Case Title: Dufour v. State

Citation: 483 So. 2d 307

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1985-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
483 So. 2d 307 (1985) Donald William DUFOUR v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 55053. Supreme Court of Mississippi. December 18, 1985. Rehearing Denied February 26, 1986. *308 Christopher Tabb, Brandon, and Bernard S. Grimm, Washington, D.C., for appellant. Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Atty. Gen. by Marvin L. White, Jr., and Amy D. Whitten, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. En Banc. ROY NOBLE LEE, Presiding Justice, for the Court: Petitioner Donald William Dufour was convicted in the Circuit Court for the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, of capital murder, and was sentenced to suffer the death penalty. On April 11, 1983, he filed a motion for new trial raising twenty-one (21) grounds for relief, which motion was subsequently denied. Petitioner appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court, which unanimously affirmed the conviction and sentence on June 6, 1984, and a petition for rehearing was denied July 25, 1984. The facts of the case are stated in Dufour v. State, 453 So. 2d 337 (Miss. 1984). Petitioner filed with the United States Supreme Court a petition for writ of certiorari to the Mississippi Supreme Court, which was denied February 19, 1985. Dufour v. Mississippi, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S. Ct. 1231, 84 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1985). Petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Supreme Court April 1, 1985. On June 17, 1985, the petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment and Sentence, pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated § 99-39-1, et seq. (Supp. 1984). Petitioner seeks relief under the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, but claims that the procedural bar provision of the act did not apply to him since it was not in effect at the time of petitioner's 1983 trial. We hold that petitioner's contention that the waiver and procedural bar provisions of the act do not apply to his case is without merit. Actually, Mississippi Code § 99-39-1, et seq. is largely a codification of the existing law. Leatherwood v. State, 473 So. 2d 964 (Miss. 1985); Tokman v. State, 475 So. 2d 457 (Miss. 1985). Petitioner claims that defense counsel failed to investigate whether there were any potential witnesses who could have presented favorable testimony as to why he deserved to have his life spared. Petitioner's counsel, R.L. Houston, talked with petitioner's brothers in Florida on several occasions, although they state in their affidavits that they cannot recall speaking to the Jackson attorneys. They told Houston that they would not come to Jackson nor did they want to get involved in the trial of their brother's case. They refused to help petitioner at that time. Petitioner claims that defense counsel failed to make application to the trial court for funds to conduct a psychological evaluation of petitioner for the purpose of determining whether mitigating circumstances existed. Further, that he had no expert assistance because counsel did not request it. However, petitioner was examined pursuant to a court order. The professionals were not people selected by the State, but by the trial court. Petitioner has failed to present facts which show there existed mitigating circumstances of a psychological nature, which could have been presented by Dr. Stanley. It is not shown that such an examination would have produced the claimed results, nor has prejudice been shown. Petitioner claims that his counsel was ineffective for not offering a complete instruction *309 on, or objecting to the failure to instruct, on the elements of the underlying felony of robbery. The Court considered the question of whether or not a robbery was in fact committed, and found that the evidence fully supported the finding that robbery had been committed. Dufour v. State, 453 So. 2d at 346. Prosecutorial misconduct will be referred to hereinafter. Petitioner contends that his counsel failed to prevent persistent misconduct of the prosecutor throughtout the trial and the sentencing. Appellee contends that the examples cited by petitioner are within the limits of proper conduct and argument and that there was no prosecutorial misconduct. We think that petitioner has failed to show prejudice under this claim. Petitioner claims that defense counsel failed to adequately cross-examine the State's primary witness, Robert Taylor. The record reflects that the plea bargain agreement between the State and Taylor was introduced into evidence, paragraph 2 of which agreement states: Any jury of average intelligence would have to be aware of benefits to Taylor of the plea agreement. Petitioner claims that defense counsel failed to object in a timely manner to improper evidence of other crimes, viz, that the prosecutor deliberately put before the jury evidence that another person had been murdered. The jury already knew that two people were murdered in the apartment that night and evidence had been introduced over objection to such facts. [Exhibits 4-N (R.335); 4-D (R.336) (R.341-342)]. Petitioner has not shown that he was prejudiced by such alleged failure. On the direct appeal in this case, the appellant assigned as Error # 1 that the trial court erred in refusing the appellant's request to hire an investigator. Although no proposed names, locations or investigative possibilities were pointed out to the lower court, as stated, supra, relatives of the petitioner were unwilling to cooperate or come to Mississippi for the purpose of assisting in the trial. The substance of this contention will be discussed in Section G, infra. Discussion of authorities hereinafter will relate to this contention. The nine (9) claims hereinabove, which relate to the total claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be considered, singly and collectively, after applying the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). The Court has applied the standard in Leatherwood v. State, 473 So. 2d 964 (Miss. 1985); Lambert v. State, 462 So. 2d 308 (Miss. 1984); Ward v. State, 461 So. 2d 724 (Miss. 1984); In Re Hill, 460 So. 2d 792 (Miss. 1984); Stringer v. State, 454 So. 2d 468 (Miss. 1984); and Thames v. State, 454 So. 2d 486 (Miss. 1984). In Leatherwood v. State, 473 So. 2d 964 (Miss. 1985), on Motion to Vacate, or to Set Aside Judgment and Sentence pursuant to the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, Mississippi Code Annotated § 99-39-1, et seq. (Supp. 1985), relying *310 upon Strickland v. Washington, supra, this Court said: 473 So. 2d at 968-69. We are of the opinion that the petitioner has not demonstrated that his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel have met the two-pronged test of Strickland v. Washington, supra, viz, (1) counsel's performance was deficient to the extent that he made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense to the extent that *311 counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive petitioner of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Under Claim B, the petitioner presents eleven (11) designated areas in which he contends that prosecutorial misconduct rendered the trial and sentencing unfair. Motion, pp. 16-26. These claims were not raised either at trial or on direct appeal. Therefore, they are waived, and petitioner cannot now raise those issues. Billiot v. State, On Motion to Vacate or Set Aside Sentence, 478 So. 2d 1043 decided October 30, 1985; Wilcher v. State, 479 So. 2d 710 (Miss. 1985); Leatherwood v. State, 473 So. 2d 964 (Miss. 1985); and Callahan v. State, 426 So. 2d 801 (Miss. 1983), cert. den. 461 U.S. 943, 103 S. Ct. 2118, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1300 (1984). (No claim designated C). Section D of the motion claims error on the failure of the lower court to grant an instruction on lesser-included offenses. Section E contends the lower court did not instruct the jury on elements of the underlying felony of robbery. Section F states the court failed to adequately instruct the jury at sentencing. Section G claims that allowing the jury to consider as an aggravating circumstance, robbery for pecuniary gain, failed to narrow the class of death eligibility. Section H states that allowing the jury to be qualified under the criteria set forth in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1968), prior to the guilt phase, resulted in a prosecution-prone jury. Section H(2d) claims petitioner was denied the assistance of an independent psychological and/or psychiatric expert to assist him in his defense. Requests were not made for the instructions referred to under Sections D and E; no assignments of error were asserted on the instructions during the sentencing phase or presented to the Court on direct appeal under Section F, and the claims are waived and procedurally barred. The Section G question was not raised at trial or on direct appeal and is waived. The Section H issue has been decided by this Court adversely to petitioner's contention, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has done likewise.[1] In Section H(2d), petitioner claims that he was denied the assistance of an independent psychological and/or psychiatric expert to assist him in his defense. Petitioner was examined on court order by motion of the State. No further motion was made for additional examination at trial, no error was assigned in the denial of such assistance on direct appeal. The claim was waived and is procedurally barred. We have considered the claims asserted by the petitioner, singly and collectively, and are of the opinion that they do not justify vacating the judgment and sentence in this case. Therefore, the Motion to Vacate or Set Aside Judgment and Sentence is denied. MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE DENIED. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER, P.J., and HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, and SULLIVAN, JJ., concur. ANDERSON, J., not participating. [1] Petitioner relies on Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir.1985). In Rault v. Louisiana, 772 F.2d 117 (5th Cir.1985), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Grigsby rationale. Note that the United States Supreme Court has granted the State of Arkansas petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Eighth Circuit affirming the district court's decision in Grigsby, supra. See: Lockhart v. McCree, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S. Ct. 59, 88 L. Ed. 2d 48 (1985).