Case Title: State v. Donald W. Jorgensen

Citation: 2008 WI 60

Docket Number: 2006AP001847-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
2008 WI 60 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP1847-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Donald W. Jorgensen, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 301 Wis. 2d 750, 731 N.W.2d 384 
(Ct. App. 2007-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 13, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 1, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Shawano   
 
JUDGE: 
James R. Habeck   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY and BUTLER, JR., JJ., join the 
concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Martha K. Askins, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Aaron 
R. O’Neil, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 60
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP1847-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2005CF37) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Donald W. Jorgensen, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 13, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished court of appeals' decision,1 which affirmed the 
decisions of the Shawano County Circuit Court, James R. Habeck, 
Judge.  Jorgensen was convicted of bail jumping, operating while 
intoxicated (fifth offense), operating with a prohibited alcohol 
concentration (fifth offense), and operating a motor vehicle 
after revocation.  The circuit court denied Jorgensen's motion 
for post-conviction relief concluding that defense counsel was 
                                                 
1 State v. Jorgensen, No. 2006AP1847-CR, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2007). 
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
2 
 
not ineffective but instead had made decisions based upon a 
reasonable trial strategy, and any error that occurred did not 
negatively impact Jorgensen.  The circuit court also concluded 
that none of the errors constituted plain error.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision, and as a result, 
Jorgensen petitioned this court for review.  On this appeal, 
Jorgensen asserts four theories of relief: plain error, in the 
interest of justice, ineffective assistance of counsel, and 
structural error.  We conclude that the unobjected to errors of 
the judge and the prosecutor in this case are fundamental, 
obvious, and substantial; and the State has failed to meet its 
burden of proof that these errors were harmless.  Thus, we 
conclude that these errors constitute plain error.  As a result, 
we reverse the court of appeals' decision and remand to the 
circuit court for a new trial. 
I. FACTS 
¶2 
On November 10, 2004, Donald Jorgensen was scheduled 
for a plea and sentencing hearing, on a matter unrelated to this 
appeal, in the circuit court of Shawano County, before Judge 
James R. Habeck.  Assistant District Attorney White (the 
prosecutor) informed the circuit court that Jorgensen and his 
attorney, James Chereskin, were having trouble communicating.  
The prosecutor relayed to the circuit court that she could 
"smell a strong odor of intoxicants" coming from Jorgensen, and 
she had requested that a deputy come and do a preliminary breath 
test.  The circuit court ordered a preliminary breath test and 
informed Jorgensen that a test was necessary in order to 
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
3 
 
determine whether he could understand that day's proceeding.  
The preliminary breath test was conducted in court and witnessed 
by both the circuit court judge and the prosecutor. 
¶3 
Deputy Miller reported, in open court and on the 
record, Jorgensen's preliminary breath test result of 0.12.  The 
judge noted, on the record as well, that Jorgensen had trouble 
following simple instructions, and the circuit court judge 
concluded that Jorgensen could not proceed.  Jorgensen's 
previous cash bond was revoked, a new cash bond was ordered for 
violating the previous bond's no alcohol provision, and the 
circuit court ordered that Jorgensen be taken to the hospital to 
determine his blood alcohol concentration and to ensure that he 
could be safely taken into custody. 
¶4 
The Shawano County Sheriff's Department investigated 
the matter, and as a result, Jorgensen was charged with bail 
jumping, which arose out of a no alcohol provision in his 
previous bond, operating while intoxicated (fifth offense), 
operating 
with 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration 
(fifth 
offense), and operating a motor vehicle after revocation. 
¶5 
Prior 
to 
trial, 
Attorney 
James 
Chereskin, 
who 
represented 
Jorgensen 
on 
previous 
matters, 
withdrew 
from 
representing Jorgensen on charges that arose out of the November 
10, 2004, events.  Attorney Chereskin cited irreconcilable 
differences as the reason for withdrawing.  Attorney Joan Boyd 
was subsequently appointed to represent Jorgensen.  However, on 
March 15, 2005, Attorney Boyd moved the circuit court to allow 
her to withdraw as Jorgensen's counsel due to a conflict of 
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
4 
 
interest.  Attorney Boyd explained, "I was in the courtroom on 
the day that [Jorgensen] was charged with these particular 
matters, and I don't think it's advisable for me to continue 
representing him."  The circuit court allowed Attorney Boyd to 
withdraw, 
and 
Attorney 
Gary 
Dodge 
(defense 
counsel) 
was 
appointed to represent Jorgensen on this matter. 
¶6 
On the morning of trial, August 31, 2005, Jorgensen 
stipulated to having four previous convictions for operating 
while intoxicated.  The court explained to Jorgensen that if he 
did not stipulate to these prior convictions, the State would 
need to prove them to the jury.  As a result and on the advice 
of his defense counsel, Jorgensen stipulated so as to remove the 
previous OWI convictions from the jury's consideration. 
¶7 
Also on the morning of trial, Assistant District 
Attorney White (the prosecutor) informed the circuit court that 
she wanted to enter the November 10 hearing transcript into 
evidence.  The prosecutor asked the circuit court to take 
judicial notice of the transcript, and she asked the circuit 
court judge to read the transcript so as to avoid any accusation 
that she read it improperly.  The defense counsel agreed that 
the circuit court should read the transcript to the jury, and 
the circuit court judge agreed to read the transcript. 
¶8 
After opening statements, the prosecutor asked the 
court to take judicial notice and admit the certified copy of 
the bail bond that pertained to the bail jumping charge.  The 
defense counsel did not object.  The circuit court judge 
informed the jury of the no alcohol provision and that this bond 
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
5 
 
was in effect on November 10, 2004.  During opening statements 
and again during closing arguments, the defense counsel told the 
jury that Jorgensen conceded to the bail jumping charge because 
he admitted to drinking alcohol at a bar near the courthouse.  
¶9 
The prosecutor also moved for the admission of the 
November 10 hearing transcript.  The defense counsel did not 
object, and the circuit court judge then stated the following to 
the jury: 
What I'm going to read to you is what happened back on 
November 10 of last year.  This was taken down by a 
court reporter who was here that day.  You see the 
court reporter here in front of you today.  So you can 
understand how that happened. 
 
So this is a part of the proceedings held before 
James R. Habeck, circuit judge in the circuit court 
for Shawano County Branch 1 held on November 10, 2004, 
in the city of Shawano Court House, reported by Nina 
Bostwick.  The appearances that day were Catharine 
White as the assistant DA, for the state, James 
Chereskin as attorney appearing on behalf of the 
defendant, and then we had the defendant, Donald 
Jorgensen in person.  And I'll read off the beginning 
part when I say they, that would be the person who 
said a particular topic.  If I use the phrase, the 
Court, that means the judge, who happened to be me 
that day. 
¶10 The circuit court judge then read from the November 10 
hearing transcript: 
THE COURT: State and Donald Jorgensen, is file 
04-CT-79.  He's here with Attorney Chereskin.  What 
was your plan on proceeding today, Attorney White? 
MS. WHITE: Your Honor this was set for a plea and 
sentencing.  I've spoken with Attorney Chereskin 
briefly outside.  He says he's having some problems 
communicating with his client today, that his client 
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
6 
 
is indicating that there's some physical problems that 
he's having. 
 
In the brief amount of time that I was close to 
his client, I could smell a strong odor of intoxicants 
from his client.  I called over to the Sheriff's 
Department 
to 
have 
a 
deputy 
sent 
over 
with 
a 
preliminary breath test device.  I'd ask the court to 
order that Mr. Jorgensen submit to a test. 
THE COURT: We need to do that to figure out if 
you would understand what's happening today then, sir.  
So here is an officer, Deputy Miller, and he's going 
to give you some instructions.  We want to make sure 
you understand what's happening today. 
(Deputy conducts test on defendant) 
DEPUTY CHRIS MILLER: Your Honor, I did not get a 
sufficient breath sample in the reading on this, is at 
a, I barely got any breath at all, your Honor.  He's 
going to be over a point one-oh (0.10). 
MS. WHITE: What's the reading? 
DEPUTY CHRIS MILLER: The reading is a point one 
two (0.12). 
THE COURT: All right. And I observed the -- 
DONALD JORGENSEN: There it is right there. 
THE COURT: I observed the prolonged instructions 
by the deputy and Mr. Jorgensen had trouble following 
the simple instructions, so I know he can't proceed 
today.  How do you want to handle this, Attorney 
White? 
MS. WHITE: Your Honor, I'd ask that the previous 
cash bond be revoked.  It should be, the court should 
be aware that he has in interim now been convicted on 
September 23 of 2004 of OWI in Calumet County that 
occurred while he was out on bond on this case as 
well.  He has another OWI pending in Outagamie 
pending, and now we have him consuming intoxicants in 
violation of his bond.  So I'm asking that the 
previous bond be revoked, a ten thousand dollar cash 
bond be set in this matter, again with the condition 
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
7 
 
that he consume no alcohol.  And I'm going to be 
asking that the officer take him to the Shawano 
Medical Center for a blood draw as evidence of a crime 
of bail jumping. 
THE COURT: Attorney Chereskin. 
MR. 
CHERESKIN: 
Your 
Honor, 
my 
client 
has 
indicated to me that if there is any alcohol in his 
system, it's a result of liquid Tylenol or NyQuil, and 
he indicates to me that he has taken NyQuil in that 
fashion for 12 years.  He also indicated to me that he 
has not consumed any alcohol, but instead is suffering 
from the after effects of a stroke. 
. . . . 
THE 
COURT: 
. . . 
I'm 
concerned 
about 
Mr. 
Jorgensen's health.  So I'm going to revoke the 
existing bond.  Our Shawano County bond, so we're 
clear, had a no alcohol provision.  It appears to me 
Mr. Jorgensen violated that, so I do have to increase 
the cash bond amount.  It's an unusual case.  I'm 
going to go to ten thousand dollars cash because of 
the circumstances here, and we'll have, Mr. Jorgensen 
will have to get checked out by the hospital just to 
make sure that he's okay to take into custody, based 
on what I've seen and heard here today, so. 
¶11 After reading from the transcript, the circuit court 
judge stated, "[t]hat's what happened in court here last 
November 10." 
¶12 During the course of the trial, Deputy Miller, 
Sergeant Lenzner, and Pamela Faehling testified as State's 
witnesses, and Jorgensen testified on his own behalf.  Deputy 
Miller testified that he could smell "a strong odor of 
intoxicants coming from [Jorgensen's] person," and Jorgensen had 
trouble opening the door to the courtroom.  He further testified 
that Jorgensen told him he had "drank two bottles of NyQuil."  
Deputy Miller stated that Jorgensen also told him that he had no 
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
8 
 
alcohol and no NyQuil after he left his home.2  Sergeant Lenzner 
testified that Pamela Faehling, Jorgensen's friend, had told the 
officer that she observed Jorgensen "drink an entire bottle, a 
quart bottle, of Peppermint Schnapps" on the morning of November 
10, 2004, before leaving for the courthouse.   
¶13 Faehling, however, gave contradictory testimony at 
trial as to whether Jorgensen drank any alcohol before coming to 
court.  She recanted the statement given to Sergeant Lenzner and 
testified that Jorgensen did not drink Peppermint Schnapps on 
the morning of November 10, 2004.  In response to persistent 
questioning by the prosecutor about Jorgensen's drinking on the 
morning of November 10, 2004, Faehling often replied "no" or 
something to the effect that she did not remember if Jorgensen 
had drank that morning.  However, Faehling did testify that 
Jorgensen drove himself to the courthouse on November 10, 2004.   
¶14 Jorgensen testified on his own behalf.  He testified 
that he did not drink any alcohol before he left his residence 
on the morning of November 10, 2004.  Previously, however, 
Jorgensen told Deputy Miller that he did not drink any alcohol 
after he left his house.  He testified that, after arriving at 
                                                 
2 Deputy Miller testifies twice about what Jorgensen said he 
drank on November 10.  At first Deputy Miller states that 
Jorgensen said he had two bottles of NyQuil, but there is no 
indication of when Jorgensen said this occurred.  The second 
time, Deputy Miller states that Jorgensen stated he had no 
alcohol and no NyQuil after he left his house.  However, the 
question Jorgensen was responding to when he gave this answer 
was: Did you have any alcohol to drink after you left your 
residence to come to court? 
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
9 
 
the courthouse but before his hearing, he drank an entire bottle 
of NyQuil, and he had two Tom Collins at a bar just a few blocks 
from the courthouse. 
¶15 During the closing argument, the prosecutor referenced 
the November 10, 2004, hearing.  She stated:  
All of these offenses happened back on November 
10, 2004 and I think that you've all, through the 
testimony and exhibits that have been entered into 
evidence, been given a fairly clear picture of what 
went on that day.  And it's unusual because what went 
on that day went on in this very room.  This is where 
it all happened.  And usually when I come before a 
jury to do my closing argument or my summing up, what 
I tell the jury is, I didn't get to see any of it 
either.  I have to learn about what happened from the 
witnesses, the same as you do.  In this case, I was 
there for some of it.  And you are actually in the 
same place where some of it happened, so you're having 
a little bit of a unique experience for a juror. 
. . . . 
. . . And as you know, I informed the Court that 
I could smell that he had been drinking when I talked 
to him briefly in the hallway with his attorney.  And 
we called over for a deputy to come with preliminary 
breath test device, because it was a condition of his 
bond that he not drink. 
 
. . . . 
 
I don't know what he drank at home.  [Pam 
Faehling] showed a bottle to Officer Lenzner, a bottle 
of Peppermint Schnapps, and said he drank it that 
morning before he left.  I don't know, I wasn't there. 
 
All I know is when he was in court he was drunk.  
And when he had the blood drawn that he was drunk.  
And he said that afternoon, while he was still drunk 
and before he had time to think and come up with a 
better lie that he had nothing to drink after he left 
home. 
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
10 
 
. . . This is a trial that is a search for truth.  
The truth of the matter is that Mr. Jorgensen is a 
chronic alcoholic.  I don't know if we're ever going 
to get him to believe that, but that's the truth.  The 
truth of the matter is Mr. Jorgensen drove to court 
that day and he was drunk, and it was a very foolish 
thing for him to do. . . . 
¶16 Jorgensen was convicted of all charges: bail jumping, 
operating while intoxicated, operating with a prohibited alcohol 
concentration, and operating a motor vehicle after revocation.    
¶17 At the post-conviction hearing, Jorgensen argued in 
favor of a new trial on three grounds: plain error, ineffective 
assistance of counsel, and in the interest of justice.  The 
circuit court concluded that Jorgensen's intoxication was not a 
defense pursued by Jorgensen; rather, his defense involved 
whether he drove himself on November 10, 2004.  The circuit 
court concluded that as a matter of trial strategy, the defense 
counsel determined that the transcript was less harmful than 
having the judge and the prosecutor testify.  While the circuit 
court expressed some confrontation clause concerns with regard 
to the State's closing argument, the circuit court concluded 
that the prosecutor's statements were based on the transcript 
and with regard to intoxication, which was not really in 
dispute.  Moreover, the circuit court concluded that the defense 
counsel chose not to object during closing argument as a matter 
of trial strategy.  The circuit court concluded, "I really don't 
see any negative impact that's apparent to me that would 
constitute plain error . . . ."  As a result, the circuit court 
denied Jorgensen's motion for post-conviction relief.  
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
11 
 
¶18 The court of appeals, in an unpublished decision, 
affirmed 
the 
circuit 
court. 
 
On 
Jorgensen's 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, the court of appeals concluded that 
while the prosecutor's comments during her closing argument were 
highly inappropriate, "there is no probability that the outcome 
of the trial would have been different absent counsel's errors."  
The court of appeals also concluded that any errors that arose 
out of reading the transcript in court were not prejudicial.   
¶19 Jorgensen also argued in favor of a new trial on the 
bases of plain error and in the interest of justice.  On the 
plain error claim, the court of appeals concluded that Judge 
Habeck's involvement did not give an appearance of bias.  Thus, 
failing to object to his involvement was not plain error.  
Lastly, the court of appeals concluded that the real controversy 
had been tried, and thus, a reversal in the interest of justice 
was not warranted.  In a dissent, Chief Judge Cane concluded 
that a new trial was warranted because of the prosecutor's 
improper statements during closing argument. 
II. PLAIN ERROR DOCTRINE 
¶20 Jorgensen's defense counsel did not object to the 
circuit court's reading of the November 10 hearing transcript or 
to the prosecutor's improper remarks during closing argument.  
As a result, Jorgensen now asserts four theories of relief: 
plain error, in the interest of justice, ineffective assistance 
of counsel, and structural error.  We conclude that the facts of 
this case give rise to plain error and thus warrant a new trial.  
First, the errors were fundamental, obvious, and substantial.  
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
12 
 
In 
this 
case, 
Jorgensen 
was 
denied 
basic 
constitutional 
protections.  Second, the State has failed to meet its burden of 
proof that these errors were harmless.  Thus, we conclude that 
the errors constitute plain error. 
¶21 Wisconsin Stat. § 901.03(4) (2003-04) recognizes the 
plain error doctrine.3  The plain error doctrine allows appellate 
courts to review errors that were otherwise waived by a party's 
failure to object.  State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶29, 301 
Wis. 2d 642, 734 N.W.2d 115.  See also 7 Daniel D. Blinka, 
Wisconsin Evidence § 103.7 (2d ed. 2001).  Plain error is 
"'error so fundamental that a new trial or other relief must be 
granted even though the action was not objected to at the 
time.'"  State v. Sonnenberg, 117 Wis. 2d 159, 177, 344 
N.W.2d 95 (1984) (citation omitted).  The error, however, must 
be "obvious and substantial."  Id.  Courts should use the plain 
error doctrine sparingly.  Id.  For example, "'where a basic 
constitutional right has not been extended to the accused,'" the 
plain error doctrine should be utilized.  Id. (citing Virgil v. 
State, 84 Wis. 2d 166, 195, 267 N.W.2d 852 (1978) (Beilfuss, 
C.J., concurring); "Wisconsin courts have consistently used this 
constitutional error standard in determining whether to invoke 
the plain error rule."  State v. King, 205 Wis. 2d 81, 91, 555 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 901.03(4) states: "Nothing in this rule 
precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial 
rights although they were not brought to the attention of the 
judge."  All references to Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 
version unless otherwise noted.   
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
13 
 
N.W.2d 189 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing to a number of Wisconsin 
cases applying the plain error doctrine).   
¶22 However, "'the existence of plain error will turn on 
the facts of the particular case.'"  Mayo, 301 Wis. 2d 642, ¶29 
(citing Virgil, 84 Wis. 2d at 190-91).  The quantum of evidence 
properly admitted and the seriousness of the error involved are 
particularly important.  Id.  "Erroneously admitted evidence may 
tip the scales in favor of reversal in a close case, even though 
the same evidence would be harmless in the context of a case 
demonstrating overwhelming evidence of guilt."  Virgil, 84 
Wis. 2d at 191.  Thus, no bright-line rule exists to determine 
automatically when reversal is warranted.  See Mayo, 301 
Wis. 2d 642, ¶29. 
¶23 If the defendant shows that the unobjected to error is 
fundamental, obvious, and substantial, the burden then shifts to 
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
14 
 
the State to show the error was harmless.4  Id. (citing King, 205 
Wis. 2d at 93).  To determine whether an error is harmless, this 
court inquires whether the State can prove "'beyond a reasonable 
doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty 
absent the error[].'"5  Mayo, 301 Wis. 2d 642, ¶47 (citation 
                                                 
4 "It is also consistent with federal case law for us to use 
a harmless error analysis in determining whether to invoke the 
plain error doctrine."  State v. King, 205 Wis. 2d 81, 92, 555 
N.W.2d 189 (Ct. App. 1996).  See also United States v. Olano, 
507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993).  However, unlike the state of 
Wisconsin where the State holds the burden, in the federal 
system the burden is on the defendant to show that the error was 
harmless.  King, 205 Wis. 2d at 93.  The concurrence advocates 
for stating the specific language that federal courts use in 
their plain error doctrine analysis.  Instead, the majority 
decision today incorporates existing Wisconsin case law on that 
issue in order to clarify Wisconsin's plain error doctrine.  See 
¶¶21 and 22 of this opinion.  While the concurrence questions 
what would qualify as fundamental and substantial error under 
the majority's test, the federal doctrine, as espoused by the 
concurrence, raises the same question.  The concurrence also 
asks whether a fundamental and substantial error can be 
harmless.  Under our analysis, any error that satisfies the 
first prong of our plain error doctrine, i.e., any error that is 
fundamental, obvious, and substantial, must then undergo the 
second prong of whether that error is nonetheless harmless.  
Today we find that the errors constitute plain error.  In this 
case, we are not presented with facts that satisfy the first 
prong but are harmless under the second prong.  In a future 
case, however, an error may satisfy the first prong but 
nonetheless be deemed harmless under the second prong's seven 
factor test, and thus, the error would not constitute plain 
error. 
5 The harmless error test has also been stated as follows: 
"[T]he error is harmless if the beneficiary of the error proves 
''beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained.''"  State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 
78, ¶47, 301 Wis. 2d 642, 734 N.W.2d 115 (citing State v. 
Anderson, 2006 WI 77, ¶114, 291 Wis. 2d 673, 717 N.W.2d 74, 
quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). 
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
15 
 
omitted).  This court has identified several factors to assist 
in determining whether an error is harmless: (1) the frequency 
of the error; (2) the importance of the erroneously admitted 
evidence; (3) the presence or absence of evidence corroborating 
or contradicting the erroneously admitted evidence; (4) whether 
the erroneously admitted evidence duplicates untainted evidence; 
(5) the nature of the defense; (6) the nature of the State's 
case; and (7) the overall strength of the State's case.  Id., 
¶48.6  If the State fails to meet its burden of proving that the 
errors were harmless, then the court may conclude that the 
errors constitute plain error. 
¶24 Wisconsin appellate courts have applied the plain 
error 
doctrine 
to 
evaluate 
unobjected 
to 
error 
that 
is 
                                                 
6 See State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, ¶¶61-77, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 
691 N.W.2d 637 (applying the harmless error factors); State v. 
Stuart, 2005 WI 47, ¶¶41-57, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 695 N.W.2d 259 
(applying the harmless error factors). 
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
16 
 
fundamental, obvious and substantial.7  In Mayo, this court 
analyzed a number of errors.  We concluded that even though 
disparaging remarks by both the prosecutor and the defense 
counsel were improper, those errors did not require a new trial 
based on plain error or in the interest of justice.  Id., ¶42.  
In Mayo, the prosecutor stated that the role of the defense 
counsel was to "get his client off the hook and not to see 
justice done but to see his client was acquitted."  Id.  The 
defense counsel, on the other hand, analogized the prosecutor to 
Saddam Hussein.  This court concluded that while the statements 
were improper, they were not prejudicial when viewed in context 
of the whole trial and thus a due process violation had not 
                                                 
7 See King, 205 Wis. 2d at 91-95 (concluding that the 
confrontation clause violation, which admitted a co-defendant's 
incriminating statements, was harmless); State v. Sonnenberg, 
117 Wis. 2d 159, 177-80, 344 N.W.2d 95 (1984) (concluding that a 
witness' irrelevant testimony was erroneously admitted but 
harmless); State v. Gustafson, 119 Wis. 2d 676, 687-89, 350 
N.W.2d 653 
(1984) 
(concluding 
that 
the 
admission 
of 
a 
defendant's no contest plea and evidence of his delinquency 
adjudication did not deny the defendant of a constitutional 
right); Virgil v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 166, 179-94, 267 N.W.2d 852 
(1978) (concluding that (1) out of court statements that were 
not inconsistent but admitted anyway did not qualify as plain 
error; (2) assistant district attorney's testimony about a plea 
bargain made with a co-defendant did not qualify as plain error; 
(3) the admission of a co-defendant's guilty plea did not 
qualify as plain error; and (4) the admission of a co-
defendant's 
testimony 
through 
a 
police 
officer 
was 
a 
confrontation clause violation that was not harmless).    
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
17 
 
occurred.8  Id., ¶43.  During her closing argument, the 
prosecutor also commented on the process she used for reviewing 
files and making charging decisions.  However, the court found 
that these comments did not provide the jury with information 
that would unfairly influence the jury's decision and infect the 
trial with unfairness.  Id., ¶45.  
¶25 On the other hand, the prosecutor's statements in 
Mayo, 
which 
she 
made 
during 
her 
opening 
statement 
and 
examination of State's witnesses, violated the defendant's 
constitutional right to remain silent because the statements 
referenced the defendant's pre-Miranda silence.  However, the 
court concluded that the error of commenting on pre-Miranda 
silence was harmless because the errors were infrequent and not 
prejudicial.  Id., ¶¶49-52.   
¶26 In State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶¶81-89, 236 
Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 606, this court analyzed whether a 
prosecutor's 
statements 
during 
closing 
arguments 
required 
reversal under the plain error doctrine.  The prosecutor 
commented on the credibility of a witness and asked the jury, 
"do you believe Tina as I do."  Id., ¶82.  Thus, the prosecutor 
inappropriately vouched for a witness.   
                                                 
8 To determine whether a prosecutor's comments give rise to 
a due process violation, the court must ask whether the 
statements "'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make 
the resulting conviction a denial of due process.'"  Mayo, 301 
Wis. 2d 642, ¶43 (quoting State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶88, 
236 Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 606).   
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
18 
 
¶27 The second comment by the prosecutor in Davidson 
resulted in the jury hearing insignificant, unsworn testimony.9  
Id., ¶83.  This court concluded that the prosecutor's statements 
were limited in scope and not "so egregious as to constitute 
plain error."  Id., ¶88.  The improper statements did not infect 
the trial with unfairness so as to render the resulting 
conviction a denial of due process.  Id.   
¶28 In the case at issue, the judge and the prosecutor 
made several errors during trial, and defense counsel did not 
object.  For example, the following errors occurred as a result 
of the court reading the transcript: (1) The admission of other 
acts such as prior convictions and pending charges for operating 
while intoxicated.  See State v. Alexander, 214 Wis. 2d 628, 
644-51, 571 N.W.2d 662 (1997) (criticizing the admission of 
prior convictions when the defendant stipulates to those 
                                                 
9 The relevant portion in Davidson reads: 
The 
second 
remark 
occurred 
during 
the 
prosecutor's rebuttal.  During cross-examination, the 
prosecutor had asked the defendant's wife whether she 
said 'that fucker' when Tina H.'s mother first called 
and told her about the assault.  The defendant's wife 
denied making the statement, and the prosecutor did 
not question Tina H.'s mother on the matter.  The 
defense commented during closing arguments that the 
prosecutor's 
own 
witness 
never 
verified 
this 
statement.  On rebuttal, the prosecutor said, 'Counsel 
made reference to the district attorney's question 
about that profanity word, that f——er, and he says my 
witness didn't even say that on the stand, and you 
know what, she didn't.  You know why she didn't?  I 
didn't ask the question.'  
Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶83.  
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
19 
 
convictions and the only purpose of admission is to prove a 
status element); see also Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) (precluding the 
admission 
of 
other 
crimes 
generally 
unless 
an 
exception 
applies).  (2) The admission of the fact that a preliminary 
breath test was conducted and the results of that test.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 343.303 (rendering a preliminary breath test 
inadmissible 
unless 
certain 
exceptions 
apply). 
 
(3) 
The 
admission of inadmissible hearsay including "testimony" from the 
judge and the prosecutor.  See Wis. Stat. § 908.02.  (4) The 
admission of information before the jury that was not subject to  
confrontation, such as the judge's remarks and the prosecutor's 
commentary regarding the preliminary breath test, their personal 
observations of Jorgensen on November 10, and their conclusions 
about Jorgensen's guilt.  See Article I, Section 7 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.  (5) The prosecutor's assertion of personal 
knowledge of the facts.  See SCR 20:3.4(e) (2004) (stating a 
lawyer shall not "assert personal knowledge of facts in issue 
except when testifying as a witness"); State v. Jackson, 2007 WI 
App 145, ¶22, 302 Wis. 2d 766, 735 N.W.2d 178.  (6) The 
admission of information regarding the judge's participation, 
including 
his 
perceptions 
and 
conclusions, 
at 
the 
prior 
proceeding.  See generally Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 56 
(1975) (concluding that a judge's pretrial involvement does not 
raise any constitutional barrier against the judge's presiding 
over the criminal trial).  However, the jury should not have 
learned of highly 
prejudicial, inadmissible evidence that 
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
20 
 
included the judge's involvement and conclusions as well as the 
prosecutor's involvement and conclusions. 
¶29 Unobjected 
to 
errors 
also 
occurred 
during 
the 
prosecutor's closing argument.  The prosecutor's closing remarks 
highlighted the highly prejudicial, inadmissible information.  
Like the judge's "testimony," the prosecutor's "testimony" was 
not subject to confrontation.   
¶30 The prosecutor, during closing argument, identified 
the defendant as a "chronic alcoholic":  
This is a trial that is a search for truth.  The truth 
of the matter is that Mr. Jorgensen is a chronic 
alcoholic.  I don't know if we're ever going to get 
him to believe that, but that's the truth.  The truth 
of the matter is Mr. Jorgensen drove to court that day 
and he was drunk, and it was very foolish thing for 
him to do. . . .   
¶31 This 
commentary 
was 
improper. 
 
First, 
it 
is 
inappropriate for an attorney to allude to a matter not 
supported by admissible evidence.  See SCR 20:3.4(e); State v. 
Freiberg, 35 Wis. 2d 480, 484, 151 N.W.2d 1 (1967) (stating that 
alcoholism is a disease that should be proven by expert medical 
opinion).  Second, it is improper for a prosecutor to provide 
the jury with information, which allows the jury to consider 
facts not in evidence when determining guilt.  See State v. 
Smith, 2003 WI App 234, ¶23, 268 Wis. 2d 138, 671 N.W.2d 854.  
Third, while the statement is not evidence because it was stated 
during closing arguments, it is still useful to assert that 
labeling Jorgensen a "chronic alcoholic" is not relevant, and it 
is highly prejudicial.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 904.01 and 904.03.  
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
21 
 
Fourth, the context in which the "chronic alcoholic" comment 
arose comes dangerously close to asking the jury to convict 
Jorgensen of OWI because he is an alcoholic who may not 
acknowledge that he has a problem.  See generally Robinson v. 
California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (rendering a statute 
unconstitutional because it punished the status of having a 
narcotics addiction rather than the act of manufacturing, 
selling, purchasing, or possessing narcotics). 
¶32 This commentary was not heard by the jury in a vacuum.  
The "chronic alcoholic" statement occurred in a trial where the 
jury 
was 
informed 
of: 
(1) 
the 
defendant's 
previous 
OWI 
convictions; (2) the defendant's pending OWI charges; (3) the 
judge ordering a preliminary breath test; (4) the trial judge 
and the trial prosecutor witnessing the November 10 events; (5) 
the judge's determination that Jorgensen needed to be sent to 
the hospital for evaluation; and (6) the trial judge and 
prosecutor's conclusions about Jorgensen's intoxication and his 
guilt. 
A. Constitutional Claims 
¶33 Relevant to a plain error analysis in this case are 
the unobjected to errors that occurred by the judge and the 
prosecutor.  In this case, Jorgensen was denied his right to 
confrontation and due process because of the transcript being 
read by the trial judge, who also presided over the November 10 
hearing, and the prosecutor's inappropriate statement during 
closing argument. 
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
22 
 
 
1. Confrontation Clause 
¶34 "'The Confrontation Clause of the United States and 
Wisconsin Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right 
to confront witnesses against them.'"  State v. Jensen, 2007 WI 
26, ¶13, 299 Wis. 2d 267, 727 N.W.2d 518 (citation omitted); see 
also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004), U.S. Const. 
amend. VI;10 Wis. Const. art. I, § 7.11  By reading the November 
10 hearing transcript at Jorgensen's criminal trial, which 
essentially 
provided 
the 
jury 
with 
the 
judge's 
and 
the 
prosecutor's conclusions about Jorgensen's guilt, the circuit 
court itself seemingly testified against the defendant, and the 
prosecutor essentially testified against the defendant by virtue 
of the judge reading the transcript from the November 10 
hearing.  This highly prejudicial and largely inadmissible 
evidence was not subject to cross-examination. 
¶35 Here, the circuit court seemed to testify against the 
defendant when it stated the following: (1) Jorgensen was having 
difficulty following simple instructions due to intoxication; 
and (2) Jorgensen violated the no alcohol provision of his bond.  
These 
statements 
directly 
related 
to 
Jorgensen's 
alleged 
                                                 
10 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him[.]" 
11 Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution states 
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face." 
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
23 
 
intoxication and the elements of the offenses charged for which 
Jorgensen was to be presumed innocent.  It remains the State's 
burden to prove those elements beyond a reasonable doubt.  Under 
Wis. Stat. § 946.49(1), the State must prove that the defendant 
violated a provision of his or her bond.  In this case, the 
terms of the bond and the defendant's knowing conduct, consuming 
alcohol, in violation of those terms are elements that the State 
must prove in order to convict the defendant of bail jumping.  
See Wis JI——Criminal 1795.  Under Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a), the 
State must prove the defendant was under the influence of an 
intoxicant at the time the defendant drove on a highway.  See 
Wis JI——Criminal 2663.  The State's burden was decreased because 
of the errors made at trial.   
¶36 The circuit court's commentary essentially constituted 
unsworn testimony against the defendant, and it reached legal 
conclusions that should otherwise rest solely within the 
province of the jury.  Jorgensen never had the opportunity to 
question the circuit court's observations.  The opportunity to 
question one's accusers is central to our adversarial system.  
Without confrontation, potential errors, mistakes of fact, and 
ambiguities are neither examined nor tested by opposing counsel.  
Since these observations likely helped to establish elements of 
the crimes charged, these were not trivial comments by the 
circuit court.  Moreover, the circuit court's observations 
informed the jury that the court believed Jorgensen was 
intoxicated, violated his bond, and was guilty. 
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
24 
 
¶37 Also, by virtue of the circuit court reading the 
November 10 hearing transcript, the prosecutor essentially 
"testified" against the defendant without being subject to 
confrontation. 
 
The 
prosecutor's 
remarks 
at 
the 
hearing 
forwarded the following assertions: (1) Jorgensen was having 
trouble communicating with his lawyer; (2) he emitted a strong 
odor of intoxicants; (3) Jorgensen was convicted of another OWI 
in Calumet County while out on a Shawano County bond; (4) he had 
a pending OWI in Outagamie County; and (5) Jorgensen violated 
his bond.   
¶38 Despite 
the 
evidentiary 
and 
procedural 
errors 
associated 
with 
this 
testimony, 
Jorgensen 
never 
had 
the 
opportunity to confront his accuser.  Thus, the defendant was 
deprived of the opportunity to test the prosecutor's statements.  
In addition, the uncontroverted, highly prejudicial, and largely 
inadmissible evidence appeared to be cloaked with the judge's 
approval.  Without the State introducing the requisite evidence,  
the jury was informed that the prosecutor believed Jorgensen was 
intoxicated on November 10, he had violated his bond, and that 
he was guilty of OWI in the past, had pending OWI charges in 
another county, and was now guilty of the crimes charged in this 
case.  Testimony from a prosecutor is difficult enough to 
overcome, but it is impossible for a defendant to test or 
counter a prosecutor's "testimony" when the defendant is denied 
his right to confront the prosecutor as a witness.  It is even 
more insurmountable when it appears that the judge is approving 
of the prosecutor's version of the evidence because the judge is 
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
25 
 
reading the observations to the jury and states, "[t]hat's what 
happened in court here last November 10."   
¶39 Jorgensen's right to confrontation was also violated 
during the prosecutor's closing argument.  The prosecutor took 
what the jury had improperly heard during the trial a step 
further.  She "testified" that Jorgensen was a "chronic 
alcoholic" who did not acknowledge his problem, that on November 
10 she smelled a strong odor of intoxicants from him, and that 
she knew Jorgensen was drunk that day in court.  While the State 
did 
produce 
testimony 
regarding 
Jorgensen's 
level 
of 
intoxication on the date in question through the toxicologist, 
Jorgensen was still denied his right to confrontation and the 
right to have the State prove its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  However, the presence of potentially duplicative 
evidence is only relevant to whether or not the error was 
harmless and is but one factor in that analysis.  Moreover, this 
is not the only constitutional error that occurred during the 
course of the trial. 
2. Due Process Clause 
¶40 The due process clause of both the United States and 
Wisconsin Constitution prohibits the government from depriving a 
person of due process of law.12  By virtue of the prosecutor's 
                                                 
12 The 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution provides that "nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law 
. . . ."  
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
26 
 
improper comments, Jorgensen was denied his right to due 
process.  We recognize that the line between permissible and 
impermissible statements is not easy to discern.  However, 
"'where the prosecutor goes beyond reasoning from the evidence 
to a conclusion of guilt and instead suggests that the jury 
arrive at a verdict by considering factors other than the 
evidence,'" the statements are impermissible.  Smith, 268 
Wis. 2d 138, ¶23 (quoting State v. Draize, 88 Wis. 2d 445, 454, 
276 N.W.2d 784 (1979)).  Improper comments, however, do not 
necessarily give rise to a due process violation.  To determine 
whether a prosecutor's comments constitute a due process 
violation, the court must ask whether the statements "'so 
infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting 
conviction a denial of due process.'"  Mayo, 301 Wis. 2d 642, 
¶43 (citation omitted). 
¶41 Accordingly, not all inappropriate statements by a 
prosecutor result in a due process violation that gives rise to 
plain error.  For example, in Mayo, King, Gustafson, and some 
statements analyzed in Virgil,13 the improper statements were 
about 
the 
role 
of 
an 
attorney, 
charging 
decisions 
by 
prosecutors, a co-defendant's guilty plea, or the improper 
statements were irrelevant to the issues.  None of the errors 
                                                                                                                                                             
Article 1, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides 
that "[n]o person may be held to answer for a criminal offense 
without due process of law . . . ."  
13 See footnote 7 for references to Gustafson, Virgil, and 
King. 
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
27 
 
infected those trials with unfairness so as to create a due 
process violation.   
¶42 In this case, however, improper statements denied 
Jorgensen his right to due process because they infected the 
trial with unfairness.  The errors occurred repeatedly and in 
different 
forms 
at 
several 
junctures 
of 
the 
trial; 
the 
statements were related to elements of the offenses charged, 
highly prejudicial, largely inadmissible, and cloaked with 
judicial approval.  This is not merely "a slip of the tongue" 
during closing argument or in questioning a witness.  Improper 
evidence was magnified by virtue of the circuit court reading 
the November 10 hearing transcript and the prosecutor using the 
transcript to make improper comments during closing argument.  
In this case, the jury improperly learned that the prosecutor 
had personal knowledge of facts at issue, of the prosecutor's 
actions at the November 10 hearing, of her conclusions about 
Jorgensen's intoxication, and her opinion that Jorgensen was 
guilty of violating his bond and thus guilty of bail jumping.  
In addition, the jury improperly learned that Jorgensen had 
prior OWI convictions and a pending OWI case.  Presumably, 
Jorgensen stipulated to these prior convictions in an effort to 
keep this information from the jury.  During the closing 
argument, the jury was urged to reach certain conclusions when 
it was told that the prosecutor knew Jorgensen was intoxicated 
on November 10 and Jorgensen was an alcoholic who did not 
acknowledge his problem.   
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
28 
 
¶43 All of these improper comments invited the jury to 
consider that Jorgensen had a significant problem with alcohol 
and to convict him based on inflammatory and inadmissible 
evidence.  Moreover, when considering the context in which the 
"chronic 
alcoholic" 
statement 
was 
used, 
the 
prosecutor 
highlighted 
the 
inadmissible 
information 
read 
from 
the 
transcript and likely infected the trial with unfairness.  
Information such as this is ordinarily excluded from the jury 
out of concern for how the jury will use the information.  
Providing this information allows the jury to conclude that 
because Jorgensen has an alcohol problem and has driven while 
intoxicated in the past, he likely drove while intoxicated on 
this occasion.   
¶44 Because of the significance, timing, repetition, and 
manner in which the improper statements were presented to the 
jury, they infected the trial with unfairness.  These highly 
prejudicial errors occurred at critical junctures of the trial.  
Their use at trial denied Jorgensen his right to due process. 
B. Harmless Error 
¶45 Once the defendant establishes that unobjected to 
errors are fundamental, obvious, and substantial, the State 
bears the burden of proving that the errors are harmless.  Here, 
the defendant has established that the errors are fundamental, 
obvious, and substantial; and thus, we turn to the State's 
argument that the errors are harmless.  The State argues that 
any errors——the denial of confrontation and due process——were 
harmless 
because 
Jorgensen 
did 
not 
contest 
that 
he 
was 
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
29 
 
intoxicated, and the evidence of intoxication was overwhelming.  
However, to conclude the errors are harmless solely because the 
State showed intoxication through other means would render the 
rest of the harmless error factors worthless.  Instead, the 
court considers the following factors to determine whether an 
error was harmless: (1) the frequency of the error; (2) the 
importance of the erroneously admitted evidence; (3) the 
presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting 
the erroneously admitted evidence; (4) whether the erroneously 
admitted evidence duplicates untainted evidence; (5) the nature 
of the defense; (6) the nature of the State's case; and (7) the 
overall strength of the State's case.  Mayo, 301 Wis. 2d 642, 
¶48.  Under the facts of this case, we are compelled to conclude 
that the errors were not harmless.   
¶46 Factor one, the frequency of the error: It is 
significant that the constitutional errors served as bookends to 
this short trial.  The very first evidence presented in this 
trial was the circuit court reading the November 10 hearing 
transcript.  During closing argument, the prosecutor bolstered 
that evidence by "testifying" about her personal knowledge of 
the November 10 events and that Jorgensen was a "chronic 
alcoholic."  If the errors were grouped together, they only 
occurred twice, but when the trial is less than one day in 
length and the constitutional errors occurred at the beginning 
of the State's case and then again during the State's closing 
argument, the frequency and timing is troubling, even if not 
dispositive.   
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
30 
 
¶47 Factor two, the importance of the erroneously admitted 
evidence: The erroneously admitted evidence directly pertained 
to elements of the crimes charged.  The inappropriate testimony 
in this case was not like the more "benign" comments of past 
cases, which included statements about the role of attorneys or 
how prosecutors charge cases.  The evidence does not occur in a 
brief moment and is then glossed over as seemingly irrelevant.  
Rather, the evidence in this case directly addressed elements of 
the crimes charged, and it was presented by the judge and 
highlighted by the prosecutor.  The State bore the burden of 
proving each and every element of the crimes charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Therefore, these were far from incidental 
statements before the jury.  Here, not only was the improper 
information admitted before the jury, it was directly pertinent 
to the State's case.  Thus, the erroneously admitted evidence 
was crucial.   
¶48 Factor three, the presence or absence of corroborating 
or contradicting evidence: The evidence was not overwhelming 
with respect to the timing of the alleged intoxication, and 
without 
the 
judge 
reading 
the 
transcript, 
the 
State's 
presentation of evidence of bail jumping was lean.  Thus, the 
State's case was significantly enriched by the information the 
jury gleaned from the improperly admitted transcript.   
¶49 Factor four, duplicative evidence: Absent the improper 
evidence before the jury, the record contains competing evidence 
about Jorgensen's intoxication at the time of driving.  Deputy 
Miller testified that Jorgensen struggled with opening the 
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
31 
 
courtroom door on November 10 and that he had a strong odor of 
intoxicants emanating from his person.  The toxicologist 
testified that Jorgensen's "blood ethanol concentration [was] 
0.174 grams per 100 milliliters."  However, the toxicologist did 
not explain or elaborate on the significance of that number as 
it pertained to legal limits of alcohol in the body while 
driving.  Faehling's testimony contradicted the statement she 
gave 
to 
Sergeant 
Lenzner. 
 
Neither 
Jorgensen's 
personal 
testimony nor Faehling's personal testimony at trial necessarily 
established that Jorgensen was intoxicated at the time of 
driving.  A significant amount of testimony attributable to 
Jorgensen's intoxication comes from either the circuit court or 
the prosecutor through the transcript reading.  While arguing 
that duplicative evidence exists is likely the State's strongest 
argument, it alone does not necessarily carry the day. 
¶50 Factor five, the nature of the defense: The State 
argues that the erroneously admitted evidence goes only to 
intoxication, which was not really contested.  Thus, the State 
argues that the erroneously admitted evidence was not crucial.  
However, Jorgensen never conceded that he was intoxicated prior 
to driving.  In fact, Jorgensen testified at trial that he had 
nothing to drink prior to leaving his house that day.14  He 
conceded at trial that he drank alcohol at a local bar prior to 
coming to the courthouse and that he had consumed NyQuil that 
                                                 
14 While this is contrary to what he said on November 10 to 
Deputy Miller, we find it significant that, at trial, he 
repeatedly denied drinking alcohol prior to driving.    
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
32 
 
day.  While part of the defense's theory was that he did not 
drive, the other part was that he did not drink prior to driving 
but rather only drank after he arrived downtown.  Thus, the 
nature 
of 
the 
defense 
does 
not 
render 
the 
potentially 
"duplicative evidence" of intoxication dispositive.   
¶51 Factors six and seven, nature of and strength of the 
State's case: A significant issue at a trial of this sort is 
whether Jorgensen was under the influence of an intoxicant at 
the time of driving.  As stated when discussing factor three of 
the harmless error test, the State's proof that Jorgensen was 
intoxicated at the time he drove his car and the evidence of 
each element of bail jumping was lean, absent the court reading 
the transcript.  There is significant question as to whether the 
jury held the State to its burden of proof or whether it cast 
aside any weaknesses in the State's case when it learned from 
the judge and the prosecutor that Jorgensen came to court 
intoxicated, had prior convictions for OWI, a pending OWI 
charge, a bond violation as a result of consuming alcohol, was 
ordered by the presiding judge to take a preliminary breath 
test, the results of the preliminary breath test, and that the 
judge sent him to the hospital out of concern for his 
intoxication.  The jury should not have heard this inflammatory 
information through the judge and the prosecutor, if at all.  
The State's case was certainly bolstered from the information 
the jury gleaned from the improperly admitted transcript.  In 
effect, the State's high burden of proof was reduced because the 
repeated, highly prejudicial, inadmissible evidence invited the 
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
33 
 
jury to convict Jorgensen without the requisite properly 
admitted evidence. 
¶52 By applying the harmless error factors, we conclude 
the errors here were not harmless and that the State has not met 
its burden of proof in that regard.  Under the facts presented, 
we simply cannot say that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt 
that a rational jury would have found Jorgensen guilty absent 
the errors.  The errors were so fundamental, obvious and 
substantial that we cannot discern whether absent these errors, 
the State would still have successfully convicted Jorgensen.  
These errors likely affected the jury's verdict.  The judge, by 
reading the transcript, may have appeared to be vouching for the 
State's case and "testifying" against the defendant without 
being subject to cross-examination.  The jury learned from both 
the prosecutor and the circuit court that Jorgensen was 
intoxicated on November 10, 2004, and the jury learned from the 
prosecutor that Jorgensen drove while under the influence in the 
past and was a "chronic alcoholic"——at least in the eyes of the 
prosecutor. 
¶53 As a result, Jorgensen was convicted without the 
constitutional 
guarantees 
due 
to 
him. 
 
The 
jury 
heard 
inadmissible, prejudicial evidence that violated Jorgensen's 
right to confrontation and due process, and it likely affected 
the jury's verdict and willingness to convict.  
No. 
2006AP1847-CR   
 
34 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶54 As a result of the November 10 hearing transcript 
being read to the jury and the State's closing argument, 
Jorgensen was denied basic constitutional rights at critical 
junctures of his short trial.  We conclude that the unobjected 
to errors of the judge and the prosecutor in this case are 
fundamental, obvious, and substantial; and the State has failed 
to meet its burden of proof that these errors were harmless.  
Thus, we conclude that these errors constitute plain error.  As 
a result, we reverse the court of appeals' decision and remand 
to the circuit court for a new trial.  Accordingly, we do not go 
further to reach a conclusion on the basis of structural error, 
in the interest of justice, or ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
No.  2006AP1847-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶55 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  The plain 
error doctrine permits judicial review of an error affecting 
substantial rights, despite a party's failure to object to the 
error.  See Wis. Stat. § 901.03(4).  I agree with the majority 
opinion's holding that the unobjected-to errors in the present 
case constitute plain error.  I write separately in order to 
clarify the plain error analysis. 
¶56 Under a plain error analysis, as I understand it, a 
defendant must show (1) that there was an error, and (2) that 
the error is "plain" (that is, "obvious" or "clear").  The State 
then must show that the error is harmless, that is, that the 
error does not affect substantial rights.1  This analysis sets 
forth a procedure in which the court first identifies the error, 
then determines whether the error is obvious or clear, and 
finally determines 
whether the error affected substantial 
rights.   
¶57 These three steps comply with the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 901.03(4), governing plain error, which provides as follows:    
Plain Error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking 
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights 
although they were not brought to the attention of the 
judge.  
¶58 The 
majority 
opinion 
concludes 
that 
an 
error 
constitutes a "plain error" when the error is "fundamental, 
obvious, and substantial" and when the State fails to meet its 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin law on plain error differs from the federal 
analysis in one important respect, namely that in Wisconsin the 
burden is on the State to show that the error is harmless.  See 
State v. Mayo 2007 WI 78, ¶29, 301 Wis. 2d 642, 734 N.W.2d 115; 
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-35 (l993). 
No.  2006AP1847-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
burden of proving that the error is harmless.2  The majority 
opinion's requirement that an error be "fundamental" and 
"substantial" seems to render redundant the separate requirement 
that the error not be harmless.  What is a fundamental and 
substantial error?  Can a "fundamental" and "substantial" error 
also be harmless?  
¶59 Confusion in determining when plain error exists is 
not surprising.  Wisconsin courts long have struggled to define 
what constitutes a "plain error."  As this court acknowledged in 
State v. Sonnenberg, 117 Wis. 2d 159, 344 N.W.2d 95 (1984), 
defining "plain error" is difficult, if not impossible.3   
¶60 The majority opinion rightfully notes that there is no 
bright line test for when an error constitutes "plain error" or 
when reversal is mandated.4  Rather, courts must weigh the 
particular facts of each case to determine whether reversal is 
warranted.5  To that end, I would follow the analysis I have set 
forth: Plain error may be found when the court's overall 
conclusion is that there was error; the error is obvious; and 
                                                 
2 Majority op., ¶¶20-23.   
3 State v. Sonnenberg, 117 Wis. 2d 159, 177, 344 N.W.2d 95 
(1984) (citation omitted).   
4 See majority op., ¶22 (citing Mayo, 301 Wis. 2d 642, ¶29).   
5 See majority op., ¶22.   
No.  2006AP1847-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
the State fails to meet its burden of proving that the error did 
not affect substantial rights. 
¶61 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
¶62 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this opinion. 
 
No.  2006AP1847-CR.ssa 
 
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