Case Title: Commonwealth v. Lester

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-10129

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-11-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-10129 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  AARON LESTER. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     March 6, 2020. - November 18, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Deoxyribonucleic Acid.  Evidence, Expert opinion, 
Chart, Prior inconsistent statement.  Constitutional Law, 
Public trial.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Argument 
by prosecutor, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 29, 2005. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Cornelius J. Moriarty, II, J., 
and a motion for a new trial, filed on November 5, 2018, was 
considered by him. 
 
 
 
Elizabeth A. Billowitz for the defendant. 
 
Cynthia Cullen Payne, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  This case arises out of the shooting deaths of 
Tyrone Lewis, Jr., and Adrian White.  On March 29, 2005, a grand 
                     
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death. 
2 
 
jury indicted the defendant on eight counts, including two 
counts of murder.2  On February 7, 2007, the Commonwealth 
proceeded to trial against the defendant, Aaron Lester, and two 
codefendants, Maurice Felder and Derrick Washington, under a 
joint venture theory.3,4  After trial, the jury found the 
defendant guilty on both indictments charging murder in the 
first degree.5  The defendant filed a notice of appeal on March 
1, 2007.6  On November 5, 2018, the defendant filed a motion for 
a new trial, which the trial judge denied on December 20, 2018.  
                     
2 The indictments also charged the defendant with three 
counts of armed robbery, one count of possession of a firearm 
during the commission of a felony, one count of possession of a 
firearm without a license, and one count of possession of a 
firearm or ammunition without a firearm identification card. 
 
3 We affirmed Felder's and Washington's convictions on 
direct appeal.  See Commonwealth v. Washington, 459 Mass. 32, 33 
(2011); Commonwealth v. Felder, 455 Mass. 359, 360 (2009). 
 
4 During trial, the judge allowed the defendant's motion for 
a required finding of not guilty as to two indictments charging 
armed robbery and denied the motion as to the other six 
indictments.  The judge also denied the defendant's renewed 
motion for a required finding at the close of evidence. 
 
5 The jury also convicted the defendant on each of the four 
remaining indictments.  On the murder convictions, the judge 
sentenced the defendant to two consecutive life sentences 
without the possibility of parole.  The judge imposed additional 
terms of incarceration to be served concurrently on the other 
convictions. 
 
6 Over the subsequent years, the defendant filed a series of 
motions to stay or extend his appeal.  The defendant also did 
not permit his attorney to file an appellate brief for several 
years. 
3 
 
We consolidated the defendant's appeal from that denial with his 
direct appeal. 
On appeal, the defendant seeks reversal of his convictions, 
claiming that each of the following amounts to reversible error:  
(1) the judge's admission of a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
expert's testimony regarding a nonexclusion result; (2) the 
judge's admission in evidence of charts depicting DNA test 
results; (3) several of the prosecutor's closing argument 
statements; (4) the judge's jury instruction that prior 
inconsistent statements may not be considered substantively; and 
(5) the judge's denial of the defendant's motion for a new 
trial, asserting that court room closure during voir dire was 
unconstitutional.  Following plenary review of the record 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we affirm. 
 
Background.  1.  The murder.  We recite the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain 
details for later discussion.  See Commonwealth v. Tavares, 484 
Mass. 650, 651 (2020).  After drinking to excess at a friend's 
Super Bowl party, on Sunday, February 6, 2005, Mark Young became 
very intoxicated.  At about 2:15 P.M., Young's girlfriend, 
Vanessa Fulton, brought Young home, helped him into bed, and, 
after a couple of hours, left with plans to return later that 
evening.  Around 9 P.M., Young awoke to the sound of an incoming 
telephone call from Felder, Young's acquaintance and a 
4 
 
codefendant in this case, who said, "I'm downstairs."  Young 
then went downstairs, opened the front door, and saw Felder with 
the defendant and Washington, the other codefendant.7  Young 
permitted all three men to enter. 
Around 10 P.M., the three visitors asked Young to contact 
Lewis to buy "crack" cocaine.8  When Young refused, the defendant 
forced Young to telephone Lewis at gunpoint.  The three 
assailants then forced Young to strip down to his boxer shorts, 
creating an excuse for Young to remain inside and thus ensuring 
that Lewis would enter Young's house once he arrived. 
 
When Lewis arrived and entered the house about twenty 
minutes later, the three assailants beat him, forced him to 
strip down to his boxer shorts, and ordered him to contact his 
driver, White, and to tell White to come inside.  When White 
entered the house, the three assailants forced him to strip down 
to his boxer shorts as well.9 
                     
7 Young knew the defendant from the neighborhood and knew 
that Washington "hung around" the defendant. 
 
8 Young had previously purchased crack cocaine from Lewis. 
 
9 Between 10:30 P.M. and 11 P.M., Fulton, Young's 
girlfriend, called Young, and he told her to come over.  When 
Fulton arrived around 11:30 P.M., she saw an unfamiliar gold car 
parked in front of Young's house.  After knocking on the door 
for about five minutes, Young cracked open the door and told her 
to come back in twenty minutes.  Fulton complied.  When she 
returned, the same gold car remained parked outside, but Young 
answered neither his door nor his telephone.  At trial, Fulton 
testified that shortly thereafter, she saw a black man on 
5 
 
 
Lewis offered to pay the three assailants $20,000 to 
release him and White.  The assailants permitted Lewis to 
contact his girlfriend.  After two telephone conversations with 
Lewis, Lewis's girlfriend handed a gift bag to an individual, 
whom she later identified as Felder,10 who arrived at her home in 
a "goldish" car.11  About twenty minutes later, Felder returned 
to Young's house, and Young then heard the assailants counting 
and dividing money in another room. 
 
Shortly thereafter, the defendant asked Young to give him 
sheets and a pillow.  After Young complied, the three assailants 
forced Young, Lewis, and White, at gunpoint, up to the attic and 
onto the floor, where the assailants used the bedding to 
restrain the victims.  Specifically, the defendant used a 
pillowcase to tie up Young. 
                     
Young's porch, whom she later identified as Felder, and two 
other black men in the immediate vicinity. 
 
10 Within one month of the murders, the police showed 
Lewis's girlfriend eight photographs, including a photograph of 
Felder, and she told the police that she could not be sure the 
photograph of Felder was of the individual who had picked up the 
bag.  Shortly thereafter, she saw Felder on television being 
arraigned in court, at which point she identified Felder as the 
individual who had picked up the bag to police. 
 
11 Lewis's girlfriend did not look at the contents of the 
gift bag before she gave it to Felder.  Lewis and his girlfriend 
had been saving money to move out of Springfield.  About one 
month before the murders, they had about $18,000 or $19,000, 
sorted into $1,000 stacks, folded, and they had bound each stack 
with a black rubber band.  Lewis' girlfriend had not seen the 
money since then. 
6 
 
 
Each assailant carried his own handgun.  According to 
Young, the defendant held a nine millimeter, Felder held a .22 
caliber Ruger, and Washington held either a .45 or .40 caliber 
gun.  The defendant stood over Young, Washington stood over 
Lewis, and Felder stood over White.  The assailants decided to 
kill the victims simultaneously, and as the assailants counted 
down, Young turned his head slightly, heard gunshots, and felt 
something hot brush his left cheek.12  When Young opened his 
eyes, he saw that Lewis had been shot in the head.  Young 
proceeded to "play dead."  White then jumped up and ran down the 
stairs, the assailants chased him, and Young heard numerous 
gunshots coming from the stairwell. 
After he heard the assailants run down the stairs, Young 
got up, went to a window, and saw two people get into a car.  
Young then went downstairs himself and saw White at the bottom 
of the stairwell, still alive.  Young fled to get help.  After 
knocking at several houses, one neighbor finally answered.  The 
neighbor testified that Young was barefoot, wearing only boxer 
shorts, shivering, and looking "very, very scared."  Young told 
the neighbor that two of his friends had been shot and killed.  
They called the police. 
                     
12 Young testified that he told police he had "a burn injury 
from the bullet grazing [his] face," but the responding police 
officers testified that they did not recall any such injuries. 
7 
 
 
2.  The investigation.  When the police arrived at Young's 
house shortly after midnight on February 7, they found White's 
body at the bottom of the attic stairs13 and Lewis on the attic 
floor, still tied up and alive.  Lewis died later due to 
multiple gunshot wounds.  From Young's house, the police 
recovered discharge cartridge casings from three different 
weapons, the types of which matched Young's testimony regarding 
the types of firearms the defendants possessed.14  The police 
observed a bullet hole next to where Young stated he had been 
lying down, which led through the attic floor and through the 
ceiling of the bathroom below.  The police recovered one 
discharged nine millimeter cartridge casing from the attic, as 
well as one spent projectile that was consistent with the nine 
millimeter cartridge casing, from the bathroom floor. 
 
Investigators tested several items and surfaces for DNA, 
including the pillowcase the defendant used to restrain Young.  
The pillowcase sample revealed DNA from multiple people, of 
which the defendant was a potential contributor.15 
                     
13 The autopsy revealed that White had been shot eight times 
and had died as a result of those injuries. 
 
14 During the autopsies, the police recovered six spent .22 
caliber projectiles and one spent .45 caliber projectile from 
White's body and two .45 caliber projectiles from Lewis's body. 
 
15 Neither Felder nor Washington was a potential 
contributor. 
8 
 
 
In Young's statement to police, he initially lied and said 
he had been a victim of a home invasion by three masked 
intruders.  After the district attorney agreed to dispose of 
Young's pending charges and assured Young that he could leave 
the Commonwealth, Young told the police the above described 
version of events.16 
 
During a routine traffic stop later that afternoon, the 
police arrested the defendant and Washington.  The police 
subsequently recovered $5,907 in cash from the defendant's 
pocket and $6,702 in cash in Washington's pocket.  The police 
had already arrested Felder earlier that morning, at the 
hospital, where he was seeking treatment for a gunshot wound to 
his hand.  Inside Felder's pants pocket, the police found $7,000 
in cash, divided into seven bundles of $1,000, each of which was 
folded and bound with a black band. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Pillowcase DNA.  At trial, the 
Commonwealth's expert testified that with regard to the mixed 
DNA sample found on the pillowcase, the defendant was a 
potential contributor, but not a match, as it was impossible to 
discern a match from a mixed sample.  We refer to such DNA 
evidence as a "nonexclusion" result, as opposed to an 
                     
16 The district attorney's office then bought Young a one-
way ticket out of Massachusetts and Young left about one month 
later.  The district attorney's office also paid for Young to 
come back to Massachusetts to testify at the trial. 
9 
 
inconclusive result, the latter of which provides "no 
information whatsoever due to insufficient sample material, 
contamination, or some other problem" (quotations omitted and 
emphasis in original).  Commonwealth v. Barnett, 482 Mass. 632, 
639 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Mattei, 455 Mass. 840, 853 
(2010).  See Commonwealth v. Cameron, 473 Mass. 100, 106 (2015).  
The expert also testified that the "probability of a randomly 
selected unrelated individual having contributed DNA to [the 
pillowcase sample was] approximately . . . [one] in [twenty-one] 
of the African-American population."17,18 
As part of his report, the expert compiled four DNA charts 
(original DNA charts) illustrating the DNA analysis.19  For 
                     
17 In contrast, the expert testified that the DNA from a red 
brown stain located outside of Young's house matched Felder's 
DNA, that it did not include any other contributors, and that 
the "probability of a randomly selected unrelated individual 
having a DNA profile matching [the sample] obtained from [the 
sidewalk stain] is approximately . . . [one] in 28.77 
quadrillion of the African-American population." 
 
18 Pursuant to our G. L. c. 278, § 33E, review, we note that 
the expert improperly testified that there was an indication 
that the defendant's DNA matched one of the allele locations 
from the pillowcase sample, but the DNA "fell below our 
threshold of the instrument" and, thus, that location could not 
be used in his final assessment.  While this was error, it does 
not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
19 The expert illustrated the DNA using thirteen distinct 
points of reference, each of which contained at least two 
numerical values.  The DNA charts contained the defendant's DNA 
makeup, as well as that of each DNA sample collected. 
 
10 
 
trial, the prosecutor both enlarged the original DNA charts and 
created new DNA charts by cutting and pasting parts of the 
original DNA charts onto two separate, smaller DNA charts 
(smaller DNA charts).20  The prosecutor displayed all six DNA 
                     
We note that the expert witness here created the DNA charts 
based upon his own testing.  When an expert provides an opinion 
based upon the testing of another DNA analyst, the charts 
created by the nontestifying DNA analyst may not be admitted in 
evidence on direct examination.  See Commonwealth v. Seino, 479 
Mass. 463, 470 (2018).  We have not squarely addressed, however, 
the issue whether the Commonwealth may offer in evidence a DNA 
chart created by a testifying expert who did not perform the DNA 
testing, but took the raw data from the electrophoresis test and 
then, from raw data and visualization of the electropherogram, 
charted the allele numbers at the various genetic locations.  
See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 n.1 (2009) 
(not every person "whose testimony may be relevant in 
establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, 
or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part 
of the prosecution's case"); United States v. Summers, 666 F.3d 
192, 202 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 851 (2012) 
("The numerical identifiers of the DNA allele here, insofar as 
they are nothing more than raw data produced by a machine, are 
indistinguishable in character from . . . gas chromatograph data 
. . . and . . . chromatograph and spectrometer results").  
Compare Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 483 (2010) 
(expert's testimony regarding DNA profiles she developed herself 
was not hearsay, but "allele numbers derived from the testing 
. . . by another analyst that were included in [the expert's] 
chart were testimonial hearsay" and, therefore, admitted in 
error). 
 
20 On the first smaller DNA chart, the prosecutor put 
Felder's DNA profile directly above that of the samples from the 
red brown stains found outside Young's house.  The numerical 
values for each DNA sample were identical, and the expert 
testified that both stain samples matched Felder's DNA.  On the 
second smaller DNA chart, the prosecutor put the defendant's DNA 
profile directly above that of the pillowcase sample.  As stated 
above, the expert testified that the pillowcase sample was a 
mixture of multiple individuals' DNA.  As such, there were more 
11 
 
charts during the expert's testimony without objection.  After 
the expert's testimony, however, the judge admitted all six DNA 
charts in evidence over the three defendants' objections.21  The 
DNA charts did not include the expert's conclusions or any 
statistical analysis. 
2.  Admission of DNA charts in evidence.22  The defendant 
argues that the judge abused his discretion by admitting the DNA 
                     
than two numbers under each of the thirteen DNA markers, and 
some of those numbers matched the defendant's DNA profile. 
 
21 Felder's attorney, who raised the initial objection in 
which the other defense attorneys joined, clarified that he did 
not object to the admission of the smaller DNA charts, but 
rather to the portions taken from the original DNA charts that 
contained the mixed samples to which the expert was not able to 
make a definitive match.  Counsel explained that he was 
concerned that the jurors would try to "make their own 
comparisons."  Although no attorney specifically objected to the 
admission of the smaller DNA charts, because the smaller DNA 
charts contain the same information as the original DNA charts, 
we consider the objection preserved. 
 
22 For the first time on appeal, and only in a footnote, the 
defendant argues that the judge erred in admitting in evidence 
the nonexclusion result from the pillowcase sample because the 
result was more prejudicial than probative.  While judges should 
not admit nonexclusion results "without accompanying statistical 
explanation of the meaning of nonexclusion," Cameron, 473 Mass. 
at 106, quoting Mattei, 455 Mass. at 855, we afford a judge's 
determination as to the admissibility of such results the same 
"substantial deference" as we do for other evidentiary 
decisions, Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 452 Mass. 236, 253 (2008), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Mathews, 450 Mass. 858, 872 n.15 (2008). 
 
Whether the defendant was a potential contributor to the 
pillowcase sample was particularly probative of the defendant's 
identity as one of the murderers and of Young's credibility.  
The latter is especially true where Young testified that the 
defendant used the pillowcase to restrain Young.  Moreover, the 
12 
 
charts that contained the nonmatch results, over objection, 
without including the statistical analysis.  We disagree. 
We have repeatedly acknowledged the importance of 
statistical analyses to explain DNA matches to the jury, 
concluding that the probative value of a DNA match is negligible 
without such analysis.  See Commonwealth v. Cole, 473 Mass. 317, 
327 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Tassone, 468 Mass. 391, 402-
403 n.2 (2014) ("evidence of a DNA match has little or no value 
without expert testimony explaining the significance of the 
match, namely, 'the mathematical probability that another person 
has this same DNA profile'").  See also Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 
457 Mass. 773, 789 (2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 990 (2011), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 20 (1994) 
(evidence of DNA match "is meaningless without evidence 
indicating the significance of the match").  As a result, we 
have held that admitting nonexclusion results without the 
accompanying statistical analysis risks misleading the jury and 
unfairly prejudicing the defendant.  See Mattei, 455 Mass. at 
                     
defendant does not argue a heighted risk of undue prejudice, nor 
do we discern one.  The expert testified that the defendant was 
not a match to the pillowcase sample and provided a statistical 
explanation regarding the probability that the DNA belonged to 
someone other than the defendant.  See Mattei, 455 Mass. at 850-
852, citing Commonwealth v. Curnin, 409 Mass. 218, 222 n.7, 230 
(1991) (applying reasoning regarding need for statistical 
explanation for DNA matches to need for statistical explanation 
for nonexclusion results).  The judge did not abuse his 
discretion. 
13 
 
852.  That rationale, however, does not apply to the admission 
of DNA charts with the same force. 
Here, the jury heard the expert's statistical analysis on 
direct examination, as well as on cross-examination and during 
the defendant's attorney's closing argument.  "The expert's 
opinions were what mattered to the jury, who likely would have 
found the raw data incomprehensible without the accompanying" 
statistics.  Commonwealth v. Seino, 479 Mass. 463, 471 (2018).  
We must trust that a reasonable juror would have understood the 
expert's thrice repeated testimony, no matter that they did not 
have the precise statistical analysis attached to the DNA charts 
during deliberation.  While we conclude that the judge did not 
err in admitting the charts, we also note that the better course 
is to remind the jury that they must consider the charts in 
conjunction with the expert's testimony, including the expert's 
statistical analysis.  See id., quoting Commonwealth v. McCowen, 
458 Mass. 461, 484 (2010) (because "[t]he DNA charts merely 
displayed genetic locations, [and] not any information regarding 
a match or the statistical probability thereof," they alone "had 
no meaningful probative value").23 
                     
23 We conclude that the same reasoning applies where an 
expert testified as to an inconclusive result and that 
inconclusive result was contained in a DNA chart admitted in 
evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Cavitt, 460 Mass. 617, 635 (2011) 
("testimony regarding inconclusive DNA results is not relevant 
evidence because it does not have a tendency to prove any 
14 
 
3.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant also 
argues that the prosecutor made several improper statements 
during her closing argument, which together or separately 
prejudiced the defendant and thus warrant a new trial.  
Specifically, the defendant argues that the prosecutor 
improperly (1) misstated DNA evidence, asserting that the 
defendant's DNA was on the pillowcase; (2) both defined 
reasonable doubt and urged the jury not to look for reasonable 
doubt; and (3) speculated that the defendant cooperated upon his 
arrest because he believed there were no living witnesses to the 
murders.  Because the defendant objected to the first two 
allegedly improper statements, we review those for prejudicial 
error.  See Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 480 Mass. 299, 305, S.C., 
480 Mass. 1015 (2018) (no prejudicial error where error did not 
influence jury or had "very slight effect" on jury [citation 
omitted]).  Because the defendant did not object to the third 
                     
particular fact that would be material to an issue in the 
case").  Neither the expert's testimony nor the data in the 
charts relating to the inconclusive DNA results should have been 
admitted in evidence.  This error, however, did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See id.  
The inconclusive DNA evidence was "wholly neutral."  Id.  There 
was no insinuation at trial that the defendant was a potential 
contributor or match to the sheet sample.  Indeed, Felder's 
defense attorney specifically asked the expert whether the 
defendant was a potential contributor to that sample, and the 
expert responded, "No."  The expert even testified that he could 
not determine whether the mixture sample contributors were male 
or female. 
15 
 
statement, should we conclude it was erroneous, "we review for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."  
Commonwealth v. Andre, 484 Mass. 403, 417 (2020). 
We consider statements made during closing argument "in the 
context of the whole argument, the evidence admitted at trial, 
and the judge's instructions to the jury."  Commonwealth v. 
Felder, 455 Mass. 359, 368 (2009).  Where the judge properly 
instructed the jury, "we must presume that the jury understood 
that instruction."  Andre, 484 Mass. at 418, citing Commonwealth 
v. Kolenovic, 478 Mass. 189, 200 (2017). 
a.  Misstatements of DNA evidence.  Despite the expert's 
testimony to the contrary, the prosecutor twice stated in her 
closing argument, over objection, that the defendant's DNA was 
on the pillowcase.24  The prosecutor erred in misstating the 
evidence.25  See Commonwealth v. Lao, 460 Mass. 12, 22 (2011), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516 (1987) 
                     
24 The prosecutor specifically stated:  "Aaron Lester's DNA 
was on the pillowcase."  Then, following the defendant's 
attorney's objection, which the judge overruled, the prosecutor 
reiterated:  "The DNA evidence, it's Aaron Lester." 
 
25 Codefendant Felder raised this issue in his direct 
appeal.  See Felder, 455 Mass. at 369.  In that case, we 
discerned "no error in the prosecutor's characterization of the 
results of DNA testing on [the] pillowcase as not excluding [the 
defendant]."  Id.  We do not extend that conclusion here.  Our 
description in Felder was inaccurate, as the prosecutor did not 
state that the sample did not exclude the defendant; rather, the 
prosecutor affirmatively asserted that the DNA on the pillowcase 
belonged to the defendant. 
16 
 
(prosecutor "may not misstate the evidence" [quotation 
omitted]).  See also Commonwealth v. Holley, 476 Mass. 114, 127-
128 (2016) (error for prosecutor to ask jury to infer that DNA 
came from police officer when DNA results were inconclusive).  
The prosecutor's error, however, did not prejudice the 
defendant.  See Alvarez, 480 Mass. at 305. 
"We consider four factors in determining whether an error 
made during closing argument is prejudicial:  '(1) whether the 
defendant seasonably objected; (2) whether the error was limited 
to collateral issues or went to the heart of the case; (3) what 
specific or general instructions the judge gave the jury which 
may have mitigated the mistake; and (4) whether the error, in 
the circumstances, possibly made a difference in the jury's 
conclusions.'"  Id. at 306, quoting Commonwealth v. Silva-
Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 807 (2009).  Here, the defendant timely 
objected and, as acknowledged by the Commonwealth, the 
prosecutor's misstatements pertained both to Young's credibility 
and to the defendant's identity; thus, they went to "a critical 
issue in the case."  Commonwealth v. Taylor, 455 Mass. 372, 384-
385 (2009). 
We next turn to the judge's instructions, which we evaluate 
"as a whole and interpret . . . as would a reasonable juror."  
Andre, 484 Mass. at 416, quoting Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 
Mass. 682, 697 (2015).  We agree that given the defendant's 
17 
 
timely objection and the prosecutor's misstatements, a specific, 
curative instruction would have been the better course.  
However, the defendant's attorney did not request a specific, 
curative instruction, nor did he object to the judge's 
instructions as given.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 24 (b), 378 Mass. 
895 (1979) ("No party may assign as error the giving or failure 
to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury 
retires to consider its verdict, specifying the matter to which 
he objects and the grounds of his objection"). 
The judge's general instructions sufficiently mitigated the 
error:  "if in the course of final arguments either attorney 
gave you an impression as to how they think you ought to find 
the facts, or expressed their own personal opinions to you about 
the facts, or talked to you about things that you didn't recall 
from the testimony, then ignore it, because it's your collective 
memory of the testimony that controls."  The judge also provided 
three separate instructions that closing arguments were not 
evidence, including a thorough instruction just prior to closing 
arguments.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Dirgo, 474 Mass. 1012, 1017 
(2016) (new trial necessary where misstatements were not "offset 
by overwhelming evidence of . . . defendant's guilt" and judge's 
general instructions "did not specifically address, and were not 
enough to cure the cumulative effect of, the particular errors 
18 
 
we have identified").  We must presume the jury understood all 
four instructions.  See Andre, 484 Mass. at 418. 
Finally, and mostly importantly, under these circumstances, 
we cannot say that the prosecutor's misstatements, which only 
comprised thirteen words of her thirty-three page closing 
argument, "possibly made a difference in the jury's 
conclusions."  Alvarez, 480 Mass. at 306, quoting Silva-
Santiago, 453 Mass. at 807.  As stated above, the jury heard the 
expert's clear testimony that the defendant was a potential 
contributor to the pillowcase DNA sample, as well as the 
required explanation of the statistical analysis.  Moreover, 
while closing arguments are not evidence, the defendant's 
attorney reiterated the expert's testimony during his closing 
argument. 
This is not a case wherein the prosecutor referred to the 
DNA charts and "encouraged the jury to act as their own 
experts."  Mattei, 455 Mass. at 856.  Rather, the prosecutor 
briefly mentioned the DNA chart in reference to the expert's 
testimony.  There was also significant evidence of the 
defendant's guilt, including Young's extensive eyewitness 
testimony, which was corroborated by the neighbor's testimony as 
to Young's demeanor and Young's statements on the night of the 
murders, the bullet hole in the attic floor where Young 
testified he had been lying down, the corresponding spent 
19 
 
projectile discovered in the bathroom below, and the cash in the 
defendant's and in his coventurer's pockets upon arrest. 
b.  Improper discussion of reasonable doubt.  During her 
closing argument, the prosecutor (1) appeared to define 
reasonable doubt and (2) urged the jury not to "look for 
doubt."26  We conclude that neither statement constituted error. 
It is error for attorneys to provide their own definition 
of reasonable doubt in their closing arguments.  To the extent 
that a prosecutor does so, that discussion must follow our 
uniform jury instruction on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  
See Commonwealth v. Russell, 470 Mass. 464, 477 (2015).  The 
prosecutor's discussion here, however, was not in error. 
Regarding the prosecutor's first statement, while legal 
instruction falls squarely within the judge's province, see 
Commonwealth v. Szczuka, 391 Mass. 666, 674 (1984), S.C., 413 
                     
26 The prosecutor stated: 
 
"Reasonable doubt.  His honor is going to tell it's not 
proof beyond all doubt.  It's not a shadow of a doubt or 
mere doubt.  You can't measure it; it's not this big or 
this big.  Because when you think about it, everything that 
you have not seen with your own two eyes you will have a 
doubt about, because you haven't seen it yourself.  You 
haven't heard it yourself.  But that is not the doubt that 
the law talks about. . . .  And you as jurors took an oath 
to find the truth.  And that's what verdict means; it means 
to speak the truth.  Not to look for doubt.  Because if you 
look for doubt, if that's your mission, then you will find 
it.  But if you search for the truth and you use your 
common sense and the law that His Honor gives you, I 
suggest that you will find the truth." 
20 
 
Mass. 1004 (1992), as both the prosecutor and the judge noted, 
the prosecutor's statements were not incorrect statements of 
law.  She correctly explained that the concept of reasonable 
doubt is not "susceptible to quantification; it is inherently 
qualitative."  Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 460 Mass. 781, 787-788 
(2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 802, 
806 (1985). 
As to the prosecutor's second statement, we conclude that 
the prosecutor did not err in encouraging the jury not to look 
for doubt.  We have previously discerned no error where judges 
instructed the jury that they need not search for doubt.  See 
Commonwealth v. Watkins, 425 Mass. 830, 836 n.9 & 839 (1997) (no 
error in instructing jury that "[a] reasonable doubt, for 
example, is not the doubt that might exist in the mind of a man 
or a woman searching for some doubt, for some excuse to acquit a 
defendant"); Commonwealth v. Randolph, 415 Mass. 364, 367 
(1993), S.C., 438 Mass. 290 (2002) (no error in instructing, 
"[Y]ou're not to search for doubt"). 
Ultimately, however, the judge's proper reasonable doubt 
instruction ameliorated any possible confusion or prejudice 
caused by the prosecutor's statements.  See Commonwealth v. 
Morales, 461 Mass. 765, 784 (2012), citing Szczuka, 391 Mass. at 
673-674. 
21 
 
c.  Improper speculation.  During the routine traffic stop, 
during which the defendant and Washington were arrested, a 
police officer asked if there was anything in the car about 
which the officer should know.  The defendant responded that he 
had $5,700 in his pocket.  During closing argument, the 
prosecutor posited that the defendant only cooperated by telling 
an officer about the cash in his pocket because the defendant 
believed Young was dead.27  On appeal, the defendant argues that 
this constituted improper speculation.  We disagree. 
The prosecutor's assertion was a reasonable inference based 
on the evidence admitted.  See Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 478 
Mass. 725, 741 (2018), quoting Kozec, 399 Mass. at 516 ("a 
prosecutor may argue 'forcefully for a conviction based on the 
evidence and on inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the 
evidence'").  Young testified that he pretended to be dead after 
the defendant stood directly over him and shot at his head, and 
the location of the bullet hole was consistent with his 
testimony.  A police officer also testified that on the night of 
the murders, Young stated that "the suspects assumed he was 
dead." 
                     
27 Specifically, the prosecutor stated:  "He thought Mark 
Young was still dead.  He didn't know he missed Mark Young.  He 
thought he was dead." 
22 
 
Moreover, the prosecutor directly responded to, and offered 
a different interpretation of, the defendant's attorney's 
closing argument that the defendant's cooperation was indicative 
of consciousness of innocence.  See Commonwealth v. Preziosi, 
399 Mass. 748, 753 (1987) (prosecutor's rebuttals of defense's 
suggestion that police cooperation demonstrated consciousness of 
innocence "were within the proper realm of suggesting opposing 
inferences which could be drawn from the evidence").  See also 
Fernandes, 478 Mass. at 741, quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 404 
Mass. 1, 7 (1989) ("prosecutor entitled to point out the 
weaknesses of the defendant's case and 'make a fair reply to the 
defendant's closing argument'").  Finally, as stated above, the 
judge made it abundantly clear that closing arguments were not 
evidence.  There was no reversible error. 
 
4.  Prior inconsistent statements instruction.  The 
defendant next argues that the judge erred in instructing the 
jury, sua sponte, that they may only consider prior inconsistent 
statements in relation to a witness's credibility, and not as 
substantive evidence.28  The defendant further argues that this 
                     
28 The judge instructed: 
 
"When there is a prior inconsistent statement made on some 
other occasion outside of the courtroom, that evidence is 
offered for the single and only purpose of impeaching the 
credibility of that witness.  If you find that it does 
impeach the credibility of that witness, that's entirely up 
to you.  If someone comes in here to court and testifies in 
23 
 
error prejudiced his defense because his attorney had sought to 
use the statement Fulton, Young's girlfriend, made to the police 
and adopted shortly after the murders, which differed from her 
trial testimony, to discredit Young's testimony.  We agree that 
the judge's instruction as it related to Fulton's adopted 
statement to the police was erroneous, but the error did not 
prejudice the defendant as to require a new trial.  Commonwealth 
v. Odgren, 483 Mass. 41, 46 (2019) (where defendant's attorney 
objected, we review for prejudicial error). 
At trial, Fulton testified that she observed three men 
outside Young's house around the time of the murders.  In her 
adopted statement to the police, however, Fulton stated that she 
had observed four men; the three men she mentioned at trial and 
one more man sitting in the gold car outside of Young's house.29  
                     
a substantially different way than something else he or she 
said on a prior occasion, it's up to you to say whether or 
not you think it affects that witness' present credibility.  
Please remember that the substance or truth of the earlier 
statement made outside of the courtroom is not affirmative 
evidence in the case.  It simply goes to the credibility of 
the witness." 
 
29 The Commonwealth argues that Fulton's adopted statement 
to the police was not actually inconsistent with her trial 
testimony, but rather completed her trial testimony because she 
was not able to recall whether there was a fourth man in the 
gold car.  While we agree with the general principle that the 
true failure of present memory on a certain matter is not 
necessarily inconsistent with a previous statement on the same 
matter, see Commonwealth v. Gil, 393 Mass. 204, 220 (1984), 
here, there was an inconsistency.  Fulton testified that she 
observed three men outside Young's house on the night of the 
24 
 
As both parties now agree, the judge properly admitted Fulton's 
adopted statement to the police in evidence, over the 
Commonwealth's objection, under the past recollection recorded 
exception to the rule against hearsay.  See Commonwealth v. 
Evans, 439 Mass. 184, 189, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 923 and 540 
U.S. 973 (2003) (describing factors to admit statement under 
exception); Mass. G. Evid. § 803(5) (2020) ("A previously 
recorded statement may be admissible if [i] the witness has 
insufficient memory to testify fully and accurately, [ii] the 
witness had firsthand knowledge of the facts recorded, [iii] the 
witness can testify that the recorded statement was truthful 
when made, and [iv] the witness made or adopted the recorded 
statement when the events were fresh in the witness's memory").  
The evidence, therefore, had a dual relevancy.  The statement 
was admitted both for its truth and to impeach Fulton's in-court 
testimony. 
To the extent that judges provide a jury instruction, like 
the one provided here, that states that prior inconsistent 
statements made during the trial are admissible only to impeach 
                     
murders, but she previously stated that she had observed four.  
Both cannot be true.  See Commonwealth v. Parent, 465 Mass. 395, 
400 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Hesketh, 386 Mass. 153, 161 
(1982) ("It is enough if the proffered testimony, taken as a 
whole, either by what it says or by what it omits to say, 
affords some indication that the fact was different from the 
testimony of the witness whom it is sought to contradict"). 
25 
 
and not as substantive evidence, that instruction, in some 
circumstances, may be incorrect.  In some trials, at least some 
prior inconsistent statements are also admitted as substantive 
evidence.30 
It is unrealistic to expect that during the course of a 
trial, the judge is going to be able to catalog every out-of-
court statement, and then give an appropriate final instruction 
as to whether each out-of-court statement was admitted 
substantively or to impeach in the absence of a request from 
counsel.  Moreover, because out-of-court statements, like the 
one here, often have a dual relevancy –- they are admissible for 
their truth and to impeach -- the party concerned about the 
purpose for which the prior inconsistent statement is admitted 
has the burden of requesting the appropriate instruction from 
the judge at the time the statement is admitted.  It is better 
practice for judges to instruct the jury at the time of the 
statements' admission as to the purpose for which they were 
                     
30 By way of example only, the following are often admitted 
substantively:  statements of a party opponent, see Mass G. 
Evid. § 801(d)(2)(A) (2020); prior inconsistent statements made 
under oath at certain proceedings, see Mass G. Evid. 
§ 801(d)(1)(A); spontaneous utterances, Mass G. Evid. § 803(2); 
coconspirator statements, see Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(E); and 
statements for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment, 
see Mass G. Evid. § 803(4); to say nothing of the fact that 
where an out-of-court statement is admitted without a limiting 
instruction, it is admitted substantively, Gil, 393 Mass. at 
221. 
26 
 
admitted.  Where no request is made, that does not mean that the 
evidence was not admissible substantively in the absence of a 
sustained objection.  It just means that the proponent of the 
evidence may not be heard to object during the final 
instructions as to the instruction on the limited use of prior 
inconsistent statements.31 
The defendants' trial strategy centered on discrediting 
Young, including his testimony that there were only three 
assailants -- the defendants.  Thus, the defendant argues that 
by preventing the jury from considering Fulton's adopted police 
statement substantively, a statement in which Fulton 
contradicted Young's trial testimony, the judge effectively 
bolstered Young's credibility.  We disagree. 
While all three defense attorneys pointed to Fulton's 
statement as a reason to doubt Young's testimony, the attorneys 
also put forth ample evidence, both substantive and impeachment, 
separate from her statement, which was designed to discredit 
Young.  The defense attorneys elicited testimony from Young on 
cross-examination regarding his inconsistent statements as to 
                     
31 Finally, we remind prosecutors that when evidence the 
Commonwealth offered was clearly admissible only to impeach but 
there is no objection, if the Commonwealth argues the evidence 
substantively, on appeal the issue would still be analyzed under 
the substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice standard and, 
in cases of murder in the first degree, under the substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice standard. 
27 
 
the alleged injury to Young's face and whether his assailants 
were wearing masks.  The defense attorneys later bolstered these 
inconsistencies through testimony and evidence from the officers 
who interviewed Young on the night of the murders.32  The 
attorneys also highlighted the deal Young made with the 
Commonwealth in exchange for identifying the defendants.  
Moreover, the defense attorneys spent the majority of their 
thorough closing arguments describing the multiple reasons why 
the jury should not trust Young's testimony. 
As such, Fulton's adopted statement to the police was one 
relatively small part of the defense's over-all strategy to 
discredit Young and the adopted statement maintained its 
relevance for that purpose.  Moreover, the defendant's attorney, 
in his closing argument, used this statement for its truth.  
Thus, we cannot say that "there is a reasonable possibility that 
the error might have contributed to the jury's verdict."  See 
Odgren, 483 Mass. at 46, quoting Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 478 
Mass. 142, 150 (2017). 
5.  Public trial.  The defendant finally renews the 
argument he made in his motion for a new trial, claiming that he 
                     
32 Primarily, the reports of two responding officers 
indicated that Young had stated that three masked men forced 
Young and three other men into the attic.  Both officers 
testified that the number of victims was a typographical error, 
but also admitted that that was the first time they had 
mentioned such an error. 
28 
 
is entitled to a new trial because the court room was closed 
during voir dire, violating his right to a public trial.  In 
support of his motion, the defendant included a portion of the 
trial transcript referencing court room closures and affidavits 
from himself, his mother, and his trial attorney, among others.  
The defendant did not object at trial.  The motion judge, who 
was also the trial judge, denied the motion. 
Here, the judge explicitly stated:  "I remember the trial 
well.  The courtroom was not closed to the public.  I do not 
credit the affidavits that the defendant's motion and friend 
[included] to the contrary."  Nothing in the record indicates 
that the judge erred.  The portion of the transcript that the 
defendant included with his motion reflects a conversation 
between the prosecutor and the judge in which the prosecutor 
explicitly asked about closed court rooms "just for edification" 
and, notably, the judge responded that the court room will not 
be closed.  Moreover, neither attorney who submitted an 
affidavit -- the defendant's attorney or Washington's attorney 
-- recalls any court room closure, and a judge need not credit a 
defendant's affidavit.  See Commonwealth v. Leng, 463 Mass. 779, 
787 (2012).  See also Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 476 Mass. 725, 
742 (2017) ("judge may consider the affiant's self-interest or 
bias"). 
29 
 
 
6.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
entire record of this case pursuant to our responsibilities 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We conclude that there is no basis 
for reducing the defendant's sentence on the murder conviction 
or ordering a new trial.  We affirm the defendant's convictions 
and the order denying his motion for a new trial filed on 
November 5, 2018.33 
So ordered. 
                     
33 Almost six months after oral argument, the defendant 
filed a second, pro se motion for a new trial.  Due to the 
delayed nature of the filing, we remand this motion to the trial 
judge for hearing and determination.  See G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  
However, because the defendant filed the motion prior to 
issuance of the rescript in this case, should the appeal from a 
denial of this motion reach our court, the "gatekeeper" 
provision of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, would be inapplicable.  See 
Commonwealth v. Raymond, 450 Mass. 729, 729 n.1 (2008).