Case Title: Caldwell v.  Cometto

Citation: 

Docket Number: 37157

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2011-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 37157 
 
DAVID L. CALDWELL and KATHY C. 
CALDWELL, husband and wife; 
LAWRENCE L. SEILER and THERESA 
L. SEILER, husband and wife; and 
PATRICIA ST. ANGELO, 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross 
Respondents, 
 
v. 
 
THOMAS W. COMETTO and LORI M. 
COMETTO, husband and wife; and DOES 
1-5, 
 
       Defendants-Respondents-Cross 
       Appellants. 
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Lewiston April 2011 Term 
 
2011 Opinion No.  61 
 
Filed:  May 26, 2011 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
       
    
 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho, Bonner County.  Hon. Charles Hosack, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.  The district court’s 
order denying attorney fees is affirmed.  No award of costs or attorney 
fees on appeal. 
 
Macomber Law, PLLC, Coeur d’Alene, for appellants.  Arthur B. 
Macomber argued. 
 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd., Sandpoint, for respondents. Brent C. 
Featherston argued. 
______________________________ 
W. JONES, Justice 
 
I.  NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants challenge the district court’s refusal to allow the removal of trees within and 
adjacent to an access-road easement in favor of Appellants running over property belonging to 
their neighbors, the Comettos. Because there is substantial evidence that the trees do not 
unreasonably hinder maintenance or snow removal, the district court’s order is affirmed. The 
district court’s denial of the parties’ requests for attorney fees also is affirmed, as neither party 
prevailed below. 
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II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This dispute involves several parcels of property in a forested rural portion of Bonner 
County, Idaho. An access road travels for roughly eight miles from the nearest county highway, 
crossing National Forest land along the way, before first reaching property belonging to Thomas 
and Lori Cometto, Respondents. The road enters the western edge of the Comettos’ parcel and 
exits to the east, crossing onto one of two properties owned by David and Kathy Caldwell. It 
then proceeds through the Caldwells’ second parcel and onward to land owned by Patricia St. 
Angelo and Lawrence and Theresa Seiler. St. Angelo, the Caldwells, and the Seilers are 
Appellants in this matter.  
Until 1997, the access road ran in a straight line directly through the Comettos’ parcel 
and was subject to a deeded easement benefiting Appellants. At that time, the Comettos rerouted 
the road so that it circumvented the buildings on their property, a project that added four new 
sharp turns to the road. The new road is also narrow, spanning just eleven to twelve feet in some 
places. 
Shortly thereafter, two of the Appellants’ predecessors in interest filed separate suits 
against the Comettos, alleging that the new road illegally injured their easement rights under I.C. 
§ 55-313. To settle that litigation, in 2000 the Appellants and/or their predecessors in interest 
signed an easement agreement with the Comettos.1 The agreement granted Appellants an 
easement over the newly constructed access road, “which easement is believed to lie within the 
West thirty (30) feet, the North thirty (30) feet, and the East thirty (30) feet of the Cometto 
Property.” It was recorded and, by its terms, is appurtenant to the Appellants’ land. 
Appellants filed this action in October of 2007, seeking an order quieting title to the new 
easement at a full thirty feet in width, a declaratory judgment that the Comettos must upgrade the 
road to the same standards as the previous road, an injunction against placing obstacles in the 
right-of-way, and other relief. Just prior to the bench trial, Appellants moved to amend their 
pleading to add a quiet-title claim based on a different supposed sixty-foot-wide deeded 
easement. On the first day of trial, the court responded to the motion by bifurcating the 
                                                 
1 The agreement is signed by Kathleen Caldwell, Appellant, David and Bonnie Crum, St. Angelo’s predecessors in 
interest, and Arlan Lemen, who is the Seilers’ predecessor in interest. Jerry and Judith Campbell also signed the 
agreement on behalf of their family trust. They are predecessors in interest to both of the Caldwells’ properties. The 
Caldwells have owned a residential property near the Comettos’ parcel since 1998, but did not obtain their second 
property until 2004, which is a largely unimproved neighboring parcel. The unimproved parcel lies directly to the 
east of the Comettos’ property; it is the parcel through which the access road travels immediately after leaving the 
Comettos’ land.  
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proceedings to allow the parties to later address easement claims other than those arising from 
the easement agreement. A three-day trial followed, focusing exclusively on the scope of the 
easement agreement.2 
After trial, the district court issued an Amended Partial Judgment in which it quieted title 
to the easement in favor of Appellants, incorporating a new professional survey of the road.3 The 
court held that the agreement conveyed a primary easement over the new travelway, as well as a 
three-foot-wide secondary easement along each edge of the road up to a maximum of thirty total 
feet in width. It held that, in areas where the travelway was less than fourteen feet wide, the 
secondary easement would expand so that the total easement width would equal twenty feet. 
Although the partial judgment required the Comettos to keep debris and obstacles out of the 
easement, it expressly precluded Appellants from removing any of the nineteen mature trees 
from the secondary easement. The Amended Partial Judgment included a Certificate of Final 
Judgment as to Appellants’ claims under the easement agreement pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b)(1). 
The court also issued an order denying the parties’ cross-motions for costs and attorney fees, 
holding that there had been no prevailing party. 
Appellants appealed from the Amended Partial Judgment and from the order denying 
their motion for attorney fees.4 They assert that there is no substantial evidence supporting the 
district court’s refusal to allow mature trees to be removed from within the secondary easement. 
They also contend that the district court’s ruling on attorney fees was premature, as they have 
further claims remaining to be resolved. The Comettos respond that Appellants are simply asking 
this Court to second-guess the trial court’s findings regarding the trees along the access road. 
They also filed a cross-appeal, asserting that the district court should have awarded them 
attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party below. 
III.  ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. 
Whether there is substantial evidence to support the district court’s refusal to allow or 
require trees within the secondary access-road easement to be removed. 
                                                 
2 Although they were plaintiffs in this action and participated in discovery, St. Angelo and the Seilers did not 
actually participate in the trial. Along with Lori Cometto, the Caldwells were the only witnesses called on 
Appellants’ behalf. The district court’s Amended Partial Judgment nonetheless applies to all Appellants, not just the 
Caldwells. 
3 The court ordered the parties to split the cost of properly surveying the road as it existed after trial.  
4 A court may “direct the entry of a final judgment upon one or more but less than all of the claims or parties” in an 
action if the district court finds there is no just reason  to delay judgment. I.R.C.P. 54(b)(1). Appeals may be taken as 
a matter of right from partial judgments certified this way. I.A.R. 11(a)(3). 
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2. 
Whether the district court properly ruled that neither party was entitled to attorney fees 
below. 
3. 
Whether either party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
IV.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews the trial court’s findings after a bench trial for clear error. I.R.C.P. 
52(a).5 “A trial court’s findings of fact in a bench trial will be liberally construed on appeal in 
favor of the judgment entered, in view of the trial court’s role as trier of fact.” Beckstead v. 
Price, 146 Idaho 57, 61, 190 P.3d 876, 880 (2008) (quoting Anderson v. Larsen, 136 Idaho 402, 
405, 34 P.3d 1085, 1088 (2001)). Factual findings will be upheld if supported by substantial, 
competent evidence, even if the parties presented conflicting evidence at trial. Griffin v. 
Anderson, 144 Idaho 376, 378, 162 P.3d 755, 757 (2007). By contrast, this Court freely reviews 
issues of law. Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 506, 65 P.3d 525, 528 (2003).  
V.  ANALYSIS 
A. 
The District Court’s Refusal to Allow Mature Trees Within the Secondary 
Easement to Be Removed Was Supported by Substantial Evidence 
Neither party contests the district court’s holding regarding the location and width of the 
access-road easement. Appellants, however, argue that they should be permitted to remove trees 
within the secondary easement that runs along the established travelway. Despite the fact that the 
district court granted a three-foot secondary easement along each side of the travelway, it 
declined to allow any trees to be removed.  It held that the “existing mature trees within the 
secondary easement have not been shown to unreasonably interfere with plaintiffs’ ability to 
maintain the travelway, and that removal of existing mature trees is precluded as it would 
constitute an alteration that unnecessarily burdens the servient tenement.” The Caldwells testified 
that a number of trees are located just adjacent to the travelway, making travel difficult. They 
contend that the trees present the greatest problem during the winter, as they impede or damage 
the Caldwells’ heavy plowing equipment and make it difficult to store snow in large piles near 
the travelway.  
The easement agreement conveyed to Appellants “an easement over and across the 
Cometto property, for the benefit of their respective properties,” located on the newly 
constructed roadway. When construing an instrument granting an easement, the court must 
consider the intent of the parties and the circumstances in existence at the time the easement was 
                                                 
5 “Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. In the application of this principle regard shall be 
given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of those witnesses who appear personally 
before it.” I.R.C.P. 52(a). 
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granted. Kolouch v. Kramer, 120 Idaho 65, 69, 813 P.2d 876, 880 (1991). “Where the grant or 
reservation of an easement is general in its terms, use of the easement includes those uses which 
are incidental or necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement, but is limited 
to those that burden the servient estate as little as possible.” Walker v. Boozer, 140 Idaho 451, 
455, 95 P.3d 69, 73 (2004) (quoting Abbott v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 548, 
808 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1991)). Idaho recognizes the existence of secondary easements, which 
convey the right to repair and maintain the primary easement so long as such activity is 
reasonable. Drew v. Sorensen, 133 Idaho 534, 538, 989 P.2d 276, 280 (1999); see also Conley v. 
Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265, 271, 985 P.2d 1127, 1133 (1999) (stating that secondary easements to 
repair and maintain the primary easement cannot enlarge the burden on the servient estate); 
Simonson v. Moon, 72 Idaho 39, 48, 237 P.2d 93, 98 (1951) (recognizing that secondary 
easements exist as to ditch rights “for the purpose of cleaning and maintenance”). 
There was substantial evidence to justify the district court’s finding that removing mature 
trees within the secondary easement would unreasonably burden the Comettos’ estate. The 
district court provided the secondary easement along the length of the access road onto which the 
Caldwells could push snow. It also allowed two snow-storage areas adjacent to the road on the 
west side of their property, the portion furthest away from the Caldwells’ parcel. The court 
reasoned that the Caldwells could store additional snow on their own property. The Caldwells 
own at least five pieces of heavy snow removal equipment, and although they have collided with 
trees before, there was no testimony that any specific trees make the road impassable in the 
winter. On appeal, rather than identifying particularly problematic individual trees, the 
Appellants seem to assert that all the trees within the secondary easement should be removed. 
Further, the district court had the benefit of a number of photographs that Appellants introduced 
at trial but did not provide to this Court on appeal. The district court’s decision is therefore 
affirmed. 
Appellants expend considerable effort arguing that the Comettos violated I.C. § 55-313 in 
1997 when they reconfigured the road so that a number of trees are directly adjacent to the 
travelway. This statute allows the servient-estate owner to relocate an access road when doing so 
does not injure interested parties.6 Statewide Constr., Inc. v. Pietri, 150 Idaho 423, 429, 247 P.3d 
                                                 
6 I.C. § 55-313 provides in full: 
Where, for motor vehicle travel, any access which is less than a public dedication, has 
heretofore been or may hereafter be, constructed across private lands, the person or persons 
owning or controlling the private lands shall have the right at their own expense to change such 
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650, 656 (2011). The Comettos contend that any claims under § 55-313 have already been 
litigated and settled by the easement agreement.  
Whether I.C. § 55-313 prevents the Comettos’ from realigning the access road is not an 
issue before this Court. The district court below expressly limited the bench trial to interpreting 
the scope of Appellants’ easement rights under the easement agreement and did not address any 
§ 55-313 arguments in its Amended Partial Judgment. Whether Appellants have any lingering 
claims under § 55-313 or whether such claims are blocked by res judicata are issues that remain 
to be resolved in the next stage of the bifurcated proceedings. 
B. 
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Declining to Award Attorney 
Fees and Costs After Issuing a Partial Judgment Because No Party Prevailed 
The district court below bifurcated the proceedings, separating Appellants’ claims under 
the easement agreement from any other claims relating to the easement. It then found that there 
was no prevailing party and denied each side’s cross-motions for attorney fees. Appellants 
contend that it was premature for the district court to enter this order because midway through a 
bifurcated action is too soon to identify a prevailing party. Both sides also argue that the district 
court should have awarded them attorney fees. 
1. 
A Partial Judgment Certified Under I.R.C.P. 54(b)(1) Is a Final Order for Which 
the Court May Award Fees and Costs 
Costs are generally allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party. I.R.C.P. 
54(d)(1)(A). The courts may also award attorney fees to a prevailing party pursuant to statute or 
contract. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1). For both costs and fees, Rule 54(d)(1)(B) governs the determination 
of who, if anyone, is the prevailing party. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B), 54(e)(1). This rule provides that 
“the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action.” 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Judges are therefore empowered to award costs and fees 
pertaining either to a final judgment or to an action that has been completely adjudicated. 
The district court’s ruling on costs and fees was not premature because a partial judgment 
is a “final judgment” as required in Rule 54(d)(1)(B). A judgment is final if it has been certified 
as such pursuant to Rule 54(b)(1). I.R.C.P. 54(a). A partial judgment certified as final is not 
subject to revision. I.R.C.P. 54(b)(1). The Amended Partial Judgment in this action has been 
certified as a final judgment with respect to Appellants’ claims under the easement agreement. 
                                                                                                                                                             
access to any other part of the private lands, but such change must be made in such a manner as 
not to obstruct motor vehicle travel, or to otherwise injure any person or persons using or 
interested in such access. 
 
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Because the judgment is final and is not subject to the court’s revision, it was within the court’s 
discretion to award costs and fees. The district court therefore could identify a prevailing party.7 
2. 
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Holding That Neither Party 
Prevailed 
The court’s decision as to which party prevailed is subject to abuse-of-discretion review. 
J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics Int’l, Inc., 130 Idaho 255, 258, 939 P.2d 574, 577 (1997). In 
examining whether a court has abused its discretion, this Court considers:  
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of this discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to 
it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.  
Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power, 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). To 
identify the prevailing party, the court considers the partial judgment “in relation to the relief 
sought by the requested parties.” I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B). The district court may apportion costs and 
fees between the parties, and where the parties have each succeeded on some issues but not on 
others, the district court may find that neither party has prevailed. E.g. Trilogy Network Sys., Inc. 
v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 847–48, 172 P.3d 1119, 1122–23 (2007); Israel v. Leachman, 139 
Idaho 24, 27, 72 P.3d 864, 867 (2003). Here, the district court’s decision satisfied the first 
element of the abuse-of-discretion analysis by recognizing that its decision was discretionary.  
The court below also acted within the bounds of its discretion and through an exercise of 
reason when it found that none of the parties had prevailed. Appellants sought to quiet title to a 
thirty-foot-wide easement pursuant to the easement agreement and to enjoin the Comettos from 
placing structures or obstacles in or near the roadway. Appellants prevailed in part in that the 
court quieted title in their favor both to the roadway itself as well as a secondary easement, 
which included two snow-storage areas. The Comettos must also keep the roadway clear. 
Appellants seek a number of other kinds of relief, including the right to upgrade and realign the 
road, but these claims have yet to be fully adjudicated, as they rest on other easement theories. 
The Comettos prevailed in part because the court found that the agreement conveyed an 
easement that, in most places, does not span a full thirty feet. They also may retain the mature 
                                                 
7 Recently this Court mentioned that attorney fees cannot be awarded until all of the claims involved in an “action” 
have been resolved. Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 804 n.4, 241 P.3d 972 n.4 (2010). It is true that an action 
has not been fully adjudicated until all the claims and defenses at issue have been resolved, but I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B) 
also provides that a court may award fees when it has issued a “final judgment.” Because a Rule 54(b) partial 
judgment is defined as a “final judgment” under I.R.C.P. 54(a), a court may issue fees pertaining to that portion of 
the action. It might well be preferable in bifurcated cases for the district court to wait to rule on motions for costs 
and attorney fees until the entire action has concluded. 
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trees along the travelway, even those within the secondary easement. The district court therefore 
did not abuse its discretion by finding that there had been no prevailing party in the first stage of 
the bifurcated proceedings. 
C. 
Neither Party Is Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal 
Appellants requested attorney fees on appeal under the terms of the easement agreement, 
which provides for attorney fees and costs on appeal to be awarded to a “prevailing party” in any 
dispute relating to the interpretation or enforcement of the agreement.8 Appellants do not prevail 
on either of the two issues they raised on appeal: (1) whether the district court should have 
allowed the trees within the secondary easement to be cut down; and (2) whether the court 
should have awarded costs and fees below to Appellants. Since they do not prevail on appeal, 
Appellants are not entitled to attorney fees under the easement agreement. 
The Comettos claim attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3), which mandates a fee award to 
the prevailing party in civil actions involving commercial transactions.9 Blimka v. My Web 
Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 728, 152 P.3d 594, 599 (2007). They also seek fees under I.C. 
§ 12-121, which allows courts discretion to award fees to the prevailing party in appeals that 
have been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.10 Berg v. 
Kendall, 147 Idaho 571, 579, 212 P.3d 1001, 1009 (2009). Where both parties prevail in part on 
appeal, this Court may deny fees. See Boll v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 334, 
344–45, 92 P.3d 1081, 1091–92 (2004) (finding no prevailing party under § 12-121 because both 
                                                 
8 Paragraph 12 of the easement agreement provides in full: “In the event that any dispute arises regarding the 
interpretation, application, breach or enforcement of this provision of this Agreement, then the prevailing party in 
such dispute shall be entitled to recover their attorney fees and costs incurred, including attorney fees and costs on 
appeal.” 
9 Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable 
instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or 
services and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party 
shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as 
costs. 
The term “commercial transaction” is defined to mean all transactions except transactions for personal or household 
purposes. The term “party” is defined to mean any person, partnership, corporation, association, private 
organization, the state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof. I.C. § 12-120(3). 
10 Idaho Code § 12-121 provides in full: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party 
or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute which otherwise 
provides for the award of attorney's fees. The term “party” or “parties” is defined to include any 
person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
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the appeal and the cross-appeal failed); Keller v. Inland Metals All Weather Cond., Inc., 139 
Idaho 233, 241, 76 P.3d 977, 985 (2003) (referring to § 12-120(3)). While the Comettos correctly 
note that Appellants were simply inviting this Court to second-guess the district court’s findings 
regarding trees along the easement, the Comettos also cross-appealed the district court’s ruling 
on costs and attorney fees. Since they did not prevail on their cross-appeal, as discussed above, 
the Comettos are not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. Without a prevailing party, it is not 
necessary to discuss whether this appeal involves a “commercial transaction” under § 12-120(3) 
or whether the appeal was brought or defended unreasonably under § 12-121. 
The Comettos also requested fees under the easement agreement, but for the reasons cited 
above, they are not the prevailing party under this contract provision and therefore are not 
entitled to fees. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The district court’s Amended Partial Judgment is affirmed, as there is substantial 
evidence supporting its decision to allow the Comettos to keep the mature trees along the 
easement. The district court’s order denying the parties’ cross-motions for attorney fees is 
affirmed, as no party prevailed below. Neither party is entitled to attorney fees or costs on appeal 
because neither prevailed. 
Chief Justice EISMANN, Justices BURDICK, J. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.