Case Title: Town of Cheswold, et al. v. Vann

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-04-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
EFiled: Apr 23 2007 2:15PI
Filing 1 14581132
Case Number 445,2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

‘THE TOWN OF CHESWOLD, a municipal §
corporation of the State of Delaware, § No. 445, 2006

PETER DAIKOS, individually and in his §

official capacity of Mayor of the Town §_—_ Court Below: Superior Court
of Cheswold, RICHARD ZIEGENHORN, § of the State of Delaware in and
individually, and in his official capacity as § for Kent County

Vice Mayor of the Town of Cheswold and §

Member of the Town of Cheswold Town §

Council, CONCHETTA EDEL, RICHARD § — CA No. 0SC-08-037

H. SEENEY, JAMES O. PLUMMER, III, §

and ROBERT W. SINE, individually and in §

their official capacities as members of the §

‘Town of Cheswold Town Council,

Defendants Below-
Appellants,

ROBBIN VANN,

Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.

Submitted: January 18, 2007
Decided: April 23, 2007

Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.

ORDER
‘This 23" day of April 2007, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties

and their contentions at oral argument, it appears to the Court that:
(2) The Town of Cheswold brings this interlocutory appeal of the
Superior Court's decision that Robbin Vann, the former Police Chief of Cheswold,
was denied due process when the Town Council voted to terminate Vann’s
‘employment because the Town Council was not impartial.’ Having concluded that

‘Vann was denied due process, the Superior Court stated it “need not determine

 

whether the Town Council had just cause to terminate Vann as Police Chief:
Cheswold makes two arguments in this appeal. First, Cheswold argues that the
‘Superior Court failed to apply a presumption that the Town Council acted honestly
and impartially when rendering its decision to terminate Vann's employment.
‘Second, Cheswold argues that Vann waived his right to claim that the Council was
biased. We find insufficient evidence in the record to overcome the presumption
that the Town Council acted honestly and impartially. Additionally, the record
establishes that Vann failed to seek the recusal of any member of the Town
Council from deciding whether there was just cause to fire him and therefore Vann
waived his claim of bias which he made for the first time on appeal. Accordingly,
we reverse and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this
order.

(2) According to Vann’s counsel on appeal, some time prior to March 8,

2005, Peter Diakos, Mayor of Cheswold, decided to hire former Council Member

" Vann v. Town of Cheswold, 2006 WL 2382798 (Del. Super.)
2d. at 4.
Ed Ryan as Town Manager. Vann was informed that the Town Council had not
passed a resolution hiring Ryan, but instead doctored the minutes to indicate that
such a resolution was passed. Vann began to investigate but then turned the matter
over to the Delaware State Police and the Office of the Attorney General because
he perceived that there was a conflict of interest.

(3) On March 8, 2005, Mayor Diakos sent Vann a letter proposing Vann’s
termination based on fifteen enumerated reasons.’ A public hearing concerning,
Vann’s termination was convened before the Town Council on May 24, 2005 as
required by 11 Del. C. § 9301. The Town Solicitor announced that the Mayor
‘would not participate because he would be a witness. The Vice Mayor presided.

In response to an inquiry of the Town Solicitor, he and the remaining members of

 

the Town Council expressed on the record that they would base their decision

solely upon the evidence presented. Vann’s attorney also asked the members of
the Town Council if they could make a decision that is contrary to the Mayor and
the Town Manager. After affirmative responses were given, no objection of bias

nor any request for recusal was raised at the public hearing by Vann or his counsel

5 Those reasons include failure to follow the Mayor's directives, failure to meet with the Town
Council, contracting. without authorization with Verizon for cell phones that Vann used
personally, giving a key tothe evidence room to another officer in contradiction of the Mayor's
directive, not being present in his office during business hours, leaving equipment in his
unlocked office, being disrespectful to the Mayor, purchasing supplies without authorization,
physically threatening the Mayor, improperly scheduling of officers, falsifying information given
to the Mayor, and refusing to follow other written Town policies.

3
(4) The Mayor and Ed Ryan, the newly appointed Town Manager, then
testified about the allegations set forth in the Mayor's March 8 letter. Ryan
explained that despite the Town’s Administrative Policy No. 5, Vann authorized
overtime for officers without obtaining the necessary approval. He also testified
that Vann obtained three cell phones, one for himself, one for his wife, and one for
a fellow officer, in the name of the Town without approval. No payment had been
‘made for several months, and as of February 24, 2005, the cell phone bill exceeded
$800.00. ‘The next day, the Town Council voted unanimously to terminate Vann’s,
employment as Chief of Police.

(5) Vann appealed the Town Council's decision to the Superior Court.
For the first time, Vann raised the issue of bias and a denial of due process. On
July 26, 2006, the Superior Court found that the Town deprived Vann of his right
to due process of law when it terminated his employment. Specifically, the
Superior Court held:

‘The particular events in this case expose a deficiency, affecting the

integrity of Van's hearing. The Councilmembers have a

conspicuous base for bias against him, because of his role in the

investigation into the Ryan appointment and the (at least superficial)
interests of the individuals opposed to Appellant's position. Indeed,

in the original “9301 hearing,” the Town’s witnesses in support of

Vann’ s termination, presented to the panel chaired by the Vice-mayor,

were Mayor Diakos and Town Manager Ryan. That, inherently,

suggests a conflict of interest, or at the very least the appearance of it,

for the Town Council members empanelled for the hearing. Although

the Town Council would not be affected if Vann were terminated, the
Town Council, Mayor, Vice Mayor, and Town Manager, would
continue to work together after the hearing. Accordingly, Vann must
bbe provided a forum for due process, where both the presence and
appearance of fairness and justice exist."

‘The Superior Court certified Cheswold’s interlocutory appeal which we

accepted,

(6) The Delaware General Assembly has established the procedure

for police chief removal. Section 9301(a) provides:

No chief of police or police superintendent of a legislatively
‘authorized police department within this State, excluding
municipalities with a population greater than 60,000, shall be
dismissed, demoted or otherwise removed from office unless there is a
showing of just cause and such person has been given notice in
writing of the specific grounds for such action and an opportunity to
bbe heard in the chiefs’s [sic] or the superintendent's own defense,
personally and/or by counsel, at a public hearing before the elected
governing body of the jurisdiction, Such public hearing, unless
‘otherwise specified by charter, shall be held not less than 5 nor more
than 30 days after such notice.®

 

Here, notice of the grounds for dismissal was given in writing, a timely public

hearing was convened before the elected governing body of the Town, and Vann

‘was given the opportunity to present his defense personally and by counsel.

o

While it is clear that due process requires any tribunal to be impartial,

the record in this case does not include sufficient evidence to overcome the

presumption that the members of Town Council acted with honesty and integrity.

4 Vann v. Town of Cheswold, 2006 WL 2382798 (Del. Super)
S11 Del. C. $9301).

a
‘The mere fact that the Town Council would continue to work after the public
hearing with the Mayor and Town Manager is insufficient to show bias. In fact,
the members of Council said they could make a decision contrary to the Mayor and
‘Town Manager. In addition, the investigation of Vann’s alleged wrongdoing does
not show bias of the remaining Council members. As the United States Supreme
Court explained in Withrow v. Larkin, “{{Jhe contention that the combination of
investigative and adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk
of bias in administrative adjudication has a much more difficult burden of
persuasion to carry.”” Thus, in order to succeed on his claim that he was denied
due process on the basis that the Town Council was biased, Vann must point to
specific facts in the record that rebut the presumption of honesty and impartiality.
(8) We have reviewed the record in this case and find that the neutrality

of the Town Council was addressed at the outset of the proceeding. Before any

 

esses were swom in, the Town Solicitor announced that the Mayor would not
participate in deciding the matter because he was a witness. The remaining
members of the Town Council were asked by the Town Solicitor whether they
were able to make their decision based solely on the evidence." They answered
2 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 USS. 38,47 (1975).
* Specifically, counsel forthe Town Council explained:

1 just have one other statement before we swear the witnesses. I'm sure that all of
you have talked to Chief Vann, and you know, you have to make your decision
Solely upon the evidence presented at this hearing. And if any members of
‘Council are unable to do that, Mr. Mayor, we should know that at this point in

6
affirmatively. The Council members were also questioned by Vann’s counsel on
whether they would be able to make a decision contrary to Ryan and Diakos.”
Again, they confirmed their impartiality. Without specific evidence to the
‘contrary, the presumption that the Town Council acted impartially must be applied.
‘The Superior Court erred when it did not do so in this case.

(9) Finally, Cheswold argues that Vann waived any claim of bias based
upon his failure to object at the hearing. We agree. The circumstances Vann relies
‘upon on appeal to show bias were known to him and his counsel atthe time of the
public hearing. Neither Vann nor his counsel sought to disqualify any member of

the Town Council from hearing his case. “A party who fails to raise a

 

jualification issue may not seek to set aside the results of a (hearing) when
knowledge of the disqualification was known by the party during [the hearing).”"°

Accordingly, the disqualification issue was waived."

time. And they would have to make their

 

ision solely upon the evidence

presented here that you hear at this hearing. Is there any problem with that with
‘member of Council?

° Specifically, Vann’s counsel asked the members:
‘The next question should be inthis case is whether the Board ean make a decision
that is contrary to Mr. Ryan and Mr. Diakos. Would you be willing to work with
them if you find that there is not just cause, that this was a witeh hunt o
something along those lines? Ate you all eligible and able to render a fair
<ecision in light of the fact that you will have to work with these people?

© Copland v. Manuel, 994 Del, LEXIS 370 (Del. Nov. 22, 1994)

“a

 

 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is REVERSED. ‘The matter is REMANDED for further proceedings

consistent with this order. Jurisdiction is retained

BY THE COUR’

/sfHlenry duPont Ridgely

Justice