Case Title: Parker v. Energy Development Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-12-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Parker v. Energy Development Co.1984 WY 112691 P.2d 981Case Number: 84-55Decided: 12/05/1984BRUCE PARKER, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CO., AN IOWA CORPORATION, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
BRUCE PARKER, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CO., 
AN IOWA CORPORATION, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, CarbonCounty, Robert A. Hill, 
J.

 
 
John R. Hursh 
and Holly Brown of Central Wyoming Law Associates, P.C., Riverton, for appellant.

John A. 
MacPherson and Catherine MacPherson of Johnson, MacPherson & Noecker, 
Rawlins, for 
appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal comes here 
for - among other reasons - the resolution of the question which asks whether an 
employer is immune from "intentional or culpably negligent conduct"1 resulting in an employee's injury 
or death under Wyoming's worker's compensation 
law.

[¶2.]     The facts necessary to 
a decision on this issue are contained in the appellant's brief. There it is 
said:

"The Plaintiff, Bruce 
Parker, was employed by the Defendant, Energy Development Co., as a pumper in 
the Vanguard No. 2 underground coal mine in Hanna, Wyoming. On or about February 23, 1982, at 
approximately 2:45 a.m., the Plaintiff was in a crew which was rock dusting a 
roadway inside the underground mine by spreading ground limestone on the wet 
roadway to dry the moisture for traction. The roof of the mine caved in while 
the crew was second-mining a bleeder pillar between numbers one and two left 
entries. Four hundred tons of rock fell on Virgle Cordell Renfrow, Jr., Steven 
Olivas, and Bruce Parker. Only Bruce survived."

[¶3.]     The complaint alleged 
culpable negligence and the commission of an intentional tort against the person 
of Bruce Parker by Energy Development Co., an Iowa corporation which was Bruce 
Parker's employer and which was contributing to Parker's account in the worker's 
compensation fund. A motion to dismiss the appellant's amended complaint was 
filed and granted on the ground that any and all claims by employee Parker 
against employer Energy Development Co. are foreclosed by Art. 10, § 4 of the 
Wyoming 
Constitution2 and § 27-12-103(a), W.S. 1977.3 

Decision

[¶4.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶5.]     This appeal was argued 
in this court September 11, 1984, just two weeks after the publication of our 
opinion in Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, 
Inc., Wyo., 687 P.2d 885 (1984).4 At argument, counsel asked that we 
overrule Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, 
Inc., supra, in which we held that the worker's compensation employer is 
immune from its employee's action for intentional tort by reason of the language 
of Art. 10, § 4 and § 27-12-103(a). This we decline to do.

[¶6.]     In Wendy's, we reviewed the history of the 
worker's compensation law and we revisited the compromise between the employer 
and the employee which resulted in our state's Worker's Compensation Act, § 
27-12-101, et seq., W.S. 1977. Through this legislation, the workers gave up 
their rights of action in common-law tort for injury or death in return for 
certain designated employer-funded benefits which were payable without regard to 
any but the worker's culpable negligence.

[¶7.]     We pointed out in Baker v. Wendy's of Montana Inc. supra, 
that, in return for contributing to the compensation fund in behalf of the 
injured or the heirs of a deceased employee, the parties to the statutory 
contract agreed that the contributing employer would receive absolute immunity 
from all common-law rights of action for an employee's injury or death. We 
called particular attention to the language of the Art. 10, § 4 constitutional 
provision which said that the right of each employee to compensation from the 
fund

"* * * shall be in lieu of and shall take the place 
of any and all rights of action against any employer contributing * * to such 
fund in favor of any person or persons by reason of any such injuries or 
death." (Emphasis added.)

We drew 
attention to § 27-12-103(a), which called for the same exclusive-remedy 
trade-off as does Art. 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution. We said in Baker that these provisions of 
Constitution and statute mean exactly what they say: i.e., a covered employee 
may not bring any cause of action whatever against his contributing employer for 
injury or death under any circumstances. In Baker we said, 687 P.2d at 
888-889:

"For all the same reasons 
that an employer may not avoid paying a compensation claim where the worker is 
injured through his or her own ordinary negligence, the worker does not have a 
tort action against the employer when he (or it) is negligent and the worker is 
covered. This is so because the act creates liability without fault on the part 
of the contributing employer and likewise provides the employer with absolute 
immunity from tort actions including the employer's violation of his duty of 
care whether the negligence is ordinary or culpable. Mauch v. Stanley Structures, Inc, 
[Wyo.,] 641 P.2d [1247,] 1250 [1982]; Barnette v. Doyle, [Wyo.,] 622 P.2d [1349,] 
1352 [1981]. This is to say that immunity is absolute. Mauch v. Stanley Structures, Inc., 
supra, 641 P.2d  at 1252 (Rose, C.J., specially 
concurring).

"Our various 
interpretations of § 27-12-103(a), W.S. 1977, reflect the absolute immunity 
afforded contributing employers under the worker's compensation laws of 
Wyoming.

"`It is clear that the 
language "take the place of any and all rights of action" and "shall be 
exclusive of all other rights and remedies", means just what is said and needs 
no judicial construction. * * * [A]s a general proposition, the exclusive remedy 
of the Wyoming workmen's compensation laws is the only remedy available unless 
the employment was unlawful or illegal.' Jordan v. Delta Drilling Company, Wyo., 541 P.2d 39, 48 
(1975).

"`As to a contributing 
employer, compensation from the fund was made the sole and exclusive remedy for 
a covered workman.' Markle v. Williamson, 
[Wyo.,] 
518 P.2d [621,] 625 [1974]."

Compensable Injury - The 
Test

[¶8.]     In Baker, there was an intentional physical 
work-related assault resulting in emotional injury, and there we held that if 
such an injury was job-related - i.e., there was a nexus between the injury and 
some condition of employment - then the injury occurred within the scope and/or 
course of employment and was compensable. We then said that a compensable injury 
precludes a cause of action for personal injury or death against the employer. 
In the case at bar, it is alleged, and for purposes of this opinion only we 
accept as true the fact, that the plaintiff-appellant received physical 
work-related injury in consequence of the contributing employer's culpable 
negligence and/or intentional misconduct. In deciding whether the employer's 
exclusive-remedy provision was a bar to a common-law intentional-tort cause of 
action, we said in Baker:

"The single issue for our 
decision in this appeal is: Was the claimed harm - i.e., assault and battery to 
the persons of the appellants and intentional infliction of emotional distress - 
a covered `injury' within the contemplation of the Worker's Compensation Act? If 
the appellants' allegations of harm constitute `injury' as conceived by the Act, 
and if it was inflicted when the appellants were within the scope of their 
employment, there cannot be an independent right of action against Wendy's 
because that company is the contributing employer of the appellants and would 
therefore be absolutely immune from suit. The test for determining whether the 
exclusive-remedy provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act operate to prevent 
actions against covered employers for intentional acts of employees is whether 
or not the claimed injury would be compensable under the 
Act.

"`In determining whether 
the workmen's compensation statute in general and the exclusivity provision in 
particular preclude an employee from bringing an action at law against his 
employer for fraud, defamation, false imprisonment or the like, most courts have 
inquired whether the injury complained of is one which was compensable under the 
Compensation Act.' Annot. 46 A.L.R.3d 1279, 1282." (Emphasis added.) 687 P.2d  at 
889.

[¶9.]     It stands without 
dispute that the appellant in the case at bar was injured while he was in the 
course or scope of his employment - in fact, he has received worker's 
compensation benefits. See Cottonwood 
Steel Corporation v. Hansen, Wyo., 655 P.2d 1227 (1982); Matter of Willey, Wyo., 571 P.2d 248 
(1977); In re Jensen, 63 Wyo. 88, 178 P.2d 897 (1947). We pointed out in Wendy's and we point out here that, in order 
for § 27-12-102(a)(xii), W.S. 19775 to be complied with, there need 
only be a causal connection between the injury and the course of employment. 
Quoting from a prior opinion, we said:

"`* * * [T]he injury is 
compensable if it arises out of and in the course of employment. This requirement emphasizes the need for a 
causal connection between the injury and the employment. Such a causal 
connection is supplied when there is a nexus between the injury and some 
condition, activity, environment or requirement of the employment. Parrott v. 
Industrial Commission of Ohio, 145 Ohio St. 66, 60 N.E.2d 660. See, Standard Oil Co. v. Smith, 56 Wyo. 537, 
111 P.2d 132; In re Jensen, supra; Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Workmen's 
Compensation Department v. Boston, Wyo., 445 P.2d 548. Cf., White Ditching Company v. Giddeon, Wyo., 
413 P.2d 45. It is this requirement, and only this requirement, which is 
envisioned by the language contained in § 27-311(n) [now § 27-12-102(a)(xii), 
W.S. 1977].' (Emphasis added.) In re 
Willey, supra, 571 P.2d  at 250, quoted in Cottonwood Steel Corporation v. Hansen, 
supra, 655 P.2d  at 1232-1233." 687 P.2d  at 892.

There can be no 
doubt but that the facts of the case at bar meet the nexus test of Willey, supra.

[¶10.]  In affirming the trial court on this 
issue, we hold, then, that where the employee's injury occurs in a work-related 
situation, as it did here, and is in all other respects compensable, as it is 
here, the employer of the injured or deceased employee who is contributing to 
the compensation fund in behalf of the worker's account is absolutely immune 
from all common-law tort remedies arising out of the injury to or death of the 
employee - including causes of action for intentional tort or culpable 
negligence. Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, 
Inc., supra.

The Article 9, § 4 
Issue

[¶11.]  The Wyoming Constitution went into effect 
July 10, 1890, and Art. 9, § 4 provided:

"MINES AND 
MINING

* * * * * 
*

[¶12.]  "§ 4. Right of action for 
injuries.

"For any injury to person 
or property caused by wilful failure to comply with the provisions of this 
article, or laws passed in pursuance hereof, a right of action shall accrue to 
the party injured, for the damage sustained thereby, and in all cases in this 
state, whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect 
or default, such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party 
injured to maintain an action to recover damages in respect thereof, the person 
who, or the corporation which would have been liable, if death had not ensued, 
shall be liable to an action for damages notwithstanding the death of the person 
injured, and the legislature shall provide by law at its first session for the 
manner in which the right of action in respect thereto shall be 
enforced."

[¶13.]  The amendment to Art. 10, § 4 of the 
Wyoming Constitution, supra n. 2, was adopted by vote of the people November 3, 
1914 and was proclaimed effective December 26, 1914.6

[¶14.]  It is the contention of the appellant 
that it was the legislative intent that Art. 10, § 4 would not impact upon Art. 
9, § 4, the net effect of which would be that, in the case at bar, the employee 
would be possessed of standing to bring his culpable-neglect and 
intentional-tort action against his employer for the

"* * * wilful failure to 
comply with the provisions of this article [Art. 9, Mines and Mining], or laws 
passed in pursuance [t]hereof * * *." Art. 9, § 4.

In other words, 
Parker contends that Art. 9, § 4 of the Constitution takes precedence over Art. 
10, § 4 and therefore the employer's immunity from suit which is contemplated by 
Art. 10, § 4 does not inure to the benefit of Parker's contributing employer, 
Energy Development Co.

[¶15.]  We cannot agree.

[¶16.]  We are not called upon here to interpret 
the meaning and scope of the provisions of Art. 9, § 4, but we will assume, 
without deciding, and for purposes of this opinion only, that the two provisions 
of the Constitution are in conflict. 

[¶17.]  Where conflict arises between an 
amendment and a provision of a constitution adopted at an earlier time, the 
latter enactment will be given preference over the earlier. Constitutional 
provisions, like statutes, may be repealed by implication by subsequent 
constitutional changes, and, while such repeals are not favored, they will be 
given effect if there is an irreconcilable repugnance between the two 
provisions. Finally, while constitutional provisions should be harmonized and 
effect given to the whole, if the provisions cannot be reconciled the subsequent 
provision shall prevail. In Matter of 
Johnson, Wyo., 568 P.2d 855, 861 (1977), we said:

"* * * Constitutional 
provisions, like statutory provisions, may be repealed or abrogated by 
implication arising out of the adoption of changes in other constitutional 
provisions, rendering obnoxious, or ineffective, the original provisions not 
expressly repealed. Wright v. Jordan, 
192 Cal. 704, 221 P. 915, 918 (1923); Egbert v. City of Dunseith, 74 N.D. 1, 
24 N.W.2d 907, 909 (1946); People v. 
Field, 66 Colo. 367, 181 P. 526, 527-528 (1919); Jackson v. Consolidated Gov. of City of 
Jacksonville, Fla., 225 So. 2d 497, 500-501 (1969); and 16 C.J.S. 
Constitutional Law § 7, at p. 35. To be sure, such repeals are not favored and 
will not be given effect unless there is an irreconcilable repugnance between 
the two provisions. Moore v. Brown, 
350 Mo. 256, 165 S.W.2d 657, 663 (1942); and Adams v. City of Hobart, 166 Okla. 267, 
27 P.2d 595, 599-600 (1933). Constitutional amendments, if possible, should be 
harmonized with other provisions of the constitution, and effect given to the 
whole instrument and to every section and clause. Luikart v. Higgins, 130 Neb. 395, 264 N.W. 903-905 (1936). If the provisions cannot be reconciled, then the subsequent 
provision shall prevail over the prior provision - even if only a partial repeal 
by implication is necessary. Engelking v. 
Investment Board, 93 Idaho 217, 458 P.2d 213, 217 
(1969)."

[¶18.]  If we are to give credence to the 
position of the appellant, we would have to say that the two constitutional 
provisions cannot be harmonized. That is, appellant says that Art. 9, § 4 gives 
him a right to bring an action against his employer for culpable neglect or 
intentional tort by reason of an injury received while in the scope of his 
employment. We have held in Baker v. 
Wendy's of Montana, Inc., supra, that such injury is compensable and 
therefore the employer's immunity is absolute under the amendment to Art. 10, § 
4, which provides:

"* * * The right of each employee to compensation 
from such fund shall be in lieu of 
and shall take the place of any and all 
rights of action against any employer contributing as required by law to 
such fund in favor of any person or persons by reason of any such injuries or 
death." (Emphasis added.)

[¶19.]  Thus, if we were to concede for purposes 
of this opinion only that the provisions of Art. 9, § 4 have the effect of 
bestowing upon Parker a cause of action against his employer under the facts of 
this case, and if we further conclude as we must - and do - that Art. 10, § 4 
gives the employer absolute immunity from "any and all rights of action * * * by 
reason of any such injuries" as that with which we are concerned here, then it 
becomes clear that there exist two irreconcilable constitutional provisions. In 
this situation, we have said that

"* * * the subsequent 
provision shall prevail over the prior provision * * *." Matter of Johnson, supra, 568 P.2d  at 
861.

[¶20.]  This identical rule was announced in 1918 
in Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke 
Co., 25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981 (1918), when this court was considering a 
due-process attack upon the statutes which had been enacted in purported 
compliance with the worker's compensation amendment to Art. 10, § 4 of the 
Wyoming Constitution. In holding that the worker's compensation amendment 
superseded any constitutional and statutory provisions having to do with older 
and other inconsistent rights, this court said: 

"The general principles 
governing the construction of statutes apply to the construction of 
Constitutions. 12 C.J. 699. And the fundamental purpose in such construction is 
to ascertain the intent of the framers and the people who adopted it, and give 
effect thereto. 12 C.J. 700. And an amendment will prevail over a provision of 
the original Constitution inconsistent with the amendment. 12 C.J. 709." 173 P. 
at 991.

[¶21.]  The position that we take here stands 
supported by the independent consideration of this identical question in Jackson v. Dravo Corporation, 603 F.2d 156 (10th Cir. 1979), where Tenth Circuit Judge McWilliams, writing for the 
United States Court of Appeals in affirming the decision of Judge Brimmer of the 
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, had under 
consideration the impact that Art. 9, § 4 might or might not have upon Art. 10, 
§ 4, supra. In holding that Art. 10, § 4 must prevail, the Court of Appeals 
said:

"It is Dravo's position 
that under the provisions of the 1914 amendment to Article X, Section 4, and 
laws passed pursuant thereto, workmen's compensation benefits are in lieu of 
`any and all rights of action against any employer contributing as required by 
law to such fund.' See Wyo. Stat. § 27-12-103 (1977). The trial court agreed 
with Dravo and held that the `right of action' created by Article IX, Section 4 
of the original Wyoming Constitution was `modified' by the 1914 amendment to 
Article X, Section 4. In other words, the trial court held that under Wyoming 
law an injured miner whose employer has complied with the Wyoming law regarding 
workmen's compensation does not have an independent cause of action against his 
employer and that compensation benefits shall take the place thereof. We agree 
with the trial court's disposition of this matter.

"The general rule is that 
where an amendment to a constitution is in conflict or in anywise modifies a 
prior provision of the constitution, the amendment controls. See, for example, 
In re Interrogatories by General 
Assembly, 171 Colo. 200, 467 P.2d 56, 59 (1970). Wyoming is in accord with 
this general rule and has held that an amendment to a constitution will prevail 
over a provision of the original constitution inconsistent with the amendment. 
Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke 
Co., 25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981, 991-92 (1918)."

[¶22.]  We agree with the holding of the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals and, having come to these conclusions, we would 
therefore affirm the trial court on this issue.

Equal 
Protection

[¶23.]  The appellant argues that the application 
of Art. 10, § 4 and § 27-12-103(a), to the facts of this appeal results in the 
appellant receiving unequal protection of the law. This position contemplates 
the theory that it is an unequal application of the laws to deny an injured 
worker or the heirs of a deceased worker compensation benefits when the worker 
is guilty of culpable negligence when the constitution does not similarly burden 
the immunity of the employer. In other words, Bruce Parker argues that Art. 1, § 
34 of the Constitution of this state7 directs that if the worker is to be 
deprived of his benefits when culpably negligent, then the employer should not 
be permitted to enjoy tort immunity when he is culpably 
negligent.

[¶24.]  While the contention structures a telling 
argument, we have held to the contrary. In Mauch v. Stanley Structures, Inc., Wyo., 
641 P.2d 1247, 1251 (1982), we found a reasonable basis for the distinction when 
we said:

"Appellant has failed to 
meet her burden of showing that the distinction made between an employer and a 
culpably negligent employee is a classification which does not rest on a 
reasonable basis. It is the employer who contributes to the fund and it is the 
employer's contributions which fund payment to workers for those injuries not 
occasioned by the employer's fault or negligence. In return for that 
contribution, the employer is granted immunity from suit. Neither the injured 
employee nor the co-employee contribute to the fund. A rational basis thus 
exists for treating the employer differently from his employees with respect to 
the extent of immunity."

Conclusion

[¶25.]  In summary, we hold that the employer is 
immune from its culpably negligent acts and its intentional torts where injury 
or death occurs while the employee was within the scope of employment. We also 
hold that the amendment to Art. 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution takes 
precedence over Art. 9, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution if they cannot be 
harmonized, and, lastly, we hold that the culpably-negligent provision of § 
27-12-103(a), W.S. 1977 does not violate the equal-protection clause of the 
state constitution.

[¶26.]  Affirmed.

1 The employer's behavior 
is so described in the appellant's brief.

2 Article 10, § 4 of the 
Wyoming Constitution provides:

"No law shall be enacted 
limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the injury or death 
of any person. Any contract or agreement with any employee waiving any right to 
recover damages for causing the death or injury of any employee shall be void. 
As to all extra hazardous employments the legislature shall provide by law for 
the accumulation and maintenance of a fund or funds out of which shall be paid 
compensation as may be fixed by law according to proper classifications to each 
person injured in such employment or to the dependent families of such as die as 
the result of such injuries, except in case of injuries due solely to the 
culpable negligence of the injured employee. Such fund or funds shall be 
accumulated, paid into the state treasury and maintained in such manner as may 
be provided by law. The right of each 
employee to compensation from such fund shall be in lieu of and shall take the 
place of any and all rights of action against any employer contributing as 
required by law to such fund in favor of any person or persons by reason of any 
such injuries or death." (Emphasis added.)

3 Section 27-12-103(a), 
W.S. 1977 provides:

"The rights and remedies provided in this 
act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804] for an employee and his dependents for 
injuries incurred in extrahazardous employments are in lieu of all other rights 
and remedies against any employer making contributions required by this act, 
or his employees acting within the scope of their employment unless the 
employees are culpably negligent, but do not supersede any rights and remedies 
available to an employee and his dependents against any other person." (Emphasis 
added.)

4 Referred to in this 
opinion as either "Baker" or "Wendy's".

5 Section 
27-12-102(a)(xii), W.S. 1977, provides:

"`Injury' means any 
harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging, and includes 
damage to or loss of a prosthetic appliance and death, arising out of and in the course of 
employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or controlled 
by the employer, incurred while at work in places where the employer's business 
requires an employee's presence and which subjects the employee to 
extrahazardous duties incident to the business. * * *" (Emphasis 
added.)

6 The amendment consisted 
of all language following the second sentence of Art. 10, § 4, supra n. 
2.

7 Article 1, § 34 of the 
Wyoming Constitution reads as follows:

"All laws of a general 
nature shall have a uniform application."

BROWN, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶27.]  In affirming this case the majority 
relies principally on Baker v. Wendy's of 
Montana, Inc., Wyo., 687 P.2d 885 (1984). Had I participated in that case I 
would have dissented.

[¶28.]  The majority opinion in this case 
holds:

"* * * [The] employer of 
the injured or deceased employee who is contributing to the compensation fund in 
behalf of the worker's account, is absolutely immune from all common-law tort 
remedies arising out of the injury to or death of the employee - including 
causes of action for intentional tort. * * *"

[¶29.]  The majority holding is broad enough to 
protect an employer from civil liability even if the employer kills or orders 
the killing of his employee when the employee is working within the scope of his 
employment. Surely the architects of our worker's compensation scheme did not 
intend that an employer be immune from civil liability when intentionally 
killing or maiming an employee. I see nothing in the legislative history of our 
worker's compensation laws that suggests an intent to render an employer immune 
with respect to his intentional torts. I do not think the grand trade-off or 
compromise referred to in this case, and in the Baker case, encompassed an 
employer's intentional tort. An employee certainly is not protected under all 
circumstances if he is injured.

[¶30.]  Under the rationale of this case and 
Baker, if an employer intentionally forced an employee's hand into a buzz saw, 
the employer would be immune from civil liability because of worker's 
compensation. On the other hand, if an employee, intentionally, or through 
culpable neglect, put his hand into a buzz saw, he could not collect worker's 
compensation benefits.

[¶31.]  I, nevertheless, concur in affirming this 
case. I do not believe that the conduct of appellee amounted to an intentional 
tort. It's conduct was negligent in the extreme, but not 
intentional.