Case Title: State ex rel. V.K.B. v. Smith

Citation: 2013-Ohio-5477

Docket Number: 2013-0636

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. V.K.B. v. Smith, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-5477.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-5477 
THE STATE EX REL. V.K.B., APPELLANT, v. SMITH, JUDGE, ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. V.K.B. v. Smith,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-5477.] 
Prohibition—Domestic relations—Child custody—R.C. 3127.18—Emergency 
temporary custody—Custody of child who is resident of Arizona 
improperly awarded to Ohio nonparent—Writ granted. 
(No. 2013-0636—Submitted August 20, 2013—Decided December 17, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Sandusky County, No. S-13-001,  
2013-Ohio-799. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals in this appeal from 
an original action in prohibition.  Relator-appellant, V.K.B., filed this action to 
prevent the respondents-appellees, Sandusky County Juvenile Court, Sandusky 
County Juvenile Court Judge Bradley J. Smith, and juvenile court magistrate Sara 
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Jo Sherick, from exercising jurisdiction with respect to the custody of her minor 
daughter, J.B. 
{¶ 2} V.K.B. had obtained sole custody of the child in a judgment issued 
by the juvenile court in 2009.  Since then, she had moved to Arizona with her 
daughter for two years, making it their permanent home. On a visit to Ohio in 
2012, she was called back to Arizona, and left the child temporarily with her 
mother.  While V.K.B. was away, the child’s paternal grandfather filed an ex 
parte motion in the Sandusky Juvenile Court for emergency temporary custody of 
the child, which was granted.  V.K.B. filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition, 
alleging that the Ohio court lacks jurisdiction now that she and the child are 
residents of Arizona. 
{¶ 3} The court of appeals, on a motion to dismiss by respondents for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, dismissed the case, 
finding that the juvenile court had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, R.C. Chapter 3127, and that V.K.B. had an 
adequate remedy by way of appeal if the court errs in its rulings.  V.K.B. appealed 
to this court. 
{¶ 4} We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals because (1) if 
V.K.B. can prove the allegations in her complaint, the juvenile court has failed to 
follow the statute that creates its jurisdiction over the child and (2) in this context, 
appeal is not an adequate remedy at law because it is neither “complete,” 
“beneficial,” nor “speedy.”  See State ex rel. Kingsley v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 
130 Ohio St.3d 333, 2011-Ohio-5519, 958 N.E.2d 169, ¶ 13 (to be considered 
adequate, the remedy must be complete, beneficial, and speedy). 
Facts 
{¶ 5} V.K.B. is the natural mother of J.B., born on August 15, 2008.  She 
was named the custodial parent by the Sandusky County Juvenile Court on 
December 18, 2009.  V.K.B. relocated to Arizona in August 2010 and filed a 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
notice of relocation with the Ohio court.  V.K.B. returned temporarily to Ohio in 
August 2012.  She was at that time actively seeking employment in Arizona.  
When V.K.B. discovered that a permanent job was available in Arizona, she 
returned there for an interview on November 9, 2012.  She left J.B. in the care of 
her mother. 
{¶ 6} While she was in Arizona, the paternal grandfather filed an ex 
parte motion for custody of J.B., which was granted. After the ex parte order was 
granted, V.K.B. filed a “notice of filing of foreign judgment” in Arizona, giving 
that court notice of the 2009 Ohio custody order.  V.K.B. claims that the 
respondents had no jurisdiction to grant the ex parte custody order, as her home 
state is now Arizona, and the courts of Arizona have jurisdiction. 
{¶ 7} The court of appeals directed respondents to respond to V.K.B.’s 
original action for a writ of prohibition, which they did.  That court ultimately 
found that V.K.B. has not shown that respondents were exercising judicial power 
unauthorized by law and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. 
V.K.B. has appealed. 
Analysis 
Oral argument: 
{¶ 8} V.K.B. has moved for oral argument. We have discretion to grant 
oral argument in direct appeals under S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.02.  In exercising that 
discretion, we consider “whether the case involves a matter of great public 
importance, complex issues of law or fact, a substantial constitutional issue, or a 
conflict among courts of appeals.” State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. Retirement 
Bd., 111 Ohio St.3d 118, 2006-Ohio-5339, 855 N.E.2d 444, ¶ 15, citing State ex 
rel. United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Am. v. Ohio 
Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 108 Ohio St.3d 432, 2006-Ohio-1327, 844 N.E.2d 335, 
¶ 25–26.  Here, V.K.B. does not present issues complex enough to require oral 
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argument and does not even assert any reason for oral argument.  We therefore 
deny the motion. 
Prohibition: 
{¶ 9} To be entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, V.K.B. must 
establish that (1) respondents are about to or have exercised judicial power, (2) 
the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would 
result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course 
of law, State ex rel. Bell v. Pfeiffer, 131 Ohio St.3d 114, 2012-Ohio-54, 961 
N.E.2d 181, ¶ 18 and 23; State ex rel. Miller v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Elections, 130 
Ohio St.3d 24, 2011-Ohio-4623, 955 N.E.2d 379, ¶ 12.  When the lack of 
jurisdiction is “patent and unambiguous,” the lack of an adequate remedy is 
considered established, as the unavailability of alternate remedies is immaterial in 
such a case.  Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Oil & Gas Comm., 135 Ohio 
St.3d 204, 2013-Ohio-224, 985 N.E.2d 480, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 10} When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, the court must presume all factual allegations 
contained in the complaint to be true and must make all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the nonmoving party. Perez v. Cleveland, 66 Ohio St.3d 397, 399, 613 
N.E.2d 199 (1993); Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 
N.E.2d 753 (1989); Phung v. Waste Mgt., Inc., 23 Ohio St.3d 100, 102, 491 
N.E.2d 1114 (1986). “[A]s long as there is a set of facts, consistent with the 
plaintiff’s complaint, which would allow the plaintiff to recover, the court may 
not grant a defendant’s motion to dismiss.” York v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 60 
Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 573 N.E.2d 1063 (1991). 
{¶ 11} The question here is whether the court of appeals properly 
dismissed V.K.B.’s complaint for a writ of prohibition, or whether there is a set of 
facts consistent with the complaint that would entitle her to the requested relief. 
The juvenile court lacks jurisdiction: 
January Term, 2013 
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{¶ 12} The complaint clearly alleges that the respondents have exercised 
and will continue to exercise judicial power. The question is whether that exercise 
is authorized by law and whether denying the writ would result in an injury for 
which no other adequate remedy exists. 
{¶ 13} V.K.B. asserts that the respondents lack jurisdiction to proceed 
because jurisdiction over J.B. passed to Arizona when J.B. became a resident of 
that state.  The juvenile court purportedly exercised temporary emergency 
jurisdiction under R.C. 3127.18.  That statute provides, first, that jurisdiction 
comes exclusively from the statute: 
 
(A) A court of this state has temporary emergency 
jurisdiction if a child is present in this state and either of the 
following applies: 
(1) The child has been abandoned. 
(2) It is necessary in an emergency to protect the child 
because the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to 
or threatened with mistreatment or abuse. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Thus, the juvenile court has emergency and temporary 
jurisdiction over a child in Ohio only if it satisfies the requirements of the statute.  
One of the requirements of the statute is that if a child-custody proceeding has 
been started in another state, the court must immediately communicate with the 
court of the other state to resolve the emergency, protect the safety of the parties 
and the child, and set a period for the duration of the temporary order.  R.C. 
3127.18(D) mandates that when 
 
[a] court of this state * * * has been asked to make a child custody 
determination under this section, upon being informed that a child 
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custody proceeding has been commenced in or a child custody 
determination has been made by a court of a state having 
jurisdiction under sections 3127.15 to 3127.17 of the Revised Code 
or a similar statute of another state, [the Ohio court] shall 
immediately communicate with the other court. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The situation before us today is precisely the situation the 
Uniform Act contemplates. 
{¶ 14} R.C. 3127.18(D) further provides: 
 
A court of this state that is exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 
sections 3127.15 to 3127.17 of the Revised Code, upon being 
informed that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in 
or a child custody determination has been made by a court of 
another state under a statute similar to this section, shall 
immediately communicate with the court of that state to resolve the 
emergency, protect the safety of the parties and the child, and 
determine a period for the duration of the temporary order. 
 
Moreover, where there has been a prior child-custody determination entitled to be 
enforced in Ohio, any emergency order under the statute is temporary and must 
specify the amount of time the court deems adequate to obtain an order from the 
other state: 
 
If there is a previous child custody determination that is entitled to 
be enforced under this chapter, or a child custody proceeding has 
been commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under 
sections 3127.15 to 3127.17 of the Revised Code or a similar 
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
statute of another state, any order issued by a court of this state 
under this section must specify in the order a period that the court 
considers adequate to allow the person seeking an order to obtain 
an order from the state having jurisdiction under sections 3127.15 
to 3127.17 of the Revised Code or a similar statute of another state. 
The order issued in this state remains in effect until an order is 
obtained from the other state within the period specified or until 
the period expires. 
 
R.C. 3127.18(C).  The complaint alleges that V.K.B. has commenced a child-
custody enforcement action in Arizona by filing the Ohio judgment there.  The 
juvenile court in Ohio, although it is aware of the Arizona filing, has apparently 
not communicated with the Arizona court to resolve the emergency, nor has it 
determined a period for the duration of the temporary order; the order states only 
that the grandfather is granted immediate custody “until a full and fair hearing 
may be held.”   That was a year ago. 
{¶ 15} V.K.B. filed a notice of relocation notifying the Ohio court of her 
move to Arizona in June 2010.  The original Ohio judgment of custody was filed 
in Arizona in December 2012.  The Ohio juvenile court does not mention the 
notice of relocation filed with that court in June 2010, nor is there any evidence 
available so far that it made contact with the Arizona court.  There is also no 
evidence that the court has since determined a period for the duration of the 
temporary order to allow the Arizona court to rule.   
{¶ 16} Moreover, the court has granted “temporary” custody to a 
grandparent, who, unlike a parent, does not have fundamental rights in the care 
and custody of a child. “Within the framework of the statutes, the overriding 
principle in custody cases between a parent and nonparent is that natural parents 
have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their 
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children.”  In re Hockstok, 98 Ohio St.3d 238, 2002-Ohio-7208, 781 N.E.2d 971, 
¶ 16, citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 
599 (1982), and In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157, 556 N.E.2d 1169 (1990).  
That “temporary” custody has now lasted over one year. 
{¶ 17} Thus, if V.K.B. can prove the allegations in her complaint, the 
juvenile court has not satisfied the requirements of the statute, and therefore does 
not have jurisdiction over the parties, the child, or the case.  
{¶ 18} Moreover, the lack of jurisdiction here need not be “patent and 
unambiguous.” V.K.B.’s argument that appeal in this case does not amount to an 
“adequate remedy” for purposes of prohibition has merit. 
{¶ 19} Ohio law has consistently applied the principle that appeal is an 
adequate remedy in cases involving child custody.  Ross v. Saros, 99 Ohio St.3d 
412, 2003-Ohio-4128, 792 N.E.2d 1126; State ex rel. Mosier v. Fornoff, 126 Ohio 
St.3d 47, 2010-Ohio-2516, 930 N.E.2d 305.  However, that precedent does not 
directly apply here. 
{¶ 20} In Ross, the mother filed for a writ of habeas corpus after her 
appeal was unsuccessful.  In Mosier, the dispute was between the parents, both of 
whom have a fundamental constitutional interest in the care, custody, and 
management of their children. 
{¶ 21} In the context of this case, appeal is not adequate. Here, the contest 
is between a parent and a nonparent.  As explained above, natural parents have a 
fundamental constitutional interest in the care, custody, and management of their 
children that grandparents do not.  Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-
Ohio-5334, 836 N.E.2d 1165, ¶ 40. 
{¶ 22} In addition, in this case the juvenile court has awarded “temporary 
custody” but has neither communicated with the Arizona court nor specified the 
duration of the temporary order to allow the Arizona court to rule.  Thus, there is 
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no guarantee that the court will not simply sit on this “temporary” order 
indefinitely. 
{¶ 23} An “adequate remedy” in child-custody cases is unlike that in other 
types of cases, because for a child and its parent, time is the most precious of 
commodities.  If a child is removed from her parent for a year, as has already 
occurred in this case, that year can never be replaced.  If a writ is not issued and 
the case returned to the juvenile court in these circumstances, it may languish for 
one or two more years before the court issues an appealable order.  The appeal 
can take an additional year or two by the time briefs are prepared and oral 
arguments delivered and the judges arrive at a conclusion. 
{¶ 24} Thus, even if the juvenile court eventually issues a final order, and 
V.K.B. appeals the case only to the court of appeals, it may take five years or 
more between the time custody was “temporarily” moved from the child’s mother 
to a nonparent and the time the case is resolved.  If the case is appealed here, it 
may take an additional year or more.  Instead of a toddler, J.B. will be seven, 
eight, or even nine years old.  The formative years she spent away from her 
mother can never be recaptured. This problem is particularly acute here, as J.B. 
has been diagnosed as autistic. 
{¶ 25} Moreover, this principle of urgency in resolving child-custody 
cases is already acknowledged by Ohio law.  For example, this court’s own rules 
require accelerated schedules for briefs, pleadings, and other matters in cases 
involving the termination of parental rights and adoption.  S.Ct.Prac.R. 
7.03(A)(2), 
12.09, 
15.03(A)(2), 
16.02(A)(1), 
16.03(A)(1), 
16.04(A)(1), 
16.05(B)(1)(a), 16.05(C)(1)(a), 16.05(D)(1)(a),  16.05(E)(1)(a), 17.04, and 18.01. 
{¶ 26} Under R.C. 2505.02(A)(2), child-custody cases are “special 
proceedings,” In re Adams, 115 Ohio St.3d 86, 2007-Ohio-4840, 873 N.E.2d 886, 
at ¶ 43, that affect a “substantial right,” In re C.B., 129 Ohio St.3d 231, 2011-
Ohio-2899, 951 N.E.2d 398, ¶11 (“a parent does have a substantial right in the 
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custody of his or her child”); In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 556 N.E.2d 1169; 
In re H.F., 120 Ohio St.3d 499, 2008-Ohio-6810, 900 N.E.2d 607. 
{¶ 27} This is not to say that appeal is not an adequate remedy in all child-
custody cases.  But where, as alleged here, (1) custody has been removed from a 
parent who previously had been awarded permanent custody, (2) custody is 
awarded to a nonparent in an ex parte proceeding, (3) the juvenile court is not 
complying with the requirements of the Uniform Act or other applicable law, and 
(4) the juvenile court has issued a “temporary” order with no indication of when a 
hearing or other action might be taken to resolve the case, appeal is not an 
“adequate remedy at law” for purposes of an extraordinary writ. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 28} While visiting Ohio, an Arizona child has been summarily taken 
from her mother and given to a nonparent through an ex parte proceeding.  The 
juvenile court did not follow the law that gives it jurisdiction over the child.  And 
the court of appeals has told the mother that she has an adequate remedy at law 
since at some distant point in the future any error will be vindicated on appeal.  
We disagree. 
{¶ 29} The writ of prohibition is granted.  The Sandusky County Juvenile 
Court is hereby directed to vacate all orders entered in this matter subsequent to 
August 2010, and the child is to be returned to the custody of the mother 
forthwith. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and O’NEILL, JJ., 
concur. 
KENNEDY and FRENCH, JJ., dissent and would affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
____________________ 
January Term, 2013 
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Gerald R. Walton & Associates, Gerald R. Walton, and John J. Schneider, 
for appellant. 
Thomas L. Stierwalt, Sandusky County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Norman P. Solze, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees. 
________________________