Case Title: Rodrigues-Novo v. Recchi

Citation: 381 Md. 49

Docket Number: 11m/03

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Joao Rodrigues-Novo, et al. v. Recchi America, Inc., et al., Misc No. 11 September Term,
2003.
[Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act – Statutory Employer Immunity from Negligence
Suit, held; under the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act, the Washington Metropolitan
Transportation Authority qualifies as a statutory employer of Rodrigues-Novo, who was
injured while performing work in connection with the construction of a M etro facility.  The
Washington Metropolitan Transportation Authority is, therefore, immune from Rodriguez-
Novo’s claim of negligence.]   
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. No. 11
September Term, 2003
JOAO RODRIGUES-NOVO, ET AL.
 V.
 
RECCHI AMERICA, INC., ET AL.
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed:   April 14, 2004
1
Section 12-603 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article states:
The Court of Appeals of this State may answer a question of law
certified to it by a court of the United States or by an appellate
court of another state or of a tribe, if the answer may be
determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying
court and there is no controlling appellate decision,
constitutional provision, or statute of this State.
2
Maryland Rule 8-305 states: 
(a) Certifying court. "Certifying court" as used in this Rule
means a court authorized by Code, Courts Article, § 12-603 to
certify a question of law to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
(b) Certification order. In disposing of an action pending before
it, a certifying court, on motion of any party or on its own
initiative, may submit to the Court of Appeals a question of law
of this State, in accordance with the Maryland Uniform
Certification of Questions of Law Act, by filing a certification
order. The certification order shall be signed by a judge of the
certifying court and state the question of law submitted, the
relevant facts from which the question arises, and the party who
shall be treated as the appellant in the certification procedure.
The original order and seven copies shall be forwarded to the
Court of Appeals by the clerk of the certifying court under its
official seal, together with the filing fee for docketing regular
appeals, payable to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals.
(c) Proceeding in the Court of Appeals. The filing of the
certification order in the Court of Appeals shall be the
We have been asked in this case to determine whether, under the provisions of the
Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act, the Washington Metropolitan Transportation
Authority (hereinafter “WMATA”) was a “statutory employer” of Joao Rodrigues-Novo and,
thus, immune from tort liability.  This case comes to us by a Certified Question from the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Certification of
Questions of Law Act, Maryland Code, §§ 12-601 through 12-613 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol.),1 and Maryland Rule 8-305.2  In the Certification
equivalent of the transmission of a record on appeal. The Court
of Appeals may request, in addition, all or any part of the record
before the certifying court. Upon request, the certifying court
shall file the original or a copy of the parts of the record
requested together with a certificate, under the official seal of
the certifying court and signed by a judge or clerk of that court,
stating that the materials submitted are all the parts of the record
requested by the Court of Appeals.
(d) Decision by the Court of Appeals. The written opinion of the
Court of Appeals stating the law governing the question
certified shall be sent by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals to the
certifying court. The Clerk of the Court of Appeals shall certify,
under seal of the Court, that the opinion is in response to the
question of law of this State submitted by the certifying court.
-2-
Order, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals summarized the circumstances giving rise
to the question now before us:
Appellant Joao Rodrigues-Novo was injured in a construction
accident while working at the Branch Avenue Metro Station in
Prince George’s County, Maryland.  At the time of the accident,
Rodrigues-Novo was employed by Pessoa Construction, Inc.
(“Pessoa”). Pessoa was a subcontractor of appellee Recchi
America, Inc. (“Recchi”).  Recchi, in turn, was a contractor
working for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transportation
Authority (“WMATA”), which owned the site. 
 
Appellant Rodrigues-Novo and his wife filed suit in the District
of Columbia Superior Court against Recchi [and] WMATA . .
. alleging negligence in the supervision, maintenance, and
inspection of the loader and construction site, which negligence
they claimed caused their damages.  The trial court granted
summary judgment to both defendants, on the ground that under
the Maryland law of workers’ compensation they were
“statutory employers” and hence immune from suit.  An appeal
has been taken to [the District of Columbia Court of Appeals]
challenging that conclusion.
3
Rodrigues-Novo asserts that certain statements in the Certifying Order reflect the
Certifying Court’s “findings” as to WMATA’s status as a statutory employer.  The Certifying
Court’s uncertainty about WMATA’s status as a statutory employer, however, is the reason
it decided to certify the question in this case.  It should be obvious that any statements made
in the Certifying Order should not be construed to suggest a particular answer to the very
question being asked.  
-3-
The answer to this question of law will be determinative of th[e]
appeal and it appears to [the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals] that as to WMATA, there is no controlling appellate
decision, constitutional provision or statute in Maryland.
Furthermore, the issue is one of general importance, given the
extensive ongoing activities of WMATA in Maryland.
Accordingly, pursuant to D.C. Code §11-723(h) (2001), the
Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Md.
Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 12-601 et seq. (2002 Repl.), and
Rule 8-305 of the Maryland Court of Appeals, we hereby
respectfully certify to the Maryland Court of Appeals the
following question of law: Whether, in the circumstances of this
case, WMATA was a “statutory employer” under the Maryland
Workers’ Compensation Act and hence immune from suit
alleging negligence.3 (Footnotes omitted.)
For the following reasons, we hold that, under the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act,
WMATA was a “statutory employer” of Rodrigues-Novo at the time of his injury.
Therefore, WMATA is immune from Rodrigues-Novo’s claim of negligence.  
I.  Background
A. Facts
On July 15, 1999, Rodrigues-Novo was working on the construction project at the
Branch Avenue Metro Station in Prince George’s County, Maryland.  While  using a Toyota
SDK-8 Loader to break up a driveway that had been built incorrectly, Rodrigues-Novo
4
WMATA has not always had insurance coverage for the workers’ compensation
claims of its subcontractors’ employees.  Prior to 1971, during the first phase of construction
of Washington’s rapid transit system (Metro), WMATA “relied upon its subcontractors to
purchase workers’ compensation insurance for subcontractor employees.”  WMATA v.
Johnson,  467 U.S. 925, 928, 104 S. Ct. 2827, 2830, 81 L. Ed. 2d 768, 774 (1984).  When
the second phase of construction commenced, WMATA decided to centralize its workers’
compensation insurance in order to save money and ensure the coverage of all employees on
its projects.  Id.  To do this, WMATA purchased “a comprehensive ‘wrap-up’ policy from
the Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Co.,” which required a single premium from WMATA
in return for “compensation payments for any injuries suffered by workers employed at
Metro construction sites and compensable under the relevant workers’ compensation
regimes.”  Id. at 929, 104 S. Ct. at 2830, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 774.
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sustained a serious injury leading to the loss of his lower right leg.  At the time of the
accident, WMATA had a contract relationship with Recchi, in which Recchi had agreed to
construct an extension of WMATA’s subterranean “Green Line,” including the Branch
Avenue Station.  To complete the work, Recchi had entered into a subcontract with Pessoa,
which promised to complete certain road construction and other concrete work at the Station.
Rodrigues-Novo worked for Pessoa.
Shortly after his injury, Rodrigues-Novo applied for workers’ compensation benefits
under the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act.  When WMATA’s workers’ compensation
insurer, Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Co., learned of Rodrigues-Novo’s application, it
notified the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission that WMATA’s “wrap-up”
workers’ compensation insurance policy4 covered the claim.  The wrap-up insurance carried
by WMATA provides compensation benefits for all workers on Metro construction projects,
including those who are employed by companies that contract with WMATA to carry out
5
According to his deposition testimony, Rodrigues-Novo received from workers’
compensation insurance $2800 to convert the transmission in his truck from manual to
automatic.
-5-
work on those projects.  See WMATA v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 925, 929-30, 104 S. Ct. 2827,
2830, 81 L. Ed. 2d 768, 774 (1984) (discussing the origin and purpose of WMATA’s wrap-
up workers’ compensation insurance).  Rodrigues-Novo has received some benefits from
WMATA’s wrap-up insurance coverage.5
B. The Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act
The Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act (hereinafter the “Act”), which is currently
codified under Maryland Code, Sections 9-101 to 9-1201 of the Labor and Employment
Article (1991, 1999 Repl. Vol.), was first enacted in 1914, as its title suggests, to compensate
employees who were injured on the job.  Harris v. Board of Education of Howard County,
375 Md. 21, 28-29, 825 A.2d 365, 370 (2003); Honaker v. W.C. & A.N. Miller Dev. Co., 278
Md. 453, 454, 365 A.2d 287, 288 (1976) (hereinafter “Honaker I”); see also Brady v. Ralph
Parsons Co., 308 Md. 486, 496, 520 A.2d 717, 723 (1987); Honaker v. W.C. & A.N. Miller
Dev. Co., 285 Md. 216, 222-23, 401 A.2d 1013, 1016-17 (1979) (hereinafter “Honaker II”).
The Act was designed as a delicate balance:  on one hand, the Act took away employees’
rights to sue employers for negligence, yet, on the other hand, it ensured employees the “right
to quick and certain compensation for injuries sustained during the course of their
employment, regardless of fault.”  Brady, 308 Md. at 496, 520 A.2d at 723 (quoting Johnson
v. Mountaire Farms, 305 Md. 246, 250, 503 A.2d 708, 710 (1986)). 
-6-
Accordingly, with exceptions not relevant here, the Act provides the “exclusive”
remedy for an injured employee against his or her employer, as set forth in Section 9-509 of
the Act:
(a) Employers. – Except as otherwise provided in this title, the
liability of an employer under this title is exclusive.
.
(b) Covered employees and dependents. – Except as otherwise
provided in this title, the compensation provided under this title
to a covered employee or the dependents of a covered employee
is in place of any right of action against any person. 
Whether an employee-employer relationship exists in the context of workers’ compensation
depends typically on the common law rules of the “master” and “servant” relationship.  See
Brady, 308 Md. at 499, 520 A.2d at 724 (citing Edith A. Anderson Nursing Homes, Inc. v.
Walker, 232 Md. 442, 444, 194 A.2d 85, 85-86 (1963)).  
When certain conditions are met, however, the Act broadens the definition of
employer to cover principal contractors that ordinarily would not be considered the worker’s
employer under the common law rules of “master” and “servant.”  See Brady, 308 Md. at
499-500, 520 A.2d at 724. To that end, Section 9-508(a) of the Act states:
(a) In general. – A principal contractor is liable to pay to a
covered employee or the dependents of the covered employee
any compensation that the principal contractor would have been
liable to pay had the covered employee been employed directly
by the principal contractor if:
(1) the principal contractor undertakes to perform any
work that is part of the business, occupation, or trade of
the principal contractor;
(2) the principal contractor contracts with a subcontractor
for the execution by or under the subcontractor of all or
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part of the work undertaken by the principal contractor;
and
(3) the covered employee is employed in the execution of
that work.
We used the term “statutory employer” in State, to the Use of Hubert v. Bennett Building Co.,
154 Md. 159, 162, 140 A. 52, 53 (1928) to describe the impact of these provisions:
The effect of this provision, when brought into operation
through the designated state of circumstances, is to impose the
absolute liability of an employer upon the principal contractor,
when he was not in law the employer of the injured workman.
The result then is that where the prescribed conditions exist, the
principal contractor becomes by the act the statutory employer
of any workman employed in the execution of the work.
Therefore, an injured worker’s exclusive remedy against a principal contractor is the
compensation available under the Act.  See Para v. Richards Group of Washington L.P., 339
Md. 241, 253-54, 661 A.2d 737, 744 (1995) (“In return for providing workers’ compensation
coverage, the principal contractor is immune from civil liability for injuries suffered by
covered employees.”); Brady, 308 Md. at 502, 520 A.2d at 726 (stating that “the injured
worker’s exclusive remedy against [a statutory employer] is under the [Act]”).
Principal contractors who do not meet the requirements of Section 9-508 are not
“employers” and, as a result, do not benefit from the tort immunity created by the Act.
Controversies over whether a principal contractor meets the requirements of Section 9-508,
therefore, commonly arise when an injured worker seeks to bring a claim for negligence
against a principal contractor rather than seek compensation under the Act.  See RICHARD P.
GILBERT & ROBERT L HUMPHREYS, MARYLAND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION HANDBOOK §
-8-
3.3-1 (2d. ed. 1993).  
In order to determine whether one qualifies as a statutory employer under the Act, this
Court has separated the requirements of Section 9-508 into four elements.  As we first
expressed in Honaker I, the entity seeking tort immunity must be:
(1) a principal contractor
(2) who has contracted to perform work
(3) which is a part of his trade, business or occupation; and
(4) who has contracted with any other party as a subcontractor
for the execution by or under the subcontractor of the whole or
any part of such work.
Honaker I, 278 Md. at 459-60, 365 A.2d at 291; see also Para, 339 Md. at 249, 661 A.2d at
741-42; Brady, 308 Md. at 503, 520 A.2d at 726-27.
We have interpreted these requirements to mean that there must be 
two contracts, one between the principal contractor and a third
party whereby it is agreed that the principal contractor will
execute certain work for the third party, and another between the
principal contractor and a person as subcontractor whereby the
subcontractor agrees to do the whole or part of such work for the
principal contractor.  
Honaker I, 278 Md. at 460, 365 A.2d at 291.  In more recent opinions, we have used the
terms “antecedent undertaking,” “antecedent contract,” or “principal contract” to refer to the
contract between the principal contractor and a third party.  Para, 339 Md. at 250, 661 A.2d
at 742; Lathroum v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., Inc., 309 Md. 445, 449, 524 A.2d 1228, 1230
(1987); Brady, 308 Md. at 504, 520 A.2d at 727.  The “subcontract” is the contract that the
-9-
principal contractor enters into with another entity for that entity to “do the whole or part”
of the work that the principal contractor has an obligation to complete.  See Brady, 308 Md.
at 504, 520 A.2d at 727; see Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc. v. Imbraguglio, 346 Md.
573, 599, 697 A.2d 885, 898 (1997).
C. Relationship of the Parties
Several documents govern the relationships of the parties, define WMATA’s role in
the construction of the Branch Avenue Station, and otherwise shed light on whether
WMATA was a “statutory employer” of Rodrigues-Novo.  These documents, which we
discuss individually, include: (1) the WMATA Compact; (2) the Fifth Annual Capital
Contributions Agreement (hereinafter “ICCA 5”); (3) the WMATA-Recchi Contract
(hereinafter the “Recchi Contract”); and (4) the Recchi-Pessoa Contract (hereinafter the
“Pessoa Contract”).
1. WMATA Compact
In 1966, the District of Columbia, the State of Maryland, and the Commonwealth of
Virginia created WMATA by entering into an interstate compact called the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Compact (hereinafter the “Compact”).  See D.C. Code
§ 9-1107.01 (2003) (containing the current provisions of the Compact); 80 Stat. 1324 (1966).
One purpose of the Compact was “to create a regional instrumentality . . . empowered . . . to
plan, develop, finance and cause to be operated improved transit facilities . . . .”  Id., art. II,
cl. 2.  The Compact also provides that WMATA may:
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(d) Construct, acquire, own, operate, maintain, control, sell and
convey real and personal property and any interest therein by
contract, purchase, condemnation, lease, license, mortgage or
otherwise but all of said property shall be . . . necessary or useful
in rendering transit service or in activities incidental thereto . .
. [and]
* * *
(f) Enter into and perform contracts, leases and agreements with
any person, firm or corporation or with any political subdivision
or agency of any signatory party or with the federal government,
or any agency thereof, including, but not limited to, contracts or
agreements to furnish transit facilities and service . . . .
Id. art. V, cl. 12(d) & 12(f).  
The Compact further authorizes WMATA to develop a plan for the regional mass
transit system, which must include plans for “transit facilities,” such as the “locations of
terminals, stations, platforms, [and] parking facilities . . . .”  The plan also must designate
“the design and location” of the transit facilities, whether the facilities are to be “constructed
or acquired by lease, purchase or condemnation,” as well as “a timetable for the provision
of such facilities . . . .”  Id. art. VI, cl. 13(a).  
In furtherance of the regional plan, WMATA is directed to “prepare and adopt a plan
for financing the construction, acquisition, and operation” of any planned facilities.  Id. art.
VII, cl. 17(a).  Financing of work on the Maryland portions of WMATA’s mass transit
system (hereinafter “Metro”) must comply with the Compact, as set forth in Section 18(b):
Commitments on behalf of the portion of the Zone located in
Maryland shall be by contract or agreement by the Authority
with the Washington Suburban Transit District, pursuant to
which the Authority undertakes to provide transit facilities and
service in consideration for the agreement by said District to
6
The parties to the ICCA 5 included WMATA, Maryland’s Washington Suburban
Transit District, the District of Columbia, Arlington County (Virginia), Fairfax County
(Virginia), the City of Alexandria, the City of Falls Church, the City of Fairfax, Montgomery
County (Maryland), and Prince George’s County (Maryland).
-11-
contribute to the capital required for the construction and/or
acquisition of facilities specified in a mass transit plan . . . and
for meeting expenses and obligations incurred in the operation
of such facilities.
Id. art. VII, cl. 18(b).
2.  Fifth Interim Capital Contributions Agreement
In 1992, WMATA entered into the Fifth Interim Capital Contributions Agreement
(hereinafter the “ICCA 5") with the Washington Suburban Transit District and numerous
political subdivisions around the District of Columbia.6  The Agreement provides that
WMATA’s funding “for [the] accomplishment of the construction program and related
activities of the Metrorail System” comes from contributions from the political subdivisions
as well as grants made by the Federal Transit Administration.  In addition to the funding
provisions, the ICCA 5 states that WMATA “will proceed with all practical dispatch to
accomplish the construction program and related activities . . . .”  Under the terms of the
ICCA 5, the construction of the Metrorail System includes the construction of four new line
segments, one of which is “Branch Avenue.”  
The ICCA 5 allows the political subdivisions certain control over the management of
the construction projects.  For example, WMATA annually must submit a proposed rail
construction budget to the political subdivisions, and a political subdivision “may
-12-
recommend a change in station facilities (i.e. the size of a parking lot or structure or the size
of a rail station bus facility or kiss-and-ride lot) within that [political subdivision] so long as
the recommended change does not change the adopted regional alignment.”  Furthermore,
the ICCA 5 provides remedies for the political subdivisions should the construction of the
Metro not occur according to the agreed schedule: 
In the event that the Federal Transit Administration does not
approve a real estate, design, or construction project . . . or a
project is significantly delayed for reasons beyond the control of
any [political subdivision] and cannot be initiated in the year in
which its commencement is scheduled in Exhibit 1, then the
funds allocated for such project may be reassigned to any other
project within the affected revenue producing line; alternatively,
upon approval of the [WMATA] Board of Directors, funds may
be advanced on an interim basis for [other projects] to other
[political subdivisions] on such terms as the affected [political
subdivision] may agree . . . .”
Similarly, WMATA has certain rights under the ICCA 5 if any political subdivision
does not provide the promised funding for a project.  In particular, WMATA may “suspend
or terminate any project or activity” if a political subdivision does not commit funds for that
project or if the political subdivision “does not perform its obligation under its [Local
Funding Agreement].”  WMATA enters into such Local Funding Agreements with political
subdivisions to “establish arrangements for their commitment to pay local contributions” to
WMATA construction projects.
Exhibit 1 of the ICCA 5 is entitled “Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Rail Construction Program.”  That Exhibit provides for the construction of the F Route of
the Metrorail System (Branch Avenue) in Prince George’s County, the part of the Metrorail
7
An addendum to Exhibit 1 discusses Metrorail construction in the District of
Columbia and specifies various aspects of the construction project. 
-13-
System that Rodrigues-Novo was working on when he was injured.7
3. Recchi Contract 
On February 16, 1996, WMATA and Recchi executed an agreement, under which
Recchi would provide: “[c]onstruction of the Branch Avenue Station and 7,710 Lineal feet
of line Section including 2,620 feet of precast segmental single box girder aerial section and
5,090 feet of retained-cut, retained fill and at-grade section; and at-grade parking for 3,370
vehicles.”  The section of the Recchi Contract entitled “Concrete Pavement” “specifies
providing portland cement concrete pavements, plain or reinforced, on a prepared subgrade
or base for vehicular traffic and parking in conformance with the sections to lines and grades
as shown.”  The Recchi Contract also contains a section providing details of the construction
of “Curbs, Gutters, and Walks,” including the materials  and mixes to be used as well as for
the execution of all concrete work.
4. The Pessoa Contract
To complete the concrete paving according to its agreement with WMATA, Recchi
engaged Pessoa, Rodrigues-Novo’s immediate employer, to furnish the necessary labor,
equipment, and supplies.  The contract between Recchi and Pessoa, which refers specifically
to the Recchi contract with WMATA, explains Pessoa’s responsibilities with respect to the
removal of any of its work that does not meet certain specifications:
[Recchi] and Engineer shall have the right to inspect [Pessoa’s]
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Work and fabrication of materials at the Project, at
Subcontractor’s plant, or elsewhere.  Within twenty-four (24)
hours after written notice from [Recchi], [Pessoa] shall proceed
promptly to take down all portions of work and remove from the
Project all materials, whether worked or unworked, which
Engineer condemns or fails to approve and shall promptly make
good all such work and all other work damaged or destroyed in
removing or making good the condemned or unapproved work,
all at no additional cost to [Recchi].
Rodrigues-Novo was injured while attempting to remove a section of concrete that Pessoa
previously had incorrectly installed.
 
II.  Discussion
Our resolution of the present controversy is informed by the four elements set forth
in Honaker I for determining statutory-employer status.  As we discussed above, to meet the
definition of a statutory employer under Section 9-508, WMATA must be:
(1) a principal contractor
(2) who has contracted to perform work
(3) which is part of his trade, business or occupation; and
(4) who has contracted with any other party as a subcontractor
for the execution by or under the subcontractor of the whole or
any part of such work.
Honaker I, 278 Md. at 459-60, 365 A.2d at 291.
WMATA asserts that it is a statutory employer under the Act because all of the
elements of Section 9-508 of the Act are met.  WMATA argues that it is a principal
contractor that entered into a contract, the ICCA 5, to perform the construction of the Branch
Avenue Station.  The ICCA 5, in WMATA’s view, was more than a funding agreement
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because WMATA had obligations to perform construction that were contingent on payment
by the political subdivisions.  In addition, WMATA contends that construction of Metrorail
facilities is part of its “trade, business or occupation.”  To support this claim, WMATA
points to the WMATA Compact, which created WMATA “to plan, develop, finance, and
cause to be operated improved transit facilities.”  WMATA further argues that its contract
with Recchi constitutes a “subcontract” in which Recchi would execute by itself or
subcontract “the whole or part” of the construction of the Branch Avenue Station.  According
to WMATA, Recchi then subcontracted with Pessoa, Rodrigues-Novo’s employer, for work
in executing parts of the Recchi contract for the Branch Avenue Station, including the work
during which Rodrigues-Novo was injured.
Rodrigues-Novo claims that WMATA was not his statutory employer because
WMATA has not satisfied the elements of Section 9-508 of the Act.  Rodrigues-Novo
disputes that the ICCA 5 constitutes a principal contract under which WMATA was obligated
to perform construction of the Branch Avenue Station.  Rather, according to Rodrigues-
Novo, the ICCA 5 merely provides funding to WMATA and does not require WMATA to
perform actual construction work.  Rodrigues-Novo also claims that WMATA is a public
utility and that its responsibilities regarding Metro development arise by legislative mandate,
not by contract as required by Section 9-508.  Moreover, Rodrigues-Novo takes the position
that WMATA’s “trade, business or occupation” is providing transportation services to the
public, which does not entail constructing Metrorail facilities.
A. Principal Contractor Who Has Contracted to Perform Work
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We begin our analysis by examining whether WMATA entered into a “principal
contract” as contemplated by the first two elements of the test set forth in Honaker I.  To
meet these elements, WMATA must be a “principal contractor” “who has contracted to
perform work” for a third party.  Honaker 1, 278 Md. at 459-60, 365 A.2d at 291.  This Court
explained how the existence of the principal contract affects one’s status as a statutory
employer:
Although acting independently of the other, the principal
contractor and the subcontractor, with his workmen employed
in the execution of the work, were each, in his own separate
capacity, co-operating toward the execution of the whole of a
particular work which the principal contractor had promised to
perform; and the liability of the principal contractor to pay
compensation to the employees of the subcontractor is confined
to only these employees who were actually engaged in the
execution of the whole or a portion of that one piece of work at
the time of the injury.
It is this necessary employment of the employee of the
subcontractor upon the piece of work which the principal
contractor has agreed to perform that forms the basis of the
statutory relation between the workman and the principal
contractor . . . . 
Hubert, 154 Md. at 166, 140 A. at 54-55.  Again, in M.A. Long Co. v. State Accident Fund,
156 Md. 639, 645, 144 A. 775, 778 (1929), we described what is meant by a “principal
contractor”:
The meaning of [the predecessor of Section 9-508] is that, in
order to create a principal contractor the statutory employer of
a workman of a subcontractor, the subcontractor must be
engaged in the work or a portion of the work which the principal
contractor agreed to perform.  Or, in other words, to create the
principal contractor a statutory employer he must have
-17-
contracted in the first instance to do the work himself, and
subsequently sublet the whole or a portion of it to someone else.
In a number of cases, we have examined whether a party seeking statutory-employer
immunity has entered into the necessary “principal contract.”  Warren v. Dorsey Enterprises,
Inc., 234 Md. 574, 579, 200 A.2d 76, 78 (1964) involved a worker who was injured while
starting a stock car race at a raceway owned by Dorsey Enterprises. The worker’s employer
had contracted with Dorsey to conduct races at the track.  Id. We held that Dorsey was not
a principal contractor because “Dorsey did not contract to produce or stage stock car races.”
Id.  In other words, because Dorsey did not have a contractual obligation to conduct the
races, there was no principal contract and Dorsey was not a statutory employer.
We held, in Honaker I, that a development company was not a statutory employer
because the company had not provided evidence of a principal contract.  278 Md. at 463, 365
A.2d at 293.  The A.N. Miller Development Company owned property on which it was
erecting a house.  Id. at 456, 365 A.2d at 289.  Miller enlisted the services of Orndorff and
Spaid, Inc. to complete various parts of the house construction, including roof installation.
Honaker, one of Orndorff’s employees, was injured while working to install the roof.  Id at
456-57, 365 A.2d at 289.  Honaker and his wife filed a tort action against Miller, but the trial
court granted summary judgment to Miller, concluding that Miller was a statutory employer
and immune from suits alleging negligence. Id. at 457, 365 A.2d at 289-90.  We reversed,
holding that, because Miller did not present evidence of a contract to build the house, he was
not a statutory employer.  We explained:
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What is missing in the case sub judice is a contract on the part
of Miller to build the house.  It is true that Miller contracted
with Orndorff for Orndorff to install the roof, but that work was
not part of any work which Miller had, in the words of the
statute, “contracted to perform.”  Thus, the contract between
Miller and Orndorff was not a subcontract.  The contract did not
assign to Orndorff some of the obligations of another contract;
it was not an agreement to perform a specified part or provide
specified materials required for the completion of another
contract; it was not a contract under or subordinate to a previous
or prime contract.  As Miller did not owe labor or services under
another contract for the work Orndorff agreed to execute, Miller
was not “a principal contractor” and Orndorff was not “a
subcontractor” with respect to the contract between them. 
Id. at 463, 365 A.2d at 293.
Honaker’s case reached this Court again after being remanded for further proceedings
in the trial court.  See Honaker II, 285 Md. at 218, 401 A.2d at 1014.  While on remand,
Miller presented evidence that it had entered into a “custom building contract” with the two
individuals “for whom the house was being built.”  Id. at 225, 401 A.2d at 1018.  In light of
this evidence, we held that Miller, indeed, was a statutory employer under the Act and
immune from Honaker’s tort suit. Id. at 230, 401 A.2d at 1020.
In Para, we concluded that a land owner and developer had formed the requisite
antecedent contract under Section 9-508.  339 Md. 241, 661 A.2d 737 (1995).  Para was
injured while working for Razzano & Fohner, a company that had contracted to perform
excavation and trenching for a construction project of The Richards Group of Washington,
Limited Partnership.  Id. at 244, 661 A.2d at 739.  The Richards Group was developing a
subdivision of homes, and, before Para sustained his injury, had entered into a contract for
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the sale of one of the lots.  Para’s relatives sued The Richards Group for damages, claiming
that the company was not a statutory employer because there was no antecedent contract.  Id.
at 247, 661 A.2d at 740.  We held that the contract for the sale of the lot, even though it had
been executed after the subcontract, constituted a principal contract under the Act. Id. at 256,
661 A.2d at 745.
In Brady, we decided that the Mass Transit Administration (hereinafter the “MTA”)
was not entitled to statutory-employer tort immunity because it had not presented evidence
of an antecedent contract.  308 Md. at 505-06, 520 A.2d at 727-28.  The MTA, an
instrumentality of the Maryland Department of Transportation, entered into a contract with
Hensel-Phelps Construction Company, which agreed to provide services for the construction
of a subway station.  Id. at 490, 520 A.2d at 720.  Hensel-Phelps subcontracted with a sheet-
metal company, whose employee died while working on the project.  The employee’s family
sued MTA, but the trial court found that MTA was a statutory employer and entered
summary judgment in its favor.  Id. at 495, 520 A.2d at 722.  We disagreed that MTA was
a statutory employer because “it never entered into a principal or antecedent contract with
a third party.”  Id. at 505, 520 A.2d at 727.  We concluded: “Borrowing words of our
predecessors, MTA never ‘contracted in the first instance to do the work’ itself.”  Id.
In a footnote, we mentioned that MTA had attempted, at oral argument, to present
evidence of an alleged antecedent contract.  Id. at 505 n.22, 520 A.2d at 727 n.22.  We
rejected MTA’s attempt to present the evidence because it was not contained in the “record
transmitted from the court below.”  Id.  Consequently, having “no knowledge of what the
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contract contained,” we refused to consider whether the evidence, a capital grant contract
between the Maryland Department of Transportation and the United States, fulfilled the
requirement of an antecedent contract.  Id.  We noted “parenthetically,” however, that “a
mere financing agreement, which grants funds for a construction project, between an owner
or contractor and a third party will not give rise to an antecedent contract unless the
agreement also requires that the owner or contractor perform work or services for the third
party.”  Id.
In Lathroum, we refused to extend the tort immunity provided by the Act to cover the
Potomac Electric Power Company (hereinafter “PEPCO”), a regulated public utility and
supplier of electricity that had contracted with the injured worker’s employer “to provide
labor and miscellaneous services for several of PEPCO’s power facilities.”  309 Md. at 446,
524 A.2d at 1228.  PEPCO argued that the required antecedent contract arose from its
contractual relationship with the public to perform work or service.  Id. at 451, 524 A.2d at
1230-31.  We dismissed this argument:
[W]e have never remotely recognized the type of relationship
PEPCO contends is sufficient to give rise to an “antecedent
undertaking” or “principal contract.”  In our view, the legislature
never intended a “principal contract” to arise where there is a
statutory duty on the part of a public utility to provide a
regulated commodity to the public.  Our cases make clear that
the “principal contract” contemplated by the legislature is one in
which a contractor agrees for stated consideration to perform
some work or service according to plans, specifications or
directions of a third party.  
Id. at 450-51, 524 A.2d at 1230.  Explaining why PEPCO’s obligation to serve the public did
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not give rise to an antecedent contract, we stated:
Clearly, PEPCO’s alleged contractual relationship with the
public fails to meet this definition.  PEPCO is not performing
any work or service according to customer specifications or
direction; it is merely providing a regulated commodity pursuant
to statutorily mandated requirements.  If indeed there is a
contract in this case, it is more akin to a contract for the sale of
a product, which this Court has concluded is not within he
contemplation of the “statutory employer” provision of the Act.
Id. at 451, 524 A.2d at 1231 (footnote omitted).
In the instant case, WMATA submits the ICCA 5 as evidence of an antecedent
contract for the construction of the Branch Avenue Station.  Rodrigues-Novo argues that both
Brady and Lathroum support his position that no antecedent contract existed.  Seizing on the
footnoted language in Brady, Rodrigues-Novo contends that the ICCA 5 is a mere funding
agreement and not a principal contract under which WMATA is obligated to perform work.
Additionally, Rodrigues-Novo emphasizes our opinion in Lathroum to argue that there was
no antecedent contract because, like PEPCO in Lathroum, WMATA is a regulated utility,
providing services to the public under a statutory mandate.  We disagree with Rodrigues-
Novo’s analysis.
Rodrigues-Novo’s reliance on the footnoted discussion in Brady misses the mark
because the ICCA 5 is more than a funding agreement.  WMATA concedes that one of the
purposes of the ICCA 5 is to arrange for funding the continued development of the Metrorail
system.   The ICCA 5, however, also makes clear that WMATA has an obligation to perform
actual work and services and that one of its obligations included the construction of the
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Branch Avenue station.  The parties incorporated into the ICCA 5 an exhibit entitled
“Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Rail Construction Program,” which sets
forth a schedule for the extension of the “F Route (Branch Avenue).”  The ICCA 5 requires
WMATA to “proceed with all practical dispatch to accomplish the construction program and
related activities in the sequence identified” in that exhibit.  The ICCA 5, therefore, provides
for more than just the funds for the extension of the “F Route,” which includes the Branch
Avenue Station.  It also obligates WMATA to perform the necessary work or services to
construct the extension.
We also reject Rodrigues-Novo’s other argument that our opinion in Lathroum
compels a result in his favor because WMATA, like PEPCO, is a public utility.  Although
WMATA is a quasi-governmental entity, its quasi-governmental character, alone, does not
render Section 9-508 inapplicable.  Rather, the specific terms of a contract and the rights and
responsibilities of the parties to the contract determine whether it should be deemed a
“principal contract” under the Act.  When a contractor and a third party enter into a contract
in which the contractor “agrees for stated consideration to perform some work or service
according to plans, specifications or directions of a third party,” that contract constitutes an
antecedent contract, regardless of whether the contractor is a government instrumentality.
Similarly, the fact that the third party is also a governmental entity does not, itself, deny the
contractor the immunity available under Section 9-508.   
Furthermore, contrary to Rodrigues-Novo’s suggestion, the ICCA 5 is not a legislative
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mandate.  We held that PEPCO’s obligation to provide electricity was “statutorily mandated”
because PEPCO was not “performing any work or service according to customer
specifications or direction.”  Lathroum, 309 Md. at 451, 524 A.2d at 1231.  This is not the
situation in the present case.  The ICCA 5, which governs the funding and construction of
Metro facilities, unlike the statutory mandate to provide electricity, reflects a “give and take”
that distinguishes a contractual agreement.  The parties to the ICCA 5 have independent
rights and responsibilities to ensure the completion of the construction program according
to the balance of interests contemplated by the agreement.  On one hand, the political
subdivisions have some control over the construction outlined in the ICCA 5; WMATA must
submit a budget annually to the political subdivisions and the WMATA Board of Directors,
which consists of six directors, two of whom have been appointed by Maryland’s
Washington Suburban Transit Commission.  In addition, the political subdivisions may
recommend changes to the station facilities as long as those changes comply with the overall
regional plan, and, if a project is significantly delayed for reasons beyond the control of the
political subdivision, funds for that project “may be reassigned to any other project.”
Balancing the rights of the political subdivisions, on the other hand, is WMATA’s power
under the ICCA 5 to suspend or terminate a particular project if a political subdivision has
not submitted the required funding.  WMATA’s obligations to perform construction of
Metrorail facilities, therefore, are different from PEPCO’s statutorily mandated obligations.
We conclude that the first two elements of the Honaker I test have been satisfied in
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the present case because WMATA had entered into a principal contract to perform work or
services needed for the construction of the Metrorail extension, the project on which
Rodrigues-Novo was working at the time of his injury. 
B. WMATA’s Trade, Business, or Occupation
Under Section 9-508, not only must a contractor show that it entered into a principal
contract to perform work or service, but the work or service called for also must be part of
the contractor’s “trade, business or occupation.”  See Honaker II, 285 Md. at 225, 401 A.2d
at 1017-18.  Rodrigues-Novo maintains that WMATA does not meet this criterion because,
in Rodrigues-Novo’s view, WMATA is in the business of operating mass transit, not
constructing facilities.  Rodrigues-Novo views the construction of Metrorail facilities as an
“ancillary precursor” to carrying out the business of providing public transportation.  The
WMATA Compact, when considered in light of our cases addressing this subject, leads us
to conclude otherwise.
Our first discussion of a principal contractor’s “trade, business or occupation” came
in Hubert, 154 Md. at 159, 140 A. at 52.  We held that the placement of tile performed by a
subcontractor was part of the trade, business, or occupation of a principal contractor that had
entered into a contract for the construction of an office building.  Id. at 167-68, 140 A. 52,
54-55.  The tiling, we held, was part of a cooperative effort to execute “the whole of a
particular work which the principal contractor had promised to perform.”  Id. at 166, 140 A.
at 54.
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In State, Use of Reynolds v. Baltimore, 199 Md. 289, 86 A.2d 618 (1952), we
determined that work that is essential or integral to fulfilling the principal contractor’s
obligation is part of the principal contractor’s business, trade, or occupation. In Reynolds,
Rosoff was obligated under a contract with the City to excavate and line a water tunnel.  Id.
at 292, 86 A.2d at 619.  Under that contract, Rosoff was required to use a type of “cage” “for
hoisting men and materials during construction.”  Id.  These cages operated in what are
known as “headframes,” which Archer Iron Works, Inc. agreed by subcontract to erect and
install.  Id.  Archer entered into a contract with Arthur Phillips & Co., which promised “to
supply ironworkers and equipment for the assembly and erection of the hoists and lifts under
Archer’s supervision.”  Id.  One of Arthur’s employees sustained a fatal injury while
attempting to install a headframe.  The employees’ dependents brought suit against Rosoff,
but Rosoff claimed immunity from the suit under the statutory-employer provisions of the
Act.  
The crux of the question before us was whether providing headframes was part of
Rosoff’s business, trade, or occupation.  Id. at 294, 86 A. at 620.  In answering this question,
we stated:
The whole work of constructing the tunnel was let to Rosoff.
The fact that the work of erecting the hoists was necessarily
preliminary and appurtenant to the actual excavation does not
make it any less an integral ‘part of the work undertaken by the
principal contractor’.  It was within the contemplation of the
parties that Rosoff should provide headframes to support the
hoists and cages; in no other way could the excavated material
be removed.  Removal of spoil is an essential part of a tunnel-
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digger’s ‘trade, business or occupation.’ 
Id. at 294-95, 86 A.2d at 620.  We concluded that the “installation of the headframes was an
integral part of Rosoff’s undertaking and in subletting that portion of the work we think he
was a statutory employer within the meaning of [the Act].”  Id. at 296, 86 A.2d at 621.  Our
reasoning here makes clear that a subcontractor’s work is part of the contractor’s business,
trade, or occupation when that work is essential or integral to the completion of the principal
contractor’s business.
Relying on all of these cases, we have held that the installation of roofing was part of
a home builder’s trade, business, or occupation, even though the principal contractor, itself,
was not equipped with the employees or materials to build a roof.  Honaker II, 285 Md. at
229, 401 A.2d at 1019-20.  We explained how roofing is an essential and integral part of
“building and selling homes”:
There is no question but that Miller is in the business of building
and selling homes.  From time immemorial shelter from the
elements has been regarded as one of the necessities of life.
Any structure with four walls must have a roof on it before it
may be considered a house.  Thus, a contention that the
installation of a roof is not part of the “trade, business or
occupation” of building homes is without merit.  Equally
without merit is the claim that because Miller owns the land
upon which it is erecting the houses which it sells, its “trade,
business or occupation” does not include the construction of
homes.
Id.
As evidenced by the WMATA Compact, construction of Metrorail facilities is part of
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WMATA’s trade, business, or occupation.  The Compact indicates that WMATA was created
for a number of purposes, including “to plan, develop, finance and cause to be operated
improved transit facilities.”  Thus, WMATA is in the business of developing the mass transit
system in and around the District of Columbia.  The development of this system cannot occur
without the extension, improvement, and creation of Metrorail facilities.  Indeed, to
effectuate the development of Washington’s mass transit, the Compact empowers WMATA
to “[c]onstruct, acquire, own, operate, maintain, control, sell, and convey real and personal
property.”  Like tiling is essential to the construction of an office building and roofing is an
integral part of home building, so is construction of Metrorail facilities essential for
developing “improved transit facilities.”
The Supreme Court’s opinion in WMATA v. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 940, 104 S. Ct. at
2835-36, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 781 supports this conclusion.  There, the Court held that, under the
Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, which formerly governed
workers’ compensation claims in the District of Columbia, “WMATA was entitled to
immunity from tort actions” brought by the injured employee of a subcontractor.  Although
the Supreme Court was interpreting statutory language different from the Act in Maryland,
its observations bolster our view that part of WMATA’s  trade, business, or occupation was
the construction of mass transit facilities.  The Court discussed WMATA’s purpose, finding
that WMATA “is charged with the construction and operation of a rapid transit system
(Metro) for the District of Columbia and the surrounding metropolitan region.”  Id. at 927,
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104 S. Ct. at 2829, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 773. The Court added that, according to the Compact,
“WMATA is authorized to hire subcontractors to work on various aspects of the Metro
construction project” and that, “[s]ince 1966 WMATA has engaged several hundred
subcontractors, who in turn have employed more than a thousand sub-subcontractors.”  Id.
Disagreeing that WMATA is in the business, trade, or occupation of constructing
Metro facilities, Rodrigues-Novo likens WMATA to a supermarket chain that builds its own
supermarkets.  He claims that the construction of a Metro station, like the grocery chain’s
construction of a supermarket, is an “ancillary precursor” to doing business, not an essential
or integral part of its undertaking.  In support of this view, Rodrigues-Novo points to
Reynolds, where we cited the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wallace,
172 F.2d 802 (4 th Cir. 1949).  The worker in Wallace was employed by a subcontractor that
agreed to perform alterations to a storage warehouse owned by Sears.  172 F.2d at 803.  The
court in Wallace denied Sears statutory-employer immunity under Virginia’s workers’
compensation statute, determining instead that Sears “was in the business of selling
merchandise,” but it “was not in the construction business.”  Id. at 808.  
We distinguished the Wallace facts in Reynolds.  199 Md. at 295, 86 A.2d at 620.  As
we discussed in greater detail above, we concluded in Reynolds that the “installation of the
headframes was an integral part” of the principal contractor’s excavation project and that the
principal contractor was a statutory employer.  Id. at 296, 86 A.2d at 621.  Distinguishing the
facts in Reynolds from those in the Wallace case, we stated that, in contrast to the excavator,
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“Sears was not in the building trade at all” and “[t]he fact that the construction of a store was
necessary or convenient to the conduct of its retail business did not convert it from a
merchant to a builder by trade.”  Id. at 295, 86 A.2d at 620.
Wallace is readily distinguishable from the case before us for the same reason we
distinguished it in Reynolds.  Unlike Sears, which only builds stores as a means to carry out
its principal function of selling merchandise, WMATA does not build Metro facilities merely
out of “necessity” or “convenience.”  The development of the Metro system, which includes
constructing Metro facilities, is not just a means to accomplish another goal.  Developing the
system is, itself, one of WMATA’s principal purposes.  It is a fundamental reason for its
creation.  Just because WMATA also engages in the operation of the Metro system does not
mean that its business, trade, or occupation is limited to such operation.  Rather, we believe
that the construction of Metrorail facilities is part of WMATA’s business, trade, or
occupation.
C. Subcontract for the Whole or Part of Principal’s Work
Having concluded that WMATA is a principal contractor which contracted to perform
work or services for a third party that is part of its trade, business, or occupation, we turn now
to the final element of the Honaker I test:  whether WMATA subcontracted for the whole or
part of the work or services required under the principal contract.  
Whether there was a qualifying “subcontract” can be determined only by considering
the scope of the principal’s obligation.  See M.A. Long Co., 156 Md. at 645-46, 144 A. at
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778.  We have defined a subcontract as “a contract with a person who owes labor or services
under another contract, to perform some or all of the services or labor due.”  Para, 339 Md.
at 249, 661 A.2d at 742.  If all or part of the principal’s obligation is sublet to another, and
the injury occurs in the course of fulfilling that obligation, a subcontract has been created
under the Act.  M.A. Long Co., 156 Md. at 645-46, 144 A. at 778.
In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 346 Md. at 599, 697 A.2d at 898, we held that
the defendant in a negligence case, Super Fresh, was not a statutory employer because it had
not established as a matter of law that the necessary principal/subcontractor relationship
existed.  The plaintiff’s husband was fatally injured while working for Supermarket
Distribution Services, Inc. (hereinafter “SDS”) at an A & P warehouse, which was managed
by Super Fresh, a wholly owned subsidiary of A & P.  Id. at 579, 697 A.2d at 888.  SDS had
a contractual obligation to provide “warehousing and distribution services.”  Id.  Although
we recognized the presence of a contractual relationship between A & P, Super Fresh, and
SDS, we stated that the “record lacks conclusive evidence concerning the substance of the
contractual obligations, if any, between SDS and Super Fresh, and any concomitant
obligations to A & P.”  Id. at 599, 697 A.2d at 898.  We held, therefore, that the record did
not support the existence of a principal/subcontractor relationship between Super Fresh and
SDS.
In this case, we have no trouble identifying the relevant contractual obligations.
WMATA was obligated under the ICCA 5 to extend “F Route (Branch Avenue).”
8
Rodrigues-Novo claims that the breaking of the concrete was “demolition” work that
was not covered by the Pessoa contract.  Rodrigues-Novo, however, was not performing any
“demolition” at the time of his injury.  To the contrary, his efforts to break the incorrectly
built driveway were carried out to effectuate the eventual proper construction of the driveway
at the Branch Avenue Station.  The Pessoa Contract required Pessoa to perform this exact
type of work.   
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WMATA’s contract with Recchi called for Recchi to complete “[c]onstruction of the Branch
Avenue Station . . . and at-grade parking for 3,370 vehicles.”  The contract also provides that
the concrete pavement done by Recchi must be “prepared subgrade or base for vehicular
traffic and parking” according to detailed specifications.  Recchi is also obligated under the
contract to provide curbs, gutters, and walks, which must be removed or replaced if placed
unsatisfactorily.
To complete the concrete paving at the Branch Avenue Station, Recchi engaged
Pessoa to furnish the necessary labor, equipment, supplies, and material.  The agreement
between Recchi and Pessoa requires Pessoa to “proceed promptly to take down all portions
of work and remove from the Project all materials, whether worked or unworked, which [the]
Engineer condemns or fails to approve.”  Rodrigues-Novo sustained his injury while 
working
for Pessoa and while using a machine loader to break a driveway that had been built
incorrectly.  The work he was performing at the time of the injury was exactly that which
Pessoa was obligated to complete according to its contract with Recchi and in furtherance
of Recchi’s commitment to WMATA.8  We hold that the WMATA contract with Recchi
constitutes a subcontract for the whole or part of the work or services required under the
ICCA 5.  Because each element of the Honaker I test has been satisfied, we further hold that
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WMATA was the statutory employer of Rodrigues-Novo at the time of his injury.
 
CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED AS
SET FORTH ABOVE. PURSUANT TO § 12-
610 OF THE COURTS AND JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS ARTICLE, THE COSTS
SHALL BE EQUALLY DIVIDED BETWEEN
THE PARTIES.