Case Title: Zaleski v. Zaleski

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11391

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2014-08-01T00:00:00Z

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SJC-11391 
 
CAROLYN ZALESKI  vs.  STEPHEN ZALESKI. 
 
 
 
Essex.     December 3, 2013. - August 1, 2014. 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & 
Lenk, JJ.1 
 
 
Divorce and Separation, Alimony, Division of property. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint 
for 
divorce 
filed 
in 
the 
Essex 
Division 
of 
the 
Probate 
and Family Court Department on December 20, 2010. 
 
 
The case was heard by Amy Lyn Blake, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred 
the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Paul P. Perocchi (Cynthia Grover Hastings with him) for the 
wife. 
 
David E. Cherny (Catharine V. Blake with him) for the husband. 
 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  The Alimony Reform Act of 2011, St. 2011, c. 124 
(alimony 
reform 
act 
or 
act), 
changed 
the 
legal 
framework 
under 
which 
courts may award alimony when a marriage ends in divorce.  The act 
                                                 
1 Chief 
Justice 
Ireland 
participated 
in 
the 
deliberation 
on 
this 
case prior to his retirement. 
2 
 
created four categories of alimony:  "[g]eneral term alimony," 
"[r]ehabilitative alimony," "[r]eimbursement alimony," and 
"[t]ransitional 
alimony," 
and 
placed 
durational 
limits 
on 
the 
length 
of 
time 
alimony 
may 
be 
paid 
absent 
specific 
extenuating 
circumstances 
as found by a judge before the statutory period expires.  See G. L. 
c. 208, §§ 48-52.  We are asked to decide in this case of first 
impression whether a Probate and Family Court judge abused her 
discretion in determining that rehabilitative alimony, with its 
presumptive five-year payment period, was the appropriate form of 
alimony 
to 
be 
ordered, 
rather 
than 
general 
term 
alimony, 
which, 
based 
on 
the 
length 
of 
the 
parties' 
marriage, 
would 
have 
permitted 
alimony 
payments to continue for thirteen years. 
 
In 
December, 
2010, 
Carolyn 
Zaleski 
(wife) 
filed 
a 
complaint 
for 
divorce from Stephen Zaleski (husband) on the ground of an 
irretrievable 
breakdown 
of 
the 
marriage.  Following 
trial, 
judgment 
entered granting a divorce nisi on the basis of irretrievable 
breakdown of the marriage, see G. L. c. 208, § 1B, awarding 
rehabilitative 
alimony 
to 
the 
wife, 
dividing 
the 
marital 
assets, 
and 
incorporating 
a 
stipulation 
of 
the 
parties 
regarding 
the 
custody 
and 
education of their two children.  The wife appealed, and we 
transferred the case to this court on our own motion. 
 
The wife challenges that portion of the judgment ordering the 
husband to pay rehabilitative alimony rather than general term 
3 
 
alimony.  She 
also 
challenges 
the 
judge's 
exclusion 
of 
the 
husband's 
bonus 
income 
from 
the 
calculation 
of 
the 
amount 
of 
the 
alimony 
award; 
the requirement that she maintain policies of term and whole life 
insurance 
as 
security 
for 
her 
obligations 
under 
the 
divorce 
judgment; 
and the division of marital assets, including the allocation of 
marital debt.  We conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion 
to 
award 
rehabilitative 
alimony, 
and 
that 
the 
allocation 
of 
debt 
and 
division of property between the parties was warranted by the 
evidence.  Nonetheless, we remand for further proceedings based on 
our determination that it was error not to include all of the 
husband's income in the calculation of the amount of alimony, and 
that there was no basis in the judge's findings to require the wife 
to maintain life insurance policies as security. 
 
Background.  We draw our summary of the facts from the judge's 
written findings of fact.  The parties were married on October 15, 
1994, in Massachusetts.  At the time of trial, the wife was 
forty-five years old and the husband was forty-eight years old.2  
They have two children, both of whom attend private schools; at the 
time 
of 
trial, 
their 
daughter 
was 
a 
sophomore 
in 
high 
school 
and 
their 
son 
was 
in 
the 
eighth 
grade.  The 
parties 
are 
in 
agreement 
that 
their 
son should also attend a private high school.  In June, 2011, the 
                                                 
2 The trial took place over three nonconsecutive days from 
January 31, 2012, to March 6, 2012. 
4 
 
parties agreed to a temporary parenting arrangement under which the 
children resided in the marital home continuously and the parties 
moved 
in 
and 
out 
of 
the 
marital 
residence 
to 
accommodate 
each 
party's 
scheduled time with the children.3  The complaint for divorce was 
served on the husband in February, 2011.4 
 
The judgment of divorce ordered the husband to pay the wife 
rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $11,667 per month for five 
years; this amount is thirty-five per cent of the husband's annual 
base 
salary 
of 
$400,000.5  A 
stipulation 
of 
the 
parties 
that 
provided 
for shared legal and physical custody of the children was 
                                                 
 
3 Pursuant to this "nesting arrangement," as described by the 
parties, when a party was not residing in the marital home with the 
children, 
that 
party 
lived 
in 
a 
shared 
apartment 
that 
was 
maintained 
by the parties for this purpose. 
 
 
4 This was a marriage of approximately sixteen years and four 
months under the definition of "[l]ength of marriage" in G. L. 
c. 208, 
§ 48 
(defining 
"length 
of 
marriage" 
as 
"the 
number 
of 
months 
from 
the 
date 
of 
legal 
marriage 
to 
the 
date 
of 
service 
of 
a 
complaint 
. . . for divorce"). 
 
 
5 Alimony was to be paid by the husband in monthly instalments 
commencing on July 1, 2012, and terminating on the earliest of July 
1, 2017, the remarriage of the wife, or the death of either party.  
For 
State 
and 
Federal 
income 
tax 
purposes, 
the 
alimony 
payments 
were 
deductible 
by 
the 
husband, 
and 
included 
as 
taxable 
income 
to 
the 
wife.  
See Holmes v. Holmes, 467 Mass. 653, 655 n.2 (2014).  The husband 
was 
ordered 
to 
maintain 
his 
then-current 
medical, 
dental, 
and 
vision 
insurance for the benefit of the children until their emancipation, 
and for the wife so long as she was eligible for coverage under the 
terms of his employer-sponsored insurance coverage.  In the event 
of an additional cost to the husband to insure the wife, the wife 
was 
to 
be 
responsible 
for 
such 
cost.  Each 
party 
was 
responsible 
for 
his or her own uninsured medical and dental expenses. 
5 
 
incorporated in the judgment; the judge ordered that neither was to 
pay 
child 
support 
"at 
this 
time."  The 
judgment 
further 
provided 
that 
the husband shall be solely responsible for the children's private 
school 
tuition 
and 
expenses, 
and 
that 
the 
parties 
shall 
share 
equally 
the 
cost 
of 
the 
children's 
extracurricular 
and 
enrichment 
activities 
and their uninsured medical and dental costs.6  In addition, the 
judgment required both parties to maintain life insurance coverage 
as 
it 
existed 
at 
the 
time 
of 
trial 
as 
security 
for 
their 
obligations; 
allocated responsibility for certain joint indebtedness; ordered 
that each party will have responsibility for liabilities standing 
in his or her own name; and provided for a division of assets, 
including a payment from the husband to the wife in the amount of 
$27,466, "[i]n order to equalize the division."7 
 
Discussion.  1.  Statutory framework.  Because there was no 
alimony jurisdiction at common law, "the power to grant alimony was 
                                                 
 
6 No provision was made for payment of the children's future 
college 
tuition 
and 
expenses.  See 
Passemato 
v. 
Passemato, 
427 
Mass. 
52, 
54 
(1998) 
("as 
a 
general 
rule, 
support 
orders 
regarding 
the 
future 
payment of post-high school educational costs are premature and 
should not be made"). 
 
 
7 The judgment ordered that the wife transfer her interest in 
the marital home to the husband, and required that the husband 
refinance the existing mortgage and pay to the wife the sum of 
$161,432, 
an 
amount 
equal 
to 
one-half 
of 
the 
equity 
in 
the 
home.  The 
judgment also ordered that certain bank accounts, investment 
accounts, and retirement accounts standing in the individual name 
of 
a 
party 
would 
remain 
that 
party's 
property.  The 
husband's 
Merrill 
Lynch 
401(k) 
account 
and 
Fidelity 
Investments 
individual 
retirement 
account were to be divided equally. 
6 
 
wholly statutory."  Gottsegen v. Gottsegen, 397 Mass. 617, 621-624 
(1986).8  The courts' authority to grant alimony has been set forth 
in 
G. 
L. 
c. 
208, 
§ 34.  As 
noted, 
the 
alimony 
reform 
act 
of 
2011 
added 
new provisions to c. 208, creating four categories of alimony; only 
rehabilitative and general term alimony are at issue here.9  Both 
require 
that 
a 
judge 
consider 
the 
factors 
set 
forth 
in 
G. L. 
c. 208, 
                                                 
 
8 The courts' statutory authority to award alimony has existed 
in the Commonwealth since 1786.  See St 1785, c. 69. 
 
 
9 The other two forms of alimony are reimbursement and 
transitional alimony.  Reimbursement alimony is defined as 
 
"the periodic or one-time payment of support to a recipient 
spouse after a marriage of not more than [five] years to 
compensate the recipient spouse for economic or noneconomic 
contribution to the financial resources of the payor spouse, 
such as enabling the payor spouse to complete an education or 
job training." 
 
G. L. c. 208, § 48.  Reimbursement alimony terminates on the death 
of the recipient or on a date certain; once ordered, modification 
of reimbursement alimony is prohibited and income guidelines, 
applicable to all other forms of alimony, do not apply.  G. L. 
c. 208, § 51 (a)-(c). 
 
 
Transitional alimony is defined as: 
 
"the periodic or one-time payment of support to a recipient 
spouse after a marriage of not more than [five] years to 
transition the recipient spouse to an adjusted lifestyle or 
location as a result of the divorce." 
 
G. L. c. 208, § 48.  Transitional alimony terminates on the death 
of the recipient or a date certain "that is not longer than [three] 
years from the date of the parties' divorce."  G. L. c. 208, § 52.  
The statute prohibits modification or extension of transitional 
alimony, which, once ordered, may not be replaced with another form 
of alimony.  Id. 
7 
 
§ 53, in deciding the appropriate form of alimony: 
"the length of the marriage; age of the parties; health of the 
parties; 
income, 
employment 
and 
employability 
of 
both 
parties, 
including employability through reasonable diligence and 
additional training, if necessary; economic and non-economic 
contribution of both parties to the marriage; marital 
lifestyle; ability of each party to maintain the marital 
lifestyle; lost economic opportunity as a result of the 
marriage; 
and 
such 
other 
factors 
as 
the 
court 
considers 
relevant 
and material." 
 
G. L. c. 208, § 53 (a).  These factors also are to be considered in 
determining the amount of alimony to be awarded.  Id.  In sum, the 
primary differences between rehabilitative and general alimony 
relate 
to 
the 
initial 
term 
limits 
set 
forth 
in 
the 
act 
and 
the 
standard 
by which the term of alimony may be extended. 
 
Rehabilitative alimony is defined as "the periodic payment of 
support 
to 
a 
recipient 
spouse 
who 
is 
expected 
to 
become 
economically 
self-sufficient by a predicted time, such as, without limitation, 
reemployment; completion of job training; or receipt of a sum due 
from the payor spouse under a judgment."  G. L. c. 208, § 48.  The 
alimony reform act provides, among other things, that 
"[r]ehabilitative 
alimony 
shall 
terminate 
upon . . . 
the 
occurrence 
of 
a 
specific 
event 
in 
the 
future," 
G. L. 
c. 208, 
§ 50 
(a),10 but 
also 
                                                 
 
10 General Laws c. 208, § 50 (a), provides in full: 
 
"Rehabilitative alimony shall terminate upon the remarriage of the 
recipient, the occurrence of a specific event in the future or the 
death 
of 
either 
spouse; 
provided, 
however, 
that 
the 
court 
may 
require 
the payor to provide reasonable security for payment of sums due to 
8 
 
that the alimony term shall not exceed five years.  G. L. c. 208, 
§ 50 
(b).  Extension 
of 
the 
term 
is 
authorized, 
however, 
on 
a 
showing 
of compelling circumstances that "unforeseen events prevent the 
recipient spouse from being self-supporting at the end of the term 
with 
due 
consideration 
to 
the 
length 
of 
the 
marriage, 
[and] 
the 
court 
finds that the recipient tried to become self-supporting."  G. L. 
c. 208, 
§ 50 
(b).11  The 
amount 
of 
alimony 
may 
be 
modified 
during 
the 
term "upon material change of circumstance."  G. L. c. 208, § 50 
(c).  By contrast, general term alimony is defined as "the periodic 
payment of support to a recipient spouse who is economically 
dependent."  G. L. c. 208, § 48.  Payments continue, subject to 
durational time limits established by the act that depend upon the 
length of the marriage; here, general alimony would have entitled 
the 
wife 
to 
support 
payments 
of 
up 
to 
approximately 
thirteen 
years.12  
                                                                                                                                                             
the recipient in the event of the payor's death during the alimony 
term." 
 
 
11 General Laws c. 208, 50 (b), provides: 
 
 
"The alimony term for rehabilitative alimony shall be not more 
than [five] years.  Unless the recipient has remarried, the 
rehabilitative alimony may be extended on a complaint for 
modification 
upon 
a 
showing 
of 
compelling 
circumstances 
in 
the 
event 
that:  (1) 
unforeseen 
events 
prevent 
the 
recipient 
spouse 
from 
being 
self-supporting 
at 
the 
end 
of 
the 
term 
with 
due 
consideration 
to 
the 
length 
of 
the 
marriage; 
(2) 
the 
court 
finds 
that 
the 
recipient 
tried 
to become self-supporting; and (3) the payor is able to pay without 
undue burden." 
 
12 Because this was a marriage of approximately sixteen years 
9 
 
See G. L. c. 208, § 49.  General term alimony can be extended for 
"good cause" if there has been a material change in circumstances 
and the reasons are supported by "clear and convincing evidence."  
G. L. c. 208, § 49 (f) (2). 
 
We 
turn 
to 
a 
consideration 
whether 
the 
judge's 
findings 
in 
this 
case reflect that she considered the mandatory factors when 
determining the appropriate form of alimony, and whether those 
findings support her conclusion that the wife should receive 
rehabilitative alimony.  We then consider whether the findings 
support 
the 
judge's 
determination 
regarding 
the 
amount 
of 
the 
alimony 
award. 
 
2.  Standard of review.  A judge has broad discretion when 
awarding alimony under the statute.  Heins v. Ledis, 422 Mass. 477, 
480-481 (1996).13  In reviewing both the form and the amount of an 
                                                                                                                                                             
and 
four 
months, 
see 
note 
4, 
supra, 
the 
durational 
period 
of 
general 
term 
alimony 
is 
governed 
by 
G. 
L. 
c. 
208, 
§ 
49 
(b) (4), 
which 
provides: 
 
"If the length of the marriage is [twenty] years or less, but 
more 
than 
[fifteen] 
years, 
general 
term 
alimony 
shall 
continue 
for not longer than [eighty] per cent of the number of months 
of the marriage." 
 
 
13 The legislative history clearly shows that the broad 
discretion judges historically have had in making awards of alimony 
was 
not 
affected 
by 
the 
Alimony 
Reform 
Act 
of 
2011, 
St. 2011, 
c. 124 
(alimony reform act).  Indeed, the Legislature appears to have 
viewed the creation of the four categories of alimony as providing 
greater 
discretion 
to 
judges.   A 
senator 
speaking 
in 
support 
of 
the 
bill that would become the alimony reform act stated, "Under this 
bill, 
people 
are 
provided 
with 
the 
ability 
to 
plan 
for 
their 
future.  
10 
 
award 
of 
alimony, 
we 
examine 
a 
judge's 
findings 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
judge 
considered all 
of 
the 
relevant 
factors 
under 
G. 
L. 
c. 
208, 
§ 53 (a), and whether the judge relied on any irrelevant factors.  
Cf. 
Baccanti 
v. 
Morton, 
434 
Mass. 
787, 
790 
(2001) 
(reviewing 
factors 
under G. L. c. 208, § 34, regarding division of marital property).  
"[I]t is important that the record indicate clearly that the judge 
considered all the mandatory statutory factors," Rice v. Rice, 372 
Mass. 398, 401 (1977), and that the reason for her conclusion is 
apparent 
in 
her 
findings.  Heins 
v. 
Ledis, 
supra 
at 
481.  "A 
judgment 
will 
not 
be 
disturbed 
on 
appeal 
unless 
"plainly 
wrong 
and 
excessive."  
Id., quoting Pare v. Pare, 409 Mass. 292, 296 (1991). 
 
3.  Rehabilitative alimony.  a.  Mandatory factors.  A judge 
has discretion in deciding whether to award rehabilitative alimony 
rather 
than 
general 
term 
alimony, 
so 
long 
as 
she 
has 
given 
appropriate 
                                                                                                                                                             
They 
are 
provided 
with 
clear 
guidance.  We 
still 
need 
discretion 
for 
judges."  See 
State 
House 
News 
Service 
(Senate 
Sess.), 
July 
28, 
2011 
(statement 
by 
Senator 
Cynthia 
S. 
Cream).  And 
in 
floor 
debates 
prior 
to adoption of the alimony reform act, a representative stated, "We 
create[d] several forms of alimony. . . . [The bill] gives judges 
the ability to do things they can't do now."  See State House News 
Service (House Sess.), July 20, 2011 (statement by Representative 
John 
V. 
Fernandes 
prior 
to 
vote 
to 
engross 
2011 
Senate 
Doc. 
No. 
665).  
See also State House News Service, Sept. 25, 2011 ("The bill lays 
out 
for 
the 
first 
time 
in 
state 
law 
specific 
guidelines 
on 
the 
levels 
and 
duration, 
amount 
and 
form 
of 
payments 
to 
former 
spouses.  Reform 
advocates say the bill will give judges more discretion on when and 
how much alimony to award"). 
 
11 
 
consideration 
to 
the 
factors 
identified 
in 
G. L. 
c. 208, 
§ 53 (a).14  
Where the determination is made that rehabilitative alimony, with 
its 
shorter 
durational 
limits, 
is 
the 
most 
appropriate 
form, 
findings 
based on those factors must support the conclusion that a recipient 
spouse's 
economic 
dependence 
is 
temporary, 
and 
that, 
at 
a 
predictable 
date, 
the 
dependent 
spouse 
can 
become 
self-sufficient 
by 
undertaking 
reasonable efforts.  See G. L. c. 208, §§ 48, 53. 
 
Here, the judge made comprehensive findings of fact in 
conjunction 
with 
her 
conclusion 
that 
the 
appropriate 
form 
of 
alimony 
in this case was rehabilitative.  "[W]e will not reverse findings 
made by the judge on the basis of oral testimony unless we are 
convinced 
they 
are 
plainly 
wrong."  Felton 
v. 
Felton, 
383 
Mass. 
232, 
239 (1981).  See Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 52 (a).  According to those 
findings, 
this 
was 
a 
marriage 
of 
approximately 
sixteen 
years 
and 
four 
months; at the time of trial the wife was forty-five years old and 
the husband was forty-eight years old; both parties enjoyed good 
health, as did their children.  During most of the marriage, both 
parties were employed full time outside the home and contributed 
their earnings to the marital enterprise.  The marriage was a "true 
partnership 
in 
every 
aspect," 
from 
the 
financial 
contributions 
that 
                                                 
 
14 There 
is 
nothing 
in 
the 
statutory 
scheme 
to 
suggest 
that, 
even 
where there is evidence of conditions supporting rehabilitative 
alimony, a judge must in every case award rehabilitative and not 
general term alimony; indeed, a fine line may distinguish the two 
in some circumstances. 
12 
 
each made "to child rearing[, and] to homemaking." 
 
The husband, who holds a bachelor of arts degree in political 
science, initially worked as a real estate appraiser, then as an 
analyst and executive in real estate investment firms.  The 
husband's income, as reported on his Internal Revenue Service W-2 
forms, 
was 
$302,442 
in 
2004.  It 
increased 
annually 
until 
it 
reached 
$1,024,555 in 2008, and was in excess of $900,000 in 2009 and 2010.  
In 2011, the husband's income as reported on his W-2 forms was 
$741,958.15  Since 2008, the husband's income has consisted of base 
salary in the amount of approximately $400,000, and bonuses which 
are paid annually in the year after they are earned.  In 2011, the 
husband 
also 
received 
$286,625 
in 
nonrecurring 
deferred 
compensation 
from 
a 
prior 
employer.  The 
husband's 
income 
during 
the 
marriage 
was 
always greater than that of the wife.  The husband was found to be 
self-supporting and fully employed commensurate with his training, 
skills, and experience. 
 
The wife holds a bachelor of science degree in business; 
beginning early in the marriage, she was employed as a sales 
                                                 
 
15 According to the judge's findings, the husband "received" 
bonuses 
from 
his 
present 
employer 
in 
the 
amount 
of 
$200,000 
in 
2008, 
$200,000 in 2009, and $345,000 in 2010, but the uncontested trial 
evidence reflects that those amounts were "earned" in the years 
indicated and received a year later and that the husband's income 
for 2011 included a bonus in the amount of $345,000, and in each of 
2010, 2009, and 2008 his income included a bonus of $200,000.  This 
evidence is consistent with the judge's findings regarding the 
husband's 2011 income. 
13 
 
representative and, starting in 1990, as a pharmaceutical sales 
representative for several companies.  In 2003, the wife was 
promoted 
to 
the 
position 
of 
sales 
district 
manager, 
a 
job 
from 
which 
she was terminated in 2007.  See note 16, infra.  At that time, her 
base salary was in the range of $127,000 to $130,000 annually, with 
a bonus of up to $40,000; she also had use of the company car. 
 
The 
judge 
found 
that 
the 
wife, 
who 
has 
not 
been 
employed 
outside 
the home since 2008, is not presently self-supporting, but has the 
ability 
and 
the 
desire 
to 
work.  The 
judge 
found 
credible 
the 
wife's 
testimony 
that 
she 
wants 
to 
work 
and 
plans 
to 
work 
outside 
the home, 
but found also that her job search efforts have been sporadic and 
superficial, and that she had not used her best efforts to secure 
employment.16  At the time of trial, the wife had received no 
interview or job offers as a result of her job search.  The judge 
was not required to credit, or to give significant weight to, the 
wife's 
assertions 
as 
to 
those 
steps 
she 
had 
taken 
in 
her 
job 
search, 
which 
do 
not, 
even 
if 
credited, 
negate 
the 
finding 
that 
the 
wife 
had 
not used her best efforts.  Cf. Flaherty v. Flaherty, 40 Mass. App. 
Ct. 289, 291 (1996).  The judge did not credit the opinion of the 
                                                 
 
16 The 
judge 
found 
that, 
immediately 
after 
being 
terminated 
from 
her job in 2007, the wife applied for a job with another company, 
but received no response.  Soon thereafter, the wife and her 
sister-in-law started a consulting firm for early-stage 
pharmaceutical companies, but the business closed after six months 
because of what the judge described as "issues" in the 
sister-in-law's life. 
14 
 
husband's expert that the wife was highly employable as a sales 
manager or marketing manager and in those jobs could earn an annual 
salary 
of 
$160,000 
to 
$170,000, 
but 
did 
find 
that 
the 
wife 
had 
skills 
that 
were 
transferrable 
across 
many 
fields 
beyond 
pharmaceutical 
and 
medical device sales. 
 
Also according to the findings, "[t]he parties lived an upper 
middle class lifestyle during the marriage.  They dined out, 
vacationed, joined a yacht club," and owned boats, luxury vehicles, 
and a second home, which the parties sold by agreement during the 
litigation.  The children attended private schools.  The husband 
held membership in a fish and game club, while the wife was a member 
of a tennis club.  The judge also found that the husband and wife 
"spent beyond their means" and that, despite the husband's 
significant income and the wife's "meaningful salary," their only 
assets at the time of trial consisted of the equity in their home 
and their retirement accounts. 
 
The 
judge 
determined 
that 
the 
wife 
was 
in 
need 
of 
rehabilitative 
alimony and that it was "anticipated that [the w]ife will return to 
the workforce on a full time basis" within a predictable period of 
time, 
and 
that 
until 
such 
time 
she 
"is 
in 
need 
of 
alimony."  The 
judge 
further 
found 
that, 
with 
reasonable 
effort, 
the 
wife 
"can 
be 
employed 
within five years.  At such time, the parties will need to review 
each of their respective financial circumstances and the need for 
15 
 
continued alimony and/or child support." 
 
These factors reflect that the judge gave consideration to all 
the factors identified in G. L. c. 208, § 53 (a).  We turn now to 
the wife's claim that the findings do not support the judge's 
determination that the wife will become self-sufficient by a 
predictable date in the future. 
 
b.  Self-sufficiency by predicted date.  The wife argues that 
the judge abused her discretion in awarding rehabilitative rather 
then general term alimony, because there is no specific event upon 
which termination was based.  The wife relies on the language in 
G. L. c. 208, § 50 (a), which provides, in relevant part, that 
"[r]ehabilitative 
alimony 
shall 
terminate 
upon . . . 
the 
occurrence 
of a specific event in the future," to support her claim that 
rehabilitative alimony is appropriate only where a judge has 
identified a "specific event in the future," such as completion of 
job 
training 
or 
a 
medical 
residency, 
passing 
a 
licensing 
examination, 
or graduation from a specific educational program.  We agree that 
the examples provided by the wife can support the award of 
rehabilitative alimony.  However, we conclude that, in some 
circumstances, the potential of future reemployment may provide a 
basis for deciding that rehabilitative, rather than general term, 
alimony should be awarded. 
 
We interpret a statute according to "all its words construed 
16 
 
by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in 
connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or 
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, 
to 
the 
end 
that 
the 
purpose 
of 
its 
framers 
may 
be 
effectuated."  Board 
of 
Educ. 
v. 
Assessor 
of 
Worcester, 
368 
Mass. 
511, 
513 
(1975), 
quoting 
Industrial 
Fin. 
Corp. 
v. 
State 
Tax 
Comm'n, 
367 
Mass. 
360, 
364 
(1975).  
The reference to a "specific event" is found only in G. L. c. 208, 
§ 50 (a), 
which 
establishes 
the 
durational 
limits 
for 
rehabilitative 
alimony.  The 
meaning 
of 
"specific 
event" 
must 
be 
considered 
in 
light 
of other provisions in the alimony reform act that define 
rehabilitative alimony and list the factors a judge must consider 
when determining the form of the alimony award. 
 
General Laws c. 208, § 48, defines rehabilitative alimony as 
support paid to "a recipient spouse who is expected to become 
economically self-sufficient by a predicted time, such as, without 
limitation, 
reemployment; 
completion 
of 
job 
training; 
or 
receipt 
of 
a 
sum 
due 
from 
the 
payor 
spouse 
under 
a 
judgment."  Although 
the 
wife 
makes no direct reference to this provision, it is implicit in her 
argument that she views the term "reemployment" to mean a specific, 
identifiable job that is expected to materialize on a date certain.  
But 
future 
employment 
is 
also 
among 
the 
factors 
a 
judge 
must 
consider 
in determining the form of alimony to be awarded. 
 
As set forth in G. L. c. 208, § 53 (a), a judge must consider 
17 
 
the "employment and employability of both parties, including 
employability 
through 
reasonable 
diligence 
and 
additional 
training, 
if necessary."  "Employable" has been defined as "capable of being 
employed," 
Webster's 
Ninth 
New 
Collegiate 
Dictionary 
408 
(1991), 
and 
"able 
to 
be 
employed," 
Webster's 
New 
Universal 
Unabridged 
Dictionary 
638 (2003).  "Employability" in this context means that a party has 
the capability of being employed.  As the act suggests, to become 
employable 
may 
require 
that 
a 
party 
undertake 
"reasonable 
diligence 
and 
additional 
training."  Thus, 
although 
a 
party 
may 
not 
be 
employed 
or employable at the time of entry of the alimony award, that party 
still could have predictable prospects of future employment in a 
specific type of work or position.  In such circumstances, if a 
party's employability in the near future is a realistic prospect, 
rehabilitative alimony might, with other considerations, be 
appropriate. 
 
The act itself sheds no further light on the specific 
circumstances in which a spouse might be deemed capable of economic 
independence at some predictable date that is five years or less in 
the 
future.  Our 
decisional 
law, 
however, 
through 
which 
the 
concept 
of rehabilitative alimony has developed, provides some guidance.  
The purpose of an award of rehabilitative alimony is "to protect, 
for 
a 
limited 
time, 
a 
spouse 
whose 
earning 
capacity 
has 
suffered 
(or 
become nonexistent) while that spouse prepares to reenter the work 
18 
 
force."  Moriarty v. Stone, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 151, 158 (1996), 
quoting Bak v. Bak, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 608, 621-622 (1987).  See 
Fechtor 
v. 
Fechtor, 
26 
Mass. 
App. 
Ct. 
859, 
867-868 
(1989) 
(affirming 
award rehabilitative alimony to "knowledgeable, experienced 
businesswoman" who "may take some time" to reach level of earnings 
she previously had achieved while employed at husband's business).  
The award of rehabilitative alimony is appropriate when a spouse's 
anticipated 
self-sufficiency 
is 
based 
on 
the 
predictable 
occurrence 
of a future event, such as reemployment.  Adlakha v. Adlakha, 65 
Mass. App. Ct. 860, 870 (2006).17  In accordance with these cases, 
the prospect of future employment, when based on a past history of 
commensurate employment followed by a brief hiatus, may be 
sufficiently predictable, even in the absence of an available, 
specifically identifiable job. 
 
Rehabilitative alimony is the appropriate form of alimony if 
"a recipient spouse . . . is expected to become economically 
self-sufficient by a predicted time."  G. L. c. 208, § 48.  Thus, 
                                                 
 
17 See Sampson v. Sampson, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 366, 371 (2004) 
(durational 
limit 
not 
warranted 
where 
"simply 
uncertain" 
that 
wife, 
sole 
proprietor 
of 
small 
business, 
could 
generate 
future 
income 
that 
would render alimony unnecessary); D.L. v. G.L., 61 Mass. App. Ct. 
488, 510 (2004) (durational limit not warranted where "simply 
uncertain" 
whether 
wife's 
future 
income 
from 
employment 
would 
render 
alimony 
unnecessary); 
Goldman 
v. 
Goldman, 
28 
Mass. 
App. 
Ct. 
603, 
613 
(1990) ("Where future events cannot be predicted with any measure 
of certainty, an alimony award should be based on present 
conditions"). 
19 
 
the alimony reform act permits a judge to determine that 
rehabilitative alimony based on expected employment is appropriate 
where there is sufficient evidence for a judge to find, with a 
reasonable 
degree 
of 
certainty, 
that 
the 
recipient 
spouse 
can 
obtain 
employment 
through 
reasonable 
efforts, 
and 
thereby 
can 
gain 
economic 
self-sufficiency, in the near future.  See G. L. c. 208, § 50 (b). 
 
Here, the judge found that both parties are educated 
professionals, 
experienced 
in 
their 
respective 
fields.  The 
wife 
had 
been employed outside the home until 2008, fewer than four years 
before the end of the marriage; at that time, her income was 
approximately 
$170,000.  After 
losing 
her 
job, 
the 
wife 
pursued 
her 
interest 
in 
interior 
design, 
attending 
classes 
in 
2009 
and 
2010, 
and 
started 
a 
business 
that 
failed 
through 
no 
fault 
of 
her 
own.  The 
judge 
found also that the wife wished to work, that she was highly 
employable 
in 
the 
area 
of 
sales, 
that 
her 
skills 
were 
transferrable, 
and that she could with reasonable diligence find employment at a 
level permitting self-sufficiency.  These findings support the 
judge's determination that the wife can be "expected to become 
economically self-sufficient by a predicted time."  G. L. c. 208, 
§ 48.  Thus, 
the 
judge 
did 
not 
abuse 
her 
discretion 
in 
deciding 
that 
the 
wife 
was 
not 
entitled 
to 
general 
term 
alimony 
under 
the 
specific 
20 
 
facts of this case.18  See Heins v. Ledis, 422 Mass. 477, 480-481 
(1996). 
 
4.  Amount of alimony award.  The wife also challenges the 
amount of the alimony award, arguing that it should not have been 
calculated solely from the husband's base salary, but rather should 
have 
encompassed 
his 
income 
from 
all 
sources, 
including 
any 
bonuses.  
The 
husband 
argues 
that 
alimony 
based 
on 
thirty-five 
per 
cent 
of 
his 
base income is sufficient to meet the wife's needs; that any future 
bonuses are the result of his own hard work alone; that the amount 
of his future bonuses is speculative; and that by ordering him to 
pay all of the cost of the children's private school education, the 
judge was in essence excluding from his income an amount that the 
judge had already considered for setting a child support order, as 
provided by G. L. c. 208, § 53 (c) (2). 
 
Included among the factors that the judge was required to 
consider 
in 
determining 
the 
amount 
of 
the 
alimony 
award 
are 
"marital 
lifestyle" and "ability of each party to maintain the marital 
                                                 
 
18 As 
to 
the 
circumstances 
of 
the 
wife's 
departure 
from 
her 
last 
position, the judge found that the wife's employer had determined 
after investigation that, as a sales district manager, she had 
approved 
an 
expense 
of 
a 
sales 
representative 
who 
had 
misappropriated 
the funds.  The wife had no knowledge of this misappropriation, but 
was 
fired 
nonetheless.  However, 
as 
the 
judge 
noted 
in 
her 
findings, 
the husband's expert was not asked what impact the involuntary 
departure 
from 
employment 
would 
have 
on 
the 
likelihood 
of 
the 
wife's 
ability to secure employment.  The wife introduced no expert 
testimony on this issue. 
21 
 
lifestyle."  G. L. c. 208, § 53 (a).  In addition, an award of 
rehabilitative alimony is governed by the general guidelines for 
awards 
of 
alimony, 
other 
than 
reimbursement 
alimony, 
that 
the 
amount 
"should generally not exceed the recipient's need or [thirty] to 
[thirty-five] per cent of the difference between the parties' gross 
incomes established at the time of the order being issued."  G. L. 
c. 208, 
§ 53 (b).  Subject 
to 
certain 
exclusions,19 "income 
shall 
be 
defined 
as 
set 
forth 
in 
the 
Massachusetts 
child 
support 
guidelines."  
G. L. c. 208, § 53 (b). 
 
As the provisions of G. L. c. 208, § 53 (b), make clear, where 
an award of alimony is necessary to assure the "self-sufficiency" 
of 
a 
spouse 
who 
is 
determined 
to 
be 
dependent 
-- 
whether 
for 
the 
short 
or long term –- the award must reflect the parties' marital 
lifestyle.  One 
method 
of 
measuring 
the 
amount 
necessary 
to 
support 
a spouse in a manner consistent with the marital lifestyle 
(particularly where, as here, the parties were found to be spending 
beyond their means) may be found in the provision that authorizes 
                                                 
 
19 General Laws c. 208, § 53 (c), provides: 
 
 
"When 
issuing 
an 
order 
for 
alimony, 
the 
court 
shall 
exclude 
from its income calculation: 
 
 
"(1) 
capital 
gains 
income 
and 
dividend 
and 
interest 
income 
which 
derive 
from 
assets 
equitably 
divided 
between 
the 
parties 
under [§] 34; and 
 
 
"(2) gross income which the court has already considered 
for setting a child support order." 
22 
 
an alimony award based on "need," or on a percentage of "the 
difference 
between 
the 
parties' 
gross 
incomes 
established 
at 
the 
time 
of 
the 
order 
being 
issued."  G. L. 
c. 208, 
§ 53 (b).  Because 
"need" 
is a relative term for purposes of the act, it must be measured in 
light 
of 
mandatory 
considerations 
that 
include 
the 
parties' 
marital 
lifestyle.  The 
judge 
found 
that 
the 
parties 
enjoyed 
"an 
upper 
middle 
class lifestyle" that included dining out, vacations, memberships 
in clubs, luxury automobiles, boats, and private schools for their 
children.  Although the husband's income at times prior to the 
divorce approached or exceeded $1 million annually, the husband and 
wife "spent beyond their means" and acquired few assets.  On these 
facts, 
the 
judge 
did 
not 
abuse 
her 
discretion 
in 
arriving 
at 
an 
award 
based on thirty-five per cent of the husband's income, rather than 
on a calculation of need based on historic marital spending.  Cf. 
M.C. v. T.K., 463 Mass. 226, 234 n.11 (2012) (noting distinction 
between 
net 
worth 
and 
standard 
of 
living, 
and 
that 
household 
spending 
is but one mode of establishing standard of living). 
 
The question remains whether the judge was required to include 
the 
husband's 
bonus 
income 
in 
this 
calculation.  The 
language 
of 
the 
act is clear that all of the payor spouse's income, as defined by 
the Massachusetts Child Support Guidelines (guidelines), must be 
included in any calculation of alimony, and bonus income is 
23 
 
specifically included in this definition.20  Caring for dependent 
children 
is 
a 
factor 
to 
be 
considered 
in 
awarding 
child 
support, 
but 
is not among the factors to be considered in determining alimony.  
See G. L. c. 208, § 53 (a).  See also Saia v. Saia, 58 Mass. App. 
Ct. 135, 137-138 (2003). 
 
It is certainly possible, as the husband suggests, that the 
judge 
factored 
in 
as 
child 
support 
an 
amount 
the 
wife 
might 
otherwise 
have 
been 
ordered 
to 
contribute 
to 
the 
costs 
of 
the 
children's 
private 
schools, but the findings on this point are not clear.  The judge 
found that "the parties agreed that neither would pay child support 
to the other," and, on this basis, ordered that neither party was 
to pay child support "at this time."  However, the record supports 
the wife's claim that there was no agreement that the husband need 
not pay child support.  Rather, at trial the wife sought child 
support calculated in accordance with applicable provisions in the 
guidelines, and proposed that the amount so calculated would be 
"designated . . . as alimony," so that the husband could enjoy the 
                                                 
 
20 The definition of income in the Massachusetts Child Support 
Guidelines 
(effective 
Jan. 
1, 
2009) 
(guidelines) 
that 
were 
in 
effect 
at the time of the trial in this case is very broad and includes 
bonuses among twenty-seven specifically identified sources of 
income, as well as "any other form of income or compensation not 
specifically 
itemized 
above."  The 
guidelines 
in 
effect 
as 
of 
August 
1, 2013, do not alter this aspect of the definition of income. 
 
24 
 
tax advantages that such a designation would provide.21  She 
thereafter 
sought 
to 
amend 
the 
judgment, 
seeking, 
among 
other 
things, 
an increase in the alimony award by a percentage of the husband's 
income in excess of his base salary.22 
 
Because the alimony amount was not calculated on the basis of 
all 
of 
the 
husband's 
income, 
as 
required 
by 
the 
statute, 
and 
because 
the 
finding 
that 
the 
wife 
agreed 
that 
the 
husband 
need 
not 
pay 
child 
support was erroneous, we are unable to conclude that the amount of 
alimony was determined after due consideration of all of the 
statutory factors.  We therefore remand to the Probate and Family 
Court for recalculation of the amount of alimony, and for any 
additional action that the judge may deem to be warranted. 
 
5.  Life insurance as security.  The judgment ordered both 
parties 
to 
maintain 
the 
life 
insurance 
policies 
in 
effect 
at 
the 
time 
of trial for the benefit of the other.  The act authorizes a court 
                                                 
 
21 Section II.A of the guidelines provides that the guidelines 
"do 
not 
preclude 
the 
Court 
from 
deciding 
that 
any 
order 
be 
designated 
in whole or in part as alimony."  Further, § II.A of the 2013 
guidelines provides that, consistent with the alimony reform act, 
 
 
"[c]onsideration 
may 
be 
given 
by 
the 
parties 
to 
preparing 
alternative calculations of alimony and child support to 
determine the most equitable result for the child and the 
parties.  Depending upon the circumstance, alimony may be 
calculated 
first, 
and 
in 
other 
circumstances 
child 
support 
will 
be calculated first.  Judicial discretion is necessary and 
deviations should be considered." 
 
 
22 We 
do 
not 
suggest 
that 
the 
amounts 
calculated 
by 
the 
wife 
are 
correct. 
25 
 
to "require reasonable security for alimony in the event of the 
payor's 
death 
during 
the 
alimony 
period.  Security 
may 
include, 
but 
shall not be limited to, maintenance of life insurance."  G. L. 
c. 208, § 55 (a).  In addition, when support for children has been 
ordered, "the court may require sufficient security for its payment 
according to the judgment."  G. L. c. 208, § 36. 
 
The wife's insurance policies would provide a death benefit to 
the husband in the amount of $1.6 million; at the same time, the 
husband would be relieved of his obligation to pay alimony.23  See 
G. L. c. 208, § 50 (a).  Although the wife is responsible for 
one-half 
of 
the 
cost 
of 
the 
children's 
extracurricular 
and 
enrichment 
activities 
and 
one-half 
of 
their 
uninsured 
medical 
and 
dental 
costs, 
nothing in the judge's findings suggests that these costs were the 
basis 
for 
her 
order.  The 
findings 
do 
not 
otherwise 
support 
an 
order 
requiring security under G. L. c. 208, § 55 (a), or under G. L. 
c. 208, § 36.  Assuming that some security could be found to be 
appropriate, the amount of the death benefit the wife was ordered 
to maintain exceeds any financial obligation she has under the 
judgment and, on this basis, the order requiring that the wife 
maintain 
life 
insurance 
policies 
with 
a 
death 
benefit 
of 
$1.6 
million 
for the benefit of the husband was an abuse of discretion. 
                                                 
 
23 The 
parties 
are 
in 
agreement 
that 
the 
wife's 
annual 
premiums 
for 
the 
policies 
she 
has 
been 
ordered 
to 
maintain 
total 
approximately 
$15,561. 
26 
 
 
6.  Division of assets.  The wife contends that the judge's 
assignment 
of 
marital 
property 
and 
allocation 
of 
responsibility 
for 
the parties' liabilities was plainly wrong and not supported by the 
judge's findings.  She argues that, because the judge found the 
marriage 
to 
be 
a 
"true 
partnership" 
and 
ordered 
a 
payment 
to 
"equalize 
the division of assets," the judge intended to effect an 
approximately 
equal 
division 
of 
assets.  The 
wife 
contends 
that 
the 
division 
was 
not 
equal, 
because 
the 
judge 
allocated 
to 
her 
a 
greater 
amount of debt than was allocated to the husband, failed to value 
certain of the husband's bank accounts, and incorrectly divided one 
asset 
based 
on 
its 
present 
value 
rather 
than 
ordering 
that 
she 
receive 
one-half of any future proceeds. 
 
We review the judge's findings to determine whether she 
considered all the relevant factors under G. L. c. 208, § 34, and 
whether she relied on any irrelevant factors.  See Baccanti v. 
Morton, 434 Mass. 787, 790 (2001).  "We will not reverse a judgment 
with respect to property division unless it is 'plainly wrong and 
excessive.'"  Id. 
at 
793, 
quoting 
Mahoney 
v. 
Mahoney, 
425 
Mass. 
441, 
447 (1997). 
 
The judgment allocates debts totaling $75,519.04 to the wife 
and $26,200.71 to the husband.  The findings reflect that over 
$16,000 of the wife's listed debts were to repay loans from members 
of 
her 
family, 
and 
over 
$57,000 
consisted 
of 
credit 
card 
debt 
incurred 
27 
 
by the wife alone.  The judge found that the wife's credit card 
charges 
reflect 
a 
lifestyle 
beyond 
that 
which 
the 
wife 
could 
afford; 
because 
the 
debts 
were 
incurred 
at 
a 
time 
when 
the 
husband 
"was 
paying 
all 
of 
the 
family's 
living 
expenses" 
and 
the 
wife 
was 
receiving 
weekly 
cash 
payments 
from 
the 
husband, 
who 
had 
taken 
over 
management 
of 
the 
family finances, the judge found that the debts were solely those 
of the wife.  The judge's findings are supported by the evidence, 
and 
the 
allocation 
of 
liabilities 
was 
not 
plainly 
wrong 
or 
excessive. 
 
Apart from this allocation of the parties' liabilities, the 
judge awarded each party assets of roughly equal value.  The judge 
was 
not 
required 
to 
follow 
a 
precise 
mathematical 
formula 
in 
dividing 
the marital estate.  See Williams v. Massa, 431 Mass. 619, 631 
(2000); Denninger v. Denninger, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 429, 430 (1993).  
The wife claims that the judge erred in concluding that the value 
of 
the 
husband's 
bank 
accounts 
was 
"nominal."  The 
husband 
testified 
at 
trial 
that 
the 
balances 
in 
these 
accounts 
had 
changed; 
he 
was 
using 
them to pay bills, and had recently made a mortgage payment on the 
former marital residence.24  The judge was entitled to, and 
implicitly did, credit this testimony when she allocated these 
accounts to the husband without an attribution of specific value. 
The 
wife 
also 
takes 
issue 
with 
the 
manner 
in 
which 
the 
judge 
divided 
                                                 
 
24 The husband's financial statement sets forth weekly living 
expenses of $7,250.61, including payments to the wife in the amount 
of $500. 
28 
 
the interests in a particular investment vehicle.  The judge found 
that the present value of the husband's interest in that investment 
vehicle 
was 
$24,625.  One-half 
of 
the 
value 
of 
the 
investment 
vehicle 
was assigned to the wife.  The wife makes no claim that the finding 
as to the present value of this asset is erroneous.25  Rather, she 
argues that the asset should have been divided on an "if, as, and 
when basis," meaning that she should receive one-half of the value 
at 
some 
future 
date 
if, 
and 
when, 
investors 
receive 
a 
return 
on 
their 
investment. 
 
Because the wife does not challenge the judge's finding as to 
the 
present 
value 
of 
this 
investment, 
and 
the 
parties 
have 
sufficient 
assets 
to 
permit 
a 
present 
payment, 
it 
was 
not 
an 
abuse 
of 
the 
judge's 
discretion 
to 
order 
present 
assignment 
of 
the 
wife's 
interest.  See, 
e.g., Dewan v. Dewan, 399 Mass. 754, 757 (1987), citing Holbrook v. 
Holbrook, 103 Wis. 2d 327, 340 (Ct. App. 1981) (present assignment 
of 
percentage 
of 
future 
pension 
benefits 
is 
"the 
preferable 
approach" 
where sufficient assets are available at time of divorce to divide 
present value without causing undue hardship to either spouse). 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the order in the 
                                                 
 
25 The husband listed this as the value on his financial 
statement submitted to the court in conjunction with the divorce 
filing.  The value reflects the cost of two subscription units of 
the investment vehicle made available through a private offering to 
employees of a certain investment firm, less an outstanding payment 
of $375. 
29 
 
judgment of divorce nisi requiring the plaintiff to maintain her 
current policies of life insurance for the benefit of the defendant 
is vacated.  The matter is remanded to the Probate and Family Court 
for recalculation of the amount of the monthly alimony payment to 
be made to the plaintiff in light of this opinion.  In all other 
respects, the judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.