Case Title: State v. Williams

Citation: 351 N.C. 465

Docket Number: 264A90-5

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2000-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 264A90-5
FILED: 7 APRIL 2000
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
MARVIN EARL WILLIAMS, JR.
On writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b) to
review an order entered 12 March 1999 by Jones (Arnold), J., in
Superior Court, Wayne County, granting defendant’s motion for
discovery under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f).  Heard in the Supreme
Court 13 December 1999.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Valérie B. Spalding,
Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.
Shelby Duffy Benton and Glenn A. Barfield for defendant-
appellee.
MARTIN, Justice.
At the 30 April 1990 Criminal Session of Superior Court,
Wayne County, defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and
sentenced to death.  On 10 September 1993 this Court granted
defendant a new trial due to “reasonable doubt” instructional
error.  State v. Williams, 334 N.C. 440, 434 S.E.2d 588 (1993). 
The state petitioned the United States Supreme Court for writ of
certiorari, and on 28 March 1994 that Court vacated and remanded
the case to this Court for reconsideration in light of Victor v.
Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 127 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1994).  North Carolina
v. Williams, 511 U.S. 1001, 128 L. Ed. 2d 42 (1994).  On
30 December 1994, upon reconsideration, this Court found no
error.  State v. Williams, 339 N.C. 1, 452 S.E.2d 245 (1994).  On
2 October 1995 the United States Supreme Court denied defendant’s
petition for writ of certiorari on direct appeal.   Williams v.
North Carolina, 516 U.S. 833, 133 L. Ed. 2d 61 (1995).
On 3 July 1996 defendant filed a motion for appropriate
relief (MAR) in the Superior Court, Wayne County.  On 22 May 1997
the trial court denied defendant’s MAR.  On 11 February 1999
defendant filed a motion for postconviction discovery in the
trial court.  On 12 March 1999 the trial court granted
defendant’s motion for postconviction discovery pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f).  On 22 July 1999 we allowed the state’s
petition for writ of certiorari to review the trial court’s
order.
The state contends defendant is not entitled to
postconviction discovery because defendant did not timely request
discovery under section 15A-1415(f).  We agree.
On 21 June 1996 the General Assembly ratified “An Act to
Expedite the Postconviction Process in North Carolina.”  Ch. 719,
1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 389 (the Act).  Among other provisions, a
capital defendant is required to file his or her MAR within 120
days from the latest of the following events or occurrences (the
“triggering occurrence”):
(1)
The court’s judgment has been filed, but the
defendant failed to perfect a timely appeal;
(2)
The mandate issued by a court of the appellate
division on direct appeal pursuant to N.C.R. App.
P. 32(b) and the time for filing a petition for
writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court has expired without a petition being filed;
(3)
The United States Supreme Court denied a timely
petition for writ of certiorari of the decision on
direct appeal by the Supreme Court of North
Carolina;
(4)
Following the denial of discretionary review by
the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the United
States Supreme Court denied a timely petition for
writ of certiorari seeking review of the decision
 Although the statutory language at issue is addressed to 
1
the “interests of justice” exception to disclosure applicable to
sensitive information within the state’s files, we believe this 
same policy objective -- assisting the capital defendant in
investigating, preparing, or presenting a motion for appropriate
relief -- represents the overall legislative intent behind
section 15A-1415(f)’s provision of postconviction discovery to
capital defendants.
on direct appeal by the North Carolina Court of
Appeals;
(5)
The United States Supreme Court granted the
defendant’s or the State’s timely petition for
writ of certiorari of the decision on direct
appeal by the Supreme Court of North Carolina or
North Carolina Court of Appeals, but subsequently
left the defendant’s conviction and sentence
undisturbed; or
(6)
The appointment of postconviction counsel for an
indigent capital defendant.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(a)(1)-(6) (1999).
This Court has recognized that the legislative intent
underlying the discovery statute, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f), is to
“expedite the post-conviction process in capital cases while
ensuring thorough and complete review.”  State v. Bates, 348 N.C.
29, 37, 497 S.E.2d 276, 280-81 (1998); accord State v. Green, 350
N.C. 400, 407, 514 S.E.2d 724, 728, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
144 L. Ed. 2d 840 (1999); State v. Atkins, 349 N.C. 62, 109, 505
S.E.2d 97, 126 (1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 143 L. Ed. 2d
1036 (1999).  Toward that end, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) provides
for “early and full disclosure to counsel for capital defendants
so that they may raise all potential claims in a single motion
for appropriate relief.”  Bates, 348 N.C. at 37, 497 S.E.2d at
281.  Moreover, the statute authorizes postconviction discovery
to “assist the capital defendant in investigating, preparing, or
presenting a motion for appropriate relief.”  N.C.G.S. §
15A-1415(f); accord Bates, 348 N.C. at 36, 497 S.E.2d at 280.  
1
Because the purpose of the statute is to assist capital
defendants in investigating, preparing, or presenting all
potential claims in a single MAR, it logically follows that any 
requests for postconviction discovery must necessarily be made
within the same time period statutorily prescribed for filing the
underlying MAR.
We have not previously addressed the manner by which the
discovery provisions contained in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f) are to
be executed.  Specifically, we have assumed, but have not
decided, that subsection (f) requires a capital defendant to file
a written motion in order to obtain “the complete files of all
law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies involved in the
investigation of the crimes committed or the prosecution of the
defendant.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f).  Because this Court now must
decide the question of whether defendant timely requested
postconviction discovery, we first examine whether, and by what
means, he or she must do so.
The statute does not, by its express terms, require a
capital defendant to file a motion to obtain postconviction
discovery.  However, the requirement of a written motion is
consistent with the custom and practice in our trial courts. 
Further, a written motion provides a logical means of notice that
a capital defendant is exercising his or her discovery rights
under the statute and will promote more accurate and uniform
application of subsection (f).  We therefore conclude that a
capital defendant must file a written motion to be entitled to
postconviction discovery under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f).   
Accordingly, we hold that, to be entitled to postconviction
discovery under section 15A-1415(f), a capital defendant must
file a written motion for discovery within 120 days of the
triggering occurrence under section 15A-1415(a).
One limited exception exists for those capital defendants
retroactively entitled to postconviction discovery under our
decision in State v. Green, 350 N.C. 400, 514 S.E.2d 724.  In
Green we held that defendants whose MARs had been allowed or were
still pending on the effective date of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(f)
were retroactively entitled to discovery.  Id. at 406, 514 S.E.2d
at 728.  Until our decision in Green, section 15A-1415(f) had not
been retroactively applied to cases in which petitions arising
from the denial of motions for appropriate relief were pending in
this Court on 21 June 1996.  Accordingly, as to defendants
entitled to postconviction discovery under Green, the 120-day
deadline for filing motions for discovery under section
15A-1415(f) will run from the date of certification of our
decision in Green, 29 June 1999.
In the present case, defendant did not file his motion for
postconviction discovery within the 120-day deadline prescribed
for filing his MAR under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(a).  Rather,
defendant filed a motion for postconviction discovery on 11
February 1999, over three years after the United States Supreme
Court denied defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari on
direct appeal, the apparent triggering occurrence under section
15A-1415(a), and approximately two and one-half years after the
effective date of the statute, 21 June 1996, and the filing of
his MAR, 3 July 1996.  Defendant is therefore not entitled to
discovery at this juncture unless otherwise eligible under the
Green exception.  Because defendant filed his MAR on 3 July 1996,
it was not pending on the effective date of the statute, 21 June
1996.  Accordingly, defendant is not retroactively entitled to
discovery under Green.
We reverse the order of the Superior Court, Wayne County,
allowing defendant’s motion for discovery pursuant to N.C.G.S. §
15A-1415(f) and remand this case to that court for entry of an
order consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED.