Case Title: Bettcher v. Wyoming Dept. of Employment

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-11-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Bettcher v. Wyoming Dept. of Employment1994 WY 123884 P.2d 635Case Number: 93-120Decided: 11/09/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Roger BETTCHER; Richard 
Metcalf; and Ernest Roybal,

Appellants 
(Petitioners),

v.

WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF 
EMPLOYMENT,

Appellee 
(Respondent).

Appeal from Unemployment 
Insurance Commission.

 

Representing 
Appellants:

Hardy H. Tate of Tate 
& Wilson, Sheridan, and Robert M. Weaver of Longshore, Nakamura & Quinn, 
Birmingham, AL.

Representing 
Appellee:

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. 
Gen., Cheyenne, and Joe Scott, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Casper.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,* MACY,** and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

*Retired July 
6, 1994.

**Chief 
Justice at time of conference.

TAYLOR, Justice.

[¶1]      In this 
consolidated appeal of contested case proceedings before an administrative 
agency, three claimants seek to reverse decisions of the Unemployment Insurance 
Commission of the Wyoming Department of Employment (Commission). The Commission 
determined that the claimants were ineligible or disqualified during some 
periods when unemployment benefits were received. The Commission found the 
claimants had each received money characterized as "back pay," and in one case a 
"severance payment," as a result of a negotiated settlement with an employer. 
The Commission ruled it could recover the amounts of overpaid unemployment 
benefits from the claimants. The claimants contend substantial evidence does not 
support the Commission's decisions in all three cases and assert that a recent 
decision of this court directs a contrary result in one case.

[¶2]      We affirm. 

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellants, the 
claimants, state one issue:

Is there substantial 
evidence to support the conclusion of the Unemployment Insurance Commission, 
Wyoming Department of Employment, that the Appellants received disqualifying 
income, disqualifying them from receiving unemployment compensation 
benefits?

[¶4]      Appellee, the 
Wyoming Department of Employment, identifies two issues:

A.

Whether the Commission's 
decisions that claimants received backpay [sic] and were therefore ineligible 
for unemployment benefits are supported by substantial evidence and are in 
conformity with law?

B.

Whether the Commission's 
decision that Metcalf received severance pay and is therefore disqualified from 
unemployment benefits is supported by substantial evidence and is in conformity 
with law.

II. 
FACTS

[¶5]      On October 1, 
1987, Roger Bettcher (Bettcher), Ernest Roybal (Roybal), and Richard Metcalf 
(Metcalf) (collectively claimants) joined a strike called by the United Mine 
Workers of America (UMWA) against their employer, Decker Coal Company (Decker) 
of Big Horn County, Montana. After extensive proceedings before the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the NLRB ruled that Decker engaged in unfair labor 
practices prior to the strike. The NLRB upheld a finding of an administrative 
law judge that Decker must "make whole employees for any lost wages or benefits" 
incurred as a result of the unilateral changes Decker made in the employees' 
terms of employment after the strike began.

[¶6]      On June 27, 1988, 
the UMWA made an unconditional offer to return to work, effectively ending the 
strike; however, Decker did not allow the workers who had participated in the 
strike to return to the mine. Finally, on September 30, 1991, the UMWA and 
Decker reached a negotiated settlement. The terms of the settlement agreement 
provided: "All strikers except those noted below, shall be entitled to $35,000 
in backpay [sic], less tax withholdings, for the period of time since their June 
27, 1988 unconditional offer to return to work until reinstatement."

[¶7]      The settlement 
agreement classified the workers who had participated in the strike into several 
categories. The material categories included: (1) the strikers who were legally 
entitled to be reinstated to their former positions would be reinstated by 
Decker and would receive $35,000.00 in "back pay" (Roybal); (2) the strikers who 
were legally entitled to be reinstated to their former positions but not 
reinstated by Decker would receive $100,000.00 in "back pay" and a "severance 
payment" (Metcalf); and (3) the strikers who were not legally entitled to be 
reinstated to their former positions would receive $35,000.00 in "back pay" 
(Bettcher). The settlement agreement included specific mathematical formulas to 
calculate the amount of "back pay" or the amount of "back pay" and a "severance 
payment" for each category.

[¶8]      The claimants 
each signed a waiver and release agreement to receive a lump-sum payment. The 
waiver and release agreement signed by Bettcher and Roybal stated, in pertinent 
part:

I, [claimant's name], in 
full and final settlement of all backpay [sic] and any other 
rights or remedies which I might have with or against DECKER COAL COMPANY * * * 
agree to accept Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00), less applicable state 
and federal withholding taxes.

(Emphasis 
added.) The waiver and release agreement signed by Metcalf stated, in pertinent 
part:

I, Richard R. Metcalf, 
hereby elect to receive a lump sum severance payment of One 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00), less applicable state and federal 
withholding taxes, in lieu of any rights to employment, reinstatement, backpay 
[sic], or any other rights or remedies which I might have with or against DECKER 
COAL COMPANY * * *.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶9]      Between June of 
1988 when the strike effectively ended and September of 1991 when the UMWA and 
Decker settled their disputes, the claimants worked sporadically for other 
employers in Wyoming. When those positions terminated, the claimants applied for 
and received unemployment benefits from the Wyoming Department of Employment, 
Unemployment Insurance Division (Division). The claimants properly applied for 
the unemployment benefits and the Division distributed them in accord with its 
guidelines.

[¶10]   After the settlement, the Division 
determined that the $35,000.00 payments received by all three claimants from 
Decker constituted "back pay," and the additional $65,000.00 received by Metcalf 
constituted a "severance payment." Notices were sent to each claimant announcing 
the Division's determinations. The notices declared that as a result of the 
"back pay" and settlements, the claimants were not eligible for some of the 
unemployment benefits they had received. The claimants filed administrative 
appeals.

[¶11]   On January 9, 1992, a hearing was 
held before an appeals examiner. The appeals examiner issued individual 
decisions. The appeals examiner found that the claimants received either "back 
pay" or "back pay" and a "severance payment", and as a result, they were not 
eligible to receive some unemployment benefits. The appeals examiner determined 
that the Division could recover any overpaid unemployment benefits from the 
claimants.

[¶12]   On March 17, 1992, the Commission 
considered the claimants' administrative appeals. The Commission noted that 
Bettcher and Roybal had argued that the $35,000.00 payments were settlements for 
the release of their rights to pursue other remedies against Decker. However, 
the Commission found that the plain language of the UMWA settlement agreement 
with Decker called for an award of "back pay." The Commission ruled Bettcher and 
Roybal were not eligible to receive unemployment benefits for a three-year 
period from June 27, 1988 to June 26, 1991. Any unemployment benefits Bettcher 
and Roybal received during this time were recoverable according to the 
Commission.

[¶13]   The Commission determined that 
Metcalf had received $35,000.00 in "back pay" and a $65,000.00 "severance 
payment." As a result of the $65,000.00 "severance payment," Metcalf was 
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits from July 3, 1988 to July 8, 
1990. The Commission ruled that any unemployment benefits Metcalf received 
during this time were recoverable.

[¶14]   On April 13, 1992, after exhausting 
administrative appeals, the claimants filed a consolidated appeal in district 
court. The district court determined that substantial evidence supported the 
Commission's rulings and affirmed. This appeal followed.

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶15]   Jurisdiction for an appeal of this 
administrative action is provided by Wyo. Stat. § 27-3-407 (1991) which permits 
a person adversely affected by a final decision of the Commission to obtain 
judicial review. Casper Iron & Metal, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Com'n of 
Dept. of Employment of State of Wyo., 845 P.2d 387, 391 (Wyo. 1993). See 
Brandt v. TCI Cablevision of Wyoming, 873 P.2d 595, 597 (Wyo. 
1994).

[¶16]   Under the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 16-3-101 through 16-3-115 (1990 & Cum.Supp. 
1994), the scope of review of a contested case proceeding is 
limited:

(c) To the extent 
necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall 
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole 
record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of 
the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

(i) Compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and 

(ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

* * * * * *

(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

Wyo. Stat. § 
16-3-114(c) (emphasis added). In our review of the Commission's decision, we 
accord no special deference to the district court's decision. Employment Sec. 
Com'n of Wyoming v. Western Gas Processors, Ltd., 786 P.2d 866, 870 (Wyo. 
1990) (quoting Southwest Wyoming Rehabilitation Center v. Employment Sec. 
Com'n of Wyoming, 781 P.2d 918, 920 (Wyo. 1989)).

[¶17]   "Our review of contested case 
orders focuses on the evidence and considers the reasonableness of the agency's 
exercise of judgment while determining if errors of law were committed or 
whether any constitutional rights were violated." Casper Iron & Metal, 
Inc., 845 P.2d  at 392. The presence in the record of substantial evidence 
supporting the findings of the agency precludes this court from substituting its 
judgment for that of the agency. World Mart, Inc. v. Ditsch, 855 P.2d 1228, 1232 (Wyo. 1993). Substantial evidence has been defined "`as such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.'" Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n, 
845 P.2d 1040, 1066 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public 
Service Com'n of Wyoming, 662 P.2d 878, 882 (Wyo. 1983)). Substantial 
evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. Trout v. Wyoming Oil and 
Gas Conservation Com'n, 721 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶18]   The claimed imprecise use of the 
English language provides the central dispute in these contested cases. The 
thesis of the debate with which we are presented is that words that once had 
precise meanings have been corrupted into mere synonyms or ambiguity by the 
infirmity of their use. As a result, we are challenged to find contrary intent 
in language which emphasizes these terms. Since we view the language used in the 
relevant agreements and statutes to be a definite expression of the intent of 
the drafters, we determine that there is no cause for relief from the 
Commission's decisions.

[¶19]   The central terms at issue are 
"back pay" and "severance payment." The claimants argue we must look at the 
substance of the payments intended by the UMWA and Decker rather than the form 
of the language used to facilitate the delivery of the money. If this is done, 
the claimants contend we will hold that Bettcher, Roybal and Metcalf received 
settlements in lieu of "back pay" or "severance payments."

A. Substantial Evidence 
of "Back Pay"

[¶20]   Bettcher and Roybal each received 
$35,000.00 from Decker. The claimants dispute the Commission's findings that 
these payments constituted "back pay." As the claimants view the intent of the 
parties, the term "back pay" was used as a "label" without specificity in the 
settlement agreement and the waiver and release agreements. We 
disagree.

[¶21]   Our inquiry considers whether 
substantial evidence supports the findings of the Commission that Bettcher and 
Roybal received "back pay." We must also determine if "back pay" constitutes a 
"wage" under the Wyoming Employment Security Law, Wyo. Stat. §§ 27-3-101 through 
27-3-704 (1991 & Cum.Supp. 1994) (hereinafter WESA). If the claimants 
received a "wage" in the form of "back pay" from Decker, they were not eligible 
to receive unemployment benefits for that period.

[¶22]   There is substantial evidence in 
the record to support the Commission's findings that Bettcher and Roybal 
received "back pay." The NLRB ordered Decker to "make whole" the employees for 
lost wages or benefits. As a result of that order, Decker and the UMWA conducted 
lengthy negotiations to reach a settlement which was subject to NLRB approval 
and procedural guidelines.

[¶23]   Under the heading, "Backpay [sic] 
And Other Payments," the settlement agreement between the UMWA and Decker 
detailed individual methods of calculating "back pay" for the specific 
categories that included the claimants. The waiver and release agreements signed 
by Bettcher and Roybal also referred to accepting an amount of money for a "full 
and final settlement of all backpay [sic] and any other rights or remedies" 
against Decker. The waiver and release agreements included a provision making 
them subject to the terms of the settlement agreement. We hold the terms of the 
settlement agreement and the waiver and release agreements state a definite 
intent of the parties to provide the claimants with an award of "back 
pay."

[¶24]   To be eligible for unemployment 
benefits, a claimant must meet several criteria, including: registering for 
work; actively seeking work; and being unemployed. Wyo. Stat. § 27-3-306(a). The 
WESA defines when a claimant is unemployed:

"Unemployment" means any 
week in which an individual performs no services and receives no wages or 
performs less than full-time work if wages payable for that week are less then 
his weekly benefit amount and are in accordance with regulations of the 
commission[.]

Wyo. Stat. § 
27-3-102(a)(xv). A "wage" is "remuneration payable for services from any source 
including commissions, bonuses and cash." Wyo. Stat. § 
27-3-102(a)(xviii).

[¶25]   Under the Social Security Act, the 
United States Supreme Court considered whether "back pay" is a "wage." Social 
Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 364-65, 66 S. Ct. 637, 640-41, 90 L. Ed. 718 (1946). The United States Supreme Court held that an employee who 
receives "back pay" for a period of time during which the employee was wrongly 
separated from his or her employment has received a "wage." Id. at 364, 
66 S. Ct.  at 641. A "wage" was defined as "remuneration for employment" and 
"employment" was defined as "any service * * * performed * * * by an employee 
for his employer * * *." Id. The United States Supreme Court determined 
that "back pay" was a form of "remuneration" and, therefore, a "wage." 
Id.

[¶26]   Most state courts have agreed that 
"back pay" should be treated as a "wage" for purposes of administering state 
unemployment benefits. In Griggs v. Sands, 526 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tenn. 
1975) (collecting cases), the Supreme Court of Tennessee examined various 
federal and state decisions and determined that "back pay" is a 
"wage."

It thus appears from our 
examination of the authorities that the Courts which have examined the question 
have uniformly with the exception of the Maryland case [Waters v. State, 
220 Md. 337, 152 A.2d 811 (1959)], found that an award of back pay is 
equivalent, both in theory and in fact, to wages earned by an employee, and that 
upon receipt thereof, the employee is ineligible for unemployment compensation 
benefits and may be made to account for them, either by reimbursement or by 
disallowance of future benefits.

Griggs, 526 S.W.2d  at 447-48. 
The Griggs court held that employees receiving an arbitration award of 
"back pay" were not eligible for unemployment benefits and the Tennessee 
Unemployment Insurance Commission was entitled to recover any overpayment. 
Id. at 448-49.

[¶27]   The court in Arizona Dept. of 
Economic Sec. v. Lidback, 26 Ariz. App. 143, 546 P.2d 1152, 1153 (1976), 
considered whether a judgment resulted in an award of "back pay." The employee 
claimed he was not paid "wages" and was, therefore, eligible for unemployment 
benefits. Id. 546 P.2d  at 1153. The court disagreed. "Regardless of the 
nomenclature applied to the judgment of the district court, it did, in fact, 
reimburse [the employee] for all wages he would have received had he not been 
wrongfully discharged from the postal service." Id. 546 P.2d  at 1154. 
Therefore, the court held the "back pay" made the employee ineligible for 
unemployment benefits and the agency was entitled to recover any overpayment. 
Id.

[¶28]   The court in Smith v. Review Bd. 
of Indiana Employment Sec. Division, 428 N.E.2d 88, 89 (Ind. App. 1981) 
considered whether a payment required by a negotiated settlement constituted 
"back pay." The settlement disposed of the employee's wrongful discharge claims 
against her employer. Id. The court determined that the language of the 
settlement characterized the lump-sum payment the employee received as "back 
pay." Id. at 91. The court held the employee had received "wages" in the 
form of "back pay" during the period when she was receiving unemployment 
benefits. Therefore, the Employment Security Division of Indiana was entitled to 
recover any overpayment. Id.

[¶29]   The definition of "wage" in the 
WESA is substantially similar to the definitions of "wage" and "employment" in 
Nierotko, 327 U.S.  at 364, 66 S. Ct.  at 641. We agree, therefore, that 
"back pay" should be considered a "wage." We hold that for purposes of the WESA, 
an employee receiving "back pay" as a result of an NLRB award, a judgment, an 
arbitration proceeding or a negotiated settlement following a period of 
separation from his or her employment has received a "wage." Lidback, 546 P.2d  at 1154; Smith, 428 N.E.2d  at 91; Griggs, 526 S.W.2d  at 
447-48.

[¶30]   The claimants attempt to 
distinguish Griggs and other authorities by arguing that if the intent of 
a "back pay" award is to "make whole" the employee, then the claimants could not 
have received "back pay." The claimants point to their average hourly earnings 
and note that the amount of "back pay" they received was far less than their 
expected pay over the period of time they were off the job. The claimants 
misconstrue the limits of "make whole" relief.

[¶31]   "Back pay" is not a fine or 
penalty; rather, "back pay" is provided to protect the employee and redress 
grievances to make the employee "whole." Nierotko, 327 U.S.  at 364-65, 66 S. Ct.  at 641. However, "make whole" relief does not mean an employee is awarded 
"back pay" in an amount equal to what the employee would have earned. Id. 
at 365, 66 S. Ct.  at 641.

[T]he term "[b]ack pay 
refers to the amount that [an employee] would have earned but for the employer's 
unlawful conduct, minus the amount that [the employee] did earn or could 
have earned if he or she had mitigated the loss by seeking or securing other 
comparable employment. Back pay includes * * * fringe benefits (such as 
medical insurance), and all other compensation that would have been obtained but 
for the [unlawful conduct]."

Lowe v. 
California Resources Agency, 1 Cal. App. 4th 1140, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 558, 560 n. 3 (1991) (quoting 3 M. Kirby Wilcox et al., 
Cal.Employment Law, EEO Civil Actions, State Law, § 43.01[8][b] (1991)). 
In a theoretical model, "back pay" acknowledges the restitution by the employer 
of the constructive "wages" which the employee was entitled to receive as a 
result of a continued legal status of employment. In Re Gurda Farms, 
Inc., 15 B.R. 868, 874-75 (D.C.N.Y. 1981).

[¶32]   The court in Smith, 428 N.E.2d  at 91 considered a settlement with a "make whole" provision. The court 
determined that it was clear the settlement was intended to compensate the 
employee with "back pay" from the date she was discharged to the date of the 
settlement. Id. The court held that since the employee had received "wages" in 
the form of "back pay" which exceeded the maximum amount of her unemployment 
benefits, the "back pay" provided "make whole" relief and she was not entitled 
to the benefits. Id. The court noted that if the employee was "not 
adequately compensated" by the settlement, the dispute should have been resolved 
by the parties to the settlement. Id.

[¶33]   The claimants' "back pay" was 
awarded under terms of the settlement agreement. While the methods of 
calculating the "back pay" resulted in a uniform payment of $35,000.00, the 
calculations involved different "back pay" periods ranging from two to three 
years, a deduction for an amount of interim earnings, and a different 
multiplying factor. The settlement agreement explained:

A. * * * The backpay 
[sic] amount takes into account a set amount for interim earnings. Although the 
amount is the same for discharged strikers and previously reinstated strikers, 
the negotiated backpay [sic] figure takes into consideration the risk of the 
discharged strikers not winning before the NLRB.

* * * * * *

Furthermore, backpay 
[sic] is in addition to any other payments which eligible employees may select 
below.

[¶34]   The Commission found that Bettcher 
and Roybal had received $35,000.00 in "back pay." The Commission found this 
amount resulted in a weekly "wage" payment to Bettcher and Roybal of $224.35 
over a three-year period. Wyo. Stat. § 27-3-102(a)(xv). This amount exceeded the 
weekly amount of unemployment benefits which Bettcher and Roybal were entitled 
to receive during this same period. Therefore, Bettcher and Roybal were made 
"whole" insofar as the WESA is concerned because they received more in the 
settlement agreement than they were entitled to receive as unemployment 
benefits. Smith, 428 N.E.2d  at 91.

[¶35]   The Commission's decisions that 
Bettcher and Roybal were not eligible to receive unemployment benefits from June 
27, 1988 to June 26, 1991 are supported by substantial evidence.

B. Substantial Evidence 
of a "Severance Payment"

[¶36]   The claimants contend that 
substantial evidence does not support the Commission's finding that Metcalf 
received a $65,000.00 "severance payment." Furthermore, the claimants argue that 
a recent decision of this court prevents the Commission from disqualifying 
Metcalf from his entitlement to unemployment benefits. We disagree.

[¶37]   There is substantial evidence in 
the record to support the Commission's finding that Metcalf received a 
"severance payment" of $65,000.00. Under the heading, "Certain Former Strikers 
Entitled to Pursue NLRB Case Or Alternative Severance/Backpay [sic] In Lieu of 
Reinstatement," the settlement agreement explained that the UMWA and Decker 
could not reach agreement on the reinstatement of certain individuals who 
participated in the strike. As a result, the parties provided that those 
individuals, including Metcalf, could pursue their pending cases before the NLRB 
or "voluntarily elect to receive from [Decker] a lump sum 
severance/backpay [sic] payment" of $100,000.00. (Emphasis added.) 
According to the terms of the settlement agreement, all eligible participants in 
the strike received $35,000.00 in "back pay." By deducting this amount of "back 
pay" from the total payment Metcalf received, the Commission properly determined 
that Metcalf received $65,000.00 in the form of a "severance 
payment."

[¶38]   The waiver and release agreement 
Metcalf signed also referred to accepting a "severance payment." In return for 
this payment, Metcalf agreed to dismiss all claims against Decker. We hold the 
terms of the settlement agreement and the waiver and release agreements stated a 
definite intent of the parties to provide Metcalf with a "severance payment" of 
$65,000.00.

[¶39]   Next, we address a question of law 
involving the statutory interpretation of a "severance payment" and the grounds 
for disqualification from an entitlement to unemployment benefits under the 
WESA. The claimants contend that Metcalf should not be disqualified because a 
"severance payment" is distinguished from "remuneration" in Wyoming. The 
claimants rely on a recent decision of this court involving a different 
statutory scheme.

[¶40]   Any question of statutory 
interpretation is a question of law. Parker Land and Cattle Co., 845 P.2d  
at 1042. "`Our standard of review for any conclusion of law is straightforward. 
If the conclusion of law is in accordance with law, it is affirmed, [Dep't. 
of Rev. & Tax. v. Casper Legion Baseball Club, Inc., 767 P.2d 608 (Wyo. 
1989)]; if it is not, it is to be corrected, [Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas 
Ass'n. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 749 P.2d 221 (Wyo. 1987)].'" Parker 
Land and Cattle Co., 845 P.2d  at 1042 (quoting Western Gas Processors, 
Ltd., 786 P.2d at 871).

[¶41]   "When interpreting statutes, we 
follow an established set of guidelines. First, we determine if the statute is 
ambiguous or unambiguous." Moncrief v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 
856 P.2d 440, 443 (Wyo. 1993). A "statute is unambiguous if its wording is such 
that reasonable persons are able to agree as to its meaning with consistency and 
predictability." Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Bd. of 
Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 220 (Wyo. 1991). Unless another meaning is 
clearly intended, "[w]ords and phrases shall be taken in their ordinary and 
usual sense * * *." Wyo. Stat. § 8-1-103(a)(i) (1989). See DiVenere v. 
University of Wyoming, 811 P.2d 273, 275 (Wyo. 1991). Conversely, "a statute 
is ambiguous only if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying 
interpretations." Allied-Signal, Inc., 813 P.2d  at 219-20.

[¶42]   The WESA defines several grounds 
for disqualification from an entitlement to unemployment benefits:

(a) For any week with 
respect to which the following situations occur or payments have been or will be 
received, an individual shall be disqualified from benefit entitlement 
if:

* * * * * *

(ii) Remuneration 
is received as severance payments, termination allowances, sick pay or 
for earning vacation.

Wyo. Stat. § 
27-3-313(a) (emphasis added). The WESA does not define the terms "remuneration" 
or "severance payments."

[¶43]   The claimants argue that the 
definitions supplied by this court for "remuneration" and "severance pay" in 
Mowry v. State ex rel. Wyoming Retirement Bd., 866 P.2d 729, 731 (Wyo. 
1993) direct a reversal of the Commission's decision regarding Metcalf's 
benefits. Applying Mowry, the claimants argue Metcalf was eligible to 
receive unemployment benefits. According to the logic advanced by the claimants, 
if the $65,000.00 payment Metcalf received was a "severance payment," then he 
did not receive any disqualifying "remuneration" under the WESA because these 
two terms are exclusive. We do not agree with the construction the claimants 
present for Wyo. Stat. § 27-3-313(a).

[¶44]   In Mowry, a question arose 
as to whether a former state employee was entitled to include amounts received 
as "severance pay" in calculations for retirement benefits. The former state 
employee asked whether the contractually obligated "severance pay" he received 
was a part of the "average salary" figure used to calculate his benefits under 
the Wyoming Retirement Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 9-3-401 through 9-3-620 (1991 & 
Cum. Supp. 1994) (hereinafter Retirement Act). Mowry, 866 P.2d  at 730. The 
Retirement Act defines "salary" as "the cash remuneration paid to [an employee] 
in a calendar year * * *." Wyo. Stat. § 9-3-402(a)(xvi).

[¶45]   In Mowry, 866 P.2d  at 731, 
this court examined various definitions of "remuneration" to determine if, in 
its ordinary meaning, "remuneration" included "severance pay." The term 
"remuneration" was defined as "`[r]eward; recompense; salary; compensation.'" 
Id. at 731 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1165 (5th ed. 1979)). 
We concluded that the ordinary meaning of the term "remuneration" "clearly 
contemplates payments made in return for something equivalent." Mowry, 
866 P.2d  at 731. The term "severance pay" referred to a "`[p]ayment by an 
employer to employee beyond his wages on termination of his employment.'" 
Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1232 (5th ed. 1979)). Our 
review of various definitions of "severance pay" lead to a conclusion that it is 
"primarily gratuitous and, although it may be intended to partially alleviate 
the loss of employment, it is not an attempt to equally compensate the employee 
for services rendered, losses suffered, or expenses incurred." Mowry, 866 P.2d  at 731. We held, based on the plain and ordinary meanings of the terms, the 
"severance pay" the former state employee received was not "remuneration" and, 
therefore, the "severance pay" was not part of the "salary" figure used to 
calculate Retirement Act benefits. Id.

[¶46]   The result the claimants seek under 
the WESA is not dictated by our decision in Mowry. Unlike Wyo. Stat. § 
27-3-313(a)(ii), the statute at issue in Mowry does not refer 
specifically to "severance payments." The Retirement Act definition of "salary" 
was exclusive to "cash remuneration." Wyo. Stat. § 9-3-402(a)(xvi). "Severance 
payments," therefore, were not associated with "salary" under the plain meaning 
of the statute. Mowry, 866 P.2d  at 731.

[¶47]   The unambiguous language of the 
WESA reflects a legislative intent to state a conjoint definition of conditions 
which provide grounds for disqualification from an entitlement to unemployment 
benefits. Wyo. Stat. § 27-3-313(a)(ii) provides for disqualification when: 
"Remuneration is received as severance payments * * *." The legislature 
understood that the ordinary meaning of "remuneration" may not include 
"severance payments." However, by specifically associating "remuneration" with 
"severance payments," we hold the legislature has expressed its intent to 
require an individual be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits when 
an employer makes a "severance payment."

[¶48]   The Commission found that Metcalf 
had received a $65,000.00 "severance payment." Applying Division regulations, 
the Commission determined that Metcalf's "severance payment" equalled his 
average weekly rate of pay at Decker for a total of 106 weeks. Therefore, 
Metcalf was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits for a 
corresponding period of time. Wyo. Stat. § 27-3-313(a).

[¶49]   The Commission's decision that 
Metcalf was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits from July 3, 1988 
to July 8, 1990 is supported by substantial evidence.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶50]   The WESA is intended to provide for 
the payment of benefits to persons who are unemployed through no fault of their 
own. Ultimately, the claimants received payments from Decker. The "back pay" was 
a form of a "wage" which made Bettcher and Roybal ineligible for unemployment 
benefits for a period of time. The "severance payment" disqualified Metcalf from 
receiving unemployment benefits for a period of time. The Commission correctly 
found that these retroactive payments resulted in an overpayment to the 
claimants of unemployment benefits.

[¶52]   The decision of the district court, 
which affirmed the Commission's rulings, is affirmed.