Case Title: Gress v. Gress

Citation: 148 N.W.2d 166

Docket Number: 

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1967-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
148 N.W.2d 166 (1967) Dorothy GRESS, Plaintiff-Appellant-Respondent, v. Ray GRESS, Jr., Defendant-Respondent-Appellant. No. 8360. Supreme Court of North Dakota. January 19, 1967. *167 Greenwood & Swanson, Dickinson, for plaintiff. Reichert & Howe, Dickinson, for defendant. ERICKSTAD, Judge. The plaintiff, Dorothy Gress, appeals from the judgment of the District Court of Stark County which granted the defendant, Ray Gress, Jr., a divorce on his counter claim. She demands trial de novo. The judgment granted Mr. Gress a divorce on the ground of cruelty. Mr. Gress appeals from that part of the judgment which denied him a divorce upon the ground of adultery and demands trial de novo. At the time of the oral argument in this court he stated that he was not asking for any change in the judgment and that he cross appealed *168 merely so that the issue of adultery could be properly considered on this appeal. In her complaint dated March 8, 1965, Mrs. Gress asserted that she and the defendant were married at Dickinson, North Dakota, on August 13, 1951; that during the course of their marriage they adopted Heidi and Mark, 7 and 8 years of age respectively as of the date of the complaint; and that during the past several years of the marriage Mr. Gress had been guilty of extreme cruelty. That part of the complaint which alleged extreme cruelty resulting in mental and physical suffering reads as follows: In her prayer for relief Mrs. Gress asked that she be granted a divorce from Mr. Gress; that she be given custody of the minor children; and that Mr. Gress be required to pay a reasonable amount of money for the support and maintenance of the minor children and of her. In his answer Mr. Gress denied that he had been guilty of extreme cruelty and alleged that he had been obliged on occasion to defend himself from physical assaults made by Mrs. Gress. He also asserted that she was not a fit and proper person to have custody of their minor children. In his cross-complaint Mr. Gress asserted grounds for divorce as follows: That for the past several years, commencing on or about the 1st of September of each year to approximately June 1st of each year, the Plaintiff has regularly absented herself from the family home approximately three (3) nights a week between the hours of approximately 6:30 o'clock p. m., and 12:00, 1:00, 2:00 or 3:00 o'clock a. m., on the pretense of bowling. That although bowling during the early hours of each evening, subsequent to such bowling activities, the Plaintiff did, until late hours mentioned, hang about certain bars and lounges, eating, drinking and dancing, and in the company of other men. That on the night of December 27 or 28, 1963, this Cross-Complainant did discover the Plaintiff in an automobile in the alley behind the Esquire Club at approximately 2:00 o'clock a. m., in the embrace of another man. Plaintiff frequently during the past several years has been out of Dickinson to Bismarck, Minot, Miles City, Denver, Billings, Minneapolis, and other cities for the ostensible purpose of participating in bowling tournaments, and Cross-Complainant has been informed and advised that her conduct on such occasions and the hours she kept were such as to raise question as to her fidelity and observance of her marriage vows. In the prayer for relief of the answer and cross-complaint Mr. Gress asked that the plaintiff's action be dismissed; that he be granted a divorce from the plaintiff; and that he be given custody of the minor children and such other relief as the court deemed just and equitable. Mrs. Gress in reply denied all the material allegations of the answer and cross complaint. Following the trial the court concluded that Mrs. Gress was not entitled to a divorce, but that Mr. Gress was entitled to one because of the extreme cruelty inflicted upon him by her. It also concluded that the parties had an equity of $20,000 in certain real and personal property and that Mrs. Gress was entitled to $10,000 thereof, to be paid her in monthly installments of $100 per month plus interest at the rate of 4% per annum. As security for the payment of this money the court provided that Mrs. Gress should have a lien upon all the real property. In addition, it concluded that Mrs. Gress was entitled to all of her personal effects, clothing, and any items of household goods which she brought into the marriage or made during the marriage. It specifically ordered that she should have the sewing machine and the 1962 Mercury Comet automobile. The trial court ordered that Mr. Gress was to be the owner of all the rest of the real and personal property. It also ordered that Mr. Gress assume and be responsible for paying all debts and obligations owing by the parties, and that he pay Mrs. Gress $500 as attorney's fees. It is from the judgment entered pursuant to the conclusions of the trial court and its order that the appeals are taken. Mrs. Gress has filed fourteen specifications of error, but instead of discussing those specifications of error separately, she has chosen on appeal to divide her argument into three parts, namely: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's findings and conclusions; (2) the effect of the testimony of the unlicensed private detective; and (3) the custody of the children. As to the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence, it is Mrs. Gress's contention that the trial court erred in finding that she did not sustain the burden of proving cruelty on the part of Mr. Gress. Mrs. Gress bases her allegation of cruelty upon various alleged physical assaults committed by Mr. Gress upon her. Let us review the evidence in that respect. Mrs. Gress testified that on March 3, 1965, Mr. Gress became angry after going through a drawer which contained all of her bills and stated that she was ruining his credit by not paying the bills. She testified in part as follows: She testified that about a year prior thereto, in March or February, Mr. Gress physically assaulted her in their home. Her testimony in that regard reads as follows: She testified that in December 1963, after having lunch at Sims Cafe in Dickinson, she walked to where her car was parked behind Schilla's Hardware store and discovered another car parked beside hers, with a man sitting in it; that it was very cold that night and, thinking there was something wrong with the man, she opened his car door on the passenger's side, got into the car, and shook him to arouse him; and that at about that time Mr. Gress drove up in his car, got into the car with her and the man, and beat them. Her testimony in that regard follows: She testified that in June 1961 or 1962 Mr. Gress became very angry with her while in their home; that she told him she was going to leave him and went downstairs to get her suitcases; and that Mr. Gress followed her downstairs. She testified as follows concerning what occurred then: In connection with this incident she testified that Mr. Gress called Dr. Guloien the next morning, and that when the doctor came to the house Mr. Gress told the doctor that he did this because he loved her. She stated that as a result of this injury she had to have a cast on her hand for about six weeks. She testified that she explained the injury to her hand by telling everyone that she fell down the stairs because she didn't want people to know what was going on in their house and in their life. She also testified, without specifying the date, time, and place, that Mr. Gress had *172 beat, hit, and strangled her on other occasions, and that this placed her in fear of her life. Mr. Gress's testimony in respect to the December 1963 incident is as follows: Mr. Gress further testified concerning that incident as follows: Mr. Gress denied physically abusing his wife in any way on any other occasion and specifically denied physically abusing her in 1964 during his mother-in-law's visit. As for the circumstances surrounding the incident which occurred in June 1961 or 1962 he testified as follows: As for the March 3, 1965, incident, Mr. Gress testified that Mrs. Gress left home about 6:30 in the evening to bowl; that when she left he asked her to be home early; that at about 8:15 he received a telephone call from her; and that she said she was sorry that she could not come right home because they had a special bowling meeting, that she would stay at the Paragon and have a cup of coffee with M___ K___ and N___ E___ and some other members of their bowling league, and that it would probably be 10:00 or 10:30 or 11:00 before she could get home. He testified that at about 9:15 on his way to the mailbox at the depot in Dickinson he saw his wife's car speeding on Highway 22; that he followed her; that she drove her car into the alley behind the Ray Hotel; and that he stopped and asked her to get into the car, but that she refused and said she wouldn't go into the hotel with him and that she was going home. His testimony concerning what transpired when he reached home a short time later is as follows: The only corroboration of Mrs. Gress's testimony that Mr. Gress physically abused her was the testimony of Dr. H. A. Guloien. That testimony is as follows: Concerning the March 3, 1965, incident, Mrs. Gress testified that, not wanting to mope around the house and feel sorry for herself, she purchased a blouse that covered her arms, covered her face with makeup, and went bowling; and that while she was having coffee after bowling, a Mr. W___ L___ stopped by and asked her what happened. Her testimony in that regard is as follows: Viewing all of the evidence, the trial court concluded that Mrs. Gress had failed in her burden of proving extreme cruelty. In light of the contradictory testimony of the parties and of the fact that the witnesses appeared personally before the trial court, who had an opportunity to see and hear them testify and to note their demeanor and candor or lack of it, the trial court's findings are entitled to appreciable weight. In a decision rendered by this court in 1966 we said: In addition to finding that Mrs. Gress failed in proving extreme cruelty on the part of Mr. Gress, the trial court noted that all of the instances of cruelty alleged by Mrs. Gress were preceded by questionable and irregular conduct on her part and so were provoked by her. It was the trial court's view that provocation is a defense which nullifies grounds for divorce based upon acts resulting from it. It cited American Jurisprudence as expressing the general rule as follows: Mrs. Gress contends that the trial court erred in these conclusions. She asserts that the proper rule is as stated in Corpus Juris Secundum: It is also her view that if there was provocation, the retaliatory conduct was out of all proportion to the provocation. We note that Mrs. Gress's reference is taken from that part of Corpus Juris Secundum which discusses the effect of excessive retaliation. The beginning sentence of that discussion states that provocation by a complainant will not justify nor excuse excessive cruelty or indignities disproportionate to the provocation. In that respect we note that in a recent decision the Supreme Court of Montana held that it was for the trial court to determine whether sufficient provocation existed and whether the retaliatory action was out of proportion to the provocation. We concur with the trial court in its conclusion that the general rule as stated by it is the correct rule and that it is applicable in this case. The conduct of Mrs. Gress, in drinking and dancing with other men in bars in Mr. Gress's absence until the late hours on numerous and quite regular occasions against his will, was certainly provocative. We conclude that the evidence is insufficient to prove that Mr. Gress's conduct was out of proportion to the provocation. In this latter conclusion we give appreciable weight to the trial court's findings. We also conclude that Mrs. Gress failed to sustain the burden of proving extreme cruelty on the part of Mr. Gress. The next issue we must consider is the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's finding of the infliction of extreme cruelty on Mr. Gress by Mrs. Gress. Here again we apply the rule that the trial court's findings are entitled to appreciable weight, especially when the parties have appeared before the trial court and have testified in person. It is our view that Mrs. Gress did inflict extreme cruelty upon Mr. Gress. The cross-examination of Mrs. Gress discloses that she participated in league bowling between three and four nights a week, on Monday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, during the bowling season, which runs from September until April or the first part of May; that the Friday evening bowling was the mixed-couple league in which she bowled with her husband; that the sponsors of her teams were the Main Bar, the Ray Hotel, Canadian Club, and the Esquire Club; that on the evenings when she bowled and her husband was not at home, she left her two children with babysitters; that she usually left home between 6:30 and 6:45 in the evening and unless she bowled two shifts in the evening, her bowling was concluded about 9:15 or 9:30; that sometimes after bowling she would stop at the Ray Hotel or the Esquire Club to have one or two drinks, but that this would not normally occur more than twice a month; that when she did this, she would perhaps not get home until 11:00 or 12:00; and that sometimes, following bowling, she would go out with some of the other women on the team to the Esquire Club for steak, and on those occasions she would perhaps not get home until 1:00 a. m. *177 She disclosed that on occasion men would sit down in the bars with her and the other women and perhaps buy them a round of drinks, and that she may perhaps have inadvertently walked out of the bars with men other than her husband. She conceded that she had seen Mr. W___ L___ on a number of occasions; and that she had called him on the telephone to arrange to meet him about five blocks north of Main Street in Dickinson, her intended purpose being to warn him that Mr. Gress had told her that if he ever saw Mr. L___ with her again, he would kill them both, and she wanted Mr. L___ to realize that Mr. Gress was serious. She testified that she did meet Mr. L___ at about 9:00 on the evening of April 24 at the appointed place and that she got into his car; that she talked about the situation between Mr. Gress and herself; and that they then drove out into the country and parked and talked for a few minutes. Her testimony in that respect reads as follows: She testified that Mr. Gress said that she could bowl all she wanted to, but that he would like her to come home after she finished bowling; and that if he had asked her to please come home or had requested her in a nice way to do so, she would have, *178 but that "something set me off when he demanded of me and I deliberately stayed away." She said that her staying away was in defiance of his attitude. Mr. Gress testified that Mrs. Gress returned to their home intoxicated two or three times a week over the preceding five years; that she arrived home at 12:00, 1:00, 2:00 o'clock, and sometimes much later; that she would be very sick when she arrived home, and that if he said anything there would be an argument; that when she arrived home, she spent a lot of time in the bathroom vomiting; and that on one occasion he observed her at the hotel, dancing with another man in such a manner as to cause him embarrassment. Other witnesses testified to Mrs. Gress's late-night drinking, dancing, and being in the company of men other than her husband. Two babysitters, one 14-year-old boy and one 19-year-old boy, who stayed with the children at night when Mrs. Gress was out, testified that she was regularly out late at night and regularly received telephone calls from men; a barmaid testified that she observed Mrs. Gress in a bar in Wibaux, Montana, when Mrs. Gress danced and with another woman companion absented herself from the bar for approximately 45 minutes with two male bartenders; a male witness testified that in the year 1963 he observed Mrs. Gress enter bars alone at night in Dickinson and that on some of these occasions she drank liquor with him. In light of the trial court's findings, which are entitled to appreciable weight, we conclude that the evidence does establish cruelty on the part of Mrs. Gress of a sufficient degree to justify the trial court's granting of the divorce to Mr. Gress. We need not discuss at length the issue arising out of the fact that the trial court, over the objection of Mrs. Gress, admitted into evidence testimony on the part of a private detective who was licensed in the State of Montana but was not licensed in the State of North Dakota. Mrs. Gress contends that because he was not licensed in North Dakota, his testimony should not have been received in evidence. As the evidence of the unlicensed private detective related only to what he saw in the process of trailing W___ L___ and Mrs. Gress, particularly on the night of April 24, and, as Mrs. Gress's testimony on cross-examination, taken before the detective testified, is for the most part to the same effect as the detective's testimony, his testimony may be completely disregarded without affecting the result. As for the issue of adultery, without a lengthy discussion of the facts or of the relative law, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to establish adultery on the part of Mrs. Gress. Nevertheless, we conclude that the court was correct in granting custody of the minor children to Mr. Gress. Our statute on custody reads as follows: North Dakota Century Code. In a 1962 decision of this court, we said: We believe that Mrs. Gress has demonstrated her lack of concern for her children by voluntarily, without necessity, leaving them with babysitters from 6:30 in the evening to as late as 2:00 in the morning *179 on numerous occasions while she engaged in bowling, drinking, dancing, and eating. Not only did she deprive the children of her care while absent from them, but of necessity she also reduced the quality of care she could give them during the day while she rested and recovered from her evenings of overindulgence. We have no assurance that she will conduct herself any differently in the future. In support of her contention that she should be given custody of the children, especially because of their tender years, she refers us to the following quotation from Corpis Juris Secundum: However, the sentence quoted continues as follows: It should be noted that we have no such statute. Further, we believe that the words "all things being equal" must be recognized as an important part of the rule. All things are not equal in this case. Especially significant is a later part of the same text: Mr. Gress assured the trial court that he had made arrangements with a widowed aunt, who has raised her family, to move into his home and take care of the children. This arrangement may not be ideal, considering the difference in age between the aunt and the minor children, but then again it must be noted that the situation as it existed while Mrs. Gress was in the home and had the responsibilities of motherhood were not ideal, either. The trial court has continuing jurisdiction in custody matters, and thus if conditions should change or if Mr. Gress should be unable to make proper arrangements for the care of the minor children, the trial court can, if necessary, make other arrangements for the custody of the children. In a 1950 decision concerning custody of two minor children this court said: In this case it is clear that the trial court's discretion was carefully and reasonably exercised. We conclude therefore that it is for the best interests of the children that they be in the custody of Mr. Gress at this time. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in all respects. TEIGEN, C. J., and STRUTZ and KNUDSON, JJ., concur. PAULSON, J., not being a member of the Court at the time of submission of this case, did not participate.