Case Title: In re Will of Jones

Citation: 362 N.C. 569

Docket Number: 37A08

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE WILL OF JOHN A. JONES, JR.
No. 37A08
FILED: 12 DECEMBER 2008
Wills--undue influence by spouse--issue of fact
There was a genuine issue of undue influence in a case involving two wills and an
allegation of undue influence over the mortally ill decedent by his wife of 47 years, given the
evidence of the relevant factors and the entire combination of facts, circumstances, and
inferences.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the
decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 188 N.C.
App. ___, 655 S.E.2d 407 (2008), affirming entry of summary
judgment for caveator on 20 October 2006 by Judge Knox V.
Jenkins, Jr. in Superior Court, Johnston County.  Heard in the
Supreme Court 5 May 2008.
Brady, Nordgren, Morton & Malone, PLLC, by Travis K.
Morton and Jason L. Hendren, for propounder-appellant
Joseph B. McLeod.
Smith Debnam Narron Drake Saintsing & Myers, L.L.P., by
John W. Narron, Bettie Kelley Sousa, and Alicia Jurney
Whitlock, for caveator-appellee Jean L. Jones.
HUDSON, Justice.
This case involves a dispute over a will executed on 1
September 2005 by testator John “Buck” Jones, Jr. and whether
that will was the product of undue influence exerted upon Mr.
Jones by his wife of forty-seven years, Jean L. Jones.  Because
we believe genuine issues of material fact remain as to the
question of undue influence, we reverse the Court of Appeals,
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which, in a divided opinion, affirmed the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment to Mrs. Jones and its order for the will to be
accepted for probate.  We also instruct the Court of Appeals to
remand to the trial court for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion on the issues of undue influence
and devasivit vel non.
On 11 October 2005, Mr. Jones, a Johnston County
resident, died at the age of seventy-six, survived by his wife
and no linear descendants.  Prior to the will he executed on 1
September 2005 (“September Will”), Mr. Jones executed a will and
trust agreement on 3 March 2005 (“March Will”); none of the
beneficiaries was present at the signing.  In the March Will,
executed after a February 2005 meeting with attorney Michael S.
Batts and his law partner, Mr. Jones directed that all household
items, his farming operation, his domesticated animals, his gun
collection, and any remaining personal effects be distributed
outright to Mrs. Jones upon the event of his death.  He also
specifically devised certain cattle to Robert Fowler, with whom
he had a longstanding friendship and partnership for cattle
breeding and sales.  
The March Will further provided that the residue of the
estate, including Mr. Jones’s shares in Carolina Packers, Inc., a
closely held meatpacking company in Smithfield, North Carolina,
started by Mr. Jones’s father and of which Mr. Jones was
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president and majority shareholder, go into a trust for Mrs.
Jones’s benefit during her life.  Joseph B. McLeod, who had
provided tax and accounting services for both Carolina Packers
and Mr. Jones since 1988, was named trustee.  Upon Mrs. Jones’s
death, the stock was to be delivered to three longtime Carolina
Packers employees, Kent Denning, Johnny Hayes, and Lynette
Thompson.  Mr. Jones also named Mr. McLeod the executor of the
March Will.  According to evidence in the record, Mr. Jones was
in decent health, ambulatory, and still working at Carolina
Packers at the time he signed the March Will.  According to Mr.
Batts, Mr. Jones specifically stated that he wanted his wife
taken care of but did not want her to have control of Carolina
Packers, and he described the terms of the March Will as being
“exactly what I want.”
In the September Will Mr. Jones expressly “revoke[d]
all earlier wills and codicils” and left close to the entirety of
his estate to Mrs. Jones outright, including the cattle
previously devised to Mr. Fowler.  The September Will also
directed that the residue of the estate be placed in a trust;
although the trust documents do not appear in the record, the
parties’ briefs to this Court suggest that the September Will
gave Mrs. Jones control of Carolina Packers.  She was also named
executrix of the September Will.
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Between the signing of the March Will and the September
Will, Mr. Jones began “a steady downhill course” in April 2005,
apparently related to the cancer with which he had been diagnosed
in 2004.  In late July 2005, Mr. Jones visited Rex Hospital’s
emergency room due to “pain [and] confusion,” and CT scans at
that time showed multiple metastatic deposits or tumors in his
brain.  According to Dr. Leroy G. Hoffman, Mr. Jones’s treating
oncologist during August and September 2005, such tumors can
cause confusion, and a doctor’s notes from that emergency room
visit reflect that Mr. Jones was indeed “profoundly weak and
confused,” with Mrs. Jones “serving as his surrogate decision-
maker.”  Mr. Jones’s diagnosis at that time, of which Mrs. Jones
was “very aware,” was terminal.
Deposition testimony and affidavits from longtime
friends and acquaintances of Mr. Jones further indicate that he
was suffering from intense pain, exhaustion, and confusion during
the summer of 2005.  Kent Denning, who had worked at Carolina
Packers for approximately twenty years, recalled Mr. Jones
exhibiting signs of confusion in the office at that time,
resulting in having to take Mr. Jones home.  Also in July, Mr.
Fowler observed Mr. Jones take more than the prescribed amount of
narcotic pain medication while the two men were fishing together. 
Mrs. Jones stated that Mr. Jones had experienced difficulties
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regulating his pain prescription beginning in late June and
through part of the summer of 2005. 
On or about 1 August 2005, Mr. Jones underwent “a
thoracic lumbar laminectomy” to relieve pain and pressure from a
tumor pressing against his spine.  Dr. Hoffman testified that
when “someone’s admitted to the hospital for an episode like this
. . . with the medications they’re taking, the postoperative
setting, there can be confusion. . . .  There may [also] be some
emotional stress going on.  You’d most likely think there was.”
Following his release from the hospital in early August, Mr.
Jones became a “total care” patient, relying heavily on others,
especially Mrs. Jones, to assist him with his medication, getting
out of bed, shaving, bathing, eating, and leaving home.  He
remained this way until his death in October.
During the months of August and September 2005, Mr.
Jones was especially physically and mentally weak.  According to
good friend John Antunes, Mr. Jones looked and sounded
increasingly weak and vulnerable, physically and mentally, during
the summer of 2005 until the time of his death.  Attorney Michael
Batts likewise described Mr. Jones as being worn down, exhausted,
and completely dependent on Mrs. Jones when he met with them at
their residence on 5 August 2005 to discuss potential changes to
the March Will, which he had drafted.  Mr. Fowler stated that
during his August and September visits with Mr. Jones, he
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“appeared very weak, less alert, and he did not speak much.”  In
a mid-August meeting with the Joneses regarding Mr. Jones’s and
Mr. Fowler’s cattle dealing, Mr. Fowler recalled that Mrs. Jones
controlled the conversation, even though Mr. Fowler had never
known Mr. Jones to involve his wife in these matters.  He also
believed that Mr. Jones appeared “weak, sick, and defeated.” 
Wayne Sinclair, a close friend of Mr. Jones for over
ten years and a witness to the March Will, stated that he saw Mr.
Jones nearly every day during 2005.  Between August and September
2005, he observed Mr. Jones’s health, strength, and mental
ability, including his sharpness and alertness, rapidly decline,
and he often helped Mr. Jones shave and bathe.  According to Mr.
Sinclair, Mr. Jones stopped speaking much during his September
visits, and he also saw Mr. Jones crying, which he had never
before seen.  Mr. Sinclair stated that “[b]y the end of August
2005, [Mr. Jones’s] attitude and personality were greatly changed
in that it appeared to [him] that he was not the same man.  His
spirit was gone and all of the fight was out of him by that
point.”
Finally, Dr. Hoffman saw Mr. Jones several hours after
the September Will was executed.  Dr. Hoffman stated that “it
would be hard to not see some signs of depression in anyone who
is in this state of cancer,” and Mr. Jones “seemed to be somewhat
depressed, which is understandable considering he has been an
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extremely active gentleman all his life.”  Dr. Hoffman further
maintained, “I don’t think he was the normal outgoing person or
type of person he was six months ago.  I didn’t ever see him
then, but I would imagine that there was some depression.”
Following Mr. Jones’s death, propounder Joseph McLeod
submitted the March Will for probate on 14 October 2005.  Shortly
thereafter, Mrs. Jones filed a caveat to the March Will alleging
that the September Will had expressly revoked the prior will and
was therefore the valid last will and testament of Mr. Jones. 
Mr. McLeod was a propounder of the March Will and the caveator of
the September Will; Mrs. Jones was the caveator of the March Will
and the propounder of the September Will.  On 20 October 2006, in
response to Mrs. Jones’s July motion for summary judgment, the
trial court concluded that there was no genuine issue of fact as
to whether Mr. Jones was unduly influenced by Mrs. Jones in
executing the September Will.  Accordingly, the trial court
granted summary judgment to Mrs. Jones and ordered the Clerk of
the Superior Court in Johnston County to accept the September
Will for probate.  
Mr. McLeod appealed, arguing that the trial court
committed reversible error in concluding that (1) the September
Will was not executed under undue influence exerted by Mrs.
Jones; (2) Mr. Jones had the testamentary capacity to execute the
September Will; and (3) summary judgment on the issue of
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devisavit vel non was appropriate despite evidence of undue
influence and lack of capacity.  In a divided opinion, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
as to each issue.  In re Will of Jones, __ N.C. App. __, __, 655
S.E.2d 407, 419 (2008).  The Court of Appeals majority concluded
that Mr. McLeod had “failed to present specific facts showing
that Mr. Jones’s will was executed solely as a result of
fraudulent and overpowering influence by Mrs. Jones that
controlled Mr. Jones at the time he executed the documents.”  Id.
at __, 655 S.E.2d at 417.  Moreover, Mr. McLeod had not “carried
his burden of proving undue influence” and had “failed to show
that Mr. Jones was susceptible to undue influence at the time he
executed the September Will.”  Id. at __, 655 S.E.2d at 416. 
Although the dissenting judge concurred on the issue of
testamentary capacity, she disagreed as to undue influence and
devisavit vel non, finding that Mr. McLeod had forecast
sufficient evidence on those issues.  Id. at __, 655 S.E.2d at
422 (Stroud, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Based on the dissent, Mr. McLeod appeals to this Court.  
Our standard of review of an appeal from summary
judgment is de novo; such judgment is appropriate only when the
record shows that “there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.”  Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 523-24, 649 S.E.2d 382, 385
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(2007) (citations and quotation omitted).  “When considering a
motion for summary judgment, the trial judge must view the
presented evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.”  Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 651, 548 S.E.2d 704, 707
(2001) (citation omitted).  If the movant demonstrates the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to
the nonmovant to present specific facts which establish the
presence of a genuine factual dispute for trial.  E.g., Lowe v.
Bradford, 305 N.C. 366, 369-70, 289 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1982)
(citing N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 56(e)).  Nevertheless, “[i]f there
is any question as to the weight of evidence summary judgment
should be denied.”  Marcus Bros. Textiles, Inc. v. Price
Waterhouse, LLP, 350 N.C. 214, 220, 513 S.E.2d 320, 325 (1999)
(citing Kessing v. Nat’l Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 535, 180
S.E.2d 823, 830 (1971)).
In applying these well-established principles here, we
must determine whether Mr. McLeod, as propounder of the March
Will, forecast evidence of a prima facie case of undue influence
sufficient to overcome Mrs. Jones’s motion for summary judgment. 
This Court has previously defined “undue influence” as  
something operating upon the mind of the
person whose act is called in judgment, of
sufficient controlling effect to destroy free
agency and to render the instrument, brought
in question, not properly an expression of
the wishes of the maker, but rather the
expression of the will of another.  “It is
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the substitution of the mind of the person
exercising the influence for the mind of the
testator, causing him to make a will which he
otherwise would not have made.”
In short, undue influence, which justifies
the setting aside of a will, is a fraudulent
influence, or such an overpowering influence
as amounts to a legal wrong.  It is close
akin to coercion produced by importunity, or
by a silent, resistless power, exercised by
the strong over the weak, which could not be
resisted, so that the end reached is
tantamount to the effect produced by the use
of fear or force.
In re Will of Turnage, 208 N.C. 130, 131-32, 179 S.E. 332, 333
(1935).  Thus, while undue influence requires “more than mere
influence or persuasion because a person can be influenced to
perform an act that is nevertheless his voluntary action,” In re
Will of Andrews, 299 N.C. 52, 53, 261 S.E.2d 198, 199 (1980)
(internal citation omitted), it does not require moral turpitude
or a bad or improper motive, In re Will of Craven, 169 N.C. 641,
649, 169 N.C. 561, 568, 86 S.E. 587, 591 (1915).  Indeed, undue
influence may even be exerted by a person with the best of
motives.  Id.; see also In re Will of Turnage, 208 N.C. at 132,
179 S.E. at 333.  Nevertheless, influence is not necessarily
“undue,” even if gained through persuasion or kindness and
resulting in an “unequal or unjust disposition . . . in favor of
those who have contributed to [the testator’s] comfort and
ministered to his wants, [so long as] such disposition is
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voluntarily made.”  In re Will of Craven, 169 N.C. at 650, 169
N.C. at 569-70, 86 S.E. at 592 (citation omitted).  
Undue influence is an inherently subjective term, and
finding its existence thus requires engaging in a heavily fact-
specific inquiry.  Indeed, we have noted the difficulty of making
such a determination in past cases:
It is impossible to set forth all the
various combinations of facts and
circumstances that are sufficient to make out
a case of undue influence because the
possibilities are as limitless as the
imagination of the adroit and the cunning. 
The very nature of undue influence makes it
impossible for the law to lay down tests to
determine its existence with mathematical
certainty.
In re Will of Andrews, 299 N.C. at 54-55, 261 S.E.2d at 200
(citation omitted); see also Hardee v. Hardee, 309 N.C. 753, 756,
309 S.E.2d 243, 245 (1983) (“This Court has recognized the
difficulty a party faces in proving undue influence in the
execution of a document.”  (citation omitted)).  Nevertheless, we
have identified several factors that often support a finding of
undue influence (“Andrews factors”):
“1.
Old age and physical and mental
weakness;
2.
That the person signing the paper is in
the home of the beneficiary and subject
to his constant association and
supervision;
3.
That others have little or no
opportunity to see him;
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4.
That the will is different from and
revokes a prior will;
5.
That it is made in favor of one with
whom there are no ties of blood;
6.
That it disinherits the natural objects
of his bounty;
7.
That the beneficiary has procured its
execution.”
In re Will of Andrews, 299 N.C. at 55, 261 S.E.2d at 200 (quoting
In re Will of Mueller, 170 N.C. 69, 71, 170 N.C. 28, 30, 86 S.E.
719, 720 (1915)).  
The diverse circumstances of Mueller and Andrews
illustrate the need to apply and weigh each factor in light of
the differing factual setting of each case.  In Mueller, the
testator’s children contested a will executed a week before the
testator’s death, which left his estate to his caregivers of two
weeks, his sister-in-law and her husband.  In Andrews, the
testator’s son challenged a will which more favorably treated the
testator’s second wife and her son by a previous marriage.  In
each instance, the facts were sufficient to present the question
of undue influence to the jury and to support the jury’s verdict
setting aside the will.
A caveator need not demonstrate every factor named in
Andrews to prove undue influence, In re Estate of Forrest, 66
N.C. App. 222, 225, 311 S.E.2d 341, 343, aff’d per curiam, 311
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N.C. 298, 316 S.E.2d 55 (1984), as “[u]ndue influence is
generally proved by a number of facts, each one of which standing
alone may be of little weight, but taken collectively may satisfy
a rational mind of its existence,” Hardee, 309 N.C. at 757, 309
S.E.2d at 246 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, any evidence showing “an opportunity and
disposition to exert undue influence, the degree of
susceptibility of [the] testator to undue influence, and a result
which indicates that undue influence has been exerted” is
generally relevant and important.  In re Will of Thompson, 248
N.C. 588, 593, 104 S.E.2d 280, 285 (1958) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).  If a reasonable mind could infer from
such evidence that the purported last will and testament is not
the product of the testator’s “free and unconstrained act,” but
is rather the result of “overpowering influence . . . sufficient
to overcome [the] testator’s free will and agency,” then “the
case must be submitted to the jury for its decision.”  In re Will
of Andrews, 299 N.C. at 56, 261 S.E.2d at 200.
Here, the record contains a substantial amount of
evidence presented by both parties, much of which ultimately
conflicts on the question of undue influence as considered
through application of the Andrews factors.  Indeed, the factual
situation presented here is more difficult in no small part
because the party accused of exerting undue influence over Mr.
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Jones is his wife of forty-seven years, the natural object of his
bounty and an individual who undoubtedly influenced Mr. Jones and
his decisions.  
We have recognized the particular closeness of the
marital relationship on a number of occasions in the context of
will cases.  See, e.g., In re Peterson, 136 N.C. 10, 20, 136 N.C.
13, 27, 48 S.E. 561, 566 (1904) (“In the light of the experience
and observation of men of the best judgment and soundest minds,
we can see nothing in the fact that this man gave his estate, the
produce of their joint industry and economy, to his wife, tending
to show mental incapacity or undue influence.”); see also In re
Will of Ball, 225 N.C. 91, 93, 33 S.E.2d 619, 621 (1945) (“Nor is
the fact testator gave his property to the childless wife of his
bosom to the exclusion of his sister and his nephews and nieces
evidence of undue influence.”); In re Will of Broach, 172 N.C.
520, 524, 90 S.E. 681, 683 (1916) (“But the fact that a wife has
influence with her husband, and even if there is evidence that
she is the dominant partner, this does not of itself prove that
she exerted that influence to dictate the terms of the will[.]”);
In re Will of Cooper, 166 N.C. 210, 211, 81 S.E. 161, 162 (1914)
(rejecting as “untenable” the caveator’s position that the
propounder wife had to rebut a presumption of undue influence).
These cases demonstrate a strong respect for marriage
and suggest that spouses are often accorded special consideration
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in undue influence cases in light of their close relationship
with the testator.  Nevertheless, the question remains as to
whether such influence was “undue” in the context of Mr. Jones’s
decision to revoke the March Will and execute the September Will. 
Again, much of the deposition testimony and affidavits is open to
competing interpretations.  Given our standard of review,
however, we view this evidence in the light most favorable to Mr.
McLeod and find that he has forecast sufficient facts from which
a jury could reasonably infer that Mr. Jones executed the
September Will as a result of Mrs. Jones’s undue influence.  
We reach no conclusion as to the validity of Mr.
McLeod’s allegations, but find it nonetheless necessary to
demonstrate which evidence presented by Mr. McLeod might allow a
jury to reasonably infer undue influence, under both the Andrews
factors and our prior case law defining the term.  First, as to
Mr. Jones’s age, physical, and mental weakness when he signed the
September Will:  as outlined above, Mr. Jones was seventy-six
years old, ill with cancer, and by many accounts confused, in
pain, significantly debilitated, and nearly entirely dependent on
his wife.  In contrast, he was in decent health, ambulatory, and
still working at the time the March Will was executed.  According
to the testimony and affidavits of several individuals who saw
Mr. Jones and interacted with him in the months immediately
before his death, he appeared vulnerable to undue influence
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because of his weakened state and in their opinions, Mrs. Jones
was engaged in such undue influence.
Mrs. Jones maintains that we should disregard the
contents of some of the affidavits submitted by Mr. McLeod, such
as that of Mr. Sinclair, as those statements are contradicted by
a later affidavit from Mr. Sinclair that she offers.  However,
these discrepancies, as well as those in the evidence from Dr.
Hoffman, go to the weight and credibility of the evidence, which
are questions for a jury and not for this Court.  See, e.g., In
re Will of Jarvis, 334 N.C. 140, 143, 430 S.E.2d 922, 923 (1993)
(stating that determining the credibility of testimony is “for
the jury, not the court”).
We find similarly unpersuasive Mrs. Jones’s contention
that the trial court’s finding that Mr. Jones did not lack
testamentary capacity at the time he executed the September Will,
undisturbed by the Court of Appeals and not before this Court,
should compel the conclusion that Mr. Jones’s physical and mental
weakness were not so acute as to support the inference that he
was more vulnerable to undue influence.  We have previously
stated that even if a jury resolves the issue of mental capacity
against a party seeking to set aside a document, a jury can still
find “consistent[] with its answer to the mental capacity issue,
that when [the person at issue] executed the [document] he was
physically and mentally weak.”  Hardee, 309 N.C. at 758, 309
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S.E.2d at 246; see also Caudill v. Smith, 117 N.C. App. 64, 69,
450 S.E.2d 8, 12 (1994) (“[A] finding against the [party
challenging a document] on the issue of mental capacity does not
necessarily preclude a finding of mental weakness on the issue of
undue influence.” (citing Hardee, 309 N.C. at 758, 309 S.E.2d at
246)), disc. rev. denied, 339 N.C. 610, 454 S.E.2d 247 (1995). 
Turning to the second Andrews factor, that the testator
is “in the home of the beneficiary and subject to his constant
association and supervision,” we note again the particular
difficulty of weighing such a finding when the testator and the
beneficiary are husband and wife residing in the same home, and
we caution that this factor should not be allowed to be
effectively considered per se prejudicial against a spouse.  
The third Andrews factor, that “others have little or
no opportunity to see” the testator, is likewise self-evident in
a situation such as here, in which a wife is looking after a very
ill husband.  By all accounts, Mrs. Jones was Mr. Jones’s primary
caregiver in the last months of his life, and evidence of her
attention to her husband’s needs undoubtedly mitigates the
suggestion that she provided such care solely to unduly influence
his estate planning decisions.  Moreover, the mere fact that the
record contains deposition testimony and affidavits from numerous
friends and acquaintances who visited Mr. Jones during August and
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September 2005 undermines the argument that Mrs. Jones was
deliberately isolating Mr. Jones.
Nevertheless, Mr. McLeod has forecast evidence that
could allow a reasonable jury to infer exactly that conclusion. 
For example, Mr. Jones signed the September Will at the residence
where both he and Mrs. Jones lived, while she was present in the
house.  Although Mr. Jones did occasionally leave the house for
brief periods in the late summer months, by the time he executed
the September Will, he was completely dependent on others for his
physical mobility and care.  Mrs. Jones confirmed that Mr. Jones
would sometimes spend time at home without his wife, but that she
never left him for more than a couple of hours at a time.
More significantly, however, Mr. McLeod presented
evidence that an intercom, or baby monitor, was located in Mr.
Jones’s bedroom, suggesting that Mrs. Jones may have monitored
Mr. Jones’s personal visits, telephone conversations, or both. 
In addition, despite his weakened physical condition, the
telephone in Mr. Jones’s room was located under his bed during
the summer of 2005, and Mrs. Jones removed it entirely in
September.  Mr. Batts recounted twice trying to telephone Mr.
Jones on 23 August 2005 to discuss the proposed changes to the
March Will; both times, Mrs. Jones answered the calls and barred
Mr. Batts from speaking to Mr. Jones.  
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Although Mr. Batts insisted the call was about a
private matter, Mrs. Jones repeatedly inquired as to the purpose
of the call and whether Mr. Batts was going to draft a new will. 
According to Mr. Batts, Mrs. Jones implied that Mr. Batts wanted
to challenge the will, and she stated that she had not coerced
Mr. Jones into changing his will and had only talked with him
about it once.  After not hearing back from Mr. Jones, Mr. Batts
called him back on 25 August 2005; Mrs. Jones again screened the
call and refused to allow Mr. Batts to speak with her husband. 
James V. Narron, the attorney who drafted the September Will,
also recalled that Mrs. Jones told him in a telephone
conversation that she wanted Mr. Jones to leave her everything
outright and did not want anyone from Carolina Packers to know
that Mr. Narron was coming to their home.
Again, while a jury might ultimately find Mrs. Jones’s
restrictions to be consistent with the actions of a dutiful wife
concerned about her sick husband’s well-being, Mr. McLeod has
forecast evidence that could likewise lead a reasonable jury to
weigh this evidence in favor of the conclusion that Mrs. Jones
used her control over access to insert herself between Mr. Jones
and his attorney, particularly concerning the terms of his will. 
Regardless of which interpretation hews most closely to the
truth, the evidence reflects that a genuine issue of material
fact remains.
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The fourth Andrews factor, that “the will is different
from and revokes a prior will,” is unquestionably present here as
to the March Will and the September Will.  Moreover, Mr. McLeod
offered considerable evidence that the September Will differed
significantly from Mr. Jones’s longtime estate plans, while the
March Will was largely consistent with prior testamentary
instruments executed by Mr. Jones in 1992, 2001, 2003, and 2004. 
In each of those documents, Mr. Jones devised the bulk of his
estate to a trust that would pay income to Mrs. Jones for life
but did not pass Carolina Packers shares to her outright. 
Rather, the 1992 will ultimately directed his shares to a
nonprofit foundation bearing his name; the subsequent documents
directed the shares to certain named employees, as did the March
Will.  Although Mr. Jones periodically changed the employees
designated to receive the shares, he always included the three
employees named in the March Will among the beneficiaries.  Mr.
Jones also always either named himself or Carolina Packers’
certified public accountant (CPA) as trustee and his acting CPA
as executor.  By contrast, the September Will left everything to
Mrs. Jones, including all stock in Carolina Packers, and named
her executrix.
Although the fifth and sixth Andrews factors--that “the
will is in favor of one with whom there are no ties of blood” and
that “it disinherits natural objects of [the testator’s] bounty”-
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-obviously weigh in Mrs. Jones’s favor as the testator’s wife and
only natural heir, the unique factual situation presented here
lessens the importance of these factors.  For example, under
either the March Will or the September Will, Mrs. Jones received
the bulk of Mr. Jones’s estate; the principal differences were
the degree of control accorded to her as executrix of the
September Will, and its provisions as to ownership of the cattle
and Carolina Packers.  In the latter case, the change ran
contrary to Mr. Jones’s long-expressed desires, as evidenced in
his conversation with Mr. Batts when he executed the March Will
and in the earlier testamentary instruments. 
Finally, as to the seventh Andrews factor, that “the
beneficiary has procured [the will’s] execution,” Mr. McLeod’s
forecast of evidence is replete with specific facts that could
allow a reasonable jury to infer such a conclusion.  For example,
after learning of the existence and terms of the March Will at
some point in July 2005, Mrs. Jones told Mr. McLeod that, “she
was very upset about the provisions of the March Will, that she
had put up with [Mr. Jones] for almost fifty years and that there
was no way that she was going to let that Will remain as it was.” 
The record contains no evidence that Mr. Jones desired or
attempted to change the March Will before that conversation. 
However, on 1 August 2005, while Mr. Jones was still in the
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hospital, Mrs. Jones called Mr. Batts and told him that “she
wanted to see him about Mr. Jones’ Will and power of attorney.” 
In his affidavit, notes, and a file memorandum
regarding his subsequent meeting with the Joneses on 5 August
2005, Mr. Batts recollected the following observations:  (1) Mrs.
Jones led the group’s conversation and repeatedly stated that the
will needed to be changed so that “she got everything”; (2) “Due
to [Mr. Batts’s] years of experience, [he] had red flags and
warning bells going off in [his] head,” and as a result, asked to
speak with Mr. Jones alone, to which Mrs. Jones responded,
“‘[W]hy, he’ll just tell you the same thing’”; (3) After Mrs.
Jones left the room, Mr. Jones began the conversation by stating
that Mr. Batts “should just do the Will the way that [Mrs. Jones]
wanted it”; (4) After Mr. Batts informed Mr. Jones that his job
as an attorney was to draft a testamentary plan that reflected
Mr. Jones’s desires, Mr. Jones replied that “he didn’t really
care anymore, that it wouldn’t be his problem who got what
because he would be gone”; (5) Mr. Jones further stated that “he
would hate to see the company sold because it had been in either
his or his father’s name for about fifty years,” but he
“guess[ed]” it “would be okay to leave [it] up to [Mrs. Jones]
and the board of directors”; (6) Mr. Jones emphasized that all he
wanted to focus on was getting back on his feet “and that he
didn’t want to keep talking about his Will all the time.”   
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According to Mr. Batts, when he and Mr. Jones rejoined
Mrs. Jones, she repeatedly inquired as to what they had
discussed.  When Mr. Batts responded that it was better if the
information remained private due to a potential will contest,
Mrs. Jones continued to press the matter.  At this point, Mr.
Jones became irritated and stated, “‘[I]t’s the same thing as we
talked about before, I didn’t tell him anything different.’”  Mr.
Batts recalled that Mrs. Jones followed him outside after the
meeting and without Mr. Jones present, spent several minutes
emphasizing again that all Mr. Jones needed was a simple will
leaving everything to her and naming her executrix.  When Mr.
Batts informed her that Mr. Jones had told the named employees
about the March Will, she responded that “if they did contest the
Will she would just fire them.”  She further stated that she had
been “‘stepped on for too long and was now going to fight for
what was hers’” and “her lawyers had told her that [Mr. Jones’]
Will wouldn’t have worked anyway, because she would have been
able to contest it and get one-half of the company.”
In addition, Mrs. Jones told Mr. Fowler, Mr. Sinclair,
and Mr. Narron of her desire to get the March Will changed.  In
mid-August Mrs. Jones told Mr. Fowler she knew the March Will
left Carolina Packers to three employees and that she was
concerned that, if the terms of the Will were effected, she would
be voted off the company’s board of directors.  Mrs. Jones also
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informed Mr. Fowler for the first time that Mr. Jones had left
him certain cattle in the March Will and said that “they wanted
[Mr. Fowler] to sign a contract providing [Mrs.] Jones would own
half of the calf crop and rights thereto.”  Mr. Fowler recalled
that during the meeting, Mr. Jones “appeared weak, sick, and
defeated” and stated, while “[l]ooking down at the floor,” “Just
sign the contract like she wants.”
Around the end of August, Mrs. Jones told Mr. Sinclair
the March Will was “‘totally wrong,’” that it did not provide
enough support for her, and that she was going to have someone
“look into” a new will.  In a telephone conversation with Mr.
Narron on 29 August 2005, Mrs. Jones stated that she wanted Mr.
Jones to leave her everything outright.  
All of these incidents and conversations, when viewed
in the light most favorable to Mr. McLeod, could support a
reasonable jury’s inference of undue influence.
In light of our standard of review, we do not recite
all of Mrs. Jones’s evidence supporting her contention that Mr.
Jones’s wishes were reflected in the September Will.  Suffice it
to say, however, that the full evidence under each of the Andrews
factors, as well as the entire “combination of facts,
circumstances and inferences,” In re Will of Andrews, 299 N.C. at
56, 261 S.E.2d at 200, leaves an issue of undue influence in the
execution of the September Will.  Perhaps, as asserted by Mrs.
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Jones, Mr. Jones had a change of heart as to the distribution of
his business assets based on his love for her and the care she
provided for him at the end of his life.  Nevertheless, those
questions and ambiguities are precisely the reason why summary
judgment was inappropriate here, as the evidence, when taken in
the light most favorable to Mr. McLeod, shows that a genuine
issue of material fact remains as to whether Mrs. Jones’s
influence was “undue.”
We conclude that Mr. McLeod has sufficiently forecast a
prima facie case of undue influence and likewise presents genuine
issues of material fact related to the questions of undue
influence and devisavit vel non in relation to the September
Will.  Therefore, we reverse and remand to the Court of Appeals
for further remand to the trial court for proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion on the issues of undue influence
and devisavit vel non.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.