Case Title: Morton v. Madison County Nursing Home Auxiliary

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90796

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2001-11-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 90796-Agenda 31-September 2001.
RICHARD MORTON, as Independent Adm'r for the Estate of 
William R. Morton, Appellant, v. MADISON COUNTY 
NURSING HOME AUXILIARY et al. (The County of Madison, 								Appellee).
Opinion filed November 21, 2001.
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	The issue in this case is whether the plaintiff's amended
complaint adding a new defendant relates back to his original
complaint under section 2-616(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure
(735 ILCS 5/2-616(d) (West 2000)).

BACKGROUND
	William Morton was a resident of the Madison County
Nursing Home. In 1998, William perished when he either fell or
jumped from a third-story window of the nursing home. Later that
year, the administrator of William's estate, Richard Morton, timely
filed a two-count complaint pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act
(740 ILCS 180/0.01 (West 2000)) and the Survival Act (755 ILCS
5/27-6 (West 2000)) against the Madison County Nursing Home
Auxiliary (Auxiliary), and served its registered agent, the director
of the nursing home (hereinafter, the first service). The Auxiliary
filed an answer raising the affirmative defense that it has no title,
interest, authority, or control over the nursing home. Instead, the
Auxiliary contended, Morton should have named Madison County
as the defendant and served its agent, the county clerk, because the
nursing home was subject to the authority and control of the
County.
	After the statute of limitations had expired, Morton moved to
amend his complaint under section 2-616(d) of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-616(d) (West 2000)) to add the County
as a defendant. Pursuant to that section, Morton averred that: (1)
the original complaint had been filed within the limitations period
for a wrongful-death action; (2) the failure to join Madison County
as a defendant was inadvertent; (3) the summons was originally
served on the director of the nursing home as an agent of Madison
County; (4) Madison County was aware of the pending action
from its inception; and (5) the cause of action asserted against the
County in the amended complaint grew out of the same occurrence
set forth in the original complaint.
	The trial court allowed Morton's amendment, and Morton
served the amended complaint on the County's registered agent,
the county clerk (hereinafter, the second service). In response,
Madison County filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Morton's
amended complaint did not relate back to his original complaint
because it failed to comply with section 2-616(d). Specifically, the
County argued that the nursing home director, whom Morton had
initially served, was not the proper agent of the County for
purposes of service. Therefore, Morton failed to satisfy the third
prong of section 2-616(d) which requires actual service on the
proper defendant. See 735 ILCS 5/2-616(d)(3) (West 2000).
Morton responded that even if his first service did not satisfy the
third prong, his second service-that on the county clerk after the
limitations period had expired-did satisfy the third prong.
	The trial court granted the County's motion to dismiss, and
Morton appealed. The appellate court affirmed, holding first that
Morton's service on the nursing home director was not proper
under section 2-211 of the Code of Civil Procedure because the
proper agent for service on a county is the chairperson of the
county board or the county clerk. Section 2-211 provides that,
"summons may be served by leaving a copy with the chairperson
of the county board or county clerk in the case of a county ***."
735 ILCS 5/2-211 (West 2000). The court concluded that, because
the director was not an "agent" of the County for purposes of
service, Morton's first service did not satisfy the third prong of
section 2-616(d). The appellate court also held that Morton could
not rely on his second service to satisfy section 2-616(d) because
the third prong of section 2-616(d) requires that service occur
within the limitations period. Morton's second service did not
occur until after the limitations period; therefore, the court held
that it did not satisfy the third prong. The appellate court thus
concluded that, under section 2-616(d), Morton's amended
complaint adding the County as a defendant did not relate back to
his original complaint. 317 Ill. App. 3d 561.
	We granted Morton's petition for leave to appeal pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 315(a) (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and now affirm
the appellate court.

ANALYSIS
	Under the common law, the failure to join the proper party
before the running of the statute of limitations was fatal to the
plaintiff's claim. Fitzpatrick v. Pitcairn, 371 Ill. 203 (1939); C.
Drechsler, Annotation, Change in Party After Statute of
Limitations Has Run, 8 A.L.R.2d §§72, 76 (1942). Indeed, an
amendment to join the proper party was regarded as the
commencement of a new action or proceeding against the
substituted defendant which does not relate back to the institution
of the original action. See 8 A.L.R.2d §72.
	For example, in Fitzpatrick, the plaintiff filed a wrongful-death action against the Wabash Railway Company and served
summons on the railway's agent. Fitzpatrick, 371 Ill.  at 205.
Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, the railway was in receivership at
the time of the accident, and the railway's agent was also the agent
of the receivers. Fitzpatrick, 371 Ill.  at 205. By the time the
plaintiff discovered his mistake, the one-year limitations period for
bringing a wrongful-death action had run. Fitzpatrick, 371 Ill.  at
205. Nevertheless, the plaintiff joined the receivers as defendants
and served them with process. Fitzpatrick, 371 Ill.  at 205. The
receivers moved to dismiss on the ground that the limitations
period had expired, and the trial court granted the motion.
Fitzpatrick, 371 Ill.  at 205. On appeal, this court held that the
plaintiff's claim against the receivers was barred, despite the fact
that the agent served was the agent of both the receivers and the
railway. Fitzpatrick, 371 Ill.  at 205, 208. This court wrote that the
"railway company was the party intended to be sued. There was no
misnomer but a case of mistaken identity of the party liable."
Fitzpatrick, 371 Ill.  at 208.
	In 1954, and in response to Fitzpatrick, our legislature enacted
section 46(4) of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, ch.
110, par. 46(4)), now section 2-616(d) of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-616(d) (West 2000)). See Ill. Ann. Stat.,
ch. 110, par. 46(4), Joint Committee Comments-1955, at 49
(Smith-Hurd 1956). Section 2-616(d) of the Code of Civil
Procedure was designed to afford relief to the plaintiff who, after
the limitations period has expired, realizes that he has named the
wrong defendant. 735 ILCS 5/2-616(d) (West 2000). In such
instances of mistaken identity, section 2-616(d) provides that a
statute of limitations will not bar the action as long as the plaintiff
can meet all five of the statutory requirements. Section 2-616(d)
provides:
			"A cause of action against a person not originally
named a defendant is not barred by lapse of time under
any statute or contract prescribing or limiting the time
within which an action may be brought or right asserted,
if all the following terms and conditions are met: (1) the
time prescribed or limited had not expired when the
original action was commenced; (2) failure to join the
person as a defendant was inadvertent; (3) service of
summons was in fact had upon the person, his or her
agent or partner, as the nature of the defendant made
appropriate, even though he or she was served in the
wrong capacity or as agent of another ***; (4) the person,
within the time that the action might have been brought or
the right asserted against him or her, knew that the
original action was pending and that it grew out of a
transaction or occurrence involving or concerning him or
her; and (5) it appears from the original and amended
pleadings that the cause of action asserted in the amended
pleading grew out of the same transaction or occurrence
set up in the original pleading, *** even though the
person was not named originally as a defendant. For the
purpose of preserving the cause of action under those
conditions, an amendment adding the person as a
defendant relates back to the date of the filing of the
original pleading so amended." 735 ILCS 5/2-616(d)
(West 2000).
	Read as a whole, section 2-616(d) requires that, in order for
the amended complaint to relate back to the original complaint, the
plaintiff must show that all five requirements have been met. See
Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990) (stating that a
statute should be read as a whole, and so that no word or phrase is
rendered superfluous or meaningless). In essence, the relation-
back provision of section 2-616(d) is an exception to the
requirement that plaintiffs comply with the applicable statutes of
limitation. These limitations exist to ensure repose and that claims
be advanced while the evidence to rebut them is still fresh.
Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County of Du Page, 195 Ill. 2d 257, 265-66 (2001); Roth v. Northern Assurance Co., 32 Ill. 2d 40, 46
(1964). In order to preserve the rights of the defendant and to
avoid doing violence to the purposes of statutes of limitation, the
legislature decided to permit an amended complaint only when "all
the *** terms and conditions [of section 2-616(d)] are met." 735
ILCS 5/2-616(d) (West 2000).
	Rule 2-616(d) requires, therefore, that at the time plaintiff
seeks to amend his complaint, the burden is on the plaintiff to
demonstrate that: he has filed the complaint within the limitations
period; his failure to name the proper defendant was inadvertent;
the defendant had knowledge of the suit within the limitations
period; the amendment is based on the same transaction or
occurrence as the original complaint; and "service of summons
was in fact had upon" the proper defendant, albeit in the wrong
capacity. (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2-616(d) (West 2000).
Only "under those conditions" can an amendment adding a person
as a defendant relate back to the filing date of the original
pleading. 735 ILCS 5/2-616(d) (West 2000). With this in mind,
we now turn to Morton's attempt to amend his complaint.
	The dispute in this case revolves around whether Morton
meets the third prong of section 2-616(d), which requires proof
that "service of summons was in fact had upon the person [or his]
agent ***, even though he or she was served in the wrong capacity
or as agent of another." 735 ILCS 5/2-616(d)(3) (West 2000).
Morton originally sued the wrong defendant, the Auxiliary, and
served the nursing home director. Morton concedes, and we agree,
that when Morton served the director as the agent of the Auxiliary,
he did not serve an "agent" of Madison County. See 735 ILCS
5/2-211 (West 2000). Therefore, Morton's service on the nursing
home director did not meet the third requirement of section
2-616(d), namely, that Morton had to serve the County or its agent
for his amended complaint to relate back. See Altevogt v.
Brinkoetter, 85 Ill. 2d 44, 51 (1981); Lau v. West Towns Bus Co.,
16 Ill. 2d 442, 449 (1959).
	Nonetheless, Morton contends that his second service, which
occurred outside the statute of limitations, satisfies the third prong
because that section does not require service within the limitations
period. In support of this contention, Morton points out that the
fourth prong of section 2-616(d), which requires that the
defendant have knowledge of the pending action, specifically
states that the defendant must obtain this knowledge within the
limitations period. See 735 ILCS 5/2-616(d)(4) (West 2000)
(requiring that "the person, within the time that the action might
have been brought or the right asserted against him or her, knew
that the original action was pending (emphasis added)"). By
contrast, the third prong contains no such language regarding the
limitations period. 735 ILCS 5/2-616(d)(3) (West 2000) (requiring
that "service of summons was in fact had upon the person ***
even though he or she was served in the wrong capacity").
	Morton's reading of the statute, however, ignores the
language of the entire provision. As we have discussed, section
2-616(d) read as a whole shows that service on the proper
defendant must be accomplished before the protection of section
2-616(d) is sought, that is, before the plaintiff moves to amend his
complaint. Here, Morton is attempting to satisfy section 2-616(d)
with his amended complaint. He wants to meet the service prong
with the service of the amended complaint on the County. Section
2-616(d), however, does not contemplate such a scenario.
	In fact, as a practical matter, Morton's pleadings show that, by
the time he sought to amend his complaint (and no later), he had
to have already served the County or its agent. In his motion to
amend his complaint to add the County as a defendant, Morton
averred that "service of summons was originally had upon the
director of the nursing home, as the agent of Madison County."
Although Morton later conceded that his service on the director
was improper, he still relied on that first service to persuade the
court to grant his motion to amend. He did not rely on his second
service (on the county clerk) to satisfy section 2-616(d). Nor could
he. At the time, Morton was seeking leave to amend his complaint.
Until such leave was obtained, Morton had nothing to serve upon
the County. Morton recognized then that a plaintiff must make an
initial showing that he meets all the requirements of section
2-616(d) before he can amend his complaint and serve the newly
added defendant. It was not until the County objected to the
court's jurisdiction in its motion to dismiss that Morton changed
his legal theory to rely on his second service. Thus, the very
procedural posture of a section 2-616(d) amendment dictates that
a plaintiff cannot rely on the service of the amended complaint to
satisfy the service prong of section 2-616(d). Accordingly, we
hold that Morton cannot rely on his second service to satisfy
section 2-616(d).
	In opposition to this result, Morton raises several arguments.
First, Morton argues that the timing of service is not governed by
the third prong of section 2-616(d), but more generally by
Supreme Court Rule 103(b) (177 Ill. 2d R. 103(b)). Under Rule
103(b), if a plaintiff who timely files a claim fails to serve the
defendant before the limitations period has expired, the court in its
discretion may allow the plaintiff to serve the defendant if he
demonstrates due diligence. Segal v. Sacco, 136 Ill. 2d 282, 286
(1990). Presumably, Morton envisions the following scenario. As
here, the plaintiff fails to serve the correct defendant within the
limitations period. But, unlike the instant case, after the statute of
limitations has run, the plaintiff serves summons pursuant to Rule
103(b) on the correct defendant, albeit in the wrong capacity.
Thereafter, the plaintiff moves to amend his complaint to sue the
correct defendant. Under Morton's reading of the rule, whether
service is proper in this scenario is a question to be decided not
under section 2-616(d) but rather under Rule 103(b).
	The problem with Morton's argument is that it confuses the
distinct purposes of Rule 103(b) and section 2-616(d). Rule
103(b) allows a diligent plaintiff to serve a defendant outside the
limitations period where the complaint naming that defendant was
filed within the limitations period. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 103(b);
Segal, 136 Ill. 2d  at 286-87. In other words, Rule 103(b) applies
only where the plaintiff has named the proper defendant within the
limitations period. Section 2-616(d), by contrast, permits the
naming of a defendant outside the limitations period, where the
proper defendant was not named within the limitations period
because of mistaken identity. Thus, Rule 103(b) and section
2-616(d) cure separate and wholly distinct pleading defects: Rule
103(b) provides a cure for late service on a timely named
defendant, and section 2-616(d) provides a cure for the late
naming of a timely served defendant. Rule 103(b), therefore, is
unavailable to plaintiffs, like Morton, who fail to name the proper
defendant within the statute of limitations.
	Morton also argues that if we hold that service under section
2-616(d) must occur within the limitations period, we have placed
the defendant, who is finally served after the limitations period and
had knowledge of the suit all along (as the County did here), in a
better position than the defendant who never heard of the suit, but
was named the last day of the limitations period and served
thereafter under Rule 103(b). Morton's objection is misplaced. As
we have discussed, section 2-616(d) exists to provide relief to a
plaintiff in instances of mistaken identity, not mistaken service. If
a defendant under section 2-616(d) is placed in a better or worse
position than a defendant under Supreme Court Rule 103(b), then
that is the judgment of the legislature. We will not here overturn
that judgment, contrary to the language and purposes of the
separate provisions.
	In addition, Morton maintains that if the third prong requires
service within the limitations period, then the defendant would
always acquire knowledge of the suit within that period. He argues
that this would render superfluous the fourth prong, which requires
that the defendant have knowledge of the suit within the
limitations period. See Kraft, 138 Ill. 2d  at 189. Morton's
argument is understandable, as the courts have often confused the
two requirements. See, e.g., Thomson v. McDonald's, Inc., 180 Ill.
App. 3d 984, 987-88 (1989); Bates v. Wagon Wheel Country Club,
Inc., 132 Ill. App. 2d 161, 166 (1971). Nevertheless, it fails as a
practical matter. For example, when an individual who acts as an
agent for several entities is served with summons, he may
understandably notify only the defendant named in the summons
and not the others for whom he also acts as agent. In that instance,
the proper defendant might not learn of the action until after the
limitations period has run. See A. Jenner, Pleading, Parties and
Trial Practice, 50 Nw. U. L. Rev. 612, 619-20 (1955). Morton's
assertion that service on the agent within the limitations period
will always constitute knowledge by the proper defendant, thereby
rending the fourth prong meaningless, is therefore incorrect.
	Indeed, if we were to adopt Morton's rendering, the third
prong would be rendered meaningless; that is, if service could
occur at any time, then it would not be included in section
2-616(d) in the first place. Morton posits that the service
requirement exists merely to bring the defendant properly before
the court. This argument, however, begs the question. The entire
provision of section 2-616(d) exists to allow the court to exercise
jurisdiction over a defendant where a plaintiff has failed to name
the defendant within the limitations period. When that defendant
objects to jurisdiction on the basis of service, the plaintiff cannot
answer that service merely brings the defendant before the court.
As we have discussed, Morton cannot rely on the service of the
disputed amended complaint outside of the statute of limitations
to claim that the County was properly served under section
2-616(d).
	Finally, citing two of our opinions, Vaughn v. Speaker, 126 Ill. 2d 150 (1988), and Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 46 Ill. 2d 288
(1970), Morton argues that the primary and virtually sole objective
of a court in allowing relation back of an amendment under section
2-616(d) is to ensure that the defendant had knowledge. In
addition to the fact that such a rendering of section 2-616(d)
would effectively dispose of the other four prongs, we observe that
the cases on which Morton relies are inapposite. In both Vaughn
and Moore, our holdings pertained to the knowledge prong of
section 2-616(d). Vaughn, 126 Ill. 2d  at 160; Moore, 46 Ill. 2d  at
293. In Vaughn, we held that section 2-616(d) provided no relief
to the plaintiffs where they failed to show that the defendant had
knowledge of the action prior to the running of the limitations
period. Vaughn, 126 Ill. 2d  at 160. In Moore, we held that the
defendant company could be deemed to have known of the action
from the beginning, so that the statute of limitations was not a bar
to the plaintiff's action. Moore, 46 Ill. 2d  at 293. In neither case
did we discuss the service prong of section 2-616(d). Vaughn and
Moore, therefore, are unhelpful to Morton here.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we hold that service under section
2-616(d)(3) must be accomplished within the statute of
limitations. Because Morton served the County outside of the
limitations period, his amended complaint adding the County as a
new defendant does not relate back to his original complaint. We,
therefore, affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
Appellate court judgment affirmed.