Case Title: Ruffin v. Delaware

Citation: 

Docket Number: 56, 2015

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2015-12-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RAMON RUFFIN, 
 
 
§  
 
§  
No. 56, 2015 
Defendant-Below,  
 
§  
  
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below – Superior Court  
§ 
of the State of Delaware  
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   
in and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID. No. 1312005545A 
STATE OF DELAWARE,       
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff-Below,         
 
§  
 
            
 
      
Appellee. 
 
             
§    
 
                                            
 
Submitted:  October 7, 2015 
Decided: December 3, 2015 
 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; HOLLAND, and VALIHURA, Justices. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
Santino Ceccotti, Esquire, Office of Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware, 
Attorney for Defendant-Below, Appellant. 
 
John Williams, Esquire, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, Attorney for 
Plaintiff-Below, Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Ramon Ruffin was charged in an eleven-count indictment with the following 
offenses: one count of Attempted Robbery First Degree, three counts of Possession 
of a Firearm During Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”), one count of Assault 
First Degree, one count of Aggravated Menacing, two counts of Possession of a 
Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”),1 one count of Receiving a Stolen 
Firearm, one count of Disregarding a Police Officer’s Signal and one count of 
Resisting Arrest.   
Following a jury trial, Ruffin was found guilty of Assault Second Degree, 
the lesser included offense of Assault First Degree.  He was convicted him, as 
charged, of all other counts.  Ruffin was declared a habitual offender pursuant to 
11 Del. C. § 4214(a).  He was sentenced to be incarcerated for a minimum of 113 
years.  
Ruffin raises four claims on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in admitting the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) trace report into 
evidence because it was inadmissible hearsay; (2) he was denied a fair trial due to 
improper, suggestive eyewitness identification; (3) the trial court erred in denying 
his request for a Lolly2 instruction regarding the State’s failure to test allegedly 
exculpatory evidence; and (4) he was prejudiced by cumulative error.  We have 
concluded that all of Ruffin’s claims are without merit.  Therefore, the Superior 
                                                          
 
1 Ruffin filed a motion for severance as to both counts of PFBPP.  The motion was granted. 
2 Lolly v. State, 611 A.2d 956 (Del. 1992). 
 
 
3 
 
Court’s judgment of conviction must be affirmed. 
Facts 
Robert Alan Cocozzoli is the owner of two McDonald’s restaurant 
franchises in Dover, Delaware.  On Monday afternoon, December 9, 2013, 
Cocozzoli was at his McDonald’s restaurant located on the northbound side of U.S. 
Route 13.  Cocozzoli was taking items outside to his Nissan Murano SUV parked 
on the south side of the restaurant. 
As Cocozzoli was putting items into his car, a person approached from the 
rear asking for a cigarette.  When Cocozzoli turned around, he heard, “Give me 
your wallet.”  At that point, he saw Ramon Ruffin pointing a gun at him.3  The gun 
Ruffin was holding looked to Cocozzoli like a .45 caliber weapon.4  After Ruffin’s 
demand for Cocozzoli’s wallet, Cocozzoli grabbed Ruffin’s hand containing the 
gun and a struggle between the two men ensued in the parking lot.  Ruffin struck 
Cocozzoli in the head several times with the gun.   
While Cocozzoli was struggling with Ruffin, a Pepsi van operated by Robert 
Yaniak, Jr. pulled into the McDonald’s parking lot.  Yaniak saw Ruffin beating 
Cocozzoli in the face repeatedly with a gun.  When Yaniak blew his van’s horn, 
Ruffin was distracted from his attack on Cocozzoli and pointed the gun at Yaniak.  
                                                          
 
3 Cocozzoli identified Ruffin at trial as the individual who approached him in the McDonald’s 
restaurant parking lot on the afternoon of December 9, 2013. 
4 Cocozzoli was shown a Hi-Point .45 caliber semiautomatic handgun that the State admitted at 
trial as State’s Exhibit #11.  Cocozzoli confirmed that it looked like the gun Ruffin pointed at 
him. 
 
 
4 
 
Yaniak had stopped his van about twenty feet from the scene of the struggle.  
Yaniak saw Ruffin’s face and thought Ruffin was going to shoot him.5   
Yaniak then saw Ruffin run to the driver’s side of a white Pontiac minivan.  
According to both Cocozzoli and Yaniak, Ruffin got into the driver’s side of the 
van.  The white Pontiac minivan backed out of a parking space in front of Yaniak, 
who wrote down the vehicle’s Delaware license plate number. 
After Ruffin fled northbound on U.S. Route 13 in the minivan, Yaniak 
exited his vehicle.  Cocozzoli told Yaniak to call 911.  In his 911 call, Yaniak 
described Ruffin’s getaway vehicle and gave the Delaware license plate number.  
Paramedics arrived at the McDonald’s and transported Cocozzoli to Kent General 
Hospital in Dover.  Cocozzoli had cuts on his face, ear, and cheek as a result of 
Ruffin’s attack.  Hospital X-rays revealed that Cocozzoli had cheek bone fractures.   
A police radio broadcast notified patrolling officers to be on the lookout for 
a robbery suspect fleeing northbound on U.S. Route 13 in a white Pontiac minivan 
with Delaware license plate number 57722.  The police broadcast described the 
robbery suspect as a black male with a handgun. 
Dover Police Department Corporal Brian Sherwood was driving on 
Scarborough Road near U.S. Route 13 in north Dover, when he received the police 
                                                          
 
5 Yaniak also identified Ruffin at trial as the individual he saw attacking Cocozzoli in the 
McDonald’s parking lot and as the person who pointed a gun at Yaniak.  Yaniak testified that 
Ruffin’s gun was a black semiautomatic. 
 
 
5 
 
radio broadcast of a robbery in progress.  Corporal Sherwood drove his unmarked 
police car to U.S. Route 13 and headed southbound.  Corporal Sherwood spotted 
the white Pontiac minivan as it passed him from the opposite direction proceeding 
northbound on U.S. Route 13.  Corporal Sherwood verified the license plate 
number and observed a black male with a red jacket driving.  Corporal Sherwood 
made a U-turn at Kentwood Drive and then drove northbound on U.S. Route 13 in 
pursuit. 
The white Pontiac minivan also made a U-turn and proceeded southbound 
on U.S. Route 13 until it turned right into the entranceway for a Holiday Inn and 
another McDonald’s restaurant.  At this point, Corporal Sherwood activated the 
lights and siren on his police vehicle.  The white Pontiac minivan attempted to 
elude the police by returning to U.S. Route 13 southbound, turning right into an old 
Wal-Mart store parking lot, driving on Crawford Carroll Road and then 
Scarborough Road before returning to U.S. Route 13. 
During the circular police pursuit, Corporal Sherwood observed the white 
Pontiac minivan run three stop signs, sideswipe a Dodge Ram vehicle, and bump a 
red car several times in an effort to push that vehicle out of the way.  Corporal 
Sherwood also observed a passenger inside the minivan.  Other Dover Police 
vehicles joined in the highway pursuit of the minivan.  At Ruffin’s trial, the jury 
observed three DVDs taken by Dover Police in-car dash cameras of the police 
 
 
6 
 
chase. 
After retracing its route past the old Wal-Mart store a second time, the white 
Pontiac minivan drove across Scarborough Road into the DelTech campus.  At this 
point, four Dover Police Officers (Brian Sherwood, Ian Thompson, Harvey Jaksch, 
and James Paul Piazza) were all in pursuit of the white Pontiac minivan.  As the 
minivan attempted to exit from the DelTech campus to turn left onto Denneys 
Road, the minivan slid over a curb and became lodged on a metal post. 
The backseat passenger of the white Pontiac minivan, later identified as 
Wilbur Doughty, jumped out and ran towards Denneys Road where he was 
apprehended by Dover Police.  The driver of the minivan also fled by running east 
toward the DelTech buildings where he was also taken into custody.  Corporal 
Sherwood, who apprehended Ruffin, identified Ruffin at trial as the driver of the 
white Pontiac minivan.  Similarly, Dover Police Officer Harvey Jaksch identified 
Ruffin at trial as the man who exited the driver’s side door of the minivan and who 
was chased down by Corporal Sherwood.  After the apprehensions of Ruffin and 
Doughty, Corporal Sherwood and Officer Jaksch observed a semiautomatic pistol 
on the minivan floor behind the front driver’s seat. 
Dover Police Department Crime Scene Investigator (“CSI”) Lawrence 
Simpkiss went to the DelTech campus on December 9, 2013, after being advised of 
an incident involving a robbery with a gun and a police pursuit.  CSI Simpkiss took 
 
 
7 
 
several photographs of the white Pontiac minivan, and located a .45 caliber 
semiautomatic Hi-Point handgun behind the front driver’s seat and in front of the 
rear passenger seat.  The gun was loaded with one cartridge in the chamber and 
eight more shells in the magazine.  The gun retrieved by CSI Simpkiss after the 
police chase was admitted without objection at trial as State’s Exhibit #11. 
CSI Simpkiss found blood on the gun.  CSI Simpkiss contacted the ATF for 
a trace report on the gun (the “ATF Report”).  The ATF Report revealed that the 
gun was originally purchased on February 4, 2007 in Richmond, Virginia by Larry 
Alphonso Tucker.  The ATF Report of the gun was admitted at trial as State’s 
Exhibit #12.  A subsequent National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) search of 
the gun by Dover Police Detective Matthew Knight revealed that the gun had been 
reported as stolen. 
Ruffin elected not to testify at his jury trial and the defense presented no 
witnesses.   
ATF Report Challenged 
The first issued raised by Ruffin challenges the evidentiary basis for his 
conviction of receiving a stolen firearm in violation of 11 Del. C. § 1450.  During 
Ruffin’s trial the State sought to admit the ATF Report, a federal government 
report concerning the purchaser of the gun that the Dover State Police recovered 
from the white Pontiac minivan Ruffin was driving leading up to his apprehension.  
 
 
8 
 
Outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor explained the circumstances of 
how CSI Simpkiss obtained a copy of the ATF Report from the federal 
government.  Defense counsel for Ruffin objected to admission of the ATF Report 
as written hearsay.   
The issue at trial was whether the ATF Report qualified as an exception to 
the rule against hearsay under either Rule 803(6) of the Delaware Rules of 
Evidence (“D.R.E.”), as a business record, or D.R.E. 803(8), as a public record or 
report.  The prosecutor initially argued that the ATF Report should be admissible 
as a business record.  The trial judge was not persuaded and stated: “So I don’t 
think that a public agency is a business.  So I don’t think it comes in under [D.R.E. 
803(6)].” 
The trial judge then considered whether the ATF Report was admissible as a 
public record or report under D.R.E. 803(8).  The trial judge concluded that a 
report from the ATF about the purchase of a firearm from a licensed dealer did not 
constitute a “finding of fact” but instead constituted a compilation of data.  
Accordingly, the trial judge stated: “So my ruling is that assuming that [CSI] 
Simpkiss can lay a proper foundation under 803(8), that [the ATF Report] comes 
in as a public record.” 
When defense counsel further argued that the ATF Report, which included 
gun purchase information, was an “investigative report” prepared by the federal 
 
 
9 
 
government, the trial judge disagreed, stating: 
I just don’t really agree that it’s an investigative – that 
this one-page document is an investigative report.  I think 
it’s just a data compilation.  It’s a statement of data that’s 
compiled.  I just don’t think it rises to the level of being 
an investigative report. 
 
Following this evidentiary ruling, CSI Simpkiss appeared as the next 
prosecution witness.  The gun that was recovered from the white Pontiac minivan 
Ruffin was driving was admitted without defense objection.  CSI Simpkiss 
explained that his normal investigative procedure is to process a gun for 
fingerprints and DNA and conduct an ATF trace report on the gun.   
CSI Simpkiss testified: “Basically if a firearm comes in with a serial number 
on it, I type in information into the ATF web page in effort to get a purchaser 
information on the gun.  It will give me the last known legal purchase of the gun.”  
CSI Simpkiss added that when someone purchases a gun, the transaction is 
reported to the ATF.  In Ruffin’s case, CSI Simpkiss requested an ATF trace report 
of the recovered gun.  Three days after his request, CSI Simpkiss received the ATF 
Report.   
CSI Simpkiss testified the ATF Report was the standard type of document 
he receives when he submits a request for an ATF trace report for a gun with a 
serial number.  In this instance, the gun with serial number X460323 was 
purchased February 4, 2007 from Virginia Firearms and Transfers Incorporated in 
 
 
10 
 
Richmond, Virginia.  The 2007 handgun purchaser was Larry Alphonso Tucker.  
On the basis of his prior evidentiary ruling, the trial judge permitted the ATF 
Report to be admitted into evidence as State’s Exhibit #12. 
Public Records’ Admissibility 
D.R.E. 803(8) provides that the following public records are exceptions to 
the rule against hearsay, and therefore may be admissible: 
[R]ecords, reports, statements or data compilations, in any form, of a 
public office or agency setting forth its regularly conducted and 
regularly recorded activities, or matters observed pursuant to duty 
imposed by law and as to which there was a duty to report, or factual 
findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority 
granted by law.6 
 
The rule further provides that the following public records do not fit within this 
exception to the hearsay rule, and therefore may not be admissible: 
(A) Investigative reports by police and other law-enforcement 
personnel; (B) investigative reports prepared by or for a government, 
a public office or an agency when offered by it in a case in which it is 
a party; (C) factual findings offered by the government in criminal 
cases; (D) factual findings resulting from special investigation of a 
particular complaint, case or incident; (E) any matter as to which the 
sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness.7 
 
The comments to the Delaware Rules of Evidence state that D.R.E. 803(8) tracks 
the language of Rule 803(8) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence (“U.R.E.”), a rule 
which, according to the comments, “was believed to be preferable over [Federal 
                                                          
 
6 D.R.E. 803(8). 
7 Id. 
 
 
11 
 
Rules of Evidence Rule] 803(8).”8 
Indeed, D.R.E. 803(8) tracks the language of U.R.E. 803(8) with only minor 
variations in the text.  There are no differences with regard to the content of the 
two rules.  First, U.R.E 803(8) prefaces its public records exception to the rule 
against hearsay by requiring the source of information contained in the record to be 
trustworthy.  Second, U.R.E. 803(8) was amended to use the term “record” in lieu 
of the phrase “records, reports, statements or data compilations, in any form,” a 
phrase which D.R.E. 803(8) still uses.  The comment to U.R.E. 803(8) provides the 
reasoning behind this amendment.   
The comment to U.R.E. 803(8) states that in “today’s technological 
environment . . . records are, or may be, kept in a variety of mediums other than 
just ‘data compilations.’”  Public records “do not consist solely of ‘data 
compilations’” and the term “records” includes emails, electronic documents, 
physical documents, images, and information compiled in databases.  The U.R.E. 
803(8) amendment reflects an understanding that the term “records” naturally 
encompasses “reports, statements or data compilations” and it is therefore 
unnecessary to list all items.  This minor stylistic change, however, does not alter 
the meaning or effect of the rule.  
 
The language of Rule 803(8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (“F.R.E.”) is 
                                                          
 
8 D.R.E. 803 cmt. 
 
 
12 
 
also similar to the language of D.R.E. 803(8) and U.R.E. 803(8). Although the 
comments to D.R.E. 803(8) indicate that “D.R.E. 803(8) tracks U.R.E. 803(8),” 
F.R.E. 803(8) contains the same essential provisions as the Delaware and Uniform 
Rules.  Therefore, federal decisions interpreting F.R.E. 803(8) are didactic in our 
analysis of Ruffin’s case.  
 
F.R.E. 803(8) provides that a record or statement of a public office is not 
excluded by the rule against hearsay if: 
(A)  it sets out: 
 
 
(i) 
the office’s activities; 
(ii)  
a matter observed while under a legal duty to report, but 
not including, in a criminal case, a matter observed by law-
enforcement personnel, or; 
(iii) 
in a civil case or against the government in a criminal 
case, factual findings from a legally authorized investigation; 
and 
(B)  the opponent does not show that the source of information or  
       other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness. 
 
 
In summary, there are two basic features supporting the exclusion of public 
records from the rule against hearsay under each of the three standards (D.R.E., 
U.R.E., F.R.E.).  First, public records from law-enforcement agencies that are 
investigative and have a focus toward litigation will not be admissible.  Second, 
public records must be trustworthy to be admissible.  Indeed, all three standards 
exclude public records from the rule against hearsay based on an understanding 
 
 
13 
 
that reports prepared by the government are trustworthy.9  
Trustworthiness can be established by showing that the public record was 
created pursuant to a legal duty.10  Trustworthiness can also be established by other 
circumstances that the court finds reasonably sufficient.11  Trustworthiness is 
questioned, however, if the public records were investigative or prepared by law-
enforcement agencies with a focus toward litigation.  
Delaware Precedents 
 
Although this Court has not directly addressed the admissibility of ATF 
reports, D.R.E. 803(8) has been applied to a variety of public records that are 
similar to the ATF Report at issue here.  In Hickson v. State,12 this Court held that 
information regarding a vehicle’s registration contained in the Delaware Criminal 
Justice Information System (“DELJIS”), a statewide database of criminal records, 
was admissible under D.R.E. 803(8).13  This Court reasoned that the DELJIS is a 
state agency charged, under 11 Del. C. §§ 8601, 8602(3) and (4), with maintaining 
“an accurate and efficient criminal justice information system.”14  Under 21 Del. C. 
                                                          
 
9 See JACK B. WEINSTEIN AND MARGARET A. BERGER, STUDENT EDITION OF WEINSTEIN’S 
EVIDENCE MANUAL § 16.02[2][a]. 
10 See Duross v. State, 494 A.2d 1265, 1270 (Del. 1985) (“Nor, do we find any reason in this 
case to doubt the trustworthiness of testimony concerning a report prepared pursuant to a 
statutory duty.”) (applying D.R.E. 803(8)). 
11 See Hickson v. State, 2003 WL 1857529, at *1 (Del. Apr. 7, 2003) (“[R]outine use of 
[Delaware’s database of criminal justice information] renders [a report] sufficiently 
trustworthy.”) (applying D.R.E. 803(8)).  
12 2003 WL 1857529 (Del. Apr. 7, 2003). 
13 Id. at *1. 
14 Id. 
 
 
14 
 
§ 2101, the State’s Division of Motor Vehicles is required to maintain records of 
vehicle registration.15  Accordingly, we noted that, “[r]ead in tandem, these statutes 
reflect a State-imposed duty to record vehicle registration and the authorization to 
make such records available to [government] agencies.”16  Furthermore, we held 
that “police officers routinely use the DELJIS system in order to ascertain publicly 
stored information concerning motor vehicles” such that “the routine use of this 
public system renders it sufficiently trustworthy.”17 
 
In Trawick v. State,18 this Court held that a certified court record of a prior 
conviction is a record from a public agency, and, as such, is a public record that 
may be admissible under D.R.E. 803(8).19  We added that such records would be 
self-authenticating under D.R.E. 902(4) and (1).20  
 
In General Motors Corp. v. Grenier,21 this Court held that the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) Gold Book report (the “Gold Book 
Report”) was admissible under D.R.E. 803(8).22  The EPA released the Gold Book 
Report in 1986 to advise auto mechanics who might be exposed to asbestos.  The 
                                                          
 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 845 A.2d 505 (Del. 2004). 
19 Id. at 509. 
20 Id.  D.R.E. 902(4) states that extrinsic evidence of authenticity of evidence is not required for 
copies of an official record or report if such records can be certified by complying with D.R.E. 
902 (1), (2), or (3).  Under D.R.E. 902(1), records that bear the seal of the government will be 
deemed self-authenticated.  
21 981 A.2d 531 (Del. 2009). 
22 Id. at 539. 
 
 
15 
 
Gold Book Report explained what diseases mechanics might contract if they came 
in contact with asbestos and how to control their exposure to asbestos.  The Gold 
Book Report cited thirty-seven sources of information, including articles by 
scientists, other EPA reports, and reports from other federal agencies.23  We held 
that the Gold Book Report was sufficiently trustworthy, that the EPA had the 
authority to disseminate such information, and that the Gold Book Report set forth 
factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted 
by law.24  Therefore, the Gold Book Report was admissible into evidence.25  
Federal Precedents 
 
Federal courts have held specifically that ATF reports are public records and 
admissible under F.R.E. 803(8).  In the criminal case of United States v. Johnson,26 
the Eighth Circuit examined the admissibility of an ATF report that contained a 
firearm’s serial number and indicated that the firearm had traveled in interstate 
commerce.27  The Eighth Circuit held that the ATF report was admissible under 
F.R.E. 803(8),28 because the information contained in the ATF report was neither a 
“matter ‘observed by law enforcement personnel,’” nor was the ATF report 
                                                          
 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 722 F.2d 407 (8th Cir. 1983). 
27 Id. at 410. 
28 Id. 
 
 
16 
 
maintained in anticipation of the defendant’s trial.29  Rather, the ATF report was 
created pursuant to a statutory duty.30 
 
In the civil case of Augustson v. Holder,31 the District Court for the District 
of New Mexico held that ATF reports regarding violations of compliance rules and 
inspections were admissible under what was then F.R.E. 803(8)(C).32  The text of 
F.R.E. 803(8)(C) was restructured in 2010 and is now F.R.E. 803(B)(iii).33  The 
District Court found that F.R.E. 803(B)(iii) provides admissibility for government 
reports that, in civil cases, are limited to “factual findings resulting from an 
investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law.”34  Applying F.R.E. 
803(b)(iii), the District Court held that the ATF reports at issue were made during 
the course of a compliance inspection pursuant to the Gun Control Act of 1968, 
and, as such, were admissible.35  
                                                          
 
29 Id. (quoting F.R.E. 803(8)). 
30 Id.  
31 728 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D.N.M. 2010). 
32 Id. at 1284. 
33 U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE 
ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES 67 (2010).  The Committee Note to the restyled Rule 
803 provides that: 
The language of Rule 803 has been amended as part of the restyling of the 
Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and 
terminology consistent throughout the rules.  These changes are intended to be 
stylistic only.  There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence 
admissibility. 
Id. at 71. 
34 Augustson, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 1284. 
35 Id. 
 
 
17 
 
ATF Report Properly Admitted 
 
We hold that the ATF Report at issue in Ruffin’s case is admissible under 
D.R.E. 803(8) as a public record.  First, the record reflects that the information 
included in the ATF Report was gathered pursuant to a duty imposed by law.  The 
Gun Control Act requires firearms dealers to fill out a transaction form, containing 
information about both the purchaser and the firearm, any time a firearm is sold.36  
Firearms dealers are under a legal duty to retain those forms for twenty years and 
to make such forms available to the ATF, essentially allowing the ATF to trace 
firearm sales.37  Therefore, like the vehicle record addressed by this Court in 
Hickson, the firearm record at issue in this case was created as a result of a legal 
duty imposed upon firearms dealers.38  
 
Second, based on the above procedure and duty, the ATF Report cannot be 
deemed, under D.R.E. 803(8), to be an investigative report prepared by law 
enforcement with any focus toward litigation.  As the trial judge found, the ATF 
                                                          
 
36 27 C.F.R. § 478.124.  “The [Gun Control Act] requires a firearms dealer to fill out a ‘Form 
4473’ (‘Form’) whenever a firearm is sold.  The Form is used to record identifying information 
about gun purchasers and the firearms they purchase, which allows firearms to be traced and 
prevents transfer to persons prohibited from possessing firearms.”  Article II Gun Shop, Inc. v. 
Gonzales, 441 F.3d 492, 494 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing 27 C.F.R. § 478.124(c)(2)). 
37 See 27 C.F.R. § 478.129(b). 
38 Assuming that the ATF did not have possession of the transaction forms or relevant 
information, that does not render the report inadmissible.  The information used to create the 
ATF Report is contained within ATF forms that distributors are under a legal duty to complete 
and maintain.  See 27 C.F.R. § 478.124.  Distributors are also under a legal duty to make these 
forms available to the ATF upon request.  See 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (2012).  Thus, the relevant 
information on the disputed report comes from ATF forms maintained by entities that “observed 
[the transaction] pursuant to [a] duty imposed by law and as to which there was a duty to report.”  
D.R.E. 803(8).   
 
 
18 
 
Report “is not making a finding of fact.  It’s simply compiling data.”  Moreover, 
the ATF Report was not introduced into evidence to prove that Ruffin was in 
possession of a stolen firearm.  
The actual trial evidence that the gun found in the white Pontiac minivan 
was stolen was provided by the next prosecution witness, Dover Police Detective 
Matthew Knight.  Detective Knight testified that information that the gun, State’s 
Exhibit #11, was stolen came from the NCIC.  Unlike information obtained from 
the ATF, information from the NCIC, such as details on stolen property, comes 
from a national database very similar to the DELJIS database discussed in 
Hickson.39  Ruffin did not object to Detective Knight’s testimony at trial.40  
Detective Knight’s recital of his NCIC search is the only evidence that 
affirmatively showed that the gun in question was stolen.  Thus, the ATF Report 
lends support to the charge of receiving a stolen firearm, but it was not, as Ruffin 
asserts, the “only credible evidence that Ruffin knowingly received a stolen 
firearm.”   
Eyewitness Identifications Properly Admitted 
On the first day of trial, Cocozzoli was asked during defense cross-
examination if he had viewed the in-car videos taken from the police vehicles 
                                                          
 
39 Hickson, 2003 WL 1857529, at *1 (“[R]outine use of [the DELJIS database] renders it 
sufficiently trustworthy.”). 
40 The NCIC report was not introduced and Detective Knight’s testimony is the only evidence of 
the NCIC search. 
 
 
19 
 
operated by Officers Thompson, Jaksch, and Piazza during the motor vehicle 
pursuit of Ruffin.  Cocozzoli replied that he had not seen those videos, but “I saw 
two photographs today . . . .”  Cocozzoli explained that the prosecutor had shown 
him the two photographs.  Ruffin’s defense counsel then asked: “And [the 
Prosecutor] told you they were two individuals inside that white [Pontiac] minivan, 
right?”  
On redirect examination of Cocozzoli, the prosecutor asked if his earlier in-
court identification of Ruffin as his attacker was based on the photo of Ruffin he 
saw that morning, or if he had “a memory, a direct recollection, of seeing the 
defendant up close and personal between that one to two minute attempted 
robbery?”  Cocozzoli said his in-court identification of Ruffin was based on his 
memory “from the incident with the robbery.” 
In recross-examination, Ruffin’s defense counsel returned to the photo 
display viewed on the day of trial but prior to Cocozzoli’s testimony and asked, 
“And the reason [the Prosecutor] showed you the photo was to aid you in 
identifying [Ruffin], correct.”  Cocozzoli answered: “No.  What he did was show 
me two photos.  He asked me if I know the person that attacked me was one of the 
two people and I said ‘Yes,’ and I pointed it out.”   
The next witness for the State was Yaniak, the Pepsi van driver on the 
afternoon of the McDonald’s parking lot attack.  He also identified Ruffin in the 
 
 
20 
 
courtroom as the man with the gun who was repeatedly beating Cocozzoli in the 
face with the weapon and as the man who later pointed the gun at Yaniak.  On 
cross-examination, Ruffin’s defense counsel asked witness Yaniak if he had 
viewed a photo of Ruffin on the morning of trial.  Yaniak replied that “It was two 
photos.” 
Defense counsel then asked Yaniak, “What were you told?”  Yaniak 
answered: “[The prosecutor] asked me if I could pick out which one of these was 
the – which one was [Ruffin].  [The Prosecutor] showed me two pictures of two 
different African American gentlemen, and he said which one was it.  I said I knew 
by looking at it who it was.”  Ruffin’s defense counsel then asked Yaniak, “So you 
knew that by process of elimination you had a fifty-fifty chance of getting it right.  
Correct?”  Yaniak responded: “Yes.  But I honestly couldn’t forget.”  Defense 
counsel then asked, “So you couldn’t forget, but you can’t remember the color of 
the car?”  Yaniak answered simply, “That’s different.”  On redirect examination, 
the prosecutor inquired about the strength of Yaniak’s memory as to the identity of 
the McDonald’s attacker.  Yaniak replied: “Some of it is unclear, but the alleged 
beating and the pointing the gun at me I’ll never forget.”   
No defense motion or objection was raised by defense counsel at the time of 
the in-court identifications of Ruffin by either Cocozzoli or Yaniak.  Rather, six 
days after Cocozzoli’s testimony, and four days after Yaniak’s testimony, defense 
 
 
21 
 
counsel for Ruffin moved for a mistrial, and conceded, “So we should have made 
that motion last week.  I didn’t.”  Ruffin’s defense counsel argued that the display 
of photographs of the two white Pontiac minivan occupants at the time of the 
police pursuit was “highly suggestive.”  The State responded that the mistrial 
motion was untimely, and that the merits of the motion went “to the weight of the 
witnesses’ in-court identification of the defendant.”  The prosecutor also clarified 
the record by adding: 
[T]hey were shown two photographs.  I’ll represent the 
other photograph was Wilbur Doughty, and they were 
asked as they were told, “Do you see the person that was 
involved in the case?”  They both picked him out, and it 
was the defendant’s photograph. 
 
The trial judge denied the mistrial motion, and stated: 
I’m not persuaded that I should attempt to undue [sic] the 
testimony that the jury has already heard.  I certainly 
don’t think there is any grounds for a mistrial.  I think 
you are raising an objection which, in my view, goes to 
the weight to be given to the evidence that we’ve just 
discussed, not its admissibility.  So your request for a 
mistrial is denied. 
 
Whether a mistrial motion should be granted lies within the trial judge’s 
discretion.41  A discretionary decision will be reversed on appeal only if it is based 
                                                          
 
41 See Jones v. State, 2013 WL 596379, at *2 (Del. Feb. 14, 2013) (finding that the trial judge did 
not abuse her discretion by denying defendant’s Motion for a Mistrial despite witness’s improper 
reference to “mug shots” used in photographic lineup); Gomez v. State, 25 A.3d 786, 793 (Del. 
2011); McNair v. State, 990 A.2d 398, 403 (Del. 2010).  The trial judge is in the best position to 
assess the risk of any prejudice from trial events.”  Copper v. State, 85 A.3d 689, 692 (Del. 
2014). 
 
 
22 
 
upon unreasonable or capricious grounds.42   
“An identification procedure will not pass constitutional muster where it is 
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification.”43  To violate due process, “the unnecessarily 
suggestive identification procedure must also carry with it the increased danger of 
an irreparable misidentification.”44  Whether an out-of-court identification is 
impermissibly suggestive is a fact-specific inquiry.45  “An identification is 
suggestive when the police conduct it in such a way that the witness’ attention is 
directed to a particular individual as the suspect upon whom the police have 
focused.”46   
In this case, the prosecutor showed Cocozzoli and Yaniak two photographs, 
one was a picture of Ruffin and the other of Wilbur Doughty.  Cocozzoli testified 
that he could not remember if the prosecutor told him that these individuals were 
“the ones inside of the van.”  Yaniak, on the other hand, admitted that the 
prosecutor suggested that “one of these people were [] on trial.”  Rather than using 
a traditional photograph lineup, the State employed an unnecessarily suggestive 
                                                          
 
42 See Revel v. State, 956 A.2d 23, 27 (Del. 2008); Zimmerman v. State, 628 A.2d 62, 65 (Del. 
1993). 
43 Younger v. State, 496 A.2d 546, 550 (Del. 1985) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)). 
44 Id. (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 120 (1977)). 
45 Weber v. State, 38 A.3d 271, 277 (Del. 2012). 
46 U.S. ex rel. Goodyear v. Del. Corr. Ctr., 419 F.Supp. 93, 96 (D. Del. 1976) (emphasis added). 
 
 
23 
 
pretrial procedure.47 
Even if a lineup is impermissibly suggestive, however, evidence of the 
identification will not be excluded at trial so long as the identification is reliable.48  
When determining if an identification procedure is impermissible, this Court must 
decide under the totality of the circumstances: (1) whether the procedure used was 
unnecessarily suggestive; and (2) whether there was a likelihood of 
misidentification.49  In determining the reliability of the identification, the United 
States Supreme Court set forth the following five factors to consider: 
[T]he opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at 
the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the 
accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, 
the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the 
confrontation, and the length of time between the crime 
and the confrontation.50 
 
Having examined the identification evidence for these five indicia of 
reliability, a reviewing court is instructed to weigh their existence and extent 
“[a]gainst . . . the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself.”51  By 
doing so, the reviewing court may judge whether the identification was the product 
                                                          
 
47 See Burrell v. State, 1999 WL 1192562, at *2 (Del. Sept. 28, 1999) (finding that viewing of a 
photo of the defendant “just prior to the in-court identification may have been unnecessarily 
suggestive.”); see also United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862, 869 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding that it 
was suggestive for an FBI agent to inform a witness that her tentative selection of two 
photographs had included one of the arrested suspect). 
48 State v. Sierra, 2011 WL 1316151, at *3 (Del. Super. Apr. 5, 2011). 
49 Richardson v. State, 673 A.2d 144, 147 (Del. 1996) (citing Harris v. State, 350 A.2d 768, 770 
(Del. 1975)). 
50 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972). 
51 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1997). 
 
 
24 
 
of observations at the time of the crime or impressions made during the suggestive 
pretrial photographic identification process.52 
An application of the five factor test in Manson v. Brathwaite leads to a 
conclusion that the two separate in-court identifications of Ruffin were sufficiently 
reliable to be admissible. 53  Both Cocozzoli and Yaniak had an opportunity to view 
Ruffin in the daylight at the time of the crime, their attention was not distracted, 
there was no discrepancy from prior descriptions, and both were certain at trial 
about their identifications.  Accordingly, the record reflects that there was no 
“manifest necessity” to grant defense counsel’s belated motion for a mistrial based 
on a claim of an impermissibly suggested photo lineup in Ruffin’s case.54 
The record supports the trial judge’s ruling that the objection goes to the 
weight to be given to the identification evidence and not to its admissibility.  
Defense counsel was free to argue about the effect of the photographic views of the 
two witnesses prior to their trial testimony, and he did so in closing argument.  
Ruffin’s counsel argued to the jury: “. . . do you think there may be a possibility 
that the reason why Mr. Cocozzoli and Mr. Yaniak said it was Ramon Ruffin had 
anything to do with the photos they were shown?  That’s a question you need to 
answer on your own.” 
                                                          
 
52 See Jones, 2013 WL 596379, at *2. 
53 See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114–16. 
54 “A trial judge should grant a mistrial only where there is ‘manifest necessity’ or the ‘ends of 
public justice would be otherwise defeated.’”  Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d 5, 11 (Del. 1998). 
 
 
25 
 
Missing Evidence Instruction Properly Denied 
Following the apprehension of Ruffin, CSI Simpkiss retrieved a Hi-Point .45 
caliber semiautomatic handgun from the minivan Ruffin was driving.  CSI 
Simpkiss later collected DNA swabbings from Ruffin and Doughty.  In addition, 
CSI Simpkiss took DNA swabs from the gun, the gun magazine, and one bullet.  
No DNA testing was performed in the investigation, however, because the 
prosecutor did not request such testing.  Ruffin’s defense counsel also never 
requested any DNA testing of the gun. 
At the jury prayer conference, Ruffin’s defense counsel requested a missing 
evidence jury instruction pursuant to Lolly v. State, for the State’s failure to 
conduct DNA testing of the seized gun.55  The State opposed any missing evidence 
jury instruction.  The trial judge denied the defense’s request for a missing 
evidence instruction and ruled: 
Well, I don’t think this is a missing evidence case.  The 
State – you know, the decision – the State collects the 
evidence.  The decision whether to test it is one that the 
State makes, which I think is within their discretion.  
They take that into account, the strength of their case, the 
cost of the examination, and with whatever factors are 
very relevant.  I think that is a Department of Justice 
function.  You could have asked for an order to have 
your expert test the DNA, couldn’t you, if you really 
wanted to test it?  So the request for DNA or missing 
evidence instruction is denied. 
 
                                                          
 
55 See id. at 959–60. 
 
 
26 
 
The State is required to collect and preserve evidence which is material to a 
defendant’s guilt or innocence.56  In Ruffin’s case the State did collect and preserve 
the evidence, the gun and DNA swabs.  Therefore, this was not a case where the 
police neglected to collect the evidence or preserve the evidence. 
At issue is whether the State had a further obligation to perform the DNA 
testing.  Delaware law is settled on this issue.  The Deberry standard only requires 
that the State adequately gather and preserve physical evidence.57  Testing of 
physical evidence seized by the police is not required.58  The State’s affirmative 
duty ends with the collection and preservation of that evidence.59  Ruffin could 
have requested pretrial DNA testing of the seized handgun, but he did not do so.60   
Conclusion 
The Superior Court’s judgment of convictions is affirmed. 
                                                          
 
56 Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d 744, 751–52 (Del. 1983); Lolly, 611 A.2d at 959–60 (uncollected 
blood evidence); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 85 (Del. 1989) (crash vehicle released prior to 
defense examination); Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1090 (Del. 1987). 
57 Deberry¸ 457A.2d at 751–52. 
58 Anderson v. State, 1999 WL 504332, at *3 (Del. Mar. 18, 1999). 
59 See Quill v. State, 2014 WL 4536556, at *2 (Del. Sept. 12, 2014); Davis v. State, 2014 WL 
3943100, at *2 (Del. Aug. 12, 2014) (gun not tested for DNA or fingerprints). 
60 Davis, 2014 WL 3943100, at *2 (noting that the gun was not tested for DNA or fingerprints, 
but that the State had no duty to test the handgun).