Case Title: CHENNAULT v SAGER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 79-089

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1980-05-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
NO. 79-89 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 C. B . CHENNAULT and MRS. CHENNAULT, Plaintiffs and Appellants, GEORGE SAGER, JOHN BUTTLEMEN, and JOY NASH, COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, GALLATIN COUNTY, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Gallatin. Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Bennett ard Bennett, Bozeman, Montana Lyman H. Bennett I11 argued, Bozeman, Montana For Respondents: Donald White, County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana Leanne Schraudner argued, Deputy County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana Submitted: April 17, 1980 Decided: 6 - 1980 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. his is an appeal from a judgment and order of t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t r e l i e v i n g respondents from t h e e f f e c t s of a temporary r e s t r a i n i n g order. The r e s t r a i n i n g order was issued a s p a r t i a l r e l i e f prayed f o r i n a complaint f i l e d by a p p e l l a n t s wT;lch sought t o permanently e n j o i n respondents from authorizing o r making any improvements upon c e r t a i n property which had been o r i - g i n a l l y designated and dedicated, under a subdivision p l a t , a s a county road. Appellants, M r . and M r s . C. B. Chennault, are t h e owners of Lots 9 and 10 of t h e Lionhead Homesites Subdivi- s i o n i n G a l l a t i n County, Montana. These l o t s are s i t u a t e d a d j a c e n t t o C e n t r a l Avenue. Central Avenue i s a street within t h e subdivision which was designated a s a p u b l i c s t r e e t a t t h e t i m e of t h e recording of t h e subdivision p l a t . During 1973 a p p e l l a n t s contacted t h e G a l l a t i n County commissioners regarding t h e p o s s i b l e abandonment of a por- t i o n of C e n t r a l Avenue. A p e t i t i o n was t h e r e a f t e r d r a f t e d by t h e county on a p p e l l a n t s ' behalf. The p e t i t i o n requested t h e abandonment of t h e n o r t h e r l y 100 f e e t of Central Avenue. Appellants c i r c u l a t e d t h e p e t i t i o n among t h e f r e e h o l d e r s of t h e i r subdivision and obtained t h e s i g n a t u r e s of f o u r people endorsing t h e p e t i t i o n : C. B. Chennault, Orion L. Hendry, Geraldine Hendry, and V i r i l G i l l e s p i e . A f t e r t h e f i l i n g of t h e p e t i t i o n , t h e county commissioners appointed a board of viewers t o i n s p e c t t h e p o r t i o n of t h e street s p e c i f i e d i n t h e p e t i t i o n . The i n s p e c t i o n was conducted on August 16, 1973. On August 23, 1973, t h e board of viewers f i l e d a r e p o r t recommending abandonment of t h e p o r t i o n of t h e road. O n August 2 1 , 1973, t h e G a l l a t i n County road super- v i s o r ' s o f f i c e r Sent n o t i c e s t o those people who had signed t h e p e t i t i o n informing them t h a t a hearing would be held with r e s p e c t t o t h e p e t i t i o n on September 6, 1973. Notices were s e n t by c e r t i f i e d m a i l t o Orion L. Hendry, C. B. Chen- n a u l t a r d M r s . V i r i l G i l l e s p i e . However, n o t i c e w a s n o t given t o any o t h e r adjoining landowners of record. The hearing regarding t h e p e t i t i o n was held on September 6, 1973. A t t h e hearing, t h e commissioners accepted t h e recom- mendation of t h e board of viewers and resolved t o abandon t h e requested p o r t i o n of t h e street. Subsequently, i n 1976, t h e county a t t o r n e y became aware t h a t t h e r e w e r e s e v e r a l inadequacies employed i n t h e process t o abandon t h e street. I n a l e t t e r dated J u l y 1 2 , 1976, t h e county a t t o r n e y n o t i f i e d t h e commissioners of t h e inade- quacies and recommended t h a t t h e order of abandonment be set a s i d e a s i n v a l i d and void. The l e t t e r s t a t e d t h a t , under Montana l a w , too few people had signed t h e p e t i t i o n f o r abandonment and t h a t n o t i c e w a s n o t properly served. Fol- lowing t h e county a t t o r n e y ' s recommendation, t h e commis- s i o n e r s i n v a l i d a t e d t h e o r d e r f o r abandonment on J u l y 1 4 , 1976. Upon being n o t i f i e d t h a t t h e abandonment had been i n v a l i d a t e d , a p p e l l a n t s contacted t h e county a t t o r n e y and were advised of t h e proper s t a t u t o r y procedures f o r aban- donment. Apparently, a p p e l l a n t s a l s o received advice from one of t h e commissioners a s t o how they might cure any d e f e c t s i n t h e i r o r i g i n a l p e t i t i o n f o r abandonment. While a p p e l l a n t s d i d pursue some e f f o r t s t o have t h e order of abandonment r e i n s t i t u t e d , it i s c l e a r t h a t they d i d n o t follow prescribed s t a t u t o r y procedures. O n September 4 , 1978, appellants f i l e d another p e t i t i o n i n accordance with s t a t u t o r y requirements f o r the abandon- ment of a second and separate street within t h e i r subdivi- sion. The street sought t o be declared abandoned w a s known as F i r s t S t r e e t . F i r s t S t r e e t i n t e r s e c t e d Central Avenue and adjoined the Lionhead Subdivision with s e v e r a l l o t s of t h e Southfork Subdivision. A hearing w a s scheduled f o r September 5, 1978, regarding t h i s p e t i t i o n . A t t h e hearing, developers of t h e Southfork Subdivision submitted a letter opposing the request f o r abandonment because it would block access t o t h e i r property. The county surveyor a l s o testi- f i e d t h a t closure of F i r s t S t r e e t would block access t o the Southfork Subdivision and t o Lots 3 and 4 of the Lionhead Subdivision. A compromise w a s reached between t h e p a r t i e s : Central Avenue would remain open a s an access t o Lots 3 and 4 of t h e Lionhead Subdivision as w e l l as t h e Southfork properties, and F i r s t S t r e e t would be abandoned except f o r t h a t portion which crossed Central Avenue. The county commissioners adopted t h i s compromise on September 22, 1978, and declared F i r s t S t r e e t abandoned pursuant t o t h e agreement. The county surveyor then granted t h e developers of t h e Southfork Subdivision permission t o c o n s t r u c t a gravel access road along Central Avenue, including the northerly 100 f e e t of the road f o r which t h e f i r s t abandonment had been invalidated. Appellants brought t h i s a c t i o n t o re- s t r a i n respondents from authorizing these improvements upon t h e road. A s p a r t of t h e r e l i e f requested, a temporary r e s t r a i n i n g order w a s issued by t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r respondents t o show cause why a permanent injunction should n o t issue. A hearing w a s held regarding t h e x a t t e r , and t h e c o u r t entered f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of l a w . The c o u r t held t h a t t h e attempt t o abandon t h e n o r t h e r l y 100 feet of Central Avenue d i d n o t comply with s t a t u t o r y require- ments and w a s void i n i t i a l l y . Accordingly, it determined t h a t t h i s portion of t h e s t r e e t had never been abandoned. A n o r d e r r e l i e v i n g respondents from t h e e f f e c t s of t h e temporary r e s t r a i n i n g order w a s entered by t h e c o u r t on August 10, 1979. It is from t h i s judgment and order t h a t a p p e l l a n t s appeal. A s i n g l e i s s u e i s r a i s e d f o r our consideration: Were respondents, a s G a l l a t i n County commissioners, e q u i t a b l y estopped from r e e s t a b l i s h i n g a p o r t i o n of Central Avenue as a p u b l i c roadway where t h e i n i t i a l attempt t o abandon t h e roadway d i d n o t comply with s t a t u t o r y procedures f o r aban- donment? Both p a r t i e s agree i n t h i s case t h a t Montana s t a t u t e s set f o r t h t h e exclusive method by which county roads must be abandoned. The s t a t u t o r y scheme f o r t h e abandonment of county roads is found i n s e c t i o n s 7-14-2601 through 7-14- 2621, MCA. To i n i t i a t e proceedings, any t e n o r a majority of f r e e h o l d e r s of a road d i s t r i c t p e t i t i o n t h e board of county commissioners f o r t h e abandonment of a p a r t i c u l a r road. Section 7-14-2601, MCA. Within t h i r t y days a f t e r t h e f i l i n g of t h e p e t i t i o n , t h e commissioners cause an i n v e s t i - g a t i o n t o be conducted regarding t h e m e r i t s of t h e p e t i t i o n . Section 7-14-2603, MCA. A p u b l i c hearing i s then scheduled and n o t i c e of t h e hearing i s given. Section 7-14-2615(2), MCA. The r e s u l t s of t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n and t h e hearing are con;i,je.ced by t h e commissioners, and a d e c i s i o n i s entered whether t o abandon t h e road. Within t e n days a f t e r t h e decision, t h e commissioners cause n o t i c e of t h e i r d e c i s i o n t o be s e n t t o a l l owners of land a b u t t i n g t h e road f o r which abandonment was sought. Section 7-14-2604, MCA. The p a r t i e s f u r t h e r agree t h a t t h e r e must be substan- t i a l compliance with t h e s e s t a t u t e s before t h e d o c t r i n e of e q u i t a b l e estoppel can be applied a g a i n s t respondents as commissioners of G a l l a t i n County. The general r u l e regard- ing the a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e d o c t r i n e of e q u i t a b l e estoppel and t h e vacation, discontinuance, o r abandonment of roads i s s t a t e d by one a u t h o r i t y a s follows: "While some l i m i t a t i o n s t o i t s a p p l i c a t i o n a r e t o be found, t h e r u l e appears t o be q u i t e gen- e r a l t h a t where t h e procedure f o r t h e vacation, discontinuance, o r a l t e r a t i o n of a p u b l i c s t r e e t o r highway by d i r e c t a c t i o n of p u b l i c authori- ties i s prescribed by s t a t u t e , it i s necessary t o adhere t o such procedure i n order t h a t the vacation o r a l t e r a t i o n be e f f e c t i v e ; . . . nor a r e t h e public a u t h o r i t i e s precluded by p r i n c i - p l e s of estoppel from denying t h e termination of t h e existence, o r a l t e r a t i o n , of t h e public way i n t h e absence of s u b s t a n t i a l compliance with t h e s t a t u t o r y procedure . . ." 175 A.L.R. 760, 762 (1948). The reluctance t o apply e q u i t a b l e estoppel t o govern- mental e n t i t i e s i s founded upon p u b l i c p o l i c y considera- t i o n s . It i s generally thought t h a t lands held by t h e p u b l i c a r e t o be protected and only disposed of where t h e r e has been compliance with t h e law. The i n t e r e s t s of t h e general p u b l i c should n o t be defeated, f o r example, by t h e unauthorized o r unlawful a c t s of public agents o r o f f i c e r s . See Norman v. S t a t e (1979), - Mont. , 597 P.2d 715, The policy of p r o t e c t i n g public lands and making s t a t u t e s t h e exclusive method f o r t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of p u b l i c lands i s w e l l recognized by our Const:itution. A r t i c l e X, Section 1 1 of t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n s t a t e s : " (1) A l l lands of t h e /state t h a t have been o r may be granted by congress, o r acquired by g i f t o r g r a n t o r devise from any person o r corpora- t i o n , s h a l l be p u b l i c lands of t h e s t a t e . They s h a l l be held i n t r u s t f o r t h e people, t o be disposed of a s h e r e a f t e r provided, f o r t h e re- s p e c t i v e purposes f o r which they have been o r may be granted, donated o r devised. " (2) N o such land o r any e s t a t e o r i n t e r e s t ---- t h e r e i n s h a l l e v e r be disposed o f e x c e p t i n -- p u r s u a n c e g e n e r a l l a w s providing -- f o r such d i s p o s i t i o n , o r u n t i l t h e f u l l market value of t h e e s t a t e o r i n t e r e s t disposed o f , t o be as- c e r t a i n e d i n such manner a s may be-provided by law, has been paid o r s a f e l y secured t o t h e s t a t e . " (Emphasis added. ) A s a r e s u l t of t h e s e policy considerations, we have s t a t e d i n previous cases t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e doc- t r i n e of e q u i t a b l e estoppel t o governmental e n t i t i e s w i l l be looked upon with disfavor. The d o c t r i n e w i l l only be ap- p l i e d i n exceptional circumstances o r where t h e r e i s mani- f e s t i n j u s t i c e . Von Tobel v. C i t y of Lewistown (1910), 4 1 Mont. 226, 108 P. 910; B i l l i n g s v. P i e r c e Co. (1945), 117 Mont. 255, 161 P.2d 636. W e must determine, under t h e p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s and circumstances of t h i s case, whether t h e d o c t r i n e should be applied here. That determination, of course, i s dependent upon whether t h e r e w a s s u b s t a n t i a l compliance with Montana s t a t u t e s regarding t h e abandonment of roads. I n t h i s case, respondents suggest as one of t h e i r argu- ments t h a t a p p e l l a n t s d i d n o t o b t a i n a s u f f i c i e n t number of s i g n a t u r e s t o s u b s t a n t i a l l y comply with t h e requirements of s e c t i o n 7-14-2601, MCA. That s t a t u t e , a s has been previ- ously s t a t e d , r e q u i r e s a p e t i t i o n t o contain t h e s i g n a t u r e s of e i t h e r t e n o r a majority of f r e e h o l d e r s of t h e road d i s t r i c t where abandonment is sought. Appellants' :?et:ition obviously does n o t comply with t h e f i r s t p a r t of t h e s t a t - u t e , s i n c e it only contains four s i g n a t u r e s . I t a l s o appears, under t h e f a c t s presented, t h a t com- p l i a n c e with t h e second p a r t was impossible. During o r a l argument, t h e p a r t i e s informed us t h a t t h e e n t i r e G a l l a t i n County comprises only one road d i s t r i c t , i n which t h e r e a r e well over 40,000 r e s i d e n t s . A "majority," t h e r e f o r e , would be more than 20,000 signatures. Because of t h e a b s u r d i t y of t h i s requirement, a p p e l l a n t s suggest t h a t t h e s t a t u t e should be construed t o r e q u i r e only t h e s i g n a t u r e s of "a majority of those d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d " by t h e abandonment. I t i s urged under such a construction t h a t simply t h e s i g n a t u r e s of those owning land which immediately a d j o i n s t h e land sought t o be abandoned would be s u f f i c i e n t . Although t h e r e are s e v e r a l persons owning land on Central Avenue i n t h i s case, only t h r e e landowners own l o t s immediately adjoining t h e n o r t h e r l y 1 0 0 f e e t of t h e s t r e e t . W e d e c l i n e t o adopt t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n advanced by a p p e l l a n t s . Adopting t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would f o r c e u s t o exceed our proper r o l e i n t h e construction of s t a t u t e s . The r o l e of a c o u r t i n construing a s t a t u t e i s simply t o ascer- t a i n and d e c l a r e i t s substance and n o t t o i n s e r t what has been omitted. Section 1-2-101, MCA. I n t h i s connection, t h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t o t h e s t a t u t e i s t o be pursued i f p o s s i b l e . Section 1-2-102, MCA. Here, t h e s t a t u t e simply states t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n must contain, a s one a l t e r n a t i v e , t h e s i g n a t u r e s of a "majority of f r e e h o l d e r s of t h e road d i s t r i c t . " The s t a t u t e does not say " a majority of those d i r e c t l y affected." Nor i s t h e r e any l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t expressed t h a t t h i s was t h e d e s i r e of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . Further, even i f w e were t o adopt a p p e l l a n t s ' i n t e r p r e - t a t i o n , it is doubtful whether t h i s would r i d any problems of a p p l i c a t i o n . The p r e s e n t problem with applying t h e "majority requirement" is t h a t t h e s i z e of road d i s t r i c t s and t h e number of f r e e h o l d e r s t h e r e i n vary. Depending upon whether t h e r e i s one o r many road d i s t r i c t s i n a county, it may be reasonable t o attempt t o o b t a i n a majority i n some circumstances while it i s unreasonable i n o t h e r s . S i m i l a r l y , t h e problem with a p p e l l a n t s ' proposed construction lies i n determining which landowners a r e d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d . It i s an o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n t o say t h a t " d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d land- owners" a r e those who own l o t s immediately a d j a c e n t t o t h e land sought t o be abandoned. Conceivably, o t h e r landowners besides t h e s e a r e a f f e c t e d by t h e abandonment. A number of c a s e s have held t h a t a required number of s i g n a t u r e s s p e c i f i e d i n a s t a t u t e f o r t h e abandonment, vaca- t i o n o r termination of a road is a m a t e r i a l element and t h a t t h e f a i l u r e t o o b t a i n such s i g n a t u r e s f a l l s s h o r t of sub- s t a n t i a l compliance. See 175 A.L.R. 760, 771, f o r an exten- s i v e l i s t of cases. For example, where a s t a t u t e f o r t h e vacation of a p u b l i c highway required t h e s i g n a t u r e s of twelve f r e e h o l d e r s of t h e county, and a p p e l l a n t submitted a p e t i t i o n f o r vacation containing only one s i g n a t u r e , a c o u r t held t h a t t h e board of commissioners was without a u t h o r i t y t o a c t with r e s p e c t t o t h e vacation. Eads v. Kumley (1918), 67 1nd.App. 361, 119 N.E. 219. There t h e c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t t h e commissioners had only such powers a s were conferred upon them by s t a t u t e , and where procedures enunciated by s t a t u t e w e r e n o t complied with, t h e proceeding was a n u l l i t y . Eads, 119 N.E. a t 221. I n d e a l i n g with t h e same s t a t u t e i n another case where seven of seventeen p e t i t i o n e r s f i l e d a w r i t t e n withdrawal of t h e i r names from a p e t i t i o n f o r vacation before t h e r e was an assumption of j u r i s d i c t i o n , t h e c o u r t held t h e commissioners w e r e without a u t h o r i t y t o assume j u r i s d i c t i o n and consider t h e m a t t e r . Current v. Current (19201, 72 Ind-App. 3 6 3 , 125 N.E. 779. I n t h i s case, w e do n o t think it was an unreasonable burden f o r a p p e l l a n t s t o o b t a i n t e n s i g n a t u r e s on t h e i r abandonment p e t i t i o n . The D i s t r i c t Court c o r r e c t l y held t h a t , because t h e r e was a f a i l u r e t o s u b s t a n t i a l l y comply with t h e s t a t u t e s on abandonment, t h e proceeding was void i n i t i a l l y . The comrnissioners were without a u t h o r i t y t o a c t with r e s p e c t t o t h e abandonment. Appellants here r e l y heavily on t h e f a c t t h a t county o f f i c i a l s and employees w e r e i n t r i c a t e l y involved i n t h e attempted abandonment. Appellants contend t h a t t h e county should be estopped from i n v a l i d a t i n g t h e abandonment because t h e a c t s c o n s t i t u t i n g noncompliance with t h e s t a t u t e s w e r e t h e u n i l a t e r a l a c t s of t h e county. County employees pre- pared a p p e l l a n t s ' p e t i t i o n providing space f o r only s i x s i g n a t u r e s , and a county commissioner apparently gave appel- l a n t s improper advice as t o how t o c u r e d e f e c t s i n t h e p e t i t i o n once t h e order f o r abandonment had been i n v a l i - dated. Although a p p e l l a n t s had, arguably, equal access t o t h e law, w e think i n general t h a t the p u b l i c has a r i g h t t o r e l y upon t h e advice and a c t i o n s of public employees and o f f i - c i a l s . I n t h i s connection, w e note t h a t t h e county a t t o r n e y properly advised a p p e l l a n t s of t h e s t a t u t o r y procedures f o r abandonment. I r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e negligence of p u b l i c employees and o f f i c i a l s , however, t h e foremost consideration i n our minds lies with t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e public i n t e r e s t . This countervailing p u b l i c policy has taken on such impor- tance t h a t it i s expressed i n our Constitution. Where p u b l i c lands a r e disposed of and t h e r e has been i n s u f f i c i e n t compliance with laws providing f o r t h e i r d i s p o s i t i o n , the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t must be protected. I n Norman, 597 P.2d a t 7 1 9 , 36 St.Rep. a t 1098, w e s t a t e d : "We recognize t h a t it w a s t h e negligence of t h e S t a t e ' s agents t h a t caused t h e s i t u a t i o n which gave r i s e t o t h i s appeal. However, t h e i n t e r e s t w e seek t o p r o t e c t i s t h a t of t h e c i t i z e n s of t h i s S t a t e t o r e c e i v e t h e h i g h e s t value from t h e s a l e of t h e lands t h e i r S t a t e government holds i n t r u s t f o r them. S t r i c t compliance with t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and s t a t u - t o r y provisions r e l a t i n g t o those lands i s t h e b e s t mode t o i n s u r e t h a t p r o t e c t i o n . I t i s generally conceded t h a t while estoppel may be e f f e c t e d a g a i n s t S t a t e government, it may n o t be a s s e r t e d where it would i n t e r f e r e with t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e p u b l i c ' s i n t e r e s t i n lands. [ C i t a t i o n s omitted. 1 " Accordingly, w e hold, without addressing t h e remaining arguments r a i s e d by a p p e l l a n t s , t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t e r r i n f a i l i n g t o apply t h e d o c t r i n e of e q u i t a b l e estop- p e l a g a i n s t t h e county. Appellants have n o t s u b s t a n t i a l l y complied with s t a t u t o r y procedures f o r abandonment. There- f o r e , t h e D i s t r i c t Court has no b a s i s f o r even considering t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e doctrine. The order f o r abandonment was void i n i t i a l l y because t h e commissioners d i d n o t have t h e a u t h o r i t y t o a c t . The D i s t r i c t Court d i d not abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n and, accordingly, t h e judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed. W e concur: %ap%