Case Title: Michael G. v. Superior Court of Orange County

Citation: 

Docket Number: S271809

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2023-04-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
MICHAEL G. et al., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY, 
Respondent; 
ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY et al., 
Real Parties in Interest. 
 
S271809 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Three 
G060407 
 
Orange County Superior Court 
19DP1381 
 
 
April 6, 2023 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Groban, 
Jenkins, and Evans concurred. 
 
1 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
S271809 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
Under California’s child dependency law, when a child is 
removed from a parent’s custody, the juvenile court ordinarily 
must order reunification services to help the parent address the 
conditions that led to the child’s removal.  Reasonable 
reunification services must be offered to qualifying parents for 
a minimum period of six or 12 months, depending on the age of 
the child, and generally may be extended for up to a maximum 
total period of 18 months.  This statutory timeline is designed to 
achieve a delicate balance between families’ interests in 
reunifying and children’s interests in avoiding protracted 
uncertainty about who will care for them.   
 
The question in this case is whether a juvenile court is 
automatically required to grant a further extension of services 
if it finds that reasonable services were not provided during the 
12- to 18-month extension period.  Under the governing 
statutes, the answer is no.  Once a child has been out of the 
parent’s custody for 18 months, the law ordinarily requires the 
court to proceed to set a hearing to determine a permanent plan 
for the child’s care.  A parent who has not received reasonable 
services may seek an extension of services beyond 18 months, 
but such extensions are not automatic:  In addition to ensuring 
other statutory conditions are met, the juvenile court must 
consider the child’s interests in deciding whether the extension, 
and consequent delay to the child’s permanent placement, is 
warranted.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.22, subd. (b), 352.) 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
2 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which 
reached the same conclusion. 
I. 
 
This case arises from dependency proceedings involving 
the minor A.G.  At the start of the proceedings, A.G. was 14 
years old and living in the care of her father (Father).1  In a 
dependency petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code 
section 300, the Orange County Social Services Agency (Agency) 
alleged that Father suffered from unresolved mental health 
issues that sometimes manifested in violent behavior.  After 
determining that Father’s delusions and paranoia put A.G. at 
risk of serious harm, the juvenile court assumed jurisdiction 
over A.G. and ordered that she be removed from Father’s 
custody.  The court directed the Agency to provide Father with 
reunification services and mandated a psychological evaluation.   
At the six-month hearing, the Agency reported that Father 
had received his case plan several months earlier but had yet to 
sign the plan or engage in the recommended services, which 
included parenting classes and individual counseling.  Father 
also resisted completing a psychological evaluation.  Father 
attempted to keep in touch with A.G. via periodic phone calls, 
but she was reluctant to communicate until he received mental 
health services.  Given this information, the juvenile court found 
that Father had been offered reasonable services but had made 
minimal progress in mitigating the circumstances that had led 
to the juvenile court’s intervention.  The court concluded that 
 
1  
A.G.’s mother participated in the juvenile court 
proceedings, but she is not involved in the proceedings in this 
court.  We therefore limit our description of the facts to those 
involving Father.  
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
3 
returning A.G. to Father “would create [a] substantial risk of 
detriment to [her] safety, protection, or physical or emotional 
well-being” and continued the case.  (See Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1).) 
At the 12-month hearing, the Agency reported that Father 
had made moderate progress since the last hearing:  He had 
signed the case plan, begun individual counseling, and 
completed parenting classes.  He had also completed his 
psychological evaluation.  The Agency reported that Father was 
eager to increase communication with A.G., and the parties 
established a schedule for regular phone calls.  While the Agency 
believed returning A.G. to Father’s custody still presented a 
substantial risk of detriment to her well-being, it recommended 
continuing the case to the 18-month review because “there [wa]s 
a substantial probability that the child w[ould] be returned to 
the physical custody of her parent” by then.  (See Welf. & Inst. 
Code, § 366.21, subds. (f), (g)(1).)  The court agreed to the 
extension, finding that the Agency had provided reasonable 
services to Father and that Father had now made moderate 
progress in alleviating the causes leading to A.G.’s removal.  
At the 18-month hearing, however, the Agency reported 
that returning A.G. to Father’s custody still presented a 
substantial risk of detriment to her well-being.  The Agency 
noted that Father was not returning calls from his social worker 
and had abruptly moved out of state without advance notice.  
Father had also informed his psychological evaluator that he 
would not consent to continued mental health services because 
they interfered with his religious beliefs.  The Agency 
recommended that the court end reunification efforts and 
schedule a permanency planning hearing under Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 366.26 (section 366.26) so that A.G. 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
4 
could be permanently placed with her older brother and adult 
family friend, with whom she had been staying since she was 
removed from Father’s custody. 
Father contested the Agency’s recommendation.  He 
argued that he had completed all aspects of his case plan, 
including his psychological evaluation, but the social worker 
assigned to his case had not obtained or reviewed his evaluation 
report in a timely fashion, facilitated visitation with A.G., or 
contacted him about further mental health services.  Father 
asked the court to find that the Agency had not offered or 
provided reasonable reunification services during the most 
recent extension period, exercise its discretion to continue the 
case and to extend reunification services, and wait to set a 
section 366.26 hearing where A.G.’s permanent placement 
would be decided.  
The court found that while the Agency had provided 
reasonable services for the first 12 months of reunification, it 
had not provided reasonable services in the period between the 
12- and 18-month hearings.  The court was, in particular, 
troubled by the Agency’s failure to timely consider the report of 
Father’s psychological evaluation, once Father had finally 
consented to participate, and to offer Father appropriate mental 
health support.  But while the court acknowledged that it could 
exercise discretion to continue the case and order more services, 
it declined to do so.  Given Father’s inconsistent visitation with 
A.G. and uneven progress over the past 18 months in addressing 
the causes that led to A.G.’s removal, the court found that 
additional services would neither be in A.G.’s best interests nor 
reasonably likely to lead to reunification.  The court ended 
reunification services and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing. 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
5 
Father filed a writ petition challenging the juvenile court’s 
decision to terminate reunification services.  He argued that he 
was entitled to an extension, given the court’s determination 
that the services provided in the 12- to 18-month extension 
period were not reasonable.  The Court of Appeal denied the 
petition.  (Michael G. v. Superior Court (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 
1133, 1138 (Michael G.).)  The Court of Appeal concluded that 
the juvenile court was not statutorily required to grant an 
extension of services.  On the contrary, Welfare and Institutions 
Code section 366.22, subdivision (a)(3), which governs the 
conduct of the 18-month hearing, instructs that the juvenile 
court must set a permanency planning hearing if the child is not 
returned to the parent’s custody at the 18-month hearing, 
regardless of whether reasonable services were provided in the 
most recent review period.  (Michael G., at p. 1143.)  The Court 
of Appeal further held that the juvenile court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying a discretionary extension of services under 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 352 (section 352), given 
Father’s “lack of consistent and regular contact and visitation,” 
“lack of significant and consistent progress in the prior 18 
months in resolving the problems that led to [A.G.]’s removal,” 
and a “lack of evidence that [he] had demonstrated the capacity 
or the ability to complete the components of the case plan.”  
(Michael G., at p. 1145.)  
As the Court of Appeal observed, some appellate courts 
have expressed uncertainty about the proper course of action 
when a court determines at the 18-month hearing that the 
parent did not receive reasonable reunification services during 
the 12- to 18-month extension period.  (Michael G., supra, 69 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1143; see In re M.F. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1, 
21 [collecting cases]; T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
6 
Cal.App.5th 1229, 1251–1252 (T.J.); see also J.C. v. Superior 
Court (June 28, 2017, G054816) [nonpub. opn.], review den. Aug. 
23, 2017, S243357 (stmt. of Liu, J.).)  We granted review to 
address the issue.2   
II. 
A. 
The purpose of California’s dependency law is “to provide 
maximum safety and protection for children who are currently 
being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being 
neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, 
protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children 
who are at risk of that harm.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300.2, subd. 
(a).)  In its effort to achieve this overarching goal, the law 
balances a number of vital interests:  children’s interests in safe 
and stable homes; parents’ interests in raising their children; 
families’ shared interests in each other’s companionship; and 
the state’s interest in protecting society’s most vulnerable 
 
2  
After the Court of Appeal decided Michael G., supra, 69 
Cal.App.5th 1133, the trial court held a permanency planning 
hearing under section 366.26, at which it set a permanent plan 
of legal guardianship for A.G. and ended dependency 
proceedings.  The trial court did not, however, terminate 
parental rights, finding a “compelling reason for determining 
that termination would be detrimental to the child” under 
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(iv). 
 
According to the Agency, “[n]o appeal has been taken from 
that October 2021 order, and it has thus become final,” 
rendering this case “factually moot.”  We nonetheless exercise 
our “discretion to retain the case and decide it as one presenting 
issues of public importance, capable of repetition, yet tending to 
evade review.”  (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 629, fn. 
3.) 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
7 
members.  (See, e.g., In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 625; 
In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 919; In re Marilyn H. 
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306.)  
Dependency proceedings span up to four stages:  
jurisdiction, disposition, reunification, and permanency.  (See In 
re Matthew C. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 386, 391; In re Ethan C. (2012) 
54 Cal.4th 610, 624–626.)  At the jurisdictional stage, the 
juvenile court determines whether to declare a child a 
dependent of the court because the child is suffering, or at risk 
of suffering, significant harm.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300.)  At 
the dispositional stage, the court decides if the child can be 
returned to, or must be removed from, a parent’s custody.3  
(Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 315, 319.)  During the reunification stage, 
qualifying parents are offered services to address the causes 
that led to the loss of custody.  (Id., § 361.5, subd. (a).)  Finally, 
if the child cannot be safely returned to the parent within a 
statutorily specified timeframe, the juvenile court proceeds to 
the permanency stage, where it either terminates parental 
rights and places the child up for adoption or it selects another 
permanent plan, such as placement with a guardian or in long-
term foster care.  (§ 366.26.)  Throughout the proceedings, the 
juvenile court is instructed to pay careful attention to the well-
being of the child, the efforts of the parent, and the services 
provided by the state to ensure that cases proceed to this final 
stage only when necessary.  (See Cynthia D. v. Superior Court 
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 253 (Cynthia D.).) 
 
3  
Throughout this opinion, we use “parent” as a shorthand 
for “parent or guardian.”  (See In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 
627, fn. 4.)  
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
8 
This case concerns the reunification stage.  When a child 
has been removed from a parent’s custody, the court ordinarily 
must order child welfare services designed to facilitate the 
reunification of the family.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 361.5, 
subd. (a), 362, subds. (c), (d); see, e.g., Tonya M. v. Superior 
Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 843 (Tonya M.).)4  Such services 
may, depending on the case, include evaluations and 
assessments, counseling, parent education, substance abuse 
treatment and testing, and other forms of assistance.  
“ ‘Reunification services,’ ” we have explained, “ ‘implement “the 
law’s strong preference for maintaining the family relationships 
if at all possible.” ’ ”  (In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 
1228.)  This is because “services enable [parents] to demonstrate 
parental fitness and so regain custody of their dependent 
children.”  (Ibid.) 
To balance the interest in family preservation with the 
child’s interest in the prompt resolution of her custody status 
and long-term placement, the dependency law establishes a 
detailed timeline for reunification.  For qualifying parents, the 
minimum length of reunification services depends on the age of 
the child at the time of removal.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5, 
subd. (a)(1).)  Parents of children under three are presumptively 
eligible for at least six months of reunification services.  (See id., 
subd. (a)(1)(B).)  Parents of children three or older are 
presumptively eligible for at least 12 months of services.  (See 
 
4 
A narrow set of exceptions permit (and sometimes require) 
bypassing reunification services for certain parents, depending 
on the circumstances of the case.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5, 
subd. (b); see, e.g., In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063, 
1078.)   
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
9 
id., subd. (a)(1)(A).)5  Reunification services are ordinarily 
provided for a maximum of 18 months after a child has been 
removed from parental custody.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5, 
subd. (a); see Tonya M., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 843.) 
During the reunification stage, the juvenile court must 
hold periodic review hearings to evaluate the status of 
reunification efforts and appropriate next steps.  (Welf. & Inst. 
Code, § 366.21.)  These review hearings ordinarily take place at 
six-month intervals.  At each review hearing, a court evaluates, 
among other things, the adequacy of the reunification services 
offered or provided and the extent of the parent’s progress.  If, 
at the six- or 12-month status review hearing, the court finds 
that there is a substantial probability the child may be returned 
to her parent within six months, or that reasonable services 
were not provided to the parent, the court extends reunification 
services for an additional six months rather than proceed to the 
final stage of dependency proceedings, permanency planning.  
(Id., §§ 361.5, 366.21, subds. (e)(3) [for children under three], 
(g)(1), (2), (4) [for children ages three and over]; Tonya M., supra, 
42 Cal.4th at pp. 843, 845–846 [describing the timeline for 
reunification services and review hearings].)  The court may 
schedule the section 366.26 permanency planning hearing “only 
if” it finds “there is clear and convincing evidence that 
reasonable services have been provided or offered to the parents 
or legal guardians.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (g)(4).)  
In other words, at the six- and 12-month status hearings, the 
 
5 
Parents of a sibling group that includes at least one child 
under three may be subject to a shorter presumptive timeline 
under specified conditions.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5, subd. 
(a)(1)(C).) 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
10 
court must find that the parent has been provided or offered 
reasonable reunification services before the court can proceed to 
set a hearing to decide whether to terminate parental rights and 
select a permanent plan for the child.6 
The statutory provisions governing the 18-month review 
hearing differ, however.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.22, subd. (a).)  
At one time, the provision governing the 18-month review 
hearing, like the provision governing the six- and 12-month 
hearings, had expressly conditioned setting the permanency 
planning hearing on a determination that reasonable services 
had been offered or provided: 
“If the minor is not returned to a parent or guardian at the 
18-month hearing and the court determines that 
reasonable services have been offered or provided to the 
parent or guardian, the court shall develop a permanent 
plan.”  (Stats. 1988, ch. 1075, § 5, p. 3471.)   
But in 1991, the Legislature amended that language, 
deleting the conjunctive “and,” and separating the directive to 
develop a permanent plan from the requirement to determine 
whether reasonable services have been offered or provided: 
 
6  
Although the statute does not define “reasonable services,” 
the Courts of Appeal have generally held that, to support a 
finding that services were reasonable, “the record should show 
that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to 
the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those 
problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents 
during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable 
efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved 
difficult . . . .”  (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414, 
italics omitted.)  The Agency here does not challenge the 
juvenile court’s conclusion that it failed to provide reasonable 
services, and we express no view on the subject. 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
11 
“If the minor is not returned to a parent or guardian at the 
18-month hearing, the court shall develop a permanent 
plan. . . .  The court shall determine whether reasonable 
services have been offered or provided to the parent or 
guardian.”  (Stats. 1991, ch. 820, § 4, p. 3647.) 
 
At the same time, the Legislature amended a different 
provision, section 366.26, which governs the conduct of the 
permanency planning hearing, to prohibit the termination of 
parental rights if, “at each and every hearing at which the court 
was required to consider reasonable efforts or services, the court 
has found that reasonable efforts were not made or that 
reasonable services were not offered or provided.”  (Stats. 1991, 
ch. 820, § 5, p. 3649; see Stats. 2005, ch. 634, § 2, p. 4842 
[shortening “each and every hearing” in this provision to “each 
hearing”; currently codified as § 366.26, subd. (c)(2)(A)].)   
Nearly two decades later, the Legislature again amended 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.22 (section 366.22)  to 
establish a narrow exception allowing certain parents who have 
faced specified barriers to reunification, such as recent 
incarceration, to receive an extension of services at the 
18-month hearing if the court determines, among other things, 
that reasonable services had not been provided and that 
extending services is in the best interests of the child.  (Stats. 
2008, ch. 482, § 3, pp. 3440–3441 [currently codified as § 366.22, 
subd. (b)].) 
B. 
The juvenile court in this case concluded at both the six- 
and 12-month hearings that Father had received reasonable 
reunification services.  The court extended services past the 
applicable statutory minimum period of 12 months after finding 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
12 
a substantial probability that the child would be returned to 
parental custody within the next six months.  (Welf. & Inst. 
Code, § 366.21, subd. (g)(1).)  But at the 18-month review 
hearing, the court found that the reunification services provided 
in the immediately preceding 12- to 18-month extension period 
were not reasonable.  Father now argues that the court was 
therefore required to extend services — and delay permanency 
planning — for another six months.  We conclude that while the 
dependency law does not categorically forbid courts from 
extending services past 18 months, neither does it require them 
to do so in every case in which they find reasonable services were 
not offered in the most recent review period.  Rather, once a 
child has already been out of the parent’s custody for 18 months, 
the law vests the juvenile court with responsibility for 
determining how to proceed after considering the circumstances 
of the case and the best interests of the child. 
 
The provision governing the 18-month review, as 
amended, currently reads:  
“Unless the conditions in subdivision (b) are met and the 
child is not returned to a parent or legal guardian at the 
[18-month] hearing, the court shall order that a hearing 
be held pursuant to Section 366.26 in order to determine 
whether adoption, 
. . . 
tribal 
customary 
adoption, 
guardianship, or continued placement in foster care is the 
most appropriate plan for the child. . . .  The hearing shall 
be held no later than 120 days from the date of the [18-
month] hearing.  The court shall also order termination of 
reunification services to the parent or legal guardian. . . .  
The court shall determine by clear and convincing 
evidence whether reasonable services have been offered or 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
13 
provided to the parent or legal guardian.”  (§ 366.22, subd. 
(a)(3).)   
As both sides acknowledge, this provision imposes no 
express requirement that reunification services be extended 
beyond 18 months if the services offered or provided in the 12- 
to 18-month period were not reasonable.  On the contrary, to 
promote the prompt resolution of the child’s custody status and 
her permanent and stable placement, the law sets a 
presumptive 18-month limit on reunification services.  As we 
have elsewhere explained, the time limit reflects a considered 
legislative choice:  “[I]n order to prevent children from spending 
their lives in the uncertainty of foster care, there must be a 
limitation on the length of time a child has to wait for a parent 
to become adequate.”  (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at 
p. 308.)  If the child has already been out of the parent’s custody 
for 18 months and still cannot be safely returned, the statute 
instructs that the court ordinarily must proceed to schedule a 
permanency planning hearing under section 366.26, at which 
the court decides whether to terminate parental rights and place 
the child for adoption or else select another permanent plan.  
(§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3); see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15 [“ ‘Shall’ is 
mandatory and ‘may’ is permissive”].)   
Section 366.22 does set out an exception to this general 
rule.  As added by the 2008 amendments and since modified by 
subsequent amendments, section 366.22, subdivision (b) 
authorizes a further extension after 18 months for three 
narrowly defined categories of parents who have faced specified 
obstacles to reunification:  (1) a parent making progress “in a 
court-ordered residential substance abuse treatment program”; 
(2) “a parent who was either a minor parent or a nonminor 
dependent parent at the time of the initial hearing”; and (3) “a 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
14 
parent 
recently 
discharged 
from 
incarceration, 
institutionalization, or the custody of the United States 
Department of Homeland Security.”  (§ 366.22, subd. (b), added 
by Stats. 2008, ch. 482, § 3, pp. 3440–3441 and amended by 
Stats. 2010, ch. 559, § 18 [adding requirement that substance 
abuse treatment programs be “court-ordered” and “residential”]; 
Stats. 2012, ch. 845, § 12 [adding exception for United States 
Department of Homeland Security custody]; Stats. 2015, 
ch. 284, § 2 [adding exception for minor or dependent parents]; 
Stats. 2015, ch. 425, § 11.5 [same].)  But even for parents falling 
within this narrow exception, an extension is not automatic.  
The parent must be making “significant and consistent 
progress” either in the substance abuse treatment program, if 
applicable, or in establishing a safe home for the child.  
(§ 366.22, subd. (b).)  Further, the court must decide (1) that 
extending services would be in the “best interests of the child,” 
and (2) either that there is a “substantial probability” that the 
child will be returned to the parent’s custody and safely 
maintained in the home during the extension period, or that 
“reasonable services have not been provided to the parent.”  
(Ibid.)  If these conditions are not met, then the usual timeline 
set forth in section 366.22, subdivision (a)(3) governs. 
The plain text thus answers the question before us.  
Unlike the statutory provisions governing the six- and 12-month 
hearings, the statutory provision governing the 18-month 
hearing contains no provision requiring the court to extend 
services if it concludes that reasonable services have not been 
offered or provided.  (Compare § 366.22 [governing the 18-month 
hearing] with Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subds. (e)(3), (g) 
[governing the six- and 12-month hearings].)  Rather, as a 
general rule, once a child has been out of a parent’s custody for 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
15 
18 months, the court must proceed to set a hearing to select a 
permanent plan for the child.  (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3).)  The 
statute does create an exception for the narrow subset of parents 
defined in section 366.22, subdivision (b).  (Earl L. v. Superior 
Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1504 (Earl L.); San Joaquin 
Human Services Agency v. Superior Court (2014) 227 
Cal.App.4th 215, 224; In re J.E. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 557, 564–
565; N.M. v. Superior Court (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 796, 805–807 
(N.M.); In re D.N. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 741, 761, fn. 18; 
Michael G., supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 1142.)  But even for that 
narrow subset of parents, subdivision (b) instructs that the court 
is not required to grant an automatic extension based on the 
inadequacy of reunification services; the court must also 
consider whether the further extension is in the best interests 
of the child. 
The legislative history reinforces this straightforward 
reading of the text.  As already explained above, in 1991, the 
Legislature amended the dependency law to separate the 
juvenile court’s obligation to determine the reasonableness of 
services from its decision to set a permanency planning hearing.  
The history indicates this was a deliberate choice.  As the 
Legislative Counsel’s Digest explained of the proposed 
amendment:  “This bill would require a court to determine 
whether reasonable services have been offered or provided to the 
parent or guardian but would delete that requirement as a 
precondition for developing a permanent plan.”  (Legis. 
Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 475, 4 Stats. 1991 (1991–1992 Reg. 
Sess.) Summary Dig., p. 352.) 
Notably, at the same time, the Legislature amended 
section 366.26 to prohibit the termination of parental rights at 
the permanency planning hearing if, “at each and every hearing 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
16 
at which the court was required to consider reasonable efforts or 
services, the court has found that . . . reasonable services were 
not offered or provided.”  (Stats. 1991, ch. 820, § 5, p. 3649; see 
Stats. 2005, ch. 634, § 2, p. 4842 [shortening “each and every 
hearing” in this provision to “each hearing”; currently codified 
as § 366.26, subd. (c)(2)(A)].)  Courts have interpreted this 
provision to “preclude[] termination of parental rights 
when . . . the department has failed to offer or provide 
reasonable reunification services to a parent throughout the 
reunification period.”  (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 
Cal.App.4th 996, 1016 (Mark N.), italics added; accord, In re 
T.M. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1172.)  This latter 
amendment reinforces the conclusions to be drawn from the 
first:  The Legislature presumably would not have thought it 
necessary to create this safeguard for the conduct of section 
366.26 permanency planning hearings if a court were always 
required to find reasonable services had been offered or 
provided — including in the extension period preceding the 
18-month review — before the permanency planning hearing 
could even be set. 
In sum, we can safely conclude that the statute means 
what it says.  Though a court at the 18-month review hearing 
must determine whether reasonable services have been offered 
or provided to the parent, an affirmative answer is not a 
statutory prerequisite to setting the permanency planning 
hearing.  (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3); see Mark N., supra, 60 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
17 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1016, fn. 9; N.M., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 807.)7 
Father acknowledges the text of section 366.22, 
subdivision (a)(3) is clear.  But he argues that it is in tension 
with a separate provision also governing the conduct of the 
18-month review hearing, Welfare and Institutions Code section 
361.5 (section 361.5), subdivision (a)(4)(A).  He focuses on the 
following language:   
 
7 
Though the legislative history does not explain why the 
Legislature continued to require juvenile courts to determine 
the reasonableness of services, the parties and amici curiae 
suggest the answer lies primarily in federal law.  Under the 
federal statute that prompted the creation of the modern 
California dependency system, an agency can lose federal 
funding if it fails to make reasonable efforts to reunify the 
family.  (See 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(15)(B), 672(a)(1), (a)(2)(A)(ii); 
45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b) (2023); see also Cynthia D., supra, 5 
Cal.4th at pp. 246–247 [discussing federal origins of state 
scheme]; In re D.C.D. (2014) 629 Pa. 325, 347–348 [105 A.3d 662, 
675–676] [discussing federal funding scheme].)   
Additionally, a court’s determination regarding the 
provision of reasonable services at the 18-month review directly 
affects its authority under other parts of the California 
dependency scheme.  As explained above, under section 366.26, 
subdivision (c)(2)(A), a court at the permanency planning 
hearing may not terminate parental rights and place the child 
for adoption if it finds that reasonable services were never 
provided throughout the reunification period.  (Mark N., supra, 
60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1016.)  And as we will explain at greater 
length in part II.C., post, whether reasonable services were 
offered or provided in the period preceding the 18-month review 
is relevant to the court’s exercise of its discretionary authority 
to continue “any hearing” under section 352, notwithstanding 
otherwise applicable statutory time limits. 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
18 
“The court shall extend the time period [up to 24 
months after the loss of custody] only if it finds that 
it is in the child’s best interest to have the time 
period extended and that there is a substantial 
probability that the child will be returned to the 
physical custody of the child’s parent or guardian 
who is described in subdivision (b) of Section 366.22 
within the extended time period, or that reasonable 
services have not been provided to the parent or 
guardian.”  (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(4)(A), italics added.)   
Focusing on that same language, some Courts of Appeal 
have concluded that section 361.5, subdivision (a)(4)(A) 
authorizes the extension of services at the 18-month hearing in 
any case in which reasonable services have not been provided.  
(In re M.F., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 23; T.J., supra, 21 
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1255–1256.)  Father, drawing on this 
reasoning, contends that section 361.5, subdivision (a)(4)(A)’s 
instructions about extensions conflict with the instructions in 
section 366.22, subdivision (a)(3).  He argues that the conflict 
should be resolved in favor of the more lenient approach.  
 
Father’s argument is based on a misreading of section 
361.5, subdivision (a)(4)(A).  That provision does not, in fact, 
generally authorize an extension of reunification services after 
18 months whenever a court determines that reasonable 
services have not been provided.  A fuller rendition of the 
provision provides important context for the language on which 
Father relies: 
“Notwithstanding 
paragraph 
(3) 
[governing 
extensions after 12 months], court-ordered services 
may be extended up to a maximum time period not 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
19 
to exceed 24 months after the date the child was 
originally removed from physical custody of the 
child’s parent or guardian if it is shown, at the 
hearing held pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 
366.22, that the permanent plan for the child is that 
the child will be returned and safely maintained in 
the home within the extended time period.  The 
court shall extend the time period only if it finds that 
it is in the child’s best interest to have the time 
period extended and that there is a substantial 
probability that the child will be returned to the 
physical custody of the child’s parent or guardian 
who is described in subdivision (b) of Section 366.22 
within the extended time period, or that reasonable 
services have not been provided to the parent or 
guardian.”  (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(4)(A), italics added.)   
As the italicized text makes clear, section 361.5, 
subdivision (a)(4)(A) applies only “at the hearing held pursuant 
to subdivision (b) of Section 366.22” — which, as we have 
already explained, takes place only if the parent fits into one of 
three narrowly defined categories of parents who have faced 
specified obstacles to reunification, such as recent incarceration 
or institutionalization.8  There is, therefore, no conflict between 
 
8  
Although In re M.F. misinterpreted section 361.5, 
subdivision (a)(4)(A) to apply more broadly than it does, the 
issue before that court concerned the denial of reasonable 
services before the 12-month review hearing, not the 18-month 
review.  (In re M.F., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 20.)  T.J., supra, 
21 Cal.App.5th 1229, on which In re M.F. had relied for its 
interpretation of section 361.5, subdivision (a)(4)(A), likewise 
 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
20 
section 361.5, subdivision (a)(4)(A) and section 366.22, 
subdivision (a)(3).  On the contrary, the two provisions reflect 
the same rule:  They both authorize extensions for parents in 
one of three narrow categories, and they both identify the same 
considerations to determine whether a six-month extension is 
warranted, including whether the extension is in the best 
interests of the child.  For Father and other parents who do not 
fall within one of those three categories, section 361.5, 
subdivision (a)(4)(A) does not apply.  
C. 
Although the governing provisions do not offer automatic 
relief to parents who have not received reasonable services in 
the period immediately preceding the 18-month review, neither 
do they leave parents without any possible remedy.  We have 
already discussed the statutory remedy for the three narrow 
 
involved a different issue.  There, the parent was never offered 
or provided reasonable reunification services at any point 
during the first 18 months after the child was first removed from 
parental custody.  (T.J., at pp. 1249–1251, 1256–1257; accord, 
In re M.S. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 568, 595 [citing section 361.5, 
subdivision (a)(4)(A) and T.J., supra, in a case involving the 
remedy available to parents who had never received 
reunification services].)   
Each case deals with an issue different from the one we 
confront here, and largely for reasons explained at greater 
length below (see pt. II.C., post [discussing the court’s extension 
authority under § 352]), their mistaken reading of section 361.5, 
subdivision (a)(4)(A) does not call into question their ultimate 
holdings.  We therefore disapprove In re M.F., supra, 32 
Cal.App.5th 1, T.J. v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th 
1229 and In re M.S., supra, 41 Cal.App.5th 568 only to the 
extent that their reasoning reflects a different understanding of 
that statutory provision than that set forth in this opinion. 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
21 
categories of parents identified in section 366.22, subdivision 
(b).  But in addition to the remedy made available under that 
provision, California courts have also long recognized an 
“ ‘emergency escape valve’ ” under section 352, a general 
provision governing continuances in dependency cases.  (In re 
D.N., supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 762; see § 352.)  As the Courts 
of Appeal have held, this section 352 escape valve is available to 
all parents in exceptional situations in which the court 
determines that extending services and continuing reunification 
efforts beyond 18 months is not contrary to the child’s interests.   
Section 352 provides that courts may “continue any 
hearing” under the dependency law “beyond the time limit 
within which the hearing is otherwise required to be held” 
(§ 352, subd. (a)(1)), provided there is “good cause” (id., subd. 
(a)(2)) and a continuance would not be “contrary to the interest 
of the minor” (id., subd. (a)(1)).  In evaluating the minor’s 
interest, the court “shall give substantial weight to a minor’s 
need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need 
to provide children with stable environments, and the damage 
to a minor of prolonged temporary placements.”  (Ibid.) 
By its terms, the statutory discretion to continue “any 
hearing” under section 352 extends to the section 366.26 
permanency planning hearing.  (§ 352, subd. (a)(1); e.g., In re 
Michael R. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 687, 694 [“section 352 [was 
enacted] so a party could continue the section 366.26 hearing”]; 
Mark 
N., 
supra, 
60 Cal.App.4th 
at 
p. 1016 [“section 
352 . . . authorizes a continuance of any hearing upon a showing 
of good cause”]; In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1779 
[“[section 352] indicates . . . that the court has discretion upon a 
showing of good cause to continue juvenile dependency hearings 
beyond the statutory time limits”].)  In the past, California 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
22 
courts have found good cause in a number of cases where 
“ ‘extraordinary circumstances’ ” justified an extension and 
doing so was consistent with the child’s best interests.  (In re 
D.N., supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 762.)  “Extraordinary 
circumstances exist when ‘inadequate services’ are offered by 
the child welfare agency or ‘an external force over which [the 
parent has] no control’ prevented the parent from completing a 
case plan.”  (Ibid.)  Examples include cases where a parent never 
receives reunification services or a reunification plan over the 
18-month reunification period (see Mark N., at p. 1017; In re 
Dino E., at p. 1778); the parent was hospitalized for most of the 
reunification period but demonstrated an “impeccable record of 
visitation and efforts to comply with the reunification plan” (In 
re Elizabeth R. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1774, 1777–1778; see id. 
at pp. 1798–1799); or the parent sought a continuance to 
complete a program required by the reunification plan that was 
otherwise impossible to finish in time (In re Michael R., at 
p. 695).9 
The harder question is whether the authority to continue 
a permanency planning hearing also includes the authority to 
 
9  
A court’s use of its discretionary authority under section 
352 may be particularly appropriate in cases where a parent has 
never received reasonable services during the reunification 
stage.  Under section 366.22, subdivision (a)(3), a juvenile court 
may proceed to a section 366.26 hearing even if reasonable 
services were never provided, but under section 366.26, 
subdivision (c)(2)(A), this deficiency would prevent the court 
from terminating parental rights and placing the child for 
adoption.  In such cases, California courts have recognized the 
availability of relief under section 352 to extend the review 
period and order an additional six months of reunification 
services.  (See, e.g., Mark N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1016.) 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
23 
extend reunification services in the meantime, notwithstanding 
the usually applicable 18-month time limit on services.  (See 
§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3)(A) [“court-ordered services may be extended 
up to a maximum time period not to exceed 18 months after the 
date the child was originally removed from physical custody of 
the child’s parent or guardian”].)  For decades, every Court of 
Appeal to address this issue has assumed that the answer is yes.  
(See, e.g., Denny H. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 
1501, 1510–1511; Mark N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1016–
1017; In re Dino E., supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1778–1780; In 
re Elizabeth R., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1798–1799; In re 
J.E., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 564.)10  We now confirm that the 
assumption is correct.  The power to continue the permanency 
planning hearing implies a power to continue reunification 
efforts.  Section 352 makes clear that, despite the law’s precise 
timeline for dependency proceedings, the “ ‘ “Legislature never 
intended a strict enforcement” ’ of these statutory limits to 
‘ “override all other concerns[,] including preservation of the 
 
10  
Some Court of Appeal opinions contain language stating 
that services can be extended beyond 18 months only if the 
conditions in section 366.22, subdivision (b) are met.  (E.g., San 
Joaquin Human Services Agency v. Superior Court, supra, 227 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 222–223; N.M., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at 
pp. 805–806.)  But these courts did not address whether a trial 
court has the discretion under section 352 to extend the timeline 
notwithstanding the statutory deadlines.  (See In re J.E., supra, 
3 Cal.App.5th at p. 566 [“The appellate court [in San Joaquin] 
did not consider, however, whether the trial court had discretion 
under section 352 to continue the 18-month review hearing and 
extend reunification services up to 24 months upon a showing of 
good cause”].)  The parties cite no case, and we are aware of 
none, in which a court has held that a juvenile court lacks such 
discretion. 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
24 
family when appropriate.” ’ ”  (In re D.N., supra, 56 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 762, quoting In re M.S., supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at pp. 594–
595.)  Nor did it intend to strip the trial court of any flexibility 
to adjust the default timelines when doing so may be required 
to remedy a critical defect in the process or address other 
unanticipated obstacles to family reunification.  (In re D.N., at 
p. 762; see also In re M.S., at p. 595 [explaining that this 
conclusion also finds support in principles of due process, which 
safeguard parents’ rights “in the care, companionship, and 
custody” of their children].) 
This flexibility applies to the timeline for reunification 
services just as it applies to the timeline for selecting a 
permanent plan.  Under the statutory scheme, the two are 
inextricably intertwined:  The very purpose of the reunification 
stage is to facilitate services that promote the preservation of 
the family before the court must finally determine whether the 
family can, in fact, be preserved.  Considering the terms and 
intended operation of the dependency system, we consider it 
unlikely that the Legislature would have given courts the 
discretion to delay the selection of a permanent plan where, for 
example, reasonable services have not been provided, without 
also giving courts the corresponding discretion to order 
additional reunification services in the meantime.  The Agency 
here agrees that courts have such authority.  The Courts of 
Appeal are uniformly in accord.  And although the Legislature 
has amended the dependency statutes many times since courts 
first recognized the availability of this “ ‘emergency escape 
valve’ ” under section 352 (In re D.N., supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 762), the Legislature has never acted to curtail courts’ 
authority to grant discretionary extensions in exceptional 
situations.  We therefore confirm that while an extension of 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
25 
services is not required under the statute, the juvenile court 
does have the discretion under section 352 to continue a section 
366.26 permanency planning hearing — and in the meantime, 
to extend reunification services past the 18-month mark — in 
extraordinary cases.  Before granting the extension, however, 
the court must determine that the extension, and the resulting 
delay to the child’s permanent placement, is not contrary to the 
child’s interests.11 
In sum, a parent who is denied reasonable services 
between the 12- and 18-month hearings is not statutorily 
entitled to an automatic extension of services at the 18-month 
review.  This means the juvenile court may set the section 
366.26 permanency planning hearing — and terminate services 
and perhaps also parental rights — even if it determines that 
the parent did not receive reasonable reunification services in 
the immediately preceding 12- to 18-month review period.  
Parents falling into one of the statutory categories set out in 
section 366.22, subdivision (b) may seek an extension under that 
section; before granting the extension, the court must be 
satisfied that the pertinent statutory conditions are met, 
including the condition that a further extension be in the best 
interests of the child.  Parents who do not fall under section 
366.22, subdivision (b) may seek a discretionary continuance of 
the section 366.26 hearing and an extension of reunification 
services under section 352.  In determining whether to grant 
 
11  
 We disapprove In re Daniel G. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 
1205, 1212–1214 to the extent that it relied on section 366.22, 
subdivision (a) for a court’s discretionary authority to order an 
extension of services at the 18-month review hearing.  That 
provision, by its terms, contains no generally applicable 
authority for seeking such extensions. 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
26 
relief, the juvenile court must consider whether there are 
exceptional circumstances constituting good cause for the 
continuance and whether the continuance would be contrary to 
the child’s interests. 
D. 
 
Father argues that constitutional concerns should prompt 
us to read the statutory scheme differently.  He contends that 
when a court has already determined that reunification services 
should be extended until the 18-month review because there is 
a substantial probability of reunification — as it did in his 
case — the failure to provide reasonable reunification services 
necessarily undermines the accuracy and fairness of any 
subsequent decision to abandon reunification and proceed to a 
section 366.26 hearing.  According to Father, parents also have 
a constitutional right to their child’s “ ‘companionship, care, 
custody, and management,’ ” and a court must be satisfied that 
reasonable services were provided before continuing to a 
hearing where those rights may be terminated.  Due process 
therefore requires reading into the statutory scheme a provision 
requiring an extension of services when a court finds at the 
18-month review that reasonable services were not provided 
during the immediately preceding review period. 
 
Father’s constitutional avoidance argument is unavailing.  
Although we ordinarily construe statutes to avoid serious 
constitutional problems, we do so only when such a reading is 
fairly possible.  (E.g., People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 
1373 [“the canon [of constitutional avoidance] ‘is qualified by the 
proposition that “avoidance of a difficulty will not be pressed to 
the point of disingenuous evasion” ’ ”].)  Here, Father offers no 
plausible interpretation of the statutory text that would 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
27 
authorize us to craft the sort of automatic extension provision 
he seeks.  We cannot, as Father asks, rewrite the statute 
“merely to eliminate a potential constitutional conflict.”  
(Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 826.) 
More fundamentally, however, Father fails to establish 
that the statute as written raises significant constitutional 
concerns.  In enacting the dependency statutes, the Legislature 
sought to achieve a careful balance between family reunification 
on the one hand and permanency for the child on the other.  (See 
In re Matthew C., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 400; In re Marilyn H., 
supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 308.)  Under this scheme, the balance tips 
towards permanency as the time since removal increases.  (See 
Tonya M., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 845 [“The effect of these 
shifting standards is to make services during [the 6-, 12-, and 
18-month periods] first presumed, then possible, then 
disfavored”]; accord, Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 256 
[describing shifting goals of the dependency scheme at different 
stages of the proceedings].)  Consistent with that general 
approach, the Legislature has chosen to mandate an extension 
of the reunification period if reasonable services have not been 
provided during earlier periods, but decided not to include a 
comparable mandatory extension provision after the child has 
been out of her parent’s custody for a prolonged period of time.  
Instead, by establishing a presumptive maximum reunification 
period of 18 months and giving courts the discretion to extend 
services beyond that point in extraordinary circumstances, the 
statutory 
scheme 
allows 
courts 
to 
make 
case-specific 
determinations about how best to promote the interests of the 
child while protecting against the erroneous deprivation of 
parental rights.   
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
28 
At least when reasonable services have already been 
provided for at least 12 months, as they were here, the failure to 
provide reasonable services during the 12- to 18-month 
extension period does not necessarily or unavoidably undermine 
the accuracy or fairness of the trial court’s eventual decisions 
regarding a permanent plan.  Here, the juvenile court found 
services deficient because of the social worker’s unexplained 
delay 
in 
reviewing 
Father’s 
psychological 
evaluation; 
nevertheless, it concluded that extending services for another 
six months would be fruitless, as Father had not maintained 
consistent and regular contact with A.G., had not made 
significant progress in resolving the issues that led to the loss of 
custody, and had not demonstrated the capacity to complete the 
components of his case plan.12  (Michael G., supra, 69 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1140, fn. 2; cf. In re J.E., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 567 [noting instance where the deficiencies in services 
related to the “ ‘core issue’ ” preventing reunification].)  Where 
the available evidence reliably demonstrates that further 
reunification services would be unlikely to succeed, due process 
does not require that a court delay permanency for the child.  
(See Earl L., supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505 [“It defies 
common sense to continue reunification efforts for a parent who 
has made minimal efforts throughout a case”].)  Where, by 
contrast, deprivation of reasonable services does impede the 
juvenile court’s ability to properly evaluate the prospects for 
family reunification, the trial court has an emergency escape 
valve:  the discretionary authority under section 352 to continue 
 
12  
Father does not challenge any of these findings on appeal, 
nor does he argue that the trial court abused its discretion in 
concluding that a further extension would not be in A.G.’s best 
interests. 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
29 
a permanency planning hearing and extend reunification 
services in exceptional circumstances. 
Father emphasizes that the possibility of a discretionary 
extension of services under section 352 is not equivalent to a 
mandatory, automatic extension.  Under section 352, a party 
must affirmatively request a continuance and demonstrate 
“good cause,” and the trial court must give “substantial weight” 
to the interests of the minor.  (§ 352, subd. (a)(1)–(2).)  
Additionally, whether to grant a continuance is a decision 
reviewed for abuse of discretion, a deferential standard.  (See 
Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1047.)  But 
although Father argues otherwise, we are unpersuaded that 
these are an unreasonable set of conditions to place on the grant 
of further extensions when a child has already spent 18 months 
out of her parent’s custody.  As this court has previously 
explained, “[s]ignificant safeguards have been built into the 
current dependency scheme.”  (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th 
at p. 307; see id. at pp. 307–308.)  As particularly relevant here, 
a parent has the right to the assistance of competent counsel in 
requesting and making the case for an extension of time.  (Welf. 
& Inst. Code, §§ 317, 317.5.)  The failure to provide reasonable 
services can constitute good cause (see, e.g., In re D.N., supra, 
56 Cal.App.5th at p. 762), and indeed, neither the juvenile court 
nor the Court of Appeal suggested that Father could not 
demonstrate good cause here based on the Agency’s failure to 
provide reasonable services between the 12- and 18-month 
hearings (see Michael G., supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 1145).  The 
juvenile court cannot terminate parental rights if a parent never 
receives reasonable services.  (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(2)(A); 
Mark N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1016.)  And should the 
juvenile court ultimately decide to terminate parental rights, 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
30 
the parent also has the right to appeal the order — again, with 
the assistance of counsel — if the parent believes the defects in 
the reunification process undermined the accuracy or fairness of 
the court’s determination.  (§ 366.26, subd. (i)(1).)  In sum, even 
though the statutory scheme may not offer automatic extensions 
beyond the 18-month mark, the statutory scheme provides 
adequate safeguards against the risk of the erroneous 
deprivation of parental rights. 
To be clear:  Nothing in our holding should be read to 
condone the Agency’s failure in this case.  The Agency should 
have provided Father reasonable services at every period in the 
reunification stage.  The possibility of family reunification 
depends on the joint efforts of social services agencies and 
parents.  By not providing reasonable services between the 
12- and 18-month hearings, the Agency failed to uphold its end 
of the bargain. 
But as the Legislature rightly recognized, any possible 
remedy for the deficiencies in the Agency’s services would affect 
more than just the parent’s interest; it would also affect the 
child’s interest in a timely, safe, and stable placement.  The 
Legislature struck a balance between these vital interests by 
setting a presumptive 18-month limit on reunification efforts, 
subject to extension in certain exceptional cases only if, among 
other statutory requirements, a court determines that the 
extension, and resulting delay, is not contrary to the child’s 
interests.  While that scheme is not the only conceivable way to 
balance the interests at stake, it is a constitutionally 
permissible one. 
 
 
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
31 
III. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     KRUGER, J. 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Michael G. v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 69 Cal.App.5th 1133 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S271809 
Date Filed:  April 6, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Orange 
Judge:  Antony C. Ufland 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Martin Schwarz, Public Defender, Seth Bank, Assistant Public 
Defender, and Brian Okamoto, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner. 
 
Los Angeles Dependency Lawyers, Dominika Campbell and Dennis 
Smeal for California Dependency Trial Counsel as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Petitioner. 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen, Aurelio Torre, 
Deborah B. Morse and Jeannie Su, Deputy County Counsel, for Real 
Party in Interest Orange County Social Services Agency. 
 
Jennifer B. Henning; and Samantha Stonework-Hand, Deputy County 
Counsel (Alameda), for California State Association of Counties as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest Orange County 
Social Services Agency. 
 
 
 
Law Office of Harold LaFlamme and Hannah Gardner for Real Party 
in Interest A.G. 
 
Kristin Hallak and Leslie Starr Heimov for Children’s Law Center of 
California, Children’s Legal Services of San Diego and Dependency 
Legal Services as Amici Curiae. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Brian Okamoto 
Deputy Public Defender 
341 City Drive South, Suite 307 
Orange, CA 92868 
(657) 251-6718 
 
Aurelio Torre 
Deputy County Counsel 
400 West Civic Center Drive West, Suite 202 
Santa Ana, CA 92701 
(714) 352-1351 
 
Samantha Stonework-Hand 
Deputy County Counsel 
1221 Oak Street, Suite 450 
Oakland, CA 94612 
(510) 272-6718