Case Title: Pastchol v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Lorine PASTCHOL v. ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE
INSURANCE COMPANY, as Insurer of Magnolia
Hospital; Scott McMahen, M.D., P. A.; Dan
Bocan, C.R.N.A.; P. Clark, R.N.; and R.
Canterbury, R.N.

95-1167                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
              Opinion delivered September 30, 1996


1.   Motions -- summary judgment -- when appropriate. -- Rule 56(c)
     of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary
     judgment is to be rendered only in those instances where "the
     pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
     admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
     that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
     that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
     law."  

2.   Motions -- summary judgment -- burden of proof. -- The burden
     of sustaining a motion for summary judgment is the
     responsibility of the moving party; all proof submitted must
     be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party,
     and any doubts or inferences must be resolved against the
     moving party.

3.   Limitation of actions -- medical injury governed by Medical
     Malpractice Act -- two-year statute of limitations
     controlling. -- The Medical Malpractice Act applies to all
     causes of actions for medical injury arising after April 2,
     1979, and supersedes any inconsistent provision of law; any
     medical injury, even one resulting in the death of a person,
     is governed by the Medical Malpractice Act and not the
     wrongful-death statute; thus, the controlling statute of
     limitations is the two-year period found in Ark. Code Ann. 
     16-114-203(a) (1987).

4.   Limitation of actions -- appellant's cause of action was for
     medical malpractice -- trial court correctly applied two-year
     period. -- Where the case at hand involved a medical injury,
     appellant's cause of action was one of medical malpractice,
     which must have been filed within two years after the cause of
     action accrued, and the trial court was correct in applying a
     two-year statute of limitations period.

5.   Limitation of actions -- medical malpractice -- when cause of
     action accrues. -- Under Ark. Code Ann.  16-114-203(b)
     (1987), the date a cause of action for medical malpractice
     accrues is "the date of the wrongful act complained of and no
     other time."

6.   Limitation of actions -- medical malpractice -- continuous-
     treatment doctrine -- when applicable. -- The appellate court
     viewed appellant's reliance on the doctrine of continuous
     treatment as misplaced because that doctrine was not designed
     to extend the statute of limitations period in cases where
     only a single, isolated act of malpractice or negligence is
     alleged; in contrast to the so-called continuing-tort theory,
     based on a single negligent act, the continuous-treatment
     doctrine becomes relevant when the medical negligence consists
     of a series of negligent acts, or a continuing course of
     improper treatment.

7.   Limitation of actions -- medical malpractice -- continuous-
     treatment doctrine inapplicable. -- In the case at hand,
     appellant complained of only one isolated act of negligence
     that occurred on a single date during the induction of
     anesthesia immediately before the decedent's surgery; no
     further acts of negligence occurred; appellees had no further
     participation in the treatment of decedent up to the time of
     his death ten days later; the mere fact that the decedent
     remained in the hospital under a doctor's care until his death
     did not demonstrate a continuing course of improper treatment
     that would toll the statute of limitations; therefore, the
     appellate court declined to apply the continuous-treatment
     doctrine to the facts of the case.

8.   Limitation of actions -- medical malpractice -- appellant's
     claim barred by statute of limitations -- appellees entitled
     to summary judgment. -- The appellate court concluded that the
     trial court correctly ruled that the date on which the cause
     of action accrued was the date on which the medical injury or
     wrongful act occurred; because appellant did not file her
     initial complaint until more than two years later, her claim
     was barred by the statute of limitations; thus, the appellate
     court concluded that appellees were entitled to summary
     judgment as a matter of law.

9.   Appeal & error -- substitution-of-parties issue not addressed
     -- any survival claim barred by two-year limitations period. -
     - Where appellant argued that the trial court erred in not
     recognizing that, subsequent to the cause of action being
     filed, appellant had been named as administratrix of the
     decedent's estate, and in refusing to allow her to substitute
     herself in that capacity as the real party in interest to the
     survival action, the appellate court concluded that it was not
     necessary to address the argument because it had already
     determined that the case was one of medical malpractice and
     that the applicable statute-of-limitations period was two
     years; thus, any survival claim appellant may have had was
     similarly barred. 


     Appeal from Columbia Circuit Court, Second Division; Carol
Crafton Anthony, Judge; affirmed.
     David J. Potter, for appellant.
     Anderson & Kilpatrick, by: Overton S. Anderson and Mariam T.
Hopkins, for appellee St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. as insurer of
Magnolia Hospital; Dan Bocan, C.R.N.A.; K. Whitehead, R.N.; and R.
Canterbury, R.N.
     Shackleford, Shackleford & Phillips, by: Dennis Shackleford,
for appellee Scott McMahen, M.D.
     Dunn, Nutter, Morgan & Shaw, by: Gary Nutter, for appellee P.
Clark, R.N.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellant, Lorine Pastchol, appeals the order of the Columbia
County Circuit Court granting summary judgment to appellees,
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, Scott McMahen, Dan Bocan,
P. Clark, K. Whitehead, and R. Canterbury, on the ground that the
statute of limitations expired prior to the filing of this medical
malpractice claim involving the death of her brother.  Jurisdiction
is properly had in this court pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-
2(a)(3) and (16).  In support of this appeal, appellant contends
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in applying the
wrong statute of limitations; in disregarding the doctrine of
continuous treatment; and in refusing to allow appellant to
substitute herself as decedent's administratrix as the real party
in interest to this action pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.  16-62-101
(1987).  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.  
     Rule 56(c) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that summary judgment is to be rendered only in those instances
where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  The
burden of sustaining a motion for summary judgment is the
responsibility of the moving party. Tullock v. Eck, 311 Ark. 564,