Case Title: ZACHARY DWIGHT FISKE JENSEN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 04-81

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
ZACHARY DWIGHT FISKE JENSEN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 85116 P.3d 1088Case Number: 04-81Decided: 08/04/2005
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
ZACHARY 
DWIGHT FISKE JENSEN,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina 
N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Kerin.

 
 

Representing Appellee:

 
 
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy 
Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
and James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Causey.

 
 
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Zachary Jensen 
(Jensen) appeals two convictions for aggravated assault arising out of an 
incident in which he threatened to kill his live-in girlfriend and their young 
son with a knife.  
Jensen argues for reversal of those convictions on three substantive 
grounds:  That 
he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against him; that 
improper victim impact testimony was admitted; and that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct while cross-examining Jensen by repeatedly asking him if other 
witnesses were lying.  
We find no merit in the first two claims of error but, after reviewing 
the record, we agree that the prosecutor improperly questioned Jensen.  However, we 
conclude that the error was harmless and affirm Jensen's convictions.

 
 

[¶2]      Jensen presents four 
issues for review:

I.                     
Did the trial court err in limiting defense counsel's 
cross-examination of alleged victim Kate Spears, and, subsequently, in denying 
its sua sponte motion for [a] new trial?

 
 

II.                   
Was improper victim impact testimony admitted into 
evidence?

 
 

III.                  
Did prosecutorial misconduct occur when the prosecutor 
questioned appellant about whether other witnesses were "lying?"

 
 

IV.               
Does cumulative error warrant reversal of appellant's 
convictions?

 
 
The State's statement of the issues substantially parallels 
those set forth by Jensen.

 
 

FACTS

[¶3]      Jensen lived in an 
apartment in Gillette, Wyoming, with his long-term 
girlfriend, Kate Spears (Spears) and their young son, S.O.  On the night of 
July 20, 2003, Jensen and Spears got into an argument over Jensen's intoxication 
while he was supposed to be watching the child.  The dispute quickly degenerated into a 
physical confrontation when Jensen refused to let Spears exit the apartment 
bathroom.  
Trying to get past Jensen, Spears attempted to knee him in the 
groin.  
Shrugging off the blow, Jensen picked Spears up and threw her against the 
sink.  He then 
grabbed Spears by her neck and threw her onto the floor.  Spears suffered 
fingernail gouges on her neck and lacerations on her back where she had hit the 
sink.

 
 
[¶4]      Jensen left the 
bathroom and proceeded to the kitchen where he obtained a knife.  Positioning himself 
between Spears and the apartment door, Jensen threatened to kill Spears, his 
son, and himself.  
At one point, Jensen placed the tip of the knife against his chest and 
attempted to stab himself.  Spears was able to convince Jensen to sit 
down and talk.  
Eventually he set the knife down on a table.  Spears grabbed the 
knife and threw it out onto the apartment balcony.  Jensen responded 
that there were more knives where that one came from and proceeded to head to 
the kitchen.  
Spears ran out to the balcony, hid the knife behind some furniture, and 
began screaming for help.  After a few minutes, Spears noticed that she 
could no longer observe Jensen in the kitchen or the apartment.  Grabbing her son, 
Spears ran out of the apartment, got into her vehicle, and drove to a nearby 
convenience store where she called 911.

 
 
[¶5]      Meanwhile, a neighbor 
who heard Spears' cries for help called 911.  The police quickly responded, and an officer 
was diverted to the convenience store when Spears' call came in.  The officer arrived 
to find Spears and her son in a distraught state.  In the course of Spears' explanation of the 
events, unprompted, her son exclaimed that Jensen had tried to hurt him and also 
tried to cut himself.  
Jensen was eventually located in a neighboring apartment and 
arrested.

 
 
[¶6]      Jensen was charged 
with two counts of aggravated assault and battery for threatening to use a drawn 
deadly weapon on Spears and his son in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-502(a)(iii) and (b)1 (LexisNexis 2005).  At trial, the 
State's witnesses testified as previously set forth.  Jensen testified on 
his own behalf.  
He claimed that he had pushed Spears, not thrown her, onto the sink in 
self-defense, and he denied throwing her to the floor.  Jensen also 
admitted that he got a knife from the kitchen.  However, he insisted that he did not threaten 
Spears or his son; he only threatened suicide.  The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both 
counts.  
Additional facts will be set forth in our discussion of the specific 
allegations of error presented by Jensen.

 
 

DISCUSSION

Whether Jensen 
was Denied His Sixth Amendment Right to Confront a Witness Against 
Him

 
 
[¶7]      In June of 2001, 
Jensen and Spears consented to a guardianship of S.O. with Sheri Gengozian, 
Jensen's mother.  
Gengozian was the primary caretaker of S.O. until January of 2003, when 
she returned physical custody to Spears.2  After Jensen was 
charged in this case, Spears and Gengozian continued to maintain a relationship 
concerning S.O.  
On August 29, 2003, Spears and Gengozian had a falling out.  As a result, 
Gengozian, with guardianship papers in hand, appeared at Spears' apartment with 
law enforcement to take custody of S.O.  On October 6, 2003, Spears filed a petition 
with the district court for custody of S.O. and to terminate Gengozian's 
guardianship.  
During this period, Gengozian allowed Spears to have custody of S.O. at 
various times, finally returning him to Spears on a permanent basis sometime 
around November 3, 2003.  By court order, Spears was awarded temporary 
custody on November 6.

 
 
[¶8]      Spears' petition to 
terminate Gengozian's guardianship was pending when the charges against Jensen 
proceeded to trial.  
On the first day of trial, Jensen sought to question Spears in 
cross-examination regarding her petition.  The State objected on relevancy grounds.  The district court 
concurred and prohibited Jensen's line of questioning.

 
 
[¶9]      On the day before 
Jensen was to be sentenced, this Court issued a decision in Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, 84 P.3d 320 (Wyo. 2004) 
wherein a conviction was reversed because the trial court denied the defendant 
his Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against him by restricting his 
ability to cross-examine the State's material witness regarding a possible 
motive to lie in his testimony.  On its own motion, the district court 
scheduled a hearing to determine if a new trial was appropriate given the Hannon decision and the court's trial ruling 
prohibiting Jensen from inquiring into the petition to terminate Gengozian's 
guardianship.  
At the hearing, the State presented argument and the testimony of Spears 
while Jensen did likewise along with testimony from Gengozian.  The district court 
concluded that Jensen was not entitled to a new trial because the limitations 
imposed on Jensen's cross-examination of Spears were proper on relevancy 
grounds.

 
 
[¶10]   On appeal, Jensen maintains that the 
court's limitation was improper under our decision in Hannon.  He contends that the evidence relating to 
Spears' petition was relevant to her motives.  He argues that the only direct evidence of 
the alleged assaults was Spears' testimony and, therefore, the jury should have 
been allowed to judge Spears' possible motives in light of the fact that their 
child was the subject of a custody dispute with Jensen's mother. 

 
 
[¶11]   Hannon was convicted of two counts each 
of second- and third-degree sexual assault and one count of attempted 
third-degree sexual assault.  Hannon, ¶¶4 and 
10.  On appeal, 
he challenged an order of the trial court that prohibited him from 
cross-examining the minor victim about the fact that he did not report the 
alleged sexual assaults by Hannon until three months after the alleged incident, 
when the victim was brought in for questioning about his own alleged sexual 
improprieties with another boy.  Id. at ¶14. Hannon argued that 
he had a right grounded in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
to cross-examine the victim concerning the allegations against him in order to 
show that he had a motivation to lie about the alleged assault by Hannon in 
order to shift blame from his own conduct.  Id.  We agreed with 
Hannon.  We 
cited Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 
39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974) for the proposition that:

 
 
Cross-examination is the principal means by which the 
believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.  Subject always to 
the broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly 
harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into 
the witness' story to test the witness' perceptions and memory, but the 
cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the 
witness. * * * A more particular attack on the witness' credibility is 
[a]ffected by means of cross-examination directed toward revealing possible 
biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate 
directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand. The partiality of a 
witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is "always relevant as 
discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony." 3A J. 
Wigmore, Evidence § 940, p. 775 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).  We have recognized 
that the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and 
important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. 
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496, 79 S. Ct. 1400, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1377 (1959).

 
 

Hannon, ¶16 (quoting 
Davis, 415 U.S. at 317-18).  A consequence of Davis is that "a criminal defendant states a violation 
of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in 
otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of 
bias on the part of the witness, and thereby to expose to the jury the facts 
from which jurors  could appropriately draw inferences relating to the 
reliability of the witness.'" Hannon, ¶18 (quoting 
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986)).  Under the circumstances of the case, we 
concluded that Hannon was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation 
when he was denied the opportunity to fully explore the victim's credibility 
through an inquiry into his potential motivations for making the accusations 
against Hannon since "the prohibited cross-examination was sufficiently 
probative of a possible ulterior motive to warrant allowing it."  Hannon, ¶24.

 
 
[¶12]   A defendant's right to cross-examine a 
witness, however, is not unfettered.  The right is subject to the trial court's 
"discretion to reasonably limit cross-examination to prevent, among other 
things, questioning that is repetitive or of marginal relevance." Hannon, ¶22 (quoting United 
States v. DeSoto, 950 F.2d 626, 629-30 (10th Cir. 1991)); see also Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232, 109 S. Ct. 480, 102 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1988). While questions directed at revealing witness bias 
are an appropriate and admissible basis of impeachment, the questions asked 
during cross-examination must be relevant in terms of showing the witness' 
possible bias against the defendant.  DeSoto, at 
Id.

 
 
[¶13]   Here, Jensen claims that the inquiry 
into the guardianship proceedings would have shown that Spears had a possible 
ulterior motive for fabricating charges against him.  We fail to perceive 
the relevance of Jensen's line of inquiry.  While the events leading to the guardianship 
proceedings occurred before trial, they took place after the events that formed 
the basis for the charges against Jensen.  If Spears' testimony at trial had been 
inconsistent with the statements she gave to the police, then an inquiry into 
the guardianship proceedings may have been probative of Spears' 
motivations.  
However, the record shows that Spears' testimony at trial was entirely 
consistent with the statements she made to the police the night of the 
incident.  
Jensen made no effort, at the trial court or on appeal, to demonstrate 
how, given that timeline, the guardianship proceedings could have had any 
relation to Spears' trial testimony.  As the proponent, it was Jensen's burden to 
demonstrate relevance, and he failed to do so.  Unlike the case in Hannon, here we cannot conclude that the prohibited 
cross-examination was sufficiently probative of a possible ulterior motive to 
warrant allowing it.  
Therefore, we must conclude that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion.

 
 

Whether 
Improper Victim Impact Testimony Was Admitted

 
 
[¶14]   Jensen contends that irrelevant victim 
impact testimony and argument occurred throughout the trial, tainting the 
proceedings against him.  In his opening statement, the prosecutor 
described S.O. as a "very frantic frightened 4-year-old boy" who was crying and 
screaming when the police arrived in response to Spears' 911 call.  Then, in her 
testimony,3 Spears recounted her emotional state, as well 
as S.O.'s:

 
 
A:  He started yanking on [S.O.'s] arm and 
telling me that he wasn't going anywhere, and that he wasn't letting us leave, 
and he is just completely irrational. I was scared.

 
 
Q:  Okay.  You were scared, you say?

 
 
A:  Uh-huh.

 
 
Q:  Okay.  What was [S.O.] doing while this took 
place?

 
 
A:  Crying, screaming.

 
 
Q:  Okay.  Was [S.O.] saying anything?

 
 
. . . .

 
 
A:  He didn't say much but, no, Mommy, Daddy.

 
 
Q:  Say that again, please. I didn't hear.

 
 
A:  I remember him saying no.  I remember him 
saying, Mommy, Daddy.  
I don't remember him saying anything else.  I remember him crying a lot.

 
 
. . . .

 
 
Q:  Okay.  And what kind of a motion did he make?

 
 
A:  A stabbing motion towards us.

 
 
Q:  Could you pick up the knife and demonstrate 
the motion he made, please?

 
 
A:  (Indicating.)

 
 
Q:  Okay.  How did you feel then, Kate?

 
 
A:  I was terrified.  I thought  I 
thought I was going to die.  I thought my son was going to die.

 
 
. . . .

 
 
Q:  Yes.  Was [S.O.] exhibiting any signs of fear or 
emotion when you were on the deck?

 
 
A:  Yeah, he was crying.

 
 
Q:  Okay.  When did he first start crying?

 
 
A:  In the bathroom.

 
 
Q:  Okay.  When did he stop?

 
 
A:  When I took him to the grandmother's.

 
 
The investigating officer described Spears as "shaking," 
"visibly upset," and crying, with S.O. in her arms "clinging on to her" 
neck.  The 
officer noted that the demeanor of Spears and S.O. improved once officers were 
on the scene.  
During closing argument, the prosecutor commented:

 
 
As [police officer Hannigan] approached [Spears], he 
notices she's crying.  
She's clinging to her child.  Her child has his arms around her neck 
grasping back.  
The child is crying.  Mother is crying.

 
 
Officer Hanningan asks, What's going on?

 
 
Mother says, I've just escaped from my apartment.

 
 
Child says, My dad tried to hurt me and then he cut 
himself.

 
 
Jensen argues that the elements of the charged crimes had 
nothing to do with the emotional state of Spears or S.O., and this testimony was 
used to stir up sympathy for them, depriving him of his right to a fair 
trial.

 
 
[¶15]   There was no objection, so Jensen must 
demonstrate plain error:

The plain error doctrine requires us to make this series of 
findings:  (1) 
The record must clearly present the incident, (2) appellant must demonstrate 
that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, 
not merely arguable, way, and (3) that appellant was denied a substantial right 
resulting in material prejudice to him.

 
 

Person v. 
State, 2004 WY 149, ¶32, 100 P.3d 1270, ¶32 (Wyo. 2004) (citing 
Schmidt v. State, 2001 WY 73, ¶24, 29 P.3d 76, ¶24 
(Wyo. 2001)).

 
 
[¶16]   We apply the following principles when 
analyzing the admissibility of victim impact evidence:

 
 
The evidence must be relevant to be admissible. W.R.E. 
402.  Evidence 
is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence."  W.R.E. 401.  In criminal cases, "[e]vidence is always 
relevant if it tends to prove or disprove one of the elements of the crime 
charged." Gomez v. State, 2003 WY 58, ¶6, 68 P.3d 1177, ¶6 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Geiger v. State, 859 P.2d 665, 667 (Wyo. 1993)).  Relevant evidence 
may be excluded, however, if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice."  W.R.E. 403.

 
 

Moore v. 
State, 2003 WY 153, ¶26, 80 P.3d 191, ¶26 (Wyo. 2003).  The testimony of 
victims of a crime describing how it affected their lives after the crime is 
irrelevant with respect to issues before a jury.  Moore, ¶27 (citing Justice v. State, 775 P.2d 1002, 1010-11 (Wyo. 1989)).

 
 
[¶17]   In this case, the testimony of Spears 
and the investigating officer was clearly relevant.  Jensen was charged 
with a count of aggravated assault against Spears and S.O. respectively.  The jury was 
instructed on the elements of aggravated assault.4

 
 

1.      On or about 
July 20, 2003;

2.      In Campbell 
County, Wyoming;

3.      The Defendant, 
Zachary Dwight Fiske Jensen;

4.      Threatened to 
use a drawn deadly weapon

5.      on [Kate Spears 
and S.O.];

6.      When not 
reasonably necessary in defense of the Defendant's person, property or abode to 
prevent serious bodily injury to another.

 
 
We have held that the statutory phrase "threatens to use" 
that is embodied in element four of the instructions to the jury requires "proof 
of an actual threat of physical injury during the act of employing a deadly 
weapon."  Miller v. State, 2003 WY 55, ¶24, 67 P.3d 1191, ¶24 
(Wyo. 2003); see also Lowseth v. State, 875 P.2d 725, 729 (Wyo. 1994) and 
Johnston v. State, 747 P.2d 1132, 1134-35 
(Wyo. 1987).  Spears' testimony 
that she was scared and terrified for her life and that of her son while Jensen 
was making stabbing motions with the knife goes towards proving that they were 
threatened by his actions.  Furthermore, Jensen's theory of the case was 
that Spears was lying about the confrontation and that he had never threatened 
Spears or S.O., only himself.  The testimony regarding the emotional state 
of Spears and S.O. during and in the immediate aftermath of the assault tends to 
disprove the assertion that Spears' accusations were calculated.  The testimony did 
not tend to establish the impact of this crime on Spears' or S.O.'s lives 
because it was restricted to their emotional states and reactions at the time of 
the assault and in the immediate aftermath when the police contacted Spears at 
the convenience store in response to her 911 call minutes later.  Jensen cannot make 
the final two showings  that there was a violation of a clear and unequivocal 
rule of law, and that he was denied a substantial right materially prejudicing 
him  required to demonstrate plain error.  The testimony was relevant and admissible, 
and no error occurred in its admission.

 
 

Whether There Was Prosecutorial 
Misconduct

[¶18]   Jensen claims that the prosecutor 
engaged in improper cross-examination when he repeatedly asked Jensen if Spears 
or an investigating officer were lying in their testimony.  The first instance 
of such questioning occurred when Jensen expressed disagreement with certain 
facts in the investigating officer's report:

 
 
Q:  And did Officer Hannigan talk to you about 
blocking [Spears] in the bathroom?

 
 
A:  Officer Hannigan asked me what happened that 
night.  I 
explained up to the bathroom, and when he  it started  asking about blocking 
and all of that other stuff, the conversation on my part ended.

 
 
Q:  Did you tell Officer Spears [sic]  or 
Officer Hannigan  I'm sorry  that you did block Spears' way out of the 
bathroom because she did not wish  because you did not wish her to leave?

 
 
A:  No.

 
 
Q:  So if Officer  if Officer Hannigan put that 
in his report, then he's not telling the truth?

 
 
A:  There's [sic] a few things that Officer 
Hannigan put in there that did not even come out of my mouth.  I actually talked 
to the officer that booked me in last night, and she couldn't remember anything 
about that. 

 
 
Q:  Officer Hannigan lied about several 
things?

 
 
A:  I'm pretty sure Officer Hannigan put a few 
things that weren't valid in that.

 
 
Q:  How are you sure about this?

 
 
A:  Because I remember that night.  I may have blown a 
.81 [sic], but when something that crucial happens in my life, it's almost like 
every detail is right on the back of my head.  I can remember that night picture 
perfect.

 
 
Q:  Okay.  So it was Officer Hannigan 
was wrong then, or he lied then when he wrote this police report out?

 
 
A:  He was wrong.  I ended it at the bathroom, yes. 

 
 
The cross-examination of Jensen continued in a similar vein 
as the prosecutor repeatedly asked him whether Spears or Officer Hannigan were 
"lying," "not telling the truth," "making it up," or "untruthful" in those 
aspects of their testimony that conflicted with Jensen's.  In his closing 
argument, the prosecutor continued by saying, "In fact, Mr. Jensen says it's all 
a lie . . . ." and "[Jensen] claims that he's here today because Ms. Spears is 
lying, making this up to get him.  And Officer Hannigan is lying and made up all 
the testimony that you heard today."  Jensen argues that resolution of this case 
hinged on the credibility, or lack thereof, of the witnesses, and that since he 
and Spears were the only witnesses to the charged crimes, prejudice resulted 
from the prosecutor's use of this cross-examination tactic because it put the 
jury in the position of having to call Spears and a police officer liars.

 
 
[¶19]   We have said in the context of closing 
argument that it is not reversible error for a prosecutor to argue that a 
defendant is a liar when "the evidence supports a reasonable inference that such 
is in fact the case."  
Beaugureau v. State, 2002 WY 160, ¶14, 56 P.3d 626, ¶14 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Barnes v. State, 
642 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Wyo. 1982)).  In this case, there 
existed "express contradictory testimony" rendering a reasonable inference that 
at least one of the witnesses was lying.  Beaugureau, ¶14; 
Wheeler v. State, 691 P.2d 599, 604-5 (Wyo. 1984).  The prosecutor was 
presenting an argument to the jury based upon reasonable inferences drawn from 
the evidence.  
Furthermore, while making this argument, the prosecutor made it clear to 
the jury that the decision rested with them when he quoted the jury instructions 
that stated, " if an attorney hints by a question that certain things are 
or are not true, you should disregard the hint.  A question is not evidence, and it should be 
considered only to the extent that it supplies meaning to the answer."  We find no error in 
the prosecutor's statements in closing argument. 

 
 
[¶20]   Turning to the prosecutor's 
cross-examination of Jensen, we note, generally, that a defendant who testifies 
in a criminal case may be cross-examined regarding his credibility just like any 
other witness.  Gist v. State, 766 P.2d 1149, 1152-53 
(Wyo. 1988); MacLaird v. State, 718 P.2d 41, 47 (Wyo. 1986); Porter v. State, 440 P.2d 249, 250 (Wyo. 1968).  In Beaugureau, however, we observed that there was a limit 
to the cross-examination of a criminal defendant:

 
 
Nonetheless, it is likewise error and misconduct for the 
prosecutor to cross-examine a defendant using the "lying" or "mistaken" 
technique (i.e., well, then if "so-and-so" said 
"such-and-such," was he "mistaken" or "lying?"). Such questions are 
improper.  If 
the prosecutor merely asked Beaugureau about what other witnesses had to say, 
allowing the jury to draw its own conclusions, the cross-examination would not 
have been objectionable.  State v. Diggs, 
34 P.3d 63, 72-73 (Kan. 
2001); State v. Manning, 270 Kan. 674, 19 P.3d 84, 100-3 (2001) 
("Questions which compel a defendant or witness to comment on the credibility of 
another witness are improper.  It is the province of the jury to weigh the 
credibility of the witnesses." (collecting cases)); State v. Stevenson, 70 Conn. App. 29, 797 A.2d 1, 7-9 
(2002) (Such questions are improper because they "require a defendant to comment 
on another witness' veracityinvade the province of the jury, create the risk 
that the jury may conclude that, in order to acquit the defendant, it must find 
that the other witnesses lied, and distort the state's burden of proof.") 
(relying on State v. Singh, 259 Conn. 693, 793 A.2d 226, 234-39 
(2002)) (collecting cases); also see State v. 
Walden, 69 Wash. App. 183, 847 P.2d 956, 959 (Div. 1 (1993)); and State v. Pitts, No. 47488-0-I, 2001 WL 1641225 at *4 
(Wash. App. Div. 1, Dec. 24, 2001) (per curiam) (use of word "lying" is 
misconduct; use of word "mistaken" merely objectionable).

 
 

Beaugureau, ¶17.  The reasoning for 
prohibiting this type of questioning was succinctly summarized by the Iowa 
Supreme Court:

 
 
[A] defendant who is asked whether another person lied is 
commenting directly on the other person's credibility.

 
 
The issue then is whether any purpose is served in asking a 
defendant whether another witness is lying.  We think the predominate, if not sole, 
purpose of such questioning is simply to make the defendant look bad, as implied 
by the Maryland court's observation in [Fisher v. 
State, 128 Md. App. 79, 736 A.2d 1125, 1163 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999)] that 
the accused's answer is unimportant. * * * The accused's answer is unimportant 
because the accused is in a no-win situation.  If the defendant says the other witness is lying, then the 
defendant is put in the position of calling someone a liar, a particularly 
unenviable state when the other witness is a law enforcement officer.  See [State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 787 (Utah 1992)] (holding such questions 
are improper because they put "the defendant in the untenable position of 
commenting on the character and motivations of another witness who may appear 
sympathetic to the jury").  If the defendant says a contradictory witness 
is not lying, then a 
fair inference is that the defendant is lying.

 
 
But, as any trial lawyer knows, there may be many 
explanations for differing descriptions of the same event. People have different 
perceptions of the same conversation that affect how and what they remember. 
Perhaps there was a misunderstanding of what was said; perhaps one person was 
distracted and did not fully or correctly hear the words uttered by the other 
person.  People 
sometimes hear what they want to hear.  It is unjust to make the defendant give an 
opinion as to who is lying when, in fact, it is possible that neither witness 
has deliberately misrepresented the truth.  It is also unreasonable to expect the 
defendant to sift through the variables of human communication to offer an 
alternative explanation for contradictions in witnesses' testimony.

 
 
We also think the use of this tacticasking the defendant 
whether another witness is lyingis incompatible with the duties of a 
prosecutor.  
Unfairly questioning the defendant simply to make the defendant look bad 
in front of the jury regardless of the answer given is not consistent with the 
prosecutor's primary obligation to seek justice, not simply a conviction.  Nor is such 
questioning consistent with the prosecutor's duty to the defendant to ensure a 
fair trial, including a verdict that rests on the evidence and not on passion or 
prejudice.  [State v. Casteneda-Perez, 61 Wn. App. 354, 810 P.2d 74, 
79 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991)] (holding prosecutor's questions asking witnesses 
whether other witnesses were lying was "contrary to the duty of prosecutors, 
which is to seek convictions based only on probative evidence and sound 
reason").

 
 

State v. 
Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 872-73 (Iowa 2003) (emphasis in original) 
(footnotes omitted). 

 
 
[¶21]   The State attempts to excuse the 
prosecutor's form of cross-examination by claiming that it was Jensen who 
initiated the attack on the veracity of Spears and Officer Hannigan.  The State argues 
that the prosecutor was merely attempting to clarify unexpected answers given by 
Jensen in response to questions exploring the contradictions between his 
testimony and that offered by Spears and the officer.  The State 
characterizes the prosecutor's questions as not particularly artful but 
innocuous. 

 
 
[¶22]   After reviewing the record, we cannot 
agree with the State's characterization.  A review of the excerpt of Jensen's 
cross-examination quoted above shows that after Jensen disputed parts of the 
investigating officer's report, the prosecutor asked whether the officer was 
"not telling the truth" and then followed that up with multiple instances of 
questions that specifically asked whether the officer or Spears was 
"lying."  This 
is precisely the type of questioning that we found improper in Beaugureau.  We stress again here that it is error and 
misconduct for the prosecutor to cross-examine a defendant using the "lying" or 
"not telling the truth" or "mistaken" technique.  Beaugureau, ¶17; 
see also Taylor v. State, 2001 WY 13, 
¶21, 17 P.3d 715, ¶21 (Wyo. 2001).  Even if Jensen had been the party that 
initially ventured into this territory by calling Officer Hannigan or Spears a 
liar, the prosecutor still has the duty to refrain from this type of 
questioning.  
Returning to the Iowa decision cited 
above, we agree with the conclusion of that court that a defendant cannot "open 
the door" to the prosecution's use of this tactic.5

 
 
For the reasons discussed, we find more persuasive the 
rationale of those courts that have held it is improper to ask the defendant 
whether another witness has lied.  We also decline to recognize an exception to 
this rule as a handful of courts have done.  The underlying rationale of those courts 
recognizing an exception is that the defendant has opened the door by 
contradicting testimony of government witnesses "in circumstances that exclude 
the possibility that the prosecution's witnesses may have been mistaken or [may 
have] testified to events based on assumptions or faulty memory."  [People v. Overlee, 236 A.D.2d 133, 666 N.Y.S.2d 572, 
577 (App. Div. 1997); State v. Morales, 198 
Ariz. 372, 10 P.3d 630, 
633 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Pilot, 595 N.W.2d 511, 518 (Minn. 1999)]  We think, however, 
that whether the defendant has invited the questioning is more properly 
considered in assessing the prejudice element of a due process claim.

 
 
First of all, the justification for admitting this 
evidencethat the defendant has opened the doordoes not resolve the fundamental 
doubt as to the probative value of such questioning.  [State v. Flanagan, 111 N.M. 93, 801 P.2d 675, 679 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 1990)] ("Whether the defendant believes the other witnesses were 
truthful or lying is simply irrelevant."); People v. 
Berrios, 298 A.D.2d 597, 750 N.Y.S.2d 302, 302 (App. Div. 2002) ("Whether 
the defendant believed that the other witnesses were lying is irrelevant." 
(Citation omitted.))  
Secondly, the exception depends on a difficult determinationwhether 
alternative explanations exist for discrepancies in the witness' testimony, a 
decision that more properly rests with the jury.  Finally, prosecutors and trial judges will 
have more guidance in assuring proper examination of witnesses with a 
bright-line rule that bars such inquiries without exception.  For these reasons, 
we hold "were-they-lying" questions are improper under any circumstance.  See [State v. Singh, 259 
Conn. 693, 793 A.2d 226, 
239 (Conn. 2002)] (rejecting 
exception).

 
 

Graves, 668 N.W.2d  at 
873.  The 
proper approach for a prosecutor is to ask the defendant "what other witnesses 
had to say [and allow] the jury to draw its own conclusions" and then make a 
proper closing argument based on the testimony.  Beaugureau, ¶¶14 
and 17.  The 
prosecutor's questions were not innocuous.  They were improper.

 
 
[¶23]   The question before us, then, is 
whether the prosecutor's misconduct was prejudicial.  Beaugureau, ¶18.  Jensen failed to object to any of the 
prosecutor's questions so our review is through the plain error prism.6

 
 
Prosecutorial misconduct "has always been condemned in 
this state.'"  
Earll v. State, 2001 WY 66, ¶9, 29 P.3d 787, 
¶9 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Valerio v. State, 527 P.2d 154, 156 (Wyo. 1974)).  Whether such 
misconduct has been reviewed on the basis of harmless error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and 
W.R.A.P. 9.04, or on the basis of plain error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(b) and W.R.A.P. 
9.05, this Court has focused on whether such error affected an accused's 
"substantial rights."  
The accused's right to a fair trial is a substantial right.  "Before we hold 
that an error has affected an accused's substantial right, thus requiring 
reversal of a conviction, we must conclude that, based on the entire record, a 
reasonable possibility exists that, in the absence of the error, the verdict 
might have been more favorable to the accused."  Earll, ¶9.

 
 

Simmons v. 
State, 2003 WY 84, ¶15, 72 P.3d 803, ¶15 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Williams v. State, 2002 WY 136, ¶21, 54 P.3d 248, ¶21 
(Wyo. 2002)). 

 
 
[¶24]   After reviewing the entire record, we 
cannot conclude that, in the absence of the prosecutor's misconduct, a 
reasonable possibility exists that the verdict would have been more favorable to 
Jensen.  
Although Jensen and Spears presented differing accounts of the events on 
the night in question, the circumstantial evidence presented at trial strongly 
corroborated Spears' testimony  most importantly, the physical injuries 
suffered by Spears and the spontaneous declaration by Jensen's son, S.O., that 
his daddy tried to hurt him.  While corroborating Spears, the 
circumstantial evidence contradicted Jensen's testimony and it was not rebutted 
by him.  The 
evidence was sufficient to sustain Jensen's convictions even taking into account 
the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's cross-examination.  Therefore, within 
the context of the case, we conclude that the prejudice to Jensen was 
slight.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the error was harmless.

 
 

Whether There 
Was Cumulative Error

 
 
[¶25]   Finally, Jensen contends that if there 
were multiple harmless errors, then the cumulative effect of those errors was 
sufficient to deny him a fair trial.  Having found only one harmless error, and no 
other errors prejudicial or otherwise, there can be no cumulative error.

 
 

CONCLUSION

[¶26]   The prosecutor committed misconduct 
when, during cross-examination, he asked Jensen if other witnesses were lying 
when their testimony conflicted with his.  We conclude, however, that the error was not 
sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal of Jensen's convictions.  Finding no other 
error, we affirm Jensen's judgment and sentence. 

 
 

FOOTNOTES

  1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-502(a)(iii) and (b) provides:

 
 
(a)  A person is guilty of aggravated 
assault and battery if he:

 
 
. . . .

            
(iii)  Threatens to use a drawn deadly weapon on another unless 
reasonably necessary in defense of his person, property or abode or to prevent 
serious bodily injury to another[.]

 
 
. . . .

 
 
(b)  Aggravated assault and battery is a 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years.

 
 
  2Pursuant to a Washington state court order in 
2000, Spears had sole legal custody of S.O.

 
 
  3We have 
included parts of Spears' testimony not cited specifically by Jensen as error in 
order to provide context.

 
 
  4There were two instructions, one for each 
victim.

 
 
  5While 
it should probably go without saying, we emphasize that the prosecutor is, of 
course, not responsible when the defendant calls another witness a liar in a 
non-responsive answer to a proper cross-examination. 

 
 
  6See supra ¶15.