Case Title: State v. John T. Williams

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1993AP002444-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1996-02-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 93-2444-CR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  93-2444-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
John T. Williams, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
 FEB. 1, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
 
                                                                 
  
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
JANINE P. GESKE, J.  This is a review of the decision of the 
court of appeals in State v. [John] Williams, 190 Wis. 2d 1, 527 
N.W.2d 338 (Ct. App. 1994), which reversed the judgment of 
conviction entered by Dane County Circuit Court Judge Robert A. 
DeChambeau against defendant John T. Williams on one count of 
first-degree recklessly endangering safety, Wis. Stat. § 941.30(1) 
(1989-1990).  The primary issue as presented by the parties is 
whether, when bind over is denied at preliminary hearing on one of 
two related felony counts in a multiple count complaint, the 
district attorney may include in the subsequent information the 
 
No. 93-2444-CR 
 
 
 
2 
same charge that was dismissed or its greater-included offense.  
We hold that any charge may be included in an information as long 
as it is transactionally related to a count on which bind over was 
ordered.  Further, we will not reach the second issue raised  
because defense counsel did not make an offer of proof concerning 
the alleged erroneous evidentiary ruling.  We reverse the court of 
appeals and affirm the judgment of conviction entered by the 
circuit court.   
 
The circuit court correctly concluded that the district 
attorney had the authority to include the charge of first-degree 
reckless injury in the information because it was not wholly 
unrelated to the charge of aggravated battery on which Williams 
was bound over.  Further, we conclude that when two or more 
transactionally related counts are charged, in that the counts 
"arose from a common nucleus of facts," State v. Richer, 174 
Wis. 2d 231, 246, 496 N.W.2d 66 (1993), and probable cause is 
found that a felony was committed in relation to one count, then 
bind over is required on all transactionally related counts. 
 
FACTS 
 
On November 11, 1991, a criminal complaint containing three 
counts was filed against Williams.  The first count alleged that 
Williams had committed aggravated battery, in an incident that 
occurred on November 4, 1991, when he struck Seri K. Storlid-
Harris in the face.  The second and third counts, aggravated 
battery and second-degree recklessly endangering safety, contrary 
 
No. 93-2444-CR 
 
 
 
3 
to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.19(1m) and 941.30(2), respectively, related 
to a separate event that occurred on November 5, 1991, at a 
different location in which Williams struck George Buie in the 
face with a large rock.  
 
Court Commissioner Todd E. Meurer conducted a preliminary 
hearing in this case on December 18, 1991.  The court found that 
ample evidence had been presented to support a finding of probable 
cause that Williams committed a felony in relation to the attack 
on Storlid-Harris and therefore bind over was ordered on Count I. 
 Buie testified at the preliminary hearing as to the circumstances 
surrounding the confrontation between Williams and himself and as 
to the extent of his injuries.  The court concluded that the State 
had met its burden on Count II and bound Williams over on that 
count but declined to bind over on Count III based on "problems" 
it had with the testimony given by Buie.  
 
The information filed on December 23, 1991, contained the 
original Counts I and II and a new Count III, based on the 
incident involving Buie, charging Williams with first-degree 
reckless injury contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.23(1).  The court 
granted Williams' motion to sever Count I from the other two 
counts.
1  Additionally, Williams moved to dismiss Count III-i 
                     
    
1  The resolution of Count I is not relevant to the issues 
raised in this appeal and because it was severed it will not be 
discussed further.  For clarity's sake, however, the charges 
resulting from Buie's injuries will be referred to throughout this 
opinion as Counts II, III-c (the count of second-degree recklessly 
endangering safety originally included in the criminal complaint), 
 
No. 93-2444-CR 
 
 
 
4 
asserting that Wis. Stat. § 970.03(10)
2 bars the inclusion in an 
information of any new count arising from the same facts as a 
count specifically dismissed at the preliminary hearing.  The 
court denied this motion finding that Count III-i was properly 
included because it was reasonably related to the evidence adduced 
at the preliminary hearing regarding Count II (aggravated battery 
of Buie) on which the commissioner had ordered bind over.  
 
The case was tried to a jury and while Williams was acquitted 
of aggravated battery (Count II), he was found guilty of 
first-degree recklessly endangering safety which the court had 
submitted to the jury as a lesser-included offense of first-degree 
reckless injury (Count III-i).  In a post-conviction motion, 
Williams renewed his challenge to the propriety of Count III-i and 
the circuit court again denied his motion on the basis that the 
charge of first-degree reckless injury was not improper because it 
was "not wholly unrelated" to Count II.  
 
The court of appeals reversed the conviction and order 
denying post-conviction relief on the basis that § 970.03(10) 
(..continued) 
and III-i (the count contained in the information of first-degree 
reckless injury). 
    
2  Section 970.03(10) provides: 
 
 
In multiple count complaints, the court shall order 
dismissed any count for which it finds there is no 
probable cause. The facts arising out of any count 
ordered dismissed shall not be the basis for a count in 
any information filed pursuant to ch. 971. Section 
970.04 shall apply to any dismissed count. 
 
No. 93-2444-CR 
 
 
 
5 
unambiguously requires that "[a]ny new charge that arises out of 
facts relied upon to dismiss a count may not be included in an 
Information . . . ."  [John] Williams, 190 Wis. 2d at 7.  This 
court subsequently accepted the State's petition for review on the 
issue of the proper interpretation of subsection (10).  We also 
agreed to address Williams' claim that the circuit court's 
restriction 
of 
cross-examination 
during 
trial 
constituted 
reversible error. 
 
Issue 1 
 
Resolution of this case requires us to interpret Wis. Stat. 
§ 970.03(10) which reads: 
 
In multiple count complaints, the court shall order 
dismissed any count for which it finds there is no 
probable cause. The facts arising out of any count 
ordered dismissed shall not be the basis for a count in 
any information filed pursuant to ch. 971. Section 
970.04 shall apply to any dismissed count. 
 
 
We begin this analysis by reiterating a point that has been made 
in several of our previous cases; there is no constitutional right 
to a preliminary examination, it is purely a statutory creation.  
See State ex rel. Funmaker v. Klamm, 106 Wis. 2d 624, 633, 317 
N.W.2d 458 (1982); State ex rel. Klinkiewicz v. Duffy, 35 Wis. 2d 
369, 373, 151 N.W.2d 63 (1967). 
 
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law which 
this court reviews without deference to the decisions of the 
courts below.  Richer, 174 Wis. 2d at 238-9.  If the plain 
language of a statute is unambiguous a court must give it effect 
 
No. 93-2444-CR 
 
 
 
6 
and can look no further.  See In Interest of J.A.L., 162 Wis. 2d 
940, 962, 471 N.W.2d 493 (1991).  However, as the Supreme Court 
has noted, "plain meaning, like beauty, is sometimes in the eye of 
the beholder."  Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 
737 (1985).  If ambiguity is found, a court should examine the 
scope, history, context, subject matter, and object of the statute 
in order to divine legislative intent.  State v. Waalen, 130 Wis. 
2d 18, 24, 386 N.W.2d 47 (1986).  Ambiguity occurs when reasonably 
well-informed persons can understand a statute in more than one 
way.  State v. Moore, 167 Wis. 2d 491, 496, 481 N.W.2d 633 (1992). 
  
 
We conclude that § 970.03(10) is ambiguous.  The circuit 
court and the State understood subsection (10) to bar reissuance 
only of the identical charge dismissed at a preliminary hearing.  
The court of appeals agreed with Williams that the State cannot 
rely on the facts surrounding a dismissed count as the basis for 
any new count in a subsequent information.  We find the statute 
susceptible to yet a third interpretation of the second sentence 
which 
results 
in 
an 
unworkable 
anomaly. 
 
If 
the 
broad 
transactional interpretation advanced by the defendant and court 
of appeals were applied literally to the language of the statute, 
one would be faced with the absurd result that the dismissed count 
is controlling, such that a count for which bind over was 
determined proper could not be included in an information if it 
 
No. 93-2444-CR 
 
 
 
7 
arose from the same facts as a count that was dismissed.
3  For 
example, if this interpretation were applied to Williams' case, 
even though the examining judge
4 found probable cause as to Count 
II, neither count could appear in the information because Count 
III-c was dismissed and both counts arose from the same facts.  
 
 
The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain 
and give effect to legislative intent.  State v. Olson, 175 Wis. 
2d 628, 633, 498 N.W.2d 661 (1993).  Subsections of a statute must 
be interpreted in a manner consistent with the purpose of the 
statute as a whole.  See State v. Swatek, 178 Wis. 2d 1, 6-7, 502 
N.W.2d 909 (Ct. App. 1993).  "A statute should be construed to 
give effect to its leading idea, and the entire statute should be 
brought into harmony with the statute's purpose."  State v. 
Clausen, 105 Wis. 2d 231, 244, 313 N.W.2d 819 (1982). 
  
Chapter 970 expressly defines the purpose of preliminary 
hearings: "[a] preliminary examination is a hearing before a court 
for the purpose of determining if there is probable cause to 
believe 
a 
felony 
has 
been 
committed 
by 
the 
defendant."  
§ 970.03(1).  This court has often stated that the primary purpose 
of preliminary examination is "to protect the accused from hasty, 
                     
    
3  The court of appeals apparently attempted to avoid this 
anomaly by adding the word "new" to the statute it found 
unambiguous. 
    
4  We recognize that, pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 967.09 and 
757.69(1)(b), a full-time court commissioner may also preside over 
a preliminary hearing, as was the case in this instance. 
 
No. 93-2444-CR 
 
 
 
8 
improvident, or malicious prosecution and to discover whether 
there is a substantial basis for bringing the prosecution and 
further denying the accused his right to liberty."  Bailey v. 
State, 65 Wis. 2d 331, 344, 222 N.W.2d 871 (1974) (quoting Whitty 
v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 287, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967), cert. denied 
in Whitty v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 959 (1968), quoting Johns v. 
State, 14 Wis. 2d 119, 122, 109 N.W.2d 490 (1961)).  We have also 
held that upon determination that bind over is warranted on at 
least one count, that purpose has been served.  Bailey, 65 Wis. 2d 
at 341.  Here, the purpose of the preliminary hearing was 
satisfied upon the commissioner's finding of probable cause to 
believe that Williams had committed a felony in connection with 
the attack on Buie. 
 
Our holding today comports with long-standing precedent that 
recognizes the prosecutor's authority, once a defendant is bound 
over, to include additional charges in the information "so long as 
they are not wholly unrelated to the transactions or facts 
considered or testified to at the preliminary."  Bailey, 65 Wis. 
2d at 341 (quoting State v. Fish, 20 Wis. 2d 431, 438, 122 N.W.2d 
381 (1963)); See also State v. Burke, 153 Wis. 2d 445, 457, 451 
N.W.2d 739 (1990); Richer, 174 Wis. 2d at 253.  In Bailey, the 
defendant was bound over following a preliminary hearing on one 
count of first-degree murder.  The subsequent information 
contained an additional three counts (indecent behavior with a 
child, enticement of a child for immoral purposes and attempted 
 
No. 93-2444-CR 
 
 
 
9 
enticement of a child for immoral purposes).  The defendant 
challenged the court's jurisdiction to try him on the additional 
counts based on the assertion that no evidence was introduced at 
the preliminary hearing to support the sex-related charges.  This 
court found that, even assuming no evidence had been presented at 
the preliminary hearing on the sex-related offenses, they were 
clearly "not wholly unrelated" to the murder and that, in fact, 
ample evidence had been presented as to the additional counts.  
Bailey, 65 Wis. 2d at 343, 341.  We held that Bailey was properly 
tried on all four counts.  
 
The authority of the district attorney to include additional 
transactionally related counts in an information was further 
strengthened in Burke, in which this court pointed to prior cases, 
including 
Bailey, 
that 
held 
"that 
in 
a 
multiple-offense 
transaction case, once the defendant has been bound over for trial 
on at least one count relating to the transaction, the prosecutor 
may in the information charge additional counts not wholly 
unrelated."  Burke, at 453.  Burke was originally charged in a 
multi-count complaint but prior to preliminary hearing the State 
moved to dismiss all but one count of second-degree sexual 
assault.  We concluded that inclusion in the ensuing information 
of four additional counts of sexual assault, on which no direct 
evidence had been received, was permissible because they were not 
wholly unrelated to the transactions or facts testified to at 
preliminary.  Id. at 457. 
 
No. 93-2444-CR 
 
 
 
10 
 
In Richer, we noted that our decisions expanding the 
authority of the district attorney to include any counts that 
exhibit such a "transactional nexus" were "indicative of this 
court's continuing efforts to further the underlying legislative 
and constitutional goals of the preliminary hearing while also 
affording prosecutors increasing flexibility in their charging 
decisions."  Richer, 174 Wis. 2d at 246.  Richer was charged with 
one count of delivery of a controlled substance involving an 
incident alleged to have occurred on November 21, 1990.  Testimony 
at the preliminary hearing was limited to that incident and 
resulted in a finding of probable cause sufficient for bind over. 
 The information subsequently filed by the State included an 
additional count charging delivery of a controlled substance on 
November 30, 1990.  Id. at 237.   
 
In concluding that the second count could not properly be 
added to the information, we discussed the stated objectives of 
preliminary examinations reiterated above and noted that the 
"proceeding must also be adequate to fulfill the defendant's 
constitutional right to know the nature and cause of the charges 
against which he must defend."  Richer, 174 Wis. 2d at 242.  The 
"state must assume the burden of establishing the transactional 
link between the charges before including additional counts in the 
information not otherwise supported by independent fact finding at 
the preliminary hearing . . . ."  Id. at 249.  Because there was 
no basis within the confines of the evidence presented at the 
 
No. 93-2444-CR 
 
 
 
11 
preliminary hearing to support the second count or to link it to 
the first, we concluded that the count alleging delivery on 
November 30, 1990, was properly dismissed.
5  Id. at 236-37. 
 
In the case before us now, the purposes of a preliminary 
hearing and the protections it must provide have been well-served 
by the inclusion in the information of the count of first-degree 
reckless injury.  There was sufficient evidence presented to 
establish probable cause that a felony had been committed by 
Williams in the context of the attack on Buie to justify 
restricting Williams' liberty and proceeding with a prosecution 
against him.  Williams was put on notice and had ample opportunity 
to prepare his defense to charges stemming from that incident. 
 
We previously addressed the sparse commentary on the 
legislative history surrounding the creation of subsection (10) in 
Bailey.  There, as here, we rejected the defendant's contention 
that the language of subsection (10) limits the prosecutor's 
authority to charge additional, related counts in an information 
following bind over.  Bailey, 65 Wis. 2d at 340.  Bailey's 
argument was based on the following Judicial Council explanatory 
note: 
                     
    
5  As the test we enunciate today should make clear, the 
evidence supporting a count charged in the information must be 
transactionally related to a count on which there has been a valid 
bind over. 
 
No. 93-2444-CR 
 
 
 
12 
 
Sub. (10) is a new provision requiring a finding of 
probable cause as to each count in a multiple count 
complaint.  If such a finding is not made as to any 
count, it shall be dismissed.  This reverses the rule in 
Hobbins v. State, 214 Wis. 496, 253 N.W. 570 [1934]. 
 
§ 63, ch. 255, Laws of 1969, at 637.  In Bailey, we explained that 
the statutory language in subsection (10) and the comment "are 
directed at the holding of the [Hobbins'] court which permitted 
the trial court to assume jurisdiction over and try counts which 
had been included in the criminal complaint but were specifically 
dismissed by the presiding magistrate at the preliminary hearing." 
 Id. at 341 (citing Hobbins, 214 Wis. at 508-510).   
 
A review of Hobbins indicates that our holding today does not 
conflict with the above language in Bailey.  The original 
complaint filed against Mr. Hobbins, a bank president, contained 
35 counts but he was bound over on only 16 of these.  On appeal, 
Hobbins argued that he was improperly convicted on Counts I and II 
because they were among those that had been dismissed at the 
preliminary examination.  Hobbins, 214 Wis. at 508.  The court 
noted that the manner in which the appeal was presented generated 
confusion but still found that, even though it appeared that the 
dismissed and recharged counts stemmed from incidents occurring on 
separate dates than those for which bind over was determined 
proper, the magistrate's opinion placed no restrictions on the 
district attorney in the filing of the ensuing information.  Id. 
at 509-510.  We conclude that the "rule of Hobbins" that is 
reversed by subsection (10) is that which allowed the court to 
 
No. 93-2444-CR 
 
 
 
13 
"resurrect" counts that were transactionally unrelated to any for 
which probable cause had been found sufficient to justify bind 
over.   
 
In a multi-count complaint, a transactionally distinct count 
(i.e. one which is not transactionally related to any others in 
the complaint) that is found lacking in probable cause and 
therefore dismissed may not be recharged nor may any charges 
arising from that same incident be included in a subsequent 
information even if other transactionally distinct counts do pass 
the muster of preliminary examination resulting in a valid bind 
over.  This rule is completely consistent with existing practice 
and precedent involving single count complaints.  In fact, this is 
the only reading of subsection (10) that does not produce 
"questionable results" and make the law look "silly," as does the 
court of appeals' interpretation by its own acknowledgment.  
[John] Williams, 190 Wis. 2d at 10; State v. [Scott] Williams, 186 
Wis. 2d 506, 513, 520 N.W.2d 920 (Ct. App. 1994).
6    
 
A statute should be construed so as to avoid absurd results. 
 State v. Peete, 185 Wis. 2d 4, 17, 517 N.W.2d 149 (1994).  
                     
    
6  The court of appeals in State v. [Scott] Williams, 186 Wis. 
2d 506, 507, 520 N.W.2d 920 (Ct. App. 1994), interpreted 
subsection (10) to require a finding of probable cause as to "the 
particular" felony charged.  In the companion opinion released 
today, State v. [Scott] Williams, No. 93-2517-CR (S. Ct. Feb. 1, 
1996), we reverse the court of appeals and conclude that the State 
"need only establish probable cause that a felony occurred as to 
one count in a set of transactionally related counts for a valid 
bind over on that set."  [Scott] Williams, op. at 1.  
 
No. 93-2444-CR 
 
 
 
14 
Further, there must be a strong showing of legislative intent 
before we will construe a statute in a manner that would create an 
anomaly in criminal procedure.  See State v. White, 97 Wis. 2d 
193, 198, 295 N.W.2d 346 (1980).  The court of appeals in this 
case concluded that subsection (10) was unambiguously susceptible 
to only one reasonable interpretation, i.e. that the prosecutor 
was barred from relying "on the facts presented at the preliminary 
hearing with regard to the dismissed charge to form the basis of a 
new charge in an Information."  [John] Williams, 190 Wis. 2d at 7. 
 In concluding that Count III-i therefore could not be added to 
the information it rejected the cases relied upon by the State 
that articulated the rule that district attorneys may include any 
not wholly unrelated count in an information (Bailey, 65 Wis. 2d 
at 341; Burke, 153 Wis. 2d at 457; Richer, 174 Wis. 2d at 253) 
because these cases had all been heard in preliminary examination 
as single count complaints.  The court of appeals thus determined 
that although "it might not be sound law to distinguish between 
single- and multiple-count complaints," the statute demanded the 
two be treated differently.  [John] Williams, 190 Wis. 2d at 10.  
On this point we agree with the court of appeals.  It is not sound 
law to make such a distinction thereby creating an anomalous 
procedure and, in this opinion, we hope to make it clear that 
single and multiple count complaints are to receive the same 
procedural treatment.   
 
 
No. 93-2444-CR 
 
 
 
15 
 
The defendant, circuit court, court of appeals and the State 
all framed the essential inquiry as one of whether the district 
attorney had the discretion to include Count III-i in the 
information.  In reaching their disparate conclusions, all of them 
focussed on the second sentence of subsection (10)--"The facts 
arising out of any count ordered dismissed shall not be the basis 
for a count in any information filed pursuant to ch. 971."  We 
conclude that the question posed here requires this court to back 
up one step in the analysis--the real issue is whether Count III-c 
was properly dismissed at the preliminary hearing pursuant to the 
first sentence of subsection (10)--"In multiple count complaints, 
the court shall order dismissed any count for which it finds there 
is no probable cause." 
 
"The true meaning of a single section of a statute . . . , 
however precise its language, cannot be ascertained if it be 
considered apart from related sections . . . ."  Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 223 (1984).  Further, 
this court may insert words into a statute that are necessary or 
reasonably inferable.  State v. Gould, 56 Wis. 2d 808, 812, 202 
N.W.2d 903 (1973).
7  After applying the rules of statutory 
                     
    
7  In State v. Gould, 56 Wis. 2d 808, 812, 202 N.W. 2d 903 
(1973), this court found ambiguity and conflict in the language of 
the then-existing version of the aggravated battery statute 
("Whoever intentionally causes great bodily harm to another by an 
act done with intent to cause bodily harm to that person or 
another . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 940.22 (1971-1972)).  To resolve 
the situation, this court held that, "the word 'great' should be 
inserted before the second 'bodily harm' therein as reasonably 
 
No. 93-2444-CR 
 
 
 
16 
construction discussed within this opinion, we conclude that 
clarity necessitates that the following language from subsection 
(7) ("to believe a felony has been committed by the defendant") 
must be added to the end of the first sentence of subsection (10). 
 The first sentence of the statute should now be read as, "In 
multiple count complaints, the court shall order dismissed any 
count for which it finds there is not probable cause to believe a 
felony has been committed by the defendant."  Further, this 
inserted language is to be interpreted in multiple count 
complaints exactly as it has been in single count complaints. 
 
 
We suggest the following procedure be employed at preliminary 
examinations on multi-count complaints and illustrate it using the 
present case as an example: 
 
(1) The examining judge shall examine the counts in the 
criminal complaint and the factual bases stated therein 
to determine which counts are transactionally related in 
that they arose from a common nucleus of facts or, in 
other words, which counts are "related in terms of 
parties 
involved, 
witnesses 
involved, 
geographical 
proximity, time, physical evidence, motive and intent," 
Bailey v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 331, 341, 222 N.W.2d 871 
(1974);  
(..continued) 
inferable and to avoid conflicting provisions and an absurd 
result."  Gould, 56 Wis. 2d at 812. 
 
No. 93-2444-CR 
 
 
 
17 
 
Here, Count I stood alone as the only count related to 
the attack on Storlid-Harris while Counts II and III-c 
were 
clearly 
transactionally 
related 
because 
they 
involved the same participants and witnesses, occurred 
at the same time and place, relied on the same physical 
evidence and allegedly arose from the same motive; 
 
(2) In a review of transactionally related counts, after 
presentation of all of the evidence at the preliminary 
hearing, if the examining judge finds there is probable 
cause to believe that a felony was committed, there is 
necessarily probable cause as to all counts that are 
transactionally related and the defendant shall be bound 
over on all those counts; 
 
The court found that there was probable cause that 
Williams had committed a felony in relation to the 
attack on Buie when it bound Williams over on Count II. 
 Therefore, the court should have also bound Williams 
over on the transactionally related Count III-c as well. 
 
(3) Conversely, if no probable cause is found that a 
felony was committed in conjunction with review of 
counts that are transactionally related, the examining 
judge shall dismiss all those counts and the district 
attorney may not include in the information those counts 
or any additional counts arising from that common 
nucleus of facts. 
 
No. 93-2444-CR 
 
 
 
18 
 
Again, Williams' case provides a clear example--if the 
examining judge had determined that there was no 
probable cause to support the count involving the attack 
on Storlid-Harris he would have been compelled to 
dismiss it and the district attorney would have been 
barred from including any counts stemming from that 
incident in a subsequent information. 
 
We have previously stated that the proper role of a judge at 
preliminary examination is to determine if there is a plausible 
account that the defendant committed a felony.  And further, that 
"[t]he court cannot delve into the credibility of a witness."  
State v. Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d 389, 397-98, 359 N.W.2d 151 (1984).  
The examining judge in this case went beyond what is expected and 
what is proper in a preliminary examination when he dismissed 
Count III-c because he had "problems" with Buie's testimony.  The 
court obviously found Buie's testimony plausible enough to believe 
probable cause existed that Williams had committed a felony in 
connection with the encounter between the two men because it bound 
him over on Count II.  The inquiry--and commentary--should have 
ended there. 
 
 
In summary, when counts are transactionally related, the 
purpose of the preliminary is served once it has been established 
that there is probable cause to believe the defendant has 
committed a felony.  Each of the particular felonies charged need 
not be proved.  It is not necessary and, in fact, is inadvisable 
 
No. 93-2444-CR 
 
 
 
19 
for the court to opine as to exactly what felony was probably 
committed.
8  Counts arising from a common nucleus of facts will 
necessarily either be supported by probable cause sufficient to 
justify bind over on all or will all be dismissed.  The evidence 
adduced at preliminary hearing concerning any dismissed count that 
is not transactionally related to a count for which bind over was 
deemed proper may not form the basis for any count in the ensuing 
information.
9  We reiterate, however, that the State may include 
any count in an information as long as it is transactionally 
related to a count on which the defendant is bound over.  The 
challenged language in subsection (10) merely restricts the 
district attorney from bringing charges in an information based on 
dismissed counts that are transactionally distinct from any counts 
for which bind over was deemed appropriate. 
                     
    
8  We stress that the purpose of preliminary examinations is 
not served by placing restrictions on the district attorney's 
"quasi-judicial" role in determining what charges are ultimately 
appropriate.  We stand by our previous observation that "the 
prosecuting attorney is not limited to the opinion of the 
preliminary hearing judge as to the crime or crimes to be charged 
in the information."  State v. Hooper, 101 Wis. 2d 517, 536, 305 
N.W.2d 110 (1981). 
    
9  Whether such a count was single or part of a multiple count 
complaint, it may only be recharged in a separate criminal 
complaint if the district attorney has or discovers additional 
evidence.  Wis. Stat. § 970.04. 
 
No. 93-2444-CR 
 
 
 
20 
 
Issue 2 
 
Williams argues that the court committed prejudicial error 
during 
trial 
by 
restricting 
cross-examination 
of 
the 
victim/witness Buie as to prior inconsistent statements made to 
the defendant's private investigator.  The court sustained the 
State's objection to this line of questioning because it found 
that Williams' failure to turn over the relevant notes constituted 
a violation of discovery under Wis. Stat. § 971.24.  
 
Rulings excluding evidence may not be found erroneous unless 
"the substance of the evidence was made known to the judge by 
offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were 
asked."  Wis. Stat. § 901.03(1)(b).  "When a claim of error is 
based upon the erroneous exclusion of evidence, 'an offer of proof 
must be made in the trial court as a condition precedent to the 
review of any alleged error.'"  State v. Hoffman, 106 Wis. 2d 185, 
217-18, 316 N.W.2d 143 (Ct. App. 1982) (quoting McClelland v. 
State, 84 Wis. 2d 145, 153, 267 N.W.2d 843 (1978)).  Williams made 
no offer of proof as to the contents of these notes and the record 
otherwise contains no indication of the nature of the inconsistent 
statements that Williams claims Buie made to the private 
investigator.  Thus, we will not reach the merits of this claim of 
error.  
 
We therefore reverse the court of appeals and affirm the 
judgment and order entered by the circuit court. 
 
No. 93-2444-CR 
 
 
 
21 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.  
 
No. 93.2444.wab 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
22 
   
 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.  (concurring).   The majority in the 
trilogy of cases decided today, State v. John T. Williams (93-
2444); State v. Terry Akins (94-1872); and State v. Scott E. 
Williams (93-2517), puts forth a highly commendable effort to 
reconcile the nearly irreconcilable.   In these efforts, the 
majority is forced to wrestle with the language of two specific 
statutes which on their face seem to contradict their conclusions.  
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 971.01(1) states in relevant part: "The 
district attorney shall examine all facts and circumstances 
connected with any preliminary examination . . . and . . . shall 
file an information according to the evidence on such examination  
. . . ."  (Emphasis added.)  In Scott E. Williams, absolutely no 
evidence was introduced regarding whether these drug offenses 
occurred within 1000 feet of a school yet the majority allows 
those four counts to stand.   
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 970.03(10), involving multiple count 
complaints, provides in relevant part:  "The facts arising out of 
any count ordered dismissed shall not be the basis for a count in 
any information . . . ."   In John T. Williams, the facts arising 
out of the count dismissed at the preliminary are the exact same 
facts which are the basis for count three of the information.   
The majority's interpretation changes a proscription of authority 
("shall not") into a grant of authority.  It is undisputed that 
 
No. 93.2444.wab 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
2 
the facts arising out of count three in the complaint which was 
dismissed are the basis for count three in the information.   In 
Akins, a challenge to equal protection is avoided only by 
utilizing the same interpretation. 
 
Consistency in the interpretation of these statutes, and 
other statutes such as Wis. Stat. § 970.04, is achieved in a far 
less tortuous manner by simply requiring a factual basis in the 
preliminary examination for each crime charged in the information. 
 This was the course urged on the court in the dissent filed by 
Justice Abrahamson in State v. Burke, 153 W. 2d 445, 451 N.W.2d 
739 (1990), in which I joined.  The reasons expressed in that 
dissent are as valid today as they were then.   Burke is the 
underpinning of each of these cases.  Without Burke, each would 
fall.  Given the choice, I would overrule Burke.  However, the 
majority refuses to do so.  Thus, Burke remains the law today.  
Because it is the law, I concur.  
   
I write only to express a deep concern.  I fear we have not 
heard the end of the problems that have consistently come before 
this court since Burke.  For example, this trilogy of cases and 
its progeny will allow the State to charge a defendant with 
second-degree recklessly endangering safety, put in evidence at 
the preliminary to show probable cause as to that charge, and then 
charge the defendant in the information with sexual assault, 
kidnapping, and attempted murder.  These cases will allow this 
 
No. 93.2444.wab 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
3 
type of charging 
as long 
as the 
additional 
charges are 
transactionally related to a count on which the defendant was 
bound over.  Any criminal justice system so utterly replete with 
plea bargaining (as is ours) that allows this type of charging to 
occur is clearly subject to abuse.   Extraordinary power has been 
placed in the hands of the district attorney with these decisions. 
  In the present day atmosphere where plea bargaining is the rule 
rather than the exception, the state holds all the levers; the 
defendant can be coerced into a plea beyond the bounds of 
fairness. 
 
That this is true is due in no small part to another facet of 
these cases:  judicial review of the state's final charging 
decision has for all intents and purposes been abolished.  The 
only judicial review is confined to the question of whether the 
additional charges are wholly unrelated in terms of the parties 
involved, 
witnesses 
involved, 
geographical 
proximity, 
time, 
physical evidence, motive and intent.  Burke, 153 Wis.2d at 457.  
There is no judicial review as to whether any evidence even exists 
to believe the defendant is guilty of the additional crimes 
charged.   
 
As a former district attorney, this writer can attest to the 
power that rests with the decision to charge.  No one can deny it. 
But it can be abused, intentionally or unintentionally.   The 
State should not resent judicial review of its charging decisions, 
 
No. 93.2444.wab 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
4 
it should welcome it.  It serves as a check on human 
fallibilities, on the pressures of an overcrowded calendar, on the 
pressures emanating from outside forces.  It may be inconvenient, 
but checks and balances are frequently inconvenient, particularly 
on the person or the institution being checked and balanced.   
 
Unquestionably, the system now set in place by these cases is 
efficient.  But efficiency should never yield to basic notions of 
fairness.  Efficiency is hardly the only sought after objective in 
a democratic society. 
 
I am authorized to state that Justices Shirley S. Abrahamson 
and Ann Walsh Bradley join in this concurrence. 
 
No. 93.2444.wab 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
93-2444-CR 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
John T. Williams, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  190 Wis. 2d 1, 527 N.W.2d 338 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1994) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
February 1, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
October 6, 1995 
Oral Argument: 
 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
ROBERT DE CHAMBEAU 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
BABLITCH, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
 
  ABRAHAMSON and BRADLEY, J.J., joins 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was submitted on the briefs of Maureen McGlynn Flanagan, assistant 
attorney general and James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Gregory J. 
Meeker and Relles, Meeker & Borns, Madison.