Case Title: LEO GENE BLOOMFIELD, JR. v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0033

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
LEO GENE BLOOMFIELD, JR. v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 97234 P.3d 366Case Number: No. S-09-0033Decided: 07/12/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
LEO 
GENE BLOOMFIELD, JR.,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. 
Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Alden.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Pojman.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      
Appellant, 
Leo Gene Bloomfield, Jr., appeals his conviction for attempted second-degree 
murder.  He contends the jury was 
improperly instructed on the elements of the crime.  He also challenges the district court's 
evidentiary ruling regarding evidence that he now contends was offered for the 
purpose of establishing that the victim was the first aggressor in the 
altercation.  He asserts that the 
rejection of that evidence undermined his claim of self defense.  We find no error and 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]      
Appellant 
presents the following issues:

 
 

1.    
Did 
the trial court err by failing to properly instruct the jury on the elements of 
attempted second-degree murder?

 
 

2.    
Did 
the trial court err in refusing the defense's evidence under Rule 
404(a)(2)?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
Appellant 
and the victim, G.C., worked together and also shared a room at an extended stay 
motel in Gillette, Wyoming.  
Appellant was dissatisfied with the arrangement.  He suspected that G.C. had stolen money 
from a wallet that he kept under his mattress, and had decided to move out when 
he received his next paycheck.  On 
Christmas Eve, 2007, an altercation occurred between the two in the motel 
room.  Although Appellant and G.C. 
provided differing versions of the incident, it was undisputed that Appellant 
stabbed G.C. several times and then called 911 for emergency assistance.  

 
 

[¶4]        
When 
officers arrived, they found G.C. bleeding from several stab wounds.  Appellant's hands and arms were 
bloody.  An officer questioned 
Appellant outside the motel room while emergency personnel attended to G.C.  Because it was cold that evening, the 
officer intended to continue questioning Appellant in a patrol car.  Before allowing Appellant in the 
vehicle, the officer asked Appellant if he had any weapons.  Appellant produced a bloody knife from 
his back pocket.  The officer asked 
Appellant if he had stabbed G.C. with the knife.  Appellant replied, "Yeah."  Appellant was subsequently arrested, 
taken to the police station, and interviewed.  Police administered a portable breath 
test during the interview.  
Appellant's blood alcohol content registered at 
.193.

 
 

[¶5]        
According 
to G.C., he had been out drinking during the day.1  When he returned to the room, Appellant 
was watching television.  G.C. fell 
asleep face down on his bed without removing his clothes.  He was awakened later when he 
experienced pain in his left shoulder.  
He testified that Appellant had "slit [his] left shoulder open with the 
knife."  G.C. testified that he 
stood up and turned around after the stabbing, but could not remember anything 
after that.  When officers arrived, 
they found G.C. lying on the edge of one bed, propped up by a clothes 
basket.  He had been stabbed several 
times.  According to the emergency 
room physician, G.C. suffered six stab wounds to the front of his bodyone in 
the neck; two near the collar bone; two on the right side of the chest; and one 
to the left side of the chest.  He 
also suffered a slash wound on the back of his shoulder.  Each of the stab wounds was 
approximately a finger's length in depth and several missed vital arteries by 
millimeters.  The doctor testified 
that given the number, depth, and location of the wounds, it appeared that the 
injuries were inflicted with lethal intent.  

 
 

[¶6]        
Appellant 
presented a different version of events.  
According to Appellant, after G.C. returned to the motel room, an 
argument erupted over what to watch on television.  The argument became physical when G.C. 
pulled Appellant's hair and hit him on the head.  The two then engaged in a shoving match 
and at some point G.C. blocked the door.  
Appellant testified that he grabbed a knife and stabbed G.C. twice.  After the stabbing, Appellant applied 
pressure to the wound in an effort to control the bleeding.  When that proved unsuccessful, he dialed 
911. 

 
 

[¶7]        
Appellant 
was subsequently charged with attempted second-degree murder.  Trial was held and the jury returned a 
guilty verdict.  Appellant was 
sentenced to a term of incarceration of not less than twenty nor more than forty 
years.  He filed this timely 
appeal.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Jury 
Instruction

 
 

[¶8]        
Appellant 
contends the district court did not properly instruct the jury on the elements 
of attempted second-degree murder.  
He presents two related challenges to the jury instruction.  First, he asserts that "intent to kill" 
is an element of the crime of attempted second-degree murder, and that the jury 
instructions erroneously failed to require the State to prove that element of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 Second, he claims that it 
was error for the district court to combine the elements of attempt with the 
elements of second-degree murder in one jury instruction.

 
 

[¶9]        
Because 
Appellant did not object to the jury instructions, we will review for plain 
error.2  See Causey v. State, 2009 WY 111, ¶ 18, 215 P.3d 287, 293 (Wyo. 2009).   To establish plain error, the appellant must show: 
1) the record clearly reflects the incident urged as error; 2) a violation of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) that he was materially prejudiced by 
the denial of a substantial right.  Id.  Although we review for plain error, we 
are guided by the following:

 
 
When 
reviewing questions involving jury instructions, we afford the trial court 
significant deference.  Jury 
"[i]nstructions must be considered as a whole, and individual instructions, or 
parts of them, should not be singled out and considered in isolation."  We confine our review to a "search for 
prejudicial error."  "[A]s long as 
the instructions correctly state the law and the entire charge covers the 
relevant issue, reversible error will not be found."  

 
 

Creecy 
v. State, 
2009 WY 89, ¶ 18, 210 P.3d 1089, 1093 (Wyo. 2009), quoting Farmer 
v. State, 
2005 WY 162, ¶ 20, 124 P.3d 699, 706 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 

[¶10]     
Wyoming's 
second-degree murder statute provides, in pertinent part: "Whoever purposely and 
maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being is guilty of 
murder in the second degree[.]"  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104 (LexisNexis 2007).  Attempt is defined as 
follows:

 
 
(a)       A person is 
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if:

 
 
(i)         
With the intent to commit the crime, he does any act which is a 
substantial step towards commission of the crime.  A "substantial step" is conduct which is 
strongly corroborative of the firmness of the person's intention to complete the 
commission of the crime[.]

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-1-301.

 
 

[¶11]     
Appellant 
contends that Instruction Nos. 1 and 6 erroneously failed to include "intent to 
kill" as an element of the crime of attempted second-degree murder.  Those instructions provided, in 
pertinent part: 

 
 
JURY 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1

 
 
      The Information 
in this case alleges that the defendant committed the crime known as Attempted 
Murder in the Second Degree.

 
 
The 
necessary elements of the crime of Attempted Murder in the Second Degree, as 
charged in this case are:

 
 

1.    
On 
or about December 25, 2007; 

2.    
In 
Campbell County, Wyoming;

3.    
The 
Defendant, Leo Gene Bloomfield, Jr.;

4.    
Purposely; 
and,

5.    
Maliciously;

6.    
Attempted 
to kill a human being.

 
 
JURY 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6

 
 
The 
necessary elements of the crime of Attempted Murder in the Second Degree, as 
charged in this case are:

 
 

1.    
On 
or about December 25, 2007;

2.    
In 
Campbell County, Wyoming;

3.    
The 
Defendant, Leo Gene Bloomfield, Jr.;

4.    
Purposely; 
and,

5.    
Maliciously;

6.    
Attempted 
to kill a human being.

 
 
If 
you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements 
has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the Defendant 
guilty.  

 
 
If, 
on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all of the evidence that 
any of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
should find the Defendant not guilty.

 
 
The 
jury was also provided jury instructions 8 and 9 which 
stated:

 
 
JURY 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8

 
 
"Purposely" 
means that the act which could have caused the death was intentionally 
done.

 
 
"Maliciously" 
means that the state of mind in which an intentional act is done is without 
legal justification or excuse.  The 
term "maliciously" conveys the meaning of hatred, ill will, or hostility toward 
another.

 
 
JURY 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9

 
 
An 
attempt occurs when a defendant intends to cause the particular crime, in this 
case second-degree murder, and he does some act which constitutes a substantial 
step toward that end.  "Substantial 
step" means conduct which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of the 
defendant's intention to complete the commission of the 
crime.

 
 

[¶12]     
The 
challenged jury instructions appear in the record, satisfying the first prong of 
plain error review.  Appellant, 
however, has not established that failure to include "intent to kill" as an 
element of the crime violates a clear and unequivocal rule of law.  Appellant concedes that second-degree 
murder is a general intent crime and that "intent to kill" is not an element of 
that crime.  He points out, however, 
that we have previously recognized that "attempt" is a specific intent crime, 
and argues that the crime charged here, attempted second-degree murder, is a 
specific intent crime requiring proof of intent to kill.  We rejected a similar argument in Reilly v. State, 2002 WY 156, 55 P.3d 1259 (Wyo. 2002).  

 
 

[¶13]     
In 
Reilly, the defendant fired several 
shots at the victim during an attempted robbery.  The defendant also repeatedly beat the 
victim on the back of the head with a tire iron.  The victim survived.  The defendant was convicted of attempted 
second-degree murder, among other crimes.  
We addressed Reilly's challenge to the attempted second-degree murder 
charge in the following discussion:

 
 
Appellant 
contends that the elements of an attempt and second-degree murder are mutually 
exclusive and/or logically impossible, because an attempt requires that one act 
with a specific intent, while second-degree murder only requires that one act 
with a general intent.  In support 
of this argument, appellant cites to cases from other jurisdictions, among them 
an attempted second-degree murder case in which the North Carolina Supreme Court 
concluded that, it is "logically impossible" for "a person to specifically 
intend to commit a form of murder which does not have, as an element, specific 
intent to kill" and that "attempted murder" is therefore "logically possible 
only where specific intent to kill is a necessary element of the underlying 
offense."  State v. 
Coble, 351 N.C. 448, 
527 S.E.2d 45, 48 (2000).  Appellant 
asks this Court to adopt a similar approach.  Her argument presents an issue of law 
that we review de novo.  
Worcester v. State, 2001 WY 82, ¶ 13, 30 P.3d 47, 
52 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-1-301 states, in pertinent 
part:

 
 
(a)       A person is 
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if:

 
 
(i)         
With the intent to commit the crime, he does any act which is a 
substantial step towards commission of the crime. A "substantial step" is 
conduct which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of the person's 
intention to complete the commission of the 
crime[.]

 
 
According 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104, "[w]hoever purposely and maliciously, but 
without premeditation, kills any human being is guilty of murder in the second 
degree...."

 
 
Appellant's 
claimed "logical impossibility" arises from the "intent" elements of these 
respective statutes.  In the past, 
crimes have commonly been categorized by whether they require a "specific 
intent" or a "general intent."  For 
many years, Wyoming had several pattern jury instructions defining and 
explaining the two terms, and yet, the differences between the concepts were not 
always readily discernible.

 
 
Realizing 
that the distinction between a specific intent crime and a general intent crime 
is apparently troublesome, we can perhaps clarify it by stating it in a somewhat 
different way. When the statute sets out the offense with only a description of 
the particular unlawful act, without reference to intent to do a further act or 
achieve a future consequence, the trial judge asks the jury whether the 
defendant intended to do the outlawed act. Such intention is general intent. 
When the statutory definition of the crime refers to an intent to do some 
further act or attain some additional consequence, the offense is considered to 
be a specific intent crime and then that question must be asked of the 
jury.

 

 

Dorador 
v. State, 573 P.2d 839, 843 (Wyo. 1978).  Following that logic, an "attempt" is a 
"specific intent" crime in that the attempt statute requires that one act with 
the intent to commit the object crime.  On the other hand, we have held that 
second-degree murder is a general intent crime, because it requires proof only 
that the act was done voluntarily or deliberately, not that there was a specific 
intent to kill.  Bouwkamp v. 
State, 833 P.2d 486, 
493 (Wyo. 1992); Ramos v. State, 806 P.2d 822, 830 (Wyo. 
1991).

 
 
We 
have acknowledged a trend in the law to dispense with the pattern jury 
instructions defining and explaining 
intent due to their "vagueness and general failure to enlighten 
juries." Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 941 (Wyo. 1997). 
Instead, juries should be instructed as to the 
appropriate intent that is an element of the particular crime; "it is more 
important that the jury understand what exactly they [are required] to 
determine."  Id.  This is consonant with our recent holding 
that "the test of whether a jury has been properly instructed on the necessary 
elements of a crime is whether the instructions leave no doubt as to the 
circumstances under which the crime can be found to have been committed."  
Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wyo. 2001). The point is that attempting formally to distinguish 
between specific intent and general intent, beyond the substantive elements of 
the crime, may not be the surest way to define the nature of the intent that 
must be proven.

 
 
Our 
precedent reveals that Wyoming is not a jurisdiction that finds it "logically 
impossible" to attempt a general intent crime.  In several opinions, we have affirmed 
attempted second-degree murder convictions.  See, e.g., Bilderback v. 
State, 13 P.3d 249 
(Wyo. 2000); Gabriel v. State, 925 P.2d 234 (Wyo. 1996); 
and Dichard v. State, 844 P.2d 484 (Wyo. 1992). 
 We have also previously recognized 
the crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter.  Warren v. State, 809 P.2d 788 (Wyo. 
1991). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-105(a) (LexisNexis 2001) provides, in 
pertinent part:

 
 
A 
person is guilty of manslaughter if he unlawfully kills any human being without 
malice, expressed or implied, either:

 
 
(i) 
Voluntarily, upon a sudden heat of 
passion[.]

 
 
In Warren, 809 P.2d  at 790, Warren 
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of attempted voluntary 
manslaughter, arguing that there was no evidence of an attempt to kill.  After stating the substantive elements of 
attempted voluntary manslaughter, this Court proceeded to evaluate the 
sufficiency of the evidence as to those elements, primarily the evidence 
supporting Warren's "attempt" to kill his victim and the accompanying inference 
regarding Warren's intent.  
Id.  We concluded that 
the reasonable inference from the evidence presented was that "Warren attempted 
to kill [his victim], and a jury could so find beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id.  In the context of appellant's 
claimed "logical impossibility," particularly the intent element of an attempt 
versus that of an underlying general intent crime, attempted second-degree 
murder is indistinguishable from attempted voluntary manslaughter.  Indeed, voluntary manslaughter is a 
"lesser included offense of the crime of second degree murder," and is "a 
general intent crime that does not require a deliberate intent to kill."  State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1138-39 (Wyo. 
1993).

 

 
A 
similar result was obtained in Compton, 931 P.2d  at 938, where a 
jury convicted Compton of attempted first-degree sexual assault.  On appeal, he questioned the adequacy of 
the district court's jury instructions, specifically regarding the elements of 
attempted first-degree sexual assault and its requisite 
intent. Id. at 939.  First-degree sexual assault is a 
general intent crime.  Id. at 941.  This Court found that 
the district court's jury instructions adequately stated the substantive 
elements of attempted first-degree sexual assault, and adequately instructed the 
jury regarding the specific intent element of an attempt.  Id. at 
940-41.

 
 

Nothing 
about the instant case convinces us that we should now find it legally or 
logically impossible for a person to attempt a general intent crime.  As we said in Compton, 931 P.2d  at 940, 
941 (quoting People v. Frysig, 628 P.2d 1004, 1007 n. 4, 1008 
(Colo. 1981)), the question presented to the jury in an attempt case essentially 
has two levels: (1) whether the person had "the intent to perform acts which, 
if completed, would constitute the underlying offense'"-in other words, did the 
person intend the conduct that constitutes the substantial step; and (2) whether 
the person had the intent necessary as an element of the underlying 
offense-"[e]xcept for the intentional conduct constituting the substantial 
step, the requisite culpability is that provided for in the definition of the 
[underlying] offense.'" That analysis works just as well for attempted crimes 
that traditionally have been categorized as general intent crimes as it does for 
attempted crimes that traditionally have been categorized as specific intent 
crimes.

 
 

Id., 
¶¶ 6-12; 55 P.3d  at 1261-63 (footnote omitted).

 
 

[¶14]     
In 
this case, the instructions satisfy the two-step inquiry articulated in Reilly.  When viewed as a whole, the instructions 
required the jury to find that Appellant intended to take a substantial step 
toward second-degree murderin other words, he intended to perform the act of 
stabbing G.C.  The jury then had to 
find that Appellant stabbed G.C. "purposely" and "maliciously."  "Intent to kill" is not an element of 
the underlying crime of second-degree murder.  The district court did not violate a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law when it did not include that element in the 
jury instructions.  

 
 

[¶15]     
Appellant 
also challenges the jury instructions because they combined the elements of 
attempt and second-degree murder into one instruction.  A jury instruction is not given in error 
simply because it combines the elements of two crimes.  Gentilini v. State, 2010 WY 74, ¶ 20, 
231 P.3d 1280, 1286 (Wyo. 2010); Rigler 
v. State, 941 P.2d 734, 741-42 (Wyo. 1997).  The test of adequate jury instructions 
is "whether the instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which 
the crime can be found to have been committed."  Mueller, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d  at 1155.  Appellant asserts that by giving one 
instruction with the elements of both second-degree murder and attempt, the 
district court "effectively eliminated the specific intent to kill from the 
required elements of the crime." 

 
 

[¶16]     
As 
discussed previously, specific intent to kill is not an element of the crime of 
attempted second-degree murder.  
Appellant presents no other basis for finding that the jury instructions 
confused or misled the jury.  He did 
not object to the instructions given by the district court.  The instructions did not violate a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law and Appellant has failed to establish plain error. 

 
 

W.R.E. 
404(a)(2) Evidence  

 
 

[¶17]     
Appellant 
claims the district court erred in refusing evidence offered by the defense 
under W.R.E. 404(a)(2).  
"A 
trial court's decision on the admissibility of evidence is entitled to 
considerable deference, and will not be reversed on appeal unless the appellant 
demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion."  Vigil 
v. State, 
2010 WY 15, ¶ 11, 224 P.3d 31, 36 (Wyo. 2010). 

 
 
We 
have described the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the question 
of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice.  Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria.  It also means exercising sound judgment 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously.  In the 
absence of an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's 
determination.  The burden is on the 
defendant to establish such abuse.

 
 

Holloman 
v. State, 
2005 WY 25, ¶ 10, 106 P.3d 879, 883 (Wyo. 2005).  If we conclude the trial court erred, we 
must then determine if the error was prejudicial.  Bromley v. State, 2009 WY 133, ¶ 24, 219 P.3d 110, 116 (Wyo. 2009).  An error 
is prejudicial if there is a reasonable possibility the verdict might have been 
more favorable to the appellant if the error had never occurred.  Callen v. State, 2008 WY 107, ¶ 5, 192 P.3d 137, 141 (Wyo. 2008).  The 
burden of proving prejudicial error rests with the appellant.  Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d 758, 767 (Wyo. 2001).  

 
 

[¶18]     
Appellant 
contends that the district court erred in failing to allow evidence that G.C. 
would become violent when intoxicated.  
He asserts the evidence was relevant to his claim of self defense and was 
properly admissible pursuant to W.R.E. 404(a)(2), which 
provides:

 
 
(a)       Character evidence generally.Evidence 
of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the 
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion, except;  

 
 
(2)       Character 
of Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the 
crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or 
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first 
aggressor[.]

 
 

[¶19]     
During 
cross-examination, defense counsel asked G.C. if he ever had too much to drink 
and became violent.  G.C. responded 
that he had not.  To counter this 
testimony, Appellant called A.L., the alleged victim in a domestic battery 
involving G.C., to testify.  The 
district court and counsel engaged in the following discussion regarding her 
testimony: 

 
 
[Prosecution]:  Judge, it's my understanding she's 
alleged to be a victim in a potential battery with [G.C.].  I don't see how any of her testimony 
would be relevant to these proceedings.

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]:   This is a direct refutation of what [G.C.] 
said when he was on the stand here.  [G.C.] has testified under oath that he 
does not get belligerent and hit people when he's drinking, and I believe that 
she can say that's not true.

 
 


 
 
[Prosecution]: 
Judge, it's my understanding that [A.L.] is expected to testify that 
approximately three months ago she may have been in [G.C.'s] presence at such 
time he was intoxicated and violent, aggressive, or something like that.  I think if that testimony is offered to 
impeach his statement that he washe doesn't get violent when he drinks, that 
there should be a limiting instruction to that effect that the Court should 
give. 

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: Your Honor, I wouldn't have a problem with a limiting instruction, but 
in this case [G.C.] is not the defendant, so I don't see what the point 
is.

 
 
[COURT]: 
Well, the point is that it seems to me that the inferences, since you're offering it for impeachment, 
merely go to whether or not [G.C.] told all of the truth, not to his 
character.

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: That's 
correct.

 
 
[COURT]: 
All right.  So you won't be 
permitted to argueyou can argue that he was untruthful, if that, in fact, is 
the way the testimony came out, but to argue that he's a batterer as a result of 
this testimony is something completely different, isn't 
it?

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: Yes.

 
 
[COURT]: 
Okay.

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: I have no problem with that.  

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  Appellant contends that the 
district court erred when it limited A.L.'s testimony to impeachment 
purposes.  He asserts that the 
testimony should have been admitted under W.R.E. 404(a)(2) as proof that G.C. 
was the first aggressor.   

 
 

[¶20]     
"It 
is settled law that a proponent of evidence has the burden to apprise the trial 
court that a rule of evidence permits the admission of that evidence."  Moe v. State, 2005 WY 149, ¶ 9, 123 P.3d 148, 151 (Wyo. 2005).  "[T]he offer 
of proof must specifically indicate the purpose of the testimony."  Pack v. State, 571 P.2d 241, 245 (Wyo. 
1977).  Defense counsel did not 
offer the evidence for substantive proof of the victim's character.  From the context of the discussion 
above, it is clear that the evidence was being introduced to impeach G.C.'s 
testimony.  Defense counsel stated 
he had "no problem" offering the testimony for impeachment purposes only.  He also assured the court that he did 
not intend to argue that G.C. was a batterer.  Appellant never sought admission of the 
evidence for a purpose allowed by W.R.E. 404(a)(2).

 
 

[¶21]     
Additionally, 
even though the district court stated the testimony was admitted for impeachment 
purposes only, no limiting instruction was ever given to the jury.  A.L. testified that she and G.C. lived 
together for about three weeks, and that he became violent after consuming 
alcohol.  She also testified as 
follows:

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: And what did he usually drink?

 
 
[A.L.]: 
Traveler vodka and a 6-pack of beer.

 
 
Q: 
And whenwhen those happened, did he become belligerent?

 
 
A: 
Belligerent and violent.

 
 
Q: 
Okay. What did he do?

 
 
A: 
Pulled my hair. Refused to let me leave.  
Slap me on the back of the head.

 
 
Q: 
Okay. Did you ever try to get away?

 
 
A: 
Yes, I did.

 
 
Q: 
What happened?

 
 
A: 
He ripped my hair out.

 
 
Q: 
And

 
 
A: 
Held me against my will.

 
 
Q: 
Would he let you leave?

 
 
A: 
No.

 
 
Q: 
Get between you and the door?

 
 
A: 
Uh-huh.

 
 
Q: 
And so if he were to tell us that he does not get belligerent when he 
drinks

 
 
A: 
That is not the truth.

 
 
Q: 
that's not true?

 
 
A: 
He does get very violent. 

 
 
Defense 
counsel made reference to A.L.'s testimony in his closing 
statements:

 
 
[T]he 
guy says when he drinks, he doesn't get belligerent, that he doesn't get 
violent.  Well, you heard 
[A.L.].  I can't speak for a lot of 
people, or any others, but at least he didn't tell you the truth in that 
respect.  He did not tell the 
truth.

 
 
Because 
no limiting instruction was given, the jury was free to consider A.L.'s 
testimony as evidence that G.C. had a character trait for violence when he was 
intoxicated.  The jury could also 
consider the testimony as corroborating evidence of Appellant's theory that G.C. 
was the first aggressor.  Appellant 
has failed to establish abuse of discretion or prejudice. 

 
 

[¶22]     
Appellant 
also claims the district court erred when it did not allow him to introduce 
evidence that G.C. had been convicted of misdemeanor battery in February 
2007.  The conviction included an 
affidavit of probable cause stating that G.C. was intoxicated during the 
incident.  During cross-examination, 
after G.C. denied that he became violent when intoxicated, defense counsel 
requested a conference at the bench:

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: Just to give you notice, I'm going to pursue the charges he's had 
where he  got drunk and hit women and was convicted for that.  They're misdemeanor charges, but this is 
not a [W.R.E.] 609 type situation.3  This is directly in response to his 
statement it never happened. 

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  The prosecution objected, 
claiming the questions constituted improper impeachment and were 
irrelevant.  Defense counsel 
responded:

 
 
They 
have to do with the issues in this case, Your Honor.  This is not 609 impeachment.  This is--the issue in this case is  
whether this man reacts that way under the [influence of] alcohol, and he's directly denied it, and I need to 
be able to ask him about those two and why he's in jail right now. 

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  The district court did not 
allow Appellant to question G.C. about the incident during 
cross-examination.  

 
 

[¶23]     
Although 
defense counsel clearly stated which rule did not apply, he did not apprise the 
court that he sought admission of the evidence under W.R.E. 404(a)(2).  Though it is unclear, the discussion 
indicates that Appellant sought admission of the evidence for impeachment 
purposes.  Defense counsel did not 
argue that the evidence supported a theory that G.C. was the first aggressor and 
never mentioned Appellant's theory of self defense.  Additionally, Appellant made no explicit 
offer of proof concerning the misdemeanor battery.  

 
 

[T]here 
is only one prudent way for an offer of proof to be made at trial.  The attorney who seeks to offer evidence, 
which has been refused or to which an objection has been upheld, should take the 
initiative.  The offer of 
proof 
should then take the form of counsel's eliciting the proposed testimony directly 
from the witness, or entering the tangible evidence in the record, all outside 
of the hearing of the jury.

 
 

Rudolph 
v. State, 
829 P.2d 269, 275 (Wyo. 1992).  
"The lack of an offer of proof impacts the district 
court's ruling and severely impedes appellate review."  Hermreck v. State, 956 P.2d 335, 338 
(Wyo. 1998).  Appellant did 
not preserve the offered evidence in the record and his assertion that the 
evidence was admissible under W.R.E. 404(a)(2) is raised for the first time in 
this appeal.  Under these 
circumstances, we cannot conclude the district 
court abused its discretion.   

 
 

[¶24]     
We 
also find that Appellant has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the 
ruling.  "The defender can only use 
that degree of force necessary to relieve the risk of harm."  Braley v. State, 741 P.2d 1061, 1067 
(Wyo. 1987), quoting Leeper v. State, 
589 P.2d 379, 383 (Wyo. 1979).  The 
jury was instructed on the law of self defense as follows:

 
 
JURY 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13

 
 
If 
the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe and did believe that he was in 
imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm from which the defendant could 
be saved only by using deadly force against an assailant, the defendant had the 
right to use deadly force in self-defense.  
"Deadly force" means force which is likely to cause death or serious 
bodily harm.

 
 
The 
circumstances under which the defendant acted must have been such as to produce 
in the mind of a reasonably prudent person, similarly situated, the reasonable 
belief that the assailant was about to kill the defendant or do serious bodily 
harm to the defendant.  The danger 
must have been apparent, present and imminent or must have appeared to be so 
under the circumstances.

 
 
If 
the defendant believed that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily 
harm, and that deadly force was necessary to repel such danger, and if a 
reasonable person in a similar situation seeing and knowing the same facts would 
be justified in believing that he was in similar danger, the defendant would be 
justified in using deadly force in self-defense.  The defendant would be justified even 
though the appearance of danger later proved to be false and there was actually 
neither purpose on the part of the assailant to kill the defendant or do the 
defendant serious bodily harm nor imminent danger that it would be done, nor 
actual necessity that deadly force be used in self-defense.  If the person so confronted acts in 
self-defense upon such appearance of danger from honest belief, the right of 
self-defense is the same whether the danger is real or merely 
apparent.

 
 
JURY 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15

 
 
One 
who has reasonable grounds to believe that another will attack him, and that the 
anticipated attack will be of such a character as to endanger his life or limb, 
or to cause him serious bodily harm, has a right to arm himself for the purpose 
of resisting such an attack.

 
 
If 
the defendant armed himself in reasonable anticipation of such an attack, that 
fact alone does not make the defendant the aggressor or deprive the defendant of 
the right of self-defense.

 
 

[¶25]     
Appellant 
testified that he and G.C. engaged in a shoving match.  They were "scrapping" and 
"wrestling."  He stated that he 
grabbed the knife because he did not want to get hurt and wanted to get out of 
the situation.  He never indicated 
that he feared G.C. would kill him or inflict serious injury.  There was no evidence that Appellant was 
in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, or that other circumstances 
existed justifying the multiple stabbings.  
Appellant has failed to demonstrate any likelihood that the verdict would 
have been more favorable had the district court allowed the 
evidence.

 
 

[¶26]     
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1G.C.'s blood alcohol 
content registered at .3.

 
 

2Appellant 
contends it is unclear whether an opportunity to make an objection to the 
challenged instruction was afforded, or if a proper objection was made.  The record, however, clearly reflects 
the following exchange:

 
 
[COURT]: 
 All right  any objections to instructions given or 
refused?

 
 
[Prosecution]: 
No, Your Honor.

 
 
[COURT]: 
[Defense Counsel], any objections to instructions given or 
refused?

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: No, Your Honor.

 
 

3W.R.E. 
609 provides, in pertinent part:

 
 

(a)     
General 
rule.For 
the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,

 
 
(1) 
evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime 
shall be admitted  if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in 
excess of one (1) year under the law under which the witness was convicted  ; 
and

 
 
(2) 
evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it 
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment.