Case Title: Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Dayton Freight Lines, Inc.

Citation: 2006-Ohio-6498

Docket Number: 20051194 and 20051247

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-12-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Dayton Freight Lines, Inc., 112 Ohio St.3d 52, 2006-Ohio-
6498.] 
 
 
SHERWIN-WILLIAMS COMPANY ET AL. v. DAYTON FREIGHT LINES, INC. ET AL., 
APPELLEES; VILLAGE OF LEWISBURG, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Dayton Freight Lines, Inc., 112 Ohio St.3d 
52, 2006-Ohio-6498.] 
Under the Am.Sub.S.B. No. 221 version of R.C. 2744.02(B)(3), a political 
subdivision may be liable for injury, death, or loss resulting from a 
nuisance that exists on public grounds within the political subdivision 
when the injury, death, or loss caused by the nuisance occurs outside the 
political subdivision. 
(Nos. 2005-1194 and 2005-1247 — Submitted April 26, 2006 — Decided 
December 27, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County,  
No. 20651, 161 Ohio App.3d 444, 2005-Ohio-2773. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 1} On the evening of February 7, 2000, a multiple-vehicle accident 
occurred on Interstate 70 near the Lewisburg exit.  Appellees are 19 individuals or 
entities involved in litigation relating to the accident.  Those involved in the 
accident claimed that a mixture of fog and smoke had created visibility problems 
that night.  Whence came the smoke?  Appellees claim that it came from the 
property of appellant, the village of Lewisburg. 
{¶ 2} Earlier on the day of the accident, in an area behind the village’s 
water plant, Lewisburg employees were burning scrap lumber, tree limbs, and 
discarded Christmas trees.  The burn piles were located approximately 2,000 feet 
north of Interstate 70.  Around 3:30 that afternoon, Lewisburg employees covered 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
the burn piles with dirt and left the area.  At 10:51 that evening, the Preble County 
Sheriff’s Office received a complaint about smoke in the location of the earlier 
burning.  Firefighters responding to the scene found four or five piles of 
smoldering brush.  One firefighter testified that smoke from the piles hung close 
to the ground and moved south toward the interstate. 
{¶ 3} Whether the smoke wound its way toward I-70 and combined with 
fog to create conditions that caused the accident is not before us today.  Appellees 
did assert that the smoke contributed to the accident and brought claims against 
the village, but the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas (in which eight 
separate claims were consolidated) concluded by summary judgment that 
Lewisburg was immune from liability pursuant to the version of R.C. 2744.02 in 
effect at the time of the accident, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 221, 145 Ohio Laws, Part II, 
2211, 2215 (“S.B. 221”).  Although former R.C. 2744.02 was amended twice 
after S.B. 221 was enacted and before the date of the accident, both of those 
amendments were held to be invalid by this court. State ex rel. Ohio Academy of 
Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062; Stevens v. 
Ackman (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 182, 743 N.E.2d 901. 
{¶ 4} The trial court found that Lewisburg’s actions fell under the 
general immunity from civil liability granted to political subdivisions in former 
R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) and further found that none of the exceptions to immunity 
contained in former R.C. 2744.02(B) operated to except Lewisburg from that 
general immunity. 
{¶ 5} The Montgomery County Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.  
The appellate court held that the exception to sovereign immunity contained in 
former R.C. 2744.02(B)(3), which made political subdivisions liable for injuries 
“caused by their failure to keep * * * public grounds within the political 
subdivision * * * free from nuisance,” applied.  The trial court had held that since 
January Term, 2006 
3 
the accidents did not occur on village property, former R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) did not 
apply. 
{¶ 6} The appellate court certified that its decision conflicted with the 
decision in Kareth v. Toyota Motor Sales (Sept. 28, 1998), Clermont App. No. 
CA 98-01-011, 1998 WL 667845.  This court granted jurisdiction by accepting a 
discretionary appeal and by certifying that a conflict over the following question 
exists: 
{¶ 7} “Under the former R.C. 2744.02(B)(3), is a political subdivision 
liable for injury, death, or loss resulting from a nuisance that exists on public 
grounds within the political subdivision where the injury, death, or loss caused 
thereby occurs outside the political subdivision?” 106 Ohio St.3d 1502, 2005-
Ohio-4605, 833 N.E.2d 1245. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 8} Former R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) provided immunity to political 
subdivisions from civil liability for injuries or losses it or its employees caused.  
Former R.C. 2744.02(B) provided exceptions to that statutorily granted immunity.  
This case deals with the exception set forth in former R.C. 2744.02(B)(3), which 
stated: 
{¶ 9} “[P]olitical subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to 
persons or property caused by their failure to keep * * * public grounds within the 
political subdivision open, in repair, and free from nuisance.” S.B. 221, 145 Ohio 
Laws, Part II, at 2216. 
{¶ 10} To answer the certified question before us, we must assume that 
Lewisburg’s burning of refuse on its property did create a nuisance that did 
contribute to the accident of February 7, 2000.  No one disputes the fact that the 
accident did not occur on village property.  We must determine whether the fact 
that the injuries and losses associated with the accident were not suffered on 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
Lewisburg’s property renders the former R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) exception to 
immunity inapplicable. 
{¶ 11} We dealt with a similar issue of statutory interpretation regarding 
an R.C. 2744.02(B) immunity exception in Hubbard v. Canton City School Bd. of 
Edn., 97 Ohio St.3d 451, 2002-Ohio-6718, 780 N.E.2d 543.  In Hubbard, 
plaintiffs alleged that the Canton City School Board of Education had been 
negligent in supervising and retaining a teacher who had allegedly sexually 
assaulted their daughters inside a city school.  The plaintiffs argued that former 
R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) created an exception from immunity for the board.  That 
statute provided:  
{¶ 12} “[P]olitical subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to 
person or property that is caused by the negligence of their employees and that 
occurs within or on the grounds of buildings that are used in connection with the 
performance of a governmental function.” S.B. 221, 145 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 
2216. 
{¶ 13} The board asserted that former R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) was limited to 
claims arising from negligence related to physical defects within or on the 
grounds of governmental buildings. 
{¶ 14} The court applied in Hubbard our long-standing rule concerning 
statutory interpretation that “where the language of a statute is clear and 
unambiguous, it is the duty of the court to enforce the statute as written, making 
neither additions to the statute nor subtractions therefrom.” Hubbard, 97 Ohio 
St.3d 451, 2002-Ohio-6718, 780 N.E.2d 543, ¶ 14.  In interpreting the statute, this 
court held that “[t]he plain language of the subsection supports the conclusion that 
the General Assembly intended to permit political subdivisions to be sued in all 
cases where injury results from the negligence of their employees occurring 
within or on the grounds of any government building.” Id. at ¶ 13.  This court 
January Term, 2006 
5 
concluded that “[t]he exception is not confined to injury resulting from physical 
defects or negligent use of grounds or buildings.” Id. at ¶ 18. 
{¶ 15} As was true in Hubbard, our first duty in interpreting former R.C. 
2744.02(B)(3) is to determine whether it is clear and unambiguous.  “If it is 
ambiguous, we must then interpret the statute to determine the General 
Assembly's intent.  If it is not ambiguous, then we need not interpret it; we must 
simply apply it.”  State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969, 804 
N.E.2d 471, ¶ 13.   
 
{¶ 16} In short, former R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) provided that “[p]olitical 
subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to persons or property caused by 
their failure to keep * * * public grounds within the political subdivisions * * * 
free from nuisance.”  Immunity is lost, according to the plain language of the 
statute, when a political subdivision fails to keep its public grounds free from 
nuisance and an injury results from that failure.  The statute makes only one factor 
regarding the injury relevant – that it is caused by the nuisance.  There is no 
requirement that the injury must also occur on the property of the political 
subdivision.  There is only a requirement that the nuisance arise on public 
property.  Former R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) is not ambiguous; to interpret it as 
Lewisburg urges would require this court to add language to the statute. 
{¶ 17} Former R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) demonstrates that the General 
Assembly is perfectly capable of limiting the reach of a political subdivision’s 
liability to injuries or losses that occur on property within the political 
subdivision; as this court held in Hubbard, pursuant to former R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) 
political subdivisions were liable for employee negligence that occurred in public 
buildings or on their grounds.  The General Assembly made no such attempt to 
limit to public areas the geographical reach of R.C. 2744.02(B)(3). 
{¶ 18} The court of appeals decision in this case conflicts with the 
decision of the court in Kareth, Clermont App. No. CA98-01-011, 1998 WL 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
667845.  Kareth concerned an accident that occurred near the intersection of State 
Route 133 and Twin Bridges Road, a county road in Clermont County.  The 
plaintiff alleged that as a result of the county’s failure to keep Twin Bridges Road 
free from nuisance, surface water drained onto or across State Route 133, creating 
a hazardous condition that caused the accident.  The plaintiff argued that even 
though the accident had occurred on state property, the county was responsible for 
the nuisance that caused the accident. 
{¶ 19} Kareth states, “The Supreme Court of Ohio has ‘refused to extend 
a political subdivision's liability to areas outside its territorial limits’ reasoning 
that the political subdivision lacks possession and control of such areas. Simpson 
v. Big Bear Stores Co. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 130, 133, 652 N.E.2d 702, citing 
Ruwe v. Bd. of Springfield Twp. Trustees (1987), 29 Ohio St.3d 59, 29 OBR 441, 
505 N.E.2d 957; Mitchell v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 92, 
30 OBR 295, 507 N.E.2d 352.” 
{¶ 20} Kareth mischaracterizes this court’s earlier holdings.  In Simpson, 
the plaintiff sued Big Bear for injuries she suffered when she was attacked in a 
parking lot adjacent to a Big Bear store; the lot was not owned by or under the 
control of Big Bear.  Simpson in no way involved sovereign immunity, but this 
court cited sovereign-immunity cases in Simpson to illustrate the requirement of 
an owner’s possession and control of the property in premises-liability cases. 
{¶ 21} In both Ruwe, 29 Ohio St.3d 59, 29 OBR 441, 505 N.E.2d 957, and 
Mitchell, 30 Ohio St.3d 92, 30 OBR 295, 507 N.E.2d 352 (both of which arose 
from accidents that occurred prior to the enactment of R.C. Chapter 2744) the 
nuisances arose outside of the political subdivision and were not caused by 
employees of the political subdivision.  In Ruwe, an accident occurred when a 
muffler lying in the roadway was catapulted by one car into the windshield of 
another car.  Evidence established that the muffler had been in or near the 
roadway in Wyoming, Ohio, for less than 90 minutes.  However, the muffler had 
January Term, 2006 
7 
lain in the roadway just outside the corporation limits of Wyoming for at least 24 
hours.  The plaintiffs sought to charge the city with constructive notice of the 
presence of the muffler for the time that it was close to but not within the city 
limits. This court recognized that municipal corporations must keep public 
highways and streets within their municipality free from nuisance, but “refuse[d] 
to place the additional burden of inspecting and maintaining the highways and 
streets of neighboring jurisdictions on a municipality,” Ruwe, 29 Ohio St.3d at 61, 
29 OBR 441, 505 N.E.2d 957.  This court held that the city was not liable, 
because there was no evidence that the city had created the nuisance or had notice 
of it. Id. at 60, 29 OBR 441, 505 N.E.2d 957. 
{¶ 22} Likewise, in Mitchell, the nuisance at issue was not created by the 
city or on city-owned property.  In Mitchell, a father and son drowned while 
fishing in Lake Erie, 100 feet outside the city of Avon Lake.  They had entered 
the lake at Miller Road Park, a city park.  It was alleged that the Mitchells’ 
drowning resulted from an undertow caused by the release of heated water from 
an electric-generating plant that was located within Avon Lake.  The plant was 
not municipally owned.  The plaintiff alleged that Avon Lake was negligent 
because it was aware of the dangerous nature of the undertow but failed to erect 
fences, post warning signs, or take other measures in the park to inform persons of 
an alleged nuisance outside the park.  This court refused to impose a duty 
“requiring a municipality to protect individuals from or warn them of dangers 
existing on property which is beyond its corporate limits or control.” Mitchell, 30 
Ohio St.3d at 95, 30 OBR 295, 507 N.E.2d 352. 
{¶ 23} Thus, although it is true that this court in Ruwe and Mitchell 
declined to impose liability on political subdivisions for nuisances over which 
they had no control, this case is different.  The property where the nuisance arose 
was under the control of Lewisburg.  And Lewisburg employees allegedly caused 
the nuisance.  Former R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) created an immunity exception for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
instances in which injury or loss was caused by a nuisance arising on public 
grounds; neither the language of former R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) nor our previous case 
law require that the injury or loss also be suffered on public grounds in order for a 
political subdivision to be liable for damages. 
{¶ 24} We thus answer in the affirmative the certified question “Under the 
former R.C. 2744.02(B)(3), is a political subdivision liable for injury, death, or 
loss resulting from a nuisance that exists on public grounds within the political 
subdivision where the injury, death, or loss caused thereby occurs outside the 
political subdivision?”  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., 
concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 25} In my view, the village’s liability for a nuisance within the political 
subdivision does not extend beyond the geographic limits of the political 
subdivision.  Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, I dissent. 
{¶ 26} In this case, appellees assert that smoke from a smoldering fire on 
the property of the village blew over an interstate outside of the village, combined 
with fog, and resulted in multiple car accidents.  The majority holds that under 
former R.C. 2744.02(B)(3), a political subdivision is liable for injury, death, or 
loss resulting from a nuisance that exists on public grounds within the political 
subdivision when the injury, death, or loss caused thereby occurs outside the 
political subdivision. 
{¶ 27} In my view, the focus of the analysis should be on whether the 
village had possession and control over the area where the accidents occurred, not 
January Term, 2006 
9 
whether the village had possession or control over the area where the nuisance 
originated.  Because the accidents occurred in an area not under the possession or 
control of the village, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
find that the village was immune from liability. 
{¶ 28} In Simpson v. Big Bear Stores Co. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 130, 652 
N.E.2d 702, a grocery store customer was physically attacked after she left the 
grocery, which was located in a shopping center.  The customer sued the grocery 
store, and this court refused to extend liability to premises not in the possession 
and control of the business owner.  I see no distinction between that case and the 
case at bar. 
{¶ 29} In Simpson, this court held that “[i]t is fundamental that to have a 
duty to keep premises safe for others one must be in possession and control of the 
premises.”  Id. at 132, 652 N.E.2d 702, citing Wills v. Frank Hoover Supply 
(1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 186, 26 OBR 160, 497 N.E.2d 1118. 
{¶ 30} With regard to requiring control over the premises of the injury, 
this court noted: “The element of control has its origin at common law.  
McKinney v. Hartz & Restle Realtors, Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 244, 31 OBR 
449, 510 N.E.2d 386.  This element has been continually reiterated in our 
decisions and is incorporated into the Restatement position.  * * * Under similar 
circumstances we have refused to extend a political subdivision’s liability to areas 
outside its territorial limits, applying this same reasoning.  See Ruwe v. Bd. of 
Springfield Twp. Trustees (1987), 29 Ohio St.3d 59, 29 OBR 441, 505 N.E.2d 
957; Mitchell v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 92, 30 OBR 
295, 507 N.E.2d 352.”  Simpson, 73 Ohio St.3d at 133, 652 N.E.2d 702.  There is 
no evidence that the village had control over the interstate. 
{¶ 31} In the conflict case, Kareth v. Toyota Motor Sales (Sept. 28, 1998), 
Clermont App. No. CA 98-01-011, 1998 WL 667845, the Twelfth District Court 
of Appeals held that a county was not responsible for an accident caused by a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
nuisance on a state highway, even though the source of the nuisance was on 
property within the control of the political subdivision.  The Kareth court held 
that the duty of a municipality to keep its public areas free from nuisance does not 
extend to property that is beyond its corporate limit or control.  Thus, “since a 
county does not have any control over state highways,” the appellate court 
concluded, “the Commissioners do not have a duty under R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) to 
repair or protect others from a nuisance that exists on a state highway regardless 
of where the source of the nuisance is located.”  I would adopt the sound 
reasoning of the Kareth court. 
{¶ 32} The majority’s interpretation means that the village can be held 
responsible for car accidents that did not happen within the village, but actually 
happened on a highway 2,000 to 3,000 feet outside the village in an area over 
which the village had no control.  The village had no authority to close the 
highway even if the village knew that the smoke would ultimately drift to the 
highway.  How far would the majority extend this liability?  Although the village 
created the smoke, it did not create the fog.  According to Lt. Peck, the fog 
extended to Huber Heights, approximately 20 miles east of the accident scene.  
And, clearly, the village had no control over the wind that carried the smoke and 
fog. 
{¶ 33} I believe that the majority’s interpretation of former R.C. 
2744.02(B)(3) today runs afoul of legislative intent.  I would call upon the 
General Assembly to clarify this important issue.  I dissent. 
__________________ 
Breidenbach, O’Neal & Bacon, Robert M. O’Neal, and Steven E. Bacon, 
for appellee Dayton Freight Lines. 
 
Dyer, Garofalo, Mann & Schultz and Robert A. Burke, for appellees 
Ronald E. Tracy Jr. and Candace Tracy. 
January Term, 2006 
11 
 
Freund, Freeze & Arnold and Patrick J. Janis, for appellees Gainey 
Transportation Services, Inc., Gainey Insurance Services, Inc., Richard D. Estes, 
and Heidi Boyd. 
 
Richard M. Hunt Co., L.P.A., Richard M. Hunt, and Kevin M. Hunt, for 
appellees Richard D. Estes and Heidi Boyd. 
James W. Gustin & Associates Co., L.P.A., and James W. Gustin, for 
appellant. 
______________________