Case Title: TERRY v. SWEENEY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-09-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
TERRY v. SWEENEY2000 WY 17510 P.3d 554Case Number: 99-327Decided: 09/06/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
CHRISTINA L. TERRY, 
Appellant (Plaintiff),v. TODD E. SWEENEY, Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Natrona County The Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, 
Judge

Representing 
Appellant: Stephen R. Winship of 
Winship & Winship, P.C., Casper, Wyoming.Representing Appellee: 
John A. Sundahl and Brian J. Hanify of Sundahl, Powers, Kapp & Martin, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, GOLDEN, HILL & KITE, JJ. 

KITE, 
Justice.

[¶1] This appeal 
is taken from several trial court orders issued during the course of 
Plaintiff-Appellant Christina L. Terry's (Terry) personal injury action 
including orders granting a mistrial, awarding Defendant-Appellee Todd E. 
Sweeney (Sweeney) costs attendant to mistrial to be paid by Terry, and 
dismissing the action due to failure to pay the assessed costs. Finding no error 
or abuse of discretion, we affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] This 
statement of the issues is found in Terry's brief:

1. When the district 
court conditions a litigant's access and ability to have her cause of action 
heard upon payment of costs in a sum that the district court is aware that the 
litigant cannot afford to pay, ha[ve] the litigant's state and federal 
constitutional rights of access to the courts, due process, and equal protection 
been improperly denied[?]

2. Whether the district 
court erred in declaring a mistrial because of the inadvertent reference by one 
of the Plaintiffs to the possibility that Defendant had liability 
insurance.

3. Whether the district 
court has any statutory or inherent power to assess attorney fees and costs 
resulting from a mistrial, and then to require payment of these fees and costs, 
prior to allowing the retrial of the matter.

4. If the assessment of 
fees and costs was proper, should it have been assessed only against the 
Plaintiff, Dale Sprague[?]

5. Whether the district 
court should have delayed assessing costs resulting from the mistrial by [not] 
requiring their payment until after the retrial of the 
matter.

6. When the district 
court made the payment of Defendant's fees and costs from the mistrial a 
precondition to a retrial of the matters, did the district court abuse its 
discretion by not allowing Plaintiffs' counsel to advance said 
costs[?]

7. Whether the district 
court erred by allowing Defendant to refer to the fact that Plaintiff had filed 
several worker[']s compensation claims for injuries not related to the subject 
injury in order to infer to the jury that she was "claims 
minded."

8. Whether the district 
court erred by denying Plaintiffs' request to present expert rebuttal 
testimony.

[¶3] Sweeney 
restates the issues in his brief as follows:

1. Whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in granting a mistrial[.]

2. Whether sanctions 
directed to costs and attorney's fees associated with preparation for a 
particular jury trial may be properly imposed for a 
mistrial.

3. Whether, given the 
totality of the circumstances, it was appropriate to dismiss with prejudice for 
failure to prosecute and to comply with prior orders of the 
Court.

4. Whether imposition of 
sanctions denies access to the courts, procedural due process or equal 
protection.

5. Whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in holding that evidence relating to Worker's 
Compensation claims were admissible and in denying leave to present rebuttal 
testimony.

FACTS

[¶4] On December 
23, 1994, Terry and her then-husband, Dale E. Sprague (Sprague), filed suit for 
damages against Sweeney, alleging his negligence caused a motor vehicle accident 
on April 19, 1993. The trial court granted a motion in limine which precluded 
the plaintiffs from making any reference to Sweeney having insurance coverage 
pursuant to W.R.E. 411. The court qualified the preclusion to permit limited 
inquiry of jurors regarding their professional relationships with insurance 
companies and the threshold questions as allowed under Wardell v. McMillan, 844 P.2d 1052, 1063 (Wyo. 1992). During jury selection, Sweeney moved for a 
mistrial, asserting a violation of the court's order with regard to insurance 
references. The motion was denied. Thereafter, Sprague, as the first witness, 
recounted a conversation between Terry and Sweeney just subsequent to the 
vehicle accident as follows:

[¶5] Chris first 
asked him what - what the hell he thought he was doing. Todd was very 
apologetic, apologizing for hitting us. He kept saying that there was something 
wrong with the brakes.

[¶6] And when 
asked, you know, for any information, all he would say is - would tell Chris was 
what his first name was, my name is Todd, but I don't know anything about the 
insurance; I can't give you that information, and that - that his father 
-

[¶7] (Emphasis 
added.) Sweeney again moved for a mistrial on the basis of the reference to 
insurance coverage. This motion was granted and subsequently memorialized in a 
written order filed November 6, 1996. On November 19, 1996, Sweeney filed 
motions requesting costs1 in the amount of $9,469.80 and 
sanctions be assessed against the plaintiffs because of the mistrial. A hearing 
was held December 2, 1996, and the Order Awarding Costs, filed December 3, 1996, 
reflected in relevant part as follows: "[T]he Court finding that the Defendant's 
Amended Motion for Costs and Sanctions should be granted based upon 
Plaintiffs['] violation of t he Court's Order on Pending Motions in this case, 
which violation resulted in the mistrial of the jury trial in the action." 
(Emphasis added.) And further:

[¶8] NOW, 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant's Amended Motion for Costs and 
Sanctions is hereby granted, and that costs in the total sum of $2,756.702 are hereby awarded in favor of 
Defendant . . . Sweeney, and against Plaintiffs . . . Terry and . . . Sprague, 
for Plaintiffs['] violation of the Court's Order on Pending Motions resulting in 
the mistrial of the jury trial in this case on October 28, 1996; (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶10] On 
December 10, 1996, the plaintiffs filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Order 
Awarding Costs, asserting that Terry should not be held jointly and severally 
liable with Sprague for the award because she did not violate the trial court's 
order. Subsequent to a hearing held March 14, 1997, the court found in its Order 
on Pending Motions,3 filed March 18, 1997, as 
follows:

[¶11] [T]he 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend Order Awarding Costs should be denied since 
the mistrial which resulted in the award of costs and attorney's fees against 
the Plaintiffs occurred in the presentation of the case in chief being presented 
(a) on behalf of both Plaintiffs, and (b) in support of the Amended Complaint 
seeking damages on behalf of both Plaintiffs; . . .

[¶12] Based on 
this reasoning, the trial court denied the plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend 
Order Awarding Costs.

[¶13] In the 
next two plus years, multiple motions were filed by the parties requesting 
respectively that the matter be set for trial or dismissed due to lack of 
payment of the sanction costs, all of which the trial court denied. At one 
point, the trial court set a payment deadline for the plaintiffs to pay the 
ordered costs which was not met. Thereafter, the trial court continued the trial 
indefinitely pending payment and subsequently set a second and final payment 
deadline. During these protracted proceedings, the trial court denied the 
plaintiffs' counsel's request to pay the costs himself. The court made it clear 
that the plaintiffs were personally responsible for payment of the costs as they 
were the parties responsible for the mistrial. The plaintiffs also filed a 
Petition for Writ of Review with this Court on July 7, 1997, which was denied on 
August 5, 1997. Terry v. District Court for Seventh Judicial District, No. 
97-194. The last court ordered payment deadline of August 31, 1999, was not met, 
and Sweeney filed a Renewed Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice on September 1, 
1999. On November 1, 1999, nearly three years after the original order setting 
out the sanction, the trial court entered an Order of Dismissal, dismissing the 
plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. Terry then appealed to this 
Court.

DISCUSSION

A. Declarati on of 
Mistrial

[¶14] "The 
court's ruling on a motion for mistrial . . . is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion." Espinoza v. State, 969 P.2d 542, 546 (Wyo. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 59 (1999); see also Ross v. State, 930 P.2d 965, 968 (Wyo. 1996). 
"`Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions 
drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard 
to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously."' Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Martin 
v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)); see also Stroup v. Oedekoven, 995 P.2d 125, 128 (Wyo. 1999).

[¶15] In 
determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, we focus on the 
"reasonableness of the choice made by the trial court." Vaughn, 962 P.2d 149, 
151 (Wyo. 1998). If the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did and the 
ruling is one based on sound judgment with regard to what is right under the 
circumstances, it will not be disturbed absent a showing that some facet of the 
ruling is arbitrary or capricious.

[¶16] Jordan v. 
Brackin, 992 P.2d 1096, 1098 (Wyo. 1999).

[¶17] An Order 
on Pending Motions, issued three days before the trial, specifically precluded 
evidence related to whether a person was or was not insured pursuant to W.R.E. 
411.4 The purpose of W.R.E. 411 "is to 
prevent the deliberate introduction of evidence of liability insurance coverage 
in tort actions premised on negligence." Parker v. Artery, 889 P.2d 520, 526 
(Wyo. 1995).

[¶18] During the 
testimony of the plaintiffs' first witness, Co-Plaintiff Sprague made a specific 
reference to insurance. Sweeney's counsel promptly moved for a mistrial, which 
the trial court granted. In reliance on Elite Cleaners and Tailors, Inc. v. 
Gentry, 510 P.2d 784 (Wyo. 1973), Terry urges that the reference to insurance 
was inadvertent and the trial court could have taken a less onerous action than 
granting a mistrial. The determination of whether Sprague's statement was 
inadvertent or intentional is one best left to the trial court. Absent the 
opportunity to observe the witness' demeanor in the courtroom setting, a review 
of the transcript excerpt reveals only the bare words devoid of the context and 
true circumstance as existed in the courtroom on the day and hour it occurred. 
Whether or not the same sanction would be deemed warranted by this Court, the 
evaluation is for the trial court, and an appellate court cannot easily 
second-guess the conclusions of the decision maker who heard and observed the 
witnesses. Gresham v. State, 708 P.2d 49, 56 (Wyo. 1985). It seems apparent 
that, even if the initial decision was a knee-jerk reaction, the court had 
sufficient time in the intervening days between the original declaration of a 
mistrial and issuance of the written order to fully reconsider its 
ruling.

[¶19] In Elite 
Cleaners and Tailors, Inc., the trial court denied the motion for mistrial under 
similar circumstances, and this Court presumed that the trial court found the 
term "insurance" was inadvertently and not deliberately injected into the 
record. The converse situation presents itself here. Based on the trial court's 
swift action at trial and subsequent issuance of a written Order Granting 
Mistrial, we presume that the court found Sprague's mention of the term 
"insurance" to be deliberate. Further, we presume that, in declaring a mistrial, 
the trial court determined it was the necessary and least onerous action 
required to cure any possible prejudice. The trial court has the authority to 
take such action "by virtue of its inherent power and duty to assure a fair and 
impartial trial." Engle v. State, 821 P.2d 1285, 1289 (Wyo. 1991). Although 
declaration of a mistrial is a harsh remedy and we do not endorse its use in any 
rote or mechanical manner, this Court has recognized that "[t]here comes a time 
. . . if the misconduct is sufficiently severe, damage control by objection and 
special instruction may not suffice to avoid mistrial or reversal." Barela v. 
State, 787 P.2d 82, 87 (Wyo. 1990). For these reasons, "we are unwilling to 
second-guess the court's ruling under these circumstances; consequently, we find 
no abuse of discretion." Brown v. State, 953 P.2d 1170, 1178 (Wyo. 
1998).

[¶20] B. 
Imposition of Sanction Costs; Refusal to Limit Sanction to One Co-Plaintiff; 
Refusal to Delay Imposition of Sanction Pending Retrial; Refusal to Permit 
Counsel to Pay Sanction Costs on Behalf of Clients

[¶21] Terry 
takes issue with the imposition of the sanction itself; the trial court's 
refusal to limit the sanction to her co-plaintiff, Sprague, who violated the 
order by his testimony; the trial court's refusal to delay imposition pending 
retrial; and the trial court's refusal to permit counsel to pay the sanction on 
his clients' behalf. Terry essentially argues the trial court lacked authority 
through either rule or statute to impose the costs sanction against her for 
causing the mistrial. We believe the authority for both the sanction and the 
method of assessment is founded in the inherent authority of all courts to "take 
actions reasonably necessary to administer justice efficiently, fairly, and 
economically and [to ensure] the court's existence, dignity, and functions."5 20 
Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 43 at 363 (1995). As this Court noted in Bi-Rite Package, 
Inc. v. District Court of Ninth Judicial District of Fremont County, 735 P.2d 709, 714 (Wyo. 1987) (emphasis added):

[¶22] It is 
unquestioned that courts have inherent powers beyond those specified in rules 
and statutes that are absolutely necessary to the courts' ability to perform the 
functions for which they were created. . . . .

[¶23] [I]t is 
said that courts possess an inherent power described as

"an extremely narrow 
range of authority involving activity so fundamental to the essence of a court 
as a constitutional tribunal that to divest the court of absolute command within 
this sphere is really to render practically meaningless the terms `court' and 
`judicial power.'" Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 562, 77 
A.L.R.Fed. 751 (3rd Cir. 1985).

[¶24] This power 
is essential to the separation of powers concept and allows a court to act 
notwithstanding contrary legislative direction. There is also an inherent power 
that is described as necessary to the efficient functioning and prompt and just 
disposition of litigation and business of the court . . . . Finally, there is an 
inherent power to take such action as is useful to the efficient functioning of 
the court.

[¶25] The record 
contains no transcripts of the trial, except the excerpt of Sprague's brief 
testimony previously referenced, and contains no transcripts for any of the 
subsequent related hearings. As this evidence is unavailable, we must assume the 
trial court conducted itself in a reasonable and rational manner. The trial 
court issued a detailed Order Granting Mistrial and subsequent Order Awarding 
Costs by which it clearly justified the declaration of mistrial and the sanction 
on the basis of the plaintiffs' violation of the pretrial order. The trial 
court's reduction of the attorney fees by more than $6,000 demonstrates its 
careful review. Based on the trial court's actions, there is a presumption that 
it determined the violation of its pretrial order to be 
deliberate.

[¶26] The 
court's reasons for refusing to limit the sanction to Sprague were clearly 
spelled out. The violation of the pretrial order "occurred in the presentation 
of the case in chief being presented (a) on behalf of both Plaintiffs, and (b) 
in support of the Amended Complaint seeking damages on behalf of both 
Plaintiffs." (Emphasis added.) The court logically concluded that the 
plaintiffs, acting in concert to obtain damages, should be sanctioned in concert 
for misconduct.

[¶27] Terry also 
asserts error that the trial court did not delay imposition of the costs pending 
retrial. To this Court, the sanction appears aimed at bringing the parties into 
essentially the same financial position with regard to the litigation as they 
held prior to the mistrial. Further, it appears to be intended to deter the 
plaintiffs from again violating a trial court order with impunity. Neither of 
these purposes would be met if assessment were withheld pending 
retrial.

[¶28] Terry 
argues the trial court erred in refusing to permit her counsel to pay the costs 
on behalf of his clients. The trial court made it clear that the sanction was to 
be paid by the plaintiffs because the mistrial was a direct consequence of their 
violation of the pretrial order. The intended deterrent effect of the sanction 
on Terry would have been undermined by permitting her counsel to cover the 
payment.

[¶29] On the 
basis of these particular facts and circumstances, we find the trial court acted 
within its inherent authority to ensure its efficient functioning and the prompt 
and just disposition of litigation. "An inherent power to impose the sanctions 
has been recognized because of the special circumstances, although support for 
those sanctions may not be found in particular rules and legislative 
enactments." Bi-Rite Package, Inc., 735 P.2d  at 716. As the sanction was within 
the trial court's inherent authority, so too was the method and manner of 
assessment.

C. Access to the 
Courts

[¶30] Terry 
contends the trial court's requirement that she pay the sanction costs prior to 
a new trial constituted denial of access to the courts. Despite Terry's 
extensive review of the case law pertaining to access to the courts, equal 
protection, and due process, the position asserted is not well founded in the 
facts. We acknowledge "that the right to access to the courts is a fundamental 
right pursuant to Article 1, Section 8" of the Wyoming Constitution. Mills v. 
Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 54 (Wyo. 1992). However, no convoluted reasoning or 
twisted view of the facts will change what is apparent on the face of the 
record. Terry had access to the courts when she filed her personal injury 
action, conducted discovery, had a trial scheduled and pretrial orders issued, 
and, on October 28, 1996, began her trial in court. Although the plaintiffs were 
literally in court, having been provided the requisite access, Sprague 
deliberately violated a court order, and a mistrial was 
declared.

[¶31] It is 
generally recognized that a court does not violate an open courts provision when 
it acts to punish conduct that disrupts the orderly administration of justice. 
See, e.g., Jensen v. Zuern, 517 N.W.2d 118, 129 (N.D. Ct. App. 1994); Williams 
v. State, 405 N.W.2d 615, 624-25 (N.D. 1987); Protect Our Mountain Environment, 
Inc. v. District Court in and for County of Jefferson, 677 P.2d 1361, 1367 n. 6 
(Colo. 1984) (en banc); Eismann v. Miller, 619 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Idaho 1980). The 
record reflects no effort by Terry to make any level of payment, no matter how 
small. It is specious to argue that, despite an almost three-year grace period, 
the court's sanction constituted denial of access to the courts to a plaintiff 
who was already physically in court and who made no apparent efforts to comply 
with its orders. Holding as Terry requests could be interpreted to mean that 
individuals of limited resources can violate court orders with impunity and 
suffer no consequence while those of more substantial resources shall bear the 
cost. This would be an equal protection issue. Or perhaps no one, regardless of 
means, shall bear the cost. On this point, we agree with the trial court when it 
stated: "If a party is allowed to disregard the orders of the court, then surely 
our entire justice system will fail." We find no denial of access or abuse of 
discretion in the trial court requiring payment of the sanction costs prior to 
resetting the matter for trial.

D. 
Dismissal

[¶32] Finally, 
we turn to the question of the propriety of the dismissal. We stated in Mora v. 
Husky Oil Company, 611 P.2d 842, 846 (Wyo. 1980) (citation omitted): "Broad 
discretion is given to the trial court with regard to sanctions, even to the 
point of dismissing the action." It is well established that a court has the 
inherent authority to dismiss a matter on its own motion for lack of 
prosecution. WR v. Natrona County Department of Family Services (In re DG), 916 P.2d 991, 994 (Wyo. 1996); Randolph v. Hays, 665 P.2d 500, 503 (Wyo. 1983). 
Here, the trial court waited more than thirty-four months after issuance of the 
order of sanction and allowed two payment deadlines to pass before it granted 
the Renewed Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice. Even at that, the order did not 
issue for a full two months from the date of the filing of the Renewed Motion to 
Dismiss with Prejudice. We can only speculate how the trial court's evident 
restraint and patience might have been impacted had Terry made even the most 
modest effort to comply. Although dismissal is a harsh penalty, under the 
specific circumstances of this case, we conclude the trial court was within its 
inherent authority and there was no abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION

[¶33] We do not 
need to address the remaining issues raised by Terry, namely the worker's 
compensation motion in limine ruling and the request to present expert 
testimony, as they had relevance only in the event of a 
retrial.

[¶34] 
Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 As set out 
in the Amended Motion for Costs and Sanctions, Sweeney asserted the costs 
expended in preparation for trial, which could not be used in a subsequent 
trial, included $9,091 in lost fee time and $378.80 for lost costs of subpoenas, 
transcripts, and service fees.

2 Pursuant to 
the Order Awarding Costs, the trial court reduced the lost fee time from $9,091, 
as requested in the Amended Motion for Costs and Sanctions, to $2,377.90 and 
awarded the full lost costs requested of $378.80.

3 The court 
also denied a Motion for Clarification in the March 18, 1997, Order on Pending 
Motions. That aspect of the order is not addressed as it is not relevant to this 
appeal.

4 As noted in 
the review of the facts, the preclusion against the mention of insurance 
coverage was qualified in the Order on Pending Motions to permit limited inquiry 
of jurors regarding their professional relationships with insurance companies 
and the threshold questions as allowed under Wardell, 844 P.2d  at 
1063.

5 This Court 
has held that the following sanctions have their basis in the concept of the 
court's inherent authority: punishment for contempt, Bi-Rite Package, Inc. v. 
District Court of Ninth Judicial District of Fremont County, 735 P.2d 709, 712 
(Wyo. 1987); dismissal for lack of prosecution, Randolph v. Hays, 665 P.2d 500, 
503 (Wyo. 1983); sanction to ensure fair and impartial trial, Engle, 821 P.2d  at 
1289; discipline of counsel for failure to comply with pretrial conference 
orders, Glatter v. American National Bank of Powell, 675 P.2d 642, 644 (Wyo. 
1984); sanction for violation of sequestration order, Cook v. State, No. 98-332, 
slip op. at 7-8 (Wyo. June 5, 2000); and entry of default judgment, Ruwart v. 
Wagner, 880 P.2d 586, 592 (Wyo. 1994).