Case Title: JG v. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-03-4

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-02-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
JG v. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES2004 WY 1384 P.3d 1268Case Number: C-03-4Decided: 02/25/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                
   

 

JG,

 

Appellant(Respondent) 
,

 

v.

 

STATE 
OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF

FAMILY 
SERVICES; STATE OF WYOMING,

ex 
rel., JLVW, minor child,

 

Appellees(Petitioners) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Platte County

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Carol 
K. Watson of Phelan-Watson Law Office, Cheyenne, Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellees:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney 
General; Dan Wilde, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Sue Chatfield, 
Assistant Attorney General

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      In a pleading 
filed in the district court on December 16, 2002, Appellant, JG, and the State 
of Wyoming, Department of Family Services (DFS), as well as the mother of the 
affected child (JLV), stipulated in a settlement agreement that JG was not the 
biological father of JLV.  JLV was 
born January 23, 1991.1  The basis for this stipulation was that 
genetic testing had ruled out the possibility that JG could be the biological 
father of JLV.2  The district court found that JG had not 
timely requested genetic testing and had conceded he was the father of JLV in 
the paternity proceedings that occurred during 1992-97.  The district court also determined there 
was no legal basis for altering the earlier paternity judgment, concluded that 
the applicable statute of limitations had run, rejected the stipulation, and 
denied the motion to vacate the judgment that was in place.  We will vacate the order from which this 
appeal is taken and remand to the district court for entry of an order 
consistent with this opinion and the stipulation of the 
parties.

 

 

[¶2]      JG advances these 
issues:

 

1.  Whether [JG's] procedural and 
substantive due process rights were violated by the district court for failing 
to follow statutory procedures in the determination of paternity, rendering the 
district court orders finding paternity in [JG] as null and 
void.

 

2.  Whether the district court had 
jurisdiction to promulgate an order which denied [JG's] and the State of 
Wyoming's stipulated agreement to vacate the finding of paternity in 
[JG].

 

3.  Whether the applicable statute of 
limitation, Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-104(a)(ii)(B) was tolled until [JG] obtained a 
paternity test in June of 2001.

 

DFS 
initially posited this statement of the issue:

 

Whether 
the district court erred in refusing to accept the parties' stipulated agreement 
seeking to vacate the 1993 paternity order?

 

[¶3]      In its initial 
briefing, DFS conceded that the district court did err in that respect.  Thus, at that point, this case was in 
the somewhat unusual posture of having neither Appellant nor Appellee arguing 
that the district court's order could or should be affirmed.  However, on August 14, 2003, before this 
Court held a conference on the case as a part of the expedited docket, DFS 
submitted a letter to the Court suggesting that the district court's conclusion 
that JG had by-passed several opportunities to present grounds for relief from 
the judgment under W.R.C.P. 60(b)3 provided a potential basis for 
affirmance of the district court's order.

 

 

[¶4]      On April 6, 1992, 
DFS filed a petition to establish paternity in the district court alleging that 
JG was the biological father of JLV.  
There was considerable difficulty locating both JLV's mother and JG, so 
service of process was not completed until September 28, 1992.  JG, who resided at the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary at that time, filed a request for the appointment of counsel and an 
affidavit of indigency on October 20, 1992.  By letter dated October 27, 1992, the 
district court advised JG as follows:

 

            
At this point in the process, it is unnecessary for you to have an 
appointed attorney.  The Statute 
requires a hearing and if you deny paternity, a blood test will be ordered.  If the blood test indicates that you are 
the probable father and you still deny paternity, the Court will appoint an 
attorney to represent you.  On the 
other hand, if the test indicates that you are not the father, then you have no 
further obligation and all the costs of this action will be paid by the 
State.

 

            
Under the circumstances, I will ask the attorney in this case to arrange 
for a telephone conference call and will ask the Warden to make you available at 
a telephone.

 

[¶5]      Because the 
governing statutes that were in place when these proceedings were in process are 
so important to the resolution of the issues raised, we summarize them 
here.  JG was not presumed to be the 
natural father of JLV.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-2-102 (Michie 1986 and Supp. 1992).4  Thus, in order to establish parentage, 
it was required that paternity be established by blood tests or other credible 
evidence.5  Blood tests are critically important 
evidence in the context of parentage cases.  No blood tests were 
ordered.

 

[¶6]      The record in the 
instant case contains no transcripts or other evidence.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-108 (Supp. 1992) 
required that a hearing on the paternity action be held as soon as practicable 
and that a record of the proceeding be kept.  Apparently, a hearing was held, and JG 
appeared by phone, but no record of that hearing was made.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-109(b) and (c) 
(Supp. 1992) required the district court to order genetic tests if requested by 
a party, and to order further independent tests, if requested.  Under that same statute, the district 
court also had authority to order genetic testing on its own motion.  Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-112(d) (Supp. 1992), trial by jury was available if a party requested 
it.  According to the record on 
appeal, no such request was made, but the record reflects that JG was 
incarcerated, indigent, and did not have the benefit of counsel.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-116(a) and (b) 
(Supp. 1992) provided that "[t]he court shall appoint counsel for a party who is 
financially unable to obtain counsel" and that "[i]f a party is unable to pay 
the cost of a transcript, the court shall furnish on request a transcript for 
purposes of appeal."  Here, no 
transcript could have been made available to JG, because the proceedings, to the 
extent there were meaningful proceedings, were not reported or otherwise 
memorialized.

 

[¶7]      The hearing in 
this case was held before a district court commissioner, and his findings and 
conclusions were referred to the district court for approval and signature.  The Judgment and Order of Paternity and 
Support, entered on February 8, 1993, included a statement that JG appeared pro 
se by phone from the State Honor Farm and that the court commissioner heard 
testimony and received evidence.

 

[¶8]      On March 17, 
1997, DFS filed in the district court a petition for order to show cause why JG 
should not be found in contempt for failure to pay child support.  Such an order was issued on March 20, 
1997, and a new Judgment and Order was entered on May 30, 1997.  This judgment also recited the taking of 
evidence and testimony but it too was not summarized in the judgment, nor is it 
otherwise found in the record.  The 
only matter that is entirely clear is that JG never received the original 
judgment of paternity.  DFS conceded 
that JG did not receive a copy of that judgment; however, the district court did 
not assign fault for that failure (State should have located JG; JG should have 
inquired about the result of the 1992-93 proceedings) and confirmed the 1993 
judgment.

 

[¶9]      In a letter dated 
June 24, 1997, JG conveyed to the district court his concerns about the renewed 
paternity determination.  The letter 
stated that JG did not know if he was the father of the child, had never 
admitted that he was the father of the child, and that he had timely requested 
both counsel and genetic testing.  
JG requested that genetic testing be ordered and offered to pay for 
it.  The district court treated JG's 
letter as a motion for genetic testing and to vacate the 1997 judgment.  In an order entered on June 30, 1997, 
the district court denied any relief.

 

[¶10]   On December 17, 1999, DFS filed 
another motion for order to show cause why JG should not be held in contempt for 
failure to pay child support.  
Appended to that motion was the 1993 judgment, but not the 1997 
judgment.  Such an order was issued 
on December 17, 1999, and re-issued on May 30, 2000.  JG did not appear and another judgment 
was entered on September 26, 2000.  
The order indicated that evidence and testimony were taken by the 
district court.  Again, if such 
evidence and testimony was taken, it was not summarized in the order, nor does 
it otherwise appear in the record.

 

[¶11]   On September 20, 2001, JG filed a 
motion to set aside the judgment of paternity, as well as the child support 
ordered over the years.  In that 
pleading, JG reiterated that he asked for counsel at the time these proceedings 
were initiated, that he requested and was denied genetic testing, and that he 
did not know of the 1993 judgment until 1997.  Continuing, JG asserted that during the 
period 1997 through 2001, he did not have funds to hire an attorney.  In July of 2001, JG finally obtained 
counsel at a fee of $200.00 a month.  
JG also obtained genetic testing.  
That testing revealed that JG was not the biological father of JLV.  By order entered on February 1, 2002, 
the district court determined that the five-year statute of limitations had run, 
and dismissed JG's motion.  
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-104(a)(ii)(B) (LexisNexis 2001).  JG appealed that order to this Court on 
February 21, 2002.  On May 29, 2002, 
an attorney for DFS filed in the district court a notice of buccal swab for 
genetic testing, and a second such notice was filed on June 18, 2002.  On June 26, 2002, JG's appeal of the 
district court's February 1, 2002 order was dismissed for want of 
prosecution.  On July 19, 2002, DFS 
filed the results of the genetic testing in the district court.  The tests established that JG was not 
the biological father of JLV.

 

[¶12]   On December 16, 2002, a pleading 
styled as a "Stipulated Settlement Agreement" was filed in the district 
court.  In that stipulation DFS, JG, 
and JLV's mother agreed that JG was not the biological father of JLV and that he 
owed no past or future child support to JLV's mother or to the State.  No hearing was held on that motion.  On January 14, 2003, the district court 
entered its order disallowing the stipulated settlement.  JG's appeal from that order is the 
subject of the instant appeal.

 

 

[¶13]   We are confronted by an unusual set 
of circumstances that we hope make this case sui generis  i.e., a case 
unlike any other.6  We have reviewed parentage cases in many 
and varied circumstances, but few, if any, of our precedents provide meaningful 
guidance in sorting out this matter.  
Indeed, it may do a disservice to our jurisprudence with respect to the 
resolution of parentage cases to attempt to explicate or justify what transpired 
in this case.

 

[¶14]   In a case that bears some 
similarity to this one, we held:

 

            
Father injects the "best interests of the child" at several 
junctures.  There are some 
circumstances where the best interests of the child are at issue in a paternity 
proceeding.  TL ex. rel. TL v. 
CS, 975 P.2d 1065, 1069 (Wyo.1999).  
However, much like the TL case, such an analysis was rendered 
unnecessary because the statute permitted this action and mandated genetic 
testing if requested by even one party.  
Id.  Here, we do not 
have a circumstance where a biologic father seeks to disrupt an established 
father-child relationship.  Instead, 
we have a presumptive father who seeks to dissolve what he contends is not an 
established and functional father-child relationship in favor of a man who has 
been determined to be the biologic father.  
Courts simply are not always capable of resolving the sorts of profound 
human dilemmas that are brought to their doorsteps, at least not in a way that 
will avoid all potential hardship to even innocent parties.  Here, though Child has two presumptive 
fathers, he has none who wishes to fully embrace that role and the 
responsibility that goes with it.  
We cannot disagree with the position of Mother, JDB, and the GAL (as well 
as the reluctantly-reached decision of the district court) that "the truth" was 
the best result that could be salvaged in this case.

 

In 
re State, Division of Child Support Enforcement, ex rel. NDB, 
2001 WY 118, ¶14, 35 P.3d 1224, ¶14 (Wyo. 2001).

 

[¶15]   In addition, we have held that the 
district court must ensure that a complete record of parentage proceedings is 
created, including the reporting of any hearings (thus ensuring the preservation 
of all evidence and the testimony of any witnesses).  JAG v. State, Department of Family 
Services, 2002 WY 158, ¶18, 56 P.3d 1016, ¶18 (Wyo. 
2002).

 

[¶16]   We have long held that parentage 
actions must be conducted in conformance with the strict procedural requirements 
set out in the parentage statutes.  
CSP v. DDC, 842 P.2d 528, 532 (Wyo. 1992); Matter of TLB, 
771 P.2d 811, 813 (Wyo. 1989) (holding that failure to strictly follow statutory 
procedures results in a void judgment); AEI v. JDM, 758 P.2d 22 (Wyo. 
1988).

 

[¶17]   Finally, we conclude that W.R.C.P. 
60(b) cannot serve as a basis to affirm the district court because the 1993 and 
1997 judgments are void for the reasons set out above.

 

 

[¶18]   We hold that the 1993 and 1997 
judgments of the district court are void for failure to strictly follow required 
statutory procedures and because no record was made of the proceedings that 
produced those judgments.  Further, 
like the NDB case cited above,  
"the truth" is the best result that can be salvaged in this case.  The order from which the appeal was 
taken is vacated, and this matter is remanded to the district court for entry of 
an order consistent with this opinion, as well as the stipulation of the 
parties.

 

FOOTNOTES

   1The settlement 
agreement was structured to resolve a ten-year-long paternity and child support 
dispute that went awry in 1992 and never really got back on the right 
track.

 

   2The record 
demonstrates that JLV did not have counsel or a guardian ad litem during the 
most recent proceedings, though JLV did have a guardian ad litem in the early 
proceedings.  The most recent 
version of the parentage statutes does not require that a minor child be 
represented.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-812 (LexisNexis 2003) (counsel may be appointed for a minor child if the 
child's interests are not otherwise adequately represented).  At the time these proceedings were 
initiated, the governing statute required that a guardian ad litem be appointed 
for a minor child.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14-2-107 (Michie 1986).  

 

   3W.R.C.P. 60 (b) 
provides:

 

(b) 
Other Reasons. -- On motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court 
may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons:  (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect;  (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in 
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);  (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of 
an adverse party;  (4) the judgment 
is void;  (5) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based 
has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment should have prospective application;  or (6) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment.  
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), 
(2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was 
entered or taken.  A motion under 
this subdivision does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation.  This rule does not limit 
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from 
a judgment, order, or proceeding as provided by statute, or to grant relief to a 
party against whom a judgment or order has been rendered without other service 
than by publication as provided by statute.  Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, 
audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, 
are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall 
be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent 
action.

 

   4In the 
intervening years, the statutes articulating the process for determining 
paternity (parentage) have been amended many times.  Currently, they are found at Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 14-2-801 through 14-2823 (LexisNexis 2003).  Under the usual circumstances, and to 
the extent necessary, we would apply the statutes that were in effect at the 
time the paternity action was initiated, or the most recent statute if that 
statute were more favorable to the affected party.  Suffice it to say here that the most 
recent version of the parentage statutes is not more favorable to any of the 
parties to this action.

 

   5This case 
graphically illustrates the rather serious consequences of relying on an 
admission of intercourse, or even an admission by the alleged father that the 
child is his, when blood tests can usually resolve this factual issue 
definitively.

   6In its brief, 
DFS characterizes the circumstances of this case as 
"unique."