Case Title: Florida Department of Natural Resource v. Juan A. Garcia, Jr. (Corrected opinion)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2000-03-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida
  
____________
No. SC93065
____________
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, etc.
Petitioner,
vs.
JUAN A. GARCIA, JR., et al.
Respondents.
[February 10, 2000]
CORRECTED OPINION
PARIENTE, J.
We accepted jurisdiction to review Garcia v. State Department of Natural
Resources, 707 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), based on express and direct
conflict with Warren v. Palm Beach County, 528 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). 
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
Respondent, Juan Garcia, Jr., was seriously injured on February 1, 1989,
when he dove into the Atlantic Ocean along the "South Beach" area of Miami
Beach.  See Garcia, 707 So. 2d at 1159.  He struck his head on debris on the ocean
1In March of 1988, the City of Miami Beach sent out an invitation to bid on a contract to
remove underwater debris from the former pier site.  See City of Miami Beach v. Dickerman
Overseas Contracting Co., U.S.A., 659 So. 2d 1106, 1108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (affirming trial
court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of contractor where performance contract to
begin work on removal of underwater debris was not finalized until after accident), review
denied, 669 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1996). 
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bottom that had allegedly been left there after the demolition of the South Beach
pier.1  See id.  Garcia was rendered a quadriplegic, and he and his parents sued the
City of Miami Beach (the City), Metropolitan Dade County, and the Florida
Department of Natural Resources (the State), among others, for negligence in
failing to remove certain underwater debris at the site, and for failing to take the
necessary precautions to prevent the accident.
In 1982, the State entered into a management agreement with the City
allowing the City to manage South Beach.  The management agreement:  (1)
provided that the State "holds title" to the beach property; (2) granted the City
"management responsibilities" of the beach for twenty-five years; (3) required the
City to submit a "management plan" providing for "the limitation and control of
land and water related activities such as boating, bathing, surfing, rental of beach
equipment, and sale of goods and services to the public;" and (4) required the City
to pay the State twenty-five percent of revenues collected from private
concessionaires.  However, the State never formally designated the beach as a
swimming area, nor did the State ever operate the beach as a public swimming
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area.  The trial court granted the State's motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that:  (1) the State had never designated the beach as a public swimming
area, and thus it had no duty of care to swimmers, and (2) even if the State owed a
duty of care to the swimmers at South Beach, it had delegated the duty to the City
in the management agreement.
On appeal, the Third District reversed, concluding that government entities
operating a public swimming area owe a duty to operate the area safely.  See
Garcia, 707 So. 2d at 1159.  This duty of care arises whenever a "body of water [is]
held out to be a public swimming area and/or commonly used by the public as a
swimming area[,]" even though the body of water was never formally designated as
a public swimming area by the government entity.  Id.  The Third District reasoned
that this duty of care is nondelegable, and thus the State could not delegate the duty
to the City through its management agreement.  The Third District also pointed out
that the decision would not impose financial hardships on the State because the
management agreement contained an indemnification clause requiring the City to
reimburse the State for any liability arising solely from its ownership of the beach. 
See id. at 1160.  The Third District remanded the case for a trial.
The State initially focuses on the broad language of the Third District's
opinion that could be read as imposing a duty of care to the public whenever a
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body of water is commonly used as a public swimming area, even if it is not
formally designated as a swimming area by the State.  It contends that because the
State holds in public trust vast amounts of lands underlying bodies of water, the
potential effect of the Third District's opinion is to make the State potentially liable
for any swimming injuries occurring in these waters.  The State further argues that
because it never formally designated South Beach as a swimming area, or
controlled the swimming area, it never assumed an operational-level duty to
operate South Beach safely. 
Garcia counters that South Beach is a world-renowned public swimming
area.  The Third District's opinion, according to Garcia, simply follows well-settled
law that when a government entity operates a public swimming area, the
government entity owes a duty to its invitees to maintain the premises in a
reasonably safe condition, and this duty cannot be delegated to others.
We address two separate issues raised by the State:  (1) whether a formal
designation as a public swimming area is necessary before a common law duty to
maintain the swimming area in a reasonably safe condition arises; and (2) whether
the district court in this case incorrectly concluded that the State could insulate
itself from liability through indemnification agreements with the local government
entities operating the public swimming area.  
2As this case involves an invitee, we reject the State's reliance on Saga Bay Property
Owners Ass’n v. Askew, 513 So. 2d 691, 693 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
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STATE'S LIABILITY FOR 
INJURIES IN BODIES OF WATERS  
A governmental entity that operates a swimming facility "assumes the
common law duty to operate the facility safely, just as a private individual is
obligated under like circumstances."  Avallone v. Board of County Comm’rs, 493
So. 2d 1002, 1005 (Fla. 1986); see Butler v. Sarasota County, 501 So. 2d 579 (Fla.
1986).  Thus, a government entity operating a public swimming area will have the
same operational-level duty to invitees as a private landowner--the duty to keep the
premises in a reasonably safe condition and to warn the public of any dangerous
conditions of which it knew or should have known.2  See, e.g., Avallone, 493 So.
2d at 1005; Brightwell v. Beem, 90 So. 2d 320, 322 (Fla. 1956); Hylazewski v. Wet
'N Wild, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1371, 1372 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).  
The core question presented in this case is whether a formal designation as a
swimming area by the State is a prerequisite to the State's liability for breach of
duty to operate the swimming facility safely, and if not, what must be shown before
a duty of care to operate the swimming area safely arises.  This Court's decision in
Avallone did not expressly require the government entity to "designate" a public
swimming area as a precondition to assuming liability for failing to operate the
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swimming area safely.  493 So. 2d at 1005.  However, the Court in Butler found
the government entity to be liable because it created "a designated swimming area
where the dangerous condition existed."  501 So. 2d at 579.  Thus, our prior cases
do not squarely resolve this question.
The appellate courts addressing this issue have focused on whether the
government entity held the area out to the public as a suitable place to swim, rather
than relying solely on whether the government had "designated" the area for
swimming.  See Andrews v. Department of Natural Resources, 557 So. 2d 85, 89
(Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Warren, 528 So. 2d at 415.  The first decision passing on this
question was Warren, where the plaintiff was injured when he dove into a lake at a
public park owned by a county.  The Fourth District concluded that "[s]ince the
county did not designate Lake Osborne as a swimming area and did not in any
manner contribute to the condition of the water or the lake bottom alleged to have
presented an illusion of depth, it cannot be held liable to appellant."  Warren, 528
So. 2d at 415.  The Fourth District focused on evidence that the county had taken
active steps to prohibit swimming at the park:  an ordinance prohibited swimming
at the park, the park rangers were instructed to discourage or prevent swimming,
and there were no signs permitting swimming or diving that would lead a person to
conclude that the lake had been designated as a swimming facility by the county. 
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See id.
This analysis focusing on the totality of the circumstances is consistent with
the Second District's opinion in Andrews, where a person drowned while
swimming at a state park.  557 So. 2d at 86.  The Second District framed the
"critical question" as whether the State had "designated the area where the
drowning occurred as a swimming area."  Id. at 88.  In resolving this question, the
Second District considered evidence that the State knew that the section of the
beach was commonly used for swimming, signs in the area permitted swimming,
and the park brochure stated that swimming was permitted without designating a
specific area.  See id. at 89.  The Second District determined that an issue of
material fact existed as to whether "the state led the public to believe that Dog
Beach was a designated swimming area."  Id.  Thus, the court in Andrews
concluded that the government entity would be liable if it held an area out to the
public as suitable for swimming, regardless of whether the area had been formally
"designated" for swimming.  Id.  
In this case, although the State itself had not formally designated South
Beach to be a public swimming area, there is no dispute that South Beach was held
out as a public swimming area by the City.  Further, the State made a conscious
decision to allow South Beach to be operated as a public swimming area when it
3Further, the State retained the right to enter the property and engage in "management
activities not inconsistent with the management plan," to grant other legal uses not inconsistent
with the plan and to inspect the "works and operations of the City."
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signed the management agreement with the City.  The management agreement
unquestionably demonstrates that the State was aware that the City would operate
South Beach as a public swimming area and the State does not contend otherwise. 
In fact, the State's management agreement demonstrates more than just an
acquiescence by the State to allow the City to operate South Beach.  The
management agreement required the City to submit a management plan detailing
"the limitation and control of land and water related activities such as boating,
bathing, surfing, rental of beach equipment, and sale of goods and services to the
public."3  (Emphasis supplied.)  Additionally, the State required the City to submit
twenty-five percent of all revenues collected from private concessionaires. 
Therefore, the State actually derived revenue from the City's operation of South
Beach.
We conclude that the fact that the State never formally "designated" the
beach as a public swimming area is not dispositive of whether the government
owes an operational-level duty to safely operate a public swimming area if
sufficient facts exist to demonstrate that the area was held out to the public as a
public swimming area.  The focus of the inquiry is not whether a formal
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designation occurred.  Rather, as in Warren and Andrews, the actions of the
government entity must be examined to determine whether, based on all the
circumstances, the government entity held the area out to the public as a swimming
area or led the public to believe the area was a designated swimming area. 
The actual operation of South Beach by the City pursuant to the management
agreement between the City and the State establishes that the basis for the State's
liability in this case is the State's permission to grant the City the right to operate
South Beach as a swimming area open to the public.  Not only did the State agree
to the operation of the public swimming area, but it put limitations on the terms of
the operation and demanded twenty-five percent of the revenues.  Thus, the
language in Garcia suggesting that the State would be considered to be operating a
public swimming area if people "commonly use" the area for swimming is dicta. 
To the extent that the assertion that people were "commonly using" the area may be
relied on as the sole basis for imposing a common law duty of care, we disapprove
of this isolated statement in Garcia.
As Andrews indicates, the "common use" of an area for swimming may be
one factor to consider in order to determine if a governmental entity held out the
area as a public swimming area or, as in Andrews, led the public to believe that the
area was designated as a swimming area.  At one end of the spectrum is the
4Of course, even if the State has not decided to operate a public swimming area, it could
still face liability under certain factual circumstances.  For example, if a government entity creates
a hazardous condition that would not be readily apparent to the public and has knowledge of the
presence of people likely to be injured by the dangerous condition, the government has a duty to
either correct the condition or warn the public.  See Ralph v. City of Daytona Beach, 471 So. 2d
1, 3 (Fla. 1983); City of St. Petersburg v. Collum, 419 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1982).  This duty to warn
the public of known dangerous conditions that the government entity has created would apply if
the government knew an area was commonly used for swimming, regardless of whether the
government entity had decided to operate a public swimming area.  There may be other factual
circumstances that would also give rise to liability, but we decline to discuss them at this time
because that issue is not before us.
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circumstance where the government entity formally designates an area for public
swimming.  At the other end of the spectrum are circumstances where either the
government entity actively attempts to prohibit swimming or has no knowledge that
some part of an undesignated beach is being used by swimmers.4
Certainly, we would agree with the State that it would be an intolerable and
unnecessary burden to expect the State to post "No Swimming" signs up and down
its expansive coastline on the chance that residents of the State may, on their own, 
select a particular area to enjoy the ocean or other waterways.  On the other hand,
where an area such as South Beach is a well-known public swimming area, from
which the State is actively deriving profit, the State has no basis for claiming
immunity from suit merely because a formal designation as a state park did not
occur.  Accordingly, we approve the holding of the Third District reversing the
summary judgment in favor of the State, but disapprove of the broad dicta
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suggesting that mere common use as a swimming area by the public creates an
operational-level duty requiring the State to maintain the swimming area with
reasonable care.
ABILITY OF THE STATE TO SEEK INDEMNIFICATION
The State further challenges the Third District's statement that a decision to
impose liability would not impose financial hardships because the management
agreement contains an indemnification clause requiring the City to reimburse the
State for any liability arising solely from ownership of the beach.  See Garcia, 707
So. 2d at 1160.  According to the State, section 768.28(18), Florida Statutes
(1999), precludes government entities from entering into indemnity agreements
such as the management agreement.  This section provides that:
 
Neither the state nor any agency or subdivision of the state waives any
defense of sovereign immunity, or increases the limits of its liability,
upon entering into a contractual relationship with another agency or
subdivision of the state.  Such a contract must not contain any
provision that requires one party to indemnify or insure the other party
for the other party's negligence or to assume any liability for the other
party's negligence.  
Id. (emphasis supplied).  
Although no courts have construed this provision, a plain reading of the
statutory language reveals that government entities are only prohibited from
entering into agreements to indemnify another government entity for the other
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entity's negligence, or to assume any liability for the other entity's negligence.  In
contrast, the agreement in this case was for the City to indemnify the State for the
City's own negligence.  Thus, an indemnification agreement is not prohibited by
this statute. 
This interpretation of section 768.28(18) is also consistent with the common
law right of indemnification.  At common law, a nonnegligent party who is
vicariously liable for the tortious actions of another can seek indemnification from
the tortfeasor.  See, e.g., Houdaille Indust., Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490 (Fla.
1979).  Therefore, at common law, the State would have been able to seek
indemnity from the City if the State was without fault and held vicariously liable
for the City's failure to keep South Beach reasonably safe.
Finally, with regard to the issue of the nondelegable duty raised by the
dissent, the State has not challenged the Third District's statement that the
landowner's duty to invitees to keep the premises reasonably safe is nondelegable. 
See Garcia, 707 So. 2d at 1159.  In fact, the State concedes that if it had first
designated South Beach as a public swimming area and then turned over the
operation of South Beach to the City, it could be vicariously liable.  Because this
matter is being reversed and remanded and neither party has raised or briefed the
correctness of the Third District's statement, we decline to address the issue of the
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vicarious liability of a landowner.
Accordingly, we approve the Third District's decision on the grounds stated
in this opinion and disapprove of the statement that "common use" by the public is
the basis for imposing a common law duty of reasonable care on the State.  We
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, ANSTEAD, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which HARDING, C.J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, J., dissenting.
I dissent from the majority's decision in this case because I conclude that the
majority and the Third District Court of Appeal decided this case on the wrong
basis.  I can agree with the majority that the determination of whether a
governmental unit is operating a swimming facility should not be based entirely
upon whether there has been a formal designation as a public swimming area.
However, the determination should have been made by a straightforward
application of Avallone v. Board of County Commissioners, 493 So. 2d 1002 (Fla.
1986), in which this Court said:
A government unit has the discretionary authority to operate or not
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operate swimming facilities and is immune from suit on that
discretionary question.  However, once the unit decides to operate the
swimming facility, it assumes the common law duty to operate the
facility safely, just as a private individual is obligated under like
circumstances.
Id. at 1005.
The key phrase in the above quotation is "decides to operate the swimming
facility."  In this case, it is undisputed that the State made a planning-level decision
not to operate a public swimming facility at South Beach but rather to turn over
operational control of this sovereignty land to the City.  It is irrelevant that the
State knew of, approved of, and shared in the revenues of the swimming facility. 
Under our holding in Avallone, the only salient fact here is that the State made an
express decision not to operate a swimming facility and therefore did not waive
sovereign immunity.
In my view, this simple conclusion avoids policy concerns that would
emerge if, under these facts, the State were held to have waived sovereign
immunity.  The majority opinion exposes the State to liability for injuries to
swimmers, surfers, fishermen, and boaters along hundreds of miles of beaches that
are held in trust for the people of Florida.  This is an unacceptable policy decision.
Moreover, I cannot agree that this factual situation is analogous to those in
the cases relied upon by the Third District for the principle concerning a
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"nondelegable" duty.  The concept of nondelegable duty is contrary to our
distinction, for purposes of determining the existence of sovereign immunity,
between governmental planning-level and operational-level decisions, upon which
Commercial Carrier v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979), and its
progeny are based.  The proper analysis does not determine whether a
governmental entity can or cannot delegate a function.  Rather, the appropriate
question is whether a governmental entity performed an operation itself and, if so,
whether the entity exercised reasonable care.  The decision as to whether to
delegate control or whether to perform a particular operation is a discretionary,
planning-level governmental decision into which the courts cannot intrude. 
Trianon Park Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912, 918
(Fla. 1985).
Moreover, in this instance, the State's role here is similar to that of an owner,
and the City's role is similar to that of a nonowner possessor such as a lessee or an
independent contractor.  If premises liability law were applied, there would be no
liability on the part of the State, as owner, even absent a sovereign immunity bar. 
The Fifth District in Bovis v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 505 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987),
set forth the fundamental analysis of premises liability:
An owner of real property is not an insurer of the safety of persons on
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such property, nor is he subject to strict liability or liable per se for
injuries resulting from dangerous conditions on owned property.  The
crux of a cause of action for premises liability is not the ownership of
the premises, but the failure of the possessor of the premises to use
due care (negligence) in permitting licensees and invitees to come,
unwarned, to an area where, foreseeably, they may be injured by a
dangerous condition which to them is not readily apparent.  This is
why an owner of a dangerous premises is not liable to trespassers and
yet one in possession of a premises with authority to control access
thereto, such as a lessee, an independent contractor, or other
non-owner possessor, may be liable to invitees and licensees for
injuries from dangerous conditions created by the owner, or the
possessor, or by others, such as other invitees and licensees.  In this
case, as in the usual lease arrangement, the lessor had no right to
control access by third parties to the leased premises and the lessee
had actual possession and the right to control access to the leased
premises and the lessee was not the agent of the lessor-owner. 
Therefore, the lessee and not the lessor (owner) had the continuing
legal duty to inspect the premises and, in permitting or denying access
to others, to act according to the safety or danger then existing.  A
lessor (owner) may be liable in tort to the lessee and to third persons
for injuries resulting from latent dangerous conditions of which the
lessor (owner) knew or should have known and which existed on the
leased premises when the lessor (owner) delivered possession of the
leased premises to the lessee without appropriate warnings but such
liability is not based on the fact that the lessor is owner but on the
basis that the owner, as possessor, can be negligent in these particulars
just as any other possessor.  A lessor (owner) may also be liable
contractually to the lessee for damages for breach of a lease provision
requiring the lessor to maintain portions of a leased premises.  Of
course, the lessor (owner) is not liable for injuries caused solely by the
lessee's operations and activities on the leased premises.  On the other
hand, the lessee may not only be liable to third parties for injuries
resulting from the lessee's negligent operations and activities on the
leased premises but, being in possession and controlling access by
licensee and invitee, may also be liable in tort for injuries to third
parties caused by a dangerous condition on the leased premises,
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whether the dangerous condition resulted from the act of the lessee,
the act of the lessor (owner), some combination of the acts of both the
lessee and the lessor (owner), or the act of a third person.  In
summary, the duty to protect others from injury resulting from a
dangerous condition on a premises does not rest on legal ownership of
the dangerous area but on the right to control access by third parties
which right usually exists in the one in possession and control of the
premises.  The possessor (lessee) has the right and the duty to exclude
licensees and invitees from an area that is dangerous because of
dangerous operations or activities or because of a dangerous premises
condition and has the duty to warn third persons of danger.
Id. at 662-63 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
In Miller v. Sinclair Refining Co., 268 F. 2d 114 (5th Cir. 1959), the federal
appellate court stated:
In such a case, Florida law says that the lessor is not liable for injuries
to the lessee or those upon the premises in the lessee's right unless the
negligent condition which causes the injury is a violation of law, is a
pre-existing defect in construction or is inherently dangerous, or
unless the lessor undertakes to keep the premises in repair.
Id. at 117.  In this case, the record reveals that the State, as owner, had turned over
to the City, the nonowner possessor, the control of the land.  It was the City that
operated the swimming facility and, as possessor of the land, had the duty of
keeping the premises in repair.  Thus, only the City could be found liable for any
injuries its negligence might have caused.
HARDING, C.J., concurs.
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
Third District - Case No. 3D96-3588 
(Dade County)
Bruce G. Hermelee and Sarah Helene Sharp of Hermelee & Sharp, Miami, Florida,
for Petitioner
Joel D. Eaton of Podhurst, Orseck, Josefsberg, Eaton, Meadow, Olin & Perwin, P.A.,
Miami, Florida; and A. Francisco Areces of  Needle, Gallagher, Areces & Ellenberg,
P.A., Miami, Florida,
for Respondents
Louis F. Hubener, and Amelia L. Beisner, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Amicus Curiae