Case Title: Financial Relations Bd. v. Pawnee Corp.

Citation: 240 N.W.2d 565

Docket Number: 

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1976-04-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
240 N.W.2d 565 (1976) FINANCIAL RELATIONS BOARD, INC., Appellant, v. PAWNEE CORPORATION, Respondent. No. 46120. Supreme Court of Minnesota. April 2, 1976. Rice, Evans & Christensen and Robert Rice, Pipestone, for appellant. Gray, Plant, Mooty & Anderson and Richard A. Bowman, Minneapolis, for respondent. Considered and decided by the court without oral argument. TODD, Justice. Financial Relations Board, Inc. (Financial) appealed from a partial summary judgment entered against it by the Pipestone County District Court. This court sua sponte issued an order on February 13, 1976, dismissing the appeal without prejudice to Financial's right to raise the issues determined by the partial summary judgment in any subsequent appeal from a final order or judgment entered in this matter. We stated in that order that this opinion would follow. Financial's amended complaint alleged two causes of action against Pawnee Corporation (Pawnee), one based on a quantum meruit theory and one on a purported contract. The summary judgment order in this case was partial in nature, granting judgment *566 in favor of Pawnee only on Financial's contractual claims. The order and judgment both stated: The judge's memorandum made a part of the order explained: The appealability of partial summary judgments is governed by Rule 54.02, Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides: The rationale behind this rule has been explained as follows: While the trial judge in this case complied with the second requirement stated in the rule for making a partial summary judgment final and thus appealablei. e., he directed entry of the judgmenthe did not comply with the first requirement in that he did not make "an express determination that there is no just reason for delay." The word "express" in this clause is strictly followed by Federal courts in interpreting the identical language in Rule 54(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. One comment on the Minnesota rule points out: For other sources stating and discussing the general rule that partial summary judgments generally are not final judgments and therefore not appealable, see 6 Moore, Federal Practice, § 56.02[12]; 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 2715. Counsel for Financial expressed the concern that if he did not appeal on the contract theory at this stage, he would forever forfeit that claim to relief. It is true that Rule 104.01, Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, provides that an appeal from a "judgment" must be taken within 90 days after the entry thereof; however, Rule 104.01 refers only to a final judgment, not to any order or so-called judgment which is not in fact final. The clarification of this *567 limitation inherent in Rule 104.01 was apparently a primary purpose of the statement in Rule 54.02, Rules of Civil Procedure, that "any * * * decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims * * * shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims." This interaction between Rule 54.02 and Rule 104.01 has been emphasized as follows: Appeal dismissed.