Case Title: Goudge v. State

Citation: 128 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 52

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2012-10-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
ere a

 

128 Nev., Advance Opinion 52.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

EVAN EDWARD GOUDGE, No. 59061
Appellant,

Appellan FILED
‘THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent.

 

Appeal from a district court order denying a post-conviction

 

petition for release from lifetime supervision. Eighth Judicial District
Court, Clark County; Linda Marie Bell, Judge.
Reversed and remanded,

 

Graves & Leavitt and John J. Graves, Jr., Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B.
Wolfson, District Attorney, and Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy District
Attorney, Clark County,

for Respondent.

 

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
OPINION:
By the Court, HARDESTY, J.
In this appeal, we address a district court’s discretion when

resolving a petition for release from a special sentence of lifetime

 

supervision. NRS 176.0931(3), the statutory provision governing such
petitions, provides that a district court “shall grant a petition for release

from a special sentence of lifetime supervision” if certain requirements are

12-3378]

 

 
comm Be

 

met. Based on the plain language of this statute, we conclude that the
district court has discretion to determine whether a petitioner has met the
statutory requirements but lacks discretion to deny a petition for release
from lifetime supervision if that court finds the statutory requirements
were met. In this case, the district court denied the petition based on
victim impact testimony and made no findings as to whether appellant
had complied with the statutory requirements. Thus, we reverse the
district court's judgment and remand the case for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2000, the State filed an amended criminal complaint
against appellant Evan Goudge, asserting one count of lewdness with a
child under 14 years of age with respect to one victim and one count of
sexual assault of a minor under 14 years of age with respect to a different
victim. Goudge entered into a guilty plea agreement and pleaded guilty to
a single count of attempted lewdness with a child under 14 years of age.
As part of the plea agreement, Goudge acknowledged that his sentence
would include lifetime supervision.

In 2001, the district court entered a judgment of conviction
against Goudge, sentencing him to a suspended sentence of incarceration
with five years’ probation and requiring him to register as a sex offender.
In 2005, the district court entered an amended judgment of conviction to
include lifetime supervision commencing upon Goudge’s release from
probation or incarceration.

The next year, Goudge was honorably discharged from his
probation.

 
orn ae

 

In 2011, Goudge petitioned for release from lifetime
supervision.! As part of his petition, he argued that he had complied with
all legal requirements imposed on him during probation and supervision,
that he had not been convicted of a crime for more than ten years, and
that it had been determined that he had a low risk of sexual recidivism.
In support of his request to be released from lifetime supervision, Goudge
attached to his petition a letter from a licensed clinical social worker and a
report assessing Goudge's “current level of sexual recidivism risk to the
community.” The report, which was prepared by Angele Morgan, a “[s}tate
approved evaluator for psychosexual evaluations and sex offender specific
treatment,” discussed the criminal charges against Goudge, his past and
present significant relationships, profession, goals, and probation history.
‘The report indicated that Goudge felt remorseful for his actions,

In the report, Morgan also discussed Goudge’s risk
assessment. She opined that Goudge had a “low risk for sexual
recidivism” pursuant to the Sex Offender Needs Assessment Rating
(SONAR), a risk assessment instrument that “measure[s] changes in risk
levels for sexual offenders.” Morgan noted that Goudge had no formal
probation violations, although, in the pre-interview for a polygraph test
that he had taken, he had self-reported two minor probation violations for
alcohol use and viewing pornography. Morgan also stated that Goudge did

'Goudge's petition, which initially also included a request that he be
relieved from registering as a sex offender, was purportedly filed pursuant
to NRS 179D.490, but that statute only applies to the sex offender
registration requirement. Ultimately, the parties and the district court
evaluated Goudge's lifetime supervision petition under NRS 176.0981,
which is the statute at issue in this appeal.

 
on

 

not disclose the self-reported violations or the results of the polygraph test
in the interview with her, but she noted that Goudge’s current supervisor
had informed her that Goudge had passed the polygraph exam. Morgan
concluded that Goudge presented “as a low risk for sexual recidivism
based on his SONAR score and his continued compliance under
supervision over the last 10 years.’ She also concluded that Goudge
appeared to be an appropriate candidate for release from lifetime
supervision, In its opposition to the petition, the State opposed Goudge’s
request for release from lifetime supervision but observed that “it appears
that (Goudge] has met the requirements of NRS 176.0931 inclusive, and is
entitled to release from lifetime supervision under the statute.”
‘The district court held a hearing on the lifetime supervision
ssue, during which the two victims and another member of their family
testified? Both alleged victims expressed concern regarding Goudge’s
potential release from supervision and indicated that they were still
traumatized by his conduct, However, they also acknowledged that they
had no contact with Goudge in the ten years preceding the hearing.

2Before this hearing, the Nevada Division of Parole and Probation
(P&P) informed the district court that Goudge’s “[plsychosexual
{elvaluation was provided by a valid state approved sex offender specific
treatment agency,” and it provided the district court with a risk
assessment from Goudge’s probation officers.

P&P also provided Goudge with documents that were used during
Goudge’s sentencing and that would be referred to at the lifetime
supervision hearing. Further, P&P provided to the court and Goudge a
recent statement from a licensed clinical social worker, recounting a
recent visit she had with one of the victims, concluding that the victim had
“[lifelong] damage,” and requesting that Goudge continue to be subject to
lifetime supervision.

 
os

 

At the conclusion of the hearing, Goudge's counsel argued that
release from lifetime supervision was required because Goudge had
complied with the statutory requirements for release, whereas the State
argued that the statutory framework gave the district court discretion to
determine Goudge’s “future dangerousness and whether or not lifetime
supervision should be continued based upon that.” The State also argued
that, based on the testimony and other factors, there was “a showing of
potential future dangerousness.” The State refuted the validity of
‘Morgan's report, arguing, among other things, that it only acknowledged
‘one victim, even though there wore multiple victims.

After the hearing, the district court entered an order denying
Goudge’s petition “based on the severity of the crime committed.” Without
analyzing the NRS 176.0931 factors, the district court found that it had
Aiscretion to consider witness testimony in evaluating whether appellant
was a proper candidate for release from lifetime supervision. Based on
“the totality of the circumstances,” the district court found that Goudge
was not such a candidate. Specifically, because of “concerns raised by the
victim in the hearing on the matter,” the district court was not satisfied
that Goudge was no longer a threat to society. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Determining the extent of a district court’s discretion to
resolve a petition for release from lifetime supervision requires us to
interpret NRS 176.0931. Statutory interpretation questions are subject to
de novo review. See Webb v, Shull, 128 Nev. __, _, 270 P.3d 1266, 1268
(2012). When a statute's language is clear, this court will apply the plain
language in interpreting the statute. Id.; see also Otak Nevada, LLC v,

 
 

District Court, 127 Nev. __, __, 260 P.8d 408, 411 (2011) (explaining that
when a statutory phrase is clear and unambiguous, this court must give
effect to that clear meaning and will not consider sources beyond the
language of the statute to interpret it)

L

On appeal, Goudge argues that he complied with the statutory
requirements to earn a release from lifetime supervision and, thus, that
the district court was required to grant his petition for release. In
response, the State contends that, because determining punishments is
within the purview of the district court, the court maintained discretion to
decide whether Goudge would be relieved of his punishment. In
furtherance of this argument, the State contends that Morgan’s report was
merely a recommendation, which the court was not obligated to follow in
deciding whether to grant Goudge release from lifetime supervision,

When a person is convicted of a sexual offense, the district
court is required to include a special sentence of lifetime supervision as
part of the defendant's sentence. NRS 176.0931(1). This special sentence
begins after any period of probation, term of imprisonment, or period of
release on parole. NRS 176.0931(2). The person sentenced to lifetime
supervision can petition the district court for release from lifetime
supervision, however, if he or she satisfies three statutory requirements?
NRS 176.0931(3). First, the petitioner must have complied with Nevada's

3A defendant can also petition the State Board of Parole
Commissioners, which takes on the same role as the sentencing court in
such situations. Because that was not the case here, we limit our
discussion of NRS 176.0931(3) to the sentencing court.

 
os

 

statutory requirements governing registration of sex offenders. NRS
176.0931(3Xa); NRS 179D.010-.550. Second, the petitioner must not have
“been convicted of an offense that poses a threat to the safety or well-being
of others for an interval of at least 10 consecutive years after the person's
last conviction or release from incarceration, whichever occurs later.”
NRS 176.0931(3)(b). Third, the petitioner must not be “likely to pose a
threat to the safety of others, as determined by a person profes

 

ally
qualified to conduct psychosexual evaluations, if released from lifetime
supervision.” NRS 176.0931(3Xc). A “Iplerson professionally qualified to
conduct psychosexual evaluations’ means a person who has received
training in conducting psychosexual evaluations,” and is a psychiatrist,
psychologist, social worker, registered psychiatric nurse, marriage and
family therapist, or clinical professional counselor. NRS 176.133(1); NRS
176.0931(5Xb).

According to NRS 176.0931, if the petitioner meets the
requirements set forth in NRS 176.0931(3), the district court “shall grant
{the] petition” for release from lifetime supervision, The use of the word
“shall” in the statute divests the district court of judicial discretion. See
NRS 0.025(1}(4); see also Otak Nevada, 127 Nev. at __, 260 P.3d at 411.
This court has explained that, when used in a statute, the word “shall”
imposes a duty on a party to act and prohibits judicial discretion and,
consequently, mandates the result set forth by the statute. Id.; see also
Johanson _v. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 245, 249-50, 182 P.3d 94, 97 (2008)
(explaining that “shall” is mandatory and does not denote judicial
discretion” (quoting Washoe Med. Ctr, v, Dist. Ct, 122 Nev. 1298, 1303,
148 P.3d 790, 793 (2006)))..

 
Although the State argues that divesting a district court of
discretion in this context renders the role of the judiciary meaningless
with regard to determining whether convicted sex offenders are ready to
be released from lifetime supervision, reading the statute as mandatory
does not encroach upon the judicial function. While a sentencing court has
wide discretion in making sentencing decisions, Denson v. State, 112 Nev.
489, 492, 915 P.2d 284, 286 (1996), the Legislature is empowered to define
crimes and determine punishments, as long as it does so within
constitutional limits, Schmidt v, State, 94 Nev. 665, 668, 584 P.2d 695,
697 (1978). Moreover, “it is within the Legislature's power to completely
remove any judicial discretion to determine a criminal penalty by creating
mandatory sentencing schemes.” Mendoza-Lobos v, State, 125 Nev. 634,
640, 218 P.3d 501, 505 (2009).

Because the Legislature can define punishments, we conclude
that it is within the Logislature’s power to limit punishments as well.
Therefore, when the Legislature imposes mandatory language limiting the
extent of a punishment, the district court must comply with the
Legislature's mandate. Based on the plain language of NRS 176.0931, we
conclude that the Legislature has limited the district court's discretion in
the context of a petition for release from lifetime supervision, such that if
the district court determines that a petitioner has complied with the
statutory requirements, the district court lacks discretion to deny the

 

petition for release from lifetime supervision,

Th
We now consider the district court’s assessment of Goudge’s

petition for release in this case. Whether a petitioner has satisfied the

 

 
mn ae

 

requirements of NRS 176.0931(3) involves factual determinations, which
are given deference on appeal if they are supported by substantial
evidence and are not clearly erroneous. Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682,
686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005). Additionally, a district court's decision as
to whether a person is qualified to conduct a psychosexual evaluation is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Austin v. State, 123 Nev. 1, 8, 151
P.3d 60, 64 (2007) (reviewing the district court's decision as to whether a
clinical social worker was qualified to perform a psychosexual evaluation
for an abuse of discretion).

In reaching its decision with regard to a petition for release
from lifetime supervision, we conclude that the district court must make
factual findings in the record to support its ultimate conclusions with
regard to each of the statutory requirements. See Lioce v, Cohen, 124
Nev. 1, 19-20, 174 P.3d 970, 982 (2008) (providing that a district court
must make specific findings on the record when deciding a motion for a
new trial), Thi
reasons for making a particular decision, this court cannot properly review
that decision. Webb, 128 Nev. at _, 270 P.3d at 1271.

With regard to NRS 176.0931(3Y's requirements for release

so because, when the district court fails to articulate its

 

from lifetime supervision, the State only disputes Goudge’s compliance
with NRS 176.0931(3X¢), and therefore, we focus on that provision. As
noted, NRS 176,0931(3\c) provides that “a person professionally qualified
to conduct psychosexual evaluations” must determine that the petitioner
“is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others .
lifetime supervision.” Thus, in considering this factor, the district court

 

released from

 
ome a

 

must determine whether the person who has performed the psychosexual
evaluation is qualified to conduct such evaluations and, if s0, whether that
person has determined that the petitioner is not likely to pose a threat to
the safety of others if released from supervision. If the court finds that the
statutory expert is qualified and that the expert’s opinion is sufficiently
supported, then the third requirement has been satisfied. As long as the
other two requirements are also satisfied, the petitioner is entitled to
release from lifetime supervision.

Here, the district court did not address Morgan’s qualifications
or make any findings about the sufficiency of Morgan’s opinion that
Goudge was a low risk for sexual recidivism, See Rosky v. State, 121 Nev.
184, 191, 111 P.3d 690, 695 (2005) (explaining, in the context of a motion
to suppress, that “[rleviewing courts should not be required to surmise
what factual findings that the trial court has made” (internal quotation
omitted), Indeed, the district court did not mention Morgan or her report
at all, Rather, the district court's abbreviated discussion of whether
Goudge posed a threat to society focused on the “concerns raised by the
victim in the hearing on the matter.” Victim testimony, however, is not a
factor to be considered under NRS 176.0931(3). Because the district court
failed to make any relevant findings related to the requirement set forth
in NRS 176.0931(3\c), we are unable to review the district court’s factual
findings for clear error and, ultimately, to determine whether Goudge’s

10

 
petition was properly denied. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this
matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this

spinion.
iA. Auk, 4
Hardesty
We concur:
hee . Cd.
Cherry