Case Title: Commonwealth v. Brennan

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12518

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12518 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  FRANCIS T. BRENNAN. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     October 4, 2018. - December 21, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Criminal Harassment.  Global Positioning System Device. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Hingham Division of 
the District Court Department on August 26, 2016. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Julieann Hernon, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
David Cutshall, Assistant District Attorney (Gail M. 
McKenna, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Sabrina E. Bonanno (Richard J. Sweeney also present) for 
the defendant. 
 
Kevin M. Davis, for Licensed Private Detective Association 
of Massachusetts, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  A complaint issued against the defendant, 
Francis T. Brennan, charging him with two counts of criminal 
harassment in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 43A.  The charges 
2 
 
 
stem from allegations that he was using two global positioning 
system (GPS) devices to track the movements of a married couple 
he had never met before, to whom we shall refer as J.D. and J.H.1  
After holding two nonevidentiary hearings, a District Court 
judge allowed the defendant's motion to dismiss.  The judge 
ruled that the complaint did "not allege three qualifying acts 
to support a charge of criminal harassment as to either named 
victim."  The Commonwealth appealed, and we transferred the case 
to this court on our own motion.  On appeal, the Commonwealth 
contends that the complaint supplied probable cause to charge 
the defendant with two counts of criminal harassment.  We 
conclude that the series of acts outlined in the complaint that 
are attributed to the defendant satisfy the elements of criminal 
harassment against J.D. and J.H.  The order dismissing the 
complaint is reversed.2 
 
1.  Background.  "Our review of the judge's order of 
dismissal is confined to the four corners of the application for 
complaint, which in this case" consists of the police reports 
                     
 
1 Although the complaint is silent regarding any 
relationship between the defendant and the couple, the defendant 
contends in his brief, at the motion hearing, and at oral 
argument before this court that he had never met J.D. or J.H. 
before.  He claims that their first interaction was at a hearing 
for a harassment prevention order. 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Licensed 
Private Detective Association of Massachusetts in support of the 
Commonwealth. 
3 
 
 
detailing the facts underlying the defendant's arrest.  
Commonwealth v. Ilya I., 470 Mass. 625, 626 (2015).  We 
summarize the police reports that were attached to the 
complaint.  In May, 2016, J.D. discovered a GPS device attached 
to the undercarriage of his wife's vehicle and reported the 
discovery to the Hingham police department.  J.D. was concerned 
because he could not think of anyone who would be monitoring his 
or his wife's location.  The police took the GPS device and 
advised J.D. to check his own vehicle for a similar device.  
Upon returning home, J.D. discovered a second GPS device on his 
vehicle where the spare tire would be located. 
 
The following day, police interviewed J.D. and J.H. at 
length, together and separately.  Police questioned the couple 
about their finances, careers, and potential infidelity.  No 
information, however, was gathered as to who attached the GPS 
devices to their vehicles. 
 
The police contacted the manufacturer of the GPS device, 
Brickhouse Security (Brickhouse), but were unable to obtain the 
corresponding customer information.  Because J.D. was a member 
of the United States Coast Guard, he reported the event to 
Special Agent Jeremy Baldwin of the United States Coast Guard's 
investigative service.  Baldwin obtained a subpoena to gather 
information from Brickhouse.  Brickhouse informed him that the 
4 
 
 
defendant was the owner of the GPS devices and that the GPS 
devices were shipped to the defendant in December 2015. 
 
Baldwin and the police then interviewed the defendant.  At 
first, he denied any knowledge of who placed the GPS devices on 
J.D. and J.H.'s vehicles.  He stated, "[L]et's just say things 
got a little out of hand due to some prior circumstances, it[']s 
moral, it's not anything other than that, his wife might want to 
start checking his phone."  The defendant made statements 
suggesting that J.D. was having an affair and that the defendant 
was concerned about it.3  The defendant stated:  "[I am] guarding 
the hen house"; "my only stake in all this is to make sure 
somebody was not in the place that I'm in all the time"; that he 
believed J.D. was "stepping out" of his marriage; and that he 
wanted to make sure his "backyard was clear."  The defendant 
refused to provide the name of the person he alleged was having 
sexual relations with J.D. 
 
Eventually, the defendant admitted that he had an account 
with Brickhouse and that he was monitoring the movements of the 
couple's vehicles using the GPS devices, which he accessed with 
                     
3 The defendant's interest in J.D.'s fidelity is not 
apparent from the record in this appeal. 
5 
 
 
his Apple iPhone4 and laptop computer.5  Police searched the 
defendant's iPhone pursuant to a warrant and created a forensic 
extraction report.  The defendant's Internet history included 
visits to Brickhouse's online log-in page, J.D.'s Twitter social 
media page, and fifty-three Internet mapping program searches of 
various latitude and longitude coordinates gathered from the GPS 
devices.  Baldwin subpoenaed the Brickhouse account information 
and received a full history report for each device.  The history 
reports provided detailed location information about each 
device.6  Baldwin also discovered that the defendant purchased a 
third GPS device in April, approximately one month before J.D. 
discovered the two GPS devices.  Using the forensic data from 
the defendant's iPhone, the police confirmed seventeen separate 
instances in which the defendant researched the locations of the 
vehicles over the course of ten days in May 2016. 
                     
4 An iPhone, which is manufactured by Apple Inc., is a type 
of "smart" cellular telephone that, in addition to making 
telephone calls, can transmit text messages, perform the 
functions of both a camera and a video recorder, enable the 
operation of various applications, and connect to the Internet.  
See Commonwealth v. Dorelas, 473 Mass. 496, 497 n.1 (2016). 
 
5 A search of the defendant's laptop computer provided a 
negative result because the computer did not have a hard drive. 
 
6 The reports had information about the speed and distance 
the devices traveled, and the devices' coordinates, matched with 
dates and times. 
6 
 
 
 
After interviewing the defendant, the police and Coast 
Guard interviewed J.D. again and informed him of the defendant's 
accusations that he was having an affair.  J.D. denied the 
accusations and consented to a search of his cellular telephone 
by Coast Guard investigators. 
 
Throughout the police investigation, J.D. and J.H. 
expressed concern for their safety because the defendant's 
intentions were unknown.  J.H. had difficulty sleeping, and J.D. 
had to change his work schedule to be home with her during the 
nighttime hours.  The couple feared retaliation from the 
defendant for contacting the police.  They also installed 
security cameras at their residence and sought an emergency 
harassment prevention order against the defendant. 
 
2.  Standard of review.  "In reviewing a motion to dismiss 
a complaint, the judge must decide whether the complaint 
application contains 'sufficient evidence to establish the 
identity of the accused . . . and probable cause to arrest 
him.'"  Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 565 (2013), 
quoting Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160, 163 (1982).  
This standard is "considerably less exacting than a requirement 
of sufficient evidence to warrant a guilty finding."  
Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 392 Mass. 445, 451 (1984), citing Myers 
v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 848-849 (1973).  "A judge 
considering a motion to dismiss should not confuse the question 
7 
 
 
of probable cause to arrest with questions more properly 
resolved by the fact finder at trial."  Commonwealth v. Bell, 83 
Mass. App. Ct. 61, 64 (2013).  The complaint application must 
establish probable cause by providing reasonably trustworthy 
information sufficient to warrant a reasonable or prudent person 
in believing that the defendant has committed the offense.  Id. 
at 63, quoting O'Dell, supra at 450.  Whether the complaint 
application establishes probable cause is a question of law; 
thus, "we review the motion judge's . . . determination de 
novo."  Humberto H., supra at 566, quoting Commonwealth v. Long, 
454 Mass. 542, 555 (2009), S.C., 476 Mass. 526 (2017).  We are 
in as good a position as a motion judge to assess the evidence 
submitted in support of the application for a criminal 
complaint, and we consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth without deference to the motion 
judge's factual findings or legal conclusions.  Commonwealth v. 
Silva, 455 Mass. 503, 526 (2009). 
 
3.  Discussion.  To support the complaint for criminal 
harassment, the Commonwealth must show that there is probable 
cause that "(1) the defendant engaged in a knowing pattern of 
conduct or speech, or series of acts, on at least three separate 
occasions; (2) the defendant intended to target the victim with 
the harassing conduct . . . on each occasion; (3) the conduct 
. . . [was] of such a nature that [it] seriously alarmed the 
8 
 
 
victim; (4) the conduct . . . [was] of such a nature that [it] 
would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional 
distress; and (5) the defendant committed the conduct . . . 
'willfully and maliciously.'"  Commonwealth v. McDonald, 462 
Mass. 236, 240 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Kulesa, 455 Mass. 
447, 452 (2009).  See G. L. c. 265, § 43A.  The Commonwealth 
argues that the complaint overcomes the low threshold required 
to show that there was probable cause that the defendant 
committed two counts of criminal harassment.  The defendant 
maintains that there is no probable cause to support four of the 
five elements of criminal harassment:  (1) the complaint does 
not allege three qualifying acts; (2) he did not intend to 
target J.D. or J.H. with harassing conduct; (3) the conduct 
would not cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial 
emotional distress; and (4) the conduct was not committed 
willfully and maliciously. 
 
a.  Three acts targeted at J.D. and J.H.  According to the 
defendant, the complaint does not establish three qualifying 
acts of criminal harassment against either J.D. or J.H.  We 
conclude that there was probable cause that the defendant 
committed at least three separate acts targeted at J.D. and J.H. 
when he concealed the GPS device on J.D.'s vehicle, concealed 
the GPS device on J.H.'s vehicle, and then tracked the movements 
of the GPS devices from his iPhone. 
9 
 
 
 
The defendant contends that placing GPS tracking devices on 
the couple's vehicles does not qualify as an "act" under § 43A 
because there is no law that criminalizes such conduct by a 
private person.  The defendant's argument is unavailing.  A 
defendant's otherwise legal conduct may qualify as an act of 
harassment when considered with other evidence.  See McDonald, 
462 Mass. at 245.  In addition to concealing the GPS devices, 
the defendant commented to the police that J.D. was "stepping 
out" on his wife and that the defendant was "guarding the hen 
house."  Making matters worse, the defendant admits that he had 
never had any interaction with either J.D. or J.H. before.  
Viewing the evidence in this context and in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude that the act of 
concealing a GPS device on an individual's vehicle qualifies as 
an "act" within § 43A. 
 
The defendant maintains, however, that even if placing the 
GPS devices does qualify as an "act" within § 43A, it is only 
one act against J.D., placing the GPS on his car, and one act 
against J.H., placing the GPS on her car.  The defendant 
correctly points out that G. L. c. 265, § 43A (a), "requires 
that the Commonwealth prove three or more predicate acts of 
harassment that were 'directed at a specific person.'"  
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 470 Mass. 300, 312 (2014), quoting 
McDonald, 462 Mass. at 240.  He claims that the complaint does 
10 
 
 
not provide evidence that his attention was directed 
specifically at J.D. or J.H.  We disagree. 
 
The information in the complaint is enough to warrant a 
reasonable person to conclude that the defendant's harassing 
conduct was targeted at J.D. and J.H.  See generally Johnson, 
470 Mass. at 312–313 (acts of harassment can be directed 
simultaneously at more than one person).  Contrast Commonwealth 
v. Welch, 444 Mass. 80, 92 (2005), abrogated on another ground, 
O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415 (2012) (Commonwealth did not 
establish that defendant's use of homophobic slurs once when 
talking in normal tones outside apartment building where she and 
alleged victims lived and again when yelling inside her own 
apartment was intended to be heard by victims or that she should 
have known that slurs would be heard by them); Demayo v. Quinn, 
87 Mass. App. Ct. 115, 116, 118 (2015) (evidence was 
insufficient to show that defendant's conduct -- entering 
plaintiff's horse barn, removing or rearranging items, and 
throwing items into horse's stall -- was aimed at plaintiff).  
In response to the police's questioning, it was evident that the 
defendant harbored an animus toward J.D.  Cf. Demayo, supra at 
118.  The defendant made a number of statements aimed at the 
couple regarding J.D.'s fidelity to J.H.  The defendant stated 
that he believed J.D. was "stepping out" of J.D.'s marriage and 
that he wanted to make sure his "backyard was clear."  He 
11 
 
 
suggested that J.H. "might want to start checking [J.D.'s] 
phone."  The defendant stated that he was "guarding the hen 
house" and that his "only stake in all this [was] to make sure 
somebody was not in the place that [he was] in all the time."  
When he eventually admitted that he had an account with 
Brickhouse, he confessed that he was monitoring the movements of 
J.D. and J.H.  Moreover, the forensic extraction data from the 
defendant's phone showed that he was visiting J.D.'s Twitter 
social media page.  The defendant's peculiar behavior is 
exacerbated by the fact that he had never met the couple. 
 
Although the defendant's statements during the 
investigation suggest he was monitoring J.D. to protect J.H. 
from J.D.'s alleged infidelity, the defendant placed GPS devices 
on both J.D. and J.H.'s vehicles.  The complaint provides no 
indication that the defendant knew which vehicle J.D. or J.H. 
drove.  It is a reasonable inference that the defendant targeted 
both individuals when he attached a device to both vehicles, 
rather than just one, to ensure that all of J.D.'s potential 
movements were tracked.  In determining whether acts of 
harassment are directed at a person, we look not only to 
statements and conduct of the defendant but to the nature of the 
act and the natural consequence of the act.  See Johnson, 470 
Mass. at 312.  Here, a reasonable person in the defendant's 
position would have known that placing the GPS devices on both 
12 
 
 
vehicles would alarm both individuals if and when they learned 
of it.  Because the complaint provides reasonably trustworthy 
information sufficient to warrant a reasonable person in 
believing that the defendant targeted both J.D. and J.H., we 
conclude that the concealment of the two devices on the couple's 
vehicles constitutes two acts of harassment against J.D. and two 
acts of harassment against J.H. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the defendant committed at 
least one act against J.D. and J.H. when he tracked the GPS 
devices seventeen times over the course of ten days.  The 
defendant argues that his act of gathering the GPS information 
and mapping the devices' coordinates online does not qualify as 
an "act" because neither J.D. nor J.H. was aware that they were 
being tracked. 
 
Neither J.D. nor J.H. had to be aware that they were being 
tracked for the defendant's conduct to qualify as at least one 
act of harassment against each of them.  The complaint must show 
that there is probable cause that the "cumulative effect of the 
defendant's pattern of conduct 'seriously alarm[ed]' [them] -- 
not that each individual incident was alarming."  Commonwealth 
v. Walters, 472 Mass. 680, 699 (2015), S.C., 479 Mass. 277 
(2018), quoting Johnson, 470 Mass. at 314.  See Johnson, supra 
(criminal harassment "statute's wording ties the requirement to 
the over-all pattern of conduct").  J.D. and J.H. may not have 
13 
 
 
been aware that they were being tracked, but, as the defendant 
concedes, once they discovered the devices they were seriously 
alarmed. 
 
Adding an awareness element to § 43A would frustrate the 
purpose of the law.  "The criminal harassment law was passed in 
response to a perceived loophole in the stalking statute.  The 
stalking statute expressly included within its reach 
'threatening' conduct or acts, but left without remedy those 
victims plagued by harassment that, although potentially 
dangerous, did not include an overt 'threat' and thus was not 
actionable under existing law" (citation omitted).  McDonald, 
462 Mass. at 241. With advancements in technology it is becoming 
easier for people to do exactly what the defendant did here.  
Once J.D. discovered the GPS devices, it is logical that the 
defendant's tactics used to monitor the couple's movements would 
qualify as acts to satisfy the criminal harassment statute.  
Therefore, the couple did not have to know in real time that 
they were being tracked for the defendant's conduct of mapping 
their locations to constitute at least one act. 
 
We recognize that the defendant's conduct of entering the 
GPS devices' coordinates into an Internet mapping program 
seventeen times over a ten-day span may be construed as more 
than one act.  The police report shows that the defendant mapped 
the GPS coordinates at different times -- sometimes closer in 
14 
 
 
time than others -- on different days.  We count the tracking of 
the devices as at least one act for purposes of reaching the 
requisite three acts in § 43A.  We determine, however, that it 
is unnecessary in this case to conduct a temporal analysis of 
each time the defendant checked the GPS devices to deconstruct 
each individual act because we already have identified the three 
acts to satisfy the statute.7 
 
b.  Substantial emotional distress.  After learning that 
they were being tracked, the couple suffered substantial 
emotional distress.  J.D. expressed concern for his safety, 
changed his work schedule, installed security cameras at his 
house, and feared retaliation from the defendant for informing 
the police.  J.H. also was concerned for her safety, was afraid 
to be home alone at night, and had difficulty sleeping.  The 
defendant concedes that there was sufficient evidence that the 
couple was seriously alarmed by his conduct.  He argues, 
                     
 
7 We do not hold that the entire course of conduct of 
repeatedly tracking the device is one continuous act.  Although 
our cases have not established a specific amount of time that 
must elapse between harassing acts for them to be sufficiently 
discrete, acts committed during a single afternoon have been 
deemed sufficiently distinct to warrant a conviction of criminal 
harassment.  See Commonwealth v. Julien, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 679, 
685 (2003) (three incidents, two occurring on same day, 
sufficient to satisfy stalking statute).  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Kulesa, 455 Mass. 447, 451 (2009) (defendant's two telephone 
calls to victim's sister on one afternoon were sufficient for 
two of three required acts). 
15 
 
 
however, that a reasonable person in their position would not 
suffer substantial emotional distress. 
 
Contrary to the defendant's argument, the evidence in the 
complaint was sufficient to establish probable cause that a 
reasonable person in J.D. and J.H.'s positions would have 
suffered substantial emotional distress.  J.D. found two GPS 
tracking devices under his and his wife's cars that were placed 
by the defendant -- someone that the couple had never met.  The 
couple also learned that the defendant had tracked the GPS 
device's location seventeen times over the course of ten days.  
Moreover, the defendant made a number of distressing statements 
regarding J.D.'s fidelity toward J.H.  There was probable cause 
that J.D. and J.H. were seriously alarmed, and "any reasonable 
person would be greatly alarmed and experience severe emotional 
distress if subjected to such similar circumstances."  
Commonwealth v. O'Neil, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 284, 294 (2006). 
 
c.  Willful and malicious conduct.  The defendant argues 
that he did not commit the requisite three acts willfully or 
maliciously as the statute requires.  See G. L. c. 265, § 43A.  
"Wilful conduct is that which is 'intentional rather than 
accidental'; it requires no evil intent, ill will, or 
malevolence."  McDonald, 462 Mass. at 242, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Luna, 418 Mass. 749, 753 (1994).  Malicious conduct is an 
"intentional, wrongful act done willfully or intentionally 
16 
 
 
against another without legal justification or excuse."  
McDonald, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Paton, 63 Mass. App. 
Ct. 215, 219 (2005). 
 
As discussed above, the defendant committed at least three 
acts against J.D. and J.H. when he placed the GPS devices on 
each of their vehicles and then tracked the GPS devices 
locations by using his iPhone.  The acts were willful because he 
intentionally placed the GPS devices and intentionally tracked 
the locations.  Likewise, the defendant's actions were malicious 
because he had no justification for his conduct.  See O'Neil, 67 
Mass. App. Ct. at 293.  It was also reasonably foreseeable that 
J.D. and J.H. would be alarmed when they learned that they were 
being tracked.  See McDonald, 462 Mass. at 242, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Schuchardt, 408 Mass. 347, 352 (1990) ("Conduct 
is wilful when the actor intends both the conduct and its 
harmful consequences [and] may be wilful and malicious although 
its harmful consequences are neither substantial nor highly 
likely"). 
 
4.  Conclusion.  Probable cause must be determined from the 
totality of the circumstances.  Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 448 
Mass. 711, 715 (2007).  It is a concept guided by "factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable 
and prudent [people], not legal technicians, act."  Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).  The Commonwealth has 
17 
 
 
made the requisite showing.  There was probable cause that the 
defendant committed three separate acts of intentional 
harassment when he placed the GPS device on J.D.'s car, placed 
the GPS device on J.H.'s car, and then tracked the movements of 
the devices.  The acts were done willfully and maliciously, 
seriously alarmed J.D. and J.H., and would cause a reasonable 
person to suffer substantial emotional distress. 
 
As technology has advanced, the tools that people can use 
to harass victims have increased.  See Fraser, Olsen, Lee, 
Southworth, and Tucker, The New Age of Stalking:  Technological 
Implications for Stalking, 61 Juv. & Fam. Ct. J. 39, 40-41 (Fall 
2010).  The law has not fully caught up to the new technology, 
and given the speed with which technology evolves, it may 
sometimes leave victims without recourse.  See id. at 48-49.  
The Legislature may wish to explore whether the conduct of a 
private person electronically monitoring the movements of 
another private person should be criminalized, regardless of 
whether it would constitute criminal harassment.8  In these 
                     
 
8 Other States have done so.  See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code 
§ 637.7 (prohibits person or entity from using electronic 
tracking device to determine location or movement of person); 
Fla. Stat. § 934.425 (person may not knowingly install tracking 
device on another person's property without consent); 720 Ill. 
Comp. Stat. 5/21-2.5 (no person shall use tracking device to 
determine location or movement of another person); La. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 14:323 (no person shall use tracking device to 
determine location or movement of another person without consent 
of that person); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.539l (prohibits placing 
18 
 
 
circumstances, the defendant's behavior satisfied the three acts 
necessary for the criminal harassment statute, but there may be 
occasions where the facts might not be sufficient for the 
statute to encompass a defendant's conduct.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order allowing motion to  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  dismiss reversed. 
                     
tracking device on motor vehicle without consent of owner of 
vehicle); Minn. Stat. § 626A.35 (no person may install or use 
tracking device without first obtaining court order or consent 
of owner of object to which device is attached); N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 14-196.3 (no person shall use tracking device to determine 
location or movement of another person without that person's 
consent); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-69-1 (person may not knowingly 
install tracking device in or on motor vehicle without consent 
of all owners and occupants of vehicle for purpose of monitoring 
or following occupant); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-606 (person may 
not knowingly install tracking device in or on motor vehicle 
without consent of all owners for purpose of monitoring or 
following occupant of vehicle). 
 
 
9 For example, we can envision a circumstance in which a 
defendant uses a GPS device, but the Commonwealth cannot show 
that there was a specific target of the tracking, or that there 
were three acts of criminal harassment.