Case Title: Eric Christopher Caldwell v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC08-1519

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-1519 
____________ 
 
ERIC CHRISTOPHER CALDWELL, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[July 8, 2010] 
 
QUINCE, J. 
 
We have for review the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in 
Caldwell v. State, 985 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).  The district court rejected 
the contention that petitioner Eric Caldwell had been subjected to an 
unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, and certified conflict with the opinion of the Fourth District Court of 
Appeal in Raysor v. State, 795 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  The Second and Fourth Districts 
disagree as to whether an officer‟s reading of Miranda1 warnings during an 
                                          
 
 
1.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
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otherwise consensual police encounter results in a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Caldwell was not 
seized, approve the Second District‟s denial of relief, and disapprove the decision 
of the Fourth District in Raysor to the extent that it is inconsistent with this 
opinion. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In Caldwell, the Second District described the facts of this case as follows: 
On May 27, 2006, a security camera videotaped a burglar 
breaking into autos parked at the Vinoy Towers.  The police were 
called, and St. Petersburg Police Officer T. Crisco watched the grainy, 
poor-quality security film of the burglaries.  Although the individual 
features of the perpetrator were not visible, the officer was able to 
determine that the film showed a white male of slight build, wearing 
dark pants, a dark shirt, and a dark baseball cap worn backwards.  
 
The next day, Officer Crisco observed Caldwell in a nearby 
park with a group of other people.  Officer Crisco‟s attention was 
drawn by the fact that Caldwell was wearing a dark t-shirt, dark pants, 
and a dark baseball cap, worn backwards, and that Caldwell‟s build 
was similar to the person Officer Crisco had seen in the video.  
Officer Crisco drove his patrol car onto the park lawn and stopped 
near the crowd.  He did not use his sirens or lights, and driving across 
the grass was routine at the park for patrol officers because of the lack 
of paved access.  He approached Mr. Caldwell.  Officer Crisco told 
Mr. Caldwell he would like to speak with him and directed him back 
towards the police cruiser.  Mr. Caldwell agreed to come over to the 
cruiser and talk.  In the ensuing conversation, Officer Crisco told Mr. 
Caldwell that he had seen the videotape of the break-ins at the Vinoy 
Towers and that Officer Crisco knew Mr. Caldwell did it.  Mr. 
Caldwell denied involvement and denied he was the person on the 
videotape.  
 
 
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Officer Crisco read Mr. Caldwell his Miranda rights.  Mr. 
Caldwell then asked if he was under arrest.  Officer Crisco advised 
Mr. Caldwell that he was not under arrest but that Officer Crisco 
needed to ask him some questions and wanted to make sure that Mr. 
Caldwell was aware of his rights. . . . 
 
Mr. Caldwell asked Officer Crisco if he could see the tape.  
Officer Crisco told Mr. Caldwell that he would have to go to the 
Vinoy Towers to see the tape and offered Mr. Caldwell a ride.  Mr. 
Caldwell accepted the offer of a ride in the squad car.  At no time was 
Mr. Caldwell ordered or directed into the patrol car.  Officer Crisco 
told Mr. Caldwell that if he was going to ride in the patrol car, Officer 
Crisco would have to frisk him.  Mr. Caldwell did not object and was 
frisked.  Nothing was found, Mr. Caldwell got into the car, and 
Officer Crisco drove Mr. Caldwell, who was not cuffed or otherwise 
constrained, to the Vinoy Towers.  Mr. Caldwell never broke off the 
conversation nor did he ask to leave or to get out of the patrol car.  
 
On the way to the Vinoy Towers, Officer Crisco repeated his 
conviction that it was Mr. Caldwell on the tape. Upon arriving at the 
Vinoy Towers, before seeing the tape, Mr. Caldwell confessed to 
Officer Crisco.  He subsequently confessed to another police officer 
verbally and to a detective in writing. 
 
Caldwell, 985 So. 2d at 603. 
 
Caldwell was charged in the Sixth Judicial Circuit with three counts of 
felony burglary and with violating the terms of his probation.  After the charges 
were filed, Caldwell moved to suppress the statements made to Officer Crisco, 
arguing that his confessions were the product of an illegal detention in violation of 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and article I, 
sections 9, 12, and 16 of the Florida Constitution.  The motion was initially denied 
following a hearing on December 4, 2006, and was denied again at a later 
 
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evidentiary hearing on January 19, 2007.  Following the denial of his motion, 
Caldwell entered a no contest plea to the burglary charges, specifically reserving 
his right to appeal. 
Before the Second District Court of Appeal, Caldwell renewed his argument 
that the Miranda warnings had transformed the encounter into an illegal detention.  
See Caldwell, 985 So. 2d at 603-04 (citing Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185, 186 
(Fla. 1993)).  In making his argument, Caldwell relied on the opinion of the Fourth 
District in Raysor, 795 So. 2d at 1071.  In that case, a police officer had waved to 
the appellant, Freddie Raysor, in a friendly manner from across the street.  Raysor 
approached without being asked to do so, and the officer noticed calluses on 
Raysor‟s fingers, leading him to suspect that Raysor used crack cocaine.  The 
officer read Raysor his Miranda rights, which Raysor waived.  The officer then 
asked whether Raysor was in possession of cocaine or drug paraphernalia.  Raysor 
responded that he was and produced a crack pipe.  Id.  At the subsequent hearing 
on Raysor‟s motion to suppress the pipe, the officer testified that Raysor had been 
free to leave at all times during the encounter, but that he always read Miranda 
warnings “out of an abundance of caution.”  Id.  The trial court held that the 
incident was a consensual encounter and admitted the evidence produced by the 
search.  Id. 
 
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On appeal, the Fourth District concluded that the reading of Miranda 
warnings had resulted in a seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  The 
court cited the case of United States v. Poitier, 818 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1987), in 
which the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that two travelers in an airport had 
been subjected to an unconstitutional seizure.  In Poitier, two agents of the federal 
Drug Enforcement Agency approached the travelers on suspicion of carrying 
illegal drugs.  The travelers agreed to move to a less crowded area.  After the agent 
questioning the appellant received answers inconsistent with those given by her 
companion, the agent informed her that she was suspected of carrying illegal drugs 
and advised her of her Miranda rights.  The appellant then admitted to trafficking 
in cocaine.  Id. at 681.  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that although the initial 
encounter was consensual, “[t]he accusation, coupled with the Miranda warnings, 
created a sufficient show of authority to effectively restrain Poitier‟s freedom of 
movement.”  Id. at 683.  The encounter was therefore transformed into a Terry-
style2 investigatory stop requiring reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before 
the seizure could legally occur.  Id. 
Applying the reasoning of Poitier to the facts of its case, the Fourth District 
concluded that Raysor had been seized illegally.  The court explained: 
                                          
 
1.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 
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[I]n the present case the officer gave appellant warnings which are 
legally required only when a person is in custody and not free to 
leave.  Because Miranda rights are not required to be read to suspects 
unless they are undergoing custodial interrogation, it follows that a 
person who has been read his Miranda rights would reasonably 
assume that he is not free to leave. . . .  
 
. . . The only way appellant could have felt free to leave would 
have been for him to have assumed that the officer was wrong in 
advising him that he was entitled to court appointed counsel if he 
could not afford counsel right then and there. 
 
Id. at 1072. 
 
 
Two judges dissented from the en banc opinion.  The dissent observed that 
aside from the Miranda warnings, no other circumstance surrounding the encounter 
was called into question.  Rather, it was the Miranda warnings alone that were 
deemed to have resulted in the unconstitutional seizure.  Id. at 1073 (Stone, J., 
dissenting).  The dissent noted that, as the majority also recognized, the 
determinative question in the seizure analysis is whether, based on the totality of 
the circumstances surrounding the encounter, a reasonable person would believe 
that he or she was free to leave.  Id. at 1073 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. 544 (1980)).  The dissent discussed the case of California v. Hodari D., 
499 U.S. 621 (1991), where the United States Supreme Court concluded that a 
seizure did not occur simply by virtue of an officer chasing a fleeing suspect.  The 
Raysor dissent reasoned that simply advising a person of rights with the apparent 
intention of giving that person the benefit of the information, despite the fact that 
 
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such advice was not mandated by law under the circumstances, is not as restraining 
as the chase permitted under Hodari D.  Raysor, 795 So. 2d at 1073. 
 
Based on the cases discussed above, Caldwell argued before the Second 
District that Officer Crisco‟s Miranda warning had resulted in his subjection to an 
unlawful seizure.  After reciting the facts and holding of Raysor, however, the 
Second District expressed disagreement with the majority‟s conclusion in that case.  
“[T]he crucial test,” the court explained, “is whether, taking into account all of the 
circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would have 
communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police 
presence and go about his business.”  985 So. 2d at 605 (quoting Florida v. 
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991)); see United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion).  The Second District concluded that the 
totality of the circumstances test as explained in Mendenhall and Bostick could not 
be satisfied based solely on the reading of a Miranda warning.  Caldwell, 985 So. 
2d at 605.  The court explained: 
The purpose of the Miranda warning is to prevent an unaware 
citizen from surrendering his or her constitutional rights out of 
ignorance of those rights.  See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 
456, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984).  Advising a citizen of his 
rights prior to the acquisition of reasonable suspicion can only further 
the goals of Miranda in this regard.   If anything, the warning is more 
likely to place a citizen on his guard against making incriminatory 
statements as opposed to creating a false sense of security. 
 
 
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Id.  The court also noted that the circumstances surrounding Caldwell‟s particular 
encounter were even less supportive of a seizure finding, observing that 
when the reading of the Miranda warning is followed by a clarifying 
statement to the effect that the person being questioned is not under 
arrest, as happened in this case, a reasonable person would be on 
notice that he is free to disengage from the encounter should he wish 
to do so. 
 
Id.  Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Second District concluded that a 
reasonable person in Caldwell‟s position would have understood that he was free 
to terminate the encounter.  Id. 
The Second District also rejected Caldwell‟s contention that the encounter 
became an investigatory seizure when he was frisked by the officer.  The court 
acknowledged that under normal circumstances, an officer may not conduct a 
protective frisk absent reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed.  See D.L.J. v. 
State, 932 So. 2d 1133, 1134 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).  In Caldwell‟s case, however, 
the court found that the frisk was acceptable for the purposes of officer safety in 
light of the fact that Caldwell was about to become a voluntary passenger in the 
officer‟s vehicle.  Caldwell, 985 So. 2d at 605-06. 
The Second District therefore affirmed the trial court‟s denial of Caldwell‟s 
suppression motion, affirmed his conviction, and certified conflict with Raysor.  Id. 
at 606.  This Court accepted review on May 21, 2009.  Caldwell v. State, 7 So. 3d 
1097 (Fla. 2009). 
 
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ANALYSIS 
The issue presented in this case is whether a person is seized under the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when an officer advises that 
person of his or her Miranda rights.  We note from the outset the divergent 
positions taken by the two opinions certified to be in conflict.  For its part, the 
Fourth District seems to have concluded that as a per se matter, an officer‟s reading 
of Miranda warnings during an otherwise consensual encounter will always result 
in a Fourth Amendment seizure.  See Raysor, 795 So. 2d at 1072.  By contrast, the 
Second District has reasoned that because the warnings are intended to be a 
protective measure, Miranda warnings given during a consensual encounter may 
contribute to a seizure finding within the totality-of-the-circumstances framework.  
See Caldwell, 985 So. 2d at 605.  Thus, we are presented with two questions of 
law.  First, does the reading of Miranda warnings result in a per se seizure under 
the Fourth Amendment?  Second, if the first question is answered in the negative, 
what impact do the warnings have within the totality-of-the-
circumstances/reasonable person analysis set out in Mendenhall?  In conducting 
our review, we should “accord a presumption of correctness to the trial court‟s 
rulings on motions to suppress with regard to the trial court‟s determinations of 
historical facts,” but “independently review mixed questions of law and fact that 
ultimately determine constitutional issues” in the Fourth Amendment context.  
 
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Globe v. State, 877 So. 2d 663, 668-69 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Nelson v. State, 850 
So. 2d 514, 521 (Fla. 2003)). 
Seizures Under the Fourth Amendment 
 
As this Court recently explained in G.M. v. State, 19 So. 3d 973, 977 (Fla. 
2009), and Golphin v. State, 945 So. 2d 1174, 1179 (Fla. 2006), the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 12 of Florida‟s 
Declaration of Rights guarantee citizens the right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  See U.S. Const. amend. IV; art. I, § 12, Fla. Const.  The 
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the Florida 
Constitution must be construed in conformity with the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.  See 
art. I, § 12, Fla. Const.  Any evidence obtained in violation of this right may not be 
used against the defendant if such items would be excluded pursuant to the rulings 
of the United States Supreme Court.  See Hilton v. State, 961 So. 2d 284, 293 (Fla. 
2007); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“[A]ll evidence obtained 
by searches and seizures in violation of the [United States] Constitution is . . . 
inadmissible in a state court.”). 
The United States Supreme Court has determined that any warrantless 
seizure of an individual by law enforcement officers must be based on reasonable 
suspicion that the individual is engaged in wrongdoing.  Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 
 
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552.  Whether suspicion is “reasonable” will depend on the existence of “specific 
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those 
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”  Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.  This requirement 
“governs all seizures of the person, „including seizures that involve only a brief 
detention short of traditional arrest.‟”  Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 551 (quoting 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)). 
“Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens 
involves „seizures‟ of persons.”  Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.  A seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment will only occur “when the officer, by means of physical force 
or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.”  Id.  In 
Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1993), this Court identified three levels of 
police-citizen encounters.  The first level, a “consensual encounter,” involves 
minimal police contact and does not invoke constitutional safeguards.  During a 
consensual encounter, an individual is free to leave at any time and may choose to 
ignore the officer‟s requests and go about his business.  Popple, 626 So. 2d at 186.  
The second level is an “investigatory stop,” during which an officer “may 
reasonably detain a citizen temporarily if the officer has reasonable suspicion that a 
person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.”  Id. (citing § 
 
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901.151, Fla. Stat. (1991)).3  While mere suspicion is insufficient to support an 
investigatory stop, a stop will not violate a citizen‟s rights where it is based on “a 
well-founded, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.”  Id. (citing Carter v. State, 
454 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)).  The third level of police-citizen encounter is 
an arrest, which requires probable cause on the part of the officer that a crime has 
been, is being, or is about to be committed.  See id. (citing Henry v. United States, 
361 U.S. 98 (1959); § 901.15, Fla. Stat. (1991)). 
The issue we must resolve in this case is whether Officer Crisco‟s actions 
transformed what began as a first-level consensual encounter into a second-level 
investigatory stop.  See Popple, 626 So. 2d at 186.  We note from the outset that 
                                          
 
 
3.  In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), the United States 
Supreme Court explained the permitted scope of such an encounter: 
 
Under the Fourth Amendment, we have held, a policeman who lacks 
probable cause but whose “observations lead him reasonably to 
suspect” that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is 
about to commit a crime, may detain that person briefly in order to 
“investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.”  “[The] stop 
and inquiry must be „reasonably related in scope to the justification 
for their initiation.‟”  Typically, this means that the officer may ask 
the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity 
and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's 
suspicions.  But the detainee is not obliged to respond.  And, unless 
the detainee‟s answers provide the officer with probable cause to 
arrest him, he must then be released. 
 
Id. at 439-40 (quoting Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881) (citations and footnotes 
omitted). 
 
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there does not seem to be any doubt that Officer Crisco lacked reasonable 
suspicion to justify a detention.  The trial court determined at the first suppression 
hearing that the only basis for the encounter was a security video of poor and 
grainy quality.  Further, the officer himself testified that he did not have any basis 
to detain the petitioner.  Cf. id. at 187 (accepting the State‟s concession that the 
officer lacked the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a temporary detention).  
The Second District accepted without reservation that reasonable suspicion was not 
present, noting that “Officer Crisco acknowledged that he did not have a 
reasonable suspicion of guilt when he approached Mr. Caldwell.”  Caldwell, 985 
So. 2d at 604.  We accept this finding for the purposes of this appeal.  Accordingly, 
“[i]f the exchange . . . was an investigatory stop and not a consensual encounter, 
Mr. Caldwell‟s subsequent confession would have to be suppressed.”  Id. 
This Court has explained that even without reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity, police officers do not violate the prohibition on unreasonable searches and 
seizures simply by approaching individuals on the street and asking them to answer 
a few questions.  Voorhees v. State, 699 So. 2d 602, 608 (Fla. 1997) (citing Florida 
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (plurality opinion)).  In Mendenhall, the United 
States Supreme Court articulated the standard for determining whether a seizure 
has occurred: 
[A] person has been “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the 
 
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incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free 
to leave.  Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, 
even though the person did not attempt to leave, would be the 
threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an 
officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use 
of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the 
officer‟s request might be compelled. 
 
446 U.S. at 554 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  In Hodari D., the Court also 
held that in addition to circumstances indicating that a reasonable person would not 
feel free to leave, the person must either (a) in fact be physically subdued by the 
officer, or (b) submit to the officer‟s show of authority.  See 499 U.S. at 626.  
The “seizure” analysis does not depend on what the particular suspect 
believed, but on whether the officer‟s words and actions would have conveyed to a 
reasonable, innocent person that he was not free to leave.  Florida v. Bostick, 501 
U.S. 429, 437-38 (1991) (citing Royer, 460 U.S. at 519 n.4 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting)); see also Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988) (“This 
„reasonable person‟ standard . . . ensures that the scope of Fourth Amendment 
protection does not vary with the state of mind of the particular individual being 
approached.”)).  However, this Court cautioned in Golphin that “[i]mplicit in the 
reasonable person standard is the notion that if a reasonable person would feel free 
to end the encounter, but does not, and is not compelled by the police to remain 
and continue the interaction, then he or she has consented to the encounter.”  
Golphin, 945 So. 2d at 1182. 
 
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Miranda Warnings Generally 
 
In accordance with the holdings of Miranda and its progeny, this Court has 
held that, to ensure the voluntariness of confessions, the self-incrimination clause 
of article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution requires that before being 
subjected to custodial interrogation, “suspects must be told that they have a right to 
remain silent, that anything they say will be used against them in court, that they 
have a right to a lawyer‟s help, and that if they cannot pay for a lawyer one will be 
appointed to help them.”  Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 965-66 (Fla. 1992) 
(footnote omitted).  If a suspect is not warned of his rights, the prosecution will be 
barred from using statements obtained during the interrogation during its case in 
chief.  See Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990); Cuervo v. State, 967 
So. 2d. 155, 167 (Fla. 2007).  Further, once custodial interrogation begins, these 
rights must be strictly observed by the interrogating officers:  
Under Section 9, if the suspect indicates in any manner that he 
or she does not want to be interrogated, interrogation must not begin 
or, if it has already begun, must immediately stop.  If the suspect 
indicates in any manner that he or she wants the help of a lawyer, 
interrogation must not begin until a lawyer has been appointed and is 
present or, if it has already begun, must immediately stop until a 
lawyer is present.  Once a suspect has requested the help of a lawyer, 
no state agent can reinitiate interrogation on any offense throughout 
the period of custody unless the lawyer is present, although the 
suspect is free to volunteer a statement to police on his or her own 
initiative at any time on any subject in the absence of counsel. 
 
 
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Traylor, 596 So. 2d  at 966 (footnote omitted).  Thus, whether a suspect is in 
custody determines whether officers are required to advise the suspect of his or her 
Miranda rights and at what point those rights must be enforced. 
The standard for “custody” is whether, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, a reasonable person would feel that his freedom of movement has 
been restricted to a degree associated with an actual arrest.  Ramirez v. State, 739 
So. 2d 568, 573 (Fla. 1999); see Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) 
(“In determining whether an individual was in custody, a court must examine all of 
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but „the ultimate inquiry is simply 
whether there [was] a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement‟ of the 
degree associated with a formal arrest.”) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 
1121, 1125 (1983)).  As under the “seizure” analysis, the standard is based on 
“how a reasonable person in the suspect‟s position would have perceived the 
situation.”  Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 573 (quoting Davis v. State, 698 So. 2d 1182, 
1188 (Fla. 1997)).   
In Ramirez, this Court adopted a four-factor analysis, originally applied by 
the Supreme Court of Iowa, to determine whether a reasonable person would 
consider himself to be in custody under the totality of the circumstances.  Factors 
to be considered are: 
(1) the manner in which police summon the suspect for questioning; 
(2) the purpose, place, and manner of the interrogation; (3) the extent 
 
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to which the suspect is confronted with evidence of his or her guilt; 
(4) whether the suspect is informed that he or she is free to leave the 
place of questioning. 
 
Id. at 574 (citing State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 558 (Iowa 1997)).4  In 
that case, the Court noted that Ramirez was a juvenile and that “he was questioned 
in a small room at the police station by two detectives, he was never told he was 
free to leave, and all of the questions indicated that the detectives considered him a 
suspect.”  Id. at 574.  Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances, we 
concluded that Ramirez had been subjected to custodial interrogation and that 
Miranda warnings had been required before questioning began.  Id.5 
                                          
 
 
4.  This Court noted, however, that whereas in Iowa the factors are applied 
as a four-factor “test,” in Florida they are simply “considered” under the totality of 
the circumstances approach.  Id. (citing Caso v. State, 524 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. 
1988); Roman v. State, 475 So. 2d 1228, 1231 (Fla. 1985); Drake v. State, 441 So. 
2d 1079, 1081 (Fla. 1983)). 
5.  While the question of whether a person is in custody is related to the 
issue of whether that person has been subjected to an unconstitutional seizure, the 
analyses are in fact distinct.  In United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 669-72 (2d 
Cir. 2004), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted some confusion in its 
precedent regarding how the question of whether a suspect was “free to leave,” the 
seizure test under Mendenhall, interacted with the issue of custody.  It explained: 
 
[A] free-to-leave inquiry reveals only whether the person questioned 
was seized.  Because seizure is a necessary prerequisite to Miranda, 
however, it makes sense for a court to begin any custody analysis by 
asking whether a reasonable person would have thought he was free to 
leave the police encounter at issue.  If the answer is yes, the Miranda 
inquiry is at an end; the challenged interrogation did not require 
advice of rights.  On the other hand, if a reasonable person would not 
have thought himself free to leave, additional analysis is required 
 
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We emphasize that Miranda warnings are not required in any police 
encounter in which the suspect is not placed under arrest or otherwise in custody 
under Ramirez.  See McCarty, 468 U.S. at 440 (noting “the absence of any 
suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda”).  
In a noncustodial setting, officers are not required to discontinue questioning when 
a suspect indicates that he wishes to exercise his right to remain silent, nor are they 
required to provide a lawyer on the suspect‟s request.  See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
477 (“General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other 
general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our 
holding.”); see also United States v. Salvo, 133 F.3d 943, 949 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(“[B]ecause of the very cursory and limited nature of a Terry stop, a suspect is not 
free to leave, yet is not entitled to full custody Miranda rights.”).   
In the present case, it is clear that Caldwell was not placed under arrest prior 
to his initial confession, nor was he taken into custody.  The Miranda warnings 
                                                                                                                                        
because . . . not every seizure constitutes custody for purposes of 
Miranda.  In such cases, a court must ask whether, in addition to not 
feeling free to leave, a reasonable person would have understood his 
freedom of action to have been curtailed to a degree associated with 
formal arrest.  Only if the answer to this second question is yes was 
the person “„in custody‟ for practical purposes,” and “entitled to the 
full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda.” 
 
Newton, 369 F.3d at 672 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Berkemer 
v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984)). 
 
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were therefore unnecessary at the time they were given.  With this fact in mind, we 
must evaluate the impact of the warnings in light of the seizure analysis enunciated 
in Mendenhall. 
Per Se Rules 
We first address whether Miranda warnings, as a per se matter, will always 
transform a consensual encounter into a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.  The 
inquiry as to whether a seizure has occurred is fact-intensive and depends heavily 
on the circumstances of the specific encounter at issue.  See G.M., 19 So. 3d at 
978-79; Golphin, 945 So. 2d at 1183.  On multiple occasions, this Court and the 
United States Supreme Court have rejected the notion that any single factor in the 
analysis can be dispositive.  As we noted in G.M., “[t]he United States Supreme 
Court has consistently maintained that per se rules are inappropriate in Fourth 
Amendment analyses of whether a „seizure‟ has occurred.”  19 So. 3d at 978 
(citing United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 
U.S. 33, 39 (1996); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439); see also Golphin, 945 So. 2d at 1183 
(“The seizure analysis has not traditionally permitted the establishment of bright 
line rules.”).6 
                                          
 
 
6.  But see Golphin, 945 So. 2d at 1197 (Pariente, J., concurring in result 
only) (“[T]he totality of the circumstances test „does not mean that each and every 
circumstance in the case must be assumed to have the same degree of relevance 
and weight.‟  There are times when one circumstance among the totality converts 
 
- 20 - 
 
In Bostick, the Supreme Court rejected a holding of this Court that “an 
impermissible seizure result[s] when police mount a drug search on buses during 
scheduled stops and question boarded passengers without articulable reasons for 
doing so, thereby obtaining consent to search the passengers‟ luggage.”  501 U.S. 
at 433 (quoting Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 1989)).  We had 
agreed with Bostick that a reasonable person confronted by police officers on a bus 
would not feel free to leave because, among other factors, the bus leaves no space 
to move away from the officers and, had Bostick in fact disembarked, he would 
have been stranded at the terminal and lost whatever luggage was stored on the 
bus.  Id. at 435.  The United States Supreme Court disagreed with our 
determination that such encounters result in a per se seizure, explaining that 
“[w]here the encounter takes place is one factor, but it is not the only one.”  Id. at 
437.  The case was then remanded to this Court for a determination of whether 
Bostick had been seized under the “totality of the circumstances” standard.  Id. 
Likewise, in Golphin, this Court rejected the holding of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in Baez v. State, 814 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).  The 
Fourth District had concluded that as a matter of law, an otherwise consensual 
encounter matures into a seizure when an officer retains a person‟s identification to 
                                                                                                                                        
what would otherwise be a consensual encounter into a detention.”) (quoting 
United States v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 1085, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). 
 
- 21 - 
conduct a check for outstanding warrants.  See Golphin, 945 So. 2d at 1174.  In 
Golphin v. State, 838 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), the Fifth District had 
rejected the appellant‟s contention, based on Baez, that he was unlawfully seized at 
the moment an officer retained his identification.  Instead, the Fifth District 
explained that per se rules were inappropriate under Bostick, held that Golphin had 
not been seized under the totality of the circumstances, and certified conflict with 
Baez.  Golphin, 838 So. 2d at 706-08.  On appeal, this Court approved the decision 
of the Fifth District, Golphin, 945 So. 2d at 1193, explaining that the determination 
“does not turn solely on any one factor, but must be informed by the total 
circumstances of the officers‟ approach, their comportment, Golphin‟s reaction, 
and the circumstances surrounding the request for identification as well as the 
subsequent warrants check.”  Id. at 1184.  More recently, in G.M., this Court 
rejected a petitioner‟s contention that the activation of police lights always 
constitutes a seizure, emphasizing that “the activation of police lights is one 
important factor to be considered in a totality-based analysis as to whether a 
seizure has occurred.”  19 So. 3d at 979. 
In accordance with the cases discussed above, we hold that to the extent the 
Fourth District determined that the mistaken administration of Miranda warnings 
results in a seizure as a matter of law, its conclusion was error.  The proper test is 
whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would feel 
 
- 22 - 
free to end the encounter and depart.  While an individual act on the part of an 
officer may constitute a show of authority that contributes to a seizure finding, we 
again reject the notion that any single factor, taken alone, will be conclusive in 
every case in which it appears. 
Miranda‟s Impact Within the Fourth Amendment  
Totality-of-the-Circumstances Analysis 
 
 
Having rejected the Fourth District‟s conclusion that Miranda warnings will 
always result in a seizure during an on-the-street police encounter, we must 
determine to what extent, if any, Miranda warnings increase the coercive nature of 
such an encounter.  On one hand, the warnings are intended as a protective 
measure to guard against violations of a suspect‟s constitutional privilege against 
self-incrimination.  See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.  A citizen to whom the warnings 
are given, then, is at the very least aware that he has the right to remain silent and 
to decline to answer an officer‟s questions.  On the other, the warnings are required 
only during an arrest or custodial interrogation.  See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 
U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam).  Thus, in the context of an on-the-street police 
encounter, the warnings could operate as a show of authority on the part of the 
officer indicating to a reasonable person that he or she is not free to leave. 
In Caldwell, the Second District took the position that Miranda warnings 
serve to protect the rights of a citizen during a police encounter.  This conclusion is 
certainly consistent with the intent behind the warnings.  In Miranda, the United 
 
- 23 - 
States Supreme Court reasoned that a citizen will be protected from surrendering 
his or her rights out of ignorance of those rights where the citizen is first made 
aware of them.  The citizen is also placed on guard that the waiver of those rights 
may have negative consequences: 
[W]hatever the background of the person interrogated, a warning at 
the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures 
and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the 
privilege at any point in time.  
 
. . . Moreover, this warning may serve to make the individual 
more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary 
system—that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his 
interest. 
 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469.  Under this line of reasoning, citizens who are first given 
Miranda warnings should be better able to protect their constitutional rights, 
regardless of the context.  See, e.g., Luna-Martinez v. State, 984 So. 2d 592, 601 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (explaining that Miranda warnings weighed in favor of the 
conclusion that the defendant had voluntarily consented to a search because he had 
been informed that he was not required to talk to police). 
 
In part due to the protective nature of the Miranda warnings, some courts 
have declined to interpret them as a restraint on freedom in the context of a 
consensual interview with law enforcement personnel.  See, e.g., Davis v. 
Allsbrooks, 778 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1985) (declining to hold that a suspect was in 
custody during a police station interview, despite the reading of Miranda warnings, 
 
- 24 - 
where no other action by the officers was coercive or established custody); United 
States v. Charles, 738 F.2d 686, 694 n.6 (5th Cir. 1984) (agreeing with the 
conclusion of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lewis that Miranda warnings 
do not help produce a custodial interrogation); United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 
446, 447-48 (6th Cir. 1977) (finding that the giving of Miranda warnings prior to 
an otherwise voluntary police station interview is not evidence of formal arrest and 
does not contribute to a finding that a suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes).  
These courts have reasoned that if Miranda warnings alone entitled a suspect to 
additional constitutional protections, officers would be given an incentive to refrain 
from informing suspects of their rights.  See Davis, 778 F.2d at 172 (noting that 
such a holding “would convert admirable precautionary measures on the part of 
officers into an investigatory obstruction”). 
Conversely, other courts have determined that at the very least, the Miranda 
warnings are a factor to be considered in evaluating whether a suspect has been 
placed in custody under the Fifth Amendment.7  In Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 
635, 638-39 (7th Cir. 1996), a suspect was given Miranda warnings shortly after 
                                          
 
 
7.  In discussing the debate among courts over the impact of Miranda 
warnings in the context of the Fifth Amendment custody analysis, the Eighth 
Circuit referred to this position as the “transformation” argument.  The court 
adopted this term because the petitioner “argue[d] that the Agents‟ reading of the 
Miranda rights transformed an otherwise noncustodial interrogation into a 
custodial interrogation, one in which a suspect deserves Miranda‟s protections.”  
United States v. Harris, 221 F.3d 1048, 1051 n.3 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 
- 25 - 
officers arrived at his home to execute a search warrant.  In evaluating whether the 
suspect had been placed in custody before he revealed physical evidence to the 
police, the court noted that by reading the warnings, the officers had followed a 
formality of custodial arrest without actually informing the suspect that he was not 
under arrest.  Id. at 642.  While not dispositive, this fact provided at least some 
support for the inference that the defendant was in custody.  See id.; see also 
United States v. Erving L., 147 F.3d 1240, 1248 n.5 (10th Cir. 1998); United States 
v. Bautista, 145 F.3d 1140, 1148 (10th Cir. 1998); Tukes v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 508, 
516 n.10 (11th Cir. 1990). 
We believe that the same reasoning applies in the context of a Fourth 
Amendment investigatory stop.  Miranda warnings are a formality of arrest and are 
required only at the time of an arrest or prior to custodial interrogation.  Further, 
the warnings are associated in the public mind with the spectacle of an individual 
being placed under arrest.  Therefore, it is not unreasonable to conclude that an 
individual who is given Miranda warnings during what begins as a consensual 
encounter may interpret those warnings as a restraint on his or her freedom.8  For 
this reason, courts that have considered the application of Miranda in the context of 
an on-the-street police encounter have generally found it to be at least a factor in 
                                          
 
 
8.  In the present case, for example, after the warnings were read Caldwell 
immediately asked why he was being arrested. 
 
- 26 - 
determining whether an individual has been subjected to an illegal investigatory 
stop under the Fourth Amendment.  See, e.g., Poitier, 818 F.2d at 683; United 
States v. Lara, 638 F.2d 892, 898 n.10 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Giving Miranda warnings 
in a police-citizen encounter which is otherwise a nondetention interrogation may 
very well elevate such an encounter to a seizure within the meaning of Terry in 
light of the public‟s association of Miranda warnings with an arrest.”); see also 
United States v. Montgomery, 377 F.3d 582, 587 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that the 
district court listed the reading of Miranda rights as one factor indicating that a 
reasonable person in the defendant‟s position would not have felt free to leave). 
 
This conclusion on the part of a reasonable person would be further 
supported by the fact that outside the context of an arrest or custodial interrogation, 
not all of the stated rights apply.  In particular, Miranda requires that suspects be 
advised that they have the right to an attorney and that if they cannot afford an 
attorney one will be provided for them.  See Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 965-66.  While 
this advisory warning is true during a custodial interrogation, it is not true during a 
consensual encounter or investigatory stop.  See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477; Salvo, 
133 F.3d at 949.  This reasoning was adopted by the Fourth District in Raysor, 
which noted that “[t]he only way appellant could have felt free to leave would have 
been for him to have assumed that the officer was wrong in advising him that he 
 
- 27 - 
was entitled to court appointed counsel if he could not afford counsel right there 
and then.”  795 So. 2d at 1072. 
 
Based on our above discussion, we believe that the reading of Miranda 
warnings during a consensual police encounter might add to the coercive nature of 
that encounter under at least some circumstances.  For example, what begins as an 
on-the-street consensual encounter may take on characteristics of a seizure where 
the warnings operate more as a show of authority that would indicate to a 
reasonable person that he is not free to leave.  By contrast, during a voluntary 
interview at a police station in which the atmosphere is more formal and the citizen 
may already be aware that he or she is suspected of criminal activity, the reading of 
Miranda rights may serve as intended, i.e., as a protective measure placing the 
citizen on guard “that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his 
interest.”  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469.  As with every other factor under the 
Mendenhall test, whether an erroneously given Miranda warning contributes to a 
seizure finding under the Fourth Amendment must be decided on a case-by-case 
basis. 
This Case  
 
We conclude that the totality of the circumstances in Caldwell‟s police 
encounter did not result in a seizure.  We note that Caldwell was approached in a 
public area, during the daytime, and in the presence of others.  The officer did not 
 
- 28 - 
use lights or sirens, see G.M., 19 So. 3d at 974, nor did he drive his vehicle into the 
park in a manner uncommon for the area.  There was no “threatening presence” of 
multiple officers, and there is no evidence that the officer displayed a weapon.  See 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.  Although the Second District stated that Officer 
Crisco “directed” Caldwell away from the group, the record does not indicate that 
he did so in a commanding or intimidating manner.9  It is true that the officer 
confronted Caldwell about the burglaries and expressed his belief that Caldwell 
had committed them.  While this certainly contributed to the coercive atmosphere 
of the encounter, we do not believe the accusation and subsequent questioning 
resulted in an investigatory seizure when viewed within the totality of the 
circumstances.  Again, officers are not prohibited from merely approaching a 
citizen in public and asking questions regarding criminal activity.  See Voorhees, 
699 So. 2d at 608.  To prevail, Caldwell must point to some actual physical force 
or show of authority on the part of the officer.  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. 
                                          
 
 
9.  To some extent, any encounter with a uniformed police officer may lead 
to some apprehension on the part of a citizen.  See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 
492, 495 (1977) (“Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer 
will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is 
part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be 
charged with a crime.”).  However, this fact alone cannot support a seizure finding 
under the Fourth Amendment, see Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16, and we do not find 
the mere fact that the officer was in uniform to have been particularly coercive in 
this case. 
 
- 29 - 
 
With regard to the officer‟s reading of Miranda warnings, we acknowledged 
above that the warnings might in some circumstances indicate to a reasonable 
person that he or she is being arrested and therefore not free to leave.  Here, 
however, Caldwell asked the officer why he was being arrested and was 
specifically informed that he was not under arrest, but rather that the officer merely 
wanted to make sure Caldwell was aware of his rights.  A reasonable person, 
having received this clarification, would not have believed that he was under 
arrest.  Further, the circumstances of the encounter after the warnings indicate that 
the tenor of the conversation remained consensual.  In particular, we note that 
Caldwell was given the option of viewing the security video, which he accepted.  
The officer did not threaten to take Caldwell to the police station or place him 
under formal arrest.  When Caldwell was placed in the police car he was not 
handcuffed or otherwise restrained inside the vehicle.  Caldwell was also aware, 
due to the Miranda warnings, that he had the right to remain silent.10 
                                          
 
 
10.  While Caldwell had also been (incorrectly) warned that he had the right 
to an attorney, we note that he did not attempt to invoke this right.  If he had done 
so and been informed that he was not entitled to counsel, the mistaken reading of 
the Miranda warnings might have contributed more significantly to the 
coerciveness of the encounter.  See Tukes, 911 F.2d at 516 n.11 (suggesting that it 
would greatly increase the coerciveness of an interrogation if officers were to 
inform a suspect of his right to appointed counsel but then deny his request for an 
attorney). 
 
- 30 - 
 
Nor do we think Caldwell was seized as a result of the pat-down search 
conducted by the officer.  First, although the record does not indicate whether 
explicit consent was given, Caldwell appears to have given his implicit consent to 
the search.  Caldwell was informed in advance that he would be frisked as a 
condition of accepting a ride in the officer‟s vehicle and did not object to this 
condition.  See State v. Iaccarino, 767 So. 2d 470, 477 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (listing, 
as one factor used by courts to evaluate implied consent, whether a defendant was 
aware in advance that his conduct would subject him to a search).  Second, we note 
that Caldwell is not objecting to anything discovered as a result of the frisk itself.  
Therefore, even if, as Caldwell asserts, the search was illegal for lack of consent or 
reasonable suspicion that he was armed, it would still have to be demonstrated that 
a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave at the time he made the 
incriminating statements.11  Given that Caldwell was informed that he would be 
                                          
 
 
11.  It is established law that an officer may not conduct a frisk without 
reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed with a dangerous weapon.  See § 
901.151(5), Fla. Stat. (2009).  We note, however, that in every case but one cited 
by the petitioner, the suspect objected to the admission of evidence discovered on 
his or her person during the search.  See Hidalgo v. State, 959 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 2007) (objecting to drugs discovered during frisk); D.L.J., 932 So. 2d at 1133 
(concealed firearm); Hines v. State, 737 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (knife); 
Hunt v. State, 700 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (drugs); Sholtz v. State, 649 So. 
2d 283 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (drugs); Beasley v. State, 604 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1992) (drugs); Harris v. State, 574 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (evidence of 
burglary and grand theft).  None of these cases involved a situation where, as here, 
a defendant argued that an unconstitutional frisk prevented the admission of a 
statement or physical evidence obtained at a later time. 
 
- 31 - 
frisked in advance, that he failed to object, and that nothing was actually 
discovered as a result, we find that the overall coercive impact of the pat-down was 
minimal within the totality of the circumstances of the encounter.12 
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that a reasonable 
person in Caldwell‟s position would have understood that he was free to remain 
silent or end the encounter had he chosen to do so.  Further, we hold that Miranda 
warnings do not result in a seizure as a matter of law.  While we do not discount 
that possibility that Miranda warnings may increase the coercive atmosphere of a 
                                                                                                                                        
The exception is Navamuel v. State, 12 So. 3d 1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), in 
which officers conducted an illegal pat-down of the defendant in front of his home, 
then immediately obtained his consent to search the residence.  The defendant later 
objected to the admission of evidence seized from the house.  However, the court 
did not analyze whether the defendant had been seized under the Fourth 
Amendment, but instead based its holding on the invalidity of the consent.  Id. at 
1286 (citing Delorenzo v. State, 921 So. 2d 873, 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)).  
Accordingly, we find that it is not directly relevant to the case at bar. 
 
12.  We find it unnecessary to review the “officer safety” exception relied on 
by the Second District.  See Caldwell, 985 So. 2d at 606.  We note only that its 
application appears to be strictly limited to circumstances where a citizen 
voluntarily becomes a passenger in the officer‟s vehicle, but neither objects nor 
consents to being searched.  Obviously, if a citizen voluntarily accepts a ride in a 
police vehicle but does object to being frisked, the search would be illegal absent 
reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed.  See § 901.151(5), Fla. Stat. (2009).  
Conversely, if the citizen accepts a ride but consents to being searched, the search 
would be presumed legal so long as consent was given freely and voluntarily.  See 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983); Washington v. State, 653 So. 2d 362, 
364 (Fla. 1994). 
 
- 32 - 
police-citizen encounter outside the context of a custodial interrogation, we find 
that the warnings did not result in a seizure in this case.  Accordingly, we approve 
the decision of the Second District in Caldwell to the extent that it is consistent 
with this opinion, and disapprove the opinion of the Fourth District in Raysor to 
the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result only. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur in part because I agree with the majority‟s rejection of a per se rule 
that the administration of Miranda warnings always transforms a consensual 
encounter into an investigatory stop.  However, I dissent from its decision that an 
investigatory stop did not occur in this case because, absent other circumstances 
that would indicate to a reasonable person that he or she is free to leave, the 
administration of Miranda warnings constitutes a show of authority that would 
cause a reasonable person to believe that he or she was not free to terminate the 
encounter and leave.  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16 (stating that a seizure under 
 
- 33 - 
the Fourth Amendment occurs only “when the officer, by means of physical force 
or show of authority, has in some way retrained the liberty of a citizen”).   
Consider the facts of this case from a common sense viewpoint.  A police 
officer approaches an individual, tells the individual that he would like to speak to 
him, and directs the individual back toward his police cruiser.  The police officer 
knows he lacks reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop.  But the 
police officer confronts the individual with evidence of guilt in a crime by telling 
the individual that he knows the individual committed certain break-ins and then 
reads the individual his Miranda rights.  Would a reasonable person feel free to 
terminate the encounter and leave?  I conclude that, under the totality of the 
circumstances, he would not.   
The operative question under the Fourth Amendment is whether a law 
enforcement officer‟s conduct amounts to a show of authority such that a 
reasonable person would not believe he or she is free to terminate the encounter 
and leave.  I conclude that Miranda warnings unmistakably constitute a show of 
authority and communicate to an individual that he or she is not free to leave.  The 
warnings also constitute a strong indication that the investigating officer intends 
for the defendant to remain for questioning.  
Miranda warnings were designed to minimize the coercive effect of 
custodial interrogations.  They were not designed for use in consensual encounters.  
 
- 34 - 
In fact, the very wording of the warnings is incompatible with a consensual 
encounter.  The warnings advise defendants that they have the “right to remain 
silent” and that anything they say can and will be used against them in a court of 
law.  Additionally, the warnings advise defendants that they have the “right to talk 
to a lawyer” and have the lawyer present during questioning.  The warnings advise 
defendants that a lawyer will be appointed for them.  The warnings advise 
defendants that they can decide at any time not to exercise these rights and not 
answer any questions.  What the warnings do not tell defendants is that they are 
free to leave!  As the Fourth District aptly observed:  “The only way appellant 
could have felt free to leave would have been for him to have assumed that the 
officer was wrong in advising him that he was entitled to court appointed counsel 
if he could not afford counsel right there and then.”  Raysor, 795 So. 2d at 1072.   
In light of the strong indication that a reasonable person would believe that 
he or she is not free to leave after the Miranda warnings are administered, I would 
conclude that the totality of the circumstances in this case resulted in a seizure.  
The officer told Caldwell that he would like to speak to him and confronted 
Caldwell with evidence of guilt by telling Caldwell he knew Caldwell committed 
the break-ins.  These circumstances, coupled with the administration of the 
Miranda warnings, constituted a show of authority such that a reasonable person 
would not feel free to leave.  
 
- 35 - 
For all of these reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.  
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D07-565 
 
 
(Pinellas County) 
 
J. Andrew Crawford and Frank W. McDermott of McDermott Law Firm, P.A., St. 
Petersburg, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Robert J. Krauss, Bureau 
Chief, and Diana K. Bock, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent