Case Title: Rojas v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 6, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MARCOS ROJAS, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 6, 2002 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr.A. No. IN00-02-1215 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 3, 2002 
 
 
 
 
  Decided:   July 26, 2002 
 
Before WALSH, HOLLAND and STEELE, Justices 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 26th day of July 2002, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief 
filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to 
withdraw, and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Marcos Rojas, pleaded guilty to 
Robbery in the First Degree.  He was sentenced to 12 years incarceration at 
Level V, to be suspended after 8 years for 4 years at Level IV Plummer 
Center, in turn to be suspended after 6 months for 3 ½ years of probation.  
This is Rojas’ direct appeal. 
   
(2) 
Rojas’ trial counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
pursuant to Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
 
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consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold: (a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims 
that could arguably support the appeal; and (b) the Court must conduct its 
own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally 
devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without 
an adversary presentation.1 
 
(3) 
Rojas’ counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and complete 
examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  By 
letter, Rojas’ counsel informed Rojas of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and 
provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the accompanying 
brief and the complete hearing transcript.  Rojas was also informed of his 
right to supplement his attorney’s presentation.  Rojas responded with a brief 
that raises two issues for this Court’s consideration.  The State has 
responded to the position taken by Rojas’ counsel as well as the issues raised 
by Rojas and has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
 
(4) 
Rojas raises two issues for this Court’s consideration.  He 
claims that: a) his constitutional rights were violated and his guilty plea was 
involuntary because the prosecutor did not honor a prior promise to 
                                                          
 
1Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 
(1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
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recommend a 4-year prison term; and b) his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance. 
 
(5) 
On September 18, 2001, the day of trial, Rojas signed a guilty 
plea form and plea agreement, and entered a plea of guilty to Robbery in the 
First Degree.  During the plea colloquy, the judge explained to Rojas that, in 
exchange for his guilty plea, the State would drop a pending carjacking 
charge and recommend a pre-sentence investigation, which Rojas said he 
understood.  Rojas stated that no other promises had been made to him, as 
reflected in the guilty plea form and plea agreement, and also stated that he 
was satisfied with his counsel’s representation.   
 
(6) 
At the sentencing hearing on December 7, 2001, the State 
recommended a sentence of 10 years incarceration at Level V.  Defense 
counsel objected, arguing that the State previously had promised to 
recommend a sentence of only 4 years incarceration at Level V.2  The 
prosecutor agreed that he had discussed such a recommendation with 
defense counsel in the past, but disagreed that it was part of the plea 
agreement.   
                                                          
 
2Defense counsel based his argument on five e-mails that passed between him and the prosecutor between 
the dates of June 8, 2001 and September 6, 2001.  An e-mail dated July 25, 2001 stated the following: “In 
that he [Rojas] is looking at 2 class B felonies (2-20 each) and in that there is the prior violent felony 
conviction will rachet (sic) the presumptive sentence up to 10 years[.]  I will say 4 years, the 1st 2 being 
minimum/mandatory.” 
 
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(7) 
Rojas’ claim that his rights were violated and his guilty plea 
was involuntary due to the State’s improper sentence recommendation is 
without merit.  Even if the prosecutor had recommended a 4-year prison 
term, the Superior Court would not have been bound by that 
recommendation.3  Indeed, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the 
judge would have imposed a different sentence even if there had been a 
recommendation of a 4-year prison term, rendering any alleged error 
harmless.4   
 
(8) 
There was no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the 
Superior Court in imposing a 12-year prison term.  While the sentence 
exceeded the Truth in Sentencing guidelines, the guidelines were not binding 
on the Superior Court judge.5  The sentence was well within the statutorily-
authorized limits6 and, thus, provides Rojas no grounds for relief.7      
 
(9) 
Rojas’ claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is also 
unavailing.  Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel will not be 
                                                          
 
3SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 11(e) (1) (B). 
4The sentencing judge clearly was aware of the communications between the prosecutor and defense 
counsel; nevertheless, he sentenced Rojas to a 12-year term. 
5Gaines v. State, 571 A.2d 765, 766-67 (Del. 1990). 
6DEL. CODE ANN. tit 11, §§ 832, 4205 (2001), authorizing as much as a 20-year prison term for Rojas’ first 
degree robbery conviction.    
7Gaines v. State, 571 A.2d at 766-67. 
 
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considered for the first time on direct appeal.8  Accordingly, we will not 
review this claim in the first instance. 
 
(10) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Rojas’ appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We are also satisfied that Rojas’ counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and has properly determined that 
Rojas could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice          
                                                          
 
8Duross v. State, 494 A.2d 1265, 1267-68 (Del. 1985).