Case Title: DESHAZER v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-150

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-08-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
DESHAZER v. STATE2003 WY 9874 P.3d 1240Case Number: 02-150Decided: 08/21/2003
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

TIMOTHY 
JOHN DESHAZER,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Johnson County

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

W. 
Keith Goody, Jackson, Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Richard Rideout, Special 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Messrs. Pauling and Rideout.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant, 
Timothy John deShazer (deShazer), appeals from the judgment and sentence, 
adjudicating him to be guilty of the crimes of attempted kidnapping,1 aggravated assault and battery,2 and aggravated burglary.3  He was sentenced to a term of 8 to 15 
years on the kidnapping conviction, 5 to 8 years on the aggravated assault and 
battery, and 10 to 20 years on the aggravated burglary.  The sentences were to be served 
consecutive to one another.

 

[¶2]      In this appeal, 
deShazer contends that the district court erred in failing, sua sponte, to 
suspend the proceedings because the court had reasonable cause to believe that 
deShazer was unfit to proceed because of his readily evident mental 
condition.  In addition, he contends 
that the district court abused its discretion in denying motions for a new trial 
and to permit him to plead not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency, 
as well as by denying a second round of those same motions without a hearing on 
them.  Further, deShazer contends 
that his defense attorney did not provide effective assistance of counsel by 
failing to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency, 
and by failing to demand that the proceedings be suspended during trial because 
there was reasonable cause to believe that deShazer was not fit to proceed.  Finally, deShazer contends that the 
convictions should have merged for purposes of sentencing.

 

[¶3]      Because we are 
convinced that the district court failed to properly exercise its responsibility 
to suspend the proceedings when it became evident that deShazer was not mentally 
fit to testify on his own behalf, and because deShazer did not have the benefit 
of effective assistance of counsel, we will reverse and remand for a new 
trial.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶4]      As his issues, 
deShazer submits these matters for our disposition:

 

I.          
Did the court err when it failed to suspend the proceedings on its own 
motion since it had reasonable cause to believe that [deShazer] was unfit to 
proceed?  Accordingly, were [his] 
rights under the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments 
to the United States Constitution and the applicable provisions of the Wyoming 
Constitution violated?

 

II.          
Did the court err when it denied [deShazer's] motion to set aside the 
jury verdict, motion to grant  a new trial and motion to permit [him] to enter 
a plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness and deficiency?  Accordingly, were [his] rights under the 
5th, 6th, and 14th amendments to the United 
States Constitution and the applicable provisions of the Wyoming Constitution 
violated?

 

III.         
Did the court err when it ruled on [deShazer's] motion to set aside the 
jury verdict without a hearing?  
Accordingly, were [his] rights under the 5th, 
[6th,] and 14th Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and the applicable provisions of the Wyoming Constitution 
violated?

 

IV.        Was 
defense counsel ineffective by failing to enter a plea of not triable and not 
guilty by reason of mental illness and deficiency and by failing to request that 
proceedings be suspended during trial since there was reasonable cause to 
believe that [deShazer] was unfit to proceed?  Accordingly, were [his] rights under the 
5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and the applicable provisions of the Wyoming Constitution 
violated?

 

V.        
Should the convictions have merged for purposes of 
sentencing?

 

The 
State's summary of the issues is in substantial harmony with that presented by 
deShazer.

 

FACTS

 

[¶5]      The victim of the 
crimes and deShazer were childhood friends who attended school together and 
lived in the same neighborhood in Omaha, Nebraska, until they finished high 
school.  At that time, the victim 
moved to Buffalo with her family, and the two had no contact again until April 
27, 1998, when she called him "out of the blue."  For the next month they were in frequent 
contact by phone and e-mail, and then over Memorial Day weekend in 1998, they 
met in Chamberlain, South Dakota, to see one another.  At that time deShazer was living in 
Milwaukee.

 

[¶6]      The two also 
spent a week together in Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Canada, and North 
Dakota, from July 6-13, 1998, at which time they returned to Buffalo.  During that trip, deShazer mentioned to 
the group with whom they were traveling that he was planning to move to Wyoming, 
which came as a surprise to the victim.  
He stayed in Buffalo with the victim until sometime during the first week 
of August, at which time he left.  
In the victim's perception, he was leaving and probably not coming 
back.  The victim wanted deShazer to 
leave because she was going to Nevada to stay with her sister, who had been 
diagnosed with cancer.  deShazer 
sent flowers to the victim and her sister and called persistently until the 
victim began declining to answer the phone if the caller ID indicated it was 
deShazer calling.

 

[¶7]      The victim 
returned to Buffalo in late August of 1998.  At that time she received a call from 
deShazer, and when she answered the phone, he said, "So it didn't work out did 
it?"  She responded, "No, it 
didn't."  The victim perceived that 
deShazer became angry and protested that he had spent a lot of time and money on 
their relationship.  The victim said 
she could not do anything about the time but she would be glad to reimburse him 
for the money.  He gave a figure of 
$600.00, and the victim said she would try to pay him over time and that she 
never wanted to hear from him again.

 

[¶8]      Nonetheless, 
deShazer persisted in calling the victim on a weekly basis and she habitually 
would hang up on the calls and instructed her children to do the same.  On one occasion, a male friend of the 
victim answered the phone, and the caller hung up.  The caller ID indicated that the call 
was from "deShazer, T."  Not long 
after that, he called her again and said, "So, you have a new dick in your 
life."  The victim then changed her 
phone number and e-mail address, and the phone calls and other communication 
ceased for a time.

 

[¶9]      After returning 
from a trip to Seattle on January 3, 1999, the victim found a note from deShazer 
in her mailbox.  In that note he 
wrote:  "Sorry I missed you.  I hope to hear from you by January 
10.  Otherwise  perhaps you will 
see when I return.  P.S. As you 
recall communication is one of the trusts we put in each other."  The note had not come through the mail 
but appeared to have been placed in her mailbox by deShazer.  The victim believed the note was a 
veiled threat and took it to the Buffalo police.  She then sent two letters, one of which 
she composed, and one composed by her attorney, but neither was received by 
deShazer (they were sent certified mail and were returned undelivered).  Those letters demanded that deShazer 
desist from having any contact with the victim.  Toward the end of 1999 the victim became 
increasingly anxious about deShazer's intentions.  Based upon information which she 
received from her sister, who had in turn been in contact with deShazer's 
sister, the victim was aware that deShazer was unrelenting in his obsession 
about her.  In addition, several 
suspicious calls were made to her home in November and December of 1999.  As a result, the victim borrowed a 
handgun from her father for protection.

 

[¶10]   January 5, 2000, was a usual 
workday for the victim and, although she had planned to go out with her fiancé
that night, those plans were cancelled and she stayed at home alone doing 
work.  It was a Wednesday night, and 
the victim's children were with her former husband for visitation.  The victim opined that deShazer was 
aware that she was usually alone on Wednesday nights, because he learned about 
that routine while he was there.  As 
she was about to leave home to go out to a friend's ranch, the victim thought 
she heard someone trying to open the back door from the outside, and it 
frightened her.  Next, she heard 
pounding on the front door and could tell it was about to give way.  She attempted to make a phone call to a 
friend but spoke only a few words and had to drop the phone and retreat to what 
she thought might be safety.  That 
friend called the victim's neighbor and asked the neighbor to go over and check 
on the victim.  The victim ran into 
her bedroom to get the gun that she had borrowed from her father and at that 
point, she could tell that whoever had broken in the front door was in the 
house.  She could hear deShazer 
screaming out her name and then she saw him coming down the hall with a gun 
pointed at her.  She told deShazer 
that she too had a gun and that she would shoot.  deShazer then put his gun down on the 
floor, removed the goggles he was wearing, and put them in a black duffel bag 
that he was carrying.4  He said to the victim, "Don't you know 
I've loved you since the 5th grade.  My whole family thinks I'm a stalker  
and it's all your fault."

 

[¶11]   At this point, the victim's back 
door bell rang.  As things 
eventuated, it was her neighbor, who her friend had called, coming to check on 
her.  deShazer asked the victim 
several times if she had called the police, and she said that she had not.  The victim, who had been cornered in her 
bedroom, put down her gun and began walking toward the back door to answer it, 
hoping deShazer would not shoot her.  
When she got to the door, it was her neighbor.  The victim told deShazer that she was 
leaving and that he should leave also.  
She then left with her neighbor and they ran to the neighbor's house and 
called 911.  The police arrived 
within 5-10 minutes.  The victim was 
able to call deShazer's sister and get a description of his car and the license 
number, etc., which was relayed to the police.  deShazer was apprehended near Gillette a 
short time later.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶12]   We turn to the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals for an outline of the standards that must be employed in the review 
of issues relating to competency of a defendant as it pertains to the trial 
process:

 

            
Although competence is a factual issue, that term, as this case clearly 
demonstrates, is not self-defining.  
Because competency to stand trial is an aspect of substantive due 
process,  the legal standard by which competency is to be evaluated is 
constitutionally mandated.  
Accordingly, the components of that standard, required as they are by the 
Constitution, do not vary according to the views of a particular court.  The Constitution can require but one 
gauge against which to determine whether, because of his mental condition, a 
defendant's due process rights are violated by requiring him to stand 
trial.  The content of the standard 
of competency is therefore a question of law which we review de 
novo.

 

Lafferty 
v. Cook, 
949 F.2d 1546, 1550-56 (10th Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted); 
State v. Soares, 916 P.2d 1233, 1251 (Hawai'i 1996); Dusky v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1960) (per curiam); and 
see Hayes v. State, 599 P.2d 558, 562-63 (Wyo. 
1979).

 

[¶13]   Here, the district court did not 
conduct a competency hearing, so no standard was employed.  However, the standard for such a hearing 
is that set out in the cases cited immediately above.  Once the trial court has "evaluated a 
defendant's competency by the correct standard, the second inquiry on review is 
whether the trial court's determination of a defendant's competency is fairly 
supported by the record of the proceeding at which the determination [is] 
made.  In other words, the 
substantial evidence standard of review governs the second inquiry."  Soares, 916 P.2d  at 1251.  Again, because no competency hearing was 
conducted, the record at trial cannot provide the factual information necessary 
to evaluate this second prong of the test.  
The information supplied to the district court post-trial (to determine 
if deShazer was competent to proceed with sentencing and whether or not there 
should be a new trial) addresses the substantive issue of whether or not 
deShazer was competent and/or insane before, during, and after trial.5

 

 

[¶14]   The status of deShazer's mental 
health was in question from the very outset of this case.  In fairness, we note that neither 
defense counsel nor the prosecutor were of much assistance to the district court 
with respect to this looming problem.  
Of course, the very acts which constituted the crime suggested that a 
problem could exist, and all participants, including the district court, were 
aware of that.  This factor cannot 
count for much, however, as many if not most crimes suggest mental health 
problems.

 

[¶15]   Considerable evidence was seized at 
the time deShazer was arrested, including tape-recorded "rantings" and 
typewritten and handwritten letters and notes, most of which might have raised 
the spectre of mental illness or incompetency even in the mind of a lay 
observer.  Those materials strongly 
suggested that deShazer's "state of mind" was that he intended to kidnap and 
kill the victim and then take his own life.  Indeed, that was the State's theory of 
this case.  Further, the State's 
theory of the case was that deShazer's actions required cool calculation and 
considerable detailed planning, belying a suggestion that he was 
incompetent.  On the other hand, the 
defense strategy at trial was that deShazer was merely a lovesick fool who 
honestly believed that if he could force the victim to hear him out, all of his 
problems with respect to their broken relationship would be 
solved.

 

[¶16]   At the arraignment on February 15, 
2000, the district court inquired in a general way if deShazer was satisfied 
with his attorney, to which he answered, "Yes," and further if defense counsel 
"was aware of any procedural problems or detrimental delay in the case so far," 
to which defense counsel answered, "No."  
At a pretrial conference held on April 4, 2000, defense counsel indicated 
that deShazer was doing well.  
However, during that same court proceeding, the prosecutor called the 
district court's attention to the fact that deShazer's father had attempted to 
have his son involuntarily committed to a mental hospital shortly before the 
crimes were committed because he believed his son to be obsessed with the 
victim, severely depressed, and suicidal.  
At a bail modification hearing held on April 11, 2000, the district court 
made this comment directed to the prosecuting attorney:

 

COURT:  Well, 
Mr. Erb, obviously, the accusations against the Defendant are quite 
serious.  One thing that was 
disturbing to the Court, however, was you attaching to this motion a document 
that appears to be some sort of petition or pleading that might be filed in a 
case that alleges the mental incompetency of this 
Defendant.

            
Do you know why that might be important to the Court?  It is because any party to a criminal 
action, including the Court, might request an examination of a Defendant to see 
whether or not he is competent to stand trial, to see whether or not he is 
competent at the time of the alleged instances.  And I do not want a 9th 
inning pitch for a mental health evaluation when we already have this matter 
scheduled for trial.  Is that going 
to happen?

 

MR. 
ERB:  I do not anticipate bringing such a motion, Your Honor.  Mr. Goddard has indicated that they do 
not intend to offer any evidence regarding insanity or mental illness as a 
defense.

I 
presented those documents, Your Honor, so that the Court would be well advised 
in order to make an appropriate ruling on bond.  This is information that was provided to 
us from the family, the people who know him best.

 

[¶17]   The hearing then moved away from 
that subject and on to further discussion of modifications to deShazer's 
bond.  However, a bit later in the 
proceedings the defense attorney informed the district court that deShazer "was 
examined by two mental health professionals before the ultimate plea was made of 
not guilty to determine whether he was a danger to himself or others."6  Clearly, an alarm bell went off for the 
district court, and he pressed the defense attorney for more detailed 
information.  In response, the 
defense attorney revealed this:

 

MR. 
GODDARD:  Part of our proceeding and part of what happened, we needed 
to make sure, in fact, what kind of plea we were going to make with regard to 
Mr. [d]eShazer; and we had to have at least some indication about his mental 
competency and his state of mind.

He 
was examined by two mental health professionals.  That was then utilized to make our 
determination as to what pleas were going to be made.  Both of which found him not to be a 
danger to himself or others.

 

[¶18]   The mental health issue came before 
the district court at a hearing held on April 18, 2000, but the district court 
indicated that it did not want to consider that issue as part of a "substantive 
argument," but only wanted to consider the foundation and hearsay aspects of 
it.  The trial got underway on May 
8, 2000 and continued until May 11, 2000.

 

[¶19]   The district court had made it 
clear that any matters relating to a sanity defense had to be raised before 
trial, but no such plea was offered.  
Near the end of the State's presentation of its case, the defense first 
broached the subject of whether or not deShazer was fit to proceed.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-302 (LexisNexis 
2003) provides:

 

(a)  No 
person shall be tried, sentenced or punished for the commission of an offense 
while, as a result of mental illness or deficiency, he lacks the capacity, 
to:

            
(i) Comprehend his position;

            
(ii) Understand the nature and object of the proceedings against 
him;

(iii) Conduct 
his defense in a rational manner; and

(iv) Cooperate 
with his counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed. 

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303 (LexisNexis 2003) provides:

 

(a)  If 
it appears at any stage of a criminal proceeding, by motion or upon the court's 
own motion, that there is reasonable cause to believe that the accused has a 
mental illness or deficiency making him unfit to proceed, all further 
proceedings shall be suspended.  
[Emphasis added.]

            
(b)  The court shall order an examination of the accused by a 
designated examiner.  The order may 
include, but is not limited to, an examination of the accused at the Wyoming 
state hospital on an inpatient or outpatient basis, at a local mental health 
center on an inpatient or outpatient basis, or at his place of detention.  In selecting the examination site, the 
court may consider proximity to the court, availability of an examiner, and the 
necessity for security precautions.  
If the order provides for 

commitment 
of the accused to a designated facility, the commitment shall continue no longer 
than a thirty (30) day period for the study of the mental condition of the 
accused.

            
(c)  Written reports of the pretrial examination shall be filed 
with the clerk of court.  The report 
shall include:

                        
(i) Detailed findings;

            
(ii) An opinion as to whether the accused has a mental illness or 
deficiency, and its probable duration;

(iii) An 
opinion as to whether the accused, as a result of mental illness or deficiency, 
lacks capacity to comprehend his position, to understand the nature and object 
of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and 
to cooperate with his counsel to the end that any available defense may be 
interposed;

(iv) An 
opinion as to whether at the time of the alleged criminal conduct the accused, 
as a result of mental illness or deficiency, lacked substantial capacity to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law;

(v) A 
recommendation as to whether the accused should be held in a designated facility 
for treatment pending determination by the court of the issue of mental fitness 
to proceed; and

(vi) A 
recommendation as to whether the accused, if found by the court to be mentally 
fit to proceed, should be detained in a designated facility pending further 
proceedings.

            
(d)  The clerk of court shall deliver copies of the report to 
the district attorney and to the accused or his counsel.  The report is not a public record or 
open to the public.  After receiving 
a copy of the report, both the accused and the state may, upon written request 
and for good cause shown, obtain an order granting them an examination of the 
accused by a designated examiner of their own choosing.  For each examination ordered, a report 
conforming to the requirements of subsection (c) of this section shall be 
furnished to the court and the opposing party.

            
(e)  If the initial report contains the recommendation that the 
accused should be held in a designated facility pending determination of the 
issue of mental fitness to proceed, the court may order that the accused be 
committed to or held in a designated facility pending determination of mental 
fitness to proceed.

            
(f)  If neither the state, nor the accused or his counsel 
contests the opinion referred to in paragraph (c)(iii) of this section relative 
to fitness to proceed, the court may make a determination and finding of record 
on this issue on the basis of the report filed or the court may hold a hearing 
on its own motion.  If the opinion 
relative to fitness to proceed is 

contested 
the court shall hold a hearing on the issue.  The report or reports may be received in 
evidence at any hearing on the issue.  
The party contesting any opinion relative to fitness to proceed has the 
right to summon and cross-examine the persons who rendered the opinion and to 
offer evidence upon the issue.

            
(g)  If the court determines that the accused is mentally fit 
to proceed, the court may order that the accused be held in confinement, be 
committed to a designated facility pending further proceedings, or be released 
on bail or other conditions.  If the 
court determines that the accused lacks mental fitness to proceed, the 
proceedings against him shall be suspended and the court shall commit him to a 
designated facility for such period as the court may order but not to exceed the 
time reasonably necessary to determine whether there is substantial probability 
that the accused will regain his fitness to proceed:

(i) If 
it is determined that there is no substantial probability that the accused will 
regain his fitness to proceed, the accused shall not be retained in a designated 
facility unless proper civil commitment proceedings have been instituted and 
held as provided in title 25 of the Wyoming statutes.  The continued retention, hospitalization 
and discharge of the accused shall be the same as for other patients.  However, if the accused is discharged, 
the criminal proceedings shall be resumed, unless the court determines that so 
much time has elapsed since the commitment of the accused that it would not be 
appropriate to resume the criminal proceeding;

(ii) If 
it is determined that there is substantial probability that the accused will 
regain his fitness to proceed, the commitment of the accused at a designated 
facility shall continue until the head of the facility reports to the court that 
in his opinion the accused is fit to proceed as provided in paragraph (iii) of 
subsection (c) of this section.  If 
this opinion is not contested by the state, the accused or his counsel the 
criminal proceeding shall be resumed.  
If the opinion is contested, the court shall hold a hearing as provided 
in subsection (f) of this section.  
While the accused remains at a designated facility under this subsection, 
the head of the facility shall report at least once every three (3) months on 
the progress the accused is making towards regaining his fitness to 
proceed.

            
(h)  A finding by the court that the accused is mentally fit to 
proceed shall not prejudice the accused in a defense to the crime charged on the 
ground that at the time of the act he was afflicted with a mental illness or 
deficiency excluding responsibility.  
Nor shall the finding be introduced in evidence on that issue or 
otherwise brought to the notice of the jury.  No statement made by the accused in the 
course of any examination or treatment pursuant to this section and no 
information received by any person in the course of the examination or treatment 
shall be admitted in evidence in any criminal proceeding then or thereafter 
pending on any issue other than that of the mental condition of the 
accused.

            
(j)  Notwithstanding any provision of this section, counsel for 
the accused may make any and all legal objections which are susceptible of a 
fair determination prior to trial without the personal participation of the 
accused.

 

[¶20]   The above-cited statutes are in 
harmony with the ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards 
(1989).  Of special importance here 
is Standard 7-4.2:

 

            
(a)  The court has a continuing obligation, separate and apart 
from that of counsel for each of the parties, to raise the issue of incompetence 
to stand trial at any time the court has a good faith doubt as to the 
defendant's competence, and may raise the issue at any stage of the proceedings 
on its own motion.

            
(b)  The prosecutor should move for evaluation of defendant's 
competence to stand trial whenever the prosecutor has a good faith doubt as to 
the defendant's competence.  The 
prosecutor should further advise defense counsel and the court of any 
information that has come to the prosecution's attention relative to defendant's 
incompetence to stand trial.

            
(c)  Defense counsel should move for evaluation of the 
defendant's competence to stand trial whenever the defense counsel has a good 
faith doubt as to the defendant's competence.  If the client objects to such a motion 
being made, counsel may move for evaluation over the client's objection.  In any event, counsel should make known 
to the court and to the prosecutor those facts known to counsel which raise the 
good faith doubt of competence.

            
(d)  A motion for evaluation should be in writing and contain a 
certificate of counsel indicating that the motion is based on a good faith doubt 
that the defendant is competent to stand trial and that it is not filed for 
purposes of delay.  The motion 
should also set forth the specific facts that have formed the basis for the 
motion.

            
(e)  In the absence of good faith doubt that the defendant is 
competent to stand trial it is improper for either party to move for 
evaluation.  It is improper for 
either party to use the incompetence process for purposes unrelated to 
incompetence to stand trial such as to obtain information for mitigation of 
sentence, to obtain favorable plea negotiation, or to delay the proceedings 
against the defendant.

            
(f)  In making any motion for evaluation, or, in the absence of 
a motion, in making known to the court information raising a good faith doubt of 
defendant's competence, the defense counsel should not divulge confidential 
communications or communications protected by the attorney-client 
privilege.

 

Also 
see, John M. Burkoff, Criminal Defense Ethics 2d Law and Liability, § 5:6 
(2002).

 

[¶21]   As the prosecution was about to 
rest on the last day of trial, the defense attorney asked for an in-chambers 
conference.  As that proceeding got 
underway, the defense attorney told the district court that based upon his 
observations, deShazer had "continued to improve" during the pretrial 
process.  Defense counsel iterated 
that he had had mental examinations done and the examinations established that 
deShazer knew right from wrong and "that a competency defense was not 
appropriate."  As defense counsel 
began to prepare deShazer for trial, he observed that deShazer was "extremely 
depressed," and was unable to concentrate or do the things necessary to get 
ready for trial.  Through contacts 
the deShazer family had with a psychiatrist in Casper, an arrangement was made 
during the weekend break in the trial for deShazer to be evaluated by 
psychiatrist Bruce Kahn, M.D.  Both 
defense counsel and the district court noted that deShazer had appeared to do 
well on the first day of trial, both in the courtroom and in chambers.  Defense counsel's concern was that 
deShazer was not "capable" of assisting counsel in his defense nor was he 
"capable" of testifying in his own defense if he chose to do so.  Defense counsel's indication was that, 
in any event, he did not intend to have deShazer testify.  Defense counsel indicated that 
deShazer's testimony would not be material and that after consultation with 
counsel, as well as with his family, a decision was made to go ahead with the 
proceedings.  Defense counsel also 
conceded that he "never had a case like this, and I don't have experience with 
mental health people  or mentally ill people that has provided me any kind of 
background to do this.  I'm prepared 
to proceed, but I thought the court needed to be aware."  The district court then asked that 
deShazer be brought into chambers because it needed to "make some advisements 
and inquiry."  The following 
advisement/inquiry was made:

 

            
THE COURT:  I am informed that the State is close to the end of 
their case.  So you and Mr. Goddard 
will be given an opportunity to put on a case of your own if you want to.  Mr. Goddard has explained to me that 
there's a couple of witnesses that he thinks that you all will probably want to 
call, and that's fine.

            
The critical thing, though, that I want to be sure of is that you 
understand your personal right to either testify to or remain silent.  The Court has absolutely no preference 
over which choice you make; it just wants to be sure that you understand the 
choice and that whatever choice you make along those lines is done of your own 
free will.

            
So you understand that as a matter of law you're not required to testify, 
correct?

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Correct. But 

            
THE COURT:  Also, at this stage of the game you absolutely have 
the right to testify if you want to.  
The choice that you make may be very important to you.  And I suggest that you not make any 
choice like that without consulting with your counsel.  But I need to know kind of ahead of time 
what you think you personally want to do.  
Not what somebody else thinks you ought to do, but what you want to 
do.

            
THE DEFEDANT:  I want to, but I'm wrestling with whether or not 
I'm prepared for it (indicating) mentally.  
And I've been talking with Greg about that.

            
THE COURT:  So you haven't made up your mind yet what you want 
to do?

            
THE DEFENDANT:  Correct.  
I was hoping to talk to Greg here over this lunch 
break.

 

[¶22]   When defense counsel called Dr. 
Kahn as a witness, a conference was held out of the hearing of the jury.  The purpose of that hearing, as 
articulated by the district court, was, "[i]n this case the Defendant has not 
entered a plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency and has 
represented to the Court that he will not tender any evidence regarding that 
type of defense."  At the outset it 
was agreed that Dr. Kahn would not offer an opinion that deShazer met the 
statutory definition for incompetency due to mental illness or deficiency.  Dr. Kahn was asked, and he responded to, 
a question regarding deShazer's mental state at the time of the crime.  He opined:

 

            
DR. KAHN:  Yes, I do have an opinion, in that he was 
psychotically depressed at the time of the offense and I think that his illness 
contributed substantially and materially to the commission of acts of which he's 
accused.  I think that the mental 
illness contributed substantially and materially to loss of impulse 
control.

            
And it would be my further opinion, if I were asked, 

Your 
Honor, and allowed the opportunity to answer, that it meets the threshold 
criteria of the volitional prong of the mental illness statute, 7-11-301, et 
se[q]. as the lack of substantial capacity to refrain from conduct which doesn't 
conform to the requirements of [the] law.

 

[¶23]   When the district court asked about 
deShazer's competency to stand trial, Dr. Kahn responded:

 

            
DR. KAHN:  With all due respect, Your Honor, I think that he 
lacks [the] mental capacity to assist in some respects with his defense; but I 
think it would be your decision, Your Honor, if he did not  if he was not 
competent by virtue of the means  or, rather, the way in which he did not have 
mental capacity.

            
Let me explain it.  I'm not 
being very clear, and I'm aware of that.

            
Capacity is a function of his mental wherewithal.  Competency is a judicial construct, and 
it's not for me to tell the Court how relevant or significant his ability to 
testify might be.  I do not think he 
has the mental capacity to testify in his own behalf.  But if the Court were to decide that 
that's a relatively insignificant issue, for example, because counsel says we 
don't want him to testify regardless of how healthy he is mentally, then he 
probably is competent.

            
And regardless of how incapacitated he is mentally in that respect, in 
all other respects I think he has mental capacity to understand the nature of 
the proceedings and to assist counsel.  
The narrow exception is I don't think he can testify on his own behalf in 
his current frame of mind.

 

[¶24]   After considerable further 
discussion, the district court determined that Dr. Kahn would be allowed to 
testify, so long as his testimony was precisely limited to "the Defendant's 
state of mind, some of the processes that go on with people if they do get 
involved in what we commonly refer to as an obsession, perhaps, arguably, the 
Defendant, you know, would have the right to offer that sort of explanation to 
the jury, since the contra inferences will obviously be made."  Following Dr. Kahn's testimony, a very 
brief conference was held wherein deShazer stated that he had decided not to 
testify.

 

[¶25]   Thus, we are confronted with 
determining whether, in light of all the information available to the district 
court, it should have sua sponte suspended the proceedings, declared a mistrial, 
excused the jury, and ordered a mental examination of deShazer before a new 
trial could be held.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-11-303 does not make it entirely clear what procedure should be 
followed in an instance such as this where the problem does not come fully to 
light until the middle of a jury trial.  
However, in this regard, the statute plainly contemplates that it might 
arise "at any stage of a criminal proceeding."  As future events bear out, it took 
several months for a mental examination to be completed at the Wyoming State 
Hospital for purposes of sentencing and a motion for new trial, and many more 
months yet for a second examination to be completed at the request of the 
prosecution.  As a practical matter, 
the jury could not be held in waiting for a period of over one year.  In such a circumstance, we conclude that 
the only practical solution was to declare a mistrial and re-initiate 
proceedings, if that was the appropriate thing to do in light of the mental 
examination(s).  As a predicate to 
that, we must also conclude that the district court was obligated to suspend the 
proceedings given the information that slowly accumulated before it, from the 
date of the crime until the ultimate bridge had to be crossed in the midst of 
trial.

 

[¶26]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-302 affords 
broad protection to the mentally ill.  
Of course, the standard articulated by that statute is also the law of 
the land.  Drope v. Missouri, 
420 U.S. 162, 95 S. Ct. 896, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S. Ct. 836, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815 (1966).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303 places great 
responsibility on both the prosecutor and the defense attorney, but ultimately 
that responsibility must fall upon the shoulders of the district court.  The ABA Criminal Justice Mental 
Health Standards, Standard 7-4.1 summarizes the prevailing law in this 
regard:

 

            
(a)  No defendant shall be tried while mentally incompetent to 
stand trial.

            
(b)  The test for determining mental competence to stand trial 
should be whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with 
defendant's lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and 
otherwise to assist in the defense, and whether the defendant has a rational as 
well as factual understanding of the proceedings.

            
(c)  The terms competence and incompetence as 
used within Part IV of this chapter refer to mental competence or mental 
incompetence.  A finding of mental 
incompetence to stand trial may arise from mental illness, physical illness, or 
disability; mental retardation or other developmental disability; or other 
etiology so long as it results in a defendant's inability to consult with 
defense counsel or to understand the proceedings.

 

[¶27]   The commentary to that standard 
emphasizes that the case law only establishes "a basic norm, understandably and 
necessarily imprecise, that permits individual judges to evaluate each case in 
the light of an individual defendant's level of functioning in relation to the 
complexity of that case."  ABA 
Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, supra at 172.  There appears to be general agreement 
that an adequate evaluation must touch on at least five 
areas:

 

            
1.  Defendants should have a perception of the process not 
distorted by mental illness or disability.  
Whether phrased in terms of (a) an ability to perceive rationally and 
without distortion, (b) an "understanding" of the process, or (c) an "awareness" 
of the charge and possible verdicts, or (d) couched in a codified requirement 
that defendants understand that there is a judge on the bench, a prosecutor who 
will try to convict, and defense counsel who will defend against criminal 
charges, the thrust of the requirement is that defendants understand the nature 
of the process and their functions as participants within that process free from 
undue perceptual distortion.

            
2.  Defendants require a capacity to maintain the 
attorney-client relationship, embracing an ability to discuss the facts of a 
case with counsel "without paranoid distrust," to advise and accept advice from 
counsel, to elect an appropriate plea, and to approve the legal strategy of the 
trial.  The relationship requires an 
ability to consult rationally about a pending case which is something more than 
a superficial capacity to converse with others.

            
3.  A third requirement, somewhat akin to the second, bears on 
the ability to recall and relate factual information.  If a primary purpose of the prohibition 
against trying incompetent defendants is to preserve accuracy in factfinding, 
then defendants must be able to recall and relate factual occurrences.  If they are not, they cannot reveal 
exonerating circumstances to their attorneys.  This requirement has been variously 
phrased: that a defendant have "sufficient memory to relate answers to questions 
posed" to him or her, that "he [or she] can follow the testimony reasonably 
well," and that there be a "capacity to realistically challenge prosecution 
witnesses."  Without that capacity, 
defendants realistically are unable to exercise the rights to consult with 
counsel, testify in personal defense, and confront 
accusers.

            
4.  Defendants should be capable of testifying in personal 
defense if that should be appropriate.

            
5.  A final factor is a defendant's abilities to meet the 
competency criteria in the setting of the particular charges, the extent of the 
defendant's needed participation in trial proceedings, and the complexity of the 
case.  Therefore, an evaluator 
should consider a defendant's mental ability in relation to the severity of the 
charge and the complexity of the case.

 

ABA 
Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, 
supra at 173-75.

 

[¶28]   We hold that the circumstances 
presented at trial were sufficient to trigger the requirement that the district 
court conduct a competency hearing in order to determine if deShazer was fit to 
proceed.  State v. Bostwick, 
1999 MT 237, ¶¶16-29, 988 P.2d 765, ¶¶16-29 (Mont. 199) (also see concurring 
opinion, Bostwick, ¶¶35-47); see 3 Charles Alan Wright, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 556, n.7 (1982); and compare State v. 
Lopez, 22 P.3d 1040, 1048-49 (Kan. 2001) (district court affirmed based upon 
district court's thorough inquiry of the defendant and his counsel, as well as 
the report of an evaluation done by a jail physician during the noon recess); 
State v. Boorigie, 41 P.3d 764, 771-72 (Kan. 2002) (district court 
affirmed although proceedings continued while competency evaluation was pending 
where evaluation ultimately determined that defendant was competent before trial 
began); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 178-79 (Colo.App. 1999) (where 
district court conducted one competency hearing, it was not error to fail to 
conduct second hearing merely because defendant stated he was not 
competent).  Because no hearing was 
conducted, as was required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303(a), we are without a 
sufficient record to ascertain whether or not deShazer was actually incompetent 
or if there was substantial evidence that deShazer was competent.  As is demonstrated in the excerpts from 
the transcript of the proceedings set out above, rather than making a full 
inquiry of Dr. Kahn and deShazer when the opportunity was ripe, the district 
court curtailed that inquiry.  As a 
consequence, we are compelled to reverse deShazer's convictions and remand for a 
new trial.

 

[¶29]   In the Bostwick decision, 
the Montana Supreme Court opted to remand for a nunc pro tunc hearing on the 
question of competency.  
Bostwick, ¶31.  We 
decline to do so in this case because we do not perceive that there is a 
meaningful possibility that such a hearing would fully protect deShazer's 
rights.  In addition, because we 
also hold that defense counsel was ineffective, a new trial is necessary for 
that reason as well.

 

 

[¶30]   Our standard of review with respect 
to this issue provides that the paramount determination is whether, in light of 
all the pertinent circumstances, trial counsel's acts or omissions were outside 
the range of professionally competent assistance.  We indulge a strong presumption that 
counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the 
exercise of reasonable professional judgment.  An appellant claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the record that counsel's performance 
was deficient and that prejudice resulted.  
We also inquire as to whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as 
having produced a just result.  
Schmidt v. State, 2001 WY 73 ¶32, 29 P.3d, ¶32 (Wyo. 2001); 
Chapman v. State, 2001 WY 25 ¶6, 18 P.3d 1164, ¶6 (Wyo. 2001); Pearson 
v. State, 12 P.3d 686, 691-92 (Wyo. 2000).

 

[¶31]   In this instance, we find that it 
suffices to note that counsel appears to have admitted in court that he did not 
know how to handle this particular case, nor his client, and the record does not 
reflect what effort counsel made to become sufficiently learned in that regard 
so as to provide effective assistance to his client under these 
circumstances.  Defense counsel's 
admitted lack of the basic knowledge essential to this area of criminal defense 
work, and an apparent trial strategy that did not evince a sound legal 
foundation, mandate reversal of deShazer's conviction.  These failings were instrumental in 
denying deShazer a meaningful defense, especially because the strategy chosen, 
that deShazer intended only to attempt to compel the victim to hear him out 
concerning their relationship, relied so heavily upon deShazer's ability to 
explain himself.  The critical issue 
near the end of trial was an evident lack of competency on deShazer's part to 
testify in his own defense and to otherwise assist in that defense.  See generally, George L. Blum, 
Annotation, Adequacy of Defense Counsel's Representation of Criminal Client  
Issues of Incompetency, 70 A.L.R.5th 1, esp. § 8(b) (1999); 
George L. Blum, Annotation, Adequacy of Defense Counsel's Representation of 
Criminal Client  Pretrial Conduct or Conduct at Unspecified Time Regarding 
Issues of Insanity, 72 A.L.R.5th 109, esp. § 5(b) (1999); and 
George L. Blum, Annotation, Adequacy of Defense Counsel's Representation of 
Criminal Client  Conduct at Trial Regarding Issues of Insanity, 95 
A.L.R.5th 125, esp. § 3(b) (2002).  We can only conclude that, under these 
peculiar circumstances, defense counsel was ineffective and that this 
ineffectiveness ultimately was prejudicial to deShazer's case.  For this reason, too, we are compelled 
to reverse and remand for new trial.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶32]   Under the circumstances presented 
by this case, we hold that the district court erred in failing to conduct a 
competency hearing in the face of mounting doubt that the defendant was 
competent or fit to stand trial and, most especially, in the face of direct 
evidence from a psychiatrist that deShazer was unable to testify in his own 
behalf because of his mental problems.  
In addition, we hold that defense counsel was ineffective in representing 
deShazer to a degree that proved to be prejudicial to his defense.  For these reasons, the judgment and 
sentence are reversed, and the matter is remanded to the district court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-201 and 6-1-301 (LexisNexis 2003) 
provide:

 

§ 6-2-201. 
Kidnapping; penalties; effect of release of victim.

            
(a) A person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another 
from his place of residence or business or from the vicinity where he was at the 
time of the removal, or if he unlawfully confines another person, with the 
intent to:

                        
(i) Hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or 
hostage;

                        
(ii) Facilitate the commission of a felony;  or

                        
(iii) Inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or 
another.

            
(b) A removal or confinement is unlawful if it is 
accomplished:

                        
(i) By force, threat or deception;  
or

            
(ii) Without the consent of a parent, guardian or other person 
responsible for the general supervision of an individual who is under the age of 
fourteen (14) or who is adjudicated incompetent.

            
(c) If the defendant voluntarily releases the victim substantially 
unharmed and in a safe place prior to trial, kidnapping is a felony punishable 
by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) 
years.

            
(d) If the defendant does not voluntarily release the victim 
substantially unharmed and in a safe place prior to trial, kidnapping is a 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not less than twenty (20) years or for 
life except as provided in W.S. 6-2-101.

 

§ 
6-1-301. Attempt; renunciation of criminal 
intention.

            
(a) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime 
if:

(i) 
With the intent to commit the crime, he does any act which is a substantial step 
towards commission of the crime.  A 
"substantial step" is conduct which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of 
the person's intention to complete the commission of the crime;  or

(ii) He intentionally engages in conduct which would constitute the crime 
had the attendant circumstances been as the person believes them to 
be.

            
(b) A person is not liable under this section if, under circumstances 
manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal intention, he 
avoided the commission of the crime attempted by abandoning his criminal 
effort.  Within the meaning of this 
subsection, renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary if it is 
motivated, in whole or in part, by circumstances, not present or apparent at the 
inception of the person's course of conduct, which increase the probability of 
detection or apprehension or which make more difficult the accomplishment of the 
criminal intention.  Renunciation is 
not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct 
until a more advantageous time or to transfer the criminal effort to another but 
similar objective or victim.

 

   2Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-502 (LexisNexis 2003) provides:

 

§ 
6-2-502.  Aggravated assault and 
battery; penalty.

            
(a) A person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if 
he:

(i) 
Causes serious bodily injury to another intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human 
life;

(ii) Attempts to cause, or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily 
injury to another with a deadly weapon;

(iii) Threatens to use a drawn deadly weapon on another unless reasonably 
necessary in defense of his person, property or abode or to prevent serious 
bodily injury to another;  
or

(iv) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to a 
woman whom he knows is pregnant.

            
(b) Aggravated assault and battery is a felony punishable by imprisonment 
for not more than ten (10) years.

 

  3Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-3-301 (LexisNexis 2003) provides:

 

§ 6-3-301.  Burglary; aggravated burglary; 
penalties.

            
(a) A person is guilty of burglary if, without authority, he enters or 
remains in a building, occupied structure or vehicle, or separately secured or 
occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit larceny or a felony 
therein.

            
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, burglary is a 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of 
not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or 
both.

            
(c) Aggravated burglary is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not 
less than five (5) years nor more than twenty-five (25) years, a fine of not 
more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00), or both, if, in the course of 
committing the crime of burglary, the person:

                        
(i) Is or becomes armed with or uses a deadly weapon or a simulated 
deadly weapon;

                        
(ii) Knowingly or recklessly inflicts bodily injury on anyone;  or

                        
(iii) Attempts to inflict bodily injury on anyone.

            
(d) As used in this section "in the course of committing the crime" 
includes the time during which an attempt to commit the crime or in which flight 
after the attempt or commission occurred.  
[Emphasis added.]

 

   4In order to make 
the narrative complete, we will point out that deShazer came to this 
confrontation supplied with an unusual amount and array of gear, including:  the goggles; shin guards under his 
pants; jock strap with plastic cup; bolt cutters; charcoal lighter fluid; 
Berretta pistol; Muscle-Man stun gun; duct tape; pepper mace; gas can with gas 
in it; flex ties that could be used to bind a person's wrists; and much 
more.

   5That evidence is 
in conflict, but we summarize it here in order to more fully explain the 
circumstances of this case.  The 
Wyoming State Hospital's evaluation of deShazer determined that he suffered from 
a mental illness that was treatable with psychotropic drugs and that he was not 
competent to stand trial.  deShazer 
was also evaluated in the federal prison system after parallel federal charges 
were filed against him.  That 
evaluation was made after deShazer had been taking psychotropic drugs and his 
mental illness was in remission.  
Contrary to the Wyoming State Hospital's findings, the federal evaluation 
determined that deShazer had no mental illness and was competent to stand trial 
at the time he was tried.

   6So far as we can 
perceive from the record, these evaluations were directed toward whether or not 
deShazer was dangerous to himself or to others and did not purport to be for the 
purpose of determining competency or sanity.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
25-10-101(a)(ii) and 25-10-109(b)(ii) (LexisNexis 
2003).