Case Title: ProgressOhio.org v. Kasich

Citation: 2011-Ohio-4101

Docket Number: 20110622

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-08-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
ProgressOhio.org v. Kasich, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-4101.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-4101 
PROGRESSOHIO.ORG, INC., ET AL. v. KASICH, GOVERNOR, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as ProgressOhio.org v. Kasich,  
Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-4101.] 
Section 3 of 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1 is unconstitutional insofar as it attempts to 
confer exclusive, original jurisdiction on this court to consider the 
constitutionality of the act’s provisions — Cause dismissed for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction. 
(No. 2011-0622 — Submitted August 8, 2011 — Decided August 19, 2011.) 
ORIGINAL ACTION filed pursuant to Section 3 of 
2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This cause originated upon the filing of an original action pursuant 
to Section 3 of 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1 (“H.B. 1”).1  We dismiss this cause for 
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
                                          
 
1  {¶ a} Section 3 of H.B. 1 provides: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 2} Under Section 2(B)(1), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, this 
court has original jurisdiction in quo warranto, mandamus, habeas corpus, 
prohibition, procedendo, any cause on review as may be necessary to its complete 
determination, and all matters relating to the practice of law, including the 
admission of persons to the practice of law and the discipline of persons so 
admitted. The parties do not claim that this action falls under our original 
jurisdiction as set forth in the constitution.  Instead, petitioners request a 
declaratory judgment that H.B. 1 is unconstitutional and a prohibitory injunction 
preventing respondents from acting pursuant to its provisions.  We lack original 
jurisdiction to grant this relief.  See State ex rel. Ministerial Day Care Assn. v. 
Zelman, 100 Ohio St.3d 347, 2003-Ohio-6447, 800 N.E.2d 21, ¶ 22 (“neither this 
court nor the court of appeals has original jurisdiction over claims for declaratory 
judgment”); State ex rel. Lanham v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (1997), 80 Ohio 
St.3d 425, 427, 687 N.E.2d 283 (“We * * * lack original jurisdiction to grant 
relators’ request for prohibitory injunctive relief”); see also Kent v. Mahaffy 
(1853), 2 Ohio St. 498, 499, wherein we held that a statutory provision that 
purported to confer upon this court jurisdiction to grant an injunction in a case 
pending in another court was ineffective (“We can exercise only such powers as 
the constitution itself confers, or authorizes the legislature to grant.  We can 
derive no power elsewhere”). 
                                                                                                                   
    {¶ b} “The Supreme Court of Ohio shall have exclusive, original jurisdiction over any claim 
asserting that any one or more sections of the Revised Code amended or enacted by this act, or any 
portion of one or more of those sections, or any rule adopted under one or more of those sections, 
violates any provision of the Ohio Constitution; and over any claim asserting that any action taken 
pursuant to those sections by the Governor or the nonprofit corporation formed under section 
187.01 of the Revised Code violates any provision of the Ohio Constitution or any provision of the 
Revised Code.  Any such claim shall be filed as otherwise required by the Court’s rules of practice 
not later than the sixtieth day after the effective date of this act.  If any claim over which the 
Supreme Court is granted exclusive, original jurisdiction by this section is filed in any lower court, 
the claim shall be dismissed by the court on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction to review 
it.”   
January Term, 2011 
 
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{¶ 3} “It is a well-established principle of constitutional law that when 
the jurisdiction of a particular court is constitutionally defined, the legislature 
cannot by statute restrict or enlarge that jurisdiction unless authorized to do so by 
the constitution.  This principle is grounded on the separation of powers 
provisions found in many American constitutions * * *.”  See Smith v. State 
(1976), 289 N.C. 303, 328, 222 S.E.2d 412, and cases cited therein. 
{¶ 4} Although Smith is from another jurisdiction, the principle set forth 
above is true in Ohio.  “[N]either statute nor rule of court can expand our 
jurisdiction.”  Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., N.A. (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 39, 41, 577 
N.E.2d 1077; see also State ex rel. Cleveland Mun. Court v. Cleveland City 
Council (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 120, 122, 63 O.O.2d 199, 296 N.E.2d 544 (“neither 
the Civil Rules nor statutes can expand this court’s original jurisdiction and 
require it to hear an action not authorized by the Ohio Constitution”); Classic 
Pictures, Inc. v. Dept. of Edn. (1952), 158 Ohio St. 229, 229-230, 48 O.O. 453, 
108 N.E.2d 319 (“If plaintiff’s contention were true, the General Assembly would 
have conferred upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in addition to that 
conferred by the Constitution.  Such legislation would be void”); State ex rel. 
Richards v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago, & St. Louis Ry. Co. (1895), 53 Ohio 
St. 189, 237, 41 N.E. 205 (“That the original jurisdiction of this court cannot be 
enlarged or diminished by legislative action, but is such, only, as the constitution 
confers, was settled at an early day after the present constitution was adopted”). 
{¶ 5} Therefore, insofar as Section 3 of H.B. 1 attempts to confer 
exclusive, original jurisdiction on this court to consider the constitutionality of the 
act’s provisions it is unconstitutional.  Neither legislation nor rule of court can 
expand our jurisdiction under Section 2, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 6} The provisions of 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. 153 do not apply 
retroactively and, therefore, do not resolve this present action.  They do, however, 
provide a remedy for petitioners to institute an action challenging the 
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constitutionality of amended R.C. 187.01 et seq. by way of an action in the 
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. 
{¶ 7} Based on the foregoing, we dismiss this cause for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction.  Our holding renders moot petitioners’ motions for 
preliminary injunctive relief and to strike respondents’ notice of supplemental 
authority and request for an expedited hearing. 
Cause dismissed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, 
CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 8} I would sua sponte convert this action to a mandamus action and 
grant an alternative writ to begin the briefing process.  It is my long-held view 
that this court has not only the constitutional power but also the responsibility to 
exercise original jurisdiction in matters that demand early resolution.  Although 
the granting of writs of mandamus and prohibition to determine the 
constitutionality of statutes is “ ‘limited to exceptional circumstances that demand 
early resolution,’ ” this court has accepted for exceptional review cases involving 
statutes that had comprehensive reach and wide impact. State ex rel. Ohio AFL-
CIO v. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp., 97 Ohio St.3d 504, 2002-Ohio-6717, 780 
N.E.2d 981, ¶ 12, quoting State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. 
Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 515, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Pfeifer, J., 
concurring); see also State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich (1994), 69 Ohio 
St.3d 225, 631 N.E.2d 582. 
{¶ 9} This is such a case.  Like Voinovich, this case challenges the 
constitutionality of legislation that makes significant changes to the organizational 
structure of state government but does not involve a complex factual scenario that 
January Term, 2011 
 
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would benefit from the development of a record in a trial court.  We would be 
serving the interests of the state and of judicial economy by addressing 
petitioners’ claims now. 
__________________ 
Victoria E. Ullmann, for petitioners, ProgressOhio.org, Inc., Michael J. 
Skindell, and Dennis E. Murray. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Aaron D. Epstein and Pearl M. 
Chin, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondents, John R. Kasich, Governor, 
James A. Leftwich, Director of the Department of Development, and Timothy S. 
Keen, Director of the Office of Budget and Management. 
______________________