Case Title: Richardson v. UPS Store, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12769

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-10-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12769 
 
KEVIN RICHARDSON, SECOND1  vs.  THE UPS STORE, INC., & another.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 9, 2020. - October 28, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ.3 
 
 
Notary Public.  Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Certification of a question of law to the Supreme Judicial 
Court by the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts. 
 
 
Orestes G. Brown for the plaintiff. 
 
Joseph R. Palmore, of the District of Columbia, for the 
defendants. 
 
Michael Walsh, for Walsh & Walsh LLP, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Individually and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated. 
 
2 J&V Logistics LLC. 
 
3 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death. 
2 
 
BUDD, J.  In this case we have been asked by the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts whether 
G. L. c. 262, §§ 41 and 43, Executive Order Nos. 455 (03-13) and 
455 (04-04), or the codification of such orders within G. L. 
c. 222, limit the fees that a notary public may charge for any 
and all notarial acts to no more than $1.25.  The question 
arises in connection with a lawsuit brought by the plaintiff, 
Kevin Richardson, II, alleging that the defendants, The UPS 
Store, Inc., and J&V Logistics LLC, the franchise owner, 
overcharged him for notary services.  We conclude that the $1.25 
fee cap set forth in G. L. c. 262, § 41, applies only to a 
particular notarial act known as "noting," i.e., a step in the 
process of protesting a dishonored negotiable instrument, and 
that the meaning of that section has not been expanded, either 
by statute or executive order, to include all notarial acts.4  
And aside from § 41 there currently are no statutes or executive 
orders that cap fees for any other notarial act. 
Background.  We recite the undisputed facts relevant to the 
certified question.  The plaintiff used the services of a notary 
public at the subject UPS store to notarize documents signed by 
the plaintiff or his wife various times between 2012 and 2016.  
On at least three occasions, the plaintiff was charged a total 
                                                 
4 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Walsh & Walsh 
LLP. 
3 
 
of ten dollars per service, including $1.25 for the notarization 
and $8.75 for clerical fees. 
 
In August 2016, the plaintiff filed suit against the 
defendants in the Superior Court, alleging violations of G. L. 
c. 262, § 41, and G. L. c. 93A.  The defendants removed the case 
to the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts under the Federal Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005, where the plaintiff moved for class certification of 
present and former purchasers of notarization services from the 
defendants for the period between August 30, 2012, to the date 
of judgment, and alleging $5.9 million in damages.  The 
defendants opposed class certification and moved to certify to 
this court the question whether § 41 applies to all notarial 
acts as the plaintiff contends.  The District Court certified 
the question regarding the scope of § 41, and denied the 
plaintiff's motion for class certification with leave to renew 
within fourteen days of our opinion on this matter. 
 
The certified question5 put to this court asks: 
"Does [G. L. c. 262, § 41 or 43,] proscribe fees in excess 
of $1.25 for notarization of a document where the notarial 
act at issue is unrelated to the protest of a bill of 
exchange, order, draft or check for non-acceptance or non-
payment, or of a promissory note for non-payment and what, 
if any, impact do Executive Order Nos. 455 (03-13) and 455 
(04-04) and the codification of Executive Order No. 455 
                                                 
5 The original certified question, which made reference only 
to G. L. c. 262, §§ 41 and 43, was expanded to include Executive 
Order No. 455 and G. L. c. 222 in the inquiry. 
4 
 
(04-04) as [G. L. c. 222] in 2016 have on the question of 
whether [G. L. c. 262, § 41 or 43,] proscribe such fees?" 
 
For reasons explained infra, we answer the question "no," G. L. 
c. 262, §§ 41 and 43, do not proscribe fees for acts unrelated 
to the protest of a negotiable instrument, and neither Executive 
Order Nos. 455 (03-13) and 455 (04-04) nor G. L. c. 222 has any 
impact on our interpretation of §§ 41 and 43. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Scope of G. L. c. 262, § 41.  In 
determining the scope of § 41, "[o]ur analysis begins with the 
statutory language, the principal source of insight into 
[l]egislative purpose" (quotation and citation omitted).  Dental 
Serv. of Mass., Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 479 Mass. 304, 
306 (2018).  Section 41 provides: 
"The fees of notaries public shall be as follows:  For the 
protest of a bill of exchange, order, draft or check for 
non-acceptance or non-payment, or of a promissory note for 
non-payment, if the amount thereof is [$500] or more, one 
dollar; if it is less than [$500], fifty cents; for 
recording the same, fifty cents; for noting the non-
acceptance or non-payment of a bill of exchange, order, 
draft or check or the non-payment of a promissory note, 
seventy-five cents; and for each notice of the non-
acceptance or non-payment of a bill, order, draft, check or 
note, given to a party liable for the payment thereof, 
twenty-five cents; but the whole cost of protest, including 
necessary notices and the record, if the bill, order, 
draft, check or note is of the amount of [$500] or more, 
shall not exceed two dollars, and if it is less than 
[$500], shall not exceed one dollar and fifty cents; and 
the whole cost of noting, including recording and notices, 
shall in no case exceed one dollar and twenty-five cents" 
(emphasis added). 
 
5 
 
The plaintiff contends that § 41 limits the fees that notaries 
public are permitted to charge for any notarial act to $1.25.  
In support of this interpretation, he points to the last 
sentence in § 41, which states:  "[T]he whole cost of 
noting . . . shall in no case exceed one dollar and twenty-five 
cents."  We are not convinced. 
By its plain language, § 41 applies to fees charged by 
notaries public in connection with the act of "protesting" the 
nonpayment of a negotiable instrument.  A protest is a series of 
notarial acts in which a notary public prepares a certificate of 
dishonor verifying that a negotiable instrument, such as a check 
or promissory note, was dishonored by nonacceptance or 
nonpayment.  See G. L. c. 106, § 3-505 (b).  The certificate is 
used to recover the money owed.  See G. L. c. 106, §§ 3-503 (a), 
3-505 (b).  Although this process rarely is used in modern 
times, it was a common procedure in 1836, when the law was first 
passed.  R.S. (1836), c. 122, § 16.6  Section 41 enumerates a 
                                                 
6 General Laws c. 262, § 41, is the current codification of 
a statute that was originally enacted in 1836 as R.S. (1836), 
c. 122, § 16.  Since its enactment in 1836, the statute has 
undergone multiple revisions as the Legislature periodically 
recompiled its statutes.  See R.S. (1836), c. 122, § 16; G.S. 
(1860), c. 157, § 13; P.S. (1882), c. 199, § 21; R.L. (1902), 
c. 204, § 31; G. L. c. 262, c. 41 (1921).  The final clause, 
providing that "the whole cost of noting, including recording 
and all notices, shall in no case exceed one dollar and twenty-
five cents," was introduced in 1839, and has remained unchanged 
since.  See St. 1839, c. 93, § 1. 
6 
 
variety of fees associated with discrete notarial acts within 
the process of protesting, including two separate fee caps that 
limit the "whole cost of protest" to two dollars if the 
negotiable instrument is worth $500 or more, and $1.50 if the 
negotiable instrument is worth less than $500. 
The statute does not define "noting"; thus, it is to be 
"construed according to the common and approved usage of the 
language."  G. L. c. 4, § 6, Third.  At the same time, however, 
"technical words and phrases and such others as may have 
acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law shall be 
construed and understood according to such meaning."  Id.  See 
Anderson v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh PA, 476 
Mass. 377, 382 (2017). 
The plaintiff argues that "noting" should be broadly 
defined according to various dictionary definitions of the verb 
"to note" and that the phrase "the whole cost of noting" refers 
to all notarial acts, thereby limiting the fee for all notarial 
acts to $1.25.  However, there is ample evidence, including the 
unique context and use of the term in § 41, that it is used as a 
term of art, limited in meaning and application. 
When § 41 was enacted in the mid-1800s, "noting" commonly 
was known as a step in the process of protesting the failure to 
honor a negotiable instrument.  See F.M. Hinch, John's American 
Notary and Commissioner of Deeds Manual § 442, at 281 (3d ed. 
7 
 
1922).  It refers to a notary's act of initialing, dating, and 
briefly describing the stated reason for the failure to honor a 
negotiable instrument as a precursor to issuing a formal 
certificate of protest.  See A.E. Piombino, Notary Public 
Handbook:  Principles, Practices & Cases, National Edition 177 
(1996) (defining "note of protest" as "brief written statement 
of the fact of a protest, signed by the notary public on the 
bill, which will be transcribed into proper form at a later 
time"); J.O. Skinner, A Book of the Laws of Washington Relating 
to Notaries Public 234 (1911) ("The 'noting' of a bill is merely 
a preliminary step to the protest . . .").  Black's Law 
Dictionary likewise refers to "noting" in its definition of 
"protest," describing it as "[a] notary public's written 
statement that, upon presentment, a negotiable instrument was 
neither paid nor accepted" and stating that this process is also 
termed "initial protest" and "noting protest."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 1479 (11th ed. 2019). 
By noting the protest, notaries could date certificates 
when they were received, making it easier to comply with time 
restrictions associated with protesting.  See Bailey v. Dozier, 
47 U.S. 23, 29 (1848) ("if the bill has been duly presented for 
acceptance, or payment, and dishonored, and a minute made, at 
the time, of the steps taken, which is called noting the bill, 
the protest may be drawn up in form afterwards, at the 
8 
 
convenience of the notary"); Allen v. Merchant's Bank of N.Y., 
22 Wend. 215, 242 (N.Y. 1839) (when protesting foreign bill, 
sufficient to "note the protest on the day of demand, and it may 
be drawn up in form at a future period" [citation omitted]). 
Various courts, including this one, referred to "noting" in 
this context in the 1800s.  See Opinion of the Justices, 150 
Mass. 586, 588 (1890) (recognizing "noting and extending of 
marine protests" as one of principal acts of notaries public 
within Commonwealth).  See also Bailey, 47 U.S. at 29; Smith v. 
Roach's Ex'r, 46 Ky. 17, 19 (1846); Allen, 22 Wend. at 242; Bank 
of the Ohio Valley v. Lockwood, 13 W. Va. 392, 432-433 (1878).  
Thus, we conclude that "noting" as it appears in § 41 is used as 
a term of art rather than as the broader definition of the verb 
"to note," as in "to make a brief written statement."7  See 
Black's Law Dictionary 828 (1st ed. 1891). 
                                                 
7 Even if we were to adopt the nontechnical definition of 
"noting" as "mak[ing] a brief written statement," as discussed 
infra, the subject matter of the statute dictates that we limit 
the scope of this general term to protests only.  Section 41 
sets fees for "the protest of a bill of exchange, order, draft 
or check for non-acceptance or non-payment, or of a promissory 
note for non-payment," "recording the same," "noting the non-
acceptance or non-payment of a bill of exchange, order, draft or 
check or the non-payment of a promissory note," "each [such] 
notice . . . given to a party liable for the payment thereof," 
and "the whole cost of protest," before using the general phrase 
"the whole cost of noting."  G. L. c. 262, § 41.  Because all of 
the other acts enumerated in § 41 are unambiguously related to 
the process of protest, "noting" must likewise refer, at its 
broadest, to brief written statements made in the course of a 
protest. 
9 
 
Other rules of statutory construction also point to this 
result.  The canon of noscitur a sociis counsels that terms must 
be read within the context of the statute in which they appear.  
"[A] general term in a statute or ordinance takes meaning from 
the setting in which it is employed.  The literal meaning of a 
general term in an enactment must be limited so as not to 
include matters that, although within the letter of the 
enactment, do not fairly come within its spirit and intent."  
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department 
of Agric. Resources, 477 Mass. 280, 287-288 (2017), quoting 
Kenney v. Building Comm'r of Melrose, 315 Mass. 291, 295 (1943).  
Section 41 sets a schedule of fees for particular notarial acts, 
all of which unambiguously refer to acts related to the process 
of protest.  The final clause, setting a fee for "the whole cost 
of noting," takes its meaning from the rest of § 41, and 
therefore must also refer to a particular protest-related act, 
that is, the technical definition of noting an initial protest, 
discussed supra.  Additionally, "[w]here the Legislature uses 
the same words in several sections which concern the same 
subject matter, the words must be presumed to have been used 
with the same meaning in each section" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Insurance Rating Bd. v. Commissioner of Ins., 356 
Mass. 184, 188-189 (1969).  Section 41 uses "noting" twice in 
setting fee limitations.  Its first use sets a fee limit of 
10 
 
seventy-five cents for "noting the non-acceptance or nonpayment 
of a bill of exchange," firmly contextualizing "noting" as a 
notarial act within the scope of protest.  Section 41 then uses 
"noting" within the clause at issue, limiting the "whole cost of 
noting" to $1.25.  Due to the Legislature's repeated use of 
"noting" within § 41, we must presume that the Legislature 
intended to use the term consistently throughout the statute, 
and therefore interpret the second use of noting to be limited 
by the first. 
We also must treat the Legislature's decision not to use a 
broad catch-all phrase such as "notarial act" at the end of § 41 
as intentional, and therefore cannot imply its meaning where the 
phrase was excluded.  See Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 439 Mass. 826, 
833 (2003), quoting 2A N.J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory 
Construction § 46.06, at 194 (6th ed. rev. 2000) ("[W]here the 
legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and 
excluded it in another, it should not be implied where 
excluded").  The Legislature defines "notarial act," or 
"notarization," as "an act that a notary public is empowered to 
perform" in G. L. c. 222, § 1.  Among other things, G. L. 
c. 222, discussed infra, sets forth rules and regulations for 
notaries public.  See G. L. c. 222, §§ 15, 16, 22, 23.  In 
contrast, § 41 excludes any mention of "notarial acts" 
generally, and instead uses precise language throughout the 
11 
 
section to regulate the steps of a protest.  We must presume 
that had the Legislature intended the final clause in § 41 to 
limit fees for all notarial acts, it would have done so. 
Finally, if we were to interpret the last mention of 
"noting" in § 41 as meaning all notarial acts so as to limit the 
fee for all notarial acts to $1.25, that would render other 
parts of § 41 both ambiguous and meaningless, a result we 
eschew.  See King v. Town Clerk of Townsend, 480 Mass. 7, 11 
(2018) (declining to "adopt an interpretation that renders the 
act ambiguous"); Phillips v. Equity Residential Mgt., L.L.C., 
478 Mass. 251, 258 (2017), quoting Adamowicz v. Ipswich, 395 
Mass. 757, 760 (1985) ("so long as it yields a 'logical and 
sensible result,' we do not interpret a statute so as to render 
any portion of it meaningless"); ROPT Ltd. Partnership v. Katin, 
431 Mass. 601, 603 (2000) (court may not interpret statutes to 
produce illogical result). 
Interpreting "the whole cost of noting" to mean the cost of 
any notarial act would result in the final clause of § 41 
capping fees at $1.25 for all notarial acts, including the 
various acts of protest regulated in earlier clauses of § 41.  
This interpretation of the "whole cost of noting" creates direct 
conflict with the earlier clause that caps fees for the "whole 
cost of protest" at two dollars for negotiable instruments with 
a value of $500 or more and at $1.50 for negotiable instruments 
12 
 
with a value under $500.  Protest, as a notarial act, would be 
regulated both by the "whole cost of protest" clause with fee 
limits of two dollars or $1.50, and by the "whole cost of 
noting" clause, which sets a cumulative cap of $1.25 under this 
interpretation.  Defining "the whole cost of noting" as the cost 
of any notarial act renders the fee limits on the "whole cost of 
protest" meaningless because of the conflicting fee caps and 
creates ambiguity over which fee limitation applies when 
protesting negotiable instruments.  We reject this 
interpretation, as it produces an illogical and contradictory 
result.  See Commonwealth v. Rosado, 450 Mass. 657, 663 (2008), 
quoting ROPT Ltd. Partnership, 431 Mass. at 603 (rejecting 
interpretation that would "produce an illogical result"). 
For all of the reasons outlined supra, we conclude that the 
Legislature used "noting" as a term of art describing a specific 
step in the process of noting and did not intend for it to refer 
to all notarial acts.8 
                                                 
8 The plaintiff points to legislative history to support his 
interpretation of § 41.  He contends that, in adding the "whole 
cost of noting" clause to § 41 in 1839, three years after the 
statute was enacted, the Legislature intended to insert a catch-
all fee for all notarial acts, as was present in two colonial 
laws regulating notary fees that predated § 41.  See R.S. 
(1836), c. 122, § 16; St. 1839, c. 93, § 1.  The first colonial 
regulation of notary public fees was enacted in 1650 and 
included a catch-all fee for "any kind of [writing] not hereby 
specially [provided] for."  See 3 Records of the Governor and 
Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England 210 (1854).  By 
13 
 
2.  Section 43.  The plaintiff argues that § 43, which 
governs the fees for official duties or services, confirms that 
the fee for any notarial act is capped at $1.25.  This argument 
is misplaced.  General Laws c. 262, § 43, provides:  "The fees 
of public officers for any official duty or service shall, 
except as otherwise provided, be at the rate prescribed in this 
chapter for like services."  The plaintiff apparently contends 
that § 43 applies the $1.25 fee limit set forth in § 41 to "like 
services," and that "like services" means all notarial acts.  
This argument presupposes that § 41 sets a $1.25 fee cap, which, 
as discussed supra, is an interpretation we reject. 
The ordinary meaning of "like" is "[e]qual in quantity, 
quality, or degree; corresponding exactly," or "[s]imilar or 
substantially similar; of much the same nature."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 1113 (11th ed. 2019).  "Like services," then, refers 
to acts that are virtually identical to ones with fees 
prescribed in G. L. c. 262.  Our interpretation of the precursor 
                                                 
1713, a different fee schedule for notaries public had been 
established, including a similar catch-all provision for "other 
writings" on a per page basis.  See P.L. (1713-1714), c. 4.  
However, the Legislature did not codify either of the colonial 
fee schedules when it enacted the statute at issue in 1836.  
Further, when the Legislature added the "whole cost of noting" 
clause in 1839, it did not adopt the catch-all language of the 
colonial acts, which referred to "any kind of [writing]" and 
"other writings"; instead, the Legislature used "noting," which, 
as discussed supra, is a term with a well-established technical 
meaning. 
14 
 
statute9 to § 43 is consistent with this view.  In Howard v. 
Proctor, 7 Gray 128 (1856), a tax collector charged the 
plaintiffs a commission for costs related to the collector's 
seizure and sale of the plaintiffs' horse to recover unpaid 
taxes.  Id. at 130, 132-133.  Although no statute specifically 
prescribed the fees chargeable by a tax collector, we reasoned 
that, under the precursor statute to § 43, the tax collector was 
permitted to charge a fee equal to the statutory fee prescribed 
for the same act carried out by a sheriff.  Id. at 132-133 ("The 
like services are those of the sheriff").  In Converse v. 
Jennings, 13 Gray 77 (1859), we concluded that a tax collector 
could not charge the statutory fee chargeable by a sheriff for 
executing a levy on real estate because the tax collector's 
action of stopping the sale of a property for nonpayment of 
taxes was not a "like service" to the sheriff's levy on a 
completed sale.  Id. at 78.  Howard and Converse effectuated our 
understanding that fees for "like services" means statutorily 
prescribed fees for the same services performed by a different 
                                                 
9 The relevant statutory language was first enacted in 1836:  
"In all cases, not expressly provided for by law, the fees of 
all public officers, for any official duty or service, shall be 
at the same rate as those prescribed in this chapter for the 
like services."  R.S. (1836), c. 122, § 21.  Over the subsequent 
decades, this statute was slightly revised as the Legislature 
recompiled its statutes.  See G.S. (1860), c. 157, § 14; P.S. 
(1882), c. 199, § 23; R.L. (1902), c. 204, § 33; St. 1913, 
c. 611, § 16.  It was renumbered as G. L. 262, § 43, in 1921, 
where it has remained with the relevant language unchanged. 
15 
 
type of official.  See Simmons v. County of Suffolk, 230 Mass. 
236, 238 (1918) (applying same statutory standard of 
compensation to different justices and clerks for performing 
same "like" services). 
Thus, read together with § 41, § 43 simply requires other 
officials who are authorized to provide the services described 
in § 41 to limit the fees for such services to those enumerated 
in § 41.  For example, a "United States consul or vice consul" 
is also permitted to prepare a protest pursuant to G. L. c. 106, 
§ 3-505 (b).  Section 43 requires a consul who provides that 
service to limit the fees charged to those set forth in § 41.  
Section 43 does not, by reference to "the rate prescribed in 
this chapter for like services," extend the $1.25 fee limit for 
the "whole cost of noting" in § 41 to all notarial acts.  As 
discussed supra, "noting" a protest is a discrete notarial act.  
It is not a service "like" other notarial acts, such as 
notarizing a document or witnessing a signature.  For these 
reasons, we conclude that § 43 has no impact on the scope or 
meaning of § 41. 
3.  Impact of subsequent executive orders and legislation 
on scope of § 41.  The plaintiff additionally argues that, even 
if "noting" was used as a term of art when § 41 was passed in 
1836, by referencing § 41 in Executive Order No. 455, in effect 
the Governor altered the section so that the meaning of the 
16 
 
phrase "the whole cost of noting, including recording and 
notices, shall in no case exceed [$1.25]" was no longer limited 
to protests but was extended to any notarial act.10  We do not 
agree. 
In 2003, the Governor issued Executive Order No. 455, 
entitled "Standards of Conduct for Notaries Public," to provide 
contemporary guidelines regarding the proper duties and conduct 
of notaries public.11  See Executive Order No. 455 (03-13).  The 
executive order provided notaries public with notice of what 
behavior constituted misconduct and would be considered by the 
Governor when deciding whether to appoint, reappoint, or remove 
a notary's commission.  See Executive Order No. 455 (04-04), 
                                                 
 
10 We note that in 2016, in addition to codifying 
substantial portions of Executive Order No. 455, the Legislature 
added §§ 16 and 19 to G. L. c. 222, which provide that notaries 
public cannot charge fees in excess of "the fee provided for in 
[G. L. c. 262, § 41,] or any other general or special law or 
executive order," and must tender services when such fee is paid 
(emphasis added).  See G. L. c. 222, §§ 16 (a) (vi), 19, 
inserted by St. 2016, c. 289, § 6.  Thus, the Legislature has 
authorized the Governor to promulgate fee limitations for 
notarial acts, in addition to the Governor's constitutional 
authority over the appointment and removal of notaries public.  
See arts. 4 and 37 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts 
Constitution. 
 
11 In 2004, the Governor issued a revised Executive Order 
No. 455, which made multiple revisions to the original order.  
Compare, e.g., Executive Order No. 455 (04-04), § 1, with 
Executive Order No. 455 (03-13), § 1.  However, the relevant 
provisions of Executive Order No. 455 are identical in both 
orders.  See Executive Order No. 455 (04-04), §§ 2, 6(a)(6), 7; 
Executive Order No. 455 (03-13), §§ 2, 6(a)(6), 7. 
17 
 
§ 1(a).  With regard to § 41, it provided:  "A notary public 
shall not perform a notarial act if . . . the notary public will 
receive as a direct result of the notarial act any commission, 
fee, . . . or other consideration exceeding in value the fees 
set forth in [G. L. c. 262, § 41] . . . ."  Id. at § 6(a)(6).  
It similarly required that "[a] notary shall perform any 
notarial act described in this executive order for any person 
requesting such an act who tenders the fee set forth in [G. L. 
c. 262, § 41]," unless certain circumstances not relevant here 
are present.  Id. at § 7. 
According to a document published in 2003 by the Governor's 
legal counsel, entitled "Frequently Asked Questions and 
Clarifications:  Executive Order 455 (03-13)," the primary 
purpose of Executive Order No. 455 was to prevent fraud, 
forgery, and other misconduct by notaries public. 
Importantly, although Executive Order No. 455 referenced 
§ 41, the clear intent was to provide a mechanism to enforce 
that section, not to interpret or modify it.12  See Frequently 
                                                 
12 Earlier, in 1996, the Secretary of the Commonwealth 
published a brochure entitled "Guidelines for the Notary 
Public."  Under the heading "What fees may a notary legally 
charge?" the document provides: 
 
"According to their fee statute [G. L. c. 262, § 41 (1986 
ed.)], notaries public may charge no more than one dollar 
and twenty-five cents ($1.25) for noting and recording a 
document and no more than two dollars ($2.00) for 
18 
 
Asked Questions and Clarifications:  Executive Order 455 (03-
13), supra ("Does the Executive Order change any statutes?  No.  
If there is a statutory requirement in place, the Executive 
Order does not change that requirement"). 
In 2016, the Legislature enacted a sweeping reform in 
notary public law with the passage of St. 2016, c. 289, entitled 
"An Act regulating notaries public to protect consumers and the 
validity and effectiveness of recorded instruments".  The 
statute significantly amended G. L. c. 222 and imposed the first 
significant regulations on the conduct of notaries public in 
decades.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 222, §§ 13 (qualifications for 
appointment), 15 (listing notarial acts and prescribing forms 
for acknowledging signatures), 16 (prohibiting certain acts), 17 
(prohibiting notaries from practicing law unless licensed 
attorneys), 21 (requiring specific language in notary public 
                                                 
protesting commercial paper.  As a notary, you are a public 
servant and should be available to perform a public service 
at a reasonable cost.  Excessive charges could result in 
complaints to the Governor's Council." 
 
The plaintiff contends that this publication indicates that the 
Secretary understood G. L. c. 262, § 41, as setting a $1.25 fee 
for "noting and recording" any document.  However, this 
publication, like Executive Order No. 455, simply refers to 
§ 41; it does not purport to modify its meaning.  Even more 
telling, the brochure admonishes notaries that they should be 
"available to perform a public service at a reasonable cost" and 
that "[e]xcessive charges could result in complaints to the 
Governor's Council."  There would be no need for such warnings 
if § 41 set the fee for any notarial act at no more than $1.25. 
19 
 
advertisements in languages other than English).  In doing so, 
the Legislature codified and replaced Executive Order No. 455's 
provisions referencing G. L. c. 262, § 41, by including G. L. c. 
222, §§ 16 and 19, which largely mirror the language of the 
order.  See Executive Order No. 571 (Oct. 6, 2016) (repealing 
Executive Order No. 455, effective on same date on which St. 
2016, c. 289, went into effect). 
Using virtually the same language as Executive Order No. 
455, G. L. c. 222, § 16 (a) (vi), prohibits a notary public from 
performing "a notarial act" for any fee "exceeding the maximum 
fees provided in [G. L. c. 262, § 41,] or any other general or 
special law or executive order."  Section 19 provides that a 
notary public must perform "a notarial act" for any person 
tendering "the fee provided for in [G. L. c. 262, § 41,] or any 
other general or special law or executive order," subject to 
certain exceptions not relevant here.  In turn, G. L. c. 222, 
§ 1, defines "notarial act" and "notarization" as "an act that a 
notary public is empowered to perform." 
The plaintiff argues that the references to § 41 in §§ 16 
and 19 extend the $1.25 fee cap in § 41 to all notarial acts, 
because G. L. c. 222 expressly defines "notarial act" to 
encompass any act performed by a notary public and §§ 16 and 19 
do not state that the fees set forth in § 41 are prescribed only 
for acts related to protest.  However, merely referencing a 
20 
 
previous statute by title and chapter does not suffice to amend 
or alter the meaning of the referenced statute. 
By their plain language, §§ 16 and 19 require a notary 
public to provide services after receipt of the appropriate 
fees, see G. L. c. 222, § 19, and prohibit a notary public from 
receiving payment in excess of the maximum fees, G. L. c. 222, 
§ 16 (a) (vi).  Accordingly, these sections refer not only to 
§ 41, but also to the fees prescribed for a "notarial act" by 
"any other general or special law or executive order."  G. L. 
c. 222, §§ 16 (a) (vi), 19.  At the time the Governor issued 
Executive Order No. 455, G. L. c. 262, § 41, was the only 
statutory authority to prescribe fees chargeable by notaries 
public, and it remains so today.  Nonetheless, the Legislature's 
inclusion of "any other" source of fee limits contemplates that 
if the Legislature enacts subsequent fee limits for notarial 
acts other than protests, §§ 16 and 19 will function to enforce 
those new limits as well.  Thus, just like the executive order 
that preceded them, references to § 41 in §§ 16 and 19 simply 
enforce the fee limitations established in § 41 by establishing 
civil and criminal penalties for charging excessive fees for the 
services enumerated in § 41.  See G. L. c. 222, § 18. 
The plaintiff also contends that G. L. c. 222, § 23, 
evidences the Legislature's implicit understanding that G. L. 
c. 262, § 41, limited fees for all notarial acts.  Section 23 
21 
 
prohibits charging any fee for certain notarial acts:  
"Notwithstanding [G. L. c. 262, § 41], no fee shall be charged 
by a notary public to notarize a signature on an absentee ballot 
identification envelope or other voting materials or on any 
application or claim by a United States military veteran for a 
pension, allotment, allowance, compensation, insurance or other 
veterans' benefit."  Because § 23 forbids fees for specific acts 
unrelated to protest "[n]otwithstanding" G. L. c. 262, § 41, the 
plaintiff argues that the Legislature must have understood § 41 
to regulate all notarial acts, not just protest-related ones.  
We have acknowledged that "[t]he use of such a 'notwithstanding' 
clause clearly signals the drafter's intention that the 
provisions of the 'notwithstanding' section override conflicting 
provisions of any other section."  Attorney Gen. v. Commissioner 
of Ins., 450 Mass. 311, 319 (2008), quoting Cisneros v. Alpine 
Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10, 18 (1993).  However, the 
"notwithstanding" clause in § 23 does not change the complete 
absence of language in G. L. c. 222 purporting to extend the 
$1.25 fee limit in § 41 to all notarial acts.  Further, 
regardless of the Legislature's understanding of the scope of 
§ 41, referencing the section in G. L. c. 222, or anywhere else, 
does not and cannot have the effect of amending § 41 itself.  
That is, even if the Legislature passed G. L. c. 222 with the 
mistaken assumption that § 41 limits the maximum fees for all 
22 
 
notarial acts, this would not broaden § 41's original scope.  
See Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Liberty Mut. 
Ins. Co., 371 Mass. 186, 194 (1976) ("[t]he views of a 
subsequent [Legislature] form a hazardous basis for inferring 
the intent of an earlier one" [citation omitted]). 
Nothing in the language or legislative history of G. L. 
c. 222, §§ 16 and 19, or any other sections of c. 222, indicates 
that the Legislature intended to change the scope of the fee 
structure prescribed by § 41.13 
Conclusion.  We answer the certified question as follows:  
No -- G. L. c. 262, §§ 41 and 43, do not proscribe fees in 
excess of $1.25 for notarial acts unrelated to the act of 
protest, and neither Executive Order No. 455 nor G. L. c. 222 
has any impact on our interpretation of either section. 
The Reporter of Decisions is to furnish attested copies of 
this opinion to the clerk of this court.  The clerk in turn will 
transmit one copy, under the seal of the court, to the clerk of 
the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts, as the answer to the question certified, and will 
also transmit a copy to each party. 
                                                 
13 Of course, should there be a desire on the part of the 
Legislature or the Governor (by way of G. L. c. 222, § 19; see 
note 10, supra) to cap fees at $1.25 for all notarial acts, they 
can do so directly, by way of statute or executive order, 
respectively.