Case Title: P. v. Vasquez

Citation: 

Docket Number: S128854

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2006-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 7/10/06  
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S128854 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/7 B159379 
ANDREW VASQUEZ et al.,  
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BA200494 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Does the erroneous denial of a defendant’s motion to disqualify the 
prosecuting district attorney’s office for a conflict of interest (Pen. Code, § 1424) 
constitute a deprivation of due process?  We conclude that not all erroneous 
denials under Penal Code section 1424 result in due process violations; we further 
conclude the participation of a conflicted prosecutor in this case did not do so.  We 
therefore reject defendants’ contention that the Court of Appeal erred in failing to 
assess the prejudice flowing from constitutional error.  We further conclude that 
the trial court’s failure to disqualify the prosecutor in this case, an error under 
Penal Code section 1424, was not prejudicial under the standard of People v. 
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Defendants Andrew Vasquez and Anthony Fregoso were charged with the 
murder of Armando Ayala, with allegations Vasquez personally used a knife and 
Fregoso personally used a baseball bat in the crime.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 12022, 
 
 
2
subd. (b)(1).)1  After a joint trial, both defendants were found guilty of second 
degree murder, the use allegations were found true, and they were each sentenced 
to 16 years to life in prison. 
The facts of the offense are not important to the issues we address here.  As 
summarized by the Court of Appeal (neither party disputes the lower court’s 
accuracy), the trial testimony showed, in brief, the following:  Defendants and the 
victim belonged to rival “tagging crews.”  On the day before the offense, Ayala 
(the victim) and two other young men hit, kicked, and sprayed a young woman in 
the face with mace, warning her against interfering with their crew.  The young 
woman told Fregoso of the attack, and the next day, apparently in retaliation, 
defendants approached Ayala near the entrance to Fairfax High School.  As 
Fregoso positioned himself in front of Ayala, Vasquez approached him diagonally 
from behind, holding something (some witnesses saw a knife) in his hand.  
Warned by a friend, Ayala turned and sprayed pepper spray as Vasquez, with a 
side-arm motion, stabbed him in the chest with a knife.  The wound, which 
severed an artery and penetrated Ayala’s lung, was fatal.     
The motion to disqualify the district attorney’s office arose from the family 
relationship between defendant Vasquez and two employees of the Los Angeles 
County District Attorney (LACDA).  According to Vasquez’s trial counsel, and 
undisputed by the People, Vasquez’s mother had been, at the time of trial, an 
administrator in the LACDA’s office for about 13 years.  Her husband, Vasquez’s 
stepfather, had been employed for about the same period as a deputy district 
attorney.  After the Attorney General refused the LACDA’s request that he assume 
prosecutorial duties, the LACDA assigned Deputy District Attorney Patricia 
                                              
1  
All unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
 
 
3
Wilkinson to prosecute the case.  Wilkinson declared she did not know Vasquez’s 
mother or stepfather, though according to defense counsel the mother recalled 
once having discussed shoe shopping with Wilkinson.  
Defendants, through counsel, indicated to Prosecutor Wilkinson their 
willingness to waive a jury trial and have the charges adjudicated by the assigned 
trial judge, the Honorable Norman Shapiro.  Wilkinson, according to Vasquez’s 
attorney, declined even to raise the possibility with her superiors, giving a reason 
that prompted Vasquez’s attorney to make an oral recusal motion under section 
1424, which counsel for Fregoso joined.  According to defense counsel, Wilkinson 
said she “didn’t want to do anything that could make it look like there had been 
any kind of favor toward Mr. Vasquez because of his father being . . . in the 
district attorney’s office.”  This, defense counsel suggested, constituted evidence 
that Vasquez was “being treated differently because of who his father is.”  While 
the prosecutor had no obligation to waive a jury trial, counsel argued, Wilkinson’s 
response indicated the LACDA’s concern that it might appear to be showing 
favoritism toward Vasquez had created an “extra layer” of analysis in the office’s 
decisionmaking about Vasquez, one that would not be present if a different office 
prosecuted the case.   
In response, Prosecutor Wilkinson gave three reasons she decided not to 
waive a jury:  she “felt a jury just wouldn’t have any difficulty with the evidence”; 
Judge Shapiro was himself a former member of the LACDA’s office and 
Wilkinson “did not wish to put [the trial] court in a position of having its integrity 
questioned” in the event of a prodefense ruling; and, the victim’s family having 
been upset because of changes in LACDA staffing on the case and having 
conveyed concerns “that perhaps we were not pursuing things,” Wilkinson 
“wanted to insure that there was no appearance of any impropriety on the part of 
our office in handling this.”  
 
 
4
The trial court denied the recusal motion on the ground the prosecutor had 
given “an adequate reason” for declining to waive a jury trial, to wit, that “based 
on the court’s long experience as a prosecutor and with this particular office,” it 
would be unwise to try this case to the court.     
The case was then tried to a jury, which was unable to reach a verdict.  
According to defense counsel’s discussion with the jurors after the trial court 
declared a mistrial, two jurors had voted for a verdict of first degree murder, six 
for second degree murder, three for voluntary manslaughter, and one for acquittal.     
The matter was assigned to the Honorable Larry Fidler for retrial. 
Defendants renewed their recusal motion, this time in written form relying on 
section 1424 and defendants’ due process rights under the United States and 
California Constitutions.  The motion again relied on the prosecutor’s fear of 
apparent favoritism as a reason for declining to try the case to Judge Shapiro, as 
well as on three additional factual circumstances.  First, after the mistrial, the 
prosecutor had refused to accept pleas to voluntary manslaughter, continuing 
instead to demand pleas to at least second degree murder, and “is still charging 
ahead with her assassination [first degree murder] theory.”  Second, at the first 
trial, “the case became a cause celebre with numerous deputy district attorneys 
hanging around the courtroom.”  Counsel amplified the latter point at the motion 
hearing, stating that “this case has a lot of intensity because of the fact of who Mr. 
Vasquez’s father is, and . . . the atmosphere was electric, it was very intense and it 
was very uncomfortable.”  Finally, the defense planned to call Vasquez’s 
stepfather as a witness at the retrial; he would testify Vasquez habitually carried a 
pocketknife.   
Prosecutor Wilkinson responded that it was Judge Shapiro’s prior 
relationship with the LACDA’s office and the undesirability of putting him in a 
position “of having his decision perhaps questioned” that had led her to decline a 
 
 
5
court trial before him, though she also referred separately to “avoid[ing] the 
appearance of impropriety,” without specifying whether her reference was to an 
appearance on the part of Judge Shapiro or the LACDA.  With regard to the plea 
offer, Wilkinson stated she believed the facts of the case supported first degree 
murder on a theory of premeditation or lying in wait and did not show provocation 
so as to support a voluntary manslaughter verdict.  She was willing, as her office 
had always been, to accept pleas of second degree murder.  
The trial court denied the renewed motion to recuse, reasoning that the 
stepfather’s potential role as a witness was not grounds for disqualifying the entire 
LACDA office and Wilkinson’s refusal to waive a jury before Judge Shapiro was 
based on the identity of the trial judge, not the family relationship between 
Vasquez and LACDA employees.  For these reasons, the court found, defendants 
had not met their burden under section 1424 of showing a likelihood of unfair 
treatment.  
The case was tried to dual juries, which convicted defendants of second 
degree murder.  The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the recusal motion should 
have been granted but defendants, on appeal, had failed to show prejudice from 
the error.  The appellate court found Vasquez’s family relationship with LACDA 
employees had caused a conflict of interest for that office, a conflict sufficiently 
severe as to indicate a likelihood defendants would not receive fair treatment at all 
stages of the criminal proceedings.  (§ 1424; People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 
580, 593-594.)  Both the existence of a conflict and its severity were evidenced by 
the prosecutor’s admission that concerns over appearing to favor Vasquez had 
motivated, at least in part, her decision not to waive a jury trial, and by the 
prosecutor’s refusal after the first jury hung to offer a plea less than second degree 
murder.  The record showed pressure from the victim’s family “created the 
 
 
6
potential for unfairness in this case where the prosecutor felt an obligation to treat 
Vasquez more harshly in order to avoid a charge of favoritism.”   
In light of its view of the conflict, the Court of Appeal observed, it would 
have granted defendants relief from the erroneous recusal denial had they sought 
relief before trial by filing a petition for a writ of mandate based solely on the 
likelihood of unfair treatment.  But on appeal, the court held, defendants were 
entitled to reversal only if they could show the error caused “actual harm” in the 
form of a “probability (versus possibility)” of a different result had a 
nonconflicted attorney prosecuted the case.  Defendants could not do so:  Because 
the jury hung in the first trial, no prejudice resulted from the prosecutor’s refusal 
to try the case to Judge Shapiro, and the prosecutor’s offer of a plea to second 
degree murder was fair, if not as favorable as an offer of voluntary manslaughter; 
further, whether a nonconflicted prosecutor would have made defendants a 
manslaughter offer is “necessarily speculative.”  The Court of Appeal did not 
discuss whether the trial court’s failure to recuse the LACDA required reversal on 
the ground it deprived defendants of due process.   
We granted defendants’ petitions for review. 
DISCUSSION  
I.  The Trial Court Erred Under Section 1424 in Denying the 
Recusal Motion 
We agree with the Court of Appeal that the close family relationship 
between longtime employees of the LACDA and defendant Vasquez created a 
conflict of interest and a consequential likelihood of unfair treatment that should 
have been avoided through recusal of the prosecutorial office.  The assigned 
deputy district attorney admitted, both to defense counsel and at the first recusal 
motion hearing, that concerns about an appearance to the victim’s family of 
favoritism by the LACDA’s office had in part influenced her to reject the defense 
 
 
7
proposal for a bench trial before Judge Shapiro.  This admission of an extrinsic 
influence over the prosecutor’s discretionary decisionmaking showed both the 
conflict’s existence―i.e., that because of the family relationship there was a 
“reasonable possibility that the DA’s office may not exercise its discretionary 
function in an evenhanded manner”―and that its severity required the LACDA be 
disqualified―i.e., that the conflict was “so grave as to render it unlikely that 
defendant will receive fair treatment during all portions of the criminal 
proceedings.”  (People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal.3d 141, 148; see People v. 
Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 594 (Eubanks).) 
As we explained at length in Eubanks, public prosecutors in California are 
required to exercise their discretionary functions, which are broad in scope and 
subject to only limited review, “ ‘with the highest degree of integrity and 
impartiality.’ ”  (Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 589, quoting People v. Superior 
Court (Greer) (1977) 19 Cal.3d 255, 267.)  Impartiality, in this context, means not 
that the prosecutor is indifferent to the conviction or acquittal of the 
defendant―the prosecutor does not share in the neutrality expected of the judge 
and jury―but that the prosecutor is “expected to exercise his or her discretionary 
functions in the interests of the People at large, and not under the influence or 
control of an interested individual.”  (Eubanks, at p. 590.)  The public prosecutor’s 
proper interest “ ‘ “is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” ’ ”  
(Id. at p. 589.)  
In section 1424, the Legislature established a substantive test for a motion 
to disqualify the district attorney:  “The motion may not be granted unless the 
evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that 
the defendant would receive a fair trial.”  The statute demands a showing of a real, 
not merely apparent, potential for unfair treatment, and further requires that that 
potential “rise to the level of a likelihood of unfairness.”  (Eubanks, supra, 14 
 
 
8
Cal.4th at p. 592.)  Although the statute refers to a “fair trial,” we have recognized 
that many of the prosecutor’s critical discretionary choices are made before or 
after trial and have hence interpreted section 1424 as requiring recusal on a 
showing of a conflict of interest “ ‘so grave as to render it unlikely that defendant 
will receive fair treatment during all portions of the criminal proceedings.’ ”  
(Eubanks, at p. 593, quoting People v. Conner, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 148.) 
On review of the trial court’s denial of a recusal motion, “[o]ur role is to 
determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the [trial court’s 
factual] findings [citation], and, based on those findings, whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying the motion.”  (People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 
281, 293-294; accord, Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 594.)  Here, the trial court 
found Deputy District Attorney Wilkinson had declined the defense offer of a 
bench trial before Judge Shapiro because of “the problems attendant with his 
[Judge Shapiro’s] past position,” rather than “because of who the defendant is, vis-
à-vis his stepfather and his mother.”  This finding is not supported by substantial 
evidence.   
At the first recusal motion hearing, Vasquez’s attorney represented to the 
court that Wilkinson had told him she was not interested in waiving a jury because 
“she didn’t want to do anything that could make it look like there had been any 
kind of favor toward Mr. Vasquez because of his father being . . . in the District 
Attorney’s office.”  Wilkinson did not contradict this aspect of defense counsel’s 
account of their conversation.  In describing her motives, she said she was 
concerned about possible criticism of Judge Shapiro should he rule for the 
defense, but continued, “And, also, I wanted to insure that there was no 
appearance of impropriety on the part of our office in handling this.” 
At the second hearing, defense counsel repeated his representation that 
Wilkinson had told him “she decided not to do that [waive a jury] because she said 
 
 
9
it might have the appearance of an impropriety that they’re giving Mr. Vasquez 
some kind of a break . . . .”  Again, Wilkinson did not deny she had made such a 
statement, stating only that she had put on the record before Judge Shapiro “that in 
light of the judge’s prior relationship with the office I felt that it will be best not to 
waive jury to him to avoid the appearance of impropriety and also I did not wish to 
put him in that position of making a decision and ultimately having his decision 
perhaps questioned.”  
Before the trial court was thus defense counsel’s uncontradicted 
representation that Deputy District Attorney Wilkinson had told counsel she was 
reluctant to waive a jury before Judge Shapiro because it could be seen as 
favoritism by the LACDA toward Vasquez motivated by his close family 
relationship with LACDA employees.  While Wilkinson also cited concerns about 
possible criticism of Judge Shapiro, she confirmed that with the victim’s family 
expressing the view “that perhaps we were not pursuing things,” she “wanted to 
insure that there was no appearance of any impropriety on the part of our office in 
handling this.”  On this record, the trial court’s apparent finding that Wilkinson 
was motivated only by the desire to prevent possible criticism of Judge Shapiro, 
and not also by an appearance of favoritism toward Vasquez by the LACDA, was 
unsupported by substantial evidence.  
Examining the trial court’s decision to deny recusal in this factual light, we  
conclude the court abused its discretion.  In most circumstances, the fact one or 
two employees of a large district attorney’s office2 have a personal interest in a 
                                              
2  
According to the LACDA Web site, the office has a staff “of approximately 
1,962 includ[ing] 948 deputy district attorneys, 239 investigators, and 775 support 
personnel, comprising the largest local prosecutorial agency in the nation.”  
( [as of July 10, 2006].) 
 
 
10
case would not warrant disqualifying the entire office.  (See Millsap v. Superior 
Court (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 196, 200-204; Trujillo v. Superior Court (1983) 148 
Cal.App.3d 368, 370-373.)  But where the record on the recusal motion indicates 
that the conduct of any deputy district attorney assigned to the case, or of the 
office as a whole, would likely be influenced by the personal interest of the district 
attorney or an employee, the motion is properly granted.  (See People v. Conner, 
supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 148-149 [recusal of entire office proper where deputy 
district attorney witnessed the defendant’s violent courthouse escape and assault 
on a deputy sheriff, a “harrowing experience” he discussed with coworkers]; 
People v. Choi (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 476, 480-483 [same where district attorney 
with indirect personal connection to charged murder continued to involve himself 
in the proceedings despite “ethical wall” established within his office].)   
In the present case, Deputy District Attorney Wilkinson had no personal 
interest in the case, but two other employees of the LACDA, Vasquez’s mother 
and stepfather, did.  That personal interest, by raising the concern that acceding to 
a defense request would be perceived by the victim’s family as favoritism to 
Vasquez, influenced Wilkinson’s decision not to accept a defense proposal for a 
bench trial.  The admitted role Vasquez’s family relationship with LACDA 
employees played in influencing the prosecutor’s conduct of the case 
demonstrated a likelihood defendants would not be treated fairly by the LACDA at 
all stages of the criminal proceedings, requiring the office’s recusal.  (Eubanks, 
supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 593-594.)3 
                                              
3  
Other circumstances the defense relied on in the trial court as evidence of a 
disabling conflict are less compelling.  That the defense intended to call Vasquez’s 
stepfather, a deputy district attorney with the LACDA’s office, as a witness did 
not itself require the office’s disqualification.  (See People v. Snow (2003) 30 
Cal.4th 43, 86-87.)  That several deputy district attorneys attended the trial at 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
11
Although defendant Fregoso did not have a family relationship to LACDA 
employees, we assume, without deciding, that the influence of Vasquez’s family 
relationship on the prosecutor’s decision not to waive a jury trial provided 
codefendant Fregoso with an equivalent justification to seek recusal of the 
LACDA.  The Attorney General does not assert that on this record any basis exists 
to distinguish between defendants in this regard.  
II.  Defendants Fail to Show a Due Process Violation  
Defendants contend the failure to disqualify the LACDA’s office was a 
violation not only of section 1424 but also of their federal and state due process 
rights (U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15) and that such 
a constitutional violation is a structural error admitting of no harmless error 
analysis.  We conclude the error was not of constitutional dimension and therefore 
do not reach the question of prejudice from a constitutional violation.   
Defendants argue, first, that section 1424 merely provides a procedural 
framework for adjudicating the constitutional question, not a separate substantive 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
times, making the atmosphere “intense” and “uncomfortable,” does not 
demonstrate a likelihood of unfair treatment.   
 
Finally, unlike the Court of Appeal, we are not persuaded the prosecutor’s 
unwillingness to accept a plea to voluntary manslaughter, after the jury deadlocked 
in the first trial, shows a disabling conflict.  From brief postmistrial discussion, 
Deputy District Attorney Wilkinson stated, she understood the jury had 
deadlocked nine to three in favor of first degree murder.  Even according to 
defense counsel’s count, eight of the 12 deadlocked jurors had voted for murder.  
The prosecutor had witnesses who could provide both a preexisting motive 
(retaliation for Ayala’s recent assault on a young woman associated with Vasquez 
and Fregoso’s tagging crew) and evidence of preparation for a serious assault or 
killing (Vasquez’s approaching the victim with a knife in hand).  Under these 
circumstances, we are not convinced the prosecutor’s decision to continue 
demanding pleas of at least second degree murder reflects any unusual or improper 
consideration. 
 
 
12
standard for deciding whether a prosecutor’s continued participation is 
impermissible.  We disagree.  As we have previously explained (see Eubanks, 
supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 591; People v. Conner, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 147), section 
1424 was enacted in part to refine the standard for pretrial recusal this court had 
articulated in People v. Superior Court (Greer), supra, 19 Cal.3d 255 (Greer).  In 
Greer, we held the trial court had the statutory authority under Code of Civil 
Procedure section 128 to disqualify the prosecuting attorney.  (Greer, at p. 261, fn. 
4.)  The recusal standard we stated was any conflict of interest that “might affect 
or appear to affect” the prosecutor’s impartiality.  (Id. at p. 269, italics added.)  
Responding to an increase in the number of recusals, which the Attorney General 
attributed in part to Greer’s “appearance” standard, the Legislature made clear in 
Penal Code section 1424 that a conflict of interest, whether actual or apparent, 
required recusal under our statutory law only if it bore an actual likelihood of 
leading to unfair treatment.  (Eubanks, at pp. 591-592.)  In addition to providing 
for procedures by which the motion for recusal was to be made and answered, 
section 1424 established substantive requirements for a motion to disqualify the 
district attorney.  (Eubanks, at p. 591.) 
We disagree, as well, with the suggestion that under the actual likelihood 
standard every erroneous denial of a recusal motion under section 1424 is also a 
deprivation of due process.  In Greer, while considering the scope of the trial 
court’s authority against the “background” of “the due process implications of 
prosecutorial bias” (Greer, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 268), we expressly rejected the 
notion that “before he recuses a prosecutor, the trial judge must first determine that 
failure to do so would permit a violation of the defendant’s basic constitutional 
rights” (id. at p. 264).  Rather, the goal of pretrial recusal is to avoid conflicts that 
might lead ultimately to due process violations and hence to reversals or mistrials.  
The constitutional guarantees of a fair trial, we explained in Greer, “would seem 
 
 
13
better served when judges have discretion to prevent even the possibility of their 
violation.  Individual instances of unfairness, although they may not separately 
achieve constitutional dimension, might well cumulate and render the entire 
proceeding constitutionally invalid.  The trial judge need not delay until the last 
straw of prejudice is added, by which time it might be too late to avert a mistrial or 
a reversal.”  (Id. at pp. 264-265.) 
Even under the somewhat narrower standard the Legislature created in 
section 1424, pretrial recusal still fulfills the prophylactic function we identified in 
Greer.  Though no longer including circumstances where a conflict only appears 
to affect the prosecutor’s impartiality, trial courts’ statutory power under section 
1424 continues to allow recusal whenever a conflict creates a likelihood of unfair 
treatment.  This standard serves to prevent potential constitutional violations from 
occurring.  Thus, the failure to recuse when required under section 1424 may lead 
to the denial of a fair trial or other unfair treatment, but does not necessarily do so. 
Neither this court nor the United States Supreme Court has delineated the 
limitations due process places on prosecutorial conflicts of interest.4  In Greer, as 
noted, we treated the due process problem of an interested prosecutor as 
“background.”  (Greer, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 268.)  We observed that a “fair and 
impartial trial” is fundamental to due process and that the prosecutor, as well as 
the court, must “respect this mandate” by exercising his or her discretionary 
powers impartially (id. at p. 266), but we did not define the types or severity of 
interestedness that would violate the constitutional mandate.  Similarly, in 
                                              
4  
We have repeatedly refrained from assuming that section 1424’s 
substantive standard is identical to, or different from, constitutional commands.  
(People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 86, fn. 12; Hambarian v. Superior Court 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 826, 833, fn. 4; Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 596, fn. 8.) 
 
 
14
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc. (1980) 446 U.S. 238, 249-250, the federal high court 
observed that “[p]rosecutors are also public officials; they too must serve the 
public interest” and that consequently “[a] scheme injecting a personal interest, 
financial or otherwise, into the enforcement process may bring irrelevant or 
impermissible factors into the prosecutorial decision and in some contexts raise 
serious constitutional questions.”  In the case before it, however, the court found it 
unnecessary to say “with precision what limits there may be on a financial or 
personal interest of one who performs a prosecutorial function, for here the 
influence alleged to impose bias [an institutional financial interest in increased 
enforcement] is exceptionally remote.”  (Id. at p. 250, fn. omitted.)  
The Supreme Court gave the problem of an interested prosecutor further 
attention in Young v. U. S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A. (1987) 481 U.S. 787, 790 
(Vuitton), holding improper a district court’s appointment, to prosecute a criminal 
contempt for violations of an injunction against trademark infringement, of 
attorneys who also represented the trademark holder.  Special criminal contempt 
prosecutors, like United States Attorneys, should have an undivided duty to see 
justice done.  (Id. at pp. 803-804.)  The interest of the government in 
“dispassionate assessment of the propriety of criminal charges for affronts to the 
Judiciary” is not necessarily congruent with the private client’s interest in the 
monetary benefits of enforcing the court’s injunction.  (Id. at p. 805.)  Because of 
the attorneys’ ethical duties to their private client, moreover, the conflict was 
unusually manifest:  while ordinarily “we can only speculate whether other 
interests are likely to influence an enforcement officer,” where a prosecutor also 
represents an interested private party, “the ethics of the legal profession require 
that an interest other than the Government’s be taken into account.”  (Id. at 
p. 807.)  
 
 
15
Defendants’ reliance on Vuitton for the proposition that participation of an 
interested prosecutor universally or generally infringes due process suffers from a 
fatal flaw:  Vuitton was decided not on constitutional grounds but under the United 
States Supreme Court’s supervisory powers over the lower federal courts.  
(Vuitton, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 790, 809.)  Only Justice Blackmun, in a 
concurring opinion, wrote that “the practice―federal or state―of appointing an 
interested party’s counsel to prosecute for criminal contempt is a violation of due 
process.”  (Id. at pp. 814-815 (conc. opn. of Blackmun, J.).)  Vuitton stands as an 
example of how external influences might affect discretionary prosecutorial 
decisionmaking, but does not establish a due process test for prosecutorial 
conflicts. 
Several lower federal courts and courts of our sister states have squarely 
addressed prosecutorial conflicts as a due process problem.  The most influential 
decision has been Ganger v. Payton (4th Cir. 1967) 379 F.2d 709 (Ganger), which 
like Vuitton involved a prosecutor’s simultaneous representation of a private party 
with an interest in the criminal case.  The Ganger court found Ganger’s Virginia 
assault conviction constitutionally invalid because the prosecuting attorney had 
simultaneously “represented Ganger’s wife in the prosecution of a divorce action 
. . . based upon the same alleged assault on Mrs. Ganger.  Ganger testified that the 
prosecuting attorney offered to drop the assault charge if Ganger would make a 
favorable property settlement in the divorce action.”  (Id. at p. 711.)  The 
prosecutor’s self-interest (“including the possibility that the size of his fee would 
be determined by what could be exacted from defendant”) thus made it impossible 
for him to exercise “fairminded judgment” with regard to whether and how to 
prosecute Ganger criminally.  (Id. at p. 713.)  “We think the conduct of this 
prosecuting attorney in attempting at once to serve two masters, the people of the 
Commonwealth and the wife of Ganger, violates the requirement of fundamental 
 
 
16
fairness assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  (Id. at 
p. 714.) 
A number of courts have followed Ganger in holding a prosecutor’s 
simultaneous representation of an interested private party infringes the defendant’s 
right to a fundamentally fair trial.  In Cantrell v. Commonwealth (Va. 1985) 329 
S.E.2d 22, for example, the murder victim’s parents hired a private attorney to 
assist the public prosecutor in trying the victim’s husband for her killing.  
Although the public prosecutor was present throughout the trial, the private 
attorney took the lead, examining most of the witnesses and making the closing 
argument.  The same private attorney represented the parents in a civil proceeding 
in which they sought custody of the defendant and the victim’s child.  (Id. at pp. 
24-25.)  The appellate court held the likelihood of conflict between the attorney’s 
two interests “rises to the level of an overwhelming probability,” substituting 
“private vengeance [for] impartial application of the criminal law” in violation of 
the defendant’s due process rights.  (Id. at p. 26.)   
More recently, the court in State v. Eldridge (Tenn.Crim.App. 1997) 951 
S.W.2d 775, 782, also found a due process violation in the participation of 
“special prosecutors who represent the victim in a civil matter arising from the 
same incident giving rise to the criminal prosecution.”  The potential for influence 
on the prosecution by a private interest is simply too great in situations involving 
such simultaneous representation:  “Just as a special prosecutor may be tempted to 
bring a tenuously supported prosecution if such a reward promises financial or 
legal rewards for the private client, a special prosecutor may also be tempted to 
suggest the abandonment of a meritorious prosecution if a settlement providing 
 
 
17
benefits to the private client is conditioned on a recommendation against criminal 
charges.”  (Id. at p. 781.)5   
In contrast to these cases involving simultaneous representation of directly 
conflicting interests, a number of courts have declined to find a due process 
violation where the prosecutor is alleged merely to have a personal interest that 
might add to his or her zeal.  Thus, in Wright v. United States (2d Cir. 1984) 732 
F.2d 1048 (Wright), the defendant asserted the assigned Assistant United States 
Attorney (Puccio) had a disabling conflict of interest because his wife (whom he 
met and married while investigating the defendant) was a political opponent of the 
defendant, had urged authorities to investigate him, and had allegedly been 
assaulted, on another occasion, by the defendant’s associates.  (Id. at p. 1055.)   
The Wright court found an appearance of impropriety, but no due process 
violation, in assignment of the case to Puccio.  (Wright, supra, 732 F.2d at 
pp. 1055, 1057-1058.)  The court distinguished Ganger both as to the role of the 
interested prosecutor and the nature of his interest.  First, the investigation and 
prosecution were initiated not by Puccio but by the United States Attorney.  
“Second, even if we interpret the facts most adversely to Wright’s prosecutors, 
they were not utilizing the criminal process to advance their own pecuniary 
                                              
5  
See also State v. Cox (La. 1964) 167 So.2d 352, 358 (failure to recuse 
district attorney who was the victim in a closely related charged crime deprived 
the defendant of a “fair and impartial trial”); People v. Zimmer (1980) 51 N.Y.2d 
390, 395 [414 N.E.2d 705, 708, 434 N.Y.S.2d 206] (where the public prosecutor 
who procured indictment against a corporation’s founder and principal owner was 
also corporate counsel, prosecutor was “serv[ing] two masters[,] . . . a problem 
instinct with due process implications”).  Cases of successive representation, in 
which an attorney who has represented the defendant joins the prosecutor’s office 
and appears against the defendant in the same matter, have also been held to 
violate fundamental fairness.  (See, e.g., Young v. State (Fl.Dist.Ct.App. 1965) 177 
So.2d 345, 347; Davenport v. State (Ga.Ct.App. 1981) 278 S.E.2d 440, 441.)   
 
 
18
interests, such as the prosecutor’s interest in Ganger ‘that the size of his fee would 
be determined by what could be exacted from defendant’ in the divorce case, 
[Ganger, supra, 379 F.2d] at 713. . . .  Mrs. Puccio’s interest, unlike Mrs. 
Ganger’s, was not a pecuniary interest in utilizing the criminal process to further 
her position in civil litigation but a public one in the condemnation of a man 
whom she thought, whether for good reasons or for bad, to have violated the 
public trust.  [Citation.]  In short, this case, with the facts taken at their worst 
against the Government, does not present the spectacle of a prosecutor’s using the 
‘awful instruments of the criminal law’ [citation] for purpose of private gain and, 
although we consider the choice of Puccio as prosecutor to have been ill advised, 
we do not regard it as having deprived Wright of due process of law.”  (Wright, at 
pp. 1057-1058.)6 
That personal influences on a prosecutor are not always regarded as 
creating so substantial a conflict as to deprive the defendant of fundamental 
fairness is not surprising.  District attorneys, as people, inevitably hold individual 
personal values and allegiances and feel varying emotions relating to their work.  
As public officeholders, they may also have political ambitions or apprehensions.  
But that a public prosecutor might feel unusually strongly about a particular 
                                              
6  
See also United States v. Heldt (D.C. Cir. 1981) 668 F.2d 1238, 1276-1278 
(fact that the defendants had sued prosecutors in a civil action arising out of 
searches did not demonstrate due process violation requiring reversal on appeal 
where the defendants had not sought recusal on this basis in the trial court and no 
evidence indicated conflict had influenced course of criminal action); Villalpando 
v. Reagan (Ariz.Ct.App. 2005) 121 P.3d 172, 176-178 (where conflicted city 
prosecutor had recused himself and recommended neighboring city’s prosecutor 
be appointed to prosecute, speculation that nomination was based on some 
influence conflicted prosecutor had over substitute prosecutor held insufficient to 
show due process violation). 
 
 
19
prosecution or, inversely, might hesitate to commit to a prosecution for personal or 
political reasons does not inevitably indicate an actual conflict of interest, much 
less a constitutional bar to prosecution.  (See Schumer v. Holtzman (1983) 60 
N.Y.2d 46, 56 [454 N.E.2d 522, 467 N.Y.S.2d 182] [district attorney’s “anxiety” 
over an appearance of impropriety, arising from her past political differences with 
the defendant, not grounds for disqualification]; People v. Nelson (N.Y.Crim.Ct. 
1995) 167 Misc.2d 665, 672-674 [647 N.Y.S.2d 438, 443] [neither district 
attorney’s actions in urging federal prosecution after earlier state acquittal in high 
profile case, nor effect of prior acquittal on his possible political ambitions, shows 
existence of a conflict that would disqualify district attorney from prosecuting the 
defendant on new, unrelated charges].) 
Even as regards judicial disqualification, the United States Supreme Court 
has distinguished between “matters of kinship [and] personal bias,” which “seem 
generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion,” and a judge’s “direct, 
personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against” a 
defendant, which deprives the defendant of due process.  (Tumey v. Ohio (1927) 
273 U.S. 510, 523; accord, Haas v. County of San Bernardino (2002) 27 Cal.4th 
1017, 1025.)  In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie (1986) 475 U.S. 813, 820, for 
example, the federal high court held a state supreme court justice’s “general 
hostility towards insurance companies that were dilatory in paying claims,” arising 
out of the justice’s personal experience, did not, as a constitutional matter, 
preclude the justice from sitting in a case involving bad faith failure to pay claims.  
Such general frustration did not reveal a disqualifying bias, as “it is likely that 
many claimants have developed hostile feelings from the frustration in awaiting 
settlement of insurance claims.”  (Id. at p. 821.)  In contrast, the justice’s 
simultaneous participation as a plaintiff in a different bad faith suit gave him a 
“ ‘direct, personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary’ ” stake in the outcome of the case 
 
 
20
before the state supreme court (id. at p. 824), violating the insurer litigant’s due 
process rights (id. at p. 825). 
The Supreme Court’s postulate that pecuniary conflicts of interest on a 
judge’s or prosecutor’s part pose a constitutionally more significant threat to a fair 
trial than do personal conflicts of interest may be somewhat counterintuitive, for 
common experience tells us that personal influences are often the strongest.  But 
according “matters of kinship [and] personal bias” (Tumey v. Ohio, supra, 273 
U.S. at p. 523) dispositive constitutional importance in this context would import 
into constitutional law a set of difficult line-drawing problems.  As neither judges 
nor prosecutors can completely avoid personal influences on their decisions, to 
constitutionalize the myriad distinctions and judgments involved in identifying 
those personal connections that require a judge’s or prosecutor’s recusal might be 
unwise, if not impossible.  The high court’s approach to judicial conflicts 
generally leaves that line-drawing process to state disqualification and disciplinary 
law, with “only the most extreme of cases” being recognized as constitutional 
violations.  (Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 821.) 
To show a due process violation arising from a prosecutor’s conflicting 
interest should be more difficult than from a judge’s, for the “rigid requirements” 
of adjudicative neutrality (Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., supra, 446 U.S. at p. 248), 
articulated in Tumey v. Ohio, supra, 273 U.S. 510, and other cases, do not apply to 
prosecutors.  “[T]he strict requirements of neutrality cannot be the same for 
administrative prosecutors as for judges, whose duty it is to make the final 
decision and whose impartiality serves as the ultimate guarantee of a fair and 
meaningful proceeding in our constitutional regime.”  (Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., at 
p. 250.) 
In this light, we are not persuaded that in the case at bench the prosecutor’s 
desire to avoid an appearance of favoritism presented by an indirect personal link 
 
 
21
between the prosecutor and defendant Vasquez deprived these defendants of 
fundamental fairness in the proceedings.  Neither Deputy District Attorney 
Wilkinson nor her supervisors had a direct, substantial interest in the outcome or 
conduct of the case separate from their proper interest in seeing justice done.  
They did have an interest in avoiding an appearance of favoritism by the LACDA, 
but we do not believe this conflict was “so severe as to deprive [defendants] of 
fundamental fairness in a manner ‘shocking to the universal sense of justice.’ ”  
(Villalpando v. Reagan, supra, 121 P.3d at p. 175.)   
Given that “matters of kinship” do not necessarily create a constitutional 
bar even to a judge’s participation (Tumey v. Ohio, supra, 273 U.S. at p. 523), we 
are unable to conclude the family relationship between a defendant and two 
employees out of hundreds in a public prosecutor’s office (see fn. 2, ante) 
constitutionally bars that entire office from participating in the prosecution.  The 
indirect family link here, and the potential it created that the LACDA would “bend 
over backwards” to make sure no favoritism appeared, are closer to the district 
attorney’s “anxiety” over an appearance of impropriety in Schumer v. Holtzman, 
supra, 454 N.E.2d at page 527, or the advocacy interest of the prosecutor’s wife in 
Wright, supra, 732 F.2d at pages 1057-1058, than to the prosecutors’ simultaneous 
representation of directly conflicting interests in Ganger, supra, 379 F.2d at pages 
713-714, State v. Eldridge, supra, 951 S.W.2d at page 781, or Cantrell v. 
Commonwealth, supra, 329 S.E.2d at page 26. 
Nor can defendants point to any specific prosecutorial actions taken as a 
result of the conflict that deprived them of a fundamentally fair proceeding.  
Although Wilkinson’s fear of seeming to favor Vasquez influenced her decision to 
decline a bench trial before Judge Shapiro, the result of that decision was only that 
defendants received a jury trial―which, in any event, led to a mistrial rather than 
convictions.  As discussed above (see fn. 3, ante), the evidence does not support a 
 
 
22
finding that Vasquez’s family relationship to LACDA employees influenced 
Wilkinson or her office in their decision not to accept pleas to voluntary 
manslaughter rather than murder.   
As to the prosecutor’s conduct at the second trial, Vasquez points to two 
pieces of evidence he contends the prosecutor improperly introduced and one 
instance in which the prosecutor did not timely inform defense counsel of potential 
inculpatory evidence.  Vasquez does not argue these incidents constituted 
unconstitutional misconduct in themselves, but rather that they demonstrate the 
prosecutor’s extraordinary zeal and lack of impartiality.  Evidentiary issues and 
discovery disputes of this type are fairly common in serious criminal trials, 
however, and absent more we cannot conclude they either showed or resulted from 
a fundamentally unfair conflict of prosecutorial interest.  Zealous advocacy in 
pursuit of convictions forms an essential part of the prosecutor’s proper duties and 
does not show the prosecutor’s participation was improper.  (Hambarian v. 
Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 843.) 
Because the failure to recuse the LACDA did not infringe upon defendants’ 
state or federal constitutional rights to due process of law, the Court of Appeal did 
not, as defendants contend, err in failing to consider the error to be a structural 
violation of fundamental constitutional rights or to apply the harmless error 
standard for constitutional trial error.  
III.  Violation of Section 1424 Is Not Structural Error  
To the extent defendants contend a failure to recuse that violates section 
1424 but not due process principles is a structural error and hence reversible per 
se, we disagree.  Prejudice from such a state law error, as we explain below, must 
instead be evaluated under the standard of People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 
(Watson).  Under that standard, the trial court’s error here was harmless. 
 
 
23
Article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution provides that no 
judgment shall be set aside because of an error in procedure unless the reviewing 
court, “after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,” 
concludes the error “has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”  We have construed 
this provision to require in most circumstances an appellate determination 
whether, in light of the entire record, “ ‘it is reasonably probable that a result more 
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the 
error.’ ”  (People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 492, quoting Watson, supra, 46 
Cal.2d at p. 836.)  At the same time, we have recognized that certain fundamental 
errors in procedure, sometimes referred to as “ ‘structural,’ ” “are not susceptible 
to the ‘ordinary’ or ‘generally applicable’ harmless error analysis―i.e., the 
Watson ‘reasonably probable’ standard―and may require reversal of the judgment 
notwithstanding the strength of the evidence contained in the record in a particular 
case.”  (Cahill, at p. 493.) 
Whether the erroneous denial of a motion to disqualify the prosecutor under 
section 1424 is structural in character and, if not, how actual prejudice may be 
shown on appeal are questions of first impression in this court.  Nor has the United 
States Supreme Court decided whether participation of an interested prosecutor is 
prejudicial per se.  But in Vuitton, supra, 481 U.S. 787, a four-justice plurality of 
the high court asserted that the appointment of an interested private party’s 
attorney to prosecute a criminal contempt (which the court majority held improper 
under its nonconstitutional supervisory authority) was an error “ ‘so fundamental 
and pervasive’ ” as to require reversal without any prejudice analysis.  (Id. at 
p. 809.)7   
                                              
7  
Three justices agreed with the Vuitton plurality that the appointment was an 
error, but disagreed it was prejudicial per se and would have remanded for a 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
24
The Vuitton plurality gave several reasons for this conclusion, reasons that 
have also been articulated in several sister-state decisions.  The plurality first 
looked to the prosecutor’s critical role in criminal proceedings, comparing the 
participation of a conflicted prosecutor to that of a conflicted judge, a 
discriminatorily selected grand jury, or a petit jury exposed to biasing publicity, all 
of which it regarded as fundamental error regardless of actual prejudice.  (Vuitton, 
supra, 481 U.S. at p. 810.)8  Second, the plurality focused on the appearance of 
impropriety created by an interested prosecutor, reasoning that “[a] concern for 
actual prejudice in such circumstances misses the point, for what is at stake is the 
public perception of the integrity of our criminal justice system.”  (Vuitton, at 
p. 811.)9  Finally, the plurality averred that “[a]ppointment of an interested 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
determination of prejudice (Vuitton, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 825-827 (conc. & dis. 
opn. of Powell, J.)), while one justice dissented entirely (id. at p. 827 (dis. opn. of 
White, J.)).  The fifth vote for reversal came from Justice Scalia, who would have 
held the district court had no constitutional authority to initiate a contempt 
prosecution or appoint any prosecutor.  (Id. at p. 815 (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.).) 
8  
Accord, Sinclair v. State (Md.Ct.App. 1976) 363 A.2d 468, 475, and 
footnote 8 (prejudice “presumed” as a matter of public policy in light of 
prosecutor’s role in deciding whether to bring charges); Com. v. Tabor (Mass. 
1978) 384 N.E.2d 190, 196 (“The district attorney is vital to the administration of 
justice and to the vindication of constitutional rights.  In view of his great 
responsibilities, a district attorney may not compromise his impartiality.  
[Citations.]  We therefore require a new trial”); State v. Basham (S.D. 1969) 170 
N.W.2d 238, 242 (as public prosecutors are “quasi-judicial officers representing 
the state,” public policy requires reversal without a showing of “specific 
prejudicial acts”).  
9  
Accord, Davenport v. State, supra, 278 S.E.2d at page 441 (appearance of 
impropriety denies the defendant a fair trial); People v. Zimmer, supra, 414 N.E.2d 
at page 708 (“Moreover, even if the actuality or potentiality of prejudice were 
absent, what of the appearance of things . . . ?”); State v. Eldridge, supra, 951 
S.W.2d at page 784 (“What is at stake is the public perception of the integrity of 
our criminal justice system”).   
 
 
25
prosecutor is also an error whose effects are pervasive.  Such an appointment calls 
into question, and therefore requires scrutiny of, the conduct of an entire 
prosecution, rather than simply a discrete prosecutorial decision.  Determining the 
effect of this appointment thus would be extremely difficult.  A prosecution 
contains a myriad of occasions for the exercise of discretion, each of which goes 
to shape the record in a case, but few of which are part of the record.”  (Vuitton, at 
pp. 812-813.)10  
A number of state and federal courts, on the other hand, have refused to 
grant the defendants reversals and new trials because of the participation of a 
conflicted prosecutor without a showing of actual prejudice, even when agreeing 
the prosecutor should have been recused.  In Wright, supra, 732 F.2d at pages 
1056-1057, the court focused on the procedural posture of the case before it―a 
collateral postconviction attack rather than a pretrial motion to recuse or even a 
direct appeal.  “Indeed, we think that the degree of prosecutorial misconduct of the 
sort here in question and the degree of prejudice to the defendant necessary to 
justify action by a reviewing court steadily increase as the case goes forward, with 
the least being required on a motion to disqualify, somewhat more on a pretrial 
motion to dismiss an indictment, still more on a motion in the district court after 
conviction but before appeal, somewhat more on direct appeal, and as will be 
                                              
10  
Accord, People v. Stevens (Colo.Ct.App. 1981) 642 P.2d 39, 41 (no 
prejudice showing required because evidence prosecutor revealed confidences 
received while previously representing the defendant “would be well-nigh 
impossible for a defendant to bring forth”); Com. v. Tabor, supra, 384 N.E.2d at 
page 196, footnote 13 (“ ‘almost impossible to establish actual prejudice’ ”); 
People v. Zimmer, supra, 414 N.E.2d at page 707 (referring to “practical 
impossibility of establishing that the conflict has worked to defendant’s 
disadvantage”); State v. Eldridge, supra, 951 S.W.2d at page 784 (conflict of 
interest violations “defy analysis by the harmless error standards”). 
 
 
26
developed below, a good deal more on collateral attack.”  (Id. at p. 1056, fn. 8, 
italics added.)   
Similarly, in United States v. Heldt, supra, 668 F.2d at pages 1276-1277, 
the court distinguished between a timely motion to disqualify, which should be 
granted if the prosecutor has a conflicting interest, and an appeal following a trial 
at which the defendant did not make a recusal motion.  In that situation, the 
appellate court held, “the government interest[] in conserving judicial and 
prosecutorial resources” mandated the defendants must be required to “prove 
actual prejudice” to obtain a reversal.  (Id. at p. 1277.)  The court added that a 
conflicted prosecutor presented a “less fundamental . . . threat to defendants” than 
participation by a conflicted defense attorney or judge, situations in which no 
showing of actual prejudice is required.  (Id. at p. 1277, fn. 83.)11  
In the circumstances of this case, we hold, as did the appellate court below, 
that the trial court’s violation of section 1424 does not entitle defendants to 
reversal on appeal without a showing of prejudice.  Relief from an erroneous 
denial under section 1424 is available by pretrial writ petition.  (See, e.g., Millsap 
v. Superior Court, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 205; Lewis v. Superior Court (1997) 
53 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1286-1287.)  At least where, as here, the defendant did not 
seek such a writ, “the government interest[] in conserving judicial and 
                                              
11  
Accord, United States v. Lorenzo (9th Cir. 1993) 955 F.2d 1448, 1453 
(following Heldt in requiring a prejudice showing on appeal, even where the 
defendants apparently did move to recuse in the trial court); State v. Williams 
(Iowa 1974) 217 N.W.2d 573, 575 (while prosecutor may have had a conflict of 
interest, denial of mistrial upheld because “it does not follow [the conflict] 
affected the outcome of the trial”); Commonwealth v. Dunlap (Pa.Super.Ct. 1975) 
335 A.2d 364, 366 (“While we feel it was improper for the prosecuting attorney to 
permit the appearance of a conflict of interest, we fail to find any specific 
prejudice to the appellant to warrant the grant of a new trial”). 
 
 
27
prosecutorial resources” (United States v. Heldt, supra, 668 F.2d at p. 1277), given 
constitutional force by the “miscarriage of justice” standard that governs our 
review (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13), strongly militates against reversing on appeal 
without a showing of actual prejudice.  As the Attorney General points out, we 
have reached similar conclusions as to somewhat analogous types of error:  while 
in a pretrial motion or review thereof a prospective likelihood of unfairness 
suffices, on appeal or collateral attack the defendant must show, at least, a 
probability that such prejudice actually occurred.  (See People v. Williams (1989) 
48 Cal.3d 1112, 1125-1126 [change of venue motion]; People v. Wilson (1963) 60 
Cal.2d 139, 150-154 [motion to dismiss for denial of speedy trial].)   
Nor do we find the Vuitton plurality’s arguments for structural error 
(Vuitton, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 809-813) compelling as applied to California 
procedures.  While the prosecutor has important obligations to the cause of justice 
that can be impaired by a conflict of interest, he or she is also an advocate for the 
defendant’s conviction; the basic guardians of the defendant’s rights at trial are his 
attorneys and the court, not the prosecutor.  Thus, the participation of a conflicted 
prosecutor, while it may be error under section 1424, is not as fundamental a flaw 
in the fairness of the proceedings as the participation of a biased or conflicted 
judge or juror or a conflicted defense attorney.  (United States v. Heldt, supra, 668 
F.2d at p. 1277, fn. 83.)12  
                                              
12  
Trial by a judge who lacks impartiality is given as an example of structural 
error in Arizona v. Fulminante (1999) 499 U.S. 279, 309 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 
supra, 273 U.S. 510 [judicial conflict of interest]).  The denial of an impartial jury 
is also reversible per se.  (People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1087-1088.)  
Representation by defense counsel with a conflict of interest is described as 
structural in People v. Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 493 (citing People v. 
Mroczko (1983) 35 Cal.3d 86).  (See also Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980) 446 U.S. 335, 
348-350 [a defendant who did not object at trial to joint representation with 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
28
An appearance of impropriety arising from participation of a conflicted 
prosecutor, the second factor relied upon in Vuitton, supra, 481 U.S. at page 811, 
is less of a consideration under section 1424 than under the high court’s 
supervisory authority.  As we have previously noted, section 1424 was enacted in 
part to tighten the standards for recusal so that a mere appearance of impropriety 
would not itself suffice; the statutory standard focuses instead on the actual 
likelihood of unfair treatment.  (Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 591-592.)  To 
hold that an erroneous failure to recuse under section 1424 is reversible per se 
because of the appearance of impropriety it creates would be contrary to the 
statutory policy. 
The strongest argument for considering the participation of a conflicted 
prosecutor to be structural error is the third one relied upon in Vuitton, supra, 481 
U.S. at pages 812-813, and echoed by a number of other cases (see fn. 10, ante):  
that the potential effects of the error pervade the proceedings, possibly including 
any of the discretionary decisions the prosecutor makes from charging to sentence 
recommendation, and themselves could affect the composition of the record, 
making it practically impossible to trace the error’s prejudicial effects.  This is 
obviously true in a certain respect:  the reasons for a prosecutor’s discretionary 
decisions rarely appear in the record, and one often cannot know what different 
decisions a nonconflicted prosecutor would have made.   
Yet sometimes defendants are able to show actual prejudice, or at least a 
strong probability of actual unfair treatment, as, for example, in Ganger, where 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
codefendant need not show prejudice, but must show that actual conflict of interest 
adversely affected counsel’s performance]; People v. Ortiz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 975, 
988 [“Reversal is automatic, however, when a defendant has been deprived of his 
right to defend with counsel of his choice”].) 
 
 
29
there was evidence the prosecutor “offered to drop the assault charge if Ganger 
would make a favorable property settlement in the divorce action” (Ganger, supra, 
379 F.2d at p. 711), or State v. Eldridge, supra, 951 S.W.2d at page 783, in which 
it was apparent that payment of a certain amount in settlement of the civil case 
“would result in a favorable recommendation of the special prosecutors in the 
criminal matter.”  Even in the case at bench it is claimed, and the Court of Appeal 
agreed, that the conflict of interest influenced Deputy District Attorney 
Wilkinson’s decision, after the first jury deadlocked, not to reduce her plea bargain 
demand from second degree murder to voluntary manslaughter.  Although we 
conclude the record does not support such a finding (see fn. 3, ante), this form of 
prejudice could be demonstrated on other facts.  The possible prejudicial effects of 
a conflict of interest on the part of the prosecutor may be pervasive, but they are 
not necessarily untraceable. 
The question, ultimately, is whether the threat to the integrity of criminal 
proceedings posed by participation of a prosecutor with a conflict of interest that 
before trial “render[ed] it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial” 
(§ 1424), but which in the event did not demonstrably affect the actual course of 
the proceedings, justifies a departure from the ordinary rule, grounded in the need 
for finality of judgments and conservation of judicial resources and embodied in 
article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution, that to obtain reversal a 
criminal appellant must show prejudice.  At least under the circumstances of this 
case―where defendants failed to avail themselves of their pretrial remedy by 
filing a writ petition―we conclude no such departure is justified. 
Finally, for reasons related to those discussed in part II, ante, we conclude 
the trial court’s error in this case was harmless under Watson.  The prosecutor’s 
refusal to stipulate to a bench trial before Judge Shapiro, while it was influenced 
by the prosecutor’s conflict of interest, was not detrimental to defendants as the 
 
 
30
result was only that they received a jury trial, which did not end in conviction. The 
record does not show a likelihood that Judge Shapiro would instead have acquitted 
defendants of murder had he been the trier of fact.  Nor does the record show any 
other prejudicial prosecutorial choices or conduct traceable to the LACDA’s 
conflict of interest.  Thus it is not “reasonably probable that a result more 
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the 
error.”  (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)  
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
I concur in the judgment, but write separately to emphasize the unique 
circumstance that gave rise to this conflict for the Los Angeles County District 
Attorney’s Office (LACDA).  Because defendant Vasquez’s parents were LACDA 
employees, prosecutor Wilkinson expressed concern that decedent’s family might 
interpret her waiver of a jury trial as an act of favoritism to Vasquez.  During the 
hearing on Vasquez’s recusal motion, Wilkinson told the court that the decedent’s 
family was “very concerned that perhaps we were not pursuing things.”  She 
stated, “I wanted to insure that there was no appearance of any impropriety on the 
part of our office in handling this.”  
 
It is to be expected that families of homicide victims will be acutely 
concerned about the progress of a defendant’s prosecution.  An act of homicide 
claims a life, but it also profoundly affects the family that is left behind.  The 
desire by these family members for a diligent and vigorous prosecution is 
understandable.  Crime victims have a right to actively follow the case that results 
from a defendant’s conduct.  That they may do so, and may do so with intensity, 
does not create a conflict, nor should our opinion be read to imply that it does so.     
 
However, a prosecutor speaks not solely for the victim or his family, but for 
all the People.  The body of the “The People” includes the defendant and his 
family and citizens who know nothing about a particular case.  The district 
attorney is expected to exercise his or her discretionary functions independently in 
the interests of the entire community.  
 
2 
 
The line crossed here was a very fine one.  It flowed from the particular 
relationship of Vasquez and his family with the prosecutor’s office itself.  
Wilkinson’s laudable goal of avoiding the appearance of impropriety created its 
own irony.  Wilkinson sought to make clear that Vasquez was not receiving more 
lenient treatment because of his parents’ employment.  In the process, she appears 
to have treated him differently because of that relationship.  Defendants may 
legitimately be treated differently for a wide variety of reasons.  But this particular 
disparity of treatment, based on Vasquez’s familial ties to the prosecutor’s office, 
is what gave rise to the conflict here.       
 
I concur with the majority that the trial court’s failure to disqualify the 
LACDA’s office was a violation only of Penal Code section 1424 and not 
defendants’ federal and state due process rights.  The prosecutor’s refusal to 
stipulate to a bench trial was harmless.  (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.) 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY MORENO, J. 
 
 
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that “the close family relationship 
between longtime employees of the LACDA [Los Angeles County District 
Attorney] and defendant Vasquez created a conflict of interest and a consequential 
likelihood of unfair treatment that should have been avoided through recusal of the 
prosecutorial office.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.)  I also agree with the majority that 
not every violation of Penal Code section 1424 (section 1424) necessarily violates 
due process guarantees.  (Id., at p. 13.)  I dissent, however, from the majority’s 
further conclusion that the denial of defendants’ recusal motions in this case did 
not constitute a due process violation.  (Id., at p. 11.) 
The pattern of conduct by the prosecutor in this case established that 
Vasquez was treated differently and less favorably than another defendant in his 
position would have been who did not have Vasquez’s family connection to the 
LACDA.  This disparate treatment of Vasquez violated the duty imposed on 
prosecutorial offices to exercise their discretion in an impartial and evenhanded 
manner “born of objective and impartial consideration of each individual case.”  
(People v. Superior Court (Greer) (1977) 19 Cal.3d 255, 267.)  As we stated in 
Greer, “[i]ndividual instances of unfairness, although they may not separately 
achieve constitutional dimension, might well cumulate and render the entire 
proceeding constitutionally invalid.”  (Id., at p. 265.)  That point was reached by 
the time of the second motion to recuse because by then there was demonstrable 
 
2 
evidence that the prosecutor’s discretionary decisions were being driven by the 
LACDA’s concern that it not be perceived as showing any favoritism to Vasquez 
due to his family connection to the office.  Because “we do not know and cannot 
now ascertain what would have happened if the prosecuting attorney had been free 
to exercise the fair discretion which he owed to all persons charged with a crime in 
his court” (Ganger v. Peyton (4th Cir. 1967) 379 F.2d 709, 714), I am unable to 
conclude that the constitutional violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
(Ibid, citing Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.)  Accordingly, I would 
reverse defendants’ convictions.1 
I emphasize at the outset that my conclusion arises from the specific facts 
of this case viewed in their totality.  I do not intend to suggest that a prosecutor’s 
office should be recused in every case in which either a defendant or a victim of 
crime has some family connection to that office.  Moreover, even in this case, 
recusal would not have been necessary had there not been a pattern of unfair 
treatment of Vasquez both on the record and reasonably inferable from the record.  
My opinion should be read with those caveats in mind. 
I begin with the applicable law.  Classically, the concept of due process 
does not describe discrete events in a prosecution but the entire unfolding 
procedure.  (People v. Lyons (1956) 47 Cal.2d 311, 319 [“It is axiomatic that when 
an accused is denied that fair and impartial trial guaranteed by law, such procedure 
amounts to a denial of due process”].)  The seminal case regarding prosecutorial 
                                              
1   
Although the basis of the conflict in this case involved the employment of 
Vasquez’s parents by the LACDA, as codefendant Anthony Fregoso observes he 
and Vasquez were tried together – before the second trial Fregoso moved 
unsuccessfully to sever his trial from Vasquez’s – and thus Fregoso’s “fate was 
dependent upon the prosecutor’s treatment of [Vasquez] with regard to every 
discretionary decision.” 
 
3 
conflicts makes it clear that prosecution of a defendant by a conflicted prosecutor 
implicates the due process right to a trial that is “fair and impartial” at every stage 
of the proceeding.  (People v. Superior Court (Greer), supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 266.)  
As Greer also makes clear, “It is the obligation of the prosecutor, as well as of the 
court, to respect this [due process] mandate.”  (Ibid.) 
The prosecutor has a special duty of impartiality that flows from his or her 
function as “ ‘the representative . . . of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, 
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice 
shall be done.’ ”  (People v. Superior Court (Greer), supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 266.)  
Moreover, the prosecutor’s role as representative of the People necessarily 
includes “ ‘the defendant and his family and those who care about him.  It also 
includes the vast majority of citizens who know nothing about a particular case, 
but who give over to the prosecutor the authority to seek a just result in their 
name.’ (Corrigan, On Prosecutorial Ethics (1986) 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. 537, 
538-539.)”  (People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 589-590, italics added.) 
The obligation of a prosecutor to observe the mandate of due process is 
particularly crucial in light of the prosecutor’s broad discretionary powers during 
the course of a criminal prosecution.  “[I]t is precisely because the prosecutor 
enjoys such broad discretion that the public he serves and those he accuses may 
justifiably demand that he perform his functions with the highest degree of 
integrity and impartiality . . . .”  (People v. Superior Court (Greer), supra, 19 
Cal.3d at pp. 266-267; People v. Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 590 [“Thus the 
district attorney is expected to exercise his or her discretionary functions in the 
interests of the People at large, and not under the influence or control of an 
interested individual”].)  To fulfill this due process obligation, the prosecutor’s 
exercise of discretion must be “born of objective and impartial consideration of 
 
4 
each individual case.”  (People v. Superior Court (Greer), supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 
267.)2 
Applying these principles to the instant case, the record shows that certain 
discretionary decisions made by the prosecutor were not “born of objective and 
impartial consideration” of the circumstances of this case but affected by 
LACDA’s interest in avoiding allegations by the victim’s family or the general 
public that favoritism had been shown to the child of longtime employees of the 
office.  Furthermore, I submit that this conflict was not personal to the prosecutor 
who handled defendant’s case but was an institutional conflict involving the entire 
LACDA.  The clearest evidence that this conflict was institutional, and that it was 
recognized as such by the LACDA itself, can be inferred from the fact that the Los 
Angeles District Attorney tendered the prosecution to the Attorney General long 
before defendants’ motions to recuse the office.3  Given that the head of the office 
recognized the existence of a potentially disabling conflict, it is not plausible that 
                                              
2   
I do not believe that what the majority describes as the “somewhat narrower 
standard the Legislature created in section 1424” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 15), 
diminishes the prosecutor’s responsibilities in this respect.  To the contrary, the 
two-part test established by section 1424 for recusal seems to echo these due 
process concerns.  Under the statute, “ a ‘conflict,’ within the meaning of section 
1424, exists whenever the circumstances of a case evidence a reasonable 
possibility that the DA’s office may not exercise its discretionary function in an 
evenhanded manner” and recusal is required when the conflict is “so grave as to 
render it unlikely that defendant will receive fair treatment during all portions of 
the criminal proceedings.”  (People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal.3d 141, 148, italics 
added.) 
3   
As I emphasized at the outset, in examining whether the conflict in this case 
violated defendants’ due process rights, I am focused only on the particular 
constellation of facts presented here.  I do not intend to suggest that every case in 
which a district attorney unsuccessfully tenders prosecution of a case to the 
Attorney General will necessarily constitute evidence of the existence of a 
disabling conflict.  The subsequent conduct by the district attorney’s office may 
demonstrate that any conflict was successfully negotiated. 
 
5 
the various discretionary decisions made by the individual prosecutor in this case 
did not reflect an institutional interest in avoiding any showing of favoritism 
toward Vasquez. 
With respect to those discretionary decisions, I find compelling evidence of 
the disparate and unfair treatment of Vasquez in the prosecutor’s refusal to waive 
jury trial.  The majority and I are in agreement that, based on the prosecutor’s own 
statements, this decision was influenced by the prosecutor’s concern “about an 
appearance to the victim’s family of favoritism by the LACDA’s office” toward 
the child of longtime employees.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.) 
In light of this admission, I also find suspect the prosecutor’s decision to 
refuse defendants’ offer to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter.  The majority 
argues that the prosecutor’s refusal was justified by the vote of the first jury that 
showed at least eight jurors had voted either for first or second degree murder – 
three voted for voluntary manslaughter and one to acquit – and because the 
evidence was susceptible to an assessment that Vasquez committed murder.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 11, fn. 3.)  I disagree. 
The prosecutor’s earlier refusal to accept a court trial in order to avoid the 
appearance of favoritism leads to the conclusion that a similarly improper motive 
likely led her to reject defendants’ offers to plead to voluntary manslaughter.  
Under the circumstances, a prosecutor who was not hindered by a conflict of 
interest would have seriously considered, and likely accepted, defendants’ offer.  
The first trial had left fully one-third of the jury unconvinced that a murder had 
occurred.  A prosecutor looking at this result, knowing that his or her evidence 
was likely to be weakened by the passage of time and the availability of a 
transcript with which to impeach prosecution witnesses, might well have accepted 
a plea to a lesser charge.   
 
6 
Finally, as the Court of Appeal observed, the evidence in this case could 
also have supported a finding that Vasquez did not intend to kill the victim.  
“Vasquez had no prior criminal record.  The evidence of Vasquez’s intent was 
arguably ambiguous.  The evidence showed the P.A.L. and C.N.E. tagging crews 
were rivals but that their usual mode of confrontations was fistfights.  The tagging 
crews had no history of using deadly weapons, or any weapons for that matter, 
beyond mace or pepper spray.  The jury at the first trial obviously could not agree 
on the crime committed.  It is possible that several of these jurors believed 
Vasquez and Fregoso merely intended to assault and scare the victim rather than 
kill him.” 
In light of these circumstances, I cannot agree with the majority that the 
prosecutor’s categorical rejection of defendants’ offer to plead to voluntary 
manslaughter was not influenced by the conflict that the prosecutor admitted had 
influenced her decision not to waive jury.  In my view, that conflict appears to 
have permeated the prosecutor’s treatment of defendant. 
In short, “[g]iven the entire complex of facts in this case,” I conclude that 
defendants did not “receive fair and impartial treatment” (Hambarian v. Superior 
Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 826, 852 (dis. opn of Moreno, J.)), resulting in a violation 
of their due process rights.  (Cf. People v. Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 599 
[“the trial court must consider the entire complex of facts . . . to determine whether 
the conflict makes fair and impartial treatment of the defendant unlikely”].)  A 
prosecutor, straining to avoid showing any favoritism toward the child of career 
employees of her office, made at least two documented discretionary decisions 
that were not reached in a fair and impartial manner.  These decisions must be 
viewed in light of the recognition by the Los Angeles District Attorney that this 
case represented a potentially disabling conflict as evidenced by his unsuccessful 
tender of the case to the Attorney General.  Thus, the individual prosecutor’s 
 
7 
discretion in this case was guided by institutional concerns about showing 
favoritism to Vasquez rather than concerns personal to her.  Accordingly, I would 
reverse defendants’ convictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
I CONCUR:  GEORGE, C. J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Vasquez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 122 Cal.App.4th 1027 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S128854 
Date Filed:  July 10, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Larry P. Fidler 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Nancy J. King, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Andrew Vasquez. 
 
Sylvia Whatley Beckham, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Anthony 
Fregoso. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. 
Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Kristofer Jorstad, Victoria B. Wilson, Steven D. Matthews, Mary 
Sanchez and Herbert S. Tetef, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Nancy J. King 
1400 Sixth Ave., Suite 210C 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(858) 755-5258 
 
Herbert S. Tetef 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-0201