Case Title: ROBERT PAUL PARRIS V. JAMIE SUE PARRIS

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0247

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-03-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
ROBERT PAUL PARRIS V. JAMIE SUE PARRIS2009 WY 44204 P.3d 298Case Number: S-08-0247, S-08-0248Decided: 03/30/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
ROBERT 
PAUL PARRIS,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.JAMIE SUE 
PARRIS,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Daniel 
E. White and Rhonda Sigrist Woodard of Woodard & White, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming. 

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Mary 
T. Parsons of Parsons & Cameron, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant 
(Father) appeals from the child custody provisions of a decree and a clarified 
decree entered in the parties' divorce action.  We conclude that the district court 
abused its discretion in fashioning the custody award, and therefore 
reverse.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Did the district 
court abuse its discretion in awarding primary legal custody and shared physical 
custody of the parties' minor child (Child) to the appellee 
(Mother)?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The parties were 
married in 1988.  Child was born in 
1998.  In April 2006, Mother 
informed Father that she had been having an affair with TM, who "has a bad 
background but has cleaned himself up, that he is a felon and he used drugs." 
 Shortly thereafter, Father filed a 
divorce complaint along with several pre-trial motions.  The motions were resolved via a 
stipulated order which, in pertinent part, appointed a custody evaluator, and 
gave the parties temporary joint legal and physical custody of Child, with 
physical custody alternating on a weekly basis.

 
 
[¶4]      On January 12, 
2007, Father filed a motion seeking modification of the temporary custody order 
on the ground that Mother and Child spent "substantial amounts of time" with TM, 
who recently "was found to be in possession of cocaine, drug paraphernalia, 
cutting agents, and a false urine sample . . . ."  Mother filed a response to Father's 
motion in which she admitted its primary averment, but claimed that she had 
severed all ties with TM and that neither she nor Child "will be spending any 
time around [TM] in the future."  The district court entered an order on 
March 7, 2007, disposing of Father's motion in relevant part as 
follows:

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
            
2.     The 
parties agree that [TM] was arrested on December 22, 2006 for the unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance. [Mother] has, through her counsel, advised 
the Court that she has terminated all contact with [TM].

 
 
            
3.     Because 
of [Mother's] representation, the Court does not find it necessary at this time 
to conduct a separate evidentiary hearing on [Father's] motion for modification 
of temporary custody.

 
 
            
4.     In view 
of [TM's] present circumstances, [Mother] should be ordered not to permit any 
verbal, written or personal contact, of any kind, between [TM] . . . and 
[Child].

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
            
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

 
 
            
1.     That 
[Mother] shall be and she is hereby ordered not to permit any verbal, written, 
or personal contact of any kind between [TM] . . . and 
[Child].

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
[¶5]      Mother's written 
pre-trial statement reiterated her decision to separate herself and Child from 
TM:

 
 
A 
long-term relationship with [TM] did look encouraging until I found out about 
his arrest and charges for possession of cocaine.  I still do not feel like I know all of 
the details and truth about the charges and why they were dismissed.  In any event, I have terminated all 
physical contact with [TM], and [Child] has not talked to or seen [TM] since 
January 12, 2007.  I do not consider 
[TM] a boyfriend any longer or even a potential boyfriend.  He has made a very big mistake, he was 
dishonest, and he has an addictive personality.  I have continued to talk to him on the 
phone however, as a friend; I find it difficult to abandon somebody in their 
biggest time of need.  And I did not 
consider or appreciate the fact that continuing to talk to him on the phone 
would jeopardize my chances of custody for [Child].  [Child] is the most important person in 
my life, and if it means I cannot talk to [TM] on the phone, then so be 
it.

 
 
[¶6]      The divorce trial 
covered four days in April 2007.  
Mother testified repeatedly that she had no intention of resuming a 
relationship with TM, that her relationship with TM "terminated" when she 
learned about the "drug bust," and that it was not appropriate for Child to have 
further contact with TM.  In 
addition, the court-appointed custody evaluator, a clinical psychologist who 
specializes in child and family psychology, testified as 
follows:

 
 
            
Q.   In this particular 
instance, do you believe that it is appropriate in any way for [Mother] to 
continue a relationship with [TM]?

 
 
            
A.   
No.

 
 
            
Q.   Why is 
that?

 
 
            
A.   Given the history 
that he has and the concerns that surround that history, drug use or the arrest, 
and the fact that  he was arrested 
before, I think in January of this year, and it is acknowledged that he's got 
this problem, that he is not personally of good character to be around the child 
and given the child's perception that that's done with.  Maintaining that relationship I think is 
a very bad situation for her and for the child.

 
 
[¶7]      At the end of the 
trial, the district court delayed making a decision and asked both attorneys to 
submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.  That was on April 19, 2007.  Both attorneys filed their submissions 
on June 12, 2007.  In the meantime, 
however, Father filed a motion seeking an order requiring Mother to show cause 
why she should not be held in contempt of court for allowing Child to have 
telephone contact with TM, and for resuming her relationship with TM.  In a responsive pleading, Mother admitted 
that she had dinner with TM and that Child had answered the telephone when TM 
called.  The motion was heard and 
denied on May 25, 2007, with the district court finding that Mother did not act 
willfully in allowing the telephone contact.

 
 
[¶8]      On September 27, 
2007, the district court issued its decision letter.  In pertinent part, that decision letter 
provided as follows:

 
 

2.    After taking into 
consideration the factors contained in W.S. 20-2-201 with regard to disposition 
of [Child], 
I will adopt the existing shared parenting schedule, that being a week with each 
parent.  I gave thought to extending 
the period that each parent spends with [Child] to two weeks, however, based 
upon the parents' preference to maintain the existing schedule and the 
difficulty the two week period would place upon [Father's] professional 
responsibilities I have concluded that it is in [Child's] best interest to 
ratify the existing schedule.  In 
the event one of the parties wishes to take a vacation with [Child] which 
exceeds one week, I will expect the other party to cooperate.  I have given great thought to the issue 
of designating a primary residential custodian.  It is clear that [Child] has a good 
relationship with both of his parents.  
It is also clear that each parent has the ability to provide adequate 
care for [Child] and that each parent is a competent and fit parent.  I am concerned about the propriety of 
the decisions [Mother] made with regard to [TM] and I am concerned about 
[Father's] ability and willingness to allow [Mother] to provide care for [Child] 
without intrusion.  I am also 
doubtful that he would respect [Mother's] parental rights and responsibilities 
including the right to privacy.  
Although [Father] has somewhat recently demonstrated an admirable desire 
to spend more time with [Child], there is not much disagreement between the 
parties that while [Child] was younger [Mother] was the primary caregiver.  It is commendable that [Father] has 
found ways to arrange his work schedule to expand the time he spends with 
[Child].  I believe by sharing 
parenting time [Child] will benefit from the attention and strengths of both 
parents.  I believe that [Father's] 
structured thinking would operate to [Child's] disadvantage if he was designated 
as the primary residential custodian therefore, taking all of these factors into 
consideration, it will be the order of the Court that [Mother] 
will be designated the primary residential custodian.  I am concerned that if [Father] is 
designated the primary residential custodian, he would seek ways to influence or 
control [Mother's] conduct and manner of handling [Child] which would create 
animosity and anxiety that would adversely affect [Child].  Although I suggested in my comments that 
the parties look at the idea of dividing the responsibilities of the primary 
residential custodian in retrospect I don't believe that is a good idea.  I encourage the parties to continue 
their practice of exchanging notes and or emails regarding [Child's] 
welfare.  Since parenting time with 
[Child] is divided equally, neither party may move [Child] from Laramie County, 
Wyoming without court approval. . . .

 
 
(Emphasis 
in original.)  In addition to these 
general considerations, the district court also specifically rejected Father's 
proposed conclusion that "[Child] shall not be permitted to have contact or 
communication with [TM] . . . ."

 
 
[¶9]      The record does 
not reflect why no decree was entered within a reasonable time after issuance of 
the decision letter.  On March 13, 
2008, Father filed a motion seeking the district court's reconsideration of its 
decision not to forbid contact between Child and TM.  The gravamen of the motion was that 
Mother was pregnant and that, if TM was the unborn child's father, it was likely 
that Mother and TM would continue to have contact.

 
 
[¶10]   While the motion for 
reconsideration was pending, Father filed a motion seeking an order requiring 
Mother to show cause why she should not be held in contempt of court for 
violating the March 7, 2007 order that forbade contact between Child and TM. 
 This lengthy motion alleged recent 
contact between Child and TM, alleged that Mother and TM were considering 
marriage, and reminded the district court of the negative trial testimony about 
contact between Child and TM.  On 
June 2, 2008, Father filed another, similar motion, this time alleging that TM 
had moved into Mother's residence.  
Two days later, Father filed yet another motion, this one seeking an 
emergency order suspending the shared custody arrangement due to TM's presence 
in Mother's residence.

 
 
[¶11]   Mother responded to these motions 
on June 20, 2008, admitting that she was cohabiting with TM, and admitting that 
he was the father of her newborn child.  Five days later, Father filed a motion 
seeking a new trial on the custody issue.  Father supplemented that motion on July 
29, 2008 with a copy of TM's criminal record.  A second supplement on August 7, 2008 had 
attached to it a letter from Child's counselor detailing Child's difficulties 
with TM, and recommending that Father should have primary custody.  Father's final motion for new trial 
reiterated the issue of contact between Child and TM, and noted that Child had 
placed a 911 call complaining about being left with TM.

 
 
[¶12]   On August 13, 2008, the district 
court put an abrupt end to this post-trial wrangling by sending the following 
e-mail to counsel:

 
 
Folks:  after too many months of deliberating I 
am going to issue the decree.  I am 
going to deny all of the pending motions.  
I am uncomfortable revisiting the custody issue even though it appears 
there have been changes since the parties stipulated to the shared custody and 
perhaps even since the trial.  
Although it is possible [Mother] violated the order on temporary custody, 
the outcome of that motion could only be a finding of contempt and sanctions 
rather than a change in custody.  
The order on temporary custody will be subsumed by the decree.  While it may not be apparent to you or 
your clients, I have spent many hours working and reworking the decree and 
reviewing the evidence submitted.  I 
would hope the decree will be filed this week.  I gave considerable thought to issuing a 
partial decree pertaining only to the property issues and conducting another 
hearing on custody, but I don't believe that would be appropriate under all of 
the circumstances even if it might be allowable under rules.  In the event either party wishes to seek 
modification of the decree, I will be assigning this case to another judge . . . 
.

 
 
As 
a result of these decisions, it will not be necessary to have the hearing this 
afternoon regarding Mr. Homar's testimony and the hearing scheduled for August 
12th and those hearings are hereby vacated.

 
 
[¶13]   A Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
was entered on October 9, 200818 months after the trial.  The decree contained the following 
relevant findings of fact:

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
3.     It is in the child's 
best interest to ratify the parenting schedule existing at the time of the 
trial, that being one week with each parent.  Prior to and subsequent to the trial 
[Father] became increasingly concerned about the association between [Child] and 
[TM].  [Father] repeatedly requested 
that the court hold [Mother] in contempt for violation of the temporary custody 
order in which the Court prohibited contact between [Child] and [TM].  [Father] also asked the Court to set a 
post-trial hearing at which the Court could receive additional evidence and 
modify the custody of [Child].  The 
Court finds that most of the events which caused [Father] such concern took 
place after the closure of evidence in this case, and therefore the resolution 
of such issues is more appropriately treated after the entry of a 
decree.

 
 
4.     The Court is aware that 
shared custody is not favored by the Wyoming Supreme Court, however in this 
case, the parties voluntarily set up such an arrangement and the Court is simply 
ratifying an arrangement selected by the parties prior to the presentation of 
evidence to the Court.  In addition, 
the Court finds that both parents have positive traits which would operate to 
the benefit of the child and shared custody will provide him with the maximum 
opportunity to benefit from such traits.  
Lastly such an arrangement was recommended by the child custody 
evaluator.

 
 
5.     It is clear that the 
child has a good relationship with both of his parents.

 
 
6.     It is clear that each 
parent has the ability to provide adequate care for the child and that each 
parent is a competent and fit parent.

 
 
7.     [Mother] has been the 
primary care-giver for the child until shortly prior to the initiation of this 
matter, although the Court is favorably impressed that [Father], once this 
marriage began to disintegrate demonstrated a desire to spend substantial 
amounts of time with his child.

 
 
8.     The Court has doubts 
about [Father's] ability and desire to respect [Mother's] judgment, parental 
rights and responsibilities, including the right to privacy and as a result the 
Court finds that he would not be an appropriate primary legal 
custodian.

 
 
9.     If [Father] is 
designated the primary residential or legal custodian, he would seek ways to 
influence or control [Mother's] conduct and manner of handling the child, which 
would create animosity between the parents and anxiety that would adversely 
affect the child.

 
 
10.   The parties should continue their 
practice of exchanging notes and or emails regarding the child's 
welfare.

 
 
11.   [Mother] should be designated the 
primary legal custodian.  The Court 
considers that designation to mean that she is the one who will make decisions 
affecting the child's welfare in the event the parents are unable to agree on 
such decisions.

 
 
[¶14]   Based upon those findings, child 
custody was ordered as follows:

 
 

Child 
Custody.  [Mother] 
is hereby designated primary legal custodian.  The parties shall continue to share 
time, with the child residing with each parent on alternating weeks.  Although [Mother] is designated as the 
primary legal custodian giving her the authority to make all significant 
decisions affecting the parties' child, [Mother], prior to making those 
decisions shall consult with [Father] and in the event there is no agreement 
regarding such decisions, [Mother] shall have the ultimate decision making 
authority.  [Father] shall have the 
minor child beginning at 8:00 a.m. on each Friday which is an even-numbered 
date.  [Mother] shall have the minor 
child beginning at 8:00 a.m. on each Friday which is an odd-numbered date.  The holiday schedule shall be as set 
forth in Exhibit A, attached hereto, and incorporated herein by reference.  Should either party desire to take the 
child on a vacation which exceeds one week, then the parties may do so and shall 
cooperate in scheduling such a vacation and thirty (30) days' notice shall be 
given.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶15]   We very recently reiterated our 
standard for reviewing the child custody determinations of a district 
court:

 
 
            
Child custody decisions are within the sound discretion of the trial 
court.

 
 
            
It has been our consistent principle that in custody matters, the 
welfare and needs of the children are to be given paramount consideration.  The determination of the best interests 
of the child is a question for the trier of fact.  We do not overturn the decision of the 
trial court unless we are persuaded of an abuse of discretion or the presence of 
a violation of some legal principle.  
Resor v. Resor, 987 P.2d 146, 
148 (Wyo. 1999), quoting Reavis v. 
Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 (Wyo. 1998).

 
 

Testerman 
v. Testerman, 
2008 WY 112, ¶ 8, 193 P.3d 1141, 1144 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
            
A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner 
which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.  Our review entails evaluation of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the district court's decision. . . .  Findings of fact not supported by the 
evidence, contrary to the evidence, or against the great weight of the evidence 
cannot be sustained.  Similarly, an 
abuse of discretion is present when a material factor deserving significant 
weight is ignored.

 
 

Eickbush 
v. Eickbush, 
2007 WY 179, ¶ 9, 171 P.3d 509, 511 (Wyo. 2007) (citations 
omitted).

 
 

Buttle 
v. Buttle, 
2008 WY 135, ¶ 15, 196 P.3d 174, 178 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶16]   We will, perhaps, make shorter 
shrift of this debate than did the district court.  We must first point out that the issues 
have not been brought to us with much clarity.  Potential distinguishable issues appear 
to be:  (1) Did the district court 
abuse its discretion in reaching the custody decision set forth in its decision 
letter?; (2) Did the district court abuse its discretion in entering the decree 
based upon the trial evidence?; (3) Did the district court abuse its discretion 
in denying any or all of Father's post-trial motions?; (4) When, if ever, may a 
district court consider matters that occurred after trial?; (5) Are the child's 
best interests determined at the time of trial, or at the time that a decree is 
entered 18 months later?; and (6) What factors in this case support a shared 
custody arrangement?

 
 
[¶17]   The following analysis leads us to 
the conclusion that the child custody provisions in the decree and in the 
clarified decree must be reversed.  
First, a decision letter does "not constitute a judicial determination 
which may be considered a final order."  
Broadhead v. Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731, 733 (Wyo. 1987).  Thus, 
the district court was free to revise its rulings prior to judgment, and could 
have heard the pre-judgment motion to reconsider.  Steranko v. Dunks, 2009 WY 9, ¶ 6, 199 P.3d 1096, 1096-97 (Wyo. 2009); Broadhead, 737 P.2d  at 733.  Procedurally, both W.R.C.P. 59 and 
W.R.C.P. 60 provide methods, even after judgment, for re-opening the evidence or 
providing a new trial.

 
 
[¶18]   Second, it was utterly obvious in 
the instant case that the circumstances that existed at the time of trial no 
longer existed at the time the decree was entered.  In fact, the primary issue of 
concernTM's contact with Mother and Childwas exactly the opposite of what 
Mother's trial testimony said it would be.  
Were this an extraneous matter, it might be overlooked.  But we have made it clear that in child 
custody decisions, the best interests of the child are paramount.  Buttle, 2008 WY 135, ¶ 15, 196 P.3d  at 
178.  And in this case, everybody 
testified that it was not in Child's best interests to have contact with 
TM.

 
 
[¶19]   Finally, we are concerned that, 
despite this Court's repeated admonition that shared custody is disfavored, and 
despite the lack of any evidence in this record that these two parents could 
ever make a success of shared custody, that is what the district court 
ordered.  See Buttle, 2008 WY 135, ¶ 31, 196 P.3d  
at 181.  To endorse a shared custody 
arrangement, this Court must be able to determine from the record "that a 
comprehensive evaluation of all relevant factors occurred prior to determining 
custody."  Id. at ¶ 32, 196 P.3d  at 181, citing Pace v. Pace, 2001 WY 43, ¶ 17, 22 P.3d 861, 867 (Wyo. 2001).  That did not 
happen here, where shared custody was ordered largely on the ground that such 
had been the temporary agreement of the parents, and that both parents had good 
qualities.  To the extent that the 
district court relied upon the opinion of the custody evaluator, it must be 
remembered that the custody evaluator believed TM was "out of the picture."  He further opined that "[m]aintaining 
that relationship I think is a very bad situation for her and for the child." 
 In other words, his opinion that 
Mother should have primary custody was only good so long as TM was not in the 
home.  By the time the decree was 
entered, TM was in the home.

 
 
[¶20]   Perhaps one needs to read the 
entire trial transcript to see why shared custody was such a bad idea in this 
case.  Boiled down to its 
essenceand this is recognized in the district court's findingsthe testimony 
revealed that the divorce resulted from Mother's eventual resistance to, and 
rejection of, Father's controlling personality.  Disagreement permeated their 
relationship at the time of trial, especially insofar as Child was 
concerned.  The testimony of 
counselors and teachers, not to mention evidence of the 911 call, showed that 
Child already was having difficulty being "shared."  Most poignant was the custody 
evaluator's recitation of Child's most recent description of what he 
wanted:

 
 
            
He said when we talked, and especially toward the end, I think the last 
15 minutes of the interview, I talked to him about an hour and two minutes, he 
said that what he wanted was more time with dad, less time with mom.  And then more time with mom and less 
time with [D]ad.  And that was his 
idea.

 
 

            
He thought it was good because he said a week was okay for him to 
transition, but 
it is really hard because he has to change himself to fit into each home in all 
the ways he's supposed to be.

 
 

            
So he said if he did it like every four days, it would be really hard 
because he couldn't do it.  So he 
thought that if maybe he had two weeks in one home and then like a week in 
another home.  He mentioned Monday, 
Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday he was reciting, trying to figure out 
in his mind.  Then 
he would have a long period where he wouldn't have to change.  And he thought that was really good if 
he could just have that one house.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶21]   The district court abused its 
discretion by entering a decree containing child custody provisions that were 
not in the best interests of the child.  
We reverse and remand for a new custody hearing, which we assume will be 
scheduled promptly, and at which the current circumstances of the parties and 
the child shall be considered.