Case Title: In the Matter of Samuel V. Convery, Jr., an Attorney at Law

Citation: 

Docket Number: d-57-99

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2001-02-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). PER CURIAM This is an attorney disciplinary case. Respondent, Samuel V. Convery, of Metuchen, was admitted to practice law in New Jersey in 1969. He has never before been disciplined. This matter was initiated by the Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE) on its filing of a Motion for Final Discipline pursuant to Rule 1:20-13(c)(2). The OAE's motion was based on respondent's conviction for promising employment or other benefit as consideration for any political activity in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. 600 (the Hatch Act) and RPC 8.4(b). Prior to the commencement of the OAE's action, between 1991 and 1993, respondent served as the Mayor of the Township of Edison. In his capacity as Mayor, at the request of a Freeholder, respondent had supported the effort of Robert J. Engel (Robert J.), the son of Robert F. Engel (Robert F.), a Republican member of the Edison Town Council, in obtaining employment with Middlesex County. Thereafter, Robert J. was hired by the County as an at-will employee. In July 1995, Shobna Patel retained respondent to represent Pooja M. Inc. ( Pooja ) in connection with its purchase and development of real estate in Edison Township. Pooja intended to develop the property as a banquet hall, with a restaurant, a bar, offices, an art gallery, and a retail store. To do so, it needed to obtain zoning variances and approval of preliminary site plans from the Township of Edison Board of Adjustment. In February 1996, respondent filed an application with the Edison Board of Adjustment for the variances and for site plan approval on behalf of Pooja. There was considerable public opposition to Pooja's project at the first public hearing on April 16, 1996. Thereafter, in August 1996, respondent promised Robert F. and his son, Robert J., that he would assist the son in obtaining permanent employment, as opposed to an at-will position, with Middlesex County in exchange for the Engels' assistance in obtaining favorable votes for the Pooja project from two zoning board members. In addition, following the April 1996 zoning board hearing, respondent became aware that Gerard Kenny, a member of the Edison Board of Adjustment, had been quoted in a news article as expressing an intention to vote against the Pooja project. Respondent subsequently sent a copy of that article and spoke to John Wade, the business agent of Ironworkers' Local Union 373, out of which Kenny worked as an ironworker. Wade, who usually determined which union members to send out on union jobs, then confronted Kenny with the article, telling him that he should reconsider his opposition to the project because he was biting the hand that feeds him. Respondent denied that he asked Wade to make any such comments to Kenny. Thereafter, during the summer of 1996, Robert F. told Kenny that respondent would assist Kenny in obtaining a job with the County of Middlesex or the State of New Jersey if Kenny agreed to vote for the Pooja project. Subsequently, Robert J. met with Kenny to confirm that he would support the Pooja project. The Board of Adjustment's final vote on the project was scheduled for August 20, 1996. At that meeting, Kenny voted to approve the project. Although respondent admitted, for purposes of the federal charges, that his actions in obtaining the Engels' assistance and the members' votes on the project constituted a form of political activity, he explained that he considered his actions to be permissible lobbying. As a result of his April 1998 guilty plea to the charges, respondent was sentenced to three years probation. As a condition thereof, he was confined to his home for three months, required to perform five hundred hours of community service, and fined $5,000. Following respondent's conviction, the OAE filed its Motion for Final Discipline with the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB or Board ). The OAE sought a six-month suspension based solely on respondent's general-intent misdemeanor conviction under the statute. The DRB determined to grant the OAE's motion, but a majority concluded that respondent's misdemeanor conviction warranted only a reprimand. Although the Board acknowledged that most federal misdemeanor convictions have resulted in terms of suspension ranging from three to six months, it concluded that compelling mitigating circumstances warranted the less severe discipline. Two members of the DRB dissented, stressing that respondent's misconduct, although a misdemeanor under federal law, would support a conviction of bribery under the New Jersey law, a second degree offense. The Supreme Court issued an Order to Show Cause why respondent should not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined pursuant to R. 1:20-16(b). HELD: Attorney Samuel V. Convery's criminal conviction for promising employment or other benefit as consideration for any political activity, in violation of the Hatch Act, constituted a violation of RPC 8.4(b) and warrants a six-month suspension from the practice of law. 1. A criminal conviction of an attorney is conclusive evidence of guilt in a disciplinary proceeding, and respondent's guilty plea to the federal misdemeanor of promising employment or other benefit for political activity constituted a violation of RPC 8.4(b) because it relates to the commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer. (pp. 7-8) 2. Once an attorney is convicted of a crime, the sole issue to be determined is the extent of discipline to be imposed. Determining the appropriate discipline for criminal misconduct by an attorney requires consideration of many factors, including the nature and severity of the crime, whether the crime is related to the practice of law, and any mitigating factors such as respondent's reputation. (pp. 8-10) 3. As an experienced attorney and ex-counsel to the Edison Board of Adjustment, respondent should have known that influencing two members of a zoning board, a quasi-judicial tribunal, through third parties to vote to grant a variance for the benefit of his client was highly improper, as opposed to permissible lobbying. (pp. 10-12) 4. The principal goal of disciplinary proceedings is to foster and preserve public confidence in the bar and to protect the public from attorneys who do not meet the high standards of professional responsibility. (pp. 12-14) 5. The seriousness of respondent's offense mandates discipline no less severe than that imposed by the Court, and would warrant more stringent discipline were it not for the mitigating circumstances presented. (pp. 14-15) 6. Respondent's ethical transgressions were serious, and his actions, which compromised the integrity of the Edison Board of Adjustment's disposition of the variance application of respondent's client, warrant a six-month suspension from the practice of law. (p. 15) JUSTICE ZAZZALI filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which JUSTICE LONG joined. Although Justice Zazzali agreed with the Court's determination that respondent's conduct violated RPC 8.4(b), he believed that a probationary sanction, including additional community service, would satisfy the need to protect the public interest while serving the administration of justice. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN and VERNIERO join in this PER CURIAM opinion. JUSTICE ZAZZALI has filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which JUSTICE LONG joins. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA did not participate. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY D- 57 September Term 1999 IN THE MATTER OF SAMUEL V. CONVERY, JR., An Attorney at Law. Argued September 26, 2000 -- Decided February 2, 2001 On an Order to show cause why respondent should not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined. Richard J. Engelhardt, Deputy Ethics Counsel, argued the cause on behalf of the Office of Attorney Ethics. John D. Arseneault argued the cause for respondent (Arseneault & Fassett, attorneys). PER CURIAM This disciplinary proceeding arises from a Motion for Final Discipline Based Upon a Criminal Conviction filed by the Office of Attorney Ethics ("OAE") before the Disciplinary Review Board ("DRB"). The OAE moved for final discipline against respondent Samuel V. Convery, Jr. pursuant to Rule 1:20-13(c)(2). The OAE based its motion on respondent's conviction for promising employment or other benefit as consideration for any political activity in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. 600 (the Hatch Act). The conviction constitutes a violation of RPC 8.4(b), which states that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer." Five out of seven participating members of the DRB recommended that respondent be reprimanded on the basis of his guilty plea to the federal misdemeanor of promising employment or other benefit for political activity. Two members dissented and voted to withhold decision and to require the OAE and respondent to submit supplemental briefs on the scope of respondent's unethical conduct and the appropriate discipline. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that a six-month suspension is the appropriate sanction. I The limited record reveals the following facts. In 1969, respondent was admitted to the New Jersey bar. He has no prior disciplinary history. At the time that the ethics complaint was filed, respondent practiced with the law firm of Convery & Convery, P.C., together with his two sons. A Democrat, respondent had previously served as the Mayor of the Township of Edison from 1991 to 1993, and prior to his term as Mayor he had been counsel to the Board of Adjustment. In his capacity as Mayor, respondent was well acquainted with Robert F. Engel (Robert F.), a Republican member of the Edison Town Council. During respondent's term as Mayor, a Freeholder had requested that respondent support the effort of Robert J. Engel (Robert J.), the son of Robert F., in obtaining employment with Middlesex County. Respondent agreed to do so. The County's public- property division thereafter hired Robert J. as an at-will employee. In July 1995, Shobna Patel retained respondent's law firm to represent Pooja M. Inc. ( Pooja ) in connection with its purchase and development of real estate in Edison Township. Pooja needed to obtain zoning variances to develop what had been church property. Pooja intended to develop the property as a banquet hall, with a restaurant, a bar, offices, an art gallery and a retail store. The proposed uses required Pooja to obtain use and bulk zoning variances and approval of preliminary site plans from the Township of Edison Board of Adjustment. Respondent's firm was to receive a $100,000 legal fee for the representation, regardless of the success or failure of the project. Respondent's Pre-sentence Investigation Report reveals that, because of Pooja's financial difficulties, Pooja was unable to pay respondent's entire fee until the project was approved and completed. II A criminal conviction of an attorney is conclusive evidence of guilt in a disciplinary proceeding. R. 1:20-13(c)(1); In re Howard, 143 N.J. 526, 529 (1996); In re Kinnear, 105 N.J. 391, 393 (1987). Respondent's guilty plea to the federal misdemeanor of promising employment or other benefit for political activity constituted a violation of RPC 8.4(b) because it relates to the commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer. Once an attorney is convicted of a crime, the sole issue to be considered is the extent of discipline to be imposed. R. 1:20-13(c)(2); In re Zauber, 122 N.J. 87, 92 (1991); Kinnear, supra, 105 N.J. at 393; In re Goldberg, 105 N.J. 278, 280 (1987). In assessing the measure of discipline to be imposed, the background facts and circumstances of the case drawn from pre- sentence reports, plea agreements, and other reliable documentation, are relevant. In re Spina, 121 N.J. 378, 389-90 (1990). Even a minor violation of the law by an attorney tends to lessen public confidence in the legal profession as a whole. In re Hasbrouck, 152 N.J. 366, 371 (1998) (citing In re Addonizio, 95 N.J. 121, 124 (1984)). The commission of a criminal act by an attorney also constitutes a violation of that attorney's duty to uphold and honor the law. In re Bricker, 90 N.J. 6, 11 (1982). Pursuant to RPC 8.4(b), for an attorney to "commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects" constitutes professional misconduct. Determining the appropriate discipline for criminal misconduct by an attorney requires a consideration of many factors, including "the nature and severity of the crime, whether the crime is related to the practice of law, and any mitigating factors such as respondent's reputation, his [or her] prior trustworthy conduct, and general good conduct." In re Lunetta, 118 N.J. 443, 445-46 (1989). That respondent's crime directly involved the practice of law is undisputed. He improperly attempted to influence a zoning board's decision in favor of his client, Pooja, by promising Robert F. and his son, Robert J., that he would assist the son in obtaining permanent employment with Middlesex County in exchange for the Engels' assistance in obtaining favorable votes from two zoning board members on the Pooja project. Respondent pled guilty to the Hatch Act offense of promising a benefit in exchange for political activity. Specifically, respondent admitted that he offered Robert J. a permanent job with Middlesex County if Robert J. and his father, Robert F., would use their political influence to obtain the favorable votes of two zoning board members for respondent's client's project. The Hatch Act states in part as follows: [w]hoever, directly or indirectly, promises any employment, position, compensation, contract, appointment, or other benefit, provided for or made possible in whole or in part by any Act of Congress, or any special consideration in obtaining any such benefit, to any person as consideration, favor, or reward for any political activity or for the support of or opposition to any candidate or any political party in connection with any general or special election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any political office, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. IN THE MATTER OF SAMUEL V. CONVERY, JR., An Attorney at Law. ZAZZALI, J., concurring and dissenting. The majority fairly sets forth the facts of this case in a comprehensive opinion. I concur with the determination that respondent's conduct violates R.P.C. 8.4(b). I also agree that a penalty must be imposed upon respondent. I respectfully dissent, however, with regard to the quantum of that penalty. A reprimand and a probationary sanction including additional community service would satisfy the need to protect the public interest while serving the administration of justice. The following factors are relevant to the analysis: the decision of the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB or Board) to impose a reprimand; the determination of the Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE) not to appeal the DRB decision; the lack of knowledge on the part of respondent that his conduct was criminal; the context in which this dispute arose; the DRB dissent; the substantial mitigation; and the fairness of prospectivity. I review those circumstances seriatim. Again, the OAE stated that respondent did not knowingly commit a crime. The OAE elaborated at the DRB hearing when it said that respondent didn't realize he was committing a crime. He thought he was engaging in political lobbying. (Emphasis added.) Fundamental fairness requires that we make a decision upon the record as presented. This was a violation of the Hatch Act. That is what was charged, nothing more, nothing less. Judge Rodriguez has duly punished respondent for that infraction. We must determine how that should affect his professional standing. Our ethics jurisprudence and common sense allow us to look at respondent's state of mind in determining that penalty. Here, the DRB and the ethics prosecutor concluded that respondent did not know he was committing a crime. If it was clear to respondent that his conduct was criminal, I would join the majority. Indeed, I would argue for an even stronger penalty. But respondent believed that his conduct was political, not criminal. Sadly, that is a fine line that is all too often blurred. I do not suggest that the absence of criminal intent exonerates respondent. He is not a na.f -- he knew what he was doing. Nonetheless, he did believe that he was engaged in legal lobbying. That belief may be irrelevant to law enforcement authorities, but it is germane to an ethics determination. Importantly, the DRB and the OAE credited his belief. That does not exculpate; it does mitigate. [(Emphasis added.)] The majority opinion of the Court also recognizes that significant mitigating circumstances inhere in this case. The Office of the United States Attorney acknowledged that respondent clearly demonstrated a recognition and acceptance of responsibility for his conduct in this matter. Finally, Judge Rodriguez stated at sentencing: I am certain that this offense may be unique in your life, [and] I don't think we will ever see you again in a court of law under these circumstances. The mitigation is compelling, as the DRB found. Although Judge Rodriguez did not sanction such activity, and in fact condemned it as serious, as do we, he assists our review because he identified the political milieu in which respondent's misconduct occurred. Just as he balanced the wrong against the reality in meting out the sentence, we achieve justice if we issue a probationary sanction together with a reprimand, plus additional community service, and a warning to all that suspension without conditions will be the byword for those who continue to conduct business as usual. NO. D-57 IN THE MATTER OF SAMUEL V. CONVERY, JR., An Attorney at Law. Decided February 2, 2001 Opinion by PER CURIAM Concurring/Dissenting Opinion by Justice Zazzali