Case Title: Roussalis v. Apollo Elec. Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Roussalis v. Apollo Elec. Co.1999 WY 44979 P.2d 493Case Number: 98-166Decided: 04/27/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
JOHN 
E. ROUSSALIS, II, (Appellant) (Defendant),

v.

APOLLO ELECTRIC CO., 
(Appellee) (Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Natrona County Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, 
Judge

Mark W. Gifford, 
Casper, WY, Representing Appellant.

Larry W. 
Harrington, Casper, WY, Representing Appellee. 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and HILL, JJ.

HILL, 
Justice.

[¶1]      John E. Roussalis 
II (Roussalis) appeals from a judgment entered by the district court in favor of 
Apollo Electric Co. (Apollo).

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Roussalis 
presents four issues for consideration:

1. Did the trial 
court err in awarding unjust enrichment damages in the amount of $73,930.08 
where the Appellee sued for breach of contract and accepted the benefit of a 
$43,673.15 partial summary judgment under breach of contract 
theory?

2. Did the trial 
court err in awarding unjust enrichment damages in light of Appellee's unclean 
hands?

3. Did the trial 
court err in the measure of damages applied to Appellee's unjust enrichment 
claim?

4. Should the 
case be remanded to the district court with instructions to enter judgment 
against Appellee and in favor of Appellant for the $10,214.00 in carrying 
charges improperly assessed against, and paid by, Appellant on summary 
judgment?

[¶4]      Apollo did not 
present a separate statement of the issues.

FACTS

[¶5]      This dispute has 
its genesis in an October 1995 fire at the Aristo Building located in Casper, 
Wyoming. The Aristo Building, which was partially owned by Roussalis, contained 
several businesses on the ground floor with residential apartments on the upper 
level. The post-fire inspection by the City electrical inspector culminated in a 
determination that the entire building's electrical system should be re-wired. 
Apollo was contacted to provide the necessary re-wiring work and began the 
project in November of 1995.

[¶6]      The subsequent 
dispute and legal proceedings associated with the work on the Aristo Building 
were virtually guaranteed by the fact that no written estimates, bids, work 
orders, or contracts for the electrical work ever were created by the parties. 
As described by the trial judge in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Judgment, the testimony offered by the parties on the discussions between them 
Arelative to [the] estimated costs, ongoing costs, performance of the electrical 
work, difficulties with the performance of the electrical work, requirements of 
the electrical work to be performed to assure that the building would pass 
inspection by the City of Casper, discounts on the materials and/or labor to be 
furnished on the project, and limitations or caps on the dollar amount to be 
charged by [Apollo] for the labor and materials furnished on the project" was, 
to say the least, Ainconsistent, diffuse, and 
contradictory."

[¶7]      What is 
undisputed is that Apollo worked on the project over a period of approximately 
four months, and submitted six billing invoices to Roussalis as follows: 

                                    
Invoice Date                                       
Amount  

 12/15/95                                            
$10,114.94 

 12/29/95                                            
$10,698.04  

 01/26/96                                            
 $13,112.31  

 02/09/96                                            
$11,839.79  

 02/23/96                                            
$7,890.96  

                                    
03/29/96                                             
$22,356.76 

In total, Apollo 
billed $76,012.80 for the work on the Aristo Building.

[¶8]      Roussalis did not 
pay any of the bills, although he did initial a January 31, 1996, billing 
statement that summarized the first three billings totaling $33,925.29. 
Confronted with Roussalis' failure to pay, Apollo filed an action in the 
district court on July 1, 1996, for the recovery of $75,998.84 for Agoods and 
services delivered to" Roussalis. On February 12, 1997, Apollo filed a motion 
for summary judgment on its claim.

[¶9]      The district 
court granted a partial summary judgment on April 23, 1997, concluding that, by 
initialing the January 31, 1996, billing summary, Roussalis had agreed to pay 
the first three invoices. Judgment was entered against Roussalis for the 
$33,925.29, along with a carrying charge totaling $9,747.86, for a total of 
$43,673.15. The district court denied Apollo's summary judgment motion for the 
remaining three invoices on the grounds that there were issues of material fact 
remaining on those claims.

[¶10]   Prior to trial on the remaining 
invoices, Roussalis paid $44,139.29 in satisfaction of the partial summary 
judgment. A bench trial on the remaining claims was held on February 2, and 3, 
1998. At the commencement of the trial, the district court noted that Apollo's 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law suggested that the theory of 
recovery was unjust enrichment. The district court stated that the complaint 
indicated Apollo was proceeding under a contract theory, but, based upon the 
fact that a pleading may be amended to conform to the evidence, the district 
court concluded that an unjust enrichment claim was within the purview of the 
general complaint.

[¶11]   As previously noted, the 
presentation of consistent facts was marred by contradictory testimony from the 
parties regarding what was said by whom in relation to the work that was 
performed on the Aristo Building. In general, Roussalis' position was that 
Apollo consistently exceeded its estimated costs for the project. In addition, 
Roussalis introduced evidence that Apollo had charged for hours which were 
unsupported by time sheets, and that the authorization for the carrying charge 
on January 31, 1996, was stamped on the billing summary after Roussalis 
initialized it. In contrast, Apollo introduced evidence that it had never given 
a definitive estimate of the cost of the project, and that Roussalis, aware of 
the ongoing costs, never told them to cease working. Indeed, Apollo offered 
testimony that Roussalis simply conveyed to the company the message to Aget the 
work done" and to do the work necessary to "bring the building up to 
code."

[¶12]   The district court concluded that 
the services and materials furnished by Apollo were accepted, used, and enjoyed 
by Roussalis and, consequently, Apollo was entitled to recover the last three 
invoices under a theory of unjust enrichment. The total of the three invoices of 
$42,087.51 was offset by the labor costs that were unsupported by time cards. In 
addition, the district court concluded that the carrying charge to the January 
31, 1996, billing summary, which was the subject of the partial summary judgment 
ruling, was added after that document was initialed by Roussalis, and, 
therefore, the recovery was further offset by the amount attributable to the 
carrying charge. After taking into account the offsets and the amount already 
paid by Roussalis, the district court awarded Apollo an additional $29,791.51, 
plus costs and interest at the legal rate from the date of judgment until 
paid.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶13]   The trial court made express 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The factual findings of a judge are not 
entitled to the limited review afforded a jury verdict. Hopper v. All Pet Animal 
Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538 (Wyo. 1993). While the findings are 
presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly 
admissible evidence in the record. Id. Due regard is given to the opportunity of 
the trial judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and our review does 
not entail weighing disputed evidence. Id. Findings of fact will not be set 
aside unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly 
erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on 
the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been committed. Id. We review a district court's conclusions of law de novo 
on appeal. Id.

Springer v. Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield of Wyoming, 944 P.2d 1173, 1175-76 (Wyo. 
1997).

DISCUSSION

[¶14]   The first issue raised by Roussalis 
relates to the purported amendment of Apollo's pleading from a claim in contract 
to an equitable claim for unjust enrichment just prior to trial. Up to the time 
of the trial, the district court, and apparently Roussalis, considered Apollo's 
action to be one for breach of an implied contract. The district court's partial 
summary judgment implicitly awarded judgment to Apollo on the first three 
invoices based upon a contract created by Roussalis' initialing of the January 
31, 1996, billing summary. Nevertheless, the district court concluded that 
unjust enrichment was within the purview of Apollo's pleadings and allowed 
Apollo to proceed under that theory.1

[¶15]   On appeal, Roussalis contends that 
the district court erred in allowing Apollo to amend its pleading because the 
causes of action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment are mutually 
exclusive. Further, Roussalis claims that Apollo was barred by the doctrines of 
judicial estoppel, collateral estoppel, and res judicata from amending its 
complaint to one for an equitable remedy after initially electing to proceed 
under a contract claim.

[¶16]   Even if, as suggested by Roussalis, 
we assume that Apollo's complaint pleaded a cause of action in contract which 
was belatedly amended to an action for an equitable remedy, there is no error. A 
complaint may include alternative, independent claims as long as the factual 
allegations articulate the essential elements of the claims.2 Giacchino v. Estate of Stalkup, 908 P.2d 983, 985 (Wyo. 1995); see also W.R.C.P. 8(e) (allowing pleadings regardless 
of consistency or whether based on legal or equitable grounds or both). 
Moreover, pleadings may be amended to conform to the evidence. W.R.C.P. 
15(b).

[¶17]   In this case, the amendment 
resulted in a contract claim for the first three invoices, and an equitable 
claim for unjust enrichment related to the last three invoices. While Roussalis 
may be correct that a contract claim and a claim for unjust enrichment are 
mutually exclusive, that would be true only if they were being applied to the 
same set of facts. Simply because a relationship between parties is defined at 
least in part by a contract, does not necessarily mean that the entire course of 
dealings between the parties must necessarily be determined by contract law. If 
a plaintiff can present evidence of distinct, separate losses under an equity or 
tort theory sufficient to justify recovery beyond breach of contract, then it 
should be entitled to make a recovery so long as it is not duplicative or 
cumulative in nature. See Fox v. F & J Gattozzi Corporation, 672 N.E.2d 547, 
552 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that plaintiff had presented sufficient 
evidence to sustain causes of action for contract and unjust enrichment, but 
granting defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the 
unjust enrichment, since otherwise there would have been a duplicative 
recovery).

[¶18]   Roussalis' second issue asserts 
that the district court erred in awarding unjust enrichment damages in light of 
Apollo's "unclean hands." Roussalis' claim is predicated upon evidence that (1) 
Apollo stamped a carrying charge on the January 31, 1996, billing summary after 
Roussalis initialed it, and (2) Apollo's charges for labor were in excess of the 
hours those employees actually worked. As a corollary to this argument, 
Roussalis also contends that if Apollo is not barred from recovery under 
Aunclean hands," then the amount of recovery should be reduced by some unstated 
amount.

[¶19]   The doctrine of unclean hands is 
premised on the maxim that: "He who comes into equity must come with clean 
hands." Harsha v. Anastos, 693 P.2d 760, 762 (Wyo. 1985) (quoting Dutch Maid 
Bakeries, Inc. v. Schleicher, 58 Wyo. 374, 131 P.2d 630, 634 (1942)). A trial 
court's conclusions on issues of equity are factual determinations. Harsha, 693 P.2d  at 762; see also 30A C. J. S. Equity § 102 (1992). As noted above, in a 
trial to the bench we will disturb the district court's findings of fact only if 
they are clearly erroneous. Springer, 944 P.2d  at 1175-76.

[¶20]   The doctrine of unclean hands is 
not generally favored by courts. 30A C. J. S. Equity § 114 (1992). Relief may be 
given to a less than angelic plaintiff while at the same time fashioning a 
recovery which accounts for the asserted wrong. 30A C. J. S. Equity § 111 
(1992). In this case, there was testimony from Apollo's bookkeeper to the effect 
that the carrying charge stamp and the extra hours charged were not deliberate 
but the result of simple mistakes. In any event, the district court took these 
overcharges into account and reduced the amount awarded to Apollo accordingly. 
Therefore, we find that the district court's decision was not clearly erroneous 
in light of the circumstances. For the same reason, we also decline to reduce 
the amount of recovery awarded by the district court as suggested by 
Roussalis.

[¶21]   Finally, Roussalis claims that the 
district court failed to reduce the award by the $10,214.00 in carrying charges 
that he was erroneously ordered to pay pursuant to the partial summary judgment. 
The district court's order states:

21. The Partial 
Summary Judgment entered in this case on April 23, 1997, should be modified to 
provide for a partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff Apollo and against 
Defendant Roussalis in the sum of $33,925.29 alone, but Defendant Roussalis 
should be entitled to full credit for the $44,139.29 payment - $33,925.29 
against the partial summary judgment, and $10,214.00 against the judgment 
hereinafter awarded.

22. Competent 
and persuasive evidence was presented at trial to establish Plaintiff Apollo's 
entitlement to an additional recovery under a theory of unjust enrichment for 
the services and materials furnished to Defendant Roussalis in the sum of 
$42,087.51, on the last three invoices listed above . . . less an adjustment and 
offset in the sum of $2,082.00 . . . and further reduced by the sum of 
$10,214.00 previously paid by Defendant Roussalis in excess of the partial 
summary judgment as determined and calculated in paragraph 21 
hereinabove.

Roussalis did, 
in fact, receive credit for the carrying charge, and his claim, otherwise, is 
without merit.

CONCLUSION

[¶22]   The district court did not err when 
it amended Apollo's pleadings at the commencement of the trial, and its decision 
to award damages for unjust enrichment subject to an appropriate reduction for 
unproven costs was not clearly erroneous.

[¶23]   Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 Our review 
of this issue is constrained somewhat because Roussalis apparently addressed 
this issue in his opening statement. Because the statement was not recorded, it 
is impossible to determine to what extent and on what grounds Roussalis 
objected, if indeed he even did, to this issue. Since we conclude that there was 
no error, we do not need to determine whether Roussalis has waived this issue by 
failing to object or by raising it for the first time on 
appeal.

2 Roussalis 
has not presented any challenge to the complaint on the basis of an inadequate 
articulation of the essential elements of Apollo's 
claims.