Case Title: Maryland Arms Limited Partnership v. Cari M. Connell

Citation: 2010 WI 64

Docket Number: 2008AP001700

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
2010 WI 64 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP1700 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Maryland Arms Limited Partnership, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Cari M. Connell and Linda J. Connell, 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2009 WI App 87 
Reported at: 320 Wis. 2d 147, 769 N.W.2d 145 
(Ct. App 2009-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 6, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael B. Brennan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
GABLEMAN, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there was a brief 
by Randy J. Wynn, West Allis, and oral argument by Randy J. 
Wynn. 
 
For the defendants-appellants there was a brief by James B. 
Connell and Crooks, Low & Connell, S.C., Wausau, and oral 
argument by James B. Connell. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William F. White, 
Clayton P. Kawski, and Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, Madison, on 
behalf of the Apartment Association of South Central Wisconsin, 
Inc., the Apartment Association of Southeastern Wisconsin, Inc., 
the Central Wisconsin Apartment Association, and the Lakeshore 
Apartment Association, Inc., and oral argument by Clayton P. 
Kawski. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 64
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP1700  
(L.C. No. 
2007CV2291) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Maryland Arms Limited Partnership, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Cari M. Connell and Linda J. Connell, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed as 
modified.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  The petitioner, Maryland Arms 
Limited Partnership (Maryland Arms), seeks review of a published 
court of appeals decision reversing the circuit court's grant of 
summary judgment, which was in Maryland Arms' favor.1  The court 
of appeals remanded the case to the circuit court with 
directions that summary judgment be entered instead for the 
defendants, Cari and Linda Connell.   
                                                 
1 See Maryland Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2009 WI App 87, 
320 Wis. 2d 147, 769 N.W.2d 145, reversing an order of the 
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Michael B. Brennan, Judge. 
No. 
2008AP1700   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Maryland 
Arms asserts that under an unambiguous 
sentence of its residential lease, Cari Connell (Connell) is 
liable for the damage to her apartment when her plugged-in hair 
dryer caused a fire.  Although Maryland Arms acknowledges that 
her conduct was not negligent, it contends that Connell is 
liable because she had "control" of the hair dryer and "but for 
the acts of this tenant to introduce into this unit the hair 
dryer that caused the fire," the fire damage would not have 
occurred.  It further contends that the court of appeals erred 
when it determined that the residential lease was void as an 
attempt to contravene the public policy expressed in Wis. Stat. 
§ 704.07.2    
¶3  Because the essential principle posed by Maryland Arms, 
"control," does not appear in the sentence in question and 
because it is unclear that the parties intended that the conduct 
here would constitute an "act" that would impose liability on 
the tenant, we determine that the sentence in the residential 
lease is ambiguous.  Further, the ambiguity is compounded when 
that sentence is read in the context of the paragraph as a 
whole, because Maryland Arms' construction of that sentence 
would render the preceding sentence surplusage.  Thus, we 
conclude that the terms of the lease do not unambiguously 
provide that Connell is liable for the fire damage caused in 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2008AP1700   
 
3 
 
part by her acts of bringing a hair dryer into the apartment and 
plugging it into an electrical outlet.   
¶4 
Given 
that 
our 
construction 
of 
the 
lease 
is 
dispositive, we decline to address whether any lease provision 
that assigned liability to a tenant for damages not caused by 
negligent acts or misuse would contravene the public policy set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 704.07.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals, albeit on a different 
rationale. 
I 
¶5 
The facts in this case are not in dispute.  In 2004, 
Cari Connell was a 21-year-old student who leased a Milwaukee 
apartment from Maryland Arms.  The lease was guaranteed by 
Connell's mother, Linda. 
¶6 
On July 7, 2006, Connell awoke to discover a fire in 
the bathroom of her apartment.  She called the fire department 
and evacuated the building.   
¶7 
According to the fire investigation report issued by 
the 
Milwaukee 
Police 
Department, 
the 
fire 
originated 
in 
Connell's bathroom.  The report described the fire as an 
"accidental fire" and identified a "plugged in hair dryer" as 
the "cause of fire."  The "cause of ignition" was listed as 
"unintentional," 
and 
under 
the 
headline 
"Human 
Factors 
Contributing to Ignition," the investigator checked the box 
labeled "none."  The officer issuing the fire investigation 
report declined to check a box labeled "negligent fire."   
No. 
2008AP1700   
 
4 
 
¶8 
Maryland Arms repaired the damaged apartment and 
presented Connell an invoice totaling $8,533.81.  Connell did 
not pay.  According to Connell, Maryland Arms evicted her in 
August for failing to pay the bill and subsequently refused to 
return her security deposit.3   
¶9 
Maryland Arms filed suit in Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court, naming Connell and her mother as defendants.  The 
complaint made no allegations of negligence.  It did not contend 
that Connell mishandled the hair dryer or the electrical outlet 
in any way that made the hair dryer more likely to malfunction.  
Rather, it alleged that Connell was liable for the fire damage 
under the terms of the residential lease.   
¶10 The complaint demanded reimbursement for the cost of 
repairing the apartment.  It further alleged that Maryland Arms 
was unsuccessful in its attempts to re-rent the apartment in 
August 2006 and was therefore entitled to August rent.  The 
complaint stated that Connell and her mother "refuse to pay the 
amounts referenced herein despite due demand having been made."  
Maryland Arms attached the lease, the fire investigation report, 
and a list of itemized damages to the complaint.        
¶11 Connell's answer asserted that "the fire which damaged 
[her apartment] was accidental in nature and not the result of 
negligence."  It further contended that neither the lease nor 
                                                 
3 In its circuit court filings, Maryland Arms denied that it 
wrongfully evicted Connell and wrongly withheld her security 
deposit.  Although the parties may dispute the facts surrounding 
the termination of the lease, these facts are not material to 
the issues we decide here.     
No. 
2008AP1700   
 
5 
 
Wisconsin law permitted a claim for damages resulting from an 
accidental fire not caused by the negligent act of the tenant.4  
¶12 The parties entered into a stipulation, agreeing in 
relevant part to the following facts: Maryland Arms' damages 
were correctly itemized; these damages were "caused by a fire, 
the origin of which came from a hair dryer owned by Cari Connell 
as 
described 
in 
the 
Milwaukee 
Police 
Department 
Fire 
Investigation Report"; and "Cari Connell did not previously know 
of any defect in said hair dryer."   
¶13 In their briefing and arguments at the circuit court, 
the parties focused on the terms of the lease signed by Connell, 
her mother, and Maryland Arms.  The residential lease is a nine-
page document, including attachments.  It provides in relevant 
part: 
Lessee shall be responsible for all intentional and 
negligent acts or breaches of this Lease by Lessee, 
Lessee's occupants, guests and invitees.  Lessee shall 
be 
liable 
for 
all 
damage 
to 
the 
premises 
and 
appliances and equipment belonging thereto, in any way 
caused by the acts of Lessee, Lessee's occupants, 
guests and invitees. 
Throughout this opinion, we refer to this provision in the lease 
as the "Liability Paragraph."5  
 
                                                 
4 Additionally, Connell counterclaimed, alleging that she 
was entitled to damages for wrongful eviction and the wrongful 
withholding of her security deposit.  The circuit court entered 
final 
judgment 
without 
addressing 
or 
resolving 
Connell's 
counterclaim.  The arguments presented by the parties in the 
circuit court, the court of appeals, and this court have 
exclusively addressed whether Connell is liable for the repairs 
to the apartment.  Connell has not requested that we remand the 
case to the circuit court for resolution of her counterclaims.   
No. 
2008AP1700   
 
6 
 
¶14 Both parties moved for summary judgment.  Maryland 
Arms cited to nine separate paragraphs in the lease and to one 
rule, but its brief in support of summary judgment did not 
analyze the language of the provisions it cited.  Rather, it 
argued that Connell should be liable for the damage to the 
premises "because it was Cari Connell's hair dryer that caused 
the fire."  Connell asserted that a residential lease that 
imposed liability for non-negligent acts would be contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 704.07 and therefore void.6  Additionally, Connell 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 Briefs and arguments were presented on behalf of Maryland 
Arms by Amici Curiae Apartment Association of South Central 
Wisconsin, 
Inc., 
Apartment 
Association 
of 
Southeastern 
Wisconsin, Inc., Central Wisconsin Apartment Association, and 
Lakeshore Apartment Association, Inc.   
Amici attached a copy of the form lease used by the 
Apartment Association of South Central Wisconsin.  This lease 
differs from Maryland Arms' form lease.  It provides that the 
tenant agrees "[t]o be responsible for all acts of negligence or 
breaches of this agreement by Tenant and Tenant's guests and 
invitees, and to be liable for any resulting property damage or 
injury."  At oral argument, counsel for amici was unaware of any 
other form lease besides that of Maryland Arms that contains the 
language at issue in this case.   
6 Wis. Stat. § 704.07 provides, in relevant part: 
(1) Application of section.  This section applies 
to . . . all residential tenancies.  An agreement to 
waive 
the 
requirements 
of 
this 
section 
in 
a 
residential tenancy is void. . . .  
(2) Duty of landlord. . . . (c) If the premises are 
damaged 
by 
fire, . . . not 
the 
result 
of 
the 
negligence or intentional act of the landlord, this 
subsection is inapplicable and either sub. (3) or (4) 
governs. 
(3) Duty of tenant.  (a) If the premises are damaged 
by the negligence or improper use of the premises by 
No. 
2008AP1700   
 
7 
 
argued that the terms of the lease did not impose liability for 
non-negligent acts. 
¶15 The circuit court acknowledged that "there was no 
negligence or improper use proved, or stipulated to, in this 
case."  Without explaining its construction of the terms of the 
lease, the circuit court stated that the second sentence of the 
Liability Paragraph "memorializes the parties' intent that the 
defendants would be liable for accidental fire damage."    
¶16 The 
circuit court determined that the Liability 
Paragraph did not contravene Wis. Stat. § 704.07, and thus 
Connell was "liable for the fire caused by the hair dryer."  The 
court granted Maryland Arms' motion for summary judgment.  
Judgment was entered in the amount of $9,342.31, including fees 
and costs.     
¶17 The court of appeals reversed the decision of the 
circuit court.  It agreed with Connell that "both the lease and 
Wis. Stat. § 704.07 . . . require that Cari Connell must be 
negligent in connection with the fire as a precondition to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
the tenant, the tenant must repair the damage and 
restore 
the 
appearance 
of 
the 
premises 
by 
redecorating. . . .  
(4) 
Untenantability. 
 
If 
the 
premises 
become 
untenantable because of damage by fire, . . . the 
tenant may remove if the inconvenience to the tenant 
by reason of the nature and period of repair, 
rebuilding or elimination would impose undue hardship 
on the tenant.  If the tenant remains in possession, 
rent abates to the extent the tenant is deprived of 
the 
full 
normal use of the premises. . . . This 
subsection is inapplicable if the damage or condition 
is caused by negligence or improper use by the tenant.    
No. 
2008AP1700   
 
8 
 
imposition of liability."  Maryland Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 
2009 WI App 87, ¶3, 320 Wis. 2d 147, 769 N.W.2d 145.  The court 
remarked that "[i]f indeed the lessee is responsible for 'all 
damage' caused in any way by the lessee, the first sentence of 
the provision limiting Cari Connell's liability to damage caused 
by negligent acts or improper use is unnecessary."  Id., ¶5.   
¶18 Despite its apparent conclusion that the lease did not 
impose liability for damage caused by a tenant's non-negligent 
acts, the court of appeals went on to conclude that the lease 
provision was void as "an attempt to waive the requirements of 
Wis. Stat. § 704.07."  Id., ¶1.  It determined that the clear 
intent of Wis. Stat. § 704.07 "is to have the landlord shoulder 
the responsibility for fire repairs when there is no tenant 
negligence or improper use of the premises."  Because Cari 
Connell was not negligent and did not improperly use the 
premises, the court of appeals concluded that Connell was not 
liable for the fire damage.  Id., ¶14.  
¶19 Maryland Arms petitioned this court, asking us to 
review the court of appeals' determination that the lease 
provision was void as an attempt to contravene the public policy 
expressed in Wis. Stat. § 704.07.  Connell filed a response, 
contending that review was unnecessary.  Further, she asserted 
that there was "an alternative ground that would support the 
result in this case."  Specifically, she asserted that the 
circuit court's construction of the lease was unreasonable 
because "the act of bringing a hair dryer into [the] apartment 
or plugging in a hair dryer" was not the cause of the fire, as 
No. 
2008AP1700   
 
9 
 
the term "cause" is understood by its plain and ordinary 
meaning.  We accepted review. 
II 
¶20 We review the grant or denial of a summary judgment 
motion using the same standards and method as are applied by the 
circuit court.  Pawlowski v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 WI 
105, ¶15, 322 Wis. 2d 21, 777 N.W.2d 67.  A moving party is 
entitled to summary judgment if there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  Id.; Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).   
¶21 Here, the material facts are undisputed.  The question 
is whether Maryland Arms is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law under the terms of the lease.7  The interpretation and 
application of a contract to undisputed facts present a question 
of law, which we review independently of the determinations 
rendered by the circuit court and the court of appeals.  Osborn 
v. Dennison, 2009 WI 72, ¶33, 318 Wis. 2d 716, 768 N.W.2d 20.   
                                                 
7 Although 
the 
parties' arguments in this case have 
primarily focused on the interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 704.07, 
the question of the interpretation of the lease is properly 
before the court.   
Throughout 
the 
litigation, 
Connell 
has 
continuously 
asserted that the terms of the lease do not impose liability 
under these facts.  The court of appeals briefly opined that the 
terms of the lease did not impose liability for non-negligent 
acts, but then based its holding on the statute.  Connell's 
response to the petition for review asserted that interpretation 
of the contract was an alternative ground that would support the 
court of appeals' decision.   
No. 
2008AP1700   
 
10 
 
¶22 The primary goal in contract interpretation is to 
"give effect to the parties' intent, as expressed in the 
contractual language."  Seitzinger v. Cmty. Health Network, 2004 
WI 28, ¶22, 270 Wis. 2d 1, 676 N.W.2d 426.  We interpret the 
language "consistent with what a reasonable person would 
understand the words to mean under the circumstances."  Id.   
¶23 "Where 
the 
terms 
of 
a 
contract 
are 
clear 
and 
unambiguous, we construe the contract according to its literal 
terms."  
Gorton v. Hostak, Henzl & Bichler, S.C., 217 
Wis. 2d 493, 506, 577 N.W.2d 617 (1998).  When the contract 
language 
is 
ambiguous, 
however, 
"two 
further 
rules 
are 
applicable: (1) evidence extrinsic to the contract itself may be 
used to determine the parties' intent and (2) ambiguous 
contracts are interpreted against the drafter."  Seitzinger, 270 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶22.   
III 
¶24 In interpreting this residential lease, we examine the 
relevant portion of the agreement to discern the parties' 
intent.  The Liability Paragraph provides:  
[1] Lessee shall be responsible for all intentional 
and negligent acts or breaches of this Lease by 
Lessee, Lessee's occupants, guests and invitees.  [2] 
Lessee shall be liable for all damage to the premises 
and appliances and equipment belonging thereto, in any 
way caused by the acts of Lessee, Lessee's occupants, 
guests and invitees. 
¶25 Initially, we focus on the second sentence of the 
Liability Paragraph because Maryland Arms asserts that this 
sentence unambiguously imposes liability on the tenant for the 
No. 
2008AP1700   
 
11 
 
fire damage here.  We then turn our focus to the Liability 
Paragraph as a whole to determine whether the two sentences, 
when read together, unambiguously demonstrate that the parties 
intended for the tenant to be liable under these circumstances. 
A 
¶26 Our interpretation of the second sentence centers on 
the following words: "Lessee shall be liable for all damage to 
the premises . . . in any way caused by the acts of Lessee[.]"  
We begin by interpreting the phrase "in any way caused by the 
acts of Lessee."   
¶27 Both the circuit court and Maryland Arms contend that 
the express terms of the second sentence impose absolute 
liability under these facts.  The circuit court examined the 
second sentence of the Liability Paragraph in isolation and 
determined that it "memorializes the parties' intent that the 
defendants would be liable for accidental fire damage"——even 
though the Liability Paragraph does not discuss "accidental fire 
damage."   
¶28 Maryland Arms is more circumspect.  It explains that 
it took Connell's "acts" of bringing the hair dryer into the 
apartment and plugging it in to "cause" the fire within the 
meaning of the lease.  Maryland Arms asserts that the tenant is 
contractually liable for damages caused by any act of the tenant8 
                                                 
8 The lease also addresses acts of the tenant's occupants, 
guests, and invitees which cause damage.  Because occupants, 
guests, and invitees are not at issue in this case, we do not 
discuss them further.    
No. 
2008AP1700   
 
12 
 
if the damage is the result of something "in the control" of the 
tenant.   
¶29 At oral argument, counsel for Maryland Arms advanced 
the argument that under the terms of the lease, the tenant is 
absolutely liable for anything in her control: 
COURT: The contract makes the tenant absolutely 
liable?   
MARYLAND ARMS: Under the circumstances that are in the 
control 
of 
the 
tenant, 
yes, 
that 
is 
my 
conclusion. . . .    
COURT: Would you be making the same argument if she 
did not have it plugged in, but of course she is the 
one that brought it in, and some way it was next to 
something that caused some other problem?   
MARYLAND ARMS: If it was the result of something out 
of the control of the landlord, my answer would be 
yes. . . .      
¶30 Subsequently in oral argument, Maryland Arms again 
emphasized that the meaning of the second sentence centers 
around the concept of "control":  
This case in my opinion boils down to one concept——who 
is 
in 
control 
of 
the 
item 
that 
caused 
the 
problem. . . .  Obviously, if it is a defective toilet 
it is the landlord's toilet, the tenant [] is not in 
control of that.  How else is a landlord going to 
through his contract protect himself . . . from items 
or appliances that are brought into the landlord's 
premises by a tenant?  
¶31 Additionally, Maryland Arms made clear the breadth of 
a tenant's liability under its interpretation of the second 
sentence.  According to Maryland Arms, the second sentence 
covers the "act" of introducing any item or appliance into the 
apartment: "[B]ut for the act of this tenant to introduce into 
No. 
2008AP1700   
 
13 
 
this unit the hair dryer that caused the fire, we would not be 
here."  The problem with Maryland Arms' interpretation of the 
second sentence is twofold.   
¶32 First, it is important to note that not only does the 
word "control" not appear in the second sentence of the 
Liability Paragraph, this concept of "control" appears nowhere 
in the entire lease.  The second sentence simply does not 
distinguish between damage to those items that are within the 
control of the tenant and those that are not within the tenant's 
control.  In essence, Maryland Arms asks us to read the word 
"control" into the second sentence.  At the same time that 
Maryland Arms asserts that we should read in the word "control," 
it contends that the express words of the second sentence 
unambiguously demonstrate that the parties intended that whoever 
controlled the item is liable for the damages.  Its arguments 
are at odds with each other.   
¶33 Second, taken at face value, the breadth of Maryland 
Arms' construction of the contract would produce absurd results.  
Maryland Arms asserts that any act within the control of the 
tenant can give rise to liability under the contract.  If the 
landlord can identify an "act" of the tenant that is a "cause" 
of the damage to the premises, liability for repairing the 
premises is shifted to the tenant——regardless of how remote the 
tenant's act was from the damage and regardless of whether the 
damage would not have occurred but for other concurrent causes 
outside of the tenant's control.   
No. 
2008AP1700   
 
14 
 
¶34 Imagine the following scenario: A tenant leaves town 
for the weekend, locking her apartment.  While she is out of 
town, 
burglars 
break 
into 
the 
apartment 
to 
steal 
her 
possessions.  Because the door is locked, they break a window to 
gain entry.  Under the second sentence as construed by Maryland 
Arms, the tenant would be liable for the damage to the window.  
The act of locking the door was within her control, and but for 
this act, the window would not have been broken.  Does the 
language of the second sentence of the Liability Paragraph 
unambiguously demonstrate the parties' intent that the tenant 
should be liable for this damage? 
¶35 Likewise, consider a scenario where lightening strikes 
an appliance that the tenant brought into the apartment, and the 
subsequent 
fire 
causes 
substantial 
damage 
to 
the 
entire 
apartment complex.  Bringing the appliance into the apartment 
was a cause in fact of the fire.  Was it the intent of the 
parties that the tenant would be liable for such damage when 
they signed the lease?   
¶36 An inspection of many apartments would likely reveal 
that the tenant has brought untold number of items into the 
apartment and has left many appliances turned off but still 
plugged into an electrical outlet.  Many electrical appliances 
still have live wires even when turned off.  In order to avoid 
liability, did the parties intend that the tenant should 
routinely unplug such things as the washer and dryer, microwave, 
telephone answering machine, dishwasher, alarm clock, stereo, 
No. 
2008AP1700   
 
15 
 
television, DVD player, lamps, computer, modem, and electric 
toothbrush——as well as the hair dryer?   
 
¶37 Here, the second sentence of the Liability Paragraph 
requires an "act" of the tenant which "causes" damage.  We 
cannot conclude, however, that the acts described above were the 
kinds of "acts" which the parties intended would render a tenant 
liable under the express words of that sentence.9     
¶38 Accordingly, we do not agree with the circuit court 
that 
the 
second 
sentence 
of 
the 
liability 
paragraph 
unambiguously 
"memorializes 
the 
parties' 
intent 
that 
the 
defendant would be liable for accidental fire damage."  Because 
the essential principle posed by Maryland Arms, "control," does 
not appear in the sentence in question and because it is unclear 
that the parties intended that the conduct here would constitute 
                                                 
9 The dissent dismisses the above hypotheticals as inapt.  
Without pointing to any provision in the lease that references 
"an act of God" or "control," the dissent concludes: "When 
damage is caused by an unconnected third party or an act of God, 
the landlord is assigned the duty to fix and pay for the damage 
to the premises . . . . In these situations neither party 
controls events, and responsibility for damage is allocated."  
Dissent, ¶104.   
In fact, Maryland Arms' expansive interpretation of the 
lease would assign the tenant liability for repairing the 
premises——even when the damage was caused in substantial part by 
an "unconnected third party" or an "act of God"——as long as the 
landlord could identify some act of the tenant that was part of 
a "causal chain."  See id., ¶112.  Appliances, even those that 
are plugged in, normally do not spontaneously combust without 
some 
intervening 
cause——perhaps 
a 
defect 
caused 
by 
the 
manufacturer or faulty wiring.  Here, the factual record is not 
developed, and nothing in the record sheds light on why this 
particular hair dryer ignited.           
No. 
2008AP1700   
 
16 
 
an "act" which would impose liability on the tenant, we 
determine that the sentence in the residential lease is 
ambiguous.10     
B 
¶39 Even if we determined that the second sentence 
unambiguously imposed absolute liability on the tenant when read 
in isolation and that such a construction was reasonable, 
however, we would be forced to pause when examining the 
Liability Paragraph as a whole.  As the court of appeals has 
explained when interpreting an insurance policy, "A provision 
that is unambiguous in itself may be ambiguous in the context of 
the entire policy."  Ruenger v. Soodsma, 2005 WI App 79, ¶10, 
281 Wis. 2d 228, 695 N.W.2d 840.   
¶40 "Contextual ambiguity exists when a provision is 
reasonably susceptible to more than one construction when read 
                                                 
10 Although the dissent purports to rely on the terms of the 
lease in concluding that Connell is liable for the accidental 
fire damage here, it is apparent that the dissent's conclusion 
is unhinged from the lease.  Instead of interpreting the text of 
the lease, the dissent is based on what it considers to be good 
public policy.   
Like Maryland Arms, the dissent poses that the concept of 
"control"——not found in the lease——"is at the heart of a lease 
that allocates liability to the party best able to control 
risk."  Dissent, ¶103.  The dissent asserts that "the tenant is 
in the best position to manage the premises in a way that 
minimizes risk." Id.   
The question addressed in this opinion is not what risk 
allocation arrangement is most supported by public policy.  
Rather, the question is whether the terms of this particular 
lease unambiguously impose liability on the tenant for repairing 
the property damage at issue here.           
No. 
2008AP1700   
 
17 
 
in the context of the policy's other language."  Marotz v. 
Hallman, 2007 WI 89, ¶39, 302 Wis. 2d 428, 734 N.W.2d 411.  
"[T]he point of contextual ambiguity [analysis] is not to read 
provisions in isolation."  Id. at ¶43.11   
¶41 Here, if the second sentence is read as broadly as 
Maryland 
Arms 
asserts, 
then 
the 
first 
sentence 
has 
no 
independent meaning.  The first sentence provides that the 
tenant is "responsible" for "intentional and negligent acts or 
breaches of this lease" by the tenant or her guests.  The second 
sentence 
provides 
that 
the 
tenant 
is 
"liable 
for 
all 
damage . . . in any way, caused by the acts of" the tenant or 
her guests.   
¶42 Intentional acts, negligent acts, and breaches are 
subsets of the broader category "any acts."  If the second 
sentence covered any and all "acts," then it would necessarily 
cover the types of acts described in the first sentence.  
Construing the second sentence as broadly as Maryland Arms 
                                                 
11  "For inconsistencies to alter the construction of an 
otherwise unambiguous provision, the inconsistencies must be 
material to the issue in dispute and be of such a nature that a 
reasonable insured would find an alternative meaning."  Marotz 
v. Hallman, 2007 WI 89, ¶39, 302 Wis. 2d 428, 734 N.W.2d 411.   
No. 
2008AP1700   
 
18 
 
asserts would subsume the meaning of the first sentence, 
rendering it mere surplusage.12   
 
¶43 Given the risk of surplusage, we conclude that the 
language of the second sentence, when read in the context of the 
policy's other language, is reasonably susceptible to another 
construction measured by the objective understanding of an 
ordinary tenant.  Thus, the terms of the lease do not 
unambiguously provide that Connell is liable for the fire damage 
caused in part by her acts of bringing a hair dryer into the 
apartment and plugging it in to an electrical outlet.13   
                                                 
12  At oral argument, counsel for the amici appeared to 
agree that Maryland Arms' interpretation would render the first 
sentence surplusage.  Counsel asserted that the second sentence 
was clear and that "'in any way caused by' means 'in any way 
caused by.'"  The court asked counsel: "But why do you need the 
first sentence if you interpret the second sentence to mean the 
tenant is absolutely liable, which is really what you're saying, 
for any damage caused by the tenant's act——regardless of 
negligence or intentional?"  Counsel responded: "Exactly . . . , 
I don't think you need the first sentence.  I think to hold the 
tenant liable here you only need the second sentence."     
13 In its brief to the court, Maryland Arms highlights seven 
additional provisions in the residential lease and one rule 
contained in an appendix to the lease agreement.  Without 
providing any analysis, it asserts that "while the majority of 
the appellate proceedings focused on [the Liability Paragraph], 
this Court can find the Connells liable for the property damage 
pursuant to" each of the highlighted provisions.  Generally, we 
do not respond to issues that have not been fully developed or 
briefed.  State v. Johnson, 2009 WI 57, ¶71, 318 Wis. 2d 21, 767 
N.W.2d 207. 
No. 
2008AP1700   
 
19 
 
C 
¶44 Having determined that there is ambiguity whether the 
second sentence of the lease is read in isolation or in 
conjunction with the first sentence, we must construe the words 
to determine the meaning.  The principle that ambiguities are 
construed against the drafter is a "deeply rooted doctrine" of 
contract interpretation.  Walters v. Nat'l Props., LLC, 2005 WI 
87, ¶13, 282 Wis. 2d 176, 699 N.W.2d 71.  "In choosing among the 
reasonable meanings of [an agreement], that meaning is generally 
preferred which operates against the party who supplies the 
words[.]"  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 (1979).14   
                                                                                                                                                             
Nevertheless, it appears that most of the provisions 
highlighted by Maryland Arms are inapt.  For instance, paragraph 
3.3 provides that the landlord "shall not be liable to Lessee or 
others . . . for any damage to or loss of any personal property 
located in or about the premises[.]"  Similarly, paragraph 
8.1(d) provides that the landlord "shall not be liable for any 
loss . . . which Lessee may sustain."  Maryland Arms' liability 
to Connell is not at issue in this case.  The only provision 
which might be relevant is paragraph 3.2, use restrictions.  It 
provides: "Lessee shall not use or keep in or about the premises 
any article or thing which would in any manner increase the risk 
of fire . . . ."  Maryland Arms has not presented any analysis 
or argument about how that provision applies to these facts.   
14 The comments to the Restatement explain the rationale 
underlying this rule:  
Where one party chooses the terms of a contract, he is 
likely to provide more carefully for the protection of 
his own interests than for those of the other party.  
He is also more likely than the other party to have 
reason to know of uncertainties in meaning.  Indeed, 
he may leave meaning deliberately obscure, intending 
to decide at a later date what meaning to assert.   
No. 
2008AP1700   
 
20 
 
¶45 When possible, contract language should be construed 
to give meaning to every word, "avoiding constructions which 
render portions of a contract meaningless, inexplicable or mere 
surplusage."  Kasten v. Doral Dental USA, LLC, 2007 WI 76, ¶48, 
301 Wis. 2d 598, 733 N.W.2d 300.  Connell asserts that the only 
way to read the Liability Paragraph and give meaning to both 
sentences is to construe "any acts" in the second sentence to 
refer to the types of acts enumerated in the first sentence.   
¶46 Connell offers an alternative to Maryland Arms' 
assertion 
that 
the 
Liability 
Paragraph 
imposes 
absolute 
liability.  She explains that the first sentence assigns 
"responsibility" to the tenant for "intentional or negligent 
acts [and] breaches of this lease."  Under the first sentence, 
the tenant is "responsible" regardless of whether the act or 
breach of the lease is the act of the tenant or of the tenant's 
"occupant, guest, or invitee."  The second sentence describes 
what the tenant is liable for if she breaches the duties 
described in the first sentence——the tenant is liable for the 
damage caused to "the premises and appliances and equipment 
belonging thereto."   
¶47 Because 
Connell's 
interpretation 
construes 
the 
ambiguity against the drafter and avoids a construction that 
would render the first sentence meaningless surplusage, we 
                                                                                                                                                             
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 (1979) cmt. a.  Further, 
"[t]his rule is often invoked in cases of standardized contracts 
and in cases where the drafting party has the stronger 
bargaining position."  Id.; see also Gorton v. Hostak, Henzl & 
Bichler, S.C., 217 Wis. 2d 493, 506, 577 N.W.2d 617 (1998). 
No. 
2008AP1700   
 
21 
 
conclude that she offers the more reasonable interpretation of 
the Liability Paragraph.  Therefore, we read the "acts" 
discussed in the second sentence to refer to the acts that the 
lease provides responsibility for in the first sentence——
intentional or negligent acts or breaches of the lease.  Such a 
construction of the lease comports with another principle of 
contract interpretation——it avoids a construction that produces 
an absurd result.   
¶48 
Given 
that 
our 
construction 
of 
the 
lease 
is 
dispositive,  we decline to address whether any lease provision 
that assigned liability to a tenant for damages not caused by 
negligent acts or misuse would contravene the public policy set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 704.07.15  Typically, an appellate court 
should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.  State v. 
Blalock, 150 Wis. 2d 688, 703, 442 N.W.2d 514 (Ct. App. 1989).  
Issues that are not dispositive need not be addressed.  Gross v. 
Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300, 277 N.W. 663 (1938).   
¶49 In sum, because the essential principle posed by 
Maryland Arms, "control," does not appear in the sentence in 
question and because it is unclear that the parties intended 
that the conduct here would constitute an "act" that would 
impose liability on the tenant, we determine that the sentence 
in the residential lease is ambiguous.  Further, the ambiguity 
                                                 
15   The amici expressed concerns that the court of appeals' 
ruling impedes the freedom to contract.  Because our conclusion 
is based solely on an interpretation of this lease, the freedom 
to contract is not implicated by this decision.  We save for 
another day a discussion of the scope of Wis. Stat. § 704.07. 
No. 
2008AP1700   
 
22 
 
is compounded when that sentence is read in the context of the 
paragraph as a whole, because Maryland Arms' construction of 
that sentence would render the preceding sentence surplusage.  
Thus, we conclude that the terms of the lease do not 
unambiguously provide that Connell is liable for the fire damage 
caused in part by her acts of bringing a hair dryer into the 
apartment and plugging it in to an electrical outlet. 
¶50 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals, albeit on a different rationale. 
By the Court.—The analysis of the court of appeals is 
modified, and, as modified, affirmed.   
  
 
 
 
No.  2008AP1700.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶51 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion and agree that the lease at issue does not 
unambiguously provide that the tenant, Cari Connell (Connell), 
is liable for the fire damage caused by her hair dryer, see 
majority op., ¶43, especially since the parties stipulated that 
neither Connell nor Maryland Arms Limited Partnership (Maryland 
Arms) was negligent.  Therefore, the lease must be construed 
against the drafter and in favor of the tenant.  See Walters v. 
Nat'l Props., 2005 WI 87, ¶13, 282 Wis. 2d 176, 699 N.W.2d 71 
(providing that this court adheres to the "universally accepted 
legal maxim that any ambiguities in a document are to be 
construed unfavorably to the drafter"); see also Fergen v. 
Lyons, 162 Wis. 131, 135, 155 N.W. 935 (1916) ("[I]n case of any 
ambiguity in the provision of a lease . . . , the construction 
should be adopted which will favor the tenant rather than one 
which will favor the landlord.").  In this case, the lease does 
not unambiguously allocate liability to the tenant for fire 
damage caused by her hair dryer——that is, fire damage caused by 
neither the landlord's "negligence or intentional act," Wis. 
Stat. § 704.07(2)(c), nor the tenant's "negligence or improper 
use" of the apartment, § 704.07(3)(a).  The benefit of the 
ambiguity must therefore fall in the tenant's favor.  I write 
separately, however, to clarify that parties are not necessarily 
prohibited from allocating liability by contract, see dissent, 
¶122, so long as it is done clearly and is otherwise enforceable 
by law.   
No.  2008AP1700.akz 
 
2 
 
¶52 Wisconsin Stat. § 704.07 outlines the general duties 
of a landlord and tenant with respect to repairing leased 
premises.  To determine the parties' duties, it is instructive 
to go through each subsection of § 704.07.  A review of each 
subsection makes clear that § 704.07 does not dictate who is 
liable for repair when the premises are damaged by fire caused 
by neither the landlord's "negligence or intentional act" nor 
the tenant's "negligence or improper use."  
¶53 As a preliminary matter, subsection (1) provides that 
Wis. Stat. § 704.07 applies "to all residential tenancies" and 
that "[a]n agreement to waive the requirements of this section 
in a residential tenancy is void."  § 704.07(1). 
¶54 Pursuant to subsection (2), the landlord has the duty 
to "[m]ake all necessary structural repairs" "[e]xcept for 
repairs made necessary by the negligence of, or improper use of 
the premises by, the tenant."  Wis. Stat. § 704.07(2)(a)3.  
Accordingly, under § 704.07(2), the landlord has the primary 
duty to repair unless the repairs are made necessary by the 
tenant's negligence or improper use of the premises.  However, 
significant to this case, subsection (2) does not apply "[i]f 
the premises are damaged by fire, water or other casualty, not 
the result of the negligence or intentional act of the 
landlord."  § 704.07(2)(c).  Instead, "either sub. (3) or (4) 
governs."  Id.  Hence, it seems that if the landlord's 
negligence or intentional act caused the "fire, water or other 
casualty" damage, then the duty to repair remains with the 
landlord, as provided in subsection (2).  However, if the "fire, 
No.  2008AP1700.akz 
 
3 
 
water or other casualty" damage is caused by something other 
than the landlord's negligence or intentional act, then we must 
turn to subsection (3) or (4).  
¶55 In this case, Connell's apartment was damaged by fire.  
The parties stipulated that Connell's "hair dryer was the cause 
of the fire" and that "Connell did not previously know of any 
defect in said hair dryer."  Accordingly, the parties stipulated 
that the fire was caused by something other than the negligence 
or intentional act of the landlord or the negligence or improper 
use of the premises by the tenant. 
¶56 As I turn to subsection (3), it outlines the tenant's 
duty to repair the damage and restore the appearance of the 
premises "[i]f the premises are damaged by the negligence or 
improper use of the premises by the tenant."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 704.07(3)(a).  In such instances the landlord "may elect to 
undertake the repair," but "the tenant must reimburse the 
landlord for the reasonable cost thereof."  Id. 
¶57 Given the parties' stipulation that the fire damage 
was caused by Connell's hair dryer, as opposed to Connell's 
negligence or improper use of the apartment, the tenant's duty 
to repair under subsection (3) does not govern the facts of this 
case, and we must then turn to subsection (4). 
¶58 Subsection 
(4) provides the tenant with certain 
options and rights "[i]f the premises become untenantable 
because of damage by fire, water or other casualty": 
No.  2008AP1700.akz 
 
4 
 
1. 
"[T]he tenant may remove from the premises unless 
the 
landlord 
proceeds 
promptly 
to 
repair 
or 
rebuild"; 
2. 
The tenant may remove if the inconvenience by 
reason of the nature and period of repair or 
rebuilding "would impose undue hardship on the 
tenant"; 
3. 
The 
tenant 
may 
remain 
in 
possession 
of 
the 
premises, provided that "rent abates to the extent 
the tenant is deprived of the full normal use of 
the premises"; and 
4. 
If 
the 
tenant 
justifiably 
moves 
out 
under 
subsection (4), "the tenant is not liable for rent 
after the premises become untenantable and the 
landlord must repay any rent paid in advance 
apportioned to the period after the premises become 
untenantable." 
Wis. Stat. § 704.07(4).  These options and rights do not 
seemingly apply if the damage is caused by the tenant's 
negligence or improper use.  Id.   
¶59 As the dissent points out, in this case, neither the 
pleadings nor the parties' stipulation of facts expressly 
indicates 
whether 
Connell's 
apartment 
became 
untenantable 
because of the fire damage.  Dissent, ¶127.  However, at oral 
argument, counsel for Maryland Arms appeared to concede that the 
apartment was untenantable: 
Attorney Wynn: [Connell] went to bed at night, 
left her hair dryer plugged in, presumably off.  When 
No.  2008AP1700.akz 
 
5 
 
she woke up, the apartment was on fire and caused over 
$8000 of damages.  Fortunately no one was personally 
injured; however, the apartment was destroyed. 
Court: If the apartment was destroyed, I assume 
that it was uninhabitable.  Is that correct? 
Attorney Wynn: Yes.  And in fact, in this 
particular circumstance . . . the tenant was relocated 
to another apartment owned also by Maryland Arms. 
Maryland Arms subsequently repaired the damaged apartment and 
billed Connell for the cost, minus her $200 security deposit, 
for a total of $8,533.81.  According to Connell, Maryland Arms 
terminated her tenancy when she refused to pay. 
¶60 Assuming that the fire damage did in fact render 
Connell's apartment untenantable, Connell was well within her 
rights to remove from the premises while Maryland Arms repaired.  
See Wis. Stat. § 704.07(4).  However, subsection (4) is silent 
as to who is responsible for the costs of repair.  Invoking 
paragraph 3.6 of its lease,1 Maryland Arms demanded that Connell 
reimburse it for the repair costs.   
¶61 However, the parties' freedom to contract is subject 
to our "universally accepted legal maxim that any ambiguities in 
a document are to be construed unfavorably to the drafter."  See 
Walters, 282 Wis. 2d 176, ¶13; see also Fergen, 162 Wis. at 135.  
In my view, the lease at issue does not unambiguously allocate 
                                                 
1 Paragraph 3.6 provides:  
Lessee shall be responsible for all intentional and 
negligent acts or breaches of this Lease by Lessee, 
Lessee's occupants, guests and invitees.  Lessee shall 
be 
liable 
for 
all 
damage 
to 
the 
premises 
and 
appliances and equipment belonging thereto, in any way 
caused by the acts of Lessee, Lessee's occupants, 
guests and invitees. 
No.  2008AP1700.akz 
 
6 
 
liability to Connell for the fire damage caused by her hair 
dryer and must therefore be construed in her favor.   
¶62 According to Maryland Arms, the second sentence of 
paragraph 3.6 of the lease unambiguously imposes absolute 
liability on the tenant for all damage "in any way" caused by 
the tenant's "acts," be they negligent or otherwise.  Maryland 
Arms argues that Connell is therefore liable for the fire damage 
because Connell brought the hair dryer into the apartment.  I do 
not agree with Maryland Arms' and the dissent's position that 
the lease unambiguously allocates liability to the tenant for 
any damage caused by anything the tenant brings into her 
apartment.  See dissent, ¶¶74-76. 
¶63 The ambiguity is further shown by the fact that were 
we to accept Maryland Arms' interpretation of the second 
sentence of paragraph 3.6, the first sentence would be rendered 
meaningless.  See majority op., ¶41.  The first sentence imposes 
responsibility onto the tenant for all the tenant's "intentional 
and negligent acts or breaches."  The tenant's "intentional and 
negligent acts" are necessarily encompassed in the second 
sentence's category of the tenant's "acts."  Thus, "[c]onstruing 
the second sentence as broadly as Maryland Arms asserts would 
subsume the meaning of the first sentence."  Majority op., ¶42.  
We must avoid a construction of the lease which renders portions 
of the "'meaningless, inexplicable or mere surplusage.'"  Kasten 
v. Doral Dental USA, LLC, 2007 WI 76, ¶48, 301 Wis. 2d 598, 733 
N.W.2d 300 (quoting Goebel v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of 
Racine, 83 Wis. 2d 668, 680, 266 N.W.2d 352 (1978)); see also 
No.  2008AP1700.akz 
 
7 
 
Baker v. McDel Corp., 53 Wis. 2d 71, 76-77, 191 N.W.2d 846 
(1971). 
¶64 Because the lease does not unambiguously allocate 
liability to Connell for fire damage caused by the mere fact 
that she brought a hair dryer into her apartment, we must 
construe the lease in her favor.  For that reason, I 
respectfully concur. 
 
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
1 
 
 
 
¶65 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  This dispute 
requires us to interpret an apartment lease and to square its 
terms with Wis. Stat. § 704.07, which sets out certain rights 
and duties of landlords and tenants. 
THE LEASE 
¶66 In 
November 
2005, 
Cari 
Connell, 
21, 
rented 
an 
apartment in a 41-unit building in Milwaukee.  She signed a 9-
page lease.  The lease was co-signed by Cari's mother, Linda, 
who personally guaranteed payment of any and all sums due to the 
lessor under the lease.  The lease was renewed for a second year 
in 2006. 
¶67 The lease contains numerous provisions pertaining to 
such matters as rent, the security deposit, the obligations of 
the lessee (tenant), and the rights of the lessor (landlord).  
Among these provisions are the following: 
 
2.3 Said premises shall be left by Lessee in a 
clean and undamaged condition.  The cost or estimate 
of repairing any damage to said premises which is not 
listed in the Apartment Inspection Report shall be 
deducted from the security deposit, as will the cost 
of restoring the premises to a clean and rentable 
condition, normal wear and tear excepted. 
 
. . . .  
 
3.3 Lessor not liable for property damage or 
loss.  Lessee expressly agrees that Lessor shall not 
be liable to Lessee or others, including Lessee's 
guests, occupants and invitees, for any damage to or 
loss of any personal property located in or about the 
premises, or the building of which the premises are a 
part, where said damage or loss results from any cause 
whatsoever, other than the negligent acts of Lessor.  
It is the responsibility of the Lessee to provide 
insurance for their personal property. 
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
2 
 
 
. . . .  
 
3.5 Lessee to keep premises clean and in good 
repair.  Lessee shall keep the premises in a clean, 
tenantable condition and in as good repair as at the 
beginning of the Lease term, normal wear and tear 
excepted. 
 
3.6 Lessee responsible for acts and breaches of 
Lease by Lessee and Lessee's occupants, guests and 
invitees.  Lessee shall be responsible for all 
intentional and negligent acts or breaches of this 
Lease 
by 
Lessee, Lessee's occupants, guests and 
invitees.  Lessee shall be liable for all damage to 
the premises and appliances and equipment belonging 
thereto, in any way caused by the acts of Lessee, 
Lessee's occupants, guests and invitees. 
 
. . . .  
 
6. 
DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION BY FIRE OR OTHER 
CASUALTY.  Subject to Wisconsin Law, in the event that 
the Leased premises suffers casualty loss or damage as 
a result of fire or other casualty, and in the event 
that, as a result of said loss or damage, the Leased 
premises are rendered uninhabitable, and in the event 
the premises may be restored or the damages repaired, 
this Lease and the liability for rent shall continue, 
except that said liability for rent shall be abated 
during any period of repair or reconstruction.  In the 
event the premises cannot be repaired within sixty 
(60) days from the happening of such injury, then this 
Lease shall cease and terminate from the date of such 
injury.  Said liability for rent shall not abate if 
the loss, damages or injury to the demised premises is 
caused 
by 
the 
negligence 
of 
Lessee, 
Lessee's 
occupants, guests or invitees. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶68 The purpose of several of the lease provisions is to 
limit the liability of one of the parties.  The lease also 
allocates liability for a casualty like fire or other damage to 
the premises in situations where neither party is at fault.  For 
instance, the lessee is made responsible for intentional and 
negligent acts or breaches of the lease by the lessee's 
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
3 
 
occupants, 
guests 
and 
invitees, 
even 
though 
the 
lessee 
personally may be wholly without fault.  Section 3.6. 
INTERPRETING THE LEASE 
¶69 This case involves an accidental fire in Cari's 
apartment in 2007 that caused more than $8,500 in damage to the 
premises.  The first issue is whether the lease assigns 
liability for this damage to the tenant under circumstances in 
which the fire was caused by a hair dryer owned by the tenant, 
after the tenant brought the hair dryer into the apartment, 
plugged it in, and left it plugged in overnight. 
¶70 The critical lease provision, Section 3.6, reads as 
follows: 
Lessee shall be responsible for all intentional and 
negligent acts or breaches of this Lease by Lessee, 
Lessee's occupants, guests and invitees.  Lessee shall 
be 
liable 
for 
all 
damage 
to 
the 
premises 
and 
appliances and equipment belonging thereto, in any way 
caused by the acts of Lessee, Lessee's occupants, 
guests and invitees.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶71 The landlord does not claim that the tenant was 
negligent 
or 
that 
the 
tenant 
intentionally 
breached 
any 
provision of the lease.  The landlord does claim, however, that 
the tenant caused the damage.  The landlord claims that the 
tenant "caused" the damage by acts which, though in themselves 
innocent, were nonetheless intentional and led to the fire in 
Cari's bathroom. 
¶72 The word "cause" has a well-established meaning in 
Wisconsin law.  When determining whether an act "caused" an 
injury or harm as a factual matter, the test is whether the act 
was a "substantial factor" in causing the injury or harm.  
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
4 
 
Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶47, 309 
Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 ("One is causally negligent when his 
or her conduct is a substantial factor in causing injury to 
another."); see Wis. JI——Civil 1500. 
¶73 Causation is one of the fundamental elements in a 
negligence claim.  Cause questions ask whether there was a 
causal connection between the negligence of any person and the 
injury claimed.  The questions do not ask about "the cause" but 
rather "a cause."  Ultimately, the fact-finder must determine 
whether a party's negligence was a substantial factor in 
producing the injury.  Wis. JI——Civil 1500. 
¶74 Here, the landlord is not required to establish 
negligence.  The landlord is not required even to allege 
negligence because the lease makes the tenant liable for damage 
to the premises "in any way caused by the acts of the Lessee."  
(Emphasis added.)  The focus, then, is on the causal connection 
between acts of the tenant and damage to the premises.  Were the 
acts of the tenant substantial factors in producing the damage 
to the premises?  Specifically, were Cari's acts in plugging in 
her hair dryer and leaving it plugged in overnight, or longer, 
substantial factors in causing the fire?  The circuit court 
found that "the defendants [were] liable for the fire caused by 
the hair dryer." 
¶75 Employing the "substantial factor" test to determine 
whether Cari's acts produced the fire is a rational and 
reasonable way to interpret the word "cause" in the lease and to 
determine liability.  See Clark v. Leisure Vehicles, 96 
Wis. 2d 607, 617-18, 292 N.W.2d 630 (1980).   
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
5 
 
¶76 Using 
that 
test, 
the 
lease 
provision 
at 
issue 
unambiguously renders the tenant liable for the fire damage 
caused by her acts of bringing her hair dryer into the 
apartment, plugging in the hair dryer, and leaving the hair 
dryer plugged in for hours when it was not being used. 
THE LANDLORD'S INTEREST 
¶77 Residential appliance fires cause an estimated 25 
deaths, 525 injuries, and $211 million in property damage each 
year.  See United States Fire Administration, Focus on Fire 
Safety: 
Appliance 
Fires, 
available 
at 
http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/citizens/focus/appliances.shtm. 
 
The 
appliances involved include everything from television sets to 
hair dryers.  USFA Fire Cause Methodology, available at 
http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/fireservice/nfirs/tools/fire_cause_categ
ory_matrix.shtm.  According to the National Fire Protection 
Association, fire from electrical equipment, like hair dryers, 
was the third leading cause of house fires in 1998.  Ken Amaro, 
Hair Dryer May Be Too Hot to Handle, First Coast News (May 6, 
2004), 
available 
at 
http://www.firstcoastnews.com/news/news-
article.aspx?storyid=18342. 
¶78 Residential appliance fires are only one of many 
financial risks facing property owners, including landlords.  
Some of these risks are unavoidable.  Prudent property owners 
acquire insurance to cover these risks, but the more risks they 
seek to cover, irrespective of fault and irrespective of their 
ability to control the risks, the higher the premiums the 
insureds are likely to pay.  Thus, landlords have a strong 
economic 
incentive 
to 
allocate 
liability 
to 
tenants 
in 
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
6 
 
situations where tenants are better able to control risk or 
where tenants are actually at fault. 
¶79 When landlords allocate some risk of liability to 
tenants, their objectives would be undermined if they got 
tripped up in problems of proof. 
¶80 Section 2.3 of the lease is a classic example of risk 
allocation: 
2.3 Said premises shall be left by Lessee in a 
clean and undamaged condition.  The cost or estimate 
of repairing any damage to said premises which is not 
listed in the Apartment Inspection Report shall be 
deducted from the security deposit, as will the cost 
of restoring the premises to a clean and rentable 
condition, normal wear and tear excepted. 
Section 2.3 does not require the landlord to prove that the 
tenant caused the damage found in the tenant's apartment. 
¶81 Section 3.6 does require proof of causation, but it 
does not require proof of negligence. 
¶82 As 
noted 
above, 
the 
landlord 
did 
not 
allege 
negligence.  The lease was drafted so that the landlord would 
not be required to prove negligence, inasmuch as proof of 
negligence——as opposed to proof of cause——could be both costly 
and difficult.  It does not follow, however, that there was no 
fault in Cari's actions simply because the landlord did not 
allege negligence. 
¶83 Since 
at 
least 
the 
late 
1970s, 
Underwriters 
Laboratories, Inc. has required all electronic personal grooming 
appliances, e.g., hair dryers, bearing the UL seal, to attach 
tags to the power supply cord warning users to unplug the 
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
7 
 
appliance after using.1  See Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., 
Standard for Safety: Electric Personal Grooming Appliances 38 
(5th ed., Apr. 9, 1979) (UL 859).  Warnings are also included in 
the instructional materials accompanying the product: 
 
WARNING——To 
reduce 
the 
risk 
of 
burns, 
electrocution, fire, or injury to persons: 
 
1. 
An appliance should never be left unattended 
when plugged in. 
Id. 
 
¶84 The reason for this warning is that parts in many hair 
dryers are electrically live even when the switch is off.2 
                                                 
1 The UL standards state: 
An appliance of the type described in paragraph 
37.6 [[a] hand supported hair dryer blower styler, 
styler dryer, heated air comb, etc.] shall be provided 
with a tag that is permanently attached to the power 
supply cord.  The following warning instruction shall 
be included on the tag: 
 
DANGER——TO REDUCE THE RISK OF ELECTROCUTION: 
 
1. 
Always unplug this appliance after using. 
 
. . . .  
 
DO NOT REMOVE THIS TAG. 
Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., Standard for Safety: Electric 
Personal Grooming Appliances 36A (5th ed., Apr. 9, 1979) (UL 
859). 
 
2 Several current brands of hair dryers (Conair, Revlon, 
Vidal Sassoon) attach warning labels that read: "UNPLUG IT[.]  
As with most electrical appliances parts in this dryer are 
electrically live even when switch is off: To Reduce Risk of 
Death by Electric Shock: 1. Always 'Unplug It' After Use." 
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
8 
 
¶85 Against this background, requiring a landlord to prove 
a tenant's negligence before allocating liability for an 
appliance fire would require the landlord to investigate the 
circumstances surrounding a tenant's use of the appliance before 
the fire: What brand of appliance was involved?  Was a warning 
label attached to the appliance?  Had the appliance been dropped 
or a cord damaged before use?  Was the appliance turned on or 
plugged in before the fire?  Was an appliance that was turned on 
left unattended? How long was an appliance left plugged in?  
Most of this information would have to be obtained from the 
tenant. 
¶86 In this case, the landlord did not attempt to 
determine the brand of hair dryer, whether it had a warning 
label, or how long it had been plugged in because the landlord 
did not have to prove negligence.  Instead, the landlord 
established that Cari left her hair dryer plugged in——at least 
overnight——and that the hair dryer caused the fire.  Leaving the 
hair dryer plugged in was a substantial factor in causing the 
fire, and this evidence satisfied the landlord's burden under 
the lease. 
MAJORITY OPINION 
¶87 The majority does not like this result because it 
believes the tenant, who knowingly accepted liability for damage 
caused by her acts, is not as able to bear the cost of that 
damage as the landlord.  The majority engages in fanciful 
argument to divert attention from the plain language of the 
lease.  It concludes that the language of the lease is 
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
9 
 
ambiguous, and, therefore, the lease must be construed against 
the drafter. 
¶88 The central provision of the lease reads: 
 
3.6 Lessee responsible for acts and breaches of 
Lease by Lessee and Lessee's occupants, guests and 
invitees.  [1] Lessee shall be responsible for all 
intentional and negligent acts or breaches of this 
Lease 
by 
Lessee, Lessee's occupants, guests and 
invitees.  [2] Lessee shall be liable for all damage 
to the premises and appliances and equipment belonging 
thereto, in any way caused by the acts of Lessee, 
Lessee's occupants, guests and invitees. 
¶89 The majority argues that the second sentence is 
ambiguous and that the ambiguity "is compounded when that 
sentence is read in the context of the paragraph [Section 3.6] 
as a whole, because Maryland Arms' construction of that sentence 
would render the preceding sentence surplusage."  Majority op., 
¶3.  The majority writes: 
[I]f the second sentence is read as broadly as 
Maryland Arms asserts, then the first sentence has no 
independent meaning. . . .  
 
Intentional acts, negligent acts, and breaches 
are subsets of the broader category "any acts."  If 
the second sentence covered any and all "acts," then 
it would necessarily cover the types of acts described 
in the first sentence.  Construing the second sentence 
as broadly as Maryland Arms asserts would subsume the 
meaning of the first sentence, rendering it mere 
surplusage. 
Majority op., ¶¶41-42. 
¶90 This interpretation is not correct.  The first 
sentence reads: "Lessee shall be responsible for all intentional 
and negligent acts or breaches of this Lease by Lessee and 
Lessee's occupants, guests and invitees."  This sentence may be 
deconstructed as follows: 
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
10 
 
 
A. 
Lessee shall be responsible for all intentional 
acts. 
 
B. 
Lessee shall be responsible for all negligent 
acts. 
 
C. 
Lessee shall be responsible for all breaches of 
the lease. 
 
D. 
Lessee also is responsible when one of these acts 
or breaches is done by Lessee's occupants, guests or invitees. 
¶91 The first sentence makes the tenant "responsible" for 
the tenant's intentional or negligent acts or the tenant's 
"breaches of this Lease."  A tenant's intentional acts, 
negligent acts, or breaches of the lease may have nothing to do 
with "damage to the [tenant's] premises" or with "liability" 
therefor, which is the subject of the second sentence. 
¶92 To illustrate, the lease contains a number of duties 
and prohibitions for the tenant.  For example, the tenant is 
prohibited from keeping any pets on the premises, using the 
premises for immoral or unlawful purposes, creating noise or 
disturbances, dropping items from windows, allowing water to run 
except when in use, allowing the apartment to be used as a place 
of business, using grills, obstructing sidewalks and entryways, 
or interfering with heating, lighting, and other building 
apparatuses.  Furthermore, the tenant is required to maintain 
the apartment in a way that will not increase the risk of fire, 
keep the premises clean and in good repair, remove garbage from 
the premises, park vehicles in a proper manner, and pay utility 
bills when due. 
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
11 
 
¶93 The first sentence of Section 3.6 holds the tenant 
responsible for all these requirements, even when they are 
committed by a person, like a guest, other than the tenant.  So 
long as these acts do not result in damage to the premises, 
however, they do not come within the purview of the second 
sentence. 
¶94 To illustrate specifically, Section 3.1 prohibits a 
lessee from keeping pets on the premises without written 
permission.  When a tenant keeps a pet without permission, the 
tenant breaches the lease.  When that pet bites or scratches a 
child walking in the hallway of the building, the tenant will be 
"responsible" for injury, not the landlord.  In neither 
situation is there "damage to the premises." 
¶95 One can easily imagine situations in which a tenant 
causes injury to another by a negligent act but does not damage 
the premises.  Improper treatment of garbage may not damage the 
premises or create "liability," but it may drive other tenants 
crazy. 
¶96 Scrutinizing what is covered in the first sentence of 
Section 3.6 makes the scope of the second sentence clear.  The 
second sentence introduces an element not necessarily present in 
the first sentence; namely, "damage to the premises"——and it 
omits prerequisite conditions present in the first sentence; 
namely, intent, negligence, or breach of the lease.  Because the 
second sentence does not require a breach of the lease as a 
prerequisite for liability, it reaches acts that would not be 
objectionable if they had not resulted in "damage to the 
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
12 
 
premises," e.g., leaving a hair dryer plugged in when not in 
use. 
¶97 Conversely, the second sentence does not reach a broad 
swath of activity for which the tenant might be "responsible" 
but would not be "liable" on account of "damage to the 
premises."  The second sentence allocates liability to the 
tenant for damage to the premises, irrespective of whether the 
tenant's causative acts involved intent, negligence, or breach 
of the lease. 
¶98 For the majority to insist that Maryland Arms' 
construction of the second sentence renders the first sentence 
surplusage disregards the different terms and different scope of 
the two sentences. 
¶99 The majority adopts the tenant's interpretation of 
Section 
3.6, 
under 
which 
the 
first 
sentence 
assigns 
"responsibility" 
for 
"intentional 
or 
negligent 
acts" 
and 
"breaches of this lease," and the second sentence assigns 
liability caused only by breaches of the duties enumerated in 
the first sentence.  Majority op., ¶46.   
¶100 The majority, in effect, concludes that Section 3.6 
intends to say: "Lessee shall be liable for all damage to the 
premises caused by the tenant's intentional or negligent acts or 
breaches of this lease," and nothing more.  This interpretation 
erases distinctions and disregards the import of plain language, 
and, of course, it would force the landlord to prove such 
elements as negligence. 
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
13 
 
¶101 The sentence "Lessee shall be liable for all damage to 
the premises . . . in any way caused by the acts of Lessee" 
could not be more clear.   
¶102 The majority also attacks counsel's explanation of the 
lease in terms of "control."  "[C]ontrol," the majority 
declares, does "not appear in the second sentence of the 
Liability Paragraph." [3.6]  Indeed, the "concept of 'control' 
appears nowhere in the entire lease."  Majority op., ¶32.  What 
the majority evidently forgets is that the landlord's legal 
rights are not grounded in the rhetoric or analysis of counsel; 
they are grounded in the language of the lease. 
¶103 The truth is, however, that the concept of "control" 
is at the heart of a lease that allocates liability to the party 
best able to control risk.  When a tenant rents an apartment, 
the tenant takes custody and control of the premises.3  The 
landlord may establish rules and regulations; but in almost all 
circumstances, the tenant controls who goes into the apartment, 
what goes into the apartment, and what transpires in the 
apartment.  Under these circumstances, the tenant is in the best 
position to manage the premises in a way that minimizes risk.  
When the landlord later discovers damage to the premises, the 
landlord cannot be expected to prove that the damage was caused 
by the tenant's negligence as opposed to, say, an invitee's 
negligence, or whether the damage was simply the result of an 
accident.  For sound policy reasons related to control, 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 704.05(2) notes that, with a few 
exceptions, "the tenant has the right to exclusive possession of 
the premises." 
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
14 
 
liability for damage to the premises is assigned to the tenant 
if the landlord can show that the damage was caused by an act of 
the tenant, the tenant's occupants, the tenant's guests, or the 
tenant's invitees.  The tenant is not liable for "normal wear 
and tear," and the tenant is not liable for damage that is 
fairly attributable to the landlord.   
¶104 When damage is caused by an unconnected third party or 
an act of God, the landlord is assigned the duty to fix and pay 
for the damage to the premises but the tenant must assume the 
cost of repairing or replacing her personal property.  See 
Section 3.3.  In these situations neither party controls events, 
and responsibility for damage is allocated based upon the 
ownership of the damaged property. 
¶105 When the landlord is made responsible for abnormal 
damage that is actually caused by tenants, the landlord must 
spread the resulting expense among all tenants by charging 
higher rent.  When a tenant is made liable for damage that is 
caused by that tenant, the landlord is better able to contain 
rent and the tenant has an economic incentive for prudent 
stewardship of the premises.  The tenant also is encouraged to 
buy insurance for her protection as well as the protection of 
others.  See Section 3.3.  Imposing responsibility on the 
landlord for damage caused by a tenant, when the landlord cannot 
control risks created by that tenant, defies economic logic. 
¶106 The concept of control is linked to the substantial 
factor test which is central to causation.  A tenant would not 
be liable in circumstances that are not within the tenant's 
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
15 
 
control.  The majority's attack on counsel's "control" analysis 
is unavailing because it fails to address a real issue. 
¶107 The majority makes a third argument attacking the 
lease:  
[T]aken at face value, the breadth of Maryland Arms' 
construction of the contract would produce absurd 
results.  Maryland Arms asserts that any act within 
the control of the tenant can give rise to liability 
under the contract.  If the landlord can identify an 
"act" of the tenant that is a "cause" of the damage to 
the premises, liability for repairing the premises is 
shifted to the tenant——regardless of how remote the 
tenant's act was from the damage and regardless of 
whether the damage would not have occurred but for 
other 
concurrent causes outside of the tenant's 
control. 
Majority op., ¶33. 
¶108 There are several defects in this description of the 
landlord's position.  Counsel's "control" analysis should be 
viewed as a limitation on a tenant's liability, not an attempt 
to extend it indefinitely.  No rational fact-finder would hold a 
tenant liable for damage when a burglar breaks a window to gain 
entry to the tenant's apartment, or when lightning strikes the 
apartment.  Majority op., ¶¶34-35.  These intervening events are 
not within the control of the tenant and damage cannot be 
attributed to any act of the tenant. 
¶109 Stated differently, the acts of the tenant in the 
majority's hypotheticals would not be substantial factors in 
causing the purported damage.  The acts portrayed in the 
hypotheticals are very different from a tenant leaving a hair 
dryer plugged in overnight when it is not being used.  There is 
no question that Cari's acts were "substantial factors" in 
causing the damage.  When a burglar breaks a window to enter an 
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
16 
 
apartment, the burglar's act is so overwhelmingly the cause of 
the damage that it simply could not be said that the tenant's 
act of locking the door was a substantial factor.   
¶110 The majority gives a laundry list of electrical 
appliances to suggest the scope of the tenant's potential 
liability.  It then reasons that the parties could not have 
intended that the tenant routinely unplug all these appliances.  
Majority op., ¶36.  This reasoning ignores the purpose of the 
provision at issue: to allocate risk to the party that controls 
the premises and the appliances on that premises.   
¶111 Is it more logical to hold the landlord responsible 
for fires caused by the tenant's electrical appliances——even 
when the landlord may have no knowledge of the appliances, much 
less the ability to plug them in or unplug them when they are 
not being used?  The simple fact is, if and when a fire occurs, 
someone will have to pay for it.  In the relatively unusual 
situation here——a fire in the tenant's apartment caused by 
neither the negligence or intentional act of the landlord nor 
the negligence or improper use of the premises by the tenant——
contractually allocating risk to the tenant is not less 
reasonable than imposing that risk on the landlord. 
¶112 Causation is normally a fact question.  There may be 
situations in which it is genuinely unclear whether a tenant's 
act or acts caused the damage for which the landlord is seeking 
to hold the tenant liable.  The proper response in such a case 
is not to reinterpret the lease but rather to make a factual 
finding on the question of cause.  See Fandrey v. Am. Fam. Mut. 
Ins. Co., 2004 WI 62, ¶12, 272 Wis. 2d 46, 680 N.W.2d 345 
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
17 
 
(cause-in-fact is an issue for the jury).  The word "cause" is 
not ambiguous simply because, in different fact situations, it 
is not easy to determine whether certain acts caused damage.  
The stipulated facts in this case show a causal chain between 
the tenant's acts and the fire in her apartment.  In short, 
Cari's acts were a substantial factor in producing the damage. 
¶113 Finally, 
the lease does not necessarily "shift" 
liability to the tenant.  A tenant is clearly responsible for 
loss to her own personal property, from her hair dryer to her 
clothes to her furniture, from theft or fire, absent the 
landlord's negligence.  The landlord would contend that the 
lease codifies a tenant's common law responsibility for other 
damage on these facts.4 
¶114 For all these reasons, I cannot agree with the 
majority's conclusion that the lease is ambiguous.  The lease 
unambiguously renders the tenant liable for the damage to the 
premises caused by her acts of plugging in her hair dryer and 
leaving it plugged in overnight, or longer. 
APPLICATION OF WIS. STAT. § 704.07 
¶115 The majority declines to address the second issue, 
whether Wis. Stat. § 704.07 precludes a residential lease from 
allocating liability for damages that were caused by something 
other than the negligence or intentional act of the landlord or 
the negligence or improper use of the premises by the tenant.  
                                                 
4 "At common law the tenant bore the risk of a fire or any 
other casualty loss."  Judicial Council Committee Note, 1969, 
Wis. Stat. § 704.07 (quoted in Maryland Arms Limited Partnership 
v. 
Connell, 2009 
WI App 87, ¶10, 320 Wis. 2d 147, 769 
N.W.2d 145). 
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
18 
 
The court of appeals based its decision on these statutory 
grounds, not on a fanciful interpretation of the lease. 
¶116 This case involves the interplay of several different 
provisions within Wis. Stat. § 704.07.  The statute begins by 
asserting that it applies to all residential tenancies and that 
"[a]n agreement to waive the requirements of this section in a 
residential tenancy is void."  § 704.07(1).  The statute then 
sets out the duties of the landlord in subsection (2): 
(a) Except for repairs made necessary by the 
negligence of, or improper use of the premise by, the 
tenant, the landlord has a duty to do all of the 
following: 
1. 
Keep 
in 
a 
reasonable 
state 
of 
repair 
portions of the premises over which the landlord 
maintains control. 
. . . .  
3. 
Make all necessary structural repairs. 
. . . .  
(c) If the premises are damaged by fire, water 
or other casualty, not the result of the negligence or 
intentional act of the landlord, this subsection is 
inapplicable and either sub. (3) or (4) governs. 
Wis. Stat. § 704.07(2) (emphasis added). 
¶117 The statute sets out the duties of the tenant in 
subsection (3): 
(a) If 
the 
premises 
are 
damaged 
by 
the 
negligence or improper use of the premises by the 
tenant, the tenant must repair the damage and restore 
the 
appearance 
of the premises by redecorating.  
However, the landlord may elect to undertake the 
repair or redecoration, and in such case the tenant 
must reimburse the landlord for the reasonable cost 
thereof; 
the 
cost 
to 
the 
landlord 
is 
presumed 
reasonable unless proved otherwise by the tenant. 
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
19 
 
Wis. Stat. § 704.07(3)(a). 
¶118 Finally, the statute provides for the situation in 
which the premises become untenantable without the fault of 
either the landlord or the tenant: 
If the premises become untenantable because of 
damage by fire, water or other casualty or because of 
any condition hazardous to health, or if there is a 
substantial violation of sub. (2) materially affecting 
the health or safety of the tenant, the tenant may 
remove from the premises unless the landlord proceeds 
promptly to repair or rebuild or eliminate the health 
hazard or the substantial violation of sub. (2) 
materially affecting the health or safety of the 
tenant; or the tenant may remove if the inconvenience 
to the tenant by reason of the nature and period of 
repair, rebuilding or elimination would impose undue 
hardship on the tenant.  If the tenant remains in 
possession, rent abates to the extent the tenant is 
deprived of the full normal use of the premises.  This 
section does not authorize rent to be withheld in 
full, if the tenant remains in possession.  If the 
tenant justifiably moves out under this subsection, 
the tenant is not liable for rent after the premises 
become untenantable and the landlord must repay any 
rent paid in advance apportioned to the period after 
the premises become untenantable.  This subsection is 
inapplicable if the damage or condition is caused by 
negligence or improper use by the tenant. 
Wis. Stat. § 704.07(4) (emphasis added). 
¶119 The court of appeals acknowledged that the statute 
"does not explicitly spell out whose duty it is to repair 
damages caused by a fire when the premises are damaged by 
something other than the landlord’s negligence or intentional 
act, or the tenant’s negligence or improper use."  Maryland Arms 
Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2009 WI App 87, ¶9, 320 Wis. 2d 147, 769 
N.W.2d 145.  However, the court reasoned that "the only logical 
conclusion" is that "landlords are obligated to repair the 
premises when the fire damage was not caused by the landlord’s 
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
20 
 
negligence or intentional act or the tenant’s negligence or 
improper use of the premises."  Id. 
¶120 Following this logic, the court of appeals incorrectly 
concluded 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 704.07(3) 
provides 
the 
only 
circumstance in which the tenant has a duty to repair.  Maryland 
Arms, 320 Wis. 2d 147, ¶7.  Accordingly, it added, the lease 
provision was unenforceable because it attempted to waive the 
requirements of § 704.07.  Furthermore, the court of appeals 
reasoned, based on the Judicial Council Note to the statute, the 
legislature intended "to prohibit generally worded clauses in a 
lease from overriding the statute."  Id., ¶13.  Because this 
line of reasoning places a restriction on residential leases 
that is not present in the statute, I cannot agree with the 
court of appeals' interpretation of the statute. 
¶121 Statutory interpretation begins with the language of 
the statute. 
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  If 
the language of the statute is plain, we inquire no further.  
Id.  When interpreting the language of the statute, we read the 
language "not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation 
to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and 
reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46. 
¶122 A close reading of § 704.07 reveals that it does not 
prohibit parties from allocating liability as the parties did in 
this lease. 
¶123 Neither § 704.07(2) (duties of the landlord) nor 
§ 704.07(3) (duties of the tenant) applies in this case.  
Section 704.07(2) does not apply because the damage was "not the 
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
21 
 
result of the negligence or intentional act of the landlord."  
§ 704.07(2)(c).  Section 704.07(3) does not apply because the 
premises were not "damaged by the negligence or improper use of 
the premises by the tenant."  § 704.07(3)(a). 
¶124 Section 704.07(4) sets out the situation in which the 
premises become untenantable.  In that event, the tenant may 
remove (1) unless the landlord promptly rebuilds or repairs; or 
(2) if the repair would cause an undue hardship on the tenant.  
Id.  If the tenant chooses to remain on the premises, rent is 
abated "to the extent the tenant is deprived of the full normal 
use of the premises."  Id.  If the tenant moves out, she is no 
longer liable for rent.  Id. 
¶125 In summary, § 704.07 as a whole describes three 
potential circumstances: (1) if the damage is caused by the 
landlord's negligence or intentional act, the landlord has a 
duty to repair; (2) if the damage is caused by the tenant's 
negligence or improper use of the premises, the tenant has a 
duty to repair (or pay for repair); (3) if the premises become 
untenantable, the tenant may remove unless the landlord repairs, 
and may abate rent.  Wis. Stat. § 704.07(4). 
¶126 Nothing in the language or structure of § 704.07 
suggests that § 704.07(3) sets out the only circumstance in 
which the tenant may be liable for damages caused by fire.  The 
court of appeals reasoned that this was the "only logical 
conclusion" based on the various landlord duties imposed by the 
statute.  The statute, however, does not impose a duty to repair 
on the landlord when fire damage was caused by something other 
than the landlord's negligence or improper act.  It merely 
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
22 
 
allows the tenant to abate rent or remove unless the landlord 
repairs, if the fire renders the premises untenantable. 
¶127 The specific circumstances of § 704.07(4) are not 
present in this case.  Neither the pleadings nor the stipulation 
indicates that the fire rendered the premises untenantable.  It 
appears 
that 
Maryland 
Arms 
repaired 
the 
property 
and 
subsequently billed Cari for the amount of repair.  It does not 
appear that Cari invoked either of the remedies in § 704.07(4): 
removal or rent abatement.  Thus, even if § 704.07(4) prohibited 
contractual allocation of liability where damage rendered the 
premises untenantable, that prohibition would not apply to these 
facts because there is no indication that the fire rendered the 
premises untenantable. 
¶128 There are two additional provisions in chapter 704 
that illuminate § 704.07(4).  Wisconsin Stat. § 704.05(1) reads 
as follows: 
(1) When 
section 
applicable. 
 
So 
far 
as 
applicable, this section governs the rights and duties 
of the landlord and tenant in the absence of any 
inconsistent provision in writing signed by both the 
landlord and the tenant.  This section applies to any 
tenancy. 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 704.05(1) 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
This 
section 
acknowledges the parties' ability to define their rights with 
respect to one another by contract.  Although the language 
applies specifically to § 704.05, the underlying principle 
carries over to § 704.07.  Thus, so long as the parties do not 
waive the requirements of § 704.07, the freedom of contract 
embodied in § 704.05 permits them to allocate risk by the terms 
of the lease. 
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
23 
 
¶129 The second provision that sheds light on the proper 
interpretation 
of 
§ 704.07 
is 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 704.09(2).  
Section 704.09 governs the transfer of the landlord's or 
tenant's interest in the property.  Section 704.09(2) states: 
"In the absence of an express release or a contrary provision in 
the lease, transfer or consent to transfer does not relieve the 
transferring party of any contractual obligations under the 
lease, 
except" 
in 
a 
specified 
situation. 
 
Thus, 
while 
§ 704.09(2) does not explicitly address rights under § 704.07, 
it supports the proposition that a tenant's liability under a 
lease continues even when the tenant is no longer in possession 
of the premises.  Read together with § 704.07(4), it clarifies 
that § 704.07(4) does not limit the parties' ability to allocate 
risk for damage.  A tenant may remove from the property under 
§ 704.07(4), in which case the tenant will no longer be liable 
for rent.  Section 704.07(4) does not, however, relieve a tenant 
of other liability she may have incurred under the lease. 
¶130 Because nothing in Wis. Stat. § 704.07 imposes a duty 
on a party to repair damage that was not caused by the 
landlord's 
negligent 
or 
intentional 
act 
or 
the 
tenant's 
negligence or improper use of the premises, the lease provision 
at issue is not prohibited by the statute's command that "[a]n 
agreement to waive the requirements of this section in a 
residential tenancy is void."  Wis. Stat. § 704.07(1).  The 
statute leaves open the opportunity for landlords and tenants to 
allocate liability in such situations as they see fit. 
¶131 The Apartment Association of South Central Wisconsin, 
Inc., Apartment Association of Southeastern Wisconsin, Inc., 
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
24 
 
Central Wisconsin Apartment Association, and Lakeshore Apartment 
Association, Inc. contend that the court of appeals decision 
will have negative consequences for landlords throughout the 
state because it "assign[s] blanket legal responsibility for 
certain apartment damages to a landlord, regardless of whether 
the damages were caused by that landlord."  As a result, 
landlords are made responsible for such losses, even when they 
"(1) are not in possession of the property, (2) are not in 
control of the instrumentality causing the damages, and (3) are 
otherwise wholly innocent with regard to the damages." 
¶132 This case presents an important issue of statutory 
interpretation that will have widespread effect on residential 
leases in Wisconsin.  The majority has failed to address this 
issue, limiting its attention to the language of the specific 
lease at hand.  Furthermore, it has exacerbated the problem 
identified by the apartment associations by misinterpreting 
unambiguous language in the lease and creating a de facto rule 
of landlord responsibility, even where the parties agree 
otherwise.  This decision will increase insurance premiums for 
landlords who will now be responsible for damages caused by 
factors beyond their control.  Renters throughout the state 
will, in turn, bear this burden in the form of increased rent. 
CONCLUSION 
¶133 In sum, the lease provision at issue clearly and 
unambiguously renders the tenant liable for damage to the 
premises resulting from the fire caused by her acts of bringing 
the hair dryer into the apartment, plugging it in, and leaving 
it plugged in overnight, or longer.  Wisconsin Stat. § 704.07 
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
25 
 
does not preclude a residential lease from allocating liability 
for damage to the tenant's premises caused by neither the 
negligence of the landlord nor the negligence of the tenant.  
The decision of the court of appeals should be reversed.  
Because 
the 
majority 
concludes 
otherwise, 
I 
respectfully 
dissent. 
¶134 I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2008AP1700.dtp 
 
 
1