Case Title: State v. Valdez

Citation: 

Docket Number: 80880-5

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 18–0955 
 
Filed October 18, 2019 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
GUILLERMO AVALOS VALDEZ, 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, John D. 
Ackerman, Judge. 
 
The defendant appeals his sentence of incarceration, arguing the 
district court erred in declining to order probation.  AFFIRMED. 
 
Scott M. Wadding of Sease & Wadding, Des Moines, for appellant. 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney 
General, Patrick Jennings, County Attorney, and Kristine Timmins, 
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee. 
 
 
2 
 
MANSFIELD, Justice. 
This case presents the question whether immigration status may be 
considered during sentencing.  The defendant in this case is a Mexican 
national who pled guilty to and was convicted of a class “C” felony drug 
offense.  He was placed on an immigration hold for likely deportation.  At 
sentencing, the defendant sought probation, while the State requested 
incarceration.  The district court imposed a prison sentence, expressing 
the view that it would not be feasible to order probation for someone who 
was going to be deported to Mexico.  The defendant appeals. 
On appeal, we conclude, like the majority of other jurisdictions, that 
immigration status per se is not an appropriate sentencing consideration, 
but that immigration status may be taken into account to the extent it 
affects an otherwise relevant sentencing factor.  We also conclude that on 
this record, the district court properly determined that probation would 
not be appropriate for someone whose probation would have to be 
supervised in Mexico.  We therefore affirm the defendant’s conviction and 
sentence. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History. 
Guillermo Avalos Valdez was born in Mexico in 1981.  In 1997, he 
entered the United States without legal permission.  He settled in Merced, 
California. 
On December 24, 2017, Avalos Valdez was stopped on Interstate 29 
in Woodbury County for driving eighty-four miles per hour in a seventy 
miles-per-hour zone.  As two Woodbury County deputies approached the 
vehicle, they could smell marijuana coming from it.  They removed Avalos 
Valdez and a female passenger from the vehicle.  A subsequent search 
uncovered two hockey-sized duffle bags and two boxes with Christmas-
themed wrapping paper containing a total of 184 pounds of marijuana, 
 
3 
 
mostly divided into individually heat-sealed one-pound bags.  A .45 caliber 
pistol with a loaded magazine and Grim Reaper handgrips was found 
under the front passenger seat.  Avalos Valdez had a tattoo showing a Grim 
Reaper with a marijuana leaf, and the female passenger also had a Grim 
Reaper tattoo.  The vehicle was registered to an “Iran Guillermo Avalos 
Valdez.” 
Avalos Valdez was charged with possession with intent to deliver a 
controlled substance, more than fifty but not more than 100 kilograms of 
marijuana, a class “C” felony.  See Iowa Code § 124.401(1)(c)(5) (2017).  He 
was also charged with a drug stamp tax violation, a class “D” felony.  See 
id. § 453B.12(2).  Avalos Valdez waived speedy trial. 
On May 18, 2018, Avalos Valdez entered into a written agreement 
with the State to plead guilty to the possession with intent to deliver count, 
with the drug stamp tax violation being dismissed and the parties being 
free to argue sentence. 
A presentence investigation (PSI) report had been prepared.  The 
report noted a prior California conviction in 2008 for vandalism.  
Avalos Valdez indicated that he had done general labor (although he had 
some back issues) and made approximately $12,000 in 2017.  
Avalos Valdez told the interviewer that he was a regular marijuana user 
for his back issues and described “being on an adventure” when he was 
arrested.  At the time of sentencing, Avalos Valdez was on a United States 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) hold for potential 
deportation.  The PSI report stated that on the Iowa Risk Revised (IRR) risk 
assessment tool, Avalos Valdez “scored in the low category for future 
violence and the low category for future victimization.”  According to the 
PSI report, “The IRR would further indicate the Defendant would be 
supervised initially at the low normal level of supervision should he be 
 
4 
 
supervised in the community.”  However, the report also noted the quantity 
of marijuana involved and recommended that Avalos Valdez receive a term 
of incarceration. 
On May 22, the district court held a hearing for the purpose of plea 
taking and sentencing.  During the guilty plea colloquy, defense counsel 
addressed the immigration consequences of Avalos Valdez’s plea and 
explained, “[B]ecause this is an aggravated felony and a controlled 
substances offense, there would be deportation, mandatory detention, if 
he does have any removal proceedings.”  The court accepted 
Avalos Valdez’s guilty plea and, with the consent of the parties, proceeded 
to sentencing.  The State asked for imprisonment: 
Your Honor, the State would be requesting that the 
defendant be sentenced to an indeterminate term of 
incarceration of ten years, that the minimum fine of $1,000 
plus the 35 percent surcharge be imposed and that that be 
suspended, and the other mandatory minimum requirements. 
The State believes that that penalty is appropriate due 
to the fact that the defendant did have 180 pounds of 
marijuana in his possession at that time, which is a 
significant amount.  The defendant also has no significant ties 
to the area as well as the immigration hold which will make it 
difficult for him to complete probation.  The State believes that 
the presentence investigation recommendation of the prison 
sentence is the appropriate one in this case, and that’s what 
we would request. 
Defense counsel responded by asking for probation: 
My client is asking that the Court grant him probation 
on this offense.  The presentence report indicates that the 
Iowa risk revised assessment that was used indicates he has 
a -- he has a low category for future violence, a low category 
for future victimization, and that the IRR would indicate he 
could be supervised initially on a low/normal level in the 
community. 
I realize he has an immigration hold, but he, essentially, 
only has one prior conviction for vandalism back in 2008; so 
he really doesn’t have a criminal history to speak of at all. 
 
5 
 
With probation, I realize he’s going to be taken into 
custody by immigration.  He has the hold.  It’s likely he will 
be deported.  I know there are times, at least in federal court, 
where we have made a term of probation “You shall not 
illegally re-enter the United States” so that if he ever comes 
back to the United States he will be in violation of his 
probation and he would be brought back to court. 
He’s requesting that he be given that opportunity to deal 
with his immigration and let them make that determination.  
Otherwise, other than the quantity involved here, if he was 
here as a United States citizen, I think that probation would 
be something that would definitely be a possibility.  So we are 
asking that he be treated the same as someone else would and 
let immigration handle the immigration consequences that he 
is aware of. 
The court imposed a prison sentence as requested by the State.  It 
stated, 
I want to address some of your comments.  The 
statement that you think this Court would give a U.S. citizen 
with the same record a suspended sentence is not accurate. 
180 pounds of marijuana is one big deal, and it’s -- he’s a 
danger to the community.  And he’s also a flight risk.  I don’t 
think probation would be appropriate with pleading to this 
charge given his immigration status.  He won’t be available if 
I were to award probation, as I understand it.  So I don’t think 
probation is an appropriate sentence here. 
Therefore, the Court finds that the sentence imposed 
will provide for the maximum opportunity for the defendant’s 
rehabilitation, to protect the community from further offenses 
by this defendant and others.  I’ve considered the nature of 
the offense committed and the contents of the presentence 
investigation report and the plea agreement. 
Avalos Valdez filed a notice of appeal on May 31.  We retained the 
appeal. 
II.  Standard of Review. 
We review sentences for abuse of discretion.  State v. Roby, 897 
N.W.2d 127, 137–38 (Iowa 2017).  However, our review is not forgiving of 
a denial of a constitutional right.  Id.  To put it another way, if we disagree 
with the trial court’s fact-finding after applying a de novo standard of 
 
6 
 
review, we will rely on the facts as we find them to determine whether the 
Iowa Constitution has been violated.  Id. at 138. 
III.  Mootness. 
We must first deal with a threshold question of mootness.  On 
September 17, 2019, the State moved to dismiss Avalos Valdez’s appeal as 
moot.  Avalos Valdez was paroled on May 16 of this year, having served 
approximately seventeen months of his ten-year sentence.  He was 
released to ICE and then taken into the custody of the United States 
Marshal pending federal prosecution in San Diego, California.  The State 
maintains that these events render Avalos Valdez’s appeal moot: 
[E]ven if he prevails on appeal and even if he is resentenced to 
a suspended sentence, he will face the same result—
mandatory immigration detention and impending deportation 
following his federal criminal charge.  This Court cannot grant 
any relief that will undo the prison time that the defendant 
has already served.  Therefore, a remand for resentencing will 
have no appreciable effect on the defendant’s status. 
Avalos Valdez resists the State’s motion.  He contends the appeal is not 
moot, and even if it is, an exception to the mootness doctrine applies. 
“The key in assessing whether an appeal is moot is determining 
whether the opinion would be of force or effect in the underlying 
controversy.”  Puntenney v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 928 N.W.2d 829, 840 (Iowa 
2019) (quoting Perkins v. Bd. of Supervisors, 636 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Iowa 
2001)), petition for cert. pending, No. 19–447 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2019).  
Avalos Valdez concedes that prevailing on this appeal would not get him 
released from federal custody.  However, he points out there would be a 
difference going forward if he were deemed on state-ordered probation 
rather than state-ordered parole.  Avalos Valdez contrasts his case with 
others where the defendant had completely served his sentence.  See, e.g., 
State v. Wilson, 234 N.W.2d 140, 141 (Iowa 1975).  We also note that if 
 
7 
 
Avalos Valdez is convicted on the pending federal charge, his federal 
sentence could be affected by whether he received a suspended sentence 
or (as actually happened) a ten-year sentence on his state drug trafficking 
charge.  See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.1, at 379–82 (U.S. 
Sentencing Comm’n 2018) (adding 3 points to the criminal history 
guideline calculation for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding 
one year and one month but only 1 point for a totally suspended sentence). 
In any event, we agree with Avalos Valdez that the public-
importance exception applies here and warrants our exercise of 
jurisdiction.  We discussed the public-importance exception at some 
length in Homan v. Branstad, 864 N.W.2d 321, 330–31 (Iowa 2015).  There 
we said, 
We consider four factors in determining whether we should 
exercise our discretion to decide a moot action under this 
exception: 
(1) the private or public nature of the issue; 
(2) the 
desirability 
of 
an 
authoritative 
adjudication to guide public officials in their 
future 
conduct; 
(3) the 
likelihood 
of 
the 
recurrence of the issue; and (4) the likelihood the 
issue will recur yet evade appellate review. 
Id. at 330 (quoting Maghee v. State, 773 N.W.2d 228, 234 (Iowa 2009)). 
Weighing those factors here, we find the issue both important and 
likely to recur.  Approximately 50,000 unauthorized immigrants reside in 
Iowa, comprising 1.7% of the state’s population.  U.S. Unauthorized 
Immigrant Population Estimates by State, 2016, Pew Research Center 
(Feb. 5, 
2019), 
www.pewhispanic.org/interactives/u-s-unauthorized-
immigrants-by-state/ (follow “DATA” hyperlink).  We have already 
recognized the importance of giving accurate advice to defendants on the 
immigration consequences of guilty pleas.  See generally Diaz v. State, 896 
N.W.2d 723, 725 (Iowa 2017).  Judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and 
 
8 
 
defendants also need to know whether immigration status can be 
considered in sentencing. 
Additionally, this issue has the potential to evade appellate review.  
Whether to order probation for an offender who is subject to deportation 
is more likely to arise when the offender, like Avalos Valdez, otherwise 
faces indeterminate prison sentencing totaling ten years or less.  In those 
circumstances, as with Avalos Valdez, it is quite possible that the 
defendant—even if sentenced to prison—will be paroled to an ICE detainer 
before any sentencing appeal can be decided.  Accordingly, we deny the 
motion to dismiss and will proceed to the merits of this case. 
IV.  Merits. 
Avalos Valdez raises a single issue on appeal—whether his sentence 
violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Iowa and 
United States Constitutions because it was based on his immigration 
status.  See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Iowa Const. art. I, §§ 6, 9.  Our court 
has not previously addressed the extent to which a sentencing court may 
take into account a defendant’s immigration status. 
Avalos Valdez and the State cite and discuss the same out-of-state 
cases in their briefs, so it behooves us to examine them closely. 
In State v. Zavala-Ramos, the trial court sentenced a drug offender 
who had previously been deported and who was on an immigration hold 
to prison, even though the sentencing guidelines called for a presumptive 
probationary sentence.  840 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).  The 
defendant appealed the sentence, arguing it was improper for the 
sentencing court to rely on “his immigration status and immigration law 
violations.”  Id.  The Oregon Court of Appeals took a middle path, 
reasoning, 
 
9 
 
Immigration status per se is not relevant.  However, 
circumstances that demonstrate a defendant’s unwillingness 
to conform his conduct to legal requirements, whether or not 
there are criminal consequences, may be.  Defendant had 
been illegally in the United States at least twice.  The court 
could consider that pattern of conduct in determining whether 
it is likely that a probationary sentence would serve the 
purposes of the guidelines to protect the public and punish 
the offender. 
Id. at 1316 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).  The court nonetheless 
reversed and remanded for resentencing because the court had not 
provided a sufficient explanation of “why the circumstances are so 
exceptional that imposition of the presumptive sentence would not 
accomplish the purposes of the guidelines.”  Id. at 1317 (quoting State v. 
Wilson, 826 P.2d 1010, 1012 (Or. Ct. App. 1992)). 
In People v. Cisneros, the California Court of Appeal took a similar 
middle path.  100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 785 (Ct. App. 2000).  It stated, 
We conclude that the trial court erred in ruling that 
illegal aliens are categorically excluded from participation in 
the deferred judgment program for first-time drug offenders.  
Trial courts are free to consider illegal alien status as a factor 
in determining whether a defendant is a good candidate for 
the deferred judgment program, but illegal alien status is not 
an automatic disqualification. 
Id.  The court went on, 
An illegal alien may be a poor candidate for probation given 
typically limited ties to the community and the prospect of 
deportation.  The same considerations may weigh against 
admitting an illegal alien to the deferred entry of judgment 
program.  However, a defendant’s misdemeanor violations of 
the immigration laws in entering the United States without 
inspection and failing to register do not necessarily constitute 
“criminal conduct rendering him or her unsuitable for 
deferred entry of judgment . . . ” in every instance. 
Id. at 788 (citation omitted) (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 1000.3). 
 
10 
 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals followed the same center 
course in Yemson v. United States, 764 A.2d 816, 819–20 (D.C. 2001).  
There the court concluded, 
Because even an illegal alien has a right to due process, 
a court imposing sentence in a criminal case may not treat the 
defendant more harshly than any other defendant “solely 
because of [his] nationality or alien status.  That obviously 
would be unconstitutional.”  This does not mean, however, 
that a sentencing court, in deciding what sentence to impose, 
must close its eyes to the defendant’s status as an illegal alien 
and his history of violating the law, including any law related 
to immigration.  Indeed, “[t]he sentencing court . . . must be 
permitted to consider any and all information that reasonably 
might bear on the proper sentence for the particular 
defendant, given the crime committed.” 
Id. at 819 (alterations in originals) (first quoting United States v. Gomez, 
797 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1986); then quoting Wasman v. United States, 
468 U.S. 559, 563, 104 S. Ct. 3217, 3220 (1984)). 
Likewise the Nevada Supreme Court.  In Ruvalcaba v. State, it 
confronted the following situation: 
We note that the sentencing judge below did not sentence 
Ruvalcaba more harshly based upon ethnicity or nationality, 
or because Ruvalcaba committed the crime in a country 
foreign to him.  Nor did the sentencing judge predicate his 
decision on any animus towards illegal aliens.  Rather, the 
sentencing judge denied Ruvalcaba’s request for probation 
because, as an illegal alien, Ruvalcaba would likely be 
deported if he received probation and would thus ultimately 
avoid punishment. 
143 P.3d 468, 470 (Nev. 2006).  Drawing a distinction between a sentence 
based on “citizenship” and one based on “the ability to enforce the criminal 
laws of [the] state,” the court affirmed the defendant’s sentence.  Id. at 471.  
The court observed that “a defendant’s ability to comply with the terms of 
probation is certainly a legitimate factor for a sentencing judge to consider 
in determining whether to grant probation.”  Id. 
 
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In People v. Hernandez-Clavel, the Colorado Court of Appeals framed 
the issue as “whether the circumstances relating to defendant’s status as 
an illegal alien subject to deportation were proper considerations in the 
sentencing court’s decision to grant or deny probation.”  186 P.3d 96, 97 
(Colo. App. 2008).  The court answered yes.  Id. at 100.  It recognized as 
legitimate the trial court’s concern that the defendant’s likely deportation 
meant that he could not benefit from probation or be available to 
participate in probation.  Id.  The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of 
probation, rejecting also the defendant’s contention that his sentence 
violated equal protection principles.  Id. 
In Trujillo v. State, the Georgia Court of Appeals upheld a trial court’s 
decision to deny probation to an unauthorized alien, noting that “the trial 
court would have been remiss had it ignored the practical realities 
presented by Trujillo’s immigration status and the obstacles that it would 
have presented to Trujillo’s ability to comply with the imposed conditions 
of probation.”  698 S.E.2d 350, 355 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).  The court 
specifically rejected the defendant’s argument that the sentence violated 
his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection under the 
law.  Id. at 353–54. 
In People v. Cesar, on the other hand, the New York Appellate 
Division vacated a sentence because the trial court had denied probation 
“solely on the basis of the defendant’s status as an undocumented 
immigrant.”  14 N.Y.S.3d 100, 107 (App. Div. 2015).  The court reasoned 
that this would be a violation of due process and equal protection.  Id. at 
106.  Yet the court acknowledged, 
[C]ourts 
may 
appropriately 
consider 
a 
defendant’s 
undocumented immigration status in imposing criminal 
sentences.  The decision to impose or not impose a sentence 
of probation may legitimately be affected by factors directly 
 
12 
 
related to undocumented status.  Those factors include, but 
are not necessarily limited to, the likelihood of the defendant’s 
deportation during the probationary period, the defendant’s 
history, if any, of repeated departures from and illegal 
reentries into the United States, the presence or absence of 
family in the United States, the defendant’s employment 
history, and the defendant’s legal employability. 
Id. 
Most recently, in State v. Cerritos-Valdez, the Nebraska Supreme 
Court wrote a thorough opinion that dissected many of these prior cases.  
889 N.W.2d 605, 611–13 (Neb. 2017).  In that case, the defendant pled 
guilty to possession of a controlled substance and driving under the 
influence.  Id. at 608.  The district court denied the defendant’s request 
for probation, commenting, “[I]t’s very difficult, if not impossible, for the 
Court to impose probation when the first term of probation is that you 
obey all laws; and to obey all laws, you would have to leave this country, 
which would then conversely make it impossible for you to be supervised 
by probation.”  Id. at 609. 
On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed.  Id. at 613.  
Following its survey of prior caselaw from other jurisdictions, the court 
concluded, 
Based on the foregoing, we agree that a defendant’s 
status as an undocumented immigrant cannot be the sole 
factor on which a court relies when determining whether to 
grant or deny probation; however, a sentencing court need not 
ignore a defendant’s undocumented status.  When deciding 
whether to grant probation, a defendant’s undocumented 
status may properly be considered by a sentencing court as 
one of many factors so long as it is either relevant to the 
offense for which sentence is being imposed, relevant to 
consideration of any of the required sentencing factors under 
Nebraska law, or relevant to the defendant’s ability or 
willingness 
to 
comply 
with 
recommended 
probation 
conditions. 
Id. at 611–12 (footnotes omitted).  The court then found the defendant’s 
sentence in compliance with these parameters: 
 
13 
 
Here, the district court expressed concern that due to 
Cerritos-Valdez’ undocumented status, it would be difficult for 
him to comply with the standard terms of probation.  
Generally speaking, this is an appropriate sentencing 
consideration; it was a concern shared by the probation officer 
who completed the PSI, and it was one which was supported 
by the information contained in the PSI. 
Id. at 612–13. 
Sifting through these authorities, they appear to point in a single 
direction.  A defendant’s immigration status, qua immigration status, may 
not be the basis for a sentence.  However, to the extent immigration status 
affects an otherwise relevant sentencing factor, it may be taken into 
account. 
Avalos Valdez cites one case to the contrary—State v. Mendoza, 638 
N.W.2d 480 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).  In that case, the probation officer 
indicated in the PSI that she had been told the defendants, both Mexican 
nationals, would be deported once released.  Id. at 482.  The district court 
declined to order probation for them because their immigration status 
made probation “impossible and impractical.”  Id.  The court reversed the 
sentence.  Without citing or discussing any out-of-state authority, it noted 
that deportation is a “collateral” consequence of a guilty plea.  Id. at 483.  
It then continued, 
This observation compels our conclusion that possible 
deportation because of immigration status is not a proper 
consideration in criminal sentencing.  If the district court were 
to consider deportation as a factor in its sentencing decision, 
it would be considering a possible collateral consequence in 
arriving at an appropriate sentence for the defendant.  We 
conclude 
that 
consideration 
of 
a 
possible 
collateral 
consequence, which is beyond the control of the district court 
and which may or may not occur, is not a valid consideration 
in deciding whether to impose a presumptive sentence or to 
depart from the guidelines. 
Id. at 484. 
 
14 
 
The logic of Mendoza is open to criticism.  Since Mendoza was 
decided, both the United States Supreme Court and our court have 
recognized that immigration is not simply an inscrutable maze.  There are 
circumstances when deportation is more than just a “possible” result of a 
criminal conviction; it can be a certainty.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 
356, 368–69, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010); Diaz, 896 N.W.2d at 731–32.  
To say that probation should be granted because deportation “may or may 
not occur” is probably finessing the issue too much.  And to treat 
immigration as simply a “collateral” consequence may no longer be 
realistic.  See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365–66, 130 S. Ct. at 1481–82; Diaz, 
896 N.W.2d at 732.  When the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
reversed its prior position on consideration of immigration consequences 
during sentencing, it pointed out that: 
Reasoning that immigration consequences are collateral 
to conviction, this court has held that a trial judge should not 
consider 
the 
potential 
immigration 
consequences 
in 
fashioning a sentence.  This reasoning was undermined in 
Padilla when the Supreme Court declined to accept the view 
that immigration consequences are collateral to conviction.  
Therefore, our precedent that a trial judge cannot factor 
immigration consequences into sentencing is no longer good 
law. 
Commonwealth v. Marinho, 981 N.E.2d 648, 660 n.19 (Mass. 2013) 
(citations omitted).1 
In any event, we are persuaded that the principle announced in the 
cases other than Mendoza is the correct one.  Immigration status per se is 
not a relevant sentencing factor, but immigration status may impact an 
otherwise relevant sentencing factor and, to that extent, may be 
                                      
 
1Furthermore, as Avalos Valdez admits, the Minnesota Supreme Court has not 
adopted Mendoza but has instead expressly left open the extent to which possible 
deportation because of immigration status may be considered in sentencing.  State v. 
Kebaso, 713 N.W.2d 317, 324 n.7 (Minn. 2006) (en banc). 
 
15 
 
considered.  Such a procedure does not violate due process or equal 
protection.  To the contrary, it complies with Iowa law, which requires the 
court to take into account all pertinent information in order to select the 
sentencing option that provides “maximum opportunity for the 
rehabilitation of the defendant, and for the protection of the community.”  
Iowa Code § 901.5; see also id. § 907.5(1). 
Several other points should be noted.  Courts have at times relied 
on the effects of a defendant’s immigration status in imposing a more 
lenient sentence.  For example, in State v. Silvera, a sentencing panel 
imposed a sentence below the presumptive range so the defendant—a 
lawful permanent resident who had served in the United States Armed 
Forces and received an honorable discharge—would not be deported.  309 
P.3d 1277, 1280–81 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013).  The State challenged that 
sentence (and another in a companion case) as violating equal protection.  
The Alaska Court of Appeals disagreed, “[I]t was the harsh collateral 
consequences they faced if they were deported, not their status as non-
citizens, that led the three-judge panel to conclude that sentencing the 
defendants within the presumptive range would be manifestly unjust in 
these cases.”  Id. at 1287.  The practice approved in Silvera could not occur 
if the effects of immigration status could never be considered.  Cf. State v. 
Sanchez, 346 P.3d 701, 704 (Utah Ct. App. 2015) (holding that the trial 
court was not required to consider the defendant’s potential deportation 
and impose less than the standard sentence). 
Also, if the ramifications of immigration status could not be 
considered in criminal sentencing, it would logically follow they would be 
off-limits in other types of proceedings, such as bail setting, child custody 
and termination of parental rights.  We disagree with this result.  See In re 
Adoption of C.M., 414 S.W.3d 622, 669 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (explaining that 
 
16 
 
the mother’s “immigration status properly played a part” in a termination-
of-parental-rights proceeding); Rico v. Rodriguez, 120 P.3d 812, 818 (Nev. 
2005) (“Although we recognize that Rico is entitled to due process and 
equal protection, she has simply not demonstrated that the district court’s 
consideration of her immigration status violated her constitutional rights 
or was a primary factor in the determination of her children’s best 
interests.”); State v. Fajardo-Santos, 973 A.2d 933, 939 (N.J. 2009) (“When 
bail is set, it is entirely appropriate to consider a defendant’s immigration 
status in evaluating the risk of flight or non-appearance.”); In re 
Dependency of J.B.S., 863 P.2d 1344, 1350 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) 
(“Although not dispositive, the trial court has discretion to consider 
[immigration status], insofar as it may affect the consequences of the 
placement decision.”). 
Immigration status is not a characteristic that can never be relevant 
to government action.  For example, in Sanchez v. State, we held it did not 
violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Iowa and 
United States Constitutions for our state to deny driver’s licenses to 
unauthorized aliens.  692 N.W.2d 812, 819–20 (Iowa 2005). 
In order to carry out some legitimate public policies, such as 
optimizing the rehabilitation of a criminal offender, it may be necessary to 
consider matters such as the offender’s living and job prospects, which 
may require consideration of that offender’s immigration status.  Ignoring 
those factors simply because they are attributable to immigration status 
could result in disparate treatment of a defendant because he or she is an 
unauthorized alien. 
We now apply these principles to the present case.  For that, we 
return to the court’s statement of reasons for the sentence it imposed.  
Initially, the district court commented on the nature of the crime (involving 
 
17 
 
184 pounds of marijuana) and drew the plausible conclusions that 
Avalos Valdez could be considered a “danger to the community” and a 
“flight risk.”  The court then stated, “I don’t think probation would be 
appropriate with pleading to this charge given his immigration status.”  
But the court immediately explained further, “He won’t be available if I 
were to award probation, as I understand it.  So I don’t think probation is 
an appropriate sentence here.” 
Reading the court’s statement in its entirety, we think the court 
decided against probation for Avalos Valdez not because he was an 
unauthorized alien but because his immigration status meant he “[would 
not] be available” to undergo probation, as the court “underst[ood] it,” and 
because of the quantity of marijuana involved.  We do not see any 
constitutional defect in that ruling.  The record indicated that 
Avalos Valdez would be taken into ICE custody and then deported as soon 
as he was no longer incarcerated.  It is difficult to see how probation could 
have been implemented effectively for Avalos Valdez upon his deportation.  
Probation requires that the person be “committed to the custody, care, and 
supervision” of “the judicial district department of correctional services.”  
Iowa Code § 907.8(2).  How would that supervision occur once 
Avalos Valdez had been removed to Mexico?  And how would the 
conditions of probation be enforced?  Ordinarily, violations of probation 
are enforced as provided in chapter 908.  See id. § 907.3(2)(b).  This starts 
with an arrest and an initial appearance before a magistrate.  See id. 
§§ 908.1, .2, .11.  Notably, there is an “Interstate Compact for Adult 
Offender Supervision” in the Iowa Code, but no international compact.  See 
id. § 907B.1. 
We do not foreclose the possibility that in some future case a record 
could be developed showing that probation would be workable and proper 
 
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for a foreign national being deported to his or her home country.  
Avalos Valdez did not explain below, and does not explain in his briefing 
here, how such a probation could be implemented for him.  Instead, his 
argument is largely abstract and academic.  Accordingly, on this record we 
find no error. 
V.  Conclusion. 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Avalos Valdez’s conviction and 
sentence. 
AFFIRMED.