Case Title: INNIS v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-05-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
INNIS v. STATE2003 WY 6669 P.3d 413Case Number: 02-132Decided: 05/29/2003
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                
            

 

RICKEY 
DEAN INNIS,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee

(Plaintiff) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Ken 
Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Ryan R. 
Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Roden.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution 
Assistance Program; and Deborah R. Hochhalter, Student Intern.  Argument by Ms. 
Hochhalter.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant, Rickey 
Dean Innis (Innis), was convicted of conspiracy to operate a clandestine 
methamphetamine laboratory.1  He was sentenced to a term of not less 
than ten years nor more than 18 years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary.  He appeals, contending the district 
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over that crime, and because the 
trial court committed reversible error by failing to suppress evidence seized at 
the time of his arrest.  We will 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Innis lists these 
issues:

 

I.          
Whether the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 
alleged conspiracy?

 

II.          
Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress evidence resulting 
from the search of Mr. Shafer's vehicle because [Innis] was illegally seized 
during the search in violation of [his] State and Federal constitutional 
rights?

 

The 
State's brief conforms to those issues.

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Innis and his 
companions, Mark Shafer and Kelly McConnell, drove to Laramie on May 29, 
2001.  All three were residents of 
Fort Collins, Colorado.  They went 
to an Albertson's store and bought a large enough quantity of cold medication so 
as to raise the suspicions of the register clerk.  Most large stores selling those products 
are on the alert for such quantity purchases because they can be used in the 
manufacture of methamphetamine.  In 
this case, the Albertson's store manager called the Laramie Police Department 
because of the quantity of cold medication purchased.  The police were informed about the 
purchase of the cold tablets and given a description of the car used by the 
group, as well as the license plate number on their car.  Although the police were not aware of it 
at the time the trio was eventually stopped, they had also purchased many more 
boxes of cold tablets at other Laramie stores.

 

[¶4]      At about midnight 
that same date, a police officer saw the reported car pulling into a Mini-Mart 
store.  The officer pulled up beside 
the suspect car, but not in a manner so as to block it.  The officer asked if the group would 
answer some questions.  The group 
was cooperative.  One of the first 
questions was whether they had been at an Albertson's store.  One individual said, "yes," another, 
"no."  All three men denied 
purchasing cold tablets.  The 
officer was able to observe an open bottle appearing to contain an alcoholic 
beverage, which was a violation of a city ordinance.2  During the course of that investigative 
stop, the police officer asked all of the men to get out of the car and he did a 
"pat down" search of the subjects to ensure his safety.  When the officer got to Shafer, Shafer 
admitted he had a glass pipe in his pocket that he used to smoke 
methamphetamine.  He consented to a 
police officer removing the pipe from his pocket.  There was methamphetamine residue on the 
pipe.  Shafer was then arrested and 
taken to the Laramie Police Department for further processing and 
questioning.  During the course of 
the stop and arrests, four police officers participated in the 
process.

 

[¶5]      While Innis was 
standing outside the car, and near a waste receptacle, a police officer noticed 
that Innis wadded up a piece of paper and tried to throw it away.  It was recovered by the police and 
turned out to be a receipt from an Albertson's store for cold tablets.  Before being taken away, Shafer gave a 
written consent for a search of his car and that search turned up other 
evidence, including hypodermic needles, syringes, scales, baggies, a second 
"meth" pipe, marijuana, methamphetamine, an open container of an alcoholic 
beverage, and 38 boxes of cold pills which had been purchased that night by the 
threesome at various stores in Laramie.  
Eventually, McConnell was arrested for having an open container of an 
alcohol beverage, and both McConnell and Innis were arrested for possession of 
controlled substances.  Shortly 
after those arrests, Shafer admitted to the conspiracy, and all three were 
arrested on that charge as well.

 

[¶6]      During 
questioning at the police department, Shafer admitted that the three were in 
Laramie for a "pill run," i.e., to buy cold tablets for the purpose of 
reprocessing them into methamphetamine.  
Further, he conceded it was their intention to return to Fort Collins and 
"cook" a batch of methamphetamine, as they had done two or three other times 
during the preceding month.  Based 
upon the information obtained from Shafer, as well as other investigative 
materials already available to the Fort Collins police, a search warrant was 
obtained in Colorado for a residence owned by McConnell and shared with 
Innis.  That search produced 
evidence of the existence of a clandestine drug laboratory, which was located in 
a bedroom used by Innis.  Shafer 
testified that his role in this operation, as well as McConnell's, was to obtain 
the cold pills and other ingredients, and that Innis was the "cook," 
i.e., the person who actually knew how to, and did, produce the 
methamphetamine in his home laboratory.

 

DISCUSSION

 

 

[¶7]      Innis contends 
that the conspiracy alleged was to have no effect in Wyoming and, therefore, 
Wyoming courts have no jurisdiction over the crime.  Further, he asserts the only thing that 
occurred in Wyoming was the purchase of cold tablets, which is not a crime, and 
all other actions and/or intended actions transpired in 
Colorado.

 

[¶8]      Jurisdiction is a 
question of law to be considered by this Court de novo.  Tomlin v. State, 2001 WY 121, ¶5, 
35 P.3d 1255, ¶5 (Wyo. 2001).  
Wyoming has broad jurisdiction to punish a defendant, over whom it has 
personal jurisdiction, for an act committed outside this state, but which has an 
effect in this state.  Rios v. 
State, 733 P.2d 242, 244-50 (Wyo. 1987) (father of child could be convicted 
of interfering with child custody in Wyoming, even though neither father nor 
child had ever been in Wyoming, but mother was).  The courts of Wyoming have subject 
matter jurisdiction over drug conspiracies when the conspirators intend for the 
conspiracy to have an effect within the state of Wyoming.  Marquez v. State, 12 P.3d 711, 
715-16 (Wyo. 2000); and see Estrada-Sanchez v. State, 2003 WY 45, ¶¶6-7, 
66 P.3d 703, ¶¶6-7 (Wyo. 2003.)

 

[¶9]      The parties 
appear to agree, as do we, that the circumstances of this case pose a question 
of first impression in this state.  
Indeed, we have found no analogous case in any jurisdiction.  The gist of Innis's argument has two 
distinct aspects.  First, he 
contends that conspiracy is a crime in and of itself, and that the crime 
occurred in Colorado, not Wyoming.  
Marquez, 12 P.3d  at 715; Palato v. State, 988 P.2d 512, 
515-16 (Wyo. 1999).  Second, he 
maintains that the conspiracy did not have an intended effect in Wyoming, and 
there was no criminal act in furtherance of the conspiracy committed in 
Wyoming.  Because this case is one 
of first impression in some respects, a little background is 
appropriate:

 

            
Conspiracy is an inchoate offense, and is a crime in and of itself.  Prohibition of conspiracy serves two 
distinct purposes:  the punishment 
of group behavior and the control of inchoate activities.  The offense derives from special threats 
posed by organized group criminality.  
The group danger rationale is predicated on the likelihood that the 
participants will reinforce each other's determination to carry out the criminal 
object, the object will be successfully attained, the extent of the injury to 
society will be large, those who commit it will escape detection, and the 
group's planning will have a long-term educative effect on its members, with 
schooling in crime the result.

            
Although criminalization of conspiracy punishes the inchoate offense by 
prosecuting the agreement itself, separating and stigmatizing jointly planned 
criminal activity prior to its completion, the crime of conspiracy is directed 
at the intended result of that agreement.  
The basis of conspiratorial liability is not to punish the agreement per 
se, but, rather, like other inchoate crimes, to punish the firm purpose to 
commit a substantive crime, while hopefully preventing the actual commission 
thereof.

 

15A 
C.J.S. Conspiracy § 98 (2002).

 

[¶10]   Moreover, a conspiracy is a 
continuing offense and it lasts until the final overt act is completed.  "Every act in furtherance of it is 
deemed a renewal or continuance of the conspiracy."  15A C.J.S. Conspiracy 
§ 104.  We embrace the view 
that conspiracy is a continuing offense with a situs at the place of the 
original agreement and also in any other jurisdictions where acts in furtherance 
of the conspiracy are undertaken.  4 
Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel and Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure § 
16.4(c) at 579 (2d ed. 1999).

 

            
The elements of a criminal conspiracy include: (1) an object to be 
accomplished; (2) a plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish that object; 
(3) an agreement or undertaking between two or more of the defendants whereby 
they become definitely committed to co-operate for the accomplishment of the 
object by the means embodied in the agreement, or by any effectual means; (4) an 
overt act.

 

15A 
C.J.S. Conspiracy § 108.  It 
is not necessary that the overt act be criminal in character.  Indeed, the overt act may be wholly 
innocent in nature, provided it furthers the purpose of the conspiracy.  The overt act merely manifests that the 
conspiracy is at work.  Burk v. 
State, 848 P.2d 225, 235 (Wyo. 1993).  
15A C.J.S Conspiracy, §§ 124-125.

 

[¶11]   Relying upon these fundamental 
principles, we conclude that the conspiracy continued and was reaffirmed in 
Wyoming, and that an overt act, which was central to the purpose of the 
conspiracy, occurred here.  Thus, 
the district court in Laramie, Albany County, Wyoming had both subject matter 
and personal jurisdiction over the crime for which Innis was convicted.  A conspiracy may be prosecuted in 
Wyoming:  Where any part of the 
agreement is entered into in Wyoming; where the agreement is entered into 
elsewhere but has an intended effect in Wyoming; and where the agreement is 
entered into elsewhere, but an overt act occurs here demonstrating the 
continuation of the conspiracy.  
This enumeration is not meant to be exhaustive of all possibilities, but 
only to summarize those addressed by this Court to date.

 

 

[¶12]   Innis contends that the police 
officer's initial contact with the threesome, at the Mini-Mart, was an unlawful 
traffic stop and, thus, the detention of his person was illegal.  Continuing, Innis contends that the 
driver, Shafer, had committed no traffic infractions, no crime had been 
committed by them purchasing the cold tablets, and no criminal activity that 
could be associated with them had been reported.  Finally, Innis contends that the stop 
was pretextual and violated Innis's constitutional rights.

 

[¶13]   When we review a district court's 
ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we do not interfere with the findings 
of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  
When the district court has not made specific findings of fact, we will 
uphold its general ruling if the ruling is supportable by any reasonable view of 
the evidence.  We consider the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's ruling because of 
the district court's ability to assess "the credibility of the witnesses, weigh 
the evidence, and make the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions" at 
the hearing on the motion.  The 
constitutionality of a particular search or seizure is, however, a question of 
law which we review de novo.  
Meek v. State, 2002 WY 1, ¶8, 37 P.3d 1279, ¶8 (Wyo. 2002) 
(supporting citations omitted).

 

[¶14]   Innis concedes that Shafer 
consented to a search of the vehicle from which the evidence at issue was seized 
and directs our attention to this authority, which we must also address as a 
part of our standard of review:

 

Even 
if a person cannot directly challenge the search of a vehicle because of a lack 
of standing, they may indirectly challenge the search if they can demonstrate 
that the fruits of the search are a consequence of an illegal seizure of their 
person.  United States v. 
Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 872 (10th Cir.1995);  United States v. McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1450 (10th Cir.1993);  5 Wayne 
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.3(e), at 173-74 & fn. 231.  This concept derives from the 
proposition that Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature and, as such, 
one has the right to be free from unreasonable searches or seizures of their 
person.  Id. § 11.3(e); 
Rakas, 439 U.S.  at 133-34, 99 S. Ct.  at 425.  Thus, even without standing to directly 
contest the vehicle search, courts have suppressed evidence seized from a 
vehicle search as "fruit of the poisonous tree" if the detention or arrest of a 
person was unlawful.  
McKneely, 6 F.3d  at 1450.

 

An 
investigatory or Terry stop represents a seizure which implicates the 
Fourth Amendment, requiring the presence of specific, articulable facts and 
rational inferences giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has 
committed or may be committing a crime.  
Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 219-220 (Wyo.1994) (citing Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)); see also 
McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo.1999).  There is a dual inquiry for evaluating 
the reasonableness of an investigatory stop:  (1) whether the officer's actions were 
justified at the inception; and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope 
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first 
instance.  Wilson, 874 P.2d  
at 223 (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228, 105 S. Ct. 675, 680, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985) and Terry, 392 U.S.  at 20-21, 88 S.Ct. at 
1879)).  The conduct of an officer 
is judged by an objective standard which takes into account the totality of the 
circumstances.  Terry, 392 U.S.  at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1879-81; United States v. Lang, 81 F.3d 955, 
965 (10th Cir.1996).

 

Putnam 
v. State, 
995 P.2d 632, 636-37 (Wyo. 2000).

 

[¶15]   Innis concludes the introduction to 
this argument with this proposition:  
"If the detention of Mr. Innis was illegal, the evidence resulting from 
the search of Mr. Shafer's vehicle and Mr. Shafer's statements implicating Mr. 
Innis in the alleged conspiracy [have] to be suppressed."

 

[¶16]   We have described the various 
levels of contacts or encounters between citizens and the police in this 
way:  [1] The most intrusive 
encounter, an arrest, requires justification by probable cause to believe that a 
person has committed or is committing a crime.  [2] The investigatory stop represents a 
seizure which invokes Fourth Amendment safeguards, but, by its less intrusive 
character, requires only the presence of specific and articulable facts and 
rational inferences which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has 
committed or may be committing a crime.  
[3] The least intrusive police-citizen contact, a consensual encounter, 
involves no restraint of liberty and elicits the citizen's voluntary cooperation 
with non-coercive questioning.  
McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo. 1999) (supporting 
citations omitted).

 

[¶17]   The district court issued a 
decision letter, which detailed its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law.  After hearing and weighing all 
of the evidence pertinent to the motion to suppress, the district court 
concluded that the initial stop was consensual, as was the search of Shafer's 
car and, thus, fits into one of the exceptions where a warrant to search is not 
required.  See Andrews v. 
State, 2002 WY 28, ¶18, 40 P.3d 708, ¶18 (Wyo. 2002).  Thus, Innis's Fourth Amendment rights 
were not implicated.  The police 
officer did not activate his overhead lights, nor did he give any other visual 
or audible signal to bring Shafer's vehicle to a stop.  Shafer pulled the car into the Mini-Mart 
of his own volition.  The police 
officer made no attempt to block the car from leaving.  His intention in approaching the vehicle 
was to ask the trio some questions.  
At the officer's request, the occupants of the vehicle were asked to get 
out of the car, and they all consented to pat down searches for the purpose of 
ensuring the police officer's safety.  
Innis was informed that he was not under arrest, although Shafer had been 
arrested.  Innis was asked if he 
would like to wait inside one of the police vehicles at the scene and he did 
so.  When the search of Shafer's car 
produced illegal narcotics, Innis was arrested.  The district court's findings that Innis 
was not illegally detained or arrested during the initial stop are not clearly 
erroneous; indeed, they are consistent with all of the relevant evidence, other 
than Innis's self-serving testimony to the contrary.  Therefore, the district court properly 
denied the motion to suppress.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶18]   The district court had jurisdiction 
over the conspiracy for which Innis was convicted.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Innis's motion to suppress.  The judgment and sentence of the 
district court are affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

  1Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 35-7-1059 (LexisNexis 2001) states:

§ 
35-7-1059.  Unlawful clandestine 
laboratory operations; penalties.

            
(a) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or 
intentionally:

                        
(i) Possess a List I or II controlled substance precursor with the intent 
to engage in a c        
clandestine laboratory operation;

(ii) Possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation;

(iii) Sell, distribute or otherwise supply a List I or II controlled 
substance precursor, laboratory equipment or laboratory supplies knowing it will 
be used for a clandestine laboratory operation;

                        
(iv) Conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine 
laboratory operation.

            
(b) A person who violates subsection (a) of this section is guilty of a 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) years, a fine of 
not more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00), or 
both.

            
(c) A person who violates subsection (a) of this section is guilty of a 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than twenty-five (25) years, a 
fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00), or both if the judge 
or jury also finds any one (1) of the following conditions occurred in 
conjunction with that violation:

(i) 
Illegal possession, transportation or disposal of hazardous or dangerous 
material or while transporting or causing to be transported materials in 
furtherance of a clandestine laboratory operation, there was created a 
substantial risk to human health or safety or a danger to the 
environment;

(ii) The intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take 
place within five hundred (500) feet of a residence, business, church or school; 
or

(iii) Any phase of the clandestine laboratory operation was conducted in 
the presence of a person less than eighteen (18) years of 
age.

            
(d) A person who violates subsection (a) of this section is guilty of a 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than forty (40) years, a fine of 
not more than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00), or both if the judge 
or jury also finds any one (1) of the following conditions occurred in 
conjunction with that violation:

            
(i) Use of a firearm;

                        
(ii) Use of a booby trap.  
[Emphasis added.]

 

    Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1058 (LexisNexis 2001) 
states:

§ 
35-7-1058.  
Definitions

            
(a) As used in this article:

            
. . . . 

            
(ii) "Clandestine laboratory operation" 
means:

(A) 
Purchasing or procuring chemicals, supplies, equipment or a laboratory location 
for the illegal manufacture of controlled 
substances;

(B) 
Transporting or arranging for the transportation of chemicals, supplies or 
equipment for the illegal manufacture of controlled 
substances;

(C) 
Setting up equipment or supplies in preparation for the illegal manufacture of 
controlled substances;  
or

(D) Distributing 
or disposing of chemicals, equipment, supplies or products used in or produced 
by the illegal manufacture of controlled substances. [Emphasis 
added.]

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-303 (LexisNexis 2001) 
states:

§ 
6-1-303. Conspiracy; renunciation of criminal intention; 
venue.

            
(a) A person is guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime if he agrees with 
one (1) or more persons that they or one (1) or more of them will commit a crime 
and one (1) or more of them does an overt act to effect the objective of the 
agreement.

            
(b) A person is not liable under this section if after conspiring he 
withdraws from the conspiracy and thwarts its success under circumstances 
manifesting voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal 
intention.

            
(c) A conspiracy may be prosecuted in the county where the agreement was 
entered into, or in any county where any act evidencing the conspiracy or 
furthering the purpose took place.

 

   2Laramie, WY, 
Municipal Code § 5.08.210 (2003) states:

5.08.210 Open 
containers.

A.  No person shall consume or carry in open containers 
alcoholic liquor or malt beverages on any street or highway, in any 
vehicle, in any restaurant, hotel dining room or any other public place or 
public area whatsoever within the city, except places where the sale or service 
of alcoholic liquor or malt beverages is authorized by Wyoming State Law or city 
ordinance. [Emphasis added.]