Case Title: Charles Kenneth Foster v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC01-240

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC01-240
____________
CHARLES KENNETH FOSTER,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
____________
No. SC01-767
____________
CHARLES KENNETH FOSTER,
Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL W. MOORE, etc., et al.,
Respondents.
[February 14, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
Charles Kenneth Foster, a prisoner under the sentence of death, appeals an
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order entered by the trial court denying his postconviction motion filed pursuant to
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  Foster also petitions this Court for writ
of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. 
These cases have been consolidated.  We affirm the trial court’s denial of
postconviction relief, and we deny habeas relief.
PROCEEDINGS TO DATE
The prior proceedings in this case have been extensive, both in the trial court
and on appeal.  The facts are set out in detail in Foster v. State, 369 So. 2d 928
(Fla. 1979).  Foster was convicted of the first-degree murder and robbery of Julian
Lanier, and, after the jury recommended death, the trial court sentenced him to
death.  See id. at 931.  Foster’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by this
Court.  See id. at 932.  
This Court subsequently affirmed the trial court’s denial of Foster’s first
postconviction motion, see Foster v. State, 400 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1981), and also
affirmed the trial court's denial of Foster's second postconviction motion.  See
Foster v. State, 518 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1987).  However, this Court granted Foster's
habeas petition and remanded for a new sentencing proceeding based on a
1.  Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (holding that it was error for
the trial court to refuse to consider nonstatutory mitigating circumstances that were
presented).
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Hitchcock1 error.  See id. at 902.  Foster’s resentencing jury recommended death
by an eight-to-four vote and the trial court imposed a death sentence.  See Foster v.
State, 614 So. 2d 455, 458 (Fla. 1992).  In addition, pending resentencing, Foster
filed a third postconviction motion, which the trial court summarily denied.  See id. 
Upon review of the denial of postconviction relief and of resentencing, this Court
affirmed the denial of Foster's third postconviction motion, but vacated Foster's
death sentence and remanded the case for the trial court to enter a new sentencing
order consistent with Rogers v. State, 511 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1987), and Campbell v.
State, 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990).  See Foster, 614 So. 2d at 465.  
Pursuant to our remand, the trial court entered a new sentencing order,
reimposing the death sentence, and this Court subsequently affirmed the sentence. 
See Foster v. State, 654 So. 2d 112, 113 (Fla. 1995).  The trial court found three
statutory aggravators: (1) the murder was committed while Foster was engaged in
the commission of or attempt to commit robbery; (2) the crime was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (3) the murder was committed in a cold,
calculated, and premeditated manner (CCP).  See id. at 113-14.  The trial court
found fourteen nonstatutory mitigators: (1) Foster murdered Lanier while he was
2.  The claims in Foster’s amended 3.850 motion were: (A) the Florida
Supreme Court applied constitutionally flawed harmless error analysis regarding the
CCP aggravator; (B) Foster was denied the right to an impartial jury; (C) Foster’s
guilty verdict including both felony murder and premeditated murder amounted to
double jeopardy and due process violations; (D) Foster’s confinement on death
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under the influence of emotional or mental disturbance (little weight); (2) Foster's
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirement of the law was impaired (little weight); (3) Foster has an abusive
family background (very little weight); (4) Foster's poverty (very little weight); (5)
Foster's physical illnesses (very little weight); (6) Foster's love for, and love by, his
family (very little weight); (7) Foster's alcohol and/or drug addiction (very little
weight); (8) Foster's troubled personal life (very little weight); (9) Foster's physical
injuries (very little weight); (10) Foster's lack of childhood development (very little
weight); (11) Foster's struggle with the death of loved ones (very little weight); (12)
Foster's learning disabilities; (13) Foster's potential for positive sustained human
relationships (very little weight); and (14) Foster's remorse for the crime (very little
weight).  See id. at 113 n.5.  
THIS APPEAL AND PROCEEDING
On September 7, 1999, Foster filed his fourth 3.850 motion, which
represents the first 3.850 motion filed after the trial court entered a new sentencing
order pursuant to our remand citing Campbell.2  A Huff3 preliminary hearing on this
row for twenty-three years constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; (E) the death
penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; and (F) a violation of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), was committed when the State did not disclose to
the defense a jail physician’s letter.
3.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).
4.  In addition to addressing the six main claims, the trial court briefly
addressed twenty-nine claims that Foster included in his motion.  Foster presented
the claims as being previously preserved and often devoted little more than one
sentence to each claim.  The trial court stated, “[I]t is unclear if the Defendant is
employing this method to incorporate those arguments or if he is merely outlining
what was raised previously.”  In each of the twenty-nine claims, the trial court
found that Foster failed to state a facially sufficient claim.  Foster does not raise the
issue of the trial court’s ruling on any of those twenty-nine claims on appeal. 
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motion was held on November 27, 2000.  On December 29, 2000, the trial court
summarily denied the motion on all grounds.4  Foster now appeals the trial court’s
summary denial of his fourth 3.850 motion, alleging that the trial court erred in
denying him an evidentiary hearing, and he petitions this Court separately for a writ
of habeas corpus.
3.850 APPEAL
Foster’s claims on appeal from the summary denial of his 3.850 motion may
be summarized as: (1) the trial court erred by denying without a hearing Foster’s
claim that his right to an impartial jury was violated; (2) the trial court erred by
denying without a hearing Foster’s claim that his conviction violated double
jeopardy; (3) the trial court erred by denying without a hearing Foster’s Brady
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claim; (4) the trial court erred by denying without a hearing Foster’s claim that the
twenty-three years that Foster has spent on death row constitute cruel and unusual
punishment; and (5) the Florida Supreme Court engaged in a constitutionally flawed
harmless error analysis in Foster v. State, 654 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1995).
This Court has summarized the standard of review for summary denial of a
3.850 claim: 
To uphold the trial court's summary denial of claims raised in a
3.850 motion, the claims must be either facially invalid or conclusively
refuted by the record.  Further, where no evidentiary hearing is held
below, we must accept the defendant's factual allegations to the extent
they are not refuted by the record.   
Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla. 1999) (citations omitted).  However, this
Court has also held the following:
A motion for postconviction relief can be denied without an
evidentiary hearing when the motion and the record conclusively
demonstrate that the movant is entitled to no relief.  A defendant may
not simply file a motion for postconviction relief containing
conclusory allegations that his or her trial counsel was ineffective and
then expect to receive an evidentiary hearing.  The defendant must
allege specific facts that, when considering the totality of the
circumstances, are not conclusively rebutted by the record and that
demonstrate a deficiency on the part of counsel which is detrimental to
the defendant.
Kennedy v. State, 547 So. 2d 912, 913 (Fla. 1989) (citations omitted).  
We affirm the trial court’s summary denial of Foster’s 3.850 claims, as they
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each fall into one of three categories: procedurally barred, without merit, or
conclusively refuted by the record.
RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY
Foster claims the trial court erred by summarily denying the claim that his
right to have an impartial jury was violated because a fair cross-section of the
community was not available to serve on his jury due to the trial judge excusing a
certain class of prospective jurors.  Specifically, Foster alleges for the first time in
this 3.850 motion that pregnant women and women with small children were
automatically excused from the jury venire before voir dire began, pursuant to a
flawed statutory exemption scheme.  Foster bases this allegation on the fact that the
State’s jury notes, which allegedly were not previously available to him, do not
affirmatively indicate that potential jurors were not excused.  Foster states that if the
trial court automatically excused this class of people, it did so improperly because
the statute provided, “[E]xpectant mothers and mothers with children under 15
years of age, upon their request, shall be exempted from grand and petit jury duty.” 
§ 40.01(1), Fla. Stat. (1975) (emphasis added).  Foster claims that he was entitled
to an evidentiary hearing to explore whether or not jurors were improperly excused.
We find this claim is procedurally barred because Foster’s challenge to the
5.  Foster’s argument that this claim may be brought as a newly discovered
evidence claim is refuted by the fact that in his own 3.850 motion, he admits he
knew that the judge conducted a voir dire outside his and counsel’s presence.  The
initial prong for determining whether something constitutes “newly discovered
evidence,” involves the fact that it must have been unknown by the trial court, by
the party, or by counsel at the time of trial and the defendant, or his counsel could
not known of it through due diligence.  See Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521
(Fla. 1998).  Foster knew of the ex parte meeting with the jury venire at the time of
his trial; his counsel could have attempted to discover what went on at that meeting
through due diligence, and filed a timely pretrial motion.  Thus, this allegation is not
properly raised as one pursuant to newly discovered evidence.
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procedure in which jurors were excused was not properly preserved at the trial
level.5  See Hoskins v. State, 702 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1997) (holding that the
defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s practice of having the court clerk
automatically excuse prospective jurors pursuant to section 40.013(5), Florida
Statutes (1995), was not timely filed because the excusals had already been made
and the defendant did not challenge his jury panel).  We therefore affirm the trial
court’s summary denial of this claim.
Foster also advances an ineffective assistance of counsel argument on this
claim.  In his 3.850 motion, Foster contends that counsel was ineffective for failing
to discover and litigate the exclusion of pregnant women and women with small
children during voir dire. 
In his 3.850 motion, Foster devoted only one sentence to the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, stating: “To the extent trial counsel failed to discover
6.  We have held there are three components that a defendant must show in
order to be successful in a Brady claim: (1) the evidence must be favorable to the
defendant because it is either exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) the
evidence must have been withheld by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and
(3) prejudice to the defendant must have ensued.  See State v. Riechmann, 777 So.
2d 342, 362 (Fla. 2000).
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and litigate this issue, Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel.” 
Foster has simply failed to allege specific facts that, when considering the totality of
the circumstances, demonstrate a deficiency on the part of counsel which resulted
in prejudice to the defendant.  Furthermore, Foster has not demonstrated that he
was constitutionally entitled to have pregnant women and women with small
children serve on his jury since section 40.01(1), Florida Statutes (1975), provided
them with an excuse for service and this Court has upheld the statute in the face of
constitutional concerns.  See McArthur v. State, 351 So. 2d 972, 975 (Fla. 1977). 
Therefore, we find the trial court did not err by denying Foster an evidentiary
hearing on this claim.
BRADY CLAIM
Foster alleges the trial court erred by not holding a hearing on his claim that
the State withheld exculpatory evidence from him in violation of Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963).6  Specifically, Foster alleges the State did not disclose (until a
public records request), a letter from jail physician Dr. Russell Stewart to Sheriff
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Tullis Easterling dated July 31, 1975, in which Dr. Stewart observed “obvious
mental disturbance” in Foster during an examination before trial.  However, the
record affirmatively and conclusively refutes Foster’s claim that the letter was
withheld by the State, either willfully or inadvertently, because the record reflects
that defense counsel was in possession of this letter on June 6, 1990, during
Foster’s resentencing hearing.  Defense counsel moved to have the letter entered
into evidence and the court admitted it as defense exhibit number 4 during the
penalty phase of Foster’s resentencing hearing.  We therefore affirm the trial
court’s summary denial of this claim because Foster’s Brady claim is conclusively
refuted by the record.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY VIOLATION
Foster alleges the trial court erred by summarily denying his claim that the 
jury’s two murder verdicts, finding him guilty of separate counts of premeditated
murder and felony murder for a single death, violate double jeopardy principles. 
We find the jury’s dual verdict is supported by the evidence in this case, and, as we
stated in Lamb v. State, 532 So. 2d 1051, 1052 (Fla. 1988), “there is no reason
why a defendant cannot premeditate a murder committed during the course of a
felony.”  We hereby affirm the trial court’s summary denial of this claim because
the record reflects that the trial court properly adjudicated Foster guilty of a single
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murder conviction for first-degree murder, which conclusively refutes Foster’s
double jeopardy claim.  See id.  Of course, Foster also received a single sentence
for the murder.
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Foster argues the trial court erred when it summarily denied his claim that the
twenty-three years he has spent on death row constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.  We have previously held an extended stay on death row does not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.  See Knight v. State, 746 So. 2d 423, 437
(Fla. 1998).  We also reject Foster’s claim that the death penalty is per se cruel and
unusual punishment, an issue that we have already decided adversely to him.  See 
Davis v. State, 742 So. 2d 233, 235-36 (Fla. 1999) (holding that the claim that the
death penalty is basically cruel and unusual punishment is without merit). 
Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s summary denial of this claim, as we find that it
is without merit.
HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS
Foster alleges this Court engaged in a constitutionally flawed harmless error
analysis regarding our conclusion in Foster v. State, 654 So. 2d 112, 115 (Fla.
1995), in which we stated that because the trial court found no statutory mitigators
and three strong aggravators, the giving of an erroneous cold, calculated, and
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premeditated aggravator instruction did not affect the jury’s consideration of his
sentence, and therefore the giving of such instruction was harmless error.  A
postconviction motion is not the proper vehicle to challenge a decision of this
Court.  Rule 3.850 motions are a vehicle provided to challenge collateral issues
related to the trial court proceedings, not appellate decisions.  See Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.850(a)(1)-(6).  Further, this claim is procedurally barred because it is an improper
relitigation of an issue upon which this Court has already ruled.  See Brown v.
State, 596 So. 2d 1026, 1028 (Fla. 1992).  We therefore affirm the trial court’s
summary denial of this claim.
HABEAS CORPUS
Foster alleges both appellate counsel and postconviction counsel were
ineffective for not sufficiently arguing that the trial court erred when it stated that
aggravators were established beyond a reasonable doubt, without a specific factual
analysis that a robbery was committed.  The issue of appellate counsel’s
effectiveness is appropriately raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus and we
consider it here.  See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000). 
However, this Court has held that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel
is not a cognizable claim.  See Waterhouse v. State, 792 So. 2d 1176, 1193 (Fla.
2001) (citing State ex rel. Butterworth v. Kenny, 714 So. 2d 404, 408 (Fla. 1998),
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and Lambrix v. State, 698 So. 2d 247, 248 (Fla. 1996)).
Foster takes issue with his appellate counsel for not sufficiently arguing that
the trial court erred when it found that the State had proven the aggravator that the
murder was committed while Foster was engaged in the commission of a robbery.  
The record reflects that the robbery aggravator was asserted during the penalty
phase, but only after evidence of a robbery had already been presented during the
guilt phase and the jury found Foster guilty of the robbery that arose out of the
same criminal episode as the murder.  This Court has stated, "[A]ppellate counsel
cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise non-meritorious claims on appeal,
or claims that do not amount to fundamental error."  Happ v. Moore, 784 So. 2d
1091, 1095 (Fla. 2001) (citation omitted).  We find that appellate counsel was not
deficient for failing to raise this issue in more depth because the argument had no
merit.
Foster argues that his direction to another person to take a wallet from a
dead body is merely evidence of an "afterthought," not evidence of robbery.  This
Court has stated:
Where an "afterthought" argument is raised, the defendant's
theory is carefully analyzed in light of the entire circumstances of the
incident.  If there is competent, substantial evidence to uphold the
robbery conviction, and no other motive for the murder appears from
the record, the robbery conviction will be upheld.  Conversely, in
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those cases where the record discloses that, in committing the murder,
the defendant was apparently motivated by some reason other than a
desire to obtain the stolen valuable, a conviction for robbery (or the
robbery aggravator) will not be upheld.
Beasley v. State, 774 So. 2d 649, 662 (Fla. 2000) (citations omitted) (holding that
property being stolen after the victim was killed constituted a robbery because no
evidence demonstrated any motive for killing the victim other than to take her
money).  See also Jones v. State, 652 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1995); Bruno v. State, 574
So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1991).  The record reflects that Anita Rogers, an eyewitness to the
murder who was with Foster immediately before the murder, testified that Foster
said he was going to "rip the old man off" by taking his money when the man went
to bed with Gail Evans.   This testimony rebuts Foster's "afterthought" argument
and provides an evidentiary basis for Foster’s robbery conviction.  Therefore,
because Foster has not shown that appellate counsel's failure to argue the robbery
aggravator in more detail was of such magnitude as to constitute a serious error or
substantial deficiency falling measurably outside the range of professionally
acceptable performance, and that this alleged deficiency compromised the appellate
process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the correctness of the
result, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s denial of 3.850 relief and
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deny habeas corpus relief.
It is so ordered. 
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Two Cases:
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Bay County 
Don T. Sirmons, Judge, Case No. 75-486, and 
An Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
Joseph F. McDermott, St. Pete Beach, Florida,
for Appellant/Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee/Respondent