Case Title: Columbus Bar Assn. v. Saker

Citation: 2000-Ohio-334

Docket Number: 19991557

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2000-03-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Saker, 88 Ohio St.3d 269, 2000-Ohio-334.] 
 
 
 
 
 
COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION v. SAKER. 
[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Saker (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 269.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Six-month suspension — Entering into a 
business relationship with client when attorney and client have differing 
interests. 
(No. 99-1557 — Submitted November 16, 1999 — Decided March 22, 2000.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 98-91. 
 
On November 30, 1998, relator, Columbus Bar Association, filed a 
complaint charging respondent, Theodore R. Saker, Sr., of Columbus, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0023293, with several violations of the Disciplinary 
Rules.  Respondent answered, and the matter was heard by a panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”). 
 
The panel found that respondent, who at the time of hearing had been an 
attorney for fifty-two years without a grievance having been filed against him, 
agreed in 1989 to buy a Florida condominium from his clients, Alio Gasbarro and 
his wife, Lynn.  The Gasbarros, who wished to purchase another residence in 
Florida, were searching for a buyer of the condominium, so that they could finance 
the new residence.  Respondent prepared a purchase agreement, which he and his 
wife executed in November 1989, committing them to pay the Gasbarros for their 
equity in the property and assume the existing mortgage.  The respondent also 
prepared a warranty deed, which the Gasbarros executed in July 1990, transferring 
the property to respondent and his wife.  No closing documents were executed.  
Respondent and his wife paid approximately $32,000 to the Gasbarros for their 
equity interest.  Respondent and his wife in 1994 executed a quitclaim deed 
transferring the property to respondent’s wife, as trustee of the Saker Family Trust. 
 
 
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Respondent told the Gasbarros that he would make the current mortgage 
payments and obtain other financing within a year.  Respondent was not aware that 
the Gasbarros’ current mortgage contained both a due-on-sale clause and a 
requirement for the mortgagee’s prior consent to any sale, nor did he take steps to 
learn about those restrictions.  Respondent therefore did not advise the Gasbarros 
that, because there was no agreement with the mortgagee, they would remain liable 
on the mortgage, and he did not tell them of the due-on-sale clause.  Respondent 
also did not advise the Gasbarros to retain independent counsel to represent them 
in the transaction. 
 
Respondent and his wife took possession of the condominium. He attempted 
to obtain a loan to pay off the Gasbarro mortgage but was unsuccessful.  For six 
years respondent made payments totaling almost $60,000 on the Gasbarros’ 
mortgage, and also paid $29,000 in fees to the condominium association. 
 
In April 1996, respondent sued Alio Gasbarro for unpaid legal fees and, 
according to the panel, was ultimately awarded a judgment of over $81,000. 
 
Respondent never missed a mortgage payment, but in September 1996, the 
mortgagee advised the Gasbarros that the mortgage payments were late and that 
the sale was in violation of the provisions of the mortgage.  In November 1996, an 
attorney for the Gasbarros asked respondent to “[g]et the mortgage on the * * * 
property out of Lynn Gasbarro’s name and into your wife’s name.”  In April 1997, 
the mortgage company requested that respondent’s wife assume the mortgage but 
indicated that it would retain the Gasbarros as obligors. 
 
In May 1997, the Saker Family Trust filed suit in Franklin County Common 
Pleas Court against Mrs. Gasbarro alleging, inter alia, that Mrs. Gasbarro had 
withheld from respondent’s wife information about the existence of the due-on-
sale clause and that by failing to forward mortgage payment coupons, Mrs. 
Gasbarro had jeopardized respondent’s wife’s possession of the condominium.  
 
 
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Mrs. Gasbarro’s motion for summary judgment was denied.  In February 1998, the 
mortgagee agreed to accept respondent’s wife as a successor mortgagor and release 
Mrs. Gasbarro, and the Saker Family Trust voluntarily dismissed the complaint.  In 
August 1998, the court denied a motion by Mrs. Gasbarro for a hearing to 
determine whether the plaintiff’s conduct in filing the suit was frivolous. 
 
The panel concluded that respondent’s conduct during the sale transaction 
violated DR 5-104(A) (entering into a business relationship with a client if the 
lawyer and the client have differing interests and the client expects the lawyer to 
exercise professional judgment for the protection of the client, unless the client has 
consented after full disclosure). 
 
Additionally, the panel, after characterizing the Franklin County lawsuit as 
“preemptive,” found that by filing such a suit respondent violated  DR 7-102(A)(1) 
(asserting a position which would serve only to harass or maliciously injure 
another).  Taking into account respondent’s fifty-two-year career as an attorney 
and respondent’s belief that by entering into the transaction he was doing his client 
a favor, the panel recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of 
law for six months with the entire six months stayed. 
 
The board adopted the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the 
panel. 
__________________ 
 
Julia A. Davis, David K. Greer and Patricia K. Block, for relator. 
 
Theodore R. Saker, Sr., pro se, and Theodore R. Saker, Jr., for respondent. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  We adopt the findings and conclusions of the board.  This case 
demonstrates the hazards that exist when an attorney enters into a business 
transaction with a client and the reasons for DR 5-104(A).  Respondent believed he 
was doing a favor for a person who was a client and a friend and, probably as a 
 
 
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result of their longstanding relationship, was too informal in negotiating and 
documenting the real estate transfer.  Most important, in a situation where the 
client assumed that respondent was exercising professional judgment on his behalf, 
respondent failed to obtain his client’s consent after full disclosure.  When the 
attorney-client relationship deteriorated, the fruits of respondent’s casual approach 
to the documentation of the sale and the Disciplinary Rule requirements were 
harvested.  We find a clear violation of DR 5-104(A). 
 
Respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law for six months.  
Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.