Case Title: Ybarra v. State

Citation: 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 4

Docket Number: 19705

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2011-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
427 Nev, Advance Opinion “4
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

ROBERT YBARRA, JR., | No. 52167

Appelt, | FIL ED
‘THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent, MAR Q3 2011

 

 

Appeal from an order denying a motion to strike the death
penalty pursuant to NRS 175.554(5). Seventh Judicial District Court,
White Pine County; Steve L. Dobrescu, Judge.

Affirmed,

Franny A. Forsman, Federal Public Defender, and Michael Pescetta,

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Richard W.
Sears, District Attorney, White Pine County,
for Respondent,

 

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
OPINION

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.

A jury sentenced appellant Robert Ybarra, Jr., to death in
1981 for the murder of 16-year-old Nancy Griffith. Two decades later, the
United States Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002), that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual

M0693

 

 
 

  

punishment precludes the execution of mentally retarded persons. In
compliance with Atkins, the Nevada Legislature adopted a statutory
provision to address claims of mental retardation involving defendants
who, like Ybarra, were sentenced to death before the decision in Atkins
NRS 175.554(5). barra sought relief under that statute, asking the
district court to set aside his death sentence on the ground that he is
mentally retarded. In this appeal from the district court's order denying

relief, we address two issues.

 

First, we consider whether the denial of Ybarra’s motion to
disqualify the post-conviction district court judge based on implied bias
violated state and federal guarantees of due process. We conclude that it
did not because neither the judge's prior legal representation of the
victim’s family on matters unrelated to the murder nor the case's notoriety
in the judge's community would cause an objective person reasonably to
question the judge's impartiality.

Second, we consider whether the district court erred in
concluding that Ybarra had not demonstrated by a preponderance of the
evidence that he was mentally retarded. NRS 174.098(7) defines
“mentally retarded” as “significant subaverage general intellectual
functioning which exists concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior
and manifested during the developmental period.” As matters of first
impression, we address the three components of the mental retardation
definition and, in particular, hold that the “developmental period”
referenced in the statute includes the period before a person reaches 18
years of age. Because Ybarra failed to produce sufficient evidence of
subaverage intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior deficits before
he reached 18 years of age, the district court did not err in concluding that

 

 

 
4

Ybarra had not demonstrated that he was mentally retarded and denying
the motion to strike the death penalty.
FACTS:

On the evening of September 28, 1979, 16-year-old Nancy
Griffith and girlfriend met 26-year-old Robert Ybarra, Jr., in Ely,
Nevada. Ybarra drove the girls around town but eventually dropped off
Griffith's girlfriend at her sister's home. Although the two girls arranged
to meet later that evening, the girlfriend never saw Griffith again after
leaving her with Ybarra, When Griffith was found the next day, she was
barely alive. Ybarra had beaten and raped her, set her ablaze with
gasoline, and left her to die in the desert outside of Ely. Suffering from
burns that seared her respiratory passages and charred 80 percent of her
body, Griffith died shortly thereafter.

A jury found Ybarra guilty of first-degree murder, first-degree
kidnapping, battery with intent to commit sexual assault, and sexual
assault, And after finding four circumstances aggravated the murder and
no mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh them, the jury imposed
death for the first-degree murder and consecutive terms of life in prison
without the possibility of parole for the remaining offenses. We affirmed
the judgment of conviction and death sentence, Ybarra v. State, 100 Nev.
167, 679 P.2d 797 (1984).

Over the years, Ybarra filed three state post-conviction
petitions, which were denied in the district court. This court upheld the
district court decisions in all three instances, Ybarra v, State, 103 Nev. 8,
731 P.2d 358 (1987); Ybarra_v. Director, Docket No. 19705 (Order
Dismissing Appeal, June 29, 1989); Ybarra v. Warden, Docket No. 32762
(Order Dismissing Appeal, July 6, 1999).

 
Ybarra raised the issue of mental retardation in his fourth
petition, which he filed on March 6, 2003. In that petition, Ybarra
contended that he was incompetent to be executed due to his mental
retardation. The district court dismissed the petition, concluding that it
was procedurally barred. This court disagreed as to the mental-
retardation claim and remanded that issue to the district court for
appropriate proceedings under NRS 175.654(5). Ybarra _v. Warden,
Docket No. 43981 (Order Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part, and
Remanding, November 28, 2005). On remand, Ybarra filed a motion
under that statute. The district court conducted a two-day hearing on the
motion at which Ybarra presented the testimony of two expert witnesses,
the State presented the testimony of an expert witness, and the court
considered exhibits totaling more than 3,000 pages. The district court
determined that Ybarra had failed to meet his burden of proving mental
retardation that began during the developmental period. Based on that
failure, the district court denied the motion in a detailed 46-page written
order. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION
Judicial bias

The Honorable Steve Dobrescu presided over the post-
conviction proceedings at issue in this appeal. Judge Dobrescu disclosed
below that when he was an attorney in private practice, he represented
Griffith's sister in an adoption proceeding in 1996 and prepared wills for
Griffith's parents in 1998. Based primarily on that prior professional
relationship, Ybarra filed a motion to disqualify Judge Dobrescu for bias.
Another district court judge heard and denied the motion. See NRS

1.235(6).Ybarra challenges that decision, arguing that disqualification

 

 
was warranted under state and federal constitutional due-process
guarantees and Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct (NCJC) Canon 3E. We
disagree.

‘The NOJC “provides substantive grounds for judicial
disqualification.” PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 111 Nev. 431, 435, 894
P.2d 837, 340 (1995), overruled on other grounds by ‘Towbin Dodge, LLC v,
Dist. Ct, 121 Nev. 251, 112 P.3d 1063 (2005). Two provisions are relevant
here. First, NCJC Canon 2A provides that “fa] judge shall respect and
‘comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes

public confidence i

 

the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”
Commentary accompanying that provision explains that “[tJhe test for
appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in
reasonable minds a pereeption that the judge's ability to carry out judicial
responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired.”
Second, NCJC Canon 3E provides that “[a] judge shall disqualify
himself...in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned,” although none of the specific grounds for
disqualification enumerated in that Canon apply here. Both provisions
address the importance of impartiality.

“[T)he test for whether a judge's impartiality might reasonably
be questioned is objective,” PETA, 111 Nev. at 436, 894 P.2d at 340, and
presents “a question of law [such that] this court will exercise its
independent judgment of the undisputed facts,” id, at 437, 894 P.2d at 341

'The NCJC underwent significant revisions and renumbering
effective January 19, 2010, after the proceedings at issue here. We apply
the NCJC in effect at the relevant time,

 
 

os

Because a judge is presumed to be impartial, “the burden is on the party
asserting the challenge to establish sufficient factual grounds warranting
disqualification.” Goldman v. Brvan, 104 Nev. 644, 649, 764 P.2d 1296,
1299 (1988), abrogated on other grounds by Halverson v. Hardcastle, 123
Nev. 245, 266, 163 P.3d 428, 448 (2007); see PETA, 111 Nev. at 437, 894
P.2d at 341. Ultimately, we must decide “whether a reasonable person,
knowing all the facts, would harbor reasonable doubts about (the judge's]
impartiality.” PETA, 111 Nev. at 438, 894 P.2d at 341; see Suh v. Pierce,
F.3d __, __, 2011 WL 135713, at *5 (7th Cir. 2011) (observing that
due process requires fair trial in fair tribunal but that most judicial
disqualification matters do not rise to constitutional level and that United
States Supreme Court has never held that due process requires recusal
based solely on appearance of bias).

‘The circumstances presented here, with a prior professional
relationship between the trial judge and the victim’s family, have not been
addressed in many published decisions. An Illinois appellate court,
however, has dealt with a similar situation. In People v. Booker, the
defendant, who was charged with sexually assaulting his stepdaughter,
argued on appeal that the trial judge should have been disqualified
because the judge had represented the victim's natural father in divorce
proceedings against the victim's mother around the time the assault
occurred, 585 N.E.2d 1274, 1284 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). Recognizing that
recusal is required “whenever the judge's impartiality could reasonably be
questioned,” the appellate court could find no evidence in the record
suggesting that the trial judge was biased against the defendant, id, at
1285, thus indicating that the prior relationship alone was not sufficient to
question the judge's impartiality. See also Suh, __ F.3d at __, 2011 WL

 

 

 
aoe

185713, at "5-6 (rejecting claim of appearance of bias where trial judge
had casual acquaintanceship with members of murder victim's family).
See generally Jacobson v. Manfredi, 100 Nev. 226, 230, 679 P.2d 261, 254
(1984) (stating that “a judge, especially a judge in a small town, need not
disqualify himself merely because he knows one of the parties’)

‘The same is true here. Although Ybarra asserts that a
reasonable person would have doubts about Judge Dobrescu's impartiality
based on his prior legal representation of Griffith's family, there are not
sufficient facts in the record to support such a conclusion. Nothing in the
record suggests that Judge Dobrescu was biased against Ybarra as a
result of the prior professional relationship. The prior professional
relationship was wholly unrelated to the murder, which had occurred 17 to
19 years before the professional relationship, or the issues facing Judge
Dobrescu in the post-conviction proceedings, which commenced 5 to 7
years after the professional relationship. There is no evidence that Judge
Dobrescu has any continuing duty or obligations to the Griffith family,
Nor is there any evidence that Judge Dobrescu has a direct, personal

interest in the outcome of Ybarra’s case. Ybarra presents a speculative

 

claim that is not supported by sufficient facts to warrant disqualification.
See Rippo_v, State, 113 Nev. 1239, 1248, 946 P.24 1017, 1023 (1997)
(Disqualification must be based on facts, rather than mere speculation.”).
We therefore cannot conclude that the prior representation would cause
an objective person reasonably to doubt Judge Dobrescu's impartiality.

To the extent Ybarra argues that the notoriety of his case
requires heightened scrutiny of his disqualification motion, we again
disagree. Following Ybarra’s reasoning would require the disqualification
of the local judges in every high-profile case tried in a community. Given

 

 
cones

the presumption that judges are impartial and the challenging party's
burden of establishing sufficient factual grounds, not just speculation, to
warrant disqualification, id., we decline to ascertain bias merely based on
the high-profile nature of a case. Because Ybarra articulated no facts
causing doubt as to Judge Dobrescu’s impartiality based on the high-
profile nature of this case, we conclude that this claim lacks merit?

Because we conclude that Ybarra’s grounds for disqualification
lack merit, no violation of his state and federal due process rights occurred
by Judge Dobrescu’s participation in the post-conviction proceedings. ‘The
disqualification motion was properly denied,
Mental retardation

Ybarra argues that the district court failed to adequately
consider evidence of his mental retardation and, as a result, erroneously
denied his motion to strike the death penalty. We disagree.

Definition of mental retardation

Although the United States Supreme Court has held that the

execution of mentally retarded individuals violates the Eighth

Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, Atkins,

*Ybarra argues that the disqualification issue presents an equal
protection violation because “the degree of impartiality afforded a party is
not protected by an equal standard for all judges throughout the state, but
is relaxed when the matter is pending in a small community, in which the
threat to a judicial officer's impartiality is, as here, greater than in a large
community.” We conclude that Ybarra’s claim lacks merit as he failed to
demonstrate that he is a member of a protected class or suffered
impermissible discrimination. See Cairns v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 113, 115, 508
P.2d 1015, 1017 (1973) (explaining requirements of equal protection
claim),

 

 
 

oe

536 U.S. at 321, the Court did not prescribe a definition of mental
retardation or procedures for determining when an individual is mentally
retarded. Instead, the Court left “to the State(s] the task of developing
appropriate ways to enforce [this] constitutional restriction

 

upon... execution{s},” id, at 317 (frst, third, and fourth alterations in
original) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S, 399, 416-17 (1986)). ‘The
Nevada Legislature accomplished that task with the passage of NRS
174.098, which sets forth the procedure for raising mental retardation in a

capi

 

| case and defines “mentally retarded.” ‘The statute provides that
upon motion by a defendant,’ the district court must conduct an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant is mentally
retarded. NRS 174,098(1), (2); see also NRS 175.554(6). The defendant
bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is
“mentally retarded,” NRS 174,098(5)(b), which the Legislature defines as
“significant subaverage general intellectual functioning which existe
concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the
developmental period,” NRS 174.098(7). This court has not yet had

"The statutory scheme accounts for defendants who have not yet
been tried and sentenced to death and those who were sentenced to death
without a prior determination regarding mental retardation. Under NRS
174.098, a defendant facing a capital sentence may file a motion, not less
than 10 days before the date set for trial, to declare that the defendant is
mentally retarded. A defendant who has been sentenced to death without
a prior determination regarding mental retardation under NRS 174.098
may file a motion under NRS 175.554(6) to set aside the death penalty on
the grounds that the defendant is mentally retarded. In both
circumstances, the proceedings on the motion are governed by NRS
174.098(2)-(7), See NRS 174.098; NRS 175.554(6).

 

 
occasion to address the statutory definition of mentally retarded. We take
this opportunity to do so.

‘The definition of “mentally retarded” in NRS 174,098(7) was
taken from NRS 433.174, which was adopted in 1975 and defines “mental
retardation” for purposes of NRS Title 39 (Mental Health). See Hearing
on A.B. 15 Before the Assembly Comm. on Judiciary, 72d Leg. (Nev., Feb.
26, 2003). The statutory definition conforms to the clinical definitions
espoused by two profes
retardation—the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR)*‘

jional associations that are concerned with mental

 

 

and the American Psychiatric Association (APA)S In particular, the

statutory definition and the two clinical definitions share three concepts
(1) significant limitations in intellectual functioning, (2) significant

limitations in adaptive functioning, and (8) age of onset. Given the

“In 2006, the AAMR changed its name to the American Association
on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD). At the time
Atkins was decided and Ybarra sought relief in the district court, the
organization was known as the AAMR. Therefore, we use the designation
AAMR in this opinion.

'This focus on the AAMR’s and APA's clinical definitions is not
uncommon. As the Supreme Court observed in Atkins, the various
statutory definitions of mentally retarded in existence at that time “are
not identical, but generally conform to the clinical definitions” set out by
the AAMR and APA, 536 U.S. at 317 n.22; see also id, at 318 (“{C]linical
definitions of mental retardation require not only subaverage intellectual
functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as
communication, self-care, and self-direction that became manifest before
age 18.")

 

The AAMR defines mental retardation as “a disability
characterized by significant limitations both in intellectual functioning
and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical

‘continued on next page

 

 
similarities between the statutory definition and the clinical definitions of
mental retardation, the AAMR and APA provide useful guidance in
applying the definition set forth in NRS 174.098,

‘The first concept—significant limitations in intellectual
functioning—has been measured in large part by intelligence (1Q) tests.
Because “there is a measurement error of approximately 5 points in
asses

 

jing 19,” which may vary depending on the particular intelligence
test given, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 41 (4th
ed. 2000), the clinical definitions indicate that “individuals with IQs
between 70 and 75” fall into the category of subaverage intellectual
functioning, id, at 42, See also State v, McManus, 868 N.E.2d 778, 785
(nd. 2007); State v, Vela, 777 N.W.2d 266, 294 (Neb. 2010); Ex Parte
Briseno, 135 $.W.8d 1, 7 n.24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Although the focus

‘continued

 

adaptive skills. This disability originates before age 18.” Mental

ion, Classifici Systems of 1 (10th ed.
2002). Similarly, the APA defines mental retardation based on the same
three criteria:

‘The essential feature of Mental Retardation is
significantly subaverage general _ intellectual
functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by
significant limitations in adaptive functioning in
at least two of the following skills areas:
communication, self-care, home living,
social/interpersonal skills, use of community
resources, self-direction, functional academic
skills, work, leisure, healt, and safety (Criterion
B). The onset must occur before age 18 years
(Criterion ©).

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 41 (4th ed. 2000).

u

 
 

os

with this element of the definition often is on IQ scores, that is not to say
that objective IQ testing is required to prove mental retardation. Other
‘evidence may be used to demonstrate subaverage intellectual functioning,
such as school and other records. See McManus, 868 N.E.2d at 787; Com.
xv. Vandivner, 962 A.2d 1170, 1187 (Pa. 2009); see also Morris v. State, No.
CR-07-1997, 2010 WL 415245, at *10 (Ala, Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2010)
(considering school records in determining whether defendant was
mentally retarded), petition for cert, filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3377 (U.S. Dec. 16,
2010) (No, 10-808). But the burden remains on the defendant to present
evidence affirmatively establishing this element of mental retardation.
See NRS 174.098(6)(b).

To be found mentally retarded, an individual with subaverage

intellectual functioning must also meet the second element, showing

 

significant deficits in adaptive behavior. As the APA explains, individuals
“with IQs somewhat lower than 70” would not be diagnosed as mentally
retarded if there “are no significant doficits or impairment in adaptive
functioning.” Striplingv, State, 401 S.E.2d 500, 504 (Ga. 1991) (quoting
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 37 (3d ed. 1980));
Myers v, State, 190 P.3d 262, 268 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005) (stating that IQ
tests are not solely determinative of mental retardation issue). ‘Thus, the
interplay between intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior is critical
to a mental retardation diagnosis. “Adaptive behavior” has been defined
as the “collection of conceptual, social, and practical skills that have been
learned by people in order to function in their everyday lives,” and thus,
“limitations on adaptive behavior are reflected by difficulties adjusting to
ordinary demands made in daily life.” Com, v, Miller, 888 A.2d 624, 630
(Pa. 2005); see also In re Hawthorne, 105 P.3d 552, 557 (Cal. 2005);

12

 

 
McManus, 868 N.E.2d at 787 (noting that “Indiana's adaptive behavior
prong most closely resembles the AAMR definition”); Vela, 777 N.W.2d at
294; Briseno, 135 S.W.3d. at 7 n.25; Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders 42 (4th ed. 2000) (explaining that “[aldaptive
functioning refers to how effectively individuals cope with common life

 

demands and how well they meet the standards of personal independence
expected of someone in their particular age group, sociocultural
background, and community setting”).

‘The final element in finding mental retardation is the age of
onset, NRS 174,098(7) refers to onset during the “developmental period.”
We must therefore delineate the boundaries of the “developmental period”
referenced in the statute, To do s0, we look to the purpose of the age-of:
onset requirement, the clinical definitions of mental retardation, and other
jurisdictions’ definitions of mental retardation. The purpose behind the
age-of-onset requirement is twofold. The requirement ensures “that the
mental retardation developed during the developmental period, as opposed
to forms of brain damage that occur Inter in life,” and, in the criminal
arena, it precludes defendants from feigning mental retardation once
charged with a capital crime, Alexis Krulish Dowling, Comment, Post:
Atkins Problems With Enforcing the Supreme Court's Ban on Executing
the Mentally Retarded, 33 Seton Hall L. Rev. 773, 805 (2003); see Penny J.
White, Treated Differently in Life but Not in Death: The Execution of the
Intellectually Disabled After Atkins v, Virginia, 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 685, 707
(2009) (stating that “[t]he purpose of this [age] onset requirement is not to
exclude some people with intellectual disabilities from the mental
retardation category, but rather to differentiate between individuals with

mental retardation and individuals with other mental deficits caused by

 

 
omni

injuries or diseases that occurred during adulthood”); Nita A. Farahany,
Cruel And Unequal Punishments, 86 Wash. U. L. Rev. 859, 884 (2009)
(noting that “[iJn medicine, age of onset helps a clinician to distinguish
mental retardation from other mental disabilities”). The clinical
definitions adopted by the AAMR and the APA focus on the age of 18
years, requiring that subaverage intellectual functioning and adaptive
behavior deficits manifest themselves before that age. Most jurisdictions
are in step with the AAMR and APA and have required, either by statute
or caselaw that these intellectual and adaptive deficits must originate
before 18 years of age.’ E.g,, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-753(K)(3) (2010);
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-618(a)(1)(A) (2006); Cal. Penal Code § 1376(a) (West
Supp. 2011); Conn. Gen, Stat. Ann. § 53a-46a(h) (2009); Conn. Gen, Stat. §
1-1g (2009) (defining mental retardation); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§
4209(4)(3)(a), 4209(4)(3)(@)(2) (2007); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.137(1) (West
2006 & Supp. 2011); Idaho Code Ann. § 19-2515A(1)(a) (2004 & Supp.
2010); 725 Tl, Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/114-15(d) (West 2006); La. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 905.5.1(H)(1) (2008 & Supp. 2011); Kan, Stat. Ann, § 21-
4623(e) (Supp. 2010); Kan. Stat. Ann, § 76-12b01(@) (1997); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 15A-2005(a)(1)(a) (2009); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 701.10b(B) (West

 

7A minority of three jurisdictions—Indiana, Maryland, and Utah—
statutorily define mental retardation as the manifestation of significant
subaverage intellectual functioning and substantial impairment of
adaptive behavior before the age of 22 years. Ind. Code Ann. § 35-36-9-2
(LexisNexis 1998 & Supp. 2010); Md. Code Ann, Crim. Law § 2-
202(b)(1)(ii) (LexisNexis 2002); Utah Code Ann. § 77-15a-102(2) (2008).
Although one of Ybarra’s experts explained that the developmental period
may extend “sometimes to 25,” we have found no other support for such an
expansive view in other jurisdictions,

4

 

 
2002 & Supp. 2010); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-27A-26.1 (2004); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-13-203(a)(8) (2010); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A)
(2008 & Supp. 2010); Wash. Rev, Code. Ann. § 10.95.030(2)(e) (West 2002
& Supp. 2011); In re Brown, 457 F.3d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 2006) (recognizing
that Texas courts have adopted the AAMR definition of mental retardation
providing that mental retardation must manifest before age of 18 years);
Chase v. State, 873 So. 2d 1013, 1027-28 (Miss. 2004) (adopting AAMR:
and APA definition of mental retardation, including onset before age of 18
years); Com. v. Miller, 888 A.2d 624, 629-31, 630 n.7 (Pa. 2005) (same), A
few jurisdictions, like Nevada, have statutes that refer more generally to
the “developmental period.” Ala. Code § 15-24-2(3) (LexisNexis 1995 &
Supp. 2010); Colo, Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-1101(2) (2010); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-
7-131(a)(3) (2008 & Supp. 2010); Ky. Rev. Stat, Ann, § 532,130(2)
(LexisNexis 2008); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(10) (2003). Courts in
two of those states have answered the same question that we face in this

 

case—what is the “developmental period"? Those courts have defined
“development period” as the time before an individual reaches 18 years of
age, consistent with the age of onset used in the clinical definitions and in
@ majority of jurisdictions. Holladay v. Campbell, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1324,
1841-42 (N.D. Ala. 2006); Ex Parte Perkins, 851 So. 2d 453, 456 (Ala.
2002); Stripling v. State, 401 S.E.2d 500, 504 Ga, 1991) (observing that
Georgia's statutory definition of mental retardation is consistent with
APA, which identifies developmental period as before age 18).

We conclude that the approach to the age-of-onset
requirement taken by the AAMR and APA and the majority of
jurisdictions—that a person suffered from mental retardation prior to the

age of 18 years—best serves the purpose behind the requirement

 

 
Focusing on the period before a person reaches 18 years of age ensures
that the person suffers from mental retardation rather than some other
mental impairment that occurred later in life and that a criminal
defendant cannot feign mental retardation to avoid a capital sentence.
Considering the purpose behind the age-of-onset requirement, the
guidance provided by the AAMR and APA, and the consensus among most
jurisdictions, we conclude that the “developmental period” referenced in
NRS 174,098(7) is the period before a person reaches 18 years of age.
Accordingly, subaverage intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior
deficits must originate before 18 ye:
mental retardation contemplated by NRS 174.098.

‘3 of age to meet the definition of

 

With this understanding of the elements of mental retardation
in mind, we turn to the district court’s decision and Ybarra’s challenges to
it, To begin with, we must address the standard of review that applies

when a district court's decision regarding a claim of mental retardation is

 

reviewed on appeal. While some courts have reviewed such decisions for
an abuse of discretion, see Rondon v, State, 711 N.E.2d 506 (Ind. 1999);
State v, White, 885 N.E.2d 905 (Ohio 2008), or clear error, see Com.v.
Crawley, 924 A.2d 612, 616 (Pa. 2007) (“[O]ur standard of review [for
mental retardation determinations] is whether the factual findings are
supported by substantial evidence and whether the legal conclusion drawn
therefrom is clearly erroneous.”), others have treated it as a mixed
question of fact and law, see Walker v, Kelly, 593 F.3d 319, 322-23 (4th

“The district court found that the developmental period was
childhood to age 18 but nevertheless considered evidence of mental
retardation between the ages of 18 and 25.

 

 
Cir) (applying Virginia law to mental retardation determinations,
appellate courts review district court's factual findings for clear error and
legal conclusions de novo), cert. denied, 560 US. __, 130 S. Ct. 3318
(2010); Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712 (Fla. 2007) (noting that in
reviewing mental health determinations, appellate courts “employ[ ] the
standard of whether competent, substantial evidence eupported the
[postconviction] court's determination” and questions of law are reviewed
de novo), In our view, the determination whether a capital defendant is
mentally retarded is based on factual conclusions but requires
distinctively legal analysis to determine whether the elements of mental
retardation have been proven, and therefore, we will review such a
determination as a mixed question of fact and law. See Hernandez v,
State, 124 Nev. 639, 646, 188 P.3d 1126, 1181 (2008) (‘We have noted that
review of a district court's decision as a mixed question of law and fact is

 

appropriate where the determination, although based on factual
conclusions, requires distinctively legal analysis.”). Accordingly, we will
give deference to the district court's factual findings so long as those
findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly
erroneous, but we will review the legal consequences of those factual
findings de novo. See Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164,
1166 (2005) (applying mixed-question standard of review). Matters of

 

credibility in this area remain, however, within the district court's

discretion. See Mann v. State, 118 Nev. 851, 356, 46 P.3d 1228, 1231
(2002) (observing that on remand for evidentiary hearing “the district
court will be better able to judge credibility”). See generally Mulder v.
State, 116 Nev. 1, 15, 992 P.2d $45, 853 (2000) (“The trier of fact
determines the weight and credibility to give conflicting testimony.”). For

 

 
or i

  

the reasons explained below, we conclude that Ybarra failed to show that
the onset of any subaverage general intellectual functioning and adaptive
behavior deficits occurred before he reached age 18. Accordingly, the
district court did not err by denying the motion to strike the death penalty
on this ground.
Evidence concerning Ybarra’s alleged mental retardation

‘The district court conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing
vetting the issue of Ybarra’s alleged mental retardation. Ybarra presented
two expert witnesses—Dr. David Schmidt, a psychologist, and Dr. Mitchell
‘Young, a psychiatrist. The State countered with an expert witness—Dr.
‘Theodore Young, a neuropsychologist. ‘The district court also considered
‘more than 3,000 pages of exhibits, including school records, mental health
and medical records, military records, prison records, and letters and
other communications (primarily prison kites)® Ybarra authored during
his incarceration.

Ybarra was born on July 20, 1953, in West Sacramento,

California, and is the oldest of five children, He attended school until the

 

age of 16, when he transferred to an alternative school and ultimately
obtained

 

adult education degree shortly before he turned 19. Ybarra

 

has a lengthy history of drug and alcohol abuse beginning in his teenage

"In its broadest use, “kite” is prison slang for a written
‘communication, More narrowly, it is a written request for services or
other assistance within the prison.

10n August 30, 2010, Ybarra filed a motion for remand to present
additional evidence related to his mental retardation claim. We are not
convinced that a remand is warranted on this basis. Accordingly, we deny
the motion for remand.

18,

 

 
years and extending into adulthood. He enlisted in the Marine Corps
twice but was discharged for homosexual conduct and fraudulent
enlistment. Ybarra also enlisted in the Army National Guard but was
discharged due to a medical condition (asthma). The record shows that
Ybarra has been diagnosed with an assortment of mental conditions,
including delusions and hallucinations, organic personality disorder,
depression, and bipolar disorder, to identify a few. When Ybarra was 25
he married, but the marriage lasted only a few months.

Defense experts

‘The first defense expert, Dr. Schmidt, interviewed and tested
‘Ybarra in October 2001 and January 2002 and considered a wide range of
information in forming his opinion that Ybarra is mentally retarded.
During the evaluation, Dr. Schmidt administered the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale (3d edition) (WAIS-II1) to Ybarra, who scored a full scale
1Q of 60, which, Dr. Schmidt explained, placed Ybarra’s actual 1Q between
57-60, meaning that Ybarra’s intellectual functioning fell within the mild
range of mental retardation, As further support for this finding regarding
‘Ybarra’s limited intellectual functioning, Dr. Schmidt relied on Ybarra's
mental health records, which included a psychiatrist's diagn
Ybarra’s developmental years that he was intellectually challenged. Dr.
Schmidt also pointed to a significant head injury sustained when Yarra
was about 9 years old, after which Ybarra suffered headaches and
experienced abnormal electroencephalogram (EEG) test results.

 

during

According to Dr. Schmidt, Ybarra’s condition deteriorated into mental
illness, which changed the course of his development, driving him into the

range of mental retardation. He explained that other evidence supported

his conclusions about Ybarra’s limited intellectual functioning and

 

 
adaptive skills, including that Ybarra displayed an inability to participate
in sports, he had difficulty getting along with his school peers, and his
performance in school deteriorated with him being transferred to an
alternative school at age 16 when a school psychiatrist concluded that he
would not benefit from any further schooling. Dr. Schmidt explained that
Ybarra’s difficulties after his head injury showed that he had limited
adaptive functioning but that these problems were masked throughout his
developmental period because friends and family assisted him in his care
and provided a structured environment, As further evidence of Ybarra’s

limited adaptive skills as he grow older, Dr. Schmidt testified that Ybarra

 

was unable to maintain steady employment, relying on friends and family
for work because he was unable to secure work on his own; when he wa:
employed he only held menial jobs; he w:

 

in and out of the military,
which suggested that he could not maintain employment; he never lived
independently of others; and he became lost easily. Dr. Schmidt opined
that the IQ test he administered and the other evidence he considered
demonstrated that Ybarra is mentally retarded.11

Ybarra’s second expert, Dr. M. Young, also concluded that
Yarra is mentally retarded based on interviews with Ybarra and tests
that he administered to Ybarra in 2007 and on his review of numerous
records, including Ybarra’s medical, mental health, school, and police
records. Dr. M. Young administered the Street Survival Skills
Questionnaire (SSSQ) to Ybarra. Although the SSSQ measures adaptive

 

"Dr. Schmidt testified that the developmental period that helps
define mental retardation may include the period up to when an
individual reaches 25 years of age.

 

 
skills, Dr, M, Young's report indicates that the raw score on the SSSQ can
be converted to a standard score that is comparable to an 1Q score. Ybarra
scored a 79, which placed him in the borderline range of mental
retardation. Although Dr. M. Young observed factors indicating
malingering, he opined in his written evaluation that Ybarra met the
criteria for mental retardation based on other sources of information,
including the observations of other professionals who had interacted with
‘Ybarra that when Ybarra is “confronted with an excess of information or
affective stimuli, he becomes overwhelmed, agitated, avoidant, poorly
communicative, and unable to cope with complex scenarios or problem
solving,” thus indicating to Dr. M. Young limited adaptive skills.
‘The State's expert
Dr. T, Young, the State's mental health expert, disagreed with

Dr. Schmidt's and Dr. M. Young's assessments of Ybarra’s intellectual

 

functioning. He interviewed Ybarra on September 27, 2007, and
conducted a battery of tests, the results of which he described as “bizarre.”
Such “bizarre” results, according to Dr. T. Young, indicate that the client
manipulated the evaluation and the test results could not be interpreted.
Such was the case with Ybarra’s test results. Dr. T. Young administered
the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) to Yarra, who
scored a full scale IQ score of 66, which was consistent with the score
Ybarra received on the test administered by Dr. Schmidt and put Ybarra
in the mild range of mental retardation. But Dr. T. Young testified that
he had no confidence in the IQ score considering the uninterpretable
results from the other tests that he administered to Ybarra. Because of

the strange test results, Dr. 'T. Young administered the Test of Memory
Malingering (TOMM) to Ybarra, who scored 30, indicating malingering.

 

 
om

 

Based on the TOMM score, Dr. ‘T. Young concluded that the data he
collected from other tests was invalid, and therefore, he was unable to
draw any conclusions about brain injury or mental retardation. Because
Ybarra scored the same IQ on the test administered by Dr. Schmidt, Dr. T.
Young questioned the validity of that 1@ test. And, in fact, Dr. T. Young
opined that there have been no valid 1Q tests obtained from Ybarra that
support mental retardation.
Other evidence

No intelligence tests were administered to Ybarra during the
developmental period. Ybarra was 27 years old when he took his first
intelligence test—the WAIS, which Dr. Martin Gutride administered to
him in 1981, Ybarra scored an IQ of 86, which is outside the range of
mental retardation. When questioned about the discrepancy between
‘Ybarra’s 1Q score on the 1981 test and his significantly lower score on the
test administered in October 2001 or January 2002!" Dr. Schmidt
suggested that the 1981 test may have been scored incorrectly and
observed that 26 years had passed between the two tests, with new tests
having been developed and the norms for IQ tests having changed over
time, He also suggested that the 1981 1@ score could be inflated by as

much as 15 points"? according to the Flynn effect, which refers to a body of

 

work suggesting that IQ test scores show an upward drift over time until

"Dr. Schmidt's report does not indicate the exact date when he
administered the WAIS-III to Ybarra, His report indicates that he
conducted Ybarra’s evaluation on October 17 and 18, 2001, and January
10 and 11, 2002.

Dr. Schmidt explained that a standard deviation is 15 points,

22

 
om i

 

the test is renormed. See Pruitt v. State, 903 N.H.2d 899, 910 n.7 (Ind.
2009) (noting that Flynn effect refers “to the gradual escalation of
intelligence test scores over long periods of time”); Smith v, State, P.3d
+. 2010 WL 4397004, at *4 n.6 (Okla, Crim. App. 2010). According
to Dr. Schmidt's testimony that an IQ score of 70 to 75 indicates mild

mental retardation, such an adjustment would put the 1981 score within

 

the mild range of mental retardation,

‘Ybarra’s school, mental health, and military records provided
generalized assessments of his intellectual functioning that were not
based on intelligence tests. Ybarra’s seventh-grade teacher described him
as a C to C+ student who had no learning problems and could have worked
harder. Mental health providers who evaluated Ybarra throughout his
life for various reasons, most relating to his competency, described him a:
having average to below average intellectual functioning, with an
estimated IQ between 70 and 80. One mental health evaluator (Dr.
William 0° Gorman, in 1980) indicated that he suspected that Ybarra wa:
mentally retarded but could not establish to what degree. Military records
described Ybarra’s intellectual functioning as “dull normal,” which Dr,
Schmidt acknowledged is not within the range of mental retardation,

‘The evidence presented at the hearing included Ybarra’s
writings since his arrest and incarceration, The documents included
dozens of prison kites that Ybarra prepared during his incarceration,
which mostly dealt with dietary or medication concerns, and letters he
wrote to friends, family members, and doctors. The defense experts

 

“Dr. Schmidt characterized the teacher's description of Ybarra as
“the recollection of the teacher some 35 years later.”

23

 
suggested that the writings could not be used as evidence of Ybarra’s
intellectual functioning, as they opined that other inmates may have
assisted Ybarra in drafting the documents. No other evidence was
presented to support those opinions.
District court's ruling

‘The district court determined that the evidence simply did not
support Ybarra’s mental retardation claim, with much of the evidence
undermining the testimony and credibility of the defense experts. ‘The
district court observed that while the defense experts were “well qualified
and honorable,” “the record is so full of evidence that contradicts their
conclusions that the Court finds the bulk of their testimony to be of little
weight.” Identifying specific examples, the district court also concluded
that Ybarra’s experts “focused only on information that supported their
conclusions with minimal consideration of evidence that undermined their
opinions.” Based on “a careful review of the record, an observation of the
witnesses while testifying, and an observation of Robert Ybarra, Jr.
throughout two (2) days of hearing,” the district court concluded that
‘Ybarra failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he is
of subaverage intellectual functioning and hi

 

significant adaptive
behavior deficits and that the onset of his alleged mental retardation
occurred during the developmental period.

‘The district court concluded that Ybarra failed to present
sufficient evidence to establish significant subaverage intellectual
functioning that manifested during the developmental period. ‘The court
was persuaded in part by the fact that Ybarra was not tested for mental
retardation before age 18, and despite contact with various school officials,

no one suspected that he was mentally retarded. ‘The district court

 

 
observed that Ybarra obtained his adult education diploma and that
military records described him as having “dull normal” or “borderline”
intelligence, which the experts agreed was not in the range of mental
retardation. The district court concluded that, at best, the evidence
showed that Ybarra had below average intelligence prior to age 18.

‘The district court explained that even if it accepted Dr.
Schmidt's testimony that the developmental period extends to age 25,
noting that no jurisdiction has done so, Ybarra nevertheless failed to
produce sufficient evidence of subaverage intellectual functioning that
manifested before age 25, considering documentary evidence from other
paychologists and psychiatrists describing Ybarra as having “borderline,”
normal, or low normal intelligence and 1Q scores of 86 and 70 to 80. And
‘the court rejected Dr. Schmidt's opinion regarding Ybarra’s intellectual
functioning as incredible, noting that with all the testing and observation
of Ybarra from 1979 to 2002, Dr. Schmidt was the first to conclude that
Ybarra was mentally retarded but his report contained a “bold-faced
disclaimer” that Ybarra's IQ score “may underestimate his actual
intelligence functioning” “due to the severe distress that some portions of
the... testing caused” Ybarra, The district court also focused on Dr.
Schmidt's admission that he gave no specific test for malingering, whereas
the State's expert administered a tost to detect malingering that produced
a score that was “off the scale,” indicating that Ybarra was malingering.
The district court also found that Dr. Schmidt's conclusions regarding the
effects of Ybarra’s brain damage and of his poor judgment and limited
ability to solve problems, handle stress, and deal with his hallucinations

did not “withstand scrutiny in the context of Ybarra’s real life actions and
functioning.” The district court further identified in great detail

 

 
additional evidence of malingering and intellectual functioning that fell
outside the range of mental retardation, including: (1) that Ybarra had a
motive to fake performance on mental health tests; (2) reports by other
mental health professionals that Ybarra was malingering or exaggerating
symptoms of mental disorder and displaying psychotic behavior; (3)
reports that Ybarra played cards, backgammon, scrabble, and other games
while at a mental health facility (Lake's Crossing); (4) a report that

 

Ybarra’s hallucinations were not “valid”; (5) suggestions and inferences by
mental health professionals that Ybarra feigned incompetence; (6)
hundreds of prison kites concerning medical issues showing a level of
intelligence beyond a mildly mentally retarded individual;!° and (7)
medical progress notes suggesting that Ybarra feigned mental illness to
remain in the prison mental health unit,

‘The district court also concluded that Ybarra failed to present
sufficient evidence to establish significant adaptive behavior deficits that
manifest during the developmental period. As to Ybarra’s adaptive
behavior before age 18, the district court concluded that minimal evidence
supported any adaptive deficits. ‘The court specifically found incredible
Dr. Schmidt's conclusion that bullying by school peers and poor academic
performance indicated an adaptive deficit, and instead found that Ybarra’s

academic and social problems could also be explained by his alcohol and

 

 

©The district court rejected the defense experts’ suggestions that
Ybarra had assistance in preparing the dozens of prison kites, finding that
“{njothing in the record supports a conclusion that Ybarra has had
assistance in these writings, and the consistency in the topics and style of
writing all support a finding that Ybarra did write his own kites without
assistance.”

 

 
eon ae

drug abuse, as the other defense expert (Dr. M. Young) acknowledged.
And the court pointed out that despite those problems, Ybarra managed to
attend night school to secure his adult education diploma while
maintaining employment. ‘The district court also rebuffed Dr, Schmidt!
opinion that Ybarra had adaptive deficits because he held only menial or
minimum-wage jobs, noting that persons under 18 typically hold menial
jobs and that Ybarra worked as a forklift driver for several years. ‘The
district court also found unpersuasive Dr. Schmidt's reliance on the lack of
evidence that Ybarra lived independently, at least before the age of 18, as
proof of adaptive deficits because most children do not live independently
before the age of 18.

‘The district court was also unpersuaded by evidence Ybarra
introduced concerning adaptive-behavior deficits exhibited between the
ages 18 and 25 years, In particular, the district court found incredible Dr.
Schmidt's conclusion that Ybarra was unable to hold a job, noting that
‘Ybarra was employed for lengthy periods of time at salaries that excoeded
minimum wage at the time, As to Ybarra’s brief military service, the
district court rejected Dr. Schmidt's opinion that this evidenced adaptive-
behavior deficits as Ybarra was discharged for reasons that had nothing to
do with his ability to adjust to the ordinary demands of daily life—he was
discharged from the Marine Corps the first time for homosexuality and the
second time for fraudulent enlistment, and was discharged from the Army
National Guard for a medical condition. Further, the district court found
that the record did not support Dr. Schmidt's conclusion that Ybarra was
unable to live independently, pointing out that Ybarra moved to
California, Oregon, Montana, and Nevada and secured living quarters and
employment, and was married for a brief time.

27

 

 
Based on these findings and conclusions, the district court
determined that Ybarra failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that he suffered from significant subaverage intellectual
functioning and adaptive behavior deficits that manifested during the
developmental period. On appeal, Ybarra challenges specific aspects of
the district court's decision. We address those challenges below.

eet

‘Ybarra’s disagreement with the district court’s determination
that he did not demonstrate subaverage intellectual functioning during
the developmental period is twofold: the district court (1) erroneously
focused on the 1981 IQ test to the exclusion of the IQ results Dr. Schmidt
obtained and (2) erroneously relied on the tests administered by the
State's expert because he used improper testing instruments, scoring, and
administration techniques. We disagree, concluding that the district
court's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and that its
legal conclusions are not erroneous.

19811 test

‘Ybarra contends that the district court focused on the 1981 1@
test, disregarding the IQ test Dr. Schmidt administered, which resulted in
a score (60) that is within the mild range of mental retardation. In this,
Ybarra argues that the district court erroneously concluded that the 1981
1Q test, which yielded a score of 86, was valid and that even when
adjusted to account for the Flynn effect, the adjusted score was not within
the range of mental retardation. According to Ybarra, when the 1981

score is adjusted consistent with Dr. Schmidt's testimony, the result is an

adjusted score that is within the mild range of mental retardation.

 

 
As noted previously, the Flynn effect refers to a body of work
suggesting that scores on a particular 1@ test will drift upward over time
until the test is re-normed. See Pruitt v. State, 903 N.E.2d 809, 910 n.7
(Ind. 2009) (noting that Flynn effect refers “to the gradual escalation of
intelligence test scores over long periods of time”). Whether IQ scores
should be adjusted to account for the Flynn effect is a matter of great
dispute in other jurisdictions, See, e.g., Walker v, True, 399 F.3d 315, 322-
23 (4th Cir, 2005) (remanding for consideration of persuasiveness of Flynn
effect where district court did not consider theory); Green v. Johnson, 515
F.3d 290, 300 n.2 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting that “neither Atkins

 

jor Virginia
law appears to require expressly that [the Flynn effect and standard error
of measurement] be accounted for in determining mental retardation
status’); In.re Mathis, 483 F.3d 395, 398 n.1 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that
Flynn effect has not beon accepted as scientifically valid in Fifth Circuit);
Thomas v, Allen, 614 F, Supp. 24 1257, 1281 (N.D. Ala, 2009) (noting that
even though recognized legal cutoff score for finding of significantly
subaverage intellectual functioning is 1@ of 70 or below, a court should not
look at raw 1Q score as procise measurement and must consider “Flynn
effect” and standard error of measurement in determining whether 1Q
U.S. v, Davis, 611
F. Supp. 2d 472, 488 (D. Md. 2009) (concluding that “Flynn effect”
evidence is relevant and persuasive and will consider Flynn-adjusted
scores in evaluation of intellectual functioning); Wiley v. Epps, 668 F.
‘Supp. 24 848, 894-95 (N.D. Miss, 2009) (finding that regardless of whether
“Flynn effect’ is considered as a precise mathematical formula in this case,

score falls within range containing scores less than 7|

 

it will take into consideration the obsolescence of test norms in weighing

the evidence concerning Petitioner's intellectual functioning” but expressly

 

 
0

 

declining to rule whether Flynn effect must be applied or that failing to
apply theory is unreasonable), affd, 625 F.8d 199 (6th Cir. 2010);
Maldonado v. Thaler, 662 F. Supp. 2d 684, 713 n.27 (S.D. Tex. 2009)
(declining to apply Flynn effect to results of petitioner's 1Q scores), affd,
625 F.9d 229 (6th Cir. 2010); Inve Salazar, 443 F.3d 430, 433 n,1 (6th Cir.
2006) (noting, without deciding whether Flynn effect is valid scientific
theory, that petitioner's readjusted IQ score to account for score inflation
still above cutoff for mental retardation); State v, Dunn, 41 So, 3d
454, 470 n.16 (La, (noting that court hi
effect as scientifically valid), cort, denied, 562 U.S. _. 181 S. Ct. 650
(2010), And the district court indicated that although the AAMR
references the Flynn effect, it makes no recommendation to adjust 1Q

 

 

 

not expressly accepted Flynn

scores because of it,

We need not, however, take sides in the dispute over the Flynn
effect at this time for three reasons. First, the district court did not
disregard Dr. Schmidt's testimony regarding the Flynn effect. Rather, the
court found the testimony incredible considering (a) other sources that
either rejected the theory or did not demand adjustments in IQ scores to
account for it; and (b) other evidence in the record supporting the validity
of the 1981 IQ score, including evaluations from mental health
professionals and Ybarra’s military records reporting that he was of dull-
normal to borderline intelligence. And although the district court was “not
convinced [that] the scientific community is prepared to adjust the scores
according to the Flynn effect,” it nevertheless considered the Flynn effect
and concluded that an adjustment for that effect reduced the 1981 IQ
score to 78, which is outside the range of mental retardation. To the extent
Ybarra challenges the district court's adjustment computation because it

30

 
did not lower the IQ score by 15 points as suggested by Dr. Schmidt, we
are not persuaded that the district court committed reversible error. In
adjusting the IQ score to account for the Flynn effect, the district court
used an adjustment rate of .31 per year “(for 26 years per Dr. Schmidt),"
which reduced Ybarra’s 1@ score from 86 to 78. Many courts have applied
an adjustment rate of approximately .3 per year since the IQ test was re-
normed. See Witt v. State, 938 N.E.2d 1193, 1200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)
Giting The American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities’ User's Guide: Mental Retardation Definition, Classification
and Systems of Supports (10th ed. 2002)); Bowling v. Com., 163 S.W.3d
361, 374 (Ky. 2005) (noting that Flynn effect suggests that “as time p:
and IQ test norms grow older, the mean 1Q score tested by the same norm
will increase by approximately three points per decade”); Dunn, 41 So. 3d
at 462 (citing James Flynn, Tethering the Elephant: Capital Cases, IQ.
and_the Flynn Effect, 12 Psych., Pub. Pol., and L, 170, 176 (2006)). We

conclude that the district court's adjustment calculation was not without

 

foundation and does not indicate, as Ybarra suggests, that “the district
court acted not as an impartial arbiter but as an advocate for the state”
and was ill-informed.

Second, the district court did not rely solely on the 1981 1Q
test to determine that Ybarra had not proven that he suffers from

‘Dr. Schmidt testified that 26 to 27 years had elapsed between
Ybarra’s 1981 IQ test and the introduction of the new IQ test with
changed norms.

 

 
significant subaverage intellectual functioning. As explained above, the
district court also looked to Ybarra's school and other records, his writings,
and evidence that he was malingering. In fact, the district court expressly
observed in its order that “[t]he record as a whole (irrespective of the

various 1Q

 

»st scores) portrays Robert Ybarra as a person who does not

have significant subaver:

 

ze intellectual functioning now or during his
developmental years.”

And third, we need not decide the relevance, if any, of the
Flynn effect and the necessity of adjusting the 1981 IQ score because the
1981 1@ test, as with all of Ybarra’s IQ tests, was administered well after
he turned 18 years of age.!” Therefore, this issue has little value in
evaluating whether Ybarra presented sufficient evidence to establish
‘mental retardation as defined in NRS 174.098(7).

‘Tests administered by the State’s expert

Ybarra also argues that the district court erroneously relied on
the IQ test administered by the State's expert, Dr. T. Young, because that
test was improperly administered and therefore invalid. Specifically,
Ybarra argues that Dr. T. Young used a test that was designed for a quick
assessment rather than “making a legal determination” of mental
retardation and the test was improperly administered because Dr. T.
Young acknowledged that prison guards were present during the test,
contrary to testing protocol. In considering the IQ test administered by

 

This is true even had we accepted Dr. Schmidt’s characterization of
the developmental period as being up to age 25 years.

 

 
Dr. 'T. Young, the district court focused on its relationship to other
evidence indicating that Yarra was malingering. The court considered
the test to be invalid because other evidence, including reports from
mental health evaluations, prison medical records, letters and prison
communications from Ybarra, and other tests that Dr. T. Young
administered to Ybarra, indicated that Ybarra was malingering. It is not
clear how the court's conclusion that the test was invalid for reasons other
than those advanced by Ybarra helps Ybarra, particularly considering that
the IQ score on that test, if it were valid, would have placed Ybarra within
the mild range of mental retardation.!® Therefore, we are unpersuaded
that any consideration the district court gave to the 1Q test administered
by Dr. T. Young was improper or unfounded.

‘Ybarra further argues that Dr. T. Young improperly used and
administered the TOMM to support his conclusion that Ybarra was
malingering and the district court failed to consider evidence showing the
inaccuracy of the TOMM test results, which included evidence that the
‘TOMM should not be used on persons who are mentally retarded and that
the test sometimes gives false positive results, We are not persuaded that
the district court’s consideration of the TOMM score requires reversal.

Clearly, the district court considered the TOMM results in its
decision, observing that the TOMM score indicated malingering, but it is
also clear that the district court considered a wealth of other evidence in

\We note in this respect that Dr. Schmidt pointed to the score on
the 1@ test administered by Dr. 'T. Young as corroborating the accuracy of
the 1Q test that he had administered approximately six years earlier.

 

 
on Be

 

determining that Ybarra was malingering and therefore had not proved
significant subaverage intellectual functioning. Specifically, the district
court found evidentiary support for malingering in the prison kites that
Yarra had written over the years, which “revealfed] an intelligence level
which is clearly not that of a mildly retarded person,” and the medical
progress notes during his incarceration that “portrayled] Ybarra as a man
who knows how to manipulate and fake (or exaggerate) symptoms of
‘mental illness to accomplish his goals.” The district court also observed
who evaluated Ybarra
during his incarceration indicated that their testing of Ybarra revealed
malingering. And the district court illustrated all of those conclusions

that comments by mental health profe:

 

 

with specific references to evidence in the record, ‘The distriet court
further observed Ybarra’s “ability to manipulate health care professionals,
attorneys, play scrabble, backgammon, racquetball and volleyball, and his
ability to type, read medical literature, [and] write coherent meaningful
letters and kite

 

‘Thus, there is evidence other than the TOMM score to
support the district court's finding that Ybarra was malingering.

Moreover, as with the 1981 1Q score, the TOMM score is of
little value in determining whether Ybarra met his burden of proving
significant subaverage intellectual functioning, as the TOMM was
administered well after Ybarra reached 18 years of age.

‘The district court’s factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence and support its conclusion that Ybarra did not show
that he suffered from significant subaverage intellectual functioning that
manifested during the developmental period.

34

 
 

its

Ybarra claims two errors respecting the district court’s ruling
related to adaptive behavior deficits: the district court (1) disregarded
evidence substantiating that element and (2) improperly relied on its own
lay opinions that are contrary to the evidence. We disagree.

Evidence substantiating adaptive behavior deficits

‘The defense experts opined that Ybarra showed adaptive
behavior deficits in several areas of his life based on his victimization at
school; his record of menial, minimum-wage, supervised jobs; the lack of
evidence that he had lived independently; the short duration of his
military service; and other professionals’ observations regarding Ybarra’s
behavior when confronted “with an excess of information or affective
stimuli.” But as the district court found, those considerations did little to
demonstrate adaptive behavior deficits, And rather than disregarding
that testimony, the district court found much of it to be incredible given
other evidence in the record, all of which is carefully delineated in the
district court's thorough written order. We conclude that the district court
wi

 

in the best position to assess the credibility of the experts’ testimony,
and, although Ybarra disagres

 

with the district court's findings related to
adaptive deficits, substantial evidence supports the district court's finding
that Ybarra did not meet his burden of proving this element of mental
retardation.

‘Layopinion

Yarra contends that the district court erroneously relied on

its own lay assumptions about adaptive functioning to the exclusion of

evidence supporting a finding that he exhibited adaptive behavior deficits.

 

 
‘The essence of Ybarra’s argument is that the district court's
preconceptions about what a mentally retarded person should or should
not be able to do in terms of adaptive functioning led the district court to
ignore uncontradicted evidence of particular adaptive deficits, including
hometown; (2) his holding only
‘menial jobs; (3) his problems dealing with others while in school; (4) his

(1) Ybarra’s inability to navigate hi

 

lack of independent living as evidenced by his marriage; (6) his reliance on
another inmate to litigate a civil rights action; and () a school
psychiatrist's (Dr. William Asher) conclusion that at age 15, Ybarra had
reached his potential in school given his intellectual and emotional
capabilities. Ybarra further complains that the district court placed great
emphasis on evidence indicative of malingering in the absence of such
evidence during his childhood or incarceration and ignored evidence
showing that malingering is not inconsistent with a diagnosis of mental
retardation. We disagree with Ybarra’s assessment of the district court's
findings and conclusions in this regard.

‘What the record shows is that the district court was faced with
conflicting evidence concerning Ybarra’s alleged adaptive behavior deficits.
After listening to two days of expert testimony and considering
approximately 3,000 pages of documents, the district court found the
‘testimony of Ybarra’s experts to be incredible considering the record as a
whole. We do not perceive the district court’s conclusions about the
evidence to be improper lay opinion. Rather, the district court considered

the evidence, making reasonable inferences from it, and ultimately
concluded that Ybarra failed to show adaptive behavior deficits
considering his alcohol and drug abuse during his youth, his work record,

 

 
military service, ability to live independently and travel, and written
communications in prison."

As to Ybarra’s suggestion that the district court’s reliance on
evidence of malingering was misplaced, we disagree. The district court's
finding that Ybarra had not met his burden of proving adaptive behavior

deficits during the developmental period was not based on evidence of

 

malingering. And while malingering played a role in the district court's
finding regarding adaptive behavior deficits between the ages of 18 and
25, it considered other evidence in rejecting Ybarra’s claim of adaptive
behavior deficits during that time.” Rather, the bulk of the district
court's discussion of malingering related to the intellectual functioning

clement of mental retardation. ‘The district court expressly acknowledged

 

that malingering does not exclude the possibility of mental retardation but
that the record in this case supported a conclusion that Ybarra was
malingering, and, in addition to other evidence related to intellectual

 

"While the district court acknowledged that a fellow inmate
assisted Ybarra with a federal lawsuit, which could support Dr. Schmidt's
opinion that mentally retarded individuals often seek assistance from
others in preparing written communications, the district court observed
that Ybarra authored hundreds of coherent and concise prison kites and
letters and that “the consistency in the topics and style of writing all
support a finding that Ybarra did write his own kites without assistance.”

“Although the district court considered evidence of adaptive
behavior deficits from Ybarra's childhood to age 18 and age 18 to 26, the
developmental period as we have defined it makes evidence related to the
former primarily relevant.

 

 
functioning, he failed to prove that he had significant subaverage
intellectual functioning. In determining that Ybarra was malingering, the
district court identified specific evidence in the record where mental
health providers who had evaluated Ybarra during his incarceration
reported evidence of malingering. We conclude that any consideration the
district court gave to malingering was supported by substantial evidence.
‘Therefore, we reject Ybarra’s contention that the record lacked evidence of
malingering,

‘The district court's factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence and support its conclusion that Ybarra did not meet
his burden of proving adaptive behavior deficits that manifested during
the developmental period. Because he failed to meet his burden in this
regard, the district court did not err in concluding that he did not prove
this element of mental retardation.

CONCLUSION

Because Ybarra failed to meet his burden of demonstrating

bias based on Judge Dobrescu’s prior professional relationship with the

murder victim's family or the notoriety of his case, his disqualification

 

motion was unsupportable and properly denied, As to Ybarra's mental
retardation claim, we conclude that he failed to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that he suffered from significant subaverage intellectual
functioning and adaptive behavior deficits during the developmental
period, which extends to 18 years of age. Consequently, he failed to show
that he is mentally retarded as provided in NRS 174,098(7), We therefore

 

 
  
      
   

affirm the district court's order denying Ybarra's motion to strike the
death penalty,

Parraguirre

  
  
  

Agee,

Hardesty