Case Title: Gunn v . Select Portfolio Servicing Inc., et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 750, 2010

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LA MAR GUNN,  
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
SELECT PORTFOLIO 
SERVICING, INC. and U.S. BANK 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,  
 
          Defendants Below- 
Appellees. 
§ 
§  No. 750, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  C.A. No. 09C-04-102 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                         Submitted: April 25, 2011 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: June 13, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 13th day of June 2011, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The plaintiff-appellant, La Mar Gunn, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s November 12, 2010 bench ruling granting the motion to 
dismiss of the defendants-appellees, Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. and U.S. 
Bank National Association (the “appellees”).  The appellees have moved to 
affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the 
 
2
face of the opening brief that this appeal is without merit.1  We agree and 
affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that Gunn filed a complaint against the 
appellees in the Superior Court alleging breach of contract, fraud, bad faith 
banking practices, and violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act.  On October 21, 2010, the 
Superior Court held a hearing on the appellees’ motion to dismiss the 
complaint.  On November 12, 2010, the Superior Court issued its bench 
ruling on the motion to dismiss.  
 
(3) 
In its bench ruling, the Superior Court determined that a) Gunn 
was not the proper plaintiff to raise claims of bad faith banking or breach of 
contract or claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act or the Real 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act because he was not a party to the original 
real estate transaction; and b) there was no conversion or fraud by the 
appellees as a matter of law and fact.   
 
(4) 
In his appeal from the Superior Court’s November 12, 2010 
order, Gunn fails to address any of the legal or factual bases of the Superior 
Court’s November 12, 2010 bench ruling dismissing his complaint.  Instead, 
he asserts eighteen separate claims, all of which are, in essence, grounded in 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
 
3
his contention that the appellees did not have a legal interest in the mortgage 
securing the residential property located at 201 Cornwell Drive, Bear, 
Delaware, and, therefore, had no standing to file a foreclosure action when 
the mortgage went into default. 
 
(5) 
We have carefully reviewed the record in this case.  The same 
basic claim asserted in the instant appeal has been unsuccessfully asserted by 
Gunn in two prior appeals in this Court.2  Gunn’s instant claim is, therefore, 
barred in this proceeding as res judicata.3  Moreover, in the absence of any 
legal or factual basis for reversal of the Superior Court’s dismissal of Gunn’s 
complaint, we conclude that the Superior Court’s judgment must be 
affirmed.       
 
(6) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
                                                 
2 Gunn v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Assoc, Del. Supr., No. 102, 2009, Ridgely, J. (June 30, 2010); 
Gunn v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Assoc, Del. Supr., No. 742, 2010, Holland, J. (May 26, 2011). 
3 Dover Historical Society, Inc. v. City of Dover Planning Comm’n, 902 A.2d 1084, 1092 
(Del. 2006) (res judicata operates to bar a claim when a) the original court had 
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; b) the parties were the same as the 
case at bar; c) the issue decided was the same as the case at bar; d) the issue was decided 
adversely to the appellant; and e) the judgment in the prior action was final). 
 
4
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice