Case Title: Cofer v. Ensor

Citation: 473 So. 2d 984

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1985-04-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
473 So. 2d 984 (1985)
Robin M. COFER, as mother of Baby Cofer, deceased
v.
Herman C. ENSOR; Ensor, Baccus, Williamson, P.A.; Cullman Medical Center.
83-898.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 12, 1985.
Rehearing Denied July 3, 1985.
*985 Carl E. Chamblee, Sr. and Gould H.K. Blair, Birmingham, for appellant.
Robert E. Parsons and Marda W. Sydnor of McDaniel, Hall, Parsons, Conerly & Lusk, Birmingham, for appellee Cullman Medical Center.
PER CURIAM.
This case presents an issue of first impression:
Does the minority of a parent of a deceased minor child toll the running of the two-year period for bringing an action under Code of 1975, § 6-5-391, for the wrongful death of the minor child?
Stated differently, and perhaps more precisely as to the dispositive questions involved, is the two-year limitations period found in § 6-2-38(a), applicable to § 6-5-391, a technical statute of limitations, and thus subject to the tolling provisions of § 6-2-8(a); or is it a statute of creation, not subject to any tolling provisions, as is § 6-5-410 (wrongful death statute), in which a two-year limitations period is expressly stated (§ 6-5-410(d)), and which has been deemed "not [to be] a statute of limitations, but of the essence of the cause of action"? Parker v. Fies & Sons, 243 Ala. 348, 350, 10 So. 2d 13, 15 (1942). We hold that the two-year limitations period found in § 6-2-38(a), as applied to § 6-5-391, is a "statute of creation" and the action is barred.
Plaintiff, Robin Cofer, gave birth to a baby boy on February 10, 1980, at the Cullman Medical Center. The child died the same day. Robin Cofer's attending physician was Dr. Herman C. Ensor. At the time she gave birth, Cofer was 16 years old and married. Later that year, however, on November 14, 1980, Cofer obtained a divorce, and, therefore, she never reached the age of 18 while she was married, nor was she ever otherwise freed of the disabilities of non-age.
On December 22, 1982, the day before her nineteenth birthday, Cofer brought an action against her doctor, Herman Ensor, and the Cullman Medical Center, alleging medical malpractice in their treatment of her, which she alleges resulted in her inability to bear children. She also added a claim for the wrongful death of her minor son.
The Cullman Circuit Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the wrongful death count of the complaint on the ground that it was time barred. The action was filed two years and ten and a half months after the alleged wrongful death of the child. The trial court granted Cofer's Rule *986 54(b), Ala.R.Civ.P., motion, certifying as final its dismissal of the wrongful death claim.
The pertinent provisions of those code sections relevant to the issue involved in this case are as follows:
This Court has recognized the general rule that a distinction exists between a true statute of limitations and a statute which creates a new right of action with an express restriction on the time within which an action may be brought to enforce the right. In her brief, Cofer designates the former a "statute of limitations," and the latter a "statute of creation." We adopt these designations for our use herein.
The Court of Civil Appeals in State, Department of Revenue v. Lindsey, 343 So. 2d 535, 537 (Ala.Civ.App.1977), explained the effect of the distinction between the two types of statutes:
Consequently, where a prescriptive period is contained within the statutory grant of a cause of action, it is a statute of creation, and the period is deemed a portion of the substantive right itself, not subject to tolling provisions. See Nicholson v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc., 278 Ala. 497, 179 So. 2d 76 (1965). On the other hand, where the prescriptive period comes from without the statute, it is a statute of limitations, to which the tolling provisions apply.
Cofer maintains that the two-year prescriptive period in Code of 1975, § 6-2-38(a), is a statute of limitations, and thus is subject to being tolled by the parent's minority under § 6-2-8(a). In support of the contention, Cofer relies on the statutory history of § 6-5-391, set forth below.
The original act (Session of 1871-72), allowing the parents a right of action for the wrongful death of a minor, contained a one-year limitations period.
For reasons not material here, the first act was found to be unconstitutional in Smith v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 75 Ala. 449 (1883).
When the legislature adopted an act allowing parents to sue for the death of a minor child (Act No. 36, Acts of Alabama, *988 approved January 23, 1885), the one-year provision was not contained in the act itself but it was included in the Code of 1887 as § 2619, and in the Code of 1897 as § 2801.
Act No. 36, 1885, reads as follows:
Section 2588, referred to in § 2619 of the 1887 Code, reads:
Sections 2800 and 2801, Code 1897, provide, in pertinent part, as follows:
Sections 27 and 26, referred to in sections 2800 and 2801 respectively, read as follows:
In 1907, the limitation for filing a wrongful death claim was set at two years, whether the suit was brought by a parent under Section 26 or the personal representative under Section 27 of the 1897 Code. Section 4839 of the 1907 Code reads as follows:
Sections 2485 and 2486 read as follows:
A commissioner's note to Code 1907, § 2485, gives a detailed history of the section and shows some of the confusion which surrounded the adoption and operation of the section. The commentary also shows, however, that in the opinion of the court, the words "any person" in old section 2486 (now § 6-5-410), included minors or adults. The Commissioner's note and annotations in the 1907 Code read as follows:
The Code Commissioner also gave a history of § 2486; the Commissioner's note and related annotations read as follows:
Note: Of course, the holding mentioned in the Commissioner's note that damages recoverable under § 26 are compensatory has been overruled.
It is quite apparent from a reading of the commissioner's comments that there could be only one cause of action for wrongful death. In Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Robinson, 141 Ala. 325, 37 So. 431 (1904), an action was brought by the mother of a deceased child, as the administatrix of the child's estate, for the alleged negligent killing of the child. This Court allowed an amendment of the complaint which changed the cause of action from § 25 (injury to a child) or § 26 (death of a child) or § 27 (wrongful death of the "testator" or "intestate").
It is well-settled that the limitations period found in § 6-5-410(d) is a statute of creation, and not subject to tolling provisions because it is "of the essence of the cause of action."
In Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Chamblee, 171 Ala. 188, 54 So. 681, 682 (1911), this Court held that the two-year period provided in the wrongful death statute, within which a wrongful death action *992 must be brought, is a statute of creation, because
Accord, Downtown Nursing Home, Inc., v. Pool, 375 So. 2d 465 (Ala.1979); Shirley v. Getty Oil Co., 367 So. 2d 1388 (Ala.1979); Nicholson v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc., supra; Parker v. Fies & Sons, supra; Larry v. Taylor, 227 Ala. 90, 149 So. 104 (1933).
This Court has consistently applied the general rules governing the distinction between a statute of creation and a statute of limitation, set forth below, in reaching the conclusion that the two-year period stated within § 6-5-410 is a statute of creation:
51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions, § 8, p. 596 (1970).
Although § 6-5-391 does not contain a limitation period within the section itself, as does § 6-5-410, does that mean that the cause of action for the death of a minor is governed by the general statute of limitations, especially the tolling provisions of § 6-2-8? We think not.
When the original cause of action for wrongful death was legislatively created in 1852, it did not exclude wrongful death of minors. Thus, the two-year period included in the statute of creation applied equally to all persons. Subsequently, the statute that gave the right of action for wrongful death of a minor directly to the parent (presently § 6-5-391) did not create a cause of action for wrongful death; it allowed the parents to sue for any child's wrongful death. To conclude otherwise would be to hold that between 1852 and 1876 no cause of action existed in Alabama for the wrongful death of a minor. Thus, because the source of the period of limitations for the wrongful death of a minor was contained in the original 1852 wrongful death statute and continues to be included in § 6-5-410, it is a statute of *993 creation and not a tollable statute of limitations. The fact that the 1876 statute, vesting the cause of action in the parent, altered the period of limitations from two years to one year (a difference that was later eliminated) does not change its original source. Nor does the inclusion of this period of limitations in § 6-2-38(a) establish this separate listing as its statutory source.
The listing of the two-year period of limitations in § 6-2-38(a) must be taken for what it isnothing more and nothing less. It is a part of a total compilation of periods of limitations for causes of action ranging from those with no limitations to causes of actions of twenty years to six months. The legislature, in its wisdom, saw fit to bring together in one place in the Code the periods of limitations applicable to various common law causes of action. The fact that it elected to include within this compilation the periods of limitations applicable to wrongful death in no way reflects any legislative intent to establish this particular listing (now codified as § 6-2-38(a)) as the source of the periods of limitations for such actions.
Based on the foregoing, we can only reason that the two-year period fixed by § 6-5-410 is a statute of creation, and, therefore governs all suits for wrongful death, whether the death is that of a minor or an adult and whether the plaintiff is an adult, a minor, or a representative.
This same reasoning which we apply to § 6-5-391 was applied by the Court in Nicholson v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc., supra, in reaching the conclusion that the tolling statute (§ 6-2-8) was inapplicable to actions deemed to have been brought under § 6-5-410:
See also Whitson v. Baker, 463 So. 2d 146 (Ala.1985).
Defendants urge this Court to apply the untollable two-year period of § 6-5-410 to suits filed under § 6-5-391, as it was applied by the Court in Nicholson v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc., supra, to a suit brought by a minor dependent pursuant to what is now Code of 1975, § 25-5-11, of the Alabama Workmen's Compensation Act. This we do.
Section 25-5-11(a), in pertinent part, follows:
In Nicholson v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, supra, the Court was faced with the issue of whether or not the limitation period for filing a wrongful death suit in an employment related death pursuant to what is now § 25-5-11(a), should be tolled by the minority of the plaintiffs, the deceased employee's dependent children. The Court held that their minority did not toll the two-year limitation period, by reasoning that:
In a later case, Alabama Power Co. v. White, 377 So. 2d 930 (Ala.1979), this Court explained the purpose of § 25-5-11 in relation to § 6-5-410:
"Baggett v. Webb, 46 Ala.App. 666, 674, 248 So. 2d 275, 282 (1971) [emphasis omitted].
"The Supreme Court of Alabama gave the same interpretation to Code 1940, Tit. 26, § 312, the predecessor of Code 1975, § 25-5-11(a), as did the Court of Civil Appeals: `Section 312, Title 26, Code of Alabama 1940, gives to the dependents of an employee killed under circumstances creating liability against a third party a right to bring an action against such third party.' Nicholson v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc., 278 Ala. 497, 499, 179 So. 2d 76, 78 (1965) [emphasis omitted]....
"Appellant argues in its brief, and we agree that in Alabama there is but one cause of action for wrongful death, i.e., Code 1975, § 6-5-410. Nicholson v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc., 278 Ala. 497, 179 So. 2d 76 (1965). In other words, § 25-5-11(a) gives to the dependents of an employee killed under circumstances *995 creating liability against a third party a right to commence an action against such third party, but such action, when commenced must be deemed to arise under § 6-5-410. Nicholson, supra...." (Emphasis added.) 377 So. 2d  at 932-933.
Defendants argue that the right conferred in § 6-5-391 is so closely analogous to that conferred in § 25-5-11(a) that the same reasoning applied by the court in Nicholson, supra, should be applied here. We agree with the defendants. We recognize that § 6-5-410 and § 6-5-391 confer two separate and distinct causes of action, that the persons authorized to sue are not the same, and that the distribution of any recovery is different; but the fact remains that there can be only one action for wrongful death and that the two-year period is a statute of creation, and is of the essence of the right to sue.
The judgment of the trial court holding the action barred is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
MADDOX, JONES, SHORES, EMBRY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
TORBERT, C.J., and FAULKNER, ALMON and BEATTY, JJ., dissent.
BEATTY, Justice (dissenting):
Because the majority's holding in this case contravenes rules of statutory construction long applied by this Court, I must dissent.
This case was originally assigned to the author of this dissent. The opinion as proposed did not carry. With the consent of this dissenter, the author of the present majority opinion has incorporated some of the language used in the originally proposed opinion. Since it has become necessary for this author to conform that original opinion into this dissent, some of the language used in the majority opinion will be repeated herein.
In concluding that the limitations period stated within Code of 1975, § 6-5-410 (hereinafter referred to as § 410), governs actions brought under § 6-5-391 (hereinafter referred to as § 391), the majority overlooks the unequivocal statutory and case history to the contrary and misapplies well-established rules of statutory construction. Those rules of construction, with respect to limitation of actions, bear repeating: "[W]here the time within which the statutorily-created cause of action is fixed in the act creating the right," it is a statute of creation and not subject to being tolled. Nicholson v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc., 278 Ala. 497, 500, 179 So. 2d 76, 78 (1965). However, a general statute of limitations, such as § 6-2-38, which is made applicable to one or several rights of action, and which is contained in a statute separate and apart from those statutes creating or conferring those rights of action, is subject to being tolled. Nicholson, supra.
Although, in its opinion, the majority recognizes that § 410 and § 391 "confer two separate and distinct causes of action," it, nevertheless, concludes that the original predecessor to § 391 (Code of 1886, § 2588) "did not create a cause of action for wrongful death; it [merely] allowed the parents to sue for any child's wrongful death." Without question, resolution of the crucial issue this case presents (i.e., whether actions brought under § 391 are subject to a statute of creation or a statute of limitations) involves statutory interpretation or construction, which turns on a determination of legislative intent. In its attempt to make this determination, the majority has clearly missed the mark.
The majority reasons that the "source" of the limitations period applicable to § 391 is § 410 because, prior to the enactment of the statute creating the parents' right of action (now § 391), the personal representative of a child's estate could bring an action under the statute creating a right of action in the personal representative for wrongful death (now § 410). In so holding, the majority discounts completely one factor that points up the inaccuracy of the majority's reasoning on this issue:
Furthermore, although the personal representative had a cause of action prior to the anactment of § 391, the parents did not.
In effect, what the majority has done is substitute what it reasons to be the logical result (i.e., one cause of action for wrongful death subject to one limitations period of the same character) for that which the legislature intended in enacting § 391 and its predecessors, as is evidenced by both the language contained in and omitted from the statutes themselves.
First of all, it should be noted that when the original act (Act No. 61, Acts of Alabama, approved February 24, 1872), which contained the proviso "that suit must be brought ... within twelve months after the decease of said child," was codified in the Code of 1876 at § 2899, this proviso was deleted and, in its stead, a general limitations provision made applicable to the parents' action was added at Code of 1876, § 3231(7). This section provided that "[a]ctions under section 2899 by father or mother, against corporation or private association for wrongful act of officer or agent, causing death of minor child," must be brought within one year.
It is highly significant, and not to be overlooked, that, while the origin of this limitations statute is the original act creating the parents' right of action, in codifying this act, the legislature omitted the limitations period from the statute, § 2899, and placed it in a completely different chapter of the Code, namely, the chapter entitled, "Limitations of Actions." The fact that it was codified separately is strong evidence that, from the beginning, the legislature did not intend the parents' cause of action to be subject to a statute of creation.
Moreover, that the legislature chose, from the beginning, to place the parents' cause of action in a statute separate from that of the personal representative, and attach to it, in a completely different manner, a different time limitation (one year for the parents' action as opposed to two years for the personal representative's action) ought to be sufficient evidence of its intention that the parents' cause of action be separate and distinct from the personal representative's cause. Indeed, it seems to me that this factor alone adequately discredits the majority's misfounded notion that § 410 is so much the "source" of § 391 that this Court should ignore the history of § 391, separately, and in relation to § 410, and attach § 410's limitations period to § 391, when clearly this was never the legislature's intention.
Turning again to the statutory history of §§ 391 and 410, I find further evidence of the legislature's intent that these causes of actions are separate in the fact that just 19 days before passing the original act (Act No. 61, supra) the legislature passed Act No. 62, Acts of Alabama, approved February 5, 1872, which became the "new" wrongful death statute for the personal representative, repealing all prior wrongful death laws:
Later, when both of these death acts were put into the Code of 1876, the intended difference in the limitations period applicable to each surfaced. Not only did the legislature attach different time limitations to each action, but it also left the two-year period inside § 410 (then Code of 1876, § 2641), and did not put in a general limitations section in Chapter 2 of that Code, supra, applicable to § 410.
With respect to § 391 (then § 2899), the legislature did the exact opposite. As explained above, instead of leaving the one-year period inside the statute, as it had appeared in the act, the legislature omitted it entirely from the statute, and put in a general limitations section (§ 3231(7)) in the chapter of that Code entitled "Limitations of Actions." Clearly, this deliberate action on the part of the legislature reflects their intentions with respect to the limitations period applicable to § 391. The fact that they treated it differently from that in § 410 indicates they intended it to be given a different effect. And, under the rules of statutory construction, correctly stated but incorrectly applied by the majority, the difference in the effect is clear: the limitation contained in § 410 operates as a statute of creation, and the limitation to § 391 does not; therefore, § 391 is subject to a statute of limitations, which is § 6-2-38(a). How could it be otherwise?
The legislative history goes on. Nine years after the original statute, § 2899, supra, was held unconstitutional, the legislature "re-enacted" the statute in 1885, curing its constitutional infirmities. This time, the legislature did not even state a limitations period in the new act, the language of which theretofore controlled:
Nor was the limitations period stated in the new statute codified in the Code of 1886 at § 2588:
The general limitations statute, § 3231(7), supra, was merely amended in the Code of 1886 (§ 2619(5)) by removing the language held unconstitutional:
Then, in the Code of 1896, the legislature did something which shows, without a doubt, that it intended that the two causes of action were different and subject to two different periods of limitations. In that *998 Code, the legislature added a section in the "Limitation of Actions" chapter providing that actions under § 410 (then § 27) must be commenced within two years, while retaining the succeeding section (§ 2801) that provided for the one-year limitations period for actions brought under § 391 (then § 26)[1]:
It was not until the 1907 Code that the legislature amended the limitations period applicable to actions brought under § 391 (then § 2485), making it two years as well:
It is worth noting that § 4839 above and now § 6-2-38 refer expressly to only "[a]n action by a representative" under §§ 391 and 410 and do not make any mention of an action by a parent under § 391. Doubtless, the two-year period in § 6-2-38 would be applied by analogy to the parent's action. Nevertheless, the necessity of applying § 6-2-38 to the parent's action by analogy further supports the correct construction that the time for bringing actions pursuant to § 6-5-391 is tolled by the minority of a surviving parent of the deceased minor child.
Notwithstanding this, the majority makes no attempt to rationalize its conclusion as to what the legislature intended, even in view of the fact that up until 1907 the length of the limitations period applicable to each cause of action was different. Furthermore, even though the legislature saw fit to give each plaintiff (the personal representative or the parent) the same length of time in which to bring an action, it does not follow from this that the legislature also intended to change the character of each of the limitations periods. Evidence of that would have had to have been something different indeed. For example, evidence of the legislative intent to make § 391 subject to a statute of creation might be an amendment to the statute itself, stating within it a two-year limitations period. The converse would be true with respect to § 410an intent to change the character of its limitations period could be inferred from an amendment striking the two-year period stated in § 410, while leaving § 6-2-38(a) intact. The result of this would be to have both § 391 and § 410 subject to a pure and tollable statute of limitations.
Nevertheless, what we have is that, while both § 391 and § 410 are enumerated in § 6-2-38(a), only § 410 has the two-year period fixed in the statute creating the right, Nicholson, supra, making only that section subject to a statute of creation. *999 Unlike § 410, § 391 does not fix the time within which that action may be commenced. The limitations period applicable to § 391 is found in § 6-2-38(a), and, therefore, according to the rules of construction adopted by this Court, it is a statute of limitations subject to tolling under § 6-2-8. Furthermore, there is absolutely nothing in the legislative or case history of either statute to indicate that the limitations period contained in the wrongful death statute (§ 410) was ever applicable to or the "original source" of the limitations period applicable to the parents' cause of action for the wrongful death of their minor child.
In holding that the period fixed by § 410 "governs all suits for wrongful death," perhaps the majority fails to see any reason or logic in having the parents' action under § 391 subject to a limitations period of a different kind than that applicable to the action by the personal representative under § 410. The reason is easy to see. The action for wrongful death under § 410 belongs to the personal representative who, by statute, cannot be subject to those disabilities which trigger the tolling statutes. Code of 1975, § 43-2-22. A parent, on the other hand, may indeed be so disabled at the time his or her right of action under § 391 accrues. This the legislature has always known. Thus, the logic in having the distinction between the two causes of action is clear.
The majority purports to apply the same reasoning applied by the Court in Nicholson, supra, concluding that "there can be only one action for wrongful death," and that the two-year limitations period found within § 410 is applicable to any suit filed for wrongful death. The majority so concludes despite its express recognition that "§ 6-5-410 and § 6-5-391 confer two separate and distinct causes of action, that the persons authorized to sue are not the same, and that the distribution of any recovery is different." I emphasize that the Court in Nicholson did not in any way address the applicability of § 410's limitations period to actions under § 391. It was concerned only with § 410's applicability to Code of 1975, § 25-5-11.
Section 25-5-11(a) states, in pertinent part:
In Nicholson, supra, the Court had to decide whether or not the limitations period for filing a wrongful death suit in an employment related death, pursuant to what is now § 25-5-11(a), should be tolled by the minority of the plaintiffs, the deceased employee's dependent children. The Court held that their minority did not toll the two-year limitations period by reasoning that:
Thus, the Court in Nicholson concludes that actions brought by dependents pursuant to § 25-5-11 "must be deemed to arise under" § 410. Clearly, this statement is not true with respect to § 391, under the facts of the present case. For the moment, I quote only from Benson v. Robinson, 223 Ala. 85, 86, 134 So. 799, 800 (1931), and deal with this issue in more depth below:
Indeed, these various statutes are different and to construe them as the majority does is to completely abrogate those rules of construction applied in Nicholson, which the majority purports to follow.
In Alabama Power Co. v. White, 377 So. 2d 930 (Ala.1979), this Court explained the purpose of § 25-5-11 in relation to § 410:
"Baggett v. Webb, 46 Ala.App. 666, 674, 248 So. 2d 275, 282 (1971) [emphasis omitted].
"The Supreme Court of Alabama gave the same interpretation to Code 1940, Tit. 26, § 312, the predecessor of Code 1975, § 25-5-11(a), as did the Court of Civil Appeals: `Section 312, Title 26, Code of Alabama 1940, gives to the dependents of an employee killed under circumstances creating liability against a third party a right to bring an action against such third party.' Nicholson v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc., 278 Ala. 497, 499, 179 So. 2d 76, 78 (1965) [emphasis omitted]....
It is the very language of § 25-5-11 that distinguishes it from § 391, and which led this Court to conclude in Alabama Power Co. v. White, supra, that an action brought by the dependents pursuant to § 25-5-11(a) "when commenced must be deemed to arise under § 6-5-410." Section 25-5-11(a) does not create a cause of action. It refers to death caused under circumstances creating "legal liability for damages," and further states that "such damages shall be ascertained and determined without regard to this chapter." From this language, it is clear that the statute is making implicit reference to § 410, which creates the only legal liability for damages in Alabama in case of the wrongful death of an adult. This is why the Court in Nicholson, and later in Alabama Power Co. v. White, held that an action brought pursuant to § 25-5-11 "must be deemed to arise under § 6-5-410."
Section 391 is different; it does create a cause of action in and of itself, and the parents' action for the wrongful death of their minor child is brought under § 391 and not § 410. Therefore, although § 25-5-11 merely extends the class of persons who can bring a wrongful death action under § 410, § 391 does not just merely "extend the class." Except for the fact that § 391 is congenerous with § 410, as well as the fact that by judicial interpretation other similarities have been deemed to exist between the two statutes, they are indeed separate and distinct statutes conferring separate and distinct causes of action, a fact the majority recognizes.
However, while it is true that the Court has construed § 25-5-11 as merely extending the class of persons who can bring a wrongful death action under § 410, the Court has not likewise so construed § 391 or its predecessors.
The first case construing the first act conferring a cause of action on the parents for the wrongful death of their minor child is Smith v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 75 Ala. 449 (1883). There the Court described the nature and purpose of the act, as it was then codified:
For reasons not material here, the statute quoted above was found to be unconstitutional. Later, after its constitutional infirmities were remedied by the legislature, it was recodified in 1885. See 1885 Ala. Acts 99, supra.
In a later case, White v. Ward, 47 So. 166, 167, 157 Ala. 345, 349 (1908), the Court, construing the 1885 Act, then codified in Code of 1896, § 26, points out an important characteristic of § 391 (then § 26), which distinguishes it from § 410 (then § 27):
The cause of action for the wrongful death of an adult belongs to the personal representative and must be brought pursuant to § 410. Furthermore, the damages recoverable under § 410 must be distributed according to the statute of distributions. This is not so under § 391. Even if the personal representative brings the action for the wrongful death of a minor child, who has left parents or a parent surviving, the action must be brought under § 391, and the damages recovered belong exclusively to the parents of the child. See quote from Benson v. Robinson, supra. This point is unequivocally made by the Court in Peoples v. Seamon, 249 Ala. 284, 31 So. 2d 88 (1947)[2]:
Since the enactment of § 391 and its predecessors, the Courts have construed it as having conferred a cause of action separate and distinct from that conferred in § 410. In Adkison v. Adkison, 286 Ala. 306, 308, 239 So. 2d 562, 564 (1970), the Court reiterated that
The Court in Adkison went on to hold that the damages recoverable in that case belonged to the father of the deceased minor child.
And yet, while clear differences in purpose and effect exist between the two death statutes, the courts have also interpreted the legislative intent to be that certain similarities exist as well. In Williams v. South & N.A.R. Co., 9 So. 77, 91 Ala. 635 (1891), the Court implied a limitation analogous to the one expressed in § 410's predecessors, but not expressed in § 391's predecessors:
In a later case, Wolfe v. Isbell, 291 Ala. 327, 280 So. 2d 758 (1973), the Court held that, as a general rule of law, the same limitation expressed in § 410 would apply to actions brought under § 391:
Nevertheless, in Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Bogue, 177 Ala. 349, 58 So. 392 (1912), the Court referred to § 410's predecessor as the "congener" of § 391's predecessor, which means that the two statutes, while not the same, are of the same kind; that is, they bear a relationship to one another, or resemble each other in character, nature, or action. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, p. 478 (1971); Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, p. 238 (1973). However, the Court in Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Bogue, supra, went on to hold that because the legislature used the same language in both statutes, it intended the damages recoverable under both sections to be punitive and not compensatory:
It is clearly evident from the above quoted passage, as well as the other authorities quoted herein, that the two statutes have been regarded as conferring two separate and distinct causes of action and are to be given effect accordingly. This was the apparent intent of the legislature and, since the time § 410 and § 391 were first enacted, the courts have endeavored to give effect to each statute according to this legislative intent. The legislature chose to confer, in a separate statute (§ 391), a cause of action congenerous with that conferred in § 410. In so doing, the legislature chose not to expressly state a limitations period within § 391 itself, as it had done in § 410. *1005 The legal effect of this omission by the legislature is to make the right of action conferred in § 391 subject to a technical statute of limitations (§ 6-2-38(a)), and not subject to a statute of creation. This distinction, the majority ignores.
The Court in Nicholson, supra, correctly applied the rules of construction governing limitations of actions in reaching the conclusions that the tolling statute (§ 6-2-8) was inapplicable to the actions deemed to have been brought under § 410, not § 391:
Thus, the Nicholson court makes the distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes of creation with respect to the operation of tolling statutes, a distinction the majority has failed to apply to the statutes involved in this case.
Most recently, in Whitson v. Baker, 463 So. 2d 146, 149 (Ala.1985), this Court, quoting Nicholson, supra, said:
*1006 Without question, § 6-2-38 is a general statute of limitations, not a statute of creation, and, therefore, under the rules applied in Nicholson, supra, § 6-2-38 is tolled by the minority of the plaintiff. Indeed, but for the fact that the two-year limitations period is expressly stated in § 410, the application of § 6-2-38 to actions brought under § 410 would operate as a general statute of limitations, subject to tolling. However, because the limitations period is stated within § 410, it is a statute of creation, not subject to tolling provisions.
Since the enactment of § 391, the legislature has not seen fit to amend § 391 or its predecessors to insert an express proviso similar to the one it saw fit to delete in 1885. The rule that obtains in this jurisdiction is that the last expression of legislative will must prevail. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Goodwyn, 231 Ala. 44, 163 So. 341 (1935); First National Bank of Scottsboro v. Jackson County, 227 Ala. 448, 150 So. 690 (1933). The last expression in this instance would indicate that the legislature preferred the right of action conferred by § 391 to be governed by a general statute of limitations (§ 6-2-38(a)), rather than an untollable statute of creation. Such an intention is evident not only from the fact that the legislature chose to delete the limitations period stated in the original act, but also from the fact that in 1907, instead of amending § 391, the legislature chose to amend what is now § 6-2-38(a), making that general statute of limitations expressly applicable to § 391.
For the foregoing reasons, I would conclude that plaintiff's action was timely filed. Accordingly, I believe summary judgment was improperly granted and would, therefore, reverse and remand for further proceedings.
TORBERT, C.J., and FAULKNER and ALMON, JJ., concur.
[1]  Clearly, this listing by the legislature of the two-year period applicable to actions under § 410 is an action of the kind described by the majority:

"... It is a part of a total compilation of periods of limitations for causes of actions ranging from those with no limitations to causes of actions of twenty years to six months. The legislature, in its wisdom, saw fit to bring together in one place in the Code the periods of limitations applicable to various common law causes of action. The fact that it elected to include within this compilation the periods of limitations applicable to wrongful death in no way reflects any legislative intent to establish this particular listing (now codified as § 6-2-38(a)) as the source of the periods of limitations for such actions."
The above quoted statement is true with respect to § 410, because the two-year period is and has always been stated within § 410. But such is not and has never been the case with § 391. From the beginning, the limitations period applicable to § 391 has always been found in the "Limitation of Actions" chapter of the various Codes. Consequently, those sections, and not § 410, have been the source of the applicable limitations period for § 391. Therein lies the distinction between a statute of creation and a statute of limitations.
[2]  The Court in Peoples, supra, stated that "[t]here is nothing in the case of Taylor v. City of Clanton, 245 Ala. 671, 18 So. 2d 369 [(1944)], which is intended to conflict with the [holding reached by the Court in Peoples]." In Taylor, supra, the Court in dicta gave its opinion on an issue which that Court expressly reserved:

"The writer has serious doubt that a personal representative may maintain an action under the provisions of section 119, Title 7, Code of 1940. The reason is, section 123, Title 7, Code of 1940, gives to the personal representative the right to maintain an action for the wrongful death of a minor as well as the right to maintain an action for the wrongful death of an adult; and section 123, supra, was enacted long prior to the adoption of section 119, supra. As said by Justice McClellan [also dicta to the holding], in Lovell v. De Bardelaben Coal & Iron Co., 90 Ala. 13, 7 So. 756, 757, in reference to section 2588, Code of 1886 (now section 119, supra): `Its reference to the personal representative was necessary, on the one hand, to give the parents priority of right over him, and on the other to exclude a construction which might have defeated the representative's right to sue under section 2589 of the Code (now section 123, Title 7, Code of 1940) in a case where the parents had died after right of action accrued, and before suit brought.' See, also, McWhorter Transfer Co. v. Peek, 232 Ala. 143, 167 So. 291. But a decision of the question is not here necessary and we lay it to one side."
"... The right conferred on the personal representative to sue, whether by section 119, supra, or 123, supra,a question we do not now decide,being a new one, is not found in any administrative right at common law based upon the title of the deceased...." 245 Ala. at 674, 18 So. 2d  at 371-372.
The Court in Peoples v. Seamon, supra, decided that question reserved in Taylor v. City of Clanton, supra, at least where the deceased minor child is survived by its parent or parents.