  Wis. Stat. § 19.356(4).  This is what Zellner did. 
¶17 Following oral argument, the circuit court ruled that 
the transcript was a public record.  The circuit court went on 
                                                 
8 "Within 10 days after receipt of notice under sub. (2)(a), 
a record subject may commence an action seeking a court order to 
restrain the authority from providing access to the requested 
record. . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 19.356(4). 
No. 
2007AP2584   
 
8 
 
to rule that the transcript should not be released on the 
grounds that "the public interest is outweighed by the need for 
privacy in this type of proceeding."  The court stated that it 
would issue an order enjoining the District from releasing the 
materials.  The order was issued October 1, 2007. 
¶18 This brings us to the critical point in the process.  
It was at this point that Morgan, the original requester of the 
records, filed a notice of intervention as the statute permits 
and subsequently filed a notice of appeal on November 9, 2007. 
¶19 The significance of the dispute about the applicable 
time period——either 20 or 45 days following the issuance of the 
circuit court's order——is that Morgan filed her notice of appeal 
39 days after the order.  If the 20-day deadline is the correct 
deadline under the statute, Morgan's appeal is fruitless because 
there is no jurisdiction for the court of appeals to hear it.  
If the 45-day deadline is the applicable one, the appeal and our 
review may proceed. 
¶20 In order to resolve this question, we look carefully 
at the language of the statute.  We have on previous occasions 
articulated the assumptions and principles with which we 
undertake this exercise: 
It is, of course, a solemn obligation of the judiciary 
to faithfully give effect to the laws enacted by the 
legislature, and to do so requires a determination of 
statutory meaning.  Judicial deference to the policy 
choices enacted into law by the legislature requires 
that statutory interpretation focus primarily on the 
language 
of 
the 
statute. 
 
We 
assume 
that 
the 
legislature's intent is expressed in the statutory 
language.  Extrinsic evidence of legislative intent 
No. 
2007AP2584   
 
9 
 
may become relevant to statutory interpretation in 
some circumstances, but is not the primary focus of 
inquiry.  It is the enacted law, not the unenacted 
intent, that is binding on the public.  Therefore, the 
purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine 
what the statute means so that it may be given its 
full, proper, and intended effect. 
 
Thus, we have repeatedly held that statutory 
interpretation 
"begins with the language of the 
statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry."  Statutory language is 
given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, 
except that technical or specially-defined words or 
phrases 
are 
given 
their 
technical 
or 
special 
definitional meaning.  
 
Context is important to meaning.  So, too, is the 
structure of the statute in which the operative 
language appears.  Therefore, statutory language is 
interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in 
isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the 
language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; 
and 
reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results.  Statutory language is read where possible to 
give reasonable effect to every word, in order to 
avoid surplusage.  "If this process of analysis yields 
a plain, clear statutory meaning, then there is no 
ambiguity, and the statute is applied according to 
this ascertainment of its meaning." 
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 
58, ¶¶44-46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (internal citations 
omitted). 
¶21 We therefore turn to the language of the statute that 
governs appeals of orders in open records cases.  The subsection 
governing appeals of the type of order presented here is 
§ 19.356(8):  "If a party appeals a decision of the court under 
sub. (7), the court of appeals shall grant precedence to the 
appeal over all other matters not accorded similar precedence by 
No. 
2007AP2584   
 
10 
 
law.  An appeal shall be taken within the time period specified 
in s. 808.04(1m)." 
¶22 It has already been settled that as a requester and as 
an intervenor as of right under the statute,9 Morgan is "a 
party."  When the question of an intervenor's status first arose 
in Wisconsin, the court of appeals noted that "the issue is well 
settled among other jurisdictions," and adopted that approach, 
summing up the rule briefly:  "Simply put, [the intervenor's] 
status after intervention [is] the same as all the other 
participants in the proceeding . . . ."  Kohler Co. v. Sogen 
Int'l Fund, Inc., 2000 WI App 60, ¶11, 233 Wis. 2d 592, 608 
N.W.2d 746.  The court of appeals cited as pertinent a case that 
interpreted a parallel federal mechanism for intervention:  
"When a party intervenes, it becomes a full participant in the 
lawsuit and is treated just as if it were an original party."  
Id. at ¶12 (quoting Schneider v. Dumbarton Developers, Inc., 767 
F.2d 1007, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).   
¶23 Having established that Morgan is a party, it is 
further obvious that she is a party who is "appeal[ing] a 
decision of the court under sub.(7)."  Wis. Stat. § 19.356(8).  
The remainder of the sentence concerns the expediting of the 
appeal, a matter to which we will return shortly.  It is the 
next sentence that needs our close attention:  "An appeal shall 
                                                 
9 "'Requester' means any person who requests inspection or 
copies 
of 
a 
record, 
except 
a 
committed 
or 
incarcerated 
person . . . ." 
 Wis. Stat. § 19.32(3).  "Notwithstanding 
s. 803.09, the requester may intervene in the action as a matter 
of right. . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 19.356(4). 
No. 
2007AP2584   
 
11 
 
be taken within the time period specified in s. 808.04(1m)."  
Id. 
¶24 The question to answer then is, what is "the time 
period specified in s. 808.04(1m)"?  Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1m) 
reads as follows:  "An appeal by a record subject under 
s. 19.356 shall be initiated within 20 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from." 
¶25 Wis. Stat. § 19.356(8) tells us to look for the time 
period referenced in Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1m).  When we do so, 
the only time period referenced in § 808.04(1m) is 20 days.  
There simply is no other way to read § 19.356 that gives effect 
to its words.  If the legislature had, as Morgan contends, 
intended that the 20-day time period for appeal for this type of 
order be limited to the record subject alone, and that a 45-day 
time period for appeal apply to everyone else, it could have 
No. 
2007AP2584   
 
12 
 
clearly indicated that by referring to "the applicable sections" 
in Wis. Stat. § 808.04.10  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 88.05(3)(a). 
¶26 Our 
reading 
is 
entirely 
consistent 
with 
the 
legislature's demonstrated interest in resolving these disputes 
as speedily as possible.  Given the tight deadlines imposed 
throughout the process, a 20-day time period is much more in 
accord with the overall tenor of the statute than a 45-day time 
period.  The essence of the statute is to prescribe the special 
handling of matters involving an attempt to block release of a 
record under the Open Records Law and to require that they be 
expedited to resolution.  This is highlighted by the provision 
stating that a court and an appellate court are mandated to give 
precedence to such matters.  Wis. Stat. § 19.356(7),(8). 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶27 For the reasons stated, we now hold that the court of 
appeals erred when it found the appeal timely under Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
10 While we see the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 19.356(8) 
as unambiguously requiring a 20-day time period for appeal by 
virtue of its reference to that time period in Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.04, 
there 
are 
other 
indications 
as 
well 
that 
the 
legislature intended that result.  The notes of the Joint 
Legislative Council, which introduced the legislation, describe 
the provision's effect as requiring that "[a]n appeal must be 
taken within 20 days after entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from."  2003 Wis. Act 47, § 4 n.3.  The Legislative 
Council's Act Memo for 2003 Wisconsin Act 47 states, "Act 47 
provides a system of expedited judicial review when a record 
subject attempts to prevent the release of a public record."  
See 
http://www.legis.state.wi.us/2003/data/lc_act/act047-ab196. 
pdf (last visited June 24, 2009).  This is just such a case.  It 
makes sense that the expedited judicial review prescribed by the 
Act applies to all parties to an action concerning a record 
subject's attempt to block release of a record. 
No. 
2007AP2584   
 
13 
 
§ 19.356(8), which requires that an appeal of a decision 
relating to an open records request be filed in "the time period 
specified in s. 808.04(1m)."  The time period specified in that 
statute is 20 days.  Because the appeal was filed outside the 
20-day period, there was no jurisdiction for the court of 
appeals to review.  Since the appeal was not timely, we do not 
reach the certified questions. 
By the Court.—The appeal is dismissed and the order of the 
circuit court is affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2007AP2584.pdr 
1 
 
¶28 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J. 
(dissenting).   The 
majority opinion denies Heidi Morgan's (Morgan) open records 
request based on its conclusion that she did not timely file an 
appeal of the circuit court's decision denying access to the 
records of Robert Zellner's (Zellner) arbitration hearing.  It 
does so by concluding Wis. Stat. § 19.356(8) requires that an 
intervenor's appeal of a circuit court decision in an open 
records case be filed within the time period set out in Wis. 
Stat. § 804.04(1m) for record subjects.1  I write in dissent 
because although § 19.356 provides the initial procedural 
pathway for our review, § 808.04(1) applies to Morgan's appeal.  
Section 808.04(1) provides a minimum of 45 days in which to 
commence an appeal and Morgan's appeal was filed within 45 days 
of the circuit court decision.  And, although Morgan intervened,2 
she was not a "party" when the circuit court entered its order, 
nor was she a party during the 20-day period when the majority 
opinion concludes that she was required to appeal.3  Accordingly, 
this court should proceed to decide the important questions for 
which we granted certification.  Therefore, I respectfully 
dissent. 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶4. 
2 Zellner has not objected to Morgan's intervention in this 
court, and the majority opinion assumes it was undertaken 
sufficiently to cause Morgan to become a party.  Id., ¶22.  I, 
too, agree that Morgan is properly a party in the certification 
pending before us. 
3 Id., ¶27. 
No.  2007AP2584.pdr 
2 
 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶29 This case arises out of an open records request by 
Morgan4 for the arbitration proceeding transcript relative to 
Zellner's termination of employment as a teacher in the 
Cedarburg School District (Cedarburg).5  Cedarburg granted 
Morgan's open records request.  In an attempt to prevent 
disclosure of those public records, Zellner6 commenced the 
present action, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 19.356(4).  When he did 
so, he became the party plaintiff and Cedarburg became a party 
defendant.  § 19.356(4).  Morgan was not named in the action and 
accordingly she was not a party initially.   
¶30 The circuit court concluded that the transcript was a 
public record, but when it balanced the public's interest in 
disclosure with the public's interest in precluding disclosure, 
the circuit court concluded that the transcript should not be 
released.   
¶31 The circuit court entered its decision on October 1, 
2007.  On November 9, 2007, Morgan gave notice of her intention 
to intervene as of right, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 19.356(4), 
and on November 9, 2007, she also filed a notice of appeal.   
                                                 
4 Morgan is defined as a "requester" under the Public 
Records Law.  Wis. Stat. § 19.32(3). 
5 Cedarburg, as the custodian of the records, is defined as 
an "authority" under the Public Records Law.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.32(1).  In the parlance of this dissent, I sometimes refer 
to Cedarburg as the custodian or the custodian of the records. 
6 Zellner is defined as the "record subject" under the 
Public Records Law.  Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2g). 
No.  2007AP2584.pdr 
3 
 
¶32 On 
November 16, 
2007, 
Zellner 
moved 
to 
dismiss 
Morgan's appeal as untimely.  The court of appeals denied his 
motion on Dec. 5, 2007, concluding that Morgan's notice of 
appeal was timely according to Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1), which it 
determined to be the statute applicable to Morgan's appeal.  
Zellner v. Herrick, No. 2007AP2584, interim order (Wis. Ct. App. 
Dec. 5, 2007).   
 
¶33 Whether arbitration records are public records subject 
to an open records request is an important question of first 
impression.  Accordingly, the court of appeals certified the 
appeal to us, and we accepted the certification.    
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶34 Whether Morgan timely appealed the circuit court 
decision presents questions of statutory interpretation and 
application, which are questions of law for our independent 
review.  Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶14, 309 
Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581; Spiegelberg v. State, 2006 WI 75, 
¶8, 291 Wis. 2d 601, 717 N.W.2d 641.    
B. 
Statutory Interpretation 
 
1. 
General principles 
 
¶35 We interpret a statute to determine its meaning.  
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 
58, ¶43, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  "We assume that the 
legislature's intent is expressed in the statutory language."  
Id., ¶44.  Statutes are to be read in context, consistent with 
the statutes to which they relate.  Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 
76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659.  Statutes are to be 
No.  2007AP2584.pdr 
4 
 
read so as "to give reasonable effect to every word, in order to 
avoid surplusage."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46. 
¶36 In construing a statute, we favor a construction that 
fulfills the purpose of the statute over one that defeats that 
purpose.  Brown v. Thomas, 127 Wis. 2d 318, 323, 379 N.W.2d 868 
(Ct. App. 1985).  Finally, procedural rules, such as those 
governing the time limits for appeals, are to be construed 
liberally "so as to encourage a resolution of the controversy on 
the merits."  Split Rock Hardwoods, Inc. v. Lumber Liquidators, 
Inc., 2002 WI 66, ¶57, 253 Wis. 2d 238, 646 N.W.2d 19 (quoting 
State v. Sorenson, 2000 WI 43, ¶15, 234 Wis. 2d 648, 611 N.W.2d 
240).   
 
2. 
Public Records Law 
 
¶37 This case arises from a request for public records, 
often referred to as an open records request.  Watton v. 
Hegerty, 2008 WI 74, ¶6, 311 Wis. 2d 52, 751 N.W.2d 369.  
Therefore, the portion of Wis. Stat. ch. 19 that pertains to the 
Public Records Law is my starting point.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 19.31 sets out the legislative purpose that affects all open 
records requests.  Section 19.31 provides in relevant part: 
In recognition of the fact that a representative 
government is dependent upon an informed electorate, 
it is declared to be the public policy of this state 
that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible 
information regarding the affairs of government and 
the official acts of those officers and employees who 
represent them. . . .  To that end, ss. 19.32 to 19.37 
shall 
be 
construed 
in 
every 
instance 
with 
a 
presumption of complete public access, consistent with 
the conduct of governmental business.  The denial of 
public access generally is contrary to the public 
interest, and only in an exceptional case may access 
be denied.  
No.  2007AP2584.pdr 
5 
 
§ 19.31 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, the directive of § 19.31 
will be paramount in my interpretation and application of the 
Public Records Law sections of ch. 19. 
¶38 The 
Public 
Records 
Law 
contains 
two 
procedural 
pathways of review, depending on whether the custodian of the 
records decides to deny, or to provide, access to the requested 
records.  If the custodian denies access, a requester of the 
records has 90 days in which to commence a mandamus action in 
circuit court.  Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1)(a), (1m).  If the 
custodian grants access to the records, a record subject has 
only 10 days in which to commence a circuit court action seeking 
to enjoin release of the records.  Wis. Stat. § 19.356(4).  The 
differing time limits afforded a requester when compared with 
those afforded a record subject are consistent with Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.31's stated purpose.  This is so because more time is given 
to a requester, who is acting in accord with the policy of 
providing complete access to public records.  Less time is given 
to a record subject, who is attempting to block access to public 
records, an action contrary to the stated purpose of the Public 
Records Law.  § 19.31.   
¶39 If the circuit court in a requester's mandamus action 
affirms the custodian's decision not to release the records, 
then a requester has 45 days after notice of entry of judgment, 
or 90 days if no notice is given, to appeal the circuit court 
decision to the court of appeals.  Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1).  
However, if the circuit court, in a record subject's action 
commenced to enjoin release of the public records, denies the 
injunction, a record subject has only 20 days in which to file 
No.  2007AP2584.pdr 
6 
 
an appeal.  § 808.04(1m).  Again, this difference in the time 
accorded to seek further review is consistent with the statutory 
purpose of affording access to the records of government 
affairs:  a requester, whose actions are in line with access, is 
given more time, and a record subject, who is trying to thwart 
access, is given less time to appeal an adverse decision.  Wis. 
Stat. § 19.31.  
¶40 In the case before us, Zellner commenced this action 
requesting the circuit court to enjoin Cedarburg from releasing 
the records of his arbitration proceeding.  Therefore, Zellner 
proceeded under Wis. Stat. § 19.356(4).  In so doing, he became 
a party plaintiff and Cedarburg was required to be named as a 
party defendant.  § 19.356(4). 
¶41 The circuit court entered its decision enjoining the 
release of the public records on October 1, 2007, and Morgan 
intervened on November 9, 2007.  Therefore, Morgan was not a 
party when the circuit court entered its order. 
3. 
Timeliness of Morgan's appeal   
¶42 The majority opinion parses Wis. Stat. § 19.356(8), 
which provides in relevant part: 
If a party appeals a decision of the court under 
sub. (7), . . . [a]n appeal shall be taken within the 
time period specified in s. 808.04(1m). 
¶43 The 
majority 
opinion 
also 
parses 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 808.04(1m), which provides: 
An appeal by a record subject under s. 19.356 
shall be initiated within 20 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
No.  2007AP2584.pdr 
7 
 
The 
majority 
opinion 
applies 
the 
20-day 
limitation 
of 
§ 808.04(1m) to Morgan.  In so doing, the majority opinion reads 
the words, "record subject," out of § 808.04(1m).  This is 
contrary 
to 
basic 
statutory 
construction 
principles 
that 
statutes are to be interpreted to avoid surplusage.  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  The majority opinion also includes Morgan as 
a "party" under § 19.356(8).  In so doing, it creates a way to 
deny Morgan her right to appeal, and it contravenes the stated 
purpose for which the Public Records Law was enacted——complete 
access to public records.  Wis. Stat. § 19.31. 
¶44 I conclude that the majority errs by eliminating the 
term, "record subject," from Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1m).  I also 
conclude that a reading of the term "party" in § 19.356(8) to 
include only the record subject is consistent with both the 
stated purpose of the Public Records Law and the procedural 
pathway a record subject must use when he attempts to enjoin the 
release of public records.   
¶45 This is so because when a record subject files an 
action to enjoin release of public records, the statutes provide 
for two parties:  the authority (custodian) and the record 
subject.  Wis. Stat. § 19.356(4).  When § 19.356 is the 
procedural pathway through which the open records request is 
proceeding, the custodian will not be appealing the circuit 
court decision.  By contrast, when the custodian denies release 
of the records, the appeal proceeds under Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1), 
not under § 19.356.  See Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. Wis. 
Dep't of Admin., 2009 WI 79, ¶5 & 7, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d 
__. 
No.  2007AP2584.pdr 
8 
 
¶46 A "party" in Wis. Stat. § 19.356(8) refers to the 
record subject because it is the record subject who would appeal 
from a circuit court decision to release the records.  If the 
circuit court decides not to release the records, as occurred 
here, the custodian has no interest in appealing because the 
custodian is in the same position as it was before the open 
records request was made.  And finally, the requester may choose 
not to intervene at all, because intervention is not mandatory.  
§ 19.356(4).  Or, the requester may do so several weeks after 
entry of the circuit court decision, as occurred here, or even 
after the record subject appeals.  See City of Madison v. Wis. 
Employment Relations Comm'n, 2000 WI 39, ¶1, 234 Wis. 2d 550, 
610 N.W.2d 94.   
¶47 The majority opinion interprets procedural statutes, 
which at the very least, are ambiguous in regard to whom the 
term "party" applies.  When interpreting ambiguous procedural 
statutes, we do so in a manner that will permit a decision on 
the merits.  Sorenson, 234 Wis. 2d 648, ¶28.  As we explained in 
DOT v. Peterson, 226 Wis. 2d 623, 594 N.W.2d 765 (1999), where a 
property owner served the State of Wisconsin rather than the 
Department of Transportation, if a statute "can reasonably be 
interpreted" so as to permit review, we do so.  Id. at 625.  The 
majority errs in contravening this basic rule of statutory 
construction. 
¶48 In addition, the majority opinion's interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 19.356(8) is contrary to the express directive of 
the legislature in regard to construction of Wis. Stat. §§ 19.32 
to 19.37 because the majority opinion thwarts access to the 
No.  2007AP2584.pdr 
9 
 
public records that Morgan sought by shutting down Morgan's 
appeal rights.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.31. 
¶49 Furthermore, the majority opinion defies a common 
sense reading of the statutes.  Let me explain.  Morgan filed a 
notice of intervention on November 9, 2007.  Therefore, when the 
circuit court issued its October 1, 2007, decision, Morgan was 
not a party.  Morgan also was not a party during any part of the 
20-day time period in which the majority opinion concludes she 
was required to appeal in order for her appeal to be timely.  
Under the majority opinion's statutory interpretation, Morgan 
lost her appeal rights as a "party" before she was a "party."  
This internal inconsistency in the majority opinion demonstrates 
the ambiguity in Wis. Stat. § 19.356(8) that the majority 
opinion chooses to ignore.7  A procedural ambiguity should be 
interpreted in favor of permitting the resolution of this 
controversy on the merits.  Sorenson, 234 Wis. 2d 648, ¶22.   
¶50 In my view, the court of appeals got it right when it 
concluded that Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1) set the time limit for 
Morgan's notice of appeal.  Zellner v. Herrick, No. 2007AP2584, 
interim order (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2007).  The court of 
appeals' conclusion is consistent with what Morgan's appeal 
rights would have been if she had been required to filed a 
mandamus action due to an adverse decision by Cedarburg.  The 
court of appeals' conclusion is also consistent with Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.31, in that it interprets the Public Records Law to promote 
                                                 
7 Majority op., ¶¶18-19. 
No.  2007AP2584.pdr 
10 
 
an opportunity for complete access to government workings by 
permitting Morgan's appeal to go forward. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶51 The 
majority 
opinion 
errs 
when 
it 
contravenes 
foundational principles of statutory construction and interprets 
the Public Records Law contrary to the legislature's express 
directive in regard to the construction of Wis. Stat. §§ 19.32 
to 19.37.  Wis. Stat. § 19.31.  Morgan is seeking to shine a 
light on governmental actions, and Zellner is thwarting the 
legislature's express directive for "complete public access."  
The majority opinion assists Zellner's efforts.  Because I 
conclude that the majority opinion errs and also that Morgan's 
appeal was timely filed, I respectfully dissent.  
 
 
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