Case Title: Strongsville Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino

Citation: 2001-Ohio-1269

Docket Number: 20000841 and 20000842

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-08-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Strongsville Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino , 92 Ohio St.3d 488, 2001-Ohio-1269] 
 
 
STRONGSVILLE BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLANT, v. ZAINO, TAX COMMR., 
ET AL., APPELLEES. 
EHRNFELT, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF STRONGSVILLE, APPELLANT, v. ZAINO, 
TAX COMMR., ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Strongsville Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 488.] 
Taxation — Real property — Application for exemption — R.C. 5715.27, 
applied — Decisions of Board of Tax Appeals dismissing complaints 
objecting to application for exemption reasonable and lawful, when. 
(Nos. 00-841 and 00-842 — Submitted April 25, 2001 — Decided August 
15, 2001.) 
APPEALS from the Board of Tax Appeals, Nos. 99-A-351 and 99-A-350. 
 
PFEIFER, J.  These two cases have been combined for oral argument and 
decision. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
 
On July 7, 1998, The Cleveland Clinic Foundation (“Clinic”) filed an 
application with the Tax Commissioner to exempt from taxation certain real 
property in the Strongsville school district. The commissioner sent a notice dated 
August 24, 1998, to the Strongsville Board of Education (“BOE”), stating that an 
application for exemption of the property had been filed.  Pursuant to R.C. 
5715.27(C), discussed below, the BOE had until November 30, 1998, to file a 
statement with the commissioner indicating an intent to submit evidence and 
participate in a hearing on the Clinic’s application for exemption; however, the 
BOE did not submit any statement of intention by the November 30, 1998 
deadline. 
 
On December 29, 1998, the commissioner received letters dated 
December 28, 1998, from the BOE and Walter F. Ehrnfelt, Mayor of Strongsville 
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(“Ehrnfelt”), objecting to the application for exemption filed by the Clinic.  In 
their letters, the BOE and Ehrnfelt stated that they were filing a “complaint 
objecting to the exemption from taxation of real property owned by The 
Cleveland Clinic Foundation and Royalton Road Joint Venture * * *.”  In 
response to a suggestion made in a telephone conversation with the office of the 
Tax Commissioner that their complaints may be subject to dismissal, the BOE 
and Ehrnfelt filed additional letters on January 20, 1999.  In these letters, the BOE 
and Ehrnfelt reiterated that their December 28, 1998 letters, filed December 30, 
1998, were intended to be complaints under R.C. 5715.27(E) and (F), with 
particular emphasis on paragraph (F). 
 
By journal entry of February 8, 1999, the commissioner found that the 
BOE’s December 28, 1998 letter was a complaint filed pursuant to R.C. 
5715.27(E) and (F) and dismissed it as premature, stating that “no final 
determination on the exemption status of the subject property” had been made.  
The commissioner further noted that since the BOE had not timely filed to submit 
evidence and participate in the July 7, 1998 application for exemption pursuant to 
R.C. 5715.27(C), it had no standing to participate in the application for 
exemption.  The commissioner concluded that he lacked jurisdiction to consider 
the BOE’s complaint. 
 
The commissioner dismissed Ehrnfelt’s complaint for the same reasons 
that he dismissed the BOE’s complaint, stating that as filed under R.C. 
5715.27(E) it was premature. 
 
The BOE and Ehrnfelt appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals.  The BTA 
ruled against both the BOE and Ehrnfelt on the basis that R.C. 5715.27(E) permits 
complaints to be filed “ ‘against the continued exemption of any property’ ” 
(emphasis sic) and, since the status of the property had not been finally 
determined, there was no continued exemption against which to file a complaint. 
 
These causes are now before the court upon appeals as of right. 
January Term, 2001 
3 
Law and Analysis 
 
The BOE contends that it properly invoked the jurisdiction of the 
commissioner to participate in the exemption proceedings.  We disagree. 
 
The relevant statutes for filing and contesting an application for exemption 
are R.C. 5715.27(A) through (D).  R.C. 5715.27(A) provides that a property 
owner “may file an application” with the commissioner requesting that the 
property be exempted from taxation.  R.C. 5715.27(B) provides that a board of 
education may request the commissioner to notify it when an application for 
exemption is filed for property in its district.  R.C. 5715.27(C) provides that a 
board of education may file a statement with the commissioner and the applicant 
for exemption, “indicating its intent to submit evidence and participate in any 
hearing on the application.”  R.C. 5715.27(C) further provides that the statement 
indicating a school board’s intention to participate in an exemption hearing “shall 
be filed prior to the first day of the third month following the end of the quarter in 
which that application was docketed by the commissioner.”  Here the date certain 
for filing of the BOE’s statement of intent to participate was November 30, 1998 
(“filing date”). 
 
Pursuant to R.C. 5715.27(C), to participate in this exemption hearing the 
BOE merely had to send a timely statement to the commissioner and the applicant 
of its intention to submit evidence and participate in the hearing.  However, the 
BOE did not file any statement of intention to participate by the filing date.  When 
the BOE finally filed its letter on December 29, 1998, it did not even characterize 
the letter as a notice of intention to participate; instead, it specifically stated that 
the letter was filed as a “complaint objecting to the exemption from taxation of 
real property.”  In its January 12, 1999 letter, filed January 20, 1999, the BOE 
reiterated that it “has not attempted to untimely file an entry of appearance; 
instead, a complaint against exemption was filed * * *.”  However, in the January 
12, 1999 letter, the BOE also stated that even if the “complaint is somehow 
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construed to be a request to participate in the property owner’s proceeding, the 
Tax Commissioner has the authority under R.C. § 5715.27(D) [sic] to extend this 
time for a board of education to file a statement to participate * * *.” 
 
In its appeal to this court, the BOE has dropped any claim that its letters to 
the commissioner constitute a complaint.  Here, the BOE claims that the 
commissioner should have accepted its letters as a statement of its intent to 
participate. 
 
R.C. 5715.27(D) does state that the commissioner “may extend the time 
for filing a statement under division (C) of this section.”  Here, the BOE sought 
not so much an extension of the filing date as it sought a retroactive waiver of the 
filing date.  If the BOE needed additional time to file a statement of intent to 
participate it could have asked the commissioner for that additional time prior to 
the expiration of the last date for filing.  Were that the case, the BOE’s abuse-of-
discretion argument might be colorable. 
 
But here, the BOE made no attempt to extend the filing date until after it 
had passed.  Not until its January 12, 1999 letter did the BOE finally characterize 
its filing as a statement of intent to participate.  At the same time, the BOE first 
invoked the Tax Commissioner’s authority to extend the filing deadline. 
 
An “ ‘abuse of discretion’ connotes more than an error of law or of 
judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or 
unconscionable.” State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 16 O.O.3d 169, 
173, 404 N.E.2d 144, 149.  We are convinced that the Tax Commissioner’s 
interpretation of R.C. 5715.27(D) was reasonable, and that his decision was 
within the contemplation of the statute.  We cannot say that he abused his 
discretion.  Moreover, the BOE did not “specifically assign as error” abuse of 
discretion when it filed its notice of appeal with the BTA, thereby waiving that 
issue. Osborne Bros. Welding Supply, Inc. v. Limbach (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 175, 
178, 532 N.E.2d 739, 742. 
January Term, 2001 
5 
 
In his appeal, Ehrnfelt contends that since he filed his complaint before 
December 31, 1998, he filed a valid complaint under R.C. 5715.27(E) and (F) 
against the application for exemption filed by the Clinic.  We disagree. 
 
R.C. 5715.27(E) provides: 
 
“A complaint may also be filed with the commissioner by any person, 
board, or officer authorized by section 5715.19 of the Revised Code to file 
complaints with the county board of revision against the continued exemption of 
any property.” 
 
R.C. 5715.27(F) provides: 
 
“An application for exemption and a complaint against exemption shall be 
filed prior to the thirty-first day of December of the tax year for which exemption 
is requested or for which the liability of any property to taxation in that year is 
requested * * *.” 
 
R.C. 5715.27(E) sets forth two limitations.  First, it limits the filing of a 
complaint to “any person, board, or officer authorized by section 5715.19 of the 
Revised Code to file complaints with the county board of revision.”  In referring 
to R.C. 5715.27(E), this court has stated, “Once an exemption has been granted, 
R.C. 5715.27(E) sets forth the parties who may file a complaint against ‘the 
continued exemption of any property.’ ”  Olmsted Falls Bd. of Edn. v. Tracy 
(1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 386, 388, 667 N.E.2d 1200, 1201.  Second, R.C. 
5715.27(E) limits the type of complaint that can be filed to one filed “against the 
continued exemption of any property.”  It is this second limitation that Ehrnfelt 
fails to meet because there was no “continued exemption” against which he could 
file a complaint. 
 
The term “continued exemption” contained in R.C. 5715.27(E) was added 
to R.C. 5715.27 in 1982 (Am.Sub.S.B. No. 262, 139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 711, 713).  
The same “continued exemption” terminology was used again by the General 
Assembly when it enacted R.C. 5715.271 in 1985 (Am.Sub.H.B. No. 321, 141 
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Ohio Laws, Part II, 3243, 3245).  R.C. 5715.271 states that “[t]he fact that 
property has previously been granted an exemption is not evidence that it is 
entitled to continued exemption.”  As used in R.C. 5715.271, the terminology 
“continued exemption” clearly means property that has been previously exempted 
and continues to be exempt.  When that same meaning for “continued exemption” 
is applied to R.C. 5715.27(E), it limits the filing of complaints to those filed 
against property that has been previously exempted and continues to be exempt. 
 
Therefore, the only complaint that can be filed under R.C. 5715.27(E) is a 
complaint against an existing exemption.  R.C. 5715.27(E) does not authorize the 
filing of a complaint against an application for exemption. 
 
However, it is R.C. 5715.27(F) upon which Ehrnfelt mainly relies. 
Looking only to R.C. 5715.27(F), Ehrnfelt contends that since he filed a 
“complaint against exemption” “prior to the thirty-first day of December of the 
tax year for which exemption is requested or for which the liability of any 
property to taxation in that year is requested,” he met the statutory requirements 
for filing a valid complaint. 
 
Ehrnfelt’s contention ignores both R.C. 5715.27(E) and the fact that 
paragraphs (E) and (F) must be read and construed in pari materia.  Together 
these paragraphs set forth who can file a complaint, what the complaint can be 
filed against, and when the complaint must be filed.  Both paragraphs require that 
there be an existing exemption in order to be effective.  Neither R.C. 5715.27(E) 
nor (F) authorizes complaints to be filed against an application for exemption. 
 
Prior to the 1985 amendment of R.C. 5715.27 in Am.Sub.H.B. No. 321, 
141 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3243, 3244, only the applicant for exemption was 
authorized to participate in an exemption hearing—there was no authority for a 
school board, or anyone else, to participate.  When R.C. 5715.27 was amended in 
1985, it gave school boards, upon the timely filing of a statement of intent 
participate, the right to participate in hearings on applications for exemption.  
January Term, 2001 
7 
Without the specific authority granted by the 1985 amendment of R.C. 5715.27, 
even school boards would not be able to participate in a hearing on an application 
for exemption.  Until the right to participate in a hearing on an application for 
exemption is specifically given to someone other than a school board, no one, 
including Mayor Ehrnfelt, has a statutory right to participate or submit evidence 
in a hearing on an application for exemption. 
 
Ehrnfelt also contends that his right to due process has been violated.  
However, Ehrnfelt did not raise any constitutional issue of due process in his 
notice of appeal to the BTA and thus waived the issue.  In Cleveland Gear Co. v. 
Limbach (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 229, 520 N.E.2d 188, this court held: “The 
question of whether a tax statute is unconstitutional when applied to a particular 
state of facts must be raised in the notice of appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals * 
* *.”  Paragraph three of the syllabus. 
 
Therefore, under the facts of this case, neither appellant had the right to 
participate in the hearing on the Clinic’s application for exemption.  While 
Ehrnfelt never had the right to participate, the BOE had the right but failed to 
exercise it in a timely manner.  Accordingly, we find the decisions of the BTA to 
be reasonable and lawful, and they are hereby affirmed. 
Decisions affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Kolick & Kondzer and Daniel J. Kolick, for appellants. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, James C. Sauer and Janyce C. 
Katz, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee Tax Commissioner. 
 
Arter & Hadden, L.L.P., Bernard J. Smith AND Irene C. Keyse-Walker, for 
appellee The Cleveland Clinic Foundation. 
__________________