Case Title: Commonwealth v. Tate

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12133

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12133 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  EUGENE TATE. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     October 7, 2020. - January 22, 2021. 
 
Present:  Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Robbery.  Armed Assault in a Dwelling.  Firearms.  
Felony-Murder Rule.  Self-Defense.  Evidence, Self-defense.  
Practice, Criminal, Argument by prosecutor, Instructions to 
jury, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 15, 2013. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Kathe M. Tuttman, J. 
 
 
 
Leslie W. O'Brien for the defendant. 
 
Lindsay Russell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  In 2015, a jury convicted the defendant of 
murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder, armed 
robbery, armed assault in a dwelling, and illegally carrying a 
                     
 
1 Justice Lenk participated in the deliberation on this case 
prior to her retirement. 
 
2 
 
 
firearm.2  On appeal, the defendant argues that several 
statements made by the prosecutor in his closing argument 
constitute prejudicial error.  The defendant also argues that 
the judge erred by denying the defendant's request for a 
voluntary manslaughter instruction based on self-defense, 
reasonable provocation, or sudden combat.  Finally, the 
defendant argues that his conviction should be reduced to murder 
in the second degree because of the circumstances of the crime 
and because he was only nineteen years old at the time of the 
murder. 
Discerning no error, we affirm the defendant's convictions 
and, after plenary review of the entirety of the record, we 
decline to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
reduce the verdict or order a new trial. 
1.  Facts.  We summarize the facts that the jury could have 
found at the defendant's trial, reserving certain details for 
our discussion of the legal issues. 
In June 2013, the defendant approached Robert DeLuca, 
someone he knew from high school, looking to buy a small 
quantity of marijuana.  DeLuca connected the defendant with 
Shane Corbett and introduced the defendant to Corbett as "G."  
                     
2 The defendant was found not guilty of armed assault with 
intent to murder and assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon. 
3 
 
 
The defendant purchased two ounces of marijuana from Corbett at 
Corbett's house.  After the sale, the defendant and Corbett 
exchanged cell phone numbers. 
On July 2, 2013, the defendant called Corbett looking to 
buy a pound of marijuana.  Corbett did not deal in that 
quantity, but he knew that the defendant could buy that quantity 
from Steven Piro.  Corbett reached out to Piro to tell him that 
the defendant, who would be accompanied by another person, 
wanted to purchase a pound of marijuana.  Piro told Corbett to 
have the defendant contact him directly.  Once the defendant 
contacted Piro, Piro contacted his own supplier, Mario Fiume, to 
arrange the transaction.  Fiume agreed to do the sale at his 
house but told Piro that only one person would be allowed inside 
at a time.  The terms of the sale were $3,200 for one pound of 
marijuana, with Corbett getting $300.  Piro told Corbett the 
details and told him that the deal would happen later that 
night. 
Corbett contacted the defendant and had the defendant meet 
him at a parking lot in Stoneham so that the defendant could 
follow Corbett to Fiume's house.  Before meeting with the 
defendant, Corbett and his friend, Timothy Kinneally, stopped at 
Corbett's home and picked up a baton and a Taser to bring with 
4 
 
 
them.3  At the parking lot, Corbett and Kinneally met with the 
defendant and another unidentified black male who was bigger 
than the defendant.4  The defendant showed Corbett and Kinneally 
a stack of money.  Corbett and Kinneally then led the defendant 
and the unidentified male to Fiume's house in Stoneham.  By the 
time they arrived at Fiume's house, it was nighttime. 
Piro met Corbett, Kinneally, the defendant, and the 
unidentified male in the driveway.  Piro, Corbett, and the 
unidentified male walked into the garage while Kinneally and the 
defendant stayed in their vehicles.  When the three men entered 
the garage, Fiume and George Tecci, a friend of Piro and Fiume, 
were already in the garage.  There were two cars in the garage -
- one was covered and the other was a blue classic car.  On the 
covered car, there were multiple air-sealed bags of marijuana.  
The unidentified male and Fiume discussed the marijuana while 
the unidentified male inspected the bags.  The unidentified male 
told Fiume that the defendant would need to look at the 
marijuana before they purchased it.  The unidentified male also 
told Fiume that he was uncomfortable doing the deal in the 
garage and wanted to do it outside by his vehicle.  Fiume 
                     
3 Kinneally also had a knife at this point. 
 
4 There is no evidence in the record identifying this male, 
so we refer to him simply as "the unidentified male."  Several 
witnesses testified that the unidentified male referred to the 
defendant as his cousin. 
5 
 
 
insisted that the deal take place in the garage.  The two went 
back and forth, agitating Fiume.  Fiume then told the 
unidentified male to leave and bring the defendant into the 
garage.  He left and the defendant entered the garage. 
The unidentified male had selected one of the bags of 
marijuana, and the defendant agreed with his selection.  Like 
the unidentified male, the defendant expressed concern about 
doing the deal in the garage because he thought he might be 
robbed.  He also wanted to do the deal outside.  This agitated 
Fiume, who told the defendant to leave.  The defendant and the 
unidentified male then drove away.  Corbett, Tecci, and Piro 
also left. 
Later that night, the defendant called Piro and told Piro 
that he wanted to go back to Fiume's house to complete the deal.  
Piro was in his car with Tecci at the time.  Piro contacted 
Fiume, who initially did not want to do a second transaction.  
By this point, Fiume was with the victim, Joseph Puopolo, whom 
Fiume had invited to his house to smoke marijuana.  Puopolo 
encouraged Fiume to complete the deal, so Fiume told Piro that 
he would do the deal as long as the defendant came to the house 
in Piro's car and only one person would come into the garage at 
a time. 
Piro and Tecci met the defendant and Jesse Williams, a 
different individual from the unidentified male that was there 
6 
 
 
earlier that night, at a gasoline station in Stoneham.  The 
defendant and Williams got into Piro's car, with Williams 
sitting in the rear passenger's side seat and the defendant in 
the rear driver's side seat.  Piro drove to Fiume's house, which 
was about two minutes away.  Piro and Williams got out of the 
car and went into the garage while Tecci and the defendant 
remained in the car.  When Piro and Williams entered the garage, 
Fiume and Puopolo were already in the garage.  There was a 
single bag of marijuana on the covered car, the same bag that 
the defendant and the unidentified male had picked earlier.  
Fiume showed it to Williams.  Williams wanted to confirm with 
the defendant that this was the right bag of marijuana.  Fiume 
was hesitant about letting the defendant come into the garage 
but ultimately let him come inside.  Piro left the garage and 
went to the driveway to tell Tecci and the defendant to come 
into the garage.  At this point, Fiume and Puopolo were standing 
between the two vehicles, with Fiume closer to the entrance to 
the garage and Puopolo behind him. 
Once the defendant entered, Williams and Fiume began 
negotiating over the price, which Fiume eventually lowered.  
Williams showed Fiume that he had money for the deal, and Fiume 
responded by pulling out a stack of cash and telling the 
defendant and Williams that he also had money.  Williams then 
said he had to go outside to take the amount for the deal from 
7 
 
 
his stack of money because he did not feel comfortable doing it 
in the garage.  Williams went outside briefly and then came back 
in and told Fiume he thought he would be robbed if he tried to 
buy the marijuana.  Fiume got angry and told the men to leave. 
At this point, both Williams and the defendant pulled out 
guns.5  Williams aimed his gun at Tecci's face, ordered him to 
move, and then moved towards Fiume.  Tecci left the garage and 
ran towards a friend's house.  Piro unsuccessfully tried to 
knock the gun from the defendant's hand.  The defendant then 
stood with his gun aimed at Puopolo.  As Williams charged at 
Fiume, he told Fiume to give him the marijuana and the money.  
Fiume grabbed the bag of marijuana from the car, put it behind 
his back, and backed up toward the back of the garage.  Fiume 
attempted to punch Williams.  Williams then shot Fiume, who fell 
to the ground.  Puopolo then moved towards the defendant, and 
the defendant shot Puopolo.  Piro then ran out of the garage.  
Tecci testified that he heard a single gunshot as he fled.  
After seeing Williams and the defendant run from the garage, 
Piro went back into the garage and saw that the bag of marijuana 
that had been on the trunk of the car was gone. 
                     
5 Three witnesses testified that one of the guns was a 
revolver and the other was a semiautomatic handgun.  There was 
conflicting testimony about who had which gun; Tecci and Fiume 
testified that Williams had the revolver, but Piro testified 
initially that the defendant had the revolver but later admitted 
on cross-examination that he did not remember who had which gun. 
8 
 
 
Puopolo was discovered lying face down on the ground just 
inside the front door of the house.  He eventually died from a 
single gunshot wound.  The bullet passed through his left arm 
and then entered the chest cavity in his upper left chest area.  
The medical examiner recovered a single bullet from Puopolo's 
right chest cavity.  A State police ballistician testified that 
the bullet was a .38 caliber brass-jacketed round with a lead 
core.  This bullet was the only ballistics evidence admitted in 
evidence.6 
The Commonwealth introduced substantial evidence 
identifying the defendant as the individual that was present on 
both occasions at Fiume's garage.  A fingerprint recovered from 
the interior of the rear driver's side door of Piro's car 
matched the left index finger of the defendant.  Fiume 
identified the defendant in a photographic array several days 
after the shooting, saying, "That's the guy that shot Joe.  He 
was there both times.  That's the guy one hundred percent.  He 
shot Joe."7  At trial, Fiume identified the defendant as the 
person who shot Puopolo.8  Piro also identified the defendant at 
                     
 
6 No other bullets or shell casings were ever recovered. 
 
 
7 In the aftermath of the shooting, Fiume was shown three 
photographic arrays in total.  The defendant's photograph was 
included in only one of the arrays, the array in which Fiume 
unequivocally identified the defendant.  In the other two 
arrays, Fiume identified other unknown individuals and Williams. 
 
9 
 
 
trial as the person whom he knew as "G," who shot Puopolo, and 
who was present on both occasions that night.  Tecci similarly 
identified the defendant as the individual who was there both 
times that night.  There were also surveillance video recordings 
introduced from the gasoline station in Stoneham and from 
outside Fiume's house that showed the individual identified as 
the defendant arrive at the house both times that night. 
 
2.  Discussion.  On appeal, the defendant argues that 
multiple errors in the Commonwealth's closing argument deprived 
him of due process and a fair trial.  The defendant also argues 
that the judge erred by failing to give the jury a voluntary 
manslaughter instruction.  Finally, the defendant asks us to use 
our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict 
because he was nineteen when the crime occurred and because 
there was little evidence that he fired a shot.  We address each 
argument in turn. 
 
a.  Closing argument.  i.  Ballistics evidence.  The 
defendant challenges several statements made by the prosecutor 
during his closing argument.  The first challenged statements 
involve comments made about the state of the bullet that was 
recovered from Puopolo's chest.  In his own closing, the 
                     
 
8 Fiume conceded on cross-examination that he did not 
actually see Puopolo get shot.  Fiume did testify that, before 
Williams shot him, he saw the defendant "standing guard watching 
Puopolo]" and that Puopolo was "cornered by [the defendant]." 
10 
 
 
defendant argued that only one bullet had been fired and that it 
hit both victims.  He did so based on the absence of ballistics 
evidence or any other evidence revealing the presence of a 
second bullet or traces of a second bullet at the scene, and 
evidence from at least two witnesses who said that they heard a 
single shot.  In response, the prosecutor argued: 
"Yes, there was only one round recovered, but to 
believe what counsel wishes you to believe, and I'll 
put this picture up on the garage now.  Your memory 
controls, ladies and gentlemen, but I think Mr. Fiume 
testified he was standing about here when he got shot.  
And Mr. Puopolo was up here coming in this direction.  
So for the round that entered Mr. Fiume's chest when 
he pointed midchest by the nipple to come out his 
right flank in a downward direction then go up into 
the arm of Joseph Puopolo, hit the shoulder and then 
go down where it lodges in his chest cavity, that's 
one hell of a round.  It had built-in radar and must 
be something that the military has.  There's no 
jacketed round that can do that.  You saw the damage 
to the round, and you will, there is no damage to that 
round.  Through and through.  It goes into the body, 
and it stays there. 
 
"But keep in mind, Mario Fiume suffered penetration of 
his lungs, penetration to the liver and a fractured 
rib.  And yet that round still has enough strength to 
go over to Joe Puopolo's arm, into his chest down to 
both lungs, his aorta and lodge.  I would say that's a 
miracle round, ladies and gentlemen. 
"And you heard Sergeant Sullivan talk about the damage 
to the round, minimal.  Not uncommon.  What type of 
guns?  These guns that are maintained I would suggest 
by drug dealers are not in the same pristine condition 
that military personnel keep their weapons or police 
officers.  When he talked about a gun he referred to a 
stove pipe where the casing doesn't eject from the 
round."  (Emphasis added.) 
11 
 
 
The defendant objected to this portion of the closing, arguing 
that there was no evidence regarding what level of damage this 
type of round could do.  The trial judge agreed and, upon 
request, instructed the jury that their memory of the evidence 
controls. 
"Where, as here, the prosecutor argued facts in closing 
argument that find no support in the evidence at trial and where 
that error is preserved by a timely objection, the error is 
nonprejudicial only if we are 'sure that the error did not 
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect.'"  
Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 480 Mass. 299, 305 (2018), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Hrabak, 440 Mass. 650, 656 (2004).  "We consider 
four factors in determining whether an error made during closing 
argument is prejudicial:  '(1) whether the defendant seasonably 
objected; (2) whether the error was limited to collateral issues 
or went to the heart of the case; (3) what specific or general 
instructions the judge gave the jury which may have mitigated 
the mistake; and (4) whether the error, in the circumstances, 
possibly made a difference in the jury's conclusions.'"  
Alvarez, supra at 306, quoting Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 
453 Mass. 782, 807 (2009).  "[T]he entire record, including the 
balance of the prosecutor's argument, [is] relevant in 
determining whether the error was prejudicial to the point of 
12 
 
 
requiring a reversal of the conviction."  Commonwealth v. Kozec, 
399 Mass. 514, 523 (1987). 
We agree that the prosecutor's argument was not supported 
by the evidence and was therefore error.  See Commonwealth v. 
Rutherford, 476 Mass. 639, 643 (2017) ("closing arguments must 
be limited to facts in evidence and the fair inferences that may 
be drawn from those facts").  See also Commonwealth v. Niemic, 
483 Mass. 571, 592 (2019) ("a prosecutor may not argue facts not 
in evidence or misstate the evidence").  There was no testimony, 
either from the Commonwealth's ballistician or any other 
witness, about the significance of the condition of the bullet 
or the type of damage that this round could do.  The 
Commonwealth argues that the bullet itself was admitted in 
evidence and that the jury could draw these inferences from 
simply looking at the bullet.  We disagree, as these inferences 
could not be drawn without guiding expert testimony.  As such, 
the argument was error.  For the reasons discussed infra, 
however, we conclude it was not reversible error. 
Our analysis begins with the defendant's closing, in which 
the defendant argued to the jury that one bullet, and thus one 
shooter, caused the death of Puopolo and the injury to Fiume.  
The defendant further argued that "[t]he government will say, 
and just to predict a little bit about what [the prosecutor] is 
going to argue to you, that the bullet isn't damaged, the slug 
13 
 
 
isn't damaged enough for all of this activity."  Thus, the 
defendant himself called the condition of the bullet to the 
attention of the jury before the Commonwealth did, thereby 
introducing a level of speculation into both arguments, and 
inviting, if not requiring, a response from the Commonwealth. 
The Commonwealth's response, albeit error, also appears to 
have been more sarcastic hyperbole than factual argument, and we 
conclude the jury likely would have recognized it as such.  
"'[E]nthusiastic rhetoric, strong advocacy, and excusable 
hyperbole' are not grounds for reversal."  Commonwealth v. 
Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 350 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Sanna, 424 Mass. 92, 107 (1997).  Some of the factual argument 
was also supported by the downward trajectory of the bullet as 
it left Fiume's body. 
Moreover, after the defendant objected to the argument, the 
judge gave a curative instruction to the jury.  At the 
suggestion of defense counsel, the judge instructed the jury 
that their memory of the evidence controlled and that closing 
arguments are not evidence.  These instructions generally help 
ameliorate the impact of an error in closing, and were 
sufficient to address the arguments by both sides.  See, e.g., 
Niemic, 483 Mass. at 596 (curative instructions given before and 
during final charge that address errors in closing arguments may 
be sufficient to mitigate errors); Commonwealth v. Salazar, 481 
14 
 
 
Mass. 105, 118 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 473 
Mass. 379, 392 (2015) ("the judge properly instructed the jury 
that closing arguments are not evidence, and it is well-
established that '[t]he jury are presumed to follow 
instructions'"). 
Most importantly, the jury's conclusions did not hinge on 
whether one or two shots were fired, or whether the defendant 
fired the shot that killed Puopolo.  The Commonwealth did not 
need to prove that the defendant actually shot Puopolo for the 
jury to convict him of murder in the first degree.  The 
Commonwealth proceeded on a joint venture felony-murder theory 
with predicate offenses of armed robbery and armed assault in a 
dwelling.  Therefore, the Commonwealth simply had to prove that 
the defendant participated as a joint venturer in the armed 
robbery of Fiume or in an armed assault in a dwelling during 
which Puopolo was killed.  See Commonwealth v. Kilburn, 438 
Mass. 356, 362 (2003) (affirming conviction of murder in first 
degree on theory of felony-murder where predicate felony was 
armed assault in dwelling); Commonwealth v. Tevenal, 401 Mass. 
225, 229-230 (1987) (armed robbery as predicate felony for 
felony-murder).  See also Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 Mass. 
705, 710 (2016) (elements of joint venture armed robbery); 
Kilburn, supra at 359 n.4 (elements of joint venture armed 
assault in dwelling).  The evidence that the defendant had a gun 
15 
 
 
and participated in the armed assault in the garage and the 
armed robbery of Fiume as a joint venturer was sufficient to 
sustain the verdict. 
Finally, we conclude that, in returning their verdict, the 
jury seemed able to evaluate the credibility of the 
Commonwealth's witnesses, who, the defendant claims, were 
improperly bolstered by the Commonwealth's erroneous closing 
argument.  The jury did not find that the defendant committed an 
assault of Piro with a dangerous weapon.9  This indicates that 
the jury rejected at least some of the Commonwealth's theory of 
the case.  See Kozec, 399 Mass. at 517.  In particular, the jury 
did not accept the entire testimony of Piro, who testified that 
the defendant pointed a gun at him.  Significantly, Piro was 
also one of the witnesses who testified that the defendant shot 
Puopolo.  Given the jury's rejection of at least some of Piro's 
testimony and their acquittal of the defendant on this specific 
count, we are not persuaded that the prosecutor's argument 
                     
 
9 One of the charged predicate felonies underlying the 
theory of felony-murder was armed assault in a dwelling.  The 
Commonwealth identified four separate acts that could constitute 
the independent and distinct act necessary to prove felony-
murder -- the armed robbery of Fiume, the assault of Fiume with 
a dangerous weapon, the assault of Puopolo with a dangerous 
weapon, and the assault of Piro with a dangerous weapon.  The 
jury found the defendant guilty of the armed robbery of Fiume, 
the assault of Fiume with a dangerous weapon, and the assault of 
Puopolo with a dangerous weapon; it did not convict the 
defendant of the alleged assault of Piro with a dangerous 
weapon. 
16 
 
 
impermissibly corroborated or bolstered the testimony of the 
Commonwealth's witnesses. 
In sum, we conclude that prosecutor's statements regarding 
the bullet did not influence the jury's conclusions and were not 
prejudicial error. 
 
ii.  Statements regarding the defendant and Williams.  The 
defendant also argues that the prosecutor made improper 
arguments based on race in his closing.  Again, to place the 
prosecutor's arguments in context, we start with the defense 
counsel's closing, in which he described Fiume multiple times as 
the "drug kingpin of Stoneham," and the Commonwealth's other 
witnesses as "devious little drug dealers."  Following this, the 
Commonwealth closed as follows, emphasizing that the defendants 
were also drug dealers who intended to frighten and rob other 
drug dealers with guns: 
"[The defendant and Williams] didn't bring guns with them 
because it was going to be a friendly, cordial act. . . . 
They brought the guns with them because they didn't want 
kids from the suburbs they don't not [sic] handle the 
streets, I'll pull a gun on him he's going to freeze.  
Well, the kid didn't freeze, the [kid] threw a punch.  And 
Williams pulled the trigger." 
The prosecutor later returned to this point, arguing: 
"Were they all stupid?  Yes.  But Joe Puopolo is dead not 
because of his stupidity, he's dead because Mr. Tate, Mr. 
Williams wanted to rip off these kids from the suburbs.  
They wanted that pound, they wanted the money." 
17 
 
 
The defendant objected to these statements at the close of 
the Commonwealth's closing argument. The following exchange then 
occurred: 
Defense counsel:  "Also, my brother said twice in his 
closing about Tate and Williams ripping off kids from the 
suburbs, you know." 
 
The judge:  "I don't know how much more of a suburb 
Stoneham is than Medford." 
 
Defense counsel:  "Yeah, I don't either, and there's no -- 
there's nothing to show --" 
 
The judge:  "I mean, the suggestion is that Tate and 
Williams came from an urban area to the suburbs, and that 
Tate and Williams were more -- were preying on suburban 
drug dealers who were less sophisticated somehow than Tate 
and Williams, and I don't know what the evidence is to 
support that argument . . . ." 
In response to the defendant's objection, the judge 
instructed the jury that they could not draw any adverse 
inference against the defendant based on where he or Williams 
were from.  The full instruction read: 
"You heard some argument by [the Commonwealth] that 
the individuals in question went to the suburbs to do 
a drug rip-off in the suburbs.  I [want] to instruct 
you that you may not draw any negative inference 
against the defendant with respect to where Jesse 
Williams or the defendant are from.  The evidence that 
was put before you in this case with regard to that 
was that Mr. Williams is from Medford and that Mr. 
Tate grew up there.  And I instruct you, as counsel 
have agreed and as you may know, that Medford is a 
suburb as is Stoneham." 
This instruction was the product of back and forth between the 
lawyers and the judge that was focused on where the defendants 
18 
 
 
and the victims were from, whether one group was a more 
sophisticated or violent group of drug dealers than the other, 
and whether Medford was in fact a suburb or not.10  When asked if 
this instruction was sufficient, defense counsel indicated that 
it was.  There was no argument by either side that the 
prosecutor was making a race-based argument as opposed to a 
comparison of the different types of drug dealers. 
Because the judge gave a curative instruction, and the 
defendant did not object to the instruction, we review whether 
this argument created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Veiovis, 477 Mass. 472, 488 
(2017).  In determining whether an error created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, "[c]losing arguments 
must be viewed in the context of the entire argument, and in 
light of the judge's instruction to the jury, and the evidence 
at trial."  Commonwealth v. Muller, 477 Mass. 415, 431 (2017), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Braley, 449 Mass. 316, 328 (2007). 
Here, we discern no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice.  We begin by emphasizing that neither side should 
                     
10 The Commonwealth introduced evidence that the defendant 
grew up in Medford and went to Medford High School and that 
Williams had, at some point in the past, lived in a housing 
development in Medford.  There was no evidence as to where 
either lived at the time of the shooting or from where they came 
that night.  There was also no evidence as to why the defendant 
and Williams decided to rob Fiume. 
19 
 
 
have been drawing distinctions between suburban and urban 
defendants and suburban and urban victims, as these distinctions 
may be interpreted as grossly improper racist "dog whistles."11  
Nevertheless, in the instant case, the defendant's comments 
about suburban drug kingpins, and the prosecutor's response that 
the defendants were more violent drug dealers determined to rip 
off "kids from the suburbs," were not interpreted by either 
counsel or the judge as such an offensive tactic, but rather as 
attempts by both sides to portray the other as being aligned 
with worse drug dealers.  The arguments were also isolated 
instances in closings that otherwise carefully parsed the 
evidence.  In sum, we discern no substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice, as all sides were satisfied by the 
judge's solution, and the argument itself seems particularly 
meaningless when comparing drug dealers from Medford and 
Stoneham.12 
                     
 
11 As one Federal court has defined it, a "dog whistle" is 
"the use of code words and themes which activate conscious or 
subconscious racist concepts and frames. . . .  [C]ertain 
facially non-discriminatory terms can invoke racist concepts 
that are already planted in the public consciousness . . . ."  
Lloyd vs. Holder, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 11 Civ. 3154, (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 17, 2013). 
 
 
12 The defendant alternatively argues that if the errors in 
the Commonwealth's closing are insufficient on their own to 
warrant reversal, the combined effect of the two errors 
constitutes prejudicial error such that the defendant was 
deprived of a fair trial.  For the same reasons described above, 
20 
 
 
 
b.  Voluntary manslaughter instruction.  The defendant 
argues that he was entitled to a voluntary manslaughter 
instruction and that the judge erred in declining to give one.  
On appeal, the defendant asks us to apply our holding in 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805 (2017), cert. denied, 139 
S. Ct. 54 (2018), to this case and hold that the Commonwealth 
must prove that the defendant acted with malice in order to 
convict him of felony-murder.  We have previously held that 
Brown only applied prospectively, see Commonwealth v. Phap Buth, 
480 Mass. 113, 120, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 607 (2018), and do 
not revisit that conclusion here.  And since the defendant was 
tried before our decision in Brown, it does not apply to the 
defendant's trial.  See Brown, supra at 807. 
We also conclude that the defendant was not entitled to a 
voluntary manslaughter instruction.  "Voluntary manslaughter is 
an unlawful killing 'arising not from malice, but from . . . 
sudden [heat of] passion induced by reasonable provocation, 
sudden combat, or [the use of] excessive force in self-
defense.'"  Commonwealth v. Richards, 485 Mass. 896, 918 (2020), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 465 Mass. 672, 686 (2013).  
"[A] self-defense instruction must be given when deadly force 
was used only if the evidence . . . permits at least a 
                     
however, we conclude that the errors in the Commonwealth's 
closing argument do not constitute reversible error. 
21 
 
 
reasonable doubt that the defendant reasonably and actually 
believed that he was in 'imminent danger of death or serious 
bodily harm, from which he could save himself only by using 
deadly force.'"  Commonwealth v. Pike, 428 Mass. 393, 396 
(1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Harrington, 379 Mass. 446, 450 
(1980).  When determining whether a voluntary manslaughter 
instruction should have been given, we review the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the defendant.  Richards, supra. 
The defendant sought manslaughter instructions on the 
theories of excessive force in self-defense as well as heat of 
passion caused by sudden combat.  Specifically, he argued that a 
voluntary manslaughter instruction was warranted because the 
sale took place in close quarters in the enclosed garage, there 
was a baseball bat nearby, and the defendant and Williams were 
outnumbered. 
Even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the defendant, the judge correctly concluded that he was not 
entitled to a manslaughter instruction.  The defendant and 
Williams were the aggressors, as they brandished firearms to rob 
Fiume and not in response to any threat.  The only evidence of 
any aggression against the defendant or Williams was testimony 
that Piro tried to knock the gun from the defendant's hand and 
22 
 
 
that Fiume attempted to punch Williams.13  But these actions 
occurred after the defendant and Williams pulled out their guns 
and pointed them at Fiume and Puopolo, not before.  These 
actions, therefore, would not justify the defendant and 
Williams's use of deadly force against Fiume and Puopolo.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Carter, 475 Mass. 512, 522 (2016) (no 
manslaughter instruction warranted where defendant pointed gun 
at someone's head during robbery); Commonwealth v. Selby, 426 
Mass. 168, 172 (1997) (no manslaughter instruction warranted 
where "defendant entered the dwelling house of another, carrying 
a loaded gun, with the intent to commit a robbery"); 
Commonwealth v. Evans, 390 Mass. 144, 150-151 (1983) (no 
manslaughter instruction warranted where defendant used gun 
during armed robbery). 
There is also no evidence to suggest that the defendant was 
provoked by the enclosed nature of the garage or the number of 
people in the garage.  In fact, the defendant had already been 
in the garage earlier that night when he was alone and 
surrounded by a similar number of people.  That he later sought 
out Piro and chose to go back to the garage to complete the 
purchase with Williams severely undercuts his argument that the 
                     
 
13 There is no evidence that the victim, Puopolo, committed 
or attempted any act of aggression against the defendant or 
Williams. 
23 
 
 
fact that the sale took place in close quarters provoked him.  
Cf. Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 443-444 (2006) 
(basis for reasonable provocation existed where defendant was 
surrounded by attackers and then repeatedly punched in head and 
knocked to ground). 
Similarly, the fact that there was a single baseball bat in 
the garage does not support reasonable provocation.  There is no 
evidence that anyone ever reached for or wielded the bat.  
Significantly, there is no evidence that Puopolo, the victim, 
did anything to provoke either Williams or the defendant.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Garcia, 482 Mass. 408, 411 (2019) (no 
manslaughter instruction where no evidence of "victim's supposed 
attack against the defendant").  See also Gonzalez, 465 Mass. at 
686 (for sudden combat defense, victim must attack or strike 
defendant); Acevedo, 446 Mass. at 444 ("provocation must come 
from the victim" [citation omitted]).  On the other hand, the 
defendant and Williams had guns.  In these circumstances, where 
the defendant and a joint venturer initiated an armed robbery, 
and where the only potential provocations came after the 
defendant brandished a gun and threatened the victim, it was not 
error to decline to give a voluntary manslaughter instruction on 
any of the requested theories.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Rogers, 459 Mass. 249, 260, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1080 (2011) 
24 
 
 
("Generally, in Massachusetts, one who commits an armed robbery 
cannot assert a claim of self-defense"). 
 
c.  Relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant argues 
that we should exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
to reduce his conviction to murder in the second degree for 
several reasons.  He first argues that the evidence that he 
actually fired a shot was "weak to non-existent" such that a 
reduction to murder in the second degree would be consonant with 
justice.  This assertion ignores the testimony of at least one 
eyewitness who testified that he saw the defendant shoot 
Puopolo.  But regardless of who actually shot Puopolo, there was 
ample evidence that he was killed during the armed robbery 
committed by the defendant and Williams or, alternatively, the 
armed assaults in a dwelling.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Fernandes, 478 Mass. 725, 738-739, 746 (2018) (no relief under 
§ 33E where circumstantial evidence of defendant's participation 
as joint venturer in shooting); Commonwealth v. Gomes, 475 Mass. 
775, 781-782, 792 (2016) (no relief under § 33E where evidence 
that defendant was, at minimum, driver of car from which shots 
were fired and in which shooters fled).  Relief under § 33E is 
not appropriate where the evidence showed that, at the very 
least, the defendant and an accomplice brought guns to a drug 
deal and used those guns to commit an armed robbery and shoot 
two individuals.  See Commonwealth v. Rolon, 438 Mass. 808, 822 
25 
 
 
(2003) (where "the weight of the evidence is entirely consistent 
with felony-murder in the first degree, it is an abuse of 
discretion to reduce the verdict solely on factors unrelated to 
the weight of the evidence").  The defendant was without a doubt 
an active participant in the entire drug deal, as he initiated 
the original contacts with the Stoneham drug dealers and 
appeared both times on the night of the murder with two 
different partners, thereby suggesting that he was orchestrating 
the drug deal.  He was certainly not on the "remote outer 
fringes" of the felony-murder.  Cf. Brown, 477 Mass. at 824. 
The defendant also argues that his conviction should be 
reversed because of his age -- nineteen -- at the time of the 
robbery.  The fact that the defendant was nineteen at the time 
of the shooting is not alone enough for relief under § 33E.  We 
accordingly reject the defendant's invitation to reduce the 
verdict on this ground alone. 
Finally, we have reviewed the entire record pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and discerned no other basis to set aside 
or reduce the verdict of murder in the first degree or to order 
a new trial.  Accordingly, we decline to exercise our authority. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.