Case Title: Board of County Com'rs of Laramie County v. Dunnegan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-11-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Board of County Com'rs of Laramie County v. Dunnegan1994 WY 120884 P.2d 3Case Number: 93-206, 93-205Decided: 11/03/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
BOARD 
OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF LARAMIE COUNTY, Appellant (Respondent), v. GERALD L. 
DUNNEGAN, d/b/a J & G WHOLESALE, Appellee (Petitioner). GERALD L. DUNNEGAN, 
d/b/a J & G WHOLESALE,

 Appellant (Petitioner), 

 

v.

 

 BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF LARAMIE 
COUNTY,

 Appellee 
(Respondent).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County: The Honorable Keith G. Kautz, 
Judge Representing Board of County 
Commissioners: Robert A. Coates, Laramie County Attorney, Cheyenne, 
WY. Representing Gerald Dunnegan: Rodger McDaniel of 
McDaniel Law Offices, Cheyenne, WY.Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, 
CARDINE, * MACY, and TAYLOR, JJ. CARDINE, Justice, Retired, delivered the 
opinion of the court. THOMAS, Justice, filed a dissenting 
opinion.* Retired July 6, 1994.CARDINE, Justice, 
Retired.[¶1]           
The Laramie County Board of County Commissioners (Board) adopted a 
resolution regulating the sale, control and possession of fireworks. Gerald L. 
Dunnegan (Dunnegan), a fireworks retailer, petitioned the district court for 
judicial review of that decision and for an injunction enjoining the Board from 
enforcing the resolution. The district court affirmed the Board's adoption of 
the resolution but issued an injunction enjoining the Board from enforcing the 
resolution because the legislature did not authorize the county to "legislate a 
ban on the sale, use and possession of fireworks." Dunnegan appeals from the 
district court's affirmance of the administrative decision, and the Board 
appeals from the issuance of the injunction.[¶2]           
We reverse in part and affirm in part.[¶3]           
The issues raised by the Board, appellant in Appeal No. 93-205, are as 
follows: 

Issue 
No. I: Did the Wyoming Legislature grant counties in the State of Wyoming the 
authority to further regulate fireworks by the amendment made in 1993 to W.S. § 
35-10-205, et seq. (as amended, 1993)?A. Does W.S. § 35-10-205, 
et seq. (as amended, 1993) demonstrate clear legislative intent to grant 
counties in the State of Wyoming the authority to further regulate fireworks, 
including the authority to ban the possession or use of Class "C" 
fireworks?B. If the Court must apply judicial standards of statutory 
construction to ascertain the intent of the Wyoming State Legislature concerning 
the 1993 amendments to W.S. § 35-10-205, et seq. (as amended, 1993), did 
the 1993 amendment grant counties of the State of Wyoming the authority to 
further regulate Class "C" fireworks?* * * * *Issue No. II: Does 
the Wyoming Legislature have the ability to grant counties in the State of 
Wyoming the authority to further regulate fireworks, in addition to the 
regulations imposed by § 35-10-205, et seq. (as amended, 
1993)?Issue No. III: Did the trial court properly assess costs against 
Appellant/Respondent [Board] herein?

[¶4]           
In Appeal No. 93-206, Dunnegan, appellant, raises the following issues: 

Issue 
No. I: Was the decision of the Laramie County Commissioners to ban fireworks by 
enacting the Laramie County Firework Resolution of 1993 arbitrary and 
capricious?Issue No. II: Was the decision to enact the firework ban an 
abuse of the agency's discretion?Issue No. III: Was the decision 
supported by relevant, substantial evidence on the hearing record?Issue 
No. IV: Does the Laramie County Firework Resolution of 1993 unconstitutionally 
interfere with interstate commerce?

I. 
BACKGROUND[¶5]           
On May 20, 1993, this court, in Dunnegan v. Laramie County 
Comm'rs, 852 P.2d 1138 (Wyo. 1993) (hereinafter Dunnegan I), held 
that W.S. 35-10-205 (1988), as it existed before 1993, did not authorize 
counties to regulate fireworks more stringently than the State.[¶6]           
Meanwhile, during the 1993 legislative session, the Wyoming Legislature 
amended W.S. 35-10-205, presumably in an attempt to empower counties 
to regulate fireworks. See, 1993 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 141. Wyoming 
Statute 35-10-205 now provides: 

This 
act [§§ 35-10-201 through 35-10-207] shall not be construed to prohibit the 
imposition by municipal ordinance or county resolution of further 
regulations or prohibitions upon the sale, use and possession of fireworks 
within the corporate limits of any city or town, nor shall this act be 
construed to prohibit the imposition by any county of further regulations or 
prohibitions upon the sale, use and possession of fireworks within the borders 
of the county and outside the corporate limits of any city or town, but 
no such city, town, or county shall permit or authorize the sale, use or 
possession of any fireworks in violation of this act.

 (Emphasis 
added.) On May 4, 1993, after a public hearing, the Board, pursuant to the 
amended W.S. 35-10-205, adopted a resolution banning the possession, storage, 
use, and sale of all fireworks which contain over twenty-five one hundredths 
(.25) of a gram of explosives in Laramie County.[¶7]           
On May 21, 1993, Dunnegan, a fireworks retailer in Laramie County, filed 
a petition for judicial review of the Board's decision to adopt the 
fireworks ban. Also on May 21, 1993, Dunnegan moved the district court to 
enjoin the Board and Laramie County from implementing and enforcing its 1993 
resolution banning the sale and use of fireworks. On May 28, 1993, the district 
court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the Board and County from 
implementing and enforcing the fireworks ban.[¶8]           
After a trial on June 24, 1993, the district court: (1) affirmed the 
Board's decision to adopt the resolution because it was not arbitrary or 
capricious, was supported by substantial evidence and did not violate 
constitutional provisions, but (2) permanently enjoined the Board from enforcing 
the resolution, reasoning that the Board was without authority to enact a ban on 
fireworks. Both Dunnegan and the Board appeal.II. 
DISCUSSIONA. Appeal No. 93-206[¶9]           
The scope of this court's review is governed by W.S. 16-3-114(c), which 
provides: 

(c) 
To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action. In making the following determinations the court shall 
review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account 
shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall: 

(i) 
Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and (ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and 
conclusions found to be: (A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity; (C) In excess 
of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right; (D) Without observance of procedure required by law; 
or (E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on 
the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.

[¶10]         
Dunnegan argues that the Board's decision is "in excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory right" because the 
Laramie County Resolution (resolution) attempts to regulate articles and devices 
not included within the statutory definition of "fireworks" found at W.S. 
35-10-201(a).[¶11]         
Wyoming Statute 35-10-201(a) defines fireworks as follows: 

(a) 
"Fireworks" means any article, device or substance prepared for the primary 
purpose of producing a visual or auditory sensation by combustion, explosion, 
deflagration or detonation including without limitation, the following articles 
and devices commonly known and used as fireworks, toy cannons or toy canes in 
which explosives are used, blank cartridges, firecrackers, torpedoes, skyrockets 
and Roman candles. Fireworks shall not include any item which may be sold 
or offered for sale under 15 U.S.C. § 1261, 21 U.S.C. § 371 and 16 C.F.R., 
Commercial Practices, part 1507.

 (Emphasis 
added.) The Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261 to 1277, 
and its regulations, 16 C.F.R parts 1500 to 1512 (1993), prohibits the 
"introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce," the 
following "banned hazardous substances": 

(3) 
Fireworks devices intended to produce audible effects (including but not limited 
to cherry bombs, M-80 salutes, and other large firecrackers, aerial bombs, and 
other fireworks designed to produce audible effects, and including kits and 
components intended to produce such fireworks) if the audible effect is 
produced by a charge of more than 2 grains of pyrotechnic composition * * 
*. 

* 
* * * *

 (8) 
Firecrackers designed to produce audible effects, if the audible effect is 
produced by a charge of more than 50 milligrams (.772 grains) of 
pyrotechnic composition (not including firecrackers included as 
components of a rocket), aerial bombs, and devices that may be confused with 
candy or other foods, such as "dragon eggs," and "cracker balls" (also known as 
"ball-type caps") and including kits and components intended to produce such 
fireworks * * *. 

* 
* * * *

 (11)(i) 
Reloadable tube aerial shell fireworks devices that use shells larger than 1.75 
inches in outer diameter and that are imported on or after October 8, 
1991.

 16 
C.F.R. part 1500.17(a)(3), (8) & (11)(i) (1993). Therefore, the FHSA does 
not prohibit (permits) the sale of (1) "fireworks devices" containing a charge 
of 2 grains (0.065 grams) of pyrotechnic composition or less (and, if it is a 
reloadable tube aerial shell firework, its shells are 1.75 inches or less in 
diameter) and (2) "firecrackers" containing a charge of 50 milligrams (0.050 
grams) of pyrotechnic composition or less.1  See United States v. Focht, 694 F. Supp. 1199, 1201 (W.D.Pa. 1988) (rev'd on other grounds, 882 F.2d 55 (3rd Cir. 
1989)).[¶12]         
Those "fireworks devices" and "firecrackers" which are not prohibited by 
the FHSA, and therefore may be sold under the FHSA, are also known as common 
fireworks. See United States v. Chalaire, 316 F. Supp. 543, 548 (E.D.La. 
1970); see also 15 U.S.C.A. 1261(q)(1) (1994 Cumulative Pocket Part) (which 
designates toy paper caps, cone fountains, cylinder foundations, whistles 
without report, and sparklers as common fireworks). Both parties refer to the 
fireworks which may be sold under the FHSA as "Class C" fireworks. We could find 
no federal designation of "Class C" fireworks. Instead, the "Class C" 
designation appears to be derived from a United States Department of 
Transportation Table listing hazardous materials. See generally 49 C.F.R. part 
172 to 173. "Class C" explosives (renamed, class "1" division "4" as of January 
1, 1991) are defined, generally, as "consisting of explosives that present a 
minor explosion hazard." 49 C.F.R. parts 173.50(b)(4) & 173.53. The "Class 
C" designation also exists in the Wyoming Motor Vehicles Act which defines and 
classifies explosives. W.S. 31-5-102 (Cum.Supp. 1993). "Class C" explosives 
under the Motor Vehicles Act are described as "minimum hazard, e.g., 
fireworks."[¶13]         
The statutory definition of "fireworks" in W.S. 35-10-201, specifically 
excludes those "items" which may be sold under the FHSA. Therefore, those 
"fireworks devices" (such as toy paper caps, cone fountains, cylinder 
foundations, whistles without report and sparklers) which contain a charge of 2 
grains (0.065 grams) of pyrotechnic composition or less (and, if a reloadable 
tube aerial shell firework, are 1.75 inches in outer diameter or less) and those 
"firecrackers" which contain 50 milligrams (0.050 grams) of 
pyrotechnic composition or less are not "fireworks" according to W.S. 
35-10-210(a).[¶14]         
The 1993 Laramie County Resolution bans the possession, storage, sale, 
and use of "fireworks" within the county limits and outside the corporate limits 
of county municipalities. The resolution defines "fireworks" as 

any 
article, device or substance prepared for the primary purpose of producing a 
visual or auditory sensation by combustion, explosion, deflagration or 
detonation, including, but not limited to, the following articles and devices 
commonly known and used as fireworks: toy cannons or toy canes in which 
explosives are used, firecrackers, torpedoes, skyrockets, Roman candles, daygo 
bombs, and other devices of like construction. "Fireworks" as defined do 
not include devices containing less than twenty-five hundredths of a gram of 
explosive (.25 gm).

 (Emphasis 
added.) Thus, toy cannons or toy canes in which explosives are used, 
firecrackers, torpedoes, skyrockets, Roman candles, and daygo bombs which 
contain less than twenty-five hundredths of a gram (0.25 grams) of explosives 
are not "fireworks" and therefore, are not banned under the 
resolution. [¶15]         
Both parties assert that the resolution (1) bans certain "fireworks" 
which may be sold under the FHSA, and (2) therefore bans devices which are not 
defined as "fireworks" under W.S. 35-10-201(a). That assertion is essential to 
the existence of this dispute because if the resolution does not ban the use and 
possession of fireworks that are legal under the FHSA, then Dunnegan, who sells 
only those fireworks permitted for sale under the FHSA, is unaffected by the 
resolution. After reviewing the FHSA and its regulations, however, we question 
the correctness of that assertion.[¶16]         
We arrive at this impasse through a comparison of the FHSA's permissible 
amount of pyrotechnic composition and the resolution's permissible amount 
of explosive. As we noted previously, the FHSA permits the sale of 
"fireworks devices" containing a charge of two grains or less of pyrotechnic 
composition and of "firecrackers" containing a charge of .772 grain or less of 
pyrotechnic composition. One "grain" equals sixty-five thousandths (0.065) of a 
gram, therefore two "grains" equals approximately thirteen one hundredths (0.13) 
of a gram. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
UNABRIDGED, at 1399 (1966). Hence, "fireworks" containing a charge of thirteen 
hundredths (.13) of a gram of pyrotechnic content or less may be sold 
under the FHSA and are not considered "fireworks" under W.S. 35-10-201(a). The 
Laramie County resolution, however, allows the sale of those devices with less 
than twenty-five hundredths (.25) of a gram of explosive. Therefore, 
assuming the phrase pyrotechnic composition and the term explosive 
are synonymous, then the resolution does not ban any fireworks devices which are 
not already banned by the FHSA and regulated under Wyoming's Fireworks 
Act.[¶17]         
The problem with the above conclusion is neither pyrotechnic 
composition nor explosive is defined in the applicable statute. The 
plain meaning of pyrotechnic is: "1: the art of making or the manufacture 
and use of fireworks (as for display, military signalling or illumination) * * * 
2: materials (as fireworks, powders and ammunition) for flares or signals * * 
*." WEBSTER'S, at 1854. The ordinary meaning of explosive is: "a 
substance that on ignition by heat, impact, friction, or detonation undergoes 
very rapid decomposition (as combustion) with the production of heat and the 
formation of more stable products (as gases) which exert tremendous 
pressure as they expand at the high temperature produced[.]" Id., at 802. 
Based on these definitions, it appears that the phrase pyrotechnic 
composition contemplates a number of substances while the term 
explosive involves a single substance.[¶18]         
Despite this question of whether the resolution effectively bans 
fireworks and firecrackers which may be sold under the FHSA, we will presume, as 
both parties have, that the resolution bans devices which may be sold under the 
FHSA and under Wyoming's Fireworks Act.[¶19]         
Wyoming Statute 35-10-205 (Cum.Supp. 1993), which is at the heart of this 
dispute, purports to authorize counties to further regulate "the sale, use and 
possession of fireworks." Dunnegan contends that whatever regulatory authority 
is granted to counties by W.S. 35-10-205 is limited by the definition of 
"fireworks" in W.S. 35-10-201(a). The Board, however, interprets the phrase 
"further regulations and prohibitions * * * of fireworks" to authorize it to 
expand the statutory definition of "fireworks" and regulate devices not 
considered "fireworks" under that definition. As support for this proposition 
the Board cites Haddenham v. City of Laramie, 648 P.2d 551 (Wyo. 
1982), which held that cities and towns could adopt a more stringent 
definition of "fireworks" and, therefore, regulate and prohibit fireworks 
devices that were not included in the statutory definition of "fireworks." Id., 
at 554. At the time that Haddenham was decided, however, the definition 
of "fireworks" did not include the clear and specific exclusion of "item[s] 
which may be sold or offered for sale under [the FHSA]."[¶20]         
As we stated in Dunnegan I, "if the language of a statute is clear 
and unambiguous, we must abide by the plain and ordinary meaning of the words 
used." Dunnegan I, 852 P.2d  at 1140-41. Wyoming Statute 35-10-201(a) 
clearly and unambiguously excludes from its definition of "fireworks" "item[s] 
which may be sold or offered for sale under [the FHSA]." And, just as clearly 
and unambiguously, W.S. 35-10-205 limits whatever authority is granted to 
further regulate and prohibit fireworks to the term "fireworks" as it is defined 
in W.S. 35-10-201(a). To hold that the county could regulate items not defined 
as "fireworks," would be to ignore the statutory definition of fireworks and 
would contravene the requirement that "we give effect to every word, clause 
and sentence and construe all components of a statute in pari materia." City 
of Laramie v. Facer, 814 P.2d 268, 270 (Wyo. 1991).[¶21]         
"As an arm of the state, the county has only those powers expressly 
granted by the constitution or statutory law or reasonably implied from powers 
granted." Dunnegan I, 852 P.2d  at 1142. Any authority which the Board may 
have to regulate "fireworks" is limited to that which is granted it by the 
legislature in the fireworks act. Id. Wyoming Statute 35-10-205 
specifically limits whatever regulatory authority it may have granted to 
counties by the term "fireworks" as defined in W.S. 35-10-201(a). The Board's 
resolution attempts to regulate or prohibit devices defined as not being 
"fireworks" in W.S. 35-10-201(a). Therefore, in as much as the resolution 
regulates devices not defined as "fireworks" in W.S. 35-10-201(a), it is "in 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations" and, therefore, the 
Board's action in adopting the resolution was "unlawful and [the resolution is] 
set aside." W.S. 16-3-114(c).B. Appeal No. 93-205[¶22]         
In this appeal the Board seeks to set aside the district court's 
grant of a permanent injunction enjoining it from enforcing the resolution, and 
the Board argues that the district court abused its discretion when it awarded 
costs to Dunnegan.[¶23]         
We set aside the Board's action in adopting the resolution in Appeal No. 
93-206; and the resolution being of no effect, the issuance of the permanent 
injunction enjoining the implementation and enforcement of the resolution is of 
no effect and therefore is vacated.1. Costs[¶24]         
In its final order, the district court awarded Dunnegan his costs which 
were to "be determined by further order of the Court upon the presentation by 
[Dunnegan] of a bill of costs." The Board contends that the district court 
prematurely ordered payment of costs because it failed to determine any facts 
supporting the award of costs. The Board also argues that the award of costs was 
improper because there is no direct statutory provision requiring assessment of 
costs against it. Dunnegan did not reply to this argument.[¶25]         
"Costs * * * may be awarded only if authorized by statute and then may be 
awarded only to parties to the litigation in amounts supported by evidence as 
having been incurred and reasonable." Bi-Rite Package, Inc. v. District 
Court of Ninth Judicial District, 735 P.2d 709, 712 (Wyo. 1987). Wyoming 
Statute 1-14-126 (Cum.Supp. 1993) authorizes the trial court, in its discretion, 
to award costs and W.R.C.P. 54(d) states that "costs shall be allowed as of 
course to the prevailing party[.]" Because the trial court has yet to determine 
the specific amount of costs to be awarded, we cannot determine whether the 
amount awarded is supported by the evidence. Since the award of costs is 
permitted by statute and the trial court will determine the specific amount of 
costs based on submitted evidence, we hold it was not an abuse of discretion to 
award costs to Dunnegan.III. CONCLUSION[¶26]         
The Laramie County Resolution attempting to ban the use, possession and 
sale of explosive devices not defined as fireworks in W.S. 35-10-210(a) exceeded 
the Board's statutory authority and, therefore, is not in accordance with law. 
The permanent injunction enjoining the Board from enforcing and implementing the 
resolution is vacated because it is unnecessary, and the order awarding costs is 
affirmed.[¶27]         
We reverse in part and affirm in part.THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.[¶28]         
I dissent from the majority opinion in this case. I probably do not need 
to reiterate the views I articulated in Dunnegan v. Laramie County 
Comm'rs, 852 P.2d 1138 (Wyo. 1993) Dunnegan I. It appears the 
district court in this instance espoused that theory for resolving the case, and 
I applaud that perceptive approach even though it apparently is to no 
avail.[¶29]         
In the erudite comparison of definitions in the majority opinion, the 
essential question is begged. It is clear to me fireworks that fell outside the 
definition in WYO. STAT. § 35-10-201(a) (1988) were being offered for sale in 
Laramie County, but were subject to the exception found in WYO. STAT. § 
35-10-204(a)(iii) (1988), which provides in pertinent part: 

This 
act [§§ 35-10-201 through 35-10-207] shall not be construed to prohibit: 

* 
* *(iii) Any person from offering for sale, exposing for sale, or 
selling, any fireworks which are to be and are shipped directly out of the 
state.

 Of 
course, no one can control what the purchaser may do with the fireworks once 
that person somehow has certified they are to be shipped directly out of the 
state. I understand this was at least one of the evils the county resolution was 
designed to avoid. Be that as it may, this court has sustained, without dancing 
around the statutory definition, the authority of a municipality to prohibit 
fireworks that are not controlled by the state statute. Haddenham v. City of 
Laramie, 648 P.2d 551 (Wyo. 1982).[¶30]         
I am satisfied the court really should confront the essential question 
which is whether the counties have the authority to legislate absent a specific 
authorization of the legislation by the legislature. That has not occurred in 
this instance, and the issue should be resolved. The legislature then can decide 
whether it wants to offer that authority to the counties or whether it wants to 
expand the state regulation of fireworks. It still is true, without any 
equivocation, that the fact the statute does not prohibit the imposition of 
further regulation or prohibition upon sale, use, and possession by counties 
does not constitute a grant of authority. 

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1 These "fireworks devices" and "firecrackers" which may be sold under the 
FHSA must comply with the regulations found at 16 C.F.R. part 1507 (1993) or 
they are also banned under 16 C.F.R part 1500.17(a)(9) (1993).