Case Title: Commonwealth v. Robinson

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-09903

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2024-04-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-09903 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  LEON ROBINSON. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 5, 2024. - April 12, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, & Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Warrant, 
Affidavit, Disclosure of evidence, Argument by prosecutor, 
Assistance of counsel, Instructions to jury, Discovery, 
Capital case.  Search and Seizure, Probable cause, Warrant, 
Affidavit.  Probable Cause.  Constitutional Law, Right of 
defendant in criminal case to act pro se.  Evidence, 
Disclosure of evidence, Argument by prosecutor, Expert 
opinion, Firearm.  Firearms. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 30, 2001. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Joseph 
M. Walker, III; the cases were tried before Elizabeth B. 
Donovan, J.; a motion for a new trial, filed on April 30, 2019, 
was heard by Debra A. Squires-Lee, J.; and a motion for 
postconviction discovery, filed on December 14, 2022, was 
considered by this court. 
 
 
 
Elizabeth Caddick for the defendant. 
 
Ian MacLean, Assistant District Attorney (Mark T. Lee, 
Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  Defendant Leon Robinson was convicted of murder 
in the first degree for the 2001 shooting death of Recardo 
Robinson1 (victim).  On the afternoon of February 21, 2001, the 
defendant and the victim got into an argument at the victim's 
barbershop, which culminated in the defendant shooting the 
victim four times in front of several witnesses.  The defendant 
was arrested that night, and in 2005 was convicted of murder in 
the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and of 
unlawful possession of a firearm.   
 
Appealing from his convictions and from the denial of his 
motion for a new trial, the defendant advances a number of 
arguments regarding errors committed before and during his 
trial.  He argues that his motion to suppress evidence obtained 
from the search of his apartment was erroneously denied.  He 
also asserts that his right to represent himself at trial was 
violated, and that the trial prosecutor acted improperly by 
delaying disclosure of a change in a witness's testimony and by 
ascribing a motive not supported by the evidence to the 
defendant during closing arguments.  The defendant next contends 
that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his 
trial counsel did not introduce in evidence a swatch of fabric 
with a spot of the victim's blood, and because his trial counsel 
 
1 Although the defendant and the victim share a surname, 
they are not related.   
3 
 
did not retain an expert on eyewitness identification or blood 
spatter analysis to testify.  Finally, he asserts that the trial 
judge abused her discretion in choosing not to give the jury 
instruction requested by defense counsel on the possibility of 
an honest but mistaken identification by witnesses.  He further 
argues that the cumulative effect of all the alleged errors 
requires that we grant him a new trial.  He also requests that 
we reduce his conviction of murder in the first degree to 
manslaughter as more consonant with justice.  Separately, he 
also appeals from the denial of his motion for postconviction 
discovery, and from his conviction of unlawful possession of a 
firearm.   
 
Having considered all the arguments advanced by the 
defendant and having reviewed the entirety of the record 
pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we affirm the 
conviction of murder in the first degree.  However, we vacate 
his conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm and remand 
for a new trial on that charge. 
1.  Factual and procedural background.  We recite the facts 
as the jury reasonably could have found them, reserving certain 
facts for our discussion of the legal issues. 
The victim was the owner of Hair Textures, a barbershop 
located in the Brighton section of Boston.  On the afternoon of 
February 21, 2001, the shop saw many visitors, as the victim was 
4 
 
closing down the shop before moving to North Carolina.  Among 
the visitors that afternoon were Maurice McIntosh, a friend of 
the victim who had previously worked at Hair Textures, and James 
Rainey, who was a regular at the shop.  The defendant, who was 
not a regular at the barbershop but was a family friend of the 
victim, was also present, having received a haircut at the shop 
earlier in the afternoon.  By around 4:20 P.M., only four men 
remained in the barbershop:  the defendant, the victim, 
McIntosh, and Rainey.   
The victim began lecturing the defendant about how the 
defendant needed to "straighten up" and change the way he was 
living his life in order to take better care of his children.  
The lecture upset the defendant, and the defendant showed the 
men in the barbershop that he was carrying a black revolver.  
The victim looked at his cell phone, and the defendant asked the 
victim who he was calling.  The victim told the defendant he was 
not calling anyone, and again began lecturing the defendant on 
how to live his life.  The entire conversation between the 
victim and the defendant lasted about five minutes, at the end 
of which the defendant pulled out his gun and shot the victim 
once in the chest.  The victim fell, and the defendant shot the 
victim twice in the back and once in the back of the head.  
Rainey ran to the back of the barbershop and descended a 
staircase to the basement, where he hid until he was found by 
5 
 
police.  McIntosh fled out the front door and ran to a nearby 
pizza shop, where he called 911.   
Dorinda Carter was parking her car on Commonwealth Avenue 
outside Hair Textures at the time of the shooting.  She saw the 
defendant pull a gun from his waist area and shoot at the 
victim.  The victim fell, and the defendant shot twice more.  
The defendant left the barbershop.  Carter drove away, but 
returned to the area and spoke to police when they arrived at 
the scene.   
Police arrived at the barbershop a few minutes after the 
shooting.  They secured the scene, discovered Rainey during a 
protective sweep of the barbershop basement, and identified 
McIntosh, Rainey, and Carter as witnesses.  Police brought the 
three witnesses to a police station in Brighton, where officers 
took statements from each of the witnesses regarding their 
recollection of what had happened.  McIntosh described the 
shooter as a Black man with a dark complexion, about five feet, 
eight inches tall with a "low haircut" and goatee.  He stated 
that the shooter had worn a black and white Polo brand shirt, a 
black leather jacket, and a silver chain with a cross.  Rainey 
told police the shooter was a Black male, five feet, four inches 
tall, wearing blue jeans and a black leather jacket.  He stated 
that the shooter was about thirty-nine years old, had short 
hair, and walked with a limp.  Carter described the shooter as a 
6 
 
darker skinned man of average height with a short, cropped 
haircut, wearing a brown leather jacket and dark pants.  She 
described the gun as a black revolver.   
Based on the witness descriptions of the shooter, police 
created a set of 106 images of possible suspects.  Rainey and 
McIntosh separately viewed the photographs, and both identified 
the defendant as the shooter.  The defendant's photograph was 
added to a photographic array with nine other photographs.  This 
array was printed out, and paper versions were shown to Rainey, 
McIntosh, and Carter.  Rainey and McIntosh both identified the 
defendant as the shooter.  Carter circled two pictures to 
indicate the men who most closely resembled the shooter.  One of 
the pictures Carter circled depicted the defendant.   
On the night of the murder, the defendant was arrested at a 
convenience store near his apartment in the West Roxbury section 
of Boston.  When he was arrested, the defendant was wearing a 
black leather jacket and dark pants.  Later that night, police 
obtained a search warrant for the defendant's apartment, where 
they found a black and white Polo brand shirt and a silver chain 
necklace with a cross.  
The defendant's jacket and other evidence was submitted to 
the Boston police crime laboratory (crime lab).  There, 
criminalists discovered a small stain, roughly two millimeters 
in diameter, on the right sleeve of the defendant's jacket.  The 
7 
 
stained fabric was cut out of the jacket and submitted for 
testing.  The swatch of fabric with the stain tested positive 
for the presence of blood, and subsequent deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) testing showed that the bloodstain matched the DNA of the 
victim.   
At trial, the prosecution called McIntosh, Rainey, and 
Carter, all of whom testified regarding their recollection of 
the murder.  McIntosh and Rainey both identified the defendant 
as the shooter.  Two other witnesses who had been at the 
barbershop during the afternoon of the murder testified and 
stated they had seen the defendant there.  Criminalists from the 
crime lab testified that the small stain found on the right 
sleeve of the defendant's jacket had tested positive for the 
presence of blood, and that the blood was a DNA match for the 
victim.   
The defendant called Christopher Driscoll, another 
percipient witness to the murder, who testified that he believed 
the shooter had been a Black teenager wearing a blue jacket or 
sweatshirt.  Driscoll acknowledged that he only saw the shooter 
through the window of the barbershop for four or five seconds, 
and he admitted that his recollection of the shooter's 
appearance was "pretty foggy." 
8 
 
The defendant also presented evidence that suggested his 
brother, Michael Robinson,2 had a motive to kill the victim 
because of an altercation the night before the murder between 
the victim and Bobby Stevens, a cousin of the defendant and 
Michael.  The defense suggested that the eyewitnesses had 
mistakenly identified the defendant as the shooter instead of 
Michael because the defendant had been in the barbershop the day 
of the murder.  Michael testified that he saw the defendant 
during the afternoon of the murder, and that the two men could 
have shaken hands when they met.  The defendant posited the 
theory that when Michael and the defendant shook hands, the 
victim's blood transferred from Michael onto the sleeve of the 
defendant's jacket.   
The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree 
on the theory of deliberate premeditation and was also convicted 
of unlawful possession of a firearm.  He thereafter filed an 
appeal.  In the interceding years, the defendant was represented 
at various times by eight different appellate attorneys.  In 
2019, the defendant filed a pro se motion for a new trial.3  This 
 
2 As he shares a surname with both the defendant and the 
victim, we refer to Michael Robinson by his first name. 
   
 
3 The pro se motion for a new trial was apparently prepared 
and served on the Commonwealth in 2016.  However, there is no 
record of the motion having been received by this court until a 
copy was submitted in 2019. 
  
9 
 
motion was supplemented by a brief filed by his eighth and 
current appellate counsel.  We remanded the motion to the 
Superior Court where, following a nonevidentiary hearing, it was 
denied.4  The defendant appealed, and that appeal has been 
consolidated with the defendant's direct appeal from his 
convictions. 
2.  Discussion.  On appeal, the defendant advances a number 
of arguments regarding errors made by the trial judge, 
prosecutors, and his trial counsel that he contends weigh in 
favor of granting him postconviction relief.  We address each in 
turn.  
a.  Motion to suppress.  The defendant presents several 
arguments as to why the evidence seized from his apartment 
pursuant to a search warrant should have been suppressed.  "In 
reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the 
motion judge's subsidiary findings absent clear error but 
conduct an independent review of [the] ultimate findings and 
conclusions of law" (citation and quotation omitted).   
Commonwealth v. Tavares, 482 Mass. 694, 699 (2019). 
i.  Probable cause.  The defendant first argues that 
probable cause for the seizure of clothing, shoes, and personal 
 
4 The judge who heard the motion for a new trial was not the 
trial judge, as the trial judge had retired by the time the 
defendant's motion was heard.   
10 
 
effects from his apartment was lacking because the nexus between 
the items sought and place searched was insufficient.  The 
existence of probable cause to issue a search warrant is a 
conclusion of law we review de novo.  See Commonwealth v. Tapia, 
463 Mass. 721, 725 (2012).  To establish probable cause, the 
facts of the warrant affidavit and the reasonable inferences 
that may be drawn from them must contain enough information for 
an issuing judge to determine that "the police seek items 
related to criminal activity and that the items described 
reasonably may be expected to be located in the place to be 
searched at the time the warrant issues" (citation and quotation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Perkins, 478 Mass. 97, 102 (2017).  
The affidavit in support of the warrant to search the 
defendant's apartment provided that officers responded to a 
shooting incident after an argument at the barbershop and named 
McIntosh and Lamar Shanks as witnesses.  The affidavit further 
stated that Shanks witnessed an argument in the barbershop 
between the defendant and victim during the afternoon of the 
murder but was not present for the shooting.  McIntosh witnessed 
the argument between the defendant and victim as well as the 
shooting and identified the defendant as the shooter later that 
day.  The warrant listed as items to be seized a black revolver 
and ammunition, black slacks, a black and white Polo brand 
shirt, and papers to show proof of residency.   
11 
 
The affidavit stated that witnesses described the defendant 
as wearing black pants, a black and white long-sleeve Polo brand 
shirt, and a dark leather jacket.  The defendant was arrested 
the night of the murder near his home wearing a black leather 
jacket but not the other clothing described, leading to the 
reasonable inference that he went to his apartment and changed 
some of his clothes between the time of the murder and the time 
of his arrest.  Accordingly, it was reasonable for the judge to 
conclude that the clothes might be found at the defendant's 
residence, particularly because the items sought were "durable, 
of continuing utility to the defendant[], and it was reasonable 
to expect that they would be kept at home, particularly as they 
were not inherently incriminating to possess."  Commonwealth v. 
Alexis, 481 Mass. 91, 103 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. James, 
424 Mass. 770, 778 (1997).  See Commonwealth v. Cavitt, 460 
Mass. 617, 627 (2011) (reasonable to infer that defendant's 
clothing "could provide trace evidence linking the defendant" to 
violent crime he was purported to have committed).   
The defendant contends that a search for the "black 
revolver and ammunition" suspected to be used in the commission 
of the crime was not supported by probable cause because a 
discharged gun is inherently incriminating, and it is 
unreasonable to believe that an assailant would store such 
evidence in his home.  Although we have previously suggested 
12 
 
"that a defendant who has fired a handgun in the commission of a 
murder 'would not keep at home an incriminating handgun which 
could be readily identified as the murder weapon through 
ballistics tests,'" we need not resolve this issue in the 
instant case.  Alexis, 481 Mass. at 103, quoting James, 424 
Mass. at 778 n.15.  But see Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 
336, 343-344 (1998) (probable cause existed to search 
defendant's home for ammunition and his mother's home for 
ammunition and weapons where he was arrested in his mother's 
home on day following murder); Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 373 
Mass. 478, 488 (1977) ("police had probable cause to believe 
that the gun [used to commit murder] would be concealed in the 
defendant's home, and the search warrant was thus properly 
issued").  Where only part of a search warrant is valid, the 
remedy is to sever the part of the warrant that is overbroad or 
not supported by probable cause.  Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 486 
Mass. 159, 168 (2020).  See Commonwealth v. Lett, 393 Mass. 141, 
145 (1984) ("The partial suppression remedy for a partially 
invalid warrant, we believe, effects a pragmatic balance between 
the deterrent effect of suppression and the cost to society of 
excluding probative evidence").  Because neither a gun nor 
ammunition was discovered during the search of the residence, 
and consequently no gun was introduced at trial, the defendant 
suffered no harm as a result of the warrant's inclusion of these 
13 
 
items.  See Commonwealth v. Snow, 486 Mass. 582, 591 (2021) 
("The defendant is not prejudiced by an overbroad warrant if the 
Commonwealth does not seek to exploit the lack of particularity 
in the warrant").   
ii.  Unnamed witnesses.  The defendant next contends that 
the search warrant was not supported by probable cause because 
the final paragraph of the search warrant affidavit attributes 
the description of the defendant's clothing to "witnesses" 
without naming the particular witnesses who made such 
descriptions.  The defendant's argument essentially asks us to 
submit the affidavit to the type of "hypercritical analysis" we 
have explicitly disclaimed when reviewing a search warrant 
affidavit on appeal.  See Perkins, 478 Mass. at 102 (reviewing 
court reads search warrant affidavit "in a commonsense and 
realistic manner . . . without overly parsing or severing it").  
Although whether witnesses are named is "one factor which may be 
weighed in determining the sufficiency of an affidavit" 
(citation omitted), Commonwealth v. Atchue, 393 Mass. 343, 347 
(1984), the search warrant affidavit names two witnesses, Shanks 
and McIntosh, who both saw the defendant on the day of the 
murder and spoke with police.  The judge was entitled to make 
the reasonable assumption that one or both of the witnesses 
named in the affidavit were the witnesses who described the 
clothing worn by the defendant.  That the affidavit did not 
14 
 
explicitly name the witnesses in the paragraph describing the 
clothing thus does not render the affidavit as a whole 
defective.  See id. (sufficiency of affidavit is determined by 
"a consideration of all its allegations as a whole" [citation 
omitted]).  
iii.  Signature.  Finally, the defendant claims that the 
search warrant was defective because it was not signed by the 
issuing judge.  This argument fails because when "there is no 
dispute that the judge intended to issue the warrant, and the 
judge signed the officer's affidavit, the failure to sign the 
warrant is no more than a clerical error" (citation and 
quotation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, 405 Mass. 86, 
89, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 975 (1989).  Although the judge 
failed to sign the search warrant itself, she signed the search 
warrant affidavit, and submitted a sworn affidavit stating that 
she reviewed the search warrant application, concluded probable 
cause existed to search the apartment, and had the "unequivocal 
intention to sign the Search Warrant."  The judge's clerical 
error thus does not provide reason to invalidate the search 
warrant.  Having considered the defendant's arguments, we 
conclude that the defendant's motion to suppress was properly 
denied.  
b.  Right to proceed pro se.  In both his direct appeal and 
his appeal from the denial of his new trial motion, the 
15 
 
defendant contends that he was denied his constitutional right 
to proceed to trial pro se.  Claiming he unambiguously invoked 
his right to represent himself at trial, the defendant argues 
that the denial of this right was structural error and entitles 
him to a new trial. 
The right to conduct one's own defense in a criminal case 
is guaranteed by both the Massachusetts Constitution and the 
United States Constitution.  Commonwealth v. Conefrey, 410 Mass. 
1, 10-11 (1991), S.C., 420 Mass. 508 (1995).  Assertion of the 
right to proceed pro se, however, "must be predicated upon an 
unequivocal waiver of one's right to counsel."  Commonwealth v. 
Tuitt, 393 Mass. 801, 807 (1985).  See Conefrey, supra at 11 
(defendant can proceed pro se if "the election to proceed 
without counsel is unequivocal; voluntarily and knowingly made; 
asserted in a timely manner; and not sought for an improper 
purpose" [citations omitted]).  Accord United States v. 
Francois, 715 F.3d 21, 30 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 992 
(2013) (judges "must keep in mind the strong presumption against 
waiver" of the right to counsel and ensure decision to proceed 
pro se is knowing and intelligent).   
In May 2005, shortly before the defendant's trial was 
scheduled to begin, two ex parte hearings were held on May 3 and 
May 10 regarding whether defendant's trial counsel would 
withdraw from representing the defendant.  Counsel sought to 
16 
 
withdraw following a disagreement between the defendant and his 
attorneys regarding trial strategy.  The defendant wanted to 
argue at trial that the blood found on his jacket was planted by 
police, a theory his attorneys had informed him lacked any 
supporting evidence.  By contrast, the defendant's attorneys 
advocated for presenting the mistaken identification defense 
that was ultimately pursued at trial.  The defendant disliked 
this strategy because it involved arguing that his brother 
Michael had killed the victim in retaliation for a fight between 
the victim and the defendant's cousin, Stevens, the night before 
the murder.   
Throughout both hearings, the defendant was clear that he 
wanted his attorneys to question witnesses regarding the 
possibility that the Boston police department had planted blood 
on his jacket, and that he disagreed with his attorneys' refusal 
to do so.  Despite their disagreement, however, the defendant 
did not unequivocally express his desire to proceed to trial pro 
se.  Indeed, when asked directly by the trial judge whether he 
wished to represent himself at trial, the defendant responded, 
"Your Honor, I understand that it will be a tremendous task, and 
I'm not as good with the law as it might seems, I'm not.  I'm 
willing to go along with counsel with their theory and not to go 
pro se on this . . . ."  The defendant reiterated that he wanted 
trial counsel to elicit testimony that the bloodstain found on 
17 
 
his jacket could not have come from blood spatter.  In other 
words, although the defendant had disagreements with his trial 
counsel that led them to move to withdraw, at no point in either 
hearing did the defendant affirmatively state that he wished to 
proceed to trial pro se.  Furthermore, the trial judge told the 
defendant that during trial, if the defendant felt it was 
necessary to again discuss his trial counsel or trial strategy, 
the judge would allow the defendant to be heard without the jury 
or the prosecution present.  During the trial, however, the 
defendant did not avail himself of this opportunity, providing 
further support for the conclusion that he did not unambiguously 
request to represent himself.  See Commonwealth v. Means, 454 
Mass. 81, 90 (2009), citing Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 
516 (1962) ("Waiver of counsel may not be presumed from a silent 
record").  We therefore conclude, as the motion judge did, that 
because the defendant never unequivocally waived his right to be 
represented by counsel, his right to represent himself was not 
violated.  See Conefrey, 410 Mass. at 10-11; Tuitt, 393 Mass. at 
807. 
c.  Alleged prosecutorial misconduct.  i.  Brady claim.  At 
trial, the prosecution called McIntosh as a witness.  On direct 
examination, McIntosh stated that while the victim was lecturing 
the defendant on the afternoon of the murder, the defendant 
stepped outside of the barbershop "for a minute," at which time 
18 
 
McIntosh told the victim to "let it go" and stop arguing with 
the defendant.  McIntosh's previous testimony before the grand 
jury and his recorded statements had not mentioned the defendant 
leaving the barbershop and returning.5  When the defense objected 
and explained at a sidebar that the change in McIntosh's 
testimony had not previously been disclosed to the defendant, 
the prosecutor stated that McIntosh had not provided this 
information until trial preparation, and that the prosecution 
had inadvertently failed to provide notice of this new testimony 
to the defense prior to trial. 
The defendant contends that the Commonwealth's failure to 
disclose the change in McIntosh's testimony prior to trial 
represents a breach of the prosecution team's duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (C), 378 
Mass. 874 (1979) (prosecutors must disclose "any facts of an 
exculpatory nature" within their "possession, custody, or 
control").6  See also Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8 (d), as appearing in 
473 Mass. 1301 (2016) (prosecutors are required to "make timely 
disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known 
 
 
5 On cross-examination, McIntosh stated that the defendant 
did not leave the barbershop but did go to the sidewalk outside 
the barbershop briefly.  
 
 
6 We cite to the version of the rule in effect at the time 
of the defendant's prosecution.  The current version of the rule 
contains the same language. 
19 
 
to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused 
or mitigates the offense").  The defendant argues that the 
delayed disclosure of this information prejudiced his defense 
because if the Commonwealth had disclosed the new testimony 
prior to trial, defense counsel would have incorporated the 
evidence that the defendant left the barbershop into his opening 
argument to bolster his claim of mistaken identification. 
The Commonwealth has a constitutional duty "to disclose in 
a timely manner material, exculpatory evidence over which it has 
possession, custody, or control."  Commonwealth v. Rodriguez-
Nieves, 487 Mass. 171, 177 (2021).  See Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("suppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where 
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment").  
The changed statements came to the attention of the prosecution 
sometime before trial but were not disclosed to the defense.  
The new testimony was exculpatory because it differed in one 
respect from both McIntosh's testimony before the grand jury and 
his recorded statement describing the afternoon of the murder, 
and therefore provided a basis to impeach his testimony.  See 
Rodriguez-Nieves, supra (evidence is exculpatory where it may 
impeach prosecution's witness).  The statements thus had the 
potential to undercut the reliability of McIntosh, a prosecution 
witness whose identification of the defendant as the shooter was 
20 
 
important to the prosecution's case.  See Commonwealth v. 
Ellison, 376 Mass. 1, 22 (1978) ("The Brady obligation 
comprehends evidence which . . . calls into question a material, 
although not indispensable, element of the prosecution's version 
of the events, or challenges the credibility of a key 
prosecution witness").  The prosecution therefore had a duty to 
disclose the change in McIntosh's anticipated trial testimony 
and violated this duty by failing to disclose the new statement 
prior to trial.  See Rodriguez-Nievez, supra at 177-178 
(prosecutors violated their duty to defendant when they failed 
to disclose change in witness's statement before trial). 
Having concluded that the prosecution violated its duty of 
disclosure regarding McIntosh's changed statement, we must 
consider whether the failure to disclose the statement 
prejudiced the defendant.  "In measuring prejudice, it is the 
consequences of the delay that matter, not the likely impact of 
the nondisclosed evidence, and we ask whether the prosecution's 
disclosure was sufficiently timely to allow the defendant to 
make effective use of the evidence in preparing and presenting 
his case" (quotations omitted).  Rodriguez-Nieves, 487 Mass. at 
179, quoting Commonwealth v. Almeida, 452 Mass. 601, 609-610 
(2008).  Because defense counsel had sufficient opportunity to 
cross-examine McIntosh regarding his newly found recollection of 
the defendant briefly exiting the barbershop, we conclude that 
21 
 
the defendant suffered no prejudice from the delayed disclosure.  
We emphasize that the missing information required no special 
preparation to understand and digest.  It also differed from the 
information disclosed in only one respect, and not one of 
particular importance.  Although defense counsel was not able to 
highlight the possibility that the defendant stepped outside 
before the shooting during opening statements, he emphasized the 
idea that the defendant left the barbershop in his closing 
argument, and the defendant raises no other argument regarding 
how he was prejudiced by the delay in disclosure.  See 
Commonwealth v. Santana, 465 Mass. 270, 293-294 (2013) (no 
prejudice to defendant from delayed disclosure of exculpatory 
evidence relating to identification where defense counsel was 
able to cross-examine witness and highlight exculpatory evidence 
during closing argument and "the other identification evidence 
against the defendant was extensive").  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Correia, 492 Mass. 220, 226 (2023) (defendant was not prejudiced 
by late disclosure of prosecution's use of defendant's rap 
lyrics found on Internet where defense counsel was able to 
elicit testimony from defendant explaining lyrics).  Contrast 
Rodriguez-Nieves, supra at 179-180 (defendant was prejudiced 
when change in prosecution witness testimony was not disclosed 
before trial and expert testimony impeaching credibility of 
changed testimony would likely have mattered to jury).   
22 
 
ii.  Closing arguments.  The defendant also argues that the 
prosecutor improperly made reference to facts not in evidence 
during his closing argument to the jury.  In his closing 
argument, defense counsel argued that the defendant's brother 
Michael had murdered the victim.  The defense reasoned that the 
victim had gotten into a physical altercation with Stevens the 
day before the murder.  The victim had choked Stevens.  
Following the altercation, Stevens left the barbershop but 
warned the victim that he was "going to get [his] cousin."  
Stevens testified that by his cousin, he meant Michael, whom he 
saw a few minutes after the altercation.  Michael told Stevens 
to stay away from the barbershop, and that he (Michael) would 
take care of it.  Stevens went to a friend's apartment, where he 
told his friend that he had been in a fight with the victim, and 
that the next day, he or one of his family members would kill 
the victim.  Stevens's friend felt that the threat was serious 
enough that he went to the barbershop the day of the murder and 
warned the victim about what Stevens had said.  There was no 
evidence introduced at trial showing that Stevens or Michael 
communicated with the defendant prior to the murder.  Defense 
counsel argued that it was Michael, not the defendant, who had a 
motive to kill the victim and suggested that Michael was the 
real killer.   
23 
 
During the prosecution's closing argument, the prosecutor 
argued that because both the defendant and Michael were cousins 
of Stevens, they both would be similarly motivated to kill the 
victim because of the fight between Stevens and the victim.  The 
defendant objected, but the objection was overruled.  When the 
defendant renewed his objection after the prosecutor's closing 
argument, the judge said that she would instruct the jury not to 
speculate on any of the evidence.  During her instructions to 
the jury, the judge emphasized to the jury that closing 
arguments were not evidence, and twice told the jury not to 
decide the facts of the case on the basis of speculation.  On 
appeal, the defendant argues that the statements suggesting he 
had a motive to kill the victim were improper because there was 
no evidence introduced showing that he had communicated with 
Stevens or Michael between the altercation involving Stevens and 
the time of the murder.  Because the defendant objected to the 
statements, we review for prejudicial error.  See Commonwealth 
v. Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 141 (2007), S.C., 477 Mass. 582 
(2017). 
"Remarks made during closing argument are considered in the 
context of the entire argument, together with the evidence 
presented at trial and the judge's instructions to the jury."  
Commonwealth v. Da Lin Huang, 489 Mass. 162, 180 (2022).  A 
prosecutor may not misstate evidence or refer to facts not in 
24 
 
evidence during closing argument.  Commonwealth v. Goddard, 476 
Mass. 443, 449 (2017), citing Commonwealth v. Walters, 472 Mass. 
680, 703 (2015).  A prosecutor's closing argument may, however, 
"analyze the evidence and suggest what reasonable inferences the 
jury should draw from that evidence," Goddard, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 412 Mass. 505, 509 (1992).  Inferences 
"need not be necessary and inescapable, only reasonable and 
possible."  Goddard, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 432 
Mass. 623, 628 (2000).   
Because the prosecutor's statement regarding the 
possibility of the defendant sharing a motive with Michael was, 
in the context of the entire argument and the evidence presented 
at trial, a reasonable inference, we conclude that there was no 
error.  See Da Lin Huang, 489 Mass. at 180; Goddard, 476 Mass. 
at 449.  The jury heard testimony that around the time of the 
murder, Michael and the defendant saw each other every day, even 
though the defendant did not live in the Brighton area.  
Furthermore, Stevens's statement to the victim that he was 
"going to get [his] cousin" and his statement to his friend that 
he or one of his family members was going to kill the victim 
could logically refer to either Michael or the defendant, as 
both were his cousins.  These facts in evidence, in conjunction, 
allow the inference that Michael or Stevens communicated with 
the defendant regarding Stevens's altercation with the victim, 
25 
 
providing the defendant with the same motive as Michael to kill 
the victim.7  Accordingly, we reject the defendant's contention 
that the prosecutor's closing argument was improper.   
d.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant 
advances three theories as to why his trial counsel was 
ineffective, thus depriving him of a fair trial.  First, he 
proposes that his trial attorneys were ineffective because they 
did not enter the bloodstained leather swatch in evidence for 
the jury to consider, even though the admitted evidence included 
expert testimony regarding the bloodstain, the leather jacket 
from which the bloodstained swatch was cut, and a ruler to help 
the jury understand the size of the two-millimeter bloodstain.  
Next, he suggests that his trial counsel was ineffective for not 
calling an expert witness on eyewitness identification.  
Finally, the defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective 
 
7 We also note that a "prosecutor is entitled to make a fair 
reply to the defendant's closing argument," Da Lin Huang, 489 
Mass. at 180, quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 404 Mass. 1, 7 
(1989).  The defendant argued that because the defendant's 
cousin had been in a fight with the victim, the defendant's 
brother but not the defendant himself had a motive to kill the 
victim in retaliation.  The prosecutor's statement that 
Michael's familial motive could easily also provide a motive to 
the defendant was responsive to this argument by defense 
counsel.  See Da Lin Huang, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 130 (2013) ("A prosecutor may address a 
particular point in defense counsel's closing argument as a 
sham, but he may not characterize the entire defense as such").  
26 
 
in choosing not to call a blood spatter expert to testify 
regarding the bloodstain found on his jacket. 
 
Because the defendant was convicted of murder in the first 
degree, we review his claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel under the G. L. c. 278, § 33E, standard to determine 
whether there was a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  Commonwealth v. Henderson, 486 Mass. 296, 301-302 
(2020), citing Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 358 
(2016).   Under this standard, we first determine whether 
defense counsel committed an error in the course of trial, and 
then determine whether that error was likely to have influenced 
the jury's conclusion.  Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 Mass. 46, 62 
(2018), citing Commonwealth v. Holland, 476 Mass. 801, 812 
(2017).    
 
Where a claim of error is based on a tactical or strategic 
decision by trial counsel, rather than an omission or mistake, 
an attorney's decision is only ineffective if it was "manifestly 
unreasonable."  Henderson, 486 Mass. at 302.  Manifestly 
unreasonable decisions are those "which lawyers of ordinary 
training and skill in criminal law would not consider 
competent."  Ayala, 481 Mass. at 62, quoting Holland, 476 Mass. 
at 812.  We consider each of the defendant's claims of error in 
turn. 
27 
 
i.  Leather swatch introduction.  The defendant was 
arrested wearing a black leather jacket.  Criminalists at the 
crime lab inspected the jacket and found a small stain, about 
two millimeters in diameter, on the right sleeve of the jacket.  
They cut a swatch of fabric containing the stain from the jacket 
to perform testing on the stain.  The stain was determined to be 
human blood, and DNA testing determined that the blood belonged 
to the victim.  At trial, two criminalists testified regarding 
the testing done on the stain and the test results.  However, 
the swatch of fabric with the stain was not entered in evidence, 
although a ruler was entered in evidence to help the jury 
understand the size of the two-millimeter stain.  During jury 
deliberations, the jury asked the judge whether the leather 
swatch was in evidence, and the judge instructed the jury that 
the leather swatch was not marked as an exhibit.   
In his motion for a new trial and again on direct appeal, 
the defendant suggests that his trial counsel was ineffective 
because when they received the question from the jury about the 
swatch, they did not move to reopen the evidence to enter the 
swatch as an exhibit.  The defendant contends that he was 
prejudiced by this failure because if the jury had been able to 
see the leather swatch firsthand, they would have concluded that 
the stain was too small to have been the result of blood 
spatter, which would have bolstered his argument that the 
28 
 
bloodstain was transferred to the defendant's jacket from 
contact with his brother on the night of the murder.   
The parties disagree as to whether the decision not to move 
to submit the swatch to the jury as an exhibit was a strategic 
decision by defense counsel at trial or an inadvertent error.8  
We need not reach the issue whether the omission was a tactical 
decision, however, because even assuming the failure to submit 
the swatch to the jury as an exhibit was inadvertent, any error 
was not likely to have influenced the jury's decision.  See 
Ayala, 481 Mass. at 62.  Although the bloodstain itself was not 
introduced in evidence, the jury heard testimony regarding the 
discovery of the stain, the testing done by the Commonwealth and 
the results of that testing, and the size of the stain.  
Moreover, the jacket itself, as well as a ruler, was introduced 
in evidence, allowing the jury to visualize the size of the two-
millimeter stain.  Because the bloodstained swatch itself would 
not have provided the jury with any new information, it is 
unlikely that the introduction of the swatch as an exhibit would 
have influenced the jury's decision.9  See Commonwealth v. 
 
8 Trial counsel stated in an affidavit that he did not ask 
that the swatch be submitted as an exhibit because he could not 
"imagine that [he] would put in the government's evidence." 
 
9 We note that the defendant cites to no authority 
suggesting that failing to admit evidence that is cumulative of 
other evidence in the record rendered trial counsel ineffective, 
and we further note that the defendant provides only conclusory 
29 
 
Britto, 433 Mass. 596, 602 (2001) ("no error" by defense counsel 
in choosing not to call additional witnesses whose testimony 
would be "merely cumulative of other testimony"). 
ii.  Expert testimony.  "The decision to call, or not to 
call, an expert witness fits squarely within the realm of 
strategic or tactical decisions."  Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 491 
Mass. 339, 349 (2023), quoting Ayala, 481 Mass. at 63.  Indeed, 
the defendant's trial counsel submitted an affidavit averring 
that the choice not to call an expert witness on eyewitness 
identification was a strategic choice, reasoning that "calling 
an expert witness can cut both ways."  Accordingly, we evaluate 
whether trial counsel's decision not to call an expert witness 
on eyewitness identification was manifestly unreasonable at the 
time it was made.  See Ayala, supra, citing Holland, 476 Mass. 
at 812. 
The defendant argues that the decision not to call an 
expert on eyewitness identification was manifestly unreasonable 
because such an expert could have educated the jury regarding 
bystander misidentification, which might have undercut the 
testimony of McIntosh and Rainey by suggesting that they 
mistakenly identified the defendant as the shooter because they 
had seen him in the barbershop earlier in the day.  An expert 
 
allegations regarding the prejudice suffered from the swatch not 
being presented to the jury. 
30 
 
also could have testified that when a witness is in a highly 
stressful situation or in a situation involving a weapon, their 
memories of the situation can be distorted.  See Commonwealth v. 
Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 372-373 (2015), S.C., 478 Mass. 1025 
(2018) (scientific research shows that high levels of stress 
reduce eyewitness's ability to accurately remember events and 
make identifications).   
Having reviewed the entire record, we cannot conclude that 
the decision not to call an eyewitness identification expert was 
manifestly unreasonable in this case.  See Kirkland, 491 Mass. 
at 356-357 (trial counsel not ineffective in choosing not call 
expert witness where "testimony had the potential to be a 
double-edged sword for the defense, potentially helping the 
defendant's case on the one hand but hurting it on the other," 
and where physical evidence unrelated to expert's testimony 
identified defendant as shooter).  As defendant's trial counsel 
stated in his affidavit, expert witnesses can cut both ways.  If 
called at trial, an eyewitness identification expert likely 
would have been forced to admit that because Rainey and McIntosh 
spent thirty minutes and two hours, respectively, in the 
barbershop with the defendant prior to the shooting, they likely 
had ample opportunity to observe the defendant in a 
nonstressful, well-lit environment, bolstering the credibility 
of their identifications of the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. 
31 
 
Franklin, 465 Mass. 895, 910 n.24 (2013) ("Whether the witness 
had an adequate opportunity to observe the offender at the time 
of the offense will be affected by such matters as how long or 
short a time was available, how far or close the witness was, 
[and] how good were lighting conditions . . ." [citation 
omitted]).   
Furthermore, an eyewitness identification expert likely 
would have suggested that the description of the shooter by 
defense witness Christopher Driscoll was likely to be unreliable 
because Driscoll only observed the shooter for four to five 
seconds in a stressful situation immediately after the shooting.  
See Gomes, 470 Mass. at 372-373 (discussing negative effects of 
stress on memory formation).  Driscoll testified for the defense 
at trial and described the shooter as a Black teenager wearing a 
blue jacket or sweatshirt, although he acknowledged that his 
recollection of the shooting was "pretty foggy."  Driscoll was 
the percipient witness whose description of the shooter least 
resembled the defendant, who was in his late thirties at the 
time of the murder.  The defendant's trial counsel could 
reasonably have concluded that calling an expert who might 
bolster the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses while 
undercutting the reliability of Driscoll's testimony would harm 
the defendant's case at trial.  See Kirkland, 491 Mass. at 356-
357.  The decision not to call an expert in this case was 
32 
 
therefore not one "which lawyers of ordinary training and skill 
in criminal law would not consider competent."  See Ayala, 481 
Mass. at 62.  The defendant was therefore not denied effective 
assistance of counsel by trial counsel's decision not to call an 
expert witness on eyewitness identification.  See id. 
Similarly, the defendant argues that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for choosing not to call a blood spatter expert at 
trial.  In support of his motion for a new trial, the defendant 
submitted an affidavit from a blood spatter expert who opined 
that "while it is possible, it is unlikely that the blood stain 
on the sleeve of the jacket" was the result of blood spatter 
from a gunshot.  Trial counsel stated at an ex parte hearing 
before trial that a blood spatter expert had been retained and 
could testify that the spot of blood on the jacket was unlikely 
to have come from blood spatter.  Trial counsel did not, 
however, believe calling the expert was necessary, given the 
limited testimony the Commonwealth provided regarding blood 
spatter,10 and because an expert would not be able to provide an 
alternate theory for the origin of the bloodstain.  Defense 
 
10 At trial, the prosecution did not provide any evidence 
suggesting that the bloodstain found on the defendant's jacket 
was the result of blood spatter.  Instead, the prosecution's 
witnesses discussed the chain of custody of the jacket and 
discussed the scientific testing that showed the stain was the 
victim's blood, but they did not offer theories as to how the 
blood had come to be on the defendant's jacket.   
33 
 
counsel was also able to elicit testimony from a Commonwealth 
expert regarding the fact that small droplets of blood do not 
spatter as far as larger droplets, and during closing arguments 
he emphasized that the two-millimeter stain was unlikely to have 
resulted from blood spatter because of its small size.  The 
strategic decision by trial counsel not to call a blood spatter 
expert was therefore not manifestly unreasonable because, as the 
motion judge observed, a blood spatter expert would likely have 
been forced to admit on cross-examination that it was possible, 
if unlikely, for the bloodstain to have resulted from blood 
spatter during the shooting, and thus could potentially damage 
the defendant's case.  See Kirkland, 491 Mass. at 356-357 
(decision not to call expert witness not manifestly unreasonable 
where expert had potential to harm defendant's case).   
e.  Jury instructions.  At trial, defense counsel requested 
a jury instruction stating that, in addition to considering 
whether a witness identifying a perpetrator testified honestly, 
the jury should also consider "whether the witness's 
identification is accurate or instead is an honest mistake."  
The trial judge did not so instruct the jury.  Rather, the judge 
gave the then-current model jury instruction on identification 
(Rodriguez instruction).  See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 378 
Mass. 296, 310-311 (1979) (Appendix), S.C., 419 Mass. 1006 
(1995) (providing jury instruction on identification testimony 
34 
 
that was basis for model instruction used at defendant's 
trial).11  Near the end of the model jury instruction, the judge 
added, "In analyzing identification testimony you may consider 
whether or not the witness might simply be mistaken."  On 
appeal, the defendant contends that the judge's decision to 
instruct the jury to consider that "a witness might simply be 
mistaken" rather than instructing the jury as to an "honest but 
mistaken" identification was an abuse of discretion. 
"Fairness to a defendant compels the trial judge to give an 
instruction on the possibility of an honest but mistaken 
identification when the facts permit it and when the defendant 
requests it."  Commonwealth v. Pressley, 390 Mass. 617, 620 
(1983).  Providing such an instruction "help[s] to ensure that 
the jury understand 'the thrust' of the Rodriguez instruction -- 
i.e., that a witness might simply be mistaken."  Commonwealth v. 
Pires, 453 Mass. 66, 72 (2009). 
In Pires, 453 Mass. at 68-72, we considered jury 
instructions essentially identical to the jury instructions 
provided in the present case.  See id. at 69 n.2 (setting out 
 
11 We have since updated the model jury instruction on 
identification to reflect more recent science on factors that 
affect the reliability of eyewitness identification.  Gomes, 470 
Mass. at 376.  See Model Jury Instructions on Eyewitness 
Identification, 473 Mass. 1051 (2015).  We explicitly 
"intend[ed] the new instruction to have no retroactive 
application."  Gomes, supra at 376.  As such, the Rodriguez 
instruction was proper at the time of trial.   
35 
 
full jury instruction provided on identification).  Like the 
trial judge in this case, the judge in Pires gave the Rodriguez 
instruction on identification and instructed the jury that "[i]n 
analyzing identification testimony, you may consider whether or 
not the witness might simply be mistaken."  Id. at 71.  We held 
that "[a]lthough this was not the specific language the 
defendant had requested, it was sufficient, in the context of 
the over-all instruction, to apprise the jury on the possibility 
of an 'honest but mistaken' identification."  Id.  As in Pires, 
the instruction here conveyed to the jury the possibility of an 
honest but mistaken identification, and we therefore discern no 
error in the jury instructions offered by the trial judge.  See 
id.  See also Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 597 (2005), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Daye, 411 Mass. 719, 739 (1992) ("The 
judge is not required to grant a particular instruction so long 
as the charge, as a whole, adequately covers the issue").   
f.  Motion for postconviction discovery.  In December of 
2022, the defendant filed a motion before this court to view the 
district attorney for the Suffolk district's trial file.  The 
defendant argued that because allegations had been made that the 
trial prosecutor in this case withheld exculpatory evidence in 
an unrelated proceeding,12 and because other Brady violations 
 
12 Following an independent investigation undertaken on 
behalf of the district attorney for the Suffolk district, the 
36 
 
have been discovered in unrelated cases, he should be allowed to 
review the district attorney's trial file to uncover any 
potentially exculpatory evidence.  Because the motion was not 
related to a motion for a new trial or a previously filed motion 
for postconviction discovery, we denied the motion.  See Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (4), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001) 
("Where affidavits filed by the moving party . . . establish a 
prima facie case for relief, the judge on motion of any party 
. . . may authorize such discovery as is deemed appropriate 
. . .").  We also noted that the defendant had failed to 
establish a prima facie case for relief, as he made no attempt 
to explain what evidence he was seeking.  See Commonwealth v. 
Ware, 471 Mass. 85, 94 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Daniels, 
445 Mass. 392, 407 (2005) (when requesting postconviction 
discovery, defendant "must make a sufficient showing that the 
discovery is reasonably likely to uncover evidence that might 
warrant granting a new trial"). 
Here, the defendant contends that we erred and should allow 
his discovery motion.  We decline to do so.  We emphasize that 
the defendant continues to engage in a "fishing expedition" 
 
prosecutor was cleared of any wrongdoing with regard to the 
other case.  Prosecutor Cleared of Withholding Evidence, Will 
Rejoin Suffolk DA's Office, Boston Globe, July 6, 2023.  
37 
 
untethered to any specific claims.  See Ware, 471 Mass. at 94; 
Daniels, 445 Mass. at 405-407. 
g.  Cumulative error.  The defendant also argues that the 
cumulative effect of the alleged errors discussed supra require 
that he be granted a new trial.  As we have reviewed each of 
these alleged errors and have found no prejudice to the 
defendant, even when viewed as a whole, there are no grounds on 
which to provide the defendant a new trial.  See Commonwealth v. 
Niemic, 483 Mass. 571, 596 (2019) (for defendant to be entitled 
to new trial, errors must be such that "we cannot be certain 
that the jury would have been able to look at the evidence 
clearly and reach a decision based only on proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt").   
We also reject the defendant's argument that we should 
exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce his 
conviction of murder in the first degree to manslaughter.  "[W]e 
do not sit as a second jury to pass anew on the question of the 
defendant's guilt."  Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 470 Mass. 163, 167 
(2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Carlino, 449 Mass. 71, 80 
(2007).  Moreover, "[r]egard for the public interest impels us 
to use with restraint our power under § 33E to modify the jury's 
verdict," Ortiz, supra at 166-167, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Colleran, 452 Mass. 417, 431 (2008).  Here, the defendant's 
argument that the verdict is not consonant with justice is 
38 
 
unsupported.  We therefore decline the defendant's invitation to 
reduce his conviction to manslaughter.   
h.  Firearm charge.  The defendant also appeals from his 
conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm.  At the time the 
defendant was convicted, licensure was considered an affirmative 
defense to a charge of unlawful possession of a firearm.  See 
Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666, 689 (Guardado I), S.C., 
493 Mass. 1 (2023) (Guardado II).  Following the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n 
v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), however, we held "that absence of 
licensure is an essential element" of firearm possession 
offenses.  Guardado I, supra at 690.  "Because Bruen was decided 
after the defendant's trial but while the case was pending on 
appeal, he is entitled to the benefit of the new rule; that is, 
the right to have the Commonwealth prove that he lacked a 
license."  Guardado II, supra at 12.  We therefore vacate the 
defendant's conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm and 
remand for a new trial on that charge.  See id. 
i.  Moffett briefing.  The defendant filed a 248-page pro 
se brief along with the brief written by his appellate counsel.  
The defendant's pro se brief advances thirty-three different 
arguments, some duplicative of arguments included in the brief 
filed by counsel and discussed supra.  The Commonwealth urges 
that we should strike the defendant's pro se brief and disregard 
39 
 
the arguments contained therein because the defendant's pro se 
arguments were not included in defense counsel's appellate 
brief, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Moffett, 383 Mass. 201, 208 
(1981).   
As we are required to conduct a plenary review of the 
record to determine whether a meritorious claim existed, 
pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we have reviewed 
the defendant's pro se brief despite its numerous 
nonconformities, which we will not belabor here.  Having 
reviewed the entirety of the record, including all the 
additional issues raised by the defendant in his pro se brief, 
we conclude that nothing contained therein warrants an award of 
extraordinary relief.  We also conclude that none of these 
issues merits further discussion.   
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed, the defendant's 
conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of 
deliberate premeditation is affirmed, as is the denial of his 
motion for a new trial.  Additionally, we affirm the denial of 
the defendant's motion for postconviction discovery.  We vacate 
the defendant's conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm 
and remand for a new trial on that indictment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.