Case Title: State v. Busse

Citation: 231 Kan. 108, 642 P.2d 972

Docket Number: 53,180

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1982-04-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
231 Kan. 108 (1982)
642 P.2d 972
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellant,
v.
GEORGE L. BUSSE, JR., Appellee.
No. 53,180

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 3, 1982.
Jeffrey A. Chubb, county attorney, argued the cause and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, was with him on the brief for appellant.
Stanley L. Basler, of Cherryvale, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HOLMES, J.:
The State of Kansas appeals, pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(3) (Ensley), from a question reserved in a criminal case. Defendant-appellee was charged with aggravated burglary and attempted rape. He was found not guilty of both charges in a trial by jury.
At defendant's preliminary hearing he was of the opinion that the ability of the State's witnesses to identify him would be a crucial issue and, as a part of his trial strategy, he waived his right to be present during the preliminary hearing. His counsel, of course, was present and afforded the opportunity to cross-examine all the State's witnesses. Donald Yaus, the arresting police officer, testified, but at the time of trial Officer Yaus failed to appear, although he had been subpoenaed and was expected to appear. The State desired to introduce the transcript of Officer Yaus' preliminary hearing testimony and, at a hearing in chambers, the court ruled that the transcript was inadmissible as it was hearsay and the defendant had not met the witness "face to face" in the preliminary hearing. The ruling was based upon the last clause of K.S.A. 60-460(c).
*109 At the outset appellee asserts that the issue is not one which should be properly considered as a question reserved. We do not agree. In State v. Lamkin, 229 Kan. 104, 621 P.2d 995 (1981), we stated:
The issue before the court is whether a defendant in a criminal action may voluntarily waive the statutory protection of meeting a witness face to face provided by K.S.A. 60-460(c). We deem the matter to be of sufficient statewide importance in the prosecution of criminal cases to warrant review as a question properly reserved under K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(3).
We now turn to the question before the court. As indicated, the defendant, as a part of his trial strategy, voluntarily elected to waive his right to be present at the preliminary hearing where the following dialogue took place between the court and counsel:
"THE COURT: Mr. Chubb?
"MR. BASLER: That is correct, your Honor.
"MR. BASLER: That is correct.
"MR. BASLER: I believe he did, your Honor.
"MR. BASLER: No.
Thus, it is apparent that the defendant freely and voluntarily *110 waived his right to be present after being advised by counsel.
K.S.A. 60-460(c) provides in pertinent part:
....
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
Section 10 of the Kansas Bill of Rights states:
Thus it appears that the statutory safeguard of the defendant's right in a criminal case to meet the witnesses face to face is the same as the right given under Section 10 of the Kansas Bill of Rights.
It should be noted that the question of whether Officer Yaus was in fact unavailable to testify at the trial is not an issue in this appeal. The State had used reasonable diligence to insure his *111 presence and his failure to appear evidently was a surprise to both parties. State v. Steward, 219 Kan. 256, 264, 547 P.2d 773 (1976).
It has long been recognized that a defendant may waive federal and state constitutional rights and that the right of confrontation under the United States Constitution and the right to meet the witnesses "face to face" under Section 10 of the Kansas Bill of Rights are satisfied when defendant has had an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him. State v. Washington, 206 Kan. 336, 479 P.2d 833 (1971); State v. Terry, 202 Kan. 599, 451 P.2d 211 (1969).
Appellee argues, however, that K.S.A. 60-460(c) grants broader protection and rights to a defendant than those guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. It is contended that before hearsay testimony by way of a transcript of prior testimony or by deposition may be admitted, the defendant must have actually been present in a face to face confrontation with the witness at the previous hearing or at the taking of the deposition. We think such a literal construction of the statute is erroneous. In Terry we held:
In the instant case the defendant had the opportunity to confront Officer Yaus and meet him face to face at the preliminary hearing. It was the defendant who elected, as he had the right to do, not to be present and exercise his rights. [State v. Chuning, 201 Kan. 784, 443 P.2d 248 (1968).] Instead he left it to his counsel to confront the witness face to face on his behalf. While defendant's strategy appears to have been successful in this case, if he had been convicted after electing to waive not only his *112 constitutional rights but his statutory right, he would have been bound by the consequences.
We hold that the provisions of K.S.A. 60-460(c) to the effect that "the provisions of this subsection (c) shall not apply in criminal actions if it denies to the accused the right to meet the witness face to face" may be waived by a defendant in a criminal action when done so freely and voluntarily with full knowledge of the possible consequences.
The trial court was in error when it ruled that the transcript of the testimony of Officer Yaus from the preliminary hearing was inadmissible.
The appeal is sustained.