Case Title: State v. Cox

Citation: 

Docket Number: S48092

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2004-10-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  October 14, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
DAVID LEE COX,
Appellant.
(CC 99C46448; SC S48092)
En Banc
On automatic and direct review of the judgment of conviction
and sentence of death imposed by the Marion County Circuit Court.
Terry Ann Leggert, Judge.
Argued and submitted July 20, 2004.
Dan Maloney, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause
and filed the briefs for appellant.  With him on the briefs was
Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director of the Office of Public
Defense Services.
Erika L. Hadlock, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for respondent.  With her on the
briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General, Timothy Sylwester and Ryan Kahn, Assistant
Attorneys General.
KISTLER, J.
The judgment of conviction and sentence of death are
affirmed.
KISTLER, J.
This case is before us on automatic and direct review
of defendant's judgment of conviction and sentence of death. 
Defendant raises 37 assignments of error challenging the trial
court's rulings during the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. 
For the reasons set out below, we affirm the judgment of
conviction and sentence of death.
This case arises out of a homicide at the Oregon State
Penitentiary (OSP).  The relevant facts divide into three parts: 
defendant's relationship with the victim, Mark Davis; Davis's
relationship with the Lakota Club and another inmate, Donnie
Graham; and finally the agreement among the Lakota Club, Graham,
and defendant to kill Davis.  We begin with the relationship
between defendant and Davis and set out the facts consistently
with the jury's verdict.  See State v. Pratt, 309 Or 205, 207,
785 P2d 350 (1990), cert den, 510 US 969 (1993) (stating standard
of review).
In 1998, a dispute arose between defendant and Davis. 
Davis asked defendant for permission to use defendant's "rig," a
homemade syringe used to inject drugs.  Although defendant denied
Davis permission, Davis told defendant's cellmate otherwise.  The
cellmate gave Davis defendant's rig, which contained defendant's
drugs.  Defendant became upset when he learned what had happened. 
In an effort to make things right, defendant's cellmate took
Davis's sunglasses and gave them to defendant.  Later, in front
of other inmates, Davis took his sunglasses back from defendant
at knife point.
Within the prison, defendant had a reputation as a
"heavyweight" convict -- someone who demanded respect from the
other inmates.  Davis enjoyed a lesser reputation.  According to
one inmate, Davis was a "punk" -- someone who was "just a
complete scumbag, homosexual, not to be trusted."  When Davis
took his sunglasses back from defendant at knife point, he
undermined defendant's reputation within the prison.  As an
inmate explained, "if [Davis] does something bad to [defendant]
and [defendant] doesn't respond to it, he's now gotten punked by
a punk.  We call that being a punk's punk."  To restore his
reputation, defendant needed to retaliate against Davis.
Davis also had problems with other inmates.  Davis was
involved in trafficking heroin and tobacco within the prison. 
Davis traded heroin that he obtained from an inmate, Graham, to
the Lakota Club (1)
 for tobacco.  Davis in turn traded the
tobacco that he received from the Lakota Club to Graham for
heroin.  The Lakota Club understood that Davis was getting the
heroin from a guard, and Graham understood that Davis was getting
the tobacco from a guard.  Neither was aware that the other was
supplying Davis with contraband.
Davis told the Lakota Club that the guard was late in
supplying him with heroin and asked the club to "front" or
advance him some tobacco until he could get the heroin and pay
the club.  Davis told a similar story to Graham.  The club and
Graham advanced respectively tobacco and heroin to Davis on the
understanding that he would pay when the guard came through. 
There was, however, no guard, and Davis did not repay either the
club or Graham.
Graham learned that Davis was getting the tobacco from
the Lakota Club.  Graham spoke with the club members and told
them that he, and not a guard, had been supplying Davis with the
heroin that Davis had been trading to the Lakota Club.  When
Graham and the Lakota Club realized that Davis had "burned" them,
they were concerned about his actions for two reasons.  First, he
still owed them a debt.  Second, and more importantly to Graham
and the Lakota Club, Davis's actions affected their ability to
collect from other inmates.  A member of the Lakota Club
explained:
"[I]f word gets out that, you know, you're selling --
you've got a product for sale, but yet you're going to
let this guy over here who is considered a nobody to
burn you, I mean, you can't expect nobody else to pay
their bill because they are going to look at you as
being weak."
Graham and the Lakota Club were aware that Davis also
had "burned" defendant in a deal and had "disrespected" defendant
when he had taken the sunglasses from defendant at knife point. 
Recognizing that defendant had an interest in retaliating against
Davis, Graham proposed that he, the Lakota Club, (2)
 and
defendant enter into an agreement.  Graham offered to give
defendant $5,000 worth of heroin, and the Lakota Club offered to
give defendant $500 worth of tobacco and supply him with a knife
if defendant would agree to "deal with" Davis.  Defendant
accepted the offer.
Pursuant to their agreement, the Lakota Club and Graham
provided defendant with the heroin and tobacco two to three weeks
before he stabbed Davis.  That way, defendant could "have some
fun, get high, smoke cigarettes, sell some heroin and raise some
money" before the stabbing.  The Lakota Club also provided
defendant with a knife.  One of the club members gave defendant a
shank (a homemade knife) that the club members had sharpened by
grinding it on the concrete floor in the clubhouse.  The "war
chief" of the club explained to the club member who gave
defendant the shank how to stab Davis in the back in a way that
would kill him.
On September 13, 1998, as the inmates were lined up on
the prison yard to return to their cells, defendant came quickly
across the yard.  Holding the shank with both hands, he stabbed
the shank in Davis's back and pushed it up towards Davis's heart. 
He pushed so hard that one inmate saw Davis "going up on his toes
as he was stabbed."  Davis stumbled against another inmate and
then reached back and pulled the shank out of his back.  The
shank went between Davis's ribs and into his left lung and aorta,
causing him to die from internal bleeding. 
A grand jury indicted defendant for aggravated murder
and possessing a weapon in a correctional institution.  See ORS
163.095(2)(b) (defining aggravated murder as intentional homicide
committed by person confined in correctional institution); ORS
166.275 (prohibiting inmates from possessing weapons).  The jury
convicted defendant of both charges and imposed the death
penalty.  On review, defendant raises 37 assignments of error
challenging his aggravated murder conviction and death sentence. 
We write to address 23 of the assignments of error.  We affirm
the other rulings to which defendant has assigned error without
further discussion.
EVIDENCE OF THE VICTIM'S CRIMINAL ACTS
At trial, defendant did not dispute that he had stabbed
Davis.  He argued, however, that he had intended to injure Davis,
not kill him.  It followed, he concluded, that at most he could
be guilty of manslaughter.  Defendant's counsel outlined
defendant's theory of the case in his opening statement. 
Defendant claimed that he feared Davis and wanted to stab him so
that the prison officials would transfer Davis to another
facility.  More specifically, defendant understood that, if he
stabbed Davis and injured him, Davis would not tell the prison
officials who had stabbed him.  Not knowing who stabbed Davis,
the prison officials would have to transfer Davis to a different
facility to protect him.
To establish that he feared Davis, defendant sought to
introduce evidence in the guilt phase of his trial that Davis had
acted violently (1) towards defendant and (2) towards others in
prison.  The trial court ruled that defendant could introduce
evidence of Davis's violent acts towards him but that he could
not introduce evidence of Davis's violent acts towards others.
After the trial court made its ruling, defendant made
an offer of proof to preserve his objection.  He called witnesses
who would have testified that:  (1) on April 2, 1989, Davis
became angry with his cellmate at the Oregon State Correctional
Institution (OSCI) and cut him with a razor; (2) on October 27,
1989, Davis used a razor blade to hold a guard hostage at OSCI
for approximately an hour; (3) in 1995, Davis stole an inmate's
watch at OSP while the inmate was taking a shower and also pulled
a weapon on another inmate to take his drugs; (4) in 1994 or
1995, Davis stole an inmate's shoes at OSP and hit the inmate
with his fists when he tried to retake the shoes; and (5) in 1996
or 1997, Davis robbed an inmate at OSP with a shank.  Also, two
of the inmate witnesses would have offered their opinion that
Davis was violent, and one inmate witness would have opined that
Davis was psychotic. (3)

After considering defendant's offer of proof, the trial
court clarified the basis of its ruling.  It stated that evidence
of Davis's violent acts towards others had little bearing on
whether defendant intended to injure rather than kill Davis. 
Even if the evidence had some relevance, the court concluded that
the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative
value.  The court reasoned that evidence of Davis's violence
towards others
"would be misleading to the jury and create a lot of
additional evidence that would just become confusing,
and I think really would just be a -- lead the jurors 
* * * more down the line [that] the victim deserved to
be killed, so we're not going to pay attention to
whether or not the defendant was trying to kill the
victim or just injure him, which is really what th[e
jurors] need to be focused on in this case."
The court also noted that, without testimony that defendant was
aware of Davis's violent acts towards others, evidence of those
acts would not be relevant.  The court accordingly permitted
defendant to introduce evidence only of Davis's violent acts
towards defendant.
Under OEC 404(3), three-part test applies when a party
seeks to introduce other crimes or bad acts evidence to prove
motive: 
"'(1) The evidence must be independently relevant for a
noncharacter purpose [such as, in this case, proof of
motive]; (2) the proponent of the evidence must offer
sufficient proof that the uncharged misconduct was
committed and that [the victim] committed it; and
(3) the probative value of the uncharged misconduct
evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the
dangers or considerations set forth in OEC 403.  Each
of these requirements must be satisfied before
uncharged misconduct evidence is admissible under
OEC 404(3).'"
State v. Hampton, 317 Or 251, 254, 855 P2d 621 (1993) (quoting
State v. Johnson, 313 Or 189, 195, 832 P2d 443 (1992)) (first
brackets in original).  The state does not dispute that defendant
satisfied the second step in the test.  It focuses instead on the
first and third steps.
The first step in the test combines two analytically
separate questions -- whether the evidence is relevant and, if
so, whether it is relevant for a purpose that OEC 404(3) permits. 
In this case, the state contends that defendant's evidence was
not relevant, but it does not dispute that, if the evidence was
relevant, OEC 404(3) permits its admission to prove defendant's
motive.  We pause briefly to explain why we agree that
defendant's proffered evidence, if relevant, is admissible under
OEC 404(3).  Under that rule, other crimes evidence "is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
that the person acted in conformity therewith."  OEC 404(3).  "It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive."  Id.; see State v. Johns, 301 Or 535, 544, 725 P2d 312
(1986) (explaining that OEC 404(3) is rule of inclusion).
Here, defendant sought to introduce evidence of Davis's
other crimes to show that Davis had a propensity for violence. 
But he did not seek to prove that character trait to show that
Davis had acted in conformity therewith, which is what OEC 404(3)
prohibits.  See Johns, 301 Or at 548 (stating that OEC 404(3)
prohibits admission of other crimes evidence only if it is
offered to prove both "(1) the character of a person, and (2)
that the person acted in conformity therewith").  Rather,
defendant sought to introduce evidence that Davis had acted
violently to prove his own motive for stabbing Davis -- that
defendant reasonably believed that he needed to protect himself
from Davis.  OEC 404(3) permits the admission of other crimes
evidence for that purpose.  See Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Oregon
Evidence § 404.06, Art IV-59 (4th ed 2002) (explaining
proposition).
Having concluded that OEC 404(3) permits the admission
of defendant's evidence, we turn to the question whether the
evidence is relevant.  Evidence is relevant if it increases or
decreases, even slightly, the probability of the existence of any
material fact in issue.  Hampton, 317 Or at 255.  In this case,
the state argues that the proffered evidence was not relevant for
two reasons.  It observes initially that evidence of Davis's
violent acts against others is relevant to prove defendant's
motive only if defendant knew of those acts.  On this record, the
state contends, a reasonable juror could not find that defendant
knew what Davis had done to others.
We agree that Davis's violent acts towards others are
relevant to prove that defendant feared Davis only if defendant
was aware of those acts.  See State v. Horseman, 52 Or 572, 579,
98 P 135 (1908) (recognizing principle).  As the state notes,
without defendant's testimony, the jury could infer defendant's
knowledge only from circumstantial evidence.  On that point,
defendant argues that one witness testified that the "prison
grapevine is very accurate and very fast."  Defendant contends
that, given that evidence, a reasonable juror could infer that
defendant was aware of Davis's violent acts both at OSCI and at
OSP.
Two of the incidents concerning Davis that defendant
included in his offer of proof occurred at OSCI approximately
nine years before defendant stabbed Davis.  Both incidents were
remote in time; they occurred at a different correctional
institution, and it would be mere speculation to conclude, on
this record, that defendant was aware of those incidents. (4) The other incidents occurred at OSP from 1994 to 1997.  Although
somewhat distant in time, they did occur in the same penitentiary
where defendant was incarcerated.  We assume, without deciding,
that evidence of the prison grapevine was sufficient to permit a
weak inference that defendant was aware of the incidents at
OSP. (5)

The state advances an alternative reason why the
evidence was not relevant.  It argues that evidence that
defendant feared Davis did not make it more likely that defendant
intended to injure rather than kill Davis.  In the context of
this case, we reach a different conclusion.  Evidence that
defendant feared Davis made it more likely that defendant would
take some action to protect himself from Davis.  Given the more
serious consequences that would result from murder, the jury
reasonably could agree with defendant's theory and find that he
sought to injure rather than kill Davis in order to get the
prison officials to move him.  In sum, evidence of Davis's other
crimes at OSP was relevant to prove that defendant feared Davis. 
The remaining question is whether, even if relevant,
the evidence's "probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury."  OEC 403; Hampton, 317 Or at 254 n 4. (6) We review the trial court's resolution of that issue for abuse of
discretion.  See State v. Barone, 328 Or 68, 87, 969 P2d 1013
(1998), cert den, 528 US 1135 (2000) (employing that standard of
review).  In reviewing the trial court's ruling, we note that the
court did not preclude defendant from introducing any evidence to
prove that he feared Davis.  Rather, it permitted him to
introduce evidence of Davis's violent acts toward defendant. 
There was also evidence that another inmate had told defendant,
when Davis tried to take his glasses back from defendant at knife
point, that "you already know the guy is fucking crazy, man.  He
gets on them drugs and he wants more, you know.  He's crazy." 
Similarly, another inmate testified that he did not have "any
dealings" with Davis.  He had explained that the "guy was a
serious dope fiend, maniac.  To have any dealings with Mark Davis
would be jeopardizing your well -- safety * * *."
In deciding whether to admit additional other crimes
evidence, the trial court reasonably could conclude that the
probative value of defendant's proffered evidence was minimal. 
There was, at best, only a weak inference that defendant was even
aware of Davis's other crimes at OSP.  Some of those crimes
involved thefts with no threat of violence.  The remainder
involved two or three incidents similar to the one that defendant
experienced -- the threatened use of a weapon or fists to take or
retain someone else's property.  Although evidence of those
incidents would have advanced defendant's case, the trial court
reasonably could conclude that they would not have added greatly
to the evidence already before the jury.
The trial court also identified two potential risks of
introducing defendant's evidence.  First, the court noted that
allowing defendant to prove and the state to disprove Davis's
acts towards others would "create a lot of additional evidence
that would just become confusing" to the jury.  As we understand
the trial court, it was concerned about the potential for a
series of mini-trials to determine what Davis had or had not done
on other occasions and whether it was likely that defendant had
or had not known of those acts.  Second, the court reasoned that
evidence of Davis's crimes towards others could cause the jury to
focus on whether Davis "deserved to be killed" rather than on
whether defendant intended to injure or kill Davis when he
stabbed him.  See John W. Strong, 1 McCormick on Evidence § 193
at 681 ((1999) (observing that admitting evidence of victim's bad
character poses that risk of prejudice).
Weighing the potential for prejudice against the
relevance of defendant's proffered evidence, the trial court
explained in some detail why the prejudicial effect of the
evidence substantially outweighed its probative value.  This
court has recognized that "trial judges are granted broad
discretion when findings are made on the record to back up this
discretionary call."  State v. Mayfield, 302 Or 631, 647, 733 P2d
438 (1987); accord Hampton, 317 Or at 260.  Here, the trial court
persuasively explained why it reached its conclusion.  In light
of the weak inference that defendant had any knowledge of Davis's
acts towards others, we cannot say that the court abused its
discretion.
STRIKING DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY
Defendant testified during the guilt phase of the
trial.  Much of his testimony repeated, in greater detail,
evidence that already was in the record.  Defendant testified
concerning his drug use in prison, recounted his confrontations
with Davis, and described how Davis had taken the sunglasses from
him at knife point.  He testified that, as a result of Davis's
actions, he feared him. (7)
  Defendant also testified
concerning the events surrounding the stabbing.  He testified
that the Lakota Club had not given him the shank.  He explained
that he had torn a metal bar out of a cart and that "a guy that
works out in [the prison] industries * * * took it out and
sharpened it, brought it back to me the very next day." 
Defendant also explained that, if he had wanted to harm Davis, he
would not have gone to the Lakota Club for help.  He denied that
either Graham or the Lakota Club had given him anything in
exchange for attacking Davis.   Finally, when asked whether he
had intended to kill Davis, defendant testified, "No way, no way,
never.  I wanted to hurt the guy and I wanted the worm -- I
wanted the wound to be serious and noticeable, but I didn't want
that wound to be fatal."
During cross-examination, a question arose concerning
defendant's other crimes.  The trial court excused the jury, and
the state asked defendant a series of questions.  Outside the
presence of the jury, defendant answered some of the state's
questions.  He refused, however, to answer three questions.  He
refused to identify the person who, he testified, had helped him
make the weapon that he used to stab Davis.  He refused to
identify the persons to whom he sold drugs in the prison, and he
refused to identify the persons who supplied him with those
drugs.  The trial court advised defense counsel that, "if
[defendant] refuses to answer the questions on cross-examination,
then his testimony will be stricken."  The court added, "I don't
know if you want to talk to him, but that's the rule."
The trial court gave defense counsel an opportunity to
speak privately with their client.  The court then confirmed that
defendant understood that, if he refused to answer the three
questions, the court would strike his testimony.  After the court
had clarified defendant's position, one of defendant's counsel
noted that "there is another issue which arises, and that is
whether striking all of the testimony is the appropriate remedy." 
Counsel directed the court's attention to a Court of Appeals case
and explained that the decision whether to strike all of
defendant's testimony "rests with the discretion of the court."
Having considered defense counsel's arguments, the
trial court advised counsel that it was going to tell the jury
that it was striking defendant's testimony but, if defendant
changed his position over the weekend, to let the court know. 
The court then called the jury in and told them:
"The State is unable to cross-examine the defendant on
all of his direct testimony; therefore, the defendant's
entire testimony is stricken.  You're not to consider
it in your deliberations at all."
After the court gave the jury that instruction, it excused them
for the weekend, and defendant moved for a mistrial because "the
remedy employed by this court in striking all of the defendant's
testimony is greater than that which would be necessary to
redress the harm addressed by the state's inability to cross-examine him on the particular points that were made."  The court
denied the motion.
When the trial resumed, the trial court returned to its
decision to strike defendant's testimony.  The court explained to
the parties that it had reviewed the case that defense counsel
had provided "regarding the court's options, which was striking
the defendant's [witness's] testimony, and although the -- that
case discussed that you could maybe parcel out, you know, some
parts of the testimony, in that particular case the court struck
[all of] the defendant's witness['s] testimony."  The court
explained that, having reviewed the case and reconsidered the
issue, it adhered to its ruling striking defendant's testimony.
Defendant raises three issues on review.  First, he
argues that the trial court erroneously believed that, once he
refused to answer the state's questions on cross-examination, the
court's only option was to strike his testimony.  Second, he
argues that the trial court abused its discretion because
striking his testimony was not necessary to remedy the harm
caused by his refusal to answer the questions.  Finally,
defendant argues that striking his testimony was "arbitrary and
disproportionate under the federal constitution."  We begin with
defendant's subconstitutional arguments.
Defendant argues initially that the trial court failed
to recognize that it had discretion either to strike his
testimony or impose a less onerous remedy when he refused to
answer the state's questions.  He contends that the trial court's
decision rests on a misapprehension of the law.  See State v.
Rogers, 330 Or 282, 310-11, 4 P3d 1261 (2000) (addressing
comparable problem).
The premise of defendant's argument is correct.  In
Oregon, trial courts have broad discretion to control the order
and presentation of evidence.  See OEC 611 (stating that courts
shall exercise reasonable control over order and presentation of
evidence); Rogers, 330 Or at 300 (recognizing that principle). 
That includes the discretion to strike the testimony of a witness
who refuses to answer questions on cross-examination or to impose
a less onerous sanction when appropriate.  See State v. Mende,
304 Or 18, 21, 741 P2d 496 (1987) (holding that, although not
required to do so, trial court had discretion to strike
defendant's affidavit when he refused to submit to cross-examination).
Although defendant's premise is correct, he errs in
asserting that the trial court misperceived the scope of its
authority.  The trial court expressly recognized that it either
could strike defendant's testimony or impose a lesser sanction,
if appropriate, to cure defendant's refusal to answer questions
on cross-examination.  Although the trial court's initial remarks
might have suggested a different understanding, the court's later
statements reveal that it correctly understood the scope of its
authority.
Defendant advances a second argument.  He contends that
only one of the questions that he refused to answer went to the
merits of his testimony and that two of the questions concerning
drugs were merely collateral.  In defendant's view, his failure
to answer those questions did not prejudice the state in a way
that would warrant striking all of his testimony.  The state
responds that defendant did not preserve the question whether the
trial court should have imposed a lesser sanction and that, if he
did, the trial court acted within its discretion in assessing the
effect of defendant's refusal to answer on the state's right to
test defendant's testimony on cross-examination.
We begin with the state's preservation argument.  See
State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 15 P3d 22 (2000) (considering
preservation first).  In Wyatt, the court explained that a
party's "failure to object to the particular sanction imposed by
the judge or, in the alternative, to argue for some other
sanction, fails to preserve a claim on appeal that the judge
erred in failing to consider the availability of a less onerous
sanction."  331 Or at 343 (footnote omitted).  Here, defendant
objected to the particular sanction that the trial court imposed. 
Although defendant did not propose lesser sanctions, Wyatt does
not require that he do so to preserve the issue.  We accordingly
turn to the merits of defendant's second argument.
The court has held that, when a witness's death during
a civil trial prevented the opposing party from cross-examining
her, the trial court could either strike the witness's direct
testimony or declare a mistrial.  Best v. Tavenner, 189 Or 46,
54, 218 P2d 471 (1950).  More recently, the court has recognized
that, although not required to do so, a trial court may strike a
criminal defendant's testimony who refuses to submit to cross-examination.  Mende, 304 Or at 21.  The court has not had
occasion until now to identify the principles that should guide a
court's discretion when a party refuses to answer only some
cross-examination questions.  We turn to that question.
A criminal defendant has both a statutory and a
constitutional right to testify in his or her own defense. 
See ORS 136.643 (statutory right); (8)
 State v. Lotches, 331 Or
455, 483 n 10, 17 P3d 1045 (2000), cert den, 534 US 833 (2001)
(recognizing defendants' state and federal constitutional rights
to testify). (9)
  As the court has recognized, however, a
criminal defendant's right to testify is subject to the state's
right to cross-examine him or her.  See Mende, 304 Or at 21.  ORS
136.643 expressly conditions the defendant's right to testify on
the state's right of cross-examination, and defendant does not
argue that either the state or federal constitution prohibits the
legislature from imposing that condition.  Such an argument would
be difficult to mount.  See Rogers, 330 Or at 301-02 (recognizing
that rights under Article I, section 11, are subject to
reasonable limitations); Brown v. United States, 356 US 148, 154-56, 78 S Ct 622, 2 L Ed 2d 589 (1957) (recognizing that criminal
defendant's right to testify is subject to cross-examination).
"For two centuries past, the policy of the Anglo-American system of evidence has been to regard the necessity of
testing by cross-examination as a vital feature of the law." 
John Henry Wigmore, 5 Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1367, at
32 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).  As this court has explained, "[i]t is
axiomatic that a party against whom a witness is called has the
right to cross-examine the latter."  Best, 189 Or at 53.  And the
United States Supreme Court has stated that a criminal defendant
"has no right to set forth to the jury all the facts which tend
in his favor without laying himself open to a cross-examination
upon those facts."  Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 US 304,
315, 20 S Ct 944, 44 L Ed 1078 (1900).  These decisions, as well
as ORS 136.643, reflect the considered judgment
"that no safeguard for testing the value of human
statements is comparable to that furnished by cross-examination, and the conviction that no statement
(unless by special exception) should be used as
testimony until it has been probed and sublimated by
that test."
Wigmore, 5 Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1367 at 32.
It follows that, when a witness refuses to submit to
any cross-examination or to answer cross-examination questions
necessary to test the witness's direct testimony, that refusal
undermines the trier of fact's ability to rely on the witness's
direct testimony.  In those circumstances, the courts generally
have recognized that a trial court may strike the witness's
testimony.  See John W. Strong, 1 McCormick on Evidence, § 19 at
88 (5th ed 1999) (summarizing cases).  Not every refusal to
answer a question on cross-examination undermines the reliability
of the evidence, and some courts have held that, when a witness
refuses to answer "cross-examination questions which are
logically relevant only to the witness's credibility and
otherwise immaterial, the direct testimony should not be stricken
or * * * at the least the judge ought to have a measure of
discretion in ruling on that matter."  See id. at 89 (summarizing
cases).
The decision in United States v. Cardillo, 316 F2d 606
(2d Cir), cert den, 375 US 822 and 375 US 857 (1963), which we
find persuasive, illustrates those principles.  In Cardillo, two
members of a conspiracy to sell stolen goods testified for the
government against their coconspirators.  The defendants cross-examined one witness by asking whether he had "committed other
crimes in the past and whether he was guilty of certain crimes
with which he was then charged in the state courts."  Id.  The
witness invoked his right against self-incrimination, and the
Second Circuit held that the trial court correctly declined to
strike the witness's direct testimony.  Id.  It reasoned that the
questions related solely to the witness's credibility and "had no
relation to the subject matter of his direct examination."  Id.  
The court reached a different conclusion when another
government witness refused to answer a cross-examination question
that related to the subject matter of his testimony.  That
witness testified that he gave $5,000 to the defendants so that
they could buy the stolen property.  Cardillo, 316 F2d at 612. 
When asked where he had obtained the money, the witness replied
that he had borrowed it from "a friend."  Id.  When the
defendants asked the witness on cross-examination to name the
friend, the witness refused to answer.  Id.  The defendants
argued that, if the witness had named his "friend" and if they
could prove that the witness had not borrowed the money from that
person, they could impeach the witness's testimony.  Id.
In explaining why the refusal to answer this cross-examination question warranted striking the witness's direct
testimony, the court reasoned:
"[D]espite the original claim that [the witness's]
proposed cross-examination related to 'credibility,' it
was not the type of testimony that would have developed
the general unsavory character of the witness as might
questions dealing with prior convictions.  The answers
solicited might have established untruthfulness with
respect to specific events of the crime charged.  It is
in this field that the decisions appear to call for the
striking of testimony."
Cardillo, 312 F2d at 613.  As the court explained, the "financial
transaction [that the defendants had sought to inquire about on
cross-examination] was not collateral but directly related to
[the defendants'] participation in the conspiracy."  Id. at 612.  
In those circumstances, the court held that the trial court
should have stricken the direct testimony.  Id. at 613.
Applying those principles, we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in striking defendant's
testimony.  Defendant's refusal to identify the person whom he
claimed had sharpened the metal rod for him bore directly on his
intent -- the primary issue in the guilt phase.  The state had
presented evidence that the Lakota Club had made and given
defendant a shank, in addition to tobacco and heroin, to kill
Davis.  Defendant testified that the Lakota Club had nothing to
do with the homicide, that the club had not given him the shank,
and that another inmate had helped him make it.  If defendant had
identified the inmate who, he testified, had helped him make the
shank, the state could have tested the truthfulness of
defendant's claim that he had not stabbed Davis pursuant to any
agreement to kill him.
The other two questions that defendant refused to
answer also bore on his intent.  One of the members of the Lakota
Club had testified that, in return for defendant's agreement to
kill Davis, the club and Graham had given defendant tobacco and
heroin two to three weeks in advance of the homicide so that
defendant could "get high, smoke cigarettes, sell some heroin and
raise some money" before the stabbing.  Defendant, however,
refused to identify who bought drugs from him and who supplied
the drugs he sold.  Defendant also denied receiving tobacco and
heroin from the Lakota Club or Graham.  If defendant had answered
the questions that the state posed to him on cross-examination,
the state would have been able to test, either as a result of the
timing of his drug sales or by questioning the suppliers he
identified, whether defendant truthfully denied receiving any
heroin or tobacco from Graham and the Lakota Club.  Put another
way, defendant's refusal to answer denied the state the
opportunity to test his claim that he had no connection to any
agreement to kill Davis.
Defendant refused to answer those questions knowing the
consequences of his decision.  He did not object to the questions
at trial; the state's questions related directly to the events of
the charged crime; and the answers to those questions were
necessary to a complete cross-examination.  Defendant's refusal
to answer prejudiced the state's ability to test the details of
his direct testimony, and the trial court acted within its
discretion in striking his testimony. (10)

Finally, citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 US 44, 107 S Ct
2704, 97 L Ed 2d 37 (1987), defendant argues that striking his
testimony violated due process. (11)
  In support of that claim,
defendant notes that the state did not ask other inmate witnesses
to name the persons who used drugs in prison.  He also notes that
the state did not seek to strike the testimony of three inmate
witnesses who testified that, if asked, they would not identify
who traded contraband in the prison.  Defendant reasons that the
trial court arbitrarily treated him differently from other
witnesses in violation of due process.
The initial problem with defendant's constitutional
argument is its premise -- that the state arbitrarily treated him
differently from other witnesses.  As noted, the state asked
defendant about the persons to whom he sold drugs and the persons
who supplied him with drugs to test his claim that he had
received no heroin or tobacco from Graham and the Lakota Club in
exchange for killing Davis.  The state had no reason to ask other
inmates who testified about that issue.  There was no evidence
(or suggestion) that those witnesses had received drugs from
Graham or the Lakota Club as part of an agreement to kill Davis. 
Although the state asked defendant different questions than it
asked the other witnesses, its decision to do so was reasonable. 
Because the premise of defendant's claim fails, so does the
claim. (12)

A WITNESS'S COMMENT ON DAVIS
During his case-in-chief, defendant introduced evidence
that he had reason to fear Davis.  On rebuttal, the state called
a witness who testified that, over the course of several
conversations, he heard defendant tell another inmate that he was
angry at Davis, that he intended to retaliate against him, and
"that he was seriously thinking about shanking [him]."  The state
then asked:
"Q.  During any of these conversations did
[defendant] ever express any fear towards Mark Davis?
"A.  I'm sorry.  No.
"Q.  You laugh.  That seems a little unusual.  Why
-- why are you laughing?
"A.  Because [Davis] was a fly.  It would be like
a fly being scared of a spider or -- you know." (13)

Defense counsel moved to strike the witness's answer.  He also
moved for a mistrial on the ground that referring to Davis as a
fly constituted impermissible character evidence.  Finally,
counsel argued that, because the witness's testimony had opened
the door, defendant was free to introduce evidence of Davis's
violent acts towards others.
The trial court denied defendant's motion to strike and
his motion for a mistrial.  It also adhered to its earlier ruling
that defendant could ask about Davis's violent acts towards him
but not about Davis's violent acts towards others.  On review,
defendant assigns error to the trial court's rulings denying his
motion to strike, denying his motion for a mistrial, and limiting
his rebuttal evidence.  However, in his argument, defendant does
not identify any reason why the evidence was inadmissible; that
is, he does not identify any reason why the court should have
struck the witness's testimony or declared a mistrial.  Rather,
defendant's argument assumes that the evidence was admissible and
focuses on whether the court erred in limiting the rebuttal
evidence.
The difficulty with defendant's argument is that the
witness's statement did not interject a new issue into the case. 
The trial court previously had recognized that the question
whether defendant feared Davis was part of the case, and the
witness's comparison of defendant and Davis merely provided
additional evidence on that question.  We have held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting evidence of
Davis's other crimes to prove that defendant feared Davis. 
Nothing in the witness's answer changes that conclusion. (14)

PLEADING SENTENCING FACTS IN THE INDICTMENT
The grand jury indicted defendant for committing
aggravated murder.  The indictment does not refer, however, to
the facts that a jury must find in the penalty phase before it
can decide whether to impose the death penalty.  Defendant argues
that, under Ring v. Arizona, 536 US 584, 122 S Ct 2428, 153 L Ed
2d 556 (2002), those facts must be pleaded in the indictment. 
Defendant did not raise this issue below but asks us to review it
under the plain error doctrine.  ORAP 5.45(6).  Defendant
acknowledges that the court has rejected similar unpreserved
claims, see State v. Oatney, 335 Or 276, 297, 66 P3d 475 (2003),
cert den, ___ US ___, 124 S Ct 1148 (2004)  (illustrating
proposition), but contends that the United States Supreme Court's
recent decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 US ___, 124 S Ct
2531, 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004), demonstrates that this court's
earlier decisions are incorrect.
As a matter of state procedural law, a state appellate
court will reach an unpreserved issue only if the error is both
apparent on the face of the record and if it is appropriate, in
the exercise of the court's discretion, to reach the issue.  See
Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 381-82, 823 P2d 956
(1991) (explaining plain error doctrine).  An error is apparent
if it is "obvious, not reasonably in dispute."  Id. at 381. 
Having reconsidered defendant's argument in light of Blakely, we
reaffirm that the error that defendant perceives is not apparent. 
We do not decide whether, if it were, we would exercise our
discretion to reach it.
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US 466, 476-78, 120 S Ct
2348, 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000), the Court held that a state
criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to have a jury
decide certain facts that affect the defendant's sentence and a
Fourteenth Amendment due process right to have the state prove
those facts beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Court was careful to
limit its holding to those two rights.  The Court noted:
"Apprendi has not here asserted a constitutional
claim based on the omission of any reference to
sentence enhancement or racial bias in the indictment. 
He relies entirely on the fact that the 'due process of
law' that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the States
to provide to persons accused of crime encompasses the
right to a trial by jury and the right to have every
element of the offense proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.  That Amendment has not, however, been construed
to include the Fifth Amendment right to 'presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury' that was implicated in our
recent decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
523 US 224 (1998).  We thus do not address the
indictment question separately today."
Id. at 477 n 3.  In Ring, the Court again noted and reserved this
issue.  536 US at 597-98 n 4.
The quoted passage from Apprendi implies that, if
defendant has a federal constitutional right to have a fact pled
in the indictment, that right derives solely from the Fifth
Amendment.  The decision in Blakely does nothing to change that
suggestion.  In Blakely, the Court stated that the question
presented was whether the state had violated the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.  1224 S Ct 2534.  The
defendant did not argue that the indictment should have pled the
facts that enhanced his sentence, and the Court did not address
whether the Fifth Amendment right to "presentment or indictment
of a Grand Jury" applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.  See id. at 2539 (basing decision on Sixth Amendment). 
If the Court has not decided whether the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the Fifth Amendment right upon which defendant's
claim appears to depend, the federal constitutional error that
defendant perceives cannot be described as apparent, obvious, or
not reasonably in dispute.  See Ailes, 312 Or at 381-82
(describing apparent error). (15)
  As a matter of state
procedural law, defendant's unpreserved federal constitutional
claim is not properly before us.
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE CLAIMS
Defendant identifies 15 instances during his trial in
which witnesses testified concerning another person's out-of-court statements.  Defendant argues that admitting this testimony
violates his rights under the federal Confrontation Clause. 
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 US ___, 124 S Ct 1354, 158 L Ed
2d 177 (2004) (interpreting Confrontation Clause).  Defendant did
not object to this testimony below but argues that we should
reach his federal constitutional claims under the plain error
doctrine.  The state responds that the challenged statements do
not constitute plain error.  It notes that some statements
defendant now challenges are not hearsay.  Other statements, it
contends, are not "testimonial" and thus do not raise
Confrontation Clause issues under Crawford.  Alternatively, the
state argues that, even if some of the statements are testimonial
and the error is apparent on the face of the record, we should
not exercise our discretion to reach it.
As noted above, as a matter of state procedural law, an
appellate court will reach an unpreserved issue only if the error
is apparent on the face of the record and if it is appropriate,
in the exercise of the court's discretion, to reach the issue. 
See Ailes, 312 Or at 381 (explaining plain error doctrine).  Even
if we assume that the error is plain, this is not an appropriate
occasion to reach it.  As the state notes, if defendant had
raised a timely objection, the state could have found other ways
to prove the facts that defendant now challenges, or it could
have chosen to forego the testimony and avoid the issue.  In
these circumstances, we decline to exercise our discretion to
reach the unpreserved issues that defendant asks us to decide. 
See Ailes, id. at 382 (explaining courts' discretion not to reach
apparent errors).  Having considered the issues that defendant's
assignments of error raise, we affirm the judgment of conviction
and sentence of death.
The judgment of conviction and sentence of death are
affirmed.
1. On one level, the Lakota Club provides a place for
Native Americans incarcerated in OSP to socialize and also to
engage in religious ceremonies.  However, one member of the club
testified that, in addition to those officially sanctioned
activities, the club was involved in "[d]rug smuggling,
tobacco[s] * * * [m]aking weapons, dealing drugs, doing drugs;
anything that was illegal to do in the prison, we did it."  The
witness later clarified that not all the club members were
engaged either in illegal activities or in the agreement to kill
Davis.
2. As noted, not every member of the club was a party to
the agreement.  Because the identity of the club members who were
parties is not relevant to the issues that defendant raises, we
refer to the club generally for ease of reference.
3. Defendant testified as part of the offer of proof.  The
trial court, however, had struck defendant's testimony during the
guilt phase because he had refused to answer cross-examination
questions, and it did not consider defendant's testimony in
determining whether the proffered evidence was admissible in the
guilt phase.
4. Defendant notes that, in the offer of proof, one
witness referred to an unspecified incident involving Davis at
OSCI and said "that's a well-talked-about incident over at
O[S]CI."  The fact that the incident (whatever it was) was "well-talked-about at O[S]CI" does not mean that it was "well-talked-about" at OSP, where defendant was incarcerated.
5. Three of the witnesses also offered opinions that Davis
was either violent or psychotic.  The fact that the witnesses had
formed opinions about Davis does not imply that defendant was
aware of their opinions or the basis for them; none of
defendant's witnesses testified, for example, to Davis's
reputation in OSP, which would have provided a different basis
for inferring defendant's knowledge.
6. OEC 403 provides:
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
7. Defendant did not testify concerning the remainder of
his theory of the case; that is, he did not testify that he
understood that, if he only injured Davis, Davis would refuse to
identify who stabbed him and that the prison officials would be
forced to transfer Davis to another facility to protect him from
future attacks.  That evidence came in through other witnesses.
8. ORS 136.643 provides, in relevant part:
"In the trial of * * * a person accused or charged
with the commission of a crime, the person so charged
or accused shall, at the own request of the person, but
not otherwise, be deemed a competent witness[.] * * * 
The defendant or accused, when offering testimony as a
witness in the own behalf of the defendant, gives the
prosecution a right to cross-examination upon all facts
to which the defendant or accused has testified and
which tend to the conviction or acquittal of the
defendant or accused."
9. In Lotches, the court noted that, in addition to the
federal constitution, Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution gives criminal defendants a right to testify in
their own behalf.  331 Or at 483 n 10.  But see Rogers, 330 Or at
298-99 (holding that right to be heard in Article I, section 11,
incorporates framers' contemporaneous understanding, which did
not recognize criminal defendant's right to testify).
10. State v. Mai, 294 Or 269, 656 P2d 315 (1982), is
consistent with this decision.  In Mai, the court upheld the
trial court's ruling precluding the defendant's witness from
testifying because the defendant had refused to comply with the
discovery statutes.  Id. at 279-80.  The court recognized that
preclusion "should be imposed only when no lesser sanction would
accomplish the aim of the [discovery] statute."  Id. at 277.  The
defendant, however, had refused to provide discovery after being
ordered to do so, and his refusal had prejudiced the state.  In
those circumstances, preclusion was appropriate.  Id. at 279-80. 
Here, defendant's refusal to answer the state's cross-examination
questions prejudiced the state's ability to test the truth of
defendant's testimony in much the same way that the defendant's
refusal to provide discovery prejudiced the state in Mai.
11. In his brief, defendant asserts that the trial court's
ruling "implicates" Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution and the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.  Defendant does not explain why the
trial court's ruling violated those rights.  We decline to
address defendant's undeveloped constitutional claims and limit
our discussion to the single constitutional argument that he made
in his brief.  See State v. Thompson, 328 Or 248, 254 n 3, 971
P2d 879, cert den, 527 US 1042 (1999) (declining to reach
undeveloped constitutional claims).
12. Given our disposition of defendant's federal claim, we
do not decide whether defendant may convert what appears at
bottom to be an unequal treatment claim against the state into a
due process claim that the trial court's ruling was arbitrary. 
See Rock, 483 US at 62 (holding that absolute prohibition against
hypnotically refreshed testimony arbitrarily infringed federal
right to present defense). 
13. The witness presumably meant to say that defendant
being scared of Davis was like a spider being scared of a fly.
14. Defendant argues that the trial court's refusal to
allow him to introduce other crimes evidence violates his right
to cross-examination under both Article I, section 11, of the
Oregon Constitution and the Sixth Amendment.  Both rights are
subject to reasonable limitations.  See Rogers, 330 Or at 301 (so
stating); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 US 673, 679, 106 S Ct
1431, 89 L Ed 2d 674 (1986) (same).  The restrictions that the
trial court imposed stayed within constitutional bounds.
15. We need not decide whether, as the footnote in Apprendi
appears to suggest, defendant's federal claim that the indictment
should have pled facts that enhance his sentence derives solely
from the Fifth Amendment.  It is sufficient to say that, in light
of that note, the federal source of defendant's claimed error is
also unclear.