Case Title: In the Matter of Kelley

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13145

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-03-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13145 
 
IN THE MATTER OF MICHAEL J. KELLEY. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 7, 2022. – March 16, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Attorney at Law, Disciplinary proceeding, Attorney-client 
relationship, Use of confidence or secret, Public 
reprimand.  Evidence, Presumptions and burden of proof.  
Words, "Generally known." 
 
 
 
Information filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the 
county of Suffolk on September 15, 2020. 
 
The case was reported by Lowy, J. 
 
 
Pamela A. Harbeson, Assistant Bar Counsel. 
Joseph S. Berman for Board of Bar Overseers. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  The Board of Bar Overseers (board) voted to 
publicly reprimand the respondent, Michael J. Kelley, for 
failing to communicate adequately with a client and for failing 
to deliver various clients' files to successor counsel in a 
timely fashion.  However, the board concluded that bar counsel 
2 
 
had failed to prove an additional charge, namely, that the 
respondent had disclosed confidential information about a client 
in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6 (a), as amended, 474 Mass. 
1301 (2016) (rule 1.6 [a]), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.9 (c), as 
appearing in 471 Mass. 1359 (2015) (rule 1.9 [c]).  Bar counsel 
demanded that an information be filed with the county court. 
The primary issue before us is the role of the "generally 
known" analysis in deciding whether an attorney has disclosed 
confidential information improperly.  See rule 1.6 comment 3A 
(comment 3A) ("'Confidential information' does not ordinarily 
include . . . information that is generally known in the local 
community or in the trade, field or profession to which the 
information relates").  We conclude that the question whether 
information is "generally known" is, when important, part of bar 
counsel's burden of proof.  Bar counsel here did not provide 
sufficient evidence that the respondent disclosed confidential 
information because bar counsel did not prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the information was not generally known.  
Considering the respondent's other professional misconduct, 
however, we agree with the board that the respondent should be 
publicly reprimanded. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts relevant to the 
respondent's purported disclosure of confidential information 
that are supported by substantial evidence.  See S.J.C. Rule 
3 
 
4:01, § 8 (6), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1310 (2009).  We leave 
for later discussion the facts pertaining to the respondent's 
other alleged misconduct, which involved different clients. 
 
An individual contacted the respondent seeking assistance 
in appealing from the Social Security Administration's denial of 
her brother's claim for disability benefits.  The brother 
(client) signed a fee agreement with the respondent.  The 
respondent filed an appeal on the client's behalf in Federal 
District Court, and a judge in that court subsequently issued an 
order stating that the client either had to pay a filing fee or 
move for leave to proceed without paying the fee.  The 
respondent attempted to contact the client multiple times about 
signing the paperwork necessary for seeking leave to waive the 
filing fee, and he moved successfully to enlarge the time for 
filing the paperwork; the client, however, never responded.  A 
Federal District Court judge dismissed the action without 
prejudice on May 19, 2014.  The respondent notified the client 
of the dismissal. 
Around two years later, the client's sister contacted the 
Federal District Court to check the appeal's status and learned 
that the appeal had been dismissed.  After failing to find a 
different attorney to represent her brother, the client's 
sister, who was herself an attorney, filed a motion to vacate 
the dismissal.  The motion asserted that the client's sister had 
4 
 
made several attempts to contact the respondent regarding the 
status of her brother's case but had received no response from 
him, and that she therefore did not learn about the dismissal 
until she contacted the court.  The motion also stated that the 
respondent had said he would return the client's file to the 
client but had not done so. 
The respondent filed a "response" to the motion to vacate 
on behalf of himself and not in support of any party.  The 
affidavit attached to the response stated, among other things, 
that "[o]n February 12, 2016, [the client] was arrested by the 
. . . [p]olice for allegedly shoplifting and possession of Class 
A drugs," and "[o]n February 20, 2017, [the client] was arrested 
by the . . . [p]olice for allegedly assaulting and battering a 
person [sixty] or older or disabled."  The affidavit suggested, 
and an earlier letter from the respondent to the client's sister 
had asserted, that the respondent believed that the client's 
sister had become interested in the client's claim for 
disability benefits only after the client had been arrested. 
Bar counsel filed a petition for discipline against the 
respondent, alleging that the respondent impermissibly had 
disclosed confidential information by including the client's 
arrest history in the affidavit.  In his initial answer to the 
board's petition for discipline, which he later amended on the 
board's request, the respondent explained that he had 
5 
 
"discovered the circumstances of [the client]'s [first] arrest 
by Googling his name . . . .  The information was contained 
within the [p]olice [b]lotter of [the client's] home town 
newspaper . . . ."  The respondent claimed that he had learned 
about the client's second arrest in the same manner. 
An evidentiary hearing was held before a hearing committee 
of the board.  The respondent did not provide sworn testimony at 
the hearing, at which he represented himself.  In his opening 
statement, however, he argued that the information about the 
client's arrests came "from the [town's] local paper.  It was 
nothing that [the client] had told me or his sister had told 
me."  He made a similar statement in his closing argument.  When 
the respondent asked the sister on cross-examination whether the 
arrests "were published in the local paper," the sister 
testified, "I didn't personally see them in the paper.  I can't 
really answer . . . that." 
After the hearing, the hearing committee issued a report 
concluding that the respondent had disclosed confidential 
information in violation of the rules of professional conduct.  
The hearing committee observed that although the respondent had 
suggested during his opening statement and while questioning the 
client's sister that he had learned about the information at 
issue from a local newspaper, there was no evidence proving as 
much.  Accordingly, the hearing committee decided, citing 
6 
 
comment 3A, that there was no evidence that the information was 
"generally publicized or known within the local community, or 
that [it was] a matter of widespread publicity, so as to except 
the information from the definition of 'confidential 
information.'"  The hearing committee ultimately recommended, 
based on the disclosure of confidential information and other 
misconduct against different clients (the latter of which is 
discussed infra) that the respondent be suspended for ninety 
days and be required to pass the multistate professional 
responsibility examination. 
 
Neither the respondent nor bar counsel appealed from the 
hearing committee's decision to the board.  However, after 
reviewing the matter, the board made a preliminary determination 
to reject the hearing committee's report and recommendation.  It 
gave the parties the opportunity to brief three issues:  "(1) 
Which party bears the burden of proof as to whether the 
information at issue . . . is 'confidential information' within 
Rules 1.6 and 1.9 and their comments; (2) Did the party who 
bears the burden of proof on that issue satisfy its burden; and 
(3) Assuming no violations are found as to [the count involving 
disclosure of confidential information], what would be the 
recommended disposition?"  See Rules of the Board of Bar 
Overseers § 3.52 (2017).  Bar counsel and the respondent filed 
memoranda addressing the board's questions. 
7 
 
 
The board then decided that bar counsel had not proved that 
the information the respondent had disclosed was confidential.  
In its memorandum, the board explained that the hearing 
committee had been wrong to require the respondent to prove that 
the information was "generally known in the local community."  
Rather, according to the board, "it was up to bar counsel, who 
bears the burden to prove each element of an offense, to prove 
that the information was not generally known and therefore 
confidential. . . .  The burden never shifts."  Nevertheless, 
the board voted to impose a public reprimand for the 
respondent's other misconduct. 
 
Bar counsel demanded that an information be filed in the 
county court.  See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (6).  After a hearing, 
a single justice of this court reserved and reported the case to 
the full court.  We agree with the board that bar counsel did 
not satisfy the burden of proving that the respondent disclosed 
confidential information and that the respondent should be 
publicly reprimanded for his other misconduct. 
Discussion.  1.  Whether the respondent disclosed 
confidential information.  a.  Legal background.  In the first 
count of the petition for discipline, bar counsel alleged that 
the respondent violated rules 1.6 (a) and 1.9 (c) when he 
included information about the client's arrest history in his 
Federal District Court affidavit.  Pursuant to rule 1.6 (a), 
8 
 
"[a] lawyer shall not reveal confidential information relating 
to the representation of a client" absent exceptions not 
relevant here.  And pursuant to rule 1.9 (c), "[a] lawyer who 
has formerly represented a client in a matter . . . shall not 
thereafter[, absent exceptions not relevant here]:  (1) use 
confidential information relating to the representation to the 
disadvantage of the former client, or for the lawyer's 
advantage, or the advantage of a third person, . . . or (2) 
reveal confidential information relating to the representation 
. . . ." 
Comment 3A to rule 1.6 explains that whether information is 
"confidential" turns, in part, on whether it is "generally 
known."  According to that comment, "'[c]onfidential 
information' does not ordinarily include . . . information that 
is generally known in the local community or in the trade, field 
or profession to which the information relates."  The comment 
then explains that whether information is "generally known" 
depends primarily on how widespread the information has become: 
"Information that is 'generally known in the local 
community or in the trade, field or profession to which the 
information relates' includes information that is widely 
known.  Information about a client contained in a public 
record that has received widespread publicity would fall 
within this category.  On the other hand, a client's 
disclosure of conviction of a crime in a different state a 
long time ago or disclosure of a secret marriage would be 
protected even if a matter of public record because such 
information was not 'generally known in the local 
community.'  As another example, a client's disclosure of 
9 
 
the fact of infidelity to a spouse is protected 
information, although it normally would not be after the 
client publicly discloses such information on television 
and in newspaper interviews." 
 
As this comment makes clear, the rule is concerned with whether 
information is known, not whether it is knowable.  That the 
information is available in a public record is not dispositive; 
rather, the focus is on how many people in the relevant 
community, trade, field, or profession actually have learned the 
information. 
b.  Burden of proof.  The issue presented here is how the 
analysis of what is "generally known" relates to bar counsel's 
burden of proof in determining whether an attorney has disclosed 
confidential information improperly.  Whether information is 
generally known is not always dispositive because, according to 
comment 3A, generally known information is not confidential 
"ordinarily."  When it is important whether information is 
generally known, bar counsel must prove that the information is 
not generally known to satisfy his or her burden of proof. 
"In all disciplinary proceedings [b]ar [c]ounsel shall have 
the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence . . . ."  
Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers § 3.28.  Therefore, to prove 
a violation of rule 1.6 (a) or rule 1.9 (c), bar counsel must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a respondent has 
revealed or misused information that is "confidential."  Because 
10 
 
comment 3A states that whether information is confidential 
depends in part on whether it is generally known, whether the 
information is generally known is intertwined with what bar 
counsel has to prove.  It is, therefore, part of bar counsel's 
burden of proof. 
An argument that information is generally known is not an 
affirmative defense that the respondent must prove.  See Rules 
of the Board of Bar Overseers § 3.28 ("The [r]espondent shall 
have the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence on 
affirmative defenses and matters in mitigation").  An 
affirmative defense "does not directly challenge any element of 
the offense."  Commonwealth v. Grafton, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 717, 
720 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Farley, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 
854, 861 (2005).  Instead, "it involves a matter of 
justification peculiarly within the knowledge of the 
[respondent] on which he [or she] can fairly be required to 
adduce supporting evidence" (quotations, citation, and 
alteration omitted).  Commonwealth v. Humphries, 465 Mass. 762, 
769 (2013).  Any argument about whether information is generally 
known relates to whether an element of the offense -- 
confidentiality -- is satisfied, not whether there is an 
independent justification for the offense.  And, by its terms, 
the existence of "generally known" information is not a matter 
"peculiarly within the knowledge of the [respondent]" (citation 
11 
 
omitted).  Id.  Cf. Matter of Murray, 455 Mass. 872, 873, 887 
(2010) (respondent has burden of explaining what happened to 
unaccounted-for cash that belonged to client and was not 
deposited in client trust account because, among other reasons, 
"it is the attorney who will be in possession of, or otherwise 
have access to, the relevant information"). 
Our decision that bar counsel has the burden of proving 
that information is not generally known does not impose an undue 
burden on bar counsel.  By the time a case is before a hearing 
committee of the board, bar counsel should have conducted a 
thorough enough investigation to know how the respondent had 
learned of the disclosed information.  See Rules of the Board of 
Bar Overseers §§ 2.1 (bar counsel must conduct investigation 
before taking action against respondent), 4.4(a), 4.5(a) (board 
may subpoena respondent at bar counsel's request).  If the 
respondent learned of the information from an arguably public 
source, then that fact will limit the scope of bar counsel's 
inquiry regarding whether the disclosed information is generally 
known.  If the respondent learned of the information from a 
private source, such as a client, then bar counsel may have to 
conduct additional research.1  The need for further 
 
1 There was no evidence here about how the respondent 
learned of the information that he disclosed.  The respondent 
indicated in his opening statement and closing argument at the 
hearing, and in his initial answer to the board's petition for 
12 
 
investigation, however, is no reason to avoid implementing the 
rules of professional conduct as written, especially considering 
the high stakes for attorneys involved in disciplinary 
proceedings.  See Commonwealth v. Munoz, 384 Mass. 503, 507 
(1981) ("assuming that it may be difficult for the Commonwealth 
to prove noninsurance, this obstacle does not warrant [shifting 
the burden to the defendant], in view of the fact that 
noninsurance is an element, in fact, the central element of 
[the] prosecution['s case]"). 
 
c.  Application to the present case.  We see no reason why 
this case should not fall within the "ordinar[y]" situation 
discussed in comment 3A, where the information disclosed, if 
generally known, would not be confidential.  To prove that the 
disclosed information was confidential, therefore, bar counsel 
had to prove that it was not generally known.  Because there was 
no evidence at the hearing that the disclosed information was 
 
discipline, that he had discovered the information in a local 
newspaper after searching for the client's name on the Internet.  
Opening statements and closing arguments are not evidence, 
however.  See Commonwealth v. Alemany, 488 Mass. 499, 511 
(2021).  And after the chair at the hearing asked the respondent 
whether he wanted his opening statement to be treated as his 
testimony on the record, the respondent answered in the 
negative.  We do observe, though, that information in a local 
newspaper of record might well be the sort of information that 
we would consider to be generally known, especially when the 
information is printed within a short time of the disclosure. 
13 
 
not generally known, bar counsel did not satisfy this burden of 
proof. 
 
2.  Sanction.  The board sanctioned the respondent with a 
public reprimand for misconduct other than his alleged 
disclosure of confidential information.  This misconduct 
involved multiple clients other than the client already 
discussed.  The respondent does not challenge before this court 
either the conclusion that he engaged in the other misconduct or 
the sanction imposed, and we agree with the board that the 
respondent should be publicly reprimanded. 
The hearing committee decided, and the board accepted, that 
the respondent failed to communicate adequately with a client, 
see Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4 (a), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1319 
(2015), and failed to deliver client files timely to successor 
counsel, see Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15A, 480 Mass. 1316 (2018), and 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16 (d) and (e), as appearing in 471 Mass. 
1396 (2015) (effective until September 1, 2018).  The findings 
underlying these conclusions are supported by substantial 
evidence.  The failure to communicate involved a client who 
hired the respondent to refile an application for disability 
benefits related to military service.  The claim was denied; the 
respondent filed an appeal and informed the client that he had 
done so.  The respondent then failed to communicate with the 
client over the next ten months; the client retained a new 
14 
 
lawyer who successfully prosecuted the claim.  The failure to 
transfer client files involved multiple clients applying for 
benefits related to military service who fired the respondent 
and directed him to deliver their files to successor counsel.  
The respondent delayed turning over the files, and when he did 
deliver them, they were incomplete.2 
In cases involving failure to communicate, attorneys have 
been privately reprimanded, rather than receiving a harsher 
sanction, even in the face of aggravating circumstances.  See 
Admonition No. 17-29, 33 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 596, 599, 
600-601 (2017) (attorney received private admonition for failing 
to communicate with client where attorney committed multiple 
rules violations, had substantial experience in practice of law, 
and previously had been disciplined).  Attorneys also have been 
privately reprimanded in cases involving failure to deliver 
client files.  See Admonition No. 05-13, 21 Mass. Att'y 
Discipline Rep. 698, 699 (2005) (attorney received private 
admonition for failing to communicate with client and not 
 
2 The respondent argued at the hearing and before the board 
that he delayed transferring his former clients' files because 
successor counsel failed to provide him with an appropriate 
consent form allowing him to release medical information.  Bar 
counsel argued, and the board concluded, that the Federal 
regulations on which the respondent relied were inapplicable.  
Neither bar counsel nor the board discusses on appeal this 
apparently complex issue of Federal law, and we therefore do not 
analyze it. 
15 
 
returning file where attorney committed multiple rules 
violations and had substantial experience in practice of law). 
Here, however, the aggravating factors warrant more than a 
private admonition.  In addition to having substantial 
experience in the practice of law, see Matter of Moran, 479 
Mass. 1016, 1022 (2018), and having been disciplined before, see 
Matter of Saab, 406 Mass. 315, 327-328 (1989), the respondent 
committed multiple rules violations involving multiple clients, 
see Matter of Strauss, 479 Mass. 294, 302 (2018), who were 
vulnerable individuals seeking disability benefits, see Moran, 
supra at 1023, citing Matter of Lupo, 447 Mass. 345, 354 (2006).  
Considering these aggravating factors, we agree with the board 
that a public reprimand is appropriate. 
 
Conclusion.  An order shall enter in the county court 
publicly reprimanding the respondent.  See Rules of the Board of 
Bar Overseers § 3.56(a) ("In the event that the court orders 
. . . a public reprimand, the order of the court shall 
constitute the . . . public reprimand"). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.