Case Title: Cook v. Van Orden

Citation: 

Docket Number: 50143

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2023-10-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 50143 
 
 
ROGER COOK and SHELLEY COOK, 
husband and wife, 
 
     Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
 
JAY VAN ORDEN and SHELLI VAN 
ORDEN, husband and wife; DEXTER VAN 
ORDEN, an individual, 
 
     Defendants-Appellants, 
 
and 
 
LAVAR 
GROVER 
and 
JEANETTE 
GROVER, husband and wife; MERRILL 
HANNY and BETHEA HANNY, husband and 
wife; DONALD G. ALLEN and KATHY 
ALLEN, husband and wife; BARRY COX and 
LINDA COX, husband and wife, and DOES I-
V, 
 
     Defendants. 
_________________________________ 
LAVAR 
GROVER 
and 
JEANETTE 
GROVER, husband and wife, 
 
     Counterclaimants-Cross Claimants, 
 
v. 
 
ROGER COOK and SHELLEY COOK, 
husband and wife, 
 
     Counterdefendants-Respondents, 
 
and 
 
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Pocatello, August 2023 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: October 26, 2023 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
 
2 
 
JAY VAN ORDEN and SHELLI VAN 
ORDEN, husband and wife; DEXTER VAN 
ORDEN, an individual, 
 
     Cross Defendants-Appellants, 
 
and 
 
MERRILL HANNY and BETHEA HANNY, 
husband and wife; DONALD G. ALLEN and 
KATHY ALLEN, husband and wife; BARRY 
COX and LINDA COX, husband and wife, 
 
     Cross Defendants. 
_______________________________________   
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) 
) 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Bingham County, Darren B. Simpson, District Judge. 
 
The order of the district court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 
 
Cooper & Larsen, Pocatello, for Appellants. J. D. Oborn argued. 
 
Parsons Behle & Latimer, Idaho Falls, for Respondents. Jon Stenquist argued. 
_____________________ 
 
BRODY, Justice. 
This is the second appeal of this matter, which concerns the existence of a prescriptive 
easement and the presumption of permissive use. Shelley and Roger Cook own a parcel of land 
(the “Cook Property”) located in Bingham County, Idaho. The Cook Property was originally 
owned by Shelley’s grandfather, John Harker Sr., and has stayed in the Harker family ever since. 
The Cooks filed suit against Jay and Shelli Van Orden alleging they had a prescriptive easement 
across the Van Ordens’ land (the “Van Orden Property”) via a road the parties call “Tower Road.” 
Tower Road connects the Cooks’ property to a county road and has been used by the Cooks and 
their predecessors in interest since the Cook Property was homesteaded in 1908. The district court 
initially entered judgment in favor of the Van Ordens after it determined the Cooks had failed to 
prove the necessary element of adverse use for a prescriptive easement. The Cooks appealed, and 
this Court reversed the district court’s decision. This Court explained that it was necessary for the 
district court to determine the statutory period of adverse use because “there were potentially 
 
3 
 
periods of adverse use” that could satisfy “either the five-year or twenty-year period for 
establishing a prescriptive easement.” Cook v. Van Orden, 170 Idaho 46, 53, 507 P.3d 119, 126 
(2022) (“Cook I”). The case was remanded to the district court to determine the statutory period 
and analyze whether the Harkers’ or Cooks’ (collectively “Harkers/Cooks”) use of Tower Road 
was adverse during that time. 
On remand, the district court determined that the use of Tower Road by the Harkers was 
presumptively permissive prior to 1910 and that “nothing in the evidence [implies] that Harkers’ 
or Cooks’ permissive use of Tower Road . . . ever changed into an adverse use.” Nevertheless, the 
district court identified a statutory period from 1962 to 2006, and granted the Cooks’ prescriptive 
easement claim by concluding the period of statutory use was sufficiently adverse due to the 
common belief of the Harkers/Cooks and the Thompsons—the Van Ordens’ predecessors in 
interest—that the Harkers/Cooks had a right to use Tower Road. In other words, the adverse use 
was established based on a claim of right regardless of the preceding permissive use. The Van 
Ordens appealed to this Court, contending that the district court erred in granting the Cooks a 
prescriptive easement. For the following reasons, we reverse the district court’s decision and 
remand for entry of judgment in favor of the Van Ordens. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. 
The Cook Property  
The Cook Property is a 160-acre parcel of land located in Bingham County. Shelley Cook’s 
grandfather, John Ray Harker (“John Harker Sr.”), homesteaded the land in 1908. John Harker 
Sr.’s widow, Sarah M. Clark (formerly Sarah M. Harker), was granted title to the land under the 
Homestead Act in 1922. Over the following years, the Cook property was conveyed to various 
family members. Their son, John Harker Jr., obtained ownership of the land in 1967. John Harker 
Jr.’s daughter, Shelley Cook, and her husband, Roger Cook, were deeded the land in 2018. 
Currently, Shelley and Roger Cook are the titled owners of the Cook Property.  
Before John Harker Jr. obtained ownership, the Cook Property was leased to Allen 
Thompson in 1962. For roughly twenty years, he and his son, Ted Thompson, dry-farmed the land 
until the late-1980s. At that point, Ted placed the property into the government’s Conservation 
Reserve Program (“CRP”) and continued to lease the land and reseed it in accordance with the 
CRP requirements until 2015.  
 
 
4 
 
B. 
The Van Orden Property 
In 1910, George Thompson purchased a large parcel of land in Bingham County that 
included what is now the Van Orden Property. Upon his passing in 1968, George’s daughter, Gwen 
Wilts, inherited the portion of the land that now constitutes the Van Orden Property. The Van 
Orden Property comprises approximately 2,000 acres. Wilts appointed her brother, Allen 
Thompson, and later his son, Ted Thompson, to act as her agents over the Van Orden Property. 
Allen and Ted dry-farmed the property until 1993. Then, like the Cook Property, Ted placed the 
land into the CRP until 2014. Roughly one year later, the Longhursts purchased the Van Orden 
Property. In late 2016 or early 2017, the Longhursts sold the property to the Van Ordens. 
C. 
Tower Road 
Tower Road takes its name from radio towers, which were built on land that was once part 
of the Van Orden Property. Tower Road connects the Cook Property to County Road 129 South 
10th East in Bonneville County, Idaho. Tower Road runs through several properties, including the 
Van Orden Property. In the mid-1980s, Ted Thompson created a side road off Tower Road known 
as the “Cut Out Road.”  
Since at least the 1960s, there has been a gate on the Van Orden Property near the 
intersection of Tower Road and County Road 129 South 10th East. Prior to the mid-1980s, it was 
a simple wire gate with a chain and occasionally a lock (referred to as the “farmer’s gate”). 
According to the testimony of Matthew Thompson (the son of Ted Thompson) the Harkers 
probably had keys to the lock or put their own lock on the farmer’s gate.  
In the 1980s, at the request of power companies with property in the area, the Thompsons 
replaced the farmer’s gate with a metal gate, which the parties refer to as the “heavy gate.” The 
heavy gate was originally locked with a combination lock, then a single lock and key system was 
used. The Thompsons provided the Harkers/Cooks with a key to the heavy gate. In the 1990s, the 
lock and key system was replaced by personal locks on the gate in a daisy-chain series. Vehicles 
could drive around the heavy gate. During the years that the Thompsons owned the Van Orden 
Property, the public drove motorcycles, cars, pickups, four-wheelers, all-terrain vehicles, horses, 
and station wagons on the property.  
The following figure shows Tower Road and the properties at issue: 
 
5 
 
 
Figure 1. Map of Tower Road and Adjacent Properties 
 
D. 
Accessing the Cook Property 
John Harker Sr. accessed the Cook Property primarily by taking Tower Road. Between 
1962 and 1967, John Harker Jr. also used Tower Road to access the Cook Property. In addition, 
Harker Jr. used the Cut Out Road to haul grain and to take boy scouts camping on the Cook 
Property. While Allen and Ted Thompson were leasing the Cook Property from the early 1960s to 
1993, they accessed the Cook Property via Tower Road. The Cooks would use Tower Road to 
access their property an average of ten times per year to check that the property complied with the 
CRP requirements. When the Cooks forgot their key to the heavy gate, they would drive around 
the heavy gate or take a road by the Idaho Falls Country Club that connected to Tower Road.  
 
6 
 
When the Longhursts owned the Van Orden Property between 2015 and 2016, the Cooks 
would access Tower Road through Country Club Road. In the fall of 2016, Mr. Cook called Mr. 
Longhurst to speak with him about the Cooks getting a lock placed on the gate so they could access 
Tower Road. Mr. Longhurst was unavailable to speak with him at that time. Mr. Cook called Mr. 
Longhurst again several months later to make the request but, by then, the Longhursts had sold the 
land to the Van Ordens. 
When the Van Ordens purchased the property, it was only partially enclosed. In the summer 
of 2017, the Van Ordens completely enclosed the property with a fence and gated the access points 
to Tower Road. The fence and gates contain the Van Ordens’ cattle. Strangers, including Mr. Cook, 
would leave gates open, letting cattle out, or close gates that were intentionally left open by the 
Van Ordens to herd cattle through. To avoid this and to keep trespassers out, the Van Ordens 
placed locks on their gates. During this time, Mr. Van Orden told Mr. Cook that they would allow 
the Cooks to use Tower Road if the Cooks called and asked for permission first. Mr. Cook, 
however, expressed that he did not want to have to ask for permission.  
E. 
Procedure 
On July 17, 2017, the Cooks filed suit against the Van Ordens, asserting a prescriptive 
easement over Tower Road. During a bench trial in October 2020, multiple witnesses, including 
members of the Cook and Thompson families, testified that the Harkers/Cooks had a right to use 
Tower Road. The district court held that the Cooks’ use of Tower Road was open and notorious, 
“continuous and uninterrupted from the early 1960s (if not before) until 2017,” and with the actual 
or imputed knowledge of the Thompson family who possessed the land on behalf of the owner of 
the servient tenement. However, the district court also found that the Harkers’/Cooks’ use of 
Tower Road was not adverse. Based on this conclusion, the district court determined that it did not 
need to calculate the applicable statutory period for the prescriptive easement claim because it 
became irrelevant. Following the bench trial, the title to Tower Road was quieted in favor of the 
Van Ordens.  
The Cooks appealed to this Court, arguing that the district court had erred in determining 
their use had not been adverse and by not assigning a statutory period. In Cook I, we held that the 
district court erred by not assigning a statutory period to its analysis because there was “evidence 
suggesting that there may have been periods when the use was adverse.” 170 Idaho 46, 53, 507 
P.3d 119, 126 (2022). Without first knowing the relevant statutory period, the Court was unable to 
 
7 
 
determine whether the Harkers’/Cooks’ use was adverse. Id. Thus, we reversed the district court’s 
decision and remanded the case for the district court to identify the relevant statutory period and 
then determine whether the use had been adverse during that period.  
On remand, the district court determined the Cooks established the necessary elements of 
a prescriptive easement for the five-year statutory period, continually, from 1962 to 2006. The 
district court determined that the Harkers’/Cooks’ use of Tower Road was by permission from 
1908 to 1962 but was “under a claim of right” from 1962 to 2015. The district court explained that, 
other than the “adverse and under a claim of right” element, all other elements for a prescriptive 
easement for Tower Road had been met between 1908 and 2015. Notably, the district court found 
that “nothing in the evidence [implies] that the Harkers’ or Cooks’ permissive use of the Tower 
Road, established prior to 1910, ever changed into an adverse use.” The district court determined 
that, under prescriptive easement case law decided prior to this Court’s decision in Cook I, it 
“would find that the Cooks failed to show adverse use and would deny the prescriptive easement.” 
Nevertheless, the district court interpreted Cook I to suggest that the presumption of permissive 
use from 1908 to 1962 must be disregarded, and that the “Cooks’ and Thompsons’ common belief 
in the Harkers’ right to use the Tower Road and the Cut Out Road equates to an adverse use under 
a claim of right.” From this, the district court concluded that it was obligated to find that the 
Harkers’/Cooks’ use had been adverse and granted the Cooks a prescriptive easement. 
The Van Ordens timely appealed to this Court, arguing that the district court erred in 
granting the Cooks an easement by prescription after finding that the Cooks had not established 
adverse use of Tower Road. 
II. 
  STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
“This Court’s ‘review of a trial court’s conclusions following a bench trial is limited to 
determining whether the evidence supports the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact 
support the conclusions of law.’” Chester v. Wild Idaho Adventures RV Park, LLC, 171 Idaho 212, 
519 P.3d 1152, 1161 (2022) (quoting Burns Concrete, Inc. v. Teton Cnty., 168 Idaho 442, 456, 483 
P.3d 985, 999 (2020)). “A district court’s determination that a claimant has or has not established 
a private prescriptive easement involves entwined questions of law and fact.” Cook I, 170 Idaho 
at 51–52, 507 P.3d at 124–25 (quoting Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 479, 129 P.3d 1223, 1228 
(2006)).  
 
8 
 
“[W]hen reviewing the trial court’s findings of fact in a case in which the facts must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence, the job of the reviewing court is simply to determine 
whether there is substantial and competent evidence to sustain the finding.” Latvala v. Green 
Enters., Inc., 168 Idaho 686, 695, 485 P.3d 1129, 1138 (2021) (quoting Sowards v. Rathbun, 134 
Idaho 702, 707, 8 P.3d 1245, 1250 (2000)). Evidence is substantial and competent if a reasonable 
trier of fact could accept and rely upon it in making the factual finding challenged on appeal. Id. 
“However, “[t]he substantial evidence standard for appellate review requires a greater quantum of 
evidence when the trial court’s finding must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, than 
when mere preponderance is required.” Id. “[T]his Court exercises free review over a trial court’s 
conclusions of law, including the question ‘of whether the facts found, or stipulated to, are 
sufficient to satisfy the legal requirements for the existence of an implied easement or a 
prescriptive easement.’” Id. (quoting Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390, 394, 210 P.3d 75, 79 
(2009)).  
III. 
ANALYSIS 
“An easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not 
inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner.” Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. 
Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 420, 283 P.3d 728, 737 (2012) (quoting Hughes, 142 Idaho at 480, 129 
P.3d at 1229). To establish a prescriptive easement, the party claiming the easement must provide 
clear and convincing evidence that their use of the subject property was (1) open and notorious, 
(2) continuous and uninterrupted, (3) adverse and under a claim of right, (4) with the actual or 
imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement, (5) for the statutory period. Cook, 170 
Idaho at 52, 507 P.3d at 125. “Idaho law disfavors private prescriptive easements.” H.F.L.P., LLC 
v. City of Twin Falls, 157 Idaho 672, 679, 339 P.3d 557, 564 (2014). Because prescription acts as 
a penalty against the burdened landowner, “courts should closely scrutinize and limit rights 
obtained through prescription. . . .” Id.  
The district court determined that the Harkers’/Cooks’ use of Tower Road was 
presumptively permissive because the Van Orden Property was wild, unenclosed, and unimproved 
when the Harkers initially began using the property in 1908. Despite concluding this permissive 
use never changed into adverse use, the district court further determined that it was obligated to 
find that the Cooks established the “adverse and under a claim of right” element under its 
interpretation of Cook I. Each conclusion is addressed in turn.  
 
9 
 
A. 
The district court did not err when it determined that the Harkers’ use of 
Tower Road was presumptively permissive because the Van Orden Property 
was wild, unenclosed, and unimproved. 
 “The question whether a use was adverse, made pursuant to an implied servitude, or 
permissive, in the inception is often difficult to answer, particularly in cases of long-established 
uses where the original parties are not available to describe the circumstances of the initial use.” 
Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 2.16 cmt. g (2000). To help determine whether a use 
was permissive or prescriptive, “[c]ourts have developed a series of presumptions . . . .” Id. In 
Idaho, “[t]he general rule is that proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the 
claimed right for the prescriptive period, without evidence as to how the use began, raises the 
presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of right.” Lemhi Cnty. v. Moulton, 163 
Idaho 404, 409, 414 P.3d 226, 231 (2018) (quoting West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 557, 511 P.2d 
1326, 1333 (1973)). “Proof of all of these elements shifts the burden to the owner of the servient 
estate, who must demonstrate that the claimant’s use was permissive.” Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 
675, 680, 946 P.2d 975, 980 (1997).  
However, “[t]he presumption of adverse use is inapplicable and rather permissive use is 
presumed” if the servient estate is wild, unenclosed, and unimproved. Cook I, 170 Idaho at 54–55, 
507 P.3d at 127–28. “[I]f the presumption of permissiveness applied when the use began, the 
presumption continues until a hostile and adverse use is clearly manifested and ‘brought home’ to 
the servient property owner.” Id. (quoting H.F.L.P., LLC, 157 Idaho at 681, 339 P.3d at 566). As 
this Court has stated, 
[t]he reason for the rule that a passageway over unenclosed and unimproved land 
is deemed to be permissive is sound and also easily understandable . . . . It assumes 
that the owner of such land in many instances will not be in position to readily 
detect or prevent others from crossing over his land, and, even if he did, he might 
not enter any objection because of a desire to accommodate others and because 
such usage resulted in no immediate damage to him. Also[,] in such instances the 
landowner would probably have no reason to think the users of the passageway 
were attempting to acquire any adverse rights. On the other hand[,] there would be 
no reason or basis for such inference of permission on the part of the landowner if 
someone tore down his fence or destroyed his crops by reason of such usage. These 
acts alone would be calculated to put the landowner on notice that others were using 
his land adversely to his own interest and right of occupation. 
 
H.F.L.P., LLC, 157 Idaho at 681–82, 339 P.3d at 566–67 (2014) (quoting Cox v. Cox, 84 Idaho 
513, 522, 373 P.2d 929, 934 (1962)). 
 
10 
 
“This Court has cautioned against becoming overly focused on discussions of shifting 
presumptions in prescriptive easement cases.” Cook I, 170 Idaho at 53, 507 P.3d at 126 (citing 
Hughes, 142 Idaho at 481, 129 P.3d at 1230). Instead, we encourage courts to focus “on whether 
the five prescriptive easement elements have been satisfied based on the facts before them.” 
Hughes, 142 Idaho at 481, 129 P.3d at 1230. However, since Hughes, this Court has explained: “it 
is not error for the court to use such rules as ‘an approach to determining whether the claimant had 
met the elements for a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing evidence.’” Backman, 147 
Idaho at 399, 210 P.3d at 84 (quoting Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 64, 190 P.3d 876, 883 
(2008)). Presumptions may be permitted if each of the five elements for a prescriptive easement 
are adequately analyzed. Id. In this case, the district court was permitted to apply presumptions 
because it adequately analyzed each of the five elements for a prescriptive easement claim, “as 
this Court expressed a desire for in Hughes and Beckstead.” Id. Moreover, this case provides an 
instance where the application of presumptions is appropriate to determine whether use during the 
statutory period was adverse or permissive because Harker Sr. is not available to describe the initial 
use of Tower Road.  
A grant of permission can be express or can be implied by law when the servient estate 
was wild, unenclosed, and unimproved when the use began. See Cook I, 170 Idaho at 54–55, 507 
P.3d at 127–28; see also Hughes, 142 Idaho at 480–81, 129 P.3d at 1229–30. In Cook I, this Court 
stated that “[a]dverse use may be established if the users can demonstrate that their use was not 
based on a grant of permission, but rather consisted of assertive conduct founded in common belief 
that they had a right to use the road without seeking permission.” 170 Idaho at 56-57, 507 P.3d at 
129-30 (emphasis added). As such, it is crucial to understand whether the Harker/Cook families’ 
use of Tower Road was based on permission, either express or implied.  
The Harkers began using Tower Road when John Harker Sr. homesteaded the Cook 
Property in 1908. The individuals who were present when the use began and would have personal 
knowledge regarding whether the Thompsons granted John Harker Sr. permission to use the road 
have all passed away. Evidence regarding whether John Harker Sr. had express permission to use 
Tower Road was limited to Shelley Cook’s testimony that there was no indication in her family 
history that permission had been sought. As that testimony does not conclusively settle whether 
explicit permission had been granted, the question becomes whether the Harkers’ use of Tower 
 
11 
 
Road was implicitly and presumptively permissive—an issue that must be analyzed under the 
applicable presumption for use across wild, unenclosed, and unimproved land. 
The testimony presented at trial provides substantial and competent evidence to support 
the district court’s conclusion that the Van Orden Property was wild, unenclosed, and unimproved 
when the Harkers’ use of Tower Road began. The unfarmed portion of the land consists of 
sagebrush, quaking aspen, and juniper trees, or rocks, and Mrs. Cook testified that fields were 
planted on the property in the 1960s. The Thompsons never built corrals, buildings, or other 
improvements on the property. Therefore, the district court reasonably inferred that the land was 
both wild and unimproved before the fields were planted in the 1960s. In addition, the Van Orden 
Property was unenclosed when the Van Ordens purchased it in 2016 or 2017. Because substantial 
and competent evidence supports the conclusion that the Van Orden Property was wild, 
unenclosed, and unimproved prior to the 1960s, the district court’s conclusion that the Harkers’ 
initial use of Tower Road was presumptively permissive is affirmed. 
B. 
The district court erred when it determined that the Harkers’/Cooks’ use of 
Tower Road became adverse in 1962 to establish a prescriptive easement. 
As noted above, the district court determined that the presumption of permissive use 
applied to the Harkers’ initial use of Tower Road. “[I]f the presumption of permissive use applied 
when the use began, the presumption continues until a hostile and adverse use is clearly manifested 
and ‘brought home’ to the servient property owner.” H.F.L.P., LLC, 157 Idaho at 681, 339 P.3d at 
566. “[T]he nature of the use is adverse if ‘it runs contrary to the servient owner’s claims to the 
property.’” Backman, 147 Idaho at 397, 210 P.3d at 82 (quoting Akers v. D.L. White Constr., Inc., 
142 Idaho 293, 303, 127 P.3d 196, 206 (2005)). For a hostile and adverse use to be clearly manifest, 
“a user must make some new and independent act that would put the owner of the servient property 
on notice that the use was no longer permissive.” Id. at 398, 210 P.3d at 83.  
1. The district court was not obligated to find adverse use under Cook I.  
The district court stated that “nothing in the evidence [implies] that the Harkers’ or Cooks’ 
permissive use of Tower Road . . . ever changed into an adverse use. Based upon these facts, it is 
difficult to conclude that the Harker family demonstrated an ‘adverse use of the Tower Road.’”  
The district court noted that, ordinarily, it would find that the Cooks failed to establish a 
prescriptive easement under Fuquay v. Low, 162 Idaho 373, 397 P.3d 1132 (2017), H.F.L.P., LLC, 
157 Idaho 672, 339 P.3d 557, and Backman, 147 Idaho 390, 210 P.3d 75. However, the district 
 
12 
 
court determined that the Cooks established adverse use due to its interpretation of our holding in 
Cook I. A portion of the district court’s decision centered on the following statement in Cook I:  
It is not necessary to show a history of contentious or aggressive behavior to satisfy 
the “adverse use” element of a prescriptive easement—although, unfortunately, that 
is often the case. Adverse use may be established if the users can demonstrate that 
their use was not based on a grant of permission, but rather consisted of assertive 
conduct founded in common belief that they had a right to use the road without 
seeking permission. Here, Shelley Cook, Matthew Thompson, and Shirley 
Thompson all testified that the Harkers’ and Cooks’ adverse use of the road over 
the servient estate was predicated on the understanding that the Harkers had a right 
to use the road and did not need permission.  
 
Cook I, 170 Idaho at 56–57, 507 P.3d at 129–30. The district court stated that this “holding appears 
to signal that a common belief of a claimant’s right to use the contested property satisfies both the 
‘adverse’ and ‘as a matter of right’ prongs of the third prescriptive easement element.” Under this 
interpretation, the district court determined that it “was obligated to find that the Cooks [had] 
established adverse use” based on “the Cooks’ and Thompsons’ common belief in the Harkers’ 
right to use the Tower Road and the Cut Out Road.” This interpretation would also suggest that 
the Court’s statement in Cook I provided a new or different legal standard for prescriptive 
easements than the Court’s decisions in Fuquay, H.F.L.P., LLC, and Backman. That is not the case.  
In Cook I, we reaffirmed the well-established principle that adverse use cannot be 
established if the use is based on permission. 170 Idaho at 56-57, 507 P.3d at 129–30; see Fuquay, 
162 Idaho at 377, 397 P.3d at 1136; see also H.F.L.P., LLC, 157 Idaho at 681, 339 P.3d at 566; 
Backman, 147 Idaho at 397–-98, 210 P.3d at 82–83. We further noted that assertive conduct paired 
with a common belief that there was a right to use the road could constitute adverse use under a 
claim of right. 170 Idaho at 56–57, 507 P.3d at 129–30; see H.F.L.P., LLC, 157 Idaho at 681, 339 
P.3d at 566; see Backman, 147 Idaho at 398, 210 P.3d at 83. Thus, the quoted statement from Cook 
I above simply restates existing principles of adverse use for prescriptive easements. See Cook I, 
170 Idaho at 56-57, 507 P.3d at 129–30. We did not eliminate the presumption of permissive use, 
nor did we eliminate the need for specific conduct to overcome the presumption of permission to 
establish use that is adverse. Our restatement of settled principles in Cook I was not intended to 
compel the district court to decide the prescriptive easement issue a specific way. Instead, we held 
that without knowing the statutory period, this Court could not determine whether the district court 
erred when it determined the Cooks’ use of Tower Road was not adverse. Id. at 53–57, 507 P.3d 
 
13 
 
at 126–30. We also noted that testimony indicating the Harkers had a right to use the road “could 
have established adverse use.” Id. at 57, 507 P.3d at 130 (emphasis added). However, this merely 
indicated that there were “potentially periods of adverse use,” which made it necessary to 
determine the time parameters the district court considered. Id. at 53, 507 P.3d at 126 (emphasis 
added). In short, the district court was not obligated to find that the Cooks had established “adverse 
use and under a claim of right” under our decision in Cook I.  
2. The Cooks did not establish that the Harkers’/Cooks’ permissive use of 
Tower Road changed into an adverse use.  
 On remand from Cook I, the district court found that “nothing in the evidence [implies] 
that the Harkers’ or Cooks’ permissive use of the Tower Road, established prior to 1910, ever 
changed into an adverse use.” Nevertheless, the district court determined the Cooks established 
adverse use for a five-year statutory period, continually, from 1962 to 2006. Because the 
presumption of permissiveness applied when the use began, the Cooks needed to establish by clear 
and convincing evidence that “some new and independent act” occurred between 1962 to 2006 
“that would put the owner of the servient property on notice that the use was no longer permissive.” 
Backman, 147 Idaho at 398, 210 P.3d at 83. The Cooks failed to do so.  
In the early 1900s, John Harker Sr. began using Tower Road to access the Cook Property. By 
the 1960s, the Harker family continued using the road in a similar manner, by driving on Tower Road 
to access the property. Testimony at trial establishes that the Harkers/Cooks and the Thompsons held 
a common belief that the Harker family had a right to use Tower Road and that the Harkers/Cooks did 
not seek permission to use Tower Road. However, once permissive use was established, the mere 
subjective belief that one has a right to use the road in question is not sufficient to establish adverse 
use. See Backman, 147 Idaho at 397–98, 210 P.3d at 82–83; see also H.F.L.P., LLC, 157 Idaho at 
682, 339 P.3d at 567. Nor would permissive use change to adverse use merely because permission 
was not continually sought. See Wood v. Hoglund, 131 Idaho 700, 704, 963 P.2d 383, 387 (1998) 
(“[P]ermissive use cannot ripen into a prescriptive easement.”).  
 Rather, the Cooks needed to put forth evidence to show that a hostile and adverse use was 
“clearly manifested and ‘brought home’ to the servient property owner.” H.F.L.P., LLC, 157 Idaho 
at 681, 339 P.3d at 566 (citation omitted); see also Fuquay, 162 Idaho at 379, 397 P.3d at 1138 
(citation omitted). “[T]he rule is well established that no use can be considered adverse or ripen 
into a prescriptive right unless it constitutes an actual invasion of or infringement on the rights of 
 
14 
 
the owner.” Fuquay, 162 Idaho at 379, 397 P.3d at 1138. In this case, the record supports the 
district court’s conclusion that the Harkers’/Cooks’ permissive use of Tower Road never changed 
into an adverse use.  
At trial, the Cooks argued that they asserted their right to Tower Road in the 1980s by 
occasionally driving around the heavy gate to access Tower Road. However, as the district court 
noted, the public also drove around the heavy gate. When a claimed easement is used 
“indiscriminately by the general public,” a prescriptive easement generally cannot be established. 
Hughes, 142 Idaho at 481, 129 P.3d at 1230 (quoting Hall v. Strawn, 108 Idaho 111, 112–13, 697 
P.2d 451, 452–53 (Ct. App. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Cardenas v. Kurpjuweit, 116 
Idaho 739, 779 P.2d 414 (1989)). Therefore, the district court did not err when it concluded that 
the Cooks’ occasional circumvention of the heavy gate was not a sufficiently adverse act to 
overcome the established permissive use.  Furthermore, the Cooks only needed to drive around the 
heavy gate if they forgot their key, which was given to the Harkers by Ted Thompson. As the 
district court correctly noted: “a lock and key system, whereby the dominant estate owner is given 
a key, is [a factor] which supports a finding of permissive, rather than adverse, use.” See, e.g., 
H.F.L.P., LLC, 157 Idaho at 682, 339 P.3d at 567; Christle v. Scott, 110 Idaho 829, 718 P.2d 1267 
(Ct. App. 1986). Thus, the district court’s finding that the Cooks’ use remained permissive is 
supported by additional facts in the record. 
For these reasons, the district court’s conclusion that the Harkers’ and Cooks’ use of Tower 
Road remained permissive is supported by substantial and competent evidence. As such, the Cooks 
failed to prove all the elements for a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing evidence, and 
the district court erred in granting the Cooks a prescriptive easement. 
C. 
Attorney Fees and Costs 
The Cooks assert that they are entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-
121. Idaho Code section 12-121 provides that a “judge may award reasonable attorney’s fees to 
the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.” Inasmuch as the Cooks have not prevailed on 
appeal, they are not entitled to attorney fees.  
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the district court’s decision granting the Cooks 
a prescriptive easement and remand with instructions that the district court enter judgment in favor 
 
15 
 
of the Van Ordens. The Cooks are not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. Costs are awarded to the 
Van Ordens as a matter of course pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40(a). 
Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices STEGNER, MOELLER and ZAHN CONCUR.