Case Title: Gibson v. Drainage Products, Inc.

Citation: 2002-Ohio-2008

Docket Number: 20010588

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-05-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Gibson v. Drainage Products, Inc., 95 Ohio St.3d 171, 2002-Ohio-2008.] 
 
 
GIBSON, ADMR., APPELLANT, v. DRAINAGE PRODUCTS, INC., APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Gibson v. Drainage Products, Inc., 95 Ohio St.3d 171, 2002-Ohio-
2008.] 
Employer and employee — Requirements employee must satisfy in order to 
prevail against employer for an intentional tort — Fyffe v. Jeno’s, Inc., 
applied — Determining whether sufficient evidence exists to survive 
employer’s motion for a directed verdict. 
(No. 2001-0588 — Submitted February 6, 2002 — Decided May 8, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Paulding County, No. 11-99-14, 2001-
Ohio-2110. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J. 
{¶1} 
On February 21, 1996, Mike Gibson was an employee of appellee, 
Drainage Products, Inc.  On that day, Gibson suffered severe burns as a result of a 
manufacturing accident that occurred at one of appellee’s plants.  Gibson died 
three days later as a result of his injuries and complications. 
{¶2} 
Appellee is a manufacturer of corrugated plastic drainage tubing.  
As part of appellee’s manufacturing process, raw plastic is placed into a machine 
called an extruder, which heats the plastic, melting it into a malleable form.  
Electric heaters located on the outside of the extruders are used to heat the plastic 
to approximately five hundred degrees Fahrenheit in order to keep it malleable 
and permit it to flow through the manufacturing line.  Once the plastic is heated in 
the extruder, it travels through a “screen changer” that removes dirt and debris 
from the plastic.  The plastic then passes into a die, where it is molded into a 
circular pipe shape. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶3} 
On the day in question, Timothy Jewell was working as an 
operator on one of the extruder lines when he noticed that “hot molten” plastic 
appeared to be leaking from the screen changer.  In an effort to stop the leakage, 
Jewell attempted to tighten bolts near the screen changer and in the process broke 
some of the bolts.  At that point, Jewell notified his foreman, John Meggitt, who 
instructed Jewell to shut down the line so that the bolts could be replaced. 
{¶4} 
Either Jewell or Meggitt then proceeded to repair the broken bolts 
that held the pipes and screen changer together.1  At some point Jewell remained 
at the work site and began to remove plastic residue that had accumulated around 
the screen changer, while Meggitt left the work area to find replacement bolts. 
{¶5} 
Prior to cleaning the plastic residue, Jewell separated the 
manufacturing line at the screen changer.  The extruder was shut down and the 
electrical heaters in the area of the repair were turned off.2  Apparently, however, 
the electric heaters surrounding the pipe leading into the die cast were left on.  
These heaters were located approximately four to five feet from the electric 
heaters in the area of the screen changer that had been deactivated. 
{¶6} 
Gibson was working as a “mixer” on the day of his accident in an 
area of appellee’s plant approximately thirty-five to forty feet from where Jewell 
was stationed.  Gibson approached Jewell and asked whether Jewell needed any 
help.  Appellee’s employees indicated that it was company policy for workers to 
offer such assistance once assigned duties were completed.  In fact, appellee’s 
safety director testified that employees were expected to check with a supervisor 
for another assignment once assigned tasks were completed.  Meggitt, who had 
left the area of repair to obtain new bolts, was Gibson’s supervisor. 
                                          
 
1. 
The testimony on this point is conflicting, as Jewell and Meggitt each testified that he had 
removed the bolts. 
2. 
Once again the testimony of Jewell and Meggitt is at odds.  While there is no dispute that 
the extruder was shut down and the heaters were turned off in the vicinity of the repair, Jewell and 
Meggitt disagree as to who actually performed this procedure. 
January Term, 2002 
3 
{¶7} 
Jewell declined Gibson’s offer of assistance.  At about the same 
time, appellee’s maintenance supervisor, Randy Bullinger, came upon the area of 
repair.  After a brief discussion with Jewell, Bullinger heard a hissing sound and 
immediately yelled “watch out.”  Jewell, who testified that he heard a bang or 
“popping” sound prior to the explosion, was able to drop to the floor.  However, 
Gibson, who was standing approximately three feet away from the open pipe, was 
sprayed directly in the face, neck, and chest with hot molten plastic. 
{¶8} 
Gibson was transported by ambulance to Van Wert Hospital and, 
thereafter, transferred to Parkview Hospital in Fort Wayne, Indiana.  While at 
Parkview, Gibson was treated for first, second, and third degree burns.  Gibson 
also underwent a surgical procedure to remove the molten plastic material that 
had adhered to his skin, primarily to his face.  Gibson died three days after he was 
admitted to Parkview. 
{¶9} 
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) 
cited appellee for numerous violations related to Gibson’s accident, including 
appellee’s failure to comply with its own written lockout/tagout safety program.  
The lockout/tagout safety procedure is required during “the servicing and 
maintenance of machines and equipment in which the unexpected energization or 
start up of the machines or equipment, or [the] release of stored energy could 
cause injury to employees.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Section 1910.147(a)(1)(i), Title 29, 
C.F.R.  OSHA rules mandate that employers establish energy control 
lockout/tagout procedures, including employee training and periodic inspections, 
to ensure that before any employee performs any servicing or maintenance on a 
machine or equipment that is subject to unexpectedly energizing, starting up, or 
releasing stored energy, “the machine or equipment shall be isolated from the 
energy source, and rendered inoperative.”  Section 1910.147(c)(1), Title 29, 
C.F.R.  Appellee had previously been cited by OSHA in 1994 for not having a 
written lockout/tagout program. 
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{¶10} On January 21, 1997, Gibson’s widow, appellant Susan R. Gibson, 
individually and as administrator of the estate of Mike Gibson, and also as parent 
and natural guardian of Kayla and Samantha Gibson, filed a complaint against 
appellee and others in the Court of Common Pleas of Paulding County.3  
Appellant’s complaint alleged that appellee had committed an intentional tort 
against Mike Gibson that resulted in his death.  Appellant also alleged claims of 
medical malpractice against Parkview Memorial Hospital and two Indiana 
physicians who had treated Mike Gibson.  Appellant’s malpractice claims were 
dismissed prior to trial due to a lack of personal jurisdiction over the Indiana 
defendants. 
{¶11} The matter proceeded to trial solely on the intentional tort claim 
against appellee.  Appellee moved for summary judgment contending, in part, that 
appellant had failed to present evidence sufficient to establish intent according to 
the “substantial certainty” test set forth in Fyffe v. Jeno’s, Inc. (1991), 59 Ohio 
St.3d 115, 570 N.E.2d 1108, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus.  By entry 
dated April 27, 1998, the trial court overruled appellee’s motion for summary 
judgment. 
{¶12} The matter proceeded to a jury trial on October 25, 1999.  At the 
close of appellant’s case, appellee moved for a directed verdict pursuant to Civ.R. 
50(A), again contending that appellant had not proven the necessary elements for 
establishing an intentional tort as set forth in Fyffe.  The trial court agreed and 
granted appellee’s motion for directed verdict.  The trial court found that 
appellant had failed to establish, as required by the second element of the Fyffe 
test, that prior to the accident appellee knew of the existence of a dangerous 
                                          
 
3. 
Haviland Drainage Products, Inc., was originally named as a party defendant.  Haviland 
and appellee, Drainage Products, Inc., are separate but related companies.  Mike Gibson worked 
for Drainage Products, Inc., and an amended complaint was filed correcting this error. 
January Term, 2002 
5 
process, procedure, equipment, or condition within its facility that was 
substantially certain to cause harm to Mike Gibson or any other employee. 
{¶13} Appellant appealed the trial court’s ruling to the Paulding County 
Court of Appeals.  The court of appeals, in a split decision, affirmed the trial 
court’s judgment on different grounds.  The court of appeals focused its attention 
on the third element of the Fyffe test, which requires the employee to demonstrate 
“that the employer, under such circumstances, and with such knowledge, did act 
to require the employee to continue to perform the dangerous task.”  Id., 59 Ohio 
St.3d 115, 570 N.E.2d 1108, at paragraph one of the syllabus.  The court of 
appeals determined, based on the evidence submitted, that appellant had failed to 
raise even the inference that appellee had required Mike Gibson to continue to 
perform any dangerous task.  The court of appeals found appellant’s remaining 
evidentiary issues moot.  Judge Shaw dissented, finding that appellant presented 
sufficient evidence at trial to survive a motion for directed verdict in regard to all 
three elements of the test set forth in Fyffe. 
{¶14} This matter is now before this court upon the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
{¶15} Appellant contends that the court of appeals erred in affirming the 
directed verdict in appellee’s favor.  Appellant urges this court to find that an 
injured employee can satisfy the third element of the Fyffe test if evidence is 
submitted showing that the employer required the employee to be in the work 
environment or vicinity where a dangerous process, procedure, condition, or 
instrumentality is substantially certain to cause injury. 
{¶16} The law setting forth the necessary elements and level of proof 
required in order to demonstrate a workplace intentional tort is well established.  
In Fyffe, 59 Ohio St.3d 115, 570 N.E.2d 1108, we modified and explained the 
three-prong test originally set forth in Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. 
(1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489, paragraph five of the syllabus, that an 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
employee must satisfy in order to prevail on a workplace intentional tort claim 
against an employer.  We held in Fyffe that “in order to establish ‘intent’ for the 
purpose of proving the existence of an intentional tort committed by an employer 
against his employee, the following must be demonstrated:  (1) knowledge by the 
employer of the existence of a dangerous process, procedure, instrumentality or 
condition within its business operation; (2) knowledge by the employer that if the 
employee is subjected by his employment to such dangerous process, procedure, 
instrumentality or condition, then harm to the employee will be a substantial 
certainty; and (3) that the employer, under such circumstances, and with such 
knowledge, did act to require the employee to continue to perform the dangerous 
task.”  Id., 59 Ohio St.3d 115, 570 N.E.2d 1108, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶17} In paragraph two of the syllabus in Fyffe, we further outlined the 
proof necessary to establish intent on the part of the employer when we stated that 
“[t]o establish an intentional tort of an employer, proof beyond that required to 
prove negligence and beyond that to prove recklessness must be established.  
Where the employer acts despite his knowledge of some risk, his conduct may be 
negligence.  As the probability increases that particular consequences may follow, 
then the employer’s conduct may be characterized as recklessness.  As the 
probability that the consequences will follow further increases, and the employer 
knows that injuries to employees are certain or substantially certain to result from 
the process, procedure or condition and he still proceeds, he is treated by the law 
as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.  However, the mere knowledge 
and appreciation of a risk—something short of substantial certainty—is not 
intent.” 
{¶18} As previously noted, for reasons different from those relied upon 
by the trial judge, a majority of the court of appeals found no error in the trial 
court’s decision to grant appellee’s motion for directed verdict.  The court of 
appeals determined that appellant had failed to establish the third element of the 
January Term, 2002 
7 
test set forth in Fyffe, and instead concluded that Mike Gibson had placed himself 
in danger by choice and not as a requirement of employment.  The court of 
appeals concluded that there was no evidence from which the jury could have 
inferred that appellee had required Mike Gibson to be in the area to offer 
assistance with the problem.  The court of appeals further found that there was no 
evidence submitted that Gibson was in the area in search of his immediate 
supervisor to obtain another assignment.  We disagree. 
{¶19} Civ.R. 50(A)(4) provides: 
{¶20} “When a motion for a directed verdict has been properly made, and 
the trial court, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party 
against whom the motion is directed, finds that upon any determinative issue 
reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted 
and that conclusion is adverse to such party, the court shall sustain the motion and 
direct a verdict for the moving party as to that issue.” 
{¶21} “By the same token, if there is substantial competent evidence to 
support the party against whom the motion [for directed verdict] is made, upon 
which evidence reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, the motion 
must be denied.  Kellerman v. J.S. Durig Co. (1964), 176 Ohio St. 320 [27 O.O.2d 
241], 199 N.E.2d 562.”  Hawkins v. Ivy (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 114, 115, 4 O.O.3d 
243, 363 N.E.2d 367.  As we stated in O’Day v. Webb (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 215, 
58 O.O.2d 424, 280 N.E.2d 896, “[i]t is the duty of a trial court to submit an 
essential issue to the jury when there is sufficient evidence relating to that issue to 
permit reasonable minds to reach different conclusions on that issue, or, 
conversely, to withhold an essential issue from the jury when there is not 
sufficient evidence relating to that issue to permit reasonable minds to reach 
different conclusions on that issue.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id., paragraph four of the 
syllabus.  Moreover, the party against whom the motion is directed is entitled to 
have the trial court construe the evidence in support of its claim as truthful, giving 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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it its most favorable interpretation, as well as having the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences drawn from that evidence.  Ruta v. Breckenridge-Remy Co. (1982), 69 
Ohio St.2d 66, 68, 23 O.O.3d 115, 430 N.E.2d 935. 
{¶22} Appellant introduced deposition and trial court testimony 
indicating that it was company policy for employees, once their own assigned 
duties were completed, to seek out additional work assignments and to assist 
fellow employees in fulfilling other employment responsibilities.  Timothy 
Jewell, a former mixer and the operator of the extruder line that caused Gibson’s 
injuries, testified that if employees completed their work, the company expected 
them to perform other duties and to help fellow employees complete job tasks.  
Furthermore, Robert Hughes, appellee’s safety director, testified by deposition 
that on the date of the accident, Mike Gibson did nothing wrong to cause his 
injuries.4  In addition, during his deposition Hughes indicated that it would not be 
unusual for Gibson to complete his duties as a mixer and that, in those instances, 
he would be expected to find other work.  During his examination at trial, Hughes 
reiterated that Mike Gibson was expected to seek other work once he completed 
his mixing duties and, more important, Hughes testified that employees who had 
completed assigned tasks were required to ask their supervisors for additional 
assignments. 
{¶23} In Hannah v. Dayton Power & Light Co. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 
482, 696 N.E.2d 1044, we considered a situation analogous to the instant matter. 
The employee in Hannah was a volunteer member of the employer’s emergency 
                                          
 
4. 
We are aware that Hughes’s trial testimony on this issue conflicts with his deposition 
testimony and that appellant’s trial counsel attempted to impeach the witness regarding this 
discrepancy.  However, in ruling on the propriety of a directed verdict, we are not permitted to 
weigh the evidence.  Ruta v. Breckenridge-Remy Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 66, 23 O.O.3d 115, 
430 N.E.2d 935, paragraph one of the syllabus (“A motion for directed verdict does not present a 
question of fact or raise factual issues, but instead presents a question of law, even though in 
deciding such a motion it is necessary to review and consider the evidence”).  In determining 
whether sufficient evidence exists to survive a motion for directed verdict, our task is merely to 
construe the evidence, as well as all reasonable inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party. 
January Term, 2002 
9 
rescue squad who died while attempting to rescue fellow employees stranded 
several hundred feet in the air on the platform of a nine-hundred-foot smokestack.  
We held in Hannah that, according to the third element of the Fyffe test, the 
employer did not have to expressly order the employee to engage in the dangerous 
task that led to his death.  Id. at 487, 696 N.E.2d 1044.  Instead, we concluded 
that, in an action alleging a workplace intentional tort, in order to overcome a 
motion for summary judgment, an opposing party can satisfy this requirement by 
presenting evidence that raises an inference that the employer, through its actions 
and policies, required the employee to engage in the dangerous task.  Id.  In 
Hannah, there was evidence that the rescue squad was composed entirely of 
volunteers and that decedent had volunteered to perform the rescue.  
Nevertheless, based upon testimony that the employer expected the rescue squad 
to respond to the emergency and to do so in a safe manner, as well as other 
evidence, we concluded that reasonable minds could differ as to whether the 
employer required the employee to engage in the dangerous task.  Id. 
{¶24} While the issue in Hannah concerned the evidence necessary to 
survive summary judgment in relation to the third element of Fyffe, the rationale 
applied in Hannah is equally applicable to situations involving Civ.R. 50 motions 
for directed verdict.  See Sanek v. Duracote Corp. (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 169, 
172, 539 N.E.2d 1114, citing Pariseau v. Wedge Products, Inc. (1988), 36 Ohio 
St.3d 124, 127, 522 N.E.2d 511.  Thus, for purposes of surviving a motion for 
directed verdict, it is not necessary for an employee to show that the employer 
expressly ordered the employee to engage in the dangerous task.  Instead, the 
third element of the Fyffe test can be satisfied by presenting evidence that raises 
an inference that the employer, through its actions and policies, required the 
employee to engage in that dangerous task.  Hannah, 82 Ohio St.3d at 487, 696 
N.E.2d 1044.  Moreover, Hannah was quite explicit in its determination that a 
jury issue arises concerning the third element of the Fyffe test when sufficient 
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credible evidence is presented that the employer merely expected the employee to 
engage in a dangerous task.  Id.  In light of the foregoing, and after consideration 
of the evidence submitted herein, we conclude that appellant presented sufficient 
evidence to withstand appellee’s motion for directed verdict. 
{¶25} Construing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in favor of 
appellant, we find that reasonable minds could differ in this matter as to whether 
the employer required the employee to engage in a dangerous task.  Clearly, a jury 
could reasonably conclude that Mike Gibson was in the area of repair offering 
assistance to Tim Jewell as he was expected to according to the terms and 
conditions of employment or, alternatively, that Gibson had been in the area 
attempting to locate his supervisor to obtain another assignment.  As Judge Shaw 
correctly noted in his dissent, either determination by a jury would satisfy the 
appellant’s burden on the third element of Fyffe. 
{¶26} In so holding we necessarily reject the court of appeals’ assertion 
that the appellee’s general expectation that its employees will inquire about and 
perform work outside their primary duties “is not tantamount to a requirement 
that Mike Gibson specifically assist in the repair of a manufacturing line without 
the power to the entire line having been first shut down.”  (Emphasis sic.)  There 
is nothing in the language of the third element or in our prior case law that would 
lead to the conclusion that appellee must specifically require Gibson to engage in 
repair of the manufacturing line.  The test set forth in Fyffe requires only that the 
employer possess knowledge of a dangerous condition within its business and 
knowledge that, if the employer exposes an employee to such dangerous 
condition, then harm to the employee is substantially certain to occur.  Fyffe, 59 
Ohio St.3d 115, 570 N.E.2d 1108, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶27} In any event, the standard for establishing an intentional tort 
“emerges not so much from the words used to formulate the test as it does from 
the decisions rendered in response to specific fact situations.  Such is the nature of 
January Term, 2002 
11 
the common law.”  Kunkler v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (1988), 36 Ohio 
St.3d 135, 139, 522 N.E.2d 477.  With that in mind, cases involving workplace 
intentional torts must be judged on the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
each incident.  Here, molten plastic was forcefully discharged from appellee’s 
manufacturing line and traveled a distance of approximately three to four feet 
before it struck and severely burned Mike Gibson.  Whether Gibson was 
specifically requested to participate or was actually participating in the ongoing 
repair of the extruder is not relevant to determining whether Mike Gibson was 
required to perform a dangerous task.  Rather, the primary concern is whether 
appellee, through its policies and conditions of employment, placed Gibson in a 
position where he was subjected to a “dangerous process, procedure, 
instrumentality or condition” and harm was substantially certain to follow. 
{¶28} Finally, we address appellee’s apparent confusion regarding the 
degree of knowledge required for the third element of the Fyffe test.  Appellee 
contends that there is no evidence in this case that appellee knowingly required 
appellant’s decedent to engage in a dangerous task.  Not only is this argument 
completely contrary to our holding in Hannah, it is also contrary to the very 
foundation relied upon by this court in establishing workplace intentional tort 
jurisprudence in this state.  “ ‘All consequences which the actor desires to bring 
about are intended, as the word is used in [the] Restatement.  Intent is not, 
however, limited to consequences which are desired.  If the actor knows that the 
consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still 
goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the 
result.’ ”  Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 36 Ohio St.3d at 115, 522 N.E.2d 
489, quoting 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965) 15, Section 8A, 
Comment b.  In other words, appellee could be liable for the consequences of its 
acts even though it never intended a specific result. 
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{¶29} Accordingly, we hold that, in regard to the third element of the test 
set forth in Fyffe, appellant has submitted sufficient, credible evidence to 
overcome appellee’s motion for directed verdict.  A final determination regarding 
the third element of Fyffe must, nevertheless, be left to a jury.  However, because 
the appellate court found appellant’s remaining issues on appeal moot, this matter 
must first be remanded to the court of appeals in order to address appellant’s 
remaining assignments of error, including whether appellant has presented 
sufficient evidence to survive a motion for directed verdict in relation to the first 
two elements of the Fyffe test. 
{¶30} Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and 
this cause is remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent 
with this decision. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting. 
{¶31} I cannot join the majority’s departure from the test this court set 
forth in Fyffe v. Jeno’s, Inc. (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 115, 570 N.E.2d 1108.  Fyffe 
refined this court’s determination that an Ohio employee could recover damages 
from his or her employer where the employer could be said to have intended to 
injure the employee.  Today’s majority essentially obviates the third prong of 
Fyffe.  It does so by concluding that reasonable minds could find the required 
performance of a dangerous task in an employer’s general mandate that an 
employee seek other work. 
{¶32} Here, the plaintiff produced no evidence in her case-in-chief that 
the employer assigned Gibson to perform a particular task.  Without evidence of 
January Term, 2002 
13 
that, there could be no proof that the employer knew that Gibson was substantially 
certain to be harmed in “perform[ing] the dangerous task,” as the third prong of 
Fyffe prescribes.  Thus, the trial court properly directed the verdict at the close of 
the plaintiff’s case.  I would, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals upholding the directed verdict. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Murray & Murray Co., L.P.A., W. Patrick Murray, William H. Bartle and 
Steven C. Bechtel, for appellant. 
 
Cook, Troth & Burkard, Ltd., Glenn H. Troth and Norman E. Cook, for 
appellee. 
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