Case Title: Walker v. American Ass'n of Prof. Eye Care Specialists

Citation: 

Docket Number: 031844

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
CAROLYN J. WALKER 
 
v.  Record No. 031844 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
June 10, 2004 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF 
PROFESSIONAL EYE CARE 
SPECIALISTS, P.C., d/b/a AAPECS, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
Charles D. Griffith, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether an attorney who 
delivers a pleading, signed by a pro se plaintiff, on behalf 
of the plaintiff is, by that action, "counsel of record."  We 
further consider whether the pleading in this case is invalid. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
The material facts of this case are not in dispute.  On 
December 13, 2001, Carolyn J. Walker ("Walker"), caused a 
motion for judgment to be filed in the Circuit Court for the 
City of Norfolk alleging negligent medical treatment by 
American Association of Professional Eye Care Specialists, 
P.C. and two of its agents (collectively, "AAPECS").  Walker 
signed her name to the motion for judgment.  According to 
testimony in proceedings before the trial court, attorney 
Robert S. Cohen ("Cohen") arranged for delivery of the motion 
to the trial court because Walker "didn't know where the 
courthouse was."  Along with Walker's motion for judgment, 
Cohen sent a cover letter indicating that the motion for 
 
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judgment was to be filed on behalf of Walker.  A check drawn 
on Cohen's client trust account in the amount of the filing 
fees was also enclosed.  Cohen did not expressly state in the 
cover letter that he was making an appearance on behalf of 
Walker. 
 
Walker initially engaged Cohen in early 2001 to 
"investigate whether or not she had a potential case" against 
AAPECS.  She placed $1500 in an escrow account with Cohen.  On 
July 3, 2001, Cohen informed Walker that he would not 
represent her in the case and that "if she wished to go 
forward with it, that she'd have to file a suit either in her 
name or get another attorney to do so."  While a different 
attorney drafted the motion for judgment for Walker, she asked 
Cohen to help her find a medical expert for a fixed fee of 
$500, which he did.  Both the fee for finding an expert and 
the court filing fees were drawn from Walker's funds in escrow 
with Cohen.  The residue was transferred to the attorney who 
eventually agreed to represent Walker.  Both Cohen and Walker 
agreed in their testimony that at the time the motion for 
judgment was filed, Cohen was not Walker's attorney and Walker 
understood that Cohen was not her attorney. 
 
AAPECS filed a motion to strike and a motion to quash 
arguing that Walker's pleading was improperly signed because 
Cohen represented her at the time the pleading was filed.  The 
 
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trial court held two hearings on the matter.  At the second 
hearing, the trial court received testimony from both Walker 
and Cohen.  In an order and opinion, the trial court granted 
AAPECS' motions, concluding that Cohen was Walker's counsel of 
record and that Walker's pleading had been improperly signed 
by her under Rules 1:4 and 1A:4. The trial court dismissed the 
action with prejudice.  Walker appeals the adverse judgment of 
the trial court. 
II.  Analysis 
 
The dispositive issue in this case is whether Cohen was 
counsel of record for Walker when the motion for judgment was 
filed.  AAPECS argues that the trial court made a finding of 
fact that Walker was not conducting her own case.  The trial 
court stated, at the conclusion of its first hearing on the 
matter, that "I am giving you that factual conclusion that Mr. 
Cohen made an appearance in the case.  He was counsel of 
record when he filed that motion for judgment." However, the 
conclusion that Cohen made an appearance or was counsel of 
record is a mixed question of law and fact.  We must consider 
the facts which are essentially undisputed and then determine 
whether, as a matter of law, Cohen was counsel of record when 
the motion for judgment was filed.  Consequently, we review 
the trial court's judgment de novo.  Caplan v. Bogard, 264 Va. 
219, 225, 563 S.E.2d 719, 722 (2002). 
 
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Walker maintains that the trial court erred in its 
holding that Cohen was counsel of record in the case as a 
matter of fact.  We hold that as a matter of law, Cohen was 
not counsel of record.  Additionally, Walker assigns error to 
the trial court's holding that Rule 1A:4 applies to her case 
and required Cohen to sign the motion for judgment.  Walker 
further asserts that the trial court's misinterpretation of 
the applicability of Rule 1A:4 resulted in its conclusion that 
the pleading was invalid.  We agree with Walker. 
 
Rule 1:4 establishes general requirements for pleading.  
Specifically, Rule 1:4(c) mandates that "Counsel or an 
unrepresented party who files a pleading shall sign it and 
state his address."  Rule 1:4(l) requires "counsel of record" 
to list his or her office address and telephone number at the 
foot of "[e]very pleading, motion or other paper served or 
filed."  Rule 1:5 states that "'Counsel of record' includes a 
counsel or party who has signed a pleading in the case or who 
has notified the other parties and the clerk in writing that 
he appears in the case." 
 
In this case, Walker signed the pleading as an 
unrepresented party in conformance with Rule 1:4(c) and (l) 
but Cohen did not sign the pleading.  Furthermore, Cohen's 
cover letter to the clerk of the court requesting filing does 
not notify other parties and the clerk in writing that he 
 
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appears in the case.  Consequently, it does not support the 
legal conclusion that he became counsel of record simply by 
virtue of a cover letter enclosing a pleading signed by a 
party. 
 
The trial court erroneously concluded, under Rule 1A:4 
and our decision in Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Harman Mining 
Corp., 264 Va. 279, 283, 568 S.E.2d 671, 673 (2002), that 
Cohen was Walker's counsel of record at the time the motion 
for judgment was filed and that because Walker signed the 
pleading in error, it was consequently invalid.  Rule 1A:4 
deals with foreign attorneys and is inapplicable to this case.  
The final sentence of Rule 1A:4 simply emphasizes that when 
foreign counsel is permitted to conduct a case in the 
Commonwealth, "a pleading or other paper required to be 
served," shall, nonetheless, be signed by a member of the 
Virginia State Bar. 
 
Further, the trial court placed great weight upon the 
finding that "Cohen continued to represent and protect 
Plaintiff's legal interests from the time she retained him 
until he transferred the remainder of her retainer fee to her 
current counsel."  While true, it is not dispositive of the 
legal question whether Cohen was counsel of record in the 
pending case.  Cohen's continued protection of Walker's legal 
interests was consistent with his duty under Rule 1.16(d) of 
 
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the Rules of Professional Conduct.  Having determined that he 
was not going to represent Walker in her intended lawsuit, 
Cohen facilitated her filing of pleadings prepared by a 
different lawyer in order to toll the statute of limitations 
and preserve her cause of action.  In this regard, Cohen was 
taking "steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect 
a client's interests" upon the termination of his 
representation.  Such conduct did not make him counsel of 
record in legal proceedings pending before the trial court. 
 
We hold that the trial court erred in granting AAPECS' 
motion to quash and motion to strike and dismissing Walker's 
motion for judgment with prejudice.  The judgment of the trial 
court will be reversed and the motion for judgment will be 
reinstated on the docket of the trial court. 
Reversed and remanded.