Case Title: Commonwealth v. Dunn

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13454

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2024-05-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13454 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  WARREN W. DUNN. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     January 5, 2024. – May 9, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Obscenity, Child pornography.  Probable Cause.  Search and 
Seizure, Probable cause, Warrant, Affidavit.  Practice, 
Criminal, Motion to suppress, Affidavit.  Words, "Lewd 
exhibition." 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 12, 2021. 
 
Pretrial motions to suppress evidence and for a hearing on 
the affidavit supporting a search warrant were heard by Elaine 
M. Buckley, J., and conditional pleas of guilty were accepted by 
Brian A. Davis, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Christopher DeMayo (Sabrina Bonanno also present) for the 
defendant. 
Elizabeth A. Mello Marvel, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  The defendant, Warren W. Dunn, pleaded guilty 
to two counts of possession of child pornography in violation of 
2 
G. L. c. 272, § 29C (vii), and two counts of possession of child 
pornography as a subsequent offense in violation of G. L. 
c. 272, § 29C (vii), after incriminating evidence was discovered 
in his apartment pursuant to a search warrant.  On appeal, the 
defendant asserts that the search lacked probable cause because 
the trooper who submitted the search warrant application 
provided a deficient description of two allegedly lewd images in 
his affidavit and did not attach the images themselves to the 
affidavit.  The defendant urges us to create a new rule, 
requiring magistrates to personally view allegedly lewd images 
before issuing search warrants.  We decline to do so.  Although 
attaching the photographs or providing a more thorough 
description would have been preferable in this case, the 
affidavit read in its entirety was sufficient to establish 
probable cause.  The defendant also appeals from the denial of 
his motion for a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 
U.S. 154, 155-156 (1978), arguing that the trooper made an 
intentionally or recklessly false statement in his affidavit 
when describing the images at issue.  We hold that the motion 
judge did not abuse her discretion in concluding that the 
defendant failed to demonstrate that the trooper's descriptions 
are false.  Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the defendant's 
motion to suppress and the denial of his motion for a Franks 
hearing. 
3 
 
Background.  1.  The CyberTipline report.  We summarize the 
relevant facts from the affidavit submitted by State police 
Trooper Gerald F. Donovan in support of his application for a 
warrant to search the defendant's apartment.  See Commonwealth 
v. Mora, 477 Mass. 399, 400 (2017) ("our inquiry as to the 
sufficiency of the search warrant application always begins and 
ends with the 'four corners of the affidavit'" [citation 
omitted]). 
Donovan has worked as a member of the State police Internet 
crimes against children (ICAC) task force since 2013.  In 2018, 
he also became a member of the State police cyber crime unit.  
The primary duty of the ICAC task force is to investigate 
potential sexual exploitation of children on the Internet.  
Donovan has continued to receive training related to this work, 
attending the ICAC investigative techniques training program, 
which includes training on crimes associated with child 
exploitation, and the Attorney General's annual cyber crime 
conference since 2014. 
Based on his training and experience related to the sexual 
exploitation of children, Donovan described in his affidavit how 
persons who have previously possessed child pornography are 
likely to keep sexually explicit visual images depicting 
children "secreted[] but readily at hand."  He also explained 
4 
that these persons are "not likely to destroy [their] 
collection" of such material. 
 
On April 27, 2020, Donovan received a "CyberTipline" report 
concerning potential child pornography.  The report was sent to 
the ICAC task force by the National Center for Missing and 
Exploited Children (NCMEC).  NCMEC is a private, nonprofit 
organization that "provides services nationwide for families and 
professionals in the prevention of abducted, endangered, and 
sexually exploited children."  In 1998, NCMEC created the 
CyberTipline, a national clearinghouse for tips and leads 
regarding child sexual exploitation.  The CyberTipline permits 
the public and electronic service providers (providers)1 to 
submit online reports of potential child exploitation media.  
After receiving a report, NCMEC works to identify potential 
geographic information in the reported file.  NCMEC then shares 
its CyberTipline reports with law enforcement agencies.2 
 
1 Under Federal law, a provider is defined as "an electronic 
communication service provider or remote computing service," 18 
U.S.C. § 2258E(6), and is obligated to make a report of any 
suspected online child sexual exploitation "as soon as 
reasonably possible" to the CyberTipline of NCMEC, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2258A.  See Commonwealth v. Guastucci, 486 Mass. 22, 23 n.2 
(2020). 
 
2 "Pursuant to its clearinghouse role as a private, 
nonprofit organization, and at the conclusion of its review in 
furtherance of its nonprofit mission, NCMEC shall make 
available" each CyberTipline report to at least one of several 
enumerated law enforcement agencies, including "[a]ny State or 
 
5 
The CyberTipline report received by Donovan was first 
submitted to NCMEC by a provider, Microsoft, on March 18, 2020.  
Attached to the report were two images flagged as potential 
child pornography.  A Microsoft employee viewed the two images 
and then reported both as child pornography.  According to 
NCMEC's categorization system, Microsoft identified both images 
as "B2."  NCMEC defines B2 as "a pubescent minor in any image of 
lascivious exhibition depicting nudity and one or more of:  
restraint, sexually suggestive poses, focus on genitals, 
inappropriate touching, adult arousal, spreading of limbs or 
genitals, and such depiction lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value." 
The two images attached to the CyberTipline report were 
then submitted to NCMEC's law enforcement services portal.  
Through this portal, law enforcement can utilize a tool that 
"compare[s] . . . hash values calculated from suspected child 
pornography images and videos with hash values stored in the 
[child victim identification program]."3  NCMEC reported that 
 
local law enforcement agency that is involved in the 
investigation of child sexual exploitation."  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2258A(c). 
 
3 A "hash value" is "[a] number produced by an algorithm 
that is based on the digital contents of a medium, file, or 
drive, and usu[ally] represented as a sequence of characters.  
The value can be used to authenticate data copied from 
electronic devices, storage media, and electronic files.  
 
6 
both images contained "recognized hash values."  A "recognized 
hash value" is associated with an image or video that was 
previously submitted to NCMEC's child recognition and 
identification system and "may or may not contain apparent child 
pornography or depict identified children."4 
After reviewing the CyberTipline report, Donovan personally 
viewed the two images in question.  He provided identical "brief 
description[s]" for both images in his affidavit:  "This image 
depicts a pubescent male standing completely naked with the 
focus of the image on the young boy's penis.  The young boy is 
approximately [thirteen] to [fifteen] years of age."  Donovan 
did not attach the images to his application for a search 
warrant. 
As part of his investigation, Donovan also reviewed a 
report from the Hull police department.  This report recounted 
 
Matching hash values often strongly suggests that a copy is 
identical to the original."  Black's Law Dictionary 862 (11th 
ed. 2019). 
 
4 As noted in the affidavit, in addition to recognized hash 
values, NCMEC also categorizes two other types of hash values:  
identified child and unrecognized hash values.  A hash value 
categorized as "identified child" is associated with an image or 
video that appears to show at least one child previously 
identified by law enforcement.  Although these hash values may 
be associated with "apparent child pornography," they may also 
be associated with files that do not contain child pornography.  
An "unrecognized hash value" is associated with an image or 
video that has not been previously submitted to the child 
recognition and identification system. 
7 
the defendant's 2007 arrest after police seized "various media 
forms containing child pornography of boys as young as [ten] 
years old" from the defendant's apartment -- the same residence 
Donovan sought to search in his application for a search 
warrant.  The report also described how "[a]n interview was 
conducted post-Miranda where [the defendant] made several 
admissions consistent with [the] Hull [police department's] 
investigation." 
Additionally, the Attorney General issued an administrative 
subpoena to Comcast, an Internet service provider, for the 
subscriber information linked to the Internet protocol (IP) 
address in the CyberTipline report.5  Comcast's records 
identified the defendant as the subscriber for the designated IP 
address and his place of residence as the service address.  When 
cross-referenced with the CyberTipline report, the IP address 
from the subpoena is the same IP address listed for the two 
images reported by Microsoft. 
Last, Donovan submitted a query to the registry of motor 
vehicles and checked the Hull town assessor's online database as 
part of his investigation.  Through these efforts, Donovan 
confirmed that the defendant was a level two sex offender and 
 
5 "IP address" is defined as "the numeric address of a 
computer on the Internet."  Merriam-Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary 660 (11th ed. 2020). 
8 
owned an apartment associated with the IP address that was the 
subject of the Attorney General's subpoena. 
2.  The search.  On June 3, 2020, Donovan applied for a 
search warrant to search any computers, cell phones, or digital 
devices at the defendant's residence for evidence related to the 
crimes of possession and dissemination of child pornography.  
The application also included a request for a qualified computer 
forensic and hardware expert to search the defendant's computer 
system and to copy digital evidence stored on any servers that 
the defendant may have remotely accessed from his digital 
devices. 
A magistrate granted the application for the search warrant 
that same day, on June 3, 2020.  On execution of the warrant 
later that afternoon, a laptop, "thumb drive," cell phone, and 
empty tablet box were seized.  Officers later found over 2,800 
images of child pornography on the thumb drive and one such 
image on the cell phone. 
3.  Prior proceedings.  In March 2021, a grand jury 
indicted the defendant on two counts of possessing child 
pornography in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 29C (vii), and two 
counts of possessing child pornography as a subsequent offense 
in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 29C (vii). 
In September 2021, the defendant filed two motions in the 
Superior Court:  a motion to suppress the evidence seized from 
9 
his devices and a motion for a Franks hearing.  After an 
evidentiary hearing in November 2021, a Superior Court judge 
denied both of the defendant's motions in a written decision 
entered on January 4, 2022. 
On August 26, 2022, the defendant filed an agreement to 
plead guilty, expressly preserving his right to appeal from the 
judge's denials of his motion to suppress and his motion for a 
Franks hearing.  The defendant pleaded guilty to all charges 
later that day.  As part of his plea, the defendant stipulated 
to certain facts regarding the two images that were attached to 
the CyberTipline report.6 
Because the two allegedly lewd photographs were impounded, 
in February 2023, the defendant filed a motion to compel the 
Commonwealth to produce the photographs.  The motion was allowed 
the following month, with instruction from the motion judge that 
 
6 The defendant stipulated that one image "appeared to 
[depict] a juvenile male" looking to the right.  "The photo was 
cropped in such a way that essentially you could not see the 
juvenile below the knees and the juvenile had his face partially 
obstructed."  The photograph showed "the naked torso of the 
juvenile, as well as the naked penis of the juvenile male."  The 
defendant also stipulated that the second image was of "a naked 
juvenile male . . . holding a rock,  . . . the rock being mostly 
covered by his hands."  The image contained blurred trees in the 
background and "light streaming in . . . show[ing] . . . a 
partially erect juvenile penis casting a shadow on the leg of 
the juvenile."  As these details were not included in the 
affidavit accompanying the application for a search warrant, we 
do not consider them in analyzing whether probable cause existed 
to issue the warrant.  See Mora, 477 Mass. at 400. 
10 
defense counsel was permitted to view, but not copy, the 
impounded materials after executing an appropriate protective 
order. 
After the defendant filed a notice of appeal from the 
denials of his motion for a Franks hearing and his motion to 
suppress, his appeal was docketed in the Appeals Court in May 
2023.  That same month, the defendant filed an application for 
direct appellate review with this court, which we allowed on 
June 16, 2023. 
Discussion.  1.  Motion to suppress.  On appeal from the 
denial of his motion to suppress, the defendant argues that 
Donovan's "conclusory" descriptions of the two images did not 
establish probable cause to search the defendant's home and 
electronic devices.  The defendant also asks us to institute a 
new rule requiring magistrates, in reviewing search warrant 
applications, to personally view allegedly lewd images before 
making a probable cause determination.  We conclude that the 
search warrant in this case was supported by probable cause and 
decline the defendant's request to create a new rule. 
"The question whether there was probable cause to issue the 
search warrant is a question of law that we review de novo."  
Commonwealth v. Perkins, 478 Mass. 97, 102 (2017).  Our analysis 
"begins and ends with the four corners of the affidavit," from 
which we draw all reasonable inferences (citation omitted).  
11 
Commonwealth v. Lowery, 487 Mass. 851, 856 (2021).  See 
Commonwealth v. Morin, 478 Mass. 415, 425 (2017).  This is not a 
"hypercritical analysis" but a "commonsense and realistic" 
examination (citation omitted).  Perkins, supra.  We are guided 
by the "factual and practical considerations of everyday life on 
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."  
Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Anthony, 451 Mass. 59, 68 (2008).  
To determine if probable cause existed, we examine whether an 
affidavit showed a sufficient nexus "between the suspected 
criminal activity, the items sought, and the place to be 
searched."  Commonwealth v. Martinez, 476 Mass. 410, 416-417 
(2017).  Whether an affidavit supplied probable cause is a fact-
intensive inquiry.  Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 521-
522 (2017).  We therefore give "considerable deference to the 
magistrate's determination of probable cause."  Lowery, supra at 
857.  See Commonwealth v. Keown, 478 Mass. 232, 238 (2017), 
cert. denied, 583 U.S. 1139 (2018). 
Probable cause is "not a high bar" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Guastucci, 486 Mass. 22, 26 (2020).  See Keown, 
478 Mass. at 238 ("The probable cause necessary to support the 
issuance of a search warrant does not require definitive proof 
of criminal activity" [citation omitted]).  "In dealing with 
probable cause . . . we deal with probabilities" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Henley, 488 Mass. 95, 116 (2021).  
12 
"The probable cause showing necessary for issuance of a search 
warrant is 'only a fair probability that evidence of such a 
crime would be found in particular locations,' not 'a prima 
facie showing that the defendant possessed child pornography.'"  
Martinez, 476 Mass. at 416-417, quoting Anthony, 451 Mass. at 
72. 
Where an application for a search warrant is based on an 
allegation that an image possessed by the defendant is child 
pornography, probable cause for the issuance of a warrant can be 
established through (1) the magistrate independently viewing the 
image in question and determining that it constitutes child 
pornography; (2) a sufficiently detailed description in the 
search warrant affidavit of the image in question to allow the 
magistrate to determine that the image constitutes child 
pornography; or (3) other sufficient evidence contained in the 
four corners of the affidavit that corroborates that the image 
in question is child pornography.  See United States v. Pavulak, 
700 F.3d 651, 661 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 968 
(2013).  See also United States v. Chiu, 36 F.4th 294, 297 (1st 
Cir.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 336 (2022) (corroborative 
evidence established by "fair probability" that images were 
pornographic). 
We examine first if the affidavit adequately described the 
images as lewd.  See G. L. c. 272, § 29C (vii) (unlawful to 
13 
"knowingly purchase[] or possess[] a . . . visual reproduction 
. . . of any child whom the person knows or reasonably should 
know to be under the age of [eighteen] years of age and such 
child is . . . depicted or portrayed in any pose, posture or 
setting involving a lewd exhibition").  To determine if an image 
constitutes a "lewd exhibition," we utilize the factors 
enumerated in United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. 
Cal. 1986), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 
1239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856 (1987).  See 
Commonwealth v. Rollins, 470 Mass. 66, 76 (2014).  We consider 
the Dost factors with the purpose of G. L. c. 272, § 29C, in 
mind.  See Commonwealth v. Rex, 469 Mass. 36, 45 (2014) (purpose 
of statute is "to protect children from sexual exploitation").  
These Dost factors are: 
"1) whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on 
the child's genitalia or pubic area; 
 
"2) whether the setting of the visual depiction is sexually 
suggestive, i.e., in a place or pose generally associated 
with sexual activity; 
 
"3) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose, or 
in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child; 
 
"4) whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or 
nude; 
 
"5) whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coyness or 
a willingness to engage in sexual activity; [and] 
 
"6) whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to 
elicit a sexual response in the viewer." 
 
14 
Dost, supra. 
 
Our determination of lewdness is made on a case-by-case 
basis.  Rex, 469 Mass. at 45.  Although the Dost factors are a 
guide, they are "neither comprehensive nor dispositive."  Id.  
An image need not exhibit each factor to be lewd.  Id.  However, 
"nudity alone is not enough to render a photograph lewd."  
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 293, 302 (2012).  
See Rex, supra at 43 ("whether photographs of the naked body are 
entitled to protection under the First Amendment [to the United 
States Constitution is] based on an assessment of whether . . . 
they are lewd"). 
 
In his affidavit, Donovan described the images as depicting 
"a pubescent male standing completely naked with the focus of 
the image on the young boy's penis.  The young boy is 
approximately [thirteen] to [fifteen] years of age."  The 
defendant asserts that these descriptions were insufficient to 
establish probable cause, analogizing to United States v. 
Brunette, 256 F.3d 14, 17-18 (1st Cir. 2001), where the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a search 
warrant lacked probable cause based on the conclusory 
description provided.  Specifically, the officer in Brunette 
described the images at issue as depicting "a prepubescent boy 
lasciviously displaying his genitals" (citation omitted).  Id. 
at 17.  The First Circuit characterized this description as a 
15 
"legal conclusion parroting the statutory definition" of child 
pornography.  Id.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)(v) (Federal 
statute criminalizing child pornography image asks whether image 
depicts "lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pubic 
area").  The First Circuit concluded that this meager "legal 
assertion, absent any descriptive support and without an 
independent review of the images, was insufficient to sustain 
the magistrate judge's determination of probable cause."  
Brunette, supra. 
 
Here, Donovan's descriptions of the images do contain some 
additional detail beyond what was found to be inadequate in 
Brunette.  Aside from specifying that the juveniles are nude, 
Donovan estimated their ages to be between thirteen and fifteen 
years old, in contrast to Brunette, where the juveniles were 
described only as "prepubescent."  Brunette, 256 F.3d at 17.  
The subjects of the photograph "are of an age when [children] 
normally are clothed."  United States v. Frabizio, 459 F.3d 80, 
86 (1st Cir. 2006).  See Sullivan, 82 Mass. App. Ct. at 305 
(nude girl appearing on cusp of puberty in photograph was "well 
past the age of the 'Coppertone girl'"); United States v. Knox, 
32 F.3d 733, 750 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1109 
(1995) ("No one seriously could think that . . . an innocuous 
family snapshot of a naked child in the bathtub violates the 
child pornography laws"). 
16 
Donovan also described the juvenile's penis as the "focus" 
of each image.  We agree with the defendant that this 
description is conclusory, as it largely mirrors the first Dost 
factor, "whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on 
the child's genitalia or pubic area," without elaboration.  
Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 832.  Donovan provides no explanation as 
to how the juveniles' genitalia are the "focus" of the images.  
He does not describe the lighting, composition, or perspective 
of the photographs; the gestures or positioning of the 
juveniles; the proximity or framing of the genitalia; or any 
photographic manipulation such as cropping or blurring.7  See 
Figueroa v. Mazza, 825 F.3d 89, 101 (2d Cir. 2016) ("In a number 
of the photos, the child's genitals are the primary object of 
focus; indeed, some photos show nothing else save the child's 
lower torso and upper thighs"); United States v. McCarty, 835 F. 
Supp. 2d 938, 946 (D. Haw. 2011) (focal point was genitalia 
where children's faces were cut off from image); United States 
v. Getzel, 196 F. Supp. 2d 88, 92 (D.N.H. 2002) (focal point of 
image was genitalia where image was taken at "horizontal vantage 
point near the subjects' feet" and "present[ed] . . . genitalia 
 
7 We do not intend to suggest that further explanatory 
details are required for every Dost factor.  For example, where 
an affiant describes an image as containing a "nude" child, the 
meaning of the word "nude" is self-evident. 
 
17 
at the forefront of the image").  In the absence of further 
information, the descriptions of the images alone were 
insufficient to establish probable cause.8 
However, the affidavit contained more than a single sparse 
description of two images.  First, the affidavit described how 
CyberTipline reports are created.  A provider -- here, Microsoft 
-- submitted an initial report flagging two images.  The 
affidavit further specifies that a Microsoft employee personally 
viewed the two images.  This personal observation is a factor 
the magistrate could consider in the probable cause analysis.  
See Commonwealth v. Atchue, 393 Mass. 343, 348 (1984) (personal 
observation coupled with specific facts was factor in support of 
probable cause).  Other jurisdictions have found that 
CyberTipline reports themselves weigh in favor of probable 
cause, holding these reports to be equivalent to a reliable tip 
from a concerned citizen.  See, e.g., People v. Wadleigh, 93 
Cal. App. 5th 531, 541 (2023); James v. State, 312 Ga. App. 130, 
134 (2011) (Google employee "act[ed] in the role of a concerned 
citizen" in making report to NCMEC).  We agree.  See 
Commonwealth v. Cavitt, 460 Mass. 617, 628-629 (2011) (tips from 
 
8 An incomplete description of the image's focal point risks 
speculating about the viewer's subjective intent instead of the 
"objective criteria of the photograph's design."  United States 
v. Amirault, 173 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir. 1999).  "If . . . 
subjective reaction were relevant, a sexual deviant's quirks 
could turn a Sears catalog into pornography."  Id. at 34. 
18 
citizen informants are given more weight in probable cause 
analysis because these informants do not have protection of 
anonymity and may be subject to charges for filing false 
reports). 
 
Second, the affidavit detailed the results of a hash search 
on NCMEC's law enforcement services portal.  NCMEC returned 
"recognized hash values" for both images.  This allowed the 
magistrate to reasonably infer that another person or entity 
previously submitted images with the same hash values to NCMEC.  
See United States v. Keith, 980 F. Supp. 2d 33, 36-37 (D. Mass. 
2013) ("any alteration of the file, including even a change of 
one or two pixels, would result in a different hash value").  
Although this information does not confirm that the images are 
child pornography, it does raise the reasonable inference that 
another person or provider suspected that the exact same images 
were child pornography.  Thus, even if NCMEC's description of a 
"recognized hash value[]" is equivocal, the inference that at 
least one other person or entity suspected the images to be 
child pornography adds weight to the probable cause analysis.  
See Commonwealth v. Nowells, 390 Mass. 621, 627 (1983) (separate 
informant statements may support probable cause finding with 
adequate mutual corroboration). 
 
Third, Donovan confirmed that the defendant was a 
registered level two sex offender and detailed the defendant's 
19 
prior arrest in 2007.9  Donovan explained that in 2007, police 
seized "child pornography of boys as young as [ten] years old" 
from the defendant's residence.  The defendant also made 
"several admissions" in connection with the 2007 investigation.  
From this, the magistrate knew, or could at least reasonably 
infer, that the defendant had previously been arrested and 
charged with possessing child pornography and admitted to doing 
so.  A defendant's prior criminal history may be helpful for 
establishing probable cause, particularly where the prior 
history involves a similar crime.  See Commonwealth v. Long, 482 
Mass. 804, 814 (2019) (while "a prior conviction of a related 
offense does not establish probable cause that an individual is 
committing a similar offense[,] . . . [it] may be a factor in 
the over-all [probable cause] analysis"); United States v. 
Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 
933 (2009) ("defendant's criminal history relating to child 
pornography" is "factor[] weighing in favor of probable cause"); 
United States v. Wagers, 452 F.3d 534, 541 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 549 U.S. 1032 (2006) (prior conviction of possession of 
 
9 A person is classified as a level two sex offender "when 
it has been determined his or her risk of reoffense is moderate 
and the degree of dangerousness posed to the public is such that 
a public safety interest is served by public access to sex 
offender registry information."  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.03 
(2016). 
20 
child pornography was "relevant, though not dispositive" to 
probable cause analysis). 
The defendant's criminal history is particularly relevant 
here, where Donovan explained, based on his experience, that a 
person who has previously possessed child pornography is likely 
to retain similar images.  See Guastucci, 486 Mass. at 29 
(evidence of previous possession of child pornography supports 
reasonable inference that person may presently possess new 
images); Long, 482 Mass. at 814; Commonwealth v. Fontaine, 84 
Mass. App. Ct. 699, 707 (2014) (prior criminal convictions 
considered in probable cause analysis); Commonwealth v. Victor, 
1 Mass. App. Ct. 600, 602 (1973) (same).  See also United States 
v. Notman, 831 F.3d 1084, 1088 (8th Cir. 2016) (noting "the 
compulsive nature of the crime of possession of child 
pornography and the well-established hoarding habits of child 
pornography collectors"). 
 
Considering the affidavit as a whole -- including Donovan's 
description of the image depicting nude juveniles from thirteen 
to fifteen years of age, the Microsoft employee's personal 
observation of the images, the hash search results, and the 
defendant's prior criminal history -- the magistrate had 
sufficient information to find probable cause to issue a search 
warrant. 
21 
The defendant cites two cases, Brunette, and United States 
v. Sheehan, 70 F.4th 36 (1st Cir. 2023), to suggest that we 
should hold otherwise and institute a new rule requiring 
magistrates to personally view allegedly lewd images.  However, 
neither case creates such a rule.  In Brunette, 256 F.3d at 17-
19, the First Circuit held that where an affidavit contained 
only "conclusory statutory language" describing the images in 
question, without any "other indicia of probable cause," the 
magistrate was required to view the allegedly lewd images.  But 
as the First Circuit later reiterated, "[i]n Brunette, we 
observed that including . . . contextual and investigatory 
details in an affidavit may have put the government on firmer 
probable-cause footing than the mere anodyne parroting of 
statutory language" (emphasis added).  Chiu, 36 F.4th at 298–
299.  In Sheehan, supra at 46, the First Circuit considered an 
affidavit where the images at issue were described as depicting 
"prepubescent penises that lacked pubic hair."  The court first 
held that the affidavit's description, which "did little more 
than signify that the images contained child nudity," was 
insufficient, "when viewed in isolation," to establish probable 
cause.  Id.  The court then noted that an inadequate description 
of the images did not end its inquiry, and next assessed whether 
additional information in the affidavit, considered along with 
22 
the "otherwise deficient image description," justified a finding 
of probable cause.  Id. at 47. 
The defendant cites to no cases, and to our knowledge no 
cases exist, that have adopted the rule he urges us to announce.  
See Pavulak, 700 F.3d at 661; United States v. Wellman, 663 F.3d 
224, 228 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 953 (2012) ("We 
decline to impose a requirement that a search warrant 
application involving child pornography must include an image of 
the alleged pornography"); United States v. Mutschelknaus, 592 
F.3d 826, 828-829 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Lowe, 516 
F.3d 580, 586 (7th Cir. 2008) ("an issuing court does not need 
to look at the images described in an affidavit in order to 
determine whether there is probable cause to believe that they 
constitute child pornography"); Brunette, 256 F.3d at 19-20; 
United States v. Jasorka, 153 F.3d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1998) ("the 
issuing magistrate is not required to personally view allegedly 
obscene [materials] prior to issuing a warrant [for] their 
seizure" [quotation and citation omitted]).  See also United 
States v. Miknevich, 638 F.3d 178, 183 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
565 U.S. 847 (2011), quoting New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 
U.S. 868, 874 n.5 (1986) ("we have never held that a magistrate 
must personally view allegedly obscene films prior to issuing a 
warrant authorizing their seizure"); United States v. 
Battershell, 457 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006) (same); United 
23 
States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1247 n.2 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(same).10 
Whether describing an image in the search warrant affidavit 
or attaching the image itself is the better approach will depend 
on the nature of the subject matter and the circumstances of 
 
10 Surveying other jurisdictions, we note that many other 
State courts have likewise declined to adopt such a rule.  See, 
e.g., People v. Rowland, 82 Cal. App. 5th 1099, 1120 (2022) 
("the magistrate could rely on [sufficient] description and did 
not have to view the images to decide whether a warrant should 
issue to search and seize [suspect's] property"); People v. 
Rabes, 258 P.3d 937, 941 (Colo. App. 2010) ("we decline to adopt 
an absolute requirement that images of child pornography must be 
attached to the affidavit to establish probable cause"); State 
v. Sawyer, 335 Conn. 29, 44 (2020) (descriptions of photographs 
alone provided "fair probability" images were lascivious); State 
v. Peltier, 373 So. 3d 380, 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2023) ("the 
law does not require the magistrate to personally review the 
alleged [child] pornography"); State v. Nuss, 279 Neb. 648, 655 
(2010) ("while copies of images . . . may be used to establish 
probable cause . . . , they are not absolutely required"); State 
v. Henz, 514 P.3d 1, 13 (N.M. Ct. App. 2022) ("the issuing court 
need not independently view images alleged to depict child 
pornography in order to establish probable cause"); Commonwealth 
v. Green, 204 A.3d 469, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019), aff'd, 265 
A.3d 541 (2021) ("Although the magisterial district judge did 
not view the photograph, the affidavit of probable cause 
contained a sufficient description of it to provide probable 
cause to believe it was child pornography"); State v. Reisner, 
253 A.3d 1273, 1282 (R.I. 2021) ("a judge must have the tools, 
via either the image itself, a thorough description, or a direct 
connection between the specific hash value and files containing 
child pornography, to independently assess whether there is 
probable cause to believe that an image of a child is 
pornographic"); State v. Stone, 137 S.W.3d 167, 178 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2004) ("it is not necessary that a magistrate personally 
view allegedly obscene material prior to issuing a warrant; 
rather, the magistrate can conclude there is probable cause 
based on an affidavit's description of the obscene materials"). 
 
24 
each case.11  In deciding which method to use, affiants should 
also consider that anytime a person -- including a magistrate -- 
views an image of child pornography, the child is revictimized.  
See Rex, 469 Mass. at 46 ("each time [child pornography] is 
viewed the child is harmed" [citation omitted]).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Feliz, 481 Mass. 689, 703 (2019), S.C., 486 
Mass. 510 (2020) (children depicted in child pornography are 
revictimized with each viewing); United States v. Rothenberg, 
923 F.3d 1309, 1325 (11th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 
812 (2020), quoting Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 457 
(2014) ("the victim suffers continuing and grievous harm as a 
result of her knowledge that a large, indeterminate number of 
individuals have viewed and will in the future view images of 
the sexual abuse she endured"); United States v. Kearney, 672 
F.3d 81, 95 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1223 (2013) 
(every additional viewing of child pornography "represents a 
renewed violation of the privacy of the victims and a repetition 
of their abuse" [citation omitted]); United States v. Kelly, 868 
F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1204 (D.N.M. 2012) ("Some child victims report 
they feel re-victimized every time they are informed someone 
 
11 For example, where the lewd nature of a particular image 
is difficult to convey in a written description, an applicant 
may opt to attach the image instead.  Conversely, where an image 
is particularly graphic or disturbing, and its lewd nature does 
not elude description, an applicant may wish to provide a 
written description. 
25 
views the images that memorialize the brutal pain and shame they 
have suffered.  They live in fear that anybody they meet in 
person could recognize them from these images"). 
Therefore, we do not adopt a new rule requiring magistrates 
to personally view allegedly lewd images.  Instead, a magistrate 
must ensure that the affidavit as a whole provides a 
"substantial basis" to conclude that evidence of the crime, here 
possession of child pornography, is "probably present . . . at 
the place to be searched" (citation omitted).  Lowery, 487 Mass. 
at 857. 
 
2.  Motion for Franks hearing.  A defendant may submit a 
Franks motion "to challenge the truthfulness of factual 
statements made in an affidavit supporting the warrant."  
Commonwealth v. Amral, 407 Mass. 511, 519 (1990).  A defendant 
must make a "substantial preliminary showing" to be entitled to 
a Franks hearing.  Commonwealth v. Long, 454 Mass. 542, 552 
(2009), S.C., 476 Mass. 526 (2017), quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 
155.  First, a defendant must show that an affiant either 
included a false statement or omitted material "knowingly and 
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Andre, 484 Mass. 403, 407-
408 (2020).  Second, the defendant must demonstrate that the 
false statement was necessary for the probable cause 
determination.  Id. at 408.  If a defendant successfully makes 
26 
this preliminary showing, he is entitled to a hearing.  
Commonwealth v. Valdez, 402 Mass. 65, 67 (1988).  If at the 
hearing, "the judge finds probable cause lacking, the judge must 
void the warrant and suppress the evidence and any 'fruits 
thereof.'"  Andre, supra, quoting Long, supra at 553.  We review 
the denial of a motion for a Franks hearing for abuse of 
discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Perez, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 278, 
285 (2015). 
Here, the defendant claimed in his motion, and asserts on 
appeal, that Donovan's description of the images in his 
affidavit is false.  To prove the falsity of Donovan's 
description, the defendant provided a contrasting description of 
the images.  The motion judge concluded that the defendant 
failed to demonstrate that Donovan's characterization was 
intentionally or recklessly false.  The judge reasoned that "the 
defendant's descriptions of the images merely reflect a 
different interpretation of what the images depict."  The judge 
further noted that the defendant's interpretation of the images 
ran counter to Microsoft's designation of the images as 
"lascivious" in the CyberTipline report. 
 
It was not an abuse of discretion for the judge to conclude 
that Donovan's descriptions of the images did not amount to 
intentionally or recklessly false statements.  As discussed 
supra, Donovan described the images as depicting "a pubescent 
27 
male standing completely naked with the focus of the image on 
the young boy's penis.  The young boy is approximately 
[thirteen] to [fifteen] years of age."  The defendant, on the 
other hand, characterized the images as "more akin to National 
Geographic type images or nudist beach images," further 
describing one image as showing "a standing nude male from the 
knees up, looking to the right, with trees in the background" 
and the other image as showing "a nude male holding a rock with 
trees in the background."  The defendant offered no other 
evidence that Donovan's description was false beyond his own 
description.12 
Where a "defendant merely challenge[s] the veracity of the 
police officer's affidavit by offering his own account of the 
events in question," it "does not rise to the level of a 
 
12 The defendant has also filed a motion requesting that we 
order the Superior Court to transmit the two impounded 
photographs to this court, so that we may compare Donovan's 
description to the actual photographs.  These photographs were 
not part of the motion judge's consideration in denying the 
motion for a Franks hearing, and therefore we will not consider 
the images on appeal.  See Commonwealth v. Delossantos, 492 
Mass. 242, 252 n.9 (2023) ("we review only the evidence 
presented to the motion judge").  The defendant attempts to 
justify his failure to present the images to the motion judge, 
explaining that the order impounding the two photographs 
prevented him from attaching copies of the photographs to his 
Franks motion.  However, the defendant fails to explain why he 
did not file, in connection with his Franks motion, a motion for 
some form of relief -- such as a motion for in camera inspection 
-- to ensure that the impounded images were viewed by the motion 
judge and therefore incorporated into the record on appeal.  The 
defendant's motion is denied. 
28 
substantial preliminary showing of intentional falsity or 
reckless disregard for the truth."  Commonwealth v. Ramos, 402 
Mass. 209, 215 (1988).  Moreover, even in his descriptions of 
the images, the defendant still admits that they depict nude 
males; he simply characterizes them as "nudist beach images."  
Therefore, the judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the 
defendant's motion for a Franks hearing. 
 
Conclusion.  We affirm the orders denying the defendant's 
motion to suppress and motion for a Franks hearing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.