Case Title: State v. Jamieson

Citation: 206 Kan. 491, 480 P.2d 87

Docket Number: 45,900

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1971-01-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
206 Kan. 491 (1971)
480 P.2d 87
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
AUSTIN LYRRELL JAMIESON, Appellant.
No. 45,900

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 23, 1971.
Roy Lucas, of New York, New York, argued the cause, and James C. Thompson and Anthony R. Russo, both of Kansas City, were with him on the brief for the appellant.
David Zook, Assistant County Attorney, argued the cause, and Kent Frizzell, Attorney General, James W. Bouska, County Attorney, and Mark L. Bennett, Jr., Assistant County Attorney, were with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This is an appeal from a verdict and judgment convicting the defendant of the offense of procuring an abortion contrary to the provisions of K.S.A. 21-437.
Defendant's motion for a new trial was overruled and he was sentenced to confinement in the Johnson County jail for one year. He has appealed.
Although the constitutionality of the Kansas Abortion Act is challenged, we need only to consider appellant's first contention which reads:
We are inclined to agree with appellant's contention. The information, with formal parts omitted, states:
The abortion act (K.S.A. 21-437) in effect at the time of the offense attempted to be charged reads:
There have been numerous rules stated in an attempt to determine when an exception in a criminal statute must be stated in the information.
One of the earlier rules relied on by appellant placing emphasis on the location of the exception in the statute, was repudiated by this court in State v. Eary, 121 Kan. 339, 246 Pac. 989, where it is said:
The well established rule in all jurisdictions is that there must be negative averment of an exception where it constitutes an integral part of the offense defined in the statute.
In State v. Hill, 189 Kan. 403, 369 P.2d 365, 91 A.L.R.2d 750, we stated at page 410:
The general rule may be found in 1 C.J.S., Abortion, § 21, p. 327:
There may sometimes be a dispute as to just when an exception constitutes as integral part of the offense. In State v. Ferron, 122 Kan. 845, 253 Pac. 402, this court announced in a very concise rule for determining just when an exception is an integral part of the offense charged. We stated:
The defendant in the present case might be found guilty of the *494 abortion and still be innocent under the language of the statute creating the exception.
The appellee in its brief stresses the use of the word "unlawful," stating:
The manner of the performance of the abortion might be unlawful and still not constitute an offense under the statute if necessary to save the life of the mother. It was stated in State v. Bridges (Mo.), 412 S.W.2d 455, at page 458:
It might also be noted here that the appellee cites cases dealing with the burden of proof. We make no comment other than to say that we are now dealing with the allegations of an information.
The appellee also relies on the case of State v. Perello, 102 Kan. 695, 171 Pac. 630, where this court held that an exception in the intoxicating liquor law need not be stated in the information. In the Perello case this court went to considerable pains to state why the case was an exception to the general rule. It stated at page 697 of the opinion:
*495 In 1 Am.Jur.2d, Abortion, § 18, p. 198, we find the general rule stated as follows:
We are forced to conclude that the exception in K.S.A. 21-437  "unless the same shall have been necessary to preserve the life of such woman"  is an integral part of the definition of the offense of abortion, and the failure to negatively aver the exception in the information constituted a fatal defect.
It necessarily results that the conviction must be set aside and the defendant discharged from the judgment and sentence.
It is so ordered.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.