Case Title: Potvin v. Champlain Cable Corp.

Citation: 165 Vt 504, 687 A.2d 95

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1996-10-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Potvin v. Champlain Cable Corp.  (95-385); 165 Vt 504; 687 A.2d 95

[Opinion Filed 18-Oct-1996]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 95-385


Claire Potvin                                     Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
     v.                                           Chittenden Superior Court

Champlain Cable Corp.                             April Term, 1996


Linda Levitt, J.

Leslie C. Pratt, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellant

Coddy Marx, Patricia M. Sabalis and Anita R. Tuttle of Downs Rachlin &
  Martin, Burlington, for defendant-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley (FN1), Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       JOHNSON, J.  This employment discrimination case raises two important
  issues: (1) whether an employee whose physical impairment limits her
  ability to work certain hours may be "substantially limit[ed]" for purposes
  of the Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA), 21 V.S.A. § 495d(5)(A), and
  (2) whether federal labor law preempts a state-law disability
  discrimination claim brought by an employee who is covered by a collective
  bargaining agreement.  The trial court held that plaintiff's claim is not
  preempted by federal law, but granted summary judgment to defendant on the
  ground that plaintiff's impairment did not substantially limit her ability
  to work.  We agree that plaintiff's claim is not preempted, but conclude
  that plaintiff has made a sufficient factual showing to support her claim
  that she was substantially limited in her ability to work.  Accordingly, we
  reverse the court's decision granting summary judgment to defendant.

 

                                I.

       Plaintiff has been employed by defendant Champlain Cable Corporation
  since 1977.  In 1988, she took a position as a first-shift expediter and
  remained in that position until October of 1990, when she discovered that
  she had ulcerative colitis.  As a result of her medical condition,
  plaintiff underwent three surgeries in a procedure known as a colectomy,
  which ultimately resulted in the removal of her large intestines.

       Plaintiff's first surgery occurred in November 1990 and caused her
  absence from work until January 14, 1991.  When she returned to work, she
  continued in her position as a first-shift expediter.  On February 20,
  1991, plaintiff underwent a second surgery, the recovery from which
  resulted in her absence from work until May 1991.  She once again returned
  to work as a first-shift expediter.  After plaintiff returned to work,
  however, the company assigned her to the second shift, which was scheduled
  from 3:00 p.m. until 11:00 p.m.  According to defendant, plaintiff was
  moved to the second shift to make defendant's business more responsive to
  the needs of companies on the West Coast, which do not close business until
  5:00 p.m. Pacific Standard Time (8:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time). 
  Plaintiff, a member of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, was
  chosen for the reassignment based on the seniority procedure dictated by
  the collective bargaining agreement.

       In July 1991, plaintiff underwent her third surgery, and in October
  1991, plaintiff was released by her doctor to return to work.  At that
  time, plaintiff informed defendant that she could not return to work on the
  second shift because her physical condition caused her to have excessive
  bowel movements during the evening hours and required her to take frequent
  and lengthy restroom breaks.  She supported this claim with a letter from
  her doctor stating that she should return to work the day shift.  Plaintiff
  requested that she be given a first- or third-shift position or, in the
  alternative, be given a light-duty second-shift position.  Defendant
  refused her request and told her that she could return as a second-shift
  expediter or not return at all.  Five months later, in March 1992,
  defendant offered plaintiff a position as a spark tester on the third

 

  shift, which plaintiff accepted.  She is currently employed by defendant as
  a first-shift utility operator.

       In October of 1992, plaintiff filed suit against defendant, alleging
  that defendant had discriminated against her based on her gender (FN2) and
  handicap.  Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing (1) that
  plaintiff's claims were preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management
  Relations Act,  29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988), (2) that plaintiff was barred
  from bringing the suit because she had failed to use the grievance
  procedure established by the collective bargaining agreement, and (3) that
  plaintiff had failed to establish that she was a "handicapped individual"
  for the purposes of FEPA.  See 21 V.S.A. § 495d(5)(A) ("handicapped
  individual" defined as person who "has a physical or mental impairment
  which substantially limits one or more major life activities").  The trial
  court held that plaintiff's claim was not preempted, but ruled in favor of
  defendant on the ground that plaintiff's impairment was not "substantially
  limiting."  The court did not reach defendant's argument that plaintiff had
  failed to exhaust the remedies provided by the collective bargaining
  agreement.  Plaintiff appealed.  Defendant cross-appealed, urging the
  preemption and exhaustion arguments as alternative bases for the court's
  decision.

                                II.

       We begin by considering the court's decision to grant summary judgment
  to defendant on the ground that plaintiff failed to show that she was a
  "handicapped individual" as defined by FEPA.  See id.  When reviewing a
  grant of summary judgment, this Court applies the same standard as the
  trial court.  Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ovellette , 159 Vt. 187,
  189, 617 A.2d 132, 133 (1992).  Summary judgment should be granted when,
  taking all the allegations made by the nonmoving party as true and giving
  the nonmoving party the benefit of all doubts and inferences, there are no
  genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
  matter of law.  Id.  "Where the moving party does not bear the burden of
  proof

 

  at trial, it may satisfy its burden of production by showing the court that
  there is an absence of evidence in the record to support the nonmoving
  party's case. . . . The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to
  persuade the court that there is a triable issue of fact."  Ross v. Times
  Mirror, Inc., ___ Vt. ___, ___,