Case Title: KEVIN L. CANTRELL and LORI L. CANTRELL, natural parents and duly appointed representatives) of SHANE A. CANTRELL, a minor, ) V. SWEETWATER COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-05-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
KEVIN L. CANTRELL and LORI L. CANTRELL, natural parents and duly appointed representatives) of SHANE A. CANTRELL, a minor,) V. SWEETWATER COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 22006 WY 57133 P.3d 983Case Number: 05-215Decided: 05/11/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
KEVIN L. 
CANTRELL and LORI L. CANTRELL, natural parents and duly appointed 
representatives) of SHANE A. CANTRELL, a minor,)

 
 
Appellants

(Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
SWEETWATER 
COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSweetwaterCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

Richard 
Honaker of Honaker Law Offices, LC, Rock Springs, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Ford T. 
Bussart and William B. Payne of Bussart, West & Tyler, P.C., Rock Springs, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Bussart.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The parents of a 
now-ten-year-old boy appeal from the district court's dismissal of their 
complaint against a school district alleging injuries suffered by the boy on 
school property.  The district court 
concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction in the matter because the 
claim presented to the school district was not certified to under penalty of 
perjury, as is required by the Wyoming Constitution.

 
 
[¶2]      We 
reverse.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶3]      We will restate 
the dispositive issue as follows:

 
 
            
Does a verified affidavit, signed under oath by the claimants, satisfy 
the requirement of Article 16, § 7 of the Wyoming Constitution that claims 
against governmental entities be "certified to under penalty of 
perjury"?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      When reviewing 
the dismissal of an action under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, we accept the allegations of the complaint as true, we consider 
the facts in the light most advantageous to the appellants, and we affirm 
dismissal only if those facts dictate judgment for the appellee as a matter of 
law.  Wilson v. Town of Alpine, 2005 WY 57, ¶ 4, 111 P.3d 290, 291 (Wyo. 2005).  Applying 
that standard, we will set forth the relevant facts from the appellants' 
complaint:

 
 
[¶5]      The appellants' 
then-seven-year-old son was seriously injured on January 23, 2003, when he fell 
from playground equipment on the appellee's property.  The appellants subsequently were 
appointed by the probate court as co-guardians of their son's person and 
co-conservators of his estate.  On 
January 13, 2005, they presented to the appellee a document entitled "Wyoming 
Governmental Claim," in which they sought compensation for their son's injuries. 
 Both appellants signed the claim 
under oath before a notary public, who documented their signatures as 
follows:

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING                     
)

                                                            
)  ss.

COUNTY OF 
SWEETWATER        )

 
 
            
BEFORE ME, Kaye L. Fabritz, a Notary Public in and for SweetwaterCounty, State of Wyoming, personally appeared Kevin L. Cantrell 
and he, being first duly sworn by me upon his oath, says that the facts alleged 
in the foregoing instrument are true.

 
 
            
WITNESS my hand and official seal.

 
 
 
 
                                                
    /s/ Kaye L. 
Fabritz  

                                                
 Notary 
Public

 
 
A 
separate similar entry was made for Lorie L. Cantrell.1  The district court concluded that this 
procedure did not satisfy the constitutional requirement that claims be 
"certified to under penalty of perjury."

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      The existence of 
subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo.  Dir. of the Office of StateLands & Invs. v. Merbanco, Inc., 
2003 WY 73, ¶ 7, 70 P.3d 241, 246 (Wyo. 2003).  Similarly, the district court's 
interpretation and application of the Wyoming Constitution presents a question 
of law that is also reviewed de 
novo.  RM v. WashakieCountySch. Dist. No. One, 2004 WY 162, ¶ 7, 
102 P.3d 868, 871 (Wyo. 2004).  In 
construing constitutional provisions, we follow the same rules that govern the 
construction of statutes.  
Id.; and Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, ¶ 39, 88 P.3d 1050, 1065 (Wyo. 2004).  We are 
guided primarily by the intent of the drafters, and in determining that intent 
we look first to the plain and unambiguous language used.  Cathcart, 2004 WY 49, ¶ 39, 88 P.3d  at 
1065.  Only if we find a provision 
to be ambiguous do we resort to the rules of construction.  Mgmt. Council of the Wyo. Legislature v. Geringer, 953 P.2d 839, 843 
(Wyo. 
1998).  In such case, we then 
consider the mischief the provision was intended to cure, the historical setting 
surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, and other surrounding 
facts and circumstances.  Merbanco, 2003 WY 73, ¶ 35, 70 P.3d  at 
253.  The initial question of 
whether a constitutional provision is ambiguous is a question of law, reviewed 
de novo.  Lance Oil & Gas Co. v. Wyo. Dep't of 
Revenue, 2004 WY 156, ¶ 19, 101 P.3d 899, 905 (Wyo. 2004); and Wilson v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2003 WY 105, ¶ 6, 75 P.3d 669, 672 (Wyo. 2003).  Ambiguity exists if the provision is 
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.  Lance Oil, 2004 WY 156, ¶ 20, 101 P.3d  
at 905; and Union Pac. Res. Co. v. 
Dolenc, 2004 WY 36, ¶ 13, 86 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Wyo. 
2004).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      Article 16, § 7 
of the Wyoming Constitution currently provides as follows:

 
 
            
No money shall be paid out of the state treasury except upon 
appropriation by law and on warrant drawn by the proper officer, and no bills, 
claims, accounts or demands against the state, or any county or political 
subdivision, shall be audited, allowed or paid until a full itemized statement 
in writing, certified to under penalty of 
perjury, shall be filed with the officer or officers whose duty it may 
be to audit the same.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  We have repeatedly held 
that Article 16, § 7including the language "certified to under penalty of 
perjury"applies to claims presented under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-39-101, et seq. 
(LexisNexis 2005).  See, for example, Lavatai v. State, 2005 
WY 133, ¶ 1, 121 P.3d 121, 121 (Wyo. 2005); Jauregui v. Mem'l Hosp. of Sweetwater 
County, 2005 WY 59, ¶ 7, 111 P.3d 914, 916 (Wyo. 2005); Wilson, 2005 WY 57, ¶ 5, 111 P.3d  at 
291-92 (Wyo. 2005); Wooster v. Carbon 
County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2005 WY 47, ¶ 7, 109 P.3d 893, 896 (Wyo. 2005); Bell v. Schell, 2004 WY 153, ¶ 10, 101 P.3d 465, 468 (Wyo. 2004); Yoak v. Ide, 
2004 WY 32, ¶ 6, 86 P.3d 872, 874 (Wyo. 2004); Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2004 WY 31, ¶ 14, 
86 P.3d 863, 868 (Wyo. 2004) (Beaulieu 
II); and Beaulieu v. Florquist, 
2001 WY 33, ¶ 17, 20 P.3d 521, 527 (Wyo. 2001).  We have repeatedly also held that the 
district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction in the case of a 
governmental claim that does not meet constitutional requirements.  Jauregui, 2005 WY 59, ¶ 16, 111 P.3d  at 
919; Wilson, 2005 WY 57, ¶ 7, 111 P.3d  at 292; and Wooster, 2005 WY 47, 
¶ 22, 109 P.3d  at 900.

 
 
[¶8]      The issue of 
whether the constitution requires that a 
governmental claim be "certified to under penalty of perjury" is not being 
relitigated in the present case.  
Rather, the question now before the Court is whether that 
requirement"certified to under penalty of perjury"can be satisfied by a 
notarized oath in the form set forth above, in which the alleged facts of the 
claim are sworn to be true.  The 
district court answered that question in the negative, concluding that the 
constitutional provision required the very words "under penalty of perjury" to 
be included in the claimants' certification.

 
 
[¶9]      Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7 
was amended in 1970 to read as it currently does.  Before that, it was worded as 
follows:

 
 
No money 
shall be paid out of the state treasury except upon appropriation by law and on 
warrant drawn by the proper officer, and no bills, claims, accounts or demands 
against the state, or any county or political sub-division, shall be audited, 
allowed or paid until a full itemized statement in writing, verified by affidavit, shall be 
filed with the officer or officers whose duty it may be to audit the 
same.

 
 

Wyo. Const. 
art. 16, §7 (Michie 1957) (emphasis added).  At the time of the amendment, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-154 (Michie 1957) defined the crime of "false certificate, affidavit or 
statement" as follows:

 
 
            
Whoever willfully, corruptly and falsely before an officer, authorized to 
administer oaths, under oath or affirmation, voluntarily makes any false 
certificate, affidavit or statement of any nature, for any purpose, in any 
matter where an oath is authorized to be taken, or whoever willfully, corruptly and falsely, 
voluntarily makes any false certificate or statement of any nature under penalty 
of perjury, shall be deemed guilty of perjury, and shall be imprisoned in the 
penitentiary not more than five years.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶10]   The old constitutional requirement 
was to "verify" a claim by "affidavit."  
To "verify" means to "confirm or substantiate in law by oath or 
proof."  Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
of the English Language Unabridged 2543 (2002).  Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary 1556 (7th ed. 1999) defines "verify" in our 
context as "to confirm or substantiate by oath or affidavit, to swear to the 
truth of."  In turn, an "affidavit" 
is "a sworn statement in writing made esp[ecially] under oath or on affirmation 
before an authorized magistrate or officer[.]"  Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary at 35.  And once again, Black's Law Dictionary at 58 contains a 
similar definition:  "A voluntary 
declaration of facts written down and sworn to by the declarant before an 
officer authorized to administer oaths."  
By contrast, to "certify" is "to attest esp[ecially] authoritatively or 
formally[.]"  Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
at 367.  In legal parlance, to "certify" means to 
"authenticate or verify in writing . . . [t]o attest as being true or as meeting 
certain criteria."  Black's Law Dictionary at 220.  On its face, the unambiguous intent of 
the amended provision was to allow claims against governmental entities to be 
supported by unsworn certificates, so long as such were made "under penalty of 
perjury," thus making the declarant subject to a charge of perjury under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-154.  That is what 
the district court concluded in the present case, and to that extent, the 
district court was correct.

 
 
[¶11]   In giving meaning to statutes and 
constitutional provisions, however, we must always endeavor to find the 
reasonable intent of the drafters.  
Constitutional provisions, like legislative enactments, are presumed to 
be logical, reasonable, and just.  
Kunkle v. State ex rel. Wyo. 
Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 49, ¶ 11, 109 P.3d 887, 890 (Wyo. 
2005); Snake River Brewing Co. v. Town of 
Jackson, 2002 WY 11, ¶ 29, 39 P.3d 397, 408 (Wyo. 2002).  The concomitant rule is that such 
provisions should not be read so as to produce absurd results.  Corkhill v. Knowles, 955 P.2d 438, 445 
(Wyo. 1998), 
on subsequent appeal, 2002 WY 119, 51 P.3d 859.  If we apply those rules, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the amended constitutional provision now 
before us was intended to allow the presentment of governmental claims supported 
by something less than an affidavit made under oath.  It is not reasonable to conclude that 
the intent of the amended provision was to forbid the presentment of 
governmental claims supported by an affidavit made under oath, even if that is 
the very language that was replaced by amendment.  If it is acceptable to state that the facts supporting a 
claim are true, it certainly must be acceptable to swear that those facts are 
true.  In reaching this conclusion, 
we are cognizant of the fact that the purpose and effect of the constitutional 
amendment was to remove the words "verified by affidavit" from the provision. We 
are likewise aware of the presumption that an amendment means change was 
intended, and we are to endeavor to give effect to that change.  See Bd. of County Comm'rs for Sublette 
County v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2002 WY 151, ¶ 30, 55 P.3d 714, 722 (Wyo. 
2002).  We are not violating those 
rules here because it just is not reasonable to believe that, while establishing 
a lesser standard for presenting governmental claims, the intention was that 
claims meeting the higher standard would be barred.  We conclude that, if a governmental 
claim is supported only by certificate, that certificate must be accompanied by 
the words "under penalty of perjury," but that a claim may be supported by 
verified affidavit without inclusion of those words.2

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶12]   The requirement of Article 16, § 7 
of the Wyoming Constitution that governmental claims be certified to under 
penalty of perjury was satisfied in 
this case by the verified affidavit 
of the claimant.  While this is 
true, however, the better practice always will be to have the claimant sign the 
claim, "under penalty of perjury," as set out in the constitution.  This is not a situation where something 
"almost as good" was substituted for actual compliance, and we are not, 
therefore, finding substantial compliance sufficient.  Rather, we are stating that compliance 
exceeding the constitutional language sufficed.  
The district court had jurisdiction over the governmental claim in 
this matter.  The other issues 
raised by the parties are rendered moot by this 
conclusion.

 
 
[¶13]   Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent herewith.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
spelling of Mrs. Cantrell's first name appears alternatively in the file as 
Lorie or Lori.

 
 

2For 
interesting discussions of the meaning of the phrase "under penalty of perjury" 
in the context of a constitutional challenge to the false swearing statute, see 
Nimmo v. State, 603 P.2d 386, 388-89 
(Wyo. 1979), and Id. at 395-96 (Rose, J., dissenting).  In particular, Justice Rose concludes 
that "under penalty of perjury" simply "provides the element of an oath" in that 
it provides a "declaration of veracity" to be submitted with the claim.  Id. at 396.