Case Title: State ex rel. Squaw Mountain Cattle Co. v. Wheatland Irr. Dist.,

Citation: 

Docket Number: 85-219

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-11-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
State ex rel. Squaw Mountain Cattle Co. v. Wheatland Irr. Dist.,1986 WY 202728 P.2d 172Case Number: 85-219Decided: 11/17/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
The STATE of 
Wyoming ex 
rel. SQUAW MOUNTAIN CATTLE COMPANY and Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Company, 
Petitioners,

v.

WHEATLAND IRRIGATION 
DISTRICT, and its Board of Directors, Respondents.

Two companies 
which entered into irrigation contract brought action seeking writ of mandamus 
to have resolved obligation of irrigation district to deliver water. The Supreme 
Court, Thomas, C.J., held that: (1) questions presented essentially were 
resolved in earlier case determining amount of water subject to delivery and 
period of time during which district was required to honor water demands and 
were subject to doctrine of res judicata; (2) evidence supported factual 
determinations that natural flow of creek was insufficient to furnish water 
demanded and that water demanded would be put to beneficial use without 
unnecessary or intentional waste; and (3) mandamus was proper remedy to compel 
supplying of water.

Writ issued. 

Thomas S. Smith, 
Smith, Stanfield & Scott, Laramie, for petitioners.

William R. 
Jones, Jones, Jones, Vines & Hunkins, Wheatland, for respondents.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The parties to this 
proceeding seek to have resolved further the obligation of Wheatland Irrigation 
District to deliver water which is imposed by a contract for a reservoir site 
and various court proceedings relating to that contract. After careful 
consideration of the file and record before this court, earlier court 
proceedings relating to the subject matter of this controversy, and the briefs 
and arguments of counsel, the court is persuaded that the alternative writ of 
mandamus entered on January 14, 1986 should be made absolute. It hereby is 
ordered that the alternative writ of mandamus be, and it hereby is, made 
absolute.

[¶2.]     Wheatland Irrigation 
District is the successor in interest of Wyoming Development Company which, on 
March 1, 1900, contracted with The Swan Land and Cattle Company (then a 
corporation existing under the laws of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland) to lease a site for a water storage reservoir. As consideration for the 
reservoir site, Wyoming Development Company agreed to furnish through the 
headgates for the Two Bar Ditch and the Muleshoe Ditch water to irrigate lands 
of The Swan Land and Cattle Company "lying under such ditches and capable of 
being irrigated therefrom." Wyoming Development Company agreed to furnish 
"throughout the irrigation season * * * such quantity of water as may be carried 
and conveyed through and by means of such irrigation ditches." In 1947 The Swan 
Company (the successor of The Swan Land and Cattle Company) conveyed its lands 
which lie under such ditches and are capable of being irrigated therefrom and 
transferred its rights under the reservoir lease to the Two Bar-Muleshoe Water 
Company. Squaw Mountain Cattle Company is one of the shareholders of Two 
Bar-Muleshoe Water Company, and its interest as a shareholder is proportionate 
to the lands that it owns which initially were transferred to the Two 
Bar-Muleshoe Water Company by The Swan Company.

[¶3.]     The rights and 
obligations under this reservoir lease have been the subject matter of 
litigation in several cases. In litigation which culminated in the opinion in 
Anderson v. Wyoming Development Company, 60 Wyo. 417, 154 P.2d 318 (1944), 
certain individual purchasers of water from Wyoming Development Company attacked 
the right of The Swan Company to receive water pursuant to the reservoir lease. 
In essence the plaintiffs contended that The Swan Company had no right to use 
water from Reservoir No. 2 (the leased reservoir site) because its lands were 
not included in the reservoir permit. Demurrers to the complaint were sustained 
by the district court, and that judgment was affirmed. In the opinion in that 
case this court said:

"The amount of water thus 
contracted for is the amount the lessor's two ditches, known as the Two Bar and 
Mule Shoe, and whose dimensions are stated, can carry for the irrigation of 
certain lands of the lessor which are capable of irrigation; as additional 
consideration for this lease the lessee agrees to furnish water from the said 
Sybille Creek as shall be sufficient to irrigate 300 acres to be used upon lands 
selected by lessor.

* * * * * 
*

"It would appear that 
plaintiffs desire to retain the benefit of the reservoir and the lands which 
make it available, and yet deny to The Swan Company the right to have the agreed 
consideration for this use of its land.

* * * * * 
*

"We have discovered no 
sections in the statutory law of this state relative to reservoir supply water 
which were operative at the time this contract was made which would render it 
void. Plaintiffs have not directed our attention to any such enactments. We have 
already mentioned that, at the time this lease was made, no restrictive laws 
were in existence relative to the use of storage water except the elemental 
principles of due appropriation of water and the application thereof to a 
beneficial use. It would seem that these requirements have been met in this 
matter, as we have seen. * * *" Anderson v. 
Wyoming Development Company, supra, 60 Wyo. 492, 493, 154 P.2d 346, 
347.

[¶4.]     Some 30 years later Two 
Bar-Muleshoe Water Company brought an action against Wheatland Irrigation 
District seeking specific performance of the contract and damages. The district 
court entered judgment in favor of Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Company ordering 
Wheatland Irrigation District to perform the March 1, 1900 contract. Relief in 
the form of damages was denied "such having been waived and withdrawn." In that 
decision the district court indicated that the volume of water Wheatland 
Irrigation District must furnish for the 300 acres alluded to in Anderson v. Wyoming 
Development Company, supra, was "the statutory standard of 1 cubic foot per 
second for each 70 acres." An appeal by Wheatland Irrigation District from that 
judgment was dismissed because not all of the claims had been disposed of at 
that time, and the trial court did not make a determination pursuant to Rule 
54(b), W.R.C.P., that there was no just reason for delay in entering a final 
judgment on fewer than all of the claims. Wheatland Irrigation District v. Two 
Bar-Muleshoe Water Company, Wyo., 431 P.2d 257 (1967). In arriving at that 
holding, however, this court stated that the lease provided for a quantity of 
water consistent with the carrying capacity of the ditches, rather than a 
quantity consistent with the statutory duty of water:

"It is `distinctly' 
understood and agreed that the quantity of water to be furnished shall be that 
quantity which the ditches can carry `with their present dimensions, as 
hereinabove stated.'

* * * * * 
*

"In order to prevail in 
an action for specific performance, it would seem plaintiffs would have been 
obligated to adduce convincing evidence of some nature as to the quantity of 
water intended." Wheatland Irrigation District v. Two Bar-Muleshoe Water 
Company, supra, 431 P.2d  at 258.

[¶5.]     The litigation in the 
district court then continued. The trial court ultimately concluded that the 
original carrying capacity of the Two Bar Ditch was 26 c.f.s., that the original 
capacity of the Mule Shoe Ditch was 25 c.f.s., and that the lease required 
Wheatland Irrigation District to provide water throughout the growing season of 
the lessor, even if that did not coincide with Wheatland Irrigation District's 
irrigation season. Judgment was entered in favor of Two Bar-Muleshoe Water 
Company, and Wheatland Irrigation District appealed. The decision of the 
district court was affirmed, but it was modified to reflect that the capacity of 
the Mule Shoe Ditch was only 17.5 c.f.s., and the total acreage to be irrigated 
was identified as 1,597 acres. Wheatland Irrigation District v. Two Bar-Muleshoe 
Water Company, Wyo., 521 P.2d 1334 
(1974).

[¶6.]     This brings us to the 
present controversy. It appears that in 1980, 1981 and 1982, Wheatland 
Irrigation District refused to honor demands for water made by Two Bar-Muleshoe 
Water Company. In the spring of 1983, perhaps in an attempt to resolve the 
controversy, Wheatland Irrigation District attempted to purchase the lands of 
Squaw Mountain Cattle Company. In the spring of the following year the district 
court issued a decision letter refusing a request by Two Bar-Muleshoe Water 
Company that the court hold Wheatland Irrigation District in contempt for the 
refusals to deliver water in the years 1980, 1981 and 1982. The decision letter 
stated that Wheatland Irrigation District's actions were not "flagrant, wanton 
or malicious." Then in 1984 Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Company filed suit against 
Wheatland Irrigation District asking for specific performance of the contract, 
requesting an order to Wheatland Irrigation District to comply with the decision 
of this court in 1974, and praying for damages for the refusal to deliver the 
water demanded in the years 1980 through 1983. Wheatland Irrigation District 
answered this complaint and counterclaimed for a declaration of its duties under 
the contract and for a taking by eminent domain of the leased reservoir site. 
Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Company then filed a motion for summary judgment on all 
of the issues in the case. The trial judge wrote a decision letter which denied 
summary judgment on the specific performance count because factual questions 
existed as to beneficial use and impossibility of performance, and the matter of 
eminent domain was held in abeyance. Counsel professed confusion with respect to 
this letter and an additional letter from the district judge 
followed.

[¶7.]     In the fall of 1985, 
while the suit described above was pending in the district court, Wheatland 
Irrigation District again refused to honor Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Company's 
demand for water subsequent to September 15, 1985, and on that day Wheatland 
Irrigation District cut off the water. On October 2, 1985, counsel for Two 
Bar-Muleshoe Water Company arranged a conference call involving himself, the 
district judge, and counsel for Wheatland Irrigation District. The product of 
this telephone call was that the trial court ordered Wheatland Irrigation 
District to continue delivering water and set a hearing for October 17, 
1985.

[¶8.]     After that order 
Wheatland Irrigation District filed in this court a petition for a writ of 
prohibition against the trial court which addressed the oral order to deliver 
water and claimed that the water was not needed; the natural flow of Sybille 
Creek was sufficient to provide water; Wheatland Irrigation District needed to 
preserve water for the 1986 water season; delivery would waste water, soaking 23 
miles of the Laramie River channel, filling a 500 acre-foot basin to raise the 
water to the tunnel, and soaking 10.7 miles of the Sybille Creek channel before 
delivery at the headgate of the Two Bar Ditch; if delivery were effected Two 
Bar-Muleshoe Water Company could not beneficially use it; and Wheatland 
Irrigation District needed to dry and clean the channel. This petition recited 
that Wheatland Irrigation District had been delivering water since 3:00 P.M. on 
October 2, 1985. On October 4, 1985 an order was entered in this court requiring 
Squaw Mountain Cattle Company and the trial court to show cause why a writ of 
prohibition and/or a writ of mandamus should not issue, indicating that the 
trial court might not have had jurisdiction to make the ruling on October 2, 
1985 because Squaw Mountain Cattle Company had not properly instituted the 
proceedings. That order directed the trial court to refrain from enforcing its 
order until further order of this court. Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Company and 
Squaw Mountain Cattle Company filed their response on October 15, 1985 and the 
trial court filed its response on October 16, 1985. In addition Two Bar-Muleshoe 
Water Company and Squaw Mountain Cattle Company, on October 16, 1985, filed 
their petition for writ of mandamus against Wheatland Irrigation District 
alleging the refusal of Wheatland Irrigation District to follow the mandate of 
this court and an attempt to intimidate Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Company and Squaw 
Mountain Cattle Company into submission.

[¶9.]     This court then entered 
an order denying the writ of prohibition, in part because the petition for 
mandamus had been filed. On that same day an order was entered in the mandamus 
proceeding which directed the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing to 
determine:

"(1) [I]s the natural 
flow of Sybille Creek sufficient to furnish the amount of water demanded for the 
Muleshoe [sic] and Two Bar ditches not to exceed 17.5 cubic feet per second for 
the Muleshoe [sic] ditch and 26 cubic feet per second for the Two Bar ditch; and 
(2) will the water demanded by Petitioners be put to beneficial use without 
unnecessary or intentional waste; * * *."

Resolution of 
these questions of fact was necessary to ascertain whether Wheatland Irrigation 
District was delivering water in accordance with the 1974 decision of this 
court. The hearing was held on October 30, 1985, and the trial court 
reported:

"Based on this hearing it 
is my opinion that the answer to question # 1 is `no' and the answer to question 
# 2 is `yes.'"

Premised upon 
this report from the trial court an order was entered granting an alternative 
writ of mandamus requiring Wheatland Irrigation District to show cause why a 
permanent writ of mandamus should not issue.

[¶10.]  Wheatland Irrigation District's response 
by means of a brief asserts as cause for not issuing a writ of mandamus the 
following:

(1) The matters at issue 
here were not determined in the 1974 case;

(2) The trial court erred 
in answering both propounded questions;

(3) Two Bar-Muleshoe 
should be limited to the statutory 1 per 70 under the contract beneficial use 
provisions;

(4) Transporting the 
contracted for water through the available, losing stream, transportation system 
is waste.

A response was 
filed by the petitioners Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Company and Squaw Mountain 
Cattle Company, and oral argument then was held with respect to the issues in 
this case.

[¶11.]  It is clear from the opinion in Wheatland 
Irrigation District v. Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Company, supra, that this court 
did determine the amount of water which is subject to delivery under the 
contract and the period of time during which Wheatland Irrigation District must 
honor Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Company's demands for water. Wheatland Irrigation 
District must deliver the 1900 capacities of the two ditches, i.e., 26 c.f.s. at 
the headgate of the Two Bar Ditch and 17.5 c.f.s. at the headgate of the Mule 
Shoe Ditch. The delivery of this water must be accomplished during Two 
Bar-Muleshoe Water Company's irrigation season, and Wheatland Irrigation 
District must comply with a demand by Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Company for the 
quantity of water required by the earlier decision whenever the natural flow in 
Sybille Creek will not furnish the requisite amount. This must be done without 
regard to the irrigation season normally recognized by Wheatland Irrigation 
District. The questions presented in this proceeding essentially were resolved 
in the earlier case and are subject to the doctrine of res 
judicata.

[¶12.]  We required the trial court to determine 
whether the natural flow of Sybille Creek was sufficient to provide the quantity 
called for by the lease because if it were that might excuse Wheatland 
Irrigation District's failure to deliver the water demanded by Two Bar-Muleshoe 
Water Company and Squaw Mountain Cattle Company. The trial court found, however, 
that the natural flow of Sybille Creek was not sufficient to furnish the water 
demanded, i.e., not more than 26 c.f.s. at the headgate of the Two Bar Ditch and 
17.5 c.f.s. at the headgate of the Mule Shoe Ditch. In addition, in accordance 
with this court's order, the trial court determined that the water demanded 
would be put to beneficial use by Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Company without 
unnecessary or intentional waste. In responding to the order to show cause 
Wheatland Irrigation District has presented extensive argument that the district 
court erred in arriving at these factual determinations. The record demonstrates 
a lengthy evidentiary hearing held by the trial court before deciding the 
questions, and the transcript of that hearing manifests sufficient evidence to 
support the factual determinations.

[¶13.]  Wheatland Irrigation District vigorously 
contends that the district court erroneously determined that the water demanded 
would be put to beneficial use. In structuring this argument Wheatland 
Irrigation District emphasizes § 41-3-101, W.S. 1977, which says in pertinent 
part, "* * * [b]eneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and limit of the 
right to use water at all times, not exceeding the statutory limit * * *." The 
statutory duty of water alluded to in this provision is 1 c.f.s. per 70 acres of 
land. Section 41-4-317, W.S. 1977. On the basis of these provisions Wheatland 
Irrigation District contends that Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Company is not entitled 
to receive more than 1 c.f.s. per 70 acres of land under the 1900 contract. It 
is clear that the lease does not specifically reference this standard, nor could 
it. The right to receive water of Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Company, as between it 
and Wheatland Irrigation District, is found in the 1900 lease. It has been 
adjudicated that the provisions of that contract entitle Two Bar-Muleshoe Water 
Company to 26 c.f.s. at one headgate and 17.5 c.f.s. at the other. Wheatland 
Irrigation District v. Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Company, supra. It also has been 
held that the statutory limitations that might otherwise apply to water supplied 
from a reservoir do not affect this water. Anderson v. Wyoming Development 
Company, supra. That holding is certainly a matter of stare decisis, and well 
may be subject to the doctrine of collateral estoppel as between Two 
Bar-Muleshoe Water Company and Wheatland Irrigation 
District.

[¶14.]  The statutory duty of water of 1 c.f.s. 
per 70 acres of land could be considered as evidence in determining the question 
of how much water is "necessary for the proper irrigation" of the subject lands. 
We are not informed of any construction of that statute that suggests that more 
water than 1 c.f.s. per 70 acres of land constitutes waste. If that were the 
rule the statutory right to the use of surplus water found in § 41-4-320, W.S. 
1977, would be inefficacious. Consequently, while it must be accepted that the 
statutory duty of water of 1 c.f.s. per 70 acres is controlling in those 
instances in which it applies, it is appropriate to perceive that statutory 
measure as primarily controlling the allocation of a scarce resource rather than 
a per se standard for waste. The statute by itself does not demonstrate that 
additional water would not be beneficially used, and the record discloses no 
other facts which would lead to any different conclusion that the finding of the 
district court that the water demanded by Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Company and 
Squaw Mountain Cattle Company will be put to beneficial use without unnecessary 
or intentional waste.

[¶15.]  We recognize the limitation of beneficial 
use without unnecessary or intentional waste encompassed in the contractual 
language with respect to the water which Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Company is 
entitled to receive. We do not intend by our disposition of this matter to 
foreclose any opportunity of Wheatland Irrigation District to demonstrate by 
competent evidence at some future time that water which is furnished to Two 
Bar-Muleshoe Water Company at the headgates of the respective ditches is not 
being used beneficially as required by the contract. Given satisfactory proof of 
such a circumstance Wheatland Irrigation District would be entitled to invoke 
available remedies for breach of the lease agreement and quite possibly might 
obtain relief with respect to furnishing water in the future. As of now, 
however, Wheatland Irrigation District must continue to provide the water 
specified under the lease when it is demanded.

[¶16.]  Wheatland Irrigation District argues that 
in order to meet its obligations under the contract it must transport water 
through a losing system. Loss attributable to the transportation of the water to 
the delivery point specified by the contract is not a factor with respect to 
beneficial use by Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Company. Clearly it is cost of doing 
business for Wheatland Irrigation District, but that is a cost which Wheatland 
Irrigation District's predecessor in interest apparently believed to be 
acceptable in order to secure the reservoir site from the predecessor in 
interest of Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Company and Squaw Mountain Cattle Company. 
Remorse on the part of Wheatland Irrigation District over the conclusion of its 
predecessor in interest does not serve to adjust its obligations pursuant to the 
contract.

[¶17.]  Wheatland Irrigation District asserts 
that because of the loss of water through the transportation system it is 
impossible to perform its obligations under the contract. The evidence does not 
suggest that is true, and certainly there is no reason to believe that it could 
not deliver from the reservoir the water required by the 
lease.

[¶18.]  This court has held that mandamus is a 
proper remedy to compel the supplying of water. McHale v. Goshen Ditch Company, 
49 Wyo. 100, 52 P.2d 678 (1935). In LeBeau v. State ex rel. White, Wyo., 377 P.2d 302 (1963), the court held that, because it was unclear whether the water 
commissioner illegally had impounded the water which LeBeau demanded, the right 
sought to be enforced was not "clear and certain, so as not to admit of any 
reasonable controversy," and thus an ordinary lawsuit, other than mandamus, was 
the proper remedy. Even so we did not depart from the position espoused in 
McHale v. Goshen Ditch Company, supra. Wheatland Irrigation District is 
organized and exists pursuant to § 41-7-201, et seq., W.S. 1977, and is subject 
to a writ of mandamus to require the supplying of water under the 
lease.

[¶19.]  In State ex rel. Whitehead v. Gage, Wyo. 
377 P.2d 299 (1963), the court reiterated its earlier position that a writ of 
mandamus is warranted only where it will be effectual as a remedy and should be 
denied where it is "impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief, 
making the case moot." In that case the court held that the writ of mandamus to 
compel the secretary of state and the attorney general to reapportion the 
legislature for the 1962 election would not be appropriate because the election 
already had been held. In this case relief cannot be enforced by requiring 
delivery of water for prior years. The petition in fact, however, requests the 
court to compel Wheatland Irrigation District to comply with the decision of 
this court in 1974. Consequently, no date for or event to trigger performance 
was specified, and for that reason the controversy continues and this case has 
not become moot because of intervening events. The record indicates that 
Wheatland Irrigation District continually and persistently has refused to 
fulfill its contractual obligations to Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Company and Squaw 
Mountain Cattle Company. We thus perceive a continuing course of action which 
justifies the issuance of the writ of mandamus.

[¶20.]  The cases articulate the proposition that 
mandamus will issue "only where the duty to perform is clear, certain and 
undisputable." State ex rel. Whitehead v. Gage, supra; LeBeau v. State ex rel. 
White, supra; § 1-30-105, W.S. 1977. Subsequent to the 1974 decision of this 
court in Wheatland Irrigation District v. Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Company, supra, 
there could be no question that the duty of Wheatland Irrigation District is 
clear, certain and undisputable.

[¶21.]  Section 1-30-104, W.S. 1977, provides 
that the writ should not issue where there is an adequate remedy at law. It 
cannot be used to serve the purpose of ordinary civil actions. State ex rel. 
Whitehead v. Gage, supra. As the court stated in LeBeau v. State ex rel. White, 
supra, 377 P.2d at 304:

"In the absence of good 
reason therefor mandamus cannot be resorted to as a substitute for an appeal. * 
* * [T]he delays incident to an appeal do not ordinarily affect the adequacy of 
the remedy."

Because of a 
persistent and willful avoidance by Wheatland Irrigation District from 1973 
until 1985 of the clear duty imposed by the contract and this court an ordinary 
action at law followed by an appeal would not serve as an adequate remedy for 
Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Company and Squaw Mountain Cattle Company. Good reason 
exists in this case to invoke the remedy of mandamus.

A peremptory 
writ of mandamus will issue this day. Costs and fees are awarded to the 
petitioners in accordance with law.

ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING

[¶22.]  This case came on before the Court on the 
Petition for Rehearing, filed herein by the Respondents, The Wheatland 
Irrigation District and its Board of Directors, on December 1, 1986, and the 
Court having examined the file and record of the Court, together with the 
opinion of the Court in this case, and having carefully considered the Petition 
for Rehearing and the Brief in Support of Respondents' (The Wheatland Irrigation 
District and its Board of Directors) Petition for Rehearing, and being fully 
advised in the premises, and having carefully considered the matters raised in 
the Petition for Rehearing, finds that the Petition for Rehearing should be 
denied, and it therefore is

[¶23.]  ORDERED that the Petition for Rehearing, 
filed herein on behalf of the Respondents, The Wheatland Irrigation District and 
its Board of Directors, on December 1, 1986, be, and the same hereby is, 
denied.

[¶24.]  URBIGKIT, Justice, would vote to grant 
the rehearing with the following comment:

[¶25.]  Recognizing the apparently unstoppable 
nature of this exhaustive litigation, I would favor granting a rehearing for 
response by petitioner on the issues now enumerated, in order for this court to 
determine whether the subjects are settled, supplementary, or properly within 
the continued and pending district court proceedings. Hope springs eternal that 
it is possible to avoid a Toltec or Carissa Mine eminence of judicial investment 
thereby. Toltec Watershed Improvement District v. Johnston, Wyo., 717 P.2d 808 
(1986); State Board of Law Examiners v. Spriggs, 61 Wyo. 70, 155 P.2d 285 
(1945); and Tibbals v. Graham, 55 Wyo. 169, 97 P.2d 673 (1940).