Case Title: Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Insurance Company

Citation: 2009 WI 27

Docket Number: 2007AP000983

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2009-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
2009 WI 27 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP983 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Heritage Farms, Inc., Audrey Bunchkowski, 
Russell Bunchkowski, Ruth Dutcher, Howard 
Dutcher, Sally Freitag, Amy Holzwart, James 
Holzwart, Kathleen Khin, Glenwood Zellmer, Daryl 
Lloyd, Donald Lloyd, Judy Maas, Jeffrey Maas, 
Carolyn Mueller, Lois Rucich, George Rucich, 
Donna Semrow, Harland Semrow, Beverly Singer, 
Norman A. Singer Trust, Joan Singer, Gordon 
Singer, Singer Living Trust, Inga Stoellinger, 
Otto Stoellinger, Catherine Swanton, Swanton 
Family Trust, Christine Toliver, Alan Toliver, 
Krista Zimmer and Norman Zimmer, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest, Auto-
Owners Insurance Company, Safeco Insurance 
Company of America and Acuity, a mutual 
insurance company, 
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
     v. 
Markel Insurance Company, J.J.J. Recreation 
Corporation d/b/a Lake of the Woods Campground, 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company and 
Jeffrey Knaack, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
Ted Schwochert, Paul B. Schwochert, Helen 
Schwochert and Sue Schroeder, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Markel Insurance Company, J.J.J. Recreation 
Corporation d/b/a Lake of the Woods Campground, 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company and 
Jeffrey Knaack, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 
          Plaintiff, 
     v. 
Markel Insurance Company, J.J.J. Recreation 
Corporation d/b/a Lake of the Woods Campground, 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company and 
Jeffrey Knaack, 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2008 WI App 46 
Reported at: 309 Wis. 2d 217, 747 N.W.2d 762 
(Ct. App.2008-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 26, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 9, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waushara   
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas T. Flugaur   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
GABLEMAN, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by Mark L. Thomsen, Charles David Schmidt, and Cannon & Dunphy, 
S.C., Brookfield, and oral argument by Charles David Schmidt. 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief filed by 
John V. McCoy, Brian D. Parish, and McCoy & Hofbauer, S.C., 
Waukesha, and oral argument by John V. McCoy. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Charlotte Gibson, 
assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was J.B. Van 
Hollen, attorney general, on behalf of the Wisconsin Department 
of Natural Resources. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 27
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP983  
(L.C. No. 
2004CV131, 2004CV138 & 2005CV24) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Heritage Farms, Inc., Audrey Bunchkowski, 
Russell Bunchkowski, Ruth Dutcher, Howard 
Dutcher, Sally Freitag, Amy Holzwart, James 
Holzwart, Kathleen Khin, Glenwood Zellmer, 
Daryl Lloyd, Donald Lloyd, Judy Maas, Jeffrey 
Maas, Carolyn Mueller, Lois Rucich, George 
Rucich, Donna Semrow, Harland Semrow, Beverly 
Singer, Norman A. Singer Trust, Joan Singer, 
Gordon Singer, Singer Living Trust, Inga 
Stoellinger, Otto Stoellinger, Catherine 
Swanton, Swanton Family Trust, Christine 
Toliver, Alan Toliver, Krista Zimmer and Norman 
Zimmer, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest, 
Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Safeco Insurance 
Company of America and Acuity, a mutual 
insurance company, 
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Markel Insurance Company, J.J.J. Recreation 
Corporation d/b/a Lake of the Woods Campground, 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company and 
Jeffrey Knaack, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
_______________________________________________ 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 26, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
No.  2007AP983 
2 
Ted Schwochert, Paul B. Schwochert, Helen 
Schwochert and Sue Schroeder, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Markel Insurance Company, J.J.J. Recreation 
Corporation d/b/a Lake of the Woods Campground, 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company and 
Jeffrey Knaack, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
_______________________________________________ 
 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 
 
          Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Markel Insurance Company, J.J.J. Recreation 
Corporation d/b/a Lake of the Woods Campground, 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company and 
Jeffrey Knaack, 
 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published court of appeals' decision1 that affirmed the decision 
of the Waushara County Circuit Court, Thomas T. Flugaur, Judge.  
                                                 
1 Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2008 WI App 46, 
309 Wis. 2d 217, 747 N.W.2d 762.  
No. 
2007AP983   
 
3 
 
The circuit court concluded that Heritage Farms, Inc.2 could not 
be awarded double damages and attorney fees pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 26.21(1) (2007-08)3 because that statute applies only to 
railroad corporations and none of the defendants are a railroad 
corporation.  The court of appeals affirmed, and as a result, 
Heritage Farms petitioned this court for review.  We granted the 
petition for review and reverse the court of appeals. 
¶2 
This case presents two issues for review.  First, does 
Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) apply only to a certain class of 
tortfeasor?  We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) is not 
limited to a specific class of tortfeasor such as a railroad 
corporation, and a violation under Wis. Stat. § 26.20 is not a 
prerequisite for the applicability of § 26.21(1).  Second, does 
§ 26.21(1) require a showing of "gross negligence"?  We conclude 
that the term "negligence" in § 26.21(1) does not require a 
showing of "gross negligence." 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶3 
Between March 3 and March 8, 2003,4 Jeffrey Knaack 
ignited a large debris pile, which consisted of leaves, pine 
needles, brush, stumps, and building materials.  Knaack was 
                                                 
2 We will refer to the plaintiffs collectively as "Heritage 
Farms." 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated.  The full text 
of Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) can be found in ¶10. 
4 A burning permit for Lake of the Woods was obtained for 
March 3 through March 8, 2003, but Knaack was unable to recall 
exactly what day he started the burn pile on fire.   
No. 
2007AP983   
 
4 
 
responsible for maintaining this burn pile at the Lake of the 
Woods Campground as a favor to Jack Scimeca who owned the 
property and operated the business.  On April 14, 2003, the 
March burn pile fire escaped the Lake of the Woods Campground, 
and as a result, burned 572 acres of land.   
¶4 
Heritage Farms filed a civil action against the 
defendants5 (hereinafter referred to as "Markel") claiming 
negligence, trespass, and nuisance.  Heritage Farms sought 
double compensatory damages and attorney fees pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 26.21(1).  Markel moved the court for partial summary 
judgment asserting that § 26.21(1) did not apply because none of 
the defendants were a railroad corporation and none had violated 
Wis. Stat. § 26.20.  The circuit court granted that motion and 
concluded that § 26.21(1) applies only to railroad corporations.  
After a four week jury trial, a verdict was returned that 
awarded Heritage Farms $568,422 in damages.6  Heritage Farms 
subsequently moved the circuit court to reconsider its previous 
ruling regarding the applicability of § 26.21(1).  The circuit 
court denied Heritage Farms' motion to reconsider.  Heritage 
Farms appealed that ruling and the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court.  The court of appeals concluded that § 26.21(1) 
                                                 
5 The defendants include Knaack, Knaack's personal liability 
carrier, American Family Mutual Insurance Company, Lake of the 
Woods Campground, and its commercial liability insurer, Markel 
Insurance Company. 
6 The circuit court entered judgment on the verdict, and 
with costs and interest, the defendants were liable to Heritage 
Farms in the amount of $637,267.72.  
No. 
2007AP983   
 
5 
 
applied only to railroad corporations and did not decide the 
issue of whether "gross negligence" was required.  Heritage 
Farms petitioned this court for review, which we accepted.         
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶5 
The issues in this case are questions of statutory 
interpretation.  Statutory interpretation is a question of law 
that we review de novo but benefiting from the lower courts' 
analyses.  C. Coakley Relocation Sys., Inc. v. City of 
Milwaukee, 2008 WI 68, ¶14, 310 Wis. 2d 456, 750 N.W.2d 900. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶6 
"[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
determine what the statute means so that it may be given its 
full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  This court begins statutory interpretation with 
the language of the statute.  Id., ¶45.  If the meaning of the 
statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry and give the 
language its "common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except 
that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given 
their technical or special definitional meaning."  Id. 
¶7 
Context and structure of a statute are important to 
the meaning of the statute.  Id., ¶46.  "Therefore, statutory 
language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not 
in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language 
of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id.  Moreover, the 
"[s]tatutory language is read where possible to give reasonable 
No. 
2007AP983   
 
6 
 
effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."  Id.  "A 
statute's purpose or scope may be readily apparent from its 
plain language or its relationship to surrounding or closely-
related statutes——that is, from its context or the structure of 
the statute as a coherent whole."  Id., ¶49. 
¶8 
"'If this process of analysis yields a plain, clear 
statutory meaning, then there is no ambiguity, and the statute 
is applied according to this ascertainment of its meaning.'"  
Id., 
¶46 
(citation 
omitted). 
 
If 
statutory 
language 
is 
unambiguous, we do not need to consult extrinsic sources of 
interpretation.  Id.    
¶9 
The two issues presented in this case require us to 
interpret Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) and related statutes.  We 
address both issues in detail below.   
¶10 Wisconsin Stat. § 26.21, "Civil liability for forest 
fires," provides: 
(1) In addition to the penalties provided in s. 
26.20, the United States, the state, the county or 
private owners, whose property is injured or destroyed 
by forest fires, may recover, in a civil action, 
double the amount of damages suffered, if the fires 
occurred through willfulness, malice or negligence.  
In a civil action, a court may award reasonable costs 
for legal representation to provide owners recovering 
damages under this subsection. 
(2) Persons causing fires in violation of this 
chapter shall be liable to the state in an action for 
debt, to the full amount of all damages done to the 
state lands and for all expenses incurred by the towns 
fighting 
forest 
fires 
and 
shall 
be 
liable 
to 
municipalities in an action for debt, to the full 
amount of all damages to the municipal lands and for 
No. 
2007AP983   
 
7 
 
all expenses incurred by the municipalities fighting 
such fires. 
¶11 Wisconsin Stat. § 26.20, "Fire protection devices," 
includes a number of subsections pertaining to actions that must 
be taken by those corporations that operate on or maintain a 
railway.7  Subsection (9) of Wis. Stat. § 26.20, "Penalty," 
provides: 
(a) Any corporation, by its officers, agents, or 
employees, violating this section, shall forfeit not 
more than $500. 
(b) Any corporation, by its officers, agents or 
employees, willfully violating this section shall be 
fined not more than $1,000. 
(c) Any conductor, individual in charge of a 
train or officer, agent or employee of a railway who 
violates this section shall forfeit not more than 
$500. 
A. Applicability of Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) to Markel 
¶12 Markel argues that Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) does not 
apply to all tortfeasors, but rather, it argues that the statute 
applies only to those tortfeasors who violate Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.20, i.e., railroad corporations.  Since no railroad 
corporation is involved in this case, Markel argues that it 
                                                 
7 While nothing specifically limits Wis. Stat. § 26.20 to 
only railroad corporations, most of the statutory provisions in 
§ 26.20 involve only those who operate on or maintain a railway.  
However, Wis. Stat. § 26.20(3) does apply to donkey, traction, 
and portable engines, which indicates a broader construction 
than 
just 
railroads 
except 
that 
any 
"appeal" 
regarding 
subsection (3) is to be decided by the commissioner of 
railroads.  Subsection (8) also seems to contemplate an 
application that is not limited to railroad corporations, but 
locomotives are referenced in this subsection as well.  
No. 
2007AP983   
 
8 
 
cannot be penalized under § 26.21(1).  Markel reasons that 
§ 26.21(1) is limited by § 26.20 because § 26.21(1) states "[i]n 
addition to the penalties provided in s. 26.20."  Markel also 
asserts that other portions of chapter 26, Wisconsin case law, 
and 
the 
statute's 
legislative 
history 
all 
support 
the 
interpretation 
that 
§ 26.21(1) 
applies 
only 
to 
railroad 
corporations.  Heritage Farms, on the other hand, argues that 
§ 26.21(1) applies to all tortfeasors.  Heritage Farms reasons 
that nothing in the statutory provision specifically limits the 
statute's scope to a specific class of tortfeasor such as 
railroad corporations, and to apply § 26.21(1) in such a manner 
would lead to absurd results.  Heritage Farms supports its 
interpretation by relying on the legislative history, historical 
context, and the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources' 
(DNR) conclusion that § 26.21(1) is not limited to a specific 
class of tortfeasor. 
¶13 We agree with Heritage Farms, and as a result, we 
reverse the court of appeals' decision.  We conclude that Wis. 
Stat. § 26.21(1) is not limited to a specific class of 
tortfeasor such as a railroad corporation, and a violation under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 26.20 
is 
not 
a 
prerequisite 
for 
applying 
§ 26.21(1).  The following four reasons support our conclusion. 
¶14 First, the text of Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) does not 
limit that statute's application to railroad corporations.  To 
interpret the statute consistent with Markel's argument would 
require us to insert words into the statute.  Markel argues as 
though the phrase "railroad corporation" was inserted as 
No. 
2007AP983   
 
9 
 
follows: "In addition to the penalties provided in s. 26.20, the 
United States, the state, the county or private owners, whose 
property is injured or destroyed by forest fires [caused by a 
railroad corporation], may recover, in a civil action . . . ."8  
Because the legislature did not so limit the application of 
§ 26.21(1) to railroad corporations, we will not insert those 
words into the statute to create such a result.9 
                                                 
8 We use "railroad corporation" rather than "violator of 
§ 26.20" because the defendants in this case argue that 
§ 26.21(1) applies only to railroad corporations.  In this case 
we need not reach the determination of whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.20 applies only to railroads.  
9 See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 
2004 WI 58, ¶39, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citing to the 
United States Supreme Court, Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 
503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992), asserting that "[w]e have stated 
time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says 
in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says 
there."); 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland 
Statutes and Statutory Construction (7th ed. 2007) (§ 46:3, 
"'Expressed' intent," stating "[w]hat a legislature says in the 
text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the 
legislative intent or will"; § 46:6, "Each word given effect," 
stating "it is also the case that every word excluded from a 
statute must be presumed to have been excluded for a purpose"; 
§ 47:23, "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius," stating "where 
a form of conduct, . . . there is an inference that all 
omissions 
should 
be 
understood 
as 
exclusions"; 
§ 47:38, 
"Insertion of words," stating "[i]n construing a statute, it is 
always safer not to add to or subtract from the language of a 
statute unless imperatively required to make it a rational 
statute") (internal punctuation and footnotes omitted). 
No. 
2007AP983   
 
10 
 
¶15 Second, 
the 
statutory 
history10 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 26.21(1) supports the interpretation that the current version 
of § 26.21(1) is not limited to railroad corporations and does 
not require a violation of Wis. Stat. § 26.20 in order to be 
applied. 
 
Before 
1977, 
the 
two 
statutory 
sections 
were 
specifically linked together by the phrase "such fires."  The 
1905 version of § 26.21(1) allowed recovery of additional 
penalties for those fires——"such fires"——which were a violation 
of the 1905 version of § 26.20.  The 1905 version of § 26.21(1), 
"Civil liability for forest fires" read as follows: 
In addition to the penalties provided in [section 
1494-57], the United States, the state, the county or 
private owners, whose property is injured or destroyed 
by such fires, may recover . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 1494-58 (Supp. 1906) (emphasis added).  Because the 
legislation 
at 
that 
time 
referred 
to 
"such 
fires," 
the 
legislature had limited the applicability of the 1905 version of 
§ 26.21(1) to fires that qualified as a § 26.2011 violation.  
                                                 
10 By statutory history, we are referring to the previously 
enacted versions of the statute, which have been subsequently 
amended by the legislature.  Wisconsin Stat. § 26.21(1) was 
originally enacted in 1905; see § 18, ch. 264, Laws of 1905.  It 
was referenced as Wis. Stat. § 1494-58; see Wis. Stat. ch. 61, 
§ 1494-58 (Supp. 1906).  Revisions relevant to this appeal were 
made in 1927 and 1977.  Wisconsin Stat. § 26.20, was enacted in 
1905; see § 17, ch. 276, Laws of 1905.  It was referenced as 
Wis. Stat. § 1494-57; see Wis. Stat. ch. 61, § 1494-57 (Supp. 
1906).   
11 The 1905 version of Wis. Stat. § 26.20 was applicable to 
more than just railroad corporations.  Section 1494-57 applied 
to "any logging locomotive, donkey or threshing engine, railway 
locomotive and all other engines, boilers, and locomotives."  
See Wis. 
Stat. ch. 61, § 1494-57 (Supp. 1906).  Other 
subsections referred primarily to railroad corporations.   
No. 
2007AP983   
 
11 
 
Therefore, those two sections were linked together until 1977 
when the "such fires" language was removed by the legislature 
and replaced with the broader term, "forest fires."12  We must 
give deference to that legislative action.  The 1977 revisions 
that 
removed 
the 
"such 
fires" 
language 
eliminated 
the 
qualification that the fires be a violation of § 26.20 and thus 
expanded the penalty provision to include those who cause a 
forest fire regardless of whether the fire was a violation of 
the preceding section.  Wisconsin Stat. § 26.21(1) is no longer 
limited in its application to "such fires" that qualify as a 
§ 26.20 violation, and as a result, a § 26.20 violation is no 
longer a prerequisite for applying § 26.21(1).  Consequently, 
whether 
§ 26.20 
is 
limited 
to 
fires 
caused 
by 
railroad 
corporations is irrelevant to our determination since that 
statute stands alone and § 26.21(1) has a broader application to 
those who cause a forest fire. 
¶16 Third, if the legislature meant to limit Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.21(1)'s application to only violators of Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.20, then § 26.21(1) would have been more appropriately 
inserted in § 26.20.  Section 26.20 has its own penalty section.  
                                                 
12 See Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) (1977-78).  We also note that 
"forest fire," which is referenced in Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1), is 
defined broadly under Wis. Stat. § 26.01(2) (2001-02).  "'Forest 
fire' means uncontrolled, wild, or running fires occurring on 
forest, marsh, field, cutover, or other lands or involving farm, 
city, or village property and improvements incidental to the 
uncontrolled, wild, or running fires occurring on forest, marsh, 
field, cutover, or other lands."  See Wis. Stat. § 26.01(2).  
This broad definition is inconsistent with Markel's narrow 
construction of § 26.21(1).  
No. 
2007AP983   
 
12 
 
See Wis. Stat. § 26.20(9).  If, as Markel argues, § 26.20 is 
limited to railroad corporations and must be violated in order 
for § 26.21(1) to apply, then the legislature likely would have 
placed § 26.21(1) in the penalty subsection of § 26.20 instead 
of creating a stand alone provision.  We give deference to the 
legislature's action. 
¶17 Fourth, 
although 
not 
determinative, 
we 
find 
it 
significant that the DNR has concluded Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) 
applies to all tortfeasors and not just railroads.  For example, 
the burning permit, which was issued by the DNR in this case, 
contains the following warning: "If your fire escapes and 
becomes a forest fire you can be charged for all costs of 
extinguishing the fire and, in civil action, may be charged for 
twice the value of any property damaged or destroyed."  The DNR 
has had the opportunity to consider Wisconsin's forestry 
provisions and understands the history of forest fires and 
timber in this state.  As a result, we find it significant that 
the DNR has determined that the statute applies to all 
tortfeasors rather than just railroad corporations. 
¶18 Markel, however, makes several arguments in support of 
limiting Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) to only those who violate Wis. 
Stat. § 26.20——primarily railroad corporations.  Markel asserts 
that the phrase in § 26.21(1), "[i]n addition to the penalties 
in s. 26.20," means that § 26.21(1) is limited to railroad 
corporations who have violated § 26.20.  Markel argues that to 
receive double damages under § 26.21(1), one must have violated 
§ 26.20.  Thus, a violation of § 26.20 is a prerequisite to 
No. 
2007AP983   
 
13 
 
receiving the benefits of § 26.21(1).  Markel relies primarily 
on The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th 
ed. 2000) to define the word "addition."  "Addition," Markel 
asserts, means "the act or process of adding, especially the 
process of computing with sets of numbers so as to find their 
sum" or "something added, such as a room or section appended to 
a building."  Markel thus argues that the penalties of 
§ 26.21(1) must be added to those in § 26.20.  
¶19 While we have often utilized the dictionary to assist 
us in statutory interpretation,13 Markel fails to define the 
correct term.  Markel defines the word "addition," but the 
phrase in question is "in addition to."14  This phrase means 
"[o]ver and above; besides."  The American Heritage Dictionary 
of the English Language 20 (3d ed. 1992).  Thus, the phrase "in 
addition to" does not mean that Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) applies 
only when it is being added to penalties under Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.20.  Rather, the phrase "in addition to" means besides the 
                                                 
13 State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 499-500, 573 N.W.2d 187 
(1998) (concluding that a dictionary may be utilized to guide 
the meaning of common and ordinary words); See Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶54 (utilizing a dictionary definition). 
14 See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶49 (stating that "[m]any 
words have multiple dictionary definitions; the applicable 
definition depends upon the context in which the word is used"). 
No. 
2007AP983   
 
14 
 
penalties provided in § 26.20, the penalties of § 26.21(1) may 
also be applicable.15 
¶20 The phrase "in addition to," however, does serve a 
useful purpose.  As a principle of statutory interpretation, a 
specific statute generally prevails over a general statute.  
State v. Anthony D.B., 2000 WI 94, ¶11, 237 Wis. 2d 1, 614 
N.W.2d 435.  If the language "in addition to" did not appear in 
Wis. Stat. § 26.21, a violator of Wis. Stat. § 26.20 could 
assert that the only damages or penalties applicable to it would 
be those in the specific statute of § 26.20.16  It seems counter-
intuitive that the legislature would have intended to limit the 
liability of one who causes a forest fire as a result of 
violating § 26.20, to the forfeitures listed in the specific 
statute of § 26.20.  However, because of the phrase "in addition 
to," a violator of § 26.20 that causes a forest fire may also be 
subjected to double damages and attorney fees pursuant to 
§ 26.21(1) and is not limited to only those penalties in 
§ 26.20.   
                                                 
15 The dissent states that "a plaintiff employing § 26.21(1) 
could never obtain damages that are '[i]n addition to the 
penalties provided in s. 26.20' if the conduct that caused the 
fire did not violate § 26.20, thereby permitting the State to 
assess a penalty under § 26.20."  See dissent, ¶56.  According 
to the dissent's logic, the "in addition to the penalty" 
language really reads "when there is a violation of § 26.20."  
That is not a plain language reading of the statute.  
16 While this argument was not made by the defendants in 
this case, it is still relevant to address.  A similar argument 
was made successfully in Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 
174 F.2d 297, 301-02 (10th Cir. 1949). 
No. 
2007AP983   
 
15 
 
¶21 Markel also argues that Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) is 
limited to railroad corporations because Wis. Stat. § 26.14 is 
not mentioned in § 26.21(1), and § 26.14 addresses all civil 
liability rather than just civil liability of railroads.17  
Markel's reliance on § 26.14 is unpersuasive because the 1905 
version of § 26.21(1) was created over 20 years before § 26.14 
was created in 1927, and as a result, it is not surprising that 
§ 26.14 is not referenced in § 26.21(1).  Furthermore, if 
§ 26.21(1) was limited to violations of § 26.20, one who is 
liable for damages under § 26.14 could then escape the penalties 
of § 26.21(1).  However, the legislature chose the phrase 
"forest fires," in both statutes instead of limiting either 
statute.  There is simply no indication that the legislature 
intended as Markel suggests. 
¶22 Markel relies on Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission of Wisconsin to assert that "'where a statute 
                                                 
17 Wisconsin Stat. § 26.14, "Forest fires, authority of fire 
fighters, compensation, penalties, civil liability" provides in 
part: 
(9)(a) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed 
as affecting the right to damages.  The liability of 
persons for damages is not limited to the destruction 
of merchantable timber but may also include the value 
of young or immature forest growth. 
(b) Any person who sets a fire on any land and 
allows such fire to escape and become a forest fire 
shall be liable for all expenses incurred in the 
suppression of the fire by the state or town in which 
the fire occurred.  An action under this paragraph 
shall be commenced within the time provided by s. 
893.91 or be barred. 
No. 
2007AP983   
 
16 
 
with respect to one subject contains a given provision, the 
omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a 
related subject is significant in showing that a different 
intention existed.'"  Kimberly-Clark, 110 Wis. 2d 455, 463, 329 
N.W.2d 143 (1983) (citing State v. Welkos, 14 Wis. 2d 186, 192, 
109 N.W.2d 889 (1961) (emphasis added)).  Because, Markel 
argues, 
subsection 
(2) 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 26.21 
"clearly 
encompasses all violations of chapter 26," and subsection (1) 
does not contain such broad language, the two provisions have a 
different scope.  Thus, according to Markel, subsection (1), 
unlike subsection (2), applies only to railroad corporations.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 26.21(2) provides: 
Persons causing fires in violation of this 
chapter shall be liable to the state in an action for 
debt, to the full amount of all damages done to the 
state lands and for all expenses incurred by the towns 
fighting 
forest 
fires 
and 
shall 
be 
liable 
to 
municipalities in an action for debt, to the full 
amount of all damages to the municipal lands and for 
all expenses incurred by the municipalities fighting 
such fires. 
¶23 While the principle relied upon by Markel is an 
important tool of statutory interpretation, it is not helpful in 
this case because of the differences between the two subsections 
of Wis. Stat. § 26.21.  Subsection (1) is drafted from the 
perspective of who may bring an action, and subsection (2) is 
drafted from the perspective of who is the tortfeasor.  This 
plain reading of the subsections leads us to question the 
purported 
"similarity" 
of 
the 
provisions, 
and 
thus, 
the 
application of this principle of statutory interpretation is not 
No. 
2007AP983   
 
17 
 
appropriate in this case.  Moreover, it seems peculiar that two 
subsections of the same section would implicitly vary so greatly 
in scope but not do so more explicitly.  Therefore, we do not 
find Markel's reliance on this principle persuasive in the case 
at hand. 
¶24 Finally, Markel argues that the three cases "to have 
ever cited Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1)," or any predecessor to that 
statute, were all lawsuits involving railroad corporations, and 
thus, this is further proof that § 26.21(1) applies only to 
railroad corporations.  Markel relies on Bonnell v. Chicago, St. 
Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Co., 158 Wis. 153, 147 N.W. 
1046 (1914), Allenton Volunteer Fire Department v. Soo Line 
Railroad Co., 372 F. Supp. 422 (E.D. Wis. 1974), and Town of 
Howard v. Soo Line Railroad Co., 63 Wis. 2d 500, 217 N.W.2d 329 
(1974).   
¶25 However, 
Markel's 
reliance 
on 
these 
cases 
is 
unpersuasive for two reasons.   
¶26 First, all of these cases were decided before the 
legislature's 1977 revisions.  Recall that the legislature acted 
in 1977 to remove the "such fires" language from Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.21(1) and replace it with the broader language "forest 
fires."  Thus, a reasonable interpretation prior to 1977 was 
that recovery under § 26.21(1) was limited to situations where a 
fire occurred due to a violation of Wis. Stat. § 26.20 and "such 
fires" caused by a railroad corporation, given most of the 
predecessor statute applied only to railroad corporations.  
No. 
2007AP983   
 
18 
 
Thus, it makes sense that these cases before 1977 involved 
railroad corporations.  
¶27 Second, none of these cases cited by Markel conclude 
that Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) is specifically limited to railroad 
corporations.  Rather, these cases reference § 26.21(1) for 
other reasons.  See Bonnell, 158 Wis. at 161 (concluding that 
the 1905 version of § 26.21(1) required a showing of gross 
negligence, but there is no commentary on a limitation to only 
railroads); Allenton, 372 F. Supp. at 423 (concluding that 
§ 26.21(1) does not permit recovery of firefighting expenses if 
a claimant is not the owner of the property, but there is no 
commentary on a limitation to only railroads); Town of Howard, 
63 Wis. 2d at 503-04 (concluding that § 26.21 at that time did 
not permit a town to recover costs, but there is no commentary 
on a limitation to only railroads).  Thus, while these cases 
involve railroad corporations, they are not binding precedent 
concerning the issue now before this court.  
¶28 Accordingly, we conclude that recovery under Wis. 
Stat. § 26.21(1) is not limited to a specific class of 
tortfeasor such as railroad corporations, and a violation under 
Wis. Stat. § 26.20 is not a prerequisite for the applicability 
of § 26.21(1).   
¶29 As a practical matter, it makes sense that the 
legislature would choose to severely punish all forest fire 
starting tortfeasors rather than just railroads, given the 
importance of forests and ecology in this state.  Our forests 
are 
important 
not 
only 
to 
those 
who 
enjoy 
recreational 
No. 
2007AP983   
 
19 
 
activities and hunting, but they are also important to our 
ecology and our economy. 
¶30 The people of Wisconsin have traditionally valued our 
forests.  Clearly, Wisconsin's forests have long provided many 
opportunities for recreational activities, such as hunting, 
fishing, and hiking.  See Wis. Cartographers' Guild, Wisconsin's 
Past and Present: A Historical Atlas 60-61 (1998); see also 
Martin Hintz, Hiking Wisconsin (1997) (identifying the many 
parks 
with 
hiking 
trails, 
canoeing, 
and 
other 
outdoor 
activities); Robert C. Willging, On The Hunt: The History Of 
Deer Hunting In Wisconsin (2008).  Additionally, Wisconsin's 
timber industry has been a significant source of commercial 
activity since the 1830s.  See Wis. Cartographers' Guild, supra, 
at 40.  "Timber put the young state of Wisconsin in the national 
spotlight," and "[b]etween 1899 and 1905, Wisconsin led the 
nation in lumber production."  Id.  
¶31 A 2004 report states that Wisconsin's forest products 
industry "is the backbone of Wisconsin's economy."  See Terry 
Mace 
et 
al., 
Wisconsin's 
Forest 
Products 
Industry: 
Grow 
Wisconsin Through Sustainable Forestry, Wisconsin Consortium on 
Biobased Industry, Feb. 2004.18  In 2004: Wisconsin was the 
                                                 
18 This report may be found at http://www.bioeconomy.wi.gov/ 
(click on "Documents" and under subheading "Papers" click on 
"October 17, 2005, Forest Products Background Piece").  This 
website 
is 
the 
homepage 
of 
"The 
Consortium 
on 
Biobased 
Industry."  The consortium was created by Governor Doyle's 
executive order #101 "Relating to the Development and Promotion 
of Biobased Industry" (dated May 27, 2005).   
No. 
2007AP983   
 
20 
 
number one paper-making state in the nation and had been for the 
past 50 years; Wisconsin's forest products and processing 
produced 8.1 percent, or $18.7 billon, of the state's total 
industrial output; and Wisconsin's forests supported our tourism 
and recreational economy creating $5.5 billon annually in 
forest-based recreation.  Id.   
¶32 Despite the evident success of the timber industry, 
"[i]n the early lumbering days, more timber was lost to fire 
than was actually harvested."  See Wis. Cartographers' Guild, 
supra, at 47.  "Wasteful timber-cutting practices led to 
disastrous 
forest 
fires, 
including 
the 
deadly 
Peshtigo 
[Wisconsin] fire."  Id.  See also Denise Gess & William Lutz, 
Firestorm at Peshtigo: A Town, Its People, and the Deadliest 
Fire in American History (2002).  "Today, wildfires still affect 
the logging, tourism, and recreational industries."  See Wis. 
Cartographers' Guild, supra, at 47.   
¶33 However, railroad corporations have not been the 
single or even the predominant offender when it comes to forest 
fires.  Historically there have been a wide range of offenders 
who have shouldered the responsibility for causing forest fires.  
See Forest Fires, by Percentage Causes (Wis. State Conservation 
Comm'n 1935) (graph illustration showing that between 1920-1933 
the cause of forest fires was 30 percent smokers, 29 percent 
land clearing, 13 percent campfires, 12 percent arson, and 8 
percent railroads); J.A. Mitchell & Neil LeMay, Forest Fires and 
Forest-Fire Control in Wisconsin 47-48 (Wis. State Conservation 
No. 
2007AP983   
 
21 
 
Comm'n 1952) (setting forth similar percentages as cited above 
for the years 1935-1949).   
¶34 Early forestry legislation also lends support to the 
conclusion that a wide range of causes have been responsible for 
causing forest fires.  See Mitchell & LeMay, supra, at 15-16 
(identifying legislation between 1826—1895 aimed at limiting 
forest fires by punishment for starting fires and leaving them 
unextinguished, punishment for fire escaping one's own land, 
prohibiting burning between July—October, and requiring spark 
preventers for many types of engines).   
¶35 Accordingly, given the importance of the forests to 
this state and the fact that forest fires have not been 
predominantly caused by railroad corporations, it makes sense 
that the legislature has chosen to severely punish all those 
responsible for starting a forest fire. 
B. Gross negligence 
¶36 Markel asserts that Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) is not 
applicable in this case because Heritage Farms did not prove 
that Markel acted with "gross negligence."  Markel's argument 
that "gross negligence" must be proven is based on this court's 
1914 
decision 
in 
Bonnell, 
which 
interpreted 
the 
phrase 
"wilfulness, malice or negligence" in the 1905 version of 
§ 26.21(1) to require "gross negligence."  Bonnell, 158 Wis. at 
161.  Heritage Farms argues that the concept of gross negligence 
was eliminated in 1962 by this court's decision in Bielski v. 
Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 14-19, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962). 
No. 
2007AP983   
 
22 
 
¶37 We conclude that the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.21(1) does not require "gross negligence."  The relevant 
portion provides in part:   
[One] may recover, in a civil action, double the 
amount of damages suffered, if the fires occurred 
through willfulness, malice or negligence. . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) (emphasis added).  While this language is 
identical to the statutory language interpreted in Bonnell, 
which involved the 1905 version of § 26.21(1), see Wis. Stat. 
§ 1494-58 (1914), it has not been modified since this court's 
1962 decision in Bielski.   
¶38 In 1914, this court concluded in Bonnell that "gross 
negligence" was required under the 1905 version of Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.21(1).  Bonnell, 158 Wis. at 161; see also Wis. Stat. 
§ 1494-58 (1914).  The court stated that "the word 'negligence' 
is qualified or modified by the associated words and means such 
negligence as carries with it an element of wilfulness or 
malice; in other words, gross negligence."  Bonnell, 158 Wis. at 
161. 
¶39 The 
concept 
of 
"gross 
negligence," 
however 
was 
abolished by this court in 1962.  Bielski, 16 Wis. 2d at 14-19 
overruled in part on other grounds by Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 
97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).  The court concluded that 
"[o]nly by abolishing the present concept of gross negligence 
and considering such conduct as ordinary negligence and treating 
it in terms of degree on a comparative basis can an equitable 
No. 
2007AP983   
 
23 
 
and fair result be reached in all cases."  Bielski, 16 
Wis. 2d at 17-18.   
¶40 While this abolishment alone would not necessarily 
alter the past interpretation in Bonnell, the legislature's 
actions subsequent to our 1962 abolishment lead us to conclude 
that "gross negligence" is not the standard in Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.21(1).  In 1977, the legislature repealed and recreated 
§ 26.21, which resulted in substantive changes and dividing the 
statute into two subsections.  See § 448u, ch. 29, Laws of 1977 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
We 
generally 
presume 
that 
when 
the 
legislature enacts a statute, it is fully aware of the existing 
laws.  County of Dane v. Racine County, 118 Wis. 2d 494, 499, 
347 N.W.2d 622 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing Mack v. Joint Sch. Dist. 
No. 3, 92 Wis. 2d 476, 489, 285 N.W.2d 604 (1979)).  As a 
result, we presume that the 1977 legislature would have known 
that common-law gross negligence was abolished in 1962, and 
thus, if the legislature meant to retain and memorialize "gross 
negligence" it would have either removed "negligence" from the 
statute or added "gross" to the statute when it made other 
substantive changes to the statute in 1977. 
¶41 Because the legislature could not have been more clear 
in 1977 when it repealed and recreated Wis. Stat. § 26.21, we 
will not now insert the word "gross" into this statute and we 
will not delete the word "negligence" from the statute.  As a 
result, we reject Markel's argument that Heritage Farms was 
required to prove that Markel acted with "gross negligence."  
The legislature used the word "negligence" in the statute; it 
No. 
2007AP983   
 
24 
 
did not add the phrase "gross negligence" to the statute.  We 
presume that the legislature cast a wide net when punishing 
those who start forest fires.  It presumably intended to include 
not only those who act willfully and maliciously but also those 
who act negligently.  If the legislature did not intend to 
include those who act negligently, it could have deleted the 
word "negligence."  If the legislature did intend to include 
those who act negligently, what else could it have done but use 
the word negligence?  We owe deference to that legislative 
determination to punish those who set forest fires whether 
willfully, maliciously or negligently.  See supra note 9 
(stating the legislature says in a statute what it means and 
means in a statute what it says).   
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶42 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) is not limited 
to 
a 
specific 
class 
of 
tortfeasor 
such 
as 
a 
railroad 
corporation, a violation under Wis. Stat. § 26.20 is not a 
prerequisite for the applicability of § 26.21(1), and the term 
"negligence" in § 26.21(1) does not require a showing of "gross 
negligence." 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
No.  2007AP0983.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶43 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (dissenting).   I write 
separately because I have concluded that Wis. Stat. § 26.20 
(2007-08) establishes affirmative obligations for railroads and 
others who use spark-producing engines, such as locomotive, 
donkey, traction and portable engines, in areas that may cause 
forest fires, and that Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) expands the 
potential award of damages caused by forest fires, from that 
which would otherwise be permitted under the common law, if the 
fires arise because of a failure to meet an obligation set out 
in § 26.20.  Because there is no claim that any defendant failed 
to meet any § 26.20 obligation, § 26.21(1) has no application to 
the claims of the plaintiffs in this case.  Accordingly, I would 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals and I respectfully 
dissent from the majority opinion.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶44 This case arose out of a fire that the jury found was 
set by Jeffrey Knaack on March 3, 2003 at the Lake of the Woods 
Campground 
property 
and 
was 
not 
properly 
extinguished, 
permitting it to become the Crystal Lake Fire on April 14, 2003.  
Knaack had a burn permit issued by the Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR) that permitted him to lawfully set the fire at 
the Lake of the Woods Campground.   
¶45 When the fire re-ignited and became the Crystal Lake 
Fire, it caused extensive damage to the plaintiffs' properties.  
To recover their damages, the plaintiffs brought common law 
claims of negligence, trespass and nuisance, which they tried 
No.  2007AP0983.pdr 
 
2 
 
before a jury.  They succeeded on each claim.1  The jury awarded 
damages in excess of $500,000.   
¶46 Because the plaintiffs alleged that the jury award 
should be doubled pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) and the 
circuit court concluded that § 26.21(1) did not apply to their 
claims, the plaintiffs appealed to the court of appeals.  The 
court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's conclusion that 
§ 26.21(1) did not apply.2  Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. 
Co., 2008 WI App 46, ¶17, 309 Wis. 2d 217, 747 N.W.2d 762.  
Accordingly, it is the interpretation and application of 
§ 26.21(1) that is the central focus of this review.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶47 The questions presented by this case require the 
interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. § 26.20 and Wis. 
Stat. § 26.21(1).  The interpretation and application of 
statutes present questions of law that we review independently 
of the decisions previously made by the circuit court and the 
                                                 
1 Although the plaintiffs argue in their briefs that they 
may also have a breach of contract claim based on the burn 
permit the DNR issued to Knaack, no breach of contract claim was 
submitted to the jury.  Accordingly, it is not an issue that I 
will address here.  
2 The court of appeals concluded that Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) 
applies only to railroads.  Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. 
Co., 2008 WI App 46, ¶17, 309 Wis. 2d 217, 747 N.W.2d 762.  As 
will become apparent in this dissent, I conclude that § 26.21(1) 
applies when an affirmative obligation set out in Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.20 has not been met.  It is not necessary to decide whether 
railroads are the only persons for whom § 26.20 establishes 
affirmative obligations.    
No.  2007AP0983.pdr 
 
3 
 
court of appeals, but benefiting from their analyses.  Marder v. 
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶19, 286 
Wis. 2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 110.   
B. 
Statutory Interpretation  
 
1. 
General principles 
¶48 Statutory interpretation "begins with the language of 
the statute."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 
612 N.W.2d 659).  We assume that the meaning of a statute is 
expressed in the words the legislature chose.  Id., ¶44.  The 
context in which the operative language appears is important too 
because a statute's meaning may be affected by the context in 
which it is used.  Id., ¶46.   
¶49 If our focus on the statute's language yields a plain, 
clear meaning, then there is no ambiguity, and the statute is 
applied according to its plain terms.  Id.  If the statutory 
language is unambiguous, it is unnecessary to consult extrinsic 
sources to facilitate interpretation.  Id.  However, if a 
statute is "capable of being understood by reasonably well-
informed persons in two or more senses," then the statute is 
ambiguous.  Id., ¶47.  When a statute is ambiguous, we may 
resort to extrinsic sources, such as legislative history, to 
assist our understanding of the statute's meaning.  Id., ¶48. 
¶50 A review of statutory history is often helpful.  
"[S]tatutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis."  
Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 
No.  2007AP0983.pdr 
 
4 
 
541, 749 N.W.2d 581.  "Statutory history encompasses the 
previously enacted[, amended and] repealed provisions of a 
statute."  Id.  "By analyzing the changes the legislature has 
made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in 
arriving at the meaning of a statute."  Id.  "Therefore, 
statutory history is part of the context in which we interpret 
the words used in a statute."  Id.  
2. 
Statutory history 
¶51 A review of the statutory history of Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.20 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 26.21(1) 
is 
very 
helpful 
in 
interpreting those sections because their relationship to each 
other has remained constant over the years.  As we have 
explained, statutes should not be read in a vacuum, but must be 
read with an understanding of other statutes, in context, in 
order to best determine their plain meaning.  Burbank Grease 
Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 2006 WI 103, ¶26, 294 Wis. 2d 274, 
717 N.W.2d 781; City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee County, 27 
Wis. 2d 53, 56, 133 N.W.2d 393 (1965). 
¶52 When first enacted, Wis. Stat. § 26.20 and Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.21(1) were Wis. Stat. ch. 61, § 1494-57 (Supp. 1906) and 
Wis. Stat. ch. 61, § 1494-58 (Supp. 1906), respectively, of the 
1905 statutes.3  In 1905, § 1494-57 imposed an affirmative 
obligation on those with "any logging locomotive, donkey or 
threshing engine, railway locomotive and all other engines, 
boilers and locomotives operated in, through or near, forest, 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 26.20 and Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) were 
also known as sections 17 and 18, respectively, of ch. 264 of 
the Laws of 1905.   
No.  2007AP0983.pdr 
 
5 
 
brush or grass land," to employ netting on the engines "to give 
the most practicable protection against the escape of sparks, 
cinders or fire" from the engines.  § 1494-57. 
¶53 Wisconsin Stat. § 1494-57 also set out penalties to be 
levied by the State for failing to comply with the affirmative 
obligations contained in § 1494-57.  The penalty provision 
provided that "[a]ny corporation by its officers, agents or 
employes, wilfully violating the provisions of this section 
shall be liable to a fine" of $50 to $500 for each violation.  
§ 1494-57.  The plain language of the penalty provision shows 
that penalties did not come into play until an affirmative 
obligation set out in § 1494-57 had not been met.  Stated 
otherwise, no penalty could be levied unless the person who was 
obligated to perform certain tasks by § 1494-57 violated the 
provisions of § 1494-57.    
¶54 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 26.20 
continues 
to 
set 
out 
affirmative obligations relative to spark-producing engines.  
For example, it provides that all "road locomotives operated on 
any railroad" must have their engines equipped with spark 
arresters that meet or exceed the minimum performance and 
No.  2007AP0983.pdr 
 
6 
 
maintenance standards established by the State to reduce the 
chance of sparks escaping from the engine.  § 26.20(2).4   
¶55 Wisconsin Stat. § 26.20 also continues to provide for 
penalties to be levied by the State on those who fail to meet 
their affirmative obligations when operating spark-producing 
engines.  § 26.20(9).  Subsection (9) provides: 
(a) Any corporation, by its officers, agents, or 
employees, violating this section, shall forfeit not 
more than $500. 
(b) Any corporation, by its officers, agents or 
employees, willfully violating this section shall be 
fined not more than $1,000. 
(c) Any conductor, individual in charge of a 
train or officer, agent or employee of a railway who 
violates this section shall forfeit not more than 
$500. 
As was the case with Wis. Stat. ch. 61, § 1494-97 (Supp. 1906), 
the provisions of the penalty subsection of § 26.20 do not come 
into play until one who has an affirmative obligation set out in 
                                                 
4 Most of the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 26.20 set out 
obligations that are specifically limited to railroads.  For 
example, § 26.20(4) requires that those who operate a railway 
must clear the right-of-way of all brush, logs and material that 
may provide fuel for a fire.  Section 26.20(5) requires 
corporations operating railroads to prevent their employees from 
depositing live coals or ashes upon the tracks outside of the 
yard limits, unless those coals are immediately extinguished.  
And § 26.20(7) requires those operating a railroad during the 
dangerously dry season to provide fire patrols when requested to 
do so.  However, the affirmative obligations of those operating 
engines that produce sparks is not necessarily limited to 
railroads, as § 26.20(8) permits inspection of "any locomotive, 
donkey, or threshing engine, railway locomotive, and all other 
engines, boilers, and locomotives operated in, through or near 
forest, brush, or grass land."  
No.  2007AP0983.pdr 
 
7 
 
§ 26.20 fails to meet such an obligation and therefore, is 
"violating this section."  § 26.20(9).   
¶56 The relationship between the affirmative obligations 
set out in various subsections of Wis. Stat. § 26.20 and the 
penalty provision of § 26.20(9) assists in understanding the 
plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1).  This is so because 
§ 26.21(1) begins, "In addition to the penalties provided in s. 
26.20."  After that threshold is met, § 26.21(1) provides an 
opportunity to double the damages a property owner may recover.  
However, the damages that the property owner suffered must have 
arisen from a failure to meet an affirmative obligation set out 
in § 26.20, because it is only from a violation of one of 
§ 26.20's provisions that a penalty may be levied by the State.  
Stated otherwise, a plaintiff employing § 26.21(1) could never 
obtain damages that are "[i]n addition to the penalties provided 
in s. 26.20" if the conduct that caused the fire did not violate 
No.  2007AP0983.pdr 
 
8 
 
§ 26.20, thereby permitting the State to assess a penalty under 
§ 26.20.5 
¶57 Additionally, were it not that the damages that a 
property owner seeks to double under Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) arose 
from the same conduct that could support a penalty under Wis. 
Stat. § 26.20(9), the phrase, "In addition to the penalties 
provided in s. 26.20" would have no meaning.  It is a basic 
premise of statutory construction that all words in a statute 
must be given meaning.  Kelley Co. v. Marquardt, 172 Wis. 2d 
234, 250, 493 N.W.2d 68 (1992).   
                                                 
5 Lest there be confusion, I point out that whether the 
State actually assesses a penalty that is "provided" under Wis. 
Stat. § 26.20(9) is not determinative of whether a Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.21(1) claim is available.  Rather, it is the type of 
conduct 
that 
drives 
the 
availability 
of 
a 
remedy 
under 
§ 26.21(1), just as it was the type of conduct that was 
determinative of whether a remedy under Wis. Stat. ch. 61, 
§ 1494-58 (Supp. 1906) was available.  As we explained in 
Bonnell v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 158 Wis. 153, 147 
N.W. 1046 (1914), when interpreting Wis. Stat. ch. 61, § 1494-57 
(Supp. 1906) in regard to whether the second question in the 
special verdict was properly posed, "[that question] describes 
and covers substantially in the language of the statute the duty 
imposed upon the defendant by that statute."  Id. at 158.  We 
noted, "[h]ere was a case where the statute required the 
defendant to use a certain safety appliance described in the 
statute [§ 1494-57] and in this question."  Id. at 159.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 26.21(1) states that it comes into play 
"[i]n addition to the penalties provided in s. 26.20."  It does 
not say that § 26.21(1) may be employed in addition to the 
penalties 
"actually 
assessed" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 26.20.  
Accordingly, the State's action or lack thereof in assessing a 
penalty that is provided in § 26.20 does not affect the 
applicability of § 26.21(1). 
No.  2007AP0983.pdr 
 
9 
 
¶58 My reading of Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) is consistent with 
the statutory history of § 26.21(1).  In 1905, Wis. Stat. ch. 
61, § 1494-58 (now § 26.21(1)) provided in relevant part: 
In addition to the penalties provided in the 
preceding section of this act, the United States, the 
state, the county or private owners, whose property is 
injured or destroyed by such fires, may recover, in a 
civil action, double the amount of damages suffered, 
if the fires occurred through wilfullness, malice or 
negligence. 
In 1905, the "preceding section of this act" was Wis. Stat. ch. 
61, § 1494-57, the predecessor of Wis. Stat. § 26.20.  In 1905, 
a property owner could employ the double damage provisions of 
§ 1494-58 if there had been a violation of the "preceding 
section."  Then, the "preceding section" was § 1494-57.  Without 
failing to meet an affirmative obligation set out in § 1494-57, 
there would be no grant of power to the State to assess a 
penalty under 
§ 1494-57, the section preceding § 1494-58.  
Therefore, in 1905, a property owner could not avail himself of 
double damages for a fire that was not caused by a failure to 
meet the affirmative obligations set out in § 1494-57.   
¶59 I note that Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) remains in much the 
same form as it was when enacted in 1905.  It provides in 
relevant part:   
In addition to the penalties provided in s. 
26.20, the United States, the state, the county or 
private owners, whose property is injured or destroyed 
by forest fires, may recover, in a civil action, 
double the amount of damages suffered, if the fires 
occurred through willfulness, malice or negligence.   
The provision for double damages and attorney fees remains 
connected to the preceding statute, now Wis. Stat. § 26.20, 
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because § 26.21(1) directs that it is available "[i]n addition 
to the penalties provided in s. 26.20."  This linkage between 
the two statutes has been constant since 1905.   
¶60 Furthermore, the term "in addition to" is found in 
other sections of ch. 26, and in each instance, the relief that 
is "in addition to" that previously provided is based on the 
same conduct for which a previous penalty could have been 
assessed.  For example, Wis. Stat. § 26.05(3)(c) provides that 
"in addition to any other penalty," a person who violates 
§ 26.05 (timber theft), or a rule promulgated under it, must pay 
the reasonable costs incurred to establish the volume and value 
of the timber cut and removed.  Wisconsin Stat. § 26.09(2) and 
(3)(c) provide remedies that are grounded in the unauthorized 
cutting of raw forest products.  Section 26.09(2) provides, "In 
addition to any other enforcement action," and § 26.09(3)(c) 
provides, "[i]n addition to the award under par. (b)."  Without 
the unauthorized cutting of raw forest products, neither 
subsection (2) nor (3)(c) would come into play.  The linkage to 
conduct that will permit the State to assess a penalty is a 
necessary 
part 
of 
the 
interpretation 
and 
application 
of 
§ 26.21(1), just as it is for the interpretation and application 
of §§ 26.05(3)(c), 26.09(2) and 26.09(3)(c).   
¶61 Accordingly, I conclude that the plain meaning of Wis. 
Stat. § 26.21(1) requires that a claim for double damages and 
attorney fees under § 26.21(1) must be based on a fire that 
arose because of a defendant's failure to meet an affirmative 
obligation under Wis. Stat. § 26.20.  Because none of the 
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plaintiffs' claims arose because of a fire caused by a failure 
to meet an affirmative obligation set out in § 26.20, § 26.21(1) 
has no application here.   
C. 
Majority opinion 
¶62 The 
majority 
opinion 
asserts 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 26.21(1) is not limited to railroads.6  I agree that § 26.21(1) 
is not necessarily limited to railroads, but that does not 
answer the question that the case really poses, which is whether 
§ 26.21(1) is applicable when the conduct underlying the lawsuit 
does not violate Wis. Stat. § 26.20.  My analysis leads me to 
conclude 
that 
§ 26.21(1) 
is 
not 
applicable 
in 
those 
circumstances.  Furthermore, as I have explained above, no words 
need be added to or subtracted from § 26.21(1) to conclude that 
it does not apply to the plaintiffs' claims.  
¶63 The major problem with the majority opinion's analysis 
is that while it acknowledges the historic link between conduct 
that violated Wis. Stat. ch. 61, § 1494-57 (Supp. 1906) (now 
Wis. Stat. § 26.20) and a claim for damages under Wis. Stat. ch. 
61, § 1494-58 (Supp. 1906) (now Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1)),7 it does 
not analyze how the plaintiffs' claims for damages are "[i]n 
addition to the penalties provided in s. 26.20."  Instead, it 
posits that were the introductory phrase not present, a 
plaintiff who has suffered damages caused by a fire may be met 
                                                 
6 Majority op., ¶14. 
7 Majority op., ¶15. 
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with the defense that a State penalty imposed under § 26.20(9) 
is the only consequence of the fire.8   
¶64 However, damages based on common law claims for 
negligence, trespass and nuisance have long been available, as 
the 
plaintiffs' 
jury 
verdict 
demonstrates. 
 
Furthermore, 
statutes are not to be interpreted as changing the common law 
unless the legislature explicitly states that it is its purpose 
to do so.  Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 103 Wis. 2d 
56, 74, 307 N.W.2d 256 (1981).  There is no statement in either 
Wis. Stat. § 26.20 or Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1), explicit or 
implied, that the legislature was changing any common law claim 
that could be based on a fire. 
¶65 The majority opinion also concludes that there is no 
longer a linkage between Wis. Stat. § 26.20 and Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.21(1) because in 1977 the legislature placed the provisions 
in two separate sections and changed the words "such fires" to 
"forest fires."9  I am unpersuaded.   
¶66 First, the form the legislature used for statutes in 
1905 was to include many provisions of ch. 264 of the Laws of 
1905 in one section, Wis. Stat. ch. 61, § 1494 (Supp. 1906), 
with serial sections for differing provisions.  Second, "forest 
fire" had a statutory definition in 1977;10 however, forest fire 
                                                 
8 Majority op., ¶20. 
9 Majority op., ¶15 
10 The definition of forest fires was set out in Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.11(2) in 1977; it now appears in Wis. Stat. § 26.01(2): 
No.  2007AP0983.pdr 
 
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had no statutory definition in 1905.  Furthermore, the term, 
"forest fires," was used in the title of Wis. Stat. ch. 61, 
§ 1494-58 (Supp. 1906), just as it is used in the title of Wis. 
Stat. § 26.21 today.  Third, it is just as logical that "such 
fires" was replaced with "forest fires" because the legislature 
wanted to clarify that runaway fires that were started by 
sparking engines, but burned prairie grasslands rather than 
forests, came within the ambit of § 26.21(1), even though 
forests were not burned by such runaway fires.11  However, 
whatever the reason for the statutory amendment from "such 
fires" to "forest fires," none of the proffered reasons in the 
majority opinion do anything to explain the introductory phrase, 
"[i]n addition to the penalties provided in s. 26.20," which 
phrase draws into § 26.21(1) the conduct of Wis. Stat. § 26.20.   
¶67 Furthermore, I do not agree that the DNR's use of 
language in the burn permit that is similar to that found in 
Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) is the DNR's interpretation of § 26.21(1); 
or even if it were, that it is of any assistance in determining 
the plain meaning of § 26.21(1).  First, nowhere on the burn 
permit is there a reference to § 26.21(1), although Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.12(5), Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31-19.39, Wis. Stat. § 23.45 and 
Wis. Stat. § 25.11(2) are referenced.  Second, the language 
                                                                                                                                                             
"Forest fire" means uncontrolled, wild, or running 
fires occurring on forest, marsh, field, cutover, or 
other lands . . . . 
11 Ever since forest fire was defined in the statutes, 
forest fire has included fires that did not burn trees, e.g., 
fires that burned marsh lands, as well as those fires that did 
burn forests.   
No.  2007AP0983.pdr 
 
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follows the question:  "What is the penalty for burning without 
a permit?"  While it may have been possible to argue that this 
language created a contract with the DNR, of which the property 
owners who suffered fire damage were third party beneficiaries, 
that claim is not before the court.   
¶68 And finally, the majority opinion contends that Wis. 
Stat. § 26.21(1) "is drafted from the perspective of who may 
bring an action."12  While I do not disagree with that statement, 
it does not encompass the complete directive of the statute.  
The statute speaks to particular conduct, through its reference 
to the penalties of Wis. Stat. § 26.20, and those penalties can 
be afforded only for fires that were caused by failing to meet a 
statutory obligation of § 26.20.  Section 26.21(1) also uses the 
term "the fires," rather than "a fire," indicating that not all 
fires that cause damage to property come within the ambit of 
§ 26.21(1).   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶69 I have concluded that Wis. Stat. § 26.20 establishes 
affirmative obligations for railroads and others who use spark-
producing engines, such as locomotive, donkey, traction and 
portable engines, in areas that may cause forest fires, and that 
Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) expands the potential award of damages 
caused by forest fires, from that which would otherwise be 
permitted under the common law, if the fires arise because of a 
failure to meet an obligation set out in § 26.20.  Because there 
is no claim that any defendant failed to meet any § 26.20 
                                                 
12 Majority op., ¶23. 
No.  2007AP0983.pdr 
 
15 
 
obligation, § 26.21(1) has no application to the claims of the 
plaintiffs in this case.  Accordingly, I would affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals and I respectfully dissent from 
the majority opinion. 
¶70 I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN joins this dissent. 
 
 
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