Case Title: State v. Miller

Citation: 2020-Ohio-1420

Docket Number: 2018-0948

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-04-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Miller, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-1420.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-1420 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. MILLER, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Miller, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-1420.] 
Trial courts must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c)—A trial court strictly 
complies with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) when it advises a defendant in a manner 
reasonably intelligible to the defendant that a guilty or no-contest plea 
waives the rights enumerated in the rule; the trial court is not required to 
use the particular words stated in the rule. 
(No. 2018-0948—Submitted December 11, 2019—Decided April 14, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 105363, 
2018-Ohio-843. 
__________________ 
 
FISCHER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we are asked whether trial courts in felony cases must 
strictly comply with the plea colloquy required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and, if so, 
whether strict compliance requires that the colloquy include particular words.  We 
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reaffirm that a trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c); however, 
this does not mean that the trial court must use the particular words stated in the 
rule.  Instead, to strictly comply with the rule, the trial court must orally advise the 
defendant, in a manner reasonably intelligible to the defendant, that the plea waives 
the rights enumerated in the rule. 
I.  Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellee, Shawn Miller, pleaded guilty 
to a number of crimes in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.  During 
the plea hearing, the trial court enumerated the constitutional rights Miller would 
be entitled to if he elected to go to trial and Miller affirmatively stated that he 
understood those constitutional rights.  The trial court did not, however, specifically 
ask Miller whether he understood that he was waiving those rights by pleading 
guilty.  The trial court accepted Miller’s guilty pleas and sentenced him to an 
aggregate eight-year prison term and three years of postrelease control. 
{¶ 3} On appeal to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, Miller argued that 
the pleas should be vacated because the trial court had failed to ensure that he 
understood that by pleading guilty he was waiving the constitutional rights 
enumerated in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). 
{¶ 4} In a two-to-one decision, the court of appeals vacated Miller’s guilty 
pleas, reversed his convictions, and remanded the case to the trial court for further 
proceedings.  Applying this court’s decision in State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 
2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, the Eighth District concluded that the trial court 
was required to strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) and that in order to strictly 
comply, the court had to specifically advise Miller that he would waive his 
constitutional trial rights by pleading guilty.  The court of appeals acknowledged 
that common sense dictates that by pleading guilty, a defendant will not be able to 
exercise those constitutional rights; however, because the court of appeals 
concluded that the trial court had failed to abide by Veney’s strict-compliance 
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standard when it failed to advise Miller that a guilty plea waives those constitutional 
rights, the court vacated Miller’s pleas, reversed his convictions, and remanded the 
cause to the trial court for further proceedings. 
{¶ 5} The dissenting judge stated that the totality of the circumstances 
indicated that Miller knew what rights he would lose by pleading guilty and what 
rights he would have if he chose to go to trial.  Because she concluded that the trial 
court had “meaningfully conveyed the substance of Miller’s rights,” she concluded 
that the trial court had complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2).  2018-Ohio-843, ¶ 27-28 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 6} This court accepted jurisdiction over the state’s proposition of law: 
“A reviewing court applies a substantial compliance standard in determining 
whether criminal defendants understand they are waiving their constitutional trial 
rights when entering a plea in a felony case.”  See 153 Ohio St.3d 1502, 2018-Ohio-
4288, 109 N.E.3d 1259. 
II.  Analysis 
{¶ 7} The state argues that the Eighth District’s decision elevates form over 
substance.  It asserts that so long as a defendant understands that pleading guilty to 
an offense waives his or her constitutional trial rights, the trial court has complied 
with Crim.R. 11(C)(2).  It accordingly urges the court to adopt a substantial-
compliance standard with respect to Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c)’s requirement that a trial 
court determine whether a defendant understands that by pleading guilty he will 
waive his constitutional trial rights.  Adopting the position of the dissenting opinion 
below, the state urges this court to conclude that by advising Miller of the 
constitutional rights he would have if he chose to go to trial, the trial court notified 
Miller that he would be waiving those rights if he opted not to go to trial and thus 
satisfied Crim.R. 11(C)(2). 
{¶ 8} Miller responds that the state failed to preserve the issue whether 
substantial compliance or strict compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) is required 
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when determining whether defendants understand that they are waiving their 
constitutional trial rights by pleading guilty.  He further asserts that the Eighth 
District correctly held that strict compliance is required, and he argues that even if 
a substantial-compliance standard applies, the trial court failed to satisfy that 
standard in this case. 
A.  The Issue in this Case Is Properly Before Us 
{¶ 9} As an initial procedural matter, we conclude that the state’s failure to 
argue below for a substantial-compliance standard does not constitute a basis for 
affirming the judgment of the court of appeals.  The issue whether substantial 
compliance or strict compliance applies is not essential to this case.  Rather, the 
critical issue is what Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) requires of the trial court and what 
showing a defendant must make to demonstrate that the plea is invalid.  The state 
contends that the trial court’s colloquy fully complied with the requirements of the 
rule by conveying the substance of Miller’s constitutional rights to him in a 
reasonably intelligible manner.  We agree. 
{¶ 10} Moreover, in its opinion, the Eighth District acknowledged that its 
strict-compliance holding conflicted with the Tenth District’s holding in State v. 
Ellis, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-912, 2015-Ohio-3438, ¶ 10-12, that Veney, 120 
Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, allows substantial compliance 
with the portion of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) requiring the trial court to determine 
whether the defendant understands that by pleading guilty he or she is waiving his 
or her constitutional trial rights.  2018-Ohio-843 at ¶ 12-14.  Both parties have had 
a full opportunity to brief the issue, and given the differing views of the Eighth and 
Tenth Districts on this issue, we determine that it would assist the lower courts if 
we address this issue now. 
B.  Legal Background 
{¶ 11} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) is the basis for our analysis in this case.  That rule 
provides:  
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In felony cases the court * * * shall not accept a plea of guilty 
or no contest without first addressing the defendant personally and 
doing all of the following: 
* * * 
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the 
defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the 
rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s 
favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be 
compelled to testify against himself or herself. 
 
{¶ 12} Our most relevant precedent regarding the issue of which standard 
applies is Veney.  Of particular relevance is the language of Veney’s syllabus:  
 
A trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) 
and orally advise a defendant before accepting a felony plea that the 
plea waives (1) the right to a jury trial, (2) the right to confront one’s 
accusers, (3) the right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses, (4) 
the right to require the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and (5) the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.  
When a trial court fails to strictly comply with this duty, the 
defendant’s plea is invalid.  (Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), applied.) 
 
Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, at syllabus. 
{¶ 13} In addressing the question of which standard applied, the Veney 
court confronted the question whether the trial court’s failure to advise a criminal 
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defendant of one of his constitutional trial rights was subject to harmless-error 
review under Crim.R. 52.  The court explained that “ ‘for a guilty plea to be 
voluntarily and intelligently entered, the defendant must be informed that he is 
waiving’ ” the constitutional rights listed in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).  Id. at ¶ 25-26, 
quoting State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 477-478, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981).  But 
the court held that only substantial compliance with the nonconstitutional 
requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2), namely the requirements in subdivisions (a) and 
(b), is required and that a defendant’s claim that his plea is invalid due to a failure 
to adhere to those provisions is subject to harmless-error review, which requires a 
showing of prejudice.  Id. at ¶ 14-15.  But a trial court’s failure to notify a defendant 
of his constitutional rights listed in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) amounts to plain error.  Id. 
at ¶ 24, citing Ballard at 476-477. 
{¶ 14} Veney therefore held that “the trial court must orally inform the 
defendant of the rights set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) during the plea colloquy for 
the plea to be valid.”  Id. at ¶ 29.  The court explained that “[a]lthough the trial 
court may vary slightly from the literal wording of the rule in the colloquy, the court 
cannot simply rely on other sources to convey these rights to the defendant.”  Id.  
Because the record in that case showed that the trial court had “plainly failed to 
orally inform Veney of his constitutional right to require the state to prove his guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt,” the plea was invalid.  Id. at ¶ 30.  Notably, the case at 
bar does not involve the plain failure of the trial court to inform Miller of his 
constitutional rights. 
{¶ 15} The three justices concurring in part and dissenting in part in Veney 
agreed that “trial courts when conducting plea colloquies must strictly comply with 
all parts of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).”  Id. at ¶ 33 (Lanzinger, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  Thus, the justices unanimously concluded that trial courts must 
strictly comply with all parts of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), necessarily including the 
January Term, 2020 
 
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portion requiring that the court determine that the defendant understands that by 
pleading guilty he is waiving his constitutional trial rights. 
C.  What Does Strict Compliance Require? 
{¶ 16} We reaffirm the unanimous conclusion of the justices in Veney that 
trial courts must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and the majority’s 
holding that a failure to do so cannot be deemed harmless.  The critical question 
before us in this case, then, is: What must a trial court do to strictly comply with 
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c)? 
{¶ 17} Miller mistakenly equates strict compliance with a requirement that 
the judge recite the provisions of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) almost verbatim.  Thus, he 
would require the judge’s explanation to the defendant to include either the word 
waiver or a synonym of waiver, such as give up, forgo, bypass, surrender, abandon, 
or relinquish.  Miller’s suggested requirement misinterprets Veney and other 
decisions of this court that make clear that strict compliance simply means that the 
court has to notify the defendant of each one of the constitutional rights that the 
defendant is giving up; and if the court fails to do so, the guilty plea is invalid—no 
showing of prejudice is required.  See State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-
Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d 51, ¶ 12 (“Though failure to adequately inform a defendant 
of his constitutional rights would invalidate a guilty plea under a presumption that 
it was entered involuntarily and unknowingly, failure to comply [as to] 
nonconstitutional rights will not invalidate a plea unless the defendant thereby 
suffered prejudice”), citing State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 
(1990); Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d at 475-478, 423 N.E.2d 115.  We have never 
mandated that a trial court use particular words in order to comply with Crim.R. 
11(C)(2)(c).  See Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, at 
¶ 29; Ballard at paragraph two of the syllabus.  Indeed, as we explained in Ballard,  
 
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[f]ailure to use the exact language contained in Crim.R. 
11(C), in informing a criminal defendant of his constitutional right 
to a trial and the constitutional rights related to such trial, including 
the right to trial by jury, is not grounds for vacating a plea as long 
as the record shows that the trial court explained these rights in a 
manner reasonably intelligible to that defendant. 
 
Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.  Rather, the trial court needs to inform a 
defendant of those constitutional rights that the defendant will not be able to 
exercise if the defendant pleads guilty, and the information provided by the court 
must be in words that the defendant can understand.  See Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c); 
Ballard at 480 (the goal of Crim.R. 11(C) is to ensure that the defendant is informed 
“and thus enable the judge to determine that the defendant understands that his plea 
waives his constitutional right to a trial”). 
{¶ 18} As we explained in Veney, Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) requires the court to 
convey to the defendant the information set forth in the rule so that the defendant 
can make a voluntary and intelligent decision whether to plead guilty.  Veney at  
¶ 18, citing Ballard at 479-480.  With this focus on setting forth information in a 
manner that the defendant can understand, we have cautioned against requiring 
courts to mirror the language set forth in the rule:   
 
[T]he focus, upon review, is whether the record shows that the trial 
court explained or referred to the right in a manner reasonably 
intelligible to that defendant.  To hold otherwise would be to elevate 
formalistic litany of constitutional rights over the substance of the 
dialogue between the trial court and the accused.  This is something 
we are unwilling to do. 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
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Ballard at 480. 
{¶ 19} Thus, the goal of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) is to make sure that a 
defendant understands that after entering into a plea, certain rights cannot be 
exercised.  If this court were to require verbatim or nearly verbatim plea colloquies, 
as argued for by Miller, that requirement would in some cases undermine the goal 
of having the defendant actually understand the ramifications of the plea.  We 
accordingly hold that a trial court strictly complies with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) when 
in its plea colloquy with the defendant, it advises the defendant in a manner 
reasonably intelligible to the defendant that the plea waives the rights enumerated 
in the rule. 
D.  The Trial Court Strictly Complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) 
{¶ 20} In this case, as the plea colloquy set forth below shows, the trial 
court, in language understandable to the average person, not in legalese, set forth 
the constitutional trial rights listed in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), such that Miller could 
make a voluntary and intelligent decision whether to plead guilty knowing that 
those constitutional rights would not be exercisable if he did.  And after the judge 
explained each constitutional right to Miller, Miller stated that he understood the 
right. 
 
THE COURT: As good as the plea bargains might sound to 
people, nobody is under an obligation to accept them.  You’re 
welcome to stay with not guilty and go to trial instead.  Right, Mr. 
Miller? 
DEFENDANT MILLER:  Yes, Your Honor. 
* * * 
THE COURT:  And if you go to trial, you always have your 
lawyers.  Can’t afford one, one is appointed no cost to you.  
Understood, * * * Mr. Miller? 
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DEFENDANT MILLER:  Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT:  And you know that at trial you’re presumed 
innocent.  The burden is on the prosecutor.  They have to come in 
with evidence.  They have to prove each of the original charges 
against you with evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. 
If there is one or more charges on the list that they cannot 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt, you would be acquitted and 
discharged of that count if they couldn’t prove to that degree.  
Understood, Mr. Miller? 
DEFENDANT MILLER:  Yes, Your Honor. 
* * * 
THE COURT:  So at trial you’re welcome to take the 
witness stand in your defense but you have a right to stay off the 
stand and remain silent.  No one can make you talk or even comment 
on your silence.  Understood, * * * Mr. Miller? 
* * * 
DEFENDANT MILLER:  Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT:  And do you understand that you and your 
lawyer get to cross-examine all the witnesses that the prosecutor 
brings in here to try to build a case against you * * *?  You 
understand that?  * * *  Do you, Mr. Miller? 
DEFENDANT MILLER:  Yes. 
THE COURT:  Okay.  So the other thing you need to know, 
your lawyer can issue subpoenas to select your witnesses, get them 
on the witness stand.  The Court will enforce those subpoenas to 
help you get them here to testify for you.  * * *  Understood, Mr. 
Miller? 
DEFENDANT MILLER: Yes, Your Honor. 
January Term, 2020 
 
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THE COURT:  Any questions from any of you? 
* * * 
DEFENDANT MILLER:  No. 
 
Although Miller argues that some synonym of the word waiver must be used in the 
plea colloquy in order to ensure that the defendant understands the ramifications of 
pleading guilty, it is clear from the transcript excerpt set forth above that that is not 
true.  The court strictly complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) by setting forth the 
constitutional rights that Miller would have if he elected to go to trial and 
communicating to Miller that the effect of his plea was that he would not be going 
to trial. 
{¶ 21} We see no error in this exchange.  Common sense tells us that the 
trial judge’s use of easily understood words conveyed to Miller that he would be 
waiving certain constitutional rights if he were to plead guilty and that the exchange 
resulted in Miller’s plea being voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made.  To 
reach any other result would raise form over substance.  We refuse to require trial 
courts to use particular words during the plea colloquy. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 22} We reaffirm our holding in Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-
5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, that trial courts must strictly comply with Crim.R. 
11(C)(2)(c).  And we hold that a trial court strictly complies with Crim.R. 
11(C)(2)(c) when it orally advises the defendant in a manner reasonably intelligible 
to the defendant that the plea waives the rights enumerated in the rule. 
{¶ 23} Because we conclude that the trial court strictly complied with 
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) in this case, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals 
and reinstate Miller’s guilty pleas and convictions. 
Judgment reversed 
and convictions reinstated. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, DEWINE, DONNELLY, and 
SADLER, JJ., concur. 
LISA L. SADLER, J., of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, sitting for 
STEWART, J. 
_________________ 
 
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Gregory Ochocki, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Patrick J. Milligan Co., L.P.A., and Patrick J. Milligan; and James E. Kocka, 
for appellee. 
_________________