Case Title: MARRIAGE OF GOOD

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1984-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 83-454 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1984 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JEANNE M. GOOD, n/k/a JEANNE M. HARGETT, Plaintiff, Respondent and Cross-appellant, and GOOD, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and for the County of Flathead, The Honorable J.M. Salansky, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant : Garlington, Lohn & Robinson; E. Craig Daue, Missoula, Montana For Respondent : Hash, Jellison, O'Brien & Bartlett; James C. Bartlett, Kalispell, Montana -- Submitted on Briefs: June 7, 1984 Decided: November 15, 1984 Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e *John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. A p p e l l a n t , O r v i l l e K . Good, f i l e d a motion i n t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , County of F l a t h e a d , s e e k i n g t o have t h e D i s t r i c t Court d e c l a r e h i s c h i l d s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n f u l l y paid through t h e d a t e of t h e motion. The Honorable James M. Salansky conducted an e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g and e n t e r e d an o r d e r i n f a v o r of a p p e l l a n t ' s w i f e f o r c h i l d s u p p o r t a r r e a r a g e i n t h e amount of $8,264.06. From t h a t o r d e r Mr. Good a p p e a l s and h i s ex-wife c r o s s a p p e a l s . W e a £ £ irm. Issues (1) Whether an o b l i g o r husband may be g i v e n c r e d i t a g a i n s t h i s c h i l d s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n f o r payments made o u t s i d e t h e ambit of t h e d i v o r c e d e c r e e when t h e o b l i g e e w i f e has o r a l l y agreed t o such c r e d i t . ( 2 ) When an o b l i g e e wife who h a s a s s i g n e d h e r c h i l d s u p p o r t r i g h t s under a Montana d e c r e e t o another s t a t e and t h a t s t a t e a g r e e s w i t h t h e o b l i g o r husband d u r i n g t h e term of t h e assignment t o a r e d u c t i o n i n h i s o b l i g a t i o n , is t h e w i f e l a t e r e n t i t l e d t o judgment a g a i n s t t h e husband f o r : a . t h e amount of t h e r e d u c t i o n ; b. any o t h e r p a r t of t h e c h i l d s u p p o r t a s s i g n e d ? ( 3 ) Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t make a mathematical e r r o r i n computing t h e amount of c h i l d s u p p o r t accrued? F a c t s By d e c r e e d a t e d June 10, 1 9 7 0 , t h e m a r r i a g e between a p p e l l a n t and respondent was t e r m i n a t e d , t h e f o u r minor c h i l d r e n were placed i n t h e c u s t o d y of t h e i r mother and a p p e l l a n t was ordered t o pay f i f t y d o l l a r s per c h i l d p e r month c h i l d s u p p o r t . The d e c r e e was i s s u e d by t h e E l e v e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t i n and f o r the County of F l a t h e a d . Respondent h a s l i v e d i n t h e S t a t e of Washington s i n c e b e f o r e t h e d i v o r c e i n 1970. Appellant h a s consequently made h i s c h i l d s u p p o r t payments t o t h e Washington Department of S o c i a l and Health S e r v i c e s (WDSHS) and i n J u l y 1970 WDSHS reduced a p p e l l a n t ' s s u p p o r t payments t o a t o t a l of $150 p e r month. WDSHS was t h e payee of a p p e l l a n t ' s s u p p o r t payments through September of 1979. From t i m e t o time between t h e d a t e of t h e d i v o r c e and September of 1979, respondent r e c e i v e d p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e from WDSHS and a s a c o n d i t i o n t o r e c e i v i n g such a s s i s t a n c e a s s i g n e d h e r s u p p o r t r i g h t s t o t h a t agency. The l a s t t i m e such an assignment was made, June 6 , 1979, respondent a s s i g n e d t o WDSHS a l l unpaid c h i l d s u p p o r t accrued t o t h a t d a t e under t h e Montana d e c r e e . A p p e l l a n t and r e s p o n d e n t a g r e e d o r a l l y b e t w e e n t h e m s e l v e s t h a t a p p e l l a n t would p a y c e r t a i n o f t h e c h i l d r e n ' s medical and d e n t a l b i l l s and i n r e t u r n respondent would g i v e him c r e d i t a g a i n s t h i s c h i l d s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n . The p a r t i e s f u r t h e r agreed i n f o r m a l l y t h a t a p p e l l a n t would n o t be o b l i g a t e d t o respondent f o r s u p p o r t of a c h i l d w h i l e t h a t c h i l d l i v e d w i t h him. Each of t h e f o u r c h i l d r e n h a s l i v e d w i t h a p p e l l a n t f o r c e r t a i n p e r i o d s of t i m e s i n c e t h e d a t e of t h e d i v o r c e . A p p e l l a n t h a s a l s o p a i d c e r t a i n medical and d e n t a l b i l l s i n c u r r e d by t h e c h i l d r e n . I n each i n s t a n c e a p p e l l a n t h a s taken c r e d i t a g a i n s t h i s s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n by n o t making c e r t a i n payments t o respondent. Through correspondence with appellant during 1982, WDSHS agreed to accept $3,000 as full payment of support obligation from the date of the divorce through September of 1979. By motion dated November 10, 1982, appellant sought an order of the District Court declaring his child support obligation fully paid through that date. At no time prior to that motion did respondent seek to enforce her child support rights other than through the WDSHS. Discussion I. Appellant's first issue on appeal and respondent's lone cross-appeal issue is whether it is proper to allow a non-custodial parent credit against child support arrearage for sums he paid to physicians and dentists in reliance upon an oral promise of credit by the custodial parent. Based upon substantial evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, the District Court Judge held there was a proper agreement between the parents regarding credit for payment of medical and dental bills and accordingly awarded appellant more than $1,600 credit against his support obligation. Respondent argues the District Court erred in so holding because such a ruling essentially permits the non-custodial parent to substitute his own judgment for that of the custodial parent as to how child support monies are to be spent. This argument is misplaced. The District Court did not rule on whether the father's judgment was being substituted for the mother's but rather ruled on whether there was an agreement between the two parents on this issue. The District Court found such an agreement between the parties and we see no error in that finding. The wife asked the husband to pay bills in lieu of support payments and he did so, relying on her judgment. Clearly, there was no substitution of judgment involved. Respondent further argues the dissolution decree cannot be modified to reduce or cancel past due and unpaid child support and then cites six cases to buttress the point. In one of those cases, Williams v. Budke (1980), 186 Mont. 71, 506 P.2d 515, this Court spelled out the correct approach to this issue (an approach evidently overlooked by respondent): "Two Montana decisions have addressed the issue of whether a parent upon whom a child support obligation rests should be granted credit for voluntary expenditures made in a manner other than that specified in the support order or dissolution decree. Haaby v. Haaby (1974), 165 Mont. 475, 529 P.2d 1387; Weber v. Weber (1978), Mont., 576 P.2d 1102, 35 St.Rep. 309. However, af ter examining the case law of this and other jurisdictions we have found the basic question addressed by the courts is whether there has been substantial compliance, in whole or in part, with the child support order. Was the spirit and purpose of the support order accomplished without violating any other provision of the dissolution decree? We believe this is the correct approach to the issue." In the instant case, we find no violation of the spirit and purpose of the support order by granting appellant credit for payments made to medical institutions. This is true particularly since respondent asked appellant to do so. It was nothing more than a streamlining of a payment process; husband paid the doctors directly rather than going through the wife as an intermediary. The dissolution decree was left unscathed by the transaction and we will not agree with respondent's contention that the District Court modified the divorce decree. 11. Next, appellant asserts as error the District Court's ruling that respondent was entitled to a judgment against him for the amount of the reduction in support payments granted by the WDSHS and for any part of the child support assigned by respondent to the WDSHS. In order to receive public assistance from the State of Washington, respondent assigned all of her unpaid child support accrued through September 30, 1979 to the WDSHS. During the term of the assignment the WDSHS agreed to a reduction in support and to a compromise of the arrearage with appellant. Appellant accepted, and made reduced payment to WDSHS. The court's findings of fact no. 7 and no. 8 were as follows : "7. That through January, 1983, and considering the dates three of the children obtained the age of majority, the total obligation of $50.00 per month per child is $25,000.00. The records maintained by the State of Washinqton through September 18, 1975, show payments of $7,057.50. In addition, Plaintiff has acknowledged payments totaling $5,000.00 through January 1983. In addition, a recent payment made by attachment to Defendant's IRS check in the sum of $698.96 should be credited. "8. That the total amount of arrearage due is calculated as follows: Total per Decree $25,000.00 Less records by State of Washington -$7,057.50 Less payment acknowledged -$5,000.00 Less IRS payment -$ 698.96 Less c r e d i t s f o r s t a y Less c r e d i t s f o r m e d i c a l , d e n t a l and o r t h o d o n t a l payments -$1,629.48 TOTAL DUE throuqh J a n . 1983 T h e r e a f t e r , t h e c o u r t made t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n c l u s i o n s of law and o r d e r : "1. P u r s u a n t t o 40-4-208, MCA, t h e Court may m o d i f y c h i l d s u p p o r t o n l y a s t o i n s t a l l m e n t s a c c r u i n g subsequent t o t h e t i m e a motion f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n is f i l e d . No motion f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n was submitted and t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o pay c h i l d s u p p o r t a t $50.00 p e r month p e r c h i l d remains unchanged. T h a t t h e C o u r t f i n d s no agreement on t h e p a r t of P l a i n t i f f t o reduce t h e $50.00 sum t o $37.50. "2. That Defendant should be g i v e n c r e d i t f o r payments on b e h a l f of t h e c h i l d r e n made i n t h e p a s t f o r medical, d e n t a l o r o r t h o d o n t a l expenses. "3. That t h e d i v o r c e d e c r e e provided f o r no c e s s a t i o n of s u p p o r t payinents d u r i n g t h e summer v i s i t a t i o n p e r i o d s and Defendant should be g i v e n no c r e d i t f o r same o t h e r t h a n t h o s e a m o u n t s h e r e i n b e f o r e given. "4. Defendant had t h e burden of proof of showing payment of h i s s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n and t h a t burden h a s n o t been m e t . "5. The Court h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h i s m a t t e r and h a s the r i g h t t o p r o t e c t t h e p a r t i e s by making t h e o b l i g a t i o n f o r a r r e a r a g e payable j o i n t l y t o P l a i n t i f f and t h e S t a t e o f W a s h i n g t o n , W e l f a r e Department. ORDER "1. T h a t t h e P l a i n t i f f s h a l l recover of t h e Defendant t h e sum of $8,264.06, and c o s t s of s u i t ; " 2 . That t h e v o l u n t a r y payment of s a i d sum by O r v i l l e K . Good s h a l l be made by check o r money o r d e r made payable t o J e a n n e M. H a r g e t t and t h e S t a t e o f Washington, Welfare Department; " 3 . T h a t i n t h e e v e n t t h e sum i s c o l l e c t e d i n v o l u n t a r i l y by e x e c u t i o n , Jeanne PI. H a r g e t t s h a l l r e p o r t t h e amount r e c e i v e d t o t h e Washington Department of Welfare; " 4 . That t h e r e q u e s t of Jeanne M. H a r g e t t t o have her t r a v e l expenses p a i d and t o have a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s a s s e s s e d , t o g e t h e r w i t h h e r m o t i o n f o r i n c r e a s e d c h i l d s u p p o r t w i l l be heard by t h e Court on t h e 1 9 t h d a y of A u g u s t , 1 9 8 3 , a t 9:30 o ' c l o c k , a.m.; and t h e Defendant s h a l l have h i s a f f i d a v i t of f i n a n c i a l s t a t e m e n t f i l e d t e n ( 1 0 ) d a y s b e f o r e s a i d h e a r i n g . Defendant s h a l l produce f o r examination by P l a i n t i f f ' s c o u n s e l h i s 1980 and 1981 income t a x r e t u r n a s w e l l a s wage s t a t e m e n t s f o r 1982 t e n ( 1 0 ) days b e f o r e s a i d h e a r i n g . " The a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t due t o t h e f a c t h i s w i f e r e c e i v e d p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e from t h e S t a t e of Washington and a s s i g n e d a l l of her unpaid c h i l d s u p p o r t accrued through S e p t e m b e r 30, 1979 t o t h e WDSHS, h e h a s no f u r t h e r o b l i g a t i o n t o pay t h e amount set f o r t h i n t h e d e c r e e . H e a r g u e s t h e WDSHS h a s t h e s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o compromise o r c h a r g e o f f any s u p p o r t a r r e a r a g e s a s s i g n e d t o it and t h a t d u r i n g t h e term of t h e assignment t h e WDSHS agreed t o t h e r e d u c t i o n of t h e s u p p o r t . He f u r t h e r a r g u e s t h a t because h i s w i f e acquiesced i n t h e a c t i o n s taken by t h e a p p e l l a n t w i t h t h e W D S H S f o r a p e r i o d of t h i r t e e n y e a r s , s h e is circumventing t h e e f f e c t of her u n c o n d i t i o n a l assignment of s u p p o r t t o t h e WDSHS and t h e r e s u l t i n g compromise made w i t h t h a t agency. H e f u r t h e r a r g u e s t h e w i f e ' s assignment of h e r c h i l d s u p p o r t r i g h t s under t h e Montana d e c r e e is v a l i d . H e c i t e s t h e d i v o r c e d e c r e e h e r e i n is a judgment under Montana law. Rule 5 4 ( A ) Montana Rules of C i v i l Procedure. "There c a n be no q u e s t i o n t h a t a judgment is a s s i g n a b l e . " Ginsberger v. Adams ( 1 9 2 2 ) , 62 Mont. 430, 205 P. 658. W e do n o t f i n d t h e above c i t a t i o n a p p l i c a b l e t o t h i s c a s e . There is no q u e s t i o n t h e e f f e c t of t h e w i f e ' s i n t e r e s t i n t h e accrued s u p p o r t payments t o t h e s t a t e can be a s s i g n e d and a l l o w s t h e s t a t e t o s t e p i n t o t h e shoes of t h e wife. However, t h e w i f e does n o t have t h e r i g h t t o modify t h e d i v o r c e d e c r e e f o r t h e accrued c h i l d s u p p o r t payments. Nor does e n t e r i n g i n t o an assignment t o r e c e i v e w e l f a r e i n any way a f f e c t t h e judgment of a c o u r t of t h i s s t a t e . See, I n r e t h e Marriage of Linda Williams and L a r r y Williams (Mont. 1 9 8 0 ) , 612 P.2d 212, 37 St.Rep. 974; Williams v. Budke ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 186 Mont. 71, 606 P.2d 515; Dahl v. Dahl (1978) 176 Mont. 307, 577 P.2d 1230. The a p p e l l a n t r e l i e s on a Washington compromise s t a t u t e f o r h i s a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e d i s s o l u t i o n d e c r e e can be modified a s t o accrued c h i l d s u p p o r t . T h i s compromise s t a t u t e p r o v i d e s i n p a r t : "The Department may a c c e p t o f f e r s of compromise of d i s p u t e d c l a i m s from a p a r t i a l or t o t a l charge-off of s u p p o r t a r r e a r s owed t o t h e Department t o t h e t o t a l amount of p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e paid t o or f o r t h e b e n e f i t of p e r s o n s f o r whom t h e s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n is i n c u r r e d . " See R.C.W. 75.20 A.220. I t should be noted t h a t t h e s t a t u t e r e f e r r e d t o and r e l i e d upon, r e v e a l s t h a t t h e s t a t e may o n l y compromise a r r e a r s owed t o t h e s t a t e . The s t a t u t e does n o t p e r t a i n t o s u p p o r t a r r e a r s due a p a r e n t . C l e a r l y t h e s t a t e is n o t subrogated t o a n y t h i n g i n e x c e s s of t h e amount awarded i n t h e o r i g i n a l d e c r e e . A s noted i n Moore v. Yoore (Wash. App. 1 9 7 8 ) , 583 P.2d 1249, t h e Washington c o u r t followed its own c o u r t d e c i s i o n and h e l d t h a t its s u b r o g a t i o n r i g h t s o n l y apply t o t h e amount of t h e c o u r t o r d e r e d s u p p o r t , and d o e s n o t a p p l y t o t h e f u l l amount t h a t was p a i d by t h e S t a t e of Washington t o t h e respondent i n t h i s c a s e d u r i n g t h e t i m e s h e was on w e l f a r e . 111. A p p e l l a n t f i n a l l y a s s e r t s a s e r r o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s mathematical computation i n adding a d i s a l l o w e d c r e d i t t o t h e t o t a l amount of s u p p o r t accrued. W e need c i t e no a u t h o r i t y t o s e t t l e a q u e s t i o n of s i m p l e mathematics. A p p e l l a n t owes X amount of a r r e a r a g e . From t h a t t o t a l he c l a i m s Y amount of c r e d i t s . The D i s t r i c t Court c a n n o t d o more t h a n d i s a l l o w t h e claimed c r e d i t s t o t h e t o t a l amount of a r r e a r a g e , t o do s o would be t o charge a p p e l l a n t twice f o r an indebtedness--the mathematical e q u i v a l e n t of double jeopardy. Summary Our holding today is designed t o e n f o r c e t h e terms of s u p p o r t a s s p e c i f i e d by t h e D i s t r i c t Court d e c r e e ; n o t t o e n f o r c e a n e x t r a j u d i c i a l m o d i f i c a t i o n by t h e WDSHS. However, s i n c e t h e W D S H S is an a s s i g n e e it h a s t h e r i g h t t o proceed a g a i n s t t h e husband f o r any a r r e a r a g e s under i t s agreement w i t h him. "This should n o t p r e c l u d e t h e w i f e from proceeding i n her own r i g h t . " Moore v. Moore (Wash. App. 1 9 7 8 ) , 583 P.2d 1249, 1252. I n Moore t h e w i f e had a s s i g n e d her s u p p o r t payments t o t h e WDSHS i n o r d e r t o r e c e i v e p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e . The husband had f a l l e n behind i n h i s payments sometime d u r i n g t h e a s s i g n m e n t and c o n t i n u e d t o b e d e l i n q u e n t even a f t e r t h e assignment had been d i s c o n t i n u e d . The w i f e then s t a r t e d a show-cause proceeding t o d e t e r m i n e t h e amount of d e l i n q u e n t c h i l d s u p p o r t . The c o u r t e n t e r e d an o r d e r f i x i n g t h e amount of d e l i n q u e n t s u p p o r t and a month l a t e r t h e husband moved t o j o i n t h e WDSHS a s a n e c e s s a r y p a r t y . The c o u r t denied t h e motion b u t amended t h e amount of d e l i n q u e n t s u p p o r t s e g r e g a t i n g what was owed t h e w i f e and what was owed t h e husband. The husband appealed contending h i s ex-wife "was n o t e n t i t l e d t o a judgment f o r any c h i l d s u p p o r t d u r i n g t h e 40 months i n which s h e was p a i d p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e because s h e had a s s i g n e d a l l her r i g h t , t i t l e and i n t e r e s t t o s u p p o r t payments t o t h e s t a t e . " Moore, a t p. 1.251. The Court o f Appeals of Washington a f f i r m e d t h e w i f e ' s r i g h t t o proceed i n h e r own r i g h t a g a i n s t t h e husband even f o r t h e p e r i o d s h e had a s s i g n e d h e r s u p p o r t r i g h t s t o t h e ImSHS. The c o u r t reasoned t h e i n t e n t of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e when it e n a c t e d t h e s t a . t u t e r e q u i r i n g t h e payee of p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e t o a s s i g n a l l s u p p o r t r i g h t s is t o recoup p u b l i c monies. T h e r e f o r e t h e WDSHS h a s a r i g h t t o s u b r o g a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e w i f e ' s judgment . However, t h e c o u r t s t a t e d : "A b e t t e r procedure might have been t o s e r v e a copy of t h e motion t o show c a u s e on t h e s t a t e s o t h a t it would have been aware of t h e p r o c e e d i n g s e a r l i e r i n o r d e r t o g i v e t h e department an o p p o r t u n i t y t o i n t e r v e n e . However, u n d e r t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , s h e should n o t be estopped t o proceed by t h e s t a t e ' s f a i l u r e t o p r o s e c u t e . " Moore a t p. 1252. I n o t h e r words, simply because t h e WDSHS had allowed t h e husband t o f a l l i n t o a r r e a r s on h i s s u p p o r t d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d of assignment t h e w i f e was n o t p r e c l u d e d from s e e k i n g t o c o l l e c t t h o s e a r r e a r s . I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e w e s i m i l a r l y hold t h e w i f e may s u e t o recover any a r r e a r a g e s under t h e Montana d e c r e e , t h e agreement between t h e husband and t h e WDSHS n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g . T h i s holding today is n o t t o be c o n s t r u e d t o s u b j e c t t h e husband t o a double c o l l e c t i o n b u t r a t h e r t o a l l o w t h e w i f e t o proceed on her own r i g h t while a l l o w i n g t h e WDSHS ( o r any o t h e r p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e agency of any o t h e r s t a t e s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d ) t h e r i g h t of s u b r o g a t i o n a g a i n s t a recovery by h e r . W e hold t h a t n e i t h e r Washington nor Montana c a s e o r s t a t u t o r y law p e r m i t s t h e m o d i f i c a t i o n of a d i s s o l u t i o n d e c r e e t o reduce o r c a n c e l p a s t due o r unpaid c h i l d s u p p o r t payments and t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t e r r i n g r a n t i n g t h e respondent, w i f e , a judgment f o r c h i l d s u p p o r t p u r s u a n t t o t h e d i s s o l u t i o n d e c r e e , i n c l u d i n g t h e amount of t h e p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e r e c e i v e d d u r i n g t h a t t i m e . The t h e D i s t r i c t Court is a f f i r m e d , e x c e p t II \ a e b i i g & ) d i s c u s s e i n i s u e 111. W e r e t u r n t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t o change its o r d e r t o comply w i t h t h i s o p i n i o n . W e concur: