Case Title: Toledo Bar Assn. v. Savage

Citation: 1995-Ohio-60

Docket Number: 19942664

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1995-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Toledo Bar Association v. Savage. 
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[Cite as Toledo Bar Assn. v. Savage (1995), ____ Ohio St.3d ____.] 
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Attorneys at law -- Misconduct -- Public reprimand -- Unauthorized 
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communication with a represented party concerning the subject of the 
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representation. 
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(No. 94-2664 -- Submitted September 13, 1995 -- Decided December 20, 
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1995.) 
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ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
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Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 94-17. 
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In an amended complaint filed on April 4, 1994, relator, Toledo Bar 
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Association, charged respondent, Barry E. Savage of Mount Pleasant, South 
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Carolina, Attorney Registration No. 0025481, with two counts of professional 
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misconduct, each alleging a violation of DR 7-104(A)(1) (unauthorized 
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communication with a represented party concerning the subject of the 
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representation).  A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
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Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”) heard the matter on October 17, 1994. 
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With respect to the first count, the evidence established that respondent 
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communicated with Beverly Cooper on January 26, 1993 in an attempt to find her 
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husband, Kenneth M. Cooper, and obtain Mr. Cooper’s signature on documention 
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to transfer a liquor license bought by respondent’s client in a larger transaction for 
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the client’s purchase of a gas station.  The Coopers were represented by their 
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general counsel in the negotiations to purchase the gas station, as well as in certain 
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credit-related concerns involving a bank, which respondent also represented.  The 
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Coopers’ attorney had authorized respondent to discuss directly with Mr. Cooper 
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some matters in which the bank had an interest, but he had not authorized 
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respondent to contact Mr Cooper about the liquor license transfer, and he never 
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authorized respondent to speak with Mrs. Cooper in his absence.   
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In fact, the Coopers’ attorney had specficially advised respondent on 
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January 26, 1993 that Mr. Cooper, who was actually in the hospital at the time, 
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would not be available to sign the liquor license transfer papers for seven to ten 
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days.  Nevertheless, respondent later drove with his client from Toledo, Ohio, to 
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the Coopers’ home in Birmingham, Michigan.  At approximately 9:30 p.m., 
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respondent and his client visited Mrs. Cooper, who explained that her husband 
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was not at home.  Mrs. Cooper knew respondent and his client, but their visit 
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surprised her.  She initially asked respondent, referring to his capacity as counsel 
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for the bank, whether he had come to “take [her] house,” to which respondent 
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replied that he had not.  Mrs. Cooper spoke with respondent and his client for 
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about forty-five minutes, during which respondent apparently inquired repeatedly 
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about Mr. Cooper’s whereabouts, but mostly engaged in small talk, and did not 
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discuss legal matters.  Respondent defended his actions on the ground that Mrs. 
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Cooper’s signature was not required for the transfer of the liquor permit, and he 
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did not speak to Mr. Cooper. 
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With respect to the second count, the evidence established that respondent 
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attempted to elicit information from the client of another attorney after the 
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attorney had advised respondent of his representative status.  On August 20, 1993, 
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respondent sent a letter directly to the represented party seeking to aid his client in 
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establishing a claimed mechanic’s lien.  Respondent defended his actions on the 
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ground that he had only spoken with his opposing counsel once on the telephone, 
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the other attorney had failed to send a purportedly promised letter confirming his 
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representation and address, and respondent had not kept the other attorney’s 
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telephone number. 
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The panel found a violation of DR 7-104(A)(1) on both counts.  It observed, 
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however, that neither of respondent’s unauthorized communications had 
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prejudiced the clients represented by the other attorneys.  After considering this 
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and the favorable character references offered by several of respondent’s 
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colleagues, the panel recommended that respondent receive a public reprimand for 
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his misconduct.  The board adopted the panel’s report, including its findings of 
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fact, conclusions of law and recommendation. 
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Thomas J. Szyperski, for relator. 
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Barry E. Savage, pro se. 
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Per Curiam.  Upon review of the record, we agree with the board’s findings 
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of misconduct and its recommendation.  We therefore also reject the arguments 
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raised in respondent’s objections -- (1) that his unauthorized communication with 
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Mrs. Cooper was ethical because her signature was not required to execute the 
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transfer of the liquor license, and (2) that his unauthorized request for information 
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from a represented party was permissible because the opposing counsel had not 
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identified his address in writing. 
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Apparently, respondent contends that Mrs. Cooper was not represented in 
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the liquor license transfer by the Coopers’s general counsel and, therefore, 
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respondent could not have communicated with her about “the subject of [her] 
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representation” in that matter.  DR 7-104(A)(1).  The subject of the representation 
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at issue, however, was the sale of the gas station, including the agreement to 
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transfer the liquor license, and the Coopers’ general counsel plainly represented 
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Mrs. Cooper’s interests, as well as those of her husband, in the entire transaction.  
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Moreover, another “subject of the representation” about which respondent had no 
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authority to communicate with Mrs. Cooper was the Coopers’ credit with the bank 
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respondent represented.  Respondent nevertheless surprised Mrs. Cooper at her 
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home, which generated their discussion about the possibility of the bank’s 
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foreclosure.  Either way, respondent’s communications with Mrs. Cooper violated 
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DR 7-104(A)(1). 
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Furthermore, an attorney is not relieved of the duty to communicate only 
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with the attorney of a represented party by the opposing counsel’s failure to  
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confirm the representation in writing.  DR 7-104(A)(1) forbids such 
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communication upon the attorney’s knowledge of the party’s representative, and 
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respondent admits having had that knowledge here. 
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We, therefore, publicly reprimand respondent for having committed these 
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two violations of DR 7-104(A)(1).  Costs taxed to respondent. 
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Judgment accordingly. 
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MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and 
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COOK, JJ., concur. 
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