Case Title: People v. Dowl

Citation: 

Docket Number: S182621

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2013-08-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 8/29/13 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S182621 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 5 F057384  
LEWIS MARCUS DOWL, 
) 
 
) 
Kern County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BF125801A 
 
____________________________________) 
 
The Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (CUA) (Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 11362.5)1 and the Medical Marijuana Program (MMP; § 11362.7 et seq.) 
authorize use of marijuana for medical purposes under certain circumstances.  We 
granted review in this case to consider issues relating to expert testimony when a 
criminal defendant defends against a charge of possession of marijuana for 
purposes of sale by introducing evidence that, under these statutes, he legally 
possessed the marijuana for medical purposes.  Defendant Lewis Marcus Dowl, 
who asserted such a defense, contends the evidence at trial was insufficient to 
establish his intent to sell because the expert who opined at trial on that subject 
lacked experience distinguishing between lawful possession for medical use and 
unlawful possession for purposes of sale.  Insofar as defendant argues the expert‟s 
                                              
1  
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Health and Safety 
Code. 
 
2 
opinion was inadmissible or insufficient because the witness was unqualified, we 
find that defendant forfeited the argument by failing to object at trial to the 
witness‟s qualifications.  Insofar as defendant otherwise contends the evidence is 
insufficient to sustain his conviction, we disagree.  We therefore affirm the 
judgment. 
I.  Facts 
On Saturday, November 29, 2008, a little after 4:00 p.m., two police officers 
stopped defendant for playing loud music in his car.  Defendant presented his 
driver‟s license and a medical marijuana identification (ID) card with an 
expiration date of August 21, 2009, and said there was marijuana in the car.  A 
search revealed $21 in cash, a WD-40 can with a hidden compartment containing 
marijuana residue, and a total of over two ounces of marijuana:  17.2 grams in a 
single bag in defendant‟s pocket, three grams in each of 10 bags in the driver‟s 
door, and 6.5 grams in each of three bags on the backseat.  Defendant did not 
exhibit signs of being under the influence of marijuana and possessed nothing that 
would be used for ingesting marijuana, such as pipes or rolling papers.  His belt 
buckle read, “CA$H ONLY.”  Based on these circumstances, an information 
charged defendant with unlawful transportation of marijuana in violation of 
section 11360, subdivision (a), and unlawful possession of marijuana for purposes 
of sale in violation of section 11359.    
At trial, Officer Jason Williamson, who was one of the arresting officers, 
testified that in his expert opinion, defendant possessed the marijuana for sale.  He 
based his opinion on (1) the packaging and location of the marijuana found in the 
door and on the backseat, (2) defendant‟s “CA$H ONLY” belt buckle, viewed in 
conjunction with the absence of “pay-and-owe” sheets or any written record of 
sales transactions, and (3) the fact that defendant was on probation for a prior 
conviction for possession of marijuana for sale.  Regarding the first circumstance, 
 
3 
the officer explained:  “We have 10 bags all almost exactly three grams in the 
driver‟s map compartment of the vehicle.  These bags typically sell for about 
$5.00 a piece.  The price could go up to [$]10 if it‟s extremely good marijuana.  
We have three bags which are approximately 6.5 grams each in the backseat, again 
packaged with the same materials but double the value of the ones in the door.  
And the ones of equal size were kept in different places that I know through my 
training and experience to be for quick reference.”  Drug dealers “know” the areas 
where people go to buy drugs, and “they can drive up to that area and give what 
they call curb service.  People walk up to the door of their car.”  Regarding the 
belt buckle, the officer testified that “CA$H ONLY” “[l]et[] people know if they 
want marijuana they got to come out with the cash, he‟s not going to front it to 
them or take an IOU.  It‟s also significant in the fact that it shows his mind-set 
regarding the sales of narcotics and the reason why I did not find a pay-and-owe 
sheet or a written recordation of sales transactions because he is not giving anyone 
credit.”  Officer Williamson also testified that, given the totality of the 
circumstances, defendant‟s possession of a medical marijuana ID card did not 
affect his opinion.  He also testified that he had been a police officer for nine 
years, had received training in identifying marijuana possessed for personal use 
and marijuana possessed for sale, and had received no training in determining the 
validity of a medical marijuana ID card.   
In his defense, defendant claimed he possessed the marijuana, not unlawfully 
for purposes of sale, but lawfully for purposes of medical treatment.  According to 
the evidence he offered at trial, including his own testimony, he obtained a 
prescription for marijuana from his doctor to help with chronic pain and insomnia 
related to a 2007 shoulder injury.  He obtained a medical marijuana ID card from 
the Kern County Health Department in Bakersfield in July 2008, and it was valid 
at the time of his arrest.  He smoked marijuana in cigars and was carrying a cigar 
 
4 
“splitter” on his keychain at the time of his arrest.  He purchased the marijuana at 
a medical marijuana dispensary in Los Angeles, but could not recall the 
dispensary‟s name.  The marijuana came packaged in a single bag.  He divided it 
into separate bags, based on the amount he smoked on a daily basis and because 
small bags are easier to carry.  A small bag would fit into the secret compartment 
of the WD-40 can found in his car upon his arrest, which was where he stored his 
marijuana at work.  There were many bags in the door and on the backseat because 
he had been in a rush and had thrown them into the car.  He denied selling 
marijuana, but admitted having previously been convicted of possession of 
marijuana for sale.    
The jury convicted defendant of both unlawful transportation and possession 
of marijuana.  The court sentenced him to three years in prison.    
On appeal, defendant argued in relevant part that his convictions should be 
reversed because the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish he possessed the 
marijuana for purposes of sale.  Officer Williamson‟s opinion testimony was not 
evidence of this fact, defendant asserted, because he needed, but lacked, 
experience in differentiating those who possess marijuana lawfully for medical 
purposes from those who possess it unlawfully with the intent to sell.   
Defendant relied on two cases:  People v. Hunt (1971) 4 Cal.3d 231 (Hunt) 
and People v. Chakos (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 357 (Chakos).  In Hunt, a jury 
convicted the defendant of unlawful possession for sale of a restricted dangerous 
drug, methedrine.  On appeal, we reversed that conviction for two reasons:  (1) 
nondisclosure of an informer‟s name; and (2) insufficient evidence.  (Hunt, supra, 
4 Cal.3d at pp. 237-241.)  Regarding the latter ground, we reasoned that, “in the 
circumstances of this case,” a police officer‟s testimony that the defendant 
possessed methedrine for sale was not “substantial evidence to support the 
conviction.”  (Id. at p. 237.)  We explained:  “In cases involving possession of 
 
5 
marijuana and heroin, it is settled that an officer with experience in the narcotics 
field may give his opinion that the narcotics are held for purposes of sale based 
upon matters such as quantity, packaging, and the normal use of an individual.  On 
the basis of such testimony convictions of possession for purposes of sale have 
been upheld.  [Citations.]  [¶]  A different situation is presented where an officer 
testifies that in his opinion a drug, which can and has been lawfully purchased by 
prescription, is being held unlawfully for purposes of sale.  In the heroin and 
marijuana situations, the officer experienced in the narcotics field is experienced 
with the habits of both those who possess for their own use and those who possess 
for sale because both groups are engaged in unlawful conduct.  As to drugs, which 
may be purchased by prescription, the officer may have experience with regard to 
unlawful sales but there is no reason to believe that he will have any substantial 
experience with the numerous citizens who lawfully purchase the drugs for their 
own use as medicine for illness.  [¶]  In the absence of evidence of some 
circumstances not to be expected in connection with a patient lawfully using the 
drugs as medicine, an officer‟s opinion that possession of lawfully prescribed 
drugs is for purposes of sale is worthy of little or no weight and should not 
constitute substantial evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction.  No such 
special circumstances were shown here as to the methedrine in the blue and white 
travel case.”  (Id. at pp. 237-238.) 
In Chakos, the Court of Appeal held that, under Hunt, when a defendant 
offers evidence he lawfully possessed marijuana for medical purposes, a police 
officer‟s opinion testimony that the defendant possessed the marijuana for sale 
does not constitute substantial evidence to convict unless the officer has “expertise 
in distinguishing lawful patterns of possession from unlawful patterns of holding 
for sale.”  (Chakos, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 367.)  The court found that the 
testifying officer in Chakos “was unqualified to render an expert opinion” because 
 
6 
“[t]he record fail[ed] to show” he was “any more familiar than the average 
layperson or the members of this court with the patterns of lawful possession for 
medicinal use that would allow him to differentiate them from unlawful 
possession for sale.”  (Id. at pp. 368-369, some italics omitted.) 
In opposing defendant‟s appeal, the People argued they had qualified 
Officer Williamson at trial as an expert on possession of marijuana for sale, and 
cited his trial testimony that he had specific training in the difference between 
possession of marijuana for personal use and possession for sale.   
The Court of Appeal rejected defendant‟s argument and affirmed his 
convictions, finding that Chakos had erred in applying Hunt.  The court held that 
Officer Williamson “was not required to additionally qualify as a medical 
marijuana expert in order to render a valid opinion that the marijuana found in 
defendant‟s possession was possessed for sales.”  Hunt is distinguishable, the 
court reasoned, because the CUA, unlike the statute at issue in Hunt, “provides an 
affirmative defense.”  Chakos, the court further reasoned, is “inconsistent with the 
nature” of that “affirmative defense”; it “improperly reallocates” to the 
prosecution the burden of proof on the CUA defense by “requiring the 
prosecution‟s narcotics expert to also qualify as a medical marijuana expert in 
order to opine that marijuana in a defendant‟s possession is possessed for sales.”  
The court thus held that “a police officer need not qualify as a medical marijuana 
expert in order to render an opinion that marijuana being possessed is possessed 
for sales in cases where the defendant raises an affirmative defense under” the 
CUA.  It found that “the presence of the marijuana in defendant‟s car, combined 
with Officer Williamson‟s expert opinion that the circumstances of defendant‟s 
possession were consistent with unlawful sales, constituted substantial evidence 
supporting defendant‟s convictions for transporting and possessing marijuana for 
sales.” 
 
7 
We granted defendant‟s petition for review and requested briefing on 
several additional issues, including the effect on this appeal of defendant‟s failure 
to object at trial to Officer Williamson‟s qualifications to render an opinion on 
defendant‟s intent to sell the marijuana.   
II.  Discussion 
California‟s statutes specify that, except as authorized or provided by law, 
it is a crime to possess marijuana (§ 11357), to cultivate, harvest, dry, or process it 
(§ 11358), to possess it for sale (§ 11359), to transport, import, sell, administer, or 
furnish it (§ 11360), or to give it away (id.).  
California‟s statutes also contain several medical-related exceptions to this 
criminal liability.  The CUA, which California voters adopted in 1996, provides 
that the laws prohibiting possession and cultivation of marijuana — sections 
11357 and 11358, respectively — “shall not apply to a patient, or to a patient‟s 
primary caregiver, who possesses or cultivates marijuana for the personal medical 
purposes of the patient upon the written or oral recommendation or approval of a 
physician.”  (§ 11362.5, subd. (d).)  This statute “provides an affirmative defense 
to the crimes” sections 11357 and 11358 define:  possessing and cultivating 
marijuana.  (People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81, 84 (Wright).)  A defendant 
may invoke it by introducing at trial evidence that raises a reasonable doubt as to 
the facts underlying the CUA defense.  (People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 
464, 479-483.) 
“Almost immediately after the CUA became effective, questions arose 
about whether it provided a defense to marijuana-related offenses” other than the 
two “specified in its text”:  possession of marijuana under section 11357 and 
cultivating marijuana under section 11358.  (Wright, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 90.)  
For example, a split of published authority developed as to whether the CUA 
 
8 
established a defense to one of the crimes of which defendant was convicted here:  
transporting marijuana (§ 11360).   (Wright, supra, at pp. 90-92.)   
In 2003, to settle this question, and others surrounding the CUA, the 
Legislature enacted the MMP (§ 11362.7 et seq.).  (See Wright, supra, 40 Cal.4th 
at p. 92.)  Under that program, those who provide documentation from an 
“attending physician” that they have “been diagnosed with [certain] serious 
medical condition[s] and that the medical use of marijuana is appropriate” 
(§ 11362.715, subd. (a)(2)) may obtain an “identification card that identifies” them 
as “a person authorized to engage in the medical use of marijuana” (§ 11362.71, 
subd. (d)(3)).  The MMP further specifies that a person who (1) “transports or 
processes marijuana for his or her own personal medical use” (§ 11362.765, subd. 
(b)(1)) and (2) either has an identification card or does not have one but is 
“entitled to” the CUA‟s “protections” (see § 11362.7, subd. (f) [defining “qualified 
patient”]), “shall not be subject, on that sole basis, to criminal liability under 
Section 11357 [possession of marijuana], 11358 [cultivation of marijuana], 11359 
[possession for sale], 11360 [transportation], 11366 [maintaining a place for the 
sale, giving away, or use of marijuana], 11366.5 [making available premises for 
the manufacture, storage or distribution of controlled substances], or 11570 
[abatement of nuisance created by premises used for manufacture, storage or 
distribution of controlled substance].”  (§ 11362.765, subd. (a).) 
As noted above, defendant argued at trial that he possessed the marijuana 
not for purposes of sale, but for legally authorized medical use.  On appeal, he 
argues that, because the evidence he introduced at trial raised a reasonable doubt 
as to his lawful medical use claim, the prosecution had to call a witness with 
“expertise in distinguishing unlawful possession . . . from lawful possession” for 
medical purposes, “if there would not be substantial evidence to support 
conviction without such an expert.”  Here, defendant continues, we must reverse 
 
9 
his conviction because Officer Williamson, who testified regarding defendant‟s 
intent, lacked the expertise to distinguish between lawful and unlawful possession, 
and “there was no other substantial evidence to support a conviction.”  “[B]ecause 
he had insufficient expertise regarding lawful possession for medical use,” his 
opinion cannot “constitute substantial evidence” of intent to sell.  
The precise legal basis of defendant‟s attack on the sufficiency of the 
officer‟s opinion testimony is somewhat unclear.  At several points in his opening 
brief, he argued that, because of the officer‟s lack of expertise, the testimony 
lacked “adequate foundation.”  Later, in his reply brief, he argued that the problem 
is one of “admissibility”; the testimony, he asserts, “cannot go to the weight of 
evidence on the possession for sales issue” because it “is not based on sufficient 
knowledge so as to meet the threshold standard of admissibility.”  After we 
requested supplemental briefing on the consequences of his failure to object at trial 
to the officer‟s qualifications, defendant asserted that the problem is not one of 
“admissibility” but simply of insufficient evidence.  Regardless of its 
admissibility, he argued, the testimony cannot constitute substantial evidence 
because the record fails to show the officer had adequate experience with lawful 
possession of marijuana for medical purposes.   
Insofar as defendant argues the evidence failed to meet the test of 
admissibility, his failure at trial to object on this ground precludes him from 
asserting it on appeal.  We have long and repeatedly held that a defendant who 
fails at trial to object that a witness lacks the qualifications to render an expert 
opinion may not on appeal contest the opinion‟s admissibility.  (People v. 
Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 948; People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395 , 
477-478; People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 161-162; People v. Bolin 
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 321.)  This rule helps the trial court “take steps to prevent 
error from infecting the remainder of the trial” and to develop an adequate record.  
 
10 
(People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 624.)  “Equally important,” it 
“afford[s] the prosecution the opportunity to . . . provide additional foundation for 
the admission of evidence . . . .”  (Ibid.)  It thus ensures that the party offering the 
evidence has an opportunity to address any objection and “ „prevents a party from 
engaging in gamesmanship by choosing not to object, awaiting the outcome, and 
then claiming error.‟ ”  (Ibid.) 
The reasons for the forfeiture rule fully apply on the record here.  
Defendant argues that, during his trial testimony, Officer Williamson did not 
describe any specific training regarding lawful possession of marijuana for 
medical purposes.  However, the record shows that Officer Williamson was never 
asked about such training at trial.  It also shows that, on cross-examination at the 
preliminary hearing, defense counsel elicited testimony from the officer regarding 
his training in this area.  On this subject, Officer Williamson testified at the 
preliminary hearing as follows:  (1) he had received “in-field training on people 
possessing marijuana for medical use”; (2) he had “seen marijuana purchased from 
a dispensary and it was most often put in like prescription bottles with a label on it 
and so forth”; (3) he had received training or experience in how marijuana is 
packaged when sold for medical use and had “[run] into people who actually 
purchased from a dispensary that had marijuana packaged in that fashion with 
labels that said what it was, where it was from, who it was for”; and (4) he 
understood that those possessing a medical marijuana ID card use “about a gram 
or less” each time they use it.  This testimony at the preliminary hearing suggests 
that defendant‟s later failure at trial to object to Officer‟s Williamson‟s 
qualifications may have been “part of a tactical strategy on his part to avoid” 
further testimony regarding the officer‟s expertise, either to avoid enhancing the 
officer‟s credibility or as part of a “gamble” that some error regarding the 
testimony‟s admission would “provide grounds for reversal.”  (People v. Coleman 
 
11 
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 778, 777.)  Because a party offering expert testimony need 
not establish the witness‟s qualifications absent an objection (Evid. Code, § 720; 
People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 852), defendant‟s failure to object at trial 
eliminated the incentive of the prosecution “to provide additional testimony to lay 
a foundation for [Officer Williamson‟s] testimony” (People v. Coleman, supra, 46 
Cal.3d at p. 778) and of the trial court to “take steps to prevent error from infecting 
the remainder of the trial” and to develop an adequate record.  (People v. Williams, 
supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 624.)  He therefore cannot now challenge on appeal the 
testimony‟s admissibility based on the officer‟s qualifications. 2 
It follows from this conclusion, and from other basic principles of 
California law, that defendant also may not now obtain reversal by having a 
reviewing court declare on appeal, as a matter of substantial evidence review, that 
Officer Williamson was unqualified to render an opinion at trial regarding 
defendant‟s intent to sell.  If there is an objection at trial to a proffered expert‟s 
qualifications, the determination of whether the witness is qualified to testify as an 
expert is a question for the trial court, not the jury.  (People v. Davis (1965) 62 
Cal.2d 791, 800; Huffman v. Lindquist (1951) 37 Cal.2d 465, 476.)  A trial court‟s 
                                              
2  
At the preliminary hearing, after Officer Williamson opined that defendant  
possessed the marijuana for purposes of sale, defendant‟s counsel stated:  
“Objection, lack of foundation.”  Even were this objection sufficient to constitute a 
challenge to the officer‟s expertise (compare People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 
271, 298 [defendant who made “lack of foundation” objection to expert testimony 
“never sought to challenge the witnesses‟ qualifications as experts”] with Lemley 
v. Doak Gas Engine Co. (1919) 40 Cal.App. 146, 154-155 [Supreme Court 
opinion on denial of petition for hearing stating that lack of foundation objection 
“fairly presented the question of the sufficiency of the evidence as to the expert 
qualifications of the witness”]), defendant‟s failure to reassert the objection at trial 
forfeited the issue for appeal.  (See People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 
1139.) 
 
12 
determination that a witness is qualified to testify “is binding on” the jury, 
although jurors may consider any evidence of the witness‟s qualifications in 
determining the weight to give the testimony.  (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 
29B pt. 2 West‟s Ann. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) § 720 , p. 316; see also Bossert v. 
Southern Pacific Co. (1916) 172 Cal. 504, 506; Fairbank v. Hughson (1881) 58 
Cal. 314, 315.)  While an appellate court may review the trial court‟s decision, it 
may reverse only for an abuse of discretion, and must uphold the ruling unless 
“ „ “the evidence shows that a witness clearly lacks qualification as an 
expert . . . .” ‟ ”   (People v. Chavez 1985) 39 Cal.3d 823, 828.)  In light of these 
principles, defendant, by failing to object, has forfeited appellate review of 
whether the evidence is sufficient to establish that Officer Williamson was 
qualified to testify as an expert that defendant possessed the marijuana for 
purposes of sale.3 
Nevertheless, despite his failure to object, defendant may argue on appeal 
that the evidence put before the jury at trial — including the officer‟s opinion 
testimony — was insufficient to establish he possessed the marijuana for purposes 
of sale.  (Tahoe National Bank v. Phillips (1971) 4 Cal.3d 11, 23, fn. 17 
[“contention that a judgment is not supported by substantial evidence” is an 
“exception” to the rule that “points not urged in the trial court cannot be raised on 
appeal”].)   
                                              
3  
Contrary to the assertion in the concurring opinion, we do not hold that 
defendant has forfeited his claim that the officer's lack of expertise “rendered his 
opinion insufficient „as a matter of substantial evidence.‟ ”  (Conc. opn. of 
Werdegar, J., post, at p. 2.)  Rather, we hold that defendant has forfeited any claim 
that the officer was unqualified to testify as an expert that defendant possessed the 
marijuana for purposes of sale, even if presented as a substantial evidence 
argument.  As our subsequent discussion demonstrates, defendant remains free to 
argue on appeal about the weight to which that testimony was entitled. 
 
13 
However, having reviewed the record, we reject defendant‟s argument.  We 
begin by reiterating that the jury heard not only Officer Williamson‟s opinion 
regarding defendant‟s intent, but also the officer‟s testimony regarding the various 
circumstances that, in his experience, were consistent with that conclusion.  
Notably, although contesting the officer‟s ultimate opinion regarding defendant‟s 
intent, defendant does not challenge the officer‟s expertise in identifying for the 
jury circumstances that are generally consistent with an intent to sell.  On the 
contrary, defendant concedes that the officer “had significant experience and 
training in distinguishing between marijuana possessed for personal use and 
possession [of] marijuana for sale,” such that he could identify “different factors 
that would be considered when somebody is running a sales operation as opposed 
to just using it for personal enjoyment.”  Indeed, consistent with the officer‟s 
testimony regarding the circumstances on which he based his opinion, defendant 
concedes that the “factors” that “typically” or “normally indicate sales” of 
marijuana include “large quantity,” “baggies,” and “the number of packages found 
containing marijuana.”  
Defendant‟s concessions are understandable given the evidence at trial.  
Regarding Officer Williamson‟s expertise, the jury heard the following testimony:  
(1) before his hiring in March 1999 as a reserve police officer, Officer Williamson 
“attended a year and a half long reserve police academy, the extended version, . . . 
where [he] received several hours of training in drug recognition, people 
possessing drugs for personal use, people possessing drugs for the purpose of 
sales, signs and symptoms of people being under the influence of various drugs, 
paraphernalia associated with ingesting various drugs, and in each one of those 
categories to some extent with marijuana”; (2) after his March 1999 hiring, he 
entered “a field training program . . . with a senior police officer where [he] ran 
into many people in the street that were in possession of marijuana; in possession 
 
14 
of rolling papers, pipes, various items used for ingesting marijuana; people 
possessing marijuana for the purpose of sales, and either handled those 
investigations or was present while other officers handled those investigations”; 
(3) after being hired full-time in August 1999, he was “put back through a full-
time police academy at the Bakersfield Police Department Law Enforcement 
Training Center where [he] received more hours of instruction on drug 
recognition, people possessing drugs for personal use, people possessing drugs for 
the purpose of sales, paraphernalia associated with the ingestion of various drugs, 
and in each one of those areas dealt to some extent with marijuana”; (4) after 
graduating from that program in December 1999, he “entered into a full-time field 
training program  . . . with three different senior police officers, where [he] saw 
many more people in possession of marijuana, people possessing marijuana for 
personal use, and people possessing marijuana for the purposes of sales”: (5) since 
then, he had “made many, many arrests of people in possession of marijuana, 
several arrests for people possessing marijuana for the purpose of sales”; and (6) 
he received training in the difference between possession of marijuana for 
personal use and possession of marijuana for the purposes of sale, which 
“consisted of different factors that would be taken into consideration when 
somebody is running a sales operation as opposed to just using it for personal 
enjoyment, to include amount, packaging, how marijuana is typically distributed 
on the street, the average prices that marijuana goes for, how to tell slight 
differences in quality of marijuana by looking at it and smelling it.”  
Regarding the circumstances supporting the officer‟s opinion, as noted 
above, the jury heard evidence that police found 10 bags, each containing three 
grams of marijuana, in the driver‟s door of defendant‟s car and three bags, each 
containing “approximately 6.5 grams” of marijuana, on the backseat, “packaged 
with the same materials” as the bags in the door.  Officer Williamson testified that 
 
15 
bags of the size found in the door “typically sell for about $5.00 a piece,” and 
could sell for as much as $10 if they contain “extremely good marijuana.”  Bags of 
the size found on the backseat sell for “double the value of” the three-gram bags 
found “in the door.”  Based on his training and experience, the officer also 
explained that bags “of equal size [are] kept in different places . . . for quick 
reference.”  Drug dealers “know” the areas where people go to buy drugs, and 
“they can drive up to that area and give what they call curb service.  People walk 
up to the door of their car.”  Notably, defendant testified that he himself had taken 
all of the marijuana out of one bag, packaged it in the bags the police found — 
deciding both the number of bags and the amount to put in each — and placed the 
bags at various places in the car.  Defendant was wearing a belt buckle that read 
“CA$H ONLY,” which the officer testified both suggested that defendant intended 
to sell the marijuana and explained why there was no written record of sales 
transactions.  According to Officer Williamson, the belt buckle “[l]et[] people 
know if they want marijuana they got to come out with the cash, he‟s not going to 
front it to them or take an IOU.”  Defendant possessed no paraphernalia associated 
with personal use of marijuana and showed no signs of having used it.  He had a 
prior conviction for possession of marijuana for purposes of sale.  Officer 
Williamson testified that he based his opinion regarding defendant‟s intent to sell 
the marijuana on all of these circumstances. 
In addition, evidence before the jury regarding defendant‟s financial 
circumstances further supported the officer‟s opinion.  From May 2007 until his 
arrest in November 2008, defendant‟s wages as a part-time baby-sitter — roughly 
$100 to $300 per month — were his only income.  In terms of expenses, defendant 
testified he paid about $1,500 for his car; paid for his gas and his food; paid his 
mother over $100 a month for rent; “help[ed] from time to time” with his mother‟s 
electric bill; paid for his own marijuana, which he had been using daily for about 
 
16 
10 years, since age 15; and paid $200 for the marijuana he possessed when the 
police arrested him.  The prosecution highlighted this testimony during closing 
argument, commenting:  “You heard testimony that the defendant makes 
anywhere from $100 to $300 a month baby-sitting and that that‟s his only form of 
income.  You also heard that he pays $100 a month in rent to his mom.  He takes 
care of his own food.  He takes care of putting gas in his car and maintaining the 
vehicle.  He also told you he spent $200 purchasing the marijuana.  There‟s the 
$300 bucks.  So where is he getting the rest of the money that he needs to make it 
through the month?  By selling marijuana.”   
To be sure, defendant offered explanations for some of these circumstances, 
but the jurors did not have to believe them.  Indeed, based on the evidence before 
them, there were valid reasons not to.  For example, defendant testified he pleaded 
guilty in 2007 to possession of marijuana for purposes of sale only because he had 
been threatened, but he refused at trial to identify the persons who purportedly 
threatened him and he testified he had never told anyone about the supposed 
threat.  He testified he purchased the marijuana at a dispensary in Los Angeles, but 
he could not remember the dispensary‟s name.  He testified he “just threw” the 
bags into the car because he “was in a rush,” but did not explain where he was 
going, why he was in a rush, or how 13 hurriedly thrown bags ended up neatly 
segregated in two places based on the amount of marijuana they contained, with 
10 bags, each containing an amount that sells for $5, within easy reach in the 
driver‟s door, and three bags on the backseat, each containing an amount having 
double that value.  He testified he was using the marijuana for an injury he 
sustained in May 2007, but he did not obtain his medical marijuana ID card until 
July 2008, after his October 2007 possession for sale conviction.   
On this record, the evidence before the jury was not insufficient regarding 
defendant‟s intent to sell merely because none of it specifically referenced Officer 
 
17 
Williamson‟s experience with the legal use of marijuana for medical purposes.  
Notably, defendant never asserted otherwise at trial; he never made an issue of the 
officer‟s expertise or argued to the jurors that they should disbelieve the officer‟s 
testimony because the evidence failed to show he had any experience with the 
legal use of marijuana for medical purposes.  On the contrary, during closing 
argument, defendant emphasized the officer‟s expertise, arguing that, because of 
his law enforcement experience, he had assumed from the circumstances before 
him — a “young Black man” playing “his radio real loud” and “packaged” 
marijuana — that defendant intended to sell the marijuana, and had discounted all 
indications inconsistent with that assumption.  
The facts supporting the officer‟s opinion, as detailed above, distinguish 
this case from Hunt, supra, 4 Cal.3d 231.  There, in reversing a conviction for 
unlawful possession for sale of methedrine, this court found that none of the 
circumstances on which the testifying officer based his opinion regarding the 
defendant‟s intent to sell — “ „the quantity involved, the over-all street value, 
[and] the normal use by an individual‟ ” — supported that conclusion.  (Id. at p. 
238.)  Our opinion explained:  “Under [the officer‟s] own testimony, the use by an 
individual could be up to 8 ccs. a day.  The quantity [the defendant possessed] was 
less than 120 ccs. and could have been as little as a two-week supply.  The street 
value seems immaterial.  The fact that medicine purchased lawfully at reasonable 
prices may demand a much greater price in the illegal market furnishes no reason 
to suppose that a possession of a two-week supply of the drug pursuant to 
prescription is held for profit rather than use.”  (Ibid.)  By contrast, as explained 
above, the circumstances surrounding defendant‟s possession did “furnish[]” 
(ibid.) valid reasons for the officer‟s opinion.  For this reason, defendant‟s reliance 
on Hunt is unavailing. 
 
18 
Also unavailing is his reliance on Chakos, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th 357.  As 
noted above, in finding insufficient evidence, the court there reasoned that, under 
Hunt, the testifying officer was “unqualified to render an expert opinion” 
regarding the defendant‟s intent (id. at p. 369, first italics added) because the 
record showed he “had only the most tenuous knowledge of the patterns of lawful 
possession of marijuana under state law” (id. at p. 359).  However, Hunt nowhere 
states that the officer who testified in that case was unqualified to render an 
opinion.  It held that, because the record offered no “reason to believe” the 
testifying officer had “any substantial experience with the numerous citizens who 
lawfully purchase [methedrine] for their own use as medicine for illness,” his 
opinion that the defendant possessed that drug for purposes of sale was, combined 
with the factual circumstances of that possession, insufficient evidence of the 
defendant‟s intent.  (Hunt, supra, 4 Cal.3d at pp. 237-238.)  Moreover, the Chakos 
court, having reviewed the record for substantial evidence, was not convinced that 
the circumstances surrounding the defendant‟s possession supported the testifying 
officer‟s opinion.  The officer “laid great stress on the fact that” there was a single 
bag in the defendant‟s backpack containing a “precise amount” — “a quarter-
ounce” — that was “consistent with drug dealing.”  (Chakos, at p. 368.)  However, 
the court continued, the officer also found bags and jars containing “irregular 
amounts” in the defendant‟s closet, a circumstance which, based on the officer‟s 
own testimony, a reasonable trier of fact could view as being “inconsistent with 
dealing and . . . consistent with lawful use under the [CUA].”  (Ibid.)   Such an 
inference, the court reasoned, was indeed “intuitive because, while marijuana may 
be lawfully possessed under the [CUA], it is not exactly easily obtainable in open, 
licit circumstances.”  (Ibid.)  In the court‟s view, the “[p]ractical difficulties [in] 
obtaining the drug” could explain not only the irregular amounts, but also why 
defendant had a gram scale in his closet — to ensure that the legal medical user 
 
19 
does not possess more than the maximum amount the CUA permits — and why, 
as a lawful, medical user, he had “an extra supply on hand within the legal 
amount.”  (Ibid.)  As explained above, we find that, in this case, the circumstances 
surrounding the possession do support the officer‟s testimony.  Thus, without 
deciding whether we would have reached the same conclusion in Chakos, we find 
that case distinguishable. 
III.  Disposition 
For reasons set forth above, we affirm the Court of Appeal‟s judgment. 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
I concur in the court‟s judgment affirming the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal.  I write separately to state my view regarding the impact of the procedural 
forfeiture created by defendant‟s failure to object at trial to the testimony of a 
prosecution expert on distinguishing possession of marijuana for sale from 
possession for personal use.  
As the majority states, defendant contends the evidence at trial was 
insufficient to establish possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 11359) because the expert who opined on that subject at trial, one of the 
arresting officers, lacked training and experience distinguishing between lawful 
possession for medical use, which defendant advanced as a defense, and unlawful 
possession for purposes of sale.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1.)  I concur fully in the 
court‟s rejection of this insufficient evidence claim.  Despite defendant‟s claim he 
possessed the marijuana only for his personal medical use, the trial record is 
replete with evidence of circumstances “not to be expected in connection with a 
patient lawfully using the drugs as medicine” (People v. Hunt (1971) 4 Cal.3d 231, 
238 (Hunt)), circumstances on which both the police officer testifying as a 
prosecution expert and the jury itself could reasonably rely for the conclusion the 
marijuana was possessed for sale. 
I also agree that defendant, by failing to object at trial to admission of the 
officer‟s opinion on possession for sale, has forfeited any claim the opinion was 
 
2 
erroneously admitted.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 9-11.)  Speculation on defense 
counsel‟s possible tactical reasons for not objecting is beside the point.  (See maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 10.)  Under Evidence Code section 353, subdivision (a), the lack 
of an objection precludes any claim of erroneous admission regardless of whether 
counsel was deliberately sandbagging, thought the objection futile, or was merely 
inattentive.  Nor does it appear, as the majority suggests, that defendant‟s failure to 
object eliminated any incentive for the prosecution to buttress the officer‟s 
qualifications as an expert.  (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 11.)  Informing the jury of 
the officer‟s special expertise in medical marijuana use would have added force 
and weight to his opinion and would have greatly reduced the likelihood of an 
insufficient evidence claim under Hunt, supra, 4 Cal.3d 231.  Defendant‟s failure 
to object bars him from complaining on appeal about admission of the officer‟s 
opinion, but it does not make him responsible for any weaknesses in the evidence 
the People chose to put on. 
Nor can I agree with the majority that the absence of a trial objection 
precludes defendant from arguing the officer‟s lack of expertise in medical 
marijuana rendered his opinion insufficient “as a matter of substantial evidence 
review.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11, italics added.)  The majority acknowledges that 
while admissibility of an expert opinion is for the court to decide, the jury may 
still consider the expert‟s qualifications in determining the weight to be given his 
or her opinion.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 12; see Seneris v. Haas (1955) 45 Cal.2d 
811, 833 [“Where a witness has disclosed sufficient knowledge of the subject to 
entitle his opinion to go to the jury, the question of the degree of his knowledge 
goes more to the weight of the evidence than its admissibility”]; accord, People v. 
Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 140.)  The jury thus remains free, notwithstanding 
the trial court‟s decision on admissibility, to decide that a prosecution expert‟s 
relative lack of knowledge on a particular point reduces the probative force of his 
 
3 
or her opinion below the level needed to prove a fact in issue beyond a reasonable 
doubt.   
As the majority also acknowledges, a claim of insufficient evidence 
requires no trial objection for its preservation.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 12; see 
People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1119, 1126.)  Substantial evidence to support a 
criminal verdict being evidence that is “reasonable, credible, and of solid value” 
(People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578), it follows that despite the absence 
of an objection to the testimony, an appellate court, reviewing the record for 
substantial evidence to support the verdict, may conclude a prosecution expert‟s 
relative lack of knowledge on a particular point renders his or her opinion 
insufficiently solid to constitute substantial evidence of guilt, even when taken 
with the other evidence presented.  That is precisely the conclusion this court 
reached in Hunt, supra, 4 Cal.3d at pages 237-238.  Defendant, in challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support his possession for sale conviction on the 
ground of the officer‟s lack of specific expertise, simply urges us to follow Hunt 
and reach the same conclusion here. 
Of course, that defendant‟s contention is procedurally proper does not mean 
it succeeds on the merits.  While the prosecution did not present evidence at trial 
of the officer‟s special training and experience with medical marijuana use, the 
significant evidence of his expertise that was presented (see maj. opn., ante, at 
pp. 13-14), together with the circumstances of possession upon which his opinion 
was based (id., pp. 14-15), gave the expert opinion here the substantial probative 
force we found lacking in Hunt.  The majority therefore correctly rejects 
defendant‟s claim of insufficient evidence on its merits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Dowl 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 183 Cal.App.4th 702 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S182621 
Date Filed: August 29, 2013 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Kern 
Judge: Kenneth C. Twisselman II 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michelle May and John R. Hargreaves, under appointments by the Supreme Court, and Thomas M. 
Singman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez, Catherine Chatman, 
Jeffrey Grant and David A. Rhodes, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
John R. Hargreaves 
Central California Appellate Program 
2407 J Street, Suite 301 
Sacramento, CA  95816 
(916) 441-3792 
 
Jeffrey Grant 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 327-6751