Case Title: Lucas v. Lakin

Citation: 

Docket Number: 80719

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1997-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after the filing of the opinion 
to request a rehearing. Also, opinions are subject to modification, correction or withdrawal at 
anytime prior to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, because the 
following slip opinion is being made available prior to the Court's final action in this matter, 
it cannot be considered the final decision of the Court. The official copy of the following 
opinion will be published by the Supreme Court's Reporter of Decisions in the Official 
Reports advance sheets following final action by the Court. 
 
              Docket No. 80719--Agenda 31--September 1996. 
       RONALD "RINK" LUCAS, Appellant, v. L. THOMAS LAKIN et al., 
                               Appellees. 
                     Opinion filed January 30, 1997. 
 
     JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court: 
     The question presented in this appeal is whether an individual 
sheet of a nominating petition which is filed pursuant to section 
7--10 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7--10 (West 1994)) is 
rendered invalid if the address set forth within the circulator's 
affidavit at the bottom of the petition sheet does not match the 
address where the circulator of the sheet is registered to vote. 
The fifth district of the appellate court answered this question 
affirmatively. 278 Ill. App. 3d 163. We granted leave to appeal 
(155 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now reverse the judgment of the appellate 
court. 
 
                                Background 
     On December 11, 1995, Ronald P. "Rink" Lucas (Lucas) filed a 
nominating petition seeking to have his name placed on the ballot 
for the March 19, 1996, Democratic primary for the office of 
Madison County recorder. The nominating petition consisted of 20 
individual sheets containing a total of 330 signatures. Two hundred 
fifty-five valid signatures were required to secure a position on 
the primary election ballot. 
     On December 22, 1995, L. Thomas Lakin (Lakin) filed an 
objector's petition (see 10 ILCS 5/10--8 (West 1994)) in which he 
contested the validity of numerous signatures on Lucas' nominating 
petition and asserted that there was an insufficient number of 
valid signatures remaining on the petition to warrant placing 
Lucas' name on the primary election ballot. In the portion of the 
objector's petition relevant here, Lakin alleged that the 
circulator of the first sheet of Lucas' nominating petition, Aaron 
Wanagat (Wanagat), was not registered to vote at the address listed 
in the circulator's affidavit on that sheet. Thus, according to 
Lakin, Wanagat was not a valid circulator and the sheet, which 
contained 20 signatures, had to be stricken in its entirety. 
     On January 9, 1996, the Madison County officers electoral 
board (the Board) held a hearing pursuant to section 10--9 of the 
Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10--9 (West 1994)) to consider Lakin's 
objections. In a written decision issued on January 11, 1996, the 
Board found, inter alia, that Wanagat was a registered voter of 
Madison County. However, the Board also found that Wanagat was 
registered to vote at an address other than the one listed in the 
circulator's affidavit on the petition sheet. The Board ruled that 
Wanagat was therefore not a valid circulator and that the first 
sheet of Lucas' nominating petition was void. As a result of this 
ruling, and others made by the Board, Lucas' nominating petition 
had only 244 valid signatures--11 short of the 255 required. 
Accordingly, the Board ordered that Lucas' name not appear on the 
ballot for the primary election. 
     Lucas sought judicial review of the Board's decision in the 
circuit court of Madison County. See 10 ILCS 5/10--10.1 (West 
1994). Following a hearing held on February 2, 1996, the circuit 
court entered judgment reversing the Board's decision regarding the 
validity of the first petition sheet. The circuit court based its 
judgment on two appellate court decisions, Bass v. Hamblet, 266 
Ill. App. 3d 1110 (1st Dist. 1994), and Whelan v. County Officers' 
Electoral Board, 256 Ill. App. 3d 555 (2d Dist. 1994). Both of 
these decisions held that the relevant provisions of the Election 
Code do not require that the address in the circulator's affidavit 
match the address where the circulator is registered to vote. 
Because the circuit court's ruling restored 20 signatures to Lucas' 
petition, the court ordered that Lucas' name be placed on the 
primary election ballot. 
     Lakin appealed from the circuit court's judgment and, after 
expedited review, the appellate court reversed the circuit court 
and affirmed the original decision of the Board. The appellate 
court expressly declined to follow Whelan and Bass, concluding that 
those opinions were too restrictive in their reading of the 
pertinent sections of the Election Code. The appellate court's 
mandate was issued along with its opinion on March 14, 1996. On 
Lucas' motion, this court stayed the appellate court's mandate 
pending consideration of Lucas' petition for leave to appeal. On 
March 19, 1996, the primary election took place. Lucas appeared on 
the ballot and lost the election. 
 
                                 Analysis 
     We observe, at the outset, that while the primary election 
which is at the heart of this appeal has already been held, this 
cause is not moot. One exception to the mootness doctrine permits 
a court to resolve an otherwise moot issue if that issue concerns 
a substantial public interest. This public interest exception may 
be applied if (1) the question presented is of a public nature, (2) 
an authoritative resolution of the question is desirable for the 
purpose of guiding public officers, and (3) the question is likely 
to recur. Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board,  158 Ill. 2d 391 , 395 (1994). The instant appeal raises a question of election 
law which, inherently, is a matter of public concern. In addition, 
as noted above, the issue before us has created a split of 
authority in our appellate court. Resolution of the question 
presented in this appeal is therefore necessary, as the issue will 
likely arise again in future elections. Accordingly, we reach the 
merits in this cause. 
     The facts in this case are not in dispute. At some time prior 
to circulating the first sheet of Lucas' nominating petition, 
Wanagat moved from the Madison County address where he was 
registered to vote to another address located within Madison 
County. When he moved, Wanagat inadvertently failed to transfer his 
voter registration to his new address. Subsequently, when asked to 
provide his address in the circulator's affidavit at the bottom of 
the petition sheet he was circulating, Wanagat simply listed, 
without any intent to deceive or mislead, his new Madison County 
address. The sole issue which the parties contest is whether, under 
these facts, the relevant provisions of the Election Code require 
that the petition sheet which Wanagat circulated be declared 
invalid. 
     When construing the meaning of a disputed statute, this 
court's primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the 
intent of the legislature. People v. Zaremba,  158 Ill. 2d 36 , 40 
(1994). Legislative intent is best determined by examining the 
statutory language, which must be given its plain and ordinary 
meaning. People v. Tucker,  167 Ill. 2d 431 , 435 (1995). Because the 
construction of a statute is a question of law, our review is de 
novo. Vuletich v. United States Steel Corp.,  117 Ill. 2d 417 , 421 
(1987). 
     Section 7--10 of the Election Code sets out the requirements 
for nominating petitions filed on behalf of political parties in 
primary elections. The section states that the circulator's 
affidavit must appear in the following form: 
          "At the bottom of each sheet of such petition shall be 
          added a statement signed by a registered voter of the 
          political division, who has been a registered voter at 
          all times he or she circulated the petition, for which 
          the candidate is seeking a nomination, stating the street 
          address or rural route number of the voter, as the case 
          may be, as well as the voter's city, village or town; and 
          certifying that the signatures on that sheet of the 
          petition were signed in his presence; [and indicating the 
          dates the sheet was circulated]; and certifying that the 
          signatures on the sheet are genuine, and certifying that 
          to the best of his knowledge and belief the persons so 
          signing were at the time of signing the petitions 
          qualified voters of the political party for which a 
          nomination is sought. Such statement shall be sworn to 
          before some officer authorized to administer oaths in 
          this State." 10 ILCS 5/7--10 (West 1994). 
     Lakin does not contest the Board's finding that Wanagat was 
registered to vote in Madison County at the time he circulated the 
petition, nor does he argue that Wanagat's failure to update his 
registration address, by itself, invalidated his status as a 
registered voter as a matter of law. It is also undisputed that 
section 7--10 does not expressly require the address in the 
circulator's affidavit to match the address where the circulator is 
registered to vote. Lakin does not allege any other irregularities 
with respect to Wanagat's affidavit. Therefore, we conclude that 
Wanagat's affidavit was in compliance with the criteria set out in 
section 7--10. 
     Lakin contends, however, that in addition to being governed by 
section 7--10, Wanagat was also subject to the requirements of a 
definition section of the Election Code, section 3--1.2 (10 ILCS 
5/3--1.2 (West 1994)). Under the terms of this section, Lakin 
argues, Wanagat was not a valid circulator of Lucas' nominating 
petition. Section 3--1.2 of the Election Code provides: 
               "3--1.2. For the purpose of determining eligibility 
          to sign a nominating petition or a petition proposing a 
          public question the terms `voter', `registered voter', 
          `qualified voter', `legal voter', `elector', `qualified 
          elector', `primary elector' and `qualified primary 
          elector' as used in this Code or in another Statute shall 
          mean a person who is registered to vote at the address 
          shown opposite his signature on the petition or was 
          registered to vote at such address when he signed the 
          petition." (Emphasis added.) 10 ILCS 5/3--1.2 (West 
          1994). 
     Lakin maintains that the phrase "[f]or the purpose of 
determining eligibility to sign a nominating petition" does not 
refer solely to those individuals whose signatures count toward the 
nominating petition's numerical signature requirement, but instead 
refers to all the individuals who physically sign the petition, 
including the circulator. From this, Lakin reasons that because the 
address in Wanagat's affidavit was different from his voter 
registration address, he was not a "registered voter" within the 
meaning of section 3--1.2. Lakin notes that section 7--10 requires 
circulators to be registered voters. Therefore, according to Lakin, 
Wanagat was not a valid circulator and the Board was correct in 
striking the petition sheet from Lucas' nominating petition. We 
disagree. 
     To "sign" a nominating petition, in the plain and ordinary 
sense of the word, means to add one's signature to the nominating 
petition for the purpose of supporting the candidate whose name 
appears on the petition. See Whelan, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 559; Bass, 
266 Ill. App. 3d at 1112--13. We believe the legislature had this 
commonly accepted meaning of the word "sign" in mind when it 
enacted section 3--1.2. To hold otherwise would strain the language 
of that section beyond its normal meaning. Section 3--1.2 speaks of 
eligibility to sign a nominating petition, not of eligibility to 
circulate one. By its own terms, section 3--1.2 does not govern the 
actions of petition circulators. 
     Our conclusion that the phrase "eligibility to sign a 
nominating petition" refers only to those individuals who sign the 
petition as a means of endorsing the listed candidate is supported 
by the remaining language of section 3--1.2 and by the language of 
section 7--10. Section 3--1.2 defines "registered voter" as "a 
person who is registered to vote at the address shown opposite his 
signature on the petition." This definitional language parallels 
the portion of section 7--10 describing the requirements which must 
be met by the individuals signing the nominating petition: 
               "Such petition shall be signed by qualified primary 
          electors residing in the political division for which the 
          nominating is sought in their own proper persons only and 
          opposite the signature of each signer, his residence 
          address shall be written or printed. The residence 
          address required to be written or printed opposite each 
          qualified primary elector's name shall include the street 
          address or rural route number of the signer, as the case 
          may be, as well as the signer's city, village or town." 
          (Emphasis added.) 10 ILCS 5/7--10 (West 1994). 
     The portion of section 7--10 which describes the requirements 
which petition circulators must meet states that the circulators 
must provide their "street address or rural route number" and their 
"city, village or town," but makes no reference to the circulator's 
address appearing opposite his or her signature. Indeed, as the 
sample form provided in section 7--10 shows, the circulator's 
signature appears at the bottom of the petition sheet, underneath 
the address and other information contained within the circulator's 
affidavit. See 10 ILCS 5/7--10 (West 1994); see also T. Jaconetty 
& S. Ruffolo, Ballot Access, in Election Law 1S.72 (Ill. Inst. for 
Cont. Legal Educ. Supp. 1995) (containing a complete sample 
nominating petition). Clearly, if the legislature had intended 
section 3--1.2 to apply to petition circulators, it would not have 
created a definition of "registered voter" which follows, narrowly 
and exclusively, the portion of the statutory language and sample 
form which applies only to the individuals who sign the nominating 
petition as a means of endorsing the listed candidate. 
     Lakin also maintains, as did the appellate court below, that 
his proposed construction of section 3--1.2 is necessary to 
effectuate the legislative intent behind that provision. Lakin 
notes that section 3--1.2 codified a 1983 appellate court decision, 
Greene v. Board of Election Commissioners, 112 Ill. App. 3d 862 
(1983). In Greene, the appellate court determined that section 10-- 
4 of the Election Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 46, par. 10--4) 
required a person who signs a nominating petition to be registered 
to vote at the address set forth on the nominating petition. The 
court noted that it would be difficult to verify that an individual 
is registered to vote, and is therefore qualified to sign the 
nominating petition, if that individual was registered to vote at 
an address other than the one shown on the petition. The court 
concluded that its holding was therefore necessary to facilitate 
the verification procedure and to preserve the integrity of the 
election process. Greene, 112 Ill. App. 3d at 869. 
     Analogizing to Greene, Lakin maintains that it is difficult to 
verify that a circulator has met the statutory requirement of being 
registered to vote when the circulator's voter registration address 
and the address given in the circulator's affidavit are not 
identical. Lakin asserts that, as in Greene, this difficulty 
provides a compelling justification for requiring that the address 
listed in the circulator's affidavit and the circulator's voter 
registration address match one another. Lakin concludes, therefore, 
that the legislature must have intended for section 3--1.2 to apply 
to circulators. 
     Contrary to Lakin's assertions, we do not believe that the 
need to facilitate the process of verifying the voter registration 
of petition circulators is necessarily as compelling as the need to 
facilitate the verification process for those who sign the 
nominating petition. First, unlike the individuals who sign the 
nominating petition to endorse the listed candidate, the circulator 
must make a sworn statement that he or she is a registered voter. 
Thus, the circulator is subject to an additional constraint which, 
by itself, helps ensure that the circulator is registered to vote. 
In addition, in any nominating petition, there are far fewer 
circulators than there are individuals signing that petition. 
Therefore, as a practical matter, verifying the registration of 
circulators is less burdensome than verifying the registration of 
the individuals who sign the nominating petition. These factors, in 
conjunction with the plain language of the statute, provide the 
basis for concluding that the legislature intended to limit the 
reach of section 3--1.2 to individuals who sign a nominating 
petition in support of the listed candidate. 
     As the instant appeal demonstrates, Lakin's interpretation of 
section 3--1.2 imposes a potentially harsh result upon the 
individuals who sign the nominating petition. Under Lakin's 
proposed construction, a registered circulator's inadvertent 
failure to update his or her voter registration address may cancel 
the otherwise valid signatures of the voters who sign the petition 
sheet, thereby nullifying those voters' right to endorse the 
candidate of their choice. See Bass, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 1113. We 
are mindful of the need to tread cautiously when construing 
statutory language which restricts the people's right to endorse 
and nominate the candidate of their choice. See, e.g., Tully v. 
Edgar, 171 Ill. 2d 297, 307 (1996) (legislation which limits the 
people's right to nominate candidates implicates the fundamental 
right to vote). Accordingly, in the absence of a clear legislative 
statement to the contrary, we hold that the Election Code does not 
require that the address in the circulator's affidavit on a 
nominating petition filed pursuant to section 7--10 be identical to 
the address where the circulator is registered to vote. 
     For the foregoing reasons we reverse the judgment of the 
appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
 
Appellate court judgment reversed; 
                                           circuit court judgment affirmed.