Case Title: Middleton v. Chaney

Citation: 

Docket Number: S49145

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2002-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  November 15, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

GARY LEE MIDDLETON,
	Respondent on Review,
	v.
MARY JEAN CHANEY,
aka JEANNIE M. CHANEY,
	Respondent,
	and
JERRY CUMMINGS
and PATRICIA CUMMINGS,
	Petitioners on Review.
In the Matter of the Guardianship of
BRAD LEE MIDDLETON,
	Ward.
(CC 97-DR-1197, 96-P-0237; CA A108878; SC S49145)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted September 6, 2002.
	James M. Brown, of Enfield Brown Knivila & Razor, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioners on review.
	Ryan S. Joslin, Mt. Vernon, argued the cause for respondent
on review.
	Before Gillette, Presiding Justice, and Durham, Riggs, 
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.**
	GILLETTE, P.J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed as
modified.  The order of the circuit court is reversed.  The case
is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
	*Appeal from Josephine County Circuit Court, J. Loyd O'Neal, Judge. 177 Or App 679, 34 P3d 722 (2001).
    **Carson, C.J., and Leeson, J., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
		GILLETTE, P.J.
		Petitioners (uncle and aunt) seek review of a Court of
Appeals decision that terminated their guardianship of a child
whom they have reared since 1996 and awarded custody of the child
to his father.  Middleton v. Chaney, 177 Or App 679, 34 P3d 722
(2001).  We agree with the Court of Appeals that the guardianship
should be set aside.  However, for the reasons that follow, we
hold that any award of custody to father is premature.  We
therefore modify the decision of the Court of Appeals in that
respect, and remand the matter to the trial court for further
proceedings.  
		We take the following undisputed facts from the Court
of Appeals opinion and from the record.  Child was born on July
2, 1990.  Mother and father never married, but father attended
prenatal appointments with mother and was present at child's
birth.  Father lived with mother in Grants Pass for the first 10
months of child's life.  On May 1, 1991, father began serving a
six-and-one-half-year prison sentence for manufacturing drugs. 
For about two years, father was able to maintain a relationship
with child from prison.  During that time, he telephoned child
and sent letters and small presents.  
		After a time, however, father and mother's relationship
deteriorated, and contact between father and mother lessened. 
Father tried to continue his relationship with child through
mother's sister-in-law but that, too, proved difficult. 
Eventually, father became aware that mother was neglecting child
and tried, unsuccessfully, to intervene.  
		By 1996, mother had developed a serious alcohol
problem, and she and child were virtually homeless.  In August
1996, mother's uncle and aunt, who then lived in Washougal,
Washington, agreed to take child on a three-week fishing trip. 
When they picked up child in southern Oregon, they observed that
child appeared to be in very poor condition: at six years old, he
was very small and weighed only 32 pounds; he appeared to be
malnourished; and his baby teeth were rotten.  When uncle and
aunt returned to southern Oregon with child at the end of the
trip, they learned through an intermediary that mother had left
word that she could not care for child and had requested that 
uncle and aunt keep him.  They agreed and returned with child to
Washington.
Uncle and aunt recognized that child needed prompt
medical attention.  Accordingly, they hired a lawyer and
petitioned the Josephine County Circuit Court to have themselves
appointed as child's guardians, so that they could cover child
under their insurance and enroll child in school.  In their
petition, uncle and aunt averred that the identity of child's
father was unknown.  In their haste, they made no serious effort
to ascertain father's identity and to locate him, as ORS 125.060
and ORS 125.065 require. (1)  Mother supported the petition, and the
court appointed uncle and aunt as child's guardians on October
30, 1996.  Child has lived with them since that time.  
		Father learned that child was living with uncle and
aunt in December 1996.  He wrote and telephoned them, but they
were not receptive to his efforts.  They immediately arranged
with prison authorities to have their telephone number removed
from the list of numbers that father was permitted to call.  That
action effectively cut off father's access to child while he was
in prison. 
		Father was released into a community corrections
facility in July 1997.  He then filed a pro se motion to
terminate uncle and aunt's guardianship, along with a petition to
obtain custody of child.  In December 1997, father was released
from community corrections, moved into a three-bedroom house in
Grants Pass with his 24-year-old daughter and her six-year-old
daughter, and began work as an electrician.  
		In October 1998, father moved for summary judgment on
his motion and petition.  Uncle and aunt did not appear at the
hearing on the summary judgment motion or otherwise oppose
father's guardianship termination motion or his petition for
custody.  Nevertheless, the trial court declined to award father
summary judgment.  The court observed that uncle and aunt's
guardianship over child had been in place for two years at that
point and concluded that, in that circumstance, the court could
not terminate the guardianship in the absence of a finding that
it would be in the child's best interest to do so.  Accordingly,
the court consolidated the matters that father raised in 1997
with uncle and aunt's earlier guardianship proceeding and
conducted a trial in the consolidated cases in May 1999.  
		At trial, father argued, among other things, that the
guardianship was void as to him because of the lack of notice. 
Uncle and aunt did not join that issue directly, but introduced
evidence that child had been thriving in their care for quite
some time and that father was a virtual stranger to child.  
		The trial court ruled, without extended statutory
analysis, that uncle and aunt had been "duly appointed guardians"
of child at the earlier guardianship proceeding.  It also ruled
that terminating the guardianship and awarding custody of child
to father "would be highly detrimental to the psychological well-being of the child," because "there is no strong attachment
between the biological father and the child at this time."  The
court denied father custody and continued the guardianship.  
		Father appealed the trial court's ruling to the Court
of Appeals.  Father argued that the trial court erred in failing
to hold that the original guardianship was void because uncle and
aunt had not given father proper notice, that the trial court
erred in considering one of the statutory criteria for
terminating a guardianship (best interest of the child) when the
guardianship never was valid in the first place, and that the
trial court erred in failing to grant his unopposed summary
judgment motion.  
		As noted, the Court of Appeals reversed.  That court
held that uncle and aunt's failure to make a diligent effort to
search for father was fatal to their guardianship.  177 Or App at
683.  In so concluding, the court rejected uncle and aunt's
assertion that they had "substantially complied" with the
requirements of ORS 125.060 and ORS 125.065, the notice
provisions of the guardianship statute, inasmuch as father
eventually had had an opportunity to show why the court should
terminate the guardianship.  Id. at 684-85.  The Court of Appeals
observed that the "substantial compliance" doctrine operates as a
substitute for literal compliance with a statutory notice
requirement when a person has received actual notice and,
therefore, has suffered no prejudice as a result of the technical
deficiency.  The court stated that, in the context of a
guardianship over a child, the purpose of the notice requirement
is to allow a parent to participate in a proceeding that
determines his or her child's fate.  In the present case, father
did not receive actual notice of the guardianship proceeding
until well after it occurred.  As a result, he did not have a
chance to question whether a guardianship was necessary, to
influence the choice of guardians, or to request that the court
impose conditions on the guardianship.  The court stated that
"[l]ack of notice to father, therefore, was much more than a
technical deficiency that did not interfere with the purpose of
the statute:  It was a significant, prejudicial error that
utterly negated that purpose."  Id. at 685.  
		The Court of Appeals then turned to consider the
consequences of the failure to notify father.  The court observed
that the guardianship statute itself does not specify particular
consequences of the failure to notify a parent.  Id.  However,
according to the Court of Appeals, this court's decision in
Hughes v. Aetna Casualty Co., 234 Or 426, 383 P2d 55 (1963),
provides guidance in that regard.  In Hughes, this court held
that a decree of adoption was void as to a biological mother who
was not served with notice of the pending adoption and there was
no notice by publication, as applicable statutes required.  The
Court of Appeals determined that the same result should obtain
here and held, therefore, that uncle and aunt's guardianship over
child was void as to father.  177 Or App at 686.  Then, without
further analysis, the court stated:  "That being the case, father
has custody."  Id.  We allowed uncle and aunt's petition for
review.  
		Uncle and aunt repeat their "substantial compliance"
argument in this court, essentially contending that the fact that
father had an opportunity to argue, in 1999, that circumstances
existing at that time did not necessitate a guardianship ought to
overcome the fact that uncle and aunt failed to notify father in
1996 of the initial guardianship proceeding.  The couple dispute
the relevance of this court's decision in Hughes, asserting that
it is critical that the trial court found that it is in the
child's best interest to remain with them.  However, they offer
no statutory or decisional support for their position that the
trial court had the authority to ignore their failure to comply
with the requirements of ORS 125.060 and ORS 125.065, declare
that uncle and aunt were child's "duly appointed guardians," and
continue the guardianship.
		As noted above, ORS 125.060(1) provides that, in a
protective proceeding, including one to establish a guardianship
over a child, appropriate notices "must be given to all persons
whose identities and addresses can be ascertained in the exercise
of reasonable diligence."  (Emphasis added.)  Specifically, ORS
125.060(2)(b) provides that such notices "must be given by the
petitioner to * * * [t]he * * * parents" of the person for whom
entry of a protective order is sought.  (Emphasis added.) 
Moreover, ORS 125.065(1) provides that that notice "must be
personally served on the parents of" the person for whom entry of
a protective order is sought, if that person is a minor. 
It is undisputed that uncle and aunt could have
ascertained father's identity and address with reasonable
diligence.  Under ORS 125.060, then, notice to father of uncle
and aunt's 1996 petition for guardianship was mandatory.  ORS
125.065 required uncle and aunt to serve father personally with
notice of the pending guardianship proceeding.  They did not do
so. (2)  We agree with the Court of Appeals' recitation of the
prejudice that father suffered as a result of that failure to
notify.  Had father been permitted to participate in the
guardianship proceeding from the outset, he might not have been
the "total stranger" to child that the trial court declared him
to be after the May 1999 trial.  For that reason, we also agree
with the Court of Appeals that uncle and aunt's failure to
provide notice to father of the pending guardianship proceeding
rendered the guardianship award void as against father's later
challenge to its validity.  
		As noted, the Court of Appeals, having concluded that
uncle and aunt's guardianship of child was void as to father,
ended its inquiry and directed the trial court to enter an order
granting custody to father.  That was the relief that father had
requested.  In their petition for review, uncle and aunt rebuke
the Court of Appeals for failing to take child's present needs
and interests into account, but they still do not offer a theory
of their own, apart from their continued insistence on the
validity of the guardianship, for maintaining the status quo.  
Notwithstanding the limited help that we have received
on the issue from uncle and aunt, we agree with them that the
Court of Appeals' peremptory disposition of the case was
premature.  In our view, the question whether the invalidity of
the guardianship leads inexorably to the conclusion that custody
of child reverts to father is one that the trial judge should
address first.  That court is in the best position to determine
the present circumstances, and to apply the law that is pertinent
to those circumstances.  We therefore modify the decision of the
Court of Appeals in that respect. (3)  
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed as
modified.  The order of the circuit court is reversed.  The case
is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.



1. ORS 125.060 provides, in part: 
		"(1) The notices required by this section must be
given to all persons whose identities and addresses can
be ascertained in the exercise of reasonable diligence
by the person required to give the notice.
		"(2) Notice of the filing of a petition for the
appointment of a fiduciary or entry of other protective
order must be given by the petitioner to the following
persons:
		"* * * * *
		"(b) The spouse, parents and adult children of the
respondent."
ORS 125.065 provides, in part: 
		"(1) * * * Notice of a petition must be personally
served on the parents of a respondent if the petition
is based on the fact that the respondent is a minor. 
	* * *.  
		"(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) of this
section, the notices required under ORS 125.060 may be
mailed to the last-known address of the person.  If the
address or identity of any person is not known and
cannot be ascertained with reasonable diligence, notice
of the filing of a petition may be given by publishing
at least once a week for three consecutive weeks a copy
of the notice in a newspaper having general circulation
in the county where the hearing is to be held. * * *"
Uncle and aunt testified at trial that they limited their inquiry
concerning father's identity to reviewing child's birth
certificate, which states that the father was unknown, and asking
mother once whether she knew who the father was.  They claim that
she responded that she was not sure.  The birth certificate lists
child's last name as that of father and not of mother, but uncle
and aunt did not inquire further of any other family members,
many of whom lived nearby and knew father's identity and
whereabouts.  Neither did they publish notice of the filing of
the petition for guardianship in any newspaper.  Uncle and aunt
have not contended that their efforts to notify father were
sufficient to meet the requirements of ORS 125.060 or ORS
125.065.  

2. As noted, they also did not publish notice of the
pending petition for guardianship in any newspaper, which ORS
125.065(2) required them to do in the event that they could not
ascertain father's identity or whereabouts.  

3. In so doing, we express no view as to the appropriate
disposition.  We note in passing that there might be other legal
avenues for resolving the issue.  See, e.g., ORS 109.119(1)
(allowing "[a]ny person * * * who has established emotional ties
creating a child-parent relationship" to petition court for order
recognizing and accommodating such relationship).