Case Title: State Of Florida v. Charles A. Kettell, Sr

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC07-573

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2008-04-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-573 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
CHARLES A. KETTELL, SR.,  
Respondent. 
 
[April 24, 2008] 
 
CANTERO, J. 
 
In this case we decide whether the crime of wantonly or maliciously 
shooting into a building can be established solely by proof of the shooting itself.  
We review Kettell v. State, 950 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), where the trial 
court instructed the jury as much.  The Second District Court of Appeal reversed, 
however, holding that the statute required more than mere proof of the shooting.  
That decision directly and expressly conflicts with Holtsclaw v. State, 542 So. 2d 
437 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989), in which the court held that merely shooting at, into, or 
within a building establishes the elements of the crime.  We have jurisdiction to 
resolve the conflict.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.; State v. Kettell, 959 So. 2d 
 
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717 (Fla. 2007) (granting review).  Applying the elementary principle that 
performing an act “wantonly or maliciously” requires more than merely 
performing the act, we hold that proof of the shooting alone is insufficient to prove 
the crime.  We therefore approve the Second District‟s decision.  
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
When neighbors heard shots coming from Kettell‟s apartment, they called 
911.  Officers were dispatched and, upon arriving there, found Kettell alone.  The 
apartment was filled with haze and smelled of gunpowder.  The officers found a 
.38 caliber revolver, gun cleaning materials, and ammunition, as well as bullet 
holes and bullet fragments in the floor molding.  Kettell later admitted to his ex-
wife that he fired the shots.  He was charged with violating section 790.19, Florida 
Statutes (2003), which provides, in pertinent part, that “[w]hoever, wantonly or 
maliciously, shoots at, within, or into . . . any public or private building . . . shall be 
guilty of a felony of the second degree.”1  The case went to trial, where a major 
issue was Kettell‟s intent. 
                                          
 
 
1.  The entire statute provides as follows: 
 
 
Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into, or 
throws any missile or hurls or projects a stone or other hard substance 
which would produce death or great bodily harm, at, within, or in any 
public or private building, occupied or unoccupied, or public or 
private bus or any train, locomotive, railway car, caboose, cable 
railway car, street railway car, monorail car, or vehicle of any kind 
 
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At trial, a controversy erupted over the jury instructions on the elements of 
the crime.  At the charge conference, arguing that Holtsclaw (the conflict case) 
held that intent was established solely by evidence that the defendant fired shots 
within his apartment, the State proposed special jury instructions.  The court 
reserved ruling until after closing arguments.  In closing, the State argued in part 
that Kettell‟s act of firing his weapon was wanton and malicious because of the 
risk of personal injury or property damage.  Defense counsel argued that the State 
had not established wanton or malicious intent because it failed to prove the 
likelihood of personal injury or property damage or Kettell‟s knowledge of any 
such likelihood.  After closing arguments, the State again requested its special jury 
instructions because the “jury need[ed] to be instructed that this is a per se crime.”  
Defense counsel objected, arguing that the special instructions negated the statute‟s 
wanton or malicious intent requirement, instead creating per se liability for 
shooting into a building.  Considering itself bound by Holtsclaw, the trial court 
granted the instruction. 
                                                                                                                                        
which is being used or occupied by any person, or any boat, vessel, 
ship, or barge lying in or plying the waters of this state, or aircraft 
flying through the airspace of this state shall be guilty of a felony of 
the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or 
s. 775.084. 
§ 790.19, Fla. Stat. (2003). 
 
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The standard jury instruction for the crime requires proof of three elements: 
that the defendant (1) shot a firearm; (2) at, within, or into a building, occupied or 
not; and (3) did so “wantonly or maliciously.”  Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 10.13.  
These terms are defined in the instructions as follows: 
“Wantonly” means consciously and intentionally, with reckless 
indifference to consequences and with the knowledge that damage is 
likely to be done to some person. 
“Maliciously” means wrongfully, intentionally, without legal 
justification or excuse, and with the knowledge that injury or damage 
will or may be caused to another person or the property of another 
person. 
Id.  The trial judge gave these standard instructions, and then gave the State‟s 
requested special instructions, which read: 
 
In other words, to sustain a conviction for wantonly or 
maliciously shooting at, within or into a building, the conduct must 
have been done with an intent to cause damage or injury.  This intent 
element is fulfilled by a person who intentionally shoots at, within or 
into a building for the primary purpose or with a specific intent of 
shooting at a person in or near the building as well as by a person who 
shoots at, within or into a building per se. 
 
Ownership of the building is no defense to the offense of 
maliciously or wantonly shooting at, within, or into a building. 
(Emphasis added.)  The jury found Kettell guilty.  On appeal, however, the Second 
District reversed, finding that the first special instruction misstated the law.  
Kettell, 950 So. 2d at 508. 
 
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II. DISCUSSION OF LAW 
The issue here is whether one can “wantonly or maliciously” shoot at, into, 
or within a building by “shooting at, within or into a building per se.”  We hold 
that the answer must be “no.”  The adverbs “wantonly or maliciously” require 
more than the act of shooting itself.  Below we (A) explain the nature of the 
conflict in the district court decisions, (B) resolve the conflict by first analyzing the 
genesis of the phrase “per se” in the cases interpreting the statute and then 
concluding that Holtsclaw misinterpreted these decisions to remove the statute‟s 
intent requirement, and finally (C) reject the State‟s contention that giving the 
erroneous special instruction was harmless error. 
A.  The Conflict in the Cases 
 
In deciding to give the State‟s special instruction on intent, the trial court 
relied on the Fifth District Court of Appeal‟s decision in Holtsclaw, 542 So. 2d 
437.  Accordingly, to define the conflict here, we first examine that case. 
 
Holtsclaw involved similar, if more violent, facts.  After a night of heavy 
drinking, the defendant returned to his trailer, where his wife and a baby had 
stayed.  Id. at 438.  When she asked about the blood on his chin, he struck her.  He 
then retrieved a gun and several times threatened to shoot himself and her.  He shot 
into the floor and then into the wall of the room where the baby was sleeping.  
When his wife rushed into the room to protect the child, he followed her and again 
 
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fired into the wall.  He was charged with violating section 790.19, as well as with 
aggravated assault and battery.  The jury found him guilty on all counts, but the 
trial court granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the charge of 
violating section 790.19.  When Holtsclaw appealed his convictions for aggravated 
assault and battery, the State cross-appealed.  Id. at 437-38. 
 
The Fifth District reinstated Holtsclaw‟s conviction.  In its brief opinion, the 
court addressed the issue as follows: 
 
Holtsclaw‟s attorney argues this statute did not apply because 
Holtsclaw owned the trailer and either (1) the shots were made 
without an intent to injure anyone; or (2) the shots were not directed at 
anyone.  None of these reasons constitute defenses to section 790.19, 
by its own language, nor does case law so construe it.  As we said in 
Skinner v. State, 450 So. 2d 595, 596 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), review 
denied, 470 So. 2d 702 (Fla.1985): 
[We] hold that section 790.19 . . . is violated by a person 
who intentionally shoots at, within, or into a building for 
the primary purpose, or with the specific intent, of 
shooting at a person in or near the building, as well as by 
a person who shoots at, within, or into a building per se.    
Holtsclaw, 542 So. 2d at 438-39. 
 
In this case, the State requested the special instruction, and the trial court 
granted it, based on the emphasized language from Holtsclaw above.  The State 
argued that, based on that language, the wanton or malicious intent element is 
fulfilled by shooting at, within or into a building “per se.”  The Second District 
found that the special instruction was “not a correct statement of the law.”  Kettell, 
 
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950 So. 2d at 507.  The court noted that the instruction absolved the State from 
proving that the act was done wantonly or maliciously.  Id. at 506-07.  The district 
court then addressed the basis for the erroneous instruction—the opinion in 
Holtsclaw: 
 
In giving the incorrect instruction, the trial court relied on 
language in Holtsclaw v. State, 542 So.2d 437, 438-39 (Fla. 5th DCA 
1989).  See also Skinner v. State, 450 So.2d 595, 596 (Fla. 5th DCA 
1984).  As we have explained, we cannot accept the view that the 
language at issue constitutes a correct and clear statement of the law.  
The Holtsclaw court undoubtedly sought to express the view that an 
offense under section 790.19 may be established without showing that 
the defendant shot at someone.  In other words, a defendant who 
shoots into a building can do so wantonly or maliciously even though 
he does not shoot at someone.  Unfortunately, the language employed 
in Holtsclaw suggests that the intent element is fulfilled simply by 
showing that someone shot into a building without proving that the 
shooting was done wantonly or maliciously. 
Kettell, 950 So. 2d at 507.  Thus, disagreeing with Holtsclaw about the proof 
required to establish the intent element of section 790.19, the court held the 
instruction erroneous; and because the instruction concerned an element of the 
crime, it reversed and remanded for a new trial.  Id. 507-08. 
B. Resolving the Conflict 
 
The district court opinions essentially conflict over whether proof of the first 
two elements of section 790.19 (shooting a firearm at, within, or into a building) is 
sufficient to establish the third (doing so wantonly or maliciously).  Understanding 
why Holtsclaw is incorrect first requires us to (1) review the history of the district 
 
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courts‟ interpretations of section 790.19 and then (2) explain how Holtsclaw 
misinterpreted these decisions to remove the statute‟s intent requirement. 
1. The Genesis of the Phrase “Per Se” in Interpretations of the Statute 
 
The root of the conflict can be traced back almost fifty years, when courts, in 
describing the intent required under the statute, first began to use the phrase, 
“shooting at or into a building per se.”  A district court first used the phrase in 
Golden v. State, 120 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960).  In that case, the defendant, 
while shooting at the victim, chased him into the victim‟s home.  One bullet struck 
the victim, but others lodged in various parts of the home.  Concluding that the 
evidence showed that the defendant‟s “malicious and wanton attitude was directed 
only at [the victim],” not, as the statute required, “that appellant was wantonly or 
maliciously shooting at or into the house per se,” the First District Court of Appeal 
reversed the conviction.  Golden 120 So. 2d at 653.  Thus, the district court used 
the phrase “shooting at or into the house per se” to articulate the requirement that 
the object of the shooting must be the building itself.  Proof that a defendant was 
shooting at a person was insufficient. 
 
Over two decades later, a judge on one district court, and a panel of another, 
took issue with Golden.  In Johnson v. State, 436 So. 2d 248, 248 (Fla. 5th DCA 
1983), the panel affirmed without opinion the defendant‟s conviction under section 
790.19.  In a specially concurring opinion, however, Judge Cowart provided the 
 
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facts, which were similar to those in Golden.  Johnson apparently circled a car 
while shooting at one of the passengers.  Addressing the First District‟s opinion, 
Judge Cowart wrote:   
The disjunctive adverbs, “wantonly or maliciously,” refer to that 
mental condition which would naturally and in common experience be 
expected to be the attitude of one who, with reckless disregard of the 
potential deadly consequences, intentionally and for no good and 
lawful purpose discharges a firearm at, within or into an object known 
to contain, or to often contain, human beings, as distinguished from 
the lack of intent of one who accidently discharges a firearm or the 
mind and attitude of one who, without intending any wrong or harm, 
innocently shoots a firearm under apparently safe conditions.   
Inanimate objects, such as houses and cars, seldom so offend a person 
as to become the subject of a malicious and wanton attitude and of a 
wrath such as would cause one to shoot the object per se.  Such rare 
occurrences could hardly have been what the statute was intended to 
proscribe.    
Johnson, 436 So. 2d at 249-50 (Cowart, J., concurring specially) (emphasis 
added).2  Judge Cowart concluded that “the statute does not require that the 
defendant's malevolent attitude be that of a specific intent and that intent be in the 
form of a specific intention to harm the object involved.”  Id. at 250. 
 
The next year, the Second District adopted the same position.  Affirming the 
denial of a motion to dismiss, the district court held that “the element of wantonly 
                                          
 
 
2.  In a footnote, Judge Cowart explicated the meaning of the phrase “per se” 
and the First District‟s use of it in Golden.  Johnson, 436 So. 2d at 249 n.2 
(“Therefore, in Golden the phrase “the house per se” means the house by itself;  
the house taken alone; the house in isolation; the house unconnected with other 
matters; the house in and of itself; or the house because of, or on account of, the 
house itself.”). 
 
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shooting at or into a building is not negated by the pleaded facts that defendant 
fired at a man who was in front of the building.”  Ballard v. State, 447 So. 2d 1040, 
1041 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).  That is, “„[w]antonly‟ does not require that the building 
be the target.”  Id.  Then, in Skinner v. State, 450 So. 2d 595, 595-96 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 1984), the Fifth District, with Judge Cowart now writing for the majority, 
used the phrasing that the court in Holtsclaw later quoted.  The court held that 
section 790.19 “is violated by a person who intentionally shoots at, within, or into 
a building for the primary purpose, or with the specific intent, of shooting at a 
person in or near the building, as well as by a person who shoots at, within, or into 
the building per se.”  Id. at 596.  Thus, Judge Cowart used the phrase “shooting . . . 
into the building per se” not to hold that merely shooting into a building proves 
intent, but to emphasize that the target of the shooting need not be a person. 
 
The Second and Fifth Districts thus decidedly rejected the First District‟s 
interpretation in Golden.  These courts did not, however, hold that firing into a 
building is per se criminal.  Rather, they held that the building itself need not be 
the target of the shooting.  A defendant‟s contention that he had aimed at a person 
in or near a building is not a defense.   
 
In response to these decisions, the First District receded from Golden.  See  
Polite v. State, 454 So. 2d 769, 771 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (receding from Golden 
 
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and “adopt[ing] the rationale expressed in Johnson”); Carter v. State, 469 So. 2d 
775, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (recognizing that Polite receded from Golden). 
2. Holtsclaw Eliminated the Statute’s Intent Requirement 
 
As detailed above, the phrase “shooting into a building per se” arose in the 
context of whether the intent to shoot must be directed at the building itself.  That 
was not the issue, however, in either this case or in Holtsclaw.  Rather, the conflict 
here results from Holtsclaw‟s incorrect reliance on Skinner to address a much 
different defense: that the shooting was not wanton or malicious. 
 
As already noted, the court in Holtsclaw quoted the “per se” language in 
Skinner to hold that the defendant‟s claims (lack of malicious or wanton intent) did 
not “constitute defenses to section 790.19, by its own language.”  542 So. 2d at 
438.  Thus, the court held that under the statute it is no defense that the act of 
shooting was not malicious or wanton.  Such a holding effectively renders section 
790.19 a per se crime.   
 
The court‟s opinion in Holtsclaw misinterpreted the holding of Skinner.  
Skinner addressed the Golden defense (that intending to shoot a person instead of a 
building did not establish the requisite intent under the statute).  Its use of the 
phrase, “shooting at or within a building per se” addressed only that defense.  That 
was not Holtsclaw‟s defense, and it is not Kettell‟s.   
 
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The reasoning in Holtsclaw also disregards the plain language of the statute, 
which requires that the prohibited act be done “wantonly or maliciously.”  As 
noted above, the standard jury instruction for section 790.19 defines maliciously 
and wantonly as follows: 
“Wantonly” means consciously and intentionally, with reckless 
indifference to consequences and with the knowledge that damage is 
likely to be done to some person. 
“Maliciously” means wrongfully, intentionally, without legal 
justification or excuse, and with the knowledge that injury or damage 
will or may be caused to another person or the property of another 
person. 
Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 10.13.  Therefore, as to this element, the State must 
prove: (1) that the act was done intentionally and recklessly without regard for the 
consequences; and that the defendant knew either (2) “that damage is likely to be 
done to some person” (for acting “wantonly”) or that injury or damage will or may 
be caused to another person or the property of another person (for acting 
“maliciously”).  See Smith v. State, 679 So. 2d 30, 31 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (“A 
conviction under section 790.19 requires that the perpetrator act „wantonly‟ or 
„maliciously‟ in throwing the projectile toward an occupied or unoccupied 
building.  In other words, the evidence must show that the defendant threw the 
rock with reckless indifference to the consequences or with knowledge that 
damage to person or property was likely to occur.”).  Under the statute, proof that 
 
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the defendant shot at or into a building is simply insufficient to prove that the act 
was wanton or malicious. 
 
Because the mere shooting into a building does not establish intent under the 
statute, the two special instructions given the jury in this case were erroneous.  The 
instructions provided that the wanton or malicious “intent element is fulfilled . . . 
by a person who shoots at, within or into a building per se” and that “[o]wnership 
of the building is no defense to the offense.” (Emphasis added.)  As the Second 
District noted, “the [first] instruction thus indicates that shooting at, within, or into 
a building is an act that „standing alone‟—that is, without reference to the intent to 
cause damage or injury—is sufficient to satisfy the intent element of the offense” 
and held “[t]his is not a correct statement of the law.”  Kettell, 950 So. 2d at 506-
07.  We agree.  In fact, both of these special instructions are erroneous statements 
of the law.  Proof that an accused fired a shot at, within, or into a building does not 
establish malicious or wanton intent.  The State must prove this element in 
accordance with the definitions of those terms, including the defendant‟s 
knowledge that his act may injure someone or damage someone else‟s property.   
 
In this case, Kettell argued that he lacked malicious or wanton intent: that 
the firing was not reckless; that the shots were directed away from people or into 
objects; that no one was injured and no injury was intended; that no one else‟s 
property was damaged; and that he had no knowledge that he was likely to injure 
 
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anyone or damage anyone else‟s property.  The special instructions removed that 
defense because they required the jury to find him guilty upon proof that he fired 
into a building. 
C. The Error Was Harmful 
 
Having concluded that the special instructions given at trial were erroneous 
statements of the law, we now turn to the State‟s contention that any error was 
harmless.3  We disagree. 
 
Noting that the trial court gave both the standard jury instruction applicable 
to section 790.19 as well as the erroneous special instructions, the Second District 
concluded that “in full context, the best that can be said of them is that they are 
contradictory and therefore confusing and misleading.”  Kettell, 950 So. 2d at 507.  
Accordingly, the district court reversed and remanded for new trial because the 
trial court did not correctly instruct the jury on the elements of the crime charged.  
Id.  The State argues that any error was harmless because the evidence supports the 
jury‟s finding of wanton or malicious intent. 
 
We have previously held that due process requires “that a defendant be 
accorded the right to have a Court correctly and intelligently instruct the jury on 
                                          
 
 
3.  We reject without discussion the State‟s contention that it was necessary 
to give the erroneous instructions to Kettel‟s jury in order to punish defense 
counsel for alleged misconduct.  No misconduct occurred; and even if it did, the 
sanction for misconduct cannot include the granting of an instruction that misstates 
an element of the crime. 
 
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the essential and material elements of the crime charged and required to be proven 
by competent evidence.”  Gerds v. State, 64 So. 2d 915, 916 (Fla. 1953).  Jury 
instructions, however, are subject to the contemporaneous objection rule, and 
unpreserved claims of error cannot be raised on appeal absent fundamental error.  
Castor v. State, 365 So.2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1978).  In Kettell‟s case, the trial court 
gave the standard instruction on the elements of the crime, including the definitions 
of the hotly disputed element of wanton or malicious intent, without alteration.  
Over the defendant‟s objection, the court at the same time instructed the jury that 
wanton or malicious intent was established if the jury found only that the defendant 
fired a gun in his apartment.  As we explained above, the judge thus erroneously 
instructed that shooting within a building is a per se crime.  See Butler v. State, 493 
So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla. 1986) (“[T]he court should not give instructions which are 
confusing, contradictory, or misleading.”). 
   
The court‟s error cannot be considered harmless.  We have held that “[s]ince 
the jury is entitled to be instructed on the elements of the offense, it cannot be 
harmless error to fail to do so especially when the omission is brought to the 
attention of the trial court by the defendant.”  Scott v. State, 808 So. 2d 166, 170-
71 (Fla. 2002), superseded on other grounds by § 893.101, Fla. Stat. (2002), as 
recognized in Garcia v. State, 901 So. 2d 788, 792 n.1 (Fla. 2005).  Although the 
court in this case did not, as in Scott, fail to instruct the jury on an element of the 
 
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crime, its use of the State‟s requested instruction resulted in an incorrect instruction 
on the law regarding a disputed element of the crime.  The instruction 
impermissibly removed, or at least reduced, the State‟s burden to prove malicious 
or wanton intent beyond a reasonable doubt.  The court‟s faulty instructions on the 
intent element were thus material to the jury‟s consideration of whether Kettell 
violated section 790.19.  Therefore, the error was not harmless.  See id.; see also 
Reed v. State, 837 So. 2d 366, 369 (Fla. 2002) (holding that an erroneous jury 
instruction was fundamental error because the instruction contained an incorrect 
definition of an element that reduced the State's burden of proof, was “material to 
what the jury had to consider to convict the petitioner,” and was “a disputed 
element” at trial); Barton v. State, 941 So. 2d 1291, 1291 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) 
(reversing and holding that the trial court erred by instructing on justifiable force 
because, in the absence of a separate forcible felony, the instruction 
“impermissibly negate[d] the defendant‟s claim of self-defense”); Murray v. State, 
937 So. 2d 277, 282 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (holding that fundamental error occurred 
where the jury was given contradictory instructions, one correct and the other 
incorrect). 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
We hold that the wanton or malicious intent element of the crime defined by 
section 790.19, Florida Statutes, is not established solely by evidence that a 
 
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defendant fired a shot at, within, or into a building.  The State also must prove that 
the shooting was done wantonly or maliciously as those terms are defined in the 
standard jury instruction.  We therefore approve the decision of the Second District 
in this case and disapprove the Fifth District‟s decision in Holtsclaw.  We remand 
this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D05-2882 
 
(Pinellas County) 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Robert J. Krauss, 
Assistant Attorney General, Bureau Chief, and Richard M. Fishkin, Assistant 
Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Alisa Smith and Bruce P. Taylor, 
Assistant Public Defenders, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent