Case Title: In re Tucker

Citation: 348 N.C. 677

Docket Number: 96CR05088

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1998-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 617A97
FILED: 9 JULY 1998
IN RE:
INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE, NO. 207
ELTON G. TUCKER, Respondent
This matter is before the Court upon a recommendation
by the Judicial Standards Commission, entered 16 December 1997,
that respondent, Judge Elton G. Tucker, a Judge of the General
Court of Justice, District Court Division, Fifth Judicial
District of the State of North Carolina, be censured for conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the
judicial office into disrepute in violation of Canons 2A, 3A(1),
and 3A(4) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct.  Heard
in the Supreme Court 28 May 1998.
William N. Farrell, Jr., Special Counsel, for the
Judicial Standards Commission.
Tharrington Smith, L.L.P., by Roger W. Smith, E. Hardy
Lewis, and F. Hill Allen, for respondent.
ORDER REJECTING CENSURE.
The Judicial Standards Commission (Commission) bases
its recommendation for censure upon two sets of actions by Judge
Tucker (respondent) involving four individual cases.  The
Commission notified respondent on 15 July 1996 that it had
ordered a preliminary investigation to make inquiry concerning
alleged misconduct.  Special counsel for the Commission filed a
complaint against respondent on 19 May 1997, alleging that
respondent: (1) disposed of two cases involving defendants
charged with driving while impaired (DWI), State v. Mullaney, New
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Hanover County docket number 96CR05088, and State v. Nored, New
Hanover County docket number 96CR10555, ex parte when neither
case was calendared for his courtroom and no evidence was
presented; and (2) continued prayer for judgment for two years
and then dismissed the cases of State v. Webb, Pender County
docket number 93CR01250, and State v. Doffermyre, New Hanover
County docket number 93CR19541, also involving defendants charged
with DWI.  Respondent answered, generally admitting the factual
allegations but denying that they described the use of his
judicial power for purposes which he knew or should have known
were beyond the legitimate exercise of his authority.
 
After a hearing conducted 13 November 1997, the
Commission found that respondent entered not guilty pleas and not
guilty verdicts in the Mullaney and Nored cases based solely on
the ex parte representations of defense attorney John Collins,
without determining whether the State had consented to the
dispositions or wished to be heard.  The Commission further found
that respondent failed to carry out his duty to pronounce
judgment and sentence as mandated by N.C.G.S. § 20-179 in the
Webb and Doffermyre cases.  Based on its findings, the Commission
concluded that respondent’s conduct constituted conduct in
violation of Canons 2A, 3A(1), and 3A(4) of the North Carolina
Code of Judicial Conduct, conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into
disrepute, and willful misconduct in office in light of a private
reprimand issued in 1986.  The Commission recommended that this
Court censure respondent.
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We appreciate the Commission’s thorough analysis and
recommendations.  The Commission serves “as an arm of the Court
to conduct hearings for the purpose of aiding the Supreme Court
in determining whether a judge is unfit or unsuitable.”  In re
Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 97, 240 S.E.2d 367, 372 (1978).  However,
when the Commission’s recommendations are reviewed, they “are not
binding upon the Supreme Court, which will consider the evidence
of both sides and exercise its independent judgment as to whether
it should censure, remove or decline to do either.”  In re
Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 244, 237 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1977). 
Historically, the Court has resisted adopting “strict guidelines”
for determining whether a judge should be censured or removed and
has instead chosen to decide each case “upon its own facts.”  In
re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 157, 250 S.E.2d 890, 918 (1978), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 929, 61 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979).  After carefully
reviewing the record, the evidence presented at the hearing
before the Commission, the recommendation of the Commission, and
the briefs of both parties, and after hearing oral argument, this
Court concludes that respondent’s conduct does not require
censure.
Respondent’s conduct as to the first set of cases can
be summarized as follows.  On 26 June 1996, respondent was
presiding over New Hanover County Criminal District Court in
courtroom 317.  Defense attorney Collins approached respondent at
the bench with the Mullaney and Nored case files.  Collins
presented respondent with the files and said, “These are for not
guilty, not guilty.”  According to former assistant district
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attorney Sandra Gray Criner, “not guilty, not guilty” was a
practice which had developed in dealing with DWI cases for which
the Breathalyzer test results were sufficient but for which some
other essential element was lacking.  The policy of the elected
district attorney was “not to dismiss driving while impaired
charges” for a defendant who blew .08 on the Breathalyzer or
refused to take the Breathalyzer test.  Rather than violate this
policy by dismissing a DWI case, the assistant district attorney
would call the case but not present any evidence.  Of necessity,
if the State presented no evidence, the judge would enter a not
guilty verdict.
Over a period of time, this practice was reduced to the
shorthand of “not guilty, not guilty.”  After determining that
the State had insufficient evidence to prosecute a DWI case,
Criner testified that she and the defense attorney would take the
case file to respondent and state, “This is a not guilty, not
guilty,” meaning that the defendant was pleading not guilty, the
State was presenting no evidence, and the judge should enter a
verdict of not guilty.  In some instances, after discussing the
case, either Criner or the defense attorney alone would take the
case to respondent for this “not guilty, not guilty” treatment. 
Respondent testified that while this was not a common practice,
it was not unusual either.  Evidence in the record suggests that
other assistant district attorneys and other defense attorneys
may also have engaged in this “not guilty, not guilty” procedure;
the evidence is inconclusive as to whether it was practiced by
any other district court judges.  It is apparent from the record
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that John Carriker, District Attorney for the Fifth Prosecutorial
District, was unaware of this practice.
In the Nored and Mullaney cases, when defense attorney
Collins presented respondent with the case files and stated,
“These are for not guilty, not guilty,” respondent understood
that to mean that the assistant district attorney had been
consulted on these cases and that the State would present no
evidence.  Respondent acted as he had on previous occasions under
similar circumstances and entered not guilty pleas and not guilty
verdicts.  Collins testified that he “believed [he] had the
consent of Ms. Criner” in the Nored and Mullaney cases based on a
brief conversation they had had two weeks earlier.  However,
Criner had not authorized Collins to proceed in such a manner
with these two cases.  Collins had removed the Nored case file
from courtroom 302 and had taken the Mullaney file from its place
in courtroom 317 without the permission of either of those
courtrooms’ prosecuting attorneys.  For unknown motives, Collins,
whom respondent had ample reason to trust by reputation, by
personal knowledge, and by his position as an officer of the
court, misled respondent as to the status of these two cases,
resulting in State v. Mullaney and State v. Nored being disposed
of without the State’s consent and without the State being heard.
In 1978, Chief Justice Sharp wrote that no judge can
“justify disposing of a criminal case in court without the
knowledge of the prosecuting attorney, for when he does so he
purposely violates the duties of his office.”  In re Peoples, 296
N.C. at 155, 250 S.E.2d at 916.  This pronouncement is as valid
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today as when it was made, and our decision in this case is in no
measure intended to weaken or undermine it.  However, we conclude
that in the particular instances in question respondent did not
intentionally or knowingly dispose of the cases “without the
knowledge of the prosecuting attorney.”  The State, through the
actions of at least one assistant district attorney, had
acquiesced in, if not initiated, the process of disposing of
cases in this shorthand manner.  We cannot say, under these
peculiar circumstances, that respondent must be censured for
failing to make further inquiry as to the State’s position.
Nonetheless, we strongly condemn the “not guilty, not
guilty” practice engaged in by respondent, assistant district
attorney Criner, and Mr. Collins.  Each judge and attorney in the
courts of our State has a duty to uphold the legal process. 
Neither complacency nor the search for efficiency should obscure
that responsibility.  We reaffirm the standard announced in In re
Nowell:
[T]he disposition of any case for reasons
other than an honest appraisal of the facts
and law as disclosed by the evidence and the
advocacy of both parties[] will amount to
conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice.  In due course, such conduct cannot
fail to bring the judicial office into
disrepute.
In re Nowell, 293 N.C. at 251, 237 S.E.2d at 256.  While we do
not approve of or condone respondent’s actions, we decline to
hold that respondent’s participation in this process, under the
circumstances, amounted to conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice which brings the judicial office into
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disrepute.  However, we send a clear warning to judges, district
attorneys, assistant district attorneys, and defense attorneys
that such procedures and practices are wholly unacceptable.
As to the second set of cases at issue, respondent’s
actions can be described as follows.  On 3 June 1993, in the case
of State v. Webb, respondent determined, following a trial on a
plea of not guilty, that the defendant was guilty of driving
while impaired.  Defense counsel argued that the defendant had no
prior alcohol-related offenses, that he drove for a living and
would lose his commercial driver’s license if convicted of DWI,
and that he had small children.  Respondent did not enter a
verdict of guilty, but continued prayer for judgment for two
years with the case to be dismissed at that time if the defendant
had no alcohol-related moving violations in that time period.  On
3 February 1994, the defendant in the Webb case came before
respondent again, having been charged with DWI but pleading
guilty to a reduced charge of reckless operation, a nonalcohol-
related offense.  When the DWI case from June 1993 came on for
disposition before respondent on 22 June 1995, respondent
dismissed it because there had been no intervening convictions
for alcohol-related moving violations.  In a similar occurrence,
on 19 April 1994, respondent continued prayer for judgment for
two years in the case of State v. Doffermyre after finding the
defendant guilty on a plea of guilty to DWI.  When the Doffermyre
case came on for judgment on 19 April 1996, respondent dismissed
the case.
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Evidence adduced at the hearing before the Commission
showed that respondent firmly believed he had the authority to
prevent a “conviction” by continuing prayer for judgment to a
date certain and then dismissing the case.  Respondent considered
the PJC (prayer for judgment continued) to be a “commonly used
tool” in disposing of misdemeanor cases and did not know that it
was not available for DWI cases.  He mistakenly believed that the
mandatory sentencing provisions of N.C.G.S. § 20-179 would not
come into effect if he continued prayer for judgment until a date
certain and then dismissed the case.  Respondent testified that
“it was my opinion that until a sentence was entered--until a
judgment was pronounced that there was no conviction.”  He
continued to adhere to this interpretation of the law even after
the complaint in this inquiry was filed.
This Court held in In re Greene, 297 N.C. 305, 255
S.E.2d 142 (1979), that “the Courts of North Carolina do not have
an ‘inherent’ power to continue prayer for judgment on conditions
or to suspend sentence where the sentence is made mandatory by
the General Assembly.”  Id. at 312, 255 S.E.2d at 147.  Greene 
involved the sentencing provisions of N.C.G.S. § 20-179, under
which the General Assembly mandated an entry of judgment and
sentence upon conviction on or a plea of guilty to a charge of
DWI.  When the case of Greene was brought to the attention of
respondent in August 1997 by former Superior Court Judge Gary
Trawick, respondent conceded that he did not have authority to
continue prayer for judgment in a DWI case by virtue of the
mandatory sentencing required by N.C.G.S. § 20-179.  Respondent
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testified before the Commission that he recognized that he had
been mistaken about his authority and that he would no longer
continue prayer for judgment in order to dismiss a DWI case.
A judge is expected to “be faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence in it.”  Code of Judicial
Conduct Canon 3A(1), 1998 Ann. R. N.C. 247-48.  However, we have
stated that judges may not be disciplined for errors of judgment
or errors of law.  In re Martin, 333 N.C. 242, 245, 424 S.E.2d
118, 120 (1993).  Respondent’s error in the Webb and Doffermyre
cases occurred when he entered prayers for judgment continued and
then dismissals, rather than sentences as required by N.C.G.S. §
20-179, upon finding the defendants guilty of DWI.  This conduct
was the result of a mistaken, but honest, interpretation of the
law and respondent’s authority under the statute.  It did not
involve “more than an error of judgment or a mere lack of
diligence,” In re Nowell, 293 N.C. at 248, 237 S.E.2d at 255,
and, as such, does not merit censure.
In summary, we conclude that the actions of respondent
at issue here were not so egregious as to amount to conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the
judicial office into disrepute within the meaning of N.C.G.S. §
7A-376.
Now, therefore, it is, pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-376
and -377 and Rule 3 of the Rules for Supreme Court Review of
Recommendations of the Judicial Standards Commission, ordered
that the recommendation of the Commission that Judge Elton G.
Tucker be censured be, and is hereby, rejected.
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Done by order of the Court in Conference, this the 8th
day of July, 1998.
________________________________
         For the Court
WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, this the ____ day of July 1998.
CHRISTIE SPEIR CAMERON
Clerk of the Supreme Court
________________________________
Assistant Clerk