Case Title: IGLEHART v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF ROGERS COUNTY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 95585

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2002-10-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
IGLEHART v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF ROGERS COUNTY  IGLEHART v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF ROGERS COUNTY 2002 OK 76 60 P.3d 497 Case Number: 95585, cons. w/ No. 95586 Decided: 10/01/2002 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA TOM IGLEHART and BRENDA IGLEHART, husband and wife, Plaintiffs/Appellants v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF ROGERS COUNTY, OKLAHOMA, and VERDIGRIS VALLEY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, Defendants/Appellees ED HUTCHINSON and SHIRLEY HUTCHINSON, husband and wife, Defendants. ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIV. 1 ¶0 The plaintiff driver was injured in an automobile accident allegedly caused by the negligent maintenance of a tree by defendant Utility Company. The driver alleges that because the tree obstructed her view of a stop sign, she entered an intersection without stopping and collided with another vehicle. The District Court, Rogers County, Jack K. Mayberry, trial judge, gave summary judgment to Utility Company and to Board of County Commissioners. Plaintiffs (the driver and her husband) brought separate appeals from the two summary judgments. The Court of Civil Appeals consolidated the appeals, reversed summary judgment for Board (95,585) but affirmed that given Utility Company (95,586). On certiorari granted on plaintiffs' petition, THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS IS VACATED ONLY INSOFAR AS IT RELATES TO THE NOW-REVERSED SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR UTILITY COMPANY; THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR UTILITY COMPANY IS REVERSED AND THE CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS TO BE CONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT Larry L. Oliver, Larry L. Oliver & Associates, P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Appellant Brenda Iglehart Bill Shaw, Shaw, Crutchfield & Shaw, Claremore, Oklahoma, for Appellant Tom Iglehart Brian E. Dittrich, Karla M. Rogers, Whitten, Nelson, McGuire, Wood, Terry, Roselius & Dittrich, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Appellee Verdigris Valley Electric Cooperative OPALA, J. ¶1 The dispositive issue presented on certiorari is whether a utility company owes a duty of care to motorists on roadways adjacent to the utility company's power lines when it is foreseeable that negligently maintaining trees underneath its lines could pose a road hazard to traveling motorists. We answer the question in the affirmative and hold that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's summary judgment for Utility Company. I THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION ¶2 This is a negligence action arising from an automobile accident. On 5 April 1997 Brenda Iglehart (plaintiff or Mrs. Iglehart) was driving east in Rogers County on county road EW 39 and failed to stop where that road intersected county road NS 418. Traffic on NS 418 had the right-of-way. As she crossed the intersection, she was broadsided by a car traveling south on NS 418. Mrs. Iglehart and her husband, who joined her to press his own claim for loss of consortium (collectively called plaintiffs), allege that a large white pine tree located approximately thirty-three (33) feet west of a stop sign on the southwest corner of the intersection obstructed Mrs. Iglehart's view of the sign, and that a proximate cause of the accident was her inability to see the sign. ¶3 Among the other defendants, plaintiffs sued the Verdigris Valley Electric Cooperative (Utility Company) which owns the easement where the tree is located. Plaintiffs contend Utility Company negligently maintained the tree by "topping" it (cutting off the top) in order to keep the tree limbs from interfering with Utility Company's electric lines passing above the tree. By so doing, plaintiffs allege, Utility Company caused the tree to grow laterally and more densely, obscuring the stop sign in a foreseeable fashion. According to plaintiffs, Utility Company owes a duty of care to motorists traveling on the adjoining roadway, or, in the alternative, at least a duty to warn of a hazardous condition within its control, and that its breach of this duty directly caused plaintiffs' injuries. ¶4 The trial court gave summary judgment to Utility Company as well as to Board of County Commissioners of Rogers County (Board). Plaintiffs brought separate appeals from the adverse summary judgments. The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) consolidated the appeals and reversed the summary judgment for Board, but upheld that given in favor of Utility Company. COCA held that a utility company does not owe a duty of care to travelers on roads adjacent to its power lines which are under its maintenance. For this view COCA relies on cases from the Oregon ¶5 We granted certiorari on plaintiffs' petition for review of the summary judgment for Utility Company (95,586). [60 P.3d 500] II SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE STANDARD FOR ITS REVIEW ¶6 Summary process - a special pretrial procedural track pursued with the aid of acceptable probative substitutes ¶7 Oklahoma's summary adjudication process is similar, but not identical, to that followed in the federal judicial system.¶8 Summary relief issues stand before us for de novo examination. 11 All facts and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. 12 Just as nisi prius courts are called upon to do, so also appellate tribunals bear an affirmative duty to test all evidentiary material tendered in summary process for its legal sufficiency to support the relief sought by the movant. 13 Only if the court should conclude that there is no material fact in dispute and the law favors the movant's claim or liability-defeating defense is the moving party entitled to summary judgment in its favor. 14 [60 P.3d 501]III UTILITY COMPANIES OWE A DUTY OF CARE TO TRAVELING MOTORISTS WHO FORESEEABLY MAY BE INJURED BY NEGLIGENCE IN MAINTAINING THEIR UTILITY LINES¶9 To establish negligence liability for an injury, plaintiffs must prove that (1) defendants owed them a duty to protect them from injury, (2) defendants breached that duty, and (3) defendants' breach was a proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. 15 The burden is not cast upon plaintiffs to establish that defendants were negligent in order to escape defendants' motion for summary judgment. Rather, to avoid trial for negligence, defendants must establish through unchallenged evidentiary materials that, even when viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, no disputed material facts exist as to any material issues and that the law favors defendants. 16 Utility Company contends that (1) no duty existed and that (2) if a duty existed, the company did not breach it, and that (3) its actions were not a proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries.A. ¶10 The threshold question for negligence suits is whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty of care. 17 We recognize the traditional common-law rule that whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another, that, if he (she) did not use ordinary care and skill in his (her) own conduct, he would cause danger of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger. 18 Among a number of factors used to determine the existence of a duty of care, the most important consideration is foreseeability.19 Generally a "defendant owes a duty of care to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct with respect to all risks which make the conduct unreasonably dangerous." 20 Foreseeability establishes a "zone of risk," which is to say that it forms a basis for assessing whether the conduct "creates a generalized and foreseeable risk of harming others." 21 ¶11 The question of whether a duty is owed by a defendant is one of law; a breach of that duty is a question of fact for the trier. IV THERE ARE DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO UTILITY COMPANY'S BREACH OF ITS DUTY OF CARE TO TRAVELING MOTORISTS WHO FORESEEABLY MAY BE INJURED AND THE PROXIMATE CAUSATION OF THE ACCIDENT; WHENEVER DISPUTED FACTS STAND TENDERED, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION IS INAPPROPRIATE A. ¶12 Disputed Issue of Fact As To Foreseeability Of The Injuries Plaintiffs have raised a disputed issue of fact as to the foreseeability of the injuries suffered by them in a manner sufficient to avoid summary process. According to the affidavit of plaintiffs' expert witness, James R. Morgan, the white pine tree in question "has been 'topped.' The main tree trunk has been cutoff [sic] in the upper quadrant of the tree. Once this occurs, the upward growth is halted. The tree growth then occurs (a) by increasing density; and (b) by increased limb growth." Mr. Morgan's affidavit goes on to state that these consequences are "particularly true for this type of pine tree. This information is commonly known to those who cut trees. The 'topped' tree must grow somehow as it matures with age. If it cannot grow upward, it grows outward and in density. It is common knowledge that Pine [sic] trees, when topped, increase in density." ¶13 Utility Company challenges the certainty with which Mr. Morgan may make such statements as to this particular tree, noting that he had not seen the tree before it was topped. The record reveals no Utility Company's challenge to this affidavit. When one fails in summary process timely to challenge any aspect of an evidentiary substitute, one's objection is waived and the unobjected-to materials will be deemed to have been properly included for the court's consideration. ¶14 In sum, it is undisputed that defendant Utility Company "topped" the tree in question, but did not otherwise trim it, and that no warning was given to traveling motorists. The extent to which the tree obscured or obstructed the stop sign from the view of motorists on EW 39 tenders a disputed issue for the trier's determination. It is for a jury to decide whether topping, but failing to trim the tree laterally or to warn motorists of the obstruction caused by the tree in issue, is a breach of the duty to which we hold the defending Utility Company. B. ¶15 Oklahoma law defines proximate cause as "the efficient cause which sets in motion the chain of circumstances leading to the injury." ¶16 Because these disputed issues of fact remain unresolved, the summary adjudication for Utility Company was in error. It must now stand reversed. V UTILITY COMPANY'S RELIANCE ON § 11-401(A) OF THE HIGHWAY SAFETY CODE IS MISPLACED ¶17 Utility Company attempts to avoid trial by arguing that the terms of § 11-401(A) of the Highway Safety Code ¶18This argument fails to negate the existence of a material fact issue as to the proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. First, Utility Company relies on statutory text not in force on the date of the 5 April 1997 accident. The pertinent language, "whether a stop sign is present or visible," was added to § 11-401 by a 1997 amendment that became effective 1 November 1997 . Second, although both the 1997 version of § 11-401(A) and that in force on April 5 ( VI SUMMARY ¶19 A utility company owes a duty of care to traveling motorists who foreseeably may be injured by its act or omission. Whether the utility exercised a proper degree of care vis-a-vis plaintiffs in the maintenance of the "topped" tree whose dangerous condition should have been anticipated presents a disputed issue of fact . Where material facts are disputed, summary adjudication is improper and cannot stand. The cause must be remanded for a nisi prius resolution of all untried issues tendered (or to be tendered). ¶20 On certiorari granted on plaintiffs' petition, the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals is vacated only insofar as it relates to the now-reversed summary judgment for Utility Company; the trial court's summary judgment for Utility Company is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings to be consistent with today's pronouncement. ¶21HARGRAVE, C.J., WATT, V.C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, OPALA, KAUGER, SUMMERS and BOUDREAU, JJ., concur; ¶22 FOOT