Case Title: SMITHCO ENGINEERING, INC. v. INTERNATIONAL FABRICATORS, INC., AN OKLAHOMA CORPORATION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
SMITHCO ENGINEERING, INC. v. INTERNATIONAL FABRICATORS, INC., AN OKLAHOMA CORPORATION1989 WY 131775 P.2d 1011Case Number: 88-66Decided: 06/16/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
SMITHCO ENGINEERING, 
INC., AN OKLAHOMA CORPORATION, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

INTERNATIONAL 
FABRICATORS, INC., AN OKLAHOMA CORPORATION, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LincolnCounty, John D. Troughton, 
J.

Roger Cowan of 
Harris and Morton, Evanston, for appellant.

Timothy O. 
Beppler and Sharon M. Rose of Vehar, Beppler, Jacobson, Lavery & Rose, P.C., 
Evanston and Jack L. Brown of Patton and Brown, Tulsa, Okla., for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     A subcontractor, 
Smithco Engineering, Inc. (Smithco), and its supplier, International 
Fabricators, Inc. (IFI), an equipment fabricator on Exxon Corporation's LaBarge 
gas plant construction project present this appeal. Diverse arguments developed, 
including performance, warranty and termination with awarded attorneys' fees 
under Oklahoma 
law also addressed. We affirm the judgment for the supplier in principle sum and 
reverse the award of attorneys' fees.

ISSUES

[¶2.]     Smithco comprehensively 
addresses the issues as whether:

I. * * * the court failed 
to give effect to the term "turnkey" as the term was used by I.F.I. and 
Smithco.

II. * * * there were 
express warranties made by I.F.I.

III. * * * I.F.I. 
effectively disclaimed express warranties and if not whether there was evidence, 
as a matter of law sufficient to establish breach of express 
warranty.

IV. * * * I.F.I. 
effectively limited its liability and remedies for breach of express warranty, 
and if not whether Smithco was entitled to incidental and consequential 
damages.

V. * * * award of 
attorneys fees as part of costs was error.

[¶3.]     IFI restates each issue 
to apparently present the same inquiry from its perspective, except to add a 
sixth issue of appellate attorneys' fees.1 We discern as issues of this 
case:

[¶4.]     (1) sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain the trial court as to "turn key" terminology and its 
contractual effect; (2) existence and breach of express warranties; (3) 
limitation clause and its effect on the relationship between the supplier and 
the purchaser; and (4) award of attorneys' fees resulting from purchase 
agreement litigation where attorneys' fees are statutorily provided in Oklahoma 
but not in Wyoming. The chief concern in relation to attorneys' fees is a 
conflict of law dilemma of whether statutory provisions for litigative 
attorneys' fees will follow the Oklahoma litigants and their dispute into 
another forum where a similar statutory provision or common law rule does not 
exist.

FACTS

[¶5.]     Smithco, an Oklahoma corporation, was a subcontractor on the Wyoming 
Schute Creek Exxon gas plant construction near LaBarge, Wyoming. The plant customizes CO2 as the major 
ingredient of the produced natural gas for oil field secondary recovery uses and 
other purposes. The plant was a large facility costing more than a billion 
dollars to construct. As part of its portion of construction, Smithco needed 
approximately 22,000 square feet of movable louvers for construction of 
air-cooled heat exchangers for a total purchase price of $425,499.73. IFI, also 
an Oklahoma 
corporation, was in the business of providing louvers for industrial plant 
construction.

[¶6.]     These parties 
negotiated through a bid process and struck a deal, referenced in the record by 
Quote No. I-2066 Rev. 2, dated October 16, 1984. A few days later, an amendment 
dated October 19, 1984 was made to the original agreement changing certain terms 
of the quotation which was duly accepted by IFI by written notation. 
Unfortunately, these documents lacked clarity about who had the responsibility 
to design to operational sufficiency for the weather extremes in Lincoln and SweetwaterCounties of high altitude, dry climate 
and, in the winter, very cold temperatures. At that time, IFI was the only known 
supplier, since a competitor, Dunlop, elected not to bid. The process for 
production and installation of the individual louver systems contemplated a 
multi-step procedure. First, all necessary components were manufactured or 
acquired and delivered to Smithco who, after receipt, arranged for first one, 
then another, Salt Lake City firm to assemble them from the IFI parts which had 
been delivered unassembled in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The assembled units were then 
taken to the project for a third step installation at the Exxon plant in 
Wyoming.

[¶7.]     Concerning the contract 
interpretation, two provisions occupied considerable attention during 
litigation. The last paragraph of the acceptance letter included the 
following:

In addition I.F.I. will 
provide a turn key or total responsibility service to SMITHCO as required by but 
not limited to job specifications and notes, which will include documentation, 
instrumentation drawings, etc.

Invoice forms 
used by IFI as statements on the reverse of the printed form captioned General 
Terms and Conditions of Sale included:

Seller warrants products 
it manufactures to be free from defects in material and workmanship under normal 
use and service when operated in accordance with conditions stated in the 
proposal, and will, within one year after shipment by Seller repair or replace 
without cost any Seller product (when returned with transportation charges 
prepaid, properly crated) which upon Seller inspection proves to be defective. 
This warranty is in lieu of all other warranties, liabilities and obligations 
expressed or implied, and any implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for 
use is expressly disclaimed. Warranty on products or accessories not 
manufactured by Seller is limited to warranty furnished by respective 
manufacturers. Seller assumes no responsibility for improper use, deterioration, 
erosion, corrosion, etc., or for any consequential damages. Any unauthorized 
attempt at local repairs voids the warranty. All capacities specified are based 
on our understanding of your requirements and on apparatus being properly 
installed and operated. Liability under the above warranty is limited to repair 
or, in our judgment, replacement of equipment or parts, F.O.B. our factory, 
after the equipment has been returned, inspected and found defective by us. In 
no event shall we be liable unless written notice has been made upon discovery 
of defect and written acceptance made by us. Seller maintains facilities for 
customer representative to review and inspect equipment at our shop. Upon a 
signed receipt by customer representative prior to shipment, acceptance of the 
equipment is deemed to transpire.

[¶8.]     Unfortunately for 
whatever reason, which was not made completely clear on this record, the 
assembled equipment did not work well following the fabrication into working 
units in Salt Lake 
City by Smithco's third-party contractors and after 
delivery to Exxon's Schute Creek plant. Corrective efforts were mutually 
attempted until IFI discontinued its participation and modification thereafter 
continued by Smithco through other avenues. Never completely satisfactory, 
changes were finally achieved, but qualified acceptance by Stearns-Roger for 
Exxon was derived after extensive expenditures by Smithco. From the sum of 
$425,499.73 total contract price, Smithco withheld payment from IFI of $112,566, 
who then sued. This appeal follows the trial court's ruling generally for the 
supplier in the resulting balance due litigation.

[¶9.]     In the detailed 
findings of fact, the trial court found:

9. IFI did not design the 
louver, cable and actuator package, rather it was designed by Smithco using IFI 
promotional material and other information possessed by Smithco without the 
involvement of IFI.

* * * * * 
*

12. The agreement between 
IFI and Smithco included the following items:

* * * * * 
*

C. Except as noted in 
paragraph 14 below, the louvers, actuators, cables and other items supplied by 
IFI to Smithco were to conform to the drawings and specification furnished by 
Smithco.

D. The contract was turn 
key.

E. By the term "turn 
key", IFI and Smithco intended and understood that IFI was to marshal for 
delivery to Smithco the various louvers, actuators, cables and other items 
required by the contract.

F. Except as noted in 
paragraph 14 below, IFI expressly warranted to Smithco that the louvers, 
actuators, cables and other items would conform to the drawings and 
specifications furnished by Smithco.

G. IFI disclaimed any 
implied warranty that the louvers, actuators, cables and other items were fit 
for the use intended by Smithco.

H. Smithco's remedy for 
the breach of any warranty by IFI was effectively limited to the cost to repair 
or replacement of defective parts; Smithco was not entitled to recover 
consequential or incidental damages as the result of the breach of any warranty 
by IFI.

* * * * * 
*

19. After receiving the 
purchase orders, IFI prepared approval drawings which contained the same 
information and designs supplied by Smithco through Smithco's purchase orders 
and louver lay-out drawings. IFI submitted the approval drawings to Smithco for 
review prior to manufacturing of the louvers. During this process, IFI did not 
design the louver system; rather the design for this system and the 
specification of the component parts was controlled by 
Smithco.

[¶10.]  In summary, the trial court found that 
Smithco did design the system, that the design specifications were not 
sufficient, and that IFI did meet specification criteria, even if a workable 
unit was not produced after assembly. Furthermore, the trial court discerned 
that:

22. The testimony at the 
trial did indicate that there were some items supplied by IFI that did not 
conform to Smithco specifications. As to those items which did not conform to 
Smithco's specifications, IFI satisfied any Smithco claim in that IFI repaired 
or replaced those items which were not so conforming with conforming 
items.

As a result, 
Smithco owed IFI $112,566 plus interest and $35,000 as attorneys' fees for the 
collection litigation.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE

[¶11.]  Exhaustive examination of the complex 
trial evidence, including blueprints, shop drawings and correspondence reveals a 
conflict as to who was to design and why that design did not work satisfactorily 
within the environment of the plant in southwestern Wyoming. We would find 
this entire subject subsumed within the inquiry of design responsibility and, 
with conflicting evidence, will accord the trial court the normal preference in 
affirmation.2

Our rule is that where 
the sufficiency of evidence is an issue we uphold the judgment if there is 
evidence to support it, and in so doing we look only to the evidence submitted 
by the prevailing party and give to it every favorable inference which may be 
drawn therefrom, without considering any contrary 
evidence.

Hance v. 
Straatsma, 721 P.2d 575, 578 (Wyo. 1986). See also Ruby Drilling Co., Inc. 
v. Title Guar. Co. of Wyoming, Inc., 750 P.2d 674 (Wyo. 1988); Eddy v. First 
Wyoming Bank, N.A.-Lander, 750 P.2d 294 (Wyo. 1988); Alexander v. Phillips Oil 
Co. a subsidiary of Phillips Petroleum Co., 741 P.2d 117 (Wyo. 1987); Western 
Utility Contractors, Inc. v. City of Casper, 731 P.2d 24 (Wyo. 1986); and 
Simpson v. Kistler Inv. Co., 713 P.2d 751 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶12.]  Somewhat differently placed is the phrase 
"turn key" as found in the supply purchase agreement. As a well-established 
construction industry term, "turn key" means completion of the facility to 
operational status subject only to punch list and warranty item so that the 
purchaser can turn the key and commence occupancy or operation. See TK Harris 
Co. v. CIR, 112 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1940), involving the turn key construction of 
an oil well; Glassman Const. Co., Inc. v. Maryland City Plaza, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 1154, 1157 (D.Md. 1974); Dachner v. Union Lead Mining & Smelter Co., 
65 Nev. 313, 195 P.2d 208 (1948); Robbins v. C.W. Myers Trading Post, Inc., 253 
N.C. 474, 117 S.E.2d 438 (1960); Waddle v. Gammel, 305 P.2d 559, 563 (Okla. 
1956); and Gantt v. Van Der Hoek, 251 S.C. 307, 162 S.E.2d 267, 270 (1968). Cf. 
Valentine v. Ormsbee Exploration Corp., 665 P.2d 452 (Wyo. 1983), day work 
contract distinguished from hourly contract or turn key 
contract.

A turnkey project is one 
in which the developer builds in accordance with plans and specifications of his 
own architect subject to performance specifications for quality and workmanship, 
and with limited guidance for features as style of house, number of bathrooms, 
etc. 1 B.J. McBride & I. Wachtel, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS § 9.120[12] 
(1980).

Lincoln 
Services, Ltd. v. United 
States, 678 F.2d 157, 158-59 n. 2, 230 Ct.Cl. 
416 (1982), concerning a "turnkey design and construction contract." The 
requirements of minimum specifications do not prevent a contract from being turn 
key. C & L Const. Co. v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 791, 802 
n. 4 (1984), aff'd 790 F.2d 93 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

[¶13.]  However, with delivery of unassembled 
parts in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and the key to be ultimately turned in far away 
LaBarge, Wyoming, and the assemblers situated at plants near Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this court agrees with the trial court in this factual situation, 
regardless of the term's more normal meaning. Smithco did not establish a 
warranty of design by IFI considering the completion and installation by third 
parties on behalf of the subcontractor, Smithco. As Justice Holmes in Towne v. 
Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425, 38 S. Ct. 158, 159, 62 L. Ed. 372 (1918) astutely espoused: "A word is not a crystal, transparent and 
unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and 
content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." The 
use of the term "turn key" does not abrogate the general rule that the entire 
contract must be considered to determine the meaning. Glassman Const. Co., Inc., 
371 F. Supp. 1154; Robbins, 117 S.E.2d 438. Also, the express contract terms can 
control over any industry usage. Glassman Const. Co., Inc., 371 F. Supp.  at 
1158. Thus when the acceptance letter's use of the expression "turn key" is read 
in conjunction with the job specification requirements, we conclude that the 
trial court correctly found no design responsibility assumed by IFI. Moreover, 
the design responsibility in even a usual turn key contract can be 
restricted.

[T]he term "turn-key 
construction job" under the applicable case law imposes upon the contractor the 
responsibility for providing the design of the project and responsibility for 
any deficiencies or defects in design, except to the extent that such 
responsibility is specifically waived or limited by the contract 
documents.

Mobile Housing 
Environments v. Barton and Barton, 432 F. Supp. 1343, 1346 (D.Colo. 1977) 
(emphasis added). Although the use of the word is unusual in accord with its 
normal definition, it is fair to accept the operational context that it, as 
found by the trial court, meant everything present necessary to put the package 
together to be a workable unit. This is unlike the situation faced by the 
Delaware Supreme Court in Neilson Business Equipment Center, Inc. v. Italo V. 
Monteleone, M.D., P.A., 524 A.2d 1172, 1174 (Del.Super. 1987), where the 
purchaser and the supplier contracted that the "turn-key computer system" was to 
be both chosen and customized to the office's desired billing method by the 
supplier and was to "function immediately." We find no error by the trial court 
in discerning "by the term `turn key,' IFI and Smithco intended and understood 
that IFI was to marshal for delivery to Smithco the various louvers, actuators, 
cables and other items required by the contract." Both parties entered into the 
contract with their eyes wide open, aware of the distance, assembly, and 
installation variations from a usual turn key contract. Thus, this court will 
not rewrite the contract because of an alleged unilateral mistake. See Glassman 
Const. Co., Inc., 371 F. Supp.  at 1159.

[¶14.]  The record does not reveal if IFI was 
actually a manufacturer of the parts or whether it simply assembled and packaged 
them except clearly, the cable and actuators were "spected parts"3 purchased from third parties. 
Essentially, this wagon, when tendered, was only nuts, bolts and pieces of metal 
on delivery in Tulsa. It follows that if IFI did not design 
and did not assemble, its pricing charts were correctly found by the trial court 
to not create a fitness warranty for the assembled unit to be suitable for the 
LaBarge project. The use of the term "turn key" is not a guarantee, and even in 
a more conventional turn key sense, causation still must be shown between a 
system's malfunction and the actual supplier's work to prove a defect. See Ray 
v. Strawsma, 183 Ga. App. 622, 359 S.E.2d 376, 379 (1987), 
concerning an allegedly defective security system.

[¶15.]  There is a more directed problem with the 
implied warranty disclaimer stated on the reverse of invoicing statements. Its 
publication by billing notice antedates the parties' sales contract. However, we 
will accept Smithco's analysis of the disclaimer in relation to this issue as 
stated in its brief:

The court below found 
that Appellee effectively disclaimed any implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose. [A]ppellant disagrees with this finding. The only 
disclaimers were on the back of billing invoices sent to Appellant after the 
agreement was finalized in October, 1984.

"Both historically and 
under the Code, the time for determining the terms of the contract is when the 
bargain is struck. Disclaimers of warranty are no different. Therefore, unless 
the disclaimers are disclosed prior to the agreement and agreed upon, thereby 
made part of the contract, they are not binding." Van Den Broeke v. Bellanca 
Aircraft Corp., 576 F.2d 582, 584 (5th Cir. 1978)

While the above is of 
concern, it should make no difference in the instant case, because Smithco is 
not relying upon implied warranties, 
which the court below found to be disclaimed, whether or not such a finding is 
correct. Smithco relies upon express warranties. Even if the disclaimer relied 
upon by the court below was effective, it would not control, in the face of 
express warranties. [Emphasis in original.]

[¶16.]  Our answer in acceptance of the posture 
taken by Smithco as to the effectiveness of the disclaimer under the 
circumstance is also taken with the acceptance of the instructional posture of 
the trial court that, lacking a design or assembly contract, express warranties 
were not created under these 
circumstances. With recognition that the trial court expressly found as a 
fact that non-conforming material was repaired or replaced, any further 
departure to reach an award for Smithco on its counterclaim is not demonstrable 
as trial error requiring reversal.

[¶17.]  We hold that the findings of fact upon 
which the judgment was granted are supported by substantial evidence within the 
compendium of the evidentiary disputes of the participants. Consequently, the 
judgment is affirmed as to the contract payment dispute.

ATTORNEYS' 
FEES

[¶18.]  The last issue presented is a conflict of 
law and forum dispute of whether these two Oklahoma corporations brought the Oklahoma attorneys' fees - court costs statute4 - to Lincoln County, Wyoming where IFI filed this action to 
foreclose on a mechanic's lien and recover for the sale of the louver parts. The 
trial court found the Oklahoma statute provided 
a substantive right and by contract situs in that state which was to be applied 
in Wyoming. 
This resulted in an award to IFI of $35,000 in attorneys' fees. Wyoming provides no 
comparable statute and case law is explicit in delineation that attorneys' fees 
cannot be awarded in the absence of an agreement between the parties5 or an explicit statute justifying 
the award. Bowers Welding and Hotshot, Inc. v. Bromley, 699 P.2d 299 (Wyo. 
1985).

[¶19.]  The subject raises two separate inquiries 
under the conflict of law configuration. First is whether a statutory provision 
of this kind is procedural or substantive, and second is whether the decision of 
the statute's procedural or substantive character is to be made under the law of 
the situs or the law of the forum. To analyze this area, a converse of the 
inquiries will be pursued.

[¶20.]  The lex fori, or forum court, determines 
a statute's character. Glick v. White Motor Co., 317 F. Supp. 42, 45 (E.D.Pa. 
1970), aff'd 458 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1972); American Physicians Ins. Co. v. 
Hruska, 244 Ark. 1176, 428 S.W.2d 622, 627-28 (1968); St. Louis-San Francisco R. 
Co. v. Cox, 171 Ark. 103, 283 S.W. 31 (1926); Neve v. Reliance Ins. Co. of 
Philadelphia, 357 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Mo. App. 1962); R. Leflar, The Law of 
Conflict of Laws § 58 (1959). "[T]he law of the forum normally determines for 
itself whether any particular rule of law, local or extra-state, is to be 
characterized as procedural or substantive." R. Leflar, supra, § 60 at 110. The 
basis of the procedural-substantive distinction is that the rule of comity 
generally applies only to substantive rights and not remedies. Neve, 357 S.W.2d  
at 250.

It is a widely settled 
principle of the doctrine of interstate comity that foreign laws will not be 
given effect when contrary to the law, or public policy, or general interest of 
the citizens of the state of the forum.

Severn v. Adidas 
Sportschuhfabriken, 33 Cal. App. 3d 754, 109 Cal. Rptr. 328, 333 (1973), concerning 
conflicting service of process statutes.

[¶21.]  Wyoming has recognized the common law rule 
that only if a statute is deemed to be substantive will the forum court apply 
the foreign statute. Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 341, reh'g denied 590 P.2d 1340 (Wyo.), 
cert. denied 444 U.S. 863, 100 S. Ct. 132, 62 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1979). Clearly, the law 
of the forum controls procedural matters. American Physicians Ins. Co.l 428 S.W.2d  at 628; Billingsley v. Lincoln Nat. Bank, 271 Md. 683, 320 A.2d 34, 35 n. 1 (1974); Satterwhite v. 
Stolz, 79 N.M. 320, 442 P.2d 810, 815 (1968); E. 
Scoles & P. Hay, Conflict of Laws § 3.8 at 58 (1984). Cf. 
Connell v. Delaware Aircraft Industries, 44 Del. 86, 55 A.2d 637, 640 (1947), 
where that court suggested that modification of the common law rule may be 
necessary if the matter sought is "so inseparably interwoven with substantive 
rights." While the difference between substantive and procedural law may not be 
easy to determine, it is generally held that substantive law relates to the 
cause of action's rights and duties, whereas procedural law involves "`the 
machinery for carrying on the suit.'" Roth v. Roth, 571 S.W.2d 659, 672 (Mo. 
App. 1978) (quoting Shepherd v. Consumers Co-op. Ass'n, 384 S.W.2d 635, 640 
(Mo. 1964)). 
See also Barker v. St. 
LouisCounty, 340 Mo. 986, 104 S.W.2d 371, 377 
(1937).

[¶22.]  We find the trial court erred in 
determining the judgment assessment of attorneys' fees was substantive which 
would define forum right from foreign jurisdiction cost taxation statutes.6 See also Feinsod v. L. & F. 
Const. Co., 17 N.J. Misc. 65, 4 A.2d 692, 694, cert. denied 123 N.J.L. 149, 8 A.2d 110 (1939), modified 124 N.J.L. 173, 10 A.2d 728 (1940), finding imposition 
of attorney fees to be procedural. This case is similar to Taylor v. Security 
Nat. Bank, 20 Ariz. App. 504, 514 P.2d 257, 261 (1973), where the Arizona Court 
of Appeals applied the law of California to the contract interpretation, but 
applied Arizona law to the requirement of the evidence to prove reasonable 
attorney's fees when California and Arizona law differed on that point. Cf. 
Grace v. Allen, 407 S.W.2d 321, 325 (Tex. Civ.App. 1966), which is the converse 
of the instant case; the Texas court applied New York substantive law to the 
contract which did not allow attorney's fees, but awarded attorney's fees under 
the Texas statute.

[¶23.]  We are buttressed in our view by the fact 
that Oklahoma 
recognizes that the assessment of attorney's fees as costs under Okla. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 12, § 936 (West 1988), which is part of the Oklahoma Civil Procedure 
Code, is procedural. Cox v. American Fidelity Assur. Co., 581 P.2d 1325, 1327 (Okla.App. 1977); Jeffcoat v. 
Highway Contractors, Inc., 508 P.2d 1083, 1087 (Okla.App. 1972). Cf. Guardian 
Life Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 152 Ark. 597, 240 S.W. 25 (1922), where the Texas attorney's fee statute was similar to the Arkansas one, so the Arkansas court enforced the Texas 
statute.

[¶24.]  In Neve, 357 S.W.2d  at 249-50 the Kansas 
City Court of Appeals held that although the parties agreed to interpret the 
contract under Kansas law, it was not a waiver of the rule that the case would 
be tried in a Missouri forum under Missouri procedural law. "Absent something 
binding to the contrary, a litigant is not entitled to insist upon the trial of 
his rights or defense under the procedural laws of a sister state rather than 
under the procedural laws of the forum state. Lynde v. Western & Southern 
Life Ins. Co., Mo. App., 293 S.W.2d 147, 150 [1956]." Neve, 
357 S.W.2d  at 249. Similarly, IFI cannot insist that the procedural Oklahoma attorney's fees statute be applied by Wyoming courts. Having 
chosen the forum, IFI has implicitly chosen the procedural law that accompanies 
the forum court.

[¶25.]  Additionally, IFI asks for appellate 
attorneys' fees. Finding the Oklahoma statute to be procedural in relation 
to the trial attorneys' fees, we decline to award attorneys' fees for the 
appeal.

CONCLUSION

[¶26.]  The use of the term "turn key" in this 
case is not a magical absolver; there was substantial evidence to support the 
trial court's conclusion that IFI was merely a supplier of the goods so no 
breach of design warranty was present. No breach of express warranty existed 
since IFI repaired or replaced the non-conforming goods. However, the trial 
court's application of the Oklahoma attorney's fees statute was in error. 
Therefore, the judgment for the supplier on the contract balance will be 
affirmed, but the imposition of trial attorneys' fees will be reversed. This 
court declines to award appellate attorneys' fees.

[¶27.]  Affirmed in part and reversed in 
part.

GOLDEN, J., files a specially 
concurring opinion with whom CARDINE, C.J., joins.

THOMAS, J., files a concurring 
and dissenting opinion.

1 Two concerns are created 
by brief which are noted for these appellate counsel and the practicing bar 
generally. First, Smithco, in direct disregard of the rules of this court, 
provided no references to the record for its statement of facts. W.R.A.P. 
5.01(3). Future repetition in briefs filed with this court may result in 
disregard of all statements not supported by the required record reference. For 
what can happen, see Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 531 So. 2d 1049 (Fla.App. 1988), where the 
unreferenced brief was stricken. Second, IFI restated and mutated every issue. 
It is suggested that, if this court is expected to properly respond, the same 
subjects require attention. We all need to be on the same page. If IFI feels 
required to restate Smithco's issue, a comparison of terminology and explanation 
of needed divergences would be part of any preferable appellate brief 
writing.

As symptomatic, we note 
Smithco's issue four states:

IV. Whether I.F.I. 
effectively limited its liability and remedies for breach of express warranty, 
and if not whether Smithco was entitled to incidental and consequential 
damages.

and compares to 
IFI's issue four:

IV. Whether IFI satisfied 
its obligation under the limitations clause to repair or replace 
materials?

A. The limitations clause 
was effective.

B. Smithco has failed to 
prove damages for breach of warranty. [Emphasis in 
original.]

2 Although not contested 
by either party, this court will apply the forum law of Wyoming as to the 
sufficiency of the evidence standard. See Restatement (Second) of Conflicts, § 
135 (1971). Cf. Harwell v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 1245, 1247 (8th 
Cir. 1974), cert. denied 421 U.S. 949, 95 S. Ct. 1681, 44 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1975) 
(where no conflict between federal and Arkansas 
sufficiency of the evidence standards was found, so Arkansas rules 
applied.)

3 The characteristics, 
supplier and size, as well as supplier designation were required in the plans, 
specifications or shop drawings with the "equal or better" substitution 
qualification. "Spected" means defined by specifications and plans. It was in 
the specification and description of these items as to sizing and consequent 
capacity from which considerable controversy developed. The actuators, 
constituting the motors for panel movement, were apparently initially 
underpowered.

4 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, 
§ 936 (West 1988) states:

In any civil action to 
recover on an open account, a statement of account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, 
wares, or merchandise, or for labor or services, unless otherwise provided by 
law or the contract which is the subject to the action, the prevailing party 
shall be allowed a reasonable attorney fee to be set by the court, to be taxed 
and collected as costs. [Footnote omitted.]

5 See Annotation, 
Enforceability of Provision in Agreement for Attorneys' Fees, Valid in State of 
its Execution or Performance, But Invalid Under Law of Forum, 54 A.L.R.2d 1053 
(1957). Oklahoma law is identical to Wyoming in application of 
the rule that "costs do not include attorney's fees except when a statute 
expressly provides for them." Hicks v. Lloyd's General Ins. Agency, Inc., 763 P.2d 85, 86 (Okla. 1988). The difference is that Oklahoma has the enabling statute for contractual 
collection costs which Wyoming does not.

6 This court is not 
unaware of the complexities engendered by the application of F.R.C.P. 68, Offer 
of Judgment. F.R.C.P. 68 is very similar to W.R.C.P. 68 in attribution of 
attorneys' fees as costs in the unattained offer of settlement cases. See Marek 
v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 105 S. Ct. 3012, 87 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985) and Margulies, After Marek, the Deluge: 
Harmonizing the Interaction Under Rule 68 of Statutes that Do and Do Not 
Classify Attorneys' Fees as "Costs", 73 Iowa L.Rev. 413 (1988).

GOLDEN, Justice, specially 
concurring, in which CARDINE, Chief 
Justice, joins.

[¶28.]  I concur in the result in this case, but 
would have used a more straightforward analysis to hold in favor of 
International Fabricators, Inc. I prefer that the majority opinion be written so 
that members of the Wyoming Bar will have no difficulty determining how it fits 
into our established rules of construction for contract 
terms.

[¶29.]  I would have analyzed this case using the 
following standards of appellate review. As a matter of law, this court 
determines whether a written contract term is ambiguous by independently 
reviewing the disputed term in light of the actual language of the entire 
contract. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Paulson, 756 P.2d 764, 766 
(Wyo. 1988); and Bethurem v. Hammett, 736 P.2d 1128, 1136 (Wyo. 1987). A term is ambiguous if, considered 
in light of the plain language of the entire contract, it is susceptible to more 
than one reasonable meaning. State Farm, 756 P.2d  at 766; and Farr v. Link, 746 P.2d 431, 433 (Wyo. 1987). When an ambiguity is found, its 
presence justifies examining extrinsic evidence to determine the reasonable 
intention of the parties. State v. Pennzoil Company, 752 P.2d 975, 978-79 
(Wyo. 1988). 
When extrinsic evidence is considered in this context, the interpretation of the 
ambiguous term becomes a mixed question of fact and law, which is best answered 
by the trial court in most circumstances. Kilbourne-Park Corporation v. 
Buckingham, 404 P.2d 244, 246 (Wyo. 1965). Further, ambiguous contract terms 
are generally construed against the party who drafted the written agreement. 
Pennzoil, 752 P.2d  at 979-80.

[¶30.]  Applying these fundamental standards 
here, we could easily have adopted the trial court's finding that the phrase 
"turn key" was ambiguous as a matter of law, thereby requiring consideration of 
extrinsic evidence. We then could have reiterated the extrinsic evidence as 
considered by the trial court that Smithco's employee authored the October 19, 
1984 letter containing the disputed terms and deferred to the trial court's 
interpretation of the mixed question of fact and law before it. I would have 
reached the majority's result by affirming what appears to be the trial court's 
use of this fundamental analysis.

THOMAS, Justice, concurring and 
dissenting.

[¶31.]  I agree with that aspect of the court's 
opinion which affirms the judgment in favor of International Fabricators, Inc. I 
disagree with that portion of the majority opinion which denies the award of 
attorney fees. In my judgment, the trial court should be affirmed in all 
respects.

[¶32.]  I am disposed to read differently from 
the majority the provisions of Okla. Stat. Ann.Tit. 12, § 936 (West 1988). While 
that section may be included within that part of the statutes relating to 
procedure in Oklahoma, the language providing that "[i]n any civil action to 
recover on * * * [a] contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, 
or merchandise * * * unless otherwise provided by law or the contract which is 
the subject of the action, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney fee to be set by the court, * * *" articulates a substantive right. 
That conclusion is particularly appropriate in this instance since the 
contracting parties both were residents of the state of Oklahoma, and it is 
reasonable to assume that they contemplated Oklahoma law in the formation of 
their contract.

[¶33.]  The majority cites Bowers Welding and 
Hotshot, Inc. v. Bromley, 699 P.2d 299 (Wyo. 1985), for the proposition that attorney 
fees cannot be awarded unless the parties so provide by their agreement or there 
exists an explicit statute justifying the award. This court has said that a 
statute that affected the rights of the parties "became a part of the contract 
as though written into its terms." Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Cattle Breeders of Canada, 
Ltd. v. Y-Tex Corporation, 590 P.2d 1306, 1309 (Wyo. 1979) (the statute involved 
was the U.C.C.); see Century Ready-Mix Company v. Lower & Company, 770 P.2d 692 (Wyo. 1989). In two other instances, the court has noted that "laws which 
subsist at the time and place of making a contract, and where it is to be 
performed, enter into and become a part of it as though expressly referred to 
and incorporated in its terms." Tri-County Electric Association, Inc. v. City of 
Gillette, 584 P.2d 995, 1007 (Wyo. 1978); Application of Hagood, 356 P.2d 135, 138 
(Wyo. 1960). 
While those cases did not involve attorney fees, the principle is apt, and the 
quotation alludes to two places, the time and place of making the contract and 
the time and place where it is to be performed.

[¶34.]  Consequently, I would not reverse the 
district court with respect to the award of attorney fees on the basis of 
whether the statute is substantive or procedural, although I do perceive it as 
substantive. In my view, the Oklahoma statute, where the contract was made, 
became a part of this contract. The rule is consistent with the substantive law 
of the state of Wyoming and cannot be perceived as being 
contrary to the public policy of this state. I, therefore, would hold that the 
Oklahoma 
statutory provision for attorney fees became a part of the contract of these 
parties and, for that reason, I would affirm the district court in its award of 
attorney fees to International Fabricators, Inc.