Case Title: EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF WYOMING v. LARAMIE CABS, INC.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-05-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF WYOMING v. LARAMIE CABS, INC.1985 WY 69700 P.2d 399Case Number: 84-71Decided: 05/31/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
COMMISSION OF WYOMING, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT), 

v. 

LARAMIE CABS, INC., 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

 
 
Carl J. 
Hildebrand, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming, Casper, for appellant 
(defendant-respondent).

No appearance for appellee 
(plaintiff-petitioner).

Before THOMAS*, C.J., and ROSE, ROONEY**, BROWN and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* Became Chief Justice 
January 1, 1985.

** Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The sole issue raised 
in this appeal is whether the taxicab drivers who lease cabs from appellee 
Laramie Cabs, Inc. in exchange for a percentage of the fares are employees under 
the terms of the Wyoming Employment Security Law, §§ 27-3-101 through 27-3-704, 
W.S. 1977. Appellant Employment Security Commission of Wyoming classified these 
workers as employees and required appellee to contribute to the unemployment 
compensation fund on their behalf. The district court overturned the agency's 
action on the ground that Laramie Cabs lacked sufficient control over the 
drivers, either in fact or under the lease agreement, for the drivers to qualify 
as employees under the employment security law.

[¶2.]     While we agree with the 
district court's determination that the drivers performed their services outside 
the control of Laramie Cabs, that finding alone does not determine the workers' 
employment status under the law. We will hold that Laramie Cabs failed to carry 
its burden of establishing that the taxicab drivers were not in its employment, 
as that term is defined in § 27-3-104(b), W.S. 1977, of the employment security 
law. We will, therefore, reverse the decision of the district court and 
reinstate the final action of the Employment Security Commission of Wyoming, 
which requires appellee to contribute to the unemployment compensation fund 
according to the wages earned by the taxicab drivers.

FACTS

[¶3.]     In the summer of 1982, 
Robert Sullivan, president of Laramie Cabs, Inc., notified the Employment 
Security Commission of Wyoming (ESC or Commission) that he considered his 
taxicab drivers to be independent contractors and that he wished to discontinue 
payments on their earnings to the unemployment compensation fund. Sullivan 
prepared a lease agreement under which Laramie Cabs would lease its vehicles to 
licensed taxicab operators, who would enjoy "complete discretion" in performing 
the duties generally associated with the taxicab business.

[¶4.]     The field auditor and 
the contributions audit section of ESC determined that the leasing arrangement 
did not suffice to alter the status of the drivers as employees under the 
employment security law. Laramie Cabs appealed that decision to the Commission 
and requested a hearing pursuant to § 27-3-502, W.S. 1977.1 Prior to the hearing, Laramie Cabs 
began operating under the lease agreements. Accordingly, by the time of the 
employer liability hearing on March 1, 1983, appellee was able to present 
evidence of the actual working conditions under the new lease 
agreements.

The Lease 
Agreement

[¶5.]     The Taxicab Lease 
Agreement provides for Laramie Cabs to lease its radio-equipped vehicles to 
licensed operators and to maintain the cabs and equipment in good working 
condition. Laramie Cabs further agrees to furnish all gas, oil, antifreeze, and 
tires, to maintain liability insurance, and to assume responsibility for all 
licenses, taxes and fees for each vehicle. Paragraph 2 obligates the company to 
notify the drivers by radio or telephone of potential 
passengers:

"2. Services: Lessor agrees to make 
available telephone call service, radio service, and to furnish repair and 
maintenance service in connection with the operation of said leased taxicab. 
Lessor agrees to notify the various lessees of its taxicabs of calls received 
from persons desiring transportation upon an impartial basis in rotation or by 
notifying lessee of that taxicab which is nearest the location of the 
call."

[¶6.]     In exchange for these 
services, supplies and equipment, the lessees-drivers agree to pay Laramie Cabs 
60 percent of the fares collected each day and to abide by the company's rate 
schedule. The drivers further agree to operate the leased cabs reasonably, 
courteously, and lawfully and to test the equipment each 
day:

"9. Operate Carefully and Lawfully: In order 
to protect lessor's good will and licenses, lessee agrees to conduct himself (or 
herself) and to operate said taxicab reasonably, prudently, gentlemanly and 
courteously in a careful manner and in conformity with all laws, ordinances and 
regulations of the United States, the State of Wyoming and the City of Laramie 
and any political subdivision thereof, it being expressly understood between the 
parties hereto that once the lessee takes possession of the taxicab, _he will 
exercise complete discretion in the operation of same and in the performance of 
those duties tenerally [sic] recognized to be part of performing taxicab 
services. Discretion in the operation of the said taxicab is vested in the 
lessee and the lessor shall do no more than make available to lessee telephone 
call service or radion [sic] service of prospective passengers; lessee further 
agrees to return said taxicab to lessor at the end of each 24 hour term in as 
good a condition and repair as it was when received by lessee, reasonable use 
and ordinary wear and tear excepted. Lessee further agrees to inspect his (or 
her) taxicab at the beginning of each term, that _he will test the brakes, both 
foot and emergency, lights, signal lights and all other equipment; if lessee 
notes any defects, _he shall immediately report said defects to 
lessor."

The lease 
agreement may be canceled by either party upon written 
notice:

"6. Term: The term of this lease is for a 
period of twenty-four hours, but this lease shall be automatically renewed for a 
period of 24 hours per day from day to day under the same terms and conditions 
as stated herein unless one of the parties to this lease gives notice to the 
other party in writing that this lease shall not be 
renewed."

Finally, the 
agreement purports to establish the drivers as independent contractors, 
ineligible for unemployment benefits:

"11. Status of Lessee: By this agreement the 
lessor and the lessee acknowledge and agree that there does not exist between 
them the relationship of employer-employee, principal-agent, or master-servant, 
either express or implied, but that the relationship of the parties hereto is 
strictly that of lessor-lessee, the lessee being an independent contractor free 
from interference or control on the part of the lessor in the operation of said 
taxicab, subject only to adherence to applicable statutes and ordinances of the 
state, county and city in which said lessee operates equipment leased from 
lessor.

"12. Unemployment Insurance: Inasmuch as the 
relationship between the parties hereto is that of lessor and lessee, lessor 
shall not make any remittances for unemployment insurance and lessee shall not 
make any application for benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Act of the 
State of Wyoming upon the termination of this 
lease."

Actual Working 
Conditions

[¶7.]     Laramie Cabs, the only 
taxicab service based in Laramie, holds a city license to provide 
intracity transportation and a permit from the Wyoming Public Service Commission 
to operate within the state. Sullivan, the company president, testified that he 
maintains a list of persons who have been licensed by the City of Laramie to drive taxicabs. 
When a cab becomes available for lease, the company enters into an agreement 
with one of these eligible drivers.

[¶8.]     Laramie Cabs obtains 
almost all of its business from patrons who contact the company by telephone. 
The dispatcher notifies the nearest driver, who can refuse to take the fare if 
he chooses. When that occurs, another driver, Sullivan or his wife transports 
the customer. Sullivan testified that each driver sets the days and hours which 
he wishes to work. The drivers enjoy some personal use of the leased vehicles, 
but must return the cabs to a central location when they are not available to 
drive for an extended period of time. Each driver pays his own fines for traffic 
violations as well as the liability-insurance surcharges which result from such 
violations.

[¶9.]     Laramie Cabs presented 
evidence to establish that other governmental agencies, including the United 
States Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service, have recognized 
taxicab drivers as independent contractors under the type of lease agreement at 
issue here. Sullivan testified that the Wyoming Workmen's Compensation Division 
reviewed the company's lease agreement and concluded that the cab drivers were 
not employees for purposes of the Worker's Compensation Act. Finally, appellee 
introduced a summary of the results of a national survey of taxicab company 
operators, prepared by the University of North 
Carolina, which indicates that in 1982 58 percent of 
taxicab drivers were independent contractors.

Disposition by the Agency 
and the District Court

[¶10.]  Based on the foregoing evidence presented 
by appellee at the administrative hearing, ESC determined that the taxicab 
drivers were employees under the employment security law:

"We conclude that these 
drivers were subject to direction and control by Laramie Cabs, Inc. Such is 
indicated by the ability of either party to terminate the relationship at any 
time without incurring liability, the restrictions on fares and the requirements 
concerning operating procedures. Also, the usual course of business for Laramie 
Cabs, Inc., is to provide cab service. It is apparent that the service provided 
by cab drivers is within that course of business. By necessity, the `places of 
business' for Laramie Cabs, Inc., are principally the taxicabs themselves; these 
services were obviously performed therein by its drivers. In addition, the 
drivers were not customarily engaged in an independently established trade, 
occupation, or business. If they wish to drive a taxi in Laramie, Wyoming, they can only work for Laramie Cabs, 
Inc. The drivers have made no capital investment, and they are not responsible 
for sales taxes, advertising, gasoline and oil expenses, liability insurance, 
maintenance or other overhead.

* * * * * 
*

"It is our decision that 
the taxicab drivers working for Laramie Cabs, Inc., are engaged in employment 
for Laramie Cabs, Inc., and the wages paid are subject to Employment Security 
contributions."

Laramie Cabs 
petitioned the district court to review this final agency action. After 
consideration of the record, the court overturned the Commission's decision on 
the ground that Laramie Cabs lacked sufficient control over the drivers, either 
under the contract or in fact, to classify them as employees within the meaning 
of the employment security law. The Commission has appealed the district court's 
decision to this court.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶11.]  Established standards guide our review of 
an appeal which stems from an administrative action following a hearing. We 
review the action as though it came directly to this court from the agency and 
are not bound to accept any of the conclusions reached in the district court. Wyoming State Department of Education v. 
Barber, Wyo., 649 P.2d 681, 689 (1982). We follow the 
same rules of review as did the district court. Id. We must uphold the agency's decision which 
is supported by substantial evidence contained in the entire record. Gulf Oil Corporation v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 
Wyo., 693 P.2d 227, 239 (1985); § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E), W.S. 1977. Substantial evidence means 
such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion. Gulf Oil Corporation v. 
Wyoming Oil 
and Gas Conservation Commission, supra.

[¶12.]  In undertaking this review, we note that 
the legislature has expressly designated the Employment Security Commission as 
the body responsible for determining whether a particular working relationship 
constitutes employment under the Act.2 The agency's decision, however, is 
governed by the statutory definition of employment, § 27-3-104(b), W.S. 1977, 
discussed infra. We must, therefore, review the record to determine whether 
substantial evidence supports the agency's findings with respect to each of the 
criteria specified in the statute. Tharp 
v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 57 Wyo. 486, 121 P.2d 172 (1942); Unemployment Compensation Commission of 
Wyoming v. Mathews, 56 Wyo. 479, 111 P.2d 111 
(1941).

EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
LAW

Definition of 
Employment

[¶13.]  The employment security law defines 
employment as services performed for wages and requires the employer to 
contribute to the unemployment compensation fund based on those wages, unless 
the services satisfy three specified conditions. Section 27-3-104(b), W.S. 1977, 
provides:

"(b) Services performed 
by an individual for wages is [are] employment subject to this act unless the 
commission finds:

"(i) The individual is 
free from control or direction over the performance of services by contract and 
by fact;

"(ii) The service is 
outside the usual course of business for which the service is performed or it is 
performed outside all of the employing unit's places of business; 
and

"(iii) The individual is 
customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession or 
business."

Section 
27-3-102(a)(xviii), W.S. 1977, broadly defines wage to include remuneration from 
any source:

"`Wage' means 
remuneration payable for services from any source including commissions, bonuses 
and cash."

We have said 
that the statutory definition of employment determines whether a worker may be 
eligible for unemployment benefits under the Act, Scott v. Fagan, Wyo., 684 P.2d 805, 810 
(1984). A worker is covered by the Act unless the hiring party establishes that 
the worker's services satisfy all three specified conditions of nonemployment. 
Unemployment Compensation Commission of 
Wyoming v. 
Mathews, supra.

[¶14.]  Our legislation parallels that enacted by 
many states to ease the hardships faced by workers who find themselves 
unemployed. See Ben Realty Co. v. 
Employment Security Commission, Wyo., 416 P.2d 220, 222 (1966). As we review 
the status of the taxicab drivers in the case at bar, we find pertinent that 
said by the Supreme Court of Oregon in Kirkpatrick v. Peet, 247 Or. 204, 428 P.2d 405, 409 (1967), in analyzing a statutory definition of employment which 
substantially tracks our § 27-3-104(b)(i) and (iii):

"Our previous cases make 
it clear that in using the word `employment' in the Unemployment Insurance Act 
the legislature did not intend to incorporate the common law test for 
determining the master-servant relationship. Rather, the test is to be found by 
looking at the purpose of the Act. That purpose is served only if the Act is 
construed broadly enough to include persons who, although independent 
contractors according to the common law test, are peculiarly subjected to the 
hazard of unemployment because of the nature of their 
occupation."

See also Clayton v. State, Alas., 598 P.2d 84 
(1979); Graham v. Miera, 59 N.M. 379, 
285 P.2d 493, 496 (1955).

[¶15.]  In recognition of the special purpose of 
employment security laws, courts have held that the agencies created to 
administer such laws are not bound by the rulings of other agencies based on 
different legislative enactments. The Court of Appeals of Arizona, in Arizona Department of Economic Security v. 
Little, 24 Ariz. App. 480, 539 P.2d 954, 956 (1975), discussed its reasons 
for adhering to this position:

"* * * At least as early 
as 1944 in the case of Gaskin v. 
Wayland, 61 Ariz. 291, 148 P.2d 590 (1944), our Supreme Court held that 
terms in our Employment Security Act such as `employment', `employer', `wages', 
and `remuneration' are not words of art with rigid meanings, but rather are used 
as broad terms of description, evidencing a legislative intent to give to the 
Act a broad and liberal coverage to the end that the far-reaching effects of 
unemployment might be alleviated. Likewise, it was held in the case of McClain v. Church, 72 Ariz. 354, 236 P.2d 44 (1951), that determinations by federal courts as to what constitutes 
employment within the meaning of federal statutes are not binding upon Arizona 
courts in determining what constitutes employment within the State Employment 
Security Act. See also Sisk v. Arizona 
Ice & Cold Storage Co., 60 Ariz. 496, 141 P.2d 395 (1943). Therefore it 
was error for the trial court to rely on the administrative ruling of the 
Internal Revenue Service as to the definition of 
employee."

See also Read v. Warkentin, 185 Kan. 286, 341 P.2d 980, 
986 (1959).

[¶16.]  We find the reasoning in these cases 
sound and conclude that general rules concerning the master-servant relationship 
or the independent-contractor concept are not determinative of a worker's status 
under the employment security law. Under § 27-3-104(b), all services for 
remuneration constitute employment subject to the Act, unless the existence of 
all three express factors justifies withdrawing a particular group of workers 
from the Act's coverage. This definition reflects the purpose of the Act to 
afford temporary protection to a broad range of workers involuntarily 
unemployed. With these concepts in mind, we turn to a consideration of the 
record in this case and the statutory criteria for assessing the work 
relationship.

Freedom from 
Control

"The individual is free 
from control or direction over the performance of services by contract and by 
fact * * *." Section 27-3-104(b)(i), W.S. 1977.

[¶17.]  In applying this portion of the test to 
factual situations, in the past, we have found the existence of an employment 
relationship where the employer retained the right to control the details of the 
work, Tharp v. Unemployment Compensation 
Commission, supra, 121 P.2d  at 176, or actually directed the worker's daily 
job performance, Scott v. Fagan, 
supra, 684 P.2d  at 810. Under the Taxicab Lease Agreement in the instant case, 
the drivers agree only to operate their leased vehicles courteously and lawfully 
and to inspect the cabs for defects at the end of each term. The lease leaves 
the details of the job - such as work days, length of shifts and routes - to the 
discretion of the drivers. In practice, the drivers set the days and hours they 
choose to work, use the cabs for nonbusiness purposes, and can refuse to take 
fares at any time. The drivers pay their own fines for traffic violations, thus 
minimizing Laramie Cabs' interest in the daily driving routine. 

[¶18.]  The ESC cited the following facts in 
support of its conclusion that Laramie Cabs retained control over the drivers 
pursuant to the lease agreement:

"* * * The amount charged 
as a fare is not more than the amount in a rate schedule approved by the City of 
Laramie upon application by Laramie Cabs, Inc. * * *

"* * * Under the 
contract, either party to the agreement may terminate the agreement at any time. 
Drivers are required by the contract to operate the assigned cab carefully and 
lawfully, to be courteous to passengers and to inspect the cab before each use 
for any defects and report them to the company."

Our review of 
the entire record, however, convinces us that this evidence of control and 
direction over the drivers' job performance is insubstantial in comparison to 
the freedom enjoyed by the drivers, in fact and under the contract, to perform 
the details of their work as they see fit. The lease agreement sets out only 
broad policies of conduct, leaving the details of performance to the drivers. 
The City of Laramie, rather than Laramie Cabs, limits the 
rates for transporting passengers. While the right of either party to terminate 
the agreement upon written notice provides Laramie Cabs with some degree of 
control over the drivers, Scott v. 
Fagan, supra, this right, standing alone, is insufficient to establish 
control "over the performance of services." Section 27-3-104(b)(i). Davis Cabs, Inc. v. Leach, 115 
Ohio App. 165, 
184 N.E.2d 444 (1962).

Service Outside the 
Course or Places of Business

"The service is outside 
the usual course of business for which the service is performed or it is 
performed outside all of the employing unit's places of business * * *." Section 
27-3-104(b)(ii), W.S. 1977.

[¶19.]  This second factor is framed in the 
alternative so that to remove the taxicab drivers from coverage under the Act, 
their services must be either outside the business of transporting passengers by 
taxicab or performed outside all of the company's places of business. See Unemployment Compensation Commission of 
Wyoming v. Mathews, supra, 111 P.2d  at 118. Since it is undisputed that the 
drivers in this case work within the usual course of the taxicab business, we 
turn to a consideration of whether the vehicles leased to the drivers qualify as 
the taxicab company's place of business.

[¶20.]  The Court of Appeals of Georgia, in Redwine v. Wilkes, 83 Ga. App. 645, 64 S.E.2d 101 (1951), found that taxicab drivers worked within the company's place 
of business where, inter alia, the drivers received notice of waiting customers 
through the company's dispatching system:

"* * * As to subsection 
(B) the evidence showed that the service was performed in the usual course of 
the business of the Everready Cab Co., which was also in the usual course of the 
business of the individual taxicab drivers, and was performed in part at least 
within the place of business of the enterprise for which it was performed, in 
that the Company received telephone calls for patrons and relayed them to 
drivers over its own system, with the operation of which the drivers were not 
concerned * * *." 64 S.E.2d  at 103.

In Clayton v. State, supra, 598 P.2d  at 86, 
the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that a state-owned parcel of land called 
NC-88 constituted a place of business of a timber-cutting company so long as the 
company held a lease to harvest timber from that land:

"* * * With regard to 
(B), Clayton [the proprietor of the timber-cutting company and alleged employer] 
focuses on the second part requiring that the service be performed outside of 
all the places of business of Clayton's enterprises. He claims that his only 
place of business was his mill in Nenana, and that the workers at the NC-88 
leasehold premises were thus performing services `outside of all [his] places of 
business.' This argument is simply unrealistic. Clayton's business involves 
processing lumber; NC-88, for which he bid on and won a contract to harvest 
timber, must be considered a place of business in 1974."

[¶21.]  The business of Laramie Cabs consists of 
providing transportation to customers as requested. The taxicabs are leased to 
qualified drivers solely for the purpose of supplying such service. Customers 
trigger the dispatch of the leased vehicles by calling Laramie Cabs and 
requesting transportation. The taxicabs bear the company name and insignia, thus 
advertising their availability for hire.

[¶22.]  The essence of Laramie Cabs' business is 
conducted in cabs between the customer's origin and destination, not in the 
company office. Given the nature of the taxicab business, we conclude that the 
vehicles which provide the service must be considered a place of business of the 
taxicab company.

Independent 
Business

"The individual is 
customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession or 
business." Section 27-3-104(b)(iii), W.S. 1977.

[¶23.]  The ESC cited the following facts in 
support of its conclusion that the taxicab drivers were not customarily engaged 
in independent businesses:

"* * * The drivers do not 
operate taxicabs for any other company and work under the auspices of the 
permits obtained by Laramie Cabs, Inc. The phone listing is placed under the 
name of Laramie Cabs, Inc., and any advertising is paid for by Laramie Cabs, 
Inc. Laramie Cabs, Inc., pays for the fuel, insurance, license plates, and 
P.S.C. plates. Laramie Cabs, Inc. * * * provides whatever maintenance and 
repairs are needed by the taxicabs.

* * * * * 
*

"The drivers for Laramie 
Cabs, Inc., make no capital investment in the corporation. If Mr. Sullivan 
agrees to place a driver on his list, the driver must only obtain his operating 
license and sign his contract."

[¶24.]  We considered the question of whether 
barbers were engaged in an independently established business in Tharp v. Unemployment Compensation 
Commission, supra, 121 P.2d  at 177. There the barbers and the barber-shop 
owner had entered into license agreements under which each barber received use 
of a chair, lavatory and surrounding space in the shop. The shop owner agreed to 
furnish supplies and utilities. We said:

"The barbers in question 
were not in this case `engaged in an independently established trade, 
occupation, profession or business'. Under the License agreement Tharp bought 
their supplies, furnished them light, heat, water and a place to work and 
equipment vital to the carrying on of their business, i.e., chairs and 
lavatories, they supplying only the less expensive tools of their profession. 
This disposes of the requirement subd. (5)(C), supra [now (b)(iii)]." 121 P.2d  
at 177.

[¶25.]  In discussing Oregon's counterpart to § 
27-3-104(b)(iii), the Supreme Court of that state said in Kirkpatrick v. Peet, supra, 428 P.2d at 
409-410:

"It is to be noted that 
the statute requires the occupation to be both `independently established' and 
`customarily' engaged in. This requirement is not met if the continued existence 
of the enterprise depends upon its relationship with a particular employer. If 
there is such dependence, the person employed does not have the prospect of 
supporting himself in the pursuit of his occupation if the person employing him 
terminates the relationship. It was the purpose of the Unemployment Insurance 
Act to provide relief where there was this type of risk of 
unemployment."

The Supreme 
Court of Washington espoused the same rule of independence in Schuffenhauer v. Department of Employment 
Security, 86 Wn.2d 233, 543 P.2d 343, 347 (1975), holding that Washington's 
statutory equivalent of § 27-3-104(b)(iii) calls for an enterprise which exists 
separate and apart from the relationship with the particular employer and which 
will survive termination of that relationship.

[¶26.]  The Appellate Court of Indiana, in Young v. Indiana Employment Security 
Board, 134 Ind. App. 263, 187 N.E.2d 489, 492 (1963), concluded that cab 
drivers were not engaged in an independently established 
trade:

"As to being engaged in 
an independently established trade or business, the drivers employed none of 
their own capital, owned none of the equipment, had no business or overhead 
expense, nor did they incur any financial risk. The appellants are the ones who 
were engaged in the taxi business, and the drivers devoted their time and effort 
to the important function necessary to the taxi business of driving and 
operating such cabs."

Similarly, the 
Court of Appeals of Georgia, in Redwine v. Wilkes, supra, held that cab 
drivers did not engage in an independent business since they were required to 
operate under the auspices of the holder of a common carrier 
permit:

"* * * As to subsection 
(C) [Georgia's counterpart to our subsection (b)(iii)] the evidence was 
undisputed that in order for any taxicab driver in the City of Athens to operate 
a cab in that city it was necessary not only that he have an individual license, 
but that this license be used under and in connection with a franchise or permit 
granted to some person, firm or corporation who had qualified as a common 
carrier for hire and who carried insurance and otherwise fulfilled the 
conditions of the franchise. None of the drivers in question had such a 
franchise, nor did they customarily engage in an independently established trade 
or occupation." 64 S.E.2d  at 104.

[¶27.]  The taxicab drivers in the instant case 
work in conformance with the city and state permits held by Laramie Cabs. The 
company furnishes gas, oil and other supplies, carries liability insurance, pays 
licensing fees and maintains the cabs and other equipment. Laramie Cabs 
furnished the capital to purchase the cabs and other equipment and bears the 
risks attendant upon such investment. In sum, the drivers depend on their 
relationship with Laramie Cabs to earn their livelihood as taxicab drivers. We 
conclude that the evidence amply supports the Commission's finding that the 
drivers are not engaged in independent trades, occupations, professions or 
businesses within the meaning of the employment security 
law.

[¶28.]  Finally, we note that the drivers' 
agreement, under the leasing arrangement, to waive any claim to unemployment 
benefits does not control the issues in this case. Section 27-3-319(a), W.S. 
1977, provides that such agreements made by employees are 
void:

"Except as provided by 
W.S. 27-3-305 [concerning unemployment benefits withheld to satisfy an 
employee's child-support obligations], any agreement to waive, release or 
commute benefit rights or any other rights under this act [§§ 27-3-101 through 
27-3-704] is void * * *."

[¶29.]  Substantial evidence exists in support of 
the Commission's conclusion that Laramie Cabs failed to satisfy, with respect to 
its taxicab drivers, all of the exceptions to employment as defined in the 
employment security law. Therefore, the Commission's finding of employment is 
reinstated and the decision of the district court is 
reversed.

1 Section 27-3-502(a), 
W.S. 1977, provides in part:

"Upon its own motion or 
application of an employing unit and after notice and opportunity for hearing, 
the commission may determine if an employing unit is an employer and if services 
performed for the employing unit qualify as employment."

2 Section 27-3-104(b), 
W.S. 1977 provides in part:

"Services performed by an 
individual for wages is [are] employment subject to this act unless the commission finds [the 
existence of specified conditions.] * * *" (Emphasis 
added.)

THOMAS, Chief Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶30.]  I agree with all that is said in the 
majority opinion except that with respect to the proposition of the right of 
control over the performance of services I would go even further than the 
majority. Were I one of the drivers for Laramie Cabs, Inc., I would be quite 
certain that if I did not comply with the desires of the owner the lease would 
not be renewed for the next twenty-four-hour period. I believe that 
pragmatically the lease must be perceived as furnishing to the owner the 
equivalent right of control that is to be found in any employment at will. 
Furthermore, under the appropriate standard of review, while different arbiters 
might reach different conclusions, the record contains substantial evidence 
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion that 
the owner had preserved an effective right of control.

ROONEY, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom CARDINE, Justice, 
joins.

[¶31.]  Although I agree with much of that said 
in the majority opinion, I believe that the substantial evidence before the 
commission established the status of the taxicab drivers to be that of 
independent contractors rather than that of employees of appellee. The letter 
opinion of the district court judge, the Honorable Arthur T. Hanscum, properly 
analyzed this relationship, and I would affirm his 
holding.

STANDARDS OF 
REVIEW

[¶32.]  The majority opinion notes that we must 
review an agency action based upon the evidence before such agency (unless 
additional evidence was taken by the district court pursuant to Rule 12.08, 
W.R.A.P.), and that we should affirm such action if it was based upon 
substantial evidence. However, we do not apply the same standard as applied to 
appeals in other matters; i.e., since 1979, we do not consider only the evidence 
of the prevailing party in gauging the existence of substantial evidence.1 In Board of Trustees of School District No. 4, 
Big Horn County v. Colwell, Wyo., 611 P.2d 427, 428-429 (1980), we pointed 
out that:

"Prior to 1979, the 
`substantial evidence' standard was definitely mandated in the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act:

"`(c) The court's review 
pursuant to the provisions of this section shall be limited to a determination 
that:

* * * * * 
*

"`(iv) The findings of 
facts in issue in a contested case are supported by substantial evidence * * *.' 
Former § 9-4-114(c), W.S. 1977.

"This subsection was 
amended, effective May 25, 1979, to require agency action, findings and 
conclusions to be supported by substantial evidence, but also to provide for a 
review of the `whole record.' Under this standard, we do not examine the record 
only to determine if there is substantial evidence to support the Board's 
decision, but we must also examine the conflicting evidence to determine if the 
Board could reasonably have made its findings and order upon all of the evidence 
before it. After reviewing the history and rationale in changing the 
`substantial evidence' rule in the Wagner Act to the `whole record' provision of 
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (similar to present provisions of § 
9-4-114(c) [now § 16-3-114(c)]), the consideration is stated in Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor 
Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S. Ct. 456, 465, 95 L. Ed. 456 (1951), 
and quoted in National Labor Relations 
Board v. Walton Manufacturing Company, 369 U.S. 404, 405, 82 S. Ct. 853, 854, 
7 L. Ed. 2d 829 (1962):

"`* * * the "reviewing 
court is not barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot 
conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial, 
when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including 
the body of evidence opposed to the Board's view," it may not "displace the 
Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would 
justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo." 
* * *'" (Footnote omitted.)

We have also 
recognized another standard for review in this type of case: 

"We must strongly 
emphasize, however, that each case of this character must be decided upon its 
own set of facts. It is impossible to lay down a general rule and the case at 
bar may not be regarded as a precedent or controlling force in all litigated 
matters of this character." Unemployment 
Compensation Commission of Wyoming v. Mathews, 
56 Wyo. 
479, 111 P.2d 111 (1941).

TAXICAB 
DRIVERS

[¶33.]  The status of taxicab drivers has been a 
particular problem with reference to unemployment compensation statutes. The 
district court recognized this fact and noted that there was "competent legal 
authority on both sides of the coin," citing several cases holding each way. It 
pointed out that the cases with factual and statutory similarities with this 
case and our statute found the status to be that of independent contractor. The 
trial court referred to Annot.: Taxicab driver as employee of owner of cab, or 
independent contractor, under social security and unemployment insurance 
statutes, 10 A.L.R.2d 369 (1950); to Treasury Regulation 90, promulgated under 
Title IX of the Social Security Act, Art. 205; and to the definitions of 
"servant," "master," and "independent contractor" in Restatement of Agency 2d, 
§§ 2 and 220 (1958), to establish that the determinative factor on the issue of 
whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor is the amount of 
control exercised over the worker in the means, manner of performance and result 
in connection with the work activity.

[¶34.]  The district court referred to and quoted 
from Woods v. Nicholas, 163 F.2d 615 
(10th Cir. 1947); Party Cab Co. v. United 
States of America, 172 F.2d 87 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied 338 U.S. 818, 
70 S. Ct. 62, 94 L. Ed. 496; and Davis 
Cabs, Inc. v. Leach, 115 Ohio App. 165, 184 N.E.2d 444 (1962), to illustrate 
holdings and reasoning of other courts that taxicab drivers are independent 
contractors and not employees under the circumstances of this case. It noted 
that Davis Cabs, Inc. v. Leach was a 
case "virtually on `all fours' with the instant case" in that its lease 
agreement was almost identical to that in this case.

THE 
STATUTE

[¶35.]  The majority opinion directs its 
attention to the three items listed in § 27-3-104(b), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Pamphlet),2 as those which mark services by an 
individual as those of an independent contractor. I need not here consider the 
first of these three items inasmuch as the majority opinion agrees with the 
district court that such first item was satisfied in this case. In reviewing the 
facts of this case, the majority opinion agrees that a review of the entire 
record reflects that appellee's "control and direction over the drivers' job 
performance is insubstantial in comparison to the freedom enjoyed by the 
drivers, in fact and under the contract."

[¶36.]  However, the majority opinion finds the 
two other requirements of § 27-3-104(b) were not met in this case. I disagree. I 
believe that under the facts of this case, the commission could not reasonably 
have made findings that (1) the services performed by the drivers were not 
performed outside appellee's place of business, and (2) the drivers were not 
customarily engaged in an independent occupation.

Outside of Places of 
Business

[¶37.]  The legislature did not intend the 
language of § 27-3-104(b)(ii) to encompass all of appellee's taxicabs as being 
"places of business," as was concluded by the majority opinion. In construing a 
statute, words must be given their ordinary, usual and plain meaning, and 
accorded their most obvious import. Stagner v. WyomingState 
Tax Commission, Wyo., 682 P.2d 326, appeal 
dismissed ___ U.S. ___, 105 S. Ct. 237, 83 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1984); Ward v. Board of Com'rs. of 
JohnsonCounty, 36 Wyo. 
460, 256 P. 1039 (1927); Board of 
Commissioners of WestonCounty v. Blakely, 20 Wyo. 259, 123 P. 72 
(1912).

"* * * If a statute 
employs a term which has not a technical law, but has a standard popular 
meaning, it presumably employs it in the latter, unless another sense is clearly 
intended. * * *"

McCann v. The 
United States of 
America, 2 Wyo. 274, 298 
(1880).

Additionally, 
portions of an act must be read in pari materia, and every word, clause and 
sentence of it must be given effect, all with the purpose of ascertaining and 
giving effect to the legislative intent. Haddenham v. City of 
Laramie, Wyo., 648 P.2d 551 
(1982); Ross v. Trustees of 
University, 31 Wyo. 464, 228 P. 642 
(1924).

[¶38.]  "[P]laces of business" may have varied 
shades of meaning resulting from the context in which the phrase is employed. 
Normally there can be a distinction between places of business and places where 
business is conducted. Likewise, there can normally be a distinction between 
places of business and places of employment. Sometimes the three terms can refer 
to the same place. There can be more than one place of business, more than one 
place where business is conducted and more than one place of employment. A 
building contractor or a carpenter contractor may conduct his business on the 
premises of a person who is having a house built. The premises may be the 
primary place of employment for the painter and carpenters doing the work and 
they may be a place where the contractors are conducting business. But the 
premises are not the places of business for the contractors. Process cannot be 
served on the contractors by leaving it at the houses with their owners as the 
"places of business" for the contractors. Their places of business are their 
offices, warehouses, etc., from which their contracting operations are really 
conducted.

[¶39.]  That contained in the last paragraph is 
recited only to illustrate the varied shades of meaning which may be attributed 
to the words "places of business" resulting from the context in which used. The 
meaning may be slightly different where used in the context of service of 
process, licensing, liquor laws, parole, possession of fire arms, corporate 
activities, commercial code, etc. My position with reference to use of the 
phrase in § 27-3-104(b)(ii) has to do only with its use for unemployment 
compensation tax purposes by appellee and only with reference to the facts of 
this case.

[¶40.]  In defining the plain and ordinary 
meaning of the term "places of business" as used in a statute worded as § 
27-3-104(b)(ii), the Washington court held in Northwest Tool & Supply, Inc. v. 
Employment Security Department, 15 Wn. App. 118, 547 P.2d 908, 910 (1976), 
that "the term `places of business' * * * was intended to refer only to fixed 
locations from or within which the employer transacts business, such as an 
office or warehouse." The issue in that case was whether the statute entitled 
the employer to an exemption from payment of unemployment compensation taxes. 
The dispute centered on whether the services of the sales people were performed 
outside of all the places of business of the employer, where the fact situation 
was that trucks were used as display areas and as transportation for the 
automobile salesmen to reach potential customers and to deliver tools. Certainly 
if these display delivery trucks were not the employer's "places of business," 
the taxicabs involved in this case were not appellee's "places of 
business."

[¶41.]  The language "or it is performed outside 
all of the employing unit's places of business" would have no pertinency at all 
as a condition for independent contract status if "places of business" were 
interpreted to be places where business is conducted, such as in taxicabs as 
decided by the majority opinion. There never could be an instance or place in 
which the person whose status is in question was not conducting business for or 
with the employing unit. Such interpretation was not intended. The very language 
of the paragraph anticipates situations in which the places where business is 
conducted are outside of the employing unit's place of business. The statute 
must be interpreted so as to give it effect in some situations. Every word, 
clause and sentence of a statute must be considered so that no part is 
inoperative or superfluous. Attletweedt 
v. State, Wyo., 684 P.2d 812 (1984); Haddenham v. City of Laramie, supra. 
Part of appellee's business may have been conducted in the taxicabs, and the 
drivers' places of employment may have been in the taxicabs, but the taxicabs 
were not appellee's places of business. A number of similar situations can be 
noticed: A law firm's place of business is not the courtroom; a post office's 
place of business is not each of the houses in the block where a mailman 
delivers mail, etc. Yet, these are places where the employer must conduct 
business. The legislature did not intend to designate the taxicabs as appellee's 
places of business.

[¶42.]  The requirement of § 27-3-104(b)(ii) is 
pertinent to a situation such as existed in Tharp v. Unemployment Compensation 
Commission, 57 Wyo. 486, 121 P.2d 172 (1942), wherein, as noted in the 
majority opinion, the lease agreement was for the barber chair, lavatory and 
surrounding space in the lessor's barber shop. Obviously the services to be 
performed were not to be done outside the employing unit's place of business - a 
situation entirely different from that in this case.

[¶43.]  Also of pertinency is the fact agreed 
upon in the majority opinion that appellee does not have control or direction 
over the performance of the drivers' services by contract or by fact. Such 
control could exist even if the services were performed outside appellee's 
places of business, and, perhaps could not exist even if performed within 
appellee's places of business. But the failure to have such control under the 
circumstances of this case is an important factor in deciding that the services 
were performed outside appellee's places of business. Lack of control over the 
manner in which the drivers operated the taxicabs, when they were operated, or 
where they were operated would amount to an inability on the part of appellee to 
control his own places of business - if the taxicabs are his places of business. 
Such result seems inconsistent with the normal and usual principles, rights, 
duties and obligations which are incident to the relationship which one has over 
his places of business.

[¶44.]  Additionally, when § 27-3-104 is read as 
a whole, taxicab driving is not included within the statutory itemized list of 
that considered to be "`employment.'" Where a statute enumerates the subjects or 
things on which it is to operate, or the persons affected, or forbids certain 
things, it is to be construed as excluding from its effect all those not 
expressly mentioned under the rule of "`Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.'" 
Town of Pine Bluffs v. State Board of Equalization, 79 
Wyo. 262, 333 P.2d 700, 708 (1958). Subsection (b) of § 27-3-104 applied in the majority 
opinion in reaching its result and quoted in full supra is preceded by 
subsection (a), which reads:

"As used in this act [§§ 
27-3-101 through 27-3-704], `employment' means service:

"(i) Performed by an 
employee defined under 26 U.S.C. § 3306(i) including service in interstate 
commerce, except 26 U.S.C. § 3121(d)(2) does not apply;

"(ii) Subject to any 
federal tax against which credit may be taken for contribution payments into any 
state unemployment fund;

"(iii) Required to be 
employment under this act as a condition for full tax credit against the tax 
imposed by 26 U.S.C. § 3301 through 3311; and

"(iv) Otherwise specified 
under W.S. 27-3-104 through 27-3-108."

[¶45.]  26 U.S.C. § 1982 ed. § 3306(i) except 26 
U.S.C. § 1982 ed. § 3121(d)(2) used in § 27-3-104(a)(i) to define employment 
service causes the applicable federal law to be: 

"* * * `[E]mployee' means 
-

"(1) any officer of a 
corporation; or

* * * * * 
*

"(3) any individual 
(other than an individual who is an employee under paragraph (1) or (2)) who 
performs services for remuneration for any person -

"(A) as an agent-driver 
or commission-driver engaged in distributing meat products, vegetable products, 
fruit products, bakery products, beverages (other than milk), or laundry or 
dry-cleaning services, for his principal;

* * * * * 
*

"(D) as a traveling or 
city salesman, other than as an agent-driver or commission-driver, engaged upon 
a full-time basis in the solicitation on behalf of, and the transmission to, his 
principal (except for sideline sales activities on behalf of some other person) 
of orders from wholesalers, retailers, contractors, or operators of hotels, 
restaurants, or other similar establishments for merchandise for resale or 
supplies for use in their business operations;

"if the contract of 
service contemplates that substantially all of such services are to be performed 
personally by such individual; except that an individual shall not be included 
in the term `employee' under the provisions of this paragraph if such individual 
has a substantial investment in facilities used in connection with the 
performance of such services (other than in facilities for transportation), or 
if the services are in the nature of a single transaction not part of a 
continuing relationship with the person for whom the services are performed."3

The district 
court analyzed the foregoing and concluded that taxicab drivers did not fit the 
definition contained therein. The district court went on to say in its opinion 
letter:

"* * * Furthermore, it is 
interesting to note that the Internal Revenue Service has recognized the 
drivers' independent status in the 
present case, meaning the Petitioner [appellee] need not make contributions 
under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (26 U.S.C. § 3301 through 3311), a 
condition referred to in Wyoming's act, W.S. 27-3-104(a)(iii) cited above. Since 
the I.R.S. has recognized the drivers' nonemployee status under their laws, it 
seems this gives further credence to Petitioner's [appellee's] position in this 
case." (Emphasis added.)

[¶46.]  Construing § 27-3-104 as a whole, 
subsection (a) supports an interpretation of the language in paragraph (ii) of 
subsection (b) to not include the taxicabs as appellee's places of 
business.

Independent 
Occupation

[¶47.]  With reference to the third requirement 
of § 27-3-104(b) of the independent contractor status, the very factors which 
the majority opinion accepted to reflect a lack of control by appellee over the 
drivers establish the independent occupation of the drivers and the fact that 
they customarily engage in driving the taxicabs. The majority opinion 
recites:

"* * * Under the Taxicab 
Lease Agreement in the instant case, the drivers agree only to operate their 
leased vehicles courteously and lawfully and to inspect the cabs for defects at 
the end of each term. The lease leaves the details of the job - such as work 
days, length of shifts and routes - to the discretion of the drivers. In 
practice, the drivers set the days and hours they choose to work, use the cabs 
for nonbusiness purposes, and can refuse to take fares at any time. The drivers 
pay their own fines for traffic violations, thus minimizing Laramie Cabs' 
interest in the daily driving routine."

The district 
court points out that the lease agreement purports to create a lessor-lessee 
relationship where the lessee is an "independent contractor free from 
interference or control on the part of the lessor in the operation of said 
taxicab." The lessee is liable for sales and all other taxes. The drivers are 
free to take or refuse calls, set their own hours and days they wish to work, 
charge a fee of any amount up to the fare schedule, and use the taxicab for 
their own personal use. The dispatching feature is also optional with the 
driver.

[¶48.]  All of these factors bear on the 
existence of an independent occupation on the part of the drivers. Today many 
businesses and occupations do not purchase their automobiles, tractor-trailers, 
trucks, etc. They lease them, usually with the lessor paying for the insurance, 
licenses, etc. One can rent a vehicle from the size of a pickup to a large van 
with which to move freight or furniture or almost any commodity, without 
becoming an employee of the lessor. Many of the freight and moving companies 
lease all of their motor fleets. An employer-employee relationship does not 
result in those situations. Section 27-3-104(b)(ii) does not require the 
occupation of the individual to be his only occupation. The drivers may also be 
students attending the University, clerks in a mercantile establishment, 
housewives, etc. It is sufficient that the driving of taxicabs be an independent occupation, customarily 
engaged in by them. The nature of the occupation is to be judged as to these 
factors from the standpoint of the individual.

[¶49.]  Once again, the acknowledged fact that 
the drivers are free from control or direction over the performance of their 
services, by contract and by fact, establishes the independency of the drivers 
in carrying on the task or occupation of operating the taxicabs. In this instance, the finding of lack of 
control by appellee over the drivers is tantamount to a finding that they are 
customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation or 
business.

CONCLUSION

[¶50.]  The commission could not reasonably have 
made its findings upon the evidence which was before it in the whole record. I 
would affirm the decision of the district court.

1 We have often said that 
on appeal we assume the evidence in favor of the successful party to be true and 
leave out of consideration evidence in conflict therewith, giving the evidence 
of the successful party every reasonable inference to be drawn from it; e.g., Martin v. Wing, Wyo., 667 P.2d 1159 
(1983); Distad v. Cubin, Wyo., 633 P.2d 167 (1981); Kinsley v. McGary, 
Wyo., 390 P.2d 242 (1964).

2 Section 27-3-104(b), 
W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Pamphlet), reads:

"Services performed by an 
individual for wages is [are] employment subject to this act unless the 
commission finds:

"(i) The individual is 
free from control or direction over the performance of services by contract and 
by fact;

"(ii) The service is 
outside the usual course of business for which the service is performed or it is 
performed outside all of the employing unit's places of business; 
and

"(iii) The individual is 
customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession or 
business."

3 Paragraph (2) is omitted 
pursuant to direction in § 27-3-104(a)(i) and subparagraphs (B) and (C) of 
paragraph (3) are omitted pursuant to direction in 26 U.S.C. § 3306(i).