Case Title: R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97-225

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc.1999 WY 42978 P.2d 581Case Number: 97-225, 97-226Decided: 04/27/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
R. C. 
R., INC., a Wyoming corporation, (Appellant) (Defendant and Counterclaim 
Plaintiff),

v.

RAINBOW CANYON, INC., a 
Wyoming corporation; MC OPERATING COMPANY, a Texas partnership; ROBERT E. DELINE 
and ANNABELLE M. DELINE, husband and wife; KIRK COMPANY, a Texas partnership; 
GARY L. PALMER and NANCY J. PALMER, husband and wife; and JAMES C. HILL and 
SANDRA L. HILL, husband and wife, (Appellees) (Plaintiffs and Counterclaim 
Defendants),

R. C. R., INC., a Wyoming 
corporation, (Appellant) (Defendant and Counterclaim 
Plaintiff),

v.

JAMES C. HILL and SANDRA 
L. HILL, husband and wife, (Appellees) (Plaintiffs and Counterclaim 
Defendants).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Carbon County, The Honorable Kenneth Stebner, 
Judge.

Kermit C. Brown 
of Brown, Nagel & Waters, LLC, Laramie, WY. Representing 
Appellant.

John R. Vincent, 
Riverton, WY., Representing Appellees Hills and MC Operating 
Company.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
expedited case conference; retired November 2, 1998.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      This appeal 
centers around the enforceability and location of an express easement granted by 
the predecessors in interest of R. C. R., Inc. to James C. and Sandra L. Hill 
(Hills) to access their property. The trial court granted a partial summary 
judgment in favor of the Hills, concluding the easement was valid and 
enforceable. After a bench trial, the court determined the location of the 
easement had been fixed by its historic use. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant, R. C. 
R., Inc., presents the following issues:

a. Is the 
easement granted by that certain document entitled "Easements," recorded in book 
694 at page 236 of the Carbon County records, an easement in 
gross?

b. Did the 
easement terminate upon a conveyance of their lands by the 
Grantees?

c. Is the 
easement a permanently floating servitude?

d. Did the Trial 
Court err when it located the easement relying on Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power 
& Light, 922 P.2d 850 (Wyo. 1996)?

e. In the event 
the easement at issue must be located, did the Trial Court err in not allowing 
the servient estate owner the right in the first instance to fix the permanent 
location of the easement?

f. Did the Trial 
Court lose jurisdiction of the matter at the time the full time for appeal 
commenced to run, such that the Amended Judgment entered by the Trial Court is 
null and void and of no legal force or effect on the parties or the subject 
matter of this action?

[¶3]      The Hills, as 
appellees, respond with these two issues:

A. Did the trial 
court properly grant partial summary judgment in favor of Appellees on the 
validity of an express easement?

B. Did the trial 
court properly locate the easement used by Appellees to gain access from the 
Baggott County Road to their home located in Section 9, T. 15 N., R. 83 W., 6th 
P. M., Carbon County, Wyoming?

FACTS

[¶4]      In 1959, Rainbow 
Canyon, Inc. (Rainbow Canyon) purchased land adjacent to the Encampment River in 
Carbon County, Wyoming. Rainbow Canyon was incorporated by George B. Kelley, 
Stephen G. Burg, Edwin F. Deline, and Walter W. Deline as a fishing club, and 
each held one share in the corporation. Each shareholder also received a 
one-half acre lot on the Rainbow Canyon property. The individual plaintiffs in 
this case are the successors in interest to the original Rainbow Canyon 
shareholders.1

[¶5]      The property was 
originally accessed by a Bureau of Land Management (BLM) road, which required 
fording the Encampment River from the west to the east side of the river. In 
1960, Walter Deline asked Kermit Platt, who owned land adjoining the Rainbow 
Canyon property to the south, about purchasing a parcel of his land on the east 
side of the river so the property could be accessed from the county road. Mr. 
Platt did not wish to sell; however, he agreed to an access road across his land 
and suggested a contractor to blade a road through the sagebrush. No other 
individual directly sought permission to cross Mr. Platt's property at that 
time, but each of the original owners, and their successors in interest, used 
the road.

[¶6]      In 1969, the 
Hills purchased an interest in Rainbow Canyon. Around 1976, they decided to 
build a home. The bank, which financed a portion of the Hills' construction 
costs, required a valid, recorded access easement to the Hills' property. On 
February 20, 1979, in a document entitled "Easements," Mr. and Mrs. Platt 
granted the Hills an easement for ingress and egress from the county road to the 
Hills' property across the Platts' property.2 The document was properly executed 
and recorded.

The document 
provides, in pertinent part:

[¶7]      FOR AND IN 
CONSIDERATION OF THE SUM OF Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other good and valuable 
consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, Kermit C. Platt and 
Barbara P. Platt, husband and wife, hereinafter called the Grantor (whether one 
or more), hereby grants unto James C. Hill and Sandra L. Hill, husband and wife, 
P. O. Box 6, Encampment, Wyoming, their heirs and assigns, hereinafter called 
Grantee (whether one or more), * * *

* * * a 
perpetual right of way and easement to maintain, inspect, operate and travel 
upon an access road from the existing county road to the Grantees' tract of land 
situate in the SE3SE3 of Section 9, Township 15 North, Range 83 West of the 6th 
P. M., over, across and upon the lands owned by the Grantor in the E2 of Section 
16, Township 15 North, Range 83 West of the 6th P. M., together with the right 
of ingress and egress to and from said land for any and all purposes necessary 
and incident to the exercise by the Grantee of the rights granted by this 
easement and right of way.

[¶8]      Grantor shall 
have the right to use and enjoy the above described premises and the Grantee 
shall not interfere with the Grantors' use and occupancy of said land and shall 
not build, create or permit any obstructions or excavations or ditches which 
would interfere with the safety or grazing of livestock; provided, however, 
Grantor shall not exercise such use and enjoyment in a manner that will impair 
or interfere with the exercise by Grantee of any of the rights herein 
granted.

[¶9]      The terms, 
conditions and provisions of this agreement shall be binding upon and inure to 
the benefit of the parties hereto, their heirs, executors, administrators, 
successors, assigns and legal representatives. All rights herein granted may be 
released or assigned in whole or in part.

[¶10]   In 1990, Jon R. and Martha K. Gray 
purchased the northern 90 acres of the Platt's property, and, in 1992, they 
acquired the remaining 230 acres of the parcel. The warranty deeds included 
language indicating that the deeds were subject to all easements, reservations, 
restrictions, and rights-of-way of record or apparent on the grounds. The 
recorded Hill easement was thus excepted from the deeds, and the title insurance 
policy also excepted the Hill easement. Title to the entire parcel was 
eventually transferred to R. C. R., Inc., a corporation owned by the Grays. R. 
C. R., Inc. subsequently sold the southern 230 acres to Alex J. 
Horst.

[¶11]   In 1993, Mr. Gray wrote the Rainbow 
Canyon shareholders a letter, proposing to give them a written easement for 
either: 1) a conveyance of some Rainbow Canyon land to him and cross-fishing 
rights, or 2) an equal share of ownership in Rainbow Canyon, Inc. and certain 
amendments to its bylaws. On June 11, 1994, R. C. R., Inc. and Mr. Horst granted 
Rainbow Canyon an easement across a portion of the Gray and Horst lands. That 
easement did not follow the route of the existing access road and, by its own 
terms, has now expired. In the fall of 1994, Mr. Gray sent the shareholders an 
invoice for trespassing fees in the amount of $4,800 for six 
months.

[¶12]   Rainbow Canyon, Inc. and its 
shareholders brought a quiet title action, alleging, under various theories, 
their rights to access across the property owned by the defendants, R. C. R., 
Inc. and Mr. Horst. The defendants counterclaimed, also seeking to have their 
title quieted. The trial court granted a partial summary judgment, concluding 
that the Hills have a valid, appurtenant easement across the defendants' 
property, but leaving for trial the issue of the precise location of the 
easement. A two and one-half day bench trial was held June 5 through June 7, 
1996. On January 17, 1997, the trial court entered its Judgment, quieting title 
in R. C. R., Inc. and Mr. Horst, subject to the Hill easement. The court 
reiterated its previous ruling that the Hill easement is valid, and set the 
exact location of the easement. The court determined that the other plaintiffs 
took nothing in the action; they have not appealed.

[¶13]   On January 31, 1997, R. C. R., Inc. 
and Mr. Horst filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
59(e). They noted that the trial exhibit attached to the court's judgment and 
delineating the fixed location of the Hill easement as Athe purple road" 
(Exhibit 33) was unclear in that it appeared to include splinter routes 
accessing the Palmer and Deline lots on the Rainbow Canyon property. In 
addition, it was not possible to ascertain the location of the easement on the 
black and white copy provided to counsel. The defendants also argued that the 
easement was intentionally drafted as a permanently floating servitude, and the 
court should not have fixed the location.

[¶14]   On February 26, 1997, the Hills 
filed their Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment based on a clerical mistake in the 
judgment, pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(a). The Hills pointed out that Exhibit 33 did 
not depict the southern part of Mr. Horst's property or the county road, and 
thus the Judgment did not locate the entire Hill easement which, by its terms, 
provides access from the county road to the Hill property. The Hills offered a 
substitute map, Exhibit A, which included the county road and all of Mr. Horst's 
property.

[¶15]   The court held a hearing on the 
parties' motions to alter or amend. As of May 30, 1997, no decision had been 
rendered on the outstanding motions, and R. C. R., Inc. and Mr. Horst filed a 
Notice of Appeal from the Judgment, which was docketed in this court as No. 
97-225.

[¶16]   On June 4, 1997, the trial court 
entered its Amended Judgment, granting the Hills' motion, and granting the R. C. 
R., Inc./Horst motion in part. Specifically, the judgment was altered to 
substitute Exhibit A as the attachment which shows the location of the Hill 
easement. The court delineated the easement with Xs, and clarified that the 
easement accessed only the Hills' lot. Finally, the court ordered the parties to 
share the cost of a metes and bounds survey of the fixed location of the Hill 
easement. On June 30, 1997, R. C. R., Inc. and Mr. Horst filed a Notice of 
Appeal from the Amended Judgment, which was docketed in this court as No. 
97-226.

[¶17]   Docket Nos. 97-225 and 97-226 were 
consolidated on appeal. We subsequently granted Mr. Horst's motion to dismiss 
him as an appellant.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶18]   The factual findings of a judge are 
subject to a broader scope of review than a jury verdict, and the appellate 
court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record. Hopper 
v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538 (Wyo. 1993). However, the 
court's findings are presumptively correct and will not be set aside unless they 
are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there 
is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left 
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. The 
court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Hopper, 861 P.2d  at 
538.

[¶19]   The court derives the meaning of an 
easement from its language, much as we would in the case of a deed or other 
written agreement. Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power and Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850, 
854 (Wyo. 1996). If the language of the easement is not ambiguous and if the 
intent of the parties can be gathered from its language, that should be done as 
a matter of law. Id. If the terms of description are inadequate or nonexistent, 
then extrinsic evidence may be considered to ascertain the intent of the parties 
as to the location and dimensions of the easement. Id. at 855 (quoting Jon W. 
Bruce & James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land & 
7.02 (rev. ed. 1995) [hereinafter Bruce & Ely]); see also Salt River 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Heiner, 663 P.2d 518, 521 (Wyo. 
1983).

DISCUSSION

Nature of Hill 
Easement

[¶20]   The first question presented by 
this appeal is whether the Hills' easement is appurtenant or in gross, which 
bears on the issue of transferability. R. C. R., Inc. argues that the Hill 
easement was an easement in gross, which terminated upon the Hills' conveyance 
to MC Operating Company3 in 1988.

[¶21]   "`An easement is appurtenant to 
land when the easement is created to benefit and does benefit the possessor of 
the land in his use of the land.'" Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., 519 P.2d 972, 975 (Wyo. 1974) (quoting Restatement of Property § 453, at 2914 (1944)). In 
contrast, "`[a] n easement is in gross when it is not created to benefit or when 
it does not benefit the possessor of any tract of land in his use of it as such 
possessor.'" Id. (quoting Restatement of Property, supra, § 454, at 2917). An 
easement will not be presumed to be in gross when it can fairly be construed to 
be appurtenant. Id.

[¶22]   The Hill easement, the pertinent 
portions of which are set out in the facts, includes terms which we have 
described as badges of an appurtenant easement. The language of the easement 
indicates that it was created to benefit a specific tract of land. Weber, 519 P.2d  at 975. The conveyance contains a perpetual right-of-way grant for ingress 
and egress to the Hills' property, including the right to inspect and maintain 
the road. Id. The easement benefits the Hills in their use of their property and 
is not limited to the Hills personally. Rather, the Platts granted the access 
rights to the Grantee, Atheir heirs and assigns," and the instrument expressly 
states that its provisions shall inure to the benefit of the parties, "their 
heirs," executors, administrators, successors, assigns and legal 
representatives." Id. The easement can, therefore, fairly be construed as 
appurtenant.

[¶23]   An easement appurtenant is 
transferred with possession of the dominant property even if it is not mentioned 
in the document of transfer. Delgue v. Curutchet, 677 P.2d 208, 212 (Wyo. 1984). 
The "Easements" document contains no limitations on the transferability of the 
easement and, in fact, contemplates future transfers of both the dominant and 
servient estates. The district court correctly concluded that the Hill easement 
is an easement appurtenant which is transferable and which survived the 
conveyance of the Hill tract."

Location of Hill 
Easement

[¶24]   Having determined that the Hill 
easement is a valid, appurtenant easement, we turn to the matter of its 
location. The trial court, applying the principles set out in Edgcomb v. Lower 
Valley Power and Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850 (Wyo. 1996), determined that the 
easement was a floating easement which had been located by historic use. R. C. 
R., Inc. contends the Hills' easement is a permanently floating servitude and, 
therefore, the court erred when it fixed the location of the easement. Their 
position is that Edgcomb is factually different from, and should not control the 
outcome of, the case at bar. In the alternative, R. C. R., Inc. argues that the 
servient estate should be allowed to fix the permanent location in the first 
instance.

[¶25]   The "Easements" document does not 
specify the location of the easement. An express easement which does not state 
the location of the easement is called a floating easement. Edgcomb, 922 P.2d  at 
855; Bruce & Ely, supra, ¶ 7.02[2]. Floating easements, because they are not 
limited to any specific area on the servient tenement, burden the entire 
servient estate. Bruce & Ely, supra, ¶ 7.02[3]. Although R. C. R., Inc. uses 
the term "permanently floating servitude," they do not argue that the Hill 
easement should remain indefinite and unfixed in its location. Their argument is 
that the "Easements" document reserves a right in the servient estate to locate 
and relocate the easement periodically.

[¶26]   In support of its position, R. C. 
R., Inc. directs our attention to the following language in the granting 
instrument:

Grantor shall 
have the right to use and enjoy the above described premises and the Grantee 
shall not interfere with the Grantors' use and occupancy of said land and shall 
not build, create or permit any obstructions or excavations or ditches which 
would interfere with the safety or grazing of livestock[.]

They believe 
that the above language, along with the use of the term "an" access road as 
opposed to "the" access road, demonstrates the parties' intent that the easement 
not be permanently located but, instead, subject to periodic relocation by the 
servient estate. While the above language limits the Hills' use of the easement 
so as not to interfere with the Grantors' use and occupancy, we do not find that 
language susceptible to the broad interpretation assigned by R. C. R., Inc. The 
instrument does not reserve to the servient estate either the right to locate 
the easement in the first instance, or the right to unilaterally relocate the 
easement.

[¶27]   Once a court concludes that the 
location or the dimensions of an easement are not adequately described in the 
instrument, it generally examines the surrounding circumstances to determine the 
intent of the parties. Edgcomb, 922 P.2d  at 855 (quoting Bruce & Ely, supra, 
¶ 7.02[2][b]). The parties are presumed to have intended an easement that is 
reasonably convenient or necessary under the circumstances. Id. Courts look to 
various factors to establish a reasonable description of the easement, including 
the purpose of the easement, the geographic relationship between the dominant 
and servient estates, and the benefit to the easement holder compared to the 
burden on the servient estate holder. Id. "Use existing at the time the easement 
was created is considered strong evidence of the intended location and 
dimensions of the easement. * * * Use commenced after the execution of the 
easement to which the servient estate owner acquiesces is also persuasive." 
Bruce & Ely, supra, ¶ 7.02[2][b]. The court must be careful to determine the 
location of the easement on the basis of circumstances at the time the easement 
was created. Id.

[¶28]   The trial court, relying on this 
court's decision in Edgcomb, determined that the location of the Hill easement 
was fixed by historic use. Edgcomb involved a floating easement for a power 
transmission line. Applying the principles set out in the preceding paragraph, 
this court held that the parties' intent, evidenced by the granting instrument, 
was that the easement would become definitely located once the line was 
constructed. 922 P.2d  at 855-56. The court determined the easement was defined 
by the current location of the transmission line. Id. at 
855.

[¶29]   R. C. R., Inc. believes the case at 
bar is distinguishable from Edgcomb because multiple routes have been used over 
the years to access the Rainbow Canyon property. However, at the time the Hill 
easement was granted in 1979, only one road traversed the Platt property, the 
road that was constructed around 1960 to provide Mr. Deline access to his land 
in Rainbow Canyon. That road was referred to as the "orange road" throughout the 
proceedings.4 When Mr. Platt was asked, during 
his deposition, whether he gave Mr. Hill permission to use a particular road in 
the written easement, he responded, "There was no particular road, because there 
was only one road." Mr. Platt's testimony is strong evidence that the parties 
intended the easement to be located on the one and only access road in existence 
at the time the easement was granted - the orange road.

[¶30]   R. C. R., Inc. argues that the 
servient estate should designate the location of the easement in the first 
instance. A number of courts hold, where the location of an easement has not 
been defined, that the servient estate should designate the location of the 
easement in the first instance. 4 Richard R. Powell & Patrick J. Rohan, 
Powell On Real Property § 34.12[2] n. 19 and cases cited therein; Bruce & 
Ely, supra, & 7.02[2][a]. However, as discussed above, the intent of the 
parties in this case is that the easement was defined by the access road in 
existence at the time the easement was created. In any event, Mr. Platt, the 
Grantor and original servient estate holder, was involved in the construction of 
the original access road.

[¶31]   Sometime in the early to mid-1980s, 
Mr. Platt relocated a portion of the road, which had often drifted shut in the 
winter, to the top of a hill where the wind could sweep it bare. The new route, 
referred to as the "purple road," overlapped the orange road to a significant 
degree, retained the original termini, and was agreeable to the Hills. The Hills 
accessed their property via the purple road from the time it was built until 
1995, when Mr. Gray unilaterally relocated a portion of the road. The relocated 
segment, designated as the "pink road," entered the Rainbow Canyon property at a 
different location than the purple road, and required the Hills to enter their 
property from their back yard. The trial court, in its original Judgment, 
disregarded the pink road and fixed the purple road as the permanent location of 
the easement.

[¶32]   The fact that the permanent 
location designated by the court, the purple road, deviated slightly from the 
original route, is inconsequential considering that both parties were in 
agreement with the move. "An easement holder and the servient estate owner may 
relocate the easement by mutual consent." Ericsson v. Braukman, 824 P.2d 1174, 
1177 (Or. App. 1992) (quoting Bruce & Ely, supra, & 7.03[1][c]). In 
addition, the court properly disregarded Mr. Gray's unilateral relocation of the 
road. The general rule, which we adopt here, is that unilateral relocation of an 
easement is not permitted, absent an express provision in the granting 
instrument. Bruce & Ely, supra, & 7.05[1]. A unilateral relocation rule 
would introduce considerable uncertainty into land ownership and incite 
litigation. Stamatis v. Johnson, 224 P.2d 201, 203 (Ariz. 1950); see also Davis 
v. Bruk, 411 A.2d 660, 665 (Me. 1980). In addition, the easement holder could be 
subject to harassment by the servient owner's attempts to relocate to serve his 
own conveniences. Davis, 411 A.2d  at 665. A handful of courts permit the 
servient estate owner to unilaterally relocate the easement if the original 
termini are retained and the easement holder is not materially inconvenienced. 
Bruce & Ely, supra, & 7.05[4]. However, even if we were to apply this 
exception, the record fully supports the court's decision. Mr. Hill testified 
that he was not notified about the relocation beforehand, and the new road 
required him to enter the Rainbow Canyon property through his back yard instead 
of through his front entrance, which had been specially designed and 
landscaped.

[¶33]   We hold that the trial court 
properly applied the law to the facts of this case to determine the location of 
the Hill easement. The Judgment entered by the trial court is affirmed except to 
the extent it was amended as described in the following 
section.

Amended 
Judgment

[¶34]   Finally, R. C. R., Inc. raises a 
procedural argument, averring that the court acted outside its authority when it 
amended the original judgment after the end of a court term.5 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-401(a) 
(Michie 1997) sets out the circumstances under which a judgment can be modified 
after the end of a term, and we agree that none of those circumstances fit the 
facts of this case. However, in Spomer v. Spomer, 580 P.2d 1146, 1148 (Wyo. 
1978), this court held that W.R.C.P. 60(a) eliminates the requirement that 
motions to correct clerical errors be made within the court term. Therefore, the 
key question is whether the error for which the Hills sought relief in their 
motion to alter or amend was properly classified as a clerical error which was 
subject to correction after the end of the term in which the judgment was 
entered.

[¶35]   Rule 60(a) of the Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:

(a) Clerical 
mistakes. -Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record 
and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the 
court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after 
such notice, if any, as the court orders.

Rule 60(a) is 
intended to correct clerical, not judicial errors. Spomer, 580 P.2d  at 1148-49. 
A clerical error is a mistake or omission of a mechanical nature, apparent on 
the face of the record, that prevents the judgment as entered from accurately 
reflecting the judgment that was rendered. Id. at 1149; Matter of Kimball's 
Estate, 583 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Wyo. 1978). "[T]he central purpose of Rule 60(a) is 
to effectuate the contemporaneous intent of the court and to ensure that the 
judgment reflects that intent." Spomer, 580 P.2d  at 1149. Rule 60(a) is designed 
to clarify as well as to correct, and is properly invoked to dispel either 
patent or latent ambiguities in a judgment. Id.

[¶36]   In their Rule 60(a) motion, the 
Hills pointed out that the map attached to the original judgment, Exhibit 33, 
did not depict the southern part of Mr. Horst's property or the county road. 
Therefore, the judgment did not locate the entire Hill easement which, by its 
terms, provides access from the county road to the Hill property. The Hills 
offered a substitute map, Exhibit A, which included the county road and all of 
Mr. Horst's property.

[¶37]   Historically, the Hills and the 
other plaintiffs in this case did not enter the Platt property from the county 
road. Rather, they turned north from the county road onto property directly to 
the east of the Platt tract and traveled about a quarter mile before turning 
west, crossing a cattle guard and entering the Platt tract (now owned by Mr. 
Horst) on the purple road. Nevertheless, the new map, Exhibit A, depicted a road 
marked as "Gray's New Road," which turned north from the county road onto Mr. 
Horst's property and then tied into the purple road.6 Mr. Gray testified that when he 
first bought the north 90 acres from Mr. Platt, he obtained a written access 
easement from the county road to the existing access road used by the Hills and 
built Gray's New Road.

[¶38]   In its amended judgment, the court 
recognized that the Hill easement clearly and unambiguously provided for an 
access easement from the county road to the Hills' Rainbow Canyon property, and 
that to force the Hills to traverse the adjoining property would run counter to 
the clear language of the easement. The court noted the defendants did not 
allege that the southern portion of the easement had been abandoned or otherwise 
relinquished or waived by the Hills due to nonuse. The court additionally noted 
that testimony presented during the trial established the fact that Gray's New 
Road provided access from the county road to the purple road. The court 
accordingly altered the fixed location of the Hill access road to include Gray's 
New Road; so, instead of entering Mr. Horst's property from the east, it enters 
his property from the county road, travels north, and connects with the purple 
road.

[¶39]   After carefully reviewing the 
record, we believe the district court acted properly. The original judgment was 
patently ambiguous. It purported to validate the Hill easement, which on its 
face grants access from the county road to the Hill property, yet the map 
introduced at trial and attached to the judgment did not reflect the entire 
servient estate. We do not perceive the omission in the original judgment as 
reflecting a deliberate choice on the part of the court, which would 
appropriately be cured by an appeal. The court appropriately modified the 
earlier judgment so it would be in conformance with the intent expressed 
therein: to fix the location of the Hills' access easement from the county road 
to their property.

[¶40]   We hold the court did not act 
outside its authority when it amended the original judgment to clarify and 
correct a patent ambiguity. The amended judgment is, therefore, 
affirmed.

CONCLUSION

[¶41]   The district court correctly 
determined that the Hills' easement to access their property is valid and 
enforceable. The court's decision to fix the location of the easement is in 
accordance with law, and the chosen location reflects the parties' intent, as 
evidenced by the granting instrument and historic use. The Judgment and Amended 
Judgment are affirmed in accordance with this opinion.

Footnotes

1 The Kirk 
Company acquired Mr. Kelley's interest; the Palmers acquired Mr. Burg's 
interest; Robert and Annabelle Deline acquired Edwin Deline's interest; and the 
Hills acquired Walter Deline's interest.

2 In addition 
to the easement for ingress and egress, the document also grants an easement for 
a water line, which is not at issue in the case at 
bar.

3 On June 29, 
1988, the Hills transferred their property by warranty deed to named-plaintiff 
MC Operating Company. The Hills maintain that the transfer was for purposes of a 
loan, and that they retained equitable title to, and possession of, the 
property. According to the Hills' brief, title was transferred back to the Hills 
on February 26, 1996.

4 During Mr. 
Hill's deposition, he colored the various routes on a map, which was later 
entered as a trial exhibit. The witnesses referred to these colored roads during 
their testimony, as did the court in its Judgment.

5 The court 
entered its original judgment on January 17, 1997. The court's term ended on 
February 17, 1997, but the plaintiffs did not enter their motion to alter or 
amend the judgment until February 26, 1997. The court entered its amended 
judgment on June 4, 1997.

6 A similar 
map, which included Gray's New Road, was filed as an attachment to the original 
complaint.