Case Title: Denzell v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 49S02-1106-CR-340

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Deborah Markisohn 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ellen H. Meilaender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 49S02-1106-CR-340 
 
DOUGLAS DENZELL,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49F08-0807-CM-168596 
The Honorable Barbara Collins, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-1001-CR-89 
_________________________________ 
 
June 14, 2011 
 
David, Justice. 
 
Douglas Denzell is a fifty-eight-year-old man.  Psychiatric reports reveal that he suffers 
from paranoid schizophrenia.   
 
In July 2008, the State charged Denzell with Class A misdemeanor resisting law en-
forcement and Class B misdemeanor public intoxication.  The State alleged that police officers 
responded to a complaint that Denzell had refused repeated requests to leave a bar.  According to 
the probable cause affidavit, the officers then also asked Denzell to leave, but he would not.  
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Jun 14 2011, 11:51 am
 
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Denzell allegedly had bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and a wobbly gait, and when an officer 
attempted to handcuff him, Denzell screamed an obscenity and acted as if he were going to 
punch the officer.  Officers eventually subdued and arrested Denzell.   
 
 
A couple of weeks later, the trial court ordered a competency evaluation, and two psy-
chiatrists examined Denzell.  In their respective reports submitted to the court, both doctors di-
agnosed Curtis as a paranoid schizophrenic and stated he was incompetent to stand trial.  One 
opined that it may take several months of inpatient treatment to restore Denzell to competency.  
The other opined that Denzell would ―likely‖ respond positively to treatment and ―regain compe-
tence to stand trial in the foreseeable future.‖   
 
In August 2008, after receiving the reports, the trial court found Denzell incompetent to 
stand trial and committed him to the Division of Mental Health and Addiction (DMHA) for 
treatment.  Accordingly, a few days later, Denzell was transported to a hospital.   
 
In October 2008, after receiving letters stating that Denzell had been restored to compe-
tency, the trial court issued an order to have Denzell brought to a pretrial conference on October 
30.  But on October 29, the hospital emailed the trial court, stating Denzell had ―been cheeking 
his meds when he discovered he would be returning to court‖ and was decompensated.  Denzell 
was thus no longer competent to stand trial and remained at the hospital.   
 
In November 2008, the trial court received a letter stating that Denzell had again been 
restored to competency.  At a pretrial conference on December 11, Denzell requested to be 
placed in the mental-health diversion program.  The trial court referred the case to the diversion 
program and released Denzell on his own recognizance.   
 
In February 2009, the State and Denzell executed a mental-health diversion agreement.  
In June, Denzell became noncompliant with his medications and treatment in contravention of 
the agreement.  Denzell also failed to appear for a court hearing.  As a result, the trial court is-
sued an arrest warrant, and Denzell was arrested on August 6.   
 
The following day, the trial court ordered competency evaluations.  Both psychiatric 
evaluation reports revealed Denzell was currently incompetent to stand trial but opined he could 
 
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be restored to competency.  Accordingly, on September 9, the trial court entered a commitment 
order.   
 
That same day Denzell filed a motion to dismiss the charges, relying on State v. Davis, 
898 N.E.2d 281 (Ind. 2008).  He argued he was entitled to dismissal because he had already 
served, with credit time earned, the maximum imposable sentence for his charges.  The State 
filed a response, countering that (1) unlike Davis, psychiatrists have opined that Denzell will be 
restored to competency and that (2) the State has interests sufficiently important to overcome 
Denzell‘s substantial liberty interest.   
 
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.  Denzell sought, and was granted, an interlo-
cutory appeal of that order.  Denzell raised one issue on appeal: whether the pending charges vi-
olate his right to due process on fundamental-fairness grounds.   
 
The Court of Appeals found that the pending charges do not violate Denzell‘s right to due 
process and affirmed the trial court.  Denzell v. State, 935 N.E.2d 1245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).  
We address Denzell‘s due process claim in conjunction with another decision today that presents 
a substantially similar issue.  
 
Denzell‘s appellate reply brief and petition to transfer focus heavily on the Court of Ap-
peals decision in Curtis v. State, 932 N.E.2d 204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. granted.  In Curtis, 
the Court of Appeals found that the pending criminal charges violated the defendant‘s due 
process rights despite the facts that (1) the trial court had not found the defendant incompetent 
under the mandated statutory procedures and (2) the trial court had never committed the defen-
dant.  Id. at 207–08.  As reflected in Curtis v. State, No. 49S02-1010-CR-620, __ N.E.2d __                     
(Ind. June 14, 2011), we disagree and find no due process violation in that case in light of the 
relevant precedent—namely, State v. Davis, 898 N.E.2d 281 (Ind. 2008)—and the various inter-
ests at stake.1      
 
Although the facts of Denzell‘s case differ from the facts of Curtis, the relevant precedent 
and interests at stake are the same.  As the Court of Appeals noted, there has been no determina-
                                                 
1 Although we find no due process violation in Curtis, we find that Curtis has a valid claim under Indiana 
Criminal Rule 4(C) and is thus entitled to discharge on those grounds. 
 
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tion that Denzell will never be restored to competency.  Denzell, 935 N.E.2d at 1248.  In fact, the 
record not only reflects that Denzell can be restored to competency but also reveals that Denzell 
stopped taking his medications once he discovered he would return to court.  It would be counte-
rintuitive to allow a defendant to assert a due process violation based on incompetency if the de-
fendant himself purposely decompensated to avoid going to court.  Accordingly, Denzell does 
not have a viable fundamental-fairness argument.     
 
Although the Court of Appeals was correct in rejecting Denzell‘s due process argument, 
we believe that the standard it used in evaluating Denzell‘s claim was too stringent: 
Under Davis and Habibzadah, a refusal to dismiss charges against an accused may 
violate his due process rights only if (1) the accused has been committed for 
treatment longer than the maximum possible sentence that could be imposed upon 
conviction, and (2) the court has . . . determined that the accused has no reasona-
ble likelihood of being restored to competency.   
Id. at 1248 (first emphasis added).  Although relevant precedent is a necessary consideration 
when evaluating defendants‘ fundamental-fairness claims, this Court noted in Davis that ―due 
process ‗is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circums-
tances.‘‖  898 N.E.2d at 287 (quoting Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of Durham County, N.C., 
452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981)).  As we note today in Curtis, there may be factual scenarios that differ 
from Davis and other relevant precedent that still fall within the parameters of a due process vi-
olation.  Curtis, slip op. at 13.  But, as explained above, Denzell‘s case is not one of them.   
 
In all other respects, we summarily affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals, under 
which the trial court‘s denial of Denzell‘s motion to dismiss is affirmed.  Ind. Appellate Rule 
58(A)(2).        
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan, and Rucker, JJ., concur.