Case Title: Shrader v. Ritchey

Citation: 309 S.W.2d 812

Docket Number: A-6608

State: texas

Court: Texas Supreme Court

Date: 1958-02-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
309 S.W.2d 812 (1958) J. T. SHRADER et al., Appellants, v. W. G. RITCHEY et al., Appellees. No. A-6608. Supreme Court of Texas. February 5, 1958. Cain, Taylor & Cain, Liberty, for appellants. Robert F. Atkins, County Atty., Coldspring, for appellees. *813 HICKMAN, Justice. This case is here on certificate from the Court of Civil Appeals, Ninth Supreme Judicial District, at Beaumont, essential portions of which are copied below. The certificate recites: The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court and overruled the motion for rehearing. Thereafter it granted appellants' motion to certify certain questions to this court. The certificate further recites: Finally, the certificate recites: Under our view of the question presented it calls not for the construction of a statute but for the determination of a sound public policy. As stated in the certificate, the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals in this case is in direct conflict with the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Cunningham v. State, 119 Tex.Cr.R. 572, 44 S.W.2d 739. The pertinent part of Article 6959, R.S. 1925, reads: The tentative opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals in this case holds that the publication of the notice on November 23, November 30, December 7, and December 14, of the election held on the following January 5 was a substantial compliance with the provisions of the statute, and that a strict construction should not be given it. Accordingly, it ordered that the judgment of the trial court decreeing that the election was valid be affirmed. The Court of Criminal Appeals in the Cunningham case, under substantially the same state of facts, held an election void. The original opinion in that case was released in December, 1931, and the opinion on rehearing in January, 1932. Both opinions reflect that the question was given careful consideration. Since the Legislature has not amended the statute, we must assume that that court will feel bound by that decision should the question of the construction of the statute arise again. A willful violation of the provisions of the stock law in a county or subdivision thereof in which it has been adopted is punishable as an offense. Penal Code, Article 1369. It was held in Griffin v. Tucker, 102 Tex. 420, 118 S.W. 635, 640: It will be noted that the court recognized its duty "ordinarily" to follow the construction given by the Court of Criminal Appeals to a statute which is penal in its nature. Clearly this is a case in which the ordinary rule should be followed. The certificate states that the same question in all likelihood will continue to arise. It would be an intolerable situation should this Court hold the election valid and then when the officers undertook to enforce the stock law they would be met by a binding decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals that the election was void and that, therefore, no law had been violated. When a refusal by this Court to follow a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals in construing a statute, the violation of which is a penal offense, would create an intolerable situation, it is our duty not to refuse to do so but to follow the ruling of that court. Commissioners' Court of Nolan County v. Beall, 98 Tex. 104, 81 S.W. 526. The proper administration of justice demands that harmony exist in the construction of statutes criminal in their nature between our two courts of last resort. Some of the older members of the Bar will recall the confusion created in 1911 when these two courts rendered conflicting decisions with reference to the validity of a provision for initiative and referendum in a city's charter. See Ex parte Farnsworth, 61 Tex.Cr.R. *815 353, 135 S.W. 535, 33 L.R.A.,N.S., 968, and Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dallas, 104 Tex. 114, 134 S.W. 321. The confusion which would be created by our failure to follow the Court of Criminal Appeals in this case would be much more serious than that resulting from the two decisions just mentioned. While in general this Court is more liberal in construing statutes with regard to the giving of notice of an election than the Court of Criminal Appeals, there is no reason for indulging in any liberality in the instant case. The Cunningham case is the only case by either this Court or the Court of Criminal Appeals construing the particular statute under review, and we do not hesitate to follow it. From what has been written above, it follows that we answer the first question in the affirmative, and that answer renders the second question immaterial.