Case Title: In re Child of Jessica C.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020 ME 63

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2020-05-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 63 
Docket: 
Pen-19-496 
Submitted 
On Briefs: May 4, 2020 
Decided: 
May 12, 2020 
 
Panel: 
MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILD OF JESSICA C. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  Jessica C. appeals from a judgment of the District Court 
(Bangor, Jordan, J.) terminating her parental rights to her child.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii) (2020).  The mother argues that the court’s 
findings of parental unfitness and best interest are not supported by sufficient 
evidence and that its ultimate determination of the child’s best interest 
constituted an abuse of discretion.  We affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  On May 2, 2017, when the child was just over one month old, the 
Department of Health and Human Services filed a petition for a child protection 
order.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4032 (2020).  In November 2017, a jeopardy order was 
issued only in relation to the father, but in January 2018, the Department 
amended its petition to allege jeopardy against the mother due to concerns of 
substance use, untreated mental health issues, and unstable living conditions.  
 
 
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After the child’s father passed away due to a drug overdose, the Department 
filed an affidavit in support of a preliminary child protection order.  See 
22 M.R.S. § 4034 (2020).  In July 2018, the court granted the preliminary 
protection order, temporarily removing the child from the mother’s custody 
and placing him in the Department’s custody.  See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4034(2), 
4036(1)(F) (2020).  The child was placed with a relative and has resided there 
since July 2018.  In August 2018, the mother appeared at a summary 
preliminary hearing (Campbell, J.), at which she waived her right to contest the 
temporary order.  See id. § 4034(4). 
 
[¶3]  In December 2018, the mother agreed to a jeopardy order 
(Jordan, J.), which required her to engage in rehabilitation and reunification 
services.1  In March 2019, when the child was two years old, the Department 
filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4052 
(2020).  After a one-day hearing on November 19, 2019, see 22 M.R.S. § 4054 
(2020), the court entered a judgment terminating the mother’s parental rights 
to the child. 
 
[¶4]  The following findings by the court are supported by competent 
evidence in the record.  See In re Child of Corey B., 2020 ME 3, ¶ 3, 223 A.3d 462. 
                                         
1  The jeopardy order included both of the mother’s children, but only one child is involved in this 
appeal; custody of the other child was granted to that child’s father. 
 
 
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[The child] has been in State custody since July 26, 2018, for a 
present total of sixteen (16) months.  The Court finds that the 
mother has not progressed from her initial situation in July of 2018.  
Although she made some progress originally, she has regressed for 
a number of months.  Given the mother’s history, the Court 
concludes that it would take many months more to possibly correct 
and stabilize[] her situation such that the child could be returned 
to her care.  [The child] cannot and should not have to wait for his 
mother to possibly do better. 
 
The Court finds that [the mother] has repeatedly made excuses 
about her conduct and promises to change throughout the life of 
this case.  She now promises the Court she will do much better if 
given a few more month[s] to prove herself.  The Court finds that 
her explanations of her failures to this point as deriving from a 
combination of being badly affected by the trauma of finding [the 
child’s] father dead from an overdose and her need to work to 
support herself taking up a lot of her time to be insufficient. 
 
The Court finds that [the mother’s] contact with the child has been 
sporadic.  She has not attended or been involved with consistent 
mental health and substance abuse counseling.  The Court finds 
that it would be unfair to [the child] and harmful to him to continue 
exposing him to her unpredictable and neglectful behavior. 
 
 
[¶5]  The court found that the State had proved by clear and convincing 
evidence that the mother was an unfit parent on two statutory grounds, namely 
that the mother was unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy and 
that she had been unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child within 
a time reasonably calculated to meet his needs.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).  The court then determined that termination of the 
 
 
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mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest.  See id. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶6]  In order to terminate a parent’s rights without consent, the trial 
court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, at least one of the statutory 
bases for parental unfitness and that termination is in the child’s best interest.  
See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2) (2020); In re Child of Sherri Y., 2019 ME 162, ¶ 5, 
221 A.3d 120.  We review these factual findings for clear error and will uphold 
the findings so long as any competent record evidence supports them.  
In re Child of Sherri Y., 2019 ME 162, ¶ 5, 221 A.3d 120.  Clear and convincing 
evidence exists where “the court could reasonably have been persuaded that 
the required factual findings were proved to be highly probable.”  Id. (quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
[¶7]  Regarding the court’s unfitness findings, the mother contends that 
the Department failed to present clear and convincing evidence that she was an 
unfit parent because it relied on the absence of evidence of drug screens and 
signed releases of records.  We conclude that the court’s unfitness findings were 
supported by clear and convincing evidence, including testimony from the 
guardian ad litem, the caseworker, and the mother’s counselor, which indicated 
 
 
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that the mother had failed to make sufficient progress over the course of the 
sixteen months that the child was in the Department’s custody.  Further, in 
evaluating conflicting evidence, the court was entitled to find that the mother’s 
testimony was not credible on a number of counts.  See In re Children of 
Tiyonie R., 2019 ME 34, ¶ 6, 203 A.3d 824 (“Although the mother offered 
contradictory evidence regarding her fitness as a parent, the weight and 
credibility of that evidence was for the trial court’s determination.”). 
 
[¶8]  We review the court’s ultimate determination of best interest for an 
abuse of discretion and its underlying factual findings for clear error.  See 
In re Child of Corey B., 2020 ME 3, ¶ 9, 223 A.3d 462.  In determining a child’s 
best interest, the trial court considers factors including “the needs of the child, 
the child’s age, attachment to relevant persons, periods of attachment and 
separation, ability to integrate into substitute placement or back into the 
parent’s home, and the child’s physical and emotional needs.”  In re Child of 
Sherri Y., 2019 ME 162, ¶ 8, 221 A.3d 120 (quotation marks and alteration 
omitted); see 22 M.R.S. § 4055(2) (2020).  The court’s findings concerning these 
best interest considerations were supported by record evidence, such as 
evidence regarding the child’s very young age, the fact that he had been in the 
 
 
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Department’s custody for the latter half of his life, and his anxiety when the 
mother would schedule a visit and then fail to attend. 
 
[¶9]  In addition, the court heard evidence demonstrating that the child 
benefitted from the relative’s care.  See In re Kenneth S., 2017 ME 45, ¶ 6, 
157 A.3d 244 (observing that, although the question of who should adopt the 
child is separate from a termination proceeding, “in conducting a best interest 
analysis, the court may consider evidence that the current foster placement is 
furthering the child’s permanency plan, especially where that plan is to place 
the child for adoption”).  The mother contends that, in conducting its best 
interest analysis, the court did not properly consider a permanency 
guardianship with the relative as an alternative to termination and adoption.  
We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s determination.  See 
In re Cameron B., 2017 ME 18, ¶¶ 11-13, 154 A.3d 1199.  The court was entitled 
to rely on the guardian ad litem’s opinion that due to the child’s young age, the 
certainty of adoption was in the child’s best interest and preferable to a 
permanency guardianship.  See In re Haylie W., 2017 ME 157, ¶ 4, 167 A.3d 576. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Amy McNally, Esq., Woodman Edmands Danylik Austin Smith & Jacques, P.A., 
Biddeford, for appellant Mother 
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office 
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Bangor District Court docket number PC-2017-56 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY