Case Title: In re an Impounded Case

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13127

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-12-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC–13127 
 
IN THE MATTER OF AN IMPOUNDED CASE. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 4, 2022. - December 22, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Privileged Communication.  Social Worker.  Evidence, Privileged 
record, Communication with social worker, Deposition.  
Practice, Criminal, Standing, Judicial discretion.  Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on January 12, 2021. 
 
 
The case was heard by Cypher, J. 
 
 
 
Rachel M. Self for the defendant. 
 
Katharine K. Foote (Edmund P. Daley also present) for the 
child. 
 
Karen A. Palumbo, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Hartley M.K. West & Taylor Jaszewski, of California, & 
Brenda R. Sharton, for Jane Doe Inc. & another, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  This case presents the novel question whether 
a court may order the deposition of a social worker as a remedy 
2 
 
for the inadvertent but unlawful destruction of privileged 
treatment records that a Superior Court judge had found were 
necessary to a criminal defendant's preparation for trial before 
learning of the destruction.  We conclude that, in these 
particular and highly unusual circumstances, the motion judge 
did not abuse his discretion in ordering a limited deposition. 
 
In 2018, Jonathan,1 then six years old, told his parents 
that one of his teachers had touched him inappropriately.  
Subsequently, Jonathan participated in the first of two 
interviews with the Sexual Assault Intervention Network (SAIN).  
At the first SAIN interview, however, Jonathan denied any 
inappropriate touching by the defendant.  Following that 
interview, Jonathan began seeing a licensed social worker for 
counseling.  After completing approximately six sessions with 
the social worker over the course of roughly six weeks, Jonathan 
participated in a second SAIN interview, during which he made 
new and detailed claims that the defendant, among other things, 
had sexually abused him on numerous occasions.  The defendant 
subsequently was indicted on charges arising from Jonathan's 
allegations during this second interview.  After a hearing on 
the defendant's motion pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 17, 378 
Mass. 885 (1979) (rule 17), and the so-called Lampron-Dwyer 
 
 
1 A pseudonym. 
3 
 
protocol, a Superior Court judge determined that the defendant 
was entitled to examine the social worker's treatment records 
concerning her work with Jonathan.  See Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 
448 Mass. 122 (2006); Commonwealth v. Lampron, 441 Mass. 265 
(2004). 
 
Eventually, the social worker revealed that she 
inadvertently had destroyed Jonathan's treatment records while 
closing her private practice.  In response, a different judge of 
the Superior Court ordered that, as a remedy for the destruction 
of the records, the defendant would have the opportunity to 
depose the social worker.2  Jonathan opposed the deposition in 
the Superior Court, and also filed a petition in the county 
court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking to block the 
deposition.  A single justice of this court vacated the order 
that the social worker could be deposed, and the defendant 
appealed.  The order of the single justice shall be vacated and 
 
 
2 These hearings were conducted by three different judges of 
the Superior Court; two of the judges retired while litigation 
on the rule 17 motion and the destruction of the records was 
proceeding.  The first judge allowed the defendant's rule 17 
motion after a hearing, the second ordered the initial remedy 
for the destruction of the treatment records, and the third 
judge ordered a deposition as an additional remedy for the 
destruction of the records. 
 
4 
 
set aside, and an order shall enter in the county court denying 
Jonathan's petition for extraordinary relief.3 
 
1.  Background.  The following facts are undisputed.  In 
March of 2018, Jonathan, who was then in the first grade, told 
his parents that the defendant, Jonathan's technology teacher, 
had taken Jonathan and two other students into a separate 
classroom and showed them scary and inappropriate video 
recordings.  Jonathan also told his parents that, on one 
occasion, he had told the defendant that he had a cramp in his 
leg, and that in response the defendant said he could help if 
Jonathan would remove his pants.  According to a police report, 
Jonathan's father asked Jonathan if the defendant had touched 
his "privates," and Jonathan responded affirmatively. 
 
Jonathan's parents contacted police and, later that month, 
Jonathan participated in the first of two SAIN interviews.  
During this interview, Jonathan denied that the defendant had 
touched him; specifically, Jonathan said that, after telling the 
defendant about the cramp in his leg, he "didn't take [his] 
pants off.  [The defendant] just told me to.  I said no." 
 
Following this interview, Jonathan began treatment with the 
social worker.  During April and the first part of May of 2018, 
Jonathan and the social worker met for approximately six 
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Jane Doe Inc. 
and Independence House Inc. 
5 
 
treatment sessions.4  On May 7, Jonathan participated in a second 
SAIN interview.  This interview was markedly different from the 
first.  During this interview, Jonathan said that the defendant 
had inserted his finger into Jonathan's anus on three separate 
occasions, and once had punched Jonathan in the abdomen with 
such force that Jonathan later urinated blood.  Jonathan had not 
previously made similar allegations either to his parents or 
during the first SAIN interview.  During this second interview, 
Jonathan repeatedly emphasized that he was telling the truth. 
 
In August of 2018, the defendant was arrested and indicted 
on five counts of statutory rape of a child, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 23A (c) (mandated reporter); eight counts of aggravated 
indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen years, 
G. L. c. 265, § 13B 1/2; one count of assault and battery on a 
child causing bodily injury, G. L. c. 265, § 13J (b), and two 
counts of witness intimidation, G. L. c. 268, § 13B. 
 
About one year after his indictment, in July of 2019, the 
defendant filed a motion pursuant to rule 17 to view the 
privileged treatment records created during Jonathan's treatment 
with the social worker.  See G. L. c. 112, § 135B.  The crux of 
the defendant's argument was that the therapy sessions likely 
contributed to the significant discrepancies between the 
 
 
4 The precise number of treatment sessions is unknown, in 
large part because Jonathan's treatment records were destroyed. 
6 
 
allegations made by Jonathan during his first and second SAIN 
interviews, and that access to the treatment records therefore 
was essential for the preparation of his defense; Jonathan 
objected.  After a hearing, a judge of the Superior Court issued 
a notice and summons to the social worker ordering her to 
produce the records by October 4, 2019.  Following an additional 
hearing, the judge modified the scope of the order, requiring 
the social worker to produce only the treatment records she 
compiled between April 2 and June 30 of 2018.5 
 
The social worker, however, did not respond to three 
separate summonses; on January 9, 2020, a hearing was held to 
address her lack of response.  The social worker was not present 
at the hearing, but later that day the court received a letter 
from her that read: 
"I, [an] LICSW[,] closed my private practice during 
the Fall of 2018.  In the course of closing the 
office, [Jonathan's] record was shredded in error.  As 
a result, I am unable to provide the court with the 
requested treatment records from 4/2/18-6/30/18.  I am 
able to communicate verbally and/or write a treatment 
summary regarding my recollections of what occurred 
during this time period in treatment.  My apologies to 
the court for this error." 
 
 
Over the remainder of that year, Jonathan, the defendant, 
the Commonwealth, and the social worker participated in numerous 
 
 
5 Maintenance of social worker treatment records is 
mandatory in the Commonwealth.  See 258 Code Mass. Regs. § 22.02 
(2017). 
7 
 
hearings regarding the social worker's revelation and the 
appropriate remedy for the destruction of the treatment records.  
In July of 2020, a Superior Court judge (who was not the judge 
who ordered the deposition) found that the social worker's 
destruction of the records had been inadvertent.  As a remedy, 
the judge ordered, over objections from Jonathan and the 
Commonwealth, that the social worker both produce a written 
summary of her treatment of Jonathan and share with the court 
copies of two treatment updates regarding Jonathan that the 
social worker had sent to Jonathan's mother during the summer of 
2018.6 
 
The defendant subsequently reviewed the treatment summary 
and treatment updates pursuant to the procedures set out in 
rule 17 and the Lampron-Dwyer protocol.  After doing so, he 
filed a motion for relief in which he requested that the judge 
either exclude from admission at trial any of the statements 
 
 
6 The social worker had come across these messages to 
Jonathan's mother after having informed the court that the 
original treatment records had been destroyed.  The precise 
medium of this correspondence is not entirely clear from the 
record.  At a hearing in July of 2020, the social worker 
testified that "after [the] last court appearance" she "went 
through" her "past emails" and found "two letters that I wrote 
that I emailed, but those are actually typed up."  At other 
times during the hearing, the social worker described this 
correspondence as two "letters," while the order allowing the 
deposition refers to this correspondence as comprising "an email 
from June 2018 and a letter from August 2018."  For simplicity, 
we refer to this correspondence as the "treatment updates." 
8 
 
Jonathan made during the second SAIN interview or, in the 
alternative, order the social worker to "participate in a 
pretrial deposition or voir dire so that" the defendant could 
receive "a fair opportunity to investigate the credibility of 
[Jonathan's] allegations and propriety of [the social worker's] 
techniques."  Such a remedy was necessary, the defendant argued, 
because the "facts in this case are strongly indicative of false 
allegations due to suggestive and coercive questioning, first 
from [Jonathan's] parents, and later from [the social worker's] 
treatment." 
 
In December of 2020, after a hearing on the defendant's 
motion, a different judge from the one who had issued the order 
to produce the treatment records ordered that the defendant be 
permitted to depose the social worker.  In his order, the judge 
stated that, although he did "not agree that the record before 
the court warrant[ed]" the exclusion of any statements made by 
Jonathan during the second SAIN interview, he agreed that "the 
defendant is entitled to more than the [treatment update e-mail 
messages] and summary prepared by [the social worker]."  The 
order also stated that the "deposition shall be limited to the 
treatment period between April 2, 2018 and May 7, 2018," and 
that if the parties could not agree to additional specific terms 
for the taking of the deposition, the judge would issue an order 
specifying the terms. 
9 
 
 
The parties were unable to agree on terms for the taking of 
the deposition.  On December 31, 2020, the defendant submitted 
to the court a proposed deposition protocol that included the 
exclusion of the Commonwealth from attendance at the deposition, 
and an order that "[the social worker] may not refuse to answer 
questions related to [Jonathan's] treatment during this time 
period on the grounds of the social worker privilege," see G. L. 
c. 112, § 135B.  Jonathan did not propose any alternative terms; 
rather, on January 12, 2021, he moved to stay the deposition and 
any filings related to it, in a detailed motion objecting to the 
taking of the deposition in the first instance.  Three days 
later, he filed a "motion for extension of time to propose 
protocols," which again presented Jonathan's objections to the 
taking of the deposition.  At the same time, Jonathan filed a 
petition for relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, in the county 
court, seeking to block the deposition.  Two weeks later, 
Jonathan filed a motion in the county court asking that the 
proceedings in the Superior Court be stayed pending resolution 
of the petition for extraordinary relief. 
 
A single justice of this court allowed the motion to stay, 
and subsequently vacated the order allowing the taking of the 
deposition, because she concluded that such a deposition was not 
permissible under either rule 17 or Mass. R. Crim. P. 35, 378 
Mass. 906 (1979) (rule 35), which governs the taking of 
10 
 
depositions in criminal cases.  The defendant appealed to the 
full court, arguing both that Jonathan lacked standing to file a 
petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3, and that the single justice 
abused her discretion in vacating the order allowing the 
deposition. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "It is well 
settled that this court will not reverse an order of a single 
justice in the absence of an abuse of discretion or clear error 
of law."  Greco v. Suffolk Div. of the Probate & Family Court 
Dep't, 418 Mass. 153, 156 (1994).  An abuse of discretion exists 
when a judge makes "a clear error of judgment in weighing" the 
relevant factors, "such that the decision falls outside the 
range of reasonable alternatives" (citations omitted).  L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). 
 
b.  Whether Jonathan had standing to seek appellate review 
in the county court.  As a threshold matter, the defendant 
argues that the single justice abused her discretion by 
considering the merits of Jonathan's challenge to the deposition 
order because Jonathan lacked standing to bring a petition under 
G. L. c. 211, § 3.  We do not agree. 
 
It is undisputed that Jonathan had standing to challenge 
the defendant's original rule 17 motion seeking to review the 
social worker's treatment records.  See Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 145.  
The defendant argues, however, that Jonathan's initial, valid 
11 
 
challenge precludes any additional challenge relating to 
information in the treatment records.  In the defendant's view, 
because Jonathan already "had his opportunity to address the 
court," and a Superior Court judge "heard [Jonathan] and decided 
that the defendant was entitled to [the social worker's] 
treatment records within a specific set of dates –- despite 
[Jonathan]'s objection," Jonathan should now be precluded from 
challenging the order permitting the deposition.  This argument, 
however, disregards the fact that the initial order allowing 
examination pursuant to rule 17, and the subsequent order 
allowing the taking of the deposition, are separate and distinct 
orders; the second order was fashioned as a remedy for the 
destruction of the documents referenced in the first order.  The 
two orders also encompass potentially different intrusions into 
the privilege of confidentiality held by clients of social 
workers.  See discussion, infra. 
 
"As a general rule, only parties to a lawsuit, or those who 
properly become parties, may appeal from an adverse judgment" 
(citations omitted).  Randolph v. Commonwealth, 488 Mass. 1, 6 
(2021), quoting Corbett v. Related Cos. Northeast, 424 Mass. 
714, 718 (1997).  In narrow circumstances, courts may allow 
exceptions to this rule.  For instance, "[t]here are limited 
circumstances in which a nonparty has been permitted to appeal 
from a judgment, despite its failure to intervene, . . . where a 
12 
 
nonparty has a direct, immediate and substantial interest that 
has been prejudiced by the judgment, and has participated in the 
underlying proceedings to such an extent that the nonparty has 
intervened 'in fact.'"  Randolph, supra, quoting Corbett, supra. 
 
Such is the case here.  A "judge's discovery order is not 
reviewable under any established procedure" and the deposition 
order encroaches upon the substantial interest of Jonathan's 
social worker's privilege.  See Commonwealth v. Bing Sial Liang, 
434 Mass. 131 133 (2001); Commonwealth v. Wojcik, 43 Mass. App. 
Ct. 595, 608 (1997).  Our jurisprudence makes clear that this 
privilege qualifies as a "substantial interest."  See Randolph, 
488 Mass. at 6; Commonwealth v. Hunt, 462 Mass. 807, 817 (2012).  
See also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10, 15 (1996).  In 
addition, Jonathan apparently has intervened "in fact" in the 
Superior Court case, see Randolph, supra; prior to filing his 
emergency petition, Jonathan filed an opposition in the Superior 
Court challenging the order requiring the social worker to 
produce a treatment summary, participated in the show-cause 
hearing on the destruction of the records, and challenged the 
order requiring the deposition.  Accordingly, the single justice 
did not abuse her discretion in reaching the merits of 
Jonathan's challenge to the order permitting the deposition. 
 
c.  The deposition order.  The defendant also challenges 
the single justice's decision to vacate the order allowing the 
13 
 
deposition as an abuse of discretion.  In his challenge, the 
defendant asserts that the "summary submitted by [the social 
worker]" is roughly one and one-half pages long, covering a 
treatment period of approximately two months, and is "devoid of 
specific information about her treatment methods or how the 
treatment progressed over her" sessions with Jonathan. 
 
During one hearing on the proper remedy to be imposed for 
the destruction of the records, the social worker testified on 
cross-examination that she did not know the difference between a 
"clinical treatment record and a criminal treatment summary," a 
statement that indicated a possible lack of familiarity with the 
professional and regulatory obligations of clinical social 
workers in Massachusetts.  See 258 Code Mass. Regs. § 22.02 
(2017).7  The social worker's counsel objected to this line of 
questioning, but the judge allowed it on the ground that the 
social worker's answer could "hel[p] [him] understand what it 
might mean to her in terms of what a summary would look like."  
 
 
7 These regulations provide that clinical social workers 
"shall establish and maintain a separate, legible, adequate and 
accurate written clinical treatment record for each client 
receiving such services," and mandate that those records "shall 
contain" an enumerated list of subjects, including, inter alia, 
"[d]ocumentation of any changes or revisions in the assessment 
or diagnosis of the client's mental, emotional or behavioral 
condition, disorder or diagnosis which occur during the 
provision of clinical social work services," and 
"[d]ocumentation of any changes or revisions in the treatment 
plan which occur during the provision of clinical social work 
services to that client." 
14 
 
The judge's subsequent order that the social worker create a 
summary, however, was untethered from any of the regulatory 
requirements for the content of such records, and devoid of any 
guidance regarding what the summary should include.  After the 
social worker submitted the document the defendant challenges, 
and following a hearing on the defendant's motion for relief, a 
different judge concluded that this remedy was inadequate, and 
ordered a limited deposition of the social worker. 
 
The single justice vacated the deposition order on the 
grounds that it was supported by neither rule 17 nor rule 35, 
and "contradict[ed] the purpose of the Dwyer protocol."  She 
emphasized that the plain language of rule 17 "makes no 
reference to the creation of documents or other records by means 
of depositions or interrogatories, and, notably, depositions are 
governed by other rules of criminal procedure," namely rule 35. 
 
We agree with the single justice that the deposition order 
is not supported by rule 17 and the Lampron-Dwyer protocol, or 
by rule 35.  Pursuant to Mass. Rule Crim. P. 17 (a) (2), a judge 
may issue a summons ordering an individual to produce "books, 
papers, documents, or other objects" prior to trial, and may 
"permit" such objects "or portions thereof to be inspected and 
copied by the parties and their attorneys if authorized by law."  
The "limited purpose of rule 17 (a) (2) is to authorize the 
court 'to expedite the trial by providing a time and place 
15 
 
before trial for the inspection of the subpoenaed materials.'"  
Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 142, quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683, 698-699 (1974).  The process by which rule 17 
documents may be viewed is governed by the protocol established 
in Lampron, 441 Mass. at 270-271, and Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 139-
140. 
 
Under the Lampron-Dwyer protocol, a moving party must 
demonstrate good cause for a summons to issue.  Good cause is 
established by a showing: 
"(1) that the documents are evidentiary and relevant; 
(2) that they are not otherwise procurable reasonably 
in advance of trial by exercise of due diligence; 
(3) that the party cannot properly prepare for trial 
without such production and inspection in advance of 
trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection 
may tend unreasonably to delay the trial; and (4) that 
the application is made in good faith and is not 
intended as a general fishing expedition" (quotations 
omitted). 
 
Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 140-141, quoting Lampron, 441 Mass. at 269.  
These requirements have been summarized as "relevance, 
admissibility, necessity, and specificity."  Commonwealth v. 
Mitchell, 444 Mass. 786, 792 (2005).  If a defendant 
demonstrates good cause, a summons is issued to the record-
holder, and the records are held under seal by the court and 
subject to "stringent nondisclosure provisions."  See Dwyer, 448 
Mass. at 146.  Only the moving party is permitted to view the 
records at this stage.  Id. 
16 
 
 
Rule 17 and the Lampron-Dwyer protocol thus represent a 
careful balancing.  They establish not only that a statutory 
privilege sometimes must yield to a defendant's need for 
information to mount a defense and thus obtain a fair trial, but 
also that, in such circumstances, the intrusion must be made 
with great care and pursuant to exacting procedures.  Rule 17 
contemplates only the examination of existing objects, not the 
creation of new evidence.  See, e.g., Lampron, 441 Mass. at 269. 
 
For instance, in Commonwealth v. Matis, 446 Mass. 632, 635-
636 (2006), we concluded that rule 17 (a) (2) permitted a 
defendant in a rape case to inspect, measure, and photograph a 
three-bedroom home that was the scene of the alleged crime.  
While we acknowledged that "the object here cannot be physically 
brought to court by the third party," and in that way "may be 
different in its portability from other objects subject to 
summons under rule 17 (a) (2)," we concluded that it "ma[de] no 
difference" in the analysis whether the order was permissible 
under rule 17.  Matis, supra at 634-635.  We have reached the 
same conclusion where the object in question did not exist at 
the time of issuance of the order, but could be made tangible, 
such as a buccal swab.  See Jansen, petitioner, 444 Mass. 112, 
116-118 (2005) (allowing rule 17 motion to take buccal swab of 
third party for deoxyribonucleic acid analysis prior to trial 
after concluding that saliva was object within meaning of 
17 
 
rule 17).  See also Matis, supra at 634 (describing case as "not 
far removed from the circumstances in Jansen").  A deposition, 
by contrast, is not a tangible object.  Accordingly, rule 17 
does not support the order that the social worker be deposed. 
 
The single justice also concluded that the deposition order 
was unsupported by rule 35.  That rule provides that "[w]henever 
due to exceptional circumstances, and after a showing of 
materiality and relevance, it is deemed to be in the interest of 
justice that the testimony of a prospective witness of the 
defendant or the Commonwealth be taken and preserved, the judge 
may . . . order that the testimony of the witness be taken by 
deposition."  Depositions under rule 35 ordinarily are reserved 
for situations in which a witness likely will be physically 
unavailable for trial.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tanso, 411 
Mass. 640, 645-646 (1992) (no abuse of discretion in allowance 
of Commonwealth's rule 35 motion for deposition of witness who 
reasonably feared that his testifying would provoke violent 
retribution from defendants).  See also Commonwealth v. Ross, 
426 Mass. 555, 557-559 (1998) (ordering new trial after 
Commonwealth took deposition of witness who had been living 
abroad but did not demonstrate witness's inability or 
unwillingness to return for trial, thus failing "to demonstrate 
her unavailability within the meaning of rule 35"). 
18 
 
 
Nothing in the record suggests that, if the trial judge 
were to decide that the social worker could testify as to her 
privileged records of her treatment of Jonathan at trial, and if 
one of the parties then chose to call her, the social worker 
would be unavailable to testify.  The record shows that she was 
living and working in Massachusetts when she produced the 
treatment summary, and nothing in the record suggests that she 
since has left the Commonwealth.  Although the social worker 
failed to respond to the first three summonses, she since has 
attended hearings, written the requested summary, produced the 
two e-mail messages to Jonathan's mother that she told the court 
she had found, and offered to provide oral responses about her 
treatment of Jonathan;8 she has given no indication that she 
would refuse to appear for trial.  Accordingly, the single 
justice did not abuse her discretion in concluding that neither 
rule 17 nor rule 35 supported the order allowing the defendant 
to depose the social worker. 
 
We note, however, that the challenged deposition order was 
not issued pursuant to rule 17.  Rather, it was a remedy for the 
unfortunate -- and, we anticipate, exceedingly rare -- situation 
 
 
8 We note, however, that since the social worker's initial 
offer to the court, she repeatedly has attempted to avoid being 
deposed, on the ground that the subject matter of any deposition 
would go beyond the information contained in the now-destroyed 
treatment records. 
19 
 
in which a defendant was deemed entitled to inspect privileged 
documents, only for the ostensible keeper of those documents to 
reveal that she unlawfully (but accidentally) had destroyed 
them, and had done so even before the defendant's rule 17 motion 
was filed.  Moreover, the deposition order was not the first 
remedy crafted by the Superior Court judges to address the 
destruction of the statutorily mandated treatment records.  
Rather, the deposition was ordered as an additional remedy after 
a Superior Court judge found "that the defendant is entitled to 
more than the email and letter produced and the summary prepared 
by [the social worker]." 
 
To our knowledge, we have not before considered a case 
involving circumstances such as these.  We recognize that 
extraordinary fact patterns may require courts to exercise their 
"inherent authority" to "ensure fair trials, promulgate rules, 
and administer the courts."  See Sullivan v. Chief Justice for 
Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial Court, 448 Mass. 15, 24 (2006).  
Courts "have the inherent power to do whatever may be done under 
the general principles of jurisprudence to insure to the citizen 
a fair trial, whenever his [or her] life, liberty, property or 
character is at stake."  Beit v. Probation & Family Court Dep't, 
385 Mass. 854, 859 (1982), quoting Crocker v. Justices of the 
Superior Court, 208 Mass. 162, 179 (1911).  "Simply stated, 
implicit in the constitutional grant of judicial power is 
20 
 
'authority necessary to the exercise of . . . [that] power.'"  
Beit, supra, quoting O'Coin's, Inc. v. Treasurer of the County 
of Worcester, 362 Mass. 507, 510 (1972). 
 
The single justice understandably did not evaluate the 
deposition order in the context of this broader discretion, and 
instead focused only on the claims under rules 17 and 35 that 
Jonathan raised in his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition.  Viewed 
through this broader lens, however, we cannot say that the 
motion judge abused his discretion in determining that "the 
defendant is entitled to more than the email and letter produced 
and the summary prepared by [the social worker]," and in 
concluding that this remedy could take the form of a limited 
deposition. 
 
As discussed supra, the defendant's initial rule 17 motion 
resulted in the finding that he was entitled to review the 
social worker's treatment records.  At the time of this finding, 
there was no reason for the parties to believe that these 
records no longer existed.  After failing to respond to a number 
of summonses, however, the social worker revealed, approximately 
three months after production of the records had been ordered, 
that she had, in violation of her regulatory obligations, 
destroyed all of Jonathan's treatment records.  Subsequently, 
the motion judge concluded that the (allegedly very brief) 
treatment summary and the two e-mail messages to Jonathan's 
21 
 
mother concerning treatment updates that the social worker did 
produce were inadequate as a remedy for the destruction of the 
original records.  Taken together, these factors present a 
situation in which it was not an abuse of discretion for the 
motion judge to order that the social worker be subjected to a 
limited deposition. 
 
Finally, we note that the motion judge issued the order 
that the social worker be deposed with instructions that the 
precise terms of the deposition would be decided at a later 
date, either by the parties' agreement or, if they were unable 
to agree, by the judge himself.  This meant that the order did 
not, on its face, explicitly limit the scope of the deposition, 
or provide protocols by which the court could ensure that the 
deposition would be cabined appropriately.  Although this aspect 
of the deposition order did not, in and of itself, amount to an 
abuse of discretion on the part of the motion judge, we 
emphasize that, in light of the nature of the relief that 
originally was allowed under rule 17, any deposition of the 
social worker must be confined to the parameters of the 
destroyed treatment records, with adequate protocols and 
safeguards to ensure that the deposition is so limited, in order 
to effectuate its intended purpose. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The decision of the single justice 
vacating the order that the social worker be deposed is vacated 
22 
 
and set aside.  The matter is remanded to the county court for 
entry of an order denying Jonathan's petition under G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, and remanding the matter to the Superior Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.