Case Title: BILDERBACK v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 99-231

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-11-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
BILDERBACK v. STATE2000 WY 20013 P.3d 249Case Number: 99-231Decided: 11/08/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
MICHAEL HOWARD BILDERBACK 
II, Appellant (Defendant), v.THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Converse County The Honorable Barton R. Voigt, 
Judge

Representing 
Appellant:Sylvia Lee Hackl, 
State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Diane E. Courselle, 
Director of the Defender Aid Program; and Gordon Ellis and Vaughn Neubauer, 
Student Interns for the Defender Aid ProgramRepresenting 
Appellee:Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy 
Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
Kimberly A. Baker, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, 
Director of the Prosecution Assistance Program; and Jalie Meineck, Student 
Intern for the Prosecution Assistance Program

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, GOLDEN, HILL & KITE, JJ.

KITE, 
Justice.

[¶1] While on 
parole from various felony convictions, Appellant Michael Howard Bilderback II 
went on a criminal rampage which ended in the shooting of a Wyoming highway 
patrolman. A jury convicted him of attempted second-degree murder, use of a 
firearm while committing the felony of attempted second-degree murder, and 
concealing stolen property. The trial court sentenced him on each charge and 
ordered that the sentences be served consecutively. Mr. Bilderback appeals, 
raising various objections to the fairness of his trial including the claim that 
his convictions for attempted second-degree murder and use of a firearm in the 
commission of a felony should have merged for sentencing purposes. We affirm his 
convictions on all charges. However, we vacate the sentence for use of a firearm 
in the commission of a felony as constituting double jeopardy because, for the 
purpose of sentencing, that charge merged with the attempted second-degree 
murder charge.

ISSUES

[¶2] Mr. 
Bilderback presents these issues for our review:

ISSUE 
I

Was trial counsel 
ineffective and Mr. Bilderback deprived of a fair trial, when counsel failed to 
request lesser included charges, when there was substantial evidence presented 
by both prosecution and defense that Mr. Bilderback lacked malice and intent to 
kill, essential elements of the crime of conviction?

ISSUE 
II

Did the trial court 
commit per se reversible error when it instructed the jury that it might infer 
the intent to kill from the use of a weapon, where an unsuccessful attempt was 
charged?

ISSUE 
III

Did the prosecution 
commit prosecutorial misconduct when it elicited testimony regarding Mr. 
Bilderback's request for counsel to create an inference of 
guilt?

ISSUE 
IV

The trial court violated 
the prohibitions against double jeopardy found in the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article One, Section Eleven of the Wyoming 
Constitution when it ordered that sentences for attempted second degree murder 
under Wyoming Statutes §§ 6-1-301(a)(i) and 6-2-104 and use of a firearm while 
committing a felony under Wyoming Statute § 6-8-101(a) run consecutively when 
the use of a firearm and the murder attempt were the very same 
act[.]

[¶3] Appellee 
State of Wyoming rephrases the issues as follows:

I. Was Appellant denied 
effective assistance of counsel?

II. Did the district 
court err in instructing the jury that it might infer the intent to kill from 
all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the use of a deadly 
weapon in a deadly or dangerous manner?

III. Was an impermissible 
comment made upon any invocation of Appellant's right to 
silence?

IV. Did the district 
court violate Appellant's double jeopardy right against multiple punishments for 
a single offense when it imposed cumulative sentences for attempted second 
degree murder and for the use of a firearm in the commission 
thereof?

FACTS

[¶4] After 
committing two armed robberies and stealing two automobiles in Nebraska, Mr. 
Bilderback fled, driving westward through Wyoming. Accompanied by a friend, he 
stopped for only food, gas, and restrooms, getting no sleep for several days. He 
intended to go to the state of Washington. At some point during the trip, he 
removed a .25 caliber semiautomatic pistol from his jacket and placed it beneath 
his leg on the driver's seat. At about eight o'clock in the morning on Monday, 
January 11, 1999, Wyoming Highway Patrolman Howard Parkin clocked Mr. 
Bilderback's car traveling ninety miles per hour as it approached Douglas. He 
turned on his emergency lights and siren and followed the car. Mr. Bilderback 
pulled off the interstate into the right emergency lane, stopped his vehicle, 
and rolled down the driver's window. Officer Parkin, who was wearing his uniform 
and badge, stopped behind Mr. Bilderback's car, got out of his car, walked to 
Mr. Bilderback's car, and leaned forward to speak to the driver. Mr. Bilderback 
turned toward the window, pointed the pistol at Officer Parkin, and shot the 
officer point blank in the face. Officer Parkin fell to the ground, drew his 
gun, and fired at Mr. Bilderback's car as it drove away. Mr. Bilderback left the 
interstate at the next exit and drove north on State Highway 59. He was later 
apprehended after being chased on State Highway 59, leaving the road, and 
driving across the prairie until his car got hung up on a railroad track. Mr. 
Bilderback threw his gun from the moving vehicle before the chase ended. At the 
trial, Mr. Bilderback denied that he shot Officer Parkin by accident or 
involuntarily.

DISCUSSION

A. Ineffective Assistance 
of Counsel

[¶5] First, Mr. 
Bilderback complains that he was denied his constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to request instructions on 
attempted voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault and battery as 
lesser-included offenses. The standard of review we apply to claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel is set forth in Sorensen v. State, 6 P.3d 657, 
660 (Wyo. 2000), where we recognized that appellate courts should be extremely 
reluctant to find an appellant's trial counsel ineffective.1 We do not evaluate the counsel's 
performance from a perspective of hindsight, and there is a strong presumption 
that the counsel made all decisions within the bounds of reasonable professional 
judgment. Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 609 (Wyo. 1992); Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336, 342 (Wyo. 1987). Here, the effectiveness of Mr. Bilderback's counsel 
is evidenced by the fact that his client was charged with attempted first-degree 
murder, but was convicted of only the lesser offense of attempted second-degree 
murder.

[¶6] Although we 
cannot determine from the record what instructions were offered or rejected,2 we can conclude that, even if it 
had been offered, the trial court was not required to give an attempted 
voluntary manslaughter instruction because the evidence did not support such an 
instruction. A lesser-included offense instruction must be given only when there 
is evidence which would justify the trier of fact in acquitting the accused of 
the greater offense and convicting him on the lesser offense. Carey v. State, 
984 P.2d 1098, 1101 (Wyo. 1999). An attempted voluntary manslaughter instruction 
would have been appropriate only if Mr. Bilderback had claimed some other reason 
for his actions other than the malicious action contained within the attempted 
second-degree murder elements. Certainly, his claim that he was frightened by 
unknown persons in Nebraska could not provide justification for shooting a law 
enforcement officer who stopped him for speeding. On the claim that the 
aggravated assault and battery instruction should have been given, we conclude 
it is not a lesser-included offense of attempted second-degree murder. If the 
lesser offense includes an element which the greater offense does not, it is not 
a lesser-included offense. State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1134 (Wyo. 1993). 
Aggravated assault and battery can be charged under four separate paragraphs of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a) (LEXIS 1999). Paragraph (i) requires serious bodily 
injury, paragraphs (ii) and (iii) require use or threat of use of a deadly 
weapon, and paragraph (iv) requires bodily injury to a pregnant woman. Attempted 
second-degree murder does not have these elements. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
6-1-301(a), 6-2-104 (LEXIS 1999). We conclude the trial court would not have 
been justified in giving either suggested instruction and the counsel's 
representation cannot be found ineffective under the applicable 
standards.

B. Inference Instruction 
Was Proper

[¶7] The trial 
court gave the following instruction to which Mr. Bilderback now 
objects:

The jury may infer the 
existence of premeditation, malice, and the intent to kill from all the facts 
and circumstances of the case. Specifically, an inference of malice, or an 
inference of the intent to kill, though not an inference of premeditation, may 
arise from the use of a deadly weapon in a deadly or dangerous manner. Such 
inferences are permissive, rather than mandatory. In other words, the jury is 
not required to make such inferences.

[¶8] This 
instruction was proper and met the standard set forth in Harley v. State, 737 P.2d 750, 754-56 (Wyo. 1987), which followed the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S. Ct. 1965, 85 L. Ed. 2d 344 
(1985). The instruction made it clear the inference was permissive only. The 
inference was a rational one based on common sense; e.g., malice can be inferred 
from the use of a deadly weapon in a deadly or dangerous manner. The facts of 
this case make that inference imminently reasonable. Mr. Bilderback was a 
fugitive who was driving a stolen car and had a pistol positioned under his leg. 
When stopped for a traffic violation, he shot the officer in the face without 
provocation or warning, and then he fled. Under these facts and circumstances, 
it was reasonable for the trial court to instruct the jury it could conclude the 
defendant acted with malice and intent to kill.

C. No Improper Comment on 
Mr. Bilderback's Exercise of His Right to Counsel

[¶9] During the 
trial, the policeman who interviewed the defendant testified that when the 
interview began Mr. Bilderback did not request an attorney and he answered the 
questions asked after being given his Miranda warning. Then later in the 
interview, Mr. Bilderback did request an attorney, and the interview ended. The 
prosecution made no further reference to or comment on Mr. Bilderback's refusal 
to answer further questions or his exercise of his right to remain silent and 
have counsel. Despite not objecting to this testimony at the trial, Mr. 
Bilderback now asserts that the prosecution's actions and the policeman's 
testimony constituted both improper comment by the state upon an accused 
person's exercise of his right to remain silent and prejudicial error under 
Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387 (Wyo. 1995). We disagree. The policeman made no 
reference to Mr. Bilderback remaining silent; he referenced only his request for 
counsel. The testimony was offered to explain how the interview ended, and the 
prosecution made no further reference of any kind to the request for counsel. 
Neither Tortolito nor any other authority stands for the proposition that any 
reference at all to the defendant asking for counsel is prejudicial error, and 
we decline to establish such a rule. See Beartusk v. State, 6 P.3d 138, 144 
(Wyo. 2000).

D. Cumulative Sentence 
for Attempted Second -Degree Murder and Use of Firearm in the Commission 
Thereof

[¶10] Mr. 
Bilderback next contends his constitutional right not to be twice placed in 
jeopardy was violated because the same act resulted in convictions and 
sentencing under two different statutes. We have repeatedly noted the three-fold 
impact of the double jeopardy clause. We have said it prohibits a second 
prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal, a second prosecution for 
the same offense after a conviction, and multiple punishments for the same 
offense. Frenzel v. State, 938 P.2d 867, 868 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 959 
(1997). In this case, we are concerned with only the third aspect of the 
protection against double jeopardy; that is, multiple punishments for the same 
offense and whether the two convictions should have merged for sentencing 
purposes.

[¶11] The 
standard of review for determinations regarding the doctrine of merger was set 
forth in Rouse v. State, 966 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Wyo. 1998) (some citations 
omitted):

The doctrine of merger 
embodies that aspect of constitutional assurances against exposure to double 
jeopardy which precludes alternative legislative proscriptions of a single 
offense. If elements of two charged offenses are identical or if the elements of 
one charged offense constitute an indispensable subset of elements requisite to 
conviction of a second offense, a trial court cannot lawfully impose separate 
sentences upon conviction of both. If, on the other hand, this "statutory 
elements" test reveals disparate component parts to the two charged offenses, it 
may be presumed that the legislature intended separate or cumulative punishments 
upon convictions of both. Under such circumstances, the fact that a continuing 
course of conduct engendered several charges creates no impediment to multiple 
convictions and sentences.

[¶12] The 
statutory elements test is derived from Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932) and is susceptible to a more 
succinct statement:

"The applicable rule is 
that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct 
statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two 
offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which 
the other does not."

[¶13] State v. 
Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1130 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S.  at 304, 
52 S.Ct. 180). At the threshold, appellate resort to the statutory elements test 
in order to resolve the issue of merger would appear to be a pure question of 
law calling for de novo review of the trial court's conclusions. Such an 
analysis may indeed suffice when the question of merger concerns the entitlement 
of the State to charge a defendant with separate crimes and have each charge 
submitted to the jury.

[¶14] The 
question of merger as a bar to multiple sentences for the same act, however, 
summons a more complex appellate standard of review. As a practical matter, in 
appeals alleging imposition of multiple sentences for a single act, the focus 
necessarily expands to embrace those facts proven at trial. The ultimate 
question becomes whether those facts reveal a single criminal act or multiple 
and distinct offenses against the victim or victims and hence the 
State.

[¶15] Owen [v. 
State, 902 P.2d 190 (Wyo. 1995),] and Rivera [v. State, 840 P.2d 933 (Wyo. 
1992),] contemplate multiple charges where guilt of charge A "was a part of and 
necessary to, the accomplishment" of charge B. Rivera, 840 P.2d  at 943 (quoted 
in Owen, 902 P.2d at 194). For example, Mr. Rivera was convicted of indecent 
liberties with a minor for pulling down his victim's blue jeans and panties, but 
was also convicted of first-degree sexual assault for the subsequent penetration 
of the same victim. Since the act of committing indecent liberties was a 
necessary and indispensable precursor to the sexual assault, we held that the 
offenses merged for purposes of sentencing. Restated, our rule is that when the 
facts show that the defendant's act in violation of crime B could not have been 
accomplished in any way other than through prior violation of crime A, the two 
charges must merge for purposes of sentencing. Such a merger is mandatory only 
when the facts necessary to prove charge A describe the only possible way in 
which crime B may be committed.

[¶16] The 
statutes involved in Mr. Bilderback's two charges and convictions provide as 
follows:

Whoever purposely and 
maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being is guilty of 
murder in the second degree, and shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for any 
term not less than twenty (20) years, or during life.

[¶17] Section 
6-2-104.

(a) A person is guilty of 
an attempt to commit a crime if:

(i) With the intent to 
commit the crime, he does any act which is a substantial step towards commission 
of the crime. A "substantial step" is conduct which is strongly corroborative of 
the firmness of the person's intention to complete the commission of the crime; 
or

(ii) He intentionally 
engages in conduct which would constitute the crime had the attendant 
circumstances been as the person believes them to be.

[¶18] Section 
6-1-301(a).

(a) A person who uses a 
firearm while committing a felony shall be imprisoned for not more than ten (10) 
years in addition to the punishment for the felony. For a second or subsequent 
conviction under this section a person shall be imprisoned for not more than 
twenty (20) years in addition to the punishment for the 
felony.

(b) Subsection (a) of 
this section does not apply to those felonies which include as an element of the 
crime the use or possession of a deadly weapon.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-8-101 (LEXIS 1999).

[¶19] Under the 
statutory elements test alone, the two charges have different elements. The 
state argues that the test allows separate sentences and effect must be given to 
the legislature's intent to provide a separate punishment when a person uses a 
firearm while committing a felony. However, legislative intent cannot overcome 
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. In addition, § 
6-8-101(b) indicates the legislature did not intend additional punishment when 
the first felony has the use of the deadly weapon as one of its elements. 
Although attempted second-degree murder does not have that statutory element, 
under the facts of this case, Mr. Bilderback did not commit any other act which 
could have constituted attempted second-degree murder other than using the 
firearm. Our merger analysis does not end with the application of the statutory 
elements test.

[¶20] Here, Mr. 
Bilderback does not argue that the state could not charge and the jury could not 
convict on both attempted second-degree murder and the use of a firearm while 
committing a felony. Instead, he claims those crimes must merge for sentencing 
under our precedent. A jury found Mr. Bilderback guilty of both attempted 
second-degree murder and using a firearm in the commission of a felony. The 
trial court sentenced him to a term of fifty years to life for the attempted 
second-degree murder and a term of nine to ten years for using a firearm while 
committing the attempted second-degree murder with the terms to be served 
consecutively. He contends the two charges were for the "same act" and, when he 
was given consecutive sentences for the two convictions, his right to not suffer 
double jeopardy for the same act was violated. Appellate review of that issue 
involves the in-depth factual analysis set forth above in 
Rouse.

[¶21] It is 
undisputed that Mr. Bilderback's only act which caused him to be found guilty of 
attempted second-degree murder was the shooting of Officer Parkin. Obviously, 
under the facts in this record, that shooting could not have been accomplished 
without the use of the firearm. The state presents a theoretical argument that 
not all attempted second-degree murder scenarios necessarily involve the use of 
a firearm, and this is certainly true. But that is not the correct analysis. We 
must carefully examine the facts of this case and determine whether this 
defendant's offenses under § 6-1-301(a)(i) and § 6-2-104 could have occurred 
without the defendant necessarily committing an offense under § 6-8-101(a). They 
could not. An apt description of the doctrine of merger of offenses for 
sentencing is found in Commonwealth v. Whetstine, 496 A.2d 777 (Pa.Super. Ct. 
1985), as that doctrine has been developed in 
Pennsylvania.

[¶22] In 
deciding whether offenses merge, the question is whether the offenses charged 
"necessarily involve" one another, or whether any additional facts are needed to 
prove additional offenses once the primary offense has been proven. In deciding 
merger questions, we focus not only on the similarity of the elements of the 
crimes, but also, and primarily, on the facts proved at trial, for the question 
is whether those facts show that in practical effect the defendant committed but 
a single criminal act.

[¶23] 
Additionally, we note that analysis of merger claims traditionally has revolved 
around the concept of injury to the sovereign; in order to support the 
imposition of more than one sentence, it must be found that the defendant's 
conduct constituted more than one injury to the 
Commonwealth.

[¶24] Whetstine, 
496 A.2d  at 779-80 (citations omitted).

[¶25] We hold 
the state was entitled to charge both offenses and it was entitled to have them 
presented to the jury. The state had no way of anticipating how the evidence 
would be perceived by a jury or what the jury's conclusion might be with respect 
to the charged offenses. Once the jury convicted Mr. Bilderback of both charges, 
however, the charges merged for punishment purposes, and only one sentence 
should have been imposed. In the context of the Whetstine rationale, only one 
injury occurred to the state in this instance. We, therefore, vacate the 
sentence for using a firearm in the commission of a felony. This acknowledges 
Mr. Bilderback's right not to be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense 
and affords an adequate accommodation to the constitutional 
prohibitions.

CONCLUSION

[¶26] There was 
no reversible error in connection with Mr. Bilderback's trial and convictions. 
The Judgment and Sentence is affirmed as modified.

Footnotes

1 "When 
reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the paramount 
determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's 
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance. The reviewing court should indulge a strong presumption that counsel 
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise 
of reasonable judgment."

Sorensen, 6 P.3d  at 660 (quoting Jackson v. State, 902 P.2d 1292, 1295 
(Wyo. 1995)) (citations omitted).

2 The 
transcript does reflect that the trial court asked the defense counsel if he was 
satisfied with the jury instructions as prepared and the defense counsel said he 
was satisfied and did not wish to propose any additional instructions at that 
time.