Case Title: Mountain View/Evergreen Imp. and Service Dist. v. Casper Concrete Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-03-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mountain View/Evergreen Imp. and Service Dist. v. Casper Concrete Co.1996 WY 31912 P.2d 529Case Number: 95-143Decided: 03/11/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming

MOUNTAIN VIEW/EVERGREEN IMPROVEMENT AND SERVICE DISTRICT, an 
Improvement and Service District formed under the laws of the State of 
Wyoming,  

Appellant (Plaintiff), 

 

v. 

 

CASPER 
CONCRETE COMPANY, a Wyoming Corporation,  

Appellee (Defendant).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County; 

Honorable 
Dan Spangler, Judge.

 

Representing Appellant: 

Phillip T. Willoughby, Casper.

 Representing Appellee:

Richard R. Wilking, Casper, Earl J. Hanson, 
Billings.

 

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Chief 
Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant, 
Mountain View/Evergreen Improvement and Service District (Mountain View), 
appeals the trial court's order which entered a judgment for Casper Concrete 
Company (Casper Concrete) in an action against Casper Concrete for negligence 
and breach of contract.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

[¶3]      The issue in this 
case is:

 

Did the district court err in granting defendant's 
motion for directed verdict at the conclusion of the plaintiff's 
case?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      Mountain View was 
formed to provide financing for sidewalks, curb gutters, street improvements and 
paving for two subdivisions in unincorporated Natrona County, Wyoming. Mountain 
View hired Civil Engineering Professionals, Inc. (CEPI) as the project engineer. 
CEPI developed the contract documents for the construction project and awarded 
the contract to Casper Concrete in July, 1990.

 

[¶5]      Casper Concrete 
substantially completed the project in December of 1990; however, because of 
problems with subsidence on the newly paved streets, final completion and 
payment did not take place until January, 1992. Six areas of subsidence were 
found in the spring of 1991. Casper Concrete fixed the first six areas of 
subsidence pursuant to a change order issued by Mountain View through CEPI. CEPI 
engineers did not believe the subsidence problems could be attributed to Casper 
Concrete's work; therefore, Casper Concrete was paid to fix the subsidence areas 
found in 1991. New areas of subsidence were found after 1991 which also required 
repair. However, neither CEPI nor Mountain View ever presented Casper Concrete 
with a claim for defective work pursuant to the contract.

 

[¶6]      On April 1, 1993, 
Mountain View filed a lawsuit against Brooks Water and Sewer District (the 
entity which placed sewer lines below the streets before the streets were 
paved), CEPI, and Casper Concrete seeking payment for damages for the cost of 
repairs to the subsidence areas. Claims against Brooks Water and Sewer District 
were dismissed after reaching this Court in Mountain View/Evergreen Improvement and 
Service District v. Brooks Water and Sewer District, 896 P.2d 1355 (Wyo. 
1995) (reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded). CEPI was dismissed 
with prejudice after CEPI and Mountain View reached a settlement agreement. 
Mountain View claimed Casper Concrete breached the contract and negligently 
performed its work, causing the subsidence problems in the 
project.

 

[¶7]      After Mountain 
View presented its evidence to the district court during the bench trial, Casper 
Concrete moved for a non-suit or, in the alternative, a directed verdict.1 Casper Concrete based its motion on 
defenses provided by two provisions of the contract. In one provision Mountain 
View and Casper Concrete waived all claims of both parties once final payment 
was made. The other provision granted Mountain View a one-year warranty period 
for claims against Casper Concrete for defective work. In its order granting 
Casper Concrete's motion, the trial court declared the waiver provision was 
enforceable and found that Mountain View failed to submit any claims under the 
one-year warranty clause before it expired.2 Mountain View appeals from that 
order and judgment.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶8]      Our standard of 
review for an order granting a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the end 
of plaintiff's case in chief pursuant to WYO.R.CIV.P. 52(c)3 requires this court to take the 
plaintiff's evidence as true and afford it all favorable and reasonable 
inferences. True Oil Co. v. Sinclair Oil 
Corp., 771 P.2d 781, 795 (Wyo. 1989); Kaiser v. Farnsworth Drilling Co., Inc., 
851 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Wyo. 1993). "A motion for judgment at the close of the 
plaintiff's case is in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence, and admits its 
truth." True Oil, 771 P.2d  at 795 
(quoting Hawkey v. Williams, 72 Wyo. 
20, 23, 261 P.2d 48, 55 (1953)).

 

[¶9]      WYO.R.CIV.P. 
52(c) states, in pertinent part:

 

If during a trial without a jury a party has been 
fully heard on an issue and the court finds against the party on that issue, the 
court may enter judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a 
claim . . . that cannot under the controlling law be maintained. . . 
.

 

The trial court determined 
the waiver provision and the one-year warranty provision in the contract between 
Mountain View and Casper Concrete established a defense to Mountain View's 
claims as a matter of law.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶10]   The applicable sections of the 
contract between Mountain View and Casper Concrete 
provide:

 

13.12. If within one year after the date of final 
acceptance . . . any Work is found to be defective, CONTRACTOR [Casper Concrete] 
shall promptly, without cost to OWNER [Mountain View] and in accordance with 
OWNER's written instructions, either correct such defective Work, or, if it has been 
rejected by OWNER, remove it from the site and replace it with nondefective Work.

 

[¶11]   The original contract was amended 
to provide the following:

 

Waiver of 
Claims:

 

14.16. The making and acceptance of final payment 
will constitute:

 

14.16.1 A waiver of claims by Owner against 
Contractor, concerning claims arising from unsettled liens, from defective work, 
from failure to comply with the Contract Documents or the terms of any special 
guarantees specified therein of any rights with respect to Contractor's 
continuing obligations under the Contract Documents; and

 

14.16.2 The nature and acceptance of direct payment 
will constitute a waiver of all claims by Contractor against 
Owner.

 

The contract defines "defective" 
as:

 

An adjective which when modifying the word Work 
refers to Work that is unsatisfactory, faulty or deficient, or does not conform 
to the Contract Documents, or does not meet the requirements of any inspection, 
reference standard, test or approval referred to in the Contract Documents, or 
has been damaged prior to ENGINEER's recommendation of final payment (unless 
responsibility for the protection thereof has been assumed by OWNER at 
Substantial Completion in accordance with paragraph 14.8 or 
14.10).

 

[¶12]   As the trial court noted in its 
ruling, the contract's one-year warranty period lapsed before Mountain View made 
any claims against Casper Concrete. Mountain View made its final payment to 
Casper Concrete in January, 1992. Therefore, the one-year warranty lapsed in 
January, 1993. Mountain View did not file this lawsuit against Casper Concrete 
until April, 1993. In fact, no claims were submitted to Casper Concrete under 
the warranty provision in the contract. Members of the Mountain View board of 
directors knew that the contract contained a one-year warranty period. However, 
Mountain View allowed the warranty period to lapse, and with it, any claims it 
may have had against Casper Concrete.

 

[¶13]   Mountain View maintains the 
provisions concerning the waiver of claims after final payment and the one-year 
warranty have an ambiguous double meaning. A contract is ambiguous if it is 
obscure in its meaning because of indefiniteness of expression or because it 
contains a double meaning. Prudential 
Preferred Properties v. Underwood Ranch Co., 873 P.2d 598, 600 (Wyo. 1994). 
Section 14.16.1 waives claims for defective work upon final acceptance and 
payment, but the one-year warranty also covers defective work. Mountain View 
argues that it could not waive its claims for defective work at the time of 
final payment and have a one-year 
warranty for defective work. "The question of whether a contract is ambiguous is 
a question of law, which may be independently determined by this court." Id. The warranty and waiver provisions 
may be ambiguous in this contract; however, we need not reach this issue because 
the lapse of the one-year warranty is dispositive in this 
case.

 

[¶14]   We will note, however, that even if 
we held the contract was ambiguous, our analysis of the contract does not stop 
there. Mountain View argues that because the waiver provision and the one-year 
warranty provision create an ambiguity in the contract, Mountain View did not 
waive its claims upon final payment. However, Mountain View's agent, CEPI, 
drafted the contract. Ambiguous contracts are construed against the drafter. Id. Therefore, we must construe the 
ambiguous terms in the contract against Mountain View. Mountain View's position 
would allow it to unfairly benefit from the ambiguous terms in a contract 
drafted by its own agent.

 

[¶15]   Once Mountain View made its final 
payment to Casper Concrete, the waiver provision dictates that Mountain View 
waived its claims against Casper Concrete for "defective work from failure to 
comply with the Contract Documents." Therefore, Mountain View's breach of 
contract claim for failure to comply with the contract documents was waived 
according to the terms of the contract. Since waiver is an affirmative defense 
to a breach of contract claim, the trial court appropriately dismissed Mountain 
View's claim against Casper Concrete under the waiver provision of the contract 
as well.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶16]   The trial court appropriately 
dismissed Mountain View's claims against Casper Concrete. When Mountain View 
made the final payment to Casper Concrete, Mountain View waived its right to 
file any claims for defective work against Casper Concrete. Even if the waiver 
provision did not apply in favor of Casper Concrete, Mountain View did not make 
any warranty claims or file its lawsuit until after the one-year warranty period 
expired.

 

Footnotes

1 We note for our Wyoming practitioners 
that the proper motion in a trial without a jury after the plaintiff has 
completed the presentation of evidence is a motion for a judgment as a matter of 
law, pursuant to WYO.R.CIV.P. 52(c). See WYO. R.CIV.P. 52(c), 9 CHARLES A. 
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE. § 2371 (2d ed. 
1994). The Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure no longer use the term "non-suit," 
and the term "directed verdict" has been replaced with the term "judgment as a 
matter of law." WYO. R.CIV.P. 50. Further, WYO.R.CIV.P. 50 only applies in jury 
cases, not in cases tried before the court. See WYO.R.CIV.P. 50, 9A WRIGHT & 
MILLER, supra § 
2523.

2 The district court ruled from the bench 
on Casper Concrete's motion:

It appears to 
me that the position of the defendant is correct; that there is an enforceable 
waiver provision in the contract; that there was consideration given by both 
sides for that provision; and that the claims submitted here have been waived to 
the extent that there might still be time for claims under the one-year 
guarantee clause; that the claims were not submitted under that clause either. 
So I'll grant the motion, then.

3 Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 
41(b)(1), which is the rule actually cited in True Oil, has been amended since the 
case was decided in 1989. The applicable portion of Rule 41 was transferred to 
Rule 52(c) in 1993. See WYO. R.CIV.P. 
41, 52(c) and 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, § 2371.