Case Title: Auclair v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 5775

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-03-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Auclair v. State1983 WY 29660 P.2d 1156Case Number: 5775Case Number: 5775Decided: 03/21/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
PAUL AUCLAIR, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF). 

Appeal from the District 
Court, ParkCounty, John T. Dixon, 
J.

Sylvia Lee 
Hackl, State Public Defender, Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, Wyo. Defender Aid 
Program; Laramie, and Kurt C. Weiss, Intern (argued), 
signed the brief on behalf of 
appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Allen C. Johnson, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Thomas T.C. Campbell, Intern (argued), signed the brief on behalf of 
appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE and 
BROWN, JJ.

RAPER, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Paul Auclair 
(appellant) was found guilty by a jury and sentenced on three criminal counts1 arising from an incestuous 
relationship he engaged in with his thirteen year-old daughter. During the trial 
the transcript of a recorded telephone conversation between appellant and his 
daughter, held before appellant was arrested, was introduced and received into 
evidence by the trial judge over his objection. Appellant raises on appeal the 
following issue:

[¶2.]     "Was the appellant[']s 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel denied by the use and introduction into 
evidence at trial, of the transcript of a telephone conversation between 
appellant and his daughter, when that phone call was recorded after the 
initiation of formal judicial proceedings and without appellant[']s 
knowledge?"

[¶3.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶4.]     On October 23, 1981, 
appellant's daughter contacted a social worker from the Wyoming Department of 
Public Assistance and Social Services (DPASS) and revealed to him that her 
father (appellant) had, for the past several months, engaged in an incestuous 
relationship with her. She, later that day, told the same story to Powell Chief 
of Police, Bob Coorough. After the initial interview, DPASS placed appellant's 
daughter in a foster home. On October 24, 1982, a criminal complaint alleging 
appellant had violated § 6-5-102, W.S. 1977 - Wyoming's incest statute - was 
made and filed by Chief Coorough pursuant to Rule 3, W.R.Cr.P. On the same date, 
an arrest warrant was issued by the justice of the peace pursuant to Rule 4, 
W.R.Cr.P. for the arrest of appellant.

[¶5.]     On October 25, 1981, 
appellant, by his own account, voluntarily went to the Powell police station 
where Chief Coorough informed him of the allegations made by his daughter. Chief 
Coorough, prior to any conversation with appellant at the police station, 
insured that appellant was aware of his constitutional rights - per Miranda. He 
then proceeded to interview appellant about his daughter's allegations. During 
the interview, appellant complained that, since DPASS had taken his daughter, he 
had been unable to talk to her and would like to do so to clear up the matter. 
At the conclusion of the interview, despite the fact that a warrant had issued 
against him, appellant was allowed to go home.2 The interview was not objectionable 
to appellant who, at trial, offered a transcript of that interview, which was 
received in evidence.

[¶6.]     On October 26, 1981, at 
the request of Chief Coorough, appellant's daughter was examined by a physician 
to determine if there was evidence that would corroborate her allegations. The 
examination revealed, in the opinion of the physician, that appellant's thirteen 
year-old daughter had previously, and on more than one occasion, had sexual 
intercourse with an adult male. There was medical evidence that prior to 
returning to live with her father she had not yet engaged in sexual intercourse. 
Chief Coorough later testified that, in his mind, the physical examination 
further substantiated the allegations made by the little girl against 
appellant.

[¶7.]     Also on the 26th, Chief 
Coorough arranged for appellant's requested conversation with his daughter. 
Appellant was not allowed to speak with her in person but was allowed to talk to 
her by telephone. She spoke from a social services office in Powell. The 
conversation was tape recorded at the request of the police. There is nothing in 
the record to indicate that the police instructed appellant's daughter what to 
say to her father other than it was requested that she not let her father know 
that the conversation was being taped. She was instructed to deny that the call 
was being taped if her father questioned that fact. During the conversation, in 
the face of denials by his daughter, appellant indicated his awareness that the 
conversation was being taped and indicated that he really did not care whether 
it was taped or not. The transcript reveals no instance where appellant ever 
admitted any criminal wrongdoing, although the State, in its zeal, apparently 
believed selected passages were incriminating.3

[¶8.]     After all of the 
foregoing took place, appellant was finally arrested during the evening of 
October 26th. He appeared initially before a justice of the peace October 27, 
1981. From that time on he has been represented by a public 
defender.

[¶9.]     A transcript of the 
recorded telephone conversation between appellant and his daughter was 
introduced by the State at trial as State's Exhibit 23, and was objected to on 
the grounds that it was unfair and obtained as the result of an illegal wiretap. 
The objection was ultimately overruled and the transcript of the telephone 
conversation was received into evidence. During the State's cross-examination of 
appellant, certain allegedly incriminating passages in portions of the 
transcript were alluded to.

[¶10.]  Appellant now on appeal raises a Sixth 
Amendment objection to the evidence in question when no objection on that ground 
was raised at trial. At trial, the transcript of the telephone conversation was 
objected to on the ground that it was the product of an illegal wiretap - a 
Fourth Amendment issue. That, of course, was not on valid ground and the 
objection was properly overruled. See, Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 408, 17 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1966), reh. denied 386 U.S. 951, 87 S. Ct. 971, 17 L. Ed. 2d 880 (1967).4 Rule 103, W.R.E.5 requires us, where new grounds for 
objecting to the admission of evidence are raised on appeal, to consider whether 
plain error nullified the conviction. 1 Louisell and Mueller, Federal Practice 
§§ 8 and 21 (1977). We, therefore, take up the Sixth Amendment issue to 
determine if plain error occurred.

[¶11.]  We have recently set out the three-part 
test to determine if plain error exists:

"* * * First, the record 
must be clear as to the incident which is alleged as error. Second, the party 
claiming that the error amounted to plain error must demonstrate that a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law was violated. Finally, that party must prove that a 
substantial right has been denied him and as a result he has been materially 
prejudiced. * * *" Bradley v. State, Wyo., 635 P.2d 1161, 1164 
(1981).

[¶12.]  In this case we turn our attention only 
to the second requirement and look to see if appellant's right to counsel was 
violated since the record is clear as to the incident alleged as error. We do 
not dispute that the right involved is substantial. If a violation of 
appellant's right to counsel is found, we have indicated that it is such a basic 
right that its violation can never be treated as harmless error. Chavez v. State, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1341, cert. denied 446 U.S. 984, 100 S. Ct. 2967, 64 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1979) (following Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S. Ct. 1173, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1978)). We note, however, the following language from 
Holloway:

"Moreover, this Court has 
concluded that the assistance of counsel is among those `constitutional rights 
so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless 
error.' Chapman v. California, supra 
[386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967)], at 23. Accordingly, when a 
defendant is deprived of the presence and assistance of his attorney, either 
throughout the prosecution or during a critical stage in, at least, the 
prosecution of a capital offense, reversal is automatic. Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S. Ct. 157, 7 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1961); 
White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S. Ct. 1050, 10 L. Ed. 2d 193 (1963)." 435 U.S.  at 489, 98 S. Ct.  at 
1181.

In the instant 
case we are not confronted with the prosecution of a capital offense nor does 
the claimed deprivation of the right to counsel here arise out of any conflict 
of interest among several defendants who have been required to be jointly 
represented by one attorney. We turn our attention then to determine if the 
trial court violated appellant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by its ruling 
to receive the transcript of the telephone conversation into 
evidence.

[¶13.]  The Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution guarantees that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right * * * to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."6 Appellant argues here that this 
right to counsel accrued after an arrest warrant issued but before his arrest 
occurred. We disagree.

[¶14.]  Rule 6, W.R.Cr.P. sets out when an 
indigent's right to assignment of counsel accrues under our 
rules:

"Every defendant who is 
unable to obtain counsel shall be entitled to have counsel assigned to represent 
him at every stage of the proceedings from his initial appearance before the 
commissioner or the court through appeal, unless he waives such 
appointment."

That rule, as we 
shall show, though relating only to assignments of counsel, states the general 
view as regards the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of all criminal defendants. 
In Chavez v. State, supra, this court 
summarized the then-existing state of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Little has 
changed to expand that right since then. 

[¶15.]  The Sixth Amendment has been made 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 93 A.L.R.2d 733 (1963). The basic contours of the right are identical in 
both state and federal contexts. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424, reh. denied 431 U.S. 925, 97 S. Ct. 2200, 53 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1977), and Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S. Ct. 2056, 23 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1969). It is without question that a criminal defendant is entitled to be 
represented at all stages of the proceeding against him. Chavez v. State, supra, 
and Hoskins v. State, Wyo., 552 P.2d 342, cert. denied 430 U.S. 956, 
97 S. Ct. 1602, 51 L. Ed. 2d 806 (1976). In a long line of constitutional cases 
reaching back to Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158, 
84 A.L.R. 527 (1932), the United States Supreme Court has firmly established 
that an individual's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel only 
accrued at or after the time adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated 
against him. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1972). In Powell v. Alabama the Court spoke in terms of critical 
periods or critical stages in the proceeding, other than trial itself, when the 
right to counsel attaches. A critical stage of the proceedings has been held to 
include:

"* * * arraignment, Powell v. State of Alabama, supra; 
preliminary hearing, Coleman v. 
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S. Ct. 1999, 26 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1970); after the 
initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings, Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1972); at custodial interrogation, Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966); and Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964); at post-indictment lineup, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967); at corporeal identification after initiation 
of adversary judicial criminal proceedings, Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 98 S. Ct. 458, 54 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1977)." Chavez 
v. State, 604 P.2d  at 1347.

[¶16.]  We note here, before proceeding further, 
that appellant's Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination 
is not involved. Although the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966), required an accused's right 
to counsel be included in its now classical warning, that case dealt with the 
Fifth Amendment and custodial interrogations.7 To come within the requirements of 
Miranda, custodial interrogation must 
still be present. Edwards v. Arizona, 
451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, reh. denied 452 U.S. 973, 101 S. Ct. 3128, 69 L. Ed. 2d 984 (1981). We are not 
confronted with a custodial interrogation here under any construction of that 
term. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980) (discussing meaning of "custodial 
interrogation").

[¶17.]  With the foregoing in mind, we turn to 
appellant's specific argument here. He urges us to adopt the position that the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the time an arrest warrant issues, 
regardless of whether an individual has been arrested or placed in custody. If 
we were to adopt such a position, he then argues that under Massiah v. United 
States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S. Ct. 1199, 12 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1964), the contents of his 
October 26th conversation with his daughter were inadmissible at trial as being 
obtained without a waiver of his right to counsel. Of course, ultimately 
appellant would then have us say that by allowing the contents of his telephone 
conversation to be admitted at trial, the trial court committed plain error for 
which he contends we must reverse. In that we will hold there was no error in 
admitting the transcript, we need not reach plain error as a ground to 
reverse.

[¶18.]  In Massiah v. United States, supra, and for 
that matter in the more recent and factually similar cases of Brewer v. Williams, supra, and United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 
100 S. Ct. 2183, 65 L. Ed. 2d 115 (1980), the Supreme Court held that 
post-indictment or post-arraignment statements from defendants surreptitiously 
obtained without waiver of their right to counsel were inadmissible at trial in 
violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Those cases dealt 
particularly with post-indictment or post-arraignment statements and not with 
pre-arrest statements.

[¶19.]  In the case before us the statements 
complained of were made not only before a district court information was filed 
or an arraignment proceeding held, but also before appellant was arrested. After 
a careful review of the United States Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment decisions, 
we have yet to find a case in which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was 
held to accrue prior to arrest, whether a warrant was outstanding or otherwise. 
The Court, in Kirby v. Illinois, 
supra, discussing when the right to counsel attaches, 
said:

* * * [T]he point is 
that, while members of the Court have differed as to existence of the right to 
counsel in the contexts of some of the above cases, all of those cases have involved points 
of time at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings - 
whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, 
or arraignment." (Emphasis in original.) 406 U.S.  at 689, 92 S. Ct.  at 1882.

That statement 
does not declare at which elaborated event adversary judicial proceedings begin, 
it states that the right attaches at whichever of those events adversary 
judicial proceedings have begun. Of particular note is the Court's language, 
"adversary judicial criminal proceedings," to set the point at which the right 
attaches rather than simply setting it when judicial proceedings have begun. In 
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 
93 S. Ct. 2568, 37 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1973), after setting out the historical 
development and expansion of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel, the Court 
said that it looks, when setting the point at which the right attaches, to 
determine whether the accused required legal aid in coping with legal problems 
or meeting his adversary.

[¶20.]  The Court, in holding that an 
identification of an accused at a post-arrest preliminary hearing without the 
assistance of counsel was a violation of the accused's right to counsel said: at 
that point the accused found himself confronted with the prosecutorial forces of 
organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural 
criminal law. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 98 S. Ct. 458, 54 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1977) (quoting from Kirby v. 
Illinois, supra). In all of the Supreme Court's decisions on this point, the 
need for an adversarial setting for the right to accrue stands out, as well it 
should when dealing with the right to counsel.

[¶21.]  In the case before us, judicial 
proceedings began with the issuance of an arrest warrant but adversary judicial proceedings did not 
begin until after appellant was arrested and made a party to the proceedings. 
Prior to his arrest appellant was protected by, at the very least, the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments but not the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, except, of 
course, in the custodial interrogation setting dealt with in Miranda. As noted earlier, there were no 
violations of appellant's Fourth and Fifth Amendment guarantees. To hold that 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as contemplated by appellant attached 
before he was made aware by arrest that the State intended to prosecute him 
would be to extend the Sixth Amendment right to counsel further than has any 
decision of the United States Supreme Court to date. The presence of such 
proceedings in the files of a court and the presence of a warrant in a law 
enforcement officer's desk or pocket is inert until triggered by placing the 
accused in custody. We refuse to adopt appellant's position and extend the Sixth 
Amendment application as he suggests.

[¶22.]  Appellant complains that since an arrest 
warrant had issued, the police could do nothing further but arrest him. Delay in 
the use or execution of an arrest warrant does not make it invalid. 1 Wright, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 55 (1982). There are no 
constitutional requirements dictating that an arrest warrant be executed at the 
earliest opportunity. People v. 
Nisser, 189 Colo. 471, 542 P.2d 84 (1975). Rule 4, 
W.R.Cr.P., dictates no time limit on the execution of an arrest warrant. We note 
that in Hoffa v. United States, 
supra, a Sixth Amendment argument similar to appellant's was raised. There it 
was argued that appellant Hoffa could have been arrested before a damaging, 
incriminating conversation was held with a government agent. Therefore, the 
incriminating evidence was acquired only by flouting Hoffa's Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel. The Supreme Court rejected the argument when it 
said:

"Nothing in Massiah, in Escobedo [v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964)], or in any other case that has come to our attention, even remotely 
suggests this novel and paradoxical constitutional doctrine, and we decline to 
adopt it now. There is no constitutional right to be arrested. The police are 
not required to guess at their peril the precise moment at which they have 
probable cause to arrest a suspect, risking a violation of the Fourth Amendment 
if they act too soon, and a violation of the Sixth Amendment if they wait too 
long. Law enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty to call a halt 
to a criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum evidence to 
establish probable cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall far short of the 
amount necessary to support a criminal conviction." (Footnote omitted.) 385 U.S.  at 310, 87 S. Ct. 417.

In view of the 
seriousness of the allegation of incest, we cannot condemn the police for 
waiting until a physician's exam of appellant's daughter was completed or that 
their evidence was otherwise firmed up before proceeding on the warrant. 
Appellant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was 
unaffected.

[¶23.]  Appellant calls our attention to several 
state court decisions8 in which he argues the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel has been extended to the point he requests us to 
extend it now. Reviewing those cases we note that in all but the New York case, the courts 
were faced with and addressed post-arrest and, in most cases, post-arraignment 
events. The criminal defendants were in those cases in custody, under arrest and 
well aware that the State was proceeding against them; therefore, they had the 
right to counsel at the critical stages set out in the various decisions. Of 
course the situation we are faced with is distinguishable in that here appellant 
had not yet been arrested when the alleged Sixth Amendment violations 
occurred.

[¶24.]  As noted above, appellant also cited 
New York 
authority in support of his position. In People v. Samuels, fn. 8 supra, the 
court makes it clear that the right to counsel attaches at the time a warrant 
issues because, in its view, a recent addition to their rules of criminal 
procedure requires as much. Prior to the adoption of that rule of procedure, 
New York 
followed the traditional view that held the right to counsel attached at 
arraignment on a warrant. People v. 
Samuels, fn. 8 supra. Because particular procedural rules in New York differ from 
ours, we find the line of cases following their rule changes to be less than 
persuasive here.

[¶25.]  Our research of decisions from other 
jurisdictions leads us to the conclusion that adversary judicial proceedings at 
which the right to counsel attaches can only occur at some point after an 
individual has been arrested.9 A criminal defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attaches only when confronted by the prosecutorial 
forces of the State, when faced with the intricacies of substantive and 
procedural criminal law. We hold that the admission and use of the transcript of 
the telephone conversation was not a violation of appellant's Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel; therefore no plain error was committed.

[¶26.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Appellant was convicted 
and sentenced to: six to eight years in the penitentiary for taking indecent 
liberties with a child in violation of § 14-3-105, W.S. 1977; four to five years 
in the penitentiary for committing incest in violation of § 6-5-102, W.S. 1977; 
and four to five years in the penitentiary for engaging in illicit sexual 
relations with a child in violation of § 14-3-104, W.S. 1977; all sentences to 
be served concurrently.

2 Chief Coorough explained 
that he wanted to wait until the little girl was examined by a physician and her 
story could be somewhat substantiated before acting on the arrest 
warrant.

3 Appellant complains of 
the State's use of the following exchange:

"[Appellant] There's only 
one way out of this and that's for you to just get up and tell them you're 
lying.

"[Daughter] That'd be 
lying though.

"[Appellant] But it's the 
only way out of this.

"[Daughter] That'd be 
lying."

4 In Hoffa the Court 
said:

"Neither this Court nor 
any member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects 
a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his 
wrongdoing will not reveal it. Indeed, the Court unanimously rejected that very 
contention less than four years ago in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 83 S. Ct. 1381, 10 L. Ed. 2d 462. In that case the petitioner had been convicted of attempted bribery of an 
internal revenue agent named Davis. The Court was divided with regard to the 
admissibility in evidence of a surreptitious electronic recording of an 
incriminating conversation Lopez had had in his private office with Davis. But there was no 
dissent from the view that testimony about the conversation by Davis himself was 
clearly admissible." 385 U.S.  at 302-303, 87 S. Ct.  at 
413-414.

See also, United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 91 S. Ct. 1122, 28 L. Ed. 2d 453, reh. denied 402 U.S. 990, 91 S. Ct. 1643, 29 L. Ed. 2d 156 
(1971).

5 Rule 103, W.R.E., 
provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. - Error may 
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected, and

"(1) Objection. - In case 
the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike 
appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific 
ground was not apparent from the context; * * *

* * * * * 
*

"(d) Plain error. - Nothing in this rule 
precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although 
they were not brought to the attention of the court."

6 Section 10, Art. 1 of 
the Wyoming Constitution likewise provides for the right to counsel in criminal 
prosecutions and tracks the federal provision.

7 We note that although 
Miranda was briefed and argued as a Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel case, to 
the surprise of Miranda's ACLU attorneys it was decided as a landmark Fifth 
Amendment case in which the right to counsel was addressed only in the context 
of custodial interrogations and then only to secure the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. 61 F.R.D. 259, 278 (1972) (remarks of John 
J. Flynn); Miranda v. Arizona, 
supra.

8 Arnold v. State, Mo., 484 S.W.2d 248 
(1972); People v. McGowan, 105 Cal. App. 3d 997, 166 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1980); People v. Faulkner, 86 Ill. App.3d 136, 40 
Ill.Dec. 895, 407 N.E.2d 126 (1980); State v. Mitchell, Tenn., 
593 S.W.2d 280, cert. denied 449 U.S. 845, 101 S. Ct. 128, 66 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1980); 
People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218, 424 N.Y.S.2d 892, 400 N.E.2d 1344 
(1980).

9 State v. Irving, 231 Kan. 258, 644 P.2d 389 (1982) (taped conversation prior to 
adversary judicial proceedings not a Sixth Amendment violation); State v. Ruth, 102 Idaho 638, 637 P.2d 415 
(1981) (accused entitled to counsel from initial appearance on); State v. Masaniai, 63 Haw. 354, 628 P.2d 1018 (1981) (issuance and execution of an arrest warrant does not constitute the 
initiation of adversary judicial proceedings); State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wn.2d 436, 610 P.2d 893 (1980), on remand from United States Supreme Court, 94 Wn.2d 858, 620 P.2d 999 (1980) (a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
attaches when a critical stage in a criminal prosecution resulting in a loss of 
liberty is reached).

THOMAS, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶27.]  I agree with the result in this case, and 
I do not necessarily disagree with any of the substantive law encompassed in the 
majority opinion. In my special concurring opinion in Barnes v. State, Wyo., 642 P.2d 1263 
(1982), I did articulate my position with respect to disposition when a claim of 
error is urged upon this court under the guise of plain 
error.

[¶28.]  I still am satisfied that as a matter of 
judicial restraint we should examine the substantive law only to the point of 
reaching a conclusion that plain error is not present. When, as in this 
instance, the absence of plain error hinges upon a conclusion that there exists 
no clear and unequivocal rule of law which was violated, we should not make any 
holding with respect to the merits of the appellant's claim of error. As I view 
the majority opinion, it does resolve a claim of error which is asserted to be 
reviewable under the plain-error doctrine even though review of the error 
claimed is foreclosed by the plain-error doctrine. For that reason I cannot join 
in the ground for disposition set forth in the majority 
opinion.