Case Title: PEGGY A. ROHRER V. BUREAUS INVESTMENT, GROUP NO. 7, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0180

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
PEGGY A. ROHRER V. BUREAUS INVESTMENT, GROUP NO. 7, LLC2010 WY 96Case Number: S-09-0180Decided: 07/07/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
PEGGY 
A. ROHRER,Appellant(Defendant),v.BUREAUS INVESTMENT, 
GROUP NO. 7, LLC,Appellee(Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Big Horn County

The 
Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

John 
M. Burman, Faculty Supervisor, U. W. Legal Services Program; and Carissa D. 
Mobley, Student Intern.  Argument by 
Ms. Mobley.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Larry 
W. Harrington, Casper, WY.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Peggy 
A. Rohrer (Rohrer), contends that the district court abused its discretion in 
denying her "Motion to Have Requests for Admission Deemed Denied, or in the 
Alternative to Withdraw Admissions."  
She also contends that the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment for Appellee, Bureaus Investment, Group No. 7, LLC (Group 7) because it 
had failed to present a prima facie case for summary judgment and because she 
came forward with evidence that created genuine issues of material fact.  We reverse and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Rohrer raises 
these issues:

 
 

I.              
Whether 
the district court erred in denying [Rohrer's] Motion to have Requests for Admissions 
Deemed Denied, or in the Alternative, Motion to Withdraw Admissions, where 
the only evidence on the record establishes that [Rohrer] had denied the matters 
in the request for admissions and returned them to [Group 7] through the United 
States Postal Service, and where Rule 36 of the Wyo. R. Civ. P. allows for 
withdrawal of admissions where the moving party can show that presentation of 
the merits of the action will be subserved by allowing the withdrawal and the 
opposing party fails to demonstrate that they will be prejudiced by allowing the 
withdrawal.

II.            
Whether 
the district court erred in granting [Group 7's] Motion for Summary Judgment, finding 
that [it] had made and supported its motion for summary judgment as required by 
Rule 56 of the Wyo. R. Civ. Pro., where the rule requires there to be no genuine 
issues of material fact before summary judgment will be granted as a matter of 
law.

 
 
Group 
7 did not provide a statement of the issues, but it argues that the district 
court's order denying Rohrer's motion to withdraw admissions was not an abuse of 
discretion and that the grant of summary judgment in Group 7's favor was 
sound.

 
 
PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      On August 6, 
2007, Group 7 filed a complaint in the district court.  A very similar amended complaint was 
filed on December 26, 2007.  (The 
district court apparently asked Group 7 to file an amended complaint at an 
in-chambers conference on November 8, 2007.  That proceeding was not reported and it 
is not included in the record on appeal.)  
The amended complaint alleged that Group 7 owned a credit account in 
Rohrer's name.  The complaint 
further alleged that Rohrer had obtained credit card account number 
************9333 (hereafter "Account") from Chase Manhattan Bank 
(USA).

 
 
[¶4]      Continuing, Group 
7 alleged that Rohrer used the Account, that it had bought that Account, and the 
corresponding debt was now owed to Group 7.  By using the Account, Rohrer agreed to 
its terms and owed "$5,504.61, as well as interest from the day following the 
last cycle date, 04/08/2004."  Group 
7 further contended that Rohrer owed reasonable attorney's fees and contractual 
interest "if provided in the attached agreement."  Rohrer is alleged to have failed to make 
the payments due under the Account agreement.  Because Rohr failed to make the 
payments, Group 7 alleged she owed it $6,682.15 plus contractual interest from 
04/08/2004 (the contractual interest rate was 15.9900%).  Group 7 contended that Rohrer also owed 
it prejudgment interest on that sum as well.  Group 7 also contended that it would be 
"inequitable" for the district court to deny Group 7's claim for repayment of 
the sums at issue.  A copy of the 
Account agreement was attached to the complaint.

 
 
[¶5]      On August 31, 
2007, and January 7, 2008, Rohrer, acting 
pro se, answered the complaints, generally asserting that she owed nothing 
and therefore could not owe any interest or attorney's fees either.  She also claimed the money figures cited 
in the complaint were inaccurate and that she had steadfastly denied owing the 
claims made by Chase and Group 7.  
On January 7, 2008, Rohrer also filed a motion to dismiss due to lack of 
prosecution.  That motion was denied 
by order entered on April 14, 2008.  
Rohrer filed another motion to dismiss due to lack of prosecution on July 
17, 2008.  Group 7 filed a motion 
for summary judgment on August 5, 2008.  
Attached to that motion was a copy of "Plaintiff's First Combined 
Discovery to Defendant."  In that 
discovery request, Group 7 demanded that Rohrer admit to the following 
facts:

 
 
(1) 
Admit that you applied for a credit account with Chase.  (2) Admit that credit card number 
************9333 was issued to you by Chase herein.  (3) Admit that you received at least one 
credit card for Credit Account ************9333.  (4) Admit that you received a card holder 
agreement, a copy of which is attached to the complaint, when you received the 
credit card for Credit Account ************9333.  (5) Admit that you used, or allowed 
another person to use the Credit Account ************9333 while it still had a 
balance.  (6) Admit that you 
received monthly statements from the issue of Credit Account ************9333. 
 (7) Admit that you stopped making 
payments on the Credit Account ************9333 while it still had a balance. 
 (8) Admit that you owed $5504.61 on 
the account on April 8, 2004.  (9) 
Admit that interest on the account as of April 8, 2004 was 15.9900% per annum. 
 (10) Admit that you did not make 
any payments on the account after April 8, 2004.

 

[¶6]      Group 7 also 
filed a motion for summary judgment and an affidavit in support of that motion 
in which Group 7 averred that the "paper" at issue here was purchased by Group 
7.  Attached to that motion were (1) 
a copy of the bill of sale memorializing that purchase on 4/30/04; (2) a copy of 
the original Credit Agreement; (3) a copy of a billing with a payment due date 
of 05/02/04 showing a balance of $5,504.61; (4) a copy of a billing showing a 
payment due date of 05/03/2004 showing a balance of $0.00.  We note here that the bill of sale 
described above contained a notation that it was in reference to "Accounts 
described in Exhibit A' attached hereto," but no such attachment appears in the 
record.  Another attachment was an 
affidavit for attorney's fees signed by Group 7's attorney in the amount of 
$375.00.

 
 
[¶7]      On August 5, 
2008, Group 7 filed a brief in support of its motion for summary judgment, as 
well as a statement of the undisputed material facts which mandated summary 
judgment in Group 7's favor.  A 
hearing on that motion was set for August 21, 2008, and then vacated and reset 
for September 18, 2008.

 
 
[¶8]      On February 11, 
2009, counsel entered an appearance on Rohrer's behalf.  On March 27, 2009, Rohrer filed a 
response to Group 7's motion for summary judgment.  She contended that the debt at issue had 
been settled with Chase as shown in a document found at page 124 of the record 
on appeal.  She claimed she had 
disputed all attempts made by Chase and others to collect that debt again, 
although she did not have any documentation to support that contention, other 
than the document on page 124.  She 
also asserted that she answered all of the requests for admissions and 
substantively denied Group 7's assertions that she owed any debt to it, but she 
had not retained a copy of that response.  
Rohrer also moved the district court to allow her to withdraw any 
admissions she was deemed to have made.

 
 
[¶9]      The district 
court denied Rohrer any relief with respect to the admissions.  It also granted summary judgment for 
Group 7, finding there were no genuine issues of material fact of record and 
that Group 7 was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Admissions

 
 
[¶10]   The civil rule which governs the 
sort of admissions at issue here is lengthy and detailed:

 
 
Rule 
36.  Requests for 
Admission.

 
 
(a)  Request for Admission. -- A party may 
serve upon any other party a written request for the admission, for purposes of 
the pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 
26(b) set forth in the request that relate to statements or opinions of fact or 
of the application of law to fact, including the genuineness of any documents 
described in the request.  Copies of 
documents shall be served with the request unless they have been or are 
otherwise furnished or made available for inspection and copying.  The request may, without leave of court, 
be served upon the plaintiff after commencement of the action and upon any other 
party with or after service of the summons and complaint upon that 
party.

            
Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set 
forth.  The matter is admitted 
unless, within 30 days after service of the request, or within such shorter or 
longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the request is directed 
serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection 
addressed to the matter, signed by the party or by the party's attorney, but, 
unless the court shortens the time, a defendant shall not be required to serve 
answers or objections before the expiration of 45 days after service of the 
summons and complaint upon that defendant.  
If objection is made, the reasons therefor shall be stated.  The answer shall specifically deny the 
matter or set forth in detail the reasons why the answering party cannot 
truthfully admit or deny the matter.  
A denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested admission, and 
when good faith requires that a party qualify an answer or deny only a part of 
the matter of which an admission is requested, the party shall specify so much 
of it as is true and qualify or deny the remainder.  An answering party may not give lack of 
information or knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless the 
party states that the party has made reasonable inquiry and that the information 
known or readily obtainable by the party is insufficient to enable the party to 
admit or deny.  A party who 
considers that a matter of which an admission has been requested presents a 
genuine issue for trial may not, on that ground alone, object to the request; 
the party may, subject to the provisions of Rule 37(c), deny the matter or set 
forth reasons why the party cannot admit or deny it.

            
The party who has requested the admissions may move to determine the 
sufficiency of the answers or objections.  
Unless the court determines that an objection is justified, it shall 
order that an answer be served.  If 
the court determines that an answer does not comply with the requirements of 
this rule, it may order either that the matter is admitted or that an amended 
answer be served.  The court may, in 
lieu of these orders, determine that final disposition of the request be made at 
a pretrial conference or at a designated time prior to trial.  The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to 
the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.

            
(b)  Effect of 
Admission.  Any matter admitted 
under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits 
withdrawal or amendment of the admission.  
Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amendment of a pretrial 
order, the court may permit withdrawal or amendment when the presentation of the 
merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the party who obtained the 
admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice 
that party in maintaining the action or defense on the merits.  Any admission made by a party under this 
rule is for the purpose of the pending action only and is not an admission for 
any other purpose nor may it be used against the party in any other 
proceeding.

 
 
[¶11]   We have held that the district 
courts have broad discretion to manage pretrial discovery matters.  Therefore, we review a district court's 
decision on a motion to withdraw or amend admissions under Rule 36(b) by 
applying the abuse of discretion standard.  
Wolf v. Allen, 2008 WY 136, 
¶ 4, 196 P.3d 775, 776 (Wyo. 2008).  
In that case we stated the "abuse of discretion" standard to 
be:

 
 
A 
court abuses its discretion when it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of 
reason under the circumstances.  The 
party who is attacking the trial court's ruling has the burden to establish an 
abuse of discretion, and the ultimate issue is whether the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did.

 
 
[¶12]   In our decisions, we have not been 
altogether consistent in articulating what we mean by "abuse of 
discretion."  However, the following 
is the statement of its meaning as we have employed it since the publication of 
our decision in Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151-52 (Wyo. 1998):

 
 
Over 
the years, an abuse of discretion has frequently been described by this Court as 
"an error of law in the circumstances." Eager v. Derowitsch, 68 Wyo. 251, 264, 
232 P.2d 713, 717 (1951).  This 
phrasing apparently first appeared in Wyoming in the Eager case, and recent examples of its 
invocation are found in [many cases] (citations omitted).  We have begun to question the validity 
of such a definition of abuse of discretion, and have suggested that "the 
ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it 
did."  Gaines v. Doby, 794 P.2d 566, 570 
(Wyo.1990).  See also, Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1286 
(Wyo.1993).

 
 
            
We conclude that we should no longer describe an abuse of discretion as 
an error of law under the circumstances because a court does not enjoy any 
discretion with respect to an error of law.  We perceive the core of our inquiry as 
reaching the question of reasonableness of the choice made by the trial 
court.  Henceforth, we will turn to 
a definition adopted in Martin v. 
State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo.1986), in which we said:

 
 
      Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wash. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 (1985).  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 
            
We have invoked that definition in [many cases] (citations 
omitted).

 
 
            
While on occasion we have offered a more concise concept of abuse of 
discretion, such as a determination as to whether or not the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did, (Mapp v. 
State, 929 P.2d 1222, 1225 (Wyo.1996); Counts v. State, 899 P.2d 1341, 1343 
(Wyo.1995)), or whether the court acted in a manner which exceeded the bounds of 
reason under the circumstances (Miller v. 
State, 904 P.2d 344, 351 (Wyo.1995); Kupec v. State, 835 P.2d 359, 362 
(Wyo.1992)), in this case we proceed to determine whether the trial court could 
reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its ruling was arbitrary 
or capricious.

 
 
Compare, 
Hodges v. Lewis & Lewis, Inc., 
2005 WY 134, ¶ 11, 121 P.3d 138, 142-43 (Wyo. 2005) (wherein we included 
the abandoned language, "[a]n abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error 
of law committed by the court under the circumstances.").

 
 
[¶13]   We proceed now to invoke the abuse 
of discretion standard we have heretofore applied, albeit not altogether 
consistently, since 1999:

 
 
Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.

 
 

Vaughn, 
962 P.2d  at 151 (citation omitted).

 
 
[¶14]   Furthermore, we apply the 
analytical framework for addressing the specific issue posed here as set out in 
Hodges, ¶¶ 12-14, 121 P.3d at 
143:

 
 
In 
order to satisfy the first prong of the two-part test for withdrawing or 
amending admissions under W.R.C.P. 36(b), the moving party must show that the 
presentation of the merits of the case will be subserved by allowing the 
withdrawal or amendment.  The 
purpose of Rule 36 is "to expedite the trial and to relieve the parties of the 
cost of proving facts that will not be disputed at trial."Perez v. Miami-Dade County, 297 F.3d 1255, 1265 (11th Cir.2002) quoting 8A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller 
& Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2252 (2d ed.1994) [now 
Vol. 8B, 3d ed. 2010].  The first 
factor of the Rule 36(b) test emphasizes the importance of having actions 
resolved on the merits rather than as a result of a technical error.  Raiser, 409 F.3d  at 1246; Perez, 297 F.3d  at 1266.  This requirement is satisfied when it is 
shown that upholding the admissions would practically eliminate any presentation 
of the merits of the case.  Id. Thus, there is a distinct preference 
in the rule for ascertaining the truth and deciding the case on its merits.  Perez, 297 F.3d  at 
1266.

 
 
            
Applying the first part of the test to this case, we conclude that 
allowing Lewis to amend its response to Request for Admission No. 26 which 
stated that Ms. Hodges did not contribute to her injuries subserved the 
presentation of the merits of the controversy.  Lewis had filed an answer denying Ms. 
Hodges' claim that it was negligent and expressly stating, in an affirmative 
defense, that Ms. Hodges was more than fifty percent (50%) at fault for her 
injuries.  If the admission had been 
allowed to stand, it would have essentially decided the breach-of-duty element 
of Ms. Hodges' negligence action.  
Permitting the parties to present evidence on the fault issue advanced 
the search for the truth and promoted a correct legal ruling.  As we stated in Emmett Ranch, Inc. v. Goldmark Engineering, 
Inc., 908 P.2d 941, 945 (Wyo.1995), requests for admission under Rule 36 are 
not intended to resolve ultimate legal matters.  See also, Perez, 297 F.3d  at 1268.  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit phrased it well:

 
 
... 
[W]hen a party uses the rule to establish uncontested facts and to narrow the 
issues for trial, then the rule functions properly.  When a party like Perez, however, uses 
the rule to harass the other side or, as in this case, with the wild-eyed hope 
that the other side will fail to answer and therefore admit essential elements 
(that the party has already denied in its answer), the rule's time-saving 
function ceases; the rule instead becomes a weapon, dragging out the litigation 
and wasting valuable resources.  

 
 

Perez, 
297 F.3d  at 1268.

 
 
            
The second part of the Rule 36(b) test requires the party seeking to have 
the admissions upheld to show it would be prejudiced by withdrawal or amendment 
of the admissions.  "The prejudice 
contemplated by Rule 36(b) is not simply that a party who obtained the admission 
now has to convince the jury of its truth.  
"Bergemann v. United States, 
820 F.2d 1117, 1121 (10th Cir.1987).  
Instead, the party seeking to have the admissions enforced must show that 
it will have difficulty proving its case as a result of the withdrawal of the 
admissions.  For example, prejudice 
may be established if key witnesses are unavailable to testify about the matter 
which was initially admitted under Rule 36.  The amount of time the party seeking to 
uphold the admission has relied upon it may also be important to determining 
whether that party would be prejudiced by withdrawal or amendment of the 
admission.  Smith v. First National Bank, 837 F.2d 1575, 1577-78 (11th Cir.1988) quoting Brook Village North Assoc. v. General Elec. 
Co., 686 F.2d 66, 70 (1st Cir.1982).

 
 
[¶15]   In the instant case, Rohrer asserts 
that she did respond to the requests for admissions, although she had no proof 
of that contention.  However, she 
answered both the initial and the amended complaints with forthright denials of 
the gravamen of the complaint, i.e., that she owed Chase (or Group 7) any money 
for the credit card Account at issue.  
Rohrer does not appear to contest the matters posed in admission nos. 
1-6, but denies 7-10.  Although we 
decline to characterize the request for admission used in this case as being a 
"wild-eyed hope that the other side will fail to answer," we do perceive it as 
an attempt to obtain Rohrer's admissions to matters that she had vehemently 
denied multiple times since 2004.  
We deem that a circumstance which satisfies the first part of the test  
i.e., the presentation of the merits of the case will be subserved by allowing 
withdrawal of at least those admissions contained in items 6-10.  Secondarily, Group 7 has not come 
forward with a plausible argument that it would be prejudiced by allowing Rohrer 
the opportunity to tell her apparently quite brief story, and otherwise present 
her case, to a fact-finder.  In sum, 
we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by not allowing Rohrer 
to withdraw those admissions which go to the matters which she has denied since 
this matter first arose over six years ago.

 
 
Genuine 
Issues of Material Fact

 
 
[¶16]   Rohrer also contends that if the 
admissions Group 7 is dependent on are permitted to be withdrawn, then a genuine 
issue of material fact exists because her denial that she owes the debt at issue 
is at odds with Group 7's contention that she owes a debt owned by Group 7 via 
the bill of sale that does not include the Exhibit "A" referenced therein.  We are further persuaded that that 
contention is sound.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶17]   The district court's summary 
judgment order is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the district court 
with directions that Rohrer's motion to withdraw admissions 6-10 be granted and, 
furthermore, that this matter be set for trial.