Case Title: Russell S. Borst v. Allstate Insurance Company

Citation: 2006 WI 70

Docket Number: 2004AP002004

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
2006 WI 70 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP2004 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Russell S. Borst and Tina Borst, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
Allstate Insurance Company, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 13, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 6, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael Fisher 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants, there were briefs (in the 
Court of Appeals and Supreme Court) by John V. O’Connor and 
O’Connor, Dumez, Alia & McTernan, S.C., Kenosha, and oral 
argument by John V. O’Connor. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief by John F. 
Fuchs, Catherine A. Goodman, and Fuchs, DeStefanis & Boyle, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by John F. Fuchs and 
Catherine A. Goodman. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Mark A. Frankel and 
LaFollette Godfrey & Kahn, Madison; Kevin J. Lyons and Davis & 
Kuelthau SC, Milwaukee, on behalf of the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Section of the State Bar of Wisconsin. 
 
 
2006 WI 70
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP2004  
(L.C. No. 
2002CV1601) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Russell S. Borst and Tina Borst, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Allstate Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 13, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Kenosha 
County, Michael S. Fisher, Judge.  Reversed and remanded.   
 
¶1 
JON 
P. 
WILCOX, 
J.   This 
case 
comes 
to 
us 
on 
certification from the court of appeals.  The appellants, 
Russell S. Borst and Tina Borst, appealed an order of the 
Circuit Court for Kenosha County, Michael S. Fisher, Judge, 
denying their motion to vacate an arbitration award.   
¶2 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
certified 
the 
following 
questions: (1) Is there a presumption of impartiality among all 
arbitrators 
which 
may 
be 
"sidestepped" 
only 
by 
explicit 
agreement of all parties by which they may select arbitrators 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
2 
 
who 
in 
effect 
are 
their 
advocates? 
(2) 
Under 
Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(b) (2003-04),1 can "evident partiality," 
due to a relationship between an arbitrator and a party be 
avoided by full disclosure at the outset and a declaration of 
impartiality?  (3) Other than the deposition procedure outlined 
in Wis. Stat. § 788.07, is the nature and extent of discovery 
during the arbitration process governed by contract, the 
arbitrators' inherent authority, or a combination of the two? 
¶3 
We hold the following: (1) We adopt a presumption of 
impartiality among all arbitrators, whether named by the parties 
or not.  This presumption may be rebutted, and an arbitrator may 
act as a non-neutral when the parties contract for non-neutral 
arbitrators or the arbitration rules otherwise provide for non-
neutral arbitrators; (2) Evident partiality cannot be avoided 
simply by a full disclosure and a declaration of impartiality.  
In challenges to an arbitrator based on evident partiality where 
the disputed relationship is fully disclosed, circuit courts 
must remove an arbitrator prior to the arbitration, or vacate an 
arbitration 
award 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(b) 
when 
a 
reasonable 
person 
would 
have 
serious 
doubts 
about 
the 
impartiality of the arbitrator; and (3) Arbitrators have no 
inherent authority to dictate the scope of discovery, and absent 
an express agreement, the parties are limited to the procedure 
for depositions, as described in Wis. Stat. § 788.07.   
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
3 
 
¶4 
Applying 
the 
above 
standard, 
we 
conclude 
that  
Arbitrator Rick Hills (Hills), who serves as Allstate's attorney 
on an ongoing basis, demonstrated evident partiality such that 
the arbitration award must be vacated; therefore, we reverse the 
order of the circuit court denying the motion to vacate and 
remand to the circuit court to vacate the arbitration award and 
order a new arbitration.   
I 
¶5 
Russell S. Borst (Borst) was involved in an automobile 
accident with an uninsured motorist on November 23, 2000.  Borst 
was injured in the accident and received treatment.  Subsequent 
to the accident, Borst sought reimbursement for his damages 
under his uninsured motorist coverage provided in an insurance 
policy issued by Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate).     
¶6 
In settlement discussions, Allstate stated that it 
believed Borst was 50 percent liable for the accident and thus 
would only be willing to pay 50 percent of the claim.  Allstate 
also requested all medical records related to the claim be sent 
after Borst finished his treatment.  A month later, Allstate 
again stated its position on liability remained unchanged after 
considering the statements from both drivers and the photographs 
of the vehicles and the intersection. 
¶7 
Borst subsequently provided his records, with the 
exception of two bills, which Borst indicated would be sent when 
they were received.  In a letter dated February 6, 2002, Borst 
provided the missing bills, and documentation of Borst's wage 
loss.  Furthermore, Borst indicated that if there was any 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
4 
 
additional information Allstate needed, it should advise as 
such.  Eventually, Allstate made a settlement offer of $5,000.  
¶8 
In 
calculating 
the 
settlement 
offer, 
Allstate 
considered $4,331 in medical bills and $2,654 in lost wages, but 
indicated it thought Borst was 50 percent negligent for the 
accident.  Borst rejected the settlement offer and requested 
arbitration in accordance with the insurance policy.  The "If We 
Cannot Agree" provision of the policy reads in part as follows: 
If the insured person or we don't agree on that 
person's right to receive any damages or the amount, 
then at the written request of either the disagreement 
will be settled by arbitration.  Arbitration will take 
place under the rules of the American Arbitration 
Association unless either party objects.   
If either party objects, the following method of 
arbitration will be used instead.  The insured person 
will select one arbitrator.  We will select another.  
The two arbitrators will select a third.  If they 
cannot agree on a third arbitrator within 30 days, the 
judge 
of 
a court 
of 
record in 
the 
county of 
jurisdiction where arbitration is pending will appoint 
the third arbitrator.  The written decision of any two 
arbitrators will determine the issues.  The insured 
person will pay the arbitrator that person selects.  
We will pay the one we select.  The expense of the 
third arbitrator and all other expenses of arbitration 
will be shared equally.  However, attorney fees and 
fees paid to medical and other expert witnesses are 
not considered arbitration expenses.  These costs will 
be paid by the party incurring them.   
¶9 
The parties elected to select arbitrators as provided 
for in the policy.  Borst selected Eugene Gasiorkiewicz as his 
arbitrator, and Allstate responded by naming Hills.  Borst 
immediately objected to Hills as an arbitrator because Allstate 
was a client of Hills' law firm.  Hills disputed Borst's 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
5 
 
contention that he could not be neutral, stating that "I can 
assure you that whenever I serve as an arbitrator I base my 
decisions on the evidence."  Gasiorkiewicz and Hills then 
selected the third arbitrator. 
¶10 Allstate subsequently served upon Borst a set of 
written interrogatories, a request for document production, and 
medical authorizations.  In response, Borst filed a motion with 
the arbitration panel to quash this discovery as unnecessary.  
After substituting counsel, Allstate informed the arbitration 
panel it "wish[ed] to conduct the deposition of Mr. Borst and 
also obtain authorizations for release of records and without a 
formal order from the arbitration panel, that discovery may 
proceed."  In support of its contention, Allstate emphasized the 
proof of claim provision of the insurance policy.2  Additionally, 
Allstate filed a motion with the panel requesting that Borst's 
claim be dismissed for failure to answer the discovery or, in 
the alternative, for an order requiring him to appear for a 
deposition and comply with other policy provisions.  On August 
                                                 
2 This provision of the policy reads as follows: 
PROOF OF CLAIM; MEDICAL REPORTS 
As soon as possible, you or any other person 
making claim must give us written proof of claim.  It 
must include all details we need to determine the 
amounts payable.  We may also require any person 
making claim to submit to questioning under oath and 
sign the transcript.  The insured person may be 
required to take medical examinations by physicians we 
choose, as often as we reasonably require.  We must be 
given authorization to obtain medical reports and 
copies of records. 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
6 
 
22, 2002, the arbitration panel denied Allstate's motion to 
dismiss Borst's claim.  Further, Borst was ordered to give a 
deposition, supply medical authorizations, and cooperate in 
other appropriate discovery.   
¶11 Borst indicated that he would not submit to a 
deposition, 
and 
he 
intended 
to 
challenge 
in 
court 
the 
appropriate extent of discovery as well as whether an attorney 
can act as an arbitrator in a case that involves one of his 
firm's clients.  Allstate responded by electing not to depose 
Borst, but it did not waive its right to the deposition.  
Instead, Allstate chose to depose the other driver involved in 
the accident.  Borst, in turn, provided a list of damages and 
confirmed the accuracy of all pre-arbitration discovery.     
¶12 On December 5, 2002, Borst3 responded by filing suit 
against Allstate, alleging breach of contract, bad faith, and 
fraud and misrepresentation.  Borst also sought a permanent 
injunction enjoining arbitration.  Allstate filed an answer 
along with a number of motions.  Borst responded with a motion 
to bar further arbitration as a prerequisite to suit.  In this 
motion, Borst also requested that if the arbitration was allowed 
to 
proceed, 
the 
court 
order 
Allstate 
to 
select 
another 
arbitrator.  In its brief in opposition to Borst's motion, 
Allstate represented that while it did not believe anything 
prevented it from selecting an arbitrator with whom it had an 
                                                 
3 Borst actually filed suit with his wife, Tina Borst.  For 
simplicity, we will continue to refer to the Borsts collectively 
as simply "Borst." 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
7 
 
ongoing 
relationship, 
"[n]evertheless, 
as 
discussed 
with 
Plaintiff's counsel in the past, in an effort to resolve this 
matter, Allstate is willing to choose a different arbitrator."   
¶13 At the hearing on October 10, 2003, the circuit court 
remanded the matter back to the previous arbitration panel and 
held the other motions in abeyance pending the resolution of the 
arbitration.   
¶14 When the matter of Hills' participation came up at the 
motion hearing, the court stated, "Allstate indicated they would 
be willing to consider someone else. . . . See if you can agree 
on an arbitrator.  Give me a list.  If you can't, give me a list 
of those people each of you would believe would be a good 
arbitrator."  To this, Allstate's attorney replied, "We'll do it 
that way.  I would just go on the record as saying I don't plan 
on naming somebody who also does a boat load of work for the 
client."   
¶15 Borst's attorney drafted a proposed order stating that 
"Allstate Insurance Company shall designate a new arbitrator, to 
serve in place of Attorney Rick Hills."  Allstate's attorney 
asked the court to refrain from signing the order until he had a 
chance to confirm with Allstate its authorization to substitute 
Hills.  A few days later, Allstate submitted an order without 
the mandate that Allstate switch arbitrators, and the court 
signed this order on November 1, 2003.   
¶16 The arbitration panel eventually rendered a unanimous 
decision in the matter concluding the total value of the claim 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
8 
 
was $3,531 and each driver was 50 percent responsible for 
causing the accident for a net award to Borst of $1,765.50.   
¶17 Allstate filed a motion for court confirmation of the 
arbitration award under Wis. Stat. § 788.09, and Borst filed a 
motion for vacation of the award under Wis. Stat. § 788.10 on 
the grounds that Hills is a member of a law firm that represents 
Allstate on a continuing basis, which rendered Hills partial in 
the matter.  At the hearing on the matter, the circuit court 
stated the following: 
Well, the Court sees the problem; and had it been 
brought to my attention, I would have made other 
suggestions for arbitrators; but based upon what the 
law is, there are no rules, and least that I can see, 
that I have found, that there is a presumption of 
validity, that there was a three-arbitrator panel, 
that it was a unanimous decision.   
There has been provided no substantial evidence 
that there was partiality; and based upon that and the 
fact there needs to be some rules set up so we know 
where we are going, the Court is going to deny the 
motion to vacate the arbitration award and see where 
it goes from here.   
As such, the circuit court confirmed the arbitration award, 
denied Borst's motion to vacate, and dismissed the matter on the 
merits in an order filed on July 13, 2004.   
¶18 Borst appealed, and the court of appeals subsequently 
certified the matter to this court. 
II 
¶19 We first address whether there is a presumption of 
impartiality that may be avoided if the parties explicitly 
contract 
for 
non-neutral 
arbitrators 
or 
if 
applicable 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
9 
 
arbitration rules provide for non-neutral arbitrators.  Although 
not important to the resolution of this case since the parties 
agree that the arbitrators were intended to be neutral, today we 
adopt such a presumption of impartiality.         
¶20 As noted in the amicus brief submitted by the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Section of the Wisconsin 
State Bar (State Bar), the appropriate function for party-
appointed arbitrators generates a great deal of confusion within 
the ADR community.  Part of the confusion stems from the fact 
that courts have permitted the use of both neutral and non-
neutral arbitrators in the arbitration process.  See Seth H. 
Lieberman, Something's Rotten in the State of Party-Appointed 
Arbitration: Healing ADR's Black Eye That is "Nonneutral 
Neutrals," 
5 
Cardozo 
J. 
Conflict 
Resol. 
215 
(2004).  
Additionally, parties frequently  do not designate whether the 
party-appointed arbitrators are supposed to be neutral or non-
neutral.  We believe confusion will be lessened, as the State 
Bar suggests, by prescribing presumptive impartiality as the 
appropriate role for the party-appointed arbitrator, unless the 
parties contract for non-neutral arbitrators or the arbitration 
rules otherwise provide for non-neutral arbitrators.     
¶21 Furthermore, we believe such a presumption is in 
accordance with the language of Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(b), which 
discusses the vacation of an arbitration award "[w]here there 
was evident partiality or corruption on the part of the 
arbitrators, or either of them."  (Emphasis added.)  We 
interpret this language to mean that every arbitrator on the 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
10 
 
panel is supposed to be unbiased absent express contractual 
language or applicable arbitration rules to the contrary.  
Diversified Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Slotten, 119 Wis. 2d 441, 448, 
351 N.W.2d 176 (Ct. App. 1984).  In Diversified, the parties 
utilized a selection process of arbitrators similar to this 
case.  On appeal, the parties differed on whether arbitrators 
chosen in this fashion were expected to be biased in favor of 
the choosing party.  Id. at 447-48.  The court rejected the 
supposed "modern view" that arbitrators selected by the parties 
are expected to be biased, and stated that "[i]f parties are to 
be encouraged to submit their disputes to arbitration as an 
alternative to litigation, they must be assured an impartial 
tribunal."  Id. at 448.  The court of appeals also pointed to 
the language of Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(b), which "provides that 
awards shall be vacated upon a showing of evident partiality on 
the part 
of 
either of 
the 
arbitrators. 
 
This language 
demonstrates that the legislature did not contemplate partisan 
arbitrators."  Id. (emphasis in original). 
¶22 We note that our decision in Richco Structures v. 
Parkside Village, Inc., 82 Wis. 2d 547, 263 N.W.2d 204 (1978), 
seems to suggest the opposite result, but a closer inspection of 
the facts demonstrates that our decision today is in accord with 
Richco Structures.  In that case, the parties each appointed an 
arbitrator and those two arbitrators selected, in the words of 
the stipulated terms of the arbitration agreement, "a third, 
independent arbitrator."  Id. at 550.  Further, if the three 
arbitrators could not agree on a decision, the independent 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
11 
 
arbitrator's decision would be accepted as final and binding.  
Id.  In determining whether there was evident partiality under 
what was then Wis. Stat. § 298.10(1)(b) (1975-76), we concluded 
that under the stipulation, sole decision-making power was, in 
effect, granted to the third, independent arbitrator.  Id. at 
557.  As such, "since two of the arbitrators in the case at bar 
were 
effectively, 
and 
by 
design, 
representatives 
of 
the 
respective parties, our construction of 'evident partiality' 
should only be read to apply to the arbitrator intended by the 
parties to be neutral."  Id.  The facts in Richco Structures 
make clear that the language of the stipulation demonstrated the 
parties' intent that only the arbitrator picked by the two 
party-appointed arbitrators was to be "independent," especially 
given the fact that the two party-appointed arbitrators did not 
have final decision-making authority.  We do not take the 
language of Richco Structures to mean that in all tripartite 
arbitration panels, only the third arbitrator is subject to the 
impartiality 
requirement 
of 
§ 788.10(1)(b), 
and 
therefore, 
Richco Structures is not contrary to our decision today that all 
arbitrators are presumed impartial.    
¶23 The presumption we adopt today also puts Wisconsin in 
line with "the recent trend away from non-neutral party-
appointed 
arbitrators 
and 
the 
heightened 
expectations 
of 
independence and neutrality of commercial arbitrators."  Richard 
Chernick, Arbitrator-Neutrality Rule Reflects Change in Ethics, 
Daily Journal, Apr. 14, 2004, http://jamsadr.com/j_pub/ 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
12 
 
show_article_print.asp?id=81.  For example, on March 1, 2004, 
the American Arbitration Association and an American Bar 
Association task force promulgated an updated version of the 
Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes.  The most 
striking difference between the original 1977 version and the 
2004 version is the application of a presumption of neutrality 
to all arbitrators, including party-appointed arbitrators.  In 
the Introductory Note on Neutrality, the 2004 Code of Ethics 
reads in part: 
The 
sponsors 
of 
this 
Code 
believe 
that 
it 
is 
preferable for all arbitrators including any party-
appointed 
arbitrators 
to 
be 
neutral, 
that 
is, 
independent and impartial, and to comply with the same 
ethical 
standards. . . . This 
Code 
establishes 
a 
presumption 
of 
neutrality 
for 
all 
arbitrators, 
including party-appointed arbitrators, which applies 
unless the parties' agreement, the arbitration rules 
agreed to by the parties or applicable laws provide 
otherwise. 
Chernick, supra.  This presumption is then laid out in Canon IX 
of the 2004 Code of Ethics.  Id.  Arbitrators that are supposed 
to be predisposed to the position of the party appointing them 
are discussed in Canon X.  Id.   
¶24 As 
the 
State 
Bar 
recognizes, 
a 
presumption 
of 
impartiality will greatly reduce the amount of process-related 
disputes initiated by a party who concludes, either during or 
after the arbitration, that they had not known that partial 
arbitrators were permitted.  Furthermore, a presumption of 
impartiality would force sophisticated commercial parties who 
affirmatively desire to use partial arbitrators to reach a 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
13 
 
clearer and more comprehensive set of ground rules before taking 
their dispute to an arbitration panel.  For these reasons, we 
conclude that adopting a default presumption of impartiality is 
the prudent course of action. 
¶25 For purposes of this decision, however, such a 
presumption is immaterial.  That is, although the arbitration 
clause in the contract was silent as to the intent of the 
parties on the role of the arbitrators, at oral argument the 
parties agreed that their understanding of the arbitration 
provision in the insurance contract was that the entire panel 
was to be neutral.  It is with this understanding in mind that 
the parties proceeded into arbitration and with which we review 
the circuit court's decision in this case. 
III 
¶26 We now proceed to the next question certified by the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
which 
concerns 
the 
scope 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(b), and whether evident partiality due to 
a relationship between an arbitrator and a party can be avoided 
by full 
disclosure 
at 
the 
outset 
and a 
declaration of 
impartiality.  If so, the arbitration award need not be vacated, 
as Hills disclosed his relationship with Allstate.  If evident 
partiality cannot be avoided simply by disclosure, we must 
determine whether the arbitration panel's award in this case 
must be vacated under § 788.10(1)(b).  
¶27 Allstate argues that there is no law precluding an 
arbitrator from proceeding after he or she fully discloses a 
relationship with one of the parties.  In fact, Allstate 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
14 
 
continues, under a literal reading of Wisconsin case law, there 
can be no evident partiality upon disclosure of a relationship.  
Thus, under Allstate's view, because Hills disclosed his 
relationship with Allstate at the outset, Hills properly sat on 
the arbitration panel. 
¶28 In 
our 
view, 
Allstate's 
position 
is 
entirely 
unreasonable, especially considering the facts of this case.  As 
noted above, the parties agree that the entire panel was to be 
neutral.  Despite this understanding, Allstate still argues that 
disclosure is all that is necessary for a "neutral" arbitrator.  
Under Allstate's view then, Allstate's corporate counsel could 
serve as an arbitrator, as long as this relationship was 
disclosed.  This example demonstrates the fallacy of Allstate's 
position.   
¶29 The more difficult issue for us concerns what a party 
is entitled to when it objects to another party's arbitrator for 
reasons of partiality at the beginning of or during an 
arbitration.  As the court of appeals put it, is disclosure all 
a party can expect until the award is made, at which time it can 
be challenged pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(b)? 
¶30 Admittedly, our case law is generally limited to post-
award challenges addressing whether an arbitrator's failure to 
disclose a particular relationship to one of the parties 
constituted evident partiality.  See DeBaker v. Shah, 194 
Wis. 2d 104, 533 N.W.2d 464 (1995); Sch. Dist. of Spooner v. Nw. 
United Educators, 
136 Wis. 2d 263, 
401 
N.W.2d 578 (1987), 
overruled by DeBaker, 194 Wis. 2d 104; Richco Structures, 82 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
15 
 
Wis. 2d 547.  However, other federal4 and state decisions provide 
some guidance. 
¶31 There is authority for the view that an arbitrator 
cannot be removed before an award has been rendered.  See e.g., 
Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 110 F.3d 892, (2d Cir. 1997) 
(holding that the Federal Arbitration Act did not permit pre-
award removal of an arbitrator considering that the plaintiff 
was aware of the arbitrator's relationship with the defendant 
when the arbitration agreement was reached); Astoria Med. Group 
v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y., 182 N.E.2d 85 (N.Y. 1962) 
(holding that it was improper for the court to tamper with the 
arbitration format designed by the parties and the appropriate 
approach was to attack the arbitration award after it had been 
rendered).     
¶32 However, there is also authority for the opposite 
position.  See, e.g., Arista Mktg. Assocs., Inc. v. Peer Group, 
Inc., 720 A.2d 659 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); Excelsior 
57th Corp. v. Kern, 630 N.Y.S.2d 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) 
(dismissing a challenged arbitrator before an award was made 
because of his participation in a prior arbitration between the 
same parties).  In Arista, the primary issue was whether the New 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 788.10 is nearly identical to 9 U.S.C. 
§ 10 (2000).  Federal cases construing the Federal Arbitration 
Act 
are 
persuasive 
authority 
in 
interpreting 
§ 788.10.  
Diversified Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Slotten, 119 Wis. 2d 441, 446, 
351 N.W.2d 176 (Ct. App. 1984). 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
16 
 
Jersey statutes5 authorized the pre-arbitration removal of a 
party-appointed, non-neutral arbitrator where evident partiality 
was demonstrated.  The Arista court held that under New Jersey 
law, judicial disqualification of an arbitrator demonstrating 
evident partiality was permitted whenever discovered.  Id. at 
664. 
 
Like 
Wisconsin, 
New 
Jersey 
has 
a 
pre-arbitration 
disclosure requirement which, in the Arista court's words, 
"'reduce[s] 
the 
likelihood 
of 
potentially 
wasteful 
post-
arbitration challenges[,]'"  id. at 665 (citation omitted), and 
"leave[s] to the parties themselves the initial decision as to 
whether to object to an arbitrator designated by the other side 
and, if necessary, to seek judicial determination of whether 
that arbitrator appears to be too partial to be permitted to 
participate in the arbitration."  Id. (citation omitted).  
¶33 Likewise, part of this court's reasoning in requiring 
pre-arbitration disclosure was to allow the parties and not the 
courts to gauge "the arbitrator's conscious or unconscious 
predilection to favor one of the parties because of the 
arbitrator's own interests."  Richco Structures, 82 Wis. 2d at 
560-61.  This reasoning was also echoed by the concurring 
opinion in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty 
Co., 393 U.S. 145, 151 (1968) (White, J., concurring) (reasoning 
that pre-arbitration disclosure is beneficial in arbitrations 
                                                 
5 New Jersey Stat. Ann. § 2A:24-8(b) (2003-04) provides that 
a court shall vacate arbitration awards "(w)here there was 
either evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or 
any thereof." 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
17 
 
because with this information parties are "free to reject the 
arbitrator or accept him with knowledge of the relationship and 
continuing faith in his objectivity").  In Justice White's view, 
"[t]he arbitration process functions best when an amicable and 
trusting 
atmosphere 
is 
preserved 
and 
there 
is 
voluntary 
compliance 
with 
the 
decree, 
without 
need 
for 
judicial 
enforcement."  Id.     
¶34 We believe this case provides an example of a 
situation where a pre-arbitration challenge is necessary and 
efficient.  Although Borst challenged Allstate's selection of 
Hills from the beginning, Allstate refused to select another 
arbitrator.  It seems to us that in most instances, in the 
interest of fundamental fairness, a challenged arbitrator will 
simply be replaced by the opposing party, especially if on a 
reasonable basis, as in this case.  Unfortunately, that did not 
happen here, and we conclude a pre-arbitration challenge is an 
appropriate remedy in situations such as this.  Furthermore, for 
reasons we discuss below, the circuit court should have ordered 
Allstate 
to 
replace 
Hills 
upon 
Borst's 
pre-arbitration 
challenge. 
¶35 In sum, we adopt the position taken by the Arista 
court.  That is, unless the parties have contracted to use a 
specific arbitrator, pre-arbitration challenges to arbitrators 
selected by the parties are permissible.  Such pre-arbitration 
challenges promote efficiency in the arbitration process when a 
party reasonably objects to the use of an arbitrator selected by 
the opposing party as Borst did of Hills in this case.  We 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
18 
 
further 
believe 
pre-arbitration 
challenges 
are 
especially 
relevant in cases such as this where the parties agree that the 
arbitrators are to be neutral.  In pre-arbitration challenges, a 
party may seek the removal of a challenged arbitrator under the 
general equity powers of the circuit court.6  Under this power of 
equity, the circuit court must order the party to select another 
arbitrator if the court determines the challenged arbitrator 
demonstrates "evident partiality" as that term is defined below.  
¶36 We also reiterate that arbitrators should continue to 
disclose relevant relationships in accordance with our case law, 
see DeBaker, 194 Wis. 2d 104, and such disclosure puts the 
burden on the opposing party to object.  A failure to initially 
object to the selection of an arbitrator, based on the 
information disclosed prior to the arbitration, may act as a 
forfeiture of any subsequent post-arbitration challenge on the 
disclosed information.7  See e.g., Kiernan v. Piper Jaffray Cos., 
137 F.3d 588, 593 (8th Cir. 1998); Fort Hill Builders, Inc. v. 
Nat'l Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 866 F.2d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1989).  
Post-arbitration challenges, of course, are permissible under 
                                                 
6 See W.J. Dunn, Disqualification of Arbitrator by Court or 
Stay of Arbitration Proceedings Prior to Award, on Ground of 
Interest, Bias, Prejudice, Collusion, or Fraud of Arbitrators, 
65 A.L.R. 2d 755 § 2(c) (1959) (citing e.g., Gaer Bros., Inc. v. 
Mott, 130 A.2d 804 (Conn. 1957); Palmer Plastics, Inc. v. Rubin, 
108 N.Y.S. 2d 514 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951)).    
7 In some cases, the significance of the information 
disclosed prior to the arbitration will not be apparent until 
after the arbitration commences.  In such an appropriate 
instance, a subsequent challenge to the arbitrator based on the 
pre-arbitration information is permissible. 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
19 
 
Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(b) based on the circumstances of the 
arbitration 
itself 
or 
on 
information 
discovered 
post-
arbitration. 
¶37 Allstate contends that this case presents such an 
instance of forfeiture,8 in that Borst forfeited his right to  
make a post-arbitration challenge to Allstate's selection of 
Hills by failing to object to the November 1, 2003, order of the 
circuit court.  Moreover, Allstate argues that because Borst did 
not sufficiently preserve this issue in the circuit court, he is 
not entitled to review of this issue as a matter of right.  See 
State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶11, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 
N.W.2d 727.  
¶38 From our review of the record, we conclude that Borst 
sufficiently pleaded and argued the issue of Hills' partiality 
to the circuit court, prior to the commencement of the 
arbitration, such that the issue was not forfeited.  First, 
Borst objected to Allstate's choice of Hills almost immediately 
after Allstate selected him.  Once the arbitration process came 
to a halt, Borst filed suit.  In the complaint, Borst alleged 
that Allstate did not name an arbitrator who was "fair and 
unbiased" but instead named Hills, "an attorney whose firm had 
represented Allstate Insurance Company on numerous occasions, 
                                                 
8 Although Allstate argues that Borst "waived" his right to 
object to Allstate's selection of Hills, we believe this is 
really more an issue of forfeiture "because it refers to the 
forfeiture of a right by silence rather than the intentional 
relinquishment of a known right."  State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, 
¶11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (citations omitted). 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
20 
 
and was clearly biased towards them."  Further, the complaint 
alleged that when Borst objected, Hills "refused to recuse 
himself and Allstate Insurance Company failed to appoint an 
unbiased arbitrator."  These allegations formed the basis of 
Borst's cause of action for a permanent injunction.   
¶39 Borst again raised the objection in a subsequent 
motion for an order barring further arbitration.  In the motion, 
Borst requested that if his claim was ordered back into 
arbitration, Allstate should be required to name another 
arbitrator because of the attorney/client relationship between 
Hills and Allstate.  In its response brief, Allstate represented 
that in an effort to resolve the matter, it would be willing to 
choose a different arbitrator.  Then again, at the motion 
hearing, Allstate indicated it would be willing to consider 
another arbitrator who did not do a "boat load" of work for 
Allstate. 
¶40 It is not clear from the record why the circuit court 
elected to sign Allstate's submitted order, which did not 
require Hills' removal, as opposed to Borst's, and admittedly, 
Borst would have been well-served by immediately moving for 
reconsideration of the order signed by the circuit court.  
However, Borst clearly objected to the use of Hills as an 
arbitrator on a number of occasions prior to the commencement of 
the arbitration.  Furthermore, Allstate represented to Borst and 
the court that it would be willing to choose a different 
arbitrator, but never followed through with these assurances.   
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
21 
 
¶41 In sum, we believe Borst sufficiently preserved his 
right to challenge the appointment of Hills in both a post-
arbitration 
motion 
with 
the 
circuit 
court 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(b) and on appeal to this court.  In other 
words, Borst did not forfeit any right to challenge Hills' 
appointment to the arbitration panel.    
¶42 Having disposed of Allstate's forfeiture argument, we 
next turn to the issue of whether there was evident partiality 
on the part of Hills, such that the arbitration award must be 
vacated.  In general, "[b]ecause the policy of this state is to 
foster arbitration as an alternative to litigation, arbitration 
awards are presumed to be valid.  An award will be set aside 
only upon a showing that one of the statutory grounds for 
vacatur 
exists." 
 
Richco 
Structures, 
82 
Wis. 2d at 
553.  
"Essentially the court's role is supervisory in nature——to 
insure that the parties receive what they bargained for when 
they agreed to resolve certain disputes through final and 
binding arbitration."  Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Madison Metro. 
Sch. Dist., 2004 WI App 54, ¶9, 271 Wis. 2d 697, 678 N.W.2d 311.   
¶43 In this case, Borst argues that the award must be 
vacated 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(b), 
which 
reads, 
in 
pertinent part, as follows:  "[T]he court in and for the county 
wherein the award was made must make an order vacating the award 
upon the application of any party to the arbitration: . . . (b) 
Where there was evident partiality or corruption on the part of 
the arbitrators, or either of them[.]"  The circuit court must 
vacate an arbitration award if the proponent proves, by clear 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
22 
 
and convincing evidence, that there was evident partiality on 
the part of the arbitrator.  DeBaker, 194 Wis. 2d at 117.  
Whether there is evident partiality on the part of the 
arbitrator is a question of law that we review de novo.  Id. at 
112.   
¶44 We hold that there was evident partiality on the part 
of Hills, such that vacation of the arbitration award is 
mandated.  That is, based on evidence that is clear, plain, and 
apparent, a reasonable person would have serious doubts about 
the impartiality of Hills, on a neutral arbitration panel.  In 
this case, the fact that Hills had a substantial, ongoing 
attorney/client relationship with Allstate leads us to conclude, 
as a matter of law, that Hills demonstrated evident partiality 
such that the arbitration award must be vacated. 
¶45 For 
our 
interpretation 
of 
the 
phrase 
evident 
partiality, we first turn to the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. 145, which addressed 
whether an arbitration award should be vacated on the grounds of 
evident partiality, albeit on the grounds of a failure of the 
arbitrator to disclose a relationship with a party.  In that 
case, a plurality of the Court suggested that arbitrators are to 
meet the ethical standards of federal judges and the arbitrators 
"not only must be unbiased but also must avoid even the 
appearance of bias."  Id. at 150.     
¶46 However, Justice White wrote a concurrence, in which 
he made it clear that the Court did not decide that arbitrators 
should be held to the standard of judges.  Id. (White, J., 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
23 
 
concurring).  
Furthermore, 
the concurrence 
concluded 
that 
arbitrators should not automatically be disqualified by a 
business relationship with a party as long as there is mandatory 
disclosure 
of 
relationships 
"where 
the 
arbitrator 
has 
a 
substantial interest in a firm which has done more than trivial 
business with a party[,]" id. at 151-52 (emphasis added), as the 
parties are then "free to reject the arbitrator or accept him 
with knowledge of the relationship and continuing faith in his 
objectivity."  Id. at 151. 
¶47 Although 
we have 
not officially 
adopted Justice 
White's concurrence as authoritative, we have noted the federal 
courts of appeals apparent preference for its reasoning.  
DeBaker, 194 Wis. 2d at 113 n.4.  In DeBaker, we analyzed 
whether an arbitrator demonstrated evident partiality because he 
did not disclose that he received campaign contributions from 
members of the law firm representing one of the parties.  Id. at 
108.  We concluded that the arbitrator did not demonstrate 
evident partiality within the meaning of § 788.10(1)(b) using 
the following standard: 
"[E]vident partiality" exists only when a reasonable 
person knowing the previously undisclosed information 
would 
have 
had 
"such 
doubts" 
regarding 
the 
impartiality of the arbitrator that the person would 
have taken action on the information.  "In other 
words, 
a 
reasonable 
person 
would 
conclude 
it 
'evident,' that is clear, plain, and apparent from the 
undisclosed information, that partiality is so likely 
that action was required."  Put another way, the 
standard is not simply that a reasonable person, upon 
learning 
of 
the 
undisclosed 
information, 
would 
investigate further.  The standard is whether the 
reasonable person, after further investigation, would 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
24 
 
conclude that "partiality is so likely that action was 
required." 
Id. 
at 
116-17 
(emphasis 
in 
original) 
(internal 
citation 
omitted).  We noted that this standard was in accord with the 
federal courts' construction of the phrase evident partiality.  
Id. at 117 n.5 (citing Morelite Const. Corp. v. N.Y. City Dist. 
Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984) 
("[W]e hold that 'evident partiality' within the meaning of 9 
U.S.C. § 10 will be found where a reasonable person would have 
to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the 
arbitration."); Toyota of Berkeley v. Auto. Salesman's Union, 
Local 1095, United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 834 F.2d 
751, 756 (9th Cir. 1987) (to show evident partiality on part of 
arbitrator party alleging bias must demonstrate facts that 
create a "reasonable impression of partiality"); Dowd v. First 
Omaha Sec. Corp., 495 N.W.2d 36, 43 (Neb. 1993) (adopting 
Morelite Const. test as appropriate for considering whether 
arbitrator was evidently partial under federal law)). 
¶48 In 
DeBaker, 
we 
essentially 
restated 
the 
test 
enunciated in Richco Structures, 82 Wis. 2d 547.  The holding of 
that case principally dealt with the adoption of a requirement 
for full disclosure at the outset of arbitration.  However, in 
adopting such a rule, the court stated as a rationale that it 
would help eliminate litigation where the courts would have to 
determine the fine line between whether "the relationships were 
casual, 
innocent, 
superficial, 
isolated, 
insignificant 
or 
inconsequential . . . or 
whether 
the 
relationships 
were 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
25 
 
substantial."  Id. at 560.  Thus, this language suggests a 
substantial relationship between an arbitrator and a party is 
indicative of evident partiality on the part of the arbitrator.  
See also Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 151-52 (White, J., 
concurring). 
¶49 In conformity with the language from our previous 
decisions in DeBaker and Richco Structures, and in the interest 
of fostering neutral arbitration panels, we adopt a similar 
standard for cases such as this where the disputed relationship 
was disclosed prior to the arbitration.  That is, the circuit 
court 
must 
vacate 
an 
arbitration 
award 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(b) due to evident partiality if based on 
evidence that is clear, plain, and apparent, a reasonable person 
would have serious doubts about the impartiality of the 
arbitrator. 
¶50 We first acknowledge that this standard must be taken 
with the perspective that in most instances, party-appointed 
arbitrators are paid by the party who selects the arbitrator.  
Indeed, in this case, the arbitration provision in the insurance 
contract provides as such.  However, this is a typical aspect of 
arbitration. 
¶51 Furthermore, in adopting this standard we acknowledge 
that arbitrators with experience in particular fields can be 
effective in arbitrations.  That is, Allstate is well within its 
right to appoint an arbitrator with a prominent background in 
insurance defense.  Indeed, such an arbitrator may have had 
indirect dealings with Allstate in the insurance industry.    
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
26 
 
However, 
in 
this 
case, 
there 
is 
a 
direct, 
substantial 
relationship between Hills and Allstate.  In other words, Hills 
has represented Allstate in a number of lawsuits and apparently 
will continue to represent Allstate in the future.   
¶52 In sum, we conclude that the ongoing attorney/client 
relationship between Allstate and Hills is of such a substantial 
nature that a reasonable person would have serious doubts about 
the partiality of Hills.  Therefore, as a matter of law, Hills 
was evidently partial under Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(b), and the 
arbitration award must be vacated.   
IV 
¶53 Finally, 
we 
address 
the 
third 
certified 
issue 
concerning the nature and extent of discovery permitted during 
an 
arbitration 
process, 
absent 
any 
express 
contractual 
provisions that detail the parties' intent.  Again, in this 
case, the arbitration provision of the contract is silent as to 
the terms of discovery, along with many other conditions of the 
arbitration. 
¶54 Borst 
essentially 
contends 
that 
discovery 
in 
arbitration is the exception and not the rule.  Borst argues 
that in an arbitration of a first party insurance claim, and 
absent extraordinary circumstances, the parties should simply 
submit their cases to the arbitrators.  Unfettered discovery, 
Borst argues, defeats the general purposes of arbitration to be 
faster, less formal, and less expensive.  See Employers Ins. of 
Wausau v. Jackson, 190 Wis. 2d 597, 610-11, 527 N.W.2d 681 
(1995).  In support of this argument, Borst points to the 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
27 
 
Wisconsin Arbitration Act, ch. 788, which makes no provisions 
for 
discovery 
apart 
from 
court-ordered 
depositions.  
Wis. Stat. § 788.07.  Furthermore, in this particular case, 
Borst maintains that there was no real need for discovery, given 
that there was no claim of permanent injury, the medical records 
and bills had been supplied, and Allstate claimed to have fully 
assessed liability before it made its offer.   
¶55 For its part, Allstate submits that because the 
legislature allowed for the taking of depositions during 
arbitration, then it surely would allow for other less costly 
forms of discovery.  The legislature, Allstate argues, left the 
extent of discovery to the discretion of the arbitrators.  
Allstate further contends that the arbitrators will be most 
familiar with the facts of the case and the need for appropriate 
discovery, and therefore should be left with this discretion.     
¶56 We 
conclude 
that 
arbitrators 
have 
no 
inherent 
authority to dictate the scope of discovery, and absent an 
express agreement to the contrary, the parties are limited to 
depositions as spelled out in Chapter 788.  We agree with the 
State Bar in that parties would be well-served to either: (1) 
explicitly address the scope of discovery and the procedures to 
resolve disputes regarding discovery; or (2) reference a set of 
established ADR provider rules that specify how discovery should 
be handled.   
¶57 In our view, arbitrators do not have the inherent 
authority to determine the necessity and scope of discovery 
allowed because, quite simply, there is no statutory authority 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
28 
 
providing 
for 
discovery 
outside 
of 
the 
procedures 
for 
depositions enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 788.07. 
¶58 Essentially, the main Wisconsin law we have to guide 
us on this issue is the language of Wis. Stat. § 788.07 itself:   
Depositions. 
Upon 
petition, 
approved 
by 
the 
arbitrators or by a majority of them, any court of 
record 
in 
and 
for 
the 
county 
in 
which 
such 
arbitrators, or a majority of them, are sitting may 
direct the taking of depositions to be used as 
evidence before the arbitrators, in the same manner 
and for the same reasons as provided by law for the 
taking of depositions in suits or proceedings pending 
in the courts of record in this state. 
This section does not speak to, for example, interrogatories, 
requests for production, or medical authorizations.  Indeed, 
even looking beyond this particular section, the Wisconsin 
Arbitration Act does not speak to any other form of discovery.  
To allow for the amount of discovery Allstate seeks, we would 
have to read more into § 788.07 than is present in the statutory 
language.  Such a decision would violate our well-settled canon 
of statutory interpretation that if the language is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. 
for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.       
¶59 Importantly, arbitration is a matter of contract.  See 
Jay E. Grenig & Nathan A. Fishbach, Methods of Practice, 2A 
Wisconsin Practice Series § 86.40 at 272 (4th ed. 2004).  
Therefore, the amount of authority vested in the appointed 
arbitrators and the specifics of the arbitration process are, in 
turn, governed by the contract.  Indeed, parties can contract to 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
29 
 
allow arbitrators a wide amount of latitude in managing the 
arbitration, subject to the constraints of the law.  See 
Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's 
London, 202 Wis. 2d 673, 552 N.W.2d 420 (Ct. App. 1996).  Simply 
put, without a contractual provision granting some form of 
authority on the arbitrator, there is no "inherent authority" 
under Wisconsin law that an arbitrator can fall back on.9  Thus, 
absent a contractual provision specifying how discovery will be 
handled, the parties are limited to the discovery procedures 
provided in the statutes.   
¶60 A grant of such "inherent authority" in arbitrators by 
this court would give us pause as we do not want to turn the 
arbitration process into another trial system.  We believe the 
better approach is to leave it to the parties, in the future, to 
ensure arbitration agreements are clearly drafted, and detail 
the 
necessary 
components 
and 
procedures 
of 
the 
desired 
arbitration. 
¶61 Additionally, the goal of arbitration is "to resolve 
the entire controversy out of court without the formality and 
expense that normally attaches to the judicial process."  Grenig 
                                                 
9 Some jurisdictions have determined that discovery during 
arbitration is at the discretion of the arbitrator.  See e.g., 
Rintin Corp., S.A. v. Domar, Ltd., 374 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 
(S.D. Fla. 2005); McCrary ex rel. McCrary v. Byrd, 559 S.E.2d 
821, 826 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).  However, there is authority for 
the opposite conclusion.  That is, when parties submit their 
disputes to arbitration, "they relinquish the right to certain 
procedural niceties which are normally associated with a formal 
trial.  One of these accoutrements is the right to pre-trial 
discovery."  Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389, 390 (4th Cir. 1980). 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
30 
 
& Fishbach, supra, § 86.40 at 272 (emphasis added).  We believe 
unfettered discovery, as the arbitration panel granted to the 
parties 
here, 
is 
contrary 
to 
the 
goals 
of 
arbitration, 
especially when considered with the relatively small amount of 
the underlying claim and the amount of information Allstate 
already had at its disposal prior to the arbitration.   
¶62 In this case, there were no set provisions in the 
insurance contract that detailed the terms of the discovery in 
the arbitration.10  Therefore, if the parties decide to conduct 
another arbitration, discovery will be limited to depositions as 
detailed in Wis. Stat. § 788.07.   
V 
¶63 In sum, we hold the following: (1) We adopt a 
presumption of impartiality among all arbitrators, whether named 
by the parties or not.  This presumption may be rebutted and an 
arbitrator may act as a non-neutral when the parties contract 
for non-neutral arbitrators or the arbitration rules otherwise 
provide for non-neutral arbitrators; (2) Evident partiality 
cannot be avoided simply by a full disclosure and a declaration 
of impartiality.  In challenges to an arbitrator based on 
                                                 
10 Allstate maintains in its brief that the rules of the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA) apply to this case.  This 
contention is problematic for two reasons.  First, it is unclear 
which set of arbitration rules promulgated by the AAA would be 
applicable.  Second, at oral argument, counsel for Allstate 
conceded that, as provided for in the contract, the parties went 
a "different route" for the arbitration than that provided by 
the AAA by choosing their own arbitrators.  As such, we conclude 
that no rules of the AAA are binding on our decision. 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
31 
 
evident partiality where the disputed relationship is fully 
disclosed, circuit courts must remove an arbitrator prior to the 
arbitration, 
or 
vacate 
an 
arbitration 
award 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(b) when a reasonable person would have 
serious doubts about the impartiality of the arbitrator; and (3) 
Arbitrators have no inherent authority to dictate the scope of 
discovery and absent an express agreement, the parties are 
limited to the procedure for depositions, as described in 
Wis. Stat. § 788.07.   
¶64 Applying 
the 
above 
standard, 
we 
conclude 
that  
Arbitrator Hills, who serves as Allstate's attorney on an 
ongoing basis, demonstrated evident partiality such that the 
arbitration award must be vacated; therefore, we reverse the 
order of the circuit court denying the motion to vacate and 
remand to the circuit court to vacate the arbitration award and 
order a new arbitration.   
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed, 
and the cause is remanded. 
 
 
No. 
2004AP2004   
 
 
 
1