Case Title: Park View Manor v. HOUSING AUTHORITY, ETC.

Citation: 287 N.W.2d 83

Docket Number: 

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1979-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
287 N.W.2d 83 (1979) PARK VIEW MANOR, INC., a North Dakota Corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the COUNTY OF STUTSMAN, Jamestown, North Dakota, a Public Corporation, Defendant and Appellee and Cross-Appellant. Civ. No. 9627. Supreme Court of North Dakota. December 20, 1979. Hjellum, Weiss, Nerison, Jukkala & Vinje, Jamestown, for plaintiff and appellant; argued by John Hjellum, Jamestown. Gilje, Greenwood & Dalsted, Jamestown, for defendant and appellee; argued by Charles J. Gilje, Jamestown. PEDERSON, Justice. This is an appeal by Park View Manor (PVM) and a cross-appeal by Housing Authority of the County of Stutsman (Stutsman) from a judgment entered after a trial to the court without a jury. That judgment awarded Stutsman the sum of $726.78, plus interest. The judgment is based upon findings of fact made by the trial court and separately stated conclusions of law. Rule 52(a), NDRCivP. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for purposes set forth herein. After a one-day trial, the presiding judge issued a memorandum decision in which facts and law were discussed and a decision *84 announced. The memorandum ended with: "Counsel for the defendant [Stutsman] may prepare the appropriate Order." Findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment were accordingly prepared and adopted by the trial court. We quote in full those findings of fact and conclusions of law: Some of the background may be useful in understanding this case. The dispute involves the meaning of certain provisions in four leases between the parties. Previous litigation arose because the parties could not agree as to the meaning of certain lease terms. That litigation ended when the parties agreed to a stipulation which apparently was intended to be a clearer and more understandable statement of the disputed provisions in the leases. In effect, the pertinent terms of the stipulation supersede the lease provisions which caused the initial dispute. Those stipulated provisions are: Apparently the clarifying language agreed to in the stipulation resulted, not in a clearer understanding between the parties, but in further dispute and this second lawsuit. Stutsman argues generally that because PVM did not "at or before the time of the annual accounting" in 1976 and 1977, present to Stutsman a list of its actual expenditures, the court should not have considered taxes for 1975 and 1976. Stutsman apparently does not dispute the amount of those taxes but in effect says that PVM waived its right to any reimbursement by not complying with paragraph VI of the stipulation, which required a list of expenditures each year no later than February 1st. The trial court in findings numbered II, III, IV and V found that PVM did pay real estate taxes for 1975 and 1976 in excess of the agreed base sum and was entitled to credit therefor. There is no finding of fact or conclusion of law that indicates that there was a waiver or any other basis upon which PVM was entitled to this credit. The only statement we find as a basis for findings II, III, IV and V is in the trial court's memorandum decision as follows: "No harm can be shown to come to either side, nor is any penalty built into the contract." The requirements in paragraph VI of the stipulation appear clear and unambiguous in requiring annual accountings and an annual listing of expenditures. The fact that there is no harm to anyone that this was not done, alone is not sufficient reason for the courts to, in effect, rewrite that portion of the contract. That is not to say that there may not be a legal and adequate basis under law or equity for not enforcing the accounting requirement under the circumstances of this case. That determination, however, is a trial court function and we remand so that the preparation of an appropriate finding can be made, or a retrial, if deemed necessary by the trial court, in order to provide a basis for the required finding. See Sand v. Red River Nat. Bank & Trust Company, 224 N.W.2d 375, 378 (N.D. 1974). The existence of any doubt as to whether the trial court or the appellate court is the ultimate trier of fact issues is detrimental to the orderly administration of justice, impairs the confidence of litigants and the public, and multiplies unwarranted appeals. Pendergrass v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 181 F.2d 136, 138 (8th Cir. 1950). PVM argues that Rule 52(a), NDRCivP, is applicable and that the memorandum decision, the findings of fact, and the conclusions of law are not supported by the evidence, and then points out that this court has repeatedly said that: Before we can arrive at any disposition of this argument, which would apparently require a distinguishment between fact issues, law issues, and issues of mixed fact and law, we must examine the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the memorandum decision to determine upon what basis the trial court acted. In paragraphs VIII and IX, the trial court finds as a fact that PVM "has failed in its burden" of proof. Very little additional explanation is found in the memorandum decision where the trial court merely said that PVM "made little attempt to delineate or explain any of the bills," PVM "is required to carry the burden of proof," and "his [PVM's] claim must fail." These are the type of "findings of fact" which this court specifically rejected in Struchynski v. Decker, 194 N.W.2d 741 (N.D.1972). See also comments on the purposes *87 of Rule 52(a) in Peterson v. Hart, 278 N.W.2d 133, 136 (N.D.1979). The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for the preparation of more adequate findings of fact or, if deemed necessary by the trial court, for a new trial. No costs on appeal will be allowed. ERICKSTAD, C. J., and PAULSON, SAND and VANDE WALLE, JJ., concur.