Case Title: State v. Peterson

Citation: 356 P.2d 925

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1960-11-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
356 P.2d 925 (1960) STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert R. PETERSON, and Mary D. Peterson, Defendants and Appellants. No. 10055. Supreme Court of Montana. Decided November 14, 1960. Stanley M. Doyle, Polson, for appellants. Stanley M. Doyle, Polson, argued orally for appellants. Geoffrey L. Brazier, Helena, amicus curiæ. Anthony F. Keast, Missoula, for respondent. Anthony F. Keast, Missoula, argued orally for respondent. CASTLES, Justice. This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict against two defendants for the crime of operating a milk establishment, handling, collecting and preparing milk for distribution to consumers without a license, a misdemeanor. Judgment was in the amount of $2.50 fine against each defendant. Basically, the facts to be fairly gleaned from the record are these: The defendants, man and wife, lived in their home in Missoula. They operated a dairy farm at Moiese through a hired man or at least an agent. Milk from the dairy was taken to a cheese factory, in part; and in part collected or delivered to the defendants' home where individual consumers took delivery in their own containers. The Livestock Sanitary Board officers endeavored to inspect the herd, test the milk, and finally to require a license and conformance with the Sanitary Code and Regulations. The officers met resistance, or at least a complete lack of cooperation. In September of 1958, some sort of conditional sales contract arrangements were made by defendants by which alleged contracts they sold the milch cows individually to the individual consumer, *926 continuing to operate in the same way. This arrangement, which by reading of the record can only be classed as an ill-disguised subterfuge, was apparently an effort to get away from licensing and sanitation requirements. The consumers and the defendants were happy with their own arrangements, but the public officials charged with the duty of enforcing the laws and regulations as to milk production and distribution were not. At any rate, the defendants were arrested and charged with misdemeanor. The foregoing statement of fact is made, although neither brief conforms to our rules in setting forth the facts. Trial was had resulting in convictions and the very nominal fines of $2.50 being levied against each defendant. At the conclusion of the trial, new defense counsel took over, and made a motion for new trial on various grounds. The motion for new trial was denied, and this appeal followed. The appellants set forth nine specifications of error some of which appear trivial or are not set out in accordance with our rules. Therefore, we shall ignore some of the arguments of counsel and go to the heart of the case. An amicus curiae appearance by brief and argument was made by counsel for the Montana Milk Control Board on the constitutionality phase of the Montana Milk Control Act, Chapter 204 of the Laws of 1939, as amended by Chapter 192 of the Laws of 1959. However, even though the brief of amicus curiae is well presented, we are unable to see from the record before us where any question of constitutionality has been properly raised or presented. The only question that need be considered herein is as to whether a fair trial was had. The record reveals a somewhat bitter contest between the prosecution and defense. The trial judge was quite lenient in allowing testimony in. It would not be desirable herein to set forth the many numerous exchanges between counsel and comments by the court, but certain ones will point out what we consider prejudicial error in the conduct of a trial by the prosecutor and court. It should be said here that the county attorney, who prosecuted, represented the State on the appeal. In oral argument the county attorney acknowledged improper conduct on his part in the trial, attempted to excuse it as an "unfortunate outburst" and argued that in any event it was not prejudicial to the rights of the defendants to have a fair trial. These matters were presented to the trial court in the motion for new trial, but were not thought by the trial judge to be prejudicial. From the record the following appears: Mrs. Mary D. Peterson, one of the defendants, who had been previously called and sworn as a witness, was recalled as a witness in her own behalf, and testified, on direct examination by Mr. Goldman, as follows: The partial quotation of the exchanges themselves answer the question on this appeal. The theatrical nature of the performance in threatening a defendant with perjury charges in such a manner before a jury by the elected county prosecutor is prejudicial error. The inflammatory nature of the performance is patent when considered in the light of the entire record. We recognize the general rule, with rare exceptions arising from extreme cases, that prejudice created by unwarranted statements of counsel in the presence of the jury is sufficiently cured by an admonition by the court to the jury to wholly disregard such statements. Carroll v. United States, 9 Cir., 1907, 154 F. 425; State v. Bloor, 20 Mont. 574, 52 P. 611. But here, the trial judge's comments were such that he could not cure the error by any admonition. As to conduct of prosecuting attorneys, it is said in 42 Am. Jur., Prosecuting Attorneys, § 20, pp. 255, 256, that: The insinuation that one of the defendants, Mrs. Peterson, was not going to speak truthfully and the threat and intimidation in the manner revealed by this record is prejudicial error. For the foregoing reason, the judgments are reversed and the cause remanded for new trial. HARRISON, C. J., and ANGSTMAN, J., concur. BOTTOMLY, Justice (dissenting). I cannot agree with the disposition of this case, as set forth in the majority opinion. From the facts in this record, it appears that good, hardworking citizens, who were attempting to meet the high cost of milk for their children, formed under a contract, a self-owned and serving place for the processing of the milk from their own herd *930 of milch cows. A little diplomacy exercised by the representatives of the Milk Control Board and the county and state officials would have, without doubt, corrected any errors, if any. Instead, the defendants were hounded by the prosecuting attorney, and on the trial were unmercifully browbeaten. This is one of the most unfair, unjust and immoral proceedings and trials that has been brought to my attention in almost fifty years in the law. First of all, this Milk Control Board Act of 1939, enacted as Chapter 204, Laws of 1939, and as amended, was one of several "war measures" passed about the time of the "Blue Eagle", all for the purpose of temporarily steadying and stabilizing industries and the prices of commodities. In this particular industry of milk, the owners of dairy herds were losing money because hardly anyone had the money to buy, people by the thousands were going to shipyards, to war industries, into service, etc., herds were being sold, and without these restrictive measures milk would have been practically unobtainable. So, pioneering individualism and private enterprise was ditched for the sheltering protection of the State and Federal laws. When the war was over, however, such fair trade laws were carried on as a form of subsidy to the industry as agriculture's parity is carried on. For the reasons stated, and the shameful conduct of the prosecution, I would reverse the judgments and order the record in the district court stricken. ADAIR, Justice (dissenting). This is a petty case. The two appellants were accused, tried and convicted of the crime of handling and distributing milk without a license. They have appealed to this court from judgments of conviction entered on a jury's verdict, adjudging that each appellant pay a fine in the trifling sum of $2.50. Section 49-125, R.C.M. 1947, says: "The law disregards trifles." The prosecutor's conduct at the trial, as shown by the record before us on this appeal, shocks the conscience, disregards the statutes regulating orderly procedure and violates the rights guaranteed the appellants under our Constitutions, both State and Federal. This court should forthwith set aside, vacate and annul the judgments, and order the unqualified dismissal of the entire proceeding in the trial court. The prosecution started out as a $2.50 proceeding. It winds up in the same trifling amount.