Case Title: Foster v. Alabama Power Co.

Citation: 395 So. 2d 27

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1981-02-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
395 So. 2d 27 (1981)
I. J. FOSTER
v.
ALABAMA POWER COMPANY et al.
Richard Dale FOSTER, a minor, 15 years of age, by his father and next friend, I. J. Foster
v.
ALABAMA POWER COMPANY et al.
79-933, 79-934.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 20, 1981.
*28 Charles L. Howard, Jr. of Howard & Howard, Birmingham, for appellants.
S. Allen Baker, Jr. of Balch, Bingham, Baker, Hawthorne, Williams & Ward, Birmingham, for appellee.
MADDOX, Justice.
This appeal is from an order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Alabama Power Company. Plaintiffs, father and son, filed separate actions against Alabama Power Company alleging that on September 3, 1973, Richard Dale Foster, the 15-year-old son of I. J. Foster, climbed a transmission line tower owned or maintained by Alabama Power Company in the vicinity of Overton, Alabama. Young Foster came in contact with a high voltage line, experienced electrical shock and was caused to fall and suffer severe and permanent personal injury.
In their complaints, as last amended, the plaintiffs claimed: (1) that Alabama Power Company was negligent in and about its trade or business; (2) that the power line was negligently maintained; (3) that the defendant wantonly conducted the trade or business of handling the transmission of electricity and did wantonly maintain the power line; (4) that the defendant negligently or wantonly created circumstances which induced persons to go on the tower; (5) that the defendant negligently or wantonly failed to cause a proper warning; (6) that the defendant negligently or wantonly failed to properly maintain warning devices; and (7) that the defendant negligently or wantonly failed to provide or maintain adequate safeguards or barriers, all in the transmission of electricity, a dangerous instrumentality.
Alabama Power answered and moved for summary judgment on the grounds that there were no genuine issues of material fact, on the ground that Richard Dale Foster was a trespasser upon the transmission line tower at the time of his injury and that the only duty owed to him by Alabama Power was not to willfully or wantonly injure him.
The trial court granted Alabama Power's motion for summary judgment on December 11, 1979. Shortly thereafter, the appellants, plaintiffs below, moved to have the court set aside its order and judgment on the grounds that they were not ready for the matter to be submitted to the court for a final order and that they wanted more time in which to perform additional discovery and an opportunity to file a response to the motion for summary judgment before final submission. Thereafter, appellants performed additional discovery and the matter was submitted to the court for a final judgment. Once again, the court found in favor of Alabama Power and issued an order granting summary judgment in its favor on April 16, 1980.
The only issue presented is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Power Company. In deciding whether there was a genuine issue as to any material fact which would warrant submission of the case to a jury, we must examine the duty, if any, owed by Alabama Power to Richard Dale Foster, and the applicability of the doctrine of attractive nuisance to these facts in order to *29 determine the appropriateness of summary judgment on these facts.
In examining the applicability of the doctrine of attractive nuisance, we must determine whether the transmission line tower was a dangerous condition or a dangerous instrumentality. An excellent statement of the rationale upon which the attractive nuisance doctrine is based is found in Tolbert v. Gulsby, 333 So. 2d 129 (Ala. 1976). The Court stated:
In the instant case, the doctrine of attractive nuisance cannot apply because Richard Dale Foster was 15 years old at the time of his injury and the evidence presented in connection with the motion for summary judgment shows that he was a boy of intelligence. For example, he was an Eagle Scout. In Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Robins, 209 Ala. 6, 95 So. 367 (1923), this Court first discussed a number of cases which held that someone over 14 years of age cannot recover under the doctrine of attractive nuisance and then stated:
209 Ala. at 8, 95 So. 367. Further, this Court, in Abbott v. Alabama Power Co., 214 Ala. 281, 107 So. 811 (1926), citing Robins, stated:
Appellants further contend that the Alabama Power transmission line tower with its high voltage power line is a dangerous instrumentality. The maintaining of a dangerous instrumentality on one's property creates "straight negligence" liability. Tolbert v. Gulsby, 333 So. 2d 129 (Ala.1976). This doctrine, like that of attractive nuisance, depends upon the status of the injured party in relation to the defendant's land.
In Tolbert v. Gulsby, this Court, commenting upon the duty owed to persons upon another's land, stated:
"Wantonness" has been defined by this court as
333 So. 2d  at 131-132.
Thus, if the injured person is found to be a trespasser, the only duty owed to him by the landowner is not to wantonly or intentionally injure him. The duty owed is the same, whether the trespasser is an adult or a child. As stated in Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Green, 276 Ala. 120, 159 So. 2d 823 (1964):
The duty of one who maintains a power line has been stated as follows:
Alabama Power Co. v. Alexander, 370 So. 2d 252, 254 (Ala.1979).
The Power Company is responsible to trespassers only for a wanton or intentional injury to the trespasser. As stated in Alexander, 370 So. 2d  at 254, the Power Company must have either actual or constructive notice of the presence of the person who is likely to be injured and "absent this notice, the Power Company [has] no duty to insulate the wires or take precautionary measures unless under the totality of the circumstances, the Power Company should have reasonably anticipated that persons, pursuing business or pleasure, might come in contact with the power lines."
In this case, while there was at least a scintilla of evidence that the Power Company might have had reason to know that people were in the area and might be near the tower, there was no evidence from which a factfinder could infer that the Power Company had any reason to know that people might be climbing the tower. In his deposition, Young Foster stated that the reason he climbed the tower was "to get a better view of the countryside." In Ryckeley v. Georgia Power Company, 122 Ga.App. 107, 176 S.E.2d 493 (1970), the Georgia Court of Appeals had the opportunity to consider a fact situation which is very similar to the present case. In Ryckeley, an eleven-year-old boy was killed when he climbed approximately 40 feet up an electrical transmission line tower, came into contact with a high voltage wire, was shocked and fell to the ground. There Georgia Power had knowledge that people had been shooting at the insulators on the tower and had posted a sign, which had rusted and become illegible, that stated "Danger High Voltage, Do Not Shoot at Insulators." The Court stated:
122 Ga.App. at 112, 176 S.E.2d 493.
Plaintiff contends that a material issue of fact was presented on the question whether the Power Company could have reasonably anticipated that plaintiff would climb its transmission line tower. Ordinarily, this would be a fact question, which would preclude entry of a summary judgment.
The trial judge, in an opinion, discussed the evidence submitted by plaintiffs which they contend presented a material question of fact. The trial court opined:
Plaintiff essentially argues that the Power Company was under a duty to adopt some means to prevent people from climbing the tower or at least post appropriate warnings so that persons attracted to the tower by curiosity would have some understanding of the danger which would surround them if they attempted to go upon the structure.[1]
*33 Under all the facts presented in connection with the motion for summary judgment, we conclude that the trial judge did not err in granting summary judgment in this case. His judgment is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C. J., and SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
JONES, J., concurs in the result.
[1]  There was a sign located on the tower which witnesses testified read: "Danger" and "Do Not Climb." The sign was rusted. The injured boy, at his deposition, testified about the sign:

Q Well, did you see any signs at all.
A I think there's a sign on there.
MR. HOWARD: Are you talking about before or since this happened that
A I'm talking about during the time.
MR. BAKER: I'm talking about before, any time before, I'm not evenlike a week before or right before you climbed the tower, did you notice any signs on the tower?
A There's a sign hanging there.
Q Well, did you read that sign?
MR. HOWARD: He didn't say he saw it before, he said there's one hanging there now, or was. What he's asking you is what you saw before you fell
MR. BAKER: What you saw before you climbedbefore this accident happened?
A Iyou know, not noticing any signs, you know, like I said, all this come up really
Q Well now, I'm just sayingI'm not talking about how well you could read it, did you notice a sign before the accident?
A No, I didn't.
Q Did you see anything on that tower that looked like it might have been a sign, that had been rubbed out or rusted over, or anything like that?
MR. HOWARD: He's talking about before you fell, young man.
A Well, I didn'tif I'd noticed one or something like that.
MR. HOWARD: Not what you would have done but
MR. BAKER: Did you notice anything that looked like it might have been a sign before the accident?
A No, no, not to catch my sight, no.
Q In other words, you didn't see anything?
A No.
Q You didn't see any kind of sign right there near the ladder?
A I seenit would be a sign.
Q There was a sign near the ladder?
A Right. If it was wrote out, if you could see it better, you could probablyI didn't, like I said
MR. HOWARD: You didn't see it, did you say?
A Seen it, maybe glanced at it, I didn't really see it. I'm saying what I said was maybe, you know, look at it over, overlook it because it was nothing to catch your eye, that's what I'm saying.
MR. BAKER: But you did see something that looked like it might be a sign? You weren't curious as to what that sign might say?
A Well, it wouldn't, it wasn't visible enough to really read it.
Q Did you, any attempt to read this sign to try to figure out what it said?
A No, I made the judgment in my mind to where, you know, thinking the wires and everything would be safe, so I just went up to see what I could see.
MR. BAKER: You made a judgment in your own mind that those wires were safe, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you couldn'tyou didn't read the sign, did you read any part of the sign?
A Not that I can remember.
Q Not even a letter?
A No. I meanI'm not saying, I didn't read it at all myself, no.
Q All right. You just made your own independent judgment those wires above were safe, is that correct?
A Right.
Q All right. Now, after you saw that sign that you couldn't read, did you climb up the ladder, or climb up the tower?
A Yes.