Case Title: Dorsey v. Dorsey

Citation: 

Docket Number: 38, 2024 / 40, 2024/ 70, 2024/ 71, 2024

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2024-02-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RALPH DORSEY,1 
    
    Petitioner Below, 
    Appellant, 
 
    v. 
 
DAPHNE DORSEY, 
 
    Respondent Below, 
    Appellee. 
 
 
RALPH DORSEY, 
    
    Petitioner Below, 
    Appellant, 
 
    v. 
 
DAPHNE DORSEY, 
 
    Respondent Below, 
    Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
§  No. 38, 2024 
§   
§  Court Below—Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  File No. CN22-02379 
§  Petition No. 22-11199 
§ 
§  
§ 
§ 
 
 
§ 
§  No. 40, 2024 
§   
§  Court Below—Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  File No. CN22-02379 
§  Petition No. 22-11199 
§   
§   
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties in these appeals under Supreme Court 
Rule 7(d). 
2 
 
RALPH DORSEY, 
    
    Petitioner Below, 
    Appellant, 
 
    v. 
 
DAPHNE DORSEY, 
 
    Respondent Below, 
    Appellee. 
 
 
RALPH DORSEY, 
    
    Petitioner Below, 
    Appellant, 
 
    v. 
 
DAPHNE DORSEY, 
 
    Respondent Below, 
    Appellee. 
§   
§  No. 70, 2024 
§ 
§  Court Below—Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  File No. CN22-02379 
§  Petition No. 22-11199 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
§ 
§  No. 71, 2024 
§ 
§  Court Below—Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  File No. CN22-02379 
§  Petition No. 22-11199 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§   
 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and GRIFFITHS, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
(1) 
This order addresses four appeals filed by the appellant (“Ex-
Husband”) against the appellee (“Ex-Wife”).  We first summarize the relevant 
background and then address the disposition of each appeal in turn.  In sum, Appeal 
Nos. 38 and 40, 2024, are dismissed and interlocutory Appeal Nos. 70 and 71, 2024, 
are refused. 
3 
 
Background 
(2) 
Ex-Husband filed a petition for divorce in April 2022.  He did not 
request ancillary relief.  Ex-Wife did not respond, and on August 30, 2022, the 
Family Court entered a divorce decree (the “Original Decree”).  On March 20, 2023, 
Ex-Wife filed a motion seeking to reopen ancillary matters under Family Court Rule 
of Civil Procedure 60(b).2  Among other grounds for relief, Ex-Wife asserted that 
she had not been served with the divorce petition and that she was unaware of the 
divorce proceeding until September 2022, after the Family Court had entered the 
Original Decree.  Ex-Husband opposed reopening, arguing that Ex-Wife had not 
established that she was entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) because, among other 
things, she had received notices of the proceedings at a New Jersey address that she 
provided and her participation in various court matters in Delaware and New Jersey 
demonstrated that she was aware of the divorce proceeding.   
(3) 
At the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing on the Rule 60(b) motion 
on September 20, 2023, the Family Court orally granted the motion.  On September 
22, 2023, the Family Court entered a written order (the “Ancillary Reopening 
Order”)3 that granted the motion for the reasons stated on the record.  The Ancillary 
 
2 It appears that Ex-Husband has been represented by counsel since the outset of the Family Court 
proceedings, and Ex-Wife has been represented by counsel in the Family Court proceedings since 
March 18, 2023.  To be clear, the numerous filings described in this order were filed by counsel 
on the parties’ behalf. 
3 The Ancillary Reopening Order is one of the orders from which Ex-Husband filed the notices of 
appeal at issue. 
4 
 
Reopening Order directed Ex-Wife to file her request for reservation of jurisdiction 
over ancillary matters, including name change, within twenty days, after which the 
court would enter a scheduling order regarding ancillary relief.  Ex-Wife then filed 
a “Notice for Ancillary Jurisdiction,” requesting that the court retain jurisdiction 
over property division, alimony, attorneys’ fees, and court costs and that the court 
permit Ex-Wife to change her name.  Ex-Husband objected, asserting that a valid 
and enforceable “reconciliation agreement” (the “Separation Agreement”)4 
governed property-division issues and limited the scope of ancillary matters that 
could be subject to court resolution solely to the issue of alimony.   
(4) 
On October 5, 2023, the Family Court entered an order retaining 
jurisdiction over property division, alimony, attorneys’ fees, and court costs; 
providing that the court would issue a new divorce decree incorporating by reference 
the Separation Agreement and changing Ex-Wife’s name; and stating that the 
incorporation of the Separation Agreement into the divorce decree “shall not be 
construed as an admission by [Ex-Husband] as to its enforceability, which [Ex-
Husband] retains the right to contest on proper application.”  That same day, the 
Family Court entered an “Amended Final Decree” of divorce (the “Amended 
 
4 The parties dispute whether the agreement is a “separation agreement” or a “reconciliation 
agreement” and the legal effect of such distinction.  By referring to it as the “Separation 
Agreement,” we do not intend any substantive determination of those issues; we have selected that 
terminology merely to correspond to the title of Ex-Wife’s motion seeking to set aside the 
agreement, which is discussed below. 
5 
 
Decree”) that incorporated the Separation Agreement, changed Ex-Wife’s name, and 
stated that the effective date of the decree was October 5, 2023.   
(5) 
Ex-Husband filed two motions for reargument or relief from judgment 
in October 2023.  In the first motion (“First Motion”), which appears to have been 
filed after the Family Court issued the Ancillary Reopening Order but before the 
court issued the Amended Decree (or before Ex-Husband was aware of the Amended 
Decree), Ex-Husband argued that the court should not have reopened ancillary 
matters or, at most, should have reopened solely as to alimony.  In the second motion 
(“Second Motion”), which appears to have been filed after Ex-Husband received the 
Amended Decree, Ex-Husband argued that the court inadvertently or mistakenly 
changed the effective date of the divorce and that the Amended Decree should be 
dated effective August 30, 2022, the date of the Original Decree.5  Ex-Wife filed an 
opposition to the First Motion; she does not appear to have responded to the Second 
Motion.  Around the same time, Ex-Wife also filed a motion to set aside the 
Separation Agreement, which Ex-Husband opposed.   
(6) 
On January 24, 2024, the Family Court entered an order (the “January 
Order”)6 that addressed several of the outstanding motions.  First, the court denied 
 
5 As discussed below, Ex-Husband later informed the court that he had remarried in September 
2023.  His motion filed in October 2023 did not so inform the court, however. 
6 The January Order is one of the orders from which Ex-Husband filed the notices of appeal at 
issue. 
6 
 
Ex-Husband’s motion for reargument or relief from judgment as to the Amended 
Decree.  The court held that the motion was an untimely attempt to relitigate the 
September 22, 2023 Ancillary Reopening Order and that Ex-Husband had not 
established entitlement to relief under Rule 60(b).  The substance of the court’s 
ruling focused primarily on Ex-Husband’s First Motion for reargument and not on 
his Second Motion, which related to the Amended Decree’s effect on the date of 
divorce.  Although the court did note Ex-Husband’s argument regarding the date, 
the court did not change the date of the Amended Decree at that time.  Second, the 
court granted Ex-Wife’s motion to set aside the Separation Agreement, concluding 
that the agreement should be set aside as unconscionable.  Finally, the court 
addressed another motion, filed by Ex-Wife, that does not appear to be at issue in 
these appeals. 
(7) 
On January 30, 2024, Ex-Husband filed a motion for reargument or 
relief from judgment as to the January Order (the “Third Motion”).  In the Third 
Motion, Ex-Husband argued that the Second Motion—the motion that sought to 
address the date of the Amended Decree—was not untimely, because it was filed 
eight days after the entry of the Amended Decree, when the court first changed the 
date of divorce.  The Third Motion also asserted substantive reasons why the 
Amended Decree erroneously changed the date of the divorce.  Like the Second 
7 
 
Motion, the Third Motion did not inform the Family Court that Ex-Husband had 
remarried in September 2023. 
The Appeals 
(8) 
On January 31, 2024, Ex-Husband filed two appeals.  The notice of 
appeal in No. 38, 2024, identifies the Ancillary Reopening Order and the January 
Order as the subjects of the appeal.  It appears that Ex-Husband’s counsel intends 
Appeal No. 38, 2024, to challenge the Family Court’s decision to reopen ancillary 
matters.7  The notice of appeal in No. 40, 2024, identifies only the January Order as 
the subject of the appeal.  It appears that Ex-Husband’s counsel intends Appeal No. 
40, 2024, to relate to the portion of the January Order that granted Ex-Wife’s motion 
to set aside the Separation Agreement.8  The Senior Clerk of this Court issued notices 
to show cause why each of these two appeals should not be dismissed for “failure to 
comply with Rule 42 when taking an appeal from an apparent interlocutory order.” 
(9) 
On or about February 4, 2024—after this Court issued the notices to 
show cause in the first two appeals, but before Ex-Husband responded to them—Ex-
Husband also filed in the Family Court two applications for certification of 
 
7 See Dorsey v. Dorsey, No. 38, 2024, Docket Entry No. 1, Notice of Appeal (Del. filed Jan. 31, 
2024) (stating that appellant appeals “from the orders of the Family Court . . . dated September 22, 
2023 and January 24, 2024 in case number 22-111999 (Motion to Reopen Pursuant to Rule 
60(b))”). 
8 See Dorsey v. Dorsey, No. 40, 2024, Docket Entry No. 1, Notice of Appeal (Del. filed Jan. 31, 
2024) (stating that appellant appeals “from the order of the Family Court . . . dated January 24, 
2024 in case number 22-11199 (Motion to Set-Aside the Parties Separation Agreement)”). 
8 
 
interlocutory appeal.  Ex-Wife opposed certification.  In a letter dated February 7, 
2024, Ex-Husband’s counsel informed the Family Court—for the first time—that 
Ex-Husband had remarried in September 2023 and again asked the Family Court to 
address the issue of the date of the Amended Decree.9   
(10) The Family Court denied the applications for certification of 
interlocutory appeal on February 15, 2024.  The court also entered an order, nunc 
pro tunc, rescinding the Amended Decree and correcting the Original Decree to 
allow Ex-Wife’s name change and to incorporate the Separation Agreement into the 
divorce decree.  To implement that order, the court issued an “Amended Final 
Decree” bearing the date of August 30, 2022, providing for the name change, and 
reflecting the incorporation of the Separation Agreement (the “Current Decree”). 
(11) On February 20, 2024, Ex-Husband filed two notices of interlocutory 
appeal in this Court.  Like the notice of appeal in No. 38, 2024, the notice of 
interlocutory appeal in No. 70, 2024, identifies the Ancillary Reopening Order and 
the January Order as the subjects of the appeal and appears intended to challenge the 
reopening of the ancillary matters.  And like the notice of appeal in No. 40, 2024, 
the notice of interlocutory appeal in No. 71, 2024, identifies the January Order as 
 
9 The letter stated that Ex-Husband advised counsel “today [February 7, 2024] that he remarried 
on September 13, 2023 over a year after the original decree was entered and approximately 3 weeks 
before the decree was amended to October 5, 202[3].” 
9 
 
the subject of the appeal and appears intended to relate to the portion of the January 
Order that granted Ex-Wife’s motion to set aside the Separation Agreement. 
Appeal Nos. 38 and 70, 2024—Reopening of Ancillary Matters 
(12) In response to the notice to show cause in No. 38, 2024, Ex-Husband 
asserts that the appeal “concerns the Family Court’s decision to grant [Ex-Wife’s] 
motion [to] have ancillary matters reopened pursuant to Rule 60(b).”  He contends 
that the Family Court could not reopen ancillary matters under Rule 60(b) because 
that rule applies only to reopen a judgment or order.  He reasons that, because there 
was no judgment or order regarding ancillary matters, there was nothing to reopen 
under Rule 60(b).  Moreover, he contends that the effect of the Family Court’s 
decisions was to allow Ex-Wife to pursue ancillary relief after the entry of a final 
divorce decree, in violation of 13 Del. C. § 1518(c).10  Ex-Husband also asserts 
various arguments as to the Amended Decree’s change in the effective date of the 
divorce.11  In response, Ex-Wife argues that an order reopening ancillary matters is 
not a final, appealable order because such an order does not clearly declare the trial 
court’s intention that it be the court’s final act in the case. 
 
10 See 13 Del. C. § 1518(c) (“In the decree granting or denying a petition for divorce or annulment, 
or by separate order or orders preceding or following such decree, the Court shall dispose of all 
other prayers for relief, where appropriate under the facts and law; but an application for such 
relief and a hearing thereon must be presented in the petition or response, or by motion after notice 
to the other party prior to the entry or denial of such decree.”). 
11 As stated above, the Family Court has rescinded the Amended Decree and issued the Current 
Decree, with an effective date of August 30, 2022, the date of the Original Decree. 
10 
 
(13) “An aggrieved party can appeal to this Court, as a matter of right, only 
after a final judgment is entered by the trial court.”12  “[A]n order is deemed final 
and appealable if the decision is the trial court’s last act in disposing of all justiciable 
matters within its jurisdiction.”13  In appeals from Family Court, “the final order 
granting a divorce decree and a final order regarding ancillary relief are severable.”14  
Title 13, Section 1518(a) provides:   
A decree granting or denying a petition for divorce or annulment is final 
when entered, subject to the right of appeal.  An appeal that does not 
challenge the decree of divorce or annulment, but challenges only 
rulings with respect to relief awarded under other sections of this 
chapter, or other matters incidental or collateral to such decree, shall 
not delay the finality of the decree of divorce or annulment, and the 
parties may remarry while the appeal is pending.15 
 
“When the Family Court retains jurisdiction to consider requests for ancillary relief, 
following the entry of a divorce decree, each final ruling on a request for a specific 
type of ancillary relief is directly and separately appealable to this Court.”16  But 
“[a]ll rulings that are made within the context of a particular ancillary proceeding 
are not necessarily final.”17  For example, “an award of interim alimony is clearly 
not a final ruling on an ancillary application for alimony.”18  “An appeal from an 
 
12 Lipson v. Lipson, 799 A.2d 345, 347 (Del. 2001). 
13 Id. at 348. 
14 Id. at 347. 
15 13 Del. C. § 1518(a). 
16 Lipson, 799 A.2d at 347. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
11 
 
interlocutory ruling, which is made within the course of deciding a particular request 
for ancillary relief, is subject to the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 42.”19 
(14) After careful consideration, we have determined that Appeal No. 38, 
2024, is interlocutory and must be dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 42.  The 
appeal challenges the Family Court’s decision to reopen ancillary matters.  That 
decision was not final and appealable, because it left the substance of ancillary 
matters to be litigated and decided.  Thus, the proper vehicles for Ex-Husband to 
seek this Court’s review of his arguments that the Family Court erroneously 
reopened ancillary matters are either (i) an appeal from a final decision on the 
ancillary matters;20 or (ii) a procedurally proper interlocutory appeal.  Because 
Appeal No. 38, 2024, is neither of those, it is dismissed. 
(15) In Appeal No. 70, 2024, Ex-Husband has petitioned this Court under 
Supreme Court Rule 42 to accept an interlocutory appeal from the Family Court’s 
decision granting Ex-Wife’s motion to reopen ancillary matters.  In his application 
for certification of an interlocutory appeal, Ex-Husband argued that the Family Court 
should certify the appeal because (i) the Family Court’s decision involves a question 
 
19 Id. 
20 See, e.g., Ravine v. Ravine, 2006 WL 453213 (Del. Feb. 22, 2006) (addressing wife’s arguments 
that Family Court erroneously granted husband’s motion to reopen the divorce to enable husband 
to request alimony, in appeal taken following Family Court’s final judgment awarding husband 
alimony); Flood v. Flood, 1993 WL 22038 (Del. Jan. 22, 1993) (holding that Family Court abused 
its discretion by granting wife’s motion to reopen the divorce so that the court could divide marital 
property, in appeal taken by husband following Family Court’s final judgment ordering that the 
property at issue be sold at auction). 
12 
 
of first impression;21 (ii) the decision sustained the controverted jurisdiction of the 
Family Court;22 (iii) the decision opened a judgment of the trial court;23 and (iv) Ex-
Husband’s success on appeal would terminate the litigation.24  The Family Court 
denied certification, concluding that it had not decided a substantial issue of material 
importance that merits appellate review before a final judgment.25 
(16) We conclude that interlocutory review is not warranted in this case.  
Applications for interlocutory review are addressed to the sound discretion of this 
Court.26  Importantly, we reiterate that the Family Court has rescinded the Amended 
Decree and reinstated the date of divorce from the Original Decree.  Thus, continued 
proceedings on ancillary matters do not appear to leave a cloud over the validity of 
Ex-Husband’s second marriage.  With that issue having been addressed by the 
Family Court, it seems that the parties’ dispute—which raises intertwining legal, 
procedural, and factual issues as to the standards that apply to a post-divorce request 
for ancillary relief when there may or may not be an enforceable contract between 
the parties27—can best and most efficiently be resolved after the Family Court enters 
 
21 DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42(b)(iii)(A). 
22 Id. R. 42(b)(iii)(D). 
23 Id. R. 42(b)(iii)(F). 
24 Id. R. 42(b)(iii)(G). 
25 Id. R. 42(b)(i). 
26 Id. R. 42(d)(v). 
27 See generally Rockwell v. Rockwell, 681 A.2d 1017 (Del. 1996) (holding that modification of 
the alimony provisions of a separation agreement that was incorporated into a final divorce decree 
is subject to statutory standard for modification if the alimony was judicially determined but is 
controlled by contract principles if the alimony was determined by an agreement of the parties that 
13 
 
a final judgment on the ancillary matters.  Thus, exceptional circumstances that 
would merit interlocutory review of the Family Court’s decisions do not exist in this 
case,28 and the application for interlocutory review does not meet the strict standards 
for certification under Supreme Court Rule 42(b). 
Appeal Nos. 40 and 71, 2024—Setting Aside of Separation Agreement 
(17) In response to the notice to show cause in No. 40, 2024, Ex-Husband 
asserts that the Family Court’s decision to set aside the Separation Agreement 
equates to an entry of a declaratory judgment in Ex-Wife’s favor and is therefore 
final and appealable.  Ex-Wife concedes that a declaratory judgment “can be” a final, 
appealable order if it disposes of all the issues in a case and leaves nothing for future 
determination or consideration.  But she asserts that the Family Court’s decision 
granting Ex-Wife’s motion to set aside the Separation Agreement is not such a final 
judgment, but rather is a “factual determination made on the enforceability of the 
agreement” and “was not intended to be case dispositive or the court’s final act.”  
 
was made an order of the court); Sanders v. Sanders, 570 A.2d 1189 (Del. 1990) (holding, before 
statutory amendment to subject-matter jurisdiction of Family Court, 67 Del. Laws ch. 446 
(approved Oct. 5, 1990), that Family Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over an independent 
action for contractual rescission and ancillary relief when the agreement was not merged into the 
divorce decree and the action was not part of divorce proceedings and followed the parties’ 
divorce, but stating that wife was not without a remedy because she could seek to reopen the 
divorce to seek ancillary relief). 
28 DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42(b)(ii).  Cf. Goode v. Goode, 2024 WL 807334 (Del. Feb. 27, 2024) 
(refusing interlocutory appeal from order denying ex-husband’s motion to dismiss petition for 
specific performance of separation agreement filed by ex-wife). 
14 
 
Ex-Wife further argues that the Family Court’s “final act will be the determination 
of ancillary matters.” 
(18) After careful consideration of the parties’ positions, the portions of the 
January Order relating to the motion to set aside the Separation Agreement, and the 
complex procedural posture of this case, we conclude that the Family Court’s 
decision to set aside the Separation Agreement is not a final, appealable order and 
that Appeal No. 40, 2024, is therefore interlocutory and must be dismissed for failure 
to comply with Rule 42.  Ex-Husband can assert his challenges to the Family Court’s 
determination that the Separation Agreement should be set aside in an appeal from 
a final decision on the ancillary matters.   
(19) In Appeal No. 71, 2024, Ex-Husband has petitioned this Court under 
Supreme Court Rule 42 to accept an interlocutory appeal from the Family Court’s 
decision to set aside the Separation Agreement.  In his application for certification 
of an interlocutory appeal, Ex-Husband argued that the Family Court should certify 
the appeal because the Family Court’s decision involves a question of first 
impression,29 which he characterized as “the enforceability of a reconciliation 
agreement executed during the marriage which is neither a premari[t]al agreement 
nor a[n] agreement resolving ancillary matters following a divorce.”  He also 
 
29 DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42(b)(iii)(A). 
15 
 
asserted that his success on appeal would terminate the litigation,30 “except the issue 
of alimony,” and he argued that “probably 90% of the litigation expenses will be 
eliminated if property division is not an issue.”31  The Family Court denied 
certification, concluding that the interlocutory order did not decide a substantial 
issue of material importance that merits appellate review before a final judgment.32  
We conclude that interlocutory review is not warranted in this case, for the reasons 
discussed above with respect to the refusal of Appeal No. 70, 2024.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED this 29th  day of February, 2024, that: 
(i) 
Appeal No. 38, 2024, is DISMISSED; 
(ii) 
Interlocutory Appeal No. 70, 2024, is REFUSED; 
(iii) Appeal No. 40, 2024, is DISMISSED;  
(iv) 
Interlocutory Appeal No. 71, 2024, is REFUSED; and 
 
 
 
30 Id. R. 42(b)(iii)(G). 
31 He further stated that “[a]ll litigation will be terminated if respondent’s action to reopen the 
divorce proceedings is reversed on appeal.”  Ex-Husband’s arguments buttress our conclusion that 
the issues presented by Ex-Husband’s various appeals are intertwined and should be resolved 
together by the Family Court in the first instance. 
32 DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42(b)(i). 
16 
 
(v) 
Ex-Husband’s motion asking this Court to order the Family Court 
to dismiss Ex-Wife’s motion for interim alimony is DENIED AS 
MOOT.33 
 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
       Chief Justice 
 
33 The motion asserted that the Family Court lacked jurisdiction to act on the request for interim 
alimony while Appeal No. 38, 2024, was pending.