Case Title: Neeley v. State

Citation: 457 N.E.2d 532

Docket Number: 1282S497, 682S230

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1983-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
457 N.E.2d 532 (1983)
Thomas Lee NEELEY, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 682S230 (Formerly 1282S497).

Supreme Court of Indiana.
December 30, 1983.
Rehearing Denied February 23, 1984.
*533 Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, Paul Levy, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Lee Cloyd, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
PIVARNIK, Justice.
This cause involves two direct appeals regarding two separate criminal actions brought against Defendant-Appellant Thomas Lee Neeley in the Marion Superior Courts. Criminal action number one, CR81-260B, proceeded as follows:
Criminal action number two, CR81-270A, developed as follows:
Appeal number two, 682S230, is Appellant's direct appeal taken from criminal action number two. In said Appeal, Appellant raises the following three issues with respect to criminal action number two:
1. whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to file a habitual offender count against Appellant;
2. whether the trial court erred by allowing Appellant to plead guilty to being a habitual offender; and,
3. whether the jury's verdict finding Appellant guilty of class C felony robbery was supported by sufficient probative evidence.
Appeal number one, formerly 1282S497, springs from criminal action number one. Specifically, appeal number one is Appellant's direct appeal taken from the trial court's denial on September 1, 1982, of Appellant's original and amended petitions for post conviction relief. In appeal number one, Appellant raises the following two issues:
4. whether Appellant was denied due process of law when the State sought to have him sentenced as a habitual offender in criminal action number two; and,
*534 5. whether Appellant's plea of guilty to class B felony robbery was supported by sufficient probative evidence.
On January 11, 1983, this Court ordered appeal number one consolidated into appeal number two but permitted separate briefs to be filed in each case.
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred by allowing the State to amend the information in criminal action number two by adding a habitual offender count. Appellant specifically claims that the trial court erred by violating the "spirit" of the plea agreement reached between the State and Appellant in criminal action number one. That agreement provided in pertinent part as follows:
Clearly, the State agreed to forego prosecution only on the habitual offender count which was added in criminal action number one to enhance the class B felony robbery therein charged on August 29, 1981. This agreement patently did not apply to any charge other than that alleged by the Information in criminal action number one. The State did not, therefore, breach its agreement when it filed to enhance the class C felony robbery underlying criminal action number two.
Appellant's argument that the "spirit" of his plea agreement should preclude the State from filing a habitual offender count against him in an unrelated case merely amounts to a request that this Court rewrite his plea agreement. This we will not do. By Appellant's logic, the State might forever be barred from pursuing a habitual offender count against him. It is well settled that the decision to prosecute or not to prosecute lies within the prosecutor's discretion so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, (1978) 434 U.S. 357, 98 S. Ct. 663, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, reh. denied 435 U.S. 918, 98 S. Ct. 1477, 55 L. Ed. 2d 511. We will not usurp that discretion. We now strictly construe the written plea agreement accepted in criminal action number one and interpret said agreement by the terms explicitly stated therein. Whatever subjective expectation Appellant may have had as to the sentence he might receive in an unrelated cause will not control. The prosecutor in criminal action number one legitimately bargained to waive his discretionary right to prosecute a habitual offender count against Appellant in criminal action number one. See Howard v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 589, 377 N.E.2d 628, cert. denied 439 U.S. 1049, 99 S. Ct. 727, 58 L. Ed. 2d 708. No similar waiver was made with respect to criminal action number two. Accordingly, the trial court properly allowed the State to file a habitual offender count against Appellant in criminal action number two.
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred by allowing him to plead guilty to being a habitual offender in criminal action number two. His argument is based upon Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(c) (Burns Supp. 1983) which provides:
*535 Appellant argues that the word "shall" was intended to be a word of command and therefore precludes the possibility of a guilty plea. In Lawrence v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 306, 286 N.E.2d 830, this Court adopted a procedure for handling habitual offender cases. The procedure requires, inter alia, that the habitual offender count be made on a page separate from the rest of the charging instrument. This Court expressly held:
Lawrence, 259 Ind. at 315, 286 N.E.2d  at 835 (adopting language from State v. Ferrone, (1921) 96 Conn. 160, 113 A. 452). This statement interpreting our habitual offender statute clearly indicates that the accused may elect to plead guilty to a habitual offender count. Whether the accused may properly be sentenced as a habitual offender is a question of fact which, as any other question of fact, may be settled by the jury or by the court or may be admitted to by the defendant.
In the case of criminal action number two, the taking of Appellant's guilty plea involved substantially the same proceeding as transpires during any other change of plea hearing in the criminal courts of this state. The trial court entered into the record certified copies of certain court and prison records to substantiate Appellant's two prior unrelated felony convictions. In pleading guilty to being a habitual offender, Appellant was afforded the same procedural safeguards required by statute for any guilty plea. We find no error on this issue.
Appellant next contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his class C felony robbery conviction in criminal action number two. The facts adduced at trial show that Barbara Benson, a teller at the American Fletcher National Bank located at 2055 North Shadeland Avenue in Indianapolis, identified Appellant as the man who stepped up to her teller's station, announced a hold-up, demanded money and left with the bank's cash. Appellant does not argue that the State failed to prove any particular element of class C felony robbery but rather requests that this Court reweigh the evidence. This we will not do. Fisher v. State, (1983) Ind. 453 N.E.2d 990. The direct evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant's robbery conviction in criminal action number two.
Appellant also argues that the post-conviction relief court considering criminal action number one erred by:
We already have decided in Issue I above that the State agreed to forego prosecution of only the habitual offender count added in criminal action number one. This the State did. The State did not in any way breach the agreement it made with Appellant in criminal action number one when it undertook to have Appellant adjudged a habitual offender in criminal action number two. Appellant's argument is totally without merit.
Appellant lastly argues that there was no factual basis for his plea of guilty to class B felony robbery in criminal action number one. Appellant specifically asserts that no evidence was proffered to show that he was armed with a deadly weapon when he perpetrated the charged robbery. The law in Indiana is that a defendant's statement that he understands the nature of the charge against him and understands *536 that his guilty plea is an admission that he committed the charged crime is sufficient to establish a factual basis for the proper entry of his guilty plea. Lombardo v. State, (1981) Ind. 429 N.E.2d 243; Lloyd v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 227, 383 N.E.2d 1048.
During Appellant's guilty plea hearing, the trial court examined Appellant at length and the following exchanges were recorded:
We now hold that a sufficient factual basis for Appellant's guilty plea in criminal action number one was established pursuant to Lombardo and Lloyd.
Finding no error, we affirm Defendant's convictions in all things in both causes.
GIVAN, C.J., and DeBRULER, HUNTER and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.