Case Title: Aiken v. State

Citation: 390 So. 2d 1186

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1980-11-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
390 So. 2d 1186 (1980)
Harry J. AIKEN et al., Petitioners,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 56671.

Supreme Court of Florida.
November 26, 1980.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Tatjana Ostapoff, Chief Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for petitioners.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Max Rudmann, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for respondent.
ADKINS, Justice.
By petition for certiorari we have for review a decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, State v. Aiken, 370 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), which conflicts with a prior decision of another district court of appeal on the same point of law. State v. Alonso, 345 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution (1972).
This appeal involves two criminal cases in which the defendants/appellants are charged with the crime of sexual battery, proscribed by section 794.011, Florida Statutes (1977). The trial court dismissed the informations in both cases because they contained no allegation of criminal intent to obtain sexual gratification.
The only issue before us is whether the sexual battery statute is violated when a sexual attack is made, regardless of any sexual gratification motives, provided the battery falls within the statutory definition set out below.
Section 794.011(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1977).
Informations were filed against appellants Aiken and Davis as follows. In the *1187 case of State v. Aiken, Count II of the information alleges that defendant:
In the case of State v. Davis, Count I alleged that:
Count II alleged that defendant Davis:
Appellants filed motions to dismiss these charges because the information failed to allege intent for sexual gratification. After argument, the trial court granted appellant's motions on the authority of State v. Alonso, 345 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). The court in Alonso upheld a trial judge's conclusion that in order to be convicted of the crime of involuntary sexual battery a defendant must be charged with intent to attain sexual gratification.
In the case sub judice, the state appealed the decision of the trial court. The appeals were consolidated in the Fourth District Court of Appeal, which reversed the trial court, holding that intent for sexual gratification is not an element of sexual battery.
We agree with the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal. For the court, Judge Beranek wrote:
State v. Aiken, 370 So. 2d  at 1185, 1186.
The decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Alonso is overruled. The decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in the case sub judice is approved.
It is so ordered.
*1188 SUNDBERG, C.J., and BOYD, OVERTON, ENGLAND, and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
McDONALD, J., concurs specially with an opinion, with which OVERTON, ENGLAND and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
McDONALD, Justice, specially concurring.
I concur with the majority opinion but also agree with the specially concurring opinion of Judge Dauksch in this cause and the specially concurring opinion of Judge Schwartz in Surace v. State, 378 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1980). Like Judge Schwartz, I would go further and hold that
Id. at 899.
OVERTON, ENGLAND and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.