Case Title: Patricia S. Magyar v. Wisconsin Health Care Liability Insurance Plan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1995AP000972

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-0972 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Patricia S. Magyar, Individually, and As Special 
Administrator of the Estate of Anthony F. Magyar, 
Deceased. 
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
City of Milwaukee, 
 
Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
Wisconsin Health Care Liability Insurance Plan, 
and Lawrence J. Frazin, M.D., 
 
Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners, 
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 
 
Defendant-Co-Appellant-Petitioner. 
Neurological Surgery of Milwaukee, S.C. 
 
Defendant-Intervenor. 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  200 Wis. 2d 491, 546 N.W.2d 886 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 27, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 30, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas P. Doherty 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Abrahamson, C.J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
  Geske, J., joins 
 
 
Geske, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
  Abrahamson, C.J., Steinmetz, Bablitch, 
 
 
  Wilcox, Bradley and Crooks, JJ., joins 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners there 
were briefs by Michael P. Malone, Susan R. Tyndall and Hinshaw & 
Culbertson, Milwaukee and oral argument by Susan R. Tyndall. 
 
 
 
For the defendant-co-appellant-petitioner there 
were briefs by James M. Fergal, Linda V. Meagher and Schellinger 
& Doyle, S.C., and oral argument by James M. Fergal. 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief 
by William M. Cannon, Mark L. Thomsen and Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., 
Brookfield and oral argument by William M. Cannon. 
 
 
For the defendant-intervenor there was a brief by 
Todd M. Weir and Otjen, Van Ert, Stangle, Lieb & Weir, S.C., 
Milwaukee.  
 
 
 
No.  17008.rtf 
 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-0972 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Patricia S. Magyar, Individually, and As 
Special Administrator of the Estate of 
Anthony F. Magyar, Deceased, 
 
  
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
City of Milwaukee, 
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
 
 
v. 
 
Wisconsin Health Care Liability Insurance 
Plan, and Lawrence J. Frazin, M.D., 
 
 
Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 
. 
          Defendant-Co-Appellant-
Petitioner, 
 
Neurological Surgery of Milwaukee, S.C., 
 
          Defendant-Intervenor. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 27, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
Cause Remanded. 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   On the day trial commenced 
in Patricia Magyar’s medical malpractice action against numerous 
defendants, Ms. Magyar and one of the defendants, Neurological 
 
 
No.  17008.rtf 
 
 
2 
Surgery of Milwaukee (NSM), asked the circuit court to approve a 
settlement agreement between them dismissing NSM from the 
lawsuit.  The settlement was contingent on a ruling by the 
circuit court excluding an expert witness named only by NSM, Dr. 
Proctor, from testifying at trial.  The non-settling defendants 
objected, but the circuit court approved the settlement and 
ordered that the non-settling defendants could not call Dr. 
Proctor as a witness.  The non-settling defendants contend that 
the exclusion of Dr. Proctor’s testimony was an erroneous 
exercise of discretion by the circuit court.  We agree.  
Accordingly, we reverse and, inasmuch as this evidence went 
solely to the issue of liability, we remand to the circuit court 
for a new trial to determine liability. 
¶2 
The relevant facts are as follows:  On December 13, 
1990, Dr. Frazin performed surgery on Anthony Magyar.  Nine days 
later, Mr. Magyar died.  His widow, Patricia Magyar, filed a 
medical 
malpractice 
action 
against 
Dr. 
Lawrence 
Frazin, 
Wisconsin 
Health 
Care 
Liability 
Insurance 
Plan 
(WHCLIP), 
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund (the Fund), and NSM 
alleging that Dr. Frazin’s negligence caused Mr. Magyar’s death. 
 Specifically, Ms. Magyar alleged that Dr. Frazin’s failure to 
order peri-operative antibiotics for Mr. Magyar led to the 
infection which caused his death. 
¶3 
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 802.10(3)(b) and 802.11, the 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Judge Thomas P. Doherty, 
presiding, issued a scheduling order establishing the deadlines 
by which the parties were required to serve each other with a 
complete list of witnesses.  Ms. Magyar identified Dr. Butler, a 
 
 
No.  17008.rtf 
 
 
3 
neurosurgeon, and Dr. Buggy, an infectious disease expert and 
one of Mr. Magyar’s treating physicians, as the expert witnesses 
she planned to call at trial.  Dr. Frazin named himself and Dr. 
Sypert, neither of whom was an infectious disease expert. 
¶4 
During discovery depositions, Dr. Buggy testified that 
Mr. Magyar should have received antibiotics at the beginning of 
the operative procedure, i.e., on December 13, 1990.  After Dr. 
Buggy’s deposition, NSM filed a motion to adjourn the trial and 
amend the scheduling order so that it might have additional time 
to name an infectious disease specialist to respond to Dr. 
Buggy’s testimony.  NSM’s motion was granted.  Although the 
other defendants had reserved the right to supplement their 
witness lists upon completion of the discovery depositions of 
plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, neither the Fund, WHCLIP, nor Dr. 
Frazin did so. 
¶5 
The amended scheduling order required NSM to advise 
Ms. Magyar of the general nature of the testimony of its expert 
witnesses.  NSM named Dr. Jerva, the Fund’s neurosurgical expert 
and Dr. Proctor, an infectious disease specialist.  As to the 
general nature of Dr. Proctor’s testimony, on May 31, 1994, NSM 
stated that Dr. Proctor believed that commencing antibiotics on 
December 15, 1990 or later probably would not have altered the 
outcome in this case.   
¶6 
On Wednesday, November 23, 1994, the day before 
Thanksgiving and 5 days before the trial was scheduled to begin, 
NSM sent Ms. Magyar and the defendants a letter by fax 
clarifying Dr. Proctor’s opinions.  This letter revealed that 
Dr. 
Proctor 
disagreed 
with 
“Dr. 
Buggy’s 
contention 
that 
 
 
No.  17008.rtf 
 
 
4 
antibiotics at any time . . . would have altered the outcome of 
this case.” 
¶7 
On the morning trial was to commence, Ms. Magyar and 
NSM informed the circuit court and the other defendants that 
they had reached an agreement to dismiss NSM as a party.  NSM’s 
dismissal was contingent on a ruling by the circuit court that 
Dr. Proctor, NSM’s witness, could not testify at trial.  The 
other defendants had not named Dr. Proctor or any other 
infectious disease expert as a trial witness.  The non-settling 
defendants objected to the exclusion of Dr. Proctor’s testimony. 
 The circuit court rejected their objections and approved the 
settlement.  Dr. Proctor did not testify at the trial.   
¶8 
The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that WHCLIP, 
Dr. Frazin, and the Fund (the non-settling defendants) were 
required by the scheduling order to name the witnesses they 
intended to call at trial.  Because the non-settling defendants 
neither named Dr. Proctor, nor included a provision in their 
witness lists “to call any witness named by any other party,” 
the court of appeals resolved that it could not conclude that 
the circuit court’s decision to exclude Dr. Proctor was an 
erroneous exercise of discretion.  The court of appeals further 
concluded that it was not erroneous for the circuit court to 
deny the non-settling defendants’ motion for a continuance to 
enable them to secure another infectious disease expert because 
the trial had already been adjourned on four separate occasions 
and another adjournment would result in another year’s delay. 
 
 
No.  17008.rtf 
 
 
5 
¶9 
This case presents a single issue for review: whether 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it 
excluded Dr. Proctor’s testimony from the trial.  
¶10 The circuit court has the discretion to exclude the 
testimony of a witness if a party is prejudiced by opposing 
counsel’s failure to name that witness.  Milw. Rescue Mission v. 
Milw. Redev. Auth., 161 Wis. 2d 472, 490, 468 N.W.2d 663 (1991); 
Fredrickson v. Louisville Ladder Co., 52 Wis. 2d 776, 782, 191 
N.W.2d 193 (1971).  The circuit court’s exercise of discretion 
will be upheld absent an erroneous exercise of discretion.  
Milwaukee Rescue Mission, 161 Wis. 2d at 490.   
¶11 The court properly exercises its discretion when it 
examines the relevant facts, applies a proper standard of law, 
and reaches a reasonable conclusion using a demonstrated 
rational process.  Id.  If the circuit court bases the exercise 
of its discretion upon an error of law, its conduct is beyond 
the limits of discretion.  State v. Hutnik, 39 Wis. 2d 754, 763, 
159 N.W.2d 733 (1968).  
¶12 The non-settling defendants contend that the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion by applying the wrong 
legal standard to the facts.  Dr. Proctor is an infectious 
disease specialist, and the theory of Ms. Magyar’s case was that 
Dr. 
Frazin’s 
failure 
to 
order 
peri-operative 
antibiotics 
resulted in an infection which caused Mr. Magyar’s death.  Thus, 
they argue, Dr. Proctor’s testimony was highly relevant to the 
issue of liability.   
 
 
No.  17008.rtf 
 
 
6 
¶13 In 
support 
of 
their 
argument, 
the 
non-settling 
defendants point to the legal standard governing the circuit 
court’s power to exclude relevant evidence, Wis. Stat. § 904.03: 
 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
They 
argue 
that 
this 
highly 
probative 
evidence 
was 
not 
outweighed by any of the statutory considerations. 
¶14 Ms. Magyar argues that the probative value of Dr. 
Proctor’s testimony was outweighed by her surprise in learning, 
just five days before trial, that the general nature of Dr. 
Proctor’s testimony had significantly changed.  Ms. Magyar 
contends that unless Dr. Proctor was excluded from testifying, 
she would have been unfairly prejudiced by having to respond to 
a different defense than that which she had anticipated and for 
which she had prepared.   
¶15 Although Wis. Stat. § 904.03 does not list “surprise” 
as a specific ground for excluding evidence, a witness whose 
testimony results in surprise to the opposing counsel may be 
excluded if the surprise would require a continuance causing 
undue delay or if surprise is coupled with the danger of 
prejudice and confusion of issues. Lease America Corp. v. Ins. 
Co. of N. America, 88 Wis. 2d 395, 400, 276 N.W.2d 767 (1979). 
¶16 Fredrickson suggests that the drastic measure of 
excluding a witness should be avoided by giving the surprised 
party more time to prepare, if possible.  Fredrickson, 52 Wis. 
2d at 784.  See also, Judicial Council Committee’s and the 
 
 
No.  17008.rtf 
 
 
7 
Federal Advisory Committee’s Notes pertaining to § 904.08, 59 
Wis. 2d at R73-R75.  This suggestion is based on “the policy of 
discovering all of the truth.”  Fredrickson, 52 Wis. 2d at 784 
(citation omitted).  Accordingly, continuance is usually the 
more appropriate remedy for surprise; exclusion should be 
considered only if a continuance would result in a long delay.  
State v. O’Connor, 77 Wis. 2d 261, 287-88, 252 N.W.2d 671 
(1977).  Ms. Magyar did not raise the issue of a continuance 
before the circuit court. 
¶17 The question then becomes whether the surprise was 
unfair, and, if so, whether the unfair surprise outweighed the 
probative value of the evidence.  Jenzake v. City of Brookfield, 
108 Wis. 2d 537, 543, 322 N.W.2d 516 (Ct. App. 1982). 
¶18 Upon review of a discretionary decision, the test is 
not whether this court as an original matter would have denied 
the motion; it is whether the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in doing so.  Schneller v. St. Mary’s 
Hospital, 162 Wis. 2d 296, 306, 455 N.W.2d 250 (1991).  Thus, 
our purpose upon review is not to decide the merits of Ms. 
Magyar’s arguments, but rather to determine whether the circuit 
court applied the proper legal standard to the facts of this 
case.  Accordingly, we turn to the transcript of the November 
28th hearing in which the circuit court issued its order to 
determine whether the circuit court’s analysis was guided by 
Wis. Stat. § 904.03: 
 
THE COURT:  All right.  The court has heard no 
argument to the contrary and will proceed under the 
assumption that it has the discretion to rule either 
way in this matter.  And I am prepared to do so. 
 
 
No.  17008.rtf 
 
 
8 
But to put it in the context of what is going 
through my mind, it is this: 
That with regard to Dr. Proctor, he was available 
insofar 
as, 
I 
assume, 
that 
he 
was 
subject 
to 
depositions by any party in this lawsuit.  His 
identity was disclosed fairly early – fairly early in 
the sense of after the – Mr. Weir [NSM’s counsel] – 
Mr. Weir’s appearance in the case.  He was the first 
expert on behalf of any defendant in the area of 
infectious disease. 
Plaintiff apparently had already disclosed that 
they had one and, in fact, he had been deposed, Dr. 
Buggy. 
So it is apparent at that time or should be 
apparent to all concerned that infectious disease or 
that subject was going to be – was going to be the 
subject matter – a subject matter in this lawsuit as 
well as the fact that cause of death—as pointed out by 
Mr. Cannon—also alluded to that. 
So 
the 
significance 
of 
infectious 
disease 
testimony was or should have been apparent to all 
parties at the time of Dr. Buggy’s deposition and 
certainly when Dr. Proctor is identified as an expert 
on behalf of NSM. 
 
R.166:109-10 (emphasis added).  As we review the record, we look 
for reasons to sustain the circuit court’s discretionary 
decision.  In re Paternity of Dustine R.P., 185 Wis. 2d 452, 
463, 518 N.W.2d 270 (Ct. App. 1994).  From the circuit court’s 
discussion of the significance of infectious disease testimony, 
we conclude that the court considered the probative value of Dr. 
Proctor’s testimony and found that it was significant to the 
issue of liability.  
¶19 Next, we consider whether the circuit court considered 
the element of surprise to the plaintiff.  The circuit court 
concluded that the significance of infectious disease testimony 
was or should have been “apparent to all,” i.e., none of the 
parties should have been surprised that infectious disease 
testimony was going to be offered at trial.  The court’s 
 
 
No.  17008.rtf 
 
 
9 
discussion suggests that since the significance of Dr. Proctor’s 
testimony was apparent to all, and Dr. Proctor was available for 
deposition, that if a party was surprised by the content of his 
testimony, it should not have been.  In other words, even if the 
plaintiff was “surprised” by the nature of Dr. Proctor’s 
testimony, the surprise was not “unfair.” 
¶20 However, the next step the circuit court should have 
taken in its analysis was to weigh the probative value of Dr. 
Proctor’s testimony, which it found “significant,” against the 
danger of unfair surprise, which it found nonexistent.  Under 
Wis. Stat. § 904.03, relevant evidence is excluded only if the 
probative value of the evidence is outweighed by, inter alia, 
unfair surprise.  The only reasonable conclusion that can be 
reached when weighing no danger of unfair surprise against a 
significant probative value is that the evidence must be 
admitted.  The circuit court reached the opposite conclusion.  
The circuit court concluded that despite the highly probative 
value of the evidence and the lack of unfair surprise, the 
evidence would nonetheless be excluded.  This was not a 
reasonable conclusion and, hence, was an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.  See Milwaukee Rescue Mission, 161 Wis. 2d at 490 
(stating 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
“properly 
exercises 
its 
discretion when it examines the relevant facts, applies a proper 
standard of law and reaches a reasonable conclusion”)(emphasis 
added). 
¶21 Further review of the record illuminates the circuit 
court’s rationale for its erroneous conclusion: 
 
 
 
No.  17008.rtf 
 
 
10
I am always kind of reluctant to preclude 
legitimate evidence from coming in before a jury, but 
that’s not an absolute. 
And I am satisfied that in this situation, that 
there 
are 
ways 
for 
counsel 
for 
the 
two 
other 
defendants to protect themselves insofar as this type 
of potential.  And I – I don’t know that it’s a very 
extraordinary situation at all. 
As I indicated in my opening remarks here, that 
settlements, arrangements and compromises that others 
may consider conspiracies, if you will between certain 
parties of the lawsuit occur and, often times, on the 
day of trial or, for that matter, in the course of 
trial. 
I -- In weighing the equities in this situation, 
it seems to me that they weigh towards the – Mr. Weir 
and his client [NSM] and at least vicariously, Mr. 
Cannon [Ms. Magyar’s attorney], and that since the 
production of Dr. Proctor by anyone other than Mr. 
Weir who has named him would be outside the scheduling 
order and the anticipation – well, was only named as a 
witness by – by Mr. Weir, and that it was an 
accommodation, as a matter of fact, limited to Mr. 
Weir to make himself – make a witness available such 
as Dr. Proctor.   
I think the equities weigh on that side of the 
issue, and the court will, in effect, grant the 
request of Mr. Weir and Mr. Cannon and preclude the 
testimony of Dr. Proctor on behalf of either of the 
two defendants or, for that matter, the plaintiff, 
should that unlikely situation occur at the trial.  
 
R.166:113-14.  The equities, the circuit court concluded, 
weighed heavily in favor of allowing NSM to be dismissed from 
the lawsuit.  By focusing on the equity to NSM, the circuit 
court interjected an improper legal standard into its analysis. 
 This was an erroneous exercise of discretion that resulted in 
 
 
No.  17008.rtf 
 
 
11
the improper exclusion of evidence that was highly relevant to 
the issue of the defendants’ liability.
1 
¶22 In sum, in determining whether to exclude Dr. Proctor 
from testifying at trial, the circuit court properly considered 
the factors of probative value and unfair surprise.  Having 
determined that the evidence was highly probative and that there 
was not unfair surprise to the plaintiff, on its face, the court 
could have reasonably reached only one conclusion: the evidence 
would not be excluded.  However, the court reached the opposite 
result, based largely if not entirely on an improper legal 
standard, namely the equities to the settling defendant.  When a 
circuit court applies the proper legal standard to the relevant 
facts but arrives at an unreasonable conclusion, it goes beyond 
the limits of discretion.  Similarly, the application of an 
improper legal standard is an erroneous exercise of discretion. 
 Hutnik, 39 Wis. 2d at 763.  We conclude that the circuit 
court’s order to exclude Dr. Proctor from testifying at trial 
                     
1 The parties also suggest that the circuit court may have 
been sanctioning the non-settling defendants for their failure 
to comply with the scheduling order.  Exclusion of a witness is, 
under the appropriate circumstances, a means of sanctioning a 
party for its failure to comply with a scheduling order, 
Schneller, 162 Wis. 2d 296.  However, exclusion of a witness is 
an extreme sanction for egregious noncompliance that lacks a 
clear and justifiable excuse.  Id. at 311.  Neither the circuit 
court’s ruling, nor the record suggests that Dr. Proctor’s 
exclusion was a sanction for the non-settling defendants’ 
failure to comply with the scheduling order.   
Furthermore, the circuit 
court rejected 
Ms. Magyar’s 
contention 
that 
she 
was 
prejudiced 
by 
the 
non-settling 
defendants’ failure to inform her of their intent to call Dr. 
Proctor as a trial witness.  See Milw. Rescue Mission, 161 Wis. 
2d at 490.  
 
 
No.  17008.rtf 
 
 
12
was an erroneous exercise of discretion.  Accordingly, we 
reverse and, inasmuch as this evidence went solely to the issue 
of liability, remand for a new trial to determine liability. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
No. 95-0972.ssa   
 
1 
¶23 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).   I 
join both the majority opinion reversing the court of appeals' 
affirmance of the order of the circuit court and Justice Geske's 
concurrence. I write separately to point out only what I believe 
are some troubling aspects of the circuit court's ruling in this 
case. 
¶24 On the morning of trial, the circuit court agreed to a 
settlement between one defendant, NSM, and the plaintiff, Ms. 
Magyar. The settlement was contingent on the exclusion of Dr. 
Proctor as a witness for any party at trial. The result of the 
circuit court's accession to this settlement was that the 
remaining defendants were made to go to trial without an 
infectious disease expert, contrary to their expectations.  
¶25 I believe that absent extraordinary circumstances not 
present in this case, a circuit court should not agree to a 
settlement 
without 
giving 
the 
remaining 
parties 
ample 
opportunity to meet any surprises caused by the settlement. 
¶26 I also note that our cases (some of which I authored 
for the court) may injudiciously read unfair surprise into 
§ 904.03 as an element against which probative value is to be 
measured for exclusion of evidence.
2 The present case points out 
                     
2 See Thomas H. Barland, Michael J. Brose & Susan R. 
Steingass, 
The 
Wisconsin 
Rules 
of 
Evidence: 
A 
Courtroom 
Handbook, pp. 8-1 to 8-10 (April 1997) (State Bar of Wisconsin) 
(discussing cases considering surprise in context of § 904.03). 
See also Judicial Council Committee's Note and Federal Advisory 
Committee's Note to § 904.03, 59 Wis. 2d R73-R75 (1973) 
(discussing surprise in context of Wisconsin and federal rules). 
 
 
No. 95-0972.ssa   
 
2 
how unfair surprise arises preliminarily to questions of 
weighing 
the 
admissibility 
of 
evidence 
for 
purposes 
of 
submission to the fact finder. In an appropriate case we may 
wish to reconsider our analyses of unfair surprise as an element 
of § 904.03.  
¶27 I am authorized to state the Justice Janine P. Geske 
joins this concurrence. 
 
 
No. 95-0972-jpg   
 
1 
¶28 JANINE P. GESKE, J. (concurring).   I join the 
majority opinion.  I write separately only to comment on why I 
believe the circuit court erroneously considered the "equity" of 
allowing the dismissal of NSM when deciding whether to exclude 
Dr. Proctor as a witness.  When asked to give Ms. Magyar an 
advisory ruling on whether the other defendants might be allowed 
to call Dr. Proctor once NSM was no longer a party, the circuit 
court should have refused. 
¶29 While NSM remained a party to this litigation, Dr. 
Proctor could have and would have been called as a witness.  NSM 
had properly listed Dr. Proctor on its witness list.  Ms. Magyar 
neither filed nor argued a motion in limine requesting that Dr. 
Proctor's testimony be limited to only those opinions he 
expressed in his earlier report.  She never moved to strike Dr. 
Proctor as a witness for NSM based on prejudicial surprise of 
his new opinions. 
¶30 Instead, Ms. Magyar and NSM worked out a dismissal 
agreement conditioned upon an advisory opinion by the trial 
court.  At the time Ms. Magyar requested the court's ruling, 
there was no issue to decide.  NSM was still a party and Dr. 
Proctor was a properly scheduled witness.  If NSM had ceased to 
be a party to the lawsuit, then the issue of whether another 
defendant could call Dr. Proctor as a witness would have been 
ripe for determination. 
¶31 Because the trial court did not wait until the issue 
was properly presented, it inappropriately became distracted by 
considering the equities of a dismissal of NSM rather than 
 
 
No. 95-0972-jpg   
 
2 
simply 
weighing 
the 
factors 
described 
in 
Fredrickson 
v. 
Louisville Ladder, 52 Wis. 2d 776, 783 (1971).  As a result, the 
court "erroneously excluded evidence that was highly relevant to 
the issue of the defendant's liability" (Majority op. at 10-11). 
¶32 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Shirley S. 
Abrahamson, Justice Donald W. Steinmetz, Justice William A. 
Bablitch, Justice Jon P. Wilcox, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and 
Justice N. Patrick Crooks join this concurring opinion.