Case Title: State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Halstead

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-07-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Halstead1990 WY 74795 P.2d 760Case Number: 89-130Decided: 07/17/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. 
WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION, 

PETITIONER 
(OBJECTOR-DEFENDANT),

v.

JORDAN JODY HALSTEAD, A 
MINOR DEPENDENT CHILD OF JODY GLENN DODGION, EMPLOYEE, 

RESPONDENT 
(CLAIMANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Sweetwater County, Jere Ryckman, J.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Ron Arnold, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Larry M. Donovan, Asst. Atty. 
Gen., for petitioner.

Michael J. Finn 
of Kaumo, Piaia and Tyler, Rock Springs, for respondent.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J.,* THOMAS, URBIGKIT and 
GOLDEN, JJ., and ROONEY, Retired J.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

URBIGKIT, Justice.

[¶1]      The Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division (State Fund) appeals from a summary judgment1 in favor of Jordon Jody Halstead by 
an administrative hearing examiner who granted benefits to the child who had 
been born out of wedlock after his young father was killed in a work related 
accident. The State Fund contested the benefits granted to Jordon Jody Halstead 
on grounds that paternity had not been established and the statute of 
limitations for filing a claim had expired by the time paternity was 
established.

[¶2]      Because summary 
judgment was not available in this case, we reverse and remand.

FACTS

[¶3]      In 1985, sixteen 
year old Jody Glenn Dodgion became intimately associated with Alice Ione Colley, 
who became pregnant from the relationship.2 Jody suffered a critical head wound 
at his first day of work on September 24, 1985, was declared disabled in early 
November and died December 4, 1985. On May 1, 1986, Jody's son, Jordan Jody 
Halstead, was born and his young mother, Alice Ione Colley, was appointed 
guardian on December 11, 1986. Chronologically thereafter, as a proceeding 
relating to the small child, a petition was filed on February 5, 1987 to 
establish paternity and, on May 9, 1988, a claim for death benefits for the 
dependent child under worker's compensation was filed3 to which the State Fund objected. 
On June 2, 1988, the district court entered an order establishing Jody Glenn 
Dodgion as the father of Jordan Jody Halstead.4

ISSUES

[¶4]      The State Fund 
questions whether:

I. * * * [t]he 
administrative hearing officer err[ed] when she granted summary judgment to the 
appellee.

II. * * * [t]he order 
issued by the administrative hearing officer [was] arbitrary, capricious and an 
abuse of discretion or unsupported by substantial evidence in her findings 
that:

A. The Clerk of District 
Court is a party to a Workers' Compensation case, is an agent of the State, and 
the State is therefore bound by representations made by the Clerk's Office in 
reference to Workers' Compensation claims. 

B. The statute of 
limitations found at § 27-14-503, W.S. 1977, is tolled pending the establishment 
of paternity.

C. Appellee did not have 
standing to claim dependent child benefits until paternity in the deceased 
worker was established.

III. * * * [t]he 
administrative hearing officer err[ed] in ruling that the claim for benefits was 
not barred by § 27-14-503, W.S. 1977, and in not granting summary judgment for 
appellant.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT 
GENERALLY AVAILABLE TO HEARING EXAMINERS

[¶5]      In the first 
issue, the State Fund argued there was a genuine issue of material fact 
rendering summary judgment inappropriate. Then it its third issue, the State 
Fund argued summary judgment was appropriate for it because there was no genuine 
issue of material fact presented. Both issues are resolved by reference to 
Jackson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Comp. Div., 786 P.2d 874 (Wyo. 
1990).5

[¶6]      Summary judgment 
is not available in contested worker's compensation cases under Jackson unless 
it falls within the one exception in which the "agency's sole task is to 
determine questions of law or public policy." Jackson, 786 P.2d  at 879. See 
Walker v. Karpan, 726 P.2d 82 (Wyo. 1986). That exception, in what is 
essentially a dismissal on the pleading similar to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), is not 
available to either party here because the pleadings do not establish either 
litigant to be entitled to relief as a matter of law. Jackson, 786 P.2d 874; 
Herring v. Welltech, Inc., 715 P.2d 553 (Wyo. 1986); Federal Power Commission v. 
Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 84 S. Ct. 1105, 12 L. Ed. 2d 112, reh'g denied 377 U.S. 974, 377 U.S. 984, 84 S. Ct. 1881, 12 L. Ed. 2d 745, 12 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1964); 
Massachusetts Outdoor Advertising Council v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 9 Mass. 
App. 775, 405 N.E.2d 151 (1980).

RESOLUTION OF THE CASE ON 
REMAND

[¶7]      With remand 
required, this court is still faced with three issues: (1) whether the State is 
bound under the doctrine of estoppel by representations allegedly made by the 
clerk of the district court; (2) whether the statute of limitations under W.S. 
27-14-503 bars this claim; and (3) whether respondent was required to file a 
claim for benefits before paternity could be established.

[¶8]      For the reasons 
which follow, we hold the statute of limitations did not bar this claim because 
the statute was tolled until parentage was determined - an indispensable 
requirement for eligibility in this case. This holding negates the need to 
discuss the issue of estoppel.6 

[¶9]      The State Fund's 
issues essentially question the effect of W.S. 27-14-503 and 27-14-505 in this 
case.

[¶10]   Those statutes provide in relevant 
part:7

(a) An award for 
compensation involving an injury which is the result of a single brief 
occurrence rather than occurring over a substantial period of time shall not be 
made unless in addition to the proper and timely filing of the reports of the 
accident, an application or claim for award is filed within one (1) year after 
the date the accident occurred or for injuries not readily apparent, within one 
(1) year after discovery of the injury by the employee. The report of accident 
is not a claim for compensation.

W.S. 
27-14-503.

     If an injured employee 
is mentally incompetent or a minor, or where death results from the injury and 
any of his dependents are mentally incompetent or minors, at the time when 
any right or privilege accrues under this act, no limitation of time 
provided for in this act shall run so long as the mentally incompetent or minor 
has no guardian.

W.S. 27-14-505 
(emphasis added).

[¶11]   We interpret the clause "at the 
time when any right or privilege accrues under this act" in W.S. 27-14-505 to 
mean Jordan Jody Halstead's right accrued on June 2, 1988 when the order of the 
district court determined Jordon Jody Halstead, within his status of 
illegitimacy, was the child of the deceased worker. The district court 
determination then made the child a valid claimant. Consequently, we find that 
the date of determination of parentage was the date the right to claim benefits 
accrued. Under the statute, the right to claim benefits would not have expired 
at the one year period after the guardian had been appointed because the child's 
familial rights to be a claimant came to exist with his determination by a 
decree of parentage that the decedent worker was his father. The good cause 
case, Hawkins v. Safety Casualty Co., 146 Tex. 381, 207 S.W.2d 370 (1948) is 
compatible in result. We consequently hold that the statute of limitation began 
to run on June 2, 1988 with the entry of the parentage decree. 

[¶12]   In the similar context of Bauer v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 695 P.2d 1048 (Wyo. 1985), 
this court determined the limitation period was no bar under estoppel. The same 
reasoning can be applied to an expiration of a right to claim before that right 
to claim comes to exist under the statute. Mominee v. Scherbarth, 28 Ohio St.3d 
270, 503 N.E.2d 717 (1986). A principal responsibility in statutory 
interpretation is to apply the legislative intent demonstrable from the language 
utilized in order to sustain its constitutionality. Our decision that here the 
limitation period for Jordan Jody Halstead started when his paternity had been 
established, finds support from criteria in two different areas of 
constitutional law development.

[¶13]   In first concept, as a principle 
logically rejective of petitioner's argument, are the cases which address 
statutes of limitation limiting the time available for the parentage of the 
minor child to be determined, which issue evokes consideration of discrimination 
between legitimate and illegitimate children violative of equal protection and 
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. Criteria addressing unjustified burdens upon the illegitimate 
child as a constitutional deprivation are addressed in three decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 103 S. Ct. 2199, 76 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 102 S. Ct. 1549, 71 L. Ed. 2d 770 (1982); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 93 S. Ct. 872, 35 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1973). 
Any unduly restrictive time limitations for proof of parentage is 
unconstitutional. Enforcement of a parental support obligation within the 
illegitimacy status is, dependent upon determination of the parentage of the 
father and a time limitation that imposes a burden on the illegitimate child, 
significantly different from the status of the legitimate child which was 
determined to be unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Pickett, 462 U.S.  at 18, 103 S. Ct.  at 2209. The 
Pickett-Mills cases resulted in substantial state court decisions also voiding 
unduly restrictive statutory limitations for illegitimate children to prove a 
parentage relationship with the father based normally on a Fourteenth Amendment 
concept of due process and equal protection. State, Dept. of Health and 
Rehabilitative Services, on Behalf of Gillespie v. West, 378 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 
1979), four year statute of limitation unconstitutional; Dornfeld v. Julian, 104 Ill. 2d 261, 84 Ill.Dec. 471, 472 N.E.2d 431 (1984), two year statute of 
limitation unconstitutional; State ex rel. Rake v. Ohden, 346 N.W.2d 826 (Iowa 
1984), two year statute of limitation unconstitutional; Alexander v. Com. ex 
rel. Mills, 708 S.W.2d 102 (Ky.App. 1986), four year statute of limitation 
unconstitutional; Com. ex rel. Lepard v. Young, 666 S.W.2d 735 (Ky. 1983), three 
year statute of limitation unconstitutional; Frick v. Maldonado, 296 Md. 304, 
462 A.2d 1206 (1983), two year statute of limitation unconstitutional; State 
Dept. of Revenue v. Wilson, 634 P.2d 172 (Mont. 1981); three year statute of 
limitation unconstitutional; State ex rel. Adult and Family Services Div. v. 
Bradley, 295 Or. 216, 666 P.2d 249 (1983), six year statute of limitation 
unconstitutional; Tennessee Dept. of Human Services v. Hinton, 660 S.W.2d 506 
(Tenn. App. 1983), two year statute of limitation unconstitutional. Cf. 
Astemborski v. Susmarski, 499 Pa. 99, 451 A.2d 1012 (1982), cert. granted and 
judgment vacated 462 U.S. 1127, 103 S. Ct. 3105, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1360, remanded 502 
Pa. 409, 466 A.2d 1018 (1983), a six year statute of limitation to bring 
paternity action was determined to be constitutional.

[¶14]   The constitutional principles of 
Pickett and Mills assuring an adequate opportunity for a child to prove 
parentage to secure support cannot be distinguished from the child's right to 
also prove parentage to acquire decedent benefits under worker's compensation. 
We construe the limitation period to be constitutional under due process and 
equal protection by rejecting a discriminatory result against an illegitimate 
child. Heather v. Delta Drilling Co., 533 P.2d 1211 (Wyo. 1975). With proof of 
parentage, the limitation period commences, provided the guardianship 
requirement of the compensation statute is met. W.S. 27-14-503. See likewise 
regarding the rights of the father for due process in any parentage denial, 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972) and In 
re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545 (La. 1990).

[¶15]   There is a second cluster of 
constitutionally disposed cases addressing statute of repose where there is the 
potential for the period for filing a claim to terminate before the incident of 
damage or loss has actually occurred. See, for example, Phillips v. ABC 
Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980); Carr v. Broward County, 541 So. 2d 92 
(Fla. 1989); Shessel v. Stroup, 253 Ga. 56, 316 S.E.2d 155 (1984); Klein v. 
Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 437 N.E.2d 514 (1982); Daugaard v. Baltic Co-op. Bldg. 
Supply Ass'n, 349 N.W.2d 419 (S.D. 1984); Neagle v. Nelson, 685 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 
1985); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984); and Funk v. Wollin Silo 
& Equipment, Inc., 148 Wis.2d 59, 435 N.W.2d 244 (1989). Those cases have a 
logical relevance to this case, where premised on a constitutional right, to be 
able to assert a remedy before a statutory abnegation of the right occurs. 
Shessel, 316 S.E.2d 155; Neagle, 685 S.W.2d 11. Although we have no equivalent 
worker's compensation precedent which has been presented or found in our 
research, these cases appropriately direct attention to the same problem of 
exhaustion of the right to a remedy before the opportunity for its utilization 
may have occurred, Hardy v. VerMeulen, 32 Ohio St.3d 45, 512 N.E.2d 626 (1987), 
cert. denied 484 U.S. 1066, 108 S. Ct. 1029, 98 L. Ed. 2d 993 (1988), and sometimes 
before the incident of damage or loss has occurred, Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 
69, 688 P.2d 961 (1984). Although currently centered in the field of medical 
malpractice,8 Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 
33 Ohio St.3d 54, 514 N.E.2d 709 (1987), the cases involve a broad array of 
statutes where a repose and not a limitation function is introduced as the 
boundary of time for action by the injured party.9 Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 
435 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1983); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288 (1983); Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319 (N.D. 1986); Kennedy 
v. Cumberland Engineering Co., Inc., 471 A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984); Daugaard, 349 N.W.2d 419. Within this class of cases, there is the injured child segment. 
Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986); Coffey v. Bresnahan, 127 
N.H. 687, 506 A.2d 310 (1986); Mominee, 503 N.E.2d 717; Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983). There is also within some of the cases an analytical 
trend that has developed which avoids the determination of textural 
unconstitutionality in the statute of repose situation by denying application of 
the limitation until a reasonable time after the right might have been pursued 
following damage and known knowledge of injury. Kohnke v. St. Paul Fire and 
Marine Ins. Co., 144 Wis.2d 352, 424 N.W.2d 191 (1988). This adaptation applies 
a condition to the statutory language that, despite its terms, if the incident 
of damage or discovery occurs after the expiration of the period provided, a 
reasonable time continues to exist for the claim to be made. Tucker v. Nichols, 
431 So. 2d 1263 (Ala. 1983); Kenyon, 688 P.2d  at 979, Cameron, J., concurring; 
Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41 (Colo. 1984). See also Coffey, 506 A.2d 310.

[¶16]   The obvious philosophical and 
sociological concern that a right which actually exists as the result of the 
misconduct of a person may be lost before anything can be done to pursue 
attainment of a remedy has authored an obvious trend either in construction to 
achieve constitutionality or a determination of unconstitutionality in these 
statute of repose cases. Phillips, 611 P.2d 821; Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 
424 A.2d 825 (1980); Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose: 
Federalism Reigns, 38 Vand.L.Rev. 627, 644 (1985). A perspective of 
constitutionality which initially developed a number of years ago when statutes 
of repose first appeared in the construction and later products liability 
segments of the law has now developed a clear converse trend in recent result. 
See Note, The Unconstitutionality of Medical Malpractice Statutes of Repose. 
Judicial Conscience Versus Legislative Will, 34 Vill.L.Rev. 397 (1989) and most 
recent examples found in the Utah cases, Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989); Stilling v. Skankey, 784 P.2d 144 (Utah 1989); and Sun 
Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, Inc., 782 P.2d 188 
(Utah 1989). In the Utah cases, the court held that the Utah architect's and 
builder's statute of repose establishing a seven year limitation was 
unconstitutional under the open court provision of the Utah Constitution. In 
analysis of the difference between a statute of limitation which provides a 
period of time after a right accrues to pursue action and a statute of repose 
which limits the time for a right of action even though the event may not have 
yet occurred from which the damage accrues, the Utah court in Horton and Sun 
Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. pursues the national precedent. The critical 
concern manifested in the whole periphery of statute of repose cases are those 
circumstances where the time runs out before the opportunity to pursue relief 
occurs, Funk, 435 N.W.2d 244, either because the event of damage has not yet 
developed, Note, Oklahoma's Statute of Repose Limiting the Liability of 
Architects and Engineers for Negligence: A Potential Nightmare, 22 Tulsa L.J. 
85, 105 (1986), or discovery of the injury may not have occurred, Clark v. 
Singer, 250 Ga. 470, 298 S.E.2d 484 (1983); Carson, 424 A.2d 825; Berry By and 
Through Berry v. Beech Aircraft, Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). This problem 
is magnified in those cases where medical malpractice injuries to minor children 
are the subject matter of the litigation. Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 6 
Ohio St.3d 300, 452 N.E.2d 1337 (1983). See also Young v. Haines, 41 Cal. 3d 883, 
226 Cal. Rptr. 547, 718 P.2d 909 (1986). The same thesis is applied here to 
permit filing the claim after parentage has been established.

[¶17]   Another argument advanced by the 
State Fund requires attention. It is argued that parentage was not material and 
the date of its determination lacks adjudicatory significance for the 
proceeding. The concept of that argument is that the fetus was not dependent on 
the father at the date of his injury or death. This position argues that 
dependency alone and not parentage is the criterion. This argument has 
sustainable validity only if we say that a post-humous legitimate child is also 
not necessarily the dependent of the father. Discrimination based on the status 
of the child is constitutionally impermissible. Jordan v. Delta Drilling Co., 
541 P.2d 39 (Wyo. 1975); Gomez, 409 U.S. 535, 93 S. Ct. 872. Since we are 
obviously not willing to hold that a legitimate child may have rights as a child 
only if the mother is living with the father just prior to death, we will also 
hold for the purpose of this case that Jordan Jody Halstead was dependent on 
Jody Glenn Dodgion since the law specifically provides parental obligations 
which have effectuation upon birth. Heather, 533 P.2d 1211.10 Without parental determination, 
the enforceable dependency responsibility does not accrue since the functional 
factor in enforceability is the determination of that parental relationship. In 
this regard, we adopt the analysis on the subject utilized by the hearing 
examiner. As a matter of law, the prospective child is a dependent of the 
putative father if in fact the child, when born, is actually his child. Bowers 
v. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Workmen's Compensation Division, 593 P.2d 182 
(Wyo. 1979); Jordan, 541 P.2d 39; Gomez, 409 U.S. 535, 93 S. Ct. 872.

[¶18]   We are further sustained in this 
decision by the absence of countervailing authority. The State Fund provided 
none and our research has not developed precedent to the contrary. The 
constitutional perspective of the rights of the child, whether illegitimate or 
legitimate, was determined by the United States Supreme Court in its Fourteenth 
Amendment, due process and equal protection cases of Pickett, Mills, and Gomez. 
The foundational case for Wyoming is Heather, cited by the State Fund, where the 
court reversed a death benefit denial rendered on the basis that illegitimacy 
deprived the child of entitlement to benefit under the statute. In Heather, the 
baby was only a few months old when the admitted father was killed. By that 
time, no proceedings to determine parentage or assess support responsibility had 
been initiated and no actual support had been received. The court found a 
presumption of dependency from the fact of parentage. Here, the hearing examiner 
found a status of dependency by the status and relationship between the mother 
and father and the obligation that the father had for the child yet then 
unborn.

[¶19]   We recognize that the State Fund 
takes comfort in Jim's Water Service v. Eayrs, 590 P.2d 1346 (Wyo. 1979) to 
provide support for a rule that actual economic dependency is the test rather 
than parental responsibility. We will confine Jim's Water Service to its facts 
of step-children which present a far different arena of responsibility than 
those for which the parent is impressed by law with support obligations for his 
or her children. We will not apply Jim's Water Service to control the legal 
status of statutory dependency when a child is born after the death of its 
father who had no opportunity to acknowledge or deny that fatherhood. Heather, 
533 P.2d 1211, which was followed by Jim's Water Service, 590 P.2d 1346 and then 
followed by Bowers, 593 P.2d 182, clearly prohibited any discrimination between 
children, dependent on inter-marriage of their parents. The strong support 
stated in Bowers for Heather convinces us that it reflects the current law of 
required equality in availability for support between the natural child and the 
child born out of wedlock.

Heather carefully 
considers the federal decisions, the philosophy for change and concludes that 
such a distinction between children

"* * * establishes a 
discriminatory classification which is justified by no legitimate state interest 
and violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
[C]onstitution of the United States." 533 P.2d  at 1212.[11]

Bowers, 593 P.2d  
at 183-84.

[¶20]   Reversed and remanded.

GOLDEN, 
J., 
concurs in the result only.

ROONEY, Retired J., filed an 
opinion specially concurring in part and dissenting in 
part.

ROONEY, Justice, Retired, 
specially concurring in part and dissenting in part.

[¶21]   I concur with the procedural 
holding of the majority opinion, i.e., that which holds that the hearing 
examiner lacked the power to give a summary judgment. See Jackson v. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 786 P.2d 874 (Wyo. 1990). I find 
additional procedural error. I dissent from that held in the rest of the 
majority opinion - the substantive holding.

PROCEDURE

[¶22]   The improper entry of a summary 
judgment by the hearing examiner is an indication of her misunderstanding of her 
role in this proceeding. She does not act in this matter as a judge - although 
she signs her letter opinion and the "judgment" with the designation of 
"Administrative Law Judge," and her letterhead reflects Gerald F. Murray to be 
"Chief Administrative Law Judge." The rules of practice and procedure adopted by 
the hearing examiner defines the office of hearing examiner as "court" and the 
hearing examiners as "judges." The hearing is defined as "trial." They provide 
for appointment of attorneys and for fixing of the attorney fees by the hearing 
examiners. The misunderstanding by the hearing examiner is a result of a 
potential ambiguity in W.S. 27-14-602. It provides in part1 that "[t]he case shall be 
determined by a hearing examiner following the contested case procedures of the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act." Seemingly, the hearing examiners 
interpret this section to give them authority to resolve matters subject only to 
an appeal to the district court, whereas the contested case procedures of the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (referred to in such section) makes 
provision for a hearing before the agency, i.e., the Workers' Compensation 
Division, and for an officer to preside at the hearing with authority and power 
to "[m]ake recommended decisions when directed to do so by the agency." 
(Emphasis added.) See W.S. 16-3-112.2

[¶23]   If the interpretation given by the 
hearing examiner to such provision in W.S. 27-14-602 is correct, then the 
provision would be unconstitutional in violation of Article 2, Section 1 of the 
Wyoming Constitution. It provides:

"The powers of the 
government of this state are divided into three distinct departments: The 
legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons 
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the 
others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or 
permitted."

[¶24]   Although the prohibition in Article 
2, Section 1 of our constitution is very exact,3 practical application of it, 
together with the check and balance scheme of the Constitution, results in some 
overlapping of the powers of the three branches. But the overlap should be 
confined to that which is implicit in the check and balance scheme or which is 
an obvious practical adjunct to the principal power and authority of the 
respective branch or agency.

     "The courts have 
perceived the necessity of avoiding a narrow construction of a state 
constitutional provision for the division of the powers of the government into 
three distinct departments, for it is impractical to view the provision from the 
standpoint of a doctrinaire. Thus, the modern view of separation of powers 
rejects the metaphysical abstractions and reverts instead to a more pragmatic, 
flexible, functional approach, giving recognition to the fact that there may be 
a certain degree of blending or admixture of the three powers of government. 
Moreover, the doctrine of separation of powers has never been strictly or 
rigidly applied, and indeed could not be, to all the ramifications of state or 
national governments; government would prove abortive if it were attempted to 
follow the policy of separation to the letter.

     "The doctrine does not 
require such a rigid classification of all the incidental activities of 
government as to make it improper for one branch of the government to use any 
technique or method of procedure already adopted by another branch of the 
government. At the same time, it is the duty of the courts to attempt to 
enforce the true meaning, intent, and purpose of the constitutional provision 
declaring the distribution of governmental powers, notwithstanding there is 
necessarily some mingling and overlapping of powers between the three 
departments of government which cannot be avoided rather than to encourage 
departure therefrom.

* * * * * *

"The correct principle 
deductible from the better-reasoned cases dealing with the separation of powers 
seems to be that even the primary function of any of the three departments may 
be exercised by any other governmental department or agency so long as (1) 
the exercise thereof is incidental or subsidiary to a function or power 
otherwise properly exercised by such department or agency, and (2) the 
department to which the function so exercised is primary retains some sort of 
ultimate control over its exercise, as by court review in the case of the 
exercise of a power judicial in nature." (Emphasis added and footnotes 
omitted.)

16 Am.Jur.2d, 
Constitutional Law, § 299 (1979), and see the cases cited therein.

[¶25]   As an example of the overlap, the 
ability of an executive agency to make rules and regulations (primarily a 
legislative function) is confined to making rules and regulations pertaining 
to the business or function of such agency. Again, the ability of an 
executive agency to determine legal rights, duties or privileges after a hearing 
(primarily a judicial function) is confined to instances pertaining to the 
business or function of such agency - and then subject to judicial 
review.

[¶26]   In this instance, if the hearing 
examiner is part of the Workers' Compensation Division, as the agency,4 she is acting incidental as 
subsidiary to the function of that agency (making her recommendations to the 
agency for agency action as required by W.S. 16-3-112), and the separation of 
powers provision of the constitution is not violated. However, if the office of 
hearing examiner is an "agency" within itself, then, since its only function is 
judicial, and with the hearing examiner's action not being incidental or 
subsidiary to any other function of the agency, i.e., the hearing examiner, a 
violation of the separation of powers provision of the constitution would 
result.

[¶27]   Of course, the legislature could 
establish separate subordinate courts with jurisdiction over contested workers' 
compensation cases. Article 5, Section 1 of the constitution 
provides:

     "The judicial power of 
the state shall be vested in the senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, in a 
supreme court, district courts, and such subordinate courts as the 
legislature may, by general law, establish and ordain from time to time." 
(Emphasis added.)

[¶28]   Such courts would be part of the 
judiciary, subordinate to the district courts and the Supreme Court, judges 
being selected and procedures being followed as required for the judiciary. They 
would not be a part of the executive branch as may be contemplated by W.S. 
27-14-602(b).5 The interpretation placed on the 
statute by the hearing examiners is easily understandable. Such could have been 
the legislative intent in its enactment.

[¶29]   Legislative intent is the primary 
and foremost consideration in statutory construction. Such intent should be 
ascertained as nearly as possible from the language of the statute. State Board 
of Equalization v. Tenneco Oil Co., 694 P.2d 97 (Wyo. 1985); State ex rel. Motor 
Vehicle Division v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732 (Wyo. 1983); In re Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1982); Wyoming State Department of Education v. Barber, 649 P.2d 681 (Wyo. 1982). All portions of an act must be read in pari materia, and every 
word, clause and sentence of it must be given effect and considered so that no 
part will be inoperative or superfluous, all with the purpose of ascertaining 
and giving effect to the legislative intent. Story v. State, 755 P.2d 228 (Wyo. 
1988); Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 701 P.2d 1139 (Wyo. 1985); Haddenham v. City of 
Laramie, 648 P.2d 551 (Wyo. 1982).

[¶30]   The hearing examiner's 
interpretation is consistent with the language in the first sentence of the 
statute, i.e., "the office of independent hearing examiners is created as a 
separate and independent agency" (emphasis added), and it is consistent 
with the language in subsection (c), i.e., "[t]he hearing examiner has exclusive 
jurisdiction to make final administrative determination of the validity and 
amount of compensation payable under the act." Although not part of the act, the 
title to the 1989 amendment to it reflects in part the creation of the agency 
"separate from the division."6

[¶31]   However, as already noted, the 
foregoing is inconsistent with the direction in subsection (b) of the act for 
"following the contested case procedures of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure 
Act." The legislative intent in enacting the statute is to have it conform with 
the constitution. Any reasonable construction will be resorted to in order to 
sustain the constitutionality of an act of the legislature. Hopkinson v. State, 
664 P.2d 43 (Wyo. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1983); Hanson v. Town of Greybull, 63 Wyo. 467, 183 P.2d 393 (1947); 
Stewart v. City of Cheyenne, 60 Wyo. 497, 154 P.2d 355 (1944); Board of 
Commissioners of Big Horn County v. Woods, 18 Wyo. 316, 107 P. 753 (1910); 
Barkwell v. Chatterban, 4 Wyo. 307, 33 P. 940 (1893). 

[¶32]   Accordingly, W.S. 27-14-6027 must be construed to establish the 
office of hearing examiners as part of the Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division, to which Division the hearing examiner recommends action in cases 
heard by him - all pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. Since 
such was not done in this case, I would remand it to the agency for action by it 
on its recommendation of the hearing examiner.8

SUBSTANTIVE

[¶33]   Normally, a remand on the 
procedural error would make unnecessary consideration of the substantive issues. 
However, since the majority opinion considered the substantive issues - all in 
the interest of judicial economy and efficiency - and in recognition that this 
matter came to us on certification from the district court, I submit the 
following dissent to the substantive determination of the majority of the 
court.

1 - STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS

[¶34]   The hearing examiner and the 
majority of the court, in a compassionate and laudable effort to afford relief 
to respondent, each apply different provisions of the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act to avoid the operation of the statutory limitation for filing 
by respondent of a claim for benefits.9 Neither application is directly 
pertinent to the time at which the one year limitation period began to run in 
this case - the beginning of such period being tolled because of respondent's 
minority.10 I find the time at which the 
period began to run to be clearly and simply set forth in the last clause of 
W.S. 27-14-505, i.e., in "no limitation of time provided for in this act shall 
run so long as the mentally incompetent or minor has no guardian."

[¶35]   This clause must be given some 
meaning. See Story, Hamlin and Haddenham (supra) regarding all portions of an 
act must be read in pari materia, and every word, clause and sentence of it must 
be given effect and considered so that no part will be inoperative or 
superfluous, all with the purpose of ascertaining and giving effect to the 
legislative intent. This clause would be inoperative, superfluous and 
meaningless under the holding of the hearing examiner or under that of the 
majority of the court. Giving effect to the clause results in the one year 
limitation being tolled only until the minor or incompetent has a 
guardian.

[¶36]   In this case, the guardian was 
appointed for respondent on December 11, 1986. The claim was not filed until May 
9, 1988. Accordingly, it was barred by the one year limitation for the filing of 
it.

[¶37]   The majority opinion holds that the 
language "at the time when any right or privilege accrues" in W.S. 27-14-50511 is controlling, and that such 
accrual occurred when "the order of the district court determined Jordan Jody 
Halstead, within his status of illegitimacy, was the child of the deceased 
worker." As already noted, such interpretation makes a nullity of later words in 
the act directly stating that the limitation of time ceases to run upon 
appointment of a guardian for the minor or the incompetent. Additionally, the 
language "at the time when any right or privilege accrues" refers to the 
existence of the status of incompetency or minority at such time. In this case, 
respondent met the minority requirement whether the right or privilege accrued 
at the time of his birth, when his guardian was appointed, when the claim was 
filed, or when paternity was declared by the court. Having met that requirement, 
inquiry next turns to the following language in the act which designates the 
time during which the limitation on time for filing of a claim is tolled, i.e., 
"so long as the mentally incompetent or minor has no guardian."

[¶38]   Compassion for respondent cannot 
change the law. Courts are bound to interpret and declare what is the law, they 
cannot usurp the power of the legislature by deciding that which should have 
been said in the law. Berber v. State Highway Commission, 80 Wyo. 340, 342 P.2d 723 (Wyo. 1959); Hamilton v. Territory of Wyoming, 1 Wyo. 131 
(1893).

[¶39]   The hearing examiner held the 
language in W.S. 27-14-102(a)(iii)12 to be controlling. She held that 
respondent did "not fit into the definition of child and would not be entitled 
to Worker Compensation benefits" until "[a] formal action to establish paternity 
* * * [was had] before a claim could be made." The opposite conclusion with 
reference to respondent's fitting the definition of "child" was reached by this 
court in Heather v. Delta Drilling Company, 533 P.2d 1211 (Wyo. 1975). We held 
that the word "children" includes illegitimate children. The conclusion of the 
court in Heather is the proper one. (The issue as to the fact of paternity was 
not before the court in Heather since the father admitted 
paternity.)

[¶40]   The hearing examiner's holding does 
focus on the problem of paying benefits without assurance that the recipient is 
actually the son of the employee. The answer is in a recognition that the filing 
of a claim does not ipso facto result in payment of it. The law requires the 
filing of a claim within one year after the disability of minority is removed, 
i.e., upon appointment of a guardian. One of the elements to be established at 
the hearing with reference to payment of the claim is the fact of paternity. Of 
interest in this case is the fact that the claim was actually dated May 4, 1988 
and filed May 9, 1988, about a month before June 2, 1988 when the order 
establishing paternity was filed. If the guardian had acted properly, the claim 
could have been filed within a year after appointment even if the fact of 
paternity had not then been judicially declared13 - just as it was filed about a 
month before such declaration.

[¶41]   When the question of paternity was 
presented at the hearing, the hearing examiner could have taken whatever action 
was necessary to be sure benefits were not paid until paternity was judicially 
declared, e.g., continued the hearing, make an award subject to the judicial 
declaration of paternity, etc. Such action is not precluded by the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act.

[¶42]   W.S. 16-3-107 relative to general 
procedure in contested cases under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act 
provides in pertinent part:

"(j) Opportunity shall be 
afforded all parties to respond and present evidence and argument on all issues 
involved. * * *

"(k) * * * Every agency 
shall proceed with reasonable dispatch to conclude any matter presented to it 
except that due regard shall be had for the convenience and necessity of the 
parties or their representatives. * * *

* * * * * *

"(n) Unless precluded by 
law, informal disposition may be made of any contested case by stipulation, 
agreed settlement, consent order or default."

[¶43]   In summary, respondent (by and 
through his guardian) failed to file his claim for benefits within the 
statutorily authorized time for doing so, i.e., one year after appointment of 
the guardian. If the claim had been timely filed, the decision on it could have 
been delayed for a reasonable time pending judicial declaration of paternity or 
nonpaternity.

2 - ESTOPPEL

[¶44]   The hearing examiner ruled that the 
Workers' Compensation Division was estopped, in any event, from refusing to 
accept a claim for benefits after the statutory limitations period on the basis 
of information furnished to respondent's grandmother (mother of respondent's 
mother) by an employee of the Clerk of Court.

[¶45]   In an affidavit submitted to the 
hearing examiner, the grandmother, Carolyn Halstead, stated that she made two 
telephone calls to the office of the District Court, Sweetwater County, in which 
she talked to Mrs. Hoover, an employee of that office. She stated that during 
the first conversation in late September 1985, she was told by Mrs. Hoover "that 
since the paternity of Jody Glenn Dodgion as to the then unborn child of Alice 
Ione Colley was not established, a Worker's [sic] Compensation claim could not 
be filed." She stated that during the second conversation in early December 
1985, she was "again" told by Mrs. Hoover "that a Worker's [sic] Compensation 
claim could not be filed on behalf of Alice Ione Colley's unborn child until 
Jody Glenn Dodgion's paternity of the unborn child was established."

[¶46]   In an affidavit submitted to the 
hearing examiner, Jennie L. Hoover stated that she was an employee of the office 
of the Clerk of District Court, Sweetwater County, and received the two 
telephone calls from Carolyn Halstead who inquired "as to the requirements 
necessary to receive death benefits for Jordan Jody Halstead." She stated that 
she "told Carolyn Halstead that it was the burden of the claimant to establish 
entitlement to death benefits. I told Carolyn Halstead that the claimant has to 
establish that he was the child. I did not tell Carolyn Halstead that a separate 
paternity action was required. I told Carolyn Halstead that a birth certificate 
is generally sufficient evidence." She further stated that "I did not refuse to 
accept application for benefits and that "[a]t no time did anyone on behalf of 
Jordan Jody Halstead attempt to file for death benefits."

[¶47]   Here, there is not only a direct 
conflict in testimony concerning the nature of the advice as to whether or not 
"a claim could be filed," but there is a lack of involvement by the parties to 
this matter in the communication concerning the advice. Carolyn Halstead is not 
a party to this matter. Alice Colley, the daughter of Carolyn Halstead, is the 
guardian of respondent and a party to this action. The Clerk of Court is not a 
party to this matter - the Workers' Compensation Division is.

"The elements of 
equitable estoppel are that the party asserting estoppel must show that 
he (1) lacks the knowledge of facts, (2) is without means of discovering them, 
(3) relies upon actions of the party sought to be charged, and (4) changed 
position accompanying such reliance." (Emphasis added and citation 
omitted.)

Cheyenne Dodge, 
Inc. v. Reynolds and Reynolds Company, 613 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Wyo. 
1980).

[¶48]   Any assertion made by Mrs. Hoover 
concerning this matter was not made as a party to it. The action by Mrs. 
Hoover was not an action by the Workers' Compensation Division. She was acting 
in performance of the ministerial duties of the Clerk of Court. She could 
not give legal advice, and, if she did, respondent acting through his guardian 
could not rely thereon for the purpose of estoppel.

     "The well-recognized 
rule is that a representation as to a matter of law will not ordinarily support 
an action for fraud or deceit, nor constitute an estoppel to rely upon the 
statute of limitations, the reason for the rule being that representations as to 
matters of law are ordinarily considered as expressions of opinion, and 
justifiable reliance cannot be had upon the mere opinion of 
another."

51 Am.Jur.2d, 
Limitation of Action, § 451 (1970) and cases there cited.

[¶49]   Additionally, Carolyn Halstead's 
relay of information to the guardian placed it in the category of hearsay. A 
party (the guardian) should not be able to rely on hearsay concerning the acts 
of another as a basis of estoppel.

[¶50]   Conclusive in this connection is 
the fact that the second element listed supra in Cheyenne Dodge, Inc. as 
necessary for estoppel is not here present, i.e., "the party asserting estoppel 
must show that he * * * (2) is without means of discovering [the facts]." 
Respondent, through his guardian, was represented by an attorney during much of 
the period in which the claim could be timely filed. And, as noted supra, 
the claim for benefits was actually filed before paternity was judicially 
declared.

3 - 
DEPENDENCY

[¶51]   Nothing said in this dissent is 
intended to modify in any way the previous holdings of this court making 
substantial dependency of a minor child on the employee as a test of eligibility 
for benefits. The following language in W.S. 27-14-102(a)(iii)14 must be given some 
meaning:

"`Child' means any 
unmarried minor or physically or mentally incapacitated individual receiving 
court ordered support or substantially all of his financial support from the 
employee at the time of injury or death of the employee * * *."

We properly said 
in Jim's Water Service v. Eayrs, 590 P.2d 1346, 1351 (Wyo. 1979):

"[W]e conclude that the 
definition of a child was intended by the legislature to make substantial 
dependency the test of eligibility and to eliminate the confusion and dispute 
existing before regarding stepchildren, adoption, legitimacy, lineage, and 
alienage."

And in Heather, 
533 P.2d  at 1213, the acknowledged illegitimate child was "never actually 
furnished any specific financial or other support by her father." Nonetheless, 
we held that there was a conclusive presumption of her dependency. The court 
said:

     "`Dependency in fact 
must be established in order to qualify for death benefits in all cases except 
those involving a conclusive presumption of dependency. Proof of actual 
dependency does not require a showing that the claimant relied on the deceased 
for the bare necessities of life and without his contribution would have been 
reduced to destitution; it is sufficient to show that the deceased's 
contributions were looked to by claimant for the maintenance of claimant's 
accustomed standard of living. Hence a claimant may be dependent although 
receiving other income from claimant's own work, from property or from other 
persons on whom claimant is also dependent. Usually, actual contribution to 
claimant's support is enough to establish dependency without evidence of legal 
obligation to support. Proof of bare legal obligation to support, unaccompanied 
by either actual support or reasonable expectation of support, is ordinarily not 
enough to satisfy the requirement of actual dependency. Under the general 
principle that morality is not an inherent ingredient of dependency, a statuted 
based on dependency in fact is none the less satisfied when actual dependency 
accompanies unconventional domestic arrangements.'"

Id. at 1214, n. 
7 (quoting 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 63.00, p. 
11-58).

[¶52]   In this case, the employee was 
living with respondent's pregnant mother. The conclusive presumption of 
dependency existed even before birth. If the claim for relief had been timely 
filed, benefits could not have been denied on the basis of lack of 
dependency.

[¶53]   Of course, dependency alone is not 
sufficient for eligibility for benefits. The parent-child relationship (referred 
to in the last portion of W.S. 27-14-102(a)15 must also exist. Again, if the 
claim for relief had been timely filed, the dependency and the relationship 
could have been established in this instance.

[¶54]   I would remand this case to the 
Workers' Compensation Division for correction of the procedural defect, i.e., 
for receipt of the hearing examiner's recommendation, and for action thereon in 
accordance with this dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1 When appellate briefs 
include page references to the record to support factual claims made in the 
briefs, those claims can be checked at a glance. When the briefs contain no page 
references, valuable legal research time is expended because the entire record 
must be searched for each claim. Petitioner's thirty-four page brief did not 
contain a single cite to the record. We advise in the strongest terms that all 
briefs comply with W.R.A.P. 5.01(3). See Condict v. Condict, No. 89-51 (Wyo. 
January 24, 1990) (reh'g denied February 7, 1990) (order dismissing appeal with 
prejudice).

2 There was no evidence to 
indicate Jody Glenn Dodgion was aware by the time he died that Alice Ione Colley 
had become pregnant.

3 The May 9, 
1988 claim for death benefits for the dependent child, which initiated the 
hearing and presents this appeal, is not to be found in the record. The 
concurrence of the litigants and the assumptions of the briefing suffice to 
obviate remand on this basis alone, but clarification of the record is required 
that a claim was in fact made before further final action is 
taken.

4 There was a third 
proceeding when, by declaratory judgment, the teenage mother contested whether 
members of the decedent's family could be claimants in a wrongful death 
proceeding. This issue was decided in Butler v. Halstead By and Through Colley, 
770 P.2d 698 (Wyo. 1989).

5 Jackson, 786 P.2d 874 
had not been decided when this case was argued before this court. The effect of 
a more recent statutory change will not be presently considered. Wyo. Sess. Laws 
ch. 88 (1990) may or may not have effectively superceded Jackson.

6 The estoppel argument 
grows from an allegation that personnel in the Sweetwater County District Court 
clerk's office furnished information to the mother of Alice Colley, who was 
later appointed guardian ad litem and who brings this suit for the benefit of 
the young child. The State Fund contests both what was said to this third party 
and authority of personnel in the clerk's office within the newly centralized 
state agency system. Surprisingly, no discussion has surfaced about the 
direction given by the state agency to the clerk of court which may have 
constituted authority to recommend and, to some degree, notice to the decedent's 
family by an October 18, 1985 letter.

Due to the number and 
frequency of telephone calls we have received concerning above referenced case, 
I thought I should advise you of our opinion on certain issued [sic] discussed 
with us.

* * * * * *

(3). Someone on his 
behalf should apply for permanent total disability with payments going to a 
legal guardian and should Jody die as a result of his injuries, all payments 
should be stopped with balance of award going back to the fund or funds from 
which award was made.

(4). Since Jody is an 
unmarried minor with no dependents, there would be not [sic] further death 
benefits made, other than for funeral expenses.

(5). Jody's mother and/or 
father can not prove entitlement to dependent parent benefits.

* * * * * *

I have not yet had the 
chance to review any medical reports so these opinions are based upon which I do 
have and upon telephone conversations. In no way am I trying to tell the court 
how to handle this difficult case and I thank you for allowing me to express my 
opinion.

These statements by the 
State Fund become significant when the denial-objection decision was furnished 
on May 17, 1988, which first stated an objection based on the expiration of the 
statute of limitations and then added "[a]lso, there has been no proof of 
paternity in this case."

If 
a decision on the basis of estoppel proved available, estoppel based on the 
communications from the State Fund might have significance. Obviously, the State 
Fund creates that kind of question if it says that a claim is objectionable 
because there is no determination of parentage until the statute of limitation 
expires and then raises the statute of limitation to defeat the claim after 
parentage has been determined. An argument can be made that if the State Fund 
objects to the claim until parentage is determined, that once parentage is 
determined and for some reasonable time thereafter, the claim can be made. At 
issue, then, is whether parentage must be determined in the worker's 
compensation proceeding or may first be determined in the statutory 
parentage process. Neither party has briefed nor argued estoppel by act of the 
state agency itself.

7 The State Fund cites 
W.S. 27-14-503(a) and 27-14-505. Those statutes were found in the prior law and 
are similar but not identical with the present provisions. The 1986 
recodification, effective June 23, 1986, is to be applied procedurally as long 
as a substantive right is not adversely affected. Owens v. Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County, 52 Cal. 2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959). See also Byrd v. Blue Ridge 
Rural Electric Cooperative, 356 U.S. 525, 78 S. Ct. 893, 2 L. Ed. 2d 953, reh'g 
denied 357 U.S. 933, 78 S. Ct. 1366, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1375 (1958) and 73 Am.Jur.2d 
Statutes § 354 at 490 (1974). Processing was handled under the hearing examiner 
administrative structure that was first created by the 1986 enactment. Bemis v. 
Texaco, Inc., 400 P.2d 529, reh'g denied 401 P.2d 708 (Wyo. 1965) is not 
inapposite since the issue there concerned substantive rights and not procedural 
provisions changed by a newly enacted statute.

8 See Note, The 
Unconstitutionality of Medical Malpractice Statutes of Repose. Judicial 
Conscience Versus Legislative Will, 34 Vill.L.Rev. 397 (1989).

9  Statutes of repose and 
statutes of limitations are often confused. They are similar in that both 
prescribe the time period within which a plaintiff may commence his suit. The 
distinguishing feature between the two is the time at which the respective 
periods commence. Generally, in medical malpractice actions, if the plaintiff's 
cause of action accrues and the statutory period commences when the injury 
occurs or, as is most often the case, when the plaintiff is or should be aware 
that he has been injured, the statute is properly termed a statute of 
limitations. If the statutory period commences upon the occurrence of an event, 
regardless of when the injury occurs, at a time when the plaintiff may or may 
not be aware of any injury, the statute is properly termed a statute of repose. 
In the latter case the repose period commences upon the occurrence of an event, 
such as the negligent act or omission of the health care practitioner, but the 
injury caused by this act or omission may be latent and therefore not manifest 
itself until after the statutory period has elapsed. Consequently, the 
plaintiff's claim may be barred before he is or should be aware that he has been 
injured or has a claim.  Note, supra 
n. 8, 34 Vill.L.Rev. at 400-01 (footnotes omitted). See Com. v. Owens-Corning 
Fiberglass Corp., 238 Va. 595, 385 S.E.2d 865 (1989) (differentiation noted when 
effecting governmental entities). See also McGovern, The Variety, Policy and 
Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 Am.U.L.Rev. 579 
(1981). Phillips, 611 P.2d 821 is not directly defined in designation to be a 
statute of repose case, although in terminology, the differentiation is 
recognized. "[T]he statute in question, * * *, is not a statute of limitations 
but is a grant of immunity from suit." Id. at 831. Cases this court cited 
generally for precedential support include some of the more influential statute 
of repose decisions, including Overland Const. Co., Inc. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979); Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Haw. 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973); Skinner v. 
Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967); Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 
(Ky. 1973); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 
1977); Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977); 
Broome v. Truluck, 270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978); and Kallas Millwork 
Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis.2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975). Compare Reynolds v. 
Porter, 760 P.2d 816 (Okla. 1988), where that court determined the statute was a 
statute of limitation without the benefit of the discovery rule and was also 
unconstitutional under the Oklahoma Constitution.

10 This legal duty is 
established by both civil and criminal remedies. See W.S. 14-2-104, right to 
bring paternity actions; effect of agreements; proceedings when child is not yet 
born; W.S. 14-2-113, effect and contents of judgment or order; new birth 
certificate; determination of support; continuing jurisdiction; W.S. 14-2-204, 
liability for support; right of action; venue; service; measure of recovery; 
remedy is cumulative; execution; W.S. 20-3-101 through 20-3-104, desertion of 
wife or children; and W.S. 20-6-101 through 20-6-401, child support enforcement 
as a list which is not exhaustive and relates in some fashion to support of 
children.

11 Respondent argues that 
the State Fund raised the dependency issue first on appeal. "`Our rule is that 
in the absence of fundamental error affecting a substantial right of the 
appellant or involving the jurisdiction of the court, we do not consider 
questions sought to be raised for the first time on appeal.'" Hyde v. State, 769 P.2d 376, 381 (Wyo. 1989) (quoting Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 928 (Wyo. 
1984)). Whether or not the question was properly raised, we address the subject 
to determine that discrimination cannot be justified between children based on 
the marital status of the parents as the constitutional concept of both Heather 
and Bowers. Initial action of the State Fund when it suggested existence of a 
requirement to establish parentage for authentication of a claim is compatible 
with our recognition of the child's constitutional interest involved in 
determination of the familial relationship.

  

FOOTNOTES for the 
Concurrance and Dissent

1 W.S. 27-14-602 provided 
in its entirety at the time this matter was before the Agency:

"(a) For the purposes of 
this act, the office of independent hearing officers is created. The chief 
hearing officer shall be a qualified member of the Wyoming state bar, appointed 
by the governor and shall serve at the pleasure of the governor. The governor 
may appoint additional hearing officers who are qualified members of the Wyoming 
state bar to serve as necessary throughout the state. An independent hearing 
officer shall conduct contested cases under this act in accordance with this 
section. The division shall provide office space and materials required by the 
hearing examiners.

"(b) If either the 
division or the employer object to the right of the employee to receive 
compensation, as to the amount of compensation or to amounts or procedures 
claimed for medical and health care, or at the request of the employee, the case 
shall be immediately referred to a hearing examiner who shall set the case for 
hearing at the earliest opportunity. The case shall be determined by a 
hearing examiner following the contested case procedures of the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act. Appeals may be taken from the decision by any 
party to the contested case to the district court as provided by the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act. Hearings may be held in any area of Wyoming giving 
consideration to the convenience of the employee, employer and 
division.

"(c) All written reports, 
claims and other documents filed with the clerk of court and the division shall 
be considered as pleadings in the case. The attorney general's office shall 
represent the division in all contested cases. The hearing examiner has 
exclusive jurisdiction to make the final administrative determination of the 
validity and amount of compensation payable under this act. All court costs 
shall be paid from the worker's compensation account if the judgment is in favor 
of the employer or the division. If judgment is against the employer and the 
employer contested the claim without being joined in the contest by the 
division, the court costs shall be paid by the employer. When the employer or 
division prevails, the court costs shall not affect the employer's experience 
rating.

"(d) The hearing examiner 
may appoint an attorney to represent the employee or claimants and may allow him 
a reasonable fee for his services at the conclusion of the proceeding. The 
attorney shall be paid according to the order of the hearing examiner either 
from the worker's compensation account, from amounts awarded to the employee or 
claimants or from the employer. If the employer or division prevails, the 
attorney's fees allowed shall not affect the employer's experience rating." 
(Emphasis added.)

2 W.S. 16-3-112 provides 
in its entirety:

"(a) If not otherwise 
authorized by law there shall preside at the taking of evidence in all contested 
cases the statutory agency, one (1) or more members of the body which comprises 
the agency, or an employee of the agency or an employee of another agency 
designated by the agency to act as presiding officer. The functions of all those 
presiding in contested cases shall be conducted in an impartial manner. Any 
officer shall at any time withdraw if he deems himself disqualified provided 
there are other qualified presiding officers available to act.

"(b) Officers presiding 
at hearings shall have authority, subject to the published rules of the agency 
and within its power to:

"(i) Administer oaths and 
affirmations;

"(ii) Issue 
subpoenas;

"(iii) Rule upon offers 
of proof and receive relevant evidence;

"(iv) Take or cause 
depositions to be taken in accordance with the provisions of this act [§§ 
16-3-101 through 16-3-115] and the rules of the agency;

"(v) Regulate the course 
of the hearing;

"(vi) Hold conferences 
for the settlement or simplification of the issues;

"(vii) Dispose of 
procedural requests or similar matters;

"(viii) Make 
recommended decisions when directed to do so by the agency; and

"(ix) Take any other 
action authorized by agency rules consistent with this act.

"(c) In all contested 
cases to the extent that it is necessary in order to obtain compliance with W.S. 
16-3-111 the agency (excepting county and municipal agencies and political 
subdivisions on the county and local level) may request the office of the 
attorney general to furnish to the agency such personnel as may be necessary in 
order for the agency to properly investigate, prepare, present and prosecute the 
contested case before the agency. The attorney general upon the receipt of the 
request shall promptly comply with same with no charge being made against the 
requesting agency's appropriation other than for travel and per diem 
expenses.

"(d) To the extent an 
agency utilizes an employee of another agency (other than the staff of the 
attorney general) to preside at a hearing or otherwise the salary of the 
employee during the period of the employment and the expenses incurred by the 
employee shall be charged against the appropriation of the using 
agency.

"(e) When required by law 
an agency shall adopt rules and regulations providing a procedure for the use 
and the selection of an administrative hearing officer. An agency shall not 
delegate the authority to make final decisions to an independent administrative 
hearing officer unless required by law." (Emphasis added.)

The 
clause in W.S. 16-3-112(a), "If not otherwise authorized by law" and the last 
sentence in W.S. 16-3-112(e), "An agency shall not delegate the authority to 
make final decisions to an independent administrative hearing officer unless 
required by law," refer to authorization by constitutional means. The language 
"when directed to do so by the agency" in W.S. 16-3-112 allows the agency to act 
on the matter without a recommendation from the presiding officer.

3 For example, the 
Constitution of the United States does not contain such exact or specific 
prohibition. It provides in pertinent part: "All legislative Powers herein 
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist 
of a Senate and House of Representatives." Art. I, Sec. 1; "The executive Power 
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America," Art. II, Sec. 
1; "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish." Art. III, Sec. 1.

4 "Agency" is defined in 
the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, § 16-3-101(b)(i):

"`Agency' means any 
authority, bureau, board, commission, department, division, officer or employee 
of the state, a county, city or town or other political subdivision of the 
state, except the governing body of a city or town, the state legislature and 
the judiciary[.]"

5 See supra note 
1.

6 Initially, the judiciary 
(district court) determined the matters referred to in W.S. 27-14-602(b). In 
1986, W.S. 27-14-602 was enacted. In 1989, among other amendments, an amendment 
to the act changed the first sentence from "[f]or the purposes of this act, the 
office of independent hearing officers is created," to "[f]or the purposes of 
this act, the office of independent hearing examiners is created as a 
separate and independent agency funded under the worker's [sic] compensation 
account." (Emphasis added.)

7 See supra note 
1.

8 This court has applied 
Article 2, Section 1 of the Wyoming Constitution in other cases, e.g., the 
judicial branch cannot determine the qualifications for membership in the House 
of Representatives, such is a legislative function. State ex rel. Schieck v. 
Hathaway, 493 P.2d 759 (Wyo. 1972). The legislature, not the judiciary, 
determines that which is a crime and the parameters for punishment therefor. 
Hopkinson, 664 P.2d 43; The legislature cannot prohibit allegations of dollar 
amount of damage in an ad damnum clause of a pleading. It is the Supreme Court's 
function to prescribe form and content of pleadings. White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102 (Wyo. 1984). It is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine for the 
courts to collect drivers' licenses in traffic matters and to issue temporary 
ones. Such is an executive branch function. Holtz 674 P.2d 732. The court cannot 
restore civil rights by expunging a criminal record. The power of pardon is for 
the executive branch.

9 W.S. 27-14-503(a) 
provided in its entirety at the time this matter was before the 
Agency:

"(a) An award for 
compensation involving an injury which is the result of a single brief 
occurrence rather than occurring over a substantial period of time shall not be 
made unless in addition to the proper and timely filing of the reports of the 
accident, an application or claim for award is filed within one (1) year after 
the date the accident occurred or for injuries not readily apparent, within one 
(1) year after discovery of the injury by the employee. The report of accident 
is not a claim for compensation."

W.S. 27-14-605(c) now 
recognizes the different types and natures of allowable benefits under the one 
year limitation period applying separately to the different categories. W.S. 
27-14-605 provides:

"(a) If a determination 
is made in favor of or on behalf of an employee for any benefits under this act, 
an application may be made to the division by any party within four (4) years 
from the date of the last payment for additional medical and disability benefits 
or for a modification of the amount of benefits on the ground of increase or 
decrease of incapacity due solely to the injury, or upon grounds of mistake or 
fraud.

"(b) Any right to 
benefits shall be terminated and is no longer under the jurisdiction of this act 
if a claim for any medical or disability benefit is not filed with the division 
within the four (4) year limitation prescribed under subsection (a) of this 
section.

"(c) A claim for medical 
benefits which would otherwise be terminated under subsection (b) of this 
section and barred under W.S. 27-14-503(a) and (b) may be paid by the division 
if the claimant:

"(i) Submits medical 
reports to the division substantiating his claim;

"(ii) Proves by competent 
medical authority and to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the 
condition is directly related to the original injury; and

"(iii) Submits to an 
examination by a health care provider selected by the division and results of 
the examination validate his claim."

10 W.S. 27-14-505 
provides:

"If an injured employee 
is mentally incompetent or a minor, or where death results from the injury and 
any of his dependents are mentally incompetent or minors, at the time when any 
right or privilege accrues under this act, no limitation of time provided for in 
this act shall run so long as the mentally incompetent or minor has no 
guardian."

11 See supra note 
10.

12 W.S. 27-14-102(a)(iii) 
provides:

"`Child' means any 
unmarried minor or physically or mentally incapacitated individual receiving 
court ordered support or substantially all of his financial support from the 
employee at the time of injury or death of the employee and includes an adopted 
child, stepchild, posthumous child or acknowledged illegitimate child but does 
not include a parent or spouse of the employee[.]"

13 Before the office of 
hearing examiner was established, workers' compensation contested cases were 
handled by the district court, and the issue of paternity could have been 
handled by it together with other issues pertaining to the claim.

14 See supra note 
12.

15 See supra note 
12.