Case Title: RODRIGUEZ v. CASEY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 01-195

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
RODRIGUEZ v. CASEY2002 WY 11150 P.3d 323Case Number: 01-195Decided: 07/18/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

JOSEPH 
A. RODRIGUEZ, Personal Representative

of the 
Estate of LOREN LINTON, Deceased, 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

JUNE C. 
CASEY, Personal Representative

of the 
Estate of ROBERT C. WILKOSKE,

Deceased, 

Appellee(Defendant).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

            
David G. Lewis, Jackson, Wyoming; and David Broiles, Fort Worth, 
Texas. 

Representing 
Appellee: 

            
J. Kent Rutledge and Becket B. Hinckley of Lathrop & Rutledge, P.C., 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and 
VOIGT, JJ. 

*  Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument. 

  

            
VOIGT, Justice. 

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from a judgment on the pleadings granted to the Wilkoske Estate in a wrongful 
death action.  The district court 
held that the complaint was premature and ineffective because it was filed 
before the related claim was rejected by the personal representative of the 
Wilkoske Estate, and that, when the two-year condition precedent of the wrongful 
death statute expired prior to such rejection, so, too, did the cause of 
action.

 

[¶2]      We 
reverse.

 

ISSUE

 

[¶3]      The Linton Estate 
phrases the issue as follows:

 

Can a 
wrongful death claimant against a tortfeasor-decedent's estate file suit on the 
day the condition precedent terminates, even though the personal representative 
has yet not rejected his claim.

 

The 
Wilkoske Estate rephrases the issue as follows:

 

            
Where a wrongful death suit against an estate is filed before the 
required creditor's claim is rejected, is the suit timely under the wrongful 
death statu[t]e if the creditor's claim is not rejected until after the two-year 
wrongful death condition precedent has expired?

 

For 
simplicity's sake, we state the issue as follows:

 

What 
does the word "maintain" mean in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-717 (LexisNexis 
2001)?

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶4]      W.R.C.P. 12(c) 
provides, in part, for motions for judgment on the 
pleadings:

 

Motion 
for judgment on the pleadings.    
After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the 
trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.

 

We have 
a well-established standard for application of this rule:

 

            
A defendant is entitled to judgment on the pleadings if the undisputed 
facts appearing in the pleadings, supplemented by any facts of which the 
district court may take judicial notice, establish that no relief can be 
granted.  . . . A judgment on the 
pleadings is appropriate if all material allegations of fact are admitted in the 
pleadings and only questions of law remain.

 

Greeves 
v. Rosenbaum, 965 P.2d 669, 671 (Wyo. 1998) (citing Johnson v. Griffin, 922 P.2d 860, 861-62 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 971 (1996)).  Our review is akin to consideration of a 
motion to dismiss under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted.  
Greeves, 965 P.2d  at 672.  We consider the allegations of the 
complaint to be true, and view them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.  Id.  We have previously held that W.R.C.P. 
12(c) is available when an entire controversy may be disposed of because a 
statute of limitations provides an effective bar to recovery, and we see no 
reason why the same remedy should not be available when the issue is the 
condition precedent of the wrongful death statute.  Johnson, 922 P.2d  at 
862.

 

FACTS

 

[¶5]      On October 25, 
1998, Loren Linton was driving a truck belonging to Sunrise Express on 
Interstate 80 near Laramie.  Linton 
was killed when his truck collided with a tow truck being driven by Robert 
Wilkoske.  Wilkoske died several 
months later of causes unrelated to the accident.

 

[¶6]      On October 20, 
2000, acting as an estate creditor, Sunrise Express filed a petition to open the 
Wilkoske Estate.  On October 23, 
2000, the Linton Estate was also established.  On the same date, the Linton Estate 
filed a creditor's claim in the Wilkoske Estate, based on the alleged wrongful 
death of Linton.  The following day, 
the Linton Estate filed a wrongful death complaint against the Wilkoske 
Estate.  The Linton Estate's probate 
claim was not rejected by the personal representative of the Wilkoske Estate 
until January 26, 2001.  The same 
attorney created both estates, got both personal representatives appointed, and 
filed the creditor's claim, the claim rejection, and the wrongful death 
complaint.

 

STATUTES

 

[¶7]      The present 
appeal arises within the above-mentioned wrongful death action.  At issue is the interplay between two 
separate statutory time limitationsone in the wrongful death statutes and one 
in the probate code.  The 
substantive cause of action for wrongful death is created by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-38-101 (LexisNexis 2001):

 

            
Whenever the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or 
default such as would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action to 
recover damages if death had not ensued, the person who would have been liable 
if death had not ensued is liable in an action for damages, even though the 
death was caused under circumstances as amount in law to murder in the first or 
second degree or manslaughter.  If 
the person liable dies, the action may be brought against the executor or 
administrator of his estate.  If he 
left no estate within the state of Wyoming, the court may appoint an 
administrator upon application.

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-38-102(d) (LexisNexis 2001) contains the time limitation that is 
pertinent to the present controversy:

 

Every 
such action shall be commenced within two (2) years after the death of the 
deceased person.

 

[¶8]      The import of 
this time constraint in the matter at hand lies in its application by the 
district court because of the way the district court construed certain time 
limitations in the probate code.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-703(a) (LexisNexis 2001) requires claims against an 
estate to be filed with the court clerk within three months after the date of 
first publication of a notice to creditors.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-712(a) (LexisNexis 
2001) then provides that the personal representative is to allow or reject the 
claim within thirty days after expiration of the time for filing claims.  The probate code time requirement 
bearing most directly on the instant case is found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-717 
(LexisNexis 2001):

 

            
No holder of any claim against an estate shall maintain any 
action thereon unless the claim is first rejected in whole or in part by the 
personal representative and the rejection filed with the clerk . . 
..

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  Finally, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
2-7-718 (LexisNexis 2001) provides as follows:

 

            
When a claim is rejected and notice given as required, the holder shall 
bring suit in the proper court against the personal representative 
within thirty (30) days after the date of mailing the notice, otherwise the 
claim is forever barred.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION

 

[¶9]      The issue before 
this Court is purely a question of statutory construction.  Our standards for that process have 
often been repeated:

 

            
This court interprets statutes by giving effect to the legislature's 
intent.  . . .  We begin by making an inquiry relating 
to the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their 
arrangement and connection.  . . 
.  We give effect to every word, 
clause, and sentence and construe together all components of a statute in 
pari materia.  
. . .  Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law.  
. . .  We review questions of 
law de novo without affording deference to the district court's 
decision.

 

Worcester 
v. State, 2001 
WY 82, ¶ 13, 30 P.3d 47, 52 (Wyo. 2001).  If a statute is clear and unambiguous, 
we simply give effect to its plain meaning.  Wesaw v. Quality Maintenance, 
2001 WY 17, ¶ 13, 19 P.3d 500, 506 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting In re Claim of 
Prasad, 11 P.3d 344, 347 (Wyo. 2000)).  Only when we find a statute to be 
ambiguous do we resort to the general principles of statutory construction.  Wesaw, 2001 WY 17, ¶ 13, 19 P.3d  
at 506 (quoting In re Claim of Prasad, 11 P.3d at 347).  An ambiguous statute is one whose 
meaning is uncertain because it is susceptible to more than one 
interpretation.  Pierson v. 
State, 956 P.2d 1119, 1125 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Amrein v. State, 836 P.2d 862, 864-65 (Wyo. 1992)).

 

            
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that courts may try to 
determine legislative intent by considering the type of statute being 
interpreted and what the legislature intended by the language used, viewed in 
light of the objects and purposes to be accomplished.  . . .  Furthermore, when we are confronted with 
two possible but conflicting conclusions, we will choose the one most logically 
designed to cure the mischief or inequity that the legislature was attempting to 
accomplish.

 

In re 
Collicott, 2001 
WY 35, ¶ 9, 20 P.3d 1077, 1080 (Wyo. 2001).  We presume that statutes are enacted by 
the legislature with full knowledge of existing law, so we construe statutes in 
harmony with existing law, particularly other statutes relating to the same 
subject or having the same purpose.  
In re Estate of Fosler, 13 P.3d 686, 688-89 (Wyo. 2000) 
(quoting Matter of Voss' Adoption, 550 P.2d 481, 486 (Wyo. 
1976)).

 

[¶10]   Statutes must be construed so that 
no portion is rendered meaningless.  
Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 541 (Wyo. 2000).  Interpretation should not produce an 
absurd result.  Id.  We are guided by the full text of the 
statute, paying attention to its internal structure and the functional relation 
between the parts and the whole.  
In re Worker's Compensation Claim of Johnson, 2001 WY 48, ¶ 8, 23 P.3d 32, 35 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting In re Hernandez, 8 P.3d 318, 321 (Wyo. 
2000) and Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Wyo. 1993)).  Each word of a statute is to be afforded 
meaning, with none rendered superfluous.  
Jessen v. Burry, 13 P.3d 1118, 1120 (Wyo. 2000).  Further, the meaning afforded to a word 
should be that word's standard popular meaning unless another meaning is clearly 
intended.  Soles v. State, 
809 P.2d 772, 773 (Wyo. 1991).  If the meaning of a word is unclear, it 
should be afforded the meaning that best accomplishes the statute's 
purpose.  Radalj v. Union Savings 
& Loan Ass'n, 59 Wyo. 140, 138 P.2d 984, 996 (1943).  We presume that the legislature acts 
intentionally when it uses particular language in one statute, but not in 
another.  In re Savage, 218 B.R. 126, 132 (10th Cir. BAP 1998) (quoting BFP v. Resolution 
Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 114 S. Ct. 1757, 128 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1994) and 
City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338, 114 S. Ct. 1588, 1593, 128 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1994)); see 
also Matter of Voss' Adoption, 550 P.2d  at 485.  If two sections of legislation appear to 
conflict, they should be given a reading that gives them both effect.  Flores v. Flores, 979 P.2d 944, 
947 (Wyo. 1999).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶11]   It may be instructive here clearly 
to state the problem presented in this case.  The wrongful death statute contains a 
two-year limitation for the commencement of an action.  We have previously described this 
requirement as a condition precedent rather than a statute of limitations, and 
we have held that it may not be tolled or extended.  Corkill v. Knowles, 955 P.2d 438, 
442 (Wyo. 1998).  Standing alone, this condition precedent 
serves as no roadblock to the Linton Estate in the present case; the wrongful 
death action was filed before the two-year period expired.  The argument presented by the Wilkoske 
Estate, however, is that the otherwise timely filed complaint was a nullity 
because it was filed before the probate claim was rejected.  As a result of this argument, the focus 
of this controversy is on the probate code.

 

[¶12]   A brief detour is in order.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-4-101 (LexisNexis 
2001) describes what is known as a "survival" action:

 

            
In addition to the causes of action which survive at common law, causes 
of action for mesne profits, injuries to the person, an injury to real or 
personal estate, or any deceit or fraud also survive.  An action may be brought notwithstanding 
the death of the person entitled or liable to the same, but in actions for 
personal injury damages, if the person entitled thereto dies, recovery is 
limited to damages for wrongful death.

 

[¶13]   We said in DeHerrera v. 
Herrera, 565 P.2d 479, 482 (Wyo. 1977):

 

[T]he 
prime difference between survival and wrongful death statutes is that the 
survival statute merely continues a cause of action in existence.  The injured party's claim after death is 
an asset of the estate while the wrongful death statute creates a new cause of 
action for the benefit of designated persons who have suffered the loss of a 
loved one and provider.

 

This 
distinction between survival actions and wrongful death actions is important in 
the context of the present case because Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-706 (LexisNexis 
2001) clearly tolls the running of the applicable statute of limitations until 
after a claim based on a survival action has been rejected, but does not do the 
same for a wrongful death action.1  Instead, wrongful death actions are 
subject to the time limitations set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-7-717 and 
2-7-718.

 

[¶14]   In granting the Wilkoske Estate's 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, the district court emphasized Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 2-7-717, the pertinent language from which we will 
repeat:

 

            
No holder of any claim against an estate shall maintain any action 
thereon unless the claim is first rejected in whole or in part by the personal 
representative and the rejection filed with the clerk . . 
..

 

Further, 
the district court relied on Matter of Estate of Campbell, 950 P.2d 557, 
560 (Wyo. 1997) for the proposition that "[w]ith respect 
to claims against an estate, there is no access to the courts, and thus no 
affirmative relief is sought, until the claim has been denied by the personal 
representative."

 

[¶15]   While we understand the district 
court's reliance on the above-quoted statement from Matter of Estate of 
Campbell, we find that it is appropriate now to revisit Matter of Estate 
of Campbell, as well as a few other cases, in order to reach a holding 
specific to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-717.  
That is because we have never previously addressed the import of the 
legislature's use in that statute of the particular word "maintain," as opposed 
to some other word.

 

[¶16]   Matter of Estate of Campbell 
involved two certified questions:  
whether Medicaid reimbursement claims of the State Department of Health 
are subject to the time limitations for filing creditor's claims under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 2-7-703(a), and whether such claims qualify as future claims under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-705(a) (LexisNexis 2001).  Matter of Estate of Campbell, 950 P.2d  at 558-59.  The language from Matter of Estate of 
Campbell quoted above and in the district court's decision letter, when read 
in context, is not a declaration or holding that no lawsuit can be filed until 
the claim has been denied.  Rather, 
it is an explanation of why the claim filing deadline in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
2-7-703(a) is not a statute of limitations, while the deadline in Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 2-7-718 is a statute of limitations.2

 

[¶17]   We are further convinced that 
Matter of Estate of Campbell does not answer the question now before this 
Court when we look to Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 719 P.2d 234 (Wyo. 
1986), which 
is cited in Matter of Estate of Campbell as the source of the "no access 
to the courts" statement.  Matter 
of Estate of Campbell, 950 P.2d  at 560.  While Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-717 is 
quoted in Taylor, it is not interpreted.  Taylor does not go beyond noting 
that the statute prohibits "maintaining" an action until the underlying claim 
has been denied; it does not say what "maintain" or "maintaining" means.  Taylor, 719 P.2d  at 
238.

 

[¶18]   Matter of Estate of Campbell 
is cited in another case for the proposition that no suit may be filed until the 
underlying claim has been rejected by the personal representative.  See Harris v. Taylor, 969 P.2d 142, 145 (Wyo. 1998).  In Harris, 969 P.2d  at 143, the 
personal representative of the estate did not serve a known creditor with the 
notice required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-205(a) (LexisNexis 2001).3  In reversing a summary judgment in favor 
of the estate, and in holding that the statute of limitations found in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 2-7-718 is not triggered unless the personal representative has 
strictly complied with the probate code's notice requirements, we did, indeed, 
cite Matter of Estate of Campbell as noted above.  Once again, however, not only is the 
meaning of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-717 not directly addressed in Harris, the statute is not even mentioned.  Instead, Harris focuses on the requirement in Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 2-7-718 that a suit must be filed, if at all, within thirty days after 
rejection of the claim.  Harris, 969 P.2d  at 145.

 

[¶19]   At first glance, the somewhat 
similar case of Scott v. 
Scott, 
918 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 1996), 
might seem to provide guidance in resolving the present issue.  Indeed, Scott 
was cited in Harris 
along with Matter 
of Estate of Campbell.  But Scott, 
like Matter 
of Estate of Campbell, 
is not based on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-717 and adds nothing to the interpretation 
of that statute.  Scott 
involved a survival action; its conclusion, based on Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-7-703 
and 2-7-706, is that failure to file a claim against the estate bars the 
claimant from bringing an action against the estate.  Scott, 
918 P.2d  at 201.  That, of course, is not the issue with 
which we are currently concerned.

 

[¶20]   None of these cases speak directly 
to the question of what the legislature intended by use of the word "maintain" 
in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-717.  
Keeping in mind the rules of statutory construction detailed above, our 
job is to give effect to the most likely, most reasonable, interpretation of the 
statute, given its design and purpose.  
First, we must decide whether the statute is ambiguous.  Standing alone, perhaps it is not.  But use of the word "maintain" in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 2-7-717, followed so closely by use of the word "bring" in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 2-7-718, does create ambiguity.  The question is whether "maintain" means 
"bring suit" or means "continue a suit already brought."

 

[¶21]   The two words do not have the same 
dictionary meaning.  In relevant 
context, "bring" means "to cause to exist or occur," while "maintain" means "to 
keep in an existing state . . . to continue or persevere in . . .."  Merriam-Webster's 
Collegiate Dictionary 
143, 702 (10th ed. 1999).  Black's 
Law Dictionary 
192, 953 (6th ed. 1990) contains the following 
definitions:

 

To 
"bring" an action or suit has a settled customary meaning at law, and refers to 
the initiation of legal proceedings in a suit.  . . .  A suit is "brought" at the time it is 
commenced.  . . .  "Brought" and "commenced" in statutes of 
limitations are commonly deemed to be synonymous.  Under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and also most state courts, a civil action is commenced by filing a 
complaint with the court.

 

            
To "maintain" an action is to uphold, continue on foot, and keep from 
collapse a suit already begun, or to prosecute a suit with effect.  . . .  To maintain an action or suit may mean 
to commence or institute it; the term imports the existence of a cause of 
action.  Maintain, however, is 
usually applied to actions already brought, but not yet reduced to 
judgment.  . . .  In this connection, it means to continue 
or preserve [sic] in or with; to carry on.

 

[¶22]   From these sources, we can conclude 
that both the common and the legal definition of maintain is "to continue with 
something already in existence."  In 
the present context, that suggests that, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-717, a 
wrongful death action may be filed, but it may not be pursued to judgment until 
the claim has been filed and rejected by the personal representative.  What supports that interpretation of the 
statute?  To begin with, we must 
remember that the legislature chose the specific word "maintain" and we must 
presume it did so purposely.  The 
legislature could have used the word "bring" or the word "brought" or the word 
"commence," as it did in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-7-706 and 2-7-718 and in over a 
dozen statutes of limitation.4  Beyond that, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the legislature recognized the very difficulty, as exemplified by 
the present case, that results from the fact that the time limitation in the 
wrongful death statute is a condition precedent, rather than a statute of 
limitations, and cannot be tolled.

 

[¶23]   A comparison of examples may be 
instructive.  If A suffers personal 
injuries at the hands of B, A has four years to bring an action against B.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) 
(LexisNexis 2001).  If B dies, A's 
cause of action survives.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 1-4-101 and 1-4-102 (LexisNexis 2001).  The action is filed as a claim against 
B's estate and the personal representative is substituted for B as the 
defendant.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
2-7-709 (LexisNexis 2001).  Where 
the suit is not filed before B's death, A must first file a claim against the 
estate and wait for that claim to be rejected, but during the interim, the 
statute of limitations is tolled until five days after notice of rejection is 
mailed.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-7-703 
and 2-7-706.  Consequently, A's 
cause of action is not at risk if the personal representative does not reject 
the claim before the four-year period expires.

 

[¶24]   The situation is different, 
however, if A dies from the personal injuries inflicted by B.  A's estate has two years to bring a 
wrongful death action against B.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-38-102(d).  
If A's estate sues B for wrongful death, and B later dies, the cause of 
action survives.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-38-101.  Just as with a personal 
injury action, the personal representative is substituted for B in the wrongful 
death action.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
2-7-709.  Although Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
2-7-706 does not apply to toll the two-year condition precedent, the suit has 
already been "brought."  Under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 2-7-717, it just cannot be "maintained" until a claim is filed in 
the estate and is rejected by the personal representative.  And when this scenario is varied 
slightly so that it resembles the case now before this Court, there is no reason 
to think that the legislature would have intended to distinguish between a 
wrongful death claimant who files his lawsuit before the alleged tortfeasor dies 
from one who files his lawsuit after the alleged tortfeasor dies.  In either case, the suit may not be 
maintainedcontinued toward judgmentuntil the probate claim is filed and 
rejected.

 

[¶25]   While the legislature's use of 
"maintain" in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-717 and use of "bring" in the very next 
section may have created an ambiguity, we do not conclude that the two sections 
are necessarily contradictory.  Even 
if we did so conclude, it would be our duty to read them so as to give them both 
effect.  Flores, 
979 P.2d  at 947.  What Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-718 adds to 
the statutory scheme is finality for purposes of estate administration.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-718 is not limited 
to any particular claim or cause of action.  What it says is that, for any rejected 
claim, the holder must bring suit, if at all, within thirty days after the 
rejection notice is mailed.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 2-7-718 is a "super" statute of limitationsit gives the personal 
representative what is, in effect, a trump card.  Regardless of the status of any external 
statute of limitations or condition precedent, suit on a claim is barred if it 
has not been brought within that thirty days.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶26]   We pointed out above that this 
statutory scheme is ambiguous.  Our 
goal here has been "to adopt that sense of the words which best harmonizes with 
the context and promotes in the fullest manner the policy and objects of the 
legislature.'"  Zmijewski 
v. Wright, 
809 P.2d 280, 283 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting 
United States v. Hartwell, 
6 Wall. 385, 73 U.S. 385, 396, 18 L. Ed. 830 (1867)).  In that regard, we have previously held 
that

 

[t]he 
object of limitation statutes in estate matters is to expedite and facilitate 
the settlement of estates by providing a procedure whereby the executor or 
administrator of an estate can wind up the affairs of a decedent in an orderly 
manner and make distribution of assets as speedily as practicable.  . . .  The purpose, however, is to bar belated 
creditors and not to furnish a vehicle by which executors or administrators may 
refuse to apply the assets of an estate to the payment of 
debts.

 

Park 
County ex rel. Park County Welfare Dept. v. Blackburn, 
394 P.2d 793, 795 (Wyo. 1964).  See also 
Zmijewski, 
809 P.2d  at 283.  This balance between the rights of 
claimants and the need for finality in estate administration is reflected 
further in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-716 (LexisNexis 2001), which states, in 
part:

 

            
Pending final adjudication of all claims and litigation as to which 
claims have been timely filed, the personal representative shall proceed with 
the administration of the estate to the extent possible without prejudicing the 
possible rights of creditors, but the estate shall not be closed and no payment 
of claims or distributions to distributees shall be made which would impair the 
ability of the estate to honor the claims as finally adjudicated, in accordance 
with their priority.

 

[¶27]   Inasmuch as the condition precedent 
of the wrongful death statute is not a statute of limitations and may not be 
tolled, it makes sense that the legislature would use the word "maintain" rather 
than the word "bring" in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-717 to allow for the situation 
where the two-year period will expire before the period for rejection of claims 
expires.  For this Court to rule 
that "maintain" means "bring" would upset the balance between claimant and 
estate that is clearly a primary legislative purpose in Article 7 of the Probate 
Code.

 

[¶28]   We hold that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
2-7-717 allows the holder of a wrongful death claim, under the circumstances of 
this case, to bring his or her civil action and serve the personal 
representative before the claim has been filed and rejected in the probate 
estate.

 

[¶29]   We reverse the district court and 
remand for further proceedings.

 

FOOTNOTES

  1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-706 states, in 
part:

 

            
Where a cause of action against the decedent survives his death under 
W.S. 1-4-101 and 1-4-102, before an action may be brought thereon in any court, 
a claim based thereon shall be filed and shall have been rejected by the 
personal representative.  The 
running of the applicable statute of limitations on the cause of action shall be 
tolled from the time the claim is filed until five (5) days after the date of 
mailing of notice of rejection by the personal 
representative.

 

  2The explanation being that the 
filing of a claim does not directly seek affirmative relief from the court, as 
does the filing of a complaint.

  3Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-205(a) states, 
in part:

 

A true copy of the notice required 
in W.S. 2-7-201 shall be mailed by ordinary United States mail, first class, 
to:

 

            
* * *

 

            
(ii)         
Each creditor of the decedent whose identity is reasonably ascertainable 
by the personal representative within the time limited in the notice to 
creditors.

 

  4See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
1-3-102, 1-3-103, 1-3-104, 1-3-105, 1-3-107, 1-3-108, 1-3-109, 1-3-111, 1-3-113, 
1-3-114, 1-3-115, 1-3-116, and 1-3-118 (LexisNexis 2001).