Case Title: State ex rel. Warner v. Indus. Comm'n

Citation: 2012-Ohio-1084

Docket Number: 2010-1283

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-03-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Warner v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-1084.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-1084 
THE STATE EX REL. WARNER, APPELLEE, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION  
OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. Warner v. Indus. Comm.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-1084.] 
Workers’ compensation—Average weekly wage—R.C. 4123.61—Unemployment 
compensation excluded from wage total—Treatment of seasonal layoffs. 
(No. 2010-1283—Submitted December 6, 2011—Decided March 22, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 09AP-841, 2010-Ohio-2476. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellee, Rick D. Warner, is a construction worker who has 
periods of unemployment each year that are the result of seasonal layoffs.  After 
being injured at work, Warner asked appellant Industrial Commission of Ohio to 
establish his average weekly wage (“AWW”) for the purpose of awarding future 
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compensation.  At issue is the treatment to be accorded those weeks of 
unemployment in calculating his AWW. 
{¶ 2} Warner began working for appellant Central Allied Enterprises, 
Inc. in 2004.  Central Allied paves roadways.  Warner had worked on paving 
crews before and, by his own admission, knew when he started with Central 
Allied that the work was seasonal.  In the past, Warner had applied for 
unemployment compensation during the winter layoff, and he continued this 
practice during his time with Central Allied. 
{¶ 3} Warner was hurt at work on September 7, 2007, and a workers’ 
compensation claim was allowed.  He later sought temporary-total-disability 
compensation, which required the commission to establish his AWW in order to 
determine the amount of those benefits.  Typically, the AWW is calculated by 
dividing total wages for the year prior to injury by 52 weeks.  State ex rel. Clark 
v. Indus. Comm., 69 Ohio St.3d 563, 565, 634 N.E.2d 1014 (1994).  R.C. 4123.61, 
however, contains exceptions to this general formula, one of which requires the 
commission to exclude from the calculation “any period of unemployment due to 
sickness, industrial depression, strike, lockout, or other cause beyond the 
employee’s control.” 
{¶ 4} Evidence established that in the year prior to injury, Warner had 
worked for 30 weeks and had been unemployed for 22 due to the seasonal layoff.  
During that time, he had received both wages for the weeks worked and 
unemployment compensation for the weeks that he did not.  Warner proposed two 
different figures for his AWW.  The first excluded his 22 weeks of unemployment 
and the associated unemployment benefits from the calculation.  In the 
alternative, he advocated including both the number of weeks that he was 
unemployed and the dollar amount of his unemployment compensation in the 
formula.  Warner clearly indicated that he was not seeking both to exclude his 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
weeks of unemployment and to include the corresponding unemployment 
compensation. 
{¶ 5} A commission staff hearing officer (“SHO”) rejected both 
proposals. He excluded from the wage total the amount of unemployment 
compensation received but included in the weekly divisor the number of weeks 
that Warner did not work.  In refusing to exclude the number of weeks that 
Warner was unemployed from the weekly divisor, the SHO found that Warner’s 
weeks of unemployment were not beyond his control and thus not within the 
exception of R.C. 4123.61.  Citing Warner’s previous experience in the industry 
and his years with Central Allied, the SHO found: 
 
[T]he seasonal layoff was not unforeseen and is a normal part of 
employment within this industry.  The Claimant has presented no 
evidence of any attempt to look for work during his period of 
seasonal layoff.  Thus, the Hearing Officer finds that the 
unemployment sustained by the Claimant represents a lifestyle 
choice and shall not be excluded from the calculation of the 
Average Weekly Wage. State ex rel. Baker Concrete Constr., Inc. 
v. Indus. Comm. (2004), 102 Ohio St.3d 149 [2004-Ohio-2114, 
807 N.E.2d 347]. 
 
{¶ 6} The SHO also rejected Warner’s alternative request to add the 
dollar amount of his unemployment compensation to the total amount earned in 
the year preceding injury.  Citing State ex rel. McDulin v. Indus. Comm., 89 Ohio 
St.3d 390, 732 N.E.2d 367 (2000), the SHO concluded that unemployment 
benefits were not “wages” and could not be included in the AWW computation. 
{¶ 7} After further appeal was refused, Warner filed a complaint in 
mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.  There, Warner 
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prevailed, and the court issued a limited writ ordering the commission to further 
consider Warner’s request.  The court held that the commission had abused its 
discretion in failing to include the dollar amount of Warner’s unemployment 
compensation because it was federally taxable income under the Internal Revenue 
Code.  The court also criticized the commission’s finding that there was no 
evidence that Warner had looked for other work during the seasonal layoff, citing 
Warner’s receipt of unemployment compensation, which, under R.C. 
4141.29(A)(4)(a)(i), required proof of a job search. 
{¶ 8} The commission and Central Allied now appeal to this court as a 
matter of right.  Warner has been joined by amici curiae Ohio Association of 
Claimants’ Counsel and Ohio Association for Justice, which urge the exclusion of 
Warner’s 22 weeks of unemployment from the weekly denominator. 
{¶ 9} The average weekly wage is intended to “ ‘find a fair basis for 
award for the loss of future compensation.’ ” State ex rel. Wireman v. Indus. 
Comm., 49 Ohio St.3d 286, 287, 551 N.E.2d 1265 (1990), quoting Riley v. Indus. 
Comm., 9 Ohio App.3d 71, 73, 458 N.E.2d 428 (1983).  The figure must do 
substantial justice to the claimant, but it cannot create a windfall. Wireman at 287.  
In the case at bar, we must determine whether the commission abused its 
discretion in (1) including Warner’s 22 weeks of unemployment in the weekly 
divisor or (2) excluding the amount of unemployment compensation he received 
for those weeks in his wage total. 
Weeks of unemployment 
{¶ 10} In setting the AWW, “any period of unemployment due to 
sickness, industrial depression, strike, lockout, or other cause beyond the 
employee’s control shall be eliminated.” R.C. 4123.61.  Seasonal unemployment 
is not listed in the statute, so Warner can prevail only if he establishes that those 
weeks of unemployment were beyond his control. 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
{¶ 11} Appellants assert that Warner’s weeks of unemployment were not 
beyond his control.  They stress that Warner had been a seasonal construction 
worker for years and was accustomed to its cycle of work and layoff.  Because 
Warner chose to remain in this occupation knowing that he would be released at 
season’s end, appellants argue that the layoff was not an unanticipated 
circumstance and, by extension, neither was the period of unemployment that 
followed. 
{¶ 12} Warner disagrees.  He does not dispute that his yearly layoff was 
foreseeable and that in remaining with Central Allied, he tacitly assented to it.  
What was never foreseeable, Warner argues, was whether he would be able to 
find another job over the winter.  Warner claims that over the period in question 
he tried to find other employment and cites his receipt of unemployment 
compensation as proof of that.  Thus, while he may have assented to a winter 
layoff, he did not voluntarily choose to remain unemployed during that time.  
This, according to Warner, rendered his unemployment beyond his control. 
{¶ 13} Foreseeability of job loss does not necessarily render seasonal 
unemployment voluntary.  State ex rel. Baker Concrete Constr., Inc. v. Indus. 
Comm., 102 Ohio St.3d 149, 2004-Ohio-2114, 807 N.E.2d 347, ¶ 15.  Certainly, 
seasonal unemployment can be considered voluntary when it is the result of a 
worker’s choice to enjoy the time off rather than look for another job during the 
off-season.  On the other hand, many seasonal employees want to work during the 
layoff but, despite diligent efforts, cannot find other employment.  In those 
situations, unemployment may be considered to be beyond the individual’s 
control. 
{¶ 14} Warner cites his receipt of unemployment compensation as proof 
that he looked for work during the winter layoff.  Baker Concrete, however, 
declared that a claimant’s receipt of unemployment compensation did not, for 
workers’ compensation purposes, automatically establish that postlayoff 
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unemployment was beyond the individual’s control.  It acknowledged that receipt 
of those benefits required an ongoing search for work, but it also recognized that a 
job search had a qualitative component.  Given the independence of the workers’ 
compensation and unemployment-compensation systems, we noted, “A job search 
sufficient to satisfy OBES [Ohio Bureau of Employment Services] might not 
satisfy the commission.” Baker Concrete at ¶ 23. 
{¶ 15} In this case, the commission never addressed the adequacy of 
Warner’s job search because it wrongly believed that he had not presented any 
evidence of a search for other employment.  The court of appeals was accordingly 
correct in ordering further consideration of this issue, and that portion of its 
judgment is hereby affirmed. 
The dollar amount of Warner’s unemployment benefits 
{¶ 16} The court of appeals ordered the commission to include the amount 
of Warner’s unemployment benefits based solely on its status as federally taxable 
income.  McDulin, however, declared federal taxability to be irrelevant in 
determining what to include in the AWW wage total.  Inclusion of unemployment 
compensation, moreover, could create an impermissible windfall in situations 
where the commission has determined that weeks of unemployment were beyond 
the claimant’s control and omitted those weeks from the AWW calculation.  
Accordingly, that portion of the court of appeals judgment is reversed. 
{¶ 17} We hereby return the cause to the commission to determine 
whether Warner’s weeks of unemployment were beyond his control. We clarify 
that on remand the commission should total only Warner’s Central Allied wages 
from the year prior to his September 7, 2007 injury and divide by 52, unless 
Warner shows that he was not able to be employed during any of the 22 weeks 
during which he was seasonally laid off. Any week during the layoff in which his 
unemployment was beyond his control within the meaning of R.C. 4123.61 
should be excluded from the divisor. Thus, if all unemployment time satisfies the 
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statute, Warner’s total wages would be divided by 30 to produce an average 
weekly wage.  Accordingly, we affirm that portion of the court of appeals 
judgment that returned the cause for further consideration of this matter. 
{¶ 18} We additionally order the commission to exclude the amount of 
Warner’s unemployment compensation from his wage total and reverse that 
portion of the court of appeals judgment directing otherwise. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
The Stocker Pitts Law Firm and Dana M. Debski, for appellee. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Gerald H. Waterman, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellant Industrial Commission. 
Kastner, Westman & Wilkins, L.L.C. and James W. Ellis, for appellant 
Central Allied Enterprises, Inc. 
Philip J. Fulton Law Office, Philip J. Fulton, and Chelsea J. Fulton, urging 
affirmance for amici curiae, Ohio Association of Claimants’ Counsel and Ohio 
Association for Justice. 
______________________