Case Title: CUSTODY OF R L S

Citation: 

Docket Number: 81-084

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1981-08-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 81-84 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1981 I N T H E M A T T E R O F CUSTODY O F R.L.S. & T.L.S., Minors, GARY L. SAYER, P e t i t i o n e r and Appellant, C A R L A JEAN BARKHOFF a/k/a E N G D A H L , Respondent and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Tenth J u d i c i a l District, I n and f o r t h e County o f Fergus, The Honorable Leroy McRinnon, Judge p r e s i d i n g , Counsel o f Record: For Appellant: Radovich & Johnson, B i l l i n g s , M o ~ t a n a For Respondent ; W i l l i a m E. Berger, Lewistown, Montana F i l e d : Submitted on B r i e f s : June 4 , 1981 Decided: August 20, 1981 AUG 2 0 1981 M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr., d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Garry Sayer appeals from a judgment of the D i s t r i c t Court which denied h i s p e t i t i o n f o r modification of custody of h i s minor children, and modified the v i s i t a t i o n provisions of a Wyoming custody decree. Appellant and respondent a r e the n a t u r a l p a r e n t s of Travis Sayer, age 4 and Rosemary Sayer, age 5, born during t h e period t h e p a r t i e s l i v e d together. When t h e p a r t i e s separated i n J u l y of 1979, they w e r e l i v i n g i n Sheridan County, Wyoming. I n i t i a l l y , the a p p e l l a n t r e t a i n e d physical custody of t h e children; however, following disagreements, t h e respondent p e t i t i o n e d a Wyoming c o u r t and was granted a w r i t of habeas corpus. The a p p e l l a n t then f i l e d a p e t i t i o n t o determine p a t e r n i t y and f o r l e g a l custody of the c h i l d r e n . Before t r i a l , t h e a c t i o n was s e t t l e d by an order of the Wyoming c o u r t which r a t i f i e d and incorporated a s e t t l e m e n t agreement executed by the p a r t i e s . The agreement e s t a b l i s h e d the a p p e l l a n t ' s p a t e r n i t y and contained the following provisions: "2. Custody: Carla Jean Engdahl and Garry L. Sayer a r e both f i t and proper t o have custody of s a i d minor children. Carla Jean Engdahl s h a l l have primary custody and c o n t r o l of Rosemary and Travis Sayer s u b j e c t t o the r i g h t of reasonable v i s i t a - t i o n i n t h e f a t h e r , Garry L. Sayer. " 3 . V i s i t a t i o n : U n t i l each r e s p e c t i v e c h i l d reaches school age, Carla Jean Engdahl s h a l l have the minor c h i l d r e n i n her custody s i x months, and Garry L. Sayer s h a l l have them i n h i s custody f o r t h e o t h e r s i x months. Carla s h a l l have s a i d c h i l d r e n f o r t h e i n i t i a l s i x month period beginning January 1, 1980. After each c h i l d reaches the age a t which he o r she s h a l l a t t e n d school, Carla Jean Engdahl s h a l l have custody of t h a t c h i l d during the school year and Garry L. Sayer s h a l l have custody during t h e summer months. " Thereafter, the respondent and c h i l d r e n l e f t Wyoming and moved t o Lewistown, Montana, t o be near the respondent's family. The a p p e l l a n t , d i s s a t i s f i e d with t h e order of the Wyoming c o u r t , p e t i t i o n e d t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Yellowstone County, f o r modification of custody, a l l e g i n g t h e c h i l d r e n were i n s e r i o u s physical and mental danger due t o the respondent's unstable mental condition and drug abuse. The respondent answered and cross-petitioned t h e c o u r t requesting f u l l custody of t h e c h i l d r e n a l l e g i n g t h e p e t i t i o n e r abused alcohol and had a v i o l e n t temper. The p a r t i e s subsequently s t i p u l a t e d t o a venue change t o t h e Tenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Fergus County, where a t r i a l before t h e c o u r t was held. During t h e t r i a l t h e D i s t r i c t Court l i m i t e d much of t h e testimony t o t h e period following the Wyoming decree. Appellant claims t h i s was e r r o r . The c o u r t entered f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law on December 1, 1980, and ordered: "1. That t h e primary c a r e , custody and c o n t r o l of Rosemary Lee Sayer and Travis Loren Sayer be and remain with t h e respondent, Carla Jean Engdahl. " 2 . That t h e p e t i t i o n e r , Gary [ s i c ] L. Sayer, have t h e r i g h t of reasonable v i s i t a t i o n , including t h e r i g h t t o take the s a i d c h i l d r e n i n t o h i s home f o r t h e period of one month during t h e summer each year; t h a t otherwise v i s i t a t i o n be arranged by p r i o r n o t i c e between t h e p a r t i e s . . ." W e f i n d the following i s s u e s r a i s e d by t h i s appeal: 1. Whether the D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by l i m i t i n g i n q u i r y t o f a c t s following t h e Wyoming decree. 2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n r e s t r i c t i n g ap- p e l l a n t ' s v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s . SCOPE O F I N Q U I R Y I N MODIFICATION OF C U S T O D Y HEARINGS During the t r i a l t h e c o u r t sustained respondent's ob- j e c t i o n s t o the admission of any f a c t s p r i o r t o t h e i n i t i a l decree agreeing t h a t t h e primary i s s u e was not p a r e n t a l f i t - ness b u t r a t h e r whether t h e r e had been a change i n circumstances s i n c e t h e i n i t i a l decree. A change i n circumstances i s a s t a - t u t o r y p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r a change i n custody. Section 40-4- 219(1), MCA. Appellant contends it was r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r f o r t h e c o u r t t o l i m i t the evidence t o p o s t decree f a c t s . W e agree with t h e a p p e l l a n t . Modification of custody decrees i s governed by s e c t i o n 40-4-219, MCA, modeled a f t e r the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) , which provides : " (1) The c o u r t s h a l l n o t modify a p r i o r custody decree unless it f i n d s , upon t h e b a s i s of f a c t s t h a t have a r i s e n s i n c e the p r i o r decree o r t h a t w e r e unknown t o t h e c o u r t a t t h e t i m e of e n t r y of t h e p r i o r decree, t h a t a change has occurred i n the circumstances of the c h i l d o r h i s custodian and t h a t t h e modification i s necessary t o serve t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d . I n applying these standards t h e c o u r t s h a l l r e t a i n the custodian appointed pursuant t o the p r i o r decree unless: " ( a ) t h e custodian agrees t o the modification; " (b) t h e c h i l d has been i n t e g r a t e d i n t o the family of t h e p e t i t i o n e r with consent of t h e custodian; o r " ( c ) t h e c h i l d ' s p r e s e n t environment endangers s e r i o u s l y h i s physical, mental, moral, o r emo- t i o n a l h e a l t h and t h e harm l i k e l y t o be caused by change of environment i s outweighed by i t s ad- vantage t o him . . ." Resolution of t h i s i s s u e r e q u i r e s construction of t h e phrase " f a c t s . . . unknown t o t h e c o u r t a t t h e t i m e of e n t r y of t h e p r i o r decree." Section 40-4-219 ( I ) , MCA. Respondent contends t h a t although no hearing was held p r i o r t o e n t r y of t h e i n i t i a l decree, it should be held res j u d i c a t a on t h e i s s u e of p a r e n t a l f i t n e s s . I n t h e case of Svennungsen v. Svennungsen (1974), 165 Mont. 161, 527 P.2d 6 4 0 , decided before t h e adoption of the UMDA, t h i s Court considered whether the noncustodial p a r e n t must make a showing of change i n circumstances where the custody i s s u e had n o t been contested i n an adversary hearing i n t h e i n i t i a l d i s s o l u t i o n a c t i o n . W e held i n t h e af firmative. "Whether t h e order respecting custody has been granted a f t e r a f u l l adversary proceeding o r a f t e r a d e f a u l t divorce, a s i n t h i s case, t h e considerations a r e t h e s a m e . The requirement f o r a f i n d i n g of a change i n circumstances i s designed t o p r o t e c t t h e person who has custody from the harassment of f u r t h e r l i t i g a - t i o n . W e recognize t h a t t h i s l i n e of reasoning would be inappropriate i f a p p e l l a n t was i n f a c t u n f i t t o have custody. That case i s not now before us. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t , i n both the decree of divorce and t h e order modifying custody, found t h a t the a p p e l l a n t was a f i t and proper person t o have the c a r e , custody and c o n t r o l of Derek. W e hold merely t h a t , based upon the f a c t s of t h i s case, a showing of a s u b s t a n t i a l change of circumstances should have been required before t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t inquired i n t o the custody i s s u e on respondent's p e t i t i o n and t h a t the d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n holding t h a t , s o l e l y because t h e is- sue of custody was n o t ' l i t i g a t e d ' i n the p r i o r d i - vorce hearing, the custody i s s u e could be l i t i g a t e d a f r e s h before him." 527 P.2d a t 643. The reasoning supporting the r u l e of Svennungsen emphasized t h e p r i n c i p l e s of c u s t o d i a l c o n t i n u i t y and p r o t e c t i o n of t h e custodian from undue harassment while recognizing t h a t an u n f i t custodian would be an exception t o t h e r u l e . Montana's adoption of s e c t i o n 40-4-219, MCA, d i d n o t diminish t h e importance of these p r i n c i p l e s ; however, t h e new s t a t u t e does d i r e c t the D i s t r i c t Court t o examine a l l r e l e v a n t f a c t s , "unknown t o the c o u r t a t the t i m e of e n t r y of t h e p r i o r decree . . ." The Washington case of Timmons v. Timmons (1980), 94 Wash.2d 594, 617 P.2d 1032, addressed t h e same i s s u e i n applying an i d e n t i c a l s t a t u t e . The reasoning of t h e c o u r t i s sound, and we adopt it i n construing our s t a t u t o r y provision. " P e t i t i o n e r urges t h a t ' f a c t s . . . unknown t o t h e c o u r t ' r e f e r s only t o f a c t s not presented t o t h e c o u r t when a genuine contested hearing took place. Since her d i s s o l u t i o n was uncontested, she maintains t h a t only f a c t s which a r o s e s i n c e t h e decree should have been considered and t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n admitting pre-decree f a c t s . "Before the p r e s e n t Dissolution A c t , former RCW 26.08.110 (repealed 1973) provided t h a t custody decrees could be 'modified, a l t e r e d , and revised by t h e c o u r t from t i m e t o t i m e as circumstances may require. ' W e held under t h i s s t a t u t e t h a t - r e s judicata p r i n c i p l e s generally applied t o bar recon- s i d e r a t i o n of conditions e x i s t i n g a t t h e t i m e of t h e decree. B r i m v. S t r u t h e r s , 44 Wash.2d 833, 835, 271 P.2d 4 4 1 (1954). Thus, modification required a change of circumstances s i n c e t h e o r i g i n a l decree, and evidence r e l a t i n g t o events and conditions p r i o r t o t h e decree was inadmissible. Holten v. Holten, 64 Wash.2d 203, 206, 390 P.2d 982 (1964); s e e Whi-te v. White, 24 Wash.2d 52, 56, 163 P.2d 137 (1945). " I n l i m i t i n g the scope of inquiry, it was assumed t h a t t h e c o u r t granting the o r i g i n a l decree made i t s d e c i s i o n based on knowledge of a l l t h e e x i s t i n g cir- cumstances. I n re Rankin, 76 Wash.2d 533, 537, 458 P. 2d 176 (1969) . When a custody decree was entered upon d e f a u l t , therefore, the reasons f o r t h e r u l e d i d n o t apply: " ' The c o u r t has had no opportunity t o observe t h e two contending p a r e n t s upon the witness stand o r t o ex- amine t h e evidence concerning t h e i r f i t n e s s and con- cerning t h e welfare of the c h i l d . I t must accept t h e a l l e g a t i o n s of the p e t i t i o n e r o r , a t b e s t , t h e uncross-examined testimony of t h e p e t i t i o n e r . . . ' Rankin, a t 536, 458 P.2d a t 178. "Thus, a d e f a u l t custody decree could be modified without a showing of changed circumstances and t h e c o u r t could consider f a c t s which e x i s t e d a t t h e t i m e t h e o r i g i n a l decree was entered. Rankin, a t 537-38, 458 P.2d 176; see White v. White, supra. " P e t i t i o n e r argues t h a t the Rankin r u l e should n o t apply t o uncontested d i s s o l u t i o n s under the 1973 A c t . She d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e Rankin decree, which w a s uncon- t e s t e d because it was by d e f a u l t , from t h e usual un- contested d i s s o l u t i o n today, i n which t h e decree i s entered upon a p e t i t i o n which both p a r t i e s have joined. To allow consideration of pre-decree f a c t s , she con- tends, would undermine the policy of t h e p r e s e n t D i s - s o l u t i o n Act t h a t t h e p a r t i e s , r a t h e r than a judge, can b e s t work o u t d i s s o l u t i o n arrangements. "We conclude t h a t , because of t h e continuing paramount concern f o r the b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d , t h a t t h e r a t i o n a l e f o r t h e Rankin r u l e equally a p p l i e s when the p a r t i e s join i n a p e t i - t i o n . A couple should n o t be a b l e t o f o r e c l o s e j u d i c i a l i n q u i r y i n t o f a c t s which may a s s i s t i n making t h e c r i t i c a l determination of how a c h i l d ' s i n t e r e s t s would b e s t be served, by agreeing a s t o who should receive o r i g i n a l custody. Whether t h e decree i s entered upon d e f a u l t , o r whether t h e decree i s entered upon an agreed p e t i t i o n a f t e r b r i e f questioning of t h e p e t i t i o n e r , t h e observa- t i o n s we made i n Rankin s t i l l apply: " ' [ t ] he primary concern of the c o u r t s i s always t h e welfare of t h e c h i l d . I t would be u n r e a l i s t i c t o assume t h a t t h i s concern can be served a s w e l l by a c o u r t which does n o t hear evidence and does n o t have an opportunity t o observe both p a r e n t s a s it can by one i n which the r i g h t of one p a r e n t t o custody is contested by the other.' "Rankin a t 537, 458 P.2d a t 179. The Rankin r u l e a s s u r e s t r u e j u d i c i a l consideration of a l l r e l e v a n t f a c t s concerning the welfare of the children." 617 P.2d a t 1035-1036. MODIFICATION O F VISITATION RIGHTS Comparison of t h e v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s granted t o the a p p e l l a n t i n the i n i t i a l decree with t h e v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s of the appealed judgment supports t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s second a s s e r t i o n of e r r o r . The i n i t i a l decree granted a p p e l l a n t s i x months of v i s i t a t i o n u n t i l the c h i l d r e n reach school age and v i s i t a t i o n during the summer months t h e r e a f t e r . The D i s t r i c t Court r e s t r i c t e d a p p e l l a n t ' s v i s i t a t i o n t o one month i n t h e summer. This was e r r o r . Section 40-4-217, MCA, governs modification of v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s : ". . . (3) The c o u r t may modify an order granting o r denying v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s whenever modification would serve t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d ; b u t t h e c o u r t s h a l l n o t r e s t r i c t a ~ a r e n t ' s v i s i t a t i o n L r i g h t s unless it f i n d s -- t h a t tEe v i s i t a t i o n would endanger s e r i o u s l y t h e c h i l d ' s physical, mental, moral - o r emotional health." (Emphasis added.) The record does n o t contain a finding, nor would t h e record support such, t h a t t h e f u l l summer v i s i t a t i o n of t h e i n i t i a l decree 'would endanger s e r i o u s l y the [ c h i l d r e n ' s ] physical, mental, moral o r emotional h e a l t h ' . The modification was a r e s t r i c t i o n of v i s i t a t i o n without t h e r e q u i s i t e s t a t u t o r y finding. The p a r t i e s do n o t c o n t e s t j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e Montana c o u r t t o a c t . Sections 40-4-211, MCA, and 40-7-104, MCA (Uniform Child Custody J u r i s d i c t i o n A c t ) , d e t a i l t h e b a s i s f o r j u r i s d i c t i o n . Under our law j u r i s d i c t i o n over modification of a foreign decree cannot be based upon Montana being t h e "home s t a t e " of t h e c h i l d r e n a s t h e c h i l d r e n were not i n t h i s state f o r a s u f f i c i e n t period preceding f i l i n g of t h e p e t i t i o n . J u r i s d i c t i o n can be premised upon Montana c o u r t a c t i o n being i n t h e " b e s t i n t e r e s t " of t h e children. W e assume t h a t j u r i s d i c t i o n was so acquired. I n summary, w e must r e v e r s e t h e judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court and remand f o r f u r t h e r proceedings congruent w i t h t h i s opinion. Upon remand t h e D i s t r i c t Court should make a f i n d i n g t h a t it has j u r i s d i c t i o n and state t h e b a s i s f o r W e concur: