Case Title: Balbirnie v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 115650

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2020-07-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 115,650 
 
JOHN BALBIRNIE, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to 
effective assistance of counsel, and denial of the right can lead to reversal of a jury 
verdict. Courts consider whether a reversible denial of the right occurred by applying a 
two-prong test stated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). A convicted defendant must first 
establish deficient performance, by showing that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. Then, the defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense.  
 
2. 
 
After a full evidentiary hearing about an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
brought under K.S.A. 60-1507, an appellate court reviews a district court's findings of 
fact and conclusions of law under a mixed standard of review. The appellate court 
examines the record and determines whether substantial competent evidence supports the 
district court's factual findings and determines whether those findings support the district 
2 
 
 
 
court's conclusions of law. The appellate court then reviews the conclusions of law 
de novo.  
 
3. 
A court considering whether ineffective assistance of counsel caused prejudice 
must ask if a defendant has met the burden of showing a reasonable probability the result 
of the proceeding would have been different but for counsel's deficient performance. The 
ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceedings and 
whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the result of the proceedings is 
unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process counted on to produce just 
results. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed November 17, 
2017. Appeal from Franklin District Court; ERIC W. GODDERZ, judge. Opinion filed July 24, 2020. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is 
reversed, and the case is remanded with directions. 
 
Gerald E. Wells, of Jerry Wells Attorney-at-Law, of Lawrence, argued the cause and was on the 
brief for appellant.  
 
Brandon L. Jones, county attorney, argued the cause, and Stephen A. Hunting, former county 
attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
LUCKERT, C.J.:  A jury convicted John Balbirnie of the second-degree murder of 
Paul Nicholson, who died from a stab wound to the chest. Balbirnie appealed and his 
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. State v. Balbirnie, No. 106,849, 
3 
 
 
 
2013 WL 3455772 (Kan. App. 2013) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 298 Kan. 1204 
(2014).  
 
Within a year after the mandate issued in Balbirnie's direct appeal, he moved to 
have his conviction set aside. Balbirnie, who has consistently and repeatedly maintained 
his innocence, argued his appointed trial counsel ineffectively represented him by failing 
to admit into evidence a recording of a 911 call in which the caller identified someone 
other than Balbirnie as the person who stabbed Nicholson.  
 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Balbirnie must show (1) his 
attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). The district court held Balbirnie failed 
to establish both requirements. The Court of Appeals panel disagreed on the first prong, 
holding trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
But the panel agreed with the district court that Balbirnie had failed to establish the 
second prong of prejudice. Balbirnie v. State, No. 115,650, 2017 WL 5508140 (Kan. 
App. 2017) (unpublished opinion). We reverse both the Court of Appeals and the district 
court and remand for further proceedings.  
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Balbirnie seeks relief from his conviction through a motion filed under K.S.A. 
60-1507. Some facts from Balbirnie's underlying criminal case are required to place his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in context. During the events leading to 
Nicholson's death, several people were at Tarissa Brown and Phillip Wallace's apartment, 
including Brown, Wallace, Balbirnie, Nicholson, and Brandon Ellsmore. Wallace and 
4 
 
 
 
Ellsmore admitted to verbally and physically fighting with Nicholson just before 
Nicholson's death. Wallace denied using a weapon. Both Wallace and Ellsmore placed 
Nicholson's death at the hands of Balbirnie, although their accounts of events were 
inconsistent. Additional facts about the crime will be discussed as we consider the 
possible prejudice to Balbirnie.  
 
In his 60-1507 motion, Balbirnie claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for 
many reasons. Balbirnie has preserved only one for our consideration:  His claim that his 
trial counsel should have introduced a recording of a 911 call made by Brown while the 
fight was ongoing. In Balbirnie's motion, he explained why the call was exculpatory: 
 
"Counsel failed [to] present the 911 audiotape of an eyewitness who clearly indicated 
Phillip Wallace stabbed Mr. Nicholson in the chest and this wound was the fatal blow. 
This evidence was clearly exculpatory and supported Mr. Balbirnie's defense that he did 
not stab Mr. Nicholson and the other individuals at the home were responsible for 
[Nicholson's] death."  
 
After reviewing the motion, the district court appointed new counsel and held an 
evidentiary hearing. Balbirnie's trial counsel and Balbirnie testified.  
 
Balbirnie's trial counsel testified that Balbirnie maintained his innocence—from 
the time law enforcement officers interviewed him through the trial, sentencing, and 
beyond. The defense strategy was to prove Balbirnie was innocent and that Wallace or 
Ellsmore fatally stabbed Nicholson. Trial counsel acknowledged he received a copy of 
the 911 call in his discovery materials and reviewed it in preparation for trial. He agreed 
the call was exculpatory. Balbirnie's counsel expected the State to admit the recording of 
the 911 call into evidence, but it did not do so. Counsel explained that by the time he 
5 
 
 
 
realized the State was not going to admit the 911 call, it was impossible to secure 
subpoenas to establish foundation.  
 
When asked whether he considered establishing the foundation through the 911 
caller's testimony, counsel said he thought he had. He later realized he must have 
forgotten to do so. He testified any failure to question the caller about the recording's 
authenticity was an oversight and "[i]n no way" a strategic decision. He also testified that 
had he introduced the 911 call into evidence, he could have presented the jury with a 
potential suspect other than Balbirnie.  
 
A recording of the call was introduced into evidence at the 60-1507 hearing. On it, 
Brown identifies Wallace as her fiancé and later can be heard saying, "My fiancé stabbed 
him and he's laying [sic] right here."  
 
Following the hearing, the district court denied the motion, finding trial counsel 
did not perform deficiently and, even if trial counsel were deficient on some basis, 
Balbirnie had not established prejudice.  
 
Discussing the deficient performance prong of the ineffective counsel test, the 
district court found "[t]oo many factors were present at trial to now decide that counsel 
was unreasonable or deficient in not presenting the 911 tape." The court reasoned that 
trial counsel referenced the 911 call when cross-examining Brown, other witnesses 
confirmed the same facts about the stabbing, the 911 call is hard to decipher and 
understand due to Brown's emotional state, and the recording contradicted the assertion in 
Balbirnie's motion that Brown "'clearly indicated Phillip Wallace stabbed Mr. Nicholson 
in the chest and this wound was the fatal blow.'" Finally, the district court found one 
6 
 
 
 
could argue it was trial strategy not to play the audio "given the obvious emotional 
turmoil the witnesses experienced at the time of the call."  
 
Addressing the prejudice prong, the district court found there was "no reasonable 
probability that any of the errors complained of by the defendant [were] sufficient enough 
to undermine confidence in the outcome." The district court reasoned that the evidence at 
trial included several witnesses who saw Balbirnie stab Nicholson, Balbirnie's own 
statement admits he was at the scene during the fights, police arrested Balbirnie at the 
scene, and blood evidence implicated Balbirnie in the altercation. Ultimately, the district 
court said:  "The defendant has not presented sufficient enough evidence to establish that 
there is a substantial likelihood of a different result in this case."  
 
Balbirnie appealed the denial. The Court of Appeals panel held the evidence did 
not support the district court's finding that the failure to introduce the 911 call was a 
strategic decision. The panel noted that Balbirnie's trial counsel testified his actions were 
not strategy but oversight. Balbirnie, 2017 WL 5508140, at *2. And the panel held the 
failure to introduce the 911 call fell below an objective standard for reasonably effective 
representation. The panel reasoned that Balbirnie's defense was that someone else 
stabbed Nicholson, causing his death. And the call directly supported that defense 
because Brown identified someone besides Balbirnie as the person who stabbed 
Nicholson. 2017 WL 5508140, at *2.  
 
But the Court of Appeals panel affirmed the district court's result because it agreed 
Balbirnie had not established that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to 
introduce the 911 call. 2017 WL 5508140, at *2-4. The panel also rejected Balbirnie's 
other ineffective assistance claims for failing to meet the briefing requirements to raise 
the claims on appeal. 2017 WL 5508140, at *4-5.  
7 
 
 
 
 
Balbirnie timely petitioned for review, which this court granted. This court's 
jurisdiction is proper under K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (petition for review of Court of Appeals 
decision).  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to 
effective assistance of counsel, and denial of the right can lead to reversal of a jury 
verdict. Courts consider whether a reversible denial of the right occurred by applying a 
two-prong test stated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland. A convicted 
defendant must first establish deficient performance by "show[ing] that counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." 466 U.S. at 687-88. 
Then the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 
466 U.S. at 687. See State v. Adams, 297 Kan. 665, 669, 304 P.3d 311 (2013). 
 
 
After a full evidentiary hearing about an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
under K.S.A. 60-1507, an appellate court reviews a district court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law under a mixed standard of review. The appellate court examines the 
record and determines whether substantial competent evidence supports the district 
court's factual findings and determines whether the court's factual findings support its 
conclusions of law. The appellate court then reviews the district court's conclusions of 
law de novo. 297 Kan. at 669. 
 
8 
 
 
 
 
Performance Prong  
 
To begin, we note that Balbirnie's petition for review is limited to his ineffective 
assistance claim based on the 911 call. He makes no challenge to the Court of Appeals' 
holding that he failed to sufficiently brief his other ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims. As a result, we will not discuss those other claims. See Supreme Court Rule 
8.03(a)(4)(C) (2017 Kan. S. Ct. R. 54) ("The court will not consider issues not presented 
or fairly included in the petition.").  
 
In raising his trial counsel's failure to introduce into evidence the 911 call, 
Balbirnie's petition seeking our review focuses exclusively on the Court of Appeals 
holding that he had not established Strickland's second prong of prejudice. In other 
words, Balbirnie has not raised the first Strickland prong for our consideration.  
 
Nor has the State. The State did not cross-petition or otherwise respond to the 
Court of Appeals' holding on counsel's performance, as permitted by Supreme Court Rule 
8.03(b), (h)(1) (2017 Kan. S. Ct. R. 53). See Balbirnie, 2017 WL 5508140, at *2 ("Since 
Balbirnie's defense was that someone else stabbed Nicholson, causing his death, and [the 
caller] had said her fiancé had stabbed Nicholson, failing to introduce the 911 call was 
below an objective standard for reasonably effective representation.").  
 
As a result, the question of error as to the performance prong is not before us, at 
least according to the holding of some cases that predate Balbirnie's petition for review. 
See State v. Ortega, 300 Kan. 761, 777-78, 335 P.3d 93 (2014) (State did not file cross-
petition challenging Court of Appeals' findings of instructional error and prosecutorial 
misconduct; those issues not before court). But at least one other case predating 
Balbirnie's petition suggested the State need not—indeed, could not—file a cross-petition 
9 
 
 
 
for review. See State v. Laborde, 303 Kan. 1, 5-6, 360 P.3d 1080 (2015) (noting that in a 
criminal case, the State cannot file a cross-petition when it prevailed in the Court of 
Appeals, even if it disagreed with the rationale). We have since clarified the need to file a 
cross-petition or provisional cross-petition in these situations. See Supreme Court Rule 
8.03(c)(3) (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 55) ("The purpose of a cross-petition is to seek review of 
specific holdings the Court of Appeals decided adversely to the cross-petitioner.").  
 
Because our caselaw at the time Balbirnie petitioned for review created some 
ambiguity about the need for the State to file a cross-petition for review for us to consider 
the performance prong, we briefly note our agreement with the panel's analysis. 
Balbirnie's trial counsel testified he did not make a strategic decision. Instead, he 
assumed the State would admit the 911 call and was not prepared to introduce it once the 
State did not. 
 
Balbirnie's failure to subpoena a witness or establish the foundation to admit the 
call through other means, such as through Brown authenticating her voice on the 
recording, prevented the jury from hearing the recording of the call on which Brown said 
Wallace had stabbed Nicholson. The call thus supported the defense theory. See 2017 
WL 5508140, at *2.  
 
In addition, as we will detail in our discussion of the prejudice prong, the call 
would have impeached the testimony of other witnesses. We therefore affirm the Court of 
Appeals' holding that failing to introduce the 911 call fell below an objective standard for 
reasonably effective representation.  
 
10 
 
 
 
Prejudice  
 
The United States Supreme Court has explained that defense counsel's 
ineffectiveness may require reversing a verdict but not always:   
 
"Some errors will have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an isolated, 
trivial effect. Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is 
more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96.   
 
Strickland identified the tipping point:  "Taking the unaffected findings as a given, 
and taking due account of the effect of the errors on the remaining findings, a court 
making the prejudice inquiry must ask if the defendant has met the burden of showing 
that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors." 
466 U.S. at 696; see State v. Butler, 307 Kan. 831, 853, 416 P.3d 116 (2018) (defendant 
claiming to have been prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel must show a 
reasonable probability the result would have been different but for counsel's 
performance).  
 
More simply stated, "the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental 
fairness of the proceeding" and "whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, 
the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the 
adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just results." Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 696. We have thus explained that a "reasonable probability" means "a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Chamberlain v. State, 
236 Kan. 650, 657, 694 P.2d 468 (1985). The district court cited the correct standard but 
also said that Balbirnie had not shown a "substantial likelihood" of a different result, a 
11 
 
 
 
higher burden than required. We look instead for a reasonable probability. When doing 
so, we "must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury." Chamberlain, 
236 Kan. at 657. See Butler, 307 Kan. at 853.  
 
The Court of Appeals panel noted this standard applied and reached the conclusion 
Balbirnie had not met it. It noted all the details reported in the 911 call were hard to 
follow, Brown did not say whether Wallace had stabbed Nicholson in the back or the 
chest, and there was other significant evidence against Balbirnie. Balbirnie, 2017 WL 
5508140, at *1, 4.  
 
To evaluate these and other points, we need to discuss the facts of the crime in 
more detail. These details form the totality of the evidence and lead us to conclude:   
 
 The evidence supporting the verdict is conflicting, and a jury could 
question the veracity of some or parts of each eyewitness' testimony.  
 
 Although the 911 call did not establish that Wallace inflicted the killing 
stab, it raises questions about the credibility of those who attributed the stab 
to Balbirnie. 
 
 The emotional nature of the call does not obscure its highly probative 
value.  
 
 The other evidence does not remove the potential for a reasonable doubt 
about Balbirnie's guilt. 
 
12 
 
 
 
As to the first point, the evaluation of veracity would likely be influenced by the 
forensic evidence. The State's forensic pathologist testified that after the fatal wound was 
inflicted, Nicholson would have had at least a few seconds of awareness before 
experiencing a gradual cessation of all functions. The fatal wound would have caused 
death within a few minutes and usually would cause a person to collapse "pretty rapidly." 
A jury could view the call as significant evidence of present sense impressions about the 
sequence of events and who inflicted stab wounds, especially since Nicholson collapsed 
near Brown.  
 
The call undermines the credibility of Brown, Wallace, and Ellsmore, as Wallace 
denied using a weapon, and Brown and Ellsmore both testified they did not see Wallace 
with a knife. See K.S.A. 60-420 ("Subject to K.S.A. 60-421 and 60-422, for the purpose 
of impairing or supporting the credibility of a witness, any party including the party 
calling the witness may examine the witness and introduce extrinsic evidence concerning 
any conduct by him or her and any other matter relevant upon the issues of credibility.").  
 
The call also discredits the testimony of Brown about Balbirnie's admission. 
Brown testified that after the police had arrived, Balbirnie said, "'I stabbed the dude in the 
neck.'" Neither the call nor any officer's testimony confirms that admission. 
 
Balbirnie summarized various other reasons these witnesses' testimony could be 
discredited:   
 
"The several interviews with law enforcement and sworn testimonies given by these 
witnesses are replete with glaring inconsistencies. Tarissa Brown's story goes from not 
seeing John Balbirnie stab the victim to watching him pull a pocket knife from his pocket 
and stabbing Paul Nicholson twice. Brandon Ellsmore's story begins with him telling law 
13 
 
 
 
enforcement they could rule out John Balbirnie, to a later interview where he alleges 
seeing something shiny in John Balbirnie's hand that could have been a knife, but he 
wasn't sure, to finally Mr. Ellsmore testifying at trial that he watched John Balbirnie pull 
a pocket knife from his pocket, open the pocket knife and then stab the victim. The 
several stories told by Tarissa Brown and Brandon Ellsmore share a strikingly similar 
evolution and raise similar concerns regarding the veracity of their statements and 
testimonies. Additionally, Brandon Ellsmore received a significant reduction in prison 
time for his ever-changing version of the truth. Based upon the statements given by 
Mr. Ellsmore and Ms. Brown, Ms. Brown's fiancé, Phillip Wallace was not charged in 
connection with the death of Paul Nicholson."  
 
The call also underscores these issues with the witnesses' testimony. There is a 
reasonable probability the jury would view these credibility issues in a different light if it 
had heard the recording of the 911 call.  
 
The district court and Court of Appeals panel also discounted the effect of the call 
because Brown is emotional, and the call is at times confusing. This is true, but Brown 
still identifies her fiancé as Wallace and states, "My fiancé stabbed him and he's laying 
[sic] right here." And, as Balbirnie argues, the jury could view this emotion as the most 
credible evidence because Brown was reacting contemporaneously before the witnesses' 
stories evolved. Balbirnie posits Brown's emotional state "portrayed a woman who had 
just witnessed, first hand, a crime and that she reacted to her observation in a very 
visceral way, giving the observation a credible quality." We agree.  
 
The State argues and the Court of Appeals also reasoned that the call does not 
clearly indicate that Brown saw the fatal blow. But it was for the jury to decide whether 
the fatal stab occurred within Brown's view. Even if her statement to the dispatcher was 
an inference, the jury could have determined the inference was reasonable and entitled to 
14 
 
 
 
weight because it was against Brown's personal interest to implicate her fiancé. Given the 
implications, the jury could have determined the version on the call was more reasonable 
than Wallace's significantly different version of events. Thus, the inference could have 
impacted the jury's assessment of witness credibility and Balbirnie's guilt.  
 
Finally, the panel discussed two types of other significant evidence against 
Balbirnie:  blood and Balbirnie's video-recorded statements at the police station.  
 
The panel noted that Balbirnie had Nicholson's blood on his bracelet and shoelace. 
The testimony described the evidence as showing droplets of blood found on a knot in 
Balbirnie's bracelet and the top knot of Balbirnie's left shoelace. This evidence was 
inculpatory, but there was also evidence that DNA profiles from Ellsmore's socks and 
Wallace's face matched Nicholson's DNA. And law enforcement testified there was blood 
throughout the apartment. There were other plausible ways Balbirnie could have gotten 
some of Nicholson's blood on him other than because he was the person who fatally 
stabbed Nicholson.  
 
The panel also discussed Balbirnie's interviews at the police station. Balbirnie did 
not include these interviews in the record on appeal. But the panel noted that the 
prosecutor discussed the video in closing arguments, reminding the jury that Balbirnie 
wiped blood off his shoulder when no one else was in the room, reenacted a stabbing 
motion, and told Wallace through a wall, "'I hope I don't get told on. Just deny it, Phillip. 
don't blame me.'" Balbirnie, 2017 WL 5508140, at *4. The Court of Appeals reasoned 
that Balbirnie had the burden to present a record supporting his claims of error and he 
should have included the videos. Despite not having the recordings to review, the panel 
concluded:  "[W]e cannot ignore the existence of the video—as described in our record—
even though the video itself is not in our record." 2017 WL 5508140, at *4.  
15 
 
 
 
 
In doing so, the Court of Appeals did not account for the evidence that police 
swabbed Balbirnie's chest and the results came back as consistent with Balbirnie's DNA, 
not Nicholson's. Thus, relying on the lack of forensic evidence the jury could have 
rejected any suggestion the action demonstrated Balbirnie's guilt.  
 
What is more, many of Balbirnie's statements while alone in the interview room, at 
least as described in the record, are ambiguous and others are denials of guilt. Defense 
counsel pointed to the interviews in closing, arguing that when Balbirnie was left alone in 
the room, he repeatedly said, "'I just didn't do anything wrong.'" A detective testified that 
Balbirnie never confessed. In fact, Balbirnie consistently told the detectives that he was 
merely a witness and had nothing to do with the stabbing. Finally, during the 60-1507 
evidentiary hearing, Balbirnie's trial counsel testified Balbirnie has consistently 
maintained his innocence. The evidence is not as one-sided as the State would suggest.  
 
In conclusion, we hold the record presents many credibility and evidentiary issues 
that could be influenced by a jury hearing that (1) there was a 911 call from Brown made 
shortly after she observed what occurred at the time of Nicholson's death and (2) she 
distinctly accused her fiancé Wallace, against her best interest, as the person who stabbed 
Nicholson and did not identify Balbirnie. We find merit in Balbirnie's argument the 
importance of the 911 call cannot be over-estimated because it would have refuted the 
other witnesses' testimony and given the jury a reasonable alternative to Balbirnie 
delivering the fatal wound.  
 
Despite the strong presumption of the reliability of a jury verdict, Balbirnie's trial 
counsel's ineffective assistance upsets the fundamental fairness of the proceeding, leading 
16 
 
 
 
us to hold the result of Balbirnie's trial is unreliable because of a prejudicial breakdown in 
the adversarial process. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
We hold that Balbirnie has met his burden of showing that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for his trial counsel's deficient performance, the result of his trial 
would have been different.  
 
We reverse the Court of Appeals decision affirming the district court and reverse 
the district court. We reverse Balbirnie's conviction and order new trial proceedings.   
 
 
NUSS, C.J., not participating.1 
 
MICHAEL E. WARD, District Judge, assigned.2 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  Chief Justice Lawton R. Nuss heard oral arguments but did not 
participate in the final decision in case No. 115,650. Chief Justice Nuss retired effective 
December 17, 2019.  
 
2REPORTER'S NOTE:  District Judge Ward was appointed to hear case No. 115,650 
under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by art. 3, § 6(f) of the Kansas 
Constitution to fill the vacancy on the court by the retirement of Justice Lee A. Johnson.