Case Title: Commonwealth v. Monroe

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11813

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-08-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11813  
 
 
 
 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CHARLES MONROE.  
 
 
 
Worcester.      March 5, 2015. - August 19, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of 
statement, Harmless error.  Practice, Criminal, Admissions 
and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Motion to 
suppress, Harmless error.  Evidence, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement.  Error, Harmless. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 2, 2010.  
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by James 
R. Lemire, J., and the cases were tried before David 
Ricciardone, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Nancy A. Dolberg, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for the defendant. 
 
Donna-Marie Haran, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
2 
 
 
HINES, J.  After a jury trial in the Superior Court, the 
defendant, Charles Monroe, was convicted of four counts of 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon (knife); two 
counts of armed robbery; two counts of indecent assault and 
battery on a person fourteen years of age or older; two counts 
of armed kidnapping with serious bodily injury; and one count 
each of kidnapping and assault and battery.1  The convictions 
were based on three incidents that occurred in October, 2010, 
during which the defendant, then eighteen years old, accosted 
three different teenage victims as they walked to school.  The 
defendant appealed, arguing that (1) admission of statements he 
made to police during a videotaped interview violated his right 
to due process, and (2) the trial judge erred in discharging two 
deliberating jurors.  We transferred the case to this court on 
our own motion and now conclude that the motion judge erred in 
denying the defendant's motion to suppress statements and that 
the statements were admitted at trial erroneously.  On the 
record before us, we agree that the police engaged in 
impermissibly coercive tactics that rendered the defendant's 
statements involuntary under the circumstances of the 
 
1 The defendant was acquitted of three counts of aggravated 
rape and one count of assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon (knife).  A nolle prosequi was entered prior to 
trial on the charges of armed robbery and breaking and entering 
with intent to commit a felony.  
 
                                                          
 
3 
 
interrogation.  Because the erroneous admission of those 
statements at trial was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 
we reverse the convictions on that ground2 and remand for a new 
trial. 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts the jury could have 
found, reserving for later discussion the details of the 
postarrest interview.   
 
The morning of October 19, 2010, the first victim, E.C., a 
seventeen year old female, was walking to her bus stop when she 
noticed a man, later identified as the defendant, walking behind 
her.  The defendant attempted to get her attention, but she did 
not turn around.  The victim crossed the street, evading the 
defendant.  The following morning, E.C. encountered the 
defendant again on her walk to the bus stop.  This time, the 
defendant got close to her and began asking questions.  The 
defendant attempted to "hug" the victim, but she pushed him 
away.  When the defendant attempted to put his arm around the 
victim again, she noticed that he was holding a short silver 
knife, which he placed against her neck, telling her, "Don't 
scream.  Come with me."  The defendant led the victim to a tree 
on the other side of the street.  As the victim struggled to get 
 
2 Given our view of the defendant's argument that his 
statements were admitted at trial erroneously, we do not address 
his alternative claim that the judge improperly dismissed two 
deliberating jurors. 
                                                          
 
4 
 
away, her backpack fell off her arm; the defendant grabbed the 
bag and ran away.   
 
On October 25, 2010, the second victim, L.B., a fifteen 
year old female, was walking to school when the defendant 
approached her and began walking beside her.  L.B. tried to 
ignore the defendant, but he grabbed her by the neck and pressed 
down on her throat.  He put a knife to her throat, lifted her 
off the ground, and attempted to move her to a nearby driveway.  
The victim was able to get her feet back on the ground, remove 
the defendant's hand from her neck, and move away from the 
defendant.  The victim then ran from the scene.  On arriving 
home, she realized she had minor cuts to her neck and a deep cut 
on her thumb.   
 
On October 27, 2010, the third victim, A.G., a sixteen year 
old female, was walking to school when the defendant approached 
her and told her she looked familiar.  A.G. engaged the 
defendant in conversation, and he said that he would walk her to 
school.  The victim, who was not that familiar with the area, 
eventually realized that the two were not walking in the 
direction of her school, and when she stated this, the defendant 
became angry and aggressive.  He told her to walk towards "the 
green building," and at some point she noticed he had something 
in his hand.  The victim followed the defendant into the 
building, where he put a knife to her neck.    
5 
 
 
Inside the building, the victim performed oral sex on the 
defendant; he also touched her breasts and inserted his penis 
into her rectum.3  After about fifteen minutes, the defendant 
told the victim to give him another "blow job."  The victim 
complied, and the defendant eventually ejaculated into her 
mouth.  The defendant made the victim empty her tote bag in 
front of him and took a yellow highlighter that had been in her 
bag.  The defendant then allowed the victim to leave, and she 
resumed walking towards school.  After disclosing the attack to 
school officials, the victim was brought to the hospital where a 
sexual assault exam was performed.  The defendant's 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) was found on A.G.'s genitals and 
face.  A.G. identified the defendant as her attacker in a 
photographic array.  Police recovered a yellow highlighter from 
the defendant's pocket later that day.   
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant filed a motion to suppress 
the statements he made to police officers during a postarrest 
interview, claiming that even if the waiver of his Miranda 
rights is deemed valid, his statements were nonetheless 
involuntary.  The judge denied the motion based on his review of 
the videotaped interview, the transcript of the interview, and 
 
3 The victim testified that the defendant forced her to 
perform these acts at knifepoint.  The defendant maintained that 
the sexual contact was consensual.  The defendant was acquitted 
of the rape charges stemming from this incident.   
                                                          
 
6 
 
the police report prepared after the interview.  The defendant's 
inculpatory statements and some of his exculpatory statements, 
made during the interview, were admitted through the testimony 
of the two interviewing detectives and a redacted version of the 
videotaped interview that was played for the jury.4   
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the motion judge erred 
in denying his motion to suppress, claiming that psychological 
coercion, together with other factors,5 rendered his statement 
involuntary and that the admission of his involuntary statement 
at trial violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  More specifically, he 
 
4 Although the defendant objected to the portions of the 
videotape that showed denials made by the defendant, he did not 
object to playing a redacted version of the videotape showing 
the defendant's inculpatory statements.  The Commonwealth agreed 
to certain redactions, but the videotape contained other denials 
that were admitted as relevant to credibility or to show 
consciousness of guilt.  Defense counsel renewed his objection 
to having those portions admitted.   
 
 
5 The Commonwealth points out that the defendant's motion to 
suppress did not reference specifically his youth, emotional 
instability, lack of food and shelter, lack of access to his 
family, and lack of notice of the charges as factors probative 
of the involuntariness of the statements and, citing 
Commonwealth v. Pina, 406 Mass. 540, 542, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
832 (1990), urges no consideration of these belatedly asserted 
factors in our review.  We decline to view the issue so narrowly 
as the additional factors are properly considered within the 
totality of the circumstances test applicable to the defendant's 
claim, made in his motion to suppress and on appeal, that his 
statements were involuntary.   
 
                                                          
 
7 
 
contends that the coercive nature of the detectives' statements 
regarding the fate of his infant child compels a finding that 
his statement was involuntary.   
 
a.  Standard of review.  In reviewing the grant or denial 
of a motion to suppress, we "review de novo any findings of the 
motion judge that were based entirely on the documentary 
evidence."  Commonwealth v. Thomas, 469 Mass. 531, 539 (2014).  
Because the defendant's interview was video recorded, "we are in 
the same position as the motion judge to determine what occurred 
during the interview."  Id. at 535 n.4. 
 
b.  The interview.  The following summary is based on our 
review of the unredacted videotape of the defendant's postarrest 
interview and the police report prepared on that same date.6  The 
defendant was arrested at approximately 4 P.M. on Wednesday, 
October 27, 2010, in connection with the crimes against the 
three victims.  Following his arrest, he was transported to the 
Worcester police detective bureau.  By 4:15 P.M., the defendant 
was seated alone in an interview room with his hands cuffed 
behind his back.    
 
6 The unredacted videotape was marked as an exhibit at trial 
and is the only version of the videotape in the record.  We have 
not been provided with the list of statements redacted from the 
videotape.  Because it is clear from the record that the 
defendant's inculpatory statements, made after the defendant's 
will was overborne, were contained on the redacted version of 
the videotape that was played for the jury, we are able to 
resolve this appeal without reviewing these materials.  
                                                          
 
8 
 
 
At approximately 4:30 P.M., Detectives James O'Rourke and 
Donna Brissette entered the room.  Detective O'Rourke asked the 
defendant to stand and moved the defendant's cuffed hands from 
behind his back to in front of him.  Detective O'Rourke advised 
the defendant that the interview was being videotaped, informed 
him of his right to use a telephone, read him his Miranda 
rights, and informed him that he was at the detective bureau 
concerning a warrant.  When the defendant asked about the 
substance of the warrant, Detective O'Rourke informed the 
defendant that he could not tell the defendant about the 
substance of the warrant unless the defendant waived his Miranda 
rights and agreed to speak with the officers.  The defendant 
then signed a waiver of his Miranda rights.   
 
Detective O'Rourke then asked the defendant several 
background questions, on topics including his education and 
whether he had any children.  The defendant said that he was 
working toward his general education degree (GED) and that he 
has both a son and a daughter.  At 4:43 P.M., the detectives 
informed the defendant for the first time that he had been 
positively identified by three victims of assaults that occurred 
on October 20, October 25, and earlier that morning, October 27.  
In connection with the assaults, Detective O'Rourke asked the 
defendant questions regarding his whereabouts and activities 
earlier that morning and on October 25.  The detective went on 
9 
 
to tell the defendant that he "should be trying to help 
[himself] out," and after that point the interview grew 
increasingly aggressive.  Detective O'Rourke informed the 
defendant that he would only have "one opportunity to talk . . . 
and tell [the detectives] why this happened."   
 
At this point in the interrogation, Detective Brissette 
turned the conversation toward the defendant's daughter, asking 
him her age and about the family's involvement with the 
Department of Children and Families (DCF).7  The defendant 
responded by stating, "Don't tell me they're going to take my 
daughter 'cause -- don't even tell me 'cause I don't want to 
hear it.  'Cause my daughter is the most important thing in my 
life."  The detective continued on the subject of the 
defendant's child, suggesting that the defendant was aware of a 
scheme by the child's mother to get "money from [w]elfare and 
stuff," but that the defendant was "playing dumb" during the DCF 
investigation just as he was doing with the questions about his 
whereabouts when the victims were attacked.   
 
During the next few minutes of the interrogation, the 
defendant told the police that he had emigrated from Africa with 
 
7 The detective referred to the agency by its former name, 
the Department of Social Services.  The detectives specifically 
asked about a case opened about one month before the defendant's 
arrest where the defendant's girl friend reported that their 
daughter had fallen.   
                                                          
 
10 
 
his family, that he had emotional problems, that he had not 
eaten or showered recently, and that he had slept on the stairs 
inside the house where he once had lived with his family.  He 
also revealed that he was aware the police were looking for him 
but that he did not know why, only to be interrupted by the 
detective stating, "You damn well know why the cops were looking 
for you."  It was at this point that the interrogation turned 
from questions about the defendant's background back to the 
subject of his child.  At 4:45 P.M., the detective stated the 
following:   
 
"[T]his is the time to talk to us about what happened, 
 
okay?  You know what happened.  This is your opportunity.  
 
You're probably going to end up going away for a long time.  
 
You're not going to see that two month old baby for a long, 
 
long time, okay?  This is the time, maybe this morning you 
 
met this girl, maybe it was consensual or whatever but this 
 
is the time to talk to us about it and what was going on 
 
the last couple of -- last week, with those two other 
 
girls.  This is the time to talk to us about it and tell 
 
us about it, okay?  Look at me, don't keep looking away 
 
from us."   
 
 
The defendant then dropped his head into his hands and began to 
cry, eliciting from the detective a command to stop "looking 
away."  The defendant explained that "the only reason why I'm 
crying 'cause I don't want to live a day without seeing my 
daughter."   
 
This exchange preceded a barrage of references to the 
defendant's child and girl friend, with the detectives 
repeatedly telling the defendant to "think of [his] daughter," 
11 
 
"think of [his] girl friend," that he would be the reason his 
girl friend lost custody of their child, and that he would be 
the reason his child would be raised by strangers.  At 4:56 
P.M., the detectives, alternating between each of them without 
any responses from the defendant, stated, "[Y]ou're going to be 
the reason your girl loses that baby"; "'Cause you know what, 
there's a 51A[8] just like there was the last time, [DCF] is 
already involved with you and with your daughter"; and "At least 
have that baby grow up with someone they know.  The baby might 
not see you but at least it will be with the mom."  
Additionally, the detectives provided potential reasons as to 
why the defendant may have committed the assaults and robberies 
during this period, stating for example that "things are a 
little tough right now.  You got a three month old that means 
the world to you and don't know how you're even going to provide 
for her."  The defendant continued to cry, held his head in his 
hands, was generally unresponsive to the detectives' questions, 
and stared blankly in front of him.9   
 
8 A report of suspected child abuse filed with the 
Department of Children and Families in accordance with G. L. 
c. 119, § 51A, is frequently referred to as a 51A report.   
 
 
9 The defendant did, however, answer a few questions and 
made limited exculpatory statements during this period, stating 
"I didn't attack no girl this morning"; "I'm not raping, I 
didn't sleep with none of them"; and "I didn't have sex with 
none of them."  
                                                          
 
12 
 
 
Within minutes of these repeated references to the 
possibility that the defendant's girl friend could lose custody 
of the child, the defendant made incriminating statements 
regarding the three incidents.  He first acknowledged that there 
was one dollar in E.C.'s backpack the prior week.  The defendant 
then conceded that he had walked with A.G. earlier that morning 
but maintained that they did not have any sexual contact and 
that he did not assault her.  Detective Brissette later told the 
defendant that they had evidence of the defendant's DNA on A.G. 
from the assault that morning.  After more prodding by the 
detectives, the defendant remarked, "I'm going to tell on behalf 
of my daughter, because I love my daughter . . . I'm going to 
talk -- I'm going to tell you the truth because I love my 
daughter."  The defendant then admitted that A.G. performed oral 
sex on him and that he ejaculated on her exposed buttocks, but 
stated that she initiated this contact.  He also admitted that 
he robbed E.C. and L.B. and that he had a knife when he robbed 
L.B., but that he only pulled out the knife once she tried to 
fight him.   
 
The detectives asked whether he had committed any other 
robberies, and the defendant responded that maybe he committed 
13 
 
robberies "a long time ago."10  The defendant further stated, "I 
get emotional problems, 'cause I do have emotional problems.  I 
need help, that's all I need."   
 
c.  Voluntariness.  A voluntary statement is one that is 
"the product of a 'rational intellect' and a 'free will,' and 
not induced by physical or psychological coercion."  
Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 207 (2011), quoting 
Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 433 Mass. 549, 554 (2001).  In applying 
this principle, "we examine whether, in light of the totality of 
the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, the 
will of the defendant was overborne to the extent that the 
statement was not the result of a free and voluntary act."  
Commonwealth v. Selby, 420 Mass. 656, 663 (1995), S.C., 426 Mass 
168 (1997).  "[B]oth the characteristics of the accused and the 
details of the interrogation" are encompassed in the analysis of 
the totality of circumstances (citation omitted).  Commonwealth 
v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 146, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 
(1982), quoting Commonwealth v. Daniels, 366 Mass. 601, 606 
(1975).  More specifically, we may consider "promises or other 
inducements, conduct of the defendant, the defendant's age, 
 
10 The record reflects that the Commonwealth and the 
defendant agreed to redact the portion of the videotaped 
interview relating to prior robberies that were not the subject 
of this trial, but that this information was not redacted from 
the version shown to the jury because of a technical error.   
                                                          
 
14 
 
education, intelligence and emotional stability, experience with 
and in the criminal justice system, physical and mental 
condition, . . . and the details of the interrogation, including 
the recitation of the Miranda warnings."  Commonwealth v. 
Mandile, 397 Mass. 410, 413 (1986), S.C., 403 Mass. 93 (1988), 
and cases cited.  The Commonwealth bears the burden to establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's confession was 
voluntary in accordance with these principles.  Commonwealth v. 
Baye, 462 Mass. 246, 256 (2012).  After considering all of the 
factors essential to our review of the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation, especially the use 
of psychologically coercive tactics related to the defendant's 
child, we conclude that the Commonwealth has failed to meet that 
burden. 
 
i.  Coercion relating to the defendant's child.  The police 
interrogation of the defendant, rife with threats to the 
defendant's ability to maintain contact with his infant 
daughter, properly may be characterized as psychologically 
coercive.  See Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 
435-436 (2004) ("Coercion may be readily applied by way of 
implied threats and promises, just as it is by express threats 
and promises").  Here, as evidenced by the videotaped interview, 
the detectives threatened the defendant with the loss of contact 
with his child by repeatedly and falsely claiming that if he did 
15 
 
not tell them what happened, the child could be taken away and 
raised by strangers.  Although we have stated that a particular 
tactic generally will not render a confession involuntary, see 
Selby, 420 Mass. at 664, the particular conduct at issue here, 
threats concerning a person's loved one, may impinge on the 
voluntariness of a defendant's confession.  Lynumn v. Illinois, 
372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963) (defendant's statement involuntary when 
induced by threats that financial aid to infant children would 
be discontinued and children taken from her if she failed to 
confess).  See Commonwealth v. Scott, 430 Mass. 351, 355 (1999), 
citing Commonwealth v. Berg, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 206 (1994) 
("Concern for a loved one may, in certain circumstances, render 
a confession involuntary").  See also Commonwealth v. Hunt, 12 
Mass. App. Ct. 841, 844-845 (1981) ("concern for one's family 
may be as significant in inducing an involuntary confession as a 
concern for oneself").  The issue boils down to whether the 
Commonwealth has met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the police tactics were not "so manipulative . . . 
that they deprived [the defendant] of his ability to make an 
unconstrained, autonomous decision to confess."  Baye, 462 Mass. 
at 256, quoting United States v. Walton, 10 F.3d 1024, 1030 (3d 
Cir. 1993). 
 
The temporal relationship between the defendant's 
inculpatory statements and the detectives' psychologically 
16 
 
coercive tactics is clear and close and it supports our 
conclusion that the defendant's will was overborne and that his 
statements were involuntary.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Durand, 
457 Mass. 574, 596-597 (2010).  The chronology is telling.  The 
defendant made his first incriminatory statement at 5:05 P.M.11 
after the litany of threats described above, and more 
specifically three minutes after the detectives repeated their 
suggestion that the defendant's child would be protected from an 
adverse custody determination if he confessed.  Before he 
implicated himself in response to the threats regarding his 
child, the defendant was not told that the police lacked the 
power to remove the child from his girl friend's custody or that 
his confession would have no bearing on whether the child's 
custody status could be changed.12  The convergence of the 
defendant's apparent devotion to his child as reflected in his 
statements and conduct during the videotaped interview, the 
defendant's ignorance of the authority of the police to effect a 
change in his child's custody, and the prominence of the 
psychologically coercive tactics during the interrogation 
 
11 The defendant acknowledged that there was one dollar in 
E.C.'s backpack, indicating for the first time that he was with 
E.C. and knowledgeable of the contents of her backpack.   
 
 
12 See generally G. L. c. 119, § 24 (procedures for removal 
of child from parents' custody). 
 
                                                          
 
17 
 
persuades us that the defendant lost the ability to "make an 
unconstrained, autonomous decision to confess," Baye, 462 Mass. 
at 256, quoting Walton, 10 F.3d at 1030, and thus, his will was 
overborne.  That breaking point occurred at approximately 4:57 
P.M., when the defendant reacted to Detective O'Rourke's 
statement, "At least have that baby grow up with someone they 
know" by stating, "Please don't take my daughter"; hanging his 
head; and crying.13  His inculpatory statements followed. 
 
The defendant's personal characteristics, considered as 
part of the totality of the circumstances of the videotaped 
interview, also are relevant to our conclusion that his will was 
overborne by the police tactics involving his child.  During the 
interrogation, the defendant alerted the police to and 
demonstrated a disturbed emotional or physical state, a factor 
relevant to voluntariness.  LeBlanc, 433 Mass. at 555; 
Commonwealth v. Magee, 423 Mass. 381, 388 (1996).  In Magee, 
supra at 383, the defendant was "exhausted, emotionally 
distraught, and disheveled, and her responses to questions were 
13 Although the defendant made limited exculpatory 
statements during the period between 4:54 and 4:57 P.M., he was 
generally nonresponsive until he made his first incriminating 
statement.  The exculpatory statements made by the defendant do 
not render his statements voluntary where the defendant's will 
was overborne by the detectives' repeated threat to have his 
child removed from her mother's care unless the defendant 
confessed to the charges.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 387 
Mass. 96, 100 (1982) (exculpatory statements tend to show 
defendant capable of rational thought). 
                                                          
 
18 
 
interrupted by periods of sobbing and shaking."  In that case, 
we held that the defendant's debilitated physical and emotional 
state, together with psychological coercion in the form of a 
promise by police that she would receive the medical treatment 
she requested in return for her statement to police, rendered 
her statement involuntary.  Id. at 388.  Like the defendant in 
Magee, the defendant in this case was in an emotionally 
disturbed state at the time of his interview.  He informed the 
police of his condition but nonetheless was subjected to the 
psychological coercion described above.  Here, the defendant was 
generally unresponsive to police questioning until the police 
made threats regarding the custody of his child.  After that 
occurred, the defendant cried and invoked his love for his child 
before providing inculpatory statements to the police.  As in 
Magee, although the defendant's emotional and physical condition 
is not determinative, his condition is a substantial factor in 
our consideration of whether his will was overborne by the 
police tactics.  Id. at 388. 
 
We consider as well the defendant's age and educational 
background in our analysis of the voluntariness of the 
defendant's statements.  See Commonwealth v. Meehan, 377 Mass. 
552, 567 (1979) (defendant's youth and poor educational 
background may support finding of involuntariness).  Here, the 
defendant had recently turned eighteen years of age and was in 
19 
 
the process of obtaining his GED at the time of his arrest.  He 
had emigrated from Africa to the United States just six years 
prior.  While these factors alone are insufficient to warrant 
suppression of the defendant's statements, the defendant's young 
age and poor educational background support the conclusion that 
his statements were involuntary.  See id. 
 
Last, the hostile tone of the interview also supports our 
conclusion that the defendant's will was overborne during the 
course of the interview.  See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 463 Mass. 
95, 103 (2012).  In Johnson, supra, we recognized that the 
environment of an interview may be considered oppressive if the 
defendant is handcuffed.  Here, the defendant's handcuffs were 
not removed.  Moreover, the tone of the interview was hostile 
where the two detectives volleyed statements between them, often 
times leaving no opportunity for the defendant to respond.   
 
Taken together, these factors persuasively demonstrate that 
the defendant's will was overborne and that, as a consequence, 
statements made thereafter were involuntary.  The use of those 
statements against the defendant at trial was constitutional 
error. 
 
ii.  Other tactics.  We comment briefly on the detectives' 
use of other interrogation techniques which, although not 
dispositive, contributed to the defendant's loss of his "ability 
to make an unconstrained, autonomous decision to confess."  
20 
 
Baye, 462 Mass. at 256, quoting Walton, 10 F.3d at 1030.  First, 
"minimization" during interrogation of a crime of which a 
defendant is accused, combined with other factors, can render a 
confession involuntary because minimization carries with it an 
implied promise that the requested confession will result in 
lenient treatment.  DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. at 439.  Prior to 
the defendant making any inculpatory statements, the detectives 
offered the defendant reasons for why he may have committed the 
alleged robberies, such as needing money to buy food for himself 
and his infant daughter, and minimized the rape allegation by 
pointing out that both the defendant and the alleged victim were 
old enough to engage in consensual sexual activity.   
 
Second, "[t]he use of false information by police during an 
interrogation is deceptive and is a relevant factor indicating a 
possibility that the defendant's statements were made 
involuntarily."  Selby, 420 Mass. at 664.  Here, Detective 
Brissette informed the defendant that they had evidence of his 
DNA on the victim who had allegedly been assaulted that morning.  
It is evident from the record that the detectives could not have 
yet known to whom any DNA recovered from that victim belonged.  
In combination with the psychological coercion, the minimization 
and false statement support our conclusion that the defendant's 
inculpatory statements were involuntary.  
21 
 
 
d.  Effect of the constitutional error.  Having concluded 
that it was constitutional error for the defendant's involuntary 
statements to be used against him at trial, we must now 
determine whether to set aside his convictions.  See Durand, 457 
Mass. at 592, quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 
(1978) ("any criminal trial use against a defendant of his 
involuntary statement is a denial of due process of law" 
[emphases in original]).  The defendant argues that his 
convictions must be vacated because the admission of his 
statements was a structural error.  We have not yet determined 
whether the structural error standard should apply or whether, 
with the defendant having filed a motion to suppress on 
constitutional grounds, the harmless error standard should 
apply, and we do not do so here.  See Durand, supra (reserving 
for another day whether structural error applies).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Hoyt, 461 Mass. 143, 154 (2011), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Whelton, 428 Mass. 24, 25-26 (1998) ("The denial 
of a motion to suppress evidence on constitutional grounds . . . 
is reviewable without further objection at trial").  Under the 
harmless error standard, "we consider 'the importance of the 
evidence in the prosecution's case; the relationship between the 
evidence and the premise of the defense; who introduced the 
issue at trial; the frequency of the reference; whether the 
erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of properly 
22 
 
admitted evidence; the availability or effect of curative 
instructions; and the weight or quantum of evidence of guilt.'"  
Thomas, 469 Mass. at 552a, quoting Commonwealth v. Santos, 463 
Mass. 273, 287 (2012).  Because we conclude that the 
introduction of the defendant's involuntary statements was not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we need not resolve the 
question. 
 
The defendant's incriminating statements contained on the 
videotape were pivotal to the Commonwealth's case.  Although the 
Commonwealth presented the testimony of the three victims and 
other evidence tying the defendant to the incidents, such as DNA 
evidence and his clothing, the extent of criminal liability from 
the incidents depended on credibility.  Because the defendant 
did not testify, the video recording provided the jury with his 
description of the encounters.  During the involuntary portion 
of the interview, the defendant admitted that he robbed E.C. and 
L.B., that he pulled out a knife on L.B., and that he had sexual 
contact with A.G.  Therefore, the prosecution was able to use 
the nontestifying defendant's involuntary statements to support 
the victims' credibility.  The prosecutor also referenced the 
defendant's videotaped statements in his closing argument, 
23 
 
telling the jury that the defendant admitted to having a knife 
on him during all three incidents.14   
 
Moreover, the defense strategy was limited by the 
introduction of the involuntary statements.  Defense counsel 
conceded to the acts that the defendant admitted performing 
during his videotaped interview, specifically robbing the first 
victim, using a knife while intending to rob the second victim, 
and having consensual sex with the third victim.  Defense 
counsel argued that the Commonwealth failed to prove the 
remaining charges.15   
 
The error in admitting the defendant's involuntary 
statements was further compounded by the erroneous introduction 
of a statement in the videotape that the defendant had 
previously committed robberies not related to the charged 
offenses.  Thus, the jury heard evidence of bad acts that were 
not properly admitted.  Although the judge provided instructions 
 
14 In the interview, Detective Brissette asked, "where's the 
knife that you`ve been carrying for a few days?"; the defendant 
responded, "I lost it," and described a silver and brown pocket 
knife.   
 
 
15 Specifically, defense counsel argued that the 
Commonwealth failed to prove assault and battery with a 
dangerous weapon and kidnapping against the first victim; 
kidnapping of the second victim; and rape, indecent assault and 
battery, and kidnapping against the third victim.  Of these 
charges, the defendant was convicted of assault and battery with 
a dangerous weapon and kidnapping against the first victim, 
kidnapping of the second victim, and indecent assault and 
battery against the third victim.  
                                                          
 
24 
 
on this point, the prejudice caused by introduction of the 
videotaped statements was further compounded by this error and 
we conclude that the admission of the videotaped statement was 
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Santos, 463 Mass. at 
289.   
 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgments are reversed and the 
verdicts set aside.  The case is remanded to the Superior Court 
where the defendant is to receive a new trial in accordance with 
this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.