Case Title: DHW v. John Doe

Citation: 

Docket Number: 47130

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2019-12-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO   
Docket No. 47130 
 
In the Interest of:   
Jane Doe I and Jane Doe II, 
Children Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. 
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STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND WELFARE, 
 
     Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
JOHN DOE (2019-16), 
 
     Respondent-Appellant, 
 
and 
 
GUARDIAN AD LITEM, 
 
     Guardian Ad Litem-Respondent. 
 
 
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Boise, October 2019 Term 
 
Opinion filed: December 23, 2019 
 
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, State of Idaho, Nez 
Perce County.  Victoria Olds, Magistrate Judge.   
The order of the magistrate court is affirmed. 
Knowlton & Miles, PLLC, Lewiston, for appellant.  Paul C. Alexander argued. 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Lewiston, for respondent. Floyd L. E. 
Swanton argued. 
Nolta Law Office, Lewiston, for respondent Guardian Ad Litem.  Paige M. Nolta argued. 
_____________________________ 
BURDICK, Chief Justice. 
John Doe (“Father”) appeals the magistrate court’s termination of his parental rights to 
his minor children Jane Doe I (“B.L.S.”) and Jane Doe II (“A.C.S.”). On December 11, 2018, the 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (“Department”) filed a petition to terminate Father’s 
parental rights to B.L.S. and A.C.S. After a four-day trial, the magistrate court found by clear 
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and convincing evidence that termination was proper on the grounds of neglect and that 
termination was in the best interests of the children. The magistrate court also terminated the 
parental rights of Jane Doe (“Mother”), who filed a separate appeal regarding termination of her 
parental rights to B.L.S., A.C.S., and a third child, X.V.S. (not included in Father’s appeal). On 
June 11, 2019, the magistrate court entered a final order terminating Father’s parental rights. We 
affirm. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This appeal concerns the termination of Father’s parental rights to his two minor children, 
B.L.S. (born March 25, 2008) and A.C.S. (born December 24, 2017). On Christmas Eve, 2017, 
the Department received a referral when A.C.S. was born prematurely at Gritman Medical 
Center in Moscow, Idaho. Mother’s amniotic fluid had ruptured prematurely due to drug use. 
Tests confirmed that A.C.S. was prenatally exposed to methamphetamine. Shortly after her birth, 
A.C.S. was life-flighted to Sacred Heart Medical Center in Spokane, Washington for treatment.  
On-call staff for the Department conducted an initial safety assessment and the 
Department’s Region 2 Child Welfare Supervisor (Region Supervisor) met with Mother at 
Gritman Medical Center on December 27, 2017. Mother explained that she and Father had been 
in an on-and-off relationship for the past 20 years. At the time of the meeting, Mother and Father 
lived together in a camper on his family’s farm near Kendrick, Idaho. Mother disclosed that she 
actively used methamphetamine and had used methamphetamine while pregnant with A.C.S. She 
also explained that she and Father used methamphetamine together in their camper, sometimes 
with their children present. 
Mother described frequent incidents of domestic violence that occurred in the home. For 
instance, when the couple fought they would yell and throw appliances and other objects at each 
other. She also recalled an incident where the windshield of one of their vehicles had been 
shattered when an object was thrown at it during a fight. Mother also described an incident 
where Father “ripped the door off the hinges of the camper” during a “drug-induced altercation” 
and left it on the ground for days. During another incident, Father threatened to harm himself and 
Mother with a firearm while the children were “in the vicinity.” 
Based on the information Mother provided to the Region Supervisor and the rest of its 
investigation, the Department filed a petition to remove the children from the home under the 
Child Protection Act on January 2, 2018. The magistrate court granted the petition the same day 
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it was filed and scheduled a shelter-care hearing for January 4, 2018. At the hearing, Mother 
stipulated to the Department retaining custody of all three children on the basis of an unstable 
home environment. Father was not present, but attended a continued shelter-care hearing on 
January 8, 2018, where he also stipulated to jurisdiction due to an unstable home environment. 
B.L.S. was placed into foster care with one of Father’s cousins and A.C.S. was eventually placed 
into foster care with Father’s sister after a one-month stay with another foster family. 
After an adjudicatory hearing where Father and Mother again stipulated to jurisdiction 
and custody, the Department worked with the parents to develop a case plan. Father agreed to the 
tasks in the case plan and it was adopted by the court on February 23, 2018. 
Father’s case plan contained tasks for him to complete that were designed with the goal 
of establishing “stability in his life so he is able to be a safe parent to his children” by living “a 
sober life, free of abuse and neglect for himself and his children.” The first task in Father’s case 
plan required him to complete a substance abuse assessment (GAIN-I assessment) and comply 
with the recommendations of the treatment provider. Father was supposed to begin the first task 
no later than 15 days from the date the case plan was approved. The second task required Father 
to establish and maintain sobriety, complete random urinalysis tests (UAs) at the request of 
Department staff, and self-report barriers to attending treatment or maintaining sobriety. The 
third task required Father to attend and participate in mental health services. The fourth task 
required Father to demonstrate stability in his housing status by establishing sober housing. 
Father’s fifth task required that he demonstrate the ability to meet his own basic needs as well as 
the needs of his children. This task included the requirement that he demonstrate financial 
stability through continued employment or accessing other resources to ensure his and his 
children’s needs were met. Father’s sixth task required that he participate in all scheduled 
visitation with his children and demonstrate his ability to recognize the needs of his children by 
responding to them in an age-appropriate manner. The seventh task required him to actively 
participate in all reunification services with his children. The final task required Father to address 
the domestic violence and relationship conflict with Mother if they planned to stay together. The 
case plan listed individual counseling, anger-management evaluations, couples counseling, and 
parent counseling as possible services to be used in accomplishing this task. 
The magistrate court held review hearings in May, June, and September of 2018 to 
evaluate the parents’ progress on their case plans, the status of the children in their foster-care 
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placements, and the Department’s reunification efforts. At a review hearing on October 29, 2018, 
the Department requested an early permanency hearing on the grounds that both parents had 
made little progress on their case plans. Agreeing that the parents had made very little progress 
up to that point, the magistrate court moved the permanency hearing up from December 28, 
2018, to November 26, 2018. At the permanency hearing, the magistrate court approved a 
permanency plan that sought termination of parental rights and relative adoption with the foster 
parents as the primary goal for each child.  
The Department subsequently filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both 
Mother and Father on December 11, 2018, approximately 11 months after the children had been 
placed in the Department’s custody. At the time of the trial, Father was renting a house in 
Kendrick and both he and Mother were living there together. The Department’s petition asked 
the magistrate court to terminate Father’s parental rights on the following grounds: 
COUNT I 
The children are neglected as defined in I.C. §§ 16-2005(1)(b), 16-
2002(3)(a), and 16-1602(31)(a) [because they] are without proper 
parental care and control, and/or subsistence, medical and/or other 
care or control necessary for their well-being because of the 
conduct and/or omission of their parents, and/or their neglect or 
refusal to provide [for] them . . . . 
COUNT II 
The children are neglected as defined in I.C. §§ 16-2005(1)(b), 16-
2005(1)(d), 16-2002(3)(a), and 16-602(31)(b) because their parents 
are unable to discharge their responsibilities to and for them and, 
as a result of such inability, the children lack the parental care 
necessary for their health, safety and/or well-being. Such inability 
will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period . . . . 
COUNT III 
The parents have neglected the children as defined in I.C. § 16-
2005(1)(b) because the parents have failed to comply with the 
Court’s orders and/or the case plan in a Child Protective [A]ct 
case. [The children] have been in the custody of the Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare since their removal on January 
2, 2018. 
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After a four-day trial,1 the magistrate court made the following findings by clear and 
convincing evidence: the Department had legal custody of the children for 15 of the most recent 
22 months without reunification occurring; Father failed to comply with the case plan, failed to 
provide proper parental care and control for his children, and is unable to discharge his parental 
responsibilities; and termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of B.L.S. and 
A.C.S.  
The magistrate court entered a final order terminating Father’s parental rights to B.L.S. 
and A.C.S. on June 11, 2019. Father timely appeals. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did Father properly preserve his argument that Idaho Code section 16-1622(2)(g)(i) 
caused the magistrate court to violate his right to due process? 
2. Is the magistrate court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights to B.L.S. and 
A.C.S. supported by substantial, competent evidence? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Under Idaho Code section 16-2005(1), a court may terminate parental rights “if it finds 
that doing so is in the best interests of the child and that at least one of five grounds for 
termination is satisfied.” In re Doe (2014-23), 157 Idaho 920, 923, 342 P.3d 632, 635 (2015). 
The grounds set out by the trial court for terminating parental rights “must be proved by clear 
and convincing evidence.” In re Doe (2013-15), 156 Idaho 103, 105–06, 320 P.3d 1262, 1264–
65 (2014) (citing Matter of Aragon, 120 Idaho 606, 608, 818 P.2d 310, 312 (1991)); 
I.C. § 16-2009. To meet the clear-and-convincing standard, there must be “evidence indicating 
that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain.” Matter of Doe II, 165 Idaho 
199, 202, 443 P.3d 213, 216 (2019) (quoting In re Adoption of Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 
P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006)).  
On appeal, this Court must conduct an independent review of the record, but “must draw 
all reasonable inferences in favor of the magistrate court’s judgment, as the magistrate court has 
the opportunity to observe witnesses’ demeanor, to assess their credibility, to detect prejudice or 
motive and to judge the character of the parties.” In re Doe (2014-23), 157 Idaho at 923, 342 
P.3d at 635 (quoting Doe v. Doe, 150 Idaho 46, 49, 244 P.3d 190, 193 (2010)). When a 
magistrate court has applied the clear and convincing standard, this Court “will not disturb the 
                                                 
1 The first three days of the trial took place on February 28, March 1, and March 5, 2019. Mother gave birth to a 
fourth child on March 21, 2019, and the fourth day of the trial was continued from March 25 to May 2 at the request 
of the parents. 
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magistrate court’s decision to terminate parental rights if there is substantial, competent evidence 
in the record to support the decision.” Doe, 150 Idaho at 49, 244 P.3d at 193. “Substantial, 
competent evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.” Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).  
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Father failed to preserve his argument that Idaho Code section 16-1622(2)(g)(i) caused 
the magistrate court to violate his right to due process. 
Father argues that an apparent difference between 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(i) and Idaho 
Code section 16-1622(2)(g)(i) caused the magistrate court to violate Father’s due-process rights 
by holding a permanency hearing 11 months into the case. However, Father raises this issue for 
the first time on appeal. 
 “Generally, an issue presented on appeal must have been properly framed and preserved 
in the court below.” Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Butcher, 157 Idaho 577, 581, 338 P.3d 
556, 560 (2014) (citations omitted). “The Court will not consider issues that are raised for the 
first time on appeal.” Id. (citing Sadid v. Idaho State Univ., 151 Idaho 932, 941, 265 P.3d 1144, 
1153 (2011)). 
At the October 29, 2018, hearing, Father objected to moving the permanency hearing 
from December 28, to November 26, 2018. Father’s objection was on the grounds that he was 
seeking inpatient treatment at the time of the hearing and that it was too early to decide whether 
to move up the permanency hearing date. Then, at the permanency hearing itself, Father objected 
again, arguing it was too early to change permanency goals from reunification to termination and 
adoption. Father argued there that he was now receiving inpatient treatment for his drug 
addiction, and, in light of his recent progress, the court should refrain from changing the 
permanency goals. 
 Father did not argue at either hearing that moving up the permanency hearing would 
violate his right to due process. He did not mention 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(i), let alone argue that 
it was substantively different than Idaho Code section 16-1622(2)(g)(i). In fact, Father provided 
no legal authority in the record below to support his argument that moving up the permanency 
hearing was improper. Therefore, Father failed to preserve his due process argument for appeal. 
We will not find error in a district court’s decision on an issue it did not have the opportunity to 
address. State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 99, 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019) (“We will not hold that 
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a trial court erred in making a decision on an issue or a party’s position on an issue that it did not 
have the opportunity to address.”).  
Even though Father’s failure to preserve his argument is dispositive in this case, we 
nevertheless address it to provide guidance should similar arguments be made in the future. Had 
Father properly preserved his argument, it would fare no better on the merits. Father argues that 
42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(i) creates an implied policy of “patience and extra time for parents if 
family members, at the state’s option, are caring for the children . . . .” Under Father’s 
interpretation, Idaho Code section 16-1622(2)(g)(i) does not contain the same “policy of 
patience” due to textual differences between the Idaho statute and its federal counterpart. This 
reasoning leads Father to conclude that the magistrate court violated his right to due process 
because it was unable to consider the implied “policy of patience” when deciding whether to 
move up the permanency hearing. However, the statutes impose requirements on the 
Department, not the magistrate court, so Father misunderstands the mechanics of both statutes.  
To illustrate, the federal statute provides in relevant part: 
In the case of a child who has been in foster care under the 
responsibility of the State for 15 of the most recent 22 months . . 
. the State shall file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the 
child’s parents . . . and, concurrently, to identify, recruit, process, 
and approve a qualified family for adoption, unless –  
(i) at the option of the State, the child is being cared for by 
a relative. 
42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(i) (emphasis added).  
The Idaho statute on the other hand, is worded as follows:  
If the child has been in the temporary or legal custody of the 
department for fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) 
months, the department shall file, prior to the last day of the 
fifteenth month, a petition to terminate parental rights, unless the 
court finds that:  
(i) The child is placed permanently with a relative. 
I.C. § 16-1622(2)(g)(i) (emphasis added). 
 
Idaho Code section 16-1622(2)(g) serves to impose a requirement on the Department, not 
any determination made by the magistrate court. Specifically, the statute requires the Department 
to file a petition to terminate parental rights if a child has been in their custody for 15 of the most 
recent 22 months without reunification occurring. Section 16-1622(2)(g)(i) serves as an 
exception to that rule, relieving the Department of the requirement if the child has been placed 
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with a relative. In other words, the exception gives the Department the option  of declining to file 
a petition to terminate parental rights under certain circumstances. It does not have any bearing 
on any decision made by the magistrate court. 
 
Furthermore, any perceived difference between Idaho Code section 16-1622(2)(g)(i) and 
42 U.S.C. 675(5)(E)(i) may present an issue of whether Idaho’s plan for foster care and adoption 
assistance qualifies for federal funding, but it does not present an issue of Father’s right to due 
process. See 42 U.S.C. 670. (explaining that 42 U.S.C. 675(5)(E)(i) is part of a federal statutory 
scheme designed to provide states with federal funding if they implement programs consistent 
with 42 U.S.C. 670 et seq.). Thus, even if Father had preserved his due-process argument for 
appeal, it would have failed on the merits. 
B. The magistrate court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights is supported by 
substantial, competent evidence.  
Termination of parental rights requires a two-part finding that (1) at least one of the five 
statutory bases for termination has been met, and (2) termination is in the best interests of the 
child. In Interest of Doe I, 163 Idaho 274, 277, 411 P.3d 1175, 1178 (2018) (citing In re Doe 
(2014-23), 157 Idaho 920, 923, 342 P.3d 632, 635 (2015)); see also I.C. § 16-2005(1). We 
discuss each part below. 
1. Bases for termination 
Idaho Code section 16-2005(1) lays out the five possible statutory bases for termination 
of parental rights. “Each statutory ground is an independent basis for termination.” State v. Doe, 
144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007) (citation omitted).  
The relevant statutory basis for termination in this case is neglect. See I.C. § 
16-2005(1)(b). “Neglect” can be established in a number of ways, including: by failing to 
comply with the case plan under Idaho Code section 16-2002(3)(b), failing to provide proper 
parental care and control under Idaho Code section 16-1602(31)(a), and inability to discharge 
parental responsibilities under Idaho Code section 16-1602(31)(b). The magistrate court found, 
by clear and convincing evidence, that Father neglected B.L.S. and A.C.S. as defined under all 
three statutes. We review each finding in turn. 
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i. Substantial, competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s finding that 
Father neglected his children as defined by Idaho Code section 16-2002(3)(b). 
The magistrate court found by clear and convincing evidence that Father neglected his 
children under Idaho Code section 16-2002(3)(b). That section provides that a child is 
“neglected” where: 
The parent(s) has failed to comply with the court’s orders or the case plan 
in a child protective act case and: 
(i) The department has had temporary or legal custody of the child 
for fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) months; and 
(ii) Reunification has not been accomplished by the last day of the 
fifteenth month in which the child has been in the temporary or 
legal custody of the department. 
 
I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b). To find neglect under Idaho Code section 16-2002(3)(b), the magistrate 
court must “find that the parent is responsible, whether directly or indirectly, for non-compliance 
with the requirements of a case plan.” Matter of Doe, 164 Idaho 875, 879, 436 P.3d 1224, 1228 
(2019) (citing Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2016-14), 161 Idaho 596, 600, 389 P.3d 
141, 145 (2016)). “This requirement reflects the reality presented by parents who engage in 
behavior that results in non-compliance with no apparent thought or consideration of the effect of 
that behavior upon the case plan.” Id. 
In this case, the magistrate court made its findings of fact in thorough detail. In applying 
Idaho Code section 16-2002(3)(b), the magistrate court first found that “[t]he Department has 
had custody for fifteen of the most recent 22 months, and reunification was not accomplished by 
the last day of the fifteenth month.” 
Here, the Department took custody of the children on January 2, 2018, and the magistrate 
court ordered termination of Father’s parental rights on June 11, 2019. Therefore, the children 
had been in the custody of the Department for 15 of the most recent 22 months without 
reunification occurring. 
 After addressing the timing requirements, the magistrate court found that Father failed to 
comply with the case plan, it explained: 
Father had not completed one Case Plan task by the 
completion of trial, and has not substantially complied with any 
Case Plan task over the life of this case. He did not complete a 
GAIN assessment until July 2018 (very late), and failed to follow 
any of its recommendations. He was discharged from treatment for 
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lack 
of 
attendance. 
Father 
continued 
to 
actively 
use 
methamphetamine, thus causing him to miss supervised visitations 
(especially those with ACS), individual and group counseling, 
random UAs, and office meetings. Father failed to engage in 
treatment until the eleventh hour. 
Father’s continued sobriety is in question. Questions 
remain based on his late entry into outpatient treatment, his 
declining a hair follicle test and his refusal to submit to UAs until 
April 2019. Even if sober, Father has not been sober long enough 
to prove such will be maintained. Father was placed in modified 
outpatient treatment based on his need to work and the distance 
between Kendrick and Lewiston. Father has done nothing to 
address his mental health. He has downplayed and largely ignored 
the domestic violence in the household, and discounts its damaging 
effect on the children. 
Father seems to be in denial about the negative affect that 
his volatile, violent, relationship with Mother had on the 
household. Until Father addresses his own mental health and 
co-dependency issues through individual counseling (not substance 
abuse or couples counseling), the children remain at risk. 
Simply put, Father did not comply with his case plan. 
Father contends that it was impossible for him to fully comply with a number of tasks in 
his case plan. He argues it was impossible to comply with the first task because he was unable to 
enter inpatient treatment due to reasons beyond his control. Specifically, he argues that through 
no fault of his own, the funding window lapsed a day early, preventing him from seeking 
inpatient treatment. The window was supposed to last for 30 days.  
However, Father admits that he failed to obtain a GAIN-I assessment within the 15-day 
period provided for in the case plan. As to seeking treatment, Father waited until the 29th day of 
his 30-day funding window before attempting to enter inpatient treatment. There was testimony 
at trial that Father would have qualified for funding had he called sooner, instead of waiting until 
one day before the funding window closed. 
Father also contends that it was impossible to comply with the third, fifth, and eighth 
tasks in his case plan. He claims that he could not engage in mental health treatment until he 
obtained substance abuse treatment. He argues that the couples counselor told him to seek 
substance abuse treatment before continuing couples counseling. By the time he completed 
inpatient treatment, he further claims, it was too late to engage in mental health treatment or 
address the domestic violence issues between him and Mother because the permanency goal had 
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already been changed. Likewise, he argues that his treatment-related obligations prevented him 
from working 40 hours a week to reach financial stability in time.  
However, while these facts may have made compliance more difficult, they did not 
render compliance impossible. Father could have sought individual mental health counseling at 
any point during the life of his case plan. To the extent that Father argues he did not have enough 
time to work his case plan, he is responsible for his own failure because he waited until the 11th 
month before attending inpatient treatment. Had Father obtained his GAIN-I assessment within 
the original 15-day window and thereafter entered into inpatient treatment, he would have had 
more time to complete the other tasks in his case plan such as seeking mental health treatment, 
obtaining financial stability, and addressing the domestic violence in his relationship with 
Mother. Therefore, it was not impossible for Father to comply with any tasks in the case plan. 
His failure to do so stems largely from his lack of efforts during the first 11 months of the case.  
In sum, substantial, competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s finding that 
Father neglected B.L.S. and A.C.S. by failing to comply with his case plan under Idaho 
Code section 16-2002(3)(b). 
ii. Substantial, competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s finding that 
Father neglected his children as defined by Idaho Code sections 
16-1602(31)(a) and 16-1602(31)(b). 
The magistrate court also found by clear and convincing evidence that Father neglected 
his children under Idaho Code sections 16-1602(31)(a) and 16-1602(31)(b). A “neglected” child 
under Idaho Code section 16-1602(31)(a) is a child “[w]ho is without proper parental care and 
control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary for his well-being because of 
the conduct or omission of his parents, guardian or other custodian or their neglect or refusal to 
provide them . . . .” A “neglected” child under Idaho Code section 16-1602(31)(b) is a child 
“[w]hose parents, guardian or other custodian are unable to discharge their responsibilities to and 
for the child and, as a result of such inability, the child lacks the parental care necessary for his 
health, safety or well-being . . . .” In determining whether a child is neglected under Idaho Code 
section 16-1602(31), the court “may consider both past and current conduct.” In Interest of Doe 
Children, 163 Idaho 367, 373, 413 P.3d 767, 773 (2018) (citation omitted). This Court has 
recognized that evidence of drug problems (which interfere with parental abilities), unstable 
employment or housing, and incarceration all support a finding of neglect. Matter of Doe 
Children, 164 Idaho at 490, 432 P.3d at 39 (citing Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe 
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(2016-32), 161 Idaho 754, 390 P.3d 1281 (2017)). Also, “infliction of perpetual domestic 
violence, even if not directed at the children, supports a finding of parental neglect as it provides 
for an unstable and dangerous home environment.” In re Doe, 143 Idaho 343, 347, 144 P.3d 597, 
601 (2006) (citation omitted). 
In finding that Father neglected B.LS. and A.C.S. under Idaho Code sections 
16-1602(31)(a) and 16-1602(31)(b), the magistrate court pointed to the “extreme volatility and 
violence surrounding the relationship between Mother and Father. . . .” The magistrate court 
explained that the violence occurred “over a substantial period of time,” which, considered 
alongside the “severe substance use in the household” and instability in the home, established a 
sufficient basis for termination.  
The evidence in the record supports the magistrate court’s determination. The 
Department became involved in this case after receiving a referral that A.C.S. was born 
prematurely due to being prenatally exposed to methamphetamine. Mother testified that she and 
Father had used methamphetamine for years. Father’s substance abuse counselor testified that 
Father self-reported methamphetamine use on five separate occasions during the time in which 
he was supposed to be working his case plan. Mother further testified about multiple instances of 
domestic violence between herself and Father that occurred in front of their children. 
Specifically, she testified she and Father fought frequently, sometimes escalating to the point of 
throwing appliances and other objects at each other. She testified that, on one occasion, Father 
wielded a firearm inside of the household, threatening to harm himself or her in front of one their 
children. She also described a “drug induced altercation,” where Father ripped the door of their 
home off its hinges and left it on the ground. Father also had pending criminal charges for felony 
grand theft and several misdemeanors including injury to a child, possession of a controlled 
substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia at the time of trial. Therefore, substantial, 
competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s findings of neglect under Idaho Code section 
16-1602(31)(a) and 16-1602(31)(b). 
2. Best Interests of the Children 
As noted above, even if a statutory basis for termination of parental rights exists, 
termination is only proper if it is also in the best interests of the child. I.C. § 16-2005(1). Here, 
the magistrate court found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental 
13 
 
rights was in the best interests of B.L.S. and A.C.S. Father argues that this finding is not 
supported by substantial, competent evidence. We disagree.  
There is “no set list of factors a court must consider” when conducting a 
best-interests-of-the-child analysis. Doe v. Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015). 
However, there are a number of factors that a trial court may consider, including “stability and 
permanency of the home, unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent to 
the child’s care after the child is placed in protective custody, improvement of [the] child while 
in foster care, the parent’s efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s continuing 
problems with the law.” In re Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014) (citations 
omitted). A trial court may also consider “whether the child’s needs are being met, and the 
child’s need for stability and certainty.” Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 797, 
803, 275 P.3d 23, 29 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing Doe v. Dep’t of Health & Welfare, Human Servs. 
Div., 141 Idaho 511, 516–17, 112 P.3d 799, 804–05 (2005)). 
The magistrate court stated the following in support of its conclusion that termination of 
both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children: 
There is no basis to believe that Mother or Father can provide the 
safe, structured, and nurturing environment necessary to address 
these children’s special needs. These needs arose due to the 
extreme neglect (both in utero and after birth) by both parents in 
the home due to their substance abuse, depression and domestic 
violence in the home in the presence of the children. 
Here, substantial, competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s decision that 
termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interests of B.L.S. and A.C.S. First, the 
magistrate court considered that B.L.S.’s needs were not being met when she was living with her 
parents. B.L.S.’s counselor testified that B.L.S. was forced into the role of peacemaker and 
caretaker while she lived with the family. He further testified about how instability in the home 
while she lived with her parents caused B.L.S. to suffer PTSD, adjustment disorder, anxiety, and 
depression, which led to nightmares and flashbacks. 
The magistrate court then considered that B.L.S. has substantially improved while in 
foster care. B.L.S.’s foster parent, who is also Father’s cousin, testified that she had slowly taken 
over caring for X.V.S. so that B.L.S. could transition back into just being a kid again. She further 
testified that she noticed a positive change in B.L.S.’s behavior after B.L.S. allowed her to take 
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over as the caretaker for X.V.S. The frequency of B.L.S.’s nightmares and flashbacks also 
diminished significantly in foster care. 
As for A.C.S., the magistrate court first considered the circumstances of her birth and 
Father’s lack of a relationship with the child. Mother did not seek prenatal care for A.C.S. and 
she was born testing positive for methamphetamine. When she left the hospital and went into 
foster care, A.C.S. would frequently spit-up and experience diarrhea. A.C.S. also suffered 
developmental delays and had limited use of her arms as a result of prenatal exposure to drugs. 
Father’s case worker testified that Father questioned his paternity of A.C.S. and failed to show 
up for many visits with her. This led the magistrate court to conclude that Father had not 
established a bond with A.C.S. Her foster parent testified, on the other hand, that A.C.S. requires 
extra nurturing and patience, which her family has given to A.C.S. since she was placed in their 
home. 
The magistrate court also found that B.L.S. and A.C.S. need stable, structured, safe, and 
sober environments in order to thrive. B.L.S.’s counselor testified that it was best for B.L.S. to 
remain in an environment where she felt safe and secure. The guardian ad litem also testified that 
B.L.S. and A.C.S. need a stable and peaceful environment. The evidence just discussed, coupled 
with the evidence of Father’s substance abuse, domestic violence issues, and mental health 
issues, provide ample support for the magistrate court’s decision. Therefore, the magistrate 
court’s determination that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interests of 
B.L.S. and A.C.S. is supported by substantial, competent evidence.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Substantial, competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s findings that Father 
neglected his children and that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the children’s best 
interests. Accordingly, we affirm the magistrate court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights 
to B.L.S. and A.C.S. Costs are awarded to the Department. 
 
Justices BEVAN, STEGNER, MOELLER, and TROUT, Pro Tem, CONCUR.