Case Title: Dorothy Falls v. JVC America, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1051677

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: 06/13/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1051677
_________________________
Dorothy Falls
v.
JVC America, Inc.
Appeal from Tuscaloosa Circuit Court
(CV-04-1558)
PARKER, Justice.
I. Background
Dorothy Falls began working for JVC America, Inc.
("JVC"),  on November 13, 1986, and continued working for JVC
until June 23, 2004, operating winding machines in the tape
facility and various machines in the disc facility at JVC's
plant.  Around June 2003 she was transferred from the tape
department to the disc department, and shortly thereafter the
1051677
2
tape facility closed.  Her primary responsibility in the disc
facility involved printing labels.
On August 19, 2003, Falls began to experience headaches,
nausea, and weakness.  Although the first onset of these
symptoms occurred, not at work, but while she was driving her
car, she subsequently started experiencing these symptoms upon
her arrival at work or shortly thereafter.  While she was
experiencing these symptoms on August 21, 2003, paramedics
took her to the hospital, and she was treated by Dr. Craig
Buettner.  On August 27, 2003, she again experienced these
symptoms and visited Dr. Buettner.  Dr. Buettner told her not
to return to work and set an appointment for her for September
12, 2003.  On that date she told Dr. Buettner that her
symptoms had disappeared.  At Dr. Buettner's request, she saw
a neurologist, Dr. James Geyer, on September 24, 2003.  Dr.
Geyer found no abnormalities and authorized her to return to
work on September 29, 2003.  However, her symptoms recurred
within five hours of beginning her shift.
When she visited Dr. Buettner again on October 2, 2003,
he began to suspect that something at the plant, like a dye or
a fume, might be causing an allergic reaction.  Shortly
1051677
3
thereafter, she saw Dr. Peter Casten, medical director of the
DCH Regional Medical Center in Tuscaloosa, which specializes
in occupational-health issues.  Dr. Casten evaluated her but
was unable to determine at that time whether her symptoms were
work related.  She returned to work on November 11, 2003, and
had an immediate onset of symptoms.  On that date Dr. Lisa
Mani, who worked with Dr. Casten's practice group, saw Falls;
Dr. Mani noted that the symptoms occurred only while Falls was
at the JVC workplace.  
Pursuant to Dr. Buettner's authorization, Falls returned
to work again early in June 2004, and within three hours she
began to experience symptoms so severe she felt like she would
pass out, and she had to leave.
On or about June 21, 2004, Falls returned to work and
later that day advised Gail Lawson, her "lead person" at the
JVC plant, that she was ill.  Lawson told her to see Mike
Hall, her superintendent.  Hall took her to the Human
Resources Department, where she met with Sandy Kornegay and
Tom Kizziah.  They gave Falls a resignation form, but she
refused to sign it and asked for permission to leave to see
her doctor, which was granted.  Over the next several days she
1051677
Falls testified that she had occasionally worked for
1
brief periods in the packaging department of the disc
facility, and that while she was working in the packaging
department her symptoms became less severe but did not
4
saw Dr. Buettner, her personal physician, and Dr. Casten,
JVC's company-approved doctor.
On the evening of June 22, 2004, Falls received a
telephone message asking her to contact Felicia Gross with
JVC.  Gross was responsible for overseeing JVC's workers'
compensation claims and making medical appointments for work-
related injuries.  Falls spoke with Gross, and Gross made an
appointment for her with Dr. Casten for June 23, 2004, at 1:00
p.m.
    On June 23, 2004, Gross spoke with Victor Hamner, the
plant manager, concerning Falls.  She testified that they
discussed whether Falls's case could result in a worker's
compensation claim.  Hamner instructed Gross to arrange for
Falls to see him before she saw Dr. Casten.
Falls met with Hamner at 1:00 p.m. on June 23, 2004.  She
told Hamner that she could not work in the plant without
becoming physically ill.  Hamner told her she would have to
resign or she would be terminated.  She answered that she
could not return to work in the plant,  but she refused to
1
1051677
disappear.  She did not consider a transfer to the packaging
department to be an acceptable option because her symptoms,
although less severe, were still present and because those who
worked in packaging were temporary employees whose wages were
less than hers. 
The merits of Falls's worker's compensation claim are not
2
before this Court in this appeal.
5
resign.  Hamner therefore terminated Falls's employment.  Her
termination notice read:
"Dorothy Falls is being terminated today for the
following 2 reasons: (1) Lack of dependability; and
(2) She has expressed to us that she can no longer
work in this facility.
"Dorothy has not returned to work since her leave of
absence ended 6/10/04. Sandy Kornegay, Tom Kizziah,
and Mike Hall met with Dorothy on June 21/04 and she
told them at that time that she gets sick as soon as
she walks through the door of JVC, and she expressed
that she cannot work in this building."
Falls filed a complaint against JVC in the Tuscaloosa
Circuit Court, alleging that JVC had fired her in retaliation
for her filing or intending to file a worker's compensation
claim (CV-04-1558); she also filed a worker's compensation
claim against JVC in the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court.   
2
The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of
JVC in Falls's retaliatory-discharge case, finding:
"It is undisputed from the evidence that the
decision to terminate [Falls] from her employment at
1051677
This is apparently a typographical error.  The date
3
should be "6/22/04."
6
JVC was made on 6/22/04. ... [JVC employees and
officials] testified that on 6/22/06,[ ] they had no
3
knowledge that [Falls] was claiming that her medical
condition was related to her occupation at JVC.  The
only testimony regarding knowledge of the claim for
worker's 
compensation 
benefits 
came 
from 
a
conversation [Falls] had with Felicia Gross, who
played no role in [JVC's] decision to terminate
[Falls's] employment.  This conversation took place
on 6/23/04, and after the decision to terminate
[Falls] had been made by others.  It is also
undisputed that on 6/22/04, Sandy Kornegay called
[Falls] after the decision makers' meeting, and gave
her a choice of resigning or being terminated.
Since the decision to terminate [Falls] was made on
6/22/04, [Falls's] workman's compensation claim
could not be the sole motivating factor in [Falls's]
termination.
"There is a failure of proof of specific
knowledge 
of 
[Falls's] 
claims 
for 
workman's
compensation benefits on the part of the decision
makers, at the time she was terminated, and that the
knowledge of her workman's compensation claim was
the 
sole 
motivating 
force 
behind 
[Falls's]
termination.  Therefore, there is a critical link
missing in the chain of [Falls's] burden of proof.
Since [Falls] is unable to prove all the elements of
a prima facie case, [JVC] is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.
"Summary judgment is therefore granted in favor
of the defendant JVC on [Falls's] retaliatory
discharge claim."
Falls has appealed that summary judgment to this Court.
II. Standard of Review
1051677
7
This Court set forth the appropriate standard of review
of a summary judgment in Lee v. City of Gadsden, 592 So. 2d
1036, 1038 (Ala. 1992):
"[O]ur review of a summary judgment is de novo; that
is, we must examine all the evidentiary submissions
that were presented to the trial court. Tolbert v.
Gulsby, 333 So. 2d 129 (Ala. 1976).  The two-tiered
standard of review for summary judgment has been
repeatedly stated: (1) there must be no genuine
issues of material fact, and (2) the movant must be
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  Ala. R.
Civ. P. 56(c), Tripp v. Humana, Inc., 474 So. 2d 88
(Ala. 1985).  Further, on review of a summary
judgment, we must view all the evidence in a light
most favorable to the nonmovant and we must
entertain 
all 
reasonable 
inferences 
from 
the
evidence in favor of the nonmovant.  Fincher v.
Robinson Bros. Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 583 So. 2d 256
(Ala. 1991).  See, also Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie,
Inc., 564 So. 2d 412 (Ala. 1990).
"The party moving for a summary judgment must
make a prima facie showing that there are no genuine
issues of material fact and that he is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law, Fincher, 583 So. 2d
at 257.  If this showing is made, the burden then
shifts to the nonmovant to rebut the movant's prima
facie showing by 'substantial evidence.'" 
(Footnote omitted.)
III. Analysis
In 1984 the Legislature established, as part of the
Workers' Compensation Act, § 25-5-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975,
a cause of action for retaliatory discharge based on the
plaintiff's filing a claim for worker's compensation benefits:
1051677
8
"No employee shall be terminated by an employer
solely because the employee has instituted or
maintained any action against the employer to
recover workers' compensation benefits under this
chapter ...."
Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-11.1.  In Alabama Power Co. v.
Aldridge, 854 So. 2d 554, 563 (Ala. 2002), this Court
articulated the following test for determining whether a
plaintiff may recover for retaliatory discharge under § 25-5-
11.1:
"In order for an employee to establish a prima facie
case of retaliatory discharge the employee must
show: (1) an employment relationship, (2) an on-the-
job injury, (3) knowledge on the part of the
employer 
of 
the 
on-the-job 
injury, 
and 
(4)
subsequent termination of the employment based
solely upon the employee's on-the-job injury and the
filing of a workers' compensation claim."
JVC does not dispute that Falls had an employment
relationship with JVC, that Falls developed a medical
condition during the course of that employment, or that JVC
knew of that medical condition.  JVC, however, does dispute
that Falls's medical condition was caused by or was related to
her job and therefore disputes that JVC knew that Falls's
medical condition was caused by or was related to her job.
JVC strongly denies that the termination of Falls's employment
1051677
9
was based solely upon her medical condition and her filing of
a worker's compensation claim.  
We will focus upon the fourth prong of the Aldridge test,
which is dispositive: whether the termination of Falls's
employment was based solely upon her medical condition and her
filing of a worker's compensation claim based on that
condition.  We will not elaborate on the second and third
prongs of the Aldridge test, because resolution of those
issues is not necessary to the resolution of this case. 
We first observe that, according to the Aldridge test,
the "subsequent termination" of Falls's employment must have
been "based solely upon [her] on-the-job injury and the filing
of a workers' compensation claim."  Aldridge, 854 So. 2d at
563.  However, Falls testified that she did not file a
worker's compensation claim until after JVC terminated her
employment.  Thus, the question is whether the termination of
her employment can be considered "subsequent" to her filing a
worker's compensation claim and whether the sole reason for
her discharge was her filing of a worker's compensation claim.
Falls argues that "[s]ection 25-5-11.1 does not require
formal commencement of a civil action as a prerequisite to
recovery. Hexcel Decatur, Inc. v. Vickers, 908 So. 2d 237, 242
1051677
10
(Ala. 2004) (citing cases and refusing to overrule precedent
to that effect)." 
Hexcel Decatur did hold that § 25-5-
11.1 does not require, in a retaliatory-discharge action, that
a civil action seeking worker's compensation benefits be filed
before the termination of the plaintiff's employment.  The
Court in Hexcel Decatur agreed with the plaintiff's argument
that "only a claim for benefits need be made before the
employment is terminated in order for a former employee to
maintain a retaliatory-discharge action." Hexcel Decatur, 908
So. 2d at 239.  The Court in Hexcel Decatur refused to
overrule Tyson Foods, Inc. v. McCollum, 881 So. 2d 976 (Ala.
2003), and McClain v. Birmingham Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 578
So. 2d 1299 (Ala. 1991), both of which had held that the
filing of a worker's compensation claim, without the
institution of a civil action seeking worker's compensation
benefits, was sufficient to meet the requirement of § 25-5-
11.1.
However, Falls does not meet the requirement of § 25-5-
11.1, even as interpreted by Hexcel Decatur, Tyson Foods, and
McClain.  Those cases held that § 25-5-11.1 could be satisfied
if a worker's compensation claim is filed before the former
employee's employment is terminated.  There is no evidence
1051677
11
indicating that Falls had filed a claim or even that she had
talked about filing a claim before JVC terminated her
employment.  The only evidence of a retaliatory discharge is
Gross's testimony that she told Hamner that Falls's injury
could involve a "possible Worker's Comp claim."  To treat
Falls's discharge as a retaliatory discharge, we would have to
be convinced that Hamner terminated Falls's employment in
retaliation for her possibly filing a worker's compensation
claim that she had not filed or even talked about filing.  And
even if we were to be so convinced, treating her termination
as a retaliatory discharge would stretch § 25-5-11.1 far
beyond the outer limits of Hexcel Decatur, Tyson Foods, and
McClain.  Falls has failed to establish that she had commenced
any kind of worker's compensation claim before JVC terminated
her employment.
If the Legislature desires to expand § 25-5-11.1 so that
a 
retaliatory 
discharge 
would include terminations of
employment in anticipation of workers' compensation claims, it
may do so by amending the statute.  Unless and until the
Legislature does so, however, we must interpret the statute as
written.  Because the statute uses the verb phrase "has
instituted or maintained" in relation to an action to recover
1051677
12
worker's compensation benefits, it is clear that § 25-5-11.1
contemplates an action for a termination of employment in
retaliation against an event, i.e., the filing of a worker's
compensation claim, that has already occurred.  
IV. Conclusion
Alabama's 
Workers' 
Compensation 
Act 
provides 
compensation
for employees who are injured and/or disabled on the job.
Falls has testified that she filed an action seeking worker's
compensation benefits after her employment with JVC was
terminated.  We have been provided with no information as to
the status or outcome of that action, and we make no judgment
concerning its merits.
The case before us is limited to Falls's claim of a
retaliatory discharge under § 25-5-11.1.  Under the facts of
this case, Falls is unable to establish a prima facie case
that she was discharged by JVC in retaliation for making a
claim for benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in entering a summary
judgment for JVC, and we affirm that summary judgment.
1051677
13
AFFIRMED.
 
See, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, and Murdock, JJ.,
 concur.  
Lyons, J., concurs specially.  
Cobb, C.J., concurs in part and concurs in the result. 
1051677
14
LYONS, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the main opinion, which refuses to recognize
a claim of retaliatory discharge pursuant to § 25-5-11.1, Ala.
Code 1975, under the circumstance here presented, when the
former employee had not filed a claim for benefits under the
Workers' Compensation Act at the time she was discharged.
Although the potential for injustice remains in the context
where an employer fires an unconscious employee as the
employee is being loaded into an ambulance, any expansion of
the statutory remedy for a retaliatory discharge to meet
circumstances where the employer knew or should have known of
the likelihood of a claim is a matter for the legislature.  
In addition to the above-described window of opportunity
to be used by an employer to foreclose the statutory remedy,
this Court's recent decision in Blue Circle Cement Inc. v.
Phillips, [Ms.  1060564, November 30, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___
(Ala. 2007), opened a second window of opportunity in case the
first window is missed.  Under Blue Circle, an employee can be
discharged 
after 
claiming 
benefits 
but 
before 
reaching 
maximum
medical improvement, and the employer can defeat the
subsequent retaliatory-discharge action by proof of the
1051677
15
employee's inability to work as the reason for discharge.  As
I stated in my dissent in Blue Circle, the defense of
inability to perform as a basis for an employee's discharge
should not be available absent proof of the futility of
further rehabilitation pursuant to benefits available to the
employee under the Workers' Compensation Act.  I was in a
small minority in Blue Circle; the correction of this
injustice, therefore, is also a matter for the legislature. 
1051677
16
COBB, Chief Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the
result).
I concur in the holding that under the facts of this case
Falls has failed to establish a prima facie case of
retaliatory discharge under Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-11.1.
However, to the extent that the main opinion might be read as
authority for the proposition that filing a worker's
compensation 
claim 
is 
a 
necessary 
prerequisite 
for
establishing a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge in
every case, I concur only in the result.