Case Title: Sievers v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC20-225

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2022-11-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC20-225 
____________ 
 
MARK D. SIEVERS, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
November 17, 2022 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Mark D. Sievers appeals his first-degree murder conviction 
and corresponding death sentence, as well as his conviction for 
conspiracy to commit murder.1  We affirm in all respects. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Guilt Phase 
On June 28, 2015, Dr. Teresa Sievers left a family vacation 
and returned alone to her Bonita Springs home.  After pulling into 
the garage, she retrieved her luggage and walked into the house.  
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
 
 
 
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Unbeknownst to Dr. Sievers, Curtis Wayne Wright, Jr., and Jimmy 
Ray Rodgers were waiting inside to carry out the murder that her 
husband—defendant Mark D. Sievers—had hired them to perform.  
When Dr. Sievers entered the kitchen, Wright and Rodgers beat her 
in the head with hammers until she died. 
The murder marked the culmination of a plot that began 
weeks earlier, when Sievers traveled to Missouri for Wright’s May 
2015 wedding.  Over the course of several conversations during the 
wedding weekend, Sievers asked his longtime friend Wright to 
murder Dr. Sievers as soon as possible.  Initially uncertain, Wright 
eventually agreed to “take care of it” for at least $100,000 in life 
insurance proceeds. 
Wright then recruited Rodgers by promising him part of the 
life insurance money.  In his trial testimony, Wright explained that 
Rodgers had “been involved in other deaths” and characterized him 
as “somebody that would actually do it.”  Throughout the planning, 
only Wright communicated with Rodgers; Sievers had explicitly told 
Wright that he did not want to know the identity of any accomplice 
Wright might hire.  Sievers and Wright themselves used prepaid cell 
phones for their calls about the plot, thinking those phones were 
 
 
 
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safer and more secure than their regular phones.  Phone records 
showed that their prepaid phones became active only after they 
exchanged a code word on their regular lines. 
Sievers envisioned two possible scenarios for the murder: June 
28 at the Sieverses’ home (to look like a burglary) or June 29 at 
Dr. Sievers’ medical office (to look like a mugging).  Sievers knew his 
wife was set to return home alone from a family vacation on June 
28.  He had booked her return flight, and he wanted to ensure that 
he and their daughters would not be in town at the time of the 
killing. 
Sievers prepared in depth for each scenario.  For the home 
murder plan, Sievers tested going over the backyard fence, and he 
trimmed bushes in the yard to carve out a path to the garage.  He 
also told Wright how to enter the house and disarm the security 
system.  For the office murder plan, Sievers sent Wright aerial 
photographs of the building, identifying a secluded stairwell that 
Dr. Sievers used when she left work late at night.  He also gave 
Wright the stairway access code.  Sievers told Wright that, 
regardless of where the murder took place, it should appear to have 
been committed incident to a burglary or robbery. 
 
 
 
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Wright and Rodgers left Missouri on June 27, equipped with 
detailed instructions and money from Sievers.  They arrived in 
Bonita Springs, Lee County, Florida, early the next morning.  
Wright and Rodgers first stopped at the Sieverses’ home and left 
after a brief visit.  Then they drove past Dr. Sievers’ medical 
practice to evaluate its potential as a murder location, but they 
eliminated that option after feeling too exposed on the property.  For 
the remainder of the day, they napped in their rental car, shopped 
at Walmart, and spent time at the beach.   
Around 10:30 p.m., Wright and Rodgers returned to the 
Sieverses’ residence.  They put on coveralls and gloves and “pried 
open” the already unlocked side door to mimic a burglary.  Thinking 
Dr. Sievers would arrive at midnight, Wright was taken aback when 
he heard the garage door roll up shortly before 11:25 p.m.  Wright 
scrambled to conceal himself in the garage as he watched 
Dr. Sievers park the car, retrieve her luggage, and enter the house.  
Wright then followed her, picking up a hammer that was lying on 
the garage freezer on his way inside.   
As he walked into the kitchen, Wright stumbled on a dog dish, 
startling Dr. Sievers, who turned toward Wright at the noise.  
 
 
 
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Wright struck her head once and swung two more times while she 
put up her hands to defend herself.  At this point, Rodgers began to 
attack her, too.  Using a different hammer, Rodgers bludgeoned her 
in the head over and over.  Eventually, Dr. Sievers went silent as 
she fell to the floor, where Rodgers continued to hit her until Wright 
made him stop.  Certain that Dr. Sievers was dead, Wright and 
Rodgers left the house and drove back to Missouri.   
While Wright and Rodgers were carrying out the murder, 
Sievers was still at his mother-in-law’s home in Connecticut, on 
vacation with his two daughters.  Earlier that day, Sievers out of the 
blue called Dr. Mark Petrites, a family friend, to “check in” and 
inform him of Dr. Sievers’ travel plans.  The next morning, on June 
29, Sievers heard from Dr. Sievers’ office that she did not show up 
for work.  Sievers again called Dr. Petrites and asked him to stop by 
the house to check on his wife.  Dr. Petrites found it odd that 
Sievers gave him the garage code and instructed Dr. Petrites to just 
walk in, rather than first knock on the front door.  When he entered 
the Sieverses’ home, Dr. Petrites found Dr. Sievers face down on the 
kitchen floor in a pool of blood. 
 
 
 
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The first break in the subsequent police investigation came 
two weeks later.  Law enforcement in Illinois called lead detective 
David Lebid with the news that someone had come forward with 
information potentially related to the murder.  Lebid traveled to 
Illinois to conduct an in-person interview of the informant, and, 
from that interview, Wright emerged as a suspect.   
Eventually, police obtained a warrant to search Wright’s house 
in Missouri.  There, they seized Wright’s cell phone and the GPS 
used on the trip to Florida, which in turn linked Wright to Rodgers.  
While detectives executed a search warrant at Rodgers’ residence in 
Missouri, Rodgers’ girlfriend, Taylor Shomaker, led authorities to 
evidence connecting Rodgers to the crime, including the backpack, 
shoes, shirts, and beverage cooler that had been purchased at a Lee 
County Walmart on the day of the murder.  Shomaker also brought 
detectives to the sites where she and Rodgers had discarded the 
coveralls worn during the murder and pieces of Rodgers’ 
deconstructed prepaid cell phone.  Wright and Rodgers were then 
arrested, interrogated, and charged.   
Wright initially denied involvement in the murder.  But he 
later confessed, implicated Sievers in the crime, and agreed to a 
 
 
 
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plea deal.  Sievers himself was indicted in May 2016 for first-degree 
murder and conspiracy to commit murder.   
At trial, the State proved its case principally through Wright’s 
testimony; Rodgers did not testify.  The State corroborated Wright’s 
account with cell phone, GPS, and video surveillance records that 
documented both Sievers’ painstaking planning and Wright’s 
locations in the weeks before and immediately after the murder.  
The State presented the backpack, shoes, shirts, and beverage 
cooler that were purchased in Lee County on the day of the murder 
and later found in Rodgers’ Missouri home.  The State also 
introduced fibers from Rodgers’ discarded coveralls worn during the 
murder that were found on Dr. Sievers’ corpse and in the rental car.  
Dr. Thomas Coyne, the Lee County medical examiner, testified 
about the autopsy he performed on Dr. Sievers.  He determined that 
she died from blunt head trauma from multiple impact wounds to 
the back of the skull that were consistent in size with the head of a 
hammer. 
Sievers did not testify at trial.  His defense counsel argued in 
closing that there was no credible evidence connecting Sievers to 
the crime.  According to defense counsel, the State had done 
 
 
 
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nothing more than prove that Wright and Rodgers—not Sievers—
murdered Dr. Sievers.  The defense focused on Wright’s asserted 
lack of credibility, highlighting his bipolar disorder, his status as a 
five-time felon, and his admitted lies during the investigation.  The 
defense theorized that Wright, hoping to protect his wife from being 
prosecuted for tampering in the murder investigation, was simply 
parroting a narrative that had been fed to him by the State.   
On December 4, 2019, the jury found Sievers guilty of first-
degree premeditated murder and conspiracy to commit murder.  
Penalty Phase 
The same jury returned a week later for the penalty phase.  
The State presented victim impact evidence but otherwise relied on 
evidence from the trial.  Sievers presented mitigating evidence 
through several relatives, all of whom testified to his loving 
relationship with his family, especially with his daughters. 
The State sought to prove two aggravators: murder committed 
in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner with no pretense of 
moral or legal justification; and murder committed for pecuniary 
gain.  The jury unanimously found the CCP aggravator but not the 
pecuniary gain aggravator.  On the verdict form, it checked that no 
 
 
 
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mitigating circumstances had been proven, even though Sievers’ 
lack of criminal history had been conceded by the State.  The jury 
unanimously recommended a death sentence.   
Spencer Hearing and Sentencing 
The trial court held a Spencer2 hearing on January 3, 2020.  
Sievers entered his clean disciplinary record from the Lee County 
Sheriff’s Office, a postcard from his daughter, and a letter that had 
been written before the murder by Dr. Petrites’ wife, expressing her 
affection for the Sievers family.  The court noted for the record that 
Sievers’ daughters did not want him to die.  Sievers himself made a 
statement to the court.  He denied involvement in the murder, said 
he loved Dr. Sievers and their two daughters, and asked to be 
spared from the death penalty.  The State introduced an additional 
victim impact statement.   
After a thirty-minute recess, the trial court sentenced Sievers 
to death for the murder conviction and to a consecutive thirty-year 
prison sentence for the conspiracy conviction.  The court gave great 
weight to the jury’s recommendation in favor of a death sentence.  It 
 
 
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
 
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found the CCP aggravator (but not the pecuniary gain aggravator) 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt and gave it great weight.  The 
court found the following mitigating circumstances had been 
established, but gave them little weight: that Sievers had no prior 
criminal history; that he had a loving and supportive relationship 
with his family; that his family would be negatively affected if he 
were to be executed; and that he had engaged in charitable 
activities that benefited the community.  The court found that the 
mitigating effect of Sievers’ positive relationship with his family was 
undercut by his decision to procure the murder of his daughters’ 
mother.  Finally, the court found that the evidence did not support 
Sievers’ requested statutory mitigator for capital felony accomplices 
whose participation was “relatively minor.” 
This direct appeal followed.   
ANALYSIS 
Sievers raises myriad challenges to his convictions and death 
sentence, none of them meritorious.  We will address Sievers’ claims 
in the order presented in his opening brief.   
 
 
 
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Guilt Phase Challenges 
Issues I through III: Polygraph-Related Claims.  A principal 
theme of Sievers’ closing argument was that the State had not 
subjected Wright to a polygraph examination, even though Wright’s 
plea agreement gave the State the option to do so.  Sievers’ counsel 
ended closing argument by telling the jury:  “When you weigh the 
evidence and you look at all these facts, ultimately, the one 
question you all have to ask yourselves:  Do you trust Curtis Wayne 
Wright?  And would you feel different if a polygraph had been 
administered?”  After defense counsel finished, and outside the 
presence of the jury, the State argued that this reference to a 
polygraph was improper.  Ultimately, the State persuaded the trial 
court to instruct the jury as follows:  “If Mr. Wright had actually 
taken a polygraph, those results, if they were—if he passed, would 
not have been admissible during this trial.”  The State then 
proceeded to give its rebuttal.  
Sievers now argues that the trial court’s instruction misstated 
the law, that it amounted to a comment to the jury on the 
evidentiary weight of the State’s decision not to give Wright a 
 
 
 
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polygraph exam, and that it indirectly commented on Wright’s 
credibility.  We disagree. 
As to the first point, Sievers forfeited any challenge to the 
substance of the trial court’s instruction.  During the parties’ 
discussion of this issue with the trial court, defense counsel did not 
contest the instruction’s content.  Instead, counsel told the trial 
court that the State, rather than the court itself, should raise the 
admissibility issue with the jury in the form of an argument.   
Nor is there merit to Sievers’ claim that the trial court’s 
instruction amounted to a comment on the evidence or on Wright’s 
credibility.  The jury could reasonably have taken defense counsel’s 
closing argument to imply that the jury would have known the 
results of any polygraph exam administered to Wright.  Against that 
backdrop, it was not error for the trial court to issue a clarifying 
instruction.  Importantly, the trial court gave Sievers free rein to 
argue to the jury that the decision not to subject Wright to a 
polygraph showed the State’s unwillingness to find the truth. 
Sievers next maintains that the State, in rebuttal, falsely 
suggested that Wright would be administered a polygraph exam 
sometime between the end of trial and Wright’s sentencing.  The 
 
 
 
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record does not support this claim.  It is true that the State’s 
rebuttal told the jury that Wright remained obligated to take a 
polygraph at the State’s request, but the argument did not imply 
that the State necessarily would avail itself of that option. 
Sievers’ final polygraph-related claim has to do with the 
testimony of lead detective Lebid.  Lebid interviewed Wright in July 
and August 2015, and he was present for Wright’s proffer in 
January 2016 and sworn statement in February 2016.  On cross-
examination, Lebid acknowledged that the State had not given 
Wright a polygraph exam, even though Lebid knew that Wright lied 
in the 2015 interviews and at the beginning of the January 2016 
proffer.  On redirect and over defense counsel’s objection, the 
prosecution rhetorically asked Lebid if he needed a “lie detector 
machine” to tell him when Wright was lying—to which Lebid 
answered “no.”  Sievers now argues that these questions and 
answers implied that Lebid had a “natural ability” to detect Wright’s 
truthfulness and thus improperly bolstered Wright’s credibility. 
The record does not support Sievers’ argument.  It was defense 
counsel, during Lebid’s cross-examination, who first juxtaposed 
Wright’s undisputed lies with the State’s failure to administer a 
 
 
 
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polygraph exam.  In response, the State on redirect elicited 
testimony that, at the time of Wright’s summer 2015 interviews, 
Lebid was already aware of evidence (e.g., surveillance videos from a 
Walmart in Florida) that directly exposed Wright’s lies.  Read in its 
entirety, the thrust of the testimony on redirect was not that Lebid 
had an intuitive sense of Wright’s credibility, but rather that other 
evidence available to Lebid showed when Wright was lying.  We 
conclude that no improper bolstering occurred. 
Issue IV: Wright’s Reference to Prayer.  On direct examination, 
Wright acknowledged that he lied at the outset of his January 2016 
proffer meeting when he said that he had stayed outside the 
Sieverses’ home while Rodgers alone carried out the killing.  Wright 
explained the lie by testifying that he had “struggled with [his] own 
personal involvement in it, the physical part of it.”  But then he said 
this about his decision to tell the truth:  “I just couldn’t quite let go 
of all that.  And I took a break.  I talked to my attorney.  I prayed.”  
Defense counsel objected, arguing that Wright’s reference to having 
prayed violated section 90.611, Florida Statutes (2019).  Sievers 
now argues that this alleged violation appealed to “religious bias” 
and improperly bolstered Wright’s credibility. 
 
 
 
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We find no violation of section 90.611.  That law says:  
“Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of 
religion is inadmissible to show that the witness’s credibility is 
impaired or enhanced thereby.”  Here, Wright made a fleeting 
reference to prayer and explicitly equated it with talking to his 
attorney and taking a break.  The prosecution neither solicited 
Wright’s prayer reference nor mentioned it again.  Sievers’ argument 
lacks merit. 
Issue V: Wright’s February 2016 Meeting with the State.  After 
the January 2016 proffer, Wright again met with the State on 
February 19, 2016.  The latter meeting proceeded in two parts.  
First, Wright discussed a plea agreement and agreed to cooperate 
with the State.  Second, Wright made a sworn statement about the 
murder.  
Part of the discussion at the February meeting focused on 
Wright’s wife, Angela.  The prosecutor told Wright that the 
authorities were aware that Mrs. Wright had asked potential 
witnesses in the investigation to change their statements.  In that 
context, the prosecutor referred to Wright’s wife as a “blip on [his] 
radar screen” that he wanted “to go away.”  But the prosecutor 
 
 
 
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explained that the plea agreement would not protect Wright’s wife 
and that she would be prosecuted if the investigation revealed her 
involvement in the murder.  Wright acknowledged that he 
understood and assented to the plea agreement.  He then gave his 
sworn statement.   
At trial, after the State rested its case-in-chief, Sievers recalled 
Lebid for the purpose of introducing into evidence the video of the 
“blip” discussion at the February 2016 meeting.  The State objected, 
arguing that the disputed video footage was hearsay, that any 
introduction of the video needed to occur during Sievers’ cross-
examination of Wright or Lebid, and that the video evidence would 
be cumulative in light of Wright’s and Lebid’s testimony on direct 
and cross-examination.  Sievers countered that it was admissible 
because the State had opened the door by asking Wright about his 
truthfulness in its case-in-chief and because the video would show 
Wright’s bias to protect his wife.  The trial court excluded the video.   
Sievers argues on appeal that the trial court erred by 
excluding the video footage, but we disagree.  Regardless of the 
merits of the State’s hearsay objection or of the State’s objection to 
the timing of Sievers’ attempt to introduce the footage, we conclude 
 
 
 
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that the video evidence was cumulative and therefore properly 
excluded.  See § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (2019) (“Relevant evidence is 
inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the 
jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”); Gutierrez v. 
Vargas, 239 So. 3d 615, 625 (Fla. 2018) (“Courts should exercise 
their discretion to avoid the needless waste of time through 
unnecessary presentation of cumulative evidence.”). 
The record shows that Sievers questioned both Lebid and 
Wright about the February 2016 meeting.  During Wright’s cross-
examination, defense counsel explicitly broached the “blip” 
discussion that Sievers sought to introduce via the video:  
DEFENSE: You had some concerns that Ms. Wright may 
be charged in some capacity for this; is that correct? 
WRIGHT: I had concerns that she was going to get—yeah. 
DEFENSE: Yes. 
WRIGHT: Yeah, I don’t know about a charge, but yeah. 
DEFENSE: And do you recall that Mr. Hunter said that 
Angie is a blip that will go away?  Do you recall Mr. 
Hunter saying that? 
WRIGHT: Yeah. 
. . . 
DEFENSE: That made you feel better about giving your 
testimony, protecting your wife, correct? 
WRIGHT: Not about giving my testimony, but . . . 
DEFENSE: You love your wife, correct? 
WRIGHT: I do. 
 
 
 
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DEFENSE: You want to protect your wife, correct? 
WRIGHT: I do. 
DEFENSE: And so if you can make sure that she is 
insulated from prosecution, that’s something you want, 
isn’t it? 
WRIGHT: Yeah, when she’s innocent. 
On recross, defense counsel again asked if Wright remembered 
the prosecutor calling Mrs. Wright a “blip” and read portions of the 
transcript from the February 2016 meeting.  Counsel even elicited 
Wright’s acknowledgment that he wanted to protect his wife (though 
Wright added that his participation in the plea agreement had 
“nothing to do” with her). 
Likewise, during Lebid’s cross-examination, defense counsel 
asked about Mrs. Wright.  He said: 
DEFENSE: Mr. Hunter asked you about Angela Wright.  
You said there was no evidence to show that Angela 
Wright went to Florida; is that correct? 
LEBID: Correct. 
DEFENSE: Okay.  And you said you could—you could 
affirmatively rule out Angela Wright as a participate—
participant in the murder, correct? 
LEBID: Correct.  
. . . 
DEFENSE: If Ms. Wright helped in the planning, she 
could be charged, correct? 
LEBID: Absolutely. 
DEFENSE: If she helped Mr. Wright avoid detection, she 
could be charged for this, correct? 
LEBID: Absolutely.  
 
 
 
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And even after the trial court ruled to exclude the video, 
counsel questioned Lebid about Mrs. Wright’s involvement in the 
case and how Lebid was able to eliminate her as a suspect. 
Finally, relying on the evidentiary foundation developed during 
trial, defense counsel in closing argument pursued the theme that 
Wright was lying to protect his wife.  Counsel told the jury that Mrs. 
Wright had tampered with witnesses, and he suggested that the 
State could have charged her in connection with the murder.  
Alluding to the prosecutor’s remarks at the February 2016 meeting, 
counsel told the jury:  “And why not prosecute Angie [Wright]?  
Because she’s a blip.  She’s a blip that only Curtis Wright can make 
go away.” 
We note that Sievers does not claim that Wright or Lebid gave 
any trial testimony inconsistent with any statement in the excluded 
video.  On the contrary, their testimony appears to have accurately 
recounted the exchanges at issue.  We find no error in the trial 
court’s decision to exclude this cumulative evidence.   
Issue VI: Sexual Motive.  During Wright’s cross-examination, 
defense counsel inquired whether Lebid had asked Wright about his 
“sexual preference” and about whether Sievers and Wright “had a 
 
 
 
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sexual relationship.”  The trial court sustained the State’s 
relevance-based objections before Wright could answer the 
questions.  In a sidebar, the court explained to counsel:  “It’s not 
relevant at this time, unless someone is going to get up and say 
they had a relationship.  I haven’t heard it, so I don’t see how it’s 
even relevant, and I’m going to sustain the objection.”  Sievers now 
argues that the trial court’s ruling violated Sievers’ confrontation 
rights and deprived him of an opportunity to explore Wright’s 
motives for murdering Dr. Sievers. 
“Limitations on the examination of a particular witness are 
controlled in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial 
court’s ruling in this area will only be reversed if the aggrieved party 
demonstrates an abuse of that discretion.”  Kormondy v. State, 845 
So. 2d 41, 52 (Fla. 2003).  We see no abuse of discretion here.  It 
was reasonable for the trial court, before allowing defense counsel 
to proceed down a tangential and potentially distracting path, to 
determine whether there was any evidence showing a potential 
romantic relationship between Wright and Sievers.  Absent any 
proffer from defense counsel to that effect, the trial court acted 
 
 
 
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within its discretion by sustaining the State’s objection to defense 
counsel’s questioning on this issue. 
Issue VII: Neighbor’s Testimony.  During the State’s case-in-
chief, the jury heard testimony from Kimberly Torres, the Sieverses’ 
next-door neighbor.  Two aspects of Torres’s testimony are at issue 
on appeal.  First, Torres testified about unexpectedly encountering 
Sievers on her backyard lanai several months before the murder.  
Second, Torres recounted an argument she overheard between 
Sievers and Dr. Sievers the month before the murder.  Torres 
testified that Dr. Sievers said, “I’m f-ing tired of this” and “I’m 
leaving,” to which Sievers responded:  “If that’s what you want to 
do, fine, but we’ll see about that.”  Sievers objected at trial to these 
portions of Torres’s testimony.   
Sievers now argues that the trial court should not have 
allowed the testimony about the lanai encounter because it was 
irrelevant, overly prejudicial, and evidence of prior bad acts.  But we 
see no error in the admission of this testimony.  Torres’s testimony 
tended to corroborate Wright’s account that Sievers had actively 
scoped out his home as a possible murder location and investigated 
 
 
 
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jumping over the backyard fence as the best way to access the 
home. 
As to Torres’s testimony about the overheard argument, 
Sievers maintains that the statements Torres attributed to 
Dr. Sievers and him are hearsay and do not fall within any 
exception to the hearsay rule.  The State counters that the 
statements qualify under exceptions for excited utterances and for 
statements of then-existing state of mind.  In particular, the State 
says that Sievers’ “we’ll see about that” comment shows Sievers’ 
state of mind and helps explain his conduct in having his wife 
killed. 
We need not resolve the question whether the disputed 
statements qualified for any hearsay exception or, indeed, whether 
the statements even meet the definition of hearsay; after all, it is 
not obvious that the statements contained assertions that were 
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  Any error in 
admitting Torres’s testimony about the Sievers’ argument was 
harmless because there is no reasonable possibility that such error 
contributed to the conviction.   
 
 
 
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To the extent it relied on Torres’s testimony at all, the State 
focused on the lanai encounter, not the overheard argument.  In 
closing argument, the State emphasized what it called Sievers’ 
“recon mission” to Torres’s backyard.  But the State did not even 
mention the overheard argument.  Nor did the State in closing 
argue to the jury that marital problems explained the murder.  
Instead, the State argued that Dr. Sievers’ substantial life insurance 
gave Sievers a financial motive to commit the crime.  Under these 
circumstances, we believe the State has met its burden to prove 
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.   
Issue VIII: Autopsy Photographs.  Sievers next challenges the 
trial court’s decision to admit eleven autopsy photographs showing 
trauma to Dr. Sievers’ head and body.  The photographs depicted 
injuries to her skull from multiple angles, as well as defensive 
wounds on her body.  Sievers argues that the photos’ prejudicial 
effect substantially outweighed their probative value. 
We find no abuse of discretion in the admission of the autopsy 
photographs here.  In this case, the photographs corroborated 
Wright’s testimony about the murder and assisted the jury in 
understanding the medical examiner’s testimony.   
 
 
 
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Issue IX: Cumulative Error.  Sievers next argues for reversal 
based on cumulative error.  That doctrine applies where multiple 
errors, though individually harmless, combine to deprive the 
defendant of a fair and impartial trial.  McDuffie v. State, 970 So. 2d 
312, 328 (Fla. 2007).  The cumulative error doctrine has no place in 
this case because we have not found multiple errors.  See Fletcher 
v. State, 168 So. 3d 186, 220 (Fla. 2015); Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 
792, 815 (Fla. 2002). 
Issues X and XI: Motions for Judgment of Acquittal.  Sievers 
maintains that the trial court erred in denying his motions for 
judgment of acquittal on the first-degree murder count and on the 
conspiracy count.  We review the denial of a motion for judgment of 
acquittal de novo and uphold convictions supported by competent, 
substantial evidence.  Pagan, 830 So. 2d at 803.  If, after viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier 
of fact could find the existence of the elements of the crime beyond 
a reasonable doubt, sufficient evidence exists to sustain a 
conviction.  Id.  For the reasons we explain, we affirm the trial 
court’s denial of Sievers’ motions for judgment of acquittal on both 
counts. 
 
 
 
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As to the first-degree murder count, the State had to prove 
that Dr. Sievers was dead, that Sievers’ criminal act caused her 
death, and that her death was premeditated.  § 782.04(1)(a), Fla. 
Stat. (2019).  Because Sievers was not present at the murder, the 
jury was instructed on the principal theory of liability.  Under that 
theory, Sievers could be found guilty of first-degree murder if he 
had procured, hired, or aided Dr. Sievers’ killing.  § 777.011, Fla. 
Stat. (2019).   
Wright’s testimony was sufficient to establish every necessary 
element of the crime, and it is not for our Court to determine the 
credibility of that testimony.  Specifically, the jury could conclude 
from Wright’s testimony that Sievers had promised to pay Wright to 
murder Dr. Sievers, that Sievers and Wright carefully planned the 
murder weeks in advance, and that Wright and Rodgers murdered 
Dr. Sievers according to Sievers’ plan.  As we have explained, the 
State corroborated Wright’s testimony with cell phone evidence 
showing their communications leading up to the murder.  The State 
also presented evidence corroborating Wright’s account of his and 
Rodgers’ commission of the crime.  We therefore reject Sievers’ 
claim, and, under our independent obligation to review the 
 
 
 
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sufficiency of the evidence, we conclude that competent, substantial 
evidence supports Sievers’ first-degree murder conviction.  See Fla. 
R. App. P. 9.142(a)(5).   
As to the conspiracy count, Sievers points to the fact that the 
indictment alleged that he conspired with both Wright and Rodgers.  
Sievers claims that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal given 
the undisputed evidence that Sievers never communicated with 
Rodgers about the murder and told Wright that he did not want to 
know the identity of any accomplice.  
Sievers’ argument here misstates the law of conspiracy.  To 
sustain a conspiracy conviction, the government does not need to 
prove that the defendant knew the identity of every other person 
alleged to have been part of the conspiracy.  It is enough that the 
State prove that the alleged co-conspirators shared a common 
purpose to commit the crime.  See Blumenthal v. United States, 332 
U.S. 539, 557 (1947) (“[T]he law rightly gives room for allowing the 
conviction of those [members] discovered upon showing sufficiently 
the essential nature of the plan and their connections with it, 
without requiring evidence of knowledge of all its details or of the 
participation of others.”); Pino v. State, 573 So. 2d 151, 152 (Fla. 3d 
 
 
 
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DCA 1991) (“Moreover, direct proof of the criminal agreement is not 
necessary to establish a conspiracy; the jury may infer from all the 
surrounding circumstances that a common purpose to commit a 
crime existed.”).  Here, Wright’s testimony was sufficient to support 
a jury finding that Sievers, Wright, and Rodgers all were members 
of a single plot to murder Dr. Sievers.   
Penalty Phase Challenges 
Issue XII: Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty.  Section 
782.04(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2016) (effective Mar. 7, 2016), sets 
out certain procedural requirements for death penalty cases.  In 
pertinent part it says: 
If the prosecutor intends to seek the death penalty, the 
prosecutor must give notice to the defendant and file the 
notice with the court within 45 days after arraignment.  
The notice must contain a list of the aggravating factors 
the state intends to prove and has reason to believe it can 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt.  The court may allow 
the prosecutor to amend the notice upon a showing of good 
cause. 
This provision went into effect in March 2016, and the State 
concedes that it applied to Sievers’ prosecution.3   
 
 
3.  Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.181 also governs the 
State’s notice to seek the death penalty, but that rule is 
 
 
 
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Sievers was arraigned on May 9, 2016.  Forty-four days later—
that is, one day before the statutory deadline—the State filed a 
notice of intent to seek the death penalty.  But that notice did not 
list the aggravating factors that the State intended to prove.  The 
omission was inadvertent, as the State appears to have been 
unaware of the then relatively new requirements of section 
782.04(1)(b).  Instead, the State had filed the notice under the 2016 
version of Criminal Procedure Rule 3.202, which pertained to 
discovery in death penalty cases and did not require any 
aggravators to be listed. 
Sievers soon filed a motion to strike the State’s notice.  That 
same day—four days after the expiration of the 45-day deadline—
the State filed an amended, substantively compliant notice that 
listed two aggravating factors.  Sievers responded with a motion to 
strike the State’s amended notice. 
After a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying 
Sievers’ motions to strike.  The court concluded that the State’s 
 
inapplicable here because the Court did not adopt it until months 
later, on September 15, 2016. 
 
 
 
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initial filing, though defective for failing to list aggravators, was 
timely.  And the court further ruled that the State had shown good 
cause for filing an amended, compliant motion—specifically, that 
the delay was “negligible” and that Sievers was not prejudiced.  
Sievers now argues that the trial court’s ruling was in error and 
that the State’s failure to file a timely, compliant notice requires this 
Court to reverse Sievers’ death sentence. 
We affirm, but on grounds independent of the merits of the 
trial court’s good cause determination.  Guided by our Court’s 
analysis in Massey v. State, 609 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1992), the most 
analogous precedent of which we are aware, we conclude that any 
procedural defect here is subject to harmless error analysis. 
In Massey, the state had failed to comply with a statute that 
required notice to be served on the defendant before his sentencing 
as a habitual felony offender.  The defendant argued that the state’s 
procedural misstep required vacatur of his sentence.  Our Court 
disagreed, relying on section 59.041, Florida Statutes (1989).  That 
statute instructs that a reviewing court may not set aside a criminal 
judgment “for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure” 
unless the court determines that “the error complained of has 
 
 
 
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resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”  Our Court’s precedents equate 
this statutory standard with the harmless error test.  See State v. 
Lee, 531 So. 2d 133, 136 n.1 (Fla. 1988).  In Massey, we 
emphasized:  “[T]he issue in this case is not whether Massey must 
show harm in order to assert the lack of notice as error but rather 
whether the state, by affirmatively proving no harm, can bring this 
technical error within the harmless error rule.”  609 So. 2d at 600. 
Here, as in Massey, we are faced with a statute that imposes a 
mandatory claim processing (i.e., nonjurisdictional) rule but does 
not specify a remedy for noncompliance.  Applying the harmless 
error standard of review, we conclude that the State has shown 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Sievers suffered no prejudice from 
any delay in the State’s full compliance with section 782.04(1)(b).  
In Sievers’ case, the State filed a compliant notice within four days 
of the statutory deadline.  At that time, discovery had not 
commenced, and no hearings were scheduled.  Sievers’ trial did not 
begin until three and a half years later, in November 2019.  Given 
these circumstances, we find harmless error and therefore decline 
to vacate Sievers’ death sentence. 
 
 
 
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Issue XIII: Prior Criminal History Mitigator.  On the penalty 
phase verdict form, the jury checked “no” to the statement:  “One or 
more individual jurors find that one or more mitigating 
circumstances was established by the greater weight of the 
evidence.”  The jury did so even though the State, in its penalty 
phase closing argument, twice conceded that Sievers had 
established the statutory mitigator for “no significant history of 
prior criminal activity.”   
Sievers now maintains that the jury’s decision was a reaction 
to a misstatement by the State in that same closing argument.  
During a question-by-question explanation of the penalty phase 
verdict form, the State told the jury:  “So, if one or more individual 
jurors find that one or more mitigating circumstances was 
established by the greater weight of the evidence, check ‘no.’  It was 
not.”  Sievers claims that, through this misstatement, the State 
“persuaded” the jury to reject an “important undisputed” mitigator 
and thereby “corrupted the jury’s decision-making process.” 
Because Sievers did not object to the disputed statement at 
trial, we review this claim for fundamental error.  And we find no 
such error here.  Almost immediately after the statement at issue, 
 
 
 
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in the same closing argument, the State again told the jury that 
Sievers had no prior criminal history.  After the State’s closing, 
defense counsel reminded the jury about the State’s concession.  
And finally, after the parties’ penalty phase closing arguments, the 
trial court instructed the jury on the law of mitigating 
circumstances and accurately explained the penalty phase verdict 
form.  Viewing the relevant record as a whole, we conclude that 
Sievers has fallen far short of the high bar necessary to establish 
fundamental error as to this claim.  Santiago-Gonzalez v. State, 301 
So. 3d 157, 175 (Fla. 2020) (reciting fundamental error standard).  
Issue XIV: Postcard Redaction.  As mitigation, Sievers 
repeatedly emphasized his loving relationship with his family, 
especially his two daughters.  In addition to offering live testimony 
from several relatives, Sievers sought to prove that relationship by 
introducing into evidence a postcard his daughter had sent him 
while he was in custody.  The State objected to the postcard as 
hearsay but agreed to its admission—including a portion of the 
postcard saying “I love you”—subject to redaction of these three 
sentences:  “Is it possible they could kill you?  I really hope NOT.  
Please say no.”  (Emphasis in original.)  The postcard was redacted 
 
 
 
- 33 - 
over Sievers’ objection and admitted into evidence.  Sievers now 
argues that the redaction constituted reversible error. 
Our precedent establishes that, in the penalty phase of a 
capital trial, both the State and the defendant must be afforded the 
opportunity to rebut hearsay evidence sought to be admitted by the 
other side.  Frances v. State, 970 So. 2d 806, 813-14 (Fla. 2007).  
There is no question that the redacted portion of the postcard—
saying that the daughter did not want Sievers to be executed—was 
hearsay.  Here, neither of Sievers’ daughters testified, and the State 
would have had no opportunity to cross-examine the author of the 
postcard.  We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 
evidentiary ruling. 
Issue XV: Victim Impact Evidence.  At the penalty phase trial, 
the State presented victim impact evidence consisting of live 
testimony from Dr. Sievers’ mother and a brief video clip of 
Dr. Sievers herself.  In the video, Dr. Sievers discusses her 
commitment to practicing holistic and preventative medicine.  
Sievers objected at trial, and he now argues that the admission of 
the video, particularly in combination with the testimony of 
Dr. Sievers’ mother, was reversible error. 
 
 
 
- 34 - 
We find no error in the admission of the victim impact 
evidence here.  Under Florida law, victim impact evidence is 
admissible “to demonstrate the victim’s uniqueness as an individual 
human being and the resultant loss to the community’s members 
by the victim’s death.”  § 921.141(8), Fla. Stat. (2019).  Our Court 
regularly upholds the admission of victim impact evidence that falls 
within the statutory definition.  See, e.g., Colley v. State, 310 So. 3d 
2, 17 (Fla. 2020) (statement from victim’s friend detailing victim’s 
unique characteristics permissible); Jordan v. State, 176 So. 3d 
920, 932-33 (Fla. 2015) (statement from victim’s family detailing 
loss permissible).  In this case, the live testimony and the brief (less 
than two-minute) video were relevant to show the loss suffered by 
Dr. Sievers’ family and community, and this evidence was not 
unduly prejudicial.  
Issue XVI: Alleged Failure to Hold a Spencer Hearing.  The 
Spencer hearing is an aspect of the capital sentencing process that 
typically occurs after the penalty phase trial and jury 
recommendation, but before the trial court’s imposition of sentence.  
We have explained that the purpose of a Spencer hearing is to: 
 
 
 
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(a) give the defendant, his counsel, and the State, an 
opportunity to be heard; (b) afford, if appropriate, both the 
State and the defendant an opportunity to present 
additional evidence; (c) allow both sides to comment on or 
rebut information in any presentence or medical report; 
and (d) afford the defendant an opportunity to be heard in 
person. 
Spencer, 615 So. 2d at 691.  In this case, the trial court on January 
3, 2020, held a hearing at which all of these things occurred—
including an in-person statement from Sievers, argument from 
defense counsel, and the admission of additional mitigating 
evidence.  After hearing from the parties, the trial court took a 
recess to collect its thoughts.  The court then returned and imposed 
its sentence. 
Although he did not object to the trial court’s procedure at the 
time, Sievers now argues that our Court’s decision in Spencer 
required the trial court to impose sentence on a separate day after 
the Spencer hearing.  Sievers maintains that the procedure that the 
court followed here amounted to a failure to hold a Spencer hearing 
at all, and that this was fundamental error. 
Sievers’ argument lacks merit.  Our decision in Spencer does 
not categorically preclude the trial court from holding a Spencer 
hearing and imposing sentence on the same day.  Nor does Florida’s 
 
 
 
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death penalty statute say that a Spencer hearing and the imposition 
of sentence must occur on different days.  § 921.141, Fla. Stat. 
(2019).  We find no error—much less fundamental error—in the 
procedure that the trial court followed here.  See Robertson v. State, 
187 So. 3d 1207, 1216-17 (Fla. 2016) (combining Spencer hearing 
and imposition of sentence in one proceeding did not violate due 
process where defendant presented evidence and addressed the 
court before imposition of sentence).   
Issue XVII: Cold, Calculated, and Premeditated Aggravator.  
Sievers argues that the jury’s CCP finding lacks a constitutional 
basis because it depended entirely on Wright’s (allegedly uncredible) 
testimony.  We reject this claim for the same reason that we 
rejected Sievers’ challenge to the denial of his motion for judgment 
of acquittal.  It is the jury’s role, not ours, to evaluate witnesses’ 
credibility and weigh the evidence.   
Issue XVIII: Proportionality Review.  Sievers lastly urges us to 
undertake a proportionality review.  We held in Lawrence v. State, 
308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020), however, that this Court lacks 
constitutional or statutory authority to do so.  We decline to revisit 
Lawrence here. 
 
 
 
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CONCLUSION 
We affirm Sievers’ first-degree murder conviction and 
corresponding death sentence, as well as his conviction for 
conspiracy to commit murder.  
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, POLSTON, COURIEL, and 
GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
FRANCIS, J., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LABARGA, J., concurring in result. 
 
Because I continue to adhere to my dissent in Lawrence v. 
State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020), wherein this Court abandoned 
this Court’s decades-long practice of comparative proportionality 
review in direct appeal cases, I can only concur in the result. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Lee County, 
Bruce E. Kyle, Judge – Case No. 362015CF000673000BCH 
 
Howard L. “Rex” Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Karen M. Kinney, 
Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
for Appellant 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and 
Christina Z. Pacheco, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
 
 
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for Appellee