Case Title: KINION v DESIGN SYSTEMS INC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1980-12-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
N o . 80-202 I N T H E SUPREME COURT O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1980 RICHARD K I N I O N I P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, DESIGN SYSTEMS, I N C . , A Montana Corporation, Ted T. Topolski, B i l l Childers, Larry Dauenhauer, Defendants and SECURITY TRUST and SAVINGS BANK, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l District, I n and f o r t h e County of Cascade. Honorable H. W i l l i a m Coder, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: C. L. O v e r f e l t argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent: Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole and D i e t r i c h , B i l l i n g s , Montana Ronald Lodders argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted: November 2 0 , 1980 Decided : 2 4 1980 F i l e d : 21<(; + ; $ $ @ M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . P l a i n t i f f Richard Kinion brought a breach of c o n t r a c t a c t i o n a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t Design Systems, I n c . , t h e S e c u r i t y T r u s t and S a v i n g s Bank ( S e c u r i t y Bank), and s e v e r a l o t h e r s i n J u l y 1978. A d e f a u l t judgment was e n t e r e d a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t s Design Systems, I n c . (Design) and S e c u r i t y Bank by t h e Cascade County D i s t r i c t C o u r t on December 27, 1978. S e c u r i t y Bank moved to set a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment on March 1 0 , 1980. Judge Coder e n t e r e d a n o r d e r s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment on March 27, 1980. Richard Kinion t i m e l y f i l e d a n o t i c e of appeal from t h e District Court o r d e r and on June 3, 1980, f i l e d an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a w r i t of s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l . W e hold t h a t t h e District Court o r d e r is i n t e r l o c u t o r y and n o n a p p e a l a b l e and t h a t t h e p r e s e n t case is i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t h e e x e r c i s e of s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l . I n S h i e l d s v. P i r k l e R e f r i g e r a t e d F r e i g h t l i n e s ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont . , 591 P.2d 1120, 36 St.Rep. 472, we s p e c i f i c a l l y h e l d t h a t an o r d e r v a c a t i n g a d e f a u l t judgment is o n l y a p p e a l a b l e as a f i n a l judgment under Rule 1, M.R.App.Civ.P., i f t h e r e s u l t of t h e o r d e r is t o f i n a l l y d i s p o s e of t h e case. I n t h e p r e s e n t case t h e o r d e r v a c a t i n g t h e d e f a u l t judgment l e f t t h e case pending i n t h e Cascade County District Court f o r a t r i a l on t h e m e r i t s . A s a r e s u l t , no f i n a l judgment was e n t e r e d , t h e D i s t r i c t Court o r d e r was i n t e r l o c u t o r y and t h e a p p e a l is not p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t . K i n i o n ' s a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a w r i t of s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l was f i l e d t o allow t h i s Court a means of g r a n t i n g him r e l i e f i n t h e e v e n t w e determined, as w e have, t h a t t h i s c a s e is n o n a p p e a l a b l e . H e asserts t h a t t h e i s s u a n c e of a w r i t of s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l i n t h e p r e s e n t case would be p r o p e r s i n c e t h e a l t e r n a t i v e remedy, a t r i a l on t h e merits, is w h o l l y i n a d e q u a t e . P l a i n t i f f f u r t h e r - 2 - asserts t h a t a w r i t should i s s u e to p r e v e n t n e e d l e s s l i t i g a t i o n . A similar i s s u e was p r e s e n t e d i n F i t z g e r a l d v. Aetna I n s . Co. ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 176 Mont. 186, 577 P.2d 370. I n t h a t case, Aetna a p p e a l e d from a D i s t r i c t Court o r d e r which g r a n t e d t h e p l a i n t i f f a p a r t i a l summary judgment. Aetna a l s o s o u g h t a w r i t of super- v i s o r y c o n t r o l with r e g a r d t o a District Court o r d e r denying a motion to s t r i k e two c o u n t s of p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint. T h i s Court s t a t e d t h a t t h e o r d e r was i n t e r l o c u t o r y and t h e r e f o r e r e v i e w a b l e o n l y upon a f i n a l judgment under R u l e s 1 and 2, M.R.App.Civ.P. Our h o l d i n g , which f o l l o w s , a l s o d i s p o s e s of t h e s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l i s s u e i n t h e p r e s e n t case: ". . . To p e r m i t review of such an o r d e r p r i o r t o f i n a l judgment through t h e d e v i c e of super- v i s o r y c o n t r o l or o t h e r e x t r a o r d i n a r y w r i t is t o accomplish i n d i r e c t l y t h a t which cannot be done d i r e c t l y . See S t a t e ex rel. Kosena v. D i s t r i c t Court ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 172 Mont. 21, 560 P.2d 522. Accordingly, w e d e c l i n e t o review t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l of d e f e n d a n t ' s motion to s t r i k e a t t h i s t i m e as t h e i s s u e is not pro- p e r l y b e f o r e us." 176 Mont. a t 195, 577 P.2d a t 375. The a p p e a l is a c c o r d i n g l y d i s m i s s e d w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e , t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a w r i t of s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l is denied and t h e case is remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s . Chief J u s t i c e W e concur: / ' 7 JUG tices L , * * ? v