Case Title: Littrell v. Wigglesworth

Citation: 2001-Ohio-87

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Littrell v. Wigglesworth, 91 Ohio St.3d 425, 2001-Ohio-87.] 
 
 
 
LITTRELL, ADMR., ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. WIGGLESWORTH, ADMR., ET AL.; 
WESTFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL., APPELLEES. 
STICKNEY, APPELLANT, ET AL., v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE, ET AL. 
KARR, ADMR., ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. BORCHARDT; PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Littrell v. Wigglesworth (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 425.] 
Insurance — Motor vehicles — Mandatory offering of uninsured and 
underinsured motorist coverage — “Amounts available for payment” 
language in R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), for the purpose of setoff, construed. 
(Nos. 00-745 and 00-801 — Submitted January 30, 2001 — Decided May 23, 
2001.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Butler County, Nos. 
CA99-05-092 and CA99-08-141. 
(No. 98-2445 — Submitted January 30, 2001 — Decided May 23, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Richland County, No. 98 CA 7. 
ON RECONSIDERATION. 
(Nos. 99-219, 99-223 and 99-224 — Submitted January 30, 2001 — Decided 
May 23, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Seneca County, Nos. 13-98-33, 13-98-35 
and 13-98-34. 
ON RECONSIDERATION. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
For the purpose of setoff, the “amounts available for payment” language in R.C. 
3937.18(A)(2) means the amounts actually accessible to and recoverable 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
by an underinsured motorist claimant from all bodily injury liability bonds 
and insurance policies (including from the tortfeasor’s liability carrier).  
Clark v. Scarpelli (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 271, 744 N.E.2d 719, followed 
and applied. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J. 
Littrell v. Wigglesworth 
 
On February 16, 1997, John Littrell, Jr., was the driver of a motor vehicle 
that was owned by his mother-in-law, Stella Pratt,1 when he was involved in a 
head-on collision with a motor vehicle operated by Jeffrey Wigglesworth.  The 
collision was caused when Jeffrey’s automobile allegedly veered left of center 
and collided with the Pratt vehicle.  As a result of the accident, John and Jeffrey 
were both killed.  Stella Pratt, a passenger with John, was also killed.  Other 
occupants of the Pratt vehicle, John’s wife, Ina Littrell, and John’s children, 
Dennis and Suzanne, also suffered injuries. 
 
At the time of the accident, Jeffrey was insured under a policy of 
automobile liability insurance with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company (“State Farm”) with liability limits of $100,000 per person and 
$300,000 per accident and a $1 million liability umbrella policy.  The Pratt 
vehicle was insured under a policy of automobile liability insurance with Colonial 
Penn 
Insurance 
Company 
(“Colonial 
Penn”) 
that 
provided 
uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage with limits of $100,000 per person and 
$300,000 per accident.  Ina Littrell was insured under a policy of automobile 
liability insurance issued by Westfield Insurance Company (“Westfield”) that 
included uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage in the amount of $500,000 per 
accident.  All five occupants of the Pratt vehicle were insureds under the 
                                                          
 
1. 
Cheryl Pratt, Stella’s daughter, was a co-owner of the vehicle. 
January Term, 2001 
3 
Westfield policy as family members residing in the same household and the 
Colonial Penn policy as the insurer of the Pratt minivan.2 
 
On February 9, 1998, appellants, Ina Littrell, individually and as 
administrator of the estate of John Littrell, Jr., Linda Littrell, as guardian of 
Dennis and Suzanne Littrell, and Naomi Gadberry, as administrator of the estate 
of Stella Pratt, filed personal injury and wrongful death claims, in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Butler County, against Nancy Wigglesworth, as administrator 
of the estate of Jeffrey Wigglesworth.  Appellants also sought underinsured 
motorist benefits under the Colonial Penn and Westfield policies.  The complaint 
further sought underinsured motorist proceeds for James Littrell, John, Jr.’s 
brother, who had underinsured motorist coverage with Preferred Risk Mutual 
Insurance Company, and for Ernie Pratt, Jr., Stella Pratt’s grandson, who had 
underinsured motorist coverage with Allstate Insurance Company.  The trial court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant insurance companies. 
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for Butler County affirmed the judgment 
of the trial court.  The court of appeals subsequently found its decision to be in 
conflict with two decisions of the Second District Court of Appeals, Estate of Fox 
v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. (June 12, 1998), Montgomery App. No. 1456, 
unreported, 1998 WL 309212, and Berry v. Przyborowski (Nov. 19, 1999), Miami 
App. No. 99-CA-21, unreported, 1999 WL 1043880. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon our determination that a conflict 
exists (case No. 00-801), and pursuant to the allowance of a discretionary appeal 
(case No. 00-745). 
Stickney v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 
 
On January 20, 1996, Jennifer R. Stickney was a passenger in an 
automobile driven by Eric Semon.  Jennifer was killed as a result of injuries she 
                                                          
 
2. 
In its opinion, the court of appeals also confirms that all occupants in the Pratt vehicle are 
covered insureds for purposes of the Westfield and Colonial Penn policies. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
sustained when Semon lost control of the vehicle.  On December 2, 1996, 
appellant, Scott A. Stickney, Jennifer’s father and the administrator of her estate, 
settled with the tortfeasor’s insurer for $125,000. 
 
At the time of the accident, Scott, his wife, Cynthia Stickney, another 
daughter, Gina Stickney, and son, Scott Stickney, Jr., were insureds under two 
policies of automobile liability insurance with appellee State Farm.  Each policy 
provided uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage with limits of $100,000 per 
person and $300,000 per occurrence.  On April 25, 1997, appellant, along with 
surviving family members, brought a declaratory judgment action against appellee 
seeking uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits under the State Farm policies.  
Both sides submitted motions for summary judgment.  On January 20, 1998, the 
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm.  An appeal was 
filed, and on October 19, 1998, the Richland County Court of Appeals affirmed 
the judgment of the trial court. 
 
On November 16, 1998, appellant filed a notice of appeal with this court.  
On May 24, 2000, we vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded 
this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.  Stickney v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 504, 727 N.E.2d 1286.  On August 2, 2000, 
we granted a motion for reconsideration solely to address the issue presented in 
appellant’s second proposition of law and held this matter for a decision in case 
Nos. 00-745 and 00-801, Littrell v. Wigglesworth.  Stickney v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 1471, 732 N.E.2d 1001. 
Karr v. Borchardt 
 
On July 8, 1996, Helen Beddow was a passenger in an automobile driven 
by her husband, Andrew.  Helen was injured when Andrew’s vehicle and a 
vehicle driven by Elizabeth Borchardt collided.  Helen subsequently died as a 
result of her injuries. 
January Term, 2001 
5 
 
Helen was survived by Andrew and four adult children, Ginger Karr, 
Vicki Husk, John Beddow, and Sharon Sumpter.  On January 3, 1997, wrongful 
death and survival claims were filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Seneca 
County against Borchardt on behalf of appellants, Ginger Karr, Vicki Husk, and 
John Beddow.3  The complaint also sought a declaration that appellants were 
entitled to recover underinsured motorist benefits from their respective 
automobile liability insurance policies. 
 
At the time of the accident, Borchardt was insured under a policy of 
automobile liability insurance with Westfield Insurance Company, with policy 
limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence.  Ginger Karr was 
insured through a policy of automobile liability insurance issued by Progressive 
Insurance Company, which provided underinsured motorist coverage benefits of 
$12,500 per person and $25,000 per accident.  Vicki Husk had a policy of 
automobile liability insurance issued by Allstate Insurance Company, which 
provided underinsured motorist coverage of $100,000 per person and $300,000 
per accident.  John Beddow had an automobile liability insurance policy issued by 
State Farm that included underinsured motorist coverage with limits of $50,000 
per person and $100,000 per accident.  Appellants’ claims against Borchardt were 
settled for the limits of Borchardt’s policy, and Westfield paid $100,000 to the 
estate of Helen Beddow.4  The trial court subsequently granted motions for 
summary judgment in favor of appellees, Allstate Insurance, Progressive 
Insurance, and State Farm Insurance.  The Court of Appeals for Seneca County 
affirmed the judgments of the trial court. 
                                                          
 
3. 
The remaining surviving beneficiaries, Andrew Beddow and Sharon Sumpter, are not 
parties to the Karr appeals. 
4. 
The limit of liability of Borchardt’s policy with Westfield Insurance Company was 
$100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence.  While there is no verification in the record 
before us, the parties do not dispute that $200,000 was paid to the other injured passengers in the 
Beddow vehicle. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
On January 29, 1999, appellants, Ginger Karr (case No. 99-219), Vicki 
Husk (case No. 99-223), and John Beddow (case No. 99-224) filed notices of 
appeal with this court.  On May 24, 2000, we vacated the judgment of the court of 
appeals and remanded this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.  Karr 
v. Borchardt (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 535, 728 N.E.2d 362.  On August 2, 2000, we 
granted a motion for reconsideration solely to address the issue presented in 
appellants’ third proposition of law and held this matter for a decision in case 
Nos. 00-745 and 00-801, Littrell v. Wigglesworth.  Karr v. Borchardt (2000), 89 
Ohio St.3d 1471, 732 N.E.2d 1002. 
I.  Statutory Setoff Against Underinsured Motorist Coverage 
 
On October 20, 1994, the General Assembly enacted Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20 
(“S.B. 20”), which amended R.C. 3937.18, that section of the Revised Code 
requiring the mandatory offering of uninsured and underinsured motorist 
coverage.  These appeals involve the S.B. 20 amendments to R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), 
which requires liability insurance policies to provide the following5: 
 
“Underinsured motorist coverage, which shall be in an amount of 
coverage equivalent to the automobile liability or motor vehicle liability coverage 
and shall provide protection for an insured against loss for bodily injury, sickness, 
or disease, including death, suffered by any person insured under the policy, 
where the limits of coverage available for payment to the insured under all bodily 
injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured 
are less than the limits for the insured’s uninsured motorist coverage.  
Underinsured motorist coverage is not and shall not be excess insurance to other 
applicable liability coverages, and shall be provided only to afford the insured an 
amount of protection not greater than that which would be available under the 
                                                          
 
5. 
There have been two subsequent amendments to R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) since the enactment 
of S.B. 20.  See 147 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2373; 2000 Sub.S.B. No. 267, effective September 21, 
2000.  However, those changes were minor, and the language of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) under 
consideration here has remained unchanged. 
January Term, 2001 
7 
insured’s uninsured motorist coverage if the person or persons liable were 
uninsured at the time of the accident.  The policy limits of the underinsured 
motorist coverage shall be reduced by those amounts available for payment under 
all applicable bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons 
liable to the insured.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
In Stickney, the question is whether, in a claim for underinsured motorist 
benefits, the term “amounts available for payment” in R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) should 
be construed to mean those amounts actually received by the insured from the 
tortfeasor’s automobile liability insurance coverage.  In Karr, essentially the same 
issue is framed as whether the limits of a claimant’s underinsured motorist 
coverage are compared to the limits of the tortfeasor’s automobile liability 
coverage or whether they are compared to the amounts actually received by a 
claimant from the tortfeasor’s liability policy.  Finally, in Littrell, the Butler 
County Court of Appeals certified the following question for our consideration:  
“Whether R.C. 3937.18[(A)(2)] precludes recovery merely because the insured’s 
underinsured motorist coverage limits are identical to or less than the tortfeasor’s 
liability limits when, due to the presence of multiple claimants, the insured is 
unable to recover the tortfeasor’s limits.” 
 
The setoff provision of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) was amended by S.B. 20 by 
the addition of this sentence:  “The policy limits of the underinsured motorist 
coverage shall be reduced by those amounts available for payment under all 
applicable bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons 
liable to the insured.” 
 
We recognize that Stickney has not been briefed.  However, the issue 
before the court has been fully briefed in Karr and Littrell.  In addition, the 
Littrell case was presented in oral argument.  Further, this same issue has been 
fully briefed and argued in Clark. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
In accordance with our holding in Clark v. Scarpelli (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 
271, 744 N.E.2d 719, “[f]or the purpose of setoff, the ‘amounts available for 
payment’ language in R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) means the amounts actually accessible 
to and recoverable by an underinsured motorist claimant from all bodily injury 
liability bonds and insurance policies (including from the tortfeasor’s liability 
carrier).”  Id. at syllabus. 
 
In Clark, we stated that the original purpose of underinsured motorist 
coverage was to ensure that persons injured by an underinsured motorist would 
receive at least the same amount of total compensation as they would have 
received had they been injured by an uninsured motorist.  Id. at 275, 744 N.E.2d 
719, citing James v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 386, 389, 18 
OBR 440, 443, 481 N.E.2d 272, 274-275, disapproved on other grounds in Cole v. 
Holland (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 220, 667 N.E.2d 353.  We noted that “ ‘it would 
make no sense for this court to reach the absurd result that an injured party is 
better off when struck by an uninsured tortfeasor than by a person who possesses 
liability insurance.’ “  Clark, 91 Ohio St.3d at 275, 744 N.E.2d at 725, quoting 
Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Phillips (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 162, 165, 556 N.E.2d 1150, 
1153.  We further emphasized that pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), as amended 
by S.B. 20, underinsured motorist coverage was not intended to be excess 
insurance to the tortfeasor’s liability coverage and that the statutory language 
indicated that a person injured by an underinsured motorist should never be 
afforded greater coverage than that which would be available had the tortfeasor 
been uninsured.  Clark, 91 Ohio St.3d at 276, 744 N.E.2d at 725. 
 
In light of the reasoning concerning R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) set forth in Clark, 
the matters before us can now be fully and properly resolved.  We now proceed to 
apply the law pronounced therein to each of these appeals. 
II.  Littrell v. Wigglesworth 
January Term, 2001 
9 
 
Appellants contend that to determine the setoff against the underinsured 
motorist coverage in a situation involving multiple claimants,6 R.C. 
3937.18(A)(2) requires a comparison of the amounts available for payment to 
each insured from the tortfeasor.  Appellants argue that the statutory language 
does not permit underinsured motorist carriers to set off the total amounts paid to 
all other injured claimants but merely allows a setoff of the amounts each insured 
has received from the tortfeasor. 
 
The tortfeasor, Jeffrey Wigglesworth, had $1,300,000 in available liability 
coverage through State Farm, all of which was tendered and accepted in 
settlement of all claims against Wigglesworth’s estate and State Farm.  According 
to appellants, the entire $1,300,000 was allocated to the five occupants of the Pratt 
vehicle.  The estate of John Littrell, Jr., received $415,000, the estate of Stella 
Pratt received $275,000, Ina Littrell received $460,000 on her personal injury 
claim, and Dennis and Suzanne Littrell each received $75,000 for their personal 
injury claims. 
 
Colonial Penn, which provided automobile liability insurance for the Pratt 
minivan, has been dismissed from this appeal pursuant to a settlement agreement 
of the affected parties.  Preferred Risk, the automobile liability insurer for James 
Littrell, John, Jr.’s brother, has also been dismissed by agreement.  Therefore, the 
only policies remaining under consideration are Ina Littrell’s Westfield policy and 
Ernie Pratt, Jr.’s Allstate policy. 
A.  Westfield Policy 
 
The Westfield policy insured all five occupants of the Pratt minivan and 
provided underinsured motorist coverage with a single policy limit of $500,000 
per accident.  Had the tortfeasor been an uninsured motorist, the maximum 
                                                          
 
6. 
In our continuing review, case by case, of the issues surrounding the application and 
accessibility of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, it would appear that, in most cases, 
the application of the R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) “amounts available for payment” language arises when 
both multiple parties and multiple policies are involved. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
amount available to the five occupants of the Pratt minivan would have been 
$500,000.  The amount available for payment from the tortfeasor was $1,300,000, 
which was paid to the claimants herein.  As this amount exceeds the amount 
available from the Westfield policy, the occupants of the Pratt minivan are not 
entitled to underinsured motorist benefits from Westfield.7 
B.  Allstate Policy 
 
Ernie Pratt, on the other hand, is entitled to underinsured motorist benefits.  
Ernie Pratt, the grandson of decedent Stella Pratt, filed a claim for underinsured 
motorist benefits through his automobile liability policy with Allstate.  The 
Allstate policy provided underinsured motorist coverage with limits of $25,000 
per person and $50,000 per accident. 
 
Stella Pratt was struck and killed by a tortfeasor possessing $1,300,000 in 
liability coverage.  Allstate argues for a strict limits-to-limits approach, wherein 
the limits of the tortfeasor’s liability policy are compared to the limits of the 
underinsured motorist claimant’s automobile policy, which would preclude Ernie 
from any recovery of underinsured motorist benefits because the tortfeasor’s 
liability limits far exceeded the stated limits of Ernie’s policy with Allstate.  
Allstate argues that a limits-to-limits comparison satisfies both the language of 
and public policy behind R.C. 3937.18(A)(2). 
 
While we rejected this contention in Clark, the fallacy of Allstate’s 
position is further illustrated by Ernie Pratt’s underinsured motorist claim.  
According to the parties, Ernie received, from the $275,000 paid to the estate of 
Stella Pratt, $8,000 in wrongful death proceeds, presumably as a next of kin.  See 
R.C. 2125.02(A)(1).  Had Stella Pratt’s death resulted from an accident with an 
uninsured motorist, Ernie would have had uninsured motorist coverage from his 
                                                          
 
7. 
This case illustrates well the multiple-policies issue.  If each of the five occupants of the 
Pratt minivan had had a separate policy of insurance, then each would have had coverage under 
his or her own policy up to the single policy limit less any sums received from the tortfeasor’s 
policy. 
January Term, 2001 
11 
Allstate policy up to the $25,000 per-person limit.  Under a comparison of the 
limits, Ernie would not be entitled to recover underinsured motorist benefits.  
Thus, a strict policy-limits-to-limits comparison is untenable, as clearly it would 
give Ernie more coverage had Stella been killed in an accident caused by an 
uninsured motorist. 
 
Furthermore, while it is true that the tortfeasor’s automobile liability 
proceeds far exceeded the limits of Ernie’s Allstate policy, the entire amount of 
the tortfeasor’s policy has been allocated for the wrongful death and personal 
injuries suffered by the five occupants of the Pratt minivan.  Allstate would have 
us apply the entire $1,300,000 settlement from the tortfeasor as a setoff against 
the limits of Ernie’s automobile liability policy when, in fact, those proceeds have 
been exhausted by payments to parties other than Allstate’s own insured, Ernie.  
For the policy reasons set forth by the General Assembly and explained both in 
Clark and herein, we reject this argument of Allstate. 
 
Moreover, it is only because Ernie has a separate automobile liability 
policy through Allstate that he is able to recover underinsured motorist benefits.  
Ernie was not an insured under either the Westfield or Colonial Penn policies that 
provided underinsured motorist coverage for the occupants of the Pratt minivan.  
As a result, if Ernie did not have a separate contract of automobile liability 
insurance with Allstate, he would have no claim at all for underinsured motorist 
coverage regardless of the settlement received from the tortfeasor or the policy 
limits provided in the Westfield or Colonial Penn policies. 
 
Therefore, because Ernie did receive $8,000 out of the proceeds paid by 
the tortfeasor for the wrongful death of Stella Pratt, that is the amount available 
for payment from the tortfeasor.  Ernie is, therefore, entitled to underinsured 
motorist coverage up to the single, per-person limit of his Allstate policy, reduced 
by the amount received from the tortfeasor. 
III.  Stickney v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
Appellant, Scott Stickney, received $125,000 from the tortfeasor’s liability 
carrier toward his damages resulting from the death of his daughter, Jennifer.  
Scott’s wife, Cynthia, and their other children, Gina and Scott, Jr., did not receive 
any share of the settlement proceeds.  Two automobile liability insurance policies, 
insuring Scott and his family and issued by State Farm with underinsured motorist 
coverage limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident, were in effect 
at the time of Jennifer’s accidental death.  According to appellant, since Cynthia, 
Gina, and Scott, Jr., as statutory wrongful death beneficiaries, did not share in the 
settlement proceeds received from the tortfeasor’s liability carrier, they are 
entitled to recover underinsured motorist benefits from the State Farm policies.  
State Farm, on the other hand, contends that the $125,000 from the tortfeasor’s 
liability policy was the amount available for payment applicable to all wrongful 
death claimants and that is the amount that should be set off against the $100,000 
per-person limits of the State Farm policies. 
 
In order to determine the amount of underinsured motorist coverage 
available to the wrongful death beneficiaries, we begin by determining the amount 
that those beneficiaries would have received had their losses resulted from the 
negligence of an uninsured motorist.  There apparently is no dispute between the 
parties concerning the antistacking clause and the single per-person limit 
provision in the State Farm policies.  The trial court granted summary judgment in 
favor of State Farm, and appellant did not challenge the validity of these clauses 
on appeal.  Thus, had appellant’s decedent been killed by an uninsured motorist, 
the maximum amount that all wrongful death beneficiaries could have recovered 
in uninsured motorist benefits, according to policy language permitted by R.C. 
3937.18(H), would have been the $100,000 per-person limit of the State Farm 
policy.  Pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), underinsured motorist coverage is 
“provided only to afford the insured an amount of protection not greater than that 
which would be available under the insured’s uninsured motorist coverage” had 
January Term, 2001 
13 
the tortfeasor been uninsured at the time of the accident.  The amount awarded to 
decedent’s personal representative for the benefit of the next of kin, $125,000, is 
the amount available for payment.  Since this amount exceeds that which would 
be available under appellant’s uninsured motorist coverage, the wrongful death 
beneficiaries are not entitled to underinsured motorist benefits from State Farm. 
IV.  Karr v. Borchardt 
 
The parties agree that $100,000 was paid from the tortfeasor’s liability 
carrier to the personal representative of decedent Helen Beddow and distributed 
equally among the five statutory wrongful death beneficiaries, each receiving 
$20,000. 
 
The appellants argue that although $100,000 in liability proceeds had been 
paid to the survivors of the deceased, Helen Beddow, $100,000 was not available 
for payment to each insured but, rather, that amount was available for payment to 
all statutory beneficiaries.  Appellants contend that each statutory wrongful death 
beneficiary received slightly less than $9,000 from the tortfeasor (his or her pro 
rata share after expenses, attorney fees, and a statutory subrogation lien to 
Medicare) and that is the “amount available for payment” that should be 
compared to the policy limits of the underinsured motorist coverage.  In contrast, 
the insurers contend that each statutory beneficiary’s share of the liability 
coverage received from the tortfeasor ($20,000), and not his or her net recovery, 
is the figure that must be compared to the limits of underinsured motorist 
coverage for purposes of calculating setoff and determining whether the tortfeasor 
was underinsured within the meaning of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2).  Appellees urge that 
$20,000 is the amount available for payment and that attorney fees and other 
expenses should not be taken into consideration.  Appellees are correct, with the 
exception that the pro rata share of the statutory subrogation lien to Medicare 
should not be charged as part of the setoff.  Our explanation of the appropriate 
calculations for each claimant follows. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
As a preliminary matter, we hold that expenses and attorney fees are not 
part of the setoff equation.  Such fees are an expense of an insured and should not 
act, in order to increase underinsured motorist benefits, to reduce the “amounts 
available for payment” from the tortfeasor’s automobile liability carrier.  
Conversely, a statutory subrogation lien to Medicare should be considered when 
determining the amounts available for payment from the tortfeasor.  Such a lien is 
not an expense of an insured. 
 
Appellants claim that the total amount of the statutory subrogation lien to 
Medicare is $21,698.13.  Thus, the charge to each of the five wrongful death 
beneficiaries for their pro rata share of the Medicare lien is $4,339.63. 
A.  Ginger Karr 
 
Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that Ginger Karr is not entitled to 
underinsured motorist benefits.  At the time of her mother’s fatal accident, Ginger 
had in effect an automobile liability policy with Progressive that provided 
underinsured motorist coverage in the amount of $12,500 per person and $25,000 
per accident.  If the decedent had been killed by an uninsured motorist, Ginger 
would have had uninsured motorist coverage up to a maximum amount of 
$12,500.  Ginger has received $20,000 from the tortfeasor.  After taking into 
consideration Ginger’s pro rata share of the subrogation lien, and subtracting that 
amount ($4,339.63) from the $20,000 that Ginger recovered from the tortfeasor, 
Ginger’s actual amount recovered was $15,660.37.  If the accident had been 
caused by the negligence of an uninsured motorist, Ginger could not have 
received more than the $12,500 per-person limit from her Progressive policy.  
Therefore, Ginger is not entitled to underinsured motorist coverage. 
B.  Vicki Husk and John Beddow 
 
However, Vicki Husk and John Beddow are entitled to underinsured 
motorist coverage from their respective policies.  Vicki Husk had underinsured 
motorist coverage with Allstate Insurance Company with limits of $100,000 per 
January Term, 2001 
15 
person and $300,000 per accident.  Vicki could, therefore, collect up to the 
$100,000 per-person limit if the accident had been the fault of an uninsured 
motorist.  In comparison, the amount available for payment to Vicki from the 
tortfeasor’s liability carrier was the same as it was to her sister, Ginger Karr, 
approximately $15,660.  As a result, the tortfeasor was underinsured as to Vicki, 
and Vicki has underinsured motorist coverage up to the per-person limit of her 
Allstate policy after setting off the amount recovered from the tortfeasor. 
 
John Beddow had an automobile liability insurance policy issued by State 
Farm that provided underinsured motorist coverage with limits of $50,000 per 
person and $100,000 per accident.  John’s recovery from the tortfeasor was 
approximately $15,660, the amount available for payment to all statutory 
wrongful death beneficiaries.  As John could have collected up to his per-person 
limit of $50,000 had the tortfeasor been an uninsured motorist, John also is 
entitled to underinsured motorist coverage.  Accordingly, John may collect 
underinsured motorist benefits up to the per-person limit of his State Farm policy 
less the amount available for payment from the tortfeasor. 
V.  Conclusion 
 
We therefore reverse the judgments of the courts of appeals and remand 
these matters to the trial courts for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion, recognizing, of course, that action taken by the trial courts in Stickney 
and Karr based on our previous remand may have been dispositive of these 
matters. 
Judgments reversed 
and causes remanded. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  Recently, I respectfully dissented from this court’s 
decision interpreting the phrase “amounts available for payment” in R.C. 
3937.18(A)(2).  See Clark v. Scarpelli (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 271, 284, 744 
N.E.2d 719, 731 (Cook, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  I predicated 
my dissent upon the Clark majority’s having reached and decided an issue that 
Clark did not, and could not, even present.  I further noted my view that the Clark 
majority had misconstrued the validity of Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Andrews 
(1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 362, 604 N.E.2d 142, misappropriated authority reserved to 
the General Assembly, and misapplied R.C. 3937.18(A)(2)’s triggering provision.  
The majority today repeats these same errors. 
I.  Triggering 
 
By reaching the setoff issue in the consolidated cases, the majority here, as 
in Clark, incorrectly accepts that underinsured motorist coverage has first been 
triggered.  As I explained in my dissent in Clark, the General Assembly has 
superseded the interpretation of the triggering provision to which the majority 
erroneously adheres.8  See Section 7, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 
238; Clark v. Scarpelli (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d at 287-288, 744 N.E.2d at 733-734 
                                                          
 
8. 
Section 7, S.B. 20, 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 238, provides: 
 
“It is the intent of the General Assembly in amending division (A)(2) of section 3937.18 
of the Revised Code to supersede the effect of the holding of the Ohio Supreme Court in the 
October 1, 1993 decision in Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500 [620 
N.E.2d 809]relative to the application of underinsured motorist coverage in those situations 
involving accidents where the tortfeasor’s bodily injury liability limits are greater than or equal to 
the limits of the underinsured motorist coverage.” 
 
I have previously explained the effect of this uncodified law as follows: 
 
“Given such an explicit expression of legislative intent, I cannot agree that the General 
Assembly intended to adhere to the Andrews-Savoie construction of the triggering provision of 
R.C. 3937.18(A)(2).  Because Savoie and Andrews contain the same erroneous interpretation of 
the statute, superseding Savoie has the practical effect of superseding Andrews.  The ‘triggering’ 
sentence of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) should therefore not be interpreted pursuant to the Andrews-
Savoie ‘amount recovered to limits of UIM coverage’ comparison.  Rather, the uncodified law 
should be viewed as evincing an intent to correct this court’s prior, erroneous interpretation of the 
triggering provision set forth in Andrews and Savoie and to reinforce the limits-to-limits 
comparison that the plain language of the statute warrants.”  Clark, 91 Ohio St.3d at 287-288, 744 
N.E.2d at 734 (Cook, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
January Term, 2001 
17 
(Cook, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The plain language of the 
statute mandates a limits-to-limits comparison as opposed to a comparison of the 
amounts actually recovered to the underinsured motorist policy limits.  This 
limits-to-limits comparison precludes application of underinsured motorist 
coverage in Littrell, Stickney, and Karr. 
Littrell 
 
In regard to Littrell, the majority correctly concludes, albeit using wrong 
reasoning, that there can be no recovery from the underinsured motorist coverage 
of Ina Littrell’s policy.  The majority erroneously concludes, however, that Ernie 
Platt may recover under his policy.  But as the majority acknowledges, when 
comparing limits to limits, Platt cannot recover “because the tortfeasor’s liability 
limits far exceeded the stated limits of Ernie’s policy with Allstate.”  That is the 
correct result under the law enacted by the General Assembly.  While the majority 
rejects this interpretation on the basis that “a strict policy-limits-to-limits 
comparison is untenable,” “the role of a court is not to decide what the law should 
say; rather, the role of this court is to interpret what the law says as it has been 
written by the General Assembly—regardless of whether it constitutes sound 
policy.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Clark, 91 Ohio St.3d at 291, 744 N.E.2d at 736 (Cook, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), citing Cablevision of the Midwest, 
Inc. v. Gross (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 541, 544, 639 N.E.2d 1154, 1156. 
Stickney 
 
The majority correctly determines that there is no underinsured recovery 
in Stickney, but again uses the same wrong reasoning.  It is not that the amount 
actually recovered by Scott Stickney offsets any applicable underinsured motorist 
coverage that resolves the question; rather, the fact that the limits of coverage 
available under the tortfeasor’s policy equaled the limits of the underinsured 
motorist coverage precluded further recovery.  Like Platt’s underinsured motorist 
coverage in Littrell, Stickney’s coverage was never even triggered. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
Karr 
 
The majority is similarly correct in finding no underinsured recovery but 
wrong in rationale in regard to Ginger Karr in Karr.  Although Karr’s recovery 
exceeded her $12,500 per-person policy limit, it is the triggering provision and 
not the setoff provision of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) that forecloses recovery.  Further, 
because a limits-to-limits comparison of Borchardt’s $100,000/$300,000 liability 
policy and the respective policies held by Vicki Husk ($100,000/$300,000) and 
John Beddow ($50,000/$100,000) reveals either equal limits, or in Beddow’s 
case, a higher policy limit, underinsured motorist coverage is not triggered.  The 
majority should not, therefore, have reached the issues of how expenses, attorney 
fees, and Medicare payments figure in calculating setoff under R.C. 
3937.18(A)(2). 
II.  Setoff 
 
In my dissent in Clark, I noted that to regard the phrase “amounts actually 
recovered” in pre-S.B. 20 R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) as having the same meaning as the 
phrase “amounts available for payment” in the amended statute “espouses the 
view that the 1994 amendment to the statute was merely cosmetic, then, as it 
would have effected no substantive change.”  Clark, 91 Ohio St.3d at 291, 744 
N.E.2d at 736-737 (Cook, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Because 
this issue of interpretation was not properly presented in Clark, I expressed no 
opinion as to its ultimate validity.  But because the majority has continued to 
adhere to its erroneous reasoning, I address the issue here so as to clarify just what 
I assess to be the proper rationale to be applied in those cases in which the issue 
of setoff actually exists. 
 
Even if these cases did present the issue of what amounts the R.C. 
3937.18(A)(2) setoff provision contemplates—and even though I agree with the 
conclusion that the majority reaches—I would not join in the majority’s 
reasoning.  This is so because the majority’s questionable reliance on Andrews is 
January Term, 2001 
19 
wholly unnecessary.  Rather, uncodified law expresses legislative intent to 
provide for setoff of the amounts actually recovered. 
 
A review of the legislative development of underinsured motorist law 
reveals that the General Assembly enacted former R.C. 3937.181 in 1980 with the 
passage of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 22.  That statute contained no explicit setoff 
provision, but incorporated the subrogation provision for uninsured motorist 
coverage contained in R.C. 3937.18(C).  138 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1458, 1460.  That 
latter section provided that “the insurer * * * is entitled to the proceeds of any 
settlement or judgment resulting from the exercise of any rights of recovery of 
[the injured party] against [the tortfeasor].”  Id. at 1459. 
 
In 1982, the General Assembly passed Am.Sub.H.B. No. 489.  This bill 
repealed R.C. 3937.181 and incorporated reworked underinsured motorist 
coverage provisions into R.C. 3937.18.  The resulting version of R.C. 
3937.18(A)(2) provided that the limits of an insured’s recovery were to be 
calculated as follows: 
 
“The limits of liability for an insurer providing underinsured motorist 
coverage shall be the limits of such coverage, less those amounts actually 
recovered under all applicable bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies 
covering persons liable to the insured.”  139 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2937. 
 
The setoff scheme therefore called for subtracting the amount paid to the 
injured party from the limits of that party’s underinsured motorist policy. 
 
The General Assembly then passed Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20 (“S.B. 20”) in 
1994.  S.B. 20 amended the setoff provision of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) to read9: 
 
“The policy limits of the underinsured motorist coverage shall be reduced 
by those amounts available for payment under all applicable bodily injury liability 
                                                          
 
9. 
The General Assembly also amended R.C. 3937.18 in 1997 (147 Ohio Laws, Part II, 
2372), 1999 (S.B. No. 57), and 2000 (Sub.S.B. No. 267).  These amendments did not alter the 
setoff provision of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured.”  145 Ohio 
Laws, Part I, 211. 
 
I find that the uncodified law found in Section 8 of S.B. 20, 145 Ohio 
Laws, Part I, 204, 238, answers just what the phrase “amounts available for 
payment” is intended to mean.  That section provides: 
 
“It is the intent of the General Assembly in amending division (A)(2) of 
Section 3937.18 of the Revised Code to declare and confirm that the purpose and 
intent of the 114th General Assembly in enacting division (A)(2) of section 
3937.18 in Am. H.B. 489 was, and the intent of the General Assembly in 
amending section 3937.18 of the Revised Code in this act is, to provide an offset 
against the limits of the underinsured motorist coverage of those amounts 
available for payment from the tortfeasor’s bodily injury liability coverage.”  Id. 
at 238. 
 
With this the General Assembly stated that it intended the phrase 
“amounts available for payment” in the amended statute to have the same effect 
and purpose as the phrase “amounts actually recovered” in the prior version of the 
statute.  This expression of intent resolves the interpretation issue without resort 
to the majority’s contorted deductions from the Andrews case.10 
III.  Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I disagree with the majority’s deciding an issue 
of underinsured motorist law not presented by the cases at bar.  Were the setoff 
question actually presented, the relevant uncodified law would lead me to concur 
                                                          
 
10. 
“As the majority concedes, Andrews interpreted the triggering provision of (A)(2) and not 
the setoff provision.  While Andrews construed ‘the limits of coverage available for payment’ in 
the triggering provision of subsection (A)(2) to mean ‘the amount actually available for 
payment’—essentially the same as ‘those amounts actually recovered’ in the language of the 
former setoff sentence of the subsection—this interpretation was erroneous both then and now.  
Andrews, 65 Ohio St.3d at 366, 604 N.E.2d at 145-146.  The [Andrews] rationale has not only 
been superseded; moreover, it was predicated on an unsupported perception of public policy and 
was contrary to the plain language of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2).”  Clark, 91 Ohio St.3d at 291-292, 744 
N.E.2d at 737 (Cook, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
January Term, 2001 
21 
only in the syllabus language, with the exception of its reliance on the erroneous 
Clark.  Because I would affirm the courts of appeals, I respectfully dissent. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur in the foregoing 
dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Elk & Elk Co., L.P.A., Thomas L. Dettelbach and Todd O. Rosenberg, for 
appellants in case No. 98-2445. 
 
Meyers, Hentemann & Rea Co., L.P.A., Henry A. Hentemann and J. 
Michael Creagan, for appellee in case No. 98-2445. 
 
Murray & Murray Co., L.P.A., Dennis E. Murray, Sr., W. Patrick Murray, 
Charles M. Murray and Steven C. Bechtel, for appellants in case Nos. 99-219, 99-
223 and 99-224. 
 
Meyers, Hentemann & Rea Co., L.P.A., Henry A. Hentemann and J. 
Michael Creagan, for appellee Progressive Insurance Company in case No. 99-
219. 
 
Eastman & Smith, Ltd., and John D. Willey, Jr., for appellee Allstate 
Insurance Company in case No. 99-223. 
 
Gallagher, Bradigan, Gams, Pryor & Littrell, L.L.P., and James R. 
Gallagher; Kitch, Drutchas, Wagner & Kenney, P.C., John S. Wasung and Susan 
Healy Zitterman, for appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
in case No. 99-224. 
 
Waite, Schneider, Bayless & Chesley and Arthur D. Rabourn; Casper & 
Casper and Margaret H. McCollum, for appellants in case Nos. 00-745 and 00-
801. 
 
Benjamin, Yocum & Heather, L.L.C., Timothy P. Heather and Charles F. 
Hollis III, for appellee Allstate Insurance Company in case Nos. 00-745 and 00-
801. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
Droder & Miller Co., L.P.A., and W. John Sellins, for appellee Westfield 
Insurance Company in case Nos. 00-745 and 00-801. 
 
Murray & Murray Co., L.P.A., Steven C. Bechtel, W. Patrick Murray and 
Charles M. Murray, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Academy of Trial 
Lawyers in case Nos. 00-745 and 00-801. 
 
Elk & Elk Co., L.P.A., and Todd O. Rosenberg, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae Cleveland Academy of Trial Lawyers in case Nos. 00-745 and 00-801. 
__________________