Case Title: Sullivan v. Yanez

Citation: 

Docket Number: 399, 2023

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2024-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
FRED SULLIVAN,1 
 
Respondent Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
YVETTE ANDERS YANEZ, 
 
Petitioner Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 399, 2023 
§ 
§  Court Below–Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  File No. CK23-02126 
§  Petition No. 23-17381 
§                         
§   
§ 
 
Submitted: April 4, 2024 
Decided: 
June 20, 2024 
 
Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
After consideration of the parties’ briefs and the Family Court record, it 
appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Fred Sullivan (“Father”), filed this appeal from the 
Family Court’s protection-from-abuse (PFA) order dated September 25, 2023.  We 
find no error or abuse of discretion in the Family Court’s decision and therefore 
affirm. 
(2) 
Father and the appellee, Yvette Yanez (“Mother”), are the parents of a 
boy, born in 2010 (the “Child”).  In August 2023, Mother filed a petition for a PFA 
 
1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
 
 
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order together with a motion and affidavit for an emergency ex parte PFA order 
against Father on behalf of herself and the Child.  The filings alleged that Father had, 
among other things: (i) beaten the Child with a belt on multiple occasions and then 
withheld the Child’s phone from him so that he was unable to take pictures of the 
resultant bruising; (ii) on one occasion, pushed the Child up against a wall while 
yelling at and choking him; and (iii) sent multiple derogatory and threatening texts 
to Mother.  On August 17, 2023, the Family Court entered a temporary PFA order 
and scheduled a hearing on the merits for September 5.  On September 1, the Family 
Court extended the temporary PFA order and rescheduled the hearing for September 
25.  On September 14, Father filed a motion and affidavit for an emergency ex parte 
order for custody of the Child.  As is typical, Father’s motion was assigned a 
different petition number.  The Family Court consolidated the custody petition with 
the PFA petition and sent a notice to the parties informing them that the Family Court 
would consider both petitions at the September 25 hearing. 
(3) 
At the September 25 hearing, the Family Court heard testimony from 
Mother and Father and interviewed the Child.  Following the hearing, the Family 
 
 
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Court granted the PFA petition and awarded temporary custody of the Child to 
Mother.2  Father appeals. 
(4) 
Our review of a decision of the Family Court extends to a review of the 
facts and law, as well as inferences and deductions made by the trial judge.3  Our 
duty is to review the sufficiency of the evidence and to test the propriety of the 
findings.4  Findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly 
erroneous.5  We will not substitute our opinion for the inferences and deductions of 
the trial judge if they are supported by the record.6  If the Family Court correctly 
applied the law to the facts, we review its decision for abuse of discretion.7  To obtain 
a PFA order, a petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
respondent has committed an act of domestic violence.8 
(5) 
Father’s arguments on appeal may be fairly summarized as follows: (i) 
the evidence presented did not support the PFA order; (ii) insufficiency of service; 
 
2 The Family Court also denied Father’s petition for emergency custody.  Father filed a motion to 
reargue, identifying the custody petition number and Father as the petitioner in the caption but 
attempting to reargue the merits of Mother’s PFA petition.  The Family Court denied the motion, 
finding it lacked merit with regard to either petition. 
3 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Clark v. Clark, 47 A.3d 513, 517 (Del. 2012). 
8 Stuart v. Stuart, 2017 WL 1090543, at *1 (Del. Mar. 22, 2017). 
 
 
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and (iii) the Family Court was biased in favor of Mother.  We find Father’s 
arguments to be unavailing. 
(6) 
Although Father raises various “due process” complaints in connection 
with his first claim of error, his argument is essentially that the evidence presented 
at trial did not support the Family Court’s finding that a PFA order was warranted.  
But a review of the PFA hearing transcript reflects that Mother did, in fact, present 
sufficient evidence to support the Family Court’s finding that Father had engaged in 
domestic violence.  The definition of “abuse” includes “[i]ntentionally or recklessly 
placing or attempting to place another person in reasonable apprehension of physical 
injury” and “[e]ngaging in a course of alarming or distressing conduct in a manner 
which is likely to cause fear or emotional distress.”9  In finding that a PFA order was 
warranted with regard to the Child, the Family Court credited the Child’s accounts 
of Father beating him with a belt and choking him—that is, the Family Court found 
that Father recklessly placed the Child in reasonable fear of physical injury.  And 
Mother presented evidence that Father had sent her threatening text messages, 
including one in which he threatened to kill her.  Although Father attempted to place 
the blame on the Child for those texts, the Family Court explicitly rejected his 
proffered theory as “unpersuasive” and implicitly found that Father had engaged in 
a course of distressing conduct that was likely to cause Mother fear or emotional 
 
9 10 Del. C. § 1041(1). 
 
 
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distress.  “When the determination of facts turns on a question of the credibility and 
the acceptance or rejection of the testimony of witnesses appearing before the trier 
of fact, we will not substitute our opinion for that of the trier of fact.”10  As Father 
acknowledges, “[t]he Judge’s finding appear[s] to have been based on the credibility 
of [the Child’s] and [Mother’s] testimony.”11  He is correct.  We will not disturb the 
Family Court’s credibility determinations on appeal.  
(7) 
We review Father’s insufficiency-of-service argument for plain error 
because he did not raise it in the Family Court in the first instance.12  There is no 
plain error here.  Defects in service of process must be raised in the first instance or 
they are waived.13  In any event, it is clear that Father had adequate, actual notice of 
the proceedings: (i) Father concedes that he learned of the hearing on (if not before) 
September 14—eleven days before the hearing; (ii) Father does not dispute that he 
received the Family Court’s notice of the hearing scheduled for his petition for 
custody, and that document noted that his custody petition was consolidated with 
 
10 Shimel v. Shimel, 2019 WL 2142066, at *2 (Del. May 14, 2019) (citations omitted). 
11 Opening Br. at 18. 
12 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8 (“Only questions fairly presented to the trial court may be presented for 
review; provided, however, that when the interests of justice so require, the Court may consider 
and determine any question not so presented.”); Whittaker v. Houston, 888 A.2d 219, 224 (Del. 
2005) (observing that plain error is that which is “so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to 
jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process”). 
13 Brewington-Carr v. Coleman, 1999 WL 734775, at *2 (Del. Aug. 30, 1999) (holding that a 
party’s failure to register a timely objection to insufficient service of process procedurally bars it 
from raising the argument later). See also Del. Fam. Ct. Civ. R. P. 12(h)(1) (a defense of 
insufficiency of process is waived if not made by motion under Rule 12 or included in a responsive 
pleading). 
 
 
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Mother’s pending PFA petition and cited the September 25 hearing date; (iii) Father 
emailed Mother’s counsel about discovery in advance of the September 25 hearing; 
and (iv) Father prepared for the September 25 hearing, as evidenced by the fact that 
he appeared at the hearing with documents and witnesses.  
(8) 
We also review Father’s claim that the Family Court judge was biased 
in favor of Mother for plain error because Father did not move for the judge’s recusal 
below.  Again, there is no plain error here.  Father’s claim of bias is based on the 
fact that the attorney (“Counsel”) who filed the petition for a PFA order and related 
documents on Mother’s behalf is a former law clerk for the judge who presided over 
the September 25 hearing.  Even assuming, without accepting, Father’s position that 
a judge cannot fairly preside over a proceeding involving one of his former law 
clerks,14 a different attorney from Counsel’s office represented Mother at the 
September 25 hearing.  Moreover, Father’s claim of bias seems to be predicated 
entirely on the fact that the Family Court granted Mother’s petition for a PFA order.  
But “a trial judge’s rulings alone almost never constitute a valid per se basis for 
disqualification on the ground of bias.”15   
 
14 Indeed, the Court finds such a bright-line assumption untenable, given the frequency with which 
a law clerk goes on to practice before the court for which he clerked as well as the professional 
nature of the law clerk/judge relationship. 
15 In re Whittrock, 649 A.2d 1053, 1054 (Del. 1994). 
 
 
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(9) 
As a final matter, after Father filed his reply brief in this appeal, he 
continued to submit various documents to the Court.  These documents were 
improperly filed because they either: (i) contain additional argument that is 
impermissible under Supreme Court Rule 15(a)(vi),16 or (ii) cite information that 
Father discovered after—or factual developments that followed—the Family 
Court’s September 25 order and are therefore not part of the record on appeal.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court be AFFIRMED. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
Justice 
 
16 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 15(a)(vi) (providing that “no other brief or writing containing argument may 
be submitted without leave of the Court” after briefing is complete).