Case Title: State v. Wilcox

Citation: 160 Vt. 271, 628 A.2d 924

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1993-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_WILCOX.92-355; 160 Vt. 271; 628 A.2d 924

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-355


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

 Kevin Wilcox                                 April Term, 1993


 Robert Grussing III, J.

 Christopher C. Moll, Windham County Deputy State's Attorney, Brattleboro,
   fo plaintiff-appellee

 Sam Kono, Public Defender, Brattleboro, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   Defendant appeals from a jury conviction of disturbing the
 peace by use of the telephone, in violation of 13 V.S.A. { 1027(a).  He
 argues that the court erred by instructing the jury that the intent required
 under the statute should be measured at the time the threat was made rather
 than at the time the call was placed.  Relying on the same statutory
 argument, defendant also contends that the court erred by denying his motion
 for judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence.  We
 reverse.
        The alleged victim received a call from defendant, who apparently
 wished to complain to her husband, a town selectman, about perceived
 injustices he had suffered at the hands of the town.  The caller identified
 himself, and the wife recognized his voice from several previous calls.
 Despite the wife's repeated attempts to convince defendant that she could
 not help him, the phone call lasted approximately twenty minutes.  The wife
 finally hung up when defendant stated something to the effect, "How would
 you like to be shot?"  Defendant was charged under { 1027(a)(ii), which
 criminalizes telephoning another and threatening "to inflict injury or
 physical harm to the person" if done with the "intent to terrify,
 intimidate, threaten, harass or annoy."  The information stated that
 defendant was "a person who with intent to intimidate telephoned another . .
 . and threatened to inflict physical harm."
      After the State rested at trial, defendant moved for judgment of
 acquittal on the ground that the State had failed to prove that he had the
 requisite intent at the time the call was placed.  In denying defendant's
 motion, the court ruled that intent should be measured at the time the
 threat was made.  Defendant then rested.  He renewed his argument prior to
 the court's charge, but the court again rejected his interpretation of the
 statute and gave an instruction on intent in accordance with its earlier
 ruling.  After some deliberation, the jury foreman indicated that the jury
 was having difficulty reconciling the court's instruction on intent with the
 statutory language.  The court then stated that, as a matter of law, "intent
 must be measured at the time the words were spoken, not at the time the
 telephone call was made or immediately prior to it."  The jury returned a
 guilty verdict shortly thereafter.
      Section 1027(a) of Title 13 was added in 1967 in response to concern
 over increased use of the telephone as a vehicle to harass persons.  Hearing
 on H-42 Before the House Judiciary Committee, January 18, 1967, microfilm
 no. F-671, at 1-2 (statement of representative of telephone company that
 requested bill).  Similarly worded statutes exist in many other
 jurisdictions, see Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
 State Criminal Statute Forbidding Use of Telephone to Annoy or Harass, 95
 A.L.R.3d 411 (1979) [hereinafter Use of Telephone to Annoy or Harass],
 including Arizona, whose telephone harassment statute served as a model for
 { 1027.  Hearing on H-42, supra, at 4-5 (statements of deputy attorney
 general and telephone company's attorney).
      All of the jurisdictions that have addressed this issue, including
 Arizona, (FN1) have concluded that specific intent under these statutes is
 measured at the time the call is placed.  See, e.g., Gormley v. Director,
 Conn. State Dep't of Probation, 632 F.2d 938, 941-42 (2d Cir. 1980)
 (interpreting similarly worded Connecticut statute); State v. Hagen, 558 P.2d 750, 753 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976); State v. Gattis,