Case Title: State of Florida v. Stanely V. Huggins

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC99-27

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2001-03-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC99-27
____________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Petitioner,
vs.
STANLEY V. HUGGINS,
Respondent.
[March 22, 2001]
QUINCE, J.
We have for review the decision in State v. Huggins, 744 So. 2d 1215 (Fla.
4th DCA 1999), which certified conflict with the Second District Court of Appeal’s
decision in State v. White, 736 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).  We have
jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  Because the language of section
775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), is ambiguous, we approve the decision of the
Fourth District Court of Appeal in Huggins, which held that the Prison Releasee
Reoffender Act is not applicable to a defendant who is convicted of burglary of an
1  The Prison Releasee Reoffender Act provides in pertinent part:
(8)(a)1.  “Prison releasee  reoffender” means any
defendant who commits, or attempts to commit: . . . 
q.     Burglary of an occupied structure or dwelling;
or . . . within three years of being released from a state
correctional facility operated by the Department of
Corrections or a private vendor.
2.     If the state attorney determines that a
defendant is a prison releasee reoffender as defined in
subparagraph 1., the state attorney may seek to have the
court sentence the defendant as a prison releasee
reoffender.  Upon proof from the state attorney that
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a
defendant is a prison releasee reoffender as defined in this
section, such defendant is not eligible for sentencing
under the sentencing guidelines and must be sentenced as
follows: . . . 
c.     For a felony of the second degree, by a term
of imprisonment of 15 years; . . . 
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unoccupied dwelling. 
Stanley Huggins (Huggins) was charged with burglary of a dwelling.  Both
Huggins and the State agree that the dwelling was not occupied at the time of the
crime.  Prior to entry of a plea of guilty to the offense, Huggins sought clarification
from the trial court as to whether the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act (PRR),
section 775.082(8)(a)(1)(q), Florida Statutes (1997)1, applied to him.  The burglary
was committed within three years of his release from prison, and the PRR imposes
steep mandatory minimum sentences for commission of certain crimes within three
2   The Fourth District receded from its own prior opinions in Scott v. State,
721 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); State v. Litton, 736 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA
1999); and Wallace v. State, 738 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).   
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years after the reoffender’s release from prison.  Had Huggins been sentenced
under the PRR, a mandatory fifteen-year sentence would have been imposed.  Over
the State’s objection, the trial court ruled that burglary of an unoccupied dwelling is
not one of the enumerated offenses in section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997). 
The trial court sentenced Huggins to fifty-five months in the Department of
Corrections. 
The State appealed and argued that the enumerated offense of “burglary of
an occupied structure or dwelling” was intended to include burglary of any dwelling
whether occupied or not because the word “occupied” modifies only the word
“structure.”  The en banc Fourth District agreed with the trial court and concluded
the word occupied modifies both structure and dwelling. 2  In so holding the court
certified conflict with the Second District on the same issue of law.  We likewise
agree with the trial court and approve the decision of the Fourth District holding the
PRR inapplicable to burglary of an unoccupied structure and burglary of an
unoccupied dwelling.
Both the State and Huggins argue that the language of section
775.082(8)(1)(q) is clear and unambiguous, although they advocate opposite
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interpretations.  We do not agree because the phrase “occupied structure or
dwelling” as used in the PRR is susceptible to more than one interpretation. 
“Ambiguity suggests that reasonable persons can find different meanings in the
same language.”  Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.
2d 452 (Fla. 1992).  As is evident from the arguments being presented in this case,
reasonable persons can find different reasonable meanings in the phrase “occupied
structure or dwelling.”  The ambiguity exists because it is unclear whether the word
“occupied” modifies “structure” only or modifies both “structure” and “dwelling.” 
The State argues that the word “occupied” modifies the word “structure”
only, and not both “structure” and “dwelling.”  If there is any doubt, the State
argues, the rules of statutory interpretation require courts to apply the doctrine of
nearest antecedent, i.e., that an adjective only modifies the word it is most near.  If
we were to accept the State’s position, we would be required to find that the word
“occupied” cannot reasonably be construed to modify both the words “structure”
and “dwelling.”  Phrases constructed like the phrase at issue, however, are
commonly construed to mean that the adjective modifies subsequent nouns, for
example, “qualified man or woman” and “governmental fine or penalty” mean
“qualified man or qualified woman” and “governmental fine or governmental
penalty,” respectively. 
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The State also argues that the language of the burglary statute supports its
reading of the PRR language.  The State asserts that the Legislature never intended
that “burglary of a dwelling” be further distinguished by occupied or unoccupied,
because in either event the offense levels are the same.  The burglary statute
provides in pertinent part as follows:
810.02  Burglary.--
(1)     “Burglary” means entering or remaining in a
dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to
commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the
time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or
invited to enter or remain.
(2)     Burglary is a felony of the first degree,
punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not
exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s. 775.082,
s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 if, in the course of committing
the offense, the offender:
. . . .
(c)     Enters an occupied or unoccupied dwelling
or structure, and
1.      Uses a motor vehicle . . . or
2.      Causes damage to the dwelling or 
structure . . . 
(3)     Burglary is a felony of the second degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s.
775.084, if, in the course of committing the offense, the
offender does not make an assault or battery and is not
and does not become armed with a dangerous weapon or
explosive and the offender enters or remains in a:
(a)     Dwelling, and there is another person in the 
dwelling at the time the offender enters or remains;
(b)     Dwelling, and there is not another person in
the dwelling at the time the offender enters or remains;
3  Included among the list of offenses eligible for sentencing under the PRR is
armed burglary, i.e., burglary with a dangerous weapon or explosive.
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(c)      Structure, and there is another person in the
structure at the time the offender enters or remains; or
(d)     Conveyance, and there is another person in
the conveyance at the time the offender enters or remains.
§ 810.02, Fla. Stat. (1997) (emphasis added).  While it appears that the Legislature
intended the crime of “burglary of a dwelling” not be broken down into occupied
or unoccupied for purposes of the classification of the crime, we cannot say it is
unreasonable to interpret the PRR, a sentencing statute, to require a different result.  
The Legislature has the authority to not only define crimes but to also
determine the range of punishment applicable to such crimes.  See Sims v. State,
754 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2000).  For whatever reason, the Legislature when enacting the
PRR chose to make that act applicable to a limited number of crimes including
“burglary of an occupied structure or dwelling.”3  The list of crimes which qualify
for PRR sentencing includes life felonies, first-degree felonies, second-degree
felonies, and third-degree felonies.  All sexual batteries are included but not lewd
and lascivious assault; carjacking is an eligible offense but not grand theft.  Thus, it
is clear that crimes of the same degree are not necessarily punished in the same
manner or to the same extent under the PRR.
The State also argues the burglary statute, section 810.011, Florida Statutes
4  Section 810.011, Florida Statutes (1997), provides in pertinent part as
follows:
810.011 Definitions.–As used in this chapter:
. . . . 
(2)     “Dwelling” means a building or conveyance
of any kind, including any attached porch, whether such
building or conveyance is temporary or permanent,
mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is
designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at
night, together with the curtilage thereof.
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(1997), defines “dwelling,” and the definition does not make any distinction
between occupied and unoccupied, so no distinction can be made.4  While this
position seems reasonable at first blush, it does not explain the Legislature’s
distinction in section 810.02(c), Florida Statutes, wherein burglary is deemed a first-
degree felony where the offender “enters an occupied or unoccupied dwelling or
structure.”  Clearly in this section, the Legislature intended the word dwelling to be
modified by the adjectives “occupied” and “unoccupied.”  Therefore, to say that
the word “occupied” may not logically modify the word “dwelling” belies section
810.02(c).  Furthermore, the definition itself, which includes the language “designed
to be occupied by people lodging therein at night,” carries within it the connotation
that while the purpose of a dwelling is occupation by people, a dwelling need not
always be occupied. 
The defendant argues that the PRR provision clearly applies to burglary of
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an occupied structure or an occupied dwelling.  The defendant further suggests that
if the statute is ambiguous, any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the
defendant under the rule of lenity and section 775.021(1), Florida Statutes (1997). 
Indeed, the same criminal code which contains the PRR outlines certain rules of
construction.  Section 775.021(1) provides, “The provisions of this code and
offenses defined by other statutes shall be strictly construed; when the language is
susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorably to the
accused.”  This provision of chapter 775 mandates the result reached by both the
trial and appellate courts.  
Neither the State’s nor the defendant’s interpretation of the language
“occupied structure or dwelling” can be said to be unreasonable.  Because we hold
that the phrase “occupied structure or dwelling” as used in section 775.082(8)(1)(q)
is susceptible to differing constructions, we are bound to construe the language
most favorably to the defendant.   For that reason, we approve the Fourth
District’s decision below.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, HARDING and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which LEWIS, J., concurs.
LEWIS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which WELLS, C.J., concurs.
PARIENTE, J., recused.
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, C.J., dissenting.
I do not agree with the majority’s reading of this statute.  I find that the
Legislature intended, by its deliberate use of the word “or,” to have the statute
apply both to a dwelling, whether occupied or not, or to an occupied structure. 
Under this statute, “occupied” modifies “structure,” not “dwelling.”
Therefore, I would quash the Fourth District and approve decisions on this
issue from the Second District in State v. White, 736 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA
1999), and cases that followed in that district, the First District in Foresta v. State,
751 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1st DCA), review granted, 767 so. 2d 456 (Fla. 20000), and
the Fifth District in Whiten v. State, 765 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).
LEWIS, J., concurs.
LEWIS, J., dissenting
Section 775.082 (9)(a)1. q, Florida Statutes, defines a “prison releasee
reoffender” as “any defendant who commits, or attempts to commit . . . Burglary
of an occupied structure or dwelling.”  My brothers and sisters in the majority
reach the conclusion that this definition applies only to defendants convicted of
5See Perkins v. State, 682 So. 2d 1083, 1084 (Fla. 1995) (citing Perkins v. State,
630 So. 2d 1180, 1181-82  (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)).
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burglaries of occupied dwellings.  They do so based upon the premise that, in
using the phrase, “burglary of an occupied structure or dwelling,” the Legislature
has failed to show a clear and specific intent to provide enhanced punishment for
burglary of a “dwelling” (which, following the 1982 amendment to section
810.011(2), Florida Statutes, this Court has defined as a structure or conveyance
suitable for lodging, irrespective of actual occupancy).5  If that is correct, then the
rule of lenity would, indeed, apply.
However, in my view, the language considered here and purpose of the
PRR’s ambit are neither ambiguous nor susceptible to differing interpretations.  In
Perkins, in defining the term “dwelling” as used in the amended burglary statute, we
specifically recognized that it was “apparent here that the legislature has extended
broad protection to buildings or conveyances of any kind that are designed for
human habitation.  Hence, an empty house in a neighborhood is extended the same
protection as one presently occupied.”  682 So. 2d at 1085.  As observed by the
Second District Court of Appeal in Medina v. State, 758 So. 2d 113, 113-14 (Fla.
2d DCA 2000), it is incongruous that the Legislature would intend “the occupancy
of a dwelling [to] be an element of the crime for purposes of sentencing when it is
6As we observed in State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345, 355 (Fla. 2000):
In passing the Act, the Legislature found that (1) recent court decisions
have mandated the early release of violent felony offenders; (2) the
people of the State and its visitors deserve public safety and protection
from violent felony offenders who have previously been sentenced to
prison and who continue to prey on society by reoffending; and (3) "the
best deterrent to prevent prison releasees from committing future crimes
is to require that any releasee who commits new serious felonies must be
sentenced to the maximum term of incarceration allowed by law, and
must serve 100 percent of the court-imposed sentence."
Although the felonies enumerated in the Act are not entirely
coextensive with those set forth in the habitual felony offender statute,
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not an element of the crime for purposes of conviction.”  Medina, 758 So. 2d at
113 (“We fail to see how the occupancy of a dwelling can be an element of the
crime for purposes of sentencing when it is not an element of the crime for
purposes of conviction.  Therefore, we hold that burglary of a dwelling, whether
occupied or not, is a qualifying offense under the Act.”) (citing State v.
Chamberlain, 744 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); State v. White, 736 So. 2d
1231, 1232 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)).  A “dwelling” is directly and unmistakably
connected with the thought of human habitation as opposed to a structure which
falls into a totally different category.
In my view, in addressing this issue, the clear legislative intent reflected in the
Act to provide “public safety and protection from violent felony offenders” to the
people of this State and its visitors6 should serve as our guiding polestar.  A
section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1997), there is considerable overlap.
The additional felonies included in the Act--treason, carjacking,
home-invasion robbery, aircraft piracy, burglary of an occupied structure
or dwelling, committing criminal offenses with a weapon, committing
criminal offenses involving the use or threat of physical force or violence
against another, engaging in lewd sexual assaults upon children, abusing
or neglecting children, and engaging in activities involving sexual
performance by a child--are all crimes which have significant potential to
compromise the victim's personal safety. It is apparent, reading the
"Whereas" clauses accompanying the Act, that this is the type of
"predatory" behavior which the legislators were endeavoring to curtail.
(Emphasis supplied.)
7Pursuant to section 810.011(1), Florida Statutes,"structure" means “a building
of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it, together with the
curtilage thereof.
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structure, by definition,7 is not “designed for human habitation,” and, therefore--
absent the qualification that it be “occupied”--is not, as a target for criminal activity,
highly likely to involve a threat of bodily harm to persons.  The same cannot be
said, however, about dwellings, where occupancy by persons is specifically
contemplated.  In my view, there is reason and clear logic to attach “occupied” to
“structure” but not to “dwelling.”
Thus, while it is reasonable to conclude that, consistent with its legislative
intent, the Legislature has limited application of the PRR to defendants convicted of
burglaries of “occupied structures,” the stated goals of public safety and protection
are not similarly furthered if application of the PRR turns upon the serendipitous
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absence of persons from a target of criminal activity specifically designed for
human habitation.  Based upon the foregoing, I respectfully dissent.
WELLS, C.J., concurs.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Certified Direct Conflict
Fourth District - Case No. 4D98-3949 
(Palm Beach County)
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Celia Terenzio, Bureau Chief, West Palm
Beach, and Daniel P. Hyndman, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach,
Florida,
for Petitioner
Richard Jorandby, Public Defender, and Karen E. Ehrlich, Assistant Public
Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Respondent