Case Title: BERTAGNOLLI v. LOUDERBACK

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-65

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
BERTAGNOLLI v. LOUDERBACK2003 WY 5067 P.3d 627Case Number: 02-65Decided: 04/21/2003
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

JOE 
BERTAGNOLLI,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

MAX 
LOUDERBACK and

LARRY 
WESTBROOK,

 

Appellees(Defendants).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Michael 
R. O'Donnell and Rhonda Sigrist Woodard of Woodard & O'Donnell, P.C., 
Cheyenne, Wyoming; and Sharon Rose of Lavery & Rose, P.C., Evanston, 
Wyoming  

 

Representing 
Appellees:

Ford 
T. Bussart and Marvin L. Tyler of Bussart, West & Tyler, P.C., Rock Springs, 
Wyoming  

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 

            
KITE, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Joe Bertagnolli 
was injured while working in General Chemical Corporation's trona mine in 
Sweetwater County.  He filed suit 
against his co-employee supervisors, Max Louderback and Larry Westbrook, 
alleging they required him to work in an area of the mine generally known to be 
extremely dangerous and refused his request to "lock out," or turn off, the 
power to the shuttle belt machine (shuttle belt).  The district court granted the 
supervisors' motion for summary judgment concluding they did not have knowledge 
of an unguarded sheave wheel which was the specific instrumentality of Mr. 
Bertagnolli's injury and, therefore, as a matter of law, they could not be 
liable for the injuries under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104(a) (LexisNexis 
2001).  We find questions of 
material fact existed regarding the supervisors' knowledge of the general risks 
of working near the shuttle belt and whether their actions met the requirements 
of the statute and constituted willful and wanton misconduct and, therefore, 
reverse.  

 

 

 

[¶2]      The parties agree 
only one issue is presented on appeal:  
Did the district court err in granting summary judgment in favor of the 
co-employee supervisors?

 

 

 

[¶3]      "Pursuant to our 
standard of review for summary judgments, we recite the facts from the vantage 
point most favorable to the plaintiffs, as the party opposing the motions, 
awarding them all the favorable inferences which may be drawn from those 
facts."  Andersen v. Two Dot 
Ranch, Inc., 2002 WY 105, ¶3, 49 P.3d 1011, ¶3 (Wyo. 2002); see also 
S & G Investors, LLC v. 
Blackley, 994 P.2d 941, 943 (Wyo. 2000).  Evidence submitted by Mr. Bertagnolli in 
opposition to the supervisors' summary judgment motion consisted of lengthy 
affidavits, deposition excerpts, and exhibits which set forth his version of the 
events.  The following summary of 
the facts is drawn from those materials.

 

[¶4]      On November 13, 
1996, Mr. Bertagnolli was instructed by his section foreman and direct 
supervisor, Mr. Westbrook, to shovel ore rubble in the west end of the shuttle 
belt area of the mine also known as the 702 area.  Mr. Bertagnolli had worked at the mine 
for about two years but had never before worked in the shuttle belt 
area.

 

[¶5]      The shuttle belt 
moves raw ore from the level of the mine on which mining occurs to lower levels 
where other equipment moves it to the surface.  It resembles an open rail car with a 
long, continuous belt on top and travels up and down a track approximately forty 
to fifty feet in length by means of a steel cable attached to both ends of the 
car.  The cable makes a large loop 
around several pulley wheels called "sheave wheels."  The cable and sheave wheels are 
approximately twelve inches above the track.  The cable runs through an electric motor 
called a "tugger" which can pull the shuttle belt in either direction on the 
rail track.  An operator controls 
the movements of the shuttle belt from a level of the mine below where the 
shuttle belt is located.  By 
maneuvering the shuttle belt back and forth, the operator aligns it over bins 
which receive ore from the bottom of the shuttle belt and then transfer the ore 
to a set of feeders that move it to another series of belts and on to the 
surface. In the east end, workers are protected from the movements of the steel 
cable by a series of steel walkway plates positioned over the cable.  There is also a steel guardrail in the 
east end to keep workers away from the shuttle belt and its moving parts.  On the west end, however, the steel 
cable is exposed, the sheave wheels are unguarded, no steel plates are in place 
over the cables, and there is very little clearance between the shuttle belt and 
the walls of the mine. Workers in the west end are unprotected from the dangers 
presented by the shuttle belt and its moving parts.

 

[¶6]      When Mr. 
Bertagnolli was instructed to shovel the shuttle belt area clean, he and Mr. 
Westbrook were standing in the west end.  
Mr. Bertagnolli asked whether he was expected to do the work while the 
shuttle belt was operating, and Mr. Westbrook responded in the affirmative.  Mr. Bertagnolli then requested the belt 
be "locked out" so it could not be turned on while he was in harm's way.  Mr. Westbrook left to discuss the matter 
with Mr. Louderback, the shift supervisor.  
The supervisors came back together, and Mr. Louderback advised Mr. 
Bertagnolli the belt would not be locked out.  Mr. Bertagnolli stated he would not work 
in the area unless the belt was locked out, and Mr. Louderback told him, if he 
did not do the job, he could be fired.  
Mr. Bertagnolli asked that the union steward be contacted to resolve the 
matter.  Mr. Louderback instructed 
Mr. Westbrook to notify the union steward, and then they both left the 
area.  Mr. Bertagnolli, believing he 
could be fired for refusing to work, started to shovel the ore debris in the 
west end of the shuttle belt area while he waited for the union steward to 
arrive.

            
  

[¶7]      John "Bud" Dolce, 
one of Mr. Bertagnolli's crew mates, walked by the shuttle belt area a couple of 
hours later.  He called to Mr. 
Bertagnolli and told him he was shoveling in "an unsafe area that needed to be 
locked out."  Mr. Bertagnolli told 
Mr. Dolce he had been ordered by Mr. Louderback to do this job and he had 
requested a union steward.  About an 
hour or so later, while Mr. Bertagnolli was working approximately five feet 
behind the rail car, the car started to travel back towards him, and the cable 
beneath his feet began to move.  He 
threw his shovel to the left and tripped when he stepped back to grab his 
wheelbarrow.  He stuck his right 
foot behind him to catch his balance, and his boot caught in the pinch point 
between one of the steel cables and the sheave wheel.  The wheel completely severed the back 
portion of Mr. Bertagnolli's right foot. Over the following three years, Mr. 
Bertagnolli underwent eleven surgeries to repair his foot.  In the end, these efforts were 
unsuccessful, and in October of 1999 his right leg was amputated just below the 
knee.

 

[¶8]      Mr. Bertagnolli 
filed suit against the supervisors under § 27-14-104(a) alleging they willfully, 
wantonly, and intentionally ordered him to work in close proximity to operating 
equipment with known dangers of amputation and death and for refusing to turn 
off the electricity to the equipment after being specifically requested to do 
so.  The supervisors moved for 
summary judgment contending they could not be liable for Mr. Bertagnolli's 
injuries because they did not know the sheave wheel that severed the back 
portion of his foot was unguarded.  
For purposes of the summary judgment, the parties orally stipulated that 
the legal standard for co-employee liability should be based on § 27-14-104(a) 
and the willful and wanton misconduct standard.  In their briefs submitted to this court, 
they agree, under § 27-14-104(a), liability is imposed on co-employees who 
commit intentional acts or willful and wanton misconduct.

 

[¶9]      After the summary 
judgment hearing, the district court granted the supervisors' motion concluding 
Mr. Bertagnolli presented no evidence that they had knowledge prior to his 
accident that the sheave wheel was unguarded.  Consequently, the supervisors could not 
be found to have violated § 27-14-104(a) or the willful and wanton misconduct 
standard and, at most, were negligent.  
This appeal followed. 

 

            

 

[¶10]   When a motion for summary judgment 
is before this court, assuming there is a complete record, we have exactly the 
same duty and materials as did the district court and must follow the same 
standards.  Hoblyn v. 
Johnson, 2002 WY 152, ¶11, 55 P.3d 1219, ¶11 (Wyo. 2002).  The propriety of granting summary 
judgment depends upon the correctness of a court's dual findings that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and the prevailing party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Id. 
 This court looks at the record 
from the viewpoint most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving to 
him all the favorable inferences which may be drawn from the facts contained in 
affidavits, depositions, and other materials appearing in the record.  Id.

 

[¶11]   The party moving for summary 
judgment bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for a 
summary judgment.  If the movant 
carries this burden, the party opposing the summary judgment must come forward 
with specific facts to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact does 
exist.  Eklund v. PRI 
Environmental, Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶10, 25 P.3d 511, ¶10 (Wyo. 2001).  A material fact has been defined as a 
fact upon which the outcome of the litigation depends in whole or in part.  Hoblyn, 2002 WY 152, 
¶11.

 

 

 

A.        
Co-employee Liability

 

[¶12]   In order to determine whether a 
disputed issue of material fact existed in this case, we must first clarify the 
standard for co-employee liability against which the evidence is to be 
measured.  Wyoming's co-employee 
liability law under the worker's compensation statutes has evolved over the past 
several decades.  This court's 
discussion in Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 52 (Wyo. 1992), includes a 
concise review of the relevant historical developments.  The Wyoming Constitution provides 
employers who contribute to the worker's compensation fund immunity from 
liability for employees injured on the job.  Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 
4.

 

[¶13]   However, in 1974, this court 
recognized and adopted the common law doctrine that co-employees could be liable 
when their own negligence caused injury to other employees.  Markle v. Williamson, 518 P.2d 621, 624 (Wyo. 1974).  In 1975, the 
legislature provided co-employees immunity when they were "acting within the 
scope of their employment unless the employees [were] grossly negligent."  1975 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 149, § 1 (§ 
27-312(a)).  Shortly thereafter, the 
legislature substituted the words "culpably negligent" for "grossly 
negligent."  1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 
ch. 142, § 1 (§ 27-312(a) (renumbered § 27-12-103(a)).  In interpreting these provisions, this 
court determined the legislature's qualified grant of co-employee immunity, 
excepting circumstances of culpable negligence, was constitutional and did not 
violate Article 10, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution because the amount of 
damages recoverable was not limited.  
Instead, the statute limited only the causes of action available for 
recovery.  Meyer v. Kendig, 
641 P.2d 1235 (Wyo. 1982).

 

[¶14]   In 1986, the legislature repealed § 
27-12-103(a) and recreated it as § 27-14-104(a) to provide for total immunity of 
co-employees.  1986 Wyo. Sp. Sess. 
Laws ch. 3, § 3.1  In Mills, we held § 27-14-104(a) 
unconstitutional as it violated the equal protection clause of Article 3, 
Section 27 of the Wyoming Constitution by treating similarly situated people 
differently and violated Article 1, Section 8 of the Wyoming Constitution by 
denying access to courts when it granted co-employees complete immunity from 
suits, including immunity for intentional acts and for willful and wanton 
misconduct.  Mills, 
837 P.2d  at 49, 54.  In 
reaching this conclusion, we stated:

 

[W]e 
do not perceive that complete immunity for co-employees who were acting within 
the scope of their employment was the least onerous means by which the objective 
of the Act could be achieved.  
Section 27-14-104(a) precluded employees from bringing suit against 
co-employees who committed intentional torts while they were acting within the 
scope of their employment.  In 
essence, that provision permits an employee to intentionally harm a co-employee 
without being concerned about civil liability.  While such immunity may slightly 
decrease the number of lawsuits filed by employees and increase the number of 
employees who will be guaranteed compensation, it severely burdens the State's 
undeniable interest in prohibiting an individual from committing an intentional 
tort without the possibility of liability.  
Harmony in the work place may actually be enhanced if an employee knows 
that the worker next to him will be legally accountable for some of his actions, 
and, even though the parties have not presented facts concerning insurance costs 
and the financial status of the worker's compensation fund, we would be hard 
pressed to hold that those objectives could be attained only under a scheme 
which provided complete immunity to employees.

 

In 
summary, the legislature's grant of complete immunity to co-employees, which 
includes immunity for intentional acts and for willful and wanton misconduct, 
infringed upon the fundamental right to access to the courts.  Such an infringement triggers 
application of the strict scrutiny test.  
Under that test, we are unable to identify a compelling state interest 
which would permit complete immunity for co-employees.

 

Id. 
at 
55 (citations & footnote omitted).

 

[¶15]   In response to the Mills 
decision, the legislature amended the co-employee liability statute in 1993. 
This version of the statute was in effect on the date of Mr. Bertagnolli's 
accident and remains so today:

 

(a) 
The rights and remedies provided in this act for an employee including any joint 
employee, and his dependents for injuries incurred in extrahazardous employments 
are in lieu of all other rights and remedies against any employer and any joint 
employer making contributions required by this act, or their employees acting 
within the scope of their employment unless the employees intentionally 
act to cause physical harm or injury to the injured employee, but do not 
supersede any rights and remedies available to an employee and his dependents 
against any other person.     

 

Section 
27-14-104(a) (emphasis added); see also 1993 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 47, § 
1.  Since its passage, we have 
referenced this version of the statute as it relates to the interpretation of 
the phrase "intentionally act to cause physical harm or injury" on only one 
occasion, in Harbel v. Wintermute, 883 P.2d 359 (Wyo. 1994), and 
stated:

 

The 
exclusive remedy provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act do not provide 
immunity to a co-employee who commits intentional acts or willful and wanton 
misconduct.  Mills v. 
Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 55 (Wyo. 1992).  
See Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-104(a) (permitting co-employee tort action 
when "employees intentionally act to cause physical harm or injury to the 
injured employee . . . .").  Therefore, under the Worker's 
Compensation Act, [the employee] was permitted to sue [the co-employees] to 
recover damages for personal injury suffered in a work-related accident that 
allegedly resulted from the culpable negligence of his co-employees.  Copp v. Redmond, 858 P.2d 1125, 
1126-27 (Wyo. 1993) (holding that for claims accruing between July 1, 1987 and 
February 18, 1993, proof of culpable negligence was required for co-employee 
tort action).  See Wyo. Stat. 
§ 27-12-103(a) (1983) (repealed 1986) (establishing culpable negligence as 
standard of negligence for co-employee litigation under Worker's Compensation 
Act).  

 

883 P.2d  at 363 (emphasis added).2  This discussion implies that the amended 
standard of "intentionally act to cause physical harm or injury" equates to 
willful and wanton misconduct.  We 
continue to believe the concept of willful and wanton misconduct has essentially 
the same legal effect as the statutory language "intentionally act to cause 
physical harm or injury."  Well 
before the 1993 amendment to § 27-14-104(a), this court expressly defined 
willful and wanton misconduct in terms of intentional 
actions:

 

Willful 
and wanton misconduct is the intentional doing of an act, or an 
intentional failure to do an act, in reckless disregard of the 
consequences and under circumstances and conditions that a reasonable person 
would know, or have reason to know that such conduct would, in a high degree of 
probability, result in harm to another.

 

Weaver 
v. Mitchell, 
715 P.2d 1361, 1370 (Wyo. 1986) (emphasis added); see also Mayflower 
Restaurant Company v. Griego, 741 P.2d 1106, 1115 (Wyo. 1987).  In addition, one of the bases of the 
Mills decision was the conclusion that allowing immunity for intentional 
acts and willful and wanton behavior violated the constitution, and the 
legislature's response to that decision was the adoption of the statute granting 
immunity except for intentional acts.  
Mills, 837 P.2d  at 55.  
Our conclusion that the statutory grant of immunity covers all but 
intentional acts and willful and wanton misconduct is consistent with the 
parameters of statutory construction:

 

"All 
statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of 
the existing state of law with reference thereto and statutes are therefore to 
be construed in harmony with the existing law, and as a part of an overall and 
uniform system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect is to be 
determined in connection, not only with the common law and the constitution, but 
also with reference to the decisions of the courts."

 

Fosler 
v. Collins, 
13 P.3d 686, 689 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Voss v. Ralston, 550 P.2d 481, 486 (Wyo. 
1976)); see also Andersen, 2002 WY 105, ¶22.

 

[¶16]   Mr. Bertagnolli argues the key 
factors in finding co-employee liability under § 27-14-104(a) are a co-employee 
with (1) knowledge of the hazard or serious nature of the risk involved, (2) 
responsibility for the injured employee's safety and work conditions, and (3) 
willful disregard of the need to act despite the awareness of the high 
probability that serious injury or death may result.  Our jurisprudence in this area is 
consistent with these factors.  In 
Calkins v. Boydston, 796 P.2d 452 (Wyo. 1990), we held the injured 
employee must demonstrate his co-employees had actual knowledge of the dangerous 
condition which caused his injury.  
Mr. Calkins worked for an oil well service company and was injured when 
his leg got caught in the unguarded drive shaft of a pump truck.  He sued the company secretary-treasurer, 
Marinell Boydston, and her son Gerald Boydston, the president of the 
company.  The evidence demonstrated 
Mr. Calkins had used the pump truck in the past and had informed the Boydstons 
that the pump needed to be replaced.  
However, he provided no evidence the Boydstons knew the drive shaft was 
unguarded or the pump was dangerous; therefore, summary judgment was 
proper.

 

[¶17]   In Smith v. Throckmartin, 
893 P.2d 712 (Wyo. 1995), this court emphasized that the co-employee's actions 
must be willful and not merely inadvertent in nature.  In that case, Mr. Throckmartin was Mr. 
Smith's supervisor, and, on the day of the accident, they were working together 
loading sand into a truck.  Mr. 
Throckmartin operated a backhoe while Mr. Smith tamped and broke up clumps of 
sand in the truck bed with a metal bar.  
By Mr. Smith's own admission, Mr. Throckmartin hit the metal bar with the 
backhoe bucket by mistake causing Mr. Smith to fall from the truck bed and incur 
serious head and spinal injuries.  
This court again required the plaintiff to provide evidence the 
co-employee acted with a state of mind approaching intent to do harm or 
committed an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of known or obvious 
risks so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.  893 P.2d  at 714.  Inferences from evidence of violations 
of safety regulations were found insufficient to raise genuine issues of 
material fact regarding the co-employee's knowledge of the nature of the risks, 
particularly when uncontroverted evidence that the co-employee lacked such 
knowledge was presented.  See 
also McKennan v. Newman, 902 P.2d 1285, 1287-88 (Wyo. 1995); Poulos v. 
HPC, Inc., 765 P.2d 364, 366 (Wyo. 1988).  

 

[¶18]   In Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188 (Wyo. 1989), we reversed summary judgment in favor of certain 
co-employees, and the underlying facts are similar to those alleged by Mr. 
Bertagnolli.  The plaintiff 
provided evidence that responsible supervisors were apprised of the dangerous 
condition, failed to take reasonable steps to remedy the dangerous condition, 
and overtly threatened to fire the reporting employee who was ultimately 
injured.  While working at a coal 
mine, Mr. Case slipped on a hidden grease spot and fell onto the metal surface 
of the boom point sheave area of a dragline.  We found evidence was provided that four 
co-employees had varying degrees of direct supervisory responsibility for Mr. 
Case's safety and working conditions, had been made aware of the dangerous 
condition, had refused to clean or allow Mr. Case to clean or lock out the area 
to lessen the danger posed, and had threatened to terminate his employment if he 
did not do the work as instructed.

 

[¶19]   In each of these cases, we 
consistently held the requirements of the statute and the standards of willful 
and wanton misconduct were met when the evidence demonstrated the co-employee 
had knowledge of the dangerous condition and demonstrated a disregard of the 
risks through intentional acts.  
With this standard in mind, we now must review the evidence submitted by 
Mr. Bertagnolli to determine whether it was sufficient to create a genuine issue 
of material fact with regard to the supervisors' knowledge of the dangerous 
condition and whether they acted intentionally in disregard of known 
risks.

 

 

[¶20]   Upon review of the order granting 
summary judgment and the supporting opinion letter, it is evident the district 
court believed the only issue before it was the narrow question of whether the 
supervisors knew of the unguarded sheave wheel and the danger it presented.  In truth, the issues presented by Mr. 
Bertagnolli in his complaint were much broader than simply the danger posed by 
the unguarded sheave wheel and, instead, included the well-known dangers 
associated with the larger apparatus, the shuttle belt, especially when 
employees were required to work in close proximity to the machine while it was 
energized and operational.  

 

[¶21]   The broad nature of Mr. 
Bertagnolli's negligence claim is also clear from the affidavits, deposition 
excerpts, and exhibits submitted in response to the supervisors' summary 
judgment motion which demonstrate a much more pervasive safety risk than just 
the unguarded sheave wheel.  Mr. 
Bertagnolli testified in his affidavit that, on the day he was injured, he 
specifically asked Mr. Westbrook to lock out the shuttle belt.  Mr. Westbrook reportedly asked Mr. 
Louderback whether the machine should be locked out while Mr. Bertagnolli worked 
in the west end shoveling debris.  
Mr. Louderback allegedly told Mr. Bertagnolli he would not allow the 
shuttle belt to be locked out, and Mr. Bertagnolli responded he would not work 
in the shuttle belt area unless the equipment was locked out because moving 
belts are extremely dangerous and he did not want to be exposed to this kind of 
danger.  Mr. Louderback purportedly 
threatened to fire Mr. Bertagnolli.  
Mr. Bertagnolli testified he requested the union steward be called 
because he believed the steward could determine whether his safety concerns were 
justified and require the shuttle belt be locked out.  However, Mr. Bertagnolli also alleged he 
thought, while waiting for the steward's arrival, he was required to perform the 
assigned task or risk losing his job.  
Mr. Bertagnolli's affidavit also states he attended safety meetings where 
the supervisors were present and the lockout policy was discussed.  He learned at those meetings the mine 
policy provided the equipment had to be locked out whenever anyone was required 
to work around a moving belt or other moving piece of 
equipment.

 

[¶22]   Dean Wehr, a mine employee until 
1996 and supervisor of mine maintenance from 1989 to 1994, explained in his 
affidavit that the shuttle belt operator controls movement of the shuttle belt 
from a level below where the machine is located and, while operating the 
machine, cannot see the shuttle belt area where Mr. Bertagnolli was 
working.  His affidavit also 
stated:

 

18.  . . . [T]he 
policy, practice and custom at this mine, including on November 13, 1996, 
[understood by every worker and supervisor] was that no worker was allowed to 
perform maintenance on . . . any parts of the Shuttle Belt unless it 
was locked out [because t]o do otherwise would have been a violation of the 
safety rules at the mine, a gross violation of long-standing custom and 
practice, and could expose workers to a high degree of probability of being 
severely injured or killed.

 

. . . .

 

20. 
 The only time workers were allowed into the area of the Shuttle Belt was 
when it was locked out. . . . With the equipment not in 
operation, the extreme risk of severe injury or death . . . was 
reduced and workers were allowed to perform maintenance and cleaning in the 
area. 

 

            
. . . .

 

22.  The 
shift supervisor and section foreman, among others, have the direct 
responsibility of enforcing the policies, practices and customs of the mine 
regarding miner safety.  They have 
the direct responsibility . . . to make certain that none of their 
workers are working in the west end, or unprotected end, of the loadout area of 
the mine, or around the Shuttle Belt, unless the Shuttle Belt has been locked 
out. . . . This responsibility existed through my years at the 
General Chemical mine.

 

 [¶23]  Mr. Dolce, a co-worker and crew mate on 
the night of the accident, signed an affidavit swearing he saw Mr. Bertagnolli 
shoveling in the west end of the shuttle belt area, he yelled to him he was in 
an unsafe area that needed to be locked out, and Mr. Bertagnolli responded that 
Mr. Louderback had ordered him to do the work and he had requested a union 
steward.  Mr. Dolce told Mr. 
Bertagnolli that he would have refused to do the work.  Mr. Dolce's affidavit also states he 
attended meetings where the supervisors were present when the lockout policy was 
discussed and he learned the safety policy required the shuttle belt be locked 
out whenever workers were in the unprotected west end. 

 

[¶24]   In the supervisors' depositions, 
they both, albeit reluctantly, acknowledged the extremely hazardous nature of 
work done in and around the energized shuttle belt and their awareness of 
numerous ways a worker could be injured through amputation of body parts or even 
loss of life.  However, they denied 
knowing the sheave wheel, which severed Mr. Bertagnolli's foot, was 
unguarded.  They also denied they 
had knowledge of any company policy requiring the shuttle belt to be locked out 
under the circumstances which existed on the night of the accident, Mr. 
Bertagnolli requested a union steward, or they threatened to terminate his 
employment if he did not work as instructed.

 

[¶25]   The supervisors argued Mr. 
Bertagnolli offered no evidence they had actual knowledge of the dangerous 
condition and presented only mere inferences drawn from alleged violations of 
safety policies and practices which were insufficient to create a material issue 
of fact in the face of their testimony they had no such knowledge. 
Smith, 893 P.2d 712. This argument fails to persuade us.  It is directed at the narrow issue of 
the unguarded sheave wheel and ignores evidence of the general risks of working 
in the area of the shuttle belt.  
The supervisors' testimony could be interpreted by the fact-finder as 
proving they knew of the broader dangers of the shuttle belt area.  Mr. Bertagnolli is entitled to have a 
jury determine whether that evidence, together with the evidence presented with 
regard to their intentional acts, demonstrates the supervisors "intentionally 
act(ed) to cause physical harm or injury" and their actions constituted 
willful and wanton misconduct.  

 

[¶26]   We conclude the district court 
viewed the issues too narrowly and failed to address the evidence which created 
questions of fact concerning the supervisors' knowledge of the general risks 
posed by the shuttle belt.  With 
this larger question in mind, we find multiple issues of material fact existed 
which require resolution by the fact-finder before judgment can be properly 
rendered in this matter.  
Case, 776 P.2d 188.  
Consequently, the co-employee supervisors were not entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.  

 

[¶27]   Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 

FOOTNOTES

1Section 
27-14-104(a) (emphasis added) as recreated in 1986 read as 
follows:

 

(a)  The 
rights and remedies provided in this act for an employee and his dependents for 
injuries incurred in extrahazardous employments are in lieu of all other rights 
and remedies against any employer making contributions required by this act, 
or his employees acting within the scope of their employment, but 
do not supersede any rights and remedies available to an employee and his 
dependents against any other person. 

 

 

2This case went on to hold the claim was precluded because the employee 
failed to comply with the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, a separate statutory 
provision having no application to Mr. Bertagnolli's 
claim.