Case Title: Parkville Federal v. Maryland National

Citation: 343 Md. 412

Docket Number: 121/95

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1996-08-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Parkville Federal Savings Bank v. Maryland National Bank, No. 121,
1995 Term
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT is not effective to attach property of a
judgment debtor not named in the writ, but listed as a judgment
debtor in a pleading attached to the writ.
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 121
  September Term, 1995
___________________________________
PARKVILLE FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK
v.
MARYLAND NATIONAL BANK
___________________________________
Murphy, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Chasanow, J.
___________________________________
      Filed:  August 29, 1996      
          
We are called upon in this case to determine whether a writ of
garnishment issued pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-645 is effective to
attach the property of judgment debtors not named in the writ, but
listed on an attached pleading prepared by the judgment creditor.
We hold that the writ of garnishment issued in the instant case was
not sufficient to attach the property of debtors not identified on
the writ itself.
I.
In March of 1993, Parkville Federal Savings Bank (Parkville)
obtained 
judgments 
against 
four 
defendants: 
 
People's
Transportation, Inc., Quality Plus, Inc., Peter R. Schanck and
Charles G. Fagan.  Pursuant to Md. Rule 2-645, Parkville filed a
request for a writ of garnishment in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County.  The request was date stamped March 18, 1993 and
sought a writ of garnishment (writ) of any property held by
Maryland National Bank (Maryland National) that was owned by any of
the four judgment debtors.  The clerk issued a writ on March 23,
1993.   
The writ consisted of a form captioned "CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE COUNTY *** WRIT OF GARNISHMENT OF PROPERTY" with various
blank spaces where the clerk typed the required information.  In
the space provided for "Defendant/Judgment Debtor" the clerk
entered "People's Transportation, Inc., et al."  The only address
of the judgment debtor provided on the form was "16101 Chargin
-2-
Blvd., Shaker Heights, Ohio, 44120," the address for People's
Transportation.  The writ did not name any of the other three
debtors listed in the request, or provide any of their addresses.
The writ was served on Maryland National on March 26, 1993.
Stapled to the writ was a copy of the request, which listed the
names and addresses of the three other judgment debtors not
identified on the writ itself.  
After being served with the writ and attached request,
Maryland National filed a plea of nulla bona, asserting that it did
not have in its possession any assets owned by People's
Transportation.  Maryland National did not respond regarding any
assets owned by the other three debtors who were listed on the
attached request.  After the plea was filed, counsel for Parkville
contacted Maryland National's counsel and inquired as to why
Maryland National had not filed an answer with respect to any of
the judgment debtors that, although not identified on the writ,
were listed in the attached request.  Maryland National advised
Parkville that it was not required to respond regarding the assets
of debtors that were not named on the writ itself.  
Shortly thereafter, Parkville filed a motion for an order of
default, arguing that Maryland National was in default for failing
to file an answer concerning the assets of the other three debtors:
Quality Plus, Inc., Peter R. Schanck and Charles G. Fagan.  The
circuit court granted the motion on May 26, 1993 and entered an
order of default against Maryland National.  Maryland National
-3-
     The two remaining debtors, Peter R. Schanck and Charles G.
1
Fagan, filed for bankruptcy protection prior to the order vacating
default.  Hence, we will discuss only whether the writ applied to
Quality Plus, Inc.
     Maryland National's supplemental answer indicated that a
2
total of $63,517.52 had been in its possession, but during
discovery the parties agreed that the correct figure was
$61,902.47. 
subsequently filed a motion to vacate the order of default,
contending that it was only required to answer for People's
Transportation, not for the other debtors who were not listed on
the face of the writ.  The circuit court granted Maryland
National's motion on September 2, 1993, but also ordered Maryland
National to file an answer as to any assets owned by Quality Plus.,
Inc.   Maryland National complied, filing a supplemental answer,
1
which indicated that Quality Plus had an account at Maryland
National that contained $13,473.09 at the time of the service of
the writ.  Maryland National also acknowledged that an additional
$50,044.43 passed through the Quality Plus account after the
service of the writ.  The supplemental answer indicated that none
of the funds remained in the account. 
Parkville moved for summary judgment against Maryland National
in May of 1994, contending that Maryland National had improperly
released a total of $61,902.47  from the Quality Plus account in
2
violation of the writ, and hence was liable to Parkville for the
full amount released.  Maryland National filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment, arguing that it was not liable to Parkville
-4-
because the writ had not sufficiently identified Quality Plus as a
judgment debtor.  After a hearing, the circuit court granted
Parkville's motion and entered judgment against Maryland National
for $61,902.47 plus $4,543.36 in pre-judgment interest. 
Maryland National appealed to the Court of Special Appeals on
the sole question of whether the writ served on Maryland National
required the bank to garnish the funds in the Quality Plus account.
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court, holding
that the writ served on Maryland National did not adequately
identify Quality Plus as a judgment debtor, and hence Maryland
National was not required to hold the funds in the Quality Plus
account based on the writ.  Maryland National v. Parkville Federal,
105 Md. App. 611, 660 A.2d 1043 (1995).  We granted Parkville's
petition for certiorari.
II.
A.
A writ of garnishment is a means of enforcing a judgment.  It
allows a judgment creditor to recover property owned by the debtor
but held by a third party.  See PAUL V. NIEMEYER AND LINDA M. SCHUETT,
MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY at 518 (2nd ed. 1992).  As this Court
explained in Fico, Inc. v. Ghingher, 287 Md. 150, 411 A.2d 430
(1980): 
"A garnishment proceeding is, in essence,
an action by the judgment debtor for the
-5-
benefit of the judgment creditor which is
brought against a third party, the garnishee,
who holds the assets of the judgment debtor.
An attaching judgment creditor is subrogated
to the rights of the judgment debtor and can
recover only by the same right and to the same
extent that the judgment debtor might recover.
The judgment itself is conclusive proof of the
judgment debtor's obligation to the judgment
creditor.  The sole purpose of the garnishment
proceeding therefore is to determine whether
the garnishee had any funds, property or
credits which belong to the judgment debtor."
(Citations omitted).    
287 Md. at 159, 411 A.2d at 436. 
A judgment creditor may obtain a writ of garnishment by filing
a request for a writ with the clerk of the circuit court.  Md. Rule
2-645(b).  The request must include: (1) the caption of the action
in which the judgment was obtained; (2) the amount owed under the
judgment; (3) the name and last known address of the judgment
debtor; and (4) the name and address of the party holding the
property (the garnishee).  Id.  Upon the filing of the request, the
clerk is required to issue a writ.  Id.  The writ is to contain all
of the information in the request, including the name and address
of the judgment debtor, as well as the name and address of the
person requesting the writ, and the date of issue.  Md. Rule 2-
645(c).  
Once obtained and properly served on the garnishee, a writ of
garnishment requires the garnishee to take positive action by
holding the property until the entry of judgment in the garnishment
action.  Fico, 287 Md. at 162, 411 A.2d at 437.  See also Flat Iron
-6-
v. Foley, 90 Md. App. 281, 292, 600 A.2d 1156, 1161, cert. denied,
327 Md. 79, 607 A.2d 921 (1992).  Hence, if the garnishee
surrenders the property after service of the writ but prior to
judgment, the garnishee is liable to the judgment creditor for the
value of the debtor's property released.  Bedding Co. v. Warehouse
Co., 146 Md. 479, 492, 126 A. 902, 907 (1924); Flat Iron, 90 Md.
App. at 292, 600 A.2d at 1161.     
B.
The sole question before us is whether the writ served on
Maryland National on March 26, 1993 required the bank to hold the
property of Quality Plus, even though the single-page form prepared
by the clerk identified the judgment debtor as "People's
Transportation, Inc., et al." and Quality Plus was listed as a
debtor only on the attached request for the writ.  In other words,
we must determine whether the writ consisted of the single-page
form prepared by the clerk, or whether the writ included the
single-page form plus the attached request.  
Parkville argues that the single-page form prepared by the
clerk was merely a judicial "cover sheet," and that the writ itself
actually consisted of the form as well as the attached copy of
Parkville's request for the writ.  Parkville contends that the
presence of "et al." on the form after People's Transportation
provided notice to Maryland National that other judgment debtors
-7-
were included in the writ.  Because the attached request listed
Quality Plus as a judgment debtor, and provided the address for
Quality Plus, Parkville contends that the writ required Maryland
National to hold the assets of Quality Plus.  Parkville asserts
that "all that was necessary to have avoided entirely the dispute
represented by this case was for Maryland National simply to read
that which was served upon it."  
Conversely, Maryland National argues that only the single-page
form prepared by the clerk constituted the writ of garnishment.
Because that single sheet listed only one judgment debtor, People's
Transportation, Maryland National contends it was required only to
answer for property owned by that creditor.  Maryland National
argues that the use of "et al." on the writ was insufficient to
incorporate the information in the attached request, which was
prepared by Parkville and bore no indication of approval from the
clerk of court.  
The Court of Special Appeals agreed with Maryland National,
explaining:
"Parkville Federal's argument is not
supported by the language of Md. Rule 2-645.
Maryland Rule 2-645 specifically requires that
the writ contain the name of the judgement
debtor.  It is not sufficient that the writ
contains 
a 
veiled 
reference 
to 
another
document that supplies this information to the
garnishee. *** [I]t is the obligation of the
judgment creditor to obtain a writ that
properly 
identifies 
the 
property 
to 
be
attached, and the garnishee is not required to
look any further than the text of the writ
-8-
     It is undisputed that the request was stapled to the writ
3
when it was served on Maryland National.  
itself."  (Emphasis added).
Maryland National, 105 Md. App. at 618, 660 A.2d at 1046.   
We agree with the Court of Special Appeals.  The plain
language of Md. Rule 2-645(b) and (c) requires that the writ of
garnishment "contain the information in the request," including
"the name and last known address of the judgment debtor."  Md. Rule
1-202(z) defines a "writ" as a "written order issued by a court."
(Emphasis added).  In the instant case, only the single-page form
was prepared and issued by the clerk of the court.  The attached
request filed five days earlier that listed Quality Plus as a
debtor was prepared not by the clerk, but by Parkville's counsel.
The request, captioned "REQUEST FOR WRIT OF GARNISHMENT OF
PROPERTY," was signed only by Parkville's attorney and contained no
signature, stamp or other indication of approval or ratification by
any court official.  In fact, although Parkville asserts in its
brief that it was the clerk who attached the request to the writ,
there is no evidence in the record establishing how the request
became attached to the writ.   Furthermore, the single-page form
3
prepared and issued by the clerk seemed by its express language to
be applicable to a single judgment debtor and did not contain
language attempting to incorporate the attached request into the
writ.  The writ stated: "[y]ou are hereby directed to hold the
-9-
     Given our conclusion that "et al." was insufficient to make
4
the request part of the writ, we need not decide whether an
external document may be incorporated by reference into a writ of
garnishment.  Incorporation by reference of documents into certain
court orders is expressly permitted by rule.  See Maryland Rule
S77b (authorizing incorporation of property settlement into decree
for divorce, annulment, or alimony).  We note that no such rule
expressly authorizes incorporation of separate documents into writs
of garnishment.  
property of the Judgment Debtor named above subject to further
proceedings in this Court."  (Emphasis added).  The only judgment
debtor expressly "named above" was People's Transportation.    
Parkville contends that the clerk's use of the term "et al."
following People's Transportation on the writ was sufficient to
indicate it was applicable to more than one debtor and make the
attached request part of the writ.  We do not agree.  The term "et
al." does mean "and others" or "and another."  BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
at 553 (6th ed. 1990).  Translated literally, the writ therefore
indicated that the judgment debtor was People's Transportation "and
others."  Aside from indicating that other judgment debtors
existed, the use of "et al." did not override other language in the
writ.  The writ did not notify Maryland National that it was
applicable to more than one judgment debtor or notify Maryland
National that some or all of the judgment debtors listed in the
previously filed request were also included in the writ.   The
4
language of the writ seemed to indicate that it was applicable only
to the single "judgment debtor named above," i.e. People's
Transportation.   
-10-
We concur with the Court of Special Appeals that the burden of
obtaining a writ that specifically and accurately identifies the
judgment debtor rests upon the judgement creditor.  Maryland
National, 105 Md. App. at 616, 660 A.2d at 1045.  See also Flat
Iron, 90 Md. App. at 294, 600 A.2d at 1162.  A garnishee should not
be required to engage in a questionable interpretation of a
particular writ to determine whether the property of a particular
judgment debtor is or is not to be garnished.  The face of the writ
should clearly and unambiguously identify any and all judgment
debtors whose property is to be garnished.  To hold otherwise would
place an unfair burden on the garnishee.  Cf. Flat Iron, 90 Md.
App. at 294, 600 A.2d at 1162 (noting that garnishee is "not
obligated to search for the debtor under any name but that
specified in the writ of garnishment" nor required "to make
detailed inquiries as to the status of any account not listed in
the writ to determine" if the funds belong to another party).  
The need for certainty in identifying the judgment debtors
covered by a writ of garnishment is critical given that a writ
requires the garnishee to take positive action and impound assets
owned by another party.  A banking institution may be held liable
for damages if it improperly impounds assets of parties not covered
by a writ.  See McHugh & Assoc. v. Comm. & Farm. Bk., 59 Md. App.
519, 527, 476 A.2d 736, 740, cert. denied, 301 Md. 353, 483 A.2d 37
(1984); Andree v. Equitable Trust Co., 46 Md. App. 688, 693, 420
-11-
     Banking institutions have immunity from liability for
5
impounding property claimed by a third party, but only when that
property is impounded pursuant to a court order.  Maryland Code
(1980, 1992 Repl. Vol.), Financial Institutions Article, § 5-
306(b).
A.2d 1263, 1266 (1980).   Hence, if a banking institution
5
incorrectly interprets an ambiguous writ of garnishment and, as a
result, impounds assets owned by a party not actually covered by
the writ, the banking institution may be liable for any resulting
damages.  See McHugh, 59 Md. App. at 526-27, 476 A.2d at 740.  At
the same time, if the banking institution erroneously interprets an
ambiguous writ of garnishment as not covering a party that turns
out to be covered by the writ, and hence does not impound that
party's assets, the bank could be liable to the judgment creditor.
See Bedding Co., 146 Md. at 492, 126 A. at 907.
These kinds of problems can be avoided by requiring that writs
of garnishment clearly and unambiguously identify on their face the
judgment debtors to which they apply.  Other courts have also
recognized the importance of certainty in identifying the debtors
on the face of a writ of garnishment:
"In garnishment proceedings in execution
of judgments against multiple debtors, it has
been held that each debtor must be named
specifically in the garnishee process, even
though the names might be ascertainable from
court records or copies of court documents
served with the process....  In such cases,
the courts have reasoned that, while it is
permissible to garnish property or debt in
regard to more than one debtor in the same
process, a garnishee has no way of knowing
-12-
which debtors were in fact made parties to the
garnishment, unless each is specifically
identified."
David J. Marchitelli, Annotation, Sufficiency, as to Content, of
Notice of Garnishment Required to be Served Upon Garnishee, 20
A.L.R.5th 229, 258 (1994).  In Overton Bank and Trust v.
PaineWebber, 922 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996), the court held
that a bank was not liable for failing to impound assets held by a
corporation not named as a judgment debtor on the writ, even though
the corporate entity was identified in the application for the
writ.  The court explained:
"[A]lthough Painewebber focuses its attention
on the application for writ of garnishment,
the Court in Bank One [v. Sunbelt Sav., 824
S.W.2d 557 (Tex. 1992)] center[ed] its inquiry
solely on the writ of garnishment itself and
does not appear to suggest that a party
unnamed in the writ can be supplied through
its mention in the application for the writ.
Again, `[w]hen a creditor wants to challenge
title to funds held by a third party, the
creditor should seek a writ of garnishment
naming the nominal [party]....'"
Overton Bank, 922 S.W.2d at 313-14 (quoting Bank One, 824 S.W.2d at
558 (holding that a writ of garnishment naming only a corporate
officer was insufficient to attach the assets of the officer's
corporation not named on the writ)).  
Similarly, in cases where writs of garnishment have
misidentified the judgment debtor, courts have held the writs to be
insufficient to require the garnishee to impound the assets of the
true debtor.  See Staley v. Brown, 146 So.2d 739 (Miss. 1962); R &
-13-
M Tire Service Co. v. Deposit Guaranty Bank & T. Co., 160 So. 274
(Miss. 1935); Tyson v. Nettler, 539 N.E.2d 660 (Ohio Ct. App.
1987); Greco v. Rainal, 4 A.2d 232 (Pa. Super. Ct 1939).  Cf.
Vaughn v. Spitz, 682 S.W.2d 847 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)(holding that a
garnishment notice seeking to attach funds belonging to husband and
not mentioning wife was insufficient to attach funds in joint
account of both husband and wife). 
Given the need for certainty in the identification of judgment
debtors covered by a writ of garnishment, we hold that in the
instant case the writ was effective only as to the assets of the
debtor named on the one-page writ prepared by the clerk:  People's
Transportation.  The writ was not effective as to the three other
debtors, including Quality Plus, listed on the attached request
prepared by Parkville.  We therefore affirm the decision of the
Court of Special Appeals. 
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
COURT 
OF
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
AFFIRMED.
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE
PAID BY PETITIONER.