Case Title: Burr v. Allard

Citation: 293 P.2d 969

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1956-02-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
293 P.2d 969 (1956) Morrison W. BURR, Plaintiff in Error, v. Amos ALLARD, George Allard and Martin Allard, Defendants in Error. No. 17747. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. February 20, 1956. *970 Frank A. Bruno, H. D. Reed, C. Hamilton Evans, Denver, for plaintiff in error. Alden T. Hill, Ralph H. Coyte, Gene E. Fischer, Fort Collins, for defendants in error. ALTER, Chief Justice. Amos Allard, George Allard and Martin Allard recovered judgments against Morrison W. Burr totaling $6,215.50. Defendant is here by writ of error seeking a reversal of the judgments. The Allards will be designated as plaintiffs and Burr as defendant as they appeared in the trial court. The record discloses that on December 22, 1954, plaintiffs filed their complaint, consisting of four causes of action (claims), in the first three claims each plaintiff sought individual judgment on defendant's several promissory notes in the sum of $600 each, dated April 7, 1954, and payable on June 7, 1954. In the fourth claim plaintiffs sought a joint judgment against defendant in the sum of $4,200 as the agreed value of a percentage in certain mineral rights which defendant promised and agreed, but failed, to deliver to plaintiffs on or before June 5, 1954. It appears that in 1952 Burr leased the mineral rights on certain lands owned by plaintiffs for a period of eighteen months and posted a bond in the form of a check for $6,000 guaranteeing his agreement to drill an oil well within eighteen months. No well was drilled within the eighteen months, and the plaintiffs, as it was agreed they might do, presented defendant's check for payment, which was dishonored by the bank. Subsequently defendant entered into another agreement with plaintiffs, giving them three promissory notes dated April 7, 1954, and payable June 7, 1954, and agreed to assign to plaintiff's royalty interests in other leases of mineral rights that would have a market value of $4,200. The defendant defaulted in the payment of his notes and failed and refused to assign royalty interests to plaintiffs valued at $4,200 or any other sum. This litigation resulted. In chronological order the record discloses: Complaint filed December 22, 1954 Summons and copy of complaint served on defendant in Larimer County December 22, 1954 Defendant's default entered January 13, 1955 Judgment entered January 19, 1955 Garnishee summons served on bank March 14, 1955 Levy on defendant's 1954 Cadillac March 14, 1955 Motion to set aside default judgment May 19, 1955 Hearing on motion and denial thereof June 21, 1955 Record filed and writ of error sued out August 9, 1955 Defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment was, as noted, filed on May 19, 1955, and denied on June 21, 1955. The pertinent parts of defendant's verified motion to set aside the default judgment are: "That the defendant, because of financial difficulties, was unable to procure and hire counsel to prepare and file a responsive pleading to the said Complaint, that during said period the defendant did consult with an attorney in this County and discussed with said attorney possible defenses to the action; that said attorney did not urge said defenses because the defendant herein was not able to pay the small and reasonable retainer requested by said attorney; that the defendant herein does have a good and valid defense to said action, and each and every of the several causes of actions alleged in said Complaint, in that the considerations for the notes and other writings which formed the basis of the plaintiffs' judgments were gas and oil leases executed by the plaintiffs to the defendant, which purported to convey to him materials and mineral rights in several and divers sections of lands lying and situate in Jackson County, Colorado; that *971 true copies of said oil and gas leases are hereto attached, made a part hereof and marked Exhibit `A'. A copy of the lease in question contains two provisions to which attention is called: * * * * * It is to be noted that nothing appears in the record here remotely indicating that defendant ever made any objection to plaintiffs' title to the leased premises. Defendant, in his motion to set aside the judgment, does not state or intimate what his "good and valid defense" to the action is, and his statement that the "plaintiffs did not have title to said lands and minerals thereon in the manner and form purported to be conveyed in said oil and gas leases" is but a conclusion with no facts set forth even tending to support it. It appears from the record that it was exactly two months from the day on which the levy was made on defendant's Cadillac automobile and garnishee summons served on a bank in which defendant and his wife jointly had their safety deposit box that defendant filed his motion to set aside the judgment. Rule 60(b), R.C.P.Colo., provides: In Gumaer v. Bell, 51 Colo. 473, 119 P. 681, we held under the Code provisions wherein excusable neglect was specifically mentioned as one of the causes for setting aside a default judgment, the syllabus, well supported by the record, is as follows: *972 "Whenever the court of review, upon on examination of the facts, is convinced that the action of the court below, in such case, was not in conformity with the spirit of the law its single duty is to vacate the erroneous judgment. * * * In Self v. Watt, 128 Colo. 61, 259 P.2d 1074, 1077, the plaintiff in error made an unsuccessful attempt for relief from a judgment by filing a motion to vacate the judgment, and we there held that the motion was addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and would not be disturbed unless it appeared that there had been an abuse of that discretion. It appears in that case that Self asserted that he was acting upon the advice of his counsel, who had informed him that he would have a six month period in which to determine whether he could raise the funds necessary to pay his obligation under his purchase contract. He urged this as a reason why he should be relieved of the consequences of the default judgment. With reference thereto we said: In Browning v. Potter, 129 Colo. 448, 271 P.2d 418, the syllabus, well supported by the opinion, is as follows: The record discloses that the trial court did not abuse its judicial discretion in denying defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment, and, accordingly, the judgment is affirmed