Case Title: Ex parte Hillard and Warr.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1200452

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2021-09-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: September 3, 2021
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300
Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 SPECIAL TERM, 2021
_________________________
1200452
_________________________
Ex parte Deborah Hillard and Holland Hillard Warr
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Deborah Hillard
v.
Rik Tozzi)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-16-312)
SELLERS, Justice.
Deborah Hillard and Holland Hillard Warr jointly petitioned this
Court for a writ of mandamus, raising numerous issues.  We ordered
1200452
answers and briefs on one issue raised by Warr: whether the Jefferson
Circuit Court erred in denying her summary-judgment motion on the
counterclaim brought against her by her former husband, Rik Tozzi, which
Warr asserts is barred by principles of res judicata.  Warr specifically
requests that we issue the writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to
grant her summary-judgment motion.  We deny the petition as to that
issue.  Moreover, because, in our order of April 28, 2021, we ordered
answers and briefs as to only that one issue, we implicitly denied the
petition as to the other issues raised by Hillard and Warr.  See Ex parte
Carson, 945 So. 2d 448, 449 (Ala. 2006).
Warr and Tozzi married in July 2011.  Shortly before their marriage,
Warr's house was destroyed by a tornado.  Warr used insurance proceeds
from the loss to purchase and begin remodeling a house in which she and
Tozzi planned to live.  It appears that title to the new house was vested
solely in Warr's name.
Apparently the insurance proceeds were insufficient to promptly
complete the remodeling, and, in September 2012, Warr's mother,
Deborah Hillard, sent Tozzi an email indicating that Hillard was going to
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provide $140,000 to "tide [Warr] over."  Attached to the email was a draft
promissory note providing that the funds were to be repaid to Hillard
within 90 days.  Although the original draft of the promissory note
identified both Warr and Tozzi as borrowers, Tozzi removed Warr's name
and accompanying signature line and signed his name to the promissory
note as the sole borrower.  According to Tozzi, Hillard represented to him
when she sent the draft promissory note that she needed the promissory
note executed immediately for tax purposes, that she had been unable to
locate Warr to obtain her signature, that Tozzi would not personally have
to repay the loan, and that the loaned funds would be repaid to Hillard
from the proceeds from the eventual sale of the house.
Thereafter, Hillard arranged for $140,000 to be transferred from a
trust, of which Hillard was a beneficiary, to a bank account held jointly by
Hillard and Warr.  The money was then transferred to a different bank
account also held jointly by Hillard and Warr, which the parties have
referred to as the "house account."  Funds in the house account were used
to pay for the remodeling of Warr's new house.  Tozzi had no ownership
interest in either of the referenced bank accounts or the house.
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In February 2014, Tozzi initiated divorce proceedings in the
Tuscaloosa Circuit Court.  During those proceedings, Tozzi asserted that
he should not be required to repay the money allegedly due Hillard
pursuant to the promissory note because the funds had been used solely
to improve Warr's house and because he had contributed his own funds
toward those improvements.  He asked the domestic-relations court to
treat the funds allegedly due under the promissory note as a joint marital
debt and to order them to be repaid from the proceeds from the sale of
Warr's house.  The domestic-relations court, however, declined Tozzi's
request and, in April 2019, entered a divorce judgment declaring in part
that "each party shall be liable for any debts in his or her own name."  It
appears that that portion of the divorce judgment was based on a
prenuptial agreement entered into by Tozzi and Warr, which made each
party responsible for his or her personal debts.
 During the pendency of the divorce proceedings, Hillard initiated a
collections action against Tozzi in the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court.  She
stated causes of action alleging breach of the promissory note and money
had and received.  At some point, Hillard's action was transferred to the
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Jefferson Circuit Court where, in December 2016, Tozzi filed a
counterclaim against Hillard.  He also added Warr as an additional
counterclaim defendant at that time.  
Pursuant to his counterclaim, Tozzi alleged that Hillard had
fraudulently induced Tozzi to execute the promissory note by
misrepresenting that he would not have to repay the money loaned, by
misrepresenting that Hillard needed a promissory note only for tax
purposes, and by misrepresenting that Hillard had been unable to locate
Warr to obtain her signature on the promissory note.  Tozzi also asserted
that Hillard had fraudulently suppressed the fact that the money would
be deposited into a bank account held jointly by Hillard and Warr. 
Additionally, Tozzi alleged that Warr had conspired with Hillard to
fraudulently induce Tozzi to sign the promissory note as the sole borrower
and had fraudulently suppressed the fact that the money was deposited
into a bank account held by Warr and Hillard.1
1Tozzi later amended his counterclaim to allege that Hillard had
been unjustly enriched because the loaned funds had been deposited in
her own bank account.
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Warr moved for a summary judgment on Tozzi's counterclaim,
arguing in part that it is barred by principles of res judicata based on the
earlier divorce proceedings.  The trial court denied Warr's motion, and she
timely filed the instant petition for a writ of mandamus.
"A petition for a writ of mandamus is an appropriate
method by which to seek this Court's review of the denial of a
motion to dismiss or for a summary judgment predicated on
the doctrine of res judicata. Ex parte LCS Inc., 12 So. 3d 55, 56
(Ala. 2008) (citing Ex parte Sears, Roebuck & Co., 895 So. 2d
265 (Ala. 2004)). See also Ex parte Jefferson Cnty., 656 So. 2d
382 (Ala. 1995).
" 'The standard governing our review of an
issue presented in a petition for the writ of
mandamus is well established:
" ' "[M]andamus 
is 
a 
drastic 
and
extraordinary writ to be issued only
where there is (1) a clear legal right in
the petitioner to the order sought; (2)
an 
imperative 
duty 
upon 
the
respondent to perform, accompanied by
a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another
adequate remedy; and (4) properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court." '
"Ex parte Cupps, 782 So. 2d 772, 774-75 (Ala. 2000) (quoting
Ex parte Edgar, 543 So. 2d 682, 684 (Ala. 1989))."
Ex parte Webber, 157 So. 3d 887, 891 (Ala. 2014).
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"Res judicata and collateral estoppel are two closely
related, judicially created doctrines that preclude the
relitigation of matters that have been previously adjudicated
or, in the case of res judicata, that could have been adjudicated
in a prior action.
" 'The doctrine of res judicata, while actually
embodying two basic concepts, usually refers to
what commentators label "claim preclusion," while
collateral estoppel ... refers to "issue preclusion,"
which is a subset of the broader res judicata
doctrine.'
"Little v. Pizza Wagon, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1269, 1272 (Ala. 1983)
(Jones, J., concurring specially). See also McNeely v. Spry
Funeral Home of Athens, Inc., 724 So. 2d 534, 537 n.1 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1998). In Hughes v. Martin, 533 So. 2d 188 (Ala.
1988), this Court explained the rationale behind the doctrine
of res judicata:
" 'Res judicata is a broad, judicially developed
doctrine, which rests upon the ground that public
policy, and the interest of the litigants alike,
mandate that there be an end to litigation; that
those who have contested an issue shall be bound
by the ruling of the court; and that issues once
tried shall be considered forever settled between
those same parties and their privies.'
"533 So. 2d at 190. The elements of res judicata are
" '(1) a prior judgment on the merits, (2) rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) with
substantial identity of the parties, and (4) with the
same cause of action presented in both actions.'
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"Equity Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. Vinson, 723 So. 2d 634, 636 (Ala.
1998). 'If those four elements are present, then any claim that
was, or that could have been, adjudicated in the prior action is
barred from further litigation.' 723 So. 2d at 636. Res judicata,
therefore, bars a party from asserting in a subsequent action
a claim that it has already had an opportunity to litigate in a
previous action."
Lee L. Saad Constr. Co. v. DPF Architects, P.C., 851 So. 2d 507, 516-17
(Ala. 2002).
Warr has not shown that, in the divorce action, Tozzi asserted or
fully litigated the allegedly fraudulent acts and omissions surrounding the
advent of the promissory note.  It does not appear that Tozzi's tort-based
assertions in the present case, namely, that Warr suppressed material
information and participated in a conspiracy to fraudulently induce him
to sign the promissory note as the sole borrower, were made in the divorce
action or addressed in the divorce judgment, which made no specific
mention of the promissory note.  Even so, Warr asserts that the doctrine
of res judicata precludes a party from litigating not only matters that have
been previously adjudicated, but also matters that could have been
adjudicated in a prior action.  This Court does not doubt that the
domestic-relations court could have taken into account Tozzi's fraud and
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conspiracy allegations, had he made them, in exercising its discretion in
dividing the parties' marital property and debt.  See Coleman v. Coleman,
566 So. 2d 482, 485 (Ala. 1990) (indicating that, in a divorce action, the
trial court "can consider the conduct of the parties during the marriage
when awarding alimony and dividing the marital property").   According
to Warr, because Tozzi could have made his fraud and conspiracy
allegations in the divorce action, he is barred from raising them as tort
claims in the present case.
Warr bears the burden in seeking a writ of mandamus.  Ex parte
Glover, 801 So. 2d 1, 6 (Ala. 2001) ("The petitioner bears the burden of
proving each of [the] elements [establishing entitlement to mandamus
relief] before the writ will issue.").  In her petition, Warr does not provide
meaningful discussion of precedent dealing specifically with the ability of
a party in a divorce action to pursue tort claims in a separate action
against the other party to the divorce action.  For example, in Coleman,
supra, this Court held that a former wife was barred from suing her
former husband in tort based on an allegation that he had infected her
with a sexually transmitted disease during their marriage because she
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had entered into a settlement agreement in connection with previous
divorce proceedings, which was incorporated into the parties' final divorce
judgment, that provided that each party released the other from "any and
all claims and demands."  566 So. 2d at 483.  The Court in Coleman noted
as follows regarding the state of the law with respect to a party's ability
to sue his or her former spouse based on acts or omissions that occurred
during the marriage:
"The present state of the law in Alabama concerning the
issue of whether a wife is barred from bringing a tort action
against her former husband for acts that occurred during their
marriage is gleaned from a well-established line of cases. See
Ex parte Harrington, 450 So. 2d 99 (Ala. 1984); Jackson v.
Hall, 460 So. 2d 1290 (Ala. 1984); Weil v. Lammon, 503 So. 2d
830 (Ala. 1987); and Smith v. Smith, 530 So. 2d 1389 (Ala.
1988).
"In Ex parte Harrington, 450 So. 2d 99 (Ala. 1984), we
permitted a wife to file a tort action for assault and battery in
one county, even though she had filed a divorce complaint in
another county. In her tort action she alleged the same
operative facts concerning the violence perpetrated on her by
her former husband that she had alleged in her divorce action.
The tort action was filed before a final judgment was entered
in the divorce case, there was no settlement agreement of the
parties in the case, and the issue of assault and battery had
not been completely litigated.
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"In Jackson v. Hall, 460 So. 2d 1290 (Ala. 1984), we did
not allow a wife to pursue a tort action for assault and battery
against her former husband. Prior to filing her tort action, she
had entered into a settlement agreement in the divorce action
in full and final settlement of 'all property matters and other
matters between the parties.' In Jackson, we said:
" 'The question here, however, is whether or not
that action is barred under the material before the
trial court on the summary judgment motion. The
answer to this question depends upon the
construction of the agreement of the parties and
the effect of the divorce decree.
" '....
" 'This agreement was merged into the divorce
decree and thus became a part of that decree, final
and not subject to modification. Thus, the question
of liability for a pre-existing cause of action for an
assault by one spouse against the other was
decided in the divorce action.'
"460 So. 2d at 1292 (citations omitted).
"In Weil v. Lammon, 503 So. 2d 830 (Ala. 1987), we did
not allow a wife to pursue a tort action for fraud and
misrepresentation against her former husband. We noted that
the wife had asserted the alleged fraud and misrepresentation
in support of her claim for alimony, and we held that the wife
was barred by reason of the principle of res judicata. We
expressly noted that Weil did not overrule Ex parte
Harrington, but left open a field of operation where there had
not been a settlement of all claims by the parties, or a claim
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fully litigated in a divorce case that had proceeded to a final
judgment.
"Finally, in Smith v. Smith, 530 So. 2d 1389 (Ala. 1988),
we did not allow a wife to pursue a tort action for assault and
battery against her former husband. The tort action was filed
before a final judgment in the divorce case was entered.
However, the parties had entered into extensive settlement
negotiations, and the trial judge was aware of the fact that the
former husband was attempting to provide for his former
wife's medical expenses. In light of the circumstances of the
case, we held that the former wife was estopped from
relitigating matters that were settled in the divorce action. 530
So. 2d at 1391.
"Those cases, read together, do not establish a general
rule that a divorce action routinely precludes a former spouse
from suing the other in tort based upon acts that occurred
during the marriage. Rather, each case must be examined on
its own facts and circumstances."
566 So. 2d at 484-85.  See also Ex parte Howle, 776 So. 2d 133 (Ala. 2000)
(discussing Harrington, Jackson, Weil, Smith, and Coleman and
concluding that a former wife was precluded from pursuing a tort claim
alleging assault and battery against her former husband because she had
expressly raised the particular instance of assault and battery in support
of her claim for alimony in the divorce action, had been awarded
compensation by the domestic-relations court for medical expenses
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incurred because of the assault and battery, and had accepted payment of
that award by the former husband).
In a special concurrence in Weil v. Lammon, 503 So. 2d 830 (Ala.
1987), Justice Adams noted his "opinion that actions for divorce are sui
generis" and that "[t]o rule that in every divorce case a party's cause of
action must be litigated in that proceeding, of necessity, would deny the
right to trial by jury." 503 So. 2d at 832 (Adams, J., concurring specially). 
In Osborne v. Osborne, 216 So. 3d 1237 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016), the Court
of Civil Appeals held that a former wife was not barred from pursuing a
tort action alleging assault and battery against her former husband
because, even though she had presented evidence of the assault and
battery in a prior divorce action, she had not sought damages in the
divorce action aimed at compensating her for injuries she had suffered as
a result of the assault and battery, the assault and battery claim had not
been "fully litigated in the divorce action," and the domestic-relations
court had not awarded the former wife compensation for her injuries.  The
court in Osborne also pointed to Justice Adams's special concurrence in
Weil regarding the right to a jury trial in tort actions and concluded that
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"a divorcing spouse should not be required to include tort claims in a
divorce action."  216 So. 3d at 1246.  See also Abbott v. Williams, 888 F.2d
1550, 1554 (11th Cir. 1989) (concluding that "Alabama precedent does not
establish a bright-line rule that a divorce judgment automatically
precludes one former spouse from suing the other in tort based upon
conduct which occurred during the marriage," that "each such case [must]
be examined on its own facts and circumstances," and that "a case is
within the 'field of operation' left open by [Ex parte] Harrington[, 450 So.
2d 99 (Ala. 1984),] if a settlement agreement, merged into a final divorce
judgment, did not cover the tort claim, or if all elements of the tort claim
were not fully litigated and decided in the divorce action, even though the
divorce action has proceeded to final judgment").
Thus, Alabama has a line of precedent dealing specifically with
whether a former spouse can pursue tort claims against his or her former
spouse based on acts or omissions that occurred during the marriage.  In
her petition for a writ of mandamus, Warr does not discuss any of that
precedent.  The only arguably relevant divorce-related case Warr cites in
her petition is Turenne v. Turenne, 884 So. 2d 844, 849 (Ala. 2003), which
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she quotes only for the proposition that "fraud actions ... are within the
ancillary jurisdiction of the domestic relations division" of a circuit court. 
But she provides no discussion of the details of Turenne, which involved
assertions of fraudulent inducement and suppression in connection with
a divorce  settlement agreement that had been incorporated into a divorce
judgment.
In her reply brief, Warr acknowledges Weil, 503 So. 2d at 832, which
she quotes for the proposition that "there is no reason why all known
claims between spouses in a divorce action should not be settled in that
litigation," and Ex parte Howle, 776 So. 2d at 135, which she quotes for
the proposition that "[t]he first three elements [of the doctrine of res
judicata] are clearly satisfied -- the divorce judgment is a prior judgment
on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction in an action
between the same parties."  But Warr does not provide meaningful
discussion of the precedent she cites or the other relevant precedent noted
above.  She has not established that the instant case is controlled by
opinions holding that a former spouse was barred from pursuing a tort
claim against the other former spouse based on conduct that occurred
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before a divorce.  For example, she has not shown that the allegedly
tortious acts and omissions surrounding the execution and delivery of the
promissory note were fully litigated in the divorce action or that Tozzi's
tort allegations were resolved by a settlement agreement entered in the
divorce action or by the final divorce judgment.
The writ of mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary remedy. 
Webber, 157 So. 3d at 891.  It should be issued only where the petitioner
has demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief sought below.  Id. 
Because Warr has not demonstrated a clear legal right to a judgment in
her favor on Tozzi's counterclaim based on principles of res judicata, we
deny the petition.
PETITION DENIED.
Parker, C.J., and Wise, Bryan, Stewart, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.
Bolin, Shaw, and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result.
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