Case Title: White v. Conrad

Citation: 2004-Ohio-2148

Docket Number: 20021550

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-05-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as White v. Conrad, 102 Ohio St.3d 125, 2004-Ohio-2148.] 
 
 
WHITE, APPELLANT, v. CONRAD, ADMR., APPELLEE, ET AL. 
[Cite as White v. Conrad, 102 Ohio St.3d 125, 2004-Ohio-2148.] 
Workers’ compensation — Reinstatement of surviving spouse death benefits 
sought after marriage annulled — Court of appeals’ determination that 
Industrial Commission’s denial of reinstatement of death benefits is not 
appealable to a common pleas court reversed — Cause remanded to 
court of appeals for consideration of whether an annulment of a 
remarriage puts a deceased employee’s surviving spouse back in the 
position where she is entitled to receive death benefits. 
(No. 2002-1550 — Submitted September 17, 2003 — Decided May 12, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Medina County, No. 3287M, 2002-Ohio-
3754. 
_________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶1} 
On April 11, 1989, veterinarian Porter White died in an automobile 
accident while responding to an emergency for his employer, Animal Centre of 
Medina, Inc.  Pursuant to R.C. 4123.59(B) and (D), Porter’s surviving spouse, 
plaintiff-appellant, Audrey White, was awarded workers’ compensation death 
benefits.  Under R.C. 4123.59(B)(1), those benefits would continue until her death 
or remarriage. 
{¶2} 
On August 30, 1997, Audrey married David Smith, a dentist from 
Kansas.  Pursuant to R.C. 4123.59(B)(1), defendant-appellee, Bureau of Workers’ 
Compensation (“bureau”), issued Audrey a two-year lump-sum payment of death 
benefits.  Less than two years later, Audrey initiated divorce proceedings against 
Smith, and on July 5, 2000, their marriage was annulled by the District Court of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Johnson County, Kansas.  The Kansas court granted the annulment because it 
found that the marriage had been induced by fraud — Smith had concealed from 
Audrey his use of and addiction to crack cocaine. 
{¶3} 
On July 31, 2000, Audrey filed a motion with the bureau seeking 
reinstatement of death benefits.  A district hearing officer denied her motion, a 
staff hearing officer affirmed that decision, and the Industrial Commission of 
Ohio refused to hear her appeal.  Audrey then appealed from the order to the 
Medina County Court of Common Pleas.  The trial court reversed the order, 
finding that Audrey was entitled to participate in the workers’ compensation fund 
as the surviving spouse of Porter White.  The court found that Audrey should 
receive death benefits retroactive to the date they had been terminated and that 
Audrey could not retain the lump-sum payment she had received.  The trial court 
held, “Because [after the annulment, Audrey must] be treated legally as if she had 
never remarried, * * * there is simply no new ‘right to participate’ or ‘extent of 
disability’ issue to decide.  [Audrey] remains a dependent for purposes of 
workers’ compensation benefits, just as if she [had] never remarried.” 
{¶4} 
The bureau appealed from the trial court’s decision.  The appellate 
court reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the trial court had lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether Audrey was entitled to payment 
of further compensation.  The court found that the issue was an extent-of-the-
disability question rather than a right-to-participate question and was thus not 
appealable to the trial court pursuant to R.C. 4123.512.  The appellate court cited 
this court’s statement in State ex rel. Liposchak v. Indus. Comm. (2000), 90 Ohio 
St.3d 276, 280, 737 N.E.2d 519, that “any issue other than whether the injury, 
disease, or death resulted from employment does not constitute a right-to-
participate issue” and is thus not appealable to a common pleas court. 
{¶5} 
The cause is before this court upon the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
January Term, 2004 
3 
Law and Analysis 
{¶6} 
R.C. 4123.59 provides that if an injury causes an employee’s 
death, benefits will be paid to persons wholly dependent on the employee at the 
time.  A surviving spouse is “presumed to be wholly dependent for [his or her] 
support upon a deceased employee.”  R.C. 4123.59(D)(1). 
{¶7} 
Orders regarding death benefits are “appealable pursuant to 
sections 4123.511 to 4123.512 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 4123.59(E).  R.C. 
4123.512(A) allows a claimant to appeal an order of a staff hearing officer from 
which the commission has refused to hear an appeal in “an injury or occupational 
disease case, other than a decision as to the extent of disability to the court of 
common pleas of the county in which the injury was inflicted * * *.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
{¶8} 
The appellate court’s decision rested on Liposchak, 90 Ohio St.3d 
276, 278, 737 N.E.2d 519, in which we held that “dependency issues do not 
invoke the basic right to participate in the workers’ compensation system and, 
therefore, are not appealable.” Id. at 278, 737 N.E.2d 519.  Although the issue in 
Liposchak concerned an appeal of a determination under R.C. 4123.60, the court 
also spoke as to determinations regarding death benefits under R.C. 4123.59: 
{¶9} 
“[W]e hold that although death benefits may be granted or denied 
based on dependent status as defined in R.C. 4123.59, the denial or grant of such 
benefits is not appealable unless it concerns the causal connection between injury, 
disease, or death and employment.”  Liposchak, 90 Ohio St.3d at 281, 737 N.E.2d 
519. 
{¶10} However, this case is distinguishable from Liposchak.  Pursuant to 
R.C. 4123.512(D), appealable orders are of two kinds: those which, like in 
Liposchak, involve the right to participate and those that, as in this case, involve 
the right to continue to participate.  Liposchak defines the issue that may be 
appealed in a right-to-participate case: was the injury, occupational disease, or 
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death causally related to the worker’s employment?  But once it is determined that 
a claimant has a right to participate, a later termination of participation is a right-
to-continue-participation case, to which Liposchak does not apply. 
{¶11} In the instant case, Audrey’s right to participate in the fund had 
already been established — given the statutory presumption of dependency — 
when it was determined that Porter’s death arose in the course and scope of his 
employment.  The bureau then later found that Audrey no longer had a continued 
right to participate and terminated her participation. 
{¶12} This court has consistently acknowledged that a claimant has the 
right to appeal to a common pleas court an order that terminates his right to 
participate: 
{¶13} “Once the right of participation for a specific condition is 
determined by the Industrial Commission, no subsequent rulings, except a ruling 
that terminates the right to participate, are appealable pursuant to R.C. 
4123.519.” (Emphasis added.)  Felty v. AT & T Technologies, Inc. (1992), 65 
Ohio St.3d 234, 602 N.E.2d 1141, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶14} In Thomas v. Conrad (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 475, 692 N.E.2d 205, 
this court addressed the issue of whether an employer has a right to appeal, under 
R.C. 4123.512, an order not to terminate participation in the fund.  This court held 
that the right to appeal an order concerning termination lies only with a claimant 
whose right is terminated. 
{¶15} Audrey is a claimant whose participation in the fund was 
terminated.  She thus has a right to appeal to a common pleas court under R.C. 
4123.512. 
{¶16} The substantive issue of whether an annulment of a remarriage 
puts a deceased employee’s surviving spouse back in the position where she is 
entitled to receive death benefits was left unanswered by the court below, when 
January Term, 2004 
5 
the court found the issue moot.  We remand this cause to the court of appeals for 
consideration of that issue. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, LUNDBERG STRATTON, and 
O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents and would affirm. 
__________________ 
Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. 
Jaffy, for appellant. 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, Douglas R. Cole, State Solicitor, and Mark 
E. Mastrangelo and Jeffrey B. Duber, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 
__________________