Case Title: Friday-Spivey v. Collier

Citation: 

Docket Number: 032315

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2004-09-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
JULIA FRIDAY-SPIVEY 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 032315 
JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
 
 
 
September 17, 2004 
CHARLES LEE COLLIER 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Kathleen H. MacKay, Judge 
 
Julia Friday-Spivey, the plaintiff in a personal injury 
action arising from a collision between her vehicle and a fire 
truck, appeals from the judgment of the trial court holding that 
the defendant, Charles Lee Collier, was protected by the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity with regard to his alleged 
negligence while operating the fire truck.  The issue before us 
is whether Collier’s driving of the fire truck, under the facts 
of this case, required the exercise of judgment and discretion 
sufficient to invoke the protection of sovereign immunity.  We 
conclude that it did not and therefore will reverse the judgment 
of the trial court. 
I.  BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
At the time of the accident at issue, Friday-Spivey was 
operating a vehicle westbound on Spring Mall Road in Fairfax 
County.  Collier, a fire technician employed by the Fairfax 
County Fire and Rescue Department,1 was driving a fire truck 
                     
1 Although Friday-Spivey originally alleged that Collier was 
employed by the Fire Department, the parties did not dispute 
that he was in fact an employee of Fairfax County. 
 
2
owned by the Greater Springfield Volunteer Fire Department (the 
“Fire Department”) eastbound on Spring Mall Road.  As Collier 
attempted to turn left into a shopping mall parking lot, he 
allegedly failed to yield the right of way to Friday-Spivey, 
thereby colliding with her vehicle.  As a result of the impact, 
Friday-Spivey sustained personal injuries. 
Friday-Spivey filed an action against Collier and the Fire 
Department to recover damages for the injuries she sustained in 
the accident.  Both defendants filed pleas in bar.  The trial 
court sustained the Fire Department’s plea in bar and dismissed 
it from the case with prejudice pursuant to the provisions of 
Code § 27-23.6(B) in effect at that time.2 
 
Testimony at the ore tenus hearing on Collier’s plea in bar 
established that at the time of the accident, Collier was en 
route to the shopping mall in response to a “Priority 2” 
dispatch regarding an infant locked in a vehicle at that 
                                                                  
 
2 In pertinent part, the prior version of that statute 
authorized a county to “provide fire-fighting and rescue 
services to its citizens by using both government-employed and 
volunteer company or association firefighters and rescuers.”  If 
a county utilized such a system, the volunteer companies and 
associations were “deemed an instrumentality of the county . . . 
and as such exempt from suit for damages done incident to 
providing fire-fighting and rescue services to the county 
. . . .”  Code § 27-23.6(B)(2000).  Subsequent amendments have 
not materially altered these provisions. 
 
 
3
location.  Collier knew nothing about the infant’s condition at 
that time. 
In responding to a Priority 2 call, Collier acknowledged 
that according to Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department 
Standard Operating Procedures, he was required to proceed 
without activating warning devices, i.e., “no lights and no 
sirens,” and to obey all statutes governing the operation of 
motor vehicles.3  Nonetheless, he had to “drop everything and 
proceed to the call.”  Collier’s duty, as a fire technician, was 
to deliver the manpower and equipment needed to assist the 
infant. 
 
At the time of the accident, Collier was driving a pumper 
truck with a crew of four: his captain, a paramedic, a fire 
fighter, and himself as the driver.  While on duty, this crew 
was required to stay together at all times in case they had to 
respond to a dispatch.  According to Collier, a pumper truck 
weighs 40,000 pounds.  He received specific training to drive 
that vehicle, including both written and “over the road” 
examinations.  When asked about the decisions he was required to 
make in responding to the Priority 2 dispatch on the day of the 
accident, Collier stated, “Well, the route of travel, the 
                     
3 In contrast, a “Priority 1” call means that there is a 
“[g]reat potential for loss of life or serious injury.”  
Response to a Priority 1 call requires the use of warning 
equipment. 
 
4
address, I am driving a large piece of equipment, it’s pretty 
heavy, so I have to be extra careful when I’m driving the fire 
truck, it’s not like driving my personal car on the road.  
Stopping distances, and so forth.”  He also testified that he 
“decided to take the quickest route possible” because an infant 
was locked in a vehicle and “we just [did not] know what to 
expect when we [got] there.” 
 
After the hearing on Collier’s plea in bar, the trial court 
sustained that plea, finding that Collier was entitled to 
sovereign immunity.  The court subsequently entered an order 
dismissing Collier from the action with prejudice.  We awarded 
Friday-Spivey this appeal. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
This Court has outlined a four-factor test for determining 
whether an individual working for an immune governmental entity, 
such as a county employee like Collier, is entitled to the 
protection of sovereign immunity.  James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 
53, 282 S.E.2d 864, 869 (1980); Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 
313, 321 S.E.2d 657, 663 (1984).  The parties agree Collier 
meets three of the four factors and the sole issue is the fourth 
factor: “whether the act in question involved the exercise of 
 
5
discretion and judgment.”4  Colby v. Boyden, 241 Va. 125, 129, 
400 S.E.2d 184, 187 (1991). 
Friday-Spivey argues that the facts of this case are 
governed by this Court’s holding in Heider v. Clemons, 241 Va. 
143, 400 S.E.2d 190 (1991).  In Heider, a deputy sheriff 
collided with a motorcycle as he was leaving a residence where 
he had just served judicial process.  241 Va. at 144, 400 S.E.2d 
at 190.  Heider argued “that, as a deputy sheriff who regularly 
and necessarily operated an automobile to perform his legal duty 
of serving judicial process, he was entitled to the sovereign 
immunity defense with respect to the operation of the 
automobile.”  Id., 400 S.E.2d at 190-91.  We disagreed, holding 
that Heider was not entitled to sovereign immunity under the 
circumstances of the case because “the simple operation of an 
automobile did not involve special risks arising from the 
governmental activity, or the exercise of judgment or discretion 
about the proper means of effectuating the governmental purpose 
of the driver’s employer.”  Id., 400 S.E.2d at 191.  In that 
case, the deputy sheriff was like any other person driving a car 
                     
4 The four factors are: (1) the function performed by the 
employee, (2) the extent of the state’s interest and involvement 
in that function, (3) the degree of control and direction the 
state exercises over the employee, and (4) whether the act 
performed involves the use of judgment and discretion.  James v. 
Jane, 221 Va. at 53, 282 S.E.2d at 869 (1980). 
 
6
who “must make myriad decisions.”  Id.  The duty of care in 
ordinary driving situations “is a ministerial obligation.”  Id. 
Collier distinguishes Heider in several respects.  The 
deputy sheriff in that case had completed his governmental 
purpose and was leaving the scene without any urgency.  In 
contrast, Collier was on his way to accomplish the governmental 
purpose of delivering the manpower and equipment necessary to 
rescue an infant locked in a car.  Collier cites as examples of 
discretion and judgment his determination of the route to be 
taken and the maneuvering of the 40,000-pound pumper truck 
through traffic.  Collier also notes that, unlike the police car 
in Heider, a 40,000-pound pumper truck requires specialized 
training to operate.  Collier essentially argues that he is 
entitled to sovereign immunity because the inherent difficulty 
and special skills required in operating a specialized piece of 
equipment (the pumper truck) means he “is not like any other 
driver in routine traffic.”  Under the facts of this case, we 
disagree. 
In Stanfield v. Peregoy, 245 Va. 339, 429 S.E.2d 11 (1993), 
we considered whether a city employee driving “a combination 
snow plow/salt truck,” was entitled to sovereign immunity in an 
action for negligence occurring while plowing and salting city 
streets during a snowstorm.  Id. at 341, 429 S.E.2d at 12.  
While it is true that in affirming the trial court’s grant of 
 
7
sovereign immunity we commented that “the defendant had 
completed a special course of instruction given to the employees 
selected to operate the equipment,” id. at 342, 429 S.E.2d at 
12, we implicitly rejected a rationale based on the use of 
special equipment or specialized training by a government 
employee as a basis for decision: 
Perhaps if this accident had happened as 
defendant was driving his truck en route to the 
area he was assigned to plow and salt, or if it 
occurred when he was returning to his 
Department’s headquarters after completing his 
function of plowing and salting, he would have 
been engaged in ‘the simple operation’ of the 
truck ‘in routine traffic,’ a ministerial act. 
 
Id. at 344, 429 S.E.2d at 13. 
 
Likewise, in Wynn v. Gandy, 170 Va. 590, 197 S.E. 527 
(1938), 
the driver of a school bus asserted the defense 
of sovereign immunity on the basis that operation 
of the bus was an act undertaken on behalf of the 
government.  We held that sovereign immunity was 
not available to the bus driver, stating that the 
defense does not apply to ‘the performance of 
duties which do not involve judgment or 
discretion in their performance but which are 
purely ministerial.’ 
 
Heider, 241 Va. at 145, 400 S.E.2d at 191.  In Wynn we were not 
concerned with whether driving a school bus “sufficiently large 
to accommodate . . . from ninety to 112 children,” required any 
special training, despite the fact that “the bodies of large 
buses of this type are extended on both sides” such that the 
 
8
driver “could not see persons at either side [of the bus] after 
the front of the bus had passed” and the street was filled with 
“rollicking and excited children.”  Wynn, 170 Va. at 593-94, 197 
S.E. at 528. 
Despite a natural inclination to classify the report of a 
child in a locked car as an “emergency,” the facts of this case 
do not support the conclusion that Collier’s driving involved 
the exercise of judgment and discretion beyond that required for 
ordinary driving in routine traffic situations.  Collier 
testified that “Priority 2 calls are considered public service 
calls” involving “[a]nything from a cat in a tree to a leaky 
water pipe.”  Specifically, Collier confirmed that “when [he] 
got this Priority 2 call, this was a public service call.”5 
During his deposition Collier also admitted that, based on 
what he knew at the time, “there was no danger” involved in the 
call to which they were responding and he understood that “when 
[he] got a [Priority 2] call, [he was] to respond in a 
nonemergency manner and conform to all the traffic regulations.”  
When asked on direct examination whether “there [was] any 
difference in the way you respond to a call for a cat in a tree 
versus an infant locked in a car, according to your 
regulations,” Collier responded: “My regulations, no.”  And 
                     
5 The Fairfax County fire department receives between 4,500 
and 5,000 public service calls a year. 
 
9
although Collier had to “drop everything and proceed to the 
call,” he specifically testified that was true for all calls 
“whether you get either a priority one or a priority two call.” 
As established by his own testimony, Collier was driving in 
a nonemergency manner without lights and sirens, to a “public 
service call” during which he was required to obey all traffic 
regulations.  The special skill and training required to operate 
a fire truck under these circumstances is not the exercise per 
se of judgment and discretion for purposes of sovereign 
immunity.  To find otherwise would not comport with our prior 
decisions, which have held that sovereign immunity does not 
extend to “ordinary driving situations,” Heider, 241 Va. at 145, 
400 S.E.2d at 191, in “routine traffic.”  Colby, 241 Va. at 129, 
400 S.E.2d at 187.  Thus, there were no “special risks” inherent 
in Collier’s task as existed in cases such as Colby (police 
officer in hot pursuit in a high speed chase with emergency 
lights and siren activated), or National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. 
Catlett Volunteer Fire Co., 241 Va. 402, 404 S.E.2d 216 (1991) 
(fire truck en route to a burning vehicle with emergency lights 
and siren activated). 
Collier’s suggestion that a controlling factor is whether a 
government employee received specialized training in the 
operation of a special or heavy duty vehicle (e.g., tractor-
trailer, fire truck, school bus, dump truck, snow plow, etc.) 
 
10
has been effectively rejected in prior decisions.  Such a rule 
would create a blanket immunity as a matter of law whenever that 
vehicle was used to perform a governmental function.  The 
analysis by this Court in prior decisions demonstrates that this 
suggested approach has been rejected.  Immunity was rejected in 
Wynn even though the vehicle was oversized and specialized, a 
result noted with approval more recently in Heider.  The 
comments by this court in Stanfield quoted above also make it 
clear that not all driving of a specialized vehicle will be 
immune. 
 
Obviously, there are situations where responding to a child 
locked in a car is under such exigent circumstances that the 
government employee responding must use a degree of judgment and 
discretion beyond ordinary driving situations in routine traffic 
to accomplish that governmental mission.  On this record, 
however, that is not this case.  Collier was in routine traffic 
under a mandate “to respond in a nonemergency manner and conform 
to all the traffic regulations.”  Nothing in this record 
reflects that any special characteristic of the fire truck had 
any nexus whatsoever to the accident.  Collier’s driving was a 
ministerial act requiring no significant judgment and discretion 
beyond that of ordinary driving in routine traffic. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
11
 
For the reasons previously stated, we conclude that Collier 
did not exercise judgment and discretion beyond that necessary 
in an ordinary driving situation − a ministerial act.  As such, 
he is not entitled to sovereign immunity for his alleged 
negligence.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court will 
be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE KOONTZ joins, dissenting. 
Because I conclude that driving a 40,000-pound fire truck 
to a shopping mall in response to a dispatch involving an infant 
locked in a vehicle required the exercise of judgment and 
discretion in order to effectuate the governmental purpose of 
providing rescue services, I respectfully dissent. 
In Virginia, the question whether an individual working for 
an immune governmental entity, such as a county employee like 
Charles Lee Collier, is entitled to the protection of sovereign 
immunity is answered by applying a four-part test first 
enunciated in James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 53, 282 S.E.2d 864, 869 
(1980) and reiterated in subsequent cases.  Messina v. Burden, 
228 Va. 301, 313, 321 S.E.2d 657, 663 (1984).  The four factors 
are: “(1) the nature of the function the employee performs; (2) 
the extent of the government’s interest and involvement in the 
function; (3) the degree of control and direction exercised over 
 
12
the employee by the government; and (4) whether the act in 
question involved the exercise of discretion and judgment.”  
Colby v. Boyden, 241 Va. 125, 129, 400 S.E.2d 184, 186-87 
(1991); accord Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hylton, 260 Va. 56, 
63, 530 S.E.2d 421, 424 (2000); Stanfield v. Peregoy, 245 Va. 
339, 342, 429 S.E.2d 11, 12 (1993). 
In the present case, the plaintiff, Julia Friday-Spivey 
contends, and the majority agrees, that the fourth prong of the 
test was not satisfied.  The majority concludes that Collier 
“did not exercise judgment and discretion beyond that necessary 
in an ordinary driving situation − a ministerial act.”  In 
reaching that conclusion, the majority relies primarily on the 
fact that the dispatch to rescue an infant locked in a vehicle 
was categorized as “Priority 2,” as would be a dispatch 
concerning a cat in a tree, and that the situation was not an 
actual “emergency.” 
Although Collier acknowledged that, in responding to a 
Priority 2 dispatch, he was required by regulation to proceed 
without activating warning devices and to obey all statutes 
governing the operation of motor vehicles, he testified that he 
nevertheless “decided to take the quickest route possible” 
because an infant was locked in a vehicle and “we just [did not] 
know what to expect when we [got] there.”  Collier stated, 
“[T]here [was] a potential of injury or loss of life.  
 
13
Especially with a child in a car.”  Because of that potential, I 
believe that responding to a dispatch involving an infant in a 
locked vehicle is fundamentally different than responding to 
public service calls in general and that the former, unlike the 
latter, requires the exercise of discretion and judgment to 
effectuate the governmental purpose of providing rescue 
services. 
The fourth prong of the James test has been determinative 
in several of this Court’s cases.  A review of those cases 
illustrates that whether the act in question involves the 
exercise of judgment and discretion generally turns on whether 
effectuating the governmental purpose embraces “special risks.”  
Colby, 241 Va. at 129, 400 S.E.2d at 187.  For example, in 
Colby, a police officer, with emergency blue lights activated, 
was pursuing, in a high-speed chase, a motorist who had 
proceeded through a red traffic light.  Id. at 127, 400 S.E.2d 
at 185.  Although the police officer’s municipal employer had 
promulgated guidelines governing responses to emergency 
situations, we recognized that such guidelines could not 
“eliminate the requirement that a police officer, engaged in the 
delicate, dangerous, and potentially deadly job of vehicular 
pursuit, must make prompt, original, and crucial decisions in a 
highly stressful situation.”  Id. at 129, 400 S.E.2d at 187.  
The police officer, unlike a driver in routine traffic, had to 
 
14
“make difficult judgments about the best means of effectuating 
the governmental purpose by embracing special risks in an 
emergency situation.”  Id. 
Similarly, in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Catlett 
Volunteer Fire Co., 241 Va. 402, 405, 404 S.E.2d 216, 217 
(1991), a volunteer fireman was driving a fire truck, with 
emergency equipment activated, to the site of a car fire on 
private property.  The fireman failed to stop before crossing 
railroad tracks as required by both state law and certain 
internal safety policies of the volunteer fire company that 
owned the fire truck.  Id.  As the fire truck proceeded over the 
railroad tracks, it collided with a train.  Id.  Citing our 
decision in Colby, we could not “logically distinguish the act 
of crossing a railroad track without stopping in order to 
extinguish a fire from running a red light in order to apprehend 
a traffic offender.”  Id. at 413, 404 S.E.2d at 222.  
Effectuating the governmental purpose in both situations 
involved “special risks.”  See also Smith v. Settle, 254 Va. 
348, 352-53, 492 S.E.2d 427, 429-30 (1997) (ambulance driver 
traveling with siren and red lights activated to a location 
where he could establish radio contact with his other squad 
members was entitled to sovereign immunity although he actually 
had not been dispatched to the scene of an emergency when he was 
involved in a motor vehicle accident); Hylton, 260 Va. at 64, 
 
15
530 S.E.2d at 424 (police officer exercised discretion and 
judgment when he decided to pursue a motor vehicle operator who 
had committed a traffic infraction even though the officer was 
just attempting to begin that pursuit when he collided with 
another vehicle). 
The importance of “special risks” in our analysis of the 
fourth prong of the James test is further demonstrated by two 
cases involving school bus drivers.  In Wynn v. Gandy, 170 Va. 
590, 591, 197 S.E.2d 527, 527 (1938), the driver of a school bus 
was proceeding from a filling station where the bus had been 
serviced to a school for the purpose of picking up children at 
the school.  As the children were crowding around and running 
after the moving bus, one student was shoved into the bus, 
causing fatal injuries.  Id.  We did not afford the school bus 
driver sovereign immunity because the defense is not available 
for “the performance of duties which do not involve judgment or 
discretion in their performance but which are purely 
ministerial.”  Id. at 595, 197 S.E.2d at 529.  In contrast, we 
held in Linhart v. Lawson, 261 Va. 30, 36, 540 S.E.2d 875, 878 
(2001), that a school bus driver’s act of transporting children 
involved discretion and judgment.  The factual difference 
between Wynn and Linhart was that the driver in Linhart was 
actually transporting children at the time of the accident at 
issue.  See Stanfield, 245 Va. at 345, 429 S.E.2d at 14 (noting 
 
16
that the school bus driver in Wynn claimed sovereign immunity 
merely because he was operating a school bus not because he was 
actually transporting children at the time of the accident).  
The “special risks” connected with the act of transporting 
school children in a bus are apparent. 
We discussed the concept of “special risks” again in 
Stanfield.  There, a city employee was operating a city truck 
and spreading salt during a snowstorm when the truck skidded on 
ice into an intersection and collided with a bus.  Id. at 342, 
426 S.E.2d at 12.  The city driver had completed a special 
course of instruction for employees who operated snow removal 
equipment and was required to obtain a chauffeur’s license, 
learn defensive driving techniques, and complete at least 16 
hours of on-the-job training.  Id.  In effectuating the 
governmental purpose of snow removal, the city employee had to 
determine whether to apply salt to a particular street and, if 
so, how much salt to spread, whether to plow the snow away, or 
whether to do both.  Id.  We concluded that, at the time of the 
accident, the city employee was not involved in “the simple 
operation” of the city truck, id. at 344, 429 S.E.2d at 13 
(quoting Heider v. Clemons, 241 Va. 143, 145, 400 S.E.2d 190, 
191 (1991)), “nor was he driving ‘in routine traffic.’ ”  Id. 
(quoting Colby, 241 Va. at 129, 400 S.E.2d at 187).  “[T]he 
conduct of driving and spreading salt combined as an integral 
 
17
part of the governmental function of rendering the city streets 
safe for public travel.”  Id.  Thus, operation of the city truck 
“involved special risks arising from the governmental activity 
and the exercise of judgment or discretion about the proper 
means of effectuating the governmental purpose.”  Id. 
Conversely, we found no “special risks” arising from the 
operation of an automobile by a deputy sheriff when he collided 
with a motorcycle as he was leaving a residence where he had 
just served judicial process.  Heider, 241 Va. at 145, 400 
S.E.2d at 191.  Recognizing that every driver of a vehicle makes 
“myriad decisions,” which in ordinary driving situations are 
“ministerial obligation[s],” we held that “[t]he defense of 
sovereign immunity applies only to acts of judgment and 
discretion which are necessary to the performance of the 
governmental function itself.”  Id.  There, the deputy sheriff’s 
simple operation of the police vehicle “did not involve special 
risks arising from the governmental activity, or the exercise of 
judgment or discretion about the proper means of effectuating 
the governmental purpose.”  Id. 
Unlike the deputy sheriff in Heider, Collier was not 
involved in the simple operation of a fire truck nor was he 
driving in an ordinary situation.  As in Colby, Collier’s 
employer had established regulations governing the manner in 
which he had to operate the pumper truck in responding to 
 
18
different types of dispatches.  But, those guidelines did not 
eliminate the need for Collier to make prompt, crucial decisions 
about the proper means of effectuating the governmental purpose 
of delivering the manpower and equipment needed to rescue an 
infant locked in a vehicle.  He had to accomplish that purpose 
by operating a 40,000-pound pumper truck.  Collier explained 
that he needed to be “extra careful” when driving the vehicle 
because of its size and the distances required to stop safely.  
An ordinary person without special training would not be allowed 
to operate that type of fire truck.  Collier had the special 
training.  Collier further explained that, since he did not know 
the condition of the infant, he “decided to take the quickest 
route possible.”  Given these facts, I conclude that the act of 
operating the pumper truck in conjunction with the act of 
providing rescue services involved “special risks” and the 
exercise of judgment and discretion as to the most effective 
means of accomplishing the governmental purpose.  Surely, if 
“special risks” attended the operation of the salt truck in 
Stanfield, the same is true here when Collier was responding to 
a dispatch concerning an infant locked in an automobile. 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would affirm 
the judgment of the circuit court.