Case Title: Rancourt v. Attorney General

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13327

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2023-03-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13327 
 
MICHAEL A. RANCOURT  vs.  ATTORNEY GENERAL. 
 
 
March 7, 2023. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  Sex 
Offender. 
 
 
 
Michael A. Rancourt appeals from a judgment of the county 
court denying, without a hearing, his petition for relief under 
G. L. c. 211, § 3.  Rancourt was convicted in 1985 of aggravated 
rape and other offenses, and this court affirmed his 
convictions.  Commonwealth v. Rancourt, 399 Mass. 269, 270 
(1987).  The Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) issued a 
decision in 2005 ordering him to register as a level three sex 
offender.  In so doing, the SORB denied his motion for relief 
from the registration requirement on the ground that his 
conviction of a sexually violent offense disqualified him from 
such relief.  The SORB's decision was affirmed by a judge in the 
Superior Court and then the Appeals Court.  Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 3798 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 68 Mass. 
App. Ct. 1114 (2007).  Rancourt later moved for 
reclassification, but the motion was denied by the SORB in 2008.  
In his petition, Rancourt brought constitutional challenges to 
both Federal and State sex offender registration laws, claimed 
that his sentence was unlawful, and sought an order relieving 
him of any obligation to register as a sex offender and removing 
his name and identifying information from certain databases.  We 
affirm the judgment of the single justice. 
 
"General superintendence relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, is extraordinary.  We will not disturb the single justice's 
denial of relief absent a clear error of law or abuse of 
discretion."  Roberts v. Hingham Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 
486 Mass. 1001, 1002 (2020), quoting Culley v. Cato, 460 Mass. 
2 
 
1009, 1010 (2011).  "Our jurisprudence under G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
consistently reinforces the principle . . . that the 
extraordinary remedy of general superintendence is meant for 
situations where a litigant has no adequate alternative remedy." 
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 21634 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 484 Mass. 1046, 1047 (2020), quoting McMenimen v. 
Passatempo, 452 Mass. 178, 185 (2008).  Each of Rancourt's 
claims can be addressed in the ordinary process.  His 
constitutional challenges to the sex offender registration laws 
could be brought in a declaratory judgment action in the 
Superior Court.  Any challenge to his sentence or to his 
underlying convictions could likewise be brought in the trial 
court.  He could seek relief from the registration requirement 
by filing a motion to terminate his registration obligation with 
the SORB and seeking judicial review from any adverse decision.1  
See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.30 (2016).  Should any of these 
remedies prove unsuccessful, Rancourt would then have an 
opportunity to appeal in the ordinary course.  The fact that 
these ordinary processes would be time-consuming does not 
entitle Rancourt to bypass them by invoking our superintendence 
power under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  See, e.g., Votta v. Police Dep't 
of Billerica, 444 Mass. 1001, 1001 (2005) (G. L. c. 211, § 3, is 
not "a substitute for the normal appellate process").   
 
Moreover, relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is reserved for 
"exceptional circumstances, when necessary to protect 
substantive rights."  Montanez v. Flahive, 484 Mass. 1009, 1010 
(2020), quoting Cappadona v. Riverside 400 Function Room, Inc., 
372 Mass. 167, 169 (1977).  Rancourt has not shown that the 
single justice abused his discretion in finding that no 
exceptional circumstances were present here.  In sum, the single 
justice neither erred nor abused his discretion by denying 
relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. 
 
1 Rancourt suggests that such a motion would be futile, 
where the SORB previously determined that he could not be 
relieved of the obligation to register due to his conviction of 
a sexually violent offense.  Since then, however, this court has 
ruled that a person convicted of a sexually violent offense must 
be given an opportunity to demonstrate that he or she does not 
pose a risk of reoffense and is not a current danger to the 
public.  Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 8725 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 450 Mass. 780, 793 (2008).  See Commonwealth v. 
Hammond, 477 Mass. 499, 513 (2017) (despite statutory 
registration requirement for person convicted of sex offense 
involving child, defendant may assert as-applied due process 
challenge before SORB). 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
Michael A. Rancourt, pro se. 
 
Nicole M. Nixon, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
respondent.