Case Title: State v. Harris

Citation: 2012 UT 77

Docket Number: 20100080

State: utah

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Date: 2012-11-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
This opinion is subject to revision before final publication in the Pacific Reporter. 2012 UT 77 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH ——————— STATE OF UTAH, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. ANTOINE DARNELL HARRIS, Defendant and Appellant. ——————— No. 20100080 Filed November 9, 2012 ——————— Third District, West Jordan The Honorable Terry L. Christiansen No. 081400099 ——————— Attorneys: Mark L. Shurtleff, Att‟y Gen., Christine F. Soltis, Asst. Att‟y Gen., Melanie M. Serassio, Salt Lake City, for appellee Joan C. Watt, Jaqueline R. Hopkinson, Salt Lake City, for appellant ——————— JUSTICE LEE authored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, JUSTICE DURHAM, and JUSTICE PARRISH joined. ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE NEHRING filed a concurring opinion. ——————— JUSTICE LEE, opinion of the Court: ¶1 Antoine Harris was charged with two counts of assault in January 2008. He appeared for a jury trial in October 2009 and was subsequently convicted of a class B misdemeanor assault. Harris now appeals, claiming that his jury was assembled in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of the Equal Protec- tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We disagree and ac- cordingly affirm. STATE v. HARRIS Opinion of the Court 2 I ¶2 In December 2007, Amber Wardle and Sarah Michel spent the day shopping. After their spree, the pair decided to return to Wardle‟s apartment, which she shared with her then-boyfriend, Antoine Harris. Wardle indicated to Michel that she wanted Har- ris to move out and that she wanted Michel there during the con- frontation. ¶3 Soon after they arrived at Harris‟s apartment, a fight erupt- ed between Wardle and Harris. During the course of their spat, Harris told Wardle that she should stop hanging out with Michel. After hearing this from the other room, Michel stepped into the bedroom to confront Harris. Michel and Harris exchanged barbs, and Michel informed Wardle that she was leaving because she was angry at Harris. ¶4 According to Michel, before she could reach the front door of the apartment, Harris shut the door and locked it. Harris then pushed her up against the door and started to choke her. In the midst of this tussle, Michel hurled a highly charged racial slur at Harris and told him to let her go. Michel stated that Harris even- tually released her, but shortly afterward it appeared to her that he was going to hit Wardle. Michel testified that she intervened, at which point Harris jumped on top of her and began to choke her again. ¶5 Harris‟s version of events was somewhat different. He tes- tified at trial that instead of locking Michel in the apartment, he in fact had attempted to usher her out of the house when she sud- denly attacked him. In an attempt to defend himself, Harris grabbed Michel by the neck and pushed her away. It was at this point that Michel used the racial epithet, which Harris admitted infuriated him; thus provoked, Harris conceded that he started to choke Michel. ¶6 In the midst of the skirmish, Michel told Wardle to get help. Wardle ran out of the apartment, prompting Harris to leave Michel and chase after Wardle. The police ultimately arrived and catalogued Michel‟s injuries. Based on their accounts and Michel‟s injuries, Harris was charged with one count of aggravated assault, Cite as: 2012 UT 77 Opinion of the Court 3 a third-degree felony,1 and one count of domestic violence assault, a class B misdemeanor.2 ¶7 Harris appeared for a one-day jury trial on October 28, 2009. The trial court conducted standard jury selection, assem- bling a venire and conducting voir dire. After several members of the jury venire were dismissed for cause, the court invited trial counsel to exercise their peremptory strikes. As counsel deliberat- ed, the judge passed the time by reading aloud an excerpt from an article entitled “Do You Swear that You Will Well and Truly Try?”3 ¶8 After the peremptory strikes were completed and submit- ted to the judge, the court asked defense counsel whether he “pass[ed] the jury for cause.” Defense counsel replied, “I think we need to approach the bench,” and immediately added, “Oh, we do pass for cause, yes.” The following sidebar ensued: DEFENSE COUNSEL: The concern we have is Juror Number 3 was struck by the State. He‟s the only mi- nority on the jury, so (inaudible) want a Batson chal- lenge on this, she needs to justify why she (inaudi- ble) the only minority on the jury. COURT: All right, do you have a reason for that? PROSECUTOR: Yeah, (inaudible). 1 See UTAH CODE § 76-5-103. 2 See id. § 76-5-102. 3 As Harris notes, this dated article included a series of inappro- priate stereotypes of potential jurors, presented in the form of old- timey advice once dispensed to the criminal bar—long-since dis- credited pearls of “wisdom” like the notion that defense attorneys should avoid “German[s],” who are “bull-headed,” and “Swedes,” who are “stubborn,” in favor of “Jews” and “Irishmen” who are “easiest to move to emotional sympathy.” Such stereo- types have no place in our judicial system. They certainly should not have been propagated by the court. But although the content of the article was inappropriate, its reading does not affect our de- cision on appeal, as Harris asserts no claim that the judge‟s con- duct injected reversible error into the trial. STATE v. HARRIS Opinion of the Court 4 COURT: Alright, why don‟t we put that on the rec- ord during the break? DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay, I just wanted to inform you of that (inaudible).4 ¶9 The court then announced the names of the selected jurors. It asked both the prosecutor and defense counsel “is that the jury you have selected?” Both responded in the affirmative, stating “it is, your honor.” Without further objection by defense counsel, the remainder of the venire was dismissed, including Juror Number 3, and the jury was sworn. During the subsequent recess, the court noted that defense counsel had “ask[ed] to approach the bench on a Batson challenge” and invited counsel to “make that on the rec- ord now.” Defense counsel then made the following record: [B]ased on the state‟s taking off Juror No. 3, who clearly was the only minority on the jury, as I looked through . . . my notes on his answers, there‟s nothing in there that would indicate any reason to take him off the jury other than the fact that he was 27 years old and was obvious[ly] . . . of the Asian race and so I think the State has to justify why they took that person off the jury. ¶10 The court then asked the prosecutor to explain his strike, to which he responded: [W]hen I was watching [Juror No. 3] during the time that [the judge] was reading the story to the jurors, he was not paying attention. He kept putting his head down, he wasn‟t listening and that concerns me when someone doesn‟t want to pay attention. I also noted in my notes that he kept looking at me funny and so any time I get a bad feeling from a ju- ror and if they‟re not paying attention, initially I was going to leave him on and then he just wasn‟t pay- ing attention. He has to pay attention during the ju- ry trial. 4 Although the court‟s audio recording is garbled in places and does not perfectly capture what was said, our independent review of it reveals the substance of the sidebar and confirms that the en- tire sidebar lasted less than forty seconds. Cite as: 2012 UT 77 Opinion of the Court 5 I had concerns about (inaudible) [another juror] as well but the defense had struck her. I didn‟t know if she would have any problems with her or anything but . . . the defense struck her as number four, but she was actually paying attention and listening to what [the court] had to say and [Juror No. 3] was not paying attention. ¶11 After the prosecutor‟s response, the court confirmed that Harris was not Asian but was a minority, and then asked if there was “[a]nything else [they] need[ed] to put on the record.” De- fense counsel replied: Judge, I guess my response to that is, it‟s hard for somebody to tell if somebody is paying attention. People have different ways of paying attention and this is a smaller room (inaudible) reading to them or talking to them and so the fact that somebody is looking around or something, I don‟t think is neces- sarily they‟re not paying attention. So I don‟t think that‟s sufficient, but just so the record is clear. The court responded to this last statement, saying “Thank you. Alright. We‟ll recess for about 10 minutes,” to which defense counsel replied, “Thank you, Your Honor.” ¶12 With that, the trial proceeded. At the conclusion of the State‟s case-in-chief, the court dismissed the simple assault charge based on insufficient evidence. Following its deliberation, the jury convicted Harris of a class B misdemeanor assault, a lesser- included offense of the initial charge of aggravated assault. Harris appealed. II ¶13 Harris challenges his conviction on the ground that “the State‟s use of a peremptory challenge to strike the only member of a racial minority group from the jury venire violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Harris‟s argu- ment rests on the prohibition of racial discrimination in jury selec- tion laid out in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Under Bat- son, parties generally “may exercise peremptory strikes to remove jurors during jury selection for virtually any reason, or for no rea- son at all.” State v. Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53, ¶ 7, 190 P.3d 1259 (internal quotation marks omitted). That general rule is qualified, however, STATE v. HARRIS Opinion of the Court 6 by the proposition that “parties in a criminal action may not dis- criminate against potential jurors by exercising peremptory chal- lenges solely on the basis of race.”5 For the reasons set forth be- low, we conclude that Harris failed to timely preserve his Batson challenge, the trial court did not err when it did not make findings or rule on the Batson challenge, and Harris‟s ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on his counsel‟s failure to timely preserve his Batson challenge fails under Strickland. A ¶14 Harris contends that his Batson challenge was both timely raised and erroneously rejected. Whether Harris‟s challenge was timely is a question of law that we review for correctness.6 For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that Harris‟s challenge was untimely. ¶15 A properly made Batson challenge involves three steps. The challenging party must first make a “prima facie case of purpose- ful discrimination in the selection of the petit jury.” State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ¶ 15, 140 P.3d 1219. Once the Batson objection has been raised and clearly articulated, “the burden shifts to the pro- ponent of the peremptory challenges to rebut the prima facie case by offering neutral, nondiscriminatory justifications for the per- emptory challenges.” Id. “Finally, if the proponent provides a suf- ficient explanation for the peremptory challenges, the trial court must determine whether the opponent of the peremptory chal- lenges has proven purposeful discrimination.” Id. ¶16 It is not enough, however, for a party to raise a Batson chal- lenge and expect opposing counsel and the court to complete the heavy lifting. A Batson challenge “must be raised in such a man- ner that the trial court is able to fashion a remedy in the event a Batson violation has occurred.” Id. ¶ 44. This prerequisite entails not only specificity in the substance of the challenge, but also a critical timing element: The objecting party must raise and press his challenge “before the jury is sworn and the venire dismissed.” Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53, ¶ 14. 5 State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ¶ 14, 994 P.2d 177. 6 See State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ¶ 11, 140 P.3d 1219 (“Whether [a] Batson challenge was timely raised is a question of law.”) Cite as: 2012 UT 77 Opinion of the Court 7 ¶17 This timing element is not drawn arbitrarily. As we have noted, trial courts ought to resolve Batson objections while the iron is hot since “[t]he burden-shifting framework of Batson is best im- plemented if it is litigated while the peremptory strikes are fresh in the minds of both the court and the litigants.” Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ¶ 42. That said, however, “in the event that the trial court fails to timely resolve a Batson objection, [trial] counsel . . . has an abso- lute obligation to notify the court that resolution is needed before the jury is sworn and the venire dismissed.” Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53, ¶ 14 (emphases added). This obligation to timely press for resolu- tion is so incumbent on the moving party, we have warned, that “[f]ailure to do so, or acquiescing in the court‟s inaction, will . . . constitute a waiver of the original objection.” Id. (footnote omitted). ¶18 In light of this timing requirement and the “absolute obli- gation” of trial counsel to demand resolution of a Batson challenge before the jury is sworn and the venire dismissed, we conclude that Harris waived this challenge by failing to properly and timely ask for its resolution. Harris‟s characterization of what happened at trial does not persuade us to the contrary. Harris maintains that he timely presented his objection and that the prosecution failed to carry its burden at the second step of the Batson challenge, as- serting that “the prosecutor‟s explanation did not contain the type of specificity and details necessary to demonstrate that the chal- lenge was racially neutral.” Harris also insists that not only did he raise the requisite objection in the first sidebar but that the district court‟s resolution of the Batson issues was complete at that point. Thus, Harris argues that the subsequent record made by the par- ties after the jury pool was dismissed was merely a memorializa- tion of what had already happened. This characterization simply doesn‟t jibe with the record, however, and we accordingly reject it. ¶19 In the initial sidebar, defense counsel indicated only that the State needed to “justify” its peremptory strike of Juror Num- ber 3. In the limited time she had, the prosecutor apparently gave a quick, race-neutral explanation. After hearing the explanation, the court indicated that it would allow the attorneys to put the matter on the record “during the break.” Harris‟s counsel made no objection, instead responding with the compliant comment, “Okay, I just wanted to inform [the court] of that.” STATE v. HARRIS Opinion of the Court 8 ¶20 More importantly, he also made no objection when the court subsequently read the selected juror names, asked Harris‟s counsel whether this was the jury he had selected, and proceeded to dismiss the remaining venire before the promised “break.” In- stead, counsel responded to the judge‟s inquiry about whether the jury announced was the one he had selected by stating, “it is, your honor.” ¶21 What happened next only further highlights defense coun- sel‟s acquiescence. When the parties met again at the break to put the matter “on the record,” the court thanked them for their ar- gument without making any findings or ruling on the challenge. And, once again, instead of objecting or requesting that the court correct the error, Harris‟s counsel simply replied, “[t]hank you, Your Honor.” Harris‟s acquiescence in the court‟s inaction could not have been clearer.7 Accordingly, based on his failure to de- 7 If the case had proceeded as Justice Nehring suggests—with the court rejecting counsel‟s demand for a timely resolution of his Batson claim and expressly requiring “counsel to delay his Batson challenge until a time when our precedent declares it untimely,” infra ¶ 42—then that would indeed present a troubling problem. But that is not what happened here. Defense counsel never clearly asserted a request to have the Batson issue resolved before dismis- sal of the jury venire, and the court never rejected any such re- quest. In the initial sidebar, the judge merely indicated that defense counsel would have the chance to put his Batson challenge on the record during the break—without indicating when the break would occur, or whether it would happen before or after he seated the jury and dismissed the venire. Thus, the court‟s ruling requiring a delay until the “break” did not itself close the door on timely preservation of a Batson challenge. It left that matter open, as a resolution of the Batson issue during a “break” before the dismis- sal of the venire could still be timely. When the court subsequently proceeded to read the names of the jurors, and asked defense counsel whether this was the jury he had selected, then the timing problem was squarely presented. It was at that point that counsel‟s preservation duty was framed in sharp focus, as that was the point of no return for resolution un- Cite as: 2012 UT 77 Opinion of the Court 9 mand a ruling and resolution on his objection, we conclude that Harris waived his Batson challenge.8 B ¶22 Harris also asserts that, even if we conclude that his Batson challenge was not timely, we “can review the error under . . . the plain error doctrine.” He further posits that a “Batson error is a „structural error‟ that is not subject to a conventional prejudice analysis.” Accordingly, Harris argues that this court could reach these issues “even if he had not [properly preserved the Batson issue].” The State, for its part, insists that not only did Harris waive his Batson challenge but that he “also invited any alleged error” and therefore cannot obtain relief through plain error. We disagree with both positions. ¶23 First, we reject the State‟s notion that Harris invited or “planted” any error. His failure, as explained above, was that he failed to adequately preserve his Batson challenge, not that he openly induced the court‟s error. Next, for the reasons discussed below, we conclude that Harris cannot make out a case of plain error. ¶24 The plain error doctrine is a carefully circumscribed excep- tion to the requirement of preservation. See State v. Munguia, 2011 der Batson (since it was then clear that the break would not occur prior to the dismissal of the venire). And at that point, as before, counsel responded only with a statement of acquiescence (“it is, your honor”). Only after defense counsel had affirmatively acqui- esced in the jury selected did the court proceed to dismiss the ve- nire. Thus, the court afforded defense counsel an additional op- portunity—once it had become clear that the venire would be dismissed prior to any break—to make a timely Batson challenge. Counsel‟s failure to avail himself of that opportunity amounted to waiver, in a manner not implicating the problematic scenario ad- verted to by Justice Nehring. 8 This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the sidebar lasted less than forty seconds. Supra ¶ 8 n.4. From what dialogue can be gleaned from the trial record, it‟s obvious that although Harris‟s trial counsel raised a Batson challenge, he failed to ask the court for resolution of that challenge before the jury was sworn and the venire dismissed. STATE v. HARRIS Opinion of the Court 10 UT 5, ¶ 12, 253 P.3d 1082. We invoke this exception sparingly.9 To show plain error, a party must establish three things: (1) that an error exists, (2) that the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) that the error is harmful. Id. In order to show harm, the complaining party must demonstrate that “absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶25 Harris‟s waiver of his Batson objection ends our inquiry be- fore we reach the question of prejudice. Plain error requires not only that error exist, but that it be “obvious to the trial court.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Batson violation alleged by Harris could not have been “obvious” to the trial court. Indeed, an evaluation of the alleged error is effectively foreclosed by Har- ris‟s failure to complete and press for timely findings on the ques- tions of the prosecution‟s neutral justification and purposeful dis- crimination. ¶26 Harris‟s waiver is compounded, moreover, by the fact that defense counsel did not even challenge the prosecution‟s neutral explanation as pretextual, but simply challenged the conclusion that it necessarily precluded a finding of discrimination. That move effectively thwarted the court‟s capacity to address the questions it would have to resolve if it looked past counsel‟s waiver and reached the merits in this case, including (a) whether the district court‟s determination of a race-neutral justification was facially sufficient; and (b) if so, whether the district court erred in finding a lack of purposeful discrimination. Those deci- sions, moreover, would be reviewed under a standard that would afford some deference to the district court, which had an oppor- 9 See State v. Scott, 447 P.2d 908, 910 (Utah 1968) (“[T]here may be exceptional circumstances when errors not excepted to are so clearly erroneous and prejudicial to the fundamental rights of a defendant that an appellate court will of its own accord take no- tice thereof.”); see also State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (clarifying that on “issues not properly preserved for appeal . . . plain error is itself an infrequently used exception to the general rule”). Cite as: 2012 UT 77 Opinion of the Court 11 tunity to view the behavior of counsel and of the venire during the selection and voir dire process.10 ¶27 The problem is that no such findings were requested or en- tered. And since our position on appeal is far removed from the intimate, first-hand knowledge of the trial court, we can hardly accept the defense‟s position that there was discrimination at face value.11 Thus, even if we determined that the trial court erred in not resolving Harris‟s Batson challenge, the only remedy available to us would be a remand for a new trial or for appropriate find- ings. But both options would be unreasonable. ¶28 A new trial based solely on not seating a juror would be a novel move for this court and would swiftly undermine the effi- ciency of our trial courts. Worse, it would perversely incentivize defense counsel to take the same (in)actions Harris‟s counsel did here. We cannot and will not allow litigants to silently sow the seeds of error so that they may be reaped in the event of an unde- sirable verdict.12 10 State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996) (uphold- ing trial court‟s overruling a Batson challenge where the “trial court was involved in the voir dire process and observed first- hand the prosecutor‟s demeanor,” the trial court observed “that the prosecutor‟s reason was clear and specific and made without any hesitation,” and that “facial expressions or body language . . . provide a sufficient basis to support the exercise of a peremptory challenge”). 11 Manzanares v. Byington (In re Adoption of Baby B.), 2012 UT 35, ¶ 40, P.3d (“Findings of fact . . . . entail[] the empirical, such as things, events, actions, or conditions happening, existing, or taking place, as well as the subjective, such as state of mind. Since the lower court often has a comparative advantage in its firsthand access to factual evidence . . . [s]uch findings are accordingly over- turned only when clearly erroneous.” (first alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 12 See Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ¶ 44 (“[T]o allow a Batson challenge to proceed after the venire has been dismissed is only to sanction abuse. If such a result were allowed, a party would be able to de- lay raising a Batson challenge until it determined whether it ap- STATE v. HARRIS Opinion of the Court 12 ¶29 And if we were to remand, the findings required of the trial court would be practically impossible. First, the court would have to decide whether the proffered justification was sufficiently race- neutral, related to the trial at hand, reasonably specific and clear, and legitimate. State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996). And if it deemed the prosecutor‟s explanation sufficient, the court would then have to determine whether there actually was purposeful discrimination, weighing the prima facie showing of discrimination and the neutral explanation. This would require the district court to summon the implicated juror, mentally recon- struct the scene of the voir dire, recall observations of individual- ized behavior, make appropriate findings, and rule on the issue— all of this months or years after the fact. No court could make such findings with any reliability or objectivity. ¶30 Thus, because Harris waived his Batson challenge, he can- not now establish that there was error or that any supposed error would have been obvious to the trial court. We therefore conclude that Harris cannot establish plain error, and accordingly affirm his conviction.13 C ¶31 Harris finally contends that the court can reach his chal- lenge because “defense counsel was ineffective for failing to insist that the court clearly resolve the challenge.” He insists that his at- torney was deficient—within the meaning of the first prong of the test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)—in not “obtain[ing] an explicit, oral ruling regarding the Batson challenge before the jury was sworn and the venire dis- missed, and to object to the empaneled jury.” ¶32 We need not determine whether counsel‟s performance was deficient under the first prong of Strickland because Harris‟s proved of the selected jury. Such sandbagging is antithetical to notions of judicial economy and procedural fairness.”). 13 Harris also urges us to adopt the view that Batson errors are structural in nature and therefore obviate the prejudice inquiry under the plain error standard. Because we conclude that any er- ror here could not have been obvious to the trial court, however, we need not and accordingly do not reach the prejudice question or the “structural error” ground for avoiding proof of prejudice. Cite as: 2012 UT 77 Opinion of the Court 13 ineffective assistance claim clearly fails under the second prong. To satisfy Strickland‟s second prong, Harris was required to “af- firmatively prove prejudice” by “show[ing] that there [wa]s a rea- sonable probability that, but for counsel‟s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 693–94. Harris has failed to make this showing, and we affirm on that basis. ¶33 Counsel‟s failure to properly press a Batson challenge would be actionable under Strickland only if the Batson challenge itself could be shown to be plausibly meritorious. Put conversely, the failure to press a losing Batson challenge cannot satisfy Strick- land‟s second prong because a procedurally proper but meritless Batson claim could not be shown to have changed the result of the proceeding below. ¶34 Harris‟s Strickland claim falters on that basis. The sum and substance of Harris‟s Batson challenge is his assertion that Juror Number 3 was Asian. That fact standing alone is likely insufficient even to establish a prima facie case at Batson step one. See State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1988) (noting that mere identifica- tion of a juror‟s race is insufficient; requiring allegation of discrim- ination on the basis of race). And it surely falls short of establish- ing the ultimate question under Batson—of purposeful discrimina- tion on the basis of race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86–87, 95, 98. Harris‟s failure to identify facts sufficient to sustain a finding of purposeful discrimination foil his Strickland claim, as the failure to assert a losing Batson challenge could not have altered the result at trial. ¶35 As noted above, Batson prescribes a three-step process: (a) a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the use of a per- emptory challenge; (b) rebuttal by the party employing the chal- lenge by proffer of neutral, nondiscriminatory justifications; and (c) if sufficient neutral justifications are given, proof of purposeful discrimination. Supra ¶ 15. Harris has failed to demonstrate the viability of his Batson challenge under this framework. Even as- suming for the sake of argument that Harris cleared the prima fa- cie hurdle at step one, the evidence in the record suggests no basis for a finding of purposeful discrimination upon evaluation of the record evidence under steps two and three. ¶36 Under step two, the record indicates that the prosecutor as- serted that Juror Number 3 was struck because he was not paying STATE v. HARRIS ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE NEHRING, concurring 14 attention and was looking at the prosecutor “funny.” Such justifi- cations—going to juror inattentiveness—“deserve[] careful scruti- ny” to assure that there is specific juror behavior supporting the justification. See United States v. Johnson, 4 F.3d 904, 913 (10th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the prosecutor‟s ex- planation here satisfied that standard as his explanation was spe- cific and plausibly related to the obvious need for jurors to pay attention during trial. And race-neutral explanations at Batson step two need not be particularly “persuasive, or even plausible.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995). The persuasiveness or plausibility of the step two explanation is evaluated at step three, where the court is charged with deciding whether the peremptory strike was a result of purposeful discrimination. Id. ¶37 We see no basis—and Harris has offered none—for a find- ing of purposeful discrimination under step three. In response to the prosecutor‟s race-neutral explanation, defense counsel only vaguely asserted that he felt this explanation was not “sufficient” because it was “difficult to tell if someone is paying attention.” That is hardly persuasive proof of “purposeful discrimination.” And absent anything more than the hunch from the juror‟s race and vague doubts about the prosecutor‟s explanation, we con- clude that Harris has failed to identify any basis for concluding that his unpreserved Batson claim would have succeeded if it had been timely raised. That failure also thwarts Harris‟s Strickland claim, as any deficiency in the presentation of a meritless Batson challenge could not have altered the result at trial. III ¶38 Harris waived his Batson objection by not timely pressing for resolution of his challenge. And because he waived his chal- lenge, he cannot show that there was error or that any such error would have been obvious to the trial court. We accordingly de- cline to engage in plain error review and affirm the conviction be- low. ——————— ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE NEHRING, concurring: ¶39 I concur in the holding of the court. I cannot, however, agree with the court‟s discussion of the timeliness of Mr. Harris‟s Batson challenge. The majority concludes that Mr. Harris‟s Batson challenge was untimely because he failed to meet his “absolute Cite as: 2012 UT 77 ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE NEHRING, concurring 15 obligation” to notify the court that it must resolve the Batson chal- lenge before the jury is sworn and the venire dismissed, even if it is the judge‟s suggestion that he delay the challenge.1 ¶40 In the eyes of the majority, Mr. Harris irretrievably waived his Batson challenge when he acquiesced to the judge‟s request that he place his Batson challenge on the record after the venire was dismissed.2 During the sidebar conference that Mr. Harris re- quested, he expressly raised a Batson challenge. The court pro- posed that a record be made of the challenge “during the break.”3 Under the majority‟s analysis, the record made pursuant to the court‟s instructions during the subsequent recess was pointless. Tellingly, Mr. Harris‟s first response to the trial judge‟s query about whether he passed the jury for cause was to request the sidebar conference at which he raised his Batson challenge.4 The trial judge noted that Mr. Harris sought a Batson challenge when he announced that defense counsel had asked to approach on a Batson challenge.5 ¶41 Although I concede that, as a practical matter, the court had no remedy at this point except to declare a mistrial in the event it concluded that Mr. Harris‟s Batson challenge was well- taken, the categorical rule that once the venire has been dismissed the Batson challenge has been waived would seemingly end the matter, irrespective of the likelihood that the complications caused by a mistrial at this early stage would be minimal. ¶42 I have little doubt that any attempt by Mr. Harris‟s coun- sel to “press” the court to make a definitive Batson ruling before excusing the venire would have been fraught with risk. The rec- ord clearly communicates that the trial judge was determined to move the proceeding along. The majority admits as much when it notes, in reference to the prosecution‟s response to the Batson chal- 1 Supra ¶ 17 (citing State v. Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53, ¶ 14, 190 P.3d 1259). 2 Supra ¶ 18. 3 Supra ¶ 8. 4 Supra ¶ 8. 5 Supra ¶ 9. STATE v. HARRIS ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE NEHRING, concurring 16 lenge, that it was made “in the limited time she had.”6 And alt- hough Mr. Harris acquiesced “in the court‟s inaction,” it was the court that asked counsel to delay his Batson challenge until a time when our precedent declares it untimely.7 ¶43 In sum, I find that Mr. Harris‟s counsel conducted himself in a fully understandable manner when he sought to advance his Batson challenge. I am prepared, however, to accept, albeit with misgivings, our absolutist rule on Batson timing. ——————— 6 Supra ¶ 19. 7 Supra ¶¶ 9, 21.