Case Title: People v. Basler

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87770

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-11-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 87770-Agenda 31-May 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 								LINDA BASLER, Appellee.
Opinion filed November 16, 2000.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the judgment of the
court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Jackson County,
defendant, Linda Basler, was convicted of driving under the
influence and sentenced to 12 months' probation. The appellate
court reversed and remanded for a new trial. We granted the
State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. For the
reasons that follow, we now affirm the appellate court's judgment
as modified.
	In October of 1996, defendant was arrested by police and
charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS
5/11-501 (West 1996)). The circuit court appointed the Jackson
County public defender to represent her. On the day of her trial,
defendant requested a continuance to seek private counsel on the
grounds that she and her appointed attorney did not agree on
certain matters. Defendant also advised the court that she had been
ill, that she did not feel capable of assisting in her defense, and
that some of her witnesses were not able to testify that day.
	The circuit court denied defendant's motion, and the matter
proceeded to trial before a jury. The jury returned a verdict of
guilty. The circuit court then sentenced defendant to 12 months'
probation and fined her $300. The court also ordered defendant to
pay $5 per month for the services of the probation office and to
pay $25 for the services of her public defender.
	Defendant filed a post-trial motion for a new trial, arguing
that the State had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt. That motion was denied, and defendant appealed. As
grounds for her appeal, defendant asserted that the circuit court
abused its discretion when it denied her motion for a continuance
without making further inquiry into the circumstances involved
and without making a finding that she had brought the motion to
delay trial. Defendant further contended, among other things, that
the trial court should not have ordered her to pay a fee to the
public defender's office without holding a hearing on her financial
circumstances and her ability to pay.
	The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial in
an unpublished order. No. 5-97-0979 (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23). As grounds for its decision, the court
held that the circuit court had committed reversible error when it
rejected defendant's motion for a continuance without inquiring
further into the circumstances or finding that she had presented the
motion merely to delay the trial. The appellate court further held
that the trial judge should not have required defendant to pay the
$25 fee for her public defender without first holding a hearing on
her ability to pay. In disposing of the case, the appellate court
directed the circuit court to hold such a hearing on remand and to
provide a court reporter to memorialize that hearing.
	Defendant petitioned for rehearing, asking the appellate court
to consider additional claims she had raised on appeal, including
a claim that the circuit court should not have received evidence of
the results of a horizontal-gaze-nystagmus (HGN) test without first
conducting a hearing under Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923). Although the appellate court purported to deny
defendant's petition, it vacated its decision and filed a new,
published opinion in its stead.
	In its opinion, the court reiterated its prior holdings in the
case, but added a discussion regarding the Frye issue. 304 Ill. App.
3d 230. The court noted that it had previously ruled that the HGN
test meets the Frye standard and is admissible when a proper
foundation is laid. See People v. Buening, 229 Ill. App. 3d 538,
545-46 (1992). The court observed, however, that People v. Kirk,
289 Ill. App. 3d 326 (1997), a subsequent decision from another
district of the appellate court, took a different view. In Kirk a
divided panel of the Fourth District of the appellate court held that
it is necessary to conduct a Frye hearing prior to the admission of
the result of a HGN test in a criminal trial for DUI. Kirk, 289 Ill.
App. 3d at 331.
	Although it cited Kirk with approval, the appellate court in
this case stopped short of embracing that decision and overruling
Buening. Similarly, it did not expressly hold that the trial court had
erred in admitting the HGN test results at the original trial without
first conducting a Frye hearing. Instead, it simply suggested that
if a new trial is held following remand and the State wishes to
introduce evidence of the HGN test results, then "a Frye hearing
might well be appropriate."
	On this appeal, the State does not take issue with the appellate
court's decision to reverse and remand for a new trial based on the
circuit court's refusal to grant defendant a continuance. Nor does
it contest the appellate court's determination that the trial judge
should not have required defendant to pay the $25 fee for her
public defender without first holding a hearing on her ability to
pay. The State's sole concern is the appellate court's handling of
the Frye issue.
	The State contends that the appellate court's decision is
problematic because it denied the State the opportunity to address
defendant's request that the appellate court address admissibility
of HGN test results under the Frye standard. According to the
State, the appellate court's decision to vacate its original order and
file a new opinion in its place was tantamount to granting
defendant the relief she requested on rehearing. Where a petition
for rehearing is allowed, the opposing party has the right under our
rules to respond. 155 Ill. 2d R. 367(d). Because the court in this
case purported to deny defendant's petition for rehearing,
however, the State was deprived of that right. 155 Ill. 2d R.
367(d).
	The appellate court's decision is also problematic, according
to the State, because its directions to the circuit court are
ambiguous and confusing. As we have indicated, the appellate
court's decision neither overrules Buening nor expressly adopts
Kirk and gives no clear indication as whether a Frye hearing is, in
fact, required on remand.
	Before considering the State's contentions, we must first
address the position taken by defendant. In responding to the
State's arguments, defendant goes beyond the points raised by the
State and invites our court to use this matter as a vehicle for
considering whether HGN test results should ever be admitted in
prosecutions for driving under the influence. This we decline to
do. The problem with undertaking such an expansive analysis is
that validity of the HGN test was never challenged in the trial
court. Defense counsel raised no objection to the admission of the
HGN test results against defendant, and use of the HGN test
results was not contested by defendant in her post-trial motion.
	As a general rule, a defendant must object to an error at trial
and include the objection in a post-trial motion in order to preserve
it for review on appeal. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186
(1988). A reviewing court may override considerations of waiver
where plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights are
involved. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). The present case, however,
involves neither circumstance. In addition, because validity of the
HGN test was not raised below, the record is devoid of the
evidentiary material necessary to assess defendant's challenge.
Such material cannot be presented to an appellate court in the first
instance. We are not triers of fact. Our function is to serve as a
court of review. Accordingly, even if we wanted to take up the
matter, we would have no informed basis for doing so.
	Given the lack of pertinent evidence in the trial court, the
absence of appropriate objections by defense counsel, and the
failure of defendant to raise the issue in her post-trial motion, the
appellate court's decision to address the validity of HGN test
results on rehearing is difficult to comprehend. Wholly aside from
the question of whether the State was prejudiced by its inability to
file a response under Rule 367(d) (155 Ill. 2d R. 367(d)), the
posture of the case was such that the appellate court could not
possibly make a definitive ruling on the matter. At best, its
conclusions could only be tentative and conditional. The result is
a remand order that obfuscates the law and offers no clear
guidance to the trial court. Based upon what the appellate court
has written, the trial court has no way to judge whether and under
what circumstances a Frye hearing must actually be conducted.
Accordingly, the appellate court's remand directions do little to
advance the court's stated goal in addressing the issue, which was
to prevent error on retrial.
	The appellate court's analysis of the Frye issue is flawed for
another, more fundamental reason. Defendant cited research to the
court questioning the validity of the HGN test. In ruling as it did,
the court apparently believed that requiring a Frye hearing was the
appropriate mechanism for bringing that research before the trial
court so that the issue of the test's validity could be reassessed.
The court's concern is legitimate. Science is not static, and
methods must exist for reexamining the validity of scientific tests
when new information is acquired. What the appellate court failed
to appreciate is that the Frye test is not an appropriate vehicle for
accomplishing that purpose.
	Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), which is
followed in Illinois, pertains to the admission of scientific
evidence which is novel. It requires that evidence be generally
accepted in the relevant scientific community before it can be
admitted. People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 187-88 (1996). The
HGN test was found to meet the Frye standard in People v.
Buening, 229 Ill. App. 3d 538 (1992). That decision, in turn, was
followed by the appellate court in People v. Wiebler, 266 Ill. App.
3d 336, 339 (1994).
	In the wake of Buening and Wiebler, HGN test results have
been routinely admitted in prosecutions for driving under the
influence. The tests are no longer "novel" in any meaningful sense.
As a result, the State should not be put to the burden of having to
reestablish the test's validity in every case. See People v. Kirk, 289
Ill. App. 3d 326, 335-37 (1997) (Steigmann, P.J., specially
concurring). Where, as here, a scientific method has been shown
to be generally accepted, a Frye test is no longer necessary each
time the State seeks to use evidence obtained by that method. See
People v. Rozo, 303 Ill. App. 3d 787, 793 (1999); see also People
v. Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d 500, 518 (1990) (trial court did not err by
failing to hold a Frye hearing on admissibility of electrophoresis
testimony after taking judicial notice of electrophoresis as an
accepted scientific procedure based on the prior decision in People
v. Partee, 157 Ill. App. 3d 231 (1987), that such testimony was
admissible); People v. Johnson, 262 Ill. App. 3d 565, 568-69
(1994) (trial court appropriately relied on precedential case law to
determine that the proffered DNA testimony was admissible and
had no need to conduct a Frye hearing prior to making its decision
on the admissibility of that evidence). To the extent that the
appellate court's decision in People v. Kirk, 289 Ill. App. 3d 326
(1997), suggests otherwise, it is hereby overruled.
	Although the State is no longer required to show that the
HGN test satisfies the Frye standard before it may introduce the
results of an HGN test into evidence, the validity of HGN tests and
test results is not beyond challenge. If a defendant has evidence
showing that HGN tests are scientifically unsound, then he may
interpose the appropriate objection to the HGN test results and
present his supporting evidence to the trial court. If the trial court
is persuaded by the defendant's evidence, then the court has the
right to bar its admission. Note, however, that it is the defendant's
obligation to show that the test results are infirm. It is not the
responsibility of the State to show that the tests and results are
scientifically valid. Absent proof by the defense that the HGN test
is unsound, the State need only show that the officer who gave the
test was trained in the procedure and that the test was properly
administered.
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is affirmed, as modified herein, and the matter is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed as modified.
	I concur in the plurality's holding that defendant waived any
argument concerning the admissibility of horizontal-gaze-nystagmus (HGN) test results by failing to raise this argument in
the trial court. In light of this holding, the plurality's additional
discussion concerning the admissibility of HGN test results is
entirely dicta without precedential value.
	JUSTICE BILANDIC joins in this special concurrence.
	JUSTICE McMORROW, dissenting:
	The defendant, Linda Basler, was convicted of driving under
the influence based in part on the arresting officer's testimony that
defendant failed the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test. An
officer who administers an HGN test asks the driver to cover one
eye and focus the other on an object, such as a pen, held by the
officer at the driver's eye level. As the officer moves the object
gradually out of the driver's field of vision toward the ear, the
officer watches the driver's eyeball to detect involuntary jerking.
This jerking may indicate that the driver's blood-alcohol content
exceeds the legal limit. See People v. Buening, 229 Ill. App. 3d
538, 539-40 (1992).
	In an unpublished order, the Fifth District of the appellate
court reversed defendant's conviction. The appellate court
concluded that the trial judge erred in summarily denying a motion
for a continuance which had been filed by defendant. According
to the appellate court, the trial judge should have inquired into
defendant's circumstances and determined whether the motion was
merely an attempt to delay trial.
	Defendant subsequently filed a petition for rehearing before
the appellate court. In this petition, defendant asked the appellate
court to consider additional claims she had raised on appeal,
including a claim that the circuit court should not have received
evidence of the HGN test without first conducting a hearing
pursuant to Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Frye requires that novel scientific evidence be generally accepted
in the relevant scientific community before it may be admitted at
trial. People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 187-88 (1996). The
appellate court thereafter issued a published opinion in which it
reiterated its prior conclusions and stated that defendant's petition
for rehearing was denied. Nevertheless, in the published opinion,
the appellate court addressed the merits of defendant's argument
regarding the use of HGN testing and the Frye standard.
	Addressing the Frye issue, the court noted that the Fifth
District of the appellate court concluded, in People v. Buening,
229 Ill App. 3d 538 (1992), that HGN testing is generally accepted
in the relevant scientific community and that such testing is
admissible when a proper foundation is laid. However, in People
v. Kirk, 289 Ill. App. 3d 326 (1997), the Fourth District disagreed
with Buening and criticized its analysis regarding general
acceptance. In particular, the Kirk court disagreed with Buening's
heavy reliance upon a judicial decision from Arizona (State v.
Superior Court, 149 Ariz. 269, 718 P.2d 171 (1986) (en banc))
which concluded that HGN testing meets the Frye standard. Kirk
noted that relying exclusively upon prior judicial decisions to
establish general scientific acceptance can be a " 'hollow ritual' "
if the underlying issue of scientific acceptance has not been
adequately litigated. Kirk, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 333, quoting 1 J.
Strong, McCormick on Evidence §203, at 870 n.20 (4th ed. 1992).
Kirk concluded that the question of scientific acceptance had not
been "fully and thoroughly litigated" (Kirk, 289 Ill. App. 3d at
334) in Buening or in State v. Superior Court. Kirk expressed no
opinion on whether HGN testing met the Frye standard. Instead,
the court held that the general scientific acceptance of HGN testing
had not yet been established as a matter of law.
	The appellate court in the instant matter stated that it agreed
"with Kirk that relying on other courts' opinions to conclude that
the HGN test meets the Frye standard may cause problems." 304
Ill. App. 3d 230, 234. The court then stated: "[W]e suggest to the
trial court that if there is a retrial and the State wishes to introduce
evidence of the HGN test results, a Frye hearing might well be
appropriate." 304 Ill. App. 3d at 234. The court reversed
defendant's convictions and remanded the matter to the trial court.
	On appeal to this court, the State challenges the appellate
court's handling of the Frye issue. The State argues that the
appellate court's decision to address the Frye issue upon denial of
defendant's petition for rehearing denied the State the opportunity
to respond to defendant's arguments. In addition, according to the
State, the appellate court's decision is confusing because it does
not expressly follow either Kirk or Buening and does not state
whether a Frye hearing is, in fact, required on remand. The
defendant, in turn, asks that this court rule upon whether HGN
testing meets the Frye standard.
	A plurality of this court (Chief Justice Harrison, Justice
Miller, and Justice Rathje) agrees with the State that the appellate
court should not have addressed the Frye issue upon denial of
defendant's petition for rehearing. The plurality does not believe,
however, that the appellate court should have avoided the issue
because the State was not allowed to respond to defendant's
arguments in the petition for rehearing. Instead, the plurality
concludes that, because the Frye issue was not raised in the trial
court, there was a "lack of pertinent evidence" before the appellate
court and, therefore, "the appellate court could not possibly make
a definitive ruling on the matter." Slip op. at 4. The plurality also
expressly declines to decide on the ultimate question as to
"whether HGN test results should ever be admitted in prosecutions
for driving under the influence." Slip op. at 3. According to the
plurality, because no Frye hearing was held in the circuit court,
"the record is devoid of the evidentiary material necessary to
assess defendant's challenge. Such material cannot be presented
to an appellate court in the first instance. We are not triers of fact.
Our function is to serve as a court of review. Accordingly, even if
we wanted to take up the matter, we would have no informed basis
for doing so." Slip op. at 4.
	The plurality then goes on to state that the appellate court's
Frye analysis "is flawed for another, more fundamental reason."
Slip op. at 4. The plurality notes that the appellate court in
Buening held that HGN testing satisfies the Frye standard and that
this decision was followed in People v. Wiebler, 266 Ill. App. 3d
336 (1994). The plurality concludes that, based upon these
appellate decisions, HGN testing is "no longer 'novel' in any
meaningful sense," that HGN testing "has been shown to be
generally accepted" and that "the State should not be put to the
burden of having to reestablish the test's validity in every case."
Slip op. at 5. Therefore, according to the plurality, the appellate
court in Kirk was wrong when it held that the general scientific
acceptance of HGN testing has not been legally established. The
plurality states that it would overrule Kirk and states that the
appellate court in the instant matter was wrong to suggest that a
Frye hearing might be required.
	There are several serious problems with the plurality opinion.
The most glaring is that the opinion contains a large internal
contradiction. The plurality states the following:
		"In responding to the State's arguments, defendant goes
beyond the points raised by the State and invites our court
to use this matter as a vehicle for considering whether
HGN test results should ever be admitted in prosecutions
for driving under the influence. This we decline to do. The
problem with undertaking such an expansive analysis is
that validity of the HGN test was never challenged in the
trial court. Defense counsel raised no objection to the
admission of the HGN test results against defendant, and
use of the HGN test results was not contested by
defendant in her post-trial motion." (Emphasis added.)
Slip op. at 3-4.
From these statements it appears that the plurality will not decide
whether HGN testing meets the Frye standard but, instead, will
leave that question to another day.
	However, the plurality then goes on to expressly endorse the
holdings of Buening and Wiebler:
		"[T]he State should not be put to the burden of having to
reestablish the [HGN] test's validity in every case.
[Citation.] Where, as here, a scientific method has been
shown to be generally accepted, a Frye test is no longer
necessary each time the State seeks to use evidence
obtained by that method." (Emphasis added.) Slip op. at
5.
 Thus, at the outset of its analysis, the plurality unequivocally
states that it expresses no opinion on whether HGN testing meets
the Frye standard. Yet, incredibly, only a few paragraphs later, the
plurality states that HGN testing meets the Frye standard. The
plurality opinion "obfuscates the law and offers no clear
guidance." Slip op. at 4. The plurality does a disservice to the bar
and to this court with this type of analysis.
	There are other problems with the plurality's analysis in
addition to the contradiction noted above. Recall that the appellate
court in Kirk disagreed with Buening's heavy reliance upon a
single judicial opinion to conclude that HGN testing meets the
Frye standard. Recall too the holding of the court in Kirk, i.e., that
it could not resolve whether HGN testing meets the Frye standard
because the issue had not been "fully and thoroughly litigated" in
the circuit court. This holding is precisely the same conclusion
reached at the outset of the plurality's analysis. The plurality states
that the appellate court in this case should not have addressed the
Frye issue because it was not litigated in the circuit court and,
therefore, there was a "lack of pertinent evidence" by which it
could be resolved. Moreover, according to the plurality, this court
cannot address the Frye issue because "the record is devoid of the
evidentiary material necessary to assess defendant's challenge."
Slip op. at 4.
	Given that the plurality apparently agrees with Kirk's analysis,
why does the plurality state that it would overrule that decision?
Further, why does the plurality agree with Buening when that court
apparently did not rely upon "evidentiary material[s]" (slip op. at
4) in reaching its conclusion that HGN testing meets the Frye
standard? Is the plurality saying that the Frye issue was fully and
adequately litigated in Buening even though it appears that the
court relied exclusively upon judicial opinions rather than
testimony adduced in the circuit court to establish the general
acceptance of HGN testing? The plurality obviously approves of
Buening. Yet, if the procedure to establish general acceptance
followed by the appellate court in Buening was proper, i.e., relying
upon judicial opinions, then why does the plurality hold that this
court cannot resolve the Frye issue because of a lack of factual
findings in the record? The plurality's failure to address these
issues only engenders confusion.
	The plurality states that it overrules Kirk because, before Kirk
addressed the Frye issue, Buening and Wiebler concluded that
HGN testing meets the Frye standard. Therefore, according to the
plurality, HGN testing was no longer "novel" scientific evidence
when the issue reached the Kirk court and that court should have
simply taken judicial notice that the issue had been resolved. In
essence, the plurality determines that once any district of the
appellate court concludes that scientific evidence passes the Frye
test, that district and every other district are bound by the first
decision. There is no authority for such a result. The cases the draft
cites in support of this holding (see slip op. at 5) state only that
trial courts acted correctly in relying on appellate case law.
Certainly the districts of the appellate court may follow each
others' decisions, but they are not required to do so. The plurality
mistakenly equates being generally accepted in the legal
community with being generally accepted in the scientific
community (the standard for the Frye test). Scientific evidence
may be "generally accepted" in the legal community once a district
of the appellate court has determined that it passes the Frye test,
but this is not a guarantee that the initial decision was correct. It is
patently erroneous to bar subsequent appellate panels from
requiring a Frye hearing if they question the original decision.
	Instead of following the confusing and contradictory path
taken by the plurality, I would simply address the issue initially
presented by the State. The State argues that it was unfair for the
appellate court to address the Frye issue after receiving
defendant's petition for rehearing because the State was not
allowed to respond to that petition. However, our rules only
require the appellate court to allow the opposing party to respond
when the court allows a petition for rehearing. 155 Ill. 2d R.
367(d). In this case, the court did not allow the petition for
rehearing; rather, it modified its disposition upon denial of
rehearing (and changed the disposition from an unpublished Rule
23 order to a published opinion). Accordingly, the appellate court
was not required to allow the State to respond.
	This result does not subvert the purpose of our rules. If the
opponent of the initial petition is unhappy with the disposition as
modified upon denial of rehearing, the opponent may file its own
petition for rehearing. Our rules only bar subsequent petitions for
rehearing after the appellate court has granted a petition for
rehearing. 155 Ill. 2d R. 367(e). Thus if the State was dissatisfied
with the appellate court's disposition it could have filed its own
petition for rehearing, which in fact it did in this case. This
allowed the State to make any and all arguments it could have
made in responding to the defendant's original petition for
rehearing.
	It is true that the appellate court's resolution of the Frye issue
is confusing. As the plurality notes, the appellate court neither
explicitly overrules Buening nor expressly adopts Kirk, and does
not clearly state whether a Frye hearing must be held on remand.
I would hold, therefore, that the cause should be remanded to the
appellate court for the limited purpose of clarifying its holding.
	Finally, it is important to emphasize that the issue of whether
HGN testing meets the Frye standard has not been resolved by the
opinions issued by this court in the case at bar. The reasoning and
result of Kirk have not been overruled by this court, just as the
reasoning and result of Buening have not been affirmed. See slip
op. at 6 (Heiple, J., specially concurring, joined by Bilandic, J.).
	JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this dissent.