Case Title: Gerstell v. State ex rel. Dept. of Revenue and Taxation

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87-294

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-02-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Gerstell v. State ex rel. Dept. of Revenue and Taxation1989 WY 52769 P.2d 389Case Number: 87-294Decided: 02/24/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
JUDY LYNN 
GERSTELL, PETITIONER,

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING, EX 
REL., DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND TAXATION, RESPONDENT.

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

 
 
Robert J. 
Reese, Reese & Mathey, Green River, for petitioner.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mark Quiner, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for 
respondent.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, 
JJ., and BROWN, J., Retired.

 
 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The question raised by 
the appellant, Judy Lynn Gerstell (Gerstell), is whether the procedure invoked 
for suspension of a driver's license under the provisions of §§ 31-6-101 to 
-106, W.S. 1977 (May 1987 Repl.), relating to implied consent to chemical 
testing, is invalid and void because it contravenes the provisions found in the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (§§ 16-3-101 to -115, W.S. 1977 (Oct. 1982 
Repl.)), particularly § 16-3-113(c). We hold that the proceedings which resulted 
in the suspension of Gerstell's driver's license were not invalid or void for 
lack of jurisdiction or for failure to comply with the provisions of § 
16-3-113(c). We affirm the order of the Department of Revenue and Taxation 
(Department) suspending Gerstell's driver's license.

 
 

[¶2.]     In her Brief of 
Appellant, Gerstell says that the issue is:

 
 
"Whether a 
license suspension can be upheld when the suspension proceedings are conducted 
in violation of § 16-3-113(c) of the Wyoming Statutes."

 
 
The 
Department says that the issue is:

 
 
"Whether 
the suspension of appellant's driver's license was proper, according to 
procedure, and mandated by law?"

 
 
We are not 
presented with a dispute as to underlying facts. At about 3:25 A.M. on the 
morning of June 25, 1987, a peace officer serving in the Green River Police 
Department arrested Gerstell for a violation of § 31-5-233, W.S. 1977 (May 1987 
Repl.).1 The Officer's Signed Statement, 
made on a form prepared by the Department, includes this statement of facts 
justifying the initial contact:

 
 
"Observed 
vehicle traveling at high rate of speed westbound upon W. Railroad Ave. Observed 
that driver while operating vehicle, drifted to the extreme left bound oncoming 
lane at W. Railroad and N.2nd W. Vehicle also failed to make stop at stop sign 
located on W. Railroad 
Ave. and N.4th W."

 
 
In 
completing the form, the officer described the following physical 
characteristics pertaining to Gerstell:

 
 
"Odor of 
Alcohol Very Strong

 
 
"Speech 
slurred slow, hard to understand

 
 
"Balance 
swayed from side to side, used vehicle for support,

 
 
"Signs or 
Complaints of Injury None * * *."

 
 
The 
statement goes on to reflect that she was unable to accomplish an initial field 
sobriety test and refused to take any others and that Gerstell said "she had 
been drinking a little." It also is checked to set forth the fact that she did 
not take a chemical test. It was after these procedures that Gerstell was 
arrested for the violation of § 31-5-233.

 
 

[¶3.]     It is clear that 
Gerstell was advised that failure to submit to required chemical tests would 
result in a suspension of her driver's license. The signed statement was 
submitted on a form furnished by the Department of Revenue and Taxation. In 
addition, Gerstell was furnished with a copy of a Refusal which is also a notice 
of suspension and a temporary driver's license furnished by the Department of 
Revenue and Taxation. This procedure was accomplished by the peace officer at 
the time of the arrest.

 
 

[¶4.]     The pertinent statutes 
provide as follows:

 
 
     "§ 31-6-102. Test to 
determine alcoholic or controlled substance content of blood; suspension of 
license.

 
 
    "(a) If arrested for an 
offense as defined by W.S. 31-5-233:

 
 
     "(i) Any person who 
drives or is in an actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a public 
street or highway in this state is deemed to have given consent, subject to the 
provisions of this act, to a chemical test or tests of his blood, breath or 
urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol or controlled substance content 
of his blood. The test or tests shall be:

 
 
     "(A) Incidental to a 
lawful arrest;

 
 
     "(B) Given as promptly 
as possible after the arrest;

 
 
     "(C) Administered at 
the direction of a peace officer who has probable cause to believe the person 
was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a public 
street or highway in this state while under the influence of alcohol or a 
controlled substance or under the combined influence of alcohol or any 
controlled substance to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving 
the vehicle. The peace officer who requires a test pursuant to this section may 
direct that the test shall be of blood, breath or urine. However, if the officer 
directs that the test be of the person's blood or urine, the person may choose 
whether the test shall be of blood or urine. The person has this option unless 
the peace officer has probable cause to believe there is impairment by a 
controlled substance which is not subject to testing by a blood or breath test 
in which case a urine test may be required.

 
 
     "(ii) For tests 
required under this act, the arrested person shall be advised 
that:

 
 
     "(A) His failure to 
submit to all required chemical tests requested by the peace officer shall 
result in the suspension for six (6) months of his Wyoming driver's license or 
his privilege to operate a motor vehicle;

 
 
     "(B) If a test is 
taken and the results indicate the person is under the influence of alcohol, he 
may be subject to criminal penalties and his Wyoming driver's license or his privilege to 
operate a motor vehicle shall be suspended for ninety (90) 
days;

 
 
     "(C) He may go to the 
nearest hospital or clinic and secure any or all required tests at his own 
expense or any remaining required tests shall be administered by a person at a 
place and in a manner prescribed by and at the expense of the agency employing 
the peace officer.

 
 
     "(b) Results of tests 
obtained at the arrested person's expense shall be made available to the 
arresting officer and the arrested person. Disclosure of the test results by the 
person administering the test is not a violation of the doctor-patient 
relationship.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
     "(d) If a person under 
arrest refuses upon the request of a peace officer to submit to a chemical text 
designated by the agency employing the peace officer as provided in subsection 
(a) of this section, none shall be given. The peace officer shall submit his 
signed statement to the department. Upon receipt of the statement the department 
shall suspend the person's Wyoming driver's license or his privilege to 
operate a motor vehicle in this state for six (6) months subject to review as 
provided in this act. The statement submitted by the officer shall 
contain:

 
 
     "(i) His probable 
cause to believe the arrested person was driving or in actual physical control 
of a motor vehicle: 

 
 
     "(A) On a public 
street or highway in this state;

 
 
     "(B) While under the 
influence of alcohol or a controlled substance to a degree which rendered him 
incapable of safely driving the vehicle; and

 
 
     "(ii) That the person 
refused to submit to a test upon the request of the peace 
officer.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
     "(f) In addition the 
signed statement submitted under subsection (d) or (e) of this section, the 
peace officer shall issue the person a temporary license similar to but in lieu 
of the license authorized under W.S. 31-7-138. This temporary license shall be 
valid for thirty (30) days, shall not be renewed, shall contain a notice that 
the person has twenty (20) days from the date of issuance within which to 
request a hearing from the department and that failure to timely request a 
hearing will result in the suspension automatically commencing upon expiration 
of the temporary license or upon expiration of any existing suspension or 
revocation if the person's license or privilege is suspended or revoked at the 
time the temporary license is issued. W.S. 31-7-138(d) and (e) apply to a 
license under this section. For purposes of this section, the peace officer acts 
as an agent for the department when providing notice of the suspension and 
notice of the opportunity for a hearing. W.S. 31-7-137 applies to a notice under 
this act. Failure to demand a hearing within the twenty (20) day period is a 
waiver of the right of hearing, and the suspension shall commence upon 
expiration of the temporary license or upon expiration of any existing 
suspension or revocation if the person's license or privilege is suspended or 
revoked at the time the temporary license is issued. If a timely demand for 
hearing is made, the department shall forward the demand to the independent 
hearing examiner who shall schedule a hearing within forty-five (45) days after 
receipt of the request and provide the arrested person at least ten (10) days 
notice of the hearing. The hearing shall be conducted by the hearing examiner. 
If the hearing examiner fails to schedule the hearing within forty-five (45) 
days of the request, other than at the request of the licensee, the licensee, as 
his sole remedy, shall be given credit against any action upheld at the hearing 
for the time between the expiration of the forty-five (45) day period and the 
date the hearing was first scheduled.

 
 
     "(g) For the purposes 
of this section, the signed statement submitted by the peace officer shall be 
deemed a sworn statement and shall be subject to penalties for 
perjury.

 
 
     "§ 31-6-103 
Application for hearing; stay of suspension of license; scope of 
hearing.

 
 
     "(a) A timely request 
for a hearing shall stay the suspension until the order following the hearing is 
entered and all appellate review of the matter is completed, provided the stay 
of suspension is effective only so long as there is no suspension for a similar 
violation during the hearing and appeal period.

 
 
     "(b) The scope of a 
hearing for the purposes of this act shall cover the issues of whether a peace 
officer had probable cause to believe the arrested person had been driving or 
was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a public street or 
highway in this state while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled 
substance to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely driving the 
vehicle, whether the person was placed under arrest, whether he refused to 
submit to a test upon request of the peace officer or if he submitted to a test 
whether the test results indicated there was at least ten one-hundredths of one 
percent (0.10%) by weight of alcohol in the person's blood, and whether, except 
for the persons described in this act who are incapable of refusing, he had been 
advised that his Wyoming driver's license or privilege to operate a motor 
vehicle shall be suspended for six (6) months if he refused to submit to a test 
and suspended for ninety (90) days and subject him to criminal penalties if he 
submitted to the test and the results indicate the person is under the influence 
of alcohol. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing examiner shall order 
that the suspension either be rescinded or sustained. If the person submitted to 
a chemical test, the hearing examiner has the same authority to modify a license 
suspension under this act as he does under W.S. 31-7-105.

 
 
     "(c) Pre-hearing 
discovery, available to any interested party is limited to access to the notice 
of suspension, signed statement and any accompanying documentation submitted by 
the arresting officer. Other types of discovery available under other law are 
not available in a hearing under this section."

 
 
Gerstell 
does not urge that the statutory procedure set forth above was not followed by 
the officer.

 
 

[¶5.]     On July 1, 1987, the 
Department mailed to Gerstell a "Notification of Receipt of Implied Consent" in 
which the Department stated that it had received advice as to her refusal to 
submit to a chemical test and that her driver's license would be suspended from 
July 25, 1987 to January 20, 1988. The notice also stated that Gerstell's 
written request for a hearing must be received within twenty days of June 25, 
1987. Apparently, this crossed in the mail with a request for hearing sent by 
Gerstell's attorney on June 30 in which a request was made for "* * * all 
documents pertaining to this file when you receive them." On July 2, 1987, the 
Department sent a second letter informing Gerstell that her request for a 
hearing had been received and that her temporary driving privileges would be 
extended until the hearing was held. The hearing initially was scheduled for 
August 5, 1987 but, because the Department failed to furnish the requested 
documents, it was continued until September 2, 1987. While Gerstell complains in 
her statement of the case about the failure of the Department to furnish the 
documents until August 21, 1987, we do not perceive that any claim of error is 
premised upon this failure, and no prejudice can be discerned relating to 
it.

 
 

[¶6.]     The Independent Hearing 
Examiner, after the hearing, found that the peace officer had probable cause to 
believe that Gerstell was driving on the public streets while under the 
influence of alcohol; that Gerstell had been arrested for driving under the 
influence of alcohol; that she had been informed, in accordance with law, of her 
rights and obligations under the Wyoming statutes; and that she had refused to 
comply and submit to a chemical test. He upheld the suspension of Gerstell's 
driver's license pursuant to the provisions of § 31-6-102.

 
 

[¶7.]     Gerstell contends that, 
because it failed to comply with the mandate of § 16-3-113(c), the Department 
lacked jurisdiction over the license suspension proceeding until it had done so. 
Her logic leads her to the conclusion that, because the Department of Revenue 
did not have jurisdiction, the decision of the hearing examiner must be held to 
be void and of no effect. The particular defect she points to is that the 
Department suspended her driver's license before giving her notice by mail of 
facts or conduct which would warrant the intended action. Her position depends 
upon the premise that the suspension proceeding was initiated when the peace 
officer furnished her with the Notice of Suspension and Temporary Wyoming 
Driver's License. She says that, the proceeding having been initiated in that 
way, the Department obviously failed to initiate it by giving notice by 
mail.

 
 

[¶8.]     The statute upon which 
Gerstell depends provides in pertinent part:

 
 
"(c) No 
revocation, suspension, annulment or withdrawal of any license is lawful unless, 
prior to the institution of agency proceedings, the agency gave notice by mail 
to the licensee of facts or conduct which warrant the intended action, and the 
licensee was given an opportunity to show compliance with all lawful 
requirements for the retention of the license. If the agency finds that public 
health, safety or welfare imperatively requires emergency action, and 
incorporates a finding to that effect in its order, summary suspension of a 
license may be ordered pending proceedings for revocation or other action. * * 
*" Section 16-3-113(c).

 
 
The 
Department's argument is that the proceedings in this instance were properly 
initiated, pursued, and completed in accordance with law. The Department urges 
that Gerstell's argument that jurisdiction is lacking because of her claimed 
procedural defect is without merit. Pointing to the "Notification of Receipt of 
Implied Consent" which was mailed to Gerstell just six days after arrest, the 
Department argues that Gerstell had proper notice and that it had complied with 
the appropriate statutory proceedings.

 
 

[¶9.]     Buttressing her 
argument, Gerstell points to the proposition that the Department of Revenue and 
Taxation, as is true of other state administrative agencies, has no authority or 
power other than that specifically conferred upon it by statute. She cites 
Matter of Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 745 P.2d 563 (Wyo. 1987), and TriCounty Electric Association, Inc. v. 
City of Gillette, 525 P.2d 3 (Wyo. 1974). She contends 
that the rule is that the authority of the Department must be narrowly construed 
with any reasonable doubt as to the actual extent of that authority being 
resolved against the agency. Matter of Mountain States; Public Service 
Commission v. Formal Complaint of WWZ Co., 641 P.2d 183 (Wyo. 1982); TriCounty 
Electric. Applying the rule of strict construction, jurisdiction could be found 
to be lacking if the Department in fact failed to comply with the statutory 
requirements, and Gerstell's contention that the findings of the hearing 
examiner would be null and of no effect would be correct.

 
 

[¶10.]  It is to be noted that Gerstell does not 
contend that the Department in any way failed to comply with the provision of § 
31-6-102 or § 31-6-103. Instead, it is her position that, because the procedure 
outlined in those statutes fails to satisfy the requirements of § 16-3-113(c), 
the Department's procedure is inefficacious. It is noted in passing that the 
logical effect of Gerstell's argument is that it would be impossible for the 
Department to suspend a driver's license pursuant to the statutory provisions 
because the initial notice always would be furnished by the peace officer and 
never would be mailed.

 
 

[¶11.]  We know well the rule that in construing 
statutes an absurd result should be avoided. There is a presumption that the 
legislature intends to adopt legislation that is reasonable and logical. State 
ex rel. Department of Revenue and Taxation, Motor Vehicle Division v. McNeese, 
718 P.2d 38 (Wyo. 1986); McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1980); 
Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Irvine, 589 P.2d 1295 (Wyo. 1979). It is 
also assumed that the legislature did not intend futile acts. E.g., Hamlin v. 
Transcon Lines, 701 P.2d 1139 (Wyo. 1985); 
Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055 (Wyo. 1984); 
Thompson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow Committee, 
651 P.2d 778 (Wyo. 1982); Yeik v. Department of 
Revenue and Taxation, 595 P.2d 965 (Wyo. 1979). Furthermore, statutes that relate 
to the same subject matter should be harmonized where that is possible. WYMO 
Fuels, Inc. v. Edwards, 723 P.2d 1230 (Wyo. 
1986); State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Division v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732 (Wyo. 1983). In this 
instance, harmonization can be accomplished by applying the rule that a specific 
statute will govern over a general statute. E.g., City of Rock Springs v. Police Protection Association, 610 P.2d 975 
(Wyo. 1980); White v. Board of Land 
Commissioners, 595 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1979); 
Irvine; Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle 
Division v. Shipley, 579 P.2d 415 (Wyo. 1978).

 
 

[¶12.]  We have noted that Gerstell does not 
contest the fact that the Department indeed did mail a Notification of Receipt 
of Implied Consent six days after her arrest. Section 31-6-102(f) provides only 
that "if a timely demand for hearing is made, the department shall forward the 
demand to the independent hearing examiner who shall schedule a hearing within 
forty-five (45) days after receipt of the request and provide the arrested 
person at least ten (10) days notice of the hearing." This provision was 
complied with. The statute manifests a legislative intent that the automatic 
suspension is provisional only, and that the due process rights of the holder of 
a driver's license will be protected by the procedure set forth in the statute. 
Section 31-6-103 provides that the timely request for hearing stays the 
suspension until the entry of the order following the hearing and the completion 
of all appellate review.

 
 

[¶13.]  Giving these statutes a reasonable and 
logical construction, there is no conclusion other than a holding that, by 
forwarding the request for hearing to the independent hearing examiner, the 
Department of Revenue then institutes the proceedings for suspension of the 
license and, in accordance with the Department procedures, notice by mail was 
furnished to Gerstell of facts or conduct which warranted the intended action 
prior to the time the case was forwarded to the independent hearing examiner. 
Gerstell then had every opportunity to show compliance with all lawful 
requirements for the retention of her license. We note the provision in § 
16-3-113(c) of authority to summarily suspend a license if the agency finds that 
public health safety and welfare require emergency action. In our view, the 
legislature, by providing for the seizure of the license by the peace officer, 
has, in effect, usurped the prerogative of the Department to make a finding that 
emergency action is required. The Department cannot be faulted for adopting 
appropriate procedures to implement that legislative 
policy.

 
 

[¶14.]  The order of the Department of Revenue 
and Taxation suspending Gerstell's driver's license is 
affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Section 
31-5-233, W.S. 1977 (May 1987 Repl.), provides, in pertinent 
part:

 
 
"(a) It is 
unlawful for any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor, to a 
degree which renders him incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle, to drive 
or have actual physical control of any vehicle within this 
state."