Case Title: Zumwalde v. Madeira & Indian Hill Joint Fire Dist.

Citation: 2011-Ohio-1603

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Zumwalde v. Madeira & Indian Hill Joint Fire Dist., Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-1603.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-1603 
ZUMWALDE, APPELLEE, v. MADEIRA AND INDIAN HILL JOINT FIRE  
DISTRICT ET AL; ASHBROCK, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Zumwalde v. Madeira & Indian Hill Joint Fire Dist.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-1603.] 
Civil immunity of political subdivisions and employees — Action by employee of 
political subdivision arising out of employment relationship — R.C. 
2744.09(B). 
(No. 2010-0218 — Submitted February 1, 2011 — Decided April 7, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, 
No. C-090015, 2009-Ohio-6801. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
In a civil action brought by an employee of a political subdivision against another 
employee of the political subdivision arising out of the employment 
relationship, R.C. 2744.09(B) removes immunity only as to the political 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
subdivision and does not affect the statutory immunity of the fellow 
employee. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} The issue in this case is whether R.C. 2744.09(B) removes 
immunity from an employee of a political subdivision in a civil action filed 
against the employee by another employee of the same political subdivision when 
the civil action relates to a matter that arises out of the employment relationship 
between the employee bringing the suit and the political subdivision.  For the 
reasons that follow, we conclude that R.C. 2744.09(B) does not remove immunity 
from an employee of a political subdivision under such circumstances.  We 
accordingly reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this matter 
to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} Plaintiff-appellee, Barbara Zumwalde, previously sued defendant 
Madeira and Indian Hill Joint Fire District for unlawful employment 
discrimination.  As part of the resolution of that matter, the district offered 
Zumwalde full-time employment contingent upon her passing a physical 
examination. 
{¶ 3} In completing a questionnaire for the examination on July 14, 
2005, Zumwalde indicated that she neither had nor had ever had back problems.  
Further, Zumwalde certified that all her answers in the questionnaire were true 
and complete and acknowledged that any material and deliberate falsification of 
fact would be grounds for dismissal.  It was later learned, however, that 
Zumwalde’s medical records indicated that she had received chiropractic 
treatment for back pain beginning in May 2005. 
{¶ 4} On September 29, 2005, Zumwalde sustained a work-related injury 
to her low back during a training exercise.  As a result, Zumwalde filed a 
January Term, 2011 
3 
 
workers’ compensation claim, which the district approved for benefits on or about 
October 14, 2005. 
{¶ 5} While investigating Zumwalde’s workers’ compensation claim, 
Chief Stephen Ashbrock of the district learned of Zumwalde’s chiropractic 
treatment 
for 
back 
pain. 
 
Ashbrock 
determined 
that 
Zumwalde’s 
misrepresentations violated the district’s Personnel Guide and scheduled a 
predisciplinary conference for July 31, 2006. 
{¶ 6} Based on the evidence presented at the July 31, 2006 conference, 
Ashbrock found that Zumwalde had violated two provisions of the Personnel 
Guide.  Ashbrock suspended Zumwalde for 30 calendar days without pay and 
provided notice of her right of appeal to the district’s Personnel Committee of the 
board of trustees.  Zumwalde appealed the suspension.  On October 20, 2006, the 
Personnel Committee sustained Ashbrock’s conclusions and findings but reduced 
the period of loss of pay to 20 calendar days. 
{¶ 7} Zumwalde then filed suit in the Hamilton County Court of 
Common Pleas against the district and Ashbrock, asserting retaliation claims for 
filing (1) her previous discrimination suit and (2) the workers’ compensation 
claim.  The district and Ashbrock filed a motion for summary judgment.  
Ashbrock argued, as a district employee, that he was immune from Zumwalde’s 
claim pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) and that there was no evidence that he had 
acted with a malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner so 
that he would lose his immunity.  The trial court, in denying Ashbrock’s motion, 
held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Ashbrock had 
acted maliciously, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. 
{¶ 8} Ashbrock appealed the decision to the First District Court of 
Appeals.  In affirming the denial of immunity, the First District analyzed the issue 
pursuant to R.C. 2744.09(B).  The First District held that R.C. 2744.09(B) 
removes immunity from political-subdivision employees in civil actions filed 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
against them by another employee of the political subdivision in regard to any 
matter arising out of the employment relationship between the employee filing the 
suit and the political subdivision. 
{¶ 9} We accepted Ashbrock’s appeal under our discretionary 
jurisdiction for review of a single proposition of law:  “R.C. §2744.09(B) applies 
only to claims by an employee against a ‘public subdivision’ for ‘claims arising 
out of the employment relationship.’"  125 Ohio St.3d 1413, 2010-Ohio-1893, 
925 N.E.2d 1001. 
Relevant Statute 
{¶ 10} R.C. Chapter 2744, the political-subdivision tort-immunity law, 
was enacted in 1985 and addresses when political subdivisions, their departments 
and agencies, and their employees are immune from liability for their actions.  
Exceptions to immunity are contained in R.C. Chapter 2744. 
{¶ 11} R.C. 2744.09 provides: 
{¶ 12} “This chapter does not apply to, and shall not be construed to apply 
to, the following: 
{¶ 13} “(A) Civil actions that seek to recover damages from a political 
subdivision or any of its employees for contractual liability; 
{¶ 14} “(B) Civil actions by an employee, or the collective bargaining 
representative of an employee, against his political subdivision relative to any 
matter that arises out of the employment relationship between the employee and 
the political subdivision; 
{¶ 15} “* * *  
{¶ 16} “(E) Civil claims based upon alleged violations of the constitution 
or statutes of the United States, except that the provisions of section 2744.07 of 
the Revised Code shall apply to such claims or related civil actions.” 
Analysis 
January Term, 2011 
5 
 
{¶ 17} Ashbrock argues that the First District erred in its application of 
R.C. 2744.09(B) to the circumstances of this case.  He asserts that by the plain 
language of R.C. 2744.09(B), the removal of immunity is limited to claims 
asserted against the political subdivision and does not extend to removal of 
immunity held by a fellow employee of the political subdivision. 
{¶ 18} Ashbrock maintains that in order for the subsection to apply to a 
claim against a fellow employee, the words “or any employees of the political 
subdivision” would have to be added to the end of Subsection (B). 
{¶ 19} Further, Ashbrock maintains that R.C. 2744.09(A) supports his 
position that this language should not be read into Subsection (B).  This is 
because R.C. 2744.09(A) contains the phrase “or any of its employees.”  
Ashbrock contends that because the General Assembly specifically included the 
phrase “or any of its employees” in Subsection (A) for the purpose of allowing 
claims not only against the political subdivision but also against the employees of 
the subdivision, the General Assembly, if it meant to remove immunity from 
political-subdivision employees in Subsection (B), would necessarily have used 
the phrase “or any of its employees,” which it did include in Subsection (A). 
{¶ 20} In response, Zumwalde contends that the plain language of R.C. 
2744.09(B) precludes both political subdivision and their employees from 
asserting immunity in cases arising out the employment relationship.  Zumwalde 
relies on the use of the term “civil actions” in the statute for her argument.  She 
maintains that application of the ordinary meaning of the term “civil actions” to 
R.C. 2744.09(B) demonstrates that the General Assembly intended to remove the 
entire “suit” or “proceeding” from the purview of R.C. Chapter 2744 immunity 
and not merely those claims alleged against a political subdivision. 
{¶ 21} Zumwalde further asserts that examining R.C. 2744.09 as a whole 
illustrates that the General Assembly purposefully chose to remove entire “civil 
actions” arising out of the employment relationship from the ambit of R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
Chapter 2744.  She compares the use of “[c]ivil actions” in R.C. 2744.09(B) with 
the use of “[c]ivil claims” in R.C. 2744.09(E) to foreclose the possibility that the 
General Assembly intended to limit the operation of Subsection (B) to claims 
against a political subdivision.  If the legislature intended R.C. 2744.09(B) to 
remove immunity only as to claims raised by an employee against the employee’s 
political subdivision, Zumwalde argues, it would have made its intention clear by 
using the word “claims” as it did in R.C. 2744.09(E).  Zumwalde contends that 
adopting Ashbrock’s interpretation requires the court to substitute the word 
“claim” for “action,” which oversteps the judiciary’s duty to apply the law as 
enacted by the legislature. 
{¶ 22} This court concisely stated a well-settled rule of statutory 
interpretation in Slingluff v. Weaver (1902), 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574, 
paragraph two of the syllabus:  "[T]he intent of the law-makers is to be sought 
first of all in the language employed, and if the words be free from ambiguity and 
doubt, and express plainly, clearly and distinctly, the sense of the law-making 
body, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation.  The question 
is not what did the general assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of 
that which it did enact.  That body should be held to mean what it has plainly 
expressed, and hence no room is left for construction." 
{¶ 23} The court further expounded upon this rule in Provident Bank v. 
Wood (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105-106, 65 O.O.2d 296, 304 N.E.2d 378:  "It is 
a cardinal rule that a court must first look to the language of the statute itself to 
determine the legislative intent.  If that inquiry reveals that the statute conveys a 
meaning which is clear, unequivocal and definite, at that point the interpretive 
effort is at an end, and the statute must be applied accordingly."  (Citation 
omitted.) 
{¶ 24} The language of R.C. 2744.09(B) is clear and unambiguous on its 
face and requires no interpretation.  Subsection (B) clearly states that immunity is 
January Term, 2011 
7 
 
removed only with respect to political subdivisions.  Had the General Assembly 
intended also to remove immunity from the employees of political subdivisions, it 
could have easily done so by including the word “employee” in R.C. 2744.09(B), 
as it did in R.C. 2744.09(A).  To find otherwise would require this court to insert 
“employee” into Subsection (B).  But “[a] court should give effect to the words 
actually employed in a statute, and should not delete words used, or insert words 
not used, in the guise of interpreting the statute.”  State v. Taniguchi (1995), 74 
Ohio St.3d 154. 156, 656 N.E.2d 1286. 
{¶ 25} Additionally, Zumwalde’s argument that the use of “civil actions” 
instead of “civil claims” signifies the legislature’s intent to remove immunity for 
employees of political subdivisions is without merit.  R.C. 2744.09(A) employs 
the term “civil actions” but, as discussed above, specifically states that immunity 
is removed as to any of the political subdivision’s employees.  If the General 
Assembly had intended “civil actions” to remove immunity for political-
subdivision employees, following Zumwalde’s logic, there would be no need to 
refer to “a political subdivision and any of its employees” in Subsection (A). 
{¶ 26} Finally, Zumwalde maintains that public-policy considerations 
weigh in favor of denying immunity to political-subdivision employees named as 
defendants in a civil action arising out of the employment relationship.  However, 
our conclusion that R.C. 2477.09(B) is unambiguous prevents us from 
entertaining Zumwalde’s public-policy arguments.  Lancaster v. Fairfield Cty. 
Budget Comm. (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 242, 245, 699 N.E.2d 473. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 27} In a civil action brought by an employee of a political subdivision 
against another employee of the political subdivision arising out of the 
employment relationship, R.C. 2744.09(B) removes immunity only as to the 
political subdivision and does not affect the statutory immunity of the fellow 
employee. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
{¶ 28} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals 
holding that Ashbrock was not entitled to immunity pursuant to R.C. 2744.09(B).  
This cause is remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent 
with our decision herein. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Law Office of Marc Mezibov, Marc D. Mezibov, and Susan M. Lawrence, 
for appellee. 
 
Rendigs, Fry, Kiely & Dennis, L.L.P., Wilson G. Weisenfelder Jr., and 
Laura I. Hillerich, for appellant. 
 
White & Fish, L.P.A., Inc. and Arnold S. White, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae Ohio Association for Justice. 
 
Fortney & Klingshirn and Neil Klingshirn; and the Gittes Law Group and 
Frederick M. Gittes, urging affirmance for amicus curiae the Ohio Employment 
Lawyers’ Association. 
 
Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn Co., L.P.A., Stephen L. Byron, Rebecca K. 
Schaltenbrand, and Stephen J. Smith; and John Gotherman, urging reversal for 
amici curiae Ohio Municipal League, Ohio Township Association, and Ohio Fire 
Chiefs’ Association. 
_______________________