Case Title: Wyrulec Co. v. Schutt

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93-31

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
WYOM Found Document:Wyrulec Co. v. Schutt






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Wyoming Supreme Court Cases



Wyrulec Co. v. Schutt1993 WY 167866 P.2d 756Case Number: 93-31, 93-32Decided: 12/30/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Cite as: 1993 WY 167, 866 P.2d 756



WYRULEC 
COMPANY, a Wyoming corporation, 
Appellant 
(Defendant),
v.
Richard 
SCHUTT, 
Appellee 
(Plaintiff).
 
Richard 
SCHUTT, 
Appellant 
(Plaintiff),
v.
WYRULEC 
COMPANY, a Wyoming corporation, 
Appellee 
(Defendant).
 
 
 
Lawrence 
G. Orr of Orr, Buchhammer & Kehl, Cheyenne, for Wyrulec Co., 
appellant in 93-31; appellee in 93-32.
Michael 
E. Warren of Sawyer & Warren, P.C., Torrington, for Richard Schutt, 
appellee in 93-31; appellant in 93-32.
Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.
Cardine, 
J., filed a specially concurring opinion.
GOLDEN, 
Justice.
[¶1]      These 
consolidated appeals arise from a negligence suit against appellant Wyrulec 
Company. Appellee Richard Schutt fell and sustained injuries after touching 
appellant's low voltage electrical wires. A jury verdict awarded $368,584 in 
damages and found appellant sixty percent negligent and appellee forty percent 
negligent. Appellant claims the trial court erred in refusing jury instructions 
applying WYO. STAT. § 37-3-304 (Supp. 1989), the High Voltage Power Lines and 
Safety Restrictions Act, and WYO. STAT. § 27-11-105(b)(vi) (Supp. 1990), the 
general duty clause of the Wyoming Occupational Health and Safety Act, to the 
facts of this case. Appellee cross-appealed claiming the trial court erred in 
granting summary judgment that strict liability was inapplicable to the facts of 
this case and erred in refusing jury instructions regarding statute violations 
and assigning a higher duty of care because electricity is an ultrahazardous 
instrumentality.
[¶2]      We 
affirm.
ISSUES
[¶3]      Appellant states 
the issues as:
I. 
Did appellee's failure to give notice to appellant of his intent to work around 
high voltage lines, as required by W.S. 1977 § 37-3-304 operate as a bar to his 
cause of action against the appellant utility?
II. 
Did the trial court err in refusing to instruct the jury regarding the duties 
imposed on the appellee by provisions of the Wyoming High Voltage Power Lines 
and Safety Restrictions Act, W.S. 1977 § 37-3-301 et seq.?
III. 
Did the trial court err in refusing to instruct the jury regarding the duties 
imposed on the appellee by provisions of the Wyoming Occupational Health and 
Safety Act, W.S. 1977 § 27-11-105(b)(vi)?
[¶4]      Appellee 
rephrased the issues as:
I. 
Was W.S. § 37-3-304 (Wyoming's "High Voltage Power Lines and Safety Restrictions 
Act") applicable in this case?
II. 
Were the provisions of Wyoming's Occupational Health and Safety Act, herein 
referred to as OSHA, relevant in this case, and if so, was there a violation of 
those provisions?
[¶5]      On cross-appeal, 
appellant Schutt states the issues as:
I. 
Should the doctrine of strict liability apply in this 
case?
II. 
Did the trial Court improperly refuse plaintiff's jury instructions numbered 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5 and 6?
[¶6]      Appellee 
rephrased as:
I. 
Did the trial court correctly rule that the doctrine of strict liability did not 
apply to a situation where overhead electrical lines were accidentally contacted 
by appellant?
II. 
Did the trial court commit reversible error in refusing to instruct the jury 
regarding specific provisions of the National Electric Safety 
Code?
FACTS
[¶7]      Appellee Richard 
Schutt (Schutt), a general contractor, was shingling a roof at the Valley View 
Farms in Lingle, Wyoming. Overhanging one roof were two sets of wires owned by 
appellant Wyrulec Company (Wyrulec), a nonprofit rural electrical cooperative. 
The first set of three wires carried 7,200 volts and hung about sixteen feet 
above the roof. The second set of four electrical wires ran from a transformer 
to the house and carried voltage ranging from 110 to 240 volts. Although the 
distance of these four wires from the roof was disputed, it appears the bottom 
wire was no more than three feet above the roof. While working, appellee raised 
up into two of the low voltage electrical wires and received electric shocks 
causing him to fall to the edge of the roof. Scaffolding stopped him from 
falling further, but the fall fractured two vertebrae. The fractures required 
surgical fusion of five vertebrae.
[¶8]      Before the jury 
trial, the district court granted Wyrulec's summary judgment motion to exclude 
the application of strict liability. At the trial, the court admitted testimony 
concerning Wyrulec's possible violations of the National Electric Safety Code 
codified at WYO. STAT. § 37-3-114 and Schutt's possible violations of both the 
High Voltage Power Lines and Safety Restrictions Act, and WYO. STAT. § 
27-11-105(b)(vi), the general duty clause of the Wyoming Occupational Health and 
Safety Act. The court refused jury instructions specifically referring to these 
violations and also refused jury instructions assigning a higher degree of care 
because electricity is an ultrahazardous instrumentality. The court's specific 
instruction to the jury stated that "ordinary care means the degree of care 
which might reasonably be expected of the ordinary careful person under the same 
or similar circumstances."
DISCUSSION
HIGH 
VOLTAGE POWER LINES AND SAFETY RESTRICTION ACT
[¶9]      Wyrulec's first 
two issues concern the applicability of WYO. STAT. § 37-3-304 which states in 
pertinent part:
     37-3-304. Activity in close proximity 
to lines; clearance arrangements; procedure; payment; 
notice.
(a) 
If any person or business entity desires to temporarily carry on any act in 
closer proximity to any high voltage overhead line than permitted by this act, 
the person or business entity responsible for performing the work shall promptly 
notify the appropriate public utility and shall ask the public utility for 
assistance.
[¶10]   Wyrulec contends that the notice 
provision in paragraph (a) of this statute required Schutt to contact them. 
Although the statutory language indicates that notice depends upon whether the 
activity is in proximity to high voltage lines, Wyrulec argues the notice 
provision should apply when, as in this case, the voltage of the lines is 
unknown. Wyrulec theorizes that since only notice would cause Wyrulec to have a 
duty to Schutt, his failure to notify bars his cause of action. We reject this 
interpretation of the statute.
[¶11]   This court's method of statutory 
interpretation is to read the text of the statute and pay attention to its 
internal structure and the functional relation between the parts and the whole. 
Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 
1045 (Wyo. 1993). In order to ascertain its intent and general purpose and the 
meaning of each part, the five sections of this act are to be read in pari 
materia and construed as a whole. Parker, at 1042. The language is clear and 
unambiguous because its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to 
agree as to its meaning with consistence and predictability. Parker, at 1043. 
When the statutory language is unambiguous, the general rule is that the court 
will not resort to application of rules of construction. Id. We look to the 
plain, ordinary meaning of the language of the statute and apply that meaning. 
Id.
[¶12]   WYO. STAT. § 37-3-302 defines high 
voltage as "voltage in excess of six hundred (600) volts measured between 
conductors or between a conductor and the ground." Section 37-3-303 of the act 
prohibits activity beneath a high voltage power line unless clearances exceed 
six feet. In this case, all power lines which exceeded 600 volts were at least 
sixteen feet above the roof. Section 37-3-304 of the act requires notice only 
when there will be activity in closer proximity to high voltage lines than is 
permitted under § 37-3-303. Section 37-3-305 only grants the utility a right of 
indemnity if this act is violated and damage occurs. There is no language that a 
cause of action would be barred.
[¶13]   We "will not enlarge, stretch, 
expand or extend a statute to matters not falling within its express 
provisions." City of Cheyenne v. Huitt, 844 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting 
Lo Sasso v. Braun, 386 P.2d 630, 632 (Wyo. 1963)). "Where a statute enumerates 
the subjects or things on which it is to operate, or the persons affected, or 
forbids certain things, it is to be construed as excluding from its effect all 
those not expressly mentioned under the rule of expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius." Huitt, 844 P.2d  at 1104 (citing Town of Pine Bluffs v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 79 Wyo. 262, 333 P.2d 700 (1958)).
[¶14]   It was undisputed that the wires' 
voltage which Schutt contacted ranged only from 110 volts to 240 volts. The 
purpose of this act was to forbid activity in close proximity to high voltage 
wires of 600 volts or more unless the utility was notified and safety 
arrangements were made. This statute does not apply to low voltage wires and 
therefore did not apply to the facts of this case. Wyrulec's contention that the 
statute applied because of Schutt's failure to ascertain the voltage of low 
lines over a roof would impermissibly expand its reach. Because this act does 
not apply in this case, the district court properly refused instructions for the 
jury to consider it.
WYOMING'S 
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT
[¶15]   Wyrulec's next issue requires us to 
consider whether WYO. STAT. § 27-11-105(b)(vi) was applicable in this case. This 
provision states:
     (vi) To require the 
employer to be charged with the following duties:
     (A) Each employer 
shall furnish to his employees, a place of employment and            
employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or 
that are likely to      
cause death or serious physical harm.
[¶16]   Wyrulec contends the district court 
should have instructed the jury on the contents of this provision. Applying the 
statutory interpretation method outlined above, we find the provision is 
unambiguous and its plain meaning is to protect employees. The provision is not 
relevant in a tort action between an employer and a third party. Wyrulec has not 
presented cogent argument or pertinent authority as to why this statute should 
apply in a negligence case between the employer and a third party. As this court 
has stated many times, issues which are unsubstantiated will not be addressed. 
Davis v. State, 859 P.2d 89, 94 (Wyo. 1993).
STRICT 
LIABILITY
[¶17]   On cross-appeal, Schutt contends 
strict liability applies to this case under the theories of product liability or 
the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher. We hold that strict liability under either 
theory is not applicable in this case.
1. 
Product Liability.
[¶18]   For the reasons articulated below, 
we do not find that electricity is a product within the definition of 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Wyoming adopted the RESTATEMENT as 
the definition of product liability in Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1986).
[¶19]   Classifying electricity as a 
product for strict liability purposes would make one who sells electricity 
liable to the ultimate user or consumer if the electricity is in a defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user, as long as it reaches the user or 
consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. d (1965).
[¶20]   Section 402A was intended to apply 
to manufactured products delivered to the consumer or user without substantial 
change. Wyoming has never before considered whether electricity is a "product." 
Other courts have ruled on the question, however. Generally, those courts that 
have determined electricity is not a product have found:
     A "product" is 
anything made by human industry or art. Electricity appears to fall outside this 
definition. This is so because electricity is the flow of electrically charged 
particles along a conductor. [A utility] does not manufacture electrically 
charged particles, but rather, sets in motion the necessary elements that allow 
the flow of electricity. What we have here is a purported defect in the 
distribution system. Such a system is, in our view, a 
service.
Otte 
v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 37 Ohio St.3d 33, 523 N.E.2d 835, 838 (1988). 
Accord, Bowen v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 183 A.D.2d 293, 590 N.Y.S.2d 628, 
631 (4 Dept. 1992). When the consumer pays by the kilowatt hour, he is simply 
paying for the use of the electricity and not for an individual product. Otte, 
523 N.E.2d  at 838-39. We agree with this analysis of the nature of electricity 
and hold that electricity is a service and not a product.
[¶21]   Because RESTATEMENT, supra § 402A 
requires there be a "product" and does not apply to a service, strict liability 
in tort for damages caused by electricity is not a cause of action that may be 
asserted.
2. 
Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine.
[¶22]   Schutt next contends that strict 
liability should be imposed because electricity is an abnormally dangerous 
activity as contemplated by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 
(1977).
[¶23]   The abnormally dangerous activity 
theory for imposing strict liability evolves from the doctrine in Rylands v. 
Fletcher, L.R. 1-Ex. 265 (1866). In Jacoby v. City of Gillette, 174 P.2d 505 
(1946), this court considered whether to adopt the Rylands doctrine. The rule of 
Rylands was:
The 
person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there 
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, 
if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the 
natural consequence of its escape.
Jacoby, 
174 P.2d  at 509.
[¶24]   Wyoming, as had most states, 
rejected the notion that absolute liability should be imposed for anything 
brought onto the land which was not naturally there, escaped and caused damage. 
This court required that negligence must be shown. Jacoby, 174 P.2d  at 512. We 
have since consistently imposed the standard of ordinary care under all of the 
circumstances rather than absolute liability. Although the rule of Rylands has 
evolved as defined by RESTATEMENT ONE and RESTATEMENT SECOND, the facts of this 
case do not require that we adopt strict liability rather than require a showing 
of negligence.1
STANDARD 
OF CARE
[¶25]   Schutt next contends it was error 
for the district court to refuse to instruct the jury that Wyrulec owed a higher 
degree of care to him because electricity is an ultrahazardous activity. He 
relies on Ruhs v. Pacific Power & Light, 671 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1982). 
Ruhs was injured by electricity after touching high voltage wires. The court 
reversed summary judgment granted to the defendants because it found there were 
issues of material fact as to whether Ruhs, a tree trimmer, knew about the 
dangers of high-voltage wires and whether electric company employees violated 
the National Electrical Safety Code.
[¶26]   As part of its discussion of 
Wyoming's applicable law, the court in Ruhs determined electricity was an 
ultrahazardous instrumentality. Ruhs, 671 P.2d  at 1272 (citing 26 Am.Jur.2d 
Electricity, Gas and Steam §§ 52, 53 (1966)). The court then determined from Pan 
Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Like, 381 P.2d 70, 72-74 (Wyo. 1963), that Wyoming has 
recognized a higher standard of care for businesses involving "ultrahazardous" 
instrumentalities.2 However, the Ruhs court clearly 
stated that
[e]xercising 
reasonable care under "all the circumstances" is still the standard, but greater 
care is required because the nature of the business is 
ultrahazardous.
Ruhs, 
671 F.2d  at 1271.
[¶27]   Our examination of Pan American 
confirms the accuracy of this statement. The plaintiff there had been injured 
after natural gas escaped from a well and caught fire. The jury was given a 
general instruction on the standard of care which is similar to the instruction 
given in the present case.
It 
was made clear to the jury what Pan American's duty was, and with respect to 
standard of conduct, the court instructed as to a general rather than a special 
standard by saying negligence is a failure to observe for the protection of 
others that degree of care which the circumstances justly demand; in other 
words, it is the want of that care which an ordinarily careful person would 
exercise under all the circumstances of the case.
Pan 
Am., 381 P.2d  at 73.
[¶28]   Pan American contended the jury 
should have been instructed that the applicable standard of care was the custom 
of the industry. Pan Am., 381 P.2d  at 72. In the course of rejecting the notion 
that industry custom conclusively established due care, the court discussed the 
meaning of the standard of care when a dangerous instrumentality was involved. 
The court did not require a higher standard of care. Instead, it rejected an 
absolute standard of "duty" in dealing with dangerous agencies and held that it 
was proper for the jury to consider whether the defendant was negligent based on 
the hazards known to exist. Pan Am., 381 P.2d  at 74. As we stated there and have 
consistently stated ever since, the standard of care is ordinary care under 
all of the circumstances.
[¶29]   This is the standard of care 
regardless of whether a dangerous instrumentality is involved. It is not 
necessary to have degrees of care because the legal standard remains constant. 
FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.13 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 
1993). Some jurisdictions do suggest that more than ordinary care is required. 
See Fortman v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 80 Ohio App.3d 525, 609 N.E.2d 1296, 1299 (2 Dist. 1992) ("A power company owes a duty to exercise the highest 
degree of care * * *. We are not prepared to protect a utility with a lower 
standard of care * * *"); and see Cerretti v. Flint Hills Rural Elec., 251 Kan. 
347, 837 P.2d 330, 339 (1992) (electric companies are under a duty to exercise 
the highest degree of care to prevent injury).
[¶30]   However, we believe the standard is 
correctly stated as ordinary or reasonable care but what constitutes ordinary 
care increases as the danger increases. The concept of ordinary care 
accommodates all circumstances so that the degree of care varies with the 
circumstances. Ordinary care which is "commensurate with the danger" does not 
impose a higher duty, "but more fully defines what is ordinary care under the 
facts presented." Texas Utilities Elec. v. Gold Kist, 817 S.W.2d 749, 753 (Tex. 
App. 1991). See also, Rich Mountain Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Revels, 311 Ark. 1, 
841 S.W.2d 151, 153 (1992) (electric companies must exercise ordinary care); and 
Rogers v. Grunden, 589 N.E.2d 248, 256 (Ind. App. 1992) (although some states 
require utmost care, we require ordinary care under like conditions and 
circumstances).
[¶31]   Appellee's contention that the jury 
should be made aware of this higher standard by jury instructions is incorrect. 
Under the proper circumstances, it is counsel's function to present the jury 
with argument that electricity's inherently dangerous nature requires the 
highest degree of care which in general terms means that every reasonable 
precaution suggested by experience and the known dangers of the subject ought to 
be taken. Pan Am., 381 P.2d  at 74.
JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS
[¶32]   Schutt's final issue also relies on 
the Ruhs case. He contends that the trial court erred in refusing jury 
instructions which instructed the jury that violations of the National 
Electrical Safety Code were evidence of negligence. However, he does not explain 
how the errors prejudiced him. It is the burden of the complaining party to 
establish an error as prejudicial. McCarthy v. Whitlock Constr. & Supply, 
715 P.2d 218, 221 (Wyo. 1986). An error is prejudicial if there is a reasonable 
possibility that in the absence of error the verdict might have been more 
favorable to the losing party. Id. Schutt does not explain either how the 
verdict might have been more favorable to him or in what manner he could be 
considered the losing party. Without cogent argument or pertinent authority, we 
decline to address these issues. Davis, 859 P.2d  at 94.
[¶33]   The judgment of the district court 
is affirmed.
CARDINE, 
J., files a specially concurring opinion.
CARDINE, 
Justice, specially concurring.
[¶34]   I concur in the result but dissent 
from that portion of the opinion under "Standard of Care." This case involves an 
accident in which appellee touched a low voltage line and fell. Low voltage 
electricity is not ultrahazardous. It is something encountered in ordinary, 
normal daily activities when plugging in the coffee pot or toaster. It is like 
driving a car, something everyone does in the business of daily living; and so 
the activity is ordinary, and the duty is ordinary care. But the opinion assumes 
the activity (low voltage electricity) to be ultrahazardous and states the duty 
for one dealing with "dangerous agencies" as "ordinary care under all of the 
circumstances." It concludes: "This is the standard of care regardless of 
whether a dangerous instrumentality is involved. It is not necessary to have 
degrees of care because the legal standard remains constant." At 
762.
[¶35]   I believe degrees of care are 
helpful because they move the law beyond a vague generality that no one can 
apply with any consistency; they are helpful in informing citizens more clearly 
what conduct is expected of them and what may result in liability; and I believe 
this, although it might be contrary to what is said to be the "enlightened" 
view. Finally, I believe courts rely too much upon the alleged "enlightened" or 
"modern" view propounded mostly by others with little trial or practical 
experience.
[¶36]   My problem with the majority's 
statement that "the standard of care [when dealing with extrahazardous activity] 
is ordinary care under all the circumstances," is that it is misleading. 
At 762. The statement leaves a jury with the impression that dealing with high 
voltage electricity is just an ordinary, everyday activity, no more significant 
than what is usually encountered. It is simply unfair to the injured party who 
most often suffers life threatening injuries or death. High voltage electricity 
(7,200 or 14,000 volts) is not "ordinary."
[¶37]   The majority opinion later states: 
"[W]e believe the standard is correctly stated as ordinary or reasonable care 
but what constitutes ordinary care increases as the danger increases," at 762, 
and then, quoting from Ruhs v. Pacific Power & Light, 671 F.2d 1268, 1271 
(10th Cir. 1982), states that
[e]xercising 
reasonable care under "all the circumstances" is still the standard, but greater 
care is required because the nature of the business is 
ultrahazardous.
At 
762. When the court states that greater care is required when an 
ultrahazardous activity is involved, that is an accurate statement. But the 
court is then incorrect in holding that although greater care is required, the 
jury must not be told of it. I would hold that the jury be so instructed, and I 
would approve such instruction.
[¶38]   The majority opinion states 
plainly, however, that it does not approve of an instruction informing the jury 
that "greater care is required" when an ultrahazardous activity is involved. 
Therefore, henceforth, an injured person should be prepared to produce evidence 
for the jury of the dangerousness of the activity, the accident frequency, 
statistical information totalling and describing the nature and magnitude of 
injuries, the likelihood of death, safety precautions available, safety training 
and programs, safety devices, and expert testimony upon all these elements and 
the ultrahazardous nature of the activity so that the jury can identify and 
apply the proper greater standard of care required "under all of the 
circumstances."
[¶39]   Further, I disagree with that part 
of the majority opinion which states that Wyoming common law recognizes only one 
standard of care in negligence actions, regardless of the dangerousness of the 
instrumentality involved. The majority states, I believe incorrectly, that "we * 
* * have consistently stated ever since [Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Like, 381 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1963)], the standard of care is ordinary care under all of the 
circumstances." At 762. This court, in Pan Am., at 73-74, stated in pertinent 
part the following:
     Counsel for the oil 
company have insisted that the standard of care, against which the acts of 
defendant-company should be measured, is that which on the average is exercised 
in the industry. The case of Citizens Coach Company v. Collier, 233 Ark. 912, 
348 S.W.2d 873, and other authorities are cited. For the most part, however, the 
cases cited have to do with businesses which involve very little risk as 
compared to the ultrahazardous activity involved in the instant case. The 
difference, we think, will become apparent from our subsequent 
discussion.
* 
* * * * *
     Attorneys for Pan 
American admit in their brief that the drilling and completion of an oil well 
"is always a hazardous undertaking," and that serious accidents can and do 
occur. * * *
* 
* * * * *
     A higher degree of 
care is required in dealing with a dangerous agency than in the ordinary affairs 
of life or business which involve little or no risk. This care is sometimes 
described as a high degree of care, or a very high degree of care, or in some 
instances as the utmost care or extreme care.
* 
* * * * *
     While no absolute 
standard of duty in dealing with dangerous agencies can be prescribed, it is 
safe to say in general terms that every reasonable precaution suggested by 
experience and the known dangers of the subject ought to be 
taken.
The 
sum of all of the above is that the Pan American court acknowledged the activity 
as extrahazardous, and, although its statement of law is less than clear, the 
preponderance of what is stated and a fair summary is that "a higher degree of 
care is required in dealing with a dangerous agency than in the ordinary affairs 
of life," and that the jury should be so informed.
[¶40]   In Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188 (Wyo. 
1989), an injured employee sued several coemployees for culpable negligence. The 
trial court granted each of the coemployee defendants summary judgment. On 
appeal to this court, we reversed summary judgment, finding that genuine issues 
of material fact existed concerning the question of culpable negligence of 
several of the coemployee defendants. Id. at 197-98. In the process of 
determining that material questions of fact existed, we discussed the duty of 
care owed by these coemployees. Justice Golden, writing for the majority, 
stated:
     In this case, the 
outer boundary of this delegated duty is defined by the additional factor that 
mining is considered an extrahazardous activity in Wyoming, W.S. 27-12-106 
(1977), involving the use of dangerous agencies. Persons knowingly dealing 
with a dangerous agency must exercise the care commensurate with the danger 
involved. Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Like, 381 P.2d 70, 74 (Wyo. 
1963). As such, the degree of care of those entrusted with the duty to provide a 
safe workplace is greater than under the ordinary circumstances of life or 
business where little or no risk is involved. This standard of care requires 
that every reasonable precaution suggested by experience and the known dangers 
of the subject ought to be taken. [emphasis added]
Case, 
776 P.2d  at 192.
[¶41]   Clearly, this court has applied a 
higher standard of care to those dealing with extrahazardous instrumentalities, 
and so instructing lay jurors has long been an established practice in the 
state. If a majority of this court desires to overrule what I consider 
precedent, it may do so; but it should acknowledge that it is overruling 
precedent.
[¶42]   I concur in the majority opinion in 
this case because I believe that appellee was not entitled to an instruction on 
the higher standard of care for extrahazardous instrumentalities because the 
accident involved low voltage wires which are not extrahazardous 
instrumentalities. 
 FOOTNOTES
1 Although the RESTATEMENTS first limited Rylands to "ultrahazardous" 
activity and then to "abnormally dangerous" activity, the doctrine has still 
achieved only limited acceptance. See Wheatland Irrigation Dist. v. McGuire, 537 P.2d 1128 (Wyo. 1975).
2 Pan American referred to natural gas as a "dangerous agency"; however, 
we do not find any authority that the terms have a different meaning as used in 
these two cases. Pan Am., 381 P.2d  at 74.
 





Citationizer© Summary of Documents Citing This Document



	Cite
	Name
	Level



 2000 10CIR 553, 211 F.3d 1193, Hynes v. Energy West, Inc.Cited
Wyoming Supreme Court Cases
 CiteNameLevel

 1994 WY 19, 869 P.2d 136, Furman v. Rural Elec. Co.Discussed
 1994 WY 132, 885 P.2d 861, Earlywine v. PetersonCited
 1995 WY 125, 899 P.2d 891, Jack v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Los AngelesCited
 1995 WY 124, 900 P.2d 1140, Bowen v. State, Wyoming Real Estate Com'nCited
 2003 WY 140, 78 P.3d 257, BITZ v. STATECited
 2004 WY 73, 92 P.3d 794, EASUM v. MILLERCited
 2007 WY 30, 152 P.3d 387, JAMES E. CORNELIUS V. POWDER RIVER ENERGY CORPORATION, INC., a Wyoming corporation, acting through their agents, officers, employees and representativesCited




Citationizer: Table of Authority



	Cite
	Name
	Level



 1982 10CIR 61, 671 F.2d 1268, Ruhs v. Pacific Power & LightDiscussed
Wyoming Supreme Court Cases
 CiteNameLevel

 1946 WY 15, 174 P.2d 505, 62 Wyo. 487, Jacoby v. Town of City of GilletteCited
 1958 WY 47, 333 P.2d 700, 79 Wyo. 262, Town of Pine Bluffs v. State Bd. of EqualizationCited
 1963 WY 24, 381 P.2d 70, Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. LikeDiscussed
 1963 WY 54, 386 P.2d 630, Lo Sasso v. BraunCited
 1986 WY 61, 715 P.2d 218, McCarthy v. Whitlock Const. and SupplyCited
 1986 WY 73, 716 P.2d 334, Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.Cited
 1989 WY 136, 776 P.2d 188, DANIEL CASE v. GLENN GOSS, DARRELL R. "DICK" DOWNING, LARRY LARGENT, MIKE HESSE, CHRIS SCHUTZ, CLIFF OVERY, LARRY MANN, BOB McCASKILL, GEORGE SEAMAN, GLENN GRIGGSCited
 1993 WY 7, 844 P.2d 1102, City of Cheyenne v. HuittCited
 1993 WY 10, 845 P.2d 1040, Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game and Fish Com'nCited
 1993 WY 115, 859 P.2d 89, Davis v. StateCited