Case Title: In Re Nelson

Citation: 255 Kan. 555, 874 P.2d 1201

Docket Number: 71,014

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1994-05-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
255 Kan. 555 (1994)
874 P.2d 1201
In the Matter of BRYAN E. NELSON, Respondent.
No. 71,014

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 27, 1994.
Bruce E. Miller, disciplinary administrator, argued the cause and was on the formal complaint for the petitioner.
Bryan E. Nelson appeared pro se.
Per Curiam:
This original proceeding in discipline was filed by the office of the Disciplinary Administrator against Bryan E. Nelson, of Overland Park, Kansas, an attorney admitted to the practice of law in the state of Kansas. The formal complaints filed against the respondent consist of four counts and allege violations of MRPC 1.4 (1993 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 267); MRPC 1.15 (1993 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 299); MRPC 3.3 (1993 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 314); MRPC 4.1 (1993 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 327); and MRPC 8.4(a), (b), (c), (d), and/or (g) (1993 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 347). The respondent filed an answer admitting and denying allegations contained in the formal complaint.
A hearing before the panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys was held November 19 and December 6, 1993, at the Kansas Judicial Center in Topeka, Kansas. Disciplinary Administrator Bruce E. Miller appeared in person and the respondent appeared in person and proceeded pro se. The panel made the following findings and conclusions:
"COMPLAINT NO. B4845  COUNT I
FINDINGS OF FACT
"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
"RULE 8.4 Misconduct
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
...
...
...
"COUNT II
"FINDINGS OF FACT
`A. [By Respondent] That's correct.
....
"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
"RULE 8.4 Misconduct
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
...
...
...
"COMPLAINT NO.  B5695 COUNT III
"FINDINGS OF FACT
"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
"RULE 1.4 Communication
"COMPLAINT NO. B5698
....
"FINDINGS OF FACT
"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
"RULE 1.4 Communication
"RULE 1.16 Declining or Terminating Representation
....
The panel noted the following mitigating and aggravating circumstances, concluding with a recommendation for a plan of discipline *559 involving indefinite suspension but recommending that the discipline be probated and that the respondent be placed on supervised probation under terms and conditions as set forth below:
"MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
"AGGRAVATED CIRCUMSTANCES
"RECOMMENDATION
b. Responses to client requests for information;
c. Respondent's trust account.
"REHABILITATION
"FINANCIAL AFFAIRS
"CONCLUSION
In the response to the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the panel, Bryan E. Nelson, by written declaration, indicated he did not wish to file exceptions to the final hearing report, findings, and recommendations of the State Board for Discipline of Attorneys.
As we noted in State v. Russo, 230 Kan. 5, 630 P.2d 711 (1981), the reports and recommendations of the Board for Discipline of Attorneys and its hearing panel are advisory and not binding upon this court. At the same time, the findings of fact entered by the panel and its conclusions of law, particularly when no exceptions are filed by the respondent, are entitled to serious consideration *562 by this court. We concur with the findings and conclusions of the panel and adopt them as our own. The findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence.
The respondent's act of attempting to possess cocaine was a felony offense under Kansas law. In accord with the panel's conclusion, we conclude that the respondent did engage in professional misconduct by committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness, and his fitness to practice law. MRPC 8.4 (b), (d), and (g) (1993 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 347).
The question of whether the respondent made any false statements to the court in defending himself in his criminal case was a contested factual issue before the hearing panel. The respondent vigorously denied that he misrepresented anything to the court and basically claimed that his attorneys provided the information to the court indicating that the cocaine found in his car was planted by the police or by police informants. He defended this issue before the panel on the basis that no witness was brought forward to show that the respondent ever directly said that the cocaine was planted in his car. He claimed before the panel that he should have been more careful about monitoring what his attorneys may have said in pleadings before the court. A large portion of the record was devoted to this issue.
Based upon controverted evidence, the panel concluded that the evidence established violations of MRPC 8.4 (c), (d), and (g); that is, the respondent engaged in professional misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. The panel based its conclusion on the evidence presented as well as a statement of the respondent to the court at the time of sentencing:
While the respondent filed no exceptions to the report of the hearing panel, before this court the respondent steadfastly denied that he engaged in any conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and, as he did before the panel, claimed that he was not careful with his attorneys in monitoring what they said before the court in his criminal case.
*563 With very few exceptions, this court has imposed either suspension or disbarment as a sanction when an attorney has been convicted of a felony offense. See In re Leitner, 254 Kan. 940, 869 P.2d 738 (1994); In re Pomeroy, 252 Kan. 1044, 850 P.2d 222 (1993); In re Jarczyk, 252 Kan. 4, 847 P.2d 1190 (1992); In re Evans, 252 Kan. 1, 841 P.2d 461 (1992); In re Morris, 251 Kan. 592, 834 P.2d 384 (1992); In re Wilson, 251 Kan. 252, 832 P.2d 347 (1992); In re Dickson, 250 Kan. 1, 824 P.2d 197 (1992); In re Kershner, 250 Kan. 383, 827 P.2d 1189 (1992); In re Laing, 246 Kan. 334, 788 P.2d 284 (1990); In re Lerner, 244 Kan. 342, 767 P.2d 1319 (1989); In re Sowers, 244 Kan. 594, 771 P.2d 933 (1989); In re Barritt, 243 Kan. 519, 757 P.2d 730 (1988); In re Sturgis, 239 Kan. 527, 720 P.2d 1118 (1986); In re Hyter, 235 Kan. 1, 677 P.2d 1017 (1984); In re Wriston, 231 Kan. 576, 645 P.2d 376 (1982); State v. Russo, 230 Kan. 5, 630 P.2d 711 (1981); In re Hutton, 230 Kan. 3, 630 P.2d 161 (1981); In re Evans, 229 Kan. 182, 621 P.2d 991 (1981).
In the case of In re Smoot, 243 Kan. 589, 757 P.2d 327 (1988), this court imposed the penalty of public censure upon the respondent for his activity in possessing less than a gram of cocaine. Smoot entered a plea of guilty in the federal district court under a federal charge to one count of possession of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1982), a misdemeanor charge at that time under federal law. The respondent in this case entered a plea of guilty to a State charge of attempted possession of cocaine, which is a class D felony under Kansas law.
In this case, the panel was unanimous in concluding that respondent's conviction violated MRPC 8.4 (b), (d), and (g); that is, that the respondent did commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; that he engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and that he did engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. The respondent takes no exceptions to these conclusions, and we adopt these conclusions as our own.
We would note that in the case of In re Smoot, the single allegation was a federal misdemeanor conviction for cocaine possession. *564 In this case, we have concluded that the respondent's felony conviction violated MRPC 8.4(b), (d), and (g); that during the course of the criminal prosecution against the respondent, he and his attorneys made certain allegations and that his action violated MRPC 8.4(c), (d), and (g); and that his dealing with two clients violated MRPC 1.4 (1993 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 267) and 1.16(d) (1993 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 305). Clear and convincing evidence established all of the above violations.
We disagree with the panel's conclusion that supervision under the circumstances of this case is appropriate. We note that in approaching the panel the respondent did not propose to the panel that he be supervised by a member of the Johnson County Bar Association. The respondent did not believe supervision was necessary: "I don't have any problem with that. I do not believe that I need supervision. I think my law practice that I engage in is impeccable." It was on the recommendation of the panel and the allowance of an additional seven days' time that moved the respondent to present a plan of supervision to the panel. We agree with the respondent that, for the most part, he does in fact practice at a level which would not indicate a necessity for supervision.
We partially agree with the recommendations of the hearing panel when it concludes: "Although we agree that Respondent's breaches of conduct were extremely serious and could warrant disbarment, we are reluctant to recommend such unconditional discipline in this case." We also are reluctant to impose such unconditional discipline, but we do believe that indefinite suspension from the practice of law without probation is warranted under all the circumstances in this case.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondent, Bryan E. Nelson, be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in the state of Kansas and this suspension date from the date of his temporary suspension which incurred on March 8, 1993. It is further ordered that the respondent shall comply with the provisions of the Supreme Court Rule 218 (1993 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 187).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any time after the expiration of three years' suspension and upon full restitution being made *565 to Marcia Huehn for the fee advanced by her to the respondent, the respondent may apply for reinstatement under Supreme Court Rule 219 (1993 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 192).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this order be published in the official Kansas Reports and the cost of this action be assessed to the respondent.