Case Title: Torrence v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 732, 2010

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2012-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DESMOND TORRENCE, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 732, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0205014445 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: April 27, 2012 
   Decided: June 11, 2012 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices.        
O R D E R 
 
This 11th day of June 2012, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs, 
their supplemental memoranda, and the record on appeal, it appears to the 
Court that: 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Desmond Torrence, filed this appeal 
from the Superior Court’s order, dated November 3, 2010, denying his third 
motion for postconviction relief.  We find no merit to Torrence’s appeal.  
Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
(2) 
The record reflects that Torrence was arrested in 2002 for the 
robbery and murder of a motel desk clerk.  The crime was captured on the 
2 
 
motel’s video surveillance camera and showed two masked men, similar in 
height, commit the robbery.  Upon exiting the motel, one of the masked men 
turned around and shot the clerk in the face, killing him instantly.  No 
physical evidence was recovered at the scene.  Two months later, however, 
during a police interview on an unrelated matter, Earnest Cooper told police 
that he, Torrence, and Stephen Kattes, committed the robbery. Eventually 
Torrence and Kattes were arrested, and all three men were charged with 
robbery, murder, and related offenses.  Prior to Torrence’s trial, Cooper and 
Kattes pled guilty to Robbery in the First Degree, two counts of Possession 
of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (PFDCF), and Conspiracy 
in the Second Degree.  Kattes also pled guilty to Wearing a Disguise During 
the Commission of a Felony. 
(3) 
At Torrence’s trial, Cooper testified that all three men planned 
the robbery.  Cooper had been assigned the task of driving the getaway car.  
While fleeing the scene, Torrence told Cooper that he had shot the clerk. 
Kattes testified similarly to Cooper as to the planning of the robbery.  Kattes 
testified that when he and Torrence went into the motel, Torrence was the 
one who held the weapon and shot the clerk.  The State also presented the 
expert testimony of an FBI agent who reviewed the motel’s surveillance 
video.  The expert opined that both masked men were approximately 5 feet 8 
3 
 
inches tall, which was consistent with the height of Torrence and Kattes, 
respectively.  Cooper, at six feet four inches, was considerably taller. 
(4) 
The record reflects that, on the subject of Torrence’s 
codefendants’ testimony, the trial judge instructed the jury as follows: 
The testimony of an accomplice must be examined and weighed 
by the jury with particular care. 
The jury should consider whether the testimony of the 
accomplice has been affected by self-interest, or by an agreement with 
the State, or by his own interest in the outcome of this case, or by bias 
for or against the defendant.  The fact that an alleged accomplice has 
entered a plea of guilty to some of the offenses charged is not in itself 
evidence of guilt of the defendant.1 
 
No objection was made to this jury instruction at trial. 
(5) 
The jury convicted Torrence in September 2003 of Murder in 
the First Degree (felony), Robbery in the First Degree, Conspiracy in the 
Second Degree, and two counts of PFDCF.  The jury acquitted him of 
Murder in the First Degree (intentional), the associated count of PFDCF, and 
Wearing a Disguise During the Commission of a Felony.  Because it was a 
capital case, the Superior Court held a separate penalty hearing to determine 
whether Torrence should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death.2  On 
November 19, 2004, the Superior Court followed the jury’s recommendation 
and sentenced Torrence to life imprisonment. 
                                          
 
1 In his supplemental reply memorandum, Torrence denies that this instruction was ever given to his jury.  
We reject Torrence’s contention, which is clearly contradicted by the record on appeal. 
2 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (2007 & Supp. 2010). 
4 
 
(6) 
After the verdict but prior to the penalty phase, Torrence moved 
for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the jury’s not guilty verdict on the 
charges of intentional murder and wearing a disguise implied that the jury 
found that he was not one of the masked men and had not fired the fatal shot.  
Torrence further asserted that the State had presented no evidence 
suggesting that he was the driver of the getaway car.  On November 18, 
2004, the Superior Court denied Torrence’s motion, determining that: 
The verdict . . . more likely reflects the jury’s 
inability to decide what specific role [Torrence] 
played in the robbery but with a judgment that he 
was a participant.  In other words, the jury must 
have been satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that 
[Torrence] was an accomplice to the murder and 
robbery but not convinced that he was the trigger-
man.3 
  
(7) 
Torrence raised the denial of his acquittal motion on direct 
appeal, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his 
convictions because his acquittal of wearing a disguise implied that the jury 
believed he was not present in the motel when the clerk was shot.  By Order 
dated November 2, 2005, we affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment, 
applying the “rule of lenity”4 to conclude that “[t]he jury was free to believe 
the testimony of Kattes and Cooper that Torrence was a participant in the 
                                          
 
3 State v. Torrence, Del. Super., Cr. ID No. 0205014445 (Nov. 18, 2004) (sentencing opinion). 
4 This Court has held that inconsistent verdicts will be affirmed if the inconsistency can be explained by 
jury lenity.  Tilden v. State, 513 A.2d 1302, 1306-07 (Del. 1986). 
5 
 
robbery, but . . . also entitled to reasonably doubt their testimony that 
Torrence was the shooter.”5 
(8) 
In October 2006, Torrence, through counsel, filed his first 
postconviction motion, which claimed that Kattes had recanted his trial 
testimony.  After an evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court denied the 
motion.  Torrence did not appeal. 
(9) 
Torrence filed his second postconviction motion in January 
2010.  In that motion, Torrence argued that, based upon this Court’s 2009 
decision in Allen v. State,6 the Superior Court’s jury instructions on the issue 
of accomplice liability were defective.   The Superior Court denied 
Torrence’s motion.  On appeal, we affirmed the denial of Torrence’s motion 
on the ground that it was procedurally barred.7 
(10) Torrence filed his third motion for postconviction relief in 
September 2010.  For the first time, Torrence argued that the Superior Court 
committed reversible error when it failed to instruct the jury on 
uncorroborated accomplice testimony consistent with Bland v. State.8  
                                          
 
5 Torrence v. State, 2005 WL 2923501, *3 (Del. Nov. 2, 2005). 
6 Allen v. State, 970 A.2d 203 (Del. 2009) (holding that when the State proceeds on a theory of accomplice 
liability for criminal offenses that are divided into degrees, the jury is required to make an individualized 
determination regarding both a defendant’s mental state and his culpability for any aggravating fact or 
circumstance). 
7 Torrence v. State, 2010 WL 3036742 (Del. Aug. 4, 2010). 
8 See Bland v. State, 263 A.2d 286, 288 (Del. 1970) (requiring that the trial judge instruct the jury to 
examine the testimony of an alleged accomplice “with suspicion and great caution”).   
6 
 
Torrence further argued that, as this Court held in Smith v. State,9 his trial 
counsel’s failure to request a Bland instruction constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel.   
(11) The motion was referred to a Superior Court Commissioner.  
The Commissioner concluded that Smith had no application to Torrence’s 
case because Torrence had been tried as a principal and not solely as an 
accomplice.10  By report and recommendation, the Commissioner found that 
Torrence’s claims were procedurally barred and recommended that the 
motion be summarily dismissed.  By order dated November 3, 2010, the 
Superior Court adopted the Commissioner’s report and denied Torrence’s 
third postconviction motion.  This appeal followed. 
(12) In his opening brief on appeal, Torrence again argues that the 
testimony of his codefendants was conflicting and, thus, uncorroborated.  
Accordingly, Torrence argues, the Superior Court erred in failing to give a 
Bland instruction to the jury, and his trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to request the instruction.  After the briefs were filed, we stayed the appeal 
until we decided Brooks v. State and Owens v. State (collectively, Brooks),11 
two cases that were consolidated for decision in order to address how a jury 
should be instructed on the issue of accomplice testimony.  After we issued 
                                          
 
9 Smith v. State, 991 A.2d 1169 (Del. 2010). 
10 See White v. State, 2010 WL 1781021 (Del. May 4, 2010).  
11 Brooks v. State, 40 A.3d 346 (Del. 2012). 
7 
 
our decision in Brooks, the parties in this appeal filed supplemental 
memoranda.  The matter was then submitted for decision. 
(13) In his opening brief as supplemented, Torrence contends that 
the testimony of Cooper and Kattes was uncorroborated and irreconcilable.  
Thus, Torrence argues, the Superior Court committed plain error in failing to 
give a proper Bland instruction regarding accomplice testimony.  Torrence 
also argues that that his trial counsel was ineffective under Smith for not 
requesting the Bland instruction.   
(14) In its supplemental answering memorandum, the State concedes 
that, pursuant to this Court’s recent holding in Brooks, the Superior Court 
was required to instruct the jury on accomplice testimony.  The State further 
concedes that the accomplice testimony instruction that the Superior Court 
gave to Torrence’s jury differs from the jury instruction on accomplice 
testimony that is now mandated by Brooks.12  The State points out, however, 
that Brooks does not apply retroactively.  Consequently, the State argues, the 
Superior Court adequately instructed the jury on accomplice testimony under 
the law as it existed at that time, which allowed the Superior Court some 
discretion to modify the Bland instruction.  Thus, according to the State, the 
Superior Court did not commit plain error in failing to give the exact Bland 
                                          
 
12 See id. at 350 (setting forth the required jury instruction on accomplice testimony). 
8 
 
instruction, and trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the 
instruction as given. 
(15) In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
a defendant must prove that: (a) counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness; and (b) there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome of the 
proceeding would have been different.13  There is a strong presumption that 
counsel’s representation was professionally reasonable.14  In this case, 
because we find no error in the jury instruction as given, we conclude that 
counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to it. 
 
(16) In reviewing the sufficiency of a jury instruction, this Court will 
read the instructions as a whole to determine if the trial court accurately 
instructed the jury on the law.15  Some inaccuracies and inaptness of 
language are to be expected in any jury charge.16  The relevant consideration 
is whether the instructions as a whole are reasonably informative, not 
misleading, and allowed the jury to intelligently perform its duty in returning 
a verdict.17   
                                          
 
13 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
14 Id. at 689. 
15 Hankins v. State, 976 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 2009). 
16 Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104, 128 (Del. 1983). 
17 Hankins v. State, 976 at 842. 
9 
 
 
(17) In Cabrera v. State,18 we upheld an accomplice testimony 
instruction as “adequate” even though the instruction did not use the phrase 
“suspicion and great caution” that was mandated in Bland.  In considering 
the accomplice testimony instruction as a whole in Torrence’s case, we find 
that the instruction was reasonably informative, not misleading, and allowed 
the jury to intelligently perform its duty in returning a verdict.19  The 
instruction given in Torrence’s case, in fact, is similar to the jury instruction 
we recently upheld in Brooks.20  Torrence’s jury was instructed to consider 
the accomplice testimony with “particular care” and warned them the 
testimony may be affected by self-interest and the accomplices’ plea 
agreements.  Under the circumstances, we find no error in the instruction. 
We thus conclude that counsel’s failure to object to the instruction did not 
amount to ineffective assistance.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice  
 
                                          
 
18 Cabrera v. State, 747 A.2d 543, 545 (Del. 2000). 
19 Hankins v. State, 976 A.2d at 842. 
20 See Brooks v. State, 40 A.3d at 346.