Case Title: In re J.S.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92A20

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2020-12-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 92A20 
Filed 11 December 2020 
IN THE MATTER OF: J.S., J.S., J.S. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from order entered on 26 
November 2019 by Judge Aretha V. Blake in District Court, Mecklenburg County. 
This matter was calendared in the Supreme Court on 23 November 2020 but 
determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 
the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
No brief filed for petitioner-appellee Mecklenburg County Department of Social 
Services, Youth and Family Services Division. 
 
Kip David Nelson for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Lisa Anne Wagner for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
 
MORGAN, Justice.  
 
 
Respondent-mother appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her 
parental rights to her minor children, “James,” “Jiles,” and “Jacyn.”1 Respondent-
mother’s counsel has filed a no-merit brief pursuant to Rule 3.1(e) of the North 
Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. After an independent review, we conclude 
that the issues raised by counsel in respondent-mother’s brief do not entitle her to 
                                            
1 We use pseudonyms for respondent-mother’s children to protect their privacy and 
for ease of reading.  
IN RE J.S., J.S., J.S. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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relief and affirm the trial court’s decision to terminate respondent-mother’s parental 
rights. 
James and Jiles entered the nonsecure custody of Mecklenburg County 
Department of Social Services, Youth and Family Services Division (YFS) upon the 
agency’s 15 March 2018 filing of a juvenile petition which alleged that the children 
were neglected and dependent. In the petition, YFS represented that it had been 
involved with the family for several years, that respondent-mother and the children’s 
father had an extensive history of domestic violence, and that respondent-mother’s 
parental rights to another child had previously been terminated. The petition went 
on to detail recent incidents of domestic violence perpetrated by the father against 
respondent-mother, alleging that some of them occurred in the presence of James and 
Jiles. The trial court entered an order adjudicating the two children as neglected 
juveniles on 5 June 2018. 
Jacyn was born in September 2018. On 31 January 2019, YFS filed a petition 
alleging that Jacyn was a neglected juvenile. In this petition, YFS alleged that 
respondent-mother had multiple pending criminal charges, that YFS had received a 
report regarding another incident of domestic violence between respondent-mother 
and the children’s father, and that the parents had not made progress addressing the 
issues which led to the previous neglect adjudication regarding James and Jiles. YFS 
was granted nonsecure custody of Jacyn and the agency placed her with her two 
IN RE J.S., J.S., J.S. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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brothers. Jacyn was adjudicated as a neglected juvenile by virtue of an order entered 
by the trial court on 12 March 2019. 
YFS filed motions in the cause to terminate respondent-mother’s parental 
rights to Jacyn on 21 June 2019 and to James and Jiles on 28 August 2019. Both 
motions alleged the same four grounds for termination: (1) neglect, (2) willful failure 
to pay a reasonable portion of the children’s cost of care, (3) abandonment, and (4) 
respondent-mother’s parental rights with respect to another child of hers had been 
terminated involuntarily and she lacked the ability or willingness to establish a safe 
home. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (3), (7), (9) (2019). The motions were based on 
substantially the same allegations. In the motions, YFS detailed the circumstances 
that led to the prior neglect adjudications for the three children and, in light of the 
submitted information, alleged that respondent-mother had failed to make adequate 
progress with respect to the case plan requirements that were established to 
remediate those circumstances. 
The motions to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights to the three 
children were heard on 30 October 2019. Respondent-mother was not present at the 
hearing. After the evidence was presented, the trial court found that respondent-
mother’s parental rights were subject to termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1), (7), and (9) (2019): respectively, neglect, abandonment, and the parental 
rights of respondent-mother with respect to another child of hers had been 
terminated involuntarily and respondent-mother lacked the ability or willingness to 
IN RE J.S., J.S., J.S. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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establish a safe home. The trial court found that there was insufficient evidence of 
the existence of the alleged ground to terminate addressed in N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(3) that respondent-mother had willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of 
the cost of care for the three juveniles. Lastly, the trial court concluded that 
termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights to James, Jiles, and Jacyn was in 
the children’s best interests. The trial court entered its written order memorializing 
its decision to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights to all three children on 
26 November 2019.2 Respondent-mother appeals.3 
Respondent-mother’s appellate counsel has filed a no-merit brief on 
respondent-mother’s behalf pursuant to Rule 3.1(e) of the North Carolina Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Counsel has also advised respondent-mother of the right to file 
pro se written arguments on respondent-mother’s own behalf with this Court and has 
provided respondent-mother with the documents necessary to do so. Respondent-
mother did not submit any written arguments.4  
                                            
2 The order also terminated the parental rights of the father of James, Jiles, and 
Jacyn. He did not appeal and therefore is not a party in the matter before this Court. 
 
3 The record on appeal does not include proof that respondent-mother’s notice of 
appeal was served on the other parties as required by N.C. R. App. P. 3.1(b). However, neither 
YFS nor the guardian ad litem raised this issue, and thus it has been waived. See Hale v. 
Afro-Am. Arts Int’l, Inc., 335 N.C. 231, 232, 436 S.E.2d 588, 589 (1993) (“[A] party upon whom 
service of notice of appeal is required may waive the failure of service by not raising the issue 
by motion or otherwise and by participating without objection in the appeal[.]”). 
 
4 YFS did not submit any appellate materials to this Court, but the guardian ad litem 
did file a brief, agreeing with respondent-mother’s counsel that there are no meritorious 
claims upon which respondent-mother could prevail. 
IN RE J.S., J.S., J.S. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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In the no-merit brief, respondent-mother’s counsel concedes that there was an 
adequate basis for the trial court’s adjudication regarding the mother’s inability to 
establish a safe home. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(9) (providing that a parent’s rights can 
be terminated when parental rights for another child have been terminated and “the 
parent lacks the ability or willingness to establish a safe home”). Respondent-
mother’s parental rights to another child had been terminated in an earlier case; the 
trial court concluded that respondent-mother was unable to establish a safe home in 
the present case. In light of respondent-mother’s history of domestic violence, mental 
health issues, incarceration, and unstable housing, this determination by the trial 
court was appropriate. See In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 412–13, 831 S.E.2d 54, 61–62 
(2019) (affirming termination of parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(9) 
based on the mother’s history of incarceration, unstable housing, and failure to 
complete a case plan). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding and 
concluding that a basis for termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights 
existed.  
As to disposition, counsel for respondent-mother also concedes that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that termination of respondent-mother’s 
parental rights would be in the children’s best interests. This decision can only be 
reversed if “the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary 
that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 
190, 199, 835 S.E.2d 417, 423 (2019). A trial court is required to consider several 
IN RE J.S., J.S., J.S. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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statutory factors and ultimately determine whether termination is in a child’s best 
interests. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a); In re C.J.C., 839 S.E.2d 742, 746 (2020). The trial 
court here properly considered the pertinent factors and aptly exercised its discretion. 
We conduct an independent review of any issues identified in a no-merit brief 
filed pursuant to Rule 3.1(e). In re L.E.M., 372 N.C. 396, 402, 831 S.E.2d 341, 345 
(2019). In the brief filed on behalf of respondent-mother in this appeal, respondent-
mother’s counsel discusses four issues that could arguably support an appeal, yet 
acknowledges that the appeal ultimately lacks merit due to the existence of a ground 
to allow termination of parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(9). Based upon 
our review of the issues identified in the no-merit brief, we are satisfied that the trial 
court’s 26 November 2019 order was based on proper legal grounds. Accordingly, we 
affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights. 
AFFIRMED.