Case Title: B.R.C.M. v. Florida Department of Children & Families

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC16-179

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2017-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-179 
____________ 
 
IN THE INTEREST OF: B.R.C.M., A MINOR CHILD,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,  
Respondent. 
 
[April 20, 2017] 
 
LABARGA, C.J. 
 
B.R.C.M., a minor child, seeks review of the decision of the Third District 
Court of Appeal in In re B.R.C.M., 182 So. 3d 749 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), on the 
ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with the decision of another district 
court of appeal on a question of law.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), 
Fla. Const. 
BACKGROUND 
B.R.C.M., an unaccompanied minor from Guatemala, illegally entered the 
United States at age thirteen and was released by the Office of Refugee 
 
 
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Resettlement to his godmother as a sponsor.1  After his arrival, a private petition 
was filed on behalf of B.R.C.M. alleging three grounds for adjudication of 
dependency under section 39.01(15), Florida Statutes (2014), which defines a 
dependent child as a child who is found by the court: “(a) [t]o have been 
abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child’s parent or parents or legal 
custodians”; “(e) [t]o have no parent or legal custodians capable of providing 
supervision and care”; or “(f) [t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, 
abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians.”  In support 
of a determination of dependency, the petition asserted that B.R.C.M.’s father 
abandoned him at birth and never provided him with food, shelter, clothing, and 
medical care.  The petition asserted that B.R.C.M.’s mother abandoned him at age 
four when she disappeared and never contacted him again or provided him with 
basic necessities.  B.R.C.M. then went to live with his grandmother until she was 
no longer able to care for him because of old age and illness.  At age thirteen, 
fearing he would be forced to join a local gang and having no family to care for 
                                          
 
 
1.  We recognize that B.R.C.M. appears to reside with his godmother, who 
as a sponsor, is entrusted with his care and custody by the federal government.  
The sponsor care agreement encourages sponsors who are neither parents nor legal 
guardians to establish legal guardianship with the local court.  We observe that 
Florida courts have exclusive jurisdiction of all proceedings relating to child 
welfare.  An adjudication of dependency would not preclude B.R.C.M. from 
continued care by his godmother, but would ensure appropriate placement for the 
child, consistent with the permanency goals of Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes. 
 
 
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him, B.R.C.M. fled Guatemala, travelled through Mexico, and entered the United 
States in Hidalgo, Texas.  The petition asserted that B.R.C.M. was placed with his 
godmother in Miami, Florida, and met his father for the first time after his arrival 
in the United States.  His father has maintained telephone contact with B.R.C.M., 
but has not provided for the child’s basic needs.  The petition was denied after an 
eight-minute hearing in the circuit court, during which the court made no factual 
findings.     
On appeal, the Third District repeatedly observed that the child’s sole 
purpose in filing the dependency petition was to facilitate an application for 
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS) and seek lawful permanent residency.  In 
re B.R.C.M., 182 So. 3d at 751.  The district court determined it was “plain on the 
face of the petition that B.R.C.M. is not ‘truly’ abandoned, abused or neglected 
within the meaning of Chapter 39,” and despite acknowledging that “[a] 
godmother is neither a parent nor legal custodian under the statute,” affirmed the 
summary denial of the petition.  Id. at 751-52, 754.  The court concluded: “The 
purpose of the dependency laws of this state is to protect and serve children and 
families in need, not those with a different agenda.”  Id. at 754 (quoting In re 
K.B.L.V., 176 So. 3d 297, 301 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (Shepherd, J., specially 
concurring)).       
 
 
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ANALYSIS 
The Third District’s conclusion—that B.R.C.M. was not entitled to the 
protections of Chapter 39 because he is not “truly” abandoned, abused, or 
neglected and that his petition was filed for the sole purpose of seeking an 
immigration status—expressly conflicts with the decision of the First District in In 
re Y.V., 160 So. 3d 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).   
In In re Y.V., the First District reversed the summary dismissal of a private 
petition for dependency where the petition set forth the applicable grounds for 
dependency and alleged sufficient facts, warranting an adjudicatory hearing.  The 
First District stated the express purpose of Chapter 39 as set forth by the 
Legislature; identified the appropriate form and contents of a dependency petition; 
and recognized that the applicable law, section 39.01(15), Florida Statutes (2013), 
provides seven independent grounds for adjudicating a child dependent.  Id. at 578.  
Additionally, the First District declared that “[a]n intent to obtain [SIJS] says 
nothing in and of itself regarding the facial sufficiency of the dependency 
allegations . . . [t]herefore, a petition for dependency should not be rejected in 
Florida based on the mere motivation of the petitioner.”  Id. at 581.   
The purpose of Chapter 39 is “[t]o provide for the care, safety, and 
protection of children . . . ; to ensure secure and safe custody; to promote the health 
and well-being of all children under the state’s care; and to prevent the occurrence 
 
 
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of child abuse, neglect, and abandonment.”  § 39.001(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014).  
Consistent with this purpose, section 39.01(15) provides seven independent 
grounds upon which a child may be adjudicated dependent.  “[W]hen a Florida 
court is presented with a dependency petition, the court’s concern should be 
whether the allegations made in support of an adjudication of dependency satisfy 
Florida’s statutory grounds for such an adjudication, not whether the [juvenile] 
hopes to obtain [SIJS].”  O.I.C.L. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 205 So. 3d 575, 
578 (Fla. 2016) (quoting In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d at 581).  “[I]f a child qualifies for a 
declaration of dependency under our statutes, the child’s motivation to obtain legal 
residency . . . is irrelevant.”  F.L.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 912 So. 2d 
1264, 1269 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).  Moreover, “[i]f federal law grants a right to 
alien children to regularize their immigration status by first obtaining a state court 
adjudication of dependency, then there is no basis for failing to declare a child 
dependent so long as he or she meets the statutory criteria for dependency.”  Id.   
In his dissent in In re B.R.C.M., Judge Salter identified the trend toward 
summary denials of dependency petitions by immigrant juveniles based on a belief 
or conclusion that the juveniles are not entitled to adjudicative findings because 
they are only seeking immigration relief, not state assistance following abuse, 
abandonment, or neglect.  182 So. 3d at 764 (Salter, J., dissenting).  The dissent 
observed: “the recent spate of summary denial orders in the trial court and per 
 
 
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curiam affirmances in [the Third District] suggest a categorical rejection of such 
petitions rather than the usual individualized evidentiary hearings and written 
findings of fact.”  Id. (Salter, J., dissenting).  We disapprove of the categorical 
summary denial of dependency petitions filed by immigrant juveniles, and find no 
authority in the statutory scheme that allows for dismissal or denial without factual 
findings by the circuit court. 
In this case, the dependency petition was filed on behalf of B.R.C.M. by 
next friends having personal knowledge of the facts alleged, in accordance with 
Florida dependency law and procedure.2  The petition asserted three grounds for 
dependency under section 39.01(15), and alleged sufficient facts, establishing a 
prima facie case.3  Nonetheless, the Department of Children and Families did not 
investigate the allegations in the petition, and it was denied after a brief hearing in 
which no evidence was presented and no fact-finding resulted.  See id. at 755-56 
(Salter, J., dissenting). 
                                          
 
 
2.  “All proceedings seeking an adjudication that a child is dependent shall 
be initiated by the filing of a petition by an attorney for the department, or any 
other person who has knowledge of the facts alleged or is informed of them and 
believes that they are true.”  § 39.501(1), Fla. Stat. (2014).  See Fla. R. Juv. P. 
8.201(a)(2). 
 
3.  Each dependency petition shall “allege sufficient facts showing the child 
to be dependent based upon applicable law.”  Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.310(a)(1).   
 
 
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When a petition for dependency alleges specific facts supporting a finding of 
dependency under any of the seven statutory grounds, the circuit court must make 
individualized factual findings and apply the law to the facts in order to make a 
proper adjudication of dependency.  See id. at 766 (Salter, J., dissenting) (“Florida 
circuit courts should enter findings of fact and conclusions of law that address each 
juvenile petitioner’s individual claims.”).  “If the petition states a prima facie case, 
the petitioner should be permitted to introduce evidence in support of his or her 
claims, and the court should enter specific adjudicative findings responsive to the 
issues presented by the petition and the evidentiary record.”  Id. (Salter, J., 
dissenting).  If a child meets the statutory criteria for dependency, the child must 
be adjudicated accordingly, regardless of the child’s motivations for seeking a 
dependency adjudication.  Whether the petition seeks an adjudication to assist the 
child in applying for an immigration status under federal law is not a basis for 
summarily dismissing or denying the petition.  See id. at 755 (Salter, J., 
dissenting).  The determination of whether an immigrant juvenile may obtain SIJS 
is reserved for the federal immigration authorities.  See In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d at 
581.   
Because the Third District approved the summary denial of B.R.C.M.’s 
petition on the basis that his purpose was to seek lawful permanent residency, and 
 
 
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determined that he was not “truly” needy without any factual record or evidence 
regarding the child’s circumstances, we quash the decision below.   
CONCLUSION 
We agree with the dissent below that “B.R.C.M.’s ‘private petition’ for 
dependency . . . warrants individualized consideration and adjudication rather than 
summary denial.”  In re B.R.C.M., 182 So. 3d at 754-55 (Salter, J., dissenting).  
Accordingly, we quash the decision of the Third District and remand the case for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs. 
LAWSON, J., concurs specially with an opinion. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which QUINCE and POLSTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LAWSON, J., specially concurring. 
I write separately to acknowledge that Justice Canady and those joining his 
dissent make some valid observations, with which I do not disagree.  However, the 
dissent also appears to agree that there is an express and direct conflict between the 
Third District’s decision in In re B.R.C.M., 182 So. 3d 749 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), 
and the First District’s decision in In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).  
 
 
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The dissent further disagrees with portions of the Third District’s analysis; agrees 
with portions of the First District’s opinion; and appears to agree with the rule 
announced by this Court on the conflict issue: namely, that private dependency 
petitions cannot simply be summarily and categorically denied because they appear 
to be motivated by a desire to gain immigration relief for the child. 
Unlike the dissent, I prefer to reach the conflict issue rather than essentially 
approve the result reached by the Third District on the alternative ground that the 
petition could have been dismissed based upon pleading deficiencies.  The general 
rule is that a pleading should not be dismissed without leave to amend unless the 
privilege to amend “has been abused” or amendment would be “futile,” i.e., where 
the pleading deficiencies cannot be cured.  Price v. Miller & Solomon Gen. 
Contractors, Inc., 104 So. 3d 1251, 1252 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).  Because it is clear 
that the trial judge here would have dismissed this petition irrespective of any 
attempt to amend, I believe the conflict issue to be ripe for decision.  See, e.g., 
State v. Walker, 923 So. 2d 1262, 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (noting that the law 
does not require futile acts to preserve error for review).  I also agree with Justice 
Lewis that immediate legislative attention and clarification is needed in this area.  
Otherwise, the courts of this State will continue to expend valuable resources 
trying to figure out whether and how to apply our dependency statute to facts that 
do not appear to have even been contemplated when it was enacted. 
 
 
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LEWIS, J., concurring in result. 
 
Although I cannot agree with the summary nature of the proceedings below, 
I do agree with the multiple district courts in Florida, including the Third District 
which have essentially held that the structure of statutory dependency in Florida 
cannot and should not be allowed to be transformed into an immigration 
processing system which is strictly reserved for our federal immigration 
authorities.  The problems generated by this approach seem to be widely increasing 
and need legislative attention and clarification immediately. 
CANADY, J., dissenting. 
Although I do not agree with certain elements of the Third District’s 
reasoning in In re B.R.C.M., 182 So. 3d 749 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), I nonetheless 
would approve the result reached in that decision.  Under the pertinent provisions 
of chapter 39, Florida Statutes, B.R.C.M.’s dependency petition was not sufficient 
to state a prima facie case of dependency.  Accordingly, dismissal of the petition 
was warranted. 
I agree with the majority that “[i]f a child meets the statutory criteria for 
dependency, the child must be adjudicated accordingly, regardless of the child’s 
motivations for seeking a dependency adjudication” and that “[w]hether the 
petition seeks an adjudication to assist the child in applying for an immigration 
status under federal law is not a basis for summarily dismissing or denying the 
 
 
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petition.”  Majority op. at 7.  I also agree with the majority that “[i]f the petition 
states a prima facie case, the petitioner should be permitted to introduce evidence 
in support of his or her claims, and the court should enter specific adjudicative 
findings responsive to the issues presented by the petition and the evidentiary 
record.”  Id. at 7 (quoting In re B.R.C.M., 182 So. 3d at 766 (Salter, J., 
dissenting)).  But I disagree with the conclusion that the petition filed in this case is 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of dependency.  Based on the facts alleged 
and the grounds pleaded in the petition, the Petitioner failed to pass the threshold 
requirement for an evidentiary hearing. 
The Petitioner argues here that a determination of dependency is justified on 
three separate grounds.  One of those grounds, however, was not pleaded in the 
petition.  And the facts alleged in the petition are not sufficient to show a prima 
facie case under either of the other two grounds on which the Petitioner relies. 
The petition is devoid of any claim for a determination that B.R.C.M. is a 
dependent child on the ground enumerated in section 39.01(15)(e), Florida Statutes 
(2014)—that is, as a child found “[t]o have no parent or legal custodians capable of 
providing supervision and care.”  In the absence of a claim in the petition that 
dependency exists and should be adjudicated on this specific ground, this basis for 
determining dependency has never been properly at issue in this case.  Requiring 
an evidentiary hearing regarding this unpleaded claim is totally unjustified. 
 
 
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Nor is an evidentiary hearing justified on the other two grounds asserted by 
the Petitioner.  The facts alleged in the petition do not establish a prima facie case 
that B.R.C.M. is a dependent child on the grounds enumerated in either section 
39.01(15)(a), as a child found “[t]o have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by 
the child’s parent or parents or legal custodians,” or section 39.01(15)(f), as a child 
found “[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by 
the parent or parents or legal custodians.”  Understanding the insufficiency of the 
claims made on these two grounds requires a journey through the definitional maze 
of section 39.01.  The dependency claim here relates to abandonment and 
neglect—not to abuse.  And the insufficiency of that claim turns at least in part on 
elements of the statutory definitions of abandonment and neglect.  The 
insufficiency is also indicated by the way the basic definitional term at issue here is 
framed: “[c]hild who is found to be dependent.”  § 39.01(15), Fla. Stat. (2014).  
The very term itself suggests a determination based on circumstances that are not 
temporally remote.  Such a determination thus could not be based on the 
circumstances in Guatemala years ago that are alleged in the petition. 
Abandonment is defined in section 39.01(1) as 
a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the 
absence of a parent or legal custodian, the caregiver, while being able, 
has made no significant contribution to the child’s care and 
maintenance or has failed to establish or maintain a substantial and 
positive relationship with the child, or both.  
 
 
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The allegations of abandonment in the petition fail to pass muster under this 
definition for two reasons.  Even to the extent that the conduct of the Petitioner’s 
parents in Guatemala might be considered a proper focus, the petition contains no 
allegations that the parents were able to do anything to remedy their failures 
regarding the care of B.R.C.M.  More to the point, there is no allegation of any 
deficiency on the part of the caregiver—B.R.C.M.’s godmother—to whom 
B.R.C.M. has been entrusted by the federal government.  Indeed, B.R.C.M. seeks 
to remain in the custody of the caregiver.  
It is not subject to dispute that under federal law B.R.C.M. is in the custody 
of the government of the United States, which has ultimate responsibility for his 
well-being.  The person to whom B.R.C.M. has been entrusted by the federal 
government is properly deemed a caregiver within the meaning of section 39.01.  
The definition of caregiver in section 39.01(10) includes a “person responsible for 
a child’s welfare as defined in subsection (47).”  Section 39.01(47) includes within 
the various categories specified a broad reference to “any other person legally 
responsible for the child’s welfare in a residential setting.”  B.R.C.M.’s godmother 
has necessarily undertaken obligations as a condition for the placement of 
B.R.C.M. with her “in a residential setting” by the federal government that readily 
bring her within this category. 
 
 
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Regarding the allegations of neglect, as with the allegations of abandonment, 
there is no claim that the godmother has in any way neglected B.R.C.M.  And 
regarding the allegations concerning the parents, the dependency claim runs 
aground on the provision contained in section 39.01(44)’s definition of neglect that 
circumstances depriving a child of proper care “shall not be considered neglect if 
caused primarily by financial inability unless actual services for relief have been 
offered to and rejected by such person.”  The allegations of the petition contain not 
a hint that the circumstances affecting B.R.C.M.’s family in Guatemala were the 
result of anything other than “financial inability.”  Further, as previously 
mentioned, it is questionable that allegations of such temporally remote 
circumstances are a proper predicate for an adjudication of current dependency. 
The allegations of the petition also fail to support the claim under section 
39.01(15)(f) that B.R.C.M. is “at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, 
or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians.”  This claim is based on the 
specter of deportation and the circumstances that B.R.C.M. might face in 
Guatemala after being deported.  As a practical matter, it seems virtually certain 
that any return of B.R.C.M. to Guatemala would occur only when B.R.C.M. is an 
adult.  In any event, leaving that practical matter aside, the allegations of the 
petition simply do not show an “imminent” risk of anything.  The allegations rest 
on nothing more than speculation that the federal government might deport 
 
 
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B.R.C.M.  Beyond the fact that the requirement that an “imminent” risk be 
established has not been met, it is a dubious proposition that section 39.01(15) is 
designed to protect against actions of the federal government under the 
immigration laws. 
The decision of the First District in In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d 576, 579 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2015), correctly recognizes that “the federal and state statutory scheme 
currently in place . . . provides a pathway for undocumented children who have 
been abused, abandoned, or neglected to obtain lawful permanent residency in the 
United States” (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); § 39.5075, Fla. Stat. (2013)).  But 
the dependency claims regarding such children must be evaluated based on the 
specific requirements of the dependency statute.  And not every undocumented 
child will necessarily meet the requirements for a determination of dependency.  
Here, those requirements have not been met.  Further, it is by no means clear that 
section 39.5075—which in subsection (4) authorizes Florida courts to issue orders 
“finding that [a dependent] child meets the criteria for special immigrant juvenile 
status” under federal law—applies to private petitions seeking such a finding.  
Section 39.5075(4) refers specifically to petitions submitted by “the department or 
community-based care provider” as distinct from private petitions. 
QUINCE and POLSTON, JJ., concur. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
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Third District - Case No. 3D15-962 
 
 
(Miami-Dade County) 
 
Ricardo Rodriguez and Mary M. Gundrum of Immigrant Children’s Justice Clinic, 
Florida International University College of Law, Miami, Florida; and Steven 
Hadjilogiou and Angela Vigil of Baker & McKenzie, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Stephanie C. Zimmerman, Deputy Director & Statewide Director of Appeals, 
Children’s Legal Services, Bradenton, Florida; and Karla Perkins, Appellate 
Counsel, Children’s Legal Services, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
Bernard P. Perlmutter of Children & Youth Law Clinic, University of Miami 
School of Law, Coral Gables, Florida; and Whitney M. Untiedt of Akerman LLP, 
Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae Florida’s Children First 
 
Rebecca Sharpless and Romy Lerner of Immigration Clinic, University of Miami 
School of Law, Coral Gables, Florida; and Robert Latham, Bernard Perlmutter, and 
Kele Stewart of Children & Youth Law Clinic, University of Miami School of 
Law, Coral Gables, Florida; and JoNel Newman and Melissa Swain of Health 
Rights Clinic, University of Miami School of Law, Coral Gables, Florida, 
 
for Amici Curiae University of Miami School of Law Children & Youth 
Clinic, Health Rights Clinic, and Immigration Clinic