Case Title: In the Matter of an Impounded Case

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13465

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2024-02-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13465 
 
IN THE MATTER OF AN IMPOUNDED CASE. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 4, 2023. - February 14, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ.1 
 
 
Sealing.  Youthful Offender Act. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on January 24, 2023. 
 
The case was reported by Lowy, J. 
 
 
Pauline Quirion for the petitioner. 
Nina L. Pomponio, Special Assistant Attorney General (Tonie 
J. Ryan also present) for Commissioner of Probation. 
Paul M. Kominers, Kristen R. Gagalis, Tamara S. Wolfson, 
Leon Smith, Virginia Benzan, David M. Siegel, & Susan Malouin, 
for Citizens for Juvenile Justice & others, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
Afton M. Templin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
 
1 Justice Lowy participated in the deliberation on this case 
and authored this opinion prior to his retirement. 
 
2 
 
LOWY, J.  This case requires us to determine which of the 
two relevant sources for record sealing -- G. L. c. 276, § 100A 
(§ 100A), the adult criminal record sealing statute, or G. L. 
c. 276, § 100B (§ 100B), the juvenile delinquency sealing 
statute -- governs the sealing of records from youthful offender 
proceedings.  This appeal arises from the Commissioner of 
Probation's (commissioner's) denial of the petitioner's request 
that his youthful offender records be sealed pursuant to § 100B, 
with the commissioner instead applying the adult criminal record 
sealing statute, § 100A.  We conclude that § 100B, the juvenile 
delinquency sealing statute, is the proper statute for the 
sealing of records of youthful offenders.2,3 
Background.  In 2012, the petitioner was indicted on four 
counts of witness intimidation and three counts of felony 
extortion.  The Juvenile Court ordered pretrial probation with 
respect to the extortion charges, which were later dismissed.  
With respect to two of the witness intimidation charges, the 
Juvenile Court adjudicated the petitioner a youthful offender 
 
2 This opinion exclusively concerns youthful offender 
records in noncapital cases.  Nothing in this opinion addresses 
the issue of record sealing as it relates to capital cases. 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Citizens for 
Juvenile Justice, the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, the 
New England Law CORI Initiative, Northeast Legal Aid, and the 
University of Massachusetts Law School Human Rights at Home 
Clinic; and the youth advocacy division of the Committee for 
Public Counsel Services. 
 
3 
and ordered his commitment to the Department of Youth Services.  
As to the other two witness intimidation charges, the Juvenile 
Court adjudicated the petitioner a youthful offender and ordered 
a seven-year probation sentence.  The petitioner sought the 
sealing of his youthful offender records pursuant to § 100B in 
late 2021, having satisfied the listed requirements under that 
statute.4  The commissioner denied the petitioner's request in 
early 2022, stating that the petitioner's youthful offender 
adjudications fell under § 100A, the requirements of which the 
petitioner had not met.5  The petitioner appealed from the denial 
 
4 In part, § 100B provides that "[a]ny person having a 
record of entries of a delinquency court appearance in the 
commonwealth . . .  may . . . request that" his or her record be 
sealed.  Pursuant to § 100B, the commissioner must seal the 
record of such an applicant provided the applicant satisfies 
certain listed requirements.  The relevant listed requirement of 
§ 100B is that an applicant's court appearances and court 
dispositions, including any period of supervision or probation, 
must have been closed at least three years prior to the request.  
The petitioner satisfies this requirement. 
 
5 In part, § 100A provides that "[a]ny person having a 
record of criminal court appearances and dispositions in the 
commonwealth . . . may . . .  request that" his or her record be 
sealed.  Pursuant to § 100A, the commissioner must seal the 
record of such an applicant provided the applicant satisfies 
certain listed requirements.  The relevant listed requirement of 
§ 100A is that an applicant's court appearances and court 
dispositions, including any period of custody, for any felony 
record must have been closed at least seven years prior to the 
request.  Also relevant is that § 100A does not apply in cases 
of convictions for witness intimidation charges; records of such 
convictions generally cannot be sealed.  See G. L. c. 268, §13B.  
The petitioner has not satisfied the seven-year waiting period 
requirement, and his records involve adjudications for witness 
intimidation charges, which cannot be sealed under § 100A. 
 
4 
of his request by way of a petition in the county court seeking 
extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  The single 
justice reserved and reported the case to the full court without 
decision. 
Discussion.  Where a case is reserved and reported by the 
single justice, we do not need to decide if the case meets the 
standard for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, and instead may 
proceed to the merits.  See Commonwealth v. Whitfield, 492 Mass. 
61, 67 n.9 (2023) ("Where the single justice has exercised [his 
or] her discretion to reserve and report the matter, we proceed 
to adjudicate the merits").  The question presented by the 
petitioner's appeal is whether youthful offender dispositions 
may be sealed in a manner more like adult criminal records under 
§ 100A or delinquency records under § 100B.  Because this is a 
question of statutory interpretation, the standard of review is 
de novo.  See Pembroke Hosp. v. D.L., 482 Mass. 346, 351 (2019).  
"Legislative intent controls our interpretation of statutes."  
Commonwealth v. Montarvo, 486 Mass. 535, 536 (2020).  
Legislative intent can be gleaned by looking "to the words of 
the statute, construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the 
language, considered in connection with the cause of its 
enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the 
main object to be accomplished" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Garvey, 477 Mass. 59, 61 (2017).  If 
 
5 
the statutory language is clear, we conclude our analysis.  See 
Montarvo, supra; Garvey, supra.  If the statutory language is 
ambiguous, however, we then look to sources external to the 
statute to determine legislative intent.  See Matter of E.C., 
479 Mass. 113, 118 (2018). 
1.  Plain text.  When interpreting a statute, we look first 
to the "plain and ordinary meaning" of the statutory language 
(citation omitted).  Velazquez v. Commonwealth, 491 Mass. 279, 
281 (2023).  See Care & Protection of Rashida, 488 Mass. 217, 
225 (2021), S.C., 489 Mass. 128 (2022).  If specific terms 
remain undefined under the statute, we may look to dictionary 
definitions to understand a term's ordinary meaning.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 489 Mass. 589, 593 (2022); Harmon v. 
Commissioner of Correction, 487 Mass. 470, 479 (2021) ("For 
terms that are not 'technical,' we construe statutory words and 
phrases in their 'common and approved usage'" [citation 
omitted]). 
The relevant plain text of § 100A applies the statute to 
"person[s] having a record of criminal court appearances and 
dispositions."  The relevant plain text of § 100B applies the 
statute to "person[s] having a record of entries of a 
delinquency court appearance."  Neither statute references 
youthful offender adjudications -- understandably, given that 
the category of youthful offender was created in 1996, long 
 
6 
after §§ 100A and 100B were passed. 
Where adult criminal records may be sealed under § 100A and 
delinquency records may be sealed under § 100B, we are 
unconvinced that the Legislature intended that a category of 
offenders under age eighteen be deprived of the opportunity to 
have their records sealed under at least certain circumstances.  
See Commonwealth v. Rainey, 491 Mass. 632, 642 (2023) ("our 
respect for the Legislature's considered judgment dictates that 
we interpret the statute to be sensible, rejecting unreasonable 
interpretations unless the clear meaning of the language 
requires such an interpretation" [citation omitted]). 
We assume that the Legislature is aware of existing 
statutes and thus interpret statutes in harmony with prior 
enactments to promote a consistent body of law.  See Globe 
Newspaper Co., petitioner, 461 Mass. 113, 117 (2011) ("In 
interpreting a statute, we presume that when the Legislature 
enacts a law it is aware of the statutory and common law that 
governed the matter in which it legislates"); Commonwealth v. 
Callahan, 440 Mass. 436, 440-441 (2003).  See also Montarvo, 486 
Mass. at 541 ("The Legislature is presumed to be aware of the 
prior state of the law as explicated by the decisions of this 
court" [citation omitted]).  Accordingly, we agree with the 
parties that either § 100A or § 100B permits sealing of youthful 
offender records. 
 
7 
The petitioner contends that the "criminal court" language 
of § 100A cannot apply to him because youthful offender 
proceedings, which occur in the Juvenile Court, are not criminal 
in nature.  Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 384 Mass. 
784, 786 (1981) ("An adjudication concerning a juvenile is not, 
of course, a conviction of [a] crime").  The petitioner likewise 
contends that the phrase "delinquency court" in § 100B is 
inclusive of youthful offender proceedings because "delinquency" 
is often understood to encompass a wide range of adjudications 
of individuals under eighteen years of age.  "[D]elinquency" and 
"delinquency court" are undefined under the statute.  Black's 
Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) defines juvenile delinquency 
broadly as "a juvenile's violation of the law," or more 
specifically as behavior "by a minor . . . that would be 
criminally punishable if the actor were an adult, but instead is 
usu[ally] punished by special laws applying only to minors."  
Id. at 1038. 
As the commissioner notes, however, the Legislature 
maintains distinct categories of delinquent child and youthful 
offender proceedings.  See G. L. c. 119, § 58 (describing 
separate procedures for when juveniles are adjudicated 
"delinquent child[ren]" versus "youthful offender[s]").  
Accordingly, while the dictionary definition of delinquency is 
expansive, it does not square with the Legislature's distinction 
 
8 
between delinquent children and youthful offenders.  In sum, the 
texts of § 100A and § 100B, neither of which contains any 
reference to the category of youthful offender or otherwise 
addresses youthful offender proceedings, are ambiguous on the 
matter of the sealing of the petitioner's record. 
2.  Sources external to the statutes.  Where statutory 
language is ambiguous, we turn to extrinsic sources to determine 
the Legislature's probable intent as it pertains to the sealing 
of youthful offender records.  See Harmon, 487 Mass. at 479.  
Because neither the adult criminal record sealing statute nor 
the juvenile delinquency sealing statute mentions youthful 
offenders, and because we have concluded that the Legislature 
intended for there to be a path for the sealing of youthful 
offender adjudications, we are tasked with determining whether, 
in the context of sealing records, the Legislature intended for 
youthful offenders to be treated more like other juveniles or 
more like adults based on extrinsic sources. 
The commissioner urges that we look to G. L. c. 119, § 60A 
(§ 60A), which governs the "[i]nspection of records in youthful 
offender and delinquency cases," to glean the Legislature's 
intent with regard to the sealing of youthful offender 
adjudications.  Under § 60A, the commissioner notes, youthful 
offender proceedings are open to the public "in the same manner 
and to the same extent as adult criminal court."  The 
 
9 
commissioner argues that this statute suggests a broader 
statutory scheme under which youthful offenders are to be 
treated the same as adult criminal offenders. 
In contrast, the petitioner contends that § 60A reveals the 
Legislature's intent that youthful offenders be treated more 
like other juveniles than adults.  The statute states: 
"The records of a youthful offender proceeding conducted 
pursuant to an indictment shall be open to public 
inspection in the same manner and to the same extent as 
adult criminal court records.  All other records of the 
court in cases of delinquency arising under [§§ 52 to 59], 
inclusive, shall be withheld from public inspection except 
with the consent of a justice of such court . . ." 
(emphasis added). 
 
G. L. c. 119, § 60A.  The petitioner argues that the word 
"other" indicates that the Legislature intended youthful 
offender proceedings to be a subcategory of delinquency cases. 
Moreover, the petitioner directs the court to G. L. c. 119, 
§ 53 (§ 53), which governs the interpretation of § 60A.  Section 
53 instructs that § 60A "shall be liberally construed so 
that . . . children brought before the court . . . shall be 
treated, not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, 
encouragement and guidance."  Section 53 further indicates that 
"[p]roceedings against children under [§ 60A] shall not be 
deemed criminal proceedings."  We agree with the petitioner that 
§ 60A's likening of youthful offender records to delinquency 
records by use of the word "other" and, more significantly, 
 
10 
§ 53's overarching mandate that youthful offenders be treated as 
children in need of aid are more indicative of the Legislature's 
intent as to the sealing of youthful offender records than 
§ 60A's "public inspection" directive that youthful offender 
proceedings be open to the public. 
More broadly, the commissioner argues that the Legislature 
provides for separate processes for delinquent children and 
youthful offenders to hold youthful offenders more accountable 
for more severe offenses, indicating its intent to treat 
youthful offenders more like adults than delinquent children.  
The Commonwealth initiates all delinquency proceedings by way of 
complaints in the Juvenile Court, whereas the Commonwealth may 
proceed by indictment in the Superior Court when a juvenile 
qualifies as a youthful offender.  G. L. c. 119, §§ 52, 54.  An 
indictment is required for a juvenile to be adjudicated a 
youthful offender, which is not the case for delinquent 
children.  See G. L. c. 119, § 54; Commonwealth v. Hampton, 64 
Mass. App. Ct. 27, 34 (2005).  Should a juvenile be adjudicated 
a youthful offender as opposed to a delinquent child, a judge 
may sentence him or her as if he or she had been an adult.  See 
G. L. c. 119, § 58.  But see Commonwealth v. Connor C., 432 
Mass. 635, 641 (2000) ("At the same time, the provisions of the 
1996 amendments did not eviscerate the longstanding principle 
that the treatment of children who offend our laws are not 
 
11 
criminal proceedings"). 
The petitioner argues that the Legislature provides for a 
separate Juvenile Court system to maintain a distinction between 
minors and adults facing charges, indicating its intent to treat 
youthful offenders more like delinquent children than adults.  
While youthful offender adjudications, compared to delinquency 
adjudications, allow for harsher sentencing for more serious 
offenses such as firearms offenses or those involving the 
infliction or threat of serious bodily harm, the distinction 
between these two kinds of adjudications "affects only 
sentencing."  Commonwealth v. Dale D., 431 Mass. 757, 761 
(2000).  See G. L. c. 119, § 54.  Although youthful offender 
proceedings are begun by indictment, "the Juvenile Court retains 
jurisdiction over a juvenile in noncapital cases whether the 
juvenile is indicted as a youthful offender or proceeded against 
by complaint."  Dale D., supra, citing G. L. c. 263, § 4, and 
G. L. c. 119, § 58.  We find this latter fact persuasive. 
As we have consistently recognized, the Juvenile Court is a 
"forum[] in which, to the extent possible, the best interests of 
the child serve to guide disposition" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Magnus M., 461 Mass. 459, 466 (2012).  "[A]n 
adjudication of a juvenile as a youthful offender subjects him 
[or her] to more severe penalties, including State prison 
sentences, see G. L. c. 119, § 58, but it does not transform his 
 
12 
illegal act from an act of delinquency into a crime, and does 
not change the statutory obligation to treat him 'as far as 
practicable' as a child 'in need of aid, encouragement and 
guidance' rather than as a criminal."  Commonwealth v. Anderson, 
461 Mass. 616, 630, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 946 (2012), citing 
G. L. c. 119, § 53. 
Furthermore, a scheme that forces juveniles who meet the 
standard for record sealing under § 100B to wait considerably 
longer before they may pursue record sealing under § 100A, or 
otherwise accept that their record can never be sealed under 
§ 100A, fails to aid, encourage, and guide children and instead 
may interfere with their capacity to thrive.  See Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. District Attorney for the Middle Dist., 439 
Mass. 374, 384 (2003) ("ready access to a defendant's prior 
criminal record might frustrate a defendant's access to 
employment, housing, and social contacts necessary to [his or 
her] rehabilitation").  The petitioner's records involving 
witness intimidation charges, for example, could not be sealed 
pursuant to § 100A, even if he requested sealing after waiting 
the longer seven-year period.  That certain children could never 
have their records sealed does not accord with the Legislature's 
intent that the best interests of the child be prioritized in 
Juvenile Court dispositions.  Thus, we agree with the petitioner 
that the Legislature's maintenance of a separate Juvenile Court 
 
13 
system reflects its intention to treat juveniles tried in that 
system differently from adults. 
After review of the text of §§ 100A and 100B and an 
analysis of legislative intent as to youthful offender 
adjudications as revealed in §§ 53 and 60A and more broadly, we 
conclude that the Legislature intended that, in the context of 
record sealing, youthful offender adjudications be treated more 
like delinquency adjudications than adult criminal 
adjudications. 
Conclusion.  In sum, we conclude that, in the absence of 
further legislative guidance, § 100B's process is most 
consistent with the directive of the Legislature to aid, 
encourage, and guide juveniles, including youthful offenders.  
Accordingly, we hold that it was error for the commissioner to 
refuse to seal the petitioner's Juvenile Court records pursuant 
to § 100B, given that the petitioner has satisfied all listed 
requirements and the statute mandates sealing in such instances.  
The case is remanded to the county court for the entry of a 
judgment in favor of the petitioner.6 
 
6 Because we allow the petitioner's request for relief 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, we need not address his request 
for mandamus relief pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 5.  Likewise, 
because we decide for the petitioner on statutory interpretation 
grounds, we need not address the petitioner's arguments whether 
the commissioner's interpretation of the sealing laws violated 
the equal protection principles of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and art. 1 of the Massachusetts 
 
14 
So ordered. 
 
Declaration of Rights or is otherwise repugnant to the laws of 
the Commonwealth.