Case Title: Ex parte Natasha Cunningham.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1190187

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2020-11-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: November 6, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2020-2021
____________________
1190187
____________________
Ex parte Natasha Lashay Cunningham
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Natasha Lashay Cunningham
v.
State of Alabama)
(Houston Circuit Court, CC-18-888 and CC-18-889;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-18-0551)
1190187
SELLERS, Justice.1
Natasha Lashay Cunningham petitioned for, and this Court granted,
certiorari  review of the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals
holding that the offense of possession of a controlled substance is a lesser-
included offense of the offense of distribution of a controlled substance. 
See Cunningham v. State, [Ms. CR-18-0551, September 20, 2019]  ___ So.
3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2019). We reverse and remand. 
Facts
The Houston County grand jury returned an indictment charging
Cunningham with distribution of a controlled substance, a violation of §
13A-12-211, Ala.  Code 1975.2 That indictment reads:
"The Grand Jury of said county charge that before the finding
of this indictment, Natasha Lashay Cunningham, whose name
is otherwise unknown to the Grand Jury, did unlawfully sell,
furnish, give away, deliver or distribute a controlled substance,
to-wit: methamphetamine, in violation of Section 13A-12-211
1This case was previously assigned to another Justice on this Court;
it was reassigned to Justice Sellers on October 1, 2020.
2Cunningham was also indicted for second-degree possession of
marijuana, a violation of § 13A-12-214, Ala. Code 1975.  She was convicted
of that charge. That conviction is not at issue in this appeal. 
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of the Code of Alabama against the peace and dignity of the
State of Alabama."
(Emphasis added.)
Following a trial, the Houston Circuit Court granted Cunningham's
motion for a judgment of acquittal as to the distribution-of-a-controlled-
substance charge because the evidence did not support that charge. Over
Cunningham's objection, the circuit court instructed the jury on possession
of a controlled substance as a lesser-included offense of distribution of a
controlled substance.  The jury returned a verdict finding Cunningham
guilty of possession of a controlled substance, a violation of § 13A-12-212,
Ala. Code 1975. The circuit court sentenced Cunningham to 48 months in
prison.  She appealed.  On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that
the circuit court properly instructed the jury on the offense of possession
of a controlled substance as a lesser-included offense of distribution of a
controlled substance. As part of its analysis, the Court of Criminal
Appeals recognized that there could be circumstances in which a
controlled substance could be distributed without a defendant being in
actual or constructive possession of the substance. The court then
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reasoned that, because there was evidence indicting that Cunningham
actually possessed a controlled substance, the jury was free to consider
possession as a lesser-included offense of the charged offense of
distribution.  This Court granted the petition for the writ of certiorari to
review the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision. 
Standard of Review
In reviewing the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision on a petition for
a writ of certiorari, this Court applies de novo the standard of review
applicable in the Court of Criminal Appeals.  Ex parte Knox, 201 So. 3d
1213 (Ala. 2015). 
Discussion
  
Cunningham argues that the circuit court erred in instructing the
jury on the possession-of-a-controlled-substance offense as a lesser-
included offense of distribution of a controlled substance.   In an unusual
stance and contrary to its position below, the State agrees with
Cunningham that, under the facts presented, the possession-of-a-
controlled-substance offense should not have been submitted to the jury
for its consideration. For the reasons provided herein, we agree.   
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"[T]o be a lesser included offense of one charged in an indictment,
the lesser offense must be one that is necessarily included, in all of its
essential elements, in the greater offense charged." Payne v. State, 391 So.
2d 140, 143 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980). "Whether a crime constitutes a lesser-
included offense is to be determined on a case-by-case basis."  Aucoin v.
State, 548 So. 2d 1053, 1057 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989). In determining
whether an offense is a lesser-included offense of the charged offense, "the
potential relationship of the two offenses must be considered not only in
the abstract terms of the defining statutes but must also be considered in
light of the particular facts of each case." Ingram v. State, 570 So. 2d 835,
837 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990).  To that end, the Court of Criminal Appeals
has explained:
"The 'particular facts' of each case are those facts alleged in
the indictment. Thus, 'the statutory elements of the offenses
and facts alleged in an indictment -- not the evidence
presented at trial or the factual basis provided at the
guilty-plea colloquy -- are the factors that determine whether
one offense is included in another.' Johnson v. State, 922 So.
2d 137, 143 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005)."
Williams v. State, 104 So. 3d 254, 264 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012) (emphasis
added).  
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Moreover, § 15–8–25, Ala. Code 1975, provides:
"An indictment must state the facts constituting the
offense in ordinary and concise language, without prolixity or
repetition, in such a manner as to enable a person of common
understanding to know what is intended and with that degree
of certainty which will enable the court, on conviction, to
pronounce the proper judgment."
Similarly, Rule 13.2(a), Ala. R. Crim. P., mandates:
"The indictment or information shall be a plain, concise
statement of the charge in ordinary language sufficiently
definite to inform a defendant of common understanding of the
offense charged and with that degree of certainty which will
enable the court, upon conviction, to pronounce the proper
judgment."
In other words, an indictment must clearly inform the criminal
defendant of the offense with which he or she is being charged and against
which he or she is expected to defend. In this case, the indictment
charging Cunningham tracked the distribution-of-a-controlled-substance
statute and alleged that "Cunningham ... did unlawfully sell, furnish, give
away, 
deliver 
or 
distribute 
a 
controlled 
substance, 
to-wit:
methamphetamine, in violation of Section 13A-12-211 of the Code of
Alabama."  The circuit court granted Cunningham's motion for a judgment
of acquittal as to that charge and, over her objection, instructed the jury
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on the offense of possession of a controlled substance as a lesser-included
offense of the offense of distribution.  Section § 13A-12-212(a)(1) provides
that "[a] person commits the crime of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance if[,] ... [e]xcept as otherwise authorized, he or she possesses a
controlled substance enumerated in Schedules I through V."  
The indictment charging Cunningham with distribution of a
controlled substance, however, does not include the statutory element of
possession, nor does it allege any facts essential to the offense of
possession of a controlled substance. Thus, under the facts of this case,
because  the indictment enumerated only the statutory language for the
offense of distribution of a controlled substance, Cunningham was not
given sufficient notice that she would have to defend against the offense
of possession of a controlled substance. As indicated, the Court of Criminal
Appeals held that the circuit court properly found possession of a
controlled substance to be a lesser-included offense of distribution of a
controlled substance because, it reasoned, evidence was presented at trial
indicating that Cunningham actually possessed a controlled substance.
However, it is not the evidence adduced at trial that anchors our analysis;
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rather, we look to the indictment and must strictly construe it. To do
otherwise would treat the proceedings in this case as if the terms of the
indictment were so flexible as to imply a factual allegation that
Cunningham was in possession of  a controlled substance. To reach such
a determination would require us to disregard the law enunciated in
Williams, supra.  That is, the statutory elements of the offenses and the
facts alleged in an indictment -- not the evidence presented at trial -- are
the factors that determine whether one offense is included in another.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals, and we remand the cause to that court for proceedings
consistent with this opinion. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Parker, C.J., and Stewart, J., concur.
Bryan and Mitchell, JJ., concur in the result.
Bolin, Shaw, Wise, and Mendheim, JJ., dissent.
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MITCHELL, Justice (concurring in the result).
In its brief to this Court, the State confesses error and urges us to
reverse Natasha Lashay Cunningham's conviction for possession of a
controlled substance.  That is a remarkable position for the State to take,
and it weighs heavily as I analyze the issue before us.  For that reason,
and for the reasons generally outlined in the main opinion, I concur in the
result.
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BOLIN, Justice (dissenting).
Because Natasha Lashay Cunningham failed to raise the issue
whether her indictment was defective, I must respectfully dissent.  
Cunningham was indicted for distributing a controlled substance
(methamphetamine), a violation of § 13A-12-211(a), Ala. Code 1975, and
second-degree possession of marijuana, a violation of § 13A-12-214, Ala.
Code 1975.  She was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine), a violation of § 13A-12-212, Ala. Code
1975, and second-degree possession of marijuana.  On appeal to the Court
of Criminal Appeals, Cunningham argued that the circuit court erred: 1)
by considering the offense of possession of a controlled substance to be a
lesser-included offense of the offense of distribution of a controlled
substance and submitting a charge on possession of a controlled substance
to the jury for consideration; 2) by denying her motion for a mistrial after
a witness stated that Cunningham had prior drug offenses; 3) by, in effect,
denying her motion for a judgment of acquittal; 4) by denying her motion
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to suppress the evidence seized from her purse; and 5) by denying her
Batson3 motion.  
With regard to the lesser-included offense of possession, which is the
ground as to which Cunningham argues a conflict exists and as to which
this Court granted certiorari review, the Court of Criminal Appeals
stated:
"Cunningham argues that the circuit court erred when,
after granting her motion for a judgment of acquittal to the
charge of distributing a controlled substance, it submitted the
charge of unlawful possession of a controlled substance as a
lesser-included charge to the jury.
"This Court has never directly decided the question of
whether simple possession of a controlled substance is a
lesser-included offense of distribution of a controlled
substance.  However, in Harris v. State, 274 So. 3d 304 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2018), this Court held that possession of a
controlled substance was a lesser-included offense of an
attempt to commit distribution. Because Harris had been
convicted of attempting to commit distribution of a controlled
substance and of marijuana, double jeopardy precluded his
convictions for possession of a controlled substance and
possession of marijuana. 
"....
3Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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" 'In Williams v. State, 104 So. 3d 254 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2012), this Court explained that,
" ' " ' " 'to 
be 
a
lesser included
offense of one
charged in an
indictment, the
lesser 
offense
must be one that
is 
necessarily
included, in all
of its essential
elements, in the
greater offense
charged[,]' Payne
v. State, 391 So.
2d 140, 143 (Ala.
Cr. App.), writ
denied, 391 So.
2d 
146 
(Ala.
1980), ... unless
it is so declared
by statute."
" ' " ' James v. State, 549 So.
2d 562, 564 (Ala. Cr. App.
1989). "Whether a crime
constitutes a lesser-included
offense is to be determined
on a case-by-case basis."
Aucoin v. State, 548 So. 2d
1053, 1057 (Ala. Cr. App.
1989). 
"In 
determining
whether one offense is a
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lesser included offense of
the charged offense, the
potential relationship of the
two 
offenses 
must 
be
considered not only in the
abstract 
terms 
of 
the
defining statutes but ... also
... in light of the particular
facts of each case." Ingram
v. State, 570 So. 2d 835, 837
(Ala. Cr. App. 1990) (citing
Ex parte Jordan, 486 So. 2d
485, 
488 
(Ala. 
1986);
emphasis in original). See
also Farmer v. State, 565
So. 2d 1238 (Ala. Cr. App.
1990).'
" ' "[Ford v. State,] 612 So. 2d [1317,]
1318 [(Ala. Crim. App. 1992)]. The
'particular facts' of each case are those
facts alleged in the indictment. Thus,
'the statutory elements of the offenses
and facts alleged in an indictment -- not
the evidence presented at trial or the
factual basis provided at the guilty-plea
colloquy 
-- 
are 
the factors 
that
determine whether one offense is
included in another.' Johnson v. State,
922 So. 2d 137, 143 (Ala. Crim. App.
2005)."
" ' Williams, 104 So. 3d at 264.'
" Harris v. State, 274 So. 3d at 308.
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"Section 13A-12-211, Ala. Code 1975, provides that '[a]
person commits the crime of unlawful distribution of controlled
substances if, except as otherwise authorized, he or she sells,
furnishes, gives away, delivers, or distributes a controlled
substance enumerated in Schedules I through V.' Section
13A-12-212(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, provides that '[a] person
commits the crime on unlawful possession of a controlled
substance if[,] ... [e]xcept as otherwise authorized, he or she
possesses a controlled substance enumerated in Schedules I
through V.'
" 'Based on the statutory elements of the
offenses and facts as alleged in the indictments,
possession of [methamphetamine] ... [is a]
lesser-included 
offense[] 
of 
[distribution 
of
methamphetamine]. Specifically, the commission of
the [distribution offense] as alleged in the
indictment necessarily included all the elements of
the possession offense[] as alleged in the
indictment.'
" Harris, 274 So. 3d at 309.
"This Court recognizes, as have other courts, that there
may be circumstances in which a substance may be distributed
without the defendant's having any actual or constructive
possession. However, in this case, Cunningham did have
possession of the controlled substance; therefore, under these
circumstances, the circuit court properly found possession to
be a lesser-included offense of distribution. Thus, the circuit
court did not err in instructing the jury on the offense of
unlawful possession of a controlled substance."
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Cunningham v. State, [Ms. CR-18-0551, Sept. 20, 2019]     So. 3d     ,     
(Ala. Crim. App. 2019) (footnotes omitted).
In her petition for certiorari review, Cunningham argues conflict as
the only ground for review.  See Rule 39(a)(1)(d), Ala. R. App. P.
Specifically, she argues that possessing a controlled substance is not a
lesser-included offense of distributing a controlled substance because, she
says, possession, either actual or constructive, is not an  element of
distribution. Although Cunningham cites general propositions of law
regarding indictments, she does not argue that the indictment in her case 
was defective.  Instead, her argument is that the indictment included the
statutory elements of unlawful distribution and that those elements do
not include the element of possession.    
This Court granted certiorari review of the only issue Cunningham
raised.   In her brief, Cunningham again argues that the statutory
elements of unlawful distribution do not include the element of possession. 
 In response, the State argues that the indictment was defective because
it did not include a charge of possession or facts that indicated
Cunningham possessed the controlled substance.  I disagree -- the
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indictment was sufficient to serve its constitutional purpose of enabling
the accused to  prepare a defense, and the alleged factual defect raised by
the State does not rise to the level of rendering the indictment defective.4 
Furthermore, the State did not concede this point before the Court of
Criminal Appeals.  If we were to address the defective-indictment
argument the State raises before this Court, we would be reversing the
judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals on a ground not raised in that
court and not raised by the petitioner for certiorari review.  Although
there may be an occasion when a lower appellate court opinion raises a
"new" issue that may then be addressed in a certiorari petition, that is not
the case here.  Cunningham could have raised the issue now raised by the
State before the circuit court and before the Court of Criminal Appeals,
but she did not.     
4" The fundamental constitutionally guaranteed benefits of an
indictment to an accused are ' "that he may prepare his defence, and plead
the judgment as a bar to any subsequent prosecution for the same
offence." ' Gayden v. State, 262 Ala. 468, 47[1], 80 So. 2d 501, 504 (1955)
(quoting United States v. Simmons, 96 U.S. 360, 362, 24 L.Ed. 819
(1877))."  Ash v. State, 843 So. 2d 213, 216 (Ala. 2002), overruled on other
grounds, Ex parte Seymour , 946 So. 2d 536 (Ala. 2006). 
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The State is correct that whether a crime constitutes a lesser-
included offense depends on the particular facts of each case.  The State's
argument that the indictment should have included the word "possession"
(or facts that indicated Cunningham possessed the drugs) was not made
by Cunningham in her certiorari petition.  Additionally, the State's
argument ignores the fact that, although there may be circumstances in
which a substance may be distributed without the defendant's having any
actual or constructive possession, Cunningham did have possession of the
controlled substance.  In other words, in this case, it is a question of law
as to whether possession of a controlled substance is a lesser-included
offense of distribution of a controlled substance.  
I do not believe that the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion conflicts
with Harris v. State, 274 So. 3d 304 (Ala. Crim. App. 2018), as
Cunningham argues in her petition, because Harris involved "attempt"
and actually supports the argument that possession is a lesser-included
offense of the offense of distribution as explained by the Court of Criminal
Appeals.   Second, the petition is not before us on the ground of first
impression; only the ground of conflict is before this Court. 
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Therefore, I dissent to reversing the Court of Criminal Appeals'
judgment.
Mendheim, J., concurs.
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SHAW, Justice (dissenting).
According to the main opinion, because the indictment in this case
"enumerated only the statutory language for the offense of distribution of
a controlled substance," ___ So. 3d at ___, the petitioner and defendant in
this case, Natasha Lashay Cunningham, "was not given sufficient notice
that she would have to defend against the offense of possession of a
controlled substance."  ___ So. 3d at  ___.  I disagree; the common
understanding of the description in the Alabama Code of what it means
to "distribute" a controlled substance can clearly indicate possession of the
controlled substance.  Thus, under the law specifying what an indictment
must describe, the language of the indictment in this case was sufficient
to give Cunningham "notice" that she was accused of not only distributing,
but also possessing, that controlled substance.  I therefore respectfully
dissent.  
An indictment, among other things, (1) is a statement of legal
conclusions rather than a statement of facts; (2) is not required to set up
the proof necessary for a conviction; (3) needs to allege only the essential
facts necessary to apprise a defendant of the crime charged, not the
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State's theory of the case; and (4) is sufficient if it substantially tracks the
language of the statute violated.  See Vaughn v. State, 880 So. 2d 1178,
1193 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003), and the numerous authorities quoted and
cited therein.  The "'"particulars as to manner, means, place or
circumstances [of the offense] need not in general be added to the
statutory definition."'" Smith v. State, 797 So. 2d 503, 514 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2000) (quoting People v. Soto, 74 Cal. App. 3d 267, 273, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 343, 346 (1977), quoting in turn People v. Britton, 6 Cal. 2d 1, 5, 56
P.2d 494, 496 (1936)).  Rule 13.2(a), Ala. R. Crim. P., provides that an
indictment "shall be a plain, concise statement of the charge in ordinary
language sufficiently definite to inform a defendant of common
understanding of the offense charged and with that degree of certainty
which will enable the court, upon conviction, to pronounce the proper
judgment."  Further, "[t]he words used in an indictment must be
construed in their usual acceptation in common language."  Ala. Code
1975, § 15-8-5.  Finally, "[s]pecification of an offense in an indictment or
information shall constitute a charge of that offense and of all lesser
offenses necessarily included therein."  Rule 13.2(c), Ala. R. Crim. P. 
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A person commits the crime of unlawful distribution of a controlled
substance if "he or she sells, furnishes, gives away, delivers, or distributes
a controlled substance."  Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-12-211(a).  A person
commits the crime of unlawful possession of a controlled substance if he
or she "possesses a controlled substance."  Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-12-
212(a)(1).  In order to "possess" something, one must "have physical
possession or otherwise ... exercise dominion or control over" it.  Ala. Code
1975, § 13A-1-2(13) (emphasis added).  "Possession" of a controlled
substance includes what is called "constructive possession," which is
simply defined as being "knowingly in a position to exercise dominion and
control over the drug, either directly or through others." Bailey v. State,
67 So. 3d 145, 156 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009).  The common meaning of an
allegation that one "sells, furnishes, gives away, delivers, or distributes"
a controlled substance can easily be understood as an allegation that one
exercises "dominion or control" over the controlled substance.5
5The State contends that there can be situations in which
distribution of a controlled substance under § 13A-12-211(a) could be
accomplished by someone who is not in possession of the controlled
substance.  But that is not the way this language, under its usual
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In the instant case, the indictment alleged that the petitioner,
Cunningham, "did unlawfully sell, furnish, give away, deliver[,] or
distribute" methamphetamine, which, under the common meaning of
those terms, can be read as alleging, among other things, that she
exercised dominion and control over that controlled substance; thus, it can
clearly 
be 
understood 
as 
alleging 
that 
she 
possessed 
the
methamphetamine.  No further facts must be alleged to indicate
possession.  Just because it may be possible for one to distribute a
controlled substance without possessing it does not negate a common
meaning of those terms; it cannot be said that the words "sell, furnish,
give away, deliver, or distribute" cannot include possession, which is how
one must read those terms to say that Cunningham had no "notice" that
possession was alleged in this case.  The allegations of the distribution
charge in the indictment, which track the language of the distribution
statute, were sufficient to inform a defendant of common understanding
acceptance, would be solely understood.  The terms "sells, furnishes, gives
away, delivers, or distributes" encompass many acts, including, but not
limited to, exercising dominion or control.
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that possession was alleged and enabled the court to pronounce the proper
judgment.  I thus respectfully dissent.
23