Case Title: Griffin v. Griffin

Citation: 348 N.C. 278

Docket Number: 276PA97

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1998-05-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 276PA97
FILED: 8 MAY 1998
GEORGE A. GRIFFIN and BRENDA GRIFFIN,
Plaintiffs
v.
SAMUEL GRIFFIN, JO BULLOCK, CHARLIE LANKFORD, DOROTHY LANKFORD
and KENNETH DAVID BULLOCK,
Defendants
v.
MICHAEL GRIFFIN, DONNA GRIFFIN, GEORGE F. GRIFFIN, and FRANCIS
ANDREWS,
Third Party Defendants
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31
and on appeal of right of a constitutional question pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(1) to review a unanimous, unpublished decision
of the Court of Appeals, 126 N.C. App. 224, 491 S.E.2d 564
(1997), affirming the imposition of sanctions against attorney
Charles Henderson by Corbett, J., at the 11 September 1995
session of District Court, Johnston County.  Heard in the Supreme
Court 17 December 1997.
The controversy in this case began when Samuel Griffin
murdered his wife, Marie Griffin, and was sentenced to life in
prison.  Samuel Griffin and Marie Griffin had two children,
Samuel Griffin II, born in 1985, and Catherine Marie Griffin,
born in 1987.
George Griffin, the nephew of Samuel Griffin, and his
wife, Brenda Griffin, filed this action for the custody of the
two children in District Court, Jones County, on 19 September
1990.  Jo Bullock, a defendant in the action, was the sister of
-2-
Marie Griffin and is married to Kenneth David Bullock.  Charlie
and Dorothy Lankford were the parents of Marie Griffin.
In August 1991, an order was entered granting primary
custody to the plaintiffs with visitation to the Bullocks.  In
March 1992, a consent order was entered switching this
arrangement and awarding primary custody to the Bullocks with
visitation to the plaintiffs.  In the meantime, on 25 February
1992, Michael Griffin, the brother of Samuel Griffin, and his
wife, Donna Griffin, who were not parties to this case at that
time, filed through their attorney Charles Henderson a petition
for the adoption of the two children.  This petition was filed
without notice to any of the parties to this action.  On 23 April
1992, the clerk of superior court entered an interlocutory order
tentatively approving the adoption and giving custody of the two
children to Michael and Donna Griffin.  On 28 April 1992, the
Bullocks made a motion pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 11 to
sanction Mr. Henderson for filing the adoption proceeding.  The
Bullocks contended that the adoption proceeding was filed to
harass them and disrupt the orders of the court in this custody
case.
On 1 May 1992, the clerk of superior court, pursuant to
an order by the district court, rescinded the interlocutory order
tentatively approving the adoption and giving custody of the
children to Michael and Donna Griffin.  Michael and Donna Griffin
then intervened in this case.  The venue of the case was then
changed from Jones County to Onslow County and finally to
Johnston County.
-3-
The Bullocks’ motion for sanctions against Mr.
Henderson was heard on 11 September 1995, and the trial court
entered its order on 15 November 1995.  The court did not impose
sanctions for the matters alleged in the Bullocks’ motion, but it
sua sponte imposed sanctions for ten pleadings filed with the
court which it said were filed for an improper purpose in
violation of Rule 11; the court held that five of the pleadings
were not well grounded in fact or law.  The court ordered Mr.
Henderson to pay counsel fees for the Bullocks.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the imposition of
sanctions except for the filing of two affidavits which were not
signed by Mr. Henderson.  The case was remanded for a
recalculation of attorneys’ fees.
We allowed discretionary review for Mr. Henderson.
Bailey & Dixon, L.L.P., by Gary S. Parsons and John M.
Kirby, for appellant Charles Henderson.
Edward P. Hausle, P.A., by Edward P. Hausle, for
defendant-appellees Jo and Kenneth David Bullock.
WEBB, Justice.
Charles Henderson had been given notice by the Bullocks
that they would seek to have sanctions imposed upon him for
filing a petition for an adoption.  After the hearing, the court
did not impose sanctions for the filing of the adoption petition. 
It did, however, on its own motion, impose sanctions for the
filing of pleadings for which Mr. Henderson had not received
notice that such sanctions would be sought.  We agree with Mr.
Henderson that this was error.
-4-
“Notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to
depriving a person of his property are essential elements of due
process of law which is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.”  McDonald’s Corp. v. Dwyer, 338
N.C. 445, 448, 450 S.E.2d 888, 891 (1994).  The Court of Appeals
held that Mr. Henderson received adequate notice of the sanctions
to be imposed against him.  This is so, said the Court of
Appeals, because (1) Mr. Henderson had full notice that he was
under consideration for Rule 11 sanctions, (2) the district court
issued a detailed order reciting findings of fact informing him
why the sanctions had been imposed, and (3) Mr. Henderson fully
participated in the hearing at which sanctions were imposed.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals.  It is not
adequate for the notice to say only that sanctions are proposed. 
The bases for the sanctions must be alleged.  Taylor v. Taylor
Prods. Inc., 105 N.C. App. 620, 629, 414 S.E.2d 568, 575 (1992),
overruled on other grounds by Brooks v. Giesey, 334 N.C. 303,
317, 432 S.E.2d 339, 347 (1993).  In this case, the notice
actually misled Mr. Henderson as to what sanctions would be
imposed.  Mr. Henderson was notified that sanctions were proposed
for filing the adoption proceeding, but sanctions were imposed
for something else.  The fact that the court made detailed
findings of fact in the order for sanctions is not adequate.  In
order to pass constitutional muster, the person against whom
sanctions are to be imposed must be advised in advance of the
charges against him.  The fact that Mr. Henderson participated in
the hearing and did the best he could do without knowing in
-5-
advance the sanctions which might be imposed does not show a
proper notice was given.
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we reverse the
Court of Appeals and remand for further remand to the District
Court, Johnston County, to vacate the order imposing sanctions on
Mr. Henderson.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.