Case Title: Jones v. Brown

Citation: 

Docket Number: S068824

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2022-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 58	
December 30, 2022	
649
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF OREGON
BETHANIE J. JONES,
aka Bethanie Joanne Jones,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Nichole BROWN,
Superintendent,  
Coffee Creek Correctional Institution,
Defendant-Respondent.
(CC 20CV02495) (CA A175780) (SC S068824)
On certification from the Court of Appeals under ORS 
19.405.* Certification accepted and under advisement on 
September 16, 2021.
Argued and submitted May 12, 2022.
Jedediah Peterson, O’Connor Weber LLC, Portland, 
argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.
Rebecca M. Auten, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, 
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent. Also 
on the brief were Ellen Rosenblum, Attorney General, 
Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Rosalind M. Lee, Portland, filed the brief for amicus cur-
iae Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association.
Aliza Kaplan, Portland, filed the brief for amicus cur-
iae Criminal Justice Reform Clinic at Lewis & Clark Law 
School. Also on the brief were Michaela C. Gore, Laney B. 
Ellisor, Colin Bradshaw, and Bijal Patel.
Anna Sortun, Portland, filed the brief for amici curiae 
Latino Network, Don’t Shoot Portland, NAACP Corvallis-
Albany Branch #1118, NAACP Eugene-Springfield Branch 
#1119, NAACP Salem-Keizer Branch #1166, NAACP 
Portland Chapter 1120B, Black Millennial Movement, Unite 
______________
	
*  On appeal from the Washington County Circuit Court, Patricia A. Sullivan, 
Judge.
650	
Jones v. Brown
Oregon, Immigrant and Refugee Community Organization, 
and Urban League of Portland.
Before Walters, Chief Justice, and Balmer, Flynn, 
Duncan, Nelson, and Garrett, Justices, and Baldwin, Senior 
Judge, Justice pro tempore.**
BALMER, J.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and 
reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the circuit 
court for further proceedings.
______________
	
**  DeHoog, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Cite as 370 Or 649 (2022)	
651
	
BALMER, J.
	
Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the 
ground that three of seven criminal convictions that resulted 
from her 2015 jury trial had been based on nonunanimous 
guilty verdicts and thus violated the rule announced in 
Ramos v. Louisiana, ___ US ___, 140 S Ct 1390, 206 L Ed 2d 
583 (2020), that the Sixth Amendment prohibits conviction 
of a crime by a nonunanimous verdict.1 The post-conviction 
court denied relief on that claim, holding that the Ramos 
rule was inapplicable to the challenged convictions because 
those convictions already were final when Ramos was 
decided. Petitioner appealed the denial of that claim, and 
the appeal was certified to this court, along with two other 
post-conviction appeals, Watkins v. Ackley, 370 Or 604, ___ 
P3d ___ (2022), and Huggett v. Kelly, 370 Or 645, ___ P3d 
___ (2022) (both decided this day), that raise similar ques-
tions about whether and how a conviction that was based on 
a nonunanimous guilty verdict can be challenged, based on 
Ramos, in a post-conviction proceeding.
	
Our decision in Watkins resolves the present claim 
of error. In Watkins, the petitioner’s sole claim on appeal was 
that the post-conviction court had erred in denying relief for 
convictions that were entered in violation of the jury una-
nimity requirement recognized in Ramos, based on its con-
clusion that the rule of Ramos did not apply “retroactively” 
to convictions that already were final when the Ramos deci-
sion issued. We concluded that the post-conviction court’s 
reasoning was incorrect—that a conviction that violates the 
Ramos jury unanimity rule, even if it became final before 
that rule was announced, constitutes a “substantial denial” 
of a constitutional right which “rendered the conviction[s] 
void,” and thus requires post-conviction relief under ORS 
138.530(1)(a)—unless one of the procedural defenses in the 
Post-Conviction Hearings Act has been raised and sus-
tained. Watkins, 370 Or at 607.
	
1  In her 2015 trial, petitioner was convicted of first-degree assault with a 
firearm (Count 1), second-degree assault with a firearm (Count 2), and unlawful 
use of a weapon (firearm) (Count 3), by nonunanimous (11-1) verdicts; as well as 
four counts of reckless endangerment (Counts 4-7) by unanimous verdicts. Those 
convictions became final in 2019, after this court denied petitioner’s petition for 
review of the Court of Appeals’ decision affirming her convictions. State v. Jones, 
296 Or App 553, 439 P3d 485, rev den, 365 Or 557 (2019).
652	
Jones v. Brown
	
Like the petitioner in Watkins, petitioner here 
argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief 
for her convictions that had been entered in violation of the 
Ramos jury unanimity rule on the ground that that rule 
does not apply retroactively. Watkins establishes that peti-
tioner is correct that the post-conviction court’s reasoning 
was erroneous. In the absence of any argument by the state 
that the post-conviction court’s decision was correct for some 
other reason, we conclude that the post-conviction court 
erred in denying relief as to petitioner’s three convictions 
that were entered on nonunanimous verdicts.2
	
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part 
and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the circuit 
court for further proceedings.
	
2  In her appeal, petitioner also challenges the post-conviction court’s denial 
of relief on her claims that trial counsel had been constitutionally inadequate in 
four respects: first, in failing to object to certain comments by the prosecutor that 
indicated that petitioner had invoked her rights to counsel and to remain silent; 
second, in failing to object to certain comments by the prosecutor that indicated 
that petitioner had invoked her right to counsel; third, in failing to object to 
the three nonunanimous guilty verdicts; and fourth, in failing to object to jury 
instructions regarding the permissibility of nonunanimous guilty verdicts. We 
reject without discussion petitioner’s challenge to the post-conviction court’s 
denial of relief on the first two of those inadequate assistance of counsel claims 
(which in theory might have implicated all seven of her convictions, rather than 
just the three that resulted from nonunanimous verdicts). We do not address peti-
tioner’s challenge to the denial of the other two inadequate assistance of counsel 
claims because our present decision that petitioner is entitled to relief on her 
claim that directly implicates the three convictions that were based on nonunan-
imous verdicts, renders those challenges moot.