Case Title: Douglas v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 146/10

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2011-10-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Ellis Richard Douglas, Jr. and Lamont Curtis v. State of Maryland, Nos. 146 & 147,
September Term, 2010
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - PETITION FOR WRIT OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE -
IMMEDIATE APPEAL OF DENIAL: A petition for writ of actual innocence, filed
pursuant to Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol, 2010 Supp.), § 8-301, of the Criminal
Procedure Article (“C.P.”), is a final judgment subject to immediate appeal pursuant to
Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 12-301 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings
Article (“C.J.”).  The right to appeal is not abrogated by C.P. § 7-107(b), because claims of
actual innocence are not cognizable under the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act
(“UPPA”), codified at C.P. §§ 7-101 through 7-301.  
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - PETITION FOR WRIT OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE -
DENIAL WITHOUT HEARING: A petition for writ of actual innocence, filed pursuant
to C.P. § 8-301, may not be denied without a hearing if: (1) the petition is in writing; (2)
states in detail the grounds on which the petition is based; (3) describes the newly discovered
evidence; (4) contains or is accompanied by a request for a hearing; (5) distinguishes the
newly discovered evidence claimed in the petition from any claims made in prior petitions;
and (6) satisfies the burden of pleading and asserts grounds upon which relief may be
granted.  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 146 
September Term, 2010
ELLIS RICHARD DOUGLAS, JR.
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
           No. 147
            September Term, 2010
__________________________________
                LAMONT CURTIS
                              v.
    STATE OF MARYLAND          
__________________________________
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
*Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
Opinion by Barbera, J.
Harrell, Battaglia, and Adkins, JJ., dissent.
Filed: October 27, 2011
*Murphy, J., now retired, participated in
the hearing and conference of this case
while an active member of this Court; after
being recalled pursuant to the Constitution,
Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption
of this opinion.
1 Section 8-301 was amended in 2010.  Because none of the amendments affect our
analysis, we cite the current version of the statute.  Section 8-310,“Petition for writ of actual
innocence,” provides:
(a) Grounds. – A person charged by indictment or criminal information with
a crime triable in circuit court and convicted of that crime may, at any time,
file a petition for writ of actual innocence in the circuit court for the county in
which the conviction was imposed if the person claims that there is newly
discovered evidence that:
(1) creates a substantial or significant possibility that the result may
have been different, as that standard has been judicially determined; and
(2) could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Maryland Rule 4-331.
(b) Requirements. – A petition filed under this section shall:
(1) be in writing;
(2) state in detail the grounds on which the petition is based;
(3) describe the newly discovered evidence;
(4) contain or be accompanied by a request for hearing if a hearing is
sought; and 
(5) distinguish the newly discovered evidence claimed in the petition
from any claims made in prior petitions.
* * *
(e) Hearing. – (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the
court shall hold a hearing on a petition filed under this section if the petition
satisfies the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and a hearing was
requested.
(2) The court may dismiss a petition without a hearing if the court finds
that the petition fails to assert grounds on which relief may be granted. 
(f) Ruling. – (1) In ruling on a petition filed under this section, the court may
set aside the verdict, resentence, grant a new trial, or correct the sentence, as
the court considers appropriate. 
(2) The court shall state the reasons for its ruling on the record.
(g) Burden of proof. – A petitioner in a proceeding under this section has the
burden of proof.  
These consolidated cases present us with our first opportunity to interpret Maryland
Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2010 Supp.), § 8-301 of the Criminal Procedure Article
(“C.P.”),1 providing for Petitions for Writs of Actual Innocence based on newly discovered
evidence.  Both Appellant Ellis Richard Douglas, Jr. and Appellant Lamont Anthony Curtis
2 Douglas actually filed an application for leave to appeal, but in June 2010, the Court
of Special Appeals ordered that Douglas’s filing be treated like a notice of appeal from the
Circuit Court’s decision.
2
were serving their respective sentences when C.P. § 8-301 went into effect on October 1,
2009.  Both then filed pro se petitions for writs of actual innocence with the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City.  The Circuit Court denied both petitions without holding a hearing.
Appellants noted their respective appeals to the Court of Special Appeals and, on our
initiative, we issued a writ of certiorari before argument in the Court of Special Appeals.2
We granted Appellants’ Motion to Consolidate the separate appeals because the two present
identical questions, which are:
I. Is an order denying a petition for writ of actual innocence without a hearing
an automatically appealable order?
II. Did [the trial court] erroneously deny [Douglas’s and Curtis’s] petitions for
writ of actual innocence without hearings in violation of § 8-301 of the
Criminal Procedure title of the Maryland Code?
For the reasons that follow, we hold that the denial of a petition for writ of actual
innocence is an immediately appealable order, regardless of whether the trial court held a
hearing before denying the petition.  We also hold that C.P. § 8-301 imposes a burden of
pleading, such that a petitioner is entitled to a hearing on the merits of the petition, provided
the petition sufficiently pleads grounds for relief under the statute, includes a request for a
hearing, and complies with the filing requirements of C.P. § 8-301(b).  As a consequence of
these holdings, we reverse the order denying Douglas’s petition and affirm the order denying
3 The third bullet was not recovered from the officer’s utility belt until approximately
two months after the incident, when the officer noticed the bullet lodged in his belt as he
prepared to return to duty after recovering from his injury.  He immediately notified his
supervisor and the bullet was collected and processed by forensic analyst Joseph Kopera.
3
Curtis’s petition.  We remand Douglas’s case for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
I. Background
A. Appellant Douglas
Douglas’s underlying convictions—for attempted murder in the second degree,
assault, and related handgun offenses—arose out of an altercation on January 26, 1990,
between Douglas and several Baltimore City police officers outside a bar in Baltimore City.
One police officer saw Douglas sorting through what appeared to be packages of heroin or
cocaine, approached him, and asked Douglas to come speak with his partner.  Douglas
initially complied with the officer’s request, but then turned and tried to run away.
When Douglas turned to flee, the officer noticed a .22 caliber handgun tucked into the
small of Douglas’s back.  The officer successfully retrieved the weapon.  A struggle quickly
ensued as other officers arrived on the scene.  Douglas then pulled a .380 caliber handgun
from his front waistband and fired four shots.  One bullet struck an officer in the upper thigh
and three other bullets struck another officer: one hit just below the knee, one severed his
police radio cord, and one lodged itself in his utility belt.3  The officers recovered the second
gun and ultimately restrained Douglas.  
At trial, Douglas appeared pro se after he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right
4
to an attorney and fired his public defender.  Seven police officers involved in the altercation
testified.  Additionally, two ballistics experts, Joseph Reese and Joseph Kopera, testified
regarding the ballistic evidence.  Reese testified that he had examined the bullet removed
from one officer’s leg and positively identified it as being fired from the .380 caliber
handgun taken from Douglas.  Kopera testified that he examined the bullet recovered from
the other officer’s utility belt several months after the incident and positively identified it as
having been fired from the same .380 caliber gun.
The jury convicted Douglas of five counts of attempted second degree murder, five
counts of assault, five counts of using a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence,
and two counts of unlawfully wearing, carrying, and transporting a handgun.  The Court of
Special Appeals, in an unreported per curiam opinion, affirmed Douglas’s convictions.
Douglas then filed two postconviction petitions, both of which were denied.  
In 2009, Douglas filed pro se in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City the present
petition for writ of actual innocence pursuant to then-newly enacted C.P. § 8-301.  Douglas
alleged that the trial court had committed several errors.  He further alleged that there was
new evidence regarding the officer-witnesses who testified at his trial.  Specifically, he
asserted:
[O]n or about September of 1994, Accuser-Witness: Officer Graham Sylvester
was involved in another police shooting case . . . and . . . this time, Officer
Sylvester’ fellows, police officers did not go along with Officer Sylvester’
story and Officer Sylvester was forced to retire from the Baltimore City Police
Department.  [Also,] on or about March 22, 1996, Police Officer Brian Bacon,
who was an accuser-witness against Douglas at the Circuit Court For
Baltimore City, appeared in the United States District Court For The District
4 “Hacking” is the term used to describe the act of unlawfully working as a taxi driver.
5
of Maryland and was exposed as an perjurer . . . by changing his . . . testimony.
[Finally,] on or about March 9, 2007, the Sunpaper’s Newpaper’ Reporter
Jennifer McMenamin wrote an News Article “that exposed Joseph Kopera,
Head of the Maryland State Police Firearm Unit, as an perjurer; . . . and he
help to denied Douglas a Fair Jury Trial, with his perjurer’ testimony . . . .
[Sic].
The Circuit Court denied Douglas’s petition without a hearing by Order dated
November 5, 2009.  The substance of the Order reads in full:
The court ha[s] reviewed all submissions and ha[s] considered all facts in the
case, and ha[s] found that the Petitioner fails to show that there is newly
discovered evidence, which could not have been discovered in time to move
for a new trial, that creates a substantial or significant possibility that the
results of his trial may have been different.
Douglas immediately filed in the Court of Special Appeals a “Notice of Application
for Leave to Appeal” the Circuit Court’s Order.  In June 2010, the Court of Special Appeals
ordered that Douglas’s application be treated like a notice of appeal from the circuit court’s
decision.  On our initiative, we issued a writ of certiorari prior to arguments in the Court of
Special Appeals.
B. Appellant Curtis
Curtis’s underlying convictions—attempted murder in the first degree, assault, and
related handgun offenses—arose out of the shooting of James Sanders on the evening of
November 22, 1994.  On that night, Sanders was “hacking”4 for a drug dealer, Nike.  Sanders
dropped Nike off at the home of another individual, Dray.  While Sanders waited in his car
for Nike to return, an individual approached Sanders’s car and shot at Sanders three times,
5 The record before us does not indicate whether the victim’s identification of the
shooter as Tony created conflict with the indictment of Curtis.  We assume the lack of
dispute arises from the probability that Curtis, whose middle name is Anthony, may have
gone by the nickname Tony.  This is supported by the fact that Curtis’s last known residence
was his grandmother’s house on Richwood Avenue.
6 Curtis produced two other defense witnesses at trial: Anthony Jones, who testified
that Sanders did not tell him that Curtis was the shooter, and Charlene Wise, who testified
that Curtis was home with her the night of the shooting.
7 As indicated below, the identity (or identities) of “Aaron,” “Eri” and “Airy” is/are
disputed.  Our use of one name over the other simply reflects the spelling of the name in the
trial transcript.
6
in the shoulder and head.  Sanders told police officers that a man named Tony, who lived on
Richwood Avenue, shot him.  He also picked Curtis’s face out of a photographic lineup.5
During a “turn-up” at Curtis’s last known address, an officer spoke with Curtis’s
grandmother, Margaret Adkinson.  He wrote her name on his report, as well as the name
“Margaret Eri.” 
Among other witnesses, Wayne Miles testified for the defense as an eyewitness.6
Miles testified that he was in Dray’s house when he heard two shots.  He immediately went
outside and saw a light-skinned man, not Curtis, fire a third shot into Sanders’s car.  He
testified that he was not acquainted with Curtis.  
The State impeached Miles’s credibility by asking how he came to testify in the case.
Miles responded that the day after the shooting, “a friend of mine named Aaron came . . .
[and] asked me did I know anything about [the shooting, and] I told him I seen [sic] the
whole thing.”7  Miles then explained that Aaron “came back a month later and like he asked
me my name, my name and stuff,” because “I guess he wanted me to help out with the case.”
7
On the last day of trial, during rebuttal, the State asked a detective about someone
named “Airy.”  The detective responded:  “The name came up in a turn up . . . at [Curtis’s
grandmother’s address].  Margaret Airy.  The name was written on the report when they tried
to do the turn up.”  
The State argued during closing that Miles’s friend Aaron was really a friend of
Curtis’s named “Airy,” or “Eri,” drawing an inferential relationship with Margaret Eri, the
name the officer had written on the report from the “turn-up” at Curtis’s grandmother’s
address.  The State argued that “Airy” (or Aaron or Eri) coerced Miles to testify on Curtis’s
behalf. 
During deliberation, the jury asked two questions: “1) Can we have clarification on
who [Miles] said came to his house to talk to him about the shooting?  2) Who is
MARGARET ERI?”  The court denied the defense’s request to play back the videotape of
Miles’s testimony because the jury had to rely on its own memory.  The court allowed each
party one minute to argue to the jury a theory as to the identity of “Margaret Eri.”  
The jury ultimately convicted Curtis, and the Court of Special Appeals, in an
unreported per curiam opinion, affirmed the convictions. 
In 2010, Curtis filed a pro se petition for writ of actual innocence under C.P. § 8-301.
Curtis argued that the newly discovered evidence was an affidavit of his grandmother,
Margaret Adkinson, in which she swore that she had never mentioned the name of “Airy,”
or “Eri,” to the police.  Curtis asserted that this affidavit created a substantial or significant
possibility that the outcome of his trial would have been different.  Curtis also asserted that
8
his grandmother’s testimony did not become relevant until the end of the trial.  Additionally,
he argued that the evidence was unavailable to him within the ten-day period during which
he could have filed for a new trial because his grandmother had fallen ill from the shock of
Curtis’s conviction and could not give an affidavit, and his imprisonment left him “lost,
confused and bewilder[ed] of what options he had.”
The Circuit Court denied Curtis’s petition for writ of actual innocence without a
hearing, by order dated April 9, 2010.  The court provided the identical reasoning given in
Douglas’s case:
The Court ha[s] reviewed all submissions and ha[s] considered all of the facts
in the case, and ha[s] found that the Petitioner fails to show that there is newly
discovered evidence which could not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial that creates a substantial or significant possibility that the result of
his trial may have been different.
Subsequently, Curtis filed a notice of appeal in the Court of Special Appeals.  On our
initiative, we issued a writ of certiorari in Curtis’s case prior to arguments in the Court of
Special Appeals.
II. Right to Appeal?
A. Statutory Right to Appeal Final Judgments
The State has filed a motion to dismiss both of the consolidated appeals on the ground
that the denial of an order entered pursuant to C.P. § 8-301 is not appealable.  For the reasons
that follow, we hold that such rulings are appealable.  We therefore deny the State’s motion.
In Maryland, criminal defendants do not have a constitutional right to appeal.
8 Section 12-302 provides specific exemptions from applicability of the appeal right
granted by § 12-301, such as contempt proceedings and decisions from appellate review of
District Court decisions.  Section 12-302 also provides for specific instances in which the
State may appeal in criminal cases.  None of those provisions apply in the matter sub judice.
9
Cubbage v. State, 304 Md. 237, 241, 498 A.2d 632, 634 (1985).  Instead, “the right to seek
appellate review is statutory; the Legislature can provide for, or preclude, [it].”  Fuller v.
State, 397 Md. 372, 382, 918 A.2d 453, 459 (2007).  C.P. § 8-301 is silent with regard to a
right of appeal.  The State, as we shall see, mounts several arguments in support of its view
that there is no right of appeal from the denial of a petition brought under C.P. § 8-301.
Appellants counter that the General Assembly had no need to address the right of appeal in
C.P. § 8-301 because Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 12-301 of the Courts &
Judicial Proceedings Article (“C.J.”) grants a general right to appeal final judgments.  We
shall address Appellants’ argument first.
Section 12-301 provides:
Right of appeal from final judgments – Generally 
Except as provided in § 12-302[8] of this subtitle, a party may appeal from a
final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court. The right
of appeal exists from a final judgment entered by a court in the exercise of
original, special, limited, statutory jurisdiction, unless in a particular case the
right of appeal is expressly denied by law. In a criminal case, the defendant
may appeal even though imposition or execution of sentence has been
suspended. In a civil case, a plaintiff who has accepted a remittitur may cross-
appeal from the final judgment.
“[A] final judgment” is one that “either determine[s] and conclude[s] the rights of the parties
involved or den[ies] a party the means to ‘prosecut[e] or defend[] his or her rights and
10
interests in the subject matter of the proceeding.’”  In re Billy W., 386 Md. 675, 688, 874
A.2d 423, 431 (2005) (quoting Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41, 566 A.2d 767, 773
(1989)) (some alterations in original).  Important is whether “any further order is to be issued
or whether any further action is to be taken in the case.”  Id. at 689, 874 A.2d at 431.
We conclude that the denial of a petition for writ of actual innocence is a final
judgment under C.J. § 12-301.  The ruling concludes a petitioner’s rights as to all claims
based on the newly discovered evidence alleged in the petition.  Once the court denies the
petition, nothing remains pending in the case.  A denial under C.P. § 8-301 also denies a
petitioner “the means to ‘prosecut[e] or defend[ ] his or her rights and interest in the subject
matter of the proceeding,’” id., 874 A.2d at 431 (quoting Rohrbeck, 318 Md. at 41, 566 A.2d
at 773) (alterations in original), because C.P. § 8-301(b)(5) requires the petitioner to
“distinguish the newly discovered evidence claimed . . . from any claims made in prior
petitions.”  The requirement prevents a petitioner from re-filing a petition on the basis of the
same allegedly newly discovered evidence.  
Moreover, the final judgment requirement of C.J. § 12-301 aims to “prevent piecemeal
appeals and . . . the interruption of ongoing judicial proceedings.”  Stephens v. State, 420 Md.
495, 502, 24 A.3d 105, 109 (2011) (quoting Sigma Reprod. Health Ctr. v. State, 297 Md.
660, 665, 467 A.2d 483, 485 (1983)).  Because a denial of a petition for writ of actual
innocence leaves no matter pending with the trial court, our conclusion that it is a “final
judgment” under C.J. § 12-301 comports with the purpose of the statute.  
11
The State asserts that a denial of a petition for writ of actual innocence is not a final
judgment because “[i]n criminal cases . . . the final judgment occurs after conviction, upon
the imposition of sentence.”  The argument ignores the purpose of the final judgment rule set
forth in C.J. § 12-301.  
An order is interlocutory, and therefore  not “final” for purposes of C.J. § 12-301, if
“there are pending proceedings in which issues on the merits of the case remain to be
decided.”  Sigma, 297 Md. at 666, 467 A.2d at 485-86 (“Ordinarily . . . an appeal from a
pretrial or trial order will not be heard where there are pending proceedings in which issues
on the merits of the case remain to be decided.  Such orders are interlocutory, not final, and
nonappealable until after entry of a final judgment.”).  Sigma does not dictate that rulings on
matters arising after sentencing do not come within the final judgment rule.  Indeed, we have
not hesitated to review denials of motions filed under Rule 4-331(c).  See, e.g., State v.
Matthews, 415 Md. 286, 999 A.2d 1050 (2010); Evans v. State, 382 Md. 248, 855 A.2d 291
(2004), Jackson v. State, 358 Md. 612, 751 A.2d 473 (2000).  Neither has the Court of
Special Appeals.  See, e.g., Ramirez v. State, 178 Md. App. 257, 941 A.2d 1141 (2008);
Mack v. State, 166 Md. App. 670, 891 A.2d 369 (2006); Jackson v. State, 164 Md. App. 679,
884 A.2d 694 (2005).  
The State, in further support of its argument that an order denying relief under C.P.
§ 8-301 is not appealable, urges us to consider its legislative history.  In the State’s view, the
history reflects that the General Assembly did not intend such orders to be subject to
appellate review.  The State points in particular to action the legislature took in 2010 (after
9 The current volume of the Health-General Article is Maryland Code (2000, 2009
Repl. Vol.).  No amendment since Fuller affects our analysis here.  
10  We reasoned in Fuller that a motion under H.G. § 8-507 was more akin to a habeas
corpus action than a motion to modify sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345–which we noted
could possibly be appealed–because relief under H.G. § 8-507 “does not affect the length of
a sentence[,] . . . initiates a statutory cause of action separate from the conviction, and may
be filed repeatedly ‘at any other time the defendant voluntarily agrees to participate in
(continued...)
12
Appellant’s filed their petitions) to amend C.P. § 8-301.  Among the proposed amendments
was one that would have included express language conferring the right to appeal.  H.B. 128,
2010 Session, First Reading January 18, 2010.  That appeal provision was stricken from the
amendments.  See H.B. 128, 2010 Session, Third Reading File Bill, Amendment No. 2.  The
State interprets this action as reflecting the General Assembly’s purpose that there be no right
of appeal from a denial of a petition filed pursuant to the statute.  We are not so persuaded.
We have explained why the denial of a petition filed pursuant to C.P. § 8-301 is a final
judgment.  Given that C.J. § 12-301 expressly authorizes the right of appeal from a final
judgment, explicit language to that same effect in C.P. § 8-301 would be redundant, and thus
unnecessary.
We also reject, as misplaced, the State’s reliance on our decision in Fuller for the
proposition that, absent an express appeal provision in C.P. § 8-301, there is none.  Fuller
is inapposite because we concluded in that case that the ruling sought to be appealed—the
denial of a petition for commitment for substance abuse treatment pursuant to Maryland
Code (1982, 2005 Repl. Vol., 2006 Supp.), § 8-507 of the Health-General Article
(“H.G.”)9—is not a final judgment, and, therefore, C.J. § 12-301 does not apply.10  397 Md.
10(...continued)
treatment.’”  Fuller v. State, 397 Md. 372, 389, 918 A.2d 453, 463 (2007) (quoting H.G. §
8-507).  We discussed extensively the history of the right to appeal the denial of a habeas
corpus petition and recognized that the legislature had conferred an express appeal right in
response to our prior refusal to review the denial of such petitions.  Id. at 389-93, 918 A.2d
at 463-66.  We concluded, therefore, that lack of an express right to appeal in H.G. § 8-507
was determinative.  Id. at 393, 918 A.2d at 465-66.  
11  We do not mean to intimate that a convicted defendant is limited to filing only one
petition, pursuant to C.P. § 8-301; we do mean that a convicted defendant is limited to raising
only once, under the statute, a claim that a particular item of evidence is newly discovered.
13
at 394, 918 A.2d at 466.  We rejected the argument that a denial of a motion under H.G. §
8-507 was a final judgment because a motion brought under that statute “may be filed
repeatedly and the denial of a single petition does not preclude [the defendant] from filing
another.”  Id., 918 A.2d at 466.  Because C.J. § 12-301 does not apply, whether H.G. § 8-507
itself provides an express right to appeal was essential to the analysis.  Moreover, unlike
petitions pursuant to H.G. § 8-507, a petitioner under C.P. § 8-301 has but one chance to
assert a particular claim of newly discovered evidence.11
For all these reasons, we hold that a denial of a petition for writ of actual innocence
is a final judgment under C.J. § 12-301.
B. Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act’s Express Denial?
The conclusion that C.J. § 12-301 grants a general right to appeal denials of C.P. § 8-
301 petitions does not end our inquiry because C.J. § 12-301 precludes appeal where
“expressly denied by law.”  We must now consider the State’s assertion that the Uniform
Postconviction Procedure Act (“UPPA”), codified at C.P. §§ 7-101 through 7-301, strips the
14
right of appeal from actions brought under C.P. § 8-301.
Section 7-107(b)(1), the relevant section of the UPPA, provides, in pertinent part:
In a case in which a person challenges the validity of confinement under a
sentence of . . . imprisonment by seeking the writ of habeas corpus or the writ
of coram nobis or by invoking a common law or statutory remedy other than
this title, a person may not appeal to the Court of Appeals or the Court of
Special Appeals.
(emphasis added).  The State argues that § 7-107(b)(1) of the UPPA expressly denies the
right to appeal a denial under C.P. § 8-301.  Appellants respond that the UPPA does not
apply to  C.P. § 8-301, because claims of newly discovered evidence made pursuant to that
statute are not cognizable under the UPPA, and  C.P. § 7-107(b) was intended only to deny
appeals in matters that could have been heard under the UPPA.  We conclude that Appellants
have the better part of the argument.
The purpose of the UPPA was to streamline “into one simple statute all the remedies,
beyond those that are incident to the usual procedures of trial and review, which are . . .
present[ly] available for challenging the validity of a sentence.”  State v. Zimmerman, 261
Md. 11, 24, 273 A.2d 156, 163 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v.
D’Onofrio, 221 Md. 20, 29, 155 A.2d 543, 647 (1959)).  The UPPA does not eliminate
alternative remedies, such as habeas corpus, coram nobis, or other common law or statutory
remedies, though it restricts the right to appeal orders pursuant to those traditional remedies.
Brady v. State, 222 Md. 442, 447, 160 A.2d 912, 915-16 (1960).  But where the UPPA does
not provide a remedy, the preclusive effects of C.P. § 7-107(b)(1) do not apply.  See
Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 662, 574 A.2d 898, 912 (1990) (explaining that, “[i]n
15
situations where the Post Conviction Procedure Act did not provide a remedy, and thus was
not a substitute for habeas corpus, the enactment of the new statute provided no reason for
restricting appeals in habeas corpus cases”).
It is settled that questions of guilt or innocence cannot be raised in petitions for
postconviction relief.  See, e.g., Thornton v. Md. Penitentiary, 241 Md. 715, 717, 216 A.2d
894, 895 (1966) (per curiam) (concluding that no grounds for postconviction relief exist
where petitioner claims actual innocence).  It is just as well settled that a petition for
postconviction relief “is not a substitute for a motion for a new trial.”  Roe v. Patuxent Inst.,
240 Md. 717, 719, 214 A.2d 162, 163 (1965) (per curiam).  C.P. § 8-301 provides a
defendant an opportunity to seek a new trial based on newly discovered evidence that speaks
to his or her actual innocence, as evident from the title of the statute itself.  
Furthermore, the legislative history of C.P. § 8-301 reflects a legislative purpose that
the statute extend the right to seek a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence
beyond that afforded a convicted defendant under Maryland Rule 4-331(c).  The Fiscal and
Policy Note that accompanied Senate Bill 486, which became C.P. § 8-301 in 2009, included
the statement that the then-current law afforded a defendant relief under “Rule 4-331 . . . if
newly discovered evidence exist[ed] that could not have been discovered by due diligence
in time to move for a new trial within 10 days after the verdict.”  The Note also stated that
defendants had one year within which to file Rule 4-331 motions based on newly discovered
evidence.  Id.  The Note mentioned, too, that Virginia law provided defendants the
opportunity to present newly discovered evidence within 21 days after sentencing, which
12 The statute was amended in 2010.  Section 8-301(a) now provides:
A person charged by indictment or criminal information with a crime triable
in circuit court and convicted of that crime may, at any time, file a petition for
writ of actual innocence in the circuit court for the county in which the
conviction was imposed if the person claims that there is newly discovered
evidence that:
(1) creates a substantial or significant possibility that the result may
have been different, as that standard has been judicially determined; and
(2) could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Maryland Rule 4-331.
13 Subsection (c) was modified in 2010, but none of the amendments are material to
our analysis here.  
16
right the Virginia legislature “expanded . . . in 2004 to allow felons to submit new evidence
other than DNA tests.”  Id.  
C.P. § 8-301, as originally enacted,12 declared, in subsection (a): 
A convicted person, at any time, may file a petition for writ of actual
innocence . . . if the person claims that there is newly discovered evidence that:
(1) creates a substantial or significant possibility that the result may have been
different, as that standard has been judicially determined; and (2) could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Maryland Rule 4-
331.
2009 Md. Laws ch. 744.  C.P. § 8-301 by its language embodies the apparent intention of the
General Assembly to enact in Maryland (similar to the Virginia enactment) a broader claim
of actual innocence, based on newly discovered evidence, than that provided under Md. Rule
4-331(c).13  
We are persuaded that the remedy afforded under C.P. § 8-301, like the similar (albeit
more restricted) remedy provided by a motion for new trial, see Patuxent Inst., 240 Md. at
719, 214 A.2d at 163, is necessarily part of “the usual procedures of trial and review”
17
available to a criminal defendant that were not intended to fall within the scope of
postconviction relief, see Zimmerman, 261 Md. at 24, 274 A.2d at 163 (“The [UPPA] was
passed with the intent that there be brought together ‘into one simple statute all the remedies,
beyond those that are incident to the usual procedures of trial and review, which are at
present available for challenging the validity of a sentence.’” (quoting Brady, 222 Md. at
447, 160 A.2d at 915-16) (emphasis added)).  We therefore conclude that the UPPA’s appeal
preclusion does not apply to claims arising under C.P. § 8-301. 
C.
In sum, we hold that the denial of a petition under C.P. § 8-301 is a final judgment and
may be appealed pursuant to C.J. § 12-301.  Furthermore, the UPPA appeal-stripping
provision does not apply to C.P. § 8-301.  Accordingly, the State’s Motion to dismiss is
denied.  
III. The Merits of Appellants’ Claims
A. The hearing requirement
Both Appellants contend that the Circuit Court erred in denying their C.P. § 8-301
petitions, without affording them a hearing.  Appellants contend generally that the statute
establishes a pleading requirement that, if met, automatically triggers a hearing, provided one
was requested.  The State responds that the express language of the statute allows the trial
court to deny a petition for writ of actual innocence without a hearing, even if the petition has
met the procedural pleading requirements, “if the court finds that the petition fails to assert
grounds on which relief may be granted.”
18
To determine whether C.P. § 8-301 mandates a hearing before the trial court may
dismiss the petitions and, if so, under what circumstances, we turn to our rules of statutory
interpretation:
In statutory interpretation, our primary goal is always to discern the legislative
purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a
particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional or part of the Rules. We
begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the
language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to ensure that no word,
clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or
nugatory. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not
look beyond the statute’s provisions and our analysis ends.  Occasionally we
see fit to examine extrinsic sources of legislative intent merely as a check of
our reading of a statute’s plain language.  In such instances, we may find
useful the context of a statute, the overall statutory scheme, and archival
legislative history of relevant enactments.
Evans v. State, 420 Md. 391, 400, 23 A.3d 223, 228 (2011) (quoting Ray v. State, 410 Md.
384, 404-05, 978 A.2d 736, 747-48 (2009)). 
Section 8-301(e) provides:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the court shall hold
a hearing on a petition filed under this section if the petition satisfies the
requirements of subsection (b) of this section and a hearing was requested.
(2) The court may dismiss a petition without a hearing if the court finds that
the petition fails to assert grounds on which relief may be granted.
Section 8-301(b), in turn, provides:
(b) Requirements. – A petition filed under this section shall:
(1) be in writing;
(2) state in detail the grounds on which the petition is based;
(3) describe the newly discovered evidence;
(4) contain or be accompanied by a request for a hearing if a hearing is
sought; and
19
(5) distinguish the newly discovered evidence claimed in the petition
from any claims made in prior petitions.  
The statute also defines “grounds”:
(a) Grounds. – A person charged by indictment or criminal information with
a crime triable in circuit court and convicted of that crime may, at any time,
file a petition for writ of actual innocence in the circuit court for the county in
which the conviction was imposed if the person claims that there is newly
discovered evidence that: 
(1) creates a substantial or significant possibility that the result may
have been different, as that standard has been judicially determined;
and 
(2) could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Maryland Rule 4-331. 
C.P. § 8-301(a). 
C.P. § 8-301(e)(2) grants the court the authority to dismiss a petition that, although
compliant with the procedural requirements of subsection (b), does not assert grounds upon
which relief could be granted.  The language of the statute is key.  It requires that a petition
“assert” grounds for relief; it does not require the petitioner to satisfy the burden of proving
those grounds in the papers submitted.  Additionally, the plain language of the statute
declares that a petitioner has the requisite grounds if he “claims that there is newly
discovered evidence that: (1) creates a substantial or significant possibility that the result may
have been different . . . ; and (2) could not have been discovered in time to move for a new
trial under Maryland Rule 4-331.”  C.P. § 8-301(a) (emphasis added).  Nothing in the
language of the statute requires more than that a petitioner plead those assertions before the
hearing requirement is triggered.  We are prohibited by our rules of construction from
reading into a statute a construction not reflected by its plain language, Price v. State, 378
20
Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003), and we will not do so here.
We therefore hold that the statute establishes only a burden of pleading grounds for
relief, not of proving them, and that a trial court may dismiss a petition without a hearing
when one was requested, pursuant to C.P. § 8-301(e)(2), only when a petitioner fails to
satisfy the pleading requirement.  The pleading requirement mandates that the trial court
determine whether the allegations could afford a petitioner relief, if those allegations would
be proven at a hearing, assuming the facts in the light most favorable to the petitioner and
accepting all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the petition.  That is, when
determining whether to dismiss a petition for writ of actual innocence without a hearing
pursuant to C.P. § 8-301(e)(2), provided the petition comports with the procedural
requirements under C.P. § 8-301(b), the trial court must consider whether the allegations, if
proven, consist of newly discovered evidence that “could not have been discovered in time
to move for a new trial under Maryland Rule 4-331” and whether that evidence “creates a
substantial or significant possibility that the result [of the trial] may have been different.”
C.P. § 8-301(a). 
This standard does not require that a trial court take impossibilities as truths.  For
example, if a petition asserts, as “newly discovered,” evidence that was clearly known during
trial, then the evidence cannot be “newly discovered,” and the trial court may dismiss the
petition without a hearing.  Similarly, if a petition asserts procedural errors committed by the
trial court, that is not “newly discovered evidence.”  If, however, the petition alleges newly
discovered evidence that “could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
21
under Maryland Rule 4-331,” and which “creates a substantial or significant possibility that
the result may have been different,” then it would be error to dismiss the petition merely
because the petition itself did not convince the trial court without a hearing. 
In Jackson we recognized the persuasive value of a hearing.  358 Md. at 625, 751
A.2d at 479-80.  As we explained, 
[The right to a hearing] represents an assessment by us of the significance of
the matter under consideration, at least to the parties, and, given that
significance, of their right, if they choose to exercise it, to present directly to
the court, viva voce, the reasons why they should prevail.  It is a recognition
that personal, vocal communication with the judge may not only itself be a
more effective means of persuasion than written documents that may be read
hurriedly and not fully appreciated or understood, but that a hearing offers at
least a limited opportunity for dialogue, allowing for clarification, for greater
precision, for addressing concerns harbored and expressed by the judge.  It is
a right that, ordinarily, may be waived, but when not waived, we are loathe, in
the absence of extraordinary circumstances, to find its denial harmless.  It
would often be a matter of pure speculation whether prejudice ensued –
whether, had the party been given the opportunity to make his or her “pitch”
at a hearing, the result may have been different – and that is much more likely
the case when the decision may rest upon the resolution of factual disputes or
the exercise of discretion and judgment. 
Id., 751 A.2d at 479-80.  We also recognized the necessity for courts to adhere strictly to
rules mandating a hearing in particular instances.  Id. at 623, 751 A.2d at 479.  We noted that,
“[e]ven when afforded only by rule, and not as an incident of due process of law, the right
to a hearing is of fundamental importance.”  Id. at 625, 751 A.2d at 479-80.  
We also have recognized the importance of holding a hearing even when one is
neither mandated by statute nor by Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  In Arey
v. State, 400 Md. 491, 929 A.2d 501 (2007), we had before us a petition filed pursuant to
14 We recognize that new Rule 4-332 became effective October 1, 2011, and applies
to actions commenced on or after that date, “and, insofar as practicable, to all actions then
pending[.]”  38 Md. Reg. 1195 (September 23, 2011). 
22
C.P. § 8-201 (DNA evidence – Postconviction review).  That statute requires the court to
order DNA testing if, inter alia, “a reasonable probability exists that the DNA testing has the
scientific potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence.”  C.P. § 8-201(d).  We
reasoned that, 
given the purpose underlying the statute, which is to provide a means for
incarcerated persons to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant
to a claim of wrongful conviction or sentencing, and notwithstanding that [the
statute] is silent on the issue of hearings, if the court determines that there is
a genuine factual dispute as to whether the evidence exists, ordinarily the court
should hold a hearing.
Id. at 507, 929 A.2d at 510.  The same reasoning applies where C.P. § 8-301(e) mandates a
hearing on a petition for actual innocence in the scenarios explained above. 
B.  Sufficiency of the Petitions in the Cases at Bar
We begin by noting that both Douglas and Curtis filed their petitions pro se.  It has
become our practice to construe liberally filings by pro se inmates, particularly when the
statute involved is remedial.  Matthews, 415 Md. at 298, 999 A.2d at 1057 (giving “benefit
of a liberal construction of the petition, particularly in light of the salutary purposes of [C.P.
§ 8-301] . . . and the lack, so far, of rules of procedure to guide the process.”14 (quoting
Simms v. State, 409 Md. 722, 731-32, 976 A.2d 1012, 1018 (2009)) (internal quotation mark
omitted)); Simms, 409 Md. at 731, 976 A.2d at 1018 (recognizing federal practice to construe
liberally pro se pleadings and applying that practice to inmate’s petition for DNA testing
23
under C.P. § 8-201).  It is appropriate to construe liberally both petitions at issue.
1. Douglas’s Petition
Douglas asserts that he was entitled to a hearing before the court denied his petition
because he satisfied all of the procedural requirements of C.P. § 8-301(b).  The State, though,
contends that Douglas’s petition does not comport with the statute’s procedural requirements,
including that he did not request a hearing.  Specifically, the State asserts, inter alia, that the
claims are procedural, not evidentiary; the petition does not indicate that the evidence was
newly discovered and could not have been discovered earlier; and the petition does not assert
the materiality of the evidence.  We disagree.  Construing Douglas’s petition liberally, we
conclude that the petition satisfies the statute’s pleading requirements. 
The first requirement is easily satisfied because Douglas submitted his petition in
writing.  The petition also satisfies the second requirement, that Douglas “state in detail the
grounds on which the petition is based.” C.P. § 8-301(b)(2).  The petition includes several
detailed allegations of error committed by the trial judge in addition to several items of
evidence that were discovered years after Douglas’s trial and sentencing.  Douglas also
includes a blanket assertion that 
That Statement Of Facts with Exhibits in Support of Statement Of The Case
is of great importance, which will show “that Douglas was an continual to be
an Victim of Miscarriage Of Justice, caused by these Police Officers, Assistant
State’s Attorney Schenker and Judge Johnson actions and/or lack of actions
and perjury’ testimonies by witnesses and Douglas is actual innocence. [Sic.]
We also conclude that Douglas’s petition satisfied the third procedural requirement,
that Douglas “describe the newly discovered evidence.”  C.P. § 8-301(b)(3).  As mentioned
15 The State argues that liberal construction in this case is inappropriate because
requesting a hearing is procedural and this Court, like federal courts, requires that pro se
petitioners follow the same rules and procedures as lawyers.  However, as we noted in Simms
v. State, 409 Md. 722, 731 n. 9, 976 A.2d 1012, 1018 n.9 (2009), “[t]he notion that the
contents of an unrepresented criminal inmate’s pleading should be liberally construed does
not conflict with the proposition that unrepresented litigants are expected to follow the rules
of procedure.”  Therefore, we will not construe against Douglas the fact that he did not
explicitly say the words, “I want a hearing.”
24
above, Douglas made several allegations.  Among them he alleged that, on March 9, 2007,
an article was published that “exposed Joseph Kopera . . . as an perjurer.’ [Sic.]”  Officer
Kopera was one of the expert witnesses who had testified for the State during Douglas’s trial.
This allegation, viewed in the light most favorable to Douglas, could be proven to be newly
discovered evidence. 
Douglas also satisfied the fourth requirement under C.P. § 8-301(b)(4), which requires
that the petition request a hearing if one is sought.  Although Douglas did not expressly state
“I request a hearing,” we are persuaded that the petition, liberally construed, reflects
Douglas’s indicated desire for a hearing.15  His petition recited the complete language of the
statute, which included the provision that the petition include a request for a hearing.
Additionally, he filed a proposed “Writ of Habeas Corpus” for the warden to produce him
for a hearing. 
Douglas also has satisfied C.P. § 8-301(b)(5), that he “distinguish the newly
discovered evidence claimed in the petition from any claims made in prior petitions.”  We
have said that a petitioner may not file multiple petitions based on the same claim, but that
does not prevent a petitioner from filing subsequent petitions asserting grounds of different
16 Douglas filed two postconviction petitions and a motion to reopen his closed
postconviction proceeding, which, like the petitions, was also denied.  Upon each denial,
Douglas sought leave to appeal.  The Court of Special Appeals denied each request.
25
newly discovered evidence.  The possibility of filing multiple petitions asserting different
grounds gives context to the requirement that a petitioner distinguish the evidence in the
instant petition from claims in prior petitions.  Douglas asserts that the phrase “prior
petitions” does not refer to every prior filing.16  We, too, are persuaded that the language does
not extend so broadly.  As this was Douglas’s first petition under C.P. § 8-301, he has no
claims to distinguish.  We conclude, therefore, that Douglas has satisfied all of the
requirements of (b)(5), such that a hearing was required pursuant to C.P. § 8-301(e)(1) before
the trial court denied Douglas’s petition.  
It remains for us to consider whether the court, nonetheless, could dismiss the petition
without a hearing because Douglas “fail[ed] to assert grounds on which relief may be
granted,” pursuant to C.P. § 8-301(e)(2).  We discussed above that C.P. § 8-301(e)(2)
authorizes the trial court to dismiss a petition for writ of actual innocence without a hearing
even though one was requested, if the court concludes that the allegations, if proven, could
not entitle a petitioner to relief.  In this regard, the court erred in summarily denying the
petition.
Douglas alleged grounds that, if proven, could entitle him to relief.  Douglas asserted
that there was newly discovered evidence that Officer Kopera, who had testified at Douglas’s
trial, had falsified his credentials.  Douglas submitted as an exhibit with his petition a
26
newspaper article explaining his allegation of newly discovered evidence.  Dated March 9,
2007, the article reported that “Joseph Kopera, head of the Maryland State Police firearms
unit, claimed on witness stands to have degrees that he never earned . . . .  Questions
regarding the longtime firearms and toolmarks examiner’s credentials were raised several
weeks ago by state public defenders working with the Innocence Project.”  The article
explained that “the chief attorney with the . . . Innocence Project . . . became concerned about
Kopera’s qualifications while reviewing transcripts” and noting inconsistencies regarding the
credentials he testified he had earned.  Given that there were “hundreds of people he helped
convict”  and that Kopera had worked for “21 years in the Baltimore Police Department’s
crime laboratory before he was lured away in 1991 to join the state police,” viewing
inferences in the light most favorable to Douglas, it could be that the evidence could not have
been discovered within time to move for a new trial under Rule 4-331.  
Further, Douglas’s petition asserted that Kopera “help to denied Douglas a Fair Jury
Trial, with his perjurer’ testimony at Douglas’ Jury Trial. [Sic.]”  These allegations assert a
basis that the newly discovered evidence “creates a substantial or significant possibility that
the result [of Douglas’s trial] may have been different.”  C.P. § 8-301(a)(1).  
In short, Douglas’s petition satisfied the procedural requirements of C.P. § 8-
301(a)(1).  He is entitled to the hearing on the petition he requested.  We emphasize that,
although Douglas has satisfied the pleading requirement to assert grounds for relief, it does
not follow automatically that he can prove his claim.  
2. Curtis’s Petition
27
We now turn to the merits of Appellant Curtis’s appeal.  Unlike Douglas’s petition,
Curtis’s petition for writ of actual innocence contains only one claim of newly discovered
evidence: an affidavit from his grandmother, indicating that she is willing to testify in court
that she never mentioned the name “Airy,” or “Eri,” to the police.  The State contends that
Curtis’s petition fails because he did not assert that the affidavit could not have been obtained
within one year after the mandate from the Court of Special Appeals and, moreover, the
affidavit is not newly discovered evidence because Curtis indicates in his petition that he was
aware of the information after his conviction.  The State further contends that, even if the
affidavit was newly discovered evidence, the grandmother’s testimony would be unlikely to
create a significant or substantial possibility that Curtis would be found not guilty because
the affidavit does not undermine the victim’s unequivocal testimony that Curtis shot him.
Curtis counters that his grandmother’s testimony would create a substantial or significant
possibility that a jury would find him not guilty because, as evidenced by the jury’s interest
in the identity of “Airy,” or “Eri” during their deliberations, the theory that Curtis coerced
witnesses factored heavily into Curtis’s conviction.
We agree with the State that the Circuit Court properly denied Curtis’s petition
because the evidence of his grandmother’s affidavit is not “newly discovered evidence.”  We
therefore need not consider whether Curtis has satisfied the other requirements that might
entitle him to a hearing on the petition.  In Argyrou v. State, we explained that,
“[e]xculpatory evidence known . . . prior to the expiration of the time for filing a motion for
a new trial, though unavailable, in fact, is not newly discovered evidence.”  349 Md. 587,
28
600 n.9, 709 A.2d 1194, 1200 n.9 (1998) (emphasis added).  Consequently, even construing
Curtis’s pro se petition liberally, his claim fails.  Curtis indicated in his petition that he
wanted to obtain an affidavit from his grandmother stating that she never mentioned the name
“Airy,” or “Eri,” to the police, but could not because of his grandmother’s health and his own
incarceration.  As evidence that is known but unavailable does not constitute “newly
discovered evidence,” Curtis’s claim does not meet the requirements to obtain a hearing
under C.P. § 8-301.
IV.
In summary, we hold that denials of petitions filed under C.P. § 8-301 are subject to
appeal as final judgments.  We also hold that C.P. § 8-301(e)(2) establishes a burden of
pleading for a petitioner.  If that burden is satisfied, and if the petition otherwise satisfies the
statutory requirements for a hearing, then the court may not dismiss the petition without first
holding a hearing.  The statute allows the court to dismiss a petition without affording a
petitioner a hearing when, assuming the facts in the light most favorable to the petitioner and
accepting all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the petition, the petition fails to
assert grounds upon which relief can be granted, i.e. that there is newly discovered evidence
that creates a significant or substantial possibility that the trial results would be different and
that the evidence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
4-331. 
Applying these holdings to the cases at bar, we conclude that Douglas is entitled to
a hearing on his petition for writ of actual innocence.  We further conclude that the Circuit
29
Court’s denial of Curtis’s petition must stand.  We note that an amendment to C.P. § 8-301,
providing for an opportunity for the State to respond within 90 days of the receipt of
petitioner’s written notice of the petition, was enacted after Douglas’s petition was denied.
Therefore, on  remand, the State shall have an opportunity to submit a written response to
Douglas’s petition.  We make no conclusions regarding the underlying merits of Douglas’s
petition and we recognize that decisions on the merits of requests for new trials based on
newly discovered evidence, whether filed pursuant to Rule 4-331 or the C.P. § 8-301, are
committed to the hearing court’s sound discretion.  
ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
B A L T I M O R E  
C I T Y  
D E N Y I N G
APPELLANT DOUGLAS’S PETITION FOR
WRIT 
OF 
ACTUAL 
INNOCENCE
VACATED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT
COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION;
COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE MAYOR AND
CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.
ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
B A L T I M O R E  
C I T Y  
D E N Y I N G
APPELLANT CURTIS’S PETITION FOR
WRIT 
OF 
ACTUAL 
INNOCENCE
AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLANT CURTIS. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                          OF MARYLAND                      
No. 146
September Term, 2010
                                                                             
ELLIS RICHARD DOUGLAS, JR.
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                             
No. 147
September Term, 2010
                                                                             
LAMONT CURTIS
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                              
 
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
*Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
                                      JJ.                                   
Dissenting Opinion by Harrell, J.,
which Battaglia and Adkins, JJ., join.
                                                                             
Filed:    October 27, 2011
*Murphy, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of this Court; after being
recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV,
Section 3A, he also participated in the decision
and adoption of this opinion.
I dissent.  The State’s motion to dismiss these appeals, as not allowed by law, should
be granted.
The Majority opinion concedes, at slip op. 9, that neither Douglas nor Curtis are
entitled to appeal the denials of their petitions for writs of actual innocence unless a right of
appeal is granted by statute.  The creation in 2010 by the Legislature of the petition for writ
of actual innocence mechanism for convicted defendants in criminal cases to seek a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence (which could not have been discovered in time to move
for a new trial under Md. Rule 4-331) clearly did not provide for an appeal from the denial
of such a petition.  See Md. Code, Crim. Proc. Art., § 8-301 (2011).  In fact, an effort to
include a right to appeal in the new statute (House Bill 128 of 2010) failed inclusion in the
final bill.  We have said in an analogous context that “[w]e generally presume that the
Legislature acts with full knowledge of prior and exiting law, legislation, and policy. . . and
obviously could have provided an appellate remedy for the denial . . . .”  Fuller v. State, 397
Md. 372, 393, 918 A.2d 453, 465 (2007) (citations omitted).
The Majority opinion, stepping into this void in the specific statute in play here,
supplies that which the Legislature chose conspicuously not to provide, by placing the weight
of the Majority’s conclusion that a right of appeal exists in these cases on the general final
judgment provision of Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 12-301 (2011).  This statute
cannot bear that weight.  My reading of § 12-301 (like the State’s) is that, in a criminal law
context, it grants a right of direct appeal from a final judgment of conviction and sentencing,
whether as the result of an initial trial or a court-ordered re-trial.  See Sigma Reproductive
Health Ctr v.  State, 297 Md. 660, 665-66, 467 A.2d 483, 485 (1983); accord Warren v.
-2-
State, 281 Md. 179, 182-88, 377 A.2d 1169, 1171-74 (1977).  The distinction to be made is
between the underlying criminal case and a collateral attack on a criminal judgment, such as
via post-conviction petition, habeas corpus, or coram nobis.  See State v. Matthews, 415 Md.
286, 308, 999 A.2d 1050, 1063 (2010) (citing Ruby v. State, 353 Md. 100, 724 A.2d 673
(1999)).  The former, including denials of motions for a new trial filed under Md. Rule 4-
331, are the type of final judgments for which § 12-301 of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art. serves
as statutory authority for the availability of an appeal.   The latter, now including petitions
for writ of actual innocence, are dependent on other statutory authority, if any, for a right of
appeal.  As for petitions for a writ of actual innocence, none exist.  The denials of the
petitions in these cases are not susceptible of fitting under the umbrella of permitted appeals
from statutorily-permitted interlocutory orders, nor do they fall within the collateral order
doctrine.
Judge Battaglia and Judge Adkins authorize me to state that they join the views
expressed in this dissent.