Case Title: Rebecca Clarke v. Wisconsin Elections Commission

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2023-10-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
2023 WI 70
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This order is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
 
 
 
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
 
 
Rebecca Clarke, Ruben Anthony, Terry Dawson, 
Dana Glasstein, Ann Groves-Lloyd, Carl Hujet, 
Jerry Iverson, Tia Johnson, Angie Kirst, Selika 
Lawton, Fabian Maldonado, Annemarie McClellan, 
James McNett, Brittany Muriello, Ela Joosten 
(Pari) Schils, Nathaniel Slack, Mary Smith-
Johnson, Denise Sweet and Gabrielle Young, 
 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Don Millis, 
Robert F. Spindell, Jr., Mark L. Thomsen, Ann 
S. Jacobs, Marge Bostelmann, Joseph J. 
Czarnezki in their official capacities as 
Members of the Wisconsin Election Commission;, 
Meagan Wolfe in her official capacity as the 
Administrator of the Wisconsin Elections 
Commission; Andre Jacque, Tim Carpenter, Rob 
Hutton, Chris Larson, Devin LeMahieu, Stephen 
L. Nass, John Jagler, Mark Spreitzer, Howard 
Marklein, Rachael Cabral-Guevara, Van H. 
Wanggaard, Jesse L. James, Romaine Robert 
Quinn, Dianne H. Hesselbein, Cory Tomczyk, Jeff 
Smith and Chris Kapenga  in their official 
capacities as Members of the Wisconsin Senate, 
 
          Respondents, 
 
Wisconsin Legislature, 
 
          Intervenor-Respondent.   
FILED 
 
OCT 6, 2023 
 
Samuel A. Christensen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Court entered the following order on October 6, 2023: 
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
2 
 
On August 2, 2023, petitioners Rebecca Clarke, et al., 19 
Wisconsin voters, filed a petition for leave to commence an 
original action under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.70, together with a 
supporting memorandum, an appendix, and a motion for a scheduling 
order.  The petitioners allege that the state legislative districts 
adopted by this court in Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Comm'n, 
2022 WI 19, 401 Wis. 2d 198, 972 N.W.2d 559 (Johnson III)—
including the voters' districts—are an unconstitutional extreme 
partisan gerrymander; violate Article IV, Sections 4 and 5 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution because the districts do not consist of 
"contiguous territory;" and violate the Wisconsin Constitution's 
separation-of-powers doctrine.  The petitioners ask that we assume 
original 
jurisdiction 
and, 
after 
resolving 
certain 
legal 
questions, declare the existing state legislative districts 
unconstitutional.   
 
On August 22, 2023, the named respondents in this matter, 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, et al., filed responses to the 
original action petition.  Several of the respondents, a number of 
members of the State Senate, oppose the petition, arguing that 
petitioners' claims are foreclosed by this court's decision in 
Johnson III and are an unduly delayed collateral attack on that 
decision.  Several additional respondents, also members of the 
State Senate, support the petition, arguing that petitioners' 
claims are meritorious.  For their part, respondents Wisconsin 
Elections Commission, its members, and its administrator, take no 
position on the merits of the petition.   
 
On August 22, 2023, the Wisconsin Legislature filed a motion 
to intervene as a respondent.  No response or opposition to this 
motion to intervene has been filed.   
 
On August 22, 2023, the Wisconsin Legislature and Professor 
Charles Fried filed motions for leave to file amicus briefs 
regarding the petition for original action.  No response or 
opposition to these motions to file amicus briefs has been filed. 
 
This court has long deemed redistricting challenges a proper 
subject for the court's exercise of its original jurisdiction.  
See, e.g., Jensen v. Wisconsin Elections Board, 2002 WI 13, ¶17, 
249 Wis. 2d 706, 639 N.W.2d 537 ("there is no question" that 
redistricting actions warrant "this court's original jurisdiction; 
any reapportionment or redistricting case is, by definition, 
publici juris, implicating the sovereign rights of the people of 
this state.").  This includes challenges to existing district maps.  
See State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d 544, 558, 126 
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
3 
N.W.2d 551 (1964) (resolving challenges to a legislatively enacted 
map through an original action).   
 
Nevertheless, after considering all of the filings, we 
decline to grant leave to commence an original action with respect 
to Issues 1-3 presented in the petition.  Although these issues 
raise 
important 
and 
unresolved 
questions 
of 
statewide 
significance, the need for extensive fact-finding (if not a full-
scale trial) counsels against addressing them at this time.  See 
Jensen, 249 Wis. 2d 706, ¶20.  Additionally, the petitioners 
acknowledge that a decision on Issues 4 and 5 set forth in their 
petition "could render it unnecessary" to decide Issues 1-3.  
Accordingly,   
 
IT IS ORDERED that the motions for leave to file non-party 
briefs, amici curiae, are granted, and the accompanying briefs are 
accepted for filing; 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for leave to commence 
an original action is granted solely as to Issues 4 and 5 set forth 
in the petition;     
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for scheduling order is 
granted to the extent that this order sets forth a schedule for 
certain proceedings in this case; 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Wisconsin Legislature's motion 
to intervene is granted.  The Legislature's motion is timely; it 
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action; it is 
situated such that the disposition of the action may, as a 
practical matter, impair or impede its ability to protect that 
interest; and it has demonstrated that its interests are not 
adequately represented by the existing parties.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 803.09;  
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any additional party wishing to 
intervene in this case must file a motion to intervene, together 
with a supporting memorandum addressing the requirements of Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 803.09, by October 10, 2023;  
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties may each file a single 
response to all motions to intervene no later than 4:00 p.m. on 
October 12, 2023.  Each response shall not exceed 25 pages if a 
monospaced font is used or 5,500 words if a proportional serif 
font is used;  
 
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
4 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties and the proposed 
intervenors whose motion to intervene has not yet been decided 
shall file simultaneous briefs addressing only the following 
questions:  
 
1.) 
Do the existing state legislative maps violate the 
contiguity requirements contained in Article IV, Sections 
4 and 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution?  
 
2.) 
Did the adoption of the existing state legislative maps 
violate the Wisconsin Constitution's separation of powers?   
 
3.) 
If the court rules that Wisconsin's existing state 
legislative maps violate the Wisconsin Constitution for 
either or both of these reasons and the legislature and 
the governor then fail to adopt state legislative maps that 
comply with the Wisconsin Constitution, what standards 
should guide the court in imposing a remedy for the 
constitutional violation(s)?   
 
4.) 
What fact-finding, if any, will be required if the court 
determines there is a constitutional violation based on 
the contiguity clauses and/or the separation-of-powers 
doctrine and the court is required to craft a remedy for 
the violation?  If fact-finding will be required, what 
process should be used to resolve questions of fact?    
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each party and each proposed 
intervenor whose motion to intervene has not yet been decided shall 
file an initial brief addressing the four questions set forth above 
on or before 12:00 noon on October 16, 2023, or a statement that 
no brief will be filed.  Each party and each proposed intervenor 
whose motion to intervene has not yet been decided may file a 
response brief on or before 12:00 noon on October 30, 2023.  The 
form, length, pagination, appendix, and certification requirements 
shall be the same as those governing standard appellate briefing 
in this court for a brief-in-chief and a response brief.  See Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.19;  
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any non-party that wishes to file 
a non-party brief amicus curiae addressing the four questions set 
forth above must file a motion for leave of the court to file a 
non-party brief pursuant to the requirements of Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.19(7).  Non-parties should also consult this court's Internal 
Operating Procedure concerning the nature of non-parties who may 
be granted leave to file a non-party brief.  A proposed non-party 
brief must accompany the motion for leave to file it.  Any proposed 
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
5 
non-party brief shall not exceed 20 pages if a monospaced font is 
used or 4,400 words if a proportional serif font is used.  Any 
motion for leave with the proposed non-party brief attached shall 
be filed no later than 12:00 noon on November 8, 2023.  Any 
submission by a non-party that does not comply with Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.19(7) and any proposed non-party brief for which the 
court does not grant leave will not be considered by the court; 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that unless ordered otherwise by a 
majority of the court, the court will hear oral argument in this 
matter on Tuesday, November 21, 2023, beginning at 9:45 a.m., in 
the Supreme Court Hearing Room, 2nd Floor, East Wing of the State 
Capitol, Madison, Wisconsin.  Each party will have 20 minutes of 
initial oral argument time and an additional 10 minutes for 
rebuttal.  Each party shall have back-up counsel available to argue 
in the event that the designated attorney(s) cannot appear and 
present oral argument for any reason on the scheduled oral argument 
date.  Further information regarding oral argument will be provided 
in subsequent communications from the court or its clerk. 
 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if any party does not wish to 
participate in oral argument, that party shall file a notice to 
that effect no later than 12:00 noon on Tuesday, November 7, 2023;   
 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that requests for additional briefing 
or extensions will be viewed with disfavor; and 
 
IT 
IS 
FURTHER 
ORDERED 
that 
all 
Wisconsin 
attorneys 
participating in this case must each opt in to this case in the 
appellate court electronic filing system.  All Wisconsin attorneys 
who are not already opted in for this case are hereby ordered to 
do so as soon as possible and no later than five days from the 
date of this order. 
 
ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
C.J.   (dissenting).  This 
original action is nothing more than a motion for reconsideration 
of this court's decision in Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections 
Commission, 2022 WI 19, 401 Wis. 2d 198, 972 N.W.2d 559 ("Johnson 
III"), and appears to have been filed only because of a change in 
the court's membership.  Where does this cycle end?  Must this 
court also allow additional future parties to simply sit this 
litigation cycle out and come forward next court term—or after the 
next court election—and present already litigated claims again?  
What is to stop any party dissatisfied with the outcome here from 
carrying out challenges ad infinitum, each time from a slightly 
different angle, until their desired outcome is reached?  This 
litigation chips away at the public's faith in the judiciary as an 
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
6 
independent, 
impartial 
institution, 
undermines 
foundational 
judicial principles such as stare decisis, and casts a hyper-
partisan shadow of judicial bias over the decisions of this court.   
Today, my colleagues grant one original action petition and 
deny another.  Specifically, four members of this court vote to 
grant Clarke v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, No. 2023AP1399-
OA, and deny Wright v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, No. 
2023AP1412-OA.  I concur in Wright and dissent in Clarke because 
we should not accept either of these cases.  Our court just decided 
redistricting last year in Johnson III.  Redistricting should not 
be an annual event.  Redistricting is a process that, under our 
state constitution, is only supposed to occur once every decade.1  
However, redistricting was required by this court nearly two years 
ago because the Governor vetoed the maps drawn by the Legislature, 
creating an impasse.  Absent court action, Wisconsin would have 
been in a constitutional crisis: Wisconsin would have had no maps 
in place to conduct state and federal elections.  Thus, the court, 
as the final arbiter, was required to act.  We clearly are not in 
that constitutional predicament today.  
The congressional map selected by the court was submitted by 
Democrats, specifically Governor Evers.  The state legislative 
maps ultimately selected by the court were submitted by 
Republicans, specifically the Wisconsin Legislature.  However, the 
selection of the current state legislative maps occurred only after 
the United States Supreme Court summarily reversed my colleagues' 
original selection of Governor Evers' state legislative maps 
because the Governor's maps violated the Voting Rights Act.  
Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 14, 400 Wis. 2d 626, 971 
N.W.2d 402 ("Johnson II"), summarily rev'd sub. nom. Wis. 
Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 595 U.S. 398 (2022) (per 
curiam).  The issues presented in these original actions have 
already been decided by this court.  The court, acting within its 
limited role to "answer legal questions," adopted maps that it 
decided were constitutional as a judicial remedy for an 
undisputedly unconstitutional situation (the previous district 
maps no longer matched the geographic distribution of Wisconsin's 
citizens).  This judicial remedy of court-adopted maps stands for 
the next ten years, absent the enactment of new constitutionally 
compliant maps by the Legislature and the Governor.  
                                                 
1 "At its first session after each enumeration made by the 
authority of the United States, the legislature shall apportion 
and district anew the members of the senate and assembly, according 
to the number of inhabitants."  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 3.  
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
7 
I dissent to the order granting the original action petition 
filed in Clarke because it appears to be evidence of a partisan 
and political, rather than a reasoned and restrained, approach, 
and thus departs from the constitutional role of the judiciary.  
Some may prefer that other maps be drawn.  And now, it seems, there 
is a pre-ordained plan to accomplish that goal. However, I urge my 
colleagues to exercise judicial restraint here rather than give in 
to the temptation to exercise raw, political, partisan power. 
In granting Clarke, four of my colleagues accept only two of 
the five issues presented.2  Those same colleagues add two 
additional questions to the list of questions to be answered in 
briefing, two additional questions that are, at best, curious.3  
Why is this?  We do not know.  These orders are devoid of any 
stated rationale.  Hiding their rationale from the public is far 
from being transparent and accountable.  The Clarke petitioners 
presented these five issues: 
1. 
Whether the state legislative redistricting 
plans proposed by the Legislature and imposed by this 
Court 
in 
[Johnson 
III], 
are 
extreme 
partisan 
gerrymanders that violate Article I, Section 1 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution's guarantee of equal protection 
                                                 
2 The petitioners in Clarke and in Wright raise almost 
precisely the same issues and ask for precisely the same relief.  
Why not accept both cases, consolidate them, or hold one in 
abeyance?  In certain respects, Wright has more complete pleadings. 
3 The court majority has added the following questions to be 
answered in briefing:  
If the court rules that Wisconsin's existing state 
legislative maps violate the Wisconsin Constitution for 
either or both of these reasons and the legislature and 
the governor then fail to adopt state legislative maps 
that comply with the Wisconsin Constitution, what 
standards should guide the court in imposing a remedy 
for the constitutional violation(s)?; and  
What fact-finding, if any, will be required if the 
court determines there is a constitutional violation 
based on the contiguity clauses and/or the separation of 
powers doctrine and the court is required to craft a 
remedy for the violation? If fact-finding will be 
required, what process should be used to resolve 
questions of fact? 
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
8 
under law; and whether this cause of action is 
justiciable in Wisconsin courts. 
2. 
Whether the state legislative redistricting 
plans proposed by the Legislature and imposed by this 
Court in Johnson III are extreme partisan gerrymanders 
that retaliate against voters based on their viewpoint 
and exercise of free speech and abridge the ability of 
voters with disfavored political views to associate with 
others to advance their political beliefs in violation 
of Article I, Sections 3 and 4 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution; and whether these causes of action are 
justiciable in Wisconsin courts. 
3. 
Whether the state legislative redistricting 
plans proposed by the Legislature and imposed by this 
Court in Johnson III are extreme partisan gerrymanders 
that 
fail 
to 
"adhere[] 
to 
justice, 
moderation, 
temperance, 
frugality, 
and 
virtue, . . . [and] 
fundamental principles" in violation of Article I, 
Section 22 of the Wisconsin Constitution; and whether 
this cause of action is justiciable in Wisconsin courts. 
4. 
Whether the state legislative redistricting 
plans proposed by the Legislature and imposed by this 
Court in Johnson III violate the requirement of Article 
IV, Sections 4 and 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution that 
legislators be elected from districts consisting of 
"contiguous territory." 
5. 
Whether the state legislative redistricting 
plans proposed by the Legislature and imposed by this 
Court in Johnson III violate the separation-of-powers 
principle inherent in the Constitution's division of 
legislative, executive, and judicial power by usurping 
the Governor's core constitutional power to veto 
legislation and the Legislature's core constitutional 
power to override such a veto. 
Four members of this court seemingly attempt to evade several 
fatal flaws by accepting only two of the five issues presented, 
namely, the issues relating to contiguity and separation of powers.  
I suspect the court's focus will be on contiguity even though that 
issue was already considered and decided in the Johnson litigation.  
Johnson III, 401 Wis. 2d 198, ¶70 ("The Legislature has satisfied 
the remainder of Wisconsin's constitutional requirements.  The 
assembly districts are contiguous and sufficiently compact.").  
Accepting this case primarily, if not solely on contiguity, leads 
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
9 
one to conclude that four of my colleagues may already know the 
result they wish to obtain.  Moreover, one of the issues added by 
the court has already been answered in the Johnson litigation with 
the court's unambiguous conclusion that the "least change" 
standard applies.  Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2021 WI 87, 
¶¶64-79, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469 ("Johnson I").  The second 
added issue regarding fact-finding is not needed for the questions 
of law presented in the two accepted issues, but if fact-finding 
were somehow necessary, which is quite unclear, we are not a fact-
finding court.  The decision to accept the original action petition 
in Clarke is a travesty which disregards our very recently decided 
Johnson litigation and completely ignores longstanding, sound 
legal principles and the precedent that binds the court. 
Do my colleagues refuse to accept the other issues or the 
petition in Wright because they know this court has already decided 
these matters?  Or is it because most of the petitioners in Wright 
were allowed to intervene in the Johnson litigation?  Typically, 
this court accepts all issues for review before determining which 
of those issues are necessary to resolve the case.  I suspect my 
four colleagues may have tried to narrow the issues at the outset 
to be able to better achieve the pre-determined outcome they 
desire.  But will the remedy they seek invoke the other issues not 
accepted for review, missing the benefit of briefing or argument?  
Petitioners appear to be raising the contiguity argument as a means 
to indirectly re-litigate the already litigated and decided issues 
of political fairness and political gerrymandering.  But, the four 
in the majority did not accept those issues so they are not before 
the court.  This court is asked to consider "partisan fairness" in 
overturning the current apportionment maps, as the parties claim 
that 
"the 
current 
legislative 
maps 
are 
extreme 
partisan 
gerrymanders."  But these issues are not before the court, and 
this court already addressed the issue of partisan fairness in 
Johnson I, determining that it was not the court's role to answer 
political questions such as claims of partisan fairness, but only 
to answer "legal" questions such as whether the proposed maps 
"satisfy all constitutional and statutory requirements".  Johnson 
I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶4.  As these issues have already been 
expressly decided, we should not be resolving them again here. 
Perhaps another answer why four members of this court would 
limit its selection of issues to contiguity and separation of 
powers could be an attempt to dodge appellate review.  When four 
members of the judicial branch decide they also serve as members 
of the legislative and executive branches, should they not at least 
subject themselves to further appellate scrutiny?  Yet, the limited 
issues the four justices accept seem to seek evasion of any such 
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
10 
scrutiny. However, any remedy imposed might nonetheless be subject 
to review.  Typically, we take all the issues presented even if 
the court does not need to decide them because at its inception, 
we do not know the matter well enough.  We need extensive legal 
research, 
briefing 
and 
argument. 
This 
time 
around 
seems 
different:  it seems the four justices find that standard 
procedure unnecessary, as they already appear to know they do not 
need to fully research and hear all of the issues and arguments 
presented.  Instead, it seems the four justices only accept the 
two questions of law in order to avoid having the case proceed 
through traditional fact finding at the trial court.  
Notably, these justices vociferously dissented when the court 
decided Johnson III, a redistricting action, last year.  They 
primarily objected because there was no fact-finding.  Johnson 
III, 401 Wis. 2d 198, ¶161 (Karofsky, J., dissenting).  This case, 
with all of its issues, could have proceeded and facts could have 
been fully developed in the courts below, but since it now appears 
that they have changed their view and abandoned their objection 
once they became a majority of the court, perhaps a thorough 
process is not what they now desire.  It is worth wondering whether 
this case would withstand a full vetting based upon developed facts 
and law.  Unlike the Johnson litigation, where the court was 
required to act within a short time frame and remedy a 
constitutional violation by adopting new maps, these original 
actions do not pose a situation where the state is without 
constitutionally compliant maps absent court action.  There is no 
urgency to act with such haste and without a thorough vetting.  It 
is also not urgent to act before the Legislature has decided 
whether they should proceed with implementing a plan which mirrors 
Iowa's.4  Why does the court wish to act with such haste when the 
Constitution clearly vests redistricting powers within the 
province of the Legislature and Governor?  This hastiness also 
portends that this case is decided almost before it has begun. 
                                                 
4 Claire Reid, Robin Vos proposed 'Iowa-style' redistricting 
for Wisconsin. What does that mean? Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 
(Sept. 
13, 
2023); 
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2023/09/13/wisconsi
n-redistricting-what-is-iowa-style-model-proposed-by-
vos/70840624007/; Andrew Bahl, Is Iowa-style redistricting in 
Wisconsin's 
future? 
The 
Cap 
Times, 
(Sept. 
13, 
2023), 
https://captimes.com/news/is-iowa-style-redistricting-in-
wisconsin-s-future/article_49c8e042-526f-11ee-ad2f-
2fdd42d8bb17.html  
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
11 
All of this question-raising behavior seems to demonstrate 
not prudential judicial reasoning, but rather a sheer will to 
expedite a preconceived determination to ensure that all maps are 
favorable to a particular constituency.  When a court already knows 
the answer, the procedures in advance of that decision are nothing 
more than judicial window dressing.  This order seems to bear the 
hallmarks of just that. 
Far from being "judicial window-dressing," the court's 
reliance on foundational legal principles also supports the fact 
that both petitions should be denied because the Johnson III 
decision is the law.  Under the doctrines of stare decisis,5 issue 
                                                 
5 The doctrine of stare decisis bars parties from seeking to 
overrule recently decided cases such as Johnson III.  See State v. 
Alan Johnson, 2023 WI 39, ¶19, 407 Wis. 2d 195, 990 N.W.2d 174 
("[W]e require a special justification in order to overturn our 
precedent."); Hinrichs v. DOW Chemical Co., 2020 WI 2, ¶¶66-67, 
389 Wis. 2d 669, 937 N.W.2d 37 ("Second, the doctrine of stare 
decisis militates against the precipitous change in the law that 
Dow seeks. Stare decisis is fundamental to the rule of law.  
Indeed, '[t]his court follows the doctrine of stare decisis 
scrupulously because of our abiding respect for the rule of law.'  
'Fidelity to precedent ensures that existing law will not be 
abandoned lightly. When existing law is open to revision in every 
case, deciding cases becomes a mere exercise in judicial will, 
with arbitrary and unpredictable results.'  Accordingly, any 
departure from stare decisis requires 'special justification.'" 
(citations and footnotes omitted)).  
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
12 
preclusion,6 claim preclusion,7 and the law of the case,8 the 
Johnson III decision stands.  Cases that have been decided with 
finality are not re-litigated.  During the Johnson litigation 
addressing this issue of redistricting maps, we liberally 
permitted any and all parties to intervene in the case.  We then 
"granted intervention to all parties that sought it."  Johnson II, 
400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶2.  While the respondents were parties to the 
previous litigation, the Clarke petitioners apparently chose not 
to participate or at a minimum made no attempt to formally do so.9  
                                                 
6 The doctrine of issue preclusion clearly bars the parties 
from re-litigating what was already decided in the Johnson 
litigation.  See Aldrich v. LIRC, 2012 WI 53, ¶88, 341 Wis. 2d 36, 
814 N.W.2d 433 ("The doctrine of issue preclusion . . . is 
designed to limit the re-litigation of issues that have been 
actually litigated in a previous action.")  
7 The doctrine of claim preclusion bars parties from bringing 
claims now which could have been brought in the Johnson litigation.  
See Dostal v. Strand, 2023 WI 6, ¶24, 405 Wis. 2d 572, 948 
N.W.2d 382 ("[C]laim preclusion . . . extends to all claims that 
either were or could have been asserted in the previous case.").  
8  The doctrine of law of the case, in the interest of there 
being finality in court decisions, binds the parties in any 
subsequent retrial or appeal involving the same case and 
substantially the same facts as was addressed in the Johnson 
litigation.  See State v. Moeck, 2005 WI 57, ¶18, 280 Wis. 2d 277, 
695 N.W.2d 783 (The law of the case doctrine is a "longstanding 
rule that a decision on a legal issue by an appellate court 
establishes the law of the case, which must be followed in all 
subsequent proceedings in the trial court or on later appeal."). 
9 Notably, although the Clarke petitioners were not 
themselves 
parties in the Johnson litigation, they are represented in this 
case by many of the same law firms and lawyers who represented 
other parties in Johnson.  Specifically, Black Leaders Organizing 
for Communities, Voces de la Frontera, League of Women Voters of 
Wisconsin, Cindy Fallona, Lauren Stephenson, and Rebecca Alwin 
were parties in the Johnson litigation and were represented by Law 
Forward, Inc.; Stafford Rosenbaum LLP; and the Campaign Legal 
Center.  Those same law firms, with only the addition of a few 
additional out-of-state lawyers, now represent the petitioners in 
the Clarke case, creating the appearance that the lawyers have 
simply substituted a new group of parties to continue the 
redistricting litigation they could not resolve to their 
satisfaction in the Johnson litigation.   
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
13 
The law requires them to live with that decision.  Reframing 
arguments or attempting new fact-finding nonexistent in the 
previous litigation but involving the same maps should not be 
allowed to prevail.  Were that an acceptable tactic, there would 
be no finality in the law or litigation.  "If at first you don't 
succeed, try, try again" may be a good maxim for children, but 
that has never been the case for fully vetted, fully litigated and 
decided cases.  If these parties believed that these considerations 
were fundamental to map determinations, the time for participation 
was during the Johnson litigation.  That time has now passed. This 
court should not re-litigate the exact same maps one year later, 
with no intervening change in the law or facts presented.  At most, 
we see a motion for reconsideration; but in this case, such a 
motion is long since time barred. Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.64 ("A 
party may seek reconsideration of the judgment or opinion of the 
supreme 
court 
by 
filing 
a 
motion 
under 
s. 
809.14 
for 
reconsideration within 20 days after the date of the decision of 
the supreme court.").  There is no other legal basis or procedural 
mechanism for this court to once again re-examine these maps. 
Moreover, the petitioners' claim that the court's decision in 
Johnson III violated separation of powers does not seem to warrant 
serious review.  In the Johnson litigation, there had to be new 
redistricting maps; the maps enacted following the 2010 census 
were undeniably unconstitutional following the 2020 United States 
Census.  The Legislature and the Governor, the branches 
constitutionally responsible for redistricting, exercised their 
constitutional authority in a way that resulted in an impasse.  
Since the impasse meant that there was a lack of constitutionally 
                                                 
In addition, the seven Wright petitioners include five 
individuals who already participated in the Johnson litigation as 
parties—a group referred to in the Johnson decisions as the 
"Citizen Mathematicians and Scientists":  Stephen Joseph Wright 
(Chair of the Department of Computer Sciences at the University 
Wisconsin-Madison); Gary Krenz (Professor Emeritus of Mathematical 
and Statistical Sciences and Adjunct Professor of Computer Science 
at Marquette University); Sarah J. Hamilton (Associate Professor 
of Mathematics at Marquette University and an Assistant Adjunct 
Professor at the Medical College of Wisconsin); Jean-Luc 
Thiffeault (Chair of the Department of Mathematics and a Professor 
of Applied Mathematics at the University Wisconsin-Madison); and 
Somesh Jha (Professor of Computer Sciences at the University 
Wisconsin-Madison).  The Wright petitioners are represented by the 
same attorneys who represented the Citizen Mathematicians and 
Scientists in the Johnson litigation.   
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
14 
required maps in place prior to holding the next partisan election, 
the judicial branch was forced to intervene, albeit in a limited 
fashion.  We were forced to proceed with a judicial proceeding in 
the Johnson litigation to select constitutionally compliant maps 
as a remedy for the ongoing constitutional violation.  
It will be interesting to see how the separation-of-powers 
argument is presented. Seemingly, the argument is that by adopting 
legislative maps submitted by one party (i.e., the Legislature), 
this court violated the separation of powers because the Governor 
had previously vetoed those maps as part of the legislative 
process.  Would not the argument that the court violated the 
separation of powers by "judicially overriding" the Governor's 
veto of those maps also require finding that this court violated 
separation of powers by choosing the Governor's proposed 
congressional maps over the Legislature's proposed congressional 
maps?  Why does that scenario not also infringe on the 
Legislature's constitutional authority to enact new district maps?  
Indeed, the congressional maps proposed by the Governor and adopted 
by this court in Johnson II are still in effect.  If the 
petitioners' separation-of-powers claims have legal merit, should 
we also be reviewing the Governor's congressional maps to address 
that same violation? We shall see.  My guess is that the majority 
will not say much about separation of powers. 
The petitioners advance the proposition that Clarke raises 
issues no different than cases recently decided from other states.  
No other state in the nation is doing or has done what the 
petitioners ask this court to do.  None of those cases align with 
the procedural posture of the Johnson litigation and this new case.  
None of the other state cases the parties cited10 involve asking a 
state supreme court to reconsider maps that court adopted as 
constitutional just one year prior.  Moreover, Wisconsin, unlike 
the states upon which the parties rely, constitutionally vests 
both its legislature and its governor with the constitutional duty 
                                                 
10 Szeliga v. Lamone, C-02-CV-21-001816, 2022 WL 2132194 (Md. 
Cir. Ct. Mar. 25, 2022); League of Women Voters of Utah v. Utah 
Legislature, No. 220901712 (Utah 3d Dist. Ct. Nov. 22, 2022); 
Republican Party of New Mexico v. Oliver, No. S-1-SC-39481 (N.M. 
July 5, 2023); Avalos v. Davidson, No. 01CV2897, 2002 WL 1895406 
(D. Colo. Jan. 25, 2002); Balderas v. Texas, No. 6:01CV158, 2001 
WL 36403750 (E.D. Tex. 2001).   
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
15 
to determine redistricting.11  Wisconsin's unique procedural events 
in the Johnson litigation have not been replicated in these other 
states.12   
All of these factors, when considered together, seem to lead 
to the reasonable conclusion that accepting this original action 
is a purely political action to achieve a desired outcome.  Despite 
this court having just declared that the existing maps are 
constitutional, four members of this court nonetheless accept the 
original action petition in Clarke.  At the same time, four members 
of this court attempt to evade judicial review by selecting only 
                                                 
11 In the states the parties cited to, the individuals 
constitutionally responsible for redistricting are:  Maryland: the 
governor (M.D. Const. art. III, §V); Utah: Utah Legislative 
Redistricting Committee and the Utah Independent Redistricting 
Commission (Utah Const. art. IX, §1); New Mexico: the legislature 
(N.M. Const. art. VI, § 16); Colorado: independent commission as 
of 2018 (Colo. Const. art. V, §§ 44-48); and Texas:  the 
legislature, and if they fail to do so, the legislative 
redistricting board (Tex. Const. art. III, §28).  
12 In Maryland, the suit challenged a legislative-drawn map 
enacted over gubernatorial veto: the court ordered the legislature 
to adopt a revised map, which the legislature did, and which the 
governor then subsequently signed into law.  In Utah, the suit 
arose after the legislature adopted its own map over the three 
maps created and proposed by the Independent Redistricting 
Committee: the trial court declined to dismiss the plaintiff's 
partisan gerrymandering claims and the Utah State Supreme Court 
heard oral arguments in July 2023. The New Mexico Supreme Court, 
unlike the Wisconsin Supreme Court, determined that partisan 
gerrymandering claims were in fact justiciable.  Whereas the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted a map following a political impasse 
between its legislature and governor, in Colorado, the State 
District Court drew its own congressional map following the General 
Assembly's failure to pass a congressional redistricting plan in 
time for the 2002 elections. After the Republican-led legislature 
attempted to replace that court-drawn map, the Colorado Supreme 
Court ruled that the constitution allowed only one round of 
congressional redistricting after each 10-year census. And 
finally, in Texas, after the state failed to produce a 
congressional redistricting plan, the federal district court drew 
its 
own 
redistricting 
plan 
according 
to 
various 
neutral 
districting factors.  In none of these other states did their state 
supreme court draw the maps or overturn maps which they had adopted 
as a judicial remedy a year prior.  See supra n.10. 
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
16 
two of the five issues presented. These are questions of law, yet 
those justices nonetheless inquire about fact finding and also ask 
a question which telegraphs that they are poised to overturn the 
"least change" determination made in Johnson I.  399 Wis. 2d 623, 
¶¶64-79.  Despite this evasive framing of the case, Caperton 
nonetheless looms large and will remain a cloud over this outwardly 
handpicked, predetermined, and preordained litigation.13    
Finally, the Wisconsin Elections Commission does not seem to 
be a party that is taking a position. The petitioners' requested 
remedy affects 17 senators in odd-numbered districts.  These 
senators are named parties in Clarke.  But each Senate district 
has within it three Assembly seats, so there are potentially far-
reaching ramifications for seats in the Assembly.  Why not name 
those in the Assembly as well? If the result of the Johnson III 
maps being declared unconstitutional is that senators in odd-
numbered districts lack authority to hold their seats, then does 
the same lack of authority apply to members of the Assembly?  
Upon closer inspection, this original action appears to be 
nothing more than a thinly-veiled motion for reconsideration of 
this court's decision in Johnson III.  This court should not accept 
the petition in Clarke.  In granting the petition in Clarke, four 
members of this court have chosen to chip away at the public's 
faith in the judiciary as an independent impartial institution, 
undermine foundational judicial principles such as stare decisis, 
and cast a hyper-partisan shadow of judicial bias over the 
decisions of this court.  Such short-sighted behavior demonstrates 
the court majority's sheer will to expedite a preconceived outcome 
for a particular constituency. This abandonment of their judicial 
oath is disappointing.  I dissent.    
I am authorized to state that Justices REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY 
and BRIAN HAGEDORN join this dissent.   
 
 
                                                 
13 The public's faith in the judiciary as an independent, 
impartial institution is upended when parties are allowed to 
"[pick] the judge in [their] own case."  Williams v. Pennsylvania, 
579 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2016).  Where parties are allowed to pick who 
presides over their cases, a specter of judicial bias violates 
parties' due process rights and invalidates the outcome.  Parties 
can give the impression that they have impermissibly "picked the 
judge in their own case" through donating overwhelmingly to the 
campaign of a judge they hope to have preside over their case.  
See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
17 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).   
"Herald, read the accusation!" said the King. 
On this the White Rabbit blew three blasts on the 
trumpet, and then unrolled the parchment scroll, and 
read as follows:— 
"The Queen of Hearts, she made some tarts, 
    All on a summer day: 
The Knave of Hearts, he stole those tarts, 
    And took them quite away!" 
"Consider your verdict," the King said to the jury. 
"Not yet, not yet!" the Rabbit hastily interrupted. 
"There's a great deal to come before that!" 
*** 
"No, no!" said the Queen.  "Sentence first—verdict 
afterwards." 
Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland 165-67, 187 
(1865).   
A great deal came before the majority's decision to grant the 
petitioners this additional kick at the cat.  Ironically, an 
election for the office of supreme court justice makes possible 
this purely political proceeding—unconvincingly masquerading as a 
"judicial" one.  Janet Protasiewicz and Jill Karofsky delivered 
their sentence first—"Rigged!"—and will form a majority with Ann 
Walsh Bradley and Rebecca Dallet to shift legislative power from 
Republicans and bestow an electoral advantage on Democrats, 
fulfilling one of Protasiewicz's many promises to the principal 
funder of her campaign, the Democratic Party of Wisconsin.  At 
least the King in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland wouldn't have 
wasted time on a show trial contaminated with copious conflicts of 
interest.  Protasiewicz campaigned on "restoring democracy"14 and 
the other members of the majority regularly rail against imaginary 
threats to democracy.  See, e.g., Teigen v. WEC, 2022 WI 64, ¶208, 
                                                 
14 Janet Protasiewicz (@janetforjustice), Twitter (Mar. 7, 
2023, 
2:21 
PM) 
https://twitter.com/janetforjustice/status/1633201166929592320?c
xt=HHwWgIC8md3zpaotAAAA. 
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
18 
403 Wis. 2d 607, 725, 976 N.W.2d 519, 577 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., 
dissenting), reconsideration denied, 2022 WI 104.  It is hard to 
imagine a more brazen assault on democracy than removing duly 
elected senators from office by judicial fiat.   
I. Down the Rabbit Hole 
Petitioners are late to the redistricting tea party, which 
started in 2021 and concluded in 2022.  After each decennial census 
conducted under the United States Constitution, the Wisconsin 
Constitution requires the legislature "to apportion and district 
anew the members of the senate and assembly, according to the 
number of inhabitants."  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 3; see Johnson v. 
WEC, 2021 WI 87, ¶1, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469 (Johnson I).  
In 2021, the Wisconsin Legislature drew and passed new maps, but 
the governor vetoed them.  Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶2.  The 
then-existing 
maps, 
enacted 
into 
law 
in 
2011, 
were 
unconstitutional 
because 
shifts 
in 
Wisconsin's 
population 
"disturbed the constitutionally guaranteed equality of the 
people's representation in the state legislature."  Id.  In the 
face of political impasse, this court was asked to provide a remedy 
for that inequality.  Id.  We did so, initially selecting the 
legislative maps proposed by Governor Evers.  See Johnson v. WEC, 
2022 WI 14, ¶10, 400 Wis. 2d 626, 971 N.W.2d 402 (Johnson II).  
The United States Supreme Court summarily reversed because a 
majority of this court improperly applied the constitutional 
guarantee of equal protection in its selection of the Governor's 
maps, which sorted voters based on race without constitutionally 
permissible justification.  Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections 
Comm'n, 595 U.S. 398, 406 (2022) (per curiam).15  On remand, this 
court selected maps drawn by the Wisconsin Legislature.  See 
Johnson v. WEC, 2022 WI 19, ¶3, 401 Wis. 2d 198, 972 N.W.2d 559 
(Johnson III).  The remedial maps adopted by this court "would be 
in effect only 'until such time as the legislature and governor 
                                                 
15 In a startling confession of ignorance, Rebecca Dallet 
revealed on a podcast her inability to understand the United States 
Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence:  "[T]he Supreme 
Court said, 'Sorry this [sic] maps, the governor's maps violate 
the Equal Protection Clause' and they reversed and remanded to 
us. . . . I've read [the Supreme Court decision] numerous times 
and I don't understand it analytically[.]"  Justice Rebecca Dallet, 
The Supreme Importance of Wisconsin's Election, Strict Scrutiny 
(Apr. 
3, 
2023) 
(28:56-29:58), 
https://open.spotify.com/episode/0Ijqvbr52tuszDRB3lGGgQ?si=NPOfV
N72TZiv6iYYKSqL6A.   
 
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
19 
have enacted a valid legislative apportionment plan.'"  Johnson I, 
399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶19 (quoting State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 
23 Wis. 2d 606, 606, 128 N.W.2d 16 (1964) (per curiam)).   
II. The Pool of Tears 
Redistricting litigation concluded—or at least it should 
have—in April 2022, with this court's selection of new maps as a 
remedy for malapportionment.  Thereafter, state legislative 
elections occurred under those maps.  At a January 9, 2023 
candidate forum, Protasiewicz abandoned universal judicial ethics 
to unequivocally declare her position on the matter now before 
this court:  "So let's be clear here.  The maps are rigged—bottom 
line.  Absolutely, positively rigged.  They do not reflect the 
people in the state.  They are rigged, period."  She continued, "I 
believe the gerrymandering decision was wrong.  As I indicated to 
you before, I can't ever tell you what I would do on a particular 
case, but I can tell you my values and common sense tell you that 
it's wrong."16  Calling her preferred case outcomes her "values" 
does not alleviate the ethical dilemmas underlying Protasiewicz's 
involvement with this case. 
The Democratic Party of Wisconsin invested nearly $10,000,000 
in Protasiewicz's successful campaign.17  One day after her term 
began, Petitioners—all Democrats—filed this petition.  Overturning 
precedent to strip duly elected Republicans of their seats and 
deliver them to Democrats reeks of a quid pro quo.  Rebecca Dallet 
foreshadowed this very case:  "Big-money special interests have 
taken over.  Justices refuse to recuse themselves even when their 
                                                 
16 Zac Schultz, Candidates Tangle over Political Issues, 
Judicial Perspectives at First 2023 Wisconsin Supreme Court Forum, 
PBS 
Wis. 
(Jan. 
10, 
2023), 
https://pbswisconsin.org/news-
item/candidates-tangle-over-political-issues-judicial-
perspectives-at-first-2023-wisconsin-supreme-court-forum/. 
17 WisPolitics Tracks $56 Million in Spending on Wisconsin 
Supreme 
Court 
Race, 
WisPolitics 
(July 
19, 
2023), 
https://www.wispolitics.com/2023/wispolitics-tracks-56-million-
inspending-on-wisconsin-supreme-court-race/. 
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
20 
donors—who've given massive amounts of money—want the court to 
rule a certain way."18  Indeed.   
Along with her pro-abortion platform, Protasiewicz showcased 
her commitment to "fair" maps (whatever that might mean in her 
subjective opinion), announcing she would "enjoy taking a fresh 
look at the gerrymandering question."19  Protasiewicz acknowledged 
the issue would come before the court should she win the election:  
"I would anticipate that at some point, we'll be looking at those 
maps."20  Protasiewicz went so far as to signal how she would rule 
after her "fresh look" at the maps:  "If you look at the dissent 
in that maps case, that dissent is what I will tell you I agree 
with."21 
Failing to grasp the indispensability of impartiality in the 
exercise of judicial functions, Protasiewicz divulged, "I think 
that everybody knows that anybody running for any type of office 
has their [sic] own personal opinions and their [sic] own personal 
values.  And the question is, do you want to hide those opinions 
and those values from the public?  Are they entitled to know what 
your personal feelings are?  I mean, we've all got them.  So the 
question is, do we hide them?  Or do we let the public know?"22  
Protasiewicz chose her campaign strategy, but Wisconsin's Code of 
Judicial Conduct prohibits judges from engaging in extra-judicial 
activities which "[c]ast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity 
to act impartially as a judge."  SCR 60.05(1)(a).  Protasiewicz's 
                                                 
18 Judge Rebecca Dallet, Judge Rebecca Dallet: We Need to Fix 
Our Broken Wisconsin Supreme Court, The Cap Times (Feb. 13, 
2018), https://captimes.com/opinion/column/judge-rebecca-dallet-
we-need-to-fix-our-broken-wisconsin-supreme-
court/article_3851d423-bec8-5b34-bebc-4866cca7da3f.html. 
19 Jessie Opoien & Jack Kelly, Protasiewicz Would 'Enjoy 
Taking a Fresh Look' at Wisconsin Voting Maps, The Cap Times (Mar. 
2, 
2023), 
https://captimes.com/news/government/protasiewicz-
would-enjoy-taking-a-fresh-look-at-wisconsin-voting-
maps/article_d07fbe12-79e6-5c78-a702-3de7b444b332.html. 
20 Id.  
21 Henry Redman, Supreme Court Candidates Accuse Each Other 
of Lying, Extremism in Sole Debate, Wis. Exam'r (Mar. 21, 2023), 
https://wisconsinexaminer.com/2023/03/21/supreme-court-
candidates-accuse-each-other-of-lying-extremism-in-sole-debate/  
22 Opoien & Kelly, supra note 6.  
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
21 
"I can't tell you how I would rule on a case" smokescreen does not 
insulate her declarations from a due process challenge; no 
reasonable person familiar with her campaign statements would 
expect her to rule other than according to the "values" she 
explicitly professed.  No reasonable person would believe 
Protasiewicz can remain fair and impartial in this original action.    
Rebecca Dallet once recognized the corrosive effect of 
judicial candidates opining on issues the court may be called upon 
to decide:  "But as a judge, I don't take positions on specific 
issues that might come before the court.  It's wrong to do 
so.  When judges take positions on issues, they call into question 
the fairness of the courts.  Explicit partisan bias harms our 
system of justice."23   
These common-sense principles are not unique to Wisconsin.  
Then-Chief Justice Ronald M. George of the California Supreme Court 
explained, "when a candidate for judicial office speaks during an 
election campaign about his or her views on issues that may come 
before the court, voters reasonably will anticipate that he or she 
will render decisions in accordance with those personal views[.]"  
Ronald M. George, Foreword: Achieving Impartiality in State 
Courts, 97 Cal. L. Rev. 1853, 1861 (2009).  "The inclusion of a 
judge's personal views among the criteria for judicial election 
encourages a process of adjudication that is neither independent 
nor impartial."  Id. at 1862.  And it may violate litigants' 
constitutional rights.     
While Protasiewicz may have a First Amendment right to say 
whatever she thinks will get her elected, parties with cases before 
this court have a Fourteenth Amendment right to impartial arbiters 
of the law.  Would any party defending the maps adopted as this 
court's remedy in Johnson III have any confidence in receiving an 
unbiased 
decision 
after 
repeatedly 
hearing 
Protasiewicz's 
"personal opinions" and "personal values" about the maps, or after 
reading the following social media post:24 
                                                 
23 Dallet, supra note 5.  
24 Protasiewicz, supra note 1.  
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
22 
 
While judicial candidates cannot control what third parties 
(much less Hollywood elites) say about them, candidates have 
absolute control over what they repost on social media.  
Wisconsin's Code of Judicial Conduct governs such statements: "A 
judge, judge-elect, or candidate for judicial office shall not 
make or permit or authorize others to make on . . . her behalf, 
with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to 
come before the court, pledges, promises, or commitments that are 
inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative 
duties of the office."  SCR 60.06(3)(b). The First Amendment may 
permit Protasiewicz to "air" her "grievances," but retweeting 
Julia Louis-Dreyfus' inducement to vote for Protasiewicz in order 
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
23 
to "win" "[f]air maps" and "[a]bortion rights" and "[c]ontrol of 
Congress" reflects Protasiewicz's commitment to voting in favor of 
those outcomes irrespective of the law.  Protasiewicz's failure to 
recuse from this case despite her blatant bias should be reviewed 
by the United States Supreme Court before Wisconsin taxpayers are 
forced to foot the bill for a redistricting do-over.  The 
reverberations of Protasiewicz's choice to exercise her First 
Amendment right at the expense of judicial impartiality extend 
beyond Wisconsin.  Judicial candidates nationwide may replicate 
Protasiewicz's successful but ethically compromised playbook until 
the Court curbs the tactic.  "The judicial process works only when 
it is done in a disinterested manner, which is inconsistent with 
campaigns in which judges commit to rule, or appear to commit to 
rule, in a certain way in certain cases."  Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 
F.3d 189, 193 (6th Cir. 2010).   
In Caperton v. Massey, the United States Supreme Court decided 
due process required a state supreme court justice's recusal from 
a case because "'the probability of actual bias on the part of the 
judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally 
tolerable'" based in no small part on $3 million dollars in 
donations from the chairman and principal officer of a party to 
the action, to a political organization formed to support the 
justice who would hear the case after his election.  556 U.S. 868, 
877, 884 (2009) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 
(1975)).  Consistent with universal judicial ethics, the justice 
in Caperton had not made any statements during his campaign 
suggesting he had prejudged the case.  See id. at 882.  
Nevertheless, the Court determined the justice's participation 
violated the Due Process Clause because the campaign spending, 
coupled with its temporal proximity to the case, presented "a 
serious, objective risk of actual bias."  Id. at 886.  This court 
adopted the Caperton test, holding that a circuit court judge's 
repeated social media interactions with a litigant in a contested 
paternity case pending before the judge constituted a due process 
violation.  Miller v. Carroll, 2020 WI 56, 392 Wis. 2d 49, 944 
N.W.2d 542.  "To assess whether the probability of actual bias 
rises to the level of a due process violation, we apply, verbatim, 
the standard from Caperton."  Id., ¶24.  
 
Highlighting this court's rejection of a constitutionally-
infirm proposal to require recusal from cases involving parties 
who contributed $15,000 to a justice's campaign,25 Protasiewicz's 
media apologists either misunderstand or misrepresent Caperton.  
                                                 
25 S. Ct. Order 17-01 (issued June 30, 2017).  
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
24 
It isn't just about the money, although anyone equating $10,000,000 
and $15,000 exhibits something more than bad arithmetic.  Caperton 
is based on an enduring principle, pronounced decades ago by the 
United States Supreme Court:  "Not only is a biased decisionmaker 
constitutionally unacceptable, but 'our system of law has always 
endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.'"  
Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47.   
The probability of actual bias on Protasiewicz's part likely 
approaches 100%.  Wisconsin's Code of Judicial Conduct defines 
"Impartiality" as "the absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, 
or against, particular parties, or classes of parties, as well as 
maintaining an open mind in considering issues that may come before 
the judge."  SCR 60.01(7m).  "A judge, candidate for judicial 
office, or judge-elect should not manifest bias or prejudice 
inappropriate to the judicial office."  SCR 60.06(3)(a).  
"Expressions of bias or prejudice by a judge, even outside the 
judge's judicial activities, may cast reasonable doubt on the 
judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge."  Comment to SCR 
60.05(1).  A mind made up on the campaign trail is unlikely to be 
magically opened after the election.   
While Caperton likely governs recusal based on Protasiewicz's 
receipt of more than three times the amount deemed to offend due 
process in that case, Wisconsin's recusal rules govern her 
statements on the campaign trail:   
[A] judge shall recuse . . . herself in a proceeding 
when the facts and circumstances the judge knows or 
reasonably should know establish one of the following or 
when reasonable, well-informed persons knowledgeable 
about judicial ethics standards and the justice system 
and aware of the facts and circumstances the judge knows 
or reasonably should know would reasonably question the 
judge's ability to be impartial:  
 . . .  
(f) The judge, while a judge or a candidate for 
judicial 
office, 
has made a public statement that commits, or 
appears to commit, the judge with respect to any of 
the following:  
1. An issue in the proceeding. 
2. The controversy in the proceeding.   
 
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
25 
SCR 60.04(4)(f) (emphasis added). 
 
Protasiewicz is not the only occupant of the office of justice 
to declare her position on an issue everyone knew would be 
presented to the court upon her election.  In March 2023, in 
support of Protasiewicz's campaign, Karofsky said:  "When it comes 
to the maps, the maps are rigged.  I wrote in a dissent that the 
maps, I didn't use the word rigged, but if you read the dissent 
that I wrote in the final case in WEC v. Johnson err—Johnson v. 
WEC, you will see those maps are rigged.  You can't be in this 
state and not realize that.  Janet Protasiewicz is saying the quiet 
part out loud."26  One can't be in this state and not realize that 
at least some members of the majority already made up their minds 
on the issues presented in this petition.  "'[T]he most sacred of 
the duties of a government is to do equal and impartial justice to 
all its citizens.'"  United States v. Surratt, 855 F.3d 218, 220 
(4th Cir. 2017) (Wynn, J., dissenting from dismissal) (quoting 
Thomas Jefferson).  The constitutional guarantee of due process 
embodies this first principle. 
III. A Mad Tea-Party 
"Decisions first, principles later."  Robert H. Bork, 
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
Ind. L.J. 1, 5 (1971).    
The petitioners pose five claims, any one of which would 
suffice to reach the majority's preordained outcome in this case, 
but the majority selects two, the better to expedite its resolution 
of this case in petitioners' favor and perhaps dodge United States 
Supreme Court review: 
1. Do the existing state legislative maps violate the contiguity 
requirements contained in Article IV, Sections 4 and 5 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution?  
 
This question was asked, and answered in the negative, in 
Johnson III, 401 Wis. 2d 198, ¶70 ("The assembly districts are 
contiguous and sufficiently compact."). 
                                                 
26 Frederica Freyberg, Jill Karofsky on the 2023 Wisconsin 
Supreme 
Court 
Election, 
PBS 
Wis. 
(Mar. 
31, 
2023), 
https://pbswisconsin.org/news-item/jill-karofsky-on-the-2023-
wisconsin-supreme-court-election/. 
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
26 
2. Did the adoption of the existing state legislative maps 
violate the Wisconsin Constitution's separation of powers?  
This question could have been asked, but was not.  The 
petitioners could have moved to intervene in the Johnson litigation 
two years ago, but did not, and instead waited for the membership 
of the court to change before bringing this claim.  If the majority 
were consistent in its treatment of parties who sleep on their 
rights in this manner, they would apply the doctrine of laches 
onto which they latched to avoid answering unsettled issues in 
prior cases.  See, e.g., Trump v. Biden, 2020 WI 91, 394 
Wis. 2d 629, 951 N.W.2d 568; Hawkins v. WEC, 2020 WI 75, 393 
Wis. 2d 629, 948 N.W.2d 877 (applying laches to bar action filed 
two days after certification of candidates for election).  Of 
course, those cases involved challenges to the administration of 
elections which produced outcomes the majority favored.   
The court should deny this petition because it relitigates 
claims this court only recently decided in Johnson III, 401 Wis. 
2d 198, and asserts claims that could have been brought by 
intervention at the outset in Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, in 2021.  
Only a change in court membership makes a do-over possible, as the 
litigants recognized by announcing their plan to file an original 
action just two days after Protasiewicz's election27 and by filing 
this petition one day after her term began.  At least one member 
                                                 
27 Jack Kelly, Liberal Law Firm to Argue Gerrymandering 
Violates Wisconsin Constitution, The Cap Times (Apr. 6, 2023), 
https://captimes.com/news/government/liberal-law-firm-to-
arguegerrymandering-violates-wisconsin-
constitution/article_2dfb9757-6d2d-58ba-9461- 10b3d20d5f00.html. 
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
27 
of the current majority—Ann Walsh Bradley—has repeatedly decried 
altering precedent based on a change in court membership:28 
 "Before concluding, I observe that the majority's analysis 
and its overruling of Ferdon depart from the time-honored 
principle of stare decisis.  We decided Ferdon only thirteen 
years ago.  '[R]espect for prior decisions is fundamental to 
the rule of law.'  Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emp'rs Ins. of 
Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶94, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257 
(2003).  'Stare decisis is the preferred course of judicial 
action because it promotes evenhanded, predictable, and 
consistent development of legal principles . . . and 
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the 
judicial process.'   Id., ¶95.  'The decision to overturn a 
prior case must not be undertaken merely because the 
composition 
of 
the 
court 
has 
changed.' 
 
Id.; see 
also Bartholomew v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund and 
Compcare Health Servs. Ins. Corp., 2006 WI 91, ¶32, 293 Wis. 
2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216 ('No change in the law is justified by 
a change in the membership of the court[.]')."  Mayo v. Wis. 
Injured Patients & Fams. Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶¶ 109-110, 
383 Wis. 2d 1, 61, 914 N.W.2d 678, 707 (Ann Walsh Bradley, 
J., dissenting). 
 
 "Stare decisis (Latin for 'let the decision stand') is a basic 
tenet of the rule of law.   Although stare decisis is not a 
mechanical formula requiring blind adherence to precedent, 
departing from precedent requires special justification, and 
'[n]o change in the law is justified by a change in the 
membership of the court or a case with more egregious 
                                                 
28 This is not the first time Ann Walsh Bradley upended 
established precedent after a change in the membership of the 
court.  In 2006, she joined a majority in overturning Panzer v. 
Doyle, 2004 WI 52, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 680 N.W.2d 666, which the court 
had decided just two years earlier.  See Dairyland Greyhound Park, 
Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶286, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408  
(Roggensack, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) ("The 
decisions of this court are final if not set aside on a motion for 
reconsideration in the case in which the ruling was issued, Wis. 
Stat. § 809.64 (2003–04), or overturned by a federal court on a 
federal question, see State v. Webster, 114 Wis. 2d 418, 426 n.4, 
338 N.W.2d 474 (1983).  Notwithstanding this rule of law, at the 
request of the Governor, the majority opinion takes up an issue we 
decided in 2004 and puts it into the appeal of a 2001 circuit court 
decision."). 
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
28 
facts.'"  St. Croix Cnty. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs. v. 
Michael D., 2016 WI 35, ¶85, 368 Wis. 2d 170, 880 N.W.2d 107 
(Abrahamson & Ann Walsh Bradley, JJ., dissenting) (footnotes 
omitted; alteration in opinion).  "Nothing aside from the 
membership of the court has changed since Steven H.  A change 
in membership of the court does not justify a departure from 
precedent."  Id., ¶93.   
 
Nothing aside from the membership of the court has changed since 
Johnson III.  The majority abandons inconvenient principles that 
would otherwise obstruct its activism.  
 
IV. The Queen's Croquet-Ground 
 
In resurrecting the following issues from last year's 
litigation and imposing them on parties who haven't raised them, 
the majority tips its hand; it will overrule Johnson I and Johnson 
III, supplant the rule of law with the collective will of four 
members of the court, and replace last year's judicial remedy with 
an entirely political one: 
 
1. If the court rules that Wisconsin's existing state 
legislative maps violate the Wisconsin Constitution for 
either or both of these reasons and the legislature and 
the governor then fail to adopt state legislative maps that 
comply with the Wisconsin Constitution, what standards 
should guide the court in imposing a remedy for the 
constitutional violation(s)?  
2. What fact-finding, if any, will be required if the court 
determines there is a constitutional violation based on 
the contiguity clauses and/or the separation-of-powers 
doctrine and the court is required to craft a remedy for 
the violation?  If fact-finding will be required, what 
process should be used to resolve questions of fact?29 
That which was constitutional in 2022 cannot become 
unconstitutional in 2023, even if the majority so decrees.  
Nevertheless, the standards by which the court in 2022 ordered a 
remedy for the inequality of the people's representation in the 
state legislature will be discarded by the majority, in a grave 
affront to the rule of law.   
 
                                                 
29 The majority's nonsensical final question in the order 
betrays its inability to distinguish a legal claim from a factual 
one.   
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
29 
In exercising unbridled power absent lawful authority, the 
members of the majority will violate the Wisconsin Constitution, 
arrogating unto themselves purely legislative power the people 
never gave them.  Granting this original action petition "is a 
naked judicial claim to legislative—indeed, super-legislative—
power; a claim fundamentally at odds with our system of 
government."  Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 717 (2015) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  "By vesting certain powers exclusively 
within each of the three co-equal branches of government, the 
drafters of the Wisconsin Constitution recognized the importance 
of dispersing governmental power in order to protect individual 
liberty and avoid tyranny."  League of Women Voters of Wis. v. 
Evers, 2019 WI 75, ¶31, 387 Wis. 2d 511, 929 N.W.2d 209.  Tyranny 
may wear a black robe.  See Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶ 80 
(citing In re Review of the Code of Judicial Ethics, SCR Chapter 
60, 169 Wis. 2d xv, xxv (1992) (Day, J., concurring, joined by a 
majority) ("Tyranny need not be dressed in a military uniform, it 
can also wear a black robe!").  "[L]iberty can have nothing to 
fear from the judiciary alone, but would have every thing to fear 
from its union with either of the other departments."  The 
Federalist No. 78, at 523 (Jacob E. Cook ed., 1961) (Alexander 
Hamilton).  In Wisconsin, that fear has come to pass.   
"A system of government that makes the People subordinate to 
a committee of nine unelected lawyers does not deserve to be called 
a democracy."  Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 717 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  Although Wisconsin's justices are elected, democracy 
also does not countenance a system of government that subordinates 
the people of Wisconsin to a committee of four lawyers, regardless 
of how they are chosen.  After all, justices are elected to 
exercise judicial power, not to fulfill the wishes of their 
political benefactors.  See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 
433, 446-47 (2015) ("In deciding cases, a judge is not to follow 
the preferences of his supporters, or provide any special 
consideration to his campaign donors.").  Under our Wisconsin 
Constitution, judicial power is the only authority the people gave 
this court.  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 2.  Judicial elections cannot 
override the constitution.    
Ultimately, petitioners ask the court to unseat Wisconsin's 
duly elected senators by judicial decree—"off with their heads!"  
The majority's acquiescence to this unprecedented demand would 
deal a death blow to democracy in this state.  Wisconsin citizens 
would become the majority's subjects, at the mercy of the masters 
who were once the People's servants. 
* * * 
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
30 
The democratic integrity of law . . . depends entirely 
upon the degree to which its processes are legitimate.  
A judge who announces a decision must be able to 
demonstrate that he began from recognized legal 
principles and reasoned in an intellectually coherent 
and politically neutral way to his result.  Those who 
would politicize the law offer the public, and the 
judiciary, the temptation of results without regard to 
democratic legitimacy. 
Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction 
of the Law 2 (1990).  The outcome of this original action has been 
predetermined.  In granting this petition, four members of this 
court pretend the Johnson litigation never happened.  ("'Oh, I've 
had such a curious dream!' said Alice.")30  Their perverse 
politicization of this state's highest court begins with the 
results—"Fair maps!"—and will end with decisions devoid of 
democratic integrity, and without democratic legitimacy.  Would 
that it were The End, but the majority's degradation of the court 
is only just beginning.  Through the Looking Glass31 we go. 
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER joins this dissent.  
 
                                                 
30 Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland 189 (1865).   
31 Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, and What Alice 
Found There (1871). 
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
31 
BRIAN 
HAGEDORN, 
J.   (dissenting).  The 
drawing 
of 
legislative districts stirs sincere and passionate disagreement.  
As a court of law, however, we must be guided by something beyond 
political and policy debates.  If we were following the normal 
judicial process, this petition for an original action would be 
unanimously denied.  Two years ago, this court stepped into 
redistricting because the legislature did not enact new maps into 
law, which the Wisconsin Constitution requires every ten years.32  
Courts cannot pass laws, of course.  But they can impose a suitable 
remedy for constitutional violations.  We did so, and selected 
state assembly and senate maps after receiving proposals submitted 
                                                 
32 The Wisconsin Constitution states that "the legislature 
shall apportion and district anew the members of the senate and 
assembly, according to the number of inhabitants," following the 
federal government's decennial census.  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 3.  
From our founding as a state, the legislature has always 
accomplished this by enacting a reapportionment bill into law with 
the governor exercising his constitutional power to veto 
legislation.  State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d 544, 
558, 126 N.W.2d 551 (1964).  When the legislature attempted to 
reapportion districts in 1964 by joint resolution (so that the 
Governor could not use his veto pen), we rejected the move and 
held that enactment by law is what the constitution requires.  
Id. at 558-59.   
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
32 
by the parties in the case.33  We concluded, among other things, 
that the maps we settled on complied with the requirements of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  That judicial remedy remains in place 
today, filling the gap until such time as the legislature enacts 
new maps into law.   
The petitioners now seek to reverse multiple decisions of 
this court and the ongoing remedy we put in place in a case they 
                                                 
33 At the outset of the litigation, we invited the parties to 
submit proposed maps consistent with criteria we would provide.  
Johnson v. WEC, No. 2021AP1450, unpublished order (Wis. Nov. 17, 
2021).  We later discussed the legal requirements and criteria we 
would use to select maps in our first of three opinions in the 
case.  Johnson v. WEC, 2021 WI 87, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469 
(Johnson I).  Given our narrow remedial task of adjusting districts 
to resolve population disparities, we determined we would select 
maps that complied with all legal requirements and departed the 
least from existing law—that is, the districts last enacted into 
law.  Id., ¶¶24-38, 64-68, 73-79.  Following the submissions, we 
initially selected the Governor's legislative maps because we 
determined they made fewer changes to existing districts than the 
other proposals we received.  Johnson v. WEC, 2022 WI 14, ¶¶8-10, 
400 Wis. 2d 626, 971 N.W.2d 402 (Johnson II).  The United States 
Supreme Court then clarified that we could select the Governor's 
race-conscious maps only if it was proven before us that a race-
neutral alternative violated the Voting Rights Act.  Wis. 
Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 595 U.S. 398, 403-04 (2022) 
(per curiam).  We reconsidered, concluded the Governor's maps did 
not pass that hurdle, and selected the only race-neutral 
legislative maps proposed to us—those of the legislature.  Johnson 
v. WEC, 2022 WI 19, ¶¶2-3, 401 Wis. 2d 198, 972 N.W.2d 559 (Johnson 
III).  We did not do so because the legislature had some type of 
preferred status in the litigation before us.  As explained in the 
previous footnote, the legislature's constitutional prerogative 
and responsibility encompasses enacting maps into law.  Wis. Const. 
art. IV, § 3.  Because it did not accomplish this task, the 
legislature appeared before us simply as one of several parties to 
the litigation.  The same was true of the Governor.  He stood on 
equal footing with all other parties in the litigation, each of 
whom could have submitted maps that better complied with all 
relevant laws and our directive to minimize change from the maps 
then codified into law.   
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
33 
could have participated in, but chose not to.34  Parties, however, 
generally cannot challenge judicial remedies in this fashion.  This 
petition appears to be a collateral attack on the court's decisions 
and orders in Johnson v. WEC.  Procedurally, this is highly 
unusual, and it may be impermissible under the law.35  Nevertheless, 
the court today votes to take this case and consider two questions.   
First, we are asked to overturn two decisions from Johnson 
and hold that the Wisconsin Constitution requires districts to be 
physically contiguous.36  This despite the fact that the 
legislature 
has 
considered 
political 
contiguity 
(keeping 
municipalities together) to be constitutionally sufficient for at 
least the last 50 years.37  In 1992, the federal court handling a 
                                                 
34 We invited any interested parties—including individual 
voters—to join the case at the beginning stages of the litigation.  
Johnson v. WEC, No. 2021AP1450, unpublished order (Wis. Sept. 22, 
2021).  Many did; we denied none the opportunity to participate.   
35 The normal rule in litigation is that judgments are binding 
and final.  Oneida Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Nicole W., 2007 
WI 30, ¶28, 299 Wis. 2d 637, 728 N.W.2d 652.  Generally, unless a 
judgment is the result of fraud or some other narrow exception, 
parties may not challenge judgments indirectly through a separate 
proceeding—called a collateral attack.  Id.  Attempts "to avoid, 
evade, or deny the force and effect of a judgment in an indirect 
manner" will ordinarily not be entertained because they disrupt 
finality, undermine the court, and impair the administration of 
justice.  Id., ¶¶27-28 (quoting another source). 
36 Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶36 (affirming the federal 
court's conclusion in Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 
866 (W.D. Wis. 1992), that detached, municipal islands constitute 
sufficient legal contiguity under Article IV, Section 4 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution); Johnson III, 401 Wis. 2d 198, ¶70 
(holding that the assembly districts, three of which make up a 
senate 
district, 
satisfied 
the 
constitution's 
contiguity 
requirement). 
37 The brief by the Republican senators points to a statute 
passed in 1971—after the legislature adopted new maps—that appears 
to reflect this view:  "In designing the districts, the following 
factors are considered as coequal in precedence:  compactness, 
contiguity of area, and community of interest.  Island territory 
(territory belonging to a city, town or village but not contiguous 
to the main part thereof) is considered a contiguous part of its 
municipality."  Wis. Stat. § 4.001(2) (1971-72). 
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
34 
redistricting impasse explicitly considered this issue and adopted 
politically (but not physically) contiguous maps.38  The federal 
court adopted similar maps in 2002.39  No one protested on this 
ground when the legislature enacted new maps into law doing the 
same in 2011.40  And no parties in Johnson argued this point when 
we affirmed that political contiguity was constitutionally 
sufficient.41  Yet the voter-petitioners here have determined that 
now is the time to take a fresh look.  They were inspired to 
challenge longstanding precedent and practice on August 2, the day 
after a new justice was sworn into office—a remarkable coincidence. 
The second issue also runs headlong into our decisions in 
Johnson.  The petitioners argue that this court violated the 
separation of powers by adopting a judicial remedy proposed by the 
legislature, whom we admitted as a party to the litigation.42  This 
is so, they assert, because the legislature previously tried to 
pass into law the maps it later submitted to this court, and the 
Governor vetoed them.  We do not enact laws, though.  So the theory 
appears to be that this court cannot adopt a judicial remedy in 
litigation that was also an unsuccessful piece of legislation. 
There'll be time enough to evaluate the merits of these 
arguments as this case unfolds.  But make no mistake, the process 
here smells.  Everyone understands that this case is aimed at 
something 
beyond 
newfound 
concern 
for 
the 
constitution's 
contiguity requirement or whether failed legislation can be used 
as a judicial remedy.  It is a search for some plausible legal 
basis—anything will do, really—to green-light a judicially 
commanded political realignment of state government.  This case is 
an outcome in search of a theory.   
And the court is happy to oblige.  Despite the petitioners 
standing by until the court's composition changed, the court 
dutifully adopts an accelerated briefing and oral argument 
                                                 
38 Prosser, 793 F. Supp. at 866. 
39 Baumgart v. Wendelberger, Nos. 01-C-0121, 02-C-0366, 2002 
WL 34127471 (E.D. Wis. May 30, 2002). 
40 2011 Wis. Act 43. 
41 Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶36; Johnson III, 401 
Wis. 2d 198, ¶70. 
42 See supra n.2 (explaining the status of the legislature as 
a party to the litigation). 
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
35 
schedule.  It even changed our internal writing deadlines on 
original actions to ensure this case would be fast-tracked.  
Further, the court directs the parties to brief an almost identical 
question to the one we addressed in Johnson I:  what standards 
should guide the court in imposing a remedy if the current district 
lines are unlawful?  Asked and answered, methinks.  But the goal 
is to get this court into the business of being the supreme 
guardian of "partisan fairness" in map-making—contrary to what we 
just held—and to do so before the next election cycle.   
Were it otherwise, there's no way we would take a case in 
this posture and on this pseudo-emergency schedule—one brought by 
parties who strategically sat on their hands for years, who were 
invited to join the last redistricting case and did not, and who 
now seek to disturb the ongoing judicial remedy in that case on 
issues we already decided.  An ordinary court would see the 
political gamesmanship for what it is, deny the petition, and move 
on.  These are not, I'm afraid, ordinary times, and this is not an 
ordinary court. 
Granting this petition comes at a steep price.  Politics may 
be a team sport, but judging is not.  We have no partisan team 
when deciding cases.  Instead, we have sworn an oath to decide 
cases as neutral arbiters of the law, with no thumb on the scale 
for anyone.  The more we accommodate those who wish to use this 
court as a weapon in the political wars raging among us, the more 
we depart from the modest role the constitution assigns to us and 
invite even more political gamesmanship.  Those hoping the 
judiciary will boldly take up the mantle of guaranteeing "partisan 
fairness" for legislative maps may uncork their champagne in the 
short term.  But the celebration won't last long.  In the end, few 
will be happy, the politicization of the judiciary will worsen, 
and this litigation will never truly end.  
I respectfully dissent. 
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2023AP1399-OA 
36