Case Title: Morris v. Muniz

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC16-931

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2018-09-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-931 
____________ 
 
TUYUANA L. MORRIS, etc.,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
ORLANDO S. MUNIZ, M.D., et al.,  
Respondents. 
 
September 6, 2018 
 
PARIENTE, J. 
 
Following the death of a twenty-year-old woman three days after giving 
birth to a stillborn child, the trial court dismissed the personal representative’s 
wrongful death medical malpractice action, determining that her presuit medical 
expert was not “qualified” to provide a medical expert opinion under section 
766.102, Florida Statutes (2011).  The trial court also dismissed the action based 
on its finding that the personal representative failed to comply with the informal 
presuit discovery process for medical malpractice claims in violation of section 
766.205, Florida Statutes (2011).  Significantly, in dismissing under this basis, the 
 
 
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trial court made no finding that any perceived noncompliance with the discovery 
process resulted in prejudice to the Defendants.1  
Reviewing both bases for dismissal for an abuse of discretion and without 
addressing the issue of prejudice, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed.  
Morris v. Muniz, 189 So. 3d 348, 351 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).  Other district courts of 
appeal have reviewed a trial court’s dismissal of a medical malpractice action for 
failure to obtain a qualified presuit medical expert de novo.  See, e.g., Edwards v. 
Sunrise Ophthalmology Asc, LLC, 134 So. 3d 1056, 1057 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); 
Holden v. Bober, 39 So. 3d 396, 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); Apostolico v. Orlando 
Reg’l Health Care Sys., Inc., 871 So. 2d 283, 286 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).  
 
The first conflict issue in this case requires us to determine the proper 
standard of review of a dismissal of a medical malpractice action based on the trial 
court’s determination that the plaintiff’s presuit medical expert was not qualified to 
provide a medical expert opinion.  The second conflict issue requires us to consider 
whether a finding of prejudice must be made before the trial court can dismiss a 
                                          
 
 
1.  The Defendants in this case include Orlando S. Muniz, M.D., Marianna 
OB/GYN Associates, Inc., Jackson Hospital, Bay Hospital, Inc., d/b/a Gulf Coast 
Medical Center (GCMC), and Stephen G. Smith, M.D. 
 
 
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medical malpractice action as a sanction for a plaintiff’s failure to comply with the 
informal presuit discovery process.2   
To resolve these issues, we consider two guiding principles.  First, the 
purpose of the medical malpractice presuit investigation is to “facilitate evaluation 
of the claim.”  § 766.205(1), Fla. Stat. (2011).  Indeed, as we have explained, the 
presuit process was created to “facilitate the expedient, and preferably amicable, 
resolution of medical malpractice claims.”  Williams v. Oken, 62 So. 3d 1129, 1133 
n.1 (Fla. 2011) (citation omitted); see § 766.201(2), Fla. Stat. (2011) (“It is the 
intent of the Legislature to provide a plan for prompt resolution of medical 
negligence claims.”).  Second, this Court must construe the medical malpractice 
presuit screening requirements “in a manner that favors access to courts.”  Patry v. 
Capps, 633 So. 2d 9, 13 (Fla. 1994) (citing Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835, 
838 (Fla. 1993)).   
For the reasons that follow, we hold that, where the facts regarding the 
presuit expert’s qualifications are unrefuted, the proper standard of review of a trial 
court’s dismissal of a medical malpractice action based on its determination that 
the plaintiff’s presuit expert witness was not qualified is de novo.  Additionally, we 
hold that, before a medical malpractice action can be dismissed based on a trial 
                                          
 
 
2.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
 
 
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court’s finding that the plaintiff or plaintiff’s counsel failed to comply with the 
informal presuit discovery process for medical malpractice actions, the trial court 
must find that such noncompliance prejudiced the defendant.  This holding is 
consistent with our precedent, which makes clear that before an action can be 
dismissed for a plaintiff’s failure to comply with discovery, the trial court must 
find that the plaintiff’s noncompliance prejudiced the defendant.  See, e.g., Ham v. 
Dunmire, 891 So. 2d 492, 499 (Fla. 2004); Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So. 2d 278, 279 
(Fla. 1996).  On appeal, the reviewing court should determine whether there was, 
in fact, a discovery violation and whether that violation prejudiced the defendant.  
To hold otherwise would not only deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional right to 
access the courts but would also frustrate the Legislature’s intent in enacting the 
medical malpractice statutory scheme.   
In this case, because the record demonstrates that Morris’s presuit expert 
was qualified, and because the record does not establish that the Defendants 
suffered any prejudice for the alleged noncompliance with discovery, we conclude 
that the trial court erred in dismissing Morris’s action.  Accordingly, we quash the 
First District’s decision and remand with instructions to reinstate Morris’s 
complaint.   
 
 
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
This case arises out of a medical malpractice wrongful death action brought 
by Tuyuana L. Morris, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Shunteria S. 
McIntyre, the decedent.  As this case was dismissed before the opportunity for 
formal discovery, the facts set forth below, regarding the events that led to the 
decedent’s death, are taken from the complaint and the affidavit of Morris’s presuit 
expert.  
On October 22, 2008, the decedent, who was pregnant, was accepted as a 
patient at Marianna OB/GYN Associates, Inc., for prenatal (obstetric) care by Dr. 
Orlando S. Muniz.  Over the next three months, the decedent visited Dr. Muniz and 
Jackson Hospital numerous times with complaints of nausea and vomiting.  By 
December 17, 2008, the decedent had lost twenty-six pounds since her October 22 
visit; by December 29, the decedent had lost a total of thirty-six pounds.   
 
On January 18, 2009, the decedent went to GCMC, complaining of, among 
other things, mouth sores and blisters, vomiting, and dizziness.  She could not eat, 
walk, or use the restroom, was suffering hallucinations, and was unable to detect 
movement of her unborn baby.  On January 21, the decedent delivered a stillborn 
baby at GCMC.  After delivery, the decedent underwent a surgical procedure—
dilation and curettage.  Hours after the surgery, the decedent was discharged from 
 
 
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GCMC by Dr. Stephen G. Smith and advised to return for a follow-up appointment 
in three weeks.  
 
Three days later, on January 24, 2009, the decedent collapsed at home.  She 
was transported to a nearby hospital where she died.  An autopsy revealed that the 
decedent’s cause of death was “Klebsiella Pneumoniae Septicemia along with 
contributing causes [of] recent Intrauterine fetal demise and Severe Acute 
Diarrhea.”   
 
Prior to filing the complaint, Morris provided the Defendants with a notice 
of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation and a verified written medical 
expert opinion, as required by section 766.203(2), Florida Statutes (2011).  The 
expert opinion was provided by Dr. Margaret M. Thompson, who attested in a 
sworn affidavit that she was a board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist.  Dr. 
Thompson first obtained board certification in 1984 and was thereafter recertified 
in 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2009.  Over the 
course of her thirty-year career, she delivered more than 14,000 babies, had been 
“Chief of the OB-GYN department at a large medical center, Chief of Staff at a 
small women’s specialty hospital, and member of hospital-wide peer review 
committees.”  According to her affidavit, Dr. Thompson received her Juris 
Doctorate in 2007 and her Master’s in Public Affairs in 2008.  She also swore that 
she “was engaged in full-time patient care until March 2008.”  Although Dr. 
 
 
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Thompson stated in her affidavit that she was now retired due to arthritis in her 
hands, she was currently licensed to practice medicine in Texas.   
 
Upon receiving Morris’s notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice 
litigation and Dr. Thompson’s affidavit, the Defendants requested additional 
information related to Dr. Thompson’s qualifications, including a detailed 
employment history for Dr. Thompson from January 2001 through the present, the 
number of hours per week Dr. Thompson devoted to the active clinical practice of 
the same or similar specialty field, and the number of babies Dr. Thompson 
delivered each year from 2006 through 2009.  Morris responded to the Defendants 
by stating, “See Affidavit of Dr. Margaret Thompson; please also see medical 
records as provided by Jackson Hospital as to treatment provided or the lack 
thereof.”3 
 
Thereafter, Morris filed this action, alleging that the Defendants were 
negligent in, among other things, failing to recognize the severity of the decedent’s 
complaints and failing to correctly diagnose and treat the decedent’s condition.  
The Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing first, that Dr. Thompson was not a 
qualified expert under section 766.102(5)(a)2, Florida Statutes (2011)—which 
                                          
 
 
3.  GCMC asserts in its answer brief to this Court that Morris never 
responded to its request for additional information.  Answer Br. of Resp’t GCMC 
at 5.  The record supports GCMC’s assertion.  
 
 
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requires that an expert in a medical malpractice case devote professional time 
during the three years immediately preceding the date of the occurrence that is the 
basis for the action—because she “was enrolled in law school and graduate school 
during the three years prior to the time of the subject incident.”  GCMC and 
Jackson Hospital further argued that Dr. Thompson was not qualified under section 
766.102(6), Florida Statutes (2011)—which requires that an expert in a medical 
malpractice case concerning the standard of care of medical support staff such as 
nurses, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants have knowledge of the 
standard of care applicable to such medical support staff.  Thus, because Morris 
failed to provide corroboration of reasonable grounds to initiate medical 
malpractice litigation in a verified written medical expert opinion from a qualified 
medical expert, the Defendants argued, dismissal was warranted under section 
766.206(2), Florida Statutes (2011). 
As a second basis for dismissal, the Defendants argued that Morris failed to 
provide them with the additional information they requested during the informal 
presuit discovery process, as required by statute.  Thus, the Defendants argued, 
Morris did not act in good faith during the statutory presuit period and dismissal 
was warranted under section 766.205(2), Florida Statutes (2011).  
 
The trial court agreed with the Defendants’ skepticism, finding that the 
“general qualifications” in Dr. Thompson’s affidavit did “not state specifically the 
 
 
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level of practice that she engaged in during the three years immediately preceding 
the date of the occurrence . . . alleged in [Morris’s] complaint.”  The trial court also 
agreed with the Defendants that Morris refused to provide the additional 
information regarding Dr. Thompson’s qualifications sought by the Defendants.  
Relying on this Court’s opinion in Williams, 62 So. 3d 1129, the trial court 
permitted the Defendants to engage in limited discovery directed solely to Dr. 
Thompson’s qualifications.4   
 
In compliance with the trial court’s order, the parties scheduled the 
deposition of Dr. Thompson.  Prior to the deposition, the Defendants requested 
certain documents, including copies of “any and all publications” authored by Dr. 
Thompson and copies of her law school and graduate school transcripts.  Morris 
objected to the Defendants’ request for production, arguing that the documents 
requested “were beyond the scope” of the order, were not in Dr. Thompson’s 
possession, and related to information that had already been produced.   
                                          
 
 
4.  Initially, the trial court also ordered Morris to pay “all of Dr. Thompson’s 
fees and the attorneys’ fees and taxable costs incurred by the Defendants in 
engaging in this discovery process” as a sanction for Morris’s failure to provide the 
requested information during the presuit process.  However, upon Morris’s motion 
for rehearing, the trial court issued an order stating that “[u]pon further 
consideration this Court concludes that an award of Defendants’ attorney’s fees 
and taxable costs for conducting that discovery would be premature.”  
Accordingly, the trial court “reserve[d] ruling” on that issue until it determined 
whether Dr. Thompson was a qualified corroborating expert.   
 
 
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At the deposition, Dr. Thompson testified that from 2006 through her 
retirement from clinical practice in March 2008, she worked more than fifty hours 
per week as an obstetrician-gynecologist (OB-GYN) in her office and at a hospital.  
However, the Defendants continued questioning Dr. Thompson as to how she 
could attend law school while continuing to engage in full-time patient care.  Dr. 
Thompson explained that if she “were working a hundred hours a week and 50 
were devoted to [her] practice, that still le[ft] [her] 50 hours for law school.”  
Additionally, prior to starting law school, Dr. Thompson met with the dean to 
inform him that she was going to continue practicing medicine.  Although the law 
school did not have any special accommodations for part-time or alternative 
students, the dean allowed Dr. Thompson to “choose the section that the hours of 
classes would most accommodate [her] practice schedule.”  Dr. Thompson 
explained: 
After the first year, then I had a lot more flexibility.  For the first year, 
I picked the section that classed, as I recall, from 8:30 to noon 
Monday through Thursday.  On some mornings I would have a 
surgery or C-section prior to going to class at 7:00 or 7:30 in the 
morning.  I went directly from my classes at 12:00 and started my 
practice in the office at 12:30 or 1:00, and worked till about 7:00 in 
the evening.  I went home, I studied for law school if I wasn’t on call 
or did not have patients in labor.  If I did, I stayed at the hospital and 
always had my books ready to study there if I needed to be at the 
hospital.  On weekends—on Friday, when I did not have classes, I 
usually did my surgeries and my deliveries that might be elective, like 
inductions.  On Saturdays and Sundays I took call and studied. . . .  I 
tell you, after the first year when I had more flexibility, I selected 
classes that, when possible, met for longer periods, two days a week, 
 
 
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like Tuesdays and Thursdays.  So I grouped my classes together to 
minimize the time that I had to be away from the office and the 
hospital.  And I took an extra semester to graduate. . . .  And that’s 
how I did it. 
 
 
Following the deposition and an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted 
the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.  Noting its previous determination that Dr. 
Thompson’s affidavit did “not state specifically the level of practice she engaged 
in during the three years immediately preceding the date of occurrence,” the trial 
court wrote that it “once again querie[d] the feasibility” of Dr. Thompson’s 
statement that she was engaged in full-time patient care until March 2008.   
Moreover, the trial court found that the Defendants’ “reasonable inquiries” 
as to Dr. Thompson’s qualifications “remain unanswered due to [Morris’s] counsel 
[sic] restrictions to the limited discovery process.”  Referencing Morris’s counsel’s 
repeated objections during Dr. Thompson’s deposition and direction to Dr. 
Thompson to not answer certain questions, the trial court found that the Defendants 
were “thwarted” from learning certain information, such as whether Dr. Thompson 
was aware of the American Bar Association (ABA) accreditation rules restricting 
students to no more than twenty hours of work per week while attending law 
school and whether she had applied for disability “during the same period of time 
preceding this suit” due to her arthritis.  Further, the court found that the actions of 
Morris’s counsel “were purposeful and designed to deprive the Defendants’ [sic] of 
the ability to meaningfully participate in pre-suit discovery of the medical 
 
 
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negligence claims against them, and as such was not in good faith.  Twenty three 
months after the initial hearing,” the trial court wrote, “the record establishes scant 
additional information about the specific qualifications of Dr. Thompson, nor her 
ability to devote professional time in this arena for years preceding the occurrence 
which is the gravamen of this suit.”  Ultimately, the trial court concluded:  
This Court is well aware the salient statutory provisions are not 
intended to deny parties’ access to Courts on the basis of 
technicalities.  However, the actions as demonstrated in this cause rise 
above mere technicalities.  [Morris] has not complied with the 
statutory pre suit requirements, or allowed reasonable discovery into 
their expert’s devoted professional time 3 to 5 years immediately 
preceding the occurrence in this cause.  As the applicable statute of 
limitations has long since expired, and [Morris] cannot remedy this 
issue with another expert, dismissal is a proper remedy pursuant to 
[sections] 766.205(2) and 766.206(2).  
 
 
Morris appealed to the First District Court of Appeal, which, in a two-to-one 
decision, concluded that the trial court “did not abuse its discretion” and affirmed.  
See Morris, 189 So. 3d at 351.  The majority reasoned: 
The Legislature has made it clear that the special qualifications 
required for presuit medical experts are essential to the Chapter 766 
presuit investigation process.  Likewise, courts have consistently 
noted the significance of the presuit expert requirements in 
determining a claim’s legitimacy.  Here, the record contains ample 
evidence to support the trial court’s conclusions that [Morris] failed to 
offer sufficient proof of her proffered expert’s statutory qualifications, 
and that [Morris’s] lack of cooperation with [the Defendants’] 
attempts to verify the expert’s qualifications merited dismissal under 
sections 766.205(2) and 766.206(2), Florida Statutes.   
 
Id. at 350-51 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).   
 
 
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Judge Swanson dissented with opinion, arguing: 
[Morris] complied with the statutory presuit requirements by 
obtaining written corroboration from a qualified medical expert, Dr. 
Margaret Thompson.  Because Dr. Thompson’s affidavit clearly 
established her qualifications, that should have been the end of the 
matter.  Instead, [the Defendants] filed a motion to dismiss [Morris’s] 
complaint and used court-ordered limited discovery to go on a fishing 
expedition in an attempt to impeach Dr. Thompson’s qualifications.  
After [Morris’s] counsel refused to cooperate in this endeavor, the 
trial court dismissed [her] wrongful death action, depriving [Morris] 
of her constitutionally guaranteed access to the courts. 
 
Id. at 351 (Swanson, J., dissenting).  Judge Swanson stated that “Dr. Thompson’s 
affidavit on its face clearly established that she met all of the statutory 
requirements,” id. at 352, explaining: 
Specifically, her affidavit and curriculum vitae detailed her education, 
experience, and professional awards and plainly demonstrated that she 
was a board-certified obstetrician/gynecologist (OB/GYN) for thirty 
years and had been engaged in full-time patient care prior to her 
retirement in March 2008, nine months before the decedent’s death.   
Moreover, they demonstrated that she had served in several roles 
requiring her to supervise OB/GYN nurses and other medical staff at a 
hospital and to be familiar with the relevant standards of care.  
Despite this, the trial court allowed [the Defendants] to depose Dr. 
Thompson regarding her qualifications.  During her deposition, Dr. 
Thompson stated that she worked more than fifty hours per week as 
an OB/GYN in 2006 through March 2008 and explained how she 
managed to attend both graduate and law school during the same 
period.  Although the trial court questioned the “feasibility” of Dr. 
Thompson’s statement that she was engaged in full-time patient care 
while pursuing her master’s and law degrees, the trial court was not 
permitted to make credibility determinations concerning an otherwise 
unrebutted and facially sufficient affidavit.  On a motion to dismiss 
challenging a plaintiff’s compliance with the statutory presuit 
requirements in a medical malpractice action, this court applies the de 
novo standard of review and must consider all factual allegations in a 
 
 
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light most favorable to the plaintiff.  Because the trial court did not 
apply the correct principles in determining that Dr. Thompson was not 
a qualified medical expert, I would reverse the trial court’s order 
dismissing [Morris’s] wrongful death action.  
 
Id. at 352-53 (citations omitted).  This review followed. 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
The first conflict issue in this case requires us to determine the proper 
standard of review of a dismissal of a medical malpractice action based on the trial 
court’s determination that the plaintiff’s presuit medical expert is not qualified to 
provide a medical expert opinion.  The second conflict issue requires us to revisit 
whether a finding of prejudice must be made before the trial court can dismiss a 
medical malpractice action as a sanction for a plaintiff’s failure to comply with the 
informal presuit discovery process. 
Our analysis begins with Florida’s medical malpractice statutory scheme 
codified in chapter 766, Florida Statutes (2011), which requires that prospective 
medical malpractice plaintiffs obtain the opinion of a medical expert to corroborate 
the claim of medical malpractice before filing suit.  From there, we turn to the trial 
court’s first basis for dismissal under section 766.206(2), which states that a 
medical malpractice claim shall be dismissed where the prospective medical 
malpractice plaintiff does not comply “with the reasonable investigation 
requirements” of chapter 766, including obtaining “a verified medical expert 
opinion by an expert witness” as defined by statute.  § 766.206(2), Fla. Stat. 
 
 
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(2011).  We address the conflict between the First District’s application of an 
abuse of discretion standard of review to dismissal on this basis and the application 
of a de novo standard by several other district courts.  See, e.g., Edwards, 134 So. 
3d at 1057; Holden, 39 So. 3d at 400; Apostolico, 871 So. 2d at 286.  After 
resolving the conflict, we then address whether the presuit expert in this case was 
qualified under the statute.  We then turn to the trial court’s second basis for 
dismissal under section 766.205(2), Florida Statutes (2011), which states that, in a 
medical malpractice action, a party’s failure to provide to the other party 
reasonable access to information in order to facilitate evaluation of the claim 
without formal discovery “shall be grounds for dismissal.”  § 766.205(2), Fla. Stat. 
(2011); see id. § 766.205(1).   
I. Chapter 766 
Florida’s medical malpractice statutory scheme, codified in chapter 766, 
Florida Statutes, contains an elaborate presuit process for prospective medical 
malpractice plaintiffs, including a presuit investigation component.  See id. 
§ 766.201(2).  As we have explained, the presuit process was created to “facilitate 
the expedient, and preferably amicable, resolution of medical malpractice claims.”  
Williams, 62 So. 3d at 1133 n.1 (citation omitted); see § 766.201(2), Fla. Stat. 
(2011) (“It is the intent of the Legislature to provide a plan for prompt resolution of 
medical negligence claims.”).  The Legislature’s intent notwithstanding, we have 
 
 
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stated that the presuit process “restrict[s] plaintiffs’ ability to bring medical 
malpractice claims.”  Dockswell v. Bethesda Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 210 So. 3d 1201, 
1205 (Fla. 2017).  Therefore, the requirements of the presuit process must be 
“interpreted liberally so as not to unduly restrict a Florida citizen’s constitutionally 
guaranteed access to the courts.”  Kukral, 679 So. 2d at 284. 
Under section 766.203(2), prior to filing a medical malpractice action, a 
prospective plaintiff “shall conduct an investigation to ascertain that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe” that the defendant was negligent and that such 
negligence caused the prospective plaintiff’s injury.  § 766.203(2), Fla. Stat. 
(2011).  “Corroboration of reasonable grounds to initiate medical negligence 
litigation shall be provided by the [prospective plaintiff’s] submission of a verified 
written medical expert opinion from a medical expert as defined in s. 766.202(6).”  
Id.   
Section 766.202(6), Florida Statutes (2011), which governs the 
qualifications of presuit expert witnesses, defines a medical expert as: 
[A] person duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his or her 
profession who holds a health care professional degree from a 
university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert 
witness as set forth in s. 766.102.   
 
§ 766.202(6), Fla. Stat. (2011).  This section does not define “duly and regularly 
engaged.”  As the language above indicates, section 766.202(6) refers to and 
incorporates the requirements of section 766.102, Florida Statutes (2011), which 
 
 
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governs the qualifications of expert witnesses in all medical malpractice cases.  
Section 766.102(5) states in pertinent part: 
(5) A person may not give expert testimony concerning the 
prevailing professional standard of care unless the person is a health 
care provider who holds an active and valid license and conducts a 
complete review of the pertinent medical records and meets the 
following criteria: 
 
(a) If the health care provider against whom or on whose behalf 
the testimony is offered is a specialist, the expert witness must: 
1. Specialize in the same specialty as the health care provider 
against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered; . . . and 
2. Have devoted professional time during the 3 years 
immediately preceding the date of the occurrence that is the basis for 
the action to: 
a. The active clinical practice of, or consulting with respect to, 
the same or similar specialty . . . ; 
b. Instruction of students in an accredited health professional 
school or accredited residency or clinical research program in the 
same specialty; or 
c. A clinical research program that is affiliated with an 
accredited health professional school or accredited residency or 
clinical research program in the same specialty. 
 
Id. § 766.102(5)(a).  Section 766.102(5)(a)2. does not define “professional time.”5   
                                          
 
 
5.  Sections 766.202 and 766.102 were amended in 2003.  Ch. 2003-416, 
§ 48, Laws of Fla.  Prior to 2003, a medical expert was defined as one who was 
“duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his or her profession who holds a 
health care professional degree from a university or college and has had special 
professional training and experience or one possessed of special health care 
knowledge or skill about the subject upon which he or she is called to testify or 
provide an opinion.”  § 766.202(5), Fla. Stat. (2002).  There was no cross-reference 
to section 766.102.  Id.  In fact, prior to 2003, the language in what is now section 
766.102(5) and (6) did not exist; those, too, were added by the Legislature in 2003. 
 
 
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Although chapter 766 does not define “professional time” or “duly and 
regularly engaged,” we have explained the purpose of the presuit corroborating 
expert opinion as follows: 
The expert opinion to be supplied is not one which delineates how the 
defendants were negligent.  Section 766.104 refers to a written 
medical opinion “that there appears to be evidence of medical 
negligence.”  Section 766.203(2) provides that the medical expert 
opinion is for “corroboration of reasonable grounds to initiate medical 
negligence litigation.”  And [section] 766.205(1) specifically provides 
that the medical opinion need only corroborate that “there exists 
reasonable grounds for a claim of negligent injury.”  Obviously, the 
corroborative medical opinion adds nothing to the Plaintiffs’ notice of 
their claim.  It merely assures the Defendants, and the court, that a 
medical expert has determined that there is justification for the 
Plaintiffs’ claim, i.e., that it is not a frivolous medical malpractice 
claim.   
 
Kukral, 679 So. 2d at 282 (quoting Stebilla v. Mussallem, 595 So. 2d 136, 139 
(Fla. 5th DCA 1992)).  Stated another way, “[r]equiring a written expert opinion as 
                                          
 
An analysis of the bill that amended sections 766.202 and 766.102 suggests 
that the changes were made in an attempt to eliminate the occurrence of specialists 
testifying against nonspecialists and general practitioners.  The analysis observes: 
 
A great deal of litigation has occurred as a result of attempting 
to interpret and apply the provisions of s. 766.102(2), F.S.  The terms 
“medical specialty,” “specialty,” “specialist,” and “discipline or 
school of practice” are not defined in the statutes.  As a result, it is not 
uncommon for trial court judges to allow specialists to testify against 
non-specialists and general practitioners. 
Fla. S. Comm. on Health, Aging, and Long-Term Care, CS for SB 2-D (2003), 
Staff Analysis & Economic Impact Statement 18 (Aug. 12, 2003) (available at Fla. 
Dep’t of State, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.). 
 
 
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part of the presuit investigation” simply “assures the defendant that the claim was 
preceded by a reasonable investigation.”  Largie v. Gregorian, 913 So. 2d 635, 639 
(Fla. 3d DCA 2005).   
Consistent with the purpose of a reasonable investigation, the purpose of 
requiring an expert witness at the presuit stage is to assure that the corroborating 
opinion has been verified by a medical expert.6  There is no indication that the 
Legislature, in enacting this presuit process originally, or through its 2003 
amendments to sections 766.102 and 766.202, intended to make the qualifications 
for a presuit expert more stringent than an expert testifying at trial.  
 
Despite this lack of legislative intent, the dissent asserts that section 
766.202(6) does impose an additional requirement on the presuit expert, requiring 
that the presuit expert be duly and regularly engaged “at the time the written 
medical expert opinion is offered.”  Dissenting op. at 42 (emphasis added).  In 
advancing this interpretation, the dissent acknowledges that it has not been argued 
by the parties, nor was it considered by the trial court.  See dissenting op. at 46.  
                                          
 
 
6.  Medical malpractice is the only area of law where the Legislature has 
imposed strict requirements on the testimony of experts.  All other areas are 
governed by section 90.702, Florida Statutes (2018), entitled “Testimony by 
experts.”  Thus, in creating its own requirements for expert testimony, the 
Legislature has severely limited the ability of trial judges to determine whether an 
expert is qualified.  See Simmons v. State, 934 So. 2d 1100, 1117 (Fla. 2006) (“A 
trial judge has the discretion to determine if a witness’s qualifications render him 
or her an expert, and this determination will not be overturned absent clear error.”). 
 
 
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Nevertheless, the dissent asserts that the statutory language “plainly” requires this 
construction. 
We emphasize, however, as the dissent acknowledges, that Florida courts 
have expressly rejected this construction.  See Baptist Med. Ctr. of Beaches, Inc. v. 
Rhodin, 40 So. 3d 112, 118 (Fla. 2010); Fort Walton Beach Med. Ctr., Inc. v. 
Dingler, 697 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).  Indeed, in 1997, the First District 
expressly rejected the argument that the “duly and regularly engaged” language in 
section 766.202 means “at the time the corroborating opinion and affidavit are 
signed.”  Dingler, 697 So. 2d at 580.  The First District explained that it was 
“logical that the legislature intended the more specific time period in” section 
766.102 “to define when the proposed expert must have been ‘engaged in the 
practice’ ” under section 766.202.  Id.  That reasoning was then appropriately 
adopted in Rhodin to reject the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff’s presuit 
expert was not qualified.  40 So. 3d at 118. 
Additionally, while the dissent argues that the 2003 amendments to section 
766.202(6) support its interpretation, the “duly and regularly engaged” language 
has remained unchanged since its first appearance in the statute in 1988.  See 
§ 766.202, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988).  This is especially important because the 
Legislature “ ‘is presumed to know the judicial constructions of a law when 
enacting a new version of that law’ and “the legislature is presumed to have 
 
 
- 21 - 
adopted prior judicial constructions of a law unless a contrary intention is 
expressed in the new version.’ ”  Jones v. ETS of New Orleans, Inc., 793 So. 2d 
912, 917 (Fla. 2001) (quoting City of Hollywood v. Lombardi, 770 So. 2d 1196, 
1202 (Fla. 2000)).  Thus, in this case, the Legislature is presumed to be aware of 
the First District’s interpretation of section 766.202 in 1997 and made no changes 
to it.   
Further, nowhere in section 766.202(6) does it state that the expert must be 
duly and regularly engaged at the time the opinion is offered, when the role of the 
medical expert is to provide an opinion regarding the prevailing professional 
standard of care, or the professional standard of care existing at the time of the 
occurrence that is the basis for action.  See §§ 766.102(1); 766.203(2).  We cannot 
agree with a construction that not only runs counter to the purpose of the presuit 
process, which is to facilitate the resolution of medical malpractice claims, but also 
has the effect of infringing on the constitutional right to access the courts.  
Finally, with respect to the ability of a medical expert to provide an opinion 
on the negligence of nurses and other support staff, a separate subsection in section 
766.102 covers expert testimony regarding the standard of care applicable to 
nurses and other medical support staff.  See § 766.102(6).  Section 766.102(6) 
states that a person “may give expert testimony in a medical negligence action with 
respect to the standard of care of such medical support staff” if he or she is 
 
 
- 22 - 
qualified under section 766.102(5) and has “knowledge of the applicable standard 
of care for nurses, nurse practitioners . . . or other medical support staff.”  Id. 
§ 766.102(6).  This section does not specify how a person must demonstrate his or 
her knowledge of the applicable standard of care for medical support staff.  See id.   
Having set forth the relevant statutory provisions, we now turn to address the 
first basis for dismissal in this case.  
II. Dismissal for Failure to Obtain a “Qualified” Expert Witness 
 
 
Under section 766.206(2), if the court finds that the plaintiff’s notice of 
intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation “does not comply with the 
reasonable investigation requirements of ss. 766.201-766.212, including a review 
of the claim and a verified written medical expert opinion by an expert witness as 
defined in s. 766.202 . . . the court shall dismiss the claim.”  § 766.206(2), Fla. 
Stat. (2011).  This provision, like all provisions governing the presuit screening 
process for medical malpractice claims, must be construed “in a manner that favors 
access to courts.”  Patry, 633 So. 2d at 13 (citing Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 838).   
A. The Conflict 
 
Morris argues that the proper standard of review of the dismissal of a 
medical malpractice action based on the trial court’s determination that the 
plaintiff’s presuit medical expert is not qualified is de novo, as other district courts 
have concluded, because the determination as to whether a presuit expert meets the 
 
 
- 23 - 
statutory qualifications is a legal one.  See, e.g., Edwards, 134 So. 3d at 1057; 
Holden, 39 So. 3d at 400; Apostolico, 871 So. 2d at 286.  Rejecting the First 
District’s application of an abuse of discretion standard, the Defendants counter 
that, because the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the issue, the correct 
standard of appellate review is whether the trial court’s ruling is supported by 
competent, substantial evidence.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that, 
where the facts regarding a presuit expert’s qualifications are unrefuted, the proper 
standard of appellate review of a trial court’s dismissal of a medical malpractice 
action based on its conclusion that the plaintiff’s presuit medical expert is not 
qualified is de novo.  Even if the proper review standard were competent, 
substantial evidence, we would conclude that nothing in the record supports the 
trial court’s conclusion that Morris’s expert was not qualified.  
In Holden, the plaintiff’s medical malpractice action was dismissed after the 
trial court determined that the plaintiff failed to corroborate that reasonable 
grounds existed for the claim because his presuit medical expert’s affidavit did not 
establish that he was qualified to provide a medical expert opinion.  39 So. 3d at 
398-99.  The Second District Court of Appeal first correctly observed that “the 
medical malpractice statutory scheme must be interpreted liberally so as not to 
unduly restrict a Florida citizen’s constitutionally guaranteed access to the courts.”  
Id. at 400 (quoting Kukral, 679 So. 2d at 284).  The Second District went on to 
 
 
- 24 - 
determine that “[i]n order to adhere to the policy enunciated behind the presuit 
notice requirements,” courts “must review the sufficiency of [the plaintiff’s 
expert’s] qualifications and his corroborating affidavit to determine if it complies 
with the statutory requirements of chapter 766.”  Id.  Finally, the Second District 
stated that because the case involved “the trial court’s disposition of a motion to 
dismiss,” the standard of review was de novo.  Id.; see also Apostolico, 871 So. 2d 
at 286 (“We review a trial court’s disposition of a motion to dismiss de novo.”).   
We agree with the Second District’s analysis.  Determining whether a 
presuit expert witness is qualified under the statute involves reviewing the expert’s 
stated qualifications and comparing those with what is required under the statute.  
The trial court is in no better position than the appellate court to conduct this 
analysis.  This conclusion is also consistent with the well-established principle that 
pure questions of law are reviewed de novo.  See Bosem v. Musa Holdings, Inc., 46 
So. 3d 42, 44 (Fla. 2010). 
We are unpersuaded by the Defendants’ position that merely because the 
trial court holds an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the presuit expert’s 
qualifications, the appellate standard of review can only be competent, substantial 
evidence.  As the Second District explained in Oliveros v. Adventist Health 
Systems/Sunbelt, Inc., 45 So. 3d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), where “the facts 
concerning [the expert’s] background and experience are unrefuted, the question of 
 
 
- 25 - 
his [or her] qualifications as an expert turns on the application of the relevant 
statutes, which is an issue of law,” reviewed de novo.  Id. at 876; see also Aills v. 
Boemi, 29 So. 3d 1105, 1108 (Fla. 2010) (stating that questions of law “arising 
from undisputed facts” are reviewed de novo); Kirton v. Fields, 997 So. 2d 349, 
352 (Fla. 2008).  Stated another way, where the facts regarding the presuit expert’s 
qualifications are unrefuted, the trial court has not resolved any factual disputes 
that are entitled to deference on appeal.  We thus hold that, where the facts 
regarding the presuit expert’s qualifications are unrefuted, the proper standard of 
appellate review of the dismissal of a medical malpractice action based on the trial 
court’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s presuit medical expert is not qualified is de 
novo.   
We recognize that there may be cases where the trial court must reconcile 
factual disputes regarding a presuit expert witness’s qualifications.  Indeed, section 
766.203(4), Florida Statutes (2011), states that the medical expert opinion 
corroborating a prospective plaintiff’s claim of medical malpractice is “subject to 
discovery.”  Id.  That section goes on to state that the expert’s opinion “shall 
specify whether any previous opinion by the same medical expert has been 
disqualified and if so the name of the court and the case number in which the 
ruling was issued.”  Id.  Thus, using this provision as an example, there could be a 
case where the presuit expert swears that he or she has not been previously 
 
 
- 26 - 
disqualified and the defendant presents evidence to dispute that.  The trial court’s 
finding on that disputed fact would be entitled to deference on appeal.   
However, we reiterate that a trial court’s ruling on whether an expert’s stated 
qualifications satisfy the requirements of the statute is reviewed de novo, as such 
an inquiry requires simply construing the statute’s requirements and determining 
whether the expert’s qualifications align, which the appellate court is on equal 
footing with the trial court to do.  We now turn to this case.  
B. This Case 
 
In this case, Morris’s expert, Dr. Thompson, stated in her sworn affidavit 
that she was a board-certified obstetrician, who, over her thirty-year career had 
been chief of the OB-GYN department at a large medical center, chief of staff at a 
small women’s specialty hospital, and member of hospital-wide peer review 
committees.  Her affidavit also stated that she was engaged in full-time patient care 
until March 2008, which was several months before the incidents alleged in the 
complaint began, she was currently licensed to practice medicine, and she was 
recertified as a board-certified obstetrician in 2007 and 2009.   
The Defendants presented no evidence to suggest that Dr. Thompson’s 
claims were false.  Instead, they merely challenged the sufficiency of Dr. 
Thompson’s stated qualifications and her ability to devote “professional time to” or 
be “regularly engaged” in the practice of medicine while in law school.  
 
 
- 27 - 
Questioning the veracity of an expert’s sworn statements is not the same as 
presenting evidence that suggests that the claims in the affidavit are false.  
Nevertheless, the trial court found that Dr. Thompson was not a qualified expert 
under section 766.102(5)(a)2. or section 766.102(6).7  We conclude that this was 
error, as Dr. Thompson’s affidavit clearly established that she met the statutory 
requirements, and the Defendants presented no evidence to refute her sworn 
statements.   
 
In concluding that Dr. Thompson was not a qualified expert, the trial court 
and the dissent read far more into the statutes than what they clearly and 
unambiguously require.  The trial court found that Dr. Thompson failed to 
establish that she was qualified because her affidavit contained only “general 
qualifications” and did not “state specifically” the level of practice she was 
engaged in during the relevant three-year period, but the statutes do not demand 
                                          
 
 
7.  The trial court also found that Dr. Thompson was not qualified under 
section 766.102(9), which states that in an action for damages involving a claim 
against a physician licensed under certain chapters “providing emergency medical 
services in a hospital emergency department, the court shall admit expert medical 
testimony only from physicians . . . who have had substantial professional 
experience within the preceding 5 years while assigned to provide emergency 
medical services in a hospital emergency department.”  However, Morris has made 
clear that Dr. Thompson never intended to assert that she was qualified to give 
such testimony, stating in her response to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss in the 
trial court that she “did not bring a claim against ER physicians regarding any ER 
physicians’ treatment and care.  Thus such argument is moot.”  Morris continues to 
hold that position in this Court.  
 
 
- 28 - 
such specificity.  As this Court has explained, we are “not at liberty to construe” 
terms “so as to deprive plaintiffs of their causes of action.”  Silva v. Sw. Fla. Blood 
Bank, 601 So. 2d 1184, 1189 (Fla. 1992); see Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 838.  
Because Dr. Thompson’s affidavit clearly complies with the statutory 
requirements, the trial court erred in finding that Dr. Thompson was not qualified.  
§§ 766.202(6); 766.102(5)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2011).   
 
As to the trial court’s finding that Dr. Thompson’s affidavit failed to 
establish that she was qualified to provide a medical expert opinion regarding the 
standard of care for medical support staff under section 766.102(6), we conclude 
that the trial court again misconstrued the statute’s requirements.  As stated 
previously, Dr. Thompson swore in her affidavit that she was “Chief of the OB-
GYN department at a large medical center, Chief of Staff at a small women’s 
specialty hospital, and member of hospital-wide peer review committees.”  We fail 
to understand how Dr. Thompson could have overseen, managed, and reviewed 
medical support staff in those roles without knowledge of the standard of care 
applicable to that support staff.  
 
Even if Dr. Thompson’s affidavit was insufficient to demonstrate her 
qualifications under the statutes, Dr. Thompson clearly demonstrated at her 
deposition that she was qualified, as she testified that she employed a nurse 
practitioner and was familiar with Austin Medical Center’s policies and procedures 
 
 
- 29 - 
for nurses, having used them on a regular basis and “probably contributed to 
writing some of them.”  Additionally, Dr. Thompson unequivocally testified that 
she was qualified to render an opinion as to the standard of care applicable to 
medical support staff treating a patient that was in her specialty.  There is simply 
no evidence in the record to refute Dr. Thompson’s sworn statements.  Thus, 
because Dr. Thompson clearly met the statutory requirements, Morris’s medical 
malpractice action should not have been dismissed under section 766.206(2).  
C. Conclusion as to the Expert’s Qualifications 
 
At the time the presuit medical expert in this case executed her affidavit 
corroborating Morris’s claims of medical malpractice, she had enjoyed a thirty-
year career as an OB-GYN, graduating from medical school in 1978 and becoming 
board-certified in obstetrics and gynecology in 1984.  Her long career included 
serving as chief of the OB-GYN department at a large medical center and chief of 
staff at a small women’s hospital.  In short, Dr. Thompson is just the type of expert 
that the Legislature would consider is qualified.  Accordingly, because Dr. 
Thompson was clearly qualified under the statutory requirements, under any 
standard of review, we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing Morris’s 
action under section 766.206(2), Florida Statutes (2011).  We now turn to address 
the trial court’s second basis for dismissal in this case.  
 
 
- 30 - 
III. Dismissal for Failure to Allow Access to Information During the Presuit 
Process Without Formal Discovery 
 
The trial court also found that dismissal was proper under section 
766.205(2), Florida Statutes (2011), because Morris failed to comply with the 
requirements of the informal presuit discovery process.  First, Morris argues that 
additional discovery into Dr. Thompson’s qualifications should not have been 
permitted because Dr. Thompson’s affidavit satisfied the statutory requirements.  
Even if the additional discovery was proper, Morris argues that she complied.  
Notwithstanding, Morris argues that it was improper to dismiss the action in the 
absence of any prejudice to the Defendants.  The parties agree that the proper 
standard of review of a dismissal for failure to comply with discovery is abuse of 
discretion.  See, e.g., Commonwealth Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Tubero, 569 So. 
2d 1271, 1273 (Fla. 1990); Robinson v. Scott, 974 So. 2d 1090, 1092 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2007). 
A. Section 766.205, Florida Statutes (2011) 
 
Section 766.205(1) requires that, after the completion of the presuit 
investigation, each party to a medical malpractice action “shall provide to the other 
party reasonable access to information within its possession or control in order to 
facilitate evaluation of the claim.”  § 766.205(1), Fla. Stat. (2011).  Section 
766.205(2) states that “[s]uch access shall be provided without formal discovery 
 
 
- 31 - 
. . . and failure to so provide shall be grounds for dismissal of any applicable claim 
or defense ultimately asserted.”  Id. § 766.205(2).  
B. Scope of Permissible Discovery of a Presuit Expert’s Qualifications 
 
Morris first argues that additional discovery should not have been permitted 
because Dr. Thompson’s affidavit satisfied the statutory requirements.  As stated 
previously, a prospective plaintiff must corroborate their medical malpractice 
claim with a “verified written medical expert opinion.”  § 766.203(2), Fla. Stat. 
(2011).  Subsection (4) states that these medical expert opinions “are subject to 
discovery” and “shall specify whether any previous opinion by the same medical 
expert has been disqualified and if so the name of the court and the case number in 
which the ruling was issued.”  Id. § 766.203(4).  The statute does not specify the 
scope of this discovery.  
While the statute does not specify the scope of discovery into a presuit 
expert’s qualifications, certainly, if the defendant presents evidence that the 
expert’s stated qualifications are false, presuit discovery on the discrete issue 
should be allowed.  On the other hand, if the affidavit suggests a technical 
deficiency in the affidavit, there would be no reason to allow open-ended 
discovery.   
We have explained that, where a plaintiff’s presuit expert’s affidavit fails to 
establish that he or she is qualified under the statute, the trial court should hold an 
 
 
- 32 - 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the expert is qualified.  Williams, 62 So. 
3d at 1137.  In Williams, the defendant moved to dismiss the medical malpractice 
complaint, arguing that the plaintiff’s expert’s affidavit did not establish that he 
was an expert “in the field of cardiology,” and, thus, the plaintiff “failed to attach a 
corroborating affidavit from a qualified medical expert.”  Id. at 1131.  Concluding 
that the First District improperly granted certiorari review of the trial court’s denial 
of the defendant’s motion to dismiss, we explained that the First District should 
have “dismissed the petition and remanded the case to the trial court for an 
evidentiary hearing on whether [the expert] was qualified.”  Id. at 1137; see also 
Bery v. Fahel, 88 So. 3d 236, 237-38 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (remanding for an 
evidentiary hearing on the presuit expert’s qualifications where the presuit expert 
attempted to withdraw his affidavit “because he felt he was not qualified to act as 
an expert witness”); Holden, 39 So. 3d at 402-03 (reversing a dismissal order and 
remanding for an evidentiary hearing on the presuit expert’s qualifications where 
the expert’s affidavit did not on its face establish that his qualifications could be 
considered a similar specialty to the doctor).   
We conclude that neither section 766.203(4) nor our opinion in Williams 
allows a deposition of a presuit expert where, as in this case, the presuit expert’s 
affidavit clearly establishes that the expert is qualified under the statute and the 
defendant fails to present any evidence to refute those qualifications.  Indeed, 
 
 
- 33 - 
nothing in the medical malpractice statutory scheme indicates that the Legislature 
intended the presuit process to include a deposition of a presuit expert regarding 
her qualifications, where the expert demonstrates in a sworn affidavit that he or she 
meets the statutory qualifications.   
We thus agree with Judge Swanson that, where a presuit expert clearly 
demonstrates that he or she is qualified in a sworn affidavit, and the defendant has 
not presented any evidence to refute those qualifications, medical malpractice 
defendants should not be permitted “to go on a fishing expedition in an attempt to 
impeach” those qualifications.  Morris, 189 So. 3d at 351 (Swanson, J., dissenting).  
This conclusion is consistent with our previous pronouncements that, when 
reviewing matters involving chapter 766, this Court must construe the provisions 
“in a manner that favors access to courts.”  Patry, 633 So. 2d at 13; see Kukral, 
679 So. 2d at 284; Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 838. 
We now turn to the second conflict issue in this case regarding prejudice. 
C. The Second Conflict Issue 
Morris next argues that the First District’s decision, which recognizes that 
prejudice to the other party should be considered when determining the proper 
sanction for a party’s failure to comply with discovery but fails to actually address 
the issue of prejudice, conflicts with this Court’s opinion in Kukral, 679 So. 2d at 
284, and the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Vincent v. Kaufman, 855 
 
 
- 34 - 
So. 2d 1153, 1156-57 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), both of which held that dismissal in 
the absence of any prejudice to the Defendants was improper.  For the reasons that 
follow, we conclude, as we have many times before, that dismissing an action for a 
plaintiff’s failure to comply with discovery, where the trial court fails to make a 
finding of prejudice to the defendant, constitutes an abuse of discretion.  
While section 766.205(2) permits dismissal for a plaintiff’s failure to comply 
with discovery, this Court has repeatedly held that it is improper to dismiss an 
action for a plaintiff’s failure to comply with discovery where the defendant suffers 
no prejudice.  See, e.g., Ham, 891 So. 2d at 499; Kukral, 679 So. 2d at 279; Patry, 
633 So. 2d at 10.  Indeed, in Patry, we quashed the district court’s affirmance of 
the dismissal of a medical malpractice action for lack of strict compliance with the 
presuit requirements where the defendant suffered no prejudice.  633 So. 2d at 10.  
We explained that it could not be seriously argued that the goal of the medical 
malpractice statutory scheme—“to facilitate the orderly and prompt conduct of the 
screening and settlement process”—was not accomplished where the defendant 
received notice “that result[ed] in no prejudice.”  Id. at 12.  Likewise, in Kukral, 
this Court quashed the district court’s affirmance of the dismissal of a medical 
malpractice action, reasoning that “any potential prejudice to the defendants . . . 
had been eliminated.”  679 So. 2d at 284.  We explained that this conclusion was 
“consistent with our prior holdings favoring access to the courts, while still 
 
 
- 35 - 
carrying out the legislative policy of requiring the parties to engage in meaningful 
presuit investigation, discovery and negotiations.”  Id.  More recently, in Ham, we 
stated that “dismissal is far too extreme as a sanction in those cases where 
discovery violations have absolutely no prejudice to the opposing party.”  891 So. 
2d at 499. 
Particularly where the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice 
actions has expired and the defendant has suffered no prejudice, courts have 
consistently recognized that dismissal is a drastic sanction.  See, e.g., Vincent, 855 
So. 2d at 1156-57 (concluding that the dismissal of the plaintiff’s medical 
malpractice action, “the effect of which permanently barred her claim since the 
statute of limitations had since run, was not warranted where there was no 
prejudice to the defendant doctor”); Kukral, 679 So. 2d at 279 (“The effect of the 
order of dismissal was to permanently bar the plaintiffs’ claim since the statutory 
limitations period for filing claims had then expired.”); Carr v. Dean Steel Bldgs., 
Inc., 619 So. 2d 392, 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (“[D]ismissal is a drastic remedy 
which should be used only in extreme situations.”). 
Thus, consistent with our precedent, we hold that the trial court must make a 
finding of prejudice to the defendant before a medical malpractice action can be 
dismissed under section 766.205(2) for a plaintiff’s failure to comply with the 
informal presuit discovery process.  As we have repeatedly explained, “the purpose 
 
 
- 36 - 
of the chapter 766 presuit requirements is to alleviate the high cost of medical 
negligence litigation through early determination and prompt resolution of claims, 
not to deny access to the courts to plaintiffs.”  Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 838 
(emphasis added).  
Moreover, “[b]ecause dismissal is the ultimate sanction in the adversarial 
system,” particularly in the medical malpractice realm after the statute of 
limitations has expired, we remind trial courts that “it should be reserved for those 
aggravating circumstances in which a lesser sanction would fail to achieve a just 
result.”  Kozel v. Ostendorf, 629 So. 2d 817, 818 (Fla. 1993).  “[I]n those situations 
where the attorney, and not the client, is responsible for the error,” courts should 
consider the factors set forth in Kozel in determining whether dismissal is 
warranted.  Id. 
D. This Case 
Here, the trial court found that, during Dr. Thompson’s deposition, Morris’s 
counsel “repeatedly objected to questions,” “refused to allow” Dr. Thompson to 
answer certain questions, and “thwarted” the Defendants from learning information 
such as whether Dr. Thompson was aware of the ABA accreditation rules 
restricting students to working no more than twenty hours a week while attending 
law school and whether Dr. Thompson applied for disability during the same 
period of time preceding the suit due to her arthritis.  The trial court further found 
 
 
- 37 - 
that these actions “were purposeful and designed to deprive the Defendants’ [sic] 
of the ability to meaningfully participate in pre-suit discovery of the medical 
negligence claims against them, and as such was not in good faith.”  Without 
making any finding as to whether Morris’s actions prejudiced the Defendants, the 
trial court concluded that dismissal was warranted under section 766.205(2).   
On review, the First District concluded that “the record contain[ed] ample 
evidence” to support the trial court’s conclusion that Morris’s “lack of 
cooperation” with the Defendants’ attempts to verify Dr. Thompson’s 
qualifications warranted dismissal under section 766.205(2).  Morris, 189 So. 3d at 
351.  In reaching this conclusion, the First District correctly stated that “[a] court’s 
determination of the sanction to impose” for a party’s failure to comply with 
discovery “depends both on the circumstances of the case and what, if any, 
prejudice the opposing party has suffered.”  Id. at 350.  The First District did not 
identify any prejudice the Defendants suffered as a result of Morris putting a halt 
to what clearly was, in Judge Swanson’s words, a “fishing expedition.”  Id. at 351 
(Swanson, J., dissenting). 
We first conclude that, because Dr. Thompson’s affidavit clearly 
demonstrated that she was qualified, and the Defendants did not present any 
evidence to refute those qualifications, the trial court should not have permitted a 
deposition of Dr. Thompson.  Dr. Thompson had been an OB-GYN for over three 
 
 
- 38 - 
decades.  While the Defendants attempted to challenge the veracity of Dr. 
Thompson’s assertions that she was practicing in her field of medicine while 
attending law school, an issue that would have been impeachment on a collateral 
matter, they presented no evidence demonstrating that these assertions were false.   
Additionally, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in 
dismissing Morris’s medical malpractice action under section 766.205(2) without 
finding that Morris’s actions prejudiced the Defendants.  Indeed, had the trial court 
or the First District considered the question of prejudice, they would have been 
hard-pressed to identify any.  Although the Defendants attempt to argue that they 
were prejudiced because Morris’s actions delayed the resolution of the claim, delay 
is not the type of prejudice contemplated by our case law.  It was not as if Dr. 
Thompson’s opinion changed from the time that her opinion was filed.  Thus, the 
Defendants in this case had all information they needed in order to “facilitate 
evaluation of the claim.”  § 766.205(1).  
IV. Conclusion 
 
It has been observed that “there is an increasingly disturbing trend of 
prospective defendants attempting to use the [chapter 766] statutory requirements 
as a sword against plaintiffs.”  Michael v. Med. Staffing Network, Inc., 947 So. 2d 
614, 619 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).  Unfortunately, it appears that this was such a case.  
Despite the sworn affidavit of Morris’s presuit medical expert—which stated that 
 
 
- 39 - 
she had been a board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist for more than twenty 
years and served as chief of the OB-GYN department at a large medical center and 
chief of staff at a small women’s specialty hospital—the Defendants in this case 
used the medical malpractice statutory requirements as a sword.  
As a result of the Defendants’ conduct, and the trial court’s and First 
District’s exceedingly restrictive reading of chapter 766, Morris has thus far been 
deprived of her right to access the courts.  To uphold the result in this case would 
permanently deprive Morris of her right to such access to pursue her medical 
malpractice claim for the wrongful death of a twenty-year old woman because the 
statute of limitations has long since run.  Such a result not only frustrates Morris’s 
constitutional right to access to the courts, but also does nothing to advance the 
Legislature’s purpose in creating the medical malpractice presuit statutory scheme.  
Because Morris’s presuit medical expert clearly met the statutory 
qualifications for medical experts, and because Morris complied with the necessary 
discovery, the trial court erred in dismissing Morris’s action under sections 
766.205(2) and 766.206(2), Florida Statutes (2011).  Accordingly, we quash the 
First District’s decision and remand with directions that the trial court reinstate 
Morris’s medical malpractice action arising out of a death that occurred over nine 
years ago. 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
 
- 40 - 
LEWIS, QUINCE, and LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON and LAWSON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
CANADY, C.J., dissenting. 
I disagree with the majority’s decision to quash the First District’s decision 
in Morris v. Muniz, 189 So. 3d 348 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016), and to reinstate Morris’s 
medical malpractice complaint against the various defendants in this case.  I would 
instead approve the result reached by the First District.  Under a proper reading of 
the statutes governing the medical malpractice presuit process, Morris’s purported 
presuit “medical expert”—Dr. Thompson—as a matter of law did not satisfy the 
statutory requirements for such experts.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
This case is readily resolved on the ground that Dr. Thompson failed to meet 
the threshold statutory requirement of being “duly and regularly engaged” in the 
practice of the profession at the time the presuit affidavit was executed in 2011.     
§ 766.202(6), Fla. Stat. (2011).  The record reveals that at the time Dr. Thompson 
executed the affidavit, she had been retired from her OB/GYN practice for more 
than three years and by all indications had transitioned (or was transitioning) into a 
new career.  The fact that Dr. Thompson had a lengthy career as an OB/GYN 
before retiring in March 2008 does not defeat the plain language of the relevant 
statutes.     
 
 
- 41 - 
After examining the statutory requirements for a presuit “medical expert” 
and explaining why Dr. Thompson does not satisfy those requirements, I briefly 
address the problematic nature of Dr. Thompson’s affidavit and the ensuing lack of 
compliance by the plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel regarding the trial court’s order 
authorizing limited discovery into Dr. Thompson’s qualifications.  Given this 
record, I am troubled by the majority’s decision to view this case through the lens 
of an “unrefuted” affidavit.  The true extent of Dr. Thompson’s activities before 
March 2008 are unknown.  Thus, even assuming that the “duly and regularly 
engaged” requirement applies to some period of time prior to March 2008, I would 
approve the First District’s decision to affirm the dismissal of the lawsuit. 
I.  DR. THOMPSON WAS NOT A “MEDICAL EXPERT” FOR PURPOSES 
OF CHAPTER 766 
 
Prior to filing a claim for medical malpractice, a prospective plaintiff is 
required to “conduct an investigation to ascertain that there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that” the named defendant was negligent and that the negligence caused 
the plaintiff’s injury.  § 766.203(2), Fla. Stat. (2011).  As part of the mandatory 
presuit process, a prospective plaintiff must obtain “a verified written medical 
expert opinion from a medical expert as defined in s. 766.202(6).”  Id.  The 
purpose of the expert opinion is to “corroborate reasonable grounds to support the 
claim of medical negligence.”  Id.  Prior to initiating litigation, the prospective 
 
 
- 42 - 
plaintiff must first provide the defendant with a “notice of intent to initiate 
litigation,” along with the medical expert’s opinion.  Id.   
The term “medical expert” is defined in section 766.202(6) as “a person duly 
and regularly engaged in the practice of his or her profession who holds a health 
care professional degree from a university or college and who meets the 
requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102.”  (Emphasis added.)  
There is nothing backward-looking about the present-tense requirement that the 
person be “duly and regularly engaged” in the practice of the profession.  In other 
words, the person must be duly and regularly engaged in the practice at the time 
the written medical expert opinion is offered, as opposed to having been duly and 
regularly engaged in the practice during some earlier period.  But this “duly and 
regularly engaged” requirement, of course, is not the only statutory requirement for 
being a “medical expert.”  Section 766.202(6) expressly provides that the person 
must also hold a certain professional degree and “meet[] the requirements of an 
expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102.” 
Section 766.102 sets forth requirements for testifying experts in medical 
malpractice actions.  In order to be an expert witness permitted to testify 
concerning the prevailing professional standard of care, the witness must, at a 
minimum, be a licensed health care provider.  § 766.102(5), Fla. Stat. (2011).  For 
giving expert testimony against a specialist, the expert witness must meet certain 
 
 
- 43 - 
additional requirements, including that the witness “[s]pecialize in the same 
specialty as the health care provider against whom . . . the testimony is offered.”    
§ 766.102(5)(a)1., Fla. Stat.  An expert witness offering testimony against a 
specialist must also meet a specific, backward-looking requirement.  Namely, the 
expert witness must: 
2.  Have devoted professional time during the 3 years 
immediately preceding the date of the occurrence that is the basis for 
the action to: 
a.  The active clinical practice of, or consulting with respect to, 
the same or similar specialty that includes the evaluation, diagnosis, or 
treatment of the medical condition that is the subject of the claim and 
have prior experience treating similar patients; 
b.  Instruction of students in an accredited health professional 
school or accredited residency or clinical research program in the 
same or similar specialty; or 
c.  A clinical research program that is affiliated with an 
accredited health professional school or accredited residency or 
clinical research program in the same or similar specialty. 
 
§ 766.102(5)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).   
When reviewing the distinct requirements of sections 766.202(6) and 
766.102 together, it is clear that the Legislature focused on both the ongoing and 
previous experience in practice of a presuit “medical expert.”  The statutory 
requirements are “clear and unambiguous” and should be given their “plain and 
obvious meaning.”  A.R. Douglass, Inc., v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 
1931).  Thus, in this case involving a medical specialty, Dr. Thompson at the time 
she executed the affidavit was required to: (1) be duly and regularly engaged in the 
 
 
- 44 - 
practice of the profession; and (2) “[h]ave devoted professional time during the 3 
years immediately preceding the” alleged malpractice to one of the three categories 
of professional activities listed in section 766.102(5)(a)2.—under the facts 
presented here, to “[t]he active clinical practice of” OB/GYN.8 
Nothing in Dr. Thompson’s affidavit or in the rest of the record supports the 
conclusion that she was “duly and regularly engaged” in the practice of the 
profession at the time she executed the affidavit in 2011.  Dr. Thompson’s affidavit 
on its face paints the picture of someone who retired in March 2008 from a lengthy 
private medical practice and who had transitioned (or was transitioning) into a new 
career.  That conclusion is supported by the rest of the record, including the 
following interrogatory response from the plaintiff regarding Dr. Thompson’s 
profession or occupation: “Retired OB/GYN, March 1, 2008, before law practice.”  
Although Dr. Thompson maintained an active license to practice medicine in the 
State of Texas at the time she executed the affidavit, that license merely authorized 
her to engage in the practice of the profession.  Indeed, having an active license is 
itself a separate statutory requirement for a “medical expert.”  § 766.102(5), Fla. 
                                          
 
 
8.  The majority concludes that “[t]here is no indication that the Legislature  
. . . intended to make the qualifications for a presuit expert more stringent than an 
expert testifying at trial.”  Majority op. at 19.  But that conclusion ignores the text 
of section 766.202(6), which, by definition, provides that a presuit “medical 
expert” must meet certain requirements in addition to those for an expert testifying 
at trial.  See § 766.202(6), Fla. Stat. 
 
 
- 45 - 
Stat.  And although Dr. Thompson mentioned during her deposition in October 
2013 that she served as an expert for the Texas Board of Medicine after her 
retirement from private practice, serving as an expert can hardly be said to be 
“engag[ing] in the practice of” the profession.  § 766.202(6), Fla. Stat.; see Winson 
v. Norman, 658 So. 2d 625, 626 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (concluding that the alleged 
presuit expert who “confined his recent professional activities to acting as a 
‘litigation expert’ ” did not satisfy the requirement in chapter 766 of being duly 
and regularly engaged in the practice of the profession).  In any event, Dr. 
Thompson described her work for the Texas Board of Medicine as “sporadic,” 
which is quite the opposite of “regularly.”  In short, Dr. Thompson was not a 
qualified “medical expert” for purposes of chapter 766.  As a result, her affidavit 
was insufficient to “corroborate reasonable grounds to support the claim of medical 
negligence.”  § 766.203(2), Fla. Stat.9 
                                          
 
 
9.  The majority dismisses the notion that Dr. Thompson was required to “be 
duly and regularly engaged at the time the opinion is offered” in part on the ground 
that “the role of the medical expert is to provide an opinion regarding the 
prevailing professional standard of care, or the professional standard of care 
existing at the time of the occurrence that is the basis for action.”  Majority op. at 
21 (emphasis added).  But even assuming that Dr. Thompson was only required to 
be “duly and regularly engaged” in the practice “at the time of the occurrence,” she 
still would not meet the statutory requirement.  As the majority recognizes, Dr. 
Thompson “retire[d] from clinical practice in March 2008,” majority op. at 10, 
“which was several months before the incidents alleged in the complaint began,” 
majority op. at 26. 
 
 
- 46 - 
The majority’s repeated assertions that Dr. Thompson “clearly met” the 
statutory requirements, see majority op. at 29, 39, cannot be reconciled with the 
plain statutory language.  And no case law supports allowing a medical malpractice 
lawsuit to proceed where, as is the case here, the plaintiff fails to provide the 
requisite corroborating affidavit prior to the expiration of the limitations period for 
filing suit.  See Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So. 2d 278, 285 (Fla. 1996) (“We hold that 
plaintiffs’ compliance with the presuit investigation requirements of chapter 766 
prior to filing suit and within the statutory limitations period constituted sufficient 
compliance with the presuit notice and investigation requirements of the statute.”). 
The trial court and the parties in this case all appear to have conflated the 
present-tense “duly and regularly engaged” requirement of section 766.202(6) with 
the separate requirement in section 766.102(5)(a)2. regarding whether the person 
devoted professional time to the active clinical practice of the specialty during the 
three years immediately preceding the alleged malpractice.  Indeed, they all 
seemingly understood the sole relevant inquiry to be whether Dr. Thompson was 
engaged in the full-time, active practice of medicine during that three-year period 
(either at some point in time or throughout that period).   
This exclusive focus on a lookback period is likely attributable to the First 
District’s decisions in Fort Walton Beach Medical Center, Inc. v. Dingler, 697 So. 
2d 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), and Baptist Medical Center of Beaches, Inc. v. 
 
 
- 47 - 
Rhodin, 40 So. 3d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).  The reasoning of these cases on this 
point should be rejected. 
In Dingler, the First District examined the definition of “medical expert” 
found in section 766.202(5), Florida Statutes (1991), and specifically rejected the 
defendants’ argument that a presuit “medical expert” was required to be duly and 
regularly engaged in the practice of the profession “at the time the corroborating 
opinion and affidavit are signed.”  Dingler, 697 So. 2d at 580.  Dingler erroneously 
conflated sections 766.102 and 766.202 by concluding that the present-tense “duly 
and regularly engaged” requirement in section 766.202 was satisfied “so long as 
the expert’s ‘active involvement’ in the practice occurred” within the lookback 
period “as provided by” section 766.102(2).  Id. 
More recently in Rhodin, the First District cited Dingler with approval in 
rejecting the defendant’s challenge to the affidavit provided by the presuit 
“medical expert,” Dr. Byrne.  Rhodin, 40 So. 3d at 118.  And in rejecting the 
defendant’s specific argument that Dr. Byrne was not “duly and regularly 
engaged” in the practice of nursing, the First District again erroneously conflated 
that statutory requirement in section 766.202 with the “devoted professional time” 
requirement in section 766.102.  Id. at 119-20.  Rhodin failed to consider the fact 
that in 2003, the Legislature adopted a definition of “medical expert” in section 
766.202 that not only retained the “duly and regularly engaged” language but also 
 
 
- 48 - 
provided that a presuit “medical expert” must also “meet[] the requirements of an 
expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102.”  See ch. 2003-416, § 58, at 76, Laws of 
Fla.  The 2003 amendments make clear beyond any doubt that the “duly and 
regularly engaged” requirement in section 766.202 and the “have devoted 
professional time” requirement in section 766.102 are not one and the same.  
Conflating the two requirements renders the “duly and regularly engaged” 
language a nullity.  See State v. Goode, 830 So. 2d 817, 824 (Fla. 2002) (“[A] basic 
rule of statutory construction provides that the Legislature does not intend to enact 
useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a 
statute meaningless.”).   
II.  DR. THOMPSON’S INSUFFICIENT AFFIDAVIT 
Even assuming that Dr. Thompson’s activities during the three years 
immediately preceding the alleged malpractice in this case should control whether 
this case is permitted to proceed, I would approve the First District’s decision.   
In determining that the proper standard of review is de novo, the majority 
repeatedly remarks that the facts surrounding Dr. Thompson’s qualifications were 
“unrefuted.”  In doing so, the majority ignores that Dr. Thompson’s affidavit was 
problematic on its face, the facts were in dispute, and the plaintiff and plaintiff’s 
counsel—both leading up to and during Dr. Thompson’s court-authorized 
deposition—obstructed the defendants’ requests for relevant information.  This 
 
 
- 49 - 
case hardly involved “a fishing expedition in an attempt to impeach” Dr. 
Thompson’s qualifications.  Majority op. at 33 (quoting Morris, 189 So. 3d at 351 
(Swanson, J., dissenting)).   
According to Dr. Thompson’s affidavit, she “engaged in full-time patient 
care until March 2008” when she retired due to arthritis in her hands.  According to 
the very same affidavit, Dr. Thompson received her J.D. in 2007 and her M.P.Aff. 
(Master of Public Affairs) in 2008, both from the University of Texas.  In other 
words, at the same time she was purportedly still caring for patients on a “full-
time” basis, Dr. Thompson was also enrolled on a full-time basis in law school and 
in a Master of Public Affairs program.  In addition to begging obvious questions, 
not the least of which is how it is humanly possible to simultaneously do all of 
those things, Dr. Thompson’s affidavit facially conflicted with then Standard 
304(f) of the American Bar Association’s Standards for Approval of Law Schools, 
which prohibited full-time law students from working more than twenty hours per 
week.  Any reasonable defense attorney—and any reasonable trial judge, as was 
the case here—would have been skeptical.  And when the plaintiff chose to 
respond to the defendants’ requests for information—both with regard to Dr. 
Thompson and other matters—the answers were either nonresponsive or begged 
more questions.  For example, the defendants were told that Dr. Thompson 
somehow managed to deliver approximately thirty-five babies per month while she 
 
 
- 50 - 
was enrolled full-time in law school and in a master’s program.  It should go 
without saying that the trial court acted within its discretion in authorizing limited 
discovery directed at Dr. Thompson’s activities during the three-year period 
preceding the alleged malpractice.  And that discovery included a properly noticed 
deposition of Dr. Thompson along with a request for documents to be produced at 
the deposition.  
The record reflects that the plaintiff waited until approximately ninety 
minutes before the deposition to file an objection to the defendants’ request for 
documents.  The record also reflects that during the deposition, the plaintiff’s 
counsel repeatedly objected—and instructed Dr. Thompson not to answer—when 
certain relevant questions were asked regarding Dr. Thompson’s purported 
activities during the three-year period preceding the alleged malpractice.  When 
Dr. Thompson was permitted to answer questions, she testified that, among other 
things, she “probably” worked “more than” one hundred hours per week between 
her practice and her J.D. and M.P.Aff. degrees.  That included being on call for 
unaffiliated patients at the hospital two to three days per month, as well as being on 
call for her own patients every third to fourth night or day until the final year of her 
practice when she “took call . . . 24/7” for her own patients—all while suffering 
from arthritis in her hands that became “severe” in the final years of her practice.  
Of course, Dr. Thompson was not permitted to answer, for example, whether she 
 
 
- 51 - 
filed for disability with regard to her arthritis and, if so, whether the application—
which would have discussed her work history—was available for inspection.  
Similarly, Dr. Thompson was instructed to not answer questions such as whether 
she was aware of any requirements by her law school regarding not working 
outside the law school more than twenty hours per week, although her subsequent 
testimony implied that the dean of the law school knew and approved of her plan to 
continue practicing OB/GYN on a “full-time” basis—again, notwithstanding the 
American Bar Association’s Standards for Approval of   Dr. 
Thompson also was not permitted to discuss whether her compensation from and 
the finances of her medical practice changed as a result of her starting law school.  
That was the case even though Dr. Thompson revealed earlier in the deposition 
that she had hired “a contract physician” “during some of that time” but could not 
quite recall the specifics of that hire, including when she hired the physician, the 
terms of payment, or whether the physician had a set schedule for a period of time 
at least as long as a law school semester.  And Dr. Thompson was not permitted to 
answer whether she at some point sold her practice to that contract physician. 
On this record, I disagree with the majority’s description of the defendants’ 
attempts to confirm the claims made by Dr. Thompson as being “a fishing 
expedition.”  Majority op. at 33.  And I reject the majority’s view that Dr. 
Thompson’s affidavit conclusively established her statutory qualifications.  The 
 
 
- 52 - 
true extent of Dr. Thompson’s activities during the relevant period remains very 
much in doubt.  I therefore disagree with the majority’s analysis, which is entirely 
predicated on the assertions that Dr. Thompson clearly met the statutory 
requirements and that her affidavit went “unrefuted.”  This case should properly be 
viewed as a case in which a facially insufficient affidavit was submitted and the 
defendants were prevented from determining whether Dr. Thompson in fact met 
the statutory requirements.  And no case law supports allowing a medical 
malpractice suit to proceed in the absence of a timely corroborating affidavit from 
a presuit “medical expert” as defined in section 766.202(6). 
In attempting to justify its decision, the majority notes that the presuit 
statutes should be “interpreted liberally” so as to favor access to courts.  See 
majority op. at 16 (quoting Kukral, 679 So. 2d at 284).  But this case has nothing to 
do with roadblocks to court access.  Instead, this case has to do with a plaintiff 
submitting a facially insufficient and suspect affidavit and then repeatedly 
declining—even in the face of a court-imposed order—to provide relevant 
information that would have confirmed or refuted the affidavit.  “Liberally” 
interpreting the presuit process does not warrant allowing plaintiffs to obstruct 
defendants from obtaining relevant information regarding questionable claims and 
then rewarding that obstruction through an analysis that treats those claims as 
 
 
- 53 - 
“unrefuted.”  The majority’s decision to simply reinstate the plaintiff’s suit 
seriously undermines the presuit process established by the statute.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
Although the plaintiff’s purported presuit “medical expert”—Dr. 
Thompson—appears to have enjoyed a lengthy career as an OB/GYN, she did not 
meet the statutory qualifications for a “medical expert,” given that she was not 
“duly and regularly engaged” in the practice of the profession at the time she 
executed the presuit affidavit.  The plaintiff thus failed to meet the presuit burden 
of having corroborated that reasonable grounds existed to support a malpractice 
claim, and the plaintiff failed to remedy that defect prior to filing suit and prior to 
the expiration of the limitations period.  Even assuming that the only relevant 
period is the three years immediately preceding the alleged malpractice, the record 
before us—due to the conduct of the plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel—cannot 
support the finding that Dr. Thompson met the statutory qualifications.  I would 
approve the result reached by the First District in affirming the dismissal of the 
plaintiff’s complaint.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
POLSTON and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D14-3987 
 
 
(Jackson County) 
 
 
- 54 - 
 
John S. Mills, Courtney Brewer, and Andrew D. Manko of The Mills Firm, P.A., 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Peter D. Webster and Christine Davis Graves of Carlton Fields, Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent Bay Hospital d/b/a Gulf Coast Medical Center 
 
Clifford C. Higby and Kevin Barr of Bryant & Higby, Chartered, Panama City, 
Florida; and William D. Horgan and Michael J. Thomas of Pennington, P.A., 
Tallahassee, Florida,  
 
for Respondents Stephen G. Smith, M.D., Orlando S. Muniz, M.D., and 
Marianna OB/GYN Associates, Inc. 
 
Jaken E. Roane of Guilday, Simpson, West, Hatch, Lowe & Roane, P.A., 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent Jackson Hospital 
 
Philip M. Burlington and Adam Richardson of Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., 
West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
Amicus Curiae Florida Justice Association 
 
Travase L. Erickson of Saalfield Shad Law Firm, Jacksonville, Florida, and Kansas 
R. Gooden of Boyd & Jenerette, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida, 
 
 
Amicus Curiae Florida Defense Lawyers Association